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THE IMPACT OF PALESTINIAN TERRORISM ON THE ARAB/ISRAELI
CONFLICT

The University of Oklahoma

PH.D.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE IMPACT OF PALESTINIAN TERRORISM
ON THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
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Norman, Oklahoma

THE IMPACT OF PALESTINIAN TERRORISM
ON THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT

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THE EFFECT OF PALESTINIAN TERRORISM
ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

CHAPTER I

POLITICAL TERRORISM: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It has been utilized throughout history by criminals, military forces, political dissidents and governments. While terrorism for political purposes is nothing new, its applications and goals have changed and evolved to reflect the political, social, and technological climate of the post-World War II world. The utilization of political terrorism increased dramatically throughout the world during the past decade. Increasingly revolutionary groups have turned to terrorism as a means of achieving a particular goal. The primary reason for the proliferation of terrorism in recent years is simple, recognition. By employing terrorism any small group of individuals can gain worldwide publicity for itself and its cause. A revolutionary group is not a force to be reckoned with until it is recognized as such by the people and the government of the country against whom its actions are directed. A group which lacks either a strong base of support among

the population or a popular cause to mobilize the population must resort to spectacular acts of violence in order to gain recognition.

The belief that spectacular acts of violence will alienate the population is not always valid. One must remember that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.¹ An act of extreme violence, such as the murder of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics by Palestinian terrorists, may be condemned in the Western world; however, such acts are justifiable in the eyes of many Arab governments which support the Palestinian cause. The "terrorists" are regarded as heroes and martyrs by millions of supporters in the Arab world. The same is true of other groups, such as the supporters of the IRA or SWAPO causes, and supporters of the Iranian revolution. The "terrorists" are freedom fighters and their actions are justifiable acts of liberation.

In the past decade terrorists have been able to exert influence over nations and world leaders by confronting them with terrorism or the threat of terrorism. By perpetuating acts such as the kidnapping of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro and the seizure of the American Embassy in Iran, terrorists are able to hold hostage not only the individuals actually under their control, but also the headlines throughout the world. By employing terrorism little known groups, such as the South Moluccans, are able

to gain instant recognition for themselves and their cause.

Advanced technology has played an important role in the increase of political terrorism. Due to the increased sophistication of the communication equipment employed by the mass media it is possible to see the actions of terrorists as they are being played out. Bringing the actions of terrorists into the living room every evening on the television set increases the impact of their actions. The actions are shown repeatedly for television audiences and photographed extensively by the print media. Extensive research is conducted on the terrorist group, its members, its grievances, and its objectives. Thus, millions of dollars of free publicity are given to terrorists every time they carry out a spectacular act of violence. Additionally, the instant publicity effects the governmental decision-maker by arousing the emotions of the public as the act is being played out. The government leaders may find their options limited by public sentiment and they may be forced into certain courses of action by public opinion.

Advanced technology has also greatly improved the terrorist's arsenal. Such weapons as the Soviet SA-7 Grail, a man-portable surface-to-air heat-seeking missile, makes it possible for a lone terrorist to shoot down an airliner from a distance of up to two miles. In recent years PLO members have been apprehended twice, once in Rome and once in Kenya, with SA-7's and plans to shoot down El Al airliners

during takeoffs or landings.² In Rhodesia two civilian airliners have been shot down by members of the Patriotic Front utilizing SA-7's. The terrorist arsenal also contains the latest in plastic explosives, time-delay devices, and "booby-trapping" techniques.

Another reason for the increase in terrorism is the cost/benefit ratio of terrorism compared to other types of military operations. In terms of men and equipment expended, terrorism is much more economical than full-scale guerrilla warfare. By investing a very small number of personnel in a terrorist operation a terrorist group can receive world-wide attention. The publicity not only gains recognition for its cause, but also serves to attract new recruits to its movement.

The word "terrorism" is currently used to define a variety of distinct and different actions, from the coercion of a criminal organization operating for profit, to the revolutionary organization operating to promote its ideals. This study is concerned with contemporary "political terrorism." Political terrorism is "an action designed to influence political behavior by extranormal means, entailing the use or threat of violence."³ The key to this definition is the emphasis on political gain by the use or threat of violence.

Types of Terrorism

For the purpose of this study two general types and

three distinct categories of political terrorism have been identified. The two types refer to the method of employment and the targets of political terrorism, and the three categories deal with who employs the political terrorism and its purposes. The first type, selective terrorism, is used primarily on government officials or other opponents of the terrorist group, such as political leaders, police officials, and the military. The Viet-Cong employed selective terrorism extensively in order to gain control of rural villages. Between 1959 and 1964 more than 6000 Vietnamese officials and landlords were killed by the Viet-Cong in acts of selective terrorism.⁴ Both the Italian Red Brigades and the Irish Republican Army have utilized selective terrorism against the police, military, and other government representatives. The Red Brigades have copied the IRA's tactic of "knee-capping" opponents as a type of implicit warning.

The purpose of selective terrorism is to demonstrate the strength of the terrorist group, disrupt government control of the population, suppress cooperation with the government, and to embarrass the government by making it appear inept. By employing selective terrorism the terrorist group attempts to divorce the people from the government by eliminating the government representatives and demonstrating the penalties for cooperating with the government. To underscore the unprofitability of being or becoming a government representative, terrorist groups often employ

particularly brutal means of execution. The Viet-Cong, for example, executed Vietnamese village headmen suspected of cooperating with the government by disemboweling and decapitating them and their families.⁵ The attention given to such acts in the press and through word of mouth is much greater in cases where extreme brutality is used. Thus, the implied threat to others becomes all the more obvious.

Many terrorist groups actually hope that terrorism will drive the government into taking severe measures to eliminate their movement. The terrorists believe that if the government can be made to take drastic measures, such as suspending many civil liberties in order to defeat their group, the overreactions of the authorities will alienate the population. Once the population has been oppressed and alienated by the government's actions it will revolt against the government and create a power vacuum which the terrorist group will be able to fill.

The second type of terrorism, indiscriminate terrorism, involves the killing of anyone, civilian or military, regardless of their affiliation with the government. The violence is instigated in order to gain recognition for a cause, and to discredit the government by demonstrating the inability of the government to protect the people. Indiscriminate terrorism is often characterized as "mindless violence." However, the more mindless the violence, the more horrendous the act, and the more indiscriminate

the terrorism, the more publicity gained by the action. The Viet-Cong utilized indiscriminate terrorism as did the FLN during the Algerian revolution. However, the most recent widespread use of indiscriminate terrorism is by the various groups that comprise the Palestine Liberation Organization. The fedayeen, or Palestinian commandos, have relied predominantly upon indiscriminate terrorism to bring their views to the attention of the world. Over the past decade other terrorist groups have begun to emulate the tactics of the PLO. Therefore, indiscriminate terrorism is becoming much more widespread than selective terrorism.

In addition to increasing the impact of his actions by utilizing indiscriminate terrorism, the terrorist also has the advantage of ease of operation and availability of targets. Since a government cannot protect each and every citizen 24 hours a day there is no problem finding a target. This is particularly true in the democratic Western nations where there exist civil liberties that allow unrestricted travel and laws limiting indiscriminate searches. Additionally, indiscriminate terrorism generally requires less training and operational expertise than does selective terrorism. It is much easier to throw a grenade into a crowd or plant a bomb in a crowded, unsuspecting store than it is to assassinate well-guarded government officials.

Political blackmail is also more easily applied if it is applied indiscriminately. The seizing of hostages and

the issuing of political demands can either be selective, which involves the seizing of an embassy or other government institutions, or indiscriminate, in which a group of civilians is seized at random. In recent years governments have greatly increased security at embassies and other government facilities that might be subject to seizure by terrorists. Therefore, it is easier to seize an unguarded train or bus than an embassy, and the effect is just as dramatic.

Categories of Terrorism

The two types of terrorism, selective and indiscriminate, are employed in varying degrees in the three categories of terrorism.

The first category is institutional terrorism which is utilized by governments and has two distinct forms. First of all, institutional terrorism can be utilized by a government to control the population through fear and elimination of political opposition. A recent example would be the rule by terror of Idi Amin in Uganda. Secondly, a government can employ counter-terror tactics in order to combat and counter an insurgency movement. The French tactics in Algeria is an example of this tactic. The Israelis have also made use of counter-terror. The Israelis have, in the past, responded to fedayeen activities by employing such actions as neighborhood punishment, whereby homes and neighborhoods suspected of aiding and harboring terrorists are destroyed. Additionally, the Israelis have

carried out raids against sanctuary countries, such as the Latani operation into Lebanon in 1978.

The second category of political terrorism is terrorism as a stage of revolutionary warfare. There are four stages of revolutionary warfare;

- (1) Organizational Stage. This is the initial stage in which the party of the revolutionary organization is formed, the ideological base is solidified, and members are recruited.
- (2) Terrorism Stage. In this phase both selective and indiscriminate terrorism are utilized. Indiscriminate terrorism is used to draw attention to the cause and to the revolutionary movement. Selective terrorism is utilized to eliminate government supporters and to divorce the people from the government.
- (3) Guerrilla Warfare Stage. Once terrorism has achieved the desired effect and the revolutionary organization is firmly entrenched in the country, the revolution passes into the third phase, guerrilla warfare. In this stage, which may involve years, the guerrillas employ hit-and-run tactics. Isolated military outposts are attacked and small groups of government soldiers are isolated and defeated by large groups of guerrillas. Government facilities and institutions are subjected to sabotage and raid. During this phase the emphasis is on winning military victories. Although the victories may be small the government forces are

demoralized and forced on the defensive. Each guerrilla victory aids in attracting new recruits and supporters to the movement.

- (4) Conventional Warfare Stage. When the enemy has been weakened severely by guerrilla warfare the revolution moves into its final stage, conventional warfare. During this stage the government forces are openly challenged to engage in set-piece decisive battles. The guerrillas now have their forces organized into conventional army formations rather than small guerrilla bands. The insurgents no longer utilize hit-and-run tactics, but are now prepared to stand and fight. An example of this can be seen in the difference in tactics employed by the North Vietnamese and Viet-Cong after the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam. In 1975 after the withdrawal of U.S. troops the North Vietnamese invaded the South with a massive conventional force. The South Vietnamese Army was engaged in conventional warfare and defeated.⁶

The stages of revolutionary warfare are regressive as well as progressive. If the insurgents are defeated in one stage they can regress to another and reorganize and again attempt the next stage at a later date. For example, the North Vietnamese in 1972 tried to defeat the South by a conventional invasion. Due to the intervention of the U.S. in the form of renewed bombings the North Vietnamese had to

regress back to guerrilla warfare. In 1975 the North again moved into the conventional stage with successful results.

The third category of terrorism is provocational and instigational terrorism (PIT). This is a new type of warfare instigated primarily by the PLO. Both in institutional terrorism and terrorism as a stage of revolutionary warfare the major objective is to win military victories. Furthermore, revolutionary warfare aims to weaken the government sufficiently to enable a shift to conventional warfare and to defeat the government militarily. However, in provocative and instigational terrorism military victory is not the primary aim. The primary purpose of PIT is a propaganda or symbolic victory rather than a military victory. The PLO and other such terrorist groups do not challenge the military forces of the target country. The PLO's terrorist activity is actually aimed at civilians, not the military. Groups such as the PLO resort to PIT because they are unable to wage successful guerrilla warfare against the target country. Therefore, the PLO is not an insurgency movement; its members are not guerrilla warriors. The PLO is too weak militarily and lacks the internal support necessary to wage successful guerrilla warfare against Israel. Thus, the targets of the attacks are civilian or representatives of the government. Additionally, provocative and instigational terrorism is not stage-oriented as is revolutionary warfare. The terrorism employed in

revolutionary warfare is only one of four stages; it is only a part of a larger strategy. However, PIT is a strategy in and of itself. Provocational and instigational terrorism is designed to:

- PROVOKE the government into severe reaction which will turn the tide of opinion against the government. It is not necessary to provoke sympathy from the nations of the world, although that may be an objective. All that is necessary is to bring both internal and external pressure to bear on the government.
- PROVOKE recognition of the cause of the terrorist group. PIT relies on spectacular acts of terrorism to force recognition and to gain the headlines of the world. For example, the little-known South Moluccan terrorist group was able to hold the headlines for 12 days while it held a Dutch train and its passengers hostage.
- PROVOKE the world to take action in behalf of the terrorists' cause. The PLO has used PIT to gain publicity for its cause and to pressure governments into yielding concessions, such as the shutdown of the Austrian refugee processing center for Russian Jewish immigrants to Israel. This shutdown was accomplished by seizing hostages aboard a Vienna-bound train.⁷ However, the height of the PLO's success was in gaining an observer status in the United Nations. Terrorist organizations such as the PLO have political aims but no legal political structure through which to negotiate and gain political influence.

The use of terrorism actually constitutes a "diplomacy of confrontation" whereby groups can force governments to negotiate with them.

-INSTIGATE internal insurrection and widespread dissatisfaction with the government. No terrorist group has yet been able to achieve this by employing only terrorist tactics.

-INSTIGATE fear and disorder among the population. In the case of Israel, the PLO additionally hopes to discourage tourists from visiting Israel and thereby injuring Israel economically.

A significant aspect of PIT is acts of international terrorism. International terrorism is a tactic instigated in 1968 by the PLO. (The PLO and its leading role in instigating international terrorism will be explained in detail in Chapter IV). As in guerrilla warfare there are no front lines of clearcut battlefields. However, unlike guerrilla warfare there are no boundaries or territorial limitations on international terrorism. Institutional terrorism and terrorism as a stage of revolutionary warfare confine themselves to the target country, or at most to certain surrounding countries who are utilized as sanctuaries for the insurgents.

International terrorism makes extensive use of operations in non-involved nations, that is, nations which are not directly involved in the conflict between the terrorists and the target country. Non-involved nations are

much more likely to yield to terrorist demands than is the government of the target country. In the past non-involved nations have found it easier to yield to terrorist demands than to risk hostages' lives and potential embarrassment to the government. In addition, non-involved countries fear terrorist retribution if a hard-line is taken against operations of the terrorist group. A study by the Rand Corporation of 63 major kidnapping operations executed between 1968 and late 1974 found that there was a 79 percent chance that all members of a terrorist team would escape death or punishment.⁸ Thus, operations carried out in a non-involved country against symbols or representatives of the target country, such as airliners, nationals of the target country, and government and business executives, have a much greater chance of success. Additionally, if terrorists are captured or surrender in a non-involved nation their chance of escaping punishment is extremely high. Outside of Israel very few PLO terrorists have been punished for their actions or have spent any significant time in prison. In many cases the captured terrorists have been released in exchange for hostages seized by the terrorist group in order to gain freedom for their jailed comrades. The examples are numerous. In August 1972 two Palestinians planted a bomb in luggage placed on an El Al airliner. The bomb subsequently detonated in the hold of the aircraft while in flight. However, the plane was not destroyed due to the armored holds constructed on El Al planes. The

Palestinians were not on the plane but were later identified and captured by Italian police in Rome. Italy wanted to avoid conflict with the PLO and was afraid of future terrorist acts if the two Palestinians were prosecuted. Therefore, the terrorists were granted "provisional liberty" on the grounds that the explosive charge they planted "was not adequate to destroy the airliner."⁹ Naturally the terrorists disappeared from Italy as soon as they were released.

In the case of the famous hijacking to Mogadishu, Somalia by a combined group of Arab and German terrorists in 1977, three of the terrorists were killed by German Commandos in a rescue operation. However, one female terrorist survived. She remained in Somalia until she recovered from her wounds and then was flown to Iraq and released.¹⁰ Even the surviving three members of Black September, who carried out the Munich massacre of Israeli athletes, were freed. Only seven weeks after the massacre two members of Black September hijacked a Boeing 727 Lufthansa airliner and held it for the ransom of the three Black September members held in Germany. The terrorists were released and flown to Libya.¹¹

Another advantage of attacking a non-involved country is the limitation of reactions of the non-involved country to terrorist attacks. When there is a terrorist attack in Israel or against Israeli targets in another country the Israelis react violently against the source of the attack,

the bases and leaders of the terrorist group. Israel has repeatedly attacked terrorist bases in surrounding Arab countries in reaction to terrorist attacks. However, a non-involved country does not launch an air strike or send in commandos to raid the terrorist bases for political reasons. The reaction of a non-involved nation is limited to rhetoric against the terrorist group and actions against those terrorists involved. However, the primary reason for the emergence of the use of PIT and international terrorism by the PLO and other groups is their inability to wage successful guerrilla warfare in the target country.

The PLO has resorted to international terrorism due to a general inability to wage successful guerrilla warfare inside of Israel. There have been some successful attacks by the PLO on Israeli territory. However, these are acts of provocation and instigational terror and have no effect on the military capability of the country. On the contrary, these raids kill only a small number of people and only serve to harden the Israeli position toward the PLO. Also, with each new attack Israeli security and counter-terror methods are strengthened and it becomes increasingly difficult to mount successful terrorist raids. Presently the PLO can succeed in mounting a successful terrorist operation only after several months of efforts and many failures. The majority of the fedayeen are captured or killed before carrying out their mission. Each year it becomes more difficult to mount a successful terrorist attack.¹² Therefore, the PLO has

found it more advantageous to resort to acts of international terrorism.

Terrorist Tactics

As previously stated, terrorists attempt to obtain the maximum cost/benefit ratio from their actions. Therefore, terrorists concentrate on high visibility actions such as kidnapping, hijacking, indiscriminate bombings, and barricade/hostage operations. These are tactics which are little used by insurgents in revolutionary warfare. This is because these types of actions have little effect on the military capability of the target country, particularly if the acts are carried out in non-involved nations.

According to the CIA, terrorists adapt their tactics to counter the countermeasures adopted by the police and military.¹³ For example, when the increased security aboard aircraft and at airports made aircraft hijacking difficult, terrorists switched to trains, buses, and buildings. Organizations such as the PLO have been able to survive as viable organizations by constantly changing their tactics in response to preventive measures enacted against them.

The following study centers around one specific revolutionary organization which has adopted terrorism as its primary tactic. This organization, the Palestine Liberation Organization, has had a profound effect upon the Middle East conflict. It is the purpose of this study to examine this effect and the reasons behind this effect. This study is

not intended as a value judgment regarding the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the Palestinian cause. Rather is is intended as a study of the methods utilized by a group representing the Palestinian cause. Any negative implications presented in this study are directed at the utilization of terrorism as a political tool, not at any one group or government.

NOTES

¹This term is commonly used by those involved in the study of political terrorism. The exact origin of this term is unknown.

²Israeli Defense Force Spokesman's Office, Palestinian Terrorist Attacks on Foreign Soil (Tel Aviv: Israeli Defense Force, 1978), pp. 12-18.

³Harry Eckstein, Internal War (London: The Free Press, Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1968), p. 73.

U.S. Department of the Army, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, Department of the Army pamphlet no. 550-104 (Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1966), p. 70.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Bard O'Neill, Revolutionary Warfare in the Middle East, The Israelis vs. the Fedayeen (Boulder, Colorado: Paladin Press, Inc., 1974), p. 78.

⁷"Bullets, Bombs and a Sign of Hope," Time, May 27, 1974, p. 25.

⁸U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee to investigate the administration of the Internal Security Act, 94th Cong., part 4, 1975, p. 240.

⁹Christopher Dobson, Black September, Its Short, Violent History (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1974), p. 78.

¹⁰Excerpted from a lecture at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School, course "Dynamics of International Terrorism," Hurlburt Field, Florida, March 1978.

¹¹Dobson, September, p. 86.

¹²O'Neill, Revolutionary, p. 140.

¹³Central Intelligence Agency, International Terrorism in 1978 (National Foreign Assessment Center, RP 79-10149, March 1979), p. 5.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT

The basis of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a conflicting claim to a small strip of land at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea which has been called at different periods of time "Canaan," "Palestine," and "Israel." The Palestinians claim this land as their own by virtue of occupancy. The Jews cite a historical claim on the basis of the existence of an ancient Jewish state in this land, a religious bond with this land, and the continued existence of a Jewish community in Palestine for over 4000 years.

The two historical viewpoints, Arab and Israeli, differ so greatly that I have elected to handle them separately.

The Israeli Viewpoint

Historically both the Jews and the Arabs share common Semitic roots. Both groups trace their lineage back to "father Abraham" who immigrated to Palestine approximately 4000 years ago.¹ The settlement of Palestine by the Hebrew people took place approximately 1400-1300 B.C. The kingdom

reached its peak under King David and his son Solomon. This kingdom contained much of what is today Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The Jews cite this kingdom as the basis for the Jewish claim to the land of Israel. Following Solomon's death the kingdom was divided into two separate states, the kingdom of Israel in the north and the kingdom of Judah in the south. In 722 B.C. the kingdom of Israel was conquered by the Assyrians and the people were carried off into exile. In 587 B.C. the kingdom of Judah was destroyed by the Babylonians and was depopulated by a mass deportation.² In 539 B.C. Cyrus, King of Persia, conquered the Babylonian Empire. One year later the Hebrew exiles of Judah were allowed to return to Palestine and resettle. The small community of Jews who had remained in Israel combined with the returning exiles and rebuilt Jerusalem and the Jewish temple. This began the Hebrew state of the second temple period. The Jewish state was conquered in 333 B.C. by Alexander the Great. Thus began a period in which Israel was under the control of various foreign powers. In 301 B.C. the country was conquered by Egypt and in 271 B.C. by the Seleucids of Syria. The religious policies of the Seleucid ruler toward conquered territories caused the Jews to rebel in 166 B.C. In 164 B.C. the Jewish rebels managed to conquer Jerusalem and purify the temple. The Jews again set up an autonomous state which lasted until the Roman invasion in 63 B.C.³

The Jews revolted against the Romans in 66 A.D. which resulted in the destruction of Jerusalem and the second temple in 70 A.D. The majority of the Jewish population was exiled and the Jews did not return as a nation until 1948.⁴ However, a Jewish presence remained in Palestine throughout history. Although this presence was small (by 1856 the Jewish population numbered only about 10,000) the Israeli government regards this continued Jewish presence as further legitimacy for the Jewish state.⁵

Periodic outbreaks of anti-Semitism and continued persecution of Jews in many nations caused many Jews to believe that they must have their own nation again to serve as a refuge. In the late 19th century the first small Jewish settlements were formed in Palestine. However, the rise of modern Zionism began in 1897 when Theodor Herzl founded the World Zionist Organization. The objective of the WZO was to "secure for the Jewish people a publicly recognized, legally secured home in Erez Israel."⁶ The idea sparked new immigration to Palestine which was controlled by the Ottoman Empire. By the start of World War I there were approximately 85,000 Jews in Palestine.⁷

After World War I the British were granted a mandate by the League of Nations to rule Palestine. In November 1917 the British government had issued the famous Balfour Declaration which pledged support for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. The document, which is viewed by the Israelis as a further legal basis for the present

Israeli state, stated, "His majesty's government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object."⁸ However, the British never implemented the Balfour Declaration and the Jewish state was not established by the British.

Despite the setback Jewish immigration continued. By 1931 there were 174,000 Jews in Palestine; in 1939 the number had risen to approximately 449,000.⁹ The increased Jewish immigration caused resentment among the Arab population of Palestine who initiated periodic riots and attacks against Jewish settlements. The largest outbreak of violence was in 1936 when the Mufti of Jerusalem proclaimed a general strike which sparked widespread attacks against the Jewish settlers. The British government was greatly distressed by the violence in Palestine. By 1936 they had 20,000 troops stationed in the country. In order to find the cause of the unrest the British sent a Royal Commission of Inquiry to Palestine in November 1936. The Commission, known as the Peel Commission after its chairman Lord Robert Peel, conducted a two-month inquiry to determine the cause of the violence. In July 1937 the Commission issued its report. The 404-page document stressed the Arab resentment of the Jewish settlers and recommended a partitioning of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states. It further recommended that Jewish immigration be limited to 12,000 annually for the next five years. Continued Arab violence against the

Jewish settlers and the recommendations of the Peel Commission caused the British government to issue the famous "White Paper" of 1939. The White Paper called for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state to take place over a period of the next ten years. Both the Jews and the Arabs were to share power in this new state; there was not to be a separate Jewish and a separate Arab state. This policy of no separate Jewish and Arab states in the 1939 White Paper differs from the recommendations of the Peel Commission in 1937 which called for the partition of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states. The reason for this turnabout in British policy was the advent of World War II and the British government's need for the support of the Arab states. The British considered the friendship of the Arab states to be of vital importance at a time when the world was at the brink of war. The British realized that the Arab friendship could not be maintained if the Arabs in Palestine were in revolt and the Arab rulers were angered over a possible Jewish state in Palestine. Therefore, the British decided against enacting the recommendations of the Peel Commission, which called for separate Jewish and Arab states in Palestine, in order to satisfy Arab demands and to insure future friendly relations with the Arab states. The result of this was the 1939 White Paper.¹⁰

The most disastrous part of the White Paper was a

restriction on further Jewish immigration. A quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants annually for five years was established. Furthermore, the White Paper stated that, "After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it."¹¹ This declaration came at the time when Jewish refugees were attempting to leave Europe to escape the Nazi Holocaust. In the early years of Hitler's rule and even in the early years of World War II, Hitler allowed German Jews and Jews in conquered territories to leave. However, most nations were reluctant to accept the refugees. Only the Zionist settlers in Palestine were anxious to accept these Jewish refugees; nevertheless, the British government would not allow them to enter Palestine. Many Israelis still maintain ill feelings toward the British for refusing to allow Jews from Europe to immigrate to Palestine. Because the majority of the world also refused to accept any large number of Jewish refugees, 6 million Jews died in Hitler's concentration camps.

During World War II approximately 30,000 Jewish volunteers from Palestine fought in the British Army.¹² These men gained valuable military expertise which they were able to put to use in their own 1948 War of Independence in Palestine.

At the end of World War II there existed three main Jewish underground military organizations. The largest was the Haganah, which in the postwar years until Jewish

statehood concentrated primarily on self-defense and illegal smuggling of Jewish refugees into Palestine. Even after World War II the British refused to lift the restrictions of the White Paper and allow the Holocaust refugees into Palestine. The other two organizations, the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization), and the Stern gang or Lehi (Lohamei Herut Israel, Israel Freedom Fighters), were much more militant and waged open warfare against the British.¹³ Between September 1946 and May 1948 the Lehi carried out more than 100 acts of sabotage and killings against the British.¹⁴ The Irgun attacked both the British and Arab targets. The Irgun believed that only active retaliation would stop the Arab attacks and only military force could bring about the Jewish state. The Irgun's symbol was a hand gripping a rifle superimposed over a map of Palestine (including Transjordan) with the motto "Only Thus." The Irgun was led by a Polish Jew named Menachem Begin. The Irgun is best known for the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem which contained the British Military Headquarters. Ninety-one people were killed in the attack and forty-five injured.¹⁵ Both the Irgun and the Stern gang were labeled terrorist organizations by the British and Menachem Begin had a price on his head.

By 1947 the British had approximately 100,000 troops stationed in Palestine to attempt to keep the peace. The price was heavy both in terms of lives and money. Despite

the massive effort the situation continued to deteriorate and by February 1947 the families of British personnel were evacuated to England.¹⁶

The British finally decided to refer the problem of Palestine to the United Nations in April 1947. In November of 1947 the United Nations decided to partition Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. The Arab state was to receive approximately 43 percent of the land area. The area designated for the Arab state contained approximately 804,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews. The Jewish state was to encompass 56 percent of Palestine's territory and a population of 397,000 Arabs and 538,000 Jews.¹⁷ Under the Partition Plan there was to be no transfer of population and the two states were to be joined together economically in such areas as irrigation, currency, and interstate communications. Jerusalem, which amounts to approximately one percent of the area of Palestine, was to have international status under United Nations control.¹⁸ The Partition Plan was adopted by the United Nations on November 29, 1947; the British were to withdraw their troops from Palestine by May 15, 1948. The Jews in Palestine agreed to the Partition Plan. However, the Palestinian Arabs violently opposed the plan and began attacks on Jewish targets. On December 17, 1947 the Arab League Council voiced its opposition to the Partition Plan by announcing that it would stop the plan by force. The Palestinian Arabs were aided by irregulars infiltrated from Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. As the British

evacuated military bases they were turned over to the Arabs. On May 14, 1948, the day before the last British troops were withdrawn, the Jewish leaders proclaimed the establishment of the Jewish state.¹⁹ Almost immediately the four neighboring Arab states, Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, and Lebanon, invaded Palestine to crush the new state. The outcome of the war is, of course, well-known. The Israelis, despite their lack of military equipment, had anticipated the war and were fighting for their survival. The 1948 War ended in a victory for Israel and the seizure of much of the territory allocated to the Arab state in Palestine. As a result of the 1948 War the Israelis increased the territory of the Jewish state from 14,500 to 20,850 square kilometers and reduced the territory of the Arab state from 11,800 to about 5400 square kilometers. Thus, the total area under Israeli control increased from 56 percent to about 80 percent of Palestine.²⁰ The only areas of the Arab state not seized by Israel were the two areas which are presently known as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The West Bank was seized by the Jordanians and formally annexed in 1950.²¹ The Gaza Strip was seized and subsequently controlled by Egypt.²² The Israelis point out the fact that the Arab governments are now calling for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza which has been controlled by Israel since the 1967 War. However, in the years between 1948 and 1967, when these areas were controlled by Egypt and Jordan,

there was never an attempt to establish a Palestinian state in these areas.

As a result of the fighting in the 1948 War and rumors about acts of retribution by the Israelis, many Palestinian Arabs left their homes located in the Jewish state and in the territory captured by Israel. Estimates of the number of Palestinian refugees of the 1948 War range from 470,000 to 750,000.²³ A majority of the refugees moved only a few miles to the Arab-controlled areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Not all of the Palestinian Arabs fled; approximately 156,000 remained and became citizens of the new Jewish state.²⁴ They now number approximately 412,000.²⁵

The refugees in the West Bank, and particularly those in the Gaza Strip, conducted continual terrorist attacks upon the new Jewish state. The attacks from the Gaza Strip, encouraged by Egypt, were one of the primary reasons for the 1956 War between Egypt and Israel. The 1956 War resulted in no permanent territorial gains for Israel. Israel seized the Gaza Strip in order to stop the terrorists' attacks and also seized the Sinai Peninsula in order to take control of Sharm El-Sheikh on the Gulf of Aqaba and open the straits of Tiran which Egypt had blockaded. However, pressure from the United Nations and the United States forced the Israelis to withdraw.²⁶

However, in 1967 it was different. In the years following the 1956 War the Arabs continued terrorist

attacks across the borders in addition to periodic artillery shellings from the Arab armies. Prior to the 1967 War the Israeli borders were extremely vulnerable to terrorist attack and artillery fire. The pre-1967 borders were completely undesirable from a military viewpoint. From the Golan Heights the Syrians were able to rain down artillery shells on Israeli settlements. From the West Bank and Gaza Strip Arab artillery could reach most of Israel's population and industrial areas. From the West Bank, occupied by Jordan, to the sea was only ten miles at one point. The pre-1967 borders measured 985 kilometers and were not defined or separated from the Arab nations by any natural obstacles. After the 1967 War Israel's borders were reduced to 650 kilometers and were situated along more easily defended terrain such as the Suez Canal and the Jordan River. The Sinai Desert and the Golan Heights are a buffer zone between Israel and the Arab nations of Egypt and Syria. Naturally Israel is very reluctant to yield this territory.²⁷ While the accrument of this territory gave the Israelis more defensible borders it also resulted in a further exodus of thousands of Palestinian Arabs. The number of Palestinians displaced by the 1967 War is estimated to be between 300,000 to 400,000.²⁸ A further result of the 1967 War was that the territory the Israelis occupied contained almost 1.1 million Palestinians who did not flee. Presently almost one-half of the estimated 3 million Palestinian Arabs still live in the state of Israel or the Israeli-occupied territories.

Jordan has the second largest Palestinian population estimated to be approximately 800,000.²⁹

The 1973 Middle East War did nothing for the Palestinian cause. The Israelis won a costly victory and managed to maintain possession of the occupied territories. After 1973 the Israelis began to yield territory to the Egyptians in return for limited concessions. In 1975 the U.S. mediated an agreement between Egypt and Israel in which Israel agreed to withdraw from approximately 2000 square miles of the Sinai Desert and relinquish both Banks of the Suez Canal to Egyptian control. The Israelis further agreed to return the Abu Rudeis oilfield which supplied a large percent of Israel's oil need. The Egyptians agreed, in a break with the policies of the other Arab governments, "not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade."³⁰ Furthermore, the agreement stated that Egypt and Israel, "were determined to reach a final and just settlement by means of negotiations."³¹ Nowhere in the agreement are the Palestinians mentioned and no reference is made to the Palestinian problem. The Israelis believe that the Arab states should absorb the Palestinian refugees. They also believe that the Arab states deliberately keep the Palestinians in the refugee camps and refuse to absorb them in order to use them as a pawn in the war against Israel.

