HENRY LANE WILSON AND THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION, 1910-1914

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B. E. Y. and W. R. Y

PREFACE

The purpose of this thesis is to trace the diplomatic career of Henry Lane Wilson, the American ambassador to Mexico during the first three years of the Mexican Revolution. Mr. Wilson was appointed ambassador late in 1909 by President Taft and served under three successive Mexican governments. He was recalled by President Wilson August 4, 1913. As American ambassador and dean of the diplomatic corps in Mexico City, Mr. Wilson became an important influence in Mexican affairs during the Revolution under the administrations of Diaz, Madero, and Huerta. This thesis is an attempt to explain his relationships with these governments.

Whatever may be the verdict of future generations upon Mr. Wilson's conduct, it is certain that a study of his activities, as an official representative of the United States government, is essential to more pleasant relations between the United States and Mexico, for such study brings to the surface some of the causes for friction and misunderstanding.

The writer wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Watt Stewart for his guidance and helpful suggestions in connection with the work and to Professors O. A. Hilton, T. H. Reynolds, and Edward F. Willis for their constructive criticism. For assistance in the routine preparation, the writer is deeply indebted to his wife, Barbara Younger.

E.E.Y.

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Chapter I. The Rule of Porfirio Diaz: Causes of the Revolution

Just as a photographic portrait is obscure unless presented against a suitable beckground, so are the actions of a man or a policy of government often difficult to fathom except as they are viewed against the background of existing circumstances, which are themselves outgrowths of historical forces. A knowledge of the trend of Mexican affairs during the Diaz regime and at the rise of Francisco Madero serves to illuminate the career of Henry Lane Wilson as ambassador to Mexico from 1910 to 1913 and to indicate the motives which actuated him to play a decisive role in the overthrow of the popular and democratically-intentioned Madero government.

The rule of Porfirio Diaz was a most significant phase in the history of the Mexican Republic. This extraordinary ruler came to the presidency in 1876, and with the exception of four years, was Mexico's chief executive for a period of thirty-five years, or until 1911, when he was swept from power by a revolution led by Francisco Madero.[1]

During the years 1880-1884, though not president in name, he remained the dominant influence in the Mexican government by securing the election of a recognized "tool" to do his bidding.[2]

Having forced his way into office in 1876 on a platform of "no reelection", Diaz could hardly afford to succeed himself at the end of four years. But since his first term had been devoted in a large way

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[1]Frank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution, pp. 138, 139.
[2]Ibid.

to the building of a political machine, he was able to have elected an old "companion-in-arms", a mere "place-holder", General Manuel Gonzales upon whose retirement after one term he could depend.[3]

With the expiration of the Gonzales administration on November 30, 1894, Porfirio Diaz the next day began the long rule[4] which is considered the most constructive of the one hundred-year period during the republic to 1911. He gave Mexico political peace and stability and made this aspect of Mexican affairs the background for industrial growth.[5]

In order to retain political peace, as well as to satisfy his ambition for power, Diaz "planned indefinite self-perpetuation".[6] He was elected every four years, but as time went on, the elections became bare "political formulas" kept up for "appearance sake and less and less compatible with the desires of the people".[7]

Perhaps, his greatest asset as an administrator was his ability to choose coalition cabinets composed of capable men from the several political factions then existing.[8] It was a new condition in Mexican political affairs for the vanquished party to be rewarded with office.[9]

In breaking the old tradition, Diaz won over many opponents by giving them privileges. Those he could not conciliate through purchase and reward, he exiled or had assassinated.[10]

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[3]Ernest Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage, p. 55.
[4]Herbert Ingram Priestly, The Mexican Nation, A History, p. 279.
[5]Tannenbaum, op. cit., p. 139.
[6]Gruening, op. cit., p. 56.
[7]Tannenbaum, op. cit., p. 139.
[8]Priestly, op. cit., p. 379.
[9]Gruening, op. cit., p. 56.
[10]Ibid.

A third policy which President Diaz soon developed to stifle opponents was that of playing off his supporters against one another before they had gained sufficient strength to oppose him. In this manner active opposition was either pacified or ruthlessly crushed.[11]

Regardless of his tactics to secure a long tenure of office, Diaz is recognized by his worst enemies as having made great contributions to Mexico's prosperity.[12] When he became president, Mexico was ruined by civil war; it had no capital at home and no credit abroad. Agriculture was at a low ebb, the cogs of industry were clogged, and modern transportation was almost non-existent. A general lack of interest among the people seemed to dispel hope for Mexico's improvement. The long dictatorial regime has been described as a struggle "between General Diaz and General Apathy with Diaz the Victor".[13]

By 1911 when the aged Dictator was forced into exile, the Mexican government had credit abroad and a surplus of revenue in the exchequer. 15,000 miles of railroads had been constructed, ports developed, water power harnessed, and cities modernized and beautified.[14]

Some of the most successful Diaz reforms were made in the realms of the national treasury by the French Creole Jose Ives Limantour, a Porfirian appointee as minister of finance. Taking advantage of the long peace in Mexico, Limantour secured the suppression of the alcabala, an inherited Spanish tax which had hampered internal trade for centuries; changed the money standard from gold to silver so that the value of silver

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[11]Priestly, op. cit., p. 380.
[12]Ibid, p. 390.
[13]"Mexico and Its Maker", World's Work, XXII (June, 1911), 14431-3.
[14]Ibid; Tannenbaum, op. cit., p. 141.

would not undergo severe fluctuations; and effected a thorough organization of the Mexican banking system.[15]

These reforms brought into Mexico a flow of foreign capital which increased national production, developed commerce and industry, multiplied factories by the thousands, and created employment for many.[16]

Furthermore, the injection of foreign capital, with a subsequent turn of the wheels of industry, increased the national income from nineteen million to one hundred and thirty-six million dollars. Near the close of the Diaz rule, the surplus amounted to the latter sum. From this sum sixty-one millions had been spent on public works while seventy-five millions remained as a cash balance.[17]

Coming to power at a time when Mexico was at odds with many of her neighbors, Diaz wasted little time in resuming intercourse with all foreign countries.[18]

Meanwhile, another obstacle to economic penetration of Mexico by alien investments had been removed. Security of both life and property became a reality. Under Diaz, Mexico with the aid of her rurales, army, and municipal gendarmes, "became the safest country in the world, without exception". In 1910 it was the "fairest and brightest example of Hispanic American solidity".[19]

And yet a revolution, which was to last a decade, broke out; the

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[15]Priestly, op. cit., pp. 390-93.
[16]Ibid.
[17]Gruening, op. cit., p. 62.
[18]William Spence Robertson, History of the Latin American Nations, p. 57.
[19]Priestly, op. cit., p. 393; Tannenbaum, op. cit., p. 140.

Diaz power crumbled; and "the glory of Mexico proved to be evanescent." The dictator and able politician had been guided by two "complementary springs", one being ambition for power and the other, material prosperity for his nation. His ambition was realized, but his plan for the salvation of Mexico failed because of a one-man rule and a lack of wisely-administered justice. He had overlooked the importance of a lower class which required education for the good of the nation.[20]

Impressive evidences of progress in Mexico covered weaknesses that were to bring the apparent great work of Diaz to ruin. In his efforts to bring modern industrialization to his country, he had failed to destroy the feudal foundation of the Mexican economic system. Instead, "hot-house" industrialization magnified the existing evils and brought forward many new ones of its own.[21]

The Mexican dictator had failed above all else to develop his own people. Prosperity showed no creative effort on Mexico's part, and the system through which better times had apparently been established solved none of the nation's political, social, and economic problems. Diaz had fastened upon a nation of serfs the "shackles of political and economic servitude"[22] which only a revolution could break.[23]

During his time, less than twenty percent of the population was white. The remaining eighty percent was composed chiefly of half-breeds

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[20]Priestly, op. cit., p. 389.
[21]Tannanbaum, op. cit., p. 142.
[22]Gruening, op. cit., p. 63.
[23]Stephen Bonsal, "Mexico After Diaz", North American Review, XCIV (September, 1911), 394.

or pure Indians who had little to do in the affairs of their country. The Indian and the mestizo were assumed to be "congenitally and utterly incapable of responsible citizenship". The time within the scope of four centuries had been too short for this element of the population to learn proper control, according to the Diaz interpretation.[24]

Deprived of effective representation in their government, the Mexican masses, especially the agrarian class, found themselves at the mercy of their ruler who virtually gave away millions of acres of their lands to his favorites or to foreign investors.[25] The breaking up of the village communal lands which had been cultivated by the natives since the days of the Spanish conquest[26] reduced the village inhabitants to year-around wage earners or resident workers on large estates where they became indentured laborers.[27]

As the number of small landowners decreased and the village lands disappeared, more and more haciendas came into existence.[28] At the same time, the status of the lower class became almost intolerable. The Mexican laborer, forced by necessity to borrow money, found himself obligated in service to his landlord for his debts. He now became a serf.[29]

To make matters worse for the laborer, his cost of living rapidly increased, as the country became industrialized without an equal increase in wages. Money wages for industrial laborers did increase but not so

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[24]W. Archer, "Collapse of the Diaz Legend", McClures Magazine, XXXVII (August, 1911), 396.
[25]Gruening, op. cit., pp. 58-61.
[26]Ibid.
[27]Tannenbaum, op. cit., p. 151.
[28]Ibid.
[29]Robertson, op. cit., p. 661.

with the greater masses in Mexico--the agricultural laborers. Rising prices with a stationary wage and loss of lands created a general social unrest among the average Mexicans.[30]

The Indians, looked upon as the white man's inferior[31] were in some cases captured by federal officials and taken to great plantations where they were sold into bondage as slaves.[32] Thus, many Mexicans had been reduced to "utter destitution" and to the life of beggars while slavery and the system of peonage had been fastened upon them.[33]

Diaz had been able to initiate his program after the national congress had become like "plastic clay" in his hands.[34] He had also "hand-picked" the judiciary and gagged the press[35] so that opposition to his plans would have little chance to develop.

He now launched upon a program which drew deeper resentment from his already suffering people.[36] Hoping to advance material progress for his impoverished country, without equal regard for human values, Diaz invited foreign capital under broad and lavish concessions. Foreign investors needed little encouragement. They took the Mexican constitution and by-laws at their face value and were not interested in that part of their host's policy which was meant for the good of the Mexican people.[37]

If Diaz refused to grant huge concessions by open proclamation, he

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[30]Tannenbaum, op. cit., pp. 144, 149.
[31]Ibid., p. 144.
[32]Robertson, op. cit., p. 662.
[33]Archer, loc. cit., pp. 395-411.
[34]Robertson, op. cit., p. 661.
[35]Gruening., op. cit., pp. 56-58.
[36]J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico, p. 231.
[37]Samuel Flagg Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States., pp. 540-542.

usually granted them in the secret places of his palace. Often such privileges or favors were awarded by close counsellors of the dictator who, it is said, sometimes lined their pockets with Yankee gold.[38] Concessions and privileges were made not only to foreigners, but to generals, colonels, and other military leaders and to aristocratic civilians.

Profits from foreign concessions paid the fees of small groups of Mexican lawyers, bureaucrats, and politicians, who lived in Mexico City, and made large estates for foreign residents or created great dividends for their stockholders abroad.[39] The mass of people, however, received few benefits from Mexican progress in education, sanitation, public welfare, and social improvement.[40] They were politically gagged and straight-jacketed[41] and could do nothing but watch their ruler scatter privileges with both hands to capitalists who were mostly foreign. Mexico seemed to exist for the enrichment of foreigners and a favored few.[42]

These holders of foreign concessions, often exempt from taxation, were favored against Mexicans. It was foreigner against Mexican, white man against Indian, and rich man against poor.[43] Differences between Mexicans and foreigners were usually settled in court in favor of the latter, especially if they were powerful.[44]

The "large-minded" verdict of the Diaz prosperity was given usually in glowing terms by the alien who had profited by the order

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[38]Rippy, op. cit., p. 311.
[39]Gruening, op. cit., pp. 58-56.
[40]Bemis, op. cit., pp. 540-542.
[41]Bonsal, loc. cit., p. 393.
[42]Archer, loc. cit., p. 400.
[43]Tannenbaum, op. cit., 151-152.
[44]Gruening, op. cit., pp. 58-61; Francixco Bulnes, The Whole Truth about Mexico, p. 193 ff. Quoted in Rippy, op. cit., p. 311.

of Mexican affairs and hoped to profit by its continuance.[45]

Concessions to foreigners, especially Americans, aroused a "smouldering, popular hostility in Mexico" which Diaz could keep down but which might burst aflame in horrible atrocities during unsettled conditions.[46] In his declining years he found himself between two strong forces: the foreign investor and the mass of his own people. In an effort to hold to one of these forces, he permitted his ministers to surrender to foreign capital and tried to suppress his people.[47] One writer has stated that he took his country through the Red Sea of civil war and anarchy but bowed down to the Golden Calf.[48]

Mexico's independence had become economic dependence upon the foreign investor. Instead of becoming loyal Mexicans, the foreigners created a system of absentee landowning; they took their money away, leaving only a meager part to the Mexican nation in taxes and wages; their interests did not conform to the interests of the Mexican masses.

Mexico had become the "safest country" in the world for tourists, commercial travelers, aristocrats, and foreign investors, but not for the humble Mexican. There was little "security of life" for the Indian or peon.[50]

Lowered standards of life for the masses, destruction of village organization, further development of the peon, alienation of Mexican natural resources by foreigners-all these conditions formed a background against which active revolt was soon to begin.

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[45]Archer, loc. cit., p. 396.
[46]Bemis, op. cit., pp. 540-542.
[47]Rippy, op. cit., p. 231.
[48]Archer, loc. cit., p. 399.
[49]Priestly, op. cit., pp. 15,16 ff.
[50]Gruening, op. cit., pp. 63-65.

Chapter II. The Early Revolution: The Rise of Francisco Madero.

