The Joys and Sorrows of a Philosophical Life

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I want to thank the Dewey Foundation and the Pacific Division of the APA for the honor of inviting me to give this lecture. I am asked to reflect upon my life, and to give you a fragment of the story of philosophy in the same period as seen through the eyes of just one participant in that story. I think that philosophers are generally more interested in ideas than in people, and that is as it should be, so you are showing special generosity in coming here today to hear about my personal viewpoint and the events that shaped it, and I am very grateful to you.

I was one of a multitude of babies born at the leading edge of the baby boom in 1946. It was a joyous time. World War II had just ended, and hundreds of thousands of servicemen and their brides came to California to make their homes. The huge increase in population occurred with such rapidity that many people had nowhere to live and multiple families were living together. At first my parents lived in a garage behind my father’s aunt and uncle’s home in Inglewood. But by 1947 Henry J. Kaiser had turned his enormous entrepreneurial talents from shipbuilding to developing real estate, and inexpensive tract homes were put up almost overnight in the San Fernando Valley. My parents bought one in North Hollywood, an area that was quickly converted from fertile farmland to residential suburbs. Everyone was approximately the same age, and almost all the men had recently been discharged from the military. Most of the mothers stayed at home with the children, who were also about the same age. My sister, Rita, and I had playmates for our entire childhood just two doors down the street. Until I entered high school, my life was almost entirely confined to a radius of hardly more than two blocks from our house. The homes of our friends, our church, our school, a dime store and small grocery—all were within short walking
distance. We hardly ever went on a trip, and I never left California until I went to study in France when I was twenty.

There was one division that was important among the people in our neighborhood. Some were Protestant and some were Catholic. As Catholics we were in the religious minority, and I was very conscious of being separated by faith from some of my close friends. Jews from New York gradually moved onto our street, and I began to realize that we tend to define ourselves by our differences, not by our similarities, even when the similarities are far greater than the differences. I think now that we could say the same thing about any two human beings in the world, but then I was just disturbed that I could be divided from friends and neighbors by some of our most important beliefs and values. But to some degree the sense that we were different from the majority was encouraged by my parents and teachers. As children, we were told that we had higher moral standards than the children in public schools, and our liturgies and feast day processions were for me a source of personal joy.

The Catholic community grew rapidly with the population. My parents used to talk about going to Mass in a tent when our parish was founded, but by the time I started first grade, we not only had a church, but also a parish school, with sixty-five children in my first grade class, taught by a beloved nun whom I later realized could not have been out of her teens. I attended St. Jane Frances Elementary school for eight years. I absolutely loved school, but another thing I now realize is that practically the only time I was taught anything directly was in religion class. Just about everything else I taught myself. The teachers had to devote much of class time to direct instruction of the slower learners, so those of us who could figure it out on our own were allowed to do so. I really don’t think I suffered from this educational strategy at all. I absorbed the most important things from the ethos of the school, which emphasized discipline, self-control, respect for others, and the belief that every human being is sacred. Many of these lessons were intertwined with religious models whose stories were captivating to my imagination. So virtue terms were part of my early upbringing, and of course it was decades before I discovered that in secular philosophical ethics, virtue theory had been in decline for hundreds of years.

There was one dramatic event in my childhood that no doubt shaped me in ways that may be obvious to people who know me well. When I was seven years old I was diagnosed with a severe case of rheumatic fever. The doctor was extremely conservative in his treatment, probably more than necessary. I had to stay in bed without getting up for three months.
During that time I had to lie flat without moving for two hours in the morning and two hours in the afternoon. Gradually, the lying-flat time was lessened, and after a few months I was allowed to get out of bed for an hour or two at a time to play with my sister. It was nine months before I was allowed to go about a normal life although, by then, in a weakened condition. Living a life in bed, and several hours a day lying flat led me to do the only thing a person in that condition can do, which was to live a life of thought and imagination. When I recovered, I had no heart damage, and I also had lots of practice in the contemplative life.

