

WAR PARTY IN BLUE: PAWNEE INDIAN SCOUTS
IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY, 1864-1877

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PREFACE

This study relates the contributions of several hundred Pawnee Indians who served as scouts in the United States Army between 1864 and 1877. Under the command of Major Frank J. North, these Indians assisted the frontier army in the military pacification of the West. They led missions deep into contested territory, tracked hostile bands and guided the army to their camps, spearheaded attacks into enemy villages, carried messages and dispatches between different commands, guarded construction crews of the Union Pacific Railroad against Indian raiders, and, on more than one occasion, saved American troops from disaster in battle.

The scouts were part of Major North's Pawnee Battalion. This unit soon established a reputation as highly effective and disciplined fighting force. This dissertation studies the reasons why the Pawnees were such successful allies of the United States. It argues that the Pawnees applied their knowledge and experiences of Plains Indian warfare to their new role as scouts for the frontier army. Although some officials in the War Department argued that military service would have a "civilizing" effect on the scouts, their service, in fact, reinforced many of their traditional war-related values and customs. As scouts they continued to fight their traditional enemies, the Sioux and the Cheyennes. Military service allowed them to exact revenge on these enemies with the approval and the guns of the Great Father in Washington, and be paid for doing so as

well. Their mode of warfare, based on stealth and surprise, changed little, if at all. They also continued to count coups, take scalps, and practice their war-related ceremonies. Although they wore the uniform of the United States Cavalry with pride, they never ceased to be Pawnees. The Pawnee Battalion was, in many regards, a war party in blue.

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travel thousands of miles to do it. I hope this dissertation may explain. It is, after all, dedicated to them.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In 1867, General Christopher C. Augur defended his use of Indian Scouts against the criticism of officials in the Interior Department, who believed that military service retarded efforts to “civilize” these Indians. According to Augur, Indian scouts were not only effective military allies, but their service would prepare them for entrance into white society as well. “It opens to those people a useful career, [and] renders them tractable and obedient, educating them more effectually than can be done in any other way.” General William T. Sherman agreed. “If we can convert the wild Indians into a species of organized cavalry,” Sherman mused, “. . . it accomplishes a double purpose, in taking them out of temptation of stealing and murdering, and will accustom them to regular habits and discipline, from which they will not likely depart when discharged.”¹

¹ General Christopher Columbus Augur quoted in Robert Bruce, *The Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts: Narratives and Reminiscences of Military Service on the Old Frontier* (New York: Privately Published, 1932), 10. General William T. Sherman quoted in Robert Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), 128. General George Crook, who commanded the Pawnee Scouts during the Powder River Expedition of 1876, also believed that military service had a positive effect on Indians: “One thing is certain, [military service] is the entering wedge by which the tribal organization is broken up, making way for civilizing and Christianizing influences. As a soldier the Indian wears the uniform, draws rations and pay, and is in all respects on an equal footing with a white man. It demonstrates to his simple mind in the most positive manner that we have no prejudice against him on account of his race, and that while he behaves himself he will be treated the same as a white man. Returning to his tribe after this service he is enabled to see beyond the old superstition that has governed his people, and thinks and decides for himself.” General George Crook to General Philip H. Sheridan, October 30, 1876. The letter was published in full in the *New York Herald*, November 10, 1876.

The Indians to which Augur referred belonged to Major Frank J. North's famous "Pawnee Scout Battalion." Between 1864 and 1877, these scouts rendered invaluable military assistance to the United States Army. They joined the army in a number of operations against resisting Indian tribes. Usually these tribes were enemies of the Pawnee people as well. The Pawnee Scouts led missions deep into contested territory, tracked resisting bands and spearheaded attacks into their villages, protected construction crews of the Union Pacific Railroad against Indian raiders, carried dispatches through dangerous territory, and, on more than one occasion, saved American troops from disaster on the field of battle. Within a few years, the Pawnee Scouts and Major North's battalion established a reputation as a highly effective fighting force.

Sherman and Augur's pontifications that military service had the effect of streamlining the assimilation of the scouts into white society did not correspond with reality. Although the Pawnee Scouts took great pride in scouting for the American army, they never relinquished their Indian heritage. In fact, military service reinforced established martial values and customs of the Pawnees. As scouts they continued to fight their traditional enemies, the Sioux and the Cheyennes. Military service allowed them to exact revenge on these enemies with the approval and the guns of the Great Father in Washington, and be paid for doing so as well. Their mode of warfare, based on stealth and surprise, changed little, if at all. They continued to count coups, take scalps, and practice their war-related ceremonies. Sherman and Augur were well-aware that the success of the Pawnee Scouts depended largely on their familiarity with Indian warfare and enlisted them, first and foremost, for their skills as scouts, guides, and warriors. As a result, their commanding officers did little, if anything, to discourage the persistence of

Pawnee martial traditions. Thus, although the scouts proudly wore the army blue uniform of the United States Cavalry, they never ceased to be Pawnee warriors.

The Pawnee Scouts have been the subject of a number of scholarly works. Most of these studies, however, emphasize the role of Frank North in the extraordinary success of the Pawnee Battalion. Many scholars seem to agree that it was North's leadership that turned the scouts into a highly effective fighting force. In his classic study, The Pawnee Indians (Denver, 1951/Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974) George E. Hyde, for example, credited the successful military record of the Pawnee Battalion entirely to Frank North and his staff of white officers. In fact, Hyde criticizes the Pawnee leadership for past military failures:

The fine services rendered by the Pawnee Scouts in 1865-77 under white leadership causes one to wonder at the failures of the same Pawnees under their own chiefs. Something seems to have been wrong with [the] Pawnee leadership. Their warriors were brave and enterprising enough; but sometime in the dim past . . . the Pawnees seem to have picked up the idea that war meant horse-lifting, and as long as they were led by their own chiefs they could not break away from this theory . . . One must admit that there was something wrong with the Pawnee leaders who went through one disastrous experience after another and never learned that proper arms and a good reserve of ammunition were vital needs. Under the command of Frank North, his brother Luther North, and other white officers, these same Pawnee warriors -properly armed and led- were never defeated, and they won a number of handsome victories over their Sioux and Cheyenne enemies.²

² George E. Hyde, *The Pawnee Indians* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974), 272-273. Hyde's simplistic analysis is based on a number of false assumptions. First, he underestimates the importance of horse stealing among the Indians of the Plains. Horse raids were an economic necessity because they supplied the tribe with ponies for the buffalo hunt. Second, the Pawnees were fully capable of defending themselves as long as they had the means to do so. Unfortunately, the government was only prepared to supply them with guns and horses when they enlisted in the army. The government fell short in providing the Pawnees with the guns and ammunition to protect themselves. In fact, in order to appease the Sioux and Cheyennes, the government provided these enemies of the Pawnee tribe with a generous supply of guns and other supplies. Third, sustained warfare against their enemies was only possible during periods when the Pawnees were not hunting buffalo or attending their crops. Military service allowed the scouts to neglect

Other studies have echoed Hyde's conclusion, although in more subtle variations. Ironically, the contributions of the scouts themselves have not received the same praise as North's. This dissertation argues not only that the Pawnee Scouts remained distinctly Pawnee in their ways and on the battlefield but also that it is exactly those qualities that made them such effective allies of the United States. In fact, Frank North's role and that of his officers is not as large as previously assumed. In many regards, Frank North was merely the leader of a Pawnee war party that operated under the authorization of the American government. North may have been nominally in charge, but the tactics, style, and conduct of warfare were to a great extent distinctly Pawnee.

Any discussion of U. S. Indian Scouts, including the Pawnee Scouts, must begin with Thomas W. Dunlay's Wolves for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States Army, 1860-90 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982). Dunlay's work provides a general overview of the history of Indian Scouts during and after the Civil War. His work focuses mainly on the reasons and motivations for Indians to enlist in the army. According to Dunlay, Indian Scouts were not traitors to their own race or tribe. Indians based their decision to serve on a variety of considerations. "Some inevitably sought immediate personal gain, while others had in mind a long-term strategy for the benefit of the group that held their primary loyalty" (206). For many Indians, however, military service allowed them to make the transition from "free" to

these necessary economic activities because the army provided them with food and other supplies. Fourth, the villages of the Pawnees were an easier target of attack than the villages of the nomadic tribes which changed location frequently. Finally, most of the victims of Sioux aggression were women. Enemy war parties usually surprised these women when they were at work in the fields, and there were no warriors to defend them.

“reservation” Indians more gradual and tolerable. After living freely and unconstrained for centuries, tribes found themselves suddenly confined to reservations where missionaries and government agents sought to transform them from “savages” into “citizens.” As scouts they could put their skills to use while adapting to white culture. “For the Indian scouts it was a way of taking part of the white culture, a part more appealing to them than having the whole thing thrust upon them at once, as the civil authorities intended” (1). Particularly for “warriors confined to reservations, scouting eased the painful processes of enforced acculturation, offering both temporary release and a means of assimilation that was suited to their inclinations and ministered to their pride” (126). Dunlay’s discussion of the Pawnee Scouts is brief and emphasizes the role Frank North played in the organization and management of his battalion. Dunlay credits the success of the Pawnee Battalion primarily to the remarkable leadership qualities of their commander. Unfortunately, the contributions of the Pawnees are somewhat lost in his analysis.

Another general history of Indian Scouts is Fairfax Downey and Jacques Noel Jacobson, Jr., The Red Bluecoats: The Indian Scouts, U. S. Army (Fort Collins, CO: The Old Army Press, 1973). Older and less sophisticated than Dunlay’s work, Downey and Jacobson’s study provides only a superficial analysis. Some tribes, such as the Pawnees, were forced into a military alliance with the United States under pressure of more powerful hostile tribes. Others, however, were “spurred by their creed, [and] turned against their own race more for the love of a good fight than for pay or other rewards” (10). Obviously, the authors reduce Indians to the stereotype of indefatigable fighters. This portrayal echoes the views of some nineteenth-century military commanders such as

Philip Sheridan, who believed that Indians “[know] only one profession, that of war and every one of them belongs to it, and they can never resist the natural desire to join in a fight if it happens to be in their vicinity.”³ Occasionally, the authors also fall into the trap of portraying the Indians as “savages” when compared to white soldiers. Writing of the battle between General Patrick E. Connor’s troops with Arapahos under Chief Black Bear during the 1865 Powder River expedition, the authors state: “As too often happened in attacks on villages, some women and children were shot down, deliberately by the Pawnees in savage custom, inadvertantly in general by the soldiers who had orders to kill only males of twelve years old” (34). Downey and Jacobson also portray Indian Scouts as minions of the federal government who were, more or less, duped into service against their “own race.” As scouts they not only guided and led troops into combat, but they also maintained order on reservations and reinforced the military government. In their discussion of the Pawnee Battalion they, like Dunlay, believe that the success of the Pawnee Scouts depended largely on the leadership abilities of Frank North (32).

Much more useful than Downey and Jacobson’s study is David D. Smits’s article “‘Fighting Fire with Fire’: The Frontier Army’s Use of Indian Scouts and Allies in the Trans-Mississippi Campaigns, 1860-1890,” (*American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 22:1, 1998, 73-116). Although Smits draws many of the same conclusions as Dunlay, he contends that the success of the frontier army depended primarily on the contributions of Indian Scouts. The military command of the army, however, was divided over the use of these scouts. Opponents, for example, questioned the loyalty of the scouts. As a result, Indian Scouts were deployed only with the greatest caution. Indians enlisted

³ General Philip H. Sheridan quoted in Paul Andrew Hutton, *Phil Sheridan & His Army* (Norman:

for a great variety of reasons. One of these was, as General John M. Schofield pointed out, “that service in the army reduced the discontent so common among young Indian men on reservations” (76-77). Smits also quotes Luther North, brother of Frank North and an officer in the Pawnee Battalion, who wrote that the Pawnees never “adopted any of the white soldiers’ tactics [because] they thought their own [were] much better” (91). This statement indicates that the success of the Pawnee Scouts did not depend necessarily on the leadership qualities of Frank North, but rather on the skills and tactics of the Pawnees under his command. Unfortunately, Smits did not develop this idea.

Several works deal exclusively with the Pawnee Battalion. Most of these are based on the experiences and memoirs of Frank North and his brother, Luther. Alfred E. Sorenson interviewed Frank North in the 1880s and wrote a manuscript based on North’s experiences as commander of the Pawnee Scouts. The manuscript, titled “A Quarter of a Century on the frontier, or, The Adventures of Major Frank North, the ‘White Chief of the Pawnees.’” was never published. The original manuscript is kept in the “Frank North Collection” at the Nebraska State Historical Society in Lincoln, Nebraska. A slightly adapted version of the manuscript appeared as a serial under the heading “Life of Major Frank North” in the Platte County Times between May 9, 1896 and January 30, 1897. Although it provides a wealth of information on the Pawnee Battalion, its emphasis is on Major North himself.

The main source of information on the Pawnee Scouts was Luther North. Luther served as a captain in his brother’s command. He corresponded extensively with historians and other scholars and journalists interested in the Pawnee Scouts. Luther’s

University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 180.

accounts were published in magazines, historical journals, and historical collections. His writings emphasize the role of his brother as commander of the scouts. He believed that his brother never received the attention and recognition he deserved. It pained him that other western characters, such as William F. "Buffalo Bill" Cody, received more attention, sometimes undeserved, than his brother. Many of his writings, therefore, can be considered a personal monument to his brother, who died in 1885. Hence, the crucial figures in Luther's accounts of the Pawnee Battalion are not the Pawnees, but Frank North. Unfortunately, many of Luther's accounts contain numerous factual errors. With the passage of time, the number of errors only increased in his renditions of the history of the Pawnee Scouts.

In 1928, George Bird Grinnell published his double biography, Two Great Scouts and Their Pawnee Battalion: The Experiences of Frank J. North and Luther H. North, Pioneers in the Great West, 1856-1882, and their defence of the building of the Union Pacific Railroad (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1928/ Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973). Although Grinnell knew the North brothers personally, his account is based largely on Sorenson's manuscript and Luther North's letters and memoirs. As a result, this account suffers from the same shortcomings. It not only reproduces some of the factual errors in the Sorenson and North accounts, but it also relates the history of the scouts primarily from the perspective of the North brothers.

In Pawnee Hero Stories and Folk-Tales: With Notes on the Origin, Customs and Character of the Pawnee People (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), Grinnell related a few personal stories by warriors who served as scouts in the Pawnee Battalion.

The great achievement of this book is that it places the experience of the Pawnee Scouts within the context of the martial tradition of the tribe.

In 1932, Robert Bruce, a journalist from New York, published The Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts: Narratives and Reminiscences of Military Service on the Old Frontier (New York: Privately Published, 1932). This book is also based largely upon correspondence of Luther North. Unlike Grinnell, however, Bruce consulted numerous other sources for information on the Pawnee Scouts. Unfortunately, the information gathered in this scrap-book is presented in a disorganized way. Nevertheless, despite its awkward and chaotic organization, the book contains a wealth of information and provides occasional glimpses into the experiences of the Pawnee Scouts themselves.

In 1961, the University of Nebraska Press published Luther North's memoirs under the title Man of the Plains: Recollections of Luther North, 1856-1882. Although most of the information in this book is included in Grinnell's double-biography of the North brothers, Donald F. Danker, who edited this volume, added an abundance of additional information on the scouts. Danker also corrected many of the factual errors that appeared in Luther's account. That same year, Danker published an article entitled "The North Brothers and the Pawnee Scouts," (Nebraska History 42, September 1961, 161-180. Reissued in R. Eli Paul, ed., The Nebraska Indian Wars Reader, 1865-1877 Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998). This article provides a brief but good overview of the different military campaigns in which the Pawnee Scouts were involved. Danker also examined military records and other sources to complement the accounts by the North brothers.

Although Danker's work marked a shift towards the inclusion of the Pawnee perspective into the history of the scouts, Major Frank North continued to attract most of the attention of scholars. In 1984, Ruby E. Wilson published Frank J. North: Pawnee Scout Commander and Pioneer (Athens, OH: Swallow Press, 1984). Wilson discovered two diaries belonging to Frank North and based this biography on these sources.

Unfortunately, the diaries covered only the years 1869 and 1876. Wilson filled in the gaps between these two sources with fictional material. As a result, this biography should be used with great caution. In fact, much of this account is fiction, not history.⁴

The Pawnee perspective finally received some well-deserved attention in a dissertation by William Spencer Reeder. Reeder's "Wolf Men of the Plains: Pawnee Indian Warriors, Past & Present" (Ph. D. Dissertation, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, 2001) places the experience of the Pawnee Scouts in the context of the military tradition of the Pawnee tribe. The author describes Pawnee warfare from Precontact times to the present. The Pawnee Scouts, he argues, were an important chapter in the development in this tradition. Over the course of hundreds of years, the Pawnees had developed a highly effective warrior tradition. Warrior societies, whose ceremonial powers centered around medicine bundles, protected the tribe against enemy attacks. They also organized raiding expeditions into enemy territory to increase the wealth of the tribe. But during the nineteenth century, increasing pressures led to the decline of the warrior societies and, hence, the warrior tradition. Diseases, in particular, decimated the

⁴ North's 1869 diary was published in 1958. Donald F. Danker, ed., "The Journal of an Indian Fighter: The 1869 Diary of Major Frank J. North," *Nebraska History* 23 (June 1958), 87-177. North's diary of the Powder River Expedition under Generals Crook and Mackenzie has not yet been published. Excerpts from this diary can be found in Ruby Wilson's biography of Major North. The original is in the Frank North Collection, NSHS, Lincoln, Nebraska.

tribe, causing the warrior societies to disintegrate. As keepers of the medicine bundles passed away, the knowledge of these mysterious powers died with them. As the societies were no longer able to provide adequate protection for the people, the tribe became more vulnerable to enemy attacks. In 1873 this led to the disastrous slaughter of a group of Pawnee hunters by a large Sioux war party at a location in southwestern Nebraska, subsequently known as "Massacre Canyon." The disintegration of the warrior tradition caused the Pawnees to join the United States in a military alliance. Enlistment in the Pawnee Battalion, then, was evidence that the old warrior tradition, particularly the warrior societies, had lost their vitality. Not until the twentieth century, when many young men entered the U. S. army during the two world wars, were the Pawnees able to revive this proud tradition.

The major flaw in Reeder's analysis is that the Pawnee warrior tradition was not on the verge of collapse during the 1860s and 70s. In fact, it was very much alive. While it may be true that warrior societies experienced the pressures of disease and depopulation, this dissertation argues that the Pawnees who served as scouts under Major North were still reared within the warrior tradition of the tribe. They did not shed this experience as they entered military service. On the contrary, they continued to fight in the Pawnee fashion. They also continued to observe war-related ceremonies and customs. In fact, one might even argue that the Pawnee Battalion, in effect, had many of the characteristics of a temporary warrior society.

CHAPTER TWO

PAWNEE DIPLOMACY AND WARFARE, 1550-1864

[L]ike the sons of Ishmael, their hand is against everyone and everyone's hand is against them.

Washington Irving on the Pawnee Indians in *A Tour on the Prairies*, Chapter XIII.¹

The Pawnees always said that they were anxious to be at peace with the whites because they were at war with so many different Indian tribes they would have no place to go if they were at war with the whites.

Luther H. North, Captain, Pawnee Scouts.²

The Pawnees who enlisted as scouts in the U. S. Army between 1864 and 1877, carried the experience of three centuries of Plains Indian warfare into battle. During this three-hundred year period, they fought wars against the Apaches, Kiowas, Comanches, Osages, Otoes, Poncas, Kaws, Omahas, Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahos. Over time they developed and perfected a style of warfare that the United States sought to employ in its campaigns against its Indian opponents in the West. This chapter examines the military past of the Pawnee tribe. It traces the development of what ethnologist Marian W. Smith

¹ Washington Irving, *A Tour on the Prairies*. Edited by John Francis McDermott (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), 75-76; During his tour of the southern plains in 1832, Irving referred to all hostile Indians, including the Kiowas and Comanches, as "Pawnees." The quote, however, accurately captures the difficult position of the Pawnee tribe on the plains.

² Luther H. North quoted in Martha Royce Blaine, *Pawnee Passage: 1870-1875* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990),3.

calls the “war complex” of the Pawnees and ascertains the reasons why the tribe joined the United States in a military alliance.³

The peculiar nature of Plains Indian warfare, with its emphasis on horse stealing and guerrilla-style strategy, has led some scholars to characterize it as a “game of skill” rather than actual warfare. According to these scholars, warriors went on the warpath primarily for personal reasons. They entered battle in search of “glory, revenge, social status, and booty.” The game element was most clearly visible in the system of war honors. Touching and enemy in battle without intent to kill (counting coup) was considered a deed of greater bravery than shooting and killing an enemy from a distance. During horse raids, the purpose was to steal enemy horses with as little bloodshed as possible. A war party that returned from a raid with many horses but with one casualty was considered a failure whereas a war party that returned with few horses but without losing a man was considered a success. The objective was to keep the risks as small as possible. In this type of warfare, brief “skirmishes” were more typical than fixed battles.⁴

While important, the emphasis on the game element has obscured much of the true character of Plains Indian warfare. Intertribal conflicts were more complex and a more serious matter than the “war game” theory implies. They were often extremely brutal and bloody affairs in which not only men fell victim to murder and mutilation, but

³ Marian W. Smith, “The War Complex of the Plains Indians,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 78 (1938), 425-464.

⁴ According to Bernard Mishkin and Richard White, the main proponents of the “war game” theory are Robert Lowie and Harry Turney-High. See Bernard Mishkin, *Rank and Warfare Among the Plains Indians* (New York: J. J. Augustin, 1940), 3, and Richard White, “The Winning of the West: The Expansion of the Western Sioux in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” *Journal of American History* 65 (1978), 319. George Bird Grinnell, although a keen observer and student of Plains Indian cultures, wrote that the Cheyennes went to war “for glory, a wish to add to their possessions, or eagerness for revenge, but the chief motive was the love of fighting, which was instilled into them from early youth.” George Bird Grinnell, *The Cheyenne Indians: Their History and Ways of Life* (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1962), 7.

women and children as well. Recent archeological evidence suggests that the Plains tribes frequently engaged in wars of extermination before the arrival of European invaders. High casualty rates were quite common in precontact Plains warfare. Such intertribal wars were particularly intense during periods of unpredictable and severe food shortages. This situation did not change fundamentally with the arrival of the Europeans in North America. Although the Europeans introduced horses and fire-arms to the tribes, Indian warfare remained a serious contest over important resources rather than a game of skill. Even those warriors who organized small expeditions in search of horses and glory ultimately “gambled” with death, a fate they not infrequently found.⁵

The intertribal wars on the Plains were caused, above all, by economic factors. Plains tribes went to war because their survival as a people depended on securing and defending essential resources. Among those resources were guns, horses, and, most importantly, the buffalo. Indian peoples of the plains, such as the Pawnees, frequently went to war to defend their access to the hunting grounds. For the Pawnees, the buffalo was an important element for the survival of the tribe. They spent seven to eight months a year traveling the Plains in search of this animal. Buffalo meat was not only an important source of protein in their diet, but it was also a crucial ingredient in their elaborate ceremonial life. In order to ensure successful crops and success in warfare, the Pawnees were required to sacrifice buffalo meat to the Great Spirit.⁶ Access to this life-sustaining resource, then, was vital. When Euramerican expansion pushed more Indian tribes onto

⁵ Douglas B. Bamforth, “Indigenous People, Indigenous Violence: Precontact Warfare on the North American Great Plains,” *Man* 29 (March 1994), 95-115. Smith, “War Complex of the Plains Indians,” 432.

⁶ Most ceremonies of the Pawnees required the consecration of buffalo meat. Without it, the rituals could not be performed. When the buffalo became increasingly scarce, the Pawnees were no longer able to perform their rituals. As a result, knowledge of many of these ceremonies was lost. Not until the arrival of

the Plains, these tribes began to compete with each other for the buffalo. As the great buffalo herds began to diminish in the nineteenth century, partly as a result of over-hunting by the Indians themselves, intertribal warfare increased correspondingly.⁷

Thomas Farnham, who crossed the Plains in 1838, observed how the different tribes competed with each other for the hunting grounds on the Upper Arkansas River during the buffalo season:

The Eutaws [Utes] and Cheyennes of the mountains near Santa Fe, and the Pawnees of the great Platte, come to the Upper Arkansas to meet the buffalo in their annual migrations to the north; and on the trail of these animals follow up the Comanches. And thus in the months of June, August, and September, there are in [this area] from fifteen to twenty thousand savages ready and painting for plunder and blood.⁸

In the mixed economy of the Pawnees, horses fulfilled an important function. The horse allowed the Pawnees to travel great distances in search of the buffalo. Once a buffalo herd had been spotted, the hunters gave chase on horse-back. After the hunt, horses carried whole households on their backs and pulled the travois on which the women had packed the spoils of the hunt. Social status was often linked to horse ownership. Although the highest and most prestigious offices were reserved for the upper classes, who inherited such positions from their fathers, commoners could rise to prominence through economic success. The wealth of an individual was directly related

the Ghost Dance, were the Pawnees able to “revive” these lost ceremonies. See Alexander Lesser, “Cultural Significance of the Ghost Dance,” *American Anthropologist* 35 (1933), 110.

⁷ See Dan Flores, “Bison Ecology and Bison Diplomacy: The Southern Plains from 1800 to 1850,” *Journal of American History* (September 1991), 465-485. Richard White, “The Cultural Landscape of the Pawnees,” *Great Plains Quarterly* 2 (1982), 33-34.

⁸ Thomas J. Farnham, “Travels in the Great Western Prairies, the Anahuac and Rocky Mountains, and in the Oregon Territory,” in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., *Early Western Travels, 1748-1846* vol. 28 (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, 1906), 163-164.

to the number of horses he owned. Usually, a man required quite a number of them. A successful hunter used several mounts during the buffalo chase, exchanging worn-out horses for fresher ones. Other horses served as pack animals. Pawnee marriage customs also illustrate the socio-economic value of the horse. A Pawnee man who wished to marry usually had to provide the father of his bride-to-be with a gift of one to six horses. This meant that before a man could start a family, he had to invest all his energy in obtaining as many horses as possible.⁹

Contrary to popular thought, horses were not abundant on the Plains. Each year, numerous horses collapsed during the buffalo hunt or perished during harsh winters when the supply of feed was scarce. Although the Pawnees traded agricultural produce for horses, the most common way to restore the dwindling horse herds was to go on raiding parties. These horse raids served a dual purpose: they replenished tribal herds, and simultaneously weakened rivals who competed for the same hunting grounds. Of course, although the Pawnees were expert horse thieves, they, too, were in constant danger of being robbed of this valuable resource by enemy raiding parties. The loss of the tribal horse herd might affect the tribe's success on the buffalo hunt. Horse stealing, then, was not a "sport" but an important economic activity.

In order to defend their access to the hunting grounds, Indian tribes also depended on white traders to furnish them with guns, ammunition, and gun powder. These articles were necessary to maintain the military superiority of the tribes against their competitors.

⁹ Wealth was redistributed in the form of give-aways. Such give-aways not only strengthened tribal cohesion, but also elevated a man's status among his kinsmen. Among the greatest gifts a man could give away were horses. A man's prestige, then, was directly related to the number of horses he could give away. Not all high-ranking men were successful warriors or horse thieves, however. A man could obtain horses through services, such as doctoring a sick child or in manufacturing highly-valued objects, such as arrows

Tribes that succeeded in blocking other tribes from access to the white gun-trade clearly held a great advantage in Plains warfare. While less common than horse raids and wars over disputed hunting grounds, Indian nations fought each other for access to the white trade.

Personal prestige and the quest for social status must be viewed within this economic context of intertribal warfare. War honors not only celebrated the skill, bravery, and success of the individual warrior, but they also reflected on the martial superiority of the entire tribe over its enemies. War dances served the same purpose. They were not simply bragging contests between warriors who competed with each other for the highest honors, as nineteenth-century observers frequently suggested. Rather, they were occasions in which individual warriors related their part in the glorification of the tribe as a whole. It is not strange, therefore, that Indian tribes such as the Pawnees, staged war dances whenever foreign dignitaries and diplomatic delegations came to visit them. The purpose was to impress the visitors with the fearlessness of the warriors and the martial superiority of the tribe over its enemies.¹⁰

It appears that the Pawnees also went on the warpath to take captives. Sometimes these captives, mostly women, would be adopted into the household. Male captives were usually given to the women of the band, who would then torture their victim to death in revenge for relatives they had lost in the past. The Skidis took captives in order to sacrifice them in the Morning Star ceremony.¹¹ When American authorities began to

and other weapons. For Pawnee marriage customs see George Bird Grinnell, "Marriage Among the Pawnees," *American Anthropologist* 4 (July 1891), 275-281.

¹⁰ Smith, "War Complex of the Plains Indians," 432-434, 452.

¹¹ For a good discussion of the origins of the Morning Star ceremony see Ralph Linton, "The Origin of the Skidi Pawnee Sacrifice to the Morning Star," *American Anthropologist* 28 (July-September 1926), 457-466.

criticize the practice, the Pawnees did not immediately stop taking captives altogether. Instead, they traded them to whites who wished to save them from a cruel death. According to the *St. Louis Gazette* of June 19, 1818, trader Manuel Lisa “purchased” a 10-year old Spanish boy from the Pawnees. In 1824, James Pattie witnessed how the Skidis brought in a young captive supposedly for the purpose of burning him/her as a sacrifice to the stars. After some negotiations, the Pawnees agreed to surrender the captive to Pattie’s father in exchange for some cloth and paper of vermilion.¹²

The Pawnees may not have taken captives solely for torture or sacrificial purposes. Captives, especially children, may have served to replenish the nation after epidemics devastated the tribe.¹³ Unfortunately, the evidence in support of this thesis is rather weak. However, John Dunbar, missionary to the Pawnees from 1834 to 1844, described a Chaui Chief who went on the war path after losing some of his children to smallpox in 1838:

The small pox spread to the other villages, and multitudes of their children died in consequence. The first chief of the Grand Pawnees lost some of his children, and among the rest, the heir apparent, a bright active little fellow, whom the father loved as his own eyes. The old chief, in the height of his grief, considering himself now poor, and deeming that his family might lose its rank and the chieftainship pass out of it, headed a party and proceeded to the South. It was supposed his objective was war.”¹⁴

¹² Walter B. Douglas, *Manuel Lisa* (New York: Argosy Antiquarian LTD., 1964), 388-389; James O. Pattie, “The Personal Narrative of James O. Pattie,” in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., *Early Western Travels, 1748-1846* vol. 18 (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1905), 43-46.

¹³ Daniel K. Richter observed a similar motive in Iroquois warfare. Richter called the practice of replacing a dead person by capturing and adopting someone else, “mourning wars.” Daniel K. Richter, “War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 40 (1983), 528-559.

¹⁴ According to Dunbar, the chief returned from the south, where he had visited the Wichitas and the Comanches. Apparently he did not fight the Comanches. Unfortunately, Dunbar does not provide us with

When the first Spaniards entered the American interior, the Pawnees occupied a territory on the eastern Plains stretching from present-day Oklahoma to Nebraska. According to Spanish chroniclers, they were at war with the Apaches, who, at this time, lived on the western Plains. Access to the Spanish horse-trade tipped the balance of power in favor of the Apaches during the seventeenth century. Pawnee foot soldiers proved no match for the mounted forces of the Apaches, who ventured deep into Pawnee territory in search of captives who they then traded to the Spaniards in exchange for horses and metal weapons. The Apache raiders were so successful that the term “pani” came to mean “slave” among the Plains tribes.¹⁵ The constant pressure from these western horsemen pushed the Skidi Pawnees northeast. These Pawnees moved deeper into present-day Nebraska, where they built their villages near the Loup River. The remaining Pawnee bands, the Chausis, Kitkehahkis, and Pitahawirats, were forced back south and east. Pressure on the Pawnees increased after the first Siouan-speaking tribes entered the Plains. The Otoes, Quapaws, Osages, Kaws, Omahas, and Poncas crossed the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers during the late seventeenth century, and entered Pawnee territory from the east. Soon the Pawnees were at war with these tribes as well.¹⁶

The arrival of French traders and *coureurs de bois* changed the balance of power on the plains once more. Armed with French guns, the Pawnees began to push the Apaches back on to the western Plains. The appearance of French traders alarmed

specific information on the results of the expedition. Waldo R. Wedel, ed., *The Dunbar-Allis Letters on the Pawnee* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1985), 632.

¹⁵ Grinnell argues that the name “Pani” or “Pawnee” came from the term “pariki” (horn), which referred to the peculiar hair style of the Pawnees. George Bird Grinnell, “Two Pawnian Tribal Names,” *American Anthropologist* 4 (April 1891), 197-199.

¹⁶ George E. Hyde, *The Pawnee Indians* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 43-56. Although some scholars have labeled Hyde’s study as “unreliable,” this is still the best and most comprehensive

Spanish officials in New Mexico. During an expedition to the Apache stronghold at El Cuartelejo, in present-day northeast Colorado, in 1706, Spanish General Juan de Ulibarri learned that the Pawnees regularly captured Apache women and children in order to sell them into slavery to the French in exchange for guns. The Apaches begged Ulibarri to send them guns as well so they could defend themselves. Ulibarri, however, remained true to the Spanish policy which forbade the sale of guns to Indian tribes. Fifteen years later, Governor Antonio Valverde y Cosio learned from a Paloma Apache Indian that his people had been driven from their territory after a surprise attack by a combined force of Pawnees, Frenchmen, and “Jumano” Indians. To prove the power of the Pawnees, the Paloma Indian showed Valverde a gunshot wound he had received during this battle.¹⁷

The rumor of a French presence on the central Plains prompted Viceroy Marques de Valero to send an expedition into Pawnee territory. Its mission was to locate the French trade centers. In the summer of 1720, a force of forty-two soldiers and sixty Indian allies left Santa Fe under the command of Lieutenant-Governor Pedro de Villasur. Villasur did indeed locate the French traders. On the morning of August 14, a combined force of Pawnee warriors and their French allies nearly annihilated his command. Only a handful escaped. Among the casualties was Villasur himself. The Villasur disaster erased much of the prestige of the Spaniards among the Indians of the southwest. Eventually, the Apaches were forced deep into New Mexico under pressure from the Pawnees, Wichitas,

history of the Pawnee tribe. A close scrutiny of the sources reveal that most of Hyde’s work is quite accurate.

¹⁷ Elizabeth A. H. John, *Storms Brewed in Other Men’s Worlds: The Confrontation of Indians, Spanish, and French in the Southwest, 1540-1795* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), 229-230, 247-250. The exact identity of the “Jumanos” has never been established. Most likely, these Indians belonged to the Caddoan linguistic stock to which the Pawnees belonged also. During the nineteenth century, the Jumanos “disappeared” as a result of the pressure by the Osages who waged a relentless war upon them. It appears that most of the Jumano refugees were eventually absorbed into the Pawnee and Wichita tribes.

Utes, and Comanches. Every year, Pawnee warriors from all bands sneaked into Apacheria to steal horses from their Apache enemies.¹⁸

While the French trade helped to make the Skidis the dominant tribe on the central Plains, it also allowed the southern bands to prevent the Osages from invading their territory. French traders presumably also took the initiative to establish peace between the Pawnees and the Comanches in an effort to secure the trade route between Santa Fe and St. Louis. This peace was concluded around 1750. The following year, a combined war party of Pawnees, Comanches, and Wichitas, surprised and virtually annihilated an entire Osage village.¹⁹

Unfortunately for the Pawnees, the French alliance did not last. The Seven Years' War (1756-1763) ended the French trade. Spain, which was now in control of Louisiana, froze the gun trade to the Indian tribes under its jurisdiction. This new development shifted the balance of power to the Osages. Armed with British guns, the Osages conquered most of present-day northern Oklahoma, and southern Kansas. Their victories came at the expense of the southern Pawnees. During the late 1760s, the Chauis and Pitahawirats had been forced to move into Nebraska. There they constructed their villages along the Platte River. The Kitkehahkis, meanwhile, also moved north and settled along the Republican River in northern Kansas.²⁰

¹⁸ Alfred Barnaby Thomas, ed., *After Coronado: Spanish Exploration Northeast of New Mexico, 1696-1727* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), 36-39, 133-137. Thirty-two Spaniards died during the attack. An undisclosed number of Pueblos perished as well, although it appears that most of them were able to escape. Eyewitnesses related that a few days before the Pawnees had held a war dance. It is quite possible that the Pawnees held this dances to recruit and empower warriors for the upcoming battle with the Spaniards.

¹⁹ John, *Storms Brewed In Other Men's Worlds*, 318.

²⁰ Although the French presence officially ended at the conclusion of the Seven Years' War, French traders continued to operate on the plains, albeit under a different flag. These traders gave the Pawnee bands French names which often appear in British and American documents. They called the Skidis "Loups"

The sudden invasion of the southern bands into their territory did not please the Skidis, especially when the Chauis demanded to be recognized as the heads of the nation. The two bands even went to war in the 1770s. Although the Skidis immediately sued for peace, their relations with the Chauis and Pitahawirats would remain troubled for several decades. The Chauis even tried to cut the Skidis off from the white trade. In matters of war and the annual buffalo hunts, the Skidis continued to follow a separate course from the souther bands. The Skidis warred against the horticultural tribes to its east, while the southern Pawnees conducted their raids against the Apaches, Osages, and Comanches, with whom they had resumed hostilities in the 1780s.²¹

John Dunbar, whose father lived among the Pawnees in the 1830s and 40s and who recorded much of their history, called the last decades of the eighteenth century the “heroic age” of the Pawnee tribe. Although Dunbar’s assessment might be a slight overstatement, they were undoubtedly at the height of their power. Their war parties ventured deeply into hostile territory on successful horse raids. During this time the Skidis also subdued the Otoes, Omahas and Poncas. The Skidi conquest, however, was

(meaning “wolf”), the Chauis “Grands” (meaning “head” or “leading”), and the Pitahawirats “Tappages” (meaning “noisy”). They called the Kitkehahkis “Republicains” because of this tribe’s insistence on maintaining its autonomy separate from the other southern bands. They settled at the Republican River which was named after them. Hyde, *Pawnee Indians*, 104-105.

²¹ Ibid., 122-123. It appears that the peace between the Comanches and Pawnees was over by the 1790s. The Spanish even supported the Comanches against the Pawnees to prevent the latter from making raids into New Mexico. Still, the Pawnee-Comanche war threatened to disrupt the trade route between Santa Fe and St. Louis. In order to secure peace along the Santa Fe trail, the Spanish authorities sent French/Spanish frontiersman Pedro (Pierre) de Vial on a peace mission to the [Kitkehahki] Pawnees. After a long and hazardous journey, Vial reached the Pawnees in September 1793. Chief Sarisere reacted sympathetically to Vial’s errand and appointed five representatives to accompany Vial to the Comanches. While on the trail south, they were attacked by a group of 56 Pawnees who mistook Vial’s company for a Comanche war party. Fortunately for Vial and his companions, the error was discovered just in time. The Pawnees told Vial they had organized their war party in revenge for a recent Comanche raid. Upon hearing this, Sarisere’s delegates, except one, returned to their village. Ironically, Vial undertook his mission when the war between the two tribes had reached its peak. That same year, the Pawnees led incursions deep into Comanche territory. When the Comanches tried to counter, they lost Hachaxas and Ecuera, two of their

aided by diseases such as smallpox, that had struck these tribes in the 1790s and weakened them greatly.

Although the Pawnees were now at the height of their power, during the first decade of the nineteenth century there were ominous signs that great changes lay ahead. Among the most devastating developments was the introduction of foreign diseases. The same diseases that had allowed the Skidis to push back the Omahas and Poncas also threatened the Pawnee villages. Smallpox epidemics struck the Pawnees in 1825, 1831, 1838, and 1852. In 1849, migrants along the Oregon Trail introduced cholera, and in 1864 hundreds of Pawnees succumbed to measles and diphtheria.²²

Around the same time that epidemic diseases began to take their toll among the Pawnees, the first Sioux appeared from the north. Richard White has shown how the western Sioux, particularly the Oglalas and Brules, had adapted successfully to life on the Plains. They had moved onto the northern Plains during the eighteenth century in search of beaver, whose hides they traded to the British for guns and horses. Later they adopted a (more or less) nomadic lifestyle based on the buffalo hunt as their main economic activity. Because they lived in small wandering groups, they were far less vulnerable to epidemic diseases than the Plains horticulturalists, such as the Mandans, Hidatsas, Arikaras, Poncas, Omahas, Otoes, and the Pawnees, who lived in bustling agricultural villages. Blessed with freedom from disease and a high birth rate, the Sioux bands grew more populous, causing them to search for new territories and hunting grounds. First they

chiefs. In 1795 Vial was apparently more successful in bringing the two tribes together. See John, *Storms Brewed In Other Men's Worlds*, 755-764.

²² Douglas R. Parks, "Pawnee," in William C. Sturtevant, ed., *Handbook of North American Indians* 13, Part I, *Plains* (Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution, 2001), 520.

overpowered the Mandans, Hidatsas, and Arikaras.²³ As they moved further south, they also came into contact with the Pawnees. Sioux winter counts reveal that the number of encounters with the Pawnees increased after 1760. That year, according to High Hawk's winter count, the "Schili [Skidi] and Lakota met and the leader of each side was killed."²⁴ Over the next few decades, such encounters became more frequent, as Sioux expansion brought the two nations dangerously close together by the early 1800s.

The appearance of the Sioux in the north coincided with the appearance of the Cheyennes in the west. Like the Sioux they entered the Plains from the east during the 18th century. Initially they emulated the sedentary life-style of their neighbors, the Mandans, Hidatsas, and Arikaras. But shortly after the introduction of the horse, around 1760, they abandoned this life-style in favor of a more nomadic existence. They moved to the western Plains, where the buffalo was more plentiful. This brought them in conflict with the Pawnees, who saw them trespassing on their hunting grounds near the Republican River. Near the Black Hills the Cheyennes united with the Arapahos and became close friends of the Sioux. During the second quarter of the nineteenth century, these tribes would form one of the most powerful military alliances the Plains had seen. The Sioux-Cheyenne-Arapaho combination posed a formidable threat to the Pawnees.²⁵

²³ White, "The Winning of the West," 322-330.

²⁴ "High Hawk's Winter Count," in Edward S. Curtis, *The North American Indian* vol. 3, edited by Frederick Webb Hodge (New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1970), 166. The same account (page 161) mentions an earlier encounter between the two nations in 1705, when the Pawnees killed fifteen Sioux in a raid. The John K. Bear winter count mentions an attack on a Dakota camp by Skidi Pawnees in 1702. According to this account, the attackers were annihilated. James Henry Howard, "Yanktonai Ethnohistory and the John K. Bear Winter Count," *Plains Anthropologist* 21: 73, Part 2 (August 1976), 24. For another interesting winter count which relates of battles between the Sioux and the Pawnees is Swift Bear's winter count. See Lucy Kramer Cohen, "Even in Those Days Pictures were Important," *Indians at Work* (January 1942), 18-21, (February 1942), 30-31, and (March 1942), 29-30.

²⁵ Most of the ethnographic information in this paragraph comes from E. Adamson-Hoebel, *The Cheyennes: Indians of the Great Plains* (New York, 1960), and George Bird Grinnell, *The Cheyenne Indians: Their History and Ways of Life* (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1962). On the western plains the

To the Pawnees, the arrival of the Americans was much less an immediate cause for alarm than the arrival of the Sioux and Cheyennes. Shortly after the United States purchased Louisiana from the French in 1804, the first American visitors began to travel through Pawnee territory. Unlike the hostile tribes to the north and west, the Americans professed to come in peace. They claimed to have come to explore the land, establish friendly relations with its inhabitants, and possibly trade with them. Although the Pawnees had few illusions about the intentions of these Americans, they were fully aware of the potential power of the United States, both as an enemy or ally. Rather than fight these newcomers on the Plains, the Pawnees believed it better to welcome them.²⁶

Lieutenant Zebulon Montgomery Pike was the first formal American visitor to the Pawnees. In 1806, he had been sent into their territory with a small detachment of the First Infantry to inform the Indians that they were now “children” of the “Great Father” in Washington. When he reached the Kitkehahkis on the Republican River in Kansas, he learned that a large Spanish delegation under Don Fecundo Malgares had just left the Indians. Malgares had hoped to talk the Pawnees into an alliance with Spain in order to block the further westward expansion of the United States.²⁷ Although the Kitkehahkis agreed to raise the Spanish flag in their villages in return for gifts, they flatly refused to

Cheyennes (*Tsistsistas*) first reunited with their kinsmen the *Suhtai*. Around 1840, they also established friendly relations with the Kiowas and Comanches.

²⁶ By 1820, the Pawnee chiefs seemed to be duly impressed with the power of the United States. Edwin James describes a speech made by “Tarrarecawaho,” a Chaui chief who had visited Governor Clarke at St. Louis the year before, to Major Benjamin O’Fallon. “When he tells you that he is a chief, he speaks truly; when he says that his soldiers appear like the grass in the spring, in place of those who die, he speaks truly; you, my nation, are like the fly in strength, just so easily can this mighty nation crush you between their fingers.” Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., “James’s Account of S. H. Long’s Expedition 1819-1820,” *Early Western Travels, 1748-1846* v. 15 (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1905), 147.

²⁷ Malgares also encouraged the Kitkehahkis and Chaus to join forces against the Skidis who continued to raid in New Mexico. Both bands refused even though the Kitkehahkis were at war with the Skidis at this time. Hyde, *Pawnee Indians*, 151.

join the alliance that Malgares suggested. When Pike saw the Spanish flag hoisted over the Pawnee village, he demanded that it be taken down and replaced by the American flag. He added that it was “impossible for a nation to have two Fathers; that they must either be the children of the Spaniards, or acknowledge their American Father.”

According to one account of this episode, the Pawnees were so impressed with Pike’s daring attitude that they accepted the authority of the Americans. It seems more plausible, however, that the Pawnees saw greater gains in good relations with the Americans than with the Spanish.²⁸

Efforts to abolish the sacrifice of captives during the Morning Star ceremony by *Latelesha* (“Knife Chief”) and *Pitalesharo*, chiefs of the Skidis, in 1816 and 1818, must also be viewed in the context of appeasing the Americans. The Skidis, because of their location, suffered more from Sioux attacks than any of the other Pawnee bands. Knife Chief and *Pitalesharo* hoped to win the friendship and the support of the United States in their struggle against the Sioux by ending the custom.²⁹ It appears that their strategy was successful because in 1818, chiefs from all bands, among them Long Hair of the Chauis and Knife Chief of the Skidis, traveled to St. Louis to sign a treaty of “perpetual peace and friendship” with the United States. A few years later, in 1821, *Pitalesharo* and several

²⁸ See Major G. C. Sibley’s account of Pike’s visit to the Pawnees quoted in George Bird Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts and their Pawnee Battalion: The Experiences of Frank J. North and Luther H. North* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973), 43-48. Shortly after Pike left the Kitkehahki villages he ran into a Grand (Chaui) Pawnee war party which was on its way home from an unsuccessful raid against the Comanches. Only the “prompt action” of Pike and his men deterred these Indians from attacking them. Hyde, *Pawnee Indians*, 153.

²⁹ James related the story of *Latelesha* and *Pitalesharo*. *Latelesha* sold the captive Spanish boy to a company of traders under Manuel Lisa. Instead of the boy, the Skidis “sacrificed” the merchandise. See, “James’s Account of S. H. Long’s Expedition,” 153-155; Douglas, *Manuel Lisa*, 388-389; Hyde, *Pawnee Indians*, 160-161. The Skidis did not abolish the practice of human sacrifice to the Morning Star at all. Over the next few decades, there are several recorded instances when they sacrificed captives. How many women were actually sacrificed in secrecy is not known.

other chiefs went on a tour to Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and Washington, where they were greeted by cheering crowds who showered them with gifts. Charles B. King painted several portraits of the guests, and some ladies in Washington awarded Pitalasharo with a medal commemorating his daring rescue of the captive maiden in 1816. One of the spectators who saw the chiefs on their tour was novelist James Fenimore Cooper, who based one of the characters of his novel *The Prairie* upon Pitalasharo.³⁰

Overall, relations between the Pawnees and the United States were friendly. Yet, incidents occurred that tarnished the reputation of the Pawnees and branded them as “unreliable.” In 1819, a group of young Kitkehahki warriors plundered an advance party of Stephen H. Long’s expedition. Long immediately froze all trade to the Pawnees.³¹ The effects of the embargo did not go unnoticed. That same year, a Skidi war party consisting of ninety-three men, was itself caught by surprise and summarily annihilated. Although they fought bravely, the Skidi warriors lacked the guns to defend themselves. Only a handful escaped. Taking this incident to heart, the Pawnees signed another treaty in 1825

³⁰ Charles J. Kappler, comp. and ed., *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties II Treaties* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), 156-159. The treaty ended Spanish efforts to draw the Pawnees into an alliance with Spain. Hyde claims that the “Big Hair,” who appears as one of the signees, is actually “Long Hair.” Hyde, *Pawnee Indians*, 165. The portrait of Pitalasharo, shows the young chief with a war bonnet. According to some scholars this is the first-known representation this type of head dress, and may have helped to create the image of a Plains Indian chief. [W] Faux, an Englishman who visited Washington that year, wrote that the Pawnees performed a dance for President Monroe and six thousand guests: “They shewed [sic] their manner of sitting in council, their dances, their war whoops, with the noises, gesticulations, &c. of the centinels [sic] on the sight of an approaching enemy. They were in a state of perfect nudity, except a piece of red flannel round the waist and passing between the legs. They afterwards performed at the house of his Excellency M. Hyde de Neuville. They were painted horribly, and exhibited the operation of scalping and tomahawking in fine style.” W. Faux, *Memorable Days in America: Being a Journal of a Tour to the United States* (London: W. Simpkin and R. Marshall, 1823) reprinted in Rueben Gold Thwaites, ed., *Early Western Travels, 1748-1846* vol. XII (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1905), 50-51.

³¹ Apart from attacking Long’s advance party under command of Mr. T. Say, the Pawnees had recently intercepted two white hunters who had been found hunting in their territory. The two men, who had been rescued by some traders, had been “treated with such severity by the Pawnees, that they had often entreated an end might be put to their lives.” Edwin James, *Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains, Performed in the Years 1819 and ‘20* (Philadelphia: H. C. Carey and I. Lea, 1823), 147-150.

in which they promised to surrender suspects of a crime against U. S. citizens to the American authorities. In return, the United States promised to “receive the Pawnee tribe of Indians into their friendship, and under their protection.” Furthermore, the United States agreed to compensate the Pawnees for damages caused by U. S. citizens.³²

Meanwhile, during the 1820s and 1830s, the war between the Pawnees and the Sioux and Cheyennes escalated. In 1829, the Skidis discovered a Cheyenne war party near their village. After massacring the entire party, the Skidis mutilated the corpses. This event outraged the Cheyennes, who mobilized their Arapaho allies for a massive campaign against the Skidis. A number of Sioux bands also joined. In 1830 the two armies met. One Cheyenne carried the famous “medicine arrows” into battle. They were tightly wrapped in a bundle tied to his lance. The Cheyennes believed that these sacred arrows gave them greater power. Although outnumbered, the Skidis put up a brave fight. When the combatants lined up for another battle, the Pawnees carried a sick warrior on a buffalo robe and placed him in front of their line, exposing him to the arrows and gunshots of the enemy. The man had been sick a long time and wished to die in battle rather than suffer quietly at home. During the fight, the carrier of the medicine arrows rode up to the sick man to count coup on him with his lance. But the sick man grabbed the weapon and pulled it away. Although the Cheyennes fought furiously to recapture the

³² According to James, the enemy party consisted of a large body of Ictans [Apaches?], Arapahos, and Kiowas. Later, during a conference with Major Benjamin O’Fallon, the chiefs returned the stolen goods and apologized for the foolishness of the men, but they refused to turn the culprits over. “James’s Account of S. H. Long’s Expedition,” 157-160, 162-163; Hyde, *Pawnee Indians*, 166-174; Kappler, *Indian Affairs II*, 259.

sacred arrows, the Pawnees under Big Eagle kept their ground. Demoralized after the loss of the arrows, the Cheyennes and their allies retreated.³³

Despite occasional victories, the Pawnees also suffered great losses during the 1830s. In the winter of 1829-30, the Osages surprised a group of Pawnees near the upper Arkansas River and killed almost ninety of them. In 1832, a smallpox epidemic devastated their villages. According to some accounts, 3000 Pawnees died within a matter of days. The disease killed nearly everyone over age 30, and among the casualties were some of their most experienced warriors. Taking advantage of this tragedy, the Sioux attacked a Skidi hunting camp and slaughtered one hundred Indians. In 1833, the Cheyennes and Arapahos surrounded a group of Pawnee hunters in southeast Colorado and massacred them all. It became clear to everyone, particularly the Pawnees, that the Plains had become a more dangerous place.³⁴

The threat of intertribal war increased as new arrivals, pushed west by Andrew Jackson's removal policy, scrambled for territory on the Plains. As the Shawnees, Delawares, Kickapoos, Sacs and Foxes, and other tribes began to compete with the Pawnees for access to hunting grounds, the prospect of war seemed imminent. To prevent the outbreak of hostilities, the United States sent Henry E. Ellsworth on a peace mission in 1833. In the resulting treaty, the Pawnees agreed to move their villages north of the Platte River, and share the hunting grounds south of the river with the newcomers. In return, the United States promised to send annuities, provide agricultural assistance, build schools and mills, and supply blacksmiths. The United States also agreed to place

³³ For a detailed account of this battle see George A. Dorsey, "How the Pawnee Captured the Cheyenne Medicine Arrows," *American Anthropologist* 5 (1903), 644-658.

³⁴ Hyde, *Pawnee Indians*, 179, 181-182.

“twenty-five guns, with suitable ammunition, in the hands of the [government] farmers of each village, to be used in case of an attack from hostile bands.”³⁵

Peace with the newcomers did little to relieve the Pawnees from the pressures of the attacks by the Sioux and the Cheyennes. Desperate for anything that might give them an advantage in the war against these tribes, they even welcomed American missionaries into their villages in 1834. Although the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church had sent John Dunbar and Samuel Allis to the Indians to preach peace and brotherhood under God, the Pawnees hoped to obtain some form of supernatural power from the two missionaries that would aid them in their struggle against their enemies.³⁶

Attempts by the United States to effect a peace between the Pawnees and the Cheyennes and Arapahos met with little enthusiasm by either side. In June 1835, Colonel Henry Dodge, accompanied by a detachment of the First Dragoons, met with delegates of the four Pawnee bands and arranged for a peace council with the Cheyennes later that summer. During the talks, the Cheyennes showed more interest in retrieving the sacred medicine arrows from the Pawnees than in establishing peace. The Pawnees also showed little interest in peace, but used the occasion to make a good impression on the Americans by professing their loyalty and allegiance to the United States. Despite the obvious animosity on both sides, Dodge reported to his superiors that his mission had been a success. But shortly after his expedition left the area, Walking Whirlwind of the

³⁵ According to Hyde, a Pawnee delegation walked to Fort Gibson, Indian Territory, later that year, to conduct peace talks with the Osages, Creeks, Cherokees, and Choctaws. Unfortunately, Hyde does not discuss the outcome of these talks. Hyde, *Pawnee Indians*, 182-183; Kappler, *Indian Treaties* II, 416-418.

³⁶ Dunbar began his work among the Chauis, while Allis went to live among the Skidis. Hyde, *Pawnee Indians*, 191; Wedel, ed., *The Dunbar-Allis Letters*, vii-xvii.

Cheyennes organized another war party against the Pawnees. His warriors, however, blundered straight into a large Pawnee camp one foggy morning and were all slain.³⁷

Meanwhile, war with the Sioux continued. In the winter of 1837-38, the Pawnees captured some Sioux women infected with smallpox. The disease soon spread through their villages again, and about 2,000 Pawnees died. To stop the spread of the disease, the Skidis sacrificed one of the captives in April 1838. "As soon as the report of this sacrifice reached the Sioux," wrote Father Pierre-Jean DeSmet, who toured the Plains during this time, "they burned with the desire to avenge their honor, and bound themselves by oaths that they would not rest until they had killed as many Pawnees as their innocent victim had bones or joints in her body."³⁸ The Sioux held true to their word. To achieve the extermination of the Pawnees, they began a diplomatic effort in search of allies. In 1840, representatives from the Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapaho, Kiowa, Kiowa-Apache, and Comanche tribes met in council on the Arkansas River. There they established the most powerful military alliance the plains had ever witnessed.³⁹

³⁷ During Dodge's council with the Pawnees, it appears that the Indians were more concerned with tensions within the tribe than peace with the Cheyennes. In fact, Captain Lemuel Ford, who accompanied Dodge on the expedition wrote that the Pawnee delegation that met the Cheyennes on August 11 was actually a Pawnee war party. When the Pawnees learned of Dodge's presence, they turned their horse-raiding campaign into a mission of peace. Overall, Dodge showed a remarkable ignorance of Plains Indian diplomacy. See, Henry Dodge, "Report on the Expedition of Dragoons, under Colonel Henry Dodge, to the Rocky Mountains in 1835," *American State Papers: Military Affairs* 6 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1861/Buffalo, NY: William S. Hein & Co, 1998), 130-146; Louis Pelzer, ed., "Captain Ford's Journal of an Expedition to the Rocky Mountains," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 12 (March, 1926), 550-579; Hyde, *Pawnee Indians*, 193-194.

³⁸ Hiram Martin Chittenden and Alfred Talbot Richardson, eds., *Life, Letters and Travels of Father Pierre-Jean DeSmet, S. J., 1801-1873* (New York: Francis P. Harper, 1905/New York: Klaus Reprint Co., 1969), 988; Wedel, *The Dunbar-Allis Letters*, 631.

³⁹ Roberta Carkeek Cheney, *Sioux Winter Count: A 131-Year Calendar of Events* (Happy Camp, CA: Naturegraph, 1998), 26. According to the Swift Bear and High Hawk winter counts, the Sioux and their allies killed one hundred Skidis that year. Cohen, "Even in Those Days Pictures were Important," *Indians at Work* 9 (February 1942), 31; Curtis, "High Hawk's Winter Count," *The North American Indian* III, 175.

Over the next two decades, the pattern of war and disease continued to plague the Pawnees. Missionaries John Dunbar and Samuel Allis witnessed a Sioux attack on a Pawnee village in 1843. Around seventy Pawnees died in the fight, and Dunbar estimated the property damages at eight to ten thousand dollars. Fearful of more attacks, the Pawnees had little time to bury their dead properly before they abandoned the village. Dunbar observed that the “carcasses of the horses slain in [the] fight were not yet decomposed, and those of the men hastily buried had been nearly all disinterred by dogs and wolves of the prairie.”⁴⁰ The Sioux and Cheyenne pressure forced the Skidis and Chavis to resolve their differences and assist each other against their enemies. In the mid-1840s, the four bands concentrated their villages in a small area near the Platte River in order to protect themselves from Sioux attacks. Unfortunately, the move did not save them from the white man’s diseases. Migrants traveling on the Oregon Trail, which lay along the Platte River, carried their germs close to the Pawnees’ homes. The results were devastating. In 1849, for example, a cholera epidemic claimed the lives of 1,234 Indians, or one-fourth of the entire population.⁴¹

Although they had never been at war with the United States, the Pawnees suffered from a bad reputation among the travelers along the Oregon Trail. One migrant called the Pawnees “a cunning cut-throat race of villains, with an endless propensity for stealing.”

⁴⁰ N. A. Higginbotham, “The Wind-Roan Bear Winter Count,” *Plains Anthropologist: Journal of the Plains Conference* 26 (February 1981), 21. Until the mid-1840s, the missionaries had lived in relative safety from the attacks, as the Sioux thought it wise not to antagonize the white authorities. In 1844, however, they also robbed the mission. After this incident, Dunbar and Allis decided to abandon the mission. This was an option the Pawnees did not have. Overall, the missionary effort was not very successful. During the ten-year period that Dunbar and Allis operated as missionaries, warfare had increased, diseases had decimated the tribe, and poverty was rampant. Apart from a relatively successful inoculation program, the missionaries were unable to bring much relief to the Pawnees, who, at this time, needed guns more than God. Wedel, *The Dunbar-Allis Letters*, 656-660, 730-731, 684.

⁴¹ Hyde, *Pawnee Indians*, 223-229.

Another asserted that “a more savage, snakeish, thieving pack of scoundrels it is impossible to imagine.” Francis Parkman, who visited the area in the 1840s, wrote that the Pawnees were “a treacherous, cowardly banditti, who, by a thousand acts of pillage and murder, have deserved chastisement at the hands of the government.” Few travelers, however, recognized that the great migration was scattering the buffalo herds upon which the Pawnees depended for their survival. At first the Pawnees demanded tribute from the migrants for passing through their land, but as the buffalo became increasingly scarce, they began to steal to avoid starvation.⁴²

Receiving little help or protection from the U. S. government, the Pawnees were slowly reduced to poverty. Sioux and Cheyenne raiders stole their horses, ambushed their hunting parties, and killed women on their way to the corn fields.⁴³ Instead of punishing the Sioux and their allies for their continuation of hostilities against the Pawnees, the government began to shower them with gifts. At the Fort Laramie Conference of 1851, the Indian Office distributed nearly \$100,000 worth of food and presents to the Sioux and their allies in the hope of persuading them to make peace. The Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahos agreed to send a peace delegation under the supervision of D. D. Mitchell to the

⁴² Merrill J. Mattes, *The Great Platte River Road: The Covered Wagon Mainline Via Fort Kearny to Fort Laramie* (Lincoln: Nebraska State Historical Society Publications v. 25, 1969), 156-158. Francis Parkman, *The Oregon Trail: Sketches of Prairie and Rocky-Mountain Life* (New York: The Modern Library, 1949), 57-58.

⁴³ The constant threat of enemy attacks forced the Pawnees to keep sentinels posted around camp during the night. David Z. Smith, a missionary of the Moravian Church, observed in the 1850s: “Sentinels are constantly posted on all the surrounding heights, who can immediately by signs, known among the Indians, transmit intelligence in case of impending danger. During the night, sentinels are constantly perched upon the tops of the lodges, to guard against any unexpected nocturnal attack. When we were on our return, and remained over night at the Loup village, a report, probably a false alarm, had reached there during the day, that a large war-party of Sioux had lately been seen near the head waters of the Elkhorn river. During the night sentinels were as usual posted upon the lodges, a little more noisy, however, than generally, yelling to one another and singing nearly the whole night. Upon our inquiry why the sentinels made so much noise, we were informed that it was to let the Sioux know, should they be near, that they might not expect to find them

Pawnees. But when the tribes met that October at Fort Kearney, Nebraska, one of the Cheyennes, Alight-on-the-Clouds, refused to smoke the peace pipe. Although several other delegates accepted the pipe, Alight-on-the-Clouds's action basically negated the peace effort. As long as there were chiefs willing to fight, young and ambitious warriors would follow them, and there could be no real peace.⁴⁴

Apart from enemy attacks there were the pressures from white settlers who began to pour into the region after President Franklin Pierce signed the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854. Many of the immigrants saw the Pawnees as a nuisance who damaged crops and stole livestock. Some farmers made false claims against the Pawnees in order to receive some of their annuities in "compensation." Under these pressures, the Pawnees agreed to sign a new treaty in 1857 and ceded more of their land. But this concession did not seem to satisfy the land-hungry settlers, who called for the removal of the tribe. In 1859, shortly after the tribe had left on its annual buffalo hunt, a Pawnee village burned down under suspicious circumstances. The fire destroyed not only the Indians' homes, but their provisions as well. Although the newspapers claimed the fire was set by the Sioux, the destitute Pawnees believed it had been the work of white settlers. When some angry

off their guard." Gottlieb F. Oehler and David Z. Smith, *Description of a Journey and a Visit to the Pawnee Indians* (Fairfield, WA: Ye Galleon Press, 1974), 25-26.

⁴⁴ Father DeSmet, who attended the 1851 peace talks, provided an account of the event. Pawnee Chief "Big Fatty" expressed his joy at the prospect of peace: "[My] heart bounds with delight, for it had never dreamed of meeting you face to face, and of touching your hand in friendship. You see me here poor - I have not a horse to mount. Well, I will gladly go on foot the remainder of my days, if the tomahawk is to be buried by all." Alight-on-the-Clouds [DeSmet refers to him as "Ride on the Clouds", Densmore as "Touching Cloud"] responded as follows: "I accept not thy calumet of peace, lest I betray thee [pointing to Superintendent Mitchell]. Perchance while I now speak to thee [addressing the Pawnees], our brave warriors seek the lodges of thy tribe. No! I will not deceive thee, therefore know that peace exists not between me and thee." Chittenden and Richardson, eds., *Life, Letters and Travels of Father Pierre-Jean DeSmet*, 687-688. Ironically, Alight-on-the-Clouds was killed the following year by a 15-year old Pawnee named Big Spotted Horse, who shot him through the eye with an arrow. Francis Densmore claims that the boy's name was "Carrying-the-shield." Francis Densmore, *Pawnee Music* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office,

warriors plundered a few homesteads in retaliation, the governor of the Territory of Nebraska responded by sending a force of dragoons and militia in pursuit. Although the Pawnees could have eradicated the poorly trained American command easily, the chiefs decided to settle the “Pawnee War” without bloodshed. They quickly sued for peace and promised to pay for the damages. Undoubtedly, they wanted to avoid antagonizing the only nation that was not hostile towards them.⁴⁵

Around 1860 the Pawnees built a high sod wall to defend their settlement on the west, south, and east against enemy attacks. Nevertheless, between April and September 1860, Sioux raiders struck the village eight times. During their last attack, on September 14, the Sioux burned sixty earth lodges. These raids not only resulted in the loss of human life, but also caused a serious disruption of the Pawnees’ economy. The Sioux burned crops and destroyed and plundered storage pits. The Pawnees also faced problems in the buffalo hunt. As the Oregon Trail pushed the buffalo further west, the Pawnees were forced to extend their hunting expeditions deeper into dangerous territory. While on the hunt, the Sioux and Cheyennes ambushed isolated hunters who wandered too far while chasing scattered groups of buffalo. Starvation now became a reality. More and more Pawnees began to lounge around the Oregon Trail to beg westbound travelers for food and supplies. The migrants also accused the Pawnees of petty theft and horse stealing. In

1929), 59-60. Of course, it is possible that these were one and the same person, as the Pawnees changed their names occasionally during their lifetimes.

⁴⁵ Hyde, *Pawnee Indians*, 241-248.

many cases, however, the actual perpetrators of such crimes were Sioux and Cheyenne raiders.⁴⁶

Until the Civil War years, the United States seemed more content with pacifying the resisting tribes with gifts than with providing adequate protection for friendly tribes such as the Pawnees.⁴⁷ During the 1860s, however, American attitudes towards the Sioux and their allies underwent a radical change. As increasing numbers of settlers invaded the western and northern Plains, the United States itself came into collision with these tribes. Although there had been several confrontations already following the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851, after 1860 the hostilities between the United States and the Sioux- Cheyenne-Arapaho confederation entered a new phase.

The outbreak of the Plains Wars between 1860 and 1890 had important consequences for the Pawnees. Previously, American policy makers and military strategists had looked upon the Pawnees as troublesome “beggars and thieves” who preyed on the immigrant and who were undeserving of any sympathy or assistance. But with the threat of an all-out Indian war on the Plains, these same public officials began to re-evaluate the potential value of a U.S.-Pawnee alliance. It is within this context that the enlistment of the Pawnee Scouts in 1864 must be viewed. The United States needed the help of tracking down and surprising the resisting tribes, while the Pawnees seized the

⁴⁶ In 1862, while the main body was on its annual hunt, a sick Pawnee named Crooked Hand defended his village heroically against a large Sioux force of 600 men. He killed six enemies, and his band of young braves fought until the Sioux fled in terror. Hyde, *Pawnee Indians*, 224, 253-255.

⁴⁷ Until the mid-1860s, American officials mainly called upon the goodwill of the powerful nomadic tribes to cease their raids against the sedentary nations. In 1860, for example, Captain Alfred Sully, whose defensive measures at the Pawnee village had proven totally inadequate, sent an officer to Ft. Laramie to sue for peace on behalf of the Pawnees. The Sioux showed no interest and their actions showed their determination to drive the Pawnees away from the Loup River altogether. Ibid., 250-251.

opportunity to fight their enemies who had vowed their annihilation. They fought to save their own existence.

The Pawnees who served as scouts in the U. S. Army between 1864 and 1877, were not traitors of their “race.” Their enlistment must be understood in the context of Plains Indian warfare. Like most other Indian peoples, their ancestors had waged wars against rival tribes for generations. Spanish chroniclers documented the battles between the Pawnees and the Apaches in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During the next century the Pawnees fought the tribes of the southern and eastern plains: Kiowas, Comanches, Osages, Kaws, Otoes, Poncas, and Omahas. Finally, from the early 1800s onward, they came face to face with the powerful Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahos, who had formed an alliance of their own. Contrary to popular imagination, these inter-tribal wars were not fought simply for individual glory and prestige. Usually much more was at stake. Wars often decided the fates of nations. Victory or defeat could mean the difference between starvation and prosperity, annihilation and survival.⁴⁸ Faced with the grim prospect of annihilation by the Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahos, the Pawnees seized the opportunity to fight these enemies as allies of the United States.

⁴⁸ John C. Ewers, “Intertribal Warfare as the Precursor of Indian-White Warfare on the Northern Great Plains,” *Plains Indian History and Culture: Essays on Continuity and Change* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 166-179.

CHAPTER THREE

A WARRIOR'S LIFE CYCLE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PAWNEE WAR

COMPLEX, 1550-1864

Shortly after Lone Chief's birth, around 1850, his father, a Kitkehahki chief, died. Lone Chief's mother took up the responsibility of instructing her son to become a successful and important man in the tribe. Among the things that Lone Chief's mother taught him as a child was the following lesson:

You must trust always in *Ti-ra'-wa*. He made us, and through him we live. When you grow up, you must be a man. Be brave, and face whatever danger may meet you. Do not forget, when you look back to your young days, that I have raised you, and always supported you. You had no father to do it. Your father was a chief, but you must not think of that. Because he was a chief, it does not follow that you will be one. It is not the man who stays in the lodge that becomes great; it is the man who works, who sweats, who is always tired from going on the warpath.

When you get to be a man, remember that it is his ambition that makes the man. If you go on the warpath, do not turn around when you have gone part way, but go on as far as you were going, and then come back. If I should live to see you become a man, I want you to become a great man. I want you to think about the hard times we have been through. Take pity on people who are poor, because we have been poor, and people have taken pity on us. If I live to see you a man, and to go off on the warpath, I would not cry if I were to hear that you had been killed in battle. That is what makes a man: to fight and to be brave. I should be sorry to see you die from sickness. If you are killed, I would rather have you die in the open air, so that the birds of the air will eat your flesh, and the wind will breathe on you and blow over your bones. It is better to be killed in the

open air than to be smothered in the earth. Love your friend and never desert him. If you see him surrounded by the enemy, do not run away. Go to him, and if you cannot save him, be killed together, and let your bones lie side by side. Be killed on a hill; high up. Your grandfather said it is not manly to be killed in a hollow. It is not a man who is talking to you, advising you. Heed my words, even if I am a woman.¹

This story, recorded by ethnologist George Bird Grinnell in the 1880s, sums up some of the attitudes that the Pawnees had towards warfare. Only successful men could become prominent members in Pawnee society. In order to be successful, a man always had to put his faith in God, without whose supernatural protection he was destined to fail. Manhood was defined in terms of ambition, hard work, bravery, generosity towards the poor, and loyalty towards friends. The most common way for a man to satisfy his ambitions, was to go on the warpath. Should death come to him while he displayed these virtues on the battlefield, he died with honor, and this honor would then be bestowed on his family. These were the attitudes that the Pawnees carried into battle as scouts for the United States Army. Lone Chief, the boy to whom the above words were directed, enlisted in the Pawnee Battalion in 1867. He distinguished himself in battle against the Arapahos while serving in Luther North's company.²

From an early age, the Pawnees prepared boys to follow the path of warriors. They were told not to fear death and that it was, in fact, better to die bravely when young, than

¹ George Bird Grinnell, *Pawnee Hero Stories and Folk Tales: With Notes on the Origin, Customs and Character of the Pawnee People* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 45-47; See also Wayne Moquin and Charles Van Doren, eds., *Great Documents in American Indian History* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), 52-53.

² Grinnell, *Pawnee Hero Stories and Folk Tales*, 47.

to live to an enfeebled age.³ Francis Densmore, who visited the Pawnees in Oklahoma in 1919 and 1920, recorded the following song which exemplified this attitude:

I ra i ra i ra i i ra ru te ratu hura wiu ra ku ri kux ta ratuku
("He comes. It hurts to use a cane. It becomes painful to pick it up.")

This song originally belonged to a brave man who lived to an advanced age. It relates to the struggles of an old man who now depended on others to look after him. Implicitly, the moral of the song is that it is better to die young than live to an old age when one becomes a burden to others. The song was sung on different occasions. Warriors sang it in battle "when they were all tired out and so nearly beaten that even their hair was disheveled." Sometimes they sang the song as they drove their enemies away from their village, and it was also used in the scalp dances that followed the return of a successful war party.⁴

When a young man reached an age of realization that his fate was not in his own hands but in those of God, he would walk around the village singing: "My spirit rests in the belief that power is in the heavens."⁵ This song signified his readiness to go on the war path and his willingness to give up his life in the defense of his people. No longer afraid of death, he could now pursue the goal of becoming a brave warrior.

Bravery was the most highly respected virtue among the Pawnees. According to John Brown Dunbar, it determined the status of a person in the afterlife. The Pawnees

³ John Brown Dunbar, writing in 1880, seems to disagree on this point: "In common with all Indians, the Pawnees were afraid of death to an extreme degree, and therefore, personal exposure or peril was most anxiously avoided as long as possible. Hence much of their warfare partook in some measure of cheap bravado, to the partial suppression of earnest purpose to win victory by sheer courage." John Brown Dunbar, "The Pawnee Indians," *Magazine of American History* 5 (November 1880), 334.

believed that the spirit of the deceased had to follow a dangerous path that was thickly covered with falling arrows or cross a deep chasm on a small log. Only the brave passed this dangerous route to a new country of peace and plenty. Cowardly spirits chose a path free of danger. But this path was strewn with hoes, axes, and other implements of labor, indicating that he would spend his afterlife in “an existence of endless toil and servitude.”⁶ Frances Densmore recorded a song that told how, should a person die in battle, the spirits would welcome him to the spirit world and talk of all his great deeds:

Aheru raa heru kitu tix wahe he weta axrau isirit ra tawe
 (“Beloved, come, Beloved, All the spirits spoke. Here he comes.
 It is openly known that he did these generous things.”)⁷

Warriors carried songs like these into battle. They provided them comfort on dangerous missions. Although they did not seek it, the songs reminded them that they should not fear death.⁸

Apart from learning to place their fate in the hands of the supernatural, Pawnee boys also learned practical skills that were necessary attributes for a warrior. Among these skills were horsemanship, endurance, stealth, and the manufacture of weapons.

“The Pawnees are expert horsemen,” wrote Edwin James in 1820, “and [they] delight in

⁴ Frances Densmore, *Pawnee Music* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1929), 49-50.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 89-90.

⁶ According to Pawnee theology, all persons, good or bad, brave or cowardly, would be reunited in the afterlife. But there was apparently also a social division in this afterlife. John Brown Dunbar, “The Pawnee Indians,” *Magazine of American History* 8 (1882), 742.

⁷ Densmore, *Pawnee Music*, 62-63; Frances Densmore, “Communication with the Dead as Practised by the American Indians,” *Man* 50 (April 1950), 41.

⁸ Densmore also relates the story of a song with the following lyrics: “My dear child, stop crying. Yonder there, in the expanse of the heavens, is where power dwells.” The song was composed by a father to sing for his son to soothe him after his mother had died. The son learned the song, and, after he grew up, he made it into a war dance. Densmore, *Pawnee Music*, 112-113.

the exhibition of feats of skill and adroitness.” Like most tribes, the Pawnees considered horses great “medicine.” Their power allowed a man to outrun the buffalo during the hunt or to chase after an enemy. According to Charles Augustus Murray, who resided with the Pawnees during the summer of 1835, the Indians called the horse the “medicine-quadruped” (or “four-legged power”). The Pawnees obtained the horse in the late seventeenth century. The animal left such an impact on them that they believed it was a gift from Tirawahut to the people.⁹ Pawnee warriors often painted and decorated their war-horses before going on a war party. The decorations usually represented a higher power that would give the horse more power in battle. For example, Echo Hawk, a Pawnee Scout, always painted his horse’s head with white clay to symbolize an eagle. On his pony’s chest was a beaded rosette upon which was the skull of an eagle.¹⁰ The eagle represented courage, fierceness, and success in war. According to Luther North, one of the officers in the Pawnee Battalion, the Pawnees also painted their horses to make them less conspicuous targets. Warriors also fastened colored feathers in the tails and manes of

⁹ Charles Augustus Murray, *Travels in North America During the Years 1834, 1835, 1836: Including a Summer Residence with the Pawnee Tribe of Indians and a Visit to Cuba and the Azore Islands* (London, England: Richard Bentley, 1839/New York: Da Capo Press, 1974), 286. For the effects of the horse on Pawnee culture see Bernard Mishkin, *Rank and Warfare Among the Plains Indians* (New York: J. J. Augustin, 1940), 14-18, and Raymond Frank Secoy, *Changing Military Patterns on the Great Plains: 17th Century through Early 19th Century* (New York: J. J. Augustin, 1953). John Ewers, *Plains Indian History and Culture: Essays on Continuity and Change* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 207; Martha Royce Blaine, *Pawnee Passage: 1870-1875* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 49-54. The importance of the horse in Pawnee society can be further illustrated by the following statement by Samuel Allis, missionary to the Pawnees in the 1840s and 50s. According to Allis there “are more broils, jealousy, and family quarrels caused by horses than all other troubles combined. The horse frequently causes separation between man and wife, sometimes for life.” Samuel Allis, “Forty Years Among the Indians and on the Eastern Borders of Nebraska,” *Transactions and Reports of the Nebraska State Historical Society* 2 (1887), 140.

¹⁰ Brummett Echohawk, “Pawnee Scouts,” *Oklahoma Today* 27 (Summer 1977), 12.

their horses. Sometimes, warriors spent several hours preparing themselves and their horses for a fight.¹¹

Pawnee children learned to handle horses at a very young age. When John Treat Irving, who accompanied commissioner Henry E. Ellsworth's peace mission in 1833, entered a Pawnee village he saw small bands of young men amusing themselves by racing their horses at full speed while they attempted to oust each other from their saddles by violently steering their animals into each other. "There is nothing upon which the Indians pride themselves, more," Irving wrote,

than their horsemanship. Almost living in the saddle, they are as much at ease, when mounted, as when sitting upon the floor of their own lodge. Many a time, I have seen two or three village urchins, beset some unfortunate horse, while quietly dozing and ruminating, upon the prairie. After sundry coaxings and efforts, they would succeed in mounting upon his back, and then without saddle or bridle, and with a whoop and yeli, that terrified the startled steed into a full gallop, they would scamper madly along, clinging to his mane, and to each other, with a tenacity which would have astonished any one but an Indian.¹²

Like horses, guns had great power. Murray wrote that the Indians called the gun "medicine-weapon." To make this power work, however, the Pawnees believed they needed the blessing of the supernatural beings. The successful use of these weapons depended more on their 'medicine' than on their ability as marksmen. Hence, many warriors had elaborate ceremonials with which they prepared their guns for battle. But just as good spirits helped bullets to find their way, bad spirits could sabotage a weapon.

¹¹ "The Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts: Historic Localities in the Old Northwest, Recalled for Motor Tourists," *Motor Travel [Magazine]* 23:3 (June 1931), 18.

¹² John Treat Irving, *Indian Sketches, Taken During an Expedition to the Pawnee Tribes*, edited by John Francis McDermott (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955), 126-127, 177.

