HISPANIC AMERICAN POLICIES OF JAMES G. BLAINE

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PREFACE

This study has for its purpose a survey of the Spanish-American policies during the two brief terms of James G. Blaine as Secretary of State. He was much in the limelight in the post-Civil War period, and his efforts in the diplomatic field proved to be more worth while and more far reaching than the nation at that time realized.

The source material used in this study consisted mainly of bound volumes of the correspondence of the Department of State for the years involved. The background material used consisted of recognized books on the foreign relations of the United States and South America, published biographies of James G. Blaine, and published writings on the Pan-American conferences. In addition various histories of the United States were perused in order to get the domestic slant on the activities treated in this thesis. Surprisingly little on the subject was found in any one book.

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CHAPTER I

James Gillispie Blaine, who was a prominent figure in the public affairs of the United States, was elected in 1862 from Maine to the National House of Representatives. He served consecutively until 1872, when he became a member of the United States Senate from the same state. James A. Garfield, upon his election to the presidency in 1880, appointed Mr. Blaine, who was his long-time friend, Secretary of State. This appointment Mr. Blaine accepted, and he remained a member of the cabinet until President Garfield's death. During these months Mr. Blaine became the President's chief adviser, especially in determining the foreign policies of the United States. So influential was he that the history of the relations of the United States with South America and the policy of the United States toward South American countries was from 1862 to 1892 almost the work of James G. Blaine.[1]

By the time Mr. Blaine had come into political power, the United States had emerged from a group of states fringing the coast of a remote continent into one of the foremost nations of the world, with its trade touching elbows with practically every nation on the globe.[2] The inventions of steam and

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1 Carl Russell Fish, American Diplomacy (New York, 1915), 384.

2 James P. Boyd, Life and Public Services of Hon. James G. Blaine (New York, 1893), 550-563.

machinery had wrought such great changes in transportation as to bring nations into much closer relations, both political and commercial. Ships were able to travel rapidly and to haul bulky goods, thereby increasing the profits from foreign commerce. Because of the proximity of the United States and the countries of South America and because of the mutual benefit to be derived therefrom, Mr. Blaine was possessed with an earnest desire that the United States take a friendly, progressive position in regard to Latin America. Moreover he knew from his years of actual experience in Congress that the United States should cultivate more helpful commercial relations with Latin America.[3]

Thus one is not surprised that the position which Mr. Blaine immediately took was an aggressive policy not only in the development of better commercial relations between the United States and Latin-American nations but also in the belief that the United States should ever be ready to arbitrate disputes between any two American nations. He believed that the Monroe Doctrine was to be extended so as to win a positive aid to the development of that part of the world which it affected.[4]

One such instance of good will was to secure the modification of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, which provided for a joint Anglo-American guarantee of the neutrality of any

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3 James G. Blaine, Discussions: Legislative, Diplomatic, and Political (Norwich, Conn., 1886), 186-193.

4 Edward Stanwood, James Gillespie Blaine (New York, 1905), 244 ff.

inter-oceanic canal that might be constructed between North and South America. That Mr. Blaine did not originate the discussion is proved by Mr. Hayes' message to Congress March 8, 1880, in which he said, "The policy of this country is a canal under American control." President Hayes insisted that such a canal must be built under the sole protection of the United States and the country through which it was constructed, that an isthmian canal would be "virtually a part of the coast line of the United States; that our commercial interest in it is larger than that of all other countries while its relation to our power and our prosperity as a nation, to our means of defense, our unity, peace, and safety are matters of paramount concern to the people of the United States."[5]

Likewise President Garfield in his inaugural address said, "It is the right and duty of the United States to assist and maintain such supervision and authority over any inter-oceanic canal across the isthmus that connects North and South America as will protect our national interests."[6]

Secretary Blaine reaffirmed this policy, which had been approved by Congress and took a definite position against any European action in the way of a guarantee.[7] The following

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5 J. D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Published separately (Washington, D. C., 1899), VII, 505-586.

6 Ibid., VIII, 11.

7 Senate Miscellaneous Document, 42, 46th Congress, 3rd session, I, 1880-1881, (Washington, D. C., 1881), 1.

quotation from Mr. Blaine is proof of this statement:

> If the proposed canal were a channel of communication near to the countries of the Old World and employed wholly, or almost wholly, by their commerce, it might very properly be urged that the influence of the European powers should be commensurate with their interests.....with the exercise of such influence the United States could find no fault, especially if assured of equal participation in the peaceable enjoyment of the commercial facilities so afforded. The case, however, is here reversed and an agreement between the European states guarantee jointly the neutrality and in effect control the political character of a highway of commerce remote from them and near to us, forming substantially a part of our coast line and promising to become the chief means of transportation between our Atlantic and Pacific states would be viewed by this government with gravest concern.[8]

Why did Secretary Blaine support this policy regarding the isthmian canal when he knew that he would have to struggle against opposition that had most of the argument on its side? In matters of international commerce it was generally known that England held the highest percentage of trade of any one of the European nations. She had had interests in the Canal zone since its early history, and by the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty her rights were as distinctly set forth as those of the United States.[9]

The answer clearly seen is that Mr. Blaine supported the ideas of his predecessors because he was farsighted enough to know that British policies, which stood for international

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8 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Lowell, June 24, 1881, Senate Document, 237, 56th Congress, 1st session, Serial 3853 (Washington, D. C., 1900), 382.

9 William M. Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements Between the United States and Other Powers (Washington, D. C., 1910), I, 659-663.

control of the canal, would not mean the control of projected lines of communication between the Atlantic and Pacific; also that it would not lead to cordial relations with South American Republics, both of which were necessary for the United States to extend commercial expansion into that region. Mr. Blaine moved toward the resolution to demand a canal under the ownership and control of the United States Government in order to capture a larger share of the trade of Latin America.[10]

Mr. Blaine knew the moment a waterway was opened across Central America that the producers of the Pacific Coast would be brought so much nearer to their markets, that nearness to markets stimulates production, and that trade and commerce could not help but expand. He believed that the American control of this canal would cause industries of New England to extend commerce into many of the Latin American countries. Whether or not Secretary Blaine would have been able to secure the dissolution of Clayton-Bulwer Treaty by other arguments is a question that cannot be answered.

Sir Charles W. Dilke, under secretary of English Foreign Office in 1881, showed that there were prominent men in England who did share similar views to those of Mr. Blaine. He wrote that a good deal of discussion had taken place between the two governments, England and United States, even as long ago as 1869, which showed that the British government was willing to modify the stipulations of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. In the discussion of 1861, Mr. Blaine disclaimed

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10 James F. Rippy, Latin America in World Politics (New York, 1828), 193.

on behalf of the United States exclusive privileges in the passage, and asserted his desire to secure its free and unrestricted benefit, both in peace and war, to the commerce of the whole world. That being so, there is not and never has been any real principle at stake.[11]

Although Mr. Blaine had advocated the policy, of the dissolution of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and Construction of a canal under American control, his arguments did not accomplish the result he desired; he had prevented the destruction of the Treaty of 1846 with Columbia and had stopped the schemes for a joint guarantee in Central America.[12]

Another object which Blaine had to deal with as Secretary of State was that of adjusting the foreign relations of United States to the basis of peace. He was anxious to negotiate treaties of peace and amity of commercial alliance with all nations of South America. Mr. Blaine referred to this principle by attempting to arbitrate between the Republics of Mexico and Guatemala:

> We seek the conquests of peace; we desire to extend our commerce--Our trade with them is already large--but the money does not go to Spanish America. We send large sums to Europe in coin--to pay European manufacturers for the goods which they send to Spanish America. Cannot this condition of trade in a great part be changed?[13]

These two nations, Mexico and Guatemala, had disputed for a long time about the ownership of certain provinces;

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11 Charles W. Dilke, "The Future Relations of Great Britian and United States," Forum, XXVI, 527-528.

12 David S. Muzzey, James G. Blaine (New York, 1935), 201.

13 James G. Blaine, Discussions, op. cit., 428-429.

and the Guatemala minister at Washington in letter dated June 15, 1881, to Mr. Blaine had appealed to the Government of the United States. Mr. Blaine as a result of this appeal carried on correspondence with Mr. Logan, American minister to Central America. He said that Guatemala was anxious for the aid of the United States against Mexican aggression.[14]

A new administration, that of General Gonzalez had come into office in 1881 in Mexico. Mr. Blaine wrote to Mr. Morgan, the minister to Mexico, stating the friendly policy of the United States and expressing the desire to continue to enlarge reciprocal trade and interchange of commodities.[15] In other correspondence he pressed upon Mr. Morgan the importance of Mexico's submitting to arbitration the dispute that was pending, because he feared that Guatemala "might cede her territorial rights in dispute to some European Power", he persisted that otherwise it would be injurious to the best interest of all the Republics on this continent.[16]

This determined stand shows that Mr. Blaine was sensitive about foreign intervention with the weak Southern Republics. Many passages in his state correspondence demonstrate that Mr. Blaine was afraid that these Central American Republics might drift from their independent station toward European assimilation, which would cause them to lose their status

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14 Lorenzo Montufor to Mr. Blaine, June 21, 1881, Foreign Relations (Washington, D. C., 1881), I, 613-614.

15 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Morgan, June 1, 1881, Ibid., No. 452, 762.

16 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Morgan, Ibid., No. 456, 770.

as independent republics. The Mexican publicist, Matias Romero, while disapproving Mr. Blaine's course in this affair and defending Mexico on the ground of Blaine's partiality to Guatemala, stated that the making of so "serious a mistake" was "a result of his very earnest desire to have arbitration take the place of war to end international disputes."[17]

Mr. Blaine did mediate as a friend before his withdrawal from office. He had become convinced that arbitration must be confined to the boundary question.[18] There is no reason for believing that Mr. Blaine might have been led into active interference, because Mexico would not let United States settle the boundaries. Neither were his apprehensions of European intervention or of a war between the two countries ever realized. He was anxious for peace in Central America and expansion of United States commerce without undue interference with the domestic relations of any country.

There was also a boundary dispute between Colombia and Costa Rica; and these republics agreed upon the peaceful arbitration of their respective claims. The arbitrator was to be the King of Spain, or the King of Belgium, or the President of the Argentine Republic. Mr. Blaine had heard of the proposed treaty; and for the purpose of heading off European intervention in the neighborhood of a possible interoceanic canal, he sent on May 26, 1881, the following notification of the objections of the United States to both

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17 David S. Muzzey, op. cit., 207.