My high school was a small Catholic girls’ school in Burbank across the street from the Walt Disney Studios. I have many happy memories of that school, but one memory is directly related to contemporary religious epistemology. At the beginning of my ninth grade religion class, the teacher announced, “Young ladies, you are now old enough to have a more mature faith. It is not enough to believe what you were taught when you were younger. You need to know the reasons for your beliefs.” By Christmas we had studied the Cosmological argument in the form of Aquinas’ Second Way and Aquinas on the divine attributes, and I took my first philosophy essay exam. The teacher was delighted with my written work and the continuous stream of objections I gave to her every argument in class, and throughout my high school years she persisted with the idea that I should go into philosophy. This puzzled me because by my senior year I had fallen in love with physics. I thought she did not know me very well.

It is interesting to compare what I was told at fourteen with Alvin Plantinga’s well-known example of the fourteen-year-old theist who believes in God without evidence. By the early eighties, Plantinga was leading a revolution in Christian philosophy that took direct aim at the epistemological assumptions almost universally shared among philosophers of the day, and which many had used to attack the intellectual respectability of theism; in particular, the assumption that we have an intellectual obligation to base each of our beliefs on propositional evidence. Plantinga counters with the following:

What about the 14-year-old theist brought up to believe in God in a community where everyone believes? This 14-year old theist, we may suppose, does not believe in God on the basis of evidence. He has never heard of the cosmological, teleological, or ontological arguments; in fact no one has ever presented him with any evidence at all. And although he has often been told about God, he does not take that testimony as evidence; he does
not reason thus: everyone around here says God loves us and cares for us; most of what everyone around here says is true; so probably that is true. Instead, he simply believes what he is taught. Is he violating an all-things-considered intellectual duty? Surely not.1

I do not deny what Plantinga says here at all, and I will be forever grateful to him and other Reformed epistemologists like Nicholas Wolterstorff and George Mavrodes for their courage and success in showing the flimsiness of the project of evidentialism that had put religious believers on the defensive. But there is a difference between Catholic and Calvinist philosophers in our approaches to the relation between faith and reason, and the extent to which we can trust our rational faculties. I was already aware of the impressive Catholic intellectual tradition before high school, but in ninth grade it was presented to me as a centuries-long communal project of investigating the origin and constitution of the world, and I got to engage in it myself. One argument or twenty arguments is not the end of it, and all of the arguments together do not add up to belief in the most important matters such as belief in God. And we could say the same thing about beliefs important to non-theists, such as belief in democracy, or belief in the fundamental equality of human beings. Does anybody really think that they can give an argument for human equality that meets the severe standards of the evidentialists? But at the same time, does anybody think we should not exercise our minds? I don’t think it is a question of duty, but of a kind of intellectual integrity. Plantinga is right that a fourteen-year-old who believes what she is taught is doing nothing wrong. But it would be better if she were taught to apply her reasoning faculties to religious subjects, using the best examples of religious minds of the past as her models. When I was studying the history of philosophy in college, the great Christian thinkers of the long medieval period were required reading for majors, but when I got to graduate school, I discovered that Ph.D. students were not expected to study anything between Aristotle and Descartes, thereby skipping the high era of Christian philosophy entirely.

So my introduction to philosophy in ninth grade was through a tradition that got virtually no attention from philosophers through most of my professional life. In losing an understanding of one of the world’s great intellectual traditions, we lost a sense of continuity with our philosophical past, and we inherited a distorted view of that period, with little understanding of how medieval scholasticism led to the birth of modern science, or how the Christian idea of human dignity led to the eventual triumph of dignity as the ground for basic human rights. In philosophy, we sometimes reinvent something that pre-modern philosophers did
especially well, such as Ockham’s treatment of the necessity of the past, or Molina’s treatment of counterfactual conditionals, just to take two examples I have used in my own work. The loss is both intellectual and cultural. I think that there are signs that that is changing, partly because of the work of a few brilliant writers on medieval figures, and probably also because the global political climate forces us to attend to the Arabic thinkers of the past, and they were part of the same philosophical culture as Western medieval philosophers.

Looking back on my experience at my high school, I think that it was an advantage that there were no boys and that we wore uniforms. I did not have to waste a lot of time fussing with clothes and makeup in the morning and trying to get the attention of the right boy in class, ignoring most of the class lecture. I was lucky to have a boyfriend, and maybe I would have felt differently if I hadn’t been able to go out so much. But at least in that era, male presence in the classroom made it less likely that female students would participate in class discussion, and female teachers favored male over female students, a tendency that annoyed my mother immensely. My mother was not educated beyond high school and she had never heard the word “feminist,” but she was a natural feminist. She gave me the message that I could do anything I wanted in life, and should have an independent income so that I would never have to be subservient to any man. My father never mentioned the part about subservience but was strongly in favor of my pursuing a career as far as I could. One of the ironies of my halfway feminist upbringing was that since everyone assumed that I would marry a man who would support the family, it did not matter how much money I made. So I could follow my heart’s desire.