Before the enthusiasm engendered by Mexico's centennial celebration of her independence from Spain had died away in 1910,[1] the Revolution, which was to continue for a decade in movements of action and reaction, burst forth. It began with a revolt under Madero and was ended with the efforts of Obregon and Calles to regenerate the masses socially and to bridle foreign concessions.[2]

The Madero revolt was political in its nature and was directed mainly against suppression of constitutional liberties under Diaz. But after becoming president, Madero allowed his political foes too many of the new liberties which had been created as a result of the Revolution. Hardly two years had passed when both he and his vice-president, Pino Suarez, were murdered.[3] They fell as victims of a _coup d'etat_ inspired by Diaz influences led by General Victoriano Huerta who represented the old military group in Mexico City.[4] This _coup_ had been actively encouraged and assented to by the American ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson.[5]

Following these murders, Mexico was controlled for more than a year by the Huerta regime which was a reaction toward the Diaz dictatorship. Its downfall was brought about July 15, 1914, after steady refusal of President Woodrow Wilson to recognize Huerta as the rightful ruler of Mexico.[6]

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[1]Tannenbaum, _op. cit._, p. 137.
[2]Bemis, _op. cit._, pp. 544, 545.
[3]_Ibid._
[4]Tannenbaum, _op. cit._, p. 163.
[5]Gruening, _op. cit._, p. 566.
[6]Bemis, _op. cit._, pp. 544, 545.

From the time of Huerta's resignation until the United States recognized the Carranza Government, October, 1915, Mexico endured a period of confusion created by strife between various military leaders who advocated different types of reform. Carranza's regime lasted from October, 1915, to April, 1920. During this time a new constitution, which embodied political, agrarian, economic, and social reforms, was promulgated. Carranza, however, was not destined to see the practical results of these reforms. Since he was ruthless and corrupt in his dealings, he was overthrown and murdered in 1920.[7]

From this point the Revolution was converted to orderly government and its reforms consolidated into definite policies and practical legislation by Presidents Obregon and Calles.[8]

For the actual initiation of the revolutionary movement, President Diaz was personally responsible. Forces of revolt were brought to prominence in March, 1908, after the publication of an interview between the Mexican President and James Creelman, an American journalist. The article, appearing in Pearson's Magazine, quoted the Dictator as follows:

> No matter what my friends and supporters say, I retire when my presidential term of office ends, and I shall not serve again. ... I welcome an opposition party in the Mexican Republic. ... If it can develop power, not to exploit but to govern, I will stand by it.[9]

These statements from the lips of Don Porfirio were much like an earthquake to the Mexican people and exceedingly startling to the world at large. Many Mexicans refused to believe the pronouncement

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[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] For. Rel., 1911, p. 348.

sincere. But as time went on and no denial was issued, a whirl of political agitation, which had been fermenting for several years, broke loose. Already, powerful figures, seeing that the Dictator could not live forever, had laid plans for a favorable position in the race for president.[10]

Organized opposition, though weak in its nature, had appeared in state elections as early as April, 1903. Peaceful demonstrations of protest had been suppressed by Diaz authorities by armed force through the use of which blood was shed. In 1905 Democratic Clubs were formed throughout the state of Nuevo Leon, a state convention was held in Mexico City, and a platform was drafted with "no re-election" as its chief plank.[11]

While this sort of discontent grew in the provinces, political schemes for securing the presidency were being made by various Diaz supporters. The most powerful aspirants were General Bernardo Reyes, civil and military governor in the northeastern states and former minister of war, and Jose Ives Limantour, head of the strong intra-governmental clique and former minister of finance. General Reyes, hoping to thwart any plans Limantour might have for ascendancy, had organized in the frontier states Masonic lodges which were really political ward clubs. The stepping-stone for either candidate was to be the vice-presidency.[12]

But their old chief, Diaz, ever alert to the ambitions of either friends or enemies for the presidency, had different plans for both

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[10]Priestly, op. cit., p. 396; Gruening, op. cit., p. 91.
[11]For. Rel., 1911, p. 348.
[12]Priestly, op. cit., p. 394; Gruening, op. cit., p. 91.

these men. He headed off the Limentour threat by proving him technically ineligibe on the ground that his father, born in France, was only a naturalized Mexican. To defeat the purpose of General Reyes whose political organization had proposed already to name him vice-president, Diaz chose for the post Ramon Corral, an arch-enemy of Reyes, and then completely disposed of the general by sending him abroad on a fictitious type of mission.[13]

Thus, it soon became evident that the Creelman interview was a "typical piece of Diaz duplicity" designed to locate his opposition. To the Anti-Reelection Party which had been encouraged by the interview, it seemed that Diaz not only planned reelection for himself in 1910, but also to impose upon Mexico the choice of Ramon Corral for vice-president. Since Corral represented the governmental clique in power, he was thoroughly unpopular. The opposition had hoped that Diaz would allow, at least, the free choice of a vice-president in the approaching elections, for the Dictator was now in his eightieth year, and there was the probability that the vice-president would succeed him before the expiration of another six-year term. In such case, the selection of Corral for vice-president meant a continuation of Porfirian policies.[14]

Faced with this situation, the opposition, composed chiefly of pro-Reyes and anti-Corral elements, became united as the Anti-Reelection Party. Leadership of the party fell to a group of young political idealists headed by the intellectual Francisco Madero.[15]

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[13]Gruening, op. cit., p. 91.
[14]For. Rel., 1911, pp. 348,439; Gruening, op. cit., pp. 91,92.
[15]Gruening, op. cit., p. 92.

The role played by this young idealist seems rather unusual when his antecedents and early life are considered. Madero was a rich landowner and a member of the privileged class in Mexico. His early life was one of luxury and ease. Yet he became known as the apostle of the common people and directed the forces which drove from power a government partial to the interests of the propertied classes.[16] Perhaps the position he took may be explained by a brief sketch of events in his early career.

The eldest of a large family of thirteen brothers and sisters, he was born on a large hacienda in the State of Coahuila, on October 4, 1883. Almost all the members of this family were well-to-do and not a few of them were rich. Their record as Mexicans was one of law abiding citizens. It is said that not one of them was ever a drunkard or a criminal.[17]

For the first ten years of his early manhood, Francisco devoted his interest to improving the many large family estates. He introduced modern agriculture, encouraged scientific irrigation, and took a lively interest in the mineral resources of the estates. In developing several rich gold and copper mines, he made use of modern stamp mills and smelters.[18]

These activities were to be of great political significance to Madero. Because of his wise and humane treatment of thousands of natives on the estates, he gained a reputation as a friend to the common man and a foe of peonage and contract labor. This reputation he obtained be-

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[16]Edwin Emerson, "Madero of Mexico", Outlook, XCIX (November 11, 1911), 615-621.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid.

fore he actually became interested in public questions.[19]

Previous to his marriage in 1900 at the age of twenty-seven, he had given little attention to political activity. He describes his awakening to such affairs in this manner:

> Like the majority of my countrymen of the better classes, I was living a tranquil life. ... Public affairs concerned me little ... Like all the rest, I simply let myself drift with the stream, buoyed up by nothing but selfishness.
>
> My criminal indifference - a characteristic product of the times - was subjected to a rude shock by the election massacres in Monterrey, April 2, 1903. This tragedy, which was witnessed by some of my kinsmen and friends, who with their own eyes saw the cowardly ambuscade prepared for the independent voters of Monterrey, made a most painful and lasting impression upon me.[20]

From this time on, Madero took up the cause of the independent voters, first in Coahuila and then all over Mexico. To him went the credit for the foundation of the Benito Juarez Democratic Clubs with branch chapters in almost every state. By 1905 he had become the acknowledged leader of all independent voters and openly campaigned against the Diaz government in the gubernatorial race of Coahuila. It was during this campaign that a warrant for his arrest was issued but recalled by President Diaz who already had the election well in hand.[21]

After 1905 Madero set out to prepare for the next presidential election of 1910, especially after it was known that Diaz would seek reelection and would have for his running mate the discredited Ramon Corral.[22] Scarcely five months had elapsed after the Creelman inter-

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[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.

view when Madero in October, 1908, completed the publication of his book La Sucesion Presidencial, which was an open declaration of his party's sentiments and served to influence public opinion against the reelection of Diaz.[23]

Like the Diaz promise of retirement, it was a beacon light for rebellion and was twice reprinted before 1910.[24] It was a mild expression against the Diaz regime but took space for the admiration of the dictator as an individual. After reviewing the history of the Mexican people and their grievances, Madero interpreted absolutism as the source of Mexican evils and defined the immediate issues as "effective suffrage" and "no reelection". Finally he urged Diaz to carry out his pledge to retire and permit the people to elect their successor without interference.[25] The book also emphasized the probability that a Corral administration would be even worse than that of Diaz.[26]

Thus, it so happened that when Diaz announced his candidacy for his eighth term which was to begin November 30, 1910, he was faced by a strong opposition which had met April 15, and nominated Madero for president and Vasquez Gomez, a former supporter of General Reyes, as vice-president.[27] At first Diaz looked upon the Madero campaign with contempt and listened in a private interview to the latter outline his plans for a political party.[28]

But as Madero traveled over the country during the 1910 campaign,

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[23]For. Rel., 1911, p. 348.
[24]Priestly, op. cit., p. 396.
[25]Ibid.; Gruening, op. cit., p. 93.
[26]For. Rel., 1911, p. 350.
[27]Ibid., p. 351.
[28]Priestly, op. cit., p. 397.

fluently urging the people to rise against political tyranny and fight for constitutional government,[29] he was watched closely by federal police who reported the nature of his meetings and speeches. As soon as it became evident that personal attacks had been made upon the dictator,[30] Madero was arrested at Monterey on June 5, only twenty-one days before the election date. He was charged with having concealed a fugitive from justice, the fugitive being Madero's own private secretary who was habitually in Madero's house.[31] The arrest was made as a result of information supplied by a close friend of Ramon Corral upon whom President Diaz placed the blame for Madero's detention.[32]

The captive was then taken to San Luis Potosi, convicted of sedition, and imprisoned. However, during his imprisonment he was allowed to move about at liberty in the city of San Luis Potosi, after having made bail with the help of his friends. Four months later he escaped in disguise to San Antonio, Texas.[33]

Meanwhile, on October 4, despite popular Madero demonstrations throughout Mexico, the chamber of deputies declared Diaz and Corral elected for another six years.[34] A few days later Madero, now operating from San Antonio, counter-charged with a specific revolutionary program. He announced in the press as leader of a revolutionary junta[35] and declared the recent elections null and void.[36]

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[29]For. Rel., 1911, p. 350.
[30]Priestly, op. cit., p. 398.
[31]For. Rel., 1911, p. 350.
[32]Priestly, op. cit., p. 398.
[33]For.Rel., 1911, p. 350.
[34]Gruening, op. cit., p. 93.
[35]For. Rel., 1911, p. 350.
[36]Gruening, op. cit., p. 93.

The cause and purpose of the Revolution were explained in "The Plan of San Luis Potosi", a bold denunciation of the Diaz-Corral re-election.[37] Again the catchwords, "effective suffrage" and "no re-election", constituted the immediate objectives. But other significant reforms called for a distribution of large estates held by a few rich landowners; restoration of lands taken from Indian tribes; liberation of political prisoners, especially Indian prisoners of war who had been condemned to peonage; repudiation of the practice of making soldiers out of convicted criminals; and last, but not least, guarantees for free speech and free press.[38]

To execute this plan, revolutionary preparations were made while legal steps were taken by the Anti-Reelection Party to have the June elections set aside as fraudulent. The Party's electoral committee presented to the courts 150 election frauds, and then appealed to the national congress for a new election, when they were refused a hearing by the judiciary. Congress, also turned down the petition. The opposition was now convinced that rebellion only would effect a change.[39]

In November Madero entered Mexico from Texas and began to organize his support.[40] Already the news of revolt had spread like prairie fire. The plan had so greatly appealed to the discontented masses that almost everyone with a grievance in Mexico flocked around the Madero standard.[41] President Diaz at first refused to consider the situation

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[37] For. Rel., 1911, pp. 351,352.
[38] Emerson, loc. cit., p. 619.
[39] For. Rel., 1911, p. 352.
[40] Priestly, op. cit., p. 398.
[41] Gruening, op. cit., p. 94.

serious but was finally compelled to send troops into Chihuahua where disorders were rapidly spreading. Though the troops were able to gain sufficient advantage to preserve the State, they could not suppress the revolt. On the other hand, Madero, not finding sufficient force for decisive action, returned to San Antonio in December.[42]

Faced in this city with possible arrest for violation of neutrality laws, he re-crossed the border into Chihuahua on February 14 (1911), and made attempts to consolidate all the rebel forces for a signal success against federal troops. After several minor reverses, this objective was accomplished at Ciudad Juarez, opposite El Paso. Here the rebels took advantage of mismanagement of federal troops by Porfiro Diaz, Jr., who was directing the campaign in the illness of his father. On May 9, Ciudad Juarez fell and with it went the prestige of the Mexican government.[43]

Almost two months before this decisive rebel victory, President Diaz had made political efforts to save the situation. He had induced the return from Europe of Limantour who was given the privilege of forming a new coalition cabinet which would advocate reforms in keeping with the demands of the Revolution. But since the revolutionary leaders considered all proposed reforms as forced upon the government, they refused conciliation. Limantour then called an armistice and sent representatives to treat with the revolutionists who demanded the resignation of Diaz. When the demand was not met, the truce ended.[44]

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[42]Priestly, op. cit., pp. 398-399.
[43]Ibid., p. 399; Gruening, op. cit., p. 94.
[44]Priestly, op. cit., pp. 399-401; Gruening, op. cit., p. 94.