18 Ibid., 208.

Minister Dichman at Bogota and Minister Logan in Central America:

> Under these circumstances while the Government of United States of America does not expect or claim the position of necessary arbitration in differences between these two Republics, it cannot but seem strange that Colombia has not communicated to this government its intention to submit to arbitration the boundaries of the State of Panama, the territorial integrity of which the United States of America have guaranteed by a treaty, the provision of which they have been more than once called upon to execute--and that it will not hold itself bound where its rights, obligations or interests may be concerned by the decision of any arbitrator in whose appointment it has not been consulted and in whose selection it has not concurred.[19]

Secretary Blaine also informed the King of Belgium[20] that should His Majesty arbitrate in this matter, the United States would not necessarily hold itself bound by his decision. In about the same terms he also gave notice to the King of Spain.[21]

The Government of Costa Rica resented Secretary Blaine's dispatches and deferred an immediate action. Colombia, because she wanted the Treaty of 1846 canceled, was not in friendly relations with the United States.

The whole episode did not tend toward better Latin-American relations; but the important intention of Mr. Blaine was the determination of non-interference from Europe, and this he accomplished. In the words of the Representative of Costa Rica to Spain the position of the United States

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19 Blaine to Logan, May 26, 1881, Foreign Relations, 106; Blaine to Dichman, Ibid., 356.

20 Ibid., No. 50, 70-72.

21 Ibid., No. 650, 1057-1058.

was a "cloud upon the project."[22] Some months later, Secretary Blaine expressed the sympathy of the State Department with projects for uniting Central American Republics, although he declined to intervene or express approval of the use of force in accomplishing them.[23]

Another dispute that confronted Blaine was that which arose against Venezuela with respect to the collection of debts which she had incurred with European nations. After long and futile attempts to collect these debts, France broke off diplomatic relation "in consequence of the twenty years of bad faith observed by that government toward its creditors... The question cannot be regarded with indifference, since the French Government has declared it cannot accept the present prorata of the monthly payments and that if Venezuela does not accede to her demand that it be increased, the French Government will be forced to proceed in some other way."[24]

The Venezuela Government through its foreign minister, Mr. Baker, asked the United States Government to assume responsibility as to the steps which should be taken to make proper provision for payment of its national debts. Mr. Blaine notified Mr. Noyes, United States Minister to France, "to inform the minister of foreign affairs that Venezuela wants the United States to receive and disburse as trustee the increased monthly payments of the diplomatic debt in ratio to be adjusted---that United States requests

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22 Ibid., No. 659, 1067.

23 Ibid., No. 383, 603-604.

24 Senor Comacho to Blaine, March 22, 1881, Ibid., 1202.

France to delay action while it has this proposition under consideration---that the United States offers its kind offices for adjustment."[25]

Reports from various persons worthy of confidence expressed the belief that by September or October the French Government would be blockading the Venezuelian ports and taking possession of the custom houses; that if this should be executed, it would be occupation of American territory by an European State.[26]

Mr. Blaine's interest showed that he was anxious that justice be done to all parties, because he urged Venezuela to acknowledge the French claim and suggested that the United States should place an agent at Caracas in case of default.[27] Although the arrangement was not carried out on account of Mr. Blaine's resignation, it is of interest because this proposal to act as collecting agent foreshadowed a course of action for financial intervention of a later day.[28]

Mr. Blaine not only stopped an aggressive movement of France to seize Venezuelian custom houses to compel the payment of debt, but he also extended the Monroe Doctrine to prevent action from abroad. This new principle of economic penetration and its resultant political actions were clearly

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25 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Noyes, May 5, 1881, Ibid., No. 736, 1212.

26 Senor Seijas to Senor Comacho, June 27, 1881, Ibid., No. 739, 1213-1214.

27 Samuel Flagg Bemis, American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy (New York, 1927), VIII, 297-298.

28 Carl Russel Fish, American Diplomacy (New York, 1915), 385.

foreseen by Blaine.

Another conflict that caused Mr. Blaine a great deal of concern was the War of the Pacific, which originated with the Chilean-Bolivian boundary dispute. It had been agreed by the nations which freed themselves from Spain that the boundaries should be those of the colonial frontiers of the early nineteenth century. Since Spain had been careless about boundaries, disputes arose. Bolivia claimed the territory containing the Atacama nitrate beds, a right which Chile never questioned until nitrate and guano deposits had been discovered in 1842.[29]

For some time following the discovery of nitrate, the fields lay undeveloped. Chile perhaps worked more energetically at mining them, but the exploitation of such natural riches began in a small way. Protests arose over the exploitation both in the Peruvian province of Tarapaca east of Iquque and in Antofagasta, then in Bolivian territory. However the Chilean financiers and laborers, backed by British capital, enlarged the enterprise so that in course of time considerable revenues were realized.[30] In the process of developments, disputes arose between Chileans and Bolivians, which resulted in the Treaty of 1864 by which the boundary was fixed at the twenty-fourth parallel, and Bolivia agreed not to raise the tax on Chilean enterprise in Bolivian

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29 Mary W. Williams, The People and Politics of Latin America (Dallas, 1930), 553-555.

30 Pan-American Union Bulletin (Washington, 1911), XXXIII, 447.

territory between the twenty-third and twenty-fourth parallels.[31]

From the early outset, Peru and Bolivia had hoped to unite, but Chile had constantly opposed such a move. However, in 1873 Bolivia and Peru, out of fear of Chile, entered into a secret alliance of defense.[32]

Bolivia violated the treaty of 1878 when she granted a concession to a Chilean company subject to the imposition of a tax of ten centavos on each quintal of nitrates exported. Chile demanded the suspension of the tax and the arbitration of the dispute, and upon Bolivian refusal declared war.[33] The Bolivian authorities, despite the protests of the Chilean government, seized the property of the Chilean Company and announced that it would be sold on February 14, 1879, to secure the taxes called for. Peru quickly came to the support of her ally.[34] Peru and Bolivia were no match for Chile; and although the war dragged on from February 1879 until April, 1884, the actual conflict by land and sea was brief. The Chilean forces were everywhere victorious.[35]

Foreign trade was seriously injured by the war, and the European nations early set out to bring it to a close. The United States refused to let European nations interfere

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31 Henry Clay Evans, Chile and Its Relations with the United States (Durham, N. C., 1927), 98.

32 Mary W. Williams, op. cit., 555.

33 F. Nieto del Rio, "Chile's Conflict with Bolivia and Peru", Current History, Dec. 1921, XV, 449.

34 Mary W. Williams, op. cit., 555.

35 William Spence Robertson, History of the Latin American Nations (New York, 1924), 345, 346.

and assumed the whole burden of bringing the war to an end.[36] The Representatives of the United States government at an early period of the war began their exertions to bring about a settlement. The first attempt was a conference on board the U. S. S. Lackawanna, which met at the invitation of Mr. Osborne, the United States Minister to Santiago. The allies were conquered and Chile, strong in her position, demanded cession of territory. The allies replied that this demand alone made further negotiation impossible, and the conference broke up without any result.[37] The Chileans renewed the war with such vigor that President Pierola was driven to the mountains where he established a military government. On the seventeenth of January, 1881, the Chileans entered Lima and established a military government. With utter anarchy in Peru, Chile allowed the establishment of a government and the appointment of Dr. Garcia Calderon as Provisional President.

Such was the condition of the affairs existing in Bolivia, Peru, and Chile when Mr. Blaine became Secretary of State. The Government of Calderon had not been recognized by any government; having no real power, it owed its existence to the consideration of the victors, who hoped to make it an instrument of peace on their own terms. Mr. Blaine, seeing this, instructed the United States Minister at Lima, Isaac P.

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36 H. C. Evans, op. cit., 100.

37 Ibid., 100-101.

Christiancy, to recognize Calderon, April 9, 1881.[38]

Chile was in possession of Peru, and was ready to dictate terms of peace. Mr. Christiancy, according to his reports forwarded to Washington, showed that the political machinery of the country was wholly paralyzed.[39]

As stated before, Mr. Blaine was concerned with the growth of American trade in the new world and determined to build it up in a way that would rival that of the European powers. Believing that the new world republics should renounce the European idea of gaining territorial conquests, he at once instructed his envoys to let it be known that the United States would not permit intervention from Europe.[40]

Soon after the recognition of the Calderon governments, Mr. Christiancy was recalled from Peru, and Mr. Osborne was transferred to Brazil. General Hurlbut was appointed to succeed the former and General Kilpatrick the latter. Mr. Blaine then stated his policy by asserting that a victorious nation had no right to demand a cession of territory, except on failure by the latter to pay a money indemnity.[41]

Mr. Blaine was determined to have no European interference, even though the commercial interests of England,

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38 Muzzey, op. cit., 211.

39 Senate Executive Document, No. 79, June 21, 1881 (Washington, 1882), 47 Congress, 1st sess., 917.

40 James G. Blaine, "The Foreign Policy of the Garfield Administration", op. cit., 411.

41 Ibid., 344.

France, and Germany were affected by the war to a greater extent than were those of the United States; and he expressed himself to General Kilpatrick in such terms on that point:

> The government of the United States seeks only to perform the part of a friend to all the parties in this unhappy conflict between South American republics, and it will regret to be compelled to consider how far that feeling might be affected and a more active interposition forced upon it, by any attempted complication of this question with European politics.[42]

This showed that Mr. Blaine was anxious that United States ministers to Chile and Peru would be able to clear up the trouble between those countries and bring about peace. However, Garcia Calderon did not reach an understanding with Chile as he had expected to do.

General Hurlbut, as soon as he arrived in Peru, began a series of questionable acts. He took the position that there must be no cession of territory on the part of Peru and that the United States must interfere to prevent it. On August 10 and 17 he expressed these views to Mr. Blaine.[43] In addition to the regular duties of the Minister to Peru he assumed the task of interpreting Mr. Blaine's instructions, and sent the following notification to General Kilpatrick:

> The United States are not disposed to recognize on this continent the European notion of addition to territory by conquest, and as we are

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42 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Kilpatrick, June 15, 1881, Senate Exec. Doc., No. 79, 47th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington, D. C., 1882), 157-159.

