# THE DETERMINANTS OF SCHOOL EFFICIENCY IN 

OKLAHOMA: RESULTS FROM STOCHASTIC PRODUCTION FRONTIER AND DATA

ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS

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THE DETERMINANTS OF SCHOOL EFFICIENCY IN OKLAHOMA: RESULTS FROM STOCHASTIC PRODUCTION FRONTIER AND DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS

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## CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

The operational funding for public schools in the United States comes directly from tax revenue, and consequently taxpayers expect public schools to attain a certain level of quality in the provision of educational services. While schools' real expenditures have been increasing, standardized test scores-often used indicators of school qualityhave shown little if any improvement. Serious questions have been raised about the management and efficiency of public schools in the U.S.

The demand for accountability has spawned literally hundreds of studies that attempt to determine factors upon which school performance depends. Most studies focus on the "money matters" question: "Do increases in per-pupil spending improve student performance?" Hanushek (1994) found that the performance of U.S. students ranks below that of many other countries. The general findings of the 1991 International Assessment of Education Progress (IAEP) show that American students 9 and 13 years old are generally behind their peers from other countries, particularly in science and mathematics. Hanushek (1996) suggests that U.S. schools have had large increases in resources with very little, if any, improvement in outcomes. These findings confirmed his earlier statement in (1986, p. 1162) that "there is no strong or systematic relationship between school expenditures and student performance."

In Assessing Education Practices, Becker and Baumol (1995) state that real expenditures on secondary and elementary education more than tripled between 1960 and 1990, resulting in a lower student-teacher ratio and a rise in the average age, education, and specialization level of teachers. However, performance continues to decline, leading them to refer to the educational expenditures as deceptive indicators.

After reviewing a number of educational production frontiers, Taylor (1994) provides even more evidence of inefficiency. According to her findings, the United States' public schools are on average 15 percent inefficient. This has significant economic consequences, especially its effect on gross domestic product (GDP). Conversely, Bishop (1989) suggested that if the test scores had been rising during the 1970s, labor quality would have had increased by at least 2.9 percent and thereby led to an increase of 86 billion dollars in GDP.

Efficiency studies suggest a different question about the link between school funding and performance: "Can schools reallocate existing expenditures in ways that improve performance?" The studies suggest that inefficiencies could be due to exogenous factors such as the breakdown of the family, poverty, increased immigration, a misallocation of resources within the schools themselves, or the adoption of inferior pedagogy (e.g., the Becker and Baumol (1995) criticism that the poor quality of learning accomplishment signals the lack of rigorous curriculum and lack of sufficient rewards for learning.)

Deller and Rudnicki (1993), observed a positive relationship between instructional expenditure per student and, students' test scores while non-instructional (e.g. administration, operation and busing) spending has a negative effect on test scores.

In any case, the authors identify the existence of production inefficiencies in the educational production process. They suggest that, if schools are not utilizing their resources optimally, then additional resources may not produce improved outcomes.

Like other states in the U.S., Oklahoma seeks improvements in students' performance. A major educational reform law, House Bill 1017 (HB1017), was passed in early 1990 in an attempt to improve the quality of education in the state. Because the funding came from a tax increase as well as reallocation of state funds toward common education and away from other popular programs (Moomaw and Yusof, 1995, p. 1), the law created much controversy concerning its effectiveness.

Abdul Rahman (1996) estimated a simple model of the determinants of school inefficiency. Her study included various causes of inefficiencies (e.g., inputs which school administrators have control over such as expenditures and factors that are beyond their control, such as socioeconomic variables). Based on her analysis, she concluded that better quality teachers and smaller class size are relevant to better student performance. This suggests that the measures in HB1017 were a move in the right direction. However, further examination suggested that socioeconomic factors play an important role in the districts' inefficiencies. Schools with low socioeconomic status (regardless of how it is measured) are generally less efficient.

Jacques and Brorsen (1997) estimate the effects of school spending (several categories) on school performance as measured by test scores. They conclude that higher levels of instructional expenditures per student are in fact associated with higher test scores. There is no significant evidence that higher levels of instructional support lead to improved performance and in fact find a negative relationship between test scores and
spending on student support (which included expenditures on attendance and social work services, guidance services, health services, individual psychological services, speech pathology, and audiological services) holding other factors considered constant.

In a report to the Oklahoma State Senate staff, Michael Metzger (1999) concluded that a 10 percent increase in total expenditures would result in a little over 1 percent increase in student performance and suggested that a 15 percent increase in expenditures would be required to raise Oklahoma's average ACT test score from 20.6 in 1997 to the national average of 21. Abdul Rahman (1996) also found the elasticity of test scores with respect to instructional spending to be very small for the years 1991-1995. Adkins and Moomaw (1997) obtained similar results to those of Abdul Rahman using a maximum likelihood estimator.

This dissertation uses data provided by the Oklahoma Office of Accountability to estimate the stochastic production frontier for Oklahoma school districts and the determinants of district inefficiency. One new element in this research includes the use of DEA to explore the determinants of inefficiency in Oklahoma school districts. More explicitly, the objectives are:

1. examine the relationship between school district inputs and educational outcomes for Oklahoma.
2. specify and estimate a stochastic production frontier.
3. determine causes of inefficiency based on the most recently available data.
4. compare these results to those estimates from Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).
5. use an estimator that permits the random errors of the stochastic frontier to be heteroscedastic.

### 1.1 Significance of the Study

The study provides a thorough and up-to-date account of schools production in Oklahoma using the latest available data and means of analysis.

### 1.2 Organization of the Study

This study contains six more chapters organized as follows. Chapter II is a literature review, which is in two sections. Section 1 is concerned with the existing literature on education in general and Oklahoma's education system in particular, and section 2 focuses on the production models. The data description and sources for the stochastic production frontier model are presented in Chapter III. Chapter IV develops the model and discusses the econometric issues surrounding it. Chapter V presents the estimates, results, and discussions regarding the study's ability to improve the analytical tools for Oklahoma school performance as well as other areas of interest. Chapter VI includes the estimates, results and discussions based on a different specification than in Chapter V and using Data Envelopment Analysis technique. Chapter VII contains the summary and conclusion.

## CHAPTER II

## REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

### 2.1 Educational Production

Many economic studies of educational production, efficiency, and cost structure have been inspired by the Coleman report (Coleman, T. et al., 1966). The Coleman report was influential in that the analysis covered approximately 3,000 elementary and secondary schools with approximately half a million students. The report suggested an input-output relationship between administrative resource allocation and students' achievements. In addition, the report introduced policymakers to analytical issues such as production efficiency and the existence of multicollinearity among variables (Hanushek, 1979). In the report, the researchers found that students' performance was related largely to their socioeconomic background rather than the variation in schools (Hanushek, 1986, 1989).

Policy issues implied by the Coleman report generated significant interest in analysis of school performance. These studies differ in their focus and methodology; however, they provide some understanding of school efficiency.

Hanushek's survey of 147 studies (1986) suggests that in most studies expenditures per pupil, student/teacher ratio, teacher education and experience as well as family characteristics are used as the primary determinants of student achievement. The
results of these studies are in many ways contradictory; however, they are consistent in that expenditure and student performance lack a strong or systematic relationship and family characteristics definitely have an effect on their achievement.

Deller and Rudnicki (1993) suggested that competitive pressure within highly concentrated counties results in better school performance and is responsible for the school choice argument, i.e., allowing parents to choose which public school their children attend.

Caroline Hoxby conducted two separate studies on the effect of school choice on school performance. The first (Hoxby, 1994a) examines the choice between private and public schools. More specifically, she investigates the effect of private school enrollment on public school performance, holding public school spending constant. Hoxby concludes that increased competition between private and public schools increased public schools' productivity without any increase in spending.

The second study Hoxby (1994b) examines the extent to which greater choice among public schools affects public schools' performance. The author suggests that public schools with the lower per pupil spending, lower teacher salaries, and larger class size in the areas that have choices among public schools tend to have better than average student performance.

The possible effect of school size and/or district size on student performance cited by researchers captures the effect of economies of scale on schools' productivity. The results from studies of the effects of the scale economies associated with public schools are inconsistent; some find evidence of economies of scale and others do not. These
inconsistencies affect the confidence in the widely promoted and practiced consolidation policies based on economies of scale of the school districts.

Abdul Rahman (1996) studied the determinants of Oklahoma school efficiency. According to her study, the progress reports on educational performance in Oklahoma since HB 1017 suggest that schools' performance, measured by several standardized test scores, improved. The study's main purpose was to evaluate the potential effect of increases in spending in school districts and the effect of socioeconomic as well as other external factors on school district efficiency. The study finds:

- evidence of inefficiency in Oklahoma schools.
- that inefficiency, to a certain degree, is the consequence of the district's socioeconomic status. School districts with less favorable socioeconomic environments are generally less efficient.
- school districts with smaller class sizes perform better.
- evidence that economies of scale exists; i.e., size efficiency is beneficial to school districts performance. The evidence is stronger for upper grades.

Adkins and Moomaw (1997) studied the determinants of technical efficiency in Oklahoma schools. They find that:

- money matters, but not much; estimated elasticity of test score to spending are positive but very small.
- districts that have more experienced teachers are more efficient in all grades considered, except for grade 3. This may suggest that more experienced teachers may be more effective in higher grades but youthful ones may be more effective in lower grades.
- districts that pay higher salaries get better results.
- there also is evidence of possible efficiency gains from the size of the school district. Larger districts in Oklahoma tend to be more efficient than small districts. Thus districts might benefit by consolidation. According to Adkins and Moomaw's estimation, the optimal size for technical efficiency is between 18,000 and 22,000 students.

In a report to the Senate staff, Metzger (March 1999) suggests that the likely cause of the contradictory conclusions regarding expenditures and district structure may be because of errors in data and choice of model and model specification errors (i.e., econometric issues). Hanushek $(1979,1986)$ suggests that future research in this area should bear in mind the following. First, measuring and defining educational inputs and outputs can be problematical. Second, data availability may necessitate compromise regarding model selection. Finally, consideration must be given to the definition of efficiency and how it is being measured.

Some consistent findings have emerged:

- If money matters, it doesn't matter much.
- Schools tend to be inefficient and hence reallocation of resources within a district could improve performance.
- Socioeconomic factors are important.
- Few are willing to make sweeping changes in policy based on their results.


### 2.2 Production in Economics -- Production Function

A production function is a mathematical expression that relates inputs to outputs, given technology. The production function indicates the maximum output attainable with a given vector of inputs (Henderson and Quandt, p. 66).

Assume the following production function with two inputs and one output:

$$
\begin{equation*}
y=f\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right) \tag{2.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $y$ is output; $x_{1}$ and $x_{2}$ are inputs; and $f($.$) is a twice continuously differentiable$ function. In equation (2.1), $y$ is the maximum quantity of output that can be obtained with different quantities of the inputs $x_{1}, x_{2}$.

A typical production function is represented below in Figure 2.1.


Figure 2.1
Production Function

To determine the output supply and factor demand equations for firms with optimizing behavior, i.e., profit maximizing or cost minimizing firms, two different, but equivalent approaches can be taken. These are the primal approach and the dual approach.

### 2.2.1 The Primal Approach

When the output supply and factor demands are derived from a direct objective function, it is referred to as the primal approach.

## Profit Maximization

The profit of the firm is defined as total revenue (TR) minus total cost (TC).
Assume a profit-maximizing firm with production function given by equation (2.1) and profit $\pi$ as:
or

$$
\begin{gather*}
\pi=\mathrm{TR}-\mathrm{TC}  \tag{2.2}\\
\pi=p . f\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)-\left(w_{1} x_{1}+w_{1} x_{2}\right) \tag{2.3}
\end{gather*}
$$

where $p, w_{1}, w_{2}$ are the prices of output, $x_{1}$ and $x_{2}$, respectively. The values of $x_{1}, x_{2}$ that maximize profit can be obtained by setting the first order partial derivatives of equation (2.3) with respect to $x_{1}$ and $x_{2}$ equal to zero and solving for $x_{1}$ and $x_{2}$ simultaneously. That is:

$$
\begin{align*}
& x_{1}^{*}=x_{1}^{*}\left(p, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)  \tag{2.4}\\
& x_{2}^{*}=x_{2}{ }^{*}\left(p, w_{1}, w_{2}\right) \tag{2.5}
\end{align*}
$$

By substitution of (2.4) and (2.5) into the production function we obtain the output supply function:

$$
\begin{equation*}
y^{*}=\mathrm{y}^{*}\left(p, w_{1}, w_{2}\right) \tag{2.6}
\end{equation*}
$$

## Cost Minimization

For a cost-minimizing firm the goal is to produce a certain level of output at minimum cost, given input prices.

Consider the following direct cost function associated with production in equation (2.1):

$$
\begin{equation*}
c=w_{1} x_{1}+w_{2} x_{2} \tag{2.7}
\end{equation*}
$$

The input level, that minimizes cost, is obtained by minimizing (2.7) subject to production technology described in (2.1).

This is a restricted minimization problem, which can be solved by setting up a Lagrangian function:

$$
\begin{equation*}
l=w_{1} x_{1}+w_{2} x_{2}+\lambda\left(y-f\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)\right) \tag{2.8}
\end{equation*}
$$

setting the first partial derivatives with respect to $x_{1}, x_{2}$, and $\lambda$ equal to zero and solving for $x_{1}$ and $x_{2}$ simultaneously, then

$$
\begin{align*}
& x_{1}^{*}=x_{1}\left(y, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)  \tag{2.9}\\
& x_{2}^{*}=x_{2}\left(y, w_{1}, w_{2}\right) \tag{2.10}
\end{align*}
$$

$x_{1}{ }^{*}$ and $x_{2}{ }^{*}$ are conditional input demands.

In empirical applications, the primal approach requires the knowledge of the production function $f($.$) . The parameters of the production function have to be estimated$ (e.g., using econometric methods) and only then the output supply and factor demand equations can be derived.

### 2.2.2 The Dual Approach

The dual approach is the alternative to the primal approach. Its primary advantage is that it avoids the extensive computation involved in the primal approach. In this approach, the output supply and factor demands are derived from an indirect objective function.

## Profit Maximization

Assume the profit-maximizing firm in equation (2.1). The maximum profit can be obtained by substituting equations (2.4), (2.5), and (2.6) into equation (2.3):

$$
\begin{align*}
\pi^{*} & =p\left[y\left(p, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)\right]-\left\{w_{1}\left[x_{1}\left(p, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)\right]+w_{2}\left[x_{2}\left(p, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)\right]\right\}  \tag{2.11}\\
& =\pi^{*}\left(p, w_{1}, w_{2}\right) . \tag{2.12}
\end{align*}
$$

In the primal approach, profit is solely a function of input and output prices. In practice, the profit function is specified with appropriate properties (e.g., monotonicity, homogeneity, symmetry, etc.) and is estimated from observations from a sample data.

The profit function in equation (2.12) is the indirect profit function. According to Hotelling's Lemma, the first partial derivative of this profit function with respect to input prices is the negative of the input demands then:
and

$$
\begin{gathered}
\frac{\partial \pi^{*}}{\partial w_{1}}=-x_{1}^{*}\left(p, w_{1}, w_{2}\right) \\
\frac{\partial \pi^{*}}{\partial w_{2}}=-x_{2}^{*}\left(p, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)
\end{gathered}
$$

And the first partial derivative of the profit function with respect to output price is the output supply equation:

$$
\frac{\partial \pi^{*}}{\partial p}=y\left(p, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)
$$

Young's Theorem from calculus imposes certain symmetry restrictions between the cross partial derivatives of input demand and output supply functions. Young's Theorem states that the order of differentiation does not affect a second partial derivative for any twice continuously differentiable function:

$$
-\frac{\partial x_{1}^{*}\left(p, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)}{\partial w_{2}}=\frac{\partial^{2} \pi^{*}\left(p, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)}{\partial w_{1} \partial w_{2}}=\frac{\partial^{2} \pi^{*}\left(p, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)}{\partial w_{2} \partial w_{1}}=-\frac{\partial x_{2}^{*}\left(p, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)}{\partial w_{1}}
$$

and also:

$$
-\frac{\partial x_{1}^{*}\left(p, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)}{\partial p}=\frac{\partial^{2} \pi^{*}\left(p, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)}{\partial w_{1} \partial p}=\frac{\partial^{2} \pi^{*}\left(p, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)}{\partial p \partial w_{1}}=\frac{\partial y^{*}\left(p, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)}{\partial w_{1}}
$$

These symmetry conditions must be imposed on the profit function (2.12) when using the dual approach.

## Cost Minimization

Assuming that the cost-minimizing firm whose behavior is defined by (2.7) and (2.8), the indirect cost function of the cost minimizing firm can be obtained by substituting the cost minimizing input demand equations (2.9) and (2.10) into equation (2.7):

$$
\begin{align*}
c^{*} & =w_{1}\left[x_{1}^{*}\left(y, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)\right]+w_{2}\left[x_{2}^{*}\left(y, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)\right]  \tag{2.13}\\
& =c^{*}\left(y, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)
\end{align*}
$$

Equation (2.13) is the indirect cost function. In practice, this function is also specified with appropriate properties (e.g., monotonicity, homogeniety, etc.). The
function can then estimated and Shephard's Lemma is used to derive the input demand equations.

Shephard's Lemma states that the input demand equations can be derived by the first partial derivative of the cost function with respect to input prices. These input demand functions are conditional upon the output level $y$. Then:
and

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \frac{\partial_{\mathcal{C}^{*}}}{\partial w_{1}}=x_{1}^{*}\left(y, w_{1}, w_{2}\right) \\
& \frac{\partial_{\mathcal{C}^{*}}}{\partial_{w_{2}}}=x_{2}^{*}\left(y, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

Young's Theorm implies the symmetry condition:

$$
\frac{\partial x_{1}^{*}\left(y, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)}{\partial w_{2}}=\frac{\partial^{2} c^{*}\left(y, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)}{\partial w_{1} \partial w_{2}}=\frac{\partial^{2} c^{*}\left(y, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)}{\partial w_{2} \partial w_{1}}=\frac{\partial x_{2}^{*}\left(y, w_{1}, w_{2}\right)}{\partial w_{1}}
$$

### 2.2.3 Advantages of the Dual Approach

The major advantage of the dual approach is that it does not require specific functional knowledge of the production function in order to derive the output supply and input demand equations. These equations can be derived directly from the cost function or the profit function. The dual approach, with the appropriate cost or profit function, avoids the computational difficulties of the primal approach. Other advantages of the dual approach will be discussed in Section 2.2.5.

### 2.2.4 Concepts of Efficiency in Production

Efficiency in production can be defined in several ways including technical efficiency, allocative efficiency, and total efficiency.

## Technical Efficiency

Without loss of generality and to facilitate graphical description, assume a production process with a single input ( $x$ ) and a single output ( $y$ ). The production function which explains the relationship between input and output is $y=f(x)$. This function is represented in Figure 2.2.


Figure 2.2
Production Function and Technical Efficiency

In the context of efficiency measurement, the literature tends to refer to the production function as the production frontier to stress the maximal property of the function (Coelli, 1998, p. 12). Thus, the production frontier represents the maximum output attainable from each level of the input, with the current state of technology in the industry.

If firms in the industry operate on the frontier (e.g., point A), then they are technically efficient. If they operate below the frontier (e.g., points B and C), then they are technically inefficient.

A firm at point C is technically inefficient because it can operate at point A which produces a higher output level $\left(y_{A}>y_{C}\right)$ with the same amount of input $\left(x_{1}\right)$. The same type of argument explains the inefficiency resulting from operation at point B .

## Allocative Efficiency

Allocative efficiency in input selection is the mix of inputs that produces a given quantity of output at minimum cost. When input prices and output are known and when certain behavioral assumption such as profit maximization or cost minimization is appropriate; allocative efficiency can be measured.

Total efficiency: Total efficiency is the sum of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. If a firm is technically and allocatively efficient, then the firm is said to be economically efficient (totally efficient).

### 2.2.5 Production Function vs. Cost Function

Depending on the objectives of estimation, a firm's production function or cost function can be considered.

## Production Function

The production function should be estimated if:

1. the only known objective of the firm is to operate on its frontier as opposed to operating below it, i.e., obtaining maximum output from any given combinations of inputs. Estimation of the production function does not
require a behavioral assumption such as profit maximization or cost minimization.
2. there is no information available on input or output prices. The production function is purely a technical relationship.

The downsides of using the production function in estimation are:

1. if firms are profit maximizers or cost minimizers, estimation can suffer from simultaneous equation bias. This happens because the input levels and error terms are not independent of each other (Coelli, 1995, p. 226).
2. the production function captures only the technical inefficiency. This is a major drawback if the analyst is concerned with allocative inefficiency as well as technical inefficiency.
3. modeling multiple output production can be difficult.

## Cost Function

The cost function should be estimated:

1. if the firm desires to produce a certain output level at least cost and, if input price information is available. In this case no knowledge of the production function is required.
2. because the only algebraic manipulation to obtain the factor demands is the partial differentiation of the indirect profit function This is another advantage of the dual approach (Coelli, 1998).
3. if the firm produces multiple outputs.
4. if the researcher is concerned with the firm's allocative as well as technical efficiency, i.e., total efficiency.
5. because it is easier to obtain information on cost and input prices than obtaining information on input quantities.
6. the symmetry property of the cost function is of use in reducing the number of parameters being estimated, i.e., conserving the degrees of freedom and possibly elimination of multicolinearity problems (Coelli, 1998).

The downsides of using the cost function in estimation are:

1. input price information is required.
2. the hypothesis of cost minimization or profit maximization is required. These maintained hypotheses could be false in reality if the firm chooses to pursue other goals.
3. the total efficiency can be decomposed into its technical and allocative components only if the production function implied by the estimated cost function can be explicitly derived. This class of functions is referred to as self-dual functions, e.g., Cobb-Douglas technology (Coelli, 1998).

## Multiple Output Production and Distance Functions

As discussed earlier, the direct estimation of a production function does not allow for multiple output production technologies. In the past, researchers faced with this situation estimated the production function using a single aggregate output measure (Coelli, 1998).

In recent years some researchers dealt with this problem by using distance functions. Distance functions allow one to describe a multi-input, multi-output production process without specifying a behavioral assumption such as profit maximization or cost minimization.

An input distance function is concerned with a minimal proportional decrease of input vector, given an output vector. Alternatively, an output distance function is concerned with a maximal proportional increase of the output vector, given an input vector.

The focus of this section is to discuss the notion of output distance function.
Following Coelli (1998), assume a single input $x_{1}$ which produces two outputs $y_{1}, y_{2}$. The input requirement function can be defined as:

$$
\begin{equation*}
x_{1}=g\left(y_{1}, y_{2}\right) \tag{2.14}
\end{equation*}
$$

The function defined in equation (2.14) can be illustrated by a production possibility curve (PPC). PPC represents the different combinations of output that can be produced with a given level of input. PPC is the output counterpart of an isoquant and its properties are similar to the properties of isoquant. The production possibility curve in equation (2.14) is represented in Figure 2.3.


Now assume that the production technology defined by output sets, $\mathrm{P}(x)$, represents the set of all output vectors, $y$, that can be produced using input vector $x$ then:

$$
P(x)=\{y: x \text { can produce } y\}
$$

Coelli (1998, p. 62) summarizes the properties of this set. The output distance function on the output set $\rho(x)$ can be defined as:

$$
d_{o}(x, y)=\min \{\rho:(y / \rho) \in P(x)\}
$$

Following the axioms on the technology set, properties of $d_{O}(x, y)$ are:

1) $d_{O}(x, y)$ is increasing in $x$ and non-decreasing in $y$;
2) $d_{O}(x, y)$ is linearly homogeneous in $y$;
3) $d_{o}(x, y) \leq 1$ if $y$ belongs to the production possibility set of $x$, i.e., $\mathrm{y} \in \mathrm{P}(x)$; and
4) $d_{O}(x, y)=1$ if $y$ is on the PPC curve of $x$.

The concept of output distance function can be illustrated by the following example. Figure 2.4 represents the production technology where the outputs $y_{1}, y_{2}$ are produced using the input vector $x$.


Figure 2.4

## Output Distance Function and Production Possibility Set

The production possibility set in Figure 2.4, $\mathrm{P}(x)$, is the area bounded by the production possibility curve (or frontier), $\operatorname{PPC}-\mathrm{P}(x)$, and the $y_{1}$ and $y_{2}$ axes. For a firm operating at point E in the production possibility set, $\mathrm{P}(x)$, using the given input level $x_{1}$ to produce the outputs $y_{1}, y_{2}$, the value of the distance function for the firm is equal to the ratio:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\rho=\mathrm{OE} / \mathrm{OF} \tag{2.15}
\end{equation*}
$$

The firm can operate at point F , which is on the frontier with the given input level $x$ and produce more of both outputs. Hence the value of distance function, $\rho$, for operating at point F (and G ) is equal to 1 . Therefore, the firm that operates at point E can increase both its output quantities by moving to point F and still remain within the
feasible production possibility surface, i.e., $\mathrm{PPC}-\mathrm{P}(x)$. Note, the output distance function in equation (2.15) is exactly the inverse of Farrell's (1957) output oriented technical efficiency measure.

The input distance function is defined in a similar manner. The value of the distance function is exactly the inverse of Farrell's (1957) input oriented technical efficiency measure, which can be explained using the isoquants. Distance functions can be estimated directly by econometric methods or mathematical programming methods.

### 2.3 Modeling Production

This section contains a discussion of issues related to modeling the underlying relationships between inputs and output in a production process.

### 2.3.1 Average Response vs. Frontier Functions

The application of empirical estimation techniques for production and cost dates back to the work of Cobb - Douglas in 1928. Since then many others have attempted to elaborate on the subject of production (e.g., Dean, 1951; Johnson, 1960) and cost structure (e.g., Nerlove, 1963). There is also literature on the potential use of the duality between production and cost functions (e.g., Cornes, 1992).

Before Farrell's (1957) introduction of the frontier approach in estimating the dual functions' efficiency, the linear average mean response functions (production or cost) were estimated using least squares (OLS) or some variant thereof. The average functions do not necessarily represent the best technology, and therefore, there is an explicit conceptual link missing between microeconomic definitions of production or cost functions and what is being estimated. The average function assumes that all firms are
efficient, which is generally not a reasonable assumption. A frontier function is a bounding function against which inefficiency or the relative size of one-sided deviations from the maximum output or the minimum cost can be estimated.

If the relationship between inputs and output is estimated using OLS, a line satisfying the least squares assumptions is fitted through the data. The estimated line represents the average function (Figure 3.1) and does not necessarily catch the best technology.


Figure 3.1
Fitting an Average Function

Farrell (1957) introduced the frontier approach in estimating the dual functions' efficiency. The concepts of frontier cost (Figure 3.2) and production (Figure 3.3) are shown below. The idea is to fit a line so that all the observed points are above the line in the case of cost or below the line in the case of production. The vertical distance from each point to the cost or production frontier represents inefficiency.


Figure 3.2
Cost Frontier with all the Observations on or Above the Frontier Boundary


Figure 3.3

## Production Frontier with all the Observations on or Below the Frontier Line

Examining Farrell's frontier concept (1957), and efficiency measurement via a geometric presentation is revealing. Farrell argues that average function does not accord with the standard definition of the production function. This argument led to the use of unit isoquant and isocost lines to explain his idea of the frontier production function and to show how it helps to arrive at an efficiency measurement.

Farrell (1957) considered a model with two inputs ( $x_{1}$ and $x_{2}$ ) which produce a single output (y). Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, the technology is represented by unit isoquant and isocost.


Figure 3.4
Farrell's Presentation of Technical and Allocative Efficiency

The unit isoquant of a fully efficient firm is represented by $\mathrm{II}^{\prime}$ in Figure 3.4. If a firm is operating at point B then the firm operates inefficiently. This follows because it could produce at Q , which yields the same output with fewer of both inputs. This technical efficiency (TE) can be measured by a distance OQ/OB.

$$
\mathrm{TE}=\mathrm{OQ} / \mathrm{OB}=1-\mathrm{QB} / \mathrm{OB}
$$

TE can take values between 0 and 1 , and hence the degree of inefficiency of the firm can be measured. This would imply that as B approaches Q , technical efficiency approaches one.

To explain allocative efficiency, Farrell adds an input price ratio (slope of the isocost line) represented by $\mathrm{AA}^{\prime}$ in the figure. The allocative efficiency (AE) when the firm operates at B , can be measured by distance $\mathrm{OC} / \mathrm{OQ}$.

The distance CQ represents the reduction in cost if the firm operates at $Q^{\prime}$ which is a technically and allocatively efficient point. Then, the total economic efficiency (EE) is then:

$$
\mathrm{EE}=\mathrm{OC} / \mathrm{OB}
$$

The product of TE and AE is total efficiency.

$$
\mathrm{TE} \times \mathrm{AE}=(\mathrm{OQ} / \mathrm{OB})(\mathrm{OC} / \mathrm{OQ})=\mathrm{OC} / \mathrm{OB}=\mathrm{EE}
$$

The above efficiency measures are in the context of an input-oriented measure, i.e., given a desired output quantities, how much can input quantities be reduced without changing the output quantities? Alternatively, one can approach the question with an output-oriented (rather than input) measure in mind, i.e., how much output quantities can be expanded with a desired level of input quantities?

If the firm's production is governed by constant returns to scale (CRS) the two measures are equal, i.e., input-oriented measures $=$ output oriented measures $($ Färe and Lovell, 1978). However, with varying returns to scale the two measures are not equal. To illustrate, assume output $y$ is produced with a single input $x$ with $y=f(x)$.

The following graphs in Figures 3.5 and 3.6 represent the input- and outputoriented technical efficiency measures with decreasing returns to scale (DRS) and constant returns to scale (CRS) technologies.


Figure 3.5
Input and Output-Oriented Technical Efficiency Measures with DRS

In Figure 3.5, the inefficient firm is operating at a point below the PPC, point B. Farrell's input-oriented technical efficiency (TE) is:

$$
\mathrm{TE}_{\mathrm{I}}=\mathrm{AR} / \mathrm{AB}
$$

At point $B$ the firm is producing $y=O A$ and fewer inputs are required by the firm to produce here if, it is technically efficient.

The output-oriented technical efficiency:

$$
\mathrm{TE}_{\mathrm{O}}=\mathrm{CB} / \mathrm{CD}
$$

and is based on the fact that with input usage at $\mathrm{x}=\mathrm{OC}$, the efficient firm can produce more output (BD). In general for DRS technology, $\mathrm{TE}_{\mathrm{I}}<\mathrm{TE}_{\mathrm{O}}$. Alternatively, when production is governed by constant returns to scale (CRS), the two measures are equivalent, i.e., $\mathrm{AR} / \mathrm{AB}=\mathrm{CB} / \mathrm{CD}$ then $\mathrm{TE}_{\mathrm{I}}=\mathrm{TE}_{\mathrm{O}}$ (Färe and Lovell, 1978).


Figure 3.6 Input- and Output-Technical Efficiency Measures with CRS

If output-oriented measures of technical, allocative or economic efficiency (TE, $A E, E E)$ are of interest, one can account for them by using production possibility curves and isorevenue lines (see Coelli, 1998 for details). All of these measures are between zero and one like the input-oriented measures

Battese (1992) proposed a more general case of Farrell's frontier concept. The focus of the study was on the technical efficiency rather than Farrell's total efficiency.

He used the production function explicitly in an output-input space rather than, inputs per unit of outputs space.

### 2.3.2 Functional Forms in Economic Analysis of Production

In this section the objectives of production analysis are discussed. The objectives are the underlying motivation for different functional forms. If one wishes to empirically measure certain quantities of interest in production, then the researcher must choose a specific parametric functional form to estimate. The choice of functional form is governed both by practical considerations and, by the specific objectives of the research. It is generally believed that the form chosen should be consistent with the underlying data generation process of the system under study. The principle objectives of production analysis are discussed in Fuss, McFadden, and Mundalk (1978). These objectives include determining:

1. distribution parameters, e.g., income share of factors of production. These parameters are important in determining the incidence of tax and subsidy programs as well as evaluating the economic growth.
2. the returns to scale properties of technologies, e.g., the supply and financing of public services often center on the question of the existence of increasing returns to scale.
3. the degree of substitutability between factors of production. Substitutability is critical in many areas including determination of tax incidences.
4. whether production relationships may be decomposed into nested or additive components, i.e., separability. This separability allows econometricians to carry out their analysis in terms of subsets of variables instead of a total set of
possible variables. Since separability influences generality and simplicity of functional forms, it is crucial for empirical testing.
5. the existence of technical change.
6. the relative efficiency, i.e., relative efficiency of firms to the frontier technology.
7. whether a production function is homothetic, i.e., is the expansion path linear through the origin?

There are several important criteria for designing functional forms that are to be estimated. A suitable functional form should obey or satisfy:

1. maintained hypotheses of basic axioms on the nature of technology that are widely accepted (e.g., monotenicity, concavity, symmetry, etc.).
2. technological and behavioral assumptions, which may be relevant to the particular problem at hand. For example a priori knowledge of constant returns to scale.
3. some innocuous simplifying assumptions that may facilitate the analysis, such as the independence of error terms.

Also, the functional form should be a parametric (as opposed to non-parametric) functional form for the sake of convenience and tractability.

Other practical considerations come into play when working with parametric production functions.

1. The functional form should contain only the parameters that are necessary (parsimony in parameters). $\{$ Excess parameters can create severe multicollinearity. In addition, when small samples are considered, excess
parameters are associated with a loss of degrees of freedom. Parameter necessity is usually a matter of judgment and differences in opinions may lead to model uncertainty.
2. The functional forms should be clear and easy to interpret. When dealing with complex functional forms, some economic interpretations can be difficult.
3. Functional forms should be chosen with computational ease in mind. Many empirical studies have used statistical models, which are linear in parameters because of their computational ease. Imposing linearity on an inherently nonlinear process can be very misleading; especially in predicting none sample events.

In an attempt to minimize the effect of rigid structure, the so-called flexible functional forms have gained widespread use.

### 2.3.3 Alternative Functional Forms

In this section we discuss the properties of some common functional forms used in econometric estimation.

## Cobb-Douglas Functional Forms

The Cobb-Douglas functional form has been popular in the empirical estimation of the frontier model. This is due to the fact that the Cobb-Douglas function is easy to estimate and a logarithmic transformation makes the model linear in logarithm of the inputs. However, this attractive feature imposes a number of restrictions. For example, the elasticities of substitution are constant and equal to one, i.e., inputs are perfect
substitutes. In addition, returns to scale properties for all the firms in the sample are identical.