However, when the government received news of the defeat at Ciudad Juarez, it resumed negotiations which continued until May 21, when a treaty with the rebels was signed. By its terms, Diaz and Corral were required to resign and Francisco de la Barra was to become acting president until general elections were held. Diaz refused to resign until pressure from disorders and mob violence in Mexico City brought him to terms. He gave up, May 25, 1911. Corral's resignation was accepted by the chamber of deputies along with that of Diaz.[45]

The next day the aged dictator set out for the port city of Vera Cruz under the protection of federal troops led by General Huerta. Here he boarded a German steamer and sailed away to end his remaining days in Paris.[46] On the same day de la Barra assumed the presidency and accepted a cabinet composed of revolutionaries. Eleven days later (June 7) the "great apostle" Madero "amid hozannas and strewn flowers" entered the capital.[47]

Primary elections were held October 1, and general elections October 15. Choice of Madero as president was almost unanimous while Pino Suarez received a clear majority for vice-president. The successful candidates were inaugurated November 6, 1911, for terms to expire, November 30, 1916.[48]

The new president was a small man who weighed less than 135 pounds and was barely five feet, four inches high. His face bore a kindly and

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[45]Priestly, op. cit., pp. 401,402.
[46]W. Ritchie, "The Passing of a Dictator," Harpers, XCXXIV (April, 1912), 782-789.
[47]Priestly, op. cit., p. 403.
[48]Ibid.

intelligent expression which made him appear to be a sympathetic figure. He possessed a character of dogged perseverance and high moral and physical courage which almost became fanaticism when "partiotism or righting wrongs" were concerned.[49]

He has been regarded as an impractical, weak dreamer,[50] and, at least, it can be said that he was not a "strong man" in the same sense as was Diaz. Rather, he was "an energetic, worried little man, full of modern humane ideas". His personality seemed to inspire, rather than compel, and his strength was that of sympathy rather than force. He was a dreamer to the extent that he had faith in the ability of Mexico's people for the salvation of the nation.[51]

When he became president, Madero had already fulfilled one of his revolutionary pledges. By conducting honest and peaceable elections,[52] he had put Mexico through the motion of her first real political campaign. All votes in the fall elections had been cast with the semblance of free and universal suffrage.[53]

As president he was faced with the task of living up to almost impossible ideals which the hopes of his people demanded.[54] To guide people, who had been politically gagged for many years and now called upon to live under the freest of institutions, would be no easy undertaking.[55]

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[49]Emerson, loc. cit., p. 615-621.
[50]Tannenbaum, op. cit., p. 158.
[51]Arthur Ruhle, "Campaigning with Mr. Madero", Colliers, XLCIII (October 28, 1911), 35.
[52]Bonsal, loc. cit., p. 392; Gruening, op. cit., pp. 94,95; For. Rel., 1911, p. 514.
[53]Ruhle, loc. cit., pp. 18,35.
[54]Ibid. p. 35.
[55]Bonsal, loc. cit., p. 393.

Madero's success or failure would be determined by a number of circumstances. Perhaps the most important were (1) his own ability to handle situations as they arose, (2) the cooperation given to his administration by the people of Mexico, and (3) the degree to which the United States would encourage or discourage the Madero program.

The rest of this study will be devoted primarily to the position taken toward the Mexican situation by the United States Government as embodied by the Taft administration through the American Ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson.

Chapter III. Ambassador Wilson and the American Interests, 1910-1912.

Henry Lane Wilson was born November 3, 1857 at Crawfordsville, Indiana, of a well-to-do Scotch-Irish family. At the age of twenty-two he was graduated from Wabash College at Crawfordsville and began the study of law in the office of Benjamin Harrison. A few years later he became the editor and owner of the Journal of Lafayette, for a short time, and then moved to the state of Washington where he practiced law, engaged in real estate, and became a banker. Here also he began his political career by managing his brother's campaign for the United States senate in 1895. Not long after this political activity, Wilson represented his state on the committee that notified McKinley of his nomination. In 1904 during the Roosevelt campaign, he traveled over the various states of the nation to ascertain the feeling of the voters toward the approaching election.[1]

His initial service as a diplomat began in 1897 under President McKinley who appointed him minister to Chile where he remained until 1904. As a reward for his aid to Roosevelt in the election, he requested a diplomatic post in Europe and was appointed minister to Belgium, March 8, 1905. With more than ten years experience in the diplomatic service, Wilson was then chosen by President Taft late in 1909 as ambassador to Mexico where he became a vigorous defender of American interests during the overthrow of Diaz and the Revolution.[2]

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[1] Dictionary of American Biography, XX, 325.

[2] Ibid; "Progress of the World", Review of Reviews, XL, (August, 1909), 141.

By his antecedents and associations, Wilson before long became recognized as the champion of American business interests and concessions in Mexico.

Aside from his experience as a diplomat, his appointment was due to the political influence of his brother, former Senator John M. Wilson, a political boss of the state of Washington. Senator Wilson was a close political associate of President Taft's first secretary of the interior, Richard Ballinger, who was also from the state of Washington.[3] Mr. Ballinger's intimate relations with the Guggenheims were made conspicuous by the disclosures of the famous Ballinger-Pinchot controversy of 1909.[4] In Mexico, the Guggenheims owned the American Smelting and Refining Company which became a competitor to the vast Madero smelting interests which, it will be recalled, were first developed by Francisco Madero himself.[5]

Soon after his arrival in Mexico, during the closing days of the Diaz government, it is said that Ambassador Wilson was surrounded by a small clique, "which in his protecting shadow, was determined to get rich quicker and was not over-particular as to the means employed". This group known in Mexico as the "Society of Friends of the American Ambassador", who represented only themselves but tried to speak for the entire American colony, was composed of business men or those representing business interests. Its numbers included a personal representative

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[3]Edward I. Bell, The Political Shame of Mexico, pp. 129-133.

[4]L. R. Glavis, "The Whitewashing of Ballinger: Are the Guggenheims in charge of the Department of Interior?" Colliers, XLIV (November 13, 1909), 15,16; Senate Document No. 248,61 cong., 3 sess., pp. 168-179; Senate Report No. 719,61 cong., 3 sess., pp. 283-291.

[5]Bell, op. cit., pp. 129-133; Emerson, loc. cit., p. 619.

of an American petroleum magnate, a former judge in the Orient, a lawyer, a business man who supplied furniture to business offices, a newspaper publisher, and a banker.[6] The ambassador was personally a strong advocate of the Taft-Knox "dollar diplomacy"[7] and became a "spear-head" in Mexico of the larger business elements that feared a general loss of their advantageous position.[8]

Since the Diaz government was founded on the major premise that foreign capital was to have its way unhampered, relations between Mexico and the United States had been pleasant as a rule for several years. Before the coming of Wilson upon the scene, it was believed that former Ambassador David Thompson was "as active in business as in diplomacy".[9] Therefore, it would seem that the new ambassador was setting no precedent in his early beginnings as a champion of American interests. The varied concessions and huge American investments which Mr. Wilson would appear to represent cannot be ascertained with a great deal of accuracy since the several estimates have differed as to specific figures.

According to the estimate of Marion Letcher, United States consul at Chihuahua, American investments in 1912 amounted to $1,057,770,000, a sum greater than all other foreign interests combined and almost twice the value of wealth owned by Mexicans. To go a bit further, the report showed that citizens of the United States owned one-half of the total wealth in the entire republic.[10] The Fall Committee of 1919

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[6]Gruening, op. cit., p. 561.
[7]Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters, IV, 239.
[8]Gruening, op. cit., pp. 95,96.
[9]Ibid., p. 559.
[10]Daily Consular and Trade Reports (July 18, 1912), p. 316.

rejected Letcher's report and placed the American total at one and one-half billions. It showed, also, that American enterprises controlled 78 percent of Mexican mines, 72 percent of the smelting industry, 58 percent of oil development, and 68 percent of the rubber output. By 1911, from forty to seventy-five thousand Americans had established their homes in Mexico.[11]

This economic invasion of Mexico by her neighbor of the North was begun first by railway builders who entered on a large scale and by 1902 possessed holdings to the amount of 300 million dollars. At the close of 1911, valuation of this enterprise had increased to 655 millions while statistics showed that Americans had constructed two-thirds of the 16,000 miles of railroads. Following the lead made by these promoters, miners from the United States came next with properties valued at 95 millions in 1902 and 250 million dollars nine years later, after the smelting industry had been added. A great deal of the mining was done by vast business concerns such as the Hearst Estate and the Guggenheims. Auxiliary investments included property of chemists, ore testers, and refiners valued at seven million dollars in a group of nine states.[12]

Equally significant were the American holdings in Mexican land. Its acquisition was begun by railroad and mining companies, which often bought large tracts of ranching, farming, and timber lands, but was continued by ranchmen, land speculators, planters, and small farmers. For example, by 1902 the Sonora Land and Cattle Company with head-

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[11] Fall Committee, Report, II, 3322, 3313.

[12] House Document No. 305, 37 cong., 2 sess., I, pp. 433-435, 503-505; Daily Consular and Trade Reports (July 18, 1912), p. 316.

quarters at Chicago owned 1,300,000 acres in Sonora. In Chihuahua the Hearst Estate acquired one-fourth of a million acres, and just across the border of New Mexico, the American-owned Palomas Land and Cattle Company possessed two million acres. Such holdings were found in almost every Mexican state, especially in tropical regions where sugar, cotton, rubber, coffee, and tropical fruits could be produced. As to the smaller holdings, it was estimated in 1912 that 15,000 Americans were residing in Mexico permanently and cultivating small tracts. In 1902 total American investments in Mexican lands fell between 28 and 30 million dollars. Ten years later, these holdings had more than doubled to the sum of 50 to 80 million.[13] According to Professor Rippy, "Mexico was rapidly becoming a land of large American estates.[14]

In the field of petroleum and its products, American capital was introduced first by Doheny and other business men of California, after the first well was drilled in 1902. The investments of this group grew so rapidly, from one million dollars in 1907 to 70 millions by 1922, that other concerns steadily followed until 290 companies from the United States had been organized with total investments of 90 million dollars. Of a miscellaneous nature, American interests in 1902 included manufacturers and foundry men who had property valued at ten million dollars in nineteen states, bank and trust and investment companies which held in three states seven million dollars; and public utility companies, druggists, merchants, grocers, and hardware men, all

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[13]Daily Consular and Trade Reports (July 18, 1912), p. 316; House Document, No. 305,57 cong., 2 sess., I, p. 436; Fall Committee, Report, II, 3312.

[14]Rippy, op. cit., p. 314.

of whom together controlled vast interests.[15] At this time 51 percent of Mexico's imports and 77 percent of her exports came from or went to the United States.[16]

When Ambassador Wilson came to Mexico, it was estimated that 19 percent of her population was foreign or American[17] and that 100,000 people from the United States were engaged in some form of business there.[18] A popular phrase ran current that Mexico was the "foreigner's mother and the Mexican's stepmother". Felix Diaz, a nephew of the dictator, called his country the "mistress" of the United States.[19] This large stake of American interest was to exert a great influence directly and indirectly upon the future affairs of that nation.

Mr. Wilson had been in Mexico less than a year when he began using his diplomatic post to suppress all anti-American sentiment. His first attack was made upon the Mexican newspapers in November, 1910, when an article called the "Cloven Hoof of Dollarism" appeared in El Debate. The article, inspired by the burning alive by a Texas mob of a Mexican, charged with rape and murder, was sufficient to cause the ambassador to direct notes of an exciting nature to both the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs and to Washington. To Secretary Knox he wrote that the article had for its "evident purpose" to "excite public opinion and to incite the populace to violence" and that it had produced such results.

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[15] Fall Committee, Report, I, 207; House Document No. 305, 57 cong., 2 sess., I, 503-505; Consular Reports (July 18, 1912), p. 316.

[16] William Spence Robertson, Hispanic American Relations with the United States, App., p. 419.

[17] "The American Interest in Mexico", World's Work, XXVI (February, 1911), 13950.

[18] "Mexico: A Review", Outlook, XXVII (May 16, 1914), 112.

[19] Rippy, op. cit., p. 331.

He went on to explain how the agitation had led to the "assemblying of a mob" from which "inflammatory" speeches were made. The mob had then marched to the American-owned daily, The Mexican Herald, and attacked the building with stones, threatening the safety of the Herald employees, and later in the night, the group of marauders had assumed "dangerous proportions and malignant character", committing further acts of "vandalism".[20]

Mrs. A. D. McClaren, who spent many years in Mexico and who was present at the time of these incidents, wrote to a friend in the United States that the mobs did not really amount to much but consisted chiefly of "half-grown boys, students, perhaps", who resented the manner of lynching more than just an ordinary execution. She was convinced that the whole thing was a "farce".[21] Nevertheless, a visit by the ambassador to President Diaz brought about the prompt extinction of El Debate. A few days later, Mr. Wilson sent to the president a written demand for action against the Catholic daily El Pais and the Diario del Hogar for their anti-American articles, and Enrique C. Creel, the Mexican foreign minister, ordered them suppressed as "un-patriotic".[22]

President Diaz maintained that these demonstrations and newspaper comments were not indicative of anti-American sentiment on the part of his people but were a by-product of anti-Diaz feeling.[23] If this

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[20]For. Rel., 1911,pp. 354, 355; Ramon Prida, De la Dictadura a la Anar quia, I, 162, quoted by Gruening, op. cit., p. 560.

[21]Alice Day McClaren, "The Tragic Ten Days of Madero", Scribners, LV (January , 1914), 100.

[22]For. Rel., 1911,pp. 355-363.

[23]For. Rel., 1911, p. 360.

were the case, then the incoming Madero government, which was essentially friendly to the United States democracy, could hope for pleasant relations between the two countries, for the apparent happy condition of the people under the Government to the north was a goal to which the Maderists proposed to work. But the opposite happened. Instead of a decrease in anti-Americanism under Madero, it increased as time went on, and the source of much of it could be traced to the opposition of Ambassador Wilson to Madero and "everything he represented." On frequent occasions the ambassador was publicly hissed.[24]

In the beginning, President Taft had looked upon the Maderist government through "conventional, legal eyes" and immediately recognized it. But soon both the president and Secretary Knox became alarmed to the extent that they feared Madero would not be sufficiently able to protect American interests according to their existing legal rights.[25] However, Secretary Knox maintained a policy of moderation and restraint during the era of revolution. In general, the Taft administration followed the policy of dollar diplomacy in relation to Mexico. Throughout the Madero administration the attitude of the United States was friendly and the diplomatic notes dispatched to Mexico by Secretary Knox were, with few exceptions, temperate and courteous. Yet, President Taft maintained in Mexico an ambassador who was openly hostile to the Madero government. As a rule, Wilson's activities were heartily approved at Washington. The

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[24]Edith O'Shaughnessy, Diplomatic Days, p. 37; Gruening, op. cit., pp. 561,562.