The 1978 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel does provide "for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem."³² The agreement

calls for an unspecified type of autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In addition, "The solution resulting from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements."³³

The Israelis are adamant about the fact that they cannot allow an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza because of security. A Palestinian state could invite other Arab states to send in troops which would return conditions to the pre-1967 War situation. The Israelis also refuse to deal with the PLO whose members are regarded as terrorists who kill women and children in acts of indiscriminate violence. A Palestinian state, the Israelis believe, would come under the control of the PLO who would use the Palestinian state as a base for further terrorist attacks against Israel. The Israelis cite the Baghdad summit meeting of the "rejection front" held after Camp David. At this meeting the Arab nations pledged to establish a three billion dollar fund to aid and support the confrontation states, the PLO, and the resistance in the occupied territories.³⁴

At the time of this writing Israel and Egypt are still deadlocked over the type of autonomy to be given to the occupied territories. The Israelis continue to insist that the PLO has no role to play in whatever type of autonomous region is established for the Palestinians.

The Arab Viewpoint

The Palestinian Arabs trace their occupancy of Palestine back to ancient times as do the Jews. Furthermore, they constituted the vast majority of the population in Palestine until the Israeli seizure of Palestine in 1948. During the Turkish rule Palestine was dominated by certain leading Arab families who were recruited into the governing class of the Ottoman Empire.³⁵

According to the Arab viewpoint, the British supported the Jewish presence in Palestine even before the British conquest during World War I. The British first opened a consulate in Jerusalem in 1839. Since they had no proteges in the area they established a connection with the Palestinian Jews. Furthermore, the British promoted the Jewish interest in Palestine and encouraged the Turks to allow Jewish immigration.³⁶

According to the Arab view, the advent of Zionism changed the character of Jewish immigration to Palestine. The new settlers were not religious Jews who were coming to Palestine to worship and live. The new immigrants were young Jews who bought land and established agricultural settlements with the purpose of eventually establishing a Jewish state. The new Jewish immigrants were ignorant of Arab ways and customs and offended the local Arab people. Additionally, the government sold land to the Jews which belonged to Arab peasants who were unable to pay their taxes. The resulting resentment caused the attacks on the

early Jewish settlements.³⁷

The Arabs view the Balfour Declaration as an attempt to gain support of world Jewry. At the time of the Balfour Declaration there were 60,000 Jews in Palestine. The Arabs numbered almost 700,000. However, in the Balfour Declaration the 93 percent majority of Arabs are referred to as the "non-Jewish communities."³⁸

The Jewish population of Palestine continued to increase. By 1931 the number had increased from 60,000 in 1919, to 175,000. Hitler's rise to power further increased Jewish immigration, mainly from Poland and Central Europe. By 1939 the Jews numbered 429,605 out of an estimated population of 1,500,000 or approximately 28 percent. The Arabs felt a sense of injustice in that they were suffering for events in Europe for which they had no responsibility.³⁹

Increased Jewish immigration and the lack of restriction on Jewish land sales coupled with the increase of landless Arabs and unemployed Arabs in the cities led to increased tensions. The Arabs called for a restriction on Jewish immigration. However, before the British could take any action there occurred a violent uprising of the Palestinian Arabs. Strikes, guerrilla warfare, and resistance by the Arabs set off an unsuccessful attempt by the British to crush the rebellion by force. The failure of force by the British subsequently led to the "White Paper" which restricted Jewish immigration. There was still widespread distrust of British intentions. However, by 1939 the three

years of rebellion and disorder had weakened the Arabs' ability to resist. The outbreak of World War II finally caused the rebellion to die out and overshadowed the events taking place in Palestine.⁴⁰

During the war the Jews formed their underground military organizations which terrorized the Arabs of Palestine. The terror attacks against the Arabs increased after World War II as the Israelis sought to drive the Arabs out by fear. The climax of the Jewish terrorism was the attack on the Arab village of Deir Yassin on April 9, 1948 by the Irgun and Lehi. The village was captured and more than two hundred Arab men, women, and children were slain. Their bodies were allegedly mutilated and thrown into a well.⁴¹

After the end of the war President Truman requested that the British government allow the immediate immigration of 100,000 Jews to Palestine. The British were already having severe problems with illegal Jewish immigration and violence by the Jewish underground. Finally the British abandoned any hope of solving the problem of Palestine and handed the matter over to the United Nations. The British abandonment and subsequent UN vote resulted from strong economic and political pressure from the U.S. on behalf of the Zionists.⁴²

The Arabs totally rejected the Partition Plan which was adopted by the United Nations. The Jews in Palestine accepted the plan which granted them 55 percent of Palestine

at a time when they only constituted 30 percent of the population and owned less than 8 percent of the land. The resulting 1948 War led to the exodus of approximately 750,000 Arabs. The bitterness caused by the creation of the Israeli state was directed not only against Israel but also against the United States and Britain. This resentment has been a prime factor in the growth of anti-Western feelings by many of the Arab states.⁴³

In 1950 Israel passed the "Law of Return" which allows any Jew of any nationality to immigrate to Israel and receive immediate citizenship. However, the Israelis have refused to repatriate the Arab refugees of the 1948 and 1967 Wars. The Israeli law also provides for strict conditions of citizenship for non-Jews; non-Jews can become citizens after 3 years residency, but citizenship is not automatically granted. Therefore, over two million Palestinian refugees and their children are denied any chance of citizenship in their former country.⁴⁴ The PLO and the Arab governments also cite massive discrimination against the Arabs who are Israeli citizens and against Arabs in the occupied territories. Torture of Arab prisoners has also been a repeated charge leveled at Israel by the Arabs.


The Israelis are also charged with destruction of Arab property. According to PLO reports, there existed approximately 475 Arab villages in Palestine before the 1948 War. Since 1948 the Israelis have allegedly destroyed 385 villages. It is further charged by the PLO that the Israeli military between July 11, 1967 and November 1969 demolished

7554 Arab homes in acts of retaliation and collective punishment for fedayeen attacks.⁴⁵

The 1975 Sinai disengagement agreement was denounced by the PLO since it did nothing toward resolving the Palestinian problem. The PLO contrived to sabotage the agreement but failed completely. After the signing of the agreement the fedayeen leadership strongly denounced the accord. Yasir Arafat condemned the agreement stating that, "The Egyptian-Israeli agreement has increased the chances of war in the Middle East. It hasn't dealt with the basic issue in the area, which is the Palestinian problem and the cause of the Palestinian people."⁴⁶ The PLO's "foreign minister" and United Nations representative Farauk Kaddaumi stated:

The Sinai agreement goes against the (1974) Rabat Resolution. We agreed that no one would move alone. This is the first agreement between an Arab state and Israel. It should have been signed after they withdraw from all the occupied territories, not before.⁴⁷ The Israelis have bought time with it, that's all.

The PLO's anger at the Sinai agreement turned to outrage with the advent of the Camp David talks and subsequent peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. The PLO felt betrayed and Sadat moved to the top of their list of enemies. Despite the agreement by Israel to grant autonomy on the West Bank and Gaza, Israel has refused to consider the idea of a Palestinian state or any part for the PLO in the autonomy. The Israelis refused to have any mention made of the PLO in the peace treaty. In the view of the PLO and the



ELSEWHERE: An estimated 250,000 Palestinians are scattered throughout Egypt, Kuwait and other Mideast states.
ALL TOLD, about half of the 3 million Palestinians live in refugee camps.

SOURCE: "Arafat's New Drive for Power-Now a U.S. Problem," U.S. News & World Report, May 5, 1975. Page 35.

majority of the Arab world, Sadat and Egypt have given the Israelis a permanent license to occupy all of historical Palestine. Sadat sold out the Palestinians in order to get the Sinai back.⁴⁸

NOTES

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CHAPTER III

THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION: STRUCTURE, POLICY, AND LEGITIMACY

Throughout history many groups of people have been displaced as a result of warfare, the Jews included. However, the vast majority of these displaced populations have been absorbed into other nations and their causes have been forgotten by the rest of the world. This has not been the case with the Palestinians. Their cause and sense of injustice have not diminished with age. The international recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization increases every year. According to Yasir Arafat, head of the PLO, the PLO is now recognized in one form or another by 105 nations, a number greater than the nations that recognize Israel.¹ This recognition ranges from full diplomatic recognition to recognition of the PLO as a legitimate liberation front.

How has the PLO managed to avoid slipping into anonymity? Primarily, this has been accomplished by its use of terrorism as a political tool to force the recognition of its cause. In order to implement its political and military strategies the Palestinian movement has developed a complex organization under the heading of the Palestine Liberation

Organization.

The PLO is not by any means a unified organization. It is a loosely linked coalition of several diverse groups with different ideologies, tactics, and objectives. The PLO has been beset by constant strife, internal bickering, and at times open warfare among the various groups since its conception. The one common goal that links the groups together is the desire to regain the land mass which Israel now occupies.

The origin of the PLO can be found in the early attack by Palestinian Arabs on Jewish settlers in Palestine. The massive refugee camps established after the 1948 War became the breeding ground for the fedayeen ("sacrificers") which began terrorist raids into the new state. The constant fedayeen raids from the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip were one of the primary reasons for the 1956 War between Egypt and Israel. In 1956 Israel seized the Sinai and Gaza Strip in order to stop the terrorist attacks. Eventually Israel was forced to withdraw after insisting that United Nations troops be stationed in the Gaza Strip and Sinai to stop terrorist raids. However, terrorist raids continued and the Arab states became concerned that terrorist attacks from their territory would provoke another war in which they were unprepared to fight. Therefore, the Arab governments sought a way to control the fedayeen activity. The Egyptians in particular wished to establish an organization which

would unite the various fedayeen groups into a single body which could be controlled. At the Arab League Summit Conference held in Cairo in January 1964 the Arab governments acknowledged that they were not yet militarily prepared to engage and defeat Israel. They decided to establish a United Arab Command (UAC) which would acquire arms and coordinate activities designed to strengthen the military of the Arab nations. The summit meeting further authorized the establishment of a Palestine Liberation Organization which was to be the official voice of the Palestinian people and coordinate the Palestinian fedayeen activities. Furthermore, the PLO was to coordinate its activities with the United Arab Command which would limit the PLO's freedom of action.²

The PLO's first chairman was Ahmed Shukeiri who was the Palestinian representative in the Arab League. Shukeiri, born in Palestine, had served as Saudi Arabia's delegate to the United Nations. On May 22, 1964 the first Palestinian National Congress was held in Jerusalem. At this meeting the PLO was officially established and a Palestinian National Covenant was adopted.³ Provisions were also made to establish military training and camps, to obtain Palestinian admission to Arab military academies, and to establish a national fund for financing the PLO. The headquarters were to be established in Egypt.⁴ According to the PLO covenant the objective of the PLO is to liberate Palestine. Regarding

the method of liberation to be used, Article 9 of the charter states that, "Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine."⁵ This objective was reinforced when the PLO Unified Command met in Beirut in 1970 to agree upon an organizational formula for national unity. Part of the agreement, signed by all major groups of the Palestinian Resistance Movement, stated that, "The aim of the Palestinian revolution is to dismantle this entity (Israel) with its political, military, social, syndical, and cultural institutions and to liberate all of Palestine."⁶ The PLO has never renounced this objective or the method of "armed struggle" to achieve this objective.

Despite the purpose and claim of uniting the Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM) several of the smaller groups refused to join the PLO. In addition, the largest fedayeen group, Al Fatah, refused to be assimilated into the PLO. Yasir Arafat, its leader, feared Egyptian control and restriction of its raids into Israel. The competition between Fatah and the PLO coincided with the competition between the principal supporter of each group. The PLO was primarily an Egyptian-controlled organization while Fatah drew its support from Syria.⁷ Fatah believed that the PRM must be free from the political squabbles and maneuverings of the Arab states. Fatah's newspaper, Our Palestine, repeatedly emphasized that Palestinians must lead the fight for liberation and not rely upon the Arab governments. Fatah

was viewed as a radical organization by many of the Arab governments since it advocated continuous guerrilla attacks against Israel from the surrounding Arab countries. Fatah and Yasir Arafat were greatly influenced by the success of the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria. Arafat had established a working relationship with FLN members during his student days in Algeria. Fatah therefore advocated that the PRM adopt the protracted guerrilla warfare strategy of the FLN.⁸

After the defeat of the Arab armies in the Six Day War of 1967 Shukeiri began to lose support in the PLO. He was viewed as a symbol of the embarrassing defeat of 1967. As a result Shukeiri resigned and was replaced by Yahya Hammauda. Also, as a result of the 1967 War defeat Fatah, and its policy of protracted warfare against Israel, increased its popularity and following. Prior to the 1967 War the PLO was relying upon the Arab states to defeat Israel and return Palestine to Arab control. After the total defeat of 1967 the PLO realized its strategy had to change. In November 1967 Fatah called upon the PLO to disband and turn its funds over to Fatah.⁹ Despite the continuing competition between the PLO and Fatah, Arafat agreed in 1968 to unite Fatah with the PLO. It is likely that Arafat made this move due to Fatah's increasing popularity, which he believed would allow him to dominate the leadership of the PLO. At the fourth session of the Palestine National Council (PNC) held in Cairo in 1968

Fatah was allocated 33 of the 105 seats available. The next largest groups, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Saiga, received twelve seats each.¹⁰ Therefore, Fatah assumed the dominant position within the PLO.

The strife within the PRM did not end with the consolidation of the PLO and Al Fatah. In 1967 three small fedayeen groups had merged under the leadership of Dr. George Habash. This organization, called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, became the chief competitor with Fatah for leadership of the PRM. The PFLP is more leftist-oriented than Fatah, and the PFLP and Fatah have at times both claimed credit for the same operations. Fatah is much less concerned with ideology than the PFLP. Fatah's main ideology is nationalistic and centers around the liberation of Palestine. The PFLP, on the otherhand, is more Marxist-oriented and views the conflict with Israel as part of class warfare. The revolution envisioned by the PFLP extends not only to Israel but also to the "reactionary Arab states" which are linked to the Western capitalist nations. Therefore, if Zionism is to be totally defeated and the revolution to be completely successful, the reactionary Arab regimes must also be overthrown.¹¹

The PLO of today is still only an umbrella organization which attempts, often without success, to coordinate the various fedayeen groups. The strife and competition of the past continues and is in many respects much worse

than it was ten years ago. However, the PLO of today is much more independent and free of control of the Arab states. The terrorist groups that make up the PLO vary widely not only in ideology, but also in objectives. The so-called "moderate" groups, such as Fatah, have stated that they are now willing to compromise and perhaps settle for an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. On the otherhand, the "rejection front" has denounced any compromise with Israel and is still dedicated to the destruction of the state of Israel. The rejection front will be discussed later in this chapter.

Structure

In order to properly understand the PLO it is necessary to examine its structure and the various groups that comprise its membership. There are eight major groups in the PLO plus an extensive array of administrative and support offices. The PLO's primary purpose is armed liberation and terrorism; however, it also performs a number of other functions. The largest and most prominent of the groups is still Al Fatah and this is the group that will be examined first.

Al Fatah

The name "Fatah" is a reversed acronym which stands for the Arabic words "Haarakat Tahrir Falastin" (Movement for the Liberation of Palestine). The acronym was reversed because "HATAF" in Arabic denotes sudden death. "FATAH"

means "conquest."¹²

Fatah, with approximately 6000 active members, is the largest of the PLO groups. Fatah was originally supported primarily by Syria. However, it presently maintains good relations with most Arab states and is not sponsored or controlled by any one Arab state. Fatah was first formed in 1956; however, it did not really began to function until 1965.¹³ The head of both the PLO and Fatah is Yasir Arafat. Arafat was born in Jerusalem in 1928. He received a degree in engineering from Cairo University. In 1953 he joined other students in carrying out guerrilla operations against the British in the Suez Canal Zone. Arafat later joined the Egyptian Army and attended demolitions school. He fought with the Egyptian Army in the 1956 War.¹⁴ Later Arafat served as president of the Palestine Student Federation in Egypt and became connected with the Moslem Brotherhood. When the Moslem Brotherhood was outlawed in 1957 Arafat fled from Egypt.¹⁵ He moved to Kuwait and worked in the Ministry of Public Works. He was a co-founder of Fatah and quit his job in 1964 to work fulltime with Fatah.¹⁶ Fatah was supported primarily by Syria until 1966 when a new faction of the Baath Party came to power and decided to demand total obedience from Arafat and Fatah. As a result Arafat was imprisoned for a short time by Syria. After his release Arafat moved his headquarters to Beirut.¹⁷ In 1965 Arafat met Che Guevara and is believed to have been greatly influenced by Guevara's ideas on revolution.¹⁸ Arafat was

a delegate to the National Day Celebration in China in 1970. He returned to China again in 1970 and then traveled to North Vietnam.¹⁹ In 1974 Arafat addressed the United Nations General Assembly.²⁰

Al Fatah is governed by an eleven-man Central Committee headed by Arafat. The number two man in Fatah is Saleh Khalef, alias "Abu Iyad," who heads the Black September group. Fatah's military arm is called "Al Asifa" (the Storm) and is headed by Khalil el-Wazir, code-named "Abu Jihad." He is responsible for the sea-launched terrorist attacks of Fatah, of which the most famous are the March 1978 Coastal Road Bus attack and the abortive attempt in September 1978 to bombard the resort of Eliat.²¹

Fatah played a very active role in the Lebanese Civil War. It fought on the leftist side against the Christians and later against the Syrian Army. After the 1973 Yom Kippur War Fatah discontinued its terrorist operations abroad for political reasons. Arafat hoped to cultivate the image of a national liberation movement conducting a territorial-based guerrilla war. However, Fatah has maintained both foreign infrastructure and its close ties with other terrorist groups throughout the world.²² The points raised in this paragraph will be explained in Chapters 6 and 7.

The Fatah has in the last few years adopted a pragmatic approach to the Palestinian problem. The group has indicated a willingness to participate in negotiations for a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza. However,

Fatah and the PLO still refuse to recognize the state of Israel and continue to condemn the Camp David accords.

Black September

The notorious Black September organization, whose extremist actions have been condemned by Fatah and the PLO, is actually a subsidiary of Al Fatah. Black September took its name from the incident in September 1970 when King Hussein of Jordan drove the fedayeen out of his country and reportedly killed at least 2000. The Black September is responsible for some of the most horrendous terrorist attacks which have been conducted. It specializes in international terrorism. The Black September Movement (BSM) conducted the Munich massacre and the murder of one Belgian and two American diplomats in Khartoum in 1973. Many of the acts of international terrorism of Black September have been condemned by Fatah. However, several of the attacks committed by Black September were financed directly by Fatah. Intelligence and training for operations were also supplied by Fatah. Funds raised by Al Fatah have been transferred to Black September and weapons and explosives used in BSM operations have been acquired from Fatah.²³

After the Khartoum operation by BSM the Sudanese Army raided the PLO office in Khartoum and found a large number of documents linking Fatah to Black September. Among the documents were papers which showed Fawaz Yassin, the PLO chief in Khartoum, to be the "case officer" for the operation.

His deputy, Rizig Gassan, was the leader of the attack. Another Fatah member named Karam had used the PLO's land rover to drive the terrorists to the Saudi Embassy which was the site of the attack. Also among the papers seized by the authorities were instructions for the raid and a sketch of the embassy and its grounds. Karam later made a full confession linking Al Fatah with the operation.²⁴

There are several reasons for this support of Black September by Al Fatah. On the surface the supposedly moderate Fatah has fostered the impression that Black September members were extremists who had no link or support from the PLO or Al Fatah. The underlying concept was to officially deny any recognition or connection with the extremists which would cultivate their moderate image. On the otherhand, their underground support of the BSM would allow Fatah to carry out acts of terrorism abroad without having to bear the responsibility for them. It also served to appease the extremist elements within Fatah who were angry at being denied their terrorist raids and were beginning to drift away from Fatah to the more militant PFLP. Thus, Fatah could maintain its moderate position and cultivate the illusion of respectability necessary to represent the Palestinian people before official organizations, such as the United Nations. Another reason for denying support of the BSM was to avoid embarrassing the Arab governments that finance Al Fatah and the PLO.²⁵

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

The PFLP was founded in 1967 as a merger of three smaller terrorist organizations which were already active militarily. The estimated strength of the PFLP has dropped in recent years. In the early 1970's its strength was estimated to be 3000 to 4000 members. In 1979 the Israeli military estimated its membership to be approximately 700 to 900.²⁶ Whether this drop is due to losses in the Lebanese Civil War and/or the 1978 Latani Operation by Israel into South Lebanon, or other reasons is unclear. The PFLP has a Marxist-Leninist ideology and is considered to be the most radical of the PLO groups. The PFLP was the first terrorist group to utilize international terrorism and was the originator of terrorist skyjackings.²⁷ The PFLP has been responsible for most of the PLO attacks in Europe. The PFLP does not restrict its list of enemies to Israel. According to the PFLP publication entitled A Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine, its enemies are: 1) Israel - According to PFLP doctrine the state of Israel must be destroyed. 2) the World Zionist Movement - Israel is viewed as only a part of the World Zionist Movement which established and supports Israel. 3) world imperialism - Led by the United States, the imperialist nations consort to rob the underdeveloped nations of their riches. Additionally, the imperialists support Israel with both funds and arms. 4) Arab reactionaries represented by feudalism and capitalism -

This refers to the "reactionary regimes" who are supported by the imperialists and defend their colonial interests. Because of their feudal structure the "reactionary nations" are in reality opposed to any liberation movements.²⁸

Attacks of the PFLP include the planting of a bomb in a Swiss plane in 1970 that blew up in flight killing all 55 persons aboard; the Lod Airport attack in 1972 carried out by members of the Japanese Red Army in which 26 people died; and the Entebbe hijacking of the French airliner.²⁹

The principal supporters of the PFLP are Iraq, South Yemen, Algeria, and Libya. The PFLP is part of the "rejection front" which rejects any negotiated settlement with Israel. The "rejection front" is comprised of the PFLP, the Arab Liberation Front, the Palestine Liberation Front, and the Popular Palestine Struggle Front. The PFLP maintains close alliances with other terrorist groups throughout the world. It has carried out numerous joint operations with other groups including the Japanese Red Army and Baader-Meinhoff Gang. The PFLP has opened its training bases to other radical groups and extends aid in acquiring arms and other material. In September 1974 the PFLP broke away from the PLO Executive Committee and the Central Council because of the PFLP's rejection of any strategy other than revolutionary violence.³⁰

The leader of the PFLP, George Habash, is the principal rival of Yasir Arafat. He completely rejects Arafat's movement toward a political solution. Habash was

born in 1926 in Lod, Palestine to a Greek Orthodox family. He spent most of his early life in Jerusalem and reportedly engaged in terrorist activities during the 1948 War. Habash is a medical doctor who studied at the American University of Beirut from 1944 to 1951.³¹ He later founded a political party (Arab Nationalist Movement) in Lebanon which was a pro-Nasser movement committed to the concept of Arab unity. Its slogan was "Unity, Liberation, Revenge." After the 1967 War and the reassessment of the fedayeen movement Habash decided to form his own group, the PFLP.³²

The PFLP feels justified in attacking Israel and Israeli interests in any country. After an attack on an El Al airliner in Athens, Habash justified the attack by stating:

The non-Israeli passengers are on their way to Israel. Since we have no control over the land that was stolen from us and called Israel, it is right that whoever goes to Israel should ask for our permission. We want a war like the war in Vietnam. The prospect of triggering a third world war doesn't bother us. The world has been using us and has forgotten us. And we will continue our present strategy. It is a smart one, you see, would you really want to fly El Al?³³

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command

In 1968 a splinter group broke away from the PFLP and formed a new group called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command. It is commanded by a former Syrian Army captain, Ahmed Jibril. The PFLP-GC is responsible for the April 1974 attack at Qiryat Shemona,

Israel in which 16 persons were killed.³⁴ During the Lebanese Civil War the PFLP-GC became the most active group in the Palestinian camp. It fought on the side of the leftist forces.

The Syrian intervention into the Lebanese conflict and the subsequent fighting between the PLO and the Syrians caused a split within the ranks of the PFLP-GC. The split was between pro-Syrian and pro-Iraqi factions. In April 1977 the pro-Iraqi faction formed its own organization headed by Abu Abbas and called it the Palestine Liberation Front. This split caused considerable damage to the PFLP-GC. The PFLP-GC still maintains its representation in the PLO Executive Committee; however, its status in the PLO has diminished because of its increased dependence on Syria who has become its principal supporter. Due to the PFLP-GC's pro-Syrian position the rejection front in May 1977 announced its intentions of removing Jibril's organization from its ranks and replacing it with a splinter group from the PFLP-GC, the Palestine Liberation Front.

Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

Another splintering of the PFLP occurred in 1969. The new splinter group formed the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP). Its leader is a former Jordanian Christian, Naif Hawatmah. The PDFLP is primarily Marxist in doctrine and its primary goal is the

establishment of a socialist Palestine. Its membership is believed to be approximately 1000.³⁶

After the Yom Kippur War the PDFLP, like Fatah, supported the more moderate political approach of the PLO instead of the rejection front. The PDFLP maintains close ties with the Soviet Union and China. However, its primary financial support comes from Fatah. The majority of the PDFLP forces are deployed in southern Lebanon. Its main headquarters are located in Beirut.³⁷ The PDFLP's most notorious terrorist attacks are the May 1974 attack at Ma'alot, Israel in which 21 school children were killed and the November 1974 raid at Bet Shean in which four Israeli civilians were killed.³⁸

Al Saiga

Saiga was formed in 1968 by the ruling Syrian Baath Party. It is subordinate to the Syrian Ministry of Defense. Saiga was formed in order to give the Syrian government a means of participating in the fedayeen movement and the PLO. The organization has a membership of approximately 1500 to 2000, of which the majority are Syrians, not Palestinians.³⁹ Saiga ideology is aligned directly with that of Syria. Whereas Al Fatah avoids alignment with any one Arab state and advocates independence of the PLO, Saiga advocates the Syrian solutions to the Palestinian problems.

Saiga was headed by Zuhir Muhsin, a leader in the Syrian Baath Party until his assassination in July 1979.

The PLO blamed Egypt and Israel for his death.⁴⁰ The assassination took place only a few days after the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara, Turkey was seized by four terrorists belonging to a group called the "Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution." The group is allegedly an offshoot of Saiga and Egypt placed the blame for the seizure on Syria and Saiga.⁴¹

Muhsin, who was military operations chief for the PLO as well as head of Saiga, was replaced by two different Palestinians. A Syrian Air Force general of Palestinian origin, Mohammed Azzam, assumed the position as head of the PLO's military operation department and Sami Attari, a member of the Baath Party, took command of Saiga.⁴²

Saiga's adherence to the Syrian position caused considerable problems during the Lebanese Civil War. In June 1976 when the Syrian Army invaded Lebanon and subsequently stopped the PLO from crushing the Christian forces, Saiga had to shift its alliance from the leftist side to the Syrian position. After fighting with the PLO and leftists Saiga was now compelled to fight with the Syrians against the PLO and leftists. This crisis caused considerable internal friction which resulted in the disintegration of the organization. Part of the membership broke away and formed an organization called the "Vanguard of the Popular Liberation War - Palestinian Organization" which soon became defunct.⁴³

The disintegration of Saiga caused by the civil war in Lebanon made it necessary for Syria to begin a rebuilding

process. The Syrians rebuilt Saiga's network both in Lebanon and within the PLO.⁴⁴

The majority of Saiga's operations have been carried out inside of Israel. However, they have operated internationally in such incidents as the September 1973 "Vienna Operation" in which hostages were seized on a train transporting Jewish emigrants from the USSR.⁴⁵

The Arab Liberation Front

After the Syrian Baath Party formed its own fedayeen group in 1968 the Iraqi Baath Party followed its example in 1969. In order to serve Iraqi interests and participate in the PLO the Iraqi Baath Party formed the Arab Liberation Front. The ALF is headed by Abd el-Rahim Ahmed and has an estimated strength of several hundred members deployed mainly in Lebanon. Like the PFLP, the ALF views the liberation of Palestine from Israel as only a step in a larger strategy aimed at defeating reactionism and Zionism. The ultimate goal is the unification of the entire Arab world. The ALF is part of the rejection front.⁴⁶ A majority of the membership of the ALF are Iraqi, Jordanian, and Lebanese citizens rather than Palestinians.⁴⁷

The Popular Palestinian Struggle Front

The Popular Palestinian Struggle Front was formed in the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the 1967 War. The organization is headed By Dr. Samir Gusha.⁴⁸ In July of 1971 the PPSF announced a merger with Fatah. However, the

merger was short-lived and the PPSF continues to function independently. The organization has approximately 300 to 400 members who operate predominantly from Lebanon. Its principal supporters are Iraq and Libya. The PPSF is a member of the rejection front.⁴⁹

The Palestine Liberation Front

The split in the ranks of the PFLP-GC over the Syrian role in the Lebanese Civil War resulted in a new organization, the Palestine Liberation Front, being formed. The PLF is headed by Abu Abbas who had insisted that the PFLP-GC fight against Syrian forces in Lebanon. When Jibril refused and maintained a pro-Syrian position Abbas attempted to oust Jibril from the leadership of the PFLP-GC in October 1976. Abbas failed in his attempt and the rift widened to the point of no return in April 1977 when the split occurred. The two groups have operated as rivals and at times armed clashes have broken out between the two groups.⁵⁰

The PLF is pro-Iraqi and anti-Syrian. Its membership is approximately 200 to 300 members. Its principal supporters are Iraq and Libya. The organization is part of the rejection front and is yet to have a representative in the PLO Executive Committee.⁵¹

The Abu Nidal Group (Black June)

The Black June group has been the most active group in recent years. However, its operations are not directed

against Israel; they are directed against other Arabs. The name "Black June" is derived from the June 1976 Syrian intervention into Lebanon. Its operations are directed against Syria and the PLO and are supported and encouraged by Iraq, who is its principal sponsor.⁵²

Black June is a splinter group of Fatah which broke off in 1974. Its leader is Sabri el Bana (Abu Nidal) who was Fatah's representative in Iraq. Fatah has placed a death sentence on Abu Nidal and Nidal has pledged to assassinate Arafat.⁵³

In 1977 and 1978 open warfare broke out between Black June and the PLO/Fatah. Black June is responsible for attacks on the Semiramis Hotel in Damascus and the Intercontinental Hotel in Amman. It has attacked the Syrian Embassies in Rome and Pakistan and assassinated a number of PLO and Fatah members.⁵⁴

In late 1978 Iraq and PLO/Fatah made moves toward reapproachment in order to present a united front against the Camp David accords.⁵⁵ The position of Black June is not known; however, given its dependence on Iraq, it will probably follow the wishes of the Iraqi government.

The Palestine Liberation Army


When the PLO was formed in 1964 provisions were also made for a conventional army of Palestinians. To that end the Palestine Liberation Army was formed as the military arm of the PLO. The PLA is independent of the various fedayeen

groups in the PLO. Although it is organized as a part of the PLO, its forces are actually subordinate to the military of the Arab nations where it is stationed. The PLA is not a guerrilla force. Its purpose is conventional warfare. However, it has been very ineffectual and has engaged in very little combat with Israeli forces.⁵⁶

The commander of the PLA is General Misbah el Badeiri whose headquarters are located in Damascus. Currently the PLA is organized into three brigades and several battalions. The current strength of the PLA is estimated to be approximately 4000 men.⁵⁷ In 1970 the strength was estimated to be between 10,000 and 20,000.⁵⁸ This drop is probably due to attrition from the war in Lebanon and desertion.


The PLA consists of the following forces:

- 1) The Hittin Brigade of the PLA is based in Syria, which is its source of training and support. When the Syrians entered Lebanon the Hittin Brigade fought with the Syrian Army against the PLO and leftists. Eventually the Brigade was transferred to Lebanon by Syria and has fought against the Christian forces in Beirut.
- 2) The Qadasiya Brigade was originally supported and trained by Iraq. It was known as the 421st Commando Battalion of the Iraqi Army.⁵⁹ In the course of the Lebanese Civil War the Brigade disintegrated. Its members were dispersed among the various Arab nations. The majority went to Syria where the Brigade was reorganized and reestablished under the control of the Syrian Army. Two of the



THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PLO

CHART 1



*supported and controlled by

THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY

CHART 2

Brigade's battalions were transferred to Lebanon and fought in Beirut against the Christians.⁶⁰

- 3) The Ayn Jalut Brigade consists of four battalions and has in the past relied upon Egypt for its support. In early 1976 the Brigade was transferred to Lebanon where it operated under the command of Fatah. However, the Brigade began to disintegrate and was returned to Egypt in early 1977.⁶¹
- 4) The Yarmuk Brigade, which is nominally a part of the PLA, works closely with Fatah, which is responsible for its training and supply. The Brigade has four battalions and is well-equipped with artillery and tanks. Most of the personnel of the Yarmuk Brigade are deserters from the Jordanian Army.⁶²
- 5) The Karame Brigade was formed in 1971 from personnel of the Yarmuk Brigade and is located in Syria. It has a strength of three battalions.⁶³
- 6) The Popular Liberation Forces was organized in 1968 as the commando branch of the PLA. It is supported and equipped by Iraq.⁶⁴

Deployment of PLO Forces

The various factions of the PLO are organized into both regular and quasi-regular forces and number approximately 10,000. In addition, the PLO maintains militias in the refugee camps. The various militias have several thousand members who have undergone basic military training.