## Translog Functional Forms

The translog functional form was first introduced by Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (1973). This function is a direct generalization of the Cobb-Douglas function. However, unlike the Cobb-Douglas function, elasticities of substitution need not equal to one and no (sample wide) restriction upon returns to scale is imposed. Translog forms do not necessarily satisfy concavity, monotonicity, or other important axioms of production economics. According to Terrell (1996), concavity and monotonicity can be imposed at the cost of lost flexibility. In fact, classical econometric methods have no elegant way of imposing these types of restrictions; however, this is fairly easily accomplished through Bayesian analysis. Therefore, the benefit and cost of imposing these restrictions has to be carefully considered. $\downarrow$

## Generalized Leontief and Generalized McFadden Functional Forms

Diewert (1971) introduced the generalized Leontief system, which is a flexible functional form that satisfies basic axioms and other maintained hypotheses. Diewert (1974, p. 113) defines a flexible functional form for a cost function. If a cost function provides second order differential approximation to an arbitrarily twice continuously differentiable cost function that satisfies the linear homogeneity in prices at any point in the domain, then it is a flexible functional form.

Diewert (1974) utilized the Shephard duality theorem in order to obtain derived demand equations, linear in technology parameters, for ease of econometric estimations.

He chose the quadratic form in the square roots of the input prices, thus a generalization of the Leontief cost function. One feature of this function is that any set of partial elasticities of substitution can be obtained with a minimal number of parameters. A generalized Leontief production function can attain an arbitrary set of shadow elasticities of substitution where a generalized linear function attains an arbitrary set of direct elasticities of substitution at a given set of inputs and input prices. Furthermore, Diewert constructs a functional form for production function using the Shephard duality theorem. The significance of this theorem is that the cost function can be interpreted as the total cost function of some underlying production function keeping in mind that the production function may not always be expressed explicitly. By estimating the parameters of the cost function, one can be assured that these parameters are equivalent to estimating the parameters of the underlying production function, assuming the firm is operating in a competitive market.

Another generalization of a functional form due to McFadden (1978), generalized McFadden, also received attention by researchers. Like generalized Leontief, generalized McFadden is a cost function; therefore, it uses duality theory to obtain derived demand equations.

Diewert and Wales (1987) compared translog, generalized Leontief and generalized McFadden cost functions. They established that the generalized Leontief cost function and generalized McFadden cost function are equivalent in terms of flexibility, ease of estimation, and hypothesis testing.

The forms and some of the properties of these functional forms are summarized in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1
Forms and Some Properties of Alternative Functional Forms

| Production Function | Homogeneity | Elasticity of Sub. |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Cobb-Douglas <br> $\log y=a_{0}+\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_{i} \log x_{i}$ | Homogeneous | $\sigma=1$ |
| Translog** |  |  |
| $\log y=a_{0}+\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_{i} \log x_{i}$ | Not Homogeneous | $\sigma$ not a constant |
| $+\sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} a_{i j}\left(\log x_{i}\right)\left(\log x_{j}\right)$ |  |  |
| Generalized Leontief* <br> $y=a_{0}+a_{1} x_{1}+a_{2} x_{2}$ <br> $+b_{1} \sqrt{x_{1}}+b_{2} \sqrt{x_{2}}$ <br> $+b_{3} \sqrt{x_{1} x_{2}}$ | Not homogeneous | $\sigma$ not a constant ${ }^{1}$ |
| Generalized McFadden* <br> $y=\sum \sum x_{j} \phi^{i j}\left(x_{i} \mid x_{j}\right) a_{i j}$ |  |  |

### 2.4 Estimation

In this section, several issues related to estimation of the underlying relationships are discussed. Following Farrell's introduction of the production frontier, a number of authors have discussed the process by which the frontier may be estimated.

Let's begin with a discussion related to estimation of a deterministic production function. Following Aigner and Chu (1968) let output be determined as a function of inputs for a given firm:

$$
y_{i}^{*}=f\left(x_{i} ; \beta\right)
$$

where
$y_{i}^{*} \quad$ is the maximum output attainable for the $i$ th firm
$x_{i} \quad$ is the (fixed) vector of inputs
$\beta \quad$ is a vector of unknown parameter to be estimated.

The parameters of the model can be estimated substituting the observed output, $y_{i}$, for $y_{i}^{*}$ and minimizing:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \sum_{i=1}^{N}\left|y_{i}-f\left(x_{i} ; \beta\right)\right| \\
& \text { subject to: }
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
y_{i} \leq f\left(x_{i} ; \beta\right) .
$$

By doing so an implicit disturbance term has been assumed.
Aigner and Chu estimate a Cobb-Douglas parametric frontier production function, using data on a sample of N firms. Their model is defined as:

$$
\ln \left(y_{i}\right)=x_{i} \beta-u_{i} \quad i=1,2, \ldots, \mathrm{~N}
$$

where:
$\ln \left(y_{i}\right) \quad$ is the logarithm of the (scalar) output for the $i$ th firm.
$x_{i} \quad$ is a $(k+1)$ row vector, with first element being " 1 " and the remaining elements being the logarithm of the $k$ input quantities for the $i$ th firm.
$\beta=\left(\beta_{0}, \beta_{1}, . ., \beta_{k}\right)^{\prime} \quad$ is $\mathrm{a}(k+1)$ column vector of unknown parameters to be estimated.
$u_{i} \quad$ is a non-negative random variable associated with technical inefficiency in production of the $i$ th firm.

The technical efficiency is defined by the ratio of actual output of firm $i$ and its potential output, i.e., the output frontier conditional on the input vector $x_{i}$ is:

$$
\mathrm{TE}_{i}=\frac{y_{i}}{\exp \left(x_{i} \beta\right)}=\frac{\exp \left(x_{i} \beta-u_{i}\right)}{\exp \left(x_{i} \beta\right)}=\exp \left(-u_{i}\right)
$$

$\mathrm{TE}_{i}$ is the output-oriented Farrell technical efficiency measure with a value between zero and one. In their model the disturbance term, $u_{i}$, measures technical inefficiency due to factors that are under the firm's control, i.e., disturbances that are associated with the producer's and employees' effort and damaged products, etc.

The shortcoming of the deterministic model is that it does not account for other sources of disturbance noise, such as measurement error, luck, climate, etc., which are not under a firm's control and can be favorable or unfavorable to the firm's output. This suggests that frontiers themselves can vary for different firms or over time for the same firm. Then the productive efficiency should be measured by:

$$
y_{i} /\left(f\left(x_{i}, \beta\right)+v_{i}\right)
$$

where $v_{i}$ is the disturbance associated with noise. Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) suggested a new model that takes $v_{i}$ into consideration. Since the economic logic suggests the specification of the disturbance term, then:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\ln \left(y_{i}\right)=x_{i} \beta+\varepsilon_{i} \quad \mathrm{i}=1,2, \ldots, \mathrm{~N} \tag{2.16}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\quad \varepsilon_{i}=v_{i}-u_{i}$
substituting for $\varepsilon_{i}$ in equation (16):

$$
\ln \left(y_{i}\right)=\left(x_{i} \beta+v_{i}\right)-u_{i}
$$

where:
$v_{i} \quad$ is the symmetric disturbance term, iid, $\mathrm{N}\left(0, \sigma_{v}^{2}\right)$,
$u_{i} \quad$ is truncated above at 0 , and distributed as $\mathrm{N}\left(0, \sigma_{u}^{2}\right)$,
$u_{i}{ }^{\prime} s$ and $v_{i}$ 's are independent of each other.
The model defined by equation (2.16) is a stochastic frontier production function, i.e., the output is bounded above by the stochastic frontier $\exp \left(x_{i} \beta+v_{i}\right)$, rather than $\exp \left(x_{i} \beta\right)$ the deterministic frontier.

Using the stochastic frontier approach allows one to estimate the variances of $v_{i}$ and $u_{i}$, and their relative sizes can be measured. Based on these results, firms can make more accurate decisions concerning their production process.

A stochastic frontier model can be illustrated in Figure 4.1.


Figure 4.1

## The Stochastic Frontier Production Function

where: $\quad y$ is output
$x$ is input.

For a deterministic production function, $y=\exp (x \beta-u)$, the observed input-output values for firms 1 and 2 are denoted by points $A$ and $B$, respectively.

Assuming $v_{l}>u_{l}$ (since $u>0$ ), the value of stochastic frontier output for firm 1 is shown by point C. In addition, if $v_{2}<u_{2}$, the value of stochastic frontier output is shown by point D . The observed outputs will be above the deterministic frontier if $v_{i}>u_{i}$ and below the frontier if $v_{i}<u_{i}$, e.g.,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& y_{i}>\exp \left(x_{i} \beta\right) \text { if } v_{i}>u_{i} \\
& y_{i}<\exp \left(x_{i} \beta\right) \text { if } v_{i}<u_{i}
\end{aligned}
$$

The use of the maximum-likelihood (ML) method to estimate, standard errors and perform hypotheses tests is possible only with a stochastic frontier model because, the deterministic models violate certain maximum likelihood regularity conditions, i.e., the range of random variables cannot depend on unknown parameters (Coelli, 1998). Greene (1980a) suggested a particular class of distributions for $u_{i}$ ' $s$, which could eliminate the irregularity of the likelihood function associated with deterministic frontier models. However, Greene's model does not account for random errors.

The stochastic frontier models suffer from the common criticism that there is no $a$ priori justification for selection of any particular distributional form for the $u_{i}$ 's (Coelli, 1998). Stevenson (1980) assumed truncated normal distribution for $u_{i}$ 's. Greene (1990) assumed two parameter gamma distribution for $u_{i}$ 's. Although their assumptions eliminate regularity problems, the efficiency measures may be sensitive to the distributional assumptions. However, there is no hard evidence that the choice of distributional assumptions of $u_{i}$ 's have a significant effect on predicted technical
efficiencies (C.A.K Lovell, 1995 in Coelli, 1998 p.187). The specific distributional assumptions of disturbance will be discussed later in this chapter.

### 2.4.1 Modeling Stochastic Frontiers

Typically, least squares or some variant of it such as two-stage or generalized least squares have been used to estimate parameters of interest. However, it has been argued that the distributional assumptions of the models' errors and the estimation techniques used to estimate the models' parameters are not consistent with the microeconomic definition of production and cost functions (Greene, 1980). The parameter estimates can be made consistent with a simple modification of ordinary least squares; however, since the distribution of the error term is asymmetric then OLS estimates are not efficient. A maximum likelihood estimator with asymmetric error is, asymptotically, more efficient.

Aigner and Chu (1968) pioneered the estimation of deterministic frontier functions models. Since a stochastic frontier model contains deterministic às well as stochastic disturbance terms, their results are of great importance. Following Aigner and Chu (1968), assume the following frontier model where all residuals are negative

$$
y=a x_{1}^{\alpha_{1}} x_{2}^{\alpha_{2}} u
$$

where:
$y$ is output,
$x_{1}, x_{2}$ are inputs,
$u$ is a random disturbance,
$\alpha_{1}, \alpha_{2}>0$.

They suggest minimizing the sum of absolute residuals subject to the constraint that residuals have to be negative. In this case a non-parametric functional form is assumed. This is a linear programming problem, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Schmidt (1975) estimated parameters of Aigner and Chu's model using maximum likelihood under the assumption that the disturbances have an exponential distribution and showed that the two estimates are equivalent.

Alternatively, Aigner and Chu (1968) minimized the sum of squared residuals rather than the absolute residuals, but with the same constraint. This is a quadratic programming problem. Schmidt (1975) estimated the parameters of this model using ML under the assumption that the errors are half normal and showed that the two estimates are equivalent. Unfortunately, the asymptotic properties of these maximum likelihood estimators are not well established and provide no guidance in formulating or estimating the standard errors (Greene, 1980a). This problem arises because of the fact that the regularity conditions of maximum likelihood are violated.

Schmidt (1975) suggests that irregularity arises from the fact that the range of the observed random variable depends on the parameters being estimated. According to Green (1980a,p.36), aside from the range problem, if one is willing to assume that the density function of the observed random variable is continuous everywhere over its range and all the appropriate derivatives exist and are finite, the two likelihood estimators are well behaved. Large samples properties as well as standard analysis of better-behaved problems are not affected by the range problem. In these cases the information matrix can be computed to form the standard errors of the estimator. Therefore the maximum
likelihood estimator (MLE) will be consistent, asymptotically efficient and asymptotically normally distributed.

It is also worth mentioning that the gamma distribution for the disturbance term, which is asymmetric, makes MLE of the parameters of the model more efficient than OLS. The gamma density has very useful features in specification and estimation of frontier production functions. The maximum likelihood estimator of a gamma distribution has all of the usual desirable properties MLE's. Therefore, the asymptotic distribution of the estimator can be derived and the asymptotic variance matrix is easily estimated.

The additional efficiency of the maximum likelihood estimator over OLS is not artificially built into the model. The efficiency depends on the degree of skewness of the error distribution away from the frontier, i.e., when accounting for asymmetry, the higher the degree of skewness, the higher the efficiency gain by using the maximum likelihood method.

In an application of different methods, Greene (1980a) uses OLS and maximum likelihood estimators to estimate the stochastic frontier of Aigner et al. (1977). In this model, the disturbance term $\varepsilon$ is defined as $\varepsilon=v-u$ where $v$ is $\mathrm{N}\left(0, \sigma_{V}^{2}\right)$ while $u$ has a half-normal distribution. Therefore, $\varepsilon$ has an asymmetric distribution. For the deterministic frontier (where the disturbance $u$ is due to inefficiency) Greene assumed gamma density and uses the maximum likelihood estimator. His results indicate that the maximum likelihood estimates of the stochastic frontier function's parameter are quite close to OLS estimates, while the estimates of the deterministic frontier using the same estimators are very different.

Furthermore, he employs the same estimators for a cost frontier. Following Nerlove (1963), who uses a generalized 3 input Cobb-Douglas cost function, Greene concludes that, in terms of symmetry of the error distribution, the skewness coefficient of the cost function is much smaller than in the case of production function, suggesting that the error distribution associated with a cost function is closer to being symmetric.

### 2.4.2 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)

There are two parallel approaches to the estimation of stochastic frontier models, the econometric (statistical) and mathematical programming (non-statistical) approach. In the previous sections the econometric approach which requires a parametric production function was considered.

In this section attention is turned to the mathematical programming approach and conclusions are drawn based on the comparison of the two methods. As mentioned earlier, the efficiency measures discussed assume that production function is known which in practice is not the case and the efficient isoquants must be estimated. Farrell (1957) suggested the use of a non-parametric piece-wise-linear convex isoquant, where no observed point lies below or to the left of it in the context of constant returns to scale (Figure 4.2).


Figure 4.2
Piece-Wise Linear Convex Unit Isoquants
Following Farrell's input-oriented frontier model with constant returns to scale, Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) pioneered the concept of data envelopment analysis (DEA), which involves the use of linear programming.

Coelli (1998) states that a natural measure of performance is the productivity ratio:

$$
\text { productivity ratio }=\frac{\text { outputs }}{\text { inputs }}
$$

Following Coelli's notations, if data are available on K inputs and M outputs for N firms the data for the $i$ th firm is represented by column vector $x_{i}$ of inputs and column vector $y_{i}$ of outputs. X and Y represent the input and output matrix for the data for all firms, respectively. For each firm, the measure of the ratio of all outputs over all inputs is denoted as, $u^{\prime} y_{i} / v^{\prime} x_{i}$ where $u$ is an Mx1 vector of output weights and $v$ is a Kx1 vector of input weights. Solving the following linear programming problem for the $i$ th firm yields the optimal weights:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \max _{u, v}\left(u^{\prime} y_{i}\right) \\
& \text { subject to: } \\
& v^{\prime} x_{i}=1 \\
& u^{\prime} y_{j}-v^{\prime} x_{j} \leq 0 \quad j=1,2, \ldots, \mathrm{~N} . \\
& u, v \geq 0
\end{aligned}
$$

Note that the above maximization with $v^{\prime} x_{i}=1$ prevents $u$ and $v$ from having an infinite number of solutions. This is called the multiplier DEA linear programming problem.

Another approach involves the use of duality, which gives an equivalent result but with fewer constraints than the multiplier DEA. Hence is usually preferred and is called the envelopment form:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \min _{\theta, \lambda} \theta, \\
& \text { subject to: } \\
& -y_{i}+Y \lambda \geq 0, \\
& \theta x_{i}-X \lambda \geq 0, \\
& \lambda \geq 0,
\end{aligned}
$$

where $\theta$ is a scalar of inefficiency score of the $i$ th firm and $\lambda$ is a Nx1 vector of constants. Note that $\theta \leq 1$. If $\theta=1$, then the firm is operating on the frontier and hence is technically efficient in accordance with Farrell's definition of efficiency.

If all the firms are not operating at an optimal level, then variable returns to scale as opposed to constant returns to scale is the appropriate assumption. To solve the linear programming problem for variable returns to scale (VRS), a convexity constraint, $\mathrm{NI}^{\prime} \lambda=1$, is added to the constant returns to scale (CRS) model, where NI is a Nx1 vector of ones. Then solve:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \min _{\theta, \lambda} \theta, \\
& \text { subject to: } \\
& -y_{i}+Y \lambda \geq 0, \\
& \theta x_{i}-X \lambda \geq 0, \\
& N I^{\prime} \lambda=1, \\
& \lambda \geq 0,
\end{aligned}
$$

When doing so, the technical efficiency scores of the VRS technology are obtained. These scores are greater than or equal to the scores of CRS technology.

Note that VRS TE - CRS TE = scale inefficiency and not technical inefficiency. If NI $\lambda \leq 1$ then the $i$ th firm is compared to firms that are smaller or equivalent in size and not firms that are substantially larger. Changing the convexity constraint of $\mathrm{NI}^{\prime} \lambda=1$ to $\mathrm{NI}^{\prime} \lambda \leq 1$ allows one to calculate the scale economy. If VRS TE is equal to nonincreasing returns to scale technology, then there are decreasing returns to scale. Otherwise increasing returns to scale are present.

One of the piece-wise linear forms of the non-parametric DEA problem is the input-slack problem. This slack is related to the parts of the frontier that are parallel to the axis (Figure 4.2). The problem arises from the fact that even though point $A$ is on the frontier, we can move to B , which is a reduction of input $x_{2}$ and still be efficient. A number of studies suggest ways to deal with these slacks (e.g., Ali and Seiford, 1993; Coelli, 1997).

Environmental variables can influence efficiency. These variables are not traditional input variables and firms do not have control over them. To account for these variables, Coelli (1998) suggests that variables can be directly included into the linear programming problem as discretionary inputs.

If the direction of the influence of the environmental variable upon efficiency is known, then the parameters can be estimated in a single stage model. If the direction of the influence of the environmental variable upon efficiency is not known, then a twostage procedure could be used to determine the direction of the influence upon efficiency. Once the direction of the influence is known, the procedure follows that of a single-stage model.

DEA is favored by Bessent et al. (1980) and others because:

- it makes no parametric assumptions about the relationship between a firm's inputs and output.
- it easily allows for multiple outputs, which can be related to inputs linearly or otherwise.

The disadvantages of DEA are:

- It assumes that all deviations of output from its potential are due to inefficiency. If any noise is present, it may influence the efficiency measurement of DEA more than the stochastic frontier approach.
- DEA does not provide the means for hypothesis testing regarding the existence of inefficiency or the structure of the production technology. This is because mathematical programming techniques have estimators with unknown statistical properties (Aigner et al., 1977).


### 2.4.3 Modeling Inefficiency

Assume a stochastic frontier production function in which the error term is specified as:

$$
\varepsilon_{i}=u_{i}-v_{i}
$$

where:
$\varepsilon_{i} \quad$ is the disturbance term.
$u_{i} \quad$ is the deterministic component of the error term with a suitable distributional assumption, (e.g., truncated normal, gamma, etc.) associated with technical inefficiency.
$v_{i} \quad$ is the random component of the error term
and $\quad u$ and $v$ are independent of each other where $u_{i}>0$
The inefficiency effects $u_{i}$ in the stochastic frontier model can be explicitly modeled as:

$$
u_{i}=z_{i}^{\prime} \delta+w_{i}
$$

where: $\quad z_{i} \quad$ is a vector of explanatory variables
$\delta \quad$ is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated
$w_{i} \quad$ is a vector of random variables
Alternatively we can rewrite the efficiency model as:

$$
\mathrm{TE}_{i}=z_{i}^{\prime} \delta+w_{i}
$$

where $\mathrm{TE}_{i}$ represents the technical efficiency of firm $i$.
In this section, 3 alternative estimation procedures of inefficiencies will be discussed in the contexts of the econometric approach (two-stage, MLE) and the mathematical approach (DEA).

## Two-Stage Approach (OLS)

To investigate the determinants of technical inefficiency, Pitt and Lee (1981) suggested a two-stage procedure. In the first stage inefficiencies are predicted from an estimated stochastic production function. In the second stage, the predicted inefficiencies are regressed over a vector of firm-specific variables (e.g., age, experience, and education of the firm's managers) using OLS.

According to Kumbhakar, Ghosh, and McGuckin (1991) there are two basic econometric problems associated with the two-stage procedure. First, technical inefficiency and inputs may be correlated. This correlation causes inconsistent estimates of the parameters as well as technical inefficiency in the first stage.

The use of OLS in the second-stage regression is inappropriate. OLS ignores the fact that technical inefficiency (the dependent variable in the inefficiency model) is inherently one-sided (non-negative).

Greene (1980a) considers the following production function:

$$
y_{t}=\alpha+\beta^{\prime} x_{t}+\varepsilon_{t} \quad t=1, \ldots, \mathrm{~T}
$$

where $\quad y_{t}$ is output,
$x_{t}$ is the corresponding vector of exogenous variables,
$\varepsilon_{t} \quad$ is a random disturbance, $\alpha, \beta$ are fixed and unknown parameters to be estimated, and $\quad T \quad$ is the sample size.

The errors, $\varepsilon_{t}$ differ from zero due to random shocks (Aigner and Chu, 1968). The disturbance in the model typically results from logarithmic transformation of $\exp \left(y_{t}\right)=f\left(x_{t}\right) u_{t}$ where
$\varepsilon_{t}=-\ln \left(u_{t}\right)$ and $0<u_{t} \leq 1$.

The only parameter that is not consistently estimated by OLS is $\alpha$. The OLS intercept estimator is consistent for $\left(\alpha+u^{2}\right)$. If the analysis of efficiency is desired, the consistent estimation of $\alpha$ is necessary. In some instances, the least squares residuals can provide a consistent moment estimator of $\alpha$, i.e., $\hat{\alpha}$. However, even after the correction of $\hat{\alpha}$ for non-zero disturbance mean, some of the residuals may still be negative.

The computation of meaningful efficiency measures requires all of the residuals to be positive. Greene (1980a) proposes a biased but consistent estimator of $\alpha$ which forces the positive sign on the residuals that can be easily obtained. Greene (1980a, p. 32) offers a detailed explanation with regard to the estimation of $\alpha$.

In an attempt to investigate the determinants of inefficiency in Oklahoma school districts, Abdul Rahman (1996) adopted a two-stage procedure. Following Schmidt and Sickles (1984), Abdul Rahman, defined the frontier model for panel data as

$$
y_{i t}=\alpha+x_{i t}^{\prime} \beta+v_{i t}-u_{i}
$$

where:

| $i=1, \ldots, \mathrm{~N}$ | is school district, |
| :--- | :--- |
| $t=1, \ldots, \mathrm{~T}$ | is time period, |
| $y_{i t}$ | is the output of school district $i$ at time $t$, |
| $x_{i t}$ | is a 1 xK vector of inputs |
| $u_{i t}$ | is a one-sided disturbance term representing technical |
|  | inefficiency of the school district, |
| $v_{i t}$ | is a two-sided random disturbance which is uncorrelated with |
|  | the regressors. |

and $u_{i t}$ is iid with mean $u$ and variance $\sigma^{2} . u_{i t}$ and $v_{i t}$ are independent of each other.
To assure that $u_{i t}^{\prime} \mathrm{s}$ have positive sign, (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984), let
$E\left(u_{i}\right)=u>0$ and define $\alpha^{*}$ and $u^{*}$ as

$$
\alpha^{*}=\alpha-u, \quad u^{*}=u_{i}-u
$$

so that $u_{i} *$ are iid with mean 0 . The model then becomes:

$$
y_{i t}=\alpha^{*}+x_{i t}^{\prime} \beta+v_{i t}-u_{i}^{*} .
$$

With the two-stage procedure inputs can be separated into school and nonschool inputs. In the first stage school inputs were used to estimate the education production and obtain the relative efficiency. In the second stage the effect of nonschool factors on the efficiency was estimated.

To estimate the model, Abdul Rahman (1996) used the Fixed Effects estimator (Least Squares Dummy Variables) as well as Random Effects model (Generalized Least Squares) and compared the two estimates.

## Maximum Likelihood Approach (MLE)

Kumbhakar, Ghosh, and McGuckin (1991) assume that the technical inefficiency effects are the non-negative truncation of a normal distribution. The mean of the inefficiency effects is a linear function of exogenous variables with unknown coefficients and an unknown variance.

Kumbhakar et al. (1991) developed a single-step MLE technique and claimed that this technique avoids the usual criticism targeted at the two-stage procedure. Many researchers such as Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), Huang and Liu (1992), Coelli (1995a), and Battese and Coelli (1995) have also used ML procedures, preferring them over the two-stage methods.

Coelli (1995a) conducted a Monte Carlo study to investigate the finite sample properties of corrected ordinary least squares (COLS) and the MLE of Aigner et al. (1977) half-normal stochastic frontier production. The COLS estimator is basically an OLS estimator but requires the shifting of the intercept term to reach the frontier.

Aigner et al. (1977) reparameterize the variances of the deterministic error component $u$ and the stochastic error component using $\sigma^{2}=\sigma_{u}^{2}+\sigma_{v}^{2}$ and $\lambda=\sigma_{u} / \sigma_{v}$.

Battese and Corra (1997) replaced $\lambda$ with, $\gamma=\sigma_{u}^{2} / \sigma^{2}$. The parameter $\gamma$ is the contribution of inefficiency error to the total error and takes a value between zero and one. This reparmeterization simplifies computation of the MLE. Coelli's (1995a) results suggest serious bias in both ML and COLS estimates when $\gamma$ is small. However, if $\gamma$ is greater than 50 percent the ML estimator has a smaller mean square error and should be used rather than the COLS estimator.

## DEA with Second-Stage Tobit Approach

Schmidt (1975) showed that the Aigner and Chu (1968) linear programming estimator is the maximum likelihood if the disturbance term of the model has an exponential distribution. If the disturbance term has a half-normal distribution, then the quadratic programming estimator of Aigner and Chu is the maximum likelihood. As discussed earlier in this chapter, one of the more serious shortcomings of the DEA approach is that the sampling distribution of DEA estimators are unknown. Therefore, their statistical properties cannot be identified. This implies that the standard errors cannot be derived and thus, it is not possible to make any statistical inferences based on these estimates. Since DEA model estimates deterministic frontiers (i.e., no account for the random disturbance) and, the MLE of a deterministic frontier suffers from an irregularity problem, then, the fact that the programming estimators are MLE is not sufficient to establish their statistical properties.

Kirjavainer and Loikkaner (1998) studied the efficiency of Finnish senior secondary schools with DEA. The authors acknowledge that the DEA model does not account for one of the most significant and robust results of schools' input-output studies,
the effect of the socioeconomic factor, which are not controlled by schools, as well as the lack of identifiable statistical properties.

Following McCarty and Yaisawarng (1993), Kirjavainer and Loikkaner (1998), suggest the use of a two-stage model. The first stage uses DEA to calculate the efficiency scores using variables that are controlled by schools. The second stage involves the use of ML estimation of the Tobit regression model, which has well known and desirable statistical properties. The Tobit model provides efficiency measures based on variables that are not included in the DEA and are outside of the decision-making power of schools. Detailed discussion of this approach will be provided in Chapter IV.

Overall, this study suggests that inefficiencies in the education system exist. Modeling these inefficiencies requires careful consideration about the objectives of the research and availability and reliability of the data. This research continues to investigate the robustness of the results from two different estimation methods. In Chapter V the stochastic frontier regression results are compared with data envelopment results. Based on Chapter V, it is concluded that because of the existence of multiple output and the nature of the data, the Data Envelopment Analysis estimator may be a more appropriate technique. Chapter VI explores this technique on a new specification of the model.

## CHAPTER III

## DATA AND DATA DESCRIPTIONS

### 3.1 Panel Data

In recent years, the use of panel data in studying school efficiency, as well as agricultural efficiency, has gained popularity (e.g., Adkins and Moomaw, 1997). The use of panel data allows one to include firm-specific effects and time effects, i.e., pooling of cross-section and time-series data.

Panel data may reduce the bias due to the effect of omitted variables on the estimated relationship (Abdul Rahman, 1996). The principle advantage of panel data is that, for each school district, the data are observed over several periods of time. In general, the sample data are represented by observations on N cross-sectional units over T time periods hence the total sample size available to the researcher is potentially NxT .

### 3.2 Source of Data

The data for this study were obtained from the Oklahoma Department of Education, Office of Accountability for the academic years 1996-1997, 1997-1998, and 1998-1999. The data includes observations on several socioeconomic indicators (e.g., students eligible for the subsidized lunch program, parents' education level, family income, etc.). Students' performance measures are based on different standardized test scores appropriate for the different grades (e.g., ITBS, CRT, ACT scores) for over 600
school districts in Oklahoma. In order to maintain a balanced panel in this study, dependent schools which do not offer grades K-12 as well as those districts with incomplete data have been eliminated from the sample. The resulting sample includes observations on 366 school districts.

In order to preserve the consistency of the data for the years of interest, careful attention to the reliability of different measures is vital to the study. Through consultation with the staff of the Office of Accountability and close examination of the data themselves, the reliability of some of the measures is deemed questionable. Some data are logically inconsistent with their definition or with other data and some represent the subjectivity of individual respondents. In addition, the size and nature of the districts could result in different allocation of expenditures for different classifications.

### 3.3 Description of Data

Among the numerous measures of performance available, the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) and Criterion Reference Test (CRT) are probably most reliable. Hanushek (1986) acknowledges that test scores as measures of output are imperfect. However, performance on tests are used to allocate funds and evaluate educational programs. Test scores are also commonly available and appear to be valued by educators, as well as parents and decision makers, as measure of education. Here ITBS for grades 3 (IT3) and 7 (IT7) and CRT for grades 8 (CRT 8) and 11 (CRT 11) are used as measures of output.

Other measures descriptions are:
ADM: district enrollment is measured as the average daily membership in the school district rounded to the nearest whole number and is calculated by
dividing the total days of membership throughout the year by the number of days taught.

I\$: instructional expenditures per student is the total expenditure for instruction in each district divided by ADM.

O\$: other expenditures per student is the total expenditure for administration and other related operations in each district divided by ADM.

SALARY: salary is the average teacher salary which is the gross salaries and fringe benefits of the district divided by the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) teachers for the school year.

DEG: percentage of teaching staff with an advanced degree is the number of FTE teaching staff with a master's degree or higher divided by the total number of FTE teachers.

YRSEXP: years of experience is the total number of years of experience in the district divided by the number of FTE teachers.

LUNCH: percentage of Oklahoma students eligible for federally funded or reduced payment lunch in school.

This is calculated by one time count of eligible students at the beginning of the school year, divided by ADM. In some districts, because of students' migration and /or dropout, ADM decreases while the count of eligible students for reduced lunch does not change. Thus LUNCH increases to more than 100 percent. In this study, for such districts, LUNCH is assumed to be 100 percent.

MN: percentage of noncaucasian students in the district.

All the variables measured in dollars have been deflated by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator. Summary statistics of the variables for cross section and panel can be found in Tables 3.1 through 3. 4.

