

W. G. D. WORTHINGTON--

HIS SOUTH AMERICAN MISSION

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W. G. D. WORTHINGTON--  
HIS SOUTH AMERICAN MISSION

By

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## PREFACE

It has been my purpose to summarize briefly the events leading up to the commissioning of special agents to South America during the period of the Hispanic American revolution; to sketch the activities of the early agents; and to portray the services, both helpful and harmful, of W. G. D. Worthington in his capacity as special agent.

Materials used in the preparation of this study have been available in the Library of Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College and in the private library of Dr. Watt Stewart. The writer acknowledges with sincere appreciation the helpful advice of Dr. Watt Stewart, and the assistance of Mr. Ray G. Burns, whose translation from Spanish was of great value in the production of this thesis.

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Outline

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1. The United States becomes interested in Spain's South American colonies -- movement for self-rule begins in the colonies -- declarations of independence are issued -- the movement receives expressions of sympathy in the United States.
2. Colonists are ordered to pledge allegiance to the Spanish constitution of May, 1811 -- they assume the reins of government -- President Madison realizes that the United States may become involved -- Robert K. Lowry is dispatched as special agent -- Joel R. Poinsett follows him -- he abuses his authority and returns to the United States.
3. Colonel Joseph Devereux is appointed special agent -- Devereux and the American consul, Thomas L. Halsey, negotiate an unauthorized treaty with the government of the United Provinces -- both men are dismissed -- W. G. D. Worthington is chosen as special agent.

Chapter II. Worthington in Buenos Aires

1. Worthington's characteristics -- his meeting with Captain Fanning -- his reaction to life aboard ship -- his arrival in Buenos Aires -- his instructions to cancel the Devereux

- memorial -- his reception by Supreme Director Pueyrredón -- the reaction of the citizens of Buenos Aires to his presence -- his desire to expand his powers -- Tagle's insistence for recognition.
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  3. Refusal of the United States to acknowledge David C. De Forest -- the question as to the status of the provinces -- failure of Pueyrredon to grant the United States the status of most favored nation -- purpose involved in Worthington's treaty negotiations -- his departure for Chile.

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Chilean government is dissatisfied with the neutral policy of the United States.

2. The battle of Concha Rayada -- the victory at Maipú -- Worthington appoints vice-consuls -- a Cabildo Abierto meets to arrange for the formation of a constitution -- a constitutional committee is chosen -- Worthington presents a draft of his proposed constitution -- its form -- O'Higgins refuses to accept it -- his reasons for refusal -- the adoption of the Fundamental Code of Chile.
3. Worthington's letter from General José Miguel Carrera -- his suggestion to O'Higgins -- the execution of the Carrera brothers -- Worthington urges immediate United States recognition -- the Chileans believe that the neutrality policy of the United States is favorable to Spain -- Captain Biddle leaves Valparaiso -- Worthington's relations with Echeverria -- his proposed loan to the Chilean government -- reasons for its non-fulfillment -- his recall -- he resents his reception in the United States.

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Chapter I

The Historical Background

Soon after the conclusion of the North American revolution the United States began to show considerable interest in Spain's South American colonies.<sup>1</sup> By the time of the Hispanic American revolution, involved commercial interests of American citizens in the rebellious provinces made it essential that representatives of their government be dispatched to the South American countries to investigate conditions there, to promote commercial advantages, maintain neutrality, and report upon the progress of the struggle for independence.<sup>2</sup> W. G. D. Worthington was one of the persons chosen for this mission. He was commissioned to serve in Buenos Aires, Chile, and Peru.

The movement for liberation in South America began under the guise of temporary self-rule in the interest of Ferdinand VII, the rightful ruler of Spain, who was deposed by Napoleon in favor of his brother Joseph. The oppressive colonial policy of the Spanish patriot junta and the activities of royalist forces in South America

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<sup>1</sup>Halford L. Hoskins, "The Hispanic American Policy of Henry Clay, 1816, 1828," Hispanic American Historical Review, VII (November, 1927), p. 460.

<sup>2</sup>William Spence Robertson, "The Recognition of the Hispanic American Nations by the United States," Hispanic American Historical Review, I (August, 1918), p. 245.

led to the desire for complete independence from Spain by large numbers of the colonists.<sup>3</sup> Within a short time declarations of independence were issued by various provinces, and the early movement developed into an open war for liberation.<sup>4</sup>

The struggle of the South American states for independence received from the very first expressions of satisfaction and sympathy in the United States. From the beginning of the revolution, South American ships were admitted to ports in the United States under whatever flag they bore, but no formal declaration according belligerent rights to those states was ever made.<sup>5</sup>

Separatist movements took place in 1809 at Chuquisaca, La Paz, Quito, Bogotá, Caracas, and Valladolid. Juntas were created in 1810 in Buenos Aires, Bogotá, Caracas, Quito, La Plata, Santiago, and Mexico. Venezuela was the first of the revolted colonies to declare formally, through delegates gathered in a congress, its independence from Spain. In November of 1811 New Granada declared its independence. Chile also overthrew the loyal Spanish government in 1811.<sup>6</sup> Thus all over South America the principal municipalities formed juntas.

The constitution of Spain was adopted in May, 1811, and a call was made upon the Spanish colonies for allegiance to Spain. Conflict-

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<sup>3</sup>Watt Stewart, "The South American Commission," Hispanic American Historical Review, IX (February, 1929), p. 31.

<sup>4</sup>Senate Document No. 114, 71 Cong. 2 sess., pp. 38, 39.

<sup>5</sup>John Holladay Latané, The United States and Latin America, p. 48.

<sup>6</sup>Senate Document No. 114, 71 Cong. 2 sess., pp. 38, 39.

ing authorities had produced a distracted state of affairs, both within Spain and in the American colonies. During the time of French disturbance in Spain, proper attention was not paid to the American provinces. Conceiving that they had been partially abandoned by the parent state, they had decided it justifiable to act for themselves.<sup>7</sup> Embracing the examples of the North American and French revolutions, the people were assuming the reins of government, and the Spanish domination of Hispanic America was definitely on the decline.

President Madison realized that in time the South American states might call upon his government for political action. He was well aware that citizens of his republic had interests in the revolting provinces which the government might be called upon to protect or develop. This knowledge led to the dispatching of special agents, such as Worthington, to Hispanic America. Robert K. Lowry, agent to Venezuela, has the distinction of being the first representative of the North American government to any of the revolted colonies. He was soon followed by Joel R. Poinsett, whose jurisdiction included the territory of Chile, Peru, and Buenos Aires.<sup>8</sup> After his return to his country, Colonel Joseph Devereux, a citizen of the United States, went to Buenos Aires on personal business, and was commissioned as special agent by the state department.<sup>9</sup> He was the immediate predecessor of Worthington.

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<sup>7</sup>American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 218.

<sup>8</sup>Frederick L. Paxon, The Independence of the South American Republics, p. 110.

<sup>9</sup>Monroe to Devereux, Washington, January 12, 1816, MS. Department of State, Dispatches to Consuls, I, 370, 371. Cited by Watt Stewart, "Early United States--Argentine Diplomatic Relations," p. 25, (an unpublished doctoral dissertation).