[25]Bemis, op. cit., p. 546.

ambassador was given much freedom of action and his conduct as a representative of the United States government was seldom questioned.

The fears of Taft and Knox came, no doubt, from the revolutionary president's seeming inability to put down armed revolts in both northern and southern Mexico, but they were further elevated by the American ambassador's notes to the department of state. Several months before Madero came to office, during the provisional government of de la Barra, Mr. Wilson wrote two confidential notes to Secretary Knox and expressed fear that the Madero rule "might lead to disrespect of constituted authority". On June 11, 1911, he listed in detail probabilities for Madero's failure.[26] As to the new president's policy toward the United States, it was a "mild reaction" from the Diaz "subservience". Madero had written in his La Sucesion Presidencial "that each concession constitutes a precedent and many precedents constitute a right".[27]

This statement within itself might have been sufficient to make of the American ambassador a "presser" of claims for his wealthy friends. At least, he continued to play that role, and his inability to get quick results from these claims aroused within him a resentful feeling that may be detected in his reports to Washington.[28] On January 23, 1912, he wired:

> Mexico is seething with discontent- -principally among the higher and educated classes, who in the final analysis must rule this country ... At this present moment the area of actual and open rebellion against the Government is not inconsiderable.[29]

Later, on February 20, Mr. Wilson became so greatly alarmed

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[26] For. Rel., 1911, p. 509.
[27] Gruening, op. cit., pp. 561,562.
[28] Ibid.
[29] For. Rel., 1912, p. 714.

over the "danger of the situation" that he assumed enough responsibility to confer with Madero's most pronounced opponents for the sake of a better "moral effect" upon the country. In this instance, it seems that he failed to consider the thought that such action on the part of an ambassador would place Madero in an inferior position and would leave the impression that the president could not direct his own affairs. In explanation, Mr. Wilson wrote:

> I have recently been so deeply impressed with the danger of the situation and so profoundly apprehensive of the responsibilities which the downfall of the Madero Government would place upon our own Government that in addition to affording this Government every particle of information and advice which I thought of use or benefit, I have most discreetly and carefully, through reliable persons generally, but directly in two instances, endeavored to induce leading members of the Catholic Party, of the old regime, and of the commercial elements of the city to make some demonstration of a public character, coupled with a tender of service and support, as might have a moral effect upon the country at large. I believe such a moment is now under contemplation.[30]

In less than a year, the ambassador was to confer again with members of the old regime, this time, not for moral effect but for the overthrow of the only government which represented a national desire in Mexico. But as for the more immediate effects of his alarmism as expressed in his notes to Washington, he was to some extent responsible for the mobilization of the entire regular army of the United States on the Mexican border, February 4, 1912. To a great part of the Mexican population, this act was interpreted as meaning disapproval of the Madero government, and whatever might have been the motive of the United States, the 100,000 man-power demonstration vitally affected the Mexican government.[31]

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[30] Ibid., p. 723.
[31] Gruening, op. cit., p. 562.

Giving encouragement to practically all hostile persons and groups, it stimulated rebellion, encouraged banditry, and to Madero, was "a thrust which it is scarcely an exaggeration to number with the wounds that killed him. And it spilled rivers of blood in Mexico."[32] The opposition used this military threat from the United States as a means of stirring up popular fear of intervention under the Madero government which they claimed was too weak to protect the nation.[33]

In the United States many leading newspapers supported President Taft's armed threat to Mexico, but out of the general voice of approval came dissent and criticism. The New York Globe argued that however weak the Madero government was, it was the best thing in sight and that the wisdom of further weakening it was not "manifest". The Taft administration, affirmed the New York World, was under "temptation to play with fire."[34]

It is true that in the course of frequent revolts under Madero, losses of both life and property were suffered by foreigners and Mexicans alike during the development of considerable lawlessness in scattered regions. Madero found himself face to face with a varied and strong opposition as soon as he became president. In his attempts to live up to his promise to restore political liberty, he permitted his enemies the opportunity to betray his government. Arrayed against him were the land barons, the clericals, and the political "outs" - the same ring of men who surrounded Diaz and made his rule finally unbear-

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[32]Bell, op. cit., p. 148.
[33]"Warning Mexico", Literary Digest, XLIV (April 27, 1912), 870,871.
[34]Ibid.

able: the money centers of the world, including Wall Street and the Morgan interests; larger business groups in general, especially American, who feared the passing of the concessionaire system and cheap labor; a miscellaneous mass of people who had turned against the new regime when they failed to receive personal profit from it; and the disinherited peasantry, especially the agrarian division of the South led by Zapata.[35]

Of this last element, Zapata, an Indian from Morelos, had joined the Maderists during the Revolution because of their promise to restore the confiscated lands, but had resumed fighting when Madero was slow in bringing about radical agrarian reforms. Zapata's rebellion continued to grow until in 1912 several states were affected.[36]

In the North, Pascual Orozco, another former Maderist, disappointed because Madero refused to pay him one hundred thousand pesos for his service in the Revolution, began a second agitiation financed by the Terrazas family, wealthy land barons of Chihuahua. General Luis Terrazas was the father-in-law of Enrique C. Creel, a member of the old Diaz governmental clique, a banker, and part-American who had readily acquiesed in the American ambassador's demand that the two Mexican newspapers be suppressed because of their anti-American articles. General Terrazas, piqued at Madero's efforts to have his twelve-million acre estate surveyed and appraised for just taxation, had joined his

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[35]Dolores Butterfield, "Situation in Mexico", North American Review, CXCVI (November, 1912), 649; John A. Avirette, "The Situation in Mexico", Colliers, XLVIII (January 27, 1912), 14; Gruening, op. cit., p. 95.

[36]Dolores Butterfield, "The Conspiracy Against Madero", Forum, L (October, 1913), 469; Gruening, op. cit., pp. 141-144.

interests with those of Creel to form a strong financial support of the Orozco rebellion.[37]

In less than one month after the mobilization of the United States army on the Mexican border, Orozco initiated his revolt through a mutiny of the garrison at Ciudad Juarez, March 1, 1912. Even though the seizure of this city made his forces seem formidable, they never numbered more than five or six thousand men and soon became disorganized into lawlessness. However, the insurrection became a target for the Mexican press which was controlled chiefly by the old group of political "outs". Joined by the capitalist foreign press, it assailed Madero and his policies on every hand.[38]

To make matters worse for the president, Ambassador Wilson "pricked and harassed the Government with every grievance, real, manufactured, or imagined" and his notes to Secretary Knox were filled with greater tension as news of the Orozco uprising spread. On March 2, he urged Americans to abandon different sections of Mexico. It is interesting to note that other foreign diplomats were not equally concerned, for they sent no similar warnings to their nationals.[39]

Two weeks later he telegraphed the department of state for arms - 500 rifles and ammunition for self-defense to be sent to the "Arms and Ammunition Committee of the American Colony".[40] With the assent of the government to the first order,[41] the ambassador made a similar request,

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[37]Butterfield, ibid., pp. 469,470; "Our Course in the Mexican War", Review of Reviews, XLIII (May, 1911), 533-538.

[38]Butterfield, ibid., p. 470; Gruening., op. cit., pp. 302,562.

[39]For. Rel., 1912, p. 731; Gruening, op. cit., p. 562.

[40]For. Rel., 1912, p. 747.

[41]Ibid., p. 755.

March 22, on the behalf of the American Colony Committee for one thousand Krag-Jorgenson rifles and 250,000 cartridges. The next day he demanded treble the number of cartridges.[42] Mrs. McClaren, an American resident in Mexico City, wrote on April 5 to a friend in the States that so much had been said about the Capital being entered that she and her husband had begun "to mock". She explained that every time a firecracker was exploded they looked at each other in a jesting way and said, "They are taking the City".

To explain a previous falsely-reported disturbance, she related an incident which occurred while she was dining with a diplomat. During the dinner, when a maid rushed in and reported fighting at a certain place, the diplomat arose and immediately telephoned a newspaperman of the incident. The reporter, not taking the call at its face value, rushed to the scene of action to find only a sleeping village. Inquired Mrs. McClaren of her friend, "Are the man's dispatches to his government as frenzieed as this?" She explained that the occurrence was a small matter but that "it might happen equally well in a large one." Though the lady did not reveal the name of this diplomat, the incident might tend to show that official reports were sometimes exaggerated. Other of her letters left a similar impression of both the press and diplomatic circles.[43]

Nevertheless, Mr. Wilson continued his requests for more munitions. On March 25, he made an additional order which threw a new light upon his insistent demands. The telegram to Washington ran as follows:

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[42] Ibid., p. 756.
[43] McClaren, loc. cit., p. 101.

> Mr. George W. Cook and Mr. Emanuel Beck, wealthy and responsible Americans in Mexico City, desire from patroitic motives and on their own responsibility to order an additional 1,000 rifles, 1,000 field-service belts, and 1,000,000 cartridges, to be shipped with and in the same manner and for the same purpose as represented in the order sent through the Department by telegram... This should leave New York City on next Thursday and as part of the original order.[44]

This time, the Department wired back that it was "disinclined to accede" to the request of Cook and Beck without more information regarding the urgency of arms and the purpose for which they were to be used.[45] However, three days later a large shipment was dispatched on a Ward Line steamer, consigned to Wilson and invoiced to the military attache, supposedly to be used for the protection of the American colony.[46]

That the munitions were used for the purposes specified by Mr. Wilson is to be doubted. On May 3, the Madero government expelled from Mexico two naturalized Americans as pernicious foreigners, when it became known that they were conducting a mail order business under the name of the Tampico News Company which was delivering arms and munitions to the rebellious Zapata. Later it was learned that two directors of this so-called News Company were members of the ambassador's inner circle. One was none other than Mr. Beck, president of the Mexico City Banking Corporation, for whom Mr. Wilson had solicited arms; the other was Mr. Beck's attorney, Burton W. Wilson, an American lawyer.[47]

On August 22 (1912) the Ambassador informed Washington that con-

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[44]For. Rel., 1912, p. 758.
[45]Ibid., p. 766.
[46]Ibid., p. 758.
[47]Bell, op. cit., pp. 202,203.

ditions in six states were "as bad as at any time during the two revolutions, if not worse" and that the government was apparently "incompetent to meet the situation..."[48] Two hours later he advised calling the president's attention to the

> ...growing anti-American spirit of the Madero administration, which not only shows a decided preference for European markets in all lines, but is harassing and discriminating against American interests, at the instigation of a group of corrupt men who surround the president, and manifested recently in the lockout of the American employees of the railways, in the persecution of the Associated Press, and the one American newspaper in Mexico, in the Government's suborned decision in the Tlahualilo case, in the discriminatory and almost confiscatory tax placed on the oil products of Tampico, and in the present attempt to annul the concession of the Mexican National Packing Co. in spite of the protests of the Embassy and the British Legation, which annulment would involve a loss of several million pesos to the United States Banking Co. trust. ...it is respectfully suggested that a positive stand in all Mexican matters is advisable, in view of the services we have rendered to Mexico and our patience with the Government.[49]

At another time he recommended to Washington that Latin American countries should be dealt with "justly and calmly but severely and undeviatingly". To act otherwise, he affirmed, would bring "disaster and forfeit" to the United States, for the people (Mexican) would lose the "respect and awe" which they had been taught to give "us".[50] In keeping with his idea of taking a "positive stand" and dealing "calmly" with Mexico, the ambassador, in collaboration with the Department of State, sent a strong note to Minister of Foreign Affairs Pedro Lascurain, listing several Americans killed in various parts of the country and demanding immediate settlement for a variety of claims. He concluded with the demand for a

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[48]For. Rel., 1912, p. 826.
[49]Ibid., pp. 826,827.
[50]Bemis, op. cit., p. 546.

> ...comprehensive and catagorical statement as to the measures the Mexican Government proposes to adopt ... to bring about such an improvement in general conditions throughout Mexico that American settlers ... will no longer be subjected to the hardships and outrages attended by a more or less constant state of revolution, lawlessness, and chaos.[51]

Though the grievances at this time were really not so great as the ambassador would have them appear, Minister Lascurain ably answered each, referred to similar attacks on Mexican citizens, and indicated willingness to do complete justice.[52] He first expressed surprise at the tone of the note and then took up the grievances one by one. Of the thirteen Americans reported to have been killed in Mexico, four cases had occurred during the Diaz regime, and judicial investigation had been made in ten cases out of which three men had been sentenced to long prison terms and two released for the lack of evidence. In a third case the death of a certain Henry Crumbley was due to a wound received in a fight with a peon over the fact that Crumbley was making love to the peon's wife. Three other Americans who were killed were filibustering, explained Lascurain, and were engaged in active warfare against the government. The remaining cases were under investigation.[53] Therefore, he continued:

> The attitude of the Mexican Government with reference to the prosecution and punishment of persons guilty of violence against American citizens has been adjusted to the law and it cannot be made the subject for reproach, except as the result of eminently partial and adverse judgment, which is not in keeping with the proofs of amity previously received and with the course followed by the Government of the United States with reference to crimes committed within its territory against Mexican citizens. By way of an example, I may refer to the following among other cases

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[51] For. Rel., 1912, pp. 842-846.
[52] Bemis, op. cit., p. 546.
[53] For. Rel., 1912, pp. 871-873.