Such a bad spirit caused the Pawnees much grief in the 1830s. Around 1835, a young Skidi by the name of Pahukatawa was killed during a Sioux raid. The animal spirits took pity on him and breathed new life into him. Pahukatawa then returned as a spirit to his people and warned them whenever the Sioux came to attack them. But when the Skidis began to ignore him, Pahukatawa turned his back on them and began aiding the Sioux instead. The Skidis believed that the angry spirit “caused their guns to flash in the pan and the bullets to roll harmlessly from the muzzles.” They also thought that Pahukatawa broke their bow strings in battle.¹³

Despite the power of the gun, the Pawnees continued to rely heavily on other weapons, such as the bow and arrows. Antoine Deshetres, a French trader who accompanied Washington Irving on his tour of the prairies in 1832, spoke of the Pawnees’ extraordinary skills in archery:

According to [Deshetres’] accounts, the rifle of the white man was no match for the bow and arrow of the Pawnee. When the rifle was once discharged, it took time and trouble to load it again, and in the mean time the enemy could keep on launching his shafts as fast as he could draw his bow. Then the Pawnee, according to Tonish [=Deshetres], could shoot, with unerring aim, three hundred yards, and send his arrow clean through and through a buffalo, nay, he had known a Pawnee shaft pass through one buffalo and wound another. And then the way the Pawnees sheltered themselves from the shots of their enemy: they would hang with one leg over the saddle, crouching their bodies along the opposite side of their horse, and would shoot their arrows from under his neck, at full speed!¹⁴

¹³ Murray, *Travels in North America*, 286. John Ewers, *Plains Indian History and Culture: Essays on Continuity and Change* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 208-209; Hyde, *Pawnee Indians*, 195; For an account of Pahukatawa’s story see James Murie, “Pawnee Indian Societies,” *Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History* 11, Part 7 (New York: Published by Order of the Trustees [of the American Museum of Natural History], 1914), 616-623, and Grinnell, *Pawnee Hero Stories and Folk-Tales*, 142-160.

¹⁴ Washington Irving, *A Tour of the Prairies*, edited by Joseph B. Thoburn and George C. Wells (Oklahoma City, OK: Harlow Publishing Corporation, 1955), 67. Irving believed that Deshetres exaggerated the Pawnees’ skills as archers. But other observers confirmed Deshetres’ story. John K. Townsens, who

Describing a Chaui warrior in 1835, Charles Murray observed that he was accompanied by a young boy “[who] carried his bow and arrows, in the use of which his dexterity is almost unequalled, and on which he relied for victory, whether over biped or quadruped foes; the gun which he carried being used, like his coat, for show, not use, and both cast away when the chase-signal or the war-cry was given.”¹⁵

The Pawnees preferred a bow of *bois d’arc*, a type of wood that only grew on the southern plains. They obtained the wood through trade with the Wichitas, who lived in this area and who were closely related to them. Warriors always kept a stick of *bois d’arc* in their lodges to work into shape in case their old bows gave out.¹⁶ “As soon as the boys are able to run about,” wrote Murray in 1835, “they begin to practice the bow and arrow, [and at] the age of twenty they are allowed to hunt, and seek other opportunities for distinction.”¹⁷ Grandfathers usually instructed young boys in the manufacture and use of the bow and arrows.¹⁸ Pawnee boys perfected their skills in the use of arms through

traveled through Pawnee territory in 1834, witnessed how a Pawnee arrow shot clear through the carcass of an antelope “and then skimmed to a great distance over the plain.” John K. Townsend, “Narrative of a Journey Across the Rocky Mountains,” in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., *Early Western Travels, 1748-1846* vol. 21 (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1905), 165.

¹⁵ Murray also claimed that, in 1835, the Pawnees were not well-trained in the proper care for their guns: “having but lately become acquainted with the use of fire-arms, [they] soon destroy them, by examining, firing off powder, and other follies. Some they gamble away; and all that they do not either lose or spoil, they exchange with the Haitans [Apaches?] and other predatory tribes in the West and South for horses; so that when the pay-day returns, very few efficient guns are to be found in the Pawnee village.” Despite this observation, one has to keep in mind that the “refined” Englishman Murray was not very sympathetic towards the Pawnees, whom he considered a “dirty” people. Furthermore, the guns that the United States provided the Indians with may not have been of a great quality. Murray, *Travels in North America*, 269, 381.

¹⁶ John Brown Dunbar, “The Pawnee Indians,” *Magazine of American History* 4 (April 1880), 252, 277-279.

¹⁷ Murray, *Travels in North America*, 316-317.

¹⁸ Douglas R. Parks, “Pawnee,” in William C. Sturtevant, ed., *Handbook of North American Indians* 13, Part I, *Plains*, edited by Raymond J. DeMallie (Washington, D. C. : Smithsonian Institution, 2001), 534. In his memoirs, George P. Belden left a detailed description of the manufacture of bows and arrows. According to Belden, each tribe made its arrows differently. The Pawnees, for example, used medium

games. In the arrow game, one player shot his arrow between forty and sixty paces away. The other players then shot their arrows as closely as possible to the main arrow. The player who lodged his arrow closest won and could claim all the arrows discharged. Another game was a hoop and stick game called *stuts-au'-i-ka-tus*. In this game, the players threw a lance-like stick at a rawhide hoop. These games perfected hand-eye coordination as well as the use of spears and bows and arrows.¹⁹

Complementing a warrior's arsenal were the tomahawk, a war club, a spear, and a shield.²⁰ According to Edwin James, the circular-shaped shield of bison skin was thick enough to ward off an arrow. "Defended by this shield," James wrote, "a warrior will not hesitate to cross the path of an arrow; he will sometimes dexteriously seize the missile after it has struck, and discharge it back again at the enemy." Only distinguished warriors were allowed to display their weapons on a special rack in front of their lodge.²¹ But as the quality and performance of guns improved, most of these weapons were discarded.

points and used elk sinew to attach the arrow-heads to the shafts. But during the 1860s, it became increasingly difficult to identify tribes by its arrows: "Many tribes trade and exchange arrows, while others pick up and keep all the arrows they find. It is a practice among the Pawnees, to carefully collect all the arrows of their enemies and keep them to shoot them again, or trade, while many wily Indians, when they wish to attack the whites, or commit an outrage, purposely use arrows belonging to other tribes. To find a white man dead, with a Pawnee arrow sticking in him, is no longer, as in former days, evidence that a Pawnee killed him, for, most likely, the deed was done by a Cheyenne or Sioux, and the blame thus sought to be thrown on the poor Pawnees." George P. Belden, *Belden, The White Chief; or, Twelve Years Among the Wild Indians of the Plains* (Cincinnati and New York: C. F. Vent, 1870/Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974), 107.

¹⁹ John Brown Dunbar, "The Pawnee Indians," *Magazine of American History* 8 (1882), 749-751.

²⁰ Edwin James, *Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains, Performed in the Years 1819 and '20* (Philadelphia: H. C. Carey and I. Lea, 1823), 133-134.

²¹ Edwin James made the following observation in 1820: "Before the entrance to some of the lodges were small frames, like painter's easels, supporting each a shield, and generally a large painted cylindrical case of skin, prepared like parchment, in which a war dress is deposited. Edwin James, "James's Account of S. H. Long's Expedition, 1819-1820," in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., *Early Western Travels, 1748-1846* vol. 15 (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1905), 164.

Nevertheless, most of the Pawnees who served in the U. S. Army continued to carry one or more traditional weapons with them.²²

Physical and mental endurance were also highly valued martial virtues. Pawnee runners had a reputation as remarkable runners who could travel over one hundred miles in less than twenty-four hours without food or sleep. Reverend Dunbar, who joined the Pawnees on many travels, recorded many instances where they went without food for several days, without a noticeable effect. They merely wrapped a thong several times tightly around the waist “to still the gnawings of hunger.”²³ Murray observed how Pawnee warriors chewed on lead bullets, claiming that it “excites the saliva, and relieves the pains of thirst. I have more than once used one of my own rifle balls for this purpose, and have experienced much relief from so doing.”²⁴

Every warrior who entered battle, did so only after obtaining the protection of the supernatural. This protection was crucial, because without it no man, regardless of his skills and personal strength, could achieve success.²⁵ The Pawnees believed that at birth each person came under the influence of an animal spirit.²⁶ Some of these spirits gave the individual the power to cure certain illnesses. Others provided him with good fortune in battle. The wolf, for example, symbolized stealth and craft. The eagle represented courage

²² John Brown Dunbar, “The Pawnee Indians,” *Magazine of American History* 5 (November 1880), 336. Pawnee Scouts Echo Hawk preferred to carry bow and arrow over the single-shot, muzzle loading guns that were issued to him when he enlisted in Frank North’s battalion. Dog Chief, another Pawnee Scout, always carried a brass tomahawk into battle. Such weapons were useful additions to the warrior’s arsenal. Echohawk, “Pawnee Scouts,” 11-12.

²³ John Brown Dunbar, “The Pawnee Indians,” *Magazine of American History* 4 (April 1880), 263.

²⁴ Murray, *Travels in North America*, 456.

²⁵ George A. Dorsey relates the story of a poor man who sought the blessing of a “stone man” (a meteorite) and became a successful warrior and prominent man in the tribe. Dorsey, “A Pawnee Personal Medicine Shrine,” *American Anthropologist* 7 (1905), 496-498.

²⁶ Murie, “Pawnee Indian Societies,” 639.

and fierceness, while the bear symbolized invulnerability.²⁷ Once a spirit had revealed itself, the Pawnee warrior tried to master its powers. Usually this meant he had to learn the proper procedures for renewing and handling personal medicine bundles and amulets. He also had to observe certain taboos (one of which was to prevent menstruating women from handling the sacred objects). The attire of each warrior, then, consisted of the symbolic representations of these supernatural powers.²⁸ Some wore bird feathers, bear claws, or other prepared animal remains. Many warriors attached a piece of corn (which represented the power of life) to their clothes.²⁹ In 1836, Samuel Allis described some of the charms and spirits that the Pawnees appealed to for power,

They often hold conversation with animals such as wildcats, woolves [sic], bears, etc. that these animals are brave in fighting, is the reason why they have their skins, claws, bones etc in there medecine bundles. There braves value a string of the bears claws verry highly they often give a horse for them, and were them in time of war to prevent the balls, and arrows hitting them. The grey eagle is also sacred with them, they skin them with the fethers [sic] on which they were as a head dress in time of war which is also a preserver of life, they tie one or more eagles feathers on there boos [sic], quivers, shields, warspears etc which they consider notonly [sic] neat, but more aspecially [sic] as a safeguard and token of bravery. Some of there braves have told me they have ben [sic] alone surrounded by there enemies who were shooting at them from evry [sic] side, and the balls & arrows didnot [sic] hit them because they had on plenty of bears claws, eagles fethers [sic] etc. and in relating the same story have told me they

²⁷ George Bird Grinnell, "Pawnee Mythology," *Journal of American Folk-Lore* 6 (1893), 116.

²⁸ Sometimes this spirit revealed itself in visions and dreams. Usually, however, an individual learned about the identity of his guardian spirit when a doctor, who had the power of the same animal, was able to cure him when he was ill. After learning the identity of the spirit, the young man joined the doctor's lodge of his guardian to learn about its secrets. Parks, "Pawnee," 537.

²⁹ According to Densmore, when going into battle, Pawnee warriors would sing war songs like "My whole trust is in mother corn." Densmore, *Pawnee Music*, 92; According to John Brown Dunbar, Pawnee warriors spent much time on their appearance. "The full-dress toilet of a young brave was a matter of serious and protracted study. . . No devotee of fashion ever labored more assiduously to produce striking results in dress than some of these Pawnee braves." Warriors shaved their heads closely except for the scalp lock. The beard and eyebrows were carefully pulled out, and face paint was an important part of the toilet. "After killing an enemy the lower part of the face might be painted black." Dunbar, "The Pawnee Indians," 268-269.

were in a dangerous situation, but it seemed to be the Lords will that they should live longer, and it was thru his goodness that they were yet alive, but this acknowledgment was selfish and did not come from the hart [sic].³⁰

Warriors kept animal skins, bones, claws, rocks, and other representations of the supernatural, in small, personal medicine bundles. They carried these bundles into battle for protection and success. Captain J. Lee Humfreville, who met the Pawnee Scouts during the Powder River campaign in 1865, described their reverence for the bundles

The Pawnees were exceedingly superstitious in relation to their "medicine bag." Every Pawnee habitation had its family medicine bag about the size of a child's head, which was filled with something that no white man was ever able to learn much about. It was supposed to contain the "medicine" necessary to bring them all the good luck they desired, and was supposed by them to be efficacious in healing the sick or keeping away disease, and in assisting them in all their efforts and undertakings. This bag was scrupulously guarded, and no member of the family would speak of its contents. Each individual Pawnee also carried a small medicine bag about his person. This was considered a great charm, and no Pawnee warrior would think of going into battle or on a hunt without it. It was his great protection under all circumstances.³¹

Pawnee warriors generally joined one or more men's societies. Although these fraternal orders were mainly recreational organizations, they also served specific public functions. Some acted as a tribal police force during the annual buffalo hunt. Most, however, were distinctly martial in character and took on the defense of the village during enemy attacks.³²

³⁰ Wedel, *The Dunbar-Allis Letters*, 707-708.

³¹ Humfreville, *Twenty Years Among Our Savage Indians*, 373.

³² Murie, "Pawnee Indian Societies," 558-560.

There were two types of men's societies among the Pawnees. The most prestigious orders were the so-called "Lance societies." These societies were associated with the tribal bundles. Only warriors with a distinguished record of achievement were allowed to become a member. Once a candidate passed the requirements of the fraternity, he became a member for life. Men could join several orders. Each society had its own lodge, origin myth, ceremonies, dances, songs, dress, paint code, and special objects. The ceremonial life of the orders usually revolved around a special lance. Each year, these lances were symbolically "renewed" (to restore their powers) in a special spring-time ceremony. Often the lance represented or symbolized a specific martial quality. The lance of the "Thunderbird Lance" society, for example, had a point of flint stone. The flint stone represented thunder or the power to strike an enemy before he was aware of any danger. The lances were normally not taken on war parties but used only for defensive purposes. Sometimes, during battle, a warrior would plant a lance before the enemy and tie himself to it. This symbolized his determination to stand and fight until death. He could be relieved only by another warrior who, in order to save the lance, carried it away. These orders usually fought like military "companies." Members fought side-by-side, and, not infrequently, died that way. Warriors of the "Crow Lance" society, for example, would string a rope through their belts and tie themselves together during battle. When one of them was killed, the others dragged him around as they fought.³³

Less accomplished warriors frequently organized into private societies. These orders were usually formed by ambitious young men and operated in a similar manner as the Lance societies. They, too, had their own origin myths, dances, dress and paint codes,

³³ The lances guarded over the entire tribe and according to some, also had the power to attract the buffalo.

ceremonies, and objects but lacked the official sanction of the sacred tribal bundles. They were usually created by a man who had been instructed to do so in a dream or vision. The supernatural power that gave him the vision, usually represented by a special object, promised success and protection to its followers. Unlike the established orders, these organizations often went on the warpath in search of horses and honor. They often distinguished themselves through their “reckless” behavior in battle (undoubtedly to gain recognition of their bravery). Some members of the “Crazy Dog” society, for example, pulled thin ropes through the foreskins of their penises during battle. They then tied the cords to a stake which they planted before an enemy, signaling their determination to fight until death. The “Children of the Iruska” were so-called “contraries,” who did things in reverse order. They only entered a fight when told not to. During battle they shot their arrows without aiming and then went to get them despite enemy fire. Because of their aggressive character, and the fact that they leaned heavily on the vision of one person, these societies were often short-lived. Several became extinct because its members were all massacred. Others, such as the “Young Dog” and the “Mischievous” societies, were very successful and rose greatly in esteem.³⁴ The warriors’ societies resembled the “company” system of the U. S. Army. It appears that the companies of Pawnee Scouts were not only organized according to band membership (Skidi, Chaui, Kitkehahki, or Pitahawirat), but that specially assigned scouting parties were often composed of members of a specific fraternal order.

Hence, they had to be carefully protected. Ibid., 558-578.

³⁴ Murie, “Pawnee Indian Societies,” 579-594; According to George Bird Grinnell the Young Dog society received most of its power through a “medicine dance” that had been introduced to them by an Arikara Indian. During this dance (a variant of the “Sun Dance”) the dancers appealed to the almighty to take pity

War parties did not have to consist of the members of one particular society. Any chief or warrior who had had a vision could organize a war party. He drew his followers from the different societies and, sometimes, different bands. Usually the leader of a party had no difficulty in recruiting men for his party, but sometimes he organized a special war dance for this purpose. War parties varied in size from a single man to a large group that numbered several hundred warriors. The contingent of Kitkehahki warriors that surrounded Stephen Long's advance party in 1819 numbered about 130 to 140 men.³⁵

Indian warfare has often been characterized as an undisciplined and disorganized affair. In reality, Indians usually spent a lot of time preparing for battle, and the Pawnees were no exception. They also maintained rigorous discipline. Discipline was essential in both the hunt and war. According to John Brown Dunbar, there had been instances in which the chiefs had taken a life to secure obedience. A person "persisting in willful insubordination was pretty sure of at least a sound beating."³⁶ Before setting out on a war party, according to Dunbar, the Pawnee warriors spent much time practicing various maneuvers. They fought "imaginary battles" in which they deployed and reassembled troops. Supervising these maneuvers was the leader of the party, who observed the movements of his men from an elevated position. From his advantage point he also gave signals and directions to the warriors.³⁷

on them and bless them with protection and power in battle. George Bird Grinnell, "The Young Dog's Dance," *Journal of American Folk-Lore* 4 (1891), 307-313.

³⁵ Edwin James, *Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains, Performed in the Years 1819 and '20* (Philadelphia: H. C. Carey and I. Lea, 1823), 133-134.

³⁶ John Brown Dunbar, "The Pawnee Indians," *Magazine of American History* 4 (April 1880), 260-261.

³⁷ John Brown Dunbar, "The Pawnee Indians," *Magazine of American History* 5 (November 1880), 335; According to Murray, the Pawnees approached the buffalo during their summer hunt in three parallel columns, led by the chief of the hunt in the center. He also wrote that during the hunt "[n]ot a man was allowed to leave the ranks; and the discipline seemed as strict as among regular troops on a march." Murray, *Travels in North America*, 379.

War parties were, in a sense, temporary societies. According to James Murie, they became *araris taka*, or “wolf” societies. In Skidi Pawnee cosmology, the wolf symbolized the god of war (the Morning Star). The Skidis, or “Wolf” Indians, adopted this animal as their tribal emblem because of its “intelligence, vigilance, and well known powers of endurance.”³⁸ The wolf had the power to steal upon an enemy and get away without being discovered. Before setting out on the expedition, the leader of the war party had to obtain this power for his men. He would go to the village bundle-keeper and ask for a number of articles from the bundle that were related to the specific powers of the wolf.³⁹ A four-day ceremony followed in which the warriors sought the sanction of the supernatural. The party carried these objects with them on the war path in a special war bundle.

According to Murie, the warriors set out on their mission in two columns. Each line had a leader, two scouts, two soldiers, the warriors, and some assistants. The scouts surveyed the area in front and on the flanks of the expedition. They reported their findings to the leaders. The exact task of the soldiers is not clear, but it is possible that they led the warriors like “company sergeants.” They also made sure that no man ventured off by himself in search of war honors and thereby endanger the entire party. The assistants were inexperienced young men on their first expedition. They usually stayed in the background and learned the art of warfare through observation of the more experienced members. All were painted heavily with white clay to imitate the wolf. The scouts also wore wolf skin caps or white eagle feathers arranged in their hair in such a way as to resemble a wolf’s

³⁸ According to Dunbar, the enemies of the Pawnees gave a different interpretation to the wolf emblem. To them it signified “cowardice.” The name Skidi is derived from the word *Ski-rik-i*, or wolf. In fact, the proper pronunciation of the Skidi is actually Ski-ri. John Brown Dunbar, “The Pawnee Indians,” *Magazine of American History* 4 (April 1880), 259.

ears. The idea was that as he was looking over the crest of a hill, he would appear to be a wolf rather than a spying man.⁴⁰

Unlike most plains tribes, the Pawnee horse raiding parties frequently made their forays into hostile territory on foot. They sometimes walked for hundreds of miles and ventured as far as Wyoming and Texas. According to some observers, war parties went on foot as a show of their determination to return horseback. According to John Brown Dunbar, such expeditions also had some strategic advantages: “movements on foot, though not so swift for a sudden dash, could be kept more secret and unerring, [and], in case of a hard struggle . . . they could not then be so easily stampeded, and all developments could be kept better in hand.”⁴¹ Of course, not all war parties were made on foot. The Pawnees also traveled on horseback. The organization of mounted party was essentially the same as a foot party.

After the scouts had located the enemy, the party set up camp to hold a ceremony involving the war bundle. In this ritual, the members of the party once again appealed to the supernatural powers for success in the upcoming event. After the ceremony, the

³⁹ The leader of the war party was entitled to wear a special war dress which consisted of an otterskin (which was split in the middle and worn over the shoulders, with the head hanging over his back), the skin of a swift hawk, a dried ear of corn, and flint arrowheads encircled by sweet grass. Parks, “Pawnee,” 528.

⁴⁰ Murie, “Pawnee Indian Societies,” 595-596. Migrants along the Oregon Trail recalled that the Pawnees imitated the howl of a wolf or the sounds of wild turkeys to disguise their approach. Merrill J. Mattes, *The Great Platte River Road: The Covered Wagon Mainline Via Fort Kearny to Fort Laramie* (Lincoln: Nebraska State Historical Society Publications v. 25, 1969), 158. While crossing the Plains in 1846, William Clayton, a Mormon pioneer and member of Brigham Young’s advance party to the Great Salt Lake, witnessed a Pawnee horse raiding party in operation. One day, one of the guards in Clayton’s camp saw something move in the grass at the foot of a high mole. The guard proceeded towards it thinking it was a wolf. When he came within twelve to fourteen rods, he stooped to shoot at the supposed wolf. “The moment he elevated his rifle, fifteen Indians sprang to their feet all naked except the breech cloth, and armed with rifles and bows and arrows. Each man having a rifle slung on his back, and his bow strung tight in his hand and about twenty arrows.” Ray Allen Billington, ed., *William Clayton’s Journal: A Daily Record of the Journey of the Original Company of “Mormon” Pioneers from Nauvoo, Illinois, to the Valley of the Great Salt Lake* (Salt Lake City, UT: The Deseret News, 1921/New York: Arno Press, 1973), 109.

warriors held a council to discuss the plan of attack. If the enemy camp was large, they would make a stealth attack during the night to drive off the horses. A few selected men, usually the scouts and the soldiers, approached the herds quietly on foot, then tried to scare the animals into a stampede and into the direction of the other party members. Sometimes they would scream and holler to get the horses moving. Josiah Gregg, who traveled the Santa Fe Trail in the 1830s and '40s, claims that the Pawnees also used a peculiar "whistle" to scare off the horses.⁴²

When the enemy party was small, the Pawnees might decide to attack the camp with full force. The object then was to capture not only horses but enemy scalps as well. The leader of the expedition did not necessarily participate in this attack, but he frequently directed the campaign from a strategic location. He usually remained behind to guard the war bundle. Overlooking the battlefield, he sent scouts to convey his orders or he signaled the warriors from his position.⁴³ James Pattie wrote about this particular strategy in 1824:

[They make their incursions on horseback, and often extend them to the distance of six or seven hundred miles. They chiefly engage on horseback, and their weapons, for the most part, consist of a bow and arrows, a lance and shield, though many of them at present have fire arms.] Their commander stations himself in the rear of his warriors, seldom taking part in the battle, unless he should be himself attacked, which is not often the case. They show no inconsiderable military stratagem in their marches, keeping spies before and behind, and on each flank, at the distance of a

⁴¹ John Brown Dunbar, "The Pawnee Indians," *Magazine of American History* 5 (November 1880), 335.

⁴² Murie, "Pawnee Indian Societies," 596-597; Josiah Gregg, "Commerce on the Prairies," in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., *Early Western Travels, 1748-1846* vol. 20 (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1905), 90, 207.

⁴³ Martha Royce Blaine, *Pawnee Passage: 1870-1875* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 110; Edwin James tells of a leader of a Kitkehahki war party who carried a war whistle around his neck. James, *Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains*, 133.

few days travel; so that in their open country, it is almost impossible to come upon them by surprise.⁴⁴

Apart from horses and scalps, the Pawnees also took other trophies. In the 1830s, Maximilian, Prince of Wied, observed a Pawnee warrior who wore a valuable Sioux head dress into battle. He had taken it from a distinguished Sioux chief and wore it to taunt and challenge his enemies. This warrior took considerable risks, because the Sioux, recognizing the headdress of their deceased comrade, made great efforts to kill him. Clearly the Pawnee must have been extremely brave because he intentionally solicited the wrath of the Sioux.⁴⁵

Horses, scalps, and plunder were not the only objects of desire. Warriors also sought to count coup on their enemies.⁴⁶ Although Plains Indian warfare was first and foremost a struggle over economic resources, within this context personal performance during battle was important for the individual warrior. A brave warrior and successful raider would have little trouble recruiting men for new raids. The crucial measuring device of his success and prowess were the number of coups he had counted on his enemies. In order to lead future war parties, and thus receive a larger part of its spoils, warriors hoped to obtain as many coups as possible. Such acts would win them great prestige.

The Pawnees recognized several deeds that counted as war honors. All of these required great bravery and skill. Among these were: the capture of enemy horses, the

⁴⁴ Thwaites, ed., "Personal Narrative of James O. Pattie," 47.

⁴⁵ Maximilian, Prince of Wied, "Travels in the Interior of North America, 1832-1834," in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., *Early Western Travels, 1748-1846* vol. 22 (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, 1906), 326.

taking of an enemy's scalp or gun in battle, and taking an enemy prisoner. Among the highest honors, however, was to be the first to strike a dead or fallen enemy.⁴⁷ While this act may not seem very daring at first glance, the Indians did value it as such. Philip St. George Cooke, who knew the Pawnees first-hand, explained:

there are several reasons given for this singular honor; one perhaps is, that it is most likely to fall to the person who has slain the enemy. A wounded man is dangerous to approach, and will generally have friends near him; and it is a frequent stratagem to feign death to draw on an enemy-seeking this honor-to almost certain destruction. I once saw a warrior rushing too eagerly to strike a foe, who certainly was quite dead, killed by an accidental shot.⁴⁸

After the raid or attack, the war party immediately retreated with its plunder. They would ride continuously for two or three days without sleep or food. Once they were out of reach of their pursuers, they camped in a secure place. Some members went to hunt and brought back meat to be sacrificed in a thanksgiving ceremony. Two men, selected by the leader, divided the horses among the men according to their rank. After the division of the horses and the thanksgiving ceremony, it was time for a name-changing ceremony.⁴⁹

According to Pawnee belief, whenever a man performed an act of great courage, he was entitled to change his name. This custom rested on the idea that life developed in certain stages. Some men rose only a little way, while others lived on a dead level.

⁴⁶ Murie, "Pawnee Indian Societies," 640, says that coups were of no particular importance because they did not qualify a man for public service. Only consecrations of buffalo meat, wild cat skins, etc., could. For important services a person would have to have four or more consecration ceremonies to his credit.

⁴⁷ Marian W. Smith, "The War Complex of the Plains Indians," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 78 (1938), 426-434. According to Smith, the object was not simply to kill the enemy, but to humiliate him.

⁴⁸ Philip St. George Cooke, *Scenes and Adventures in the Army, or, Romance of Military Life* (Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston, 1857/New York: Arno Press, 1973), 110-111.

⁴⁹ Murie, "Pawnee Indian Societies," 596-597.

However, men who had sought the favor of the gods could “climb up” through deeds that indicated great ability or strength of character. Success in battle, such as counting coup on an enemy, was among these accomplishments. By discarding his old name and adopting a new one, a warrior announced that he had reached a new level in the path of life. This process involved a name-changing ceremony during which the man recounted his deed publicly and in the presence of a priest. Among the Chaui, Kitkehahkis, and Pitahawirats, the ceremony consisted of reciting a lengthy poem that explained the origin of the custom and related the way the gods took pity on the man and gave him the power to perform the deed. The recital ended with the disposal of the old and the adoption of the new name:

Ra-wa! Ha-wa u-ra-sha-ru we tat-ki-wa-ti.
 Hi-ri! Ta-tux ta-pa-ki-a-ho, ha-wa, Ra-ruts-ka-tit! Hi-ri! Ra-ro rik-cha ro re
 Hi-ri! A-ki-ta-ro hi-wa we-ra-ta-we-ko.
 Hi-ri! Sha-ku'-ru Wa'-ruk-ste. Hi-ri-wa wi-ti ra-ka-wa-ka-ru ko re.

(Attend! Once more I change his name. Harken! [*Ri-ruts 'ka-tit*] it was we used to call him by, a name he won long days ago, marking an act well done by him, but now passed by. Harken! Today all men shall say- Harken! His act has lifted him. Where all his tribe behold a man. Clothed with new fame, strong in new strength, gained by his deeds, blessed of the gods. Harken! [*Sha-ku'-ru Wa'-ruk-ste*] shall he be called.)⁵⁰

After the name-changing ceremony and sufficient rest, the warriors set out for home. According to Murie, they would set the grass on fire regularly to announce the villages of their return. They also painted their faces black or covered the white face paint with black dots.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Alice C. Fletcher, “A Pawnee Ritual Used When Changing a Man’s Name,” *American Anthropologist* 1 [New Series] (1899), 82-97.

⁵¹ Murie, “Pawnee Indian Societies,” 597.

Charles Murray witnessed an attack by a Cheyenne war party on a Pawnee hunting camp in 1835. Within a few minutes after the alarm rang, the Pawnee began their pursuit, but the Cheyennes made their escape under the cover of night. Later that evening, Murray heard a Pawnee by the name of Black Wolf sing a victory song:

~~I rushed upon my enemy like a buffalo!~~
I shouted my war cry aloud!
Hi-hi-hi-hi-hi!&c.
I took his scalp!
His women howl for him in their lodge!
I am a great war-chief!
I am called the Black Wolf!
Hi-hi-hi-hi!⁵²

Torture of enemy captives was not uncommon among the Pawnees. Although the Chausis, Kitkehahkis, and Pitahawirats had no equivalent to the Skidi Morning Star Ceremony, they, too, tortured prisoners.⁵³ Usually, torture was the prerogative of the women. Returning war parties presented captives to the women's society of the village, which usually consisted of single women, old maids, and widows. During the four-day ceremony, the women wore mock war-bonnets, made of corn husks instead of feathers, and carried crude representations of weapons. They made a fire in front of the prisoner and humiliated and tortured him in any conceivable way. According to James Murie,

⁵² Murray, *Travels in North America*, 329-333.

⁵³ Edwin James, who accompanied Stephen H. Long on his journey to the west in 1819-20, told the story of an old Minnetarie [Mandan?] warrior who, as a youth, had been captured by the Skidis as he was trying to steal some of their horses. The Skidis flogged him, thrust a stick up his anus, and sent him off with the stick "depending like a tail." James also related the story of Omaha Chief *Mot-tschu-jinga* (Little Grizzly Bear), who was captured and subjected to a humiliating torture. The Skidis flogged him, cut off his hair, broke his pipe, forced him to drink urine mixed with bison gall, and drove him from their village without food. He later returned with his warriors and burned a Pawnee village in revenge. These stories seem to be exceptions, because the Pawnees did not allow adult male captives to live very long. "James's Account of S. H. Long's Expedition, 1819-1820," 88, 98.

women would urinate in bowls and force the captive to drink. Others took up coals of fire with which they scorched the victim's skin. Usually, the torture ended with the death of the captive.⁵⁴

When they were unable to take captives, warriors brought in enemy scalps, which served as a substitute. The women would get the chance to exact "revenge" on the scalp. James Pattie witnessed such a scalp dance in 1824. The Pawnees raised a tall pole, on the top of which they attached the scalps they had taken in the last battle. The dance, in which the warriors sang of their deeds, lasted three days. At the end of the dance, the men took the pole down and gave the scalps to the women, whose turn it was to vent their anger at the scalps. They kicked the scalps about and threw them around until they, too, ceased "in the apparent satisfaction of gratified revenge."⁵⁵

All this time the war party was formally still in operation (allowing women and other members of the tribe to share in the glory of the expedition). It did not end until a "homecoming" ceremony had been conducted. In this ceremony, which took place after a long interval, the leader of the war party returned the objects from the war bundle to the original bundle keeper. The members of the party also presented the bundle keeper with a number of gifts, such as horses.⁵⁶

War dances not only provided individual warriors with a stage to display their bravery, but they also allowed the Pawnees to impress guests with the military prowess of the tribe. In the early 1830s, Philip St. George Cooke attended a Pawnee war dance at

⁵⁴ Murie, "Pawnee Indian Societies," 598-599.

⁵⁵ Thwaites, ed., "Personal Narrative of James O. Pattie," 44.

⁵⁶ Following the "homecoming" ceremony was a "wolf" dance. In this dance all young men who wished to join the next war party danced while the old men. According to Murie, sat around and ridiculed their ardor. Murie, "Pawnee Indian Societies," 597.

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Each time a dancer moved into the dance circle to recount a coup, he placed a small gift before the chief, who acted as a judge on the bravest deed:

[A] fine-looking warrior sprang into the circle, stuck an arrow into the ground, and then, in the most animated language, recounted one of his deeds in arms; closing with a call upon any performer of a greater action to make his claim to the prize. He said, in substance, that he had ridden alone to a Spaniard's (Mexican's) house, shot down the owner, scalped him, and driven off sixty horses and mules. After a pause, another brave arose; described an action which he deemed more brave or reputable. He had, on a certain occasion, struck a man in battle: and then removing the arrow, laid it at the feet of the presiding chief. Others in like manner offered articles, some of more value, until many had, in their finest style of oratory, proclaimed their proudest deeds. These recitals are always strictly veracious; and fashion, or custom, decides that they are not immodest. At the close, the chief adds his sanction by a distribution of the prizes. Opinion has settled the comparative honor of many of these feats. The highest is, to take a warrior prisoner; the second, first to strike a dead or fallen man in battle . . . Next to this feat is, to strike an opposing enemy in battle.⁵⁷

Warriors not only tried to impress visitors with war dances, but they also displayed their deeds on buffalo robe paintings. "The story of a battle is often depicted in this way," wrote Edwin James in 1820, "and the robe of a warrior is frequently decorated with the narration, in pictures, of some of his exploits." Warriors frequently gave these paintings away so their fame might be carried with them.⁵⁸

A warrior who died in the defense of his village or for the greater glory of his tribe received a funeral with all the splendor that his deeds deserved. After clothing him in his finest garments, a priest treated his body and face with fat and sacred red paint to give it a smooth and healthy appearance. If he had been a member of a fraternal society, his face

⁵⁷ Cooke, *Scenes and Adventures in the Army*, 110-111.

⁵⁸ "James's Account of S. H. Long's Expedition," 149, 208-209.

would be painted according to the style of his society. While uttering prayers, the priest also placed offerings of meat fat in the hands and mouth of the deceased, in order to send his spirit on its way. Then his body was wrapped in a buffalo robe or blanket. Burial took place usually within two days after death. The Pawnees buried the bodies of their dead with the head towards the east. They also placed objects in the grave, such as scalps, knives, revolvers, bows and arrows, pipes, personal bundles, etc. Warriors belonging to one of the lance societies were sometimes buried with lances that had been discarded after the lance renewal ceremony. After the burial the mourners placed food and other objects on the graves. Occasionally, a horse was slain and placed at the grave site. The idea behind these funerary gifts was that these objects would be useful in the afterlife. Sometimes, the mourners burned enemy scalps at the grave site.⁵⁹ Bodies that could not be recovered were left where they had died. This was not a violation of proper burial procedure. According to Roger Echo-Hawk, “such resting places on the open ground were respected as acceptable alternatives to interment in the earth.”⁶⁰

The death of a loved one was cause of much pain and grief among the Pawnees. In their grief, mourners slashed their arms, chests, and legs with knives. Women cut their hair. Charles Murray stated in 1835 that the “duration of mourning among [them] seems very unfixed: the widow always mourns a year for her husband; but I have sometimes seen squaws mourning . . . for a relative, who had been some years dead.”⁶¹ Father Pierre-Jean DeSmet described the burial of a Pawnee brave who had been killed during a

⁵⁹ The information on Pawnee funerary practices is based on an article by Roger C. Echo-Hawk, “Pawnee Mortuary Traditions,” *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 16 (1992), 77-99.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 91.

⁶¹ Murray, *Travels in North America*, 439.

running fight with some Arapahos in 1851. The Arapahos had attempted to steal the Pawnees' horses but were soon overtaken.

[T]he Pawnees were returning with their dead and wounded and all the stolen horses. On their return to camp, nothing was heard but cries of sorrow, rage and despair, with threats and vociferations against their enemies. It was a harrowing scene. The deceased warrior was decorated and painted with all the marks of distinction of a great brave, and loaded with his finest ornaments. They placed him in the grave amid the acclamations and lamentations of the whole tribe.⁶²

Still, the Pawnees also believed that death on the field of battle was more honorable and even *desirable* for a warrior than death of old age or sickness. A warrior, who died in the defense of the village or for the greater glory of his nation was showered with honors. His death, while a cause of much grief, was also an source of great pride. Jean Baptiste Truteau, a French trader who lived and traded among the Pawnees in the 1790s, observed this peculiar sentiment during the funeral of a Pawnee brave:

I myself have seen, when I resided for three consecutive years at the home of the nation of *Panis Republicains* [Kitkehahkis] fathers and mothers sing near the bodies of their sons that had been brought back to the village to be interred, sons who had been killed in battle between the *Halitannes* [Comanches] and the *Republicains* on open prairie at some distance from their summer hunting camp, which episode I witnessed. These women, mothers of the young men who were killed, holding a bow in one hand and

⁶² Chittenden and Richardson, eds., *Life, Letters and Travels of Father Pierre-Jean DeSmet*, 722. DeSmet also described a Pawnee grave when he traveled through Pawnee territory in the [1840s?]: "As we went on, we saw here and there the solitary burial places of the Pawnees; probably those of some chiefs or warriors who had fallen in combat with their hereditary foes, the Sioux, Cheyennes or Osages. These tombs were adorned with buffalo skulls painted red; the body is put, in a sitting position, into a little cabin made of reeds and branches of trees, strongly interwoven to keep the wolves out. The face is daubed with vermilion, the body is covered with its finest war-ornaments, and beside it one sees provisions of every kind, dried meat, tobacco, powder and lead, gun, bow and arrows. For several years the families will come back every spring to renew these provisions. Their idea is that the soul hovers for a long time about the spot where the body reposes, before taking its flight to the land of souls (205)."

an arrow in the other, sang near the bodies of their sons an air both gay and martial, thanking them for having given them the satisfaction of seeing them die at the hands of the enemy while fighting valiantly for the defense of their country, a death a thousand times preferable to the fate of him who on a wretched mat expires consumed by some deadly disease.⁶³

And so the life-cycle of a warrior came to an end. But as his spirit rose to the after world, another man would take his place. This warrior carried on the martial tradition against the enemies of his nation. He fought to preserve the buffalo grounds. He stole into enemy camps to secure the horses his people needed for the upcoming annual hunt. He was capable of committing acts of great bravery as well as great cruelty in the name of honor and revenge. His objective was always to hurt the enemy who threatened the lives of his people as well as his own existence. Sometimes he fought them as part of a war party with his brothers of his lance society. In the 1860s and '70s, he could also fight his enemy as a scout in the service of the United States Army.

⁶³ Jean Baptiste Truteau quoted in John C. Ewers, *Plains Indian History and Culture: Essays on Continuity and Change* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 204.

CHAPTER FOUR

U. S. MILITARY TACTICS AND THE RECRUITMENT OF THE PAWNEE SCOUTS

The expansion of the Sioux and Cheyennes posed a problem not only for the Pawnees but for the United States as well. Although the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 had transferred the political title to the northern and central Plains from France to the United States, the military pacification of the region by the Americans was an entirely different matter. Contrary to popular imagination, the United States did not control the Plains. The Sioux and their allies were competing with the United States for the domination of the area.¹ For most of the nineteenth century the U. S. Army was unable to impose its military hegemony over the powerful tribes of the West. It was this failure of the army to subdue these tribes that prompted military commanders to seek the assistance of those Indian nations who also suffered from the pressures of these tribes. Thus, the Pawnees did not approach the United States. Rather, the Americans approached *them*.

Until the Mexican War (1846-1848), the relations between the United States and the Indians of the Plains had been relatively peaceful. But the conclusion of the war marked a new phase of Anglo-American expansion into the West. The newly acquired territories in Oregon and the Southwest attracted thousands of settlers. Traffic along the

¹ Richard White, "The Winning of the West: The Expansion of the Western Sioux in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," *Journal of American History* 65 (1978), 342.

Santa Fe Trail increased, and new highways, such as the Oregon and California Trails, sliced through the Plains. The migrants were a source of irritation for the tribes inhabiting the Plains. Their wagon trains disrupted hunting grounds and scared away the buffalo and other game. They also depleted the supply of timber along the trails, and their livestock consumed the grass that Indian horses depended on for forage. The flow of settlers grew dramatically after the discovery of gold in California and Colorado in the 1840s and 50s.²

As the volume of traffic along the trails increased, so did the number of confrontations between Indians and whites. Some Indians resented the disruption caused by the migrants, whom they regarded as trespassers. They deplored the disappearance of game and demanded gifts such as food and supplies as a form of compensation for allowing the migrants to travel through their land. Others did not demand but simply took what they needed. They did not consider stealing a dishonorable occupation, especially if hunger was the alternative. The overland travelers, however, detested the presence of Indians along the trail.³

To prevent conflicts between Indians and migrants, the United States government adopted a number of measures. It established a series of military posts along the main routes to guard the overland trails and to impress the Indian nations with the power of the United States.⁴ In addition to building forts, government officials also began to negotiate

² For a detailed history of the impact of the Colorado gold rush on Indian-white relations see Elliott West, *The Contested Plains: Indians, Goldseekers, and the Rush to Colorado* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998).

³ Robert M. Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), 60.

⁴ Among the forts along the Oregon-California Trail and on the central Plains were Fort Kearny (in operation from 1848-1871; not to be confused with another post with the same name located at the Missouri River south of Lincoln, Nebraska, in existence from 1846 to 1848), Fort Laramie (1849-1890), Fort Fetterman ((1867-1882), Fort Sidney (also known as Sidney Barracks, 1867-1894), Fort Sedgwick (1864-1871), Fort McPherson (1863-1880), Fort Atkinson (1850-1854), Fort Dodge (1865-1882), Fort Larned

with the tribes living near the main highways. In 1851, they concluded a treaty with the tribes of the northern Plains at Fort Laramie. In this treaty, the Indians agreed to leave the migrant trains alone, refrain from wars with the United States and each other, and permit the construction of forts and roads through their territories. In return, the United States promised to pay the Indians annuities and restitution for damages caused by travelers. Two years later, at Fort Atkinson, Kansas, a similar treaty was concluded with the tribes of the southern Plains. Finally, during the 1850s, the United States adopted the reservation policy. This policy replaced the removal policy of the 1830s, which had become impractical after the United States acquired the southwestern territories during the Mexican War. The reservation policy not only allowed the United States to contain tribes in relatively small areas, but it also enabled missionaries and other agents of “civilization” to begin their work of obliterating American Indian cultures.

These measures did little to appease Indian tribes. Indians considered the presence of forts in the heart of their country as humiliating. They also resented the sluggishness with which the United States implemented its treaty provisions. Annuities rarely arrived on time, and while the government was quick to punish Indians accused of committing depredations, it did little to prevent or punish violations against Indians. Most of all, however, Indian tribes resented attempts by the government to confine them on reservations. Forts, treaties, and reservations, then, were not a solution to Indian hostilities but frequently a cause of it.⁵

(1859-1878), and Fort Hays (1865-1889). Francis Paul Prucha, *A Guide to the Military Posts of the United States, 1789-1895* (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1964), 44-45.

⁵ For an excellent discussion of the Reservation Policy see Robert M. Utley, *The Indian Frontier of the American West, 1846-1890* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), chapter 2.

The United States government depended heavily on the army to maintain peace on the Plains. Its task was twofold: protect travelers and settlers from opposing Indians and protect friendly Indians from hostile and ignorant whites. The best way to keep these groups apart was to limit the Indians from roaming the area and keep them concentrated on reservations near the forts. But the army faced a number of problems that prevented it from achieving these goals.

One of these problems was the size of the regular army. Congress placed restrictions on the size of the army for budgetary as well as ideological reasons. Policy makers in Washington disagreed on the proper policy. Some, mostly western Congressmen, advocated military conquest. Others, mostly eastern Congressmen, favored “conquest by kindness.” Washington never resolved this dilemma. As a result, the frontier army was always undermanned. Death, desertion, and discharge, produced an average turnover ratio of twenty-eight percent. To make matters worse, army was scattered over a large number of small and isolated military outposts in the West. Robert M. Utley calculated that, in 1853, each of the fifty-four stations in the West were manned by an average effective force of 124 men. The United States was unable to deploy enough troops to cover the entire territory west of the Mississippi River. This situation became even more acute between 1860 and 1876, when large numbers of troops were transferred from the West to the South during the Civil War and Reconstruction years.⁶

The quality of the troops posed another problem. Although many were competent professionals, many others were not. All enlisted men were volunteers, but this did not mean that morale was high. According to Don Rickey, Jr., many recruits were recent

⁶ Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue*, 19.

immigrants who enlisted for five years to learn the English language and the ways of the new country. Most came from poor families. Many were illiterate. The average age of the recruits was twenty-three years. The frontier army also attracted a large number of social outcasts such as vagabonds and criminals who enlisted to stay out of the hands of the law. Until the 1880s, new recruits received little or no training. Recruitment depots merely served as temporary facilities for new recruits before they were sent to their respective companies around the West. These companies served as substitute “family” units. The new soldiers usually learned military skills from observing the more experienced men in the company. Unfortunately, many saw action before this rudimentary military training was completed. As a result, most of the battle casualties in the Indian wars were inexperienced men. Army life was unrewarding, monotonous, physically and mentally taxing, and occasionally dangerous. Pay was low, and desertion was a great problem. In his annual report for 1891, Secretary of War Stephen B. Elkins estimated that between 1867 and 1891, one-third of all the men recruited had deserted the army.⁷

⁷ Before 1854, a Cavalry man received \$8 a month. Foot soldiers and artillery men received \$7, while company Sergeants earned \$13 a month. After 1854, monthly wages were raised to \$12 for the Cavalry, \$11 for Infantry and Artillery men, and \$17 for Sergeants. Soldiers who re-enlisted received more per month than first time recruits. Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue*, 36. The company was the most important unit. Cavalry and Infantry Regiments consisted of 10 companies. The officer corps per Regiment consisted of a Colonel, a Lieutenant Colonel, two Majors, an Adjutant, a Quartermaster, and a number of non-commissioned officers (Sergeant Majors, Quartermaster Sergeants, buglers for the Cavalry, and pipers and drummers for the Infantry). Each company consisted of regular soldiers (sizes varied according to the circumstances; but companies rarely reached their maximum size), commanded by a Captain, followed by a First and Second Lieutenant, and a number Sergeants. Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue*, 22. Between 1860 and 1890, the army had three major recruit depots from which active units were replenished as conditions required. Jefferson Barracks in Missouri served as a depot for the Cavalry. David’s Island (New York), Columbus Barracks (Ohio), and until the 1870s, Newport Barracks (Kentucky), served as depot stations for the Infantry. At the depots, the new recruits received their uniforms and a first taste of army food and discipline. Privates rarely had contact with their officers. The First Sergeant usually “ran” the company. He was assisted by duty Sergeants and Corporals. Don Rickey, Jr., *Forty Miles A Day On Beans And Hay: The Enlisted Soldier Fighting the Indian Wars* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963).

In his memoirs, Captain J. Lee Humfreville, who met the Pawnee Scouts on several occasions, described the hardships during military campaigns against Indians:

Let me give a brief description of the usual conditions of a real battle with Indians. The trooper, more or less incapacitated by disease incident to exposed camp life, was usually almost worn out by excessive fatigue; his dress consisted of a pair of boots (no stockings), a pair of old military trousers (no drawers) full of holes and saturated with grease and dirt, a woolen army shirt, blouse, and cap. His rations consisted of hard bread (often filled with worms), rancid bacon, and sometimes pieces of fresh meat, frequently eaten without salt or pepper. For days, and sometimes for weeks, he would be without shelter, sleeping on the ground under the broad canopy of heaven in all kinds of weather, often in rain or snow, sometimes with only a blanket crawling with vermin to cover him, half dead with repeated night watches and long daily marches over arid plains or rugged mountains. Such was the trooper's physical condition. His horse, after subsisting on grass alone for a long time, and drinking stagnant water, would be much run down and weakened. Such was his mount. This is a true description of the actual trooper, in my time, as he usually engaged in battle with the Indians.⁸

During the Civil War, local volunteer and militia units replaced the regular troops, who were sent off to the battlefields in the South. These volunteer units often consisted of rough frontiersmen who were quite prepared to deal with life in the field, but who also harbored an intense hatred of Indians. While most men serving in the regular army regarded their Indian enemies as brutal "savages, who neither gave nor expected quarter, who tortured, mutilated, and ravaged helpless enemies," this sentiment was perhaps even stronger among the western volunteers. These soldiers were even less inclined to show mercy towards Indians. Their brutal and exterminist attitude intensified the state of war

⁸ J. Lee Humfreville, *Twenty Years Among Our Savage Indians* (Hartford, CT: Hartford Publishing Company, 1897), 57. Humfreville, who served in the Eleventh Ohio Cavalry, first met the Pawnee Scouts during the Curtis and Mitchell campaign against the Cheyennes in August 1864.

between the United States and the Sioux and Cheyennes, particularly after the massacre of a peaceful Cheyenne camp near Sand Creek, Colorado, in November of 1864.⁹

The quality of the officer corps, like that of the regular soldiers, ranged from the competent to the incompetent. The U. S. Military Academy at West Point, did not prepare officers for Indian warfare. Before the Civil War, a large number of officers were drawn from civil life and had little military experience at all. Promotions depended on seniority rather than merit. The seniority system thus hampered the advancement of capable officers to top military positions. To award experience and ability, the army began to award brevet ranks. Under this system the army recognized officers' performances in battle (although Indian battles did not qualify for such a recognition) and awarded them with a brevet rank. Hence, a lieutenant or captain could claim a brevet rank of major or lieutenant colonel. More than half the colonels claimed brevets of brigadier or major general. Under certain circumstances, brevet ranks took effect in the field. This could lead to awkward situations. According to Robert Utley, a captain with no brevet might find himself serving under a lieutenant who had received a brevet of major during the Mexican War.¹⁰

Apart from the size and quality of the army, the peculiar environment of the Plains also posed a great challenge. The climate ranged from extremely cold temperatures during the winter to intense heat during the summer. The terrain was often inhospitable and hardly accessible for an army carrying heavy or light artillery. The lack of fuel, food, and fresh water made campaigning extremely difficult. The army took provisions (usually

⁹ Rickey, *Forty Miles A Day*, 230; See Stan Hoig, *The Sand Creek Massacre* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961).

¹⁰ Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue*, 32-33.

large quantities of hardtack, coffee, flour, sugar, beans, salt, and bacon) along on expeditions, but the wagons carrying the supplies slowed down the columns, limiting the army's effectiveness. The United States never quite managed to create an army that could live off the country like the Indians could. Instead, the army's Quartermaster Department established a logistical system that oversaw the delivery of supplies at certain rendezvous points during the campaigns. But even this system, because of the unpredictable nature of the Indians' movements, was inadequate. During the early phases of the Indian wars, the lack of knowledge of the region's geography also hindered campaigns.¹¹

The greatest obstacle to the military pacification of the Plains, however, were the Indians themselves. Their peculiar style of guerrilla warfare, with its emphasis on ambushes and surprise attacks, made conventional warfare virtually impossible. Indian tribes generally avoided pitched battles in which the superior fire power of the U. S. Army would give the advantage to the Americans. Their mobility and ability to live off the country gave them a great advantage over American troops.¹² To offset these disadvantages, the War Department developed a number of strategies. Among these were the "converging columns," in which commanders split their forces into separate columns to enhance the probability of contact. During the 1860s, the army had some success with

¹¹ Ibid, 5-6.

¹² According to Philippe Regis de Trobriand, an army officer who analyzed Indian warfare in his journals, the Indian mode of warfare terrified American soldiers: "Many of the new soldiers, thoroughly frightened by ridiculous reports and absurd commentaries on the Indians, have become accustomed to considering them so dangerous that they think more of avoiding them than of fighting them." De Trobriand became an advocate for the use of Indian Scouts and allies in the military campaigns of the West. Lucille M. Kane, ed. and transl., *Military Life in Dakota: The Journal of Philippe Regis de Trobriand* (St. Paul, MN: Alvord Memorial Commission, 1951), 60. In his memoirs, Captain J. Lee Hunfreville recalled his anxiety in battle: "When the battle opened there was always great uneasiness even among the most hardened campaigners. I know that I was always frightened from the time the engagement opened until it was finished, for the Indians generally outnumbered us not less than two to one. Once wounded and left on the field, there was nothing in store for a white man but torture and death. The thought of such a fate added terror to my

so-called “winter campaigns,” which took full advantage of the winter conditions when Indian mobility, too, was limited. During the campaigns of the 1870s, General George Crook tried to improve the army’s mobility by using pack mules to carry supplies. Finally, the army began to experiment with Indian auxiliaries that could track, locate, and, if possible, attack enemy camps.¹³

The first Pawnees to ever serve as scouts for the U. S. Army, joined Colonel Edwin Vose Sumner’s summer campaign against the Cheyennes in 1857. Hostilities between the United States and the Sioux and Cheyennes had erupted a few years earlier. In 1854 an overly ambitious young officer, Second Lieutenant John L. Grattan, rode with his company into a Sioux camp to investigate the theft of a cow belonging to a Mormon migrant. Grattan’s brusque and irresponsible action resulted in the prompt annihilation of his command. The following year, troops under Colonel William S. Harney retaliated by destroying a Sioux village under Little Thunder (consisting mostly of peaceful Minneconjous and Brules) at Ash Hollow, Nebraska Territory. This event angered the Sioux and their Cheyenne allies, who intensified their raids along the different migrant roads.

In October 1856, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis ordered his staff to devise plans for a military campaign against the Cheyennes. In April 1857, the plans were ready, and Winfield Scott, General in Chief of the U. S. Army, instructed Colonel Edwin V. Sumner, commander of the First Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth, to launch the expedition. The Cheyennes gathered that summer for their annual Sun Dance at a location between

distress, though, at the same time, it nerved me to desperation.” Humfreville, *Twenty Years Among Our Savage Indians*, 58.

the Republican and Arkansas Rivers. To intercept the Indians, Sumner received orders to mount two columns. The southern column, under command of Major John Sedgwick, consisted of four companies (D, E, G, and H) of the First Cavalry. Sedgwick followed the Santa Fe Trail in search of the Cheyennes and then moved north to meet with Sumner's northern column at a rendezvous point near the South Platte River. Aiding Sedgwick's troops were five Delaware Indian Scouts. His command left Fort Leavenworth on May 18.¹⁴

Sumner's column, which consisted of two companies (A and B) of the First Cavalry, took a northern route. Sumner left Fort Leavenworth on May 20, 1857. He followed the Oregon Trail and arrived at Fort Kearny on June 4. At Fort Kearny he enlisted the services of five Pawnees. The Pawnees were led by *Ta-ra-da-ka-wa*, a chief of the Pitahawirats. The Pawnees had seen the Cheyenne camp near the Republican River a few weeks earlier. They were hired to guide the troops to the site of the village.¹⁵

After leaving Fort Kearny, Sumner proceeded to Fort Laramie where he added three companies of the Sixth Infantry to his command. He then traveled to the meeting point on the South Platte, where he and Sedgwick combined their commands on July 6. The Pawnee Scouts now directed the column over rough and broken landscape to the Republican River. The difficult terrain forced Sumner to pack his supplies on mules and send the wagons, except for an ambulance, back. The march in the scorching summer heat was hard on men and animals alike. On July 27, the Pawnee Scouts discovered fresh

¹³ Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1974/1984), 45-53.

¹⁴ For an excellent history of Sumner's campaign see William Y. Chalfant, *Cheyennes and Horse Soldiers: The 1857 Expedition and the Battle of Solomon's Fork* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989).

Cheyenne horse tracks close to the camp. Sumner's troops had been discovered. Fearing that the Cheyennes might try to escape, Sumner abandoned the Infantry and ordered the Cavalry to ride ahead to intercept the Indians.¹⁶

Sumner's fears were unfounded. The Cheyennes had no intention of moving. Their scouts had been following his command since it left the South Platte River, and they had used the time to prepare for the upcoming battle. They believed that the medicine of White Bull and Grey Beard, two of their holy men, would sabotage the guns of the Americans. Certain of victory, the Cheyennes did not even prepare their village, located some fourteen miles from the battle site, for retreat.¹⁷

On July 29, 1857, the two armies met for battle at the South Fork of the Solomon River. The Cheyennes coolly awaited the arrival of the troops, then, in atypical fashion, lined up in battle formation. Sumner's troops, about three hundred men, also lined up. Fall Leaf, one of the Delaware Scouts, rode out in front of the troops and fired his gun at the Cheyennes. The Cheyennes promptly returned the fire. According to Robert M. Peck, Sumner turned to Lieutenant David S. Stanley and said: "Bear witness, Lieutenant Stanley, that an Indian fired the first shot!" Fall Leaf's action relieved Sumner from his

¹⁵ According to Percival Lowe and Robert Morris Peck, who served in the expedition, the name of the Pawnee chief meant "Speck-in-the-eye." Chalfant, *Cheyennes and Horse Soldiers*, 110-111.

¹⁶ Ibid, 156-160; According to Lieutenant David S. Stanley, the Pawnees "took us pretty straight to [the Cheyennes]." David S. Stanley, *Personal Memoirs of Major-General D. S. Stanley, U. S. A.* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1917), 43. They took the command to the Cheyennes with little consideration of the train of six-mule wagons that carried the provisions. Hence, Sumner was forced to send most of the wagons back to Fort Laramie. According to one witness, the Pawnee guides were the only ones who knew anything of the country. *New York Times*, October 15, 1857.

¹⁷ According to George Bird Grinnell, the two medicine men were named "Ice" (later assuming the name *Ho tua'hwo ko ma is* or "White Bull") and "Dark" (Ah no kit'). George Bird Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971), 117; Donald J. Berthrong, *The Southern Cheyennes* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963/1986), 140. According to George Bent, Grey Beard was an influential medicine man of the southern Cheyennes, while White Bull (or "Ice") was a medicine man of the northern Cheyennes. See George E. Hyde, *Life of George Bent Written from His Letters* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 102-104.

instructions to negotiate with the Indians first. The Colonel then issued his orders:

“Gallop March! . . . Draw Sabres! . . . Charge!”¹⁸

Upon seeing the soldiers draw their sabres, the Cheyennes' confidence crumbled. They had expected to fight the troops armed with guns, as their medicine men had predicted. The sudden appearance of the sabres baffled them. In their confusion, they quickly discharged their arrows, then turned their horses and ran. A running fight ensued.

The troopers chased the Cheyennes for seven miles until their horses gave out. Among the casualties on the American side were two troopers killed and nine wounded. The number of casualties on the Cheyenne side was difficult to determine. Private Robert Peck believed the troops killed thirty Indians. Colonel Sumner estimated the losses of the enemy at nine men killed and many wounded. The Cheyennes later admitted to George Bird Grinnell a loss of four men. The soldiers also captured one Indian.

Ta-ra-da-ka-wa and the other Pawnees had been present at the battle. But their contribution was rather controversial. Private Peck was not impressed with the conduct of the five Pawnees during the fight:

Old Fall Leaf and his Delawares went into the fight with us, and did good service, but the cowardly Pawnees, that Colonel Sumner had brought with him from Fort Kearney, only followed in our wake, scalping the dead Cheyennes, and gathering up their abandoned ponies, of which they had collected about sixty head, which the colonel agree to let them keep as part pay for their services.¹⁹

¹⁸ Robert Morris Peck, “Recollections of Early Times in Kansas Territory: From the Standpoint of a Regular Cavalryman,” *Kansas Historical Society Collections* VIII (1903-1904). Peck's recollections of the campaign were also reprinted in LeRoy R. Hafen and Ann W. Hafen, eds., *Relations with the Indians of the Plains, 1857-1861*. Vol. IX of *The Far West and the Rockies Historical Series, 1820-1875* (Glendale, CA:

Peck, who was unfamiliar with the nature of Plains Indian warfare, was even more offended by the conduct of the Pawnees after the fight. When the Pawnees learned that the soldiers had captured a Cheyenne Indian, they immediately went to Colonel Sumner. They offered to forego their pay and return all the horses they had captured in exchange for the prisoner. Peck observed:

some of our men had taken one Cheyenne prisoner. On hearing this, after the fight, the Pawnees went in a body to Sumner's headquarters and tried to buy the prisoner of him, in order to have a grand scalp-dance over him, and put him to death by torture, offering to surrender to the colonel the sixty captured ponies, and also to forfeit the money that was to be paid them on their return to Fort Kearny, if he would only give them that Cheyenne, and they seemed fairly wild with a fiendish desire to get him into their possession. Of course, the old man would not listen to any such barbarous proposition, and promptly ordered them back to their own camp, on the outskirts of ours. They went away, very angry at his refusal.²⁰

The day after the battle, Sumner ordered Captain Rensselaer W. Foote and the men of his company to stay behind to look after the wounded men until Sumner's return. While the Pawnees spent the day "stretching and drying the Cheyenne scalps they had taken," the troopers buried the two fallen soldiers. Captain Foote's men began construction of a small sod house stronghold they named "Fort Floyd," after Secretary of War John B. Floyd.²¹

Sumner's troops, including the Pawnee Scouts, left Fort Floyd in pursuit of the Cheyennes on July 31. After traveling fourteen miles, they came upon the abandoned

The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1959), 97-140; Chalfant gives a slightly different rendition of Colonel Sumner's words to Lieutenant Stanley. Chalfant, *Cheyennes and Horse Soldiers*, 189-192;

¹⁹ Peck, "Recollections," 499.

²⁰ Peck, "Recollections," 499.

²¹ Chalfant, *Cheyennes and Horse Soldiers*, 208.

Indian village. The Cheyennes had departed in a great hurry, leaving behind 170 of their lodges and most of their supplies. Among the items abandoned were thousands of pounds of dried buffalo meat, which the soldiers packed on their mules. Before turning south to continue the chase, Sumner ordered his men to burn the village. Three days later, on August 3, he sent the Pawnees back to Fort Floyd with new instructions for Captain Foote and dispatches to Fort Kearny. In his letter, Sumner ordered Foote to return to Fort Kearny as soon as the wounded men were able to travel. Sumner, meanwhile, continued the pursuit of the Cheyennes.²²

Ta-ra-da-ka-wa and the other Pawnee Scouts left Sumner's camp late that night. They took the horses they had captured with them. The journey to Fort Floyd was quite dangerous. Small parties of Cheyennes were still lurking around. On August 5, a Cheyenne war party attacked the Pawnees as they approached Fort Floyd. Although the Pawnees killed one Cheyenne, they could not prevent the loss of their horses. They managed to escape with great difficulty. An hour or two later they arrived at Fort Floyd. Their sudden appearance caused some alarm, as the men defending the fort believed they were hostile Indians. Fearing that they might be shot, the scouts yelled "Pawnee! Pawnee!" as they approached the soldiers.²³

Upon receiving his instructions from the Pawnees, Foote ordered his men to prepare for the journey to Fort Kearny. The soldiers constructed travois to transport the wounded men. On the early morning of August 8, they left the tiny fort. The Pawnees led

²² Ibid, 227; According to Robert Peck, Colonel Sumner discharged the Pawnees because of their conduct during and immediately after the battle when they tried to buy the Cheyenne captive from him. Peck wrote that the Pawnees left for their village the morning after the battle. Peck, "Recollections," 499. While it may be true that Sumner was unhappy about the Pawnees' conduct, he did not officially discharge them. It appears that he wanted them to guide Foote's command back to Fort Kearny.

the way. On August 13 they crossed the Republican River. That night, the Pawnees left the command secretly. According to 1st Lieutenant James Stuart, they decided to leave because Captain Foote had been badgering them since their arrival at Fort Floyd. Without guides, the command had no idea which direction to go. As they were running out of supplies rapidly, Lt. Stuart and a handful of men rode ahead in search of Fort Kearny. They got lost and did not find the fort until August 17, three days after the Pawnees had arrived there. A relief party, which included one of the Pawnees, was organized immediately to locate Captain Foote. While the relief party was out in search of the lost command, Captain Foote and his men wandered into the fort on August 21, almost a week after chasing off the Pawnees.²⁴

The Cheyenne campaign came officially to an end in September 1857. According to William Chalfant, it had been a significant event. It was not only the first confrontation between the United States and the Cheyennes, but it also involved some men who would become famous in the years following the battle of the Solomon. Eli Long, James Stuart, and David Stanley, for example, rose to the rank of General. Among the Indians who were present at the battle were warriors such as Tall Bull, Roman Nose, Dull Knife, Little Wolf, and even a young Oglala Sioux warrior who would later become famous under the name Crazy Horse.²⁵

For the five Pawnee Scouts, who had been instrumental in locating the Cheyenne village, the campaign had not brought the rewards they had anticipated. They not only lost

²³ Chalfant, *Cheyennes and Horse Soldiers*, 273.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 276-279.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 285, 290; In the weeks following the Battle of the Solomon, there was some debate over Sumner's decision to engage the Indians with the Cavalry only, and to charge them with sabres. Critics argued that

the horses they had captured during the battle, but upon their return to Fort Kearny they were also dismissed without pay. A few weeks later, when a U. S. treaty commission under James W. Denver arrived at the Pawnee Agency to discuss further land cessions in exchange for military protection, *Ta-ra-da-ka-wa* and the other scouts demanded that their grievances be addressed. In one of the articles of the treaty, the commissioners agreed to reimburse the scouts for their service during the Cheyenne campaign:

Ta-ra-da-ka-wa, head chief of the Tappahs [Pitahawirat] band, and four other Pawnees, having been out as guides for the United States troops, in their late expedition against the Cheyennes, and having to return by themselves, were overtaken and plundered of everything given them by the officers of the expedition, as well as their own property, barely escaping with their lives; and the value of their services being fully acknowledged, the United States agree to pay to each of them one hundred dollars, or, in lieu thereof, to give to each a horse worth one hundred dollars in value.²⁶

The service of the Pawnee Scouts had not impressed the War Department.

Officials in Washington were still reluctant to employ Indians as guides and scouts. The idea of mustering a whole battalion of Indian scouts was even more radical. Most officials believed that Indians, even friendly ones, were inherently untrustworthy. They considered Indians unreliable, treacherous, undisciplined, and thus unfit for military service.²⁷

Sumner should have waited for the Infantry, which was only several miles behind. They also believed that the sabre charge had needlessly endangered the troops. *New York Times*, October 15, 1857.

²⁶ The chiefs and headmen signed the treaty on September 24, 1857. Congress ratified it on March 31 of the following year. Charles J. Kappler, ed., comp., *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties*. II. *Treaties* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), 767.

²⁷ The army's attitudes towards Indian soldiers changed little over the next decades, despite the contributions of the Pawnees and other auxiliaries. According to Paul Beck, most officers continued to see Indians as inferior beings. They only came to accept them into American society "as second-class citizens, much as Black Americans had been." Paul N. Beck, "Military Officers' Views of Indian Scouts 1865-1890," *Military History of the West* 23:1 (Spring 1993), 1-19.

J. L. Gillis, who was appointed as Indian Agent to the Pawnees in 1859, disagreed with the War Department that the Indians under his care had no discipline. Gillis had organized a tribal police force of six braves from each of the four bands. He had colorful uniforms made for them, which gave them “a very respectable appearance.” The police officers took great pride in their work and even assisted the Agent in retrieving horses stolen by members of the tribe.²⁸ Agent Benjamin F. Lushbaugh, who assumed office in 1862, agreed with Gillis that the Pawnees, when given the opportunity, conducted themselves with great discipline. Lushbaugh revived Gillis’s police system. He recruited some of the most prominent warriors and provided them with uniforms and other symbols of distinction. “This excites in them a spirit of martial pride and emulation which is productive of good results,” Lushbaugh wrote in his report to Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles Mix. “They are very efficient in preserving order in the villages and reporting any depredations that may be committed.”²⁹

The success of the tribal police force encouraged Agent Lushbaugh to make another suggestion. In 1862 he traveled to Washington to request federal protection for the Pawnees against the Sioux. He also brought up the idea of forming a regiment of Pawnee Scouts to aid the United States against its enemies. In a letter to the War Department, he proposed

That the proper authority be given me for organizing the effective warriors of the Pawnee tribe of Indians. They number from 400 to 500, and would form a very efficient body of mounted men, properly equipped and officered by whites, and would be of great service as scouts to one or two

²⁸ *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs* (Washington, D. C.: George W. Bowman, Printer, 1860), 92. Hereafter cited as *ARCIA*.

²⁹ *ARCIA*, 1862, 122.

infantry regiments. They are well supplied with horses, and the effect of their being employed in Government service would be salutary.³⁰

Lushbaugh's request was turned down on the advice of General-in-Chief, H. W. Halleck. "The arming of the Pawnee Indians," Halleck wrote, "without further proof of their friendly character, would be of doubtful policy, if there were no other objections."³¹

General Halleck's blunt rejection of Lushbaugh's plan seemed to put a definitive end to the idea of an Indian battalion. Two years later, however, circumstances on the Plains had changed so dramatically that the idea to use the Pawnees as auxiliaries in the U. S. Army resurfaced once again.

The events that brought about a reconsideration of military policy began in Colorado in 1864. There, territorial officials set out on a disastrous course that would engulf the Plains in a war that would last until 1890. Since the discovery of gold and other mineral resources in Colorado, thousands of settlers poured into Colorado Territory each year. These settlers trespassed on Indian land and disturbed their hunting grounds. Liquor traders entered the region to sell their firewater to Indians and whites alike. The settlers considered the tribes roaming the area, mostly Cheyennes, a nuisance. These Indians not only occupied potentially lucrative sites, but they also hunted the game that miners needed for their subsistence. Furthermore, they blamed the Indians of every possible crime in the territory. They also feared the possibility of another Indian rebellion like the one that had taken place in Minnesota two years earlier. Newspapers and concerned citizens called for the removal (if not the extermination) of the Cheyennes and

³⁰ U. S. War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*. Series I, v. 13 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), 645.

³¹ *Ibid.*

other Indian tribes living within the territory. Their appeals found a warm reception with Governor John Evans, who seized upon a few minor incidents to declare war on the Cheyennes in the Spring of 1864. Evans ordered Colonel John M. Chivington of the military District of Colorado to pursue the “hostile” Indians. Chivington and his men of the First Colorado Cavalry began to harass Indians across the territory. Their actions provoked Cheyenne warriors to retaliate. Although most Indians remained peaceful, many citizens nevertheless believed that their fears of a “general Indian uprising” had come true. Small bands of Cheyenne warriors plundered settlements, attacked wagon trains, and carried off plunder. Encouraged by the Cheyennes’ successes, small groups Sioux, Kiowa, Comanche, and Arapaho warriors also took to the war path.³²

When the troubles spread from Colorado to Kansas and Nebraska, the military commanders of the region began to prepare for war. Major-General Samuel R. Curtis and Brigadier-General Robert B. Mitchell organized expeditions in search of the hostiles. Their main purpose was to secure the migrant trails against Indian attacks.³³

Most historians have credited General Curtis with the order to enlist the Pawnee Scouts in the late Summer of 1864. The historical evidence for this claim, however, is not

³² For a detailed discussion of the Indian war in Colorado in 1864, see Stan Hoig, *The Sand Creek Massacre* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961).

³³ General Curtis headed the Department of Kansas, which was sub-divided into the District of Colorado (under John M. Chivington), and the District of Nebraska (which was headed by Brigadier General Robert B. Mitchell). Samuel Ryan Curtis (1805-1866) was a West Point graduate from New York State. He served as Colonel of the Third Ohio Infantry during the Mexican War, and later practiced law in Iowa. At the outbreak of the Civil War, he became Colonel of the Second Iowa Infantry. In 1862 he advanced to the rank of Major General, commanding the Department of Missouri, before taking over the command of the Department of Kansas in 1864. Robert Byington Mitchell (1823-1882) moved in 1855 from Ohio to Kansas. During the Civil War he served as Colonel of the Second Kansas Volunteer Infantry before being promoted to Brigadier General. He assumed command of the District of Nebraska early in 1864. In 1865 President Andrew Johnson appointed him Governor of the Territory of New Mexico. See Donald F. Danker, *Man of the Plains: Recollections of Luther North, 1856-1882* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 29, 30.

conclusive.³⁴ According to Captain Eugene F. Ware of the Seventh Iowa Cavalry, which was stationed in Nebraska at the time, General Mitchell had already employed a large number of Pawnees earlier that Summer. Unfortunately, the many discrepancies in Captain Ware's account raise suspicions about its accuracy. Nevertheless, it is the only existing account of this episode.³⁵

According to Ware, General Mitchell met with Spotted Tail of the Brule Sioux in several councils near Cottonwood Springs on the Platte River to discuss the crisis on the Plains. During the first meeting, in May of 1864, he warned the Brules to stay away from the emigrant road, avoid the Cheyennes, and stop their raids on the Pawnees. Spotted Tail replied that this was Brule land and that they would come whenever they pleased. Although both men lost their temper during the exchange, they agreed to meet for another council in July.³⁶

When Mitchell arrived for the meeting on July 19, 1864, he was accompanied by approximately eighty Pawnee Scouts under Frank J. North, whose name would forever be

³⁴ Ronald Becher, *Massacre Along the Medicine Road: A Social History of the Indian War of 1864 in Nebraska Territory* (Caldwell, ID: Caxton Press, 1999), 304. During the Civil War, several Indian regiments served in the Union and Confederate armies. Major-General James G. Blunt, commander of the District of the Frontier, a subdivision of Curtis's department, commanded three regiments of "Indian Home Guards." On March 27, 1864, Blunt wrote Curtis that "[t]he Indian soldiers are excellent horsemen, and well fitted for scouting and all kinds of mounted service. As they are likely to be used to protect the Indian country against the operations of guerillas and raiders, it is almost indispensable that they should be mounted, as our force here is very small, and therefore should be made as effective as possible. The Indians are willing to re-enlist for three years, as regular volunteers, if they can be reorganized as mounted troops." Perhaps Blunt's use of Indian auxiliaries from the Five Tribes inspired Curtis to experiment with the enlistment of the Pawnees. *Rebellion Records*, Series I, v. 34, Part II, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), 755.

³⁵ Of course, it is possible that Mitchell enlisted the Pawnees on instructions of Curtis, who was his superior as commander of the Department of Kansas. But so far, the historical records have not produced such an order.

³⁶ In May 1864, Mitchell had visited the Pawnee Agency. It is possible that the Pawnee chiefs addressed the issue of Sioux depredations with the general. *Rebellion Records* Series I, v. 34, Part III, 711. According to George Bent, some Oglalas under Bad Wound and Whistler had joined Spotted Tail near Cottonwood Creek in order to avoid trouble with the Americans. Hyde, *Life of George Bent*, 137.

linked to the Pawnee Battalion.³⁷ It was Mitchell's intention to establish a peace between the Pawnees and the Brules. But as soon as the Indians saw each other they began shouting and yelling at each other "like a lot of demons." To prevent the outbreak of hostilities, Mitchell ordered cavalry troops and a cannon loaded with shrapnel between the two camps. Then he invited speakers from each side for a council. He addressed the Indians seated on his horse, speaking slowly to allow the interpreters to translate his words into Pawnees and the Sioux. In a short speech, Mitchell told the delegates that the Great Father in Washington had sent him to make peace between the Indians. Then he invited the Indians to respond to his proposal. After an awkward silence, a Sioux stepped forward. He announced that he did not think the Pawnees amounted to much but that he was willing to leave them alone if that was the President's desire. After another long wait, a Pawnee stepped forward to respond. Ware noticed the Pawnee wore a pair of blue army trousers. The Indian said "that the Pawnees in olden times had owned all of the land south of the Platte, even the country they were then standing on, but that smallpox had scourged them and they were now settled on land which they liked, and which the white man

³⁷ Luther North denied that Frank North accompanied Mitchell's troops in charge of the Pawnees. In a letter to Robert Bruce, Luther commented that "I have said several times before that Ware never saw Frank in his life . . . if Mitchell ever had a council with the [S]ioux and Pawnees I never heard of it nor did Frank . . . I hope that as far as the Norths are concerned you wont [sic] quote Eugene Ware [because] he didnt [sic] know the Norths and what he thought of the Pawnee scouts doesnt [sic] make any difference to me." Luther North to Robert Bruce, November 6, 1931 and December 8, 1931. The "Robert Bruce, Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts Papers," Box 1, Folder 4, Department of Special Collections, McFarlin Library, University of Tulsa, Oklahoma. It is possible, however, that a number of Pawnees accompanied Mitchell's command in July. On June 26, Mitchell was in Omaha when he received word that a group of hostile Indians had attacked and killed four Pawnees who were cutting hay at the agency. The next day, Mitchell started in pursuit of the raiders. Some Pawnees might have joined his command while he paused at the Pawnee Agency. Whether Frank North was present also, is not clear from the records. Perhaps he was not. Ware may have confused him for another man. *Rebellion Records* Series I, v. 34, Part IV, 567. It appears that Mitchell indeed met with a group of Indians, possibly Spotted Tail's Brules. On the morning of July 19, Mitchell wrote Curtis from Fort Cottonwood, that the "Indians are moving down the [Platte] valley toward Julesburg in force. I am leaving here this morning with two companies of Cavalry and one section of

conceded them, and that they preferred peace, and would be willing to live at peace with the Sioux and Cheyennes if the latter would be peaceful.”³⁸

Both sides made several more speeches. Most speakers boasted of their exploits against their enemies. The talks quickly broke down after one Sioux got up and said that he “did not see any particular reason for changing present conditions-that the Sioux nation was getting along all right.” He then told Mitchell that if the Great Father could not stop his own white children from fighting each other (referring to the Civil War that was raging back east), how could he expect to keep the Indians from fighting each other. The speeches that followed became increasingly hostile. Before Mitchell could restore order, both sides were taunting and threatening each other again. A battle seemed imminent, but Mitchell intervened and ordered the Pawnees back. He then told the Sioux to pack up their camp and leave the Platte River Valley immediately.³⁹

After his failure to establish peace between the Indians, Mitchell’s troops, including the Pawnee Scouts, moved up the Platte River valley toward Fort Laramie, Wyoming Territory.⁴⁰ During the trip Ware had a chance to observe the scouts in action. He was not impressed by what he saw. Before the command set out from Fort Kearny to meet Spotted Tail’s Brules, the Pawnees had been issued army clothing, consisting of a

artillery to meet them.” *Rebellion Records* Series I, v. 41, Part II, 276. Unfortunately, there are no records which relate details of the meeting between Mitchell and the Brules that afternoon.

³⁸ Eugene F. Ware, *The Indian War of 1864* (Topeka, KS: Crane and Company, 1911/New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1960). See also Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes*, 151-152, and Hyde, *Life of George Bent*, 137-138.

³⁹ Ware, *The Indian War of 1864*, 156-165. According to George Bent the meeting was held in June 1864. It appears, however, that Bent was not present himself. He may have heard about the events at the meeting from the Sioux. It is also possible, however, that Bent’s version was based on Ware’s memoirs. In his letters to George Hyde, Bent actually cites Ware’s book. Hyde, *Life of George Bent*, 174.

⁴⁰ Mitchell’s troops began the march to Fort Laramie on July 20, 1864. They arrived at the post seven days later. Several of his companies patrolled the area. By August 8, Mitchell had returned to Julesburg, Colorado territory. See correspondence between Mitchell and Curtis, *Rebellion Records* Series I, v. 41, Part II, 302, 429, 462-463, 612-613,

hat, a blouse, and a pair of trousers. By the time they reached Julesburg (Colorado Territory), most had lost their hats. Some had cut holes in their hats and placed them over their ponies' ears. Few were still wearing their blouses, and most had cut the seats out of their trousers, which they turned into leggings. Their unsoldierly appearance greatly irritated General Mitchell.