The majority of most PLO groups are located in Lebanon. The majority of the membership is also deployed in Lebanon. The majority, approximately 6500, is located in southern Lebanon. Approximately 3000 to 5000 are located in the Beirut area and in the refugee camps in the vicinity of Tripoli.⁶⁵

The PLO is governed by an Executive Committee of 14 members who control the everyday workings of the organization. The chairman of the Executive Committee is Yasir Arafat. Of the 14 members of the PLO-EC approximately six are independent and not aligned with any one group. The rest of the membership is from the various PLO groups.⁶⁶

The PLO structure also contains a National Council and a Central Committee. The National Council is a legislative body representing various segments of the Palestinian population. The PNC consists of approximately 250 members. The Central Committee is utilized to implement the decisions of the Executive Committee. It consists of the heads of the various fedayeen groups.⁶⁷

One of the primary reasons for the success of the PLO and its high degree of acceptance among the Palestinians is its structure. The PLO is much more than a terrorist organization. Its organization permeates into all areas of the Palestinian community, particularly into the refugee camps. The PLO has departments which deal with education, health, and culture in the refugee camps. This social

structure differentiates the PLO from other terrorist organizations and gives it a means of controlling and influencing the Palestinian community. According to PLO sources, the PLO Education Department runs hundreds of schools and educational programs in the refugee camps. It also awards PLO scholarships to Palestinian students which enable them to study at universities abroad.⁶⁸ The PLO has a department of the Palestine Red Crescent Organization which runs approximately 50 hospitals and 120 clinics in various Arab states where Palestinians live. The PLO's economic institute manages small factories and economic projects which provide jobs for approximately 5000 Palestinians. The PLO also possesses a Cinema Section which produces documentary films about the Palestinians. Its most famous work is the film produced with Vanessa Redgrave entitled The Palestinian.⁶⁹

The various projects, both military and social, of the PLO require millions of dollars a year. The PLO, unlike many other terrorist groups, does not need to rob banks or kidnap for ransom. Its projects are bankrolled by the various Arab states. This support will be examined in detail in Chapter 6.

Policy and Legitimacy

It is difficult to elaborate on PLO policy or goals since there exist several diverse groups within the PLO, each with its own goals and policies. However, all of the PLO groups share one common objective, the dismantlement of

the Israeli state. Despite a change in rhetoric by some PLO groups in recent years, the objective of liberating all of Palestine from Israeli control has not been changed. As demonstrated in recent statements by Yasir Arafat, which will be covered in the following chapter, the commitment to destroy the Israeli state is as strong as when the PLO was first formed. However, in order to attract support from outside of the Arab world some PLO groups have softened their rhetoric and downplayed this objective. Nevertheless, this objective, the destruction of the Israeli state, remains the primary goal of the PLO, and is one of the few policy areas in which all the PLO groups can agree and are united.

Outside of the universally accepted policy among the PLO groups of destroying the Israeli state, the PLO is wrought with disagreement over policy and objectives. There are three main areas of controversy within the PLO. First of all, there is no agreement on the methods to be used to achieve the liberation of Palestine from the Israelis. This split has existed since the early 1970's when some PLO groups began to pursue a diplomatic strategy in addition to terrorism. This led to a split in the PLO between the mainline PLO groups led by Al Fatah and supported mainly by Syria, and the so-called "rejectionists" led by the PFLP and supported mainly by Iraq and Libya. As stated previously in this chapter, the "rejectionists" refuse any negotiation and view armed struggle as the only means for liberating Palestine.

The diplomatic strategy of the PLO will be covered in detail in the following chapter.

There is no agreement among the PLO groups on the issue of acceptance of a Palestinian mini-state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Again this division is between the Al Fatah mainline PLO groups and the rejectionists. The Fatah bloc has stated its willingness to accept a Palestinian state comprised of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, Al Fatah views this only as an interim step and still refuses to recognize the existence of Israel and to relinquish its claim to the rest of Palestine that comprises the Israeli state.⁷⁰ The rejection front refers to the PLO/Fatah position as "surrender solutions" and condemns any solution that leaves any portion of Palestine in Israeli hands.⁷¹

The PLO groups do not agree on the type of government that a Palestinian state should have once liberation is achieved. As covered previously in this chapter, the ideologies of the PLO groups vary greatly. Some PLO groups, such as Fatah, advocate a type of secular democratic state in Palestine while other groups, such as the PDFLP, advocate a Marxist style of socialism (see P. 60). A further source of strife for a Palestinian state is its future political alignment with other Arab states. Naturally the PLO groups supported by Syria would probably seek close ties with that government, while other groups supported by Iraq would also seek ties with that regime.

In the following chapter the PLO's strategies and tactics will be examined. While reading this chapter it is important to realize that while the PLO's strategies and tactics have changed its basic objective has not changed. The PLO's primary goal is the same in 1980 as it was when the PLO was first formed. The primary goal of the PLO was, and still is, the destruction of the Israeli state and the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state in its place.

In the area of political legitimacy the PLO has achieved great success in recent years. The PLO's legitimacy was assured in 1974. In October 1974 the Rabat Summit Conference of the Arab heads of state recognized the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."⁷² In November 1974 Yasir Arafat made his appearance before the UN General Assembly. This appearance and the granting of observer status to the PLO in the UN has assured the organization of legitimacy outside of the Arab world. In 1975 a special Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People was created in the UN.⁷³ In 1974 the UN General Assembly passed UN Resolution 3236 which states that Palestinians have "the right to return to their homeland," "the right of self-determination," and the "right of national independence and sovereignty."⁷⁴ In recent years PLO leaders have met with numerous government representatives of various nations. There is no doubt that the PLO has achieved legitimacy. The question is "How?" In

Chapter 4 the tactics and strategies of the PLO will be explored in an attempt to answer this question.

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CHAPTER IV

TACTICS AND STRATEGIES OF THE PLO

As demonstrated in the preceding chapter, the PLO's structure is complex and organized for much more than terrorist operations. This reflects the nature of political terrorism which is much more than a military tactic. Terrorism is a tool that the PLO utilizes for political purposes.

The PLO's tactics and strategies have changed and evolved over the years. These changes will be examined as distinct phases which have evolved in response to certain events and changes within the framework of the struggle against Israel.

While the tactics and strategies have changed, the primary objective of the Palestinian Liberation Organization has remained the same throughout its history. This objective is the liberation of all of Palestine from Israel. The rhetoric has changed but the objective is the same. When the PLO was first formed the organization referred to "throwing the Jews into the sea."¹ In recent years the PLO's statements have referred to establishing a secular democratic state in Palestine in which Jews, Christians, and

Moslems would live together in harmony. However, according to PLO doctrine the Jews would not be part of the ruling majority which would be comprised of Palestinians. According to the PLO National Covenant, only the Jews who lived in Palestine prior to the 1948 War and subsequent to the statehood of Israel would be allowed to remain.² Since only approximately 400,000 Jews fit into this category, the remaining 2½ million Jewish citizens of Israel would have to leave. Although Yasir Arafat and the PLO have indicated their willingness to accept a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, they steadfastly refuse to relinquish their claim to the remainder of Palestine that is the state of Israel. In a November 1979 speech in Lisbon, Portugal Yasir Arafat stated, "Peace and stability will only be achieved in the Middle East with the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the forces of the Zionist aggressor from all Arab and Palestinian occupied territories."³ At the 1979 meeting of the Palestine National Council in Damascus a resolution was adopted which "affirmed the Palestinian peoples' commitment to the total liberation of Palestine from Zionist settler colonial domination;" further, "the Palestinian people will never negotiate with, or in any way recognize the Ugun terrorists who now head the illegal regime in Palestine."⁴

Thus, despite claims of moderation the goal of the PLO has not changed; it has, however, been reworded and stated in a more diplomatic fashion which is in keeping with

the PLO's current political strategy. Before examining the current strategy and tactics, the preceding phases of tactics and strategies will be examined to show the evolutionary process which has resulted in the current phase of tactics and strategies.

Pre-1967 War Phase

The first phase of the evolution of the fedayeen was the pre-1967 War stage which encompassed the period from Israeli statehood in 1948 to the June 1967 War. This was a period of formation and organization for the fedayeen and the PLO. After the 1956 War there were few significant acts of terrorism by the fledgling PLO groups in this period prior to the 1967 War. However, after the 1948 War the Israelis were subjected to a wave of terrorism sponsored primarily by the Egyptians and launched from the Gaza Strip. The refugee camps in the Gaza Strip became the headquarters and source of recruits for the fedayeen. As a result of these terrorist attacks and in response to the closing of the straits of Tiran by Egypt, Israel launched Operation Kadesh in 1956 and seized the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Desert. The fedayeen movement suffered greatly as a result of the 1956 War. The Israelis were successful in clearing the refugee camps in Gaza of terrorists and refused to withdraw from the Sinai and Gaza Strip until the United Nations agreed to establish the United Nations Expeditionary Force (UNEF) to maintain peace and security in these areas.⁵

A further result of the 1956 War was a reluctance on the part of the Egyptians and other Arab governments to support fedayeen raids against Israel and risk retaliatory raids and perhaps another war with Israel. Therefore, the Arab governments sought a means to control the fedayeen groups and their actions. As a result of this need to control the fedayeen, the Arab governments established the PLO in 1964.⁶

Prior to 1967 the only truly organizational large fedayeen group was Al Fatah. During the period between the 1956 War and the 1967 War the Israelis regarded the Palestinian guerrilla movement as only a minor nuisance. Even a majority of the Palestinians were skeptical of the fedayeen. The PLO, formed in 1964, was clearly controlled by the Arab governments and reflected their policies and goals. In this phase the majority of the Palestinians and the PLO were relying on the Arab governments to produce a military victory over Israel which would produce a Palestinian state. The fedayeen groups, and Al Fatah in particular, were hampered by the fact that both Egypt and Syria, particularly after the 1956 War, did not allow their territories to be used as bases for crossborder operations against Israel.⁷ King Hussein of Jordan also attempted, with little success, to prevent terrorist raids from Jordan. This reluctance by Arab governments to support fedayeen operations was caused by fear of Israeli retaliation against their territory.

However, some PLO groups, particularly Al Fatah, ignored the Arab governments' restrictions and occasionally launched raids against Israel from Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.

During this period Nasser was one of the most vocal opponents of Fatah. The Egyptian press conducted a campaign against Arafat. One Egyptian newspaper wrote that Arafat was "an agent of Zionism and imperialism sent to stir up trouble to give Israel an excuse to attack the Arab states."⁸ Nasser also attempted to discourage support for fedayeen operations by gaining the support of the other Arab nations. At the December 1965 Arab Summit Conference held in Morocco, Egypt introduced a resolution calling for a halt to all acts of terrorism against Israel for the time being, and proposed that no aid be given to the fedayeen. This resolution occurred at the same time that Nasser was trying to encourage support for the recently formed PLO which generally adhered to Egyptian policy. The resolution passed with Syria abstaining.⁹ Clearly Nasser was concerned about possible Israeli retaliation.

At this time Nasser's memory of the 1956 defeat by Israel was fresh and Nasser realized that Egypt was not militarily strong enough to defeat Israel. Nasser also realized that confrontation between the Arab states and Israel was the aim of fedayeen groups such as Fatah. In June 1965 Fatah delegates to the Palestinian National Congress in Cairo met with the world press and stated their policy, to entangle the Arab nations in a war with Israel.¹⁰

The fedayeen also realized that the Arab nations might not be able to defeat Israel. However, they realized the great numerical advantage the Arab states possessed. Perhaps Israel would win the next war and the next; however, eventually the Arab nations would prevail. The strategy of entanglement was to be induced by utilizing crossborder operations which would cause Israeli retaliation against the Arab states. This would ignite further military action by the Arab nations. Eventually this cycle of violence would escalate into war.

Fatah was the largest of the fedayeen groups operating independently of the PLO and was the leader of the entanglement strategy. With the exception of Syria, the Arab governments bordering Israel attempted to stop Fatah operations and many Fatah members ended up in Arab jails. After several Israeli reprisal raids into Jordan in 1965 the Jordanian Army undertook severe measures to stop fedayeen operations from its territory. As a result there were several armed clashes between the fedayeen and the Jordanian Army.¹¹

The opposition in Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan caused Fatah to move its headquarters to Damascus in 1965. However, the Syrians were also reluctant to allow Fatah to operate from their territory and encouraged the group to use Jordanian territory. Despite these difficulties and the fact that Fatah numbered only 200 to 300 members at this time, Fatah managed to conduct 35 raids into Israel by the end of 1965;

28 of the raids were from Jordan.¹² In total the fedayeen conducted approximately 113 raids prior to the 1967 War.¹³

In June 1967 the long awaited war broke out between the Arab nations and Israel. However, the results were devastating for the Arabs. The armies of Jordan, Egypt, and Syria were crushed in six days and the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights were seized by Israel. The fedayeen were quickly rooted out from the refugee camps of the West Bank and Gaza by the Israelis. For the fedayeen this meant losing its closest and easiest accesses to crossborder operations.

Post-1967 War Phase: Guerrilla Warfare Phase

After the total defeat of the Arab armies in 1967 the PLO was forced to change its strategy and tactics. The fedayeen leadership realized that the Arab nations could not defeat Israel in conventional warfare. The PLO realized that relying on the Arab nations to defeat Israel was unrealistic. Therefore, a new strategy must be developed. It was at this point that Arafat and Al Fatah began to gain dominance within the fedayeen movement. For years Arafat had advocated a protracted war of attrition against Israel, an Algerian/Vietnam-style guerrilla war. After the 1967 Arab defeat the fedayeen movement, seeing the success of the Algerian FLN and the Cuban guerrilla war, decided to adopt this strategy. Al Fatah and Arafat had warned against aligning the Palestine Revolutionary Movement with the Arab states and

had been a practitioner of guerrilla raids prior to 1967. This gave Fatah a high degree of acceptance and leadership in the PRM after 1967.

After the 1967 War a host of new fedayeen groups sprang up. The PFLP, PDFLP, Saiga, ALF, Black September, and a number of smaller groups were formed. Also, as a result of the 1967 War, the War of Attrition was launched by the Arab states. The War of Attrition consisted of artillery duels and crossborder raids between the Arabs and Israelis. As part of this war the PLO was viewed in a new perspective by the Arab states. The PLO became the primary source of crossborder raids during the War of Attrition. The PLO fulfilled a need in the Arab world. The Arab world needed heroes and the PLO's propaganda machine provided heroes in the form of fedayeen raiders who infiltrated Israel. After the humiliating defeat in the 1967 War the Palestinian cause had become the center of Arab emotionalism and nationalism. The Arab governments had failed completely in the 1967 War to injure the Israeli state. When the PLO began to greatly intensify its crossborder raids into Israel after the 1967 War its exploits captured the attention of the Arab world. The PLO was viewed as being a successful striking force against the Israelis. The PLO fostered the image of being able to accomplish what the Arab armies could not. Therefore, the PLO gained in popularity in the Arab world and the

Arab governments viewed the PLO as a tool which could be used to strike out at the Israeli state. Therefore, the Arab governments began to support the crossborder terrorist operations by the PLO. The words "terrorist operations" are used here because the raids were directed against civilian targets, not the Israeli military. After the 1967 War the Arab nations opened their territory and army bases for fedayeen operations and training. In addition to training, the Arab nations also supplied weapons and financial support to the PLO. This intensification of Arab support after 1967 allowed the PLO to transform itself from a weak coalition of terrorist groups before 1967 to a well-trained and equipped military force. However, the Arab governments, by providing increased support for the PLO, and thereby increasing its efficiency and popularity in the Arab world, gave the PLO a greater degree of independence from the control of the Arab states. (For a detailed account of Arab support see Chapter 6).

During this period the fedayeen movement began to expand. In addition to recruiting in the refugee camps, PLO recruiters were sent to Europe to enlist Palestinians enrolled in European universities.¹⁴

It was during this phase that the first concentrated efforts were made by the PLO to mobilize Arabs living in Israel and the occupied territories. In order to wage successful guerrilla warfare the support of the population is necessary. The guerrillas must have a support network

among the population. In Israel the Arab population numbered over 400,000; over one million Arabs lived in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. The PLO viewed these Arabs as a necessary support network for its operations.

During the last part of 1967 and in 1968 and 1969 the number of fedayeen incidents rose tremendously. In the second half of 1967 there were 115 fedayeen attacks, and of these attacks approximately 53 percent penetrated into Israeli territory. In 1968 the fedayeen conducted 922 attacks; however, only 33 percent penetrated Israeli border defenses. In 1969 the fedayeen launched over 2000 incidents, of which 19 percent penetrated Israeli border defenses.¹⁵ Many of the penetration incidents involved mine-laying and sniping and did not result in Israeli casualties. Many other penetrations by fedayeen groups were detected after their penetration and the groups were intercepted before they could complete their missions.

According to Israeli statistics, in fourteen years of fedayeen activity, 1965 to 1979, approximately 650 Israelis have been killed and 3000 wounded. Even when one considers the small population of Israel, approximately 3 million, this is a small number for fourteen years of conflict.¹⁶ Currently the PLO can only manage 2 or 3 successful penetrations of Israeli defenses a year.

Clearly the strategy of guerrilla warfare was not successful. The reason that the attempt at guerrilla warfare against Israel was not successful was because the

necessary criteria for this type of warfare was not present in Israel. Any serious student of guerrilla warfare will observe, after only a cursory inspection of Israel, that conducting guerrilla warfare would be extremely difficult. The country is relatively densely populated when compared with Vietnam or Algeria. Israel comprises a very small land mass, completely lacking in large areas with thick vegetation, jungle, or forest land. Also, Israel does not possess any large inaccessible mountainous areas as was the case in Algeria. Therefore, the guerrillas lacked any safe havens in which they could hide and base any large number of fighters. The Israeli borders are small and after 1967 the borders were situated along natural terrain barriers, the Sinai Desert, the Jordan River, and the Golan Heights.

As time progressed the Israelis were able to seal the small border by means of patrols, security fences, mines, observation aircraft, and electronic sensing devices. The few fedayeen who penetrated the border defenses still had to cross open territory in order to reach civilian settlements. Many of the fedayeen who penetrated the border were detected and intercepted before they could complete their attacks.

The fedayeen who managed to elude the military and police and reach an Israeli settlement faced a further problem, the settlements and towns have their own defense forces. Most Israeli settlements and townships are closely guarded by the civilian population which is heavily armed and trained. An Israeli civilian settlement is far from being a soft

target.

The population also offered few possibilities to the PLO. For a revolution to succeed the guerrilla must have the aid and support of the population. Mao states that the guerrilla must operate among the population as a fish swimming in water. The guerrilla must be supported, hidden, and sustained by the people. However, in Israel the majority of the population is Jewish and offers no support to the PLO. The problem of waging guerrilla war against Israel is best summarized by Israeli Major General Harkabi, presently a professor at Hebrew University of Jerusalem. According to Harkabi:

By means of guerrilla warfare France could be persuaded to give up Algeria, but no amount of guerrilla activities could bring the French to relinquish their sovereignty over France. A guerrilla warfare was instrumental in inducing the Americans to withdraw from Vietnam, but no guerrilla activities could press the Americans to leave the USA.¹⁷

Even among the Arab population the PLO was unable to generate the support necessary for guerrilla warfare. The Arab population of Israel (excluding the occupied territories) comprises only about 15 percent of the total population. The Arab population is highly concentrated in certain areas of the country which facilitates their control.¹⁸ In the occupied territories the Arab population is even more concentrated and the Israeli security forces maintain strict control. Since many Israelis immigrated from Arab nations and grew up in an Arab society, speaking Arabic as their

native language, the Israelis possess a tremendous resource for counterinsurgency operations which they utilize in the occupied territories. Thus, the strong Israeli counterinsurgency forces have been able to keep close watch over the Arab population and have been highly successful in identifying PLO cells operating among Israel's Arab population.

A further constraint on the PLO's efforts to conduct guerrilla warfare in Israel in the late 1960's was the attitude of the Arabs in the occupied territories. In order for guerrilla warfare to be successful the PLO needed a base of operations and support among the Arab population, particularly in the West Bank because of its strategic location.

However, the attitude of the Arabs in the West Bank during the late 1960's was different from their militant attitude of the late 1970's. In the first two years of Israeli occupation the West Bank Arabs believed that a solution to their problem was imminent and adopted an attitude of "samoud"

("samoud" is an Arabic term which means "hold your ground.")

By the middle of 1969 the West Bank Arabs had begun to prosper from Israeli development projects and jobs.¹⁹ Therefore, during the period when the PLO was attempting to wage guerrilla warfare inside Israel, the Arab population had not yet attained the degree of militancy and self-sacrifice necessary for support of the PLO's guerrilla war.

During this phase of development the PLO endeavored to gain recognition, credibility, and support from the Palestinian people and the Arab nations. Additionally, the PLO was

attempting to prove that it was a force to be reckoned with.

The turning point for the PLO movement after the 1967 War occurred at the battle of Karameh on March 21, 1968 in Jordan. The size and scope of the battle were not significant; furthermore, this battle was not a clearcut military victory for the fedayeen. However, the battle at Karameh was a major symbolic and propaganda victory for the Palestinian Revolutionary Movement in much the same way that the 1973 Mideast War was a major symbolic victory for the Egyptians. The exact facts concerning the battle are hard to separate from the conflicting reports made by the two opposing sides. The PLO is well-known for exaggerating its battle statistics. On the otherhand, the Israeli figures usually prove to be accurate concerning their own casualties. This is due to the fact that Israel has a small population and a relatively small standing army. Additionally, Israeli activities are well-covered by the foreign press as well as their own news media which enjoys the rights of a free press. Therefore, any attempts to conceal casualty figures would probably be futile.

The facts of the battle of Karameh, as best as they can be reconstructed from different sources are as follows: The Israelis launched a large retaliatory raid against the PLO base at Karameh, Jordan early on the morning of March 21, 1968. The force consisted of a reinforced brigade of paratroopers in halftracks, supported by tanks and aircraft. The fedayeen estimated the size of the force to be between

5000 and 10,000 men. Actually the figure would be closer to 4000. The thing that made the Karamah battle unique was the fact that the fedayeen did not follow the basic guerrilla tactic of "fading away" when confronted by a superior force. Instead the PLO made a stand at Karamah and there was heavy fighting. Shortly after the attack began the fedayeen was reinforced by units of the Jordanian Army. The fighting lasted for approximately fifteen hours. The Israelis finally gained control and killed or captured the majority of the fedayeen and destroyed a number of buildings. The Israelis claimed to have killed 150 fedayeen and 100 Jordanian troops. They further claimed to have captured 138 prisoners. Israeli casualties were said to be 21 dead and 70 wounded.²⁰ The Israelis reported losing one tank and having four more damaged; one aircraft was also lost. The PLO claimed the Israelis lost 200 men, 45 tanks, and 4 aircraft. The PLO claimed to have lost 59 men.²¹

Regardless of the actual losses, the PLO figures were believed within the Arab world and consequently Karamah was viewed as a great victory. The destroyed Israeli equipment was paraded through Amman and highly photographed by the press. The Arabs became convinced that Karamah was the beginning of a new era in the war against Israel. The fedayeen was credited with being able to accomplish what the Arab armies failed to do, i.e., win a military victory against Israel. The fedayeen's prestige and popularity increased immediately following Karamah. The recruits began to pour

in and the sheiks of the oil-rich Arab nations began to write checks. The battle of Karamah has come to be regarded as the "Stalingrad" of the fedayeen movement. The battle is regarded as a symbol of the Arabs', and especially the Palestinians', ability to stand up to the Israelis in battle. After Karamah the fedayeen believed that it had destroyed the myth of the Israeli "supermen."

After Karamah the fedayeen movement and operations greatly increased. In the period from the end of the 1967 War up until the battle of Karamah the fedayeen conducted only about 200 operations. By comparison, in 1968 the number of fedayeen actions rose to over 900. In 1969, 2777 fedayeen terrorist actions were reported by the Israelis. The PLO claims that there were 3900 fedayeen terrorist operations in 1969.²² Whatever the correct figure is, increasing activity is clear. However, as previously stated, the number of successful operations decreased as time progressed. By 1970 the Israelis had established an extensive border defense network and had greatly improved their counterinsurgency tactics. Therefore, in 1970 the number of fedayeen operations began a steady decline. By May 1970 the Israelis claimed to have killed over 1600 fedayeen.²³ The Israelis also adopted a stringent policy of retaliation against Arab sanctuary countries. The Israeli policy was one of holding the sanctuary country directly responsible for fedayeen raids originating from its territory.²⁴

TERRORISTS KILLED ACCORDING TO ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATION

12 June 1967-20 May 1970

Period	El-Fatah	Popular Liberation Forces	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Sa'eka	Other Organiza- tions	Unidenti- fied	Total
1967 (12 June - 31 December)	66	5	1	--	4	11	87
1968	450	54	39	9	1	128	681
1969	219	53	75	71	58	110	536
1970 (1 January - 20 May)	105	16	24	31	35	58	267
TOTAL	840	128	139	111	98	305	1,621

Source: Israeli Defense Forces, June 1, 1970.

The improved position of the fedayeen after Karamah led it to assume a very visible and sometimes militant posture among the Arab nations, especially in Jordan. By 1970 the PLO had secured a very dominant role in Jordan and virtually controlled certain areas of the country. The subsequent reaction by King Hussein and the decline in successful crossborder operations resulted in the PLO abandoning its strategy of guerrilla warfare and adopting a new strategy.

The Rise of International Terrorism;

The Post-Jordanian War Phase

This phase roughly encompasses the period from September 1970 to late 1974. In reality the move to international terrorism began with the PFLP as early as 1968. However, the major shift to international terrorism occurred after the Jordanian Civil War.

By 1970 Jordan had become a major source of fedayeen attacks and King Hussein was under pressure from all sides. Hussein had never been happy with the rise of the fedayeen movement in Jordan. As a result of the fedayeen operations his country was the constant victim of Israeli reprisals. Not only were the Israelis striking guerrilla bases, but they were also striking at selected civilian facilities. On June 5, 1969, following warnings to Hussein about guerrilla activity, Israeli commandos sabotaged the East Ghor Canal in Jordan. Again in August the Israelis damaged the

Canal in reprisal raids, leaving fruit and vegetables of Jordanian farmers dying on 500 square kilometers of farmland. These reprisal raids were accompanied by statements that Israel would not tolerate a guerrilla state in Jordan.²⁵

King Hussein was also pressured by members of his own cabinet and Jordanian Army officers. Many of these men were disturbed about the power the Palestinian fedayeen was acquiring in Jordan, especially in the cities. Due to the Israeli military actions in the border areas many fedayeen members had moved into the urban areas, particularly Amman.²⁶ In the Jordanian capital the fedayeen carried its weapons openly in defiance of existing laws. Many of the Jordanian people were complaining of lawlessness by the PLO members. There had been holdups, fake collection of funds, unauthorized roadblocks, and clashes between the army and fedayeen members carrying arms without authority.²⁷ Further pressure was applied on Hussein from the large number of Palestinians who were Jordanian citizens. Well over 50 percent of Jordan's population is Palestinian.²⁸

By early 1970 the stage was set for a showdown between the fedayeen and the Jordanian Army. The outcome of this confrontation was by no means assured. Even though the Jordanian Army was well trained and equipped, numbering about 55,000, one-third of the army was Palestinian. The loyalty of these Palestinian soldiers was considered doubtful. The Palestinians were concentrated mainly in the infantry units, while the armored brigades were comprised

almost entirely of Bedouins.²⁹ Therefore, when the showdown came it was the armored units that were utilized to subdue the fedayeen.

Throughout 1970 the situation grew progressively worse. The fedayeen demanded that Hussein remove several members of his cabinet who were considered anti-PLO. Also, in June 1970 rioting broke out after members of the PFLP tried to force Jordanian soldiers to contribute to the fedayeen cause. The fedayeen involved were jailed and this resulted in other fedayeen members seizing hotels in Amman and threatening to shoot European guests if their jailed comrades were not released. Hussein finally yielded to the majority of the fedayeen demands and a shaky truce was established.³⁰

The "final straw" for King Hussein came about in September 1970. On September 2, 1970 a convoy escorting King Hussein was fired upon in an apparent assassination attempt. Palestinian commandos were suspected of carrying out this attack.³¹ Only four days later the PFLP carried out a massive act of international terrorism in which four airliners were hijacked and three of the aircraft were flown to an abandoned former British airfield in the Jordanian desert. The hijacked aircraft included a TWA Boeing 707 with 151 passengers, a Swissair DC-8 with 155 passengers, and a British Overseas Airways Corp. airliner with 105 passengers. The fourth aircraft, a Pan American jumbo jet, was too large to land at the desert airfield. Consequently,

the jet was flown to Cairo where it was blown up after the passengers and crew were freed. The PFLP attempted to hijack a fifth airliner, an El Al Boeing 707; however, one hijacker was shot and killed by an Israeli security guard and the other was overpowered.³²

The PFLP terrorists who hijacked the airliners demanded the release of other terrorists held in West Germany, Israel, and Switzerland. They succeeded in gaining the release of seven terrorists held in West Germany and Switzerland; however, the Israelis refused to release any of their prisoners. The hijacked planes were eventually blown up and the passengers and crews released.³³ However, King Hussein refused to tolerate this use of Jordanian territory for acts of international terrorism.

The Jordanian Civil War began September 17, 1970 when units of the Jordanian 3rd Armored Brigade moved into Amman with the intention of clearing the capital of fedayeen. The fighting quickly spread throughout the country and Jordanian armored units shelled Palestinian refugee camps. The first stage of the civil war lasted until the 27th of September when a truce was agreed upon. However, in December fighting again broke out and continued into 1971 and ended with the final defeat of the fedayeen in Jordan. The number of fedayeen killed is uncertain with figures varying from 6000 to 10,000.³⁴

The defeat of the fedayeen in Jordan and the subsequent loss of Jordanian territory as a base of operation

ended any remaining hope of waging successful guerrilla warfare against Israel. The crossborder raids continued; however, the number of raids dropped significantly. In 1970 the number was approximately 2000; in 1971 incidents declined to approximately 500.³⁵ By 1975 the number of incidents numbered only about 10 a month.³⁶

After the defeat in the Jordanian Civil War the majority of the fedayeen groups gave up the strategy of guerrilla warfare and came to rely on spectacular acts of international terrorism to gain the attention of the world.

Since 1970 and the loss of Jordan as a base, the fedayeen has encountered difficulties in its dealings with other Arab nations. About nine thousand guerrillas escaped from Jordan to Syria.³⁷ Thousands more moved into Lebanon. However, in Syria they were kept on a tight rein. The Syrians had no intention of allowing the Palestinians to gain the high degree of power in Syria that they had held in Jordan. Neither did the Syrians wish to be the victims of Israeli retaliation raids as the result of fedayeen operations from Syria. This left only Lebanon as a free base of operations. (For a more detailed account, see Chapter 7.) However, by 1971 Israeli counterterrorism tactics had made crossborder operations suicidal. In addition, the few terrorist attacks that have been successfully carried out have not weakened the state of Israel. The strategy of guerrilla warfare had failed. However, the Palestinians revised their strategy believing that if Israel

could not be defeated by inside pressure, then perhaps it could be isolated and defeated by outside pressure. Acts of international terrorism were found to be highly successful in capturing the headlines of the world and in pressuring other nations to support the Palestinians in order to avoid terrorist acts directed against them. Also, acts of international terrorism were far from suicidal. As stated in Chapter 1, there exists a 79 percent chance that an international terrorist will escape death or punishment.

The initial tactic of international terrorism was hijacking civilian aircraft and holding the passengers and crews hostage. This tactic gained both headlines and instant concessions. The first hijacking by the PLO occurred in July 1968 when an El Al Boeing 707 was hijacked by the PFLP enroute from Rome to Tel Aviv. The three Arab terrorists ordered the plane to fly to Algeria. After they arrived in Algeria the Israelis were separated from the other passengers and taken to an army camp near the airport. The non-Israelis were freed and allowed to depart on other flights. The El Al plane and the Jewish passengers and crew were held for one month.³⁸ During this period the Algerian government refused to yield to international pressure to release the hostages. Finally, the Israeli government acquiesced and released sixteen fedayeen, who had been captured while on terrorist raids inside Israel, in exchange for the hostages.³⁹ Naturally the hijacking was regarded as a great victory by the fedayeen and their prestige was

further enhanced. Probably the most significant outcome of the hijacking was that the fedayeen observed that regardless of how outraged world reaction was to the hijackings, outrage did not go beyond words. Thus, the fedayeen was encouraged to further pursue new acts of international terrorism. The lack of action against Algeria for supporting terrorism encouraged other nations to increase their aid of international terrorism as well.

In August 1968 the Israelis were again forced to acquiesce to terrorist demands. This time the hijacking took place on a non-Israeli plane. There was a highly practical reason for selecting a non-Israeli airliner. After the Algerian hijacking El Al became the first airline to station civilian security men on every flight and at every terminal. Therefore, the terrorists adapted and selected a soft target. Non-Israeli airliners were selected as targets due to the absence of special security measures at the terminals and the lack of security personnel aboard the flights. In this case a TWA plane became the first non-Israeli airliner to be hijacked by the fedayeen. The TWA Los Angeles-Tel Aviv flight was hijacked by one female and two male Arabs to Damascus where the cockpit was blown up. All of the 113 persons aboard the flight were released except for six Israelis, four women and two men. The women were later released. However, the men, one a professor at Hebrew University and the other a businessman, were held for several months by the Syrians.⁴⁰ The hostages were

finally exchanged for 71 Arabs imprisoned by Israel; many of the prisoners were Syrian soldiers captured while conducting terrorist operations in Israel.⁴¹ In these two hijackings the fedayeen suffered no casualties and had succeeded in freeing a total of 87 comrades from Israeli prisons. In addition, much publicity had been received for the fedayeen cause. However, this was the last time Israelis were to yield to acts of international terrorism.

