

King Hussein and the Presidents:
Jordan and American Relations Since 1967

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Abstract: The following examines the relationship between the United States and Jordan after 1967. It focuses on the leadership of the US starting with the Nixon administration and ending with King Hussein of Jordan's death during the Clinton administration. It argues that King Hussein became a vital ally to the United States in preventing the expansion of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Jordan's role as an American ally during the Cold War was particularly important because of the inherent hostility of the Arabs towards the US because of its support of Israel. Jordan became an important piece of the American strategy to stop the spread of the Soviet Union in this vital region. In addition, because of Hussein's practical nature and desire to work with both the US and Israel, Jordan became an important element for American efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflicts between Israel and the Arabs. Hussein used his role to secure Jordan as an important ally of the United States and that close relationship remains twenty-years after his death. In return for his efforts, the United States granted Jordan military, diplomatic, and economic aid that allowed for the survival of Hussein's Hashemite dynasty. While ideologically compatible with the US goals in the region, Hussein's need for American support led him to align with American interests. Hussein's actions during the period are important to understand the development of the American relationship with Jordan and the broader Middle East along with broader American policy in the region.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On July 26, 1994, King Hussein bin Talal of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan addressed a joint session of Congress after the signing of the Washington Declaration and announced the end of the state of war between Israel and Jordan. Hussein spoke of his enduring friendship with the US, saying, “I have sought over thirty-four years, since the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower, to ensure that [the friendship between Jordan and the United States] be honest and true. It has been a friendship built on mutual respect and common interests. I am proud to remind you how we stood shoulder to shoulder during the long years of the Cold War. And now together we share a great hope. To establish lasting peace in the Middle East.”¹ Hussein reminded Congress and the American people that for decades, Jordan had been and continued to be a reliable partner in the Middle East for the United States. This speech was the culmination of years of work by Hussein to bring peace to Jordan through the help of the United States.

Following the formation of Jordan by the British after World War I, the leaders of Jordan frequently had a tight relationship with the West. While King Hussein was originally supported by the British, he later became one of the most important American allies in the Middle East. Because of his geographical location in the Middle East, his pragmatic disposition, and his need of outside support to survive, King Hussein established a relationship with the United States that is still strong long after his passing. This relationship has endured terrorist attacks on American interests and its allies from groups located in Jordan, a number of Middle Eastern conflicts, the Cold War, the rise of Arab nationalism, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and a large scale American war in the region. Despite these challenges, Hussein successfully formed a working relationship with a wide variety of American administrations that both protected his kingdom and demonstrated his increasing value to the United States. The United States responded to that relationship with both civilian and military aid along with the diplomatic support that was fundamental for the survival of the Hashemite dynasty in the Middle East. Since 1967 until his death in 1999, King Hussein worked with seven Presidents to make Jordan one the closest and most strategic allies of the United States in the Arab world.

King Hussein was born in Amman, Jordan on November 14, 1935, thirteen years before Israel declared independence and while Jordan still existed under the mandate of Great Britain established by the Sykes-Picot Agreement at the conclusion of World War I. Hussein's Grandfather, King Abdullah I led Jordan until his death at the hands of a

Palestinian assassin on July, 20, 1951. He was succeeded by his eldest son King Talal bin Abdullah until he abdicated his throne due to a medical condition and his increasingly erratic behavior.² After Talal's abdication, his eldest son Hussein came of age and took the throne on May 2, 1953, when he was only seventeen years old. King Hussein's primary education took place at Victoria College, a British-run primary school, in Alexandria, Egypt. After that Hussein attended school in Great Britain at the Harrow School and briefly attended the British military academy in Sandhurst.³ Hussein's upbringing in British schools combined with Jordan's already deep connection to Great Britain gave Hussein a special affinity for the West along with the ability to understand Western attitudes and sensibilities. Hussein's affection for the West was seen throughout his life, but especially in his relationship with his fourth wife, Queen Noor, and his love for Harley Davidson motorcycles.

Hussein's grandfather also had a unique relationship with Jordan's neighbor Israel that continued throughout Hussein's reign. Starting with Israel's declaration of independence and continuing after it, King Abdullah frequently worked with the Israelis to serve the interest of Jordan. He repeatedly attempted to persuade the Jews in the British Mandate of Palestine to join with Jordan under his leadership where he would allow them to live safe and free under his protection.⁴ Hussein continued that relationship and, despite some setbacks, he had a relationship with Israel unlike any other nation in the Arab world. Through that relationship, Hussein frequently interacted with Israeli leaders to try and solve the issues of the Middle East.

After World War II, Great Britain pulled back from its involvement in the Middle East. Until that point, British personnel worked throughout Jordan in all levels of the government including the government bureaucracy and the military. The Jordanian military called the Arab Legion, was led by British officer John Bagot Glubb beginning in 1939. Glubb was usually referred to in the region as Glubb Pasha, an honorary title from the Ottoman period that showed the respect many in Jordan had for Glubb. The other major British figure was Alec Kirkbride, who served as a top advisor to King Abdullah and represented British interests in Jordan.⁵ British officers had full control over the Jordanian military and while they technically reported to King Hussein, they still took orders from Great Britain. In addition, Kirkbride set up a colonial style government that consisted of Jordanian workers with British officials at the management levels of the bureaucracy.

The British position in Jordan ended after the Suez Crisis in 1956. On October 29, 1956, Israeli invaded Egypt and attempted to remove President Gamal Abdel Nasser because of his opposition to the British control of the Suez Canal. Before the invasion, Nasser nationalized the British built and owned Suez Canal, and the invasion was largely a response to that. Great Britain and France soon joined the invasion under the auspice of returning security and stability to the canal zone.⁶ The American rejection of this invasion led Hussein to want to replace Great Britain with the US as his chief benefactor. On November 9, 1956, Hussein's chief of staff contacted the American representative in Jordan and told him that Jordan needed aid to replace and £13 million it received annually from Great Britain. He

told the Americans that he was anti-communist and pledged to follow America's lead in the region.⁷ While Hussein did not get an immediate agreement, it led to his first meeting with Dwight Eisenhower in March 1959. While meeting with Eisenhower, Hussein attacked Egypt's relations with the Soviet Union and stressed the threat of Soviet imperialism in the region. For his troubles, Hussein received \$47.8 million in aid from the US.⁸ This was Hussein's first in-person contact with an American president and it set the stage for his continued relationship with every president through Bill Clinton.

The Middle East witnessed more turmoil throughout the 1960s. A growing feud developed between Hussein and Nasser influenced Hussein's relationship with the United States. Nasser came to power in Egypt when the free officer movement overthrew King Farouk in January 1952. Nasser took power in October 1954 with a regime friendly to the Soviet Union and hostile to monarchies. While Nasser officially took a stance of neutrality in the Cold War, his support of socialism, the willingness of the Soviet Union to deliver weapons and his hostility to Egypt's former colonial masters, made Nasser's Egypt a threat to both Hussein and the American interests in the region.⁹ The relationship between Egypt and Jordan worsened in 1962 when Jordan supported the monarchy in Yemen against the Egyptian backed forces in North Yemen Civil War.¹⁰ Nasser accelerated the tensions between Jordan and Egypt when he commenced a propaganda campaign to target the monarchy. Nasser accused Hussein of being a puppet of the West and disloyal to the Arab cause. He even referred to Hussein as the "whore of Jordan" in a widely broadcast speech to

the Egyptian people on February 22, 1967.¹¹ In addition, the Arab socialist party called the Baath Party took control of Iraq and Syria in 1963.¹² Both regimes would be hostile to Jordan's relationship with the US and friendly with the Soviet Union, further highlighting the need for Jordan to align with the United States.

By the start of 1967, Hussein felt encircled by governments hostile to his rule in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Israel. While Israel was not in an active conflict with Hussein, Jordan was the home of many Palestinians refugees from the Israeli War of Independence in 1948, or as the Arabs called it the *nakba* which translates to the catastrophe. His relationships with his neighbors put more pressure on Hussein to stay on good terms with the United States. He continued to seek out American arms and in 1965 he received a massive shipment from President Lyndon Johnson, including over two hundred advanced tanks. Because of concerns from Israel, Hussein needed to promise Johnson in writing that the tanks would not cross the Jordan River.¹³ While this arms package brought Jordan and the United States closer together, it also showed Hussein that many of his deals with the US would require the approval of Israel. The importance of understanding the American-Israeli relationship would prove helpful for Hussein later when he needed that alliance to support his regime.

Before 1967, the territory of Jordan consisted of present day Jordan, the West Bank and the holy city of Jerusalem. King Hussein and his family traced their heritage back to the Prophet Muhammad and both Hussein and his grandfather Abdullah considered taking care

of the Islamic sites in the city a family legacy. Located in Jerusalem is the Al-Asqa Mosque, which was started by the Second Caliphate Umar in 685 and finished under al-Walid in 705, is considered the third holiest site in Islam.¹⁴ The mosque is also called the Dome of the Rock and it is the site where Muhammad began his journey to heaven. In addition, both Hussein's grandfather and great-grandfather are buried on the site.¹⁵ This site had special meaning to Hussein and his family and he strove throughout out his reign after 1967 to return his family's special role in caring for the site.

On June 5, 1967, the Six-Day War began between Israel and the Arabs. Leading up the war, Nasser dramatically increased tension between Egypt and Israel by expelling the UN observer force out of the Sinai and closing the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Israel responded with a surprise attack on Egyptian forces on the morning of June 5. Hussein joined Egypt in the fight after facing public pressure from Nasser to unite against the Israelis.¹⁶ The decision to enter the fighting with Egypt and Syria was disastrous for Hussein. Jordan lost a large portion of the country to the Israelis, including Jerusalem and what is now known as the West Bank. In addition, seven hundred soldiers were killed with another six thousand wounded. Jordan also faced the task of absorbing another wave of over four hundred thousand Palestinian refugees who poured over the border to escape the Israeli advance. Hussein later said that those six days, "were the worse of my life."¹⁷

Soon after the defeat of the Six Day War, Hussein realized if he ever hoped to regain his land, he needed to improve relations with the United States and rebuild his country. He also needed economic assistance to deal with the massive refugee crisis and the incorporation of this huge Palestinian population into Jordan. Over the next thirty-seven years, Hussein would become one of the strongest US allies in the region with the hopes of accomplishing these goals. Hussein knew that his relationship with the United States would largely be based on his interactions with Israel and his value in preventing Soviet expansion in the Cold War. While having almost no natural resources and only one major port in Aqaba, Hussein managed to place himself at the center of American foreign policy in the Middle East for next four decades.

While Hussein had an avidity for the West and the United States that he gained from his British education, he faced local and regional challenges because of that avidity. After the Six Day War, Hussein had a huge Palestinian population in Jordan that eventually grew to over one million people. While this group had Jordanian passports and used the Jordanian dinar, they did not have any natural loyalty to the Hashemite dynasty. Hussein needed to balance his desire to work with the United States and Israel with the knowledge that a sizable portion of his population opposed that relationship. This problem only grew with the rise of the Palestinian nationalism represented by the Palestinian Liberation Organization out of the ashes of the Six Day War. While the PLO was officially formed in 1964, Yasir Arafat did

not take control of the organization until 1969, and he transformed it into a viable power in the region.

While growing Palestinian nationalism represented a challenge to Hussein, so did the rise of Nasser's form of Arab nationalism. Hussein faced frequent challenges from his neighbors because of his weakened status and his contacts with the West and Israel. Leaders like Hafez al-Assad in Syria and Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr in Iraq represented a constant threat to Hussein and Jordan because of their superior military and both states' desire to incorporate Jordan into their countries. In fact, in 1970 Syria invaded Jordan in an attempt to remove Hussein under the pretext he opposed the Palestinian militant's efforts to fight Israel. Hussein not only faced the military threat from his neighbors, but he endured frequent propaganda assaults for his interactions with the West and Israel. Finally, Hussein's relationship with Saddam Hussein of Iraq was the greatest challenge to American-Jordanian relations. Hussein was in an impossible situation, he had most of the Arab world and his biggest patron the United States against Iraq and Saddam, but he faced economic ruin and a popular uprising if he did not support Iraq. Hussein tried to work with both sides, ultimately failing to achieve his goal of a peaceful end to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, damaging his status throughout the Arab world and with the United States.

Hussein's also endured pressure because of his position in the Cold War relative to his neighbors. While the US supported both Jordan and Israel, the Soviet Union supported

Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and the Palestinians. Hussein faced frequent threats from his neighbors because of his interactions with the Israel and his support of “American imperialism.” This took the form of propaganda assaults and in at least once instance a military invasion. Hussein established early on in his reign that he did not sympathize with the Soviet cause. Despite that, he was not above using the fear of Soviet expansion to increase his leverage with the United States.

There have been a number of things written about Hussein in the past. The two most important books are Avi Shlaim’s, *The Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace*; and Nigel Ashton’s *King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life*. Both books are excellent examinations of King Hussein’s reign in Jordan and benefited from their unheralded access to King Hussein and the Jordanian government. Both of their focuses is on the history of Hussein and the inner workings of Jordan along with his family and political life at the head of the Hashemite Kingdom. In addition, Madiha Madfai’s *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process* examines how Jordan worked with the United States and attempted to make a deal with Israel up until 1991. While Madfai’s book is excellent, it was written in 1992 and therefore did not have access to many of the American sources that only recently been declassified. He also completed it before the US and Jordan repaired their relationship after the damage from the Gulf War, culminating in the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. Both events are important for understanding Jordanian policy with the United States during the Hussein era.

In addition, more sources are coming to light that provides an Arab context to the events of the region including, Abdul Salam Majali, Jawad A. Anani, and Munther J. Haddadin's *Peacemaking: An Inside Story of the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty*. The lead negotiators of the treaty wrote *Peacekeeping* and provided a detailed account of the negotiations. Adan Abu-Odeh's *Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom*, provides a detailed account of the internal thinking of the Jordanian government. Abu-Odeh served as the information minister of Jordan, chief speechwriter for Hussein and the royal representative to Parliament. In addition, Mohamed Heikal provides a series of works that presented an insider account of Egypt's view of the Middle East. From his position as an important confidant to Nasser and the head of the largest newspaper in Cairo, Heikal provided a detailed first-person account of many aspects of Jordan's relationship with Egypt and the broader Arab world.

Finally, more American sources are not available that had not been in the past. Newly declassified documents from all the American presidential administrations have provided a clearer picture of the American attitude towards Jordan and the role it played in American foreign policy. In particular, new volumes from *The Foreign Relations of the United States* focusing on the Nixon and Carter administration illustrate Hussein's role in American foreign policy for the region. In addition, Dennis Ross's *The Missing Peace* and *Doomed to Succeed: The U.S.-Israeli Relationship from Truman to Obama* and William Quandt's *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967*;

Decades of Decision: American Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-76; and the recently updated, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* provide an insider account of the American decision making process. Finally, the former CIA station chief in Amman and later the personal attorney for Hussein, Jack O'Connell, recently released *King's Counsel: A Memoir of War, Espionage, and Diplomacy in the Middle East* that shows both the American and Jordanian views of many events in the region.

The following will attempt to build on that work and focus more on the relationship between Hussein and the United States starting with the Nixon administration and continuing through Hussein's death in 1999 during the Clinton administration. Through previous works and newly declassified sources, the goal is to show that Jordan became a fundamental ally in the region for the United States that was vital to keeping the Middle East out of the control of the Soviet Union and an important element in the American goal to achieve a settlement between the Arabs and the Israelis.

The first three chapters of the book will examine the Nixon and Ford administrations and their attempts to find a peaceful solution between the Arabs and Israel. During this period, the Nixon administration attempted numerous efforts in the peace process including Secretary of State William Rogers' Rogers Plan and Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy. In addition, the United States played an instrumental role in aiding Hussein as he took on the Palestinian militant groups in his country along with an thwarted invasion by Syria.

Finally, during the Nixon administration a large-scale war occurred in the Middle East in 1973 that brought both the Soviet Union and the United States close to conflict. Hussein also faced numerous challenges to his position as the main representative of the Palestinian people, especially after the Rabat resolution in 1974. Throughout the Nixon administration, Hussein frequently demonstrated his value to the United States and the American leadership reciprocated that view through their continued attempts to support Hussein's position in the region.

The fourth chapter will focus on the Carter administration and its relationship with Hussein through the Camp David Peace Accords and the Arab reaction to the Egyptian and Israeli peace process. While the Camp David process was successful, the Carter administration had numerous disappointments in the relationship between Jordan and the United States. The chapter will explore Jordan's hope for the Geneva process, started under the lead of Kissinger and continued under Carter, and its disappointment when that process was abandoned to support an agreement between Egypt and Israel. It will also show that while the Carter administration was disappointed by the opposition of Hussein to the Camp David Accords, it welcomed his support after the threat of Soviet expansion in the region and the fall of the Shah in Iran weakened the American position in the Middle East.

The next two chapters will explore the Reagan administration and Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz's efforts to solve the Middle East conflicts. Shultz led a

number of attempts at solving the dispute between Jordan and Israel, culminating in an effort to stop the Palestinian uprising known as the *intifada*. In addition, the diplomacy surrounding the Reagan Plan and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon illustrated the difficulty Hussein and the Americans would have in working with Israel on a peace plan. Hussein also played an important role in Reagan's efforts to support Iraq in its conflict with Iran. During the Reagan administration, Hussein frequently attempted to work with the PLO and Arafat to forge an agreement with Israel, hoping to restore Jordan's role as a key partner with the West Bank. Finally, the nature of Hussein's involvement with the American-led peace process changed in 1988 when Hussein announced Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank and the Palestinian territories, officially ending his ability to lead the Palestinians in the peace process.

Chapter 7 will focus on Hussein's role in the American-led war against Saddam Hussein of Iraq over his invasion of Kuwait and its immediate aftermath. This crisis placed a great strain on American and Jordanian relations because of Hussein's relationship with Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Because of Jordan's economic, military and historical relationship with Iraq, many in the United States for the first time questioned Hussein's loyalty to American interest. After the conflict ended with Saddam's defeat, Hussein's ability to work with Bush to restart the peace process began repairing that relationship. Hussein's support of the Madrid Conference under the leadership of Secretary of State James Baker slowly brought Hussein back into the good graces of the United States.

The last chapter will examine both the Palestinian and Jordanian peace process with Israel during the Clinton administration. It will explore Hussein's efforts with both the Israelis and the PLO to achieve a peaceful settlement in their dispute. In addition, it will show that importance of the United States in the culmination of those negotiators through an Israeli – Jordanian peace treaty. Finally, it will demonstrate Hussein's value in assisting the United States' efforts to broker a deal between Israel and Palestinians through the negotiation of the Hebron Protocol and the negotiations at the Wye Conference.

In total, the chapters will demonstrate that despite having a weakened military, no historical ties to the United States, no natural resources of value, and no control of a major sea port or transportation hub, the United States valued the relationship with King Hussein and Jordan because of its geographic location and the moderation of the King. Hussein's attitude towards the West was important for promoting American interests in this vital region through his affability to the peace process and his willingness push back against Soviet expansion. In addition, Hussein nurtured that relationship because it was key to his survival and promoting the stability of his kingdom, while it also provided his best hope for returning the land lost in 1967. Hussein also believed that the United States would serve both his and the regions interests through its active participation. In 1981, Hussein described his attitude towards the United States, saying:

Our confidence is built on the principles the United States has stood for in the world, and even more on those instances in which you acted forthrightly to put

them into practice. We recall the period of World War I when my great-grandfather was leading the Arab struggle for freedom and independence from the Ottoman Empire. It was President Wilson, alone among the leaders of the great powers, who stood up for the right of peoples to self-determination as more than a phrase or ideal. It was, he said, “an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril. It was twenty-five years ago that I made the decision to lead Jordan into the closest possible friendship with the United States. I was twenty years old at the time and President Eisenhower became a source of sound advice and inspiration to me. I took encouragement from the fact that he expressed and also practiced high ideals.¹⁸

The relationship started with Eisenhower and continued through eight more presidents and while the relations between many of those presidents had their challenges, Hussein continued to strive to have a close relationship between Jordan and the United States, a goal that each of those American presidents reciprocated.

CHAPTER II

THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND THE QUEST FOR PEACE

The year 1969 began to see drastic changes in both the United States and Jordan. The Nixon administration came to Washington and brought with it a new vision for both the Middle East and the Cold War. At the start of the administration, Nixon appointed Henry Kissinger as National Security Advisor and gave him the control over much of American foreign policy, especially on issues that affected the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Nixon and Kissinger's realist approach to the Cold War allowed for repeated indirect confrontations with the Soviet Union, connecting seemingly unrelated events around the world to the larger ideological conflict of the Cold War, and to above all else, preserving the American position in the world as the superior rival of the Soviet Union and its related proxies. This attitude shaped American foreign policy in South East Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East throughout Nixon's time in office. This was especially true in the Middle East and Jordan where during the six years of the Nixon administration Washington would become deeply involved in one major war between

Israel and the Arabs along with a civil war in Jordan and numerous peace proposals. The Nixon administration always viewed war and peace in the Middle East through a Cold War lens that directed American policy for the region.

For King Hussein bin Talal of Jordan, 1969 began a dramatic change in his position in the Middle East and the world. Still suffering from the Six Day War between the Arabs and Israel, King Hussein began the process of rebuilding his country, satisfying the demands of a large refugee population, and navigating through Great Power diplomacy in the backdrop of the Cold War. In addition, he faced hostile neighbors on almost all of his borders that included radical Arab regimes dedicated to his removal and Israeli regime that occupied much of the land previously belonging to his nation. Hussein also faced a dire internal threat from radical Palestinian militant organizations that wanted to control Jordan in order to continue its war with Israel. He maintained his personal survival and that of his monarchy by balancing diplomacy and conflict all while embracing the support of his allies to advance his position. Without Hussein's relentless effort to protect his kingdom from outside agitators, Jordan would not have survived in its current form and become a valued ally of the United States in the Middle East. The friendship between Jordan and United States was important for the survival of Jordan and maintaining America's position in the Middle East relative to the Cold War.

Nixon's first term in office brought fundamental changes to the relationship between Jordan and the United States. The Nixon administration began its first term by

attempting to achieve a lasting peace in the region in the wake of the devastation from the Six Day War of 1967. Secretary of State William Rogers' attempt to move the peace process forward showed the value the United States placed on cultivating the relationship with the moderate Arab regime in Jordan. While it eventually failed, during the preparation and its implementation, it became evident that the United States wanted to use Jordan as a potential breakthrough to achieve a strategic position in the Middle East to counter the Soviet Union. The internal deliberation of the Nixon administration in preparation for the Rogers's initiative and through its early stages of development demonstrated that the United States viewed Jordan as an important ally in the region both for maintaining peace with Israel and for stopping the expansion of the Soviet Union.

The Six Day War of 1967 devastated Jordan. The military alone lost one hundred and seventy-nine tanks, fifty-three armored personnel carriers, 1062 guns and 3,166 vehicles. The vehicle losses alone accounted for eighty percent of Jordan's armored units. It also lost five hundred and fifty soldiers captured, seven hundred dead, and another six thousand wounded or missing.¹ In addition, the fighting caused over three hundred thousand refugees to enter Jordan combined with the loss of thirty-five to forty percent of Jordan's annual GDP.² King Hussein and Jordan found themselves in the weakest strategic position since its founding, forced to rely on outside assistance to survive.

Because of his weakened position, Hussein needed to use every opportunity to strengthen his nation. This included using the fears of the Cold War against the West to gain support for his struggling monarchy. In January 1968, in a meeting with US Ambassador to Jordan Harrison Symmes and the CIA Station Chief of Amman Jack O'Connell, King Hussein told them that he was considering meeting with the Soviet Union to discuss arms. He believed that the United States did not intend to give Jordan significant weapons to defend itself out of deference to Israel. He also was angered with the Johnson administration because they would not persuade the Israelis to stop their reprisal attacks on the east bank of the Jordan River. He felt that he was not an ally of the Fedayeen forces, and Israel was continually punishing him for their actions. Later, in a discussion between Hussein and US Treasury Secretary David M. Kennedy, Hussein said, "How can I devote my army to the service of the Israelis in protecting them from hostile Arab attacks by a passionate and displaced people when the inevitable consequence of a failure on my part would be retaliation by the Israelis which would contribute even further to my own downfall?"³ In addition, he was not getting the needed equipment from the Americans to stage any offensive against the Palestinian forces inside his country.⁴ It took a personal plea from O'Connell, who had spent almost a decade working in the Jordanian capital of Amman, to get Hussein to reconsider meeting with the Soviets. Eventually, O'Connell and General Amer Khammash, head of the Jordanian military, worked out a plan to get the military aid Hussein needed, strengthening his army

and allowing it to face both internal and external threats.⁵ In addition to the threat from the Israelis, Hussein needed to improve his military if he had any desire to challenge the Palestinian militants in his country. Because of his opposition to two groups opposed to the US, the Fedayeen and the Soviet Union, Hussein demonstrated it was in the American interests to supply him with needed armaments even if Israel opposed some of that aid. Contrasted with President of Egypt, Gamal Nasser's actions, where he embraced both the Soviet Union and the Fedayeen, Hussein's role as an American ally is particularly important. While the US had friendly relations with both Iran and Saudi Arabia, neither nation dealt much with Israel, justifying Hussein's importance to American interests in the region.

Hussein and the United States frequently faced tension over the issue of military aid. The US faced a conflicting desire to balance the goal of making sure Israel remained the dominant military power in the region while preventing the Soviet Union from expanding their influence to the rest of the Arab world through their transfer of military equipment to the Arabs. This occurred for a number of reasons. First, Israel was the only Western-style democracy in the region. Israel also situated itself as an American ally against Soviet expansion in the region, especially compared to the Arab nations of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, which were fully committed patrons of the Soviet Union. Finally, the White House feared the electoral power of a large American Jewish population. For many of this group, the survival of Israel was an important consideration and Nixon had

to balance that consideration with his decisions in the Middle East. Nixon said of the Jewish issue that he believed that he faced an “unyielding and short-sighted pro-Israeli attitude prevalent in a large and influential segment of the American Jewish community, Congress, the media, and in intellectual and cultural circles. In the quarter century since the end of World War II, this attitude had become so deeply ingrained that many saw the corollary of not being pro-Israeli as being anti-Israeli or even anti-Semitic.”⁶ Israel’s ability to pressure the Nixon administration angered Nixon. He would have liked to provide Hussein with more aid, but because of Israel’s support in Congress, it limited his ability to provide that aid. The consistent support of Israel from Congress limited the ability of the Nixon administration to respond to events in the region, a problem that became more important as Israel’s conflicts in the Middle East continued to escalate.

In the fall of 1969, the States Department and the White House began discussing the issue of bringing peace and stability to the Middle East through negotiations and diplomacy under the direction of the United States. Allies in the region began to inform Kissinger of the growing threat of radicalism in the Middle East and that it had the ability to overwhelm friendly nations in the region. Kissinger received these warnings not only from King Hussein in Jordan, but also from Saudi Arabia and Iran.⁷ In a meeting with Nixon and Kissinger, Hussein told them, “The situation was getting more and more desperate. If there were no solution within six months, he was afraid the extremist would get the upper hand all over the Arab world.”⁸ Secretary of State Rogers was more

in favor of starting a peace process than Kissinger. Rogers believed that the United States could still lead in a peace process and reap enormous benefits if it was successful. He argued that the US should articulate a peace plan between Israel and Jordan based on Israel returning to the 1967 lines. In addition, Israel could agree to larger land swaps if the Arabs gave them stronger guarantees on a durable and binding peace. Rogers believed that if an adversary in Egypt was getting an American peace proposal, an ally in Jordan should receive similar treatment. In addition, the Johnson administration promised King Hussein that the United States would push Israel to return to the pre-1967 lines if Hussein gave his support for United Nations Resolution 242.⁹ Hussein believed that this promise was ironclad, and he trusted the new administration to deliver it to him. Kissinger believed that this path was doomed to failure, and its likely outcome was to antagonize both sides, damaging US relations with both the Arab world and Israel. Kissinger also warned Nixon that pursuing this plan could just as easily lead to war in the Middle East after its assured failure. Kissinger argued that if the United States attempted to force peace negotiations on Israel and they failed, the Arabs might believe that the only way to change the status quo and achieve their objection would be through war.¹⁰ Both Kissinger and Rogers were correct in their assessment in part. Rogers' view that the US needed to move forward with a peace process or they faced the prospect of increasing the power of the radicals in the region proved correct. Kissinger's view that the process was doomed to failure at the current stage and its failure would damage relations between the

US and the Arab world also proved true. Because of Israel's relative strength after the Six Day War, they had no interest in making the sacrifices for peace. Israel was especially reluctant when it came to making a deal with Jordan and Hussein. The Israeli leadership believed that they had much more defensible borders after the 1967 war, especially because of the absorption of the West Bank, and they were reluctant to give up that security. The only possibility of getting Israel to make concessions to the Arabs in their current state was through pressure from the United States, and the Nixon administration had no desire for that.

Another possible benefit for the US focusing on a peace process in the Middle East was to improve the American position with the Arabs relative to the Cold War. If the Nixon administration achieved peace between Israel and the Arabs, it would improve the American position with many of the Arabs, especially nations like Egypt, who had aligned with the Soviet Union. The Nixon administration worried about the large shipments of Soviet arms heading towards the region. In addition, the Soviet Union began to take a larger interest in the constant attacks on the Egyptian-Israeli border. In a letter to Nixon, Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet Premier, warned that if Israel did not ease up its attacks, the Soviet Union would dramatically increase its arms shipment to Egypt and other friendly Arab nations.¹¹ In a speech in Moscow honoring the visiting President of Egypt, Gamal Nasser, Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet General Secretary, said, "Israel believes that extension of the conflict will lead to the breakdown of internal stability in

the Arab countries and to the rupture of friendship between the Arabs and the Soviet Union.” Israel’s actions would force the Soviet Union to respond with dramatically increased aid.¹² In 1970, the Soviet Union placed a large number of military personnel into Egypt. This included over two hundred pilots, fifteen thousand members of a missile crew, and over one hundred and fifty Soviet aircraft.¹³ The White House opposed this dramatic escalation in Soviet troops because the US felt obligated to match all Arab military gains with Israeli gains to maintain Israel’s military superiority. It was also easy to envision an attack by Israel or Egypt escalating into a great power conflict if either side felt the status quo changed by the influx of new weapons, providing a new incentive for open warfare. The White House feared that the dramatic increase in military equipment could lead Egypt to attack Israel and take their land back by force or for Israel to attempt preemptive attack to limit Egypt’s ability to gain military superiority.

Even before Rogers officially formulated his plan, opposition to it came from many directions. Kissinger was the main opponent to the plan inside the Nixon administration. He feared that pressuring Israel would give a boost to Arab radicals who opposed any peace settlement regardless of Israel’s willingness to compromise. He reasoned that if the US forced Israel to negotiate, the more radical Arab states would demand more as a way take advantage of the increased pressure on Israel, never committing to a negotiation that could conclude with a peace deal. If negotiations failed, the US would shoulder the blame. Even if they succeeded, Kissinger argued the

Palestinians would attempt to block any settlement with the goal of decreasing the stability of the region and making the rule of Hussein vulnerable in Jordan.¹⁴ Increased instability also benefited the Soviet Union, as they would take advantage of the instability to increase the value of their assistance to the Arabs. Kissinger's view was that both sides were unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices for peace, and the US would only have negative outcomes if it pressured them to do it.

In a meeting between Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on April 14, 1969, Dobrynin told Kissinger he wanted the US to come up with settlement terms and sell them to Israel while the Soviets would agree to do the same with the Arabs. Kissinger believed that the Soviets wanted him to sell the Arab position to the Israelis, mainly, that Israel would withdraw from land captured in 1967 and the Arabs would agree to some form of settlement with Israel that did not include a peace treaty. He believed the process would not open up a general dialogue that ended in a settlement that both sides accepted. Kissinger argued that there was two possible outcomes in the Soviet backed peace process. If the US forced the Israelis to agree to these principles, the Arabs would credit the Soviet Union for this achievement. If it failed, the Arabs would blame the US because of their inability to bring Israel to the table. Therefore, in Kissinger's view, there was little benefit for the United States in pushing this Soviet bilateral proposal.¹⁵

The White House also received some mixed signals from the Arabs about the possibility of negotiations led by the US and the USSR. In a meeting between Hussein and Nixon on April 8, 1969, Hussein told Nixon that he and Nasser were both willing to sign any document with Israel that did not include a peace treaty. In addition, they both supported UN Resolution 242. Hussein explained to Nixon that if Israel gave Gaza to Jordan, then he was willing to agree to a settlement on exchanges of land on the West Bank. This was an important change from Jordan's position since 1967. Up until this point, Hussein and the other Arabs demanded the complete restoration of their land from before the 1967 war. Hussein was also willing to consider a demilitarized zone and free access through Suez and the Strait of Tiran. The King told Nixon that he spoke for himself and Nasser. The problem was that on April 11, Nixon and Kissinger met with a top advisor to Nasser, Mahmoud Fawzi, who expressed less of a desire for direct negotiations with Israel and made no commitments on allowing Israel access to Egyptian waterways.¹⁶ This was a consistent problem for the Nixon administration. The Arabs did not speak with one voice and it was difficult to determine what their actual position was with regards to peace with Israel. In addition, while Hussein was enthusiastic about reaching a peace deal because of the obvious benefits to his country, the rest of the Arabs did not share that desire and only wanted peace on their terms.

To build on what he told the White House, Hussein made a speech the National Press Club in Washington on April 11, 1969, where he outlined his vision for peace with

Israel. He said he received Nasser's pledge to allow Israel free access to the Suez in a deal. In mentioning Palestinian refugee rights, he floated the idea of compensation as an alternative to resettlement. "Once their rights have been restored . . . then the final step toward peace will not be far off." He also acknowledged that the Arabs would need to address Israel's right to exist and guarantees of its security in a final settlement. One of the most important demands made by Hussein revolved around Jerusalem. He said, "We cannot envision any settlement that does not include the return of the Arab parts of the City of Jerusalem to us with all our holy places."¹⁷ He offered Israel "The end of belligerency. Respect for and acknowledgment of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all states in the area. Recognition of the right of all to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats of act of war. Guaranteeing for all the freedom of navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal."¹⁸ He said Israel would need to return all land taken in the 1967 war. While this had some similarities to the Rogers Plan, it was different in a number of important aspects. Mainly, it did not call for a binding peace settlement and did not allow any land swaps to make up for Israeli settlements now built on the West Bank. More importantly, while Hussein said he had assurances from Nasser, there is no evidence that this actually occurred. In fact, while Hussein presented Nasser's position as reasonable, in the future, Nasser frequently demonstrated he was not willing to make the sacrifices called for by

Hussein. Nasser showed that he viewed his position as the head of Arab nationalism as more important than peace with Israel.

Israel opposed starting any new talks based on the mediation of the main four powers, the US, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, for a number of reasons. First, Israel was comfortable with the current status quo. They believed that for the first time since their creation, they had a security situation that made them the clear dominant power in the region and valued the land they gained through the war in 1967. Second, the Soviet Union was firmly on the side of the Arabs and so to maintain their standing in the Arab world, they would take a hardline Arab position. Both Israel and the United States also felt that Great Britain and France were taking positions to improve their standing in the Arab world so they would be more inclined to side with Egypt and Syria in any negotiation. That left only the United States actively addressing the Israeli position. In addition, since Jordan had no active links to the Soviet Union, Israel did not feel the Kremlin should be included in talks with Jordan.¹⁹ Prime Minister of Israel Golda Meir said of the four-party talks, “The Russians were feeding and manipulating the entire Egyptian war effort; the French were almost as pro-Arab as the Russians; the British were not far behind the French; only the Americans were at all concerned with Israeli’s survival.”²⁰

The initial discussion about the US position on opening up peace talks formally began in a National Security Council Meeting (NSC) on September 9, 1969. They

discussed in what specific forum these negotiations should take place. Rogers believed they should occur under the auspices of both the Soviet Union and the United States. He believed that it would take both the US and the USSR to pressure the parties into reaching a settlement. Kissinger had a negative view of the potential of negotiations from the beginning. He believed the State Department wanted the US to lay out ahead of time to the Soviets what the proposed border solutions would look like, in particular, Israel would give back almost all of the land taken in 1967 and the Arabs, in turn, would end their state of belligerency with Israel. To add to the pressure to formulate a plan, a UN General Assembly meeting was happening the following week, and the White House wanted to be clear on directions for Rogers in his meetings with foreign leaders, specifically the Soviet Union, concerning Middle East peace.²¹

Immediately, Kissinger was concerned about the State Department's heavy focus on the United Arab Republic.²² Kissinger said, "The US cannot proceed on an Israel – UAR settlement alone. If we are going to press for a settlement, it must include Jordan. We have a much greater interest in getting our friend Hussein's territory back than Nasser's because of Hussein's moderate and pro-Western position." He also did not believe that Soviets and Nasser would agree to just a UAR-Israeli settlement because it could isolate Nasser in the Arab world, undermining Nasser's position with the more radical Arab regimes.²³ It was also not in the American interests for the only major Arab ally in the region to get a peace deal. It would set the precedent that for states like

Jordan, it was better to have the Soviet Union argue their position if they desired to achieve results.

Kissinger also noted that it would take American pressure on Israel to get them to agree to a large settlement. He felt that if the US was going to pressure Israel, they needed to do it forcefully for it to have an impact, including the threat of an arms reduction in response to any Israeli opposition. Otherwise, the US would alienate the Arabs, who believe that the US can get Israel to do whatever it wants, and the Israelis with no real credit for the US from either side. Other than try to push for some sort of peace settlement, Kissinger did not believe that the US had many good options. Other options he considered but ultimately rejected were to try to make an arrangement with USSR that kept both nations out of Middle East if the Arabs and the Israelis start a conflict. He felt that a war could be inevitable and hoped to prevent it from escalating to a battle of the Cold War. He believed that the Soviet Union would not participate openly in this plan. The US could also take a stand on refugee settlement or try to mediate an agreement between the Palestinians on the West Bank and the Israelis, to end that part of the conflict.²⁴ The problem with this was there really were no organized Palestinians that either the US or Israel was willing to negotiate with. Finally, Kissinger also worried that if they forced Israel to give up some of their land and security in a peace deal, it would make it much more difficult to pressure them on commitments against the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.²⁵ At this time the Nixon White House believed

Israel had nuclear weapons and feared their deployment in another Israeli-Arab conflict.²⁶ While Kissinger favored maintaining the status quo until the US conditions on the ground were favorable to the US, he reluctantly gave the Rogers Plan his public support.

After weighing the alternatives, the White House agreed to allow the State Department under Rogers to move forward with his attempt to reach a settlement in the region. The US decided not to include the USSR in any direct talks between Jordan and Israel because both nations were aligned with Washington. The Soviets wanted to participate in the Israeli-Jordanian talks to shield Nasser from any potential Arab backlash, but the White House remained firm on the exclusion of the Soviet Union in talks with Jordan. The US made its demands of the Arabs clear to the Soviets. They wanted “the Arabs to commit themselves to ending the state of belligerency and establishing a formal state of peace, ending terrorist attacks on Israel, some sort of formal recognition of Israel, real security arrangements and guarantees for Israeli navigation through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran.”²⁷ This was the minimum the Americans expected from the Soviets and the Arabs to agree to put increased pressure on Israel to agree to a settlement.

In the talks between the Soviets and the Americans, the sides clashed on the issue of final boundaries. The Soviets called for Israel to return to pre-1967 boundaries including Jerusalem as the starting point for negotiations. The US had told the Soviets Egypt and Israel needed to work out the position of the final boundaries. The US also

believed Jerusalem should be part of Jordan, and Israel and Jordan should discuss that issue without Soviet participation. The US was willing to argue for prewar lines with Egypt with some security arrangement for Gaza and the port city of Sharm al-Shaik. Concerning the Soviets, the US believed, that the Soviet Union was willing to argue for peace now because a reduction in tensions supported its interests in the region. Kissinger assumed that the Soviet Union would currently not prefer a large-scale conflict between the UAR and Israel, for fear that the Israelis would crush the UAR forces, possibly requiring the Soviet Union to intervene and save them. In addition, Kissinger believed that the US and Israel had vastly superior equipment and Moscow would not want to be part of another devastating defeat like the Six Day War, especially since the Soviet Union held the Arabs' fighting ability in such low regard²⁸

One important reason for the talks to proceed came from the desire to improve relations between the US and Jordan. Kissinger said, "We are experiencing somewhat of a crisis of confidence from Hussein. He is going through another bout of despair and has cited our present position on the Israeli-UAR border questions as weakening his own position." Kissinger believed that Hussein felt that if the US was willing to pressure the Israelis to leave the Sinai, then he should expect a similar result in a final settlement despite the difference in value that the Israelis placed on the Sinai compared to the West Bank and Jerusalem. Kissinger hoped to show Hussein that the US valued his contributions to the stability in the region and he would argue his position with the

Israelis to a greater degree than Kissinger would argue for the Egyptians, even though it was less likely to succeed.²⁹ It was important for Kissinger to demonstrate the continued value of his friendship with the Jordan if he hoped to maintain their positions as an important American ally in the region. In the past, Hussein demonstrated that he could be a voice of moderation in the region and support American interests, but he needed assurances from the US that they would support his regime if he sided with them as opposed to the Soviet Union.

Kissinger also believed that settlement talks would be in the interest of US-Jordanian relations. He said, “King Hussein’s ability to maintain a pro-Western posture and keep his distance from the Fedayeen is gradually decreasing” because of the constant conflict between Palestinian forces and Israeli forces on the Jordanian border.³⁰ He hoped that if that border became quiet, Hussein would face dramatically less pressure from the more radical Arab states because of his connections to the West and his opposition to the Palestinians. This is why Kissinger ultimately relented on his public opposition to the Rogers Plan. He believed it would still fail, but allowed it to progress while undermining it when it violated his view of a potential settlement.

Kissinger believed Israel was the main obstacle in securing an agreement. Kissinger said, “If we contribute to the Israeli feeling that we are further undermining their bargaining position and backing away from support for them, they may well be more inclined to engage in risky military strikes.” When discussing the problem of

getting a Jordanian-Israeli agreement, he said, “If we won Egyptian and Israeli agreement on conditions for Israeli withdrawal to the pre-war borders, we would have to produce comparable Israeli withdrawal from Jordan’s West Bank. The Israelis are even more likely to resist this, especially in Jerusalem, then they are withdrawal from the Sinai.”³¹ Kissinger believed that if the US was able to get a deal for the Soviet’s ally in Egypt, to retain their standing with Jordan, they needed to get a similar deal that at the time did not seem likely.

On December 10, 1969, Secretary of State Rogers gave a speech where he announced what became known as the Rogers Plan for restarting the peace process in the Middle East. He said, “Our policy is to encourage the Arabs to accept a permanent peace based on a binding agreement and to urge the Israelis to withdrawal from occupied territory when their territorial integrity is assured as envisaged by the Security Council resolution.”³² The basis of the plan was for the Arabs and the Israelis to “stop shooting, start talking.” The first step would be to propose a ceasefire between Israel and UAR along with any other Arab countries involved, which included Jordan. The ceasefire would be for a limited time, July 1 to September 15. Israel would stop deep air raids into Egypt and Egypt would pledge not to change the situation on the ground. This step would also need the backing of the USSR because only the USSR could stop Egypt from its continued effort to move Soviet made missiles into the canal zone. Once the ceasefire took hold, talks between the parties under the lead of Swedish Ambassador Gunner

Jarring would begin.³³ Ambassador Jarring was the Special Middle East Envoy for UN Secretary-General U Thant and held that position after the end of the 1967 war and the passing of UN Resolution 242. Rogers closed his speech by saying:

We believe that while recognized political boundaries must be established and agreed upon by the parties, any changes in the pre-existing lines should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security. We do not support expansionism. We believed troops must be withdrawn. . . . We support Israel's security and the security of the Arab states as well.³⁴

The official mandate for the Jarring negotiations was:

that [all parties] accept the UNSC Resolution of November 1967 in all its parts and will seek to reach agreement on ways of carrying it out; and that the UAR (Jordan) accept the principle of a just and lasting peace with Israel, including recognition on their part of Israel's right to exist and that Israel accept the principle of withdrawal from occupied territories in accordance with the SC resolution of November 22, 1967.³⁵

These basic principles had a broad agreement between all parties but they differed greatly on the details. For example, Israel was willing to leave some of the occupied territories, but not all of them, especially where Israeli settlements started to form. In addition, while the Arabs were willing to end the state of war between them and Israel, they did not intend to sign a formal peace treaty, just an armistice that officially ended the 1967 war.

The two most contentious issues facing the talks were the final settlement of Jerusalem and what to do with the thousands of Palestinian refugees from both the 1948 and the 1967 war. Rogers said:

We believe Jerusalem should be a unified city There should be open access to the unified city for persons of all faiths and nationalities. Arrangements for the administration of the unified city should take into account the interests of all its inhabitants and of the Jewish, Islamic, and Christian communities. And there should be roles for both Israel and Jordan in the civic, economic, and religious life of the city.³⁶

This point was crucial because it took into consideration Jordan's most important issue. For decades, the Hashemite family had a role in overseeing the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem. With the Israeli occupation after 1967, that role ended. Hussein would find it difficult to reach any settlement with Israel that did not recognize Jordan's unique role in the administration of Jerusalem. When it came to the case for refugees, Rogers said, "There can be no lasting peace without a just settlement of the problem of those Palestinians who the wars of 1948 and 1967 have made homeless. . . . We believe [a] settlement must take into account the desires and aspirations of the refugees and the legitimate concerns of the governments in the area."³⁷ This is one of the first instances where the United States publicly sympathized with the Arab refugee problem. Rogers recognized that while difficult, any peace deal would need to deal with the fate of the over one million Palestinian refugees, despite the protest from Israel. In addition, it was important for the US to show Hussein that they understood the refugee problem and its

impact on Jordan from the large refugee population that fled to Jordan after both the 1948 and 1967 war.

In the past, Nixon had shown private concern for the Palestinian refugee problem. While he was Vice President, Nixon told Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion “the Arabs were effectively using the refugee problem as a political weapon” and stressed “the importance to Israel of finding some means to offset this.”³⁸ From Nixon’s point of view, the refugee problem was more of a political issue that Israel and the Arabs needed to solve, not a humanitarian disaster that the international community needed to fix because of fairness and justice.

Rogers also felt that changes on the ground would make a settlement easier. Rogers believed that because of Soviet actions in the Middle East, Israel no longer had a supreme military advantage over the Arabs. He said, “Intelligence evaluations indicate the weight of the Soviet presence has already reduced the material and psychological advantages previously enjoyed by the Israelis.”³⁹ Rogers believed that if the United States were willing to put some pressure on Israel over the issue of arms shipments, they would be more likely to compromise on border issues fueled by their desire to regain the upper hand over the Arabs with regards to military superiority. Rogers’ view was correct and frequently demonstrated by future American administrations. The only way Israel would agree to large concessions with the Arabs is if the Americans made those

concessions valuable to Israeli interests through either a dramatic increase in military capability or the threat of cutting their aid.

The reaction to Rogers' speech and his plan was decidedly mixed. Arab newspapers, especially ones with a noticeable tilt towards the Soviet Union condemned the plan. They argued that the United States' goals continued to promote the imperialism of Israel.⁴⁰ Nasser and the Soviet Union also stated an early reluctance to sign on to the plan. The Soviet Union called it "one-sided" and Nasser rejected any direct negotiations with Israel or any deal that only Egypt and Israel signed. In addition, Nasser continued to oppose any deal that prevented Egypt's military from entering the Sini Peninsula and granting Israel freedom through Egyptian territorial waters.⁴¹ Despite, the initial negative reaction from the Arab world, eventually they became more conciliatory. When the United States announced the plan, Hussein's first inclination was to support it but he did not want to go against Egypt. He cabled Nasser and told him "What you accept, we accept, and what you reject, we reject." Once, Egypt accepted the Rogers Plan, Hussein quickly followed.⁴² Hussein's position in the Middle East was still too weak to oppose Nasser and Egypt, especially without assurances that it would succeed. In addition, Hussein's relationship with the US was still in its infancy and he had no guarantee that they valued his continued leadership of Jordan, allowing him to challenge the views of the rest of the Arab world.

According to Egypt's Foreign Minister Mahmoud Raid, Jordan was opposed to the Rogers Plan mainly because it did not give Jerusalem back to Jordan as a starting point for negotiations. Despite that, both Egypt and Jordan felt it was important for relations with the United States not to reject the plan out of hand. Because of that, Nasser and Hussein agreed that Egypt would accept it and Jordan would remain more neutral to it publicly.⁴³ Even though they announced an agreement with the plan, Nasser still publicly rejected portions of it. In particular, he opposed any binding peace agreement with Israel or to have the Sini Peninsula demilitarized.⁴⁴ Nasser and Hussein wanted to continue to hope that the Americans would push the Israelis into an agreement while frequently moving their goals to achieve a maximum settlement from the Israelis. While Hussein could have stressed to the Egyptians his opposition to parts of the plan, in the future he frequently demonstrated his affability to a plan similar to Rogers if it achieved his goal of regaining the West Bank and Jerusalem. While the Rogers Plan did not guarantee that at the onset, Hussein's future actions showed he was willing to agree to a solution based on the Rogers Plan despite what he may have said to the Egyptian leadership.

Other than the fate of Jerusalem, Jordan and Egypt had another reason to oppose a peace plan with Israel, mainly, the constant threat of radical Arab states. At the Arab League Summit in Khartoum Sudan on September 1, 1967, the Arab states passed a resolution where they all pledged "no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no

negotiations with it, and the insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country.”⁴⁵ This document became known “3 no’s policy” and was an issue for Hussein, Nasser, and later Sadat when contemplating making a deal with Israel. This policy was one of the reasons why the Arabs only wanted group or indirect talks with Israel, so not to violate the “no negotiation” point. According to Mahamed Heikal, a close aide to Nasser and Egypt’s Information Minister, Nasser did give Hussein a little room on this issue. When Arab League passed the resolution, Nasser told Hussein, “Although we have refused to negotiate, you are an exceptional case. Go to the Americans, kiss their hands if necessary, find a way to negotiate. The important thing is to regain those territories before Israel changes their character even if you have to make a separate peace with Israel.”⁴⁶ In private, Nasser knew that if Hussein hoped to get the land lost in 1967, he would need American support to accomplish that. Nasser could not express that opinion publically and still retain his desired position as the head of the Arab nationalism movement.

To try to gain Jordan’s support, Rogers sent a letter to Jordan’s Foreign Minister Zaid Rifai telling him the US had delayed a shipment of fighter planes to Israel. He also said, “Jordan should understand, however, that it will be impossible for us to keep aircraft question in abeyance in absence of ceasefire, standstill on new installations and talks started between parties under Jarring’s auspices.”⁴⁷ Rogers hoped to show Hussein and the other Arabs that the United States was attempting to pressure Israel to come to the

table. In addition, it had the added benefit of demonstrating to the Arabs that they could not rely on the Soviet Union to help them to achieve their goals, only the United States could effectively bring Israel to the table.

Rogers also used the promise of more military aid to increase Hussein's desire to participate in the peace process and remain a strong ally of the United States. In May 1970, Hussein contacted the State Department with a request for an increase in military aid, particularly new artillery. He also mentioned that the Soviets had offered him an increase in artillery shipments. The White House initially worried that the increase in aid would alter Israel's view of the balance of power in the region. The White House eventually concluded that they needed to continue to support Hussein and while the artillery shipment would strengthen Jordan, they could provide a corresponding increase to Israel, and so Israel did not feel threatened by it. In addition, it was paramount to keep the Soviet Union from gaining entry into Jordan.⁴⁸ The threat of the Soviet Union gaining a foothold in Jordan was important to overcome some opposition in the NSC to the increased arms shipment to Jordan.

Israel's reaction to the Rogers Plan was firmly negative. Meir wanted to completely reject the Rogers Plan from the beginning. The Israeli ambassador to the US, Yitzhak Rabin, returned to Israel from Washington to express the need for Israel to take a more moderate approach. He feared that after the US and President Nixon expressly asked Israel not be the first to reject it, if Israel took Meir's initial approach and ignored

the request and opposed the plan, it would severely damage relations between the two nations. In addition, Rogers made it clear to Rabin, that Israel would damage future military aid with an outright rejection of the plan.⁴⁹ Rabin's belief that Israel should not reject the plan out of hand was correct. If Israel did not even consider the American proposal, the Nixon administration would have had less incentive to consider Israel's interests in future negotiations. In addition, Israel still relied on the Americans to maintain their security and needlessly angering them could put that support in jeopardy.

In the first public statements on the Rogers Plan in a letter to the United Nations, Meir blamed the conflict on "aggressive policy of the Arab governments. Their absolute refusal to make peace with Israel and the unqualified support of the Soviet Union for the Arab aggressive stand." The letter stated, "The negotiations for peace must be free from prior conditions and external influences and pressures. The prospects for peace will be seriously marred if states outside the region continue to raise territorial proposals and suggestions on other subjects that cannot further peace and security."⁵⁰ Meir also told the Knesset, "Nobody in the world can make us accept it. We didn't survive three wars in order to commit suicide."⁵¹ Meir's attempt to link the Arabs with Cold War proved to be a potent weapon to gain support for Israel in Congress and some levels of the Nixon administration.

In a discussion with Nixon, Meir addressed the issue of a Palestinian state separate from Jordan. She worried that any deal that included a solution for the refugee

problem would eventually end with a call for a separate Palestinian state located on the West Bank. She also believed that this new Palestinian state would be openly hostile to Israel. She said, “Between the Mediterranean and the borders of Iraq, in what was once Palestine, there are now two countries, one Jewish and one Arab, and there is no room for a third. The Palestinians must find the solution to their problem together with that Arab country, Jordan”⁵² Hussein viewed this attitude as a threat to his monarchy and it was a threat that the Israelis would continue to deploy against Jordan. Many Israeli leaders argued that the Palestinians did not need a state because Jordan should be their state. If Jordan absorbed the rest of the Palestinian population, it would be unlikely that Hussein could retain his monarchy because the increase in Palestinians in Jordan would eventually overwhelm the native Jordanian Bedouin population that Hussein relied on to support his monarchy.

The Israeli cabinet accepted and rejected different parts of the Rogers Plan, which created more confusion with the US. After seeing the outline of the plan for six weeks, Golda Meir still had issues with it. In particular, she wanted to accept the terms in the letter from Nixon, but not in the official proposal sent to Jarring. In a letter to Meir, Nixon talked more about Israeli security and was vague on actual settlement issues. This caused confusion and anger in the White House. For one, they believed that Israel already agreed to the initiative and was now going back on their word. In addition, the Nixon administration could not allow Israel to dramatically change the agreement and

then have no response without seriously damaging its position in the Arab world. Nixon needed to show the Arabs that he had some ability to get Israel to stick to its original position and that the United States was an honest broker in the talks. That all would be jeopardized if Nixon allowed Israel to backtrack on its agreements.⁵³

Despite both American and Israeli predictions, Egypt agreed to the plan on July 22. Nixon wrote to Meir to ask her to accept the plan to stop the fighting and attempted to reassure her of the American view of a final settlement. Nixon said:

Our position on withdrawal is that the final borders must be agreed upon by the parties by means of negotiations under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. Moreover, we will not press Israel to accept a solution the refugee problem that will alter fundamentally the Jewish character of the State of Israel. Or jeopardize your security. We shall adhere strictly and firmly to the fundamental principle that there must be a peace agreement in which all parties undertakes reciprocal obligations to the others.⁵⁴

Despite Egypt's apparent acceptance of the Rogers Plan, the Fedayeen responded to the plan with outrage and rejection. Because Arafat was in no position to challenge Nasser, he set his sights on Hussein. On August 15, Arafat said, "We have decided to convert Jordan into a cemetery for all conspirators. Amman shall be the Hanoi of the revolution."⁵⁵ This foreshadowed the growing tension between the Palestinian forces and Hussein that would later lead to all-out conflict between the two sides. In this statement, Arafat likely had a number of goals. First, he wanted to block any peace plan that did not end with him in control over the Palestinian territories. This would most likely need the

removal of King Hussein. Second, he wanted to link the Palestinian cause with the wider Soviet-inspired anti-imperialism ideology. His goal was to show the Soviets that by supporting him over Hussein, it was a victory in the wider Cold War. Finally, Arafat could not openly challenge Nasser without losing much of his support and financing in the Arab world. This left Arafat with only the option of undermining Hussein to further his ambitions of a Palestinian state under his leadership.

By the summer of 1970, it was clear that the Rogers Plan was not moving forward as the Secretary of State hoped. While Kissinger took every opportunity to undermine Rogers behind the scenes, he blamed the collapse on a White House that did not fully engage in the process because it did not believe that the parties were interested in peace at this point. Kissinger said, “neither side would state anything other than its maximum program – Israel unwilling to forgo wholesale alterations of frontiers, the Arabs demanding total withdrawal and reluctant to undertake significant commitments for peace.”⁵⁶ While the fighting between Israel and its neighbors slowed down due to the ceasefire, the belligerents made very little progress in completing a final settlement that ended the conflict for good.

After the plan’s collapse, Kissinger summed up the error in American assumption in the Middle East as follows:

We had assumed that major power talks might break the impasse. In fact, they had not significantly changed the positions of any party. We had

assumed that the Soviets, in order to defuse the situation and limit Soviet involvement in Egypt, might feel an interest in pressing Nasser to compromise. On the contrary, Moscow had deepened its military commitment, thus encouraging Nasser's war of attrition against Israel. We had assumed Israel might in the end go along with a properly balanced American proposal. But the Israelis had flatly rejected our various plans while asking us to support them militarily and economically whether or not there was progress in negotiations. We had assumed that the Palestinians could be dealt with in a settlement purely as a refugee problem. Instead, they had become a quasi-independent force with a veto over policy in Jordan and perhaps even Lebanon.⁵⁷

In a speech on May 1, 1970, Nasser illustrated Kissinger's view of the problems in the Middle East. He called on the United States to "refrain from giving support to Israel as long as it occupies our Arab territories – be it political, military or economic support." If the US did not comply, "the Arabs must come to the inevitable conclusion that the United States wants Israel to continue to occupy our territories so as to dictate the terms of surrender."⁵⁸ This validated Kissinger's fear that the problem with attempting a peace negotiation at this time and failing further alienated the Arabs, pushing them further into the Soviet sphere.

The failed Rogers Plan was important for a number of reasons. While it did not succeed, it was the Nixon administration's first attempt to solve the complex problems of the Middle East. Nixon believed that the Rogers Plan would allow Arab leaders to see the US differently and agree to talks without coming under attack from pro-Soviet forces in their country.⁵⁹ It also showed

Kissinger and Nixon that King Hussein was friendly to the West and could be counted on to embrace the American point of view for issues in the region. The Americans also believed Hussein was an important part of their Cold War alliance system and because of that, Jordan should in the future get enough military aid to survive. Finally, the United States firmly supplanted Great Britain as Jordan's closest Western ally, permanently altering Jordan's lead partner during a crisis. This new partnership became much more important when the Palestinians and other radical Arab states directly challenged Hussein's reign. Because Nixon, Kissinger, and Rogers took an interest in helping King Hussein throughout the peace process, it demonstrated to the King that he had a loyal ally in Washington and had a better chance of achieving his goals through that partnership. This improved Hussein's view of the White House, and the Nixon administration became an important ally for Hussein and Jordan. This was important because soon Hussein would need that ally if he hoped to remain the leader of Jordan.

CHAPTER III

CIVIL WAR

After the failure of the Rogers Plan, the White House was growing more concerned about instability in Jordan. By the summer of 1970, Jordan faced a more aggressive Palestinian faction that desired a confrontation with Israel and anybody else that got in their way, King Hussein included. The strength of the Palestinian militants and sheer size of the Palestinian population residing in Jordan made them a unique threat to the reign of King Hussein. Hussein faced a number of problems because of the Palestinians. First, their continued attacks against Israel frequently caused counterattacks in Jordan. Second, members of the leadership of many of these Palestinian groups believed Hussein blocked their path to control over a Palestinian state based in Jordan, leading them to continually challenge his rule. Third, many of the Palestinian groups had a large base of support in other Arab countries, particularly Iraq, Egypt, and Syria. Because of this, Hussein felt pressure to support the Palestinians or face attempts by his neighbors to undermine his regime. Finally, the Palestinian population frequently clashed with the traditional Jordanian population, leading to conflict between the sides that often ended in bloodshed. While Hussein preferred to accommodate the Palestinians, eventually, their actions made that impossible. This forced Hussein to take drastic action

to retake control of his country. Hussein's success would not have been possible without the support of the United States and the Nixon administration.

Hussein's feud with the Palestinian militants also reverberated in Washington. To many in the American leadership, the Palestinian forces were another element of Soviet aggression. The Palestinians frequently used rhetoric that corresponded with Soviet ideology. In addition, since Soviet-allied states like Syria and Egypt supported the Palestinians, it increased the American perception of a Soviet-Palestinian nexus. Because of this, the Nixon administration viewed the survival of Hussein in his conflict with the Palestinian militants as another battlefield in the larger Cold War.

There were many different factions in the Palestinian movement but the three main ones were Fatah, led by Yasir Arafat, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), led by George Habash, and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) led by Naif Hawatmeh. These main groups had a similar end goal, mainly the destruction of Israel, but had distinct ideologies and methods. The Arabs, Israelis, and the Americans referred to the militants as the Fedayeen, which translated to those who sacrificed themselves for the cause in Arabic. The Fedayeen believed that only through direct military action against Israel would the Arabs be able to remove Israel from Arab land and achieve the return of the land lost in 1967.

The largest faction was Fatah under the leadership of Yasir Arafat. Palestinian exiles started Fatah in Kuwait in 1959. After the 1967 war, Arafat was able to use his position in Fatah to take over the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which was

an umbrella organization consisting of many Palestinian groups and financed by other Arab regimes, especially Egypt. The PLO charter denied Israel's right to exist and called for an Arab state made up of Palestinian refugees to take its place. In addition, its main goal was the "elimination of Zionism in Palestine." It called Zionism, "racist and fanatic . . . expansionist and colonialist in its aims."¹ Before taking over the PLO, Arafat was largely based in Syria and seen as a rival of Nasser's supported PLO. Many considered Fatah the most successful group in taking on Israel. Before the 1967 war, Fatah had led sixty-one attacks directly at Israel, far more than the other Fedayeen groups.² After the 1967 War, Arafat used his success in fighting the Israelis to get Nasser's support and take control of the PLO in 1969. The PLO was by far the largest of the Palestinian groups and had thousands of fighters and activists.

George Habash's PFLP was more Marxist than the PLO. While protesting both American and Israeli imperialism, Habash also emphasized Palestinian nationalism. The PFLP's ideology was more violent than the PLO and focused more on terror attacks rather than the the liberation of land occupied by Israel. Between 1968 and 1971, it was one of the most active international terrorist organizations in the world. In 1970, Habash boycotted the PLO because it was not radical enough. At its height, it was much smaller than the PLO, containing under two thousand members.³

On February 22, 1969, Naif Hawatmeh split from the PFLP and created his own group, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The PDFLP was even more radical than the other groups and much more Marxist. Hawatmeh believed that many Arab regimes were not sufficiently radical and he hoped to inspire the Arab public to replace them with more Soviet-style "people's democracies."⁴ While based in

Syria and supported by the Syrian leadership, Hawatmeh became a rising threat to King Hussein because of his frequent calls for regime change.

Early on there were concerns from the Americans, Israelis, and Jordanians about the makeup of the Palestinian radical groups and their connection to the Soviet Union and the larger Cold War. These groups often used the language and symbols of the Soviet Union, leading many to believe there was a deep ideological connection. The PDFLP's emblem was a hammer and sickle along with the Arab star and crescent, showing some connection to the Soviet Union. In an interview, Hawatmeh said, "It had become clear that the path to national liberation is that of revolutionary people's war – that is according to the Vietnamese example. As Lenin says, a people who cannot use arms will remain a people of slaves"⁵ They also chanted slogans like "Long live the memory of Comrade Ho Chi Minh" and "From Vietnam to Palestine, one struggle, one fight."⁶ In addition, the PDFLP also posed a threat to Jordan. They opposed the rule of King Hussein and did not recognize his authority over them. One of their often-repeated slogans was "No authority above the authority of the resistance."⁷

Habash and the PFLP also had a connection to the Soviet Union that was not widely known at the time. Dr. Wadi Haddad was the number two man in the PFLP and also its chief of foreign operations. Starting in 1970, Haddad was also a KGB agent. He began working with the Soviet Union for the express purpose of gaining more advanced weapons for strikes on Israel and its allies. This included RPG-7 anti-tank rockets, silencers, ammunition, and other heavy weapons. He also attempted to kidnap and assassinate the CIA Beirut station chief under orders from the Soviet Union. In addition, the KGB gave him advice and intelligence on executing terrorist attacks in the region.⁸

While American officials did not know that the Soviet Union had a connection to these Palestinian militant groups, many in the Nixon administration believed it without specific evidence. This was important because the Nixon administration viewed any actions by the Palestinian militants as an effort by the Soviet Union to diminish the American position in the region.

Arafat and the Fatah also had some connections to the Soviet Union. Before 1970, Moscow did not view the Palestinians ideologically serious, even calling them “terrorist elements having no contact with the masses.”⁹ After some military victories against the Israelis and with the support of their client Nasser, the Soviet Union began to pay more attention to the Palestinian militant groups. In the summer of 1968, Nasser took Arafat to Moscow on a secret trip to introduce him to the Soviet leadership. Arafat hoped to convince them of his hatred for both Israel and the United States and show that he could be an ally to the Soviet Union in the region. Arafat was able to convince Brezhnev of his value and the Soviet Union began providing Fatah weapons to fight the imperialist and their allies.¹⁰ Brezhnev saw the Palestinians as a progressive force in the region fighting against Israeli and American imperialism, leading him to be sympathetic to their cause.¹¹ The Soviet support for Fatah was important because it gave Arafat both diplomatic support and military aid that he needed to continue his war against Israel. In addition, the Soviets saw Arafat and his forces as an opportunity to undermine pro-American regimes like Hussein in Jordan.

The US also feared the Soviet connection to radical regimes and how it affected the survival of American allies in the region. As early as 1963, the CIA argued, “Some conservative states have attempted to prevent revolution by gradual reform, but it is

probable that they will not be able to prevent some kind of revolutionary upheaval in the years ahead.”¹² The CIA feared the Soviet Union would take advantage of the upheaval to install an anti-American and anti-Israeli regime in the heart of the Middle East, severely undermining American goals for the region. This was particularly a threat to a state like Jordan because of Hussein’s support of the US and the instability caused by the large Palestinian refugee population.

A resolution by the Palestine National Assembly on July 17, 1968, also placed the Palestinians on the Soviet side of the Cold War. It said the enemy of Palestine comes from three independent forces; Israel, world Zionism, and world imperialism under the direction of the United States. It continued to say that “The true nature of the Palestinian war is that of a battle between a small people, which is the Palestinian people, and Israel, which has the backing of world Zionism and world imperialism.”¹³ The resolution also called for a plan to “frustrate any political solution to the Palestine problem.” Finally, it argued that any peace settlement would eventually put pressure on friendly nations, like the Soviet Union, to allow the immigration of their Jewish citizens to the state of Israel so all friendly Arab states should oppose it.¹⁴ Because of their Soviet support, many in the Nixon administration believed that any action that helped the Palestinian militant groups also supported the Soviet Union and forcing the American government to oppose it.

The support of the Soviet Union was invaluable to the Fedayeen, especially since in the summer of 1970 the Palestinian militant groups began to cause more trouble in Jordan. On June 9, 1970, the PFLP, led by George Habash, attempted to assassinate King Hussein.¹⁵ Habash argued that the first step in the liberation of Palestine from the Israelis was the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy.¹⁶ While Hussein escaped injury,

this was the first of numerous attempts on his life by the Palestinian Fedayeen. Hussein did not respond to the attack for fear that any harsh military response would outrage the more radical Arab regimes and lead to his isolation. He still believed that he could reach some form of accommodation with the Fedayeen that kept him in power and allowed them some movement to strike at the Israeli occupation.

A statement by the Palestine National Council, the legislative body of the PLO, illustrates the Fedayeen's hostility to Hussein. It called for a "national democratic regime in Jordan" with the removal of the monarchy and the establishment of a state where Palestinians in the West Bank would have an equal voice in the actions of the government. To help achieve this, the statement calls for "day-by-day mass struggles" to cripple the Hussein regime. It hoped to "to achieve freedom for Palestinian revolution to act in and from Jordan and to establish its bases in Jordanian territory, and to expose the conspiracies of the subservient regime and its misrepresentation in this connection." Finally, it called for the Palestinians in Jordan to "resist terrorist policy measures and all aggressions against the freedoms and the rights of citizens to expose and resist imperialist capitalists."¹⁷ These statements were a direct threat to Hussein and his rule. They linked him with the hated Israelis and the Americans and challenged his right to continue his monarchy in Jordan. It also demonstrated that the PLO and many of its supportive Arab regimes believed that Hussein's monarchy should end, replacing it with one more aligned with the broader goals of the Palestinians and the Arabs.

One of the main problems with the Fedayeen operating in Jordan for Hussein was the Israeli retaliation in response to Fedayeen attacks. Israel believed that it needed to send a message to Arab regimes that if they allowed Palestinian militants to operate

freely on their soil, Israel would hold them responsible for the actions of the Fedayeen. For example, on May 22, the PFLP launched an attack from Lebanon where they ambushed an Israeli school bus, killing eight children. Israel responded by shelling the village where the attackers came from, killing twenty and wounding forty. In addition, Israel began to institute Israeli Defense Force (IDF) patrols in southern Lebanon to protect against further militant infiltration.¹⁸ The Israelis hoped that if their responses were harsh enough, the Arab leadership would take some action to limit the activities of the Palestinian militants.

In February of 1968, a Fedayeen group attack Israel from Jordan and Israel responded with a large air and artillery strikes in the area of northern Jordanian city of Irbid. It killed fifty-six and injured an additional eighty-two, many of which were civilians. In response, the King said, “anyone who chooses to operate from our territory should do that through us and according to our planning.” The minister of the interior also added, “We shall not allow any group to act on its own in such an extemporaneous manner. The government of Jordan is determined to protect the security of Jordan and the rule of law.” Through these statements, it was obvious that the Jordanian government placed the blame on the death of civilians on the Fedayeen and not Israel. The Fedayeen responded with mass protests in the major Jordanian cities, leading the government to back away from these statements and continue to allow the Fedayeen full maneuverability inside Jordan.¹⁹ The actions of the Fedayeen put Hussein in an impossible position. If he cracked down to harshly on the Palestinians, he faced protests in the street and active attempts by other Arab leaders to undermine his regime. If he did

nothing, the Israelis would continue to attack Jordan with the potential to destabilize the monarchy.

Despite the risks from any choice Hussein made, he did not want to face similar attacks again and attempted to institute more control over the Palestinians residing in Jordan. In addition, he also started to respond more forcibly when challenged by the Palestinians in all areas of his leadership. On June 9, 1970, Fedayeen forces freed some militants held in Jordanian prisons. Hussein responded by allowing Jordanian tanks and artillery to shell a Palestinian refugee camp. After four days of fighting, over four hundred people died with another seven hundred and fifty wounded.²⁰ This was one of the first forceful retaliations by the Jordanian army and was a preview of more violence to come.

After an assassination attempt on Hussein that killed one of his bodyguards on June 7, Prime Minister Rifai contacted the US embassy and told them the Hussein was planning to retaliate against the Fedayeen and asked the US to persuade Israel not to attack while his forces were away from the front line. Israel replied that they would not attack Jordan during these movements. Eventually, the Fedayeen and the Jordanian government agreed to a cease-fire but not before between two hundred people died, including civilians. Hussein was under pressure to end the fighting after the PFLP took sixty-eight foreign hostages at a hotel in Amman and threatened to kill them all if there was not a ceasefire. Hussein agreed to some of the demands of the Fedayeen including the removal of his military commander and prime minister. In addition, all sides agreed to return to their bases. King Hussein's position was weaker because of this intervention because the Fedayeen forces remained and forced Hussein to promote a cabinet more

inclined to sympathize with the Palestinians.²¹ This was one of the first attempts by Hussein to use the Americans to persuade the Israelis not to attack Jordan. Hussein used his improved relationship with the Nixon administration to gain Israeli assurances that they would not take advantage of his weakened state and use it to seize more land from Jordan. This was a direct benefit of Hussein's willingness to work with the Nixon administration during the failed Rogers Plan and affirmation of his value in the larger Cold War. Hussein's ability to work with Israel through the American would be important later when Hussein faced an even greater threat from the Palestinian Fedayeen.

The continued cycle of attack and then retaliations between Israel, Jordan, and the Fedayeen had the potential to get out of control in the summer of 1970. On June 3, the Fedayeen launched a rocket attack on the Israeli city of Beit Shean. Israel responded by bombing Irbid, killing seven civilians. Jordan felt the need to respond and fired artillery at the Israeli city of Tiberias. After the fighting had ended, Jordanians contacted Israel through the American embassy in Amman. Hussein said, "the Jordanian Government was doing everything it could to prevent Fedayeen rocket attacks on Israel. [The] King deeply regretted [the] rocket attacks. [The] Jordan Army [was] under orders to shoot and kill any Fedayeen attempting to fire rockets and [the] Fedayeen leaders [have] been told . . . that violators would be shot on sight." The American government urged Israel to accept the King's desire for a ceasefire and give him the breathing room he needed to deal with the Fedayeen. Israel agreed and suspended its efforts on direct retaliation against Jordan.²²

In an interview, King Hussein said of the situation in Jordan:

We had thousands of incidents of breaking the law, of attacking people. It was a very unruly state of affairs in the country and I continued to try. I went to Egypt. I called in the Arabs to help in any way they could, particularly as some of them were sponsoring some of these movements in one form or another, but without much success, and towards the end I felt I was losing control. In the last six months leading up to the crisis, the army began to rebel. I had to spend most of my time running to those units that left their positions and were going to the capital, or to some other part of Jordan, to sort out people who were attacking their families or attack their soldiers on leave. I think that the gamble was probably the army would fracture along Palestinian-Jordanian lines. That never happened, thank God.²³

Hussein was growing more frustrated by the actions of the Palestinians. In a meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad on August 20, 1970, Hussein explained to him the problems with the Palestinian Fedayeen organizations. Hussein said he “deplored the attitude of some Palestinian elements who believed that the occupation by Israel of further Arab territories would force the Arab countries into mobilizing their resources to confront Israeli aggression and eventually liberate Palestine.”²⁴ Hussein believed that many of the Fedayeen leadership wanted to commit an act that forced a massive retaliation by Israel, leading to another Israeli-Arab war.

Starting in the fall of 1970, tensions between Hussein and the Fedayeen reached its peak. On September 6, another assassination attempt on Hussein occurred, this time, the attackers killed a number of Hussein’s bodyguards. Hussein and his daughter Princess Alia barely escaped unharmed. After the attempt of his life, Hussein addressed the nation and said, “The citizens are scared and worried of what might happen at any moment as a result of the shootings, which exposes innocent people to danger, the public life to damage. People’s business and trade have been stalled. The public potential and the state’s resources are sustaining big losses. The government’s departments, institution,

and schools have ceased to function.”²⁵ Hussein felt the need to take a more forceful approach, ending their ability to use Jordan as a base to attack Israel and the Jordanian monarchy.