Table 3.1
Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Production Analysis of Oklahoma Schools (1996-1999)

|  | Mean | Maximum | Minimum | Std. Dev. |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| IT3 | 62.2377 | 93 | 26 | 9.949506 |
| IT7 | 55.6949 | 85 | 30 | 8.192466 |
| CRT8 | 74.18628 | 98.6 | 36.66667 | 9.39291 |
| CRT11 | 69.06264 | 94.25 | 29 | 9.80891 |
| O | 1992.386 | 5468.443 | 1143.357 | 463.7583 |
| I | 2859.53 | 5767.599 | 1961.999 | 498.4934 |
| ADM | 1555.872 | 41471.46 | 143.91 | 3767.604 |
| SALARY | 29615 | 35334.72 | 26608 | 1190.961 |
| DEG | 32.49643 | 80.62 | 3.69 | 13.33091 |
| YRSEXP | 15.30133 | 30.6667 | 5.830112 | 4.562163 |
| LUNCH | 51.18705 | 100 | 4.477241 | 15.93732 |
| MIN | 27.36814 | 100 | 0 | 16.58325 |
| STR | 15.95792 | 21.97037 | 8.162783 | 2.200199 |

IT3: ITBS for grade 3 (composite scores)
IT7: $\quad$ ITBS for grade 7 (composite scores)
CRT8: $\quad$ CRT for grade 8 (average scores)
CRT11: $\quad$ CRT for grade 11 (average scores)
I: Instructional expenditure (\$)
O: $\quad$ Noninstructional expenditure (\$)
ADM: Average daily membership (number of students)
SALARY: Average salary per full-time equivalent teacher (\$)
DEG: Percentage of teachers with advanced degree
YRSEXP: Average experience of teachers (year)
LUNCH: Percentage of students eligible for reduced payment lunch
MIN: Percentage of minority student
STR: Student/Teacher ratio

Table 3.2
Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Production Analysis of Oklahoma Schools (1996-1997)

|  | Mean | Maximum | Minimum | Std. Dev. |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| IT3 | 61.9235 | 95.53 | 79 | 26 |
| IT7 | 78.98361 | 98 | 32 | 8.035113 |
| CRT8 | 69.83811 | 94.25 | 52 | 8.051317 |
| CRT11 | 1922.02 | 5468.443 | 1143.357 | 10.02964 |
| O | 2782.808 | 5052.475 | 1961.999 | 462.925 |
| I | 1547.944 | 41196.32 | 157.27 | 3771.07806 |
| ADM | 30463.23 | 35334.72 | 27820.5 | 992.2415 |
| SALARY | 33.42098 | 78.47 | 4.89 | 13.58301 |
| DEG | 20.50461 | 30.6667 | 8.5 | 3.644732 |
| YRSEXP | 49.29037 | 100 | 4.477241 | 15.69812 |
| LUNCH | 26.98841 | 100 | 0 | 16.80441 |
| MIN | 15.93757 | 21.97037 | 8.76589 | 2.248703 |
| STR |  |  |  |  |

IT3: ITBS for grade 3 (composite scores)
IT7: $\quad$ ITBS for grade 7 (composite scores)
CRT8: $\quad$ CRT for grade 8 (average scores)
CRT11: $\quad$ CRT for grade 11 (average scores)
I: Instructional expenditure (\$)
O: $\quad$ Noninstructional expenditure (\$)
ADM: Average daily membership (number of students)
SALARY: Average salary per full-time equivalent teacher (\$)
DEG: Percentage of teachers with advanced degree
YRSEXP: Average experience of teachers (year)
LUNCH: Percentage of students eligible for reduced payment lunch
MIN: Percentage of minority student
STR: $\quad$ Student/Teacher ratio

Table 3.3
Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Production Analysis of Oklahoma Schools (1997-1998)

|  | Mean | Maximum | Minimum | Std. Dev. |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| IT3 | 62.36066 | 55.20 | 71 | 35 |
| IT7 | 73.50738 | 98.6 | 30 | 8.343586 |
| CRT8 | 71.66448 | 93.6 | 47 | 8.881277 |
| CRT11 | 1998.28 | 5093.221 | 29 | 9.652471 |
| O | 2857.977 | 5767.599 | 2033.86 | 455.733 |
| I | 1556.476 | 41309.39 | 156.41 | 488.0384 |
| ADM | 29153.09 | 33425.14 | 26608 | 1058.034 |
| SALARY | 32.87582 | 78.57 | 3.97 | 13.27028 |
| DEG | 12.67066 | 19.21429 | 5.830112 | 2.067773 |
| YRSEXP | 51.64396 | 84.21338 | 4.668031 | 15.95561 |
| LUNCH | 27.17257 | 99.53 | 0 | 16.42288 |
| MIN | 15.95705 | 21.44213 | 8.612003 | 2.229057 |
| STR |  |  |  |  |

IT3: $\quad$ ITBS for grade 3 (composite scores)
IT7: $\quad$ ITBS for grade 7 (composite scores)
CRT8: $\quad$ CRT for grade 8 (average scores)
CRT11: CRT for grade 11 (average scores)
I: Instructional expenditure (\$)
O: $\quad$ Noninstructional expenditure (\$)
ADM: Average daily membership (number of students)
SALARY: Average salary per full-time equivalent teacher (\$)
DEG: Percentage of teachers with advanced degree
YRSEXP: Average experience of teachers (year)
LUNCH: Percentage of students eligible for reduced payment lunch
MIN: Percentage of minority student
STR: Student/Teacher ratio

Table 3.4
Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Production Analysis of Oklahoma Schools (1998-1999)

|  | Mean | Maximum | Minimum | Std. Dev. |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| IT3 | 62.42896 | 93 | 34 | 10.04096 |
| IT7 | 56.34973 | 85 | 31 | 8.17836 |
| CRT8 | 70.06785 | 93 | 36.66667 | 8.995299 |
| CRT11 | 65.68534 | 93 | 40.83333 | 8.750936 |
| O | 2056.858 | 4878.875 | 1292.437 | 463.9328 |
| I | 2937.804 | 5702.062 | 2099.873 | 536.7986 |
| ADM | 1563.197 | 41471.46 | 143.91 | 3773.009 |
| SALARY | 29228.68 | 32800.18 | 26781.6 | 1036.082 |
| DEG | 31.19249 | 80.62 | 3.69 | 13.06936 |
| YRSEXP | 12.72873 | 17.88462 | 5.899977 | 2.066434 |
| LUNCH | 52.62682 | 90.9613 | 4.543612 | 16.01495 |
| MIN | 27.94344 | 99.82 | 0 | 16.55008 |
| STR | 15.97912 | 20.79424 | 8.162783 | 2.126718 |

IT3: $\quad$ ITBS for grade 3 (composite scores)
IT7: $\quad$ ITBS for grade 7 (composite scores)
CRT8: $\quad$ CRT for grade 8 (average scores)
CRT11: CRT for grade 11 (average scores)
I: Instructional expenditure (\$)
O: $\quad$ Noninstructional expenditure (\$)
ADM: Average daily membership (number of students)
SALARY: Average salary per full-time equivalent teacher (\$)
DEG: Percentage of teachers with advanced degree
YRSEXP: Average experience of teachers (year)
LUNCH: Percentage of students eligible for reduced payment lunch
MIN: Percentage of minority student
STR: Student/Teacher ratio

## CHAPTER IV

## THE MODEL SPECIFICATION

### 4.1 Choosing the Appropriate Function to Estimate Oklahoma Schools' Performance

In economic analysis firms are viewed as either profit maximizers or cost minimizers. A publicly funded educational institution may not have the same objective function as either a cost minimizing or a profit maximizing industrial firm. Hanushek (1986) suggests that, in the production function framework, school administrators may be better characteriźed as output maximizers. This behavioral assumption on the part of district administration has important implications for the choice of functional form and its econometric estimator.

This study proposes the estimation of a stochastic frontier production function associated with Oklahoma school districts' production process to investigate the efficiency of the school districts. The production function approach to efficiency study is appropriate for several reasons. First, the only necessary assumption is that Oklahoma school districts attempt to maximize output (maximizing test scores). Therefore, in view of the discussion in Chapter II, each district's objective is to operate at a point on its production function. Second, the available data do not contain information on input prices or output prices; hence, cost functions cannot be estimated. Finally, the production of public education is not a simple input-output relationship. Public education is affected
by environmental variables that are outside the control of schools' administrators. This implies the existence of a random error as well as the deterministic error (stochastic vs. deterministic frontier).

Battese and Coelli (1993, p. 1) state that:
the stochastic frontier production function postulates the existence of technical inefficiencies of production of firms involved in producing a particular output. For a given combination of input levels, it is assumed that the realized production of a firm is bounded above by the sum of a parametric function of known inputs, involving unknown parameters and a random error associated with the measurement error of the level of production or other factors such as the effects of weather, strikes, damaged product, etc. The greater the amount by which the realized production falls short of this stochastic frontier production, the greater the level of technical inefficiency.

A major advantage of stochastic frontier estimation is that it allows for the measurement of inefficiency, but the real advantage is that it allows for these inefficiencies to be firm-specific.

### 4.2 Econometric Specification

The econometric estimation of the production function requires the specification of a suitable functional form (e.g., Cobb-Douglas, translog, etc.) for the production function. The translog functional form is chosen because it is relatively well behaved in panel data studies and, although it is more complex than the Cobb-Douglas functional form, with the help of available computer software it is relatively easy to compute.

### 4.2.1 Two-equation Stochastic Frontier Production Model

Huang and Liu (1992) consider a two-equation stochastic frontier production model involving non-negative inefficiency effects which are a linear function of firm characteristics and a random error that can be positive or negative. The random error is assumed to have a truncated normal distribution. The truncation point is a function of firm characteristics. Huang and Liu use the maximum likelihood method (MLE) to estimate the parameters of the model using cross sectional data.

The advantage of a two-equation MLE, as opposed to a single-equation MLE, is that the inefficiency variables and the explanatory variables of the stochastic frontier can be estimated simultaneously, i.e., allowing interaction between firm-specific variables and the right-hand side variables of the frontier function. Allowing this interaction emphasizes the possibility of non-neutral shifting of average response functions, in which case OLS is not capable of determining the shape of the boundary function, which weakens its analytical ability even further. Battese and Coelli (1993) extended Huang and Liu's (1992) model to panel data, which allows the inclusion of both firm-specific effects and time effects in the inefficiency model, and applied it to farm-level data from an Indian village.

### 4.2.2 Battese and Coelli's Model of the Inefficiency Frontier for Panel Data (1993)

Consider the following stochastic frontier production model for panel data.

$$
\begin{equation*}
Y_{i t}=\exp \left(X_{i t} \beta+V_{i t}-U_{i t}\right) \tag{4.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $Y_{i t}$ denotes the production for the $t$-th observation $(t=1,2, \ldots, T)$ for the $i$-th firm $(i=1,2, \ldots, N) ; \mathrm{X}_{i t}$ is a $(1 \mathrm{x} k)$ vector of inputs of production associated with the $i$-th firm
at the $t$-th period of observation; $\beta$ is a ( kxl ) vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; the $V_{i i}$ 's are assumed to be iid $N\left(0, \sigma_{v}^{2}\right)$ random errors, independently distributed of the $U_{i t}$ 's which are non-negative random variables, associated with technical inefficiency of production; the $U_{i t}$ 's are assumed to be independently distributed, such that $U_{i t}$ is obtained by truncation (at zero) of the normal distribution with mean, $Z_{i t} \delta$, and variance $\sigma^{2} ; Z_{i t}$ is a ( $1 \mathrm{x} m$ ) vector of firm-specific variables which may vary over time; and $\delta$ is an ( $m \mathrm{x} 1$ ) vector of unknown coefficients of the firm-specific inefficiency variables.

The authors assume that at least one of the $N$ firms has observations available for the $T$ time periods however, not all firms are required to have observations for all periods.

The inefficiency effect, $U_{i t}$ in the stochastic frontier model (1) is specified as:

$$
\begin{equation*}
U_{i t}=Z_{i t} \delta+W_{i t} \tag{4.2}
\end{equation*}
$$

where:
$Z_{i t}$ 's are a set of explanatory variables, which include any variable that explains the extent to which the production observations are below the stochastic frontier production value, $\exp \left(X_{i t} \beta+V_{i t}\right)$.
$W_{i t}$ is a random variable with $N\left(0, \sigma^{2}\right)$ truncated at $-Z_{i t} \delta$, i.e., $W_{i t} \geq-Z_{i t} \delta$. These assumptions are consistent with the assumption of $U_{i t}$ in equation (4.1). The parameters of both models (4.1) and (4.2) are estimated by the Maximum Likelihood method. Derivation of the likelihood function and its partial derivatives with respect to the parameters of the model are presented in their Appendix.

Adkins and Moomaw (1997) employed Battese and Coelli's (1993) MLE to estimate a translog production function of Oklahoma school districts performance. In the
first, the inputs to production are, instructional expenditure per student, $\ln (\mathrm{I} / \mathrm{S})$, and other expenditures per student, $\ln (\mathrm{O} / \mathrm{S})$. In the second, they introduce environmental factors LUNCH, MIN, and LEP in the production function where:

LUNCH: is the percent of students eligible for subsidized lunch as a measure of poverty;

MIN: is the percent of minority student; and
LEP: is the percent of students with limited English proficiency.
These factors enter not as production inputs, but as control variables. The sample they consider is the 1990-91 through 1994-95 academic years. The parameter estimates are computed under the assumption that both components of the random error are homoscedastic. However, if the error terms are heteroscedastic then the MLE is inconsistent and their conclusions may be incorrect.
"Heteroscedasticity is one specification error that researchers can reasonably expect to encounter in the estimation of stochastic frontier models" (Caudill et al., 1995, p. 106). The problem of heteroscedasticity in frontier models has been addressed in several studies (Reifschneider and Stevenson, 1991, Yuengert, 1993, and others). However, they all took different approaches to the incorporation of heteroscedasticity into the frontier models.

These studies suggest that in frontier models, residuals are more sensitive to specification errors than the average function models, and consequently, sensitivity to specification errors can be passed on to the inefficiency measures. Heteroscedasticity in the estimation of the average function does not affect the point estimation properties of the least squares estimator; it remains unbiased. However, least squares is no longer
efficient and the validity of subsequent hypothesis tests is questionable. In a frontier model, the locus of the frontier is altered when the dispersion increases, indicating that the problem of heteroscedasticity is far more serious in these models.

The first study of this type, conducted by Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), incorporated the heteroscedasticity into the composite error term, $\varepsilon$, by allowing the mean of the deterministic part of the error term, the one-sided error term, to change. Caudill, Ford, and Gropper (1995) account for heteroscedasticity in the one-sided error term of their banking model. Their findings suggest that heteroscedasticity leads to biased parameter estimates that overstate the intercept and understate the slope coefficients for a production frontier (the opposite for a cost frontier) when the model is estimated using the maximum likelihood method. Not surprisingly, the inefficiency measures are affected by heteroscedasticity as well, since most inefficiency measures are based on residuals.

This study was extended by Hardi (1999), who employed cross-section data and the assumption of heteroscedasticity in both random terms. Hardi's results confirm Caudill et al.'s (1995) claim that firm-specific inefficiency measures are highly sensitive to the possible existence of heteroscedasticity.

Following Adkins and Moomaw (1997), the basic translog model for Oklahoma schools for the periods of 1996-1999 considered in this dissertation is:

$$
\begin{align*}
\ln \text { Score }_{i t} & =\beta_{0}+\ln \left(I_{i t}\right) \beta_{1}+\ln \left(O_{i t}\right) \beta_{2}+\left[\ln \left(I_{i t}\right)\right]^{2} \beta_{3}  \tag{4.3}\\
& +\left[\ln \left(O_{i t}\right)\right]^{2} \beta_{4}+\ln \left(I_{i t}\right) \ln \left(O_{i t}\right) \beta_{5}+\left(V_{i t}-U_{i t}\right)
\end{align*}
$$

where output:
Score: is a measure of an average districts' performance on one of the several standardized tests, which are:

IT3 ITBS scores for grade 3
IT7 ITBS scores for grade 7
CRT8 Average CRT scores for grade 8
CRT11 Average CRT scores for grade 11
Inputs:
I: Instructional expenditure per student
O: Noninstructional expenses per student, i.e., administrative and any other expenses that are not directly used for instructional purposes.

Incorporating environmental variables in equation (4.3), the model can be rewritten as:

$$
\begin{align*}
\ln \text { Score }_{i t} & =\beta_{0}+M I N_{i t} \beta_{1}+L U N C H_{i t} \beta_{2}+\ln \left(I_{i t}\right) \beta_{3}+\ln \left(O_{i t}\right) \beta_{4}+\left[\ln \left(I_{i t}\right)\right]^{2} \beta_{5}  \tag{4.4}\\
& +\left[\ln \left(O_{i t}\right)\right]^{2} \beta_{6}+\ln \left(I_{i t}\right) \ln \left(O_{i t}\right) \beta_{7}+\left(V_{i t}-U_{i t}\right)
\end{align*}
$$

Equation (4.4) is essentially Adkins and Moomaw's (1997) model except for some changes in the way some of the data are measured. The adjustments stem from changes in computation methods of some variables and/or elimination of some others by the Oklahoma Office of Accountability. In Adkins and Moomaw's study for the periods 1990-1991 through 1994-1995, the standardized test for $9^{\text {th }}$ and $11^{\text {th }}$ grades was TAP and data on LEP was available. For the period of this study (1996-1997 through 1998-1999), LEP is eliminated. The standardized test for $9^{\text {th }}$ grade is replaced by $8^{\text {th }}$ grade tests. For both $8^{\text {th }}$ and $11^{\text {th }}$ grade, TAP is replaced by CRT.

Following Adkins and Moomaw (1997) environmental and non-environmental variables in (4.4) are a part of the production function; however, the school administrators have no control over the environmental variables and, a change in these variables shifts the frontier.

The model of inefficiency includes other exogenous variables, which may measure differences in input quality, they are:

SALARY: is the average teacher salary;
YRSEXP: is the average years of experience for teachers; and
DEG: is the proportion of teachers with an advanced degree.
The model also includes variables that measure the various quantity adjustments available to district administrators, i.e., (ADM) total enrollment, enrollment squared, and student/teacher ratio (STR). The inefficiency model is written as:

$$
\begin{align*}
\mathrm{TE}_{\mathrm{it}} & =\delta_{0}+\delta_{1} \mathrm{SALARY}_{\mathrm{it}}+\delta_{2} \mathrm{YRSEXP}_{\mathrm{it}}+\delta_{3} \mathrm{DEG}_{\mathrm{it}}+\delta_{4} \mathrm{ADM}_{\mathrm{it}}+\delta_{5} \mathrm{ADM}_{\mathrm{it}}^{2}  \tag{4.5}\\
& +\delta_{6} \mathrm{STR}_{\mathrm{it}}+e_{i t}
\end{align*}
$$

where TE is the technical efficiency.

### 4.2.3 Incorporating Heteroscedasticity in the Present Study

According to Caudill et al. (1995, p. 106), "in many econometrics textbooks readers are advised to expect heteroscedasticity when the observations are of different size." Hardi (1999) suggests that the vector of exogenous variables that determine heteroscedasticity are related generally to characteristics of firm size (Hardi, 1999 p . 360). Given the differences in sizes of the schools in this application, it is perhaps reasonable to allow for heterogeneity in the variances and covariances, and then test for constant variance instead of imposing it a priori (Kumbhakar, 1997).

In this study, heteroscedasticity is incorporated in the stochastic part of the error term, i.e., $V_{i t}$. To incorporate multiplicative heteroscedasticity (Greene, 1990), consider:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sigma_{v i}^{2}=\exp \left\{S_{i t} \alpha\right\} \quad \sigma_{v i}>0 \tag{4.6}
\end{equation*}
$$

where:
$S_{i t} \quad$ is a vector of exogenous variables that determine heteroscedasticity.
$\alpha \quad$ is a vector of the parameters to be estimated.

The multiplicative functional form is easily constrained to be homoscedastic to make a likelihood ratio test possible.

In Battese and Coelli's (1993 Appendix, equation A-12) model, the logarithm of the likelihood function is written as:

$$
\begin{align*}
L^{*}\left(\theta^{*} ; y\right) & =-\frac{1}{2}\left(\sum_{i=1}^{N} T_{i}\right)\left\{\ln 2 \pi+\ln \left(\sigma_{U}^{2}+\sigma_{V}^{2}\right)\right\} \\
& -\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{t=1}^{T_{i}}\left[\left(y_{i t}-x_{i t} \beta+z_{i t} \delta\right)^{2} /\left(\sigma_{V}^{2}+\sigma_{U}^{2}\right)\right] \\
& -\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{i=1}\left[\ln \phi\left(d_{i t}\right)-\ln \Phi\left(d_{i t}^{*}\right)\right] \tag{4.7}
\end{align*}
$$

where $\theta=\left(\beta^{\prime}, \delta^{\prime}, \sigma_{v}^{2}, \sigma_{u}^{2}\right)$.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& d_{i t}=Z_{i t} \delta / \sigma_{u} \\
& d_{i t}^{*}=\frac{u_{i t}^{*}}{\sigma_{*}} \\
& u_{i t}^{*}=\left[\sigma_{v}^{2} z_{i t} \delta-\sigma_{u}^{2}\left(y_{i t}-x_{i t} \beta\right)\right] /\left(\sigma_{v}^{2}+\sigma_{u}^{2}\right) \\
& \sigma^{*}=\left(\sigma_{u}^{2} \sigma_{v}^{2}\right)^{1 / 2} /\left(\sigma_{u}^{2}+\sigma_{v}^{2}\right)^{1 / 2}
\end{aligned}
$$

Incorporating equation (4.6) in equation (4.7):

$$
\begin{align*}
L^{*}\left(\theta^{*} ; y\right)= & -\frac{1}{2}\left(\sum_{i=1}^{N} T_{i}\right)\left\{\ln 2 \pi+\ln \left(\sigma_{u}^{2}+e^{s_{i t} \alpha}\right)\right\}  \tag{4.8}\\
& -\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{t=1}^{T_{i}}\left[\left(y_{i t}-x_{i t} \beta+z_{i t} \delta\right)^{2} /\left(e^{s_{i t} \alpha}+\sigma_{u}^{2}\right)\right] \\
& -\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{t=1}\left[\ln \Phi\left(d_{i t}\right)-\ln \Phi\left(d_{i t}^{*}\right)\right]
\end{align*}
$$

where: $\quad d_{i t}$ and $d_{i t}^{*}$ are as before

$$
\begin{aligned}
& u_{i t}^{*}=\left[e^{S_{t} \alpha} z_{i t} \delta-\sigma_{u}^{2}\left(y_{i t}-x_{i t} \beta\right)\right] /\left(e^{S_{i t} \alpha}+\sigma_{u}^{2}\right) . \\
& \sigma_{*}=\left(\frac{e^{S_{i t} \alpha} \sigma_{u}^{2}}{e^{S_{i t} \alpha}+\sigma_{u}^{2}}\right)^{1 / 2}
\end{aligned}
$$

then: $\quad d_{i t}^{*}=\left\{\left[e^{s_{i t} \alpha} Z_{i t} \delta-\sigma_{u}^{2}\left(y_{i t}-x_{i t} \beta\right)\right] /\left(e^{s_{t} \alpha}+\sigma_{u}^{2}\right)\right\}$

$$
\cdot\left\{\left(e^{s_{u} \alpha}+\sigma_{u}^{2}\right)^{1 / 2} /\left(e^{S_{u} \alpha} \sigma_{u}^{2}\right)^{1 / 2}\right\}
$$

and $\theta=\left(\beta^{\prime}, \delta^{\prime}, \alpha^{\prime}\right)$.
The partial derivatives of equation (4.8) with respect to the parameters, $\beta, \delta$, and $\alpha$ are given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\partial L}{\partial \beta}=\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{t=1}\left\{\frac{\left(y_{i t}-x_{i t} \beta+Z_{i t} \delta\right)}{e^{S_{i t} \alpha}+\sigma_{u}^{2}}+\frac{\phi\left(d_{i t}^{*}\right)}{\Phi\left(d_{i t}^{*}\right)} \cdot\left(\frac{e^{S_{u} \alpha}}{\sigma_{*}^{*}\left(e^{S_{t} \alpha}+\sigma_{u}^{2}\right)}\right)\right\} x_{i t}^{\prime} \tag{4.9A}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\phi($.$) represents the density function for the standard normal random variable.$

$$
\begin{align*}
& \frac{\partial L}{\partial \delta}=\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{t=1}\left\{\frac{\left(y_{i t}-x_{i t} \beta+z_{i t} \delta\right)}{e^{S_{t} \alpha}+\sigma_{u}^{2}}+\left[\frac{\phi\left(d_{i t}\right)}{\Phi\left(d_{i t}\right)} \cdot \frac{1}{\sigma_{u}}-\frac{\phi\left(d_{i t}^{*}\right)}{\Phi\left(d_{i t}^{*}\right)} \cdot\left(\frac{e^{S_{u} \alpha}}{\sigma_{*}\left(e^{S_{i t} \alpha}+\sigma_{u}^{2}\right)}\right)\right]\right\} z^{\prime}{ }_{i t}  \tag{4.9B}\\
& \frac{\partial L^{*}}{\partial \alpha}=-1 / 2\left\{\sum_{i=1}^{N} T_{i}\left[\frac{e^{S_{i t} \alpha}}{\sigma_{u}^{2}+e^{S_{u} \alpha}}\right]+\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{t=1}^{T_{i}}\left[\frac{e^{S_{i u} \alpha}\left(y_{i t}-x_{i t} \beta+z_{i t} \delta\right)^{2}}{\left(e^{S_{u} \alpha}+\sigma_{u}^{2}\right)^{2}}\right]\right\} s_{i t}^{\prime}
\end{align*}
$$

This result could be used to generalize the Battese and Coelli estimator when the twosided random errors, $v_{i t}$, are heteroscedastic.

### 4.3 DEA and Second Stage Tobit Specification

In this section the specification of the non-parametric model, Data Envelopment Analysis, in the first stage and Tobit regression in the second stage are discussed.

### 4.3.1 DEA Model

In DEA, it is assumed that all firms have the same deterministic production frontier and any deviation from the frontier is due to inefficiency. The basic idea of this approach is to view schools as productive units with multiple inputs and outputs.

To measure technical inefficiency, output-oriented DEA uses the same inputs and outputs as the stochastic frontier model. Therefore, for the production frontier in equation (4.4), the output-oriented measure of technical inefficiency is the solution to the following multiplier form of the DEA linear programming problem. Following Coelli (1998):
$\max \left(u^{\prime} y_{i}\right)$,
$u, v$
S.T $\quad v^{\prime} x_{i}=1$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& u^{\prime} y_{j}-v x_{j} \leq 0 \quad \mathrm{j}=\mathrm{i}, \ldots, \mathrm{~N} \\
& u, v \geq 0
\end{aligned}
$$

where:
$x_{i} \quad$ is a column vector of inputs (MIN, LUNCH, I, O) for the $i$ th school district $y_{i} \quad$ is a column vector of outputs (IT3, IT7, CRT8, CRT11) for the $i$ th school district $v \quad$ is a $K x 1$ vector of input weights, $K=4$, that maximizes efficiency
$u \quad$ is a $M x 1$ vector of output weights, $M=4$, that maximizes efficiency
$u, v \geq 0$

### 4.3.2 Tobit Model

To assess the effects of variables not included in the first stage on technical efficiency, McCarty et al. (1993) suggest using efficiencies generated by DEA as dependent variables in a Tobit regression:

$$
\begin{align*}
Y_{i t}^{T} & =\beta_{0}^{T}+\beta_{1}^{T} \text { YRSEXP }_{i t}+\beta_{2}^{T} \text { DEG }_{\mathrm{it}}+\beta_{3}^{T} \text { SALARY }_{\mathrm{it}}  \tag{4.10}\\
& +\beta_{4}^{T} \mathrm{ADM}_{\mathrm{it}}+\beta_{5}^{T} \mathrm{ADM}_{i t}^{2}+\beta_{6}^{T} \mathrm{STR}_{\mathrm{it}}+\mathrm{e}_{\mathrm{it}}
\end{align*}
$$

where the T superscript denotes Tobit and $Y_{i i}^{T}$ is the DEA efficiency estimates. Efficiency estimates from the first state are between 0 and 1 , hence data is censored and thus Tobit regression is the appropriate method of estimation for equation 4.10. The explanatory variables in equation (4.10) are the variables of technical efficiency equation of the stochastic frontier model (equation 4.5). The possibility of existence of heteroscedasticty in this stage should be considered and, if in fact it exists, incorporated into the model to have efficient parameter estimates.

## CHAPTER V

## STOCHASTIC PRODUCTION FRONTIER

### 5.1 OLS Estimation of the Model

The first goal in specification of the stochastic frontier is to determine to what extent the data can be pooled. If there are significant structural changes in the school districts from year to year then aggregating them and estimating common coefficients for production function may be misleading. Also, an initial analysis for the existence of heteroscedasticity is of interest. Since test scores are measured as averages and given the wide variation in the number of pupils in each district, there is reason to suspect that the data are heteroscedastic. These issues of specification are investigated using least squares.

The first concern with the use of panel data is whether there has been any major structural changes that have occurred over time.
$\mathrm{H}_{0}$ : No structural changes among cross-sections
$\mathrm{H}_{1}: \quad \mathrm{H}_{0}$ not true
To test this hypothesis, a Chow test for each grade was performed. To compute the test statistic:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathrm{F}=\frac{(\operatorname{SSE} R-\operatorname{SSE} U) / J}{\operatorname{SSE} U /(n-K)} \sim F_{(J, n-K)} \tag{5.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where:
$\mathrm{SSE}_{\mathrm{R}}$ is the sum of squares of error from the pooled regression.
$\mathrm{SSE}_{\mathrm{U}}$ is the unrestricted sum of squares of error for each cross-section $\left(\mathrm{SSE}_{96-97}\right.$
$+\mathrm{SSE}_{97-98}+\mathrm{SSE}_{98-99}{ }^{\text {) }}$.
$\mathrm{J} \quad$ is the number of restrictions, $(2 \mathrm{~J}=16)$.
$\mathrm{n} \quad$ is the panel number of observations, 1098.
$\mathrm{K} \quad$ is the number of explanatory variables for each cross-section $(3 \mathrm{~K}=3(8)=24)$.

OLS parameter estimates of the model, under the null hypothesis, for each crosssection and for the panel data are obtained and presented in Tables 5.1-5.4. MIN and LUNCH have the expected sign and are consistent with Adkins and Moomaw's (1997) results.

Table 5.1
OLS Estimates of the Parameters of Production Function Year (1996-1997) Dependent Variable: ln (test score)

|  | Grade 3 |  | Grade 7 |  | Grade 8 |  | Grade 11 |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Variable | Coefficient | t-ratio | Coefficient | t-ratio | Coefficient | t-ratio | Coefficient | t-ratio |
| Constant | -6.0836 | -0.3499 | -6.0521 | -.4275 | 14.2761 | 1.4885 | -18.5929 | -1.2826 |
| MIN | -0.0576 | -0.9556 | -.1122 | -2.2857 | -0.1028 | -3.0922 | -0.1357 | -2.7008 |
| LUNCH | -0.3619 | -4.3949 | -.4787 | -7.1387 | -0.2907 | -6.3999 | -0.4814 | -7.0102 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{I})$ | 2.4008 | 0.4924 | .5963 | .1502 | -4.1302 | -1.5354 | 3.6982 | 0.9096 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{O})$ | 0.0008 | 0.0004 | 1.7569 | .9578 | 1.5368 | 1.2366 | 2.0134 | 1.0719 |
| $[\ln (\mathrm{I})]^{2}$ | -0.6153 | -0.7501 | .3155 | .4723 | 0.817 | 1.805 | -0.5184 | -0.7577 |
| $[\ln (0)]^{2}$ | -0.3444 | -0.8748 | .1883 | .5875 | 0.1061 | 0.4883 | -0.3203 | -0.9758 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{I}) \ln (\mathrm{O})$ | 0.3427 | 0.7442 | -.3841 | -1.0222 | -0.289 | -1.1375 | 0.0671 | 0.1747 |
| Sum of Squares Errors | 9.20211 | 6.102255 |  | 2.800867 |  | 6.398876 |  |  |

Table 5.2
OLS Estimates of the Parameters of Production Function Year (1997-1998) Dependent Variable: In (test score)

|  | Grade 3 |  | Grade 7 |  | Grade 8 |  | Grade 11 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Variable | Coefficient | t-ratio | Coefficient | t-ratio | Coefficient | t-ratio | Coefficient | t-ratio |
| Constant | -33.6618 | -2.1248 | -9.9107 | -. 7431 | -13.3632 | -1.2659 | 2.1181 | 0.1744 |
| MIN | -0.1009 | -1.5975 | -. 1356 | -2.5487 | -0.1421 | -3.3734 | -0.2273 | -4.6918 |
| LUNCH | -0.0273 | -3.3657 | -. 5128 | -7.5032 | -0.3694 | -6.8288 | -0.3517 | -5.6521 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{I})$ | 7.7698 | 1.7922 | 2.1409 | . 5866 | 3.3849 | 1.1718 | 0.5513 | 0.1657 |
| $\operatorname{Ln}(\mathrm{O})$ | 1.6443 | 0.6654 | 1.2481 | . 5999 | 0.9465 | 0.5748 | -0.0691 | -0.0364 |
| $[\ln (\mathrm{I})]^{2}$ | -0.6449 | -0.8428 | -. 2105 | -. 3268 | 0.0901 | 0.1768 | -0.1541 | -0.2628 |
| $[\ln (0)]^{2}$ | 0.1262 | -0.3247 | -. 1035 | -. 3162 | 0.4325 | 1.6694 | -0.0874 | -0.2935 |
| $\underline{\ln (\mathrm{I}) \ln (\mathrm{O})}$ | -0.3239 | -0.729 | -. 0437 | -. 1169 | -0.5223 | -1.7644 | 0.0981 | 0.2882 |
| Sum of Squ | Errors 9. | 593 | 6.701311 |  | 4.198008 |  | 5.554300 |  |

Table 5.3
OLS Estimates of the Parameters of Production Function Year (1998-1999) Dependent Variable: In (test score)

|  | Grade 3 |  | Grade 7 |  | Grade 8 |  | Grade 11 |  |
| :--- | :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Variable | Coefficient | t-ratio | Coefficient | t-ratio | Coefficient | t-ratio | Coefficient | t-ratio |
| Constant | -39.1746 | -2.7907 | -8.3154 | -.7 .39 | -13.6577 | -1.3133 | 2.5475 | 0.2395 |
| MIN | -0.0233 | -0.3755 | -.1461 | -2.7989 | -0.1601 | -3.4824 | -0.0766 | -1.6297 |
| LUNCH | -0.3847 | -4.9276 | -.4179 | -6.3606 | -0.3593 | -6.2129 | -0.4221 | -7.1365 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{I})$ | 8.0683 | 2.3297 | .1823 | .0625 | 2.951 | 1.1502 | 1.8829 | 0.7177 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{O})$ | 2.6435 | 1.0815 | 2.8523 | 1.3866 | 1.4985 | 0.8275 | -1.6226 | -0.8763 |
| $[\ln (\mathrm{I})]^{2}$ | 0.1049 | 0.1696 | .3632 | .6977 | 0.2309 | 0.5039 | -0.4784 | -1.0211 |
| $[\ln (0)]^{2}$ | 0.8453 | 2.2145 | .0424 | .1322 | 0.4447 | 1.5728 | -0.0659 | -0.2282 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{I}) \ln (\mathrm{O})$ | -1.1331 | -2.8031 | -.3846 | -1.1305 | -0.6101 | -2.0374 | 0.2691 | 0.8788 |
| Sum of Squares Errors 8.97321 | 6.35511 |  | 4.924563 |  | 5.149717 |  |  |  |

Table 5.4
OLS Estimates of the Parameters of Production Function (Panel)
Dependent Variable: In (test score)

|  | Grade 3 |  | Grade 7 |  | Grade 8 |  | Grade 11 |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Variable | Coefficient | t-ratio | Coefficient | t-ratio | Coefficient | t-ratio | Coefficient | t-ratio |
| Constant | -26.3702 | -3.0592 | -9.3923 | -1.3123 | -3.6335 | -0.5817 | -2.5406 | -0.3619 |
| MIN | -0.0592 | -1.6632 | -0.1283 | -4.3416 | -0.1307 | -5.0655 | -0.1520 | -5.2406 |
| LUNCH | -0.3382 | -7.3635 | -0.4734 | -12.4136 | -0.3476 | -10.4453 | -0.4091 | -10.9336 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{I})$ | 5.8497 | 2.5399 | 1.1379 | 0.5950 | 1.6940 | 1.0150 | 1.5517 | 0.8272 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{O})$ | 1.6906 | 1.2363 | 2.1120 | 1.9012 | 0.2211 | 0.2280 | 0.0887 | 0.0814 |
| $[\ln (\mathrm{I})]^{2}$ | -0.1633 | -0.8024 | 0.0814 | 0.4817 | 0.1154 | 0.7824 | -0.1699 | -1.0249 |
| $[\ln (0)]^{2}$ | 0.1044 | 0.9484 | 0.0252 | 0.2759 | 0.2227 | 2.7905 | -0.0869 | -0.9694 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{I}) \ln (\mathrm{O})$ | -0.4035 | -1.6214 | -0.2982 | -1.4431 | -0.4495 | -2.4927 | 0.1617 | 0.7979 |
| Sum of Squares Errors 28.04635 | 19.33482 |  | 14.72695 |  | 18.60676 |  |  |  |

The results of the Chow tests suggest that, for grades 3 and 7, no structural changes are detected over the years under study. However, the hypothesis for grades 8 and 11 , is rejected at the $5 \%$ level. The results are presented in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5
Chow Test of Structural Changes among Cross-Sections in the OLS Model

| Grade | F-statistic <br> $\mathbf{d f}=\mathbf{1 5}$ | Critical Value <br> $\boldsymbol{\alpha}=\mathbf{0 5}$ | Decision Rule |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| 3 | 1.008 | 1.67 | Not Reject $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |
| 7 | .617 | 1.67 | Not Reject $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |
| 8 | 15.785 | 1.67 | Reject $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |
| 11 | 5.870 | 1.67 | Reject $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |

One possible reason for rejecting the null hypotheses for $8^{\text {th }}$ and $11^{\text {th }}$ grade could be that, CRTs are renormed each year. Another is that the technology used by the school districts for these grades may be different for each year under the study. To allow for structural changes for each year in the panel and to capture the effects of these changes on the parameter estimates, dummy variables for years 1996-1997 and 1997-1998 are introduced into the model. The OLS parameter estimates of this model are presented in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6
OLS Estimates of the Parameters of Production Function with Dummy Variables (Panel) Dependent Variable: In (test score)

|  | Grade 8 |  | Grade 11 |  |
| :--- | :---: | ---: | :---: | ---: |
| Variable | Coefficient | t-ratio | Coefficient | t-ratio |
| Constant | -8.98612 | -1.58407 | -4.32687 | -0.63780 |
| MIN | -0.12999 | -5.55676 | -0.14655 | -5.23848 |
| LUNCH | -0.35233 | -11.67508 | -0.41673 | -1.54713 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{I})$ | 1.85033 | 1.22303 | 1.55087 | 0.85718 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{O})$ | 1.38914 | 1.57481 | 0.52009 | 0.49303 |
| $[\ln (\mathrm{I})]^{2}$ | 0.12726 | 0.95200 | -0.16022 | -1.00221 |
| $[\ln (0)]^{2}$ | 0.16921 | 2.33677 | -0.10531 | -1.21612 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{I}) \ln (\mathrm{O})$ | -0.49057 | -3.00081 | 0.14388 | 0.73593 |
| DUM1 | 0.12174 | 15.35997 | 0.05408 | 5.70517 |
| DUM2 | 0.04964 | 6.35498 | 0.08468 | 9.06481 |
| Sum of Squares Errors | 12.08280 | 17.26241 |  |  |

The results of Table 5.6 suggest that the effect of structural changes on the test scores are statistically significant. To test this hypothesis a Chow test based on the regression used for Table 5.6 which includes the two dummy variables; this regression becomes the restricted model against which the unrestricted is compared. The results are presented in Table 5.7.