These special agents were not sent as official diplomatic ministers authorized to grant official recognition by the United States. Their chief functions, apparently, were of a commercial nature. They were instructed to explain the mutual advantages to be derived from reciprocal trade agreements, to indicate the good will of the United States toward the struggling revolutionists, and to promote friendly relations with them. <sup>10</sup> The South Americans, of course, hoped to receive ministers bearing grants of official recognition, and were disappointed at the arrival of commercial agents, some of whom, apparently, were not averse to passing themselves off as ministers plenipotentiary. Most of them soon took upon themselves unauthorized functions and abused their powers in various ways. Their unceasing demands that the state department grant recognition to the provinces were a source of much annoyance.

Poinsett implied in his conversations that the United States government was anxious to aid the revolutionists officially, and left the impression that merchants and manufacturers in the United States were eager to furnish military supplies to the patriots. Despite the fact that the United States had declared its neutrality in the conflict, Poinsett urged the Chileans to declare their independence, and he became very friendly with the young Chilean leader, José Miguel Carrera. He even went so far as to present to the Chilean government his own draft of a fundamental code for the country. It was not accepted, being described as "too bold." <sup>11</sup> Becoming

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<sup>10</sup>J. Fred Rippey, Joel R. Poinsett: Versatile American, pp. 36, 37.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 43-45.

bored with inaction, he at one time fought in the armies of the Carreras. Worthington, at a later date, followed his example and prepared a proposed constitution for Chile.

Unsuccessful as military leaders, the Carreras were replaced by O'Higgins, who, in the face of a Spanish threat, allowed the former leaders once more to take command. They were routed at the decisive battle of Rancagua, October 1-2, 1814.<sup>12</sup> Worthington was later called upon to act as mediator between O'Higgins and José Miguel Carrera. The Carreras were overthrown by O'Higgins, and Poinsett's prestige declined with their bad fortune. The English opposed him, and declared that he was poisoning the minds of the Chileans against Great Britain. After four years of diplomatic misbehaviour in South America, he returned to the United States, but was not censured for his unneutral activities.<sup>13</sup>

Shortly after his appointment, Colonel Devereux, Worthington's immediate predecessor, took an active interest in the struggle of the colonies for independence. It was his belief that they merited assistance. He compared the situation in South America with that which had previously existed in North America, where the English colonies, with much less cause for complaint, had overthrown their parent nation, supported by generous European powers which come to their aid.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>Charles Edward Chapman, Colonial Hispanic America: A History, p. 271.

<sup>13</sup>Joseph Byrne Lockey, Pan-Americanism: Its Beginnings, p. 145.

<sup>14</sup>Halsey to Monroe, Buenos Aires, January 30, 1817, William R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations, I, 347, 348.

He was supported by Thomas Lloyd Halsey, consul of the United States at Buenos Aires. Halsey was impressed with the potential commercial possibilities existent between the United States and Buenos Aires, in the event of that state's becoming an independent entity. It was also his firm conviction that the provisional government would be unable to make good its independence without receiving foreign aid.<sup>15</sup> By April of 1816, Halsey had begun to lose faith in the patriot cause. By July of that year the situation in Buenos Aires was so bad that Halsey was asked, by officials of the United Provinces, to offer practically any trade concession to the United States in return for assistance.<sup>16</sup> He made very urgent recommendations to the state department for recognition.

On July 9, 1816, the Congress of Tucumán declared the independence of the "United Provinces of South America." In taking this step the people of the provinces beyond any doubt had their eyes fixed upon the United States.

Devereux, assisted by Halsey, in January, 1817, negotiated an agreement with the revolutionary government of the United Provinces, binding his own government to supply the United Provinces the sum of two million dollars. He was not authorized to declare this loan guaranteed by the United States.<sup>17</sup>

Both Halsey and Devereux falsely assumed powers not granted them by their instructions in signing this treaty with Supreme Director

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Halsey to Monroe, Buenos Aires, July 3, 1816. Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 343, 344.

<sup>17</sup>Stewart, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

Pueyrredón, who, in his anxiety to gain its approval by the United States, penned a letter to President Madison urging its consumma-  
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tion. Halsey had clearly abused his privileges as consul to Buenos Aires. He entered into privateering schemes, and mailed blank privateering commissions to persons in the United States. His own commission was revoked, and Devereux was dismissed in 1817 by President  
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Monroe.

The dismissal of Devereux made it essential that another person be chosen special agent. W. G. D. Worthington was the man selected, and upon him was placed the responsibility of correcting the errors of his predecessors.

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<sup>18</sup>Manning, op. cit., I, 349.

<sup>19</sup>Paxon, op. cit., p. 153.

## Chapter II

## Worthington in Buenos Aires

On January 23, 1817, President Madison named William G. D.

Worthington as special agent, with authority in Buenos Aires, Chile,<sup>1</sup>  
and Peru. The manner in which he was selected for his position as<sup>2</sup>  
observer of revolutionary Hispanic America is not known.

Worthington was, at the time of his appointment, thirty-three years of age. He was a well educated man. He had studied Latin and French, and spoke Spanish fluently. His literary propensity caused him to record his daily impressions in a diary. He was weak in character, bombastic in light conversation, extremely proud, and distrustful of his associates. Fond of public display, Worthington ever strove to appear as the benefactor of great enterprises, yet was niggardly in his expenditures. He was ever conscious of the fact that he was a<sup>3</sup>  
self-made man.

In New York he formed a friendship with Captain Edmund Fanning, commander of the frigate Volunteer, who had just returned from a cruise to South America. Fanning complained bitterly concerning the conduct of the Spanish officials in Chile. In February, 1816, while repairing the frigate in the port of Coquimbo, José Antonio Olate, governor of the district, had ordered the seizure of the vessel on

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<sup>1</sup>Eugenio Pereira Salas, La Misión Worthington En Chile, 1818-1819, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

the charge of smuggling. The Volunteer was, therefore, forced to depart in an unseaworthy condition.<sup>4</sup>

Fanning also commented at length upon the misfortune of the United States consul at Santiago, Mateo Ornelo Hoeval, who, without consideration of his ministry, had been thrown into San Fernandez prison. The department of state, immediately upon receipt of this information, advised Worthington that he should request the release of Hoeval when he arrived in South America "and that he protest in respectful yet strong terms this violation of the rights of neutrality."<sup>5</sup>

Worthington left New York on May 16, 1817, aboard the Augusta. He assumed the character of a private citizen in order to avoid suspicion and because of his fear of capture by Spanish privateers. An insight into the character of the man is gained by his displeasure with life aboard the Augusta:

no amusement, no interesting conversation, without women, without friends, and to think that this must be my habitation for ninety days.<sup>6</sup>

After eighty-six days at sea the Augusta approached Montevideo. Worthington, who had impatiently whiled away the time studying the Bible, reading Humboldt's essay, the Trial of New Spain, delivering an ostentatious speech on the Fourth of July, and observing the traditional ceremonies of Neptune on August 4, renounced his guise of a peaceful citizen, and revealed his true personality in the following discourse:

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 2, 3.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

You all believed I was coming to this land for health. No, I have a special mission from the president of the United States. I have not said so before for fear of an assault from the Spanish privateers; now that there is nothing to fear, I wish to have no secrets as to my identity.<sup>7</sup>

Worthington arrived in Buenos Aires upon the fifth day of September.<sup>8</sup> It was apparently his duty to explain to the South American countries that great mutual advantages would accrue should more favorable commercial relations develop between them and the United States. He was instructed to obtain commercial concessions from Buenos Aires, Chile, and Peru, and to enlighten the governments of those countries concerning the commercial privileges desired by the United States.<sup>9</sup>

Worthington's original authority was increased, however, due to the unauthorized action of Consul Joseph Devereux, his predecessor in Buenos Aires, who had presented the aforementioned memorandum to the government of the United Provinces, offering to supply it a loan of two million dollars guaranteed by the United States government. It was very essential that the offer of this loan be withdrawn, and very shortly before the departure of Worthington this diplomatic mission was entrusted to him. He was instructed to utilize all his conciliatory ability in order to prevent unfriendly complications.<sup>10</sup>

He was also obliged to explain to the government of the United Provinces that the critical moment had not yet arrived which would

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid. (The spelling of Worthington was extremely poor. The quotations are given just as they are found in the originals.)