In response to Hussein’s speech, the High Council of the Jordanian Trade Union called for a strike. Pro-Fedayeen members dominated this organization and their plan was to cripple the capital with a strike of both public and private business. The Fedayeen leadership believed that this would either force Hussein to depart in exile or make more accommodations with the Fedayeen, further weakening his standing in the country.²⁶ The Fedayeen hoped that if Hussein’s position continually weakened, they would have the power to take control of Jordan. If Hussein did not stand up to the Fedayeen, he faced not only a growing threat from them, but also an internal challenge to his rule from Jordanian nationalists tired of the constant provocations from the Palestinians. The call for a strike did not have the desired effect. In fact, it made Hussein more determined to confront the Fedayeen and remove them as a threat to Jordan.

On September 9, things escalated further when the PFLP hijacked three Western planes and forced them to land in Jordan. The airliners contained hostages from Israel, Great Britain, Switzerland, Germany, and the United States. The hijackers landed in an abandoned airstrip outside of Amman and threatened to blow up the planes with the passengers on it if the Western governments did not release a number of Palestinian prisoners in their custody.²⁷ One of the more infamous prisoners that the hijackers called for the Americans to release was Sirhan Sirhan, Robert Kennedy’s assassin.²⁸ The PFLP also said that they would only exchange passengers without dual Israeli citizenship. The problem was some the American hostages had both American and Israeli citizenship.

They also gave the West seventy-two hours to comply before they started to kill the hostages.²⁹ Through these hijackings, the Palestinian militants wanted to demonstrate the weakness of Hussein and his inability to rule his country. An additional element of the militants' actions was it demonstrated to the West that Hussein could not protect their interests in the region. Because of this, Hussein needed to react forcefully to the hijackings.

The hijacking immediately forced the Americans and other Western powers to get involved in Jordan. The Nixon administration had a number of concerns about the situation. First, they were worried about the lives of the hostages. Second, they worried about the ability for Hussein to respond and survive an open conflict with the Fedayeen. They also were concerned about showing a united front with other Western nations against the PFLP. If one nation agreed to the demands of the hijackers, then the US also would face increasing pressure to give into the demands of the hijackers. They also feared outside involvement in the crisis, mainly the large Iraqi force already stationed in Jordan and if the United States had the ability to intervene to stop an outside attack. Since the end of the 1967 conflict, Iraq stationed seventeen thousand units in Jordan under the auspice of being in place to defend Jordan from another Israeli attack. Because of the hostility between Iraq and Jordan, Hussein also worried they were there to undermine his regime given the right opportunity. Finally, that the hijacking crisis had the potential to bring down Hussein and to lead to a hostile Arab government aligned with the Soviet Union.

Kissinger immediately saw the threat the Fedayeen placed on the hope for any Middle East peace process. He said, "If we do not get the Fedayeen in Jordan under

control, the peace initiative will go by the board. Israel has to have a government to deal with that can fulfill its obligations. The President's instincts are to crush the Fedayeen now. Although he may reconsider, we must make sure such a move doesn't fail because we didn't have a good plan."³⁰ Assistant Secretary of State Joe Sisco worried about the long-term implications of direct American involvement. He said if we used American forces to prop up the King, it "could only mean a temporary prop for the King. We would have to stay for some time, and, even then, the moment we got out, the King would be in a much weaker position politically."³¹ Sisco believed that it would be impossible for Hussein to remain in power, even if he removed the Fedayeen with American help, because the images of an American force arriving in Jordan to attack the Palestinians would permanently destroy any relationship Hussein had with the rest of the Arab world.

In response, Hussein formed a military cabinet and began to strike at Fedayeen positions throughout the country. Hussein placed Wasfi Tall in charge as Prime Minister. Tall was extremely loyal to Hussein and equally hostile to the Fedayeen and their leadership. When he formed the cabinet, he hoped that this would bring the Fedayeen to the bargaining table. At a minimum, he wanted Arafat and Fatah to separate themselves from the PFLP and PDFLP and eventually to disband the most radical organizations.³² Hussein believed that if he could get rid of the most radical elements of the Fedayeen, he could retake control of his country. Hussein also faced pressure to act from his troops. Bedouin troops fiercely loyal to the King led the army. They were tired of the lawlessness, repeated attacks, and humiliation at the hands of the more radical Palestinian groups and wanted to respond. They faced continued threats to their family and

neighborhoods by the more radical groups. They also believed they needed to stand up and respond to the constant attacks on the King. Some units started to fly brassieres from their tank antennas with the implicit message to the King that if he were going to force them to act like women, they would dress the part.³³ The combination of pressures, along with the repeated assassination attempts, made Hussein more determined to wipe out the Fedayeen threat once and for all. He needed to demonstrate to the forces that supported him and to the West that he had the strength to take on this threat and end it before it continued to grow, threatening Western interests throughout the region.

The Fedayeen did not intend to negotiate with Hussein. In response to the possibility, Arafat told Hussein that he did not have total control over all the Palestinian groups and he could only guarantee the King twenty-four hours to evacuate himself and his family.³⁴ As the fighting escalated, Hussein faced another threat. The Jordanian government received word from the Iraqi government that if the Jordanian army did not stop shelling Fedayeen positions, the Iraqi army would intervene. Hussein was obviously worried about this threat because Iraq had seventeen thousand troops stationed in Jordan.³⁵ In fact, the position of the Iraqi troops was also an issue with the Nixon administration. They received some intelligence that the Iraqis might have participated in the hijacking. In a cable sent to the White House, the CIA reported that their information from a reliable source was that some Iraqi troops were in the area when the Jordanian army arrived at the airport. Hussein's inner circle believed that the Iraqis had a long-standing relationship with the PFLP. They believe that the Iraqis misjudged world reaction and were now trying to distance themselves away from the PFLP so the world would not blame them if the hijacking ended violently.³⁶

From early on, Jordan feared an intervention from Iraq. On September 2, Zaid Rafai, the chief of the royal court and a top aide to King Hussein, contacted the American embassy and asked if Jordan would have US support in case of an attack by Iraq. The previous day the Iraqi contacted Hussein and threatened intervention if the shelling of the Palestinians did not end. While being close to Hussein, Rafai was also a student of Henry Kissinger at Harvard and he hoped to use that relationship to have a direct line to the White House around the more hostile State Department. Rafai faced some resistance even getting an official response from the Americans. This was largely due to a conflict between the State Department, the CIA, and the White House. Ambassador Harry Symmes led the State Department's response and he believed that Hussein could not last. Symmes even had some communications with the Fedayeen leadership while he was the American ambassador to Jordan. Symmes gave his opinion of the situation while stationed in Washington. Because of his continued hostile attitude towards Hussein, Hussein expelled him from Jordan on May 7, 1970.³⁷ The CIA and the White House believed that not only could Hussein survive, but also he was an important ally in the region and a voice of moderations that the United States needed to nurture.³⁸

On September 15, King Hussein contacted the new American ambassador to Jordan, Dean Brown, and informed him that he was prepared to retake control of his country. He wanted American help to keep Israel from making the situation worse by either invading to strike at the Fedayeen or taking advantage of Hussein's weakened state to strike at Jordan. He also wanted to know if the Americans were willing to intervene if Jordan faced an external threat. Brown told the White House that he believed that Hussein might be bluffing and not fully committed to destroying the Fedayeen. He also

felt that Hussein might be just using increased pressure to negotiate better terms with the Fedayeen that retained his power but did not fully restrain the Fedayeen forces from striking Israel.³⁹ Hussein had threatened to wipe out the Fedayeen before, only to pull back once pressure from the rest of the Arab states began. The US did not want to support Hussein's actions publically against the Fedayeen if he was unwilling to attack the militants aggressively. Any overt actions to support Hussein against the Fedayeen would diminish the rest of the Arab worlds' view towards the Americans, a risk that some in the Nixon administration did not want if Hussein planned only a minor strike against the Fedayeen forces.

Because Great Britain had a historical tie to the Hashemite monarchy and to Jordan itself, the White House began coordination with them. Kissinger told the British Foreign Minister Sir Dennis Green that that the United States, "Attached the greatest importance to the King's survival." In addition, he told him that American military involvement is possible as a last resort but Nixon had made no decisions on the matter. At this point, Nixon preferred no confrontation at all and opposed any Israeli actions. He would rather have the US military intervene if it was necessary and keep Israel out of Jordan.⁴⁰ Nixon believed that Jordan's position in the Arab world would be better after the conflict if the US responded compared to if Israel intervened. Regardless, Nixon's contention that the US military might need to save Hussein demonstrated the value the administration placed on Hussein's survival.

The White Houses viewed the threat of a Palestinian takeover of Jordan as a potentially disastrous development in the region. Alexander Haig said, "The PLP objective was to take over the government of Jordan with the backing of the Soviet

Union's two chief clients in the region, Jordan's neighbors Syria and Iraq. Because this operation could have no other purpose than an eventual attempt to invade and destroy Israel, the fall of Hussein would certainly mean a preemptive Israeli invasion of Jordan." Nixon described the situation as "a ghastly frame of dominoes with nuclear war waiting at the end."⁴¹ Nixon rightly worried that a Middle East conflict could lead to a confrontation between the superpowers because this occurred during the October War in 1973 when the US raised their Defense Condition to DEFCON 2.

At the White House, many believed that if the Iraqis directly intervened, the Israelis would respond and attack the Iraqi forces.⁴² Because of the Soviet Union's close relationship with the Iraqi government, Kissinger and the White House were concerned over how much control Moscow had over the Iraqi forces. In response to the fighting, the Soviet chargé d'affaires Yuli Voronstov said, "The Soviet Government appeals to the Governments of Iraq and Jordan to demonstrate farsightedness and reasonable restraint so that an end can be brought to the dangerous developments in Jordan." He also said that any fighting between the Arabs can only assist the enemies of the Arab nations, the Israeli aggressors and the imperialist forces behind them."⁴³

Kissinger believed that the United States had a number of roles to play in managing the crisis. First, he wanted to keep the Soviet Union and their allies out of Jordan. He also wanted to secure the hostages, with American forces if their lives became truly in danger, and he wanted to provide encouragement to Hussein to allow him to retake full control of his country. Kissinger recommended and Nixon approved the movement of US forces to the region to demonstrate the value the US placed on protecting Hussein. The *USS Saratoga* joined the *USS Independence* off the coast of

Lebanon. The *USS John F. Kennedy* left Puerto Rico and headed towards the region. That put three carrier battle groups in the region or on the way. In addition, an amphibious task force with twelve hundred Marines was to remain in the Mediterranean Sea after a training mission. Finally, the helicopter carrier the *USS Guam* and the cruiser the *USS Springfield* moved to within striking range of Jordan. Movements on this scale were not covert. The hope was that the Soviet Union would take notice and keep its allies in the region from intervening for fear of it exploding into a larger conflict. The United States did not announce these movements publically, as to not increase the sense of a major international crisis but the White House believed the Soviet Union would receive the intended message.⁴⁴

When contemplating the increased American military movements, the National Security Staff in the White House attempted to assess how the Soviets would view these actions. Helmut Sonnerfeldt, a top aide to Kissinger, did not believe that the Soviets would directly intervene against Jordan. The Soviets main concern, he argued, was how the crisis in Jordan would affect the UAR and any precedent it could set about US intervention. Because of this, the Soviet response would focus on keeping the Americans from intervening, even if that meant pressuring the Arabs to stop the conflict. In addition, he thought it was possible that the Soviets would be supportive of an Arafat regime because of his connections to Moscow if Hussein did fall but ultimately unwilling to commit Soviet forces to accomplish the change. Because of that, Sonnerfeldt believed that the Soviet would be pleased with the removal of Hussein, just not at the expense of a wider conflict. Finally, Sonnerfeldt argued if Israeli forces attacked the Iraqi forces, that might be enough to get the Soviets involved because of their determination to defend a

direct attack on their client state. If that occurred, the United States needed to be prepared in case it caused an escalation into a broader Middle East war.⁴⁵ The possibility of this crisis escalating to a larger regional war was a real possibility. Sonnerfeldt's argument that the Soviet Union would not let a combined American and Israeli force crush an important regional ally without entering the conflict was probably true. If the fight stayed an inner-Arab dispute, both the US and the Soviet Union had less incentive to get directly involved.

The American mobilization did have an immediate impact. According to Andre Rochat, who was the representative from the International Red Cross that was negotiating for the release of the hostages, the rumors of American troop movements placed the Fedayeen in a state of panic. Nixon believed that this movement encouraged the Fedayeen to release eight hostages, including an American. The White House and the State Department debated over if they needed to send another message to the militants. Kissinger wanted to send instructions to the more radical Arab nations that the US would hold them responsible if anything happened to the hostages. Sisco and Rogers worried that the PFLP would kill some hostages just to prove their strength and wanted a statement that the US had not contemplated any military action at this point. Eventually, in a compromise, Nixon's Press Secretary Ron Ziegler read a statement from the Red Cross that said no military action was forthcoming.⁴⁶ By having Ziegler read a statement from the Red Cross, no official American statement existed that said the US was not considering the possibility of involving the military in the crisis. The Nixon administration hoped that the radical Arab regimes that had ties to the PFLP would see

this as a threat to, but not enough of a threat for the PFLP to overreact and kill some of the American hostages.

After the crisis, when discussing why it was in the American interest to support Hussein, Kissinger said, “it was important to demonstrate that friendship with the West and a moderate foreign policy would be rewarded with effective American support. It was necessary to arrest the progressive radicalization of the Middle East, which accelerated after the dispatch of Soviet missiles and combat personnel to Egypt. Nasser’s technique of blackmailing the United States with Soviet threats had to be shown as futile.”⁴⁷ Kissinger could have made a similar argument about the Soviet backed states of Syria and Iraq.

While Hussein’s forces were doing well against the Fedayeen, on September 18, the situation on the ground dramatically changed. Forces associated with the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), a group based in Syria, came across the northern border of Jordan and engaged the Jordanian military. In addition, a large Syrian tank formation also crossed the border. While Syria painted the tanks with PLA colors and decals, there was no doubt in the mind of Hussein and the Americans that this was a Syrian invasion force.⁴⁸ Jordan repelled the initial Syrian invasion force. The next day, Syria crossed the border with over three hundred tanks and a large contingent of mechanized infantry, removing what little doubt remained over who was leading the attack.⁴⁹ This was a major escalation in the crisis. It posed a threat to both Jordan and the United States because a Soviet backed Arab regime entered Jordan with a massive invasion force, strong enough to threaten the survival of the American supported regime in Jordan.

On September 19, Hussein addressed his cabinet and said, “The Syrians have entered the country and are approaching Irbid. Our troops are fighting back but the Syrians are still advancing. As a precaution we might need the help of friends, and I want you to give me the mandate to ask for such help if I have to do so.”⁵⁰ Hussein knew that he might need assistance from either the United States or even Israel. Because of the controversial nature of that decision, he wanted the cabinet’s full approval so not to be undermined by it a later date. The debate inside the cabinet room demonstrated the major dilemma of the conflict. Some thought the fight with the Palestinians and the Syrians was an internal Arab matter and should not involve outside forces. Another group believed that because of the airline hijackings, the assassination attempts on Hussein, the constant unauthorized strikes on Israel, and the prior evidence that Arafat and the Fedayeen wanted control of Jordan, the survival of the monarchy was at stake and Hussein and his allies should do everything possible to protect it. Because of these factors, all sides of the debate reached a consensus that if Jordan needed help, Hussein had their mandate to ask for it. What was not clear was that Hussein was willing to take help from anyone, including Israel. The cabinet ministers expected aid to come from the United States or Great Britain, none contemplated the possibility of an Israeli force siding with Jordan.⁵¹

Despite their historical connection to the King, the British were unwilling to help. Foreign Minister Green when talking to the Prime Minister Edward Heath best expressed their attitude. Green said, “The Palestinian revolt strikes a very deep chord in the Arab hearts. Any Western country therefore which intervenes to try to save Jordan will be involving itself in a deep quarrel in Arabia as a whole, the consequences and end of

which none could foretell. . . . Jordan as it is not a viable country.”⁵² Great Britain, already still trying to repair the damage from the Suez Crisis, did not want to increase the Arab hostility towards them by intervening to save Jordan.

The Syrian invasion changed the calculation for the White House. Because of the close connections between the Syrian and Russian military, the White House did not believe Syria would invade Jordan without the minimal support of Moscow. Kissinger told Nixon that the Soviets “were either incompetent or forcing a showdown. If they are incompetent we will have an easy victory.”⁵³ Left unsaid was that if they desired a showdown, American prestige in the region and the world would force an American intervention. Because of the preset American forces already in the region, Kissinger was confident the US would succeed there also.

To illustrate how serious the Nixon administration took this new escalation, Rogers called Voronstov and said:

At this moment, the situation is being further and dangerously aggravated by the intervention into Jordanian territory of armored forces from Syria and the concentration of further offensive force in Syria along the Jordanian border. The US Government has condemned this intervention in Jordan and has called for the immediate withdrawal of the invading forces. This intolerable and irresponsible action from Syria, if not immediately halted and reversed could lead to the broadening of the present conflict. The US Government calls upon the Soviet Government to impress upon the Government of Syria the grave dangers of its present course of action and the need both to withdrawal these forces without delay from Jordanian territory and to desist from any further intervention in Jordan. The Soviet Government cannot be unaware of the serious consequences which could ensue from a broadening of the conflict. For its part, the US Government is urging restraint by all other parties in the area.⁵⁴

Another technique the Nixon administration used to put pressure on the Soviets was to either ignore their requests for explanations or refuse to acknowledge actions that might increase tensions. For example, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov contacted Ambassador Beam on September 19; he asked about the purpose of the increased movements of the Sixth Fleet and expressed the Soviet desire that the Americans and the Israelis should not intervene. Beam replied he knew nothing of the movements and made no statements about intervention.⁵⁵ The White House hoped that the lack of communication would worry Moscow, forcing them to be more cautious.

By September 19, Hussein's situation became more desperate. He worried about a sustained invasion from Syria that would overrun his forces. He contacted the American embassy and asked about possible US reconnaissance flights over the battlefield. He also needed intelligence on the state of the Syrian forces around Irbid and if they dug in their forces prepared to for a long-term conflict with Jordan.⁵⁶ In addition, he worried that the Iraqi force would join in the fighting, overwhelming him and allowing the Fedayeen to capture Amman. If Amman fell, Hussein believed his military would also disintegrate, forcing him to abandon his throne.

Luckily for Hussein, the Iraqi military never engaged their forces to aid the Fedayeen or the Syrian invasion. Some in the Nixon White House believed that it was because of the show of American military strength and the repeated warnings about outside intervention. The CIA station chief in Amman, Jack O'Connell, believed another possible reason existed. He believed it was not Cold War politics or the direct threat by the US, but a counter-intelligence operation led by General Abud Hassan, head of the Jordanian Military Intelligence. Hassan had a source inside NATO and through him

received old plans for American military action in Jordan. He doctored those plans to make it look like a current American plan to come to Jordan's aid. Hassan knew of an Iraqi double agent working with Jordanian intelligence and gave him those plans, knowing that the plans of an American attack would make it to Baghdad. In addition, in the presence of the Iraqi military attaché in Jordan, General Zaid bin Shakir mentioned a meeting with an upcoming American advanced team. This further confirmed the phony plans already in possession of the Iraqi government.⁵⁷ However, not a direct cause, this plan would not have worked without the increased military activity ordered by Nixon. The actions by Nixon gave credence to the possibility that the US would intervene to save Hussein, encouraging the Soviet Union to pressure its supporters in the region to deescalate the crisis.

On September 20, Hussein's forces still were unable to advance against the Syrian tank units. That morning, the King made his first official request for assistance from the United States. He asked for a public statement that the US would get involved militarily if there were a sustained attack by an outside power. Hussein hoped that the threat of American involvement might get Syria to retreat. In addition, Hussein and the White House worried about another front opening up against Hussein. The US had intelligence reports that Libya threatened to intervene to help the Fedayeen but at this point, Egypt was restraining them. In addition, Ambassador Brown contacted the State Department worried about a possible shift in the Egyptian position. He feared that Egypt would drop its support for Hussein and might even consider intervening if the damage to the Fedayeen became too great.⁵⁸ The threat of Egyptian involvement could have led to Israel and the US entering the war. Because of Egypt's alignment with the Soviet Union, both the US

and Israel would have viewed the actions by Egypt as an attempt to surround Israel with hostile regimes, forcing them to respond.

Later in the day on September 20, Hussein was still waffling on if he wanted an attack on the Syrian forces by an outside power. At first, his top advisor Rifai contacted the British to see if they were available to aid Jordan.⁵⁹ Jordan preferred an intervention from the British because from Hussein's point of view, the historical ties between Jordan and Great Britain would allow him to frame the intervention not as an invasion by the West, but a historical ally is assisting Jordan from domination by an outside power. Hussein informed the American embassy that the Syrians had taken Irbid and he wanted to go to the Security Council to call for a ceasefire. The US believed that any Security Council meeting would lead to "a propaganda battle."⁶⁰ In addition, as a rule, Kissinger historically did not like to use the Security Council for a ceasefire until his side was in the preferred position. He demonstrated this belief frequently in the October War of 1973 where he repeatedly held off a ceasefire until the Israelis secured their position in their war with Egypt and Syria.

On the morning of September 21, Ambassador Brown received a message from Hussein. It said:

Situation deteriorating dangerously following Syrian massive invasion. Northern forces [are] disjoined. Irbid [is] occupied. . . . I request immediate physical intervention both air and land as per the authorization of [the] government to safeguard sovereignty, territorial integrity and [the] independence of Jordan. Immediate air strikes on [the]invading forces from any quarter plus air cover are imperative.⁶¹

This message did not say specifically whom it was asking assistance from, implying that it could come from the US, Great Britain, or even Israel.

The Nixon administration viewed the situation with a Cold War attitude. Kissinger received some intelligence that the Russians gave the Syrians free reign to act as they saw fit, neither encouraging nor discouraging action. Nixon believed that the Soviets' attitude towards the crisis was, "Stir it up boys; give them trouble."⁶² Because of the Soviet dimension and the possibility of it spreading to a full Arab-Israeli war, Nixon initially favored using American forces as opposed to Israeli forces. He believed that American forces would keep other Arab countries out and that the Soviet Union was less likely to intervene directly for fear of a direct engagement with the Americans.⁶³ The same could not be said if it was an Israeli attack. Nixon also worried about American credibility. He said, "If they do it, either we have to do something – cannot let the Syrians get away with this – or we've got to support the Israelis in doing something. We cannot make a public statement and not back it up."⁶⁴ Many of Nixon's actions during his administration occurred because of his desire to maintain credibility in the face of perceived Soviet aggression. This frequently occurred throughout the Vietnam War where Nixon and Kissinger linked the American response to the need demonstrate American willingness to confront the Soviets to maintain American credibility throughout the world.

The National Security Council meeting on September 20 discussed the problems of American and Israeli intervention. They immediately decided against an Israeli-American joint action. Kissinger and his Nixon's staff believed that would damage any standing the US had in the Arab world along with destroying King Hussein's position

with his neighbors. The problem with a solely American response was the limited resources in the region and if those resources had the ability to sustain a long campaign. The only air support available came from the aircraft carriers off the coast of Lebanon. To get any supplies or armor into Jordan, it would be necessary to use land access through Israel. In addition, if the American forces on the ground needed support, the only assistance readily available came from Israel. This again would make it look like a joint Israeli-American strike something the NSC already rejected.⁶⁵ Because of these reasons, the NSC believed that if Jordan needed an outside military force, the IDF was in the best position to intervene. It was in the United States' interest to keep the Soviet Union from intervening on behalf of Syria and the best way to achieve that goal would be a limited Israeli attack on behalf of Jordan.

To retain the possibility of American military action and at the very least make Syria and the Soviet Union believe American military action was possible, the White House ordered an improvement of the status of an airborne brigade in Germany. In addition, they put the 82nd Airborne Division on full alert. They also ordered a reconnaissance plane from a carrier in the Mediterranean Sea to travel to the Tel Aviv airport to pick up targeting information. The benefit of improving the alert status of the airborne brigade in Germany was that it would dramatically cut the time they could be on the ground in Jordan if needed to save the King or American personnel.⁶⁶ Putting the 82nd airborne on full alert would signal to both the Syrians and the Russians that the United States was contemplating American military involvement and in turn, force them to reevaluate their decision to intervene in the Jordanian civil war. Finally, by sending a reconnaissance plane from a carrier that Soviet and Egyptian radar in the area would

easily spot, the US could reinforce the possibility of imminent American military action along with planning for a coordinated attack with Israel.

Kissinger believed that the United States needed to show that they were serious about defending Jordan. If they only took minor steps to avoid escalating the situation, it could signal to the Russians that the US was not serious in its resolve. That would encourage the Russians and their allies to match the US actions, and eventually, either lead to the fall of the Hashemite Monarchy or direct military confrontation by the Cold War adversaries.⁶⁷ Another worry was a stalemate and the Syrian occupation becoming the new status quo for northern Jordan. If Hussein could not push the Syrian forces out, Syria or a combination of the Fedayeen supported by Syrian and Soviet equipment could annex the northern section of Jordan.

Also on September 20, with the White House's approval, Israel sent reconnaissance flights over Jordan to get an accurate view of the battlefield. Early the next morning, Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yitzhak Rabin contacted Kissinger and informed him the situation around Irbid was dire. Rabin believed that the Syrian forces remained strong and Syria had the ability reinforce them. In addition, he reported that the Syrians had strengthened their position around Irbid and would be hard to displace. Rabin also let Kissinger know that the Israeli leadership believed that airstrikes might not be enough, and Israeli ground troops could be needed. The White House wanted to avoid any Israeli ground incursion if possible because it could inflame the region and damage the standing of the King. Rabin also promised that the Israeli would wait until they completed their reconnaissance flights and then consult with the White House before making a decision.⁶⁸ The White House faced a number of threats from the

initial Israeli response. They needed to worry that Israel could use Hussein's weakened state to push for a larger incursion into Jordan, hoping to retain some of the lands after the crisis ended. In addition, in the past, many in the Israeli government did not respect Hussein's value to the American interests in the region and saw his removal as an opportunity to create a Palestinian state inside of Jordan, allowing them to annex the West Bank. Because of this, Nixon and Kissinger needed to restrain Israel, only allowing them to intervene if it was necessary for Hussein's survival.

In the first meeting of the Israeli cabinet, there was a split on what to do with the Jordanian request for assistance against Syria. Prime Minister Meir and Ambassador Rabin argued in favor of some intervention. They believed that Israel had had a long history with the Hashemite monarchy, and in general, it had been a positive one. This relationship was far more positive than with any other Arab leader. They believed that despite Hussein's actions in 1967, this relationship allowed for the best chance of peace with an Arab government in the near future. Opposed to them were more radical leaders led by Ariel Sharon, Moshe Dayan, and Simon Peres. They tended to believe that King Hussein could not survive much longer anyway and because of that, it was preferable to stay out of the fighting. Some even argued that it was in Israel's best interest to facilitate a Palestinian takeover of Jordan because it would settle the debate of a Palestinian state.⁶⁹ If the Palestinians controlled Jordan, the Palestinian's claim to the West Bank as a future Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital would be dramatically weakened because they no longer were stateless. Sharon and Dayan hoped to make Jordan a Palestinian state and annex the rest of the West Bank for Israel.

The cabinet finally agreed to make plans to help Hussein if it became necessary. The IDF drew up plans to move against the Syrian forces by both land and air. They also made contingencies of what to do if the Jordanian government fell. In this scenario, Israel believed that Jordan would be broken up by all its neighbors, mainly Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Israel planned that if this looked like a certain possibility, it should be ready to take their share. This would include the Gilead Heights, Kerak, and the port city of Aqaba.⁷⁰ In addition to their desire to expand their boundaries, Israel believed that if a more radical regime replaced Hussein, it would need a larger buffer against the hostile forces, necessitating more land.

The Israelis did try to get some concessions out of the United States in return for any intervention to save Hussein and Jordan from the Syrians. Rabin asked Kissinger and Sisco for support if the Egyptians responded by attacking in the Sinai. In addition, they wanted support and protection if the Soviets intervened to stop an Israeli attack on Syria. Finally, Israel wanted more arms. Kissinger agreed to almost all of it, including the replacement of any equipment or ammunition used in the fighting, but did not guarantee the US would enter the fight if the Soviets also did.⁷¹ This last point was not as significant since the US under Nixon and Kissinger repeatedly showed in the future, they would not allow the Soviet Union to attack an ally without repercussions for fear of losing American prestige to the Soviets. Kissinger preferred to have maximum flexibility to respond to a crisis with the Soviet Union, and that is why he did not give the Israelis the assurances they desired.

With Golda Meir in flight back to Israel from the United States, acting Prime Minister Allon sent a message to King Hussein through the American ambassador in Tel

Aviv on September 21. He said, “[I am] following [the] developments with deep sympathy and goodwill. In [the] view to clarify [the] situation [I] suggest [an] immediate meeting with you or with your authorized competent representative. Pick a time of your convenience.”⁷²

Hussein replied:

[I am] extremely grateful to [my] old friend for [his] concern. [The] situation [is] grave up north. [I am] trying to reorganize and given a chance we may be able to contain [the] threat. However, [the] threat of a breakthrough does exist. And this will require immediate action. I would have loved to have this chance to meet, but [it is] physically impossible at this time. [I] will arrange a meeting as soon as possible. [In the] meantime please keep in touch through this channel. Best regards and wishes.⁷³

Hussein hoped to keep the Israelis out of Jordan up until the last minute when a Syrian advance on Amman became certain. At only this point was he willing to risk the fallout from an Israeli intervention to save his monarchy.

Like the Americans, Hussein also worried about the impact of an Israeli ground invasion. In a message between Zeid Rifai and Brown, Rifai told him that Jordan was ok with ground operations by Israel against Syria, as long as it did not take place in Jordan. Rifai believed that if Israel attacked Syria inside Syria, the Syrian forces would return to defend against the Israeli offensive. Hussein could then explain to the other Arab nations that he did not collaborate with Israel, but Israel reacted on its own against Syria. Brown also made it clear to the White House that in his view, the best position for the United States was that King Hussein could meet the Syrian threat on his own. Otherwise, it would confirm to the other Arab nations, “The Jordanian monarchy is crypto-Zionist at

heart.” Brown was also unsure of the reaction of the Jordanian military to an Israeli ground force. He could not guarantee that they would not view the Israelis as a threat and break off the attack with the Syrian to engage the Israeli forces.⁷⁴ While a direct Israeli intervention would have damaged Hussein’s regime, he was probably correct in his belief that he could have survived it if Israeli forces only attacked Syria through Syria and not in tandem with the Jordanian forces. In addition, the preparations for an Israeli attack could force the Syrian to retreat to repel it, making actual Israeli intervention unnecessary.

In further communication between Brown and Secretary of State Rogers, Brown made it clear that Jordan was only asking for military ground forces if they came from the United States or the United Kingdom and planned to engage Syria inside of Jordan. Hussein was asking for airstrikes from anyone who was in a position to provide them, including the Israelis.⁷⁵ From the perspective of Hussein, he could disavow or deny airstrikes from Israel, but he could not deny the presence of ground troops. In addition, he did not trust the Israelis to use ground forces on the Syrian tank columns and then retreat. Hussein feared it was just as likely they would use it as an excuse to take more land in northern Jordan. Hussein had a much better relationship with both the United States and the UK, trusting they would not do anything that would permanently damage his reign. Finally, the US could order ground intervention under the pretense of stopping Soviet aggression, not as an attack on the Arab or Palestinian cause.

Later on September 21, the Israelis contacted Alexander Haig and informed him that they no longer believed that air strikes alone would successfully end the conflict. Rabin requested the American position on an Israeli ground invasion within two or three

hours. Haig informed the Israelis it would take more time to respond. Nixon's advisors were not unanimous on the position of an Israeli ground attack. Nixon's first inclination was to approve it. Kissinger and Rogers worried it could explode into a larger conflict with the Soviet Union and wanted to wait at least until King Hussein made a direct request. Sisco agreed with Nixon believing that Hussein was going to need Israeli ground forces to survive. Kissinger also believed that there was more time to decide. His reasoning was that the IDF would require a full mobilization in case the fighting escalated after an invasion. This would at least take forty-eight hours. He also believed that if the Syrians saw an Israeli mass mobilization, it might give them pause and retreat or stop their advancement. In addition, he believed that the Syrians might face pressure to end the fighting by other Arab leaders, particularly Nasser, so as not to have another humiliating defeat like the 1967 conflict.⁷⁶

The fear of a repeat of 1967 debacle was valid. Nasser did receive a message from Moscow that said, "[The Soviet Union is] asking us to exercise the utmost restraint because the international situation is becoming extremely delicate and any miscalculation might result in the Arabs losing all the reputation which they have recovered over the past three years."⁷⁷ The Soviet Union did not want another defeat by their proxy against an American proxy and they concurred with the American belief that currently, Israel remained a much stronger and effective fighting force.

In a conversation between Haig and Nixon, Nixon wanted to make sure he explained to the Israelis precisely the American position. Nixon's principles were:

First, the operation must succeed; success diplomatically as well as militarily must be considered; if it is militarily feasible, they must lean in

the direction of accomplishing a true air action alone . . . if, however, that proves to be militarily and overall inadequate, again what is necessary to achieve success would have our support . . . action on the ground as distinguished from the air must strictly be limited to Jordan.⁷⁸

The White House staff all agreed that Israel could bomb Syria proper, but any invasion of Syrian land by Israeli ground forces had the potential to spill into a larger conflict involving the US, the Arabs, and the Soviet Union.

Nixon also faced another issue, the response to the crisis by Congress and the American public. With all the troop deployments, it became clear the Nixon administration would have to explain the situation both to the public and Congress. This was important because if the situation continued to escalate, Nixon would need both congressional and public support to use American resources in the region effectively. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said, “Whatever we do, we should make it clear that Jordan has been attacked and that the survival of the King is crucial for U.S. interests, especially the long-term perspective.”⁷⁹ To accomplish this, the NSC produced talking points to give to members of Congress. They said, “At stake is the regime of King Hussein, a moderate leader friendly to the United States and prepared if he can to make peace with Israel. If he falls, the prospects are for radicalization and possible partition of Jordan among elements hostile to Israel and the United States. If Hussein falls, there will remain little hope for an Arab/Israeli settlement in the foreseeable future.”⁸⁰ The Nixon administration hoped to persuade Congress and the public that helping Jordan was in the US’s interests by focusing on the importance of Israel’s security and the American position in the region in relation to the Cold War. The administration believed by doing that, it would have maximum flexibility to respond to the crisis.

September 22, became the turning point in the conflict. Hussein and the Jordanian military launched a highly coordinated air and ground offensive outside of Irbid. While the Jordanian air force was smaller than the Syrian air force, Hussein and his advisors did not believe that Syria planned to use them in this fight. They believed that because Syria tried to mark their tanks with PLA, symbolizing that this was competently a Palestinian operation, they could not do the same thing with their planes.⁸¹ While it strained believability that the Palestinian forces bases in Syria had hundreds of tanks to invade Jordan, the idea of a Palestinian air force was a step too far in the minds of Hussein and his advisors. In addition, internal dissension in Syria also played a role in the lack of an air attack. Hafez al-Assad was the head of the Syrian air force and opposed the leadership of President Salih Jadid. Because of this, Assad refused to use Syrian fighter jets to protect the Syrian tank forces from the air.⁸² Assad and his loyalist eventually placed blame on Jadid for the failures in Jordan and removed him from power.

Also on the September 22, Jordan received assurances from Iraqi Vice President Harden al-Takriti that his forces did not intend to intervene in the conflict between Syria and Jordan. They even allowed the Jordanian military to pass through their lines in one instance to attack the rebel positions. While both the Iraqi and Syrian government were Baathists, they did not like each other and had a rivalry that extended beyond Jordan.⁸³ This removed another potent threat against Hussein, allowing him to concentrate his attack on Syria and the Fedayeen. In addition, the United States received intelligence that the Soviets began to urge the Syrians to withdraw. Other sources added that Syria and the Soviet Union became worried about the Israeli mobilization and the possibility of this conflict expanding into a regional war.⁸⁴ It seems likely that the efforts of Nixon and

Kissinger to continue the escalation gave the Soviets pause for fear that the Syrian invasion could blow up into a large regional war that they opposed. While the Soviet Union might have supported the Syrian actions if it had the possibility to remove an American ally in the region, they demonstrated that despite that desire, they were not willing to have an actual confrontation with the Americans to achieve that goal.

To increase the pressure on the Syrians and their supporters in Moscow further, the White House authorized four destroyers to head to the region and two attack submarines to join them on September 23. The goal of this was to show both the Russians and the Syrians that the United States was not bluffing, and increase pressure for a full Syrian withdrawal. Kissinger feared that the Syrians would hold their position and dig in, creating a zone of control in northern Jordan.⁸⁵ This action would weaken King Hussein further and could lead to an Israeli attack, increasing the scope of the conflict. In addition, Hussein could not expect to survive long as the leader of Jordan if a hostile Syrian force dedicated to his removal occupied a large section of his country.

With Jordan taking control of the airspace and looking like they would succeed, the White House wanted to make sure that the Israelis did not use this as an opportunity to attack. Despite the agreement on this broad goal, there was a conflict between the State Department and Kissinger over how to do it. Kissinger did not want to send an official message for fear that it would leak and show a lack of resolve by the US before the conflict was clearly over. Rogers believed the US needed to make it clear to Israel that they no longer supported an attack. Nixon ordered Sisco to contact the Israelis and tell them that the US wanted some consultation with Israel before any strike took place.⁸⁶ Because of the dramatic change of the situation on the ground, Nixon adjusted his view

of Israeli involvement. He said, “The U.S. does not want the Israelis to move unilaterally . . . [and] Israeli interests differed from U.S. interests and that we did not want to be drawn into the conflict as a result of Israeli initiatives.”⁸⁷ This theme of conflict between the State Department and Kissinger occurred throughout the crisis. Kissinger wanted to be more aggressive and was far more concerned about the perception of American actions throughout the world while Rogers was more concerned about the details of diplomacy and the impact of taking an aggressive approach to the crisis and the potential for it to spiral out of control. Nixon usually decided on a more aggressive posture, but, at least acknowledged Rogers’ concerns over the potential for too much escalation leading to a larger conflict.

With the main fighting over, Nasser called for an Arab summit that occurred from September 22 to the 25. Nasser had concerns about the destruction of the Fedayeen and the implications of the conflict for the broader Middle East. He also had concerns about increased American involvement. This fear intensified when a number of his advisors on the ground in Jordan told him they believed that the plan to strike at the Fedayeen came from the CIA.⁸⁸ In a meeting with Hussein, Nasser told him, “I oppose any action you may be contemplating to take against the Fedayeen. I don’t want you to liquidate them or them to liquidate you. No doubt you have the strength to crush them, but to do this you will have to slaughter 20,000 people and your kingdom will be a kingdom of ghosts.”⁸⁹ Nasser preferred to have the Palestinian militants available to strike at Israel if he ever needed them in any future conflict. Because of that, he opposed any actions by Hussein that led to their destruction.

By the end of September 24, Arafat agreed to a cease-fire, and Nasser called for another meeting of Arab leaders in Cairo to take place on September 27, for a broader discussion of the situation. While the Palestinian forces and the Jordanian government agreed to a more formal cease-fire, the King's forces continued to restore his control over the nation. While he continued to destroy the Fedayeen positions, Hussein received a protest letter from the Russians ordering the Jordanian to stop their aggressions against the Palestinians because it "only served the interests of the imperialists and Israel."⁹⁰ This letter had little impact because Hussein knew he had the full support of the United States and the Arab nations were no longer an immediate threat to his survival.

Over the next ten months and culminating on July 12, 1971, the Jordanian forces under the leadership of Prime Minister Tall continued to remove the Palestinian fighters from Jordan. On the July 12, Jordanian forces attacked the Fedayeen militants in the area of Jerash-Aijoun. The military killed or captured most of the remaining Fedayeen forces in the area. The rest evacuated to Syria. The Jordanian public considered Tall a hero and he explained that Fedayeen forces were in an "occupied area subject to the harshest conditions of evil and terror." Tall promised Hussein he would "purge the ranks – all the ranks – of those professional criminals who pose as Fedayeen."⁹¹ On July 15, Tall said the military would "seal every channel of evil regardless of how small it may be . . . We shall not tolerate the chaos of the past, undisciplined commands and attacks on our citizens and soldiers."⁹² Because of Tall's role in driving out the Palestinian forces, the Black September group assassinated Tall while he attended a meeting with other Arab leaders in Cairo.⁹³ This was particularly devastating for Hussein because Tall was a close friend and trusted advisor. He felt particularly betrayed when the Egyptian government

released Tall's assailants on bail, allowing them to escape the consequences of their actions.⁹⁴ This incident also further undermined Hussein's relationship with Anwar Sadat, who replaced Nasser upon his death on September 28, 1970.

The consequences of the Jordan civil war and the Syrian invasion had a long lasting impact on the Middle East. Nobody suffered more than the Palestinian Fedayeen forces and the Syrian government. While speaking at the Arab summit to end the fighting, Arafat pleaded with the other leaders for help and said, "There is a sea of blood. Some twenty thousand of our people are killed or wounded."⁹⁵ At one point, things were so bad for the Palestinian fighters, over one hundred militants crossed the border with Israel and surrendered to the IDF with the hope of being spared from annihilation by the Jordanian army.⁹⁶ Arafat and the remaining Fedayeen forces eventually evacuated to Syria and to Lebanon where they continued their campaign against the Israelis but lost the support of Jordan and many other Arab states. In total, the Palestinians claimed to lose thirty-five hundred civilians killed and nine hundred fighters. The Jordanians captured over twenty-three hundred fighters.⁹⁷ In total, the Palestinian Fedayeen lost almost half of their fighting force through casualty or capture during the whole of the conflict. In addition, Arafat faced an internal threat for his failed leadership during the war. Within the next year, he faced two different assassination attempts by rival members of Fatah who blamed him for the failures in Jordan.⁹⁸

Syria also suffered because of the defeat in Jordan. In material costs alone they lost over one hundred and twenty tanks, more than twenty percent of their total tanks available, and had six hundred casualties.⁹⁹ In addition, Assad used the failure of the invasion as a pretext for the removal of President Salah Jadid in November and placed

Syria permanently in the hands of him and his family.¹⁰⁰ This failed invasion hurt Syria's standing in the wider Arab world and poisoned relations with Jordan for years. In addition, it caused Syria to deepen its ties to the Soviet Union in order to replace all its losses during the conflict.

The war also changed the relations between Jordan and Israel. Dayan believed this newfound cooperation limited the chances for misunderstanding and conflict between the two nations. For example, the Yom Kippur War did not escalate into an Israeli-Jordanian conflict because of this new attitude. Dayan still believed that King Hussein was naive to the realities of differences between the two nations but felt they could at least sustain an end to the active fighting between Israel and Jordan. For example, he did not take King Hussein's assurances that all issues would be solved by the return of land lost in 1967 war, especially with regards to the issues of Palestinian refugees and Israeli security necessities, but still believed that King Hussein was an "enlightened man of the world" and somebody that Israel could eventually make peace with.¹⁰¹ The improvement of this relationship led to a series of secret meetings between Hussein and representatives of Israel in an attempt to reach a peace accord. While those efforts failed to produce a settlement between Israel and Jordan, Hussein and the Israeli leadership continued their communications leading to an improved relationship between the two nations.

The impact of the conflict also influenced American-Jordan relations. The Nixon White House viewed Hussein as a reliable friend in the region who was willing to take on the radicals and was strong enough to survive. To help stabilize the King, on September 26, the White House ordered the Pentagon to replenish food supplies for the Jordanian army and civilians. The White House also established hospitals in Jordan to care for the

wounded.¹⁰² This also resulted in a new round of military aid for Jordan. Nixon allowed for ten million dollars in direct military assistance and pledged to ask Congress for an additional thirty million which was granted.¹⁰³ A reporter on the ground after the conflict ended said she spotted a Jordanian soldier outfitted with American gear and American-made uniforms. She said, “While talking with a soldier, we noticed that he was wearing American-made equipment, in this case a cartridge belt plainly marked ‘US’. We pointed to it and he said, ‘Yes we are the American army in Jordan.’”¹⁰⁴ The conflict firmly established Jordan as a client of the US in the region and Hussein would continue to rely on the relationship in the future to maintain the security of his regime.

All sides of the conflict clearly saw the Jordanian-Syrian phase of the fighting as a part of the Cold War. After the fighting, Jordan’s Minister of Information Adnan Abu-Odeh said, “many commando organizations [were] Marxist and Yasir Arafat had been misled by Marxist propaganda.”¹⁰⁵ In October 1970, Brezhnev said the Soviet Union focused on stopping the intervention of the imperialist powers but also “tried to contribute in every possible way toward . . . stopping the extermination of the units of the Palestine resistance movement.” He added that the defeat of the Palestinian forces was “truly tragic.”¹⁰⁶ Secretary of State Rogers said, “An additional benefit of our handling of the Jordanian crisis was the fact that Syria had suffered massive casualties that would further serve as a deterrent to the future aggressiveness. Further, the Palestinian extremist had been badly hurt. . . . all of this constituted a further drain on Soviet resources.”¹⁰⁷

The conflict and the Soviet actions also reinforced Kissinger’s attitude toward the Soviet Union. On September 24, Kissinger met with Anatoly Dobrynin. Dobrynin told

him that the Soviet Union did not know that Syria was going to invade Jordan. In addition, he assured Kissinger that “Soviet advisors had left their Syrian units before the latter crossed the frontier.” This confirmed Kissinger’s belief that even if the Soviet Union did not order the Syrian invasion, they at the very least supported it. He argued that if Soviet advisors were with Syrian army all the way to the border than they had ample time to dissuade them from the invasion if it was what the Soviet Union desired.¹⁰⁸ In addition, at a meeting at the Soviet embassy on September 22, Voronstov told Kissinger that the Soviets believed Syria would not withdrawal but had agreed to not advance any further. This reinforced belief of Kissinger that the Soviets did have some control over the actions of Syria despite their protests, otherwise they would not be pushing for Syria to remain in Jordan.¹⁰⁹ Later, Kissinger would sum up his view of the crisis as follows:

Syria invaded Jordan; Israel mobilized. The Middle East seemed on the edge of war. The United States massively reinforced its naval forces in the Mediterranean and made clear that it would not tolerate any outside intervention. It soon became apparent that the Soviet Union would run no risk of confrontation with the United States. Syria withdrew and the crisis ended, though not without having first demonstrated to the Arab world which superpower was more relevant to shaping the future of the area.¹¹⁰

After the crisis, when discussing why it was in the American interest to support Hussein, Kissinger said:

It was important to demonstrate that friendship with the West and a moderate foreign policy would be rewarded with effective American support. It was necessary to arrest the progressive radicalization of the Middle East, which had been accelerated by the dispatch of Soviet missiles and combat personnel to Egypt. Nasser’s technique of blackmailing the United States with Soviet threats had to be shown as futile.”¹¹¹

Kissinger could have made the same point about Syria.

In addition to the improved relations with Jordan, the United States also attempted to improve relations with other Arab regimes after the conflict ended. A statement from the State Department to be delivered to all the Arab capitals said, “While it is understandable that feelings are deep when such bloodshed has been involved, we believe Hussein [was] forced in [this] situation by Maoist-inclined forces among [the] Palestinians, and that he is fully capable of putting his house in order and maintaining the broad support of his entire population.” They also stated that “If there are real villains in [the] Jordan tragedy they are clearly George Habash, Hawatmeh and other in the leadership of [the] extremist groups.”¹¹² The United States hoped to show other more moderate Arab regimes, like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, that they were not hostile to the Palestinians, but only the radicals. In addition, they wanted to demonstrate to the moderate regimes that these radicals might eventually turn their sights on them, and as the US has demonstrated in Jordan, it was willing to support its allies from outside aggression.

William B. Quandt, an aide, to Kissinger also argued that the United States played a vital role in the conflict. He said the American actions were important for two reasons. “First, King Hussein needed encouragement to draw full on his own military resources. He seemed to be afraid of committing his own air force without assurances that outside help would be available if he got in trouble.” Second, “Left to their own devices, Israeli leaders might have responded to the Jordan crisis differently. By working closely with the United States, Israel made its power available on terms that King Hussein was able to accept.”¹¹³

The crisis also dramatically improved the relations between Israel and the United States. The Nixon administration placed a great deal of value in the fact that Israel was willing to come to the aid of an American ally when asked. Michael Oren, the future Israeli Ambassador to the United States said, “The White House. . . would long remember Israel’s readiness to fight at America’s behest. Over the next three years, American military aid to the Jewish state multiplied tenfold and pressure for Israeli territorial concessions ceased.”¹¹⁴

The impact on Jordan was also important. Hussein finally had full control of his country and no longer worried about retaliation by Israel for events he could not control. In meeting between Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon and King Hussein on October 3, Hussein explained to Allon in more details about how he viewed the conflict. Hussein believed that after the Palestinians called the general strike, he would have faced a larger revolutionary movement in the following days. After the fighting had ended, Jordan held over twenty thousand Palestinian prisoners. This also included some Chinese advisors, highlighting to some the connection between the Palestinian militants and the larger Marxist/anti-imperialist movement. His intelligent service was using documents captured from Fatah bases to round up more Fedayeen leaders and Hussein believed that with this information he would eventually be able to destroy the Fedayeen in Jordan. The reaction from most of the Arab leadership pleased Hussein. While he was encouraged to end the bloodshed, most had no love loss for Arafat. Hussein told Allon that Saudi Arabia did not end their financial support of Jordan. Libya, under the leadership of Muammar Gaddafi, had the loudest opposition to the Jordanian actions and was one of the few nations to cut Jordan’s financial aid.¹¹⁵

For the first time since the conflict in 1967, Hussein finally had full control over his nation. By the end of 1971, almost all the Palestinian forces left Jordan and Hussein no longer feared retaliation from Israel over actions by the Fedayeen. Hussein faced an extreme threat to his survival and demonstrated there was no length he would not go to save his monarchy. He would even use the Israelis if that became necessary. In doing so, Hussein proved to the United States that he was a capable ally that they could rely on to promote stability and moderation throughout the region. It also established Hussein as a moderate voice in the region, one who would take on the radicals, with force if necessary, to promote stability in the region. The US now had a much stronger partner in the heart of the Middle East that could promote their interests to the broader Arab world. The crisis improved relations between the US and Jordan and established a working relationship between Hussein and the Israeli leadership that would be important during future crises.

CHAPTER IV

NIXON AND FORD IN THE SHADDOW OF WAR

After the fighting had ended in Jordan, King Hussein hoped to continue his quest for peace in the region with the support of his new, tighter relationship with Washington. During the second half of the Nixon administration and the Ford administration after Nixon resigned in disgrace, Hussein continued to play a constructive role in promoting American interest in the region, while trying to cement Jordan's position as a key American ally. Hussein did this through a number of peace plans, most notably the United Arab Kingdom plan, and a major regional war that involved both the Soviet Union and the United States actively assisting their allies in the region. Hussein also used the American fear from the Cold War to promote his and Jordan's interest. Despite his efforts, outside events usually thwarted his goals. These included domestic political trouble for Nixon, domestic issues in Israel, and Arab actions that did not account for Jordanian interests including another major Arab-Israeli war. Finally, the removal of Hussein as the representative of the people of the West Bank damaged his ability to negotiate with the Israelis and solve the Palestinian issue.

Hussein continued to believe that through a close relationship with the US, he could achieve his two main goals of retaining his position as the head of Jordan along

with regaining the territory lost in the 1967 war. In addition, Hussein hoped that the continued relationship with the US would protect him from the most radical elements in the Arab world and if needed, repel external threats similar to the Syrian invasion in 1970. To accomplish this feat, Hussein immediately began an effort at a new peace settlement with Israel that he hoped would eventually lead to the return of the West Bank and Jerusalem to Jordanian control now that he assured the threat to his regime from Palestinian militants had passed.

In a speech to the Jordanian public on March 15, 1972, King Hussein announced his new plan for a settlement of the Palestinian problem and the continued conflict with Israel. He called for the creation of a United Arab Kingdom which consisted of two states under one rule. The Jordanian state would reside on the East Bank of the Jordan River with the capital of Amman. The Palestinian state would be in the West Bank and would include any other liberated areas that wished to join. This implied the eventual integration of Gaza into the Jordanian federation. The capital of the Palestinian state would reside in the holy city of Jerusalem. Both states would fall under a united kingdom located in the capital of Amman and have a united armed forces under the head of the state, King Hussein. The central government would manage international affairs including the military, trade, and diplomacy. An elected governor of each state would lead day-to-day operations of each state but who would have some subservience to Hussein. Hussein said:

The new phase which we look forward to will guarantee the reorganization of the Jordanian-Palestinian house in a manner which will provide it with more intrinsic power and ability to work to attain its ambitions and aspiration. Proceeding from this fact, this formula will bind the two banks with ties of stronger fiber and with closer bonds and will

strengthen their brotherhood and march as a result of enhancing man's responsibility in each bank on bases more suitable for serving their national aspirations without prejudice to any of the rights gained by any citizen, where he be of Palestinian origin living in the Jordanian region or a Jordanian origin living in the Palestinian region.¹

Hussein believed this plan had the potential to accomplish a number of his goals. It would allow him to secure his place, and his family's place as the undisputed ruler of a united Jordan while at the same time increasing the viability of a Jordanian nation. He said, "we shall put the Jordanian - Palestinian house in order so that intrinsic strength and ability to attain our ambitions and goals will be enhanced. This formula will tighten the bonds of the two banks." Hussein believed that the plan would promote both Jordanian and Palestinian nationalism and give his main constituency, the Jordanians on the East Bank, more control over their lives separate from the plight of the Palestinian refugees settled in Jordan² Finally, it would recognize Hussein's role as the protector of the holy sites in Jerusalem.

Hussein's calls for direct voter participation and self-determination were aimed at the Americans and the West because of their commitment to the ideals of democracy and representative government. He hoped that with the focus on self-determination, leaders in Washington would favor the plan. He announced his plan just before a scheduled trip to Washington with the hope of capitalizing on this theme.³ Despite his hope and the positive nature of the trip to Washington, Hussein did not get the support he wanted for his plan. In talks with Nixon, Rogers emphasized that Hussein was a strong ally of the US but also stressed at this point Israel was unwilling to give Hussein the concessions he

desired. While the White House delivered this reality to Hussein, they attempted to ease the pain by increasing aid to Jordan.⁴

Another headwind against a dramatic peace deal with the support of the United States was the political season in Washington. In December 1971, Nixon designated Kissinger with running the American response to issues in the Middle East. According to Kissinger, “Nixon did not believe he could risk recurrent crises in the Middle East in an election year. He therefore asked me to step in, if only to keep things quiet.”⁵ In a meeting between Kissinger and Golda Meir on December 2, 1971, Kissinger and Meir agreed to stop searching for a comprehensive agreement in the Middle East for the time being. Instead, only talks concerning Israel and its neighbors would commence with the hope of minimizing any entanglements, while pushing to later any attempts at a large settlement with the broader Arab world.⁶ The importance of the Jewish vote in the upcoming election would limit Nixon’s ability to respond to a new crisis in the Middle East. It gave Israel too much leverage with Nixon, making his order for Kissinger to limit the potential problems a prudent step.

The impact of the Jordanian Civil War also influenced the United States not to get involved. Because Israel willingly came to the aid of the United States when it needed support for its ally Jordan, Nixon and Kissinger saw Israel as a more reliable ally than any time before. Because of these actions, American military aid to Israel increased tenfold and the United States stopped trying to pressure Israel into making large territorial concessions to the Arabs in order to achieve peace.⁷ In fact, from 1967-1970 American military aid to Israel averaged \$47 million dollars a year. From 1971 to 1974 that number increased to \$384 million.⁸ In addition, the White House saw Jordan now as

a state perusing the Nixon administration's view of the Cold War, with Jordan, Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, providing a bulkhead against Soviet expansion in the region and maintaining the status quo of American dominance and unfettered access to the natural resources of the region.⁹ For these reasons, the United States had very little incentive to start new initiatives that had the potential to end that favorable status quo.

Despite the initial reluctance of the United States, Hussein still moved forward with promoting his plan to the most important Arab states. He hoped that if he had their support, it might increase the pressure on Israel and the United States to agree reluctantly to negotiate with him. Hussein sent a letter to Assad asking for his support of his plan even though at that point Jordan still did not have any diplomatic relations with Syria and the wounds from the Syrian invasion during the Jordanian Civil War were still fresh. In the letter, Hussein claimed that he discussed the plan with a number of Palestinian leaders and had their support. In addition, he argued that this was the most realistic way to end the occupation during the foreseeable future. Hussein argued that any independent Palestinian state formed in the current situation would not be strong enough to withstand pressure from Israel, making a federation with Jordan the most logical step. Finally, Hussein assured Assad that once the Palestinian liberation of the occupied territories was complete, the people of those territories would have the ability to decide if they wanted to continue to maintain their association with Jordan.¹⁰ Hussein would frequently use this idea of self-determination for the Palestinian population. It had a number of benefits. First, it embraced the legacy of Woodrow Wilson and his call for self-determination after World War I, linking his ideas to American ideals. Second, it Hussein hoped to assure the other Arabs that he did not want to take over for the Palestinians and continue his

attacks on them from the Jordanian Civil War, but was willing to allow them to decide on their future.

Hussein faced difficulties in his attempt to get Egyptian approval. Days after Jordan and the Palestinian militants agreed to a ceasefire, which was brokered by Nasser, Nasser died from a heart attack on September 28, 1970. The new leader of Egypt, Anwar Sadat did not think as highly of King Hussein as his predecessor. Sadat's political training in Egypt's Free Officer Movement informed his negative attitude towards monarchs. In fact, he believed that Hussein would work with the Israelis or the Americans to thwart the Arab cause if it served his immediate interests. Soon after Nasser's death on November 19, 1970, Hussein contacted Sadat asking for a meeting in Cairo. While he agreed to the meeting initially, Sadat canceled it after learning of secret meetings between Hussein and Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon. In addition, in private meetings with various Palestinian groups, Sadat told them to ignore any actions Hussein took with Israel and oppose any settlement.¹¹

When Hussein approached Sadat about his United Arab Kingdom Plan, Hussein argued, "The PLO had imported a dangerous ideology, nearly causing the collapse of Jordan. Meanwhile, Israel was moving forward the creation of a weak puppet Palestinian entity on the West Bank so that they can swallow it when they wish."¹² Sadat rejected Hussein's plan because he thought it was a scheme pushed by the Americans. In addition, he believed it was an attempt to give Jordan control over Gaza and through it, a link to the sea. In addition, he viewed it as a means of cut off the Egyptians from the Palestinians by severing their connection to the Gaza.¹³ Sadat told Hussein that his plan was "a way of robbing the Palestinian people of their rights to self-determination."¹⁴ To

further express its outrage of the plan, Egypt broke off diplomatic relations with Jordan on April 6, 1972.¹⁵

The leading Palestinian groups also opposed it. The central committee of the PLO rejected it outright and accused Hussein of “offering itself as an accomplice to the Zionist Enemy.” It also accused Hussein of being a “subservient and collusive regime” towards the Israelis. Fatah used the plan as an excuse to continue their feud with Hussein. In a statement they said, their dispute was with “the King, the Hashemite dynasty, and the regime” for their collusion with Israel and the US. It also accused Hussein of siding with Zionism and imperialism to destroy the Palestinians.¹⁶ Finally, they rejected Hussein’s ability to negotiate for the Palestinians. The PLO central committee said, “The people of Palestine alone, and in the necessary atmosphere of freedom, can decide their own future and the future of their cause.”¹⁷ The reaction of the PLO showed signs of future problems for Hussein. The Arabs and the Palestinians would continue to challenge Hussein’s ability to speak for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Jordan.

Like the Arabs, Israel also was not an enthusiastic supporter of the ideas promoted by Hussein and the Israeli government immediately rejected his plan. Prime Minister Golda Meir opposed it for many reasons. First, it had a huge impact on Israel’s security without any negotiations on how that threat could be relieved. Second, it did not call for a lasting or binding peace with Israel, the minimum Israel needed to trade land for peace. Finally, she said the plan was a “pretentious and one-sided statement which not only does not serve the interests of peace, but is liable to spur all the extremist elements whose aim is war against Israel.”¹⁸ On March 17, the Knesset passed a resolution rejecting the idea

behind Hussein's plan by noting that "the historic right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is beyond challenge."¹⁹ This statement meant that the current state of Israel did not intend to give up land they felt historically tied to the Jewish people, this included the West Bank.

Another issue encouraging Israel not to move forward on Hussein's peace plan was the benefits of the status quo. Israeli Labor Party leader Shimon Peres said the relationship between Jordan and Israel "is distinct not in a passive sense – nonaggression, non-belligerency – but it also has an active component. This includes open bridges for people and goods, negations of war and terrorism, mutual dislike of the Russians, and an attempt to maintain a . . . consistency in our relationship" which could all go away with failed negotiation.²⁰ Israeli politicians saw no need to risk the status quo through a large public negotiation between Israel and Jordan, especially for relatively minimal gains in terms of security.

Despite Meir's initial public rejection of Hussein's United Arab plan, she was willing to meet with him to discuss it further. She did this because of the close relationship between the two governments and the desire to keep Hussein friendly towards Israel. Those meetings began on March 21, 1972. Meir told Hussein she was opposed to his plan partly because it did not openly talk about peace with Israel. Hussein assured her that he did foresee an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the West Bank then placed under a Jordanian federation until both sides agreed to a final settlement. Meir questioned if Hussein would agree to border changes not based on the 1967 lines, allowing Israel to retain some of their settlements constructed after 1967 war. Hussein told Meir that he would need most of the West Bank back, especially East

Jerusalem where a large Arab population remained. Hussein acknowledged that the negotiations would need to address the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem but he emphasized he needed to retain most of the West Bank to make the deal palpable to the rest of the Arab world. In addition, he believed that Jerusalem could remain the capital of both Israel and the Palestinian part of the United Arab Kingdom. In the interest of Israeli security, Hussein pledged to make the West Bank a demilitarized zone.²¹ While Jordan and Israel did not reach an agreement, both leaders pledged to continue the dialogue. The meetings between Meir and Hussein to discuss the United Arab Kingdom Plan were important for a number of reasons. First, many of the solutions proposed by Hussein would continue to form the basis of future peace talks between Israel and Jordan. This also included talks sponsored by the Americans. In addition, it established a working relationship between Hussein and Israel that would be important in limiting the fallout in future Israeli-Arab crises.

On June 29, 1972, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan met with Hussein to discuss the United Arab Kingdom plan. Dayan took a more hardline position than Meir and he opposed returning to Jordan any land captured in the 1967 war back. Instead, he tried to convince Hussein that Jordan should sign a peace deal or a mutual defense pact with Israel. He tried to persuade Hussein that Golda Meir was much more likely to give him favorable terms than any other Israeli leader, including himself. Hussein was unwilling to make a formal defense pact but did not reject it out of hand with the belief that he might one day in the future need Israeli assistance like he did in 1970.²²

Despite the meetings between Jordan and Israel, there was no chance for an agreement between the two nations because Israel had no incentive to change the status

quo in the West Bank. Israel, with a dominant military and continued American support, had no reason to make the compromises necessary to reach an accord with Jordan. Even though the American government enthusiastically supported making a deal with Hussein because of his affinity for the West, they were not willing to threaten Israeli aid to force them to work with Hussein. For Hussein, he could not agree to any deal that did not return the West Bank to Jordan. Besides the historical and familial link to holy sites in Jerusalem, Hussein could not survive in the Arab world if it appeared he abandoned the Palestinians to Israel. In addition, even a defense pact was unlikely because Hussein could not expect to survive solely with the defense of IDF. While a defense pact would protect him from external threats, any agreement with Israel that did not return much of the land from 1967 would increase the internal threats to his rule. He needed to make an agreement that increased or at the very least stabilized his prestige in the rest of the Arab world if he hoped to survive.

Despite the failure of the United Arab Kingdom plan, it did have a lasting impact on the region and in Jordan. Its most significant consequence was on the relationship between Jordan and the Palestinian people. According to one of the authors of the plan, Adnan Abu-Odeh, because Hussein argued for a separate Palestinian state inside a larger federation, he acknowledged for the first time that Jordan might not be reunited with the West Bank. In addition, in the minds of many Jordanians, it further separated them from the Palestinians. This was true because, in the past, the Jordanian government treated Palestinian refugees as Jordanian citizens. This plan said the Palestinians were no longer Jordanians, but something distinctly different with just a causal relationship with state and people of Jordan. Because of this, Jordanian nationalists opposed many Palestinian

organizations and causes and now concentrated their activism on a separate distinct future of Jordan without any association with the Palestinian cause.²³

After the failure of the United Arab Kingdom Plan, there was not much movement on the Jordanian - Israeli front until after Nixon won reelection in 1972. Once Nixon was assured another four years in the White House, or so he believed, Kissinger and Nixon now had more room to focus on solving the problems in the Middle East. This included trying to persuade Israel to come to some accommodation with Jordan and to continue to support Hussein in his attempt to regain much of the land lost in 1967. In addition, throughout 1973, the threat of a Middle East war greatly increased, and that threat would have a long and lasting impact on the American role in the region.

On July 8, 1972, Egypt took steps that would begin to reshape the balance of power in the region and refocus American attention on the Middle East. Anwar Sadat informed the Soviet ambassador to Egypt, Vladimir Vinogradov, that the Soviet Union had ten days to remove the over 15,000 military personnel from Egypt. Sadat hoped that this would ingratiate him with the Americans, but the only message he received was from Rogers who informed him that while the United States appreciated his actions, there was only so much they could do to persuade Israel to make fundamental changes to their approach to peace. In addition, Rogers explained to Sadat that Kissinger and the White House was currently focused on issues with Vietnam and unable to meet with the Egyptian Foreign Minister Hafez Ismail in the near future to discuss restarting the peace process.²⁴

With the backdrop of the Soviet expulsion, Hussein and Sadat met on December 17, 1972. In a meeting with Jordanian Prime Minister Zeid Rifai, Hussein and Sadat, Rifai “argued that the Soviets having reached an understanding with the United States, do not wish to anything that might jeopardize their newly-established working relationship” so will not be much help in the quest to reach a peace deal with the Israelis that return much of the land lost in 1967. Because of this, Hussein argued that the best way for the Arabs to achieve their goals was through the United States. Sadat agreed but still felt that the Soviet Union could play a role in the negotiations.²⁵ Despite the break with the Soviet advisors, Sadat still used the Soviet Union as his major arms supplier and still needed to keep the option of their support if his attempts with the United States failed. Finally, Sadat argued that a military strike would be the only thing to change the Israeli attitude. He believed that he could sustain any counterattack by the Israelis. In addition, Sadat said, “under no circumstances should Jordan in any way become involved in Egypt’s war of attrition because the Israelis would quickly overrun the East Bank and destroy the Jordanian army.”²⁶ Finally, Sadat told Rifai:

I realize my limitations. I am not good at blitzkrieg. The Israelis are good at blitzkrieg. I will fight a war of political reactivation and not of military liberation. I will wage a limited war; cross the canal, secure a bridgehead and stop. Then I will ask the Security Council to call a ceasefire. This strategy will ensure my victory in the battle, cut my losses and reactivate the peace process.²⁷

This was the first hint to both Jordan and the United States that Sadat still believed that a military option was necessary to retake much of the land lost in 1967. Most policymakers in Israel and the United States discounted this possibility because of the sheer failure of past Arab military adventures. Their assumption would prove wrong as

Sadat eventually demonstrated that he believed the only way for the Arabs to regain the land lost in 1967 was through military conquest.

There were other signs of a change in Arab attitude towards the stalemate in the region. In January of 1973, eighteen Arab leaders met in Cairo to discuss a common defense against Israel. In this meeting, the Jordanians agreed to the reactivation of a Jordanian front and the appointment of Egyptian War Minister Marshal Ahmed Ismail Ali to head the combined forces. Jordan also made a statement that they will not permit the Fedayeen to return to Jordan to launch attacks on Israel.²⁸ Because Jordan took both actions, the status quo was not dramatically altered. Hussein believed he needed to show some Arab unity to protect his position against the more radical Arab regimes, but after the war with the Palestinian militants, the repeated assassination attempts, and the murder of his trusted ally and friend Wasfi Tall, Hussein refused to allow the Fedayeen back into Jordan under any circumstance. While Israel could view Hussein allowing the Egyptian military back into Jordan as provocative, it only mattered if there was another war. At this point, both the US and Israel believed that it was unlikely that the Arabs would start another conflict with their complete failure of 1967 still fresh in their minds. In addition, while there were some military discussions, War Minister Ali did not take full command of any forces inside Jordan.

Despite this meeting, the White House still believed that Hussein was a strong ally in the region and a force for peace and stability. Kissinger accepted the belief that King Hussein was the most willing to work for peace with Israel. Hussein's only hesitation came from his position in the Arab world and the threat from other radical regimes. According to Kissinger, Hussein wished that another, more stable regime would

go first, but he would gladly join in the later stages. He hoped that this would allow him to maintain his position in the Arab world and have the anger from Arab radicals more focused on another regime better suited to handle it.²⁹ Hussein would hold on to this belief in the future, impairing his relationship with the Americans. While his beliefs that he needed another more powerful nation like Egypt to make the first steps towards peace with Israel if he hoped to survive, it diminished the attitude of some American policymakers towards Hussein. Hussein could not afford to be isolated and maintain his regime.

Nixon believed that it was important for the US to promote a peace process to provide stability for the region, but he believed that Kissinger did not want to force Israel to make the hard choices necessary for peace because of pressure he received from the Jewish community. Nixon also felt that providing some settlement in the Middle East was important for the Cold War. He believed if nothing were accomplished then the US would face “100 million Arabs hating us and providing a fishing ground not only for radicals but, of course, the Soviets.”³⁰ Despite the fact that Egypt expelled the Soviets, Nixon still believed that most events in the Middle East resulted from elements of the Cold War as was seen in his view of the Jordanian conflict with Syrian and the Fedayeen. Nixon ignored the reality that while the Cold War played a role in the actions of the Middle East, local and regional issues, with both the United States and the Soviet Union playing a supporting role, frequently drove events.

In preparation for a meeting with King Hussein on February 6, 1973, Kissinger argued in the White House the importance of Hussein to American interests in the region. He said, Hussein:

managed to wrest both independence and dignity from the initial disdain of Arab nationalist and the self-confident domination of the imperial power. [He] did so moreover, at a time when the nationalist movements were aimed as much at the ruling monarchies as at the European colonial countries. The Hashemite kings were forced into a precarious balancing act. They needed outside support against radical pressures, especially as these were increasingly bolstered by other Arab states and by the growing Soviet power. But they did not behave as the surrogates of foreigners. Rather they strove for, and succeeded in articulating, a form of Arab nationalism that asserted an Arab identity while affirming friendship for the West, seeking to demonstrate that Arab aspirations could be fulfilled through moderation.³¹

Because of Hussein's position as one of the most consistently pro-Western regimes in the Arab world, in Kissinger's view, it was necessary for the United States to promote and cultivate that relationship.

One of the first matters of discussion for Kissinger and Hussein in their meeting on February 6, 1973, was the impact of the surprise expulsion of Soviet advisors from Egypt. Hussein predicted three responses by the Soviet Union. First, Hussein believed that the Soviet Union would dramatically increase military aid to Egypt. He believed that the Soviet Union would need to do this to salvage any influence it could with Egypt. In addition, he believed that the Soviet Union would greatly increase its aid and advice to Syria. If the Soviet Union "lost" Egypt, it would need to maintain one client state in the region. Since Syria was one of the more radical regimes in the Middle East, this posed a problem for both Hussein and the United States. Syria was also the only Arab nation to invade Jordan. With a dramatic increase in Soviet arms, Hussein needed to worry about retaining a balance of power between him and his rival.³² Finally, Hussein believed the Soviets would oppose any settlement between the Arabs and Israel unless it were a comprehensive agreement between all the Arabs and Israel. This last point had a number

of complications for the Americans.³³ In previous negotiation attempts, the United States did not want to include Jordan in a group settlement because the US did not want Jordan's interests sacrificed to complete a larger peace deal and did not want the Soviets to have any role in deciding the outcome from two American allies. The US worried that if Jordan were included in a large group negotiation, Israel would be reluctant to complete a deal on the West Bank, thus making it impossible to complete the comprehensive negotiation. Israel placed special importance on the land it took from Jordan in the 1967 war for strategic and cultural reasons. The holy city of Jerusalem was located in this patch of land, containing holy sites for all the major religions. Secondly, Israel always wanted to retain the land in the West Bank to extend their frontier and protect its major population centers from Arab attacks. Finally, with a large negotiated settlement with Soviet participation, Moscow would get the credit with the Arab world if it succeeded and could blame the American failure to get concessions from Israel if the talks failed. This gave Kissinger little incentive to stake American prestige on a comprehensive deal.

Hussein also warned Kissinger that one possible reason for Egypt expelling the Soviet advisors were that the Soviets held Egypt back from any large military actions.³⁴ The Soviets had demonstrated in the past they feared any attack against Israel by large Arab force would fail, hurting both the Arab and Soviet position in the Middle East, especially after the disaster of the 1967 war. In addition, if there were a large, binding peace settlement in the region, the Arab nations would become less dependent on Soviet arms, diminishing Soviet influence in the region. Because of this, from the Soviet view, the status quo was the desired outcome of any actions in the region. Hussein knew that

the best way to get the attention of the Americans was to describe the problems of the region through a Cold War prism. This way, the US could frame their support for Jordan's position not as a threat to Israel, but as something necessary to maintain dominance over the Soviets in the region.

After Hussein's discussions with Kissinger, he met privately with Nixon. In that meeting, Hussein said that in his discussions with Arab leaders, he made it clear he wanted to improve relations between his nation and Egypt and Syria. Despite that desire, there were two points where Hussein would not change his position. He said, "We cannot, however accept any normalization of relations with these two counties by compromising two of our cardinal principles, refusing return of any Fedayeen forces to Jordan. And resumption of hostilities on our front with Israel or handing over command of the armed forces to a unified command."³⁵ This was important for Nixon because it highlighted to him why the United States could trust Hussein to maintain peace in the region. In response, Nixon told Hussein that the US would pledge \$100 million in aid to Jordan. This would come in a variety of ways. The US would give Jordan \$10 million to modernize the military along with another \$40 million in general military aid, \$50 million in budget aid and \$10 million in economic development aid.³⁶

Also of interest to Nixon, Hussein speculated on his views of the recent Soviet action in the region. He said the Soviets are "concentrating on Iraq, which poses a nuisance to Iran and a threat to the Gulf States. . . . The Soviets are apparently most interested in Syria and it is possible that they, either directly through their excessive military assistance, or indirectly through Iraq, may eventually bring Syria and Iraq into their orbit."³⁷ Hussein also told Nixon that he brought a message from the Gulf States

saying, “we are constantly urged to bring to the attention of the United States Government the need for greater U.S. involvement in the Gulf in order to assist those states to ward off communist and extremist influences that are increasingly coming to bear on the area.”³⁸ It was in Hussein’s interests to emphasize the threat from the Soviet Union to America’s position in the region despite the apparent break between Moscow and Cairo.