Although their captain was a "brave, industrious officer," Ware believed he was unable to maintain order in his ranks. Ever since the command left Lodgepole Creek, Wyoming, on July 23, 1864, the Pawnees had ridden nervously about. Sensing the presence of hostile Indians nearby, they scattered out all over the country in search of tracks and trails. Although Ware and the other men of the Seventh Iowa Cavalry were aware that Indians were near, they did not seem overly concerned. General Mitchell was not amused by the nervous spectacle created by the Pawnees. Tired of the "antics" of the scouts, Mitchell ordered them to camp on the other side of the command for the night. The next day, when the troops continued the journey, the Pawnees continued to exhibit their peculiar behavior. They seemed greatly disturbed by smoke signals and other signs of the enemy in the distance. They dashed into camp, yelling and creating a "fuss" before dashing out again. According to John Smith, the white guide accompanying the command, they were just "showing off." Mitchell agreed but was unable to calm the Indians. That evening, the general called in Frank North and his men and informed them that their services were no longer needed. He thanked them for their valorous services and then ordered them to return to Fort Kearny the next morning. In private conversations

with his officers, however, Mitchell disclosed that he was anxious to get rid of the Pawnees.⁴¹

Neither Captain Ware nor General Mitchell were impressed with the performance of the Pawnee Scouts during the expedition. Neither believed that the Pawnees could be used effectively in combat. Ware reasoned that this was a result of the inherent “inferior” nature of their race:

The Indian as an individual was inferior, and as a race was inferior, to the Iowa farm boy, in whatever light it was desirable to consider it. There has been so much of fancy written about the Indian that the truth ought at times be told. The white man has done everything that an Indian can do, and I have seen things done during the Civil War that an Indian could not do, and dare not attempt to do. In physical strength, discipline and heroism the Indian does not compare and is not in the same class with the white man with whom the Indian came into contact. The Indian is not a soldier, and he cannot be made one. He has been tried and found wanting. He is spurdy. He lacks the right kind of endurance, pertinacity, mind, and courage. We all got very much disgusted with Mr. Indian before we got through.⁴²

Ware’s views of Indians were not untypical of his time. Many Americans, especially those living and operating in the West, held similar views. What Ware failed to realize, however, was the grave danger his command had been in as it traveled along Lodgepole Creek. General Mitchell, too, had failed to grasp the seriousness of the situation. The country around Julesburg and along Lodgepole Creek was infested with hostile Indians, as events later clearly revealed. For whatever reason, these Indians did not attack. But their presence, as the Pawnees already knew, was undeniable. A Major

⁴¹ Ware, *The Indian War of 1864*, 157-195.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 188.

Underhill later explained to Mitchell that the Pawnees realized that they were surrounded by hostiles who might possibly have annihilated the entire command in an ambush.⁴³

Despite General Mitchell's negative evaluation of the scouts, it was not the end of the experiment. After Mitchell returned to Fort Kearny, in August 1864, he received word that the Cheyennes had killed fifteen settlers along the Little Blue River. General Curtis immediately rushed up from Fort Leavenworth to organize the counter offensive.⁴⁴ On his way to Fort Kearny, Curtis paused at the Pawnee Agency where he requested the assistance of the Pawnees for the campaign.⁴⁵ The Pawnees responded with great enthusiasm, and Curtis enlisted seventy-seven men on the spot. More than two hundred other warriors also expressed an anxiety to go, but Agent Lushbaugh would not allow them to leave because they were needed for the defense of the reservation. Lushbaugh proposed, however, to give the general all the Indians he needed if he would station a company of cavalry on the reservation for the protection of the agency and its personnel. Curtis declined the offer.⁴⁶

⁴³ Ibid., 210.

⁴⁴ Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue*, 289.

⁴⁵ On August 9, 1864, U. S. Collector Horace Everett of Council Bluffs, Iowa, wrote Curtis that he had received word that "the Pawnees are very anxious to join our troops in an expedition against [the Cheyennes], but that their offer is refused on the ground that it is against the policy of the Government to arm one tribe against another. The Omahas also would be glad to join us. Do you think that in these times of the nation's trial such mawkish sentimentalities should cease? These two tribes could furnish at least 2,000 warriors . . . Pray, if you can, influence the War Department to authorize the employment of these Indians. They will eventually fight on the one side or the other. Why not make and keep them our friends?" *Rebellion Records* Series I, v. 41, Part II, 626-627. See also Roger Kent Heape, "Pawnee-United States Relations From 1803 to 1875" (Ph. D. Dissertation, St. Louis University, Missouri, 1982), 297.

⁴⁶ Here, again, the exact order of events is somewhat unclear. Hyde states that Curtis came up from Kansas and had a council with the chiefs of the Pawnee tribe. A letter from Agent Lushbaugh seems to confirm this, and nothing in Luther North's account seems to contradict it. Sorenson and Grinnell, however, imply that Frank North first accompanied the General to Fort Kearney, and then returned to the agency to enlist the men. Hyde, *The Pawnee Indians* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 269; Letter by Agent Benjamin F. Lushbaugh to W. M. Albin, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, September 30, 1864 *ARCIA* 1864, 383; Danker, *Man of the Plains*, 29; George Bird Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts and their Pawnee Battalion: The Experiences of Frank J. North and Luther H. North* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973), 71.

Curtis appointed Joseph McFadden and Frank North to lead the company.

McFadden was a clerk in the trader's store on the Pawnee Agency and was married to a Pawnee woman. He had some military experience, serving under General Harney against the Sioux at Ash Hollow in 1855. Because of his previous military service, Curtis appointed him captain. Frank North had been hired at the agency in 1860 at the age of twenty. After he mastered the Pawnee language, he became interpreter at the agency trading store. Because of his language skills, Curtis appointed North lieutenant of the Pawnees. The Pawnees furnished their own horses, but received the same pay as regular enlisted men.⁴⁷

At Fort Kearny, Curtis assembled his expeditionary force from detachments from different regiments. Apart from the Pawnee Scouts, the troops consisted of companies of the First Nebraska Volunteers, the Seventh Iowa Cavalry, and the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry. Artillery units supplemented the troops. General Mitchell accompanied the expedition, but General Curtis assumed the overall command.⁴⁸ Upon Curtis's orders, the Quartermaster issued each Pawnee Scout with a blouse and a hat, to distinguish them

⁴⁷ In a letter to his own department, August 25, 1864, Curtis wrote: "Joseph McFadden, having reported with seventy-six Pawnee Indians, is hereby appointed to act as captain of scouts at \$5 a day and rations, commencing on the 20th day of this month. He will also be entitled to rations in kind. Indians will be paid as scouts at the rates paid soldiers while they are in actual service." *Rebellion Records* Series I, v. 41, Part II, 864. See also Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 71. Frank Joshua North was the second son of Jane and Thomas Jefferson North. Thomas North was born April 5, 1813, near Ludlowville, New York. Jane Almira Townley was born in Tompkins County, New York, on February 7, 1820. The two married in January 1837 and soon moved to Ohio. Their oldest son, James E. North was born in September 1838. In the winter of 1839-40, Jane North returned to New York where she gave birth to Frank on March 10, 1840. Luther Hedden North, the third son was born in Ohio on March 6, 1846. Jane North gave birth to two more children, both girls while the family was still living in Ohio. In 1856, Thomas North moved the family to Iowa and later that year to Nebraska. While on a surveying trip in Nebraska, Thomas was caught in a severe storm and froze to death on March 12, 1857. In the Spring of 1859, the remaining members of the family finally settled in Columbus, Nebraska. Robert Bruce, *The Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts: Narratives and Reminiscences of Military Service on the Old Frontier* (New York: n. p., 1932), 12.

⁴⁸ *Rebellion Records* Series I, v. 41, Part III, 36, Series I, v. 41, Part I, 243-247, Series I, v. 48, Part I, 1040-1041.

from the hostile Indians. "It gave them a distinctive and graphic appearance," Curtis wrote later, "which could not be mistaken."⁴⁹

On September 1, 1864, Curtis issued his marching orders. The Pawnee Scouts traveled in advance of the troops. Their task was to "seek after signs and report to the officer of the day or officer of the guard all intelligence received." The command first marched to Plum Creek, then turned southwest towards the Republican River. After crossing the Republican, the troops marched to the Solomon River. As there were no signs of hostile Indians, Curtis decided to split his command. He ordered General Mitchell and the companies of the Seventh Iowa to follow the Solomon westward in search of hostile Indians. Captain McFadden and the majority of the Pawnee Scouts joined Mitchell's command. Curtis, meanwhile, would follow the Solomon River in the other direction with the Kansas troops and the Nebraska volunteers. Lieutenant Frank North and a handful of scouts accompanied Curtis' command.⁵⁰

Neither Curtis nor Mitchell discovered any Indian war parties. Although Mitchell found plenty of evidence of Indian depredations, he was unable to overtake the parties responsible for the devastations. By the time his command reached Cottonwood Springs on the Platte River, his horses were spent, and he had to abort the mission. Curtis, meanwhile, found no evidence of Indians at all. On September 15, he led his tired troops into Fort Riley, Kansas. There, he received word that Confederate forces under General Sterling Price were mounting a campaign into Missouri. Curtis immediately left Fort

⁴⁹ *Rebellion Records Series I*, v. 41, Part III, 257.

⁵⁰ Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 72-73. See also Becher, *Massacre Along the Medicine Road*, 306-310.

Riley with his Kansas troops to intercept the rebels. Before leaving Fort Riley, however, Curtis authorized Frank North to reorganize the Pawnee Battalion.⁵¹

The Pawnees who accompanied Curtis and Mitchell in 1864 never received any compensation for their services. After discharging the scouts in October, Mitchell sent the muster rolls to the headquarters of the District of Nebraska to settle their accounts. But for reasons unknown, the Paymaster's Department neglected to pay the Pawnees.⁵²

Both Curtis and Mitchell had been dissatisfied with McFadden's inability to lead the Pawnees. McFadden himself seemed uncomfortable with his responsibilities as Captain of the scouts. He had lived with the Pawnees for years and had become fully integrated into their society. But his status in that society was that of a "commoner" rather than a warrior. McFadden was fully aware of this fact. Although Curtis had appointed him to lead the Pawnees, he did not believe he had the authority to order the men in his company around. He lacked the confidence of his men to lead a war party, even if it was in the service of the U. S. Army. Furthermore, McFadden had married into one of the bands of the Pawnee tribe. As a result, the warriors belonging to one of the other bands did not accept his authority. In accordance with his social rank in Pawnee culture, McFadden would ask rather than order his men into action. Not surprisingly, few felt compelled to obey him. Unlike McFadden, however, Frank North was not hindered by such cultural conventions. North was not closely identified with any particular band. Consequently, the Pawnees were more willing to obey his orders. Not surprisingly, as the

⁵¹ Becher, *Massacre Along the Medicine Road*, 309.

⁵² *Rebellion Records Series I*, v. 41, Part I, 243.

campaign progressed, Curtis began to ignore his self-appointed captain and started issuing his order directly to the 24-year old lieutenant.⁵³

The Curtis-Mitchell campaign of 1864 ended without any significant results. It did little to eliminate the Indian threat to the emigrant roads and to white settlements in Kansas and Nebraska. But the seriousness of the situation caused a few men, such as General Curtis, to reconsider the enlistment of Indian scouts to assist the troops. Many officials in the War Department and military commanders, however, remained skeptical about the usefulness of the Pawnee Indian Scouts. Despite the contributions of the Pawnees during the campaigns of 1857 and 1864, generals such as Sumner and Mitchell, and officers like Robert Morris Peck and Eugene F. Ware, held the Pawnees in low esteem. They found the conduct of the scouts, particularly during battle, barbarous, offensive, and irritating. Their attitudes reflected the sentiments typical of the nineteenth-century time. According to this view, American Indians were undisciplined, cowardly, and brutal savages, whose social and cultural mores were inherently inferior to those of Anglo-American society.

Nevertheless, the year 1864 marked only the beginning of the Indian wars on the Plains. Soon the war would escalate, and the United States faced a stiffer opposition on

⁵³ Ibid. Alfred E. Sorenson, whose history of the Pawnee Battalion was based on information from Frank North himself, gave a different explanation for McFadden's lack of authority: "McFadden, as a great many other white men had done, had degraded himself by marrying a squaw, by whom he had several children, and, in 1858, he had adopted the Indian style of dress, wearing a blanket and breech-cloth, and in every other respect living like an Indian. As a rule, when the Indians find a white man -a superior being- lowering himself in this way, they lose all respect for him. And so it was in McFadden's case, and this was the explanation of his lack of control over the Pawnees." Alfred E. Sorenson, "A Quarter of a Century on the Frontier, or, The Adventures of Major Frank North, the 'White Chief of the Pawnees' The Story of his life as told by himself and written by Alfred Sorenson." Unpublished Manuscript, Frank North Collection, RG 2321 (formerly MS 0448), Box 1, S4-F1, NSHS, Lincoln, Nebraska.

the Plains than ever before. When that happened the Pawnee Scouts received another chance to prove themselves in battle.

CHAPTER FIVE

ON THE POWDER RIVER CAMPAIGN WITH CONNOR, 1865

The Pawnee Scouts returned to their reservation in October 1864. Frank North had received instructions from General Curtis to enlist a hundred Pawnees to serve as scouts for one year.¹ In less than an hour, he had enrolled one hundred warriors who were anxious to go on the warpath against the Sioux and Cheyennes. After informing General Mitchell that he had recruited a full company of scouts, he received orders to come to Omaha with the list of the Indians' names. Bureaucratic red tape in Omaha, however, delayed the enlistment process. By the time North returned to the Pawnee Agency several weeks later, he found that the Pawnees had left for their annual winter hunt. North instructed his younger brother, Luther North, to follow the tribe and persuade the enlisted men to return at once.²

Several attempts were made to reach the Pawnees, but with little success. Bad weather forced Luther North back. A second attempt by Frank North and Charles A.

¹ On September 16, 1864, Curtis reached his headquarters at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. There he found a letter from Governor Saunders of the Territory of Nebraska. Saunders wanted to know if Curtis intended to take the Pawnee Indians with him against Confederate General Sterling Price. Curtis responded to the inquiry in a letter of September 17. "In answer to your inquiry as to taking Indians as militia, think it better not. I am authorized to take them as U. S. scouts for a year on same terms as other Federal cavalry." United States War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series I, v. 41, Part III, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), 236. Hereafter cited as *Rebellion Records*.

Small, Agent Lushbaugh's private secretary, fared little better. From his headquarters in Omaha, General Mitchell, who was no friend of the Pawnee Battalion, wrote impatiently on December 1, 1864: "Unless your company is promptly filled and ready for muster the order for raising it will be rescinded."³ North immediately returned to Omaha to ask for an extension to complete the enrollment of his men. Mitchell reluctantly granted him another twenty days.⁴

Upon his return to the Pawnee Agency, North learned that the Pawnees were returning from their hunt and were camping at different places on the Platte River. At Columbus, Nebraska, he recruited thirty-five men and appointed twenty-two year old Charles Small as first Lieutenant of the new company. North then traveled to Fort Kearny and recruited another fifty men, while his brother Luther recruited thirty-five more. The Pawnees were officially mustered into service as "Company A, Pawnee Scouts" on January 13, 1865. Frank North received a commission as captain. Charles Small and James Murie were appointed, respectively, first and second lieutenant. All three officers spoke Pawnee. Murie, who had been born in Scotland, had married a Pawnee woman with whom he had several children.⁵

Five men deserted before they were mustered in. Wandering Eagle, Comanche-Fox, Little Fox, Little Eagle, and Fox, left their camp early in 1865. They had learned

² George Bird Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts and Their Pawnee Battalion: The Experiences of Frank J. North and Luther H. North, Pioneers in the Great West, 1856-1882, and their defence of the building of the Union Pacific Railroad* (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1928), 74.

³ Alfred Sorenson, "A Quarter of a century on the Frontier, or, The Adventures of Major Frank North, the 'White Chief of the Pawnees.'" Unpublished Manuscript, Frank North Collection, NSHS, MS 448, Box 1, S4-F1, p. 70. Another copy of this manuscript can be found in the Bancroft Library, Berkeley, California. Sorenson's manuscript also appeared, in a slightly different form, as a serial in the *Platte County Times* (Nebraska), May 1896-January 30, 1897.

⁴ Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 77-79.

from Baptiste Bayhulle, the agency's half-blood interpreter, and some white men that they were not going to fight the Sioux, but that they would be sent south to "fight the negroes." Although the rumor was false, they would not return to the company.⁶

After a brief stay at Columbus, the command traveled to Fort Kearny where they arrived on February 11, 1865. At Kearny the troops received old style muzzle-loading infantry guns. Here they also received their first instructions in army discipline. Captain Lee P. Gillette of the First Nebraska Volunteer Cavalry and commander of the post, insisted that the Pawnees be drilled in the manual of arms. Over the next ten days the Pawnees drilled two hours a day, but with little effect. They could not understand English, and there were no words in their language that expressed the orders of the drill sergeants. Frank North complained to Captain Gillette that his men had been enlisted as scouts, spies, and trailers, not as regular infantrymen. He refused to drill them any longer.⁷

Perhaps Gillette wanted to punish the inexperienced captain for his insubordination, or possibly, he wished to see the experiment with the Pawnees fail. In any event, Gillette ordered North to select twenty-five of his men to go on a scouting mission to the Niobrara River in the middle of the winter. They received ten days' worth of rations but were forced to make the march on foot as there were no horses yet available

⁵ Ibid., 79. Donald F. Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains: Recollections of Luther North, 1856-1882* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 30.

⁶ "A Quarter of a century on the Frontier," 71. According to George Bird Grinnell, all thirty-five men of Lieutenant's company deserted. Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 79. This seems to be inaccurate. The official rolls list six men who deserted before muster. However, it appears that the muster rolls mistakenly list "Giving-up-his-seat" as one of the deserters. *Report of John R. Patrick, Adjutant-General of the State of Nebraska, to the Governor of the State of Nebraska* (Des Moines, IA: Mills and Company, 1871), 205-209. The rumor that the Pawnees would be sent south was not a complete fabrication. As the letter from Governor Saunders to General Curtis of September shows, there was some discussion about using the Indians as auxiliaries against the Confederate armies. See footnote 1 above.

for them. North appointed First Lieutenant Small to command the troops. On February 24, 1865, the men started on their mission. They waded through the half-frozen Platte River. Despite the extreme temperatures, none of them uttered a complaint. When they reached the Loup Fork, well below the Niobrara River, a severe snowstorm forced them to remain in camp for a week. When their supplies ran out, Lieutenant Small turned his command back to Fort Kearny. During the march in the intense cold, several men had hands, feet, and ears frozen.⁸

Gillette also required the Pawnees to perform guard duty. Unfortunately, this experiment was not very successful either. Lacking English language skills, the Pawnees occasionally held off soldiers who were returning to the fort. Usually Captain North had to come to their assistance. When Captain Gillette himself was held up in this way, he relieved the Pawnees from guard duty.⁹

That spring, the Sioux and Cheyennes stepped up their raids along the Overland Trail. They sought to avenge the massacre of a large number of Cheyenne Indians under Black Kettle near Sand Creek, Colorado, on November 29, 1864, by troops under the command of Colonel John M. Chivington.¹⁰ After the massacre, the Cheyennes sent out war pipes to the Sioux and the Arapahos. In December these tribes met in a large camp. Among the chiefs present were Tall Bull of the Cheyenne Dog Soldiers, Bad Wound and Pawnee Killer of the Ogialas, and Little Thunder and Spotted Tail of the Brules. By smoking the war pipe, they formally committed their bands to wage war against the

⁷ Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 80.

⁸ "Returns From U. S. Military Posts, 1800-1916," NARS M. 617, Roll 565, "Fort Kearny, Nebraska, January 1861-May 1871" (Washington, D. C.: National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1965), February 28, 1865. According to Grinnell, Lieutenant Small was accompanied by forty men. Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 80.

United States. They struck the first blow against the small guarded settlement of Julesburg, Colorado, on January 7, 1865. A small decoy party lured a detachment of soldiers from nearby Fort Rankin (later renamed Fort Sedgwick) into an ambush. Fourteen soldiers and four civilians died in the skirmish. The Indians then looted and destroyed a store and warehouse. In the weeks following the attack their raiding parties spread along 150 miles of the South Platte River. They attacked and burned ranches, farms, and stage stations, ambushed trains, ran off cattle, and destroyed telegraph lines. On February 2, they again struck Julesburg. Soldiers and civilians watched helplessly from nearby Fort Rankin as the Indians burned the settlement.¹¹

A hastily organized expedition by General Mitchell soon found itself snowed in at Fort Laramie. Unable to chase the Indians, Mitchell abandoned his plans and began dispersing troops all along the main roads. In March, the Pawnees, now equipped with horses, received orders to ride to Fort Rankin to scout and defend the area against Sioux and Cheyenne war parties.¹² The Pawnees remained at Fort Rankin through April. In May, they received orders to proceed to Camp Mitchell on the North Platte River.¹³ In

⁹ Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 81.

¹⁰ See Stan Hoig, *The Sand Creek Massacre* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1961).

¹¹ Robert M. Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), 300-302.

¹² The Pawnees left Kearny on March 14, 1865. According to the post returns only eighty-five Pawnees accompanied Captain North. Two men were listed as "absent with leave," while six Pawnees were in the post hospital. It is possible that these men had been on patrol with Lieutenant Small's platoon a few weeks earlier and were now treated for the effects of frostbite. "Returns From U. S. Military Posts, 1800-1916," NARS M. 617, Roll 565, "Fort Kearny, Nebraska, January 1861-May 1871" (Washington, D. C.: National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1965), March 31, 1865.

¹³ While traveling to Fort Laramie with Lieutenant Nance's company of the First Nebraska Veteran Volunteers, the Pawnee Scouts observed some of Nance's men cut down a telegraph post. The soldiers proceeded chopping up the post into firewood. The scouts alerted Captain North, who told his men "that they should not look on the act as an example, and that it was decidedly wrong." North reported the vandalism to Colonel C. H. McNally, commander of Fort Rankin. Frank North to Colonel C. H. McNally, May 22, 1865, Alan W. Farley Collection, Box 4, Folder 35, Western History Collections, University of Oklahoma, Norman.

June they traveled to Fort Laramie. While at Fort Laramie, Captain North and thirty men made an uneventful three-day eighty-five mile scout in search of government horses.¹⁴

Concerned with the developments on the Plains, General Ulysses S. Grant, Commander in Chief of the U. S. Army, began a reorganization of the military command structure in the West. Grant removed Curtis and Mitchell and created a new military jurisdiction, the Division of the Missouri, under the able command of Major General John Pope. This new jurisdiction covered most of the West. It was divided in several departments. Major General Grenville M. Dodge was appointed to head the Department of the Missouri, which covered most of the Plains region. Dodge assisted Pope in planning a campaign against the Sioux and Cheyennes. To lead the campaign, Pope and Dodge favored Brigadier General Patrick Edward Connor. After some political wrangling, Connor was appointed to command the newly created District of the Plains (a subdivision of the Department of the Missouri) on March 28, 1865.¹⁵

Connor had achieved fame fighting Indians and Mormons in Utah. Born in Ireland in 1820, he came to the United States around 1832. At the age of nineteen he enlisted in the army and fought the Seminoles in Florida. During the Mexican War he served under Zachary Taylor and Albert Sidney Johnston. After the war, he joined the California gold rush. When the Civil War broke out, he was appointed Colonel of the Third California Infantry. In October 1862 he assumed command of the Military District of Utah and

¹⁴ Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue*, 303. Janet B. Hewett, ed., *Supplement to the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* Part II, "Record of Events," v. 39, Serial No. 51 (Wilmington, NC: Broadfoot Publishing Company, 1996), 21-22. According to the post returns from Fort Sedgwick (Rankin), the Pawnees remained at the post until June 1865. "Returns From U. S. Military Posts, 1800-1916," NARS M. 617, Roll 1144, "Fort Sedgwick, Colorado, November 1864-May 1871" (Washington, D. C.: National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1965), March-June, 1865.

constructed Fort Douglas near Salt Lake City. His main assignment was to guard and protect the trails against hostile Indians. In 1863, he mounted a winter campaign against the Shoshones, who had committed depredations along the overland mail route. On January 27, 1863, his troops surprised a small Shoshone village under Bear Hunter, near Bear River, Utah. In the battle that followed, at least 224 Indians perished. The massacre and Connor's relentless pursuit of other hostile bands made him an instant favorite among western frontiersmen. Dodge and Pope believed that his experience, tenacity, and temperament made him the ideal man to lead a campaign against the Sioux and Cheyennes.¹⁶

On March 29, 1865, Major General Dodge sent his instructions to Connor. "The District of the Plains was formed to put under your control the entire overland route and to render effective the troops along it," he wrote. "With the force at your disposal you can make vigorous war upon the Indians and punish them so that they will be forced to keep the peace." Dodge ordered Connor to organize a three-pronged attack on the Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahos who were now congregating in the Powder River region. Connor also received instructions to establish a military post on the Powder River from

¹⁵ Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue*, 304-306. The District of the Plains embraced the former Districts of Utah, Colorado, and Nebraska. Its headquarters were at Denver, Colorado Territory. On March 30, Connor assumed command of the new District.

¹⁶ Brigadier General Connor has been the subject of two biographies. Fred B. Rogers, *Soldiers of the Overland* (San Francisco: The Grabhorn Press), was published in 1938. For a more recent biography see Brigham D. Madsen, *Glory Hunter: A Biography of Patrick Edward Connor* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1990). Jerry Keenan, *Encyclopedia of American Indian Wars, 1492-1890* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO Inc., 1997), 51. For a brief description of the Powder River campaign see H. D. Hampton, "The Powder River Expedition 1865," *Montana: The Magazine of History* 14 (October 1964), 2-15. The most complete account of the campaign can be found in LeRoy R. Hafen and Ann W. Hafen, eds., *Powder River Campaigns and Sawyers' Expedition of 1865* (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1961).

which future campaigns could be launched. Immediately after his arrival, Connor began to work out the details of the upcoming Indian campaign.¹⁷

The Powder River campaign consisted of three separate columns that would converge on the region from different directions. The right column, under the command of Colonel Nelson Cole, received orders to travel from Omaha to the east base of the ~~Black Hills and from there to a rendezvous point on the Rosebud River.~~ Cole's troops consisted of eight companies of his own Second Missouri Light Artillery (equipped as cavalry) and eight companies of the Twelfth Missouri Cavalry. The entire command numbered 1400 men.¹⁸ The center column of the expedition was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Walker and consisted of 600 men of the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry. Walker received directions to march with his force from Fort Laramie to the Black Hills. From there he would move to the general rendezvous on the Rosebud River.¹⁹ Connor himself directed the left column. This column consisted of two-hundred men of Colonel J. H. Kidd's Sixth Michigan Cavalry, a company of the Seventh Iowa Cavalry, a company of the Eleventh Ohio Cavalry, one-hundred and sixteen officers and men of the Second California Cavalry, eighty-four Omaha and Winnebago Scouts, and, finally, Captain North's company of Pawnee Scouts. The entire command consisted 675 men. It would travel from Fort Laramie to Horseshoe and then north to the Powder River. At Horseshoe, Captain Albert Brown of the Second California Cavalry and the Omaha Scouts would be detached from the main body, travel to Platte Bridge and follow a more

¹⁷ Hafen and Hafen, *Powder River Campaigns*, 28-31.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 25.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 25.

westerly route before reuniting with Connor on the Powder River. At the Rosebud River, Connor, Cole, and Walker would combine their commands.²⁰

The campaign was supposed to start in April or May, but it ran into logistical and organizational problems. Bad weather and administrative blunders delayed the arrival of supplies and fresh horses. Many soldiers, who had hoped to muster out when news arrived that the Civil War was over, became mutinous or deserted when they received orders to join the expedition. Few men were eager to go on an Indian campaign. As a result of these problems, Cole's command did not leave its headquarters at Omaha until the first of July. Walker did not leave Fort Laramie until later that month. Neither of these men had much experience fighting Indians nor a thorough knowledge of the territory. Connor advised Cole to hire a number of guides and scouts at the Pawnee Agency.²¹

Connor's exterminationist temperament surfaced in his instructions. On July 4, 1865, he wrote Cole: "You will not receive overtures of peace or submission from Indians, but will attack and kill every male Indian over twelve years of age." Walker received the same order on July 28.²² When a copy of Connor's instructions reached the desk of General Pope on August 11, Pope immediately commanded General Dodge to repeal the order. "These instructions are atrocious, and are in direct violation of my repeated orders. You will please take immediate steps to countermand such orders. If any

²⁰ Ibid., 25-26. The Omaha and Winnebago Scouts were under the command of Captain Edwin R. Nash, First Lieutenant Michael Evans, and Second Lieutenant Gavin Mitchell, brother of General Robert B. Mitchell. *Report of John R. Patrick*, 209.

²¹ The campaign was further delayed because of the struggle between war and peace factions within the administration in Washington. The indecision in Washington allowed the hostile bands to continue their raids against American targets. On June 14, 1865, a number of Sioux killed Captain William D. Fouts and three soldiers of the Seventh Iowa Cavalry. On July 26, Indians attacked a small detachment of the Eleventh Kansas Cavalry under Lieutenant Caspar W. Collins near Platte Bridge Station, Wyoming. Collins and four of his men died during the attack. Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue*, 318-320. Hafen and Hafen, *Powder River Campaigns*, 36-37, 42.

such orders as General Connor's are carried out it will be disgraceful to the government, and will cost him his commission, if not worse. Have it rectified without delay."²³

Pope's furious response did not reach Connor until August 20. By this time the expedition was well underway. Connor's column, including the Pawnee Scouts, had left Fort Laramie on July 30.²⁴ Small parties of Pawnees rode in advance and on the flanks of the column to scout the land in search of enemy trails. Apart from these scouting missions they also supplemented the command's provisions by hunting buffalo. Furthermore, they carried Connor's dispatches, informing General Dodge of the progress of the expedition, to distant stations and military posts.²⁵

On August 1, Connor's troops crossed the North Platte River. Three days later, he split his command. Captain Brown's two companies of the Second California Cavalry and Captain Nash's Omaha and Winnebago Scouts continued up the Platte, while the main column turned north. The Pawnee Scouts remained with Connor.²⁶

After an uneventful journey, Connor's column reached the Powder River on August 11. While the men set up camp, some Pawnees went out to hunt buffaloes. Captain B. F. Rockafellow noted that the Pawnees used their bows and arrows for the

²² Hafen, *Powder River Campaigns*, 36-37, 42.

²³ *Ibid.*, 43.

²⁴ Connor did not reach Fort Laramie until [late in June/early July]. The Pawnee Scouts accompanied him as he made his way from Julesburg, Colorado, to Fort Laramie. Hewett, *Supplement to the Official Records*, 22.

²⁵ "Diary of Capt. B. F. Rockafellow, Sixth Michigan Cavalry," in Hafen, *Powder River Campaigns*, 175, 179, 180.

²⁶ H. E. Palmer, *The Powder River Indian Expedition, 1865* (Omaha, NE: The Republican Company, 1887), 14. Finn Burnett and Luther North claim that Palmer was not present during the campaign. Although Palmer's account contains a number of inaccuracies, there is not enough evidence to suggest that he was not a member of Connor's campaign. Luther North to Robert Bruce, July 15, 1928. The "Robert Bruce, Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts Papers," Box 1, Folder 3, Department of Special Collections, McFarlin Library, University of Tulsa, Oklahoma.

hunt. They had cornered a large bull that turned on them often, pawing and shaking his head in rage. They filled the animal with arrows before it was finally brought down.²⁷

A few days later, Connor selected a site to construct a fort. His selection could not have been better. According to George Bent, a Cheyenne mixed-blood who lived among his Indian relatives for most of his life, Connor constructed his fort on the point where the Indians usually crossed the Powder River. It was also a favorite wintering ground for the Cheyennes.²⁸

There were signs of Indians everywhere. On Sunday, August 13, a scouting party under Captain Roberts found a hastily-made grave of an Indian woman. The body was covered with beads, indicating that she belonged to a rich family. According to the Pawnees, the Indians had been in a great hurry as they had been unable to give her a proper burial. That same day, General Connor ordered ten Pawnees to take some dispatches to Platte Bridge Station. This was a dangerous mission, as Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho bands were scouring the country between Connor's camp and the station. Nevertheless, after a hazardous journey, the Pawnees arrived at Platte Bridge the third week of August.²⁹

Construction of Fort Connor began on August 14. While the soldiers cut the timber for the fort, the Pawnees scouted the country for enemy Indians. On August 16,

²⁷ "Diary of Capt. B. F. Rockafellow," in Hafen, *Powder River Campaigns*, 179.

²⁸ George E. Hyde, *Life of George Bent: Written From His Letters* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 206.

²⁹ "Diary of Capt. B. F. Rockafellow," in Hafen, *Powder River Campaigns*, 180. According to Hervey Johnson, of Company G, Eleventh Ohio Cavalry, Connor's dispatches informed them that the general had reached the Powder River safely and had begun the construction of the fort. William E. Unrau, ed., *Tending the Talking Wire: A Buck Soldier's View of Indian Country, 1863-1866* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1979), 278.

Captain North's scouts discovered a party of twenty-four Cheyenne Indians. In the fight that followed, all the Cheyennes Indians were killed.

There are several different accounts of this fight. According to one account, the Pawnees had been trailing the Cheyennes for several days. They rode all night in hopes of overtaking the Cheyennes. According to Fincelius Burnett, Captain North wanted to camp ~~for the night and continue the pursuit the following morning, but the Pawnees insisted on~~ moving on in the dark. They reasoned that the Cheyennes believed that white troops were following them. The Cheyennes never expected white soldiers to continue their pursuit during the night.³⁰ On the morning of the sixteenth, the Pawnees discovered the Cheyenne camp. They approached the camp in columns of two, which led the Cheyennes to believe that they were indeed white troops. As the Cheyennes prepared for battle, some Pawnee warriors advised North to disguise himself as an Indian, possibly to make himself a less conspicuous target during battle. North wrapped a red scarf around his head and painted his face with war paint. When the column came within two hundred yards of the Cheyennes, the Pawnees began shouting their war whoops and broke into the Indian style of attack. When the Cheyennes realized the soldiers were in fact Pawnees, they panicked and scattered in every direction. After a brief battle, the Pawnees killed all twenty-four Indians, including one woman. One of the Cheyennes took no part in the fight because he had been seriously wounded in another battle. During the battle with the Pawnees, he

³⁰ According to the Sorenson account, North dismounted two of his scouts, placed them at the head of the column, and supposedly told them "that if they lost the trail it would be the peril of their lives." This statement, however, seems somewhat out of character.

tried to hide in a small ravine, but a Pawnee Sergeant, armed with a saber, followed and killed him. During the battle the Pawnees lost only four horses.³¹

³¹ Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 89-92. Grinnell's account is based largely on the Sorenson manuscript. According to Grinnell and Sorenson, the Pawnees killed twenty-six Cheyennes, but General Connor's report of August 19, mentions twenty-four Indians killed. Another account comes from Captain Henry E. Palmer, who served in Connor's expedition. Palmer wrote in his diary: "Indian scouts discovered a war party to-day, and the soldiers gave them a running fight, Captain North's Pawnees in the advance, with only a few staff officers who were smart enough to get to the front with the Pawnees. Captain North followed the Indians about twelve miles without their being aware of our pursuit; then the fun began in earnest. Our war party outnumbered the enemy, and the Pawnees, thirsty for blood and desirous of getting even with their old enemy, the Sioux [they were actually Cheyennes], rode like mad devils, dropping their blankets behind them, and all useless paraphernalia, rushed into the fight half naked, whooping and yelling, shooting, howling--such a sight I never saw before. Some twenty-four scalps were taken, twenty-four horses captured, and quite an amount of other plunder, such as saddles, fancy horse-trappings and Indian fixtures generally. The Pawnees were on horseback twenty-four hours and did not leave the trail until they overtook the enemy." Palmer, *The Powder River Indian Expedition*, 18.

Another account comes from Fincelius G. Burnett, who was one of the white guides on the expedition. Although Burnett claimed to have been present at the fight, his is perhaps the least reliable version of the fight. Burnett was 87 years old when he wrote down these memoirs. He also tended to dramatize events and inflate his own role. He may, in fact, not have been present at the fight at all. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness his account is included here: "Two or three days later a Pawnee scout was running into camp yelling, 'Sioux! Sioux!' He reported that he had seen a war party come to the river from the east, ten or fifteen miles down the river, north of the fort. Captain North thinks this war party was the same Indians who killed Caspar Collins a few days [actually weeks] before at Platte Bridge as the many scalps found in their possession was mute evidence that they had successfully attacked and killed a number of soldiers and that the age of the scalps would tend to verify the time as being of the date of the Lieutenant's death. General Connor ordered Major [Captain] North to go after them, in fact his scouts were going without orders as fast as they could catch their horses. A. C. Leighton who was an intimate friend of Major North received permission for himself and I to accompany them. Charlie Small, his lieutenant, being unwell. We left the fort about three p.m., and rode hard in our endeavor to overtake them, the Sioux, before darkness came, but it came too soon, and Major North called a halt and held a council with his scouts. He thought it best to go into camp, and wait until daylight, but the Pawnees persisted that it was best to follow on, as the Sioux thinking it was white soldiers who were following them, and that we would stop and wait for daylight, would travel a while after dark, and thinking themselves safe, and out of reach of us would camp and rest until dawn. We marched slowly on down the river for several hours and finally the scouts came in and reported that they had located the Sioux camped in the timber a few miles ahead of us. Major North ordered the Pawnees to surround them, and wait until early dawn before attacking them. They were surprised and fought manfully until the last one was killed. There were forty-two of them [clearly Burnett was off the mark here], and two of them were women; none of them escaped. They had evidently been raiding along the Overland Trail as they had a number of white men's scalps, among them was one which we took to be from a light curly-haired girl; They also had a number of Ben Holladay's horses, they were a fine lot, all branded B.H. There was one Sioux that they had been hauling on a travois who had been shot through the leg, he would in all probability have died, as his leg was in bad condition, the bone being badly crushed." "Fincelius G. Burnett With the Connor Expedition," in Hafen, *Powder River Campaigns*, 209-210. Burnett's account appeared first under the title "History of the Western Division of the Powder River Expedition," in the *Annals of Wyoming* 8:3 (January 1932), 569-579.

According to General Grenville M. Dodge, this particular group of Cheyennes had attacked and murdered a party of American soldiers a few weeks earlier. An old Cheyenne signalled his readiness to die. He placed his hand up to his mouth to indicate "that they were full of white men up to that." On the body of a dead Cheyenne, the Pawnees discovered a diary belonging to one of the American soldiers. The diary contained drawings, made by the Cheyennes, that explained where they had been and what they had done

After the battle the Pawnees returned to Connor's camp, arriving the next day around three o'clock in the afternoon. In typical Pawnee fashion they announced the success of their war party by storming into the fort, shouting and displaying the scalps of the slain enemies.³² Connor and the entire garrison turned out to receive them. The American soldiers "formed a double line through which the Pawnees marched, singing their war songs and flourishing in the air their scalp-poles, to which the [Cheyenne] scalps were attached."³³ Connor was pleased with the results of the scout. Among the spoils that the Pawnees brought in were twenty-nine animals, including four government mules and six government and Overland Stage Line horses. All evidence indicated that

over the past weeks. Grenville M. Dodge, *The Battle of Atlanta and Other Campaigns* (Council Bluffs, IA: Monarch Printing Company, 1911/Denver, CO: Sage Books, 1965), 88-89.

George Bent, finally, gives a completely different account of the fight. Although Bent was not present at the fight, he claims he received his information from Cheyennes who witnessed the battle. According to Bent only five Cheyennes were killed during the fight: "The trail used by the Indians in going south to the Platte to make raids ran just west of the new post [Fort Connor]. Connor had a large number of Pawnee and Omaha scouts with him, and while the fort was being built he set these warriors to watch the trail. The scouts were very skillful at this kind of work and during a week or so they caught several of our small raiding parties returning from the Platte and punished them pretty severely. My step-mother [Yellow Woman, the younger sister of Owl Woman, mother of Julia Bent, George Bent's half-sister] was with one of these war parties. This party went up the Platte clear into the mountains, taking a great deal of plunder, and then started back for Powder River. They passed quite near to Connor's Fort without seeing any soldiers, but the next day, about fifty miles north of the fort, they ran into the Pawnee scouts. My step-mother and four men were riding some distance ahead of the others when they saw a few Pawnees on a hill to the front. The Pawnees had disguised themselves so as to appear like Cheyennes or Sioux, and they now signaled with their blankets, "We are friends; come nearer." So the Cheyennes rode forward without suspecting any danger; but when my step-mother and the four men she was riding with had come quite close to the hill, a large body of Pawnees suddenly charged over the hill and attacked them, while at the same time a company of cavalry appeared off to one side and also attacked the Cheyennes. My step-mother and her four companions were overtaken and all killed, but the rest of the Cheyennes threw away their plunder and made their escape. The Pawnees claimed they killed twenty-four Cheyennes in this fight, but this is not true. They may have killed twenty-four Indians in some other fight about this time, but this was the only Cheyenne war party they caught, and there are men still living who were with this party and who know that only five people were killed." Bent also believed that Connor did not use his Indian Scouts in a proper way: "instead of setting them to hunting for small war parties, he could easily have learned the location of our camps." Bent drew a map of the camps, trails, and fights on the Powder River. Hyde, *Life of George Bent* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 203, 227, 228.

³² "Diary of Capt. B. F. Rockafellow," in Hafen, *Powder River Campaigns*, 181.

³³ Sorenson, "A Quarter Century on the frontier," 83.

these Cheyennes had been present at a fight, several months earlier, in which Captain William D. Fouts and four soldiers of the Seventh Iowa Cavalry had been killed.³⁴

Although the Pawnees had been in the saddle for more than thirty hours without food, they did not seem tired. With Connor's permission they prepared for a great feast. That evening, many curious officers and soldiers witnessed the festivities. The Pawnees built a large fire and danced a scalp dance. Among the spoils and trophies of the battle were scalps, buffalo robes, and other valuable items such as blankets and a woman's belt ornamented with silver brooches and brass buttons. Some of the dancers carried the captured scalps, which they had tanned and stretched, on small round hoops attached to scalp poles. During the dance the Indians sang about their exploits.³⁵ Not everybody approved of the display, however. Captain Henry E. Palmer gave the following account of the ceremony:

The war dance was the most savage scene I had ever witnessed. They [the Pawnees] formed a circle and danced around a fire, holding up the bloody scalps, brandishing their hatchets and exhibiting the spoils of the fight. They were perfectly frantic with this, their first grand victory over their hereditary foe. During the war dance they kept howling, "hoo yah, hoo yah, hoo yah, hoo you," accompanying their voices with music (if such it could be called) made by beating upon an instrument somewhat resembling a drum. No one who has never witnessed a genuine Indian war dance could form any conception as to its hideousness--the infernal "hoo yahs" and din-din of the tom-tom.

These howling devils kept up the dance, first, much to our amusement, until long after midnight, when finally the General, becoming thoroughly disgusted, insisted upon the officer of the day stopping the noise. After considerable talk Captain North, their commander, succeeded in quieting them, and the camp laid down to rest; but this war dance was

³⁴ Connor to Dodge, August 19, 1865, in Hafen, *Powder River Campaigns*, 46.

³⁵ Diary of Capt. B. F. Rockafellow," in Hafen, *Powder River Campaigns*, 182.

kept up every night until the next fight, limited, however, to 10 o'clock P. M.³⁶

Connor authorized North to distribute the spoils of the battle among his men. Some of the regular soldiers tried to buy trophies from the Indians. During the celebrations that night, the Pawnees held name giving ceremonies for the men who had fought in the battle. Among the men who received a new honorary title was Frank North, whose Indian name hitherto had been *Skiri Tah Kah* ("White Wolf"). Rather than selecting a new name himself, North asked some Pawnees to select a name for him. The Pawnees bestowed upon him the name *Pani Leshar* ("Pawnee Chief"), and North returned the honor by presenting one of the captured horses to the men who had given him the new name.³⁷

The celebrations were overshadowed by a tragic accident the next day. On August 18, an accidental discharge from a gun ended the life of "Little Ears," a Chaui Pawnee. The bullet struck him in the forehead. Not all Pawnees believed the incident was accidental. The bullet came from the pistol of a Skidi who claimed the gun went off while he was describing the recent battle to Little Ears. The incident threatened to cause tensions between the two bands. Frank North investigated the matter and concluded the incident was indeed an accident. Little Ears was buried with full military honors. After the funeral, the leaders among the Pawnees calmed the passions of their men by declaring

³⁶ Palmer, *The Powder River Indian Expedition*, 19.

³⁷ Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 93-94. According to John Box, Frank North received his name from a Skidi, which would make him a member of the Skidi band. Luther North believed that his brother received his name from a Chaui, making him a member of that band. Frank North, however, never identified himself with one band in particular. Robert Bruce, *Pawnee Naming Ceremonial* (New York: Privately Published, 1932), 10.

that the accident was the Great Spirit's punishment for their excessive glorification over the recent fight. Apparently this explanation satisfied the rest of the Pawnees.³⁸

On August 19, North's scouts discovered several small parties of Indians. During one pursuit, North, who was mounted on a fresh horse, outran his own troops and soon found himself in a tight spot when the Indians turned on him. According to Grinnell and Sorenson, the arrival of Lieutenant Small relieved him from his precarious situation.

According to Finn Burnett, North was saved by a Pawnee Scout named Bob White. Upon their return to their troops, the two men discovered that the Pawnees had surrounded a lone Indian (later identified as "Red Bull," an old Cheyenne chief). The Pawnees entertained themselves by shooting at the Indian, wounding him in many places. North ended the torture and ordered his men to kill the man at once. The Pawnees captured six horses in the fight.³⁹

On the afternoon of August 20, guards at the fort spotted a number of Indians, probably Cheyennes, on a hill. Captain North and some of his scouts gave chase and later returned to camp with three scalps, several ponies and mules, and some other goods. On the body of one of the Indians, the scouts found some letters which belonged to a private

³⁸ Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 93-94. *Report of John R. Patrick*, 207.

³⁹ Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 97-99. Palmer, *The Powder River Indian Expedition*, 19. Finn Burnett reports a slightly different version of North's narrow escape from the hostiles. According to Burnett, "Major North while scouting near the Crazy Woman's Fork of the Powder River with his Pawnees, ran into a war party, which they chased through the hills. The major in the chase became separated from his men and ran into a bunch of hostiles, who killed his horse, and was doing his best to stand them off. When he had about given up hope, one of his Pawnees, Bob White, a sergeant and one of his scouts [the muster rolls actually list White as a Wagoner], came to him. Frank told Bob to hurry and bring some of the other scouts to his relief. Bob, instead of obeying, jumped off his horse and lay down beside Frank saying: 'Me heap brave, me no run, you and me killem plenty Sioux, that better.' They were having a warm time when found and relieved by some of his scouts." "Fincelius G. Burnett With the Connor Expedition," in Hafen, *Powder River Campaigns*, 208-209. Again there are questions about the accuracy of the report, as Burnett placed this incident before the fight of August 16. All other sources indicate that this particular event took place on August 19.

Baker, of Company B of the Seventh Michigan Cavalry, as well as a book belonging to another soldier of the same regiment.⁴⁰

While chasing the Indians, the scouts discovered a train of one thousand Cheyennes. North sent a dispatch to Connor, who ordered Colonel Kidd's Sixth Michigan Cavalry to assist the Pawnees. About half a mile from the fort, Kidd met North, who was returning with the three scalps. The captain explained that his horses were exhausted and that he had to give up the chase. But he ordered Lieutenant Murie to accompany the colonel with a few of his men whose mounts were still fresh. When Kidd's command neared the place where the Cheyennes had been last seen, the colonel sent Murie and his scouts in advance to determine the exact location of the Indians. Murie did as ordered and found the Cheyenne camp. But when he returned to inform Kidd, he found that the troops had left. According to Grinnell and Sorenson, Kidd's mutinous troops were not eager for a fight with the Indians and had returned to camp. Colonel Kidd reported to Connor that there were only 30 Cheyennes and that he was unable to chase the Indians. Later that evening North and Murie reported what had transpired, and the following morning Connor reprimanded Kidd for abandoning Murie's scouts in front of the other officers of the command.⁴¹

According to Finn Burnett, the scouts brought in scalps every day. Burnett recalled that the Pawnees used a white horse to lure the Sioux and Cheyennes into an ambush.⁴² Other companies also skirmished with small parties of Sioux, Cheyennes, and

⁴⁰ "Diary of Capt. B. F. Rockafellow," in Hafen, *Powder River Campaigns*, 183.

⁴¹ Ibid., 184. Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 100-102.

⁴² Robert B. David, Finn Burnett, *Frontiersman: the Life and Adventures of an Indian Fighter, mail coach driver, miner, pioneer cattleman, participant in the Powder River Expedition, survivor of the Hay Fielf fight, associate of Jim Bridger and Chief Washakie* (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1937), 72

Arapahos. Usually, Individual Pawnees accompanied these troops. On August 21, a few Pawnees, who had accompanied Captain Marshall and forty men of the Eleventh Ohio Cavalry, returned from a patrol with two more scalps.⁴³ Despite these small successes, a decisive battle still eluded Connor. On August 22, Connor assembled his troops and began the journey to the Tongue River and the rendezvous point at the Rosebud. He ordered Colonel Kidd and the Sixth Michigan Cavalry to stay behind and garrison Fort Connor.⁴⁴

After a four-day march, Connor's troops reached Peno Creek (now called Prairie Dog Creek). As they gazed down the Tongue River valley, Jim Bridger, the famous mountain man and one of the white scouts in the command, spotted a column of smoke in the distance. General Connor ordered Captain North and some of his scouts to investigate the matter.⁴⁵ On August 27, the scouts discovered the camp. In order to determine its size, North sent two men ahead to count the number of lodges. The two men stripped themselves of their clothes, according to Pawnee custom before a possible fight. They approached the camp and hid underneath the bank of a creek. They came so near to a woman that they could have touched her by reaching over the bank. When they returned, they reported that it was a large village. North immediately sent two other men to

and 76. Burnett, "History of the Western Division of the Powder River Expedition," in the *Annals of Wyoming* 8:3 (January 1932), 569-579. Burnett later wrote to Robert Bruce: "I had the honor of being with [the Pawnee Scouts] in several engagements, and give them credit for being as cool and brave under all conditions as any man with whom I have ever been engaged. A monument should be erected at the old Pawnee Agency on the Loup River, Nebraska, in memory of Major Frank North and his Pawnee Scouts." Fincelius G. Burnett to Robert Bruce, February 19, 1929. "Robert Bruce, Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts Papers," Box 1, Folder 1, Department of Special Collections, McFarlin Library, Tulsa University, Tulsa, Oklahoma.

⁴³ "Diary of Capt. B. F. Rockafellow," in Hafen, *Powder River Campaigns*, 184. Palmer, *The Powder River Indian Expedition*, 19.

⁴⁴ Hampton, "Powder River Expedition," 12.

⁴⁵ Palmer, *The Powder River Indian Expedition*, 24. Grinnell/Sorenson claim that ten Pawnees accompanied North on this scout. Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 105.

Connor's camp to report the discovery. The dispatchers reached Connor's camp on August 28. Connor hurried his troops to finish their supper. Among the troops were Captain Brown's Second California Cavalry and the Omaha/Winnebago Scouts, who had reached the command a few days earlier. At 8 p.m. that evening, Connor led a detachment of one hundred and twenty-five white troops and eighty Indian scouts towards the village.⁴⁶

The Indian village belonged to a band of Arapahos under Chief Black Bear. It consisted of 250 lodges and numbered around 1,500 men, women, and children. There were perhaps 500 warriors in the village. A few Cheyennes were also present. Although the villagers had been alerted of the approach of the soldiers by a Cheyenne named Little Horse, the Arapahos ignored his warning. Connor's troops had marched all night, but still arrived almost too late. The women had already taken down and packed most of the lodges. The warriors had gathered most of the ponies, and half of the villagers were already mounted when Connor's troops finally arrived on the scene.⁴⁷

At 9 o'clock on the morning of August 29, Connor launched his attack. According to Henry E. Palmer, who witnessed the attack, more than "a thousand dogs commenced barking, and more than seven hundred Indians made the hills ring with their fearful yelling." When the soldiers came in sight, the Arapahos dropped their supplies and fled up a small stream. The Pawnee Scouts dashed ahead into the village, followed by the soldiers and the Omaha and Winnebago Scouts. In the chaos of the fight, the soldiers and

⁴⁶ General Connor's report of the Tongue River battle can be found in Rogers, *Soldiers of the Overland*, 198-199, and in Hafen, *Powder River Campaigns*, 46-48. Palmer claims there were 250 white troops present in Connor's party. Palmer, *The Powder River Indian Expedition*, 25. Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 106-107.

⁴⁷ George Bird Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), 210-211.

their Indian allies took little time to direct their aim. According to Palmer, “squaws and children, as well as warriors, fell among the dead and wounded.” Connor instructed North to take some of his scouts and gather as many of the Arapahos’ horses as possible. Then the general stormed after the fleeing Indians, whose valiant defense allowed many of the women and children to escape.⁴⁸

Connor pursued the Arapahos for almost ten miles, when suddenly he found himself with only three officers and ten men left. Many of the horses had become so fatigued that most soldiers had turned back. Some troopers, including a number of Pawnee scouts, returned to loot the village. When the Arapahos noticed that the troops had aborted the chase, they regrouped and turned around for a counteroffensive. Now Connor found himself in dire straits. As he fell back, around 11 a.m., he picked up more soldiers, but it was the Arapahos’ turn to chase the troops. When Connor reached the village, around 12.30 a.m., he ordered his men to destroy the property the Arapahos had left behind. The men collected buffalo robes, blankets, teepee covers, and dried buffalo meat, and threw them on top of the pile of burning lodgepoles. They burned all 250 lodges as well as an enormous amount of supplies.⁴⁹

At 2.30 p. m. Connor ordered his men to retreat from the village. The Arapahos continued the pursuit, hoping to retrieve the horses that had been rounded up by the Pawnee Scouts. They made desperate attempts to stampede the herd and probably would have succeeded if it had not been for North’s scouts. According to Palmer, the fighting

⁴⁸ Palmer, *The Powder River Indian Expedition*, 26-28. According to Connor’s report, the attack started at 7.30 a. m. Hafen, *Powder River Campaigns*, 46.

⁴⁹ According to Palmer, the soldiers also placed some of their dead comrades on the giant stakes, to prevent the Indians from mutilating the bodies. Palmer, *The Powder River Indian Expedition*, 28-29.

continued until midnight, when the Arapahos finally gave up the chase. At 2 a. m., August 30, the exhausted command returned to the main camp on the Tongue River.⁵⁰

Apart from destroying 250 lodges and a great quantity of supplies, the soldiers captured seven women and eleven children. The captives were released a few days later and sent back to their village with instructions to persuade Black Bear to come to Fort Laramie for a peace council. The sources disagree on the exact number of horses that were captured during the fight. According to Finn Burnett, the Pawnees captured over 2,000 horses. Palmer, estimated the number at 1,100 horses. Grinnell and Sorenson estimated the number of captured horses at 750. In his official report, however, Connor reported the capture of 500 horses and mules. The accounts also vary on the number of enemy casualties. According to Grinnell and Sorenson, 162 Arapahos died in the battle. Palmer and Burnett seem to agree that between 60 and 70 Indians were killed, including Black Bear's son. According to Connor, 35 warriors were killed, but his report makes no mention of any women and children who had died in the battle. The general probably thought it wiser not to mention the deaths of any non-combatants after General Pope's blistering reprimand for his previous order to kill all males over twelve years of age. Seven soldiers were wounded in the battle. Little Bird, a 22-year old Omaha Scout, was the only man killed among Connor's troops.⁵¹

Despite the victory, Connor was incensed at the conduct of some of his troopers during the fight. He was especially angry at the soldiers and Indian scouts who had

⁵⁰ Ibid., 31.

⁵¹ Hafen, *Powder River Campaigns*, 46-48 and 213. According to Palmer, two U. S. soldiers died during the battle, as well as three or four of North's Indian scouts. Palmer was clearly mistaken in this last claim, as no such casualties appear on the muster rolls. Palmer also states that a Pawnee Scout had found a little Indian boy. When asked what he was going to do with the little boy, the Pawnee answered "Don't know; kill him,

abandoned the chase in order to plunder the Arapaho village. The day after the fight, he ordered the troops engaged in the fight to pile their plunder in front of their respective company quarters. Among the trophies taken were a large number of scalps. Then Connor ordered some of his officers to burn the piles. The general made a few exceptions for the handful of men who had performed well during the battle.⁵²

Connor's decision to burn the spoils of the fight must have puzzled the Pawnee Scouts. Taking plunder had always been an important aspect of Indian warfare. Destroying the spoils was a great waste. Furthermore, many Pawnees probably believed that Connor's decision to pursue the Arapahos for ten miles after chasing them from the village had been foolish. Chasing the enemy over a long distance was extremely dangerous. It increased the risk of becoming isolated from the rest of the command. Furthermore, many of the horses were already exhausted and to continue the chase was not only useless, but, in fact, reckless. Connor's wild pursuit nearly cost the life of his men, as well as his own. Punishing the Pawnees for going after the spoils rather than risking their lives in a hopeless chase bewildered them.⁵³

The battle at the Tongue River did not end the Powder River campaign. Connor was eager for another fight. But first he had to join with Cole and Walker's commands further east. "I should have pursued the enemy farther after resting my horses," Connor wrote Dodge, "were it not that the right column of my expedition is out of supplies, and are [a]waiting me near the Yellowstone." By this time the weather had taken a turn for the

mebby." According to Palmer, the soldiers saved the boy. Palmer, *The Powder River Indian Expedition*, 31. Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 108-109. *Report of John R. Patrick*, 210.

⁵² Hafen, *Powder River Campaigns*, 47. Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 110-111.

worse. Rain storms and falling temperatures made travel extremely uncomfortable. On September 1, Connor directed Captain North and twenty Pawnees to join Captain Marshall and thirty men of the Eleventh Ohio Cavalry to travel to the rendezvous point to meet Cole and Walker. The remainder of the troops followed in the same direction. Five days later North's advance party returned. They had found no sign of Cole.⁵⁴

Connor was unaware that Cole and Walker's commands had bogged down further east. On September 8, he once again sent North and a number of his scouts in search of the lost command. When they reached the Powder River, the Pawnees discovered a large Indian village in the distance. When they pushed on they stumbled upon scene of tremendous carnage. Before them lay the remains of hundreds of dead cavalry horses, undoubtedly belonging to Cole's command. Most of them had been shot in the head. North immediately turned his men around and returned to Connor's camp on September 11. Upon receiving North's alarming report Connor dispatched Sergeant C. L. Thomas and two Pawnees to find Cole and direct him to Fort Connor where he would find supplies for his troops. This was indeed a dangerous mission, and the general instructed the Pawnees to "travel only by night and to run the gauntlet at all hazards, otherwise Cole and his men might perish within close proximity to the fort where there was an abundance of supplies, food, and ammunition."⁵⁵

Both Cole and Walker had run into major problems on their expeditions. The rough, broken character of the country made travel very difficult. The lack of fresh water

⁵³ One must also keep in mind that during the previous campaigns, under Generals Curtis and Mitchell, the Pawnees had been promised pay which they never received. Perhaps the Pawnees thought it prudent to take what they could as reimbursement of their services.

⁵⁴ Hafen, *Powder River Campaigns*, 47. Palmer, *The Powder River Indian Expedition*, 34.

⁵⁵ Rogers, *Soldiers of the Overland*, 212. Palmer, *The Powder River Indian Expedition*, 36.

and grass had weakened their horses. Scurvy and exhaustion had taken their toll among the men, who had grown increasingly insubordinate. Although the two columns met on the Belle Fourche River, north of the Black Hills, Cole and Walker, who disliked each other immensely, preferred to march in separated columns. On September 1, while his men camped on the Powder River, a large party of Cheyennes and Sioux under Roman Nose attacked Cole's horse herd. Over the next ten days, the Indians continued their attacks. Apart from the Indians, the soldiers also battled starvation and deteriorating weather conditions. During an ice storm, Cole lost more than 400 horses. According to one account, the hungry soldiers stripped the flesh from the dead mounts and devoured the meat raw.⁵⁶

On September 13, Sergeant Thomas and the two Pawnee Scouts rode into Cole and Walker's camp. According to his instructions, Cole was to move to Fort Connor, but his soldiers were in no condition to travel. Fortunately, some additional relief came a few days later. On September 14, Connor ordered Captain North and some of his scouts and some of Marshall's soldiers with supplies to aid Cole and Walker. When North and the Pawnees found the starving troops they distributed not only Connor's supplies but their own rations as well. On September 20, the Pawnee Scouts guided Cole and Walker's tired

⁵⁶ Cole reported twelve men killed, and two men missing from his command. Walker lost one man killed and four wounded. Cole estimated that the Indians lost 200 to 500 warriors during the skirmishes. These numbers were a gross exaggeration and probably an attempt to polish up his awful record for the expedition. Walker's report was more to the truth: "as to the number of Indians killed in our long fight with them I cannot say as we killed one.," he wrote. According to Grinnell, only one Indian, "Black Whetstone, an old Sioux, was killed during the fights. Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes*, 214. Hampton, "Powder River Expedition," 9-12.

troops into Fort Connor. Four days later the general himself arrived at the fort. With him were the remaining Pawnee Scouts, who drove the captured horses into the fort.⁵⁷

With Connor's return to the fort, the Powder River campaign came to an end. Major General John Pope, fed up with Connor's "mismanagement" of the campaign, had issued an order on August 22 relieving the general from his command. General Frank Wheaton replaced Connor as commander of the District of the Plains. Connor received these instructions two days before his arrival at the fort. He had intended to reorganize his troops and continue to scout the territory and was greatly disappointed with the order. General Dodge, Connor's immediate superior, and western newspaper editors were also furious at Pope's decision to end the campaign. They feared that the Indians would soon return to the trails and disrupt the traffic there.⁵⁸

On September 26, Connor left the fort bearing his name. Captain North and the Pawnee Scouts accompanied him, driving the captured Arapaho horses toward Fort Laramie. By this time, only 600 horses were left. Some had died as a result of the bad weather on the trail from the Tongue River. Others had simply escaped. At Fort Laramie, General Wheaton officially assumed command of the District of the Plains from Connor, who journeyed to Salt Lake City to assume command of the District of Utah. Wheaton gave North the option to muster his men out or to travel back to Nebraska to relieve a company of the Seventh Cavalry at the Pawnee Agency. North accepted the latter

⁵⁷ Palmer, *The Powder River Indian Expedition*, 40-41. According to Grinnell and Sorenson, about thirty-five of Cole and Walker's soldiers had perished as a result of exhaustion and starvation. It appears that this number is incorrect (see previous footnote). Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 118-123.

⁵⁸ Madsen, *Glory Hunter*, 153.

proposition, “as the Pawnees would thus be at home with their people and yet would draw pay and rations.”⁵⁹

The Powder River Campaign of 1865 was not the success its planners had hoped for. The War Department had pumped millions of dollars into a campaign that had rendered few positive results. Cole and Walker’s commands had nearly perished in the hostile environment of the northern Plains, and many questioned Cole’s claim that his troops had killed hundreds of Indians. Connor’s own victory at the battle of the Tongue River had been followed by a long and hard-fought retreat. Still, the campaign had not been a complete loss. According to Robert M. Utley, it focused public attention on the Bozeman Trail and allowed the military to gain better knowledge of the territory. Furthermore, the establishment of Connor’s fort, which was soon re-christened “Fort Reno,” insured that the Bozeman Trail would attract increasing numbers of emigrants. Utley might have added that the employment of the Pawnee Battalion had been a great success. The Pawnees had been instrumental in locating and tracking hostile Indians. They had taken nearly a hundred enemy scalps and corralled a great number of horses at Black Bear’s village. Finally, they had saved Cole and Walker’s commands from death by

⁵⁹ Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 123-125. The Pawnee Scouts returned to Fort Kearny in October 1865. Frank North and Second Lieutenant James Murie proceeded with their men to the Pawnee Agency. Lieutenant Charles Small, however, remained at Fort Kearny. In December 1865 and January 1866, Lieutenant Murie was sent on scouts with some of the men to Plum Creek. The Pawnees were mustered out of service in April 1866. “Returns From U. S. Military Posts, 1800-1916,” NARS M. 617, Roll 565, “Fort Kearny, Nebraska, January 1861-May 1871” (Washington, D. C.: National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1965), October, 1865-April 1866. The Pawnees nearly missed another payment as the ambulance carrying their pay was attacked by a band of desperadoes. However, Captain G. M. Bailey, who escorted the shipment, was able to keep the bandits at a distance and guide the ambulance safely to Columbus, Nebraska. *Omaha Republican*, January 29, 1888.

starvation. If the Powder River Campaign did anything, it established the reputation of the Pawnee Scouts.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue*, 332. According to Fincelius G. Burnett, General Connor was very pleased with the performance of his troops, including the Pawnees, during the campaign: "General Connor was a brave commander of men, fearless and discreet, never asking a man to go where he would not lead. His men loved him; he despised disobedience and cowardice. There were three regiments under his command in 1865; he loved these men - the Second Colorado, the Second California and the Eleventh Ohio. I have heard him say that with these three regiments and ninety Pawnee scouts under Major Frank North, he could whip all of the Indians on the [P]lains, and I believe that he could have done it." Finn G. Burnett quoted in Grace Raymond Hebart and E. A. Brininstool, *The Bozeman Trail: Historical Accounts of the Blazing of the Overland Routes into the Northwest, and the Fights with Red Cloud's Warriors* (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1922), 261.

CHAPTER SIX

GUARDING THE UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD, 1867-1868

In January 1866, while quartered at the Pawnee Agency, Frank North received orders to send a company of his scouts to Fort Kearny to join scouting missions along the Republican River. North sent Lieutenant James Murie and fifty men. Luther North received permission from his brother to join the scouts as an observer. The complete scouting party consisted of two regular troops of cavalry, some supply wagons, and the Pawnees.¹

The mission was largely uneventful except for one encounter between the scouts and a number of Cheyennes. Luther North accompanied a small party of ten Pawnees on a scout near present-day Frenchman Creek, when they were discovered by a party of 150 Cheyennes. Although the Cheyennes outnumbered the Pawnees, the Pawnees carried superior arms. The Cheyennes carried mostly bows and arrows, while the army had issued seven-shot Spencer carbines to the Pawnees. Despite their superior arms, Luther North advised the men to retreat. When they were near the Creek, North's horse slipped on some ice and fell. North was thrown from the saddle. He struck the ice with his head and lost consciousness. When he came to, a Pawnee had his head in his lap and was rubbing

¹ Frank North did not accompany his men to Fort Kearny. A few weeks earlier, on December 24, 1865, he had married Mary Louise Smith (1845-1883) in Columbus, Nebraska. Frenchman Creek was also known as

snow in his face while the rest of the men had formed a defensive circle around him. Instead of fleeing, they remained to save the life of North. During the fight, the Cheyennes wounded three horses with arrows, but they were unable to break through the defensive perimeter. At daybreak they gave up their siege, and North's party was able to return to camp, where they arrived around midnight and reported what had taken place. The next morning, when the command was ready to start in pursuit of the Cheyennes, a dispatch arrived ordering all troops to return to Fort Kearny. When they arrived at the fort, the campaign ended, and the Pawnees returned to their agency.²

In April of 1866 Captain G. M. Bailey of the Commissary Department received orders to muster the Pawnees out of service. Again, as had happened after the Curtis-campaigns of 1864, the Pawnees nearly missed another payment when Bailey's ambulance carrying their pay was attacked by a band of desperadoes. Fortunately, Bailey's men were able to keep the bandits at a distance, and, after some delay, the shipment arrived safely at Columbus. After mustering the Pawnees out and paying them, Bailey and his men witnessed their "novel war dance and other Indian ceremonies."³

Frenchman's Fork or Whiteman's Fork. Donald F. Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains: Recollections of Luther North, 1856-1882* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 37.

² The Spencer carbine was a seven-shot .50 caliber weapon that was adopted during the last days of the Civil War. Although there were also .52 and .56 caliber versions of this weapon, the .50 caliber was used mostly for Indian combat. The .50 caliber Spencer was 37 inches long and weighed 8.75 pounds, and was known as the "Indian Model." *Ibid.*, 38-39, 42.

³ *Omaha Republican*, January 29, 1888. The Pawnees continued to demand payment for their services in 1864. On May 3, Superintendent E. B. Taylor wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that "These Pawnees rendered valuable service to the war department, and should be paid." One week later, Pawnee Agent D. H. Wheeler, who had taken office on July 10, 1865, granted permission to Robert Moreland [and another man named Daniel Taylor], to take nine Kitkehahki Pawnees to Washington where they could address their grievances in person. When they arrived in the East, however, Moreland abandoned the Pawnees, who were sent back to Nebraska at great expense. The Pawnees never received their pay, but Agent Wheeler was dismissed for granting Moreland to take the Pawnees off their reservation without formal authorization from the Indian Office. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, *Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-1881*, D 100, M 234, Roll 660. Hereafter cited as *Letters Received*.

The next assignment for the Pawnee Scouts came in 1867 when the Union Pacific Railroad Company (U. P. R. R.) requested military assistance to protect its surveying and construction crews that were building the first transcontinental railroad in the United States. Over the next three years, the Pawnees regularly served along the U. P. R. R.

The idea of a transcontinental railroad originated in the 1830s with New York merchant and China trader Asa Whitney. In 1845 Whitney “proposed to Congress that the federal government grant a strip of land sixty miles wide, from Lake Superior to the Oregon country to a firm willing to construct a railway to the Pacific Ocean.” Although Congress failed to act, politicians such as Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton kept Whitney’s dream alive. In the 1850s the idea for a transcontinental railroad received more political support, but there was considerable sectional debate over the best route.

Northern Congressmen pushed for a northern route, while southern Congressmen, such as Jefferson Davis, favored a southern route. Illinois Senator Stephen A. Douglas suggested the building of three transcontinental roads: one from the North, one from the South, and one from Douglas’s own state of Illinois through the central Plains. After the secession of the Confederate states, Congress passed the Pacific Railroad Act in 1862. The Act provided loans and land grants to the Central Pacific Railroad, which would start construction from San Francisco eastward, and the newly incorporated Union Pacific Railroad, whose construction crews would move westward from Omaha, Nebraska.⁴

Among the principal characters of the Union Pacific Railroad was Major-General Grenville M. Dodge. After the Powder River Campaign, Dodge became frustrated with

⁴ Keith L. Bryant, Jr., “Entering the Global Economy,” in Clyde A. Milner II, Carol A. O’Connor, and Martha A. Sandweiss, eds., *The Oxford History of the American West* (New York: Oxford University Press,

the inconsistent course of the army's Indian policy. In May 1866 he resigned his post as commander of the Department of the Missouri and accepted a position as Chief Engineer for the Union Pacific Railroad at a salary of \$1000 a month. Dodge had acquired ample experience as an industrial engineer. Born in Danvers (present-day Peabody), Massachusetts in 1831, he attended Partridge's School of Practical Engineering in Massachusetts. After receiving a degree in military and industrial engineering, Dodge moved to Council Bluffs, Iowa, in 1853. While surveying the town of Columbus, Nebraska, in 1854, Dodge met Frank North and the Pawnees. For a short period he lived near the Pawnee Agency. Because of his work as a surveyor, the Pawnees named him "Sharp Eye," "Long Eye," and "Hawk Eye."⁵ When the Civil War broke out, Governor [firstname] Kirkwood of Iowa commissioned him a colonel of the Fourth Iowa Volunteer Infantry. During the war, his command captured fifty-five Confederate locomotives and hundreds of wagons, and in 1863, U. S. Grant promoted him to Major-General. During Sherman's campaign to Atlanta, Dodge's engineering crew constructed a double track trestle bridge near Roswell, Georgia, in only three days. The completion of the bridge and this strategic railroad proved essential for Sherman's successful march to the Atlantic Ocean. In 1864, General Grant appointed Dodge commander of the Department of the

1994), 213-224. For a complete history of the Union Pacific Railroad see David Haward Bain's massive *Empire Express: Building the First Transcontinental Railroad* (New York: Penguin Putnam Inc., 1999).
⁵ Dodge's relations with the Pawnees were not always cordial. The first Pawnee Indian he ever saw tried to steal his horse while he was on a surveying mission near the Elkhorn River in 1853. At one point the Pawnees believed that Dodge had poisoned one of their chiefs, "Ish-got-up." The Pawnees forced him to drink his own "medicine." When nothing happened, the Pawnees decided to release him. During the mid-1850s, relations between the Pawnees and the white settlers grew increasingly worse. In July 1855, rumor spread that the Pawnees and the Omahas had murdered a number of settlers. Alarmed at these rumors, Dodge took his wife and young daughter and moved to Omaha. Stanley P. Hirshson, *Grenville M. Dodge: Soldier, Politician, Railroad Engineer* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), 19-21.

Missouri. The following year Dodge planned the Powder River Campaign before resigning his post in 1866.⁶

Because of capital shortages and the disruption of the Civil War, construction of the U. P. R. R. did not begin in earnest until 1864. In the late fall of 1864 the road reached the Pawnee Agency, where the company hired a number of Pawnees to work as laborers on the railway. Agent Lushbaugh proudly reported to his superiors in Washington that the Pawnees did a wonderful job. They received regular pay and completed four miles of track until the work had to be suspended because of bad weather.⁷ The Pawnees took full advantage of the railroad and caught free rides to Omaha and back. The company allowed this practice in order to maintain friendly relations with the Pawnees. The only condition was that the Indians had to travel on top of box cars so they would not bother passengers. In October 1866, Dodge and Thomas C. Durant, the vice-president of the Union Pacific, invited a number of distinguished guests for a trip to the 100th Meridian on board of one of their trains. Among the visitors were Senators Benjamin Wade and J. W. Patterson, future President Rutherford B. Hayes, Palace Car baron George M. Pullman, as well as numerous governors, generals, journalists, railroad officials, doctors, judges, and other notables. The company of visitors stopped at the Pawnee Agency, where the Pawnees, hired by Dodge and Durant, performed a war dance. Many of the Pawnees remembered Dodge from ten years earlier, while others had served under him during the Powder River campaign. At the direction of Dodge, the Pawnees performed a sham Indian raid to wake up the excursionists the following day. The

⁶ Umatilla Gregory, introduction to Grenville M. Dodge's *How We Built the Union Pacific Railway and Other Railway Papers and Addresses* (Denver, CO: Sage Books, 1965), no page numbers.

performance caused some of the unsuspecting campers nearly to flee in terror. Near the bridge across the Loup-Fork River, the Pawnees also performed a mock battle with some members of their tribe dressed as Sioux warriors.⁸

So far, road construction progressed without much interference or problems. Beyond the 100th Meridian, however, surveying and construction crews entered Sioux and Cheyenne territory. The Sioux and Cheyennes objected to the construction of the railroad through their hunting grounds. Red Cloud's Oglala Sioux warriors were also incensed at Patrick Connor's audacity in constructing a fort in the heart of the Powder River country and swore revenge. The Indian war that had begun in 1864 and climaxed with the Sand Creek Massacre continued to linger on. Cheyenne and Sioux war parties scoured the area in search of horses and scalps. The surveying and construction crews were easy prey.

To deal with the Sioux and Cheyennes, chief engineer Dodge ordered that each surveying crew be composed of at least eighteen to twenty-two men. Apart from an experienced engineer and his assistants, the crews consisted of rodmen, flagmen, chainmen, axemen, teamsters and herders. Hunters were added to provide the workers and surveyors with beef. All men in the party were to be armed. Crews operating in hostile Indian country also received some military training. Dodge gave the crews specific instructions never to run when attacked by Indians. His military experience had taught

⁷ Agent Benjamin Lushbaugh to Commissioner William P. Dole, December 17, 1864. *Letters Received*, D 100, M 234, Roll 660.

⁸ Silas Seymour, *Incidents of a Trip Through the Great Platte Valley, to the Rocky Mountains and Laramie Plains, in the Fall of 1866, With a Synoptical Statement of the Various Pacific Railroads, and an Account of the Great Union Pacific Railroad Excursion to the One Hundredth Meridian of Longitude* (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1867), 86-90. Bain, *Empire Express*, 266, 290-293.

him that it was better for units to fight until relief arrived, than to attempt to outrun Indian war parties.⁹

Fortunately, the railroad crews did not have to face the Indians alone. Dodge could rely on the support of some of his old friends in the War Department. Among the strongest proponents of the transcontinental railroad was General William T. Sherman. In 1865 Sherman assumed command of the Military Division of the Missouri, which included most of the tribes of the northern and central Plains. He immediately grasped the strategic importance of the railroad for military operations against the hostile Plains tribes. The railroad, Sherman reasoned, would make the string of expensive and difficult to supply military posts nearly obsolete. Troops could travel to conflict areas quickly from a few strategically located posts along the railroad. "I regard this Road of yours," Sherman wrote Dodge, "as the solution of 'our Indian affairs' and the Mormon question, and therefore, [will] give you all the aid I possibly can." Sherman also emphasized the importance of the railroad to his superior, General Ulysses S. Grant. "The great advantage of the railroad," Sherman wrote Grant in 1868, "is that it give[s] us rapid communication and cannot be stolen like the horses and mules of trains of old."¹⁰

Sherman reassured Dodge that he would do all he could to protect the surveying parties who examined the country for the best possible route and the construction crews who were laying the tracks. The railroads were so important to the army that in the spring of 1866 it created a new military jurisdiction - - the Department of the Platte. General Philip St. George Cooke became its first commander, but he was soon replaced by

⁹ Dodge, *How We Built the Union Pacific Railway*, 15, 18.

¹⁰ Sherman to Dodge, January 18, 1867, quoted in Robert G. Athearn, "General Sherman and the Western Railroads," *Pacific Historical Review* 24 (1955), 42. Sherman to Grant, *ibid.*, 44.

General Christopher Columbus Augur. The headquarters of the new department were at Omaha, Nebraska. The department's main purpose was to protect construction crews along the route. The department also furnished military escorts to crews that were operating in hostile territory.¹¹

An act of Congress greatly facilitated Sherman's plan to protect the Union Pacific Railroad in 1866. On July 28, 1866, President Andrew Johnson signed into law "An Act to increase and fix the Military Peace Establishment of the United States." It was a sweeping reorganization of the army. Its purpose was to increase the size of the army and make it more professional. The number of cavalry regiments increased from six to ten, while the number of infantry regiments increased from nineteen to forty-five units. Among the newly created units were two black cavalry and four black infantry regiments. Each regiment consisted of twelve companies and stood under the command of one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, and three majors. Each company was under the command of a captain, who was assisted by a first and a second lieutenant. The act also reorganized the administrative structure of the War Department by creating ten different bureaus. The most important of these bureaus were the Adjutant General's Office (which sent orders and kept archives of records) and the Quartermaster's Department (which coordinated the distribution of men and supplies).¹²

The act of 1866 was designed also to deal with the "Indian problem" in the West. For that purpose, section six of the act authorized the President "to enlist and employ in the territories and Indian country a force of Indians, not to exceed one thousand, to act as

¹¹ Ibid., 41.

¹² Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1974/1984), 11.

scouts, who shall receive the pay and allowances of cavalry soldiers, and be discharged whenever the necessity for their further employment is abated, or at the discretion of the department commander.” With the expansion of the army and the authorization to hire Indian Scouts, Sherman received the manpower to guard the transcontinental railroad more effectively.¹³

On February 27, 1867, General C. C. Augur telegraphed the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and requested the services of Frank North to assist in the organization of the Pawnee Battalion. A few months earlier, in October 1866, President Johnson had appointed North as trader at the Pawnee Agency. Augur requested that the Indian Office grant North a leave of absence to aid in the protection of the U. P. R.¹⁴ North accepted Augur’s proposition to organize the Pawnee Scouts on the condition that he be granted the rank of major in the United States Army. Augur consented, and in March, North enlisted nearly two hundred Pawnees for service.¹⁵

North created four companies and appointed white men as officers. Each company consisted of members of one of the bands of the Pawnee tribe. Captain Edward W. Arnold and First Lieutenant Isaac Davis commanded Company A, which was composed of Chauis. Captain James Murie and First Lieutenant Fred Matthews commanded Company B, which contained Pitahawirats. Captain Charles E. Morse and First Lieutenant William Harvey commanded Company C, which consisted of Skidis. Finally, Luther North was appointed Captain of Company D, which was composed of

¹³ *United States Statutes at Large*, vol. VIII, “Public Acts of the Thirty-ninth Congress, Session I” Chapter 299, “An Act to increase and fix the Military Peace Establishment of the United States,” p. 332.