<sup>8</sup>Worthington to Adams, Buenos Aires, October 1, 1817. William R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations, I, 354.

<sup>9</sup>Pereira Salas, op. cit., p. 1.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

make it advantageous for the United States to grant recognition to the government established by the patriots.<sup>11</sup> He was, apparently, to convey the impression that in due time the United States government would give official assistance to the patriot cause.

Worthington was received by Supreme Director Don Juan Martín Pueyrredón in a very agreeable manner on September 22.<sup>12</sup> He undertook to explain satisfactorily to the supreme director the reasons for the non-compliance of the United States with the memorial of Devereux. He followed his commercial agreement between the United States and the United Provinces, and insisted that it was against the policy of the United States to give secret official aid to them, but that<sup>13</sup> when the proper time arrived, open assistance would be tendered.

Worthington's authoritative demeanor seems to have impressed the people of Buenos Aires and caused them to believe him a diplomatic minister from the United States whose mission was to acknowledge their independence.<sup>14</sup> This attitude apparently increased Worthington's desire to see them granted recognition. He probably experienced regret that he was merely a special agent for commerce. He was fearful that the reaction against his position as agent for commerce rather than as a minister of the United States might cause a revulsion of feeling against him. Understanding the unfavorable reception that Washington would accord news of his diplomatic pretensions,

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<sup>11</sup>Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 354.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup>Worthington to Adams, Buenos Aires, October 4, 1817. Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 355.

Worthington skillfully absolved himself of any unauthorized intention.

He wrote:

The expectations were so high & the feelings so strong, in favor of receiving a Minister from the United States, acknowledging their Independence, that notwithstanding I took great care to impress it before I landed & afterwards that I was only a Special Agent for Commerce etc., they seemed a long time loth to relinquish their anticipations of my 15 being a much more important character than I was in reality--

A short time later he declared:

to this hour I have great influence in the government and I am asked many questions that are not caused by my actions, being obliged to move with great tact in this situation in which there are no precedents.<sup>16</sup>

These were merely words of excuse. Worthington apparently desired to expand his powers. He seems quickly to have forgotten his instructions and begun acting on his own initiative.<sup>17</sup>

He early began urging the United States government to become the first to grant the new states recognition, in order that they might assume in every respect the position of a most favored nation; but he insisted, at the same time, that it was his intention not to become involved in petty intrigue. He pledged himself solemnly to maintain neutrality to the best of his ability. He declared, however, that it would be very helpful to have a United States war vessel stationed near Buenos Aires, as the British navy was well represented there.<sup>18</sup>

Gregorio Tagle, secretary of state of the United Provinces, was insistent in his demands upon Worthington for immediate recognition.

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Pereira Salas, op. cit., p. 4.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>Manning, op. cit., I, 355, 356.

In placating his demands, Worthington said that should the United States enter the struggle on the side of the provinces, other powers perhaps might enlist on the side of Spain and more than offset the advantage gained by the provinces. He also used this argument as an explanation of the fact that his credentials had lacked the much desired authority to grant official recognition.<sup>19</sup>

Tagle described the condition of the United Provinces in very flattering terms in his pleas for recognition. Worthington informed him that the United States held a most liberal attitude toward the United Provinces, but that she was at peace with all the leading European nations, including Spain. He added, however, that the foreign relations of the United States were on a worse footing with Spain than with any other nation, due to the delay of Spain in settling the claim of the United States for indemnity under the Treaty of San Lorenzo, of October 2, 1795. This treaty was a result of Spain's practice of suppressing the right of deposit at New Orleans, and her depredations on the commerce of the United States previous to 1802.

Other reasons for distrust of Spain were enumerated as differences respecting the territorial limits of the United States, in addition to her permitting the hostile Indians on the Georgian frontier to wage war against this nation, and allowing England to set up a military depot in Florida with the intention of supporting the Indians there against the United States. He also mentioned the discontent of his government pertaining to the imprisonment of American

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<sup>19</sup>Worthington to Tagle, Jesuits' College Square, October 6, 1817. Manning, op. cit., I, 356, 357.

citizens and the seizure of their property under various pretenses, both in her European and continental possessions. Worthington's avowed purpose in making the above statements was merely to bring the two nations to a closer understanding.<sup>20</sup> This is an example of his characteristic tendency to utilize every opportunity to make an imposing declaration. Manuel H. de Aguirre, agent of the United Provinces to the United States, added his pleas for recognition to those of Worthington.<sup>21</sup>

On March 3, 1817, a bill entitled "An act more effectually to preserve the neutral relations of the United States" was passed and became a law.<sup>22</sup> Don Luís de Onís, the Spanish minister in Washington, expressed gratification at the passage of this act, and declared that its adoption was proof that the United States held a friendly attitude toward Spain. He expressed hope, however, that this particular law would be observed with greater exactness than had previous laws of a like nature.<sup>23</sup> It was natural for this action to meet with disapproval in Hispanic America. Worthington, one would suppose, opposed this act and favored recognition of the provinces by the United States.

Aquirre declared the neutrality law was most severe on the people of Spanish America. He eloquently argued that it tended directly to damage the patriots who were nobly opposing a dreadful

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<sup>20</sup>Worthington to Tagle, Jesuits' College Square, October 30, 1817. Manning, op. cit., I, 359, 360.

<sup>21</sup>American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 180.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 189.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

tyranny. He resented the fact that it prohibited, or subjected to bonds amounting to a prohibition, the exportation of war supplies, or any other commercial negotiation designed to further cooperation with the Spanish American states. He pointed out that this law deprived certain of the South American governments, whose state of defense was inferior to that of Spain, of their most indispensable source of war supplies. He also stated that the law, while injurious to the Spanish American provinces, was at the same time favorable to the King of Spain.<sup>24</sup> Worthington could be expected to concur in these sentiments.

January 3, 1818, Pueyrredón penned a message to President Monroe concerning the unauthorized actions of consul Thomas L. Halsey:

Swerving from the object of his mission, the Consul of your States in these Provinces, Mr. Thomas Alsey (Halsey), who bordered on the abuse of power did not hesitate to promote the insidious attempts of the malcontents and disturbers of the peace. An act of prudence taken by me far from restraining him, opened a freer field for his ideas. Even with the leader of the anarchists, Don Jose Artigas, he entered into contracts concerning privateering which must necessarily compromise the Provinces under my command with the other Nations. The Consul Alsey has so often repeated these acts contrary to the system of the Provinces that finally I found it necessary on the seventh of this month, to issue an order that within twenty-four hours he should go on board one of the vessels in these waters, and wind up his business and return to his country or to the port that might best suit his convenience out of this territory.