> which could be mentioned, to wit: Antonio Rodriguez, burnt alive in Rock Springs, on November 9, 1910; Celso Cervantes, murdered by an American policeman in Los Angeles, California, the murderer having been acquitted; Damian Rios and another Mexican, murdered in Texas in November, 1910; Cruz Rodriguez, murdered in Del Rio by an American Customs officer; The latter was acquitted because it was said that the victim was drowned in the river while escaping from his pursuers. Nicanor Trevino, murdered in Galveston in June, 1911; Antonio Gomez, a boy, lynched in Thorndale in November, 1911. The above are a few of the many cases which prove the procrastination or indifference of the American authorities. The Mexicans arrested at Seguin on August 5 of this year, wounded by the constables and sheriffs at Marion, Texas, and placed without medical treatment in a dungeon, where one was found dead on the following day, prove the injustice of the imputation of cruelty and insensibility on the part of the Mexican judicial authorities. ... I beg to invite your attention to the fact that last year only three Americans were victims of violence, and three more during the present year. On the other hand, during the month of September alone, of 1910, there were three American victims, and one in the month of November of the same year, prior to the commencement of the revolution. From the above it can be clearly seen that outrages committed are those which appear under normal conditions.[54]

Denying the imputation that the Mexican government was hostile to interests of the United States, Lascurian took up one by one the claims upon which Mr. Wilson had demanded a "comprehensive" statement. The Tlahualilo Company, a British cotton-growing organization, had brought suit against the government because it had not received a certain amount of water from the Nazas river to irrigate its property and had found court decisions repeatedly unfavorable. Even the Diaz administration had disputed the company's right to the water since thousands of small Mexican growers would be affected adversely. The company's claims, if not unlawful, were questionable.[55]

As for the Tampico oil companies which the ambassador claimed were taxed "out of anti-American sentiment", senor Lascurain pointed out that the tax amounted to one and one-half cents per barrel and

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[54] Ibid., p. 873.
[55] Ibid., p. 875.

could scarcely be considered exorbitant when the tax on oil in California was far more. Besides, he argued, the same tax had been levied on English and Mexican oil interests as well and had been accepted without discussion. Under Diaz the owners of the great oil interests had paid no tax at all. Under Madero the companies had entered into several contracts which exempted them from all taxation except the one paid by revenue stamps, and against this one the ambassador had objected.[56]

The Mexican Herald, which Mr. Wilson considered as "persecuted", had formerly received a subsidy from the Diaz government, and because the Madero administration had refused to do likewise, it had become violently hostile to the president's policies, not only editorially but by means of a terrific campaign in which false reports had been published to cause alarm throughout Mexico. The government, therefore, suppressed one issue of a "foreign mercantile concern, which speculated with the peace of the country", this particular issue having announced a disastrous defeat of the government forces by Orozco.

After the single issue had been suppressed, the directors of the journal took advantage of the opportunity to suspend its future publication because it had not been yielding profits. They then pressed the government for supposed losses even though they were at liberty to continue its publication. The matter of the Associated Press was only a disagreement between the press association and the government over terms of a contract. Actually the ambassador had attempted to

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[56] Ibid.

convert the defunct Herald into an American "right".[57]

The complaint of the ambassador concerning a lockout of American employees on the railways was answered with the information that the said lockout was nothing more than a walk-out on the part of American workers, after the government had decreed the use of the Spanish language in train orders. Such action was a part of Madero's general policy to Mexicanize railways and was, it is true, a distinct reaction against the partiality shown by the Diaz regime to a minority of Americans over a majority of Mexican employees. Thus, it was evident that the pendulum was swinging the other way. But a similar policy by a stronger nation might have been accepted without diplomatic pressure being exerted.[58]

Another claim which Mr. Wilson pressed amounted to $3,000,000 for Chinese murdered at Torreon. The fact that one of his close associates, Judge Wilfley, was counsel for the case creates the impression that the ambassador's interest was not altogether humanitarian.[59]

Thus, with the close of the year 1912, the American ambassador had become distinctly hostile to the Madero government as evidenced by his alarmistic notes to Washington and by the dubious, but frequent, claims pressed upon the Mexican government. Such evidence will assume the nature of an indictment against Mr. Wilson's conduct, after it is shown in the following chapters that he vigorously supported the Huerta regime which came into power through the use of treachery and murder and proved

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[57] Ibid., p. 874.
[58] Ibid., pp. 910-924.
[59] Gruening, op. cit., p. 566.

itself incapable of preserving order in Mexico equal to that not preserved by the Madero administration.

Chapter IV. Ambassador Wilson and the Coup d'Etat, February, 1913.

With the coming of the year 1913, Mr. Wilson's opposition to the Madero government became magnified to the point that he supplemented his more passive role of complaining through the use of distorted and alarming diplomatic notes with active participation in a coup d'etat which overthrew the Maderist regime and cost the lives of both the president and vice-president by treacherous assassination.

As early as January 7, 1913, the ambassador wired Washington that the situation was "gloomy if not hopeless".[1] And a week later, he reported that the Madero government was planning a sham revolutionary uprising in order to kill Felix Diaz and his companions in prison, "and to make it appear that they were killed accidentally, or to be justified in shooting them immediately afterwards". He urged sending a warship.[2] It may be stated here that action of this nature on the part of Madero was completely out of harmony with his policy of forgiveness and amnesty. As a matter of fact, Felix Diaz, at the time of the ambassadorial note, had been imprisoned, instead of being shot, because of the president's leniency. This "stocky and swarthy" nephew of former President Diaz had rebelled at Vera Cruz where an attractive customshouse was located, but failing to receive the entire support of the federal battalions as he had expected, he was captured by government forces, tried, and convicted of treason. By the practice of civilized nation and certainly

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[1] For. Rel., 1913, p. 692.
[2] Ibid., p. 693.

by Mexican precedent he should have been summarily shot, but Madero interceded to save his life and allowed his transfer to the citadel, an arsenal and prison, in Mexico City.[3]

This act of clemency by the president proved to be the undoing of his government, for at the prison Felix Diaz met senor Bernardo Reyes, pompous general whom President Diaz had "shipped" to Europe because of his presidential aspirations, and who, upon hearing of the Revolution, hurried back to crush it. On reaching Havana, however, he heard of its progress and offered his services instead through a pledge of loyalty to Madero. Four months later he revolted when his prospects for the presidency proved unpromising. The rebellion was easily squelched and the general was imprisoned in Mexico City and treated with all courtesy.[4]

The prisons, now housing two arch enemies of the government, became the center of plans for its overthrow. Felix Diaz, Reyes, and several other prominent members of the military clique who were bitter over the loss of perquisites enjoyed under Porfirio Diaz conspired to depose the government and set themselves up in its place with Reyes as provisional president to be succeeded by Felix Diaz, while other members were to receive lucrative positions in the cabinet or army. General Victoriano Huerta was included in the plans but with less certainty.[5]

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[3]Gruening, op. cit., pp. 303,566; "Seven Days of Felix Diaz", Literary Digest, XLV (November 2, 1912), 774,775; William Carol, "The North and South War in Mexico", World's Work, XXVII, (January, 1914), 298-306.

[4]Gruening, op. cit., pp. 302,303; Butterfield, "Situation in Mexico", North American Review, CXCVII, (November, 1912), 465.

[5]Gruening, op. cit., pp. 303,304.

On the night of February 8, 1913, a group of cadets from the military college, in connivance with small bodies of disloyal troops, moved into the city and released Reyes and Diaz. The next morning, with the seizure of the arsenal, the rebels paraded into the great plaza in front of the National Palace and began the attack known as the tragic ten days. According to well-laid plans of the conspirators, the commander of the National Palace guard had been won over and was to submit at the beginning of the assualt, but due to the eloquence of Gustavo Madero, the president's brother, members of the guard were persuaded to remain true and the defense was turned over to the loyal and faithful General Villar. Consequently, when the rebels advanced, instead of a welcome, they received a volley and General Reyes fell dead. His men returned the fire, and then retreated to the citadel after the palace machine-guns began to sweep the square. Two hours later President Madero rode down on horseback from his residence in Chapultepec and serenly entered the palace.[6]

The attempt to depose the president was a "complete fizzle", and without the treachery of General Huerta, actively aided and encouraged by Ambassador Wilson, the coup would very likely have died at an early date.[7]

In the volley from the rebels, a bullet had shattered General Villar's collar bone, compelling his retirement. General Huerta, whom Madero had used against Orozco, was called to the palace and given charge of its defense and of the campaign to put down the rebellion.

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[6]Ibid., pp. 304,305; Bell, op. cit., 272-275.
[7]Ibid., pp. 304,566.

Meanwhile, in a secret conference, Huerta and Diaz had laid a new scheme for the president's downfall so that when Huerta assumed control of the army a "sham warfare" ensued. With four-fifths of the army loyal and with a force that outnumbered that of the rebels four to one, Huerta easily could have suppressed the revolt. Instead he rode daily with Madero as his friend but conducted attacks against the rebels so as to insure failure. For example, he hurried cavalry by train from far-away places and rushed the exhausted columns, mounted on half-starved horses, over slippery pavement to attack the three-story citadel armed with machine guns; he carefully aimed artillery so that shells fell on business sections of the city instead of on the rebel arsenal; and he kept up desultory fighting for ten days with great destruction of parts of the city, merely to create a picture of a civil war which, Madero not being able to put it down, would necessitate the service of the treacherous generals.[8]

On February 10, one day after the first sham attack, Ambassador Wilson wired the state department that practically all the local state authorities, police, and rurales had revolted to Diaz.[9] But according to another source, the entire rebellious force consisted of eight hundred men, three batteries of the artillery, and the palace guard.[10] On the day of the first assault (February 9), Wilson reported that Felix Diaz sent an emissary to ask the ambassador to urge Madero to

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[8]Gruening, ibid., pp. 304,305; "The True Story of Madero's Death", Forum, (September, 1916), 257-267.
[9]For. Rel., (1913), p. 701.
[10]Gruening, op. cit., p. 566.

resign in order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. Mr. Wilson explained that he refused to act until the man went away and returned with proper credentials. He then called together the diplomatic corp which delegated him to make demands of the minister of foreign affairs.[11]

On February 11 he notified the department that public opinion, both native and foreign, as far as he could estimate, seemed to be overwhelmingly in favor of Diaz.[12] A few hours later he wired asking that the government of the United States empower him with "firm, drastic instruction, perhaps of a menacing character", or that he be given general powers in the name of the president.[13] However, on the following day Secretary Knox replied that the president was not convinced "of the advisability of any such instructions at the present time".[14]

On the same day at 2:00, P. M., he explained that he had been informally notified by Diaz that he would expect the United States immediately to recognize his belligerency, if the rebels were successful in battle that day.[15] Still later, Mr. Wilson reported that he had gone to protest to the president against continuance of hostilities and found Madero visibly embarassed. He then visited Diaz who received him "with all honors of war". Mr. Wilson noted that the morale of the rebel troops was excellent.[16]

Three days later on the night of February 14, Ambassador Wilson sent for the British, German, and Spanish Ministers to come to the

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[11] For. Rel., 1913, p. 700.
[12] Ibid., p. 702.
[13] Ibid., p. 704.
[14] Ibid., p. 706.
[15] Ibid., p. 703.
[16] Ibid., p. 706, 707.

Embassy "to consider the situation and resolve upon some action". After a conference lasting from one o'clock in the morning until nearly three, it was decided to ask, "even without instructions", that President Madero immediately resign. The Spanish minister, designated to bear this view to the president, called the next morning upon Madero who refused to resign and maintained that diplomats had no right to interfere with domestic questions of Mexico. He further affirmed that as legally elected constitutional president, he would die in defense of his rights.[17] The next day the American ambassador went alone to confer with Huerta after an exchange of courteous notes had been made.[18] Two days later Mr. Wilson wired that Huerta notified him to expect some action that would remove Madero from power at any moment.[19]

From February 10 to February 18, the Mexican President was urged to resign first by the diplomatic corps led by Mr. Wilson and then by lukewarm politicians and wealthy Mexicans. He consistently refused and argued that such action would put a premium on future rebellions and would make the presidency a prize to any adventurer. He further maintained that his resignation would mean desertion of the masses who made him the legal, constitutional ruler of his country. In this case, it is pertinent to a study of this sort to note that those requesting the president's resignation for the "peace" of Mexico forgot to urge Diaz to cease his bombardment for the same purpose.[20]

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[17] Ibid., p. 712.
[18] Ibid., pp. 712,713.
[19] Ibid., p. 718.
[20] "True Story of Madero's Death", loc. cit., p. 286; Butterfield, "The Conspiracy against Madero", loc. cit., pp. 474,475.

The eleven-day bombardment enabled Huerta to lay his plans so that he, instead of Felix Diaz, would become president. On February 18 one of his generals entered the palace and arrested Madero and Vice-President Pino Suarez. They were then confined as prisoners, under heavy guard, in the palace. On the same day, Huerta, while lunching with Gustavo Madero, borrowed his pistol and left the restaurant. After a short time, he returned with soldiers and arrested Gustavo. The next night, Huerta turned the president's unfortunate brother over to a group of drunken officers who brutally murdered their victim. With the news of the arrests, both armies ceased firing. Thus, the coup had been effected.[21]

Huerta invited Diaz to the palace as soon as the arrests were made, but when these two conspirators were unable to agree on a meeting place because of their distrust of one another, Ambassador Wilson invited them to the Embassy where a conference, which lasted well into the morning, ensued.[22] Previous to this meeting, however, Mr. Wilson had wired the department of state that he understood the federal generals had taken control of the situation. As orginally planned, the coup was to take place at noon but an unexpected delay held it off until 1:30 P. M. In his note to Washington, the ambassador had reported the occurrence of an event one and one-half hours before it actually happened.[23]

In describing the role played by Mr. Wilson during the coup d'etat, Professor Herbert I. Priestly wrote:

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[21] Ibid.; Gruening, op. cit., p. 305.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Gruening, op. cit., p. 567.