¹⁴ C. C. Augur to Commissioner L. V. Bogy, February 27, 1867. *Letters Received*, D 100, M 234, Roll 660.

¹⁵ “Register of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914,” M233, Roll 70, Volume 150, “1866-1873, Indian Scouts,” (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1956), n. p.

Kitkehahkis. Gustavus G. Becher assisted North as First Lieutenant in this company.

Captain Lewis Merrill officially mustered the Pawnees into service on March 15, 1867.

Four days later, the scouts arrived at Fort Kearny.¹⁶

At Fort Kearny, the scouts waited until April before the horses arrived. They also received muzzle loading Springfield rifles and Colt revolvers with paper cartridge ammunition. After receiving the horses and arms, the battalion traveled to the end of the tracks near present-day Ogallala, Nebraska. While Captain Morse's company of Skidis and Luther North's company of Kitkehahkis acted as guards for the track layers, Murie's Pitahawirats and Arnold's Chauis traveled to Fort Sedgwick to exchange their old Springfield rifles for new Spencer carbines.

While scouting the area for hostiles around Ogallala, some scouts discovered a number of Sioux who had stolen fifty or sixty mules from a grading camp a few days earlier. There is some disagreement between Frank and Luther North's recollections whether these Indians belonged to Red Cloud's band of Oglalas or Spotted Tail's Brules, whose village was located nearby. Perhaps the war party consisted of warriors of both bands. In any event, Frank North gathered a number of scouts and followed in pursuit.

¹⁶ According to Luther North a "Commissioner Lee" was First Lieutenant of Company A. Isaac Davis, according to Luther North, was First Lieutenant of Company B, while Fred Matthews was First Lieutenant of Company C. It appears, however, that Luther was wrong. For the exact composition of the officers of the Pawnee companies see "Returns From U. S. Military Posts, 1800-1916," NARS M. 617, Roll 565, "Fort Kearny, Nebraska, January 1861-May 1871" (Washington, D. C.: National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1965), March, 1867. Donald Danker provides brief biographies of some of the officers of the battalion. Captain Charles E. Morse (1840?-1908), was born in New York State. In the 1840s his family moved to Illinois. Around 1859, Morse went to California but returned and settled in Columbus, where he met Frank North. In 1868 he married Alphonsene North. Fred Matthews (1831-1890) was born in Canada. Between 1864 and 1866 he drove a stage coach line from Columbus. Like Frank North, he joined Buffalo Bill's Wild West Show. In his act he drove the stage coach which came under "attack" by Indians. Gustavus G. Becher (1844-1913) was born in Pilson, Bohemia. The Becher family moved to America in 1847. In 1856 they settled in Columbus. After his career as an officer of the Pawnee Scouts, Becher became a real estate dealer in Columbus. In 1895, he was elected to the Nebraska State Legislature. Captain Edward W.

Luther North and Captain Charles Morse accompanied him. The scouts overtook the Indians near the North Platte River and had a running fight for several miles during which they recaptured the mules.¹⁷ One of the Pawnee Scouts, Baptiste Behale [Bayhulle] of Captain Morse's company, killed one of the Indians. This Indian, according to Luther North, later turned out to be a brother of Brule chief Spotted Tail.¹⁸ Unfortunately for Behale, the honor of counting coup on the fallen Indian went to someone else. Luther North, in a letter to Robert Bruce, gave the following account of this incident:

Behale ran up to within a few hundred feet of the Indian and shot the arrow, which struck the Sioux in the right side, ranged forward and the point came out of his left side, a little toward the front. The Indian stopped, took hold of the arrow, pulled it through his body, fitted it to his own bow and shot it back at Baptiste. After taking two or three steps he fell dead, without having touched Behale, though it was a very close call for him . . . As soon as the Sioux fell, Behale rode down on him and leaned over to strike the fallen foe with his bow - that was what was called "counting coup." But the horse shied off and Baptiste failed to touch him, whereupon a Pawnee warrior rushed in and struck the dead Sioux with his bow, afterward claiming the honor of having been the first to count coup on him. Behale also claimed that honor, because he was the first to reach the enemy, and would have struck him if his horse had not shied. They held a council in camp that night, and the wise men were unanimous in awarding the honor to the Pawnee. His name, I believe, had been Fox; and as that brave act gave him the privilege of changing his name, according to the custom of the Plains tribes, it was done that night by the medicine men. Thus he became Luk-tuts-oo-ri-ee-Coots (*Brave Shield*).¹⁹

Arnold (1831-1916) was a long-time friend of the North family. In 1873, Arnold was elected to the Nebraska State Legislature. Danker, *Man of the Plains*, 11f, 49f-50f. Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 138-139.

¹⁷ Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 139-140. Danker, *Man of the Plains*, 51-52. Baptiste Behale (also known as Bayhulle) served as interpreter at the Pawnee Agency for many decades afterward. According to Grinnell Behale's father was Spanish. According to Brummett Echohawk, Bayhulle's tribal name was "One Whom The Great Spirit Shines Down Upon." Brummett Echohawk, "Pawnee Scouts," *Oklahoma Today* 27 (Summer 1977), 12.

¹⁸ According to other sources, the Indian who was killed by Bayhulle was the brother of Red Cloud.

¹⁹ Robert Bruce, *The Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts: Narratives and Reminiscences of Military Service on the Old Frontier* (New York: Privately Published, 1932), 26-27.

After Captains Murie and Arnold returned with their new Spencer carbines, it was the turn of the other two companies to travel to Fort Sedgwick to exchange their guns. On the second day, when they were about ten miles of Fort Sedgwick but still on the north bank of the South Platte River, North's and Morse's scouts discovered an enemy war party consisting of a hundred warriors chasing a some U. S. troops on the other side of the river. They desperately tried to cross the Platte to assist the troops, but the river was too high and the attempt failed. Three horses drowned, and all the ammunition was wet. The Pawnees watched helplessly as the Indians killed nine soldiers. The next day, the Pawnees finally made it to the fort, where they received their new rifles.²⁰

That evening, Major Frank North, General Sherman and General Augur arrived at Fort Sedgwick. Sherman and Augur were on an inspection tour of some western forts. Morse and North's scouts accompanied the generals first to Fort Morgan and then to Fort Laramie. According to Luther North, many of the regular troops accompanying the party were deserting while they camped at Fort Morgan. One night, one of Sherman's personal guards deserted, taking one of the horses belonging to an officer with him. Sherman then ordered Frank North to furnish the guard for his headquarters. The irony of Indians guarding the head of the U. S. Army did not escape Luther North. No more horses were stolen.²¹

On June 20, while escorting General Sherman to Fort Laramie, Luther North's advance party of scouts stumbled upon a party of twenty Arapaho warriors near Lodge

²⁰ Many of the Spencer rifles were not new but had been used before and some were defective. Luther North carefully inspected each gun and returned the defective one for working rifles. Luther North relates how General William Hensley Emory (1811-1877), who commanded the fort at this time, became irritated at his close inspection of the rifles. When Emory tried to demonstrate there was nothing wrong with the guns, the

Pole Creek. The Arapahos were driving a herd of horses and mules. As they approached the Arapahos, the Pawnees gave their war whoop, which, according to North, sounded like “*Ki-de-de-de!*” Then the Pawnees scattered, and each man fought individually, chasing the Arapahos as fast as his horse could run. After a running fight covering ten miles, the scouts killed four Arapahos and captured fifty-five horses and mules. They also captured one Arapaho. The attack earned them the praise of General Sherman. After the fight, the Pawnees honored Luther North by giving him an Indian name: *Le-shar-kit-e-butts* (“Little Chief”). Captain Charles Morse, who had killed one of the Arapahos, also received a Pawnee name. The Pawnees named him *La-shar-oo-led-ee-hoo* (“Big Chief”).²²

Over the next few weeks, the Pawnee Scouts were deployed all along the western portions of the Union Pacific railway.²³ They became a common sight along the railroad. Occasionally, they became friends with men on the working crews. They frequently bivouaced near the camps of the construction crews and invited the laborers to attend their ceremonies. Thomas O’Donnell, one of the Irish hands who worked as a front gage

rifle exploded in his hands. The general almost lost an eye in this incident. Danker, *Man of the Plains*, 52-53.

²¹ Danker, *Man of the Plains*, 54.

²² Bruce, *The Fighting Norths*, 26-28, 56. According to Grinnell, the Pawnees killed two Arapahos, and only captured two mules and one pony. Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 143. Luther North to Robert Bruce, February 1, 1932. “Robert Bruce, Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts Papers,” Box 1, Folder 5, Department of Special Collections, McFarlin Library, Tulsa University, Tulsa, Oklahoma. After arriving at Fort Laramie North’s companies traveled to Granite Canyon and Fort Sanders. According to Luther North, an Arapaho named Little Crow was at Fort Sanders complaining about the raid. He threatened to kill Frank North when North just appeared on the horizon. Instead of following up on his threat, Little Crow fled in panic. Danker, *Man of the Plains*, 53-54, 72.

²³ In June 1867, Captain Arnold’s company of scouts, for example, was stationed at Fort Sedgwick, Colorado Territory. According to the post returns he patrolled the area around [Lodge] Pole Creek. “Returns From U. S. Military Posts, 1800-1916,” NARS M. 617, Roll 1144, “Fort Sedgwick, Colorado, November 1864-May 1871” (Washington, D. C.: National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1965), March-June, 1865.

spiker, became friends with Baptiste Behale, whom he called "half-breed Charlie." At the invitation of Behale, O'Donnell attended a Pawnee dance:

The next excitement was a war dance or scalp dance. I'll never forget it. Half-breed Charlie took me to that dance. There was plenty of excitement. For several days they were getting ready. They put up wigwams and the chief's lodge. Before its door in the ground was a lance and on it hung many scalps. They marched in circles three deep with the braves in the center fighting an imaginary foe all fully armed. It was truly exciting, I being on the inside circle where some brave would rush at me with uplifted tomahawk and knife as [if] to strike the fatal blow and on several occasions I stepped back to avoid it. Charley, seeing this told me no danger. But I, thinking it no[t] so long ago since they were one of the fiercest tribes did not care to trust them. And last the chief made a speech telling how the Sioux killed the Pawnees and their wives and children, stole their horses and drove them from their hunting ground. Then they (vowed) war with the Sioux till death . . . The meeting broke up for that time as our outfit and the Pawnee Scouts camped about two hundred yards apart. At night we often wished it farther for often in the night they would raise a howl and war songs and keep us awake.²⁴

Early in the summer of 1867, a surveying party under Jacob Blickensderfer, Jr., set out from Julesburg to examine the country along the eastern base of the Rocky Mountains. The party included, among others, General Dodge; T. J. Carter, one of the government directors of the road; John R. Duff, the son of the Vice-President of the Union Pacific; Civil Engineer Silas Seymour, who left an account of the trip; and General John A. Rawlins, then Grant's Chief of Staff. On July 3, the surveyors arrived at Crow Creek, in present-day Wyoming, where they began to lay out the town of Cheyenne. Here

²⁴ Although the Pawnees had been sent to protect the workers, occasionally the sudden and unexpected appearance of the Pawnees was a cause for alarm. Thomas O'Donnell recalled that the Pawnees left his crew to get supplies at Fort McPherson. While they were gone, rumors spread that Red Cloud's Oglala warriors were heading in the direction of the railroad camp. When the Pawnees returned, several weeks later, their horses got mired in a swamp near the laborers' camp. The Pawnees raised a fierce war whoop, which the workers mistook for a Sioux attack. They were relieved to discover, however, that the yell had been raised

they met General Augur, who was in the country accompanied by one or two companies of U. S. Cavalry and a large detachment of Pawnee Scouts under command of Major Frank North. After a merry Fourth of July celebration, engineer Seymour set out to examine a section of the country west of Crow Creek. Division engineer Marshall F. Hurd, a teamster and a cook joined him; and General Augur ordered Lieutenant Fred Matthews with a detachment of twenty Pawnee Scouts to escort the party.²⁵

Seymour's party left the camp on the morning of July 11, 1867. Seymour and Hurd, armed with carbines and revolvers, rode in advance. Lieutenant Matthews and some of his men followed in a short distance. Then came the government wagon which carried the camp equipage and supplies. The remaining scouts followed the wagon as a rear guard. After a few hours the party reached Granite Canyon. While Seymour was examining the area, he suddenly saw the wagon escort dash up a hill and at the same instant heard a "most unnatural and uncertain sound from a bugle, blown by one of my braves," from the top of a high bluff in the same direction. The Pawnees had discovered a party of Sioux Indians. It soon turned out that these had been the same Indians who had stolen some mules from another outfit a few days earlier. The scouts immediately dismounted and, without waiting for instructions, "commenced unsaddling their ponies, and divesting themselves of their military caps, coats, pantaloons, boots and other superfluous appendages." They then re-mounted and dashed after the Indians, ignoring Seymour's "orders and protestations to the contrary." Lieutenant Matthews and Hurd

by the Pawnees to pull their horses from the swamp. Thomas O'Donnel manuscript, MS 0698, Nebraska State Historical Society, Lincoln, Nebraska, p. 7-8.

²⁵ Silas Seymour, *A Reminiscence of the Union Pacific Railroad, Containing Some Account of the Discovery of the Eastern Base of the Rocky Mountains and of the Great Indian Battle of July 11, 1867* (Quebec, Canada: A. Cote and Company, 1873), 11-28.

joined the chase. Hurd, unable to keep pace with the scouts, returned to the outfit a little while later. With his entire escort gone, Seymour decided to return to the camp headquarters as fast as possible. The nervous engineers believed they saw the heads of several Sioux peeping over the ridge, but upon their approach, these turned out to be nothing more than “rocks, bushes, or large tufts of grass.” The party made it back to camp late that evening.²⁶

The following day, Lieutenant Matthews returned with his warriors. They had re-captured the mules and taken a number of scalps. Although Matthews’ scouts expected praise for their quick action, Seymour severely chastized the lieutenant for abandoning his party. Matthews apologized but explained that unless he had followed his warriors in their pursuit of the Sioux, probably neither would have seen them again. Seymour noticed that the Pawnees had adorned the ears and tails of the mules they had re-captured with feathers, ribbons, and “other grotesque appendages,” such as enemy scalps. General Dodge also reprimanded Matthews for deserting the party. Dodge later wrote that the Pawnees were “utterly disgusted” with the reprimand. Dodge also noted that the scouts “made the nights hideous for a week with their war dances over their fights and scalps.”²⁷

Enemy parties kept the Pawnees busy that July. As soon as an enemy was sighted, they rushed to their horses to mount a pursuit. Realizing that quick action was the best

²⁶ Ibid., 28-33.

²⁷ It does not appear that Seymour’s party was in any serious danger after the Pawnees abandoned them. In his reports to General Augur, Seymour embellished in greatly exaggerating the dangers they were in, as well as his own heroic role in guiding the party back to camp. In his memoirs, he even referred to the event as the “Great Indian Battle of July 11.” Seymour’s dramatic report of the incident received a quick response from General Augur’s office on July 15, 1867. In the letter the general commended Seymour and Hurd for their “ability and coolness,” and promoted Seymour to “Brevet Major General” for his “distinguished gallantry, in observing the enemy through his field glass,” and Hurd to “Brevet Brigadier General” for “gallant and meritorious service during the war.” The letter also promoted the near hind mule to be “Brevet Horse.” Ibid., 35-41. Dodge, *How We Built the Union Pacific Railway*, 135.

guarantee for success, they wasted little time preparing for the chase. Laborer Thomas O'Donnell recalled how the Pawnees were bathing in Lodge Pole Creek one hot July morning when the alarm, "Sioux," came. The Pawnees immediately jumped on their horses, some half dressed, others completely naked, and set out in pursuit. Although the Sioux escaped, the Pawnees returned that night with ninety freighters' horses that had been stolen from supply trains earlier.²⁸

Another valuable advantage of the Pawnee Scouts was their familiarity with the tactics of their enemies. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Irving Dodge, for example, recalled an incident when he was attacked by a Sioux war party during a hunting trip. Fortunately for Dodge a Pawnee Scout named *Li-heris-oo-la-shar* (also known as "Frank White") was with him. The two men took cover and were able to hold off the attackers. When the Sioux retreated, Dodge wanted to mount his horse and return to his camp, but the scout told him to wait. After waiting for nearly an hour the Sioux appeared again and made another attempt to overtake them. Again the Sioux were unsuccessful. Finally, they gave up, turned their horses and disappeared. Dodge and *Li-heris-oo-la-shar* reached their camp later that night. Dodge would never forget that he owed his life to a Pawnee Scout, and they remained friends forever.²⁹

²⁸ Thomas O'Donnell manuscript, MS 0698, Nebraska State Historical Society, Lincoln, Nebraska, p. 8-9.

²⁹ "In 1867 I was with a party of officers elk-hunting on the Loup River. We had an escort of twelve or fifteen infantry soldiers, and six Pawnee Indians. We established our camp in a fine position, and each officer, taking one or more Indians, went hunting as it suited him. One day I was out with one Pawnee, and, not finding any game, had ridden some twelve or fifteen miles from camp, when we were discovered by a band of between forty and fifty hostile Sioux, who immediately set upon us. About four miles back I had noticed a splendid defensive position, one of the very best I have ever seen. Putting our horses at half speed we plunged into the barrancas of the 'bad lands,' and in half an hour emerged on the spot sought for. Here we dismounted and made our preparations for fight. The Pawnee positively refused to fight on foot, and when I was ready I found him ready also; not a rag of clothing on his body, and nothing but a bridle on his horse. From some receptacle he had fished out a lot of narrow red, blue, and white ribbons, which he had tied in his hair, and in the mane and tail of his horse, and which, as he moved, streamed out for yards in the rear. Sitting perfectly naked, with unwonted ease and grace, on his barebacked horse, with fire in his eye,

William Henry Jackson, whose camera chronicled much of the history of the post-Civil War-West, observed some of the scouts on his return to Omaha from the mining fields in Montana. In his diary for Monday, July 29, 1867, Jackson recorded the following entry: “Met frequent batches of Pawnees in the garb & service of U. S. Some of them appear like good soldiers. Some of them will include their tomahawk among their weapons. They are well mounted & of course excellent riders. Had a long talk with one, chiefly by signs. Told how many scalps he had taken from the Sioux & Cheyennes, where his home was & when he was going to it, etc., etc. Great ‘injun.’”³⁰ Jackson also noted that the Pawnees “wore the regulation uniform, with carbine and pistol-the Indian trait appearing occasionally in blankets wrapped around their waists, trousers converted into

determination in his face, a Spencer carbine in one hand, the reins and a Colt’s revolver in the other, he looked no mean ally in a fight for life. I had hardly time to admire his ‘get-up’ when the whole plain in front seemed alive with yelling savages, charging directly down upon us. When they got within about two hundred and fifty yards I drew up my rifle; but before I could get an aim the whole and threw themselves on the sides of their horses and, swooping in circles like a flock of blackbirds, rushed back to the limit of the plain, about six hundred yards. Here they halted and held a consultation, and some of them, going off to the flanks, examined all the ground and approaches. Finding no line of attack except in front, they again essayed the charge, again to be sent to the rear by the mere raising of the rifle. This was again and again repeated with like result. Finally they withdrew beyond sight, and I wished to start; but the Pawnee said, ‘No, they will come again.’ They were absent for nearly an hour; I believe they were resting their horses. It was very hot, the whole affair was becoming very monotonous, and I was nodding, if not asleep, when the Pawnee said, ‘Here they come.’ I started up to find them within shot, and brought up my rifle; whereupon all ducked, wheeled, and went away as before, entirely out of sight. During all the charges the Pawnee had evinced the greatest eagerness for fight, and I had no little difficulty in keeping him by me whenever the enemy ran away after a charge. Answering yell for yell, he heaped upon them all the opprobrious epithets he could think of in English, Spanish, Sioux and Pawnee. When they wheeled and went off the last time, he turned to me with the most intense disgust and contempt, and said, emphatically, ‘Damn coward, Sioux! now go.’ So, after a four-hours’ siege, we saddled our horses and returned to camp without molestation, but were followed the whole way; and from that time we had no sport or comfort in our hunt, the wretches preceding us by day, driving away the game, and trying to burn us out every night; constantly making their unwelcome presence felt, and yet never giving us a chance for even a long shot at them.” Richard Irving Dodge, *Our Wild Indians: Thirty-Three Years’ Personal Experience Among the Red Men of the Great West* (Hartford, CT: A. D. Worthington and Company, 1883), 456-458. See also Dodge’s *The Plains of the Great West and Their Inhabitants: Being a Description of the Plains, Game, Indians, &c. of the Great North American Desert* (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1877), 383-385.

³⁰ LeRoy R. Hafen and Ann W. Hafen, eds., *The Diaries of William Henry Jackson: Frontier Photographer* (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1959), 200-201.

leggings and tomahawks tucked under their belts. No white officer was then with them, an Indian sergeant commanding that particular detachment.”³¹

One of the Indian parties that was operating in the area near the Union Pacific Railroad was Turkey Leg’s band of Northern Cheyennes. Although the Northern Cheyennes usually camped on the Powder River with Red Cloud’s Sioux, Turkey Leg frequently traveled south with about fifty lodges of his followers to visit the Southern Cheyennes. This summer, Turkey Leg joined the Cheyenne Dog Soldiers and some Brule Sioux under chief Pawnee Killer on the Republican River. In June he attended some peace councils between Pawnee Killer and George Armstrong Custer. Sensing Pawnee Killer’s desire for war, Turkey Leg decided to move his camp north in order to stay out of the way of the soldiers. In August, however, he returned and set up camp near Plum Creek on the Platte River. On August 6, a party of his warriors, under the leadership of Spotted Wolf, cut a telegraph line near Plum Creek Station. When a working crew came to investigate the matter, the Indians attacked and massacred the men.³² One of the workers, William Thompson, a native of England, survived the attack. The *St. Louis Democrat* printed his grizzly account of the massacre:

About 9 o’clock Tuesday night myself and five others left Plum Creek Station and started up the track on a hand-car to hunt up where the break in the telegraph was. When we came to where the break proved to be, we saw a lot of ties piled on the track, but at the same moment Indians jumped up from the grass all around and fired on us. We fired two or three shots in return, and then, as the Indians pressed on us, we ran away. An Indian on a

³¹ Letter from W. H. Jackson to Robert Bruce, May 2, 1931. Bruce, *The Fighting Norths*, 28.

³² George E. Hyde, *Life of George Bent: Written From His Letters* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 272-273, 276-277. John Stands In Timber, a Cheyenne tribal historian, also relates the story of the Plum Creek Massacre in his book (co-authored with Margot Liberty), *Cheyenne Memories* (New haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967/1998), 173-176.

pony singled me out, and galloped up to me. After coming to within ten feet of me he fired, the bullet entering my right arm; seeing me still run, he “clubbed his rifle” and knocked me down. He then took out his knife, stabbed me in the neck, and then making a twirl round his fingers with my hair, he commenced sawing and hacking away at my scalp. Though the pain was awful, and I felt dizzy and sick, I knew enough to keep quiet. After what seemed to be half an hour he gave the last finishing cut to the scalp on my left temple, and as it still hung a little, he gave it a jerk. I just thought then that I could have screamed my life out. I can’t describe it to you. It just felt as if the whole head was taken right off. The Indian then mounted and galloped away, but as he went he dropped my scalp within a few feet of me, which I managed to get and hide. The Indians were thick in the vicinity, or I then might have made my escape. While lying down I could hear the Indians moving around, whispering to each other, and then shortly after placing obstructions on the track. After lying down about an hour and a half I heard the low rumbling of the train as it came tearing along, and I might have been able to flag it off had I dared.³³

There were, in fact, two trains approaching. On board of the first train were engineer Brookes Bowers, fireman George Henshaw, and four others. The Cheyennes had detached one of the rails and derailed the train. They shot Bowers and Henshaw and scalped them. The other men on the train rushed back and warned the second train, which quickly reversed its gears and backed up eastward. Before the Indians burned the derailed train, they plundered the box-cars of everything that might prove of some value or that attracted their fancy. The Cheyennes made a bonfire of the plundered boxes. In the light of the fire they decorated their bodies. They tied colored pieces of ribbon to their scalplocks and hung pieces of velvet over their shoulders. They decorated their ponies with pieces of muslin and tied ribbons to their ponies’ tails. They also discovered a barrel of old Bourbon whisky, which they quickly consumed, and “which set their brain on fire and

³³ The article appeared first in the *St. Louis Democrat* of August 8, 1867, but was reprinted later in the *New York Times* of August 19, 1867. Author of the article was probably Henry M. Stanley, who also left an account of the Plum Creek Massacre in his memoirs, *My Early Travels and Adventures in America and*

rendered them delirious.” They celebrated their victory with a “violent war-song” and at daybreak they set fire to the wreck, taking fire from the furnace and throwing it in the box cars. The bodies of the railroad crew were thrown into the fire. When they saw their work fully accomplished, they left. After they were gone, Thompson managed to crawl away. He found refuge near Willow Island station, where a search party discovered him.

Thompson later returned to Omaha, Nebraska, where a doctor made an unsuccessful attempt to re-attach his scalp. Despite the failed surgery, Thompson lived to tell the tale of the massacre.³⁴

After the attack on the train near Plum Creek, officials of the Department of the Platte at Omaha deployed several companies of infantry along strategic points on the railroad. At the time of Spotted Wolf’s attack, Major North and the Pawnees had been guarding the rail lines two hundred miles farther west. Upon receiving the news of the massacre, North and some of the Pawnee companies boarded a train and traveled to Plum Creek Station. On the morning of Saturday August 17, North received a telegram from the headquarters at Omaha informing him that Indians had once again destroyed the telegraph line a few miles from Plum Creek Station. North immediately sent Lieutenant Davis and twenty scouts of Company A with instructions to investigate the matter and, if

Asia (London, England: Duckworth, 2001), 173-183. Stanley later achieved fame as an explorer in Africa where he rescued Dr. Livingston.

³⁴ Ibid. According to Porcupine, A Cheyenne who was present during the massacre, there were in fact, two trains. After derailling the first train, the second train stopped and five men climbed out. Possibly the men saw the Indians because this second train soon backed away. After the Cheyennes had left the site of the massacre, Thompson made his escape. He took his scalp in a pail of water, in the hope that it might be reattached to his head. After reaching Omaha, he was treated by Doctor R. C. Moore of that town. The operation was unsuccessful. Thompson later returned to England, and sent the tanned scalp back to Doctor Moore. According to Grinnell, the scalp, preserved in alcohol, is now stored in the Omaha Public Library Museum. Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes*, 264-268.

the enemy was still near, “attack and endeavor to whip them sufficiently to rid that station of further trouble from that band of Indians.”³⁵

When Lieutenant Davis arrived he found himself outnumbered by a large force of Cheyennes belonging to Turkey Leg’s band. Turkey Leg had taken his people to the site of the train wreck in search of more spoils. Not expecting any danger, he even had taken women and children along to help collect the plunder.³⁶ Davis immediately notified Frank North of the situation. North at once ordered Captain Murie and thirty men of Company B to the scene of action. Murie’s report of the engagement that followed does not contain many details. Fortunately, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Richard Irving Dodge arrived with a company of infantry just in time to witness the battle through a pair of binoculars from the top of a train wagon. In his memoirs, Dodge recalled the battle as “one of the prettiest and most successful fights that I have ever known among Indians”:

As soon as he had crossed the [Platte] river, Captain Murie discovered the position of the enemy, which was a most admirable one. Plum Creek is a deep bed, generally dry, some sixty feet wide, with high, almost perpendicular banks. The stage road crossed by a bridge. The Cheyenne line was drawn up about one hundred yards from the eastern end of this bridge, directly facing it. The right flank, which might be turned, was protected by eight or ten dismounted Indians posted in the loop-holed stable of the stage station. The Pawnees wore the uniform and used the tactics of the United States Army [they pretended to be regular troops], and the Cheyenne leader evidently believed that the advancing force was United States cavalry. His plan was to permit them to partially cross the bridge, and then by a vigorous onslaught, accompanied by the usual yells and shaking of buffalo robes to frighten the restive and half-broken cavalry horses, render them unmanageable, and thus throw the whole force into confusion in a most difficult and dangerous position.

³⁵ North and Murie’s official reports of the battle at Plum Creek were published in the *New York Times*, August 25, 1867.

³⁶ Hyde, *Life of George Bent*, 277.

Noting that the Indian pickets retired rapidly, and without hostile demonstration, Captain Murie suspected some trap, and on closer examination of the Cheyenne position divined the stratagem of his enemy. Being greatly inferior in force (the Cheyennes numbering one hundred and fifty-four warriors), he resorted to a counter-stratagem. Dismounting his men under cover of the tall grass of the river bottom, he caused them to strip to Indian fighting costume (breech-cloth alone); then he made each put on his uniform hat, throw over his shoulders his uniform overcoat, buttoning only the top button. Then mounted and formed, he moved slowly to the attack, at the head of what to all appearance was a company of United States cavalry, too much encumbered with clothing to make a good fight.

The Pawnees advanced by the flank left in front. As soon as the leading files passed the bridge they inclined rapidly to the left, to enable those in rear to come up promptly into line. When nearly half the company had passed, the Cheyennes charged with furious yells. When they had arrived within probably fifty yards, the Pawnees threw off hats and overcoats, and with a true Indian yell dashed at their enemy. The latter, entirely surprised and utterly stampeded, wheeled their horses, and fled in confusion and dismay. The Pawnees took sixteen scalps, two prisoners, and a number of animals without a man or horse being even scratched.³⁷

While Dodge's description of the engagement is generally correct, the superior armament of the Pawnees also contributed to the outcome of the battle. The Cheyennes carried mainly bows and arrows and were no match for the Spencer repeating rifles. Nevertheless, the coolness with which the Pawnees executed the maneuver was crucial during the fight. According to Murie's report, the scouts killed between fifteen and twenty men and captured about thirty horses. Henry M. Stanley, a newspaper correspondent for the *Missouri Democrat* who covered the incident, wrote that Captain Murie and Lieutenant Davis "did their utmost to prevent the mutilating of the dead, but it

³⁷ Dodge, *Our Wild Indians*, 442-444. Dodge's statement that there were no losses on the side of the Pawnees appears to be incorrect. According to one report the Pawnees lost one horse killed, and five wounded. Bruce, *The Fighting Norths*, 30. According to Luther North, his brother was present during the Plum Creek battle. Luther North to Robert Bruce, May 17, 1928. "Robert Bruce, Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts Papers," Box 1, Folder 3, Department of Special Collections, McFarlin Library, Tulsa University, Tulsa, Oklahoma.

was impossible, for when the Indian blood is heated, they seldom listen to orders of that nature.”³⁸ According to Frank North, the Pawnees also took three prisoners -- a middle-aged woman, a thirteen-year old boy, and a ten-year old girl.³⁹ While crossing the Platte River that evening, the girl escaped and reportedly found her way back to the Cheyennes. Murie’s troops returned to camp at 10 P. M. that night with fifteen scalps, the horses, a large number of blankets, and the two remaining prisoners.⁴⁰

Later that summer, Turkey Leg and some of other prominent Indian leaders met with an American peace commission under General Sherman. Turkey Leg took advantage of the occasion to exchange some white captives for the two Cheyenne prisoners that had been captured by the Pawnee Scouts at Plum Creek. He explained that the little boy was his nephew. In exchange for the prisoners, Turkey Leg surrendered six white captives.⁴¹

After the Plum Creek fight, North received orders to gather his battalion at Cheyenne, Wyoming, to accompany the U. S. paymaster on a trip into the Powder River region. But ranchmen in the vicinity of Laramie and along the Platte River feared that the presence of the Pawnees might incite another war, and so they received orders to return to

³⁸ Henry M. Stanley, *My Early Travels and Adventures in America and Africa* (London, England: Duckworth, 2001), 183. It is doubtful that Murie and Davis made serious attempts to refrain their men from mutilating the bodies of their enemies.

³⁹ According to Grinnell, the little girl’s name was “Island Woman.” She may have received this name because of her daring escape from the Pawnees as they were crossing the Platte River. The Cheyenne boy later received the name “Pawnee” on account of his capture by the scouts. Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes*, 268.

⁴⁰ *New York Times*, August 25, 1867.

⁴¹ The government officials present were generals Sherman, Harney, Terry, Augur, and Sanborn, and Commissioner of Indian Affairs N. G. Taylor, Colonel Tappan, and Senator Henderson. Spotted Tail, Man Afraid of His Horses, Man That Walks Under the Ground, Pawnee Killer, Standing Elk, Spotted Bear, Black Deer, Turkey Leg, Cut Nose, Whistler, Big Mouth, Cold Feet, Cold Face, Crazy Lodge, and others represented the Sioux and the Cheyennes. The white captives consisted of one seventeen-year old and two nineteen-year girls, a pair of six-year old twin boys and a baby. Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes*, 268-269. According to Luther North the name of two of the girls was Martin, but Donald Danker believes that North was mistaken. The two girls were actually daughters of Peter Campbell, who owned a farm near present-day Doniphan, Nebraska. The two girls and their twin brothers had been captured on July 24, 1867. Danker,

Fort Kearny.⁴² On their way back, the Pawnees met a band of three to four hundred Sioux, including one hundred and fifty warriors, near Pine Bluffs, Wyoming. As the Pawnees prepared for battle, Nick Janise (LaJeunesse), who was in charge of the Sioux, rode up and explained that they were on their way to Fort Laramie for a peace council. Janise demanded that the Pawnees clear the road so the Sioux could pass. Frank North, however, insisted that the Sioux should get out of the way unless they were willing to fight. Janise returned, and shortly thereafter the Sioux moved to the side of the road. The Pawnees passed them at a distance of about fifty yards. "I guess that was the first time that the Pawnees and Sioux ever got so close together without exchanging shots," Luther North later wrote. It appears that the presence of women and children prevented the Sioux from making an attack on the scouts.⁴³

While at Fort Kearny, Frank North and a company of his scouts (possibly Luther North's Company D) escorted a hunting party of some of the directors of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, including Vice-President Thomas C. Durant, Oliver Ames, Sidney Dillon, Charles Bushnell, and George Francis Train. None were very good horsemen. The Pawnees spotted a small herd of buffalo, and the chase was on. One of the Pawnees, *Co-rux-ah-kah-wah-de* ("Traveling Bear"), shot a buffalo with two arrows. One of the arrows went clear through the animal's body. After the excitement of the chase,

Man of the Plains, 61. In a letter to Robert Bruce, Luther North wrote that the woman prisoner was Turkey Leg's wife. Bruce, *The Fighting Norths*, 30.

⁴² Danker and Grinnell are not quite clear what the purpose was of the paymaster's mission. Perhaps he was bringing gifts to be distributed to the Indians in order to appease them or perhaps it was an attempt to induce them to attend the Fort Laramie peace council. Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 148.

⁴³ Bruce, *The Fighting Norths*, 28-29. In his autobiography, Luther North states that the Sioux numbered about 100 Indians. Danker, *Man of the Plains*, 61-62.

Grinnell wrote, the sophisticated easterners “expressed a wish to see some hostile Sioux and if possible, to witness a fight with them.”⁴⁴

Apart from the buffalo chase, there was little to do around Fort Kearny. The Pawnees went on a few more scouts, but they found no hostile Indians. By the end of October, most of the scouts were eager to return to their relatives at the Pawnee Agency. Inactivity and boredom caused dissent among the scouts. When Frank North attempted to discipline one of his men, a number of scouts decided to go home without the formality of discharge. According to the muster rolls, twenty-six scouts “mutinied and left camp without leave” on October 31, 1867. The Pawnee “deserters,” however, were probably not aware that their departure violated military law. They simply believed they had done their work and were free to go home. Fortunately, General Augur understood what prompted these Pawnees to leave and decided not to pursue the matter legally. Instead, he gave Major North a number of blank discharge forms to fill in the names of the missing scouts and gave instructions to the paymaster to pay the scouts. Although the incident did not affect future enlistment of the Pawnee Battalion, neither Frank nor Luther North ever mentioned a “mutiny” among their men in any of their writings. Two weeks later, on November 14, the 168 remaining scouts were officially mustered out. During the eight months they had been in service, none of the Pawnees was killed. Only one scout did not return home. Twenty-eight year old *Pe-ah-tah-wuck-oo* had died of consumption near the Laramie Hills, Dakota Territory, on September 21, 1867.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Bain, *Empire Express*, 409-410. According to Grinnell one of the travelers was Oakes Ames. Bain, however, states the excursionist was Oliver Ames, brother of the Congressman. Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 148-150. Bruce, *The Fighting Norths*, 19. Travelin Bear’s name is sometimes spelled *Corux-a-kah-wadde*.

⁴⁵ Donald F. Danker, “The North Brothers and the Pawnee Scouts,” R. Eli Paul, ed., *The Nebraska Indian Wars Reader, 1865-1877* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 79; Thomas Dunlay, *Wolves for*

Augur and Sherman were pleased with the performance of the scouts. They hoped to re-enlist the Pawnees again in the spring to guard the Union Pacific. Augur asked for permission to organize several Indian Battalions of four hundred men each from the friendly tribes in his department. Sherman passed Augur's request on and asked for a total of two thousand Indian troops. Both generals were aware of the objections of the Office of Indian Affairs to the enlistment of Indians as scouts. To overcome the suspicions of the Office, they set forth the idea that military service, in fact, prepared the Indians for assimilation into American society. "It opens to those people a useful career," wrote Augur on September 30, 1867, "renders them tractable and obedient, educating and civilizing them more effectually than can be done in any other way." Sherman agreed. In his own report of October 1, 1867, he stated that "if we can convert the wild Indians into a species of organized cavalry . . . it accomplishes a double purpose, in taking them out of the temptation of stealing and murdering, and will accustom them to regular habits and discipline, from which they will not likely depart when discharged."⁴⁶

the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States Army, 1860-90 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 156. "Register of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914," M233, Roll 70, Volume 150, "1866-1873, Indian Scouts," (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1956), n. p. The original muster rolls state that *Pe-ah-tah-wuck-oo*, died near the Black Hills. The Pawnee Scouts, however, never served near the Black Hills during 1867. In a letter to Robert Bruce, Luther North explained that the hills near present-day Laramie, Wyoming, were called the "Black Hills" in the 1860s. The hills were later renamed "Laramie Hills" to distinguish them from the Black Hills of South Dakota. Bruce, *The Fighting Norths*, 27.

⁴⁶ "I have never seen more obedient or better behaved troops; they have done most excellent service. Should it be necessary to carry on war another year against hostile tribes, I respectfully recommend that Congress be asked to permit me to organize three battalions of 400 each from the friendly tribes in this Department. It opens to those people a useful career, renders them tractable and obedient, educating and civilizing them more effectually than can be done in any other way. They are peculiarly qualified for service on the Plains; unequalled as riders, know the country thoroughly, are hardly ever sick, never desert and are careful of their horses. I have never seen one under the influence of liquor, though they have had every opportunity of getting it. As the season for active operations closes, they can be discharged to go home and look after their families for the winter. This they prefer. I propose to discharge my Pawnee scouts early in December." General C. C. Augur quoted in Bruce, *The Fighting Norths*, 10. W. T. Sherman quoted in Robert Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), 128.

Despite the opposition of some of the officials of the Indian Office, Sherman and Augur prevailed. But Augur did not receive the five battalions of four hundred men he requested. Instead, he received permission to enlist only one hundred Pawnees. Once again, at the request of the Union Pacific, their main assignment was to guard and patrol the railroad.

In February 1868, Frank North enlisted two companies of fifty men. Captain Charles E. Morse and First Lieutenant William Harvey were placed in charge of Company A. Fred Matthews, now promoted to captain, commanded Company B. Gustavus Becher assisted Matthews as his first lieutenant. Luther North did not join the battalion this year but rather remained behind to help his brother James E. North who had taken over as Indian trader at the Pawnee Agency.⁴⁷ Colonel Lewis Merrill officially mustered the Pawnees in at their agency in May of 1868.⁴⁸

The scouts received orders to patrol one hundred miles of the railroad from Wood River Station to Willow Island. Every week Major North sent out a patrol in search of hostile Indians. Apparently their service in the previous year had made an impression. The scouts found little hostile activity along the railroad.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 153. Danker, *Man of the Plains*, 65.

⁴⁸ From the "Register of Enlistments" for 1868, I have ascertained that 96 Pawnees were enlisted. If one adds the two company captains and first lieutenants, this makes the total number of enlisted men exactly 100. "Register of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914," M233, Roll 70, Volume 150, "1866-1873, Indian Scouts," (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1956), n. p.

⁴⁹ Unfortunately, there are some discrepancies between the accounts of Luther North and the histories of Sorenson and Grinnell [the latter two are based on the memoirs of Frank North.] According to Luther North, the Pawnees guarded the track between Wood River and Julesburg. The battalion was "divided into squads of twenty men and stationed at different points along the Union Pacific Railroad." As stated, Sorenson and Grinnell suggest that North sent out a patrol every week to along the one hundred miles of track to look for hostile Indians. The accounts also present slightly different records of engagements. According to Luther North, there were two minor skirmishes that year. Lieutenant William Harvey successfully chased down a small war party that had stolen some stock near Wood River. Harvey's men overtook the hostiles after a forty mile chase. In the fight that followed, the Pawnees killed two Indians and recovered all the stolen stock. The other raid, according to Luther North, was near Ogallala, where the

Perhaps the absence of hostile war parties along the railroad prompted Frank North to agree to escort four white excursionists on a hunting trip near the Republican River in July. Among the group was John J. Aldrich, who, several weeks later, published a detailed account of the trip in the *Omaha Weekly Herald*. The other men in Aldrich's party consisted of F. W. Dunn (newspaper editor of the *Chicago Freeman*), G. W. Magee (a Chicago merchant), and Sumner Oaks (from Omaha). On July 24, 1868, Aldrich's party boarded the Union Pacific at Omaha and traveled to Wood River Station where North and a detachment of forty or fifty scouts awaited them. Captains Morse and Matthews and two teamsters also accompanied the party. Lieutenants Becher and Harvey remained behind to guard the railroad.⁵⁰

The party set out for the Republican River that afternoon. After crossing the Platte River, they made camp. The wagon train formed a half circle, and the excursionists and the officers pitched their tents in the center. They had "sow-belly and Indian bread" and other "fixings" usually used by soldiers on the march for supper. Aldrich spent an uncomfortable night in his tent, which he shared with thousands of bloodthirsty mosquitoes. The next day they halted at Fort Kearny, where Major North "made a raid on the Quartermaster" for supplies. After another day of travel, they sighted a large Pawnee camp on some bluffs overlooking the Blue River. The Pawnees were on their way to the Republican River for their annual buffalo hunt.⁵¹

Indians piled some ties on the track and attacked a train containing a carload of workmen. Frank North and a party of scouts arrived just in time to prevent a massacre. After chasing the Indians to the North Platte near Ash Hollow, North's men killed three hostiles, captured thirty horses, and destroyed the Indians' camp equipage. Unfortunately, Luther North does not mention when these fights took place. Danker, *Man of the Plains*, 65-66. Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 153.

⁵⁰ John J. Aldrich, "Diary of a Twenty Days' Sport," *Omaha Weekly Herald*, August 19, 1868.

⁵¹ Aldrich, "Diary of a Twenty Days' Sport," *Omaha Weekly Herald*, August 19, 1868.

The next morning Major North's command joined the tribe on its march to the hunting grounds. The "soldiers" and chiefs of the tribe rode in advance of the camp in search of buffalos. Soon they returned with news that they had found a buffalo herd nearby. The next morning the entire camp prepared for the hunt. Aldrich observed how the Indians, "as if by magic, had [their] horses unpacked of their goods and chattels and divesting themselves of what wearing apparel they had on (which was but little,) were to be seen mounted bare-backed, with rifles, revolvers, bows and arrows in hand ready for the prey." Soon the hunters were dashing across the Plains chasing buffalo. By the end of the day, they had killed between 750 and 1,000 of the animals. That night, in camp, the excursionists joined the scouts and the tribe in a feast. The scouts stood guard around the Indian village.⁵²

The next morning, one of the scouts, "Johnny White," who "never slept at night," woke up Aldrich's party. They joined the Pawnee hunters and returned to the ground to clear up what meat had not yet been secured. After another day in camp, the Pawnees moved across the Republican River to Mud Creek. On July 30, 1868, after a traveling along Mud Creek for a few days, they discovered another herd of buffalo. Another exciting chase followed. The Pawnee Scouts, who traveled along the right flank of the tribe, joined in the fun, as did Aldrich and Major North himself. Captain Morse and some of the better mounted scouts soon took the lead. The hunters scattered across the Plains, chasing small groups of buffaloes. During the chase a scout rode up to Major North and cried out that they were surrounded by a large Sioux war party. A battle ensued. While

⁵² Aldrich, "Diary of a Twenty Days' Sport," *Omaha Weekly Herald*, August 26, 1868.

Major North and his scouts held off a force of one hundred hostiles, five hundred other Sioux attacked the Pawnee camp.⁵³

Soon news filtered back to the main camp that the Sioux had killed Major North and a number of his scouts. In his report of the battle, Aldrich noted that the rumor of the Major's death "left [the Pawnees] frantic, and it would be a waste of time to attempt to describe the fearful screams, yelling, and other manifestations of grief and sorrow that rent the air." Unwilling to believe that North was dead, Aldrich and five scouts gathered nearly a thousand rounds of ammunition and rode in the direction of the Major's position. After a dangerous ride they reached North and his troops.⁵⁴ The battle lasted three hours. A large Pawnee force finally came to the rescue of North's forces. The Pawnees chased the Sioux away and briefly pursued them. They reportedly killed twenty Indians before their horses gave out, and they had to return to their camp. When North and his scouts returned, they were welcomed by many relieved Indians. Aldrich noted

The rejoicings at the gallant Major's appearance in camp went to show how much the Pawnee tribe love and cherish him and his name. None were more glad than his messmates and companions on the trip. His troops were crazy with joy to catch his tired and worn our [sic] horse by the bridle.⁵⁵

According to Aldrich, four warriors and two scouts were killed in the battle. The official muster rolls, however, reveal that only one scout died during the engagement.

⁵³ Aldrich, "Diary of a Twenty Days' Sport," *Omaha Weekly Herald*, August 26, 1868. Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 154-155. According to Grinnell the Sioux belonged to Spotted Tail's band.

⁵⁴ According to Luther North, Frank North sent one of his scouts, "Man that left his Enemy lying in the Water," to the main camp for help. This scout eventually broke through the Sioux ranks and made it back to the main camp. Luther regarded this an act of tremendous bravery. Robert Bruce, *The Fighting Norths*, 32-33.

⁵⁵ Aldrich, "Diary of a Twenty Days' Sport," *Omaha Weekly Herald*, August 26, 1868.

They found the lifeless body of *Koot tah we coots oo hadde*, not far from the place where he had killed and scalped two Indians. The Sioux had scalped *Koot tah we coots oo hadde*. They had cut off his hands and feet and nearly severed his head from his body. His entire body was pierced with arrows. Several other scouts had received severe wounds during the battle. Two of them, *Ke wuck oo la shar* and *Loo law we luck oo la it*, died shortly thereafter from their injuries.⁵⁶ The Pawnees were devastated. They considered the loss of scalps a great stain on their nation. According to Aldrich, the fact that they had not secured any scalps themselves made the humiliation even greater.⁵⁷

Despite the attack, the Pawnees continued their hunting expedition. Over the next few days they shot nearly 1,500 buffaloes. While the women prepared the meat, the men smoked and gambled. Frank North joined the chiefs in several councils. North's opinion carried much weight, although Aldrich's statement that North's word was "law" among the Pawnees was a slight exaggeration. According to Aldrich, Frank North "had the full confidence of the nation . . . and were he to order them to charge through a river of fire, I believe they would do it, and I don't know but if there was a little brimstone in it, they would go, such is their love and fear of 'Pawnee Laschell [sic].'" When North announced that he would leave the tribe a few days later, the chiefs, to no avail, pleaded with him to stay. When North's command left the next day, the Indians cheered the scouts. Several days later, the command crossed the Blue River and reached Grand Island Station on the Union Pacific Railroad.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Records compiled from the "Register of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914," M233, Roll 70, Volume 150, "1866-1873, Indian Scouts," (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1956), n. p.

⁵⁷ Aldrich, "Diary of a Twenty Days' Sport," *Omaha Weekly Herald*, August 26, 1868.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

North's involvement in the battle of July 30 stirred some criticism in Omaha. On August 21, the *Omaha Weekly Herald* printed an editorial blaming North for provoking an Indian war. Since the battle, the Sioux and Cheyennes had retaliated by attacking several stations along the Kansas Pacific Railroad. The editors feared that North's presence along the Republican had ended a fragile peace on the frontier. The report sparked a response from F. W. Dunn, the Chicago journalist who had been present during the battle. In a letter to the *Herald*, Dunn pointed out that the Indians had been responsible for depredations several weeks prior to the battle. He also pointed out that the talk about an Indian peace was "moonshine." "[T]he depredations are not retaliations but robberies," Dunn wrote, "the Indians that commit them will continue to do so in spite of treaties, their chiefs or anything short of cold lead." General Christopher Columbus Augur of the Department of the Platte, agreed with Dunn. He believed the Cheyennes seized upon Major North's presence during the buffalo hunt as a pretext for their massacre of whites in Kansas and Nebraska.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, when the Pawnees were once again hired to guard the Union Pacific Railroad in 1870, North's instructions stated explicitly that "the Pawnees must make no scout at any great distance from the line of rail road. They will confine their operations to the line of said road and to a distance North or South of it, not exceeding twenty five (25) miles." Apparently, the ambush on North's company while escorting the Pawnee tribe on its annual buffalo hunt, prompted these instructions.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ *Omaha Weekly Herald*, September 2, 1868.

⁶⁰ Special Order 51, September 2, 1870, Frank North Collection, RG 2321 (formerly MS 0448), Box 1, S2-F1, NSHS, Lincoln, Nebraska.

After returning to Grand Island Station, North rejoined the scouts along the Union Pacific. Nothing of importance occurred until the middle of October, when a party of Indians captured some horses from ranchmen near Sidney. General Augur telegraphed North with instructions to ship a company of his scouts to Potter Station, where they were to join Major Wells, of the Second Cavalry, in search of the hostiles. The scouts discovered the Indians near Court House Rock on the opposite bank of the North Platte River. Major North immediately ordered Lieutenant Becher and some of his men to pursue across the ice cold river. In the fight that followed, Becher's scouts killed two Indians and recaptured all the stolen horses, as well as a number of Indian ponies.⁶¹

Nothing of interest occurred the rest of that year. On December 7, 1868, the Pawnees received their discharge at Fort Kearny, Nebraska, per Special Order from the Department of the Platte. Major North remained in service through the winter. He was placed in charge of the horses at Fort Kearny, to keep them in condition and have them ready for the Pawnees when spring opened again.⁶²

On May 10, 1869, the Union Pacific and Central Pacific railroads met at Promontory, Utah. The road connected the East to the West. It linked markets from New York to San Francisco and beyond. It also opened up large segments of the Plains for white settlement. Farmers could now ship their produce to urban centers all across the United States. The role of the Pawnees in the construction of the road cannot be understated. During 1867 and 1868, the Pawnees held off Indian war parties along the road in Nebraska and Wyoming. The Union Pacific Railroad Company valued their

⁶¹ Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 156-157.

⁶² "Register of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914," M233, Roll 70, Volume 150, "1866-1873, Indian Scouts," (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1956), n. p.,

contributions and in 1870, once again hired them for service along the road. In 1869, however, the scouts embarked on another mission. This time they joined General Eugene Asa Carr in his pursuit of a band of Cheyenne Dog Soldiers, who had committed depredations against homesteads and settlements in Kansas.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE REPUBLICAN RIVER EXPEDITION AND THE BATTLE OF SUMMIT

SPRINGS, 1869

After the discharge of the Pawnees, Frank North spent the next two months caring for the horses and mules at Fort Kearny. He frequently traveled back to Columbus to be with his wife Mary Louise Smith. In the evenings he attended dances and theater performances, and visited friends and relatives.¹ The Pawnees returned to their villages. They also spent their days visiting with friends and relatives and talked about their exploits while serving as scouts during the past year. Like Frank North, they, too, attended dances and theatrical performances of the various tribal societies.

Meanwhile, Sioux and Cheyenne war parties continued to create fear and havoc among the isolated settlements along the frontier. In January 1869, small raiding parties attacked mail couriers near Fort Dodge, Kansas. Another war party ambushed a stage coach near Big Timbers Station, also in Kansas, and later killed two stage company employees near Lake Station, Colorado.² The appearance of these war parties alarmed settlers in western Kansas. In typical nineteenth century fashion, most settlers branded all

¹ Frank North had had married Mary Louise Smith on December 25, 1865. Donald F. Danker, ed., "The Journal of an Indian Fighter: The 1869 Diary of Major Frank J. North," *Nebraska History* 39 (June 1958), 91-101.

Indians as treacherous, thievish, and murderous villains. They did not distinguish between friendly and “hostile” Indians. Ironically, settlers often accused friendly Indians of causing trouble and subjected them to harassment. Kansas newspapers called for a resolution of the “Indian problem.” Some favored removal of all tribes to the Indian Territory. Others favored more draconic measures and called for the extermination of the Indians. In this volatile atmosphere charged with racial bigotry, fear, and greed, any Indian in the area was looked upon as a potential danger.³

The Pawnees frequently passed through western Kansas on their hunting expeditions, much to the consternation of farmers and ranchers, who complained that the Indians destroyed crops and stole cattle. Pawnee war parties, who traveled through the region on their way to raid the Kiowas and Comanches for horses, further fueled the settlers’ anxiety. Although there was never any conclusive evidence linking the Pawnees to depredations in Kansas, many settlers were convinced that the Pawnees could not be trusted. Tensions between the Pawnees and settlers climaxed on January 29, 1869, and resulted in the slaughter of a number of Pitahawirat Pawnees near Mulberry Creek, Kansas. All the Pawnees had been scouts for the United States and had recently been discharged from service.⁴

There are conflicting reports of the events of that day. According to the report of Captain Edward Byrne, Tenth Cavalry (the famous “Buffalo Soldiers”), settlers discovered an Indian war party on January 28. The alarmed settlers rode into camp “in a

² Lonnie J. White, “Indian Raids on the Kansas Frontier, 1869,” *Kansas Historical Quarterly* 38 (Winter 1972), 370.

³ James Riding In, “Six Pawnee Crania: Historical and Contemporary Issues Associated with the Massacre and Decapitation of Pawnee Indians in 1869,” *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 16 (1992), 102-104.

great state of excitement,” and reported that a group of about thirty Indians had appeared in the area and had tried to break into a house on the Saline River. Byrne and twenty-five men of Company C started in pursuit of the Indians the next morning. After losing the trail of the Indians, Byrne divided his command into four squads. One of these squads discovered a number of Pawnees on the farm of Charles Martin near Mulberry Creek, Ellsworth County, Kansas. According to Martin’s testimony, the Pawnees had come to his farm, identified themselves as Sioux, and demanded flour, coffee, and money. They also took some whiskey and bacon. While the Indians were at the house two soldiers arrived. The soldiers placed the Indians under arrest but the Pawnees refused to go to the soldier camp. One of the soldiers then left and notified Captain Byrne, who arrived shortly thereafter. In the meantime, the Pawnees had fled into a canyon nearby. Byrne ordered the Indians to lay down their arms and surrender. Instead of obeying the order, the Pawnees began to fire at the captain, who was less than fifty yards away and clearly visible in his army uniform. The Pawnees had stripped themselves for the fight. The soldiers immediately returned fire. They also gathered some hay, set it on fire, and threw it into the canyon to smoke out the Indians. When the Pawnees retreated to the open prairie, the soldiers shot and killed six of them and took another wounded Pawnee prisoner. A few others escaped. One soldier was wounded in the fight. After the battle was over, the soldiers discovered that the Pawnees had many horsehair lariats with them, indicating that they were on a horse stealing expedition. Some settlers later killed another Pawnee Indian who had escaped from the battlefield.⁵

⁴ Ibid., 110.

⁵ William H. Leckie, *The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Negro Cavalry in the West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 44. Captain Byrne’s report and Charles Martin’s testimony can be

The Pawnee version of the incident is much different. According to the Pawnees a party of fourteen men, all of whom had served as scouts and had recently been honorably discharged from the army, set out on foot from their reservation to trade with the southern tribes, such as their Wichita relatives. They traveled light, carrying only “bows and arrows, light rifles, extra moccasins, lariats, and packs containing dried meat.” Along the way they stopped at Martin’s farm and asked for some flour and potatoes. While at the house, two soldiers arrived and examined their discharge papers. The soldiers left but soon returned with more men who immediately opened fire upon the Indians. According to the Pawnees, nine warriors died in the fire fight that afternoon. Only five escaped. The survivors later returned to the place of the carnage and buried their friends before turning back to the Pawnee Agency.⁶

Ironically, while the survivors of the Mulberry Creek massacre were underway to their villages, Frank North was busy enlisting a new company of scouts for military service. On Wednesday, February 10, 1869, while at Columbus, North received orders to organize a company of scouts to assist Major Henry E. Noyes on an expedition near the Republican River. On February 11, North enlisted fifty men and appointed his brother Luther as captain and Fred Mathews as first lieutenant of the company. After receiving clothing, horses, and equipment at Fort Kearny, the Pawnees boarded a train and traveled

found in United States, Bureau of Indian Affairs, *Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-1881*, D100, M234, Roll 660. Hereafter cited as *Letters Received*.

⁶ Riding In, “Six Pawnee Crania,” 105-106. General Alfred Sully defended the conduct of the soldiers: “Perhaps the death of these Indians is to be regretted as they are considered as friendly, but they justly deserved their fate and the officer and his men deserve great praise for their forbearance on the occasion. There are other small parties of Pawnees in this section. I have troops out trying to hunt them up and if found they will be justly dealt with. I would respectfully suggest the propriety of keeping these friendly Indians on their reservations, if this is [impracticable] that I be notified when parties leave - their agent and the chiefs now very well, when parties leave their villages on foot with lariats, that they are on a marauding expedition.” *Letters Received*, M234, Roll 660.

to Fort McPherson, where Lieutenant Alfred E. Bates mustered them in as “Company A, Pawnee Scouts.”⁷ Here, the Pawnees received additional supplies before they went into camp. That night a torrential rain swept over the camp. “All got wet and nearly froze during the night,” North wrote in his diary. A few days later, North returned to Columbus and left his brother in charge of the scouts.⁸

Captain North, Lieutenant Mathews, and the Pawnee Scouts departed from Fort McPherson a few days later. Two wagons accompanied the little command. Near the Republican River they met Major Noyes and his four companies of the Second Cavalry. The weather had become increasingly worse. Rain turned into snow, and the temperatures dropped well below freezing. Captain North recalled that his hands were so frostbitten that he lost some of his fingernails. After several days on the trail, Major Noyes’ troops, whose horses were in better condition, rode in advance of the Pawnee Scouts. Noyes informed North that they would rendezvous and camp on the Frenchmen’s Fork of the Republican River. During the march the weather conditions grew worse. Rather than trying to catch up with Major Noyes, North decided to establish camp and seek shelter from the cold. One of his sergeants, *Co-rux-ah-kah-wah-de* (“Traveling Bear”) discovered a small canyon with plenty of wood and grass. *Co-rux-ah-kah-wah-de* and some other men cut some poles and used the covers of two wagons to build a tipi. Then he ordered some of the other Pawnees to cut grass with their butcher knives to make beds for the men and built a fire in the center of the tipi. “We spread our robes and blankets,”

⁷ The Pawnees were officially mustered in at Fort McPherson by Lieutenant Alfred E. Bates on February 11, 1869. “Register of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914,” M233, Roll 70, volume 150, “1866-1873, Indian Scouts,” (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1956), n. p.

⁸ Danker, ed., “Journal of an Indian Fighter,” 101.

Luther North wrote later, “and in an hour we were perfectly warm and dry.” While the men rested, *Co-rux-ah-kah-wah-de* attended to a teamster whose foot had frozen stiff after he had stepped into a creek earlier that day. Captain North recalled how Traveling Bear

got a kettle full of snow and stuck the man’s foot in it. Then he took out his medicine bag, put about a teaspoonful of the powdered roots in his mouth, chewed it for some time, then spat into his hand and rubbed it over the foot and ankle. He sat up with this man nearly all night and repeated the treatment several times. Of course I don’t know whether it was his treatment or not, but this man only lost the nail off one toe, yet I felt sure, when I first saw it, that he would lose his foot.⁹

Many of Major Noyes’ men were not as lucky as the teamster in North’s command. When the Pawnees resumed their journey the next morning, they found the troops in camp in the open prairie. More than fifty horses and mules had frozen to death during the night. Although the soldiers had burned some of the wagons to stay warm, many were badly frozen. A number lost their feet or hands or fingers and toes after their return to Fort McPherson. After a difficult three-day march, the Pawnees guided the troops back safely to the fort.¹⁰

In the meantime, while Luther North’s company was scouting the area along the Republican River with Major Noyes, the survivors of the Mulberry Creek massacre arrived at the Pawnee Agency. During their march, they had suffered tremendously. They nearly perished of hunger and cold, and three more died of exposure shortly after their

⁹ Donald F. Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains: Recollections of Luther North, 1856-1882* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 96-99.

¹⁰ Ibid. Louis A. Holmes, *Fort McPherson, Nebraska: Guardian of the Tracks and Trails* (Lincoln, NE: Johnsen Publishing Company, 1963), 34.

arrival at the reservation. On March 22, the chiefs called a council with agent Charles H. Whaley to address the incident. Frank North was also present. The chiefs expressed their outrage at the massacre and stated that “they had not done, and did not intend to do any wrong to any white men, and have not, since the occurrence, done any wrong to any white people by way of revenge.” They demanded an investigation of the incident and demanded to see the Great Father in Washington. Agent Whaley, who kept minutes of the council, also reported that “Major North had recently enlisted one company from the tribe for service against the Sioux Indians this spring, and was about to enlist two more companies for this purpose, but the chiefs now refuse to have any more of their men enlisted until they hear what reply is made to their requests.”¹¹

Denman passed the chiefs’ request for an investigation on to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. “If this course is not pursued and justice done,” Denman wrote, “I have reason to believe from the known character of the ‘Pawnee Indian’ that they will seek redress for the outrage done to their people, and it may result in acts of retaliation upon innocent whites.”¹²

Despite Denman’s fears, the Pawnees did not retaliate. Although they did not receive the protection from the government as promised in the treaty of 1857, they were not willing to jeopardize their relations with the United States. Furthermore, retaliation might provide surrounding settlers with an excuse to wage a “race war” against them in order to expel them from the territory. Trusting that their requests would receive a sympathetic ear in Washington, the chiefs allowed Frank North to enlist another company

¹¹ Whaley to Superintendent H. B. Denman, March 22, 1869. *Letters Received*, M234, Roll 660. According to the official “Register of Enlistments,” one of the scouts, *Te-na-se-pa* (Bow) deserted on March 6, possibly in protest of the murder of the discharged Pawnees earlier that year.

of scouts from the tribe one month later.¹³ On April 23, North shipped two train cars full of men to Fort Kearny. The next day, the Pawnees received tents and teams and Lieutenant Litchfield officially mustered them in as Company B of the Pawnee Scouts. North appointed his brother-in-law Sylvanus E. Cushing captain of the new company. On Sunday, April 25, the recruits received arms and horse equipment, and the next morning they were issued clothing and bayonets for "Picket pins."¹⁴

After traveling to Fort McPherson, Major North and his scouts joined Luther North and the scouts of Company A. Over the next few weeks, the scouts went on several short missions. Usually, the two companies split up in smaller detachments to cover a wider area.¹⁵

While scouting near the North Platte River in May, the Pawnees discovered two horsemen in the distance. Major North ordered three of his men to see who they were. The Pawnees did as they were told. North gave one of the scouts one of his own horses.

¹² Denman to Commissioner Taylor, April 1, 1869, *Letters Received*, M234, Roll 660.

¹³ The chiefs might not have allowed their warriors to enlist if they had known what happened to the remains of the men massacred at Mulberry Creek. Shortly after the massacre, army surgeon B. E. Fryer disinterred the bodies of six Pawnees. Acting upon orders from the Surgeon General's Office in Washington, D. C., Fryer removed their heads for scientific research. After boiling the heads and preparing them for study, Fryer sent the skulls to the Army Medical Museum for further analysis. Fryer and other surgeons collected thousands of skulls between 1868 and 1872. Not until 1995 were the skulls returned to the Pawnee tribe and buried with full military honors at Genoa City Cemetery in Nebraska. In April 1869, however, the chiefs were unaware of the desecration of the graves of their kinsmen, and, hence, they allowed North to select [fifty] more warriors from the tribe. Riding In, "Six Pawnee Crania," 106-109. "Generations Later, Remains Reburied, 100 Indians Gather At Genoa Cemetery," *Omaha World-Herald*, 6 September 1995.

¹⁴ Riding In, "Six Pawnee Crania," 111. The "Register of Enlistments" states that the Pawnees were mustered in on April 23. North's diary, however, states that they were not officially mustered in until the next day. It is reasonable to assume, however, that Lieutenant Litchfield who mustered the Indians in, recorded April 23 so the Indians would be paid for the extra day. "Register of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914," M233, Roll 70, volume 150, "1866-1873, Indian Scouts," (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1956), n. p. Danker, ed., "The Journal of an Indian Fighter," 118-119.

¹⁵ Danker, ed., "The Journal of an Indian Fighter," 120. During most of this time Frank North traveled back and forth to his home in Columbus. During his absences Captain Luther North and Captain Sylvanus E. Cushing were in charge of the two companies.

When the Pawnees approached the men, they discovered that the two horsemen were in fact Sioux warriors. A high speed chase followed. The two Sioux went into different directions, and their pursuers also separated. The Pawnees who followed one of the Sioux, quickly overtook and killed him. The scout on North's horse who chased the other Indian was less fortunate. He pursued the Indian over a sand hill. As he rode along the hill, he saw his enemy coming back up the hill on the other side and holding a knife in his hand. The Pawnee jumped off his horse to shoot him, but the cartridge was defective. Before he could load another cartridge, the Sioux grabbed the gun and struck at the Pawnee with his knife. The Pawnee, whose name we do not know, was able to pin the Sioux to the ground, where he held him until the two other Pawnees came to his aid. One of the Pawnees put his gun against the Indian's side and pulled the trigger. The gun went off, but the bullet hit only the ground. After seeing he had missed, the Pawnee immediately ran for his horse. He yelled to his comrades that the bullet had bounced off the Sioux's body and that the man was a "medicine man" who could not be killed. Upon hearing this, the scout who was holding the Sioux to the ground let him go and was promptly slashed by the knife. The Sioux then grabbed the Pawnee's gun and Major North's horse and rode away. The incident clearly reveals the role of the belief in the supernatural in Pawnee warfare. But what happened next is also significant. When the three Pawnees reported the incident, North chastized them severely for their "superstition." North then mounted another horse and started in pursuit of the Indian himself. After a brief chase, North killed the Indian with two shots from his rifle. He announced to his men that the Sioux's "medicine" had been merely luck. He told the Pawnees that their foolishness had allowed the man to escape. North believed he had

effectively dispelled the superstitions of his men, but certain ideas die hard. It seems more likely that the Pawnees saw in North's act confirmation that the Major himself was protected by some higher power.¹⁶

On May 19, the men of Company B received their pay. Two days later, May 21, the paymaster arrived at Fort McPherson and the next morning the remaining Pawnees received their pay. Frank North and the captains of the different companies oversaw the payment. The men were well pleased. They spent the rest of the day enjoying themselves. "After dinner we pitched horse shoes," North wrote in his diary, "and raised ned Generaly."¹⁷

So far, little of interest had happened, but trouble was brewing on the western Plains. The Cheyennes were ready to resume the war against the United States. In 1868, they had attacked settlements all along the western frontier. During the battle of Beecher's Island, for example, they had besieged a company of U. S. soldiers under Major (Brevet Colonel) George A. Forsyth for several days.¹⁸ Among the Indians present at the fight at Beecher's Island was Tall Bull's band of Dog Soldiers. The Dog Soldiers (or *Hotamitanii*) were a band of ferocious fighters, best known for their reckless bravery

¹⁶ Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 99-101. Strangely, Frank North never mentioned this incident in the diary he kept for 1869. Nor was it included in the Sorenson manuscript. North was indeed with the scouts on the North Platte River on May 14 and 15. He is also known for his great modesty in reporting his own exploits, even in his personal writings. It is unlikely that Luther North invented this incident to raise the stature of his older brother (as he was apt to do on occasion). It seems more plausible that the event occurred at some other time and was mistakenly reported as having happened in 1869 by Luther North.

¹⁷ Danker, ed., "The Journal of an Indian Fighter," 125.

¹⁸ Among the casualties of the fight were six soldiers, including Lieutenant Frederick H. Beecher, after whom the Island in the river was thereafter named. Several Cheyennes, including chief Roman Nose, also perished in the battle. Donald J. Berthrong, *The Southern Cheyennes* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963/1986), 310-314. George Bird Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971), 277-292.

during battle.¹⁹ In retaliation for the attack on Forsyth's troops at Beecher's Island and other depredations, General Philip Sheridan ordered General George Armstrong Custer on a winter campaign against the Cheyennes. In November 1868, Custer's troops surprised the Cheyennes at their camp on the Washita River in present-day Oklahoma. During the battle, the soldiers massacred a large number of Indians, including peace chief Black Kettle. Custer's winter campaign, which ended in April 1869, was only partially successful. The Cheyennes under Black Kettle's successor, Little Robe, favored peace and wished to settle near Camp Supply with Little Raven's Arapahos in present day Oklahoma.²⁰ The Dog Soldiers under Tall Bull (*Hotu'a e hka'ash tait*) and White Horse, however, refused to make peace. They vowed revenge for Custer's attack on the Cheyenne camp at the Washita. They planned to travel north to join the Northern Cheyennes and Red Cloud's Sioux. While in camp near the Republican River in Kansas, they were joined by Sioux under Pawnee Killer, Little Wound, and Whistler. Soon the camp numbered around 500 warriors.²¹

¹⁹ Berthrong provides the following description of the Cheyenne Dog Soldiers: "The Dog Soldiers, also called the 'Dog Men,' were unquestionably 'the most important, distinct, and aggressive of all the warrior societies.' Comprising half of the Cheyenne warriors, the Dog Soldiers controlled the whole tribe. But the constant recurrence of the Dog Soldiers' exploits in the white man's records, especially during the wars on the Plains, can only be explained by the observers' unfamiliarity with the total organization of the Cheyenne warrior societies. The Dog Soldiers became numerically the most important of the societies in the early part of the nineteenth century. Sometime before 1850 all adult male members of the Flexed Leg band joined the Dog Soldiers, and they became a band within the tribe, camping together in the tribal camp circle. The Dog Soldiers were not governed by the usual band chiefs but by their own military chiefs. For these reasons the Dog Soldiers had greater cohesion and strength than other bands and soldier societies." Berthrong, *The Southern Cheyennes*, 68.

²⁰ Camp Supply, at the confluence of Wolf Creek and the North Fork of the Canadian River, was established on November 8, 1868. The name was changed to Fort Supply on December 30, 1878. It was abandoned in 1895. Francis Paul Prucha, *A Guide to the Military Posts of the United States, 1789-1895* (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1964), 110.

²¹ White, "Indian Raids on the Kansas Frontier," 373. Richard Weingardt, *Sound the Charge: The Western Frontier, Spillman Creek to Summit Springs* (Englewood, CO: Jacqueline Enterprises Inc., 1978), 23.

Before the Dog Soldiers could make their big strike, they ran into the Fifth Cavalry under command of Major (Brevet General) Eugene Asa Carr on May 13, 1869.²² Carr's troops were on their way from Fort Lyon, Colorado, to Fort McPherson, Nebraska, when they discovered the Tall Bull's village near Beaver Creek. In the battle that followed, four soldiers died and three were wounded. Carr estimated the Indian losses at twenty-five dead and fifty wounded. Three days later, Carr's troops fought another skirmish with the Dog Soldiers. He attempted to follow the Cheyennes, but when they scattered in all directions over the prairie, Carr was forced to abandon the pursuit.²³ The battle at Beaver Creek only infuriated the Dog Soldiers and their allies even more. In revenge, they attacked white settlements in western Kansas. On May 21, they killed four Scandinavian farmers at White Rock Creek. In the days that followed, the Cheyennes killed ten hunters before striking farms in the area. On May 28, a party of thirty Cheyennes attacked seven railroad workers near Fossil Creek Station and derailed two trains. Two days later, Memorial Day, Cheyenne war parties raided a number of German and Scandinavian homesteads on Spillman Creek. They killed nine settlers and took several captives. One of the captives, Mrs. Maria Weichell, watched helplessly while the

²² Eugene Asa Carr (1830-1910) was born in New York. He graduated from West Point in 1850. He joined General William S. Harney's campaign against the Sioux in 1854. During the Civil War he won a Medal of Honor at Pea Ridge and was assigned to the Fifth Cavalry. During the 1870s he served in Arizona and was in command of the troops at Cibecue Creek when a number of Apache Scouts suddenly turned on the troops. Several troops died in this incident and the military command censured Carr for failing to take appropriate precautions. In 1879 he assumed command of the Sixth Cavalry, which served in New Mexico and on the Pine Ridge Reservation during the Indian "uprising" at Wounded Knee. In 1893 he retired. He died in Washington, D. C. in 1910. Jerry Keenan, *Encyclopedia of American Indian Wars, 1492-1890* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1997), 37. For a complete biography of Carr see James T. King, *War Eagle: A Life of General Eugene A. Carr* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963).

²³ George F. Price, *Across the Continent with the Fifth Cavalry* (New York: Nostrand Company, 1883/New York: Antiquarian Press, 1959), 134-135. *Record of Engagements With Hostile Indians Within the Military Division of the Missouri From 1868 to 1882, Lieutenant-General P. H. Sheridan, Commanding* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, n.d.) reprinted in Joseph P. Peters, Comp., *Indian Battles and Skirmishes on the American Frontier, 1790-1898* (New York: Argonaut Press, 1966), 20.

Indians took her husband's scalp and fingers. The other captives were Mrs. Susanna Alderice and her baby.²⁴

The attacks caused a panic among the western settlements in Kansas and Nebraska, but there was some confusion about the identity of the tribes responsible for the attacks. In his report of May 31, First Lieutenant Edward Law of the Seventh Cavalry wrote that he was unable to "state of what Tribe they are, but believe them either to be Arapahoes or Pawnees as reported to me by the settlers."²⁵ Once again, the bad reputation of the Pawnees made them suspects for raids committed by others. Fortunately for the Pawnees, the identity of the actual perpetrators was soon established.

Newspapers in Kansas and Nebraska demanded action against the hostiles. Governor Harvey of Kansas quickly organized the state militia and traveled to Fort Leavenworth to request the assistance of Major General John M. Schofield. Schofield, who had recently succeeded Philip Sheridan as commander of the Department of the Missouri, immediately ordered General Custer and his Seventh Cavalry into the field. But Custer had little success locating the Indians.²⁶ Governor David Butler of Nebraska, meanwhile, contacted General Augur of the Department of the Platte in Omaha with a similar request. "I have just received news from the Big Sandy and Republican [Rivers]," Butler wrote,

The Indians are in arms again and are again threatening to repeat their former depredations in that region . . . I would ask if you can send a

²⁴ White, "Indian Raids on the Kansas Frontier," 373-378. For a detailed treatment of the depredations by the Cheyennes, including Adolph Roenigk's account of the attack on the railroad workers at Fossil Station, see Ray G. Sparks, *Reckoning at Summit Springs* (Kansas City, MO: Lowell Press, 1969).

²⁵ Sparks, *Reckoning at Summit Springs*, 40.

²⁶ White, "Indian Raids on the Kansas Frontier," 380-384.

company of soldiers to that region. If you can how soon can you do it? Can you spare them for four months? Or if not how long can you spare them? If you cannot spare them at all can you furnish me with ammunition, subsistence and transportation for one hundred men immediately? Or if not with all, with what of these can you furnish me?²⁷

On June 7, Augur ordered Brevet General Carr to lead an expedition to the Republican River. Carr received orders to leave Fort McPherson on the morning of June 9th with eight companies of the Fifth Cavalry and the Pawnee Scouts. Two other companies of the Fifth Cavalry would rendezvous with his command twenty days later at Thickwood Creek. The objective of the mission was to “clear the Republican Territory of Indians.” “All Indians found in that country,” the order continued, “will be treated as hostile, unless they submit themselves as ready and willing to go to the proper reservation. In that event, you will disarm them, and require such hostages and guarantees of their good faith as you deem fully satisfactory.”²⁸

Carr was not too thrilled with the assignment. He complained of shortages of men, horses, equipment, and supplies. His companies were only half full, and, as he had never commanded Indians before, he was skeptical of the usefulness of the Pawnee Scouts. But he could rely on some experienced officers such as Major William Bedford Royal and Major Eugene W. Crittenden. Carr also insisted that William Frederick Cody, better

²⁷ Butler to Augur quoted in James T. King, “The Republican River Expedition, June-July, 1869,” in R. Eli Paul, ed., *The Nebraska Indian Wars Reader, 1865-1877* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 31-32. King’s excellent history of the expedition originally appeared in two parts in *Nebraska History* 41 (September-December 1960), 165-199, 281-297.

²⁸ The order was issued through Assistant Adjutant General George D. Ruggles, June 7, 1869. Weingardt, *Sound the Charge*, 73-74.

known as "Buffalo Bill," be retained as chief of scouts of the command.²⁹ Several frontiersmen, such as James E. Welch, also joined the command as volunteers.³⁰

On June 8, General Augur and some of his staff members arrived at Fort McPherson to witness a full-dress parade by Carr's troops, including the Pawnees. The companies of the Fifth Cavalry, dressed in crisp blue and yellow uniforms, went through the drill with great precision and discipline. The Pawnees had been issued cavalry uniforms for the occasion, but when they appeared in front of the distinguished audience they

turned out in all sorts of styles—some with their overcoats on and some without, some with pantaloons and others with only breech cloths; some with hats and some without; some with pantaloons changed into leggings by having the seat cut out; some with boots and others with moccasins, and others with spurs on their bare heels. Their ranks presented a sad lack of uniformity in the way of dress.³¹

Still, the Pawnees performed well during the drill. Later that evening, they held a dance in preparation for the upcoming campaign. William Cody, who attended both the review and the dance, recalled that

²⁹ Other officers on the expedition were (Brevet) Majors Thomas E. Maley, Gustavus E. Urban, Leicester Walker, and John B. Babcock; Captains Jeremiah C. Denney, George F. Price, Robert Sweatman, Philip Dwyer, John H. Kane, Edward M. Hayes, William H. Brown, and Lieutenant Charles B. Brady. King, "The Republican River Expedition," 33-34. King, *War Eagle*, 100-101.

³⁰ James E. Welch left an account of the Republican River Expedition in a letter to his friend, Colonel Henry O. Clark of Vermont. The letter, which was sent from Edith, Coke County, Texas, on June 16, 1891, was first published in Cyrus Townsend Brady, ed., *Indian Fights and Fighters* (McClure, Philips & Co., 1904/Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971), 173-179. A part of Welch's account was also reprinted in Weingardt, *Sound the Charge*, 111-114. Unfortunately, there are many inaccuracies in this account. Weingardt even questions whether Welch was actually present during the expedition. However, because he believed that his expedition was hopelessly undermanned, Carr may indeed have allowed Welch and others to join the command as volunteers without pay.

they understood the drill remarkably well for Indians. The commands were given them by Major North [perhaps North was still around at this point, perhaps Cody confused him with North's brother Luther], who spoke their tongue as readily as any full-blooded Pawnee. They were well mounted, and felt proud of the fact that they were regular United States soldiers. That evening after many ladies [undoubtedly the officers' spouses] attended the dance of the Indians. Of all savages I have ever seen, the Pawnees are the most accomplished dancers.³²

~~The parade must have made a good impression on General Augur and the other~~
officers in attendance because Frank North received instructions to recruit a third company of scouts at the Pawnee Agency that same day. North placed his brother in charge of companies A and B and traveled to Columbus with Lieutenant Fred Matthews. They arrived early in the morning the next day. That afternoon, at the Pawnee Agency house they enlisted Company C. The men in this company were primarily Skidis. North appointed Captain James Murie as company commander. The next day, Lieutenant Litchfield mustered the Indians into service. After obtaining horses for the new company, North and his troops boarded a train for Fort Kearny, where they drew clothing, tents, guns, and other supplies. On the morning of June 15, they left Fort Kearny and proceeded south to join General Carr's command.³³

Carr's troops had left Fort McPherson on Wednesday, June 9, while the regimental band was playing. The song "The Girl I Left Behind Me" was traditionally played on such occasions. The two companies of Pawnee Scouts rode in advance of the cavalry troops. Fifty-four wagons, manned by civilian teamsters and wagoners, formed

³¹ Alfred Sorenson, "A Quarter of a Century on the Frontier, or The Adventures of Major Frank North, the 'White Chief of the Pawnees'" Frank North Collection, NSHS, ms 448, Box 1, S4-F1.