It is my duty not to disappoint the government of the peoples by exposing them to the calamities of disorder. This also prompted the measure. Regards entertained toward your Government had some influence in suspending the measure while properly cautioning the Consul. But since, accustomed to following his impulses, he will not be able to desist from these designs, the time may come when this Government

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<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 182.

shall adopt vigorous measures which might give offense to the public opinion between your States and these Provinces. An evil fraught with so telling consequences must be averted. It is to be hoped that your Excellency for the sake of the tranquillity of Provinces which are yearning for union with your States, will deign to retire Mr. Thomas Halsey from his office of Consul and order him to return to your country sending some one else in his place who would discharge the official duties without meddling in matters that have nothing to do with his office and without disturbing the order and tranquillity of our peoples.<sup>25</sup>

On January 7, Secretary Tagle, of the United Provinces, informed Worthington that the supreme director had ordered Halsey to leave Buenos Aires and board a vessel lying in the roads. Tagle insisted that a government could rightfully expel a consul from a country.<sup>26</sup> One of the outstanding charges against Halsey concerned his mysterious relationship with General Artigas. Artigas, now generally known as the leading figure in the development of Uruguay, led a revolt against the Unitarist government of Buenos Aires. The entire Banda Oriental population supported his strong stand for the principle of Federalism. At one time he dominated territory comprising a third of a million square miles. He assumed absolute power and control over the people of the Banda Oriental. It is obvious that any connection with the rebel leader would be detrimental to the good standing of a foreign consul.

Halsey was also accused of circulating in the provinces seditious and inflammatory papers, in addition to issuing blank privateering

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<sup>25</sup>Pueyrredón to Monroe, Buenos Aires, January 31, 1818. Manning, op. cit., I, 374, 375.

<sup>26</sup>Worthington to Adams, Buenos Aires, January 10, 1818. Manning, op. cit., I, 368.

commissions and meddling with the privateering system in various other ways.

Worthington advised him to obey the order of Supreme Director Pueyrredón and retire from the country. The order, however, was abrogated, probably in order that more evidence could be discovered against Halsey. But he did not linger long in the provinces.<sup>27</sup>

At this time Worthington professed that the various duties he was called upon to perform often perplexed him. He said that it was becoming generally believed among the North Americans in the provinces that he had considerable influence with the government established there. He declared that he did not interfere with party politics, and did not speculate nor engage in commerce.<sup>28</sup> This was probably another instance of Worthington's frequent attempts to delude those with whom he came into contact with his sense of self-importance.

Supreme Director Pueyrredón once again sought to entice the United States into granting recognition by writing a letter to President Monroe, January 14, 1818, informing him that a certain European nation was willing to acknowledge the independence of the United Provinces, but that he hoped the United States, being the first country on the American continent to free itself from a European power, would feel inclined to accept the honor of being the first to grant recognition to the new Hispanic American states.<sup>29</sup> The European nation referred

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid, pp. 368-370.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>Pueyrredón to Monroe, Buenos Aires, January 14, 1818. Manning, op. cit., I, 370, 371.

to was, beyond a doubt, England. Worthington was fearful lest England become the most favored nation. President Monroe did not respond to this plea.

Worthington gradually came to believe that the attitude of the United States toward the South American countries would be decided more by the policy of other nations toward them than by any other means. He therefore informed Adams that the Buenos Aires side of the Andes was controlled by the Portuguese and that Artigas controlled much of the region up the Parana River and was a sworn enemy of the government of the Portuguese and that of Buenos Aires. It was his conviction that the governments of South America would receive their characteristics from those of Europe and the United States, and that the misunderstandings among them at that time were of little moment.<sup>30</sup> He was anxious, however, that the institutions of the United States should dominate in the South American countries.

The patriots often reminded him that the United States had received the aid of France in the North American struggle for independence from European domination, but that the United Provinces were left to strive for their freedom alone. He believed that if the United States did not take action to protect its commercial interests, they would be lost to England.<sup>31</sup> Aguirre was still insistent, however, that it was the desire of his government to form a treaty establishing reciprocal and close relations of amity and commerce with

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<sup>30</sup>Worthington to Adams, Buenos Aires, January 15, 1818. Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 371, 372.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*

the United States.<sup>32</sup> Worthington, despite repeated actions contrary to his instructions, still maintained that "my duty is merely to state facts--which I have done."<sup>33</sup> This was another example of his attempts to justify his actions in Buenos Aires.

By the 19th of November Worthington's tendency to assume unauthorized powers had again asserted itself and "swelling upon his agency" until he "broke out into a self-accredited plenipotentiary,"<sup>34</sup> he negotiated a commercial treaty with Supreme Director Pueyrredón.<sup>35</sup> This was clearly a premeditated breach of his instructions. By this act he assumed, upon his responsibility, the functions of a cabinet minister.<sup>36</sup> He caused "a greater harm than the one he had come to remedy." In due time he actually presented the rough draft of this possible commercial treaty to the secretary of state of the United States. As soon as the state department learned of this treaty, it was disavowed. Worthington was preparing the way for his recall.

On the morning of March 28, 1818, Adams took the voluminous dispatches from Worthington and Halsey to read to President Monroe, who was convalescent. Monroe did not feel equal to hearing all of them read, and asked that Adams state their content to him. When he was informed that Worthington, who had been sent to South America chiefly to collect information, had been concluding an unauthorized treaty,

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<sup>32</sup>Aguirre to Adams, Washington, January 16, 1818. Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 373; American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 182.

<sup>33</sup>Worthington to Adams, Buenos Aires, January 21, 1818. Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 374.

<sup>34</sup>John Quincy Adams, Memoirs, IV, 159. Cited by Watt Stewart, "Early United States--Argentine Diplomatic Relations," p. 74.

<sup>35</sup>American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 413.

<sup>36</sup>Pereira Salas, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

he exclaimed:

Dismiss him instantly. Recall him! Now, to think what recommendations that man had! Dismiss him at once, and send him the notice of his dismissal by every possible channel. Send it to Halsey, though Halsey himself is recalled.<sup>37</sup>

Apparently it took a great while to execute this order, for Worthington continued to exercise his functions in South America for some time. He did not appear to be abashed by the failure of his proposed treaty.

Pueyrredón appointed David C. De Forest consul general to the United States.<sup>38</sup> He made application for formal recognition in May, 1818. His only credential was a letter from Pueyrredón declaring his appointment by virtue of articles prepared in the names of the United States and the United Provinces between persons authorized by himself and Worthington.<sup>39</sup>

The United States government refused to acknowledge him as official agent of the United Provinces on the grounds that this would virtually be granting formal recognition to the new state. He was told to inform Director Pueyrredón that Worthington had no power at all to "negotiate on the part of the United States any article to be obligatory on them." He was offered any conference that would be interesting or helpful to Pueyrredón or to the people of Buenos Aires, but was denied official recognition. De Forest did not contest the

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<sup>37</sup>Allan Nevins, ed., The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845, p. 194.

<sup>38</sup>Pueyrredón to Monroe, Buenos Aires, May (?), 1818. Manning, op. cit., I, 377, 378.

<sup>39</sup>American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 413.

trend of affairs, but later, December 9, again solicited recognition as consul general. He lost his claim.<sup>40</sup>

Adams asked him whether Buenos Aires claimed an entire or an imperfect independence. He desired this information because in the negotiation of the proposed article with Worthington, Pueyrredón had refused to contract that the United States should enjoy at Buenos Aires the status of the most favored nation. The supreme director gave as his reason for the refusal the explanation that Spain held claims of sovereignty over Buenos Aires, so, therefore, for renouncing these claims the privilege must be reserved of granting her favors that no other nation should expect to receive.<sup>41</sup>

It was uncertain, therefore, whether or not the independence of the provinces was perfect or imperfect. Adams concluded that the government of the United Provinces had declined even a reciprocal agreement that the United States should enjoy the same privileges as other nations.<sup>42</sup> The special agent apparently had nothing to say concerning this state of affairs.