Table 5.7
Chow Test of Structural Changes among Cross-Sections in the OLS Model with Dummy Variables

| Grade | F-statistic <br> df $=\mathbf{2 0}$ | Critical Value <br> $\boldsymbol{\alpha}=\mathbf{0 5}$ | Decision Rule |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 8 | .708 | 1.57 | Not Reject $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |
| 11 | .501 | 1.57 | Not Reject $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |

These results suggest that whatever structural changes occurred for grades 8 and 11, are adequately captured by the inclusion of yearly dummies. Furthermore, the coefficient estimates suggest downward secular trends in $8^{\text {th }}$ and 11 th grade test scores,
holding expenditures and the observed student characteristics constant. This may indicate an actual decline in technology employed by the school districts or merely indicate that the exams became more difficult over time.

The elasticities of output with respect to instructional (I) and noninstructional (O) expenditures based on the parameter estimates of the OLS model, using the panel data, for each grade are presented in Table 5.8. These elasticities are computed using the sample mean values of $\ln (\mathrm{I})$ and $\ln (\mathrm{O})$.

Table 5.8
Elasticities of Test Scores with Respect to Instructional and Noninstructional Expenditures Evaluated at their Asymptotic Means

|  | IT3 | IT7 | CRT8 | CRT11 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| S | .197 | .174 | .159 | .0918 |
| Standard Error | .022 | .016 | .02 | .019 |
| O | .064 | .123 | .0515 | .0683 |
| Standard Error | .032 | .0158 | .0326 | .008 |

The elasticities of test scores with respect to expenditures are positive and statistically significant for all grades at the 5 percent level. With respect to instructional expenses, the estimated effect is greater in grade 3 than in the other grades considered. However, the elasticities are fairly small even in grade 3. This result is consistent with findings of Adkins and Moomaw (1997). A one percent increase in instructional spending is expected to increase the $3^{\text {rd }}$ grade ITBS scores by almost .2 percent, .17 percent for grade $7, .15$ percent for grade 8 , and. 09 percent for grade 11 .

Smaller elasticities with regard to noninstructional expenses, ranging from . 05 to. 12 suggest that reallocation of noninstructional spending to instructional spending may result in a small improvement of test scores for all grades. This result is consistent with the findings of Adkins and Moomaw (1997) except for grade 7.

To test for the existence of any form of heteroscedasticity, White's heteroscedasticity test on the residuals of panel data for each type of test scores was conducted. The results suggest the existence of heteroscedasticity in this model. The results are presented in Table 5.9.

Table 5.9
Results of White's Heteroscedasticity Test on the Residual of Panel Data

| Output | $\chi^{2}$-statistic | df | P-Value |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| IT3 | 86.34 | 25 | .0000 |
| IT7 | 87.84 | 25 | .0000 |
| CRT8 | 93.02 | 41 | .0000 |
| CRT11 | 63.45 | 41 | .0137 |

Existence of heteroscedasticity in the average function model most likely suggests the presence of this specification error in the frontier model. For the moment this complication will be ignored and estimation of a stochastic frontier will proceed as if the model were homoscedastic. Later in the chapter, heteroscedasticity will be reconsidered using results from DEA and the efficiencies predicted by the two approaches will be compared.

### 5.2 The Frontier Approach (Stochastic Frontier Regression, SFR)

In the traditional average response function (OLS), school districts are assumed to be fully efficient, i.e., $u_{i}$ 's are not present in the model. This assumption should be tested in order to see whether we need to go beyond OLS and whether a stochastic frontier production is required at all. In order to test this, the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters in the model were obtained using Frontier 4.1 (Coelli, 1995). The results are presented in Tables 5.10 through 5.13.

As expected, LUNCH and MIN each shift the frontier down for all grades. These results confirm the importance of students' socioeconomic variation on their educational performance and therefore, increasing spending per student in districts with a higher percentage of disadvantaged students could offset their disadvantages. These results are consistent with Adkins and Moomaw (1997).

Table 5.10
Maximum-Likelihood Estimates for Parameters of Stochastic Production Frontier and Inefficiency Models for Oklahoma School Districts (Panel Data Model)

Dependent Variable: In (IT3)

| Variable | Standard |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Parameter | Coefficient | Error | t-ratio |
| Stochastic Production |  |  |  |  |
| Frontier |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | $\beta_{0}$ | -25.84899 | 1.10360 | -23.42245 |
| MIN | $\beta_{1}$ | -0.09450 | 0.03377 | -2.79807 |
| LUNCH | $\beta_{2}$ | -0.22242 | 0.03864 | -5.75591 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{I})$ | $\beta_{3}$ | 4.10110 | 0.72787 | 5.63440 ) |
| $\ln (\mathrm{O})$ | $\beta_{4}$ | 3.35807 | 0.76602 | $4.38381{ }^{\text { }}$ |
| $[\ln (\mathrm{I})]^{2}$ | $\beta_{5}$ | 0.09941 | 0.11820 | 0.84100 |
| $[\ln (0)]^{2}$ | $\beta_{6}$ | 0.16076 | 0.10202 | 1.57571 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{I}) \ln (\mathrm{O})$ | $\beta_{7}$ | -0.71907 | 0.20306 | -3.54107 |
| Inefficiency Equation |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | $\delta_{0}$ | 1.17627 | 0.46809 | 2.51292 |
| *SALARY | $\delta_{1}$ | -0.36277 | 0.16257 | -2.23143 |
| YRSEXP | $\delta_{2}$ | -0.61496 | 0.14295 | -4.30196 |
| DEG | $\delta_{3}$ | 0.00857 | 0.00402 | 2.13352 |
| *ADM | $\delta_{4}$ | -0.01686 | 0.00538 | -3.13307 |
| * $\mathrm{ADM}^{2}$ | $\delta_{5}$ | 0.00004 | 0.00001 | 3.20096 |
| STR <br> Variance Parameters | $\delta_{6}$ | -0.00977 | 0.00818 | -1.19415 |
|  | $\sigma^{2}=\sigma_{U}^{2}+\sigma_{V}^{2}$ | 0.07761 | 0.01269 | 6.11962 |
|  | $\gamma=\frac{\sigma_{U}^{2}}{\sigma_{U}^{2}+\sigma_{V}^{2}}$ | 0.86033 | 0.02692 | 31.95549 |
| Log Likelihood Function |  | 519.73200 |  |  |
| LR test of the one-sided error $\left(\mathrm{H}_{0}: \gamma=0\right)$ number of restrictions |  | $\begin{aligned} & 128.66600 \\ & 8 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| *Variable is scaled: |  |  |  |  |
| SALARY is SALARY/1,000 ADM is ADM/ 100 $\mathrm{ADM}^{2}$ is $\mathrm{ADM}^{2} / 10,000$ |  |  |  |  |

Table 5.11
Maximum-Likelihood Estimates for Parameters of Stochastic Production Frontier and Inefficiency Models for Oklahoma School Districts (Panel Data Model)

Dependent Variable: ln (IT7)

|  |  | Standard |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Variable | Parameter Coefficient | Error | t-ratio |  |
| Stochastic Production |  |  |  |  |
| Frontier | $\beta_{0}$ | -10.4653 | 1.2132 | -8.6264 |
| Constant | $\beta_{1}$ | -0.1767 | 0.0262 | -6.7391 |
| MIN | $\beta_{2}$ | -0.3354 | 0.0310 | -10.8264 |
| LUNCH | $\beta_{3}$ | 1.1231 | 0.7180 | 1.5643 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{I})$ | $\beta_{4}$ | 2.4156 | 0.7306 | 3.3065 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{O})$ | $\beta_{5}$ | 0.1834 | 0.1054 | 1.7400 |
| $[\ln (\mathrm{I})]^{2}$ | $\beta_{6}$ | 0.1155 | 0.0806 | 1.4329 |
| $[\ln (0)]^{2}$ | $\beta_{7}$ | -0.5087 | 0.1689 | -3.0122 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{I}) \ln (\mathrm{O})$ |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Inefficiency Equation | $\delta_{0}$ | 1.2290 | 0.4487 | 2.7393 |
| Constant | $\delta_{1}$ | -0.4593 | 0.1604 | -2.8644 |
| *SALARY | $\delta_{2}$ | -0.3958 | 0.1059 | -3.7354 |
| YRSEXP | $\delta_{3}$ | 0.0073 | 0.0037 | 1.9833 |
| DEG | $\delta_{4}$ | -0.0161 | 0.0046 | -3.4802 |
| *ADM | $\delta_{5}$ | 0.0004 | 0.0001 | 3.5336 |
| *ADM ${ }^{2}$ | $\delta_{6}$ | 0.0019 | 0.0082 | 0.2335 |
| STR | $\sigma^{2}=\sigma_{U}^{2}+\sigma_{V}^{2}$ | 0.0600 | 0.0073 | 8.2102 |
| Variance Parameters | $\gamma=\frac{\sigma_{U}^{2}}{\sigma_{U}^{2}+\sigma_{V}^{2}}$ | 0.9034 | 0.0167 | 54.0832 |
|  |  | 743.6904 |  |  |
| Log Likelihood Function |  |  |  |  |
| LR test of the one-sided error |  | 168.1766 |  |  |
| (H0: $\gamma=0)$ | 8 |  |  |  |
| number of restrictions |  |  |  |  |
| *Variable is scaled: |  |  |  |  |
| SALARY is SALARY/1,000 |  |  |  |  |
| ADM is ADM/100 |  |  |  |  |
| ADM ${ }^{2}$ is ADM $21,000,000$ |  |  |  |  |

Table 5.12
Maximum-Likelihood Estimates for Parameters of Stochastic Production Frontier and Inefficiency Models for Oklahoma School Districts (Panel Data Model)

Dependent Variable: In (IT8)

| Variable | Parameter | Coefficient | Standard Error | t-ratio |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Stochastic Production |  |  |  |  |
| Frontier |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | $\beta_{0}$ | -10.31359 | 1.17694 | -8.76306 |
| MIN | $\beta_{1}$ | -0.13522 | 0.02090 | -6.47153 |
| LUNCH | $\beta_{2}$ | -0.27192 | 0.02439 | -11.14877 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{I})$ | $\beta_{3}$ | 1.27378 | 0.73915 | 1.72332 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{O})$ | $\beta_{4}$ | 2.33484 | 0.73806 | 3.16346 |
| $[\ln (\mathrm{I})]^{2}$ | $\beta_{5}$ | 0.27427 | 0.09465 | 2.89777 |
| $[\ln (0)]^{2}$ | $\beta_{6}$ | 0.22877 | 0.06653 | 3.43876 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{I}) \ln (\mathrm{O})$ | $\beta_{7}$ | -0.72149 | 0.13854 | -5.20790 |
| DUM1 | $\beta_{8}$ | 0.09548 | 0.00741 | 12.88991 |
| DUM2 | $\beta_{9}$ | 0.04530 | 0.00732 | 6.18906 |
| Inefficiency Equation |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | $\delta_{0}$ | 0.11763 | 0.34224 | 0.34370 |
| *SALARY | $\delta_{1}$ | 0.09261 | 0.12188 | 0.75986 |
| YRSEXP | $\delta_{2}$ | -0.46873 | 0.13903 | -3.37143 |
| DEG | $\delta_{3}$ | -0.03362 | 0.01144 | -2.93899 |
| *ADM | $\delta_{4}$ | -0.01350 | 0.00561 | -2.40657 |
| * $\mathrm{ADM}^{2}$ | $\delta_{5}$ | 0.00353 | 0.00141 | 2.49903 |
| STR | $\delta^{2}=\delta_{6}$ | -0.00556 | 0.00631 | -0.88244 |
| Variance Parameters | $\sigma^{2}=\sigma_{U}^{2}+\sigma_{V}^{2}$ | 0.05623 | 0.01551 | 3.62678 |
|  | $\gamma=\frac{\sigma_{U}^{2}}{\sigma_{U}^{2}+\sigma_{V}^{2}}$ | 0.92430 | 0.01769 | 52.26312 |
| Log Likelihood Function |  | 996.80100 |  |  |
| LR test of the one-sided error $\left(\mathrm{H}_{0}: \gamma=0\right)$ number of restrictions |  | $\begin{aligned} & 157.85600 \\ & 8 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| *Variable is scaled: SALARY is SALARY/ 1,000 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| ADM is ADM/100 $\mathrm{ADM}^{2}$ is $\mathrm{ADM}^{2} / 1,000,000$ |  |  |  |  |

Table 5.13
Maximum-Likelihood Estimates for Parameters of Stochastic Production Frontier and Inefficiency Models for Oklahoma School Districts (Panel Data Model)

Dependent Variable: ln (IT11)

| Variable | Standard <br> Parameter |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Coefficient | Error | t-ratio |  |  |
| Stochastic Production |  |  |  |  |
| Frontier | $\beta_{0}$ | -4.54858 | 0.98441 | -4.62062 |
| Constant | $\beta_{1}$ | -0.19946 | 0.02614 | -7.63135 |
| MIN | $\beta_{2}$ | -0.27029 | 0.03056 | -8.84366 |
| LUNCH | $\beta_{3}$ | -0.10112 | 0.70362 | -0.14372 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{I})$ | $\beta_{4}$ | 2.23393 | 0.73143 | 3.05420 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{O})$ | $\beta_{5}$ | 0.14312 | 0.09843 | 1.45401 |
| $[\ln (\mathrm{I})]^{2}$ | $\beta_{6}$ | -0.00318 | 0.06895 | -0.04613 |
| $[\ln (0)]^{2}$ | $\beta_{7}$ | -0.26462 | 0.14836 | -1.78364 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{I}) \ln (\mathrm{O})$ | $\beta_{8}$ | 0.06751 | 0.00975 | 6.92451 |
| DUM1 | $\beta_{9}$ | 0.08693 | 0.00817 | 10.64080 |
| DUM2 |  |  |  |  |

Inefficiency Equation

| Constant | $\delta_{0}$ | 0.21630 | 0.28949 | 0.47419 |
| :--- | :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| *SALARY | $\delta_{1}$ | 0.03665 | 0.09988 | 0.36693 |
| YRSEXP | $\delta_{2}$ | -0.42693 | 0.08133 | -5.24936 |
| DEG | $\delta_{3}$ | -0.00026 | 0.00322 | -0.08010 |
| *ADM | $\delta_{4}$ | -0.01539 | 0.00321 | -4.79965 |
| *ADM ${ }^{2}$ | $\delta_{5}$ | 0.00004 | 0.00001 | 4.89964 |
| STR | $\delta_{6}$ | -0.00801 | 0.00575 | -1.39272 |
| Variance Parameters | $\sigma^{2}=\sigma_{U}^{2}+\sigma_{V}^{2}$ | 0.04012 | 0.00431 | 9.30646 |
|  | $\gamma=\frac{\sigma_{U}^{2}}{\sigma_{U}^{2}+\sigma_{V}^{2}}$ | 0.91177 |  |  |
|  |  | 849.07500 |  |  |
| Log Likelihood Function |  |  |  |  |
| LR test of the one-sided error |  | 255.24600 |  |  |
| (H0: $\gamma=0$ ) | 8 |  |  |  |
| number of restrictions |  |  |  |  |

*Variable is scaled:
SALARY is SALARY/ 1,000
ADM is ADM/ 100
$\mathrm{ADM}^{2}$ is $\mathrm{ADM}^{2} / 10,000$

The likelihood ratio (LR) tests of the one sided error was conducted against OLS. According to Coelli (1995a), the Wald and two-sided LR tests are of incorrect size. A test based on the third moment of OLS residuals (in the COLS technique) was found to be of correct size. However, the one-sided LR test appeared to have higher power. The test statistic for the LR test involving $\gamma=0$ has a mixed Chi-square distribution. In the case of the one-sided LR test, Coelli (p. 252) suggests that "the critical value for a test of size $\alpha$ is equal to the critical value of the chi-square $\left(\chi^{2}\right)$ distribution for a standard test of size $2 \alpha$ (e.g. the total value for a 5 percent test is reduced from 3.84 to 2.71 )."

According to the LR tests, presented in Table 5.14, the OLS specification was rejected for all grades. Rejection of OLS and the appearance of the high estimated values of the $\gamma$ 's and their $t$-ratios suggest that inefficiencies do exist. Therefore, the traditional average response function does not adequately represent the production structure of Oklahoma school districts under study.

Table 5.14
Likelihood Ratio Test of the Hypotheses for OLS Specification Involving Parameters of the Inefficiency Model

| Grade | Hyp | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Loglikelihood } \\ \mathbf{H}_{0} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \chi^{2} \text { Statistic } \\ \mathbf{d f}=8 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Critical Value } \\ 2 \alpha=.1 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Decision } \\ \text { Rule } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 3 | $\begin{aligned} & \mathrm{H}_{0}: \gamma=\delta_{0}= \\ & \delta_{1}=\delta_{2}=\ldots \\ & =\delta_{6}=0 \end{aligned}$ | 455.399 | 128.888 | 13.3616 | Reject $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |
| 7 | $\begin{aligned} & \mathrm{H}_{0}: \gamma=\delta_{0}= \\ & \delta_{1}=\delta_{2}=\ldots \\ & =\delta_{6}=0 \end{aligned}$ | 659.602 | 168.176 | 13.3616 | Reject $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |
| 8 | $\begin{aligned} & \mathrm{H}_{0}: \gamma=\delta_{0}= \\ & \delta_{1}=\delta_{2}=\ldots \\ & =\delta_{6}=0 \end{aligned}$ | 917.873 | 157.856 | 13.3616 | Reject $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |
| 11 | $\begin{aligned} & \mathrm{H}_{0}: \gamma=\delta_{0}= \\ & \delta_{1}=\delta_{2}=\ldots \\ & =\delta_{6}=0 \end{aligned}$ | 721.452 | 254.903 | 13.3616 | Reject $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |

### 5.3 The Inefficiency Equation

The inefficiency model for Oklahoma school districts is assumed to be district specific (equation (4.5) in Chapter IV with all of its assumptions). The quadratic term $\mathrm{ADM}^{2}$ has the right sign and is statistically significant. Thus, inclusion of $\mathrm{ADM}^{2}$ in the inefficiency mode is appropriate.

To test the existence of a stochastic, as well as deterministic component in the error term, a likelihood ratio test is conducted. The results are presented in Table 5.15.

Table 5.15
Likelihood Ratio Test of the Hypotheses for Existence of a Stochastic Component in the Error Term

| Grade | Hyp | Loglikelihood <br> $\mathbf{H}_{\mathbf{0}}$ | $\chi^{2}$ Statistic <br> $\mathbf{d f}=\mathbf{2}$ | Critical Value <br> $\mathbf{2 \alpha} \boldsymbol{\alpha}=\mathbf{1}$ | Decision <br> Rule |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 3 | $\mathrm{H}_{0}: \gamma_{0}=0$ | 473.77 | 92.14 | 4.605 | Reject $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |
| 7 | $\mathrm{H}_{0}: \gamma_{0}=0$ | 677.538 | 132.304 | 4.605 | Reject $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |
| 8 | $\mathrm{H}_{0}: \gamma_{0}=0$ | 940.845 | 111.912 | 4.605 | Reject $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |
| 11 | $\mathrm{H}_{0}: \gamma_{0}=0$ | 760.24 | 177.328 | 4.605 | Reject $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |

The results in Table 5.15 suggest that the error term in the model has a stochastic component for all grades.

The null hypothesis that the inefficiency effects are not a linear function of the right hand side variables in equation (4.5), $\mathrm{H}_{0}: \delta_{1}=$ $\qquad$ $. \delta_{6}=0$ is also rejected for all grades. Results are presented in Table 5.16.

Table 5.16
Likelihood Ratio Test of the Hypotheses of Linear Restrictions for Parameters of the Inefficiency Model

| Grade | Hyp | $\begin{gathered} \text { Loglikelihood } \\ \mathbf{H}_{0} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \chi^{2} \text { Statistic } \\ \mathrm{df}=6 \end{gathered}$ | Critical Value $2 \alpha=.1$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Decision } \\ \text { Rule } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 3 | $\begin{aligned} & \mathrm{H}_{0}: \delta_{1}=\delta_{2}= \\ & \ldots=\delta_{6}=0 \end{aligned}$ | 455.609 | 70.535 | 10.644 | Reject $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |
| 7 | $\begin{aligned} & \mathrm{H}_{0}: \delta_{1}=\delta_{2}= \\ & \ldots=\delta_{6}=0 \end{aligned}$ | 661.78 | 113.067 | 10.644 | Reject $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |
| 8 | $\begin{aligned} & \mathrm{H}_{0}: \delta_{1}=\delta_{2}= \\ & \ldots=\delta_{6}=0 \end{aligned}$ | 917.873 | 97.783 | 10.644 | Reject $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |
| 11 | $\begin{aligned} & \mathrm{H}_{0}: \delta_{1}=\delta_{2}= \\ & \ldots=\delta_{6}=0 \end{aligned}$ | 721.452 | 139.869 | 10.644 | Reject $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ |

The rejection of the null hypothesis in Table 5.16 indicates that the joint effects of these explanatory variables on the level of technical inefficiencies is significant.

According to inefficiency parameters estimate, presented in Tables 5.10-5.13, increasing teacher salary reduces inefficiency by a statistically significant amount for the $3^{\text {rd }}$ and $7^{\text {th }}$ grades, which is consistent with Adkins and Moomaw (1997). For grades 8 and 11 the effect of salary on efficiency is negative but statistically the effects are not significant. Years of experience affects technical efficiency positively in all grades. Adkins and Moomaw's results agree with these findings except for the $3^{\text {rd }}$ grade.

Teachers holding advanced degrees have a positive effect on efficiency for grades 8 and 11 and a negative effect on grades 3 and 7. However, the effects are statistically significant for grades 3 and 8 and not grades 7 and 11. This may suggest that for lower grades, teachers holding a bachelors degree are more desirable than the ones with more advanced degrees.

The effect of the student/teacher ratio on efficiency is not statistically significant for any grade. This implies that the positive or negative effect of increasing student/ teacher ratio on the efficiency is negligible.

In summary, the estimation of the model under this study generally supports Adkins and Moomaw's (1997) results and particularly is consistent with their results in that larger school districts have a greater degree of technical efficiency and the differences seem to stem from changes in data availability in the years considered in these studies.

The optimum district size based on each grade results are computed and presented in Table 5.17.

Table 5.17
The Optimum ADM Based on Each Grade's Results from Panel Data

| Grade | Optimum ADM |
| :---: | :---: |
| 3 | 21385 |
| 7 | 20135 |
| 8 | 19142 |
| 11 | 20676 |

Table 5.17 suggests that the optimum district size is between 19,142 and 21,383 .
However, these findings are conditional on the homoscedasticity of the model. If the data are heteroscedastic, as the results from White's tests suggest, then inferences may not be statistically valid. To the author's knowledge, there is no estimator of panel data for the stochastic frontier model where efficiencies are determined by exogenous variables that account for heteroscedasticity.

To determine the degree of robustness of this model, a DEA is performed that permits some flexibility in this specification. In addition, DEA allows more suitable modeling of district level production function since it allows for multiple output.

### 5.4 DEA and Second Stage Tobit

In this section, the results of DEA and second stage Tobit regression are discussed.

### 5.4.1 DEA Model

The first stage output-oriented DEA model:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\text { Scores }_{\mathrm{it}}=\mathrm{L}(\mathrm{MIN}, \mathrm{LUNCH}, \mathrm{I}, \mathrm{O}) \tag{5.2}
\end{equation*}
$$

Includes the same outputs and inputs as the SFR model. The SFR model estimation suggests that MIN and LUNCH have a negative effect on the test scores. Since outputoriented DEA is a maximization problem then the complement of MIN and LUNCH instead of the variables themselves are considered:

$$
\text { Scores }_{\mathrm{it}}=\mathrm{L}\left(\mathrm{MIN}^{*}, \mathrm{LUNCH}^{*}, \mathrm{I}, \mathrm{O}\right)
$$

where:
Scores $_{\text {it }}$ IT3, IT7, CRT8, CRT11
MIN* percentage of nonminority students (1-MIN)
LUNCH* percentage of students not eligible for subsidized or reduced LUNCH (1-LUNCH)
$\mathrm{I}, \mathrm{O}$ expenditures
Equation (5.2) is estimated using DEAP (2.1) software developed by T.J. Coelli (1996). Table 5.18 presents basic information on the distribution of efficiency scores generated by the DEA model under constant return to scale (CRS) and variable return to scale (VRS) assumptions for 1996-1999.

Table 5.18
Summary Statistics for DEA Efficiency Scores

|  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  | Panel |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | CRS | VRS | CRS | VRS | CRS | VRS | CRS | VRS |
| Mean | .8918 | .9256 | .8743 | .9102 | .8557 | .8837 | .8706 | .9065 |
| SD | .8486 | .672 | .9287 | .7165 | .8956 | .7279 | .9108 | .7262 |
| Minimum | .581 | .673 | .529 | .647 | .561 | .605 | .529 | .605 |
| Maximum | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

There are considerable similarities between efficiency generated under CRS and VRS. The average efficiency assuming CRS for the panel is 87 percent (suggesting an average inefficiency of 13 percent) and, assuming VRS, the average is 90 percent (suggesting an average inefficiency of 10 percent). There is small variation in VRS results, as expected (Kirjavainen and Loikkanen, 1998).

Interestingly, under both CRS and VRS assumptions, the average efficiency scores for the sample has declined and the variation has increased every year, suggesting that school districts actually became less efficient with more variation in the level of efficiency among districts throughout 1996-1999 academic years.

### 5.4.2 Tobit Regression Model

Tobit regressions are computed using the LIMDEP 7.0 software, which allows for the existence of heteroscedasticity in the model. All the explanatory variables in equation (4.10) as well as the independent variable, CRS efficiency, are considered as the possible source of this misspecification. However, CRS efficiency scores and student/teacher ratio and the size of the school districts as measured by ADM are likely sources of heteroscedasticity. Thus, a heteroscedastic Tobit regression with these variables as sources of heteroscedasticity is computed.

To test the heteroscedasticity hypothesis, a likelihood ratio test is employed:
$\mathrm{H}_{0}$ : Homoscedasticity
$\mathrm{H}_{1}$ : At least one of the variables is a source of heteroscedasticity.
The test statistic:
$\lambda=-2\left[\log \left(\right.\right.$ likelihood $\left.H_{0}\right)-\log \left(\right.$ likelihood $\left.\left.H_{1}\right)\right] \sim \chi_{J}^{2}$
where J equals the number of variables considered as a potential source of
heteroscedasticity $(\mathrm{J}=3) \lambda=-2[902.5622-929.997]=54.86 \sim \chi_{3}^{2}$
suggests that $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ should be rejected (critical $\chi_{3}^{2}=7.814$ at $\alpha=.05$ ), therefore, there is substantial evidence that at least one of the variables explains the existence of heteroscedasticity in the Tobit regression.

The Tobit coefficient estimates, computed under the assumptions of homoscedastic and heteroscedastic error terms in the model, are presented in Table 5.19.

Table 5.19
Tobit Coefficient Estimates of the Efficiency Model
Dependent Variable: Efficiency Estimates from the First-Stage DEA CRS Model

|  | Homoscedastic |  | Heteroscedastic |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Variable | Coefficient | t-statistic | Coefficient | t-statistic |
| Constant | .666951 | 7.584 | .726393 | 8.830 |
| SALARY | -.000005 | -1.829 | .099482 | -1.433 |
| DEG | .089591 | 4.091 | .099482 | 4.580 |
| YRSEXP | .003067 | 4.126 | .002656 | 3.900 |
| STR | .018588 | 12.985 | .013556 | 9.057 |
| ADM | -.000035 | -.174 | .000008 | .048 |
| ADM $^{2}$ | -.000000 | -.160 | -.000000 | -.488 |

In both models, DEG, YRSEXP, and STR have statistically significant positive effect on efficiency and the effect of SALARY, ADM, and $\mathrm{ADM}^{2}$ are all negligible. To determine
the magnitude of these effects, the marginal effects of the explanatory variables for heteroscedastic Tobit is computed and presented in Table 5.20.

Table 5.20
Tobit Slope (Marginal Effect) Estimates of the Efficiency Model

| Variable | Slope | t-statistic |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Constant | 6.52323 | 7.538 |
| SALARY | -.000003 | -1.432 |
| DEG | .089337 | 4.305 |
| YRSEXP | .002385 | 3.803 |
| STR | .020637 | 5.607 |
| ADM | .000292 | 1.386 |
| ADM $^{2}$ | -.000000 | -.489 |

The effects of teachers salary and the size of school districts are insignificant. For one unit increase in each, teachers holding advanced degrees, teachers years of experience, and student/teacher ratio, the efficiency will improve by $.08, .002$, and .02 , respectively.

### 5.5 DEA vs. SFR

In order to compare the Stochastic Frontier Regression (SFR) and the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) models, the data set on Oklahoma school districts is used in several different ways to facilitate the comparison between the results from these models.

To begin with, the four output categories are used directly in the DEA model. SFR does not allow for multiple outputs. Thus, for comparison purposes, the dependent variable in SFR is computed as the logarithm of the average of all the test scores in the panel. The results of the SFR model is presented in Table 5.21.

Table 5.21
Maximum-Likelihood Estimates for Parameters of Stochastic Production Frontier and Inefficiency Models for Oklahoma School Districts (Panel Data Model)
Dependent Variable: In (Average of all Test Scores)

| Variable | Standard |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Parameter | Coefficient | Error | t-ratio |
| Stochastic Production |  |  |  |  |
| Frontier |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | $\beta_{0}$ | -12.69181 | 1.15505 | -10.98811 |
| MIN | $\beta_{1}$ | -0.14036 | 0.01719 | -8.16405 |
| LUNCH | $\beta_{2}$ | -0.30118 | 0.01928 | -15.62106 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{I})$ | $\beta_{3}$ | 1.95900 | 0.66211 | 2.95871 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{O})$ | $\beta_{4}$ | 2.24843 | 0.65266 | 3.44504 |
| $[\ln (\mathrm{I})]^{2}$ | $\beta_{5}$ | 0.15694 | 0.08202 | 1.91335 |
| $[\ln (0)]^{2}$ | $\beta_{6}$ | 0.15582 | 0.05031 | 3.09743 |
| $\ln (\mathrm{I}) \ln (\mathrm{O})$ | $\beta_{7}$ | -0.57053 | 0.11323 | -5.03870 |
| DUM1 | $\beta_{8}$ | 0.04144 | 0.00721 | 5.74854 |
| DUM2 | $\beta_{9}$ | 0.03146 | 0.00588 | 5.34921 |
| Inefficiency Equation |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | $\delta_{0}$ | 0.55581 | 0.17862 | 3.11170 |
| *SALARY | $\delta_{1}$ | -0.20812 | 0.06965 | -2.98807 |
| YRSEXP | $\delta_{2}$ | -0.45472 | 0.08305 | -5.47490 |
| DEG | $\delta_{3}$ | 0.00148 | 0.00214 | 0.69187 |
| *ADM | $\delta_{4}$ | -0.00908 | 0.00240 | -3.78644 |
| * $\mathrm{ADM}^{2}$ | $\delta_{5}$ | 0.00223 | 0.00058 | 3.86501 |
| STR | $\delta_{6}$ | 0.01119 | 0.00448 | 2.49717 |
| Variance Parameters |  | 0.16949 | 0.00247 | 6.85311 |
|  | $\gamma=\frac{\sigma_{U}^{2}}{\sigma_{U}^{2}+\sigma_{V}^{2}}$ | 0.84875 | 0.02975 | 28.52959 |
| Log Likelihood Function |  | 127.39500 |  |  |
| LR test of the one-sided error |  |  |  |  |
| $\left(\mathrm{H}_{0}: \gamma=0\right)$ |  | 187.34200 |  |  |
| number of restrictions |  | 8 |  |  |
| *Variable is scaled: <br> SALARY is SALARY/1,000 <br> ADM is ADM/ 100 <br> $\mathrm{ADM}^{2}$ is $\mathrm{ADM}^{2} / 1,000,000$ |  |  |  |  |

The rankings of the school districts generated by the DEA CRS and SFR efficiency estimation are computed. The Spearman rank correlation between the two models is computed to be 6 .