In the early sixties my father, Walter Trinkaus, became co-founder and first president of the Southern California Right to Life League, one of the nation’s first pro-life organizations, and he formulated some of the earliest constitutional arguments against abortion, testifying before the state legislature and speaking all over the state and on national television at the time that California was debating the liberalization of abortion laws. My father’s work is discussed in Daniel K. Williams’ new book, *Defenders of the Unborn*, which overturns the conventional view of the pro-life movement in its beginnings. Before *Roe v. Wade*, the leaders were New Deal Democrats like my Dad, who saw abortion as a human rights issue, and only later did it become connected with conservative politics. In the late sixties, my father told us that someone he knew was surprised that he was both against the Vietnam War and against abortion. I grew up understanding how those two positions are connected.
No one from my school had ever been accepted to Stanford. To my astonishment and the great glee of my father, I was admitted, and enthusiastically threw myself into life on that gorgeous campus. I became a lifelong friend of my roommate, who is here today, and I had a great social life since there were more than two male students for every female in my class, but the academic life was just as wonderful. The course offerings were dazzling in their range and abundance, including fields of knowledge I didn’t even know existed. There were no firm divisions among the levels of courses, and with some exceptions, anybody could take any class. The first quarter of my freshman year I chose as my elective Chinese philosophy, taught by the eminent scholar David Nivison. At least half of the students in the class were graduate students, and most of the rest were philosophy majors. The truth is that I was out of my depth, but it didn’t bother me because it was so fascinating. I got a B+, and I imagine that that was a gift. Perhaps I would have absorbed more if I had taken the course a few years later, but I still think of my early introduction to Chinese philosophy as a formative philosophical experience.

I intended to major in physics, but found myself unprepared for the fast track in math. I considered anthropology and history, but it wasn’t until my junior year that I decided that philosophy was the only field that would hold my interest for the rest of my life. By that time I had discovered phenomenology when I took a course from Dagfinn Follesdal, but when I entered the Ph.D. program at Berkeley, phenomenology was soon left behind because I liked everything. I recall a remark Keith Donnellan made a long time ago. He said that when people really love some genre, they even enjoy the inferior examples of it. So movie buffs enjoy B movies. Philosophy buffs enjoy B philosophy articles. I was one of those. I am sorry to say that I gradually lost my delight in bad as well as in good philosophy, but I am happy to see that level of enthusiasm in many of my students.

During my year at Berkeley, I met and married Ken Zagzebski, who had just graduated from the Air Force Academy and was pursuing a master’s degree in civil engineering. It was the most violent year in Berkeley’s history. We joined some Vietnam war protests, but there were other rallies and marches, culminating in the student takeover of People’s Park, which brought in the National Guard. The latter devastated me. I had always trusted the basic good will of people in authority in spite of political and moral disagreements. I saw firsthand that it is possible for those entrusted with protecting the common good to treat their own citizens, even their own children, as the enemy. Black Americans had experienced that for some time, of course, but what was new in that era
was the radicalization of white, middle class university students. I find it revealing to think about the fact that the entire American professoriate of my generation has had experiences like that, with a lingering sense of betrayal by authority. Their emotional reaction is sometimes generalized to a sense of betrayal by political and economic systems they had previously trusted. I think that experiences of disillusionment, alienation, or betrayal can be found in many segments of American society up to the present, and I think it can create a cultural divide that makes it almost impossible for each side to understand the other because certain experiences create an emotional wall. I see something like that now in my right-wing neighbors in Oklahoma, who feel betrayed by the leadership of both political parties, and who are driving the political establishment to distraction.