The Egyptian actions towards the Soviet Union also influenced the way Israel viewed Hussein and Jordan. In a cable from American Chief of Mission Owen Zurhellen on February 13, 1973, he said, “[The] Israelis are convinced that Hussein now wants peace, but in five years since [the] Six Day War their asking price for that settlement has grown. . . . Israel now feels they can . . . get recognition of all [of] Jerusalem as sovereign Israel, cessation to Israel of one-third [of the] West Bank, and open borders allowing free trade, travel and settlement.”³⁹ Zurhellen believed that Hussein could never live with those terms and the best hope forward might be to complete a deal between Egypt and Israel, allowing an increase in Israeli security. If Israel felt more secure, they might be more willing to cut a realistic deal with Hussein. Zurhellen also said that while Hussein wants credit from Israel for his willingness to be the first Arab state to recognize it, Israel does not place too much value on that is less influential in the Arab world than someone like Sadat. He also felt that the Cold War was a hindrance to peace at the current moment. He believed that Israel felt because the Soviet Union was taking less of a role in the region, the United States would be less inclined to force Israel to make the hard choices necessary for peace because they no longer had to worry about Soviet expansion in the region and preferred to maintain the status quo.⁴⁰ Zurhellen’s argument

was correct. If the Soviets' pressure on Jordan and Israel eased, the Israel knew that the US would not want to do anything that negatively affected the status quo. Like Nixon, the Soviets had very little incentive or ability to change the situation in the Middle East without drastic action.

On February 23, Egyptian Prime Minister Hafiz Ismail arrived in Washington to discuss the peace process with both Nixon and Kissinger. In those meetings, he said Egypt was willing to end the state of war between Egypt and Israel, but could not conclude a formal peace treaty without a settlement with the other Arab nations. In particular, he needed a settlement with Jordan and Syria along with some conclusion to the remaining Palestinian issues. Ismail's view of the West Bank and Jordan was also important. He told Kissinger that Egypt had no preference with whom the Israelis settled with, either Jordan or an unnamed Palestinian leadership. He was even willing to accept the Israeli Allon plan, which would have stationed a sizeable Israeli military presence on the Jordan River and Hussein had repeatedly rejected.⁴¹ His only two requirements were that there needed to be Arab control of East Jerusalem and that Egypt got a voice on who would be the ultimate government on the West Bank. This left open the possibility of Egypt working with the PLO to take control of the West Bank and Gaza. This was different and important in Kissinger's eyes because it showed that the PLO was gaining strength and influence, while also demonstrating the still low regard some in the Arab world had for King Hussein. In addition, "it meant that Hussein might be used to extract territory from Israel but not be able to retain it. And for Israel, negotiations with Hussein were thus becoming only the admission price to confrontation with its mortal enemy, the PLO."⁴² Because of this, it was hard for Kissinger to trust and accept the Egyptian push

for peace because it would undoubtedly sacrifice a loyal American ally in King Hussein. Kissinger and Nixon could not easily replace Hussein, a reliable friend, with Egypt who up until six months previous was a solid supporter and client of the Soviet Union.

On February 27, Hussein again met with Kissinger and laid out his view of a peace negotiation between Israel and Jordan. Hussein wanted most of the West Bank returned to Jordan sovereignty. He was willing to make some changes on the border as long as Israel gave Jordan Gaza. Gaza was important to Jordan because it provided them access to the Mediterranean Sea. Hussein was also willing to allow a small Israeli force or settlement on the Jordan River. This concession was important to Israel because it provided a trip wire against an Arab invasion from the East. Hussein believed that this type of peace proposal had to be presented to the Israelis by the Americans or the government in Tel Aviv would dismiss it. Hussein also told Kissinger he believed that they had two to three years to come up with a settlement between the Arabs and the Israelis before the region would explode into conflict again.⁴³ Hussein wanted to be clear that while he was willing to make concessions to Israel on the West Bank, he was still not willing to sacrifice Jordanian control over at least the Arab sections of Jerusalem.⁴⁴ Most of Hussein's predictions on the region were correct, except this last one. War would come much sooner and unfortunately, his assessment of the possible timing of a conflict gave the Americans a reason to wait until after the Israeli elections on October 30 to push for a peace settlement.

Kissinger's attempts to persuade the Israelis to negotiate with Hussein in good faith also failed. From Israel's perspective, they were the dominant military power in the region and as long as they had the continued support of the United States, they had very

little incentive to sacrifice what many Israelis believed was their historical homeland for an empty peace with the Arabs. In addition, Israel believed that the longer the status quo of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank persisted, the more likely it would permanently take hold. When Golda Meir met with Kissinger on March 1, she told him that there were already negotiations between Jordan and Israel and the United States did not need to get involved. In addition, Meir told Kissinger that there was no reason to accelerate talks because the Israeli Defense Force was so strong, no Arab nation could launch an effective attack.⁴⁵

The summer of 1973 brought both more signs for peace and the growing prospect that war was possible. A surprising approach for engagement came through the CIA station chief in Beirut, Robert Ames, in July. An aide to Yasir Arafat contacted Ames about opening a dialogue between the PLO and the United States. Ames passed the information to the American ambassador to Iran, Richard Helms. In a meeting with Kissinger, Helms told him that Arafat wanted to talk to the US under the premise that Israel could not be removed and was going to be a permanent member of the Middle East. Arafat also communicated to Helms that, “the Palestinians must have a home and that home will be Jordan.”⁴⁶ While the Palestinians believed their homeland could be in Jordan, this did not include Jordan still under the control of Hussein. Helms believed that this could be a breakthrough because it acknowledged that Arabs could not defeat Israel and implied that this reality could result in a formal recognition of Israel by the Palestinians. The talk of supporting the removal of King Hussein bothered Kissinger. He told Helms, “I considered King Hussein a valued friend of the United States and a principal hope for diplomatic progress in the region.” Kissinger also believed that any

Palestinian organization given legitimacy in the West Bank would use the region to attack both Hussein and the Israelis. He also did not believe that just the West Bank would satisfy Arafat. Eventually, the Palestinian forces would move to expand either in Jordan or Israel. Because of this, Kissinger ordered Helms not even to reply to Arafat's message.⁴⁷ Because of Kissinger's relationship with Hussein, he had little incentive to replace him with Arafat, who was consistently hostile to the United States despite any overtures he was currently making. Hussein had already demonstrated to Kissinger that he was someone the US could count on and trust in the region, leading him to reject Arafat's overtures.

Despite Kissinger's decision, Helms pressed Arafat's case to the White House and the State Department and argued the benefits of dealing with Arafat through a Cold War prism. He told Kissinger that Arafat was receiving pressure to establish a government in exile to replace Hussein in the West Bank and eventually all of Jordan. Because of that, Helms believed that "Arafat wants a real state or nothing."⁴⁸ In regards to the Soviet Union, Helms said:

The Soviet Union . . . seeks to exploit [an] area of conflict or potential conflict in the area to enhance Soviet interests, weaken those of the United States and outflank China from the South. Supporting radical regimes in Iraq and South Yemen, the Dhufari rebels, a revolutionary new regime in Afghanistan and an India which constitutes a latent threat to Pakistani security, the Soviet Union either ferments instability or tries to increase its potential for doing so. However, the Soviets seem unlikely to pursue their goals in the region so vigorously as to destroy détente with the United States.⁴⁹

In Helm's view, despite being removed from Egypt, the Soviet Union still had a presence in the Middle East and would not hesitate to make life difficult for the US and its allies as

long as it did not threaten to permanently undermined détente. What Helms did not take into account was Arafat's willingness or ability to work with the US. Given the opportunity in the future to moderate his ways, Arafat consistently chose a more radical path, even when it led to the rejection of contact with the United States. If Kissinger and Nixon took Helm's advice, the likely result would have been a hostile Palestinian state in Jordan, continuing to attack Israel while being hostile to an American role in the Middle East.

In May, Hussein again tried to sound the alarm in both Tel Aviv and Washington that the outbreak of war was approaching because of the lack of progress towards a peace settlement. In a meeting between Kissinger and Israeli ambassador to the United States Simcha Dinitz on May 3, Dinitz explained to Kissinger that he received a message from Hussein that there was a massive Arab built up around the nations surrounding Israel. Hussein believed that this had the potential for disaster and wanted Israel to pass the information to the United States. Hussein, for example, believed that Iraq was going to attempt to station troops in Jordan again, but instead of focusing on him, it was in preparation for a war with Israel. Both Kissinger and Dinitz felt that Syria would not take any action against Israel without support from the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union would not want to jeopardize their upcoming conference with the US. Because of this, they believed that despite their intelligence agencies confirming some of the things Hussein was reporting, there was no real threat in the short term.⁵⁰

On May 17, Hussein sent a direct message to Kissinger and told him that his intelligence learned that Syrian forces have been working on night fighting in preparation for an attack on Israel. He also told them the Soviets shipped large quantities of military

equipment, including advanced radar equipment and surface-to-air missiles. He also said he was receiving pressure from Egypt to join his force with Egyptian under one command again. He believed that Egypt might strike Israel followed by an attack from Syria.⁵¹ Despite the fact that both the United States and Israel ignored his repeated warnings, Hussein still tried to maintain his position as an ally to the US by pledging not to turn over his forces to a foreign command like in 1967. He hoped that war could be avoided, but if not, to stay out of it as much as possible.

In the view of Hussein, another sign of the possible coming conflict came from the desire of Egypt and Syria to mend relations with Jordan. Between the Syrian invasion and King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom Plan, Jordan no longer had direct relations with two of its neighbors. On May 31, Mahmoud Riad, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, flew to Damascus to get Assad to ease the pressure on Hussein. Up until this point, Hussein faced countless attacks from the Arab media, with the backing of both Sadat and Assad, for his dealings with Israel and his continued opposition to the Palestinian militant groups. Riad convinced Assad to ease the attacks on Hussein because he might be necessary in a war with Israel. The next day, Riad flew to Jordan and told him of the desire from both Syria and Egypt to improve relations. He told Hussein that Egypt and Syria worried about the Syrian forces during any conflict with Israel. Mainly, they worried that Israel would move through Jordan to encircle the Syrian army. Hussein pledged not allow Israel to enter Jordan and to station his troops in a formation to make it difficult for the encirclement of the main Syrian force.⁵²

The White House also received warnings from the intelligence community that war was possible. In a memo from May 31, the CIA argued, "from Sadat's point of view,

the overriding desideratum is some for a military action which can be sustained long enough, despite Israeli's counterattacks, both to activate Washington and Moscow and to galvanize the other Arab states, especially the major oil producers, into anti-American moves."⁵³ This was one of the first warnings that a major conflict in the Middle East could have a disastrous impact on American access to oil reserves in the region. The CIA accurately reflected Sadat's view of the situation. He did believe that something needed to change the status quo in the region or Israel would never negotiate in good faith with the Arabs nor would the US pressure Israel to make concessions in a deal with the Arabs.

On June 17, Nixon met with Brezhnev and the topic of the Middle East was a major component of that discussion. Brezhnev wanted Nixon to agree to a set of principles that both sides would be forced to accept. For example, he argued that the US should force Israel to give up land taken in 1967 and in return, they would get peace and access to the Suez Canal. Brezhnev argued that if Nixon would not agree to this, he could not guarantee that Egypt or Syria would not use military force to change the status quo in the region. Nixon again rejected Brezhnev's overture, saying that the United States was not willing to force Israel to start negotiations on the basis of the Arab position, arguing it would automatically lead to failure. Nixon believed that the real reason Brezhnev wanted to bring about a peace plan was because he "was aware of the slow but steady progress we had been making in reopening the lines of communication between Washington and the Arab capitals; and he was also aware that if America was able to contribute toward a peaceful settlement of Arab-Israeli difference, we would be striking a serious blow to the Soviet presence and prestige in the Middle East."⁵⁴ It is unlikely that the Soviets knew of any planned aggression by Egypt and Syria mainly

because Egypt had limited communications with the Soviet Union after Sadat expelled their military advisors. Brezhnev likely hoped to use the threat of a new war as an incentive to get the US to pressure Israel with the ultimate goal of restoring relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt.

Kissinger attempted to reassure Hussein and thank him for retaining control of his forces in Jordan by discussing an increase in military aid in letter on June 2, 1973. Hussein wanted an additional \$10 million in direct military aid but in May, Kissinger asked him to try to get it from Saudi Arabia and if that was impossible, the US would fill his request. When Hussein told Kissinger in July that the only way he could get the aid from Saudi Arabia was if he placed his forces under a joint Arab command, Kissinger relented and agreed to order the Pentagon to assess the needs of the Jordanian military directly.⁵⁵ Like Hussein, Kissinger worried that Jordan could easily be dragged into a conflict with Israel if Hussein lost control of his forces. Kissinger needed Hussein to remain a force for stability in the region, which was impossible if his military was under the control of one of the more radical regimes like Egypt, or worse, Syria.

On July 7, Hussein met with Helms while visiting Tehran and told him that he was worried about a threat from Iraq and Syria and that a joint Arab attack could occur as early as that month. In fact, to show Helms the seriousness of the threat, Hussein gave him the proposed war plan of both Syria and Egypt. He did not say how he got it, but expressed that both Syria and Egypt were determined to regain the land lost in 1967. Hussein also said that a large group of Palestinians had recently left Jordan for Iraq to receive advanced training in preparation for the coming conflict. Hussein pleaded with

Helms to explain to Washington that he needed more weapons if he was going to continue to resist pressure to put his forces under the command of Egypt.⁵⁶

Hussein also tried to warn the British of the possibility of war. In meeting with Prime Minister Heath on July 12, 1973, Hussein warned the British leader that Sadat was growing frustrated by the stalemate with Israel and his inability to regain the land lost in 1967. Hussein said, "In such circumstances there was a strange logic which led President Sadat to believe that a disastrous war would be preferable to a continuing stalemate."⁵⁷ Hussein hoped that by delivering this news to his strongest Western allies, it might persuade them to finally put some pressure on Israel to negotiate with the Arabs in good faith to avoid another costly conflict.

On September 10, Sadat invited Hussein to a meeting in Cairo. Sadat called the meeting between Syria, Jordan, and Egypt with the hope of reestablishing military coordination and restoring ties between the three nations. Originally, Sadat wanted Hussein to agree to allow Palestinian guerrillas back into Jordan for a return of Egyptian and Syrian diplomatic relations still suspended over Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan. Hussein rejected this and threatened to end the conference so Sadat removed this request. Hussein believed the meetings with Assad and Sadat were a success and that any military actions would take place after a long preparation. He was unaware of secret meetings during the same conference between Sadat and Assad that formalized a more detailed war plan.⁵⁸ While Hussein accepted the benefits of improved relations his neighbors, Sadat and Assad were more interested in gaining access to an eastern front for the coming war and not welcoming Hussein back into the Arab fold. Hussein did not

have any clear signal that this was Sadat's intention, but he accepted the improved relations with Syria and Egypt because it would help maintain his position in Jordan.

Hussein met with Golda Meir on September 23, and told her about the Cairo summit and that he planned on letting the PLO open some offices in Jordan but would not allow them to carry out any strikes on Israel. In addition, he told her "From a very very sensitive source in Syria . . . [we have learned] all the units that were meant to be training and were prepared to take part in this Syrian action are now, as of the last two days or so, in position of pre-attack. . . . Now this has all come under the guise of training. . . these are the pre-jump of position and all the units are now in these positions." He also stressed to her that if attack occurred from Syria, he believed that Egypt would join in.⁵⁹ This meeting was controversial both inside the Arab world and Israel. Once the fighting started, the Israeli public blamed Meir for not acting on Hussein's warning and some in the Arab world accused Hussein of revealing the upcoming Arab attack. This was not Hussein giving a detailed war plan to the Israelis, mainly because he did not have access to a detailed war plan. In fact, even years later he would deny having any information that the attack was occurring. In a later interview, he said he was out riding a bike with his wife when his security service notified him that the fighting had started.⁶⁰

On the morning of October 6, the crisis Hussein had been warning about for months began. Golda Meir contacted the White House and told them Israel had confirmable intelligence that the Egyptians and the Syrians planned to attack that night at 6:00 pm Israeli time.⁶¹ This conflict was called the Yom Kippur War in Israel and the October War by the Arabs and brought about a fundamental change in the region. The White House urged Meir not to launch a preemptive attack, like in 1967, and Kissinger

said he would attempt to stop it before it started.⁶² Kissinger contacted both the Russians and friendly Arab nations in a failed effort to stop the fighting before it could begin. An important point from the American perspective of how this event played out was that it occurred in the middle of the Watergate scandal. Because of this, most of the actions by the United States were under the direction of Kissinger. While it is accepted that Nixon was kept informed, Kissinger clearly led the American response.⁶³

When the fighting started, Israel could not mobilize quickly enough and faced a far superior force. One of the reasons they did not fully mobilize at the first sign of a possible attack was because they did not want to give the Arabs a reason to attack and have the world blame them for the start of the conflict. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan felt this was important because it would be easier to receive American support if the Arabs started the conflict and he felt Israel could successfully defend against any Arab invasion. On the Syrian side of the battlefield, Syria launched the attack on the Golan Heights with over nine hundred tanks, nine hundred artillery pieces, and another four hundred and sixty tanks ready in reserve. In that position, Israel only had one hundred and thirty-seven tanks to repel the invasion. The Syrian forces advanced through the Golan Heights, moving much farther than Israel imagined possible. It took another two days, on October 8, for Israel to mount an effective counterattack.⁶⁴

The Israelis responded with a successful and brutal air assault on Syria and in the capital of Damascus. While their invasion force met heavy resistance, the IDF slowly moved through the Golan Heights and into Syria proper. By October 16, the IDF moved their forces within twenty miles of Damascus. The Syrian forces and their allies, mainly the Iraqis, attempted to counterattack and drive the Israelis out of Syria but failed

miserably. After October 16, the fighting on the Golan Heights greatly diminished and both forces dug in with little intention of moving for the next few weeks.⁶⁵

The start of the fighting on Israel's southern front also began with a large Arab push before the eventual Israeli response. Israel was outgunned five to one in tanks and twenty to one in artillery when the fighting started with Egypt. Most of the Israeli heavy weapons were not forward deployed and it took time to get them activated and moved to the frontlines. The original Egyptian thrust was highly effective and massive in size. In total, over ten thousand five hundred artillery and mortar shells fell on the Israeli front line within minutes of the start of the conflict. By October 7, sixty percent of the Israeli tanks in the Sinai were either destroyed or abandoned. The first major Israeli counterattack also failed to move the IDF forward and pushback the advancing Egyptian army. By the night of October 8, the Israeli leadership was in a full-blown panic about their situation. It reached such a level of despair the Dayan was advocating mobilizing high school students to join the fight.⁶⁶

On the night of October 9, Egypt paused its advance and began to move more units across the canal and into the Sinai. There was some dispute inside the Egyptian government over what to do next. The original plan was at the point to sue for peace, hoping to maximize Egyptian gains and hopefully regain much of the land lost in 1967. Unfortunately, Egypt was so successful, Sadat believed they could achieve more. In addition, the Syrian front was not going as well, and Sadat argued that Egypt needed to continue their advance to take pressure off Assad. Egypt failed to advance any further and in their attempt severely weakened their forces. The next ten days saw Israel finally take control of the battlefield and cross the canal advancing towards Cairo. The US

assisted through a large airlift of supplies. By October 19, Sadat realized the precarious situation he was in and asked the Soviet Union to call for a ceasefire. While the Soviet Union and the US worked out the ceasefire terms, Israel encircled the strategic Egyptian Third Army near the Suez Canal. The situation got so bad for the Egyptian government, they considered evacuating the leadership from Cairo for fear of being overrun by the Israelis.⁶⁷

From the beginning of the fighting, Hussein worried about being dragged into the conflict. He told Ambassador Brown he was concerned “the Israelis will not be content to drive the Syrians back to the cease-fire line but will want to pursue and destroy even if it takes them to Damascus. . . . A large-scale Israeli invasion of Syria . . . could drag Jordan in.” Hussein also asked the US to get Israel to stop using Jordan airspace to attack Syria. For example, Israel was using the airbase at Mafraq as a waypoint for their strikes into Syria. Hussein believed that this continued violations of Jordanian airspace was a humiliation to his air force and had to end. He worried that his air force might react to the continued violations without his approval, forcing the conflict on Jordan.⁶⁸ Hussein could not maintain his position with the Arabs if he overlooked blatant Israeli incursions into Jordan. At the very least, he would have needed to put up some token resistance to the continued Israeli attacks. Hussein hoped that through his close relationship with Kissinger and Nixon, they could persuade the Israelis to avoid entangling Jordan in the conflict.

On October 8, while the Arabs were still having success, Hussein received a message from King Faisal of Saudi Arabia asking Jordanian permission to allow Saudi troops in Jordan to move to the front line. He was also critical of Hussein not becoming a

more active participant in the fighting. Hussein rejected the Saudi request but urged the Americans to get a cease-fire at the UN so he would not be forced to get involved.⁶⁹

Because Saudi Arabia was one of the more moderate regimes and friendly to the West, Hussein worried that the pressure he would face from the more radical regimes would be hard to avoid. In addition, Hussein also believed that the war would eventually turn against the Arabs and then the Egyptians would ask for help, causing another calamity similar to the debacle of 1967. Eventually, Hussein relented and allowed the Saudis to use Jordan to move some of their forces to the battlefield. Unfortunately for the Arab cause, the forces sent by many of the Arab nations were not very useful in repelling the Israelis. One main reason was the lack of coordination amongst the Arab forces.

Hussein's nephew described the battlefield as chaotic. He said, "We had to make our own way up to the frontlines. We groped our way blind to the Golan Heights. It was complete chaos. The Saudis sent a brigade. They went up a hill one night and they decided to go to sleep, only to wake up the next morning surrounded by Israeli soldiers. . . . Their artillery did not even have ammunition."⁷⁰ This was a theme in many of the Arab conflicts with Israel. They lacked communication and coordination, resulting in the eventual destruction of the more cohesive Israel military.

Once the fighting started, both superpowers saw the conflict in terms of the Cold War. The Soviet Union immediately tried to pressure Jordan into entering the war on the side of the Arabs. Hussein contacted the White House on October 9 and told them he received a message from the Soviet Union. According to Hussein, the Soviet chargé said, "the Soviets fully support the Arabs in [the] conflict with Israel. . . . [The] Soviet Union thought all [the] Arab states should enter the battle now." While Dobrynin denied it,

Kissinger also says he received a similar message from the leadership in Algeria.⁷¹

Kissinger believed this pressure was going to continue until the end of the conflict because the Soviet Union needed to show that it supported the Arab cause in the hope of regaining the influence lost when Egypt expelled the Soviet advisors. Hussein also explained to Kissinger the impact of the conflict in the broader Cold War and the recent American attempts to improve relations with the Arabs. Hussein said:

Lastly there are your interests and ours at stake. I am saddened by the fact that the Soviets are identified with the Arab effort, whereas the United States is identified with Israel. A cease-fire . . . must come as soon as possible to save so much which is at stake. . . . Whether this could come soon or whether it would be accepted by the fighting parties and others I would not know, but it would certainly improve the image of the United States.⁷²

Kissinger believed that the end of the conflict would give the US an advantage in the Cold War. He hoped that the result of the conflict would be that the Arabs would know that the Soviet Union would not be able to get them what they wanted and would have to rely on the United States if they hoped to get a cease-fire and the return of their land. Secretary of State James Schlesinger believed that the conflict would either cost the Soviet a lot of money or alienate the Arabs from the Soviet Union because they were unwilling to replace the Arab losses. He said “The Soviets are going see \$2-\$3 billion worth of their equipment going up in smoke again. At the moment, they do not seem disposed to replace it.”⁷³

By October 11, when it became clear the tide of the battle was turning, Hussein felt increased pressure to intervene. Egypt needed Jordan to either allow for another front or help Syria before the IDF completely overran the Syrian positions. Hussein continued

to resist allowing the PLO back into Jordan and replied to a message from Sadat asking for help by telling him that he could not open a second front on his own because he lacked the airpower to support them and they would be wiped out by the IDF. He did offer to send some forces to help Syria.⁷⁴ Hussein summoned British Ambassador to Jordan Glen Balfour Paul to update him on the situation as of October 11. Hussein told Paul that he received a direct request from the Syrians to send units to the Golan Heights to fend off the Israeli counter attack. In addition, he said Sadat was pressuring him to either allow the Fedayeen back into the country to open up a second front or commit the Jordanian military to the fight. Hussein told Paul that he “had reluctantly decided that, if he was to retain any Arab credibility at all, he must make the gesture . . . of an armored brigade to relieve the Syrian left wing.” Hussein also explained that he feared that if the Syrian regime was overrun by the IDF, then the government might fall and be replaced by a more communist influenced group similar to Iraq.⁷⁵ While it is unclear what would replace the Assad regime if Israel overran it, especially considering Assad was favorable to the Soviet Union already, Hussein’s contention that he needed to do something to retain credibility with the Arab world was correct. He already faced pressure from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria to intervene and that pressure would only continue as the situation deteriorated for the Arabs.

The United States attempted to convince Hussein to delay as long as possible from getting involved. Kissinger told Hussein that that he was aware of Sadat’s request for help. Kissinger said, “I urge you to delay such a decision as long as possible, and at least for another 36-48 hours. I am making a major effort through quiet diplomatic channels to bring about an end to the fighting. I do not say this lightly – and need time

and your help.” Hussein replied that the Middle East was on a path to destruction. He also told Ambassador Brown he was “neither mad nor sick but would rather die with his soldiers than live in a dishonored, ruined country under the thumb of the Soviets.”⁷⁶ Hussein felt that if the fighting did not stop soon, his government would face increased pressure from the radical Arab nations influenced by the Soviet Union, likely leading to the demise of his regime.

On October 12, Kissinger met with Israeli Ambassador Dinitz to discuss the situation with Jordan. Kissinger told him that he was aware of Israeli opposition to Jordan sending any forces but encouraged them not to engage them directly. He emphasized that Hussein was facing increased pressure from the other Arab states to get involved and this was the minimum they felt they could do.⁷⁷ Kissinger also contacted British Prime Minister Edward Heath about the situation with Jordan. They both received the message from Hussein that he was facing increased pressure to get involved. Heath agreed with Kissinger that Hussein was taking the minimal steps in the conflict and the Israelis should not see it as a threat. Heath said, “I think this is the best arrangement really. Let him appear to be doing something when he really isn’t.” Both men agreed to contact Israel and attempt to persuade them to leave Hussein’s forces alone.⁷⁸

On October 13, Hussein contacted Kissinger and told him that he needed to do something to counter Iraqi and Soviet threats towards him. Hussein feared that if he did nothing, the Soviet-backed Iraqi government would use it as a pretext to destabilize or threaten the monarchy. Kissinger told Hussein to “continue his efforts to circumscribe the area and scale of the conflict. We all faced a very difficult situation, but I had no doubt that with steady nerves, wisdom, and courage we could yet bring some good out of

the disaster that had again struck the Middle East.” Kissinger also told Hussein that he “urged restraint on the Israelis, and it was therefore equally important for his forces to act with circumspection.”⁷⁹

Once he decided to send some forces to the battlefield, Hussein attempted to show both the US and Israel that it was the minimum he could do and still maintain his position in the Arab world. His main objective though was to commit enough forces to remove the threat from the more radical Arab regimes but still not damage his relationship with Israel and the United States. Hussein sent a message to Golda Meir and said that he did not want to commit his forces to a senseless war but feared for Jordan’s long-term survival if it was the outcast of the Arab world. Hussein told her that his only sensible option was to send a very small force into Syria, close to the Jordanian border. He believed this would not impact the battle in any significant way. He also told Meir that he believed this would give him enough credibility with the other Arab nations to prevent any long-term damage to his standing in the Arab world. He hoped Meir would respond by not attacking his forces if possible.⁸⁰

Hussein placed the Jordanian units in Syria under the command of Crown Prince Hassan, who was Hussein’s brother, to make sure the Jordanian forces did not get too involved in the fighting. Hassan ordered the brigade commander to “stall, to maintain [the] cohesiveness of the unit, and not take direct orders from [the] Syrians.”⁸¹ Hussein also traveled to the front lines to survey the battle for himself and to make sure the Jordanian forces did not get too involved. Luckily for Hussein, his closeness with the Israelis saved his life. During the fighting, an Israeli force was ordered to bomb a Jordanian unit on the Golan Heights. An Israeli officer named Ze’ev Bar-Lavie, who

worked on Jordanian issues for the military intelligence unit, saw unusual activity in the Jordanian camp. He believed that it could mean Hussein was visiting the front line. He immediately called off the strike, potentially saving Hussein's life.⁸²

On October 18, Sadat attempted to contact Hussein to convince him to allow Fedayeen forces to attack an Israeli communications center. The Jordanian government repeatedly delayed saying the King was out of contact. After four days, Hussein replied with a dozen questions about the nature of the attack, and if it was even worth it considering the risk to Jordan of a massive Israeli retaliation.⁸³ Despite the mounting Arab losses, Hussein refused to let the Fedayeen back into his country for fear he would never be able to remove them again and eventually, they would resume their attacks against his regime. Hussein maintained his position of doing the minimal amount in the conflict so the Arabs could not accuse him of abandoning the cause nor upset his prior relationship with the United States and Israel. Any actions Hussein could have taken would not have fundamentally changed the situation on the battlefield, only opened up Jordan to an Israeli counterattack.

On October 23, Kissinger talked to Golda Meir who complained about Jordanian violations of the ceasefire. Jordan accepted a cease-fire on the West Bank but its forces in Syria continued periodic engagements with the Israeli forces. Because there was never any real fighting on the West Bank, Jordan's acceptance of a ceasefire there was worthless to the Israelis. In addition, while on the Syrian front fighting continued because of the Arab forces, on the Egyptian front, the Israelis continued to violate the ceasefire in an attempt to encircle the Egyptian Third Army around the Suez. This all complicated Kissinger's efforts to end the fighting.⁸⁴

After October 23, when the Soviets and the United States agreed to a ceasefire plan quickly, there was still some opposition from Syria. While Egypt and Israel agreed to the terms of the ceasefire, Syria did not immediately respond. Hussein contacted Kissinger through Brown to tell him of this dilemma. At this point, thinking the fighting was over, Hussein had already moved more troops into Syria and placed them under Syrian command. He hoped this would improve his political standing in the Arab world after the fighting ended. Hussein told the White House that he learned Iraq was pressuring Syria to maintain the fight. He told Kissinger that he was sending a delegation to Damascus to tell Assad that the Jordanian forces were pulling out if he did not make a decision on the ceasefire. In addition, he told Kissinger that his sources believe that the Soviets were not living up to their end of the bargain. He asked Kissinger to “Please get in touch with Brezhnev and tell him that it is essential that [the] Syrians and Iraqis accede to [the] cease-fire.”⁸⁵

By October 26, Jordan removed their forces from Syria, telling Assad that even though Israel still occasionally violated the ceasefire agreement, Jordan feared that they might also violate it on the eastern front and because of that, the Jordanian armed forces needed to return to defend Jordan. In reality, Hussein knew that Israel had no intention of attacking Jordan at this point, but he saw no need to keep his forces in Syria where there was potential for them to become involved again in the fighting.⁸⁶ Hussein did not want to risk an escalation that could damage his relationship with the US or Israel over Assad’s refusal to end the conflict.

The losses from all sides of the October War were dramatic for all involved. Israel had twenty-three hundred soldiers killed and another fifty-five hundred wounded.

Egypt had over twelve thousand soldiers killed and another thirty-five thousand wounded with an additional eighty-four hundred captured. Syria had over three thousand dead, fifty-six hundred wounded and four hundred and eleven captured. The equipment losses from both sides were also massive. Egypt and Syria each lost close to a thousand tanks compared to Israel, which lost around four hundred. To make matters worse for the Arabs, Israel repaired most of its armored vehicles while much of the Arab armored vehicles were abandoned and eventually recommissioned by the Israelis.⁸⁷ Both sides lost a large proportion of their military capability but by the end of the fighting, the Arab nations were in a much worse position than when they started.

Of all the sides involved in the fighting, Jordan came out the best. In the brief encounters between the IDF and the Jordanian army, Jordan lost twenty-two tanks. In addition, because of the chaos, they lost an additional six tanks to artillery fire from Iraqi forces.⁸⁸ Hussein was able to improve relations between him and the other Arab leaders while risking very little of his armed forces. In fact, after the fighting end, militarily, Jordan was one of the stronger Arab nations. In addition, Hussein again showed Washington that he was a reliable ally that they could count on in a crisis. Finally, Hussein hoped that he demonstrated to Israel that he was not a threat to them even when they were at their weakest, and instead, could be a reliable partner for peace if they were willing to negotiate.

After the fighting had ended, Kissinger focused on maintaining the ceasefire and attempting to start a peace process. During the middle of the October War, the infamous “Saturday Night Massacre” occurred and from that point on, Kissinger almost had full control over the Middle East peace process while Nixon concentrated on the fallout from

the Watergate scandal.⁸⁹ Kissinger began a series of trips to the region, visiting all the major capitals, hoping to begin with disengagement talks that would eventually lead to a permanent settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

On November 8, Kissinger flew to Amman to discuss the ceasefire and the next steps with Hussein. Kissinger believed that the visit was more about reassuring the King about the American view of a peace settlement rather than promoting a cease-fire. Because Jordan did not fully enter the war, there was no fighting to stop and no violations of the overall cease-fire in Jordanian territory. Hussein told Kissinger, “Jordan is the Arab country most involved in terms of both land and population. Participation in the war could have led to the destruction of Jordan and the creation of a vacuum which radical elements would have filled. Non-participation could have led to the total isolation of Jordan and to our becoming the scapegoat.”⁹⁰ Hussein hoped to have the best of the both worlds, credit from Israel and the US for not attacking Israel, along with support from the Arabs because he sent forces to Syria. He hoped that this would assure his position in any peace settlement to come. When Hussein met with the Soviet ambassador to Cairo after the ceasefire, he told him that that “he repeatedly made offers to Sadat and Assad to enter in the war, but that although Assad welcomed the king’s intention, Sadat flatly rejected it.”⁹¹ While this was not completely true, Hussein only offered token assistance, Hussein hoped to place himself at the center of the Arab movement after the end of the war making it difficult for the other Arab regimes to target his monarchy with propaganda and positioning Jordan to benefit from any settlement.

Hussein explained to Kissinger his future vision of the peace process for Israel and Jordan. He said to Kissinger:

Our situation is different from that of Syria and Egypt, which are not connected with the Palestinian problem and which already had international boundaries before the 1967 war. Jordan's 1967 border was the armistice demarcation line. The West Bank is both Jordanian territory and part of Palestine. The population is Jordanian and Palestinian. The rights of the Palestinians have to do not with the West Bank and Jordan but with Israel. The question is who represents the Palestinians. Our position is that the West Bank is Jordanians-Palestinian territory occupied by Israel. It is Jordan's duty to recover that territory with minor changes on a reciprocal basis. In addition, we cannot give up responsibility for the Moslem and Christian parts of Jerusalem which should, however, remain a unified city.⁹²

Kissinger informed the King that because of the situation on the ground, he could not wait to begin the process of de-escalation until the Palestinian issue was worked out. Kissinger believed that the Israeli position was too strong. Both Syria and Egypt had pressing military issues that needed to be resolved quickly. In Syria, the Israeli forces were very close to the capital city of Damascus. In Egypt, the Egyptian Third Army remained surrounded in the desert and could not hold out much longer. Kissinger believed that a conference in Geneva that included all the warring parties along with the US and the USSR would be the best place to begin to work out these issues. Kissinger invited Hussein to the Geneva Conference and asked him to be the spokesman for the Palestinian cause.⁹³

After the fighting had ended, Kissinger believed he needed to have some communication with the PLO to advance any American sponsored peace process. On November 3 1973, Kissinger sent General Vernon Walters to meet with the PLO at the Moroccan capital of Rabat. Walter's orders were to listen to the PLO proposals but stress:

The United States has no proposals to make. . . . The Palestinians must understand however, that the United States has a fixed principle it does not betray its friends. We regard the King of Jordan as a friend. We would expect, nevertheless, that in the context of a comprehensive settlement, the relationship between the Palestinian movement and the Hashemite Kingdom could develop in the direction of reconciliation.⁹⁴

Kissinger hoped that his message would make it clear to the PLO that it had only one maneuver possible in the mind to the United States. Arafat needed to come to some kind of agreement with King Hussein that allowed him to continue as the head of Jordan. If Kissinger had succeeded, he would have allowed Hussein to cement his rule in Jordan, while removing the PLO's threat to Jordanian stability. It also would have shown Hussein that the US continued to look out for his interests while it continued the peace process.

Kissinger proposed a meeting in Geneva in December 1973, that would include the US, USSR, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria with the goal of beginning the disengagement process. Both Kissinger and Hussein were optimistic for the conference, believing that after debacle during the first phase of the October War, Israel should no longer feel invulnerable. In a meeting with Brent Scowcroft on November 6, 1973, Hussein told him his views of the Middle East after the war. He told Scowcroft that he believed nations like Jordan, Egypt, and Syria wanted peace and was willing to say so publically. He also mentioned nations like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait wanted peace but would only follow others. He believed Iraq and Israel were rejecting peace because of domestic political problems. Hussein argued that if the US could work with the Palestinians and get them to accept peace, it would be unlikely any Arab nation would not join in. In addition, Hussein argued that currently Egypt and Syria were resisting Soviet influence and if the

US could show goodwill, it could replace the Soviet Union's prior relationship with these nations. Finally, Hussein told Scowcroft that he would try to use his influence to get an end to the Arab oil boycott against the US that started in response to the American airlift of supplies to Israel.⁹⁵ Hussein's assessment of the situation was largely correct with the exception of Syria. Assad still did not have any desire to agree to a peace deal with Israel and the position of the other Arab states did not influence him. In fact, Syria's position was much closer to Iraq where they did not want peace and looked to the Soviet Union for increased support. Like Hussein, Kissinger also believed a Cold War component existed in the Geneva talks. In a meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohammad Hassan El-Zayyat, Kissinger said, "we must settle [the Middle East crisis] but not under Russian pressure. If there is Russian pressure, we will switch back to Israel because we must demonstrate that the Soviet Union cannot settle the problem." He also blamed the American decision to send arms to Israel as a response to the Soviet Union sending arms to the Arabs.⁹⁶

Hussein entered the conference with specific goals. Before the conference began, Hussein told Kissinger he wanted him to convince the Israelis to pull back from the city of Jericho on the West Bank. Hussein felt this was reasonable since Jericho was a city consisting of only Arabs. Hussein felt this would give him some standing with the other Arab nations and cement his position as the lead negotiator for the West Bank. Kissinger also believed this was not an unreasonable request and agreed to pass it on to the Israelis. When he did, the Israelis rejected it. Kissinger believed that the combination of the prospect of a disengagement agreement with Syria, evacuating the Sinai, a national

election, and the upcoming Geneva Conference were too much to upheaval to allow the Israelis to make more concessions to Hussein at that time.⁹⁷

The Geneva Conference began on December 21, 1973, and immediately did not go in the direction Hussein had hoped. Syria refused to show up in protest against the Israelis and the lack of a Palestinian representative. Jordan was upset because the summit seemed to focus purely on a disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt. Because Jordan had no direct fighting with Israel, they had no need for a disengagement agreement. Rifai opened up the Jordanian delegation by saying, “The question of withdrawal, boundaries, Palestinian rights, refugees, obligations of peace and the status of Jerusalem are all common concerns and collective responsibilities. My delegation therefore is not prepared to conclude any partial settlement with Israel on matters that are of joint interest with our Arab brothers.”⁹⁸ Another issue facing Hussein was that unlike other Arab nations who could show support for the PLO to prevent attacks by other Arab radicals, Hussein could not support the PLO without creating a direct threat to this regime. He needed to establish the precedent that he was speaking for the Palestinians with the hope of maintaining some control of the West Bank in any permanent settlement.⁹⁹

Israel believed that the conference would last a long time and even rented an office complex nearby with the goal of completing a full disengagement agreement before they left Geneva. Unfortunately, without the participation of Syria and Kissinger’s view that negotiations should only proceed in a deliberate, step-by-step approach, the conference only lasted two days. There were very little direct negotiations between Israel and the other leaders at the conference and very little movement towards

peace. According to the Israeli delegation, “Kissinger was careful not to annoy the Israeli government unnecessarily by insisting on a comprehensive settlement which would inevitably require Israel to make concessions for which it was not ready.” Kissinger hoped that by not forcing Israel to make hard decisions at Geneva, he could slowly build towards an agreement that made those decisions possible after a buildup of trust between Israel and the Arabs.¹⁰⁰ The flaw in Kissinger’s logic came from his belief that the Israelis wanted a broad peace agreement with the Arabs. While the surprise attack rattled the Israeli public, the leadership still was not willing to give up all the land it captured during the 1967 conflict, making a comprehensive agreement between the Israelis and the Arabs impossible.

The conference ended with an agreement for more meetings between the parties, along with an Israeli-Egyptian working group focused on disengagement. Jordan attempted to get a similar working group between Jordan and Israel, but the Israelis rejected it since they were not currently engaged in fighting with the Jordanians. Hussein and Rifai felt used. They came to realize that the conference was not a peace settlement, but an elaborate way to provide a forum for Egypt and Israel to negotiate. Despite that belief, Jordan agreed to continue to work with the US on a peace proposal between Jordan and Israel.¹⁰¹

After the conclusion of the Geneva Conference had produced no permanent settlement or final disengagement agreement, Kissinger began what was called “shuttle diplomacy” where he continually flew between the various Arab capitals and Israel in the quest for movement on a peace proposal. During these negotiations, both Jordan and the United States feared the consequences of the lack of progress. Hussein’s biggest fear was

the prospect of the Palestinian groups like the PLO becoming the primary representative of the Palestinian people, limiting Jordan's ability to negotiate with Israel.

Kissinger continued to present Israel with Hussein's view of a possible settlement between the two nations. Jordan's new disengagement plan called for both Jordan and Israel to each pull back eight kilometers from the Jordan Valley. Jordanian civil authorities would take over the area evacuated by the Israeli Defense Force. Hussein also promised that no Jordanian military forces would cross the Jordan River or enter the eight-kilometer zone. Hussein also wanted a working group established by the Jordanians, the Israelis, and the Americans to officially establish Jordan as the spokesman for the Palestinian cause. Kissinger believed Hussein's proposal was "moderate and statesmanlike" but unfortunately, Kissinger ran into the same problems he experienced previously. Mainly, because of a combination of security and national politics, Israel was reluctant to agree to a disengagement with Jordan that resulted in returning part of the West Bank. Israel again rejected any evacuation from Jericho because it felt that it needed a large security barrier in the Jordan Valley as stated by the Allon Plan. In addition, the National Religious Party, an important member of the current Israeli governing coalition, refused to give up any portion of the West Bank. Despite Kissinger framing the choice between negotiating with Hussein or Arafat, the Israelis preferred to negotiate with neither.¹⁰²

A combination of Arab, American, and Israeli politics made solving the Jordanian question impossible. In Israel, the current government, just recently formed, had a one-vote majority in the Knesset. In addition, outgoing Prime Minister Golda Meir promised that any settlement for the West Bank would not occur until after new elections were held

to seek the support of the Israeli public. This made it extremely difficult for new Prime Minister Rabin to even discuss a settlement with Jordan. First, after finally forming a government, he would have to call immediately for new elections so the people could vote on the settlement. In addition, because of the time, it would take to form a new government, it would freeze any negotiations on other fronts for up to a year. In addition, because Nixon was facing the consequence of the Watergate scandal, he was in no position to pressure Israel to make a concession. Finally, both Sadat and Assad had little trust for Hussein, thus no incentive to place his interests above their own in the negotiations.¹⁰³

Both Kissinger and Hussein worried about the consequences of repeated rejection by the Israelis of a moderate settlement between Jordan and Israel. In a meeting with American Jewish leaders on February 8, 1974, Kissinger said:

I predict that if the Israelis don't make some sort of arrangement with Hussein on the West Bank in six months, Arafat will become internationally recognized and the world will be in chaos. But at the moment in Israel the balance of power is held by the religious party. Hussein wants only a foothold on the West Bank so he can claim he speaks for somebody. . . . Israel [will continue] to ignore it for six months, maybe a year – at the price that at the end of the year, the terrorists will dominate.¹⁰⁴

Kissinger believed that the Arabs could easily get frustrated with Israeli opposition and allow the PLO to take over negotiations. In addition, allowing Arafat and the PLO to take control also benefited the other Arab countries by allowing them to focus solely on their interests without concern for the Palestinians since they now had their own official representation.

On August 9, 1974, the situation dramatically changed for the United States. Because of the Watergate scandal and the threat of impeachment, Nixon resigned from the presidency making Gerald Ford the President. Despite being a well-respected Congressman from Michigan, up until this point, foreign policy was not a major focus for Ford. Because of that, he allowed Kissinger to continue his leadership role in the Middle East. Kissinger would continue his active “shuttle diplomacy” with the hope of settling some of the issues in the region through a step-by-step approach with the goal of building enough momentum to lead to a comprehensive solution for all parties.

Hussein attempted to make another offer to Israel while meeting with Kissinger and Ford on August 16, 1974. Hussein explained that he was willing to accept the Allon plan as long as it was the first step and not the end of the negotiation. In addition, he told Kissinger and Ford that he favored a separate Jordanian-Israeli negotiation or a joint negotiation with Egypt. Hussein was unaware that Egypt already ruled out a joint negotiation with Jordan. Hussein argued that if he succeeded in talks with the Israelis, he would not face opposition from the Arab states if he agreed to allow the Palestinians in the West Bank to vote on staying tied to Jordan. Kissinger promised to explore the joint negotiation with Egypt but believed Egypt preferred to negotiate alone.¹⁰⁵

Despite the reasonableness of Hussein’s offer, Kissinger made little progress when discussing it with Rabin on September 11, 1974. Rabin asked Kissinger not to pressure him to sign any deal that would necessitate Israeli elections. Rabin had just taken over as Prime Minister for Golda Meir in April 1974. His majority in the Knesset was particularly small and to assure his election, Rabin publically accepted Meir’s promise to the Israeli public that a vote would occur over any changes to Israeli territory

on the West Bank.¹⁰⁶ While Kissinger understood the problems with Israeli politics, he still argued to Rabin the need for Israel to open up a serious negotiation with Jordan. He told him the threat of the PLO increasing their power existed as long as the Arabs saw no progress on the Jordanian front. He explained to Rabin that if he wanted to deal with the threat of the PLO becoming the legitimate voice of the Palestinian people, completing a deal with Hussein was his best option. Rabin's biggest fear was that if Israel made a deal with Hussein to turn over a large portion of the West Bank to Jordan, the Arabs would quickly call for Hussein to give control of that land to the PLO, creating another hostile state on Israel's border.¹⁰⁷ Rabin's fear for the future of the West Bank would eventually come true, not because he made a deal with Hussein, but because he refused to.

Kissinger's belief that eventually the Arabs would empower the Palestinians through Arafat occurred soon after Rabin's latest rejection of Hussein's overtures.

A dramatic change in the peace negotiations occurred in October 1974. An Arab summit consisting of twenty-four Arab nations occurred in Rabat, Morocco. At this summit, a resolution was passed that called for the "the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent national authority under the command of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in any Palestinian territory that is liberated."¹⁰⁸ Because of Arab pressure, the vote was unanimous, including Jordan. For the first time since 1948 and the creation of Israel, Jordan gave up its right to speak for the people of the West Bank. Because of Rabin's refusal to work with Hussein and Kissinger's unwillingness to pressure the Israeli government into making even moderate concessions to Jordan, it led to the Arabs removing Jordan from the peace process over the West Bank and Gaza.

Before the summit, Hussein's advisors argued that he should avoid Rabat so that any resolutions the Arabs passed at the summit did not bind Jordan. Hussein disregarded their advice after receiving assurances from Kissinger that the US was pressuring friendly Arab governments to block any resolutions concerning the Palestinians.¹⁰⁹ Kissinger believed that Egypt and Saudi Arabia would block any movement to make the PLO the sole negotiator of the Palestinians. In fact, the Saudis argued for the PLO and Egypt only made a half-hearted effort to put forth an alternative that still recognized Jordan's role in the West Bank.¹¹⁰ This had a long lasting impact on the peace process because it effectively replaced Hussein with Arafat as the voice of the people from the West Bank. Egypt decided to align with the Palestinians at Rabat because of frustration over Kissinger's negotiating strategy. Kissinger had argued for a step-by-step approach while the Arabs demanded to move to a final settlement, assuring their ability to regain the land lost to Israel on the battlefield. Sadat's only challenge to making the PLO the sole representative of the Palestinian people came in the form of a resolution establishing the PLO as a government in exile. When the rest of the Arabs rejected that and again called for a resolution naming the PLO as the sole voice of the Palestinian people, Sadat agreed. The success of the Rabat Summit in the view of the Arabs was reaffirmed a month later when the UN General Assembly called for the Palestinian people to have the right of self-determination and made the PLO an official observer at the UN.¹¹¹ It would have mattered little if Hussein accepted the advice of his advisors and avoided Rabat. The other Arab governments would have still pressured him to accept their resolutions and any hesitation by Hussein would have only isolated him. Because Israel was unwilling to make any real concessions, Hussein had little choice but to accept the outcome of Rabat.

The Israeli government immediately reacted to the situation at Rabat. Rabin said, “The Rabat Conference decided to charge the organizations of murderers with the establishment of a Palestinian State, and the Arab countries gave the organizations a free hand to decide on their mode of operations.” He also said that the Israeli government rejected the outcome from Rabat because of its encouragement “to terrorist elements” and said Israel would not “negotiate with a body that denies our existence as a State and follows a course of violence and terrorism for the destruction of our state.”¹¹² Because of Rabat, Israel now rejected any negotiations over the future of the West Bank. While this statement froze the peace process over the West Bank, it resulted in very little actual change because even before Rabat, Israel refused to make any real concessions with Jordan over the West Bank, concessions that could have prevented Rabat in the first place.

Hussein believed this was a dramatic failure for Jordan, the United States, and the Arabs. In a speech after the summit, Hussein explained that the Rabat resolution was actually in Israel’s interest. He argued that Israel supported the status quo and the continued occupation of the West Bank. If Jordan remained the voice for the people on the West Bank, Israel would face pressure from the United States to continue to negotiate towards a final settlement. By placing the PLO as the lone voice of the people of the West Bank, the Arabs gave Israel and the United States a legitimate reason to end negotiations over the area. This allowed Israel to expand settlements in the West Bank and take more control over Jerusalem. The King concluded by saying, “There no longer existed an Arab government which could defend directly the Palestinian interests.”¹¹³ In addition, to further demonstrate the change in Jordan because of Rabat, Hussein

suspended the Parliament.¹¹⁴ He did this because half of the Jordanian Parliament consisted of people from the West Bank and he wanted to show the Arab world that if he could not speak for the Palestinians, they should not have a voice in the Jordanian government.

The Arabs' decision at Rabat benefited nobody more than Yasir Arafat and the PLO. The PLO received international legitimacy through recognition by the UN General Assembly on November 13, 1974. To mark the occasion, Arafat gave a speech to the General Assembly demonstrating his continued hostility to Jordan, the US, and Israel. He argued that the US was punishing the Palestinians and the Arabs because of "their efforts to replace an outmoded but still dominant world economic system with a new, more logically rational one."¹¹⁵ He called for the world to choose peace over, "colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism and racism in all its forms, including Zionism."¹¹⁶ He also declared that only the PLO represented the Palestinian people and as the head of the PLO he spoke for the Palestinians, reaffirming the implication of Rabat that Jordan no longer had a role in determining the outcome for the West Bank.¹¹⁷

After the Rabat decision, Ford and Kissinger realized immediately the consequences of this action for Jordan, Israel, and the United States. In a memo to Brent Scowcroft a few days after the summit, Ford said, "The tragedy is that Israel could have prevented this situation from developing had it heeded our repeated urgings of the past six months and offered Sadat or Hussein enough to make possible for them to move along together. . . . As it was, Sadat and Hussein went to Rabat with no precise or meaningful offer."¹¹⁸ Kissinger also believed that the US Congress had a role in weakening the American position. He said, "Congress' failure to pass the aid bill and its

negative views on the nuclear reactor for Egypt gave the impression we were renegeing on our commitments. . . . This and the public attacks on me in the United States and elsewhere . . . raised doubts among Arab leaders about whether the US was able to continue to play an effective role as peacemaker.”¹¹⁹ While Congress’ refusal to pass the aid bill for Egypt did not help the situation, Kissinger’s weakened state was not caused by attacks from Congress but the result of Nixon’s failures and the position of the new Ford administration. In addition, even if Congress gave Kissinger everything he wanted, it is likely that Israel would have continued to resist any compromise on returning land on the West Bank to Jordan.

Despite these setbacks, Kissinger still attempted to bring Jordan back into the negotiation. He did this for a number of reasons. First, Jordan remained an important ally and Kissinger hoped to deliver to them what he promised in the past. Second, the Soviets continued to play a role in the Middle East and Kissinger hoped to keep them out. Kissinger still faced two major problems. Israel had no intention of giving up large amounts of land to Jordan and Egypt had no intention of bringing Jordan into their talks for fear that it might jeopardize them. In a meeting between Kissinger and Rabin on March 10, 1975, Rabin argued that while Israel was willing to negotiate with all its neighbors, Egypt should be done first and separately because it is the easiest deal to complete. In addition, while Israel was willing to negotiate with its other neighbors, those negotiations should not be connected to any other agreements nor share the same pattern.¹²⁰ Israel made clear it did not feel the need to negotiate with Jordan and did not want the Egypt talks associated with something doomed to failure.

Despite Jordan's disappointment in Israel's unwillingness to negotiate, Hussein and Rifai continued to play a constructive role in the negotiations. After coming to Assad's defense in the October War, relations between Syria and Jordan dramatically improved. On March 16, Hussein and Rifai warned Kissinger that Syria was unhappy about the pace of negotiations and the lack of a disengagement agreement on the Golan Heights. Assad told Hussein, "What we lost by force we will have to regain by force." Rifai tried to persuade Kissinger to get something for Assad so he did not have an incentive to blow up the talks. In addition, he believed that Egypt should also try to help Assad's position with the Israelis.¹²¹

Another issue Kissinger faced was the desire of some to have another Geneva Summit. Kissinger opposed this because he believed it was important to keep the Soviets out of the trilateral talks between Egypt, Israel, and the United States. Hussein told the American ambassador to Jordan, Thomas Pickering, that the Soviets were pressing him to return to Geneva, despite his insistence he said could not go because of the Rabat resolution. Hussein blamed the Soviets for pushing other Arabs and the Palestinians on the resolution at Rabat. Hussein also said that because of Rabat he would only negotiate on the behalf of the West Bank if, at the end of the talks, the West Bank could vote to decide the future role of Jordan. He believed that the PLO would never agree to this for fear of losing the vote and the West Bank to Jordan. In addition, he believed that Israel would also oppose this plan because they could not guarantee that Jordan would remain in control of the West Bank and not be replaced by some Palestinian organization.¹²² Hussein's view was correct, Israel had no intention of returning most of the West Bank to the Arabs and would not allow any chance of the formation of an independent Palestinian

state on that territory. Israel had little incentive to replace Hussein, who kept the Palestinians from launching large-scale terrorist attacks against Israel, with Arafat, who would likely encourage them.

In a meeting between Kissinger, Rifai, and Hussein on March 16, Hussein and Rifai made it clear the consequences of failure to get a disengagement agreement with between Egypt, Israel, and Syria. Hussein said, “it would be a major blow to political moderation across the Middle East and condemn the area to another war.” Rifai explained that it would be another example of the US “giving up its friends and allies – Vietnam, Korean, Cambodia, Greece, Turkey and now Sadat and other moderates in the Middle East.” Rifai also told Kissinger that if the negotiations fail, the Syrian would argue that the only option was war. From their perspective, “If Kissinger can’t persuade the Israelis to withdraw from a few kilometers in the Sinai, how can he promote a total settlement.”¹²³

Kissinger also worried about the Soviet reaction if the agreements failed. In NSC meeting on March 28, 1975, Kissinger said, “the Soviets will be a much bigger threat than in the past. In 1967 and 1973 they stood aside while their Arab allies were humiliated. The . . . resentment is building up and is likely to push them to be less cautious this time in showing their power. This is all the more true since they see the US as weak and unwilling to stand up for its commitments anywhere in the world.”¹²⁴ In the end, Kissinger believed that the Soviets would intervene to help Syria using the argument that they were attempting to move the intractable Israelis back to the 1967 line. Kissinger also believed that much of Western Europe would agree with this attitude. He also believed that the only way to challenge the Soviets would be by putting American troops

in Israel, which would be impossible with the current attitude of Congress and the American public in the aftermath of the American involvement in Vietnam.¹²⁵

The peace process had no real movement as late as October 1975. Even then, for Jordan, there was still not a clear option with the decision of the Rabat Summit still active. Hussein told Kissinger that the only way he could negotiate with Israel for the Palestinians was if the Israelis offered a grand deal on withdrawing from much of the West Bank and he got agreement from the Egyptians and the Saudis that he should proceed. Hussein was unaware that Sadat was arguing that the United States should ignore Hussein and concentrate on the Palestinians all while pushing a larger Egyptian-Israeli settlement.¹²⁶

By the end of 1976, Kissinger had obtained the agreement of Israel, Egypt, and Jordan to all negotiate a substantial withdrawal of Israeli forces. Hussein was again willing to participate as long as Egypt agreed, but because of Rabat, Egypt's focus was on their own interests and had no desire to deal with Jordanian issues. Because Ford lost to Carter, Kissinger was unable to participate in the next step, leaving further negotiations to the next administration. Still, Kissinger considered it a breakthrough that for the first time, Israel showed a willingness to give Jordan significant land in the West Bank in a final settlement agreement that would end the state of belligerency between the two nations.¹²⁷

The second half of the Nixon administration and the brief time Ford was in charge of the White House saw dramatic changes in the Middle East and the US relationship with Jordan. With American support, Hussein attempted numerous peace plans that

ultimately ended in failure because of Israeli resistance to any settlement with Jordan that did not allow them to retain much of the West Bank. Hussein also tried to use his relationship with Israel and the United States to prevent another costly war. Like his peace proposals, this effort also ended in failure. During that conflict, Hussein successfully used his relationship with the Americans to persuade Israel not to attack Jordan. Hussein also successfully committed his forces just enough to counter Arab attacks against his regime. Despite his failure to prevent the conflict, Hussein demonstrated to the US that he continued to be a reliable ally in the region and he was able to resist Arab pressure to intervene in conflicts that were against his and American interests in the region. In addition, he placed Jordan as an important barrier to Soviet expansion and ally for the American position in the Cold War agreeing to limit Soviet involvement in the peace process that followed the conflict.

The Rabat Summit fundamentally altered Hussein's ability to move forward with the peace process. While Hussein would have liked to work out a settlement with Israel, the Israeli domestic political situation would not allow for any concessions towards Hussein. In addition, the problems associated with Nixon's resignation eliminated Kissinger's ability to bring pressure on Israel to make the needed concessions. These failures ultimately led the rest of the Arab nations to strip Hussein of the legitimacy to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians, empowering Arafat as the true representative of the Palestinian people.

While the negotiations continued, Hussein saw the outlines of his next major issue, mainly, Egypt no longer had an interest in a group settlement between the Arabs and Israel, but was only concerned about Egypt's national interests. Despite this growing

problem, Hussein maintained his friendship with the US and continued to promote peace and stability in the region even if it did not lead to Jordan's preferred settlement.

Hussein's actions showed Nixon administration that Jordan was a key ally in the region and an important pillar in the American plans to keep the Soviet Union out of the Middle East. Hussein hoped to be able to continue his place in the American sphere in the Middle East during the Carter administration.

CHAPTER V

CARTER, HUSSEIN AND THE MARCH TOWARDS CAMP DAVID

While the Nixon-Ford administrations cemented Hussein's role as a valuable American ally, providing benefits in both aid and security, he was unable to complete his main goal of returning much of the land lost in 1967 back to Jordan. Hussein hoped that new president Jimmy Carter would continue the quest for peace in the region and finally allow him to become the leader of a united Jordan Valley that included the important holy sites in Jerusalem. Hussein believed that his established role as a voice of moderation in the region would lead the US to support his claim to the West Bank. Hussein believed that because Carter campaigned on dealing with the issues of the Middle East, he would have an American leader who could successfully argue his position to the Israelis. Hussein also hoped that after superpower confrontation during the October War, the US would be more likely to support the Arabs in the peace process to assure their position in the Cold War. Despite Hussein's aspirations, the Carter administration would eventually continue what Hussein viewed as the worst part of Kissinger's efforts, a focus on Egypt to the detriment of the rest of the Arab world. The main vehicle for those discussions was the Camp David peace process which severely damaged the relationship between Hussein and Carter. While these issues strained the

relationship between Hussein and Carter, they eventually put their differences aside and recognized the importance of Jordan to maintaining American interests in the region, especially when confronting the growing threat of radical Arab regimes along with the expansion of the Soviet Union.

The relationship between Hussein and the Carter administration did not begin on a good note. On February 18, 1977, a story in the *Washington Post* detailed secret payments from the CIA to King Hussein going back twenty years. The CIA acknowledged the payments to the Intelligence Oversight Board set up by President Ford to investigate abuses in the CIA. The code word for the operations was called “No Beef” and the amount of funds distributed accounted for millions of dollars reaching \$75 million by 1976. The article said that while Hussein was not a US puppet, “he rarely drifted outside the US orbit.” It also noted that “Hussein’s decisions have often been highly compatible with US and Israeli interests” since the expulsion of the PLO in 1970.¹ When Carter learned of the payment program, he ended it immediately. Despite that, news of its existence was deeply embarrassing for Hussein. For years, Hussein faced accusations that he was an American or Zionist puppet who would sell out the Palestinians at the first opportunity he had and this story added to that narrative in the radical parts of the Arab world. Carter immediately realized how damaging this story could be. When the White House got word that the *Washington Post* was working on the Hussein story, Carter called *Post* executive editor Bill Bradley and reporter Bob Woodward into the Oval Office to discuss the proposed article and its implications. Carter did not ask them not to publish but requested that they at the least wait until Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was out of the region. Since Vance was already in the

Middle East attempting to restart the Geneva talks, Carter worried that this story would damage those efforts. Carter also told them the Middle East negotiations were at a sensitive point and they should think about doing what was best for the country. Despite Carter's pleas, the story was published the next day.² After it had published, Carter sent a personal note to Bradlee telling him, "the publishing of the CIA story as the Secretary of State was on his Middle East mission and about to arrive in Jordan was irresponsible."³

Jack O'Connell, the CIA station chief and eventually Hussein's personal lawyer in the US, contended there were serious flaws in the Woodward piece. He said Hussein received five thousand dinars a month which was the equivalent of about fifteen thousand dollars. O'Connell said that when the payments started, they were used to prop him up because he was so new to power and had not established himself yet. Hussein would give the money directly to military leaders to retain their support. Eventually, Hussein was able to get support from other Arab monarchies and no longer needed the cash from the CIA. The CIA continued to give it to him anyway because it was such a small amount and they did not want to insult him or give him the belief they were pulling away. The larger sums Hussein received later were to protect his family through the hiring of a security service. O'Connell said that money came directly to him and his law firm and he used it to protect Hussein's family while they were educated in the United States.⁴ As a result of Carter's decision to stop the payments, Hussein moved his children out of the US. The CIA continued to fund Jordan's intelligence services, but through direct payments to them and not through Hussein, minimizing the impact of Carter's decision.⁵ Other contemporary sources support O'Connell's argument that the large sums of money Hussein received in the later years supported security arrangements for his family. In

addition, while Hussein had a lavish lifestyle, demonstrated by his love of fast planes and motorcycles, it is likely that much of the money he received went to supporting his military because their support was paramount for Hussein to maintain his position as the head of Jordan.

Carter eventually apologized to Hussein for how the story came out. He did not want this news story to damage relations between Jordan and the US when he was preparing to make a new push for peace. In addition, he reminded Hussein that he had no power in his country to silence the press, but was still deeply sorry for the unfair embarrassment it caused.⁶ Carter knew because of its location and relationship with the Palestinians, Jordan would be important in finding a lasting solution to the problems of the region. He also believed that Hussein would be a vital part of those efforts and did not want to harm the relationship before it truly began.

Despite the rocky start to their relationship, Carter had a deep interest in working on the problems of the Middle East. He campaigned on solving the problems of the region and saw those problems as a facet of the Cold War.⁷ He believed that the Soviet rhetoric of liberation influenced the region, and solving these problems would make it possible to stop Soviet gains throughout the Middle East.⁸ Carter also worried about the impact of a limited oil supply on the US. He feared that the Soviet Union was attempting to limit the US access to raw materials through Middle East expansion.⁹ He worried that if there were another long war in the Middle East, it would be difficult for the US to provide a sustained effort of resupplying Israel's military needs without a dramatic impact from an Arab oil boycott. He also believed that the threat of an oil embargo would make it difficult for America's European allies to sustain support for the US and

Israel.¹⁰ Carter and his advisors felt that the situation in the Middle East was in a good place for American involvement which could realistically result in a solution. They believed that the Arabs were moderating and the Israelis under Rabin could agree to a comprehensive solution. The Carter administration wanted to succeed where Nixon failed, to finally bring peace and stability to the Middle East. The combination of these events led the National Security Council to recommend to Carter that solving the Middle East issues should be an urgent priority.¹¹

Vance also agreed with Carter's assessment that the oil embargo of 1973 influenced how the administration viewed the region. He said "No longer could the United States afford to leave primary responsibility for the initiative to achieve a settlement in other hands. Nor could the United States appear in Arab eyes as insensitive to the Palestinian problems and occupation of Arab lands." Because of this, along with American economic interests and competition with the Soviet Union in Third World, the United States under Carter took more of a neutral mediator role rather than the ally of Israel as seen in the Nixon administration.¹² They believed that Israel would need to make concessions for peace and reflexively did not support the Israel position on dealing with the Arabs like past administrations. As Carter and Vance explained, the reliance on oil was the main reason for American interests in the Middle East. The results of the Arab oil embargo and the shock it brought to the American economy demonstrated why the US could not allow a hostile Soviet Union to take over the region. Even though Hussein and Jordan had no oil reserves, his position of promoting stability in this vital region demonstrated his importance to the United States.

Hussein also had hopes that the new administration would work to bring peace to the region. When Hussein met with new Secretary of State Vance in Amman on February 19, 1977, he told Vance that he believed Egypt was desperate for peace with Israel because of Sadat's gambit during the October War and the de-escalation talks. Hussein believed a more radical regime would overthrow Sadat if he could not achieve a breakthrough that returned much of Egypt's lost land. Hussein also told Vance that for Jordan to participate in any peace negotiation with Israel, the Palestinians needed to be included because of Rabat. He believed Egypt was the biggest barrier to the inclusion of the PLO because of Sadat's hostility to the organization. In addition, he believed that Sadat worried that Israel and Egypt would conclude an agreement only to see it vetoed by the Palestinians.¹³ Hussein argued that the best way to include the Palestinians without opposition from Egypt or Israel was to allow them to be part of a united Arab delegation. At this point, the Palestinians refused to join a Jordanian delegation, which was the preferred solution to the Palestinian problem for the Americans and many of the Arabs.¹⁴ Including the Palestinians was still a major problem for both the US and Israel. Since the PLO had continually refused to recognize Israel, both the US and Israel refused to negotiate with them. Without a change of attitude from the PLO, it would be hard for the US to include them in any future peace negotiation. Hussein's solution to this problem was to link the Palestinians and Jordan and allow the Palestinians to have the right to determine the nature of that relationship. He also believed issues like the right of return or just compensation for giving up that right could be worked out at a later time. Hussein still felt that Jordan should retain some control over the Arab parts of Jerusalem and argued for dual sovereignty between Jordan and Israel. He believed that this should

include free movement for all people in the united city with it serving as the capital of both Israel and a Palestine state tied to Jordan through a federation of some form. In addition, unlike Sadat, Hussein stressed he was willing to sign a formal peace treaty.¹⁵ The end result of this plan was very similar to Hussein's United Arab Kingdom proposal that he previously made. Hussein continued to promote this idea because it solved a number of problems for the region and him personally, not from a sense of altruism for the Palestinians. Hussein believed that the people of the West Bank would support unification with Jordan, enlarging the Jordanian nation. It would also return the city of Jerusalem and its holy sites to his family's control. Finally, it would allow for the peace deal with Israel that he always desired and improved relations with the US, allowing for increase economic and military aid.

Hussein visited the White House on April 25, 1977, where he told Carter he feared Israel had become so strong that they believed they no longer have to make hard decisions. In fact, he argued that some in Israel wish there was more hostility with its neighbors, if only to tighten the relationship between Israel and the United States. Hussein said "they lack the courage to gamble on peace" and feared that the region could face a disaster if there were no movement towards a solution soon.¹⁶ Because of that, Hussein believed it was going to take as a significant effort by the United States to convince Israel to participate in a comprehensive peace process.

In the meetings with Carter, Hussein proposed a similar plan to the one he previously presented to Nixon and Kissinger. He needed Israel to withdraw from the West Bank, but he was willing to agree to some land swaps as long as they were fair. He needed Jerusalem to be a united city under international control. In addition, he told

Carter that both sections of Jerusalem had to be under a joint control, not just the Arab side. Hussein wanted to make sure that the Arab sections of Jerusalem did not receive unequal treatment by allowing Israel to retain complete sovereignty over part of the capital. He finished by telling Carter that if the US could get Israel to agree to these terms, he was willing to move forward despite the protests from the other Arab states. Hussein also suggested that he felt if the international community took control over the West Bank with the promise that Palestinians would eventually have the right to self-determination, then this could overcome the problem of Israel refusing to work with the PLO.¹⁷ While this plan seemed reasonable from Hussein's perspective, the Israelis would not share this view because Israel would never accept removing Jerusalem from Israel's sovereignty.

In the preliminary talks between the Arabs and Israel, Carter emphasized a major sticking point between the Arabs and Israel was over the definition of peace. The Arabs, especially Syria and Egypt, believed a peace process should end with an agreement that stopped the fighting, nothing more. Israel on the other hand, wanted something more binding. For example, Israel believed that they needed trade and open borders between their neighbors, not just an announcement that the Arabs accepted Israel's right to exist. Israel felt that as these connections grew, it was less likely of hostilities would return because of the economic consequence of war. Hussein told Carter he believed that it would be difficult to reach that level of agreement with most of the Arab nations, but he remained willing.¹⁸

Another issue Hussein had with the United States was his ability to purchase military hardware. While in Washington, he told Carter that Jordan needed to upgrade

their military to be a force for stability in the region. Originally, Jordan requested one hundred F-5Es, an aircraft developed in the early 60s, but now wanted a mix of F-5Es and the much newer F-16 Fighting Falcon. Carter's initial response was to suggest maybe the US would give fewer arms to Israel so Jordan and the other friendly Arab allies would not need as much. Hussein replied he was fine with that proposition if there were peace, but the threat of the continued Soviet build-up in Iraq and Libya also posed a threat to his nation. Jordan's Prime Minister, Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharf, countered Carter's objections by telling him, "Our armed forces have been a source of stability in the area in recent decades. These forces have helped us to deter aggression and they have not been used only in our confrontation with Israel. We have also needed them to confront radical forces in the area." They also told Carter that Iraq was a threat to Kuwait, and with new weapons, Jordan would be in a position to join with Saudi Arabia and Iran to counter that threat if necessary.¹⁹ The implication from this request was that if the US wanted Jordan to retain its place as defending the position of the West in the region, they needed to arm them like that was the case. The example of Kuwait and Iraq was especially relevant for this argument. Iraq and its Baathist leadership was a client of the Soviet Union and had historical claims on its southern neighbor, the American friendly and oil rich Kuwait. Hussein hoped to use this as an example of a way his stronger military could be used to serve the larger interests of the US in the region by defending Kuwait if it became necessary. Carter agreed to raise Hussein's aid an additional \$23 million and promised to examine other issues like a water project in the Jordan Valley that could lead to more aid.²⁰

Hussein's first visit with Jimmy Carter came at a time of deep personal grief for the King. His third wife Alia recently died in a helicopter crash and Hussein was still dealing with the loss. During his first night in Washington, he was invited to sit on the Truman balcony with Carter and his wife Rosalynn. Carter suggested the activity because he knew it was possible to see a steady stream of planes landing at Washington National Airport and Hussein had an affinity for flying. During their discussion, Hussein began to weep when describing his late wife. Carter felt a great deal of sympathy for him and offered to send him to the Georgia coast where Hussein could recuperate and rest in private. Hussein thanked him and after he left Washington, spent a week in Georgia with friends of the Carter family.²¹ While later Hussein and Carter would have major policy differences, for Hussein, the generosity and compassion Carter showed persuaded him to disagree in strict policy terms, and to never wage personal attacks against Carter for his efforts at the peace process.²²

After talking with the Arab leaders in the region, the Carter administration came to the conclusion that the best venue for solving the outstanding issues between the Arabs and the Israelis would be in a large peace conference in Geneva. William Quandt and Harold Saunders, whom both worked with Kissinger on the Middle East and continued that role with the Carter administration, told Carter that the smaller step-by-step approach of Nixon and Kissinger no longer worked and the likeliest chance at success was a comprehensive agreement.²³ Brzezinski realized early on the difficulties they would have with the Israelis. He said:

We expected Israeli opposition, for it was our feeling that the Israelis were essentially playing for time, and were more interested in preserving an exclusive relationship with the United States than moving toward a

broader peace in the Middle East. . . . But the Israelis could not be expected to soften their position unless the Arabs too, showed some willingness to accommodate.²⁴

The Israeli attitude towards external security also influenced its unwillingness to make significant concessions with towards the Arabs. Israel believed that they needed more weapons and land to retain their superior position. One of their biggest worries was the smallest section of pre-1967 Israel centered on Tel Aviv that only measured a few miles between the Arab position and the Mediterranean Sea. Israel's defense planners worried about the possibility of the Arabs separating North and South Israel at this point. Tel Aviv, Israel's second-largest city, was located on the coast and was only a little over thirty miles to the West Bank. The Israelis believed that the only reason the Arabs did not attack was because of their military strength. While they hoped peace could be possible, they felt it would only occur if Israel were so strong that the Arabs had no other options. Because of that, Israel hoped to delay any peace proposal, especially on the West Bank and the Golan Heights, until their strength was overwhelming.²⁵

The effort to restart the peace process hit a major setback with the Israeli elections in May 1977. When a Likud governing coalition replaced the Labor Party led by Rabin and Peres. The election of the Likud government made it extremely difficult for Hussein to move forward on any peace plan. Likud was an ultra-nationalist party that called the West Bank Judea and Samaria, which referred to their biblical names. They did this to show that the Jews were there first and Israel was just reclaiming Jewish land that went back to biblical times. In a letter to President Ronald Reagan, Begin described Judea and Samaria's biblical context. He said, "Millennia ago, there was a Jewish kingdom of

Judea and Samaria where our kings knelt to God, where our prophets brought forth a vision of eternal peace, where we developed a rich civilization which we took with us in our hearts and in our minds on our long global trek for over eighteen centuries and with it, we can back home.”²⁶ In addition, the Likud platform said that those lands were an important part of *Eretz Israel* which translates to the land of Israel. It did not acknowledge the Palestinians or grant them the right to live in the West Bank with ideas of self-determination. Likud’s 1977 political philosophy said, “the right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is eternal, and is an integral part of its right to security and peace. Judean and Samaria shall therefore not be relinquished to foreign rule; between the sea and Jordan, there will be Jewish sovereignty alone.”²⁷ Because of this, once Menachem Begin became Prime Minister under the Likud government, the possibilities of peace in the eyes Hussein and the Jordanians seemed remote. The Jordanians feared the consequences of the new Likud government so much that they made contingency plans in case the Israelis annexed the West Bank and expelled all the Palestinians to Jordan. They also feared that the new Israeli government would try and destabilize the monarchy, with the hope of it being replaced by a Palestinian government. In that case, they could force more Palestinian to Jordan, making that the new Palestinian homeland and leaving the West Bank for continued Israeli expansion.²⁸

Despite his tepidness of the new Israeli government, Hussein attempted to explore where the new Israeli administration stood on the peace process. He secretly met with new Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan in London on August 22, 1977. The meeting did not go well from the perspective of either Israel or Jordan. In the meeting, Dayan got the impression that Hussein was no longer interested in dealing with the West Bank.