43 Mr. Hurlbut to Mr. Blaine, Aug. 10, 1881, Ibid., 510-512.

> becoming day by day more interested in the commerce of the Pacific, it becomes daily of more importance to us that peace should prevail.[44]

He assured Garcia Calderon, who had been devoting himself to building up the government, that the United States would intervene to save Peru. When Mr. Calderon refused the demands of Chile and issued paper money made in the United States, he was then arrested and taken to Santiago.[45]

This procedure of Mr. Hurlbut was, no doubt, far beyond his authority in that Mr. Hurlbut was coaxing the Calderon Government from all thoughts of peace and declaring that the United States would support the territorial integrity of Peru; on the other hand, General Kilpatrick was attempting to soothe the Chileans, while each minister in his dispatches to the United States was throwing the blame upon the other.[46]

But there is another angle to this most serious friction which caused Mr. Blaine's policy to end in misfortune. It developed from the money-making schemes by European and American capitalists. Of these financial schemes one enterprise, the Credit Industrial, was organized, and Crochet and Landeau claims were revived. The Crochet claim had been denied by Peru. Br. Blaine had nothing to do with this

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44 Ibid., 513.

45 H. C. Evans, op. cit., 109.

46 Kilpatrick to Blaine, Aug. 15, 1881, Foreign Relations, No. 101, 136; Mr. Hurlbut to Mr. Blaine, Oct. 26, 1881, Ibid., No. 575, 942.

claim.[47] The Landeau claim, however, was to be included in any negotiations of peace, for the reason that John C. Landeau was an American citizen apparently entitled under a lawful contract to reasonable compensation for important services to the Peruvian government.[48]

The most serious difficulty was offered by the French enterprise, the Credit Industrial, which had an agreement with Pierola to handle exclusive sale of all nitrates and guano mined in province of Peru. As Blaine stood so firmly against European intervention, the French Company now appealed to him for an American protectorate.[49] He rejected the plan, forbidding Hurlbut to lend his influence to the Credit Industrial and stated that it had been caused by rumors that Hurlbut was furthering the scheme. Blaine expressed his views as follows:

> However trustworthy the Credit Industrial may be, I did not consider it proper for the Department to have anything whatever to do with it.....It is a foreign corporation.....It is no part of your duty to interfere with its negotiations with Peruvian governments. If it can be made an effective instrumentality to aid that unhappy country in its.....helpless condition, it would be ungenerous and unjust to obstruct its operation. Your duty is negative and you have fully complied with your instructions by simply abstaining from all connections with the association.[50]

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47 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Hurlbut, Nov. 17, 1881, Senate Document, No. 49, 47th Cong., IV, 562.

48 House Reports, No. 1790, 47th Cong., VI, XII.

49 H. C. Evans, op. cit., 111.

50 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Hurlbut, Nov. 19, 1881, Sen. Exec. Doc., No. 79, op. cit., 564.

But what of Mr. Blaine? He openly and officially repudiated the schemes, but secretly he may have favored them, especially the Landeau Claims. He did not like to see the foreign bondholders come in for a share with no American participation. He had recognized the Calderon government, and the Peruvian people were looking to the United States government as their only hope of territorial salvation.

Under such circumstances Peru would doubtless have changed her views of the worthlessness of the Landeau Claim, and "would rather have Landeau have it than those other fellows" who had loaned her money and taken bonds in return. The claim was then to be a prior lien upon Peruvian territory, and its payment annexed as a condition to any treaty between Chile and Peru.

All of this brought much criticism; those in opposition tried to show that Mr. Blaine had adopted a policy of aggressive action.[51] He notified General Hurlbut and General Kilpatrick that he would no longer need their services in the settlement of the pending difficulties. He selected Mr. William Henry Trescot of South Carolina, former Assistant Secretary of State and one of the most experienced diplomatists of this country, as special envoy to Chile, Peru, and Bolivia.[52]

The American minister was instructed to insist that cession of territory was not to be the basis of a treaty.

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51 H. C. Evans, op. cit., 113.

52 Muzzey, op. cit., 213.

Mr. Trescot assured the Peruvian government that the United States would not permit Chile to retain both the conquered territory and the indemnity of twenty million dollars. He felt that the surrender of Tacna and Arica or the money alone was enough, not both. He was earnestly working to establish peace on this basis and had had some encouragement of success.[53] Trescot was also to secure satisfactory reasons for the arrest of Garcia Calderon. The United States was wanting "to see a just and honorable peace at the earliest day practicable" and was willing to work for a lasting settlement.[54]

While Trescot was working on a possible settlement, President Garfield was assassinated, Blaine resigned, and Frederick Frelinghuysen became Secretary of State. Mr. Frelinghuysen determined to follow a less aggressive policy and caused the Trescot efforts to come to naught.[55] The mediation of the United States was doomed to failure before the start because of incompetent representatives.[56] Mr. Hart writes,

> Secretary Blaine's well-meant and statesmanlike efforts to build up an international con-

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53 Exec. Doc., No. 49, op. cit., 47th Cong., IV, 712-715.

54 Blaine to Trescot, Sen. Exec. Doc., No. 79, 47th Cong., 174-179.

55 Graham H. Stuart, "The Tacna, Arica Dispute," World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, X, 78.

56 H. C. Evans, op. cit., 101.

> science among these Latin-American powers was a bad failure partly because of the weakness of his agents and partly because he was himself too ardent for the task.[57]

Those who were there at the outset had been appointed as a reward for humble party loyalty, and those who came a little later were military officers who had to be cared for after the army of occupation had been withdrawn from the South. They were not only inexperienced; they were exceedingly jealous of each other and prone to exceed their instructions. And matters were further complicated by three changes in the personnel of State Department while the War of the Pacific was in progress.

European diplomacy stood ready to mediate, but on two occasions the United States frowned upon the idea. It was a task which had to be confined to American diplomacy.[58]

It had seemed to the political enemies of Secretary Blaine that he was responsible for General Hurlbut and Kilpatrick's proceedings; that he directly encouraged General Hurlbut's outrages upon Chile; and that he, Mr. Blaine, had proceeded without restraint to encourage the schemes of these enterprises mentioned before. When the change in the administration came, his enemies caused the United States Congress to demand all of the correspondence to date

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57 Albert Bushnell Hart, Monroe Doctrine, an Interpretation (Boston, 1916), 277.

58 Rippy, op. cit., 254.

that dealt with the War of the Pacific. The correspondence was then made a matter of public record; it laid bare the schemes of the American capitalists and the instructions to press the Landeau Claim.

Mr. Blaine was drawn into the factional politics of his party for the purpose of discrediting him and the President. In this investigation, he declared before a committee of the House of Representatives,[59] which in the spring of 1882 inquired into certain questions connected with affairs in Chile and Peru said, that he was proud of this chapter in his life in which he was connected with a great man who was gone. (Garfield)

This admiration for his South American policies is justified by the fact that the committee exonerated Secretary Blaine and any of the representatives of the State Department from any blame in the negotiations of the Chile-Peru trouble.[60]

Blaine declared his conviction that Great Britian instigated the war between Chile and Peru in the hope that Chile's conquest of the nitrate area would furnish British nationals in Chile an opportunity to exploit this commodity. Some of the diplomatic agents of the United States appear to have held the same view.[61]

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59 House Report, No. 1790, op. cit., 242.

60 Congressional Record, 47th Cong., 1st sess., 13, IV (Washington, D. C., 1882), 5642, 5647.

61 Rippy, op. cit., 111.

In favoring Peru, he aimed at Chile. The result was unfortunate because Chile was antagonized and Peru, the loser, was left with a rather deeply ingrained annoyance at the United States. Thus the United States lost the good will all around.

CHAPTER II

Blaine made his presence felt in all the disputes that involved the nations of Latin America, both among themselves and with the European powers, during his brief period as Secretary of State, from March to November of 1881. Although attempts were made to settle these numerous difficulties, Mr. Blaine saw that no permanent or satisfactory results could come until there was an establishment of amicable American relations.[1] Blaine believed by dealing fairly with these nations that trade would be increased and friendship strengthened; that common interests of a trade of both continents could be bound together; and that as a result a united front could be established against any and all Old World encroachments.[2] That he wanted cordial relations between the American states is evidenced by this statement:

> It will be a great gain when we.....shall be so regulated that each shall acquire the highest possible advantage from the enlightened and enlarged intercourse of all.[3]

Secretary Blaine had noticed that there was a growing tendency of Latin-American countries to ask the United States to be arbitrator in case of disputes; the realization of this caused him to believe that the time was now ripe for a

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1 Charles Edward Russell, Blaine of Maine, 382.

2 Mary Wilhelmine Williams, The People and Politics of Latin-America, 778.

3 International American Conference, Senate Document, 232, 51st Cong., 1st sess., I (Washington, 1890), 42.

peace conference.[4] Although the idea was not entirely original with Blaine, it was he who conceived of a Congress of American Republics to be called at Washington, D. C., that would lay the foundations of a better union of which he dreamed. The project was difficult because so many of the republics were emerging from a destructive war, but Secretary Blaine went skillfully to work.[5] On November 29, 1881, as Secretary of State, he extended

> to all the independent nations of North and South America an earnest invitation to participate in a general Congress to be held in the city of Washington on the 24th day of November, 1882, for the purpose of considering and discussing the methods of preventing war between the nations of America.[6]

He expressed the hope that in setting a day for the assembling of the Congress so far ahead, the war that was then in progress on the southern Pacific coast would be ended; the nations engaged would then be able to take part in the proceedings.[7] Mr. Blaine planned that the work of the Congress was to be for the future, that the United States would not assume the responsibility of solving any issues to be presented to the Congress, and that the United States would be on the same footing as any other power. Each state was asked to send

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4 James G. Blaine, "Proposed Peace Conference", Discussions: Legislative, Diplomatic, and Political, 403.

5 Charles E. Russell, op. cit., 382-383.

6 Foreign Relations, 1881 (Washington, 1882), 13-15.

7 John Holladay Latane', A History of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1934), 646.

two representatives instructed to consider the questions mentioned in the invitation.[8]

Among the nations of this assembly the United States was to be a friend and helper, but in no sense was the United States to make any commitments. To maintain the independence of each country was to be the concern of all. Secretary Blaine saw in such a combination not only the great possibilities of increasing the trade of the United States but also the great advantages to the South American countries in security and peaceful development.[9]

Several of the states accepted the invitation,[10] but the time was inopportune; for, it will be recalled, the War of the Pacific was then in progress. Within a month after the plan was launched, Blaine had been dropped from the State Department; and his successor, Mr. F. T. Frelinghuysen, was appointed when Chester A. Arthur, who had become president after the death of Garfield, reorganized his cabinet. With President Arthur's approval Secretary of State Frelinghuysen canceled the invitations to what would have been the First International American Conference.[11]

In a communication addressed to Mr. Trescot, United States envoy to Chile and Peru, Secretary Frelinghuysen

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8 Blaine, op. cit., gives also a copy of the invitation sent to the Latin-American States, 403-406.