We attended UC Berkeley only a year and a quarter because Ken finished his master’s degree and was assigned to an air base in San Bernardino. I transferred to the Ph.D. program at UCLA and commuted an hour and a half each way from Riverside, getting a ride on the inter-library loan vehicle. What was most exciting in philosophy at UCLA in the seventies was the theory of direct reference, which eventually produced a revolution in semantics and philosophy of mind. I gulped up seminars with Keith Donnellan, Tyler Burge, David Kaplan, and Saul Kripke, who visited in the later seventies. Bob and Marilyn Adams came in the early seventies, but I had already made up my mind to work in philosophy of language, and although they later became great friends, I never took a class from either one of them. My switch from philosophy of language to philosophy of religion came later.

During the entire decade I was in graduate school at UCLA, I lived a long way from campus, and I regret not being part of a tight, supportive, graduate student community like my students have. I was almost entirely on my own, but that was partly by choice because after our twin sons, Walter and Sander, were born in 1972, I spent most of my time mothering and engaging in community and church activities with other young, educated women, and I found all of that extremely rewarding. I had a teaching assistantship and taught part-time at local colleges, but I didn’t finish my Ph.D. until the end of 1979 when I was 33. I should not have taken so long to get my degree, but actually it was not much longer than the average time at UCLA in those days. To make it worse, after that I didn’t publish anything for five years because I thought that if David Kaplan, Keith Donnellan, and Rogers Albritton rarely published, how could I have the audacity to think that I could? Tyler Burge was my dissertation advisor, and of course he published papers in great profusion, so I should have known that it could be done, but I didn’t start
publishing much until other people invited me to write for their book collections. I did make one attempt at a journal article taken from my dissertation and got a “revise and resubmit” from *Journal of Philosophy*, but I didn’t understand what I was supposed to do because the reviewer reports conflicted, so I didn’t do anything and never sent the paper anywhere else. I never wrote on direct reference again until I started using it recently in the moral theory I call exemplarism.

It was a miracle that I got a job in philosophy without moving from our home in Altadena. I had no idea whether I was a good philosopher, and since Ken had a fine job in engineering, it did not seem reasonable to uproot the family unless I got one of the top jobs in the country. I applied for a few of those and didn’t get one. But Loyola Marymount advertised for a tenure-track position and I applied for it. By chance there was a last-minute opening to teach a class in the spring semester prior to the full time opening, and since the chair had just received my application and saw that I lived in L.A., he offered me the class. That led to two visiting appointments before I got a full-time position there, the first philosopher from a high analytic department to join their department of philosophers mostly trained in Catholic institutions, and suspicious of analytic philosophy in general, and philosophy of language in particular. I cannot say how much I changed them, but I know that they changed me. But the most important thing they did for me was to hire me. If they hadn’t, I doubt that I would have become a professional philosopher.

At first I read the philosophical texts my LMU colleagues mentioned because I wanted to have conversations with them. Then I read the texts because I wanted to teach them. I quickly came to agree with them about the importance of the history of philosophy, and some of that reading led directly into my first book on a topic that captivated me since high school: the apparent incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human free will. That topic is one in which contemporary writers know the ancient, medieval, and later scholastic literature on the topic, and it has led to the sophisticated responses that continue to be published today. I would like to return to that topic in a future work, but only if I can make it far simpler than my first book. *The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge* is too complicated.

While I was working on that book, I presented a paper for the first time at a meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers at Notre Dame, and the room was full. After the talk, the session chair asked me if I had noticed that I was the only woman in the room. I had not. One month later I attended the conference that made me a professional philosopher. It was on April 14, 1984, at an NEH-sponsored conference in philosophy of...
religion at the University of Nebraska, directed by Robert Audi. Marilyn Adams had recommended me as a commentator, and I gave a response to an extremely dense and meandering paper by James Ross on divine ideas and the metaphysics of modality. It was my good fortune that most of the major philosophers of religion in the country were in the room and I had everyone’s sympathy. From that day on I was a philosopher of religion, and I either wrote books or wrote for other people’s books. I have never published many journal articles. When I attended that conference, I was thirty-eight, which is about ten years older than the usual age for starting a philosophy career. Many times over the years I have asked myself if I have caught up yet.