According to Dayan, Hussein was still bitter about the Rabat resolution and felt that if the Palestinians and the PLO did not want his help, then he saw no need to provide it.

Hussein's only concern while talking to Dayan was the East Bank and making sure Israel did not interfere with it or do anything to risk instability. He seemed like he no longer had the desire to take risks in clashing with the Arabs or the Israelis over a land and people that did not want his help. When Dayan asked if Hussein was willing to divide parts of the West Bank with Israel, he replied that he could not ask any Arab village to sacrifice itself and join Israel. He also mentioned that he would be considered a traitor in the Arab world for "selling Arab land to the Jews so he could enlarge his own kingdom."²⁹ Hussein viewed the meeting as a sign that the new Israeli government had no desire to make the necessary sacrifices for peace. He said of the meeting, "I saw my friend Moshe Dayan who become the Foreign Minister of the Likud here in London. His attitude was even harder than it had been earlier and that was the end of that. We never had any contact for a long period."³⁰

Without any movement on the peace process and despite the difficulty of the new Israeli government, the Carter administration began to work on setting up the new Geneva Conference. One of the first major issues concerning the conference was what to do with the Palestinians. In 1975, a letter of understanding was signed by Nixon and the Israelis. This letter was drafted during Kissinger's attempt at shuttle diplomacy and was an effort by the United States to get Israeli participation in further peace negotiations. While the letter mainly dealt with security and military aid matters, it also contained a clause about the Palestinians and the PLO saying the US pledged to not deal with, recognize, or negotiate with the PLO as long as it refused to recognize Israel's

existence.³¹ Because of that promise, the US did not have a vehicle for dealing with the PLO while the Arabs united at Rabat and said only the PLO could speak for the Palestinians.

The US began attempting to bring the PLO into the negotiating process by trying to convince them that recognizing Israel, or at least UNSC Resolution 242, would lead to an improvement in the lives of the Palestinians and greater international acceptance of the PLO. On August 5, 1977, Vance visited Hussein in Amman to discuss the upcoming negotiations. Hussein expressed his fear to Vance that the Arabs expected too much out of the negotiations and could react if Israel and the US do not provide meaningful gains. Hussein believed that if progress was not made quickly, “there will be a political reaction which will favor the forces of extremism in the area.” He was also worried that the election of Begin would make any progress impossible. Vance believed that the talks would progress favorably but was concerned about the Palestinian issue. He told Hussein that if the Arabs could get the PLO to accept Resolution 242, then, the US could argue to Israel that is the equivalent of the PLO accepting their right to exist.³² Vance hoped that Hussein could use his influence in the region to persuade the PLO to recognize Israel’s right to exist.

Vance also presented Hussein with Carter’s draft proposal for the Geneva talks. The plan had five main ideas that all parties should agree to before the negotiations began. This included the idea that the result would be a comprehensive settlement reflected by a peace treaty. That the basis for negotiations would come from UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. He also wanted an agreement that after a peace treaty was signed, all states would agree to normal peaceful relations between the states of the

region. This included both political and economic exchanges. Carter also wanted an understanding that eventually a phased withdrawal of all forces to safe and recognizable borders would occur. In particular, Israel needed to realize that at the end of the negotiations, they would not be able to continue to have a military presence in the West Bank and the Sinai. Finally, a non-militarized Palestinian entity would be created in the West Bank that would have the option through free election to determine if they wanted to be independent or part of Jordan.³³ Hussein was pleased with these basic principles because they were similar to his view of how the negotiations should proceed. When Vance presented these points to Begin, he rejected the notion of a Palestinian entity saying that “this would inevitably lead to a PLO-dominated, Soviet armed state.” Israel also would only accept the Palestinians at the negotiations if they were part of the Jordanian delegation and not identified as representatives of the PLO.³⁴ The Israeli leadership used the threat of the Cold War to pressure Carter into supporting their position against the PLO. By arguing, both in public and private, that the PLO would become a Soviet proxy in the region, it made it more difficult for Carter to support including them in the negotiations. The PLO did not make that effort any easier by maintaining its position that called for the destruction of Israel. In addition, while Begin said he wanted a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, he knew that the PLO would not work with Jordan and Hussein and his real goal was to block any substantial negotiation over the final solution of the West Bank. The process of delaying any negotiations over the West Bank would become a bedrock principle of the various Likud governments all the way up until the 1990s.

The next day, Hussein responded to Carter's proposed negotiation points. Hussein believed something needed to be included about Palestinian refugees if the US wanted a lasting peace. It did not necessarily need to be a full right of return for the Palestinian refugees displaced in the 1948 and 1967 wars, but must include some form of compensation to replace the land lost when the Palestinians evacuated them during the conflicts with Israel. In addition, he wanted Vance to know that Jerusalem needed to be included in the negotiations, along with a guarantee that the Arabs would have access to the Muslim holy sites. The Arab part of Jerusalem also must be under Arab sovereignty. Otherwise, Hussein appeared very happy about Carter's broad outline for negotiations.³⁵ While from an Arab perspective the access to the Muslim holy sites was important, Hussein's call for Arab sovereignty was focused on Jordanian interests rather than a united Arab interest. Hussein wanted the control of Jerusalem returned to his family, not to any future Palestinian or Arab entity created out of the West Bank and Gaza.

On June 22, 1977, Brzezinski put forth a plan to Carter outlining his vision of what the US should do about the Palestinians. He called for a return of Hussein's United Arab Kingdom Plan from 1972. He believed that the Palestinian part of the Kingdom would be demilitarized and be stationed by UN troops to maintain peace and stability. The Palestinian section would also be linked with Jordan, with Hussein retaining control over foreign policy and security. Because of Rabat, this plan would now need the support of Palestinians on the ground, which Brzezinski believed to be impossible without Arab help. He also called for a united Jerusalem that contained both the Israeli capital and an administrative capital for the Palestinian part of the Jordanian federation. A mixed council that respected all the present religions would govern all holy places.³⁶

Brzezinski's view that the only way to accomplish this would be through broad Arab support was correct. Unfortunately for Hussein, the view of the other Arab leaders towards Hussein's plan had not changed.

Once again, the Carter administration tried to bring the Palestinians into the negotiation by informally discussing the option of self-determination after an internationally backed transition from Israeli control to Palestinian autonomy. The goal was that at the end of the transition, the people of Palestine would vote on remaining part of Israel, independence, or some link to Jordan. The Carter administration still believed it was important to get the PLO and the Palestinians involved in the negotiations and hoped that this plan would persuade them to participate. On September 10, 1977, meeting with Landrum Bolling, acting as an unofficial representative of the Carter administration, in Beirut on Arafat described his opposition to the creation of a Palestinian entity with joint control by Jordan and Israel or an international body that allowed for some form of self-determination at a later date. Arafat believed that Hussein would use his position to "threaten people, bribe and corrupt those he could get to follow him so that, in the end, he would destroy our right to have an independent state."³⁷ In that scenario, Arafat would never have a leadership role in a Palestinian state or entity.

Hussein also attempted to get the Palestinians to participate in the Geneva talks in some form. In a meeting in early 1977, Hussein tried to convince Arafat to send representatives to the conference. He also urged them to accept UN Resolution 242. Despite the attempts by Hussein to mend fences with the PLO, all was not forgiven. Hussein refused to allow more members of the PLO into Jordan or for the PLO to open offices in Jordan. Hussein reaffirmed his position to Arafat that he would not represent

the Palestinians in negotiations because of Rabat.³⁸ Arafat still refused to join the negotiations as part of a Jordanian delegation or to accept UNSC Resolution 242. Despite these rejections, the relationship between Hussein and the PLO did improve during 1977. One of the main reasons was the PLO's active involvement in the Lebanese Civil War. During that conflict, PLO forces fought Syrian-backed forces for control of Lebanon. This conflict caused both Arafat and Assad to look for friends in the region and caused both leaders to strive to improve the relationship with Hussein. In fact, the Cairo Summit in 1977 saw the PLO revoke their resolution calling for the removal of Hussein and acknowledge Jordan's role in the West Bank.³⁹ The restoration of the relationship between Hussein and Arafat would become important because that relationship formed the basis for many of the attempts at the peace process during the Reagan administration. It was important for both Arafat and Hussein to end their hostility towards each other to promote the interests of the Palestinians to the United States.

In August 1977, Vance made a trip to the Middle East to discuss the Palestinian issue with various Arab leaders. Vance believed that the solution to the Palestinian issue was to create a UN trusteeship in the West Bank and Gaza that lasted a few years while the Palestinians transitioned to some form of an entity based on self-determination. Vance received positive feedback from the main Arab leaders he visited, including Hussein. Another issue was getting the PLO to participate in negotiations. To do this, Vance needed them to accept Israel's right to exist through the acceptance of the major UN resolutions. While in Saudi Arabia, Vance presented King Fahd a draft statement

that he needed the PLO to agree to if it wanted to be involved with the US. The statement said:

The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, with the reservation that it considers that the resolution does not make adequate reference to the question of the Palestinians since it fails to make any reference to a homeland for the Palestinian people. It is recognized that the language of Resolution 242 relates to the right of all state in the Middle East to live in peace.

Vance believed that this eliminated the main objections of the PLO, mainly that the UN resolutions did not address the problems of the Palestinian people and refugees, but still met the minimum requirement that the PLO recognized Israel. Much to his dismay and the dismay of his Arab allies, the Executive Committee of the PLO immediately rejected it.⁴⁰ This made it significantly harder for the US to argue for Palestinian participation. The only avenue left for Palestinian participation in any peace conference was through a delegation with Jordan or a united Arab delegation that still would not include active members of the PLO leadership.

An additional stumbling block was Egypt's position on a united Arab delegation. Egypt did not support a joint Arab delegation for fear that Assad, Hussein, or the Palestinians could then sink the negotiations with opposition to a part that did not include Egypt. Sadat was determined to get the Sinai back and did not want to threaten that goal by being linked to other nations. In addition, because of Egypt's negative relationship with the PLO, it did not want the Palestinians to have a separate voice in the talks but preferred that they remain a small part of the Jordanian delegation. This would limit the

opposition by Israel and make it more difficult for the Palestinians to break up the negotiations because they did not achieve all their goals on the West Bank.⁴¹

In July 1977, Hussein met with Sadat to try and persuade him to join a group delegation of Arabs for the proposed Geneva conference. Sadat was outraged at the thought, saying he would never take orders from a Ba'athist, referring to Assad. Hussein reminded Sadat that it was not too long ago that he fought side by side with Assad. Hussein kept pressuring Sadat to agree to at least meet with the other states to discuss the proposal and every time Sadat found some excuse why he would not. To Hussein, this was the clearest sign that Sadat had plans of his own for peace with Israel and did not want to be tied to down in a joint negotiation.⁴²

On October 1, 1977, the Soviets and the Americans released a statement that called for another Geneva peace conference to settle all the remaining issues in the region. Both the US and the USSR would co-chair the summit. they called for “a comprehensive settlement to the Middle East problem” that addressed all key issues such as:

withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict; the resolution of the Palestinian question including ensuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; termination of the state of war and establishment of normal peaceful relations on the basis of mutual recognition of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence.

They also called for demilitarized zones under the control of the UN, including US and USSR troops to maintain the peace if necessary. Unlike Nixon, Carter was less concerned about keeping the Soviets out of the negotiations. He believed that the threat

of war in the region remained and was a bigger threat to the Cold War status quo and he was determined to nullify it.⁴³ Carter's belief was supported as a result of the October War where continued escalation between the US and the Soviet Union brought both sides close to active participation in the conflict.

The statement was met with outrage by the Israelis. What the statement did not mention was UN Resolution 242. This was important to the Israelis because they had argued in the past that all negotiations should be based on 242 because it called for the "the right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." It was also somewhat vague on the return of land taken in 1967.⁴⁴ In addition, the Israeli position had always been to focus on secure borders which did not necessarily mean a return to the pre-1967 lines. Israel was also angered by the talk of the legitimate representatives of the Palestinians, which they believed referred to the PLO. In fact, because it was also a Soviet statement, it lent more weight to this criticism since the Soviets often referred to the PLO as the legitimate representatives of the Palestinians. Finally, the agreement did not mention a peace treaty but just the settlement of issues. The Israelis worried that this meant a non-binding agreement, something they had always opposed.⁴⁵ Because the statement with the Soviet Union did not mention 242, Israel wanted some assurances that past statements by the US still held. These included an affirmation of 242 and 338, rejection of the PLO, and calls for safe and secure borders based on a peace treaty. In a meeting with Carter on October 4, Dayan told him that if it were necessary for Israel to accept the statement from the USSR and the US, it would be unlikely that they would participate in the Geneva Conference. Carter assured him that this was the Soviet-American view of Geneva, but it was not necessary to accept it or was

the guaranteed outcome of the negotiations. Dayan also told Carter that Israel was not willing to allow for a Palestinian state and needed to keep many of their settlements along with some military installations. Dayan also said he was willing to listen to proposals made by Hussein and would not reject them out of hand, but Israel had security needs in the West Bank that would make it impossible to fully return to the pre-1967 lines or give the Palestinians a state.⁴⁶

Vance continued the discussion with Dayan on October 5 and encouraged him to accept the joint US-Soviet statement. He argued that the US blocked a number of demands made by the Soviets that Israeli would have opposed. This included Moscow's desire for the statement mentioning Palestinian national rights. The implication of that phrase was that at the end of the negotiations, a Palestinian state would reside in the West Bank. Dayan ignored Vance's arguments but eventually agreed that the Israelis would negotiate a working paper with the US that formed their basis for their attendance at Geneva. The paper called for a single Arab delegation, separate bilateral working groups for negotiation, and the West Bank and Gaza to be discussed in a working group that included Egypt and Jordan.⁴⁷ This working paper contradicted many of the goals of the joint US-USSR statement and focused less on Palestinian rights, and more on joining them with Jordan and Egypt.

During the planning for Geneva, Hussein was as hopeful as possible that the Carter administration understood the issues of the Palestinians and would try to work towards peace that benefited Jordan. He told Carter that he was "encouraged by your personal perseverance in this matter and your wise and fair judgment. I shall continue to work closely with you and cooperate to my fullest capacity so that our joint efforts may

lead to a just peace in our region and a positive era of relationship between the Arab world and the United States.”⁴⁸ Hussein was particularly encouraged by Carter’s attempts to deal with the Palestinian issue in light of the Rabat resolution while still envisioning a role for Jordan in the West Bank in the future once peace was achieved.

The plan for Geneva took a dramatic turn on November 9, 1977. In a speech to the Egyptian Parliament, Sadat announced that he would meet the Israelis anywhere for peace and was willing to go to Jerusalem if necessary. On November 20, Sadat arrived in Jerusalem and spoke in front of the Israeli Knesset. In his speech, Sadat made it clear that he was on his own by telling the Israelis he did not consult with other Arab leaders before he decided to come there and that many were opposed to his visit. Sadat said he came “to assume the responsibility on behalf of the Egyptian People and to share in the fate-determining responsibility of the Arab Nation and the Palestinian People . . . in a bid to save . . . the entire Arab Nation the horrors of new, shocking and destructive wars.”⁴⁹

Sadat’s speech in front of the Knesset immediately drew a response around the world. Many in the Arab world denounced it. The PLO issued a statement condemning “Sadat’s treasonous visit.” They called for the creation of a “Steadfastness and Confrontation Front composed of Libya, Algeria, Iraq, Democratic Yemen, Syrian and the PLO to oppose all capitulationist solutions planned by imperialism, Zionism, and their Arab tools.” They also condemned the planned Geneva Conference and Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 for not recognizing the legitimate national rights of the Palestinians. In addition, they called for a boycott of Sadat and Egypt.⁵⁰ This statement was signed by all the major factions of the PLO and showed that the radical regimes would not side with Sadat and planned to punish any state that did. In particular, with the

support of Syria and Iraq, it was seen as a warning to Jordan not to join with Sadat.

While Hussein wanted peace, it would be difficult to achieve that goal and maintain his leadership role in Jordan if two of the states bordering on Jordan continued to undermine his regime in response to that peace deal. Hussein wanted peace, but not at the expense of his regime.

The PLO responded in other ways towards Sadat's efforts in Jerusalem. On February 18, two PLO terrorists entered a hotel in Cyprus and murdered Youssef el-Sebai. El-Sebai was the editor of a popular newspaper in Cairo and a close friend of Sadat. The terrorists announced that "everyone who went to Israel with Sadat will die, including Sadat." Sadat was furious about this attack. He told Israeli Defense Minister Ezra Weizman, "I have excluded the PLO from my lexicon. By their behavior, they have excluded themselves from the negotiations."⁵¹ Another group of PLO-backed terrorists landed a boat on the shores of Tel Aviv on March 11, where they proceeded to attack a highway, hijack a taxi and a bus and murdered thirty-eight Israelis including thirteen children including the American niece of Connecticut Senator Abraham Ribicoff.⁵² The PLO was announcing to the world with these attacks that they could and would scuttle any talks between the Arabs and the Israelis. It was also a demonstration to the US and its allies in the region that the PLO had the power to disrupt a peace process if they chose to do it. This would have been a particular worry for Hussein because of his large Palestinian population and the fear that the PLO could increase opposition to his rule if they did not approve of a peace process.

The mayors of many of the West Bank towns also released a statement. They took a more balanced view of Sadat's visit. They criticized Sadat for not mentioning the

PLO as the sole voice of the Palestinian people but thanked him for calling for a comprehensive peace, not just one between Egypt and Israel. They recognized the sacrifices that Egypt and its people had made for the Palestinian cause. They also called for the strengthening of the alliance between all Arabs, Egypt included.⁵³ This showed the people of the West Bank were not as radical compared to the PLO and many would work with an agreement that gave them self-determination and a chance to end the occupation.

News reports immediately recognized the issues facing Hussein because of Sadat's trip. A *New York Times* report argued that Hussein was in a tough position because he could not support it without upsetting Syria who vehemently opposed it, calling it the "trip of shame." Some in the King's inner circle believed that this allowed Hussein to continue talks with Israel more openly than he has in the past. Hussein believed that for the trip to be successful, the break between Syria and Egypt would need to be repaired.⁵⁴ Because of this pressure, Hussein attempted to take a neutral stance in public while discussing his misgivings about the trip in private.

Hussein had a number of issues with Sadat's trip. Most importantly he saw the trip as a threat to the Geneva Conference and an attempt by Sadat to negotiate a separate peace with Israel while leaving out the rest of the Arabs and the Palestinians out of the process. When Hussein first publically addressed Sadat's trip to Israel, he took a mixed view. He praised Sadat for his courage but worried about the actual impact of the initiative. He hoped to encourage the rest of the Arab world to unite and continue to work towards the proposed Geneva conference. Hussein believed that neither Sadat's unilateral approach nor the rejectionist approach would solve the issue and lead to the

return of Arab land.⁵⁵ While he opposed to Sadat's unwillingness to coordinate with the other Arabs and damage the prospect of the summit at Geneva, Hussein did appreciate the value in upending the status quo. From Hussein's perspective, Sadat's trip had the potential to shape world opinion, improving the chances of a settlement with Israel.

Hussein also had a personal objection to Sadat's trip to Israel which he explained in a meeting with Brzezinski. Hussein said of the Sadat trip, "The visit to Jerusalem under occupation had great religious significance. . . . We lost Jerusalem in 1967 under Egyptian command. We knew we would lose, but we went into the war anyway. Under Egyptian command and responsibility, the West Bank was lost. The Sadat visit was a very, very , big shock." He also mentioned his family's historical connection to the Jerusalem along with the fact his grandfather was buried there after being assassinated while visiting the religious sites.⁵⁶ Hussein was trying to show Brzezinski how personally connected he was to Jerusalem and because of that how hurt he was by Sadat's visit without any consultation. Hussein was reflecting to Brzezinski the personal attitude of many Arabs on Sadat's visit to Israel.

After Sadat's trip occurred, Hussein immediately met with Assad to gauge his reaction to it. Assad told Hussein that he was outraged by Sadat's actions and would never agree to anything that came out of it. Assad also blamed the United States for being complicit in Sadat's attempt to negotiate without the rest of the Arabs. Assad threatened to allow the Soviet Union to build a nuclear base in Syria in response. Hussein also believed that Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf states agreed with Assad's view of the situation. From their point of view, Sadat's speech in Jerusalem was

a de facto recognition that Jerusalem was the capital of Israel and this was unlikely to change.⁵⁷

Immediately following the speech, Hussein talked with both Ambassador Pickering and Sadat and told them that he would like to be included in future talks. Hussein was reassured by Sadat when he told him that he believed the West Bank should be linked to Jordan. Sadat argued that while a vote might be necessary, in a year or less the PLO would have almost no influence in the West Bank and the Palestinians would likely want to stay connected with Jordan.⁵⁸ To Hussein, this was the first acknowledgment by another Arab leader that Jordan should have control over the West Bank since the decision at Rabat. Hussein's outrage over Sadat's trip to Jerusalem was eased if Sadat could assure him that the West Bank would eventually return to Jordanian control.

Soon after Sadat's trip, Hussein met with Vance and discussed his reaction. Hussein told Vance that he believed that Sadat "had something up his sleeve" to make a separate deal at the expense of the other Arabs. In particular, Hussein was concerned because he was with Sadat just days before the trip and nothing was mentioned. Hussein also gave Vance an update on Assad's attitude and relayed his view of a conspiracy led by the Americans and his threat to embrace the Soviet Union.⁵⁹ The threat about Soviet involvement in Syria was a particular concern for the Carter administration because, after the Egyptian expulsion in 1972, the Soviets' position in the Middle East was limited to Iraq and the US had no desire to see them return to more of the Middle East.

Israel also responded to Sadat's gambit but not in the way many Arabs hoped. Despite the reaction of the Israeli government, many in the Israeli public believed that peace would quickly be agreed to between Egypt and Israel. They expected both sides would make the needed compromises to achieve that peace. This attitude was felt by many Israeli politicians and the Israeli public.⁶⁰ On December 28, 1977, Begin gave a speech in the Knesset that outlined his view for the West Bank and Gaza. He called for elections that had very limited responsibilities. He believed that the Palestinians would not have their homeland, but could become either Israeli or Jordanian citizens. In addition, he said, "Israel stands by its right and its claim of sovereignty to Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district." It called for any final status to the sovereignty of those areas to be decided by negotiation.⁶¹ This plan was not seen by people outside of Israel as a concession. In fact, it would make permanent the Israeli military presence in the West Bank and preclude the Palestinians from ever having the right to determine their political status. This speech was called the Begin Plan and was widely dismissed by everyone but the Israelis. In another speech, Begin announced that he wanted to meet with all of Israel's neighbors without preconditions to reach peace and set up economic activity between the nations. When he referred to the issue of the Palestinians, he called them the Arabs of Eretz Yisrael and asked them to discuss their common future.⁶² The implication was that the Palestinians in the West Bank only had the option of joining Israel, with no hope of independence or any political or economic separation from Israel.

The US also reacted to the speeches of Sadat and Begin. Immediately following the speeches, the Carter administration attempted to retain focus on a comprehensive settlement. They soon realized that Sadat's efforts had diminished this possibility and

ended the hopes of the proposed Geneva Conference. It took a couple of months, but eventually the Carter administration realized that only possible peace process now was a bilateral negotiation between Egypt and Israel that they eventually hoped could bring in other Arabs, especially Jordan.⁶³ On January 4, 1978, while visiting Egypt, President Carter made a statement on supporting the new bilateral talks between Egypt and Israel. In the statement, Carter discussed the issues with the Palestinians and the need to address those issues. He said, “there must be a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The problem must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and enable the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future.”⁶⁴ This statement became known as the Aswan statement and it was important because no US president had ever discussed the issue of the Palestinians in such a way. Up until this point, many in Israel and their allies in the US did not even consider the Palestinians a legitimate group. They believed they were just Arabs and should have been absorbed into the country where they currently resided. It was also important because it did not single out Jerusalem as a separate negotiating point, implying that it was part of the 1967 land that Israel had to return. Carter’s statement gave encouragement to the Arabs that this president might finally take their issues seriously and encourage Israel to make the sacrifices necessary for peace.

In regards to Begin’s speech, the United States did not reject his ideas and seemed to accept some of it, leading to fear in the Arab world that the US, particularly with respect to the Palestinians, was abandoning its previous position that a settlement had to be based on UN Resolution 242. When Under Secretary of State Alfred Atherton met with Hussein on August 12, 1978, this was a major source of concern. Hussein told him

that these past few months had been “the most distressing of my life.” Atherton assured Hussein that the US position had not changed. They still supported a settlement with Israel returning most of the land captured in 1967. In addition, Atherton explained to Hussein that the US believed that at this critical time, direct negotiations between Israel and the Egypt with the US mediating was the best hope for a breakthrough. While the US hoped to get public support for the Camp David talks, Hussein at this time would not grant it. He told Atherton he agreed with the need for direct negotiations but could not join because of Rabat and the lack of the inclusion of the Palestinians. Hussein also expressed concern that the negotiations would lead to some combination of Jordanian local control with Israel remaining responsible for security. He feared that this was an attempt to give Israel control over the West Bank and use Jordan as a cover. He vehemently opposed any plan such as this. Finally, Hussein encouraged Atherton to include the Palestinians if he wanted to reach a successful, long-lasting agreement.

As 1978 progressed, the US still hoped to convince Hussein to join the negotiations. Both the US and Egypt worried that without Hussein’s participation, Egypt would face increasing pressure from the other Arab states not to sign a deal with Israel. Sadat believed that if Hussein joined the negotiation, then he could not be accused of abandoning the Palestinians they would have representation in the form of Hussein. In a meeting with Ambassador Pickering on March 5, 1978, Hussein reiterated his position that he could not agree to speak for the Palestinians unless he had assurances ahead of time that Israel would agree to a total withdrawal of the West Bank and the Palestinians would have the opportunity for self-determination. He said it would be suicide to participate without those guarantees.⁶⁵ Hussein also began to show his frustration with

the United States for not pushing more for a united Arab front at the Geneva Conference and instead focusing on strictly Egypt and Israel.

Throughout 1978, Hussein continued to face pressure from all sides on the Sadat trip to Israel and the possibility of bilateral talks between Egypt and Israel. The Americans continued to pressure Hussein to support Sadat, even though he believed Sadat had no intention of arguing for Jordan's interests with Israel. Assad and other Arab leaders continued to pressure Hussein to reject Sadat's approach and condemn him for his negotiations with Israel. Finally, Hussein faced another assassination attempt in February of 1978 that illustrated the personal threat to him if he backed Sadat. Palestinian militants snuck surface-to-air missiles into Jordan with the goal of shooting down Hussein's plane. While the plot was foiled, it reiterated to Hussein the dangerous position he was in.⁶⁶ Hussein realized that by staying neutral and attempting to show moderation, he generally would not upset either side enough for them to attempt actively to dethrone him.

Egypt also attempted to persuade Hussein to join the negotiations. Sadat believed the Hussein would be happy with an administrative role over the West Bank and through that, could be enticed to join Egypt in the negotiations. Sadat had hoped that if another Arab nation also began discussing terms with Israel, the pressure on him from other Arabs would be reduced. At the Rabat summit, Hussein said, "he would work for the accomplishment of an Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories." He also said that once the area was liberated from Israeli occupation, the people of Palestine should choose any affiliation they want.⁶⁷ Because of his close connection to the people of Palestine, Hussein was willing to take control of some of the administration duties of Palestine and eventually hoped to have them join Jordan in a federation. Egypt hoped to

build on those past statements and get Hussein to agree to participate, allowing for the completion of a more comprehensive agreement.

Sadat continued to be frustrated by Hussein's lack of willingness to join his bold push for peace. On July 8, 1978, in a meeting with Shimon Peres, the former Minister of Defense, Sadat let his anger with Hussein be known. He said Hussein "wanted the West Bank handed to him as a gift." He accused Hussein of pursuing an opportunistic policy where he had to risk nothing and in return received everything he desired. Sadat also mentioned Hussein's father died from schizophrenia and he could see the same signs currently in Hussein. In addition, Sadat said that Hussein consistently made the wrong choices. He joined Nasser in 1967 and lost the West Bank. He refused to fully enter the 1973 war and then was not included in the disengagement talks.⁶⁸

To reassure Hussein about the progress of negotiations between Israel and Egypt during the summer of 1978, Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel flew to Jordan on July 26, 1978. After meeting with Hussein, he believed he understood the King's position on the peace talks. Hussein was willing to join the talks at a moment's notice if it looked like they would get a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank and the restoration of Jerusalem in Muslim hands. Hussein was opposed to Jordan acting as an administrator of the West Bank while Israeli troops remained. Kamel told Hussein that Egypt's goal was to get the United States to focus more on the Arab position and separate itself from Israel by demonstrating the radicalness of Begin in his discussions about Jordan. He figured this would be the best way to get a lasting peace on terms the Arabs states approved.⁶⁹ During their discussions, Kamel was struck by the depth of knowledge, especially Jordanian Prime Minister Modar Badran, of the people of the West

Bank. He said Badran “knew every hill and valley. . . . He knew the people, the families, their women. . . . He knew who had dealings with the Israelis and who did not, who was for the PLO and who merely went along with them.”⁷⁰ This convinced him that no solution for the West Bank would ever occur without the support and consultation of Jordan. Kamel also found that Hussein still was angry about the situation at Rabat, especially because he counted on Egypt at the summit to protect him from the more radical Arab regimes. In addition, he believed that the Israeli actions in the West Bank were a direct result of Jordan no longer speaking for the Palestinians.⁷¹

The Carter administration also continued to encourage negotiations between all the Arabs and Israel, but most of their focus was on Egypt. As 1978 progressed, it became obvious that the US would need to be more directly involved, leading Carter to call for a summit at Camp David in September of 1978. Carter hoped that eventually other Arabs would join the negotiations and he believed that it had the potential to lead to a comprehensive peace settlement for the region. While Jordan was invited to attend, Hussein declined because he still wanted to negotiate as a joint Arab delegation and he was still honoring his commitment at Rabat.⁷² Without Jordan, Carter knew the negotiations would be difficult, but he was determined to continue because he believed it was the only current viable path.

On August 18, 1978, the CIA gave the Carter administration a report that provided an accurate depiction of Hussein’s attitudes towards that peace process leading up to Camp David. The report argued that Hussein had tried recently to balance his desire for peace while still maintaining his position with the rest of the Arab world. They believe Hussein had tried unsuccessfully to use personal diplomacy to get some form of

an Arab agreement about a joint negotiation with Israel. The CIA also believed that Hussein hoped that the West Bank and Gaza would be placed under UN control while it decided its future. Hussein did not want the creation of a Palestinian state because he believed it would eventually threaten his rule. His ideal solution was that the Palestinians will eventually choose to live in a federation with Jordan of which he remained the head. It also said that while Hussein was willing to accept most of the Israeli demands on ideas of normalization, he was firm that East Jerusalem needed to be retained by the Arabs and controlled by the Arabs. It concluded by saying that Hussein needed to have some support from its neighbors, mainly Saudi Arabia and Syria, to eventually succeed in negotiations with Israel. Without their support, or at the very least, not open opposition, it would be difficult for Hussein to join the negotiations.⁷³

A week before the commencement of the Camp David talks, Hussein sent Carter a letter outlining his position. In it, he reiterated that while he hoped the talks succeeded, he could not publicly support them until he knew the result. In addition, Jordan would not join them unless Israel promised ahead of time to withdrawal from the West Bank and allow for self-determination. Hussein also expressed his disappointment with how those talks came about. In particular, while he acknowledged the bravery in Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, he noted that it wiped out all his efforts to unify the Arabs, now making it impossible to have a broad-based, comprehensive peace settlement. He also believed that the Israeli government would never allow a settlement that included rights for the Palestinians, making it impossible for the rest of the Arab world to participate. While wishing Carter success, Hussein also made it clear that he and the rest of the Arab world would not blindly accept principles for a settlement negotiated at Camp David that they

opposed and had no part in forming.⁷⁴ Another reason Hussein did not attend was because he did not trust the participants. He believed Sadat, Carter, and Begin were meeting at Camp David to assure that no united Arab front could exist and that Egypt always wanted a separate peace without the rest of the Arab world involved.⁷⁵ Hussein's view of Sadat and Begin was correct. Neither leader had much concern for the future of the Palestinians. Sadat was determined to regain the Sinai Peninsula to justify his efforts in the October War. Begin was willing to sacrifice Israeli control over the Sinai if it meant the end of the hostility with Egypt, but he had no intention of removing Israeli dominance over the West Bank.

Even after the talks began, Carter attempted to persuade Jordan to join and when that failed, continued to discuss Jordan's role in the future of the West Bank despite their absence. When meeting with Begin and discussing Palestinian rights, according to Carter, Begin would not admit the obvious, mainly, that the present time, Jordan, and only Jordan had the right and the ability to give the Palestinians the authority to exercise autonomy. Because of this, Carter believed Jordan would need to be brought into the negotiations at some point, meaning the Israelis would probably need to make more concessions for that to happen. When the topic came up, Begin always pushed it for later while arguing for the Israeli military to retain control for the time being. In addition, Begin promised Carter that once the Palestinians had control of the West Bank, Israel only wanted to have control over the import of refugees and matters involving Israeli security. Carter thought this was a reasonable request until he learned that according to the Israelis, things as simple as road construction impacted the security of Israel.⁷⁶

At the start of the talks, Egypt argued the Jordanian position with both the US and Israel. When it came to the West Bank, Egypt believed that after five years, the area should be allowed to vote on its future, and Egypt hoped to encourage them to stay with Jordan. On the issue of settlements, Egypt argued that they thought all Israeli settlements should be evacuated from the West Bank, but the details needed to be worked out with Jordan. On Jerusalem, Egypt proposed a united city under an Arab flag, ideally Jordan's, that allowed for global access to the holy city. Finally, the Egyptian delegation told the White House they believed with US, Egyptian, and Saudi support, Jordan and Hussein could be convinced of the benefits of this type of plan for the West Bank.⁷⁷

Carter laid out his position on the West Bank and Gaza in what would become known as the “nine-point approach.” It called for the Palestinians to have some self-rule during a five-year transition from Israeli control to Palestinian control. The authority for creating the system of self-rule would come from Egypt, Israel and Jordan. Through negotiations, these states, along with consultations with the Palestinians, would create a Palestinian authority to manage the West Bank. Neither Israel nor Jordan would have sovereignty over this area during the five-year transition period. After that, it was up to the Palestinians. Israeli forces would withdraw to only a few areas of the West Bank and Gaza, still able to maintain a security presence. During the five-year transition, the Israelis and the new Palestinian entity would negotiate final borders and would decide the future relationship between the Palestinians and Jordan. Rights for both Israelis and Palestinians currently living in the West Bank would be negotiated. Finally, an economic plan for the area would be established.⁷⁸ Carter hoped that this would encourage both the Jordanians and the Palestinians to join the negotiations.

Even during the negotiations, Carter and Sadat held out hope that Hussein would eventually join them. Sadat reported that in his talks with Hussein, he believed Hussein would join them if the deal were to his liking. Regardless of Hussein's position, Carter and Sadat felt the region and their nations would all benefit from the culmination of the Camp David Accords.⁷⁹ Despite their encouragement, Hussein continued to refuse to join them. In Hussein's view, Jordan's goals for the Camp David process was to only participate if it became clear that Israel was willing to make major concessions including returning the West Bank to Jordan or to a Palestinian entity that would eventually become part of Jordan. He feared the reaction of Syria and Iraq if he openly joined the negotiations so he wanted to wait as long as possible to make sure that if he took the risk to join the talks, he received something valuable enough to make the risk worth it.⁸⁰ Carter was repeatedly told that Hussein could not join the talks unless he knew the Israelis would make concessions. In a conversation with Kamel during a bike ride on the seventh day of the Camp David talks, Carter told Kamel that he planned on pressuring Hussein and the ruler of Saudi Arabia to eventually join the negotiations so Sadat did not have to face the entire pressure from the rest of the Arab world alone. Kamel responded, "There we go again! Neither King Hussein nor King Khalid will agree to join the talks unless they were to be based upon Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank and Jerusalem."⁸¹ Carter never grasped the threat to Hussein from his more radical neighbors. He repeatedly demonstrated his belief that it was unreasonable for Hussein not join the talks. On the other hand, Hussein realized that unless he could demonstrate concrete results from the negotiations, Iraq and Syria had the ability to undermine his

regime and he was not willing to take that risk without assurances from the US and Israel on the nature of a final settlement.

As the talks progressed and Sadat believed it was possible to secure a deal without Jordanian participation, his attitude towards Hussein and Jordan began to change. In a discussion with Begin and Carter, Sadat argued that the West Bank did not belong to Jordan or Israel and the people of that region could only decide its fate. Sadat also said, such a state should not be independent nor have military forces, but should be either linked to Israel or Jordan with a preference towards Jordan.⁸² Because of Sadat's relations with the PLO, he had no interest in an independent Palestinian state with a security service run by Arafat. He feared that Arafat would use that position to make trouble for both Sadat and Hussein.

Jerusalem was the subject of the most difficult negotiations. Coming into the talks, Sadat had previously argued that Jerusalem needed to be controlled by an Arab government, especially the Arab sections that belonged to Jordan prior to 1967. Carter attempted to persuade Sadat that Camp David was not the proper place to discuss Jerusalem, especially since Israel had previously refused to make any concessions over it. Carter believed Sadat would be attacked for any deal he made on the subject. Because of that Carter recommended that Sadat ignore the issue and let Hussein focus on the holy places if he joined the negotiations.⁸³ For Carter and Sadat, this had the benefit of removing a complicated issue that could block a final agreement and assure that the issue would not enter into the discussions because of Hussein's continued refusal to participate in the negotiations. It allowed Sadat to argue that he was leaving the issue of Jerusalem

to be decided by the people it most affected, the Palestinians and the Jordanians, freeing Egypt to complete their agreement with Israel.

At the time of the Camp David meetings, Hussein was in London on a diplomatic mission to discuss the peace process with the British. While there, he asked a close friend of Sadat, Ashraf Marwan, to tell Sadat that he wanted to join the meetings. The instruction was private and not to be shared with anyone except those close to Sadat. Marwan immediately flew to Washington to talk to Sadat. Marwan got his answer and flew back to London to tell Hussein that Sadat did not need him there. After the summit, when an aide to Begin asked Sadat why he did not want Hussein to attend, Sadat said, "Because if Hussein had arrived at Camp David, we would not have reached any agreement."⁸⁴ Sadat did not want Hussein at Camp David for a number of reasons. Unlike Nasser, Sadat never thought highly of Hussein. He did not like monarchies and did not have any faith in Hussein's ability. This was frequently seen later when Sadat repeatedly referred to Hussein as schizophrenic. Sadat also believed that if the West Bank was discussed in detail, it could blow up the whole negotiation, making it impossible for Sadat to reclaim the Sinai, his only real goal.

Just days before the announcement of a deal at Camp David, Sadat called Hussein and informed him that he would be returning to Cairo soon because a deal was not possible at this time. This pleased Hussein because he always worried Sadat would sell out Jordan and the Palestinians to accomplish his deal with Israel. While visiting Spain, Hussein learned on BBC World Service that Sadat announced a deal had been reached. Hussein immediately canceled his plans to travel to Morocco and returned to Jordan.⁸⁵

Hussein believed that Sadat betrayed him and lied when he gave Hussein his assurances that no deal was forthcoming.

According to one of Sadat's associates, a major change occurred with Sadat between when he called Hussein and told him that the negotiations were dead and then two days later, agreed to a settlement. The advisor, Ossama Al Baz, said that Sadat isolated himself and the Americans fed his ego, eventually making him give in to the demands of Israel and Carter on the West Bank, allowing for a deal.⁸⁶ Sadat's determination to get a deal, despite the advice of his advisors and previous commitments he had made to other Arab leaders allowed him to overcome the issues that blocked an agreement. Sadat did what Hussein always feared he would do, sacrifice the interests of the Palestinians and the Jordanians to accomplish the return of the Sinai to Egypt, despite its impact on the rest of the Arab world.

During the later stages of negotiations at Camp David, the Americans proposed that if Jordan refused to take their role as an administrator of the West Bank, Egypt would do it. Before talking to any of his advisors, Sadat agreed to this plan. When Kamel found out about this provision, he ran to Sadat because he could not believe it was true. Kamel told Sadat this plan would be seen as a humiliation to Hussein and destroy any relationship Egypt had with Jordan. In addition, he argued Egypt did not know the first thing about the West Bank or its people, how were they going to run the area with wide opposition from the PLO. Sadat explained he would send the Egyptian army if necessary. This angered Kamel even more and he asked Sadat when it became Egypt's responsibility to wage war against the Palestinians. Kamel argued that Egypt's focus should be on getting enough out of the negotiations to entice Jordan to join them because

he believed that Jordan was the only nation capable of administering the Palestinians successfully. Another Sadat advisor, Hassan El Tohamy argued it did not matter what Hussein wanted, he heard rumors that he was going to abdicate the throne and let his brother, Prince Hassan, rule. Tohamy thought Hassan favored talks. Kamel shot down Tohamy's theory and said that most people knew Hassan has been arguing to avoid Camp David.⁸⁷ Kamal knew that without Jordan's participation the agreement focusing on the Palestinians would be rejected throughout the Arab world and that Egypt was in no position to uphold it. In addition, he believed that Sadat was getting bad advice from the advisors, Kamel knew Jordan, under Hussein or his brother, would not participate in any settlement like the Camp David talks, especially since it was negotiated without their participation.

Despite Kamel's protests, Sadat firmly believed that he could convince Hussein to join in the talks if necessary. In a conversation with Israeli Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman, Sadat said he believed Hussein would agree to create a police force for the West Bank during the period of transition as long as he got support from Saudi Arabia. If he did not participate, Sadat told Weizman that "I will take responsibility for the West Bank and Gaza. Don't worry, my policeman will use their guns."⁸⁸ To Sadat, the only issue he cared about was the return of the Sinai. As long as that was accomplished, Sadat was flexible in dealing with all other issues between the Arabs and Israel.

Kamal also had other issues with the agreement. He believed that the section on the West Bank was not in the interest of the Arab world and that Egypt had no place to speak for the Palestinians. In addition, Kamel felt that the calls for autonomy for the West Bank without a clear end to the Israeli occupation would not work with the other

Arabs and face massive resistance by both the Palestinians and Jordan. Kamal again tried to get Sadat to see his point of view and only focus on the Sinai if he could not get Jordan to join the talks, but Sadat refused. Because of this, Kamel tendered his resignation and stopped participating until the delegation returned to Cairo.⁸⁹

On the night of September 17, the Camp David Framework for Peace was signed by Egypt, Israel, and the United States. The first part of the framework consisted of relations between Egypt and Israel and the goal of returning the Sinai to Egypt and Egypt and Israel signing a peace treaty. For the West Bank and Jordan, the agreement was a colossal disaster. While it called for Palestinian self-determination and a transitional government to last five years, the agreement did not spell out what self-determination meant nor, what would occur after the transition. In addition, Begin promised to freeze settlements and remove the military government in the West Bank. Begin's interpretation of the agreement was that he would freeze settlements for the period where Egypt and Israel negotiated a formal treaty and that military government would physically move out of the West Bank, but would still have authority over any government formed by the Palestinians.⁹⁰ Even though Jordan was mentioned in the framework over a dozen times, they did not have any input on how they would participate in the West Bank transition. The agreement called on Jordan "to participate in joint patrols [with Israel] and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders."⁹¹ According to the agreement, Jordan was expected to help the Israelis police the Palestinians and target elements that threatened Israeli security. Hussein was also called on to work with Israel to determine which refugees could return to Israel and to take necessary measures to "prevent disruption and disorder."⁹² Hussein was not pleased

to be included without his consent and with no tangible gains for Jordan. The agreement encapsulated all Hussein's fears. Egypt sacrificed the Palestinian cause to regain the Sinai. It also ended the possibility of a comprehensive agreement between Israel and the Arabs, protecting Hussein from his more radical Arab neighbors. Both the Americans and the Egyptians expected him to police the Palestinians while Jordan did not participate in the agreement and received no tangible benefit from it. In addition, Hussein knew that if he refused, it would damage his relationship with the US.

Carter personally called Hussein on September 18 to explain the results of the Camp David negotiations. He told him that Israel had accepted Resolution 242 and all its principles and provisions and the Israeli occupation would end once a self-government was established on the West Bank. In addition, it called for the creation of a police force made up of Palestinians and Jordanians and while final settlement talks proceeded, Israel agreed to pause the creation of new settlements the West Bank and Gaza. Carter also gave Hussein the option to determine the level of participation of the Palestinians in negotiating a final settlement for the West Bank and Gaza. Carter promised this was just a first step in the path the peace and he was hopeful that it would truly lead to a comprehensive peace settlement between the Arabs and Israel. He offered to send someone to brief Hussein on the details of the deal. Hussein remained positive but noncommittal in his response and promised to remain that way till after he was fully briefed by Carter's representatives.⁹³

In a personal letter to Hussein, Carter told him what he believed the consequences were for the failure of the Camp David talks. He said, "A failure of our effort because of lack of support from other responsible and moderate leaders of the Arab nations would

certainly lead to the strengthening of irresponsible and radical elements and a further opportunity for intrusion of Soviet and other Communist influences throughout the Middle East.”⁹⁴ Carter believed that instability in the Third World gave the Soviet Union an opportunity to exploit that tension and expand their presence throughout the world.

Israel did not help Carter sell the agreement to the Arab world. Begin faced a growing political problem in Israel after Camp David from both the right and the left. He was accused of providing the footing for a future Palestinian state and was also attacked for limiting settlements on the West Bank and Gaza. He always responded by saying that he did not agree to anything new at Camp David that was materially different than what his cabinet approved of in the past. He also stated that the Palestinians would have very limited administrative autonomy and promised that the block on settlements would only last three months while Egypt and Israel finished negotiations.⁹⁵ Because of this, most of the Arab states believed that the idea of autonomy for the Palestinians was a mirage that would never occur and Israel would retain effective control of the area, leaving them little incentive to join the talks.

Despite his promises to wait, on September 19 the Jordanian government released a public reaction to the Camp David Accords. They announced they would not be tied to an agreement they took no role in negotiating. They also believed the only settlement should be a comprehensive one that involved all the Arabs. They also criticized Egypt, saying, “The dissociation of any of the Arab parties from the responsibilities of the collective action to reach a just and comprehensive solution . . . constitutes a weakening of the Arab stance and the chance of reaching a just and comprehensive solution.”⁹⁶

Hussein argued one of the biggest downsides of the Camp David Accords was its change

in attitude towards the Palestinians. Before Camp David, most in the Arab world demanded independence for the people of Palestine, either in a state or a federation with Jordan. The Camp David Accords replaced the idea of independence with autonomy, which left many Palestinians under Israeli control. Queen Noor said “the agreement at Camp David made autonomy the most that the Palestinians could hope to achieve, and only with the consent of the Israelis over a five-year period. An independent Palestinian state was out of the question.”⁹⁷ In addition, Hussein felt deceived by Sadat. Before the talks took place, Hussein received assurances from Sadat that nothing would be negotiated about the West Bank without Jordanian participation.⁹⁸ In the end, Hussein believed that Begin and Sadat conspired against him to keep him out of the peace process.

On September 20, Secretary Vance met with Hussein and his advisors in Amman. Hussein told Vance that because the agreement only focused on Egypt, Egypt would be isolated from the rest of the Arab world for going against a comprehensive deal and betraying the Palestinians. He also said Jordan was concerned that at the end of the five-year transition, he had no way to know what the situation would be in the West Bank. There was no guarantee that Israel would evacuate all their troops and security personnel. Because of that, it was difficult for Jordan to assume legal, political, and military responsibility for the area. He was also not pleased with the requirement for Jordan to participate with Israel in stopping Palestinian subversion without any guarantees that Israel would fully leave the West Bank. Hussein had no desire to act as the police force for Israel in Palestine, and that was seemingly what the agreement called for. Hussein criticized the vagueness of the elements of the Camp David Accords that dealt with the

West Bank, especially compared to the detailed description of Egyptian - Israeli relations. Vance tried to reassure Hussein by explaining to him that the provisions creating Palestinian self-governance would make it nearly impossible for the Israelis to reverse after five years. In regards to Jerusalem, Vance assured Hussein that the issue could not be solved in these negotiations but that the US still supported his position of a Jordanian or Arab role in running a unified city. In addition, he believed that while it did not include everything Hussein hoped for, it did provide a vehicle to end the occupation and finally reach a comprehensive settlement between Israel and the Arabs.⁹⁹ Despite Vance's assurances, Hussein's prediction of the future of the West Bank proved correct. The Israelis did not intend to create a Palestinian self-governing entity in the wake of Camp David. Instead, they hoped to use the five years to deepen their control over the West Bank and Gaza, making the creation of a Palestinian state more difficult.

The head of the Royal Court and a top advisor to Hussein Abdu Sharaf complained that the deal represented the Begin plan with Jordanian participation. While Vance argued that Jordan should want a role in determining who takes over as a neighboring country, Sharaf believed that by participating in this plan, the people of the West Bank would grow hostile to Jordan, who would view as colluding with the Israelis in their occupation. Sharaf also pointed to Israeli leadership publicly saying that "Jerusalem is to be united under Israeli rule forever, that Samaria and Judea will not be given up." He believed that with statements like that, Jordan would give up all credibility if it participated because it was clear that Israel never had any intention of giving the Palestinians their legitimate rights¹⁰⁰

While the government of Jordan criticized the deal, Hussein himself made no public comments immediately. Jordan faced a difficult decision because of the accords. First, they feared the radical regimes, especially Syria and Iraq whom all opposed it. Second, public opinion in Jordan was decisively negative towards participating in the next stage of the peace process. Finally, many of the native Jordanians did not want to be once again responsible for the Palestinians in the West Bank, which the accord made likely.¹⁰¹ King Hussein eventually reacted in a speech on Jordanian television on October 10. He said, “First, they do not imperatively link the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and the solution of the other aspects of the Arab-Israeli problem on the other fronts. Second, they do not clearly show the end of the road concerning the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza and the right of self-determination for the Palestinians.”¹⁰² Hussein believed that without assurance from Israel about the basic structure of a final deal, the Israelis, especially the Begin government, would indefinitely delay turning over the West Bank and Jerusalem to the Arabs while continuing to pursue policies on the ground that made the eventual turnover impossible.

On October 14, Hussein sent a letter to Sadat outlining his opposition to the deal. Specifically, Hussein opposed the framework deal for the West Bank and had little concern over the Egyptian-Israeli agreement. He told Sadat that the agreement was useless because Israel continues its policies of settlement expansion making the creation of a Palestinian sovereign entity impossible. Hussein pleaded with Sadat to unite and negotiate as one Arab block, otherwise, Israel would not succumb to pressure to deal favorably with the West Bank and Jerusalem.¹⁰³ While it is unlikely that Israel would

have bended to pressure from a united Arab front, it would have given Hussein the cover to participate in the agreement.

After the negotiations, the Jordanian government sent Carter a list of questions to help determine their willingness to participate further. For example, Hussein wanted to know who the US meant to be the representative of the Palestinian people. Carter replied that this point was not predetermined. Hussein also wanted to know more about the five-year transition. Carter told him that the transition was an American idea to ease the Israelis in and allow the Palestinians to successfully take control of the West Bank. Hussein also focused on the status of Jerusalem. Carter told him that the people of the Arab sections of Jerusalem would have the ability to participate in elections for the governing authority, but that authority would not include Jerusalem and his role in the new Palestinian entity. Carter told Hussein that because of Jerusalem's special status, its fate had to be decided with negotiation between Israel and Jordan. e also told him that he believed the Arabs should have some control over the Arab sections of the city.¹⁰⁴ While Hussein appreciated Carter's personal response to his questions, the answers were not enough to convince Jordan to join the talks.

Israel expressed dismay to Carter's response to Hussein. They believed that the US was backtracking on agreements it made to them at Camp David to increase Arab support of the deal. For example, Israel believed that the agreement allowed Israelis to continue to purchase land in the West Bank while Carter told Hussein that Israel had to stop the expansion. n addition, with regards to Palestinian rights, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan objected to the US mentioning the ability of the Palestinians to fulfill their legitimate aspirations. The Israelis believed the agreement only called for legitimate

rights. Dayan believed that the term aspirations implied a Palestinian state in the future and protested this to the American embassy because, despite the calls for autonomy, Israel would not tolerate an independent Palestinian state.¹⁰⁵ This demonstrated that Israel had no intentions of allowing for the creation of a Palestinian entity based on self-determination. They planned to continue to expand their settlement policy, increasing their control over the West Bank.

In a letter to Carter on November 1, 1978, Hussein explained why he could not join the negotiations at this point. He believed that without some guarantee that the end result of the negotiations would lead to an Israeli withdrawal, Jordan could not join the talks. He promised Carter that he would not argue against or attempt to block the people of the West Bank from participating but could not join himself. Hussein also expressed why he opposed the West Bank portion of the agreement. He said:

Jordan was invited to participate in arrangement of administrative, legal, military and political character during a 'transitional' period before knowing the shape or outline of the future settlement it is invited to conclude. We fear that at the end of the proposed transitional period, the results reached might be totally unacceptable. This particularly in view of the fact that Israel is repeating continuously its categorical claims about the final annexation of Arab Jerusalem, the expansion of settlements in the occupied areas and that the rejection of Arab sovereignty in occupied Arab lands.¹⁰⁶

Hussein believed that the attitude towards him and his issues by the Israelis had not fundamentally changed in his view, making it impossible for him to take the risk of participation in a process that he believed was doomed to failure. If he joined, he would face threats from the more radical regimes in Iraq and Syria with no real hope for what he considered a viable solution, which could fundamentally threaten the survival of his

regime. In regards to the upcoming Baghdad summit which was called by the Arab leadership to discuss the Camp David Accords, Hussein said, “Jordan will remain, as always, a constructive force and a voice of peace. We have been active in promoting a positive atmosphere for the conference and will pursue this effort in the coming days.”¹⁰⁷

In a meeting between Sadat and Carter and their aides on March 18, it was obvious they all grew tired of Hussein’s unwillingness to join the delegation or at least support it. While Carter preached patience, Sadat repeatedly called him schizophrenic and argued that all his outrage was for show. Sadat believed Hussein wanted the West Bank to restore his old United Arab Kingdom idea and would only join the talks if he knew he would get it. Brzezinski believed that if he explained to Hussein that the US could not predetermine results of a negotiation but still favored a large Jordanian role in the West Bank, Hussein might change his position. Despite their efforts, Hussein would end his boycott of the negotiations. To the view of Sadat and Carter, nothing would please Hussein but the agreement of his maximum position before the negotiations began.¹⁰⁸

Despite Hussein’s rejection, the White House continued to try and persuade him to participate. The White House wanted to use the momentum and attempt to finish the remaining issues so Egypt and Israel could formally sign a peace treaty. Brzezinski saw the problems occurring with Jordan. He believed that the US needed to get some withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank to make sure Jordan did not have a negative reaction to the deal. While many in the White House argued that Hussein was too timid and “wants [the US] to deliver a settlement to him on a silver platter,” Brzezinski saw the potential of bringing in the more moderate states, arguing that it would be

important to successfully maintain the deal.¹⁰⁹ Carter had a more negative reaction to Hussein. He would later say, that “Hussein was a bitter disappointment, proving to be reticent and even obstructive during crucial negotiating times. He was too financially dependent on rich Arab nations to act independently. I considered him, however, to be an honest and decent man.”¹¹⁰

The rest of the Arab world also had a hostile reaction to the deal. At the time of the agreement at Camp David, Mahmoud Riad was no longer the Foreign Minister of Egypt, but head of the Arab League and still close to Sadat. He was shocked when he read the passages consisting of the West Bank and Jordan. He said, “When I read the Framework Agreement . . . I was amazed at [Carter’s] disregard for fundamentals relating to Arab feelings and sensitivities. For instance, the reference in the Agreement is made to Jordan and Jordanians fourteen times as if Jordan was one of the States of the US or an Egyptian province, with the assumption that the King of Jordan will hurry to either Washington or Cairo to do their bidding.”¹¹¹ When meeting with Hal Saunders at the UN on September 29, Riad expressed what he felt would be obvious Arab rejections of the plan. He made reference to the idea that the agreement called for joint Israeli-Jordanian military patrols at the border at the Jordan River. To Riad this meant that the agreement had validated Israeli occupation of the West Bank because the new border between Israel and Jordan was not the 1967 line, but the line of occupation. He asked Saunders, “Is this what the US means, and how can it expect the Jordanian forces to participate in safeguarding [the]Israeli occupation of the West Bank?”¹¹²

Arafat and the PLO also rejected the deal. Arafat feared that Camp David was an attempt to remove him as a potential leader of the Palestinians. He was not wrong

because if the Palestinians had a free choice of their future, the likelihood existed that they would choose a federation with Jordan, outside of the control of the PLO. Saunders met with politicians and local leaders in the West Bank to try and explain the Camp David provisions, many were eager or intrigued about the idea of autonomy. Unfortunately, very few would go public with that belief out of fear of reprisals from Arafat.¹¹³

On November 2, all the major Arab leaders attended a summit in Baghdad to discuss the Camp David Framework and to decide what to do about Egypt's participation. In the lead-up to the summit, it became clear how angry many of the Arab leaders felt towards Sadat and his actions. The Vice-President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, threatened to topple any Arab leader that did not outwardly oppose Sadat.¹¹⁴ This did not have the desired effect because it turned the more moderate regimes, like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, against accepting PLO-prescribed sanctions against Egypt which called for a complete economic and political boycott of Egypt. At the summit, all the leaders expressed their outrage at Sadat's actions. Many Arabs leaders at the conference wanted immediate sanctions against Egypt. While these measures failed because of Saudi intervention, another secret resolution was passed calling for economic sanctions against Egypt if they signed a treaty with Israel.¹¹⁵

The summit called for the suspension of Egypt from the Arab League and the removal of the Arab League from Cairo until it rejected the Camp David Agreement. In addition, it resolved that the Camp David Agreement violated previous Arab resolutions that called for unity and made the PLO the sole representative of the Palestinian people.¹¹⁶ The Baghdad Summit was important for another reason, it started a friendship

between King Hussein and Saddam Hussein. Saddam would eventually take full control of Iraq just a few months later on July 16, 1979. Saddam was influential in persuading the wealthier, oil-rich countries to provide aid to Jordan, which amounted to \$1.25 billion over ten years. Saddam argued for Arab unity and the continued financial support of the less well-off Arab states. This new friendship would become even more important as Saddam Hussein took full control over Iraq and accelerated his ambitions throughout the Arab world.

On December 30, King Hussein wrote Carter and discussed the Baghdad Summit in detail. Hussein said, "The Arab Summit at Baghdad affirmed the Arabs' objective of seeking a just and comprehensive peace based on total Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in June of 1967." He asked Carter to return to the comprehensive approach he originally intended for Geneva as this was the only way to get broad Arab support for a peace deal.¹¹⁷ Carter obviously could not agree to stop the Egyptian talks because unlike any other Israeli-Arab negotiation, this one seemed to be working. In addition, Carter believed that both Saudi Arabia and Jordan joined the rejectionist states at the Baghdad Summit that tried to pressure Sadat to reject any treaty with Israel. Carter believed that because Jordan and Saudi Arabia agreed with some of the political sanctions of Sadat if he signed the treaty, they aligned themselves with the rest of the Arabs as opposed to the US.¹¹⁸ Because of that, he was not inclined to take Hussein's advice on the future of the peace process.

Right before the treaty was signed, Brzezinski and Warren Christopher met with Hussein to try and persuade him not to take a harsh position against Egypt and to further explain the American position. Brzezinski argued that the US was not attempting to split

the Arabs and recently began working with the more radical Iraq to deal with the threats of the renewed Civil War in Yemen.¹¹⁹ Brzezinski argued that the US needed to improve their position in the region for fear that the Soviet Union was making inroads. In light of this, Brzezinski argued, Carter put his political life at stake to try and solve the Middle East problems. Carter believed that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians helped encouraged radicals in the region and brought them closer to the Soviet Union. The US decided to work with Egypt because they believed a united Arab proposal would always be vetoed by the radicals. They hoped that once the most moderate regimes saw the benefits Egypt received from the negotiations, they would be inclined to participate. Brzezinski also reiterated that his opposition to stating the end results of the negotiation before they occurred was not a slight against Jordan or even opposition to Jordan's desired outcome, but a realization that if they stated a position beforehand, it would be more difficult to get all sides to participate.¹²⁰

The next day, Brzezinski and Vance met with Sadat and discussed Hussein's reactions. Brzezinski said that Hussein had a very dark attitude and seemed despondent. He kept saying that he was saddened about how this situation had impacted relations between Jordan and the US. Hussein also did not rule out encouraging the Palestinians to work with the US and Egypt in establishing an autonomous government in the West Bank. When Sadat was told of Hussein's reaction, he said, "He thinks himself the most clever politician in the area He wants me and President Carter to come and beg him to save the situation. There are three main influences on him, the Syrians, whom he fears. He does not heed the Palestinians, despite what he says, and he does not protect

Palestinian rights. If President Carter and I give him the West Bank, he will be shouting praises. . . . He is an opportunist. . . . He is schizophrenic.”¹²¹

On March 26, 1979, the official treaty between Israel and Egypt was signed on the White House lawn. The next day, another meeting in Baghdad occurred between the foreign ministers of eighteen Arab nations. The summit demanded that Egypt be expelled from the Arab League and the Arab League would be transferred out of Cairo permanently. It ended all Arab economic activity with Egypt and called upon the people of Egypt to, “shoulder their responsibility by supporting collective Arab efforts to confront Zionist, imperialist plots which have turned the Egyptian region into their executive tool.”¹²² It resolved that Egypt “deviated from the Arab ranks and has chosen, in collusion with the United States, to stand by the side of the Zionist enemy in one trench.”¹²³

Despite the pressure from the rest of the Arab states, Jordan and Hussein took a more moderate position. Jordan recalled its ambassador from Egypt but would not completely break relations with Sadat. On March 31, the Arabs leaders did all agree to have an economic boycott of Egypt that both Jordan and Saudi Arabia participated in. During the conference, the Saudis originally tried to take an even more moderate position, but Arafat immediately attacked them for being soft on Israel. Because of this, both Saudi Arabia and Jordan had to support some sanctions on Egypt or they would have faced a united attack by the PLO and the rest of the Arabs that could threaten their hold on power.¹²⁴

After Jordan did not support the Camp David Peace Treaty, the United States tried to pressure them through finances. This included pressuring Gulf states not to give their usual donations to Hussein, along with putting on hold almost one hundred million dollars in American aid. In addition, Jordan found it difficult to get loans through international organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Hussein withstood these threats and even told Brzezinski that if it continued, he would have to explore other options for funding his military, implying the Soviet Union. Eventually the pressure resolved itself because of outside events, and Hussein received his support, but not before putting more of a strain on American and Jordanian relations.¹²⁵

In addition, the Camp David Accords led to some reconciliation between Jordan and the Palestinians. In March 1979, Arafat and Hussein met in Amman to discuss the outcome of the Israeli-Egyptian treaty and to decide what the response should be. The meeting was a success from the Palestinian stand point because Hussein allowed Arafat to reopen PLO offices in Amman. Despite Arafat's requests though, Hussein would not agree to allow PLO militants into Jordan or allow the PLO to restart attacks from Jordan against Israel.¹²⁶ While Hussein was angry about the deal between Egypt and Israel, he still did not trust Arafat and did not want to allow him and the PLO to return to Jordan where it could eventually threaten his rule and further damage his relationship with both Israel and the United States.

While relations between Carter and Hussein remained difficult, during the second half of 1979, other events gave both sides incentive to heal their differences. On November 4, Iranian students under the leadership and support of Ayatollah Khomeini

stormed the American embassy and took almost sixty hostages. While the Soviet Union did not direct the actions of Khomeini, they did issue statements in support of it.¹²⁷ In addition, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with thirty thousand troops in December 1979, provided more instability in the region.¹²⁸ The combination of these two events forced the US to improve relations with other nations in the region for the fear of continued Soviet expansion.

Hussein attempted to further improve relations with the Carter administration in December of 1979. He sent a letter to Carter sympathizing with his plight over the taking of American hostages and also expressed his outrage of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. With large parts of the region now hostile to the US, Carter and Brzezinski saw the value in improving relations with Jordan. In December of 1979, Carter, with the recommendation of Brzezinski and Vance, certified that Jordan was an ally working towards peace in the region. If Carter did not assert this, the International Security Assistance Act of 1979 would have prevented American military aid to Jordan. Carter mentioned Jordan's history of helping the US promote peace even before he took office. In addition, he said while Hussein does not believe the Camp David Accords would succeed, he did not oppose them and would continue to work publicly and behind the scenes on behalf of the US to seek peace. Carter also noted Hussein's speech at the UN on September 25, 1979, where Hussein said Jordan "would continue to stand for a just, honorable, viable and durable peace."¹²⁹ Without this aid, the relationship between Jordan and the US would crumble, making it impossible to reach any settlement in the future on the West Bank. The results of the Ayatollah's takeover of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated the nature of the American-Jordanian relationship.

With the Soviets' advancement in the region, Carter needed to repair the relationship with Hussein to increase American allies in the region. In addition, while Hussein opposed the results of the Camp David peace process, he still was a voice for moderation in the region and the US could use his voice to promote stability. For Hussein, he needed the financial support from the United States and would eventually need to remain on good terms with the US if he ever hoped to regain the land lost in 1967. Because of these reasons, both Carter and Hussein had the incentive to mend their differences.

On April 14, 1980, the US-Jordan Military Commission issued a report. In a memo sent to the White House by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Brown provided the result of that study and made recommendations for the future. He said that starting in April 1979, the US returned to an approach with Jordan that relied more on the carrot than the stick. The United States agreed to meet the military request of the Jordanian government that included one hundred M60A3 tanks, a full complement of TOW anti-tank missiles, and an I-Hawk anti-air firing package. The goal was to “draw the Jordanians into area-wide security consultations, to give them reason to trust our determination to balance the Soviets globally and to continue to play an active role in area security.” This was important because in October of 1979, Hussein and his chief military advisor General Bin Shaker met with the Soviets and discussed air defense systems. Jordan was also requesting more trainers to help better develop their military personnel. The commission recommended to the White House that the US dramatically increase the aid to Jordan and fulfill much of its request. The goal would be to show Jordan that they were not being punished for Camp David and that the US still valued his friendship in the region.¹³⁰

Hussein also attempted to move the Palestinians to a place where they could participate in the peace process in 1979. On September 26, Hussein informed Vance that he had begun negotiations with the PLO to form some joint unit. At this point, he was not sure how that would progress but believed it was a positive development. In addition, he hoped that once they had an agreement, he would then be able to join the Egyptian – Israeli talks.¹³¹ This was important because for the first time it seemed because of Camp David, the PLO began to moderate for fear of being left out of the peace process entirely. They even had discussions with the US. While Hussein told Vance that Arafat feared that the discussions with the US were a trap to embarrass him, Hussein believed they had continuing value. Hussein also told Vance he continued to work with other Arabs to agree to a position on a new UN resolution along with negotiation with Israel.¹³² Despite his disappointment with the Camp David Accords, Hussein continued to argue the American position in the Arab world.

In a meeting between Hussein and Ambassador Sol Linowitz on January 28, 1980, Hussein continued his goal to improve relations between the US and Jordan. At this time, Linowitz was Carter's special envoy to the Middle East working on the peace process. Hussein told him that his biggest issue with Camp David was that he was not kept informed. He felt lied to by Sadat who promised to give him updates who then eventually included his participation without his consent. When the deal was announced without his knowledge or input, he felt betrayed. He argued that he was on a "parallel path" to the Camp David process that hopefully would eventually meet. Linowitz assured Hussein that the US was not working against Jordan's interests and in fact, the linking of the West Bank and Gaza as one unit, eventually would benefit Jordan if the

Palestinians agreed to some kind of confederation. Linowitz hoped that Jordan would not make the peace process with Egypt difficult. Hussein assured him that he had no intention of doing anything to harm the peace process and would continue to work for peace with the other Arabs along with trying to convince the PLO to accept UN Resolution 242 and the Israeli right to exist.¹³³

Meeting in the Oval Office on June 17, 1980, Hussein and Carter openly discussed the issues created by Jordan not fully embracing the Camp David Accords. Carter told Hussein that he was willing to do it his way and they tried with the proposed Geneva summit, but the Arabs could not agree on who would negotiate for the Palestinians and Syria refused to participate at all. In Carter's view, that path seemed hopeless. Now that the Sadat option opened, Carter told Hussein that he had a lot invested in it and would appreciate as much support as Jordan could give. Hussein assured Carter that he was not actively opposing him and any disagreement came from a lack of communication. Despite that, Hussein told Carter he continued to work the PLO with the hope of finding a way to negotiate with Israel. Hussein agreed that when he returned to Jordan he would continue to work to get the Palestinians to join the negotiations and accept resolution 242.¹³⁴

In a meeting the next day with Hussein, Carter again addressed the biggest obstacle in his mind for a peace settlement, the lack of a reasonable negotiation partner to represent the Palestinians. Carter asked Hussein if he could find members of the West Bank community who would take the lead over the PLO. He told Hussein it did not matter how they felt about Israel, but he just needed them to begin to talk. Carter figured that with enough dialogue, all differences could be worked out. Carter also explained to

Hussein why the Israelis opposed self-determination. It was because to them, that meant the eventual creation of an independent Palestinian state controlled by the PLO. Carter felt he needed to have a reasonable Palestinian negotiating partner that would agree to a confederation of some kind with Jordan, easing the concern of Israel and making a peace settlement and withdrawal of the West Bank more likely.¹³⁵ This was the last meeting between Carter and Hussein as Carter would go on to lose his reelection bid five months later. Because of that, Carter was unable to participate in the signing of the official treaty. It also ended Carter's attempts to build on the success of Camp David and move towards a comprehensive settlement between the Arabs and Israel.

The Carter presidency was an increasingly difficult and bitter time for Hussein. From the start, he felt betrayed by the CIA leak of his finances and the eventual abandonment of the Geneva peace process. Hussein and Carter both failed to grasp the other's position. Carter could not understand why Hussein would not join a peace process that proved to be successful in its first phase. Hussein could not understand why Carter abandoned his longtime ally in Jordan and sided with Egypt, when as recently as five years ago, Egypt was aligned with the Soviet Union. Hussein also did not believe Carter appreciated Jordan's position relative to the rest of the Arab world. It was not nearly as strong as Egypt and therefore could afford to break radically with the Arab consensus on Israel. Despite these differences, both leaders eventually did what was best for their countries. Carter wanted peace and stability in the region and got that in part through the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. Hussein realized that he would risk his throne if he went against the rest of the Arab world and negotiated an agreement with Israel that did not provide the necessary advancement of the Palestinian cause. Fortunately, like past

disagreements between Jordan and the US, outside events led them to rekindle their alliance so Jordan could remain an important bulwark against the radicals in the Middle East. Jordan remained part of the US's Cold War strategy in the Middle East and continued to provide a barrier to the Soviet Union's aims in the Middle East.

CHAPTER VI

REAGAN'S FIRST TERM AND CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Reagan administration took over from Carter and was determined to reestablish America's place in the world by undoing the perceived failures of the previous administration. Reagan was an optimistic governor from California and an ardent Cold Warrior. For Hussein, it was a welcomed change. Hussein hoped to rebound from the negative relationship during the Carter administration, hoping that Reagan would see value in maintaining stability in the region and supporting the American position in the Cold War. Hussein had reason to be hopeful. He had long-standing relationships with many people in the new Reagan administration including new Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Vice President George Bush. His relationship with Bush was particularly strong from working closely together when Bush was the head of the CIA.

The first half of the Reagan administration saw a number of important developments in the region. The US was still recovering from the loss of its longtime ally in Iran when Iraq launched a war with the new American enemy. The US also believed that the Soviet Union was attempting to reestablish itself in the Middle East through collaborations with Syria and Iran. The Israeli and Syrian invasions of Lebanon

also increased tensions and tested the relationship between the US and Jordan. During the Reagan administration, Hussein used his friendship with Saddam Hussein to become an important component in the American assistance to Iraq. In addition, like his predecessors, Reagan attempted to solve the conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis. Because of Jordan's geographical location and their consistent willingness to work with the United States, Hussein played an important role in Reagan's attempt to bring peace between the Arabs and the Israelis. Finally, because of the Cold War, Hussein served as a American agent in preventing Soviet expansion throughout the oil rich Middle East.

There were a number conflicts in the Middle East during the Reagan administration that impacted both Jordan and the United States. The first major war started between Iraq and Iran on September 22, 1980, when Iraqi forces launched a combined air and land invasion of Iran. Saddam Hussein had a number of reasons for the invasion of Iran. He believed that Iran was at its weakest point since it had broken relations with the West and the rest of the Arab world. Since most of Iran's military was provided by the West, Saddam believed Iran did not have the capability to fight a long conflict. He believed that he would be able to seize enough land to make the conflict worthwhile especially, Iran's oil southern region. He also saw it as an opportunity to replace the exiled Egypt as the leader of the Arab world.¹ Because of American anger towards Iran leftover from the hostage crisis, Reagan used his allies in the region to support Iraq's war with Iran through the transfer of equipment and intelligence. The renewed American relationship with Jordan was particularly important for this cause.

Throughout the 1980s, Saddam tried to develop a friendship with Hussein that he hoped would eventually pay off strategically. During a July 1981 visit to Baghdad,

Saddam took Hussein to the Hashemite royal family cemetery where he led a prayer to the souls of King Feisal and King Ghazi². He also restored a statue of King Feisal and rebuilt the cemetery so it matched its former glory. On the visit to Faisal's grave, Hussein later said, "Everybody knew we were going out there, there was a little parade, and he let me put flowers on the grave, and say a prayer, and salute the grave."³ Hussein appreciated these gestures from Hussein and it brought the two leaders closer together. Saddam also tried to improve the relationship with Hussein through their many personal interactions. Between the years 1980 and 1990, Hussein visited Baghdad sixty-one times and during each visit, he met privately with Saddam Hussein to discuss the issues in the Arab world, including the war with Iran and Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. When addressing each other in public, both Saddam and Hussein showed the utmost respect for each other, demonstrating their close friendship.⁴ In a letter from May 31, 1986, Saddam said the:

Agreement and harmony between us – which was built on the foundation of commitment and mutual trust, and cooperation and keenness on the higher interests of the nation – has been a positive factor in the Arab position during the year. . . . It has likewise contributed to giving the right example of how the Arab countries should organize their relationships

He also told Hussein that the relationship between Jordan and Iraq was different from any other relations in the Arab world.⁵ The friendship between Saddam and Hussein became so close that Saddam's family occasionally looked to Hussein for help in dealing with Saddam. In one instance, Saddam's son Uday murdered a servant and Saddam planned to have him executed as punishment. Saddam's wife called Hussein and asked him to come to Baghdad to talk Saddam out of it. Hussein flew by himself to Iraq and

persuaded Saddam to let Uday live.⁶ This close friendship is important in understanding why Hussein continued to show Saddam support, even after he moved his aggression from Iran to other Arab nations and against the interests of the US. Saddam was particularly effective in befriendng Hussein through gestures of respect while taking into account the interests of Jordan and the Hussein regime.

Hussein announced his support for Saddam Hussein and Iraq in a television address soon after the conflict started with Iran. He said:

Where does Jordan stand? I have no doubt that the unhesitant answer of each of you is: we stand alongside Iraq. This is a decision we have taken into knowing where we are going, in championing our brothers, not out of fanaticism, ignorance, or whimsical sentimentalism. Our support for Iraq is an inevitable extension of our principled stand because Iraq is right and demands nothing but justice.