³² William F. Cody, *An Autobiography of Buffalo Bill* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1920), 183.

the supply train. From the start, the expedition was plagued by a number of problems. The weather was unpredictable. Some days it was intensely hot, while on other days torrential rain storms hampered the progress of the troops. After a few days on the trail, the mules were already exhausted. Many teamsters were drunk, and one of the officers, Captain Jeremiah C. Denney, whose wife had died recently, suffered a complete mental breakdown and had to be sent back to the fort, where he eventually committed suicide.³⁴

The scouting operations began on June 12. Small units of Pawnees accompanied cavalry detachments in search of hostiles or went out on scouts of their own. One scouting party, under Lieutenant William J. Volkmar, discovered a small group of about twenty Cheyenne hunters on the first day, but they disappeared before the troops could attack. After news of the discovery reached his camp, Carr ordered one of his companies and a group of Pawnees in pursuit. By the time they arrived, however, the enemy had scattered in different directions.³⁵

On June 15 the command set up camp at the Republican River near Prairie Dog Creek. The Pawnees under Captains North and Cushing, built their camp half a mile below the cavalry. The wagon train was located between the Pawnees and the cavalry camp. The wagon boss had sent the mules to a green pasture across the river to graze. Two teamsters guarded the herd. While the Pawnees were eating their supper, they suddenly heard a war whoop across the river. A party of seven Cheyennes attacked the two teamsters guarding the mule herd. One of them was killed instantly. The other was

³³ "Register of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914," M233, Roll 70, volume 150, "1866-1873, Indian Scouts," (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1956), n. p. Danker, ed., "The Journal of an Indian Fighter," 129-130.

³⁴ King, "The Republican River Expedition," 35-37.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 37.

shot through the body with an arrow and died later that night. Before the soldiers realized what was happening, the Pawnees had shed their uniforms and rushed to their horses in pursuit of the Cheyennes. In the running fight that ensued, the Pawnees killed two Cheyennes and recaptured the mule herd. The other Cheyennes were able to escape under the cover of darkness.³⁶

The following day, Luther North reported to General Carr. North expected praise for the prompt action of his men, who had saved the mule herd and thereby prevented a premature end of the campaign. Instead, Carr reprimanded him in front of all the other officers. The general believed he had good reasons to criticize the actions of the young captain. By rushing after the Cheyennes, he had exposed himself to a possible enemy ambush. Furthermore, he had left the wagon camp exposed to a hostile attack. Although the North brothers generally had their men under control, when under attack or when the enemy was near, it became increasingly difficult to restrain them.³⁷

North did not appreciate the General's reprimand and responded that when Indians attacked his camp he intended to go for them and would not wait for orders from the general or any other man. After speaking his piece, North spurred his pony and

³⁶ Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 106-107. According to Luther North, William Cody was the first to start the pursuit of the hostiles as his horse was still saddled and nearby. In his autobiography Cody gives a slightly different rendition: "My horse was close at hand. Mounting him bareback, I galloped after the mule herd, which had been stampeded. I supposed that I would be the first man on the scene. But I found I was mistaken. The Pawnee scouts, unlike regular soldiers, had not waited for the formality of orders from their officers. Jumping their ponies bareback and putting ropes in the animals' mouths, they had hurried to the place from which the shots came and got there before I did." Cody, *Autobiography of Buffalo Bill*, 184.

³⁷ Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 108.

returned to his company. Faced with this insubordination, Carr promptly placed Captain Cushing in command of the Pawnees.³⁸

Cushing did not command the two companies of scouts very long. On Thursday, June 17, Major North and the Skidis of Company C joined Carr's troops after a long and difficult march.³⁹ North brought with him some instructions from Brevet Brigadier General George D. Ruggles, Assistant Adjutant General of the Department of the Platte. Ruggles ordered Carr to detach Captain Robert Sweatman's Company B, which was to proceed to the Little Blue River to cover and protect settlements there. Carr was not pleased with the order. "It is very disheartening to me for my command to be reduced," he wrote in his day report; "it was already too small (companies not half full) and there are a good many men whose terms will soon expire." Carr was not happy to see these troops replaced by the Pawnees, whom he considered unreliable:

The Pawnees are miserably mounted. Their ponies can hardly keep out of the way of the troops on an ordinary march. I do not know how the last will turn out. Major North lost (2) two drowned in crossing the Platte and one somewhere else and now have (3) three men dismounted. They ran (2) two to death chasing Indians on the 13th inst. I should say that they require (50) fifty good ponies to mount them properly.

They are rather lazy and shiftless; but I hope to make their Indian qualities useful. I would however like to exchange all but (30) thirty of them for good cavalry soldiers. Their knowledge of the country is vague and general.⁴⁰

³⁸ In his autobiography, *Man of the Plains* (page 108), North claimed he was arrested for his insubordination. But in a letter to his uncle Jacob C. North on November 28, 1874, he wrote that he was not.

³⁹ Danker, ed., "The Journal of an Indian Fighter," 132.

⁴⁰ Carr's report to Ruggles can be found in Fred H. Werner, *The Summit Springs Battle, July 11, 1869* (Greeley, CO: Werner Publications, 1991), 73-74.

On June 18, Carr moved camp one mile and then sent out scouting parties. The events of June 15, when the Pawnees had recklessly “endangered” themselves and the command, prompted him to make sure that “each scouting party was made up of both a group of Pawnees and one or two companies of cavalry.” Clearly, the general did not have much confidence in the Pawnees.⁴¹ Over the next few days, the Pawnees went on several scouts of the area, but they found no sign of the enemy. Occasionally, the scouts and the rest of the troops entertained themselves by hunting or riding bucking horses.⁴² On June 23, the Pawnees demonstrated their hunting skills when they surrounded and slaughtered a small herd of buffalo. Not to be outdone, William Cody mounted his horse and joined the hunt. According to Cody, in typical self-aggrandizing fashion, the Pawnees were greatly impressed with his hunting skills:

Hitherto the Pawnee scouts had not taken much interest in me. But while at the camp I gained their respect and admiration by showing them how to kill buffaloes . . . I had gone out in company with Major North, and watched them make a “surround.” Twenty Pawnees, circling a herd, killed thirty-two buffaloes.

As they were cutting up the animals, another herd appeared. The Pawnees were getting ready to surround it, when I asked Major North to keep them back to let me show them what I could do. He did as I requested. I knew Buckskin Joe [Cody’s horse] was a good buffalo horse, and, feeling confident that I would astonish the Indians, I galloped in among the herd. I did astonish them. In less than a half-mile run I dropped thirty-six, killing a buffalo at nearly every shot. The dead animals were

⁴¹ Near the Beaver River, the command stumbled upon the battlefield where Carr’s troops had fought the Indians on May 15. They found a good deal of property scattered around, as well as some ponies. The Indians had not returned to recover any of their property. From the remains left at the site, the Pawnees determined these had been northern Indians. The troops also found the bones of three U. S. soldiers of the Fifth Cavalry that had perished in the fight. The troops buried their remains in a simple ceremony. Carr’s report to Brigadier General George Ruggles, June 30, 1869, in Werner, *The Summit Springs Battle*, 77.

⁴² In his diary of the march, Frank North wrote on June 21, 1869: “nothing of importance occurred except some fun riding one of our bucking horses. it threw Wallace 3 times. finally a lieut. rode it.” Sam Wallace, according to Donald Danker, was First Sergeant of Company B, “Pawnee Scouts.” Danker, ed., “The Journal of an Indian Fighter,” 133.

strung out over the prairie less than fifty feet apart. This manner of killing greatly pleased the Indians. They called me "Big Chief," and thereafter I had a high place in their esteem.⁴³

After the hunt, Major North scribbled in his diary that they "killed lots of buffalo [and] had lots of ribs." During the chase, Luther North had lost his pocket book with 95 dollars in it when his horse tried to buck him. He searched the area where he believed it happened, but had to give up. One of the scouts, however, remembered where the horse had tried to pitch the captain. After dinner, the scout guided Major North and his brother to the place, and within minutes the money was found. "How he could have remembered just where it was I do not know," Luther North later wrote, "for I had ridden back and forth over the hill for half an hour before I had gone to camp and couldn't find the place."⁴⁴

So far the expedition had proceeded without any major incidents. But on Thursday, June 24, one of the scouts of Company B shot himself accidentally in the leg. The next day another scout accidentally shot himself in the hand. According to Luther North, the bullet entered the man's wrist, breaking the bones, then went up his arm, and exited near the elbow. The army surgeon, Dr. Louis S. Tesson, attended him, but when the wound kept getting worse, the doctor said he would have to amputate the arm. The scout adamantly refused to have his arm taken off. On June 30, Major North sent the two wounded men home with a wagon train from Fort McPherson. The wound of the scout who had been shot in the arm was in serious condition. According to Luther North it was "badly swollen and full of maggots." The scout returned to the Pawnee reservation, where

⁴³ Cody, *Autobiography of Buffalo Bill*, 186.

⁴⁴ Danker, ed., "The Journal of an Indian Fighter," 133. Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 110.

a medicine man attended to his wounds. When North returned to the agency later that fall, he was surprised to learn that the arm had healed except for a slight stiffness of the wrist.⁴⁵

The weather conditions and the hardship of the march caused much sickness among the men on the expedition. In his report of June 30 to Brigadier General Ruggles, Carr complained that “at one time our two ambulances overflowed so that a sick Officer could not find a place. We should have three Ambulances with the command and one with the train escort.”⁴⁶ Among the sick were some of the non-commissioned officers of the Pawnee Battalion. In his diary, Major North recorded that Second Sergeant George Lehman and Captain James Murie were quite ill.⁴⁷

The wagon train that arrived from Fort McPherson on June 29 brought some relief in the form of fresh food supplies. “[We] will live high again for a while,” wrote Major North in his diary. Carr took advantage of the occasion to muster and inspect the troops and write his report to General Ruggles.⁴⁸ In his report, Carr observed that “I think the Pawnees are improving somewhat in discipline and general usefulness; and [I] hope to get good service out of them.”⁴⁹ Still, problems with discipline arose occasionally. On July 6, for example, Major North wrote the following entry in his diary:

today marched in a half circle about 25 miles. Sand till you can't rest. no news from [Major] Royal today. Sam and Bart walked about ten miles for

⁴⁵ Danker, ed., “The Journal of an Indian Fighter,” 134. Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 110.

⁴⁶ Report of General Carr to Brigadier General George Ruggles, June 30, 1869, in Werner, *The Summit Springs Battle*, 78.

⁴⁷ Danker, ed., “The Journal of an Indian Fighter,” 135, 136.

⁴⁸ King, “The Republican River Expedition,” 47.

⁴⁹ Report of General Carr to Brigadier General George Ruggles, June 30, 1869, in Werner, *The Summit Springs Battle*, 76.

disobeying the q.m. [quarter master.] Lute [Luther] whipped Steve tonight.
Killed 8 or 10 Buffalo nice fat meat.

Unfortunately, the exact identity of the two men punished to walking ten miles in the sand cannot be determined with certainty. Perhaps one of the men was First Sergeant Sam Wallace, and the other Barton Hunt, a teamster. Both men belonged to Company B of the scouts. It is not clear whether Luther North “whipped” Steve [whose last name is unknown] in a friendly game of chance or physically punished him for disobeying orders.⁵⁰

On Saturday morning, July 3, Major North sent out ten Pawnees under Sergeant Wallace on a scout. When the party returned later that day, they reported they had found a fresh trail.⁵¹ This was the most promising news since the start of the campaign. The following morning, General Carr ordered Major William H. Royall and three companies to pursue the lead. Lieutenant Gus Becher, Lieutenant George D. Barclay, and fifty Scouts accompanied the troops. Royall’s orders were simple: “to surprise [the enemy], kill as many warriors as possible and capture their families and animals.” On July 5, the Pawnees in Royall’s party spotted a small party of twelve Cheyennes carrying one wounded warrior (who was named “Howling Magpie”) on a stretcher. The Pawnees did not wait for orders from Major Royall, but immediately gave chase. In the fight that followed, they took three scalps and captured eight horses. Sergeant *Co-rux-te-chod-ish* (“Mad Bear”) killed two of the Cheyennes.⁵²

⁵⁰ Danker, ed., “The Journal of an Indian Fighter,” 137. Also see Danker’s footnote on the same page.

⁵¹ According to Major North’s diary, two white men joined the Pawnees on their scout. Only one returned. It is not unlikely that the man who disappeared seized the opportunity to desert. *Ibid.*, 136.

⁵² Werner, *The Summit Springs Battle*, 61. King, “The Republican River Expedition,” 48. George Bent gives a different account of the skirmish between the scouts and the Cheyenne party. There are several

Upon their return from the scout, on July 7, the Pawnees rushed into camp announcing their victory and displaying the scalps they had taken in the fight. Major North was pleased. In his diary he recorded that “today has been a great day for the Scouts. Gus [Becher] returned at 2 p.m. with scalps from 3 Indians and 8 captured animals. 2 with U. S. brand which I turn in. 6 I gave to the men. I am in hopes we can find the small village in a few days [.] heap of dance.”⁵³ One of the officers recalled the festivities that day in a letter to a friend:

It is the custom of the Indians, after making a successful raid, to enter their own camp singing and shouting at the top of their voices. They also fire off their guns and pistols at quite a rapid rate, and so when on their return they came into our camp in their wonderful manner, our sentries did not know what to make of it; and the whole command, alarmed at the cry of Indians, sprang to arms and no little excitement ensued. The Pawnees, luckily, were recognized in time to prevent any mischief, and our little scare ended in rejoicings. These thirty [there were actually fifty] Indians, after parading themselves through our camp, proceeded to their own, where they soon inaugurated a scalp dance, much to the disgust of the remaining 120 [Indians], who, not having been engaged in action, could not participate in the dance.⁵⁴

inaccuracies in his version, however, and it should be viewed with caution: “Parties of Dog Soldiers had fights almost every day with the troops and Pawnee scouts. In one of these fights Howling Magpie was shot through both thighs [none of the official documents or personal writings of those present during the campaign, relate any skirmishes with Cheyennes before July 5]. He was too weak to ride, so two of his cousins with this war party pushed on to the Indian village, the cousins following with a mule dragging Howling Magpie’s travois. When the war party reached the village they were to send out relatives to care for the wounded man. But the soldiers and Pawnee scouts jumped the village before anyone could go out and Howling Magpie and his cousins, Shave Head and Little Man, were never again seen alive. Another war party found their dead bodies some time later. Years afterward, when the Pawnees and Cheyennes made peace, some Pawnees who were scouting with Major Carr at this time told how they came on these three Cheyennes and killed them. The Pawnees say they were scouting in advance of the troops and jumped the little Cheyenne party. Shave Head and Little Man put up a good fight and, refusing to leave their wounded cousin, were soon killed. Howling Magpie, crippled by his wounds, was killed lying in the drag.” George E. Hyde, *Life of George Bent: Written From His Letters* (Norman: University of Oklahoma press, 1967/1968), 330-331.

⁵³ Danker, ed., “The Journal of an Indian Fighter,” 137. Among the returning scouts were Gus Becher, Barclay White, and Sam Wallace.

⁵⁴ *New York Times*, July 26, 1869. *Army & Navy Journal* 6 (July 31, 1869), 791. Unfortunately I have been unable to determine the identity of the author of this letter. It was written near Fort Sedgwick on July 14, 1869, and addressed to a friend of the author in St. Louis.

General Carr was less pleased. He was certain that the surviving Cheyennes had alarmed the other Indians. Nevertheless, he decided to push on. "I had little hope of overtaking the Indians," he wrote later, "but thought I could at least hunt them out of the country."⁵⁵

The next day, July 8, the column marched back up the North Fork of the Republican River. One small platoon under command of Corporal John Kyle, Company M, were searching for some stray horses when they were attacked by a party of Indians. They escaped unharmed, but lost one horse in the skirmish.⁵⁶ The rest of the command went into camp after a fifteen-mile march. At eleven p.m. that night, gunfire awoke the sleeping men of the command. Five Cheyenne warriors charged into the camp, whooping and hollering and shooting their guns in an attempt to stampede the horse herd. One of the Pawnee Scouts, Sergeant *Co-rux-te-chod-ish* ("Mad Bear"), ran out after a Cheyenne whose horse had fallen and thrown him.⁵⁷ When *Co-rux-te-chod-ish* was about to

⁵⁵ Werner, *The Summit Springs Battle*, 62.

⁵⁶ According to Price, Corporal Kyle and his men were surrounded by thirteen Sioux warriors. The soldiers succeeded in killing three Indians. According to the official Records of Engagements, however, Kyle's party only wounded two Indians before returning to camp. Price, *Across the Continent with the Fifth Cavalry*, 136. Peters, comp., *Indian Battles and Skirmishes*, 22.

⁵⁷ George Bent provides an interesting account of the raid from the Cheyenne perspective. "The soldiers were camped near the mouth of [Cherry] Creek, news of which was brought in by a small scouting party of young Dog Soldiers. A number of young Dog Soldiers went out to make a night attack on the camp, hoping to stampede some horses. This was on July 8, 1869. Yellow Nose, the Ute captive, then a young boy of about twenty, was in this raid and says that they charged the camp about midnight, yelling and shooting. White Horse, one of the Cheyennes, shot a Pawnee scout doing guard duty. Yellow Nose said that his war horse ran against a picket rope and threw him in among the frightened cavalry horses. His arms was broken and his horse got away from him, leaving him on foot. He lost his lance and shield when he fell and could not find them in the dark. The cavalry horses were thrashing around wildly, making it very dangerous for Yellow Nose. The soldiers and Pawnee scouts were shooting and shouting, but Yellow Nose had no trouble in slipping through them, though at times they were very close. The rest of the Cheyenne party thought Yellow Nose had been killed in among the cavalry horses and returned to the village with some soldiers' horses they had captured. Hawk caught Yellow Nose's war horse and brought it back to camp. Much to the surprise of everyone Yellow Nose turned up two days later, his arm in a sling which he had cut from his shirt, having made the trip on foot. The soldiers did lots of shooting during this night attack, but fired so

overtake and count coup on the Indian, he was accidentally shot by a bullet fired by one of the soldiers. Fortunately, his injury was not serious. General Carr wrote in his final report that *Co-rux-te-chod-ish* deserved special mention for his action that night “and also for killing two of those killed by Colonel Royalls [sic] command.”⁵⁸

Although the raid made it clear that the Cheyennes were aware of the presence of the troops, it was also clear that the trail was getting warmer. Carr now pushed his men even harder, in a desperate attempt to overtake the Indians. On July 9 he directed his men northward and back to the place where Major Royall had battled the Cheyennes two days earlier. It was his last chance to make contact with the Cheyenne village. “[M]arched 30 miles without water and oh how hot and dry,” wrote Major North, “we have poor water nothing but standing rain water.” The next day, they broke camp at 6 a.m. and traveled thirty-five miles. They were gaining rapidly on the Indians. Along the trail they discovered prints of a woman’s shoe, which confirmed that the trail belonged to the Indians of Tall Bull’s Dog Soldier camp. Before the tired soldiers could rest their weary bodies, Carr assembled his command and gave his orders for the next day. “I took all available men, that is, all those, whose horses were fit for service,” he wrote later, “and they amounted to two hundred and forty-four (244) officers and soldiers, and fifty (50) Pawnees out of seven companies 5th Cavalry and one hundred and fifty Pawnees.”⁵⁹

wildly no one was hit. Mr. J. J. White, who was down here some time ago getting stories from the old people, told me that many years ago he bought the shield and lance, which Yellow Nose lost, from one of the officers of Carr’s command present at this night fight.” Hyde, *Life of George Bent*, 329-330.

⁵⁸ Danker, ed., “The Journal of an Indian Fighter,” 138. Werner, *The Summit Springs Battle*, 62. Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 111.

⁵⁹ King, “The Republican River Expedition,” 50-51. Werner, *The Summit Springs Battle*, 63. According to George Bent’s account an advance party of Pawnee Scouts discovered two old Cheyenne men and one woman following the trail of the main village. The Pawnees killed all three. Here again, there is no additional information in the official records that corroborates this claim. Hyde, *Life of George Bent*, 331.

While Carr's command moved north, Tall Bull moved his village to the South Platte River. When they reached the river, the water was so high that they were compelled to lie in camp waiting for the flood to subside. As a precautionary measure, Tall Bull sent scouts south to locate the soldiers. He also sent Two Crows and five other Cheyennes up the Platte to find a place where the river could be forded safely. Two Crows and his men returned later that evening. They had found a place where they could cross the river and marked it with sticks. A Sioux war party also came in that night and reported that the troops were following the trail. Upon hearing this news, the Sioux under Pawnee Killer, Whistler, and Two Strikes decided to cross the river immediately. Tall Bull, however, believed that the Dog Soldier village was safe for the moment and decided to stay in camp. The reason why Tall Bull thought they were safe is not clear. According to Captain George F. Price of the Fifth Cavalry, the Dog Soldiers remained in camp at the suggestion of a medicine man. According to one historian, Tall Bull trusted that Carr's cavalry would follow the trail of the decoy party that he had sent out. Luther North believed that the Cheyennes had seen them turn towards Fort McPherson and hence assumed that the soldiers were heading back to the fort. Whatever the reason, subsequent generations of Cheyennes, wrote George Bent later, "say it was poor judgment for Tall Bull to insist in going into camp instead of crossing the South Platte that evening."⁶⁰

At 6:00 in the morning of July 11, Carr set out from his camp with his command, including fifty Pawnee Scouts under Major North, and three days of rations. The wagon

⁶⁰ Hyde, *Life of George Bent*, 331-332. King, "The Republican River Expedition," 67. Price, *Across the Continent with the Fifth Cavalry*, 140.

train followed as fast as it could.⁶¹ During the morning there were two reports of Indians ahead. Carr ordered the gallop, but when they reached the “hostiles,” they turned out to be only wild horses. When the troops reached Platte Bluffs, the Pawnees reported seeing two horsemen. At their advice, Carr led the entire command through a ravine to escape detection. Here the trail of the hostile camp divided into two. A heavy trail went left, while a lighter trail turned right towards the South Platte River. Carr believed the trail was designed to mislead the troops, and decided to follow the lighter trail toward the river in the belief that the Indians needed water just as badly as his own command.⁶²

As the command struggled through heavy sand, two scouting parties came in. One reported the presence of mounted Indians to the left. The other reported having seen a herd of animals in a valley near the stream to the right. Carr detached three companies under Major Royall and William Cody to move toward the herd, while he took the remaining troops, including the Pawnees, along the main trail.⁶³ Shortly thereafter, some scouts reported that they had seen some tipis apparently belonging to the Cheyenne village. Carr immediately dispatched a messenger to Royall with orders to send a company to reinforce his command. Then he ordered the gallop. The horses struggled through the loose sand for an hour. They had not had any water since morning and were

⁶¹ The command was composed of men of the companies A, C, D, E, G, H, Fifth Cavalry, and men from companies A, B, and C, of the Pawnee Scouts. Company M remained behind, together with the remaining soldiers and Pawnees, to escort the wagon train. Price, *Across the Continent with the Fifth Cavalry*, 137.

⁶² Report of General Carr to George A. Ruggles, July 20, 1869 in Werner, *The Summit Springs Battle*, 63. King, “The Republican River Expedition,” 53.

⁶³ According to Luther North, they found three trails each leading into different directions. Carr divided the command into three detachments: Royal and Cody took the right hand trail toward the northeast, Carr followed the left hand trail toward the northwest with five or six scouts under Sergeant Sam Wallace, while Major North took thirty-five scouts on the middle trail, leading straight north. When they had traveled about fifteen miles, they were overtaken by a Pawnee Scout from Carr’s detachment with orders to join the General as quickly as possible as he had discovered the Cheyenne village. Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 113.

becoming exhausted. Carr doubted he would ever overtake the Cheyenne village. Around 2 p.m. a Pawnee advance party beckoned Carr to follow them. They pointed to a herd of animals about four miles away. Carr, who had received several false reports earlier that day, thought the “herd” were probably buffalo, but he “determined to go and see” anyway. The Pawnees began to strip themselves for the fight. They unsaddled their horses and took off as much of their clothing “as could be dispensed with and still leave something to distinguish them from the hostiles.” According to volunteer James Welch, the scouts also daubed “their faces with paint.”⁶⁴

While Carr’s command prepared for battle, Major Royall returned with his troops. He had traveled twenty miles but found no Indians. Royall’s men joined Carr’s command and rapidly proceeded in the direction of the village, taking advantage of depressions, ravines, and sand hills to remain undetected. When they came within a mile of the village, Carr halted his troops and ordered the battle formation. According to Lieutenant George H. Price, the Regimental Historian who was present during the battle, Carr placed Captain Leicester Walker’s Company H on the left column and Price’s own Company A on the right column. It was their task to attack the flanks of the Cheyenne village and cut off their escape routes. The center column, meanwhile, consisted of Company D, under command of Captain Samuel S. Sumner, Company C” under Captain Thomas E. Maley, and the Pawnee Scouts under Major North, who occupied the left flank of the column.

⁶⁴ Carr’s report to Brigadier General Ruggles, July 20, 1869, reprinted in Werner, *The Summit Springs Battle*, 63-64. Brady, ed., *Indian Fights and Fighters*, 174-175.

Carr and Royall, meanwhile, followed the advance columns with companies E and G Carr placed Major Crittenden in command of the front line and then sounded the charge.⁶⁵

It was now around three o'clock in the afternoon, July 11, 1869. The companies on the front line charged towards the Cheyenne village at full speed.⁶⁶ Carr's line, with the tired ponies of companies E and G, followed at gallop pace. The lines were stretched longer as tired horses fell behind. The attack was made from the northwest and came as a complete surprise to the Dog Soldiers. Most Cheyennes were eating their mid-day meal when Carr's troops appeared on the horizon. The soldiers had to cover almost a mile before they reached the village. Little Hawk, one of the Cheyennes who was riding some distance from the camp, first discovered the troops. He tried to reach the village to warn his friends, but his horse was slow and the Pawnees reached the village before he did. Little Hawk survived the battle, however, and escaped with a number of other Indians. A Cheyenne boy who was tending horses tried to drive the herd back to the village to warn the Indians and provide their escape. He died in a volley of gunfire from the charging troops. "No braver man ever lived," Captain Luther North wrote later, "than that fifteen-

⁶⁵ Price, *Across the Continent with the Fifth Cavalry*, 138 and Appendix 6, "Company Officers of the Fifth Cavalry," 605-617. Company M was still with the wagon train. Major Crittenden commanded the front line. Although Price was generally regarded as the regimental historian, there are some problems with his account. Sumner writes that the Pawnees were on the left, nearest to the village, while companies C, H, A, G, and K, were on the right. According to Lester Walker's account (reprinted in Weingardt, *Sound the Charge*, 108-110), Captain Maley commanded the right column, while Sumner, North, and the Pawnee Scouts were on the left, and Walker's own command was located in the center. Both Price and Walker's accounts were written long after the battle. Sumner's account was written only days after the event, and may actually be the most accurate. However, Sumner lists company K as one of the units present at the battle. Company K was in fact not present during the expedition at all.

⁶⁶ On June 6, 1929, Clarence Reckmeyer, Robert H. Bruce, and Luther North visited the Summit Springs battle site. According to Reckmeyer, in 1929, the site was located about twelve miles south and five miles east of Sterling, Colorado, on Section 1, Township 5 North, Range 52 West. Clarence Reckmeyer, "The Battle of Summit Springs," *Colorado Magazine* 6 (1929), 211.

year-old boy.”⁶⁷ The Pawnees reached the village ahead of the troops. Captain Sumner gave the following description of the charge:

At the command from the General, we all started with a rush. The Indians on my left had stripped for the fight, and went in like red devils. I was ordered to keep up with them. We could not see the village, and were riding for the herd, but on reaching the top of the next ridge there lay the village to our left and front. You never heard such a shout; the way we rode for it was a caution. Every company tried to get there first, but I had the advantage of being the nearest. The Pawnees were with me, and seeing themselves supported, put right ahead.⁶⁸

The sudden appearance of the Pawnees and the troops caused a panic among the Cheyennes. As soon as they heard the shots, they ran from their lodges to catch their horses before they stampeded. Lieutenant Price’s company, who approached the village from the left, succeeded in killing seven warriors and capturing three hundred horses. Captain Walker’s right-flank advance to the village, however, was blocked by a ravine, which delayed his progress and allowed a number of Indians to escape.⁶⁹ Those Cheyennes who had horses quickly mounted the women and children. As the women and children tried to escape, the men stayed behind to hold off the soldiers and the Pawnees. They put up a brave fight. Two Crows, one of the Cheyenne Dog Soldiers, saw his friend Lone Bear charge again and again into a party of Pawnees who were chasing the fleeing Indians. Lone Bear went down “fighting like a wild animal.”⁷⁰ James Welch, one of the white volunteers, chased a mounted Indian and shot him through the head. The Indian’s

⁶⁷ Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 115.

⁶⁸ *Army & Navy Journal* 6, August 7, 1869, p. 802. Sumner’s letter was also reprinted in Weingardt, *Sound the Charge*, 90-91.

⁶⁹ Price, *Across the Continent with the Fifth Cavalry*, 139.

⁷⁰ Hyde, *Life of George Bent*, 333.

name was “Pretty Bear,” a Cheyenne chief according to Welch. “The Pawnees knew him,” Welch later recalled, “and were anxious to secure his scalp, which I was glad to give them as I soon as became disgusted with the ghastly trophy.”⁷¹

Tall Bull, seeing that all was lost, put one of his wives and daughters on a horse. The woman begged him to escape with her, but Tall Bull “shut his ears” and then killed his own horse as he chose to die in the fight.⁷² He led some of his men and his two other wives into a small ravine with sharp high banks from where they held off the Pawnees and the troops. Among the Indians in the ravine with the Dog Soldier leader were Powder Chief and his Sioux wife and his son, Black Moon. Big Gip and his wife also followed Tall Bull into the ravine. A young Dog Soldier named Wolf With Plenty of Hair, staked himself out with a “dog rope” at the head of the ravine. All were killed.⁷³

There has been a great deal of controversy over who killed Tall Bull. Luther North claimed his brother, Major Frank North, killed the chief with a shot to the head.⁷⁴ William Cody also claimed the dubious honor and for many years reenacted the scene in his Wild West Show.⁷⁵ According to James Welch, Tall Bull was killed by Lieutenant Mason, “who rode up to him and shot him through the heart with a derringer.”⁷⁶ In 1901, General Carr claimed that Sergeant Daniel McGrath killed the chief.⁷⁷ Strangely enough,

⁷¹ Brady, ed., *Indian Fights and Fighters*, 176.

⁷² Carr’s report to Brigadier General Ruggles, July 20, 1869, reprinted in Werner, *The Summit Springs Battle*, 65.

⁷³ Hyde, *Life of George Bent*, 334.

⁷⁴ Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 117.

⁷⁵ Don Russell, Jr., *The Lives and Legends of Buffalo Bill* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960), 130-132, 138-148, 449. Luther expressed his disapproval of Cody’s claims on several occasions. See, for example, E. A. Brininstool, *Fighting Indian Warriors: True Tales of the Wild Frontier* (Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1953), 228-229.

⁷⁶ Brady, ed., *Indian Fights and Fighters*, 177.

⁷⁷ Carr made this statement in a letter of recommendation for McGrath. The letter is printed in Don Rickey, Jr., *Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay: The Enlisted Soldier Fighting the Indian Wars* (Norman:

none of the accounts have taken the possibility into consideration that a Pawnee might have killed the chief of the Dog Soldiers. Although no Pawnee stepped forward to claim credit for the killing, the fact remains that the Pawnees were the first to reach the village, and, according to the Cheyennes, they “did most of the killing [and] captured the greater part of the pony herd.”⁷⁸ There seems to be less disagreement on what happened to Tall Bull after he was struck by the fatal bullet. According to one account, High Eagle, one of the Pawnee Scouts, took Tall Bull’s scalp during the fight. After the removal of the tribe to the Indian Territory, High Eagle sold the scalp to Gordon W. Lillie (also known as “Pawnee Bill”) for his museum in the town of Pawnee, Oklahoma.⁷⁹

The Pawnees played an important role in the battle. Only volunteer James Welch was unimpressed with their fighting qualities. “The Pawnees,” he wrote later, “did not fight well. They skulked and killed the women and children.”⁸⁰ Several daring feats by the Pawnees, however, clearly refuted Welch’s view of their conduct during the fight. Sergeant *Co-rux-ah-kah-wah-de* (“Traveling Bear”), for example, followed a number of warriors into the canyon where Tall Bull and his warriors had made their last stand. A

University of Oklahoma Press), 64. It should be pointed out, however, that Carr also credited Buffalo Bill with shooting the Cheyenne chief.

⁷⁸ Hyde, *Life of George Bent*, 333.

⁷⁹ Clarence Reckmeyer, “The Battle of Summit Springs,” *Colorado Magazine* 6 (1929), 217.

⁸⁰ Welch observed that after the fight “we found we had one hundred and seventeen prisoners, four squaws, and fifteen children. They were turned over to the Pawnees.” As stated above, Welch believed that the Pawnees killed the prisoners. Clearly Welch was in error here. He exaggerated the number of prisoners. Furthermore, the prisoners were never handed over to the Pawnees. Perhaps Welch wanted to emphasize his opinion of Indians. In his account he made the following personal observation: “I think it just as impossible to make a civilized man of the Indian as it would be to make a shepherd dog of a wolf, or a manly man of a dude. They do not in my opinion possess a single trait that elevates a man above a brute. They are treacherous, cowardly, and ungrateful, Cooper to the contrary notwithstanding.” Brady, ed., *Indian Fights and Fighters*, 178.

few moments later he returned with four scalps.⁸¹ General Carr, who had previously called the Pawnees “lazy and shiftless,” re-evaluated his impression of them after the fight. “The Pawnees under Major Frank North,” Carr wrote in his official report of the expedition, “were of the greatest service to us in the campaign. This is the first time since coming west that we have been supplied with Indian scouts - and the result has shown their value.”⁸²

The victory seemed complete. According to General Carr’s report, the soldiers killed 52 Indians, destroyed 84 lodges, and captured 17 women and children, as well as 274 horses and 144 mules. Furthermore, they captured an enormous amount of supplies from the Cheyennes, including 56 rifles, 22 revolvers, 50 pounds of gun powder, 20 pounds of bullets, 8 lead bars, 14 bullet moulds, 12,000 percussion caps, 17 sabres, 9 lances, and 20 tomahawks. “[T]he above material,” wrote Carr, “will materially reduce their means of killing white people.”⁸³

Apart from guns and ammunition, Carr’s command also captured 9300 pounds of dried meat, clothes (moccasins, women’s dresses, 690 buffalo robes, etc.), 75 lodge skins, 361 saddles, 319 raw hides, as well as 1500 dollars in cash and numerous other things. Besides the articles captured, General Carr also concluded that “at least ten (10) tons of various Indian property, such as clothing, flour, coffee, corn meal, saddle equipments, fancy articles, etc. [was] destroyed by the command before leaving the camp, by burning.” Carr noted that there were 160 fires burning to destroy the Indians’ property.

⁸¹ According to Reckmeyer, Sergeant Traveling Bear was also known as “Big George,” as he was over six feet tall. Traveling Bear died at the hands of the Sioux at Massacre Canyon, Nebraska, August 6, 1873. Reckmeyer, “The Battle of Summit Springs,” 215.

⁸² Carr’s report to Brigadier General Ruggles, July 20, 1869, reprinted in Werner, *The Summit Springs Battle*, 66.

The troops also found silverware, photographs, and other goods stolen by the Indians during their raids in Kansas, as well as numerous scalps and a necklace of human fingers.⁸⁴

Two white captives were discovered in the camp. As he stopped for a drink during the battle, Major North discovered Maria Weichell crawling from a tipi. She was bleeding from a bullet wound through her breast. A short while later they found the other captive, Susanna Alderice. She had been shot and struck in the head with a tomahawk by one of Tall Bull's wives. Both women had been mistreated during their captivity. Both were pregnant and had been raped repeatedly. They had been abused by Tall Bull's wives, who were jealous because he had kept both in his lodges. The Cheyennes had killed Susanna's baby three days after her capture. Its continuing crying "annoyed them so much that they wrung its head off and threw the several parts of its body into a stream beside which they were camped." Susanna Alderice did not survive her injuries and died shortly after the soldiers found her. The day after the battle, on July 12, a funeral service was held for her. The soldiers wrapped her body in lodge skins and buffalo robes and buried her at the site of the battlefield. They left a wooden headboard with an inscription stating what was known of her at the grave. After the battle, the soldiers, including the Pawnees, donated most of the money they had retrieved from the Cheyenne camp (\$845.35 and four twenty dollar gold pieces) to Mrs. Weichell, who recovered from her injuries.⁸⁵

The American losses were negligible. One soldier received a slight wound from an arrow. The Indians had killed one cavalry horse. Twelve other horses had died of

⁸³ Carr's report to Brigadier General Ruggles, July 20, 1869, reprinted in Werner, *The Summit Springs Battle*, 66.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 66, 69-70.

exhaustion during the charge. The other horses belonging to the command were in such poor condition that Carr decided to march to Fort Sedgwick, the nearest military post. On Monday, July 12, Carr set out for the fort. After a brief march, they made camp at the South Platte River some sixty-five miles from Fort Sedgwick. Carr sent Second Sergeant George Lehman and ten men to the fort with dispatches recounting the recent victory. Three days later, on Thursday, July 15, the exhausted troops finally reached the fort.⁸⁶

At Sedgwick, Carr wrote his final report on the expedition. "It is a source of extreme gratification to the 5th Cavalry that, after all our hardships and exposures for ten months in the field, we have at last met with an undisputed success . . . I have, as usual, to express my obligations to the officers and soldiers of my command for their energy, activity and cheerful endurance of hardships."⁸⁷ Among the men who received honorable mention in his report was Sergeant *Co-rux-te-chod-ish* ("Mad Bear"), for his prompt action during the Cheyenne night raid on July 8. Upon Carr's recommendation, Congress awarded the Medal of Honor to Mad Bear on August 24, 1869. The official citation read, "Ran out from command in pursuit of a dismounted Indian; was shot down and badly wounded by a bullet from his own command."⁸⁸ According to Luther North, Carr accidentally awarded the medal to the wrong man. In his letters and memoirs, the captain insisted that Carr intended to award the medal to Sergeant *Co-rux-ah-kah-wah-de* ("Traveling Bear") for his brave action during the battle at Summit Springs, when he entered the ravine in pursuit of four Cheyennes, whom he subsequently killed and

⁸⁵ Sparks, *Reckoning at Summit Springs*, 44-49. Weingardt, *Sound the Charge*, 53-55.

⁸⁶ King, "The Republican River Expedition," 58-59. Danker, ed., "Journal of an Indian Fighter," 140-141.

⁸⁷ Carr's report to Brigadier General Ruggles, July 20, 1869, reprinted in Werner, *The Summit Springs Battle*, 62, 66.

scalped. According to Captain North, his brother corrected the “error” by presenting the medal to Traveling Bear after all. If this was the case, the medal did go to the wrong man, although Sergeant Traveling Bear was certainly deserving of the honor.⁸⁹

At Fort Sedgwick, Major North divided the spoils of the battle among his men. On July 16 he rewarded some of the captured horses to those scouts who had given especially exceptional service. Over the next few days, the Pawnees entertained themselves with horse races and other games. In his autobiography, William Cody recalled racing his horse against those of the Pawnees:

[At Fort Sedgwick] all the troops were paid off, including the Pawnees. For two or three days our Indian allies did nothing but run horses, as all the lately captured animals had to be tested to determine which was the swiftest. Finally the Pawnees offered to run their favorite against Tall Bull [the horse which Cody had obtained after the battle]. They raised three hundred dollars to bet on their horse, and I covered the money. In addition I took numerous side bets. The race was a single dash of a mile. Tall Bull won without any trouble, and I was ahead on this race about seven hundred dollars.⁹⁰

The campaign against the Sioux and Cheyennes did not end with the arrival of the troops at Fort Sedgwick. Carr intended to continue his search for the Indians as soon as his men and horses had recovered from the long march. Some of the escaped Cheyennes apparently had gone to the north, and the general intended another expedition to the Platte to flush them out. Furthermore, although Carr may not have been aware of it at the time, Pawnee Killer and Whistler’s band of Sioux were still roaming the area. But Carr would

⁸⁸ United States Senate, Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, *Medal of Honor Recipients, 1863-1973: “In the name of the Congress of the United States”* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), 284.

⁸⁹ Luther North blamed the confusion on the fact that both men had similar names. Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 120.

not lead the follow-up campaign. A personal tragedy intervened. On July 25, he received a telegram from his wife with bad news. His five month old son, George Oscar, had died suddenly. After turning over his command to Major Royall, the grief-stricken general boarded a train for St. Louis. The responsibility for the follow-up expedition rested now on the shoulders of Major Royall.⁹¹

Royall received orders "to find the trail of the refugees of the Battle of Summit Springs, if possible, and to kill any hostiles encountered." His command consisted of companies C, D, F, G, H, I, and L of the Fifth Cavalry, as well as the Pawnee Battalion. William F. Cody once again accompanied the expedition as guide. The command left the fort on August 2 in the direction of the Republican River.⁹² Frank North was not present when Royall's command left Fort Sedgwick. A few days earlier he had traveled to Columbus to assist in the investigation of the murder of Edward McMurtry, whose bloated body had been found in a pond on an island in the Platte River on June 20, 1869. As with the incidents earlier that year, settlers pointed to the Pawnees as perpetrators of the crime. The case was of special interest to Major North, because one of the accused was a former Pawnee Scout named Blue Hawk. Although the investigation and subsequent trial of the men accused of the murder would drag on for years, North soon returned to his command to join his command during Royall's follow-up operations in Kansas and Nebraska.⁹³

⁹⁰ Cody, *Autobiography of Buffalo Bill*, 195.

⁹¹ King, *War Eagle*, 119.

⁹² John R. Fischer, "The Royall and Duncan Pursuits: Aftermath of the Battle of Summit Springs, 1869," *Nebraska History* 50 (Fall 1969), 297. Price, *Across the Continent with the Fifth Cavalry*, 141.

⁹³ McMurtry lived with his wife and children not far from the Pawnee Reservation in Nebraska. On May 8, he disappeared while he was on his way to Columbus to buy groceries. His body was not found until six weeks later, on June 20. He had been shot several times, including once with an arrow of Pawnee make. The body was found on an island in the Platte River, which the Pawnees used as a grazing area for their horses.

After traveling ten miles, some Pawnee Scouts reported that they had discovered a small party of Indians five miles to the south. Royall ordered Captain Leicester Walker's Company H and fifty Pawnee Scouts to investigate. Walker discovered a large Indian party and immediately dispatched a Pawnee Scout to the main camp requesting reinforcements. Royall sent Captain Samuel Sumner's Company D and the remaining Pawnee Scouts to support Walker. The Indians belonged to Pawnee Killer's band of cut-off Oglalas, augmented with refugees from Tall Bull's Dog Soldier camp. A skirmish between the troops and the Indians followed. The group of Indians was a decoy party. As soon as the Indians received word that the soldiers and the Pawnee Scouts were near, they burned their lodges and fled in all directions. The decoy party lured the troops away and secured the safe escape of the villagers. There were no casualties. The troops returned to camp later that night.⁹⁴

The next day, August 3, Royall continued the pursuit of the escaping Indians. The trail led toward the head of Frenchman's Fork of the Republican River. The Pawnee Scouts found many dropped skins and green lodge poles, indicating that some of the

Among the Pawnees on the island at the time of McMurtry's murder were Yellow Sun and Blue Hawk. Eight Pawnees were eventually arrested in connection of the murder: the two Pawnees already mentioned, and Little Wolf, Horse Driver, Great Traveler, Lucky Man, The Lame Man, and Man That Scares Horses. The motive for the murder was not clear. The Indians denied any involvement in the murder and pointed out that there had been no proper investigation into the murder of several Pawnees a few months earlier. Perhaps McMurtry was murdered in retaliation for this incident. Perhaps he was caught stealing horses from the Pawnees and promptly executed for his crime. (During this time, settlers were a source of irritation for the Indians because of their inclination to steal wood and other resources belonging to the reservation.) Eventually, Little Wolf, Horse Driver, Yellow Sun, and Blue Hawk were indicted and brought to trial. The trial ran into jurisdictional problems and dragged on for two years. In the summer of 1871, the four accused were released on bail. A few months later the case against them was dropped. According to Luther North, however, the four men died shortly after their release, possibly as a result of their treatment in prison. David Wishart, "The Death of Edward McMurtry," *Great Plains Quarterly* 19 (Winter 1999), 5-21. Luther North recalled that Blue Hawk, a Kitkehahki, had served with him in 1867. "He was a fine man," Luther wrote, "but unfortunate." Luther North to Robert Bruce, February 9, 1929. Robert Bruce, *Fraghting Norths and Pawnee Scouts Papers*, Box 1, Folder 1, Department of Special Collections, McFarlin Library, Tulsa University, Tulsa, Oklahoma.

fleeing Indians indeed had belonged to Tall Bull's camp. The Indians traveled lightly and fast. After crossing the Frenchman's Fork, they turned north again in an attempt to outdistance Royall's troops, who were slowed down by their supply wagons. Royall decided to leave supply train behind with a rear guard in order to keep up with the Indians. He pursued them across the South Platte River about five miles west of Ogallala Station on the Union Pacific Railroad. Here, on August 6, Major North joined the command again.⁹⁵

On August 8, Royall's command camped on a little slough where the Indians had bivouaced a few days earlier. "The trail here is very plain," Major North wrote in his diary, "and I have some hopes of overtaking the Red devils." But North's hopes were soon dashed. Despite some hard traveling, Royall was unable to overtake the Indians, who managed to stay ahead of the troops with tremendous effort. The hot weather and the lack of water exhausted the troops; horses and mules collapsed, and on August 12, near the Niobrara River,⁹⁶ Royall gave up the chase. The horses were no longer able to continue the pursuit, and the men were exhausted. How exhausted became clear over the following days. On August 14 the troops lost ten horses. Major North scribbled in his diary that they simply "gave out" and had to be shot. The next day, one of the Pawnee

⁹⁴ Fischer, "The Royall and Duncan Pursuits," 297. Peters, comp., *Indian Battles and Skirmishes*, 23.

⁹⁵ Fischer, "The Royall and Duncan Pursuits," 298. After joining his battalion, Major North gave Luther North and James Murie passes to return home and placed Sylvanus E. Cushing and Gustavus Becher in charge of their companies. The reasons for their resignation is not clear. Luther North claimed he resigned after a dispute with General Carr. It must be remembered, however, that Carr was no longer present. James Murie had been seriously ill during the previous campaign and it seems plausible that he desired to return home to recuperate. Danker, ed., "Journal of an Indian Fighter," footnote page 146.

⁹⁶ While they were camping near the Niobrara River, the Pawnee Scouts found some very large (fossil) bones. The army surgeon declared that one of the bones was a giant human thigh bone. The Pawnees explained that the bone belonged to a race of giants who were exterminated by a flood after they had insulted the Great Spirit. After destroying the giants, the Great Spirit created a race of smaller human beings. Cody, *Autobiography of Buffalo Bill*, 196-197. William F. Cody, *The Life of Buffalo Bill* (London 1994), 266-267.

Scouts belonging to Lt. Fred Kislingberry's Company A, nineteen year old *Co-rux-tah-kah-tah*, died. He had been sick for several weeks, and the difficult march had aggravated his condition. The scouts buried him the same day. Although Major North wrote in his diary that he did not know the cause of death, the muster rolls stated that *Co-rux-tah-kah-tah* "Died in the field August 15th 1869 of Disease of the Heart."⁹⁷

On August 21, the command reached Fort McPherson. Royall had not been able to engage the Indians. The only thing Royall could show for his efforts were two mules and forty horses that the Indians had lost or abandoned. These mounts were given to the Pawnees for their faithful service during the campaign. The horses were unfit for military service and presented to the Pawnees on the condition that they would be transported to the Pawnee Agency without expense to the government. Major North loaded the horses on a train bound for the agency on August 25. While at the fort the scouts spent their time doing drills, racing horses, and dancing.⁹⁸

At Fort McPherson, Royall turned his command over to Lieutenant Colonel (Brevet Brigadier General) Thomas Duncan. Duncan continued the expedition with companies B, C, F, L, and M of the Fifth Cavalry and companies B, C, and M of the Second Cavalry. Major North, the Pawnee Scouts, and William F. Cody complemented the troops. On September 15, the command left Fort McPherson. Companies A and I of

⁹⁷ Danker, ed., "Journal of an Indian Fighter," 146-148. "Register of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914," M233, Roll 70, volume 150, "1866-1873, Indian Scouts," (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1956), n. p.

⁹⁸ Danker, ed., "Journal of an Indian Fighter," 150-155.

the Fifth Cavalry were held in reserve to accompany the supply train, which was to meet Duncan's troops in twenty days.⁹⁹

After moving into camp that night, Major North received instructions to detach one company of Pawnee Scouts for duty at the Pawnee Agency. General Duncan had received news that the Sioux were threatening the reservation, and the scouts were needed to protect the agency. The following day, North sent Lt. Kislingsberry's company.¹⁰⁰

During the first week of the expedition, little of interest occurred. The Pawnees went on scouts in search of Indian trails or hunted buffalo and other game to supply the camp. They also guarded the camp at night. William Cody remembered that

General Duncan, who had never before commanded the Pawnee Scouts, confused them by posting guards in a manner that was new to them. Furthermore, he insisted that the guards should call the hours through the night: "Nine o'clock and all is well," etc., giving the numbers of their posts. Few of the scouts understood English. They were greatly troubled.

Major North explained to them that when the man on the post nearest them called the hour, they must repeat the call as closely as they could. It was highly amusing to hear them do this. They would try to remember what the man on the next post had said. For example, when a white soldier called out "Post Number One, Half-past Nine and all is well!" the Indians would cry out "Pos Number half-pass cents go to h-l I don't care." So ridiculous were their efforts to repeat the calls, that the general finally gave it up and countermanded the order.¹⁰¹

It is difficult to determine the accuracy of this passage from Cody's memoirs. Cody usually portrayed Indians such as the Pawnees as "childlike" characters whose

⁹⁹ Peters, comp., *Indian Battles and Skirmishes*, 24. Price claims there were two companies of the Second Cavalry present in the Duncan Pursuit, and lists Company E instead of Company C as one of the units present during the expedition. Price, *Across the Continent with the Fifth Cavalry*, 141.

¹⁰⁰ Danker, ed., "Journal of an Indian Fighter," 155 (see also footnote on same page).

¹⁰¹ Cody, *Autobiography of Buffalo Bill*, 207.

antics served to entertain the reader. Cody, however, also portrayed some of his enemies as brutal savages with few human qualities.

On Sunday, September 26, Major North and William Cody were out hunting in advance of the command when they were attacked by a party of six Sioux warriors. Fortunately, two small advance detachments under Lt. William Jefferson Volkmar and Lt. George Frederick Price were near, as were a number of Pawnee Scouts. The troops and the scouts charged the Indians, who were soon joined by other warriors. After a chase over five miles, the soldiers spotted a Sioux camp in the distance. It belonged to Pawnee Killer's and Whistler's group of Oglalas and consisted of fifty-six lodges. When the soldiers appeared, the Oglalas abandoned their village in great haste. During the chase, the troops killed one Indian and wounded several others. They pursued the fleeing Indians until dark. When they returned to the main camp, they found General Duncan, who had been unaware of the presence of the village. They left one party of scouts in charge of the abandoned village.¹⁰² In his diary, Major North wrote about the events of the day

today we marched 24 miles and I and Cody came ahead to the [Prairie Dog] Creek and 6 Indians got after us and gave us a lively chase you bet. I got my men out and they killed one Indian and got two ponies a mule and lots of trash [spoils].¹⁰³

The following day, September 27, Duncan ordered his men to destroy the village. The soldiers burned lodges, robes, saddles, meat, and everything else the Oglalas had left behind. Among the goods were some instruments belonging to a surveying party under William E. Daugherty, which had been attacked a few weeks earlier. Duncan also ordered

¹⁰² Fischer, "The Royall and Duncan Pursuits," 300-301.

Companies F and M under Captain William H. Brown and some Pawnee Scouts under George Lehman and Fred Kisslingsberry to locate the fleeing Oglalas. They did not find the Indians, but brought back three abandoned horses and one mule.¹⁰⁴

On September 28, North ordered Second Sergeant Elias Stowe and six scouts to escort companies F and M, Second Cavalry, under Captain Mix with seventy-five captured mules to Sheridan, Kansas. The mules had been captured at Summit Springs and belonged to a Morris Mitchell of Sheridan. The next day, Duncan again sent out Captain Brown with two companies and twelve scouts under Lt. George D. Barclay. Four days later, October 2, Duncan's command captured an old Oglala woman who had strayed from the village and was unable to catch up. She was near starvation, and the soldiers fed her. She had been on her way to Spotted Tail's Brule village when she was captured. A Ponca Indian, serving with the Pawnee Scouts, interpreted her words. She told General Duncan that she had no knowledge of the Indians' plans and claimed there were no longer any hostiles in the Upper Republican country. Later, after the troops had taken her to Fort McPherson, she also admitted that the pursued band belonged to Pawnee Killer, her son, and Whistler.¹⁰⁵

On October 9, Duncan sent two companies of the Fifth Cavalry under Captain Philip Dwyer and fifteen scouts under Lt. Kisslingberry in search of the Indians. The next day, Sergeants Elias Stowe (Company A) and James Deyo (Company C) and fifteen scouts joined two Cavalry companies under Lt. James N. Wheelan for a scout on the South Fork of the Republican River. That same day, Duncan ordered companies A and F,

¹⁰³ Danker, ed., "Journal of an Indian Fighter," 158.

¹⁰⁴ Fischer, "The Royall and Duncan Pursuits," 301. Danker, ed., "Journal of an Indian Fighter," 158.

Fifth Cavalry, under Major Irwin to scout the North Fork of the Republican. Lieutenants Barclay and Hunt and fifteen Pawnees joined this party. But none of these parties encountered any hostile Indians, which confirmed the statement by the old Oglala woman that the Indians had abandoned the area.¹⁰⁶

Duncan's troops stayed in the field several more days. Apart from an occasional scout, the men relaxed and entertained themselves with card games and other forms of recreation. On October 23, Duncan received orders to return to Fort McPherson and disband the expedition. Five days later, the command reached the fort, and Major North received orders to send his men back to the Pawnee Reservation. The order came as a relief to the men of the expedition, and in his diary Major North recorded that "we are all on tip toe to get home." Before leaving the fort, General Duncan praised the Pawnee Scouts for their valuable service and Major North for his good discipline. With Duncan's speech, the Republican River Campaign officially came to an end. On October 30, Major North and the men of the Pawnee Battalion boarded a train and traveled back to the Pawnee Agency, where they arrived the next morning.¹⁰⁷ The Pawnees remained in service until November 10, 1869, when they were mustered out at the Pawnee Agency.¹⁰⁸

The Republican River Expedition of 1869 had been a great success. The Cheyenne Dog Soldiers had received a stunning blow at Summit Springs from which they never completely recovered, and the follow-up expeditions by Royall and Duncan, though less spectacular, had driven the Sioux and Cheyennes from the area. The significance of

¹⁰⁵ Fischer, "The Royall and Duncan Pursuits," 301-302. Danker, ed., "Journal of an Indian Fighter," 160 and footnote same page.

¹⁰⁶ Fischer, "The Royall and Duncan Pursuits," 303-304. Danker, ed., "Journal of an Indian Fighter," 162.

¹⁰⁷ Fischer, "The Royall and Duncan Pursuits," 304-305. Danker, ed., "Journal of an Indian Fighter," 165-167.

the campaign, particularly of the Summit Springs battle, was not lost on the legislatures of Colorado and Nebraska. On January 25, 1870, the Colorado Legislature adopted a formal resolution honoring General Carr's troops for their service during the battle:

Whereas, The prosperity of this territory has been greatly retarded during several years past by Indian warfare, preventing immigration, and greatly paralyzing industry, and whereas, defenseless women and children of our pioneer settlements have been murdered by savages, or subjected to captivity worse than death; and whereas, a detachment of United States troops under General Carr, on the twelfth [11th] of July last, at Summit Springs, in this territory, after a long and tedious pursuit, achieved a signal victory over a band of Dog Indians, retaking considerable property that had been stolen, and recapturing a white woman held captive. *Resolved*, That the thanks of the people of Colorado, through the council and house of representatives of the legislative assembly of the Territory of Colorado, be extended to Brevet Major General Eugene A. Carr, of the United States Army, and the brave officers and soldiers of his command for their victory thus achieved. *Resolved*, That the secretary of the territory be required to have a copy of these resolutions prepared upon parchment, and transmitted to General Carr.¹⁰⁹

One month after the resolution passed the Colorado legislature, Nebraska adopted a similar resolution as well. In one passage of the resolution, the Nebraska representatives specifically addressed the performance of the Pawnee Scouts under Major North.

RESOLVED, by the Legislature of the State of Nebraska, that the thanks of the people of Nebraska, be and are hereby tendered to Brevet Major-General Carr and the officers and soldiers under his command of the 5th U. S. Cavalry for their heroic courage and perseverance in their campaign against hostile Indians on the frontier of the State in July, 1869, driving the enemy from our borders and achieving a victory at Summit

¹⁰⁸ "Register of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914," M233, Roll 70, volume 150, "1866-1873, Indian Scouts," (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1956), n. p.

¹⁰⁹ Reckmeyer, "The Battle of Summit Springs," 219-220. A slightly modified version of this text can be found in Weingardt, *Sound the Charge*, 87.

Springs, Colorado Territory, by which the people of the State were freed from the ravages of merciless savages.

2d. RESOLVED, That the thanks of this body and of the people of the state of Nebraska, are hereby also tendered to Major Frank J. North and the officers and soldiers under his command of the "Pawnee scouts" for the manner in which they have assisted in driving hostile Indians from our frontier settlements.

3d. RESOLVED, That the Secretary of State is hereby instructed to transmit a copy of the foregoing resolutions to Major-General Eugene A. Carr and Major Frank J. North. Approved, February 28, 1870.¹¹⁰

Although the Battle of Summit Springs never received the attention it deserved at the time, historians now agree that it was a major event in the history of U. S.-Indian relations. It was the last major engagement with Plains Indians in Colorado, and it facilitated the opening of the territory to a new wave of settlers. Perhaps the battle would have faded from memory entirely if not for Buffalo Bill Cody, who, according to one historian, "recognized the theatrical qualities of the fight at Summit Springs." Cody incorporated the re-enactment of the battle, featuring himself in the center of events, in his Wild West Show as late as 1907.¹¹¹

As Royall and Duncan drove the last remaining hostile Indians out of Kansas, calm returned to the Kansas frontier. The only trouble during the closing months of 1869 was caused by some of the militia troops, who "did some stealing and plundering of their own, which was what the state paid them each \$1.40 a day to prevent the Indians from

¹¹⁰ Weingardt, *Sound the Charge*, 88. The original "Joint Resolution of the Nebraska State Legislature, 1870," is on display in the State (Capitol) Building in Lincoln, Nebraska. Copies of the resolution can be found in the Frank North Collection, Box 1, S2-F1, RG 2321 (formerly ms 0448), NSHS, Lincoln, Nebraska.

¹¹¹ Jack D. Filipiak, "The Battle of Summit Springs," *Colorado Magazine* 41 (1964), 343-354.

doing.” Although raids occurred occasionally in the years following the Republican River expedition, they would never “equal those of 1869 in either number or destruction.”¹¹²

¹¹² White, “Indian Raids on the Kansas Frontier,” 387-388.

CHAPTER EIGHT

FREELANCE SCOUTING OPERATIONS, 1870-1874

While the Pawnee Scouts were scouring the country in search of the Sioux and the Cheyennes with the Fifth Cavalry, changes were taking place at the Pawnee Agency. After assuming the presidency in 1869, Ulysses S. Grant set out to reform Indian policy. Shortly after his inauguration, he launched the "Peace Policy." The idea was to transfer the control of Indian agencies from civil appointees to religious denominations, who would attempt to re-socialize the American Indian and integrate them into American society by peaceful means. The underlying assumption was that religious denominations were less motivated by greed and self-interest and also less corrupt than agents of the old system. The new policy was also dubbed "Quaker Policy," as Quakers had been the principal advocates of the program. During the experimental phase of the new policy, Quakers also filled most of the positions as Indian agents on the Plains, including the Pawnee Agency.¹

By 1869 the Society of Friends, as the Quakers were known officially, consisted of two separate branches. Grant appointed the Orthodox branch of the society in charge of the Central Superintendency, which oversaw Indian agencies in Kansas and the Indian

Territory. The Hicksite branch of the society, meanwhile, was placed in charge of the Northern Superintendency, which consisted of the Indian agencies in Nebraska. The appointment of Quakers as agents and superintendents to the Indians in Nebraska had far-reaching consequences for the Pawnee tribe as a whole and the Pawnee Scouts in particular. Despite some dogmatic differences, the two branches of the society shared certain principles and attitudes towards Indians. Both sought the transformation of the Indian from “savages” to “civilized” subjects. Quakers believed that Indians should give up the hunt and their (semi) nomadic ways, abolish their tribal governments, surrender their ideas of communal property ownership, and, instead, adopt agriculture and allotment of their land as a prerequisite for civilization. But of more immediate concern for the continuation of the Pawnee Battalion was the Quaker adherence to pacifism, which was a fundamental element of their spiritual and religious philosophy. These ideas were not only at odds with Pawnee cultural norms and values, but with the social and political realities on the Plains as well. Although it was their intention to “uplift” and assist the Indians under their care, many of their policies in fact contributed to the decline of the Pawnee tribe.

In June 1869, sixty-eight year old Samuel M. Janney of the Hicksite branch of the Society of Friends assumed control of the Northern Superintendency in Omaha, while forty-one year old Jacob M. Troth arrived in Columbus to take over as agent of the Pawnee Agency. They faced enormous challenges. The Pawnees were hungry, impoverished, and demoralized as a result of diseases, the depleting buffalo resource, the

¹ Other denominations did not receive appointments until 1870. Clyde A. Milner II., *With Good Intentions: Quaker Work among the Pawnees, Otos, and Omahas in the 1870s* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982)

destruction of their crops by grasshoppers, and the constant pressures from the Sioux and hostile white settlers. Janney and Troth quickly identified the Sioux threat as one of the greatest obstacles to Pawnee advancement. Armed with good intentions, they outlined a three-step program to “save” the Indians under their care. They hoped to establish peace on the Plains by ending Pawnee horse raids, dismantling the Pawnee Scouts, and commencing peace negotiations with the Ogiala and Brule Sioux.²

The first test for the new policy came in January 1870, when a Pawnee warparty under *Uh-sah-wuck-oo-led-ee-hoor* (“Big Spotted Horse”)³ returned to the Pawnee Agency from a horse raid in the Indian Territory. On January 4, they had attacked a camp of peaceful Southern Cheyennes and Arapahos under Little Robe and Yellow Bear and captured over a hundred horses.⁴ When news of the Pawnee raid reached the headquarters of the Military Division of the Missouri in Chicago, General Philip H. Sheridan ordered General C. C. Augur to recover the stolen horses, arrest the thieves, “and confine them with ball and chain attached to their leg, at the nearest military Post, until further orders from these Headquarters.”⁵

While Superintendent Janney and Agent Troth supported Sheridan’s order wholeheartedly, General Augur was much less anxious to arrest the Pawnees and return the

² Milner, *With Good Intentions*, 38.

³ This is the spelling according to Luther North in Donald F. Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains: Recollections of Luther North, 1856-1882* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 138. In other places, Big Spotted Horse’s name is spelled *Esaue-Kedadeho*. Richard Henry Pratt, *Battlefield and Classroom: Four Decades with the American Indian* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964), 78.

⁴ The exact number of horses captured is not clear. According to Luther North the Pawnees brought in about 150 horses, but in a letter to Lt. General Philip Sheridan, Major General J. M. Schofield wrote that the Pawnees had captured 240 animals. Major General John M. Schofield to Lieutenant General Philip Sheridan, January 17, 1870, *Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-1881*, D 100, M 234, Roll 661, Pawnee Agency, 1859-1881 (Washington, D. C.: National Archives, 1956). Hereafter cited as *Letters Received*.

⁵ Lieutenant General Sheridan to Brevet Major General C. C. Augur, [January 19], 1870, *Letters Received*, Roll 661.

stolen horses to the Cheyennes. In a letter to Sheridan of March 17, Augur reported that the horse thieves were confined at Omaha Barracks and that he had confiscated the horses, but he also pleaded for leniency toward the prisoners:

In this connection I beg leave to state, that all the Indians engaged in this raid, have been faithful soldiers of ours in the past two or three summers, and have been of great service to us against the very Indians, from whom the horses were stolen, and I do not believe they were aware of any friendly relations having been established between the whites [and] those southern Indians. I am rather satisfied they thought they were doing an acceptable thing to the whites.

It has not been possible as yet to have [chains?] put upon them, and in view of what I have stated I respectfully recommend that I be not required to do so, [and] that generally their punishment be not severe. These Pawnees as I have stated before, have made us faithful [and] efficient soldiers, and hereafter may be very necessary to us, and the Chiefs are confident of their ability hereafter, to prevent any recurrence of such raids.⁶

On April 21, Augur released the six prisoners from Omaha Barracks. Agent Troth, meanwhile, made arrangements with Luther North and several Pawnees to escort the stolen horses to Fort Harker, Kansas, from where they would be returned to their rightful owners. The Pawnees claimed that many of the horses had died of “mysterious” ailments or had been stolen by the Sioux during the winter. When they delivered the horses to be returned to Fort Harker, only thirty-five sickly horses were left. Luther North and nine Pawnees, eight of whom had served as scouts in his company the previous year, drove the motley herd to the fort later that month. Among the Pawnee Scouts in North’s party were, *Sa-gule-ah-la-shar* (“Sun Chief”), Nick Koots, and *Pe-isk-ee-la-shar* (“Boy Chief,” also known as Peter Headman). A chief named *Co-rux-ta-puk* (“Fighting Bear”) also joined

⁶ Augur to Sheridan, March 17, 1870, *Letters Received*, Roll 661.

the escort. During the trip they met several white parties who regarded the Pawnees with great suspicion. Near Belleville, Kansas, they found themselves surrounded by a group of alarmed citizens who threatened to hang the Indians. After some strong language by Captain North, who showed them General Augur's letter of instructions, the Pawnees were allowed to continue their march. A few days later one of the Pawnees, while out riding alone, was arrested by some soldiers. But this incident was also resolved after intervention by North. Clearly, Kansas was a dangerous place for a small group of Indians, even if these Indians were allies of the United States.⁷

After delivering the horses to Fort Harker, the men returned to the Pawnee Agency. Most Indians traveled home on foot. One night they saw ten men lurking around their camp, probably intent on killing the entire party. Captain North moved his men out unseen and avoided unnecessary bloodshed. The following day, Sun Chief and Boy Chief challenged each other to a footrace back to the agency. They left the camp at dawn and only rested for short periods of time during the race. Sun Chief made the mistake of drinking too much water during one stop and thus lost the race to Boy Chief, who covered the distance of eighty-five miles to the agency in twelve hours (including a two-hour stop on the Blue River). The race serves as an excellent example of the remarkable endurance and physical condition of the Pawnees who served as scouts, even if Sun Chief made a tactical error during the race.⁸

⁷ Superintendent Janney to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Ely S. Parker, April 22, 1870, *Letters Received*, Roll 661. Milner, *With Good Intentions*, 39. During the march to Fort Harker, the scouts also met the brother of Susanna Alderice, the woman captive who had been killed during the Battle of Summit Springs. Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 139-142.

⁸ Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 143-146. Luther North received \$112 for his services as guide and interpreter during the march to Fort Harker. Janney to Parker, September 18, 1870, *Letters Received*, Roll 661.

Although the Pawnees had returned some of the stolen horses, their actions were not reciprocated when their enemies stole horses from *them*. Several Sioux raiding parties visited the Pawnees that spring and stole a number of ponies on several occasions. During a raid on May 19, they killed a woman and shot a man in the leg. The next day, agent Troth held a council with the chiefs, who were angry with the government's inability to protect them from the Sioux and for failing to have the Sioux return the stolen horses. They told Troth that they intended to avenge themselves upon the Sioux and recover their horses one way or another. Troth forbade them to raid the Sioux and promised to arrange a peace council with the Sioux chiefs in Washington to resolve all problems between the two nations. On June 22 Superintendent Janney met Oglala head chief Red Cloud in Omaha. Red Cloud rejected Janney's suggestion to meet with the Pawnees. He replied that the Pawnees "had once been one people with them, but had turned against them while they were contending for their rights [and] that they had joined the white soldiers [and] had killed many of the best men among the Sioux." Janney also contacted other Sioux chiefs in the area, including Spotted Tail of the Brules, but none of them expressed any serious interest in peace talks.⁹

Imprisoning the Pawnees for stealing horses from their archenemies and forcing them to return the horses was humiliating enough for the Pawnees. But the Quakers in charge of the tribe also insisted that the Pawnee Battalion be discontinued. In February 1870, Major Frank North had approached Agent Troth with the request to reorganize the Pawnee Scouts. Troth passed North's request on to Superintendent Janney but added that in his opinion their enlistment as scouts was harmful for the cause of bringing peace and

⁹ Troth to Janney, May 21, 1870 and Janney to Parker, June 22, 1870, and Agent DeWit C. Poole of the

civilization to the tribe. Janney agreed. In a letter to Commissioner Ely S. Parker of the Office of Indian Affairs, Janney listed his objections to the Pawnees serving as scouts for the army:

Agent Troth feels assured that it will be a great disadvantage to the young men and to the tribe to allow them to enlist.

They are found after being engaged in that service to be less tractable than the other Indians.

They associate with bad white men, [and] learn to drink [and] gamble, which unfits them for useful occupation and [sic] has an unfavorable effect on others.

The long standing feud between the Pawnees [and] the Sioux is by this means kept up [and] peaceable relations between them rendered almost impossible.

Agent Troth finds, on conversing with some of the most respectable of his white neighbors that they agree with him in sentiment on this subject.

The Pawnee chiefs earnestly desire that the enlistment of their young men may not be permitted; they say they wish them to stay at home [and] go to work as tillers of the soil.¹⁰

The case against the service of the Pawnees as scouts was rather farfetched. It is extremely doubtful that the Sioux would give up their raids against the Pawnees even if the Pawnee Battalion was disbanded permanently. Although the Pawnees were avid gamblers, and always had been, the record shows no evidence that they became more “prone” to drinking alcohol. On the contrary, during the thirteen-year period the Pawnee Battalion was in existence, the records shows no incidences of alcohol abuse by Indians while in the service of the United States army.

In one respect, however, the Quakers were correct. Service in the military did not speed up the process of assimilation as Generals Augur and Sherman had suggested in

Whetstone Agency to Janney, June 28, 1870, *Letters Received*, Roll 661.

1867. In fact, their service reinforced their martial values and gave them a sense of ethnic pride and self-esteem. Janney's observation that service made them "less tractable" was not completely imaginary. Many of the men joining the battalion were recent graduates of the agency school. Their exposure to white values in the classroom caused their alienation from the tribe. Service as a Pawnee Scout allowed them to gain status as warriors and be reintegrated into the tribe. In 1869, Elvira Platt, a teacher at the Pawnee Agency school, observed that a number of students faced great difficulties after leaving school. They felt they had no home, and the whites would not accept them. A few boys solved the problem by enlisting as scouts in the Pawnee Battalion and, thus, "reinstating themselves with their own people by becoming good warriors."¹¹

Commissioner Parker of the Indian Office adopted Janney's recommendations and informed the Secretary of War of his decision. When General Augur asked for permission to enlist the Pawnee Scouts for service, the War Department denied the request. Augur complained about this decision to General John Pope, who also hoped to enlist a number of scouts for operations along the Republican River. In a telegram to General Sherman on June 2, 1870, Pope wrote that "I need eight or ten very much as they are the only guides who know the country thoroughly, along the Upper Republican and Head waters of Saline and Solomon. Can I employ that number as guides for Woods and Custer who are moving

¹⁰ Janney to Parker, February 17, 1870, *Letters Received*, Roll 661.

¹¹ George E. Hyde, *The Pawnee Indians* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974), 302. Thomas W. Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States Army, 1860-90* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 153. Samuel Allis, a missionary to the Pawnees in the 1840s and 50s, complained that Pawnee boys quickly forgot everything they learned in school after they turned sixteen: "Although Indian children make good progress in reading, and especially in writing, it does them little good, as they leave the school and forget all they have learned, particularly the boys, for it is difficult to keep them in school after they are some sixteen years old. At that age they commence going to war. They establish their character as braves by stealing horses and killing their enemies." Samuel Allis, "Forty Years

on the Republican after Indians, the first with five the last with six troops of cavalry.” Adjutant General E. D. Townsend in Washington, however, informed Pope that as the “Indian Department has expressed the wish not to have Pawnees employed because of bad effects upon them [the] Secretary of War thinks it best not to use them as guides.”¹²

Pope and Augur were not the only ones who desired to employ the Pawnee Scouts. O. G. Hammond, Superintendent of the Union Pacific Railroad, also wished to hire the Pawnees to guard the railroad against Sioux and Cheyenne war parties. Hammond wrote House Representative Oakes Ames, a strong supporter of the railroad, to use his influence in the government to overturn the Indian Office’s decision to disband the Pawnee Battalion. Hammond’s letter to Ames is worthwhile to print in full, since it reveals some of the company’s view of the value of the Pawnee Scouts:

Union Pacific Railroad Company
General Superintendent’s Office
Omaha, Neb. June 20th, 1870

Hon. Oakes Ames, M. C.

Dear Sir:

The Indians are bad. From all demonstrations there is more danger from them this year than ever before.

They have fired upon our trains once, have piled ties on the track. Genl. Carr telegraphs this morning as follows. “Fort McPherson, June 18/’70. Indian warparties are appearing in the vicinity of Ogalalla. Genl. Carr thinks the stations along the line should be notified, as they may appear at other points. Wm. Forbush Lt. A. A. G. M.”

General Augur and his staff at these H’d Qrs. agree that the danger is more imminent now, judging from all signs which characterize the movements of Indians than ever before.

The object of this letter is to get influences with the Government to permit the enlistment of Pawnee Scouts, so called, being a portion of the Pawnees near Columbus on the line.

These scouts have been enlisted and served in this work for two summers, as I understand, and are and have been so efficient as scouts that the military authorities think them indispensable.

Among the Indians and on the Eastern Borders of Nebraska,” *Transactions and Reports of the Nebraska State Historical Society* 2 (1887), 159.

¹² Pope to Sherman, June 2, 1870, *Letters Received*, Roll 661.

They will go further in the same time than white soldiers, will go where white soldiers cannot, and have so much experience that they can trace the most intricate movements of the enemy and give notice of hostile parties, always in advance of any information otherwise obtained.

I understand that the cost of a campaign of these scouts is but a trifle. Their employment is opposed by the Quaker influence under their Eutopian [sic] notions of philanthropy. They have charge of these Pawnees, but they had been whipped long ago by the military, and are peacefully inclined.

The Quaker here in charge cannot keep them on their reservation and has appealed to us to forbid them riding on trains, freight trains, which they sometimes do.^[13]

The Quaker argument is two-fold.

First they say that the enlistment of their young men makes the whole number dissatisfied, whereas their employment furnishes them a living and some money to aid their friends and is therefore thought desirable by their tribe.

Second that the Sioux and other Indians on the war path are rendered worse by their enlistment. That they are greatly aggravated by the employment of Indians against Indians.

The truth is just the reverse. The two summers that scouts have been employed, have been passed with little trouble from the Indians. The present prospects are that a much larger and more determined body of Indians are arrayed against us. It is believed that the refusal of the Government to employ these scouts has emboldened them.

The danger to us is of such magnitude that I am asked to run trains through (400) four hundred miles of the road only in the day time.

If you would aid us you must act promptly in this matter. We all, military and citizens, expect trouble from Red Cloud, instead of peace. Surely we have enough now.

Since writing the above, [I] have seen Genl. Augur, commanding this Department, who says that a letter written by Janney, the Quaker Commissioner, last February to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and by him transmitted, through the Secretary of the Interior to the War Dept. was the cause of the order not to employ the scouts this year. That he, Augur, thinks it a matter of economy to have them, and that it is desirable for the service; that he has all the ponies now on hand that these scouts had last year, and that it will cost nothing but their pay, which, last year, was about \$18,000.00.

Genl. Augur cannot of course, write an official letter asking for these scouts, since the order he received, unless he is asked by authority. If Janney's letter is shown to you, you will see that he charges drinking and demoralization upon the young men who enlist, which Genl. Augur most emphatically denies.

With great respect, I am
Your obedt servant
O. G. Hammond
Genl. Supt.¹⁴

¹³ On May 31, Agent Troth reported that the Pawnees and the neighboring whites did not get along well. In order to prevent difficulties between Indians and whites, Troth requested the authorities of Platte County "to arrest as vagrants all Indians found off this Reservation without a pass and lodge them in jail and let me know and I will send for them." Janney approved of Troth's measure, and on June 23, wrote to Commissioner Parker that the Pawnees were allowed to travel freely to Omaha by train "in such numbers as to be troublesome, [and] the mayor of Omaha has complained to me about it." Janney instructed Troth to send two chiefs and two "policemen" to Omaha to gather up the Pawnees in Omaha and Council Bluffs. On June 30, Janney reported that the Pawnees had returned to the agency. "An effort will be made," Janney wrote to Parker, "to keep them at home hereafter." Troth to Janney, May 31, 1870; Janney to Parker, June 23, 1870; Janney to Parker, June 30, 1870, *Letters Received*, Roll 661.

Hammond's letter to Ames appears to have had the desired effect. But the wheels of the bureaucracy in Washington, then as now, turned slowly. The Pawnee Battalion would not be reorganized until September, and it was limited to two companies only. In the meantime, however, a few individual Pawnees served as "freelance" scouts and guides, but they did so only for non-military purposes. In June 1870, Major Frank North and two Pawnee Scouts joined Professor Othniel Charles Marsh's scientific expedition to the western Plains.