I became an epistemologist because I found epistemology incredibly boring. When I joined the Society of Christian Philosophers in the mid-eighties, I discovered that religious epistemology dominated philosophy of religion. I didn’t usually read epistemology papers by choice, but I listened to lots of conference papers on the topics that epistemologists in that era found gripping: foundationalism versus coherentism, internalism versus externalism about justification, responses to arguments for skepticism, and the interminable attempt to avoid Gettier problems. These discussions are perfectly coherent if you look at the long history leading up to them, but as one coming at the field from the outside, I thought that problems of the nature of knowledge and justification and the right way to govern our intellectual lives could be approached from a different and more fruitful standpoint. Ernie Sosa had brought up the idea of an intellectual virtue in his important paper, “The Raft and the Pyramid,” proposing that it could be used as a way to bypass the dispute between foundationalism and coherentism. Sosa’s idea then was that an intellectual virtue is a reliable belief-forming faculty, so his view was a form of reliabilism. But it occurred to me that intellectual virtue is the key to an entirely different approach to epistemology. I found it striking that the idea of a justified belief functions in epistemic evaluation the same way the idea of a right act functions in moral evaluation. So the main rivals in epistemology were analogues of the main rivals in moral theory before the renaissance in virtue ethics. Reliabilism with its focus on consequences was modeled on consequentialism, and deontological epistemology with its emphasis on epistemic duty was modeled on deontological ethics. Since I thought that virtue ethics was the most promising type of moral theory, I decided to write a book in which a theory of virtue was developed sufficiently to encompass intellectual virtues like open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and carefulness, and to generate an account of justified belief and knowledge within a virtue framework.
My wider aim was to bring epistemology and ethics closer together, and I think we see that in what my colleague Wayne Riggs calls the “value turn” in epistemology, reflected both in the stream of work on intellectual virtues, and in work on epistemic value. In my own writing I proposed what I called “the value problem” in a 1998 paper. This is the issue of what makes knowledge more valuable than mere true belief. Traditionally, knowledge has been regarded as a state good enough to make it worthwhile to apply considerable effort to get it, and it is doubtful that it would have enjoyed so much attention from philosophers were it not for the assumption that the value of knowing some proposition \( p \) is greater than the value of merely believing truly that \( p \). But I argued that a number of well-known theories of the time had trouble explaining why that is so. In any case, there was a vast demoting of the value of knowledge from its original pinnacle of a superbly valuable state. In fact, one of the most interesting features of the treatment of knowledge in Western history is that for some of the great philosophers of the past, a special type of knowledge is the highest human good. We see that view in many philosophers, but I will mention just three of the greatest. In Plato, Socrates say in his speech in the Symposium (206a) that love is the desire for the perpetual possession of beauty, and possession is a cognitive act—the apprehension of the eternal Forms. In Aquinas, the ultimate human end is happiness, which is a state in which the will is satiated. The will wills to possess all of reality, and that can be achieved in the Beatific Vision of God. So the will is satisfied in an intellectual state (ST I-II q. 1-5). In Spinoza also, the culmination of the human endeavor is an intellectual state. The highest of his three levels of knowledge is scientia intuitiva, a state in which a person grasps each thing in the universe in the context of an infinite explanatory system (Ethics IIP40s2). Compare that with the view that knowledge is a state of believing a true proposition in a justified way or as the result of the functioning of a reliable faculty such as the faculties of perception or memory.

Spinoza’s scientia intuitiva is a form of another epistemic good that was neglected for many hundreds of years—the state of understanding. In my early work I gave a plea for the recovery of understanding as a topic for epistemological investigation. My idea was that epistemic values always function as the backdrop of debates in epistemology. In eras of philosophical history dominated by the value of certainty, the threat of skepticism is a central focus of attention. In contrast, the more optimistic eras of epistemological history have been dominated by the value of understanding, and skepticism was not perceived as a serious threat. We have not fully recovered from the age of suspicion and the perennial desire to refute skepticism, but the emergence of reliabilism as a major player on the epistemological stage was a sign
of an incipient optimism about the human epistemic condition, and that optimism continues to grow with virtue epistemology. Recently, understanding and wisdom have been getting considerable attention from psychologists and theologians, as well as from philosophers, and I know of some fascinating interdisciplinary projects on both topics.