> Henry Lane Wilson was inimical to Madero throughout the Tragic Ten Days. The Embassy was the center of anti-government activity. Huerta and Diaz visited him there on the night of February 18, and talked with him concerning their pact for the division of the governmental powers they had seized. There the names of the prospective ministers were discussed and agreed upon. Wilson then submitted them to foreign ministers, who were waiting in an adjoining room, and asked their comments, in case any appointments seemed inappropriate. The ministers merely took note of them but made no comment. They then listened while Rodolfo Reyes (son of General Reyes and a capable attorney who had ably supported his father's ambitions for the presidency) read to them what is popularly known as the "Pact of Ciudadela". Huerta and Diaz shortly thereafter left, singly. The members of the Corps, on taking their farewells, expressed solicitude for the lives of the executives. Mr. Wilson seemed not deeply moved. His associates noted that he had felt free to lend his influence to the destruction of a legitimate government and to listen to the plans of the usurping factions, but when it came to proposals to save the lives of the prisoners, he had no plans nor even suggestions to offer.[24]

Marquez Sterling, the Cuban Minister, explained that on the very night (February 18) that treason had overthrown the government, Huerta and Diaz met at the American Embassy and under the aegis of Mr. Wilson drew up the so-called "Compact of the Citadel", since known in Mexico as the "Compact of the Embassy". To the diplomatic corps, which was assembled at the invitation of its dean, the American ambassador, Mr. Wilson declared that Mexico had been saved and that from now on there would be peace, progress, and prosperity. And then he stated that he had known about the plans to imprison Madero for three days and that it had been to occur that morning.[25]

Next the ambassador announced the exact composition of Huerta's cabinet. When the compact was read aloud, he lead the applause, and as Felix Diaz entered, he cried out "Long live General Diaz, Saviour

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[24]Priestly, op. cit., pp. 395, 415.

[25]Marquez Sterling, Los Ultimos Dias Del Presidente Madero, pp. 471, 472. Quoted by Gruening, op. cit., p. 568.

of Mexico!" All present were invited to the buffet to drink champagne. After Huerta and Diaz had been ceremoniously ushered out, one of the diplomats inquired as to the fate of Madero, and the American Ambassador replied that they would put Madero in a madhouse, where he should always be kept. As for Pino Suarez, he was nothing but a scoundrel. If they killed him it would be no great loss. In reply to the Chilean minister's statement that the prisoners should not be harmed, Mr. Wilson affirmed that the diplomats "must not meddle in the domestic affairs of Mexico". Nothing further was spoken as the ministers passed quietly from the Embassy.[26] Later, one of them commented:

> This Ambassador does not refuse to allow a rebel chief under the roof of his government to plot the downfall of the legitimate government to which he is accredited. He is a willing witness to the compact; he even discusses the persons who will form the new government without a thought as to whether or not the matter deals purely with the domestic affairs of the country; but when the question turns to the saving of the lives of two officials whom treason and infamy are perhaps even now discussing the manner of killing, he finds his position as representative of a foreign power does not allow him to intervene.[27]

The Cuban minister expressed the Ambassador's responsibility in these words:

> Mr. Wilson has said since that "the Embassy converted itself into the center of all activities in favor of humanity". But in all truth, as I saw it, then and later, with the testimony of the Spanish Minister, Senor Cologan, and the numerous proofs which had been accumulating since, the embassy was not other than a center of true conspiracy against the government. ... Not the revolt of the Citadel, but the conspiracy of the embassy, had triumphed.[28]

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[26] Ibid.

[27] Ramon Prida, De la Dictadura a' la Anarquia, II, 547,548. Quoted by Gruening, op. cit., p. 568.

[28] Marquez Sterling, op. cit., pp. 391, 379, 380. Quoted by Gruening, op. cit., p. 567.

A trained and unbiased observer, Edward I. Bell, who was perhaps better informed on what happened than any other American,[29] had this to say of the ambassador's influence on the Madero government:

> Knowing as I do how narrowly Madero missed a triumph over the extraordinary difficulties and deadly enemies that beset him, I am constrained to believe that the least value which can be assigned to the unfortunate influence of the American Ambassador is still sufficient to have turned the scale.[30]

From the fall of the Madero government until the death of its former chief executive four days later, Mr. Wilson abruptly changed his policy of interference in the overthrow of the existing government to one of non-interference in the affairs of the usurpers to save the lives of the deposed officials. On February 19, the same day on which the front pages of Mexico City's newspapers were covered with news of Gustavo Madero's murder, he reported to Washington:

> I went to see General Huerta this afternoon to get guarantees of public order and to learn the exact situation. He gave me satisfactory assurances and explained that Gustavo Madero had been murdered, without orders. General Huerta said that the President and Gustavo Madero had twice tried to assassinate him and had held him a prisoner for one day. He asked my advice as to whether it was best to send the ex-President out of the country or place him in a lunatic asylum. I replied that he ought to do that which is best for the peace of the country.[31]

This interview with Huerta is conspicuous for its absence of a single word concerning the safety of the prisoners. The ambassador had failed to add any caution that "soldiers without orders" might also murder Francisco Madero. Instead, the next day, February 20, he wired that a "wicked despotism" had fallen. Within two more hours he again

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[29]Gruening, op. cit., pp. 304, 368.
[30]Bell, op. cit., p. 416.
[31]For. Rel., 1913, p. 724.

telegraphed, this time requesting the department to instruct "immediately" as to recognition of the provisional government, "now installed and evidently in secure position." He further added that it would be well to note that the provisional government took office in accordance with the constitution and precedents. An hour later he wired the text of the resignation which had been forced upon Madero and Suarez.[32]

The "constitutional means" by which Huerta came to power were arranged at the American Embassy on the night of February 18. According to the "Compact of the Citadel" every effort was to be made "under the best legal conditions" for Huerta to assume the presidency within seventy-two hours. This objective was accomplished by wringing resignations from Madero and Suarez, thereby permitting the presidency to fall, according to the constitution, upon Foreign Minister Pedro Lascurain who in turn appointed Huerta to the ministry and then resigned, leaving Huerta in power. Thus, Huerta was proclaimed provisional president on February 21. Before tendering the resignations, however, Senor Lascurain asked for effective guarantees of the prisoners' lives. To the request, Huerta swore upon a medal of the Virgin of Guadalupe, which had belonged to his mother, that no attempt would be made against the life of Madero.[33]

Meanwhile, at Washington, the department of state had sensed the ambassador's responsibility. One day after Mr. Wilson reported his visit to General Huerta, Secretary Knox wired:

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[32] Ibid., pp. 724, 725.

[33] Ibid., p. 722; Butterfield, "The Conspiracy against Madero", loc. cit., p. 476; Gruening, op. cit., p. 306.

> ... General Huerta's consulting you as to the treatment of Madero tends to give you a certain responsibility in the matter. It moreover goes without saying that cruel treatment of the ex-President would injure ... the reputation of Mexican civilization, and this government earnestly ... hopes to hear that he has been dealt with in a manner consistent with peace and humanity. ...You may in your discretion make use of these ideas in your conversation with General Huerta.[34]

In a second message the next day, February 21, the secretary informed Mr. Wilson that the shooting of Gustavo Madero had caused a most unfavorable impression in Washington and that the president was gratified to believe that there was no prospect of injury to the deposed president or vice-president or their families. [35]

Two days before the ambassador received these messages from Washington, several efforts were made in Mexico to induce him to intercede in behalf of the lives of Madero and Pino Suarez. On February 19, one day after Gustavo Madero's murder, the Cuban minister wrote Mr. Wilson a note, warning him of the danger, and offered the use of the Cuban ship Cuba at Vera Cruz to take away the prisoners. Both the father and mother of Madero wrote to the diplomatic corps, of which Mr. Wilson was dean by virtue of his being the only ambassador accredited to Mexico, requesting aid to save the life of their son.[36]

Finally Madero's wife called upon the ambassador and begged him to send a letter, which Madero's mother had written, to President Taft. About three and one-half years after this visit, Mrs. Madero related her experience with the ambassador, in an interview, to Robert Hammond

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[34] For. Rel., 1913, p. 725.
[35] Ibid., p. 726.
[36] Gruening, op. cit., p. 570.

Murray, a Mexico correspondent of the New York World during the Huerta and Madero regimes. During the World War this same correspondent headed the United States Committee on Public Information in Mexico City. The interview with Mrs. Madero took place, August 15, 1916, and was later presented to her for approval. On April 29, 1927, she swore to its correctness before the vice-consul of the United States in Maxico. The interview was first used by Ernest Gruening in his Mexico And Its Heritage through the courtesy of Mr. Murray, who holds a copy-right on the following account of Mrs. Madero's interview with the ambassador.

Q. When did you have your interview with the Ambassador?
A. That afternoon, February 20, 1913. Mercedes, my sister-in-law, was with me. The Ambassador was not in when we entered the Embassy. Mrs. Wilson received us, and caused a telephone message to be sent to the Palace (he was with Huerta at the National Palace) notifying the Ambassador that we were there.
Q. What was the manner and appearance of the Ambassador?
A. ... His manner was brusque. At times Mrs. Wilson tugged at his coat, apparently to try to induce him to speak differently. It was a painful interview. I told the Ambassador that we had come to seek protection for the lives of the President and the Vice President. "Very well, Madam", said he, "What is it you want me to do?" "I want you to use your influence to protect the lives of my husband and the other prisoners."
"That is a responsibility that I do not care to undertake, either for myself, or my government", replied the Ambassador.
"Will you be good enough then", I asked, "to send this telegram to President Taft?"
I handed him a message addressed to President Taft, which had been written by the President's mother and signed by her. It was through the Ambassador that our only hope lay in obtaining communication with President Taft. We supposed that the cable was in the hands of the government (the Huerta government) and that it was useless to expect that a message of this sort would be allowed to pass.
Q. What was the reply of the Ambassador to your request, after he had read the message?
A. "It is not necessary to send this," he said. But I persisted. "All right", promised the Ambassador. "I shall send it." He put the message in his pocket.
Q. What followed after you had delivered to the Ambassador the message directed to President Taft?
A. The Ambassador said: "I will be frank with you, Madam. Your

husband's downfall is due to the fact that he never wanted to consult with me." I could reply nothing to this, for I had gone there to ask a favor, to plead for my husband's life, not to discuss questions of politics, or policies with the Ambassador.

Q. What else did the Ambassador say?

A. The Ambassador continued: "You know, Madam, your husband had peculiar ideas." I said: "Mr. Ambassador, my husband had not peculiar ideas, but high ideals." To this the Ambassador did not reply, and I proceeded to say that I asked the same protection and assurance for the life of Vice-President Pino Suarez, as I asked for President Madero. The Ambassador's manner grew very impatient. "Pino Suarez is a very bad man", he said, "I cannot give any assurance for his safety. He is to blame for most of your husband's troubles. That kind of man must disappear. ..."

Q. What did the Ambassador mean by saying that Vice-President Pino Suarez "must disappear"?

A. I inferred that the Ambassador meant that the Vice-President's life must be sacreficed. I then represented to him that Mr. Pino Suarez had a wife and six children who would be left in poverty in the event of his death.

Q. What did he say to that?

A. He merely shrugged his shoulders. He told me that General Huerta had asked him what should be done with the prisoners. "What did you tell General Huerta?" I asked. "I told him that he must do what was best for the interests of the country", said the Ambassador. Here my sister-in-law interrupted and said: "Why did you say that? You know very well what kind of men Huerta and his people are, and that they are going to kill them!"

Q. What did the Ambassador say?

A. He made no response, but turned to me and said: "You know that your husband is unpopular; that the people were not satisfied with him as President". I asked, "Why, then, if this is true, is he not permitted to go free and proceed to Europe, where he could do no harm "? The Ambassador replied, "You need not worry; the person of your husband will not be harmed. I knew all along that this was going to happen. That is why I suggested that your husband should resign". "But if you knew of this in advance, Mr. Ambassador", I asked him, "Why did you not warn my husband"? "Oh, no", replied the Ambassador, "that would not have been good policy, because then he would have prevented it".

Q. The Ambassador is quoted in an interview in the New York Herald on March 21, 1916, as saying that you had requested him to ask Huerta to "Put your husband in the penitentiary for safe-keeping". Did you make such a request of the Ambassador?

A. No. We discussed only the personal safety and the urgency of Huerta being compelled to keep his promise to allow the President and the other prisoner to leave the country. "He seems to be getting along all right", said the Ambassador, "he has slept for five hours without waking".

Q. What was the outcome of the conversation?

A. When the interview was terminated and we went away, we had gained

nothing excepting the Ambassador's assurance that the President would not suffer bodily harm and his promise to send the message soliciting the intervention of President Taft to save the lives of the prisoners.

Q. Was the Ambassador's assurance carried out?
A. Two days later the prisoners were assassinated.
Q. Did you converse with the Ambassador in Spanish or in English?
A. In English.
Q. Is it your opinion that the lives of the President and the Vice-President could have been saved by the Ambassador?
A. It is my belief that had properly energetic representations been made by the Ambassador which it was reasonable to expect him to make, in the interest of humanity, not only would the lives of the President and the Vice-President been spared, but a responsibility would have been averted from the United States which was thrust upon it by the acts of its then diplomatic representative.[37]

A short time before midnight, February 22, the prisoners were taken from the palace and informed that they were being moved to the penitentiary for greater comfort. As they entered the automobiles for their removal, it is said that an eye witness heard Madero remark: "Comrade, this is the end". When the cars reached the rear of the penitentiary, the prisoners were asked to step out, and, as they did so, revolvers were placed near their heads and their brains blown out. Immediately after the murders, a group of men, stationed at the doorway of the prison, fired several shots in the air to make it appear that a skirmish had ensued. The leader of this group was a certain Cecilio Ocon who had participated in the murder of Gustavo Madero.[38]

As its official account to the papers the next morning, the Huerta government stated that, as the prisoners were transferred to the peni-

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[37] Ibid., pp. 570-573.

[38] Butterfield, "The Conspiracy Against Madero", loc. cit., pp. 464-482; "True Story of Madero's Death", loc. cit., pp. 286-289; Gruening, op. cit., p. 573.

tentiary for greater comfort, an attempt was made to rescue them and they both were killed accidentally in the cross fire. This version, immediately accepted by Ambassador Wilson and relayed to Washington, did not hold up under inspection.[39]

In the first place, the fact that belongings of the prisoners remained at the palace did not indicate that they were to stay at the penitentiary for a great length of time. Secondly, it seemed strange that no member of the prisoners' escort was hurt by the would-be rescuers, but yet these friends of Madero riddled with bullets the men they were trying to rescue. Furthermore, the escort, in returning the fire, hit none of the assailants. It is true that after suspicion was aroused in Mexico City, a report went out that five assailants had also been killed, but the names of these individuals were never discovered nor were any corpses found.[40]

Motivated by the fact that Mexico City was shocked by the horror of the crime, especially in view of the leniency that Madero had shown to rebels against his government, Huerta conducted a "rigorous investigation". But later, a certain Cardenas, who arrived at the prison with the dead bodies, was promoted along with the doctor who performed the autopsy. With the victory of the Constitutionalists in 1915, Cardenas fled to Guatemala where he made a full confession of the crime and admitted being the officer who personally killed Madero. His confession was published in La Nacion, Havana, April 24, 1916. It has been stated

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[39]For. Rel., 1913, p. 732.