The absolute reasons involved in Worthington's negotiations with the supreme director are perhaps to be found in his love of power and fondness for ostentatious display. The weak character of the man might possibly lead one to suspect him of having a pecuniary interest in the transaction, but this supposition cannot be based upon

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<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 92.

<sup>42</sup>Adams to Monroe, Washington, January 28, 1819. Manning, op. cit., I, 93.

anything more definite than the fact that Worthington was apparently not trustworthy, and the proof we have acquired of his infirm and vacillating personality.

It would seem fortunate that his propositions were not successfully completed.<sup>43</sup> With the evidence of their failure Worthington felt that the appropriate moment had arrived for him to journey to Chile.

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<sup>43</sup> Pereira Salas, op. cit., p. 4.

## Chapter III

## Worthington's Mission in Chile

Worthington bade the supreme director of Buenos Aires farewell on January 23, 1818, and began the first lap of his long journey to Chile, via stagecoach. The coach moved rapidly, and within a comparatively short time he was in the heart of the pampas. He was bored with the monotony of the landscape and the dog days of January were suffocating. He was greatly impressed, however, by the courtesy of the people he met, but he could not understand their kindness to him. He particularly noticed the uncertain manner of the creole. The typical expression, "Who knows?" met all his question.<sup>1</sup>

In due time he arrived in Mendoza. There he rested for several days before beginning the ascent of the Andes. When he again undertook the journey, he dressed in the characteristic garb of the creole and rode a mule. He was irritable during the difficult ascent, but proud of the fact that he was the second American agent to cross the Andes.<sup>2</sup> John B. Prevost had preceded him to Chile. After four days' travel he arrived in the valley of Aconcagua, and was politely received into the home of Bishop Don José Ignacio Guido, where he was served with excellent Chilean food and graciously entertained. He was well pleased with his first impression of Chile.<sup>3</sup>

On February 3 he arrived in Santiago, where he met Prevost. The independence of Chile had been proclaimed formally on February 12, and O'Higgins had been made supreme director. Worthington transmitted

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<sup>1</sup>Eugenio Pereira Salas, La Misión Worthington en Chile, 1818-1819, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 5, 6.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

to Prevost instructions he had carried from Secretary Adams, and the two men discovered that their views coincided to a marked degree concerning the best policy to follow in Chile. Prevost soon departed to assume his duties in Peru.<sup>4</sup>

Worthington's false pride delayed his visit to the governmental authorities, but on February 27 he presented himself at the palace, where he was received by Miguel Zañartu, the Chilean secretary of state. Supreme Director O'Higgins was absent with the army.<sup>5</sup> The state department of the United States had written to Santiago concerning him, and he attributed his pretentious reception to the good words of Prevost in his behalf, as well as to the arrival of the American war vessel, Ontario, under the command of Captain Biddle.<sup>6</sup>

Zañartu extended him recognition as an agent for commerce and professed his desire to tighten the bonds between Chile and the United States.<sup>7</sup> O'Higgins deplored the lack of a letter of introduction, carrying with it formal recognition of his government. He received him as a special agent, however, probably because he was fearful of severing all chances of a speedy recognition of Chile should he not acknowledge him.<sup>8</sup> He would, beyond any doubt, much rather have received a formal minister representing the United States.

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<sup>4</sup>Prevost to Adams, Santiago, February 13, 1818. William R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations, II, 914.

<sup>5</sup>Pereira Salas, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>6</sup>Worthington to Adams, February 27, 1818. Manning, op. cit., II, 915.

<sup>7</sup>Pereira Salas, op. cit., p. 7.

<sup>8</sup>Zañartu to Worthington, Ministry of State in Chile, March 1, 1818. Manning, op. cit., II, 915, 916.

Worthington at once began arrangements for negotiating a commercial treaty between the two countries. The first official matter he brought before the Chilean authorities was the rough draft of his proposed agreement. On March 2 he presented to the Chilean officials an almost identical copy of the papers which had been once refused<sup>9</sup> by both the government of Buenos Aires and that of the United States. Zañartu promptly sent it to the Tribunal of Consultation after carefully reading it. The time was not well chosen. Before the Tribunal voiced its opinion on the matter, news arrived from the southern troops concerning reverses to the patriot cause. Public morale was at a low level.<sup>10</sup> Rumors portended approaching battle, and the North Americans residing in Santiago became ill at ease.

Worthington, under the pretext of serving his North American friends, journeyed to Valparaiso, ostensibly to interview Captain Biddle, whose vessel was lying at anchor there, to discover whether or not it comported with his instructions to delay his departure till after the impending battle between the patriot and Spanish<sup>11</sup> forces near Santiago. He was doubtless eager to protect himself, despite the fact that he expressed a desire to visit the headquarters of General San Martín and witness the battle.<sup>12</sup> Worthington experienced some busy weeks moving fearfully back and forth between Santiago and Valparaiso.<sup>13</sup> During this time of stress he took it upon himself to hand over to Captain Biddle the responsibility of

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<sup>9</sup>Pereira Salas, op. cit., p. 7.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Worthington to Adams, Valparaiso, March 5, 1818. Manning, op. cit., II, 916.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Pereira Salas, op. cit., p. 8.

protecting the threatened interests of the United States. In a typical Worthington gesture he guaranteed protection to the English commercial houses.<sup>14</sup> This move was certainly a mere empty pretension.

It was his expressed purpose, should the patriot forces emerge victorious, to proceed to Talcahuano and claim from their royalist captors the United States vessels, Canton and Beaver, which were being held by the Spanish blockading squadron in the Pacific. He feared that should the patriot forces take them, they might claim a salvage fee upon their restoration to their rightful owners. It was<sup>15</sup> Worthington's intention to avoid this possibility.

Worthington did very little in the line of his prescribed duties during this period of waiting for the destiny of Chile to be settled by battle. In a letter to the department of state he expressed the opinion that General Osorio, the royalist leader, would retreat to Talca and enter winter quarters, where he would wait until affairs in Europe took an improved trend insofar as the King of Spain was concerned; or that San Martín would end the Spanish opposition by forcing a bloodier and more decisive battle than had been even his previous victory of Chacabuco. This surmise proved to be well founded.<sup>16</sup>

Worthington expected the patriots to purchase the Windham, a British East Indiaman, which had arrived at Valparaíso on March 5. This vessel mounted thirty-six guns, and it was his belief that the

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<sup>14</sup>Pereira Salas, op. cit., pp. 7, 8.

<sup>15</sup>Worthington to Adams, Valparaíso, March 5, 1818. Manning, op. cit., II, 916.