He also talked about the strength and heroisms of the Iraqi people for “rising up to defend right and dignity.” Finally, Hussein linked the Iraqi battle to the rest of the Arab world. He talked about a kinship with the people of Iraq and a great Arab army.⁷ Hussein believed that Iran was a threat to him and stability in the region and feared the exportation of their ideology and its hostility to the monarchy. In addition, Hussein’s opposition to the Ayatollah continued to ingratiate Hussein to the Reagan administration.

Hussein believed that the threat from Iran was also based on religious factors. He said that Iran “under its present leadership, turned Islam, against the teachings and beliefs of Moslems, into a dangerous, ruthless, reactionary movement, which became a vehicle for questionable power hungry elements to achieve their objectives, rather than the stable progressive one which is Islam.”⁸ He believed that if Iran were successful against Iraq, it

would soon attempt to spread its beliefs throughout the Middle East. Khomeini highlighted this threat by repeatedly referring to Hussein as “Shah Hussein,” a reference to the deposed Shah of Iran.⁹ Hussein also linked the threat from Iran to the Soviet Union and the larger Cold War. He told the Reagan administration that Moscow told him they were going to remove the troops on their border with Iran. Hussein believed this would allow them to move those units and threaten the broader Middle East that opposed Soviet expansion, especially the oil rich Gulf States. He also told the White House that the Soviet Union backed the Iran revolution from the start and the only groups to benefit from the instability in the region was “Communism and the Soviet Union.”¹⁰ From experience with American leaders and his brief experience with the Reagan administration, Hussein knew the US was easier to persuade if it was possible to link the crisis to Soviet expansion. While the Soviet Union did support Iran in some efforts, especially later in the conflict, that relationship was not as strong because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which Khomeini opposed.

The Iran-Iraq War also brought Jordan and Iraq closer economically. From 1981 to 1982, the trade from Jordan to Iraq doubled. Jordan used the refinement of Iraqi oil as credit for its massive expansion of Iraqi imports. This included both minerals and agriculture in the form of phosphates and supplies like eggs and tomato paste. By 1985, Iraq was taking in over one third of Jordan’s exports and by 1985; this amounted to \$170 million, with almost all of the corresponding imports from Iraq coming in the form of oil. At the port of Aqaba, shipments almost doubled during the Iran-Iraq War, making it one of the most important ports for Iraq.¹¹ Jordan created a whole industry to support Iraq during the Iraq-Iran conflict. Because Iraq transitioned to a war economy and because

the conflict centered on the Persian Gulf, Iraq needed another way to transport goods to the country. Through the friendship with Hussein, along with Jordan's strategic location, the Jordanians reshaped their economy to meet this goal. This included things like creating new factories close to the border, creating a massive trucking industry to ship goods to Baghdad, and modernizing the port of Aqaba. In addition, Jordan set up an oil refinery specifically designed to process Iraqi crude. Jordan also set up a number of factories to deliver goods to Iraq since Baghdad refitted much of its manufacturing capacity for the war effort. By the end of the conflict, Jordan had close to \$1 billion in trade with Iraq.¹² The economic benefits Jordan received from Iraq became an important part of Hussein's continued support of Saddam. While Jordan did not have any natural resources, through its relationship with Iraq, Hussein could continue to grow his economy reducing the pressure on his regime.

As the war progressed, Hussein took a more active role in helping Iraq. Hussein formed the Yarmouk Brigade that provided support activities for the Iraqi government. While the members of the Yarmouk Brigade did not engage in any fighting, it allowed Iraq to move more units to the front lines while the Jordanians focused on support and supplies. This force consisted of almost forty thousand troops at its peak.¹³ Hussein also tried to use his influence with the CIA to increase the support for Saddam and Iraq from the US. By the end of the conflict, Jordan and Iraq were no longer just neighbors, but strategic allies, including economically, politically and militarily.¹⁴ Jordan's reliance on Iraq for both economic and military support became an important element used by Hussein to strengthen his position as the head of Jordan and maintain his popularity with his subjects.

In addition to helping Iraq, Jordan also used the conflict to improve relations with the rest of the Arab world. Due to the fears of the Iran-Iraq War spreading, many of the Gulf States believed they needed to strengthen their military. With American support, Jordan rented out their military to train the Gulf States as they prepared for any possible conflict with Iran. This worked because the Gulf States had large cash reserves from the sale of oil and Jordan had a strong professional military that could use their experience gained from conflicts with both Syria and Israel to train the relatively weaker and inexperienced militaries of Oman, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. Hussein even brokered a deal with Oman to have Israeli advisors enter the country and help the leader of Oman, Sultan Qaboos ibn Said, organize his military. Jordan's support of the Gulf States was important because they provided a significant financial support for Hussein and showed his willingness to help American allies in the region prepare for external threats. It demonstrated that Jordan could replace Iran as an important element of the American Cold War defense of the Middle East.

Another reason the new Iraqi alliance with Jordan was important was that it provided a counter balance to the possible threat from continued Israeli expansion. In an interview with Hussein's son, King Abdullah II, Abdullah said, "Iraq, as a counterbalance to Israel, would be a lot stronger than Syria or Saudi Arabia. It was a dividend of having a relationship that was built in fighting Iran. The dividend of having a strong neighbor like Iraq allowed my father to have a much firmer position in dealing with the Israeli government at the time."¹⁵ Throughout the 1980s, the hostile Likud government still controlled Israel with Shamir still at its head. In addition, Ariel Sharon was the defense minister and he was known to be particularly hostile to Hussein and Jordan. Through the

alliance with Iraq, it gave Hussein the support of the strongest Arab military in the region in case of a massive Israeli invasion. While Israel knew it could wipe out Hussein militarily, with the support of Iraq, Hussein had the ability to challenge any possible Israeli threat.

While the US officially took a neutral position in the Iran-Iraq conflict, they recognized the potential issues with an Iranian victory to the US position in the Middle East. Secretary of State George Shultz said, "If Iraq collapsed, [Iran] could not only intimidate but inundate our friends in the Gulf and be a strategic disaster for the United States."¹⁶ Because of that threat, the CIA began to assist Iraq with intelligence to stop Iran's advancement. Through Jordan, the United States sent Iraq information on Iran that included, supply dump locations, artillery positions, front line positions, and other strategic information about the Iranian war effort. The Jordanians learned that the US also had some contact with Iraq, leading Hussein to believe that the US was using Jordan as an intermediary to have deniability about their efforts to support Iraq if they ever became public.¹⁷ Even if you discounted the intelligence information Hussein passed to Saddam from the United States, Jordan's role as a major shipping port for Iraq was important for Iraq's ability to continue to wage war against Iran. In addition, the United States and its allies needed Jordan to deliver effectively to equipment to Iraq.

For the US, there was also a Cold War component to the Iran-Iraq War. While Iraq's military had long received support from the Soviet Union, the war with Iran and Saddam's intention to improve relations with both the US and Arab government friendly with the West, led the Soviet Union to support Iran in the conflict. In a meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, Assad explained why it was in the Soviet's interests to support Iran.

He said, “Not only are their reforms anti-imperialist, they also educate the people in the anti-imperialist spirit.” Assad also linked Iraq to the US saying, “The decision on Iraq’s war with Iran is an American decision. The decision [for Iraq] to break relations with Syria is also an American decision.”¹⁸ They encouraged Syria and Libya to send supplies to Iran and the Soviet Armies newspaper, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, accused Iraq of expanding its aims while cooperating with the expansionist aims of the US.¹⁹ In a message by the Supreme Soviet in January 1984, to the Iranian parliament, it urged cooperation between the two governments “in the struggle against world imperialism and US acts of aggression.” It was also pointed out that, Saddam Hussein was an agent of the US with the support of Jordan.²⁰ When Alexander Haig, Reagan’s first Secretary of State, traveled to the Middle East in April 1981, he said his goal was to demonstrate that the United States was still an important partner in the region. The Reagan administration believed this was in doubt because of the growing strength of the Syrian government under Assad, supported by the Soviet Union, along with the fallout from the Ayatollah’s takeover of Iran. Haig said, “The fall of the Shah, after thirty years of the closest friendship with America, created profound uneasiness. So had the advance of Soviet influence and the climate of revolutionary ferment in the region. Few in the Middle East failed to make the connection between the decline in American will and strength and the rise in tension and disorder.”²¹ In addition, Reagan, like Carter before him, worried about the threat of Soviet control over the oil resources in the region. He said, “In a region whose oil exports were essential to the West, Soviet meddling was something the United States could not tolerate.”²² Because of that, Reagan could not afford for Iran to spread its revolution into allied nations on the Persian Gulf, like Saudi Arabia and the United

Arab Emirates, for fear of having a hostile regime dominate a large majority of the world's oil supplies, threatening the American economy. Because of this, Hussein's continued support of the Iraqi war effort served American interests in the region.

Hussein also had other fears that he shared with the Americans in the hope of increasing the support of Iraq and Jordan. Hussein worried that Iran's ally Syria could join the fight and threaten Jordan. Hussein believed that Assad had designs on both Iraq and Jordan and could use the excuse of the conflict to try to take both. While Assad and Hussein both belonged to the Baath Party, they each had different ideologies. In addition, Assad was much closer to the Soviet Union and had religious ties with Iran. This fear only grew as Iraq suffered a series of defeats on the battlefield. He relayed this fear to the Reagan administration in hope that it would aid both him and Iraq against the possible threat from Iran and Syria.²³

The war between Iraq and Iran finally ended with a cease-fire on July 20, 1987. The fighting ended only after killing three hundred and sixty-five thousand people in both Iran and Iraq, with an additional seven hundred thousand injured. It cost Iran an estimated \$627 billion and Iraq \$561 billion.²⁴ The devastation from the war cemented both Saddam Hussein and Khomeini in power while limiting the expansionist desires of both parties. For Hussein, the conflict brought Jordan and Iraq closer together along with strengthening the friendship between the two leaders. Eventually, this friendship would cause problems with Jordan's Western alliances when Saddam attempted to make up for the losses from the Iran-Iraq War by invading Kuwait.

Another issue in the Middle East that affected both Jordan and the United States was the civil war in Lebanon and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982. In an invasion led by Ariel Sharon called “Operation Peace for Galilee,” an Israeli force occupied southern Lebanon, attacking the positions of the PLO and allowing their allies to attack the Palestinians refugee camps.²⁵ Sharon argued that the invasion would hurt the PLO and send a message to the other Arabs. He said, “The bigger the blow and the more we damage to the PLO infrastructure, the more the Arabs in Judea and Samaria will be ready to negotiate with us and establish co-existence.”²⁶ Hussein worried that this new, more aggressive, Israeli leadership would soon see Jordan as the next logical step. Hussein worried that Israel could invade to overthrow him and allow the creation of a Palestinian state in Jordan, freeing Israel to formally annex the West Bank. He believed Israel would do this to get the Palestinians out of Lebanon, freeing the northern border of Israel from attack. In a letter sent to Reagan on June 22, 1982, Hussein outlined this fear. He said:

Sharon’s desire, I know, is to drive [the Palestinians] eventually into Jordan so that they may be joined by others driven out of the West Bank and Gaza so that in time and with more Israeli settlers in the occupied Palestinian territories when the issue of self-determination is addressed the results would be guaranteed in Israel’s favor. At some point in the future and with the inevitable clashes with Jordan following this scenario written by Israel and Sharon and imposed upon us here, an Israeli occupation of Jordan, which is unable to arm itself will probably give way to an Israeli withdrawal once a docile Palestinian state is created on Jordanian soil.²⁷

Hussein sent the chief of his armed forces, Zaid bin Shaker, to Washington in July 1982, where he met with Secretary of State George Shultz to discuss the fears from Israel.

Shaker received assurances from Shultz that the US still considered Jordan an ally and would support its territorial integrity from any Israeli intervention.²⁸

Hussein was correct to fear Sharon's intentions to move the Palestinians out of Lebanon and the West Bank and into Jordan. In August 1982, Sharon sent a message through Egypt to the PLO that Israel would allow the PLO to leave Lebanon if they went to Jordan. Sharon said, "One speech by me will make Hussein realize that the time has come to pack his bags." Arafat replied to the message that the Palestinian homeland was not Jordan and rejected Sharon's suggestion. Eventually, the Israelis allowed Arafat and the PLO to evacuate to Tunis under a deal negotiated by Shultz and his representative Philip Habib on August 30, 1982. This ended the possibility of the PLO replacing Hussein in Jordan for the time being.²⁹ Sharon's attitude also demonstrated the failure of the Camp David Accords when it came to the West Bank. As Hussein predicted, the Likud government that signed that agreement, still had no intention of returning the West Bank to the Arabs. In addition, many still hoped to push the remaining Palestinians out of the West Bank, allowing Israel to annex the region. This position would have likely been unchanged if Hussein participated in the agreement. Israel would have likely continued its expansion policies with the eventual goal of dividing the West Bank up between Israel and Jordan.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon had a number of consequences for both Jordan and the United States. Because of American support of Israel, especially its backing in international forums like the United Nations, it forced the opposition to improve relations with the Soviet Union. During the Israeli invasion, it became clear that Syria and its allies in Lebanon moved much closer to the Soviet Union. In turn, the Soviet Union

increased its aid to Syria and further integrated them with Iran as Western opposition in the Middle East. Because of the relationship between the Soviets and the Syrians, the US responded by improving the relationship with Israel, this included an increase in arms. The attacks from Israel and their allies, the Maronite Phalange forces, devastated Arafat and the PLO, leaving them desperate for new allies in the region. Finally, the inability of the US to control Israel in Lebanon, including the massacres at Sabra and Shatila, convinced many in the Arab world that the US did not intend to challenge Israel to make the hard choices associated with peace.³⁰ George Shultz also believed that Lebanon had another lesson for the US. Because the crisis was caused because of radical Palestinian elements inside Lebanon attacking Israel, Shultz said in Congressional testimony that, “The crisis in Lebanon made painfully clear a central reality in the Middle East: The legitimate needs and problems of the Palestinian people must be addressed and resolved urgently in all their dimensions. Beyond the suffering of the Palestinian people lies a complex of political problems which must be addressed if the Middle East is to know peace.”³¹

After Reagan and Shultz had negotiated a ceasefire in Lebanon and the evacuation of the PLO out of Beirut, Reagan began his first major effort to solve the problems between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In August 1982, Reagan sent a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin urging him to restart the peace process in what came to be known as the Reagan Plan. In the letter, Reagan said, “I feel there are now opportunities which lie before us with the PLO militarily weakened and the Soviet Union shown once again to have minimal impact on the truly significant developments in the Middle East.” He told Begin that they needed to finish the work of the Camp David

Accords and solve the issues with the Palestinians. He also pledged his commitment to Israeli security.³² This was Reagan's first attempt at solving the issues between Arabs and Israel. He believed that it was an important element in promoting stability and American interests in the Cold War. He also did not want to allow the Soviet Union to reassert itself in the region based on an Arab belief that working with the United States did not bring any tangible benefits in solving their conflict with Israel.

In preparing for the Reagan Plan, Shultz argued that the United States needed to do something different from past administrations, or the process would again fail. He also believed that any improvement in relations between the Arabs and the Israelis evaporated because of Israeli actions in Lebanon. Because of this, Shultz wanted to allow all the parties to come to the talks with their view on how they should end, including the US. He believed that the US should outline its vision for a final settlement to prove to the Arabs that it was serious in finding a solution.³³ Shultz also did not object to a Palestinian state because it threatened the security of Israel, rather, he believed that the land that proposed for a possible Palestinian state was too small and barren to have a functioning economy. It would need both an economic connection to Jordan and Israel to survive. Without this benefit, it was likely to end up as a failed state, ripe for infiltration by the Soviet Union and other radical elements.³⁴

On August 24, 1982, Shultz sent Nicholas Veliotes, the US ambassador to Jordan, on a secret mission to meet with Hussein to discuss the outlines of a possible peace proposal. Hussein feared that the US would not stick with Reagan's plan once Israeli opposition became clear. Hussein also wanted assurances that the US was willing to stick with the idea of a Palestinian entity in a federation with Jordan as the result of any

negotiations. Hussein's biggest concern was to make sure that neither the Israelis nor the PLO would have full sovereignty over the West Bank. While Hussein was positive in his initial discussions with Veliotos, his letter to Reagan in late August had a different attitude. Hussein told Reagan that the PLO needed to be involved in the negotiations and that Reagan should repudiate the Camp David Accords and not use them as basis for new negotiations. While Hussein's response disappointed Shultz, Veliotos and Robert Ames, now the CIA's chief specialist, in the Middle East assured him that Hussein was always like this when negotiations began but would warm up once he realized they had a chance to succeed. After another letter from Reagan and Shultz, Hussein agreed to join the negotiations and attempted to gain the support from other Arabs.³⁵ Despite the changing situation in the Middle East, Hussein's goals for the Palestinian territories did not change. He still wanted to incorporate the West Bank into Jordan and he wanted to prevent the PLO from taking control of the area. After meeting with Shultz, Hussein believed that the Reagan administration shared those goals.

Once the Israelis got a sense that a new peace proposal was coming from the Americans, they began to try to shift it more to their position or reject it if that was impossible. Ariel Sharon sent a letter to Bill Casey, the director of the CIA, and told him that if the coming American plan did not meet Israel's approval, they would consider annexing the whole West Bank in response. The Israeli actions outraged Shultz and he still planned to move forward with his proposal.³⁶ Shultz sent Sam Lewis, the American ambassador to Israel, to meet with Begin to discuss the upcoming proposal. Lewis brought a letter from Reagan, further discussing his ideas to find a settlement of the issues between the Arabs and the Israelis. Begin immediately expressed outrage. He

requested that Reagan make no announcements until after Begin conferred with his cabinet and drafted a response. Begin angrily told Lewis that Israel “know[s] how to take care of ourselves, and we will.”³⁷ To Lewis, this implied that Begin would not succumb to American pressure and Israel was fine to stand alone if that was the cost of rejecting this plan. To make matters worse, as soon as Lewis left his meeting with Begin, the Israeli press had parts of Reagan’s letter. Begin called supporters in the US to make his point that Reagan’s plan was unacceptable even before Reagan introduced it. The Israeli newspaper discussed how the Reagan Plan violated the Camp David Accords and was an attempt to drive Israel back to the indefensible 1967 borders.³⁸

Reagan asked that his letter to Begin remained confidential and was angry Begin leaked it to the Israeli newspapers. Because of that, Reagan rejected Begin’s request to allow Israel to respond before he announced the plan.³⁹ On September 1, 1982, Reagan gave a speech in California where he announced the Reagan Plan for peace in the Middle East. He argued that there were two main reasons why the US needed to pursue peace in the Middle East at this time. First, he said, “there was a strategic threat to the region posed by the Soviet Union and its surrogates, best demonstrated by the brutal war in Afghanistan.” Second, he believed that the war in Lebanon demonstrated that while Israel’s “armed forces are second to none in the region, they alone cannot bring a just and lasting peace to Israel and her neighbors.” Reagan also announced his support for the plight of the Palestinians. He said, “the military losses of the PLO have not diminished the yearning of the Palestinian people for a just solution of their claims.”⁴⁰ Reagan also argued that both sides need to accept certain facts as undeniable. First, the Arabs needed to realize that nobody could force Israel out of the Middle East and they needed to come

to terms with that fact and agree to solve all outstanding issues through negotiations. Second, Israel needed to accept the reality of “the homelessness of the Palestinian people” and that “the Palestinians feel strongly that their cause is more than a question of refugees.”⁴¹ Because of these facts, both Israel and the Palestinian people would need to make concessions through negotiation to solve the problems in the region. Through his plan, Reagan attempted to take a more evenhanded approach to the issues of the region. He acknowledged both the issue of security for Israel and the plight of the Palestinians for the Arabs, believing that it might entice both sides to negotiate.

Reagan’s plan had a number of points. First, he called on the Palestinian people to have full autonomy as agreed to by the Camp David Accords. Reagan believed that during the five-year transition period, the Palestinians could show Israel and the world that they were able to run their affairs and that their autonomy would not negatively affect the security of Israel. Reagan also called for no new settlement activity in the West Bank or Gaza during the transitional phase of Palestinian autonomy. Reagan rejected previous Israeli arguments that said the expansion of the settlements was a necessary step in promoting Israeli security. This was important because past presidents were reluctant to criticize Israeli settlements for domestic political reasons. Reagan also declared that after the transitional period, he opposed the creation of a Palestinian state, but wanted a federation to connect the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan. Finally, Reagan called for Jerusalem to remain undivided, but still subject to negotiations and the principles of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. In addition, he called on the Palestinians of Jerusalem to have voting rights in any elections to establish the transitional government.⁴² This last point was important because Israel believed that

Jerusalem should remain united and under Israeli control. Because of that, the Arabs in Jerusalem would be citizens of Israel, having no right to participate in an election to govern a Palestinian state. The Israelis did not want to set a precedent that further weakened their claim to a united Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

Reagan's new plan for the Middle East had broad support from his advisors. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger called it "the most creative and imaginative plan yet put forth" by the United States. He also noted that the US waited until Israel fully evacuated from the Sinai in hopes of building on the success of the Camp David Accords. Finally, Weinberger believed that the plan had a chance to succeed because he thought very highly of Hussein. He said, "King Hussein had a full understanding of the security needs of Israel and was . . . one of the few heads of state in the area willing to talk to the Israelis and to try to help them."⁴³ Weinberger developed a high opinion of Hussein through the frequent contacts between the Jordanian and American military.

Before the Reagan Plan arrived, Israel had already rejected a number of its important parts. In a policy approved by the Knesset on August 5, 1981, Israel declared that "The autonomy agreed upon at Camp David means neither sovereignty nor self-determination. The autonomy agreements set down at Camp David are guarantees that under no condition will a Palestinian State emerge in the territory of Eastern *Eretz Yisrael*. At the end of the transition period . . ., Israel will present its claim and act to realize its right of sovereignty over Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district."⁴⁴ The Israeli cabinet made this statement because parts of the Camp David Accord and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty were still being implemented. The Knesset wanted to be clear that nothing in the Camp David Accords called for a Palestinian state and that the definition

of autonomy could mean many things. The Israeli government still believed that the West Bank and Gaza belonged to Israel and nothing in any previous agreement changed that calculus.

On September 2, the Israeli Cabinet issued a statement rejecting the Reagan Plan and outlining their reasons for disapproval. One of the greatest complaints from Israel came from how the plan deviated from what they agreed to at Camp David. For instance, Israel believed that Reagan's call for the Palestinians in Jerusalem to have a voice eventually would divide the city, something the Israel rejected in the Camp David Accords. They argued that Palestinians in Jerusalem were part of Israel, and had no need to vote in elections in the territories. In addition, the Cabinet also rejected the calls for ties between Jordan and the new Palestinian entity because the negotiations at Camp David did not require it. The possibility of a Palestinian state, even one linked to Jordan, also outraged the Israeli Cabinet. The statement said, "Were the American plan to be implemented, there would be nothing to prevent King Hussein from inviting his new-found friend, Yasser Arafat, to come to Nablus and hand the rule over to him. The would come into being a Palestinian State which would conclude a pact with Soviet Russia and arm itself with every kind of modern weaponry."⁴⁵ After expelling the PLO from their northern border, the Israelis had little incentive to bringing them back in force to their eastern border. While the US could view Hussein's improved relationship with Arafat as a positive step needed to move the peace process forward, Israel still believed Arafat was a terrorist and his association with Hussein tainted their view of him.

Begin also sent a letter to Reagan that formally rejected the plan. In the letter, Begin expressed outraged that the United States did not consult Israel before Jordan and

Saudi Arabia learned of the details of the plan. In addition, he objected to the fact that the US considered Jordan an equal partner in new negotiations related to Camp David when Hussein rejected those accords. He said, “Judea and Samaria will never again be the West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan which was created by British colonialism after the French army expelled King Faisal from Damascus.” He also explained the Jewish people’s historical connection to the land, as a comparison to what he believed was Arab control backed by Western colonialism. Finally, he said, “A friend does not weaken his friend; an ally does not put his ally in jeopardy. This would be the inevitable consequence were the ‘positions’ transmitted to me on August 31, 1982, to become reality. I believe they won’t”⁴⁶

Begin also made clear he had no intention of giving the West Bank to Jordan or allowing for the formation of a truly independent Palestinian state. He said, “The Palestinian state will rise of itself the day Judea and Samaria are given to Jordanian jurisdiction; then in no time, you will have a Soviet base in the heart of the Middle East. Under no circumstance shall we accept such a possibility ever arising which would endanger our very existence.”⁴⁷ Like Jordan, Israel knew that the Soviet threat was an important way to get the support of Reagan, as the Cold War was his primary concern. In addition, Begin implied that Hussein was still too weak to prevent the creation of a Palestinian state, eventually allowing the takeover of both Jordan and Palestine by the Soviet Union. Despite the rejection, Reagan asked his advisor Philip Habib to continue to work with Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia on the peace proposal and together they would work with Begin in the hopes of eventually gaining Israeli support.⁴⁸

In a meeting with Philip Habib to discuss Lebanon in October 1982, Ariel Sharon also brought up the Reagan Plan. He told Habib that the Reagan Plan would not be the basis for future negotiations. He also said:

Israeli military forces will remain in the West Bank and Gaza for five years and beyond; Israel will remain in charge of internal security as it relates to anti-terrorist activities; Israeli settlements will continue to grow and multiply; there can be no change whatsoever in the status of Jerusalem; there must be no second Palestinian state; although Israel has no objection to King Hussein as the ruler of Jordan, which is already a Palestinian state, Israel will never negotiate with anyone on the basis of those [Reagan] proposals.⁴⁹

In other statements, Sharon argued that because of terrorism, Israel would never be able to give up full control of the West Bank. He said, “The narrow plain within which most Israelis live has a width of nine miles at Herzliya; it is eight miles from the Samarian hills to Tel Aviv; three miles from the old demarcation line to Ben-Gurion airport.” He believed Arab terrorist would use those places even if peace Israel and the Arabs achieved a peace settlement. He said the Israelis experienced “One hundred years of terror. And this has nothing to do with our presence in Samaria or Judea or Gaza. Terror was a fact of our lives in the 1960s, ‘50s, ‘40s, ‘30s and ‘20s. . . . Therefore, we have no alternative but to retain responsibility for security there.”⁵⁰ He believed that the only solution was for the Palestinians to become part of Jordan, but Israel and Jordan would secure the West Bank jointly. Sharon was the leader of the Israeli movement arguing that Jordan is Palestine, negating the need for a true Palestinian state.

Despite Israel’s rejection, Hussein still proceeded and tried to get Arab support for the plan. He traveled to a number of Arab capitals to explain his desire to pursue the

initiative with Reagan and his hope that through this plan, the Palestinians could end the Israeli occupation. This led to a summit in Fez, Morocco on September 6, 1982. At the summit, the Arabs confirmed, “the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the exercise their firm and inalienable national rights under the leadership of the PLO, its sole legitimate representative.” The Fez summit also called for Israel to withdrawal from all land captured in 1967 along with the removal of all settlements. It called for all religions to operate in Jerusalem and the holy sites without restrictions. In addition, it wanted the UN to have control over the West Bank and Gaza during any transition to a Palestinian state.⁵¹ This was not the position Hussein hoped for, but it was enough for him to continue to work the peace process. The Fez statement did not forbid Jordan from negotiating with Israel and generally supported Hussein’s views on Jerusalem. For Hussein, the Fez statement gave him the opportunity to work with the Reagan administration with the hope of merging the Fez statement with the Reagan Plan.

In a speech by Hussein on April 10, 1983, he discussed his view of both the Fez and Reagan idea for peace. He said:

Jordan . . . found that the Reagan Plan lacked some of the principles of the Fez peace plan but at the same time, it contained a number of positive elements. Given the realities of the international situation, on the other hand, the Arab peace plan lacked the mechanism that would enable it to make effective progress. The Reagan peace plan presented the vehicle that could propel the Fez peace plan forward.⁵²

This was an important recognition by Hussein because it argued to the Arabs that they could not take the maximum position at the start of the negotiations if they hoped to achieve anything. Hussein also described the consequences of waiting too long to

achieve a settlement “because time was, and still is, essential to Israel’s aim of creating new facts and bringing about a fait accompli. Sixteen years have passed since the occupation, during which Israel has established one hundred and forty-six colonies in the West Bank alone and has illegally expropriated more than fifty percent of that land.”⁵³ Hussein knew the difficulty in getting the Israelis to give up any settlements. This problem would only multiply as Israel created more settlements, placing more Israelis permanently in the West Bank.

On October 22, 1982, Shultz met with King Hassan of Morocco to discuss the Reagan Plan and the Arab reaction at Fez. While Hassan was positive, he encouraged Shultz to “open the file on the PLO” and allow them to be part of the peace process. Shultz responded, “When you open that file, you find terrorism.” Shultz believed that the US position was clear if the PLO wanted to participate with US support they had to recognize Israel, accept past UN resolutions, and give up terrorism. Without that, the US had no reason to support their inclusion.⁵⁴ After the meeting with Hassan, Shultz explained to his advisors his views of the process at that point. He said:

The Arabs are aware of, and accept the difference between, a transition regime and final status arrangements. They seem to think that Begin and Sharon are impossible, but not Israel generally. There is a realistic acceptance of negotiations with Israel. The Israelis, on the other hand, have pushed hard with their military strength, and they have used it harshly. They have killed the PLO’s military operation in Lebanon, but that have paid a gigantic price. They are isolated.

He then discussed conversations with various world leaders who in the past were sympathetic to Israel but now took a more hostile view.⁵⁵ In particular, after the massacres in Sabra and Shatila, Israel no longer had the support in the West that it once did.⁵⁶ Because of Israeli’s weakened diplomatic position, Shultz hoped they would be

more willing to take American suggestions for the peace process in exchange for continued support both diplomatically and militarily, this would include working with Hussein to find some accommodation for the West Bank and the Palestinians. While Shultz's view was reasonable, the basic nature of the Israeli government did not change. They still expected complete American support and had no intention of leaving the Palestinian territories.

It was not just the terrorist actions of the PLO that made the Reagan administration hesitant to deal with Arafat. They also believed that he was a client of the Soviet Union and they did not intend to form a new state between two American allies in the heart of the Middle East controlled from Moscow. Reagan's first secretary of state, Alexander Haig said, "The Palestinian Liberation Organization was sufficiently a Soviet client that Moscow's ambassador to the United States and the Soviet foreign minister both thought it natural to attempt to deliver messages from the PLO to the US government."⁵⁷ Combine this with Arafat's frequent denunciation of the West and "American imperialism," the Reagan administration had little incentive to empower the PLO. For that reason, the Reagan administration focused on Hussein, hoping he could provide a voice for the Palestinians without the baggage of the association with the Soviet Union.

While he supported the statement from the Fez summit, Hussein faced additional obstacles if he was unable to get full Arab support for his efforts, making the acceptance of the PLO more necessary. Hussein received warnings from Brezhnev not to participate in the Reagan Plan. Brezhnev told Hussein that Israel's actions in Lebanon had resulted from its partnership with the United States. Because of that, both the US and Israel were

isolated from the rest of the world and the Soviet Union would have preferred it to remain that way. He told Hussein that the Soviet Union completely supported the Arab position as stated at the Fez Summit and Jordan could not break with its Arab brethren and side with the US. Hussein worried about the Soviet response for a number of reasons. First, he feared the threat from Soviet backed Syria, who still occasionally placed a large number of troops on the Syrian-Jordanian border. Second, because he was not getting the necessary arms shipments from the US, Hussein now relied on the Soviet Union to fill some of those needs.⁵⁸ In addition, when Hussein visited Moscow in late 1983, he was told by Soviet Premier Yuri Andropov that “the Soviets would do all they could to frustrate his efforts with the PLO” to forge a united response to the Reagan Plan.⁵⁹ Because of this, Hussein was reluctant to openly join the Reagan Plan, he did not want to risk his security on a plan that, while he may have favored, relied on the US forcing Israel to make some concessions to the Arabs, something most American administrations had been reluctant to do in the past.

Syria also rejected the Regan Plan and urged all the Arabs to follow their lead. In fact, they rejected the very notion that Israel belonged in the Middle East at all. Syrian Foreign Minister, Abd al Halim Khaddam said, “The struggle with Israel went beyond the issue of its occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights. Israel occupied these parts of the Arab world during the 1967 war, not in 1948 when Israel was established on Palestinian land. Hence, the basic issue remains, . . . the future of the Palestinian people in exile” and their return to their homeland in Israel⁶⁰ At this point, Syria and the Soviet Union had a very close relationship so it was unlikely that either party would have a different opinion on the ideas of peace, at least not publically.

Neither Syria nor the Soviet Union valued another American-led peace effort. It would have isolated Syria from the rest of the Arabs and once again showed that the only way to achieve peace with Israel was through the guidance and support of the US.

The threats from Syria and their patron the Soviet Union worried Hussein. In a meeting with Special Middle East Envoy Donald Rumsfeld on December 21, 1983, Hussein said he believed that if he was able to work out a deal with Arafat, he feared the Syrians would eventually react. He argued that to face this threat, Jordan quickly needed an increase in military aid from the US. He believed that Jordan could face a military attack by Syria to prevent any agreement with Arafat. He asked Rumsfeld what the US was prepared to do to protect him in such an instance. He told Rumsfeld that Jordan was not looking for active support in the form of troops, just for the means to defend itself. Rumsfeld assured Hussein that he would speak with Reagan about the issue but believed that despite the buildup of Soviet weapons in Syria, militarily, their strength was exaggerated.⁶¹ While Hussein's fear of Syria was justified, he always requested more military aid from the Americans, regardless of the actions of his neighbors. In addition, because of Hussein's close allegiance with Iraq, Saddam would have seen a Syrian attack on Jordan as an extension of his war with Iran because of the relationship between Assad and the Ayatollah, giving Jordan some extra protection from a Syrian attack.

In December 1982, Hussein came to Washington to meet with the Reagan administration and discuss the peace process. Hussein told Shultz he was having trouble getting support from the PLO to negotiate. He believed that the US needed to do more to pressure Israel, especially when it came to the expansion of settlements. He told Shultz that he needed the US to get Israel to agree to a limited timeframe for the transition of

self-rule by the Palestinians and a freeze on settlements. After Shultz had accomplished that, Hussein agreed to join the talks with or without PLO approval. If the PLO refused to participate, he would work to gain the support of local Palestinians not associated in any way with the PLO.⁶² In addition, Hussein asked Reagan a series of questions to gauge Reagan's attitude towards the peace process. He hoped that if the answers showed Reagan had a fair attitude towards a peace settlement, Hussein hoped to take those answers back to the Arab world to increase their support. In response, Reagan told Hussein:

The President believes, consistent with Resolution 242, that territory should not be acquired by war. He believes as well, however, that Resolution 242 does permit changes in the boundaries, which existed prior to June 1967, but only where such changes are agreed between the parties. Finally, the US believes that all of the principles of 242 – those which hold out the promise of peace and those which hold out the promise of return of territory – must be fulfilled to the maximum extent possible.⁶³

Reagan and Shultz did not give Hussein the concessions he desired regarding the period of the transition and the inclusion of the PLO, but Hussein hoped to take Reagan's response to his questions to the rest of the Arabs to induce them into participating.

Despite this rejection, Hussein met with Arafat on April 1, 1983, in Amman to argue the benefits of the plan to the PLO. Hussein believed that by joining with the PLO to negotiate the Reagan Plan, he could get around the opposition from both the Rabat and Fez summits. Arafat even agreed at one point to a joint Palestinian-Jordanian negotiation pact. He only requested that he have a chance to present the plan to the PLO Executive Committee before formally signing it. Unfortunately, after Arafat left Amman, he did not return to Jordan because the Executive Committee rejected the plan, still calling for an

independent Palestinian state.⁶⁴ When Arafat sent an envoy to Jordan to explain to Hussein the rejection of the agreement, Hussein was outraged. He believed they had an agreement and Arafat betrayed him by going against it. Hussein addressed the people of Jordan on April 10, to explain the breakdown with the PLO. He argued that while it was necessary to keep working towards a solution, he accepted the PLO's rejection and would no longer be involved in a joint delegation with the PLO. He also expressed why he wanted to negotiate and why it was a disappointment that the talks between Jordan and the PLO ended without an agreement. He said, "As for Jordan we are directly affected by the results of the continued occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip through the accelerating colonization program and through the economic pressures systematically being brought on the Palestinian people to force them out of their land."⁶⁵ While Hussein wanted to deal with the Israel to regain the territory lost in 1967, it still would have been difficult for him to survive if he faced isolation similar to Egypt. Without the support of the PLO, that was the likely result.

The White House's initial response to Hussein's actions was positive. Once Reagan received word that the PLO Executive Committee rejected Hussein's compromise with Arafat, he said they "offered a counter proposal that must have been written in Moscow." Reagan was pleased that Hussein rejected it and he began to work with other allies in the region, specifically Morocco, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, to give support to Hussein in his dispute with the PLO.⁶⁶ Reagan hoped that if the PLO was discredited as a reasonable partner, Jordan could move forward with the Reagan Plan. Unfortunately, because Hussein could not get the support of the PLO, he eventually told the Reagan administration that he could not participate in their initiative. He believed

that it was too risky to continue without the support of the Palestinians, which in turn would have led to the support of the rest of the Arabs.⁶⁷ When Hussein ended talks with the PLO, he blamed America's inability to get Israel to stop the settlement expansion as the reason he could not move forward with the peace process. Hussein felt that if the Americans could not even get Israel to stop building settlements while negotiations occurred, it would be impossible to get them to make larger sacrifices in the name of peace.⁶⁸ The Reagan administration was disappointed in Hussein's refusal and believed he did not work hard enough to convince the other Arabs to support the initiative. Because of this, there was a minor strain in American-Jordanian relations for a few years.

Another factor limiting the ability of the Arabs to accept the Regan Plan was the continued aid to Israel. According to Ambassador Veliotis, the decision by Congress to send \$500 million in aid to Israel immediately following the announcement of the ceasefire in Lebanon showed the Arabs that the US was not willing to challenge Israel in any meaningful way. He said, "We knew this money was going to be viewed in Israel and everywhere else as a payment for Lebanon. We fought and we lost. With it we lost any chance of moving on the Reagan Plan." If Reagan succeeded in blocking the aid, it "would have demonstrated that [the US was] not rewarding Israel for what they had done in Lebanon" and dramatically improved relations in the Arab world, especially Jordan.⁶⁹ This aid shipment hurt any efforts of Hussein to get other Arab leaders to support his talks with Israel and the Reagan administration. It would have helped Hussein if he could have shown both the PLO and the leaders of the other Arab nations that the US was pressuring Israel to negotiate in good faith. The aid instead showed many that the situation had not changed, and there was very little to gain from Hussein's efforts.

Despite the minor strain in relations, US and Jordan continued to cooperate on other issues. Under the direction of William Casey, the CIA began new covert operations with Jordan. They shared intelligence on the PLO and other terrorist groups in the region. Casey and Reagan believed that Jordan withheld some intelligence information because they did not fully trust the Americans after the revelations during the Carter administration of Hussein's payments from the CIA. The issue of sharing intelligence between Jordan and the US regarding terrorist groups became more important after the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut on October 23, 1983. In fact, when asked about intelligence capabilities soon after the bombing, Reagan said, "We're feeling the effects today of the near-destruction of our intelligence capability in recent years before we came here" because some believed that "spying is somehow dishonest and let's get rid of our intelligence agents."⁷⁰ In addition to sharing intelligence, Jordan and the US also had other national security connections. Throughout 1983, Casey and Weinberger were planning for an elite Jordanian combat unit that could be used to fight Soviet backed radicals and terrorist groups in the region that threatened American interests through a program called the Joint Logistics Planning Program.⁷¹ It was evident even if the peace process was not moving forward, the Reagan administration still believed Jordan could be an important ally in countering the growing threat of Soviet-supported regimes and terrorism to the United States. Hussein continued to demonstrate his value to American interests in the region despite the failures of the peace process.

In February 1984, both Hussein and Mubarak traveled to Washington to update Shultz and Reagan on the peace process. Mubarak showed new confidence that came from recent moves to allow Egypt back into the Arab fold. Both leaders discussed the

problems with Arafat and the PLO. Mubarak wanted to try to bring Arafat closer to him, hopefully, encouraging him to join the peace process. Hussein had a different attitude; he wanted to only make public gestures towards Arafat so he could claim to the other Arabs he tried to make amends with the PLO. Eventually, he wanted to continue to build support from the people of the West Bank and then restart negotiations with Israel, without the inclusion of the PLO. Unfortunately, the meetings ended badly when in a public news conference with both Reagan and Hussein, Mubarak announced that Egypt believed that only the PLO had the legitimate right to negotiate for the Palestinian and that they must be included in any peace process. Shultz was angry with Mubarak and told him as much. He believed that Egypt was attempting to continue to improve their standing in the Middle East at the expense of the peace process. Because of Mubarak's statements, Hussein told Shultz that he could not move forward with his attempts to use the Jordanian relations with the West Bank to move towards peace on his own without wider support in the Arab world.⁷² Events like this made it clear to Hussein that if he wanted to achieve his goals in the region, he would need to come to an agreement with Arafat. That even with American support, without working with Arafat directly, he would never have the support of the rest of the Arab world. To accomplish this, Hussein would need to convince Arafat to reject some of the violent actions of the PLO and trust Hussein to work for the interests of Jordan and the Palestinian people.

In March 1984, the Reagan administration was still attempting to work with Hussein to arrange negotiations with Israel, despite the lack of support from the Arab world. On March 13, Reagan addressed the Young Leadership Conference of the United Jewish Appeal, where he said:

Today, Jordan is crucial to the peace process. For that very reason, Jordan, like Israel, is confronted by Syria and faces military threats and terrorist attacks. Since the security of Jordan is crucial to the security of the entire region, it is in America's strategic interest – and I believe in Israel's strategic interests – for us to help meet Jordan's legitimate needs for defense against the growing power of Syria and Iran.

To illustrate the importance of the peace process, he discussed the Soviet threat to the region he said, “As the crossroad between three continents and the source of oil for much of the industrialized world, the Middle East is of enormous strategic importance. Were the Soviets to control the region . . . the entire world would be vulnerable to economic blackmail.”⁷³ The US could not allow a hostile government to control the largest oil reserves in the world because of the potential for economic blackmail. This same thinking led the US to intervene when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990.

Despite Reagan's positive words about Hussein and Jordan, on March 15, Hussein gave an interview with the *New York Times* where he attacked US policy towards Jordan and accused the Reagan administration, along with Congress, of having policies that were so pro-Israel, that the US “had lost its credibility as a mediator in efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.” Hussein further said that “We see thing this way: Israel is on our land. It is there by virtue of American military assistance and economic aid that translates into aid for Israeli settlements. Israel is there by virtue of American moral and political support to the where the United States is succumbing to Israeli dictates.” When discussing the actions of Congress, Hussein was upset with the strings attached to military aid designed to overcome Israeli objections. Hussain was careful not to criticize Reagan personally, he even said, “I am not critical of the President of the United States who I have said time and again I consider to be a friend and a man of

honor and principle.” Hussein was disappointed in Reagan’s inability to get Congress to do what it could to make the peace process successful.⁷⁴ In addition, much to Reagan’s disappointment, Hussein also voted with the Soviet Union in the UN Security Council on a resolution supporting Polish human rights.⁷⁵ Hussein made two requests of Reagan that when not granted, led Hussein to give his interview with the *New York Times*. In August 1983, Hussein asked Reagan not to veto a United Nations Security Council resolution that denounced Israeli settlement policy. Reagan chose to veto it to show support for Israel against the historically hostile UN. Towards the end of 1983, Hussein asked Reagan to intervene with Israel and allow a number of members of the PNC located in Gaza and the West Bank to travel to Amman for a meeting scheduled in November of 1984. Reagan was unable to convince the Israelis to wave their restrictions. Finally, the Senate was debating a bill that would have forced the US government to move the American embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This issue had the potential to inflame the region to such a degree that when Veliotos, the American ambassador to Jordan, met with a number of Senators to discuss the issue, he asked for a few days warning before the bill was passed so he had time to evacuate his personnel before the riots started.⁷⁶ For the Arab world, the moving of the embassy to Jerusalem would have symbolized American approval and acceptance of the occupation of 1967. In addition, the Arabs would view it as a rejection of UNSC 242 and its calls to return the land taken in that conflict. Hussein’s interview resulted from his continued disappointment over the Reagan administration’s inability to put any pressure on Israel. In response, through Hussein’s rebuke of the administration, he would hopefully show the other Arab nations he was not a puppet of the US, possibly improving his relationship with them and Arafat.

Hussein was careful not to criticize Reagan personally, because he knew he would need the relationship with Reagan to advance his goals in the future.

Reagan tried to improve relations with Hussein by pressuring Congress to approve an aid package that consisted of \$250 million to Jordan. While the Jordan appreciated the money, they needed newer weapon systems rather than hard cash. Congress would not allow Jordan to receive the military equipment it desired unless it made significant progress towards peace with Israel. In addition, Hussein's interview ended an effort by Reagan to sell hundreds of Stinger missiles to Jordan because it would have been impossible to get the approval of Congress. Because of that, Hussein looked to Europe and the Soviet Union to meet his military needs. This included the purchase of Javelin anti-aircraft missiles from the Great Britain, Mirage fighter planes from France, and a complete anti-aircraft system from the Soviet Union. Shultz did not blame Hussein for his outburst; he knew Hussein had legitimate reasons to be upset with the Americans. He was angry and the State Department staff in Jordan for not warning him of Hussein's growing disillusionment of American actions.⁷⁷ With some warning, Shultz believed he could have smoothed out some of the differences between Hussein and the Reagan administration and at least kept them from going public. Even if the dispute remained private, the fundamental problem would still have existed. The US was unwilling to significantly pressure Israel to make concessions to the Arabs to achieve a settlement. Without that pressure, the underlining issues between the US and the Arabs, including Jordan, would remain.

The first half of the Regan administration ended with disappointment in both Amman and Washington. Hussein hoped that Reagan would finally put pressure on the

Israelis to complete a deal that Hussein and the Palestinians could live with. Reagan believed through the Reagan Plan, he had an equitable process to complete a comprehensive agreement for the region, despite the rejection from the PLO and the Israelis. The added pressure of dealing with the civil war in Lebanon and the Iran-Iraq War, made it more unlikely that the US could solve the problems of the region. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the massacre at Sabra and Shatila increased Arab anger towards Israel, making it more difficult for Jordan to work actively to solve their issues with Israel. In addition, the relationship between Reagan and Hussein was complicated. Reagan saw Hussein as a force for the West in the region but realized he was not strong enough to take steps to help the US without at least some support from other parts of the Arab world. Despite his weaknesses, Reagan still treated Hussein as an important ally in the region and attempted to overcome congressional and Israeli opposition to that support. Despite their disagreements after the failure of the Reagan Plan, Hussein and Reagan continued to work towards peace in the region and promote American interests in the Middle East in the second half of the Reagan presidency.

CHAPTER VII

REAGAN'S SECOND TERM AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

The second half of the Reagan administration began with the relationship between Hussein and Reagan at its lowest point. Despite the differences in perspectives of the two leaders, they both had similar goals. Both Reagan and Hussein wanted to find a way to restart the peace process and repair any damage to US-Jordanian relations over the failure of the Reagan Plan. Both Hussein and Reagan would attempt new initiatives to overcome the problems of the Reagan Plan, most importantly, Israeli opposition and the question over Palestinian participation. In addition, both Reagan and Hussein attempted on numerous occasions to bring the Palestinians into the process, each time ending in failure. The leaders also had to overcome domestic political problems, both in the United States and in the Middle East. Reagan needed to convince Congress of the value in supporting Jordan despite protests from Israel. In addition, both Hussein and Reagan needed to overcome issues with Israeli domestic politics. Each issue posed a unique challenge to the relationship between the US and Jordan, frequently making the completion of a formal peace agreement more challenging. The second half of the Reagan administration also saw dramatic changes in the Palestinian territories. Hussein

continued to work to gain support from the Palestinians and the PLO. Once that failed, Hussein tried to supplant the PLO in the West Bank and Gaza. The *intifada* interrupted the plans for region held by Jordan, Israel, and the United States. The *intifada*, and the Jordanian reaction to it, fundamentally changed dynamics of the region, forcing the US to see the Palestinian-Jordanian relationship in a different light. Despite their efforts, Hussein and Reagan could not overcome conditions on the ground to forge a lasting peace deal between Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians.

The position of Arafat in December 1983 was at its weakest since he took control of the PLO. In 1982, the PLO and Arafat evacuated from Beirut, Lebanon, under a deal brokered by the US, because they faced constant attacks from both Syria and Israel. In December, Arafat faced attacks from a splinter group of the PLO backed by Syria forcing him to leave Tripoli, Lebanon. In addition, Hussein attempted to demonstrate to Arafat that Jordan had other options than working with the PLO. He reopened the Parliament, which was half filled with people from the West Bank, on January 16, 1984. He also appointed Adnana Abu-Odeh as the Minister of the Royal Court, the King's representative in Parliament. Odeh was an important piece to the King's strategy because he was born in the West Bank while still maintaining a close relationship with Hussein as a trusted advisor. He also held various positions in the Jordanian government, including Minister of Information. Hussein wanted to show Arafat that if he would not moderate his position and that of the PLO, Jordan could pursue peace with Israel without their involvement by focusing on gaining support from the people of the West Bank. Hussein used these changes to attempt to see if Arafat would be a more willing partner for peace than he had in the past. The pressure did have an impact and Arafat agreed to hold the

seventh Palestinian National Council in Amman on November 22, 1984.¹ The decision to have the PNC in Amman was symbolically important for both Arafat and Hussein. For Arafat, it showed that he was willing to work with Hussein and no longer saw him as a threat to the PLO or someone who worked against the interests of the Palestinians. For Hussein, it demonstrated he was no longer at war the PLO or its affiliates and working through him was the best way for the West and Israel to deal with the PLO.

Hussein had the support of Reagan administration for his actions to pressure Arafat to come to the table. Shultz was pleased that Hussein reopened the Parliament. He believed that it was a sign that Hussein would fully engage in the peace process and he could use the voice of Palestinians from the West Bank in Parliament for legitimacy in the negotiations.² While the Reagan administration would have preferred Hussein to work with the Israelis on solving the issues of the West Bank without the involvement of the PLO or the Palestinians, reluctantly, they realized that Jordan coming to terms with the PLO was good for the chances of peace. This was true despite the usual outrage from Israel.

Hussein also tried to rally support in the Arab world for his quest to find a workable arrangement with the PLO. On March 31, 1984, Hussein sent a letter to Saddam to gain his support for negotiations with the Americans and Israel. He hoped that with the endorsement of Iraq, the PLO might be more inclined to compromise. Hussein told Saddam that despite the US's failings, they were correct when they suggested that a lack of Arab unity made the peace process impossible.³ In addition, while working to gain support for his reconciliation with the PLO, Hussein also attempted to persuade Saddam and other Arab leaders to restore relations with Egypt. He

convinced the other Arab nations to allow Egypt attend the Islamic Conference in the December 1984.⁴ This was important because it increased the support Hussein received from Egypt and Mubarak when issues with Arafat eventually broke down. Saddam did not protest when Egypt requested to rejoin Arab organizations and did not openly oppose Hussein's efforts with the Americans. It was important to gain Saddam Hussein's agreement to welcome Egypt back into the Arab fold because Saddam was one of the leading voices demanding their punishment after Camp David. Hussein knew that despite the boycott of Egypt after the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, it remained an influential member of the Arab world. That influence only increased once the boycotts ended.

Hussein had another reason to try to work with the PLO. In an Israeli election held in July 1984, neither Likud nor the Labor Party received enough votes to form a government. Because of that, they agreed to a unity government that called for an equal number of members from each party in the cabinet and a rotating prime minister and foreign minister. For the first two years, the more moderate Shimon Peres would be prime minister and have the hardline Likud member Yitzhak Shamir as foreign minister. Hussein believed that if he could work an agreement with Arafat, then it was possible to negotiate with Peres while he was the head of Israel. Hussein also believed that once he reached a deal with Arafat, he would be in a position to negotiate with Israel without any preconditions, making it more likely Israel would agree to a formal peace process between Jordan and Israel.⁵ While Hussein rightfully believed that Peres and the Labor Party were more affable to deal with Jordan, he did not understand the complication

brought on by a unity government. Because of that, Hussein frequently placed too much faith in Peres' ability to deliver a deal with Jordan.

On November 22, 1984, Hussein welcomed the Palestinian National Council to meet in Amman and discuss the prospects for peace. Hussein hoped to garner the support of the more moderate elements in the PLO along with the people of the West Bank. He opened the conference with a speech that he transmitted to the West Bank and Gaza where he was highly critical of the PLO and Arafat. He blamed them for underestimating Israel's ability to resist their tactics and told them they were diluted if they believed Israel was close to defeat. Hussein asked, "How long shall we heed those among us who say 'Leave it for future generations'?" Hussein believed that the PLO was the main reason why the Arabs had been unable to secure the return of the West Bank and Gaza.⁶ During Hussein's speech, Jordanian television repeatedly showed Arafat in the audience when Hussein mentioned UNSC Resolution 242 and discussed the need for peace. The Palestinians in the West Bank also viewed these images and Hussein intended to show that Arafat was moderating his position on the peace process and would begin to work with Hussein to move the process forward.⁷ Despite Hussein's harsh words in his opening speech, the PLO and Hussein continued to negotiate on an agreement to work together on the peace process. Hussein's speech was an effort to increase his popularity in the West Bank and continue to pressure Arafat to moderate his positions, allowing for Jordan to negotiate with Israel. While the pressure on Arafat worked, it did not transfer to other factions in the PLO, limiting Arafat's ability to deal with Hussein.

The PLO and Hussein signed the agreement on February 11, 1985. Jordan's foreign minister, Taher al-Masri, said the agreement announced, "Jordan and the PLO

should be the nucleus of an agreement on the Palestinian question and wider Arab support could be built around this nucleus.” Masri believed that the agreement between the PLO and Hussein ended Arab opposition to Jordan playing a key role in negotiating for the Palestinians and allowed for the removal of both the Rabat and Fez summits as roadblocks for Jordanian participation in attempting to end the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Hussein believed that his could eventually lead to a rebirth of his Jordanian federation ideas represented in his United Arab Kingdom Plan of the past.⁸ Much to the disappointment of Hussein, Arafat immediately began to back away from it. While Hussein believed that the PLO would now accept Resolutions 242 and 338, Arafat continued to reject them publically. An Arafat aide said, “We reject Resolution 242. We rejected it in the past and will reject it in the future.” They also did not agree if the Jordanian-PLO pact called for an independent state or a federation with Jordan. Finally, while the agreement called for a non-PLO joint Jordanian negotiating team, Arafat quickly changed and called for the inclusion of members of the PLO.⁹ Despite Arafat’s waffling, he and Hussein continued as if the agreement was still in place. Hussein hoped that as negotiations proceeded, he could continue to get the PLO to moderate their position.

The reaction to the new agreement between the PLO and Hussein was mixed. President of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak supported the plan, seeing the need to involve the PLO to move forward in the peace process. Unfortunately, Egypt was still isolated from some of the Arab world because of continued hostility towards the Camp David Accords. The Arabs allowed Egypt to participate in most Arab meetings, but the radical regimes in Libya and Syria still rejected normalization with Egypt. Syria rejected the new

connection between Jordan and the PLO and even rejected the PLO as having the right to negotiate anything in regards to the West Bank or a union with Jordan. Syria also convinced their Palestinian allies, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, to reject it and accuse the PLO of sacrificing the interests of the Palestinian people. The Soviets also opposed the agreement because they feared it would lead the PLO out of their sphere of influence. Al-Masri even flew to Moscow to try to persuade the Soviets to participate in an international conference but Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko rejected him harshly. Hussein and Arafat sent another delegation and the Soviets refused their entry. The Reagan administration took a more cautious approach. They remained neutral for fear that the PLO still would not reject violence and become a genuine partner for peace.¹⁰

On May 4, 1985, Hussein discussed his new partnership with the PLO while visiting the United States at a convention of the National Association of Arab Americans. He said:

For the first time, we in Jordan, with our Palestinian brethren have structured an initiative representing the pursuit of their goals of self-determination through peaceful means. . . . They have also agreed to the principle that a peace settlement should be based on the return of the captured territories of 1967 in exchange for recognition of Israel's rights to exist within secure borders. . . . The PLO has also ascertained that the right of Palestinian self-determination will be exercised within the context of a confederated state of Palestine and Jordan.¹¹

Hussein believed that this was a major breakthrough for gaining American and Israel acceptance of the PLO in the negotiating process. He hoped that if the PLO

maintained this position, the Reagan administration would be willing to pressure Israel to allow Arafat to participate in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

There were two major challenges to these efforts at forging a peace agreement. First, the Americans believed that the Palestinians needed to recognize Israel and give up terrorism if they wanted to participate in any peace process, without that, both Israel and the US likely would not participate. Second, the Palestinians believed that the only way they could do those things if they felt the US would force Israel to negotiate in good faith. In particular, the PLO wanted assurance that the US would not allow Israel to drag on negotiations indefinitely while further establishing their control of the West Bank and Gaza through the building of settlements. Because the unity government in Israel contained a large contingent of Likud, this problem was difficult to overcome. Minister of Housing David Levy said, "Likud would never accept that we embark on a search for territorial compromise with Hussein."¹² The plan agreed upon between the Jordanians and the US to integrate the Palestinians into the peace process called on the PLO to endorse UNSC 242 and 338 followed by meetings between the US to establish some reorganization of the PLO. The second major issue was the conflict over the nature of the talks. The US and Israel clearly wanted bilateral talks between Israel and Jordan, while Jordan wanted an international conference led by the major powers along with United Nations involvement. The US wanted bilateral talks to keep the Soviet Union out of the negotiations. Israel wanted bilateral talks because it believed that was the most likely way for them to keep control over parts of the West Bank. In addition, they did not want to recognize or negotiate with the PLO. While this was not a new problem, the

possible involvement of the PLO in the negotiations added to an already complex process.

To further his efforts at a new peace process, Hussein met Peres in London on July 19, 1985, to discuss negotiations between the Jordanian-PLO partnership with Israel. At this meeting, the two leaders agreed on a plan for the shape of future negotiations. First, Hussein and a joint Palestinian delegation would meet with the US through US Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, Richard Murphy. In that meeting, they would express their desire for American help in working out an agreement with Israel. After that meeting, the PLO would agree to the American preconditions for openly talking with the PLO, mainly the acceptance of UNSC Resolution 242 and 338 along with the end of violence. After this, they agreed that formal peace negotiations would proceed with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian partnership. The only disagreement was how much the PLO would be part of this negotiating group. Hussein argued to Peres the need for the PLO to be involved in some form. While Peres told Hussein he rejected the idea PLO participation, he later told Shultz that after publically showing their opposition, he would allow some PLO representation.¹³ The only remaining obstacles were getting US approval and gaining the support of the other half of Peres' government represented by the Likud Party. Hussein and the US routinely faced this issue when dealing with the unity government. One half would agree to a proposal and the other half would undermine it at a later date. This dysfunction severely hampered the ability of Hussein and the Reagan administration work out a viable peace process.

During the negotiations between Peres and Hussein, Peres tried to improve Hussein's standing in the West Bank so he would have their support if it were possible to

conclude a peace deal. One example of this was when Hussein invited a Palestinian leader located in the West Bank, who was not associated with the PLO, to Amman. Israel lifted any travel restrictions placed on that leader so he could freely travel out of the West Bank and meet with Hussein. Peres also helped Jordan resolve issues of water and electricity for the West Bank.¹⁴ These efforts aimed to dramatically reduce the position of the PLO in the occupied territories and increase Hussein's ability to speak for the Palestinians at any proposed peace conference. The Israelis hoped that if they succeeded in increasing Hussein's popularity, the people of the West Bank and Gaza would welcome a federation with Jordan as a solution to the issues of self-determination, preventing Arafat from taking control of the West Bank. Hussein shared this hope and while he continued to talk with Arafat, he still planned on replacing him as the head of the Palestinians and the primary voice for all Palestinian negotiations with Israel.

On May 10, 1985, Shultz flew to the region to meet with Israel, Egypt, and Jordan to further discuss the peace process. Before he met with Hussein on May 12, the Israeli cabinet issued a statement that said, "There is a readiness for direct negotiations between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that does not include persons belonging to an organization committed the Palestinian charter." This development pleased both Shultz and Hussein who now believed that Israel would negotiate with a Palestinian delegation, as long as it did not include active members of the PLO. It could include people who either no longer had an official affiliation with the PLO, but still had connections with the group. Hussein believed that it was enough of a breakthrough that he told Shultz that when he visited Washington, he would announce that Jordan was no longer in a state of belligerency with Israel. Shultz believed Hussein's possible statement

on belligerency was an important step because it would encourage Israel's participation with Jordan and it would allow Congress to dramatically increase Jordan's aid. Unfortunately, both sides began to backtrack on their agreements. Israel released an updated statement that blocked anyone from an organization that had any role in the Palestinian National Congress. The Palestinian Charter called for the destruction of Israel and was more associated with the PLO, but the National Congress was just a legislative body that included Palestinians not affiliated with the PLO. In addition, Israel rejected any notion of an international conference. Hussein also retreated from his position. When Hussein was in Washington on May 20, he only talked about "a genuine desire for negotiations, proceeding in a nonbelligerently."¹⁵ This statement did imply a formal peace treaty or an official end to the conflict between Jordan and Israel. Shultz knew Hussein's weaker statement would not move Congress or Israel any closer to working with Jordan. While Hussein should have followed through with his statement "ending the state of belligerency" between Jordan and Israel, he still did not fully trust the Israeli unity government and was still unwilling to take dramatic steps towards the peace process without assurances of the final result. In addition, if Hussein made this gesture towards Israel, there was no assurances that it would have resulted in new support for Jordan in Congress. In fact, in the future, it would take active Israeli intervention to get Congress to support a dramatic increase in aid to Jordan.

The biggest consequence for Hussein for not making a stronger statement while in Washington was its impact on the views of Congress and arms shipments to Jordan. The Reagan administration wanted to meet Jordan's requests for armaments but had difficulty convincing Congress. Reagan saw the issue of arming Jordan as a facet of the Cold War.

He argued that Hussein is “threatened by Syria because of his efforts to bring about peace with Israel. Syria is fully armed by the Soviets.” Because of that, Reagan was willing to battle with Congress to get Hussein the defensive weapons he needed to resist the Syrian threat.¹⁶ Despite his efforts, after meeting with a group of Senators on June 12, 1985, it was clear to Reagan that it would be difficult to get the Jordanian arms package through Congress. He blamed the American Jewish lobby for blocking all arms to the Arabs. Despite the rejection from Congress, Reagan told Hussein he had the ability to send him sixty Stinger missiles immediately, and would continue to work on the rest of the aid. He described it to Hussein as a delay of aid, not an outright rejection.¹⁷ Reagan continued to try and get Hussein the aid he desire, but because of opposition from Congress that remained difficult. The minimal aid he could get Jordan improved relations between Hussein and the Reagan administration but was not enough for Hussein to take the large risks associated with a major peace process that challenged eventual Arab opposition.

The proposed conference that would include the PLO, Jordan, and Israel began to fall apart quickly. Arafat gave Hussein a list of PLO supporters who were moderate enough to deal with the Israelis but still had some connection to the PLO even if they were not direct members of the organization. Hussein gave seven of those names to the Americans and told them to pick four of them to be included in the Jordanian delegation. Hussein believed that he was giving them this list in confidence, and hoped that they would keep it that way so not to endanger the talks. Almost immediately, Israeli allies on Capitol Hill, along with the more right wing members of the Israeli government, leaked the list, proceeded to try to disqualify every name on the list as being too radical. The pressure grew until Shultz canceled a secret trip to Amman by Murphy to discuss the

joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.¹⁸ The canceling of the trip by Murphy demonstrated to Hussein that the hardline Israelis still had some control over the American policy decisions. While Israel opposed the names on the list, this was more due to Likud opposition to negotiating with the Palestinians rather than a sign of the radical nature of people Hussein chose. Shultz's unwillingness to pressure Israel at all and accepting their rejection of all Palestinians with minimal connection to the PLO wasted an opportunity to move the peace process forward.

When the discussion of an international conference came up, Hussein argued that the conference would come at the end of the negotiations, to give the settlement the weight of the UN Security Council. The Arabs believed this was important to force Israel to abide by any agreement. In addition, they believed if the US was only involved, they would undoubtedly side with Israel and force a solution on the Arabs. Jordanian Prime Minister Badran said, "In no way will we agree to American and Israel ganging up against an individual state such as Jordan. It happened with Lebanon" which "provided vivid proof of the futility of US insistence on making peace on one's own."¹⁹ Shultz was unhappy about the conference idea for a number of reasons. First, he did not believe that it would only be a ceremonial conference to ratify the deal. He believed it would be used by the Arabs and the Soviet Union to put pressure on Israel to come to a deal of their liking, especially one tilted towards the Arabs. Second, he believed the outcome of the conference would be either the US betraying Israel for the Arabs, something he did not want to do, or the US rejecting the Arab position and pushing them closer to the Soviet Union. Because of this, Shultz told Hussein he did not support the conference idea but agreed to still work within the peace process and look for compromise.²⁰

Despite Shultz's efforts, the decision of the US to block many of the proposed members of the Palestinian delegation, the failed Murphy trip to the region, and the disappointment over Hussein's visit to Washington had a number of consequences. Peres was deeply disturbed by the American reaction to the inclusion of some PLO affiliated member in the joint delegation. He believed that if he was willing to discuss issues with the PLO, then the US should not have an objection. He was disappointed that the Reagan administration sided with the more hardline members of Likud who, along with their allies in Congress, believed that the PLO should never have a role in the West Bank or in any peace process. The disqualification of the Palestinian members of the delegation led the Arabs to believe that the US would always find some opposition to working with the Palestinians and there was no use trying to meet those demands. The failure to move forward with the peace process also led to more violence in the region. On September 25, 1985, terrorists affiliated with the PLO hijacked a yacht near Larnaca Cyprus, killing three Israeli tourists. The PLO claimed they were Mossad agents but there was no evidence to that effect. In response, the IDF attacked the PLO headquarters on October 1. The Peres government believed they needed to respond to the PLO attack for fear of looking weak compared to the Likud party. The Israeli attack killed fifty-six Palestinians while wounding another hundred and missed killing Arafat by minutes. Even after these attacks, Hussein still met with Peres and they both attempted to continue the peace process. Unfortunately, on October 7, terrorists associated with the PLO, but members of the Palestinian Liberation Front, hijacked a cruise ship called the *Achille Lauro*. The terrorists executed a wheelchair-bound American Jew named Leon Klinghoffer and threw his body over the side of the ship. Hussein now faced pressure from Israel and the US to

no longer associate with Arafat. Al-Masri said that this incident was the beginning of the end for the Arafat-Hussein partnership and said, “At the end of the day Arafat didn’t deliver.”²¹ While the PLO had many factions, if Arafat could not control those factions, he demonstrated he was not in a position to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians.

The relationship between Hussein and Arafat also began to strain. On November 13, 1985, Arafat and Hussein met again to discuss the Jordanian-PLO partnership and again Arafat refused to make a firm commitment to Hussein. In addition, he made new demands of the proposed confederation between Jordan and the proposed Palestinian state. Arafat wanted the ability to have a parliament, currency, and flag. Hussein agreed to this provision but could not accept Arafat’s other requests. Arafat wanted to have a separate military in the new Palestinian state and he wanted the head of the confederation to alternate between a Palestinian and a Hashemite after Hussein died. Hussein quickly rejected these new conditions.²² First, Hussein believed allowing the Palestinians to have their own parliament and currency was a big concession. Second, neither Israel nor the US would agree to any proposal that called for Arafat to have control over an army that he could use to threaten Israel. A Palestinian army was also a threat to Hussein, he could not guarantee that Arafat would not eventually use that force to remove him from power. Finally, he did not intend to remove his family as the head of Jordan. He believed he had a legacy to protect, and that did not include turning Jordan over to Arafat after he died. In addition, if Arafat knew that he would have full control over Jordan upon Hussein’s death, it could encourage him to assassinate him. Hussein also did not trust Arafat to ever return power to Hussein and his family after his term ended.

Despite these setbacks, Hussein continued to try to bridge the gap between the Palestinians and the Americans. He met with Murphy in January 1986, and discussed what would be necessary for the US to agree to allow the PLO into the talks at an international conference. On January 25, Hussein received his official response in a letter from Reagan. In it, Reagan demanded that the PLO recognize UN Resolution 242 and 338, announce they are prepared for peace with Israel, and renounce terrorism. When Hussein took this letter to Arafat, Arafat replied that he would not recognize 242 because it did not include statements about Palestinian national rights. Hussein went back to Washington and got them to include a statement about the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Despite that, Arafat still rejected it because he believed legitimate rights did not equal national rights or the guarantee of a Palestinian state. This was the end of Hussein's involvement with the PLO.²³

On February 19, Hussein addressed Jordanian television, in a speech prepared by Adana Abu-Odeh, to announce that he would no longer work with the PLO on an agreement to work towards peace with Israel. Hussein said, "I and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan hereby announce that we are unable to continue to coordinate politically with the PLO leadership until such a time as their word becomes their bond, characterized by a commitment, credibility and constancy." The rest of the speech laid out in specific details the attempts by Jordan to facilitate a negotiating partnership with the PLO. In addition, Hussein also detailed the attempts by the Americans to facilitate the relationship and work with the PLO to find a way to make their participation acceptable to all parties. Hussein explained that when the PLO made a request or argued against an issue, the American and the Jordanians would work together

to ease their concerns. Then, the PLO would respond with new demands, making it impossible to ever get their approval.²⁴ For Hussein, it was important to show the rest of the Arab world that he made every effort to work with Arafat and the PLO. He believed that after this failure, he should have enough goodwill from the Arabs to begin to separate from the PLO. He also wanted the world to know that Arafat could not be trusted as a viable peace partner, making him the only possible solution to solving disputes over Palestinian territory. While many Arab leaders might have sympathized with Hussein's problems in working with Arafat, it did not change the actual situation. For many in the Arab world, the PLO still represented the voice of the Palestinians, despite the deficiencies in Arafat, and Hussein was still too close to the West to be trusted to look out for the interests of the Palestinians. Hussein needed to work with the PLO if he ever hoped to achieve a peace deal with Israel that was broadly accepted in the Arab world.

While disappointed that Jordan ended its efforts to work with the PLO towards peace, for all intents and purposes ending the peace process, Shultz was pleased that Hussein praised the US and placed the blame for failure squarely on Arafat. Shultz believed it was important to show the world that the PLO would not change, despite many offers and incentives from the Americans. He also felt that this would show the Arab world that the PLO missed an important opportunity to advance their cause with the US.²⁵ For the US, it looked like any peace process that involved Jordan would be suspended indefinitely. Despite Hussein's portrayal of the PLO as the problem and not the Americans or Israel, most of the Arab world still refused to recognize Hussein as the voice of the Palestinian people. Without that recognition, it was difficult for Hussein to take the risks necessary to discuss the peace process with Israel, especially considering

the likelihood that any Israeli government comprised of members of the Likud would block Israel from making major concessions.

Relations between Jordan and the PLO deteriorated quickly after their failed partnership. In fact, things got so bad between Jordan and the PLO, one top official told a foreign diplomat that he was sick and felt horrible, but he said he was supposed to greet Arafat at the airport the next day where he would, “give him a big kiss on both cheeks to make sure he catches it.”²⁶ After breaking with PLO, Hussein attempted to replace them in the West Bank. His first initiative was a five-year economic plan for the area that intended to invest over \$1 billion in the West Bank. Hussein hoped his economic reform plan, led by Prime Minister Rifai, would demonstrate to the Palestinians of the West Bank that the PLO could never bring improvements to their daily lives. He hoped that through his efforts he could demonstrate to the Palestinian people that he was their best hope to improve the situation in the Palestinian territories. Hussein also reopened the Amman-Cairo Bank, the largest bank in the region. By opening the bank, Hussein hoped to increase the Palestinians’ access to hard currency while also allowing Jordan to have more control over the importation of that currency. It also made it easier for Palestinians living throughout the Middle East to transfer funds back to their families in the occupied territories. According to Hussein’s advisor Abu-Odeh, this goal of this economic plan was to, “improve the Palestinians’ quality of life, create jobs, and eventually stop or at least slow down Palestinian emigration to Jordan.”²⁷ Hussein also worked with the Israelis to crack down on PLO forces in the area. This included closing all the PLO offices in Amman and expelling their representatives.²⁸ Reporters asked Hussein about the five-year plan at a news conference in Amman in July 1986. He argued that the plan

was not an attempt to undermine the PLO or divide the Palestinians, but an attempt to face the problems of Israeli occupation and facing its “dangers as one family.” He also commented on the peace process by saying, in his mind, the land of the West Bank was under occupation and “The important thing is to support our brothers in remaining on their land. The important thing is for us and everybody to work to restore the land to its owners so they can decide their own destiny.”²⁹

Jordan also tried to stamp out pro-PLO forces in the West Bank. For example, it had the president of the largest university in the West Bank, Mundir Salah, removed from his position because he had pro-PLO positions. Jordan also had Israel deport some Palestinians seen as PLO sympathizers, including Akram Haniyya, the editor of a pro-PLO newspaper. In addition, Hussein opened up his own newspaper in the West Bank. On behalf of Jordan, Israel also would not allow certain Palestinians to travel abroad. Finally, Jordan used economic sanctions to hurt PLO supporters. Farmers in the city of Jenin lost the ability to ship their produce to Jordan because they would not agree to pledge their loyalty to Hussein and distance themselves from the PLO.³⁰ These efforts did not have their desired effect and most of them ended when the *intifada* began.

Israel also tried to aid Hussein in increasing his influence in the West Bank. They agreed to replace the military leaders controlling the major cities with Palestinian mayors who generally rejected the PLO and supported Hussein. This included appointing a Palestinian named, Zafir al-Masri, as mayor of Nablus, one of the largest cities in the West Bank.³¹ Upon his appointment, al-Masri argued in the *Jordan Times* that his goal was not self-determination, because that is not what the Israelis offered, but to make the lives better for the Palestinians. He also declared he would not work with Israel to

establish political control over Nablus. Al-Masri also announced that he hoped the PLO would accept UNSC Resolution 242 so they could join the peace negotiations and end the occupation.³² The PLO responded by assassinating al-Masri on March 2, 1986. Hussein even tried to cultivate a relationship with a former member of Fatah with the hope that eventually he would replace Arafat. Once rumors developed that Hussein hoped to groom this person to lead the PLO, he lost all support in the West Bank.³³

Unfortunately, for Hussein, the economic and political reforms did not work and his attacks on the PLO, while popular in Jordan, diminished his approval in the West Bank. By the end of the year, polls taken in the West Bank showed that a clear majority favored the PLO as the true representative of the Palestinian people and few wanted an association with Jordan and Hussein.³⁴ Hussein believed that once he broke with the PLO publically, he needed to cement his position with the people of the West Bank if he ever hoped to lead them in negotiations with the Israel. Unfortunately, the economic program was not successful enough to overcome the ingrained popularity of the PLO for their years of resistance to the occupation. Despite his inability to improve his standing in the West Bank, Hussein continued to try to find a breakthrough in the peace process. He hoped that if he could get a breakthrough with Israel that returned the land occupied in 1967, maybe he could gain the support of the Palestinian people.