9 Russell, op. cit., 383, 384.

10 International American Conference, Reports of Committees and Discussions Thereon, IV, 222-249.

11 Williams, op. cit., 779.

wrote:

> The United States is at peace with all the nations of the earth and the President wishes, whether it will conduce to that general peace, which we would cherish, for this government, to enter into negotiations and consultations for the promotion of peace with selected nationalities without extending a like confidence to her people with whom the United States is on equally friendly terms. If such partial confidence would create jealousy and ill-will, peace, the object sought by such consultation, would not be promoted. The principles controlling the relations of the republics of this hemisphere with other nationalities may, on investigation, be found to be so well established that little would be gained at this time by re-opening a subject which is not novel.[12]

The letter closed with the expression that at any event the President wished time to consider the entire proposition.

Mr. Blaine broke his silence when he heard that many rumors were being circulated concerning the canceling of this Congress. He had heard that President Arthur had given out the information that he knew nothing of the invitation; that the meeting of the Congress might cause disputes to arise which would lead to war; that on the whole the result would be more harmful than beneficial.[13] Because of these circulating reports Mr. Blaine felt that he must make a statement that would express his ideas of the benefits of the Conference.

Thus on February 3, 1882, in a letter to President Arthur,

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12 Frelinghuysen to Trescot, January 9, 1882, Foreign Relations, 57-58.

13 Blaine, op. cit., 405.

a copy of which was sent to the New York Tribune to be printed,[14] Blaine took the President to task for destroying the scheme. In this letter he began with the statement that President Arthur sanctioned not only the peace Congress but authorized the invitations to be sent,[15] that the canceling of the invitation came as a surprise to him, and that he felt the reasons so given were insufficient. Blaine in his "Proposed Peace Congress" defended his actions by saying:

> At present, the condition of trade between the United States and its American neighbors is unsatisfactory to us, and even deplorable. According to the official statistics of our own Treasury Departments, the balance against us in that trade last year was $120,000,000, a sum greater than the yearly product of gold and silver mines in the United States. This vast balance was paid by us in foreign exchange, and a very large proportion of it went to England, where shipments of cotton provisions, and bread-stuffs supplied the money.
>
> If anything should change or check the balance in our favor in European trade, our commercial exchanges with Spanish America would drain off our reserve of gold coin at a rate exceeding $100,000,000 per annum, and would probably precipitate a suspension of specie payment in this country.....I do not say, Mr. President, that holding a peace conference will necessarily change the current of trade, but it will bring us into kindly relations with all the American nations; it will promote the reign of peace and law and order; it will increase and will stimulate the demand for articles which American manufactures can furnish with profit.[16]

Mr. Blaine closed the discussion by asking the President to consider again this idea of an American Congress and to

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14 Hispanic American Review, V, 670.

15 Gail Hamilton, Biography of James G. Blaine, 521.

16 Blaine, op. cit., 407-410.

consider the material ends to be gained from such a conference. [17]

Again in 1882 Mr. Blaine showed his bitterness when he wrote a pamphlet on the Foreign Policy of the Garfield Administration,[18] in which he said that the Congress had two principal objects in view:

First:

> To bring about peace and prevent future wars in North and South America

Second:

> To cultivate such friendly commercial relations with all American Countries as would lead to a large increase in the export trade of the United States by supplying fabrics in which we are aboundantly able to compete with the manufacturing nations of Europe.

The second object mentioned above would have been gained on the realization of the first. Blaine declared:

> Instead of friendly intervention here and there patching up a treaty between two countries today, securing a truce between others, tomorrow..... it was apparent.....that a more comprehensive plan should be adopted, if wars were to cease on the Western Hemisphere.[19]

In short, Pan-Americanism as Blaine conceived it in 1882 was expressed in two words, peace and commerce, which were to be attained by the friendly co-operation of all the American republics and by all of them receiving equal benefit.[20]

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17 Letter to President Arthur, Feb. 3, 1882, Ibid., 410.

18 Ibid., 411.

19 Ibid., 411-419.

20 Joseph Byrne Lockey, Pan-Americanism, Its Beginnings (New York, 1920), 4.

President Arthur ignored Mr. Blaine's plea. He did not change his order, because he felt that Congress should be given an opportunity to consider the advisability of the step.[21] No action was taken, however, by the United States Congress in 1882; but in 1884, when Congress met, Mr. Blaine's ideas to secure longitudinal trade conditions of the Western Hemisphere received attention in the act which authorized the President to appoint a commission to ascertain and report upon the best mode of securing more intimate international and commercial relations between the United States and the several countries of Central and South America.[22] The commission that was appointed obtained much valuable information through conferences with merchants of large cities, both in the United States and in the countries of Central and South America.[23] After fourteen months of travel and investigation the commission sent their report to Congress, which was printed and put into circulation.[24]

Thus, Mr. Blaine's commercial plan survived in Washington, and the Senate passed what is known as the Frye Bill[25] on June 17, 1886; this bill, however, did not become a law

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21 James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1897, VIII, 131.

22 Senate Exec. Doc., 54, I, 51st Cong., 1st sess., Serial No. 2685, 22.

23 Ibid., 22.

24 Ibid., 23

25 James R. Boyd, Men and Issues of '92 (New York, 1899), 320.

until May 24, 1888, when the International American Conference became a possibility.[26]

The Conference was called by Secretary of State Bayard to meet in Washington, D. C., October 2, 1889. All the states except Santo Domingo finally accepted the invitation.[27] Though most of the Latin-American countries sent only one representative, there were in all thirty-seven delegates,[28] ten of which were from the United States. The difference in the number of delegates, however, established no inequality as an agreement was made that the voting should be by states.[29] Before the date set, the administration changed at Washington, and Blaine again became Secretary of State.[30]

Mr. Blaine must have been very grateful when he was chosen president of the Conference, for he assumed nothing but good feeling and suggested only harmony in his welcome address:[31]

> The delegates I am addressing can do much to establish permanent relations of confidence, respect, and friendship between the nations which

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26 Ibid., 320.

27 Joseph Bryne Lockey, "James G. Blaine", in Samuel F. Bemis's Secretaries of State, VIII, 165-166.

28 International American Conference, Reports of Committees and Discussions Thereon, 1889-1890, I, 49-54.

29 Ibid., 58.

30 Hamilton, op. cit., 654.

31 William C. Fox,"Next Pan-American Congress," Forum, XXX, 299.

> they represent. They can show to the world an honorable peaceful conference of eighteen independent American powers, in which all shall meet together on terms of absolute equality.....a conference it would in fine seek nothing, propose nothing, endure nothing, that was not in the sense of the delegates, timely, wise, and peaceful.....We believe that friendship and not force, the spirit of just law and not violence of the mob should be the recognized rule of administration between American nations and in American nations.[32]

Among the subjects discussed during the Conference were the preservation of peace; the creation of the customs union; uniform systems of weights, measures, and coinage; and the promotion of frequent inter-communication among the American states.

The desire for peace among the American countries, as already pointed out, became a plan for international arbitration which was declared "to be a principle of international law."[33]

President Harrison expressed his idea of the benefits of the Conference in the following statement:

> But while the commercial results which it is hoped will follow these conferences are worthy of pursuit and of the interests they have excited, it is believed that the crowning benefit will be found in better securities which may be desired for maintenance of peace among all American nations and the settlement of all contentions by methods that a Christian civilization can approve.[34]

A suggestion that arbitration treaties should include a provision that in case of war a victory of arms should not

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32 International American Conference, 1889-1890, I, 39-42.

33 Williams, op. cit., 779.

34 Richardson, op. cit., 33.

convey rights to the territory of the conquered was introduced at the First International American Conference by delegates from Argentina and Brazil. Mr. Blaine had expressed the aims of the Conference as being to cultivate an American sympathy, and to form no selfish alliance against nations of the Old World.

The arbitration scheme which Mr. Blaine had so long advocated failed to obtain the support that he desired. However, another proposal came up that included the principle of Conquest.[35] The proposal created such a heated debate that Mr. Andrew Carnegie, a delegate from the United States, brought the debate to a close by asking for a recess in order that the delegates might come to an understanding of the subject. After the recess Blaine took the floor, where he argued for the new wording of the proposal; he felt that the mission of the conference would fall short should it fail to promote stability and the guaranty of just internationalism among nations of the Continent.[36]

The governments whose representatives adopted the treaty failed to approve it. The declaration against the acquisition of title by Conquest as a part of the treaty of arbitration failed to receive the official sanction of the participating governments.[37]

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35 International American Conference, II, op. cit., 1144-1145.

36 Ibid., 1146-1147.

37 Lockey, op. cit., in Bemis's op. cit., VIII, 178.

Although Mr. Blaine was interested in the policy of arbitration, he was most interested in the project known as the customs union. A customs union was generally understood as being the establishing among several nations of a single customs territory. Nations forming the union should list import duties on foreign goods under substantially the same tariff laws, divide the proceeds thereof in a given proportion, and mutually receive free of duty their respective manufactured products.[38]

This Customs Union project provided the Conference with much heated debate, as many felt that it was untimely to propose free trade among free republics. However, the most efficient step in that direction was the negotiation of partial reciprocity treaties among American nations whereby each might agree to remove its import duties on some of the material or manufactured products of one or more nations in exchange for equivalent advantages in reduction of duties.[39]

To many in the conference the idea of reciprocity seemed impractical at this time, as a Continental system for import duties constituted the main source of revenue for the American republics.[40] Also, the Committee of the Conference in charge of commercial relations was checked by the fact that during this conference the United States Congress was occupied with the McKinley Tariff of 1890, which was of

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38 International American Conference, op. cit., I, 103.