Virtues of the Mind ventured into the link between ethics and epistemology, arguing that neither field was paying attention to intellectual virtue. When I wrote Epistemic Authority a few years ago, I ventured into the link between epistemology and political philosophy, arguing that neither field was paying attention to epistemic authority. Moral and political philosophers focused on authority over actions, presumably assuming that authority in the domain of belief is the business of the epistemologists. But epistemologists were not discussing authority either. If they occasionally mentioned an “epistemic authority,” they meant an expert. Hardly anyone except Ben McMyler suggested that someone could have the normative power intrinsic to authority in the domain of belief. My purpose in that book is to show that even if we use a modern methodology focused on the self, we get the conclusion that we ought to take certain persons and communities as epistemic authorities. This traditional conclusion does not violate our autonomy and, in fact, is a rational requirement of self-governance. People who accept traditional religious authorities such as the Catholic Church can be following a dictate of autonomy.

I think that my discovery is interesting because contemporary defenders of autonomy and traditional defenders of religious authority generally assume that they have so little in common as to make it hopeless to attempt a dialogue on the defensibility of any kind of authority. They agree about nothing except that modernity has hopelessly divided them. I think they are mistaken. Under the assumption of the modern value of autonomy, traditional forms of authority can be defended. If adherents of autonomy have objections to religious or moral authority, it cannot be on the grounds that such authority conflicts with autonomy.

Epistemology became a core area of philosophy because of Descartes, and clearly, Descartes created a methodology of philosophy that starts with epistemology. I have devoted most of my work in epistemology to arguing that the real importance of the field lies elsewhere, in its study of critical components of a good human life. Epistemology connects with moral philosophy because we cannot separate the conditions for believing well from the conditions for living well, and I have already mentioned that some of the most important philosophers of the past thought that our ultimate good is a state of intellect. Epistemology
connects with political philosophy because rules for proper governance and acceptance of authority extend to the domain of belief. Epistemology connects with metaphysics because the nature of the objects of knowledge affects the way we go about getting knowledge of those objects. As Aristotle says, although knowledge of eternal things is excellent beyond compare, it is more difficult to achieve than sense knowledge, and we cannot expect to achieve it in the same way as knowledge of the physical world (Parts of Animals 644b21-645a5). The difference between knowing the divine and knowing the ordinary world is an important issue in religious epistemology, and I am happy to see that it has been getting greater attention in recent decades.

After I wrote Virtues of the Mind, I turned to virtue ethics in a new style, focusing directly on persons. I first devised a Christian form of the theory that I called Divine Motivation Theory in a book published in 2004. The idea is to define basic moral concepts like good person, right act, good motive, and good end by direct reference to persons who attract us because of their exemplary goodness. The theory makes God the ultimate foundation of morality. I said at the beginning of that book that I think there are two very different sensibilities that are expressed in moral discourse and even entire theories. One is the idea that morality attracts. The other is the idea that morality compels. The former focuses on value and virtue. The latter focuses on obligation. The former is optimistic enough to think that human beings are drawn to morality by nature and the good. The latter is pessimistic enough to think that only obligation, which is to say, force, can be the source of morality. The focus on obligation has triumphed in the modern world, and its greatest achievement is the global acceptance of a list of basic human rights, demonstrating that we can get cross-cultural agreement about minimal morality. This historic achievement has gone a long way towards getting international attention on some of the worst human abuses. But an unintended byproduct is that the focus on what we can demand from each other turns morality into a battle.

In my current book project, Exemplarist Moral Theory, I have gone back to the idea of basing an ethical theory on direct reference to exemplary persons, but I have made admiration the driving force of the theory. In recent years there has been a great deal of interest in exemplar research in psychology and in educational theory, including research on the neuroscience of exemplars. I find these studies and other studies on moral emotions and virtue some of the most interesting interdisciplinary research I have ever seen. In my new book, I am integrating some of that research along with narratives of exemplars into the body of the theory. There is a wave of academic interest in the positive sensibilities
that underlie morality, and it is very gratifying to be contributing to that movement. For too long philosophers and other scholars have focused on the negative. That skews human experience by reinforcing emotions like anger and resentment and ignoring emotions like admiration, awe, gratitude, hope, and trust. I know of numerous projects on the science of virtue, on hope and optimism, on humility, on gratitude, on awe and wonder, on the self and motivation, on happiness, a new project on moral exemplars called “moral beacons,” a new one on intellectual humility in civic life, as well as centers for the study of virtue and happiness, such as the Jubilee Center in England, and our new Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing at my campus in Oklahoma, which has partner centers in fourteen countries.12