Throughout 1987, Hussein continued his efforts to reach a peace deal with Israel. On April 11, 1987, Hussein met with Israeli Foreign Minister Peres in London. While there, they agreed to what became known as the London Agreement. This new agreement called for an international conference with the “object of bringing a comprehensive peace to the area, security to its states, and to respond to the legitimate

rights of the Palestinian people.” After the conference, negotiations between the parties would happen in a bilateral forum. The settlement would be based on UNSC Resolution 242 and 338 and called for the participation of anyone who accepted those agreements and renounced violence. This included the PLO if they renounced violence and accepted Israel’s right to exist. The Palestinians would participate through a joint delegation with Jordan. If the PLO chose to meet the conditions, then they would join Jordan in the negotiations. If they continued with acts of terrorism, then the delegation would include Palestinians from the West Bank not associated with the PLO. It called for all major issues to be decided in various Israeli-Jordanian bilateral working groups. Finally, Peres and Hussein would recommend the plan to the Americans with the hope of gaining their participation. Peres and Hussein wanted the US put forth the plan as their idea in order to gain maximum acceptance throughout the region.³⁵ The agreement had elements both sides would like. Hussein wanted the legitimacy of an international conference and Israel wanted negotiations to occur bilaterally, hoping to copy their previous success in bilateral negotiations with Egypt. It was also important for Israel to allow Hussein to have Palestinians participate in the negotiations so he could still claim to be upholding the decision of the Arabs at Rabat.

During the London meeting, Peres also offered Hussein a number of energy projects to help gain his support and boost his popularity in Jordan. These included a hydroelectric power plant, a canal between the Mediterranean and Dead Sea, and an oil pipeline from Jordan to the Mediterranean. These projects were set to begin when the *intifada* started, ending the ability of Israeli engineers to operate safely in the West Bank.³⁶ These offers would have helped both sides of the dispute. Hussein needed the

extra energy and would have benefited from canal access to the Mediterranean. For Peres, many in Israel believed that the key to a lasting peace was a growing economic relationship between the Arabs and Israel. If that occurred, it could make war too costly between the Israelis and the Arabs.

One important part of the London agreement was that Hussein negotiated with Foreign Minister Peres and not Prime Minister Shamir. Shamir claimed that Peres acted on his own without his knowledge or approval. Peres claimed that Shamir knew ahead of time that he was meeting with Hussein in London. The only thing Shamir did not know was that Hussein and Peres would reach a written agreement. Peres claimed he did not believe this was possible when he left for London, but realized he had an opportunity to move the peace process forward and so he took it.³⁷ The divide in Israel between Likud and Labor was a problem for the peace process throughout the rest of Reagan's presidency. For both Hussein and the Americans, it was hard to negotiate with the Israeli government because of the split in the government. In addition, the Reagan administration had very little desire or incentive to get in the middle of domestic political disputes in Israel. In addition, Hussein's impression in meeting with Peres was that he spoke for the Israeli government, including the members represented by Likud. When this assumption proved untrue, it permanently damaged Hussein's attitude towards Peres and would impact future negotiations with Peres.

Shamir believed that the London Agreement was only a vehicle for Hussein to act like Sadat, even though he was in a much weaker position. Shamir rejected the agreement from the beginning because he did not trust Peres or believe Hussein could deliver on his promises. Peres did nothing to alleviate this trust deficit, only increasing

Shamir's distaste for the agreement. While Shamir likely would have never accepted the agreement, Peres made a number of mistakes in his attempt to get the support of the Likud side of his government. First, he would not show Shamir a written copy of the agreement, only agreed to read it to him. Peres believed that Shamir's allies in Likud would leak the agreement and Hussein and Peres agreed to keep it a secret until it was completed. Hussein did not want to acknowledge publically he was negotiating with the Israelis until he had concrete benefits from the negotiations he could use to generate support for his plan. Hussein wanted the proposal to look like it came from the Americans, to give him some more space in the Arab world. In addition, Peres continued to go around Shamir without his notification or support to try to involve the Americans in the plan. Shamir also had an aversion to international conferences, because he believed that is where the maximum pressure on Israel would come. Like in the past, he preferred bilateral talks between Jordan and Israel. In a message to Hussein in January 1987, Shamir said, "there is no substitute for direct negotiations and that, at some point in the future; Jordan will come to realize that his path will, in the long run, ensure the best rewards. No international conference can produce the solution to our problems."³⁸

Another possible benefit to the London agreement came on April 7, 1987. At this point, the relations between Jordan and Syria had dramatically improved. Hussein frequently worked to bridge the differences with Assad and even unsuccessfully tried to mediate the dispute between Assad and Saddam Hussein. Prime Minister Rifai sent a message to the US that Syria was willing to join an international peace conference if the US could agree with Jordan on the nature of that conference. Shultz believed this was an important change because up until this point, Syria focused on blocking any attempts at

negotiation between Israel and Jordan.³⁹ It also made the agreement in London more important because it looked like an international conference could unite the Arabs. With Syrian, Jordanian, and Palestinian participation, any agreement that the London talks produced would have settled all remaining issues between Israel and its neighbors.

Shultz still had problems with American participation in the manner proposed by Peres and Hussein. His main concern was he did not want to deceive Shamir nor get directly involved in a dispute between Israel's main political parties. It was not a tenable position for an American secretary of state to be arguing the points of Israel's foreign minister to the prime minister. While Shamir did not outright reject the plan when Peres presented it to him, he did not give it his support either. In addition, on April 1, Shamir sent a Passover message to Reagan where he said it was "inconceivable that there may be in the US support of the idea of an international conference, which will inevitably reintroduce the Soviets into our region in a major role."⁴⁰ Another issue was the promise of an international conference. When Shultz talked to Shamir about, Shamir was adamant that he would not support any form of an international conference. His objection was that any conference would be stacked with anti-Israeli members and feared that even if the Americans promised direct negotiations, the conference could take control, making that unlikely. Shamir told Shultz, "I'm talking about Israel's survival. . . . With all my friendship and deep respect for you, you must understand that I cannot agree to what I believe may be in store for us as a result of such a conference." Shultz tried to ease Shamir's worries but he was unwilling to budge in his opposition.⁴¹

While Shultz supported the idea, he was consistently lobbied by both sides of the Israeli government to support their attitude towards the London agreement. Shamir sent

envoys to Shultz to suggest he should not come to the region and argued that the plan could not go forward without the support of the whole Israeli government. Peres also sent representatives to Shultz that argued that this was a real opportunity for peace, and the US would be sorry if they did not seize it. Because Shultz and Reagan did not want to get in the middle of an internal Israeli dispute, they did not push the agreement and did not travel to Israel to try to launch the peace conference. The possible inclusion of Syria was an important opportunity missed by Shultz and Reagan. Because Hussein received Assad's support, the negotiations had the potential to end the hostilities between Israel and its neighbors. It would have taken continued American pressure on the Likud bank of the Israeli government, but it was the first real opportunity in a decade to forge an agreement between Israel and its neighbors.

Shamir believed that he could meet with Hussein directly and through that relationship, he could convince Hussein to attend bilateral negotiations without the participation of an international conference. The two leaders met on July 18, 1987, where each had a vastly different attitude about the success of the meeting. Shamir reported to Shultz that the meeting could lead to more Israeli-Jordanian cooperation. In addition, he felt he could work with Hussein in finding a mutually beneficial solution to the problems of the region. Hussein told Shultz that the meeting with Shamir was a disaster and he did not believe he could work with Shamir at all.⁴² One reason Shamir might have believed that the meetings succeeded was because of how Hussein treated his guests. Hussein asked Shamir to stay the night at his estate in England, so he did not have to travel on the Sabbath. Hussein also provided a complete menu of kosher food, knowing that Shamir was very religious.⁴³ Despite his generosity as a host, Hussein did

not trust Shamir, and believed that he still was loyal to the Likud platform that called for all of the West Bank to part of Israel. The combination of the internal Israeli politics, Hussein's disdain for Shamir and his Likud allies, and the unwillingness of the United States to engage in the process directly ended the chance for a peace deal based on the London Agreement. This was a missed opportunity for all involved. For Israel, they finally had an agreement from Hussein to commit to bilateral talks, but Shamir could not get past his distrust of Peres and his opposition to even a pro-forma international conferences. For the US, if Reagan and Shultz had been more willing to pressure Shamir, they would have had their best chance to achieve a peace settlement in the Middle East that had the possibility to expand into a comprehensive agreement between Israel and the Arabs. The failure of these leaders to act directly led to the uprising known as the *intifada*.

On December 9, 1987 in the Gaza town of Jabaliyah, an Israeli truck driver ran over four Palestinians killing them. This seemingly minor event launched what was known as the *intifada* in the Palestinian territories. No outside group, including the PLO, directed this uprising and it led to violent demonstrations throughout the occupied territories. Palestinians responded to the killing with the throwing of rocks and Molotov cocktails at Israeli security services that responded with firing rubber bullets and eventually live ammunition at the Palestinian protesters. This uprising was a reaction to the never-ending Israeli occupation and the realization that it could become permanent as Israel continued to build and expand settlements on land many hoped would be a future Palestinian state. All this was widely viewed internationally through television news sources. The pictures of children throwing rocks at Israeli soldiers who responded with

rifle fire and tear gas helped increase international support for the Palestinian cause.⁴⁴

While the PLO was not involved in its beginning, it quickly joined the uprising and eventually helped to shape it as a pro-PLO movement.⁴⁵

Hussein was deeply disappointed that the London Agreement failed. He believed that Peres misunderstood Israeli opposition and did not negotiate well with Shamir. Hussein felt that Peres should have brought the plan to Shamir from the beginning, not ambushed him when it was complete. It convinced Hussein that Israel had no desire for peace and that would not change until Israel formed a government. He believed that Shamir would not go against his party members who many, including Sharon, still thought that the removal of Hussein was the solution to the Palestinian problem.⁴⁶ This ended any chance of peace between Jordan and Israel for the time being. While Hussein would still discuss the issues with the Americans, he had not real prospects in succeeding with Israel. For Hussein, it was necessary to keep the dialogue open between the US and Jordan, so any failures to move the peace process forward would come from Israel, keeping Hussein on good terms with the Reagan administration.

Despite the failure of the London Agreement, Shultz continued to attempt to arrange for a peace process between Hussein and Shamir. Shultz met with Hussein in London on October 19, 1987, where he presented the idea of Shamir and Hussein meeting along with Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev at an upcoming American-Soviet summit. Shultz believed that this forum could get Hussein's approval because it was an international conference, but not too big a conference that Shamir would reject it outright. After some pressure, he received Shamir's agreement to work towards an interim agreement between Jordan and Israel over the West Bank at a joint summit. Shamir told

Shultz, “Well, Mr. Secretary, you know our dreams, and you know our nightmares. We trust you. Go ahead.”⁴⁷ With Shamir’s agreement, Shultz believed this could finally be a breakthrough and scheduled a meeting with Hussein to present him with his new idea. Hussein was less enthusiastic than Shultz hoped. Hussein did not trust Shamir and believed that while he may agree to an interim agreement, he would never allow for a final settlement. When Shultz presented the plan to Hussein, Hussein rejected it because he did not believe Shamir would ever move away from the transitional phase of Palestinian rule, never giving the people of the West Bank the option of real self-determination. Hussein expressed his disdain for Shamir, telling Richard Murphy that he “can’t be alone with that man.” Hussein also told Shultz that Syria would never agree to this plan and would do everything to block it. He believed that eventually, the Soviets would back Syria, placing him at risk without any hope of success.⁴⁸ In addition, Hussein had scheduled the Arab League to meet in Amman relatively soon and feared the reaction if he announced he was opening up bilateral negotiations with Israel that did not include the Palestinians in any form.⁴⁹ The relationship between Hussein and Shamir was too far damaged to allow for any bilateral negotiations. While Shultz’s effort was worthwhile in the name of peace, he had very little hope of succeeding.

To make matters worse, after Shultz left his meeting with Hussein, he forgot his briefing book and the Jordanians immediately copied it. In it, it appeared to Hussein that the US was taking Shamir’s position on almost every issue. In addition, it was critical of Hussein personally. It argued that Shultz should try to get Hussein alone because he was much weaker when he was not around his advisors. The comments personally offended Hussein and when he met with Shultz the next day, he was even more hesitant to support

this new conference idea. In fact, Hussein barely agreed with any of Shultz's suggestions to move the process forward.⁵⁰ Eventually, Hussein told Shultz he could not participate. Shultz decided not to push the idea any further and dropped the plan to associate the peace process with the upcoming US-Soviet summit.

In January 1988, Shultz attempted one more effort at the peace process in response to the *intifada*. His plan had a number of steps that he intended to happen in quick succession. He hoped to show both sides signs of progress. First, the Arabs would attempt to end the *intifada* and Israel would agree to stop the expansion of settlements. After that had occurred, the next month, negotiations began on autonomy for the Palestinians. Six months after the negotiations started, Israel and the Palestinians would sign the autonomy agreement, beginning a three-month period before elections in the West Bank and Gaza to determine the makeup of the autonomous government. Three months after the autonomy talks were scheduled to end, talks on final status would start. The discussions on final status would start regardless of the state of the autonomy talks. Shultz believed that by interlocking the autonomy and final status talks, he would overcome Arab fears that Israel would drag out autonomy discussions, so they never had to move on to the issues of a final status agreement. Shultz also called for an international conference, but only for the purpose of kicking of the process. He wanted to assure Israeli fears that an international conference could devolve into something more hostile to Israeli interests by only using it to mark the formal start of his plan. He also believed that it would give Hussein the cover to participate. Before he announced the plan publicly, Shultz traveled to the Middle East to gain the support of various leaders.⁵¹

When meeting with Israel, Shultz found the normal objections. Israel opposed any form of international conference and was opposed to the speed of talks. They believed that a much longer transition was needed to judge the impact of Palestinian autonomy, something much closer to the five-year transition seen in the Camp David Accords. Hussein showed some initial caution, but eventually gave his support because of Shultz's concept of interlocking the autonomy talks with final status talks. Hussein believed this was an important feature to overcome Arab fears that final status talks would never occur.⁵² The concept of interlocking was important for the Arabs because it overcame the biggest downside of the Camp David Accords. While those accords called for Palestinian autonomy, it never progressed to a final settlement negotiation. Shultz's plan moved to final status negotiations no matter the state of autonomy talks, limiting the ability of the Israelis to repeatedly stall progress.

Because of his support in the initial meetings with leaders from the Middle East, Shultz decided to announce his plan publicly. In a meeting at the Council of Foreign Relations, attended by the ambassadors to the US of many Arab countries, Shultz laid out his plan. He said, "you have three substantive things [in the plan]: one dealing with things that can be done quickly; another dealing with issues of final status; and a third dealing with the interrelationship between them, a kind of interlocking between these two areas of substance." He also mentioned that the plan would be based off UNSC Resolution 242 calling for the exchange of territory for peace. He also said that there would be bilateral negotiations between Israel and its neighbors. He hoped that Syria would join, but acknowledge it was unlikely. Shultz also argued that ideas of complete sovereignty were changing, that nations would have to work together to solve issues like

security and access to resources. Because of that, he believed this negotiation process had the potential to finally succeed.⁵³

Once the plan was officially announced, Shultz received different reactions than what he expected. He believed that he had Shamir's support, but in fact, only Foreign Minister Peres supported it. Shamir said, "I reject the whole initiative, I only accept two words in it, and the two words are the signature – George Shultz – and nothing else." In addition, Mubarak of Egypt also was unwilling to give his support. He did not believe the Americans would pressure Israel enough to make the concessions to achieve peace on the West Bank. He also did think that with the *intifada* raging, any plan could work that did not include substantial support from the Palestinians or the PLO.⁵⁴ Hussein took a more cautious approach to the Shultz Initiative. When Shultz announced it, Hussein did not publicly support it or reject it. In a meeting with Shultz on March 1, in Amman, Hussein told him that the PLO needed to be included and that the international conference had to have the power to impose terms if necessary. He did not reject the ideas behind the conference but still believed changes needed to be made for it to be successful.⁵⁵ In a message to Shultz, the American embassy further elaborated on Hussein and his government's view of Shultz's proposal. They told him that while the Jordanians were not unhappy about American involvement, they did not believe this was a true peace effort, rather just an attempt to save Israel from the *intifada*. Many in Jordan felt the US had "breaches of faith in the peace process" in the past and had no reason to believe it would not continue.⁵⁶ Because of the uprising and the decrease in Hussein's stature in the West Bank, he knew that he could not negotiate for the PLO. In addition, he believed that an Israeli government controlled by Likud would never agree to a

settlement that turned over the West Bank to the Palestinians, so he believed that the international conference needed to have more power to force the Israelis to negotiate and enforce any final agreement. Shultz also underestimated the impact of the *intifada* on the peace process. The daily pictures of Israeli soldiers assaulting rock-throwing Palestinian civilians diminished any appetite for a peace process in much of the Arab world. No leader, including Hussein, could appear at a negotiating table with the Israeli leadership while the *intifada* raged and still expect to retain the support of their people.

Shultz went to Jerusalem on February 25, to build support for his plan. When he met with Shamir, he was told that after consultations with Begin, Shamir believed that without at least five years for the transition between autonomy and final status talks, the plan was unworkable. He told Shultz that the Israelis needed that time to prove that the Palestinians could act in good faith. Shamir's attitude discouraged Shultz, but he pledged to keep working.⁵⁷ While in Jerusalem, Shultz set up a meeting with a few local Palestinian leaders located in the West Bank with the goal of getting their support for his plan. He hoped that if he had their blessing, it would overcome any opposition from the PLO. Shultz agreed to meet them in the Arab part of Jerusalem, which would have made him the first secretary of state to visit that section since the Israeli takeover in 1967. The day before the meeting, he was told that the PLO threatened the participants so they canceled. Shultz decided to go anyway, hoping to show the Palestinians how far he was willing to go to achieve peace. When nobody showed up to the meeting, Shultz made a statement to the Arabic television networks. He said, "Peace has its enemies. Even small steps towards peace can be significant in moving beyond mistrust and hatred." He also said, "Palestinians must achieve control over their political and economic decisions that

affect their lives and be active participants in negotiations to determine their future.” He called on the Jews and the Palestinians to “look to a future of dignity, security, and prosperity. New respect for rights and new readiness for political change must replace old recrimination and distrust.”⁵⁸ Despite the continued statements from the PLO that anyone working with Shultz would be a traitor to the cause and statements from people close to Shamir that the proposal was dead, Shultz believed his plea to the Palestinians helped and hoped to continue moving forward.

In March, Reagan invited Shamir to the White House to discuss Shultz’s plan. Reagan attempted to reassure Shamir that in any international conference, the US would protect Israel’s interests. Shamir told Reagan that if the Soviets and the Europeans participated, it was unlikely that bilateral negotiations would ever occur. He believed that the Soviets, in particular, would not want a repeat of Camp David where they participated in the early stages, only to be cut out when the more consequential bilateral talks began. Reagan argued to Shamir that Israel’s fears were overblown and “the United States would never let them down.” In a meeting with Shultz, Shamir told him, “I’m talking about Israel’s survival. . . . With all my friendship and deep respect for you, you must understand that I cannot agree to what I believe may be in store for us a result of such a conference. Please go slowly. I know how much you do not want to injure us.”⁵⁹

While Shultz attempted to build support for his initiative, Hussein’s position in the West Bank continued to diminish. On March 11, 1988, the Unified National Command, an organization set up to speak for the *intifada*, issued a communiqué that called for the people of the West Bank to “intensify the mass pressure against the occupation army and the settlers and against collaborators and personnel of the Jordanian

regime.” It also called on all members of the Jordanian Parliament that came from the West Bank to resign their positions “and align with the people. Otherwise there will be no room for them on our land.” At this point in the *intifada*, Hussein regularly shipped supplies to the West Bank for use in the uprising, so he felt betrayed that the Palestinians called him an Israeli collaborator. This statement angered Hussein because he believed that he was helping the *intifada* through both political and financial support.⁶⁰ This statement also had the effect of further separating Jordan nationals with Palestinians living in Jordan. It showed that even the non-PLO leadership in the West Bank did not see any relation with the people of Jordan, making the people of Jordan more likely to want nothing to do with the West Bank and the problems of the Palestinians. For Hussein, it led to the conclusion that nobody wanted him involved in the Palestinian issues. He did not have the support of the people in Palestine because of the *intifada* and his failed economic plan. He did not have the support of the PLO because of his crackdown on the PLO after the last failed effort to produce a joint delegation. He did not have the support of the Israeli government, who under Shamir did not want to return any of the West Bank back to full Palestinian sovereignty. He also did not have the support from most of the other Arab states who did not trust Hussein nor believe he had the best interests of the Palestinians at heart. Finally, he did not have the support from his population, who tired of the constant insults of the Palestinians and the drain they caused on the Jordanian economy. Because of these factors, Hussein’s goal of negotiating a return to the 1967 Jordanian borders appeared to be at an end.

In April, Shultz again traveled to the region in hopes of beginning his peace conference. He first met with Shamir who only agreed to negotiations with Jordan but

not in an international conference. When Shultz met with Hussein, Hussein handed him a document outlining Jordan's position. Most of the points were similar to past Jordanian attitudes towards a peace process. Mainly, he wanted the settlement to have the full withdrawal of Israel from the West Bank, a settlement based on UNSC Resolution 242, and he wanted the conference to have the power to force negotiations assuring Israel to negotiate in good faith. In addition, it contained the principle of self-determination for the Palestinians and stated that Jordan would participate in the negotiations with a joint Jordan-Palestinian delegation, but would only do so if all parties agreed. It stated clearly that Jordan did not represent the Palestinians or the PLO and those parties needed to negotiate on their own. Hussein also broadcasted these conditions publically so there was no mistaking his attitude towards the initiative.⁶¹

The Arab League met on June 7 to discuss the *intifada* and how to respond to it. They called for direct Arab money to help support the Palestinian uprising. This was detrimental to Hussein because at this point, money donated to support the protests flowed through Jordan and then Jordan distributed it through a joint Jordanian-Palestinian committee. When Hussein had control of the distribution, he could direct towards people and groups that had an affinity to the Jordan, while keeping it away from the more radical elements of the PLO. At the meeting, Hussein tried to assure his fellow leaders that he had no desire anymore to retake the West Bank, but the other Arab leaders rejected his pleas and decided to focus on helping the Palestinians without the participation of Hussein and Jordan.⁶² This along with the communique from the Palestinians increased Hussein's view that the Palestinians and the Arabs were ungrateful for his continued

support of the Palestinian cause. It helped to persuade him that another approach was necessary.

The combination of the *intifada*, the continued failure of the peace process, and the reaction of the Palestinians towards Hussein and Jordan dramatically changed Hussein's attitude towards the West Bank. On July 28, Hussein canceled the economic plan for the Palestinian territories, and on July 31, Hussein gave a televised address to the nation where he announced that Jordan was disengaging from the West Bank and focusing the government's efforts on the actual state of Jordan. He said, "Of late, it has become clear that there is a general Palestinian and Arab orientation which believes in the need to highlight the Palestinian identity in full in all efforts and activities. . . . It has also become obvious that there is a general conviction that maintaining the legal and administrative relationship with the West Bank, and the consequent special Jordanian treatment of the brother Palestinians living under occupation through Jordanian institutions in the occupied territories, goes against this orientation."⁶³ From this point on, Hussein announced, Jordan would no longer participate in any form of running the West Bank and Gaza. Jordan would no longer consider Palestinians on the West Bank Jordanian citizens and issue them Jordanian passports. Jordan would stop paying West Bank civil servants. Palestinians on the West Bank would no longer participate in the Jordanian political system. Jordan would no longer talk to the Americans or the Israelis about the West Bank, the US would have to discuss those issues directly with the Palestinians and their representatives.⁶⁴ This was a complete break from any Jordanian role in the West Bank. This severed Jordan's ties to the area west of Jordan River that

existed since its founding. Hussein tired of fighting with the Palestinians, decided to focus more on his actual people, the Jordanians.

In the speech, Hussein also tried to unify the Palestinians who remained on the East Bank with Jordan. He called them, “an integral part of Jordan” who had the same “full rights of citizenship and all its obligations They are an integral part of the Jordanian state.” According to Adnan Abu-Odeh, who wrote the speech, this was because of the fear that some in Jordanian society had so tired of the Palestinians that they would try to strip the citizenship rights of any Palestinian living in Jordan. In addition, some believed that the Palestinians living on the East Bank in Jordan were supposed to be guests and now that the West Bank had been split from Jordan, they should leave.⁶⁵ For many Palestinians, Jordan had been their home almost their entire life, making the discrimination some felt inside Jordan particularly difficult. For many, it showed the need to have an independent Palestinian state and a true homeland for the displaced Palestinians to return.

When discussing the disengagement later, Hussein said:

It was the *intifada* that really caused our decision on disengagement from the West Bank. It was again our lack of ability to get any agreement with our Palestinian brethren. I wish to God they had been frank enough about what they wanted and they would have got it a long time before. But we were torn apart trying to get all the pieces of the jigsaw together to help them. However, suspicions and doubts got in the way. But beyond that, we recognized there was a definite trend that had started before the Rabat resolution of 1974 and continued all the way through. They could give, they could take, and they could whatever do they liked. They could probably give more than we could but they decided they wanted to have their say regarding their future and I simply tried to help them by that decision.⁶⁶

Hussein believed it was important for Jordan to allow the Palestinians to deal with their issues, allowing him to focus on Jordan. His only hesitation came from the status of the holy places in Jerusalem. Hussein still believed his family had a duty to safeguard the holy sites and he planned to continue that duty. Queen Noor said Hussein viewed his “responsibility [for the holy sites] as a personal and spiritual obligation as well as a political necessity, since there was no guarantee that the Israelis would allow the Palestinians sovereignty over those disputed sites.”⁶⁷ He continued to pay the religious workers whose job it was to manage and safeguard the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem and continued to claim a Jordanian role in protecting the holy sites.⁶⁸

Salah Khalaf, the head of intelligence for the PLO, said, “The King was betting the PLO would not be capable of making an initiative for peace. The best was that either there would be a failure to make decisions, or a failure to implement and that in either case, the PLO would have to go back to him.” Arafat also agreed with this sentiment. He believed that Hussein was setting the PLO up for failure because it had no money or infrastructure in the occupied territories and because of that when things turned bad for the inhabitants, they would blame the PLO for their misery.⁶⁹ Many Palestinians believed that when the PLO failed, Hussein would attempt to reclaim his role in the West Bank. While it was probably correct that Hussein hoped the PLO failed, giving him another opportunity to regain control of the West Bank, the separation between Jordan and the Palestinians had enough support inside Jordan, it would have been difficult for Hussein to rejoin the two side of the Jordan River. In addition, even if the PLO had difficulty running the daily operations of the West Bank, it was likely they would blame Hussein, Israel, and the United States, not accepting their responsibility.

After Hussein's announcement, the State Department received a cable from the American consulate in Tel Aviv that described the expected impact from Jordan's disengagement with the West Bank. Economically, they expected to have a severe impact on the West Bank economy. They also believed in the short term most people would be paid, but Jordan would discontinue additional subsidies immediately given to the Palestinian workers. One of the biggest areas of concerns was health workers. Talking to a health official in the West Bank, the embassy staff found that Jordan paid for almost a quarter of the staff. Another issue was the removal of development funds. The embassy believed that since Jordan provided most of those funds in conjunction with Israel, it would be impossible to find another to the nation to contribute funds and was willing to work with Israel. Because of this, many infrastructure projects in the West Bank would end. Finally, they believed there would be a political struggle between the PLO and the people living in the West Bank for control over the territory. Whoever gained control would then have found a way to deal with Israel to improve lives of the people in the Palestinian territories.⁷⁰

Before Jordan ended its relationship with the West Bank, it was paying for over one third of the Palestinian civil servants. Over eighteen thousand people lost their source of income because of Hussein's decision. This included ten thousand teachers and fourteen hundred health workers. In addition, West Bank passports issued by Jordan now only had a two-year life before expiration. Once those passports expired, many Palestinians working in other countries needed to return to the region to renew their travel documents with passports issued from a new Palestinian entity or Israel. Jordan also put quotas on goods, like olive oil and produce, shipped from the West Bank, limiting the

ability of many on the West Bank to earn a living. Hussein also limited travel from the West Bank into Jordan and dramatically reduced the number of Palestinians who could attend schools and universities in Jordan. Finally, all goods produced in the West Bank and sent to Jordan faced an import tax.⁷¹ The announcement that Jordan was severing its ties with the West Bank led to a panic amongst the Palestinians as they raided banks to get their savings and many found they no longer had an income. The PLO tried to smuggle money into the West Bank to help the situation, but much of it was lost to greed and corruption. In one example, the PLO paid an Israeli office ten percent to smuggle \$500,000 into the territories. Unfortunately, he kept \$150,000 for his efforts. Similar things happened when the PLO operatives took a large cut to smuggle in cash to the desperate residents of the West Bank.⁷² The lack of cash in the territories led to more hardships for the Palestinian people, including inflation and the lack of basic supplies, making the job of the PLO in managing the West Bank that much more difficult.

Israel also reacted to Jordan's ending its relationship with the Palestinian territories. Shamir said that Hussein's only goal was to "to ensure survival of the royal Hashemite house his grandfather had founded and he has headed virtually all his life." He also believed that Hussein was desperate "to keep the *intifada* from spilling over into Jordan and thus, among other danger to him, agitating and perhaps strengthening Jordan's large Palestinian population."⁷³ Shamir also announced that Israel no longer saw Hussein as a partner for peace in the West Bank and some in his party called for the immediate annexation of the Palestinian territories. Because the Labor party and Peres put so much stock in Hussein, they were largely discredited in Israeli politics and they lost the election in November 1988.⁷⁴

There were many consequences for Hussein's announcement. First, it ended the Shultz Initiative. If Jordan was no longer willing to negotiate for the Palestinians and Israel under Shamir's leadership was unwilling to negotiate with the PLO, the hope for Shultz's plan evaporated. Peres quickly realized his desire to continue negotiations under the London Agreement also ended. Hussein was now unwilling to continue with that agreement in any form. Finally, it forced the PLO to make changes that allowed for negotiations with Israel. During the *intifada*, the PLO faced pressure from local leaders in the West Bank and Gaza to moderate enough that it allowed for talks with Israel. They feared that if the PLO did not open negotiations, it would be impossible to see any gains from the *intifada*. Without negotiations, the status quo was destined to remain and Israel would continue to expand their settlements. Because of that, on November 15, the Palestinian National Council and Arafat passed a resolution agreeing to all previous UN resolutions, recognizing Israel, and calling for a two state solution.⁷⁵ This statement allowed the PLO to begin open communications with the United States, allowing the PLO to be recognized worldwide as the legitimate voice of the Palestinians. Before leaving office, on December 14, Shultz issued a statement that said, "The Palestinian Liberation Organization today issues a statement in which it accepted UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, recognizes Israel's right to exist in peace and security and renounce terrorism. As a result, the United States is prepared for a substantive dialogue with PLO representatives."⁷⁶

The Reagan administration saw many changes in the relationship between Jordan and the United States. Hussein and Reagan managed different peace initiatives that despite their efforts, all ended in failure. Hussein also repeatedly demonstrated his

importance to the US in stopping Soviet expansion while at the same time using the threats from the Soviet Union to show the White House that Jordan was an indispensable ally in the region. When Congress refused to provide Jordan with sufficient military aid, Hussein looked elsewhere. In addition, Reagan and Hussein clashed over similar issues faced by previous administrations, mainly American support of Israel and finding a just solution to the Palestinian problem.

There were also a number of missed opportunities for Jordan, the US, and Israel to achieve a peace deal. Many of these occurred because of dysfunction in the Israeli government but both Shultz and Reagan had opportunities to move the process forward if they were willing to pressure the Israeli government. Because they were not, the situation in the occupied territories continued to deteriorate, leading to the *intifada*.

The *intifada* fundamentally changed the situation in the occupied territories. The uprising destroyed any efforts by the Reagan administration to achieve a breakthrough in the peace process. Through Hussein's decision to walk away from his role in the West Bank, the United States lost its most important partner in dealing with the Palestinians. While Hussein still harbored a desire to control the West Bank, especially the holy sites in Jerusalem, the continued uprising along with the growing opposition to the Palestinians from his population made that goal impossible. Hussein's actions forced both the PLO and the United States to reexamine their previous conflicts and agree to overcome the opposition of the inclusion of the PLO in any future peace talks with Israel. The PLO now has the responsibility to govern the West Bank and Gaza, forcing them to moderate their previous violent positions if they ever hoped to achieve a settlement with

Israel. Despite Hussein's disengagement from the West Bank, he would continue to play an important role for the US in the region.

CHAPTER VIII

HUSSEIN, BUSH AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

When George H. W. Bush won election after Reagan, Hussein hoped that his past relationship with Bush would lead to real progress in the Middle East peace process. Despite their close personal relationship, the Bush presidency brought a number of challenges to Jordan's relationship with the United States. Hussein enthusiastically worked with Bush to propel his first effort at solving the issues between the Israelis and the Arabs. He hoped to use his friendship with Bush to finally accomplish Jordan's goals in the peace process. Bush's efforts were interrupted when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, leading to the first real break in American and Jordanian relations in decades. The Gulf War was a traumatic event for both Hussein and Jordan. It challenged Jordan's historical role as an important American ally in the region. Despite their divisions caused by the Gulf War, Hussein and Bush would eventually collaborate again to try and bring a peaceful solution to the Arabs and Israelis, demonstrating Hussein's importance to the interests of the United States in the region. While Bush did not get to participate in the culmination of the peace process between Jordan and Israel, the progress made during his administration was essential in finally bringing peace between Jordan and Israel.

The relationship between Bush and Hussein began while Bush was director of the CIA during the Ford administration. They had a friendly relationship built on mutual respect and admiration built over countless interactions while Bush led the CIA and amity continued when he became Reagan's Vice President. When Bush won the presidential election, Hussein was one of the first foreign leaders to call and congratulate him and told him he could not, "say how optimistic I am about the prospects for working together." The Bush and Hussein family were so close that Queen Noor also called to congratulate Barbara Bush.¹ On November 21, Bush wrote Hussein a letter and said, "You and your countrymen are on my mind. As I begin to form my foreign policy agenda, Jordan and the Middle East will remain one of my top priorities. I want to work together with you to forge fair and just solutions to the region's problems." He also told Hussein that he was happy he would, "be able to continue the wonderful working relationship with you that we have developed over the last several years."²

Bush and Hussein's first meeting after Bush's inauguration occurred at the funeral of Emperor Hirohito on February 23, 1989. In the meeting, they discussed the state of the peace process and the possibilities of future collaborations to draft a final settlement for the region. Hussein told Bush that he believed that Israeli public opinion was changing and that the Israeli government would soon be willing to discuss issues directly with the Palestinians. Bush responded to Hussein that he was pleased that the PLO finally met the minimum conditions necessary for discussions with the US. Hussein and Bush also agreed that some form of international conference would be needed to get all the major Arab states involved with the hope of reaching a comprehensive solution. In addition, the UN would need to guarantee the results of any agreement based on past UN

Security Council Resolutions. Finally, Hussein told Bush that despite his break from the West Bank, the possibility for a confederation between Jordan and the Palestinians was still possible because of his improving relations with Arafat.³ The meeting between the leaders reaffirmed their friendly relationship and showed that for once, the US and Jordan had similar views of the future peace process. Hussein finally had hope that the American leadership would pressure Israel into making the hard decisions necessary for a comprehensive peace deal. It also demonstrated that while Hussein publically broke with the West Bank, in private he still desired its eventual incorporation into Jordan.

Without the presences of aides Bush and Hussein had a private dinner the next night, together with their wives. At the dinner, Hussein gave Bush a booklet that described the Jordanian efforts for peace since 1967. Hussein used it to explain a number of myths he believed existed concerning his negotiations with Israel. He told Bush that the stronger Israel was, the less likely it was willing to make concessions for peace. This countered the traditional American belief that the US needed to make Israel secure before it would agree to a peace process. It was also a way for Hussein to argue for more weapons from the Americans. If Israel's state of security had no impact on the peace process, the US had no reason not to give Jordan modern weapons. Hussein also dismissed the need for bilateral negotiations by saying, "during the past two decades I have personally met in secret, on more than 150 occasions, totaling approximately 1,000 hours of talk, with almost every top Israeli official . . . all those efforts have not brought us any closer to the peace I am determined to achieve." Hussein closed his paper to Bush by saying, "The history of the problem and the record of past negotiations makes it clear that the only remaining viable vehicle for negotiations is an international conference, the

terms for which are already substantially agreed upon and to which all parties, except Israel, are committed to attend.”⁴ Hussein hoped that this argument would sway Bush to pressure Israel to commit to a conference to settle their dispute with the Arabs. He also wanted to show that he was, and had always been, a committed friend and ally to the United States and he hoped to continue that role during Bush’s presidency. The private dinner between the leaders and their families demonstrated the friendship they developed over years of working together. Finally, Hussein wanted to demonstrate to Bush that Jordan was not the problem in solving the issues between the Arabs and Israel. He needed a partner willing to work towards peace and up until this point, that has been missing from the negotiations.

Bush’s first foray into the peace process started when Shamir announced a plan on May 14, 1989 with a goal of stopping the still raging *intifada* in the occupied territories. His plan became known as the “Four-Point plan” and it called for elections in Gaza and the West Bank that would form a negotiating delegation to work out a five-year interim settlement with Israel. During that five-year period, the newly elected delegates would administer the West Bank and Gaza as the negotiation proceeded, the Palestinian delegation would move the territories towards self-government, with Israel retaining some security control. The delegation would not include any members of the PLO.⁵ New Secretary of State James Baker believed Shamir’s plan was too vague to get any support from the Arabs. In addition, it had no workable mechanism to discuss final settlement talks.⁶ When meeting with Bush during a Washington visit on July 7, 1989, Hussein told him that the Israeli plan did not meet the basic elements required for a workable peace plan. In particular, he was angry that the Israelis would not agree to

allow elections until after all demonstrations from the *intifada* ended. In addition, there was no possibility of a Palestinian state in the final status agreement and while negotiations continued, Israel would continue to expand its settlements in the West Bank. Bush told Hussein that he had the same concerns, but so far pressure on Israel to moderate its settlement activity had not succeeded. He also told Hussein he was frustrated by the actions of Shamir and that the US policy against expansion of settlements and for immediate free and fair elections in the territories had not changed. Hussein explained to Bush that the point of Shamir's plan was "to engage in a process of considerable apparent motion without substantial progress."⁷ For Hussein, this was a very positive meeting. He believed that in Bush, he finally had a president who would not fall victim to the usual games and delaying tactics of the Israelis. While on its face, the Shamir plan showed Israel willing to engage in a substantial peace process, in fact it was an attempt to end the *intifada*. Shamir later demonstrated he had no interest in allowing the Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank. His only goal was to end the *intifada* and argue to the world that the lack of movement in the peace process occurred because of Arab radicalness.

Both Mubarak and Baker responded with their own version of Shamir's plan. Mubarak's "Ten-point Plan" added the people of Jerusalem to the voting population and called for final settlement talks to begin sooner. Israel wanted to avoid allowing the Arabs of Jerusalem to participate in any Palestinian elections because it implied that they belonged in a future Palestinian entity, something Israel did not accept. Israel's historic position was that the Palestinians in Jerusalem belonged to the state of Israel and therefore had no reason to vote in a Palestinian election. In addition, Mubarak's plan

discussed the actual mechanisms of the election process, including the idea that Israel could not interfere in any way. Finally, it called for any negotiation to be based on past UN Security Council resolutions. Baker also responded with his own version. It tried to ease some of the concerns about the final composition of the Palestinian delegation, but still included most of the points made by Mubarak's plan. It made Egypt the center of the negotiating strategy while making no determination on the how the Palestinian election took place nor how who represented them in talks. Finally, it called for a meeting in Washington after the initial gathering in Cairo.⁸ Because Hussein abandoned his claim to the West Bank, the US did not need him to participate in the process with the Palestinians. Egypt continued to restore relations with the rest of the Arab world and because they already had relations with Israel, Mubarak replaced Hussein as the lead Arab negotiator for the Palestinians.

Israel accepted Baker's proposal reluctantly on November 9, 1989. The Israelis, the Americans and the Egyptians agreed to meet in Cairo on January 24, 1990, to further discuss these ideas. While in Cairo, Israel and Shamir added new conditions for future discussions before the talks moved to Washington. This included no prohibition on the expansion of Israeli settlements while negotiations took place and a demand that the *intifada* ended before any elections could occur. There was also disagreement on if Israel formally accepted the idea of trading land for peace and if the PLO could have any involvement at all. Egypt opposed these conditions but pledged to Baker to continue to work with him and the PLO to find a solution that satisfied everyone.⁹ Baker found that every time he believed he had an agreement to move forward with the talks, another issue arose, setting the discussion back to the beginning. Some of this was intentional.

Because Israel continued building settlements on the West Bank and in Gaza, every delay helped them alter the status quo on the ground, making it more likely that Israel would retain significant portions of the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, Arafat had little incentive to end the *intifada* before Israel made concessions. His position as the leader of the Palestinians was only enhanced while Israel failed to contain the uprisings.

In the background of the attempts to restart the peace process, Israel faced the growing problem of the influx of Soviet Jews immigrating to Israel due to the ongoing dissolution of the Soviet Union. Israel believed that to absorb those immigrants, it needed to continue to expand their settlements in the West Bank, a policy which also had the benefit of further asserting their control over the West Bank.¹⁰ In a dramatic change in American policy, during a news conference on March 3, Bush said, “My position is that the foreign policy of the United States says we do not believe there should be new settlements in the West Bank or East Jerusalem. And I will conduct that policy as if it’s firm . . . and I will be shaped in whatever decisions we make to see whether people can comply with that policy.”¹¹ This was the most public opposition to Israeli settlement activity to date by an American president and a significant gesture towards the Arabs. In addition, it contained the implicit threat that continued Israeli settlement activity could harm relations between the US and Israel. It was also an attempt by Bush to show the Arabs his commitment to the peace process and pressuring Israel to make the necessary concessions to achieve a deal.

Another challenge to the negotiations came from the PLO. While Arafat had accepted the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and renounced violence, there were still incidents between Palestinian militants and Israel. On May 30, a group of

Palestinians from the Palestinian Liberation Front, landed on a beach in Tel Aviv with the intent on attacking Israeli civilians. Fortunately, Israel security forces were able to stop them before they executed their attack.¹² When Arafat refused to condemn the attack, Baker and Bush suspended all talks with the PLO. Baker said, “Arafat had squandered any chance of establishing his credibility or even a scintilla of moral authority. . . . From a political standpoint, the PLO was no longer a reliable interlocutor.”¹³ Bush also condemned the PLO for not reacting sufficiently to the attempted attack and pledged to only work with the PLO if Arafat took steps to remove groups from his organization that still used violence.¹⁴ Since Hussein still refused to represent the Palestinians, and if the US refused to work with Arafat, Baker and Bush had very few options for moving the peace process forward. In addition, because of the *intifada*, Hussein could not have easily replaced Arafat in the negotiations even if he wanted to. His efforts would likely end in failure, diminishing his position with both Israel and the United States.

The challenges from Israel continued to frustrate Baker, and in July 1990, the negotiations finally collapsed when Shamir was reelected and added more conditions to the negotiations.¹⁵ Shamir told Baker that despite his objections, Israel never relinquished the right to settle in the West Bank and believed their presence there was as legitimate as any Palestinian.¹⁶ In his frustration, Baker told new Israeli Foreign Minister, David Levy:

Unless all parties tempered their inflexibility, there won't be any dialogue, and there won't be any peace, and the United States of America can't make that happen. . . . It's going to take some really good-faith affirmative effort on the part of our good friends in Israel. If we don't get it, and we can't get it quickly . . . I have to tell you that everybody over there should know that the telephone number is 1-202-456-1414. When you're serious about peace, call us.¹⁷

This failed attempt at the peace process, while short, shaped Bush and Baker's views of the Israeli government and its inability in their view to make the hard choices needed to achieve peace. While in Baker's view, the PLO and Arafat also were not ready to make the hard choices for peace, he did find some Arabs, in Mubarak and Hussein, willing to help the US to solve the problems of the Palestinians and the Israelis. Baker's assessment of the situation proved correct as peace process ended until after the Persian Gulf War. After that, Baker's attitude towards Hussein and Mubarak would also prove true as both led a positive role in the peace process.

While the peace process was not moving forward, Hussein continued to improve his relationship with Saddam Hussein of Iraq. Starting in 1988, and continuing in 1989, the connection between Jordan and Iraq's military and intelligence services expanded. This included joint Iraqi-Jordanian air force training, reconnaissance flights in the Jordan Valley and by 1990, a joint Iraqi-Jordanian air squadron. Hussein claimed that he needed this partnership to maintain the readiness of his troops at a reasonable expense and did not represent a new alliance between Jordan and Iraq.¹⁸ This was a strong signal to Israel that any attempt to harm Jordan would be met by a joint Iraq-Jordanian force. On February 16, 1990, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Yemen formed the Arab Co-Cooperation Council (AAC). It was joint idea between Saddam and Hussein that they presented to Egypt with the hope of creating an economic block to rival the power of the Gulf States. Hussein believed that the combination of the military of Iraq, the educated workforce of Jordan, and the manpower of Egypt, combined with their access to ports on the Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf, would create a powerful unit that

benefited all its members.¹⁹ Others saw the more nefarious goals behind the AAC. Mubarak believed the council's primary mission was trade related, but he also believed Saddam saw it as a way to increase his power in the Arab world. Once the council was formed, Saddam sent a fleet of Mercedes to Egypt for Mubarak and all his top political appointees. Mubarak rejected the gift but believed others took it. Mubarak later believed that Saddam tried something similar to gain support for his invasion of Kuwait. He told Baker that Hussein took bribes from Saddam before and likely would again. He said, "You go to Amman and you'll see all the new Mercedes."²⁰ Stories about Saddam's attempts to bribe other Arab leaders gave credence to future charges that Saddam bribed Hussein to support his invasion of Kuwait. Hussein's connections to Saddam were built on friendship but also due to the strategic needs of Jordan. Iraq was a strong military ally that could protect Hussein from Israel or Syria. In addition, by merging elements of their military and intelligence service, Jordan received the benefit of Iraq's much larger security apparatus at a fraction of the cost.

The economic issues of the region and the ability of the wealthier oil states to help the poorer Arab states was the main issue at the Arab League Summit in Bagdad on May 28, 1990. The main topic discussed by the Arab leaders was financial aid for both the Palestinians and the non-oil rich Arab states. Currently, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia only pledged money on a year to year basis, which upset Hussein because it prevented him from making long-term infrastructure improvements without knowing his future finances. Despite Hussein's pleas for change, both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait maintained their policy of only deciding on foreign aid on a year to year basis. In addition, Saddam continued to show his anger towards the Kuwaitis for their oil policies.²¹ In a speech to

the conference, Saddam urged for the Arabs to unite against the rest of the world. He said that the Arabs controlled the sixty-five percent of the world's oil and needed to unite to take advantage of that to make sure the West respected the Arab world's interests. He also talked about how the Arabs should view themselves as one Arab nation, and the strongest nations had to support the smaller ones so there was not a hole in the common Arab defense.²² Needless to say, Saddam envisioned himself as the head of this united Arab nation. While at the conference, Saddam tried to establish himself as the leader of the Arab cause, he also tried to unite the poorer Arab states under his leadership. His speech argued to leaders like Hussein that under Iraq's leadership the inequalities created by the vast oil wealth of some Arab states would, an incentive for leaders like Hussein to continue to support Saddam.

After the Arab summit in Baghdad, Saddam promised Hussein he would quickly repay a loan from the Iran-Iraq War of over \$600 million. In addition, Saddam agreed to give Hussein \$50 million in financial aid. This was important for Hussein because he currently faced many economic challenges including bread riots and forced austerity as a condition of an International Monetary Fund loan.²³ Compare Iraq's support to the support Hussein received from Kuwait during the 1980s. On numerous occasions, Kuwait promised to deliver aid to Jordan to help them out of an economic crisis. Each time, before the aid was delivered, for some reason or another, the aid was canceled or delayed.²⁴ The support from Iraq was public knowledge and compared to the support Jordan received from other Arab countries, was very high. Because of that, it is not surprising that Hussein and the people of Jordan had an affinity for Saddam in his dispute with Kuwait. It was a conflict between two governments, one who consistently

supported Jordan and its people and another that consistently broke its commitments to help Jordan.

Another factor in Hussein's support of Saddam was the views of the people of Jordan. Saddam was a large supporter of the Palestinian cause and a friend to Arafat and the PLO. The goodwill between Saddam and the Palestinians transferred to Palestinians on the West Bank and inside Jordan. To gain Arafat's support, Saddam told him in a meeting in March 1990 that, "We will enter Jerusalem victorious and will raise our flag on its walls. You will enter with me riding on your white stallion." He also explained to Arafat that, "From now on we shall not need any more concessions or political efforts because you and I know that they are useless. . . . We shall support the *intifada* by our air force and accurate missiles in order to deal a blow on the enemy and defeat it even without ground fighting." Saddam also ordered the murder of any PLO official who did not support Arafat's position.²⁵ Since Saddam was able to get the support of many of the Palestinians for his cause, it put more pressure on Hussein to not break with Iraq. If he did, he faced increased domestic pressure on his rule from the huge Palestinian population still residing in Jordan.

Any efforts to continue the peace process was interrupted in the summer of 1990 when Saddam Hussein began vocally attacking his neighbors in Kuwait for their economic and oil policies. Saddam needed to fix the Iraqi economy and pay off his large accumulated debt from the Iran-Iraq War. The only way that was possible was through the sale of oil. In September 1988, the price of oil fell to \$13.54 a barrel and in June 1990, oil traded \$17.05 a barrel.²⁶ The drop in oil prices from their high in July 1987 cost Iraq the equivalent of \$7 billion. In addition, every time the price dropped another dollar,

it cost Iraq \$1 billion. Saddam blamed Kuwait for the overproduction of oil and its inability to raise oil prices. In addition, Saddam believed that Kuwait was drilling from their land into the Rumelila Oil field in Iraq. He also believed that Kuwait set up farms and police posts on the Iraqi side of the border. Finally, Saddam wanted a number of islands in the Persian Gulf that belonged to Kuwait to build a deep water port for his navy.²⁷ While Saddam had legitimate complaints about Kuwait, especially Kuwaiti violations of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil export quotas, his larger concern was improving the Iraqi economy, ending his foreign debt from the Iran-Iraq War, and establishing himself as the leader of the Arab world. Many of these complaints aligned with the interests of Hussein. If the Iraqi economy grew, Jordan would also benefit. In addition, Jordan could benefit if the wealthy oil states shared some of their profits with smaller states devoid of natural resources like Jordan.

The first signs that Iraq could attack Kuwait occurred when some Iraqi forces moved south on July 21. Through a series of phone calls, Saddam told Mubarak and King Fahd that they were heading to the Faw peninsula, an area controlled by Iraq but disputed by Iran. He assured them he had no intention of attacking Kuwait. In addition, Fahd believed that those units were not Saddam's elite forces, the forces that would be used if he attempted to invade his neighbors. Because of that, Fahd and Mubarak were not too worried about Saddam's actions and did not believe an invasion was imminent. In other phone calls, Saddam told both Mubarak and Hussein that he was just trying to scare Kuwait, while he still expressed outrage at Kuwait's financial habits and its unwillingness to share with the rest of the Arab world. He told Mubarak that Sheikh Jaber, the leader of Kuwait, had "\$17 billion in his personal accounts, enough to pay off

half of Egypt's debts."²⁸ Saddam also told Hussein to, "Let the Gulf States know that if they do not give this money to me, I will know how to get it."²⁹ Both Hussein and Mubarak assured their allies in the region and throughout the West that they had no reason to believe Saddam had any intention of attacking Kuwait. Mubarak called Bush on July 25 and told him, "I left for Iraq and had a long discussion with President Saddam Hussein. I believe he is interested in resolving this issue and has no intention of attacking Kuwait or any other party. Hussein followed up on July 29, telling Bush, "Nothing will happen."³⁰ Hussein again talked to Bush two days later and was still confident that Iraq had no intention of attacking Kuwait.³¹

In a meeting between Saddam and the American ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, on July 25, 1990, Saddam explained his attitude toward Kuwait. He argued that after eight years of fighting Iran for the Arab cause, he could not continue to take the insults from Kuwait and its attempts to damage the Iraqi economy through its oil policies. He said the actions of Kuwait were "harming even the milk our children drink, and the pensions of the widow who lost her husband during the war, and the pensions of the orphans who lost their parents."³² He also gave a warning to Glaspie, saying, "If you use pressure, we'll deploy pressure and force. We know that you can harm us. . . . But we too can harm you. . . . We cannot come all the way to you in the United States, but individual Arabs may reach you."³³ Because of these disputes and after the clear warning to the US to stay out, on the morning of August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait.

From the start of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Hussein argued that it was an Arab issue that should be solved by Arabs. Once he found out about the invasion, he called Saddam Hussein. Saddam promised Hussein that he would be out of Kuwait soon as

long as there were no more provocations. Hussein passed this message on to Mubarak, who agreed that this should remain an Arab matter with the hope of keeping outside powers out of the Middle East. Mubarak and Hussein agreed to keep the Arab League from condemning Saddam's invasion as long as he agreed to withdraw and attend a summit that would mediate his disputes with Kuwait.³⁴ Outside involvement in the dispute had the potential to hurt Hussein in a number of ways. First, any sanctions on Iraq would damage the Jordanian economy. In addition, he sympathized with Iraq's attacks on Kuwait because he too felt the wealthy oil states did not adequately support the rest of the Arab world. Finally, Hussein frequently argued for the need for a united Arab front to deal with the West and Israel, and he agreed with Saddam that states like Kuwait did not support that unity through their economic policies.

On August 3, Hussein and Mubarak met in Alexandria and decided Hussein would fly to Baghdad and meet with Saddam. They agreed that they should attempt to get Saddam to withdraw his forces and attend a mini-summit in Saudi Arabia to work out his differences with Kuwait, peacefully, as Arab brothers. The leaders differ on their interpretations of what happened next. Mubarak said he told Hussein that before the summit occurred, Saddam needed to withdraw and restore the rightful Kuwaiti government. Hussein believed that he was flying to Iraq to get Saddam's agreement to withdraw after a summit worked out the issues between him and the Kuwaiti leadership. Hussein said, "my mission was to convince him of the idea of a mini-summit so that we could discuss a dangerous situation . . . and to ensure that the Emir of Kuwait could take part." Hussein felt that if Saddam allowed the Emir's participation, he recognized that the Emir was the rightful ruler of Kuwait, voiding Iraqi claims to the area.³⁵ Hussein

believed that he had an agreement from Mubarak not to allow any action at the Arab league until he had his chance to persuade Saddam to attend the summit and withdrawal his forces. He hoped that this would be enough to end the crisis and avoid an escalation that plunged the region into war.

In the meeting between Hussein and Saddam, Hussein said, “I know the West better than many others, and I can tell you that the West will intervene. I plead with you to withdraw.” Saddam replied, “Abu Abdullah (which meant father of Abdullah and was a formal title Saddam used when talking to Hussein as a sign of respect), don’t let them scare us. . . . We are going to withdraw. It was announced in the communiqué we issued this morning.” The message that the Iraqi Revolutionary Council Command put out agreeing to withdraw its forces put the invasion of Kuwait in religious terms. In addition, it compared the Kuwaiti family to a legendary Islamic monarch who hoarded all the worlds gold and kept it from the people. In addition, the message said that Iraq entered Kuwait through the invitation of the Kuwaiti people to liberate these riches and return it to its proper place.³⁶ Despite the harshness of the message, Hussein believed he had an agreement with Saddam that would end the crisis. On August 4, the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council announced “It there are not threats against Iraq or Kuwait, Iraqi forces will start to withdraw [on August 4]. A plan to withdraw has already been approved.”³⁷ For Saddam, he believed he could not leave Kuwait under pressure but only on his terms. Threats from outside powers, particularly the United States, would force Saddam to reconsider his plan to evacuate Kuwait because he believed it would weaken him in the eyes of his people, threatening his ability to survive.

On the evening of August 5, the Arab League met in Cairo and issued a statement condemning Iraq and demanding its unconditional evacuation of Kuwait along with the restoration of the Kuwaiti ruling family. Mubarak faced pressure from both Saudi Arabia and the US to condemn Iraq and to take a hardline against acquiring land through aggression. In addition, Mubarak believed that Saddam and Hussein were too close both economically and personally for Hussein to act as an effective representative of the Arab position. Finally, Mubarak did not trust Hussein and accused him of a conspiracy to divide up any land conquered by Iraq, including Saudi Arabia.³⁸ Instead of ending the crisis, these actions just escalated it. The actions of the Arab League outraged Hussein. He believed that he had a solution to the crisis and Mubarak did not give him the time he promised to complete it.³⁹ Egypt and the Arab League's statement condemning Iraq ended the possibility of a quick solution to the crisis. It increased the likelihood that Saddam would not leave Kuwait without the use of force. In addition, when Jordan did not support the statement from the Arab League, it further complicated Hussein's relationship with the US and his neighbors. It is difficult to be certain if Hussein was correct that Saddam planned on leaving Kuwait if he faced no provocations from the Arab League. Saddam frequently lied to both Hussein and Mubarak, making it difficult to trust his word. Hussein did accept Saddam at his word and saw Mubarak's action as a personal betrayal.

Starting on August 6, the White House and Saudi Arabia began negotiating on the stationing of American troops in Saudi Arabia to defend against a possible invasion by Saddam. In addition, Egypt participated in these negotiations and agreed to send a force of their own to prevent an Iraqi invasion. These negotiations were part of the reason why

Mubarak changed his stance against Saddam. He was working with the Americans to allow for a large foreign force, including Egypt, into Saudi Arabia. He believed that to justify that effort, he needed the support of the Arab League, making it necessary for the League to condemn Saddam's invasion. Keeping foreign troops out of Saudi Arabia was one of Saddam's main demands when he agreed to withdrawal from Kuwait.⁴⁰ For King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, it was an easy decision to invite the Americans in, despite the predicted protests from some in the Arab world over the placement of non-Muslim foreign troops in the nation containing Islam's holiest sites. Fahd said, "The Kuwaitis delayed asking for help, and they are now our guests. We do not want to make the same mistake and become someone else's guests."⁴¹ With the dramatic arrival of foreign troops, any withdrawal by Iraq would appear to be as a result of the threat of foreign intervention. While Saddam was willing to negotiate, he was not willing for it to appear he was forced out by external threats. This ended any direct dialogue between Iraq and the other Arabs and eliminated the possibility that this crisis would be resolved through only Arab mediation. It also diminished Hussein's position because he could not get either side to abide by promises made to him. Iraq was not removing its troops and Egypt was looking outside of the Arab world for a response to his condemnation of Iraq.

The United Nations passed a number of major resolutions after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. UNSC Resolution 660, passed on August 2, condemned the Iraqi invasion and "Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990." It also called for Iraq and Kuwait to begin negotiating to solve their disputes.⁴² While this resolution condemned Saddam, it still called for negotiations between him and Kuwait, a possible victory for

Saddam if he chose to take it. When Iraq did not comply, on August 6, the UNSC passed UNSC Resolution 661 that called for an immediate ban on the import of “all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait.”⁴³ Resolution 661 was particularly damaging to Jordan because Iraq was still Jordan’s largest trading partner. The Jordanian economy already in bad shape, could not afford a total break with Iraq. Jordan’s violations of the sanctions, even if they did it covertly, caused great stress between Hussein and the Americans but Hussein had little choice because of Jordan’s integration with the Iraqi economy over the previous decade.

Another impact on the Jordanian economy from the Iraqi invasion came from the massive influx of refugees. People from all over the Arab world left Kuwait and Iraq. In some cases, they just passed through Jordan with the intention of returning to Egypt, but many had no place to go and remained in Jordan. In total, Jordan had almost four hundred thousand displaced refugees. For most of the conflict, it averaged over ten thousand people entering Jordan a day. In total, over three million people passed through Jordan during the conflict.⁴⁴ Jordan had no way to house, clothe, feed, or provide employment to all these refugees and because of Hussein’s refusal to condemn Saddam, he did not receive adequate assistance from the US or the rest of the Arab world deal with this crisis.

The current state of affairs hugely disappointed Hussein. He believed that both Saddam and Mubarak lied to him, with Saddam previously assuring him that he had no intention of invading Kuwait and Mubarak going back on his word to let Hussein try and end the crisis peacefully. In addition, the economic impact of the sanctions crippled the Jordanian economy. Things got so bad that Hussein discussed with Queen Noor the

possibility of abdicating the throne. Hussein believed that his deteriorating position in the Arab world and with the US was hurting his nation and it might be better for his people if someone else took the lead. In addition, with Iraq and Saddam not listening to him, there did not seem to be a viable way out of the problem for Jordan. A number of his aides, including Prime Minister, al-Masri, along with the Queen, convinced Hussein to remain on the throne and continue to fight for Jordan's position.⁴⁵

On August 5, Hussein contacted Fahd and told him that he just spoke with Saddam who assured him that his forces were not moving towards Saudi Arabia. In fact, he said the only forces he had close were searching for the Kuwaiti royal family. Hussein told Fahd that Saddam was still willing to meet at a summit to discuss the issues between Iraq and Kuwait and that the Iraqi press was showing pictures of some Iraqi troops leaving Kuwait. Hussein even offered to send his troops to patrol the border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to make sure Iraq did not invade. Fahd ignored Hussein's request and told him that Egypt and Saudi Arabia were no longer interested in participating in a summit after Iraq rejected their calls for a full withdrawal.⁴⁶ Because of Hussein's closeness with Saddam, King Fahd could not trust Hussein completely, and Hussein's offer to send troops to the border did not ease that suspicion.

At an Arab League summit in Cairo on August 10, the Arab leaders passed a statement that called for all Arabs to assist Saudi Arabia in preventing an attack by Iraq. The statement was clumsily written and gave the impression to many at the summit that it was drafted in English and translated to Arabic so the Saudis could present it. Hussein even acknowledged that it seemed like the statement was drafted in Washington and not by the hand of King Fahd. At the summit, Arafat proposed sending a joint delegation to

Iraq to persuade him to leave Kuwait. While he was making his presentation, Mubarak and Fahd were informed of Iraqi radio broadcasts that called for the people of Egypt to close the Suez Canal and the people of Saudi Arabia to revolt and retake the holy sites from government because of their welcoming foreign troops to Saudi soil. Because of that, both leaders rejected going to Baghdad. When Hussein was asked if he would go, he said he had gone many times already and some believed he was not impartial. For that reason, he had no intention of going again. Another controversy at the summit occurred over the voting rules. In the past, on issues of security, the Arab League required a unanimous vote for any resolutions. In this case Mubarak and Fahd claimed the votes only needed a simple majority. When the resolutions passed without a unanimous vote, leaders like Gadhafi and Arafat protested the legality of the resolutions⁴⁷ Hussein largely stayed out of this debate, hoping not to alienate anyone else at this point. Any actions Hussein took at the summit would only isolate him further. He could either abandon his most strategic ally in the region or challenge his longtime friendship with the United States, neither outcome would benefit Jordan.

During the meeting of the Arab League, Bush saw some attempt by Hussein to improve relations with both the US and the rest of the Arabs. Hussein voted with the rest of the League to sanction Iraq, a big change from Hussein's previous opposition to any coercion on Saddam. In addition, when the Arab League voted to send troops to Saudi Arabia, Hussein announced his reservations, but did not officially oppose it. Hussein's abstention in the vote to send troops to Saudi Arabia was important because the vote would not have passed if he opposed it. Hussein's actions in the Arab League showed the Bush administration that he was not a pawn of Saddam.⁴⁸ Despite many leaders

complaints about Hussein, at the Arab league he demonstrated that what he was saying was true, he believed that the Arabs should resolve the issues between Kuwait and Iraq. In addition, he made it clear that when he discussed the issues with Saddam, it was not as an ally, but as a someone trying to avoid war. He had no love lost for the Kuwaitis, and Saddam and Iraq had been important for the economy and the stability of Jordan, regardless, Hussein continued to try and prevent a large scale war that he believed would devastate the region.

Many in the region and throughout the world still questioned Hussein's motives and his loyalty to Saddam and Iraq. Mubarak was one of the leading voices claiming Hussein had ulterior motives for his support of Saddam. In a call with Bush in August, Mubarak told Bush that Hussein and Yemen agreed to support Iraq for a portion of all future Kuwaiti oil sales and a portion of any financial assets Saddam could loot from Kuwait during his invasion.⁴⁹ Mubarak also told similar things to American lawmakers, including Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey. Lautenberg told the world the accusations against Hussein in an interview with CNN. Later, when he met with Queen Noor, Lautenberg admitted that it was Mubarak telling people that Hussein was on Saddam's payroll.⁵⁰ As stated in the past, Mubarak never thought highly of Hussein or his monarchy. In addition, Mubarak had incentive to minimize Hussein's role in the Middle East because it increased the importance of Egypt. If Hussein fell out of favor with the US and the Bush administration, Egypt would be the only Israeli border state with good relations with the US, making them indispensable in any future peace process.

Compared to Egypt, the relationship between Hussein and Saudi Arabia was dramatically worse. The leaders of Saudi Arabia had many reasons to believe that

Hussein was aligned with Saddam and not to trust his assurances that Iraq had no intention of attacking them. When the AAC was formed, the Saudis believed that Hussein persuaded Yemen to join, making it so that Saudi Arabia was encircled by the members of the council.⁵¹ While they did not object to its formation, believing it was just an economic unit, they still worried that it had the potential to be a military threat. In addition, historical rivalries between Hussein and the Saud family over the possession of the Muslim holy places also increased suspicion.⁵² The head of the Saudi military, General Khaled bin Sultan said, “it was not far-fetched to fear that King Hussein dreamed of retaking the Hijaz, once ruled by his great-grandfather.”⁵³ When Hussein referred to himself as Sharif in a speech to tribal leaders in Jordan, Sultan said, “The term ‘Sharif’ is an honorific title reserved for those who claim descent from the Prophet Muhammad. . . . The King’s words angered and alarmed our leadership because it seemed to signal Hussein’s ambition . . . to seize territory in the Hijaz.”⁵⁴ While there is no evidence Hussein had any intention of attacking Saudi Arabia, especially since it would likely mean the end of his rule, the beliefs of the Saudi leadership that Hussein was untrustworthy increased the view of many in the region that Hussein’s meetings with Saddam were not about looking for a peaceful solution, but to give Saddam the space he needed to consolidate his invasion. In addition, because many of the American allies did not trust Hussein and repeatedly told the White House of their issues, it increased the view of the Bush administration that Hussein was too close to Saddam.

Hussein repeatedly denied any such relationship with Saddam, he continued to state that his only goal was avoiding a devastating war. Hussein tried numerous efforts to show that he did not support Saddam’s actions in Kuwait. He publically and privately

called on him to withdraw his forces. In addition, Hussein ordered other measures to show the world that he did not accept Saddam's actions in Kuwait. For instance, he never recognized the false government in Kuwait installed by Saddam. In addition, when some cars came across the border between Iraq and Jordan, Hussein removed their license plate. At that time, license plates from Iraq contained the province location and if an Iraqi car's plates stated it was from Iraq but the province of Kuwait, then the driver was forced to remove it before entering Jordan.⁵⁵ Hussein also supported the sanctions by the Arab League. Despite his efforts, Hussein could not persuade the Bush administration nor many of his Arab neighbors that he did not support Saddam.

The Iraq crisis did help Hussein's popularity inside of Jordan despite the economic problems associated with it. Many of the Jordanian people did not like Arabs from the Gulf States. They believed they were too wealthy and privileged and then abused that wealth. They felt it was hypocritical for the US to condemn Iraq because of its occupation of Kuwait but allow and support Israel's occupation of Arab land. For one of the first times in the history of the regime, Hussein allowed anti-Western protests to show the public's opposition to intervention by outside forces in Iraq.⁵⁶ Hussein needed to allow the public to vent its outrage against the actions of the coalition for fear they would turn their frustrations towards him and his regime. It was important for Hussein to receive the backing of his people because, before the conflict, his popularity waned due to poor economic conditions in Jordan including bread riots in some of Jordanian cities in April 1989.⁵⁷ Now the people blamed the economic troubles on the West and the other, wealthier Arab states. Hussein benefited from the opportunity to divert blame for Jordan's economic crisis from the regime and onto the rest of the Arabs and the West.

While the situation in Iraq severely hampered Jordan's economy, it had been suffering even before the conflict started.

In a speech on August 12, 1990, Saddam linked the fight in Kuwait to the Palestinian issues. He said he believed that all issues of occupation should be resolved in the same forum. He said Iraq would make withdrawal arrangements in Kuwait, "in accordance with the same principles for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from occupied Arab territories in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon, [and] Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon." He also called on the Security Council to pass similar resolutions like the ones against Iraq calling for the end of all occupations. He said despite being welcomed in by the Kuwaiti people, who wanted to return to Iraq, he would remove his military from Kuwait if the Israelis and the Syrians also complied.⁵⁸ This was an effort by Saddam do two things. First, he wanted to show the hypocrisy of the West's opposition to seizing land by force. Second, he wanted to increase his popularity in the Arab streets by linking his efforts to the Palestinian cause. He hoped that if he remained popular, it would be much more difficult for Arab leaders to unite behind a military action to remove him from Kuwait. This strategy worked in Jordan where Saddam's increasing popularity limited Hussein's ability to criticize him harshly.

Another issue Hussein faced was dissension from his advisors. A number of his advisors had strong pro-Iraq beliefs and sometimes kept information from Hussein because they did not want him to oppose Saddam's actions. In one particular case, Jordan's ambassador to the United Nations, Abdullah Salah, met with the American ambassador to the UN, Thomas Pickering, to discuss possible ways to end the crisis in August 1990. Pickering proposed a number of ways that the US would support Iraqi

claims if it withdrew its forces from Kuwait. The hope was Hussein would deliver that message to Saddam. Unfortunately, the message never made it to Hussein and was likely blocked by Prime Minister Mudar Badran, who was close to Saddam and believed the US had no intention of launching a military effort.⁵⁹ While it was unlikely that Saddam would have accepted the deal, it could have improved Hussein's relationship with the US if he had the opportunity to try.

While a majority of the Jordanian public supported Hussein's attitude towards Saddam Hussein and Iraq, the same could not be said about the royal family. Hussein's younger brother Crown Prince Hassan believed that Saddam was a dangerous despot who should be avoided. Hussein and Hassan would get into loud arguments over Hussein's relationship with Saddam. Hassan believed that Jordan was sacrificing its position with the West and the Gulf states to support Saddam's goals of taking land by force, something Jordan had always opposed.⁶⁰ Usually, Hussein trusted his brother's advice, but with Saddam and Iraq, Hussein believed he was doing what was best for the region and the Arab world and could not be persuaded otherwise by anyone. In the long-run, Hussein would have been better off if he listened to his brother's advice and dumped his relationship with Saddam when Iraq refused any efforts at a compromise.

In a meeting with Bush at Kennebunkport, Maine, on August 13, Hussein tried to convince Bush to allow him to try and mediate the crisis again. Hussein believed that he could convince Saddam to withdraw eventually if the US would reduce the pressure on him. Bush rejected Hussein's overtures and believed it was a personal betrayal by Hussein to side with Saddam over the United States. At one point, Bush said, "I will not let that little dictator control 25 percent of the world's oil." To Hussein and his advisors,

this seemed hypocritical since the US supported Iraq when it attacked Iran unprovoked. In fact, they believed that the US only cared about oil, not some noble idea of opposition to unprovoked aggression.⁶¹ Bush called the meeting a disappointment. He said Hussein tried to persuade him to moderate his position, but Bush was firm that the only option left was for Iraq to leave Kuwait. Hussein tried to explain the issues to Bush, but Bush believed that if Iraq was allowed to prosper at all from this, it set a bad precedent to the world that stronger nations could use force against their weaker neighbors to get concessions. Bush also told Hussein that while Hussein was meeting with Saddam and getting his assurances that he was withdrawing, the US saw Iraqi troop movements heading south to Saudi Arabia. Because of that, they would not accept promises of a future withdrawal from Saddam, only active withdrawal would keep the US from a full scale attack to remove Iraq from Kuwait. Bush was also disappointed because he believed that Hussein was bringing a message from Saddam, or some signal that a full scale war could be avoided. When Hussein came empty handed, with only similar arguments that he presented in the past, Bush believed the meeting was a waste of time.⁶² Bush did try and persuade Hussein to join his coalition. He also rejected calls from some of his advisors to take a hardline with Hussein. The Bush administration worried at one point that Hussein might actually formally join with Saddam, and Bush did not want to push him in that direction.⁶³ While it would have helped to have Hussein's support to completely isolate Iraq, Jordan's involvement did not make a difference strategically. In addition, as long as Bush convinced Hussein to stay out of the conflict, it would not end Jordan's long-term relations with the US. While Hussein's actions damaged the relationship, he did not do anything that could not be repaired diplomatically later.

After Hussein's trip to meet Bush in Maine, he was handed a letter by the American ambassador to Jordan, Roger Harrison. It read:

We recognize that Jordan, because of its geographical location, is vulnerable to Iraqi pressure It is vital for Jordan's essential interest that it not be neutral in the struggle between Iraq and the great majority of the Arab states. The perception of de facto Iraqi-Jordanian alliance has already damaged the reputation of Jordan in the United States and elsewhere. We sincerely hope that you would take firm steps to reverse this deterioration.

Hussein was personally offended by this message. He believed that he was trying to be a neutral arbiter in the crisis and to bring it to an end.⁶⁴ Hussein was also likely angry that such a formal and cold letter came from someone he considered a personal friend in President Bush.

Throughout September, Hussein toured European capitals to try and argue for a peaceful settlement to the crisis. He had positive meetings with most of the foreign leaders, with the exception of Margret Thatcher in Great Britain. She dressed Hussein down for "backing a loser" and repeatedly called Saddam a "third-class dictator." Like Bush, Hussein believed he had a long standing friendship with the Prime Minister, but after this meeting, which his aides described as humiliating, that friendship ended. In those meetings, Hussein attempted to argue that the idea of pride was an important component in the Arab world. He believed that if the West gave Saddam a face-saving way out of the crisis, he would take it. If they demanded the humiliation of Saddam, he would continue until removed by force. Hussein argued that in Saddam's mind, it was better to be removed by force rather than a humiliating retreat if he wanted to retain power in Iraq.⁶⁵ Unfortunately, many Western nations had little patience for suggestions

about Saddam saving face. Many wanted to demonstrate the precedent that the conquering of nations would not be tolerated in a post-Cold War world. This was especially true of George Bush and Margret Thatcher.

While Hussein faced pressure from both the US and Great Britain, he received additional pressure from his neighbors. In September, Saudi Arabia began to limit the amount of oil that went to Jordan, eventually, cutting it off completely. A pipeline traveled from Saudi Arabia to Jordan that transported over eighteen thousand barrels of oil a day to Jordan. Both the British and the Americans tried to persuade the Saudis to restore the oil shipments, for fear that it would only push Hussein closer to Saddam but failed. In addition, they both realized that if the economic conditions in Jordan deteriorated too much, Hussein's rule could be jeopardy.⁶⁶ While angered by Hussein's actions, both the British and American leadership realized he was an important part of a future peace process once the war was over and did not want to see him replaced by someone not inclined to consider the interests of the West while making decisions.