39 Ibid., I, 263-264.

40 Minutes of the International Conference, Senate Doc., 231, 51st Cong., 1st sess., XIII, Serial No. 2690, 329.

vital interest to the delegates. Secretary Blaine suggested and urged with all his might that the tariff be so constructed as to compel the South American countries to give a favored place to American trade. He wrote to Mr. McKinley that the bill was "a slap in the face to the South Americans with whom we are trying to enlarge our trade.....such movements as this for protection will protect the Republican party into a speedy retirement."[41] When the bill came before the senate, Secretary Blaine wrote, "There is not a section or a line in the entire bill that will open a market for another bushel of wheat or another barrel of pork."[42]

The Conference decided that it was not time to develop a customs union, but the principle of extending trade by means of reciprocity received a favorable impulse. Likewise Mr. Blaine aroused interest among his own people to the doctrine of reciprocity. The high protectionists appeared suspicious of any plan which looked toward free trade in products in which the United States was interested. The opponents of commercial freedom thought that it would be necessary to admit wool, hides, lead, and copper ores free of duty, or at least at a low rate, if reciprocity arrangements which they feared would be made with Central and South America.[43] Secretary Blaine argued that the United States would gain the most from any reciprocity agreements because

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41 Hamilton, op. cit., 683.

42 Ibid., 686.

43 D. R. Dewey, National Problems (New York, 1907), 176.

trade would increase. European trade in Latin America was increasing while that of the United States was decreasing. Thus, under pressure the McKinley Act as passed did include provisions for "the free introduction of sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides.....for such time as he (the President) shall deem just". Blaine suspected that unless there could be a consumption elsewhere of the difference between the total of American production and the total of the country's purchasing power, there would likely be an economic depression. If the United States would admit at a reduced rate the products of South America, and if the South American countries would admit at a reduced rate the products of the United States, this would bind together in enduring bonds of common interest the two hemispheres and ward off the undesirable agents of Europe.[44] But Blaine failed to persuade the House of Representatives to incorporate the principle of reciprocity into the McKinley Bill.[45]

In his discussion of Secretary Blaine's foreign policies, Dr. T. L. Reynolds said in the presence of the writer of this thesis, "The economic factor of Blaine is most important. Blaine camouflaged his real motive to secure friendship and trade in order to secure markets for New England industrialists. Narrow as Blaine's view of world affairs was, he had an American program which taken by itself was definite and

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44 Russell, op. cit., 382.

45 Frank W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (New York, 1899), 278-279.

well conceived".[46]

In the State Department, Blaine proceeded swiftly to put into operation his ideas and ideals. He had a vision of all the Americas united by common interests and republican creeds against monarchical Europe, not hostile to Europe but independent of it. His far reaching hope was to make the Monroe Doctrine economic as well as political. He knew that commercially and to a certain extent politically, Great Britian viewed South America as her own sphere of influence, and he was not uplifted by the thought. It seemed to him that essentially America should have nothing in common with any European tradition or "influence". Great Britian was the hereditary enemy of the United States, and whatever prestige she might gain in South America would sooner or later be used to the detriment of the United States.[47]

All this zeal for trade and arbitration and for the Pan-American Congress appeared to constitute an evil omen for European trade and influence in the Western Hemisphere. The countries of Europe were afraid that Blaine's idea of expansion would extend so far as to usurp a part of their trade and commerce. They were jealous of the growing power of the United States and of the fact that Blaine had behind him a prosperous nation full of ardor, ambition, and capital.

The nations of Europe viewed the Conference as an

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46 Dr. T. H. Reynolds, Head of the History Department, Oklahoma A. and M. College, Unpublished Class Lecture, Summer 1937.

47 Russell, op. cit., 381.

opportunity for the United States to make an advance, commercially and perhaps to some extent politically, into what they considered their spheres of influence. They were not uplifted by the thought. One foreign paper saw two dangers arising from the All-American Congress, namely, the Anglo-Saxon power over Latin America and a coalition of American states against products of Europe.[48] These statements were emphatically verified by the article of de Varigney published in In Revue des deux Mondes. He wrote in substance that the question was worth investigation by the diplomats because certain circumstances caused Europe to be against the project. Europe could not sit still and let Mr. Blaine, the "American Bismark", expoit the product of the Latin American nations.[49]

Also, the British press denounced Secretary Blaine. Some British newspapers discovered that he had a monstrous scheme to unite both Americas into an absolutism under his own dictatorship.[50] Great Britian and other European countries were supplying South America with articles that might as well be furnished by the United States.

Blaine could see in such a conference great advantages and possibilities in profits. The attention of the conference

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48 Wilgus, Curtis A., "Blaine and the Pan-American Movement", Hispanic American Historical Review (Durham, N. Car., 1918), V, 703.

49 de Varigney, C- "un Homme d' Etat American", In Revue des deux Mondes (Paris, Jan. 15, 1890), 97, 433-462.

50 Russell, op. cit., 383.

had been to a great extent devoted to the consideration of measures designed to foster and promote trade between the United States and Latin America, but Mr. Blaine's aim seemed to be to allow full freedom for discussion and decision without any pressure or suggestion from the United States.[51]

Secretary Blaine, too, must have been aware that the surest way to have the conference a failure would be to take issue with these opinions coming from certain European nations, who, he felt, sought their own advantage by wanting to stir up conflicting changes and strife. If so, this would mean defeat of the conference, and would, therefore, appeal to the business interests of Europe.[52] Secretary Blaine skillfully avoided any such happening.

The Conference adjourned April 19, 1890. Mr. Blaine said in his farewell address that he was gratified at the work that had been accomplished by the Conference, that the results of this work would be defined with time, and that experience would confirm our present faith.

> If in this closing hour, the Conference had but one deed to celebrate, we should dare call the world's attention to the deliberate, confident, solemn dedication of two great continents to peace and to the prosperity which has peace for its foundation. We hold up this new "Magna Charta", arbitration between the American Republics, as the first and great fruit of the International American Conference.[53]

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51 Matias Romero, "The Pan-American Conference" (1890), North American Review, 151, 358.

52 de Varigney, C-, op. cit., 453-454.

53 International American Conference, op. cit., II, 1166-1167.

He adjourned the Conference, and without delay he wrote a letter to President Harrison submitting the report of the Conference. This report was given to the United States Congress June 19, 1890. The report was given also to the several Latin-American states. The governments whose representatives adopted the treaty of arbitration failed to approve it; also the declaration against the acquisition of title by conquest as a part of the treaty of arbitration, which Secretary Blaine desired, was not adopted.[54]

Mr. Latane' in his discussion of Pan-Americanism wrote that the creation of the Bureau of the American Republics was the tangible achievement of the First International American Conference.[55]

Of course this Bureau has developed into a very valuable organization for common understanding, the outcome of which was the Pan-American Union with the erection of a beautiful building in Washington, D. C.;[56] but there is no use to deny that other achievements can be pointed out with just as far-reaching consequences. The several conferences which have met since that time have proved valuable.[57] Thus, Mr. Blaine and the First International American Conference should have a share of the credit, because the conferences have continued

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54 Lockey, op. cit., in Bemis's op. cit., VIII, 778.

55 Latane', op. cit., 661.

56 Williams, op. cit., 780.

57 Lockey, op. cit., in Bemis's op. cit., VIII, 180.

to be a force. Mr. Elihu Root[58] in a speech in New York December 20, 1889, spoke of the delegates as being ".....the advance guard in the greatest movement since civilization began toward the brotherhood of man and the federation of the world".[59]

Indirect and distinct results must be taken into account. Unquestionably harmony and understanding between the nations were begun; also research and investigations were started and encouraged.

The Conference was a step forward, and its work was carried further by the genius of Mr. Blaine and his associates.[60] His hardest battle, as I have shown before, was with Congress over reciprocity.

Reciprocity was a difficult problem to solve. The most efficient step in that direction was the negotiation of partial reciprocity treaties among American nations whereby each might agree to remove its import duties on some of the materials or manufactured products of one or more nations in exchange for equivalent advantages in reduction[61] of duties.

Secretary Blaine fought for reciprocity in trade and against the action of Congress. He protested that Congress

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58 New York lawyer who became Secretary of State in 1905.

59 Sen. Exec. Doc., 232, op. cit., III, 295.

60 Fox, op. cit., XXX, 299.

61 International American Conference, 232, op. cit., I, 103-120.

was throwing away the most promising opportunity for increasing United States exports to the disadvantage of the great agricultural regions of the United States.[62]

It is necessary to keep in mind that in his efforts of the International American Conference and in his encouragement of the reciprocity movement, Mr. Blaine did produce lasting results. Secretary Blaine understood much more clearly than some of his contemporaries that the changing industrial conditions were destroying American separateness.[63]

Secretary Blaine was a statesman who was looking after long-time legislation. He recognized the changing imperialism. He had lived in a period of great change, belonging as much to the period of Secretary Seward[64] with his ideas of expansion as he did to the economic penetration in which the European nations were involved. He was opposed to this economic penetration of Europe,[65] as well as to the political penetration under the Monroe Doctrine, which was gradually blending in with the new Pan-Americanism.[66]

Secretary of State Blaine's efforts to build up sentiment in favor of closer trade relations between the United

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62 Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century (Boston, 1904), 276-280.

63 Carl Russell Fish, "Blaine and His Pan-Americanism", The Chronicles of America, XLVI, 65.

64 Bemis, op. cit., VII, 1; William H. Seward was Secretary of State March 5, 1861.

65 Fish, op. cit., 63-64.

66 Parker Thomas Moon, Imperialism and World Politics (New York, 1936), 452-453.

States and its neighboring republics has increased steadily since his time. Although the meaning of Pan-Americanism has changed since the time of Secretary Blaine and the First International American Conference, no doubt Secretary Blaine's great purpose of peaceful relations and mutual interests between the United States and Latin-American Countries has helped to soothe over agitations that otherwise might have caused grave differences and perhaps bloodshed.

On the whole he was ahead of his time,[67] so that many of his policies have been advanced and extended by his successors without their realizing that these same ideas were once the policies of James G. Blaine. Thus, it must be admitted that the United States has experienced a considerable degree of success in the realization of Latin-American policies because Mr. Blaine was a man of vision in a fast changing world.

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67 Russell, op. cit., 382, ff.

CHAPTER III

Scarcely had the First International American Conference adjourned when the United States became rather seriously involved in the Chilean affairs in connection with the Civil War between President Balmaceda and the Congressionalists.

Senor Don Jose Manuel Balmaceda was installed as President of Chile, September 18, 1886. Although it has been claimed that he accomplished more in his five years' term than all his predecessors combined, he was in constant conflict with his Congress throughout his administration.[1] In 1890 it refused to vote the budget for the coming year. This, eventually, caused President Balmaceda to issue an illegal decree effective January 1, 1891, declaring in force the estimates of the preceding Congress. This decree brought about an armed revolt by President Balmaceda against the Congressionalists, which declared the President deposed for violation of the constitution.[2]

The Congressionalists had the support of the navy, which seized the rich nitrate section, the revenue from which provided funds for the conduct of the war. British and German firms, because they felt that their future welfare in this district depended upon the success of the Congressionalists, contributed liberally to their cause.[3]

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1 Mary W. Williams, The People and Politics of Latin America, 604.