To see whether or not a different functional form would affect the computation of the efficiency scores for the SFR model, a Cobb-Douglas SFR is estimated. The efficiency scores for SFR under translog and Cobb-Douglas specification are almost identical. Therefore, subsequent analysis is based on the results of SFR with translog specification.

Furthermore, the SFR and DEA CRS models are estimated cross-sectionally for each grade and each year of the 3-year period under study. In order to examine the effect of technological changes over the years under study, the panel data for each grade is estimated under both SFR and DEA models.

Thus, 12 different cross-section SFR and DEA CRS $(\mathrm{N}=366)$ and 4 panel $(\mathrm{N}=$ 1098) are estimated to obtain the efficiency scores under each model. To obtain the correlation between the results of the two models, school districts are ranked based on their efficiency scores and Spearman Correlation between these rankings are computed. The results are presented in Table 5.22.

Table 5.22
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients of DEA CRS and SFR Efficiency Scores

| Grade | $\mathbf{1 9 9 6 - 1 9 9 7}$ | $\mathbf{1 9 9 7 - 1 9 9 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 9 9 8 - 1 9 9 9}$ | Panel |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 3 | .82 | .85 | .77 | .80 |
| 7 | .79 | .86 | .82 | .82 |
| 8 | .72 | .70 | .79 | .76 |
| 11 | .87 | .81 | .80 | .80 |

These results suggest that the efficiency rankings generated by both models are generally similar for the cross-sections as well as the panels which suggests that sample size and technological changes do not seem to have a strong influence on the efficiency ranking.

To compare and examine the effects of the explanatory variables in equation (4.10) on the efficiency, the parameter estimates of SFR and heteroscedastic Tobit are compared.

Recall that for SFR, equation (4.5) has inefficiency as the dependent variable, while in DEA second stage Tobit regression the dependent variable is efficiency rather than inefficiency. Thus, in order to simplify the comparison between the two models, the signs of the SFR parameter estimates are inverted. The results for both models are presented in Table 5.23.

Table 5.23
Parameter Estimates; Dependent Variable: Efficiency Estimates

|  | SFR |  | DEA-Tobit Heteroscedastic <br> Coefficient |  |
| :--- | :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | Coefficient | t-ratio | (-ratio |  |
| Constant | -.5558 | -3.1117 | .72639 | 8.830 |
| SALARY | .2081 | 2.988 | -.000004 | -1.433 |
| YRSEXP | .4547 | 5.4749 | .002656 | 3.900 |
| DEG | -.0014 | -.69187 | .099482 | 4.580 |
| ADM | .0090 | 3.7864 | .000008 | .048 |
| ADM $^{2}$ | -.0022 | -3.865 | -.000080 | -.488 |
| STR | -.01119 | -2.497 | .013556 | 9.057 |

According to the results from Table 5.23, the DEA and SFR models suggest teachers' years of experience and the size of the school districts measured by ADM have a positive effect on efficiency. However, the effect of ADM in the DEA model is not statistically significant. As for the effect of teachers' salary on efficiency, SFR suggests a positive and significant effect vs. DEA suggests the opposite.

Teachers holding advanced degrees, according to the DEA model, affect efficiency positively and statistically significant where SFR suggests just the opposite. With respect to the student/teacher ratio, the effect on efficiency is positive and significant in the DEA model and negative and significant in the SFR model.

One possible reason for a lower correlation between the multiple output DEA and SFR models, as well as differences in Table 5.23 , could be the fact that SFR simply does not allow for multiple outputs. Thus, taking the average of all outputs to overcome this restriction may not be appropriate.

Therefore, in the case of multiple outputs, DEA models with second stage Tobit regression may be more reliable to explain the efficiency differences among school districts. The efficiency rankings based on SFR and first-stage DEA CRS for multiple output panel and single output panel data for the third grade are presented in Appendix I.

## CHAPTER VI

## DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS

### 6.1 Model I Specification

In this section a variant of the DEA model where the output measures are expanded is used to achieve a more robust result. The model is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\text { Score }_{i \mathrm{it}}=f\left(\mathrm{YRSEXP}_{\mathrm{it}}, \mathrm{DEG}_{\mathrm{it}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{it}}, \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{it}}\right) \tag{6.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where output score includes all the measures in Chapter V, IT3, IT7, CRT8, and CRT11, plus:

CRT5 Average CRT scores for grade 5
ACT Average ACT scores for all seniors in the district.
Other measures of performance for high school may be of interest. However, the available data on these measures are not consistently measured. For example, graduation rate is not measured adequately. According to Profiles (1998, p. xxvi) District Report, since Oklahoma does not have a statewide student identification system to monitor student migration, the graduation rate could be understated or overstated for all districts in the state. The average GPA of high school seniors has no uniform measure of grading; also, advanced placement (AP) participation rate and AP tests scoring college credit, suffer from an inadequate number of observations.

Another interesting measure of performance is Oklahoma college freshmen taking at least one remedial course. However, observations are not consistently measured for the years under this study (1996-1999).

Following Kirjavainen (1998), teacher's education (DEG) and experience (YRSEXP) are included in the model as inputs. According to Kirjavainen, in statistical analysis teacher's education and experience are rarely found to have an impact on student achievement. However, they could affect efficiency distribution and efficiency ranking even though they are not traditional inputs. Instructional and noninstructional expenditures, I and O, respectively are the traditional inputs in the model.

### 6.1.1 DEA Estimation

The model in equation (6.1) is estimated using the DEA method for the panel data (1996-1999). Thus the number of observations for the panel is $\mathrm{N}=1062$. Given the nature of the production frontier function in this study, i.e., multiple outputs, multiple inputs, etc. DEA is better suited for estimation of efficiencies than SFR (Coelli, 1998; Kirjavainen, et al., 1998). The DEA will yield estimates of district efficiencies than can subsequently be modeled as functions of other district characteristics.

### 6.1.2 Tobit Model

The differences in efficiency scores of school districts generated by DEA could be explained by some variables not included in the DEA analysis (e.g., environmental variables). Efficiency may also be affected by the scale of operation (e.g., district size). In general, exogenous factors that affect output are built into the measure of technical efficiency (Kumbhakar, et al., 1991).

A linear model that accounts for these nontraditional inputs is:

$$
\begin{align*}
& \mathrm{EFF}_{\mathrm{it}}=\alpha_{0}+\mathrm{MIN}_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{1}+\mathrm{LUNCH}_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{2}+\mathrm{HHINCOME}_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{3}+\text { PVALUATION }_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{4}+ \\
& \text { POVERTY}_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{5}+\text { DEGADULTS }_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{6}+\mathrm{SED}_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{7}+\operatorname{SALARY}_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{8}+\mathrm{ADM}_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{9}+ \\
& \text { ADM }_{\mathrm{it}}^{2} \alpha_{10}+\mathrm{STR}_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{11}+\mathrm{e}_{\mathrm{it}} \tag{6.2}
\end{align*}
$$

where:
EFF is the efficiency score generated by DEA
MIN is as described in Chapter III
LUNCH is as described in Chapter III
HHINCOME is Average Household Income (1990) (\$)
PVALUATION is assessed value of property within the boundaries of the district per student (\$)

POVERTY is Poverty Rate (1990)
DEGADULTS is percentage of adults age 20+ with education beyond high school diploma (1990)

SED is percentage of students in special education

SALARY is as described in Chapter III
ADM is as described in Chapter III
$\mathrm{ADM}^{2} \quad$ is as described in Chapter III
STR is as described in Chapter III
e
is a random error term
With the exception of SALARY, ADM and STR that are exogenous factors which affect output, the remainder of the variables in the efficiency equation are socioeconomic variables and are outside the control of the school districts. These variables are proxies
for family influences. Elimination of dependent districts along with the availability of data results in 354 observations for each of the years in the study. Summary statistics for various years under study are presented in Tables 6.1-6.4

Table 6.1
Summary Statistics for Oklahoma School Districts 1996-1997

| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | Minimum | Maximum |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| MIN | 0.26537 | 0.16403 | 0.00000 | 0.98749 |
| SED | 0.11899 | 0.02888 | 0.03974 | 0.21684 |
| LUNCH | 0.49013 | 0.15790 | 0.04477 | 1.00 |
| FTE | 89.61236 | 199.25301 | 13.01000 | 2096.88100 |
| STR | 15.98945 | 2.19718 | 8.76589 | 21.97037 |
| SALARY | 30451.65520 | 982.65798 | 27819.10720 | 35332.95750 |
| DEG | 0.33534 | 0.13530 | 0.04890 | 0.78470 |
| YRSEXP | 20.40876 | 3.63724 | 8.50000 | 30.66670 |
| I | 2874.74186 | 453.55734 | 2090.59046 | 5354.80683 |
| O | 1820.17738 | 456.82875 | 1099.57657 | 5242.41826 |
| IT3 | 61.96328 | 9.44381 | 33.00000 | 92.00000 |
| CRT5 | 53.87571 | 5.42624 | 30.66667 | 66.66667 |
| IT7 | 55.59605 | 7.98356 | 32.00000 | 79.00000 |
| CRT8 | 52.62100 | 5.33220 | 34.66667 | 65.00000 |
| CRT11 | 73.63319 | 8.54481 | 42.20000 | 94.25000 |
| DROPRATE | 0.04049 | 0.03004 | 0.00000 | 0.15780 |
| ACT | 19.70480 | 1.40683 | 15.40000 | 23.50000 |
| ADM | 1582.49590 | 3830.25520 | 157.27000 | 41196.32000 |

Table 6.2
Summary Statistics for Oklahoma School Districts 1997-1998

| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | Minimum | Maximum |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| MIN | 0.26958 | 0.16377 | 0.00000 | 0.99530 |
| SED | 0.12191 | 0.03083 | 0.04969 | 0.25809 |
| LUNCH | 0.51488 | 0.16116 | 0.04668 | 0.84213 |
| FTE | 89.61380 | 197.19582 | 13.43000 | 2106.71755 |
| STR | 16.01358 | 2.20429 | 8.61200 | 21.44213 |
| SALARY | 29704.06090 | 1070.71722 | 27119.53570 | 34067.73720 |
| DEG | 0.33048 | 0.13191 | 0.03968 | 0.78571 |
| YRSEXP | 12.67952 | 2.05703 | 5.83011 | 19.21429 |
| I | 3013.66509 | 502.57997 | 2186.20878 | 6167.84176 |
| O | 1922.65997 | 454.78303 | 1185.43086 | 5029.66495 |
| IT3 | 62.30508 | 9.98143 | 35.00000 | 91.00000 |
| CRT5 | 66.18456 | 7.50435 | 40.50000 | 83.33333 |
| IT7 | 55.24576 | 8.39864 | 30.00000 | 75.00000 |
| CRT8 | 61.33192 | 7.40468 | 39.16667 | 82.16667 |
| CRT11 | 71.73898 | 9.67590 | 29.00000 | 93.60000 |
| DROPRATE | 0.04083 | 0.02762 | 0.00000 | 0.15090 |
| ACT | 20.01855 | 1.39185 | 16.00000 | 23.70000 |
| ADM | 1591.40328 | 3828.05241 | 161.01000 | 41309.39000 |

Table 6.3
Summary Statistics for Oklahoma School Districts 1998-1999

| Variable | Mean | Std.Dev. | Minimum | Maximum |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| MIN | 0.27816 | 0.16532 | 0.00000 | 0.99820 |
| SED | 0.12717 | 0.03099 | 0.06536 | 0.26357 |
| LUNCH | 0.52477 | 0.16158 | 0.04544 | 0.90961 |
| FTE | 91.08316 | 202.66391 | 13.00000 | 2165.05590 |
| STR | 16.02215 | 2.11174 | 8.16278 | 20.79424 |
| SALARY | 30147.39220 | 1058.27137 | 27634.59590 | 33844.86490 |
| DEG | 0.31351 | 0.12963 | 0.03687 | 0.80621 |
| YRSEXP | 12.74271 | 2.04143 | 5.89998 | 17.88462 |
| I | 3142.63675 | 564.11693 | 2249.14232 | 6310.27679 |
| O | 2000.65208 | 467.58847 | 1321.99328 | 4680.62600 |
| IT3 | 62.54237 | 9.89031 | 35.00000 | 93.00000 |
| CRT5 | 76.02024 | 9.88747 | 36.66667 | 100.00000 |
| IT7 | 56.26271 | 8.18043 | 31.00000 | 85.00000 |
| CRT8 | 70.03955 | 8.94987 | 36.66667 | 93.00000 |
| CRT11 | 64.77475 | 9.08113 | 40.28571 | 93.00000 |
| DROPRATE | 0.04078 | 0.02952 | 0.00000 | 0.15410 |
| ACT | 19.91385 | 1.37204 | 15.63000 | 23.51000 |
| ADM | 1598.49167 | 3831.98743 | 148.53000 | 41471.46000 |

Table 6.4
Summary Statistics for Oklahoma School Districts 1996-1999

| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | Minimum | Maximum |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| MIN | 0.27104 | 0.16430 | 0.00000 | 0.99820 |
| HHINCOME | 21313.03960 | 5753.18331 | 10833.00000 | 45790.00000 |
| PVALUATION | 19982.70710 | 14535.03490 | 3639.00000 | 172102.57900 |
| POVERTY | 0.18851 | 0.07467 | 0.03320 | 0.41180 |
| DEGADULTS | 0.11420 | 0.05580 | 0.02290 | 0.40100 |
| SED | 0.12269 | 0.03041 | 0.03974 | 0.26357 |
| LUNCH | .50993 | 0.16073 | .04477 | 1.00 |
| FTE | 90.10311 | 199.52986 | 13.00000 | 2165.05590 |
| STR | 16.00839 | 2.16948 | 8.16278 | 21.97037 |
| SALARY | 30101.03610 | 1081.48607 | 27119.53570 | 35332.95750 |
| DEG | 0.32644 | 0.13251 | 0.03687 | 0.80621 |
| YRSEXP | 15.27700 | 4.51403 | 5.83011 | 30.66670 |
| I | 3010.34790 | 519.93564 | 2090.59046 | 6310.27679 |
| O | 1914.49647 | 465.24712 | 1099.57657 | 5242.41826 |
| IT3 | 62.27024 | 9.76836 | 33.00000 | 93.00000 |
| CRT5 | 65.36017 | 11.96686 | 30.66667 | 100.00000 |
| IT7 | 55.70151 | 8.19245 | 30.00000 | 85.00000 |
| CRT8 | 61.33082 | 10.24532 | 34.66667 | 93.00000 |
| CRT11 | 70.04898 | 9.86907 | 29.00000 | 94.25000 |
| DROPRATE | 0.04070 | 0.02905 | 0.00000 | 0.15780 |
| ACT | 19.87907 | 1.39512 | 15.40000 | 23.70000 |
| ADM | 1590.79695 | 3826.49269 | 148.53000 | 41471.46000 |

Comparison of Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 suggests that for the years under study MIN, SED, and LUNCH have been increasing. The increase in LUNCH could possibly be due to lower household income. However, the data on household income for each
year is not available, thus the relationship cannot be confirmed. Another possibility for the increase in LUNCH is that more eligible students actually applied for assistance.

SALARY, DEG and YRSEXP have declined over time. Since SALARY is determined based on teachers' degree and experience, it is reasonable to expect these variables to move in the same direction. However, the sharp decline in YRSEXP from 20 years in 1996-1997 to almost 13 years in 1997-1998 could possibly be due to retirement of a group of highly experienced teachers.

Except for CRT11 which has declined every year, all other outputs as measured by test scores, have been increasing. The increase in test scores is especially noticeable in CRT5 and CRT8. However, CRTs are renormed every year. Thus, it is difficult to explain the differences in the performance of Oklahoma schools over time. Since district efficiency is necessarily a value between 0 and 1 , a Tobit model is used to estimate the parameters. The variable, efficiency, is truncated from below at 0 and from above by 1. This also ensures that predictions from the model will lie in this interval.

### 6.2 Results

### 6.2.1 DEA

The results of the DEA estimation are obtained using DEAP(2.1) software developed by T. J. Coelli and are presented in Table 6.5. The table contains basic information on the distribution of efficiency scores generated by DEA under constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale (VRS) assumptions. In DEA, under VRS assumption, the possibility of scale of operation is considered and the efficiency measures are affected by it.

Table 6.5
Summary Statistics for DEA Efficiency Scores, Model I (Panel)

|  | CRS | VRS |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Mean | .82155 | .91076 |
| SD | .10845 | .06146 |
| Minimum | .436 | .706 |
| Maximum | 1 | 1 |

Efficiency differences among school districts under both CRS and VRS assumptions are quite considerable. The mean efficiency of 82 percent under the CRS assumption suggests an average inefficiency of 18 percent.

To investigate the number of school districts that fall within certain efficiency intervals, frequencies of school districts are grouped based on their efficiency scores. These frequencies are presented in Table 6.6.

Table 6.6
Frequencies of School Districts in Classes Based on Efficiency Scores of the DEA Model I (Panel)

|  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Efficiency Class (Range) | CRS | VRS | CRS | VRS | CRS | VRS |
| <. 5 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| . $5-<.7$ | 55 | 0 | 49 | 0 | 48 | 0 |
| . $7-$ - 9 | 224 | 186 | 214 | 161 | 202 | 131 |
| .9-1 | 73 | 168 | 90 | 192 | 102 | 222 |

Table 6.6 suggests that school districts have become more efficient each year under both CRS and VRS assumptions. Even so, in the 1998-1999 school year, only 102 districts have efficiency estimates of .9 and above under the CRS assumption.

### 6.2.2 Tobit Regression

In the second stage, the efficiency scores generated from CRS DEA for 19961999 are regressed on the right-hand side variables in equation (6.2) by the Tobit regression method, using LIMDEP (7.0) software. In equation (6.2) school size and student/teacher ratio are explanatory variables that explain the effect of non-optimal scale of operation, if any, on the efficiency differences obtained under the CRS assumption (Kirjavainen et al., 1998, p. 388).

The possibility of existence of heteroscedasticity in the second stage is considered. Using the "Tobit Heterscedasticity" option in LIMDEP allows one to consider variables that may be the source of this misspecification error. All the explanatory variables as well as the dependent variable in equation (6.2) are considered. Except for DEGADULTS, LUNCH, and SALARY; all coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 percent level and are likely sources of heteroscedasticity. To test this hypothesis, the likelihood ratio test for heteroscedasticity is performed:
$\mathrm{H}_{0}$ : homoscedasticity
$\mathrm{H}_{1}$ : at least one of the variables is a source of heteroscedasticity
The computed likelihood ratio is:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \lambda=-2\left[\log \left(\text { likelihood } H_{0}\right)-\log \left(\text { likelihood } H_{1}\right)\right] \sim \chi_{J}^{2} \\
& \lambda=-2[1017.326-1115.880]=197.108 \sim \chi_{11}^{2}
\end{aligned}
$$

This ratio suggests that $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ should be rejected (critical $\chi_{11}^{2}=19.675$ at $\alpha=.05$ ), therefore there is substantial evidence that at least one of the variables "explain" the existence of heteroscedasticity in the Tobit regression.

The results of Tobit regression under the assumption of homoscedasticity and heteroscedasticity are presented in Table 6.7.

Table 6.7
Tobit Regression Coefficient Estimates of the Efficiency Model I Dependent Variable: Efficiency Estimates from the First-Stage DEA Model under CRS Assumption (Panel)

|  | Homoscedastic |  | Heteroscedastic |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Variable | Coefficient | t-statistic | Coefficient | t-statistic |
| Constant | 1.468993 | 16.729 | 1.347191 | 15.554 |
| MIN | -.124989 | -6.306 | -.148579 | -8.543 |
| LUNCH | -.106253 | -3.728 | -.140669 | -5.474 |
| HHINCOME | .000002 | 2.618 | .000002 | 2.717 |
| PVALUATION | -.000000 | -2.941 | -.000001 | -3.926 |
| POVERTY | -.175100 | -2.656 | -.103581 | -1.665 |
| DEGADULTS | .179362 | 2.89 | .222383 | 4.362 |
| SED | -.134157 | -1.549 | -.363291 | -4.111 |
| SALARY | -.000028 | -11.003 | -.000022 | -9.252 |
| ADM | -.000008 | -3.977 | -.000002 | -2.154 |
| ADM ${ }^{2}$ | .000000 | 3.094 | .000000 | 1.76 |
| STR | .017379 | 10.584 | .015819 | 10.386 |

The comparison of the results of the two models in Table 6.7 suggests that under the assumption of homoscedasticity the coefficient of all variables, except for SED, are statistically significant. However, when heteroscedasticity is considered, SED becomes statistically significant also, but POVERTY and $\mathrm{ADM}^{2}$ become statistically insignificant.

Based on the heteroscedastic Tobit regression results in Table 6.7, except for the assessed property value per student (PVALUATION), all of the coefficients of environmental variables over which school districts have no control, have the correct sign and, except for POVERTY, are statistically significant. One possible reason for the negative sign on PVALUATION is that it includes all types of commercial as well as residential properties in the school districts. Therefore, districts with high property
valuation could potentially have low income families. These results are consistent with previous studies which suggest that school districts heavily populated by students from a less advantage family environment are more likely to be less efficient (Adkins and Moomaw, 1997). The effect of the remaining variables in the second stage on the efficiency is as follows:

First, the size of the school districts as measured by ADM has a negative effect on efficiency; second, the student/teacher ratio has a positive relationship with efficiency; and finally, the effect of teachers salary on efficiency is negative.

To assess the magnitude of the effect of the explanatory variables on efficiency, the marginal effects of these variables under the assumption of heteroscedasticity is computed and presented in Table 6.8.

Table 6.8
Tobit Slope (Marginal Effect) Estimates of the Efficiency Model I

| Variable | Slope | t-statistic |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Constant | 1.343758 | 14.668 |
| MIN | -.155574 | -9.246 |
| LUNCH | -.145606 | -6.076 |
| HHINCOME | .000002 | 3.286 |
| PVALUATION | -.000001 | -4.395 |
| POVERTY | -.077231 | -1.256 |
| DEGADULTS | .235664 | 4.629 |
| SED | -.409743 | -4.713 |
| SALARY | -.000023 | -9.360 |
| ADM | -.000002 | 1.700 |
| ADM | .000000 | 1.755 |
| STR | .016689 | 10.893 |

The results of table 6.8 suggest that a one percent increase in MIN, LUNCH, and SED decreases the efficiency by almost $.16, .15$, and .41 , respectively. A one unit increase in DEGADULTS and STR increases efficiency by almost .24 and .01 ,
respectively. The effects of HHINCOME, POVERTY, and SALARY on efficiency are not significantly different from zero. Also, school district size (ADM) does not seem to have a significant effect on efficiency, which is consistent with Kirjavainen, et al. (1998).

### 6.3 Model II Specification

In the first stage, model II includes the traditional inputs only:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\text { Score }_{\mathrm{it}}=f\left(\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{it}}, \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{it}}\right) \tag{6.3}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where outputs; score, and inputs; I, O are as defined in equation (6.1). YRSEXP and DEG are included in the second stage. The model is estimated using DEA in the first stage and the Tobit regression method in the second stage.

### 6.3.1 Results

The results of the DEA estimation are presented in Table 6.9. The table contains the basic information on the distribution of the efficiency scores generated by DEA under CRS and VRS assumptions.

Table 6.9
Summary Statistics for DEA Efficiency Scores, Model II (Panel)

|  | CRS | VRS |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Mean | .75133 | .88691 |
| SD | .11801 | .06065 |
| Minimum | .332 | .677 |
| Maximum | 1 | 1 |

Efficiency differences among school districts under both CRS and VRS assumptions are quite considerable. The mean efficiency of 75 percent under the CRS assumption
suggests an average inefficiency of 25 percent and under the VRS assumption the average efficiency of almost 89 percent suggests an average inefficiency of 11 percent.

The efficiency equation estimated in the second stage using the Tobit regression method is equation (6.2) including YRSEXP and DEG as explanatory variables:
$\mathrm{EFF}_{\mathrm{it}}=\alpha_{0}+\mathrm{MIN}_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{1}+\mathrm{LUNCH}_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{2}+\operatorname{HHINCOME}_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{3}+$ PVALUATION $_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{4}+$ POVERTY $_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{5}+$ DEGADULTS $_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{6}+$ SED $_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{7}+\operatorname{SALARY}_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{8}+$ ADM $_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{9}+$ ADM $_{\mathrm{it}}^{2} \alpha_{10}$ + STR $_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{11}+\operatorname{YRSEXP}_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{12}+$ DEG $_{\mathrm{it}} \alpha_{13}+\mathrm{e}_{\mathrm{it}}$

The possibility of the existence of heteroscedasticity in the second stage was also considered. The dependent variable as well as all the explanatory variables in equation (6.4) are considered as the possible source of this misspecification. Except for SALARY, YRSEXP, and DEG all of the variables are likely sources of heteroscedasticity. To test this hypothesis a likelihood ratio test is performed:
$\mathrm{H}_{0}$ : homoscedasticity
$\mathrm{H}_{1}$ : at least one of the variables is a source of heteroscedasticity
The test statistic:

$$
\lambda=-2\left[\log \left(\text { likelihood } H_{0}\right)-\log \left(\text { likelihood } H_{1}\right)\right] \sim \chi_{J}^{2}
$$

where $J$ equals the number of variables considered as a potential source of heteroscedasticity $(\mathrm{J}=10)$

$$
\lambda=-2[1283.976-1336.689]=105.426 \sim \chi_{10}^{2}
$$

suggests that $\mathrm{H}_{0}$ should be rejected (critical $\sim \chi_{10}^{2}=18.307$ at $\alpha=.05$ ), therefore, there is substantial evidence that at least one of the variables "explain" the existence of heteroscedasticity in the Tobit regression.

The Tobit coefficient estimates computed under the assumption of homoscedastic and heteroscedastic error terms in the model are computed and presented in Table 6.10.

Table. 6.10
Tobit Regression Coefficient Estimates of the Efficiency Model II
Dependent Variable: Efficiency Estimates from the First Stage DEA Model under CRS Assumption (Panel)

|  | Homoscedastic |  | Heteroscedastic |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Variable | Coefficient | t-statistic | Coefficient | t-statistic |
| Constant | .709585 | 9.143 | .810359 | 10.048 |
| MIN | -.082703 | -4.859 | -.098662 | -5.748 |
| LUNCH | -.206432 | -8.373 | -.225267 | -10.036 |
| HHINCOME | .000002 | 2.207 | .000001 | 1.753 |
| PVALUATION | -.000002 | -8.209 | -.000002 | -8.040 |
| POVERTY | -.117564 | -2.079 | -.133885 | -2.415 |
| DEGADULTS | .304638 | 5.377 | .331352 | 7.313 |
| SED | -.24076 | -3.231 | -.292922 | -3.734 |
| SALARY | -.000005 | -2.265 | -.000006 | -2.354 |
| ADM | -.000008 | -1.977 | -.000002 | -.592 |
| ADM ${ }^{2}$ | -.000000 | 1.153 | .000000 | .314 |
| STR | .023476 | 16.512 | .019400 | 14.219 |
| YRSEXP | -.001703 | -3.258 | -.001514 | -3.096 |
| DEG | .000223 | 1.165 | .000034 | .259 |

The results in Table 6.10 suggest that under both assumptions, MIN, LUNCH, POVERTY, DEGADULTS, SED, and STR are the only variables where their effects on efficiency are significantly different from zero. To examine the magnitude of the effects, the marginal effects of these variables on efficiency, based on the heteroscedastic Tobit model, are computed and presented in Table 6.11.

Table 6.11
Tobit Slope (Marginal Effect) Estimates of the Efficiency Model II

| Variable | Slope | t-statistic |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Constant | .8103364 | 10.048 |
| MIN | -.098816 | -5.766 |
| LUNCH | -.225242 | -10.039 |
| HHINCOME | .000001 | 1.763 |
| PVALUATION | -.000002 | -8.052 |
| POVERTY | -.133537 | -2.411 |
| DEGADULTS | .331766 | 7.328 |
| SED | -.293425 | -3.741 |
| SALARY | -.000006 | -2.354 |
| ADM | -.000002 | -.590 |
| ADM | .000000 | .314 |
| STR | .019410 | 14.243 |
| YRSEXP | -.001514 | -3.096 |
| DEG | .000033 | .259 |

Recall that minority students (MIN), students eligible for reduced or free lunch (LUNCH), poverty rate (POVERTY), students in special education (SED), and adults age $20+$ with education beyond high school diploma (DEGADULTS) are measured in terms of percentages. Thus, the results of Table 6.11 suggest that a one percent increase in each MIN, LUNCH, POVERTY, and SED decreases efficiency by almost $.1, .23, .13$, and .29 , respectively; and a one percent increase in DEGADULTS increases efficiency by almost .33. Also, for each unit increase in student/teacher ratio (STR), efficiency increases by .02. This is consistent with Kirjavainen, et al. (1998).

### 6.4 Conclusion

Comparison of the results of Model I and Model II suggests that the average efficiency scores in Model I are higher than that of Model II. This is expected, as Model I has more variables in the first stage (Kirjavainen, 1998).

As for the second stage Tobit regression results, both models suggest that the environmental variables which school districts have no control over, such as; percentage of minority students (MIN), percentage of students eligible for reduced or free lunch (LUNCH), and percentage of students in special education (SED) have a strong negative effect and percentage of adults age 20+ with education beyond a high school diploma in the household has a strong positive effect on efficiency of the school districts. Variables like teachers' salary (SALARY), teachers' years of experience (YRSEXP), teachers holding advanced degrees (DEG), and school size (ADM) which are under the control of school districts are clearly insignificant in explaining the variation in efficiencies among school districts. The student/teacher ratio affects efficiency positively; however, the relationship is not strong. The optimal school district size as measured by ADM is computed to be around 21,460 in both models.

The efficiency rankings based on DEA CRS for Models I and II as well as the Spearman Rank Correlation coefficient between the two models are computed. The correlation coefficient is .81 , which suggests that there are rather small differences in the efficiency ranking between these two models. The efficiency rankings are presented in Appendix II.

## CHAPTER VII

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The primary objective of this dissertation was to estimate production efficiency of Oklahoma school districts in light of possible empirical specification problems caused by possible structural changes in data collection and by the possible heteroscedasticity in the error term. The existing literature indicates a relatively small number of applications of the stochastic production frontier approach to school districts, none of which considers the existence of heteroscedasticity.

A review of production frontier studies suggests the use of different methods of estimation based on the available data and model specification. The Stochastic Frontier Regression (SFR) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) are the estimators considered in this study.

First, in Chapter V a two equation stochastic production frontier was estimated using both SFR and DEA estimators, and the results are compared to see how robust these methods are. The time period under study consists of a three-year period that encompasses the 1996-97 through the 1998-99 academic school years. In this chapter the data set includes observations on 366 so-called independent (K-12) school districts and the results suggest that:

1. There are varying degrees of technical inefficiency among Oklahoma school districts. Therefore, the average response function (e.g., OLS) cannot adequately represent the production function of Oklahoma school districts. Thus a two-equation stochastic production frontier model is a preferred alternative model. This conclusion is supported on the basis of hypothesis tests that support the notion that inefficiency effects have both systematic and random components.
2. The existence of heteroscedasticity in the data was supported based on hypothesis tests. Although Jacques and Brorsen claim, without providing evidence, that heteroscedasticity in these data exist, they take the position that it is solely a function of the number of tests taken. Results in Chapter V suggest that there are other factors that contribute to heteroscedasticity in the data and that the existence of such misspecification should be checked before proceeding. An attempt to extend the computer program, Frontier 4.1 (Coelli, 1995,) to account for heteroscedasticity was not successful. However a model assuming homoscedastic error was estimated.

The estimation results of the homoscedastic model suggest that the signs of the coefficients of explanatory variables are in general as expected but these estimates may not be robust in the presence of heteroscedasticity. The results from the potentially misspecified homoscedastic production frontier were compared to a heteroscedastic Tobit model estimated from DEA efficiencies and the results are fairly similar. Perhaps the biases created by heteroscedasticity are not very large.
3. In addition to the problem of heteroscedasticity, since the model consists of multiple outputs, the existing literature suggests the use of distance-functions rather than stochastic frontier functions. Thus, the non-parametric approach to estimate efficiency of Oklahoma school districts was employed, i.e., the DEA approach.

DEA is not very useful in answering questions of whether money matters; the production function is not parameterized and it yields no estimates of the various spending elasticities. DEA suffers from a lack of well-known statistical properties. So, a second-stage Tobit regression was employed to explain the effects of variables such as teacher salary (SALARY), teacher years of experience (YRSEXP), teachers holding advanced degree (DEG), size of school district (ADM), and student/teacher ratio (STR) on the efficiency scores generated by the DEA model. Tobit regression is appropriate since the efficiency scores (dependent variable) are between 0 and 1. However, heteroscedasticty was accounted for in the Tobit regression and thus, the coefficient estimates of the so called efficiency variables are found to be in general consistent with expected hypothesis; however, with the exception of two variables, teachers holding advanced degrees and the student/teacher ratio, the effects of other variables on efficiency are not significantly different from zero.
4. It could be argued that these estimates are more reliable than those of past studies, which were based on the average response function, homoscedastic stochastic production frontier, and DEA with second-stage homoscedastic

Tobit regression. Thus, school districts are ranked based on their efficiency estimates computed using SFR and DEA CRS models and are presented in the Appendix.

Second, based on the findings in Chapter V, DEA may be a more appropriate method of estimation given the nature of the data and objectives of the school districts. Thus, Chapter VI is devoted to DEA estimation of more sophisticated specifications.

In Chapter VI the data consisted of 354 independent (K-12) school districts for the three-year period, which are used in various specifications and efficiencies are estimated using DEA. The specification of the model in this chapter include variables not included in the first and/or second stage of the model in Chapter V but seem to affect efficiency measures. Thus, the model considered in this chapter has more output measures in the first stage than the Chapter V model. Also, in the second stage, the efficiency equation, the model includes more explanatory variables which may help explain the efficiency variations among school districts. The analysis of this model also suggests that inefficiency exists among Oklahoma school districts. In the second stage, the Tobit regression model, the efficiency variables included environmental variables that school districts have no control over as well as nontraditional inputs that school districts have control over but were not included in the first stage. Here it seems that environmental variables over which school districts have no control, e.g., percentage of minority students (MIN), percentage of students eligible for reduced or free lunch (LUNCH), the poverty rate in the districts (POVERTY), percentage of students in special education (SED), and percentage of students who have an adult age 20+ with higher than a high school diploma in their household (DEGADULT) are the variables that could
possibly explain the efficiency differences among the school districts. The nontraditional inputs (e.g, teacher salary) do not seem to hold much explanatory power over efficiency except for the student/teacher ratio and even that is not very strong.