During this phase the fedayeen established its ties with other terrorist groups and the linkages for combined operations were formed. The tactic of utilizing personnel from other terrorist groups was a method by which Israeli security could be penetrated. A perfect example of this occurred in the Lod Airport massacre of May 1972. By 1972 Israeli security was extremely tight, especially at air terminals. However, the security was designed to detect Arab terrorists. Therefore, the PFLP utilized members of the radical Japanese Red Army to conduct the Lod Airport attack. In this attack 26 people were killed and 78 wounded.⁴² This was not the first instance of cooperation between the PFLP and other terrorist groups. In September 1970 when the PFLP hijacked the four airliners to Egypt and Jordan a fifth hijack attempt was foiled by Israeli security men. A female Arab terrorist was captured and the male terrorist was killed. The dead terrorist was identified as Patrick Arguello, a member of a Nicaraguan terrorist group.⁴³

The success of international terrorism used by the

PFLP was widely acclaimed by the fedayeen membership. The dominance of the PLO by Al Fatah was threatened by the PFLP. Therefore, Fatah sponsored its own international terrorist group, Black September. The acts of international terrorism in the early 1970's brought world attention to the PLO's cause. However, it also greatly damaged its image of being part of a legitimate revolutionary movement. Acts such as the Munich massacre and the murder of the U.S. diplomats in Khartoum helped darken the PLO's image. Therefore, as the PLO began to gain worldwide recognition in the mid-1970's its use of international terrorism began to fade as a new strategy evolved. Groups such as the PFLP continued international terrorism; however, the Black September movement faded out of existence as the fedayeen movement evolved into another phase.

This next stage, which will be called the "diplomacy stage" was both aided and harmed by the PLO's use of terrorism. The PLO has never been able to exert full control over its various factions. This became an acute problem in the mid-1970's when some PLO groups renounced the use of international terrorism while other groups, such as the PFLP, intensified their international attacks. The use of terrorism, both internationally and inside of Israel, by the PLO during this period of transition (early and mid-1970's) reflects the dual nature of terrorism. The attacks gave the PLO worldwide attention and demonstrated its power as a force that must be dealt with. At the same time the attacks gave the PLO a bad

image in the Western world. It appears, however, that the need for attention and recognition by the PLO outweighed the need for a favorable image in the Western world. The PLO attempted to gain both objectives by denouncing the more extreme acts of international terrorism, perpetrated by the radical groups of the PLO, and by claiming that attacks inside Israel were acts of legitimate national liberation. Also, in 1974 and 1975 the PLO's most horrendous attacks inside of Israel were conducted during the negotiations for the Sinai I and Sinai II agreements. It appears that these attacks were designed to disrupt negotiations and goad the Israelis into taking retaliatory actions, further hampering negotiations.

Despite the terrorist attacks of the mid-1970's the PLO became increasingly conscious of its image abroad. By utilizing terrorism to show its power and intensifying its diplomatic efforts, the PLO entered a new phase in 1974.

Era of Respectability: The Diplomacy Stage

By 1974 the PLO was recognized worldwide as a force to be reckoned with. Governments found it more advantageous to deal with the PLO than to risk acts of terrorism perpetrated against them. Although respectability had long been an aim of the PRM it had taken a back seat to other considerations. However, by 1974 the PLO was well established and had demonstrated its ability to successfully utilize terrorism as a political tool. The primary consideration now became establishing itself as a legitimate political entity both

to the Arab nations and to the rest of the world.

The PLO desired not only recognition as a legitimate political entity, but also recognition as the only political entity representing the Palestinian people. Acts of diplomacy combined with occasional acts of terrorism were aimed not only at gaining recognition but also at applying pressure on the Arab nations to ostracize any Arab nation that considered negotiating with Israel.

The first major breakthrough in the fight for legitimate political status came in October 1974 at the Rabat Summit Conference of the Arab heads of state. At this conference a resolution was passed which recognized the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, over all liberated territory."⁴⁴ At this conference Jordan was in essence giving up its claim to the West Bank in favor of the PLO. Thus, the PLO had achieved its aim of becoming a fully legitimate member of the Arab Block of nations. Arafat is currently regarded by the Arab nations as a legitimate head of state.

The next step to worldwide recognition came only one month later in November 1974 when Yasir Arafat appeared before the UN General Assembly. Over strong objections from the United States and Israel the PLO was granted observer status in the United Nations. The vote was 95 for, 17 against, and 19 abstentions. Ninety-five affirmative votes in the UN represent a very strong mandate. In 1975 a special Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable

Rights of the Palestinian People was formed. Both the General Assembly and the committee have strongly supported the PLO, including the rights of the Palestinian people to "national independence and sovereignty."⁴⁵

Despite these successes the PLO also experienced significant failures during this period. It has failed to win the recognition of the United States which it desperately needs. Only the United States has the power to pressure Israel into making significant concessions. The PLO has tried to win acceptance from the United States by cultivating a responsible and moderate image. It reportedly aided the U.S. in evacuating U.S. diplomats and citizens from Lebanon during the civil war.⁴⁶ Also, the PLO attempted to mediate for the U.S. during the first days of the hostage seizure in Iran. This is indeed ironic since many Iranian terrorists were trained and supported by the PLO. Additionally, the PLO has thus far refrained from conducting terrorist operations inside the United States.

The PLO has also met with certain U.S. black leaders, such as Andrew Young and Jesse Jackson. The PLO meetings with important members of the U.S. black community came about as a result of the resignation of the United States' UN Ambassador Andrew Young in August of 1979. Young had held an unannounced and unauthorized meeting with an official of the PLO. This was contrary to U.S. policy which rejects any dialogue with the PLO until it recognizes Israel's right to exist. When the Young/PLO meeting became public the

Israelis vigorously protested and in the subsequent political crisis Ambassador Young resigned. Many U.S. black leaders blamed Israel for Young's resignation and for several weeks following the resignation denounced Israeli pressure and sought open contacts with the PLO.⁴⁷

The PLO has also sought to influence U.S. public opinion in other ways. The PLO maintains an information office in Washington, D.C. which distributes pro-PLO literature throughout the U.S. and particularly on U.S. campuses. The U.S. college campuses are also the targets of pro-PLO speakers who pay periodic visits to campuses throughout the U.S.⁴⁸ However, the PLO has thus far been unable to sever the close ties between the U.S. and Israel. These ties between the United States and Israel are long-standing and the United States still feels a moral obligation to support Israel. The PLO is attempting to emphasize the morality of their cause and the alleged immorality of Israel's policies. The PLO apparently hopes to gradually erode the U.S.'s historical support for Israel and gain support for its own cause.

The PLO was also unable in this period to prevent the two interim agreements between Egypt and Israel, the Sinai I Agreement in 1974, and the Sinai II Agreement in 1975.⁴⁹

The diplomatic strategy of the PLO also caused a rift in its own ranks. Groups such as the PFLP, PFLP-GC,

and the Iraqi ALF rejected any strategy except armed liberation and formed the "rejection front."⁵⁰ However, the greatest failure of the PLO has been its inability to prevent the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

The PLO and the United Nations

The United Nations is the principal political forum for the world. All major political issues among nations will eventually end up before this forum. Since the PLO's admission to the UN as an "observer" it has utilized the UN system for gaining embarrassing resolutions and condemnation against the Israeli government and its policies. In the General Assembly and in such UN organizations as ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council) the large number of Arab, Moslem, and Third World nations insures the PLO a base of support. (For a detailed account of support of the PLO and the reasons behind this support, see Chapter 6). In the UN the PLO, with the support of the Moslem bloc and other Third World nations, has managed to politically isolate the Israelis by continually pressing for condemning resolutions that make the Israelis appear as violators of human rights. The UN, with its emphasis on human rights and its worldwide exposure, is the perfect forum for these attacks.

Since 1974 several pro-PLO resolutions have been adopted. In 1974 Resolution 3236 was adopted which recognized the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, national independence, and sovereignty.⁵¹ This

resolution was quickly followed in 1974 by Resolution 3237 which granted observer status to the PLO in the UN. This resolution was vigorously opposed by the U.S. and other Western nations. However, the vote was overwhelmingly in favor of the PLO, 95 for, 17 against, and 19 abstentions.⁵² In 1975 three pro-PLO resolutions were passed. Resolution 3375 stated that further resolutions and other measures should be adopted which would enable the Palestinian people to achieve their "inalienable national rights." The resolution further stated that the PLO should be allowed to participate in all UN-sponsored conferences dealing with the Middle East.⁵³ The next resolution was 3376 which created a special Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. This committee was expanded to 23 members in 1976; however, neither the United States nor any European countries, East or West, are members.⁵⁴ Also adopted in 1975 was resolution 3379 which declared that "Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination."⁵⁵ The U.S. and certain European nations protested against this resolution in ECOSOC and in the General Assembly and refused to acknowledge the resolution. In addition, Zionism has been linked in the UN with the South African policy of apartheid.⁵⁶ This has helped to form a bond of solidarity between the Arab and African states.

Israel has also been subjected to frequent criticism by ECOSOC's Commission on Human Rights which has repeatedly condemned a wide variety of alleged practices by the

Israelis in the occupied territories. These alleged practices include the destruction of homes, interference with religious freedoms, mass arrests, torture, and ill treatment of Arab detainees. Israel has argued during ECOSOC's deliberations on anti-Israeli resolutions that the resolutions represent, "yet another step in the apparently insatiable quest of the Arab states to collect anti-Israel resolutions in the United Nations."⁵⁷

While these pro-PLO resolutions were being adopted in the General Assembly and ECOSOC in the mid and late 1970's, Israel was protected from similar action in the Security Council by the U.S. veto power. However, this began to change in 1979 when the U.S. began to abstain on certain Security Council votes dealing with Israel. In March 1979 the Security Council adopted Resolution 449 which created a three-member commission to investigate Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. The United States abstained in this vote as they also did in the July 1979 Security Council vote which called for a halt to the building of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.⁵⁸ However, the greatest blow to the Israelis was the March 1980 Security Council resolution censuring Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank. Instead of vetoing or abstaining on this vote the United States voted for the censure. President Carter called the U.S. vote a mistake caused by a communications breakdown between the White House and the U.S. UN delegation; however, this did little to lessen the

impact of the vote.⁵⁹

Without a doubt the PLO has scored several political victories in the UN. While the UN resolutions have not resulted in substantive changes in the Arab-Israeli conflict they have given the PLO symbolic victories which in turn aid its political strategy.

Post-Camp David Phase

This phase and the preceding phase overlap since the diplomatic strategy is still being pursued. Additionally, this last phase cannot be fully evaluated since it is still unfolding and developing.

The year 1978 was a decisive year for the PLO. In that year the Israelis invaded southern Lebanon, previously known as "Fatahland," in reaction to the Coastal Road bus massacre carried out by a seaborne squad of Al Fatah. In this March 1978 attack over thirty Israelis were killed and seventy wounded.⁶⁰ The subsequent seizure of southern Lebanon in the Latani Operation was designed to permanently clear this area of fedayeen. The Israeli pullout in June 1978 took place only after the UN had agreed to establish the United Nations Interim Force (UNIFIL) in Lebanon to stop PLO infiltration into the country. In addition, the Israelis armed and trained the Christian militias in southern Lebanon who have an intense hatred of the PLO.⁶¹ As a result the PLO not only has to contend with the highly efficient Israeli defenses, but also has to cross both the UNIFIL and

Christian militia lines to reach Israel. Therefore, the PLO has lost southern Lebanon as a base of operation.

The year 1978 also saw the Egyptians and Israelis open peace negotiations which resulted in the Camp David accords. At Camp David the Israelis succeeded in denying the PLO any role in the future autonomy and administration of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The exact method used by the Israelis to deny the PLO a role in the autonomy negotiations is unknown since the negotiations were closed to the public and the press. However, it is likely that, given the intense hatred of the PLO by the Israelis, the Israelis refused to negotiate or compromise on any issues unless it was clearly understood that the PLO would have no part in the agreements or Palestinian autonomy. The fact that Sadat yielded on this point is evident from the language of the Camp David accords. No reference is made in the accords to the PLO. According to the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East," signed in September 1978 by Egypt and Israel after the Camp David negotiations, the resolution of the Palestinian problem was to be determined by "Egypt, Israel and Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people."⁶² The representatives of the Palestinians had to be "mutually agreed" upon by all parties.⁶³ Clearly the Israelis would not have agreed to any Palestinian representatives who are connected with the PLO. It appears certain that the language of the treaty was a deliberate concession to the Israelis.

The year 1978 was clearly a year of serious setbacks for the PLO. A new strategy and tactics had to be developed to counter and overcome these setbacks.

In order to counter these setbacks the PLO has attempted to intensify its terrorist operations. In order to overcome the loss of southern Lebanon the PLO has modified its method of infiltration and has come to rely heavily on seaborne attacks staged from bases in Lebanon and Syria. However, the Israeli Navy has proven to be an effective counter to these seaborne raids. The PLO tactic of seizing Israeli hostages inside Israel has also been modified in some instances. Some PLO squads have been intercepted on "suicide raids" where their only purpose was to infiltrate Israel and kill as many people as possible, disregarding the tactic of seizing hostages for political ransom.⁶⁴

Another new tactic has been operations designed to kidnap Israelis and carry them to Lebanon or other Arab countries where they are held for the release of terrorists held in Israel. This tactic is the result of an incident in southern Lebanon where an Israeli soldier was captured by a PLO group during the Latani Operation. The soldier was held in Lebanon and the fedayeen group demanded the release of terrorists by Israel in exchange for the soldier. Israel finally yielded to internal pressure and released 77 captured terrorists in this exchange. Since this PLO success other fedayeen groups have unsuccessfully mounted operations designed to capture Israeli citizens. The April 1979

seaborne raid on Nahariya in which four people were killed was an unsuccessful attempt to kidnap Israelis and take them to Lebanon.⁶⁵

Since the Camp David treaty the PLO has attempted to find a strategy that will negate the effects of the treaty. The signing of the treaty was greeted by a wave of terrorist attacks; the Egyptian Embassy in Bangladesh was seized for several hours and bombings took place in Israel and Paris.⁶⁶ The United States Embassies in Syria and Lebanon were bombed as well.⁶⁷ Less than one month after the signing of the treaty a fedayeen group calling itself "Black March" attempted to attack an El Al airliner in Brussels. The terrorists fought a brief gun battle with the security forces and two of the terrorists were captured. Eleven persons were injured in the attack, none fatally.⁶⁸ In addition, the PLO has threatened to revive Black September in order to punish Israel and Egypt.⁶⁹

Part of the PLO strategy appears to be provoking Israeli retaliation against PLO targets in Lebanon. The PLO deliberately places its bases in civilian towns and settlements. Therefore, when the Israelis retaliate they appear to be intentionally attacking innocent civilians. Thus, the PLO can attempt to turn world opinion against the Israelis.

As a result of Camp David and the dominant role assumed by the U.S. in the Middle East conflict, the PLO has leveled threats directly against the United States.

Yasir Arafat has stated, "We must not just strike at the tail of the snake (Israel and Egypt). We must get the snake's head (the United States). We must punish Carter, the engineer of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty."⁷⁰ So far the PLO has continued to refrain from attacking on U.S. soil. However, if the PLO strategy of countering Camp David is to succeed, a way must be found to influence the U.S.

As demonstrated in this chapter the PLO strategy has changed and adapted in order to counteract preventive measures enacted against it. It has combined terrorism with political action and diplomacy. It is for these reasons that the PLO and the Palestinian Resistance Movement continue to exist and prosper. Its adaptability, political and diplomatic maneuvers, reinforced and supported by the Arab governments, and its willingness to use terrorism as a political tool, combined with the uncoordinated response, lack of cooperation and lack of resolve among the rest of the world, has made the PLO what it is today.

NOTES

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CHAPTER V

THE ISRAELI RESPONSE

Just as the PLO has adapted and changed its tactics over the years, the Israelis have also had to adapt their tactics and countermeasures in order to combat the PLO. A change in PLO tactics has resulted in modification of existing Israeli counterterror tactics.

Strategy of Containment

After the 1948 War of Independence the main concern of the new Israeli government was the military threat posed by the Arab nations. As previously stated, the fedayeen was relying on the Arab governments to liberate Palestine by conventional military force. Terrorist actions were by and large utilized as tactics of harassment. Therefore, Israeli tactics were primarily concerned with the greater threat of conventional war with the Arab nations. Additionally, the PLO had not yet been formed and the fedayeen groups were disorganized and generally poorly trained. However, the fedayeen was aided by easy access to Israeli targets from terrorist bases in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. There did not exist any natural boundaries along the borders which

could serve as obstacles to infiltrating fedayeen squads. Also, the resources of the new state were under severe strain and funds were unavailable for construction of the sophisticated man-made barriers which currently exist on the borders. Therefore, frequent terrorist raids were launched into Israel. However, the success of these raids in terms of real damage was relatively slight. In 1956, for example, 26 percent of the attacks consisted of throwing hand grenades and firing on civilian settlements; 23 percent of the attacks were directed against civilian vehicles; 16 percent were sabotage of water installations; 13 percent were indiscriminate attacks on people in the streets; 9 percent were demolition attacks against buildings and other installations; and 8 percent involved mine-laying or highway sabotage. Only 4 percent were deliberate attacks against Israeli military units.¹

Since Israel was concerned primarily with combating the Arab governments, Israeli anti-terror strategy was primarily one of containment. However, by 1956 fedayeen actions from the Gaza Strip, supported by Egypt, became intolerable and resulted in the 1956 War with Egypt. The Israelis seized the Sinai and the Gaza Strip and refused to withdraw until the UN Emergency Force was established to guard against border infiltration. After the 1956 War and until 1967 terrorists were restricted from operating from Egyptian territory. Fedayeen activity did not again become significant until 1965 when Fatah began to operate with Syrian

support.²

Post-1967 War: Territorial

Based Reprisal Policy

After the 1967 War Israeli borders were situated along natural terrain features that constituted obstacles to infiltration. The Jordan River, Golan Heights, and Sinai Desert serve as obstacles to terrorist raids and this is one reason why Israel is currently reluctant to relinquish this territory. In addition, the borders were pushed back further from Israeli population centers. Thus, the fedayeen had a greater distance to travel before they could reach their targets. The greater the distance an infiltrator has to travel, the greater the chances of detection and interception. However, the improved border situation was offset initially by the vast increase in fedayeen activity after the 1967 War. The total defeat of the Arab armies in 1967 and the acquisition of buffer zones removed the immediate threat posed by the Arab governments. Therefore, the terrorist raids, sponsored by the Arab nations, became the primary concern.

A new problem arose after 1967 which became a concern to the Israelis. Prior to the 1967 War the Israelis did not have serious problems with world public opinion. However, after 1967 and the pre-emptive surprise attack on the Arab nations Israel was criticized and even condemned by many nations. Thus, the Israelis since 1967 have had to fight the battle

of public opinion. In the opinion of many experts Israel has been much less successful in the war for favorable public opinion than the war against terrorists. According to Professor Yehoshafat Harkabi of Hebrew University, the former head of Israeli Military Intelligence, the Israelis after 1967 failed to aggressively seek to win favorable world opinion. The Israelis failed to fight back particularly in the area of ideology while the Arabs devoted much time and resources to developing the ideological war.

According to Harkabi:

From the beginning Israel should have seized upon the weakness in the politicidal position of the Arabs and harped on them in order to mobilize the support of world opinion against such a position. As just as the Arab case might be, it could not justify politicide. Israel should have exploited the ugly features in the Arab position--the very high frequency of invective, vilification, anti-semitism--so as to exert pressure on them; it should have demonstrated the organic connection between politicide, genocide, and the revilement of the Israelis and Jews. Politicide as a political objective produced a tendency on the part of many Arabs to describe Israel as fundamentally and deeply depraved, as deserving a death verdict, and from such a stand to consider its builders, the Jews and their culture, as evil.

After 1967 the Israelis had to find tactics which would counter and contain border infiltration and internal terrorism. The Israelis concentrated their counterterror tactics in three areas: 1) border defense and interception, 2) territorial based reprisals, and 3) population control.

Border Defense and Interception of Infiltrators

The unsuitability of the terrain of Israel to

ISRAELI SECURITY MEASURES AND THE JORDAN VALLEY 1967 - 1970


- Israeli military settlements (Nahal settlements) established 1967 - 1969
- Main Israeli border defences (forts, minefields, artillery units) established 1968-1970
- II Bridges open to Arab civilian trade and traffic in both directions, and across which Arabs suspected of terrorism were expelled
- Main areas of terrorist activity, June - December 1967
- Main terrorist bases, for frequent raids across the Jordan, January - March 1968
- Main terrorist bases (after the Karame raid) used for spasmodic raids across the Jordan, April 1968 - September 1970

Towns and villages in which the Israeli military authorities blew up Arab houses between June 1967 and November 1969, as reprisals against terrorist activity. In all, more than 5,000 houses were destroyed, and more than five hundred Arabs expelled from the West Bank. By October 1973 more than a thousand Arabs had been expelled

--- The Israel-Jordan cease-fire line established in June 1967

..... The 'Green Line' cease-fire line between Israel and Jordan from 1949 to 1967

Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine... the liberation of Palestine is a national duty to repulse the Zionist, imperialist invasion from the great Arab homeland and to purge the Zionist presence from Palestine... the partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of Israel are fundamentally null and void.
THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COVENANT, adopted 17 JULY 1958 by the Palestine National Council



Between 1967 and 1970, Arab terrorists on the West Bank killed 12 Israelis, as well as over 50 Arabs whom they accused of 'collaborating' with Israel. Israeli forces were active in driving the terrorists towards the Jordan river, and on 21 March 1968 crossed the river in force to attack the terrorist base at Karame. Following this raid, the Israeli army established a fortified line along the Jordan, with a border fence and minefields, effectively sealing the border, and the terrorists themselves withdrew eastwards from the valley to the mountains. During 1970 terrorist acts on the West Bank stopped almost completely. They began again, on a small scale, after October 1973

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SOURCE: The Arab-Israeli Conflict, its History in Maps

guerrilla warfare has already been discussed and will not be reiterated here. However, the unsuitability of the terrain caused the PLO to rely primarily on hit-and-run crossborder terrorist raids. Therefore, the Israelis implemented an elaborate system of border defenses. The Israelis constructed security barriers along the borders with Jordan, and later along the Lebanese border. These defenses consisted of security fences supplemented by mine fields and detection devices. Patrol roads were constructed along the fences and were frequently patrolled by Israeli troops looking for signs of infiltration. In the mountains of the Jordan Valley small teams of Israelis manned observation posts and patrolled extensively looking for terrorists. Once signs of terrorist infiltration were detected, mobile strike teams were immediately dispatched to intercept the terrorists.⁴ In this manner the majority of the terrorists were intercepted before reaching their targets.

Some of the methods of border defense were considered harsh by the international community and provided the PLO with good propaganda material. One such example was the destruction of Arab villages along the 1967 Israeli-Jordanian border. The populations were evacuated and the villages were destroyed as a security measure.⁵

Another security measure by the Israelis was the establishment of the Naħal Program in which armed agricultural settlements were set up in the border areas which were considered too dangerous for civilian settlements. The

soldier-farmers of the settlements performed the territorial defense functions in these frontier areas and at the same time paved the way for future civilian settlements.

Territorial Based Reprisals

The cornerstone of the Israeli counterterror strategy has been reprisal attacks and other acts of retaliation. The Israeli government has three main reasons for employing acts of reprisals: 1) for revenge, to satisfy the internal pressure for retribution, 2) to destroy terrorist bases, leaders, and members, and to disrupt further attacks, and 3) to modify the behavior of the Arab governments and thereby discourage support of the terrorists.

Israeli reprisals have varied widely in degree of severity and range from light shelling incidents to the Beirut Airport raid of 1968. This raid by Israeli commandos resulted in the destruction, on the ground, of thirteen Lebanese airliners with no loss of life. The raid was in retaliation for an attack on an El Al airliner at Athens Airport in which one passenger was killed and another wounded. The attack was carried out by the PFLP which was headquartered in Beirut.⁶ Clearly the Israeli retaliation was aimed not at the terrorists, but at the Lebanese government in an attempt to modify its behavior and stop the support of the PFLP.

A major study entitled The Impact of Israeli Reprisals on Behavior of the Bordering Arab Nations Directed at Israel

was conducted by Barry Blechman in 1972. According to Blechman reprisals are designed to compel negative or positive goals or behavior modification on the part of the Arab governments. Reprisals for negative compellence are designed to persuade Arab governments to cease two types of behavior: 1) direct support of fedayeen groups, such as training, equipping, and financing and 2) direct actions against Israel, such as shellings, etc. Positive compellence reprisals are designed to persuade the Arab governments to stop fedayeen use of their territory for raids against Israel and to induce cooperative behavior by the Arab governments towards settlement of the overall conflict.⁷ Blechman classified the specific types of terrorists actions as reflected in Chart 4.

Blechman then performed analysis of the various Arab nations and the Palestinians looking at the type of compellence desired by the Israelis and the time period involved. This is shown in Chart 5.

Blechman found that the frequency of terrorist activity was likely to diminish following reprisals. However, the impact of reprisals was short-lived and rarely lasted longer than thirty days. Also, there was almost no evidence that reprisals compelled Arab governments to become more cooperative in their behavior regarding Israel and a Middle East settlement.⁸

CHART 4

MILITARY EVENT TYPES

Code	Event	Description
1	Arab infiltration	A crossing of the ADL by irregular Arab forces, unless associated with Type 2.
2	Arab sabotage	An attack within Israel or the occupied territories by irregular Arab forces which have crossed the ADL (includes mine, TNT, grenade attacks, etc.).
3	Israeli infiltration	All crossings of the ADLs by irregular Israeli forces.
4	Israeli attack	Any attack by regular Israeli military forces on Arab territory (includes air strikes).
5	Air and sea battle	Dogfights and so forth.
6	Border incident	Exchanges of fire across the ADL, and accidental crossing by military patrols.
7	Israeli minor violation of the armistice agreement	Includes expulsions, illegal grazing or fishing, entry of illegal forces into the DMZs or defensive zones, overflights, etc.
8	Arab minor violation of the armistice agreement	Same as 7.

CHART 5

CATEGORIES USED TO GROUP REPRISALS

Category	Time period	Target nation(s)	Purpose regarding Arab-initiated physical conflict
1	January 1, 1950-December 31, 1954	Jordan	Positive compellence
2	January 1, 1954-October 31, 1956	Egypt	Negative compellence
3	January 1, 1955-October 31, 1956	Egypt and Jordan	Negative compellence
4	January 1, 1964-May 31, 1967	Syria	Negative compellence
5	January 1, 1965-May 31, 1967	Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine ^a	Positive compellence
6	July 1, 1967-June 30, 1969	Egypt	Negative compellence
7	July 1, 1967-June 30, 1969	Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine ^a	Positive compellence

^a"Palestine" refers to individual Arab Palestinians and/or organizations composed primarily of Palestinians, such as al Fatah.

SOURCE: Barry M. Blechman. The Impact of Israeli Reprisals on Behavior of the Bordering Arab Nations Directed at Israel. 1972.

Population Control

The strategy of control of the Arab population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip utilized both incentives and deterrents. The Israeli military, which was charged with controlling these areas, issued "A Compilation of Proclamations and Orders" and a detailed code called the "Order Concerning Security Instructions." These documents were distributed to all local officials in the administered territories and established military court procedures and clearly defined security violations, such as possession of illegal arms and membership in illegal organizations.⁹

On the positive side, the Israelis realized that a stable economy and prosperous civilian population were strong inducements for cooperation with the Israelis by the Arab population. Therefore, the Israelis allocated funds for stabilizing the economies of the occupied territories and initiated large-scale public works programs. The Israeli Department of Agriculture sponsored many projects designed to improve the agriculture of these areas. West Bank agricultural production rose from 114 million Israeli pounds in 1968 to 350 million Israeli pounds in 1972. In addition, the Arab population was able to find well-paying jobs inside of Israel. By 1973 the number of Arabs working inside Israel numbered more than 80,000, or approximately one-third of the Arab work force of the occupied territories.¹⁰

While it appears that the Arabs have prospered economically under Israeli occupation, in recent years the

West Bank Arabs have become increasingly militant. The majority of the West Bank population have totally rejected the Camp David accords and support the PLO as their representative. The Israeli government has further antagonized the West Bank Arabs by continuing to build settlements in the West Bank. This has proved to be a tremendous propaganda asset for the PLO.¹¹

At Camp David Israeli Prime Minister Begin pledged to freeze construction of new West Bank settlements during the negotiation period. However, the ambiguous language of the treaty did not clarify which negotiation period this pledge referred to. Begin stated that the pledge referred to the 3-month period from the signing of the Camp David accords to when the final Egyptian-Israeli treaty was ratified and became effective. President Sadat and President Carter believed that the pledge was to cover the five-year autonomy transition period for the West Bank. Since the Camp David summit Israel has founded or legalized (as of February 1980) fourteen new settlements on the West Bank.¹² As of April 1980 there are some 14,000 Israelis living on the West Bank in 64 settlements; 39 of these settlements have been constructed since Begin came to power in 1977. These 14,000 Israeli settlers live among approximately 900,000 Arabs who comprise 98 percent of the West Bank population.¹³

The Begin government insists that the West Bank settlements are necessary for security and pose no threat to

Palestinian autonomy. Furthermore, Begin firmly believes that Jews should have the right to settle in the land that was historically Samaria and Judea.¹⁴

The continued construction of settlements on the West Bank has focused attention on the Palestinian cause and has eroded support for the Israeli position in the West. This erosion of support is evident in the March 1980 UN Security Council vote censuring Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Even the U.S. voted in favor of the censure (this vote was later called a mistake by President Carter).¹⁵ Begin has also encountered opposition to his settlement policies within the Israeli government. After the UN vote Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Simha Ehrlich (Liberal Party) stated that as painful as the UN vote was, "perhaps some basic soul searching is now called for."¹⁶ The Justice Minister Shmuel Tamir stated that the UN vote should lead the government to "draw some new conclusions" about settlement activity.¹⁷ Despite this internal opposition to the settlement policy of Prime Minister Begin, it is highly unlikely that the opposition party, if it gained power, would agree to either a dismantlement of existing settlements or an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank. Therefore, the dispute is unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future.

The Israelis do have a legitimate security concern in the West Bank; a militant independent state in the West Bank could pose a threat to peace. However, a definite threat to peace will exist until a solution for the West Bank is found.

The Post-Munich Massacre Period:Non-Territorial Based Reprisals

With the rise of international terrorism originated by the PLO in the early 1970's the Israelis were faced with an external threat. Therefore, the Israelis had to find a strategy to counter the terrorism which was operating outside of the territorial area of the Middle East. At first the Israelis were content to respond to individual acts of terrorism with the standard reprisal raids of the past directed against PLO bases. The Israelis also began to utilize political pressure combined with the threat of retaliation. After the Lod Airport massacre of 1972 the Israelis did not launch a massive retaliation raid. However, they did state that Lebanon was to blame for the attack since the PFLP headquarters were located in Beirut and the terrorists had trained in Lebanon. The Israelis called for a boycott of Beirut Airport and demanded that Lebanon instantly bring all terrorist activity in that country to an end, and threatened reprisals. The Lebanese government, mindful of the Beirut Airport retaliatory raid of 1968, did what it could to control the fedayeen.¹⁸ After much negotiation between the Lebanese government and the PLO, and some clashes between the fedayeen and the Lebanese Army, an agreement was reached. In this agreement of June 28, 1972 Arafat agreed to Lebanon's minimum demands. He agreed to freeze all operations in and from Lebanon and pull his forces back from the border with Israel. However, the fedayeen would maintain a presence near the

border. The positions at the border were occupied by Lebanese soldiers. Despite this agreement some hardline Fatah and PFLP members remained in the area and the Lebanese Army was never able to really control PLO activity.¹⁹

During this period the Israelis were also reacting to a new type of terror tactic, the letter bomb. At least sixty-six letter bombs were posted in Amsterdam and other European cities and mailed to Israeli diplomatic officers around the world. The only fatality of the letter bomb campaign was the Israeli agricultural counselor at Israel's London embassy. The Israelis quickly countered the letter bomb campaign by using x-ray machines to screen suspicious letters.²⁰

After the Lod Airport massacre and the letter bomb campaign the Israelis began to employ terror tactics of their own. On July 9, 1972 Ghassan Kanafani, the PFLP's number four man in the party hierarchy, was killed by a bomb planted in his car in Beirut. On July 19, 1972 Anis Sayegh, a senior PLO official and a member of the PFLP, was injured by a letter bomb. Then on July 25 Bassam Abu Sharif, the PFLP spokesman in Beirut was partially blinded by a letter bomb.²¹ The Israelis denied responsibility for the bombings; however, most experts agreed that the Israelis were striking back at the terrorists by using terror. However, this Israeli campaign had only begun. In September 1972 the Israelis were given a new reason for revenge, Munich.