Saddam Hussein used the issues of Arabism, the plight of the Palestinians, and religion to increase his support amongst the Arab populace, making it difficult for some leaders to oppose him, especially Hussein. In an open letter to Mubarak, on August 23, 1990, Saddam tried to link his actions to helping the poor in the Arab world against the greedy Gulf States who rejected Islam and became puppets of the West. He said the masters of the oil sheiks plotted against Iraq because it refused, "to see the Arab wealth used to damage the Arab's character, heritage, religion, and ethics." He also linked it to the Palestinian cause and said, "The aggression of the oil sheikhs . . . increase against Iraq whenever the latter showed [a] stronger adherence to the values of Arabism and Islam

and also whenever it said loud and clear that Jerusalem was Arab and that Palestine was Arab.”⁶⁷ This statement implied that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait used their oil money in the service of oppressing the Palestinians because they were under controlled by their masters in the West. Saddam argued that ending that control, the Arabs could then use their oil money to free the Palestinians and promote Pan-Arabism throughout the region. Statements like this also increased the pressure on Hussein and Jordan to not support the coalition. Because Jordan had such a large Palestinian population, Hussein could not openly go against them and side with the “oil sheiks” and still hope to retain his monarchy. In fact, in a speech to the graduating class of officers in the Jordanian military, Hussein also linked the issue of the Palestinians to the Iraq crisis. He said, “The Gulf crisis, the world economy in its oil dimension, the Palestinian problem and weapons of mass destruction are interrelated Middle Eastern problems. In our view, any position, approach or international effort to resolve only one of these problems in isolation from the others, would fail to produce security, stability, and peace in the region..”⁶⁸ Hussein faced constant pressure from his desire to maintain his historical ties to the United States and the impact of Saddam’s rhetoric on the Jordanian population. It severely limited Hussein’s options, damaging his relationship with the Bush administration and the United States.

Saddam talked about the upcoming fight against the American in grand terms. He believed he could remove the US from the region because the Americans could not sustain a war effort. In a meeting with Arafat in August 1990, Saddam told him, “we will fight America, and with God’s will, we will defeat it and kick it out of the whole region. Because it is not about the fight itself; we know America has a large air force than us.

America has more rockets than us, but I think that when the Arab people see real action of war, when it is real and not only talk, they will fight America everywhere.”⁶⁹ He foreshadowed this desire in a meeting John Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East, on February 16, 1990. Saddam told the ambassador, “When I look southward in the Gulf what do I see? . . . Warships? And they are American warships. . . . I am not a threat They ought to take their ships and go home. They don’t need to be there.”⁷⁰ If Saddam could remove American influence from the region, Iraq would clearly be the dominant power and Saddam would be the unquestioned leader of the Arab world. For Hussein, it was not in his interests for the US to be removed from the region. He still needed American help if he hoped to get Israel to make the necessary concessions with Jordan for establishing peaceful coexistence.

Saddam also frequently tried to put his fight in Kuwait and with the American-led coalition in a religious context to increase his support throughout the Arab world. In a speech on September 5, Saddam said, “Standing at one side of this confrontation are peoples and sincere leaders and rulers, and on the other are those who stole the rights of God and the tyrants who were renounced by God after they strayed from the path of God until they eventually opposed it when they became obsessed by the devil from head to toe.”⁷¹ On a speech to the Iraqi people on February 10, he said, “We are now in the seventh month since the day when atheism and falsehood reached a most extensive agreement to implement an unjust siege on the Iraqi people.”⁷² Saddam’s use of religious language had a number of goals. He wanted to rally people throughout the Arab world to his cause by showing he was fighting the enemies of God through *jihad*, not the Arabs. He also wanted to discredit Saudi Arabia by implying they strayed from the path by

allowing outside “atheists” on their land, the land containing the holiest sites in the Islamic world. In addition, he wanted to justify his invasion of Kuwait by portraying the Kuwait royal family as enemies of God. He hoped that he could use these calls to promote instability against his Arab enemies and to rally support from the Arab masses. These arguments were effective inside of Jordan, increasing the Jordanian populations support for Saddam and making it more difficult for Hussein to oppose Iraq.

On September 11, Hussein again met Saddam in Baghdad. Hussein told him that Saddam’s attempts to arrange an agreement with Saudi Arabia would not work because the Americans were running the diplomatic effort for the crisis. In addition, Hussein told him, “It is no longer a question of the future of Kuwait, it’s a matter of saving Iraq.” Hussein also explained to Saddam that he was in a tough position. He used the Falkland War as an example, saying that he supported the British in the Falklands, not because he cared about the island, but the principle prohibiting the seizure of land by force was important, especially for the Palestinian cause. Saddam rejected these warnings and said he believed that the West would split and not be able to sustain an invasion. He also called an officer into the room and asked him how would the army respond to an order to leave Kuwait. The officer responded. “Oh God forbid, sir, please don’t utter those words.”⁷³ This demonstrated why Saddam could not leave Kuwait under pressure. If he did, he would have lost his status with his people. Even if the American coalition forced him out through force, it was much easier for him to blame that debacle on a conspiracy of the “oil sheikhs” instead of the weakness of Iraq and Saddam Hussein.

On September 19, after a meeting with King Hassan II of Morocco and President Chadli ben Jedid of Algeria, Hussein drafted a letter to Saddam that called for his

withdrawal from Kuwait. While praising Saddam's strength, the letter told him they were opposed to the acquisition of territory by force. They believed if the Arab world accepted this policy it would give the Israelis a legitimate argument for keeping the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, they argued that if a war occurred it would play into the hands of outside powers looking to dominate the region by destroying the Iraqi army. Saddam's reply repeated his previous demands. He would only leave Kuwait if an Arab summit addressed his disputes with Kuwait or Israel and Syria also removed their forces from the West Bank and Lebanon.⁷⁴ With each passing day, war became more likely because of Saddam's refusal to budge.

While the relationship was strained because of Hussein's refusal to oppose Saddam openly, Bush still attempted to appeal to his friendship with Hussein and convince him of the importance of his cause. In addition, he still hoped to persuade Hussein to join the coalition. In a personal letter to Hussein on October 10, 1990, Bush stressed to him that he knew the difficult position he was in and believed his efforts towards peace were sincere, but he was still disappointed by some of Hussein's public comments about the US. He also described the horrors of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. Bush said, "surely you must be shocked and offended by the documented reports of rape, of shooting children for passing out leaflets, of the systematic dismantling of Kuwait from the hospitals to the factories and stores. It is tragic. It is indeed reminiscent of how Hitler behaved in Poland before the rest of the world came to its senses and stood up against him." He also told Hussein he did not hold him responsible for angry protests against the US held in Jordan. Finally, he said, "I know you have tried hard to find peace through dialogue; but the longer this matter goes on, the more I am convinced that there

can be no compromise that stops short of the United Nations' demands." Bush closed the letter by highlighting their personal friendship and mentioning the affection of their spouses.⁷⁵ The letter shows why Bush was so disappointed with Hussein's support of Saddam. The two leaders did have a close personal friendship, and Bush viewed some of Hussein's actions as a personal betrayal. Not only were Hussein and Bush close, their wives interacted socially and Bush spent time with the whole Hussein family, including his children when he visited the region in the past.⁷⁶ While he was sympathetic to the position of Jordan, he still believed Hussein should stand with the US and oppose the actions of Saddam, whom he viewed as a modern Hitler.

Despite the anger towards Hussein, the US still provided him with the arms necessary to defend his country. From August 2 to October 1990, the State Department approved the sale and transfer of over \$5 million dollars in military equipment to Jordan. This included things like TOW missiles, helicopter parts, weapons, and artillery shells. In addition, the British also continued meeting Jordan's need for artillery shells.⁷⁷ This demonstrated that despite their desire for Hussein to take a more proactive role in stopping Saddam, his Western allies still believed it was important for him to maintain his position in the region. In addition, it recognized the fact that because of Jordan's geographical position, it faced invasion threats from Israel, Syria, and Iraq because of its policies. The Bush administration believed it was necessary for Hussein to have the ability to defend himself against these threats justifying the continued shipments of military equipment to Jordan.

On November 29, UNSC Resolution 678 was passed which authorized the use of force against Iraq to remove it from Kuwait. With war looking more likely, Hussein

attempted one more meeting with Saddam to try and persuade him to avoid the conflict. On December 4, Saddam met in Baghdad with Hussein, Arafat, and the vice-president of Yemen, Ali Salem Al-Bid. This group argued to Saddam that he needed to leave Kuwait now before it was too late. Jordan's head of the armed forces, Sharif Zaid bin Shaker, explained that Iraq's military was no match for the American forces and would be routed on the battlefield. Saddam and his generals dismissed these warnings. They believed that the Americans had no will to fight and once they received enough casualties, they would retreat. One Iraqi general said, "if the Americans [come], [we] will crush them under [our] boots like cockroaches."⁷⁸ In addition, Hussein also pressed Saddam to release the hundreds of Western hostages he held as "guests" at important military targets throughout Baghdad. This included over twenty-five hundred Americans and four thousand Britons. After pressure from both the French leadership, who still did not commit to joining the coalition and Hussein, in early December Saddam released all his hostages.⁷⁹ While Hussein's efforts to help the hostages was a humanitarian gesture, it was also an attempt to start to improve relations with the United States and their allies. Hussein's understanding of the military situation led him to conclude that Iraq did not stand a chance against the American coalition and it was in his interests once the war ended to begin to restore his previous relationship with the United States.

On December 31, Adnan Abu-Odeh flew to Baghdad to deliver a simple message to Saddam. He said, "I carry His Majesty's greeting to the President and His Majesty's wish is to let you know that in case war flares up he does not want to see Jordanians territory or Jordanian skies violated by anyone."⁸⁰ Hussein knew the war was coming and feared being dragged into it against his will by either Iraq or Israel. He feared that

Iraq could attack Israel with either conventional or nonconventional missiles, forcing Israel to respond, with Jordan stuck in the middle. He hoped to stay out of it and protect the interests of Jordan above all else once the conflict began.

Despite their differences, as the war drew closer, Bush still believed it was important to keep some communications with Hussein alive. He tasked Richard Armitage to be an envoy to the King. Armitage flew to Amman sometime during the third week of January to hand deliver a note to Hussein from Bush. The letter said Bush still believed Hussein could play a positive role in ending the crisis. In addition, he said, “We cannot escape the fact that we differ profoundly concerning events in your part of the world. I am prepared to accept this fact without questioning the permanence of friendly relations between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the United States.”⁸¹ In one of Armitage’s meeting with Hussein, he was able to persuade Hussein to allow the Israelis to fly a certain route over Jordan to attack Iraq if it became absolutely necessary. While this was never publicized, it did help Hussein improve relations with both Israel and the US.⁸²

As war looked more likely, Hussein needed to decide how Jordan should react.

Hussein later said of this time period:

The pressure built up on us in such a way that we were totally isolated but we mobilized and that was another one of the best moments I have ever seen in Jordan. Our people came together and we of course received 400,000 refugees from the *bidun* (stateless people from Kuwait), those who had no citizenship rights, from Kuwait and from the Gulf on top of all the other problems we had to cope with. We were encircled. We mobilized almost a quarter of a million Jordanians and through that we controlled the situation. We made it very clear to the Iraqis, we spoke to the Israelis, we spoke to everyone else who might attack us, we said “We may be small, we will cause a lot of damage. We are not saying we are

invincible, we are not. But neither our land nor our air space can be used by them.” We had our forces deployed facing Iraq and facing Israel, facing north and facing south.⁸³

Israel was pleased by Jordan’s mobilization and determination to keep Iraqi troops out of Jordan as long as Hussein did not direct it towards them. They feared that Saddam could attack Israel by moving his troops through Jordan. They now saw the benefit of having a more moderate Arab leader on their border and repeatedly sent Hussein messages assuring him that they had no hostile intent towards Jordan and respected their desire to stay out of the conflict.

Because the potential of being dragged into the war, Hussein secretly met with the Israelis to discuss the situation. The deputy director of Mossad, Efraim Halevy, met with Hussein in October 1990, to further discuss the situation in Iraq. Halevy asked if Hussein would like to meet with Shamir to discuss the issues. Hussein agreed but he did not believe Shamir would agree to meet with him. When Halevy talked to Shamir, he agreed but did not believe Hussein would risk meeting him for fear that it would become public. Shamir was unaware that Hussein already agreed to the meeting. On January 4, 1991, the leaders met in Ascot, Scotland at one of King Hussein’s private residences. Shamir told Hussein he worried about the Jordanian mobilization. He said, “In October 1973 our people were not vigilant enough and the Arab attack took place and caused us a lot of damage. Now you have your troops mobilized and my general are calling for me to do the same. . . . There isn’t much distance in the Jordan Valley and it would be totally irresponsible, they say, if I did not take the same measures.” Hussein immediately promised not to allow Iraq to use its territory to attack Israel but also said Israel could not use its airspace to retaliate against Iraqi missile attacks.⁸⁴ Hussein told Shamir, “My

position is purely defensive. If anybody crosses my border or enters my air space, from Iraq or anywhere else, I will treat that as a hostile act and will act accordingly. And I will not allow anyone to attack anyone else through Jordan.” While Israeli army chief, Ehud Barak wanted more assurances from Hussein, Shamir cut him off saying, “King Hussein has given me his word, and that is enough for me.”⁸⁵ Shamir did not hold it against Hussein for his sympathy towards Saddam. Later, he acknowledged the difficult position of Hussein. He said he believed that if Jordan did not either side with Saddam or at the very least not openly oppose him, he would have likely lost his monarchy and probably his life the very next day because of the public outrage from the Jordanian people.⁸⁶ Hussein also knew that he would have to deal with Israel once the war ended and Israel’s support could be crucial in repairing his relationship with the United States. Hussein also knew that if the war entered Jordan, it could lead to the destruction of his kingdom. Because of these reasons, Hussein was determined to keep the fighting as far away from Jordan.

The issue of Iraqi chemical weapons also was raised with Jordan by Israel. Israel feared that Iraq had ballistic missiles armed with chemical weapons ready to fire at Israel’s major cities. Barak told his Jordanian counterparts that, “We have been gassed once, and we are not going to be gassed again. If one single chemical warhead falls on Israel, we’ll hit them with everything we got. If unconventional weapons are used against us, look at your watch and 40 minutes later an Iraqi city will be reduced to ashes.”⁸⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell also heard warnings about the potential of Iraq using chemical weapons on Israel and the likely Israeli response. When Powell met with Barak, Barak wanted permission to use Saudi airspace to take out

the Iraqi Scud missile launchers. Both Jordan and Saudi Arabia had previously made it clear they would not allow Israel to use their airspace for an attack. Barak told Powell, “If we don’t go in and clear out the Scuds, Saddam may use them to deliver chemical weapons. . . . They may fire nerve gas or a biological warhead at our cities. If that happens, you know what we must do.”⁸⁸ This message was passed on to the Iraqis, and it had the desired effect. Iraq did have ballistic chemical weapons ready to fire at Israel, but Saddam never gave the order for their use.

In a letter to Bush on January 10, Hussein started by telling him he always considered him a friend and despite their differences still believed that friendship existed. He also said:

I am now facing the choice, once again, of either committing all my energies and resources to averting the looming horrendous disaster, by actively engaging all concerned towards that end, as I did at the outset of the Gulf crisis, or remaining an observer while adhering to our announced policy of preventing, to the best of our ability, any violation of our territory and air space by any side to the impending carnage which will be one of the greatest setbacks the human race has yet encountered.

Hussein also asked Bush to delay an attack and allow him one more chance to find a peaceful solution.⁸⁹ Bush did not respond to the request and on January 17, launched Operation Desert Storm to remove Iraq from Kuwait.

Once Iraq hit Israel with a number of Scud missiles, the US pressured Israel not to react. The main reason this occurred is that the US feared that any Israeli retaliation could crumble the coalition made up of so many Arab countries. Another reason was to support Jordan. They believed that without an agreement ahead of time, Israel using Jordan’s air space to attack Iraq could bring Jordan into the conflict, especially

considering the Jordanian public's views of Saddam. The US feared that if Jordan did enter the conflict, they would be crushed, leading to the end of Hussein's reign.⁹⁰ Despite Hussein's lack of support for the coalition effort, the US still believed he was the best possible leader they could expect in Jordan and saw the value of keeping him on the throne. If Hussein fell, the US could not predict who would replace him. It would cause a conflict between Palestinian forces and Jordanian nationalist who still supported the crown. It would also make it near impossible for Bush to promote his ideas for a new world order once the fighting in Iraq ended. Despite Hussein's flaws and his support for Saddam, the Bush administration did not have any other viable alternatives and Jordan remained an important part of any future peace process.

During the air war, tensions between Jordan and the West increased. The people of Jordan were angered by the images on television of the total destruction of Iraqi cities by coalition aircraft. In addition, the Western allies attacked oil trucks leaving Iraq and heading into Jordan on the Baghdad-Amman International Highway. In total fourteen Jordanian civilians were killed along with twenty-six injured. This led to mass protests throughout Jordan. Many in Hussein's inner circle believed he needed to make a statement to calm down the public outrage. Things got so bad in Jordan that Western media reported the royal family made arrangements to flee if necessary. While both Hussein and Noor denied this, it does demonstrate the pressure on Hussein to react to the airstrikes by the coalition. In address to the nation on February 6, Hussein blamed the West for the war, saying they blocked his attempts to find a peaceful solution because their real goal was, "to destroy Iraq, and rearrange the area in a manner far more dangerous to our nation's present and further than the Sykes-Picot Agreement. This

arrangement would put the nation, its aspirations and its resources under direct foreign hegemony and would shred all ties between its parts, thus further weakening and fragmenting it.” He also denounced the Arabs who assisted in the war effort saying they never put forth a similar effort to liberate the Palestinians.⁹¹ While Hussein was still likely angered by the failure of the West to allow him to mediate the crisis, it was important for him to demonstrate he understood the outrage of his population if hoped to retain his position as the head of Jordan. Without Hussein’s public response, the protests in Jordan could eventually grow target the Hashemite monarchy.

Bush’s response to Hussein’s speech was quick and angry. He told Hussein, “I am not going to hide my deep disappointment with your speech. . . . If we do not agree on these matters, so be it. But we must understand that a public, political posture that takes Jordan so far from the international and Arab consensus has damaged very seriously the prospect for eliciting international help for Jordan.” Hussein replied the next week explaining that he was speaking for many Arabs and Muslims about what they viewed in Iraq. In addition, he said, “I am convinced that time will prove that my relationship with you has been that of an honest friend concerned for you personally and for Jordanian-American and Arab and Muslim-American relations.”⁹² While Hussein’s speech seemed personal to Bush, Hussein viewed it as an expression of what many people in the Middle East believed. Not that Iraq was right or just, but the Arabs should have resolved the problem, not with the military might of the United States. Hussein felt he needed to express the view of Arab nationalists everywhere that opposed the American actions in Iraq. In addition, Hussein needed to demonstrate to his people that he understood their outrage. If he did not, and openly side with the American coalition,

the unrest in Jordan directed towards the coalition could begin to focus on him. The Persian Gulf War continued to place Hussein in a difficult position. He could not go against the vast majority of his public and by not doing so, further damaged his relations with the US. While Hussein tried to have it both ways, his speech attacking the United States injured his relationship with Bush even after the conflict ended.

The American coalition defeated Saddam's forces fairly quickly but even after it was over, Jordan continued to feel the consequences of the crisis. In total, between money spent on the over four hundred thousand refugees and lost trade, the war cost Jordan \$1.5 billion.⁹³ Because of the UN sanctions on Iraq, trade at the port of Aqaba plummeted, further damaging the Jordanian economy. Saudi Arabia also continued their protest of Hussein's actions by refusing to ship oil to the kingdom. At the conclusion of the war, while Hussein's popularity with the Jordanian public might not have ever been higher, he knew to survive long-term, he would need to rehab his image with his neighbors and his strongest patron, the United States.

Another issue Hussein faced was another wave of refugees that continued ever after the fighting ended. Once the Kuwaiti royal family returned to power, they expelled almost all of the Palestinians in their country. The Kuwaitis took this action in response to Arafat and the PLO's support of Saddam. A number of the other Gulf States soon followed suit, making the extreme refugee crisis in Jordan worse. Because most of these people had Jordanian passports, Kuwait returned them to Jordan. Since Israel controlled the West Bank, they refused to allow entry to most of these refugees. This created over two hundred thousand new Palestinians in Jordan. These new refugees increased the economic issues Jordan faced, including mass unemployment and food shortages. It also

increased the hostility of many native Jordanians towards the Palestinians, as caring for them became an increasing burden.⁹⁴

After successfully defeating Iraq, Bush turned his attention back to the Middle East peace process. On March 6, 1991, Bush addressed a joint session of Congress where he talked about the need for peace between Israel and the Arabs. He said:

By now, it should be clear to all parties that peacemaking in the Middle East requires compromise. . . . We must do all that we can to close the gap between Israel and the Arab states. . . . There can be no substitute for diplomacy. . . . A comprehensive peace must be grounded in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. This principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel's security and recognition and at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political rights. Anything else would fail the twin test of fairness and security.⁹⁵

Bush announced that Baker would fly to the region and listen to the Israeli and Arab leaders to determine the best way forward. For the United States, the continued fighting between the Arabs and Israelis jeopardized Bush's new world order springing forth with the end of the Cold War. Bush believed that diplomacy needed to replace armed conflict and the best place to put that theory to test was the Middle East. In addition, Bush hoped to capitalize on American goodwill in the region from the successful defeat of Iraq.

Once the war ended, Hussein knew he needed to improve relations with the US and he began immediately. To further that aim, Hussein wrote to Bush and said:

It is a crisis which I had tried so hard to resolve before it escalated. In any event, well done my friend and you will find me more than ever determined to contribute my utmost to the healing of wounds and to the opening of a new and bright chapter in the history of this region for the benefit of future generations. We shall commit ourselves to the renewal of

the best Jordanian/American and Arab/American relations on sound, clear and solid formations.⁹⁶

Despite their continued anger at Hussein for his support of Iraq, the US believed he was an important leader in the Middle East and his survival was in the American interests. To help him overcome his economic challenges, the Bush administration facilitated the survival of Hussein's monarchy through foreign aid. Because of opposition from Congress, the Bush administration looked elsewhere to help Hussein recover from the Gulf War. They secured pledges from Germany and Japan to help the Jordanian economy. Japan provided a loan of \$450 million dollars, becoming the largest provider of aid to Jordan, and Germany offered a grant of \$210 million over two years starting in 1990. By May 1991, Jordan received over \$1 billion in combined loans and grants from foreign entities, allowing it to rebound its economy after the Gulf War and keep Hussein in power.⁹⁷ It was an important gesture by Bush to lobby for aid from foreign governments for Hussein. While he began to get over Hussein's actions during the war, it was much harder to convince Congress to do the same. Despite his anger, Bush knew it was important to keep Hussein as a viable leader in Jordan.

In an interview with Middle East reporters on March 8, Bush discussed the situation with Jordan. The previous months had large anti-American protests in Amman and Bush was asked to respond. He said that there were a lot of hurt feelings and disappointment in the United States on the street, but he recognized a stable Jordan was in everyone's interest. In addition, he said:

We've had a good relationship with the Hashemite King. But I've expressed my public disappointment because I think Jordan has swung

way on this question(Iraq). And I'm not saying it was all his fault because there were some people out there in the streets. And they're still out there yelling about me personally, and the whole United States. . . . But my view is, hey, we've all got to live together in peace, so let's take a little time now and sort this one out. We don't want to see a radicalized Jordan, and yet I must confess to a certain disappointment in [Jordan]. . . . But I've learned in life . . . take a little time, let it simmer, and then let's try to put together a more peaceful Middle East.⁹⁸

This was the first public sign that the relationship between Hussein and Bush was reparable. Bush also mentioned that he was bothered by the actions of the Jordanian press. Bush hoped that the Jordanian press, under direction from Hussein, would stop the attacks on the US and the US would begin working with Jordan to repair the relationship, furthering their joint goal of a peaceful solution between the Arabs and Israel.

In April 1991, Secretary of State James Baker met with Hussein in Aqaba to continue repairing the relationship between the US and Jordan and restarting the peace process. There, Baker described a new peace effort with the goal of finally settling all remaining issues between the Arabs and Israel. He planned on having a superpower-sponsored conference that included the Arabs and the Palestinians. He wanted the Palestinians to be part of a Jordanian delegation and promised Hussein that if he enthusiastically participated, all problems in the past would be forgotten. In addition, Baker believed he had leverage over Hussein because of his need for American support. Baker told him, "you need to know that it's going to be a tough row to hoe to repair Jordan's relationship with the United States." Hussein agreed to Baker's terms and even promised him that even if Syria was unwilling to participate, he would.⁹⁹ While Hussein knew he had to work with Baker to repair the damage with the Bush administration, he

wanted to move forward with peace with Israel and the outline of Baker's plan contained many of the ideas he supported in the past.

In his meeting with Hussein, Baker also told him that he would try and work on the Saudis' attitude toward Jordan, in hopes that this would help the Jordanian economy.¹⁰⁰ Baker was not the only one to try and help repair Jordan's relationship with the Saudis. In May 1991, the British ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alan Muro, went to King Fahd in the hopes of improving relations between Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The British, like the Americans, believed it would be necessary to bring Hussein back into the fold because he would be necessary for completing a peace deal between the Arabs and Israel. Despite the pleas from the British and the Americans, the Saudis were still unwilling to completely forgive Hussein.¹⁰¹

Hussein believed that helping the Palestinians in the peace process was his responsibility. In addition, he needed to show the American his value to the process. He said later, "I thought that a process was about to start that was irreversible, and that we had to go. The Palestinians had to go and speak for themselves, and we had to provide them with the umbrella they needed. And that's what we did."¹⁰² Like Hussein, the PLO also sided with Iraq during the Gulf War and because of that much of the Arab world denounced them. At this weakened state, they could not demand to be included because they had very little support from other Arab leaders. Because of that, Hussein could include Palestinians from the West Bank, not associated with the PLO, in his delegation. Hussein finally had some leverage over the PLO and he used it to his advantage.

Hussein initially hesitated to have a joint delegation with the Palestinians. He wanted only to focus on Jordan and allow the Palestinians to do their own negotiating. For Baker and the Americans, the PLO was still a problem and a joint delegation was the best way to assure Israeli participation. When Hussein met with Baker on May 14, he told him he was willing to have the joint delegation. Baker thanked Hussein and told him that he would push through Congress \$27 million in food aid to Jordan to help with the refugee crisis.¹⁰³ This was an important act by Baker because many in Congress still believed that Hussein betrayed the US with its neutrality during the Gulf War. For Hussein, it appeared relations with the US were beginning to return to normal.

Hussein also took other steps to make the new peace process successful. In an interview in a French newspaper, Hussein argued that the Arab position of not having bilateral talks with Israel needed to end.¹⁰⁴ Hussein also began back channel talks with Israel to discuss the potential makeup of the Palestinian part of the Jordanian delegation. Hussein did not want the talks to blow up, as they had in the past, over whom the Palestinians chose to represent them. Baker and Hussein already agreed not to allow the PLO to be publically involved. Baker told Hussein, "The Palestinians from the occupied territories need to be visibly working with you, and you have to keep your PLO tie in the background as you work on a delegation. Arafat cannot show up in Amman during the process."¹⁰⁵ Hussein's efforts to facilitate the negotiations helped to improve the relationship between Jordan and the US and repair the damage left over from the Gulf War. Hussein, once again, demonstrated his value to American led efforts in the peace process.

Despite their past negative attitude towards each other, the Gulf War brought Shamir and Hussein closer together. Hussein's promises not to threaten Israel and guarantee that he would not let Iraq attack through Jordan during the war dramatically increased the trust level between the two leaders. In fact, in the run-up Madrid, Shamir often argued on Hussein's behalf to the Americans. Shamir told Baker that the peace process must run through Hussein because he was the only Arab leader Israel trusted. In addition, when Baker met with Shamir in March 1991, Shamir insisted that the US forgive Hussein for his actions in the Gulf War. He told Baker a stable Jordan was the best hope for peace and the US should do everything possible to keep him in power.¹⁰⁶ Shamir also justified Hussein's actions during the Gulf War as consistent and necessary because of Jordan's relations with Iraq and Hussein's continued efforts to promote peace in the region. Shamir even worked with Congress to try and end hostility some members had towards Jordan. The level of support Shamir showed to Jordan reached such a high level that a Bush administration official once asked Shamir, "Who are you, the King's lawyer?"¹⁰⁷ Shamir was a valuable ally for Hussein. He eased many of the Americans concerns and was an important ally for Hussein to improve his relationship with the Bush administration and members of Congress. It demonstrated to Hussein Israel's ability to assist Jordan if they remained on friendly terms. Hussein would use this lesson frequently during the Clinton administration.

In June 1991, the US and the Soviet Union issued letters to Israel and all its neighbors proposing a joint peace conference in Madrid for October. Hussein and Assad agreed at the early stages to participate. Baker's only trouble was the Palestinians and the Israelis. To get the Palestinians to agree to participate in the Madrid Conference, Baker

privately issued a number of threats if they blocked his proposal. In a meeting in October 1991, Baker told the Palestinian delegation that if they did not go, not only would he unfreeze the \$10 billion loan guarantees for Israel, he would increase it to \$20 billion. In addition, he would not restrict the construction of settlements. Finally, he said, “If you are worried about the PLO now, name me one country that will host them, let alone a PNC meeting.”¹⁰⁸ That Palestinians, like Jordan, had very little leverage to demand more participation because the PLO had very little support from the rest of the Arab world due to Arafat’s support of Iraq and Saddam Hussein.

The letter inviting the parties to the Madrid Conference called for a joint meeting in Madrid followed shortly by bilateral meetings between Israel and the Arab nations. It called for a joint delegation of Palestinians and Jordanians to negotiate “on region-wide issues such as arms control and regional security, water, refugee issues, environment, economic development, and other subjects of mutual interest.”¹⁰⁹ It also promised that the conference could not force decisions on any of the participants, a concession to Israel who feared that was the only point of an international conference. In a separate letter to the Palestinian leadership, Bush mentioned his belief that “there should be an end to the Israeli occupation” and his rejection of any changes made by Israel to East Jerusalem.¹¹⁰ This letter was important for a number of reasons. First, it referred to Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza as an occupation, not as a dispute that needed to be resolved through negotiation. The labeling it an occupation meant that the US believed that the land never belonged to Israel and should be returned to the Arabs after the outcome of negotiations that took into consideration the security of all nations in the region. Past administrations never labeled it an occupation because it would immediately outrage the

Israelis who would accuse the US of deciding the outcome of negotiations before they occurred. In addition, many members of the governing Likud Party still hoped to annex much of the West Bank and Gaza, even after a negotiation was complete.

One of the major issues increasing the tensions between the US and Israel was the construction of settlements. Because of the ongoing collapse of the Soviet Union, a large influx of Soviet Jews immigrated to Israel. Shamir asked Bush for \$400 million in loan guarantees and another \$10 billion over five years to support that immigration. Shamir promised not to use the loans to expand settlements in the occupied territories. After the Israelis had continued to build settlements, Baker and Bush pushed Congress to delay a vote for four months on the future loan guarantees in September 1991.¹¹¹ This delay outraged Shamir. He said, “this was the first time that the US Government decided to make humanitarian aid to Israel conditional on Israel’s acceptance of a policy under dispute.”¹¹² Israel responded by calling their allies in the United States to make a full scale lobbying effort in Congress to oppose Bush’s delay. Bush responded on September 11, saying, “For the first time in history, the vision of Israelis sitting with their Arab neighbors to talk peace is a real prospect. Nothing should be done that might interfere with this prospect. And if necessary, I will use my veto power to prevent this from happening. Peace is what these new emigrants to Israel, and indeed all Israelis long for.”¹¹³ This was important because it showed the Arabs that the US was finally willing to punish Israel and force them to negotiate. In addition, it demonstrated to the Arabs that the Bush administration was committed to progressing through the peace process and would not allow actions by anyone that could upend it. Israel eventually agreed to attend Madrid, but not willingly. Israel’s Foreign Minister Shomo Ben-Ami said, “Shamir was

practically dragged to Madrid by President Bush. The message was forcefully, by way of pressure and intimidation, brought home to him that he could either have America's friendship or the territories, not both."¹¹⁴

In a letter to Hussein on October 9, 1991, the Bush administration tried to reassure him about the purpose of the upcoming Madrid Conference. It said:

The United States continues to believe firmly that a comprehensive peace must be grounded in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. Such an outcome must also provide for security and recognition for all states in the region, including Israel and for legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people. Anything else . . . would fail the twin tests of fairness and security.¹¹⁵

This statement met most of Hussein's requests for negotiating with Israel. It included Palestinian representation, an international conference, and negotiations based on past Security Council resolutions. Hussein had made most of these demands for decades with the United States and despite his dispute with Bush during the Gulf War, he finally achieved these goals.

The letter also discussed the American attitude towards the fate of Jerusalem, another very important issue for Hussein. It is said, "the United States understands the importance that all parties attach to the city. For this reason, it has long been the position of the United States that the city must not be divided again, its future status to be determined by negotiations. Thus, we do not recognize Israel's annexation or the extension of its municipal boundaries."¹¹⁶ While this statement did not recognize Jordan's special role in Jerusalem, it was important for Hussein that the US did not support Israel's continued action to cement their position in the holy city through the

continued settlement expansion. Hussein hoped that through negotiations, he would be able to regain his lost position as the caretaker for the Islamic sites in the city.

Jordan readily accepted its place at the Madrid Conference. In an address to the nation on October 12, Hussein announced his acceptance of the invitation to Madrid saying, “Peace demands no less courage than war. It is the courage to meet the adversary, his attitudes, and arguments, the courage to face hardships, the courage to bury senseless illusions, the courage to surmount obstacles, the courage to engage in a dialogue to tear down the walls of fear and suspicion. It is the courage to face reality.” He also addressed Jordan’s role in assisting the Palestinian people and promised that role would not change in these negotiations. He ended his speech calling on the Jordanian people to:

Let us awake and put an end to self-destruction in our minds and our beings. Let us put an end to the sweeping tendencies of outbidding each other and to illusions. Let us heed God, for our nation, our children, our present and our future. Let us shoulder our responsibilities and not seek escapism under the guise of leaving it to a future generation. Let us remember that the majority of Jordanians and Palestinians cannot afford the luxury of betting on the unknown.¹¹⁷

That same week, Bush sent a letter to Hussein telling him that he appreciated his friendship and thanking him for his cooperation in the peace process. He also said, “Time heals a lot of wounds,” welcoming Hussein and Jordan back into the good graces of the United States.¹¹⁸ Hussein reverted to his previous position of being America’s strongest ally for peace in the region. He continued to work for the success of the peace process in an effort to show the United States his value to their interests in the region.

In a meeting on October 12, Baker asked Hussein to send an official list to Shamir of Palestinian representatives that would participate at Madrid that were not members of the PLO but still connected enough that they would be excepted by the Palestinians. Baker told Hussein that “You are the only one who can do this. He’ll trust you more than us on this one. . . . This is the key to the whole process.” Baker also told Hussein that he was going to have technology delivered that would outfit Hussein’s personal plane with anti-missile technology.¹¹⁹ For Baker, it was a sign to Hussein that the animosity over the Gulf War was past them and he needed Hussein once again be an American ally in the peace process. In addition, it showed Hussein that the US still valued his position as the head of Jordan and would help defend him against threats if necessary.

The Madrid Conference began on October 30, 1991, and was led by the US and the Soviet Union with the UN present as an observer. While publically it was a joint US and USSR conference, at this point the Soviet Union was in the middle of falling apart, making Baker in charge of the actual structure of the conference. The conference opened with speeches from all the major participants. The Jordanian delegation, led by Kamel Abu Jaber, stated Jordan wanted to sign a peace deal with Israel, based on and upheld by international law and the United Nations. Israeli Prime Minister Shamir’s opening statement was much more divisive. He blamed almost all of the conflict on the Arabs’ refusal to recognize Israel and did not publically acknowledge the ideas of trading land for peace. Finally, Dr. Haidar Abdel Shafi, representing the Palestinians addressed the conference. While Shafi was not a member of the PLO, he did take directions from them and was there with their support. In his opening statement, he called for self-determination for the Palestinians but acknowledged that a transition period was needed.

In addition, he said that the new Palestinian state should be part of a confederation with Jordan.¹²⁰ This was important because it was the first time a representative associated with the PLO ever publically suggested a confederation with Jordan as a possible solution to the Palestinian problem. In the past, Arafat would accept that position in private negotiations with Hussein, but never would acknowledge it publically.

The Madrid Conference lasted its prescribed three days followed by bilateral negotiations in the coming weeks in Washington D.C. under the directions of the United States. Baker believed that fact that Madrid happened at all was a success. He felt every time he visited the Middle East, one side or the other would make a new unreasonable demand, not to further the talks, but to scuttle them. When the conference occurred, he said, “After forty-three years of bloody conflict, the ancient walls of Jericho, the psychological barriers of half a century came tumbling down.” Baker argued that without Madrid, the peace process between Jordan and Israel and Israel and the Palestinians would never have occurred.¹²¹ The head of the Jordanian delegation in Washington, Abdul Salam Majali, credited Baker for organizing the Madrid Conference and moving forward the peace process. He said, “His talents, diplomatic skills, intelligence, and wit, his immense courage, fairness and persistence made a difference today. He has meticulously designed the process so that all parties who have a stake in the outcome will play a role of some kind.”¹²² The Madrid Conference was an important event for both Baker and Hussein. Hussein finally achieved his international conference. It would give him the cover he needed to achieve his goal of ending the state of belligerency between Jordan and Israel. Hussein played an important role in mediating any disputes between the Israelis and the Palestinians, especially over the issues of who represented the

Palestinians. He demonstrated his importance to the United States if they wanted to achieve a lasting peace in the region. For Baker, by using American pressure where he could, he achieved a meeting between the Palestinians and Israel that started the discussion for settling their over forty-year conflict.

In the upcoming negotiations, Jordan had a number of major concerns that they felt Israel would need to address before the completion of a Jordan-Israel peace treaty. Jordan wanted to make sure that any agreement with the Palestinians did not include Jordan without their consent, similar to the agreement from Camp David. In addition, while not in possession of any weapons of mass destruction, Jordan wanted to make sure that in the future Israel did not target them with their nuclear capability. Finally, because of the demographic changes in the region, mainly Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza had a much higher birthrate than the Israelis, Jordan needed assurances from Israel that there would be no forced movement of a population out of the West Bank into Jordan in response to the demographic challenges faced by Israel.¹²³ Jordan had two issues it believed it could not violate while making a deal with Israel. First, Jordan would not violate the Arab League Charter or the Arab Defense Pact. This meant that Jordan would not violate past rulings by the Arab League, including Rabat, and would not sign a defense agreement with Israel. In addition, Jordan would also not agree to abdicate its responsibilities under the Arab Defense Pact to come to the aid of another Arab country under attack from external forces. Second, Jordan would not agree to any deal with Israel that would prejudge a deal with the Palestinians. In particular, Jordan would not agree to a border that impacted the future of a Palestinian state. It would also not agree to any

provision that limited the right of return of Palestinian refugees. Hussein believed that was an issue that should be worked out between the Palestinians and Israel.¹²⁴

The Washington Conference began with the arrival of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation to Washington D.C. on December 2, 1991. While it was a joint delegation, Baker promised both parts of the delegation they would work out their issues with Israel bilaterally. The Jordanian delegation was led by Dr. Abdul Salam Majali and the Palestinian delegation was led by Abdul Shafi. To stress the division in the delegation, the Jordanians and the Palestinians stayed in separate hotels, had separate meeting rooms, and planned on having separate goals for their meetings with the Israelis. Unfortunately, when the Israelis arrived in Washington D.C. on December 3, they had different ideas of whom they would negotiate with. They were led by Dr. Elyak Rubinstein, a legal scholar in Israel that had connections with both Shamir and Rabin. In the tour of the States Department wing that was the planned site for the negotiation sessions, the Israelis objected to having two different rooms for negotiations, one for Israeli-Jordanian talks and one for Israeli-Palestinian talks. When the Jordanians and the Palestinians saw the new structure of the negotiating room, Israel on one side and the Palestinians and Jordanians on the other side, they refused to enter and begin negotiations. Majali and Rubinstein continued to debate the set-up for a longtime in the hallway. The debate lasted so long that the State Department brought down sofas so the leaders could rest while they continued to work out this first detail of the negotiations. After a week of “sofa diplomacy,” both sides agreed to take a break until after the holidays and return to Washington in January.¹²⁵

The start of the next round of negotiations hit an immediate problem, even before the issue of the who would negotiate with who was worked out. At the end of December, Israel deported a dozen Palestinian activists to Lebanon for celebrating the anniversary of the *intifada*. The Palestinian delegation was outraged and refused to go Washington. Majali believed that Shamir was doing it to antagonize the Arabs, with the hope of canceling the negotiations. In response, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution calling for the return of the activists and declaring their deportation illegal. The US voted with the rest of the council, showing to many of the Arabs that Bush and Baker planned to remain neutral in the negotiations, and not blindly support Israel like many presidents had in the past.¹²⁶

While all sides returned to Washington on January 7, it was not until January 11 that an agreement was reached on the makeup of the negotiating teams. The Israelis agreed to one larger session that contained an equal amount of Jordanian and Palestinians that focused on issues faced by all parties. In addition, they agreed to a split of nine Jordanians and two Palestinians for the bilateral Jordanian negotiation and two Jordanians and nine Palestinians for the bilateral Palestinian negotiation.¹²⁷ The Jordanians felt it was important to have members on each track for a number of reasons. First, they had different issues than the Palestinians. The Jordanians had less concern over the internal security of the West Bank or issues of Palestinian governance but were concerned about issues involving water rights for the region and the final border agreements. Second, the Jordanian delegation worried that if it was totally separate, the Israelis could complete a deal with the rest of the Arabs quickly and then drag out negotiations with the Palestinians. If Israel completed a deal with all the other major

Arab states except the Palestinians, the pressure on Israel to make concessions would diminish. With Jordanian representation present, it was possible to keep the Jordanian and Palestinian talks at the same pace.

Shamir's continued feud with the Bush administration over the issue of settlements eventually hurt his political standing in Israel and he lost his reelection bid on June 23, 1992. The Bush administration welcomed his replacement Yitzhak Rabin, who they believed had a moderate view of the peace process and was someone who they could work to achieve Bush's goals for the region.¹²⁸ Jordan and Hussein did not have the same feelings towards Shamir and Rabin. For while Hussein and Shamir did not always get along, they reached a level of mutual respect and honesty. The Jordanians had a different attitude towards Rabin. They saw him as a general from 1967 war, the Defense Minister who attempted to violently put down the *intifada* and someone who had the same ideology as Shamir, but presented it in a friendlier way.¹²⁹ The Jordanians preferred to keep working with Shamir, believing they knew exactly where he stood on issues and did not have the ability to hide his intentions like Rabin. After the election, the Bush administration's view of Shamir proved correct. In an interview after his defeat, Shamir explained his negotiating strategy. He said, "I would have conducted negotiations on autonomy for ten years and in the meantime we would have reached a half million people in Judea and Samaria."¹³⁰ As they demonstrated in the past, Shamir and the Likud Party never had any intention of returning the West Bank to the Palestinians. Hussein's belief that he achieved a level of understanding with Shamir was misguided. While Shamir would deal with Hussein, he would never allow the return of Jerusalem and the West Bank to the Arabs.

The replacement of Shamir with Rabin helped continue the momentum towards a deal between Jordan and Israel. On November 8, 1992, the Jordanians agreed to the Common Agenda, setting out the plan to finalize a peace treaty between the two governments.¹³¹ The agenda called for “The achievement of just, lasting and comprehensive peace between the Arab States, the Palestinians and Israel as per the Madrid Invitation.” It called for bilateral working groups, each to address a different issue as the sides worked to a formal peace treaty. These issues included security, water rights, refugees, borders and future areas of bilateral cooperation.¹³² While they agreed on the structure of future peace negotiations, the Jordanians did not want to announce it publicly until the Palestinians made more progress in their negotiation. Both sides believed that they had taken the necessary steps to overcome the remaining differences and formally end the state of belligerency in a timely manner. Unfortunately for Bush, he did not win reelection and could not see the culmination of his efforts.

Despite his failed reelection bid, George H. W. Bush was responsible for momentous changes in the Middle East. While his first efforts at the peace process established his views of the region, it did not achieve a lasting settlement. His greatest contribution occurred when he demonstrated that he would take a different approach to the Israelis, not allowing them to dictate terms of the negotiations. In addition, he was the first American leader to challenge Israel’s settlement policy, even withholding American aid to Israel over their continued insistence on expanding settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. This showed both Hussein and other Arab leaders that the Americans finally would pressure Israel into negotiating a settlement for the region. Bush’s actions justified Hussein’s excitement of Bush’s election because of his

aggressive pursuit of a settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians. While Hussein appreciated Bush's efforts, after years of struggling to get full American support for the peace process, he no longer was in position to negotiate for the Palestinians. Despite these setbacks, after the Persian Gulf War, Hussein became an active part of the peace process, assisting the Bush administration in their efforts to forge an agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis. In the lead up the Madrid Conference and during the Washington meetings, Hussein continued to support the Palestinians and assist the Americans in advancing the peace process. He played a valuable role in bridging the gaps between the Israelis and the Palestinians by mediating the composition of the Palestinian delegation and supporting their role in the Washington negotiations.

While the peace process during the Bush administration showed Hussein's value to the Americans, the Gulf War also dramatically altered the Middle East and caused the first real break in American and Jordanian relations. Through Hussein's support of Saddam Hussein, he undermined decades of friendship with the US and diminished his value to many American leaders. While Hussein might have had strong economic, strategic, and domestic political reasons for supporting Saddam, his actions almost destroyed the American-Jordanian relationship. Hussein's efforts to repair that damage led him to work even harder to come to an accommodation with the Israelis. Eventually, many in the American leadership realized the dire position Hussein was in because of his people's opposition to the American coalition and welcomed him back into the American partnership, especially after he made real strides towards peace with Israel. The outcome of the Madrid Conference eventually led to a joint Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, furthering Hussein's position as an ally of the United States in the region. Despite the

fact the Bush did not get to participate in the outcome of his work towards the peace process, his leadership was fundamental in making the Israelis work with the Arabs towards solving the conflicts in the region.

CHAPTER IX

CLINTON AND THE ISRAELI-JORDANIAN PEACE TREATY

When the Bill Clinton assumed office after George H. W. Bush, King Hussein did not know what to expect from the new American administration. He never had any dealings with the former governor of Arkansas and was worried about some of Clinton's campaign statements. For example, while Clinton supported the peace process started at Madrid, he was highly critical of Bush's actions toward Israel.¹ Hussein quickly learned that Clinton was an engaged leader who used his personal charm and attention to details to build a relationship with many leaders around the world, including Hussein. He also witnessed Clinton's practicality when it came to addressing the issues in the Middle East. During the Clinton administration, Jordan and Israel completed a formal peace treaty and Hussein completed the restoration of American-Jordanian relations damaged from the Gulf War. In addition, Hussein proved a valuable ally for the United States by furthering the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians while also supporting the American position in its continued dispute with Iraq. Clinton and Hussein developed a friendship and working relationship that was vital in progressing the peace process in the Middle East.

Just before Clinton took office, Hussein faced a health scare that would eventually influence his involvement in the peace process. In August 1992, Hussein traveled to the Mayo Clinic to have an obstruction removed from his ureter. Doctors removed Hussein's kidney as a precaution after some tests found that the blockage was cancerous. While there were no signs that the cancer spread, between this and previous heart issues, the King's health was now in question. It would take Hussein a long time to recover and his doctors recommended that he try to avoid stress as much as possible, a challenge while leading a nation in the Middle East. One benefit of Hussein's health crisis was the improved relations with Saudi Arabia. One of Hussein's visitors while in the hospital recovering was Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the US. Prince Bandar was particularly close to his uncle King Fahd and his long visit singled the start of the restoration of ties between Jordan and Saudi Arabia.² Hussein's health crisis made him want to work harder to achieve peace between Israel and Jordan. He believed it would be his legacy. In addition, tightening Jordanian-Israeli and Jordanian-American relations through the formation of a comprehensive peace deal would help assure his heir's security as the head of the Hashemite regime.

When Clinton took office, the Israelis and the Jordanians continued to negotiate in Washington based off the agreed upon Common Agenda. The negotiations continued to move slowly because the Jordanians did not want to get ahead of the Palestinians. The Clinton administration continued to support those negotiations, attempting to mediate when it was appropriate. What the Jordanian delegation was unaware of was that the Palestinians and the Israelis entered into a separate, secret negotiation in Oslo, Norway. Those negotiations became public on August 29, 1993, and the Israelis and the

Palestinians signed the agreement on September 13, 1993, on the White House lawn.³ It called for Israel to recognize the PLO as the legitimate voice of the Palestinian people. The PLO recognized Israel's right to exist and live in peace with its Arab neighbors. In addition, it set up a Palestinian government for the West Bank and Gaza, called the Palestinian Authority, and called for Israel and the Palestinian Authority to negotiate all remaining issues peacefully. The agreement did not mention a solution for final borders, refugees, or the fate of Jerusalem. Israel and the Palestinian Authority would work those issues out in future negotiations.⁴ Many considered the agreement a major breakthrough for negotiations between the Palestinians and Israel and hoped that it was just the first step in securing peace throughout the Middle East. For Hussein and Jordan, the Oslo Agreement ended any chance of Hussein returning to lead the Palestinians of the West Bank. The agreement placed Arafat and his new Palestinian Authority as the permanent representative of the Palestinians in the eyes of the Israelis and the rest of the world.

The fact that the Palestinians did not inform Hussein of the Oslo talks even though he was working with the Palestinians in their negotiations in Washington outraged Hussein. He believed he went out of his way to help the Palestinians in Washington, even delaying the Jordanian negotiations so not to hurt the Palestinian efforts, and PLO betrayed that trust and effort. Mahmoud Abbas, one of the leaders of the PLO, mentioned later that it was unfair to keep Hussein out of the loop in regards to the negotiations at Oslo and he had every right to be angry. Abbas credited Hussein with helping the Palestinians in their negotiations with the Israelis by providing them legal cover to negotiate and helping them force the Israelis to discuss issues with a majority Palestinian delegation. Abbas blamed Arafat for not disclosing the information to

Hussein. He believed that Arafat did not trust Hussein nor wanted him included in any discussions about the West Bank for fear of Jordan attempting to end its disengagement and return to an active role in the territories.⁵ While the Palestinians and Israelis were justified in keeping the talks secret for fear that if they became public outside forces could disrupt them, it hurt the relationship between Hussein and both the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority. Hussein negotiated with both side in good faith and they repaid that faith by agreeing to a deal behind Hussein's back. It would negatively impact Hussein's view of both Arafat and Peres, who led the negotiations for the Israelis.

Hussein was also not pleased with the outcome of the deal. He believed the PLO gave away too much without getting Israel's assurance that it would favorably resolve the remaining issues. He believed at the very least, Israel and the Palestinians should have solved the issues of final borders and the status of refugees. Despite his disappointment, there was not much Hussein could do about it. In an interview shortly after the announcement of the Oslo Accords, Hussein said, "I came up with the conclusion that we should close up the umbrella and really get it into the closet of history, and move on our own deal with our own problems, and as far as our Palestinian brethren were concerned to give them all the support we could." He also said that he would support the Palestinian Authority leadership in any way he could.⁶ Hussein did not have many options for protest after the Oslo Accords. He previously agreed to disengage from the West Bank and therefore had little right to complain if the Palestinians made their agreement separate from him. Despite being powerless to effect the negotiation, Hussein still had to deal with the issues created by them.

For Hussein, the actions of the Palestinian Authority posed a number of threats. First, he worried about the fate of the holy sites and Jordan's traditional role in protecting and managing them. In a letter Hussein received from Arafat at the end of 1993; Arafat explained that the Israelis promised the Palestinians a special status in control over the holy places in Jerusalem.⁷ This caused two problems for the King. First, he worried the Israelis and the Palestinians were continuing to negotiate secretly, with the potential to strike even more bargains that affected Jordan. Second, he realized if negotiations with the Israelis waited too much longer, he might lose any control over Jerusalem to the Palestinian Authority, and in turn, the prestige in the Islamic world that went with that position. Hussein could no longer delay the process and increased his contacts with Israel in the hope of solving their issues and moving towards peace.

An additional threat posed by the Oslo Accords was Arafat's new position in the West Bank. Up until the Oslo Accords, Arafat was in Tunis, Tunisia, making it difficult for him to take direct control over the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The Oslo Accords allowed Arafat to return to the West Bank and personally lead the new Palestinian Authority. Hussein worried about the growing influence of Arafat on the West Bank and the fear that Arafat could still have designs on incorporating Jordan into a future Palestinian state. Hussein scheduled an election for November 8, 1993, but feared a threat to his power because of Arafat's interference and considered canceling it. Hussein knew that Jordan still contained three and a half million Palestinians in the East Bank who could vote in Jordanian elections, Hussein feared Arafat could use the upcoming elections to increase the opposition to Hussein in the Jordanian Parliament. A Jordanian constitutional expert explained this threat by saying, "These are extremely

challenging times for Jordan. Yasser Arafat did not pull a rabbit out of his hat, but a damned camel.”⁸ Finally, Hussein worried that the Oslo Accords dramatically altered his relationship with Israel. In particular, he worried that Israel would abandon its policies of the past of supporting the Hashemite role as the head of Jordan in favor of turning Jordan into a Palestinian republic. Abu-Odeh said, “King Hussein feared that Israel may have reached with Arafat an agreement that would weaken or threaten Jordan. Regarding the Palestinian question, the king was always afraid of being left out of the picture. This was for good reason because it might entice some to think that ‘Jordan is Palestine.’”⁹ While past experience justified Hussein’s fears, the new Israeli government led by Rabin was not the Likud government of Shamir and Sharon. Israel still valued Hussein as a partner for peace, and Rabin would demonstrate that as talks between Israel and Jordan continued.

Hussein realized that politically in Jordan, he might have trouble pushing a peace process through with an opposition block led by angry Palestinians hostile to his monarchy. To increase his ability to control Parliament, he amended the election law on August 4, 1993. After this amendment, the people of Jordan could only vote for one candidate in an election. Previously, voters could select a number of different candidates from very different parties and give their support to all of them. This change had a dramatic impact. First, it decreased the support of both the Islamist and Leftist parties. Since people could only vote for one candidate now, there were more likely to vote along family or historical tribal lines. In effect, the parties that gained ground were the less ideological parties, particularly ones loyal to Hussein. This was important because any treaty signed by the government of Jordan needed Parliament’s approval.¹⁰ While

Hussein had control over Jordan, in recent years he started a process of democratization, giving more power to Parliament and allowing free elections. Hussein did this to reduce domestic tensions, but Hussein worried that the growing Islamic radical movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood, could use the democratization process to hinder Hussein's future peace objectives.¹¹

Hussein and Yitzhak Rabin met in Aqaba on September 26 to discuss the Oslo agreement and the future of Jordanian-Israeli negotiations. Rabin tried to assure Hussein that Israel still valued the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan and would continue to coordinate with Jordan while discussing the peace process with the Palestinians. Israeli intelligence advised Rabin that Hussein was deeply concerned about the Oslo Accords and the future of Jordanian-Israeli relations. The intelligence service told Rabin, "King Hussein's political world has collapsed around him and the most direct means are required to calm him down."¹² Rabin also wanted to progress on the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. Rabin suggested signing the peace treaty now, while continuing to negotiate on the issues that still separated Israel and Jordan. Hussein rejected this notion, arguing that the treaty is a culmination once Jordan and Israel resolved their remaining issues. They agreed to take Hussein's approach and have their experts continue to negotiate on the remaining outstanding issues. Hussein surprised Rabin by telling him that unlike in the past, he did not need to wait for the other Arab countries, mainly Syria in this case, to complete a deal with Israel. He was ready whenever the negotiations were complete.¹³ The advice of the Israeli intelligence service to Rabin was important because Israel still valued Hussein's position in the Middle East despite their agreement with the Palestinians. Rabin realized correctly that Hussein's

presence in Jordan still had the potential to benefit Israel and the Israeli leadership should move forward with a peace process with Hussein to stabilize his position.

The peace process between Jordan and Israel continued to move forward. Hussein and his brother, Crown Prince Hassan, led the Jordanian negotiators and Rabin and his foreign ministers Shimon Peres represented the Israelis. Both leaders met in Washington in October, later meeting with Clinton and setting up a joint US-Israel-Jordan economic committee to promote economic ties between the three countries. This was important for Hussein because the Jordanian economy was still suffering from the fallout of the Gulf War and the continued disputes between the world and Iraq. On November 3, 1993, Peres secretly went to Jordan and met with Hussein to discuss elements of a future treaty. Peres also came with plans to invite “four thousand businessmen to Amman to invest in a new peaceful Middle East”. During their meeting, Hussein and Peres worked out the basic structure for a final peace accord. In it, Israel agreed to restore to Jordan land still occupied on the Dead Sea from the 1967 war. Jordan agreed to retake sovereignty over that land but to allow Israel to lease it from Jordan. The two countries agreed to have normal relations, including the opening of an embassy and the exchange of ambassadors. Finally, Jordan and Israel agreed to cooperate in the fields of agriculture, tourism, transportation and energy production. They also agreed to schedule an economic conference in Jordan to bring Israeli business to the country. Peres also agreed to work with the Clinton administration and Congress to ease Jordan’s debt and increase its aid. Finally, they agreed to a defense pact, where Israel would come to the aid of Jordan if an outside power attacked it.¹⁴ While much of the language agreed upon in this meeting would eventually make up the Israeli-Jordanian

peace treaty, the leadership of the two countries needed to work out the details. To accomplish that, a level of trust was needed between Hussein and the Israeli leadership.

While the meeting between Peres and Hussein was supposed to be secret, Peres could not help dropping hints to the Israeli press when he returned. He told reporters “put in your calendars November 3 as a historic date” and that the only thing missing from his discussions with an unnamed Arab country was a pen to sign the agreement. This caused numerous problems for Hussein and affected the future nature of the talks. First, Hussein had elections scheduled for the near future and did not want them influenced by the possibility of an Israeli peace treaty. In addition, it also changed the relationship between Hussein and the leadership of Israel. Hussein had issues with both Peres and Rabin based on past dealings with them. Hussein did not have confidence in Peres because of the failure of the London Agreement and because Peres was the lead negotiator for the Oslo Accords. Hussein did not trust Rabin because of Rabin’s role in the 1967 war and his belief that Rabin was more of a general rather than a statesman. The Peres trip changed this dynamic. Hussein and Rabin believed that Peres could not be trusted because of his inability to keep that trip secret.¹⁵ Rabin had many other reasons to exclude Peres from the negotiations. First, Rabin believed that Peres eventually intended to challenge him for leadership of the Labor Party. Because of this, Rabin not only did not trust Peres but also did not intend to allow him to gain any credit for assisting with a peace treaty, especially if it later could use against him in an inter-party battle. Rabin and Hussein agreed to a set of aides that would communicate with each other and maintain strict secrecy.¹⁶ Working closely on the peace process brought Rabin and Hussein closer together, establishing a friendship based on trust and respect that was important in

culminating a peace deal. This friendship was important to completing an agreement between Jordan and Israel because both leaders needed to trust each other to overcome the more difficult disputes based on water and final borders.

Hussein believed in the importance of keeping the talks secret. He said, “The fact that we did not announce peace contacts publically all through the past was due to a mutual agreement. At first, we were so far apart that there would have been no benefit in announcing the meetings. These meetings enabled us to get to know each other. They enabled us to examine our positions every now and then to see if there was any chance of progress.”¹⁷ Hussein did not mention that it also made it so outside agitators could not to blow up the peace process. This included both Palestinian and Israeli extremist bent on making sure Israel and Jordan never completed a peace deal. Even though Hussein opposed the secrecy in the Oslo negotiations, he rightfully believed that people like Arafat or members of the Israeli opposition could do things that increased tensions between Israel and Jordan, making it more difficult for them to negotiate an agreement. Things like a terrorist attack by a radical Palestinian group like Hamas had the potential to make it impossible for Israel and Jordan to continue to work towards an agreement.

Rabin wanted to continue the dialogue with Hussein and asked Efraim Halevy to secretly discuss a peace process with him, without letting the office of Peres and the Foreign Ministry becoming aware of it. In April 1994, Rabin asked Halevy to brief the Americans on his recent talks with Hussein and Hussein’s new desire to work towards peace and settle all remaining issues. Rabin believed that eventually he would need American support, so it was important to begin to get them involved. In this first meeting in Tel Aviv, Halevy detected a reluctance of the American officials to get involved.

Some were still angry about Hussein's actions during the Gulf War. Another issue was Syria. Warren Christopher had been in the middle of a major diplomatic effort to secure a peace deal between Syria and Israel, and while the pace was slow, they believed they were making progress. The Americans were reluctant to sacrifice the Syrian talks in any way to work with Hussein. Halevy suggested to Ross that Christopher call Hussein himself and he would see that Hussein was ready for peace. Christopher did make the call, and Hussein surprised Christopher with his pleasant attitude.¹⁸ It was important for Israel to get an American buy-in for the peace process with Jordan because Hussein would need added incentives to complete a deal. For Hussein, it was a sign that he could end the dispute on his border and at the same time return to the good graces of the United States.

On April 26, 1994, Christopher met with Hussein in Amman. In the meeting, Christopher told him that if he could reach an agreement with Israel, the US would likely forgive his debt and help him modernize his military. Believing that Hussein was moving towards a deal with Israel, Christopher began working with the Treasury Department on a plan to forgive Jordan's debt of over \$700 million along with an additional \$200 million to upgrade his military.¹⁹ Other than peace, the benefits to the Jordanian economy and military through a large aid package from the US cannot be understated. In 1990, Jordan's GDP growth rate was only one percent, while it increased the next few years; this increase came almost entirely from the influx of refugees and did not indicate any economic gain.²⁰ To handle the continuing influx of refugees from the Gulf War, Jordan needed the assistance of the US. Hussein correctly assumed that if he came to an agreement with Israel, the US would repay him for his efforts through

dramatic increases in American aid. In addition, the benefits to the Jordanian military would diminish Hussein and his heir's vulnerability to outside forces.

Hussein saw signs during the early stages of the Clinton administration that the US was willing to move past the dispute from the Gulf War and begin to assist Jordan. On October 1, 1993, Crown Prince Hassan met with Peres and Clinton at the White House to discuss the situation in Jordan. In the meeting, Peres lobbied Clinton to forgive Jordan's debt, hoping it would help move the peace process forward. Later, at a press conference, Clinton gave his approval for easing Jordan's debt burden if Jordan made peace with Israel.²¹ It was an important moment for Hussein because it demonstrated that Israel had the power to dramatically help Jordan financially through its relationships in the US, along with its ability to persuade both Clinton and the Congress. It increased Hussein's trust towards the Israelis and gave him further incentive to continue his positive relationship with Rabin.

On May 4, 1994, Israel and the Palestinian Authority signed the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, giving Arafat control over those areas of the Palestinian territories. The Jericho element of that agreement was particularly important for Hussein because of Jericho's proximity to the Jordanian border. Hussein feared that Arafat would use his position to influence Palestinians on both sides of the border, weakening Hussein's position in Jordan.²² Because of that, Hussein had a new incentive to increase negotiations with Rabin in the hopes of completing an Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. Other than Arafat's control, Hussein had two other problems that influenced his decision to accelerate negotiations with Israel. First, he needed an economic agreement with Israel and the West Bank. After the Oslo Accords, Hussein feared that the economic

components of the accords would limit Jordan's access to the West Bank market. In particular, the Oslo Accords limited the products Jordan could sell in the West Bank and placed a tax on other goods to encourage trade between Israel and the Palestinians. The goal of this provision was to give Israel preferential treatment in the West Bank as an incentive to continue to move the peace process forward. In addition, Hussein feared that the United States was losing patience with him and no longer considered Jordan a worthwhile ally in the peace process. If this became permanent, Hussein feared he could lose the chance to improve relations with the United States, an important financial component of any peace deal.²³ While peace with Israel had its own benefits, without the additional support from the United States, it was not worth the risk to Hussein to fight for a peace deal with Israel. While there was less pressure on Hussein from other Arab countries over his potential talks with Israel, he still needed to worry about the reaction of his own population. If he could demonstrate tangible benefits because of a peace agreement with Israel, it would make it easier for the Jordanian public to accept any future agreements.

On May 19, Rabin and Hussein met in London to discuss the progress in the Jordanian-Israeli talks. At that meeting, Rabin told Hussein that Israel was willing to give Jordan a privileged role in the responsibility and maintenance of Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem. In addition, Israel would respect this role in all future talks with the Palestinians. They agreed to have a public meeting at the in the region to announce to the world that they were not only working towards a Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty but those talks would soon be completed. Rabin told Hussein that he would work with Congress and Clinton to get all of Jordan's debt to the US canceled.²⁴ Hussein hoped that any deal

would give him both economic and diplomatic security, enhancing his control over Jordan. In addition, for Hussein, the return of his role at the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem had special value. Since he lost that control in 1967, almost every effort to make peace with Israel was based on Hussein's desire to return the control of those sites to the Hashemite family. This desire became even more important because of Israel's deal with the Palestinians and the potential of the Palestinian Authority to permanently replace Hussein as the guardian of the holy sites in Jerusalem.

The US saw other signs that Jordan and Israel were rapidly moving towards a breakthrough in the peace process. Ross met with Israeli representative Eli Rubinstein and Jordanian ambassador to the United States Fayez Tarawneh, to discuss a number of issues dealing with relations between Jordan and Israel. These included "tourism, Jordan Rift Valley Development, a transnational theme park in the Dead Sea, civil aviation, and the development of the 'Camp David Road' that would connect Egypt, Israel, and Jordan." The willingness of both sides to engage in the issues in a way that moved the talks forward led Ross to believe that not only a peace deal was possible, but likely. He even went as far to see if the Jordanians would be open to holding a joint press conference with the United States and Israel. Much to his surprise, both the Ambassador and the King quickly agreed. The purpose of the press conference was to announce these minor agreements and to settle on a place where a larger tri-party agreement could occur. Again, much to the surprise of Ross, Tarawneh said he nor the King were worried about where the next summit occurred, it could happen in Jordan or Israel.²⁵ It was an important step for Jordan to openly meet with Israeli officials in the region and it their

eagerness to do so increased Ross's belief that both Jordan and Israel were rapidly moving towards a historic agreement.

In June of 1994, Ross met with Jordanian Prime Minister Abdul Salem Majali. Majali was concerned that Jordan was not getting enough for taking these peace steps with Israel. Ross made some promises to the Prime Minister to reassure him of the United States' effort in assisting Jordan. Ross promised to try to convince France and Japan to reschedule Jordanian debt. He also would find some American aid to Jordan. One problem with this promise was Congress was reluctant to send aid directly to Jordan because of residual anger over Hussein's support for Iraq during the Persian Gulf War. In addition, new congressional budgeting rules required all debt relief to be paid for in the budget. Because of this, in the eyes of Congress, forgiving Jordanian debt had a similar budgetary impact as giving Jordan cash directly.²⁶ To solve this problem, Ross promised to use a food assistance program already established to aid Jordan. He also said he would help Jordan get loans through organizations like the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, hoping that would attract foreign investment. Finally, Ross promised some kind of military aid. While the Jordanians were unhappy with this package, Ross said that was the best that he could do unless Jordan made real progress towards peace.²⁷ Short of that, it would be impossible to convince Congress to spend any more money. Ross's efforts further supported Hussein's desire to agree to a peace deal with Israel. He saw all the economic and military advantages from the United States, encouraging him to continue his work with Rabin.

At the same time, Majali met with Ross, Hussein also visited Washington to discuss the peace process and the prospect of economic and military aid for Jordan.

When Hussein met with people from the Clinton administration, he received disappointing news. Clinton's aides told him that if he wanted the aid to begin, he needed to take more public steps towards peace. When Rabin found this out, he sent Israel's ambassadors to the US, Itamar Rabinovich and Efraim Halevy, to meet with Dennis Ross to argue Jordan's position. Halevy told Ross Jordan needed a squadron of F-16s to upgrade its air force. Ross was shocked that Israel asked the US to deliver F-16s to Jordan even though they still had not reached an agreement on the peace initiative.²⁸ During the conversation, Ross asked Halevy, "Tell me Efraim, who are you representing here? Israel or Jordan?" Halevy immediately replied, "Both."²⁹ Ross promised to take the requests under advisement and scheduled a meeting between Hussein and Clinton on June 22.³⁰ The scale of collaboration between the Jordanian and Israeli delegations was a surprise to US officials. It showed that both sides made a commitment towards peace and had been working closely together outside of the public eye. Rabin and Halevy's intervention on Hussein's behalf was also important because it increased the level of trust between the two leaders. It was unlike any relationship Hussein had in the past with Israeli leaders. While Hussein was on good terms with past Israeli leadership, for the first time in Rabin, he had a partner who looked out for Jordan's interests as well as Israel's. Rabin realized he needed a strong and stable Jordan if he expected Hussein to take the risks necessary for peace.

The meeting with Clinton greatly pleased Hussein. Before the meeting, at the instruction of Halevy, Hussein sent over a list of the things he hoped to achieve working with the US. Halevy intended it to be a two-page list, but Hussein sent over a complete briefing book. When Hussein and Clinton met, Clinton showed a detailed knowledge of

Hussein's requests and recited them without notes. Clinton told Hussein that he believed he could persuade Congress to remove all Jordan's debt if Hussein completed a peace treaty with Israel. In addition, Clinton told Hussein that he would direct the Pentagon to sell to Jordan military equipment that the US no longer needed in the US, but still had value to Jordan.³¹ After the meeting, Clinton, Hussein and their wives spent another long lunch together where Clinton tried to persuade Hussein to replace his air fleet with planes made by Boeing.³² Clinton's ability to memorize Hussein's needs and speak to them without the assistance of notes or aides, along with Clinton's personality, impressed Hussein. It gave the impression that Clinton was fully engaged in the issues surrounding Jordan. For Hussein, the meeting with Clinton showed a number of important things. He believed he had someone in the White House who would listen to Jordan's issues and consider their interests when dealing with the region. In addition, the talk about airplanes showed Hussein that Washington would be open for business again for Jordan. It was a clear sign that the US was ready to forgive Hussein for his support of the Saddam and Iraq, returning Jordan to its previous status as an important American ally in the region.

On July 4, 1994, the State Department called Ross because they received an urgent letter from Hussein. Ross anticipated it was a letter of delay or agreeing to some minor meeting between Jordanian and Israeli low-level minister to work out the details for later meetings. Much to his surprise, King Hussein agreed to have Secretary of State Warren Christopher fly to Jordan and have a meeting with the Prime Minister Majali and a high-level minister designated from Israel to begin work on a peace treaty. Ross felt this was the breakthrough they needed and attributed the change in Jordanian attitude directly with Clinton's ability to assure Hussein that the United States valued Jordan as a friend

and would try to help them with their economic problems.³³ Hussein had many reasons to move slowly in the process and not rush into a public meeting with Rabin. First, he needed to prepare his people for the idea of peace with Israel. After so many years of fighting, it would not be easy to just end it for many Jordanians. In addition, because of his large Palestinian population, Hussein did not want to do anything that hurt his standing with them for fear he could lose control of his country. It helped Hussein that the Palestinian Authority already signed the Oslo Accords, removing their ability to attack Jordan for selling out the Palestinians. Second, Hussein did not want to move too fast and have the talks fall apart as they repeatedly did in the past. Hussein had too much riding on their success, especially the return of his favored status with the US. Because of that, Hussein took a deliberate systematic approach that built on successes, slowly moving the process forward and culminating in a peace treaty.

On July 11, another important event happened for the peace process, but all the major parties almost missed it. King Hussein, in a speech to Parliament announced he was willing to go and meet directly with Rabin if it would help the peace process. Most in the State Department thought he was saying it just so it would make the upcoming trilateral meetings seem unimportant. The *New York Times* did not even report it and the *Washington Post* only had a small wire report on the subject. In fact, Ross believed Hussein was “pulling a Sadat” and announcing to the world that he was willing to do whatever it took to reach a peace agreement. This was confirmed when the State Department received a letter from Hussein agreeing to meet with Rabin in two weeks followed by another joint meeting at the White House.³⁴

When Clinton found out of the plan for Rabin and Hussein to meet, he wanted them to make the announcement at the White House. At that point, both Rabin and Hussein planned on meeting on the Jordanian-Israeli border. Clinton promised Hussein all sorts of financial inducements to have the agreement in Washington. Because of that, Hussein felt that he had to do it. Hussein told Queen Noor that, "This is the only time I've ever compromised for the profit of the country." After Hussein had agreed to meet in Washington, Clinton announced publically that Jordan and Israel had been in secret talks and were coming to Washington to announce the ending of their conflict. Hussein had no knowledge of what Clinton would say nor did he know the structure of the Washington meeting. Clinton planned an elaborate signing ceremony, a joint banquet celebrating the agreement, and an address to a joint session of Congress by Rabin and Hussein.³⁵ For Hussein, while frustrating not to be involved or even informed of the plan by Washington, he needed the American economic help and appreciated the chance to speak to the American people from Congress. In the end, Hussein accomplished his goals by allowing the Americans to direct some of the processes, despite his preference to have the ceremony in the Middle East. For Clinton, because he was preparing for reelection while fighting off growing attacks from Republicans, he could use an achievement in foreign policy and an agreement between Jordan and Israel would achieve that goal.

In preparation for the announcement in Washington, Rabin and Hussein continued their work in writing what became known as the Washington Declaration. While the US tried to help with the wording for the Washington Deceleration, both Jordan and Israel declined their efforts. Later, the US delegation learned that Israel and Jordan had more

secret talks and were comfortable working out their issues without outside interference. In fact, when the American ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, met with Crown Prince Hassan just days before the scheduled meeting at the White House, Hassan rejected Indyk's suggestions on the context for the declaration, saying that Jordan initialed a draft with the Israelis the previous day.³⁶ After his meeting with Hassan, when Indyk presented Rabin with a copy of the American version of the Washington Declaration, Rabin told him to keep it, he said, "We have something better." He passed Indyk a copy of what Rabin agreed to with Jordan, and Indyk shouted, "What you have here is peace!"³⁷

On July 20, 1994, just before the planned White House meeting, the trilateral economic talks continued on the coast of the Dead Sea. This meeting was a special event for many Israelis that demonstrated the importance of a peace deal with Jordan. Majali and Peres led the summit to further discuss the new economic relationship between Jordan and Israel. It was the first time leaders of Israel and Jordan openly met in the region. It was such a shocking turn of events that a number of the Israeli diplomats, along with the Israeli reporters, were seen calling home on their cell phones to tell people they were actually in Jordan.³⁸ This demonstrated how important it was to for many Israelis to improve relations with their neighbors. It was a constant reminder how isolated they were when they could see Jordan, but they had very little hope of actually going there in their lifetime.

Right before the scheduled meeting at the White House between Rabin and Hussein, it was becoming clear that a peace treaty could be the possible outcome of the discussions. While the upcoming meeting had no set agenda, a more sweeping

announcement seemed possible to many in the Clinton administration. Hussein and Rabin were working out the details independently and continued to keep the Americans uninvolved in the details. Rabin told Ross that only one other person in Israel even knew about the private talks. This became uncomfortable when Ross met with Foreign Minister Shimon Peres the night before the Washington announcement and it was clear Peres was not the other person in Israel who knew of the talks. The Israelis asked the United States not participate in the negotiations directly because they believed they were making good progress solely because of the personal relationship between Hussein and Rabin.³⁹ The State Department figured if the two sides are actually working together, maybe it was best not to interfere. This marked a major change for the United States. In the past, the US frequently mediated any sensitive negotiation between the Arabs and Israel, this includes talks between Jordan and Israel. Because of the friendship and trust between Hussein and Rabin, the Israelis and the Jordanians no longer needed the US to force them to work out their differences.