Therefore, based on the results of the DEA model in Chapter VI, it may be appropriate to conclude that the key factors affecting efficiency measures among Oklahoma school districts are primarily the students' characteristics and family environment, i.e., students' socioeconomic characteristics. Thus, an increase in spending on education may do very little for improving efficiency.

In conclusion this study, based on the results of both Chapters V and VI, suggests that:

- Variables that are not under the control of school districts seem to affect efficiency.
- The method of estimation affects the results.
- District size effects are consistent in all methods and are around 20,000 . This is also consistent with Adkins and Moomaw's (1997) results.
- Use of cross-section data may be preferred to panel-data.
- Use of new Census data makes the external variables more up to date.
- Since the data seem to be heteroscedastic because of district size as well as other variables (e.g., student/teacher ratio, efficiency scores, etc.). The DEA may be a more appropriate method of estimation. Also, since the available data is at the district level and cannot be disaggregated at the school level, the DEA method is probably a better approach.

Subsequent research could proceed in several different directions. Notably, it may be useful to isolate nontraditional inputs which school districts have control over, from socioeconomic variables over which school districts have no control in the efficiency model (second-stage) to see whether any policy implications can be drawn from these estimations. Also, assuming that proxies for input and output prices can be extracted from the data, estimating a cost function may reveal useful information about the efficiency of the school districts in Oklahoma.

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APPENDIX I

## APPENDIX 1A

Ranking of School Districts by their Efficiency Estimates Generated by the Single Output Model, 3rd Grade ITBS Scores, Using Panel Data

|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | Rank <br> DEA | Rank | Rank <br> DEA | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | Rank DEA |
| ACHILLE | 495 | 172 | 161 | 139 | 118 | 293 | 279 |
| ADA | 2780 | 143 | 120 | 106 | 65 | 260 | 238 |
| ADAIR | 908 | 321 | 263 | 183 | 154 | 93 | 66 |
| AFTON | 446 | 257 | 266 | 118 | 104 | 36 | 40 |
| ALEX | 369 | 250 | 278 | 84 | 169 | 308 | 321 |
| ALINE-CLEO | 217 | 192 | 251 | 8 | 62 | 54 | 132 |
| ALLEN | 413 | 76 | 179 | 29 | 76 | 350 | 343 |
| ALTUS | 4703 | 228 | 186 | 129 | 103 | 159 | 145 |
| ALVA | 1067 | 110 | 220 | 105 | 187 | 174 | 256 |
| AMBER-POCASSET | 452 | 94 | 124 | 41 | 138 | 131 | 175 |
| ANADARKO | 2032 | 324 | 294 | 319 | 294 | 324 | 273 |
| ANTLERS | 1154 | 175 | 108 | 90 | 44 | 96 | 95 |
| ARAPAHO | 294 | 220 | 274 | 219 | 309 | 24 | 108 |
| ARDMORE | 3414 | 114 | 231 | 153 | 220 | 135 | 216 |
| ARKOMA | 476 | 319 | 266 | 343 | 317 | 287 | 267 |
| ARNETT | 186 | 37 | 308 | 16 | 281 | 22 | 313 |
| ASHER | 227 | 365 | 363 | 87 | 157 | 9 | 1 |
| ATOKA | 937 | 171 | 242 | 161 | 206 | 261 | 245 |
| BALKO | 158 | 298 | 359 | 364 | 366 | 365 | 366 |
| BARNSDALL | 479 | 341 | 331 | 323 | 301 | 268 | 211 |
| BARTLESVILLE | 6456 | 109 | 89 | 168 | 146 | 246 | 213 |
| BATTIEST | 351 | 304 | 317 | 355 | 358 | 349 | 353 |
| BEAVER | 413 | 177 | 272 | 314 | 355 | 317 | 338 |
| BEGGS | 966 | 281 | 260 | 291 | 276 | 231 | 201 |
| BENNINGTON | 256 | 77 | 183 | 77 | 132 | 90 | 191 |
| BERRYHILL | 1002 | 134 | 63 | 30 | 13 | 259 | 184 |
| BETHANY | 993 | 138 | 85 | 259 | 157 | 180 | 127 |
| BETHEL | 1027 | 153 | 111 | 230 | 165 | 95 | 63 |
| BIG PASTURE | 266 | 326 | 324 | 286 | 306 | 314 | 326 |
| BILLINGS | 174 | 262 | 302 | 36 | 206 | 217 | 328 |
| BINGER-ONEY | 366 | 208 | 258 | 76 | 189 | 64 | 160 |
| BIXBY | 3113 | 57 | 21 | 191 | 56 | 229 | 75 |
| BLACKWELL | 1713 | 245 | 168 | 316 | 254 | 34 | 26 |
| BLAIR | 372 | 308 | 259 | 361 | 339 | 316 | 181 |
| BLANCHARD | 1197 | 232 | 107 | 210 | 79 | 278 | 201 |
| BLUEJACKET | 257 | 271 | 243 | 104 | 79 | 257 | 153 |
| BOISE CITY | 415 | 200 | 253 | 320 | 336 | 311 | 352 |
| BOKOSHE | 285 | 2 | 1 | 54 | 58 | 30 | 15 |
| BOONE-APACHE | 682 | 164 | 191 | 175 | 194 | 161 | 199 |
| BOSWELL | 443 | 249 | 324 | 206 | 236 | 134 | 143 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \operatorname{Rank} \\ \text { SFR } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ |
| BRAGGS | 257 | 260 | 247 | 328 | 289 | 182 | 122 |
| BRAMAN | 160 | 366 | 366 | 312 | 305 | 366 | 365 |
| BRAY-DOYLE | 441 | 135 | 163 | 276 | 311 | 177 | 263 |
| BRIDGE CREEK | 1031 | 136 | 28 | 279 | 161 | 247 | 121 |
| BRISTOW | 1616 | 117 | 162 | 272 | 278 | 240 | 281 |
| BROKEN ARROW | 14499 | 191 | 71 | 194 | 77 | 202 | 76 |
| BROKEN BOW | 1792 | 277 | 290 | 245 | 247 | 184 | 216 |
| BUFFALO | 354 | 312 | 341 | 162 | 312 | 83 | 291 |
| BUFFALO VALLEY | 242 | 160 | 170 | 321 | 317 | 273 | 197 |
| BURNS FLAT-DILL CITY | 685 | 290 | 326 | 310 | 334 | 309 | 319 |
| BUTNER | 288 | 14 | 34 | 12 | 53 | 2 | 1 |
| BYNG | 1692 | 241 | 235 | 215 | 233 | 352 | 345 |
| CACHE | 1263 | 105 | 122 | 155 | 155 | 223 | 182 |
| CADDO | 410 | 96 | 178 | 197 | 205 | 204 | 160 |
| CALERA | 564 | 201 | 148 | 115 | 110 | 130 | 103 |
| CAMERON | 503 | 274 | 243 | 324 | 283 | 87 | 112 |
| CANADIAN | 403 | 325 | 322 | 224 | 212 | 189 | 230 |
| CANEY VALLEY | 810 | 327 | 281 | 222 | 152 | 346 | 286 |
| CANTON | 480 | 33 | 165 | 180 | 271 | 110 | 245 |
| CANUTE | 267 | 85 | 39 | 198 | 74 | 53 | 56 |
| CARNEGIE | 770 | 331 | 303 | 339 | 325 | 328 | 301 |
| CARNEY | 265 | 328 | 280 | 170 | 198 | 357 | 344 |
| CASHION | 423 | 116 | 61 | 274 | 195 | 322 | 219 |
| CATOOSA | 2362 | 199 | 124 | 237 | 204 | 207 | 180 |
| CEMENT | 275 | 275 | 200 | 186 | 224 | 283 | 305 |
| CENTRAL | 448 | 51 | 80 | 22 | 41 | 89 | 87 |
| CENTRAL HIGH | 353 | 294 | 276 | 352 | 347 | 302 | 290 |
| CHANDLER | 1140 | 247 | 218 | 148 | 135 | 102 | 90 |
| CHATTANOOGA | 294 | 309 | 337 | 211 | 299 | 171 | 271 |
| CHECOTAH | 1628 | 336 | 328 | 296 | 280 | 120 | 144 |
| CHELSEA | 1044 | 210 | 194 | 277 | 244 | 292 | 263 |
| CHEROKEE | 405 | 276 | 124 | 89 | 20 | 103 | 9 |
| CHEYENNE | 282 | 69 | 354 | 218 | 361 | 281 | 363 |
| CHICKASHA | 2980 | 296 | 235 | 295 | 229 | 313 | 260 |
| CHISHOLM | 937 | 70 | 40 | 225 | 159 | 140 | 63 |
| CHOCTAW/NICOMA PARK | 4627 | 99 | 51 | 236 | 163 | 151 | 76 |
| CHOUTEAU-MAZIE | 936 | 311 | 276 | 305 | 270 | 334 | 300 |
| CIMARRON | 368 | 181 | 222 | 142 | 178 | 234 | 225 |
| CLAREMORE | 3632 | 137 | 88 | 165 | 108 | 194 | 142 |
| CLAYTON | 398 | 348 | 353 | 204 | 266 | 354 | 357 |
| CLEVELAND | 1674 | 165 | 165 | 249 | 222 | 270 | 223 |
| CLINTON | 2036 | 349 | 317 | 345 | 322 | 356 | 346 |
| COALGATE | 686 | 347 | 348 | 252 | 248 | 243 | 288 |
| COLBERT | 798 | 287 | 282 | 75 | 92 | 307 | 236 |
| COLCORD | 693 | 103 | 174 | 96 | 165 | 62 | 84 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ |
| COLEMAN | 179 | 63 | 225 | 235 | 283 | 74 | 154 |
| COLLINSVILLE | 1593 | 234 | 139 | 253 | 173 | 232 | 115 |
| COMANCHE | 1036 | 269 | 227 | 333 | 323 | 345 | 322 |
| COMMERCE | 811 | 255 | 200 | 340 | 297 | 82 | 39 |
| COPAN | 452 | 338 | 268 | 359 | 333 | 256 | 145 |
| CORDELL | 693 | 23 | 14 | 228 | 184 | 71 | 44 |
| COVINGTON-DOUGLAS | 335 | 215 | 296 | 273 | 337 | 296 | 329 |
| COWETA | 2454 | 120 | 71 | 109 | 67 | 58 | 25 |
| COYLE | 377 | 71 | 188 | 208 | 292 | 4 | 36 |
| CRESCENT | 640 | 74 | 59 | 166 | 108 | 219 | 138 |
| CROOKED OAK | 820 | 337 | 305 | 121 | 105 | 43 | 32 |
| CROWDER | 513 | 46 | 82 | 160 | 227 | 15 | 65 |
| CUSHING | 2029 | 285 | 349 | 233 | 340 | 255 | 341 |
| CYRIL | 457 | 354 | 315 | 79 | 47 | 185 | 156 |
| DALE | 624 | 209 | 142 | 78 | 53 | 315 | 221 |
| DAVENPORT | 455 | 310 | 283 | 59 | 79 | 70 | 87 |
| DAVIS | 926 | 129 | 154 | 20 | 45 | 20 | 59 |
| DEER CREEK | 1343 | 127 | 49 | 117 | 29 | 112 | 20 |
| DEER CREEK-LAMONT | 258 | 149 | 283 | 203 | 265 | 238 | 316 |
| DEPEW | 416 | 363 | 364 | 265 | 258 | 337 | 327 |
| DEWAR | 442 | 212 | 121 | 354 | 302 | 362 | 256 |
| DEWEY | 1168 | 300 | 215 | 156 | 60 | 266 | 145 |
| DIBBLE | 576 | 256 | 172 | 344 | 327 | 361 | 354 |
| DICKSON | 1111 | 108 | 110 | 4 | 6 | 35 | 35 |
| DOVER | 202 | 154 | 262 | 55 | 239 | 198 | 303 |
| DRUMMOND | 304 | 88 | 67 | 199 | 126 | 197 | 164 |
| DRUMRIGHT | 676 | 340 | 299 | 232 | 214 | 213 | 213 |
| DUKE | 201 | 193 | 208 | 282 | 302 | 209 | 240 |
| DUNCAN | 3882 | 107 | 99 | 130 | 148 | 178 | 182 |
| DURANT | 3015 | 18 | 24 | 17 | 21 | 45 | 58 |
| EDMOND | 16018 | 60 | 32 | 45 | 22 | 47 | 28 |
| EL RENO | 2680 | 82 | 56 | 158 | 134 | 50 | 52 |
| ELGIN | 1200 | 45 | 71 | 132 | 102 | 136 | 69 |
| ELK CITY | 2205 | 259 | 77 | 100 | 14 | 99 | 106 |
| ELMORE CITY-PERNELL | 552 | 283 | 159 | 178 | 106 | 312 | 232 |
| EMPIRE | 545 | 186 | 85 | 348 | 328 | 242 | 190 |
| ENID | 6888 | 133 | 119 | 113 | 86 | 128 | 91 |
| ERICK | 269 | 243 | 330 | 337 | 360 | 251 | 325 |
| EUFAULA | 1130 | 43 | 113 | 125 | 165 | 73 | 100 |
| FAIRLAND | 492 | 278 | 300 | 289 | 222 | 341 | 294 |
| FAIRVIEW | 834 | 29 | 9 | 62 | 17 | 116 | 102 |
| FARGO | 205 | 229 | 313 | 124 | 249 | 104 | 179 |
| FLETCHER | 481 | 118 | 30 | 52 | 6 | 158 | 41 |
| FORT COBB-BROXTON | 430 | 204 | 270 | 85 | 195 | 52 | 150 |
| FORT SUPPLY | 158 | 3 | 1 | 270 | 320 | 60 | 254 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | $\begin{gathered} \text { Rank } \\ \text { SFR } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Rank } \\ \text { SFR } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ |
| FOX | 382 | 13 | 117 | 47 | 140 | 19 | 73 |
| FOYIL | 563 | 299 | 291 | 244 | 209 | 355 | 347 |
| FREDERICK | 1130 | 265 | 264 | 122 | 192 | 330 | 322 |
| FRONTIER | 385 | 226 | 346 | 308 | 363 | 56 | 336 |
| FT GIBSON | 1887 | 27 | 34 | 43 | 33 | 55 | 48 |
| FT TOWSON | 452 | 16 | 66 | 13 | 88 | 14 | 56 |
| GANS | 286 | 364 | 365 | 360 | 359 | 8 | 44 |
| GARBER | 369 | 282 | 278 | 23 | 26 | 66 | 97 |
| GEARY | 415 | 297 | 338 | 363 | 364 | 57 | 208 |
| GLENCOE | 358 | 295 | 310 | 322 | 279 | 144 | 105 |
| GLENPOOL | 2117 | 253 | 226 | 294 | 213 | 310 | 269 |
| GORE | 599 | 34 | 96 | 94 | 175 | 295 | 292 |
| GRANDFIELD | 324 | 345 | 342 | 207 | 183 | 340 | 333 |
| GRANITE | 305 | 22 | 67 | 128 | 229 | 262 | 311 |
| GROVE | 2076 | 86 | 75 | 171 | 144 | 92 | 91 |
| GUTHRIE | 3294 | 102 | 151 | 181 | 179 | 147 | 168 |
| GUYMON | 2053 | 93 | 87 | 110 | 99 | 288 | 281 |
| HAILEYVILLE | 524 | 303 | 294 | 326 | 317 | 285 | 260 |
| HAMMON | 265 | 179 | 320 | 365 | 365 | 29 | 267 |
| HARRAH | 2235 | 125 | 95 | 123 | 96 | 86 | 76 |
| HARTSHORNE | 830 | 28 | 84 | 306 | 297 | 129 | 173 |
| HASKELL | 949 | 344 | 311 | 358 | 353 | 343 | 335 |
| HAWORTH | 614 | 50 | 111 | 311 | 324 | 331 | 317 |
| HEALDTON | 682 | 231 | 159 | 214 | 161 | 248 | 168 |
| HEAVENER | 978 | 173 | 194 | 193 | 242 | 81 | 175 |
| HENNESSEY | 818 | 254 | 228 | 53 | 160 | 233 | 208 |
| HENRYETTA | 1236 | 156 | 128 | 61 | 40 | 111 | 71 |
| HILLDALE | 1561 | 150 | 77 | 69 | 28 | 84 | 41 |
| HINTON | 602 | 19 | 19 | 35 | 29 | 11 | 14 |
| HOBART | 924 | 238 | 247 | 108 | 169 | 254 | 249 |
| HOLDENVILLE | 1235 | 6 | 43 | 66 | 151 | 78 | 156 |
| HOLLIS | 744 | 40 | 26 | 5 | 8 | 5 | 1 |
| HOMINY | 802 | 292 | 273 | 341 | 325 | 344 | 318 |
| HOOKER | 562 | 151 | 233 | 217 | 260 | 160 | 218 |
| HUGO | 1604 | 122 | 144 | 169 | 184 | 69 | 96 |
| HULBERT | 542 | 145 | 103 | 21 | 12 | 211 | 193 |
| HYDRO | 360 | 169 | 100 | 266 | 224 | 332 | 269 |
| IDABEL | 1703 | 342 | 327 | 353 | 342 | 216 | 178 |
| INDIAHOMA | 230 | 264 | 211 | 257 | 285 | 358 | 362 |
| INDIANOLA | 451 | 78 | 183 | 58 | 90 | 253 | 227 |
| INOLA | 1184 | 178 | 97 | 221 | 145 | 220 | 136 |
| JAY | 1716 | 31 | 65 | 83 | 119 | 153 | 149 |
| JENKS | 8812 | 106 | 10 | 157 | 11 | 187 | 31 |
| JONES | 1109 | 49 | 37 | 51 | 49 | 97 | 60 |
| KANSAS | 636 | 225 | 231 | 262 | 220 | 181 | 195 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Rank } \\ \text { SFR } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | Rank SFR | Rank |
| KELLYVILLE | 1208 | 187 | 100 | 338 | 308 | 335 | 287 |
| KEOTA | 506 | 279 | 230 | 14 | 39 | 67 | 98 |
| KETCHUM | 593 | 330 | 312 | 226 | 193 | 276 | 262 |
| KIEFER | 454 | 356 | 256 | 347 | 195 | 214 | 41 |
| KINGFISHER | 1247 | 139 | 82 | 92 | 25 | 139 | 60 |
| KINGSTON | 913 | 343 | 344 | 350 | 354 | 351 | 339 |
| KIOWA | 362 | 176 | 320 | 267 | 307 | 61 | 98 |
| KONAWA | 783 | 167 | 221 | 184 | 237 | 304 | 305 |
| KREMLIN-HILLSDALE | 270 | 339 | 345 | 227 | 289 | 228 | 265 |
| LATTA | 637 | 21 | 27 | 48 | 55 | 10 | 1 |
| LAVERNE | 445 | 61 | 261 | 220 | 295 | 124 | 265 |
| LAWTON | 18298 | 183 | 204 | 164 | 198 | 176 | 223 |
| LE FLORE | 288 | 221 | 175 | 229 | 217 | 286 | 158 |
| LEEDEY | 209 | 119 | 335 | 195 | 338 | 244 | 358 |
| LEXINGTON | 922 | 314 | 247 | 243 | 172 | 305 | 225 |
| LIBERTY | 536 | 288 | 256 | 260 | 217 | 319 | 297 |
| LINDSAY | 1084 | 30 | 1 | 82 | 24 | 201 | 210 |
| LITTLE AXE | 1392 | 7 | 18 | 72 | 93 | 33 | 50 |
| LOCUST GROVE | 1411 | 152 | 60 | 107 | 52 | 267 | 197 |
| LOMEGA | 178 | 98 | 269 | 173 | 244 | 26 | 100 |
| LONE GROVE | 1381 | 162 | 91 | 172 | 82 | 115 | 81 |
| LONE WOLF | 219 | 20 | 61 | 6 | 48 | 28 | 46 |
| LUTHER | 767 | 39 | 44 | 240 | 203 | 323 | 283 |
| MADILL | 1227 | 346 | 305 | 285 | 208 | 318 | 277 |
| MANGUM | 721 | 222 | 117 | 284 | 264 | 348 | 349 |
| MANNFORD | 1471 | 203 | 135 | 200 | 113 | 199 | 124 |
| MARIETTA | 909 | 316 | 188 | 241 | 173 | 277 | 124 |
| MARLOW | 1429 | 163 | 147 | 97 | 64 | 94 | 69 |
| MAUD | 430 | 355 | 350 | 80 | 42 | 329 | 299 |
| MAYSVILLE | 475 | 161 | 151 | 263 | 235 | 284 | 301 |
| MCALESTER | 2868 | 72 | 200 | 95 | 214 | 68 | 199 |
| MCCURTAIN | 242 | 41 | 25 | 127 | 135 | 175 | 173 |
| MCLOUD | 1750 | 168 | 91 | 293 | 209 | 169 | 120 |
| MEDFORD | 329 | 323 | 307 | 143 | 180 | 210 | 329 |
| MEEKER | 885 | 273 | 219 | 231 | 186 | 237 | 132 |
| MERRITT | 457 | 9 | 16 | 34 | 94 | 12 | 47 |
| MIAMI | 2516 | 90 | 50 | 147 | 113 | 173 | 132 |
| MILBURN | 272 | 216 | 175 | 33 | 78 | 236 | 229 |
| MILLWOOD | 1068 | 131 | 1 | 140 | 1 | 245 | 1 |
| MINCO | 529 | 104 | 40 | 189 | 121 | 224 | 160 |
| MOORE | 18082 | 236 | 131 | 192 | 94 | 183 | 76 |
| MOORELAND | 470 | 196 | 211 | 313 | 328 | 156 | 271 |
| MORRIS | 1036 | 148 | 80 | 315 | 253 | 339 | 284 |
| MORRISON | 454 | 26 | 103 | 28 | 65 | 179 | 177 |
| MOSS | 256 | 313 | 328 | 281 | 273 | 250 | 252 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | Rank SFR | Rank DEA | Rank SFR | Rank <br> DEA | Rank SFR | Rank DEA |
| MOUNDS | 706 | 170 | 131 | 234 | 148 | 265 | 205 |
| MOUNTAIN VIEW-GOTEBO | 370 | 132 | 289 | 141 | 312 | 188 | 336 |
| MULDROW | 1492 | 123 | 129 | 146 | 141 | 133 | 112 |
| MULHALL-ORLANDO | 244 | 89 | 234 | 31 | 246 | 168 | 293 |
| MUSKOGEE | 6782 | 190 | 186 | 126 | 180 | 117 | 155 |
| MUSTANG | 6309 | 55 | 15 | 111 | 38 | 85 | 22 |
| MWC/DEL CITY | 15399 | 111 | 98 | 154 | 121 | 126 | 130 |
| NAVAJO | 576 | 56 | 34 | 98 | 61 | 227 | 170 |
| NEW LIMA | 275 | 112 | 197 | 258 | 262 | 206 | 207 |
| NEWCASTLE | 1093 | 244 | 17 | 145 | 4 | 150 | 17 |
| NEWKIRK | . 732 | 362 | 355 | 317 | 269 | 342 | 311 |
| NINNEKAH | 549 | 291 | 240 | 246 | 229 | 363 | 361 |
| NOBLE | 2608 | 258 | 199 | 298 | 249 | 280 | 184 |
| NORMAN | 12492 | 83 | 67 | 91 | 86 | 113 | 83 |
| NOWATA | 1042 | 357 | 340 | 300 | 229 | 289 | 186 |
| OAKS-MISSION | 388 | 12 | 1 | 50 | 17 | 38 | 12 |
| OILTON | 326 | 266 | 283 | 42 | 43 | 41 | 36 |
| OKARCHE | 308 | 268 | 238 | 103 | 98 | 13 | 10 |
| OKAY | 487 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| OKEENE | 371 | 158 | 181 | 177 | 216 | 272 | 319 |
| OKEMAH | 977 | 263 | 158 | 190 | 180 | 258 | 235 |
| OKLA CITY | 38543 | 80 | 52 | 86 | 36 | 101 | 30 |
| OKMULGEE | 2302 | 270 | 286 | 302 | 281 | 299 | 285 |
| OKTAHA | 614 | 44 | 204 | 159 | 252 | 121 | 240 |
| OLIVE | 427 | 280 | 308 | 325 | 332 | 205 | 170 |
| OOLOGAH-TALALA | 1469 | 144 | 113 | 167 | 124 | 191 | 126 |
| OWASSO | 5878 | 48 | 29 | 63 | 29 | 63 | 23 |
| PADEN | 275 | 305 | 247 | 342 | 316 | 162 | 132 |
| PANAMA | 675 | 38 | 177 | 10 | 19 | 25 | 38 |
| PAOLI | 258 | 87 | 103 | 223 | 190 | 49 | 52 |
| PAULS VALLEY | 1341 | 246 | 239 | 303 | 310 | 279 | 288 |
| PAWHUSKA | 1112 | 207 | 153 | 255 | 237 | 333 | 332 |
| PAWNEE | 870 | 141 | 116 | 288 | 268 | 167 | 141 |
| PERKINS-TRYON | 1160 | 159 | 89 | 292 | 249 | 100 | 74 |
| PICHER-CARDIN | 456 | 333 | 334 | 346 | 345 | 320 | 305 |
| PIEDMONT | 1279 | 15 | 1 | 24 | 5 | 77 | 18 |
| PIONEER-PLEASANT VALE | 576 | 35 | 57 | 247 | 187 | 31 | 28 |
| PLAINVIEW | 1286 | 58 | 154 | 39 | 45 | 98 | 127 |
| POCOLA | 856 | 233 | 173 | 176 | 152 | 226 | 201 |
| PONCA CITY | 5568 | 84 | 77 | 144 | 111 | 138 | 106 |
| POND CREEK-HUNTER | 363 | 64 | 106 | 149 | 168 | 230 | 331 |
| PORTER CONSOLIDATED | 475 | 121 | 190 | 138 | 202 | 164 | 245 |
| PORUM | 494 | 320 | 300 | 356 | 350 | 235 | 227 |
| POTEAU | 1963 | 224 | 115 | 209 | 116 | 303 | 172 |
| PRAGUE | 990 | 174 | 144 | 38 | 97 | 51 | 49 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Rank } \\ \text { SFR } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ |
| PRESTON | 457 | 54 | 38 | 309 | 272 | 252 | 127 |
| PRYOR | 2359 | 198 | 74 | 119 | 35 | 148 | 84 |
| PURCELL | 1321 | 284 | 139 | 329 | 240 | 186 | 87 |
| PUTNAM CITY | 18938 | 92 | 48 | 114 | 71 | 125 | 62 |
| QUAPAW | 562 | 147 | 182 | 216 | 200 | 282 | 279 |
| QUINTON | 497 | 359 | 360 | 357 | 357 | 275 | 254 |
| RATTAN | 499 | 75 | 208 | 268 | 285 | 123 | 240 |
| RED OAK | 257 | 334 | 343 | 366 | 362 | 364 | 364 |
| RINGLING | 528 | 350 | 352 | 301 | 292 | 325 | 342 |
| RINGWOOD | 338 | 126 | 131 | 134 | 132 | 44 | 67 |
| RIPLEY | 504 | 188 | 215 | 19 | 117 | 146 | 233 |
| ROCK CREEK | 545 | 335 | 338 | 271 | 261 | 274 | 295 |
| ROFF | 331 | 211 | 254 | 238 | 243 | 338 | 340 |
| ROLAND | 1222 | 79 | 54 | 205 | 129 | 119 | 86 |
| RUSH SPRINGS | 598 | 25 | 23 | 68 | 75 | 27 | 21 |
| RYAN | 275 | 361 | 361 | 9 | 67 | 72 | 166 |
| SALINA | 823 | 322 | 331 | 330 | 343 | 269 | 273 |
| SALLISAW | 1966 | 301 | 297 | 275 | 262 | 294 | 303 |
| SAND SPRINGS | 5324 | 66 | 67 | 151 | 141 | 127 | 131 |
| SAPULPA | 4145 | 124 | 131 | 133 | 106 | 155 | 122 |
| SAVANNA | 520 | 115 | 222 | 88 | 100 | 152 | 211 |
| SAYRE | 752 | 113 | 75 | 131 | 83 | 40 | 16 |
| SEILING | 445 | 166 | 171 | 297 | 296 | 291 | 324 |
| SEMINOLE | 1467 | 219 | 191 | 327 | 288 | 142 | 137 |
| SENTINEL | 390 | 91 | 208 | 56 | 171 | 88 | 204 |
| SEQUOYAH | 1171 | 142 | 53 | 71 | 34 | 200 | 110 |
| SHARON-MUTUAL | 233 | 146 | 335 | 136 | 304 | 137 | 296 |
| SHATTUCK | 261 | 101 | 228 | 278 | 347 | 298 | 360 |
| SHAWNEE | 3833 | 289 | 291 | 174 | 211 | 218 | 250 |
| SILO | 543 | 5 | 22 | 27 | 88 | 7 | 34 |
| SKIATOOK | 2008 | 217 | 157 | 185 | 125 | 193 | 187 |
| SMITHVILLE | 307 | 36 | 1 | 49 | 126 | 79 | 139 |
| SNYDER | 558 | 329 | 331 | 152 | 254 | 76 | 230 |
| SOPER | 267 | 100 | 240 | 15 | 131 | 48 | 150 |
| SPERRY | 1116 | 73 | 33 | 40 | 27 | 59 | 33 |
| SPIRO | 1341 | 240 | 167 | 201 | 83 | 249 | 111 |
| STERLING | 365 | 214 | 180 | 137 | 85 | 105 | 94 |
| STIGLER | 1192 | 230 | 193 | 112 | 123 | 215 | 233 |
| STILLWATER | 5537 | 95 | 57 | 73 | 49 | 118 | 76 |
| STILWELL | 1537 | 202 | 196 | 25 | 70 | 6 | 8 |
| STRATFORD | 583 | 239 | 217 | 283 | 275 | 190 | 222 |
| STRINGTOWN | 243 | 24 | 93 | 74 | 143 | 203 | 108 |
| STROTHER | 402 | 358 | 356 | 101 | 163 | 32 | 117 |
| STROUD | 818 | 318 | 148 | 239 | 147 | 306 | 159 |
| STUART | 257 | 351 | 356 | 248 | 299 | 336 | 349 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Rank } \\ \text { DEA } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Rank } \\ \text { SFR } \end{gathered}$ | Rank DEA | $\begin{gathered} \text { Rank } \\ \text { SFR } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ |
| SULPHUR | 1408 | 206 | 183 | 102 | 175 | 149 | 160 |
| TAHLEQUAH | 3431 | 62 | 63 | 150 | 135 | 42 | 54 |
| TALIHINA | 663 | 227 | 222 | 196 | 100 | 196 | 118 |
| TALOGA | 193 | 315 | 362 | 179 | 349 | 172 | 348 |
| TECUMSEH | 2135 | 307 | 271 | 304 | 254 | 301 | 245 |
| TEMPLE | 283 | 352 | 347 | 331 | 328 | 80 | 195 |
| THACKERVILLE | 275 | 32 | 40 | 318 | 273 | 359 | 356 |
| THOMAS-FAY-CUSTER |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| UNIFIED DIST | 507 | 252 | 322 | 280 | 321 | 165 | 309 |
| TIMBERLAKE | 383 | 65 | 252 | 188 | 267 | 91 | 253 |
| TIPTON | 413 | 180 | 197 | 335 | 352 | 353 | 359 |
| TISHOMINGO | 966 | 213 | 54 | 120 | 49 | 107 | 26 |
| TONKAWA | 747 | 155 | 135 | 18 | 14 | 17 | 23 |
| TULSA | 41326 | 205 | 245 | 213 | 224 | 212 | 205 |
| TUPELO | 264 | 272 | 297 | 93 | 111 | 271 | 297 |
| TURNER | 340 | 302 | 351 | 261 | 344 | 122 | 250 |
| TURPIN | 508 | 286 | 316 | 256 | 289 | 154 | 236 |
| TUSHKA | 344 | 59 | 139 | 212 | 190 | 326 | 333 |
| TUTTLE | 1193 | 17 | 11 | 46 | 16 | 23 | 13 |
| UNION | 11927 | 68 | 31 | 99 | 63 | 108 | 51 |
| UNION CITY | 313 | 128 | 13 | 362 | 345 | 290 | 213 |
| VALLIANT | 1005 | 52 | 123 | 11 | 56 | 3 | 11 |
| VANOSS | 513 | 4 | 19 | 3 | 10 | 39 | 68 |
| VARNUM | 287 | 97 | 138 | 32 | 23 | 221 | 244 |
| VELMA-ALMA | 626 | 189 | 124 | 250 | 240 | 264 | 275 |
| VERDEN | 324 | 197 | 207 | 60 | 69 | 297 | 315 |
| VIAN | 871 | 360 | 358 | 332 | 312 | 143 | 118 |
| VICI | 331 | 218 | 317 | 336 | 356 | 321 | 351 |
| VINITA | 1572 | 130 | 100 | 287 | 219 | 208 | 166 |
| WAGONER | 2308 | 223 | 169 | 65 | 58 | 195 | 140 |
| WAKITA | 191 | 182 | 286 | 251 | 334 | 145 | 277 |
| WALTERS | 721 | 242 | 156 | 299 | 227 | 170 | 104 |
| WAPANUCKA | 207 | 8 | 47 | 2 | 1 | 106 | 193 |
| WARNER | 800 | 157 | 213 | 182 | 233 | 114 | 187 |
| WASHINGTON | 644 | 248 | 93 | 269 | 138 | 241 | 112 |
| WATONGA | 1005 | 194 | 150 | 70 | 90 | 163 | 189 |
| WATTS | 374 | 306 | 245 | 163 | 113 | 37 | 1 |
| WAUKOMIS | 439 | 11 | 45 | 44 | 29 | 75 | 55 |
| WAURIKA | 512 | 185 | 143 | 37 | 36 | 18 | 19 |
| WAYNE | 456 | 81 | 108 | 7 | 9 | 65 | 93 |
| WAYNOKA | 293 | 53 | 264 | 187 | 312 | 46 | 165 |
| WEATHERFORD | 1999 | 184 | 163 | 135 | 119 | 109 | 71 |
| WELCH | 350 | 47 | 135 | 57 | 156 | 21 | 219 |
| WELEETKA | 455 | 140 | 204 | 290 | 285 | 360 | 355 |
| WELLSTON | 694 | 235 | 237 | 202 | 175 | 239 | 192 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | Rank SFR | Rank DEA | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | Rank SFR | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ |
| WESTERN HEIGHTS | 3020 | 267 | 275 | 254 | 259 | 300 | 305 |
| WESTVILLE | 998 | 317 | 304 | 349 | 341 | 327 | 314 |
| WETUMKA | 476 | 42 | 129 | 64 | 150 | 16 | 81 |
| WEWOKA | 858 | 67 | 46 | 307 | 254 | 347 | 310 |
| WILBURTON | 1090 | 195 | 144 | 264 | 200 | 157 | 115 |
| WILSON1 | 501 | 332 | 200 | 81 | 71 | 141 | 150 |
| WILSON2 | 355 | 353 | 314 | 334 | 351 | 132 | 239 |
| WISTER | 438 | 261 | 254 | 116 | 129 | 263 | 275 |
| WOODLAND | 576 | 251 | 293 | 242 | 276 | 192 | 256 |
| WRIGHT CITY | 476 | 10 | 12 | 67 | 128 | 225 | 259 |
| WYANDOTTE | 688 | 293 | 288 | 26 | 73 | 222 | 240 |
| WYNNEWOOD | 862 | 237 | 214 | 351 | 328 | 166 | 148 |