The murder of the eleven Israeli athletes by Black

September caused a violent reaction by the Israeli government. No longer would its reprisals be territorial-based and limited to the Arab world. After Munich the Israeli government gave the Israeli intelligence organization "Mossad" the go ahead to hunt down and kill the PLO leaders responsible for Munich wherever they found them. Insult was added to injury when only seven weeks after the Munich massacre the three surviving Black September members responsible for the attack were freed by the West Germans after Black September hijacked a Lufthansa airliner.²² The three terrorists were flown to Libya where they were given a hero's welcome and President Ghadafi even arranged a press conference for them. It was also alleged that Ghadafi paid Yasir Arafat a reward of five million dollars for the Munich massacre.²³

After Munich the Israelis declared a universal and unconditional war on the fedayeen. One week after the Munich attack Golda Meir stated in the Knesset that Israel would fight Arab terrorists wherever possible. She stated, "We have no choice but to strike at them."²⁴

Israeli retribution for Munich was not long in coming. The day after the burial of the Israeli athletes Israeli fighters struck ten fedayeen bases in Lebanon and Syria. These raids were the deepest penetration of Arab territory since the Six Day War.²⁵ However, the main instrument of retaliation was not the Israeli Air Force or Army; it was a special organization of Israelis who used terror against the terrorists. This organization was reportedly

called "Mivtzan Elohim," or the "Wrath of God."²⁶

After the Munich massacre many PLO leaders, stationed in different parts of the world, began to meet with violent deaths. The Fatah representative in Rome, stationed at the Libyan Embassy, was shot twelve times by two men. The Israelis claimed that this man, Wael Zwaiter, was a Black September member, and was partially responsible for the Lod Airport massacre. The PLO representative in Paris was killed by a bomb planted in his telephone. Hussein Basler, the PLO man in Cyprus, was blown up by a bomb planted in his bed. In June 1973, Mohammed Baudia, the boss of the Black September network in France, was killed by a bomb planted in his car.²⁷

These examples are but a few of the numerous assassinations of fedayeen leaders. However, these were all small operations involving the killing of only one fedayeen leader at a time. Furthermore, the hierarchy of the fedayeen movement had gone underground or was in highly-guarded guerrilla strongholds in the Arab countries. Therefore, the Israelis planned a massive operation designed to eliminate the top fedayeen leaders.

The Israelis had received a great deal of criticism because of their overkill tactics in the Beirut Airport raid. Israel had also been heavily condemned throughout the world for the shooting down of a Libyan airliner that strayed over Israeli territory in February 1973; all 107 persons aboard were killed. The 727 was on a flight from Benghazi to Cairo

when it strayed off course. The Israelis stated that they had tried to make contact with the airliner to force it to land. However, the airliner's flight recorder later revealed that the pilot first thought that the Israeli planes were friendly Egyptian aircraft. By the time the pilot realized his mistake the Israeli phantoms had already begun their attack.²⁸ The Israelis stated that they had no option but to shoot down the airliner. Black September had threatened on several occasions to hijack a plane and dive it into the heart of Tel Aviv. However, no amount of Israeli reasoning could eliminate the fact that 107 innocent people had been killed.²⁹ The incident received heavy publicity throughout the world.

It is probable that in the wake of all the bad publicity the Israelis were reluctant to mount an anti-guerrilla attack, intent on assassination, in a foreign capital. One would believe that the Israelis would be concerned with the possible reaction of friendly governments, particularly the U.S. government, Israel's main source of arms. However, in March 1973 the situation changed. An incident occurred that would insure that the U.S. would not object to a major anti-fedayeen operation outside of Israel. This incident was the murder of the new and the former U.S. ambassadors to the Sudan by members of Black September.³⁰ After this incident in Khartoum the Israelis knew that the U.S. would not object to their operation in Beirut.

On April 6, 1973 six Israeli agents posing as

tourists booked into two hotels near the Beirut seafront. They also rented six cars from a local rental firm. On the night of April 9th they guided into the beach a force of Israeli commandos who landed in small boats.³¹ The Israeli commandos and agents, all heavily armed, drove to three apartments belonging to high-ranking fedayeen leaders. At the apartments the commandos broke down the doors and began shooting. The shooting lasted for about ten minutes and when it was over Abu Youssef, Kamal Adwan, and Kamal Nasser, three of the fedayeen's top leaders, were dead. Three of Abu Youssef's bodyguards were also killed in the attack, as was Youssef's wife and a seventy-year-old Italian woman who lived in the apartment building.³²

While this attack was taking place, a second group of commandos drove to the large refugee camp of Sabra where they blew up the headquarters of the PDFLP and killed a number of fedayeen. They also attacked three other terrorist offices in Beirut.³³

When it was all over, after two-and-a-half hours in Beirut, the commandos drove their rented cars back to the beach and were picked up by small assault boats. The six Israeli agents went with them, leaving behind their luggage and their unpaid bills. The Israelis later announced they had two men killed and two wounded in the operation.³⁴

After the Beirut operation the fedayeen leadership went even further underground, or took strong steps to increase their personal safety. These actions were due not

only to the fact that the Israelis had struck inside a fedayeen stronghold, but also because during the Beirut operation the Israelis had captured the files of Al Fatah, which listed the members and supporters of Fatah inside of Israel and its occupied territories.³⁵

Despite the success of the Israeli "hit teams" they were unable to eliminate the number one man on their hit list, the planner of the Munich massacre, Ali Hassan Salameh. It was the attempt to assassinate Salameh that led to the exposure of the Mossad operation.

In July 1973 Israeli intelligence located and identified an Arab living in Lillehammer, Norway as Salameh. A hit team was dispatched to Lillehammer and assassinated the man believed to be Salameh. Several members of the hit team were apprehended by the authorities and some of them broke down under interrogation and confessed the crime and implicated the Israeli government. It was also revealed that the dead man, believed to be Salameh, was actually a Moroccan waiter who lived in Lillehammer and was married to a Norwegian woman.³⁶ However, on January 22, 1979 in Beirut, Ali Hassan Salameh was killed along with four of his bodyguards by a bomb planted in his car.³⁷

After the embarrassment caused by the Lillehammer incident the Israeli assassination teams apparently curtailed their operations. In addition, the October 1973 War overshadowed the external threat of the PLO and Israeli energies were directed against the greater threat posed by the armies

of Syria and Egypt.

The Strategy of Containment in
the Era of Diplomacy

If there is one specific area where the Israelis have failed in counterterrorism strategy, it is in the area of diplomacy. During the middle and later 1970's the PLO began to make tremendous gains in the diplomatic arena. As stated in Chapter 4 the PLO is now recognized by more nations than Israel and has observer status in the UN. The Israelis have continued both their defensive and offensive strategies against terrorism but have by and large failed to effectively counter the PLO's diplomatic successes.

Two probable reasons for this failure in Israeli diplomacy are the influence of the Arab oil states, which strongly back the PLO, and the nature of the Israeli leadership. The current leaders of Israel are generally military men. Dayan, Rabin, Weizman, and even Begin, who was the commander of the Irgun, are all former military commanders. Most of their adult lives have been spent in the military faced with a constant war environment with the Arabs. Therefore, their orientations and reactions in government are those of military commanders, not politicians. Decisions are often made out of military rather than political considerations. A recent example of this can be seen in the Latani Operation. In March of 1978 a group of eleven Fatah terrorists landed on the Israeli coast and seized a tourist

bus killing over thirty people and wounding seventy. Three of the terrorists were captured and the rest were killed. As a result of this attack the Israelis reacted by invading southern Lebanon which was heavily occupied by the PLO and known as Fatahland. The Israelis cleared out the terrorists from southern Lebanon up to the banks of the Latani River. The Israelis occupied this area until international pressure forced a withdrawal. In order to gain the withdrawal the UN established the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. However, the Israelis were highly skeptical of the value of United Nations troops and took measures of their own to prevent the PLO from reoccupying this area. Before withdrawing the Israelis trained and armed Christian militiamen and turned this area over to their control. The Christian militiamen have refused to allow either the Lebanese Army or the UN into this area. Therefore, this area serves as a buffer zone for the Israelis. Since the Latani Operation the PLO has to cross both UN lines and the Christian militia area before it can even reach the Israeli border.³⁸

Another example of Israeli military-oriented policy decisions regarding terrorism is the reaction to the April 1979 PLO attack at Nahariya. In response to this terrorist attack, in which four Israelis were killed, Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman announced that Israel was adopting a pre-emptive aggressive policy toward terrorists. Since that time the Israeli military has conducted periodic strikes both on land and by air against PLO positions in Lebanon.

Many of these attacks are preventive strikes and are not in reprisal for PLO attacks. The Israeli reasoning in adopting this policy is tactically-oriented; however, it has resulted in bad strategic implications due to political considerations. It is in essence a tactical military success, but politically it is a strategic blunder. There is little doubt that the aggressive policy of continued aerial bombardment and occasional land-launched attacks against PLO positions have kept the PLO off balance. It has been proven that when you keep your enemy on the defensive it is difficult for them to launch offensive operations. The Israeli strikes have forced the PLO underground, disrupted training, and made it difficult to launch operations from southern Lebanon. However, the Israeli strikes have had a high political cost. In launching these attacks the Israelis have occasionally struck population centers where the PLO intentionally locates its training bases.³⁹ The PLO has maximized media coverage of civilian casualties which has caused the tide of international public opinion to sway away from the Israelis. Even the usually supportive United States has expressed concern and dismay over the Israeli strikes into Lebanon.

Currently the Israelis classify their counterterror policy as a "strategy of containment." According to Major General Aharon Yariv, head of the Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University and former head of Israeli Military Intelligence, the Israelis do not have a strategy

that can achieve absolute results. According to Yariv the only hope of truly containing the PLO is a strategy which will combine the military elements with a political solution to the Palestinian problem acceptable to both sides. The aims of the strategy of containment should be: 1) to prevent Palestinian terrorism from achieving its declared political purpose, 2) to limit Israel's damage and to maintain normal day-to-day activity as well as the morale of the public, and 3) to cause maximum possible damage to the terrorist organizations, without impairing Israel's overall military capability and without injuring political interests.⁴⁰

The third aim will be the most difficult to achieve since the military tactics necessary to damage the PLO will harm Israel's political position. In the future Israel may have to choose which aim is more important, preventing terrorist attacks or winning political support.

NOTES

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³Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Strategies and Israel's Responses (New York: The Free Press, 1977), p. 14.

⁴Based upon visits to the Jordanian and Lebanese borders and conversations with Lt. Col. Raphael Horowitz (Ret.) currently with the Israeli Government Press Office.

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⁶New York Times, 27 December 1978.

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¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹"All is Not Quiet on the Western Front," Christian Science Monitor, 7 February 1980.

¹²Ibid.

¹³"Key to a Wider Peace," Time, April 4, 1980, p. 42.

¹⁴The Jerusalem Post International Edition, 2-3 March 1980.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid.

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- ²¹ Christopher Dobson, Black September, Its Short, Violent History (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1974), p. 75.
- ²² Ibid.
- ²³ Laffin, Dilemma, p. 155.
- ²⁴ Dobson, September, p. 88.
- ²⁵ Newsweek, September 18, 1972, p. 24.
- ²⁶ Dobson, September, p. 90.
- ²⁷ Ibid., pp. 98-104. For a detailed account of the Israeli assassination teams see David B. Tinnin and Dag Christensen's, The Hit Team (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976).
- ²⁸ New York Times, 2 February 1973.
- ²⁹ Dobson, September, p. 11.
- ³⁰ Time, May 27, 1974, p. 25.
- ³¹ Dobson, September, p. 120.
- ³² New York Times, 10 April 1973.
- ³³ Ibid.
- ³⁴ Dobson, September, p. 120.
- ³⁵ Ibid.
- ³⁶ David B. Tinnin and Dag Christensen, The Hit Team (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976).
- ³⁷ Time, February 5, 1979, p. 111.
- ³⁸ Interview with Major Saad Haddad, Commander of the "Free Lebanon: enclave in southern Lebanon. Also see The Jerusalem Post International Edition, 26 August-1 September 1979; and The Jerusalem Post, 17 August 1979.
- ³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Abaron Yariv, "A Strategy of Containment--An Israeli Counter-terrorist Strategy," Center for Strategic Studies Bulletin, no. 2 (Tel Aviv: Center for Strategic Studies, Spring, 1979), pp. 1-2.

CHAPTER VI

THE PLO: SUPPORT NETWORK AND INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES

One of the primary reasons for the power of the PLO is its extensive support network. The major difference between the PLO and other terrorist groups is that the PLO has numerous nations that openly support its operations. While most other terrorist groups are hampered by the operation constraints of conducting clandestine training, committing robberies for financing, and stealing weaponry, the PLO has all of these necessities furnished free of charge by the Arab nations and certain other governments.

Training

The Arab governments, primarily Syria, Lebanon, Algeria, Iraq, Libya, and South Yemen, permit the PLO to operate training camps in their countries. Additionally, these countries open their own military schools and academies to members of the PLO. Other countries, such as the U.S.S.R., Cuba, North Korea, and Iran, also furnish training and support for the PLO.¹ Since the end of the Lebanese Civil War Czechoslovakia and Hungary have provided training for the

PLO. In the summer of 1978 some 32 Palestinian pilots and 60 mechanics returned to the Middle East after completing advanced courses in Eastern Europe. Cuba has reportedly sent advisors to train PLO members in Lebanon.² Libya has also provided pilot training and instruction in the use of antiaircraft missiles to the PLO.³ Despite the Camp David accords the Egyptians have continued to provide some support to the PLO. In early 1980 it was reported that 38 members of the PLO were being trained in advanced seamanship in Egypt. All 38 were studying at the Egyptian Maritime School, a civilian school which trains naval officers. In light of the increased dependence of the PLO on sea-launched attacks, this training is of particular concern to the Israelis.⁴

The U.S.S.R.'s influence on the PLO is hard to gauge; however, it has been known for years that the Soviets have been training terrorists including the PLO. Yasir Arafat first visited Moscow in 1969. In 1974 the PLO opened an office in Moscow. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when Soviet training of the PLO began; however, numerous captured PLO terrorists and even some PLO personnel interviewed by the news media in Arab countries have admitted to receiving training in the Soviet Union. It is estimated that over 200 Palestinians train in the Soviet Union each year. Training is conducted in Moscow, Tashkent, Baku, and particularly at Sanprobal, near the city of Simferopol, which is the Soviet academy for foreign training. The training includes courses in guerrilla warfare, command, artillery,

engineering, communications, demolitions, and of course, political training on communism.⁵

Financial Support

The PLO does not lack for funds; it is supported financially by some of the wealthiest nations in the world, the Arab oil states. At the Arab Summit Conference in Rabat, Morocco in December of 1969 the Arab states reportedly decided to allocate 26 million English pounds to the PLO. Libya has allegedly been the largest contributor to the PLO. In recent years Libya has contributed approximately 73 million dollars to various terrorist groups. Libya even pays special bonuses for specific terrorist operations. As stated earlier, Gadhafi of Libya reportedly paid approximately 5 million dollars as a reward for the Munich massacre. Another 2 million dollars was paid to the international terrorist "Carlos," who is affiliated with the PFLP, for the Vienna OPEC hijacking of the Arab oil ministers in 1975. Gadhafi has reportedly offered 16 million dollars to the PFLP, for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.⁶ Libya partially finances its PLO contribution by a six percent tax on all Palestinian salaries in Libya and a three percent "jihad" tax on all Libyans. Kuwait also provides considerable financial support to the PLO by means of a three and one-half percent tax on Palestinians' salaries and a general two percent tax on petrol sales and movie tickets.⁷ Kuwait's annual contribution to the PLO is estimated to be

17 million dollars. Saudi Arabia contributes approximately 10 million dollars annually. A rough estimate of the PLO's annual income would be between 40 and 50 million dollars.⁸

Logistical Support

The majority of the terrorist organizations throughout the world must obtain weapons, ammunition, and other supplies by theft or by purchasing them through clandestine sources. However, the PLO has a generous supply of free weaponry supplied by Arab governments. This includes not only small arms and explosives, but also surface-to-air missiles (SAM), artillery, and tanks. The majority of PLO weaponry is of Soviet or Warsaw Pact origin and is supplied through the Arab governments. However, at least some weaponry is supplied directly from the Soviet bloc to the PLO. In July 1972 Arafat journeyed to Moscow and reportedly received a pledge for the first direct weapons shipments to the fedayeen.⁹

An example of the effect of the Soviet supply line can be seen by an examination of the types of explosives utilized by terrorists inside Israel. The type of plastic explosives utilized in bombing attacks by the PLO inside Israel was until the mid-1970's generally of U.S. manufacture. These explosives, usually C-4 (plastic explosives), were sold by the U.S. to Arab governments, such as Saudi Arabia, for military usage. Some of these explosives eventually ended up in the hands of the PLO. However, since

the mid-1970's PLO terrorists have begun to rely heavily on Soviet bloc explosives such as Czechoslovakian Centax. The PLO maintains a scientific institute in Beirut that manufactures highly sophisticated booby traps and explosive devices, including plastic detonators.¹⁰ It is probable that some of the technology utilized at this institute was obtained by training provided in the U.S.S.R.

Another important type of logistical support supplied by the Arab governments is documentation. Various Arab governments, and particularly Libya, have furnished false passports for members of the PLO. For example Ribhi Halaum, a Fatah member, was detained in Holland carrying an Algerian diplomatic passport. Libya allegedly supplied the passports for the PLO terrorists who staged an attack on El Al in Istanbul, Turkey in 1976. The infamous Abu Daoud, who was apprehended and quickly released by French authorities in 1977, was carrying an Iraqi passport.¹¹

Political Support

In many respects the political support furnished the PLO by the Arab states has been more beneficial than all the weapons and training given to them. The power of the Arab oil states has greatly facilitated the PLO's drive for recognition. Many oil-dependent states have found it advantageous to recognize the PLO and condemn Israel rather than risk incurring the displeasure of their Arab oil suppliers. The Moslem nations also constitute a large block in the United

Nations and will vote support for any resolution supporting the PLO and the Palestinian cause. . The Moslem nations represent a powerful voting bloc in the UN (see illustration). The European governments with their dependence on Arab oil are particularly susceptible to pressure from the Arab governments. Thus, the PLO has made considerable political gains in Western Europe. In 1979 Yasir Arafat visited Austria, Turkey, Spain, and Portugal seeking increased influence for the PLO. As of early 1980 the head of the PLO's political department, Farauk Kaddaumi, has visited Paris and Brussels. The political influence of the Arab states on behalf of the PLO can be seen in the March 1980 recognition of the "Palestinians' right of self-determination," acknowledged by French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing at the end of an official visit to Kuwait.¹² Additionally, in March 1980 Austria became the first Western European nation to grant full diplomatic recognition to the PLO.¹³

The United States has in recent years been the staunchest supporter of Israel. However, as the U.S. seeks to increase its presence and influence in the Persian Gulf area it becomes more susceptible to pressure from the Arab oil states. Perhaps the political support of the PLO by the Arab states and the power of oil will be able of achieve for it what guns and bullets have failed to achieve.

Sanctuaries

This last type of support provided by the Arab states

is invaluable to the PLO. Without a safe haven from which to operate and a place to escape to, many of the PLO's operations could not have succeeded. Particularly since the rise of international terrorism by the PLO, Arab states, such as Syria, Algeria, Iraq, South Yemen, and Libya, have provided sanctuary for terrorists. It is not by accident that terrorists choose these countries as the destination for hijacked aircraft. In most Arab states PLO hijackers will not be prosecuted or extradited. If terrorists can manage to escape to these countries after committing an act of terrorism against Israel or a symbolic Israeli target, they will not only be free from prosecution, but they will also probably receive heroes' welcomes.

In the late 1970's this blatant granting of asylum to terrorists began to fade due to international pressure. This does not mean that it has stopped or that Arab support for the fedayeen has diminished. Rather it is a reluctance by the Arab governments to commit a blatant overt act of support for terrorists by openly granting asylum. Since the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the subsequent rise of a radical anti-Western, anti-Zionist government, it is possible that Iran will become another sanctuary for terrorists.

International Linkages

The effect of Palestinian terrorism reaches far beyond the Middle East. The influence and impact of the PLO has effected many nations by virtue of the PLO's

interaction and cooperation with other terrorist groups. For several years intelligence agencies have acknowledged the existence of a "terror international" comprised of several terrorist groups that cooperate with one another in the areas of training, equipment, intelligence, loaning of personnel, and joint operation. "Terror international" is not a formal organization; instead it is comprised of leftists, anti-imperialists, and Marxist groups who find it advantageous to cooperate with each other. It often appears that terrorist groups from various countries display a greater degree of cooperation and coordination among themselves than do the nations who are their targets. At the center of this "terror international" is the PLO. The PLO has been linked with terrorists from fourteen countries in various international terrorist operations. The PFLP has the greatest number of links with other terrorist organizations and over the past decade has worked with terrorists from Japan, the Netherlands, Brazil, France, Venezuela, Britain, Columbia, Turkey, and Italy.¹⁴ However, the foundation and core of terror international is made up of four terrorist organizations including George Habash's PFLP, which is the cornerstone. The other three organizations are the Japanese Red Army (JRA), the West German offshoots and remnants of the Baader-Meinholf Gang/Red Army Faction, and the Junta de Coordinacion Revolutionara. The Junta is an umbrella organization comprised of South American revolutionaries from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay.¹⁵

Since the early 1970's the PLO and other terrorist organizations have conducted numerous joint operations. Additionally, one terrorist group may conduct a terrorist operation in support of another group, or else one group may include ransom demands of another group as part of their own demands in a hostage/barricade operation. When Black September seized diplomats in the Sudan in 1973 one of their demands was the release of captured members of the Baader-Meinolf Gang held in West Germany. Another example is the seizure of a Greek freighter in Karachi in 1974 by three Pakistani members of the Moslem International Guerrillas, a group which is active in the Phillipines and Indonesia. The terrorists demanded the release of two Black September members who were imprisoned in Greece for participating in an attack at Athens Airport in which five people were killed. The BSM terrorists were released and deported from Greece to Libya where they were freed.¹⁶

Some of the most infamous terrorist attacks have been the result of joint operations and international cooperation and support by several terrorist groups. The three Japanese, members of the JRA, who committed the Lod Airport massacre for the PFLP in May 1972 were trained by the PFLP in the Middle East, utilized documents forged in Germany, and carried weapons they had received in Italy. The Munich massacre by Black September in 1972 was carried out with the assistance of the Baader-Meinhoff Gang.¹⁷ The famous hijackings to Entebbe, Uganda in 1976 and to Somalia in 1977 were

both joint operations involving the PFLP, German terrorists, and Latin American terrorists. The hijacking to Somalia was conducted in support of the kidnapping operation of Hans Martin Schleyer in West Germany and was designed to reinforce the demands of the kidnappers.¹⁸ For a more detailed list of joint operations see Appendix I.

The coordination among various terrorist groups includes a type of service industry providing documentation, training, and weaponry. Some groups specialize in providing documentation and stolen weaponry while other groups supply training and other services. Occasionally groups will pay for their training by conducting proxy attacks for another group. The Turkish People's Liberation Army has attacked Israeli targets in Turkey in return for training received by its personnel at PLO camps in Syria.¹⁹

The PLO, with its government supported terrorist training bases, is the primary source of training for terrorists throughout the world. The PLO bases are open to virtually all radicals who profess a leftist, anti-Zionist, or Marxist ideology. In addition to European, Asian, Latin American, and Middle Eastern terrorists, the PFLP has also allegedly trained U.S. radicals, including members of the Black Panthers.²⁰ Members of the Irish Republican Army have also been receiving training from the PLO for several years. The IRA's adoption of the classic underground cell structure is believed to be a direct result of its contact with the PLO who utilizes the same type structure.²¹ The PLO has also

been linked to the 1979 assassination by the IRA of British Parliament member Airey Neave. Mr. Neave's car was blown up as he left the Parliament's underground parking lot by a highly sophisticated "dual trigger" bomb. This type of bomb has been widely used by the PLO. Members of the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), a splinter group of the IRA which claimed responsibility for the bombing, are known to have been trained in PLO camps.²²

The PLO is a principal supplier of weapons to many terrorist groups. The PLO furnished rockets, anti-tank weapons, explosives, and small arms to a variety of different terrorist organizations. In November 1977 five tons of PLO weaponry, including mortars, rocket launchers, small arms, and explosives, were intercepted by authorities in Belgium. The weapons were hidden in electrical transformers that were being shipped from Cyprus to the Irish Republic. The weapons were intended for the use of the IRA and were being provided by the PLO. In 1978 the IRA received a new shipment of weapons from the Middle East, including U.S. made M-60 machine guns. These weapons enabled them to launch a new offensive. Also in 1978 the Monteneros of Argentina received Soviet manufactured RPG-7 anti-tank weapons from the PLO.²³

The connections between the PLO and other terrorist organizations are the results of meetings between the leadership of these organizations. Contact between the Japanese Red Army and the PFLP is believed to have been established in 1970 when George Habash was in North Korea to address a

symposium on revolutionary strategy. While at the symposium Habash met with members of the JRA (Rengo Sekigun). The PFLP and the JRA allegedly made an agreement pledging cooperation whenever possible. After members of the JRA had received training in PFLP camps they reciprocated by conducting the Lod Airport attack in 1972.²⁴ In 1970 representatives of a dozen groups attended a conference organized by the PFLP which was held at a refugee camp in Lebanon. The meeting was held to explore the possibilities of transnational cooperation. Since this conference in 1970 terrorist groups have held several other meetings. For example, in July 1974 the IRA organized an "Anti-Imperialist Festival" held in Belfast and Dublin. More recently a Danish radical group held a "solidarity" conference. Participating groups included the PFLP, the Fatah, and several European radical groups.²⁵

One interesting aspect of the cooperation among terrorist groups is the rise of groups which specialize in international operations. The primary groups in this category are the PFLP-Special Operations group, which was led by Wadi Haddad until his death in 1978, and the Carlos Network (a.k.a. Mohammed Baudia Commando and the Arm of the Arab Revolution). There are some who classify these two groups as one since the Carlos Network has worked with the PFLP on most operations. The Carlos Network has approximately 40 multinational members and is led by Illich Ramirez Sanchez, alias Carlos or the "Jackal." Sanchez is the son of a wealthy

Venezuelan lawyer who is a staunch communist. Sanchez briefly attended Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow from which he was reportedly expelled in 1970 for dissolute living and improper attitudes. After he left the U.S.S.R. it is believed that he journeyed to the Middle East where he became a member of the PFLP. The Carlos group is believed to operate in the Middle East, the U.K., and Europe. The Carlos/PFLP are thought to have been deeply involved in the planning of the Japanese Red Army seizure of the French Embassy in the Hague in September 1974. In June 1975 a Lebanese informer led French authorities to Carlos' hideout in Paris. The three French counterintelligence agents accompanying the informant were unarmed; Carlos was not. Carlos escaped leaving the informant and two French agents dead and the third seriously wounded. In December 1975 the Carlos Network committed its most famous operation, the seizure of the OPEC oil ministers at a meeting in Vienna. The six terrorists included Carlos, two Germans, and three Palestinians.²⁶ The whereabouts of Carlos is currently unknown.

The international linkages of the PLO also extend to Iran and the PLO was instrumental in the Iranian revolution as a result of its training, equipping, and support of the Iranian revolutionaries. Since the overthrow of the Shah Arafat has made several visits to Tehran and the PLO has been given the abandoned Israeli Embassy as its headquarters. Prior to the overthrow of the Shah the Iranian National Front and the PLO established close ties and the PLO provided

weapons and training.²⁷ The People's Sacrifice Guerrillas, a Marxist organization, are believed to have patterned their organization after Al Fatah and were financed by both the PLO and Libya.²⁸ Since the overthrow the Iranian government has become violently anti-Zionist and has been training Iranian volunteers for duty with the PLO in Lebanon. As of December 1979 an Iranian volunteer force of 1080 members has been trained, equipped, and awaits transportation to Lebanon.²⁹

As demonstrated in this chapter, the impact and effect of the PLO and Palestinian terrorism goes far beyond the Middle East. The influence of the PLO is increasing and for the Western world this probably means trouble. As the network of terrorism spreads the status of the PLO will continue to grow. Even if the PLO should achieve its territorial goals it will probably continue to aid other terrorist organizations and its success will only encourage other groups to emulate its methods. Given the close ties the PLO has established with other groups, a PLO-controlled state might well become another Libya, lending encouragement, training, and support to other radical groups throughout the world.

Reasons for the Support of the PLO by the Arab, Moslem, and Third World Nations

As demonstrated in this chapter the primary support (financial, material, and political) of the PLO comes from the Arab nations. At this point it is necessary to ask why the Arab states back the PLO and what do they have to gain

by this support?

The primary reason for the Arab support of the PLO is based on the fact that the Arab nations have never accepted the existence of a Jewish state in Palestine. The Arab states lack the military might to eliminate Israel. Also, given the American and European public sympathy for the Jews since World War II, the Arab states have found it difficult to justify the war on Israel until recent years. The Palestinian cause, manifested by the Arab states' support of the PLO, gives the Arab nations a justification for continuing the struggle against Israel. The Arab nations justify their support of the PLO by putting it in the context of supporting a national liberation movement. This is a cause with which much of the Third World can identify.

After the Arab defeat in the 1967 War Palestine became a rallying point for Arab nationalism. The Arab's humiliating defeat in 1967 and the loss of Arab territory, including the holy city of Jerusalem, sparked intense emotionalism throughout the Arab world. The emotionalism spanned the entire Arab world and there was rioting as far away as Algeria and Tunisia. In Arab countries such as Morocco and Tunisia, which had in the past protected their Jewish minorities, there were anti-Jewish actions. Since the 1967 War every Arab summit conference, Arab League meeting, or Third World meeting in which Arab nations were present discussed Palestine.³⁰ The issue of Palestine and the Palestinian Arabs became the primary concern of the Arab

nations and became synonymous with Arab nationalism.

Because of the intense emotionalism of the Palestinian issue all Arab leaders and Arab governments became obligated to support the Palestinian cause. When the PLO, through the use of terrorism, became recognized as the only representative of the Palestinians, the Arab support naturally solidified behind the PLO.

The Arab states and the PLO have also placed a religious context on the conflict and attract additional support from the Moslem world. For example, emphasis is placed on regaining the holy city of Jerusalem, which is the third holiest site for Moslems, from Israeli control. Furthermore, the Israelis have become identified with Western imperialism in the eyes of the Moslem world and the Afro-Asian bloc. The Arab nationalism which supports the Palestinian cause has evolved into a Moslem nationalism which supports the Palestinians who are regarded as victims of imperialism and oppressed Moslems. The non-Moslem Third World nations are also able to empathize with the PLO's image as a victim of imperialism. Many of the Third World nations had their own pre-independence liberation movements which became post-independence governments. Therefore, much of the Third World feels a type of kinship with the Palestinian cause. The Arab governments have aided the PLO in fostering this image of being a victim of imperialism. For example, in March 1980 Iraqi President Saddam Hussein

stated that the struggle against Israel is linked with "the developing nations' struggle against imperialism, Zionism, conspiracy and all kinds of pressure."³¹ By emphasizing the "national liberation" context of the conflict, the Arab states and the PLO have been able to gather support from beyond the Arab world.

In essence, the PLO and the "Palestinian cause" are weapons the Arab states utilize to strike against the Israeli state. This does not mean that the Arab nations lack genuine support and sympathy for the Palestinians cause. However, it must be noted that Arab opposition to an Israeli state predates the Palestinian issue and the Palestinians have not always received favorable treatment by the Arab states.

An interesting aspect of the PLO is that it is able to attract support from such a diversity of nations. The Arab states are a very politically dissimilar group of nations which range from conservative monarchies to radical Marxist regimes. The reason that the PLO is able to attract support from both religious conservative Arab states, and revolutionary leftists, is the diversity of the PLO itself. As stated in Chapter 3, the various PLO groups differ widely in their ideological and political orientations. The PLO is currently split between the relatively moderate groups, led by Fatah, and the rejectionists, led by the PFLP. The ideological split in the PLO corresponds with the ideological diversity of the Arab states. Thus, the more moderate Arab governments back the moderate PLO groups while the

radical Arab states, such as Libya and Iraq, back the PLO's rejection front. Some Arab governments, such as Syria and Iraq, have formed their own PLO groups in order to satisfy Arab pressure to support the PLO, and in order to have their own policies and objectives represented within the PLO ruling council. Other Arab states support the PLO groups which most closely represent their own political ideology.

As previously stated, support of the Palestinian cause has become synonymous with Arab nationalism and Islamic nationalism; support of the fedayeen has become mandatory for Arab rulers and governments. Failure to support the PLO can result in loss of popularity and credibility for Arab leaders. For conservative Arab governments, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, failure to support the fedayeen can result in punitive actions by the radical Arab states and the PLO. Therefore, Arab support of the Palestinian cause is universal in the Arab world.