2 Ibid., 607.

3 Henry Clay Evans, Chile and Its Relations with the United States (Durham, N. Car., 1927), 138.

Although the Balmaceda government had the support of the army, it was not strong enough to overthrow the Congressionalists, and was, therefore, defeated late in August 1891, causing Blamaceda to abdicate. In the following September he committed suicide with a pistol at the Argentine legation where he was staying.[4] The revolution came to an end with the beginning of a new provisional government under President Jorge Montt.[5]

This revolution in Chile caused diplomatic questions to arise also in the United States. However, persuing a uniform policy of maintaining friendly relations with the established government, the United States up to the overthrow of Balmaceda recognized him as the legitimate president.[6] But this recognition was a cause for occurences of so serious a nature that the United States and Chile were nearly involved in war. Secretary of State Blaine and his Minister both took a moderate view of the situation. The chief purpose of this chapter is to examine the part that Blaine played in this struggle.

The choice of the minister of the United States to Chile in 1891 was Mr. Patrick Egan, who had been appointed by President Harrison at the request of Secretary Blaine. Egan, who had become a naturalized citizen of the United States, was a native of Ireland. He was a man of honor,[7] and those

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4 Williams, op. cit., 608.

5 Ibid., 608.

6 John W. Foster, "Atlantic Pan-American Diplomacy", Atlantic Monthly, (Boston, 1840), LXXXIX, 484.

7 Harry Thurston Peck, "A Spirited Foreign Policy", The Bookman, XXI (New York, 1895).

who knew him spoke highly of his business ability and his character.[8]

The United States foreign policy with Chile between 1890-1892 had its share of criticism both at home and abroad. The chief criticism was that the United States failed to remain neutral during the revolution. The critics placed the blame for the strained relation between the two countries upon Blaine's appointment of Egan; for reasons that Egan had no diplomatic experience, and he was least suited to serve in Chile than in any of the Latin-American states because of the close commercial connections between Chile and England.[9]

Opponents of Mr. Blaine and the Harrison Administration began to investigate Egan's past and proved to their own satisfaction that the hostility of Chile toward the United States was largely due to this minister's actions;[10] that Egan was a wandering foreign adventurer whose residence in the United States had been brief, his reputation shady, and his actions questionable since he had allied himself with a would-be dictator. Concerning this statement two prominent contemporary historians, Albert Bushnell Hart[11] and John Spencer

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8 Albert Bushnell Hart, "Chilean Controversy", Practical Essays in American Government (New York, 1905), 79.

9 William E. Curtis, From the Andes to the Ocean (New York, 1907), 409.

10 National Cyclopedia of American Biography, 1899 (New York, 1906), IV, 399.

11 Hart, op. cit., 108-114.

Bassett, were of the same opinion.[12]

Just why should such an individual be appointed by Mr. Blaine to represent the United States is a question that is interesting but difficult to answer. Since the Irish vote in doubtful states was courted by the Republican party in the election of 1890, Egan's appointment to the Chilean post might have been to gain the good wishes of the Irish for the Republican party. Perhaps this appointment was made with the hope that Egan, who hated all things British, would carry this hatred with him to Chile, where he made enemies among the English residents. Perhaps both Blaine's and President Balmaceda's well known antipathy for the English in Chile influenced the appointment, and perhaps Blaine did expect Egan to advance the interests of the anti-English capitalists, because Egan wrote to Blaine:

> The hostile spirit of England and Germany must show every Chilean patriot that he should cultivate close commercial relations with the United States.[13]

Mr. Egan was favorably received by the Balmaceda Government, and both took special care to cultivate these cordial relations. Mr. Egan referred to this modification by stating that the relations between the United States and Chile were better than they had been in the past.[14] It did appear at

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12 John S. Bassett, A Short History of the United States (New York, 1921), 771.

13 H. C. Evans, op. cit., 138.

14 Mr. Egan to Mr. Blaine, Feb. 13, 1891, Foreign Relations, 1891 (Washington D. C., 1892), 104.

this time that Egan was precisely the proper one to turn Chile away from the European influence and toward the United States. Mr. Egan's correspondence with Secretary Blaine showed that he must have been favorable to the Balmaceda Government.[15] During the Civil War between Balmaceda and the Congressional party, Mr. Egan admitted to the American legation certain adherents to the Chilean government and hinted that the cause of the revolutionists did not attract him.[16]

Egan, however, hoped for a truce; and through Rear Admiral McCann, then stationed in Iquique harbor, he tried to sound the Congressional Government as to its ideas on the matter. Egan's attempt was of little consequence, for the revolutionists believed that the American Minister was hostile to their cause because he expected them to lose.[17] If Egan were wrong in his opinion that Balmaceda would win, then the American naval authorities on the Chilean coast were wrong because they held the same opinion.[18]

As the months passed, President Balmaceda influenced the American press in behalf of his cause until the whole of Chile

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15 Mr. Egan to Mr. Blaine, March 17, 1891, Ibid., 107.

16 Mr. Egan to Mr. Blaine, June 9, 1891, House Executive Document, 91, XXXIV, 52nd Cong., 1st sess., (Washington, D. C., 1892), 47.

17 H. C. Evans, op. cit., 139.

18 Rear Admiral McConn to Mr. Egan, May 25, 1891, House Exec., Doc., op. cit., 48.

seemed to think that the United States was partial to the Chilean Government.[19]

These indiscretions of Mr. Egan were of minor importance as far as the revolution in Chile was concerned, because the United States had taken no official part. However, the blame fell on his shoulders, and it was not to be thwarted by the work of Egan; Balmaceda's adversaries in Chile sent delegates to Washington, D. C., to present their claims as a belligerent nation. The President of the United States, however, not wishing to prejudge the question of recognition of a revolutionary movement, refused to receive them,[20] an act in accordance with the traditional policy of the United States that a government to be recognized must be in actual control.[21]

This refusal to recognize the revolutionists was expressed when the United States displayed offensive zeal in the capture of the Itata, a vessel which was carrying arms and munitions for Chilean insurgents.[22] The seizure of the Itata was ordered by the United States Attorney General, W. H. Miller, as a result of the claims made by Senor Don Purdencio Lazcano, the Balmaceda representative in Washington. Lazcano insisted that the Itata was in an American port for the purpose of transactions which would constitute a breach of the

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19 H. C. Evans, op. cit., 138.

20 Mr. Whorton to Mr. Egan, July 21, 1891, House Executive Document, op. cit., 57-58.

21 Mr. Egan to Mr. Blaine, Sept. 7, 1891, Ibid., 71.

22 James Daniel Richardson, Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the President, IX, 184.

United States' neutrality laws.[23]

Lazcano had approached Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State, with the information that the Balmaceda government had issued a decree forbidding the importation of arms into Chile.[24] His action was prompted, he said, because of the presence in New York at that time of Trumbull, an agent of the Chilean revolutionists, whose purpose was the purchasing of arms and munitions to carry on the revolution in Chile.[25] This attempt of Lazcano to prevent shipment of the arms from the United States was unsuccessful. Secretary Blaine told him that in accordance with international law and the laws of the United States the exportation of arms was not forbidden; but that if he wished to make a test of the laws, the courts were at his disposal.[26]

In the meanwhile Trumbull shipped his purchases across the United States to San Francisco where the guns were loaded on the American ship, the Robert and Minnie, a coastal trade ship, which had been chartered by him. The steamer Itata suddenly departed, taking along the American official who had been placed on board by United States authorities to detain it. The marshal on board was dropped at a point on the

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23 Senor Lazcano to Mr. Blaine, May 5, 1891, Foreign Relations, 1891, 316.

24 Osgood Hardy, "The Itata Incident", Hispanic American Historical Review, V (Durham, N. Car., 1926), 202.

25 Foreign Relations, 1891, 314.

26 Mr. Blaine to Senor Lazcano, March 13, 1891, House Executive Document, 91, op. cit., 197.

coast.[27] The Robert and Minnie transferred her cargo to the Itata somewhere near the Catalina Islands, and she sailed at once for Chile.[28] Whether the action of the Itata in loading the arms from the other ship constituted a violation of the neutrality laws was a debatable question, but President Harrison was indignant over the affair and had two warships detailed to follow the Itata. The Itata reached Iquique, Chile, where it was at once put in custody of the United States squadron under Rear Admiral McCann, who had already been assured by the Congressionalists that the Itata would be turned over to him as soon as it was anchored.[29] It could not be asserted, however, that the Itata had broken any law. The officers of this ship were tried in the United States courts in California where the case was discharged.[30] The United States, nevertheless, appealed the case, not because of a desire to condemn the Itata, but because the case was one involving international law and one on which the United States desired a correct decision.[31] This higher court, too, upheld the lower courts' decision[32] that the transaction was a legitimate commercial

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27 Richardson, op. cit., IX, 183.

28 Hardy, op. cit., 107.

29 Rear Admiral McCann to Mr. Tracy, May 16, 1891, House Executive Document, 91, op. cit., 255.

30 H. C. Evans, op. cit., 141.

31 Richardson, op. cit., IX, 184.

32 Hardy, op. cit., 224.

venture.[33] Thereupon the Itata was released and allowed to return to Chile. The revolution had been brought to a conclusion before the Itata returned, yet the Chilean citizens felt that the United States was siding Balmaceda by preventing the munitions from being delivered. The Itata affair can in no way be connected with the Department of State. The Itata incident kept alive suspicion and hatred toward the United States, but there is no proof that Blaine had anything to do with its chase or return.[34] There was a great deal of newspaper comment which reported that while Attorney General Miller and Secretary of Navy Tracy felt that the Itata should be returned, the rest of the administration did not.[35]

The United States navy was unpopular in Chile as a result of this Itata affair, but other incidents occurred which heightened the resentment of the revolutionary party.[36] The cable line owned by the Central and South American Telegraph Company, incorporated in the United States, connected Chile with the outside world. The process of laying the cable at Iquique was not stopped by the revolutionists who were in control there. Through Mr. Egan's efforts the United States squadron gave protection to the cable company which made a

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33 John B. Moore, "Chilean Controversy", Political Science Quarterly, VIII, 469.