[^0]
## APPENDIX IB

Ranking of School Districts by their Efficiency Estimates
Generated by the Multiple Output Model, Using Panel Data

|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Rank } \\ \text { SFR } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Rank } \\ \text { SFR } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Rank } \\ \text { SFR } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ |
| ACHILLE | 495 | 110 | 1 | 188 | 1 | 190 | 147 |
| ADA | 2780 | 15 | 62 | 10 | 1 | 25 | 85 |
| ADAIR | 908 | 61 | 1 | 43 | 42 | 15 | 1 |
| 0FTON | 446 | 227 | 102 | 249 | 185 | 43 | 50 |
| ALEX | 369 | 306 | 307 | 277 | 240 | 325 | 268 |
| ALINE-CLEO | 217 | 168 | 281 | 17 | 175 | 122 | 244 |
| ALLEN | 413 | 156 | 72 | 58 | 120 | 262 | 212 |
| ALTUS | 4703 | 54 | 167 | 104 | 215 | 113 | 249 |
| ALVA | 1067 | 72 | 246 | 70 | 237 | 155 | 300 |
| AMBER-POCASSET | 452 | 106 | 121 | 55 | 173 | 152 | 169 |
| ANADARKO | 2032 | 276 | 303 | 323 | 334 | 241 | 222 |
| ANTLERS | 1154 | 82 | 1 | 137 | 103 | 48 | 24 |
| ARAPAHO | 294 | 19 | 65 | 9 | 100 | 5 | 74 |
| ARDMORE | 3414 | 120 | 259 | 145 | 211 | 165 | 254 |
| ARKOMA | 476 | 343 | 315 | 335 | 235 | 349 | 327 |
| ARNETT | 186 | 58 | 347 | 126 | 358 | 129 | 358 |
| ASHER | 227 | 249 | 115 | 40 | 201 | 3 | 1 |
| ATOKA | 937 | 254 | 230 | 147 | 185 | 297 | 292 |
| BALKO | 158 | 296 | 365 | 316 | 365 | 265 | 353 |
| BARNSDALL | 479 | 310 | 270 | 266 | 149 | 339 | 180 |
| BARTLESVILLE | 6456 | 17 | 88 | 22 | 72 | 28 | 100 |
| BATTIEST | 351 | 331 | 331 | 317 | 335 | 318 | 345 |
| BEAVER | 413 | 295 | 340 | 294 | 349 | 283 | 339 |
| BEGGS | 966 | 328 | 296 | 278 | 287 | 183 | 180 |
| BENNINGTON | 256 | 37 | 181 | 100 | 200 | 138 | 279 |
| BERRYHILL | 1002 | 265 | 149 | 124 | 91 | 157 | 32 |
| BETHANY | 993 | 164 | 117 | 291 | 143 | 247 | 193 |
| BETHEL | 1027 | 203 | 165 | 253 | 226 | 128 | 129 |
| BIG PASTURE | 266 | 329 | 250 | 305 | 292 | 315 | 315 |
| BILLINGS | 174 | 314 | 307 | 68 | 264 | 306 | 351 |
| BINGER-ONEY | 366 | 80 | 97 | 91 | 257 | 23 | 76 |
| BIXBY | 3113 | 126 | 75 | 235 | 135 | 144 | 76 |
| BLACKWELL | 1713 | 201 | 157 | 255 | 208 | 185 | 80 |
| BLAIR | 372 | 261 | 56 | 300 | 140 | 309 | 202 |
| BLANCHARD | 1197 | 244 | 162 | 243 | 170 | 312 | 212 |
| BLUEJACKET | 257 | 301 | 248 | 269 | 84 | 207 | 28 |
| BOISE CITY | 415 | 79 | 223 | 261 | 320 | 171 | 311 |
| BOKOSHE | 285 | 13 | 1 | 82 | 1 | 9 | 1 |
| BOONE-APACHE | 682 | 98 | 95 | 175 | 213 | 263 | 289 |
| BOSWELL | 443 | 209 | 342 | 285 | 327 | 90 | 166 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | Rank DEA |
| BRAGGS | 257 | 256 | 187 | 282 | 54 | 59 |  |
| BRAMAN | 160 | 342 | 47 | 363 | 360 | 361 | 327 |
| BRAY-DOYLE | 441 | 131 | 185 | 227 | 257 | 96 | 199 |
| BRIDGE CREEK | 1031 | 213 | 82 | 268 | 125 | 256 | 123 |
| BRISTOW | 1616 | 152 | 178 | 136 | 215 | 156 | 234 |
| BROKEN ARROW | 14499 | 22 | 130 | 16 | 76 | 31 | 156 |
| BROKEN BOW | 1792 | 280 | 321 | 258 | 285 | 197 | 277 |
| BUFFALO | 354 | 226 | 341 | 232 | 355 | 174 | 350 |
| BUFFALO VALLEY | 242 | 196 | 105 | 342 | 317 | 355 | 228 |
| BURNS FLAT-DILL |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CITY | 685 | 178 | 220 | 199 | 255 | 303 | 315 |
| BUTNER | 288 | 112 | 115 | 226 | 177 | 37 | 1 |
| BYNG | 1692 | 64 | 91 | 29 | 129 | 140 | 217 |
| CACHE | 1263 | 199 | 236 | 184 | 195 | 257 | 260 |
| CADDO | 410 | 24 | 1 | 93 | 71 | 161 | 66 |
| CALERA | 564 | 95 | 49 | 62 | 33 | 49 | 67 |
| CAMERON | 503 | 337 | 282 | 364 | 363 | 246 | 53 |
| CANADIAN | 403 | 338 | 319 | 229 | 223 | 227 | 282 |
| CANEY VALLEY | 810 | 271 | 159 | 267 | 66 | 302 | 85 |
| CANTON | 480 | 163 | 311 | 322 | 345 | 344 | 347 |
| CANUTE | 267 | 175 | 121 | 142 | 1 | 286 | 225 |
| CARNEGIE | 770 | 128 | 71 | 164 | 189 | 151 | 96 |
| CARNEY | 265 | 356 | 322 | 264 | 232 | 352 | 234 |
| CASHION | 423 | 151 | 109 | 296 | 220 | 292 | 43 |
| CATOOSA | 2362 | 132 | 59 | 242 | 179 | 218 | 190 |
| CEMENT | 275 | 349 | 262 | 351 | 340 | 230 | 280 |
| CENTRAL | 448 | 143 | 134 | 79 | 1 | 86 | 33 |
| CENTRAL HIGH | 353 | 305 | 261 | 262 | 178 | 281 | 158 |
| CHANDLER | 1140 | 148 | 124 | 90 | 103 | 105 | 79 |
| CHATTANOOGA | 294 | 274 | 313 | 248 | 330 | 305 | 305 |
| CHECOTAH | 1628 | 260 | 267 | 225 | 230 | 87 | 163 |
| CHELSEA | 1044 | 289 | 238 | 325 | 307 | 224 | 188 |
| CHEROKEE | 405 | 217 | 58 | 141 | 66 | 181 | 1 |
| CHEYENNE | 282 | 105 | 366 | 118 | 366 | 196 | 366 |
| CHICKASHA | 2980 | 162 | 181 | 163 | 180 | 253 | 270 |
| CHISHOLM | 937 | 191 | 175 | 247 | 167 | 213 | 119 |
| CHOCTAW/NICOMA |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| PARK | 4627 | 71 | 93 | 167 | 156 | 85 | 119 |
| CHOUTEAU-MAZIE | 936 | 315 | 253 | 201 | 183 | 242 | 139 |
| CIMARRON | 368 | 221 | 287 | 198 | 251 | 248 | 254 |
| CLAREMORE | 3632 | 62 | 95 | 54 | 85 | 62 | 123 |
| CLAYTON | 398 | 323 | 348 | 120 | 248 | 288 | 324 |
| CLEVELAND | 1674 | 215 | 205 | 244 | 230 | 269 | 169 |
| CLINTON | 2036 | 234 | 200 | 195 | 101 | 232 | 184 |
| COALGATE | 686 | 205 | 265 | 84 | 124 | 42 | 41 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Rank } \\ \text { SFRR } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ |
| COLBERT | 798 | 308 | 334 | 170 | 160 | 255 | 151 |
| COLCORD | 693 | 195 | 216 | 299 | 286 | 220 | 48 |
| COLEMAN | 179 | 30 | 270 | 161 | 284 | 223 | 285 |
| COLLINSVILLE | 1593 | 230 | 193 | 143 | 118 | 101 | 53 |
| COMANCHE | 1036 | 299 | 245 | 298 | 223 | 267 | 241 |
| COMMERCE | 811 | 140 | 140 | 158 | 73 | 26 | 1 |
| COPAN | 452 | 287 | 159 | 346 | 251 | 331 | 241 |
| CORDELL | 693 | 45 | 1 | 186 | 125 | 158 | 123 |
| COVINGTON- |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| DOUGLAS | 335 | 285 | 336 | 250 | 282 | 316 | 338 |
| COWETA | 2454 | 192 | 188 | 130 | 105 | 150 | 108 |
| COYLE | 377 | 206 | 238 | 287 | 336 | 12 | 91 |
| CRESCENT | 640 | 251 | 190 | 237 | 220 | 271 | 225 |
| CROOKED OAK | 820 | 360 | 329 | 340 | 306 | 329 | 153 |
| CROWDER | 513 | 245 | 87 | 239 | 283 | 136 | 97 |
| CUSHING | 2029 | 283 | 360 | 228 | 353 | 209 | 360 |
| CYRIL | 457 | 243 | 72 | 181 | 150 | 252 | 247 |
| DALE | 624 | 272 | 213 | 172 | 152 | 324 | 261 |
| DAVENPORT | 455 | 208 | 78 | 166 | 127 | 153 | 174 |
| DAVIS | 926 | 133 | 139 | 25 | 1 | 66 | 70 |
| DEER CREEK | 1343 | 44 | 47 | 30 | 1 | 77 | 59 |
| DEER CREEK- |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LAMONT | 258 | 200 | 316 | 309 | 315 | 310 | 331 |
| DEPEW | 416 | 365 | 332 | 365 | 349 | 360 | 174 |
| DEWAR | 442 | 303 | 228 | 359 | 294 | 357 | 1 |
| DEWEY | 1168 | 262 | 155 | 273 | 161 | 279 | 143 |
| DIBBLE | 576 | 290 | 200 | 362 | 348 | 362 | 299 |
| DICKSON | 1111 | 233 | 226 | 56 | 1 | 215 | 147 |
| DOVER | 202 | 34 | 175 | 75 | 301 | 159 | 317 |
| DRUMMOND | 304 | 186 | 127 | 106 | 89 | 168 | 248 |
| DRUMRIGHT | 676 | 350 | 297 | 260 | 257 | 272 | 272 |
| DUKE | 201 | 115 | 82 | 156 | 206 | 254 | 332 |
| DUNCAN | 3882 | 32 | 88 | 44 | 170 | 106 | 193 |
| DURANT | 3015 | 11 | 69 | 15 | 66 | 21 | 131 |
| EDMOND | 16018 | 1 | 62 | 1 | 38 | 1 | 44 |
| EL RENO | 2680 | 135 | 141 | 144 | 195 | 135 | 112 |
| ELGIN | 1200 | 122 | 164 | 154 | 143 | 177 | 64 |
| ELK CITY | 2205 | 145 | 1 | 69 | 1 | 84 | 190 |
| ELMORE CITY- |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| PERNELL | 552 | 292 | 162 | 293 | 251 | 341 | 303 |
| EMPIRE | 545 | 325 | 197 | 358 | 278 | 199 | 81 |
| ENID | 6888 | 38 | 188 | 19 | 111 | 30 | 135 |
| ERICK | 269 | 69 | 266 | 224 | 264 | 146 | 298 |
| EUFAULA | 1130 | 90 | 147 | 138 | 48 | 56 | 78 |
| FAIRLAND | 492 | 185 | 256 | 193 | 111 | 91 | 1 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \overline{\text { Rank }} \\ & \text { SFRR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ |
| FAIRVIEW | 834 | 57 | 1 | 47 | 1 | 41 | 94 |
| FARGO | 205 | 149 | 301 | 279 | 311 | 92 | 70 |
| FLETCHER | 481 | 264 | 1 | 171 | 1 | 173 | 39 |
| FORT COBB- |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| BROXTON | 430 | 63 | 152 | 24 | 156 | 22 | 135 |
| FORT SUPPLY | 158 | 3 | 1 | 295 | 328 | 226 | 311 |
| FOX | 382 | 183 | 200 | 327 | 291 | 244 | 207 |
| FOYIL | 563 | 324 | 227 | 314 | 246 | 337 | 166 |
| FREDERICK | 1130 | 273 | 302 | 265 | 267 | 322 | 295 |
| FRONTIER | 385 | 77 | 355 | 67 | 362 | 95 | 365 |
| FT GIBSON | 1887 | 92 | 137 | 146 | 185 | 73 | 139 |
| FT TOWSON | 452 | 137 | 159 | 165 | 140 | 24 | 36 |
| GANS | 286 | 366 | 364 | 356 | 313 | 178 | 163 |
| GARBER | 369 | 320 | 299 | 94 | 58 | 107 | 145 |
| GEARY | 415 | 330 | 361 | 286 | 322 | 11 | 195 |
| GLENCOE | 358 | 317 | 291 | 271 | 120 | 118 | 1 |
| GLENPOOL | 2117 | 235 | 214 | 173 | 123 | 238 | 231 |
| GORE | 599 | 166 | 97 | 160 | 88 | 231 | 225 |
| GRANDFIELD | 324 | 291 | 184 | 207 | 114 | 251 | 284 |
| GRANITE | 305 | 23 | 85 | 307 | 329 | 205 | 174 |
| GROVE | 2076 | 85 | 105 | 81 | 129 | 78 | 158 |
| GUTHRIE | 3294 | 160 | 250 | 215 | 248 | 261 | 289 |
| GUYMON | 2053 | 83 | 105 | 83 | 82 | 187 | 210 |
| HAILEYVILLE | 524 | 345 | 335 | 360 | 342 | 290 | 215 |
| HAMMON | 265 | 68 | 339 | 324 | 336 | 76 | 357 |
| HARRAH | 2235 | 138 | 147 | 202 | 208 | 166 | 185 |
| HARTSHORNE | 830 | 150 | 250 | 301 | 307 | 311 | 325 |
| HASKELL | 949 | 353 | 336 | 349 | 326 | 351 | 352 |
| HAWORTH | 614 | 304 | 248 | 361 | 324 | 343 | 334 |
| HEALDTON | 682 | 197 | 93 | 194 | 180 | 110 | 72 |
| HEAVENER | 978 | 248 | 294 | 218 | 294 | 109 | 272 |
| HENNESSEY | 818 | 239 | 207 | 128 | 201 | 97 | 53 |
| HENRYETTA | 1236 | 97 | 86 | 89 | 80 | 170 | 109 |
| HILLDALE | 1561 | 88 | 1 | 125 | 114 | 125 | 91 |
| HINTON | 602 | 167 | 84 | 109 | 1 | 58 | 27 |
| HOBART | 924 | 93 | 109 | 48 | 150 | 149 | 123 |
| HOLDENVILLE | 1235 | 51 | 52 | 111 | 174 | 100 | 156 |
| HOLLIS | 744 | 118 | 113 | 71 | 63 | 89 | 1 |
| HOMINY | 802 | 326 | 256 | 347 | 301 | 317 | 220 |
| HOOKER | 562 | 210 | 312 | 230 | 293 | 164 | 197 |
| HUGO | 1604 | 43 | 1 | 49 | 117 | 50 | 106 |
| HULBERT | 542 | 136 | 119 | 36 | 1 | 132 | 119 |
| HYDRO | 360 | 56 | 62 | 302 | 180 | 333 | 258 |
| IDABEL | 1703 | 313 | 328 | 275 | 164 | 235 | 215 |
| INDIAHOMA | 230 | 344 | 310 | 319 | 305 | 358 | 347 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Rank } \\ \text { SFR } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Rank } \\ \text { SFR } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ |
| INDIANOLA | 451 | 180 | 223 | 213 | 58 | 314 | 199 |
| INOLA | 1184 | 236 | 126 | 252 | 192 | 260 | 199 |
| JAY | 1716 | 26 | 1 | 78 | 127 | 104 | 154 |
| JENKS | 8812 | 27 | 1 | 41 | 51 | 35 | 33 |
| JONES | 1109 | 229 | 171 | 211 | 147 | 141 | 117 |
| KANSAS | 636 | 174 | 211 | 204 | 195 | 124 | 254 |
| KELLYVILLE | 1208 | 146 | 1 | 303 | 204 | 301 | 229 |
| KEOTA | 506 | 352 | 274 | 318 | 210 | 335 | 277 |
| KETCHUM | 593 | 70 | 1 | 13 | 1 | 40 | 21 |
| KIEFER | 454 | 364 | 292 | 366 | 300 | 346 | 207 |
| KINGFISHER | 1247 | 91 | 90 | 77 | 35 | 88 | 69 |
| KINGSTON | 913 | 334 | 343 | 337 | 343 | 334 | 293 |
| KIOWA | 362 | 127 | 345 | 168 | 261 | 39 | 203 |
| KONAWA | 783 | 86 | 142 | 122 | 248 | 126 | 182 |
| KREMLIN-HILLSDALE | 270 | 267 | 326 | 272 | 315 | 239 | 288 |
| LATTA | 637 | 25 | 1 | 11 | 32 | 7 | 1 |
| LAVERNE | 445 | 81 | 346 | 85 | 270 | 27 | 135 |
| LAWTON | 18298 | 5 | 144 | 2 | 129 | 8 | 185 |
| LE FLORE | 288 | 258 | 211 | 344 | 346 | 330 | 285 |
| LEEDEY | 209 | 172 | 356 | 133 | 359 | 68 | 361 |
| LEXINGTON | 922 | 340 | 294 | 292 | 238 | 323 | 280 |
| LIBERTY | 536 | 129 | 72 | 169 | 156 | 212 | 160 |
| LINDSAY | 1084 | 134 | 1 | 113 | 1 | 275 | 300 |
| LITTLE AXE | 1392 | 107 | , | 231 | 175 | 264 | 127 |
| LOCUST GROVE | 1411 | 327 | 214 | 308 | 194 | 356 | 334 |
| LOMEGA | 178 | 29 | 303 | 37 | 235 | 147 | 233 |
| LONE GROVE | 1381 | 46 | 1 | 102 | 57 | 102 | 119 |
| LONE WOLF | 219 | 161 | 220 | 99 | 167 | 233 | 195 |
| LUTHER | 767 | 119 | 69 | 336 | 290 | 353 | 311 |
| MADILL | 1227 | 293 | 230 | 155 | 118 | 219 | 209 |
| MANGUM | 721 | 253 | 135 | 256 | 276 | 289 | 340 |
| MANNFORD | 1471 | 111 | 1 | 178 | 94 | 175 | 117 |
| MARIETTA | 909 | 187 | 78 | 179 | 137 | 273 | 187 |
| MARLOW | 1429 | 255 | 285 | 206 | 191 | 182 | 116 |
| MAUD | 430 | 363 | 336 | 297 | 37 | 366 | 362 |
| MAYSVILLE | 475 | 302 | 292 | 209 | 133 | 195 | 203 |
| MCALESTER | 2868 | 65 | 237 | 66 | 225 | 82 | 241 |
| MCCURTAIN | 242 | 257 | 178 | 223 | 275 | 282 | 272 |
| MCLOUD | 1750 | 278 | 275 | 304 | 257 | 201 | 203 |
| MEDFORD | 329 | 266 | 324 | 151 | 294 | 163 | 341 |
| MEEKER | 885 | 218 | 194 | 281 | 276 | 259 | 234 |
| MERRITT | 457 | 47 | 1 | 236 | 206 | 162 | 109 |
| MIAMI | 2516 | 33 | 52 | 59 | 99 | 81 | 138 |
| MILBURN | 272 | 335 | 314 | 289 | 273 | 300 | 249 |
| MILLWOOD | 1068 | 297 | 1 | 332 | 1 | 321 |  |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Rank } \\ \text { SFR } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Rank } \\ \text { SFR } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Rank } \\ \text { SFR } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ |
| MINCO | 529 | 154 | 67 | 153 | 137 | 123 | 83 |
| MOORE | 18082 | 10 | 97 | 7 | 82 | 16 | 169 |
| MOORELAND | 470 | 220 | 256 | 312 | 274 | 245 | 160 |
| MORRIS | 1036 | 171 | 97 | 92 | 1 | 221. | 139 |
| MORRISON | 454 | 52 | 1 | 27 | 63 | 120 | 114 |
| MOSS | 256 | 361 | 356 | 326 | 247 | 193 | 244 |
| MOUNDS | 706 | 241 | 175 | 251 | 184 | 308 | 249 |
| MOUNTAIN VIEW- |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GOTEBO | 370 | 18 | 157 | 50 | 318 | 52 | 320 |
| MULDROW | 1492 | 104 | 137 | 101 | 129 | 29 | 39 |
| MULHALL-ORLANDO | 244 | 55 | 200 | 74 | 338 | 72 | 263 |
| MUSKOGEE | 6782 | 53 | 204 | 51 | 242 | 63 | 262 |
| MUSTANG | 6309 | 21 | 1 | 28 | 73 | 32 | 60 |
| MWC/DEL CITY | 15399 | 8 | 197 | 14 | 201 | 14 | 229 |
| NAVAJO | 576 | 76 | , | 98 | 45 | 148 | 100 |
| NEW LIMA | 275 | 121 | 267 | 192 | 93 | 94 | 53 |
| NEWCASTLE | 1093 | 246 | 1 | 157 | 1 | 216 | 46 |
| NEWKIRK | 732 | 336 | 255 | 270 | 146 | 307 | 173 |
| NINNEKAH | 549 | 346 | 327 | 328 | 294 | 364 | 321 |
| NOBLE | 2608 | 311 | 285 | 274 | 211 | 249 | 147 |
| NORMAN | 12492 | 6 | 133 | 5 | 105 | 4 | 100 |
| NOWATA | 1042 | 351 | 283 | 210 | 152 | 268 | 139 |
| OAKS-MISSION | 388 | 36 | 1 | 116 | 1 | 169 | 42 |
| OILTON | 326 | 355 | 287 | 73 | 1 | 160 | 26 |
| OKARCHE | 308 | 103 | 109 | 149 | 137 | 53 | 23 |
| OKAY | 487 | 232 | 1 | 341 | 1 | 270 | 1 |
| OKEENE | 371 | 116 | 243 | 105 | 270 | 145 | 332 |
| OKEMAH | 977 | 179 | 75 | 162 | 205 | 258 | 263 |
| OKLA CITY | 38543 | 189 | 78 | 182 | 62 | 274 | 63 |
| OKMULGEE | 2302 | 288 | 324 | 331 | 333 | 345 | 354 |
| OKTAHA | 614 | 259 | 317 | 284 | 331 | 117 | 310 |
| OLIVE | 427 | 268 | 299 | 311 | 298 | 250 | 217 |
| OOLOGAH-TALALA | 1469 | 74 | 1 | 52 | 49 | 70 | 53 |
| OWASSO | 5878 | 31 | 77 | 31 | 109 | 54 | 103 |
| PADEN | 275 | 212 | 91 | 222 | 50 | 38 | 1 |
| PANAMA | 675 | 159 | 259 | 18 | 41 | 67 | 38 |
| PAOLI | 258 | 96 | 109 | 63 | 75 | 18 | 28 |
| PAULS VALLEY | 1341 | 319 | 344 | 214 | 311 | 338 | 343 |
| PAWHUSKA | 1112 | 158 | 152 | 97 | 156 | 206 | 239 |
| PAWNEE | 870 | 67 | 1 | 64 | 1 | 33 | 1 |
| PERKINS-TRYON | 1160 | 224 | 190 | 212 | 170 | 133 | 112 |
| PICHER-CARDIN | 456 | 358 | 332 | 355 | 314 | 347 | 326 |
| PIEDMONT | 1279 | 49 | 1 | 72 | 42 | 137 | 50 |
| PIONEER-PLEASANT |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| VALE | 576 | 109 | 149 | 114 | 80 | 74 | 61 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Rank } \\ \text { DEA } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Rank } \\ \text { SFR } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Rank } \\ \text { SFR } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ |
| PLAINVIEW | 1286 | 59 | 207 | 20 | 56 | 19 | 61 |
| POCOLA | 856 | 294 | 190 | 205 | 215 | 214 | 151 |
| PONCA CITY | 5568 | 40 | 155 | 21 | 95 | 34 | 87 |
| POND CREEK- |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| HUNTER | 363 | 182 | 219 | 134 | 164 | 208 | 342 |
| PORTER |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CONSOLIDATED | 475 | 237 | 270 | 220 | 244 | 340 | 318 |
| PORUM | 494 | 102 | 60 | 219 | 220 | 328 | 220 |
| POTEAU | 1963 | 130 | 152 | 88 | 111 | 108 | 68 |
| PRAGUE | 990 | 117 | 117 | 129 | 195 | 191 | 143 |
| PRESTON | 457 | 66 | 1 | 320 | 280 | 114 | 37 |
| PRYOR | 2359 | 73 | 51 | 42 | 1 | 46 | 89 |
| PURCELL | 1321 | 142 | 1 | 216 | 76 | 204 | 182 |
| PUTNAM CITY | 18938 | 7 | 124 | 3 | 90 | 6 | 115 |
| QUAPAW | 562 | 147 | 216 | 329 | 304 | 287 | 263 |
| QUINTON | 497 | 359 | 354 | 353 | 357 | 350 | 344 |
| RATTAN | 499 | 188 | 307 | 241 | 320 | 112 | 308 |
| RED OAK | 257 | 322 | 262 | 338 | 244 | 354 | 266 |
| RINGLING | 528 | 357 | 359 | 321 | 287 | 203 | 296 |
| RINGWOOD | 338 | 124 | 127 | 65 | 65 | 45 | 132 |
| RIPLEY | 504 | 228 | 225 | 35 | 114 | 184 | 222 |
| ROCK CREEK | 545 | 279 | 270 | 96 | 33 | 198 | 254 |
| ROFF | 331 | 78 | 130 | 185 | 233 | 167 | 106 |
| ROLAND | 1222 | 155 | 120 | 217 | 164 | 240 | 212 |
| RUSH SPRINGS | 598 | 41 | 1 | 61 | 45 | 179 | 89 |
| RYAN | 275 | 339 | 280 | 152 | 192 | 189 | 244 |
| SALINA | 823 | 362 | 363 | 257 | 263 | 116 | 145 |
| SALLISAW | 1966 | 214 | 234 | 123 | 152 | 186 | 249 |
| SAND SPRINGS | 5324 | 39 | 171 | 45 | 143 | 55 | 160 |
| SAPULPA | 4145 | 94 | 130 | 110 | 133 | 69 | 129 |
| SAVANNA | 520 | 123 | 197 | 112 | 142 | 65 | 83 |
| SAYRE | 752 | 225 | 238 | 119 | 87 | 99 | 48 |
| SEILING | 445 | 144 | 297 | 148 | 280 | 237 | 355 |
| SEMINOLE | 1467 | 101 | 52 | 233 | 161 | 131 | 166 |
| SENTINEL | 390 | 28 | 149 | 57 | 218 | 51 | 239 |
| SEQUOYAH | 1171 | 194 | 78 | 139 | 66 | 188 | 105 |
| SHARON-MUTUAL | 233 | 177 | 350 | 288 | 355 | 194 | 330 |
| SHATTUCK | 261 | 50 | 275 | 290 | 361 | 326 | 364 |
| SHAWNEE | 3833 | 153 | 284 | 87 | 251 | 143 | 268 |
| SILO | 543 | 35 | 1 | 117 | 102 | 36 | 22 |
| SKIATOOK | 2008 | 173 | 104 | 203 | 189 | 119 | 109 |
| SMITHVILLE | 307 | 14 | 1 | 121 | 213 | 83 | 188 |
| SNYDER | 558 | 298 | 246 | 189 | 324 | 228 | 336 |
| SOPER | 267 | 321 | 351 | 159 | 227 | 115 | 276 |
| SPERRY | 1116 | 89 | 1 | 140 | 110 | 299 | 169 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | Rank DEA | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Rank } \\ \text { SFR } \end{gathered}$ | Rank DEA |
| $\overline{\text { SPIRO }}$ | 1341 | 300 | 230 | 221 | 185 | 222 | 104 |
| STERLING | 365 | 216 | 194 | 276 | 167 | 234 | 97 |
| STIGLER | 1192 | 190 | 234 | 108 | 95 | 139 | 197 |
| STILLWATER | 5537 | 9 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 13 | 65 |
| STILWELL | 1537 | 99 | 165 | 32 | 58 | 71 | 20 |
| STRATFORD | 583 | 277 | 207 | 334 | 319 | 304 | 305 |
| STRINGTOWN | 243 | 348 | 233 | 348 | 309 | 313 | 74 |
| STROTHER | 402 | 332 | 262 | 131 | 105 | 130 | 50 |
| STROUD | 818 | 269 | 1 | 180 | 51 | 278 | 91 |
| STUART | 257 | 219 | 287 | 107 | 255 | 202 | 345 |
| SULPHUR | 1408 | 113 | 171 | 60 | 195 | 134 | 203 |
| TAHLEQUAH | 3431 | 12 | 66 | 12 | 42 | 2 | 19 |
| TALIHINA | 663 | 139 | 105 | 150 | 55 | 111 | 30 |
| TALOGA | 193 | 169 | 356 | 176 | 354 | 121 | 359 |
| TECUMSEH | 2135 | 238 | 253 | 280 | 278 | 276 | 249 |
| TEMPLE | 283 | 309 | 317 | 306 | 267 | 280 | 302 |
| THACKERVILLE | 275 | 341 | 171 | 357 | 270 | 327 | 234 |
| THOMAS-FAY- |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CUSTER UNIFIED DIST | 507 | 75 | 287 | 234 | 332 | 60 | 296 |
| TIMBERLAKE | 383 | 108 | 330 | 187 | 309 | 180 | 314 |
| TIPTON | 413 | 181 | 220 | 330 | 341 | 363 | 363 |
| TISHOMINGO | 966 | 240 | 142 | 76 | 39 | 75 | 33 |
| TONKAWA | 747 | 176 | 144 | 132 | 51 | 176 | 72 |
| TULSA | 41326 | 270 | 267 | 283 | 218 | 296 | 217 |
| TUPELO | 264 | 204 | 144 | 86 | 78 | 200 | 231 |
| TURNER | 340 | 307 | 362 | 313 | 364 | 192 | 303 |
| TURPIN | 508 | 316 | 349 | 196 | 239 | 277 | 319 |
| TUSHKA | 344 | 16 | 60 | 26 | 1 | 20 | , |
| TUTTLE | 1193 | 48 | 1 | 33 | 35 | 47 | 31 |
| UNION | 11927 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 78 | 10 | 95 |
| UNION CITY | 313 | 170 | 1 | 339 | 229 | 319 | 222 |
| VALLIANT | 1005 | 193 | 241 | 135 | 108 | 210 | 24 |
| VANOSS | 513 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 44 | 147 |
| VARNUM | 287 | 157 | 135 | 190 | 39 | 336 | 294 |
| VELMA-ALMA | 626 | 223 | 169 | 254 | 264 | 291 | 321 |
| VERDEN | 324 | 318 | 169 | 259 | 135 | 236 | 88 |
| VIAN | 871 | 333 | 319 | 238 | 228 | 93 | 81 |
| VICI | 331 | 100 | 279 | 177 | 287 | 293 | 349 |
| VINITA | 1572 | 87 | 55 | 174 | 85 | 127 | 132 |
| WAGONER | 2308 | 165 | 127 | 34 | 1 | 79 | 99 |
| WAKITA | 191 | 247 | 353 | 240 | 347 | 98 | 178 |
| WALTERS | 721 | 211 | 123 | 208 | 95 | 243 | 154 |
| WAPANUCKA | 207 | 20 | 113 | 23 | 1 | 285 | 308 |
| WARNER | 800 | 60 | 97 | 39 | 58 | 17 | 58 |
| WASHINGTON | 644 | 250 | 1 | 246 | 91 | 295 | 174 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { SFR } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Rank } \\ \text { SFR } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Rank } \\ & \text { DEA } \end{aligned}$ |
| WATONGA | 1005 | 42 | 57 | 80 | 155 | 57 | 134 |
| WATTS | 374 | 284 | 49 | 38 | 1 | 80 | 1 |
| WAUKOMIS | 439 | 114 | 186 | 183 | 120 | 103 | 45 |
| WAURIKA | 512 | 198 | 194 | 115 | 95 | 61 | 46 |
| WAYNE | 456 | 207 | 228 | 127 | 45 | 172 | 128 |
| WAYNOKA | 293 | 231 | 352 | 200 | 351 | 142 | 307 |
| WEATHERFORD | 1999 | 84 | 207 | 46 | 148 | 64 | 178 |
| WELCH | 350 | 125 | 275 | 245 | 323 | 211 | 323 |
| WELEETKA | 455 | 252 | 306 | 263 | 233 | 359 | 270 |
| WELLSTON | 694 | 281 | 275 | 343 | 269 | 332 | 289 |
| WESTERN HEIGHTS | 3020 | 275 | 323 | 197 | 261 | 284 | 336 |
| WESTVILLE | 998 | 222 | 243 | 350 | 344 | 217 | 163 |
| WETUMKA | 476 | 286 | 216 | 352 | 241 | 365 | 285 |
| WEWOKA | 858 | 282 | 205 | 345 | 298 | 348 | 329 |
| WILBURTON | 1090 | 202 | 168 | 333 | 303 | 342 | 282 |
| WILSON1 | 501 | 354 | 178 | 191 | 70 | 266 | 258 |
| WILSON2 | 355 | 347 | 102 | 354 | 352 | 294 | 266 |
| WISTER | 438 | 263 | 1 | 103 | 1 | 298 | 272 |
| WOODLAND | 576 | 141 | 241 | 315 | 339 | 320 | 356 |
| WRIGHT CITY | 476 | 184 | 67 | 95 | 163 | 154 | 211 |
| WYANDOTTE | 688 | 242 | 181 | 53 | 1 | 225 | 190 |
| WYNNEWOOD | 862 | 312 | 303 | 310 | 242 | 229 | 234 |