A further reason for Arab support of the PLO is that it focuses the attention and energies of the Arab population on an external cause and enemy. Several of the ruling Arab regimes are concerned about internal stability and potential internal opposition. Therefore, the Arab governments find it politically expedient to focus the populations' attention on an external issue, thereby alleviating potential internal opposition.

The high degree of support by the Arab governments and the forging of support links beyond the Arab world are

testimonies of the political successes of the PLO. The PLO has added a new dimension to the phrase "protracted conflict;" this phrase no longer applies primarily to military successes. The PLO has waged a successful protracted war for diplomatic recognition. What the PLO could not achieve militarily may be achieved by diplomacy. However, this diplomacy has been based on the use of terrorism and constitutes a diplomacy of confrontation.

NOTES

¹The support by these nations is widely documented; for example, see Bard O'Neill, Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-Military Analysis (Boulder, Colorado; Westview Press, 1978).

²Yoni Alexander and Robert Kilmer, eds., Political Terrorism and Business - The Threat and Response (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), p. 44.

³U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, International Summaries: A Collection of Selected Translation in Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, LEAA, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, vol. 3 (April 1979), p. 41.

⁴The Jerusalem Post International Edition, 16-22 March 1980.

⁵From the narrative of a television presentation entitled "The Russian Connection," shown on PBS in October 1979, transcribed by the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School, Hurlbert Field, Florida, March 1978.

⁶Alexander and Kilmer, Terrorism and Business, pp. 40-41.

⁷Bard O'Neill, Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-Military Analysis (Boulder, Colorado; Westview Press, 1978), p. 74.

⁸From material presented at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School in the "Dynamics of International Terrorism," course at Hurlburt Field, Florida, March 1978.

⁹O'Neill, Struggle, p. 74.

¹⁰Based on a tour of the Jerusalem Bomb Disposal Unit headquarters and an interview with the deputy commander of this unit, August 1979.

¹¹Israeli Defense Force Spokesman's Office, The PLO and International Terrorism (Tel Aviv: Israeli Defense Force, 1979), p. 12.

¹²Christian Science Monitor, 5 March 1980.

¹³Associated Press, as reported in the Norman Transcript, Norman, Oklahoma, 13 March 1980.

- ¹⁴New York Times, 26 June 1978.
- ¹⁵Israeli Defense Force, PLO, p. 2.
- ¹⁶Alexander and Kilmer, Terrorism and Business, p. 50.
- ¹⁷Central Intelligence Agency, International and Transnational Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis (National Foreign Assessment Center, PR 7610030, April 1976), p. 14.
- ¹⁸Alexander and Kilmer, Terrorism and Business, pp. 49-51.
- ¹⁹Central Intelligence Agency, International Terrorism, p. 14.
- ²⁰Stefan T. Possony and L. Bouchev, International Terrorism - The Communist Connection (Washington, D.C.: American Council for World Freedom, 1978), p. 30.
- ²¹Jack Anderson, "IRA Allied with PLO," syndicated column Oklahoma Journal, 9 September 1979.
- ²²London Observer, 1 April 1979.
- ²³Alexander and Kilmer, Terrorism and Business, p. 45.
- ²⁴"The Terrorist International," Newsweek, September 18, 1972.
- ²⁵Alexander and Kilmer, Terrorism and Business, p. 40.
- ²⁶Central Intelligence Agency, International Terrorism, pp. 16-17 and Appendix C.
- ²⁷U.S. Department of Justice, International Summaries, p. 42.
- ²⁸Material from U.S. Air Force Special Operations School, "Terrorism" course.
- ²⁹Daily Oklahoman, 19 December 1979.
- ³⁰Don Pertz, The Middle East (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978), p. 147.
- ³¹Mediterranean News, 16 March 1980. (The Mediterranean News is a weekly newspaper which is published in Malta and reflects the Libyan government's viewpoint.)

CHAPTER VII

PALESTINIAN TERRORISM: ITS EFFECT ON THE ARAB WORLD

Much has been written regarding the PLO's war against Israel and the effect of Palestinian terrorism on the Israeli state. However, the effect of the PLO on the Arab world is often overlooked. When the record is examined one can see that the Palestinian Resistance Movement has been more harmful to the Arab states than to Israel in regard to casualties and physical damage. The PLO has caused many more casualties and deaths in the Arab countries than in Israel. The PLO has been the cause, or least a major factor, in two costly civil wars in Jordan and Lebanon. It has also caused Arab casualties by operating against Israel from surrounding Arab countries which has resulted in Israeli reprisal raids against these countries. In areas such as southern Lebanon the PLO locates its bases in or near villages; the villagers may or may not be willing to allow the PLO into their community. However, the strength and force of arms of the PLO make consent by the villagers immaterial. When reprisals are mounted against PLO camps it is the villagers who are caught in the middle and suffer the most.

The fate of the Palestinians is currently the primary

obstacle to peace in the Middle East. Even the U.S. now acknowledges that a solution must be found to the Palestinian problem before a lasting peace can be achieved. However, the Israelis will not negotiate with the PLO and the PLO refuses to acknowledge the existence of the Israeli state or its right to exist. Since the Arab states recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people they are constrained into a hardline stance. Even if certain moderate Arab states were willing to work toward a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict they would be unable to do so because of the PLO's position of strength in the Arab world. By pledging cooperation and support to the PLO the Arab leaders have greatly limited the options for achieving a peaceful settlement. The PLO has bound the Arab leaders and nations into a position of intransigence.

This does not mean that if the PLO did not exist all the Arab states would be willing to accept the existence of Israel. The deep animosity and distrust between Israel and the Arab states is a difficult obstacle to overcome. However, without the constraints imposed by the PLO and the Arab rhetoric in support of the PLO, the leadership of some Arab nations could find it politically and economically expedient to accept the existence of Israel. Currently any Arab nation or Arab leader who seeks compromise with the Israelis faces a variety of punitive measures. This includes threat of assassination, civil war, political and economic boycott by the rest of the Arab world, and even military attack by other Arab states.

All of these measures have, in the past, been implemented against various Arab nations and leaders. This chapter will briefly outline the past effects of the PLO on the Arab nations and the consequence faced by Arab leaders and nations who fail to support the PLO position.

The Jordanian Civil War

After the Arab defeat in the 1967 War Jordan became the primary base of operations for the fedayeen. The constant terrorist raids from Jordan resulted in frequent Israeli reprisals. The Israelis not only attacked PLO targets but also hit Jordanian targets in attempt to pressure King Hussein of Jordan into restricting fedayeen activity. Other Arab states, such as Syria and Egypt, had in the past refused to allow fedayeen operations from their territories in order to maintain control over the fedayeen and prevent Israeli reprisals. However, in Jordan the Palestinians possessed greater strength than in Egypt or Syria. Both Syria and Egypt maintained large armies and the Palestinians represented only a small portion of the population. However, in Jordan the Palestinians represented over 50 percent of the Jordanian population.¹ The Jordanian Army numbered only approximately 55,000 men, of which one-third were Palestinians. The remainder of the army was predominantly Bedouins, who were loyal to Hussein.² The fedayeen operating inside Jordan were well armed and numbered several thousand men. Additionally, the position of Syria, which bordered Jordan

and strongly supported the fedayeen cause, was a further source of concern to Hussein. Therefore, King Hussein allowed the fedayeen to operate from Jordan.

The situation continued to worsen as the PLO gained power in Jordan and by 1970 the fedayeen in effect constituted a state within a state. The fedayeen carried their weapons openly in violation of Jordanian law, collected funds illegally, and intimidated the Jordanian population. King Hussein, in order to keep the peace, was obliged to make continual concessions to the fedayeen. In June 1970, after clashes between the Jordanian Army and the fedayeen, the King had to dismiss two top military men in order to appease the fedayeen and end the violence. The two men, Major General Nasser Ben Jamil, Hussein's uncle and the commander-in-chief of the army, and the commander of the Third Armored Division, had long been regarded as enemies of the fedayeen.³ The constant compromise by the King was gradually eroding his authority and power and there was concern that the fedayeen might take control of the country. Finally in September 1970 after an unsuccessful assassination attempt against Hussein and the use of Jordanian territory as the destination for three hijacked airliners by the PFLP, the King was forced to take action. The King unleashed his Third Armored Brigade comprised of loyal Bedouins. The fedayeen reacted by seizing much of the countryside and several towns in the northwest. The Jordanian Army, relying on its armored units, began to retake the towns and moved to

cut the fedayeen supply lines from Syria and Iraq.⁴ At this point the Syrians decided to intervene on the side of the PLO, and on September 20 a large Syrian armored unit of approximately 250 tanks with FLA markings crossed the border into Jordan. The Syrian invasion was met by the Jordanian 40th Armored Brigade and the Jordanian Air Force. In the resulting battle a large number of Syrian tanks were destroyed and the Syrians retreated across the border. Of significance in this battle is the fact that the Syrian Air Force did not enter the fighting. There are several possible reasons for this lack of support by the Syrian Air Force. One possible reason could be the existence of political rivalry in Syria between General Assad, the commander of the Air Force, and his political enemy, Salah Jadid, the Assistant Secretary General of the ruling Baath Party. Another reason could have been the reaction of the U.S. and Israel. The Israelis reacted by stating that they would intervene militarily if the Syrians did not withdraw. The U.S. reacted by ordering a Sixth Fleet task force, including two aircraft carriers and an amphibious force of 1500 marines, to a position off the Israeli-Lebanese coast. In addition, two U.S. airborne battalions in Europe and the 82nd Airborne Division in the U.S. were placed on alert.⁵ It is clear that both Israel and the U.S. were signaling to the Syrians and the U.S.S.R. that they would not tolerate a PLO/Syrian takeover of the relatively moderate state of Jordan. Such a takeover would have led to a radical fedayeen state on Israel's border

which could only have led to war.

As a result of the Jordanian Civil War the fedayeen suffered approximately 6000 to 10,000 casualties and lost Jordan as a base of operations.⁶ Additionally, King Hussein and his staff moved to the top of the PLO's list of enemies. The subsequent formation of the Black September Movement by the PLO was originally designed as a means of retribution against Jordan. On November 28, 1971 the Jordanian Premier Wasfi Tal was assassinated by the BSM during a visit to Cairo. On December 15, 1971 the chief of Hussein's personal staff was the victim of an assassination attempt in London. In February 1972 five Jordanians in West Germany, believed to be friendly with the Israelis, were assassinated by the BSM.⁷ By 1972 Black September began its infamous operations against Israel; however, since 1971 there has been one confirmed assassination attempt against Hussein and rumors of other attempts which have not been verified.⁸ The PLO leadership and Hussein remained enemies until the Camp David accords accomplished what the Arab nations had failed to do, establish a reapproachment between Hussein and Arafat.

The Lebanese Civil War

When the fedayeen were driven out of Jordan they had to find a new base of operations. Countries such as Iraq and Libya did not border Israel and were therefore unsuitable as bases for crossborder military operations against Israel. Both Egypt and Syria were unwilling to allow unrestricted

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terrorist operations from their territory. Therefore, Lebanon became the primary base of operations for the PLO.

Prior to the Jordanian Civil War the PLO was already well established in Lebanon and clashes had begun to occur between Palestinians and Lebanese by the late 1960's. In 1969 after repeated clashes between the Lebanese security forces and the fedayeen, the Lebanese government requested the mediation of Egypt's President Nasser. In November 1969 a secret agreement was signed by the commander-in-chief of the Lebanese Army and Yasir Arafat. Under this agreement, known as the "Cairo Agreements," the Palestinians were authorized to live and work in Lebanon and to establish committees to watch over Palestinian interests. The Palestinian Armed Struggle Command (PASC) was given authority to administer the Palestinian refugee camps. The fedayeen were permitted free movement in the country; however, the Lebanese military was to have full jurisdiction and authority throughout the country.⁹ In essence the "Cairo Agreements" granted authority for PLO operations from Lebanon, while the fedayeen were to abide by Lebanese laws.

The Cairo Agreements were never able to restrict the activities of the PLO in Lebanon. After the influx of Palestinian guerrillas the situation grew progressively worse. The increased fedayeen attacks from southern Lebanon resulted in large scale retaliations from Israel. This led to renewed strife between the Lebanese and the PLO. As in Jordan, many

Lebanese politicians, military leaders, and civilians were opposed to the PLO. However, there were significant differences between the situation in Lebanon and the situation in Jordan at the time of the Jordanian Civil War. In Jordan the army numbered 55,000 men, of which two-thirds were Bedouins who were loyal to King. The Bedouins were concentrated in armored units; thus, when the civil war broke out the King had specific military units he could depend upon.¹⁰ In Lebanon the army numbered only about 10,000 to 15,000 men. The officers were predominantly Christians and the enlisted men were predominantly Moslems. The army was further divided between rightists who opposed the PLO, and leftists, who supported the PLO.¹¹ Therefore, the Lebanese could not depend upon the army to curb PLO activity. Furthermore, the fedayeen had almost as many men under arms as the Lebanese Army.

Another difference between the Jordanian and the Lebanese situation was that in Jordan there existed a strong central monarch that enjoyed widespread support. In Lebanon the government was a delicate coalition of Christians and Moslems, and leftists and rightists.¹² The presence of the PLO in Lebanon upset this delicate balance of power. When the civil war broke out there did not exist a government or a politician who could command the respect and loyalty of a majority of the Lebanese population.

The continued strife and conflict between the various factions in Lebanon finally escalated into full-scale warfare in 1975. The country and government became divided into

pro-PLO and anti-PLO factions. The Lebanese Army refrained from intervention in the civil strife due to its own internal political diversity. Finally, in January the army was forced to intervene and attempt to stop the fighting. However, as feared, the army disintegrated as Moslem and Christians, rightists and leftists, deserted the army and joined the warring factions. The factions were divided along both political and religious lines. The Christians were generally rightists and were strongly opposed to the PLO. Various Christian leaders had formed strong militia units which fought against the PLO and the Moslem leftists.¹³

By 1976 the civil war threatened to upset the balance of power among the Arab states. At this point the Syrians sent units of the Palestine Liberation Army stationed in Syria into Lebanon to stop the fighting. The Syrians succeeded in establishing a short truce. However, renewed fighting broke out and the leftists and PLO proclaimed their intent to completely crush the rightist-Christians. This led to an unpredictable reaction from the Syrians who had long supported the PLO. The Syrian Army and the Syrian-supported PLO group, Saiga, entered the fighting on the side of the Christians. The Syrians turned the tide in favor of the Christians and the balance of power between the rightist-Christians and leftist-PLO was restored.¹⁴ The primary reason for the Syrian intervention on behalf of the Christians was the Syrian fear of a PLO-leftist victory which could lead to a radical PLO state bordering Syria. Since several PLO

factions were aligned with Syria's rival, Iraq, the Syrians were uncertain of the allegiance of a PLO-controlled Lebanese state and also feared Israeli intervention.

The Syrian intervention deepened the animosity and strife between Syria and Egypt and both nations accused each other of betraying the Arab cause. In late 1976 Saudi Arabia exercised its influence, assured by its financial aid to other Arab nations, to call a mini-summit meeting. The presidents of Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, and the PLO met in Riyadh and formulated a peace plan calling for a cease fire and the creation of a 30,000-man Arab "peacekeeping" force to supervise the plan. The bulk of the peacekeeping force was comprised of Syrian troops. This in turn led to concern by the Israelis and threats of intervention if the Syrians crossed over an unspecified line in southern Lebanon.¹⁵

The Lebanese Civil War lasted nineteen months and caused billions of dollars in damage. An estimated 60,000 people were killed in the war and several times that number were wounded. Approximately one million people, nearly one-third of the Lebanese population, were displaced by the fighting and much of Beirut was destroyed.¹⁶ The delicate political balance has never fully been regained and full peace has not been restored. The country is still divided into Christian and Moslem sectors and the 30,000-man peacekeeping force still remains in the country. In October 1978 heavy fighting again commenced as the Syrians fought to bring the Christian militias under control and to stop a movement

by the Christians to partition the country along sectarian lines.¹⁷ A further result of the Lebanese Civil War was the widening of the rift between Syria and Iraq. The rise of Black June led to a wave of assassinations and terrorism enacted by Arabs upon other Arabs. The Black June movement is covered in detail in Chapter 3.

As of this writing the situation in Lebanon remains a no peace/no war situation. Without a doubt the Palestinian Resistance Movement has cost the Lebanese much more than the Israelis.

Egypt and Camp David

The Arab states have never been united and inter-Arab strife and conflict has a long history. The Palestinian problem and the differing solutions advocated by the various Arab states has served to increase animosity. This does not mean that an Arab world minus the PLO would be strife-free; the feelings of distrust and animosity are too deep-rooted. However, the Palestinian Resistance Movement has most definitely had a negative impact on inter-Arab relations.

The feelings of hatred for the state of Israel are deep and intense in the Arab world and are manifested in the PRM and the Arab support thereof. This feeling of hatred is so intense that it extends to any Arab leader or state that refuses to fully back the aims of the PRM. The ostracism of Egypt by the rest of the Arab world is an example of the intense feelings that surround the Arab-Israel conflict.

The loss of Egypt as an enemy of Israel was a severe blow to the Arab world. Egypt possesses the most powerful military in the Arab world. Egypt had borne the brunt of the fighting against Israel and was the only Arab nation to have fought in all four wars against Israel. Also, Egypt has suffered the greatest number of casualties. The Egyptians have criticized other Arab governments for waging a war of rhetoric against Israel while depending on Egypt to do the fighting. The Egyptian economy, already greatly overburdened, was further hampered by high defense expenditures. Egypt had suffered greatly as a result of the conflict with Israel and had gained little. Therefore, Sadat in November 1977 took an unprecedented step and visited Jerusalem and began a peace dialog with the Israelis. The subsequent peace treaty, signed in March 1979, shocked and outraged the Arab world. In the peace treaty Sadat negotiated a vague type of autonomy for the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, the PLO was excluded from any part in the autonomy process and settlement.¹⁸

Only days after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty eighteen Arab nations and the PLO met in Bagdad to formulate plans for retaliatory actions against Egypt. At the Bagdad conference the Arab nations agreed to take diplomatic and economic actions against Egypt, including the breaking of diplomatic relations and the suspension of Egypt from the Arab League. On the economic side, technical and financial assistance to Egypt was to be cancelled and a ban

on petroleum shipments would be imposed.¹⁹

The United States had hoped that the more moderate Arab states of Jordan and Saudi Arabia would endorse the treaty. However, the U.S. had greatly misjudged the reactions of the Arab world. Although Saudi Arabia balked at some proposals of the PLO and radical states at the Bagdad conference, the Saudis eventually agreed to support the boycott. The Saudis dissolved the mutual arms industry they had established with the Egyptians in Cairo, suspended flights to Egypt in compliance with the Bagdad agreement, and refused to abide by an agreement to finance the purchase for Egypt of U.S. F5E aircraft.²⁰

The Jordanians not only refused to endorse the treaty, but they also reestablished their links with the PLO. As a result Arafat and Hussein met together in late March 1979. This type of meeting was unthinkable between these two enemies prior to Camp David.²¹ The U.S. government had hoped for Jordan's support of Camp David and was surprised when Hussein, who is widely regarded as a moderate Arab leader, totally rejected the Camp David accords. It is speculated that Hussein rejected Camp David because he was disappointed in how little the accords actually accomplished. Hussein felt that Jordan was not assured of any gain by its support of the Camp David agreements and repeatedly stated that Jordan must know the end result of its involvement in the negotiations before Jordan would commit itself to join the negotiations. Prior to the Camp David accords Hussein was

"sitting on the fence," waiting to see the results of the agreements. To Hussein the only acceptable result of the agreements would be a complete Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 War borders and some type of Palestinian self-determination. When it became clear that Camp David did not guarantee these results King Hussein came "off the fence" and joined the other Arab governments in condemning the agreements. However, King Hussein has not joined the hard core "rejectionists" who condemn the peace process. Hussein has only rejected the results of the peace process, not the process itself and has, therefore, left his options open.²²

A further reason for the rejection of the Camp David efforts by Hussein was that it was necessary for him to appear as a supporter of Arab solidarity and the Palestinian cause to Jordan and the rest of the Arab world. After the Jordanian Civil War many Arab states condemned Hussein and viewed him as an enemy. By rejecting Camp David Hussein was able to reduce the pressure on his regime from Syria, Iraq, and the PLO. As part of Hussein's appearance of maintaining Arab solidarity he has sought a reapproachment with Arafat and the PLO. Furthermore, the rejection of Camp David has also enabled Jordan to obtain a substantial amount of Arab financial aid.²³

Hussein was also afraid of internal strife if he did not reject Camp David. There had been campus unrest in Jordan during 1979 and clashes between Palestinian and Jordanian students. Since the PLO still maintains a large

number of supporters in Jordan, Hussein clearly wants to avoid another "Black September."²⁴

While Hussein has joined the other Arab governments in condemning Egypt and Camp David, Hussein has carefully avoided cutting his ties with the West. Hussein is keeping his options open and could possibly still be a part of the peace process if he is assured of a positive gain from the negotiations.

A further disappointment to the U.S. was the lack of strong public backing for the Camp David accords by the European allies. Once again the power of oil was demonstrated. The European Common Market Nations receive 68 percent of their oil from the Middle East.²⁵ Therefore, the European reaction and support was less than enthusiastic since they wished to avoid angering their Arab oil suppliers.

The anger and outrage of the Arab nations at the Camp David accords and the Egyptian government show no signs of lessening. At the 1980 meeting of the Arab foreign ministers in Islamabad, Pakistan a resolution was passed calling for all Islamic nations to boycott the Sadat regime because of its "collaboration with the enemy."²⁶ The conference further condemned the alliance formed by the Egyptians, the Israelis, and the Americans. This alliance and the peace treaty were called acts of flagrant aggression against the Arab Islamic states and the resolution called on all Islamic states to "confirm their solidarity with the Arab countries for the liberation of all the occupied Arab

territories."²⁷

The sanctions imposed upon Egypt as a result of the peace treaty enacted with Israel will cause other Arab nations to think twice before contemplating any relaxation of tensions in the conflict with Israel. They also serve to illustrate the continuing change in the Arab-Israeli conflict. A decade ago King Hussein of Jordan became the number one enemy of the PLO and the radical Arab states. As a result of the Camp David accords King Hussein has moved back into the fold and President Sadat has become the number one enemy.

The Palestinian problem is the center of the controversy in the Middle East situation. However, it should be noted that if the PLO and Palestinian problem did not exist, the majority of the Arab nations would still be violently opposed to the state of Israel. The Arab nations opposed the creation of Israel and fought a war with the new state before the Palestinian problem existed. The Palestinian problem is utilized by some radical Arab nations as a popular international cause and a convenient excuse to continue the state of war with Israel. Nevertheless, the PRM, its acts of violence, and the support rendered it by the Arab governments has cost the Arab nations dearly. This is not meant to be a value judgment concerning the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the PRM; rather it is a statement of fact.

NOTES

¹ Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank (New York: American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1977), p. 115.

² Edgar O'Ballance, Arab Guerrilla Power (Hamden, Connecticut: The Shoe String Press, Inc., 1974), p. 227.

³ Dana A. Schmidt, Armageddon in the Middle East (New York: The John Day Company, 1974), pp. 179-180.

⁴ Ibid., p. 181.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 182-183.

⁶ John Laffin, Fedayeen, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. 62.

⁷ Schmidt, Armageddon, p. 186.

⁸ Sinai and Pollack, Hashemite, p. 355.

⁹ Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978), p. 358.

¹⁰ O'Ballance, Power, 227.

¹¹ Schmidt, Armageddon, p. 169.

¹² Peretz, Middle East, p. 359.

¹³ Ibid., p. 361..

¹⁴ R.D. McLaurin, Mohammed Mughisuddin, and Abraham R. Wagner, Foreign Policy Making in the Middle East (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 260.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 359.

¹⁷ Time, October 16, 1978, pp. 62-63.

¹⁸ Time, April 9, 1979, p. 40.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Middle East Information Media Ltd., Middle East Intelligence Survey, vol. 7, no. 4 (Tel Aviv: Israel Press Ltd., 16-31 May 1979), p. 31.

²¹Time, April 2, 1979, p. 28.

²²Middle East Information Media Ltd., Middle East Intelligence Survey (Tel Aviv: Middle East Information Media Ltd., 16-31 May 1979), p. 32.

²³Middle East Information Media Ltd., Middle East Intelligence Survey (Tel Aviv: Middle East Information Media Ltd., 16-30 April 1979), p. 15.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Time, April 9, 1979, p. 40.

²⁶The Jamahiriya Mail (a weekly English language newspaper published by Libya in Malta), 2 February 1980.

²⁷Ibid.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

This study has been concerned primarily with the ramifications of Palestinian terrorism on the Middle East conflict. From this study several conclusions can be drawn which reflect both on the Middle East and on the world in general regarding the threat posed by radical groups who rely on terrorism to achieve their political goals. In this concluding chapter the specific impact of Palestinian terrorism on the conflict in the Middle East will be examined first. From these conclusions regarding Palestinian terrorism further conclusions may be drawn regarding the future direction of political terrorism in the world at large.

- 1) PALESTINIAN TERRORISM HAS WORSENERED THE CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HAS MADE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. Terrorism by the PLO has kept the Palestinian problem in the headlines and has insured that the Palestinian cause does not fade into obscurity. However, this reliance on terrorism to achieve PLO political goals has resulted in an escalating cycle of violence. Terrorist actions have resulted in increasingly severe reprisals which in turn entangle the Arab nations and lead to more terrorist actions.

The casualties resulting from this cycle of violence, particularly the civilian casualties, increase animosity and hatred on both sides. As hatred increases the probability of compromise decreases. It becomes unthinkable for the Israelis to deal with the PLO due to the memories of the acts of terrorism perpetrated by this group. The reprisals by the Israelis, which inflict casualties on the fedayeen, and in some cases, Arab civilians, reinforce both Arab propaganda and the desire for revenge. There is some proof that reprisal raids do inflict damage on the fedayeen and their ability to conduct operations. However, reprisals may also add recruits to the movement and fuel to the fire of PLO propagandists.

2) PALESTINIAN TERRORISM HAS MOVED THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT INTO A HARDLINE POSITION. At the Camp David negotiations the Israelis were adamant and unyielding on one point, no negotiations with or mention of the PLO in the Camp David accords. The Israelis will not tolerate or allow any role for the PLO in the occupied territories. The hatred of the PLO caused by terrorist actions and the continual threat of terrorism has resulted in this uncompromising and hardline position of the Israelis. Even if the PLO were to renounce the use of terrorism and cease terrorist operations it would be years before the Israeli government and people would be willing to deal with the PLO. Years of fear, hatred, and distrust resulting from terrorism cannot be erased overnight.

- 3). TERRORISM IS LESS COSTLY IN TERMS OF BOTH LIVES AND PROPERTY WHEN COMPARED WITH CONVENTIONAL WAR OR GUERRILLA WARFARE. HOWEVER, ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT MAY BE GREATER.

This point is closely linked with the preceding conclusion regarding terrorism constraining a government into a hardline position. The Israeli government has estimated its casualties resulting from fourteen years of terrorism by the PLO (1965 to 1979) to be approximately 650 killed and 3000 wounded.¹ The CIA estimates the number of casualties worldwide from all international terrorist acts for the period 1968 through 1978 to be 2102 killed and 5078 wounded.² While this number of deaths is tragic, it does not begin to compare with the number of casualties from conventional war or even guerrilla warfare. The Israelis have stated that many more Israeli citizens are injured in traffic accidents than in terrorist operations.³ Therefore, the question becomes, why does terrorism have such a profound impact when the casualties from terrorist operations are so light? The reason is that terrorism is a very personal type of warfare. Many acts of terrorism are deliberately abhorrent. Acts such as the Munich massacre of Israeli athletes and the seizure in Maalot, Israeli of a schoolhouse which resulted in the death of 21 schoolchildren, result in a very personal sense of loss and outrage.⁴ On the otherhand, in conventional war, and to a large extent, in guerrilla war, the majority of the casualties are military or government personnel. Civilian deaths do occur but they tend to be overshadowed by the magnitude of the conflict and

the large number of casualties. There is also the realization that the other side is suffering in a similar manner. However, in acts of political terrorism the population may be frustrated by an inability to strike back immediately at those directly responsible for these actions. Thus, a protracted campaign of political terrorism, in Israel or other countries, causes an impact far out of proportion to the amount of resulting casualties.

4) THE SUCCESSES OF THE PLO MAY CAUSE OTHER RADICAL GROUPS

TO EMULATE ITS METHODS. While no terrorist group has yet achieved its primary goal, the PLO has made considerable progress and it is not unreasonable to assume that the PLO will eventually gain control of a Palestinian mini-state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The political recognition and legitimacy given the PLO by the UN and over 100 individual nations may be interpreted as a reward and an end result of its terrorist operations. This assumption may be debatable; however, it is a fact that the Palestinian cause received little attention or recognition between 1948 and 1967. It was only after the rise of the PLO and its subsequent reliance on terrorism that the Palestinian problem began to receive the high degree of worldwide exposure and recognition. This, in effect, means that terrorism may not achieve the primary goal of a radical group, but it does insure the worldwide attention and recognition that may be a prerequisite for achieving their goal.

As demonstrated in Chapter 6 the PLO maintains close ties with and exercises influence over the majority of the major terrorist groups in the world today. The imitation and duplication of PLO tactics by other terrorist groups is a reality. Therefore, it is logical to assume that the diplomatic successes of the PLO will encourage other radical groups to utilize similar tactics and strategies to achieve their political goals. In essence, the world will increasingly witness a movement by radical groups toward utilization of terrorism.

5) AS THE DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION AND RESPECTABILITY OF A

TERRORIST GROUP INCREASES THE GROUP'S USE OF TERRORISM

WILL DECREASE. Since the PLO's recognition by the UN

and the majority of the nations of the world it has de-emphasized terrorist operations. However, the PLO maintains the threat of an escalation of international terrorism as a means of maintaining its political gains. The PLO has continued its operations inside Israel but it emphasizes that this constitutes a "war of national liberation" and not terrorism. The PLO is currently recognized as a legitimate non-state actor, or even a type of government in exile. In order to cultivate this image the PLO and Arafat have significantly curtailed their international operations and have concentrated on winning the propaganda victory. The PLO has already demonstrated its ability to act violently in behalf of its cause. Now that it has achieved international

recognition it hopes to make the world forget its violent side and recognize the legitimacy of its cause. In light of this conclusion it would appear, at least on the surface, that the best means of stopping terrorism could be to grant the terrorist group the recognition and publicity it desires. However, this could only lead to a worldwide increase of terrorism as obscure radical groups resorted to the use of terrorism to gain recognition of their cause.

6) CERTAIN NATIONS UTILIZE AND SUPPORT TERRORIST GROUPS TO FORWARD THEIR OWN AIMS. Countries such as Libya and the U.S.S.R. support various terrorist groups as a means of forwarding their own interests. Libya supports the most radical elements of the PLO in order to strike against Israel and the so-called "reactionary" Arab states. The U.S.S.R. supports and trains terrorist groups in order to destabilize certain governments and spread Marxist ideology, which comprises a large percentage of the training given to terrorists. The most effective terrorists are those that are closely connected to and supported by sovereign governments. The successes of the PLO would have been greatly diminished without the support of the Arab governments. If terrorism is to be successfully countered punitive measures must be enacted against nations that support terrorist groups.

7) ANTI-TERROR MEASURES CAN BE TACTICAL SUCCESSES BUT STRATEGIC FAILURES. As illustrated by the example of

Israel, defeating terrorist actions tactically and militarily is not enough. In order to successfully counter terrorism the target group must also be defeated symbolically and diplomatically. The government must put as much emphasis into winning the propaganda war as it does the military victory. Radical groups resort to terrorism because they are too weak to defeat the government militarily. Therefore, they aim at winning a symbolic victory. In the case of the PLO, it attempts to incite the Israelis into taking actions which will alienate the rest of the world. The reprisal raids by the Israelis into southern Lebanon are used by the PLO as a propaganda weapon. The PLO maximizes and encourages media coverage of these reprisals. A retaliatory strike against PLO bases in Lebanon is made to appear as a deliberate attack upon innocent civilians. Hence, the Israelis may harm the PLO militarily and win a tactical victory by the reprisal, but they lose strategically by giving the PLO a propaganda victory.

Other terrorist groups have emphasized the symbolic victory as a means of humiliating the government. The kidnapping of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades was a propaganda victory for the group. For weeks the Italian police and government were made to appear inept and helpless. The current hostage seizure of U.S. Embassy personnel in Iran has made both the U.S. government and the elected Iranian government of President Bani Sadr appear helpless. In cases such as these military might is virtually

useless. Propaganda and symbolism must be countered with even stronger propaganda and symbolism by the government.

8) PALESTINIAN TERRORISM HAS HARMED CERTAIN ARAB NATIONS

MORE THAN ISRAEL. This conclusion requires little explanation in light of Chapter 7. Without a doubt the amount of strife and casualties resulting directly or indirectly from Palestinian terrorism has been greater in the Arab nations than Israel.