34 Richardson, op. cit., IX, 184.

35 Hardy, op. cit., 224.

36 H. C. Evans, op. cit., 141.

direct off-shore connection.[37] On the night of June 20, 1891, the cable was cut in the open sea and the connection made. By this action Iquique was cut off from cable service, which of course was a serious blow to the Congressionalists.[38] While the cutting of the cable was a commercial act of a private company, it was taken by the Congressionalists as more attempts on the part of the United States to aid Balmaceda.[39]

Late in August of the same year occurred another irritating incident which contributed considerably to the strained relations between United States and Chile. It was rumored that the revolutionists were to land a force at Quinteros. To verify this report, Admiral Brown, Commander of the United States South Pacific fleet, went ashore at Valpariso to get the news of the landing for his own information. That the news of the landing reached the city before his return to the fleet caused him to be held responsible for the leak.[40] He was accused from that time as being a Balmaceda spy, which did not reflect credit on the United States navy.[41]

Although it was possible that the charge against Admiral Brown was a falsehood, the report was accepted as true by the

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37 Moore, op. cit., 470.

38 House Exec. Doc., 91, op. cit., 588-589.

39 H. C. Evans, op. cit., 142.

40 Rear Admiral Brown to Mr. Egan, Sept. 8, 1891, House Exec. Doc., 91, op. cit., 75 ff.

41 H. C. Evans, op. cit., 142.

average Chilean,[42] and was capitalized by anti-American interests to convince the Congressionalists that the United States was aiding the Balmacedists.[43] Once again, for the cable affair and for the accusations of Admiral Brown, no blame can be attached to Secretary Blaine nor to Mr. Egan.[44]

It is not surprising that the Congressionalists believed that these three contemporary acts, the Itata affair, the Cable affair, and the Quinteros Bay Episode, committed by individuals acting for the United States, had openly aided Balmaceda.

Notwithstanding these disturbing incidents the new provisional government under Jorge Montt started out in September, 1891, with a hopeful outlook. On September 1, Mr. Egan telegraphed that the Congressionalists were fully installed and inquired whether he could "recognize the new government", adding, "Everything is tranquil". On September 4, he was instructed to recognize the government if it was accepted by the people.[45]

The life of this government, of which Senor Matta was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, may be considered as

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42 House Exec. Doc., 91, op. cit., 75, 277.

43 Moore, op. cit., 471.

44 John Trumbull, "Our Neutrality in Chile", The Nation (New York, 1892), LIV, 50, admits that he was unable to obtain any proof of wrong doing.

45 Moore, op. cit., 471.

coincident with a second period in the relations of the United States and Chile. In this first period, January 1891 to September 1891, it seemed that there were mistakes made which gave the Chilean revolutionists causes for resentment against the United States. In the second period, September 1891 to January 1892, these mistakes were Chilean, while the State Department was clear of censure.

Mr. Egan reported on September 17, 1891, to Secretary Blaine that many of the young and unthinking Chileans had a bitter feeling against the United States; but, on the other hand, the more reasonable men admitted that the United States took the consistent course. The hostile element let no opportunity pass of misrepresenting every thing pertaining to the United States.[46]

The death of Balmaceda was followed by the destruction of houses and property, causing many of his friends to seek an asylum in the American legation.[47] This, too, added to the bitterness of the young element in the new government when Egan allowed some eighty of the Balmacedist refugees in the legation.[48] Mr. Egan kept them at great expense, reporting that he would permit them to leave only under safe conduct to a neutral territory.[49]

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46 Mr. Egan to Mr. Blaine, House Exec. Doc., 91, op. cit., 74.

47 Mr. Egan to Mr. Blaine, September 29, 1891, Foreign Relations, 1891, 170.

48 H. C. Evans, op. cit., 143-144.

49 Foreign Relations, 1891, 166-171.

The right of the asylum had been disputed, and the fact that the demand for safe conduct had no standing in international law[50] was here brought out, because all the legation had admitted refugees except the British.[51]

One action in particular which commanded unusual interest resulted from the method employed in handling the refugee problem. The right of asylum was not denied by the Chilean government, nor did it ask the American legation for the surrender of the refugees; it denied, for a while, however, the right of safe conduct.[52] It is true that Egan did receive more refugees than were received by any other Ambassador in Santiago.[53]

Mr. Blaine was quite willing to give that tempest torn state ample time to get on its feet and come to its senses. He felt justified in waiting until the new ministry should be in office, provided, of course, that no new source of friction should arise. Miss Hamilton in her biography of Blaine states:[54]

> Mr. Blaine was disposed from every motive to take a moderate view of the situation. Mr. Blaine would waive no hair's breadth of the right of asylum and the President refused even to consider the question whether asylum had been properly given until the privileges of the legation were restored, but toward a country rent by internal wars, Mr. Blaine believed every consideration should be shown.

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50 Moore, op. cit., 478.

51 H. C. Evans, op. cit., 144.

52 Moore, op. cit., 479.

53 Foreign Relations, 1891, 171.

54 Gail Hamilton, Biography of James G. Blaine (Norwich, Conn., 1895), 675.

But this course was offensive to the revolutionary leaders and to their supporters in Valpariso. The actions of these revolutionary leaders made it difficult for Mr. Egan to carry out Mr. Blaine's wishes; however Mr. Egan kept the refugees, as there was nothing else he could do since they were in dreadful need of protection. Mr. Evans writes in his diary:

> As to Mr. Egan he has done only what he was instructed to do from Washington, and he has done it capitally well.[55]

The situation was still further complicated by rioting which occurred in Valparaiso in the fall of the year.[56] The United States cruiser, Baltimore, under command of Captain Schley, was stationed in Valparaiso harbor. On October 16, 1891, he gave shore leave to a considerable number of his men, and most of them wandered into town that afternoon.[57] In the streets of the city a quarrel began between a Chilean and one of the American sailors, which soon developed into a street fight between a Chilean mob and a number of the men from the Baltimore. In the melee one sailor was killed, others wounded, and a considerable number arrested. Those detained were promptly released, but the local investigation dragged on; the sailors under detention reported treatment that aroused a popular demand in the United States for explanation and

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55 Robley D. Evans, A Sailor's Log. Recollections of Forty Years of Naval Life (New York, 1915), 276.

56 A. Curtis Wilgus, "Studies in Hispanic American Affairs", Argentina, Brazil, and Chile Since Independence (Washington D. C., 1935), 358.

57 H. C. Evans, op. cit., 146.

apology. Coming on top of all the incidents mentioned before and on the eve of a presidential election, the incident served to inflame the fighting spirit of the United States.[58]

Captain Schley, cammanding officer of the Baltimore, held an investigation the next morning after the sailors were attacked. He reported that it was brutal and unprovoked, that he had found his men sober and well-behaved. Blaine accepted this investigation as fully accurate and demanded through Egan prompt and full indemnity.[59]

Secretary Blaine promptly took measures to secure an apology and the indemnity that would likely be forth-coming. Mr. Blaine thought Chile was too small and our country too large to permit a fierce attitude toward a neighbor even when offending.[60] There could be no glory in any victory by force: and he was exceedingly desirous to win the friendly cooperation and confidence to Chile, not to compel her submission. He demanded for the Baltimore sailors open trial and proper representation, but he could not magnify a brawl into a battle. It was with difficulty that such a circumstance could take on continental dimension. He formed the opinion from the Chilean correspondence that there existed a disposition in Chile to stir up hostility with the United States.[61]

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58 Wilgus, op. cit., 358.

59 H. C. Evans, op. cit., 147.

60 Hamilton, op. cit., 675.

61 Ibid., 675-676.

Matta refused this demand for reparation as firmly as he did the appeals for safe conduct. He could not recognize courts other than the Chilean courts where a trial of the case was now being held. This trial dragged on into December, after which he reported that the courts were of the opinion that the riot was a drunken brawl and that the police had done all in its power to quell the riot.[62]

These reports, upon their receipt to Washington, did not meet the approval of President Harrison. With no solution in sight for either the refugee situation in Santiago or the Baltimore affair at Valparaiso, the President devoted most of his message to Congress on December 9, 1891, to the Chilean situation and especially the attack which he believed was hostile to the American uniform.[63] He directed Secretary Blaine to telegraph to Egan his conclusions which he had reached after considering the evidence of the officers and crew of the Baltimore and some of the others who witnessed the affray. In addition Egan was instructed by Secretary Blaine to communicate to the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs that the "Matta note" of December 11,[64] ascribing untruth and insincerity to President Harrison and Secretary Blaine in their official communications, was in the highest

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62 Ibid., 148.

63 Richardson, op. cit., IX, 181-187.

64 "Matta Note", House Executive Document, 91 (Washington, D. C., 1892), 179-180.

degree offensive.[65]

Senor Matta, who was easily angered, flew into a rage as soon as he heard of President Harrison's message.[66] He sent a telegram to the Chilean Minister in the United States, the content of which was to be printed both in the newspapers here and abroad.

Robley D. Evans, a commander of the battleship Yorktown, wrote in his diary December 16, 1891:

> The papers here grow more and more insolent and I don't see how Mr. Harrison can avoid sending an ultimatum at a very early day. In the meantime the Chileans .....are to get their ships ready.....and in two weeks from now the whole fleet will be ready for service.[67]

Also, Evans recorded in his diary a few days later that Grace and Company was trying to convince Secretary Blaine that the United States must not have war. Evans expressed the opinion that Harrison was for war, thet the Navy Department was preparing for war, and that Blaine could not stem the tide.[68] Also, he wrote that Egan's son told him that it was all Blaine could do to hold Harrison back.[69]

During all these turbulent weeks Chile was ruled by a temporary government set up after the fall of Balmaceda. Unable to come to terms with the new provisional government of Chile,

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65 Mr. Egan to Mr. Blaine, Dec. 14, 1891, House Exec. Doc., 91, op. cit., 181-183.

66 "Matta Note", December 12, 1891, op. cit., 180, shows this statement.

67 R. D. Evans, A Sailor's Log., 265.

68 Ibid., 277.

69 Ibid., 285.

Secretary Blaine concluded from Mr. Egan's reports that he would be justified in waiting until a new minister should be in office; that after the newly elected President Senor Jorge Montt, who would be inaugurated shortly before Christmas, 1891, an attitude of toleration might be maintained.[70] However, no change was advocated. Mr. Egan sent a telegram January 1, 1892, stating that the differences could be settled with consideration and waiting.[71]

Later the Chilean president informed Secretary Blaine that the Chilean government would withdraw all that was offensive to the United States.[72]

Mr. Blaine now felt that Chile was willing to make apologies and to offer settlement for the "Baltimore Assault". He sent Mr. Egan a telegram on January 8, asking if all that was offensive in the circular of December 11 would be withdrawn, now, by this new government.[73]

Pereira, new Minister of Foreign Affairs in Chile, allowed the refugees to be put on board the Yorktown to be taken to a place of safety but not to escape to another ship.[74] On the "Matta Note" dispatch and the "Baltimore Affair" the new government failed to give any satisfaction.