O. C. Marsh (1831-1899) received his degree from Yale University. As an adherent of Darwin's theory of evolution he was fascinated with extinct animal species, whose fossilized remains he collected. He pioneered the field of paleontology, and in 1866 Marsh's uncle, millionaire George Peabody, founded the Peabody Museum of Natural History at Yale with a gift of \$150,000. That same year, Marsh was appointed professor of paleontology at Yale. In August 1868, he traveled to Chicago to attend a meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. At the close of the meeting, he joined an excursion to Omaha and to the end of the Union Pacific Railroad. During the trip he became interested in the geological features of the Plains and obtained some fossilized animal bones. He determined to return to continue the search for extinct animal species. After Peabody's death in 1869, Marsh received a substantial inheritance that would allow him to put his ideas into practice. In 1870 he announced his plans for a scientific expedition to the western Plains and Rocky Mountains. The expedition would consist of Marsh and a team of students. Among the first to join Marsh's team was a young student named George Bird Grinnell, whose experiences during the trip would

¹⁴ A copy of Hammond's letter to Oakes Ames was sent to the Office of Indian Affairs, June 27, 1870,

spark his life long interest in Indian cultures. During the expedition Grinnell would also meet Major Frank North and some Pawnee Scouts, which would lay the foundation for his history of the Pawnee Battalion. Apart from Marsh and Grinnell, the members of the expedition consisted of Charles T. Ballard, Harry Degen Ziegler, Alexander Hamilton Ewing, John Wool Griswold, John Reed Nicholson, Charles McCormick Reeve, James Matson Russell, Henry Bradford Sargent, James W. Wadsworth (who would later serve two terms representative of the State of New York in Congress), Eli Whitney (the grandson of the inventor of the cotton gin), and Charles Wyllys Betts, who published an account of the expedition in the October edition of *Harper's New Monthly Magazine* in 1871.¹⁵

General William Sherman wrote a letter of introduction granting Marsh access to all military posts, and General Philip Sheridan promised to provide them with military escorts while the expedition was in the field. Officials of the Union Pacific Railroad were also interested in Marsh's undertaking and drastically reduced the train fares for the members of the expedition. On June 30, 1870, they left New Haven. In Omaha, they received some arms and instructions how to use their Henry rifles, since the expedition would take them into hostile Indian territory. A few days later they traveled by train to North Platte Station, and from there marched to Fort McPherson. Shortly after their arrival at the fort, they were reminded of the dangerous nature of their mission. A party of

Letters Received, Roll 661.

¹⁵ For a good biography of Marsh see Charles Schuchert and Clara Mae LeVene, *O. C. Marsh, Pioneer in Paleontology* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1940). Harry Degen Ziegler also published an account of Marsh's expedition in the *New York Weekly Herald*, Dec. 24, 1870.

hunters had just come in after a skirmish with several hostile Indians. One of the men had received an arrow through the arm.¹⁶

General Eugene Asa Carr welcomed Marsh and his students at the fort and began preparations for the expedition. Carr ordered some troops of Company I, Fifth Cavalry, under command of Lieutenant Bernard Reilly, Jr., and Second Lieutenant Earl D.

~~Thomas, to accompany the scientists.~~ A day or two later, Major Frank North and two Pawnee Scouts arrived at the post. Carr assigned them to guide the expedition to the Loup Fork River. Marsh and his students were taken to a corral where they selected their horses from the herd that had been captured from Tall Bull's camp the previous summer. According to Grinnell, there were some "amusing scenes when these young men, many of whom had never mounted a horse, attempted to ride." Fortunately, most of the horses were quite gentle and did not try to throw off their riders.¹⁷

On July 15, the expedition left Fort McPherson. Major North and the two scouts led the command. The scouts rode about a mile in advance of the column. According to expedition member Charles Betts, the scouts, "with movements characteristic of their wary race, crept up each high bluff, and from behind a bunch of grass peered over the top for signs of hostile savages." Following the scouts were Lieutenants Reilly and Thomas and the Yale party. Although they were in hostile country, some of the students were disposed to wander off from the group, much to the chagrin of professor Marsh who "was obliged to use strong language, and to summon to his aid Major North before he could

¹⁶ John F. Reiger, ed., *The Passing of the Great West: Selected Papers of George Bird Grinnell* (New York: Winchester Press, 1972), 32-33.

¹⁷ Charles Wyllys Betts, "The Yale College Expedition of 1870," *Harper's New Monthly Magazine* 43 (October 1871), 663. Reiger, *Passing of the Great West*, 33-34. George F. Price, *Accross the the Continent*

keep the party together and with the escort.” Buffalo Bill also joined the expedition on the first day. At the rear of the column, a small detachment of troops escorted six army wagons loaded with provisions, forage, tents, and ammunition.¹⁸

Grinnell was fascinated by the two Indian scouts. The name of the oldest scout was *Tucky-tee-lous*. Major North explained that the name meant “The Duellist” or “When He Being Alone Meets A Sioux Alone And They Both Shoot.” *Tucky-tee-lous* was a celebrated warrior. The name of the younger scout was *La-hoor-a-sac*, or “Best One Of All.” He was best known for his skills as a hunter.¹⁹ Grinnell described the appearance of the two Indians:

When we first saw them they were clothed simply with moccasins, breech clouts and a blanket apiece, but before starting they were fitted out with a full suit of cavalry clothes, and although they were very proud and went around pointing to themselves and saying “heap o’ good,” it was easy to see that they were very uncomfortable. As soon as we got away from the fort, they took off everything but their shirts and pantaloons and packed them carefully away and did not take them out again until we got back. . . . Just before reaching the fort, they dressed up again [and] came in, in all their finery.

They wore their hair long and had their scalp locks neatly braided, and sometimes they would decorate them with a piece of bright colored cloth or a feather.²⁰

With the Fifth Cavalry (New York: Antiquarian Press, 1959), 614. Louis A. Holmes, *Fort McPherson, Nebraska: Guardian of the Tracks and Trails* (Lincoln, NE: Johnsen Publishing Company, 1963), 42.

¹⁸ Betts, “The Yale College Expedition of 1870,” 663. Reiger, *Passing of the Great West*, 34.

¹⁹ According to Schuchert and LeVene the proper spelling of the names of the two scouts was *Tuck-he-ge-louhs* and *La-oodle-sock*. Schuchert and LeVene, O. C. Marsh, *Pioneer in Paleontology*, 102. The register of enlistments of the Pawnee Indian Scouts for 1870, lists two Indians named *La-hoo-re-sock* (“Head Warrior”) and *Tuck-it-te-louks* (“Alone to War”). “Register of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914,” M 233, Roll 70, Volume 150, “1866-1873, Indian Scouts,” (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1956), n. p.

²⁰ Reiger, *Passing of the Great West*, 35-36.

While thirst and heat plagued the young scientists, professor Marsh lectured on the strange geological formations along the trail. Marsh's discourse puzzled the soldiers accompanying the expedition and prompted Buffalo Bill to say that the "professor told the boys some mighty tough yarns to-day." On July 17, the scouts guided the expedition across the Dismal River and on to the Middle Fork of the Loup River. Here, they stumbled on several Sioux burial sites. The bodies of the dead Indians had been wrapped in robes and blankets and had been placed on scaffolds. The corpses were adorned in beads, bracelets, and face-paint. One scalpless brave clutched a rusty shotgun and a pack of cards in his crumbling hands. At the foot of the scaffold lay the remains of a pony, killed during the funeral service to accompany the dead on their journey to the afterworld. Professor Marsh brought the awestruck students back to reality when he announced "Well, boys, perhaps they died of small-pox; but we can't study the origin of the Indian race unless we have those skulls!" Unfortunately, the sources do not reveal if Marsh took the skulls with him back to Connecticut or if he placed them back on the scaffolds. Nor do they reveal how the Pawnees reacted to the desecration of the graves. They were probably bewildered by the professor's peculiar interest in the skulls of their enemies, but it is unlikely that they voiced any complaint.²¹ In January 1871, Frank North received a letter from Professor Marsh asking if it was possible to send him the two Indian skulls the expedition had found at Bird Wood Creek during the previous summer. North answered that "had I known two weeks ago that you wanted them I should have got them with pleasure," but he had disbanded the Pawnee Battalion a few days earlier and it would be

²¹ Betts, "The Yale College Expedition of 1870," 664-665.

impossible for him to gather the skulls now. However, North promised to send Marsh some skulls from “some of [the] other tribes if I have an opportunity.”²²

A few days later, the Pawnee Scouts guided the expedition to a rocky canyon littered with fossilized bones. Lieutenant Reilly posted guards around the site, and the scientists began to unearth the remains of extinct animals. The soldiers not only guarded the men against hostile Indians, who appeared to be lurking around, but also assisted in the hard work of collecting specimens. The Pawnees initially refused to assist. They claimed that the petrified bones belonged to an extinct race of giants who had been destroyed in a great flood because they had insulted *Tirawahut* (the Great Spirit). But after Marsh picked up a fossilized jaw of a horse and showed how it corresponded with the mouths of their own horses, the Pawnees joined the hunt for bones. Betts reported that “they rarely returned to camp without bringing fossils for the ‘Bone Medicine-man.’”²³

After securing a large number of fossils, the expedition resumed its journey. Every day Major North took one of the students with him to hunt for fresh meat. There was plenty of game around, but none of the inexperienced scientists killed anything because they knew nothing of hunting or rifle shooting. One day they spotted a herd of antelope. Although they “unloaded” their guns at the animals, they managed to kill only one fawn. Obviously, the expedition members were better skilled at hunting petrified animals.

²² Frank North to O. C. Marsh, January 5, 1871. A copy of this letter can be found in “The Robert Bruce ‘Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts’ Papers,” Department of Special Collections, McFarlin Library, University of Tulsa, Oklahoma, Box 1, File 2. The collection hereafter will be referred to as “Robert Bruce Papers,” with the appropriate box and file number.

²³ Betts, “The Yale College Expedition of 1870,” 664. George Bird Grinnell, “Pawnee Mythology,” *Journal of American Folk-Lore* 6 (1893), 121-122.

Fortunately, Major North and the Pawnee Scouts were around to keep the expedition supplied with fresh meat.²⁴

On July 21, clouds of smoke appeared in the sky, and a prairie fire inched its way toward the expedition. It appeared that the fire had been set by Indians intent on stealing the horses belonging to the expedition. They hoped that the fire would disorient the troops and scare the ponies away. For a short time the situation looked serious, but a sudden thunder storm and changing winds brought relief. Despite the obvious signs that Indians were near, they were left unmolested for the remainder of the trip. Only once did the members of the expedition see an Indian in the distance. Grinnell, who at this time still shared the prejudices against Indians so characteristic of his age, wrote to his parents with some disappointment that “Only one Indian was seen [in range] and no one was able to get a shot at him.”²⁵

The members of the expedition spent most evenings around campfires. Professor Marsh lectured on a variety of subjects, and occasionally the Pawnees entertained the scientists with one of their dances. Grinnell recalled the scene in his memoirs.

They were jolly fellows, both of them, and they would sing and dance for us frequently. There were not enough to have a war dance, but La-hoo-a-sac gave us the buffalo dance one night while Tucky-tee-lous sang.

The last night in camp we had a good deal of fun. We all put on our blankets and marched in single file to the Indian tent, where we sat in a circle and smoked the pipe of peace. Then the major made a speech in Pawnee, La-hoor-a-sac answered him, and then Reeve, one of our fellows, made a stump speech to the Indians which, as they did not understand

²⁴ See also George Bird Grinnell, “An Old-Time Bone Hunt,” *Natural History* 23 (New York: American Museum of Natural History, 1923), 329-336.

²⁵ Betts, “The Yale College Expedition of 1870,” 666. Reiger, *Passing of the Great West*, 35.

English, delighted them. . . . They sang the buffalo song, . . . we sang some college songs, and then the council broke up.²⁶

On July 26 they started the return trip to Fort McPherson across a desert-like country. They obtained water by digging in the dry bed of an alkaline lake. After two days of travel in scorching temperatures, they finally reached the North Platte River. On reaching the Platte, the Pawnees led the command across the treacherous quicksands and announced their arrival at the town of North Platte with a typical Pawnee whoop. Charles Betts recalled that the townspeople of North Platte “mistook us for a party of Sioux, and [they] rose in arms to repel the invaders.” On July 29, they arrived at Fort McPherson.²⁷

Professor Marsh and his students soon boarded a train west, where they went on two more scientific excursions that resulted in several other spectacular discoveries, including the complete skeleton of a dinosaur. Major North and the two Pawnee Scouts did not join them. Most likely, they returned to the Pawnee Agency. Although the Marsh expedition did not involve the entire Pawnee Battalion, or result in any clashes with hostile Indians, it was a significant event. Marsh’s expedition was the first of its kind in the West. He returned to Yale with a great number of fossils of as yet unidentified extinct species. The expedition greatly advanced the science of paleontology, and two Pawnee Scouts had played an important part in this chapter of American scientific development.

While Major North, *Tucky-tee-lous*, and *La-hoor-a-sac* were with Marsh’s expedition, lobbyists for the Union Pacific Railroad in Washington had obtained clearance to employ the Pawnee Battalion. Instead of the desired four companies, however, the Indian Office only allowed two companies to enlist. On September 4, 1870,

²⁶ Reiger, *Passing of the Great West*, 36.

Frank North and Captain Litchfield mustered in the two companies at Columbus. Luther North commanded Company A. He was assisted by First Lieutenants James F. Smith and Jay E. White, and Company Sergeant Ira Mullen. Several Pawnees also held non-commissioned ranks. Company A totaled about fifty officers and men.²⁸ Captain Sylvanus E. Cushing commanded Company B, Pawnee Scouts.

After drawing their arms and uniforms at Fort McPherson they received their marching orders on September 8. Their assignment was once again to guard the Union Pacific Railroad. Luther North's Company A, received orders to relieve Company F of the Fifth Cavalry at Plum Creek. Captain Cushing's B Company, meanwhile, was to march to O'Fallon's Station, where they would relieve Company M, Fifth Cavalry. Major Frank North, finally was ordered to establish his headquarters at O'Fallon's Station. He received instructions to "visit and inspect all portions of his Command once every two weeks and make a written report" to the district headquarters at Fort McPherson.²⁹

Despite the alarming reports by O. G. Hammond and other railroad officials earlier that year, their service along the U. P. R. R. in 1870 was quite uneventful. Detachments of Pawnee Scouts patrolled the area north and south of the tracks, but found no hostiles. In October, General Carr ordered Luther North and Company A to Fort McPherson to join an expedition into the Republican River country. Several gentlemen from Syracuse, New York, and a few Englishmen accompanied the expedition. Although

²⁷ Betts, "The Yale College Expedition of 1870," 666.

²⁸ A copy of the muster roll of Company A, Pawnee Scouts, 1870, can be found in "The Robert Bruce Papers," Box 2, File 9.

²⁹ A copy of Special Order 51, Headquarters District of the Republican, can be found in "Robert Bruce Papers," Box 2, File 9. See also Holmes, *Fort McPherson, Nebraska*, 42. See also "Returns From U. S. Military Posts, 1800-1916," NARS M. 617, Roll 708, "Fort McPherson, Nebraska, January 1866-December 1872" (Washington, D. C.: National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1965), September, 1870.

the purpose was to search for hostile Indians, Carr and his guests entertained themselves primarily with hunting buffalo and other game.³⁰

In December, Frank North took twenty-five men from Captain Cushing's company to escort a hunting party composed of several railroad officials, a few army officers, and other distinguished gentlemen. Among the guests was James Wolcott Wadsworth, who had been a member of Professor Marsh's expedition earlier that year.

Wadsworth would later serve two consecutive terms in the House of Representatives in Washington, D. C., and his son eventually became a U. S. Senator from the state of New York. Luther North also joined the party. Despite the cold weather the Pawnee Scouts guided the party to the buffalo grounds. They frequently carried their distinguished guests across icy rivers. Luther North recalled that his brother, as a prank, ordered one of his scouts in Pawnee to "fall down" and drop the man he was carrying on his back in the cold water. The order was promptly obeyed. During one hunt, William Cody impressed everyone by shooting sixteen buffalo with sixteen shots while mounted on an untrained horse. This feat earned him the admiration of Luther North and the Pawnees. The

³⁰ During one hunt, William Cody and Luther North played a prank on Mr. McCarthy, one of the English guests in the party. They decided to have the Pawnees "ambush" the unsuspecting visitor. In his memoirs, Cody described the incident as follows: "I had informed North at about what time we would be on Deer Creek, and it was agreed that he should appear in the vicinity with some of his Pawnees, who were to throw their blankets around them, and come dashing down upon us, firing and whooping in true Indian style; while he [North] was either to conceal or disguise himself. This programme was faithfully and completely carried out. I had been talking about Indians to McCarthy, and he had become considerably excited, when just as we turned a bend of the creek, we saw not half a mile from us about twenty Indians, who instantly started for us on a gallop, firing their guns and yelling at the top of their voices. 'McCarthy, shall we dismount and fight, or run?' said I. He didn't wait to reply, but wheeling his horse, started at full speed down the creek, losing his hat and dropping his gun, away he went, never once looking back to see if he was being pursued. I tried to stop him by yelling at him and saying that it was all right, as the Indians were Pawnees. Unfortunately he did not hear me, but kept straight on, not stopping his horse until he reached the camp." William F. Cody, *The Life of Hon. William F. Cody, Known as Buffalo Bill, the Famous Hunter, Scout, and Guide: An Autobiography* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978), 290-291. Interestingly, Luther North gives a totally different account of this event. According to North, Cody never informed him about

gentlemen in the party also shot their share of buffalo. Usually the Pawnees drove the animals in the direction of the inexperienced hunters.³¹ Later that month the Pawnee Battalion gathered at Fort McPherson, where it was disbanded on December 31.³²

Although their service during 1870 had been brief and had not resulted in clashes with hostile Indians, Agent Jacob M. Troth believed that the enlistment of the scouts had nevertheless provoked and angered the Sioux. In February 1871, Troth wrote to Superintendent Janney that the Sioux raids on the Pawnee reservation the previous year began only after Major North organized the scouts. In order to prevent future Sioux retaliations against the Pawnees, Troth suggested that the Indian Office should not authorize the reorganization of the battalion. Superintendent Janney endorsed Troth's recommendations in his report to Commissioner Parker.³³

The Pawnee Battalion would not be reorganized in 1871. In April General Augur informed the Office of Indian Affairs that he would not enlist the Pawnees for service this year. Augur's decision probably had more to do with the fact that the Indians had been quiet during the previous year than with the objections of the Quakers to the enlistment of the Pawnees. Nevertheless, Augur's decision greatly pleased Janney and Troth. They believed that the employment of the scouts was an obstacle in their efforts to effect a peace between the Pawnees and the Sioux. Since December 1870, they had tried to arrange a meeting between the two tribes. They received the full support and cooperation

the prank. In fact, there were no Indians near at all. Cody simply started yelling "Indians" and scared McCarthy off. Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 147-148.

³¹ Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 149-150.

³² "Register of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914," M 233, Roll 70, Volume 150, "1866-1873, Indian Scouts," (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1956), n. p. Major Benjamin Alvord, Paymaster, paid the scouts at McPherson. "Returns From U. S. Military Posts, 1800-1916," NARS M. 617, Roll 708, "Fort McPherson, Nebraska, January 1866-December 1872" (Washington, D. C.: National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1965), December, 1870.

of the Pawnee chiefs for their plan. The Brules and Oglalas, however, appeared much less interested in a cessation of hostilities between the two tribes. They effectively stalled all attempts by the Quakers to arrange for a meeting. Although Spotted Tail of the Brules time and again expressed his desire and commitment to peace, he did little to prevent his young warriors from organizing war parties into Pawnee territory. Still, the prospects of peace seemed favorable in the spring of 1871. The Pawnees agreed to meet with Spotted Tail at the Santee Agency in northeastern Nebraska. But as they prepared to meet the Brule chief, they received news that Spotted Tail had called the meeting off. Spotted Tail explained that a peace with the Pawnees might upset the other Sioux bands.³⁴ Spotted Tail proved to be a masterful diplomat. He not only stalled the peace process with the Pawnees without appearing openly hostile, but by doing so he also prevented the reorganization of the Pawnee Battalion. That summer, the Sioux killed three women and two boys during raids on the Pawnee Agency. The boys were students of the Pawnee manual labor school. Rather than questioning the effectiveness of his policy of reconciliation, Agent Troth rested comfortably in the thought that “we have the satisfaction of believing they [the students] were prepared for the sad change.”³⁵

In the fall of 1871, Superintendent Janney retired and was replaced by Barclay White. White, who was also a member of the Hicksite branch of the Society of Friends, adopted the policy of his predecessor to discourage the employment of Pawnees as army scouts. Anticipating a request from the War Department to enlist the scouts, he wrote a

³³ Janney to Commissioner Parker, February 23, 1871, *Letters Received*, Roll 661.

³⁴ Janney to Parker, Feb 23, March 2, April 11, April 24, 1871, *Letters Received*, Roll 661. David Wishart, *An Unspeakable Sadness: The Dispossession of the Nebraska Indians* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 192-193.

³⁵ Troth to Janney, September 8, 1871, *ARCIA* 1871, 453.

letter to newly appointed Commissioner of Indian Affairs F. A. Walker. White referred to Janney's report of February 17, 1870, in which Janney listed his objections to the service of the scouts. "[It] represents the subject and situations accurately as it is at the present time, contains my views, and is as definite as anything I could write." In other words, like Janney, White believed that military service would have a demoralizing effect on the Pawnees and obstruct the peace process with the Sioux. As a result of White's position, the Pawnee Battalion would not be reorganized for 1872.³⁶

White also refused to allow the Pawnees to join exhibitions and "Wild West shows." The reputation of the Pawnee Scouts as fierce Indian fighters for Uncle Sam had spread around the country. Some enterprising individuals hoped to capitalize on their accomplishments and display some of the scouts at public exhibits. In June 1872, White received a request from a Mr. Sidney Barnett of Niagara Falls, Canada, to send him some Pawnee Indians for a buffalo hunt exhibition. Earlier that month, Barnett had traveled to Nebraska where he had captured some buffalos. While there, he had also made arrangements with Major Frank North and Captain Fred Matthews to have five Pawnees take part in the hunt. Barnett arranged for the transport of the Indians and their horses and had begun advertising the event when he received notice from Agent Troth that the Pawnees under no circumstances would be allowed to leave the reservation to perform in his exhibit. Barnett appealed to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and even President Grant, but all his pleas were rejected. "I never knew that any law of the United States prevented the Indians leaving their homes to travel into civilized countries," a desperate Barnett wrote Grant on July 18, 1872; "I was always under the impression that such travel

³⁶ White to Commissioner Walker, March 29, 1872, *Letters Received*, Roll 661.

under proper persons [and] restrictions must be beneficial to the Indians tending to enlighten [and] civilize them. Had I been aware of any law or regulation preventing them from leaving their homes I should not have incurred the large expenditures I have.” But neither the Commissioner nor the President would budge.³⁷

Several months later, White received a similar request from several eastern businessmen and William Cody. Cody and his partners wished to take six Pawnees on a five-week tour of Philadelphia, New York, and Chicago. Although the consortium offered to pay for the Indians’ expenses, the Office of Indian Affairs again refused to grant permission. Superintendent White, following Quaker doctrine, explained that he disapproved of exhibitions that “encourage the Indians to continue or practice any of their savage customs, or of placing them under the care of any persons, who will not be to them Christian examples in every respect.”³⁸

The Quaker administrators had successfully blocked the reorganization of the Pawnee Battalion. Keeping Pawnee war parties from raiding the southern tribes for horses and preventing the tribe from going on its annual buffalo hunts proved to be a different matter altogether. The Quakers objected to the tribal hunts because they thwarted their

³⁷ Barnett to Commissioner Walker, June 20, 1872; A. A. Porter (Barnett’s lawyer) to Commissioner Walker, July 3, 1870; Barnett to General Porter, Secretary of President Grant, July 18, 1872. *Letters Received*, Roll 661.

³⁸ White to Walker, December 5, 1872, *Letters Received*, Roll 661. In 1872, the Office of Indian Affairs also received its first pension requests from several widows of deceased scouts. In September 1872, a number of Pawnee women, whose husbands had died while serving as scouts in the army, wrote the Department of the Interior requesting pension benefits. *Stah-roo-kah-wah-har*’s husband, *Tuck-oo-wu-to-roo* (“The Man That Strikes the Enemy”), Second Sergeant in Company A, had died at Fort Kearney on March 20, 1865. *Chuck-ih-tah-ra-shah* applied for a pension as the widow of *Ow-wih-toosh* (“First To Run”), a Corporal in Company A, who had died of consumption at Julesburg, Colorado territory on June 20, 1865. *Stah-roo*’s husband, Private *Kah-hah-liens* (“Little Ears”), had died of an accidental gunshot wound during Connor’s campaign on August 18, 1865. For *Stah-roo-kah-wah-[hoo]* the request came too late. A month after the Pension Office received her application she had also died. Commissioner [J. A. Barth/Barker] of the Pension Office of the Department of the Interior to the Commissioner of Indian

efforts at turning the Indians into sedentary farmers. Furthermore, during their long absences from the agency while chasing buffalo near the Republican River, the Indians would be “free from agency control and free to live in the old way without interference.” Finally, the Quakers feared that the Pawnees might clash with the Sioux on the open Plains and negate whatever advancements had been made in the peace process. Nevertheless, the chiefs insisted on going on their summer and winter hunts, as their food resources were low and the survival of their people depended on them.³⁹

In 1872, at the insistence of the chiefs, Agent Troth allowed the tribe to go on its annual summer hunt. He hired John Burwell Omohundro, also known as “Texas Jack,” to act as trail agent for the Indians. It was Omohundro’s task to prevent confrontations between the Indians and the white settlers who had been moving into the Republican River area. To avoid being mistaken for hostile Indians by the U. S. Army, the Pawnees carried four white flags, three by four feet large, and with a large “P” in the center to identify them. Shortly after the Pawnees left the agency, Luther North and George Bird Grinnell joined them. The expedition was a great success. The hunters killed several thousand buffaloes and did not encounter any Sioux. After several months on the trail, the Pawnees returned to the reservation. Later that year the tribe went on its winter hunt. This time, however, the Sioux were near. A large war party of Brules and “Cut-off Oglalas,” attacked the Pawnee hunting camp and stole a great number of their horses. The Pawnees

Affairs, September 2, September 5, and September 13, 1872 and Agent Troth to Superintendent White, October 8, 1872. *Letters Received*, Roll 661.

³⁹ Paul D. Riley, “The Battle of Massacre Canyon,” *Nebraska History* 54 (Summer 1973), 224.

were forced to abort the hunt and abandon most of the meat and skins they had collected.⁴⁰

In 1873, a number of Pawnees once again expressed their desire to go on the summer hunt. Agent William Burgess, who had replaced Agent Jacob Troth, reluctantly gave his permission since he thought it was a necessary step to prevent starvation. As trail agent, Burgess appointed twenty-three year old John W. Williamson, the agency farmer. Williamson received orders "to use all precaution to guard [the Pawnees against] any predatory raids [and] incursions by their enemies." On July 3, 1873, between 350 and 400 Pawnees under *Ti-ra-wa-hut Re-sa-ru* ("Sky Chief") left the agency to go on the hunt. Among the Indians were several former scouts, including *Ku-ruks-ra-wa-ri* ("Traveling Bear").⁴¹ After several successful hunts along the Republican River the Pawnees turned north and began the journey back home. Although a number of white hunters warned that they had seen Sioux Indians lurking in the area, Sky Chief ignored their warnings and decided to push on. His men had found no sign indicating that hostile Indians were near. According to one account, the military authorities also assured the Pawnees that there was no danger. But the Sioux were indeed near. A large band of Brules supplemented by a group of Cut-off Oglalas had been trailing the Pawnee hunters for several days and were intent on attacking the Pawnees. On August 5, while their agent stood passively by, the Sioux attacked the Pawnee camp. The surprise was complete. Although greatly outnumbered, the Pawnee warriors put up a brave stand. After several hours of relentless

⁴⁰ Riley, "The Battle of Massacre Canyon," 225-230. Luther North and George Bird Grinnell left excellent accounts of the summer hunt of 1872. See Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 170-173, Reiger, ed., *The Passing of the Great West*, 57-72, and Ornis (George Bird Grinnell), "Buffalo Hunt With the Pawnees," *Forest and Stream* 1, (New York, December 25, 1873), 1-2.

fighting, at least sixty-nine Pawnees lay dead. Agent Burgess later determined that twenty men, thirty-nine women, and ten children had died. According to unofficial sources, however, the death toll was much higher. Mutilated corpses littered the battle site. According to one account, Sky Chief killed his own infant son rather than have him killed and mutilated by the Sioux. Sky Chief himself died while defending his people. Traveling Bear, the Pawnee Scout and hero of Summit Springs, survived the battle despite severe injuries. The Sioux killed his family and left him for dead at the canyon. When a Sioux returned to take his scalp, Traveling Bear wrested the knife away from him and killed him. After a long and difficult march, he eventually reached the Pawnee Agency where he died a few months later. According to some sources he died of grief.⁴²

Some scholars suggested that the tragedy at Massacre Canyon was a major turning point in the history of the tribe.⁴³ Undoubtedly, the event was a major factor in the decision of a number of Pawnees to leave Nebraska and move to the Indian Territory to live with their kinsmen, the Wichitas. But the tragedy at Massacre Canyon was only one episode in a long line of disastrous events that had devastated the Pawnee tribe since the 1830s. Apart from the Sioux threat, diseases continued to weaken the tribe. Overhunting depleted the buffalo resources. Drought and grasshoppers destroyed crops, and, in the

⁴¹ It appears that this is the same man as *Co-rux-ah-kah-wah-de*, who was present at the battle of Summit Springs in 1869.

⁴² The battle of Massacre canyon has been the subject of a fair number of works. Paul D. Riley, "The Battle of Massacre Canyon," *Nebraska History* 54 (Summer 1973), 221-249, presents a good overview. Garland James Blaine and Martha Royce Blaine, "Pa-re-su A-ri-ra-ke: The Hunters That Were Massacred," *Nebraska History* 58 (Fall 1977), 342-358, adds the Pawnee perspective and provides a different account of the event. Trail Agent John W. Williamson published his memoirs of the event under the title *The Battle of Massacre Canyon: The Unfortunate Ending of the Last Buffalo Hunt of the Pawnees* (Trenton, NE: Republican Leader, 1922). Unfortunately, Williamson's account, written half a century after the fact contains many errors and discrepancies. In 1935, the *Nebraska History Magazine* 16, devoted an entire issue to the battle. The issue includes official accounts, correspondence, a historical overview by Addison E. Sheldon, and a discussion of the dedication of the Massacre Canyon Memorial in 1930.

⁴³ George E. Hyde, *The Pawnee Indians* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 316.

absence of adequate rations and the dwindling buffalo supply, caused hunger and poverty. As the keepers of the medicine bundles died at alarming rates, the knowledge of the sacred rites passed away with them. Without the knowledge to revitalize the tribe, the Pawnees experienced a spiritual demoralization. Settlers pillaged the Pawnee reserve of valuable timber and scared off game. Quaker policies undermined the authority of the Pawnee chiefs, resulting in a crisis of authority. And through it all, the United States government had been wholly incapable of providing the tribe with adequate aid and protection.⁴⁴

As a result of these pressures, some Pawnees began to consider moving to the Indian Territory. Even before the events at Massacre Canyon, in March 1873, a Pawnee tribal faction visited Kicking Bird's Kiowa camp in the Indian Territory to make peace with these former enemies in the event that the Pawnees should come to live near their Wichita relatives. At the end of the successful council, the Kiowas presented their guests with horses, and the Pawnees reciprocated by putting blankets and shawls on the shoulders of their hosts. The peace agreement removed one obstacle to Pawnee removal. Although at this point most Pawnees still objected to moving to the Indian Territory, it appears that the tragedy at Massacre Canyon wore down some of their resolve.⁴⁵

In October 1873, *Uh-sah-wuck-oo-led-ee-hoor* ("Big Spotted Horse") asked agent Burgess for permission to be taken off the tribal roll, travel to the Indian Territory, and be placed on the Wichita tribal roll. Lone Chief and Frank White joined Big Spotted Horse

⁴⁴ For good discussions surrounding the circumstances of Pawnee removal see Martha Royce Blaine, *Pawnee Passage: 1870-1875* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), Richard White, *The Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment and Social Change Among the Choctaws, Pawnees and Navajos* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), and Wishart, *An Unspeakable Sadness*, 174-202.

⁴⁵ Blaine, *Pawnee Passage*, footnote page 215.

and also asked permission to leave. Burgess reluctantly agreed. Big Spotted Horse, Lone Chief, and White were all prominent tribal soldiers and had served as scouts under Frank North. Perhaps the agent considered them a dangerous and disruptive element in the tribe. He undoubtedly recalled Big Spotted Horse's role in the horse raid against the Cheyennes early in 1870.⁴⁶

Although Big Spotted Horse, Lone Chief, and White were not chiefs, nearly three hundred Pawnees chose to follow them. They left the reservation around the middle of October. Most Indians in the party did not have permission to leave. Burgess immediately contacted Chief *Pitalesharo*,⁴⁷ whom he considered head chief of the tribe, and demanded that the Indians be brought back. *Pitalesharo* sent runners out and Big Spotted Horse returned with his followers. A confrontation between the chiefs and Big Spotted Horse's soldiers followed. This time there was no reconciliation. By the end of October, Big Spotted Horse and twenty-seven lodges (numbering about two hundred-fifty followers) had left the agency for good. In January 1874, they arrived at the Wichita Agency where they set up camp.⁴⁸

Big Spotted Horse's move to the Indian Territory was an important event in the history of the Pawnee Scouts. It indirectly brought about a change in the Quaker policy towards the enlistment of Pawnees in the American army. Big Spotted Horse's departure from the Pawnee Agency was a major embarrassment for the Hicksites in charge of the agency. Other Pawnees threatened to follow Big Spotted Horse's example. Over the

⁴⁶ According to George Hyde, Big Spotted Horse had gone to live with the Wichitas in 1870. He had returned to the Pawnee Agency in 1872, and appeared to be the ringleader in favor of removal to the Indian Territory. Perhaps Burgess agreed to let him leave the reservation because he considered him to be a "troublemaker." In the spring of 1870, Big Spotted Horse had been responsible for stealing a large number of horses from the Cheyennes. Hyde, *The Pawnee Indians*, 316.

following months, small parties of Indians clandestinely left the agency to join the Wichitas on the Washita River, Indian Territory, where they moved under the supervision of the rival Orthodox branch of the Society of Friends. As Sioux raids continued in 1874, most of the Pawnees began to express their desire to follow Big Spotted Horse's example to move to the Indian Territory as well.⁴⁹ Superintendent White and Agent Burgess tried to stem the tide. White once again tried to induce the Sioux to reach a peace agreement with the Pawnees. When this failed, he compromised his opposition to the Pawnee Scouts. White still objected "to the use of Pawnee scouts in the military operations of the United States against the Sioux tribe of Indians on account of its causing retaliation by the Sioux upon the inhabitants of the Pawnee villages." However, he informed the War Department that "I can see no objection to the use of Pawnee scouts for aiding the U. S. troops in searching out straggling bands of outlaw Indians, who, away from their reservations are engaged in deeds of violence and theft."⁵⁰

In August 1874, General E. O. C. Ord requested permission to enlist four Pawnee Indians as scouts for a military expedition against the Sioux. The Sioux had committed depredations around the settlements of Steele, Rawlins, and Seminole. According to intelligence reports, they were hiding out in the Big Horn Mountains near old Fort Reno (Connor). Ord placed Captain (Brevet Lt. Colonel) Anson Mills in command of the expeditionary force, which consisted of several companies of the Second and Third Cavalries and two companies of Infantry. Apart from the four Pawnee Scouts, William

⁴⁷ In other sources, *Pitalesharo* is sometimes spelled *Pitaresaru*.

⁴⁸ Blaine, *Pawnee Passage*, 217-218. Milner, *With Good Intentions*, 69-70.

⁴⁹ Blaine, *Pawnee Passage*, 218-233.

⁵⁰ On April 28, 1874, Lt. Colonel George A. Woodward, Fourteenth Infantry, wrote a request for four Pawnee Scouts. General E. O. C. Ord passed the request on to the Office of Indian Affairs. White's

Cody and Tom Sun also joined as guides. A caravan of seventy pack mules and twenty-eight wagons completed Mills' command.⁵¹

Unfortunately, the identity of the four Pawnee Scouts is unknown. In his report of the expedition, Mills lists the name of one of the scouts as "White." Possibly this was Bob White (Frank White's brother), who had served with the North brothers in 1869.

White and the three other scouts joined Mills' troops at Fort McPherson and boarded a Union Pacific train to Rawlins' Station, Wyoming Territory. They arrived on August 15. Mills spent the first two weeks gathering his troops and waiting for supplies. He used the time to send out detachments on scouting missions in search of fresh Indian trails. The scouting reports were not encouraging. It appeared that the Indians had been alarmed and had left the area. Nevertheless, Mills decided to march to the Powder River region in the hope of surprising some parties that had remained behind.⁵²

The command left Rawlins' Station under the cover of darkness on the night of August 31. The next day a severe snow storm compelled the troops to stay in camp. The storm raged on for thirty-six hours and tortured the horses and mules. On September 3 the weather cleared up, and Mills resumed the march. Their progress was slow as they traveled over broken landscape and the animals were weakened by the storm and the lack

response to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs dates of May 4, 1874. *Letters Received*, Roll 663. Milner, *With Good Intentions*, 71.

⁵¹ The command consisted of Companies B and D, Second Cavalry; Companies F, H, and M, Third Cavalry; Company H, Fourth Infantry; Company D, Thirteenth Infantry; four Pawnee Scouts; two guides (William Cody and Tom Sun); six [unidentified] scouts; 20 packers; 30 teamsters; one ambulance; 28 wagons; 70 pack mules. The total command consisted of 15 officers, 343 troops, and 58 hired civilians. Anson B. Mills, *Big Horn Expedition: August 15 to September 30, 1874* (Independence Rock, Wyoming Territory: no publisher, 1874), 3-5. According to his memoirs, these Sioux had entered the parade grounds at Forts Fetterman and Steele, and killed several soldiers. Anson B. Mills, *My Story* (Washington, D. C.: published by the author, 1918), 155.

⁵² Mills, *Big Horn Expedition*, 4-5, 11. At this time the Third Cavalry was stationed at Fort McPherson, Nebraska. See Holmes, *Fort McPherson, Nebraska*, 53.

of fresh grass. One of the Pawnees shot a buffalo, and the meat was a welcome addition to the usual rations of hardtack and coffee. They found plenty of wildlife but few Indians. On September 7, Mills, while riding ahead with Cody and the Pawnees, came upon a bear and her cubs. They “despatched” of the animals in less than two minutes. Undoubtedly, the Pawnees claimed the valuable bear claws as trophies. On September 9, the command ~~reached the North Fork of the Powder River. Here they found~~ signs of a large Indian village that had been abandoned in great haste some six weeks earlier. Mills dispatched his scouts and guides in search of other villages, but they soon returned and reported that all the villages had been broken up six weeks before. It appeared that the Indians had all left before the storm, and that they were headed for their reservations. Upon receiving this news, Mills decided to return to his base camp. He still believed that there were some hostile Indians in the area and determined to organize another expedition to the Tongue River, where he suspected they were hiding out. But on September 25, he received orders from General Ord to return with his command to Rawlins’ Station, where the expedition would be dissolved. On September 26, Mills’s troops began the march back to Rawlins’ Station. Nothing of interest happened on the march except that one of the soldiers, Private Miller, was seized by a bear and “horribly mangled.” Soldiers quickly came to his rescue and killed the animal, but Miller died from his wounds soon after his arrival at Fort McPherson. Unfortunately, the records do not reveal when the Pawnees received their discharge papers.⁵³

Apart from improving existing maps of the hitherto rarely explored Big Horn territory, Mills’s expedition was relatively unimportant. The same could not be said for

⁵³ Mills, *Big Horn Expedition*, 5-15.

another campaign in 1874 in which Pawnee Indians participated as scouts. After moving to the Indian Territory, Big Spotted Horse and several other Pawnees enlisted in the U. S. Army during the Red River War. Unlike Mills's expedition, the Red River War was a crucial event in U.S.-Indian relations because it marked the final military subjugation of the Kiowas, Comanches, and Cheyennes on the southern Plains. Although only a handful of Pawnees joined the army against the hostiles in 1874, their service deserves attention.

At the root of the Red River War was the destruction of the buffalo herds on the southern and central Plains. In 1870, Josiah Wright Mooar, a young entrepreneur from Vermont, began the buffalo hide bonanza in Kansas. Soon others followed in what would be an unprecedented slaughter of the bison. Between 1872 and 1874, according to some estimates, buffalo hunters killed between 4.5 and 5.5 million animals solely for their skins. After hunters rapidly depleted the buffalo herds along the railroad lines in Kansas and Nebraska, they began to shift their operations to the southern Plains. In violation of the Treaty of Medicine Lodge (1867), they established a trading post near "Adobe Walls" in the Texas Panhandle. As the prospect of starvation became more imminent, the Kiowas, Comanches, and Cheyennes protested the slaughter of the buffalo, but they received little sympathy from official quarters. Their Quaker agents seized upon the slaughter of the buffalo to promulgate farming. Meanwhile, the government did little to enforce the Treaty of Medicine Lodge. Annuity payments were habitually late and insufficient. Occasional harassment by soldiers and the activities of whiskey peddlers,

gun traders (*Comancheros*), and Mexican horse thieves, added to the grievances of the Indians.⁵⁴

In May 1874, the Comanches held their first ever Sun Dance at the suggestion of *Isa-tai*, a Quahadi prophet. A large number of Cheyennes, Arapahos, and Kiowas, also attended the ceremony. The dance was intended to stir up passions against the whites who were destroying their way of life. *Isa-tai's* message of war received strong support among most of the Comanches and Cheyennes and some of the Kiowas. War parties swarmed out to attack posts and settlements in Texas and Kansas. Among the main leaders of the Indian war factions were Lone Wolf, Satanta, Big Tree, Maman-ti, White Wolf, and Woman's Heart of the Kiowas; Quanah Parker and Big Red Meat of the Comanches; and Medicine Water, Iron Shirt, and Stone Calf of the Cheyennes. On June 27, 1874, a large party of Kiowa, Comanche, and Cheyenne warriors, launched an unsuccessful assault on the trading post at Adobe Walls. Several weeks later, a party of Kiowas under Lone Wolf ambushed a company of Texas Rangers under Major John B. Jones at Lost Valley, Texas.⁵⁵

Shortly after the fight at Adobe Walls, General Philip Henry Sheridan of the Division of the Missouri began planning a campaign to disarm and drive back the Indians

⁵⁴ James L. Haley, *The Buffalo War: The History of the Red River Indian Uprising in 1874* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985/first published by Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976), chapters 1-3. In 1875, General Philip Sheridan appeared before the Texas Legislature to defend the slaughter of the buffalo by white hunters. Although overhunting had been the cause of the war, Sheridan opposed proposals in Texas calling for the preservation of the buffalo. According to Sheridan, "[The Buffalo hunters] have done more in the last two years to settle the vexed Indian question than the entire regular army has done in the past thirty years. They are destroying the Indians' commissary . . . Send them powder and lead, if you will; but, for the sake of lasting peace, let them kill, skin, and sell until the buffaloes are exterminated. Then your prairies can be covered with speckled cattle and the festive cowboy, who follows the hunter as a second forerunner of an advanced civilization." Sheridan quoted in Haley, *The Buffalo War*, 25.

⁵⁵ Haley, *The Buffalo War*, chapters 3-6. William H. Leckie, *The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Negro Cavalry in the West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 116-117.

to their reservations. First, he ordered agencies to enroll all friendly Indians. Indians who were found outside reservation boundaries after the deadline of enrollment had passed would be considered hostile. During the second phase of the campaign, the army would round up the hostiles in a series of military maneuvers. The Indians were hiding out on the *Llano Estacado* (the “Staked Plains”), a rough and inhospitable area. Sheridan’s plan devised a five-column attack. Colonel Nelson A. Miles would march south from Fort Dodge, Kansas, with companies from the Sixth Cavalry and the Fifth Infantry. Major William Redwood Price’s Eighth Cavalry would move eastward from Fort Bascom, New Mexico. The Fourth Cavalry under Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie, meanwhile, would march north from Fort Concho, Texas. The last two columns consisted of two regiments of black troops, also known as “buffalo soldiers.” Colonel George P. Buell’s troops of the Eleventh Cavalry would march from Fort Griffin, Texas, and follow a northwestern course. Colonel John W. “Black Jack” Davidson’s Tenth Cavalry, finally, would march westward from its main base at Fort Sill, Indian Territory. Among Davidson’s troops was a company of Indian Scouts, including Big Spotted Horse and a number of Pawnees.⁵⁶

Before starting west to drive the hostiles into the trap set by Miles and Mackenzie, Davidson marched to the Wichita Agency at Anadarko, Indian Territory. He had received some alarming dispatches from agency clerk John Connell. Connell reported that Lone Wolf’s Kiowas and Big Red Meat’s Nokoni Comanches were camping nearby the agency. Davidson immediately left Fort Sill to disarm the Indians. On August 22, 1874, he arrived at Anadarko and ordered the Indians to surrender their arms. A firefight broke

⁵⁶ Haley, *The Buffalo War*, chapter 7. Leckie, *The Buffalo Soldiers*, 124.

out in which four troopers were wounded and possibly fourteen Indians killed. After the battle, the hostiles fled the scene.⁵⁷

The Anadarko fight slowed down Davidson's preparations for the campaign. He had to postpone his march for nearly three weeks. While Davidson was busy organizing his troops, General C. C. Augur, now in charge of the Department of Texas, visited the Wichita Agency. Augur granted Davidson permission to recruit a company of friendly Indians to act as scouts for the upcoming expedition. Davidson placed Lieutenant Richard Henry Pratt in charge of the new company. Among the forty-four volunteers that Pratt enlisted were thirty-five year old Big Spotted Horse and several other Pawnees. On September 1, they were officially mustered in by Lieutenant Woodward at Fort Sill. Perhaps because of his previous military experience, Big Spotted Horse received the rank of sergeant.⁵⁸

Although the historical records are silent on the reasons these Pawnees enlisted, it is not difficult to imagine their motivations. First, the Pawnees were no friends of the Kiowas and Comanches, with whom they had been at war for most of the nineteenth century. Pawnee war parties frequently traveled into Kiowa and Comanche territory in

⁵⁷ Haley, *The Buffalo War*, chapter 8. Leckie, *The Buffalo Soldiers*, 123. Some eyewitness accounts and reports of the Anadarko Fight can be found in *Letters Received*, M 234, Roll 929 (Wichita Agency), frames 1415 to 1432.

⁵⁸ Leckie, *The Buffalo Soldiers*, 130. William Spencer Reeder, Jr., "Wolf Men of the Plains: Pawnee Indian Warriors, Past & Present" (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, 2001), 320-321. Big Spotted Horse's name is listed in the official muster rolls as Esauah-Kedadeho. Although their identity can not be established with certainty, it appears that the other Pawnees were *Ke-wo-ko-et-touk* ("Charlie"), *Kuttowa-kuts-sow-kurrah* ("Lone Bird"), *Ne-he-de-son-arde* ("Leading Man"), *Ne-saw-de-teeck-ar-ish* ("Brave Chief"), *Nuh-he-da-so-sick* ("Leader"), and *Sou-kou-oot* ("Lincoln"). The spelling of these names differs significantly of those of earlier registers and is due to the fact that mustering officers usually spelled the names phonetically. "Register of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914," M 233, Roll 70, Volume 151, "1874-1877, Indian Scouts," (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1956), n. p. According to Robert Bruce, William Riding-In also served in the Red River Campaign. Robert Bruce, *Pawnee Naming Ceremonial* (New York: Privately Published, 1933), 5.

search of horses. Some of the younger warriors undoubtedly seized the opportunity to gain recognition and earn war honors. Another incentive was to leave the confines of the Wichita Agency, which had become crowded with Pawnee refugees as well as Indians wishing to enroll before Sheridan's deadline. The arrival of these Indians placed a tremendous drain on the available food supply. It is also possible that Big Spotted Horse believed that his service was in accord with the long-standing military alliance between the Pawnee tribe and the Americans. Although the United States often failed to honor its obligations, Big Spotted Horse may have considered that his service might ensure the future good will of the Americans, especially since many of his fellow Pawnees had left their agency in Nebraska illegally. Still, in the absence of historical documentation, such conclusions are but mere speculation.

General Augur had reasons of his own to allow the Indians to enlist as scouts. They would not only provide a valuable service to the army, but he also believed that it would be a good gesture towards the friendly tribes. On September 13, 1874, Augur wrote to Sheridan

The friendly tribes appear anxious to have the wild Indians punished, but were they to appear there, not one of them would fire a shot at them. They all wish to be represented however among the scouts, and I thought it best to have them all committed against the hostile bands to that extent.⁵⁹

Apart from the Pawnees, a number of Wichitas, Caddos, Tawakonis, Wacos, Kichais, Delawares, and some other tribes were also represented in Pratt's company. They received their equipment and training at Fort Sill. Lieutenant Pratt also drilled them in

preparation for the expedition. Pratt's Indian scouts were part of Davidson's Fort Sill Column. Apart from the scouts, the column consisted of companies B, C, H, K, L, and M, of the Tenth Cavalry, companies D, E, and I, of the Eleventh Infantry, and a detachment of mountain howitzers. A supply train of forty-six wagons carrying three weeks of supplies formed the rear of the command. On September 10, 1874, Davidson set out on his expedition. It was his intention to move up the Washita River and catch any Indians between himself and Miles's column, then turn south along the eastern base of the Staked Plains to drive Indians in that part of the country towards Mackenzie's forces or catch those that Mackenzie was driving towards him.⁶⁰

Pratt's scouts, including the Pawnees, carefully scanned a forty-mile area along the Washita and the North Fork of the Red River in search of hostiles. On September 17, the scouts captured a "Kiowa Mexican" belonging to Lone Wolf's band with three head of stock. The Indian was arrested and placed in iron shackles. On the 22nd Davidson met Miles. Two days later he resumed his march, this time in the direction of Mackenzie's column. "General Davidson is more than pleased with his scouts," wrote Pratt to his wife, "They cover his march from five to twenty miles on each side and in front, saving his cavalry, which is now in [as] good condition as when leaving [Fort] Sill."⁶¹

⁵⁹ Augur to Sheridan, September 13, 1874, *Letters Received*, M 234, Roll 929 (Wichita Agency), frames 1437 to 1439.

⁶⁰ Leckie, *The Buffalo Soldiers*, 130. According to Reeder company F was part of the command instead of company K. Reeder, "Wolf Men of the Plains," 321. In a letter to his wife, Lieutenant Richard H. Pratt wrote: "[Wish] you could have seen me at the head of my forty braves, as I marched through the post this morning. I have organized and equipped my command in a manner eminently satisfactory (to myself) and must say I am not without pride in it. Think of a command of forty only two of whom can understand their commander, and in which five nationalities are represented!" Richard H. Pratt to his wife, September 9, 1874, [Grant] Foreman Collection, Box 33, Folder 17, Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma City.

⁶¹ Richard Henry Pratt to his wife, September 23, 1874. Foreman Collection, Box 33, Folder 17, Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma City.

On September 25, Lieutenant Pratt's scouts discovered a buffalo herd near McClellan Creek and killed a number of animals to supply Davidson's command with fresh meat. After the hunt, the scouts discovered a lone Cheyenne, who was quickly overtaken and captured. On October 2, Davidson received word that a few Indians had been seen. He ordered a detachment of troops and Pratt's scouts to pursue them. After twenty miles, the troops gave up the chase, but the scouts continued the pursuit for another ten miles. They captured eight horses, but were unable to overtake the Indians, who had the advantage of changing onto the fresh horses they had been driving. Two days later, October 4, Davidson ordered the scouts to follow the trail of a Noconi war party. Unfortunately for Pratt, his scouts lost the trail in a rainstorm on the second day of the pursuit. On October 10, Davidson's command returned at Fort Sill. Thus far, the expedition had yielded little success. Although his troops had captured two hostiles and a handful of horses, they had also lost fifty-eight horses and mules to exhaustion during the arduous march.⁶²

After drawing supplies at Fort Sill, Davidson was ready to resume operations. General Sheridan, while visiting the fort, authorized him to recruit sixty more Indian scouts from the Wichita Agency. On October 15, these additional scouts were mustered in by Lieutenant Pratt at Fort Sill. When Davidson's command left Fort Sill on October 21, fifteen Pawnee Scouts rode out with him. Among the Pawnees were Big Spotted Horse, William Riding-In, and twenty-six year old *Pe-isk-ee-la-shar* ("Boy Chief"), better known to whites as Peter Headman. Unfortunately, there were not enough winter

⁶² Davidson's report of the march can be found in Joe F. Taylor, comp. and ed., *The Indian Campaign on the Staked Plains, 1874-1875: Military Correspondence from War Department Adjutant General's Office*,

uniforms available to clothe the new recruits. Thus, when the troops left the fort, many scouts wore the “meager garb” they wore in their camps.⁶³

Shortly after leaving the fort, Pratt’s Indian scouts discovered a small Kiowa mule herd beyond the authorized grazing grounds. The scouts captured twenty-four mules, which they added to the train. Over the next few weeks, Pratt sent small groups of his scouts on missions with detachments of regular troops. Unfortunately, his reports do not specify which scouts joined what operations. Hence, it is impossible to determine the exact role of the Pawnees during this expedition. As usual, they rode in advance of the troops in search of trails. Despite the cold and deteriorating weather conditions, they also served as couriers, carrying dispatches between the advance parties and Davidson’s main command.⁶⁴ It is also likely that they saw action in some of the skirmishes that Davidson’s troops fought with hostile Indians. On October 22, for example, Pratt sent fifteen scouts with Major George W. Schofield’s detachment. On the 24th, Schofield successfully routed a Noconi Comanche camp, capturing 69 warriors, 250 women and children, and approximately 2,000 horses. Among the captives were several prominent chiefs, including Big Red Meat, the instigator of the Anadarko Fight. Fifteen other scouts were with Captain Lewis H. Carpenter’s troops when they discovered a Kiowa village near Pond Creek. In the attack that followed, Carpenter captured twenty warriors, fifty

File 2815-1874 (Canyon, TX: Panhandle-Plains Historical Society, 1962), 69-73. Leckie, *The Buffalo Soldiers*, 130-131.

⁶³ “Register of Enlistments,” M 233, Roll 70, Volume 151, n. p. Apart from the Pawnees, Pratt’s company consisted of “31 Wichitas, . . . 14 Tawankanas, 10 Wacoos, 5 Kechies, 2 Caddoes, 2 Delawares, 1 Arapaho, 1 Shawnee, 1 Comanche and 5 white men.” Lt. R. H. Pratt to Acting Assistant Adjutant General, November 29, 1874, in Taylor, *The Indian Campaign on the Staked Plains*, 121. Reeder, “Wolf Men of the Plains,” 322.

⁶⁴ According to an article by Lt. Pratt, his scouts also served as a personal body guard while he camped near a Kiowa village under chief Big Bow. Although Big Bow had pledged to surrender, Pratt was not entirely

women and children, and 200 horses. The remaining Kiowas escaped, but shortly thereafter surrendered at Fort Sill.⁶⁵

Pratt himself was present in several skirmishes with hostiles as well. While on patrol with twenty-two scouts and eight soldiers, he stumbled on a hastily deserted Cheyenne camp on Mule Creek. The troops burned several hundred lodge poles and other property. Several days later, Pratt joined Captain Charles D. Viele's command with thirty of his scouts. The scouts soon discovered a party of Cheyennes, and Viele ordered the pursuit. Although the troops chased the Cheyennes for five days, they were unable to overtake them. The Cheyennes, however, lost fifty horses and mules during the retreat. Many of the mules carried supplies. Cold weather began to plague the troops in the field. A severe ice storm which lasted four days killed more than ninety of Davidson's horses and incapacitated twenty-six of his men with frostbite. But the same cold that plagued the troops also tormented the hostile Indians.⁶⁶

By the time Davidson, Pratt, and the Pawnee Scouts returned to Fort Sill on November 29, they had captured over 450 prisoners (including 113 warriors) and several thousand horses and mules. Although less spectacular than Colonel Mackenzie's victory over the hostiles at Palo Duro Canyon, Davidson's troops had kept the hostiles on the run. They not only destroyed most of the Indians' supplies but also prevented the hostiles from hunting buffalo to replenish their supplies. Faced with cold and starvation, most hostiles

certain if the chief was acting in good faith. See Richard Henry Pratt, "Some Indian Experiences," *Cavalry Journal* 16 (October 1905), 214-216.

⁶⁵Taylor, *The Indian Campaign on the Staked Plains*, 122. Reeder, "Wolf Men of the Plains," 323. Haley, *The Buffalo War*, chapter 13. According to Leckie, Carpenter captured only 45 Kiowas and 50 horses. Leckie, *The Buffalo Soldiers*, 131-132.

⁶⁶ Taylor, *The Indian Campaign on the Staked Plains*, 122-124.

surrendered over the following weeks and months. On December 1, 1874, Pratt's Indian scouts, including the Pawnees, were mustered out.⁶⁷

In his final report of the expedition, Pratt praised the performance of his scouts. Among the few Indians he mentioned by name was Big Spotted Horse, who deserved a "special commendation for services." Pratt was particularly impressed by Big Spotted Horse's performance under difficult circumstances. On one occasion, while his command was snowbound, Colonel Davidson ordered Pratt to send some couriers to one of his commands in the field. Davidson suggested Pratt send two of his white scouts. In his memoirs, Pratt recalled that he could not find any volunteers among his white scouts.

[They] hesitated on account of the weather and the weak condition of their horses. The Indians were less sensitive to cold and their horses hardier, and I told the General [Davidson's brevet rank during the expedition] that I was sure two Indians would satisfactorily perform the service. He agreed and I accordingly selected the Pawnee chief Esaue-Kedadeho (Big Spotted Horse). He was a tall fine specimen of a man who relished perilous service, and he selected one of his own men to go with him.

They went off in the storm and were back in four days with answer. I took them over to the General's tent, and he was greatly pleased with their promptness. The General said privately: "Pratt, if ever men needed a little something to warm them up, these men do. I have a very small quantity of excellent whiskey. What do you say to my giving them each a drink?"

I said: "you are the commanding officer, and I think it is your province to determine." He concluded to give it, brought out his bottle, and offered Big Spotted Horse a drink. The chief refused and his man did the same, saying that they did not drink whiskey.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Reeder, "Wolf Men of the Plains," 325-326.

⁶⁸ Richard Henry Pratt, *Battlefield and Classroom: Four Decades with the American Indian*, Edited and with an Introduction by Robert M. Utley (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964), 78-79. Davidson's fondness for liquor was well-known. Big Spotted Horse's conduct during the expeditions seems to be in stark contrast with Pratt's report of December 3, 1874. According to this report, Pratt had obtained some evidence showing that Big Spotted Horse had been involved in the murder of a citizen on the Washita River in August. It appears that these charges were dropped, as there are no documents available that indicate that

Big Spotted Horse's refusal to share a drink with a high ranking officer in the United States army seems to belie the charge by the Quaker administrators that military service had an inevitable demoralizing effect on the Indians. While it is true that their service exposed them to the ills of white society, it is also true that traditional Pawnee culture continued to have a strong and powerful hold on these Indians. Temperance was one aspect of this culture, as was the martial tradition. Thus, even though they wore on occasion the uniform of the United States Army, the scouts never ceased to be Pawnees. They were soldiers as well as warriors.

Apart from ending Grant's Peace Policy, the Red River War was also significant for the future of the Pawnee Battalion. Although Quakers and other religious denominations remained in charge of Indian agencies, they could no longer prevent the enlistment of Pawnees into the army. Even though the Office of Indian Affairs formally had the last word on the employment of Indian scouts, in reality the military establishment always received permission to enlist Indians for military service, especially in emergency situations.

Big Spotted Horse was subjected to a formal investigation. Taylor, *The Indian Campaign on the Staked Plains*, 134.

CHAPTER NINE

THE POWDER RIVER CAMPAIGN WITH CROOK AND MACKENZIE,

1876-1877

Between 1874 and 1875 the remaining Pawnees followed in Big Spotted Horse's footsteps and moved to the Indian Territory. They eventually settled on a 283,026-acre reservation on Black Bear Creek in present day north-central Oklahoma. Here, they began the difficult and desperate struggle for survival in a new environment. Although now far removed from any Sioux threat, the climatic and social circumstances in the Territory proved to be equally devastating to the tribe. Strange ailments such as malaria and influenza sent population numbers spiraling downward for the next two decades. Apart from escalating mortality rates, the Pawnees were no longer free to roam the prairies in search of buffalo. Government agents ordered the men to take up farming for subsistence. When not working in the fields, the Pawnees passed the time with dances or visiting their Wichita relatives or other friendly tribes. Mostly, however, they were restricted from leaving their reservation. The trauma of removal and high mortality rates, combined with boredom and poverty, demoralized many on the new reservation. A once proud people seemed to have lost its sense of self-esteem.¹

¹ The history of Pawnee removal is rather complicated. On October 10, 1874, about forty lodges set out for the Wichita Agency. Two weeks later, a large group led by John W. Williamson followed. They joined the

Although individual Pawnees had, on occasion, continued to serve as scouts for the United States Army, the Pawnee Battalion had not been reactivated since 1870. But in 1876, while the Pawnees were struggling for survival on their new reservation, events elsewhere set the wheels in motion which would lead to the resurrection of the Pawnee Battalion. That year, the western Sioux and northern Cheyennes took up arms against the United States and nearly brought the western army to its knees. In the war that followed, the Pawnee Scouts once again played an important role.

The causes of the “Great Sioux War” (the term is actually inaccurate as the northern Cheyennes were involved also) date back to the early 1870s. The Panic of 1873 had plunged the United States into a severe economic depression. A large number of banks collapsed, unemployment rose, railroad construction halted, and paper money lost its value. The nation faced a deep financial crisis. The rumor of enormous gold deposits in the Black Hills of South Dakota (then, still Dakota Territory), sparked the interest of the national government. In 1874, General William T. Sherman ordered Lieutenant

Pawnees under Big Spotted Horse who had migrated to the Wichita Agency the previous year. Only a small faction remained at the Pawnee Agency in Nebraska. The Pawnees stayed with the Wichitas until June 1875, when they moved onto their new reservation on Black Bear Creek, in present-day north central Oklahoma. The remaining Pawnees in Nebraska joined them there later that year. Although the land was good, the sudden climatic change, the hardships of removal, and the lack of adequate housing, subsistence, and medical facilities, placed an enormous strain on the health of the people. Mortality rates began to exceed birth rates until the early 1900s when the Pawnee population had declined to 700 souls. Martha Royce Blaine, *Pawnee Passage: 1870-1875* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), chapter 10. David J. Wishart, *An Unspeakable Sadness: The Dispossession of the Nebraska Indians* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 196-202. In “The Dispossession of the Pawnees,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 69 (September 1979), 382-401, Wishart argues that the Pawnees migrated to the Indian Territory to preserve Pawnee tribalism. According to Wishart, the pressures at the original Pawnee reservation in Nebraska threatened to destroy Pawnee unity. As a result of the dramatic depopulation among the Pawnees, Big Spotted Horse, the principal advocate of removal to the Indian Territory, became the most hated man on the reservation. The scorn of his fellow tribesmen became so intolerable, that he asked the agent for permission to relocate to the Wichita Agency. When the agent denied his request, he ran away. According to Hyde, Big Spotted Horse was killed by Texas cowboys during a horse lifting attempt. George E. Hyde, *The Pawnee Indians* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 335. According to other accounts, Big Spotted Horse was killed in a private dispute in 1883. See Glenn

Colonel George Armstrong Custer to organize an expedition into the Black Hills to establish the accuracy of the rumors. Custer had achieved great popularity among the general public for his daring campaigns during the Civil War and his attack on the Southern Cheyennes at the Battle of the Washita in 1868. He was a rather “unimaginative” officer (he finished last in his class at West Point in 1861), who preferred to charge the enemy head-on. Despite this crude and reckless strategy, he enjoyed an incredible amount of luck (widely known as “Custer’s Luck”) and achieved great successes on the field of battle. Custer’s Black Hills expedition consisted of his beloved Seventh Cavalry and a large group of scientists, including George Bird Grinnell, who invited Luther North along as an assistant.² Despite the peaceful nature of the trip, Custer’s expedition was in clear violation of the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, which included the Black Hills as part of the Great Sioux Reservation.³

Although Custer found little of the precious metal, he nevertheless returned from the expedition with the news that gold had indeed been found. The report sparked a genuine gold rush into the Black Hills. Miners and prospectors invaded the Black Hills from all sides. Rather than preventing intruders from trespassing on Indian land, as it was

Shirley, *Pawnee Bill: A Biography of Major Gordon W. Lillie, White Chief of the Pawnees, Wild West Showman, Last of the Land Boomers* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), 93-94.

² For an excellent study on the Black Hills Expedition see Donald Jackson’s, *Custer’s Gold: The United States Cavalry Expedition of 1874* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966). For Grinnell’s and North’s experiences during the expedition see John F. Reiger, ed., *The Passing of the Great West: Selected Papers of George Bird Grinnell* (New York: Winchester Press, 1972), and Donald F. Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains: Recollections of Luther North, 1856-1882* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 179-193.

³ There are several good books on the Great Sioux War, including Douglas S. Benson, *The Black Hills War: A History of the Conflict with Sioux Indians, 1876-1877* (Chicago: D. S. Benson, 1983), John S. Gray, *Centennial Campaign: The Sioux War of 1876* (Fort Collins, CO: Old Army Press, 1976). Robert M. Utley provides a brief but fairly complete account of the war in his classic work *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1974), chapters 14 and 15. The following account of the war is based largely on Charles M. Robinson’s more recent history *A Good Year to Die: The Story of the Great Sioux War* (New York: Random House, 1995).

obliged to do according to the stipulations of the Fort Laramie Treaty, the federal government withdrew its troops from the area to let miners in. It also arranged for negotiations with the Sioux to obtain possession of the land itself. In 1875, President Ulysses S. Grant offered to pay the Indians \$6,000,000 for the Black Hills and the land around the Little Big Horn River. The Sioux under Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse, and the Northern Cheyennes under Dull Knife rejected the government's offer. Although Red Cloud of the Oglalas and Spotted Tail of the Brules did not reject the sale of the land, their demands were unacceptable to the administration.

Instead of further negotiations, the United States began to prepare for war. Secretary of the Interior Zachariah Chandler and Commissioner of Indian Affairs Edward P. Smith ordered all Indians in the area to return to their reservations by January 31, 1876. Any Indian found off reservation land would be considered hostile. The ultimatum ignored the fact that the Indians had a legal right to reside on unceded land. Over the next few months, opponents of the sale of the Black Hills gathered near the Big Horn Mountains.

Back at his headquarters in Chicago, General Philip Sheridan began to plan a massive military campaign against those Indians who chose to ignore the order to return to their reservations. On February 7, 1876, Sheridan instructed generals George Crook and Alfred Howe Terry to mount expeditions into the Little Big Horn and Powder River in order to disarm the Indians and drive them back to their agencies. Crook's column would attack the Indians from the south, while Terry's force, which was divided into two columns (one under command of Colonel John R. Gibbon, the other under command of Lt. Colonel George A. Custer) would attack the Indians from the east and west. In many

respects, the plan resembled the successful strategy employed by Sheridan during the Red River War two years earlier.

Sheridan's plan suffered setbacks from the start. Poor weather conditions delayed Terry from marching ahead. Fortune spared one of Crook's advance parties, under the command of Colonel Joseph Reynolds, from annihilation in a battle with hostile Cheyenne Indians on March 17. As a result of the Reynolds fight, more Indians joined Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse against the army. Two months later, on June 17, 1876, Crook himself suffered an embarrassing defeat at the battle of the Rosebud. Although he lost only nine dead and twenty-one wounded, Crook's forces had received a severe thrashing and had to withdraw from the area. Eight days later, on June 25, 1876, Lieutenant Colonel Custer finally ran out of luck when he attacked a large Indian village near the Little Big Horn River. Among the Indians at the Little Big Horn were Sitting Bull's Hunkpapa Sioux, Crazy Horse's Oglala Sioux, and Dull Knife's Northern Cheyennes. Instead of running away as Custer had expected, the Indians made a determined stand. In the ensuing battle, Custer, who once boasted that the Seventh Cavalry could handle the Indians of the Plains alone, died with about two hundred and fifty men in his command. According to Indian sources, Custer never made a "stand." Most of his panic-stricken soldiers died while running for their lives.⁴

The annihilation of Custer's battalion stunned a nation on the eve of its centennial anniversary celebrations. But, as historian Charles M. Robinson observed, "Custer was performing greater service dead than he had ever done alive." His death prompted Congress to act. Since the Civil War, Congress had been steadily downsizing the frontier

⁴ Robinson, *A Good Year to Die*, 193.

army. In fact, on July 24, 1876, one day before the Custer debacle, Congress adopted an army appropriations bill which, among other things, limited the number of Indian scouts the army could employ to three hundred. But as soon news of the annihilation of Custer's command trickled back to Washington, Congress decided to support the military with all necessary and available resources. Seizing the moment, General Philip Sheridan immediately demanded an increase in the size of the army, authority to construct two forts in the heart of enemy territory along the Yellowstone, and direct military control over the Indian agencies. Congress swiftly granted all his wishes.⁵

Among the measures that Congress adopted was an "Act Concerning the Employment of Indian Scouts." The bill, which went into effect on August 12, 1876, stated that

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That so much of the Army appropriation act of twenty-fourth July, eighteen hundred and seventy-six, as limits the number of Indian scouts to three hundred is hereby repealed: and sections ten hundred and ninety-four and eleven hundred and twelve of the Revised Statutes, authorizing the employment of one thousand Indian scouts, are hereby continued in force: *Provided*, That a proportionate number of non-commissioned officers may be appointed. And the scouts, when they furnish their own horses and horse-equipments, shall be entitled to receive forty cents per day for their use and risk so long as thus employed.⁶*

The act allowed Sheridan to recruit several companies of Indian scouts to assist in the upcoming campaigns against the Sioux and Cheyennes. Among the Indians he wished

⁵ Ibid., 216 and 224.

⁶ The act is reproduced in the *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs* for 1877 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1877), 225.

to enlist for service were the Pawnees.⁷ On August 15, 1876, Frank North departed for Chicago at Sheridan's orders.⁸ Sheridan, under the mistaken assumption that the Pawnees still resided there, instructed North to travel to the Wichita Agency to enlist one hundred scouts. According to Sheridan's instructions the

Pawnees enlisted must be able bodied, active Indians. They will furnish their own horses, but will be armed, clothed and rationed by the government, and receive a per diem allowance of forty cents for each horse.⁹

The Pawnees were to be taken to Sidney Barracks, Nebraska, where they would receive their training and wait for further orders. In case the Pawnees could not furnish their own horses, Sheridan authorized North to buy horses for them.

Several days later, Major North and his brother traveled to Fort Sill, Indian Territory. When it turned out that the Pawnees no longer lived at the Wichita Agency, they boarded a train to Coffeyville, Kansas, and from there proceeded to the Pawnee Reservation by wagon. After a difficult three-day journey across rough terrain, they reached the agency around midnight, September 2. The trip had been very demanding on Major North's health. When they woke up the next morning, they found the entire tribe outside waiting to meet them. According to Luther North, when the Pawnees saw his

⁷ According to Paul Andrew Hutton, Sheridan was never a great supporter of Indian scout units. Sheridan believed they made poor allies, because they did "not possess stability or tenacity of purpose." In the mid-1880s he would declare that it would be unwise to recruit a military force from "a race so distinctive from that governing this country." Nevertheless, always the pragmatist, Sheridan was willing to set aside his own convictions to create the best possible army on such short notice to deal with the crisis situation in the war of 1876. Paul Andrew Hutton, *Phil Sheridan & His Army* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985/Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 366.

⁸ *Army and Navy Journal* 14 (August 19, 1876), 22.

⁹ The letter of instruction is in the Frank North Collection, Box 1, S1-F1, RG 2321 (formerly ms 0448), NSHS, Lincoln, Nebraska.

brother, “a great shout went up from them, *ah-ti-us Pawnee Lashar* (Father, the Pawnee Chief), and they fairly climbed over each other trying to get to him.”¹⁰

The scene of devastation and poverty on the Pawnee reservation shocked Luther North. “The tribe was in very bad shape,” he wrote in his memoirs. “They were miserably poor, nearly all of them had ague, and many of them were dying. They were very much discouraged and many of them were longing to get back to Nebraska.”¹¹

After explaining the purpose of his visit in a council with the chiefs, Major North opened a recruiting office in the Pawnee council house. He was forced to vacate the office when hundreds of young men tried to get in and sign up for the new battalion all at once. North set up a desk outside the house and within an hour had penned down the names of one hundred men.¹²

¹⁰ Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 195-197. According to Bruce, the Pawnees were recruited on September 3. They were officially mustered in on September 18, 1876. However, Captain Pollock entered September 3 as the official date of enlistment on the muster rolls. Robert Bruce, *The Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts: Narratives and Reminiscences of Military Service on the Old Frontier* (New York: Privately Published, 1932), 44. Sorenson provides a slightly different version of events. “Life of Major Frank North, the Famous Pawnee Scout,” *Platte County Times*, Columbus, Nebraska, December 19, 1896.

¹¹ Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 197-198.

¹² “Life of Major Frank North, the Famous Pawnee Scout,” *Platte County Times*, Columbus, Nebraska, December 19, 1896. Garland Blaine related the tradition of Frank North’s visit to his grandfather’s lodge on the Pawnee reservation: “A former United States Army Pawnee Scout, Leading with the Bear was ill when Maj. Frank North and Capt. Luther North went to the Pawnee agency in 1876 to seek men to fight the Cheyennes. Effie [Blaine’s mother] remembered she was outside the tipi one day and saw a man coming on foot. He may have been leading a horse. She said he was not very tall, and he looked sick - his skin was yellow and his eyes were big. Because all the men were absent, she ran inside. The man came to the tipi and said in perfect Pawnee, ‘My child, is this where ----- lives?’ He gave a name that Effie did not recognize for a minute. She had not heard her father called that for many years. She raised the tipi flap and replied, ‘Yes, you can come inside and see my father.’ Her father looked up, saw the man, and cried out, ‘Here he stands. Pari resaru [Pawnee Chief] has come.’ He had given him that name after a battle some years before. North called him by his old Pawnee Scout name. Effie’s father [stood] up, they clasped hands, put their chests together, and patted each other. Each felt bad to see the other not looking well. Her father said, ‘You do not look well, Grandfather.’ ‘I do not feel well,’ North replied, ‘but I have come to see the Scouts who are still living. I have also come to recruit some men to go and fight your enemies.’ They talked for awhile and her father asked him to stay for supper. ‘I cooked the meal, and they ate,’ Effie remembered. ‘Afterward he thanked me and turned to my father saying, “you are getting heavy [old]. It is good to know you are still here and your children can see you. Have a strong mind and think good thoughts. Don’t weaken, look to God. He is the one who’s in charge of us.” Father then talked to him in the same manner, and they said

The Pawnees were eager to enlist. Some scholars have pointed out that the main incentive to join the expedition was economic.¹³ Frank North himself seemed to believe that the Pawnees wished to go on the warpath against the Sioux in order to “draw from the government abundant rations, good uniforms, and fair pay.”¹⁴ But there were other, more personal motives as well. Many men signed up to escape the confines of the reservation. As George Bird Grinnell pointed out: “Each man, at any cost, sought to get away from the suffering of his present life; from the fever that made him quake, the chill that caused him to shiver, and above all from the deadly monotony of the reservation life.”¹⁵ One man implored Major North to take his fifteen-year-old son with him on the expedition. He told North that the boy did not need any pay and could serve as a personal servant to the major. North eventually gave in. Why the father wanted his son to go on the campaign is not clear, but the young man had his own reasons. *Ah-re-Kah-rard* (“Antlers” later known by his English name Rush Roberts) was a survivor of Massacre Canyon and joined the campaign in search of revenge. “[The] Sioux and Cheyennes were our enemies,” Roberts remembered later, “and I had this chance to operate against them.”¹⁶

goodbye. He said he was going back to the agency, and he did.” Martha Royce Blaine, *Some Things Are Not Forgotten: A Pawnee Family Remembers* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 9-10.

¹³ Hyde, *The Pawnee Indians*, 339-340. Also quoted in David D. Smits, “‘Fighting Fire with Fire’: The Frontier Army’s Use of Indian Scouts and Allies in the Trans-Mississippi Campaigns, 1860-1890,” *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 22:1 (1998), 103.

¹⁴ “Life of Major Frank North, the Famous Pawnee Scout,” *Platte County Times*, Columbus, Nebraska, December 19, 1896.

¹⁵ George Bird Grinnell quoted in Smits, “Fighting Fire with Fire,” 100. See also, George Bird Grinnell, *Pawnee Hero Stories and Folk Tales: With Notes on the Origin, Customs and Character of the Pawnee People* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 399.

¹⁶ Fairfax Downey and Jacques Noel Jacobson, Jr., *The Red/Bluecoats: The Indian Scouts, U. S. Army* (Fort Collins, CO: The Old Army Press, 1973), 41.

Although economic destitution, revenge, and escaping boredom and disease were the most important incentives for young Pawnees to enlist, it is not hard to imagine that many also signed up in the hope to earn war honors. Poverty and government policies were slowly eroding the old social structures that emphasized rank, hierarchy, and social position. Military service allowed the men to gain social recognition on the field of battle. Furthermore, old habits die slow, and some may not die at all.

In a letter to Robert Bruce in 1931, Rush Roberts remarked that the selection to serve in the 1876 campaign was a great honor in itself. "I well remember the day the men were selected," Roberts wrote, "every able-bodied man and boy [was] eager to engage in warfare with our old enemies, the Sioux and Cheyennes. Those fortunate enough to be selected were easily recognized by the broad smiles with which they greeted everyone. It was a great honor."¹⁷

There were many more Pawnees eager to enlist than North could take along. Martha Royce Blaine, whose husband's [grand]father joined the scouts that year, relates the following story, handed down by family tradition:

The next day Wichita Blaine [Garland Blaine's father] went to the agency to join the Scouts, and he stood in line with his uncle, He Who Reverses Goals. North pointed to those who could go. As soon as North came to them, his uncle said, "This is my nephew. We are ready to go." North replied, "You cannot go, but your nephew can go." The uncle answered, "Let me go. He is young. If anyone is to die, let me die." North said, "No, you are wise; stay here and teach the young people what you know." But the uncle and a lot of others followed as far as they were able to go toward Coffeerville, Kansas.

Among the men joining the Norths were *Li-Heris-oo-la-shar* (“Leading Chief” also known by his English name Frank White) and Ralph J. Weeks, an educated Indian who spoke fluent English. Both were appointed to the rank of sergeant in the battalion. John G. Bourke, aide-de-camp to General Crook, later wrote that Frank White had a “good face, prominent cheek bones, aquiline nose, large mouth and frank, open eyes, not so piercing as those usually to be noticed among the aborigines. He had the air of a far-seeing, judicious law-giver, one who took note of all he saw and whose advice could be relied on. Yet, he was no lamb, as the outlines of his countenance plainly showed that, if aroused, he would be a bad enemy.”¹⁸

Those fortunate to go gathered their clothes and, most importantly, their personal medicine bundles. Wichita Blaine packed the little bird bundle with him that his uncle had given him. Many years ago, his uncle had received a vision in which he saw a warrior. In the vision he received instructions to prepare the little bird bundle and two sacred songs to accompany it. When his nephew came of age, he gave him the bundle and instructed him in its use. His uncle told Wichita that if he wore the little bag in his hair when he went to battle he would never be killed.¹⁹

Before they set out for Coffeyville, Eagle Chief and Curly Chief made short speeches to the departing scouts. Ruling his Sun also spoke. According to Luther North, he warned the younger men that they must obey their officers or they would be punished

¹⁷ Rush Roberts to Robert Bruce, July 24, 1929. “Pawnee Trails and Trailers: An Important Chapter in the Geography and History of the Old West,” *Motor Travel Magazine* 21:6 (September 1929), 9. Bruce, *The Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts*, 57.

¹⁸ John G. Bourke, *Mackenzie's Last Fight With the Cheyennes: A Winter Campaign in Wyoming and Montana* (New York: Argonaut Press, 1966), 14.

¹⁹ Blaine, *Some Things Are Not Forgotten*, 6.

like white soldiers, causing some amusement by telling Frank that “if he had to punish any of them he shouldn’t tie them to wagon wheels.”²⁰

The men left the Pawnee Agency and traveled to Coffeyville on foot. A large group of Pawnees who had not been enlisted followed them as far as possible, begging Major North to be allowed to go. At Coffeyville, North and his men boarded a train. Some of the men following the group desperately tried to climb aboard the train, much to Major North’s dismay. According to one account,

One old man bothered North, begging him to be allowed to go, and kept crawling onto the train. North finally strapped him across the back. The old man said, “You have shamed me.” North replied, “No, you have shamed *me*. Here you are an old man and I have to strike you, an old man, so you will know you cannot go.” Many other men standing there said, “Grandfather, let us ride with you a little way.” It was hard for North to refuse them, but he had to. So many wanted to go because life was hard on the reservation, they were hungry, and they wanted to be warriors and feel successful again.²¹

From Coffeyville the scouts rode the train to Kansas City, where they changed cars and traveled to Omaha, Nebraska. The excitement of the scouts grew as they recognized more and more sites along the road. Their morale seemed to improve with each mile as they came closer to their old home. They spent the nights talking about the old days in Nebraska, singing, and dancing.²² When they arrived at Columbus, Nebraska,

²⁰ Luther North to Robert Bruce, August 25, 1929. Printed in “Pawnee Trails and Trailers: An Important Chapter in the Geography and History of the Old West,” *Motor Travel Magazine* 21:6 (September 1929), 11. Bruce, *The Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts*, 43.