These programs are not only producing high level published work in philosophy, psychology, and other fields, but their work is starting to get attention from the general educated public. I think that one of the most serious problems of professional philosophy is the lack of a public face. It is very hard to even make the topics of most journal articles understandable to the ordinary person, much less the content. But as philosophers explore more positive topics, the relevance of philosophical thought to issues in the public sphere has become apparent. People are becoming increasingly aware that philosophy has something creative and constructive to add to public discussions. Philosophers are not just the voice of sharp-edged criticism. We have in our collective memory the insights of great philosophical traditions, and because of the greater attention to Asian philosophy, that includes the impressive contributions of Confucianism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. I think there is a real hunger for this among people who look to philosophy to help them think through the big ideas, and we even see it in institutions like the U.S. Army, which has engaged philosophers to be involved with moral research.13 These are ways in which philosophers can make a difference to the country outside of the standard academic platforms.

Another example of public engagement by philosophers is in primary and secondary education, and in the education of physicians and engineers,14 where I know of programs in which philosophers have been involved in the design of curricula for character development in a way that can be empirically assessed, and I am personally acquainted with a charter middle school in Long Beach started by Jason Baehr, focused on the intellectual virtues. A generation ago, there was very little organized contact between professional philosophers and the institutions of American life, but that is changing. I think that philosophers are particularly well placed to revitalize the humanities by showing its potential to become much more than a cultural battleground. The humanities have
produced works of luminous beauty and ideas that are both challenging and inspirational. The challenges have sometimes been overwhelming, but my hope is that inspiration can match the challenges. Philosophy bears witness to the most important things that bring us together, not only the things that drive us apart. I think that now it is more important than ever to find ways to bring us together.

NOTES
2. I have in mind particularly the work of Marilyn Adams and Eleonore Stump, both of whom have brought the work of the great medieval thinkers into mainstream analytic philosophy.
5. The value problem has been discussed by a number of people. See, for example, John Greco’s paper, “Knowledge as Credit for True Belief,” in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, ed. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 111–34. For a recent collection of papers as well as references to earlier works, see Epistemic Value, sec. I, ed. Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
7. Ernest Sosa and John Greco both have an enormous body of work. For Greco, see, in particular, Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Sosa’s Locke lectures have been published in two volumes as A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2009) and Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2011).
8. See the work of Stephen Grimm on understanding, and his three-year interdisciplinary program, “The Varieties of Understanding,” directed at Fordham University with funding from the John Templeton Foundation at www.varietiesofunderstanding.com. See also the Chicago Wisdom Research Project (www.wisdomresearch.org), directed by Howard Nusbaum at University of Chicago. For an important book on wisdom by a philosopher, see Valerie Tiberius, The Reflective Life: Living Wisely Within our Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
10. This project was the topic of five Gifford Lectures delivered at the University of St. Andrews in October 2015, and is a book forthcoming by Oxford University Press.

11. I am familiar with the work of the HABITVS research group, which stands for “Human Archetypes: Biology, Intersubjectivity, and Transcendence in Virtue Science.” The group was initiated by Michael Spezio, Warren Brown, Kevin Reimer, James Van Slyke, and Gregory Peterson, and was based at Cal Tech. Subsequently, Dirk Schumann, Steven Quartz, and Jan Gauscher have joined the group. Their work includes neuroimaging of people while playing laboratory moral games like a rescuer paradigm as well as a series of other studies on moral exemplars.

12. The web address for the OU Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing is http://www.ou.edu/flourish/. The Jubilee Center is at http://www.jubileecentre.ac.uk/, and the Moral Beacons project is at http://www.moralbeacons.org/. For the Humility project, see http://humility.slu.edu/ The new intellectual humility and civic discourse project can be found at http://publicdiscourseproject.uconn.edu/. For the project on hope and optimism, see http://hopeoptimism.com/.

13. For the U.S. Army’s current character project initiative, see the website for the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE): http://cape.army.mil. See also the Army White Paper, “Developing the Character of Trusted Army Professionals: Forging the Way,” available on their homepage.

14. For the project on the good physician, see their website at http://pmr.uchicago.edu/projects/research/good-physician. The project on the good engineer is currently in the planning stages, entitled, “The Exemplary Engineer,” sponsored by the Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing, mentioned in note 12.