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70 Mr. Egan to Mr. Blaine, Nov. 10-14, 1891, House Exec. Doc., 91, 137-140.

71 Mr. Egan to Mr. Blaine, Jan. 1, 1892, Ibid., 187, 188.

72 Senor Pedro Montt to Mr. Blaine, Jan. 8, 1892, Ibid., 228.

73 Ibid., 188.

74 Mr. Egan to Mr. Blaine, Jan. 12, 1891, Ibid., 188.

Again on January 16, 1892, Mr. Egan telegraphed Secretary Blaine asking what action to take to avoid any unpleasantness between the two governments.[75]

Thus, the "Matta Note"[76] caused the climax to be reached. To Mr. Egan's question Mr. Blaine replied that the American Government could not take any action until the Chilean Government had to the requested withdrawal of the Circular, and wanted a prompt action.[77]

This demand so angered the Chilean Government that January 20, 1892, Egan's call was demanded.[78] Secretary Blaine communicated to the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs demanding that if the offensive parts of the dispatch were not at once withdrawn and a suitable apology offered, he would have no other course open to him except to terminate diplomatic relations with the Chilean Government. Furthermore, if the Chilean Government acquiesced, space in the public press was to be given to the apology comparable to that given to the offensive expression. Upon its receipt the United States would then know whether any correspondence at all could be maintained with the government of Chile upon terms of mutual respect.[79]

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75 Ibid., 190.

76 "Matta Note", Ibid., 179-180.

77 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Egan, Jan. 16, 1892, Ibid., 190.

78 Senor Pedro Montt to Mr. Blaine, Jan. 20, 1892, Ibid., 229.

79 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Egan, Jan. 21, 1892, Ibid., 193-194.

Apparently unable to come to terms with Chile, President Harrison sent a special message to Congress on January 25, 1892, submitting the entire correspondence for the past year relating to the Chilean affairs.[80] Egan's actions were approved by him by stating that his correspondence had been conducted with "dignity, ability, courtesy, and fairness." The attention of Congress was especially called to Blaine's ultimatum, "We do not covet their territory; we desire their peace and prosperity. We characterized the "Matta note" (December 11, 1891) as being offensive, undiplomatic, and grossly insulting." Therefore, if it were not at once withdrawn and public apology made, diplomatic relations with Chile would be terminated.[81]

At this time it was out of reason for Chile to consider a war against the United States. Its fleet might do some damage, but the outcome of a struggle between the two nations so unevenly matched, could never be in doubt.[82] There was, however, a question on the conduct of negotiations from January 1, 1892, on; when the new Chilean Government had been making efforts for a friendly settlement of the questions involved, President Montt and Secretary Blaine had discussed arbitration, although it was never actually offered.[83]

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80 Richardson, op. cit., IX, 215-226.

81 Ibid.

82 H. C. Evans, op. cit., 151.

83 Senor Montt to Mr. Blaine, Jan. 23, 1892, House Exec. Doc., 91, 3-5.

Just why the United States Government caused further demands instead of expressing friendly settlement is expressed by Mr. Fish. He said that the political situation in the United States caused Mr. Harrison to take advantage of the war spirit to ensure his re-election and that Secretary Blaine did not wish to be left behind should Mr. Harrison secure the presidential nomination.[84]

I doubt seriously that this could have been the reason. The special message was probably given for the purpose of acquainting the public with international complications. Secretary Blaine's requests had been expressed with candor and sympathy.[85] Chile had never met any of these requests fairly.[86] Too, not only Chile, but the whole world now knew that the citizens of the United States were to receive the same treatment as those of the most-favored nation.[87]

Of course, it is doubtful whether President Harrison could have been satisfied with less than a direct apology from Chile. Yet he appeared before Congress on January 25, with all the correspondence on the Chilean controversy before time had been allowed to receive a reply from Chile. The note was sent January 21, 1892, which was received in Chile two days

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84 Carl Russell Fish, American Diplomacy,390.

85 Hamilton, op. cit., 676.

86 Senor Montt to Mr. Blaine, January 23, 1892, 52 Cong., 1st sess., House Exec. Doc., 91, Part II,2-7.

87 Ibid., expressed this sentiment in note.

later and answered the same day (January 25) that the President came before Congress.

It is hard to understand the haste unless he expected more delay on the part of Chile. Mr. Blaine, who was a sick man during this winter and spring,[88] can hardly be held for the action taken by the President. Unfortunately, the President's action here did not help the unpleasantness that had been growing between the President and Secretary Blaine.[89]

This act of President Harrison's may have been one of the causes for Mr. Blaine's resignation as Secretary of State a few days before the Republican nominating convention met.[90] Without doubt, following January 21, the policy was that of President Harrison and not that of Blaine. Happily, there was no need of mediation. The last refugee left the legation January 13, 1892.[91]

On January 26 President Montt had the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Senor Pereira, withdraw all portions of the "Matta Note" that were offensive to the United States and to cancel the request for Egan's recall.[92]

On January 28 these facts were communicated to Congress with the statement that the Chilean message was so conciliatory

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89 Muzzey, James G. Blaine, 473-474.

90 Peck, op. cit., 372.

91 Mr. Egan to Mr. Blaine, Jan. 13, 1892, House Exec. Doc.,91, op. cit., 189.

92 Ibid., 7-10.

and friendly that President Harrison believed the differences between the two governments could be adjusted on satisfactory terms.[93]

Responding on January 30 to the communication of Senor Pereira, Mr. Blaine instructed Mr. Egan to assure the Chilean Government that the President would "be glad to meet in most generous spirit" the "friendly overtures" of the Chilean Government.[94]

In July 1892 the Chilean Government allowed the sum of seventy-five thousand dollars in American gold to be distributed among the seamen in the riot and the families of the two who were killed.[95]

Thus, after much questioning the trouble with Chile was settled to the satisfaction of the United States. President Harrison said that the reparation was accepted not only as an indemnity for a wrong done but as a most gratifying evidence that the government of Chile rightly appreciated the disposition of the United States to act in a spirit of fairness and friendliness in its intercourse with that brave people. Further evidence of the mutual respect and confidence existing between the two nations was furnished, said Harrison, by the fact that a convention submitting to arbitration the mutual claims of the citizens of the two republics had been agreed

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93 Moore, op. cit., 494.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.

upon.[96] Here may be added that the convention was negotiated in Santiago by Patrick Egan. He continued as long as Harrison was president to serve the United States as Mininter to Chile.[97]

In connection with this incident Secretary Blaine was subject to much unjust criticism. His adversaries explained the violent outburst of the Chileans against the American sailors as an expression of resentment because of Blaine's domineering attitude in 1881, and to his interference in the Civil War in 1891. Much of the criticism revolved about Patrick Egan. It was charged that Mr. Egan did not report fully and impartially the course of events, that he needlessly antagonized the British and Germans in Chile; but most of these reports were based upon misapprehension and falsehoods.[98]

Secretary Blaine's conduct throughout was correct.[99] Egan demonstrated ability, tact, and courage; and he was incorruptable. Egan quite properly maintained friendly relations with Balmaceda as long as his government survived, and any resentment which the provisional government may have felt toward him for this reason or because of his offer of an asylum to the unfortunate adherents of Balmaceda was wholly without justification.[100] The abuse which had been heaped upon both

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96 Richardson, op. cit., IX, 315.

97 Samuel Flagg Bemis, American Secretaries of States, (New York, 1928), VIII, 163.

98 Ibid.

99 Ibid.

100 Bemis, op. cit., VIII, 163.

Secretary Blaine and Mr. Egan came to them because they were the representatives of a nation whose government was unable to act in such a way as to secure the friendship of both parties in a civil war, and because they made the mistake of choosing a loser. They were succeeding in getting the friendship of Chile which might in time close the foreign exploitations of Chile to other nations. It is not, therefore, surprising to find most of the commercial nations of Europe quite willing to take the side of the revolutionary faction, when their own ends were to be bettered, against a nation, the United States, that tried to see justice prevail over force and bribery.[101]

The Secretary of State must have acted from these reasons because all these conditions were very clear to Secretary Blaine. He was a life-long advocate of friendship to the southern republics; and especially did he realize that if the United States was to succeed in its new Pan-American movement on which it was centering its diplomatic efforts, that it would be necessary for him to continue to maintain such diplomatic efforts.[102] He had through his entire career endeavored to make closer those relations of encouraging peace and friendship as well as more extensive commerce, and he had ever been willing to sacrifice much for this end.

Although this Chilean affair was very irritating, it is difficult to find in Secretary Blaine's conduct of the relation

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101 G. F. Scott, Chile, Its History and Development, Natural Features, Products, Commerce, and Present Conditions (London, 1911), 229.

102 H. C. Evans, op. cit., 154.

of the United States with Chile any desire to turn away from that policy. Mr. Blaine had grown in breadth of ideas and calmness of judgement since the time when he was in charge in 1881. He had become at that time a successful politician. But experience, responsibility, and reflection developed him into a calm and deliberate statesman.[103]

The intervening years, 1881-1889, found a man stronger in wisdom but weaker in physical strength. Garfield's Secretary of State and Harrison's great Foreign Minister were not the same man. He never ceased growing in wisdom, but the vision of 1881 was not recovered. The Blaine of 1890-1892 was not the leader in diplomatic policies, but the head of a department, subordinated by a not too sympathetic Chief.[104] Mr. Peck believed that Mr. Blaine came out of the Chilean affair with his popularity greater even than it had been before.[105]

While rumblings of war could be heard in that period of 1891-1892, it is indeed a satisfaction to learn that Mr. Blaine played no part in that drama but that he did endeavor to improve and make closer those relations of commercial friendship and lasting peace.

Despite a wave of indignation in the United States, Secretary Blaine did not allow the Harrison administration to be precipitated into a rupture.[106]

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103 Muzzey, op. cit., 425.

104 Ibid.

105 Peck, op. cit., 372.

106 Bemis, op. cit., 758.

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