[40]Gruening, op. cit., p. 573; Butterfield, "The Conspiracy against Madero", loc. cit., pp. 464-482.

that eye witnesses followed the cars from the palace and saw the dead bodies and that Madero was not recognizable except for his beard. Other reports were that the former president's hair was singed while the body of Suarez showed signs of strangulation.[41]

The day after the murders, before it was reasonable to believe that the truth was known in the case, Mr. Wilson telegraphed the government's version to the department of state, and on the day following, February 24, again wired:

> The tragedy of yesterday evidently produced no effect upon the public mind. The city remains perfectly quiet and unofficial telegrams indicate the same situation throughout the Republic, with few exceptions. ... It is quite evident that the people hail with satisfaction the present regime.[42]

According to the evidence given out by other sources, Mr. Wilson's report of conditions after the tragedy was not true. The Spanish minister wrote that the version of an attempted rescue found no acceptance outside of government circles.[43] Dolores Butterfield, who spent seventeen years in Mexico and was in the republic at the time of the assassinationa, wrote that Madero's murder brought a reaction to the extent that people gathered in the streets and wept, even under the terrorizing guns of Huerta and Diaz. Outside the capital, she reported that the country was aflame and civil war embraced Mexico. Fourteen states out of the twenty-seven were soon in open rebellion.[44]

William Carol, writing for the World's Work magazine, made a similar

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[41] Ibid.
[42] For. Rel., 1913, p. 732.
[43] Bernardo J. de Cologan, Por La Verdad, Quoted by Gruening, op. cit., p. 573.
[44] Loc. cit., pp. 464-482.

report. Both Zapata in the South and Vasquez Gomez in the North continued in revolt, he said, and in the North, "the people as a whole saw in the assassinations cold-blooded murder of their political idol at the hands of unscrupulous money interests and of old Porfirian adherents."[45]

Mr. Wilson might have been misinformed as to conditions so soon after the murders, and could have been pardoned for his error had he not continued to falsify his reports in order to secure United States recognition of the Huerta government. He urged recognition in spite of the facts that order was not preserved by the new regime and that recognition was contrary to the will of his government at Washington.

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[45] Loc. cit., pp. 298-306.

Chapter V. Ambassador Wilson and the Huerta Government.

From the day of the coup d'etat in Mexico until he was recalled by the incoming Wilson administration at Washington, the American ambassador vigorously worked to secure recognition of the Huerta regime by the United States government. Even after his dismissal, he continued to urge support of the usurping powers and publicly attacked President Wilson's Mexican policy, which was in direct opposition to that of the ambassador.

After notifying the department of state that the Huerta government was "now installed and evidently in secure position,"[1] the American ambassador sent, on February 21, the following message to his consuls:

> Provisional government installed yesterday with General Huerta as president. General public approval of congress in this city, which is perfectly quiet; reassuring reports come from other places. President Madero is a prisoner awaiting the decision of Congress in his case. Senate and Chamber of Deputies in full accord with new administration. You should make this intelligence public, and in the interest of Mexico, urge general submission and adhesion to the new Government, which will be recognized by all foreign governments to-day.[2]

By requesting his consuls to engage actively in Mexican political affairs by "urging submission and adhesion" to the provisional government, Mr. Wilson encouraged the same type of action - that of interfering in the domestic affairs of another nation - against which he had objected when a member of the diplomatic corps showed concern for

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[1] For. Rel., 1913, p. 725.
[2] Ibid., p. 732.

the life of Madero. Also, he appeared to have established a new precedent of official interference in the affairs of another nation. Moreover, his statements that Congress was in full accord with the new administration and that it would be recognized by all foreign governments "to-day" were false.[3]

Soon after the assassinations, the ambassador tried to thrust aside the incidents as of little consequence to the world and telegraphed the department of state that he was disposed to accept the government's version of the affair and consider it a closed incident and that cooperation of the department in that direction would be of infinite value.[4] The next day February 25, he wired that the Associated Press announcement that the British government would refrain from recognizing the present, legally constituted provisional government had made a disagreeable impression on the Mexican government. He then urged the secretary of state to accept a statement which he had drawn up, implying that recognition was not far off, so that action from the United States government would not produce a "depressing effect" as had the utterance from the British. The ambassador's statement was written in the manner of a pledge to the provisional government that the United States would base its conclusions on recognition "wholly from the reports of its consular officers in Mexico and of the Embassy in Mexico City."[5]

This note, requesting that Washington rely wholly upon consular

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[3]Gruening, op. cit., p. 574.
[4]For. Rel., 1913, p. 736.
[5]Ibid., p. 738.

and ambassadorial reports for its action in the Mexican situation clarified the reason why Mr. Wilson ordered his consuls to urge "submission and adhesion" to the Huerta regime to the extent that he falsified his reports to them. The Taft administration, however, refused to act as hastily as the ambassador wished. The department of state informed him that for the present no formal recognition would be accorded those de facto in control and that he should take no action in the matter, except upon specific instructions from the department to do so.[6]

Recognizing the attitude of the American newspapers, Secretary Knox further explained that "practical unanimity" of the American press considered as inadequate the explanations made by the Huerta regime in regard to the death of Madero and Suarez. The secretary then wrote that those responsible for the "horrible occurrence" could not expect to escape public suspicion and that the United States government was obliged to express itself on the "painful subject pending the promised thorough investigation".[7]

Meanwhile, before Mr. Wilson received this expression from the department of state, he had again, more vigouously this time, insisted that the consuls use their influence in behalf of the provisional government. On February 26, he wired all consuls in Mexico to exert themselves "without ceasing to bring about the general submission" to the Huerta regime and to "move actively in this matter", since the new

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[6]Ibid., p. 747.
[7]Ibid.

government was "generally adhered to throughout the republic" and was showing "great firmness and activity".[8]

A former member of President Woodrow Wilson's cabinet has said that the ambassador's dispatches were evidence that he pursued the extraordinary course of seeking to win submission within Mexico to the Huerta administration so that it might on the strength of its effectiveness command the good will of the incoming president.[9] At least, his efforts to secure recognition increased as President Wilson's inauguration drew near. On March 1, he wired that Governor Carranza of Coahuila had submitted unconditionally, and after listing other submissions, concluded that it looked as if adhesion to the provisional government would be general.[10] On the day after President Wilson's inauguration, the ambassador informed the new secretary of state, Mr. Bryan, that the states which had submitted included 90 percent of the people of Mexico and that order had been established over three-fourths of the territory they represented.[11]

But reports from American consular officers in Mexico told a different story. Widespread horror was evident in many parts of the country over the murder of Madero who was looked upon as a liberator. On the same day that the ambassador reported the unconditional submission of Carranza, Consul Louis Hostetter wired from Hermosillio, the capital of Sonora, that conditions were assuming a very serious aspect, since a majority of the people in the state were not in favor of General Huerta

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[8] Ibid., p. 751.
[9] Baker, op. cit., IV, 240.
[10] For. Rel., 1913, p. 750.
[11] Ibid., pp. 756, 757.

because of the assassinations.[12] Four days previous to this time, Governor Carranza of Coahuila had informed President Taft that the Maxican nation condemned the "villainous coup d'etat which deprived Mexico of her constitutional rulers by cowardly assassinations". He expressed hope that the United States government would not accept the Huerta regime founded upon "crime and treason".[13]

Other consuls noted similar evidences of disorder and hostility to the new Mexican government. Consul-General Hana from Monterey wired that the state of Coahuila was in revolt; Consul Edwards reported that conditions from the South and West did not show improvment and that every indication justified the prediction of a struggle which would prove to be a "real war"; Consul Ellsworth telegraphed that Carranza's success at Monclova was unquestionable; and Consul Thomas Bowman from Nogales, Sonora, stated that recruits continued to join armed forces against the Huerta government in what seemed to be "real sentiment of patriotism".[14]

In the United States, a few months later, an editorial in the Outlook maintained that it would take more than protestation from General Huerta to convince the world that the killing of President Madero and Vice-President Suarez was not political assassination.[15] In a similar expression the Review of Reviews informed its readers that Huerta promised protection to foreign capital and that Ambassador

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[12] Ibid., p. 751.
[13] Ibid., p. 742.
[14] Ibid., pp. 752,762,777,784,785.
[15] "Downfall and Death of Madero, CIII(March 1, 1913), 461,462.

Wilson publicly expressed his opinion that the provisional government was innocent of the murders. But the article pointed out that in the United States and in Europe generally it was believed that Madero was murdered with the complicity of the government.[16] In a summary of the Mexican situation, Current Opinion explained that Zapata of Morelos denounced Huerta and Diaz as the greatest enemies of Mexico. It affirmed that Huerta's power was no more effective in restoring order than that of Madero.[17]

Meanwhile, at Washington, an important event, which was to disarrange completely the ambassador's plans, took place when, on March 4, 1913, the Taft administration retired and Woodrow Wilson became president of the United States. From that time on the Mexican policy underwent great changes.

From the dispatches of Ambassador Wilson may be found, perhaps, the first hint of this change, when he protested, on March 9, to the state department that only a simple acknowledgment and "that merely addressed to him as General Huerta" had been received in answer to Huerta's telegram of congratulations to President Wilson on the latter's inauguration.[18]

In spite of the new American administration's failure to recognize Huerta as president of Mexico, the ambassador continued to work for the provisional government by minimizing the nature and extent of revolt against Huerta. On March 11, he notified Secretary Bryan that Carranza

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[16]"Death of Madero: End of his Regime", XLVII (April, 1913), 403,404.
[17]"The Mexican Situation", LV (July, 1913), 11,12.
[18]For. Rel., 1913, p. 760.

had been defeated and had retreated to Monclova, where his forces would in all probability be dispersed. He then advised the department as to the attitude of the consuls and suggested that, if any of the consuls had inadvertently been sympathizing with local activities against the federal government, they should be instructed to work for submission to the federal authorities, by which alone peace could be restored.[19]

On the same day (March 11, 1913) that the ambassador wired this counsel to Washington, President Wilson surprised diplomats of the world when he announced:

> We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests or ambitions. We ... hold that just government rests always upon the consent of the governed, and that there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon the public conscience and approval ... .[20]

As his policy approached crystallization, the American president held that the Huerta government was not a de jure government because it was initiated by crime and founded on the same principle, and that it was not a de facto government because it had not the power to perform the most elemental functions of government.[21] The new president was said to have interpreted the Mexican conflict not as a struggle between ambitious men, "seeking power, plunder, and privilege" but as an effort of a down-trodden people against oppression of a ruling class. He regarded Madero as a sincere, if impractical, ruler.[22]

At one time he stated that his passion was for the submerged 85

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[19] Ibid., pp. 763, 764.
[20] Baker, op. cit., IV, 242.
[21] "Mexico: A Review", Outlook, CV (November 22, 1913), 614.
[22] Baker, op. cit., IV, 244.

percent of Mexicans who were fighting for liberty, and again that he had to pause and remind himself that he was president of the United States and not of a small group of Americans with vested interests in Mexico.[23] In the end the Wilson administration proposed to isolate General Huerta and declared that, if he did not "retire by force of circumstances", it would become the "duty of the United States to use less peaceful means to put him out".[24]

After President Wilson's failure to heed the ambassador's demands for recognition of Huerta, the new policy was especially disappointing to Ambassador Wilson but not to the extent that he ceased his support of Huerta. He had little confidence in the president's idealism or in the success of a Mexican government not based upon force.[25] On March 12, he wrote first in an apologetic manner that he had anticipated only a mild form of coup d'etat in Mexico and that by announcing publicly his acceptance of the official account of the death of the prisoners, he adopted the surest method of allaying sentimentality which might have led to greater crimes. He then informed Secretary Bryan that unless the same type of government, as was maintained by Porfirio Diaz, was again established, new revolutionary movements would break forth.[26]

On March 30, the same day that Carranza proclaimed himself provisional president, Ambassador Wilson wrote that "the necessity for immediate meeting for the consideration of recognition" had been

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[23] Ibid., pp. 261, 244.
[24] Gruening, op. cit., p. 578.
[25] Baker, op. cit., IV, 242.
[26] For. Rel., 1913, pp. 772, 776.

urged upon him by his diplomatic colleagues. Through the months of April, May, and June, he frequently urged support of Huerta for "the peace and good will of the continent" and "upon the high grounds of international polity, American interests, and procurement of peace and order in Mexico".[27]

At Washington, the ambassador's reports kept the department of state well informed with concrete knowledge of immediate conditions in Mexico. But, on the other hand, they filled President Wilson with distrust of the ambassador whose activities he believed were in the interest of the larger business elements in Mexico. Perhaps this distrust was evident when the president sent William Bayard Hale, a brilliant journalist, to the republic to learn more of the true situation, and who, upon returning to the United States, made extensive reports many of which were highly critical of the Huerta government and of the part played by Ambassador Wilson in Mexican affairs.[28]

While President Wilson continued to make a careful study of the situation, the ambassador apparently grew impatient and wired the department of state, on June 9, that although he had been the president's personal representative at the post for more than three months, he had not been put in possession of the attitude of the administration on the question of recognition and that he respectfully requested the views of the president to be transmitted by telegraph.[29]

Five days later, the administration forwarded from Washington

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[27] Ibid., pp. 784, 790, 799, 807.
[28] Baker, op. cit., IV, 243.
[29] For. Rel., 1913, p. 807.

definite instructions which avoided any promise of recognition but stated that the United States was convinced that within Mexico itself there was a fundamental lack of confidence in good faith of those in control of Mexico City and in their intentions to safeguard constitutional rights and methods of action.[30]