9) TERRORIST TACTICS ARE ADAPTABLE AND FLEXIBLE AND ARE

CONSTANTLY CHANGING IN ORDER TO CIRCUMVENT ANTI-TERROR MEASURES. For example, in the late 1960's and early 1970's airliners were soft targets resulting in a proliferation of airliner hijackings. When some air terminals and air carriers began to take preventive measures the terrorists shifted their operations to the air terminals and carriers with nonexistent or lax security. Hijackings from U.S. terminals and aboard such carriers as El Al dropped appreciably due to increased security measures. On the otherhand, hijackings from certain European countries with lax air terminal security increased. Eventually the security at most major air terminals and aboard the major carriers was tightened. As a result terrorists began to seize hostages in buses, trains, and buildings and demanded aircraft as part of the concessions. Furthermore, just as police study terrorist tactics, the terrorists also study police tactics. Terrorists study carefully both police/military successes

and failures, which are generally covered in detail by the media, and learn from their mistakes.

The adaptability of terrorist groups, such as the PLO, is greatly facilitated by their loose structure and favorable cost/benefit ratio of personnel. The informal structure of many terrorist groups is conducive to flexibility of operation. Also, the international connections between various terrorist groups make it easy to shift to other areas of operation from which attacks may be launched, planned, or conducted. Furthermore, the small number of personnel involved in most terrorist operations allows for experimentation in new tactics. Because of this low investment of personnel a failure of some operations is not a significant loss and will not have a crippling effect upon the group.

10) THE CONTRASTING VIEWS OF MANY NATIONS REGARDING WHETHER CERTAIN ACTS OF REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE CONSTITUTE TERRORISM OR A WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION REFLECTS THE DIVERSE DIFFERENCE IN THINKING BETWEEN THE FIRST WORLD AND THE THIRD WORLD. In the United Nations resolutions designed by the Western industrial nations to combat terrorism have met with opposition from the third world. For example, in December 1972 the U.S. voted against a UN General Assembly resolution calling for a study of the underlying causes of international terrorism. In the opinion of the U.S. government the resolution contained nothing of substance

that would aid in curbing terrorism. Furthermore, the resolution failed to condemn both acts of international terrorism and those who resort to terrorism. In fact, in parts of the resolution terrorism appears to be condoned. The resolution stated that it, "reaffirms the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all people under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination and upholds the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the struggle of national liberation movements."⁵ No doubt the Third World members of the General Assembly included the PLO in the category of "national liberation movements." This underscores the fundamental difference between the First World and the Third World regarding political violence. To the Western nations terrorism is acts of violence, often directed against civilians, designed to win political concessions. To the West these acts are senseless violence; however, to many Third World nations they are justifiable acts of national liberation. To the Third World terrorism is the result of repressive acts of violence by illegitimate governments which continue to repress the legitimate political aspirations of the people of that country or region.

Most experts agree that terrorism cannot be stopped until there is international cooperation among all nations toward the prevention of terrorism. Since there exists a basic disagreement as to what constitutes terrorism, it is

highly unlikely that international cooperation will materialize.

11) IN THE 1980'S THE WORLD WILL POSSIBLY WITNESS AN ESCALATION OF BOTH ACTS OF POLITICAL TERRORISM AND THE NUMBER OF GROUPS THAT PRACTICE TERRORISM. It has been stated by some that terrorism is the weapon of the weak and oppressed. To a certain extent this is correct. Terrorism is a weapon that is utilized by groups that are too weak or lack sufficient support to make a political impact or influence political events by conventional means. Furthermore, it is a weapon utilized by groups that consider themselves oppressed, exploited, and politically or economically deprived. In some cases this may be true; in other cases it may not be true. Regardless of the legitimacy of their cause, the groups' belief in and dedication to their cause will necessitate some type of action. Increasingly this action will turn out to be political terrorism. The overall success of terrorism is debatable. However, the ability of terrorism to gain recognition and notoriety for a group is a proven fact. Therefore, as new radical groups are formed terrorism will for some groups become the primary vehicle for gaining recognition. If the PLO should succeed in its goal of replacing Israel with a PLO-controlled Palestinian state its success will be a source of inspiration for other groups who will emulate the same methods. If this happens then perhaps Mao was right, "Political power comes out of the barrel of a gun."⁶

NOTES

¹Major General (Res.) Aharon Yariv, "A Strategy of Containment - An Israeli Counter-terrorist Strategy," Center for Strategic Studies Bulletin, no. 2 (Tel Aviv: Center for Strategic Studies, Spring 1979), p. 1.

²Central Intelligence Agency, International Terrorism in 1978 (National Foreign Assessment Center, RP 79-10149, March 1979), p. ii, figure one.

³Yariv, "Strategy," p. 1.

⁴Lester A. Sobel, Political Terrorism (New York: New York Times Facts on File Inc., 1975), p. 75.

⁵UN Document A/RES/3034 (XXVII) adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 18, 1973.

⁶Mao Tse Tung, Basic Tactics of Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger Publishers Inc., 1966), p. 6.

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APPENDIX I

CONNECTION BETWEEN PLO AND OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS - OPERATIONAL PLANE

EUROPE

German Terrorist Organizations

Planting of explosive charges in West Berlin at El Al office, America House, US officers club, 12.12.69.
Perpetrator: Baader-Meinhoff

Attempted missile attack on El Al plane, Nairobi, January 1976.
Responsible: Habash's Front & Baader-Meinhoff.

Air France Lod-Rome flight hijacked to Uganda (Entebbe), 28.6.76.
Perpetrators: Habash's Front and the Revolutionary Cells (Wilfrid Bazeh and "Halimeh").

Hijacking of Lufthansa plane to Mogadishu, 13.10.77.
Perpetrator: Habash's Front, for Baader-Meinhoff, to reinforce demands of kidnappers of Hans Martin Schleier.

Explosives planted at AGREXCO offices in Frankfurt, 20.6.76.
Perpetrator: Revolutionary Cells for Habash's Front.

Dutch Red Aid and Belgian Radicals

Several members of the Dutch Red Aid train at a Popular Front (Habash) camp in South Yemen precursory to perpetrating series of attacks in Europe - August 1976.

Plan to hijack Air France flight 192 to Lod frustrated by detention of Dutch nationals Ludvina Janssen at Lod and Marius Neuenborg at Bombay, 24.9.76.
Responsible: Dutch Aid, for Habash's Popular Front.

Detonation of gas works in Holland, 5.2.72.
Perpetrators: Fatah/Black September with participation of Belgian teacher Stefan van den Bermatt.

Palestine-Swiss Committee and Scandinavian Radicals

Swiss national Bruno Brighè - sent by Habash's Popular Front to carry out attacks in Israel - detained at Haifa Port, 23.6.70.

Exposure of terrorist network in Egypt in which Palestinians, Swiss and Red Brigades members worked together for Abu Nid'al. Announced by Egyptian attorney-general, 26.4.78.

Detention of Swiss national Nani Albiniko at Beirut airport, who was carrying dynamite, apparently to carry out actions against Israeli targets. May 1978.

Norwegian student Louis Gola detained at Beirut airport en route to Frankfurt and Israel to carry out sabotage acts for Hawatmeh's Democratic Front, 6.5.77.

Three terrorists, one of them Swedish, detained in Copenhagen, 22.5.69, while planning attempt on life of Ben-Gurion during visit he was to make to Latin America.
Responsible: Habash's Front.

Irish Republican Army and British Radicals

Arms ship sent by Fatah to IRA from Cyprus detained at Antwerp, December 1972.

August '76: IRA member revealed to be training in camp of Habash's Front in South Yemen, together with Dutch Red Aid people.

"Irish Times" of 14.6.78 reports that PLO is training IRA terrorists in southern Lebanon and that UN officers in the area know of this.

British Trotskyite group, the Workers Revolutionary Party, among whose members is the actress Vanessa Redgrave, maintains ties with the Fatah, April 1978.

APPENDIX I (cont.)

EUROPE

Red Brigades

Computer of German secret service arrives at conclusion that Aldo Moro's kidnappers almost certainly connected with Palestinians: according to several Italian papers, 30.3.78.

Exposure of terrorist network in Egypt in which Palestinians, Swiss and Red Brigades members work together for Abu Nid'al: according to Egyptian attorney-general, 26.4.78.

Japanese Red Army

Lod Airport massacre by 3 members of Japanese Red Army, for Habash's Front, 31.5.72.

Hijacking of Japanese Air Lines jumbo jet en route Paris-Tokyo, 20.7.73. Perpetrator: Habash's Front, Japanese Red Army and two South Americans.

Sabotage of "Shell" oil containers at Singapore, takeover of ship in the harbor, 31.1.74. Perpetrators: Habash's Front and Red Army (two Palestinians, 2 Japanese).

Takeover of Japanese Embassy in Kuwait in order to liberate terrorists of Singapore raid, 6.2.74. Perpetrators: Habash's Front, Japanese Red Army.

Takeover of French Embassy in The Hague, 13.7.74. Perpetrators: Japanese Red Army with aid of Carlos network.

ASIA

Turkish Organizations

Murder of Israeli consul-general in Istanbul, 28.5.71. Perpetrator: Turkish Liberation Army.

Turkish authorities announce on 24.5.72 that they have seized 14 Turkish terrorists in a boat near the Syrian border; were en route to Turkey after undergoing training in Syria.

IDF detains Turkish terrorist Faik Hassan Bullit in operation at "Nehar al Berad" in Lebanon. He trained at Fatah camp there. 21.2.73.

French security forces detain 13 terrorists in Paris suburb, among them several from Turkish Liberation Army. Had planned, with aid of Habash's Front, to attack Israel Embassy in Paris. 19.12.73.

Turkish News Agency "Haber" reports on 30.5.73 that about 18 Turks killed in fighting that month in Lebanon.

Iranian Organizations

Algerian paper "Al-Sha'ab" reports on 22.10.71 that Iranian Revolutionary Movement has set up Palestinian group of 45 fighters who fought alongside Palestinians, returned to Iran.

Iranian terrorist named Mouzfar, bearing forged British passport, hurls grenade in Tel Aviv's "Chen" cinema, 11.10.75. Was sent by Habash's Front.

Official statement in Iran (according to "Al Anwar," 22.5.76) says Iranian rebels getting arms and money from Libya and from Habash's Front, and that link between them proved in confiscated documents.

Attempt to attack Jewish Agency offices in Teheran. Carried out by Iranian underground for Palestinian organization.

Islamic Liberation Movement, organizing current resistance to Shah, opens information centre in Beirut, May 1978.

APPENDIX I (cont.)

AMERICA

South American Organizations

Grenade thrown into yard of residence of Israeli honorary consul in Guatemala, 3.7.70.

Perpetrator: Guatemalan organization connected with PLO.

Abortive attempt to hijack El Al Lod-London flight, 6.9.70. (Leila Khaled wounded in fight in plane.) Perpetrators: Habash's Front and Nicaraguan underground organization. (Patrick Argualo).

Plan exposed to assassinate Israeli Ambassador to Paris by Venezuelan Carlos. 27.6.75.

Attack on OPEC building in Vienna, 21.12.75, in which OPEC Ministers seized as hostages, carried out for Habash's Front with Carlos' participation.

Air France plane hijacked to Uganda, 28.6.76. Hijackers joined in Entebbe by Antonio Degas Bouvier, bearer of Ecuadorian passport, who headed Carlos network in London.

INTERNATIONAL NETWORK

Carlos Network

Grenade thrown into Paris Drugstore by unknown terrorist of Carlos network, December 1973.

Attack on Sir Joseph Sieff in London, 30.12.73. Carried out by Carlos personally.

Two attacks on El Al planes at Orly, January 1975. Perpetrator: Carlos network for Habash's Front.

Attack on OPEC building in Vienna, 21.12.75, in which OPEC Ministers seized as hostages, carried out for Habash's Front with Carlos' participation.

Air France plane hijacked to Uganda, 28.6.76. Hijackers' commander Wilfrid Bozah connected with Carlos. Antonio Degas Bouvier, who joined up with hijackers, headed Carlos network in London.

APPENDIX II

CONNECTION BETWEEN PLO AND OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS - TARGETS

DEFENCELESS CIVILIAN TARGETS AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

<u>Mass Slaughter</u>	<u>Diplomatic Representations</u>	<u>Planes in Air/on Ground</u>
Arson at Jewish home for the aged in Germany. Seven elderly persons killed. 13.2.70.	Takeover of Israel Embassy in Bangkok by Fatah/Black September. 28.12.72.	Attack on El Al plane at Athens by gang of Habash's Front. 1 person killed, 2 wounded. 26.12.78.
Massacre at Lod Airport by Japanese Red Army trio for Habash's Front. 26 killed, 76 wounded. 31.5.72.	Takeover of Saudi Embassy in Khartoum by 8 Fatah/Black September terrorists. Three Western diplomats, including US Ambassador, killed. 1.3.73.	Explosion on Swiss Air flight from Zurich-Lod, carried out by Jibril's Front. 38 passengers, 9 crew members killed. 21.2.70.
Mass slaughter at Athens airport of TWA passengers arriving from Lod, by Arab National Youth Organization for Liberation of Palestine. 4 killed, 52 wounded. 5.8.73.	Takeover of Japanese Embassy in Kuwait, demand for release of 4 terrorists who carried out attack on oil tanks in Singapore. Perpetrators: Habash's Front and the Japanese Red Army.	Hijacking of 4 planes (Pan American, Swiss Air, BOAC, TWA) with 400 passengers. One plane blown up in Cairo, 3 at Zar Jordan. Perpetrated by Habash's Front. 6.9.70.
Mass-destruction device goes off in TWA building at New York's La Guardia airport, 14 killed, 77 wounded. 29.12.75.	Takeover of French Embassy in The Hague by 3 terrorists of Japanese Red Army who demand release of terrorist held in France. France releases him. 13.9.74.	3 attempts by Jibril's Front to get bombs on to El Al plane with aid of innocent passengers: Rome-Lod 28.7.71. London-Lod 1.9.71. Rome-Lod 16.8.72.
Grenade thrown inside TWA plane at Rome airport on 17.12.73 by Arab National Youth Organization for Liberation of Palestine. 35 persons killed.	Band of Japanese Red Army takes over American consulate and Swedish Embassy at Kuala Lumpur, demanding that Japanese Government release detained terrorists. Japanese Gov't releases 7 terrorists. 4.8.75.	Hijacking of Lufthansa plane by 5 terrorists of Habash's Front. Plane and passengers released after Lufthansa pays ransom \$5 million. 22.2.72.

BETWEEN PLO AND OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS - TARGETS OF TERRORISM:

DEFENCELESS CIVILIAN TARGETS AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

Diplomatic Representations

Seizure of Israel Embassy
Bangkok by Fatah/Black
September. 28.12.72.

Seizure of Saudi Embassy
Khartoum by 8 Fatah/
Black September terror-
ists. Three Western dip-
lomats, including US Am-
bassador, killed. 1.3.73.

Seizure of Japanese Em-
bassy in Kuwait, demand
release of 4 terror-
ists who carried out at-
tack on oil tanks in
Singapore. Perpetrators:
Habash's Front and the
Japanese Red Army.

Seizure of French Embas-
sy in The Hague by 3 ter-
rorists of Japanese Red
Army who demand release
of terrorist held in
France. France releases
him. 13.9.74.

Seizure of Japanese Red Army
over American con-
sulate and Swedish Embas-
sy at Kuala Lumpur, de-
manding that Japanese
Government release de-
tained terrorists. Japa-
nese Gov't releases 7
terrorists. 4.8.75.

Planes in Air/on Ground

Attack on El Al plane at Athens
by gang of Habash's Front. One
person killed, 2 wounded.
26.12.78.

Explosion on Swiss Air flight
from Zurich-Lod, carried out by
Jibril's Front. 38 passengers,
9 crew members killed.
21.2.70.

Hijacking of 4 planes (Pan Am-
erican, Swiss Air, BOAC, TWA)
with 400 passengers. One plane
blown up in Cairo, 3 at Zarka,
Jordan. Perpetrated by Habash's
Front. 6.9.70.

3 attempts by Jibril's Front
to get bombs on to El Al planes
with aid of innocent passengers.
Rome-Lod 28.7.71.
London-Lod 1.9.71.
Rome-Lod 16.8.72.

Hijacking of Lufthansa plane by
5 terrorists of Habash's Front.
Plane and passengers released
after Lufthansa pays ransom of
\$5 million. 22.2.72.

Explosions

Explosive charges go off in well-
known Jewish-owned London shop,
Marks and Spencer.
Perpetrator: Habash's Front.
18.8.69.

Explosive device goes off at
Jewish school in Teheran,
23.8.69.

Three bombs discovered and dis-
mantled at library in UN build-
ing in New York - had been set
prior to opening of Security
Council Mideast debate.
12.1.76.

Molotov cocktail thrown at Leb-
anese Maronite monastery in
Rome.
Perpetrator: The Assan Kanfani
Anti-Zionist Commando.
25.9.76.

Dozens of cases known of plant-
ing of bombs and throwing of
grenades at El Al, Zim, Is-
raeli tourist offices, and at
American, German and other
firms throughout world. For
example: explosion at office
of Mediterranean Club, Paris.
10.6.78.

APPENDIX II (cont.)

Economic Objectives

Detonation of fuel tanks at Port of Rotterdam by band of Fatah terrorists, 4.3.71.

Gas works in Holland detonated by Fatah/Black September, 5.2.72. With participation of Belgian teacher Stefan van den Bermatt.

Sabotage of electronics plants in Hamburg and in Hamburg oil pipeline by Fatah/Black September, February 1972.

Oil installations at Trieste attacked by Fatah/Black September, 4.8.72.

Poisoning of Israeli and Spanish oranges by unknown Palestinian organization calling itself the Front/Palestinian Command, January 1978.

Murder, Kidnapping, Taking of Hostages

Jordanian Premier Wazfi al Tal assassinated in Cairo on 28.11.71 by 4 Fatah/Black September terrorists.

Takeover of quarters of Israeli sportsmen at Munich Olympics, 5.9.72, by Fatah/Black September terrorists. As a result of action, 11 sportsmen killed.

Saika terrorists take over train carrying new immigrants on Czech-Austrian border. In return for release of hostages, Austria closes Schanau transit camp for new immigrants from USSR. 23.9.73.

Takeover of Greek boat to Port of Karachi (Pakistan), with demand for release of two terrorists who carried out slaughter at Athens airport (August 1973). Perpetrator: Arab National Youth Organization for Liberation of Palestine. 2.2.74.

Murder of 3 Western diplomats, including US Ambassador, on 1.3.73 by Fatah/Black September gang which took over Saudi Embassy in Khartoum.

Murder of US Ambassador to Lebanon during civil war there in 1976, by members of Jibril's Front.

Sending of hundreds of letter-bombs to leaders and ordinary citizens in Israel and elsewhere. Israeli agricultural attaché in London killed, September 1972.

Wave of kidnappings and murders in Italy, Germany, South America. Two best-known instances: kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro and of Hans Martin Schleier.

APPENDIX III

CONNECTION BETWEEN PLO AND OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS -

ARAB STATES AS A REFUGE FOR TERRORISTS

LIBYA	SOUTH YEMEN	ALGERIA	LEBANON
Two terrorists of Habash's Front who threw grenades at El Al offices in Brussels and The Hague on 8.9.69 apprehended; after interrogation, transferred to Libya and there released.	Hijackers of Japanese Air Lines jumbo (from Habash's Front and Japanese Red Army) on 20.7.73 compel plane to land in Libya where they blow it up. Hijackers released.	Terrorists from Habash's Front who attacked Israeli tanker "Coral Sea" in Bab el-Mandeb straits on 11.6.71 came from and returned to South Yemen.	Released hijackers of El Al plane seized by Habash's Front en route from Rome-Lod. 23.7.68.
Hijacker of plane of Jordan's Alia airline who forced it to land in Libya, 8.9.71, released in Libya. Fatah member.	Terrorists who took over train of new immigrants from USSR on Czech-Austrian border on 28.9.73 released by Austria and transferred to Libya.	Hijackers (Habash's Front) of Lufthansa plane on 22.2.72 received ransom for release of plane in South Yemen and departed that country without any delays.	Four terrorists of Habash's Front seized in Cyprus aboard ship; their aim was to get to Israel to carry out raids. Deported to Beirut, 9.1.73.
Hijackers of Lufthansa plane on 29.10.72 who demanded release of murderers of Israeli sportsmen at Munich, found haven in Libya together with their colleagues, and were released. Members of Habash's Front.	Japanese Red Army terrorists who took over US consulate and Swedish Embassy in Kuala Lumpur found haven in Libya. 4.8.75.	Four terrorists (2 Palestinians, 2 Japanese) of Habash's Front and Japanese Red Army who sabotaged "Shell" oil tanks in Singapore on 31.1.74 released following their comrades' takeover of Japanese Embassy in Kuwait and went to South Yemen.	Four Fatah terrorists who took over Egyptian Embassy in Madrid on 15.9.75 - demanding Egypt leave Geneva Conference - arrive at Algiers, and released.
Two gangs of Arab Youth Organization for Liberation of Palestine who operated at same time against Israel Embassy in Cyprus and El Al plane at Nicosia airport (9.4.73) released and go to Libya following hijacking of KLM plane in November 1973.	Terrorists of Abu al-Abas' Front for Liberation of Palestine hijack KLM plane en route from Spain-Holland (4.9.76), force it to land in Cyprus, and leave for Libya.	Six terrorists of Habash's Front who took over OPEC building in Vienna on 21.12.75 and took OPEC Ministers hostage, arrive in Algeria and are released.	
		Japanese Red Army terrorists who hijacked Japanese plane en route from Paris-Tokyo (5.10.77) forced it to land in Bangladesh, Kuwait, Damascus and, finally, Algeria, where they were released.	

APPENDIX III (cont.)

SYRIA	EGYPT	KUWAIT	IRAQ
<p>Took part in negotiations for release of TWA plane and passengers hijacked on Rome-Lod flight, 29.8.69. Two Israeli passengers released in exchange for two Syrian pilots being held prisoner in Israel.</p> <p>Three Fatah/Black September terrorists who tried to hit Schanau new immigrants camp in Austria detained, given suspended sentence, deported to Syria in March 1973.</p> <p>Two terrorists of Habash's Front who tried to attack El Al plane at Rome airport (4.4.73) detained, carrying pistols and grenades. Released that September and sent to Syria.</p> <p>Hijackers of KLM plane in Beirut, 25.11.73, force it to land at Dubai, and depart for Syria. Members of Arab National Youth Organization for Liberation of Palestine.</p>	<p>Hijackers of Olympic Air Lines plane en route from Beirut-Athens (22.7.70), members of Popular Struggle Front, arrive in Cairo, where they are released.</p> <p>Assassins of Jordanian Premier Wazfi al-Tal (28.11.71), members of Fatah/Black September, released by Egypt.</p> <p>Fatah/Black September terrorists who took over Israel Embassy at Bangkok on 28.12.72, released in Cairo.</p> <p>15 Fatah/Black September terrorists who sought to assassinate King Hussein during Rabat Summit meeting released and transferred to Cairo, 1.10.74.</p>	<p>Terrorist of Habash's Front who tried to force his way into El Al office in Athens, seized (19.7.73) Released, he leaves for Kuwait.</p> <p>5 Fatah/Black September terrorists who took over Saudi Embassy in Paris flown to Kuwait, from there left for Libya.</p>	<p>Three terrorist of Japanese Red Army who took over French Embassy at The Hague on 13.9.74 transferred to Syria and then to Iraq.</p> <p>Two terrorists of Habash's Front tried to attack El Al plane at Ori on 19.1.75, apprehended and transferred to Iraq.</p>

APPENDIX IV

CONNECTION BETWEEN PLO AND OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS -

DIVERSIFIED AID OF ARAB STATES TO TERRORISM

Country	Training camps, offices, recruitment of volunteers	Financing	Means of Warfare and Intelligence Aid	Documentation
LEBANON	All Palestinian organizations have openly operating offices, training camps. Foreign terrorists (Turks, etc.) take part in training camps.			
LIBYA	Training camps including naval training and pilot training for Palestinians and others. Recruitment offices. Set up Arab National Youth Organization for Liberation of Palestine which operates under Libyan supervision.	\$75 million annual aid to Palestinian and other terrorist organizations. Kaddafi, it will be recalled, donated £5 million to murderers of Israeli sportsmen at Munich.	Chief arms supplier to terrorist organizations in world. Supplied arms to rejection organizations in Lebanon, to IRA. "Claudia," carrying arms from Libya, seized by Britain in 1976. Libyan representations gather information for terrorist acts.	Supplies suitable passports to terrorists, e.g. passports to El Al attackers in Istanbul, August '76.
IRAQ	Training camps under auspices of Arab Liberation Front and in Iraqi army camps. In the main, training of Abu Nid'al's men and of Habash's Front.	Provides ongoing financial aid, mainly to the rejection organizations: Habash's Front, Abu Nid'al, Palestine Liberation Front.	Supplies arms and intelligence aid to organizations working under its aegis.	Supplies passports in line with need, e.g. to Abu Daoud who arrived in France in January 1977 with Iraqi passport.
ALGERIA	Training camps for the Polisario Front, Fatah, Habash's Front, Offices of most of the organizations, "Voice of Falastin" radio station.	Selective financial aid, in line with its interests.	Selective supply of arms and intelligence information.	Supplies passports. For example, Fatah member Ribhi Haloum detained in Holland (Oct. '72), bearing Algerian diplomatic passport, carrying explosives.

APPENDIX IV (cont.)

Country	Training camps, offices, recruitment of volunteers	Financing	Means of Warfare and Intelligence Aid	Documentation
SOUTH YEMEN	Training camps of Habash's Front where members of European organizations train.		Provides means of warfare and intelligence aid.	Supplies passports. Recently.. learned that it gave passports Ethiopians for sabotage purposes
SAUDI ARABIA & GULF EMIRATES		Provide financial aid. PLO rep. in Saudi Arabia said that country is PLO's chief supporter. Gave \$40 million to PLO in 1977.		
SYRIA	Training camps for Saika, Jibril's Front, Fatah; freedom of movement for Japanese Red Army.	Aids organizations under its aegis: Saika. and Jibril's Front.	Arms supplier to Fatah in Lebanon and to Saika, Jibril's organization.	Aids with passports to Saika and Jibril Front.

APPENDIX IV (cont.)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Courier Service</u>
LEBANON	
LIBYA	Libyan diplomatic service used for transfer of arms. This was method employed by murderers of sportsmen at Munich.
IRAQ	Arms and supplies transferred via Iraqi diplomatic service. In December 1976, learned that Iraq's UN office is storing arms.
ALGERIA	Algerian diplomatic service aids terrorist organizations selectively.
SOUTH YEMEN	South Yemen diplomatic service at disposal mainly of Habash's Front.
SAUDI ARABIA & GULF EMIRATES	
SYRIA	Syrian diplomatic service at disposal of Saika and Jibril Front.

IIC/279/August 1978.

APPENDIX V

MEMBERS OF PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ELECTED AT THE THIRTEENTH SESSION OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL

name/alias	Organizational Affiliation	Position on the Executive Committee	Additional position
Yasser Arafat (Abu Amar)	Fatah	Chairman of Executive Committee	Chairman of the Central Committee of Fatah
Abu el Kadoumi (Abu Luft)	Fatah	Head of Political Dept.	Secretary of the Central Committee of Fatah
Abu Muhsin	Salqa	Head of Military Dept. <i>Abu Muhsin, Political Officer</i>	Secretary General of Salqa
Yasser Abd Rabbi Yasser Abd Rabbi	"Democratic Front"/ Hawatmah	Head of Dept. for Information and Culture	Member of the Palestine Bureau of the "Dem. Front"
Abd el Rahim Ahmed	Arab Liberation Front	Head of the Dept. of Popular Organization	Secretary General, Arab Liberation Front
Abd al Hafi	"Popular Front"/ General Command. (The Jibril Front)	Head of the Dept. of Education and Higher Education.	Aid and advisor for Jibril political affairs.

SOURCE: Israeli Defense Force Spokesmans Office.

**EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ELECTED AT THE THIRTEENTH SESSION
PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL**

Position on the Executive Committee	Additional position	Former positions
Chairman of Executive Committee	Chairman of the Central Committee of Fatah	Chairman Palestinian Student union in Egypt in the '50's; was a past member of the Muslim Brotherhood; Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee since 1969.
Political Dept.	Secretary of the Central Committee of Fatah	Member of the Executive Committee since Feb. 1969 (with the exclusion of Jan.-April '73). Chairman of the political dept. of the Executive Committee since April '73.
Military Dept. <i>M. Jibril's Office</i>	Secretary General of Salqa	Member of Exec. Com. as head of Military Dept. since April '71.
Dept. for Information Culture	Member of the Palestine Bureau of the "Dem. Front"	A founder of the Habash Front, later broke away; was a founder of the "Dem. Front". Member of the Exec. Com. since Jan. '73. Chairman of Information Dept. during 12th. sessi 224
of the Dept. of Organization	Secretary General, Arab Liberation Front	A new member of the Exec. Com.
of the Dept. of Education Higher Education.	Aid and advisor for Jibril's political affairs.	Member of the Exec. Com. since July '74. One of the founders "Palestine Liberation Front" in the 1960's.

Defense Force Spokesmans Office.

Name	Organizational Affiliation	Position on the Executive Committee	Addit
Dr. Walid Kamhawi	Palestine National Front	Apparently will continue as head of the Financial Dept. (Chairman of the Palestinian National Fund).	
Abd el Jawad Saleh (Abu Jaleh, Abu Halli)	Palestine National Front	Member of the Committee for Occupied Territories Affairs of the Exec. Com.; apparently will continue as Dep. Chairman of Dept. of Occupied Territories Affairs.	
And el Muhsin Abu Mayzu	Palestine National Front	Head of Dept. of National and International Affairs - PLO Exec. Com. Spokesman, member of the Dept. of Occupied Territories.	
Dr. Alfred Tubasi	Independent/ Communist.	Member of the PLO Committee on the Occupied Territories.	
Hajdi Abu Ramadan	Independent/ Pro-Egypt.	Head of Social Affairs; Head of Central Bureau for student affairs in Egypt.	Member National 1968
Habib Kuhwagi	Independent/ (Basically Al-Fatah-pro Syrian)	Member of the PLO Committee on the Occupied Territories.	Director found in Syria the and

Position on the Executive Committee	Additional Position	Former Positions
Apparently will continue as head of the Financial Dept. (Chairman of the Palestinian National Fund).		Former member of el Kumyoun el-Arab. Member of Exec. Com. in 1964-65. Re-elected in July '74 and was head of the Financial Dept.
Member of the Committee for Occupied Territories Affairs of the Exec. Com.; apparently will continue as Dep. Chairman of Dept. of Occupied Territories Affairs.		Major of El Bireh between 1963-74. Elected to Exec. Com. in July '74 as Dep. Chairman of Dept. of Occupied Territories Affairs.
Head of Dept. of National and International Affairs - PLO Exec. Com. Spokesman, member of the Dept. of Occupied Territories.		Past member of Jerusalem City Council and Supreme Muslim Council. Member of the Exec. Com. since July '74 where he served as Chairman of the Dept. of National and Refugee Affairs.
Member of the PLO Committee on the Occupied Territories.		Member of Ramallah City Council between '62-'74. New member of the Exec. Com.
Head of Social Affairs; Head of Central Bureau for student affairs in Egypt.	Member of Palestinian National Council since 1968.	Member of PLO Exec. Com. between 1967-68.
Member of the PLO Committee on the Occupied Territories.	Director of "El Ardh" foundation for research in Syria as a member of the Palestinian writers and Journalists Assoc.	Founder of "El Ardh"; a Syrian Syrian Intelligence Agent; a new member of the Exec. Com.

Name	Organization Affiliation	Position on the Executive Committee	Additional
Dr. Ahmed Sidki Dajani	Independent	Chairman of the Council for Education and Culture.	Chairman of to the PLO Arab talks.
Muhammed Zuhdi Nashashibi	Independent/ Pro-Syrian	Administrative Secretary.	
Hamid Abu Sita	Independent/ (with leanings towards Fatah)	Chairman of the Dept. on the Occupied Territories.	

Position on the Executive Committee	Additional Position	Former Positions.
Chairman of the Council for Education and Culture.	Chairman of the PLO delegation to the Bilateral European-Arab talks.	Former member of the Jordanian Parliament. Member of Exec. Com. between July '66-Dec. '67.
Administrative Secretary.		Former member of the Ba'th party Leadership member of the Exec. Com. since 1973. Administrative Secretary to former Exec. Com.
Chairman of the Dept. on the Occupied Territories.		Member of the Exec. Com. since 1964 (except for a short period 65-66) - held the same position in the former Exec. Com.