<sup>16</sup>Worthington to Adams, Santiago, March 9, 1818. Manning, op. cit., II, 917.

patriots could utilize it to capture the blockading Spanish vessels,  
 and thereby gain complete control of the government of Chile.<sup>17</sup>

He was still dissatisfied with the failure of the Chilean government to understand the neutral attitude of the United States. He explained his lack of power to grant recognition to Zañartu by reminding him that the victory of Chacabuco had not been won prior to his appointment, and that Chile had not at that time ascended to the position of a free and independent state. He suggested the possibility that since the time that had elapsed from the proclamation of the Chilean declaration of independence was only one month, there was a possibility the "Star of Chile may again be eclipsed for a time on the Banks of the Maule, the Plains of San Fernando or the fields of Rancagua."<sup>18</sup>

He insisted that relations of amity still existed between the United States and Spain, and that it was his firm conviction that the United States had done everything which should be expected of them. He added:

Therefore the Undersigned with particular satisfaction remarks the friendly manner in which She has been recognized here & has transmitted a copy thereof to Washington & has no doubt, that the President will only appreciate the same, and as he enjoys the confidence & it is believed represents the feelings of ten millions of People over whose Republic he has been chosen to Preside, he will rejoice in the high destinies to which this important section of the great American family is fast advancing & will fully reciprocate the wishes of his Excellency the Supreme Director "to strengthen the relations of this State with a Government to which a thousand principles unite us."<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>Worthington to Zañartu, Santiago, March 12, 1818. Manning, *op. cit.*, II, 917, 918.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

Worthington's aforementioned calculations concerning the probable actions of General Osorio were well realized. The royal army was moving into Talca on March 19, when it was attacked by the patriots. By nightfall the patriots apparently held the advantage, and could perhaps have ended the battle the next morning, when they planned to renew the aggressive, had all gone well.<sup>20</sup>

Beneath the cover of darkness, however, the royalist general directed a terrific surprise attack upon the patriot forces. Their organization was disrupted and most of their troops dispersed. The Chileans were panic-stricken.<sup>21</sup> General San Martín's private secretary, Monteagudo, communicated an exaggerated account of the conflict to Worthington early in the morning of March 21.<sup>22</sup> O'Higgins was wounded in the arm at this battle of Concha Rayada.

Worthington rushed back to Valparaíso, where he spread news of the defeat of Concha Rayada, and anxiously awaited the final result of the struggle. It was his intention to go aboard the vessel Ariel, of Baltimore, and return around Cape Horn to Buenos Aires if the patriot forces were defeated.<sup>23</sup>

The Spanish leader apparently never realized the extent of his momentary success. He failed to follow up his advantage and continue to strike while the patriot forces were in a state of disruption. Within a short time San Martín had rallied his troops, and on April 5

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<sup>20</sup>Worthington to Adams, Santiago, April 8, 1818. Manning, op. cit., II, 919.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

the Spanish were defeated on the plains of Maipú. They were never  
<sup>24</sup>again a threat to the government of Chile.

Worthington took the liberty of appointing Harry Hill, of New York City, vice-consul for Santiago and Valparaiso. He was doubtful as to his authority to make appointments, so he declared that he had  
<sup>25</sup>acted on the advice of John B. Prevost. Prevost bears out this  
<sup>26</sup>statement. He had already appointed Washington Stewart, of Philadelphia, vice-consul for Coquimbo and Guano. Prevost urged the new appointees of Worthington to exert effort toward recovering several American vessels which were being held at Talcahuano under seizure and condemnation, although they had already been robbed of their cargoes. He recommended the appointees to the president very  
<sup>27</sup>warmly. Stewart and Hill immediately began exercising their functions.

A Cabildo Abierto assembled on April 17 to arrange for the cre-  
<sup>28</sup>ation of a committee to write a constitution for the new state. Movements for the formation of a constitution had arisen as early as 1812. Poinsett had lent himself to the cause of the patriots to the extent of writing a rough draft which he entitled the "Constitutional Code of the United Provinces of Chile." In this draft he tended to correct the harshness of the anti-clerical element of Don Manuel Salas,

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<sup>24</sup>Charles Edward Chapmen, Colonial Hispanic America: A History, p. 274.

<sup>25</sup>Worthington to Adams, Santiago, April 8, 1818. Manning, op. cit., II, 919.

<sup>26</sup>Prevost to Adams, Valparaiso, April 9, 1818. Manning, op. cit., II, 920.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 920, 921.

<sup>28</sup>Pereira Salas, op. cit., p. 9.

leader, at that time in the Chilean government. His early draft was not accepted.

Four residents of Santiago were chosen to form the constitution. <sup>30</sup> Worthington may have been one of them. He was, doubtless, inspired by the previous action of Poinsett. He immediately assumed the task of writing a complete free constitution for the South American State. On May 5 he presented his draft, modeled after the constitution of the United States, to O'Higgins. In presenting it to the supreme director, he wrote:

The Venerable Institutions, which for so many ages had preserved the Liberty of Great Britain, the People of the United States of America, inherited from their forefathers, and on becoming themselves an Independent Nation--gave to the World an improved System of civil Polity under the form of a confederated Republic, of a more perfect Character than had ever been enjoyed.

It has withstood the Intrigues of Peace and the Shocks of War and has afforded to our Citizens that protection & happiness which were pledged by the Compact. I therefore adopted it as my prototype and Guide.

We have seen the Son of Chile able to atchieve & defend his independence & he will now be as capable of maintaining and enjoying all the Blessings which flow from civil Liberty, as was the antient Greek or Roman Patriot. I hope the time is fast advancing when your Native Land will be not only in taste & refinement of manners--but in her exalted notions of Freedom the Atica of the South.

A well organized form of Government will ensure you Peace & Security at home, and respect abroad: It will tend to harmonize the discord, & bind up the wounds, which intestine commotions have inflicted, & evince even to your enemies, that they may have good Laws to live under, and they will become your Friends--

I think the Elections contemplated by this Constitution may forthwith take place and the Powers therein created be put in

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<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

operation without embarrassing or impeding the ulterior military movements which it may be still necessary to prosecute-- A Short Manifesto for that purpose I have taken leave to enclose.

Now Sir you can take no notice of, or act on these communications, as you may think proper--I am perfectly aware of the delicacy in a stranger offering them, yet being myself the only Public Functionary, from a Foreign country, resident near this Government, I have thought the peculiarity of my situation & the purity of my intentions, would Justify me in this measure--But as my health will not permit my writing much, I will make any personal explanations, on these fifty eight Sections whenever you feel disposed to honor me with a hearing.<sup>31</sup>

Worthington's enclosed draft of a proposed manifesto for O'Higgins to sign is as follows:

Fellow Citizens: Having been honored by you with the first place in the State, since our Independence I feel it my duty to recommend to you the adoption of a permanent good & practicable form of civil Government--The following Constitution is therefore submitted to you, And that the necessary and highly important operations of the existing Government May not be perplexed by useless Political dissensions and discussions, I shall direct the Elections to take place, and the Powers specified in the Constitution, to proceed accordingly as this Constitution provides in itself, that it may from time to time be calmly and dispassionately Altered or Amended, no ill can result from adopting it, as the basis of our Government and this will avoid, the intrigues & confusions, which have ever arisen from conventions and Congresses in this Part of the World where they have had no proper Political basis to go upon, and degenerated into wild Theorists & factious experimenters.

I have always endeavoured to serve my Country firmly in the field, and faithfully in the chair of State and whenever they shall require it am willing to lay down the honors they have conferred upon me with a clear conscience, and fervent wish for their lasting happiness and prosperity.<sup>32</sup>

Worthington's constitution contained fifty eight articles.<sup>33</sup>

The preamble was a paraphrase of that of the United States constitution.

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<sup>31</sup>Worthington to O'Higgins, Santiago, May 5, 1818. Manning, op. cit., II, 923, 924.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., pp. 924, 925.

<sup>33</sup>Pereira Salas, op. cit., p. 11.