²¹ Blaine, *Some Things Are Not Forgotten*, 11.

²² in his memoirs and correspondence, Luther North liked to recall an incident on the trip to Sidney Barracks. While in camp, he suggested to sing an old war song. The song commemorated a glorious battle in which the Pawnees defeated the Ponca Indians, who had come to their village under the false pretense of peace. When Luther made the suggestion all became quiet in the camp. *Li-Heris-oo-la-shar* (Frank White), one of the head men, came over and told North that there was a Ponca with the battalion. The Ponca had

they picked up Sylvanus E. Cushing who would accompany the Pawnee Scouts once again as a captain. Cushing, Luther North, and the scouts continued their journey to Sidney. Frank North, who had still not quite recovered from his ailments, stayed in Columbus to visit a doctor.

On September 18, the Pawnees were mustered in at Sidney Barracks by Captain Pollock. Captain Pollock, however, entered September 3, the day Major North recruited the men at the Pawnee Agency, as the official day of muster. After receiving their arms, ammunition, clothing, and camp equipment, the Pawnees went into camp on Lodgepole Creek, one mile below the town. A few days later, Major North joined them, and Captain Luther North traveled to Julesburg to buy horses for the men. At Sidney the men also received their first training. The drills were not designed to instill discipline but to bring the men into shape again. Captain North

took them out for exercise about every other day, marching a few miles up and down the roads to get them accustomed to their ponies and the country. They were all armed like other cavalymen, with carbines and revolvers, but no sabres, which were considered useless in Indian warfare. Several of the younger scouts had learned to play baseball, and made up a team of nine which played against the soldiers from the Sidney Barracks post; the soldiers usually won the games, but it kept the men in good condition, and took their minds off their wait for marching orders.²³

married a Pawnee woman and was now a full member of the tribe. *Li-Heris-oo-la-shar* explained that they did not wish to offend their friend by singing the Ponca song. Bruce, *The Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts*, 42. Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 200-201.

²³ Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 201. "Register of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914," M233, Roll 70, Volume 150, 1866-1873, Indian Scouts," (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1956), n. p. "Pawnee Trails and Trailers: An Important Chapter in the Geography and History of the Old West," *Motor Travel Magazine* 21:7 (October 1929), 16 and 17. Bruce, *The Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts*, 44.

Although the health and strength of the Pawnees steadily improved, several scouts died of ailments contracted in the Indian Territory. *Ke-wuck-oo-kah-lah* died on September 25 of typhoid fever. A week later, on October 3, *Stu-le-kit-tah-we-ait* died of pneumonia. *Ke-wuck-oo-hod-de*, finally, succumbed to “typhoid malarial fever” at Sidney Barracks on October 12.²⁴ Their bodies were buried at a military cemetery nearby.

While the Pawnees received their arms, horses, and training at Sidney Barracks, preparations for the upcoming campaigns were in full swing. After the Custer battle, the hostile Indians had dispersed into small bands. Dull Knife had taken his Northern Cheyennes deeper into the Big Horn mountains. Crazy Horse’s Oglalas were rumored to be in the Powder River region. And Sitting Bull’s Hunkpapas, Miniconjous, and Sans Arcs were encamped in Montana Territory. The army hoped to round up these Indians through a series of expeditions. The situation was urgent because hundreds of Indians, attracted by the spectacular victories over Custer and Crook, drifted away from their reservations to join the resisting Sioux and Cheyennes. Among them were many young warriors from the Red Cloud agency in northwestern Nebraska.

General Sheridan, in charge of the operations on the Plains, unfolded his plan to end the war. The plan was three-fold. First, he ordered Colonel Nelson A. Miles and his Fifth Infantry into the Yellowstone region to contain the hostile Sioux from the north and prevent them from escaping into Canada. Part two of Sheridan’s plan called for the military takeover of the Sioux agencies in Dakota Territory and western Nebraska. The purpose of this strategy was to prevent warriors from leaving their reservations to join the hostile Indians. To make certain these Indians would not take up arms against the United

²⁴ “Register of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914,” M233, Roll 70, Volume 150, 1866-

States, Sheridan wished to disarm and, if necessary, dismount them in a number of swift and decisive actions. Finally, he proposed that General Crook mount another campaign into the Powder River region in order to drive the Sioux and Cheyennes back to their reservations. To assist Crook's winter campaign, Sheridan ordered Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie and the Fourth Cavalry to Camp Robinson, Nebraska. Sheridan also intended for the Pawnees to assist Crook and Mackenzie in the winter campaign.²⁵

Despite his humiliating encounter with the Sioux and Cheyennes at the Battle of the Rosebud, General George Crook was one of the most distinguished and successful military commanders in the West. In large part, his successes depended on his understanding of Indian warfare. Rejecting orthodox military strategy as taught at West Point, Crook developed his own ideas about campaigning against Indians. He did not like to use slow-moving wagon trains, but rather preferred pack mules and a minimum of supplies to keep up with fast traveling Indians. He admired Indians for their superior skills as scouts and warriors and advocated the use of Indians as scouts and auxiliaries of the frontier army. In an interview in the *Army and Navy Journal* of October 21, 1876, Crook commented on his use of Indian scouts:

I always try to get Indian scouts, because scouting is with them the business of their lives. They learn the signs of a trail as a child learns the alphabet; it becomes an instinct. With a white man the knowledge is acquired in after life. You cannot be sure that an Indian is telling the truth; he will lie to you; so will the white man. But if you can make it to the

1873, Indian Scouts," (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1956), n. p.
²⁵ Jerome A. Greene, "The Surrounding of Red Cloud and Red Leaf, 1876: A Preemptive Maneuver of the Great Sioux War," *Nebraska History* 82:2 (Summer 2001), 69-70.

Indian's interest to tell the truth you get correct information; a white man will lie intentionally, and mislead you unintentionally.²⁶

In the same interview, Crook also gave his view on using Indians against Indians. He believed that the presence of Indian scouts had a demoralizing effect on the enemy, particularly when those scouts belonged to the same tribe as the hostile Indians. He believed that Indians were not afraid of American soldiers, whom they considered cowardly and inferior in man-to-man combat. But they feared brave and ruthless Indian warriors like themselves. "Some people say it is wrong to use the people of a tribe against itself," Crook said, "but pshaw! if I can kill one rattlesnake by making another bite him, I shall do it."²⁷

Crook's treatment of his Indian scouts often provoked the scorn and disgust of his American troops. During the Powder River campaign, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Irving Dodge penned the following commentary in his diary:

[Nov. 16] Went to General Crook to see where I should camp, and was turned off to hunt for myself - all the choice spots being appropriated by him [Crook], [to] his Indians, and pack mules. . . his Indians wash the entrails of the beeves in the stream from which his troops have to drink below. The Cavalry and Infantry are nobodies. The Indians and pack mules have all the good places. He scarcely treats McKenzie [sic] and I decently, but he will spend hours chatting pleasantly with an Indian or a dirty scout.²⁸

²⁶ *Army and Navy Journal* 14 (October 21, 1876), 166. The interview first appeared in the *New York Times*. For a good biography of George Crook see Charles M. Robinson, III, *General Crook and the Western Frontier* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001).

²⁷ *Army and Navy Journal* 14 (October 21, 1876), 166.

²⁸ Wayne R. Kime, ed., *The Powder River Expedition Journals of Colonel Richard Irving Dodge* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), entry for November 16, 1876.

Colonel Ranald Slidell Mackenzie was the commander of the Fourth Cavalry, a regiment which, under his leadership, had been turned into a crack fighting unit. Mackenzie graduated first in his class from West Point in 1862 and made a reputation for himself as a brave and able commander during the Shenandoah and Appomattox campaigns during the Civil War. His performance greatly impressed General U. S. Grant who called him "the most promising young officer in the army." During the Civil War he also received a severe injury on his right hand that would earn him the nick-name "Bad Hand" among the Indian tribes of the West. Among his greatest successes in the Indian campaigns after the Civil War was his victory over the Kiowas and Comanches at Palo Duro Canyon during the Red River War in 1874. But in 1875 he received a severe head injury that may have contributed to strange psychotic episodes that, years later, developed into full-blown insanity.²⁹

In the late summer, Mackenzie arrived at Camp Robinson, Nebraska, with six companies of the Fourth Cavalry. Camp Robinson, at this time only a small military post, had been established on March 8, 1874, to maintain order among the Sioux warriors settled there.³⁰ Most of these Indians belonged to Red Cloud's band of Oglalas. Shortly after his arrival, Mackenzie undertook a census of the number of Indians at the Red Cloud Agency. According to previous reports, there were 12,873 Sioux and about 1,200 Northern Cheyennes enrolled at Red Cloud. Mackenzie's census, however, indicated that presently there were only about 4,760 Sioux and between 600 and 700 Cheyennes at the

²⁹ Robinson, *A Good Year to Die*, 257-258. For biographies of Mackenzie see Michael D. Pierce, *The Most Promising Young Officer: A Life of Ranald Slidell Mackenzie* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993) and Charles M. Robinson III, *Bad Hand: A Biography of General Ranald S. Mackenzie* (Austin, TX: State House Press, 1993).

agency. A similar census at the Spotted Tail Agency showed similar results. Of the 9,170 Indians enrolled at the Spotted Tail Agency, only 4,775 Indians remained. Although the official numbers furnished by the agents had been grossly inflated (in order to provide more rations for the Indians), it was nevertheless clear that many Indians had joined the resisting Indians under Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull. Mackenzie immediately sent an alarming report to his superiors.³¹ General Crook endorsed Mackenzie's report: "These Agencies are and have been the head and front of all the trouble and hostilities which have been in progress," Crook wrote to Sheridan. "They are and have been regular depots of recruits and supplies."³²

On September 21, Sheridan met with Crook and Mackenzie at Fort Laramie, to discuss the upcoming winter campaign and the disarmament of the Indians at the Red Cloud and Spotted Tail Agencies. The situation became urgent in October, when the Oglalas under Red Cloud and a group of Brules under Red Leaf and Swift Bear, broke away from their agencies in protest of government proposals to remove the Sioux to the Indian Territory. They settled in two camps on Chadron Creek, Nebraska. Mackenzie ordered the Indians to return to Camp Robinson, but Red Cloud and Red Leaf refused and demanded that their rations should be sent to their new camps on Chadron Creek. Although Mackenzie withheld their rations altogether, they would not budge. On October 22, as the situation became more critical, Mackenzie sent Lieutenant Oscar Elting to Major North asking for assistance. He then gathered his troops (six companies of the

³⁰ Francis Paul Prucha, *A Guide to the Military Posts of the United States, 1789-1895* (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1964), 102.

³¹ Paul L. Hedren, *Fort Laramie and the Great Sioux War* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988/1998), 155.

Fourth Cavalry and two detached companies of the Fifth Cavalry under Major George A. Gordon), and rode into the direction of Chadron Creek. They started at night and circumvented the Red Cloud Agency so as not to draw the attention of possible Indian spies.³³

While Mackenzie's men prepared themselves to move against Red Cloud and Red Leaf, Major North and the Pawnee Scouts were in camp on the Niobrara River, a hundred miles north of Sidney. They were eating dinner when Lieutenant Elting arrived from Camp Robinson. He carried a dispatch from Mackenzie, ordering the scouts to join the troops at once to assist in the surround of the Indian camps on Chadron Creek. Major North took his brother and forty-two scouts and pressed forward on an all-night ride to overtake Mackenzie. Lieutenant Cushing, meanwhile, proceeded with the remaining scouts to Camp Robinson, where they arrived at 3 a. m. on Sunday, October 23.³⁴

The Pawnees rode seventy miles that night to link up with Mackenzie's forces. They rode at a steady pace for five hours when they finally came in sight of the troops. Their sudden appearance briefly caused some alarm among the soldiers. After a few minutes rest, the combined force continued the march. When they came within twenty miles of the two camps, Mackenzie divided his command into two equal battalions. He

³² George Crook to P. H. Sheridan, October 2, 1876. "Military Reports on the Red Cloud-Red Leaf Surround," *Nebraska History* 15 (October-December 1934), 292.

³³ Greene, "The Surrounding of Red Cloud and Red Leaf," 70-71. For an eyewitness account of these events see Eli S. Ricker, "The Surround of Red Cloud and Red Leaf: Interview of William Garnett," *Nebraska History* 15 (October-December 1934), 288-291, and R. Eli Paul, ed., *The Nebraska Indian Wars reader, 1865-1877* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 157-160.

³⁴ There is some confusion about the number of Pawnees who were present at the surrounds. According to some accounts, Mackenzie and Gordon each had twenty-four Pawnees at his disposal. Major North's diary, however, speaks of forty-two scouts. Entry for October 22, 1876, Frank North Diary, 1876-1877, Frank North Collection, RG 2321 (formerly MS 0448), Box 1, S3-F1, NSHS, Lincoln, Nebraska. Greene, "The Surrounding of Red Cloud and Red Leaf," 71. Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 201-203. Sorenson gives a slightly different account of the surrounding of the Sioux villages. Alfred E. Sorenson, "Life of Major Frank

placed Major Gordon in charge of the surround of Red Leaf's camp. Luther North and half of the scouts (twenty-one men) joined Gordon. Mackenzie himself, meanwhile, took charge of the remaining troops including Major North and the remaining Pawnees, to surround Red Cloud's village. When the trail they followed separated, the two commands parted ways.³⁵

After traveling for a while in complete silence, Mackenzie's battalion reached Red Cloud's village. But, to his surprise, he found that Gordon's troops were already there. Gordon's guide had directed him mistakenly to the wrong village. Mackenzie ordered Gordon to the other village at once and then began to prepare his men for the dawn attack. By 5 a. m. his troops had surrounded the village. Upon Mackenzie's orders, one of his interpreters called out in Lakota that the village was surrounded. Some of the women and children emerged from their tepees and sought cover in the nearby brush. On Major North's order, the Pawnee Scouts rushed into the village and rounded up all the horses. Then Captain Clarence Mauck entered the village. The Indians had been taken by complete surprise, and they quickly surrendered without firing a shot. They were quickly disarmed. Mackenzie ordered the women to break down the camp and select a few ponies from the captured herd on which to mount their baggage. When the women hesitated, Mackenzie's men torched a few tepees, whereupon they complied.³⁶

Meanwhile, Major Gordon's troops surrounded Red Leaf's village. Gordon ordered Luther North's scouts to dash through the camp to round up all horses. The men received orders not to fire unless the Indians fired first. The Pawnee Scouts gave their war

North: "The Famous Pawnee Scout," *Platte County Times*, Columbus (Nebraska), December 19 and 26, 1896, and January 2, 1897.

³⁵ Greene, "The Surrounding of Red Cloud and Red Leaf," 71-72.

whoop as they dashed through the village, but none of the Indians came outside their lodges. Many of the horses were scattered over the village, and most of them were tied down. It took the scouts almost an hour to gather the entire herd. After they had collected the horses, the Indians came out and surrendered. They were taking down their lodges when Mackenzie arrived. Mackenzie allowed the Indians to take enough horses to pack their camp and for the old and feeble ones to ride on, but he made the young warriors walk.³⁷

The Pawnees drove the captured horse herd, some 722 animals, towards Camp Robinson. They were followed by Mackenzie's troops, who escorted the defeated Indians. They arrived at Camp Robinson early in the morning of October 24. After the soldiers searched their baggage for ammunition, the Indians were sent to the Red Cloud Agency, where they set up camp again. That same day, General Crook dismissed Red Cloud from his position as "principal" chief of the Lakotas and replaced him with Spotted Tail. Crook argued that Spotted Tail's Indians were the true friends of the whites and, contrary to Sheridan's orders, refused to disarm and dismount them. In fact, he hoped to enlist the "loyal" Sioux for the upcoming winter campaign against Crazy Horse and the other hostiles.³⁸ Several days later, Crook sent three of his white scouts, William Garnett,

³⁶ Ibid., 72.

³⁷ Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 203-204.

³⁸ Greene, "The Surrounding of Red Cloud and Red Leaf," 73. The position of "Chief of all Sioux" did not exist among the Lakotas, but Red Cloud had been so designated by white officials. In a letter of October 25, Sheridan instructed Crook to "Go right on disarming and dismounting every Indian connected with the Red Cloud Agency; and if Spotted Tail and his Indians do not come up squarely, dismount and disarm them. There must be no halfway work in this matter. All Indians out there must be on our side without question or else on the side of the hostiles. We cannot any longer afford to use so much of our forces guarding Indians alleged to be friendly when they are really hostile." On October 30, Crook responded: "The other bands not disarmed, known as the Arapahoes, Loafers, and Cut-off Sioux, have been loyal to us, and to have disarmed them with the others would simply have arrayed the white man against the Indian and placed the loyal and the disloyal on the same footing." "Military Reports on the Red Cloud-Red Leaf Surround," 294.

Baptiste (“Big Bat”) Poirier, and Frank Grouard, to the Spotted Tail Agency to recruit Indians to serve as scouts for the impending expedition.³⁹

Rumors that some of the Indians might attempt to recapture their horses prompted General Crook to order Major North to take a number of his scouts and drive the herd to Fort Laramie, Wyoming Territory. Although they had been in the saddle for nearly three days with little to no sleep since the 22nd, North and forty or fifty scouts left Camp Robinson on October 24. That night they ran into a wagon train of soldiers carrying supplies for Camp Robinson. The nervous soldiers, alarmed at the sudden appearance of the Pawnees, nearly fired at them in the darkness. Fortunately, the true identity of the Indians was established just in time, and the Pawnees arrived safely at Fort Laramie the next day.⁴⁰

North turned over the herd over to the Quartermaster at Fort Laramie on October 25. Luther North, Lieutenant Cushing, and the remaining scouts arrived at Fort Laramie on October 28. A few days later, General Crook told Major North to bring the men who took part in the siege of Red Cloud and Red Leaf’s villages to select a horse from the captured herd. Then he authorized North to take seventy more horses as a reserve to replace any horses that might die or give out during the winter campaign that he was planning. After North and the Pawnees had made their selection, Crook himself picked several hundred animals to serve as extra saddle horses for the other scouts in the

³⁹ Eli S. Ricker, “The Surround of Red Cloud and Red Leaf: Interview of William Garnett,” *Nebraska History* 15 (October-December 1934), 288-291, and R. Eli Paul, ed., *The Nebraska Indian Wars reader, 1865-1877* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 160.

⁴⁰ Luther North claimed that only twenty scouts accompanied Major North. Most other sources, however, speak of forty to fifty scouts. Jerry Roche, newspaper correspondent from New York was with the soldiers transporting supplies to Camp Robinson when the Pawnees suddenly appeared. He published a lively account of the episode in the *New York Herald* of November 4, 1876.

upcoming campaign.⁴¹ The remainder of the Sioux horses, some 450 animals, were sold at auctions at Fort Laramie, Cheyenne Depot, and Sidney Barracks. With the proceeds of the auction, supplies were bought for the Indians at the Red Cloud Agency.⁴²

At Fort Laramie, General Crook began to gather troops and supplies for the Powder River expedition. His goal was to capture Crazy Horse's band. Over the next few days, units from various regiments trickled into Fort Laramie and reported to Crook for duty. The expedition consisted of three different components. The Cavalry was composed of companies B, D, E, F, I, M, of the Fourth Cavalry, H and L, of the Fifth Cavalry, K of the Second Cavalry, and K-company of the Third Cavalry. The Cavalry would take the field under command of Colonel Mackenzie. Crook placed Lieutenant Colonel Richard Irving Dodge in charge of the Infantry. Dodge had at his disposal companies A, B, D, I, F, K, of the Ninth Infantry, D and G, of the Fourteenth Infantry, and C, G, and I, of his own Twenty-third Infantry. Four companies of the Fourth Artillery formed the final component of the command. They, too, were placed under Dodge's command.⁴³

In addition to the regular troops, however, Crook also had a large number of Indian and white scouts at his disposal. Among the white scouts (many were, in fact, of mixed ancestry) were Frank Grouard and Baptiste Pourier. The Indian scouts consisted of "loyal" Indians. The Arapahos included Sharp Nose, Black Coal, Old Eagle, Six Feathers, Little Fork, White Horse, and William Friday (interpreter). Among the Sioux were Three Bears, Fast Thunder, Charging Bear, Pretty Voiced Bull, Yellow Shirt, Singing Bear, Tall Wild Cat, and Black Mouse. A handful of Cheyennes, including Thunder Cloud, Bird,

⁴¹ Greene, "The Surrounding of Red Cloud and Red Leaf," 73-74. Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 206.

⁴² Paul L. Hedren, *Fort Laramie and the Great Sioux War* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988/1998), 195.

Blown Away, Old Crow, Fisher, and Hard Robe, were also present. Three of the Cheyennes were brothers-in-law of William Rowland, a white man who had married into the tribe and accompanied the expedition. First Lieutenant William Philo Clark and Second Lieutenant Hayden Delaney were in charge of the Sioux, Arapaho, and Cheyenne Scouts. "Captain" Tom Cosgrove and Lieutenant Walter S. Schuyler's battalion of Shoshone Scouts joined the command on November 17, when the expedition was well underway.⁴⁴ Seventy-six Crow Scouts under command of Major Randall, were supposed to join the troops, but bad weather hampered their progress and they did not reach Crook's camp until December.⁴⁵ Civilian and medical personnel completed the expedition. The entire command consisted of 61 officers, 1436 enlisted men, 367 (Indian) Scouts, 400 pack mules attended to by 65 packers, 168 wagons, and 7 ambulances.⁴⁶

At Laramie, the Pawnees received supplies for the upcoming expedition: heavy underclothing, fur caps, gloves, leggings, arctic overshoes, blankets, and "A"-tents.⁴⁷ While Crook was gathering troops and supplies for the Powder River expedition, the scouts entertained themselves with horse races. Although the races were mainly intended to test the endurance and speed of the captured horses, the Pawnees' display of their captured trophies was a major source of frustration among the Sioux and Arapaho

⁴³ *New York Herald*, November 10, 1876. *Army and Navy Journal* 14 (November 18, 1876), 229.

⁴⁴ Homer W. Wheeler, *Buffalo Days. Forty Years in the Old West: The Personal Narrative of a Cattleman, Indian Fighter and Army Officer* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1925), 125-126. Bruce provides a fairly detailed list of the Sioux and Arapaho Scouts present in Crook's command. See "Pawnee Trails and Trailers: An Important Chapter in the Geography and History of the Old West," *Motor Travel Magazine* 21:12 (March 1930), 17. "A Day with the 'Fighting Cheyennes': Stirring Scenes in the Old Northwest, Recalled for Motor Tourists of 1930," *Motor Travel Magazine* 22:1 (April 1930), 19.

⁴⁵ George Bird Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915/Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956/1971), 369.

⁴⁶ Robinson, *A Good Year to Die*, 284-285.

⁴⁷ Wheeler, *Buffalo Days*, 127.

Scouts.⁴⁸ But not everything was fun and games. Major North expected great discipline from his men, and he took some unorthodox measures whenever his men disobeyed his orders. When two scouts failed to show up for a mounted inspection on October 31, North had one of them tied up and the other carry a log in front of his tent for an hour as an example to the other men in the battalion.⁴⁹

At Laramie, the Pawnee Scouts mingled freely with the regular troops.

Occasionally, Indians and white soldiers made new friendships while some old ones were rekindled. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Irving Dodge, for example, was pleased to see Pawnee Sergeant Frank White (*Li-Heris-oo-la-shar*) again. Dodge and White had first met in 1867, while stationed along the Union Pacific line in Nebraska. Together they had fought off a Sioux war party that had cornered them during a hunting expedition. John G. Bourke recalled that the scouts honored Lieutenant Charles Rockwell with an Indian name, “Six Feathers,” as a token of friendship. However, Bourke believed that this special honor might have been induced by the fact that, as commissary, Rockwell controlled large quantities of bacon, sugar, and coffee.⁵⁰ Lieutenant William Philo Clark was particularly fascinated by the Indians’ ability to communicate with members of other

⁴⁸ Second Lieutenant Homer W. Wheeler recalled how the Indians seemed to “melt together” with their ponies during horse races: “The races were usually short distances, from one hundred to four hundred yards, the latter being their favorite. I have known Indians to run for miles to test the endurance of their ponies. Their animals receive, as a rule, no special training, and rarely are precautions taken in regard to feeding them before the races. The riders ride bareback and commence to whip from the start, continuing to the end of the course with legs and arms flying; but with the perfect seat of the rider, the harmony of motion of horse and rider do not allow this to interfere as much with the stride and speed as one would naturally expect. Usually, whatever is wagered is placed in a pile at the winning post, and very rarely is there any dispute of the result of the race. At times, so reckless is the betting that the bettors are reduced from comparative wealth to abject poverty.” Wheeler, *Buffalo Days*, 122.

⁴⁹ Entry for October 31 and November 1, 1876, Frank North Diary, 1876-1877, Frank North Collection, RG 2321 (formerly MS 0448), Box 1, S3-F1, NSHS, Lincoln, Nebraska.

⁵⁰ Bourke, *Mackenzie’s Last Fight With the Cheyennes*, 7.

tribes through sign language. Clark began to study the Indian sign language and eventually publish a book about it.⁵¹

Some of the regularly enlisted men and officers, however, did not hold a very high opinion of their Indian allies. Second Lieutenant Henry H. Bellas, Fourth Cavalry, for example, believed that all Indians were treacherous and unreliable. He wrote of the ~~Indians on the Powder River expedition~~

Under the command of officers selected from the cavalry was a body of 100 [there were actually many more] friendly Indians - Pawnees, Arapahoes, Crows, Bannocks, Shoshones, Snakes [probably also Shoshones], and even Sioux and Cheyennes; for any Indian will betray even those of his own tribe, including all his wife's relations, provided the reward offered be sufficiently tempting.⁵²

The Pawnees could trust neither the Sioux nor the regular soldiers. After placing the horses captured at Chadron Creek in the care of the quartermaster of the command, the Pawnees noticed that some of the horses began to disappear mysteriously during the night. To prevent the further theft of the horses, Major North ordered his men to guard the animals at all times and kill anyone who tried to take them away. After this order was issued, no more thefts were reported.⁵³

General Crook left Fort Laramie on November 5 and set out for Fort Fetterman, Wyoming Territory, where he arrived two days later. He left without properly notifying

⁵¹ William Philo Clark, *The Indian Sign Language* (Philadelphia, PA: L. R. Hammersly, 1885/Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 5.

⁵² Henry H. Bellas quoted in Jerome A. Greene, ed., *Battles and Skirmishes of the Great Sioux War, 1876-1877: The Military View* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 173. There were, in fact, no Crow Scouts present in the Powder River expedition until December, 1876.

⁵³ George Bird Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts and Their Pawnee Battalion: The Experiences of Frank J. North and Luther H. North, Pioneers in the Great West, 1856-1882, and their defence of the building of the*

Major North of the move. Crook's sudden departure even surprised Mackenzie, who quickly gathered his troops to follow the general. Mackenzie arrived at Fetterman on November 9. Major North's scouts arrived the next day, together with Dodge's Infantry. Crook's vague instructions and seemingly erratic marching orders soon became a source of frustration for Major North.⁵⁴

North was also outraged by rumors that he would be placed under command of Lieutenant William Clark. Clark had suggested to combine all the Indian Scouts under his command. North rejected the proposal, saying he would take orders only from Crook or Mackenzie. He argued that the Pawnees and Sioux had been mortal enemies, and that combining them into one command would only create chaos. Crook agreed and Pawnee Battalion remained under North's command.⁵⁵

From Fort Fetterman, the expedition marched northwest. As usual, the Pawnees' main task was to search the area for hostile Indians and guide the troops. According to Bourke, the scouts "covered the country for thirty to forty miles on each side of the column, letting nothing escape their scrutiny, but keeping their own movements well concealed."⁵⁶ On November 18, the expedition passed the remains of Fort Reno (old Fort Connor), which had been abandoned in 1868. Shortly thereafter they arrived at Cantonment Reno, on the north bank of the Powder River at the foot of the Big Horn

Union Pacific Railroad (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1928/Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973), 256-257.

⁵⁴ Although he was, at times, a brilliant strategist, Crook often failed to communicate his plans to his officers. To many of his staff members, he appeared sometimes erratic. His orders were often vague and broad, and frequently puzzled his officers. Robinson, *A Good Year to Die*, 56-57. Danker, *Man of the Plains*, 207.

⁵⁵ "The Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts: Stirring Scenes in the Old Northwest, Recalled for Motor Tourists," *Motor Travel [Magazine]* 23:1 (April 1931), 17.

⁵⁶ Bourke, *Mackenzie's Last Fight With the Cheyennes*, 8. Greene, ed., *Battles and Skirmishes of the Great Sioux War*, 175.

Mountains. The camp had been constructed upon Crook's orders on October 12, 1876, in preparation for the expedition. Its purpose was to serve as a supply station for the troops. Here, the command also met Tom Cosgrove and his battalion of one hundred Shoshone Scouts. The entire command now numbered more than two thousand men.⁵⁷ At Reno, the scouts also received their pay. On November 18, Major North recorded in his diary that

This morn we started early and came in to Reno ahead of the Cavalry and this eve we got paid off and the men are making the money fly. They send a good share home.⁵⁸

Luther North stated that the Pawnees "made a practice of sending most of their pay home, which is more than could be said of many white soldiers. . . I believe that Frank forwarded their remittances from Fort Reno, Wyo. Ter., by the army paymaster. When we returned from the north to Sidney, Nebraska, the money could be sent by draft about as done now, though of course much slower."⁵⁹ *Ah-re-Kah-rard* (Rush Roberts), the youngest scout in the campaign, recalled that he sent his pay to his mother and brother-in-law back at the Pawnee reservation.⁶⁰ Frank North also kept track of the accounts of Indians who borrowed money from him or other officers and enlisted men, as well as all transactions among his scouts.⁶¹

⁵⁷ Robins, *A Good Year to Die*, 284-285. The name of Cantonement Reno was later changed to Fort McKinney, after Lieutenant John McKinney who died during the Dull Knife battle. the post was abandoned on November 7, 1894. Prucha, *A Guide to the Military Posts of the United States*, 89.

⁵⁸ Frank North Diary, 1876-1877, Frank North Collection, RG 2321 (formerly MS 0448), Box 1, S3-F1, NSHS, Lincoln, Nebraska.

⁵⁹ Bruce, *The Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts*, 40.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁶¹ Frank North Diary, 1876-1877, Frank North Collection, RG 2321 (formerly MS 0448), Box 1, S3-F1, NSHS, Lincoln, Nebraska.

Crook's unpredictable style of command was not the only source of trouble for Major North. There were other, more serious problems that also demanded his attention. Tensions between the Sioux and Pawnees occasionally rose to dangerous levels. Richard Irving Dodge recalled in his memoirs the following incident that nearly resulted in a fatal confrontation between the two tribes.

In his celebrated winter campaign against the Sioux, General Crook had, as auxiliaries, about three hundred and fifty Indians of various tribes and bands, among them a considerable number of Sioux and four companies of Pawnees, these latter drilled and disciplined like soldiers. I have elsewhere spoken of the unrelenting hatred of these tribes each to the other. One day when the Pawnees were quietly marching along the road in formal ranks, and the Sioux were careering in individual freedom over the prairie, a young Sioux warrior rode up to the ranks, and to signalize at once his hatred to the tribe, and his contempt for Indians who would march in ranks, struck one of the Pawnees with his "coup-stick." In an instant, half-a-dozen revolvers were presented, and the Sioux would have paid for his temerity then and there but that the Pawnee discipline was so excellent that a word from the officer restrained them. That night, the Pawnee who had been struck went to Major North, the commander of all the Pawnees, told him with sobs of disgrace that had been put upon him, and begged to be permitted to kill his assailant. This was of course, refused, but Major North made such representation of the matter to General Crook, that the Sioux were thereafter effectually restrained from such little excentricities.⁶²

Another incident occurred shortly after the Pawnees' arrived at Reno. During a council with the Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho Scouts on November 7, General Crook had promised them some of the horses herded by the Pawnees. Crook, however, failed to inform Major North of his decision. A few days, later Lieutenant William P. Clark, commanding officer of the Sioux Scouts, and Three Bears, a Sioux sergeant, rode into the

⁶² Richard Irving Dodge, *Our Wild Indians: Thirty-Three Years' Personal Experience Among the Red Men of the Great West* (Hartford, CT: A. D. Worthington and Company, 1883), 464.

Pawnee camp to collect the horses. The Pawnee guards immediately notified Major North, who arrived on scene just as Three Bears was leading North's own horse from the herd. North ordered Lieutenant Clark back and threatened to kill Three Bears if he did not let the horse go. Faced with this "insult," Three Bears returned to the Sioux camp and began to rally his men for an attack on the Pawnee Scouts. Upon receiving the news that the Sioux were preparing an attack to "clean out the Pawnees," Major North ordered his men to get ready to repel them. Then he and his brother mounted their horses to inform General Crook. On their way to Crook's headquarters, they passed by the Sioux camp. The angry Sioux watched them approach the camp. Instead of stopping, Major North began to sing a Pawnee war song. Luther North joined him, and they paraded their horses past the Sioux. The Sioux, however, refrained from attacking the Major and his scouts.⁶³

Crook himself later resolved the dispute over the horses in favor of North. But to avoid such events from occurring again, Crook held a series of councils with his Indian scouts. On November 19, Crook approached Major North and informed him that the Sioux and Cheyenne Scouts complained that the Pawnees remained distant and cool but that they wished to be friends with them. Crook suggested holding a council to establish peace between the two camps. Frank North discussed the matter with his scouts, who were unimpressed with their old enemies' complaints. According to the Pawnees, the Sioux merely pretended they wanted to become friends "so that they could have a better opportunity of getting their captured horses back from the Pawnees, among whom a large

⁶³ On November 7, Crook had a council with the Sioux, Arapahos, and Cheyenne Scouts. At this meeting Three Bears, Fast Thunder (both Sioux) and Sharp Nose called for the good treatment of their people back at the agencies. They also demanded to be given some of the horses that the Pawnees had been driving. Crook agreed. "Our Indian Allies: Crook's Talk with His Red Soldiers," *New York Herald*, November 16, 1876. Danker, *Man of the Plains*, 208-210.

number of the horses had been distributed.” Nevertheless, wishing to abide by Crook’s orders, they agreed to go to the council. Sergeants *Li-Heris-oo-la-shar* (Frank White) and *U-sanky-su-cola* joined Major North as representatives of the Pawnee Battalion.⁶⁴

The prospects for peace were not good when some of the Sioux delegates appeared at the council in full war dress regalia. Frank North called Crook’s attention to this fact and urged the general to bar these Indians from the council. Crook, however, paid little attention to the matter.⁶⁵ Crook opened the council with a long speech, in which he called upon the Indians to change their ways. In his speech, recorded by his aide de camp John G. Bourke, Crook added that the Indians needed to adopt the “white man’s road.” They should to learn to keep cattle, till farms, and live in houses like white people. According to Crook, Indians should “live like the white man and [be] at peace with him, or be wiped off the face of the earth.” He then urged the different tribes to “bury their hatchets” and “reconcile [their] petty differences.” *Tup-si-paw* and *O-ho-a-tay* spoke next for the Bannocks and Shoshones. They were followed by Three Bears, a Sioux sergeant, and Sharp Nose, principal man among the Arapaho Scouts. They, too, professed their loyalty to Crook and asked for fair treatment of their relatives at the agencies.⁶⁶ The irony

⁶⁴ Alfred E. Sorenson, “Life of Major Frank North,” *The Platte County Times*, Columbus (Nebraska), January 2, 1896. Bourke, *Mackenzie’s Last Fight With the Cheyennes*, 12. John G. Bourke, *On the Border With Crook* (Columbus, OH: Long’s College Book Co., 1950), 392. The register of enlistments spells the latter’s name *Us sak kish oo kah lah*.

⁶⁵ Alfred E. Sorenson, “Life of Major Frank North,” *The Platte County Times*, Columbus (Nebraska), January 9, 1896.

⁶⁶ Bourke, *Mackenzie’s Last Fight With the Cheyennes*, 11-12. On November 7, Crook already had a similar council with the Sioux, Arapahos, and Cheyenne Scouts. At this meeting Three Bears, Fast Thunder (both Sioux) and Sharp Nose called for the good treatment of their people back at the agencies. They also demanded to be given some of the horses that the Pawnees had been driving. Crook agreed. “Our Indian Allies: Crook’s Talk with His Red Soldiers,” *New York Herald*, November 16, 1876. Crook’s promise to give the Sioux and Arapaho Scouts some of the horses herded by the Pawnees almost led to a confrontation between Three Bears and Frank North. Major North had not been informed of Crook’s decision to give some of the horses to the Sioux. When Three Bears selected Major North’s horse from the Pawnee herd, North threatened to kill him. The dispute was later resolved in favor of North by Crook himself.

of Crook's speech must not have escaped the Indians present at the council. After all, it was Crook himself who had enlisted them to fight in a war against their own people.

Li-Heris-oo-la-shar (Frank White) spoke for the Pawnees. John G. Bourke, who attended the council and kept a detailed record of what was being said that night, described his appearance:

The hand was the hand of Esau, but the voice was the voice of Jacob; his clothes were all right, a suit of Chatham Street "hand-me-downs" obtained from the munificence of the Interior Department during a visit to Washington; his face-painting, however, would not be justified by any of the canons of good taste . . . Eye-lids and ears, and the median line of forehead and chin, blushed with vermillion; the cheekbones were stained a dark brown, and the lower half of the face a dirty lemon. The hair was divided into two pig-tails, wrapped in yellow tape and hanging over the ears.⁶⁷

Li-Heris-oo-la-shar's appearance revealed both the soldier as well as the warrior that the Pawnee Scouts seemed to embody. When he spoke, he tried to make the most of the occasion. His words were intended to impress Crook with the unconditional loyalty of the Pawnees for the white man and the desire to travel the "white man's road."

I am talking to friends. This our head chief (General Crook) talking to us and asking us to be brothers. I hope the Great Spirit will smile on us. Brothers. We are all Indians and have the same kind of skin. The Pawnees have lived with the white men a long time and know how strong they are. We are afraid of them, because they are so strong. Brothers. I don't think there is one of you can come out here today and say you ever heard of the Pawnee killing a white man. Brothers. We are all of the same color and we are all Indians. Today, this Big Chief has called us together to have a Council and I am glad of it and glad to meet you all. Father, (turning to General Crook), I suppose you know the Pawnees are civilized. We plough, farm and work the ground like white people. Father, it is so what

⁶⁷ Bourke, *Mackenzie's Last Fight With the Cheyennes*, 12.

the Arapahoes said. We have all gone on this Expedition to help and hope it may be a successful one.

Father, I'm glad you have said you would listen to what we had to say. If we have any wrongs, we'll come to tell you about them. I suppose you have heard it is a good many years since we (Pawnees) have been to war. We have given it up long ago. When I was at home, I did what our Agent wanted us to do: farmed and worked the land. When they said at Washington, they wanted us for this trip, we threw everything aside but when we go back, we'll take to farming again. Father, it is good what you have said to us. I hope these people understand it too and that we shall all be good friends. This is all I have to say. I am glad you have told us what you did about the captured stock. The horses taken will help us to work our land."⁶⁸

At the conclusion of the council, the representatives agreed to be on friendly terms from then on. To solemnize the agreement, Three Bears presented Frank White with a horse. White accepted the horse and, thus, the friendship of the Sioux. The Pawnees then responded by giving away some of their own horses.⁶⁹

It seemed that Crook's attempt to reconcile his scouts had been successful. *New York Herald* correspondent Jerry Roche, who covered the expedition, wrote that "No apprehensions are now felt of disturbances between our Sioux and Pawnee soldiers." According to Roche, the Indians "have stopped calling each other taunting names, as was their habit for a little time after our departure from Fort Laramie."⁷⁰ In the days following the council, Bourke observed that the Indian scouts continued "a delightful series of peace-talks, smokes and dances, in which there was mutual serenading, plenty in quantity,

⁶⁸ John G. Bourke's diary entry quoted in Sherry L. Smith, *Sagebrush Soldier: Private William Earl Smith's View of the Sioux War of 1876* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), 57.

⁶⁹ Alfred E. Sorenson, "Life of Major Frank North," *The Platte County Times*, Columbus (Nebraska), January 9, 1896. Danker, *Man of the Plains*, 210-211.

⁷⁰ *New York Herald*, November 27, 1876. *Army and Navy Journal* 14 (December 2, 1876), 270.

wretched in quality, some present-giving and protestations innumerable of the most affectionate friendship.”⁷¹

On November 21, some scouts returned with a Cheyenne prisoner named Beaver Dam. Under interrogation, Beaver Dam revealed the location of some of the hostile camps. Dull Knife had moved his village into the Big Horn Mountains, a few days' march south of Cantonment Reno. Crazy Horse's village was on the Rosebud, further north, not far from the place where Crook's troops had engaged them earlier that year. Crook at once ordered his men to prepare to move against Crazy Horse. The next day, the command left Reno at 6.20 a. m. That day the troops traveled twenty-five miles over rough and broken terrain. The next morning, November 23, as they were breaking camp, Crook received news that his troops had been spotted by some Indians, who were now on their way to warn Crazy Horse of the approaching troops. Realizing that a surprise attack was now impossible, Crook decided to attack the Cheyenne village instead. He ordered Mackenzie to take the cavalry and the Indian scouts and proceed in the direction of the Cheyenne village to the south.⁷² Several parties of scouts were sent out that day to locate the Cheyenne camp. Major North sent five scouts under a Pawnee sergeant. The Sioux and Arapahos also sent out scouting parties.⁷³

Mackenzie's column left camp at noon that day and traveled southward along the foot of the Big Horn Mountains. They marched twelve miles before setting up camp. The weather had become increasingly colder, and the men spent an uncomfortable night in the

⁷¹ Bourke, *Mackenzie's Last Fight With the Cheyennes*, 13.

⁷² Robinson, *A Good Year to Die*, 287-288.

⁷³ Luther North to Robert Bruce, December 4, 1929. The "Robert Bruce, Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts Papers," Box 1, Folder 1, Department of Special Collections, McFarlin Library, University of Tulsa, Oklahoma.

open air, since they had left their tents behind with Crook's column. On the 24th, they continued the journey. After marching ten miles, the Arapaho scouting party appeared in the distance. As they neared the soldiers' camp, they circled their ponies at full gallop "in a wild and excited manner" to signal their discovery of the village. When the other scouts saw this signal they began to yell in excitement. Their sudden cries alarmed the soldiers in the camp, who believed that an Indian attack was imminent. The soldiers soon learned that the scouts merely yelled in "triumph at the return of the others."⁷⁴

The scouts reported that the village was about fifteen miles to the south. Mackenzie immediately halted his column. He wanted to wait until dark before moving towards the village. While his troops rested, Second Lieutenant Homer W. Wheeler saw some of the Indian scouts race their horses as fast as they could go. Frank Grouard, one of the white scouts with the command explained that it was an old custom to do this before going into a fight, "as it gave the ponies their second wind."⁷⁵

Mackenzie forbade the men to make fires or smoke cigarettes. Few of the soldiers enjoyed a good rest. Many were anxious about the upcoming fight, particularly the young recruits who had never been in an Indian battle before. A young soldier caused quite an uproar when he rushed into camp and woke up everybody by exclaiming that the Indians were coming. When it turned out that the Indians were U. S. Indian scouts, the panic subsided.⁷⁶

Five minutes before sundown, Mackenzie ordered his men to mount their horses. Luther North recalled that the march that followed was the hardest they ever had. As the

⁷⁴ Greene, ed., *Battles and Skirmishes of the Great Sioux War*, 175.

⁷⁵ Wheeler, *Buffalo Days*, 130.

⁷⁶ Smith, *Sagebrush Soldier*, 61-64.

hours passed, the temperatures dropped. The steep, snow-covered trail was extremely difficult. When they passed through a narrow canyon, Major North ordered Luther to let the men pass by and try to count them to make certain none had fallen behind. As he counted his men, Luther noticed that many of the regular soldiers as well as a few of his scouts were “sick at the stomach.” Luther blamed their condition on the high altitude and the cold.⁷⁷

Just before daylight on November 25, they heard the faint thump of Indian drums in the distance. They were now near the village. The settlement belonged to a band of Northern Cheyennes under Dull Knife (whose actual name was “Morning Star”), Wild Hog, and Little Wolf. Black Hairy Dog, keeper of the Medicine Arrows, and Coal Bear, keeper of the Sacred Hat, were also in the village. Many of these Indians had been present at the Little Big Horn at the time of Custer’s attack. After the Custer battle, Dull Knife took his people deep into the Big Horn Mountains and out of reach of the army.⁷⁸

When they were within a mile of the village, Mackenzie halted his troops to issue orders to his officers. The Indian scouts would spearhead the attack. Mackenzie ordered Major North to charge the village on the left hand side of the creek that ran through the valley. The Shoshone Scouts would follow closely behind them. The troops, meanwhile, would charge the village on the right hand side of the creek. It was too late to surround it silently, and the shape of the valley made it impossible for the troops to take their positions without being detected. The plan was to encircle the village in a sweeping charge and cut off the Cheyennes’ escape routes. Mackenzie gave his Indian scouts time

⁷⁷ Danker, *Man of the Plains*, 211-212.

⁷⁸ George Bird Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1915/Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956/1971), chapter 27.

to move ahead of the command and prepare for battle. The Pawnees filed by the troops through the narrow canyon and unsaddled their horses, as they always did before making a charge.⁷⁹ The Pawnees were armed with Springfield carbines and revolvers. They wore their trousers but, despite the arctic temperatures, they discarded their heavy winter coats and jackets, and went into the fight in their shirt sleeves.⁸⁰ According to Luther North, all the scouts wore handkerchiefs on their heads to distinguish themselves from the hostiles.⁸¹ The scouts also took out their personal medicine bundles and other charms they carried with them. Wichita Blaine, for example, tied his grandfather's little bird bundle to his hair for protection and good fortune.⁸²

Just before the attack, Mackenzie gave his instructions to Lieutenant Lawton of private William Earl Smith's company. Smith recalled that Mackenzie "sed we were to late to surround the camp and we would have to make a dash for it. He says we will keep the Indins [the scouts] right a hed of us and make them go in first and if there is any trap, they will catch it first and then we can open on them from the rear."⁸³ Mackenzie's order showed little regard for his Indian allies.

The attack on the village began at dawn. When the bugler sounded the signal for the attack, the Pawnees raced ahead of the other Indian Scouts who were, in turn,

⁷⁹ Danker, *Man of the Plains*, 212-213. The Pawnees left the saddles and rode into the fight bareback. In the evening, after the battle, they returned to get their saddles, but found that the straps and conches of the saddles had been cut to pieces. Luther North suspected that the Sioux and Cheyenne Scouts, who were riding up behind them, were responsible for the vandalism. "The Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts: Stirring Scenes in the Old Northwest, Recalled for Motor Tourists," *Motor Travel [Magazine]* 23:3 (June 1931), 19.

⁸⁰ "The Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts: Stirring Scenes in the Old Northwest, Recalled for Motor Tourists," *Motor Travel [Magazine]* 23:2 (May 1931), 23.

⁸¹ "A Day With the 'Fighting Cheyennes': Stirring Scenes in the Old Northwest, Recalled for Motor Tourists," *Motor Travel [Magazine]* 22:11 (February 1931), 22.

⁸² Blaine, *Some Things Are Not Forgotten*, 6.

⁸³ Smith, *Sagebrush Soldier*, 66.

followed by the white troops. As they approached the village, the scouts raised their war cry. Some of the white soldiers noticed that some of the scouts used whistles that added a strange and uncanny effect to the attack. General Mackenzie, who observed the attack from a distance, reported that his men had not gone far “when our Indians commenced howling and blowing on hideous voiced wind instruments.”⁸⁴ His aide-de-camp, John G. Bourke, later remembered the “clatter and clangor of arms, the ear-piercing shrieks and yells of savage allies, their blood-curdling war songs, and the weird croon of the sacred flageolets of the Pawnee medicine men who, like the Celtic bands of old, rode boldly at the head of their people.”⁸⁵ The purpose of the terrible noise was to send the villagers into a panic and spook their horses. Second Lieutenant Henry H. Bellas was among the troops who charged the village behind the scouts:

Replying to the clear notes of the bugle, as it rang out the charge - echoed and reechoed from the walls of the canyon - was the music furnished by one of the Pawnees, who sounded a wild humming tune on a pipe that rose above all other sounds and somewhat resembled the prolonged shriek of a steam whistle. Added to this were now the shouts and cries of our foremost line of scouts, who dashed into the herds of ponies to stampede them.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ *Army and Navy Journal* 14 (December 9, 1876), 286.

⁸⁵ Bourke, *Mackenzie's Last Fight With the Cheyennes*, 29-30.

⁸⁶ Greene, ed., *Battles and Skirmishes of the Great Sioux War*, 177. In a letter to Robert Bruce, Luther North denied that there was a Pawnee who played a flute at the time of the attack: “There was no flageolets in our company some of the Sioux or Shoshone scouts may have had small bone whistles but I doubt it the only flageolets I ever heard was among the Santee Sioux and Winnebago when I was in the 2nd Nebr. Cavalry in 1863. medicine men were often great warriors Traveling Bear was a medicine man I think we had only one with us in 1876 all writers seem to want to get something out of the ordinary when writing of the scouts Col Wheeler tells of Frank calling his men with a whistle. he gave them orders as any officer would his soldiers he never carried a whistle in his life. the Santee Sioux and Winnebago Indians used flageolets to serenade there [sic] sweethearts I never heard of their use in war and I am quite sure there were none used in the Dull Knife fight. in fact I never heard of the Brulle [sic] or Ogalala Sioux use them anywhere but they may have. Luther North to Robert Bruce, January 7, 1930. The “Robert Bruce, Fighting

The attack caught the Cheyennes by surprise. Oddly enough, there is ample evidence that the Cheyennes had been forewarned that an attack was impending. According to some Cheyenne accounts, the chiefs had sent out several scouts in the days before the attack to investigate reports that soldiers were in the field nearby. When the scouts discovered Crook's camp, they reported the information to the chiefs. Some, such as Black Hairy Dog, wanted to break camp and leave immediately. But Last Bull of the Fox Soldier society, who was in charge of the defense of the camp, disagreed. When Crow Split Nose ordered his followers to go, Last Bull's Fox Soldiers even prevented them from leaving the camp. Perhaps Last Bull believed the Cheyennes could whip the soldiers again, as they had at the Little Big Horn. It seems more likely, however, that the Cheyennes simply could not believe that American troops would force a march over rough terrain in near-arctic temperatures. This might explain why they felt relatively safe despite the rumors that the soldiers had been seen.⁸⁷

The Pawnee Scouts entered the valley on the south side of the creek. But they soon learned that the trail in front of them could not be passed. The Shoshone Scouts took a sharp turn to the left and rode up into the mountains, where they took a position on top of some cliffs. From there they kept up rifle fire on the Cheyennes, who were trying to escape from the back of the village. Luther North, however, did not think they did much damage as they were almost half a mile away from the Indians. Major North, meanwhile, led his men across the creek to join the troops. But because the creek was muddy and

Norths and Pawnee Scouts Papers," Box 1, Folder 4, Department of Special Collections, McFarlin Library, University of Tulsa, Oklahoma.

⁸⁷ Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes*, 370-374. Lessing H. Nohl, Jr., "Mackenzie Against Dull Knife: Breaking the Northern Cheyennes in 1876," K. Ross Toole, et al., ed., *Probing the American West: Papers from the Santa Fe Conference* (Santa Fe: Museum of New Mexico Press, 1962), 88.

difficult to cross, they lost much time, allowing many Cheyenne women and children to escape.⁸⁸

After crossing the creek, the Pawnees charged alongside the troops. Despite the professions of friendship by the Sioux and Arapaho Scouts, the Pawnee Scouts ran a great risk of being shot from their horses by their Indian “allies.” The Cheyennes fired at the Pawnees from the ridges in front, while the Sioux Scouts rode up right behind them.

According to Luther North, the Sioux were “not very particular whether they shot at us or the Cheyennes.”⁸⁹

When the Pawnees charged the lower end of the village, many of the surprised Cheyennes did not have enough time to gather their clothes. Here, the Cheyennes suffered their heaviest losses “as the Pawnees poured deadly volleys into teepees, killing without discretion all whom they contacted.”⁹⁰ When Luther North rode into the village, a Cheyenne boy jumped in front of his horse and raised a gun. North killed the boy with a gunshot. The boy later proved to be one of Dull Knife’s sons. The Pawnees counted coup on his body as they passed by.⁹¹

Occasionally, the Pawnees were caught in a cross-fire between the troops and the Cheyennes. When Second Lieutenant Homer Wheeler discovered an Indian lying in a little depression in the ground about two hundred yards in front of him, he ordered his men to open fire. Immediately, a Pawnee Scout, who happened to be with them cried out, “Pawnee! Pawnee!” and the firing ceased. “It seems the Indian was recognized from the

⁸⁸ Danker, *Man of the Plains*, 213-214.

⁸⁹ Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 214.

⁹⁰ Greene, ed., *Battles and Skirmishes of the Great Sioux War*, 120.

⁹¹ Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes*, 364.

way he wore his hair,” Wheeler wrote in his memoirs. “He had been unhorsed and was lying low between the two fires. He must have borne a charmed life.”⁹²

The Pawnees found many of the tepees already deserted. They dismounted and climbed a small hill from where they began to shoot across the valley at the Cheyennes, who were covering the retreat of the women and children from a number of rocky ridges.⁹³ A group of soldiers under the command of Lieutenant John A. McKinney charged the village on the right flank. Ralph Weeks, who had been educated at the Pawnee Agency school and who spoke English well, joined McKinney’s troops with some of the other Pawnees. When they neared the village, they suddenly came under fire from some Cheyennes who had taken position in a canyon at the mouth of the village. Lieutenant McKinney was shot and killed almost instantly. Shortly afterwards, McKinney’s first sergeant fell as well, leaving the troops without a commander. When the soldiers began to retreat, Ralph Weeks rode up to them and yelled, “Get off your horses and come ahead on foot. There are only seven of them. We will kill them all.” The soldiers followed Weeks into the ravine and killed the Indians who had shot Lieutenant McKinney.⁹⁴

⁹² Wheeler, *Buffalo Days*, 133.

⁹³ Danker, *Man of the Plains*, 214.

⁹⁴ George Bird Grinnell, *Pawnee Hero Stories and Folk-Tales: With Notes on the Origin, Customs and Character of the Pawnee People* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 74-75. Ralph Weeks was one of Grinnell’s Pawnee informants. According to Jerry Roche, newspaper correspondent for the *New York Herald*, Lt. McKinney lived for another twenty minutes after being shot. As he fell from his horse, mortally wounded, he supposedly cried out “Get back from this place, you are ambushed,” and then exclaimed, “Oh! my poor mother! Tell her! Tell her!” *New York Herald*, December 1 and 11, 1876. According to the Cheyenne account, as recorded by Grinnell, Tall Bull (not to be confused with the Dog Soldier chief), Walking Whirlwind, Burns Red (in the Sun), Walking Calf, Hawks Visit, and Four Spirits, were among the Cheyennes killed by the soldiers. Scabby, Curly, and Two Bulls were injured. Scabby died of his wounds two days later. Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes*, 365.

Lieutenant McKinney was not the only casualty. Several soldiers were killed, and a fair number received serious injuries. The wounded men were taken off the battlefield and placed behind a hill, which was later aptly named "hospital hill." There they were attended by medical personnel. But soon Cheyenne sharp shooters fired upon the men from some rocks up on the mountain side. Mackenzie immediately took steps to drive the Indians from their position. Second Lieutenant Homer Wheeler remembered:

General Mackenzie asked Major Frank North, in my presence, at the hospital hill, if he thought he could drive the Indians away from there. North replied that he thought so, if there were only a few of them. He blew a call on his Indian whistle, which sounded to me very much like a turkey call used by hunters. In a short time half a dozen Pawnees, with a non-commissioned officer, appeared. When told what they were to do they stripped down to their "gee strings," removing their heavy boots and substituting moccasins (they were wearing uniforms) and then, tying handkerchiefs around their heads, so they might not be taken for hostiles, they quickly disappeared up the mountainside. The firing soon ceased. I was later informed that the scouts killed one or two of the hostiles and scalped them.⁹⁵

The fighting was fierce. Iron Teeth, a Cheyenne woman who was in the village at the time of the attack, recalled the advance of the troops:

Soldiers came and fought us there [at the village]. Crows, Pawnees, Shoshones, some Arapahoes and other Indians were with them. They killed our men, women and children, whichever ones might be hit by their bullets. We who could do so ran away. My husband and my two sons helped in fighting off the soldiers and enemy Indians. My husband was walking, leading his horse, and stopping at times to shoot. Suddenly, I saw him fall. I started to go back to him, but my sons made me go on, with my three daughters. The last time I saw [him], he was lying dead in the snow.

⁹⁵ Wheeler, *Buffalo Days*, 136.

From the hill tops we Cheyennes saw our lodges and everything in them burned.⁹⁶

The Cheyennes scalped Private John Sullivan, Company B, Fourth Cavalry. The Pawnees joined in the bloodbath and showed no mercy for their opponents. When *New York Herald* correspondent Jerry Roche entered the village, he found the body of an old Cheyenne woman, who had just been scalped:

A Pawnee scout was moving off from the prostrate body, bearing with him the dripping scalp. This unfortunate squaw had been found in the village hidden in a tepee after the troops had passed through it by private Butler, of the Second cavalry, who told the Pawnees, many of whom were then in the village, not to kill her. Butler's back was scarcely turned, however, before the old squaw was shot and scalped.⁹⁷

First Sergeant James S. McClellan observed a Pawnee Scout count coup on one of the slain Cheyennes:

We charged them [the Cheyennes] on foot and the bullets flew as thick as hail lots of men fell on both sides as we run in on them. They broke and run. one of them being about 15 yards from me I shot him through the small of the back. he fell on his face. I run up and gave him a few pistol shots took his gun, a sharps carbine and as I was doing so a Pawnee came up and took the coup.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Greene, ed., *Lakota and Cheyenne*, 114. For excellent accounts of the battle from the Cheyennes' perspective see Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes*, 359-382, and John Stands In Timber and Margot Liberty, *Cheyenne Memories* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967/1998), 214-219.

⁹⁷ *New York Herald*, December 11, 1876.

⁹⁸ Thomas R. Buecker, ed., "The Journals of James S. McClellan, 1st Sgt., Company H. 3rd Cavalry," *Annals of Wyoming* 57:1 (1985), 29. In a letter to Robert Bruce, McClellan later wrote, "I still remember that the Pawnee had a wide grin on his face at the thought of outwitting me in the matter of the coup." "Pawnee Trails and Trailers: An Important Chapter in the Geography and History of the Old West," *Motor Travel Magazine* 21:12 (March 1930), 20. McClellan later returned to the place where he had killed the Cheyenne and found one of the white scouts scalping the Indian. Obviously, scalping was not merely an Indian custom. Perhaps the white scout took the scalp as a morbid souvenir or to trade it to Indians for other valuables.

The fighting lasted all day. Slowly, the Cheyennes were forced to abandon their village, but the troops did not succeed in driving them out of range. The Cheyennes had taken a position in the hills and kept an unrelenting fire on the troops. Underneath the cliff from where they made their stand was a small herd of ninety or one hundred horses. Several attempts were made to secure these ponies. Four or five Arapaho Scouts made a dash for them, but were driven back. Shortly thereafter, a handful of Shoshone Scouts attempted to run off the horses, but they also failed. During the attempt, one of the Shoshone Scouts, a young warrior named *Ahusan* or *Anzi*, was shot through the body. Then Three Bears and three of his Sioux Scouts tried to take the horses, but enemy fire drove them back, too. Finally, Luther North received permission from his brother to give it a try. North selected *Pe-isk-le-shar* ("Boy Chief," also known by his English name, Peter Headman) to help him. They each carried a blanket and a revolver and were able to ride in close to the herd. Then they dashed into the herd, waving their blankets and shouting loudly to scare off the horses. Despite heavy enemy fire, they were able to lead the ponies away successfully. A few days after the battle, General Mackenzie distributed the horses among the Pawnees as a reward for their valorous service.⁹⁹

At 2 p. m. Mackenzie ordered Major North to take his Pawnees and destroy the village. The scouts pulled down the Cheyenne tepees and used the lodgepoles as burning stakes. On top of the stakes they threw clothing, weapons, dried meat, buffalo robes, and

Luther North, in a letter to Robert Bruce of March 24, 1930, emphatically denied McClellan's report that the Pawnees mutilated bodies, except for the taking of scalps. He even called McClellan a "Lyar" and even doubts whether McClellan was present during the fight. "Things like this make me pretty mad. I wouldn't believe this man under oath. you must see he is lying when he says [in his account] that the Crow [Indians]

other supplies. The Cheyennes watched helplessly from the hills as their village went up in flames.¹⁰⁰

That evening the Pawnees camped in the burning village. The fighting now had subsided. Occasionally, Cheyenne sharpshooters fired some rounds into camp. While his men were getting supper, Major North and his brother rested around a fire. They were sitting on a log drinking coffee when a bullet whizzed over their heads. It killed a mule on the other side of the fire from them. They built a breastwork of dried buffalo meat from the Indian camp, and took cover behind it.¹⁰¹ As the night fell, Major North recorded the events of the day in his diary:

Saturda[y] 25th

Had a hard nights march and at 7 a.m. struck Little Wolf's village of Cheyennes [illegible] 173 Lodges and had a hard fight which lasted all day and part of the night. we are camped in the village tonight and bullets are dropping all around us. we have burned all the lodges. 18 dead Indians are lying all around us. one lieut. and four men are killed on our side and 17 soldiers and one snake [Shoshone] Indian wounded[.] a stray bullet just [hit] a mule within 30 paces of Lute + I.¹⁰²

While the Pawnees were camped in the village, the Cheyennes spent the night in the cold hills. "We wallowed through the mountain snows for several days," recalled Iron Teeth, one of the refugees. "Most of us were afoot. We had no lodges, only a few blankets, and there was only a little dry meat for food among us. Men died of wounds,

were there. you can quote me as you like." The "Robert Bruce, Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts Papers," Box 1, Folder 4, Department of Special Collections, McFarlin Library, University of Tulsa, Oklahoma.

⁹⁹ Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 215-216. *New York Herald*, December 1 and 11, 1876.

¹⁰⁰ Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes*, 367.

¹⁰¹ Danker, ed., *Man of the Plains*, 216-217.

¹⁰² Frank North Diary, 1876-1877, Frank North Collection, RG 2321 (formerly MS 0448), Box 1, S3-F1, NSHS, Lincoln, Nebraska.

women and children froze to death.”¹⁰³ Luther North later commented on the refugees: “The thermometer never got higher than 25 below . . . Those poor Cheyennes were out in that weather with nothing to eat, no shelter, we had burned their village, and hardly had any clothing. It was said many children died. It makes me sort of sick to think about it.”¹⁰⁴ The Cheyennes eventually arrived at Crazy Horse’s village where they received help. But Dull Knife surrendered several weeks later at Camp Robinson, Nebraska. In 1877, the government removed the Northern Cheyennes to the Darlington Agency, in the Indian Territory, to live with their Southern Cheyenne relatives.

During the battle, after the Cheyennes had abandoned their village, soldiers and scouts began looting the camp. The Pawnees joined the search for plunder. According to *New York Herald* correspondent Jerry Roche, a number of Pawnees were “systematically going through the village and securing large quantities of plunder.” Private William Earl Smith hurried to join the hunt for trophies. He went “down in among the tepees to see what I could find. For the Pawneys were [already] plundering the camp.”¹⁰⁵ John G. Bourke added that “seven hundred head of stock fell into our hands, not quite hundred of the number being loaded by our Pawnees with such plunder as appealed to their fancy.”¹⁰⁶ Many items belonging to Custer’s troops were found, including letters, photographs, watches, money, and uniforms. They also discovered three necklaces made of human fingers and a buckskin bag full containing the right hands of twelve Shoshone babies. The

¹⁰³ After a difficult eleven day march, the Cheyennes reached Crazy Horse’s camp where they were fed. Greene, ed., *Lakota and Cheyenne*, 114.

¹⁰⁴ Luther North quoted in Danker, “The North Brothers and the Pawnee Scouts,” 83.

¹⁰⁵ Smith, *Sagebrush Soldier*, 77.

¹⁰⁶ Bourke, *Mackenzie’s Last Fight With the Cheyennes*, 39.

discovery of the ghastly trophies caused great distress among the Shoshone Scouts, whose cries of mourning could be heard in the days and nights following the battle.¹⁰⁷

Bourke writes that the Pawnees and Shoshones took sixteen scalps in the battle but that the other scouts did not take any, out of respect for “the wishes and prejudices of the white soldiers about them.”¹⁰⁸ While it may be true that the Sioux, Arapahos, and friendly Cheyennes did not take any scalps, they did so out of respect for their former allies rather than from an expressed desire to please the white officers in the command. According to Luther North, the “Sioux, Arapahos, and [the] few Cheyennes with us were more or less friendly with the hostile Cheyennes we were attacking-which is sufficient reason why they did not scalp the latter; but there was no such feeling on the part of the Pawnees or Shoshones.”¹⁰⁹

The attack had been a great success. Mackenzie estimated the number of Cheyennes killed at thirty. Among them were three of Dull Knife’s sons. The troops had destroyed about two hundred lodges and a large quantity of supplies. Furthermore, they had captured nearly the entire horse herd of the Cheyennes. Six cavalry men were killed during the attack: Lt. John McKinney, Corporal Patrick F. Ryan, and Privates Joseph Mengis, Alexander Keller, John Sullivan, and Beard. Private Alexander McFarland died of injuries several days later. Twenty-two men were wounded.¹¹⁰ Second Lieutenant Homer W. Wheeler was placed in charge of their transportation to Cantonment Reno. Although the Indian scouts had been among the first to enter the village during the

¹⁰⁷ *New York Herald*, December 11, 1876. Wheeler, *Buffalo Days*, 144-145.

¹⁰⁸ Bourke, *Mackenzie’s Last Fight With the Cheyennes*, 35.

¹⁰⁹ “The Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts,” *Motor Travel Magazine* 23:1 (April 1931), 17.

¹¹⁰ The loss of the men and particularly Lieutenant McKinney weighed heavy on Colonel Mackenzie, who believed that the attack had been a great failure. The outcome of the battle, in fact, caused a deep emotional

charge, only one of them, a Shoshone Scout, was wounded. Newspaper correspondent Jerry Roche explained that

The small proportion of Indians shot in the fight is traceable to their familiarity with the manner of fighting of their own people and to the shrewdness with which they evaded fire on the field while fighting at times quite as well as our regulars. Their chief usefulness, however, consisted in their employment as scouts and in leading the first dash at the hostiles to capture their ponies and demoralize them by showing them that their own people were arrayed against them. They cannot be disciplined to fight like white soldiers.¹¹¹

The *Army and Navy Journal* of December 2, 1876, reported that the “Indian allies behaved well at the start, but stopped to plunder, and were but of little use thereafter.” This description, however, seemed to apply more to the Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapahoe Scouts than the Pawnees, because the same article also stated that the “Pawnees are a very orderly, well drilled and disciplined lot of soldiers, many of whom can speak and write English. Thus far the Sioux and Arapahoes have been difficult to handle, but they are gradually being instructed and will soon present a tolerably good appearance.”¹¹²

Mackenzie seemed to be pleased with the performance of the Pawnees during the fight. Two days after the attack on the village, Mackenzie distributed the captured ponies among the Indian scouts. The Sioux Scouts were allowed to keep the handful of horses they had captured. But when they tried to distribute the horses, an ugly fistfight broke out among their ranks. The Pawnees received sixty ponies, and Major North saw to it that the horses were distributed fairly. For example, *Pe-isk-le-shar* (Peter Headman), who had

depression. It was one of the symptoms of his approaching insanity. Robinson, *A Good Year to Die*, 301-303.

¹¹¹ *New York Herald*, December 11, 1876.

secured the Cheyenne herd with Luther North, received an extra horse because he had lost one during the battle.¹¹³

On November 26, the day after the battle, Mackenzie gave the order to return to Crook's column. When they went into camp later that day, the small Pawnee scouting party that Major North had sent out on the 22nd rode into the camp. They had been scouting farther northwest of the Arapaho Scouts who discovered the village. They had found a fresh trail and had followed it until they came in sight of five or six Cheyennes driving a small herd of horses. When the Pawnees gave chase, the Cheyennes abandoned their horses and ran away. Unable to overtake the Cheyennes, the Pawnees gave up the chase and began driving the captured horses toward Mackenzie's camp. This was the day of the attack on Dull Knife's village. The next day, as they were coming towards the camp, they ran into the retreating force of Cheyennes. They were forced to abandon the captured horses and run for safety. The Cheyennes briefly gave chase. Later that evening, the Pawnees arrived at Mackenzie's camp.¹¹⁴

¹¹² *Army and Navy Journal* 14 (December 2, 1876), 270.

¹¹³ In his diary, Major North recorded that "the Gen. [Mackenzie's brevet rank] thinks we got enough [plunder] out of the village to make up for [the] loss in [our own] horses. The sioux [Scouts] had a regular Knock down over their division. the Gen. gave each of my fine men that were in scout an extra pony each and one to Peter [Headman] for one he had killed in the fight." Frank North Diary, 1876-1877, Frank North Collection, RG 2321 (formerly MS 0448), Box 1, S3-F1, NSHS, Lincoln, Nebraska. Unfortunately, the sources do not reveal exactly how the distribution of horses and other spoils occurred. Undoubtedly, the distribution of the spoils followed a certain protocol. North would have to determine who would receive the most prized items. Obviously, those who were most deserving because of their particular contributions on the field of battle, went first. In other instances, distribution may not have been so easy. North probably observed protocol by first honoring the most esteemed men in the battalion (chiefs, head soldiers, non-commissioned officers, etc.). After the attack on the Cheyenne village, for example, *Li-Heris-oo-la-shar* ("Leading Chief" also known under his English name Frank White) received two horses, whereas most other scouts only received one. It appears that White received the extra horse because of his status as one of the leading men among the Pawnee Scouts. The other Pawnees who received an extra horse were rewarded for exceptional bravery. Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts*, 275.

¹¹⁴ "Pawnee Trails and Trailers: An Important Chapter in the Geography and History of the Old West," *Motor Travel [Magazine]* 21:11 (February 1930), 18-19. Luther North to Robert Bruce, December 4, 1929. The "Robert Bruce, Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts Papers," Box 1, Folder 1, Department of Special Collections, McFarlin Library, University of Tulsa, Oklahoma. According to Grinnell, there were only three

They arrived just in time to join the other Pawnees in celebrating their victory over the Cheyennes with feasts and name-giving ceremonies. John Bourke observed that the Shoshone scouts were so grief stricken after discovering that the Cheyennes had recently attacked one of their villages and taken trophies from the bodies of friends and relatives that they neglected to “assume the new battle-names which the Pawnees alongside of them adopted, according to the usage of the Plains’ tribes, with much smoking and other ceremonial.”¹¹⁵

The Pawnees celebrated their victory with a scalp dance. Private William Earl Smith witnessed the dance at Rock Creek the day after the battle. In his diary Smith recorded that “our Indins had a skelp dance and I went over to see it. They had a good meny [scalps] and they made the valey ring with there shouts.”¹¹⁶ After the dance, the scouts prepared the scalps and cut them into small pieces to decorate their clothes, saddles, bags, and other objects. Sergeant Frank White (*Li-Heris-oo-la-shar*) honored his friend, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Irving Dodge, with a piece of the scalp of one of Dull Knife’s sons. Dodge recorded in his diary

Frank is a great friend of mine, & as evidence of that friendship, he proposes to bring me tomorrow a part of a scalp. His bucks gave him three scalps. One he is going to cut in two, subdivide one half give me one quarter & North the other - This makes us almost brothers in the Indian idea, & is the greatest compliment he can pay North & I. North is the commander of the Pawnees - I dont want the thing at all, but it would be an insult not to accept it.¹¹⁷

Cheyennes in the party that surprised the Pawnees. Two Moon (the younger), Yellow Eagle, and Turtle Road were the ones that recaptured the horses. George Bird Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1915/Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956/1971), 381-382.

¹¹⁵ Bourke, *Mackenzie’s Last Fight With the Cheyennes*, 42.

¹¹⁶ Smith, *Sagebrush Soldier*, 93-94.

¹¹⁷ Richard Irving Dodge Diary, November 30 and December 20, 1876, in Wayne R. Kime, ed., *The Powder River Expedition Journals of Colonel Richard Irving Dodge* (Norman: University of Oklahoma

The small Pawnee scouting party that returned on the 26th reported the presence of the large party of hostile Indians some six miles away to Mackenzie. Mackenzie, however, decided not to pursue because he had reached the point of diminishing returns. He decided to let “General Winter” do the rest.¹¹⁸ The rumors of a hostile Indian party nearby, however, alarmed many of the soldiers, especially the new recruits. When a small herd of buffalo accidentally strolled into a camp of scouts, the Indians fired a volley into them. The shots caused a “stampeed” among the soldiers, who believed they were under attack. They soon learned, however, what had occurred. The next day the Indians shared the buffalo meat with the hungry soldiers.¹¹⁹

On November 29, Mackenzie’s Cavalry caught up with Crook’s column. The scouts carried the captured scalps on sticks in front of their saddles and sang their victory songs as they entered the camp.¹²⁰ The next day, a funeral was held for the enlisted men killed in the fight.¹²¹ That same day Luther North went on a scout with four of his men. His party soon bogged down in heavy snow, and they nearly froze to death at night. They returned without locating the hostiles.¹²²

Press, 2000), 99 and 133. In his published memoirs, Dodge described this particular event in more detail, but he exaggerated the event somewhat to achieve a more dramatic effect. See Richard I. Dodge, *Our Wild Indians: Thirty-Three Years’ Personal Experience Among the Red Men of the Great West* (Hartford, CT: A. D. Worthington and Company, 1883), 514-515. Dodge had met Frank White ten years earlier during some “scrapes” with the Sioux. See Dodge’s *The Plains of North America and Their Inhabitants: Being a Description of the Plains, Game, Indians, &c. of the Great North American Desert* (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1877), 326-327.

¹¹⁸ Lessing H. Nohl, Jr., “Mackenzie Against Dull Knife: Breaking the Northern Cheyennes in 1876,” K. Ross Toole, et al., ed., *Probing the American West: Papers from the Santa Fe Conference* (Santa Fe: Museum of New Mexico Press, 1962).

¹¹⁹ Smith, *Sagebrush Soldier*, 94. Buecker, ed., “The Journals of James S. McClellan,” 29.

¹²⁰ James S. McClellan’s reminiscences in “A Day with the ‘Fighting Cheyennes’: Stirring Scenes in the Old Northwest, Recalled for Motor Tourists of 1930,” *Motor Travel [Magazine]* 22:6 (September 1930), 10.

¹²¹ Robinson, *A Good Year to Die*, 302.

¹²² Danker, *Man of the Plains*, 218-219.

In the days and weeks following the Dull Knife fight, Crook's expedition seemed to have lost its sense of purpose and direction. After returning to Cantonment Reno on December 2, they marched to Buffalo Springs on the Dry Fork of the Powder River where they made camp. The horses and pack mules were worn out from the long march over difficult terrain. The weather conditions also took a turn for the worse. Snow storms swept in over the country and tortured men and animals even more. "Over the next three weeks, Crook marched his men back and forth over much of northeastern Wyoming, missing rendezvous with supplies, wearing down his men and animals, and accomplishing nothing." Crook's indecisiveness and erratic orders taxed the patience of his officers and staff.¹²³

Second Lieutenant Wheeler recalled that the troops lost many horses during the scouts along the Belle Fourche as a result of the extreme cold. (Wheeler, n. p.) Snowstorms made scouting expeditions virtually impossible. To escape the freezing temperatures and the blistering wind, Luther North moved his men to a deep canyon three miles below the main camp. They found some good grass for the horses there, and discovered a large number of deer and elk. They killed more than half of the animals and took enough meat to last them two or three days. They gave the rest to the soldiers.¹²⁴

As the weather conditions deteriorated, the Pawnees were forced to stay in camp. They entertained themselves with visits, dances, and games. Among the games they

¹²³ Robinson, *A Good Year to Die*, 305-306.

¹²⁴ Luther North to Robert Bruce, March 24, 1930. The "Robert Bruce, Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts Papers," Box 1, Folder 4, Department of Special Collections, McFarlin Library, University of Tulsa, Oklahoma.

played was a race between a horse and an Indian runner forty yards and back. Major North noted that his Indians came out ahead every time.¹²⁵

On December 22, Crook's expedition began the march back to Fort Fetterman. The extreme temperatures made travel extremely difficult and uncomfortable. Major North suffered terribly during the march of asthma. Lieutenant Cushing, meanwhile froze several fingers and a toe. On Christmas eve, Major North described the hardships of the trail in his diary

[Dec. 24, 1876]

we can melt snow to cook but our poor animals have to go without [feed]. it is so cold we can hardly keep from freezing. in fact Jim [Murie is not listed] froze three fingers badly frozen. tonight is Christmas eve and oh what a christmas eve it is with us. nearly freezing and so far from home and loved ones.¹²⁶

The troops arrived at Fort Fetterman on the 29th. Here they went into camp and received new rations. In the evenings Indian scouts from the different camps visited each other to exchange gifts. The dances lasted until the early hours of the morning, and the sound of the drum and the high-pitched voices of the singers kept many of the regular soldiers awake at night. Lieutenant Colonel Dodge witnessed what he called a "begging dance" that the Sioux performed for the Pawnees. The purpose of the Sioux' "begging dance," according to Dodge, was to swindle their Pawnee hosts out of gifts. When the Sioux honored the Pawnees with a dance, Plains custom obligated the Pawnees to

¹²⁵ Diary entry for December 15, 16, 1876. On Monday, December 18, North wrote in his diary: "The Indians had a big day today. first the Skeedes danced to the Chowes and got seven or eight horses. Then the Chowes went to the Arrapahoes and danced and got twelve horses. Ralph [Weeks] got 3 + Frank [White] 2. Frank North Diary, 1876-1877, Frank North Collection, RG 2321 (formerly MS 0448), Box 1, S3-F1, NSHS, Lincoln, Nebraska.

reciprocate with gifts such as horses and clothes. In his diary, Dodge noted that the “wily Sioux” had fleeced the Pawnees out of “50 or 60 horses & a great many other valuable things.”¹²⁷ According to Luther North, however, the Pawnees only gave away about twenty-five horses. Most of these they won back in friendly gambles with the Sioux. At the end of the night, according to North, the Sioux and Pawnees “parted pretty good friends.”¹²⁸

According to Bourke, the Indians feasted and danced almost every night. After the Sioux had “serenaded” the Pawnees, the latter returned the honor by dancing for the

¹²⁶ Entry for December 24, 1876, Frank North Diary, 1876-1877, Frank North Collection, RG 2321 (formerly MS 0448), Box 1, S3-F1, NSHS, Lincoln, Nebraska.