APPENDIX VI**PALESTINIAN TERRORIST
ATTACKS ON FOREIGN SOIL**

Date	Place	Description	Organization	The Perpetrators' Fate
1968				
23.7.68.	Algeria	Three terrorists took over an El Al plane en route from Rome to Lod and forced it to land in Algeria.	Habash "Front"	Hijackers imprisoned by the Algerian gov't. until released as part of an exchange.
26.12.68	Athens	Two terrorists attacked an El Al plane with small arms and hand grenades. One Israeli passenger was killed and two stewardesses injured.	Habash "Front"	Terrorists detained by Athens police until freed in the wake of the hijacking of an Olympic plane.
1969				
18.2.69.	Zurich	A squad of four terrorists attacked an El Al plane with small arms and handgrenades. The co-pilot (an Israeli citizen) was killed and five passengers injured.	Habash "Front"	One of the terrorists was killed. Three others were arrested by Swiss authorities and released in Sept. 1970 in the wake of the hijacking of a Swissair plane to Jordan.
22.5.69.	Copenhagen	Three terrorists accused of plotting to assassinate David Ben Gurion were arrested.	Habash's "Front"	The three were released after their guilt was not proven.
29.9.69.	Rome-Damascus	TWA plane en route from Rome to Lod was hijacked by two terrorists and forced to land in Damascus. Two Israeli passengers freed in return for the release of two Syrian pilots held in Israel.	Habash "Front"	
18.8.69.	Copenhagen	An explosive charge placed in the Israel tourist office was dismantled.	Habash "Front"	
18.8.69.	London	Explosions in the "Marks and Spencer" commercial establishment.	Habash "Front"	
23.8.69.	Izmir (Turkey)	An explosive charge went off in the hands of a terrorist who intended to sabotage the Israel commercial pavilion.	Hawatmah "Front"	One terrorist was killed, the second wounded and arrested.
23.8.69.	Teheran	Explosion in a Jewish school causing light damage.		
25.8.69.	London	A hand grenade was thrown into the "Zim" office, wounding a female employee and damaging property.	Habash "Front"	The terrorists succeeded in escaping.

SOURCE: IDF SPOKESMANS OFFICE.

Date	Place	Description	Organization	The perpetrators' fate
8.9.69.	Brussels	A terrorist threw a hand grenade at the Israeli Embassy.	Habash "Front"	The terrorist was arrested and after his investigation was handed over to Libya.
8.9.69.	Bonn	Two terrorists threw a hand grenade into the Israeli Embassy.	Habash "Front"	The two terrorists succeeded in escaping.
9.11.69.	West Berlin	Time-Bomb discovered in a Jewish Community Center.	Habash "Front"	
27.11.69.	Athens	Two terrorists threw a hand grenade into the El-Al office - wounding 14 people -- among them ten local citizens and four Israelis.	"Popular Struggle Front"	The two terrorists were arrested by Athens police, but were released as a consequence of the hijacking of an Olympic Airways plane to Jordan, 22 July, '70.
12.12.69.	West Berlin	An explosive charge was discovered near the El-Al office. It was dismantled. Near "America House" a second charge was neutralized. A third charge exploded in an American Officer's Club.	Bader Meinhof Group (Associated with the Habash "Front").	
21.12.69.	Athens	Three terrorists who planned to hijack a TWA plane (arriving from Tel-Aviv) were arrested by the local police.	Habash "Front"	Terrorists released following hijacking of Olympic Airways plane on 22.7.70.
10.2.70.	Munich	Three terrorists shot and threw grenades at the passengers of an El-Al plane. One Israeli passenger killed and eight others (five Israelis, three British) injured.	Executive Committee for the Liberation of Palestine.	One terrorist was injured. All three were arrested but released following the hijacking of a plane to Jordan in Sept. 1970.
9.9.70.	West-Germany	Arsen in an old age home. Seven senior citizens died and others sustained injuries.		

Date	Place	Description	Organization	The perpetrators' fate
21.2.70.	Zurich	Swissair plane enroute from Zurich to Lod exploded in mid-air killing all 38 passengers and nine crewmembers. (from Israel 13, West Germany 10, U.S. 5, Switzerland 2, Mexico 2, Canada 2, Thailand 1, Britain 1, Belgium 1, Senegal 1. All nine crewmembers were Swiss).	Jibril "Front"	Terrorists escaped to the Middle East.
21.2.70.	Frankfurt	Explosion in cargo hold of Austrian Airlines plane. Plane damaged but landed safely.	Jibril "Front"	Terrorists escaped to the Middle East.
24.2.70.	Frankfurt	Two rigged parcels sent from Frankfurt to addresses in Israel were neutralized.	Jibril "Front"	
7.3.70.	Guatemala	Hand grenade tossed into the courtyard of Israel's honorary consul.	An unidentified Guatemalan organization supporting the Arabs.	
24.4.70.	Istanbul and Izmir	Explosion in the El-Al office in Istanbul and Pan-American offices in Izmir.	Popular Struggle Front	
4.5.70.	Asuncion (Paraguay)	Two armed Palestinians broke into the Israel Consulate's office and shot at office employees, killing an Israeli secretary and wounding a local secretary.		The perpetrators were arrested and still imprisoned.
22.7.70.	Athens and Beirut	Olympic Airways plane en route from Beirut to Athens hijacked by six terrorists and landed in Athens.	Popular Struggle Front	Hijackers and eight other terrorists released by Greek gov't. and flew to Cairo for heroes' welcome.
3.9.70.	Jordan	Three planes hijacked with 400 passengers on board. One blown up in Egypt; the other two landed in Zarka, Jordan.	Habash "Front"	

Date	Place	Description	Organization	The perpetrators' Fate
4.9.70.	London- Lod	Abortive attempt to hijack an El-Al plane. In gunfight inside the plane one terrorist was killed and a female terrorist (Lella Haled) injured. A steward (Israeli citizen) and four passengers were injured.	Habash "Front"	Injured female terrorist released by Britain in exchange for hostages subsequently hijacked in a BOAC plane.
8.9.70.	Athens	A sabotage attempt against the El-Al offices -- thwarted.		Two terrorists arrested but later released in the wake of a hijacking of a plane to Jordan, 1970.
9.9.70.	Bahrain- London	Another BOAC plane forced to land at Zarka, Jordan.		
6.10.70.	London	Rigged letters addressed to El-Al and Israel Embassy discovered.		
15.10.70.	West-Berlin	Rigged letters discovered at Israel Masada exhibition.		
<u>1971</u>				
14.3.71.	Rotterdam	Fuel tanks at the oil docks blown up by a five member terrorist squad. Approximately \$1 million damage caused.	Fatah	
26.5.71.	Rio De Janeiro	Explosion in J.N.F. office.		
28.5.71.	Turkey	The Israeli Consul General murdered.	The Turkish Liberation Army	
11.6.71.	Bab el-Mandab (S. Yemen)	The Israeli tanker Coral 10 attacked in the Bab el-Mandab straits by four terrorists causing damage to the vessel.	Habash "Front"	The terrorists escaped by boat to South Yemen coast.
20.7.71.	Rome	Sabotage of "Alia" (Jordan Airlines Co.) offices causing damage.	Fatah	
23.7.71.	Paris	A number of Molotov cocktails thrown at the Jordanian embassy.	Fatah	One of the terrorists was wounded police fire and apprehended.

Date	Place	Description	Organization	Perpetrators' Fate
24.7.71.	Egypt	Attack on Jordan Airlines plane at airport. Slight damage to plane.	El Fatah	
28.7.71.	Rome-Lod	Attempt to blow up El-Al plane en route from Rome to Lod by rigged suitcase brought aboard by a Dutch girl unaware of its nature.	Jibril "Front"	Girl released. The terrorist responsible got away.
August 1971	Algeria	Two terrorists hijack a plane to Algeria.	El Fatah	
1.2.71.	London-Lod	Attempt to blow up an El-Al plane en route from London to Lod by rigged suitcase brought aboard by Peruvian girl unaware of its nature.	Jibril "Front"	Girl released.
8.9.71.	Jordan	Hijacking of Jordanian plane of Alia Co. by Libyan hijacker.	El Fatah	Terrorist seized and released a few days later.
16.9.71.	Beirut	Abortive attempt to hijack Jordanian Alia plane flying to Beirut.	El Fatah	
28.11.71.	Cairo	Jordanian Prime Minister Waspl el-Tal murdered by four terrorists.	"Fatah" - Black September.	One terrorist wounded and arrested. All were released in Jan. '73.
15.12.71.	London	Jordan's Ambassador in London wounded by shots fired at him by two terrorists.	"Fatah" - Black September.	The perpetrators' escaped.
16.12.71.	Geneva	Explosion in the building of the Jordanian Embassy. Four people wounded and slight damage caused.	"The Jordanian National Liberation Movement"	
28.12.71.	Austria	Rigged letters of Yugoslavian and Austrian provenance. A police sapper wounded.	Jibril "Front"	
<u>1972</u>				
5.2.72.	Holland	A six man terrorist squad blew up two gas installations.	"Fatah" - Black September	The perpetrators escaped.

Date	Place	Description	Organization	The perpetrators' fate
6.2.72.	West Germany	Sabotage of a Hamburg electronics plant, causing heavy damage.	"Fatah" - Black September	
6.2.72.	Germany	Five Palestinians and a Jordanian murdered by two armed terrorists.	Black September	The perpetrators escaped.
19.2.72.	Cairo-Amman	Attempt to hijack a Jordanian plane en route from Cairo to Amman foiled.		
22.2.72.	Europe (Germany)	German Lufthansa plane hijacked by five terrorists. The plane and its passengers released after Lufthansa paid \$5 million ransom.	Habash "Front"	
22.2.72.	Hamburg (W. Germany)	Sabotage of an oil pipeline.	"Fatah" - Black September	The terrorists escaped.
11.3.72.	London	Attempt to attack King Hussein's residence, London.	Black September	
29.4.72.	Hanover, Germany	Rigged parcels sent to the Israeli pavilion at the Hanover fair.	Jibril "Front"	
9.5.72.	Lod	Sabena plane hijacked en route from Brussels to Lod under terrorist threat to blow up plane. Passengers released and terrorists trapped.	"Fatah" - Black September	Two terrorists killed, two other taken prisoner.
4.8.72	Trieste, Italy	Sabotage of oil installations by several terrorist squads operating simultaneously. Heavy damage caused.	"Fatah" - Black September	
16.8.72.	Rome-Lod	Attempt to blow up El Al plane in the air en route to Lod by bringing booby-trapped record player aboard. It exploded in luggage hold of plane.	Jibril Front	Two English girls who brought record player onto plane were released by Italian gov't. The two terrorists released on bail. Feb. '73 disappeared from Italy.

Date	Place	Description	Organization	The Perpetrators' Fate
5.9.72.	Munich	A squad of eight terrorists seized the dormitory where Israeli sportsmen were housed. In the course of the incident 11 Israeli athletes were killed.	"Fatah" - Black September	Five terrorists killed, three arrested by German authorities and released following the Lufthansa hijacking of Oct. '72.
10.9.72.	Brussels	An employee of the Israel Embassy was attacked and wounded.	"Fatah" - Black September	
18.9.72.	Amsterdam	Rigged letters sent from Amsterdam to Israel and Israeli legations throughout the world (Paris, Geneva, Montreal, Vienna, Washington, Ottawa, Brussels, Kinshasa, Buenos Aires, Phnompenh).	"Fatah" - Black September	
19.9.72.	London	The Economic Advisor of the Israel Embassy was killed when an envelope addressed to him exploded.		
20.9.72.	Buenos Aires	Synagogue sabotaged.		
4.10.72.	Malaysia	Wave of rigged letters from Malaysia to Jewish addresses in Israel and throughout the world. One such envelope, received by the "Hias" Jewish Welfare Agency. Other such letters sent to two Jews in Rhodesia and to the director of the N.Y. Chapter of the "Hadassah" organization. Rigged envelopes exploded in a N.Y. Post Office, wounding a U.S. postal employee.	"Fatah" - Black September	
13.10.72.	Paris	A bomb discovered in El-Al offices		

Date	Place	Description	Organization	The Perpetrators' Fate
23.10.72.	Holland	A PLO representative in Brussels was arrested in Holland. Rigged envelopes were discovered in his possession.	PLO	The terrorists was released shortly after.
29.10.72.	Germany	German Lufthansa plane seized by two terrorists who demanded release of the three Munich Murderers.	Habash "Front"	Found refuge in Libya and released from there.
18.10.72.	Rotterdam	A bomb was discovered in the entrance of a building housing "Bank of America" and "Zim" Co..		
30.10.72.	Malaysia/ Singapore	Rigged envelopes sent from Malaysia and Singapore to Israel.	"Fatah" - Black September	
31.10.72.	Nigeria	A rigged envelope received by the Israel Embassy.		
4.11.72.	Frankfurt	A rigged envelope received by a Jewish Zionist Youth Group.		
11.11.72.	Geneva	Five rigged envelopes received by Israeli delegation to Jewish organizations.		
11.11.72.	Britain	14 rigged envelopes received by Jewish organizations and personalities. A Jewish diamond dealer was severely wounded when one such envelope exploded.		
13.11.72.	Paris	Three armed terrorists broke into the apartment of a Syrian journalist and murdered him.	"Fatah" - Black September	The terrorists escaped.

Date	Place	Description	Organization	The perpetrators' fate
14.11.72.	Ankara (Turkey)	American Information Center sabotaged.		
21.11.72.	Toronto	Four rigged envelopes sent to Jews in that city, discovered.		
25.11.72.	Rome	Four abandoned suitcases containig weapons discovered at Rome's airport.		
7.12.72.	Singapore	Rigged envelopes sent to public institutions in Israel.	Jibril "Front"	
24.12.72.	London	A terrorist was arrested - in his possession were weapons and explosives destined to be employed against Israeli Embassies in Scandinavia.		
28.12.72.	Bangkok	Four terrorists occupy Israeli Embassy. Six Embassy employees held hostage and released by the terrorists 19 hours later.	"Black September"	The terrorists flew to Cairo and late London.
Dec. '72	Greece	A squad of terrorists uncovered in Greece, Their intent being to reach Israel by boat and to carry out terror and suicide missions there.		The terrorists returned to Lebanon.
Dec. '72	Lebanon/ Europe	An automobile carrying explosives left a Fatah base in Nahariel Bared (Lebanon) and arrived in Europe. Its cargo was to be employed in attacks against an Israeli Embassy.		

Date	Place	Description	Organization	The Perpetrators' Fate
<u>1973</u>				
1.1.73.	Kuwait/Jordan	Rigged envelopes addressed to Jordanian personalities.	"Fatah" - Black September.	
9.1.73.	Paris	Jewish Agency building was sabotaged.	"Fatah" - Black September.	
9.1.73.	Cyprus	An attempt to carry out a suicide mission in Haifa, by four terrorists was thwarted. The terrorists were taken off the ship "Maspla" in Cyprus.	Habash - Front	They were exiled to Beirut.
19.1.73.	Vienna	An attempt to attack new immigrants' transit facilities in Vienna (Schoenau Castle) was thwarted. Three terrorists were arrested.	"Black September"	Received suspended sentences and exiled to Syria, March '73.
24.1.73.	Greece-Chile Canada-Australia	Rigged envelopes sent to the Israel Consulates in Chile, and Australia and Canada. (mostly locals).	"Black September"	
26.1.73.	Madrid	An Israeli (Moshe ben Hanan) - Baruch Cohen, murdered in Madrid by a terrorist.	"Fatah" - Black September.	
26.1.73.	Italy	Three terrorists arrested by Italian authorities when crossing the Italian border with intent of attacking Soviet Jewish emigrants living in a transit hostel in Vienna.	"Fatah" - Black September.	The terrorists were later exiled.

Date	Place	Description	Organization	The Perpetrators' Fate
29.1.73.	Turkey	Rigged envelopes of Turkish provenance sent to Israel.	"Fatah" - Black September.	
31.1.73.	Rome-Ruanda	Rigged envelopes sent from Rome to the Israel Embassy in Ruanda.	"Fatah" - Black September.	
5.2.73.	Rome-Guatemala	Rigged envelopes sent from Rome to the Israel Embassy in Guatemala.	"Fatah" - Black September.	
8.2.73.	Germany-Central African Republic	Rigged envelopes sent from Germany to Israel Embassy in Bangui, capital of the Central African Republic.	"Fatah" - Black September.	
1.3.73.	Khartoum	An eight man terrorist squad occupied the Saudi Arabian Embassy. Three western diplomats murdered.	"Fatah" - Black September.	Eight terrorists still in Sudanese prison.
3.3.73.	Cyprus	The Cypriot passenger ship "Sunyon" sunk.	Habash Front	
6.3.73.	New York	An attempt to sabotage Israeli objectives in New York by means of three booby-trapped cars (one near the El Al terminal at Kennedy Airport, and two others near the the New York branches of Israel Discount Bank and Bank Leumi Le Israel) was thwarted.		
12.3.73.	Cyprus	An Israeli businessman was murdered by a Jordanian student.	"Fatah" - Black September.	The terrorist escaped.
14.3.73.	France	French security authorities arrested two terrorists who intended to attack the Israel Embassy in Paris.	"Fatah" - Black September.	

Date	Place	Description	Organization	The Perpetrators' Fate
8.6.73.	Berlin	Explosion in a weapons production plant.	"Fatah" - Black September.	
13.6.73.	Italy	Two terrorists wounded in an explosion in their car near the El Al office in Rome.	"Fatah" - Black September.	They were freed under bail, Dec. '73.
7.5.73.	Paris	An attempt by two armed terrorists to seize a room overlooking the Israel Embassy and from there to fire on the building, was thwarted.		
1.7.73.	Washington	Lt. Col. Yoseph Ayalon, Israel Air Attache, ambushed and murdered near his home.		
20.7.73.	Japan-Libya	Jumbo Jet of Japanese Aviation Co. en route from Paris for Tokyo via Amsterdam, hijacked and landed in Libya.. One of the terrorists was killed. Plane blown up on 24.7.73. in Libya.	Habash Front - "Red Army"	Terrorists captured in Libya, released later.
5.8.73.	Athens	Mass killing at Athens airport, four passengers killed (3 US citizens, 1 Austrian) and 54 wounded (22 American, 32 Greeks) most of the TWA passengers from Israel. The terrorists who were seized said they had trained in Libya and were assigned to kill travelers who had left Israel.	"Arab Nationalist Youth Organization for the Liberation of Palestine."	Terrorists released for Libya in Feb. '74.
30.8.73.	Beirut	Two terrorists arrested at Beirut Airport en route for Czechoslovakia.	Salqa	The terrorists were released 5.9.73.
5.9.73.	Rome	A terrorist missile attack on an El Al plane at Rome, was thwarted. 5 terrorists were arrested. In their possession were SA-7 missiles.	"Fatah" - Black September.	2 terrorists were released on bail, 30 Oct.. 3 were released to Libya, 1 March '74.

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ato	Place	Description	Organization	The Perpetrators' Fate
.9.73.	Paris	Five terrorists that occupied the Saudi Arabian Embassy and held 11 people hostage, were freed and flown to Kuwait.	"Fatah" - Black September.	The terrorists were later transported to Libya.
.9.73.	West Berlin	The Israeli Pavillion		
1.9.73.	Australia	A terrorist arrested in Australian.	Black September.	Terrorist freed and returned to the Middle East.
8.9.73.	Austria	Terrorists occupied a train transporting Soviet Jewish emigrants at the Marchegg border station (on the Austrian side) and held three Jews hostage. In order to obtain their release the Austrians declared that they would close the Schoenau-Castle transit facilities for immigrants.		
18.10.73.	West Berlin	4 Terrorists who brought suitcase with 4 Kg. explosives were arrested. Planndd to attack El Al plane and hotels Had Lebanese passports.	"Fatah" -Black September.	Released 10 July 1974.
25.11.73.	Beirut	Three armed terrorists boarded KLM jumbo in Beirut and gained control over it after take-off for New-Delhi and Tokyo. Plane not permitted to land at several airfields. Finally landed at Dubai. Terrorists gave themselves up and were arrested.		Released and sent to Syria.
27.11.73.	Geneva-Israel	Five rigged envelopes addressed to Israeli government offices and to an Ellat hotel, were discovered. Three additional envelopes discovered in Israel.		
29.11.73.	Holland - Israel	Six rigged envelopes sent from Holland, discovered in Israel.		

Date	Place	Description	Organization	The Perpetrators' Fate
14.12.73.	England - Israel	Nine rigged envelopes sent from England to Israel discovered.		
17.12.73.	Rome	Slaughter of passengers at Fiumicino airport. Five terrorists attacked Pan American plane, killing 31 persons and wounding 40. At same time, terrorists seized a Lufthansa plane. Flew to Kuwait and gave themselves up, one of hostages (Italian citizen) was killed.	"Arab Nationalist Youth for the Liberation of Palestine".	Terrorists handed over to Egypt and later released following hijacking of plane in Nov. '74.
19.12.73.	Paris	A joint cell of the Habash Front and Algerian and Turkish terrorist organizations was uncovered in a villa near Paris. Approximately 13 terrorists were arrested (10 of them Turkish citizens belonging to the Popular Liberation Front). They intended to kidnap the son of an Israeli diplomat and to attack the Israeli Embassy.		
25.12.73.	Britain	Four terrorists said to have conspired to carry out attacks arrested in Britain.	"Fatah" - Black September.	The terrorists were released and turned over to Syria shortly
30.12.73.	London	Harold Selig, a London Jewish personality, wounded in an assassination attempt.	Habash "Front"	The terrorist escaped.
31.12.73.	Geneva	Six booby-trapped parcels discovered in the railway station. These were neutralized.		
<u>1974</u>				
20.1.74.	London	A Libyan citizen arrested in London. It was claimed that he was to carryout an attack on the El Al offices.		He was sentenced to two years imprisonment, but exiled.
24.1.74.	London	An explosive charge hurled into the London branch of Bank Hapoalim.	Habash Front	

Date	Place	Description	Organization	The Perpetrators' Fate
31.1.74.	Singapore	Four terrorists (two Palestinians and two Japanese) sabotaged the Shell Co. fuel depot and then occupied a boat anchored on the island.	Habash Front	They were freed four days later in the wake of the occupation of the Japanese Embassy in Kuwait and flew to South Yemen.
2.2.74.	Karachi (Pakistan)	Three terrorists occupied a Greek ship and demanded the release of the two terrorists who had carried out the Athens massacre. (Aug. '73).	"Arab National Youth for the Liberation of Palestine".	The terrorists flew to Libya and were released.
6.2.74.	Kuwait	Five terrorists occupied the Japanese Embassy in Kuwait and demanded that the four terrorists who carried out the Singapore operation be permitted to leave the country.	Habash - Japanese Red Army	The terrorists who committed the act were flown in a Japanese plane from Singapore to South Yemen together with their four comrades. There they received asylum.
3.3.74.	Beirut - Amsterdam	Two terrorists gained control over British aircraft after take-off from Beirut and flew it to Amsterdam. Terrorists blew up the plane after passengers allowed to alight.		Terrorists released in Holland after hijacking of British plane in Nov. '74.
14.3.74.	Beirut	Six terrorists arrested at airport in attempt to smuggle arms into KLM plane that they planned to hijack.	"Arab Nationalist Youth Organization for the Liberation of Palestine".	Terrorists released for lack of evidence.
29.5.74.	West Berlin	Explosion near the Japanese Airline Co. causing slight damage.	Habash Front.	
25.7.74.	Paris	A Japanese citizen arrested. In his possession were forged passports.	Japanese "Red Army" Habash front	Released Sept. '74 in the wake of the attacks on the French Embassy, Hague.

Date	Place	Description	Organization	The Perpetrators' Fate	.6
3.8.74.	Paris	Three booby-trapped cars exploded in Paris slightly injuring two people. One car exploded near the Jewish Welfare Office in the center of Paris. The second one near the offices of the newspaper "L'Aurore". The third near the editorial board of the right wing newspaper "Minuit".	Habash Front		
26.8.74.	Frankfurt - Mannheim	Explosion near the Israel Tourist Office, Frankfurt. At the same time a factory in Mannheim associated with Israeli Industries was sabotaged.	Habash Front		
8.9.74.	Greece	TWA plane en route from Lod to New York via Athens exploded in midair near the Greek Coast. All 88 passengers killed.	Arab Nationalist Youth Organization for the Liberation of Palestine.		242
13.9.74.	Hague	Three terrorists occupied the French Embassy and held the Ambassador and eight employees hostage. They demanded the release of the Japanese terrorist imprisoned in France. The French government surrendered to their demands.	The Japanese "Red-Army".	The terrorists were released and taken to Iraq.	
1.10.74.	Rabat	15 terrorists who were to assassinate King Hussein arrested in Morocco.	"Fatah" - Black September	They were released and sent to Egypt.	
22.11.74.	Dubai - Tunis	Four terrorists seized British plane in transit in Dubai en route for London from Far East. Finally landed plane in Tunisia. One hostage (W. German physician) killed.	Splinter group of El Fatah in Iraq.	Terrorists gave themselves up handed over to the PLO.	
<u>1975</u>					
13.1.75.	Paris	Two terrorists shot rockets at El Al plane at Orly airport. They missed target but hit Yugoslav jet plane parked near the Israeli plane. Three persons wounded (1 Yugoslav, 2 French) citizens)	Habash Front		

Date	Place	Description	Organization	The Perpetrators' Fate
19.1.75.	Paris	Attempted attack by two terrorists on El Al aircraft at Orly airport foiled. After police fired on them, the terrorists opened small-arms fire and threw hand grenades at public in the airport. 20 persons were injured. Terrorists seized six hostages.	Muhammed Budia Commando or Habash Front	Terrorists gave themselves up to Iraqi authorities.
10.2.75.	Geneva	Explosion in building of West German Consulate.		
4.8.75.	Malaysia	Members of the Japanese "Red Army" occupied the American Consulate and Swedish legation in the Malaysian capital holding more than 50 hostages. Japan surrendered to the terrorist's demand and freed 7 terrorists imprisoned in Japan.	Japanese "Red Army"	
19.8.75.	West Berlin	Rigged envelopes sent to head of the Jewish community in Berlin. The parcel exploded in a German police car without causing damage.		
5.9.75.	Holland	Four terrorists bearing Syrian passports arrested in Amsterdam. Their aim was to take about 12 railroad passengers hostage so as to eventually cut off Dutch support of Jewish immigrants to Israel.	"Salqa"	The terrorists were sentenced to a year's imprisonment.
15.9.75.	Madrid	Four terrorists broke into the Egyptian Embassy in Spain and seized six Egyptian diplomats threatening to kill them unless the Egyptian delegation withdrew from the Geneva talks and condemned the interim accord with Israel.	"Fatah"	

Date	Place	Description	Organization:	The Perpetrators' Fate
21.12.75.	Vienna	Six terrorists occupied the OPEC building in central Vienna. At the time a convention of the oil ministers belonging to the organization was being held. The terrorists held the Oil Ministers and their aids. The following day the terrorists and their hostages (approx. 20) left for Algeria. Four were killed (two Austrians, two Libyan and one Iraqi) and a Kuwaiti citizen was wounded.		
29.12.75.	New York	A rigged parcel exploded in the TWA building at Laguardia Airport. 14 people were killed and 75 wounded.		
<u>1976</u>				
12.1.76.	New York	Three bombs were discovered near the library of the UN Headquarters. One of the bombs scheduled to go off moments before the opening of the Security Council debate on the Middle East. The bombs were dismantled.		
Jan. '76	According to reports in Nairobi	Five terrorists (amongst them a young German man and women) were captured abroad when they attempted to attack an El Al plane with missiles, with more than 100 passengers on board.	Habash Front with Hadad & Germans.	Brought to Israel and imprisoned.
8.2.76.	West Berlin	A bomb exploded at (Israel's) "Office for Israeli Economic Affairs".	Habash Front	
17.4.76.	Canada	Two terrorists arrested by Canadian police. In their possession were arms destined to be used during the Olympic Games.		

Date	Place	Description	Organization	The Perpetrators' Fate
28.6.76.	Athens-Uganda	Four terrorists seized an Air France plane. The aircraft which was en route from Lod to Rome was hijacked after having stopped at Athens. The plane landed at Libya and later at Entebbe, Uganda. 246 passengers and 12 crewmen were on board. On 30 June, 46 passengers were freed. On July 1st. an additional 100 were released. 78 Israelis, dual nationals, and the plane's crew remained. On the night of July 3-4 an IDF Commando (consisting of ground and air forces) liberated the passengers in a brilliant, daring operation. One IDF officer was killed, three Israeli citizens were killed and five others wounded, and four Israeli soldiers were wounded. Several days after the operation Mrs. Bloch, a passenger of the plane was murdered after being abducted from a Ugandan hospital by Idi Amin's agents.		
10.7.76.	Paris	An explosion occurred in the Bnei Brith office.		
20.7.76	Rome	Explosion near the Syrian airlines' offices in Rome. Printed matter stating Palestinian terrorists were responsible was found in the vicinity of the blast.		
12.8.76.	Istanbul	Attack upon an El Al plane by three terrorists. The plane was preparing to take off for a flight from Istanbul to Tel-Aviv. Two Israeli nationals were killed, one American Jew, one Japanese national were killed. 18 Israeli nationals, one Swiss and two Americans were wounded. During their interrogation the terrorists told that they received passports and were trained in Libya and that they left Libya for Rome and from there to Istanbul. A Turkish policeman was wounded.	Habash Front	Two terrorists were captured by Turkish authorities and brought to Israel. The third terrorist was killed.

Date	Place	Description	Organization	The Perpetrators' Fate
6.11.76	Istanbul	Plastic bomb explosion in the El Al building which caused slight damage.		
17.11.76	Amman	Four terrorists attacked the Intercontinental Hotel. They held the building and hostages. In a counter-attack the Jordanian army recaptured the building, liberating the hostages. A Jordanian officer and soldier were killed and one soldier wounded. In the attack two hotel workers were killed and two guests, from Holland and America, were wounded.	"Black June"	Three terrorists were killed. One seriously wounded, and recaptured.
6.5.77	Beirut	A Norwegian student was arrested at Beirut's airport when he was about to board a plane bound for Frankfurt. He was to have eventually to have planted a bomb in Israel.	"Democratic Front"	The terrorist was arrested.
28.9.77- 5.10.77	Bengla Desh	Hijackers forced a Japanese airliner in route to Turkey from Paris to land at Bengla Desh. The hijackers demanded the release of 6 imprisoned comrades and a ransom of 6 million dollars. They flew to Kuwait, Damascus, and Algeria where they surrendered themselves to authorities after their demands had been met.	Japanese Red Army	The hijackers along with their comrades were apparently transferred to Terrorist training camps in Algeria.

Date	Place	Description	Organization	The Perpetrators' Fate
4.9.76.	Nice (France)	A KLM plane from Madrid to Amsterdam via Nice was Hijacked. On the plane were 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ passengers and 7 crew members. plane later flew into Israeli skies demanding that terrorists in Israel be freed. After Israel refused to answer the terrorists demands the plane returned to Cyprus. Through the intervention of a PLO representative and representatives of the Libyan legation in Cyprus the affair was ended.	Jibril "Front" (Abu Abas)	The three terrorists were taken to the Libyan Embassy in Cyprus and from then to Libya.
24-25.9.76	Rome	- Arsen in a jointly-owned Italian Israeli irrigation concern. - Molotov cocktail in "IIIAS" Rome office. - Molotov cocktail in a Lebanese Maronite monastery. The molotov cocktail did not explode.	"Assan Kanfani" antizionist commando.	
24.9.76	Lod-Bombay	A plan to carry out attacks at Israel's Ben Gurion airport, on Israel-bound flights and within Israel proper, was foiled as a result of the arrest of a Dutch girl Ludwira Jansen, who according to her own admission had been trained in Aden. A second Dutch citizen Marius Nieuwenborg was arrested at Bombay Airport.		
4.10.76	West Berlin	Explosion in an Israeli restaurant.		

Date	Place	Description	Organization	The Perpetrators' Fate
13.10.77- 18.10.77	Majorca	A Lufthansa airliner carrying 87 passengers and crew was hijacked en route from Majorca to Frankfurt. The plane was flown via Rome to Larnaca, Cyprus and from there to Dubai, Aden, and Somalia. The hijackers who demanded a ransom and the release of imprisoned comrades in Ankara and Germany, killed the plane's captain. On the night of 17-18 the hostages were released by an operation staged by German commandos in Somalia.	Wadi Hadad in conjunction with a German Terrorist organization.	Three male terrorists killed and a female terrorist wounded.
20.11.77	Cannes (France)	An explosive charge discovered in a hall where a French-Israeli meeting was taking place.		
1.2.78	Holland	Symptoms of poisoning discovered in 5 children who had eaten Israeli oranges. Warning letters were sent to various nations by Palestinian sources.	Arab Revolution Army, Palestine command (apparently fictitious name which had been mentioned at the time of an assassination attempt on Syrian Foreign minister Khadam, Oct. '77.)	

Date	Place	Description	Organization	The Perpetrators' Fate
30.3.78	West Berlin	Time bomb planted near an El-Al office was dismantled by a demolitions expert.		
20.5.78	Orly airport, Paris	Three terrorists who apparently arrived from Tunis attacked passengers waiting at the El Al terminal. A French policeman and a civilian were killed. Two others were wounded.	"Sons of South Lebanon."	The terrorists were killed.
20.6.78	Frankfurt, West Germany.	An explosion near Agrexco's Frankfurt office caused extensive damage to the building.	Revolutionary Brothers Organization (West Germany).	
20.8.78	London	A bus carrying 20 El Al crew members was attacked by terrorists. A stewardess was killed and three crew members were wounded. Six British citizens were likewise wounded.		One terrorist was killed and another arrested in England. Three escaped.
16.10.78	West Germany	1. An explosive charge went off near an Israeli restaurant. 2. An explosive charge dismantled near the Zionist Immigration office.	The Palestinian Revolutionary connection.	
18.10.78	Berlin	2 bombs were planted near buildings belonging to Jews. One exploded causing considerable damage.		