The first article treated of the executive powers, which were delegated to a supreme and a subordinate director, who were to be elected by voice of the free citizens over twenty-one years of age. Their term of office was limited to eight years, and they were not to be eligible for reelection. They were to be assisted by a ministry of five departments: state, war, marine, finance, and technical advice.<sup>34</sup>

The second article provided for the legislative functions, which were to be vested in a Senate of fifteen members and a House of Deputies composed of fifty members. These men were to be elected in the same manner as was the director.<sup>35</sup> The third article established the judicial powers, creating a Supreme Tribunal of Justice and a system of jurisprudence. The fourth article dealt with miscellaneous powers, such as habeas corpus, liberty of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the slavery question.<sup>36</sup>

Worthington, apparently, had but little hope as to the adoption of his constitutional plan. He felt assured that the Chilean officials preferred the governmental institutions of Europe to those of the United States. He did not consider a simple republican form of government popular with the military element. O'Higgins was not in favor of accepting a constitution based upon that of the North American republic.<sup>37</sup>

The editorialist of the Duende, a Chilean newspaper, declared that the people of Chile would be absurd to believe themselves equal in ability to the North Americans, or capable enough to adapt themselves

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<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 12

<sup>35</sup>Pereira Salas, op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.

to a model of the United States constitution, the character of which he described as clashing with the temperament and character of the Chileans. O'Higgins declared the adoption of Worthington's constitution would bring the religious issue to the fore, despite its author's assertions that he had purposely refrained from mentioning these points.

The question was not settled until October 23, when the Fundamental Code of Chile was adopted. O'Higgins explained to Worthington that the despotic tone of the Code, especially in regard to the religious question, was essential, but that when the struggle for independence was definitely ended, a more liberal regime, in all respects, would be adopted.

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The disfavor in which the Chilean authorities held the United States might perhaps be explained by the fact that they suspected her of favoring the Carrera brothers. José Miguel Carrera, a popular leader, had previously dissolved the first Chilean cabildo and assumed dictatorial powers. Affairs in Chile had taken the aspect of civil war between those who favored the domination of the viceroyalty of Peru, and those who favored self-government. O'Higgins, of course, had superseded him, and the divisions of the Chileans to follow the two men had weakened the patriot cause until the royalists had defeated them at the battle of Rancagua, October 7, 1814. O'Higgins then led a contingent of San Martín's force to victory at Chacabuco,

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid.  
<sup>39</sup> Ibid.  
<sup>40</sup> Chapman, op. cit., p. 271. José Miguel Carrera had appealed for aid in the United States, where he was unofficially assisted by leading American citizens, such as Poinsett.

on February 12, 1817, and was made supreme director by him.<sup>41</sup> He naturally resented any attitude favorable to Carrera on the part of the United States.

Worthington believed that the citizens of Chile were partial to the United States, but that the government entertained an opposite attitude.<sup>42</sup> Shortly after his arrival at Santiago he had received a letter from José Miguel Carrera, who was in seclusion in Buenos Aires, urging him to use his influence as American Consul to obtain the release of his two brothers. He wrote:

I ask nothing further than that you will interpose your influence with the Chief of Buenos Ayres for the liberation of my Brothers--There does not exist against them a single crime, and I could name many who are at this moment reposing in the shade of their triumphant Bayonets. Our only wish is for the perfect liberty of Chile.<sup>43</sup>

Worthington's undated note on General Carrera's letter follows:

A few days after I received General Carrera's letter I had an Interview with the Supreme Director--I told him I had received it, and said--That altho' I did not pretend to meddle either officially or privately with the internal affairs of Buenos Ayres or Chile, either as it respected men or Measures, yet those Brothers were much esteemed in the United States, and not only would any favor shown them be appreciated generally where they were known in the United States--but I would take the liberty to say it would be particularly pleasing to Col. Poinsett & Commodore Porter two very distinguished citizens [Poinsett was especially active on behalf of the Carrera's] --That our citizens esteemed them, because they looked upon them as Patriots--They were so once but how they now become to be considered otherwise, I had not learnt--I knew of them personally--and if His Excellency wished to see the Generals letter to me I would put it in my Pocket the next time I came to the Fort, I had carelessly

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<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 273.

<sup>42</sup>Worthington to Adams, Santiago, July 4, 1818. Manning, op. cit., II, 932.

<sup>43</sup>Carrera to Worthington, Buenos Aires, September 12, 1818. Manning, op. cit., II, 940.

left it laying on the table in my room. He politely declined wishing to see it--and replied that the Carrera's might be patriots for aught he knew but that they seemed to consider Chile as their Patrimony; and rather than see her liberated by any other Persons than themselves would prefer to ruin her--That he should feel a pleasure in gratifying the feelings of those citizens in the United States whom I had mentioned--But that those two Brothers, would be tried in Chile, not in Buenos Ayres--and that with their release or punishment he had nothing to do--I told him I conceived it my duty to make the request, as I had been appealed to in a Solemn manner by the General; I neither could nor should do any thing further on the business, that I knew of; and took my leave,-- It must be recollected that at that time I had other business with the Director and chose my moment for making those remarks-- It was a delicate subject, particularly for me, as I had been appealed to under the impression, that I was somewhat in the character of a Minister Plenipotentiary--Yet I was determined to bring it forth--and although I could see it was a disagreeable subject with the Director--yet it went off really better than I expected; both as it regarded the Carrera's and myself--The truth is, I was not a Party man,--and they were convinced of it.--<sup>44</sup>

He was still attempting to justify his unauthorized behavior, and perhaps might have been hinting for an extension of his powers. He was greatly surprised when, on April 14, he received information of  
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the shooting of the Carrera brothers in Mendoza.

Worthington entered into the social life of the Chilean capital to a very great extent. He enrolled in a class of dancing instruction, and made merry with the Chilean maidens. After a short while, however, his desire to distinguish his name reasserted itself, and he busied  
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himself with other matters.

He attempted to prove to the state department that he was bene-  
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fiting the United States in a very worth while manner. He believed

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<sup>44</sup>Ibid. An undated note on General Carrera's letter.

<sup>45</sup>Pereira Salas, op. cit., pp. 8-10.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>47</sup>Worthington to Adams, Santiago, July 4, 1818. Manning, op. cit., II, 932.

that there existed in Chile a great North American, or patriot party, led by Carrera. He was certain that this party would become extinct without the assistance of the United States, because the mass of the population knew no other power except Great Britain, and did not favor her.<sup>48</sup> He pointed out that the South American governments had but very little commerce with European nations, with the exception of England. England and the United States were the leading nations carrying on commercial relations with Chile.<sup>49</sup> He was still working toward recognition by the United States.

He declared the Chileans capable of establishing and maintaining a government like that of his own country.<sup>50</sup> This was probably another instance in which his surmise was incorrect. He urged United States acknowledgment in order to insure the establishment of republics in the new nations. He insisted that if they were to continue under a monarchial form of government, it would be more advantageous to the United States should they remain under the control of Spain, than for them to develop into new and powerful kingdoms.<sup>51</sup>

He reported to Adams that Chile was fast becoming overstocked with British goods, and that the British were becoming so numerous, their commercial houses so many, and their wealth so influential, that American interests were suffering. He complained of the disadvantageous position in which the honesty and disinterest of the United States placed him. He cited as proof the story of the Governor Shelby,

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 933.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid.