* ADM is the average ADM for the cross-sections

APPENDIX II

APPENDIX II
Ranking of School Districts by their Efficiency Estimates Generated by
the DEA CRS Model I and Model II using Panel Data

|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | Model I | Model II | Model I | Model II | Model I | Model II |
| ACHILLE | 495 | 285 | 232 | 198 | 188 | 194 | 130 |
| ADA | 2780 | 218 | 140 | 149 | 80 | 168 | 125 |
| ADAIR | 908 | 60 | 32 | 47 | 18 | 46 | 21 |
| AFTON | 446 | 92 | 204 | 50 | 196 | 1 | 140 |
| ALEX | 369 | 1 | 246 | 1 | 192 | 33 | 266 |
| ALINE-CLEO | 217 | 209 | 238 | 122 | 163 | 131 | 198 |
| ALLEN | 413 | 130 | 127 | 282 | 234 | 291 | 312 |
| A'LTUS | 4703 | 213 | 133 | 209 | 119 | 261 | 200 |
| ALVA | 1067 | 257 | 199 | 236 | 159 | 233 | 190 |
| AMBER-POCASSET | 452 | 66 | 94 | 108 | 134 | 139 | 156 |
| ANADARKO | 2032 | 337 | 316 | 290 | 312 | 306 | 301 |
| ANTLERS | 1154 | 228 | 152 | 186 | 138 | 303 | 232 |
| ARAPAHO | 294 | 182 | 160 | 194 | 157 | 103 | 61 |
| ARDMORE | 3414 | 295 | 230 | 264 | 243 | 294 | 265 |
| ARKOMA | 476 | 233 | 223 | 274 | 260 | 312 | 289 |
| ARNETT | 186 | 317 | 334 | 312 | 323 | 279 | 322 |
| ASHER | 227 | 334 | 335 | 129 | 293 | 1 | 44 |
| ATOKA | 937 | 212 | 188 | 207 | 188 | 274 | 243 |
| BALKO | 158 | 348 | 351 | 352 | 351 | 322 | 350 |
| BARNSDALL | 479 | 141 | 226 | 106 | 146 | 62 | 168 |
| BARTLESVILLE | 6456 | 67 | 44 | 66 | 39 | 139 | 73 |
| BATTIEST | 351 | 267 | 332 | 271 | 338 | 234 | 345 |
| BEAVER | 413 | 251 | 280 | 290 | 308 | 179 | 232 |
| BEGGS | 966 | 225 | 193 | 266 | 210 | 211 | 152 |
| BENNINGTON | 256 | 236 | 264 | 214 | 238 | 347 | 349 |
| BERRYHILL | 1002 | 25 | 27 | 1 | 18 | 1 | 11 |
| BETHANY | 993 | 84 | 84 | 29 | 89 | 1 | 69 |
| BETHEL | 1027 | 112 | 68 | 85 | 64 | 92 | 55 |
| BIG PASTURE | 266 | 51 | 207 | 195 | 235 | 152 | 227 |
| BILLINGS | 174 | 121 | 303 | 1 | 296 | 108 | 297 |
| BINGER-ONEY | 366 | 325 | 301 | 319 | 272 | 238 | 198 |
| BIXBY | 3113 | 18 | 16 | 27 | 22 | 1 | 19 |
| BLACKWELL | 1713 | 138 | 78 | 138 | 107 | 103 | 110 |
| BLAIR | 372 | 70 | 63 | 181 | 184 | 81 | 116 |
| BLANCHARD | 1197 | 74 | 50 | 1 | 27 | 56 | 50 |
| BLUEJACKET | 257 | 93 | 314 | 1 | 236 | 1 | 94 |
| BOKOSHE | 285 | 70 | 130 | 258 | 262 | 264 | 277 |
| BOONE-APACHE | 682 | 134 | 140 | 193 | 204 | 223 | 243 |
| BOSWELL | 443 | 345 | 349 | 331 | 338 | 288 | 305 |
| BRAGGS | 257 | 60 | 171 | 40 | 125 | 1 | 57 |
| BRAY-DOYLE | 441 | 145 | 199 | 246 | 243 | 171 | 186 |
| BRIDGE CREEK | 1031 | 1 | 1 | 35 | 20 | 38 | 17 |
| BRISTOW | 1616 | 208 | 140 | 254 | 181 | 205 | 170 |
| BROKEN ARROW | 14499 | 49 | 22 | 39 | 10 | 63 | 26 |
| BROKEN BOW | 1792 | 309 | 260 | 326 | 288 | 268 | 243 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | Model I | Model II | Model I | Model II | Model I | Model II |
| BUFFALO | 354 | 317 | 294 | 350 | 342 | 330 | 319 |
| BURNS FLAT-DILL CITY | 685 | 227 | 240 | 242 | 204 | 190 | 187 |
| BUTNER | 288 | 172 | 252 | 161 | 276 | 59 | 191 |
| CACHE | 1263 | 209 | 196 | 222 | 155 | 187 | 136 |
| CADDO | 410 | 108 | 130 | 91 | 98 | 165 | 173 |
| CALERA | 564 | 183 | 150 | 139 | 76 | 119 | 77 |
| CAMERON | 503 | 288 | 284 | 279 | 252 | 184 | 184 |
| CANADIAN | 403 | 263 | 280 | 198 | 228 | 292 | 334 |
| CANEY VALLEY | 810 | 1 | 75 | 1 | 74 | 1 | 46 |
| CANTON | 480 | 333 | 326 | 274 | 331 | 324 | 333 |
| CANUTE | 267 | 172 | 137 | 134 | 148 | 225 | 231 |
| CARNEGIE | 770 | 239 | 203 | 295 | 278 | 297 | 290 |
| CARNEY | 265 | 270 | 280 | 68 | 203 | 56 | 132 |
| CASHION | 423 | 36 | 41 | 38 | 48 | 1 | 1 |
| CATOOSA | 2362 | 80 | 47 | 82 | 71 | 157 | 84 |
| CEMENT | 275 | 300 | 288 | 324 | 333 | 238 | 285 |
| CENTRAL | 448 | 231 | 273 | 143 | 121 | 125 | 116 |
| CENTRAL HIGH | 353 | 102 | 144 | 61 | 57 | 1 | 23 |
| CHANDLER | 1140 | 143 | 115 | 95 | 70 | 100 | 53 |
| CHATTANOOGA | 294 | 1 | 284 | 89 | 278 | 78 | 153 |
| CHECOTAH | 1628 | 320 | 299 | 268 | 246 | 272 | 227 |
| CHELSEA | 1044 | 187 | 157 | 117 | 128 | 131 | 123 |
| CHEROKEE | 405 | 82 | 53 | 70 | 36 | 1 | 13 |
| CHEYENNE | 282 | 353 | 353 | 354 | 353 | 354 | 352 |
| CHICKASHA | 2980 | 166 | 91 | 173 | 101 | 238 | 169 |
| CHISHOLM | 937 | 36 | 35 | 49 | 32 | 36 | 15 |
| CHOCTAW/NICOMA PARK | 4627 | 74 | 32 | 76 | 24 | 40 | 12 |
| CHOUTEAU-MAZIE | 936 | 204 | 151 | 178 | 114 | 244 | 178 |
| CIMARRON | 368 | 187 | 214 | 227 | 212 | 164 | 114 |
| CLAREMORE | 3632 | 143 | 73 | 150 | 60 | 147 | 80 |
| CLAYTON | 398 | 338 | 339 | 344 | 344 | 345 | 318 |
| CLEVELAND | 1674 | 82 | 46 | 150 | 122 | 79 | 76 |
| CLINTON | 2036 | 247 | 184 | 212 | 209 | 248 | 237 |
| COALGATE | 686 | 330 | 294 | 274 | 227 | 205 | 154 |
| COLBERT | 798 | 329 | 303 | 280 | 232 | 201 | 158 |
| COLCORD | 693 | 312 | 306 | 333 | 301 | 211 | 178 |
| COLEMAN | 179 | 286 | 293 | 298 | 257 | 327 | 328 |
| COLLINSVILLE | 1593 | 162 | 91 | 175 | 94 | 90 | 44 |
| COMANCHE | 1036 | 148 | 107 | 139 | 72 | 155 | 82 |
| COMMERCE | 811 | 233 | 259 | 227 | 197 | 182 | 142 |
| COPAN | 452 | 1 | 25 | 46 | 58 | 41 | 81 |
| CORDELL | 693 | 100 | 53 | 251 | 179 | 225 | 165 |
| COVINGTON-DOUGLAS | 335 | 87 | 211 | 171 | 272 | 201 | 250 |
| COWETA | 2454 | 200 | 121 | 103 | 37 | 54 | 24 |
| COYLE | 377 | 255 | 296 | 270 | 328 | 101 | 211 |
| CRESCENT | 640 | 113 | 171 | 157 | 159 | 95 | 61 |
| CROOKED OAK | 820 | 270 | 245 | 329 | 318 | 315 | 298 |
| CROWDER | 513 | 24 | 76 | 222 | 255 | 68 | 141 |
| CUSHING | 2029 | 350 | 343 | 328 | 336 | 297 | 320 |
| CYRIL | 457 | 170 | 167 | 126 | 119 | 205 | 238 |
| DALE | 624 | 33 | 51 | 43 | 43 | 95 | 59 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | Model I | Model II | Model I | Model II | Model I | Model II |
| DAVENPORT | 455 | 159 | 152 | 136 | 159 | 174 | 145 |
| DAVIS | 926 | 148 | 129 | 164 | 104 | 171 | 130 |
| DEER CREEK | 1343 | 27 | 11 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| DEER CREEK-LAMONT | 258 | 128 | 251 | 285 | 281 | 275 | 316 |
| DEPEW | 416 | 95 | 279 | 154 | 282 | 48 | 204 |
| DEWAR | 442 | 126 | 146 | 322 | 300 | 343 | 332 |
| DEWEY | 1168 | 105 | 58 | 108 | 46 | 97 | 54 |
| DIBBLE | 576 | 122 | 211 | 101 | 231 | 97 | 243 |
| DICKSON | 1111 | 291 | 235 | 85 | 49 | 246 | 185 |
| DOVER | 202 | 198 | 313 | 96 | 332 | 145 | 325 |
| DRUMMOND | 304 | 129 | 116 | 59 | 74 | 142 | 115 |
| DRUMRIGHT | 676 | 177 | 154 | 156 | 171 | 157 | 156 |
| DUKE | 201 | 145 | 216 | 124 | 206 | 230 | 278 |
| DUNCAN | 3882 | 201 | 123 | 189 | 122 | 178 | 113 |
| DURANT | 3015 | 150 | 117 | 177 | 118 | 237 | 174 |
| EAGLETOWN | 253 | 323 | 345 | 285 | 343 | 227 | 342 |
| EDMOND | 16018 | 21 | 11 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| EL RENO | 2680 | 172 | 102 | 242 | 169 | 196 | 134 |
| ELGIN | 1200 | 162 | 98 | 82 | 41 | 79 | 65 |
| ELK CITY | 2205 | 45 | 19 | 70 | 23 | 221 | 162 |
| ELMORE CITY-PERNELL | 552 | 113 | 94 | 200 | 150 | 188 | 178 |
| EMPIRE | 545 | 36 | 51 | 143 | 165 | 156 | 99 |
| ENID | 6888 | 164 | 89 | 119 | 58 | 121 | 57 |
| ERICK | 269 | 316 | 302 | 314 | 311 | 350 | 346 |
| EUFAULA | 1130 | 301 | 267 | 284 | 243 | 282 | 222 |
| FAIRLAND | 492 | 150 | 234 | 1 | 87 | 1 | 47 |
| FAIRVIEW | 834 | 1 | 1 | 28 | 9 | 137 | 133 |
| FARGO | 205 | 122 | 213 | 55 | 236 | 73 | 227 |
| FLETCHER | 481 | 1 | 20 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 1 |
| FORT COBB-BROXTON | 430 | 311 | 286 | 307 | 286 | 318 | 307 |
| FOX | 382 | 70 | 125 | 218 | 240 | 162 | 194 |
| FOYIL | 563 | 60 | 112 | 114 | 165 | 106 | 134 |
| FREDERICK | 1130 | 303 | 257 | 268 | 266 | 311 | 286 |
| FRONTIER | 385 | 354 | 354 | 348 | 354 | 297 | 354 |
| GANS | 286 | 301 | 331 | 249 | 288 | 145 | 268 |
| GARBER | 369 | 21 | 207 | 1 | 104 | 1 | 106 |
| GEARY | 415 | 351 | 346 | 347 | 335 | 344 | 341 |
| GLENCOE | 358 | 131 | 196 | 84 | 104 | 1 | 38 |
| GLENPOOL | 2117 | 206 | 130 | 53 | 33 | 121 | 102 |
| GORE | 599 | 185 | 202 | 189 | 146 | 269 | 243 |
| GRANDFIELD | 324 | 239 | 273 | 264 | 299 | 300 | 343 |
| GRANITE | 305 | 136 | 181 | 305 | 315 | 249 | 232 |
| GROVE | 2076 | 138 | 76 | 186 | 102 | 242 | 181 |
| GUTHRIE | 3294 | 223 | 176 | 218 | 181 | 213 | 170 |
| GUYMON | 2053 | 124 | 70 | 142 | -66 | 196 | 136 |
| HAILEYVILLE | 524 | 261 | 235 | 195 | 247 | 230 | 258 |
| HAMMON | 265 | 349 | 348 | 353 | 352 | 353 | 353 |
| HARRAH | 2235 | 88 | 38 | 107 | 72 | 152 | 112 |
| HARTSHORNE | 830 | 322 | - 319 | 346 | - 330 | 352 | 337 |
| HAWORTH | 614 | 85 | - 220 | 222 | - 247 | 255 | 293 |
| HEALDTON | 682 | 100 | 70 | 171 | 131 | 90 | 43 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | Model I | Model II | Model I | Model II | Model I | Model II |
| HEAVENER | 978 | 288 | 318 | 267 | 317 | 243 | 296 |
| HENNESSEY | 818 | 160 | 148 | 204 | 171 | 129 | 97 |
| HENRYETTA | 1236 | 209 | 137 | 182 | 110 | 267 | 217 |
| HILLDALE | 1561 | 77 | 42 | 166 | 80 | 166 | 106 |
| HINTON | 602 | 94 | 83 | 100 | 91 | 74 | 50 |
| HOBART | 924 | 230 | 167 | 236 | 178 | 245 | 205 |
| HOLDENVILLE | 1235 | 108 | 57 | 241 | 197 | 205 | 143 |
| HOLLIS | 744 | 192 | 148 | 126 | 134 | 133 | 121 |
| HOMINY | 802 | 215 | 250 | 169 | 232 | 147 | 170 |
| HOOKER | 562 | 145 | 227 | 201 | 200 | 150 | 187 |
| HUGO | 1604 | 299 | 232 | 332 | 292 | 320 | 256 |
| HULBERT | 542 | 347 | 341 | 288 | 215 | 300 | 243 |
| HYDRO | 360 | 88 | 88 | 161 | 185 | 34 | 111 |
| IDABEL | 1703 | 323 | 309 | 273 | 265 | 289 | 261 |
| INDIAHOMA | 230 | 27 | 160 | 78 | 228 | 128 | 281 |
| INDIANOLA | 451 | 236 | 258 | 182 | 238 | 86 | 96 |
| INOLA | 1184 | 53 | 34 | 111 | 50 | 63 | 34 |
| JAY | 1716 | 243 | 190 | 313 | 266 | 266 | 207 |
| JENKS | 8812 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| JONES | 1109 | 102 | 66 | 97 | 42 | 108 | 73 |
| KANSAS | 636 | 325 | 322 | 324 | 284 | 330 | 271 |
| KELLYVILLE | 1208 | 78 | 45 | 103 | 140 | 177 | 177 |
| KEOTA | 506 | 298 | 303 | 231 | 257 | 318 | 327 |
| KETCHUM | 593 | 29 | 36 | 33 | 28 | 49 | 41 |
| KIEFER | 454 | 34 | 137 | - 1 | 61 | 1 | 92 |
| KINGFISHER | 1247 | 154 | 80 | 79 | 29 | 150 | 102 |
| KINGSTON | 913 | 292 | 286 | 309 | 321 | 209 | 255 |
| KIOWA | 362 | 352 | 352 | 321 | 349 | 330 | 329 |
| KONAWA | 783 | 274 | 229 | 300 | 276 | 312 | 281 |
| KREMLIN-HILLSDALE | 270 | 236 | 261 | 184 | 251 | 194 | 250 |
| LATTA | 637 | 154 | 94 | 161 | 97 | 72 | 30 |
| LAVERNE | 445 | 343 | 340 | 262 | 219 | 181 | 136 |
| LAWTON | 18298 | 218 | 140 | 227 | 154 | 236 | 191 |
| LEEDEY | 209 | 339 | 336 | 345 | 334 | 315 | 334 |
| LEXINGTON | 922 | 226 | 179 | 175 | 96 | 105 | 63 |
| LIBERTY | 536 | 59 | 73 | 69 | 67 | 84 | 89 |
| LINDSAY | 1084 | 1 | 1 | 56 | 25 | 249 | 205 |
| LITTLE AXE | 1392 | 64 | 28 | 53 | 107 | 116 | 84 |
| LOCUST GROVE | 1411 | 201 | 123 | 234 | 170 | 294 | 263 |
| LOMEGA | 178 | 276 | 325 | 217 | 271 | 171 | 213 |
| LONE GROVE | 1381 | 179 | 102 | 159 | 79 | 166 | 102 |
| LONE WOLF | 219 | 106 | 227 | 167 | 247 | 161 | 224 |
| LUTHER | 767 | 45 | 48 | 98 | 112 | 147 | 119 |
| MADILL | 1227 | 305 | 241 | 231 | 188 | 258 | 211 |
| MANGUM | 721 | 247 | 173 | 317 | 298 | 338 | 325 |
| MANNFORD | 1471 | 20 | 14 | 31 | 12 | 71 | 36 |
| MARIETTA | 909 | 141 | 70 | 188 | 131 | 210 | 151 |
| MARLOW | 1429 | 203 | 186 | 139 | 102 | 81 | 39 |
| MAUD | 430 | 131 | 157 | 1 | 221 | 1 | 271 |
| MAYSVILLE | 475 | 152 | 181 | 91 | 150 | 112 | 84 |
| MCALESTER | 2868 | 305 | 248 | 262 | 240 | 284 | 230 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | Model I | Model II | Model I | Model II | Model I | Model II |
| MCCURTAIN | 242 | 274 | 298 | 304 | 325 | 337 | 337 |
| MCLOUD | 1750 | 158 | 100 | 129 | 54 | 88 | 40 |
| MEDFORD | 329 | 266 | 267 | 202 | 240 | 285 | 260 |
| MEEKER | 885 | 166 | 136 | 164 | 177 | 163 | 126 |
| MERRITT | 457 | 47 | 69 | 129 | 94 | 175 | 149 |
| MIAMI | 2516 | 157 | 112 | 212 | 122 | 229 | 164 |
| MIDWEST CITY-DEL CITY | 15399 | 241 | 163 | 231 | 136 | 219 | 154 |
| MILBURN | 272 | 264 | 329 | 134 | 263 | 39 | 298 |
| MILLWOOD | 1068 | 331 | 277 | 299 | 312 | 345 | 348 |
| MINCO | 529 | 58 | 81 | 73 | 61 | 36 | 18 |
| MOORE | 18082 | 88 | 38 | 61 | 20 | 63 | 27 |
| MOORELAND | 470 | 197 | 249 | 207 | 212 | 41 | 158 |
| MORRIS | 1036 | 117 | 93 | 75 | 45 | 159 | 108 |
| MORRISON | 454 | 1 | 85 | 150 | 174 | 67 | 174 |
| MOSS | 256 | 172 | 266 | 133 | 254 | 192 | 268 |
| MOUNDS | 706 | 78 | 111 | 70 | 67 | 142 | 91 |
| MT. VIEW-GOTEBO | 370 | 251 | 253 | 337 | 336 | 323 | 315 |
| MULDROW | 1492 | 249 | 175 | 238 | 159 | 200 | 144 |
| MULHALL-ORLANDO | 244 | 161 | 205 | 260 | 309 | 154 | 286 |
| MUSKOGEE | 6782 | 272 | 210 | 334 | 302 | 336 | 303 |
| MUSTANG | 6309 | 26 | 10 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 1 |
| NAVAJO | 576 | 1 | 17 | 1 | 15 | 1 | 10 |
| NEW LIMA | 275 | 340 | 333 | 316 | 305 | 279 | 235 |
| NEWCASTLE | 1093 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 49 | 32 |
| NEWKIRK | 732 | 125 | 121 | 128 | 84 | 139 | 126 |
| NINNEKAH | 549 | 55 | 89 | 248 | 226 | 116 | 160 |
| NOBLE | 2608 | 96 | 56 | 56 | 64 | 97 | 75 |
| NORMAN | 12492 | 96 | 48 | 73 | 35 | 70 | 35 |
| NOWATA | 1042 | 216 | 181 | 256 | 219 | 199 | 194 |
| OAKS-MISSION | 388 | 245 | 299 | 301 | 345 | 189 | 201 |
| OILTON | 326 | 65 | 288 | 1 | 188 | 59 | 250 |
| OKARCHE | 308 | 42 | 61 | 37 | 34 | 1 | 1 |
| OKAY | 487 | 19 | 13 | 1 | 1 | 44 | 20 |
| OKEENE | 371 | 221 | 214 | 242 | 217 | 278 | 240 |
| OKEMAH | 977 | 246 | 179 | 282 | 230 | 269 | 256 |
| OKLAHOMA CITY | 38543 | 293 | 221 | 315 | 291 | 304 | 254 |
| OKMULGEE | 2302 | 313 | 288 | 309 | 286 | 340 | 305 |
| OKTAHA | 614 | 280 | 315 | 323 | 327 | 282 | 270 |
| OLIVE | 427 | 204 | 241 | 111 | 179 | 75 | 90 |
| OOLOGAH-TALALA | 1469 | 51 | 29 | 63 | 30 | 1 | 13 |
| OWASSO | 5878 | 34 | 17 | 36 | 10 | 1 | 1 |
| PADEN | 275 | 207 | 207 | 146 | 171 | 134 | 183 |
| PANAMA | 675 | 272 | 254 | 214 | 155 | 246 | 196 |
| PAOLI | 258 | 194 | 223 | 121 | 128 | 34 | 33 |
| PAULS VALLEY | 1341 | 307 | 270 | 272 | 270 | 198 | 238 |
| PAWHUSKA | 1112 | 278 | 206 | 293 | 225 | 333 | 286 |
| PERKINS-TRYON | 1160 | 187 | - 112 | 137 | 126 | 134 | 99 |
| PICHER-CARDIN | 456 | 346 | 350 | 318 | 325 | 221 | 290 |
| PIEDMONT | 1279 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| PIONEER-PLEASANT VALE | 576 | 111 | 126 | 63 | 54 | 93 | 48 |
| PLAINVIEW | 1286 | 187 | 156 | 178 | 91 | 112 | 70 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | Model I | Model II | Model I | Model II | Model I | Model II |
| POCOLA | 856 | 280 | 218 | 259 | 181 | 186 | 120 |
| PONCA CITY | 5568 | 113 | 86 | 114 | 53 | 118 | 72 |
| POND CREEK-HUNTER | 363 | 1 | 109 | 1 | 138 | 66 | 274 |
| PORTER CONSOLIDATED | 475 | 282 | 277 | 195 | 224 | 89 | 196 |
| PORUM | 494 | 228 | 218 | 218 | 215 | 294 | 259 |
| POTEAU | 1963 | 117 | 59 | 143 | 54 | 125 | 59 |
| PRAGUE | 990 | 102 | 109 | 180 | 145 | 84 | 67 |
| PRESTON | 457 | 99 | 119 | 103 | 91 | 44 | 31 |
| PRYOR | 2359 | 91 | 43 | 89 | 30 | 190 | 121 |
| PURCELL | 1321 | 86 | 37 | 150 | 80 | 106 | 84 |
| PUTNAM CITY | 18938 | 73 | 31 | 50 | 26 | 101 | 42 |
| QUAPAW | 562 | 296 | 323 | 238 | 278 | 307 | 301 |
| QUINTON | 497 | 294 | 276 | 311 | 272 | 304 | 303 |
| RATTAN | 499 | 284 | 292 | 290 | 307 | 320 | 316 |
| RED OAK | 257 | 154 | 222 | 227 | 302 | 308 | 347 |
| RINGLING | 528 | 313 | 309 | 306 | 288 | 312 | 284 |
| RINGWOOD | 338 | 56 | 64 | 79 | 112 | 87 | 84 |
| ROCK CREEK | 545 | 117 | 160 | 85 | 78 | 175 | 147 |
| ROFF | 331 | 327 | 306 | 334 | 316 | 326 | 275 |
| ROLAND | 1222 | 214 | 135 | 159 | 77 | 213 | 161 |
| RUSH SPRINGS | 598 | 32 | 60 | 98 | 116 | 111 | 93 |
| SALINA | 823 | 342 | 337 | 303 | 261 | 230 | 181 |
| SALLISAW | 1966 | 233 | 163 | 235 | 149 | 217 | 162 |
| SAND SPRINGS | 5324 | 199 | 120 | 125 | 44 | 119 | 56 |
| SAPULPA | 4145 | 117 | 66 | 122 | 67 | 115 | 65 |
| SAVANNA | 520 | 180 | 243 | 129 | 185 | 76 | 167 |
| SAYRE | 752 | 171 | 102 | 218 | 130 | 125 | 63 |
| SEILING | 445 | 319 | 270 | 334 | 320 | 348 | 322 |
| SEMINOLE | 1467 | 134 | 65 | 204 | 143 | 193 | 129 |
| SENTINEL | 390 | 257 | 238 | 301 | 263 | 287 | 235 |
| SEQUOYAH | 1171 | 39 | 24 | 30 | 14 | 51 | 28 |
| SHATTUCK | 261 | 257 | 269 | 343 | 348 | 341 | 351 |
| SHAWNEE | 3833 | 222 | 159 | 225 | 174 | 269 | 219 |
| SILO | 543 | 40 | 23 | 169 | 116 | 182 | 126 |
| SKIATOOK | 2008 | 108 | 61 | 117 | 107 | 108 | 78 |
| SMITHVILLE | 307 | 341 | 342 | 287 | 350 | 253 | 340 |
| SNYDER | 558 | 315 | 327 | 342 | 341 | 310 | 313 |
| SOPER | 267 | 310 | 328 | 146 | 202 | 290 | 311 |
| SPERRY | 1116 | 40 | 38 | 93 | 86 | 53 | 67 |
| STERLING | 365 | 56 | 99 | 1 | 38 | 1 | 37 |
| STIGLER | 1192 | 255 | 190 | 280 | 210 | 261 | 210 |
| STILLWATER | 5537 | 23 | 9 | 41 | 16 | 69 | 29 |
| STILWELL | 1537 | 336 | 309 | 289 | 212 | 260 | 221 |
| STRATFORD | 583 | 251 | 216 | 252 | 255 | 261 | 225 |
| STRINGTOWN | 243 | 30 | 167 | 209 | 310 | 159 | 226 |
| STROTHER | 402 | 177 | 186 | 111 | 193 | 185 | 191 |
| STROUD | 818 | 42 | 25 | 88 | 87 | 46 | 48 |
| STUART | 257 | 278 | 273 | 277 | 268 | 249 | 314 |
| SULPHUR | 1408 | 243 | 167 | 293 | 221 | 253 | 189 |
| TAHLEQUAH | 3431 | 231 | 176 | 260 | 195 | 275 | 214 |
| TALIHINA | 663 | 327 | 308 | 330 | 319 | 349 | 329 |


|  |  | 1996-1997 |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* | Model I | Model II | Model I | Model II | Model I | Model II |
| TALOGA | 193 | 334 | 338 | 337 | 340 | 286 | 309 |
| TECUMSEH | 2135 | 241 | 163 | 226 | 165 | 275 | 216 |
| TEMPLE | 283 | 218 | 319 | 1 | 284 | 59 | 253 |
| THACKERVILLE | 275 | 53 | 190 | 56 | 153 | 234 | 292 |
| THOMAS-FAY-CUSTER |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| UNIFIED | 507 | 308 | 270 | 320 | 293 | 339 | 293 |
| TIMBERLAKE | 383 | 282 | 319 | 253 | 268 | 264 | 278 |
| TIPTON | 413 | 261 | 243 | 245 | 283 | 223 | 337 |
| TISHOMINGO | 966 | 184 | 107 | 238 | 152 | 213 | 147 |
| TONKAWA | 747 | 48 | 78 | 41 | 52 | 77 | 105 |
| TULSA | 41326 | 249 | 184 | 250 | 206 | 220 | 214 |
| TUPELO | 264 | 264 | 264 | 296 | 272 | 329 | 293 |
| TURNER | 340 | 332 | 330 | 341 | 347 | 300 | 298 |
| TURPIN | 508 | 195 | 261 | 167 | 199 | 130 | 203 |
| TUSHKA | 344 | 195 | 189 | 202 | 193 | 249 | 219 |
| TUTTLE | 1193 | 50 | 21 | 50 | 17 | 56 | 25 |
| UNION | 11927 | 1 | 1 | 45 | 13 | 43 | 16 |
| UNION CITY | 313 | 1 | 1 | 60 | 110 | 121 | 139 |
| VALLIANT | 1005 | 216 | 163 | 154 | 61 | 55 | 22 |
| VANOSS | 513 | 180 | 117 | 209 | 126 | 308 | 240 |
| VARNUM | 287 | 42 | 173 | 1 | 114 | 1 | 79 |
| VELMA-ALMA | 626 | 67 | 100 | 63 | 143 | 204 | 218 |
| VERDEN | 324 | 31 | 81 | 119 | 174 | 83 | 149 |
| VIAN | 871 | 320 | 309 | 340 | 304 | 351 | 331 |
| VICI | 331 | 251 | 280 | 257 | 257 | 334 | 336 |
| VINITA | 1572 | 152 | 87 | 93 | 99 | 169 | 99 |
| WAGONER | 2308 | 267 | 194 | 246 | 158 | 227 | 165 |
| WAKITA | 191 | 74 | 346 | 189 | 312 | 1 | 240 |
| WALTERS | 721 | 63 | 53 | 66 | 80 | 112 | 82 |
| WAPANUCKA | 207 | 166 | 223 | 116 | 141 | 257 | 276 |
| WARNER | 800 | 136 | 133 | 189 | 165 | 203 | 174 |
| WASHINGTON | 644 | 1 | 15 | 1 | 46 | 1 | 97 |
| WATONGA | 1005 | 223 | 145 | 278 | 201 | 327 | 261 |
| WATTS | 374 | 126 | 230 | 44 | 206 | 142 | 222 |
| WAUKOMIS | 439 | 116 | 146 | 33 | 50 | 1 | 50 |
| WAURIKA | 512 | 166 | 176 | 77 | 137 | 52 | 145 |
| WAYNE | 456 | 172 | 254 | 48 | 131 | 138 | 94 |
| WAYNOKA | 293 | 276 | 296 | 351 | 346 | 292 | 278 |
| WEATHERFORD | 1999 | 164 | 97 | 174 | 89 | 179 | 109 |
| WELCH | 350 | 192 | 288 | 255 | 306 | 241 | 324 |
| WELEETKA | 455 | 344 | 344 | 339 | 324 | 335 | 321 |
| WELLSTON | 694 | 133 | 155 | 32 | 99 | 121 | 116 |
| WESTERN HEIGHTS | 3020 | 286 | 235 | 296 | 250 | 317 | 283 |
| WESTVILLE | 998 | 297 | 261 | 184 | 217 | 279 | 264 |
| WETUMKA | 476 | 106 | 246 | 101 | 253 | 93 | 271 |
| WEWOKA | 858 | 303 | 254 | 348 | 329 | 324 | 310 |
| WILBURTON | 1090 | 267 | 198 | 204 | 185 | 255 | 208 |
| WILSON | 501 | 138 | 127 | 157 | 223 | 213 | 267 |
| WILSON1 | 355 | 185 | 324 | 1 | 293 | 1 | 308 |
| WISTER | 438 | 80 | 106 | 146 | 142 | 259 | 243 |
| WOODLAND | 576 | 288 | 317 | 327 | 321 | 342 | 343 |


|  | 1996-1997 |  |  |  |  | 1997-1998 |  | 1998-1999 |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| District | ADM* |  | Model I | Model II | Model I | Model II | Model I Model II |  |  |
| WOODWARD | 2906 | 69 | 30 | 110 | 40 | 134 | 71 |  |  |
| WRIGHT CITY | 476 | 98 | 105 | 307 | 297 | 273 | 209 |  |  |
| WYANDOTTE | 688 | 187 | 199 | 79 | 85 | 169 | 123 |  |  |
| WYNNEWOOD | 862 | 257 | 194 | 216 | 163 | 218 | 201 |  |  |

*ADM is the average ADM for the cross-sections

## 2 <br> VITA

Susanne Rassouli-Currier<br>Candidate for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Thesis: THE DETERMINANTS OF SCHOOL EFICIENCY IN OKLAHOMA:
RESULTS FROM STOCHASTIC PRODUCTION FRONTIER AND DATA
ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS
Major Field: Economics

## Biographical:

Education: Graduated from Hadaf High School, Tehran, Iran in May 1975; received Bachelor of Science Degree in Accounting and Finance from the College of Accounting and Finance, National Iranian Oil Company, Tehran, Iran in March 1980 and a Master of Business Administration from the University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond, Oklahoma in May 1994. Completed the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree with a major in Economics at Oklahoma State University in August 2001.

Experience: University of Central Oklahoma, Department of Decision Sciences, Adjunct Faculty, 1994-1995; Department of Economics, Visiting Professor, 1999-2000; Oklahoma State University, Teaching Associate, 1995-present.

Professional memberships: Oklahoma League of Economics, Southern Economic Association.


[^0]:    * ADM is the average ADM for the cross-sections