On July 25, Hussein, Rabin and Clinton made a joint statement on the White House lawn that became known as the Washington Declaration. The Declaration opened by saying, "After generations of hostility, bloodshed and tears and in the wake of years of pain and wars. His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin were determined to bring an end to the bloodshed and sorrow." It ended the state of belligerency between Jordan and Israel by promising, "Neither side will threaten the other by use of force, weapons, or any other means against each other, and both sides will thwart threats to security resulting from all kinds of terrorism." In addition, it committed both parties to the signing of a formal peace treaty between the two nations. On the

subject of Jerusalem it said, "Israel respects the special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines." In addition, it increased the connections between Jordan and Israel by connecting the phone lines, electric grid and establishing new border crossings and tourism exchanges.⁴⁰ The agreement was a major achievement for both leaders. Israel received from Jordan both recognition and the increased economic and diplomatic ties that it always sought from the Arab world. Hussein received peace with Israel, the return of Jordan to the good graces of the US and affirmation of Hussein's role in Jerusalem. Both Israel and Jordan accomplished their most important goals in the peace deal. The only thing that remained was formally writing the final peace treaty and working out any technical issues that remained.

The term belligerency almost ended the agreement before Rabin and Hussein could announce it. The lawyers advising Rabin told him that belligerency has no meaning in international law and he needed to replace it by calling for the end of war between the two nations. Hussein promised Rabin that in his statement in Washington he would make it clear what the text meant.⁴¹ He said, "The term used in international documents as have affected us so far, is 'the state of belligerency' and the 'end of the state of belligerency.' I think both in Arabic and Hebrew, our people do not have such a term. What we have accomplished and what we are committed to is the end of the state of war between Jordan and Israel."⁴² Once again, the trust between Rabin and Hussein prevailed and Hussein made clear to the world that the age of conflict between Israel and Jordan officially ended.

The following day, both Rabin and Hussein addressed a joint session of Congress.

Hussein discussed his history with the United States, declaring:

“I value the long friendship between Jordan and the United States, inherited from the era of my grandfather. I have sought over thirty-four years, since the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower, to ensure that it be honest and true. It has been a friendship built on mutual respect and common interests. I am proud to remind you how we stood shoulder to shoulder during the long years of the Cold War. And now together we share a great hope. To establish lasting peace in the Middle East.”⁴³

Hussein showed Congress and the American people that disputes from Gulf War were in the past. In addition, for decades he had led Jordan as a partner with the US and with American help, he would continue that partnership and bring peace to the rest of the region. It reminded the Americans that Hussein would be there when necessary to facilitate an Israeli relationship with other nations in the region, including the Palestinians. Hussein happily returned to the embrace of the United States and all the benefits that went with it. For Hussein, the Washington Declaration and his speech to Congress marked the successful completion of over forty-years of work. He overcame the problems associated with the Persian Gulf War and reinserted himself as a valuable American ally. In addition, he completed the work of his grandfather, establishing a peaceful relationship with Israel. Finally, he secured the future for his family in Jordan by removing both the Israeli and Palestinian threat, while placing Jordan under the protection of the United States.

To mark the new relationship between Israel and Jordan, Rabin invited Hussein to fly through Israeli air space on his return trip from the United States. The plan worried Hussein’s advisors because up until that point, Israeli airspace was strictly off limits to all

Jordan aircraft. Hussein decided to ignore his advisors and both he and the Queen enjoyed the view of Israel as Hussein flew the plane himself. In addition, to make sure nothing happened, Israel gave Hussein's plane an escort through Israel. As Hussein flew over Israel, he remained in contact with Rabin and the two celebrated the new era of Israeli-Jordanian relations.⁴⁴

After the signing of the Washington Declaration, Jordan faced very few protests at home and throughout the Arab world for their efforts at peace with Israel. In Jordan, there was a small protest led by the Islamic Action Front and the Syrian press attacked the king for abandoning a united Arab front. However, there was no direct protest from Syrian President al Assad. The only real loud protest came from the Palestinian Authority, upset over the provisions giving Jordan a special place in the final settlement of Jerusalem.⁴⁵ Hussein's efforts to prepare the Jordanian people for peace had paid off. In addition, many in Jordan hoped that the economic benefits of a peace agreement would help the struggling Jordanian economy.

After the Washington Declaration, both sides began to work on the details of the treaty. This time, the US participated more than in the past. Ten days after the Washington announcement, Warren Christopher traveled to the region and brokered a deal allowing for the opening up of the border at Wadi Arava and resuming postal service between the two nations.⁴⁶ It was remarkable that the changes announced in the Washington Declaration began to occur so quickly. Christopher wanted to show the people of the Middle East that the Declaration was not just words on paper, but a demonstration of actual progress. In the past, all actions in the Middle East peace process were slow and deliberate, with each step carefully orchestrated. Neither side wanted to

move too fast for fear of ending progress. Because of the relationship between Hussein and Rabin, that fear largely faded away.

Hussein faced an immediate issue in the negotiations when members of Congress informed him that Congress would not grant Jordan debt relief until Israel and Jordan officially signed the treaty. Hussein immediately informed Rabin of this issue and Rabin put Hussein's nephew, Talal in contact with an influential member of AIPAC named Steve Grossman. After Grossman had talked to Rabin, he called Talal back and told him that Congress would pass the bill, not to worry.⁴⁷ In addition, an issue arose because a Jordanian national living in New Jersey murdered his wife in a domestic dispute and returned to Jordan. Because Jordan did not have an extradition treaty with the US, it would not extradite him back. Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey threatened to block the aid if Jordan did not return him. Rabin asked Halevy to broker a compromise that ended the crisis.⁴⁸ For Hussein, it demonstrated the power of AIPAC and Israel in Congress and helped explain in some cases why he had trouble dealing with them in the past. In addition, it showed Hussein that he would continue to benefit from his improved relationship with Israel through Israeli support in the United States.

During the next five months, the hard work of negotiating a final peace treaty began. The two major issues were water rights and a small Israeli settlement on the border that Israel hoped to keep. The first round of negotiations between Israel and Jordan at Wadi Araba were tense. The negotiations took place in an army tent set up on the exact border between the two nations. It was so precise that the Jordanian and Israeli delegations remained in their own territory while the negotiating commenced. Dr. Munther J. Haddadin led the Jordanian delegation and Professor Uri Shamir the Israeli

delegation. The talks almost broke down immediately when Haddadin perceived an insult from Shimir because Shimir began with a discussion of future economic projects. Haddadin stormed out angrily because he believed any talks surrounding future projects could not start until they settled other issues. If Shimir had not quickly apologized, it could have stalled the peace process.⁴⁹

One of the largest areas of contention between Israel and Jordan came from the issue of water rights. Eventually, the two nations solved this issue not in the large traditional meeting, but through the personal diplomacy of Dr. Haddadin and Noah Kinarti, the Israeli representative on water issues. Their meeting occurred during the August meetings in Israel, after the Washington Declaration. Kinarti pulled Haddadin aside and asked him if they could meet in private and if Haddadin had the authorization to negotiate the water issues on his own. When he told Kinarti that was acceptable, they went to look for a private place to meet where they could discuss the issues without raising suspicion amongst the other delegates and the press that something was going on. Haddadin figured the best way to have a secret meeting was to do it in the open, so nobody would suspect a meeting was occurring. To accomplish this, they went to the cafeteria, asked to borrow the laptop of a reporter, sat down at the side of the room, and began the discussion. They separated themselves from everyone else and began to work out the water issues between their respective nations. Because it was so open, and they were using a reporter's laptop, nobody suspected an important meeting occurred. Eventually, after a lengthy discussion, the two sides reached an agreement on the distribution of water from the Jordan River. Israel pledged to send fifty million cubic meters of water a year to Jordan and pledged to find another fifty million cubic meters

through other sources like desalination.⁵⁰ Jordan feared that Israel could make changes to the Red Sea, the Jordan River, or the aquifer underneath the region that would limit Jordanian access to water. The completion of this stage of the negotiation was important to provide Jordan and Hussein confidence that they could solve other issues through compromise.

The other major issue between Jordan and Israel was a tract of land south of the Dead Sea. Since 1967, Israel placed a number of *kibbutz* farms on this land that they hoped to keep in any deal with Jordan. Jordan was determined to get all the land lost in 1967 war returned. After direct intervention between Halevy and Hussein, Israel and Jordan agreed to a deal where Israel returned the settlements to Jordanian sovereignty and Israel would lease the land from Jordan for twenty-five years. Israel also agreed to replace any water these farms used.⁵¹ This was the last major issue and both sides found a formula allowing each side to leave the negotiations satisfied. Israel for all intents and purposes kept the farms, but Jordan would have formal control. The relationship between the Jordanian and Israeli leadership allowed most issues to be worked out in this fashion, and if the delegations reached a sticking point, Rabin and Hussein solved the issue personally.

On October 26, 1994, Rabin and Hussein signed the peace treaty on the border between Israel and Jordan. The place for the gathering was an active minefield just days before. Clinton and other foreign leaders attended the ceremony, marking only the second Arab nation to sign a formal peace treaty with Israel. While similar in some aspects to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, this treaty focused less on security and more on cooperation between the two nations. In addition, unlike the Egyptian treaty, the

Israelis and the Jordanians did not require any UN or US force to serve as a buffer between the two nations. Hussein believed Jordan and Israel should do everything possible to promote the peace agreement, including fast tracking the economic connections between the two nations. Hussein described peace as:

Tearing down of barriers between people. It is people coming together, coming to know one another. It is the children of martyrs on both sides embracing. It is soldiers who fought each other coming together and exchanging reminiscences about the impossible conditions they had faced in a totally different atmosphere. It is people getting together and doing business. Real peace is not between governments but between individuals.⁵²

The peace treaty dramatically improved relations with the US, returning the US as the chief benefactor of Jordan. It also ended the notion of Israel pushing the Palestinians into Jordan and possibly making Jordan a Palestinian state. It provided for the long-term security of Jordan from any outside threat. In short, it provided for the long-term stability of the Hashemite family's control over Jordan.

At the ceremony, Clinton addressed the gathered leaders and showed through his speech that it was a new era in American-Jordanian relations, exclaiming:

King Hussein, today in this arid place, you bring to full flower the memory of the man who taught you to seek peace, your grandfather, King Abdullah. When he was martyred four decades ago, he left you with a great burden and great dream. He believed that one day, on both sides of the River Jordan, Arab and Jew would live in peace. How bravely you have shouldered that burden and carried that dream. Now after so much danger and so much hardship, Your Majesty, your day has come. Truly, you fulfilled your grandfather's legacy.⁵³

Hussein appreciated the speech because of the respect Clinton showed to his family's legacy. Hussein's relationship with Israel began when he took over the monarchy at the age of seventeen and through the guidance of his grandfather, learned at a young age the importance of a friendship with Israel and benefits of peace. After the ceremony, Clinton delivered an address to the Jordanian Parliament. Clinton tried to highlight the historical connection between Jordan and the United States. He mentioned Hussein's first meeting with Eisenhower, where Hussein pledged to stand with the US to keep communism out of the Middle East. Clinton said, "Both of us, Jordan and America, are fighting the same battle. Today, that battle is the struggle for peace. And I say again, on behalf of the United States, we will not let you down." Clinton also hoped the peace deal would improve relations between the United States and other Arab nations. He said, "America refuses to accept our civilizations must collide. We respect Islam . . . the traditional values of Islam, devotion to faith and good work, to family and society, are in harmony with the best of American ideals. Therefore, we know our people, our faiths, our cultures can live in harmony with each other."⁵⁴ Clinton's hoped that Hussein would continue to be an American partner promoting the peace process in the region. His optimism about Hussein's desire to continue to work with the United States was confirmed when Hussein continued to assist the Clinton administration as it continued the peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

Both the Israeli and Jordanian public celebrated the signing of the peace deal. For Israel, it meant an end to the constant conflict on their eastern border. For Jordan, it meant an end to the threat of Israel making Jordan Palestine. Prime Minister Majali said, "the treaty had buried *al-Watan al-Badil*." This translated to mean that some of the right-

wing Israeli politicians, mainly associated with the Likud party, could not claim Jordan was an alternative to a Palestinian state.⁵⁵ It would forever prove invalid that statement that Palestinians already had a state in Jordan.

There were immediate benefits from the peace deal for Jordan. Clinton declared Jordan a Major Non-NATO Ally of the United States, entitling them to a major increase in military aid that continued after the signing of the treaty. Jordan had a major increase in tourism from Israel because of the treaty. Before Israel and Jordan signed the treaty, Jordan received only \$35 million in support from the US. By 2014, that number reached \$700 million annually. In 1993, Jordan only received \$9 million in total military aid. This increased to \$300 million in 2014, including fifty-eight F-16s. Finally, the US undertook a number of major military related construction projects in Jordan, including a counterterrorism facility and the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center built in 2006. The US also made a number of economic investments in Jordan to help their economy. In 1996, Congress authorized the establishment of Qualifying Industrial Zones in Jordan that allowed for goods produced in Jordan and shipped through Israel to enter the US duty free. The only requirement was that while in Israel, the products had to have some value added to it. By 2002, products from these thirteen zones accounted for over ninety percent of Jordanian exports to the US.⁵⁶ There was also a dramatic increase in economic development between the Israel and Jordan. Israel cut tariffs on Jordanian imports by almost fifty percent. Israel started to invest in Jordan with over fifteen major investments in the fields of textiles, manufacturing and agriculture. They also started \$90 million joint project to produce bromine on the Dead Sea and a \$60 million plant to produce raw materials for a company located in Haifa.⁵⁷ Quickly, Hussein and the people

of Jordan witnessed the benefits of peace. Hussein's efforts to work with Israel assured his families survival as the head of Jordan and dramatically improved both the economic and military security of Jordan.

The relations between Israel and Jordan continued to improve. On October 31, 1995, Rabin and Peres led an economic conference in Amman to increase foreign investment in both Israel and Jordan. While there, the Israelis noticed a dramatic change in how the Jordanian public viewed them. Peres and Israeli ambassador Shimon Shamir took a walk towards the end of the conference around the streets of Amman. The public immediately recognized them and ran up to shake their hands and congratulate them on their achievement.⁵⁸

In the Arab world, Egypt was the biggest loser from the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty. Both the Americans and the Israelis frequently compared how both Egypt and Jordan reacted after they achieved peace with Israel and Egypt frequently came out looking worse in the eyes of the Americans. In addition, Egypt quickly realized that Israel no longer needed to rely on Cairo as a gateway to the Arab world; Hussein was willing to assume that role.⁵⁹ Egypt showed its frustration in late October 1995, at the Amman Economic Summit, when Egyptian foreign minister Amre Moussa launched an attack against an "unnamed Arab government" for rushing too fast to normalize relations with Israel. Hussein countered this argument saying, "If peace meant a better life for his people, we are not just rushing, but running." Moussa was taken aback by Hussein's retort and immediately said his argument was misconstrued and apologized to the attendees of the conference.⁶⁰ Hussein supplanted Egypt and Mubarak as the preferred America partner for promoting peace in the region. This occurred because of Hussein's

willingness to work with both Israel and the Palestinians along with his good relations with Rabin. In addition, without the threat of Israel pushing the Palestinians into Jordan or Hussein taking control of the West Bank, the relationship between Arafat and Hussein also improved. This would be important when the Americans and the Israelis needed Hussein to mediate disputes between the Palestinians and Israel.

Egypt was not the only Arab nation upset by Hussein's peace deal with Israel. In late December 1995, Hussein received word from the CIA of a Syrian plot to assassinate him. The CIA said that Syria opposed Hussein's treaty with Israel and his support of the opposition to Saddam. Syria believed that both ideas were a threat to the stability of Syria. In addition, the CIA told Hussein that Syria would start a propaganda campaign against Hussein, so to justify the assassination. The CIA also warned Hussein of Iraqi efforts to promote terrorist attacks inside Jordan, with the hope of destabilizing the regime. Hussein took these warnings seriously and changed his security situation to prevent an attack, including replacing all his bodyguards.⁶¹ Syria and Iraq had different reasons to be hostile to Hussein. Syria feared that because of Hussein's deal, the US would pressure them to make a similar deal. In addition, with the Palestinian Authority coming to terms with Israel, Syria was losing influence with the Palestinian groups in the region, threatening their position in Lebanon. For Iraq, Saddam saw the deal as another step for Jordan to regain its position with the US. Because of their shared border, he feared the US could use Jordan continue to undermine his regime.

Relations between the US and Jordan continued to improve after the signing of the treaty. Jordan's aid from the US dramatically increased and his personal relationship with the Clinton only grew. In addition, many in the Clinton administration

demonstrated their appreciation for Hussein's efforts towards peace. Meeting with Hussein in October 1994 after the Cairo Economic Conference, Christopher told Hussein, "You have done more in one year to bring peace with Israel than the Egyptians had done in seventeen years."⁶² Later that month, in a speech in to Georgetown on October 24, 1994, Christopher acknowledged the benefits of peace for the region. He said, Hussein and Rabin:

are determined that their border will become a gateway rather than a barrier. Already, there are ads in Israeli papers for tours of Jordan's great historical sites in Petra and Jerash. Through the work of the US-Jordan-Israel Trilateral Commission, plans are underway to develop joint economic projects, to share water resources, and to develop the Jordan River Valley. These projects will build bonds of human contact and common interest. They will cement an enduring peace.⁶³

Christopher wanted to show the economic benefits of peace to the region. He also wanted to demonstrate that with peace came improved relations with the US, hoping to encourage other Arab regimes to formalize relations with Israel.

Hussein's first big test to measure the strength of his repaired alliance with the US occurred throughout 1994 and 1995 when Saddam and Iraq again threatened its neighbors. In October 1994, Iraqi forces again headed in the direction of Kuwait. The US responded by again threatening military action. For Hussein, it was an opportunity to show that he learned the lessons of the previous Gulf War and in a meeting with Iraqi deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz, Hussein scolded him for Iraq's actions. In addition, he told him to tell Saddam "Jordan will not support Iraqi aggression."⁶⁴ Hussein needed to make it clear to the Arab world and the United States that he no longer supported Saddam in anyway and would back any military action against him. Hussein was no longer

willing to put his country at stake for the sake of his past friendship with Saddam. In addition, because of his improved relationship with Israel and the US, he no longer feared Saddam's military capability to threaten Jordan. He also did not need Iraq to defend against Israel or to keep Israel from making Jordan part of Palestine. Hussein even allowed the CIA to open up a station in Jordan with the goal of over-throwing Saddam.⁶⁵ On August 8, 1995, Saddam's two sons-in-laws, along with their wives and children, sought asylum in Jordan. Hussein granted their request and allowed them to speak out against the regime in Iraq. In addition, Hussein allowed the US to use Saddam's family to gain intelligence about Saddam's weapons programs. In late August, Hussein sent Saddam a letter, asking him to abide by UN resolutions and end his hostility to the West. When Saddam rejected these request, Hussein made a televised speech where he called for the removal of Saddam from power. He accused Saddam of threatening Jordan and his other neighbors, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. He said Saddam's continued actions would threaten the survival of Iraq and remove it as a barrier to Iran. He also pledged to continue to "assist the people of Iraq until the long night of their suffering comes to an end"⁶⁶ Hussein took the opposite approach to Saddam and Iraq compared to the first Persian Gulf War. Hussein no longer had the threat of popular support for Iraq and could firmly side with the Americans. In addition, while in the first Gulf War his economic stability relied on Iraq, now he needed continued American support to maintain his economy.

Relations between Jordan and Israel suffered a shock when on November 4, 1995, an Israeli assassin murdered Rabin at a peace rally in Tel Aviv. The news devastated Hussein. He lost both a friend and his partner in peace. Hussein traveled to Jerusalem

for the funeral with leaders from around the world.⁶⁷ At Rabin's funeral, Hussein gave one of the eulogies where he spoke of his friendship and partnership with Rabin to bring peace to the region. He started by saying how sad he was that it was under these circumstances that he visited Jerusalem for the first time at the invitation of the Israeli government. He said:

We achieved a peace, an honorable peace and a lasting peace. He had the courage, he had vision, and he had a commitment to peace, and standing here, I commit before you, before my people in Jordan, before the world, myself to continue with our utmost, to ensure that we leave a similar legacy. And when my time comes, I hope it will be like my grandfather's and like Yitzhak Rabin's.⁶⁸

Like Rabin, militants hostile to peace between Israel and Jordan assassinated Hussein's grandfather over rumors that he planned to make a separate peace with Israel in July 1951. For Hussein, comparing Rabin to King Abdullah was a clear sign of the esteem and respect he had for Rabin. Hussein's pledge to carry on and strive to bring peace to the region became more important as his health began to fail and he still fought to bring peace between Israel and the Arabs. He announced these intentions by saying about Rabin, "You lived as a soldier, you died as a soldier for peace. . . . We belong to the camp of peace. We believe in peace. We believe that our one God wishes us to live in peace and wishes peace upon, us for these are His teachings to all the followers of the three great monotheistic religions, the children of Abraham."⁶⁹ Going forward, for Hussein, the quest for peace was a holy promise to his departed friend and a religious duty that he intended to uphold.

Hussein worried that the death of Rabin would hurt Jordan's normalization efforts with Israel. He believed Peres was too close to Arafat and he missed the personal relationship and trust he enjoyed with Rabin. In addition, Peres made a number of military moves that stressed the relationship with Jordan. This included the assassination of a bomb maker from Hamas and Israeli attack in southern Lebanon on Syrian backed forces from Hezbollah called "Operation Grapes of Wrath"⁷⁰ Hussein still did not fully trust Peres after the failures from their dealings in the past. Many of the challenges in the relationship between Jordan and Israel would not have occurred if Rabin lived to continue his leadership of Israel.

In May 1996, Binyamin Netanyahu of the Likud Party became the Prime Minister of Israeli, defeating Peres by thirty thousand votes. At first, Hussein believed that Netanyahu would make a better partner for peace than Peres because Hussein feared Peres might sacrifice the relationship with Jordan to achieve a deal with Syria. Hussein even made efforts to help Netanyahu in the election by inviting him to a meeting in Jordan. Unfortunately, Hussein badly misjudged Netanyahu, who upon taking office, began dismantling the peace process with the Palestinians. This included breaking previous agreements and instituting a policy of mass arrests of Palestinian leaders. In addition, this included a dramatic increase in settlement construction on land in the West Bank. The situation took a dramatic turn when Netanyahu allowed the opening of an ancient tunnel near the Al-Aqsa Mosque on September 25. Because of Netanyahu's actions, mass protests occurred throughout the Palestinian territories.⁷¹ Netanyahu's decision to open the tunnel threatened the new peace between Israel and Jordan. According to the peace treaty, Israel supported Hussein's special role at the holy sites,

because of that, Hussein believed that no changes to the site should occur without his approval. In a meeting between Arafat, Hussein, Netanyahu and Clinton on October 2, 1996, Hussein appealed to Clinton to help work out the crisis. At the meeting, Hussein told Netanyahu, "I speak for myself, for Yitzhak Rabin, a man whom I had the great pride to call my friend, and for all people who benefit from peace. All this good will is being lost. We are at the edge of the abyss, and regardless of our best efforts, we might be just about to fall into it, all of us."⁷² Clinton's intervention convinced Netanyahu to reclose the tunnel.⁷³ Hussein again showed that he was a moderating influence in disputes between the Palestinians and the Israelis and he demonstrated to Clinton that he would continue to play a positive role in securing peace in the region.

The peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians also began to bog down. Previously, in a meeting with Clinton, Hussein told him that the US and Israel needed to take a different approach than what he and Rabin took. Hussein felt that the step-by-step approach that he used with Rabin would not work with the Palestinians because of the lack of trust between the two sides.⁷⁴ The Palestinians feared Netanyahu would use the old Likud trick of delaying final status talks indefinitely while Israel changed the situation on the ground through increased settlement expansion, making it impossible to create a Palestinian state. In 1997, the Palestinians and the Israelis were in the process of negotiating the pull out of Israeli forces from Hebron. With the negotiations falling apart over exactly when the Israeli pullout would begin, Hussein called Ross and said he was willing to fly to Gaza and meet with Arafat if it was helpful. Arafat agreed and invited Hussein. Hussein landed in Gaza and proposed a compromise of mid-1998 as the removal date. At this point, the Israelis were set on a pullout date of

October and the Palestinians were set on a date in May. Ross had tried to use Egypt to broker a compromise, but they proved less than helpful by arguing strictly for the Palestinian position. Hussein's proposal left the situation vague, allowing both sides to see victory in it. Hussein even flew with Ross and Palestinian negotiator Seab Erekat to Jerusalem to seal the deal.⁷⁵ The agreement was called the Hebron Protocols and it called for the splitting of Hebron, with the Palestinian Authority taking control of eighty percent and the Israelis retaining the other twenty percent. Each side would make their own security arrangements.⁷⁶ Hussein demonstrated to Ross and the Americans that he would go to any length to help the peace process move forward. He showed that he could put old disputes behind him and do what was best for the region, even if that meant working with two people, Arafat and Netanyahu, that he spent decades at war with. It also showed the US that even after Hussein received the benefits of his peace deal with Israel, in the form of US aid, unlike Egypt, he would continue to assist the US in its efforts to overcome disputes in the region.

A number of incidents in 1997 had the potential to derail the peace accord between Israel and Jordan. On March 13, 1997, a Jordanian soldier opened fire at the Jordanian border on a group of Israeli schoolchildren. The attack killed seven children and wounded another six. The attack outraged Hussein. He scolded the members of the military who had control of that area, telling them, "Shooting children is something one must not do in wartime, let alone when they are at peace." Hussein also went to the Israeli village that was home to the children and apologized to all the family members. In addition, he allowed Jordanian television to film it, showing him on his knees grieving with the families. For many in the Arab world, this was a sign of surrender, but Hussein

did not care. He wanted it shown so the people of the Middle East saw that the hatred of old times needed to end. He said, "If there is any purpose in my life it will be to make sure that all the children do not suffer the way our generation did."⁷⁷ Finally, Hussein quietly asked the Israeli government if it would be appropriate to make a donation to the families. They agreed, and Hussein transferred a million dollars to help the grieving families.⁷⁸ While Hussein's gestures did not help him in the wider Arab world, it did grant him a level of respect in the Israeli public. The mayor of Rimon, where the girls attended the school, wrote Hussein a letter. In it, he said, "Your wonderful personality, personal courage and humanity, which you showed when you visited the bereaved families, have further strengthened the support and sympathy you have from the citizens of Israel. We all see you as one of the most important, central figures in the Middle East, striving continuously, for many years, for the establishment of true peace between our two countries."⁷⁹ Hussein's main concern was the importance of promoting the peace process that he worked so hard to achieve and was outraged and ashamed that a member of his military tried to destroy that legacy.

Also in March, Hussein had a confrontation with Netanyahu over the King's plane entering Israeli airspace. Hussein agreed to fly Arafat personally in the royal airliner to a new airport located in Rafah jointly built by Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. When Hussein entered Israeli airspace, as he frequently did since the signing of the peace treaty, Israeli air traffic control denied his plane entry into Israel. The closing of Israeli airspace forced Hussein to return to Amman, deeply embarrassed by Netanyahu's actions. He sent a message to Netanyahu that said, "You are piling up

tragic actions You are pushing all the Arabs and Israelis toward an abyss of disasters and bloodbath.”⁸⁰

The third incident occurred on September 25, 1997, when two Mossad agents attempted to assassinate a Jordanian citizen named Khalid Mishal, a leader in Hamas, in response to a number of Hamas bombings in Israel. While the Mossad agents injected Mishal with poison, Mishal’s bodyguards captured two agents and another four hid out in the Israeli embassy in Amman. This assassination attempt outraged Hussein. Just a few days before Hussein met with Israeli representatives to discuss cooperation in fighting terrorists. In addition, he secured an agreement from Hamas for a thirty-year truce with Israel. Hussein called Clinton to express his outrage. Clinton agreed with Hussein’s assessment and yelled about Netanyahu, “This man is impossible!” Hussein told Clinton that if Israel did not bring the antidote to Jordan immediately, he would storm the embassy, put the Israelis on public trial and suspend the peace treaty. Hussein was not bluffing about the threat to storm the embassy. He had a Special Forces unit lined up ready to do under the command of eldest son Abdullah II.⁸¹

While Netanyahu at first balked at providing the antidote, eventually he realized he had no choice. Even then, at first Netanyahu sent the antidote but would not reveal the toxin or the chemical makeup of the antidote. Netanyahu called Ross to get his opinion on the situation and sought his help for ending the crisis. Ross was outraged. He repeatedly asked Netanyahu what he was thinking. Ross told him that he needed to give in to the King’s request. Netanyahu was reluctant without assurances that the Jordan would return the Israeli agents. Ross told him, “Prime Minister, you embarrassed the King, you have taken advantage of your special relationship in security, and you are

going to have to make amends. Start with the antidote, make an apology, and promise you won't do anything like this again and these agents will never again set foot in Jordan."⁸² Netanyahu also had to call in Halevy, who was now the Israeli ambassador to the European Union, to help negotiate a release of the Israelis. After meeting with Hussein, Halevy told Netanyahu that he did not believe Hussein was bluffing and urged him to give into Hussein's demands. Halevy was able to make some headway with Hussein, but in a surprise, it was left to Ariel Sharon to finish the negotiations. Halevy made a personal request to the King to allow the agents in the Israeli embassy to leave with him. Because of their friendship, Hussein granted the request. While a member of Netanyahu's party and a member of his cabinet, Sharon hated Netanyahu. Sharon agreed to the exchange of Hamas leader, Shaikh Ahmad Yassin, twenty-three Jordanian citizens and fifty Palestinians for the safe return of the Israeli agents.⁸³ This incident created a back channel relationship for Sharon and Hussein that would be important if Netanyahu lost power. It also once again demonstrated to the US that Hussein was the voice of moderation in the region, and Netanyahu was the obstacle to peace. While Hussein had every right to be angry because of the Israeli actions, he worked with the US to find an equitable solution that preserved Jordan's sovereignty while maintaining his relationship with the US and the Clinton administration.

Hussein had another idea for a peace plan March 1998, with the hopes of breaking the logjam in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Hussein proposed to Mubarak that all the Arab nations meet at a summit and pledge that all twenty-two Arab countries would sign a peace deal with Israel if Israel agreed to return all the West Bank to the Palestinians. Mubarak agreed and both he and Hussein believed that it would be better if

Mubarak was the sponsor of the summit. They also informed the White House of their plan. Eventually, Mubarak was contacted by Albright who told him that she was working on her own plan with the Palestinians and Israelis and an Arab summit would mess that up. Because of that, Mubarak and Hussein dropped their effort.⁸⁴ Hussein continued to work towards peace in the Middle East, but he was unwilling to do anything that went against American interests in the region.

In July 1998, Hussein's health took a turn for the worse. He had numerous tests run at the Mayo clinic and he was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. Because the cancer had spread, he would now need frequent treatments in the United States. His wife believed that diagnosis only meant Hussein had months to live.⁸⁵ Because of his condition, Hussein was more determined than ever to advance the peace process. He saw it as a legacy issue and believed that a region in peace would help the transition for his eldest son, Abdullah, when he took the crown.

On October 17, Clinton called for a summit outside of Washington D.C. at the Wye Plantation so the Israelis and Palestinians could make progress on final status talks. Despite his physical condition, Clinton asked Hussein to attend to help the negotiations. Hussein was so sick and his immune system so compromised, any delegation that met with him had to first cover their arms in an anti-bacterial solution. He was unable to eat and lost all his hair. It was obvious to everyone he was really sick. Hussein addressed the summit and said, "These differences pale in comparison to what is at stake. After [an] agreement both sides will look back and not even recall these issues. It is now time to finish, bearing in mind the responsibility that both leaders have to their people and especially the children."⁸⁶ Hussein's appearance added to the momentum of the summit.

Clinton believed that the sight of Hussein in such dire condition, still working for peace, ended much of the posturing from the participants.⁸⁷ After he finished his speech, many of the participants went to thank him for coming but did not want to shake his hand for fear of making him sick. Arafat kissed him on the shoulder instead of the cheek.⁸⁸ Even in his weakened state, Hussein made an impact on the peace process and his presence inspired many of the participants at the summit. George Tenet later described how important Hussein was to making a breakthrough at Wye and called his actions at the summit heroic.⁸⁹

When negotiations hit a standstill, Clinton called Hussein and told him that Netanyahu had threatened to leave. Hussein advised Clinton to call his bluff and if he left, they would hold a joint news conference together blaming Netanyahu for the failure. Eventually, the Palestinians and the Israelis agreed to a deal to restart the process between them. Israel agreed to return another thirteen percent of the West Bank to the Palestinians and release a number of Palestinian prisoners. Arafat and Netanyahu signed an agreement on October 23, with Hussein's participation.⁹⁰ At the press conference announcing the deal. Clinton praised Hussein for his efforts and in response, Hussein made a gesture to help Clinton in his impeachment battle with Republicans. At the signing of the Wye Agreement, Hussein said, "But on the subject of peace . . . never, with all the affection I held for your predecessors, have I know someone with your dedication, clearheadedness, focus, and determination . . . and we hope you will be with us as we seek greater success and as we help our brethren move towards a better tomorrow." Clinton later mentioned the importance of world leaders like Hussein in prevailing in his impeachment fight.⁹¹ Hussein continued to work with the Clinton administration and

demonstrate his value to the Americans. He was willing to work towards the peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis despite the detriment to his health. He assumed the role as an elder statesman of the region and continued to use his relationship with Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the Americans to promote the peace process in the Middle East.

The Wye agreement marked the end of Hussein's involvement in the peace process as his health continued to deteriorate. Despite that, during the Clinton administration, Hussein achieved a great deal in securing peace with Israel. His friendship with Rabin finally accomplished the goals started by his grandfather to normalize relations with Israel. His efforts to improve relations with the United States after the Gulf War were finally completed, bringing much needed economic relief to Jordan. In addition, even after achieving peace and security with Israel, Hussein continued to work on behalf of the Palestinians so they too could benefit from the peace process. Hussein's action during the Clinton administration firmly established Jordan as an important ally of the US in the region. This is even more remarkable when considering that Jordan's only real importance came from geography and the moderation of its leadership. It did not have the resources that Saudi Arabia or the other Gulf States had. Despite that, Hussein continued to place Jordan at the center of American foreign policy in the Middle East during the Clinton administration and played an important role in brokering agreements between Israel and the Palestinians.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

As the Clinton administration came to an end, Hussein's cancer progressively worsened. While he continued to fight the disease through several bouts of chemotherapy and trips to the Mayo clinic, he died in Jordan on February 7, 1999. His death ended the reign of one of the most significant leaders in the modern Middle East. He survived numerous coup and assassination attempts, a civil war, an invasion by a hostile neighbor and three major military conflicts. Despite having no natural resources to speak of, Hussein placed Jordan in the middle of American foreign policy in the region, assuring the monarchy and his nation's survival long after his death. While Hussein should be credited with all he has done for his nation and for promoting American interests in the region, his real legacy is his efforts to bring peace to the Arabs and the Israelis. Especially later in his life, Hussein consistently attempted to facilitate an agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians with the hope of promoting peace and stability throughout the region. Fortunately for him and Jordan, the desire for stability coincided with American interests in the Middle East and many presidents found him a willing partner in achieving that goal.

Four American Presidents attended his funeral along with leaders from all over the world. Israel sent the largest foreign delegation to the funeral, an acknowledgement of Hussein's importance to promoting peace and security in the region. Even Hussein's old foes Assad, Mubarak and Arafat attended the funeral. Clinton's statement on Hussein's death said, "Today the world mourns the loss of a partner and friend. He was a magnificent man. And like so many, I loved and admired him."¹ George H. W. Bush said of Hussein, "His contributions to world peace will go down in history. He was a loyal ally of the United States and a visionary advocate of Middle East peace. The world has lost one of its great leaders, and he will be sorely missed on the world scene."² The people of Jordan deeply felt the loss of King Hussein and an estimated eight hundred thousand mourners lined the streets Amman for his funeral procession.³ His funeral was of the largest gatherings of foreign leaders in recent memory and had dignitaries from all the Middle East nations, Europe, Asia, South America, Russia, and the United States. This was a testament to Hussein's importance to world peace and the importance of his over the forty-five-year reign as the king of Jordan.

Why did the US place such high value in the survival of King Hussein as the head of Jordan? It could not have been for domestic political reasons because Israel always had more public support in the US than any of the Arab nations. This was especially true after the October War in 1973 and the Arab oil boycott that followed along with Jordan's role in the First Persian Gulf War. Jordan had no viable economic resource like the oil reserves in Saudi Arabia, it had no access to a strategic waterway like the Persian Gulf, as the United Arab Emirates did. Jordan was not a great military power like Egypt or Iraq. Instead, Hussein and Jordan's value came from its relative location to Israel and

Hussein's moderation and willingness to promote American interests in the region. For the first two-thirds of his reign, this came from Hussein's willingness to assist the US in blocking Soviet expansion in the region. Hussein played an important part in preventing Soviet expansion and the takeover of a vital natural resource. Without Hussein's efforts, Jordan would have likely become a Soviet client as early as 1970 during Hussein's fight with Syria and the Palestinians. This would have surrounded Israel with hostile regimes, making it more likely a war like the October War could have exploded into a conflict between the superpowers. In addition, if the Soviet Union had control of Jordan, Iraq, and Syria, it could have threatened the American access to oil through the Gulf States who would have been surrounded by anti-American governments. In addition, Hussein became an important element in the American efforts to stop the spread of Iran's radical agenda. Hussein gave the Americans a way to counter the growing threat of Iran and its proxies in Syria and Lebanon by aiding Iraq through Jordan. Because of Hussein's relationship with both Saddam and the United States, he was able to facilitate aid from the US to Iraq for its war with Iran.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Hussein continued to be a moderate voice in the region, striving to achieve peace between the Arabs and the Israelis, including working with the PLO to end their conflict with Israel. He became an important American ally in facilitating negotiations between the Palestinians and the Arabs. Hussein's actions differed from Egypt, who similarly signed a peace treaty with Israel, because Hussein continued to promote the broader peace process and did not exclusively focus on his own interests. Hussein used his relationship with Israel and the Palestinians to help them achieve an agreement. This was important for the growth of the Palestinian

Authority and for American efforts to bring stability to the region. It was clear towards the end of this life that the Clinton administration relied on Hussein to bridge the gaps between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

From the start of his monarchy, Hussein attempted to forge good relations with the West and the United States. Beginning after the debacle of the Six Day War in 1967, Hussein accelerated those efforts and became a reliable ally for the United States and peace in the region. During his reign, he repeatedly showed that he was instrumental in bringing peace between the Arabs and the Israelis while also promoting American interests throughout the region. In addition, Hussein attempted to block the growing Soviet influence in the region throughout the Cold War in places like Syria, Iraq, and Egypt. Various American administrations responded to Hussein's efforts with large amounts of both economic and military aid that facilitated the survival of King Hussein and his monarchy.

During the Nixon administration, King Hussein dramatically improved his relationship with the United States. The Nixon administration demonstrated the value it placed on King Hussein's success through efforts like the Rogers Plan to find a solution between the Arabs and Israel. In addition, through the Rogers Plan, the Nixon administration demonstrated the belief that Jordan was an important part of Nixon's Cold War strategy of preventing further Soviet expansion in the Middle East. Through the Rogers Plan and Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy after the conclusion of the October War, the United States strived to show the Arabs that if they wanted to achieve their goals with Israel and regain the land lost in 1967, it could only be done through relations with the United States and not the Soviet Union. Hussein played an important part in these

negotiations, facilitating American efforts to reach a disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt and Syria. Unlike other leaders in the region, Hussein not only worked with the American to find an agreement between Jordan and Israel, he also worked with other Arab countries to improve the chances of success for Kissinger's efforts.

In addition, the Americans' view of Hussein as a valuable ally in the Cold War became important for Hussein's survival when he attempted to remove the Palestinian militants from his country in 1970 and faced an invasion from Soviet backed Syria in response. The combination of previous American military shipments to Jordan and American diplomatic efforts were important for Hussein's ability to survive the crisis. In addition, Hussein's request for Israeli aid and the Nixon administration's attempts to facilitate that aid demonstrated the importance of the Jordanian-American relationship. The Nixon administration tried to get support from Israel for an intervention, but only on terms that made Hussein's eventual survival paramount, showing the value they placed on the personal leadership of Hussein and the fear of who could replace him. If Hussein lost his conflict with Syria and the Palestinians, Hussein would have likely been replaced by a Soviet-backed leadership who had would continue to thwart American goals in the region.

The Nixon administration also saw another major Middle Eastern war that placed Jordan and Hussein in considerable danger during the October War of 1973. In this conflict, Nixon and Kissinger argued on behalf of Hussein to the Israelis. They believe it was necessary for Jordan needed to enter the war in some fashion and Israel should not respond with a full-scale attack on Jordan. They hoped to protect Hussein from both the Israelis and the anger of the Arab world if he did not participate in the attack on Israel.

The diplomatic messages sent to the Israelis arguing Hussein's position demonstrated Nixon and Kissinger's regard for Hussein and his importance for promoting American interests in the region. They hoped to help Hussein by balancing his need to retain his position in the Arab world while not facing the consequences of any action he took, similar to the devastating Israeli response which occurred when Hussein supported Egypt in the Six Day War. Without Hussein's history of moderation and his ability to work with Israel, it is likely that the war could have continued to expand. Israel barely survived an invasion on two fronts and even threatened the use of nuclear weapons to stop the Arabs advance, making. It is possible Israel's position would have been a lot worse if they faced an active invasion from Hussein on its eastern front. Hussein's willingness to work with the Americans and the Israelis was important in keeping the conflict expanding.

During the Nixon administration, Hussein experienced a number of setbacks in his attempts to regain his lost territory from the 1967 war and maintain his position as the voice of the Palestinians. When the Arab League passed the Rabat resolution in 1974, making the PLO the sole representative of the Palestinian people, Hussein needed to adapt his efforts in the peace process. This resolution passed despite American efforts to get other friendly regimes to block it during the meeting. Hussein responded by adapting his negotiation strategy to include representatives of the Palestinian people and on numerous occasions, putting aside his past disputes with Yasir Arafat to forge a peace deal with the Israelis with the support of the United States. In addition, the rise of the Likud Party in 1977 dramatically changed the nature of the Israeli government, making it vastly more conservative and less willing to deal with the Arabs, including Jordan. In

fact, some members of the Israeli government believed that Jordan was the natural home for the Palestinian people and the Israeli government should attempt to move them out of the West Bank and into Jordan. Despite these setbacks, Hussein continued to promote American interests through the peace process. While the Rabat resolution and the rise of Likud hampered his ability, Hussein still tried to organize the Arabs for a conference in Geneva that allowed for a US-led settlement between the Arabs and the Israelis.

Even when the actions of the United States disappointed Hussein, he did not fundamentally change his attitude towards the West. For example, after the destruction during the October War, Hussein hoped that Kissinger and Ford would focus on Jordanian relations with Israel and Hussein's quest to return the land lost in 1967. He did not try to sabotage the talks between the US and the other Arab nations when the Americans focused more on securing a disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel and Israel and Syria. Instead, he provided advice and encouragement to the US efforts to facilitate a disengagement agreement between Israel and the Arabs, recommending to Kissinger certain actions that might make his efforts more successful. Other leaders like Mubarak of Egypt only concerned themselves with their own national interests, willingly sabotaging other efforts if necessary. He helped to facilitate American efforts to keep the Soviet Union out of the negotiations to resolve the crisis with the goal of showing the rest of the Arab world that only through the United States could they achieve their desires of a peace process with Israel. Throughout the Nixon and Ford administrations, Hussein consistently showed an attitude of moderation that encouraged a peace process between the Arabs and Israel while supporting the American goals in the Cold War.

At the start of the Carter administration, Hussein excitedly promoted a comprehensive plan to forge a peace deal between Israel and all of the Arab states with the hope of expanding the process started by Kissinger in Geneva. When those plans merged into the Camp David Accords, the first real break occurred in American and Jordanian relations. While Hussein opposed Sadat's deal with Israel, it was not out of revulsion to making peace with the Jews, but for fear that it would end Israeli efforts at forging a peace deal with the rest of the Arab world. In fact, this is generally what occurred. Hussein, it turned out was correct. Israel was willing to make a peace deal with Egypt but had no intention of making the sacrifices necessary to end the state of belligerency with Jordan. Even when almost all of the Arabs reacted harshly to the Egyptian deal, Hussein remained a voice of moderation. He remained close to the Egyptians and did not participate in the complete economic boycott of Egypt and its people like most of the other Arab nations. While at the Baghdad Summit in 1978, Hussein did not participate in the many of the resolutions that condemned Egypt in the harshest terms and continued to argue the need for a comprehensive solution to the conflict with Israel. Hussein chose not to isolate Egypt fully keeping some of the economic connections between the two nations. This was important because it would hurt future American led efforts at the peace process if signing a treaty with Israel resulted in hostility and total isolation from all neighboring countries. Other Arab leaders boycotted and verbally attacked Egypt because of its deal with Israel. While Carter was disappointed Hussein did not participate in the Camp David process, he eventually embraced Hussein again when the American position in the Islamic world diminished through the takeover of Iran by the Ayatollah and the Soviet invasion of the Afghanistan.

Hussein wanted to replace Iran as a pillar of American policy in the region through his moderation and his willingness to work with Israel and oppose the Soviet Union.

During the Reagan administration, President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz found Hussein to be a friendly ally in their efforts to bring peace to the region. The Reagan administration had three major peace efforts, beginning with the Reagan Plan. King Hussein supported all these plans in some form. While all ended in failure, Hussein generally pushed for their success. The first plan, the Reagan Plan, failed because of Israeli domestic politics and the Likud Party's continued power. Hussein consistently worked with Reagan to find a solution that was agreeable to the Arabs and the Israelis that would allow for the peace process to move forward. He proposed a number of different arrangements that allowed for the Israelis to negotiate with non-PLO Palestinians while still respecting the wishes of the other Arab nations expressed by the Rabat resolution declaring the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. During the Reagan administration, while Hussein worked with the PLO to attempt to bridge the gap between the Arabs and Israel, other nations attempted to sabotage it. This was particularly the case with Syria. With Soviet support, Syria frequently attacked Jordan and the PLO with propaganda for their efforts to negotiate with Israel and even tried to replace Arafat because of his collaboration with Hussein. If Syria replaced Hussein in 1970, it is likely Israel and the US would have faced a more radical Palestinians movement stationed in Jordan, promoting war instead of peace. In addition, Hussein became an important ally for Reagan's attempts to counter Soviet expansion through Syria and the attempts by Iran to export its radical ideology throughout the

region. In the case of Iran, Hussein and Jordan served an important role in connecting the United States with Iraq and Saddam Hussein, supporting his efforts in the war with Iran.

Changes in the Palestinian territories ended Hussein's ability to support the American led peace effort towards the end of the Reagan administration. The rise of the *intifada* increased tension with Israel and made it impossible for either side to make a concerted effort at solving the issues between the Arabs and the Israelis. The *intifada* also led Hussein to change his relationship with the West Bank. Before the *intifada*, Hussein dealt with numerous betrayals from Arafat and in turn, tried to supplant him as the voice of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. The *intifada* interrupted that billion-dollar economic plan. With the Israeli help, Hussein hoped to improve the everyday lives of the Palestinians, believing that it would increase their desire to align with Jordan and his leadership. Once the *intifada* started, those plans ended. In response to continued insults from the Arabs and the Palestinian leadership, along with growing discontent for the Palestinian territories from his own people, on July 31, 1988, Hussein announced that Jordan was ending the ties to the West Bank. This ended the Reagan and Shultz's attempts at the peace process because they realized without Jordan's participation, it was unlikely to succeed. This was especially true because the Israelis would only agree to negotiate with the non-PLO Palestinians if they merged into a joint delegation with Jordan. Israel also refused to accept a Palestinian state, only some form of confederation with Jordan. Unwilling to make the mistakes of Camp David, the Israelis and the Reagan administration could not negotiate a deal without the active participation of Jordan and Hussein. While Hussein's efforts to disengage Jordan's role in the West Bank originally looked like it would hurt American goals for the region, it

eventually had the positive effect on the peace process. Hussein's decision to end his role in the West Bank forced the Palestinians and the PLO to take ownership of their situation. It forced the PLO to moderate because it now needed to negotiate with Israel and the United States to improve the daily lives of the Palestinian people. In addition, it forced Israel to break its prohibition of not negotiating directly with the Palestinians. Without Hussein's actions, the agreement reached between Israel and the Palestinians in Oslo was unlikely. Despite this personal setback, Hussein continued to believe he had a role to play in bringing peace between the Arabs and the Israelis and would continue that role when Reagan's Vice President, George H. W. Bush became president in 1989.

During the Bush administration, the biggest challenge to Hussein's relationship with the United States occurred. When Saddam Hussein and Iraq invaded Kuwait, Hussein found himself in a very difficult position. He had a number of factors working against him, including his close economic ties to Iraq, the population of Jordan's feelings towards Iraq, and his personal relationship with both Bush and Saddam. Hussein continued to try and find a peaceful way out of the crisis, much to the chagrin of his Western allies, and he refused to join the Western coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Despite the accusations that Hussein either planned to join Saddam or was paid off by Saddam, it seems clear that Hussein's Arab nationalism, economic survival, and the will of his people led him to take this position of neutrality in the First Gulf War. While he knew it would damage his relationship with the US, and in particular George Bush, he believed that consequence of the American-led military effort would be detrimental to the region. Even during the war, Hussein used his well-developed relationship with Israel to help keep the conflict from escalating out of control. Even when the Jordanian-American

relationship was at its lowest point, Hussein's actions continued to support American objectives for the region. His refusal to allow Iraq to use Jordan to attack Israel was important for the American efforts to maintain the coalition. If Iraq used Jordanian air space to attack Israel, it had the possibility of expanding the conflict and destroying the American-led coalition. Once the war ended, Hussein immediately tried to improve relations with the US and became an enthusiastic support of Bush's Madrid Conference and the bilateral negotiations that followed. He worked to find a role for the Palestinians in the negotiations and continued to take into account their position while moving Jordan's negotiations forward. He used his unique relationship with the Americans, Israelis, and the Palestinians to find a way to include the Palestinians in the process. Shamir's willingness to trust Hussein's efforts to build a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Madrid Conference was an important element of the conference's success. It is difficult to imagine another leader who could have facilitated the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. This process culminated during the Washington Conference when Israel and Jordan finished working on an agreement that outlined the principles for a future peace treaty between Jordan and Israel.

The success of the Washington Conference led directly to the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty and the announcement between Yitzhak Rabin and Hussein on the White House lawn in 1994 that the state of war between Jordan and Israel officially ended. This was accomplished with the personal diplomacy that Hussein frequently relied on and the support of the United States to help Jordan's economic situation after the end of the Gulf War. Without the leadership of Hussein and Rabin it is unlikely Jordan and Israel would have ended their state of belligerency. The importance of the leaders involved in the

negotiating process is demonstrated when comparing Jordan Syria. Unlike Jordan, Syria still does not recognize Israel and there are continued attacks against Syrian forces by Israel. In addition, Syria continues to support hostile militant groups like Hezbollah in their efforts to attack Israel. Hussein's moderation and pragmatism were important in establishing peace between Jordan and Israel. The Clinton administration played an important role in assisting Jordan recover, allowing Hussein to argue to his people the benefits of peace. The culmination of the peace treaty with Israel finally achieved for Hussein something that his grandfather first attempted, Jordan could finally live in open peace with its neighbors in Israel. The treaty also ended any residual hard feelings over Hussein's role in the First Gulf War because the US witnessed Hussein's efforts to compromise and achieve peace with Israel. After the treaty, Jordan became an important non-NATO ally to the US, and the US delivered countless forms of economic and military aid to strengthen Jordan's position in the region.

Even after his treaty with Israel was signed, Hussein continued to demonstrate his importance to the United States in the region through his assistance in American efforts to remove Saddam Hussein from Iraq and his continued to support the Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts. During the Clinton administration. Hussein allowed Saddam's family to defect to Jordan while allowing the US to use them for intelligence. He also let the US setup efforts in Jordan through the CIA focused on deposing Saddam from Iraq while also supporting numerous Iraqi opposition groups. In addition, he continued to act as arbiter between the Palestinians and the Israelis, striving to help them reach a peace settlement. This occurred during the negotiations for the Hebron Protocols and culminated when he left his sick bed and attended the Wye Summit to restart the peace

process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Through his efforts, Hussein demonstrated why the Americans always valued his leadership in the region. He would frequently be a voice for moderation and peace, trying to bridge the gaps between the Israelis and the Arabs and promoting American interests throughout the region.

Hussein's relationship with the US continues to be important because it laid the foundation for the American relationship with his successor and eldest son, King Abdullah II. After the attacks on September 11, Abdullah pledged Jordan's full support for the Americans to strike at those responsible.⁴ In addition, the sons of Bush and Hussein continued the work of their fathers to develop George W. Bush's road map for peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis in July 2003.⁵ During the Second Gulf War, in a meeting with the head of the coalition forces, Tommy Franks, Abdullah told him, "General, I must protect my nation's interests. But I assure you those interests coincide with America's. You can count on Jordan."⁶ When it came to Iraq, Abdullah learned the lessons from closely observing his father, Saddam Hussein was a menace and it was in Jordan's long-term interests to help the United States remove him. Jordan allowed the US to use Jordanian territory to launch Special Forces attacks against Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. The US stationed between two and three thousand Special Forces troops at the Jordanian air base Safawi, allowing them to freely operate inside Iraq. The US also stationed Patriot anti-missile batteries in Jordan to protect Israel from incoming Iraqi Scud missiles.⁷

Even in the Obama administration, Jordan is still reaping the benefits from Hussein's actions with the United States. Trade between Jordan and the United States also has continued to increase, accounting for \$3.3 billion dollars annually, a tenfold

increase since the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty.⁸ The relationship between Jordan and the US also benefited Jordan during the Arab Spring uprisings throughout the Arab world in 2011. The US has facilitated aid from Jordan from wealthier oil states like Saudi Arabia and financially supported Jordan's efforts to absorb the massive refugee population from Syria.⁹ Jordan continues to assist the United States in training fighters against the Islamic State and has partnered with Israel to confront both Syrian and Russian actions in the region.¹⁰ Abdullah also continues his father's legacy of working to promote American interests and ideals in the region. In an interview with CNN, Abdullah echoed Obama's frequent argument that ISIS does not represent Islam. He said ISIS was, "trying to invent falsely a linkage to a caliphate, link to our history in Islam that has no truth or bearing to our history." Jordan is also an active participant in the airstrikes against ISIS sometime launching up to sixty strikes on ISIS targets a day.¹¹ All these actions are directly related to the efforts of Hussein to forge a lasting alliance with the United States. The alliance Hussein worked to develop still benefits both Jordan and the United States long after Hussein's death.

The choices by Hussein and the leadership of the United States during his monarchy created the environment that allowed the Jordanian-American relationship to continue to flourish today. Hussein's ability to manage his nation's interest and align them with the United States made it possible for Jordan to remain one of the most pro-Western nations in the Middle East. While Hussein's efforts to place Jordan in the American sphere of influence during the Cold War are important, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Hussein's real legacy is his quest to achieve peace between the Arabs and the Israelis. Hussein risked his life and his monarchy to support efforts to bring peace

between the Arabs and Israel while working with the United States to achieve similar goals. At Rabin's funeral, he talked about that legacy and said,

We belong to the camp of peace. We believe in peace. We believe that our one God wishes us to live in peace and wishes peace upon us, for these are His teachings to all the followers of the three great monotheistic religions, the Children of Abraham. Let's not keep silent. Let our voices rise high to speak of our commitment to peace for all times to come, and let us tell those who live in darkness who are the enemies of life, and through faith and religion and the teachings of our one God, this is where we stand. This is our camp. May God bless you with the realization that you must join it and we pray that He will, but otherwise we are not ashamed, nor are we afraid, nor are we anything but determined to fulfill the legacy for which my friend fell, as did my grandfather in this very city when I was with him and but a young boy.¹²

Despite any troubles the various US leadership had with Hussein, his legacy of peace and stability in the region provided the best example of his value to American interest in the region and cemented his position as one of the most important American allies in the region.

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NOTES

CHAPTER I

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- ³ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 137.
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- ⁷ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (New York: Little Brown, 1979), 373.

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- ⁸⁸ Heikal, *Road to Ramadan*, 99.
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- ¹³ Heikal, *Road to Ramadan*, 160.
- ¹⁴ Heikal, *Secret Channels*, 312.
- ¹⁵ Yehuda Lukacs, *Israel, Jordan and the Peace Process* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1999), 120.
- ¹⁶ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 348-9.
- ¹⁷ Lukacs, *Israel, Jordan and the Peace Process*, 121.
- ¹⁸ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 351.
- ¹⁹ Lukacs, *Israel, Jordan and the Peace Process*, 123.
- ²⁰ Lukacs, *Israel, Jordan and the Peace Process*, 124.
- ²¹ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 353-4.
- ²² Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 355-6.
- ²³ Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom*, 207-8.
- ²⁴ Heikal, *Secret Channels*, 172-5.
- ²⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States Volume XXV: Arab – Israeli Crisis and War, 1973*, editors Nina Howland, Craig Daigle and Edward Keefer, 1-2 (Washington, DC, 2011).
- ²⁶ FRUS XXV, 2.
- ²⁷ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 364.
- ²⁸ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 205.
- ²⁹ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 199.
- ³⁰ Nixon, *Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, 787.
- ³¹ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 217.
- ³² Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 218-9.
- ³³ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 218-9.
- ³⁴ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 218.

³⁵ FRUS XXV, 32.

³⁶ FRUS XXV, 30.

³⁷ FRUS XXV, 33.

³⁸ FRUS XXV, 34.

³⁹ FRUS XXV, 45.

⁴⁰ FRUS XXV, 45-9.

⁴¹ The Allon Plan was a solution to the West Bank created by Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon in 1967. The Plan called for Jordan to take control over the major Arab populations centers in the West Bank. Israel would retain control over almost all of the uninhabited land in the West Bank, along with the Jordan Rive Valley. This would have allowed for only a small stretch of land around the Palestinian city of Jericho to be physically connected to Jordan. Hussein immediately rejected this plan because Israel retained so much of the West Bank. For more information of the Allon Plan and Hussein's response see, Shlaim's *Lion of Jordan* page 291 to 295.

⁴² Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 216.

⁴³ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 219-20 and FRUS XXV, 86-96.

⁴⁴ FRUS XXV, 96.

⁴⁵ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 220-1.

⁴⁶ CIA Electronic Reading Room, Document Number 1499655,

http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/45/73_1499655.pdf (Accessed on 10/12/15).

⁴⁷ Kai Bird, *The Good Spy: The Life and Death of Robert Ames* (New York: Broadway Books, 2015), 148 and Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 628.

⁴⁸ CIA Electronic Reading Room, Document Number 1499655,

http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/45/73_1499655.pdf (Accessed 10/12/15).

⁴⁹ CIA Electronic Reading Room, Document Number 1501599,

http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/45/73_1501599.pdf (Accessed 10/12/15).

⁵⁰ FRUS XXV, 151-4.

⁵¹ FRUS XXV, 184-6.

⁵² Riad, *Struggle for Peace*, 236-7.

⁵³ FRUS XXV, 194.

⁵⁴ Nixon, *Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, 884-5.

⁵⁵ FRUS XXV, 233-6.

⁵⁶ CIA Electronic Reading Room, Document Number 1499671,

http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/45/73_1499671.pdf (Accessed 10/12/15).

⁵⁷ Ashton, *King Hussein*, 171.

⁵⁸ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 364-5.

⁵⁹ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 367.

⁶⁰ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 368-9.

⁶¹ For more information about the October War see Benny Morris's *Righteous Victims* and Howard Blum's *The Eve of Destruction*. For an American perspective see William Qaundt's *Peace Process*. For the Soviet view of the crisis, Victor Israelyan's *Inside the Kremlin During the Yom Kippur War* provides the view of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Finally, there are a number of Arab sources that are helpful including Mahmoud Riad's *The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East* and Anwar el-Sadat's *In Search of Identity*.

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- ⁶² In the 1967 conflict, Israel received intelligence that Egypt was planning an attack. This along with other Egyptian provocations like ordering the removal of UN troops out of the Sinai, convinced the Israelis to mount a preemptive strike against the Arabs. While their justification is debatable, the Israelis were widely condemned internationally for breaking the peace by firing the first shot. For more information of the 1967 war see, Michael Oren, *Six Days of War*.
- ⁶³ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 104-7.
- ⁶⁴ Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 402-7.
- ⁶⁵ Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 407-11.
- ⁶⁶ Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 411-9.
- ⁶⁷ Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 420-31.
- ⁶⁸ FRUS XXV, 375.
- ⁶⁹ FRUS XXV, 376.
- ⁷⁰ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 372.
- ⁷¹ Henry Kissinger, *Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 148-50.
- ⁷² FURS XXV, 405.
- ⁷³ FRUS XXV, 383.
- ⁷⁴ Heikal, *Road to Ramadan*, 221-2.
- ⁷⁵ Ashton, *King Hussein*, 175-6.
- ⁷⁶ FRUS XXV, 453.
- ⁷⁷ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 194-5.
- ⁷⁸ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 190.
- ⁷⁹ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 506.
- ⁸⁰ FRUS XXV, 443.
- ⁸¹ Ashton, *King Hussein*, 176.
- ⁸² Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 373-4.
- ⁸³ Heikal, *Road to Ramadan*, 235-6.
- ⁸⁴ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 568-9.
- ⁸⁵ FRUS XXV, 671-3.
- ⁸⁶ Ashton, *King Hussein*, 178.
- ⁸⁷ Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 431-2.
- ⁸⁸ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 373.
- ⁸⁹ On Saturday October 19, 1973, Nixon ordered Attorney General Elliot Richardson to fire special prosecutor Archibald Cox. When he refused and resigned in protest, Nixon ordered Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus to do it, he also resigned. Eventually, Robert Bork was named acting Attorney General and he fired Cox.
- ⁹⁰ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 655.
- ⁹¹ Victor, Israelyan, *Inside the Kremlin During the Yom Kippur War* (State College, PA: Penn State University Press, 1995), 67-8.
- ⁹² Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 656.
- ⁹³ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 656.
- ⁹⁴ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 628.
- ⁹⁵ FRUS XXV, 892-3.
- ⁹⁶ FRUS XXV, 893.
- ⁹⁷ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 786-7.
- ⁹⁸ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 377.
- ⁹⁹ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 748.
- ¹⁰⁰ Gideon Rafael, *Destination Peace: Three Decades of Israeli Foreign Policy* (New York: Stein Day, 1981), 319.
- ¹⁰¹ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 388.

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- ¹⁰² Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 847-8.
- ¹⁰³ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 1139-40.
- ¹⁰⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States Volume XXVI: Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974 - 19776*, editors Adam Howard and Edward Keefer, 116 (Washington, DC, 2012).
- ¹⁰⁵ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), 368-70.
- ¹⁰⁶ Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 360-4.
- ¹⁰⁷ Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 358-9.
- ¹⁰⁸ Lukacs, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 464-5 and Ashton, *King Hussein*, 183.
- ¹⁰⁹ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 388-9.
- ¹¹⁰ Quandt, *Decade of Decision*, 257-8.
- ¹¹¹ Riad, *Struggle for Peace*, 282-4.
- ¹¹² Lukacs, *The Israel-Palestinian Conflict*, 189.
- ¹¹³ Madiha Rashid Al Madfai, *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process: 1974-1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 21.
- ¹¹⁴ Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians, and the Hashemite Kingdom*, 221.
- ¹¹⁵ Lukacs, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 319.
- ¹¹⁶ Lukacs, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 320.
- ¹¹⁷ Lukacs, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 319-31.
- ¹¹⁸ FRUS XXVI, 449.
- ¹¹⁹ FRUS XXVI, 449.
- ¹²⁰ Ford Presidential Library, Box 3 "Middle East Memcoms and Reports" March 7 -22, 1975 vol. 1 Folder 1.
- ¹²¹ Ford Presidential Library, Box 3 "Middle East Memcoms and Reports" March 7 -22, 1975 vol. 1 Folder 10.
- ¹²² Ford Presidential Library, Box 3 "Middle East Memcoms and Reports" March 7 -22, 1975 vol. 1 Folder 10.
- ¹²³ Ford Presidential Library, Box 3 "Middle East Memcoms and Reports" March 7 -22, 1975 vol. 2 Folder 1.
- ¹²⁴ Ford Presidential Library, Box 1 "NSC Meeting Meetings File", March 28, 1975, Folder 1.
- ¹²⁵ FRUS XXVI, 604.
- ¹²⁶ Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 1030-4.
- ¹²⁷ Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 1055-8.

CHAPTER V

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- ² Jimmy Carter, *The White House Diaries* (New York: Picador, 2010), 21-2.
- ³ Kenneth Stein, *Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab - Israeli Peace* (New York: Routledge, 1999), 190-1.
- ⁴ O'Connell, *King's Council*, 137.
- ⁵ Ashton, *King Hussein*, 191-2.
- ⁶ U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States Volume VIII: Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977 – August 1978*, editor Adam Howard, (Washington, DC, 2013), 63-4.
- ⁷ Jimmy Carter, *Keeping the Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 6.
- ⁸ Carter, *Keeping the Faith*, 242.
- ⁹ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 251.
- ¹⁰ Carter, *Keeping the Faith*, 278.
- ¹¹ William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2001), 178-80.

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- ¹² Charles Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 161.
- ¹³ FRUS VIII, 84-5.
- ¹⁴ Vance, *Hard Choices*, 169-71.
- ¹⁵ FRUS VIII, 85-8.
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- ¹⁸ FRUS VIII, 218-25.
- ¹⁹ FRUS VIII, 234-6
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- ²² Carter, *Keeping the Faith*, 285.
- ²³ Dennis Ross, *Doomed to Succeed: The U.S. – Israeli Relationship from Truman to Obama* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2015), 149.
- ²⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1983), 92-3.
- ²⁵ Dennis Ross, *Doomed to Succeed*, 148-9.
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- ²⁷ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 397.
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- ³¹ Ross, *Doomed to Succeed*, 139.
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- ³⁶ Carter Presidential Library, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: Series: Geographical Files: Folder Middle East (5/77-12/77) Container 12.
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- ⁴⁰ Vance, *Hard Choices*, 188-9.
- ⁴¹ Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, *The Camp David Accords: A Testimony by Sadat's Foreign Minister* (New York: KPI, 1986), 15.
- ⁴² Madfai, *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process*, 41.
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- ⁴⁴ Lukacs, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 1.
- ⁴⁵ Stein, *Heroic Diplomacy*, 216-8.
- ⁴⁶ FRUS VIII, 653-7.
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- ⁴⁹ Lukacs, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 137.
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- ⁵¹ Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 460.
- ⁵² Lawrence Wright, *Thirteen Days in September: Carter, Begin, and Sadat at Camp David* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 40-1.

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- ⁵⁶ Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: Series: NSA Brzezinski, Folder: Memcoms Brzezinski, 3-9/79 Container 33.
- ⁵⁷ FRUS VIII, 809.
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- ⁶² Stein, *Heroic Diplomacy*, 227.
- ⁶³ Stein, *Heroic Diplomacy*, 231-2.
- ⁶⁴ Lukacs, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 71 and Carter, *Keeping the Faith*, 303.
- ⁶⁵ FRUS VIII, 1025-6.
- ⁶⁶ Ashton, *King Hussein*, 197-8.
- ⁶⁷ Kamel, *Camp David Accords*, 165-5.
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- ⁷² Ashton, *King Hussein*, 200-1.
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- ⁸⁰ Lukacs, *Israel, Jordan and the Peace Process*, 154-5.
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- ⁸² Carter, *Keeping the Faith*, 352.
- ⁸³ Carter, *Keeping the Faith*, 380.
- ⁸⁴ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 403-4.
- ⁸⁵ Noor, *Leap of Faith*, 153.
- ⁸⁶ Madfi, *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process*, 48.
- ⁸⁷ Kamel, *The Camp David Accords*, 232-7.
- ⁸⁸ Ezer Weizman, *The Battle for Peace* (New York: Bantam Books, 1981), 320.
- ⁸⁹ Kamel, *The Camp David Accords*, 262-9.
- ⁹⁰ Quandt, *Camp David Accords*, 262-5.
- ⁹¹ Lukacs, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 158.
- ⁹² Lukacs, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 158.
- ⁹³ FRUS IX, 196-8.
- ⁹⁴ FRUS IX, 201.
- ⁹⁵ Vance, *Hard Choices*, 229-37.
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- ⁹⁷ Noor, *Leap of Faith*, 155-6

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- ⁹⁹ FRUZ IX, 210-7.
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- ¹⁰¹ FRUS IX, 203-5.
- ¹⁰² Ashton, *King Hussein*, 204.
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- ¹⁰⁴ FRUS IX, 217-220 and Quandt, *Camp David Accords*, 405-14.
- ¹⁰⁵ Dayan, *Breakthrough*, 202.
- ¹⁰⁶ FRUS IX, 400.
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- ¹¹⁰ Carter, *Jimmy Carter Diaries*, 44.
- ¹¹¹ Riad, *The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East*, 323.
- ¹¹² Riad, *The Struggles for Peace in the Middle East*, 324-5.
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- ¹¹⁵ FRUS IX, 420-1.
- ¹¹⁶ Riad, *The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East*, 333-4.
- ¹¹⁷ FRUS IX, 556
- ¹¹⁸ Carter, *Keeping the Faith*, 262.
- ¹¹⁹ A civil war in Yemen that began 1962 that lasted with sporadic fighting up until unification in 1990. During the Carter administration, the fighting escalated and the US feared South Yemen, backed by the Soviet Union, could threaten North Yemen and its main supporter Saudi Arabia. In the late 1970s, the Soviet Union continued its arming of South Yemen, increasing the threat to the US and its interests. For more information, see Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 420-1 and 447; Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, 16.
- ¹²⁰ Jimmy Carter Library, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: Series: Files: Folder: Serial Xs Container 36.
- ¹²¹ Jimmy Carter Library, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: Series: Files: Folder: Serial Xs Container 36.
- ¹²² FRUS IX, 802 and Lukacs *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 473-7.
- ¹²³ Lukacs, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 473.
- ¹²⁴ FRUS IX, 803.
- ¹²⁵ Madfai, *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process*, 54-5.
- ¹²⁶ Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom*, 218.
- ¹²⁷ Reuters, “Teheran Students Seize U.S. Embassy and Hold Hostages” *New York Times*, November 5, 1979, 1.
- ¹²⁸ Karen House, “Soviets’ Invasion of Afghanistan is Likely to Raise Pressures for Decisive U.S. Move” *Wall Street Journal*, December 31, 1979, 4.
- ¹²⁹ FRUS IX, 1035.
- ¹³⁰ Jimmy Carter Library, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: Series: Folder: Meetings – Muskie/Brown/Brzezinski 7/80 -9/80 Container 34.
- ¹³¹ FRUS IX, 950-1.
- ¹³² FRUS IX, 950-2.
- ¹³³ FRUS IX, 1066-68.
- ¹³⁴ FRUS IX, 1258-70.
- ¹³⁵ FRUS IX, 1272-83.

CHAPTER VI

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- ² King Faisal was the brother of Hussein's grandfather, Abdullah I. Faisal was established as the leader of Iraq by the British after his removal from Lebanon and Syria in 1921. His son Ghazi reigned in Iraq until 1939. Ghazi's son, Faisal II was murdered in a coup in 1958.
- ³ O'Connell, *King's Council*, 162 and Ashton, *King Hussein*, 211.
- ⁴ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 442.
- ⁵ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 210-11.
- ⁶ O'Connell, *King's Council*, 162.
- ⁷ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 214.
- ⁸ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 216.
- ⁹ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 414.
- ¹⁰ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 216.
- ¹¹ Laurie A. Brand, *Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making* (New York: Columbia University, 1994), 221-7.
- ¹² David Schenker, *Dancing with Saddam: The Dangerous Tango of Jordan – Iraq Relations* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003), 29-30 and Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 416-7.
- ¹³ Hiro, *Longest War*, 7.
- ¹⁴ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 416-7.
- ¹⁵ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 419.
- ¹⁶ George Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), 235.
- ¹⁷ Noor, *Leap of Faith*, 203.
- ¹⁸ Pavel Stroilov, *Behind the Desert Storm* (Chicago: Price World Publishing, 2011), 54.
- ¹⁹ Hiro, *Longest War*, 75-6.
- ²⁰ Hiro, *Longest War*, 123.
- ²¹ Alexander Haig, *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 169.
- ²² Ronald Reagan, *An American Life: The Autobiography*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 410.
- ²³ Ashton, *King Hussein*, 219.
- ²⁴ Hiro, *Longest War*, 250-1.
- ²⁵ For more information on the Israeli invasion of Lebanon see Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 502-14.
- ²⁶ Madfai, *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process*, 90.
- ²⁷ Ashton, *King Hussein*, 234.
- ²⁸ Shamir, *Lion of Jordan*, 420-2.
- ²⁹ Heikal, *Secret Channels*, 356-7.
- ³⁰ Madfai, *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process*, 92-100.
- ³¹ Madfai, *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process*, 100.
- ³² Reagan, *An American Life*, 431-2.
- ³³ Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 88-9.
- ³⁴ Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 89.
- ³⁵ Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 92-3.
- ³⁶ Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 93.
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- ³⁸ Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 95-6.
- ³⁹ Reagan, *An American Life*, 432.
- ⁴⁰ Lukacs, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 72-4.
- ⁴¹ Lukacs, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 75.
- ⁴² Lukacs, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 75-8.
- ⁴³ Casper Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 145.
- ⁴⁴ Lukacs, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 199.
- ⁴⁵ Lukacs, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 200-2.
- ⁴⁶ Reagan, *An American Life*, 433-4 and Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 98.
- ⁴⁷ Reagan, *An American Life*, 434.
- ⁴⁸ Reagan, *An American Life*, 434-5.
- ⁴⁹ State Department Electronic Reading Room "From Embassy in Tel Aviv to Secretary Shultz," October 1982, Document Number 82TELAV14679.
- ⁵⁰ Ariel Sharon, *Warrior: An Autobiography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 551-3.
- ⁵¹ Lukacs, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 478 and Heikal, *Secret Channels*, 367.
- ⁵² Lukacs, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 482.
- ⁵³ Lukacs, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 481.
- ⁵⁴ Shultz, *Triumph and Turmoil*, 432.
- ⁵⁵ Shultz, *Triumph and Turmoil*, 432.
- ⁵⁶ In September 1982, Israeli forces under the command of Ariel Sharon allowed hundreds of fighters from the Marinite Phalange forces to enter the Palestinian refugee camp of Sabra and Shatila. The Phalange group just had its leader assassinated and was out for revenge. Reports indicated between seven and eight hundred civilians were killed while being monitored by the IDF. Sharon was eventually forced to resign as Minister of Defense. The aftermath of the incident was captured by the BBC which led to universal international outrage towards Israel. For more information on the event, see Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 240-250.
- ⁵⁷ Haig, *Caveat*, 171.
- ⁵⁸ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 236-7.
- ⁵⁹ Lukacs, *Israel, Jordan and the Peace Process*, 160.
- ⁶⁰ Madfai, *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process*, 106.
- ⁶¹ The Rumsfeld Papers, <http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/2700/1983-12-23%20Cable%20Rumsfeld%20Mission%20-%20Meeting%20with%20King%20Hussein%20in%20London%20December%2021,%201983.pdf#search=%20Jordan>" (Accessed 1/22/2016).
- ⁶² Shultz, *Triumph and Turmoil*, 433.
- ⁶³ O'Connell, *King's Council*, 148.
- ⁶⁴ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 423-5.
- ⁶⁵ Lukacs, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 484.
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CHAPTER X

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