These instructions evidently did not satisfy Ambassador Wilson nor cause him to alter his attitude toward Huerta. Rather, by asking Huerta to dine at the American Embassy, he shocked both the president and Secretary Bryan. At a cabinet meeting, President Wilson wrote as memoranda: "I think Wilson should be recalled". As a matter of fact, Hale's presence in Mexico was bitterly resented by the ambassador as evidenced by his protest to Washington against such interference.[31]

Ambassadorial notes of this-type plus the indictments made in Hale's report, no doubt, caused President Wilson to write Secretary Bryan on July 1, that he should like to discuss with him "the necessity of recalling Henry Lane Wilson in one way or another, or perhaps calling him to Washington for consultation".[32] Two days later, the president again wrote Bryan that after reading Hale's report, he hoped more than ever that the secretary of state "would consider the possibility of recalling Henry Lane Wilson".[33]

While his fate at Washington was under consideration, the ambassador renewed his efforts for recognition by wire to Mr. Bryan, July 9. He

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[30]Baker, op. cit., IV, 254.
[31]Ibid.
[32]Ibid., p. 255.
[33]Ibid., pp. 255, 256.

explained that he was again obliged to urge upon the president the pressing necessity for some action of a drastic and convincing kind that would convince the Mexican government and people that citizens of the United States must be protected in life and property, and that the barbarous and inhuman warfare which had been waged for three years would cease.[34]

President Wilson's response to this note was to call the ambassador to Washington for consultation with his removal in the background.[35] Arriving by boat at New York, Ambassador Wilson explained that he found many reporters on dock seeking an interview and that "for the purpose of arousing public opinion" he gave to the correspondents "an outline of true conditions" which prevailed in Mexico. This story, he wrote several years later, "was faithfully reproduced by the press" and furnished the "first true picture of the actual doings and conditions south of the Rio Grande".[36]

But his "true picture" was not accepted by the press with perfect harmony. Editorially, the Outlook found that he "shocked the press and public by his undiplomatic discussion of Mexican matters" and that, because of his attempts to clear Huerta from the assassinations, many editors saw him as Huerta's agent rather than a representative of the United States government.[37] The Literary Digest explained that, during his first meeting with reporters at New York,

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[34]For. Rel., 1913, pp. 808, 809.
[35]Baker, op. cit., p. 262.
[36]Henry Lane Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium, and Chile, p. 312.
[37]"The Mexican Puzzle", CIV, (August 9, 1913), 781, 782.

the ambassador was said to have expressed resentment toward the new administration for sending special representatives to Mexico instead of relying solely upon his advice.[38] The Nation described the "indiscreet" interview in the following manner:

> When he talked to reporters at all about his delicate mission, he made a huge blunder, for a talking ambassador is always a nuisance and a peril. Even if he were the wisest and most energetic of men, he should not regard himself as the only man in Washington capable of speaking on the Mexican situation. Nobody can be an oracle on an affair so wide and varied nor is anyone more subject to mistake and narrow views than the man on the spot.[39]

From New York, Mr. Wilson went to Washington where he met the president at the White House, July 25. In writing of this meeting, the ambassador explained that he was pleased with the president's affable and pleasant demeanour but noticed "a certain inflexibility of preconceived views" which rendered a faithful presentation of the situation difficult. The president showed a "lack of knowledge of the psychology and facts of the situation", and according to the ambassador, "it was quite evident that he had not availed himself of the information accessible to him at the Department of State".[40]

As to the president's knowledge of the Mexican situation, a member of the Wilson cabinet believed him to be well informed. Even before his inauguration, President Wilson was advised of the status of Mexican affairs by the assistant secretary of state, Huntington Wilson. All reports of the American ambassador, with comments from experts in the state department, were placed in his hands, and many letters or

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[38]"Mediation as a Remedy for Mexico", XLVII, (August 9, 1913),193-195.
[39]"The Mexican Difficulty", XCII, (July 31, 1913), 92.
[40]Wilson, op. cit., p. 313.

memoranda from interventionists or those who had property at stake reached the White House. According to Ray Stannard Baker, the president had undoubtedly studied the Mexican problem before his first cabinet meeting on March 7, for there was a danger that "his hands might be forced by the ill-advised activity" of those who desired a government that would be amenable to their interests, regardless of its sanctions.[41]

A few days after his consultation with the president, Mr. Wilson was invited to appear before the Committee on Foreign Relations. To this group, it is said that he expressed his opinions with "becoming moderation" and made a favorable impression upon some of the members. He recommended immediate recognition of Huerta who would restore a sound footing. Huerta's "abyss", the ambassador was said to maintain, was financial and not military.[42]

Perhaps, anything the ambassador might have done was insufficient to place him in the good graces of the Wilson administration. The forces behind him had ceased to have political value. The most ardent efforts of his Mexico City clique, which overwhelmed the state department with telegrams, pamphlets, and delegations to Washington, did not convince the president of the necessity of retaining his services. On August 4, nine days after his arrival at New York City, Mr. Bryan informed him that the president had decided to accept his resignation, which had been tendered according to diplomatic custom at the change of

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[41]Baker, op. cit., pp. 64, 238.

[42]Bell, op. cit., p. 356; "The Mexican Puzzle", Outlook loc. cit., pp. 781, 782.

administration on March 4.[43]

According to the note from Secretary Bryan, the ambassador was dismissed because his views were so widely divergent from those of the president. Mr. Stannard Baker felt that he was recalled because "it became clear that the ambassador was not only opposed to the purposes of his chief, but was doing his best to defeat them and yet clinging to his office". In reality, he was of no use to the Wilson administration. With reference to the Mexican problem as it stood, the ambassador had nothing acceptable to offer.

On August 4, 1913, Henry Lane Wilson retired to private life and became a sharp critic of President Wilson's Mexican policy. Within a few weeks after his retirement, his article entitled, "The Latest Phase of the Mexican Situation", appeared in the Independent magazine. Though brief in content, the article vigourously attacked the president's demand for a constitutional election in Mexico and maintained that there never would be a free election and a democratic people in Mexico until the government was guided by a strong man like General Diaz who should set about educating and elevating the masses. The impression that Madero had been chosen by means of free and popular election was erroneous, the former ambassador asserted, since he received only 18,989 votes out of a population of 15,000,000.[44]

In the conduct of foreign relations, Mr. Wilson held that "idealism" was a dangerous element and that "morals and expediency" were

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[43]Bell, op. cit., p. 355; Gruening, op. cit., p. 576.
[44]Baker, op. cit., pp. 317,318,263; Bell, op. cit., pp. 355,356.

always or nearly always identical. Concluding the article, he declared that President Wilson was "under the guidance of sophisticated rhetoricans or amateur agents delving into fields of whose soil they had not the most elemental knowledge".[45]

While considering Mr. Wilson's argument that a strong man like former President Diaz was needed for a free election in Mexico, one must remember that Porfirio Diaz reigned supreme for thirty-five years, and that at the end of his rule, the masses had not been "educated" and "elevated" to the extent that the dictator felt free to grant them a popular election. As for the Madero elections, other persons saw in them the "semblance" of free and universal suffrage.[46]

Ernest Gruening held that the elections were "honest" and that no instructions other than "to fulfill legitimate functions had been given poll officials".[47] Edward I. Bell, an American journalist, observed the balloting in two small districts of Mexico City where almost 1,000 votes were cast and found it interesting to watch "the first free election ever held in Mexico". He claimed those who stated that Madero's total vote was only 20,000 out of a possible 3,000,000 were in error, for they had taken the number of electors chosen at the primaries, and not those of the whole electorate.[48] In writing of the convention which nominated Madero and Pino Suarez, Charge d'Affaires Fred M. Dearing telegraphed that the convention should be marked especially as the

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[45] Ibid.
[46] Ruhle, loc. cit., pp. 18, 35.
[47] Op. cit., pp. 94, 95.
[48] Op. cit., p. 119.

"first untrammeled political convention ever held in this country" and that it was free, open, and of an admirable temper.[49]

In June 1914, Mr. Wilson read a paper before a meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. This article called, "Errors with Reference to Mexico and Events That Have Occurred There",[50] was of considerable length and had for its major premise that the Huerta government should have been recognized. To begin with, the former ambassador lauded the Diaz government and affirmed that the dictator, though not elected by constitutional methods, governed according to law; he tried to establish justice and he developed American friendship by inviting its capital and energy to Mexico. The American investors made great profits but left greater ones for Mexico.

But as for Madero, Mr. Wilson found that a vast majority of Mexican public opinion was hostile to him from the beginning, that he paid no attention whatever to the land question, and that his election was not a popular one.

From his four years experience, the former ambassador was able to say "without the slightest hesitation" that as a whole the Constitutionalists, who were then arrayed against Huerta, were not only entirely out of keeping with our conception of what an honest people struggling for liberty should be, but were "natural savages".

That Diaz governed according to law, that he tried to establish justice, and that American investors left greater profits to Mexico

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[49] For. Rel., 1911, p. 514.

[50] Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science, LIV (July, 1914), 148-161.

than they themselves received were all statements which are questionable. Mr. Wilson failed to substantiate them as facts. Neither did he prove that a vast majority of public opinion was against Madero from the beginning. As for the land question, Madero had initiated a plan for the division of the large estates within four months after his election.[51] The Constitutionalists, whom the former ambassador considered as natural savages, later took over the reins of the Mexican government under the leadership of Obregon and Calles and converted the Revolution into orderly government.

Finally, Mr. Wilson criticized the President of the United States for sending John Lind, an unofficial delegate to treat with Huerta, but justified himself in the same article for making unofficial and unauthorized representations to Madero for the latter's resignation.

The retired ambassador's attempts to defend his conduct in Mexico were based upon the old theory of "dollar diplomacy" which seemingly had disappeared with the close of the Taft administration.

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[51]Butterfield, "The Conspiracy Against Madero", loc. cit., pp. 464-482.

Chapter VI. CONCLUSION

For the "real war" which Consul Edwards correctly foresaw in his communication to Washington, March 14, the Mexican people have from that day to this held Henry Lane Wilson in no small measure responsible. His responsibility was officially charged in Carranza's Manifesto to the Nation of June 11, 1915.[1]

Before the inauguration of a Constitutionalist president, after the overthrow of Madero, the map of Mexico had been painted with a "blood-red circle". During the uprisings after the advent of Huerta, thousands of Mexicans lost their lives in battle, by massacres, and through incidental murders. Multitudes suffered hardships and lost their property. Cities were wrecked and rural districts devastated. Americans were murdered in numbers, and Mexican hatred of Americans became bitter and enduring.

It is the belief of Edward I. Bell that many of these evils might have been prevented by more judicious action on the part of the United States after the accession of Madero. It is true that throughout the Madero administration President Taft's attitude was friendly and his language, even when it conveyed threats, was temperate and courteous. But there was one matter in which the United States was "persistently and fatally" unfriendly to Mexico from the beginning of Madero's rule until its end.[2]

President Taft maintained in Mexico an ambassador who was "lament-

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[1] Gruening, op. cit., p. 575.
[2] Op. cit., pp. 415-417.

ably missplaced, unsympathetic, unjudicious, and disastrously harmful". Believing that Madero narrowly missed a triumph over his enemies, Mr. Bell felt that the right man in the place - one who earnestly desired the established government to continue because of what might follow its overthrow - could have lent enough support to Madero to keep him in office until the minds of the masses had been turned toward peaceful means of living. As dean of the diplomatic corps and representative of the most powerful nation in Mexican affairs, Henry Lane Wilson might have been able to benefit the Madero administration. As it was, he was hostile to it throughout and finally helped to bring about its downfall by means of tactics not consonant with diplomatic practice.

Having actively aided in the overthrow of a legal government of another nation, Mr. Wilson then threw the entire weight of his energy and influence to the support of a regime entrenched by force, treachery, and assassination. He did so in the face of popular opposition in Mexico and against the policy of his own government at Washington. In his efforts to justify his actions, the American ambassador frequently explained that Madero was weak, impractical, and incapable of preserving order in Mexico. But, on the other hand, he made every effort possible to force upon the Mexican people a regime which failed, from the beginning, to stem the tide of revolt.

Had Mr. Wilson's advice concerning Huerta's recognition been followed, it is possible that another epoch of Porfirianism, safe for foreigners, would have followed in Mexico for several years. At least, it is rather certain that Huerta's success would have restored a dictatorship and presumably law and order. In this case, the "pent-up"

forces of misery, which was so prevalent under Diaz, would merely have waited for a chance to explode. The Mexican people demanded reforms, as has been indicated by the trend of legislation since 1917. It is not likely that an "iron man" such as Huerta promised to be would have sponsored a program flexible enough to admit reforms of a permanent and beneficial nature.

The evidence found in making this study indicates that Ambassador Wilson's activities were not motivated so much by what was considered best for the people of Mexico and the relationship of that country to the United States, but by the desires of his close friends in Mexico City who had selfish interests at stake. As for more specific indictments against the conduct of Henry Lane Wilson as a diplomat, this writer believes there are many.

He brought about the suppression of the Mexican press - an act which would not be tolerated in this country, even under similar circumstances. He harassed the Madero government with various grievances many of which were not real. When the opportunity presented itself, he entered into the plans for the overthrow of a government which had been established by honest elections. He failed to make sufficient arrangements to safeguard the life of the president he had helped to depose. He falsified his reports to American consuls and to the United States government in order to secure the recognition of a usurping regime which proved to be inadequate to perform the functions of government in Mexico. And finally he further aroused Mexican resentment of Americans so much that it became a more-enduring hatred.

In conclusion, it may be said that Henry Lane Wilson played a decisive part in overturning the popular and democratically-intentioned government of Francisco Madero. Without the militant encouragement and support of the American ambassador, the treason of Huerta might never have been conceived. But from the moment of the fatal coup d'etat on February 18 and the murder of the president and vice-president four days later, Mexico was to be rent asunder with confusion and bloodshed. The problems that might have been worked out through peaceful means, however blunderingly and ineffectively, were destined for years to be submerged in chaos. Causes for friction and misunderstanding between the United States and Mexico were increased. A solution to the difficulty of more pleasant relations between the two countries became a problem of the future.

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