¹²⁷ Kime, ed., *The Powder River Expedition Journals of Colonel Richard Irving Dodge*, 133. In his memoirs, Dodge described this particular event in more detail: “One day I was sitting in my tent when I heard the terrible war-whoop, accompanied by a rattling succession of shots, and, rushing out, I saw a long line of Indians in skirmishing order, advancing at a run over a hill to the Pawnee camp. I could see that the Pawnees, though in commotion, did not appear to be alarmed, and as there was no excitement at headquarters, I presumed the demonstration to be a ceremony of some kind. Getting my hat and overcoat, I made for the scene of action, but when I arrived the dance was already under full headway. The Sioux, the most cunning of all the Plains tribes, taking advantage of the near approach of separation, had determined to add another to the terrible blows they had in late years dealt the Pawnees by giving them a ‘begging dance.’ The Sioux were almost as numerous as the Pawnees, and the dance did not cease till every rascally dancer had hugged almost every individual Pawnee, and thus secured from him a liberal present. The head chief of the Pawnee, a great friend of mine, known as Frank [White: who was actually not a chief at all], but whose name I never could master, literally stripped himself, giving to the Sioux chief a war-bonnet and dress, for which to my knowledge, he had refused one hundred dollars. The unfortunate Pawnees were left almost in ‘puris naturalibus.’ The next day I met Frank, and remonstrated with him for his own and his people’s foolishness in tamely submitting to be so swindled. He admitted everything, said he knew the Sioux had done it purposely, and from hostile feeling, but that it was the ‘Indian road,’ and that he and his people would have been disgraced among all the Indians, had they not given as they did. His only hope was that General Crook would delay his return march for a few days, in which case it was the intention of the Pawnees to give a return ‘begging dance’ to the Sioux, in the hope of at least getting some of their things back. He did not expect to get all back, for he said, ‘The Sioux always were mean, stingy, cunning, and underhanded, while the Pawnees are well known for their generosity and open-handedness.’” See Dodge, *Our Wild Indians*, 368-369.

The event witnessed by Dodge is a good illustration of the way Indian tribes conducted diplomacy. It also showed that the Sioux were extremely skilled in political affairs. Although Crook may have believed he had forged a lasting peace between the Pawnees and the Sioux, it was merely a temporary truce. The Sioux Scouts performed these “begging dances” more out of self-interest than by a general desire for peace. The Pawnees were caught in a dilemma. If they refused to reciprocate the dance with gifts, they not only violated Plains Indian protocol, but they might also lose any credibility they had with General Crook as true friends of peace. Hence, the Sioux scored a diplomatic victory. The only way the Pawnees were able to make up for their “losses,” was by visiting other tribes, such as the Arapahos, and perform a similar dance for them.

Sioux the next night. The Arapahos and Cheyennes also joined the round of dances. “Nobody growled about that,” Bourke wrote, “we were assured it was a ceremonial observance among our aboriginal friends and having been paid to cheerfully suffer all such little privations, we made the best face we could over the matter and smiled through our tears.”¹²⁹

On December 31, the Pawnees drew their pay at Fetterman. That same day they returned the guns that had been issued to them prior to the expedition. Most of the guns were in poor shape as a result of the abuse they had received during the battle and the hard marches afterward. Fortunately, Lieutenant Robinson, the mustering officer, did not inspect the arms closely. The next day, the Pawnees departed for Fort Laramie, where they arrived on January 6. They stayed at Fort Laramie for a few days before setting out for Sidney Barracks.

The Pawnees returned in triumph to Sidney Barracks. According to Major North’s diary entry for January 20, 1877, the Pawnees made “quite a display of scalps” when they rode into the post.¹³⁰ “The whole town was out to watch the Pawnee Scouts return,” reminisced Luther North later. “The boys were carrying the scalps they had taken fastened on the ends of poles, which were held upright over their heads, and as we marched down the main street they sang their war songs.”¹³¹ The next day, Major North wrote letters at the request of his men to their loved ones at home. “I have been writing all day for the

¹²⁸ Danker, *Man of the Plains*, 224.

¹²⁹ Bourke, *Mackenzie’s Last Fight With the Cheyennes*, 48.

¹³⁰ Entry for January 20, 1877, Frank North Diary, 1876-1877, Frank North Collection, RG 2321 (formerly MS 0448), Box 1, S3-F1, NSHS, Lincoln, Nebraska.

¹³¹ Danker, *Man of the Plains*, 227.

men,” North wrote in his diary later that evening, “telling their people all about the fight and all the news we could think of. [W]rote 27 pages of letter paper and am tired out.”¹³²

At Sidney the Pawnee Scouts participated in their last “battle” on April 10, 1877. It was a friendly confrontation between the Pawnees and company H of the Third Cavalry to settle a bet between Major North and Lt. Charles L. Hammond. North believed his men could run off Hammond’s horses. Although both sides used blank ammunition, several Pawnees suffered powder burns, and a number of horses received saber cuts. One white trooper nearly lost an eye when shot in the face at close range with a blank charge.¹³³

Sergeant James S. McClellan witnessed the fight.

At Sidney, Troop H 3rd Cavalry had a sham battle with the Pawnees to settle an argument between Maj. North and Lt. Charles L. Hammond of our regiment. As I recall it, North had remarked that he thought his Pawnee Indians could stampede our led horses when the troop was dismounted. They tried their best but could not do it.

To my mind, one of the reasons was that the horses were not yet restored to full vigor after the recent extraordinary hard expedition; and were not inclined to scare and run any risk of losing their two good feeds a day by taking to the bald prairie in midwinter. The Indians did a good deal of yelling and shooting (as Troop H did also), of course with blank ammunition. I can almost hear the echoes of that big noise yet. Although the Pawnees rushed in and tried to lead the horses away (some of them getting pulled from the backs of their ponies for their trouble), the No. 4s, with the assistance of the dismounted men, held their ground - and the horses!¹³⁴

¹³² Entry for January 21, 1877, Frank North Diary, 1876-1877, Frank North Collection, RG 2321 (formerly MS 0448), Box 1, S3-F1, NSHS, Lincoln, Nebraska.

¹³³ Thomas R. Buenker and R. Eli Paul, “Pawnee Scouts: Auxiliary Troops in the U. S. Cavalry, 1864-1877,” *Military Images* 7 (July-August 1985), 19.

¹³⁴ Bruce, *The Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts*, 55. In a letter to Robert Bruce, Luther North wrote that they had “quite a lot of fun and if McClellan got any glory out of it I am glad of it.” Luther then added that the battle “wasn’t much like a real battle.” Luther North to Robert Bruce, December 30, 1930. The “Robert Bruce, Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts Papers,” Box 1, Folder 4, Department of Special Collections, McFarlin Library, University of Tulsa, Oklahoma.

The Pawnees stayed at Sidney for nearly three months. Colonel Samuel S. Sumner, commander of the post, was deeply impressed with the discipline displayed by the Pawnee Scouts. His guardhouse was full of soldiers who had slipped away from camp to create trouble in town. Not one of the Pawnees was ever sent to the guardhouse for disobeying orders.¹³⁵ On April 19, General Crook wrote Frank North, informing him that General Sheridan had ordered the mustering out of the Pawnee Scouts. Crook regretted that he was no longer able to retain the scouts in service since “there is no longer any necessity for the employment of scouts nor is there any appropriation on hand from which to pay them.” In his closing remarks, Crook expressed his appreciation for the valuable contributions of the Pawnee Battalion during the Powder River expedition.

I think it only just and appropriate to thank you for your excellent behaviour during the time of your stay in the military service under my command and to say that the soldierlike conduct and discipline of the Pawnee scouts is the most eloquent testimony that could be adduced to prove your fitness for the position you have held as their Commanding Officer.¹³⁶

The scouts were officially discharged on April 28¹³⁷ Before they set out from Sidney, Major North wrote General Sheridan with a special request. His scouts had a herd of 250 ponies, one hundred of which had been captured in the Dull Knife fight. Because they preferred to march home rather than travel by train, they would receive only

¹³⁵ Luther North to Robert Bruce, October 23, 1928. The “Robert Bruce, Fighting Norths and Pawnee Scouts Papers,” Box 1, Folder 1, Department of Special Collections, McFarlin Library, University of Tulsa, Oklahoma.

¹³⁶ Crook’s original letter with instructions is in the Frank North Collection, RG 2321 (formerly MS 0448), Box 1, S1-F1, NSHS, Lincoln, Nebraska.

¹³⁷ “Register of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914,” M233, Roll 70, Volume 150, 1866-1873, Indian Scouts,” (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1956), n. p.

subsistence rather than the 40 cents per pony per day for travel expenses. North insisted that his men should be treated like all other enlisted men:

Are not my men the same as other regularly enlisted and honorably discharged soldiers - entitled to "travel pay" and rations or commutation of rations, from here to their home and also will they not be entitled to the 40 c per day each for their ponies during the time they shall be on the march home?¹³⁸

After leaving Sidney, the Pawnees traveled to Julesburg, Colorado, then followed the railroad to Ogallala, Nebraska, where they crossed the Platte River. The trip was not without incidents. The night after they crossed the Platte, the horses stampeded, and it took the scouts three days to round them up again. As a result of the delay, they ran out of supplies before they reached Fort McPherson. After drawing rations at Fort McPherson, they went into camp. Shortly thereafter a local sheriff and a farmer rode into camp charging the Pawnees with killing a cow. Although they claimed they had nothing to do with the shooting, the Pawnees, who were eager to get home, paid the farmer for the cow. Frank North did not want to pay for the dead cow at all, as he feared that more settlers would file false claims. Later, *Pawnee Puk-oot* (listed on the muster rolls as *Pau-ree-puck-oot*, or "Old Horn") confessed to Major North that he had shot the cow.¹³⁹ Near Grand Island, Nebraska, a few of the scouts reportedly stole six horses. Upon their return to the agency, they were summarily arrested by the agent.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ Frank North to General Philip Sheridan, April 13, 1877. Frank North Collection, RG 2321 (formerly MS 0448), Box 1, S1-F1, NSHS, Lincoln, Nebraska.

¹³⁹ Danker, *Man of the Plains*, 229-231.

¹⁴⁰ *ARCIA* 1877, p. 95-96.

Tragedy struck when the scouts arrived at Hays, Kansas. Unlike the warm welcome the scouts received at Sidney, the reception at Hays was much less hospitable. The scouts reached Hays on May 19. When some of the men went into town, one of them, *Tah wah chuh e hod de* (“Red Willow”), was shot by a marshall. *Tah wah chuh e hod de* died a few days later of his injuries at the military hospital at Fort Hays. Major North and his brother had some difficulty restraining their men after the incident. They sent some of their sergeants into town to bring back the more hot-headed young warriors. In the aftermath of the shooting, the local newspaper wrote: “as to the necessity of shooting the Indian we shall not venture an opinion . . . but our citizens certainly owe Major North a debt of gratitude for holding the revengeful and blood-thirsty red skins in check.”¹⁴¹

At Arkansas City, Kansas, the North brothers said goodbye to their scouts. Major North was suffering from a severe asthma attack, and his brother thought it better to board a train at Arkansas City and return home. The scouts arrived at their reservation shortly thereafter. Although they received a warm welcome by their friends and relatives, newly appointed Agent Charles H. Searing was much less thrilled with the arrival of the scouts. He arrested five of the scouts accused of stealing a number of horses near Grand Island, Nebraska. The men were sent to the guardhouse at Fort Reno, Indian Territory, for sixty days. Searing also confiscated two of the stolen horses, which he would keep until its owners would come for them. Apparently, the theft of a few horses was a greater offense than the murder of an Indian. The Pawnees accused of stealing the horses were

¹⁴¹ Danker,, *Man of the Plains*, 231-232. Agent Charles H. Searing reported to Commissioner Hayt that “While the scouts were at Hays City, Kans. *en route* home, after being mustered out, a white man, who erroneously thought one of them was trying to break into his store, shot at him several times, inflicting wounds from which he died in the post-hospital at Fort Hays. I am informed the civil authorities will investigate the case at the term of their court held in October. Meanwhile the man who shot him shot

imprisoned immediately, whereas the man who shot *Tah wah chuh e hod de* was not jailed until he shot and killed a white man a few weeks later. But the agent was perhaps most troubled with the Interior Department's decision to remove Dull Knife's Cheyennes to the Indian Territory. He feared that the Cheyennes might seek revenge against the Pawnees for their role in the Powder River expedition.¹⁴²

The Dull Knife Battle was a significant event in the Great Sioux War of 1876. Although it was the only victory in Crook's Powder River expedition, it broke the resistance of the Northern Cheyennes. According to historian Lessing H. Nohl, Jr., it was "a major disaster in a series of setbacks, one that did much to convince most hostiles, Sioux as well as Cheyenne, that neither remote strongholds nor Arctic temperatures would stay the ever-growing number of 'Long Knives.' To a people accustomed to semi-hibernation during the cold months, this was a demoralizing realization. From that time forward, the hostile Indian had good reason to believe that whenever he roamed off the reservation - no matter what the weather or terrain - minions of the Great White Father would hound him."¹⁴³

another man shortly after, and is now in jail for that offense, and will probably go to the penitentiary for it." *ARCIA* 1877, p. 95-96.

¹⁴² *ARCIA* 1877, p. 95-96.

¹⁴³ Nohl, Jr., "Mackenzie Against Dull Knife," 92.

CHAPTER TEN

HOMECOMING

The Powder River Campaign marked the last time the Pawnee scouts operated together in an all-Indian unit. After returning to their reservation in the Indian Territory, the Pawnees began the difficult process of rebuilding their life. Most took up farming, others looked for work in surrounding areas.

A handful of men occasionally found employment as scouts for the army. Harry Coons served on and off as an army scout between 1877 and 1886. Upon his return from the Powder River campaign, during which he had served as a first sergeant, Coons enlisted at Fort Supply, Indian Territory. He joined Captain William C. Hemphill in the search for Dull Knife and Little Wolf's band of Northern Cheyennes, who escaped from their reservation and fled north in September 1878. He was stationed at Fort Reno, Indian Territory, for several years. Apart from acting as scout and guide, Coons also carried mail and dispatches to various posts in the Territory and acted as interpreter for other Indians when called upon by his officers. When off duty, he studied law. He gained the respect of many officers and fellow soldiers. One of his officers wrote that in the performance of his duties, Coons' work "has always been characterized for zeal, fidelity, capacity and excellent judgment." Unfortunately, his health declined, and in 1886 he received an

honorable discharge from the army. He served as Chief of Police at the Pawnee reservation. His main task was to guard the borders of the reservation against outlaws and bootleggers. He continued to study law and was admitted to the bar in 1896. He died on August 11, 1899.¹

Ralph Weeks (“Little Warrior”) served as a scout in Colorado during the Ute rebellion of 1879. On one occasion, Weeks and a Chaui boy were scouting on the plains east of the Rocky mountains when they discovered a small enemy camp. Disguising themselves as wolves, they entered the camp at night and took a number of mules. The mules had been stolen from a government train, and Weeks and the other scout received \$50 each for recovering the animals. During the same campaign, Weeks also persuaded a group of Utes to surrender. Following his discharge after the Ute War, Weeks moved back to the Pawnee reservation. He was one of the Indians who joined Buffalo Bill’s Wild West Show.²

When the Utes took up arms against the United States in 1879, Major North expected he would be asked to organize the Pawnee Battalion again. But the order never came. Instead, he remained at the ranch that he operated with his business partner, William F. Cody. In 1882 he was elected a member of the Nebraska Legislature. The following year, he joined Buffalo Bill’s celebrated wild west show. But during one of the

¹ Harry Coons was born in 1856. As a boy he attended school at the Pawnee Agency. In 1876, he joined the scouts in Crook’s winter campaign against the Sioux and the Cheyennes. According to some reports, Coons’s health problems stemmed from the demanding marches during this campaign. “The Scout Harry Coons, who served with the Norths,” Box 2, Folder 10, Robert Bruce Papers, Special Collections, McFarlin Library, University of Tulsa. William Spencer Reeder, Jr., “Wolf Men of the Plains: Pawnee Indian Warriors, Past & Present” (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, 2001), 350-351. For a history of the Dull Knife escape see John H. Monnett, “*Tell them we are going home*” : *The Odyssey of the Northern Cheyennes* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001).

performances, he suffered a severe injury when his horse slipped. The injury may have aggravated his already delicate physical condition. While working for the show, North contracted pneumonia. On March 14, 1885, he died at his home in Columbus. He was buried three days later.³

Like Weeks and Major North, a number of former scouts also joined Buffalo Bill's Wild West Show, and later Pawnee Bill's wild west show. William Cody hired the first Pawnees during the 1878-79 season. Frank North, who was Cody's business partner at the North-Cody Ranch in Nebraska, probably used his influence with the tribe to recruit men for the shows. Over the next few years, North helped to supply Cody's show with more Pawnees. In 1883, Cody persuaded North to join the show as well. He relied on North to organize and discipline the performers for the different acts. "He [North] can handle Indians better than any man living," wrote Cody to his business partner William F. ("Doc") Carver. That first season, thirty-six Pawnees joined the show with Major North. In some of Buffalo Bill's acts, the Pawnees were to act as "hostile" Indians. They would hold up stage coaches and "massacre" settlers. According to one story, while they were at Colville, Nebraska, the Pawnees got carried away during a dress rehearsal of the attack on the Deadwood Stagecoach. After the rehearsal nearly ended in a disaster, Frank North reportedly told Cody: "Bill, if you want to make this d[amned] show go, you do not need me or my Indians. You want about twenty old bucks. Fix them up with all the paint and feathers on the market. Use some old hack horses and a hack driver. To make it go you want a show of illusion not realism." At Cody's insistence, the Pawnees, as well as Major

² George Bird Grinnell, *Pawnee Hero Stories and Folk-Tales: With Notes on the Origin, Customs and Character of the Pawnee People* (New York: Forest and Stream Publishing Company, 1889/Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 70-73, 79-82.

North, stayed. The Pawnees enjoyed the work. “We were glad to earn a little money and be off the reservation,” said Wichita Blaine, a former scout who joined Buffalo Bill’s Wild West Show. The Pawnees even made friends with some of the Sioux Indians on the show.⁴

Although the Indian wars came to a close in the 1880s and 90s, the Pawnees continued to serve in the American army. One Pawnee, William Pollock, served in the Spanish-American War (1898). Pollock, the son of a Kitkehahki warrior, was born in Nebraska in 1872. After attending the Pawnee reservation boarding school, he enrolled at Haskell Indian Institute in Lawrence, Kansas. He was a gifted musician and artist. Some of his paintings were exhibited at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D. C. After his return to the Pawnee reservation, he became a deputy sheriff. On the eve of the Spanish American War, he enlisted in the First United States Volunteer Cavalry under Colonel Leonard Wood and Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt. The First Volunteer Cavalry soon achieved fame as the “Rough Riders.” Pollock saw his service in the tradition of his Pawnee ancestors: “in the memory of our brave fathers,” he wrote a friend shortly before he embarked with the troops for Cuba, “I will try and be like one of them who used to stand single-handed against the foe.” Pollock was present at the battles of Las Guasimas, San Juan and Kettle Hill, and the capture of Santiago. Theodore Roosevelt said about him that he was one of the “gamest fighters and best soldiers in the regiment.”

³ *The Columbus Democrat* (Columbus, Nebraska), Saturday March 21, 1885.

⁴ Joy S. Kasson, *Buffalo Bill’s Wild West: Celebrity, Memory, and Popular History* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 168-170. L. G. Moses, *Wild West Shows and the Images of American Indians, 1883-1933* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996), 23. Glenn Shirley, *Pawnee Bill: A Biography of Major Gordon W. Lillie, White Chief of the Pawnees, Wild West Showman, Last of the Land Boomers* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1958/Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965). Martha Royce Blaine, *Some Things Are Not Forgotten: A Pawnee Family Remembers* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 168.

According to Roosevelt, Pollock was always “leading in the charges and always being nearest the enemy.” A fellow soldier in Company D, recalled how Pollock, like the scouts of old, took off his shirt during one battle. After the war he returned to Pawnee, but shortly after his arrival, he contracted pneumonia and died on March 2, 1899. He was buried with full military honors at the cemetery north of town.⁵

Other Pawnees followed in Pollock’s footsteps. A few Pawnees served along the Texas-Mexican border during the border crisis of 1916. Walter Keys, Thomas Hand, Harry Richard, Jacob Leader, and Frank Young Eagle, all served in Company E of the First Oklahoma Infantry. Their company was stationed near San Benito, Texas, to prevent Pancho Villa’s raiders from crossing the border into the United States again.⁶

Nearly forty Pawnees served on the battle fields of France during World War I.⁷

One of the returning soldiers brought a German helmet from the battlefield and gave it to

⁵ In November 1899, the citizens of Pawnee erected a monument at the site of his grave to memorialize his service as well as that of seven other Spanish American War veterans from Pawnee. Theodore Roosevelt, who mentioned Pollock on several occasions in his war memoirs as well as in public, wrote after the funeral that Pollock “conferred honor by his conduct not only upon the Pawnee tribe, but on the American army and nation.” Reeder, “Wolf Men of the Plains,” 367-371. Theodore Roosevelt, *The Rough Riders* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1899/Dallas, TX: Taylor Publishing, 1997). Frank Finney, “William Pollock: Pawnee Indian, Artist and Rough Rider,” *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 33 (1955), 509-511.

⁶ Reeder, “Wolf Men of the Plains,” 371-372. See also Donald E. Houston, “The Oklahoma National Guard on the Mexican Border, 1916,” *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 53 (Winter 1975-76), 447-462.

⁷ The Pawnees who served in the U. S. military during World War I were: Alex Adams, Joe Ameelyonee, Louis Bayhulle, Arthur Coons, Burress Curley Chief, Harold Curley Chief, Harry Coons (Jr.), Henry Chapman, Emmett Carrion, Alex Eagle, George Echohawk, Elmer Echohawk, Joe Esau, Ben Gover, Thomas Hand, Will Justice, Walter Keys, Jacob Leader, Warren Leader, James Little Sun, Paul Little Eagle, Herbert Morris, Elmo Matlock, Edgar Moore, Lawrence Murie, Wallace Murie, James Mannington, Henry Murie, James Moses, Walter Norman, Johnathan New Rider, Samuel Osborne, Harry Richards, Frank Riding In, Charlie Riding Up, George Roberts, John Spotted Horse Chief, Delbert Spotted Horse Chief, James Sun Eagle, Elmer Sun Eagle, Dick Smith, Julius Smith, John Smith, Jobie Taylor, George Taylor, Grant White, Henry White, Charley Wilson, Ernest Wichita, Frank Young Eagle, and Moses Yellow Horse. Pawnee Agency [Records], Roll PA 44, “Military Relations and Affairs,” Indian Archives Division, Oklahoma Historical Society Microfilm Publications (Oklahoma City, 1978) frame 0048. For an excellent overview of the contributions of American Indians in World War I see Thomas A. Britten, *American Indians in World War I: At Home and At War* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997). See also Ben H. Chastaine, *Story of the 36th: The Experiences of the 36th Division in the World War* (Oklahoma City: Harlow Publishing, 1920) and Jennings C. Wise, *The Red Man in the New World Drama* (Washington, D. C.: 1931).

his mother, who carried the helmet on a scalp pole. Frances Densmore, a student of Indian music, attended the celebration for the returning Pawnee Doughboys:

I was present at the two-days dance which was held on June 6 and 7, 1919, in celebration of their return. The first day's dance was reserved for the Indians themselves; the second day's was shared by white visitors. Old war-songs were sung with new words mentioning airplanes and submarines. Two white horses were led into the lodge and given to the returned soldiers. Lawrence Murie, son of the chief, wore the khaki uniform in which he had served with the artillery at the front, some of the soldiers were in "civies" and others in full Indian regalia, while the young soldier who directed the dances carried a sword that had belonged to an ancestor. It was a mixed but jubilant affair, with many songs and speeches. [A] German helmet was on a pole topped by a captured knife, like a lance head. The young man who gave it to his mother acted in accordance with an old Indian custom in which scalps were handed over to the women, in whose defense the warriors had gone forth.⁸

After the war, the Pawnee tribe began to honor its veterans in an annual war dance celebration. The dances were held on Armistice Day, November 11. At the dance, the Pawnees paid special tribute to the aging scouts of the Indian wars. The celebration was held in the South Roundhouse, which was located ten miles south of the town of Pawnee. The Roundhouse was a larger wooden version of an old Pawnee earth lodge. It had a smoke hole at the top of the ceiling, and its door faced east, according to old Pawnee custom, "to greet the morning star." The Roundhouse was always crowded during the Armistice Day celebrations. Brummett Echohawk witnessed the celebrations as a young boy:

⁸ Frances Densmore, "The Songs of Indian Soldiers During the World War," *Musical Quarterly* 20 (October 1934), 419-425. For a detailed discussion of the Pawnees' contributions during World War I see Reeder, "Wolf Men of the Plains," 372-380.

On the west side, and facing east, were the Chiefs and Veterans. There, too, was the American flag attached to a fresh-cut willow pole. Seated next to the flag, the place of honor, were the old Scouts. They wore buckskin leggings trimmed with scalps; broadcloth breechcloths; moccasins with fine beadwork; bear claw necklaces; Presidential medallions. Their braids were wrapped in otter hides. A few still wore the old-time scalp lock with an eagle feather. In earlier times, the scalp lock was painted red and dressed to stand upright as a challenge for the enemy to come take it. They wore paint on their faces. Paint of family colors and paint to signify something holy. The paint was set at the corners of the eyes and at the part of the hair.

They were proud men . . . warriors who had worn United States Cavalry blue.⁹

Brummett Echohawk soon received the opportunity to represent the Pawnees in the uniform of the United States Army during World War II. Many other Pawnees also served in the war. They served in the army, navy, and air force. Pawnee men fought on the European front as well as in the Pacific. The tribe, meanwhile, supported their warriors from the home front. In June 1942, the Pawnees danced in tribute to the men who were in the armed forces. Others worked in war-related industries. Pawnee women volunteered and worked as nurses or in other supportive positions. Several Pawnees received medals for bravery. Del Ray Echohawk, for example, received the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Soldier's Medal, as well as the Purple Heart. Charles Harris received the Air Medal. Other Indians who received the Purple Heart were Levi Horsechief, Lawrence Good Fox, Jr., Thomas Chapman, Jr., Andrew Roberts, Jacob Moses, Jesse Howell, William Harris, Jr., Lloyd Yellowhorse, Brummett Echohawk, George Little Sun, Floyd Rice, Leonard Leading Fox, Chauncey Matlock, Philip Gover, Grant Gover,

⁹ Brummett Echohawk, "Pawnee Scouts," *Oklahoma Today* 27 (Summer 1977), 10. Ruling His Sun, a former Pawnee Scout, died in 1928, reportedly at the age of 102. Until his death, he wore the traditional scalp lock and clothing of the Pawnees. According to a local newspaper article he "steadfastly refused to

and David Woods. After being taken prisoner in the Philippines, Alexander Mathews survived the Bataan Death March and spent several years as a Japanese prisoner of war. Some, however, like Grant Gover, Charles Harris, George and William Coons, and Eugene Peters (a Pawnee-Otoe) would not return. But those who did received a hero's welcome in Pawnee.¹⁰

In 1946, the Pawnee Nation organized its first annual Pawnee Homecoming to honor members of the tribe who had fought in the American wars. Rush Roberts (Ah-re-Kah-rard), one of the last surviving scouts of Major North's battalion, was present during this celebration. The Pawnee Homecoming Powwow has been held ever since. Since World War II, Pawnee Indians have served in every major war of the United States. Pawnee soldiers fought in Korea, Vietnam, and, more recently, in the Gulf War. They, too, are honored every year at the Pawnee Homecoming Powwow, which is held during the first week of July. Not coincidentally, the Pawnee Homecoming Powwow coincides with the 4th of July Independence Day celebration. A large part of the ceremony is still devoted to the Pawnee Scouts. Today, virtually all Pawnees trace their ancestry back to a scout. They are proud of their long standing tradition of service in the United States Army. This tradition began in the 1860s, when the Pawnee Scouts offered their services to the frontier army of the West.

adopt the white man's customs and as little of his clothing as possible." *Pawnee Courier-Dispatch and Times-Democrat* (Pawnee, Oklahoma), October 4, 1928.

¹⁰ Duane K. Hale, "Indians in World War II," *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 69 (Winter 1991-92), 408-429. For excellent histories on the Indian experience in World War II see Allison R. Bernstein, *American Indians and World War II: Toward a New Era in Indian Affairs* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) and Kenneth W. Townsend, *World War II and the American Indian* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000).

CHAPTER ELEVEN

CONCLUSION

Although high ranking generals such as George Crook, William T. Sherman, and Christopher C. Augur believed that their enlistment might have a “civilizing” effect, the primary purpose of the Pawnee Scouts was to assist the United States Army in the military pacification of the American West. In theory, military service exposed the scouts to Euro-American values of discipline and authority. Through their interaction with white officers and soldiers, the scouts would also master the English language and possibly acquire other practical skills as well. Once they returned to their reservations, they could put these skills to work in their own communities. But their enlistment did not transform the Pawnees into “acculturated” soldiers. Acculturation was only a secondary consideration. The army hoped to utilize the Pawnees’ skills as trailers, guides, and warriors in its military operations against the hostile tribes of the Plains. Despite the pontifications by Crook, Sherman, and Augur, the army did little to effect the acculturation of the scouts. Military service, then, did not fundamentally change the Pawnees. On the contrary, their service as scouts reinforced rather than discouraged traditional war-related practices.

As scouts, the Pawnees continued to fight their Sioux and Cheyenne enemies. The only difference was that they now received the guns and the assistance of the Great

Father. Military service allowed them to inflict revenge upon their enemies and be paid for doing so as well. The Pawnees were not duped into fighting against people of their own race by the American government. They, in fact, welcomed the invitation to join the United States in a military alliance against a common foe.

Apart from fighting their mortal enemies, many young Pawnees also enlisted for personal reasons. Some hoped to avenge the death of a loved one. Others hoped to gain war honors. Throughout the existence of the Pawnee Battalion, scouts counted coups on their enemies, changed their names after performing a particularly brave deed, and celebrated their victories in battle with scalp dances. During their service the scouts also captured many horses, which earned them economic status within the tribe. After the tribe had been removed to the Indian Territory, many men also joined to escape poverty and disease at the Pawnee reservation.

Exposure to the “civilizing” influences of white soldiers remained limited. Although small detachments of scouts occasionally accompanied white troops, most of the time they remained part of an all-Indian, indeed, an all-Pawnee unit. The boundaries between Indian and white, then, remained essentially in tact. Even during military campaigns, contact between the scouts and the troops was limited. Cultural boundaries often separated the Pawnees from the white troops. Their refusal to drink alcohol, for example, prevented many scouts from interacting with white soldiers. At the same time, many white soldiers were suspicious if not openly hostile towards all Indians, even friendly ones such as the Pawnees.

Frank North also had to observe certain intra-tribal boundaries within the battalion. Usually the battalion consisted of separate companies, each composed of one of

the bands of the tribe. Each of these companies, whether they were Chaui, Kitkehahki, Pitahawirat, or Skidi, had its own officers. Thus, traditional tribal divisions were observed at all times. This situation led to problems when General Samuel R. Curtis appointed Joseph McFadden to command the scouts in 1864. Through his marriage with a Pawnee woman, McFadden was associated with his wife's band. As a result, the scouts who were members of the other bands did not feel compelled to obey his orders. This delicate problem was avoided with the selection of Frank North as commander of the scouts. North was not identified with any band in particular and was, therefore, more acceptable.¹¹

That the army was not very serious about educating and "civilizing" the Pawnee Scouts can also be determined from its decision to place non-military personnel in charge of the scouts. Both Joseph McFadden and Frank North were civilians when they were appointed to lead the scouts. McFadden had married into the tribe, and Frank North had been employed at the Pawnee Agency. Both spoke fluent Pawnee. Although McFadden had some previous military experience (he had served under General William S. Harney at Ash Hollow in 1855), his selection was based principally on his association with the tribe. None of the men that Frank North appointed had any previous military experience. The only exception was North's brother, Luther, who had served briefly with the Union Cavalry during the Civil War. Because of their limited military experience, North and his staff leaned heavily on the experience of their men.

¹¹ According to Luther North, his brother received his name *Skiri Tah Kah* ("White Wolf") from the Chauis, making him nominally a member of that band. According to John Box, a Pawnee Indian, North received his name from the Skidis, which would make him a member of the Skidi band. Major North, however, never claimed membership of any particular band. The name *Pani Leshar* ("Pawnee Chief") was given to him by the men in his command during the 1865 campaign. This title indicates a position above the bands. Robert

Much has been written of Frank North's leadership of the Pawnee Battalion. Clearly he was an important figure among the scouts. The scouts accepted his authority and even gave him the honorary title *Pani Leshar* ("Pawnee Chief"). Part of North's success may have been his personality. He was a stern but fair leader, whose bravery gained the respect of the Pawnees. The fact that he spoke Pawnee greatly facilitated his effectiveness as a leader. But North's authority was based on more than personality alone. The key to understanding his influence lies in his connection with the army. As the commanding officer of the Pawnee Battalion, Frank North was able to supply his men with guns, horses, and ammunition. In return, the Pawnees accepted him as a war leader, and his battalion as a war party. North's powers, however, were not only material, they were supernatural as well. North's successes in battle and the fact that he miraculously escaped death on several occasions, convinced many scouts that he was under the protection of *Tirawahut*, the Great Spirit. Because of these qualifications, many Pawnees, especially those in search of war honors and economic status, wished to join his battalion. As the leader of this war party, Pawnee tradition gave North the authority to discipline his men when they disobeyed his orders. Thus, as Thomas Dunlay pointed out, although North was not a Pawnee Indian by birth, the hierarchical structure of Pawnee society "may well have created a mental niche into which the Pawnees could fit him."¹²

Accepting his role as leader of a Pawnee war party, Frank North did little to change the ways of the men under his command. He rarely drilled his scouts and only did so when ordered by his superior officers. He did not believe that drills were useful for

Bruce, *A Pawnee Naming Ceremonial: Near Pawnee Oklahoma, Armistice Day, November 11, 1932, the Naming of Wyo-La-Shar* (New York: Privately Published, 1933), 10.

men who had been hired as scouts. In fact, it appears that North adopted many of the customs of the scouts. He sang with them during their celebrations. When his men bestowed certain honors upon him, he reciprocated the honor by presenting gifts to them. The influence of the Pawnee warrior tradition upon the North brothers became evident in 1876, when, during a confrontation with the Sioux Scouts, they began to sing a Pawnee war song signifying their readiness to fight until death.

Like the leader of a traditional Pawnee war party, Major North divided the spoils of war among his men after a successful campaign. Whether North was aware of the practice or not, by distributing captured horses among his men he fulfilled one of the functions of the leader of a war party. As a war leader he had the right to keep a large part of the spoils to himself, but as he usually gave most of the spoils away. North thus ensured himself of the trust and loyalty of his men for future campaigns.

During the expeditions and campaigns, the scouts continued to place their faith in the hand of *Tirawahut*. The scouts carried their own personal medicine bundles into battle. They carefully observed the proper rituals and taboos to ensure the blessing and protection of the supernatural. Frank North did little to discourage these practices, because he realized that confident scouts made better fighters. Each scout prepared for battle with his own customs. Usually these routines involved prayers, bundle rituals, the singing of war songs, or face painting.

The Pawnees used many of the tactics they employed on raiding parties. The element of surprise was crucial in their operations. While they scouted the land, they wore disguises to avoid detection by the enemy. On more than one occasion, they urged Frank

¹² Thomas W. Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States*

North to push ahead in order to overtake a hostile party in a surprise attack. Their phenomenal endurance made such long ventures deep into hostile territory possible. During the Plum Creek battle in 1867, they deceived Turkey Legs' band of Cheyennes by pretending to be white troops. According to Finn Burnett, they used horses to lure enemy raiders into ambushes during the 1865 campaign. The scouts preferred to go into battle almost naked. Not only did the heavy uniforms hamper their movements, but the risk of infections was much greater when pieces of cloth and textile were carried into the wound by a bullet. Their first target was always the horse herd of their opponent. Capturing the enemy horses not only added to their own wealth but prevented their enemies from escaping as well.

Even though they served under the banner of the United States, the Pawnees continued the practice of scalping. Although many officers disapproved of this custom, Frank North never discouraged the practice. The Pawnees displayed the scalps they took during battle whenever they returned from a successful mission. According to a few accounts, the Pawnees mutilated the corpses of their slain enemies while serving as scouts. Luther North, however, adamantly denied these allegations. Fact is, however, that they could be extremely cruel, but their cruelty was no worse than that inflicted upon them. They were not accustomed to taking prisoners and often killed enemy men, women, and children indiscriminately. Such was the character of inter-tribal warfare on the Plains. They were commonly wars of extermination. Although officers and enlisted men often accused their Indian allies of extreme cruelty, the record of the American army during this

Army, 1860-90 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 151.

period was hardly any better. White soldiers, too, were known to take scalps and mutilate the remains of fallen Indians.

The Pawnee Battalion, then, had all the characteristics of a Pawnee war party. This did not mean that the Pawnees did not feel any pride in wearing the uniform of the United States. On the contrary, as scouts for the Great Father, they felt like equals of the whites. Unlike the agents back at the reservation, the army treated them like men, not like children. They did not see themselves as dupes of a greater power but as allies of a foreign nation who fought a common enemy. Thus, even though they wore the uniform of the United States Cavalry, they never ceased to be Pawnees.

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APPENDIX 1

Pawnee Indian Scouts, U. S. Army, 1864-1866

Name	Age	Enlistment	Remarks	Rank
Frank North	24	Jan. 13, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Captain
Charles A. Small	22	Jan. 13, '65	Mustered out, March 7, 1866	1st. Lieut.
James Murie	23	Jan. 13, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	2nd. Lieut.
William N. Harvey	21	Nov. 12, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	1st. Sergt.
Ke-wrick-oo-coots	28	Jan. 9, '65	Reduced to ranks March 1, '65 [see below]	Q. M. S.
John M. Taylor	25	Jan. 25, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Q. M. S.
La-sharo-pit-koo	33	Jan. 12, '65	Reduced to Sgt. March 1, '65 [see below]	C. Sergt.
La-shah-kit-e-butts	32	Jan. 9, '65	Appointed Comm. Sgt. Jan. 13, 1865	C. Sergt.
Tuck-oo-we-ter-roo	35	Oct. 15, '64	Died at Ft. Kearny, March 20, '65	2nd. Sergt.
Koot-tah-we-coots-oo-lel-le-shar	25	Oct. 15, '64	[Began career as 6th Corpl., see below]	2nd. Sergt.
Te-lah-wah-see-la-ta-rick	26	Jan. 12, '65	Reduced to the ranks [see below]	3rd. Sergt.
La-sharo-le-wah-de	30	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	3rd. Sergt.
La-sharo-le-wah-de	30	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	4th. Sergt.
Lah-we-lah-his	35	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	4th. Sergt.
Lah-we-lah-his	35	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	5th. Sergt.
Kit-e-kah-rus-oo-tah-wah	33	Oct. 15, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	5th. Sergt.
Koot-tah-we-koots-oo-lel-la-shar	25	Jan. 12, '65	Promoted to 2nd. Serg't. [see above]	6th. Sergt.
La-sharo-kit-poo	33	Jan. 12, '65	Reduced to Sgt. March 1, 1865	6th. Sergt.
Ow-it-toost	30	Oct. 15, '65	Died at Julesburg, June 20, 1865	1st. Corp.
Ste-tock-tah-hoo-la-rick	30	Jan. 12, '65	Appointed Corpl. Jan. 13, 1865	1st. Corp.
Koot-tah-we-coots-oo-lel-le-shar	25	Nov. 20, '64	Promoted to Sergeant [see above]	2nd. Corp.
Lah-tah-cots-tah-kah	28	Nov. 15, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	2nd. Corp.
Tah-we-doos-led-e-hoor	28	Jan. 9, '65	Mustered out April 1, 1866 [see below]	3rd. Corp.
Se-gule-e-kah-wah-de	45	Oct. 15, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	3rd. Corp.
Se-gule-e-kah-wah-de	45	Oct. 15, '64	[same as previous]	4th. Corp.
Chuck-kah	32	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	4th. Corp.
Lah-tah-cots-tah-kah	28	Nov. 15, '64	Promoted to 2nd Corporal [see above]	5th. Corp.
Pe-ah-see-te-tah-hoo-la-rick	32	Oct. 15, '64	Mustered out April 1, 1866	5th. Corp.
Se-led-e-hoo-le-tah-we	21	Oct. 15, '64	Appointed Bugler Jan. 13, 1865.	6th. Corp.
Koot-tah-we-coots-oo-lel-le-shar	25	Nov. 20, '64	Promoted to 2nd Corporal [see above]	6th. Corp.

Lel-lu-la-shar	31	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	7th. Corp.
Chuck-kah	32	Jan. 12, '65	Promoted to 4th Corporal [see above]	8th. Corp.
Tah-we-doos-led-e-hoor	28	Jan. 9, '65	Mustered out April 1, 1866 [see above]	8th. Corp.
Samuel White	19	Dec. 12, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Bugler
Ke-wrick-oo-weete	24	Oct. 15, '64	[see below]	Bugler
Se-led-e-hoo-le-tah-we	21	Oct. 15, '64	Mustered out April 1, 1866 [see above]	Bugler
Gu-su-hoo	21	Dec. 14, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Blacks'th
Us-sah-wee-tah	25	Jan. 11, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Farrier
La-shah-kit-e-butts	32	Jan. 9, '65	Mustered out April 1, 1866 [see above]	Saddler
Kit-e-ka-rus-oo-too-rouh-too-we	35	Jan. 11, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Saddler
Bob White	22	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Wagoner
Tit-tah-we-ka-we-it	21	Oct. 15, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Wagoner
Ah-re-kah-wah	19	Oct. 15, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Buck-scud-dy	21	Nov. 15, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Buck-scud-dy	24	Jan. 19, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Corux-kit-e-butts	21	Dec. 14, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Iders-soo-hoo-re-kit-tah	35	Oct. 15, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Kit-e-ka-rus-oo-too-rouh-too-we	35	June 9, '65	Appointed Saddler [see above]	Private
Ke-wrick-oo-ted-e-oose	24	Jan. 11, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Ke-wrick-oo-te-wah-de	28	Jan. 9, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Kah-roo-chicks-see	21	Dec. 27, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Ke-wrick-oo-kit-e-butts	21	Oct. 15, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Ke-wrick	21	Oct. 15, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Kit-toox	22	Oct. 15, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Kah-hah-kit-e-butts	24	Oct. 16, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Ke-wrick-oo-tah-kah	24	Nov. 20, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Kah-se-it	24	Nov. 20, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Ke-wrick	21	Nov. 20, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Kah-deeks	24	Nov. 21, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Ke-wrick-oo-te-rar-re	21	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Kah-ter-rit	25	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
koo-tah-we-coots-oo-hod-de	22	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Kah-hah-liens	25	Jan. 12, '65	Accidentally killed, August 18, 1865	Private
Koot-tah-we-coots-too-te-lah-we	26	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private

Ke-wrick-oo-weste	23	Jan. 12, '65	Appointed Bugler [see above]	Private
Koot-tah-we-coots-oo-lo-ke-wit	27	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Ke-wrick-oo-kah-lah	24	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Kah-deeks	35	Jan. 12, '65	Deserted, June 24, '65	Private
La-kah-tah	31	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Let-te-rus-soo-hew-rick	30	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Lah-shah-tu-roo-re	19	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
La-tah-cots-pete	30	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
lee-led-e-doo-tse-dow	35	Oct. 15, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Low-we-tah-hoo-re	22	Oct. 15, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Ler-roo-suck-koo-cosh	30	Oct. 15, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
La-tah-cots-oo-kah-toos	22	Nov. 20, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Low-e-luk-e-la-it	27	Nov. 20, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Ler-loo-low-wis	26	Dec. 8, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Li-he-coots	24	Dec. 8, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Lah-sah-hoor-e-chis	21	Dec. 8, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Lel-la-wreck	21	Dec. 26, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Lel-lu-cosh	22	Dec. 26, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Loo-kit-tah-we-kah-la-hah	23	Jan. 9, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Lah-low-we-hoo-la-shah	36	Jan. 9, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Ler-loo-le-kit-tah-wi	28	Jan. 9, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Low-we-lah-koooh	25	Jan. 11, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Loo-koo-soo-hoo-kah-we	35	Jan. 10, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Nick-coots	21	Nov. 23, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Pe-ah-se-te-tah-oo-hoo-la-rick	22	Oct. 15, '64	Promoted Corpl. June 30, 1865.	Private
Stee-tock-tah-hoo-ra-rick	30	Jan. 12, '65	Promoted Corpl. Jan. 13, 1865.	Private
Ste-te-kit-tah-we-row-la-rick	28	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Tit-ta-e-wits	24	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Too-che-rus-te-rah-pe-lah	30	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Tit-tah-wa-war-de	21	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Ta-hoo-ra-row	32	Jan. 9, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Te-kit-te-welah-we-se	35	Dec. 20, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Ta-cha-rux-oo-kah-tah-wee	23	Oct. 15, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Tit-tah-we-kah-we-it	21	Oct. 15, '64	Appointed Wagoner, June 30, 1865.	Private

To-its-pah	22	Nov. 18, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Te-we-ah-re-shah	26	Oct. 15, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Tit-ta-e-wits	22	Nov. 20, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Tah-kah	26	Nov. 23, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Tah-we-li-heris	30	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Tit-te-lah-shah-oo-wrick	35	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Too-re-cha-hoo-ris	27	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Tah-hoo-la-souh	32	Jan. 12, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Wit-te-de-root-kah-wah	26	Oct. 15, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Koot-tah-we-coots-oo-te-rar-re	23	Jan. 8, '65	Deserted before muster	Private
Ke-wrick-oo-lar-sit-tah	24	Dec. 27, '64	Deserted before muster	Private
Ke-wrick-oo-kit-e-butts	23	Nov. 23, '64	Deserted before muster	Private
La-tah-cots-kit-e-butts	25	Nov. 20, '64	Deserted but returned, mustered in Mch. 1, '65]	Private
Too-ra-kut-chuck	30	Jan. 10, '65	Deserted [probably error on original doc't.]	Private
Bob White	22	Jan. 12, '65	[same as "Wagoner Bob White" above?]	Private
Kee-wook-oo-weete	24	Oct. 15, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Ke-wrick-oo-coots	28	Jan. 9, '65	[see above] Mustered out April 1, 1866	Private
La-kah-dix-tah-oo-kah-tar-har	25	Jan. 15, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Low-we-loo-koo-la-it	27	Nov. 20, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
[Te-lah-wah-see-la-ta-rick]	29	Jan. 11, '65	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Te-kit-ta-lah-we-le	35	Dec. 20, '64	Mustered out of service April 1, 1866	Private
Ke-wrick	20	Jan. 12, '65	Deserted before muster	Private
Ah-roose-ah-too-ta-it	30	Oct. 15, '64	Rejected on account of impaired vision
Kit-e-kah-rus-ookah-wah	29	Jan. 12, '65	Rejected on account of impaired vision

Note: names that appear more than once occasionally are spelled differently in the documents

Compiled from *Report of John R. Patrick, Adjutant-General of the State of Nebraska to the Governor of Nebraska, January 1st, 1871* (Des Moines, IA: Mills and Company, 1871), and *Roster of Nebraska Volunteers, From 1861 to 1869* (Hastings, NE: Wigton & Evans, 1888).

APPENDIX 2

Pawnee Indian Scouts, U. S. Army, 1867

Name	Age	Enlisted	Remarks	Rank
At re tah kah	22	15 Mch '67	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
At re kah rard	23	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Ah roose ah lah kah hoo rechick	31	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Ah sah tah kah	21	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ah sah rah kah ne re chicks	28	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
[Coos] sucks	24	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Chuck kee [] oo	20	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Chic ho tuh kah hu shar	26	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Chush	19	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Chickeo kat lah	19	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Co roox	24	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Chuck kah	28	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Corux kit e butts	24	7 Sept. '67	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Corporal
Evans, Thomas	24	15 Mch '67	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
[Eswer], Joe	31	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Sergeant
Forsch[u], James P.	Discharged Oct. 15th 1867 by order Major Frank North
Hoo rus	28	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Hee rus	22	21 Sept. '67	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ish kot tup it	31	15 Mch '67	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Kot tah ne coots oo led le shar	23	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Koot tah we coots oo loose	19	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Koot tah we koots oo tah [kah]	23	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.
Koot tah we coots oo lah hoh	28	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Koot tah we coots oo loo kewit	21	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Koot tah we coots kah lah	24	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Koot tah we coots oo hod de	18	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Koot tah we coots oo li e coots	22	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ke wuck oo kit e butts	23	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ke wuck oo la shar	24	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Ke wuck	25	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867

Ke wuck oo kit e butts	24	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Ke wuck oo te lah we	25	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Ke wuck oo te wah de	29	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Ke wuck oo ter rah sas	25	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Kah [?]ah [lieis]	19	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Kot cot tah wuck oo	26	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Kah kah kid [ook]	26	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Kah cot to lah we le	25	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Kah kot te li we	23	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Koot tah we coots	28	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Koot tah we coots oo [lock]	25	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Koot tah we coots oo pah	27	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Koot tah we coots oo had de	27	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Koot tah we coots oo ho	27	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Koot tah we coots oo tah kah	30	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Koot tah we coots oo too	25	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.
Koot tah we coots oo kah wa ha	29	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Koot tah we coots tee tay it	25	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Corporal
Koot tah we coots oo ted e oose	28	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Koot tah we coots [oote]	18	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Koot tah we coots oote lah we	23	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Koot tah we coots oo la sha	25	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Koot tah we coots oo like sas	22	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Koot tah we coots oo lah codish	25	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Kit toox	25	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Ke wuck oo ha	21	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Ke wuck oo tah ri e coots	28	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Ke wuck oo te rir re	24	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Ke wuck oo lah hah	22	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Keewuck	23	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ke wuck	25	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Ke wuck oo lah shah	24	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ke wuck oo loo ru wah	21	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ke wuck oo roo ha	20	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private

Ke wuck oo hah lah	20	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Kah kah la shar	23	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Kah kah la shah	22	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Kah chee	24	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Kah kah kid eek	23	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Koot tah we koots oo lah shah	21	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Koot tuh coots oo lat sah kah	28	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Koot tah we coots oo lo ra	28	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Koo we lah	26	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ke wuck	25	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ke wuck oo te rur re	28	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Corporal
Ke wuck oo wate	27	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ke wuck oo ted [cooe]	23	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ke wuck oo kah lah	26	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ke wuck oo tah kah	30	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Koo tit kah we	30	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Koot tah we coots oo la ri e coot	28	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Koot tah we coots oo tah wuck oo	28	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Bugler
Koot tah we coots	28	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Koot tah we coots o tah kah	25	... " ...	Deserted Oct. 31st 1867
Koot tah we coots oo kah lah	19	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ke [chu sharr]	30	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ke wuck oose kah tit	25	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ke wuck	19	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ke wuck oo had de	20	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ke wuck oo te wah de	27	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ke wuck oo kah lah	24	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ke wuck lah [rih] tah	27	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ke wuck oo pakt	23	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Kit e kee dish	23	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Kah [su] lah we lah coole	24	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Kah kah kah lah	26	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Kah deeks	28	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Lon we he his	30	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867

La tah coots oo kah wah we	25	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Lel la kit tah we te la lah	25	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Le[?] lu wack	35	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Luck taks	19	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Le ke wuck oos kat wah de	28	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
La tah cots too ri ha	32	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Lal la [shair]	26	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
La tah koots tah koooh	26	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Lah we lah his ta shar	31	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Sergeant
Loo ho roo ke oo	19	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Lu kit tah we kah wuh de	25	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Loo kit tah we kah wist	28	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Led doo	23	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Loo le kit tah we oo la it	28	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Lah tah cots tah kah	21	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
la [tah] cots kip pe re	22	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Lah he la shah	26	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Loo [Heoo]	19	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Corporal
La tah coots su te ta it	23	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Corporal
Lit te la shah rus pe	20	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Loo wah lar e chou	28	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Loo low we luck oo lait	26	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Lee led e hoo le tah we	25	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Led roo	19	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Loo rah koot chucks	29	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Loo kit tah we kah wah de	28	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Lah we li hereis	31	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Lit tah we oots it	23	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Le ka rer re re tah	25	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
La we kat tah re	21	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ler roo lah kit tah we	40	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
La roo chuck koo de [hau]	23	... " ...	Deserted Oct. 31st 1867
Loo hah roo kah wah	[28]	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Lah we kah we li ha coots	24	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private

Loo kit we li his she	24	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Lit te le kit	19	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Bugler
Nick Coots	21	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Nick coots skit lah	24	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Nick coots [ted] e oose	24	... " ...	Deserted Oct. 31st 1867
Noo hah oo so he tooke	28	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Noo hoo la shar	26	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Farrier
Oo ra sees	19	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Or rah sir it	25	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
O tah coots a la shar	30	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Corporal
Pah tid ehoo	24	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Paw re puck ooht	23	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Bugler
Pe isk ke see war riks tee	19	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Pe ra [outh] kah two	26	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
[Pat . . . is]	20	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Pe ah tah wuck oo	28	... " ...	Died Sept 21st 1867 of consumption
Pi ris ka la shar	25	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Rah ru re ice	25	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Roo rah roo la shar	28	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Sah [weet]	21	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Se doo ho tah rah	30	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Suck koo loo too ri ha	25	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Se gule e hoo la shar	25	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Se cow e sirs	36	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Sah lah wick[s]	26	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Sergeant
Skah lah luck oo ah	30	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ske de kip pe re	26	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Sa kah de de wah de	25	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Suck koo roo to ri ha	25	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Scuddy Buck	24	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Corporal
Se gule oo to ri ha	35	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ter ra ra coots chow we	25	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Ter low ra kog is	30	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Tah luck kit ta le wah	29	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867

Tah kah	19	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.
Te rer re kat wat tus	25	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Corporal
Te kah dix te kah wah de	31	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Tah we kah we it	28	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Tak ka he he rer sish	30	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Farrier
Tah wits pah	25	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
T[?] ir ra wut te rux	29	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ta we kid de kah ard de	26	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Tah tah we roo ra	20	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Tee [hon] lar eet tah eetah	21	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Turah kit ta e wah	28	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Tah we ah re sit	25	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Tuck kah dicks too wah	29	... " ...	Deserted Oct. 31st 1867
Te [oose] kah ooht	35	... " ...	Deserted Oct. 31st 1867
Te ter rer te chicks sah	26	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Corporal
Te wuck koo la he ris	30	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Tah wis sah	24	... " ...	Deserted Oct. 31st 1867
Tah kah	20	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.
Us sah koots	30	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Us sah kish su lah shar	27	... " ...	Deserted Oct. 31st 1867
White, Bob	24	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1867
Whit tit te lah we luck oo rus pe	23	... " ...	Mutinied and left camp without leave Oct. 31st 1868
White, Frank	24	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Corporal
Wit tit te la shar ler is pe	27	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Wheeler, Mat	19	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Corporal
Welsh, James	22	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Wi tit [tee] rus pe	28	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Wit tit te lah we [huck] ko rus	28	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
White, John	24	... " ...	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Wit tit te la shar is pe	26	17 July '67	Discharged Nov. 14 1867, at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private

APPENDIX 3

Pawnee Indian Scouts, U. S. Army, 1868

Name	Age	Enlisted	Remarks	Rank
Ah re kah lah	19	8 May '68	Discharged Dec. 7, 1868 at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ah loose ah loi ta it	28	2 May '68""
Ah re kah rard	22	2 May '68""
Buck Skoddy	22	2 May '68""
Corux oo ah shar	25	2 May '68""
Co roox ah kah	20	2 May '68	Died from the effects of a gun shot June 6th '68"
Chi kes tah kah la shar	20	1 May '68	Discharged Dec. 7, 1868 at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Sergeant
Co rux led e hoor	22	2 May '68"	Private
Co rux	20	2 May '68""
Co rux kit e butts	19	2 May '68""
Co rux ah nah de	25	2 May '68""
Chickes e ked e wuk	24	8 May '68""
Co luck koox	22	8 May '68""
[Idrus] soo	20	2 May '68""
Koot tah we coots oo led e oose	24	8 May '68"	Corporal
Ke wuck	20	1 May '68"	Private
Ke wuck oo kit e butts	23	1 May '68""
Ke wuck oo tah kah	19	1 May '68""
Ke wuck oo kah lah	22	1 May '68""
Ke wuck oo lel la shar	24	2 May '68""
Ke wuck oo kah lah	21	2 May '68""
Ke wuck oo hodde	19	2 May '68""
Kit che hard	19	2 May '68""
Koot tah we coots oo loo kah wah de	30	1 May '68""
Koot tah we coots oo hadde	25	2 May '68	Killed in Battle on Republican River July 30th 1868"
Koot tah we coots oo wate	25	8 May '68	Discharged Dec. 7, 1868 at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Private
Ke wuck oo kit e butts	20	8 May '68""
Kah kah de lah shar	21	8 May '68""
Ke wuck oo tah kah	19	8 May '68""

Ke wuck oo kit e butts	20	8 May '68""
Ke wuck oo led coose	19	2 May '68""
Ke wuck oo tah kah	19	2 May '68""
Ke wuck oo tah kah	21	1 May '68""
Koot tah we coots oo la ri e coots	29	2 May '68"	Corporal
Ke wuck oo	22	2 May '68"	Private
Ke wuck oo tah kah	22	1 May '68""
Ke wuck oo la shar	21	1 May '68	Died of wound received in Battle July 30th 1868"
Ke wuck	21	2 May '68	Discharged Dec. 7, 1868 at Ft. Kearny, Neb."
Ke wuck oo kah lah	27	2 May '68""
Ka chee	18	2 May '68""
Koot tah we coots li he [sus]	30	1 May '68""
Koot tah we coots oo he	21	1 May '68""
Koot tah we coots oo la shar	28	2 May '68""
Kit toox	21	2 May '68""
Koot tah we coots oo se [re] ta it	27	2 May '68""
Koot tah we coots oo kah lah	21	8 May '68""
Koot tah we coots	19	8 May '68""
Kah kah lah ooh kah	26	8 May '68""
Kah rer roo rer rit	25	9 May '68""
Loo har oo le shaik	29	8 May '68"	Sergeant
La shars chah rux	30	8 May '68"	Corporal
Le tit la wah te nis	24	2 May '68"	Corporal
La tah coots kah lah har	30	2 May '68"	Corporal
Led doo	26	2 May '68"	Private
La sharo ah toox	20	2 May '68""
Loo low we luck oo larit	23	8 May '68""
Luck koo la rus	21	8 May '68""
La shar kip pe re	25	9 May '68""
Lah tah coots kitt e butts	21	1 May '68	Deserted June 30, Apprehended July 3, Discharged Dec. 7, '68"
La tah cots tah kah	25	2 May '68	Discharged Dec. 7, 1868 at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Sergeant
La sharo [te] rus pe	30	2 May '68"	Corporal
La tah cots too ri ha	25	1 may '68"	Corporal

Lel go lel la shar	28	2 May '68"	Corporal
La tah cots oo kah toose	30	2 May '68"	Farrier
Low we lah koot e chaw	22	1 May '68"	Private
Lah la shar oose	18	2 May '68"	"
Luck it te lows	22	2 May '68"	"
Li e coots	25	2 May '68"	"
Lah we lah kooh kah lah	19	2 may '68"	"
Luck [talls?] oo la shar	30	9 May '68"	"
Loo kit tah we kah wah	26	9 May '68"	"
Loo law we luck oo la it	27	9 May '68	Died July 28, '68 of Wounds rec'd in Battle, Wood River, Neb."	"
Lushbaugh, Howard	18	1 May '68	Discharged Dec. 7, 1868 at Ft. Kearny, Neb.	Bugler
Le lit kit e ka rus oo la it	24	2 May '68"	Scout
Lee te tah loo la rick	19	2 May '68"	Scout
Pah roose ka lah	24	2 May '68"	Private
Pait is	24	9 May '68"	"
Roots tuck koo re kod e	23	2 May '68"	"
Ske gule e kah lah har	30	2 May '68"	"
Ske dih coort	19	2 May '68"	"
Se gule oo lah kit lah we	28	2 May '68"	"
Ske dih kah lah	19	8 May '68"	"
Sah lah kah	18	8 May '68"	"
See te tah loo la rick	--	2 May '68"	"
Se lit kit e ka rus oo la it	--	2 May '68"	"
Te kits te wits pah	24	2 May '68"	Farrier
Too rah cha hoo ris	24	2 May '68"	Private
Te luck oo low wits pah	21	8 May '68"	"
Te wah de	21	1 may '68"	"
Ta cha rux soo kah tah we	24	2 May '68"	"
Tha ho re a chis	30	2 May '68"	"
Te kah [dix] te kah wah de	28	2 may '68"	"
Te lah we kah [asst]	23	9 May '68"	"
Us sah coots	25	1 May '68"	Sergeant
Us sah tah kah	18	2 May '68"	Private

White, John	24	2 May '68"	Bugler
Welsh, James	19	1 May '68"	Private
White, Bob	24	8 May '68""....

Compiled from the "Registers of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914," M 233, Roll 70, Volume 150, "1866-1873, Indian Scouts," Washington, D. C.: The National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1956.

APPENDIX 4

Pawnee Indian Scouts, U. S. Army, 1869

Name	Age	Enlisted	Remarks	Rank
Ah loose ah too ta it	20	Feb. 11, '69	Discharged Nov. 10, 1869 at Pawnee Agency, Neb.	Private
Adams, Wesley	19	April 23, '69"	[Scout]
Ah loose ah li it low	25	April 23, '69"	[Scout]
Ah loox	23	April 23, '69"	[Scout]
Ah re la shah	19	June 10, '69"	[Scout]
Ah re kah rard	26	June 10, '69"	[Scout]
Buck skoddy	27	April 23, '69"	[Scout]
Buck stah kah tah	20	June 10, '69"	[Scout]
Co rux te cots tah re	25	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Co rux ah kah wah de	28	Feb. 11, '69"	Sergeant
Cha rux	30	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Co rux led e hoor	26	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Co rux	27	April 23, '69"	[Scout]
Co rucks kit e butts	23	April 23, '69"	[Scout]
Co rux (1st)	26	June 10, '69"	[Scout]
Co rux (2nd)	23	June 10, '69"	[Scout]
Co rux te chod ish	28	June 10, '69"	Sergeant
Co rux tah kah tah	19	June 10, '69	Died August 15, 1869 of Disease of the Heart	[Scout]
Howard Lushbaugh	20	Feb. 11, '69	Discharged Nov. 10, 1869 at Pawnee Agency, Neb.	Bugler
He rus	23	April 23, '69"	[Scout]
Headman, Pete	21	June 10, '69"	[Scout]
Ke wuck oo ti here is	20	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Ke wuck	30	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Koot tah we coots oo let la shar	25	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Koot tah we coots oo la ri e coots	25	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Koot tah we coots oo he	21	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Ke wuck oo pah	19	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Ke wuck oo hod de	21	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Koot tah we coots oo roo hah	25	April 23, '69"	[Scout]
Kah kah kid eek	26	April 23, '69"	[Scout]

Ke wuck oo hodde	23	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]
Koot tah we coots oo kit e butts	23	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]
Kah ta la wah hoo	20	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]
Ki wuck oo li ish she	26	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]
Ke wuck	20	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]
Ke wuck oo loo ri hah	25	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]
Kah kah kit e butts	21	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]
Koot tah we coots oo tah kah (1st)	23	June 10, '69	"	[Scout]
Koot tah we coots oo tah kah (2nd)	23	June 10, '69	"	[Scout]
Ke wuck oo loo ra	21	June 10, '69	"	[Scout]
Kah kah la shah	21	June 10, '69	"	[Scout]
Ke wuck oo hodde	20	June 10, '69	"	[Scout]
Ke roo ree la shah [aist]	21	June 10, '69	"	[Scout]
Kit toox	24	June 10, '69	"	[Scout]
Ke wuck oo la shah	26	June 10, '69	"	[Scout]
Koot tah we coots oo loo ra wah	25	June 10, '69	"	Sergeant
Ke wuck	24	June 10, '69	"	[Scout]
Koot tah we coots oo te [raue]	23	June 10, '69	"	[no rank]
Ke wuck oo too re ha	25	June 10, '69	"	[no rank]
Kah kah kah lah	21	June 10, '69	"	[no rank]
Kah see low we luck koot	20	June 10, '69	"	[no rank]
Kit e ka rus	23	June 10, '69	"	[no rank]
Koot tah we coots oo la shah	26	June 10, '69	"	[no rank]
Koot tah we coots oo ree le tail	21	June 10, '69	"	[no rank]
Koot tah we coots	20	June 10, '69	"	[no rank]
Lah tah cots i ish e	28	Feb. 11, '69	"	Corporal
Loo har roo kah lah har	25	Feb. 11, '69	"	Private
La tah cots too ri ha	23	Feb. 11, '69	"	Private
Li here is oo ricks	30	Feb. 11, '69	"	Private
Li e cootsk	28	Feb. 11, '69	"	Private
Li here ris pits oor	31	Feb. 11, '69	"	Private
Lah we cots tah re	25	Feb. 11, '69	"	Private
La hoo rah sahk	19	Feb. 11, '69	"	Private
La sharo lah kah wah de	30	Feb. 11, '69	"	Corporal

[Lel] go lel la shar	30	Feb. 11, '69	"	Farrier
Lel loo whuck	23	Feb. 11, '69	"	Private
La sharo go toe	20	Feb. 11, '69	"	Private
Loo low we luck oo [la] it	23	Feb. 11, '69	"	Private
La sharo lah ri e coots	20	Feb. 11, '69	"	Private
Lel la hoo ris ah la shar	28	Feb. 11, '69	"	Private
Luck ka le ka ricks	26	Feb. 11, '69	"	Private
La tah cots tah wuck oo	29	Feb. 11, '69	"	Private
Lah sah hoo re chis	28	Feb. 11, '69	"	Private
Loo har oo we tooke	25	Feb. 11, '69	"	Private
Ler loo chuck koo lid [ide]	30	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]
Ler loo chuck koo cah	[35]	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]
La sah kid eeh	19	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]
Loo hoo re he we it	20	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]
Lushbaugh, Dick	23	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]
Lushbaugh, Frank	21	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]
Ler looh kah	21	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]
Led do whah lar roo	30	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]
La sharo teruz	25	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]
Lah whah	18	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]
Loo hoo ooh kit tus	28	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]
La shah kip pe re	24	June 10, '69	"	Corporal
[Let] go lel a shar	24	June 10, '69	"	[Scout]
Li here is soo rick	25	June 10, '69	"	[Scout]
Lel la hoo la shar	24	June 10, '69	"	[Scout]
La tah cots kit e butts	20	June 10, '69	"	Farrier
Loo kit tah we kah lar hoo	21	June 10, '69	"	[Scout]
Loo low we luck ko la it	23	June 10, '69	"	[Scout]
La shah kip [pu]	21	June 10, '69	"	[Scout]
Murray, Andrew	21	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]
Murie, Joe	26	April 23, '69	"	Corporal
Murie, Peter	20	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]
Nick coots	19	June 10, '69	"	[no rank]
Pa sah	19	April 23, '69	"	[Scout]

Pe ah tah wuck koo	26	June [11] '69"	[no rank]
Ricketts, Clark	19	April 23, '69	[no remarks]	[no rank]
See le lick kit tah we rook	31	Feb. 11, '69	Discharged Nov. 10, 1869 at Pawnee Agency, Neb.	Private
Se gule oo too ri ha	31	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Ste whah wah	19	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Sit te de shah rook	26	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Se gule e te ta it	26	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Si[t] te la shar ris pe	26	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Skee dih tah kah	28	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Sherman, Merit	20	April 23, '69"	[Scout]
See lid e hoo le tah we	20	April 23, '69"	[Scout]
Sah [whut]	18	April 23, '69"	[Scout]
Se tee too de dard	30	April 23, '69"	[Scout]
Ste lah we lah koo la rick	30	April 23, '69"	[Scout]
Ske dih coart	21	June 10, '69"	[Scout]
Se gule oo [te] wah de	25	June 10, '69"	Corporal
Se gule oo e cool e kit	26	June 10, '69"	[Scout]
Se gule e lah kit tah we	25	June 10, '69"	Sergeant
Tow wits pah	28	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Te hat too rah	31	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Te de sah wheet	30	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Tuck oo wa te roo	30	Feb. 11, '69"	Sergeant
Te lah we kah wah de	29	Feb. 11, '69"	Corporal
Tick ted e doo hot	28	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Te lah we kah [ust]	22	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Te na se pa	[?]	1869	Deserted March 6th, 1869	
Too kit tah we oo	23	April 23, '69	Discharged Nov. 10, 1869 at Pawnee Agency, Neb.	[Scout]
Tah ka lah here is ish	32	April 23, '69"	[Scout]
Te lai we kit ta le wah	26	April 23, '69"	[Scout]
Too kit ti a wah	31	April 23, '69"	[Scout]
Ta we kit e kah ard	26	April 23, '69"	[Scout]
Te kah dix tus pe	23	April 23, '69"	Corporal
Tit tah we oo tsit	30	April 23, '69"	[Scout]
Ti he pe tus	29	April 23, '69"	Corporal

Teck ted e doo hot	22	June 10, '69"	[Scout]
Te suck koo loo	25	June 10, '69"	[Scout]
Te hoo lar e ti ate	26	June 10, '70"	[Scout]
Tuck ha le ta sicks	[?]	Feb. 11, '69	[no remarks]	[no rank]
Us sah kah oo kah lah	30	Feb. 11, '69	Discharged Nov. 10, 1869 at Pawnee Agency, Neb.	Corporal
Us sah kish oo la shar	26	Feb. 11, '69"	Private
Us sah la kah char	19	April 23, '69"	Sergeant
Us sah loo we lah koot	19	April 23, '69"	[Scout]
Us sah tow oot	24	June 10, '69"	[Scout]
Us sah hoo pe	21	"	[Scout]
White, Frank	21	April 23, '69"	Corporal
White, Bob	23	June 10, '69"	Bugler
Wit tit te kit tah we ris pe	21	June 10, '69"	[Scout]
Wit tit te kit tah we hoo ris	25	June 10, '69"	Corporal

Compiled from the "Registers of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914," M 233, Roll 70, Volume 150, "1866-1873, Indian Scouts," Washington, D. C.: The National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1956.

APPENDIX 5

Pawnee Indian Scouts, U. S. Army, 1870

Name	Translation	Age	Enlisted	Remarks	Rank
Ah loose ah lah roo kit tah	Horse Rider	26	Sept. 4, '70	Discharged Dec. 31st at Ft. McPherson, Neb.	Private
Ah kah de wuckah	Drumming	20"""
Ah loose ah la rir coots	Brave Horse	29"""
Ah re tah kah	White Calf	23"""
Ah toox	Wants to be chief	26"""
Co rux le cot tah re	Running Bear	30"""
Chilks tah kah la shar	White Man Chief	26""	Sgt.
Co rux too ri ha	Good Bear	26""	Private
Co rux	Bear	25""	Corpl.
Hoo rus	Finding	23""	Private
Koot tah we coots oo la ri e coots	Brave Hawk	20"""
Koot tah we coots oo te rer re	New Hawk	26"""
Koot tah we coots oo pah	Red Hawk	25"""
Kit toox	Beaver	25"""
Ke wuck oo la shah	Chief Fox	26"""
Kit e ka rus	Good Scout	23"""
Kah kah kit e butts	Little Crow	24"""
Koot tah we coots oo lel la hoo la shar	Chief Hawk	23"""
Ke wuck	Fox	23"""
Koot tah we coots oo see te la it	Seeing Hawk	27"""
Ke wuck oo kaks	Long Fox	26"""
Ke wuck oo wit te rar wok	Like a Fox	26"""
Koot tah we coots oo hi	Sitting Hawk	26"""
Ke wuck oo lah kah wah de	Fox in a hole	28"""
Ke wuck oo li here is	Fox Ahead	27"""
Ke wuck (1st)	Fox	23"""
Ke wuck (2nd)	Fox	21"""
Ke wuck oo hod de	Young Fox	26"""
Koot tah we coots oo tah kah	White Hawk	24""	Bugler
Ke wuck oo li ish she	Seeing Fox	25"	Dishonorably Discharged Oct. 18, 1870.	Private

Kah tar re	Runner	23"	Discharged Dec. 31st at Ft. McPherson, Neb."
Koot tah we coots oo kah lah	Lonesome Hawk	26"	"	"
Ke wuck oo tah kah	White Fox	26"	"	"
Kah kah kah lah	Having a Crow	27"	"	"
Kit che hard	Short Hair	28"	"	"
Ke wuck oo ted e oose	Blue Fox	26"	"	"
Kah kah la shar	Chief Crow	23"	"	"
Ke wuck oo roo ra	Good Fox	25"	"	"
Ke wuck oo roo ra	Good Fox	28"	"	"
Ke wuck oo hod de	Young Fox	23"	"	"
Ke wuck oo te lah re	War Fox	20"	"	"
Koot tah we coots oo pah	Red Hawk	23"	"	"
La hoo re sock	Head Warrior	26"	"	Corpl.
La tah cots tah kah	White Eagle	23"	"	[no rank]
Low we lah koole e chow	Warrior Seen	26"	"	Private
La tah cots too re ha	Good Eagle	23"	""
Lah lah kah hoo rah chicksoo	Hoping for Riches	28"	"	Sgt.
La sharo kit e butts	Little Chief	19"	"	Corpl.
Li here is pits oor	Chief Warrior	30"	"	Farrier
La shah kip [pe] re	Young Chief	28"	"	Corpl.
Loo har roo kah la har	One [that is] first	26"	"	Private
Lah lah we kah wah de	Killing the Enemy	30"	"	Sgt.
La sharo te ris pe	Hunting a chief	26"	"	Private
Loo rah rah kah tah hoo ris	Running the Gauntlet	30"	"	"
Li he coots	The Brave	27"	"	"
Lit tah we oots it	Killing Man	25"	"	"
Loo kit tah we ka la har	Riding Good Horse	29"	"	"
La tah cots kit e butts	Little Eagle	26"	"	"
Loo har oo we tooke	Brave Man	28"	"	"
Lah we kah we ri e coots	Brave Man with Bow	26"	"	"
Loo hoo la shar	Chief	26"	"	"
Loo lah hoo ris oo la	Good Name	27"	Dishonorably Discharged Oct. 18th 1870."
Luck ka le ta ricks	Man who sees all	23"	Discharged Dec. 31st at Ft. McPherson, Neb."
Li here is oo la it	Ahead Looking	23"	"	"

Lah low we lah koo led ick	Stopped Warrior	25"""
Ler roo chuck roo de hoor	Big Sun	24"""
Ler rer ra wuk te rus	Looking Ahead	29""	Sgt.
Loo che ris kah wah	Bringing in Horses	27""	Private
Low we lah koo rah lah	Warrior Lonesome	28"""
Lit tah we oo la it	With a War Party	25""	Corpl.
Loo chuck oo [loox] soos	Running Horse	25""	Private
Murie, Peter		30""	Corpl.
Oo re tut tow	Mad Fighter	26""	Farrier
Pe ish ke la shar	Boy Chief	29""	Bugler
Pa sah	Bob Tail	19""	Private
Suck koo roo too ri ha	Good Sun	31"""
Skah lah te lah we lah	A Lone Warrior	26""	Corpl.
Tit ti e wits	One in War	26""	Private
Tuck it te [louks]	Alone to War	27""	Corpl.
Ter rah	Buffalo	30""	Private
Ti e pe rics	Whip	26"""
Us sah toox	Having a Horse	26"""
Us sah kouht	Horse with Feathers	23"""
Wit te lah we lah koo rus	Willing Warrior	27"""

Compiled from the "Registers of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914," M 233, Roll 70, Volume 150, "1866-1873, Indian Scouts," Washington, D. C.: The National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1956.

APPENDIX 6

Pawnee Indian Scouts, U. S. Army, 1876-1877

Name	Enlisted	Remarks	Rank
Ah re kah lah kip pe re	Sept. 31, 1876	Discharged April 28, 1877 at Sidney Barracks, Neb.	Corporal
Ah loose ah led e doo la	Sept. 31, 1876"	Private
Ah loose ah lah cooh kit tah	Sept. 3, 1876""
Ah loose ah leh lit kah we"""
Ah re kah rard"""
Co rux kit e butts""	Corporal
Chuck ke oo""	Private
Chick ta sah"""
Crooked Hand Eddie"""
Chickes tah kah lah shar"""
Coon, Harry""	1st Sgt.
Goos soo hood e woe""	Private
He[a]dman, Peter""	Sergeant
[H]ick coots""	Private
Koot tah we coots oo lel hoo la sha""	Corporal
Ke wuck oo la shah (1st)""	Private
Ke wuck oo la shah (2nd)"""
Koot tah we coots oo see tat ta it""	Corporal
Koot tah we coots oo te la we""	Private
Ke wuck too re ha"""
Koot tah we coots oo lari [ax] coots"""
Kah dix""	Sergeant
Kah kah kit e butts""	Private
Kit toox"""
Kah kah ah tot"""
Kit toox (2nd)"""
Ke wuck (2nd)"""
Ke wuck (1st)"""
Ke wuck oo la war [rickstu]"""
Ke wuck oo kah lah (1st)"""

Ke wuck oo kah lah (2nd)"	Died Sept. 25, 1876 of Typhoid Fever."
Ke wuck oo loo ra"	Discharged April 28, 1877 at Sidney Barracks, Neb.	Sergeant
Kah kah kah lah""	Private
Kah cot tah wuck too"""
Koot tah wee coots oo tah kah""	Sergeant
Koot tah wee coots oo tah kah (2nd)""	Private
Koot tah wee coots oo kah lah"""
Ke wuck oo te lah we"""
Kah hah [liens]"""
Koot tah wee coots oo pah"""
Kouht"""
Koot tah wee coots"""
Kish ter rah"""
Kah kah kid eek"""
Ke wuck oo hod de"	Died Oct. 12, 1876 of Typhoid Malarial Fever."
Led doo whuck"	Discharged April 28, 1877 at Sidney Barracks, Neb."
La sharo too ri hi"""
Low we luck koo la shar"""
Lah tah cots oo kah wah de""	Corporal
Let go lel la sha""	Sergeant
Loo lah hoo ris oo la it""	Private
Loo le kit tah we hoo la it"""
La tah cots ka la har"""
Lincoln, Abraham"""
La tah cots tah kah"""
Loo kit tah we kah la har"""
La ta cots et te ta it"""
La tah cots a war ucks tee""	Farrier
Lah kah dix tah oo kah la har""	Sergeant
Luck tahs oo la ri e coots""	Sergeant
Led doo lar la shar""	Corporal
La sharo kit e butts""	Sergeant
Moore, Sam""	Private
Murray, Andrew"""

Nick coots (1st)	"	"	"
Nick coots (2nd)	"	"	"
Nick coots (3rd)	"	"	"
[Nock tils]	"	"	"
Nick a roo	"	"	"
Peter, Sam	"	"	"
Pritchard, Martin	"	"	"
Pau ree puck oot	"	"	Corporal
Pe ah lah li e coots	"	"	Private
Pe ish ke la shar	"	"	"
"Sidney"	[no comments]	"	"
Sah kah [peit]	Discharged April 28, 1877 at Sidney Barracks, Neb.	"	Private
Stu le kit tah we [ait]	Died Oct 3, 1876 of Pneumonia.	"	"
Simpson, Matthew	Discharged April 28, 1877 at Sidney Barracks, Neb.	"	"
Te here is tah we dah	"	"	Corporal
Tah wah chuh e hod de	Died May 29, 1877 en route to Indian Territory	"	Private
Tow we [his] ee	Discharged April 28, 1877 at Sidney Barracks, Neb.	"	"
Tit ti e wits	"	"	"
Ted e hoo	"	"	"
Ti here is ou wit	"	"	Farrier
Tah kah (1st)	"	"	Private
Tah kah (2nd)	"	"	"
Tah kah (3rd)	"	"	"
Tuck it ta le wah	"	"	"
Us sak kish oo kah lah	"	"	Sergeant
Us ke wuck	"	"	Private
Us sah kip pe di la shak	"	"	"
Us kah	"	"	"
Us sah kah lah	"	"	"
Us sah kah lah [not listed as "2nd"]	"	"	"
Us sah kouht	"	"	"
Wood, James	"	"	"
Woodruff, Jonas	"	"	"
Weeks, Ralph	"	"	1st Sgt.

White, Frank

.....".....".....

Sergeant

White, Bob

.....".....".....

Bugler

Compiled from the "Registers of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914," M 233, Roll 70, Volume 151,
"1874-1877, Indian Scouts," Washington, D. C.: The National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1956.

VITA 2

Martinus Johannes Maria van de Logt

Candidate for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Thesis: WAR PARTY IN BLUE: PAWNEE INDIAN SCOUTS IN THE
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