<sup>51</sup>Worthington to Adams, Santiago, July 4, 1818. Manning, op. cit., II, 935.

a vessel out of New York which was sold to the viceroy at Lima, and the negotiations concerning the Two Catherines, out of Providence, Rhode Island, which took aboard a cargo of wheat in Chile, and ostensibly sailed for Rio de Janeiro, but which ten days later put in at Lima, where the wheat was sold at an excessive profit to the royalists.

The Chileans insisted upon regarding these actions literally and believed the United States to be systematically supplying the royalists with foodstuffs. He declared himself as standing "peerless amidst all the intrigues which surround me." He asserted that United States influence was definitely on the decline, and that should the struggle for independence continue for any long period of time that the patriots would be justified to complain that the United States was violating her neutrality in favor of Spain. <sup>52</sup> The delay of the North American government in sending two vessels to the Chilean government, for which it had paid two hundred thousand dollars, did not <sup>53</sup> tend to promote a more favorable attitude on the part of Chile.

Worthington declared that his investigations into affairs pertaining to the actions of the armies and other functions of the state subjected him to a certain degree of suspicion, as the Chileans had by this time come to look upon him more as a consul and less as a functionary or diplomatic character. <sup>54</sup> It seems that he must still have been hoping for increased authority. His official status as consul

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<sup>52</sup>Ibid., pp. 940-943.

<sup>53</sup>Worthington to Adams, Santiago, November 18, 1818. Manning, op. cit., II, 1023, 1024.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid.

and his instructions to act as observer had both been enlarged by him until he was losing the respect of the Chilean authorities, as well as the good regard of the United States.

On December 31, Captain Biddle departed from the port of Valparaiso in the Ontario. Worthington was at a loss to explain his action. He requested official information from O'Higgins, and was referred to Secretary of State Joaquín de Echeverría. Public opinion became very intense on the subject, and Biddle's departure was attributed to one of two causes. There was a current belief that a dispute had taken place between Lord Cochrane, the Chilean Admiral, of English nationality, and Biddle, concerning the failure of the latter to salute the Chilean flag when entering the port.

The other prevalent rumor was that he had taken on board several Spanish families and a considerable amount of Spanish wealth, and, fearing a search by officers of the Chilean navy, had departed for Rio de Janeiro. Worthington insisted to Echeverría that he was confident that all United States naval officers would show the flag of Chile every respect. Concerning the second point, he said that it was not contended that the property of enemies should be protected, either on the high seas or within a port, or within the territorial jurisdiction of a belligerent. By the law of nations it was an accepted fact that a merchant vessel which should happen to be boarded and searched, then indemnified, under such circumstances, should not complain.

He voiced an opinion that should a belligerent nation know that a neutral vessel was conveying enemy property, the commander of said

vessel should be requested to give up the property. He did not admit that, under any circumstances, a forcible entry could be made on any neutral ship without violating the sovereignty of the nation. He declared that Captain Biddle was not guilty of any wrongful act, but requested information so that, should the United States have been insulted, a demand for redress might be made and that should the United States have injured Chile, steps might be taken to alleviate the in-

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justice. Echeverria denied knowing any of the reasons for Biddle's hasty departure. He admitted that differences existed between Biddle and Lord Cochrane, but declared they were not of sufficient importance to lead to Biddle's sudden action. He declared that the Chilean government had positive information that Biddle had taken on board European passengers from Lima, as well as royalist property, but that it was never the intention of the Chilean government to search a neutral vessel. He said that Captain Biddle had greatly misjudged the policy of the Chilean government if fear of forcible entry

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prompted his embarkation. Worthington was much embarrassed by Biddle's departure. He determined to show why Captain Biddle had departed, but was never successful.

Worthington was anxious for San Martín to conquer Peru, as he felt that the destiny of Chile would not be complete until Spanish rule was completely eliminated from South America. Realizing the infirm condition of the national treasury, he thought of the

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<sup>55</sup>Worthington to Echeverria, Santiago, January 4, 1819. Manning, *op. cit.*, II, 1024, 1025.

<sup>56</sup>Echeverria to Worthington, Santiago, January 8, 1819. Manning, *op. cit.*, II, 1026.

possibility of contracting a loan in the United States to aid in the organization of the expedition to be sent to liberate Peru. O'Higgins had faith in Worthington's financial powers, and believed that he was receiving the official good will of the North American government. The conservative Chilean senate accepted the offer, but raised the original sum from three million to five million dollars. The legal papers were drawn up before a notary and the government of Chile was bound with Worthington.

Despite all these arrangements, however, the treaty was never fulfilled. Worthington alleged the interest rate of eight per cent, to which he had agreed, was insufficient, as loans between private persons in the United States could demand that rate without being exposed to the risk of great distance. The provisions of the agree-  
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ment were, therefore, never carried out.

By this time news of Worthington's attempted diplomatic negotia-  
tions in Argentina had reached the state department, and Adams had advised Monroe, who was not loath to act, to recall him. His last days in Chile were bitter. The departure of the Ontario and the  
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failure of his proposed loan were not conducive to his peace of mind. O'Higgins wished to conclude an agreement concerning commerce and seamen with him before his departure. Due to the revolutionary state of the country, however, he was unable to make any definite arrange-  
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ments.

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<sup>57</sup>Pereira Salas, op. cit., pp. 15, 16.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>Worthington to Adams, Santiago, November 4, 1818. Manning, op. cit., II, 1019-1021.

Worthington bade O'Higgins farewell, and left Santiago January 8, 1819, and arrived at Santa Rosa, January 15. He found but one vessel there bound round Cape Horn. This was the British ship, Admiral Griffith, billed for Rio de Janiero. He decided not to chance passage in her, and made plans to proceed to Mendoza.<sup>60</sup> He found that rumors had preceded him to Santa Rosa to the effect that he had negotiated a loan for the Chilean government. He denied, to Adams, the truth of this rumor and declared that if he had ever endeavored to negotiate a loan, that it would have been in a purely private capacity. He wrote:

I must confess, in more than one instance, I have with regret observed a Kind of tricking & perversion in the matters of negotiation with which I have had to do more than I expected to find even in the School of Machiavel or the Cunning followers of Ignatius Loyola--<sup>61</sup>

Until the very last he maintained his pose of injured innocence. He never admitted his wrong doings. On January 26, he again began the ascent of the Andes, and his mission in Chile was over. Generally speaking, Worthington's consulship accomplished very little of lasting importance. He completed none of his unauthorized projects, and he<sup>62</sup> was reproached for his actions when he arrived in the United States. His frequent attempts to distinguish his name resulted in its degradation, but his spirit was irrepressible.

He declared that he had, upon his return from South America, expected to be received with "unequivocal approbation," but had been

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<sup>60</sup>Worthington to Adams, Santa Rosa, January 26, 1819. Manning, *op. cit.*, II, 1026, 1027.

<sup>61</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 1033.

<sup>62</sup>Pereira Salas, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

accorded instead a cold and partially accusing reception. He resented this attitude, and made remarks while "governed by irritated feelings," which he apparently later regretted. He asked that his utterances, made under stress of emotion, be viewed with much liberality, but he considered himself acquitted in every respect insofar as explanations to the United States government were concerned. <sup>63</sup> The necessity prompting the appointment of a special agent to South America during this period is evident, but the state department unfortunately erred in its selection of W. G. D. Worthington for the part. It is to be regretted that a man of more statesmanlike qualities was not chosen in his stead.

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<sup>63</sup>Worthington to Adams, Baltimore, March 10, 1820. Manning, op. cit., I, 544, 545.

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