

THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE PORTSMOUTH TREATY OF 1905

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THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE PORTSMOUTH TREATY OF 1905

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Submitted to the Department of History  
Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of  
MASTER OF ARTS  
1939

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## Preface

The purpose of this monograph is to show the important part played by Theodore Roosevelt in bringing to a close the Russo-Japanese War which was culminated in the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905.

The most important letters concerning the making of peace were not sent through our State Department because of the need for secrecy, and, therefore, are not published in our Government Documents. These letters, which were sent direct or through our Ambassadors, were first made public in 1920 by Joseph Bucklin Bishop in his book "Theodore Roosevelt and His Times, Shown in His Letters." In 1925, Tyler Dennett published "Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, Based Primarily Upon the Private Papers of Theodore Roosevelt," in which still more of these letters were made public. These two sources have been cited in a number of cases in this thesis because the material is not available in any other publications.

I believe that Theodore Roosevelt more than anyone else was responsible for the making of this Treaty. By his diplomatic appeal and his influence on the Tsar and the Mikado, he was able to bring about a conciliation between Russia and Japan in the critical meeting of August 29, 1905, and so ended the peace conference successfully with the Portsmouth Treaty.

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to my adviser, Dr. T. H. Reynolds, Professor of History and Head

of the History Department, for his helpful hints and constructive criticism; to other members of the History faculty for suggestions concerning this report; and to the Library Staff of Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College for their invaluable assistance in securing the material.

To my wife, Lila Potts, who has helped me by typing this thesis, I am most grateful.

Glenn L. Potts

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## Chapter I

### A PREVIEW OF THE FAR EAST TO 1904

The Treaty of Shimonoseki, ending the Chino-Japanese War, was signed April 17, 1895. One provision of this treaty gave Japan possession of the Liao-tung Peninsula,<sup>1</sup> but a triple intervention by Germany, France, and Russia forced her to return this important concession to China for a larger money indemnity.<sup>2</sup>

After China's defeat in this war, she

lay a stranded whale, apparently dead, or dying, and the chief powers of Europe came, like fishermen after blubber, and took here a province and there a harbor, and were callous to the fact that their victim was not dead.<sup>3</sup>

The chief powers of Europe, Germany, Russia, Great Britain, and France, did not wait for the Treaty to be signed before descending like vultures upon China, demanding leases on harbors and provinces with special commercial privileges including rights for building railroads and digging mines. They soon made agreements defining their spheres of influence in China.<sup>4</sup>

(1) John V. A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements With And Concerning China 1894-1919, New York, 1921, I, 18-19.

(2) Paul Hibbert Clyde, A History of the Modern and Contemporary Far East, New York, 1937, pp. 303-06.

(3) William Roscoe Thayer, The Life and Letters of John Hay, New York, 1915, II, 240.

(4) Payson J. Treat, The Far East, A Political and Diplomatic History, New York, 1928, pp. 322 ff.

A message on the Open Door policy in China was sent to Berlin, London, and St. Petersburg by the United States Secretary of State, John Hay. In this note Hay asked these countries which had received territorial concessions, not to discriminate against other countries of the world by (1) charging higher harbor duties or railway rates against one country than another, (2) allowing the Chinese to collect the same rate of tariff from all countries at all ports except the free ports, (3) agreeing not to interfere with any treaty port or vested interest in China.<sup>5</sup> Each of these countries agreed to these principles, some not so forcefully as others. All of them saw their advantage in not maintaining the Open Door, yet they dared not openly oppose the doctrine which Hay had championed.<sup>6</sup>

These and the other world powers had hardly become accustomed to the Open Door in China before they were excited to a desire for revenge against the Chinese because of the Boxer Rising.<sup>7</sup> The Boxers, an organization which opposed foreigners in China, on June 14, 1900, attacked the foreign legations at Peking,<sup>8</sup> causing the death of many of the members of the

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(5) House of Representatives, 56th Congress, 1st Sess., Document 1, Foreign Relations with the Annual Message of the President 1899, Washington, 1901, pp. 128 ff. After the first citation this and all documents of this set will be designated as Foreign Relations for whatever year is referred to.

(6) Thayer, op. cit., p. 243

(7) Ibid., p. 244.

(8) Ibid., p. 236. According to Treat, op. cit., p. 347, within the legations were the representatives of eleven nations: the Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, Russia, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Japan, and the charges of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and nationals of three others--Swiss, Portuguese, and China.



legations. The others were saved by troops from the United States and European countries. Germany was strongest in her demands for vengeance, and sent Count Waldersee with an army to punish the Chinese.

Following this uprising Hay played a diplomatic game of bluff and succeeded in making an agreeable settlement between China and the other powers.<sup>9</sup> By the agreement signed September 7, 1901, China agreed to chastise the Boxers, pay indemnities, both public and private for losses associated with the insurrection, and to improve trade relations with all foreign nations.<sup>10</sup>

After this understanding all nations except Russia withdrew their forces from China. Russia kept pressing the Chinese government for further concessions. These Russian demands for special interests in China caused Japan no little trepidation.<sup>11</sup>

Japan and England, both wanting to stop Russia's activity in China, signed the Anglo-Japanese alliance January 30, 1902. England agreed not to permit a third power to intervene on the side of Japan's opponent, who was understood to be Russia.<sup>12</sup>

This new alliance caused Russia temporarily to reverse her plans by agreeing on April 8 to evacuate Manchuria and to

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(9) House of Representatives, 56th Congress, 2d Sess., Document 1, Foreign Relations with the Annual Message of the President 1900, Washington, 1902, pp. 77 ff.

(10) MacMurray, op. cit., p. 267.

(11) Henry Chung, The Oriental Policy of the United States, New York, 1919, p. 56.

(12) Alfred L. P. Dennis, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Berkeley, 1923, pp. 1 ff.

recognize China's sovereignty there.<sup>13</sup> Russia began military evacuation but maintained a strong railway guard to protect her commercial interests,<sup>14</sup> including the Yalu Lumber Company, which held a lumber concession granted to a Vladivostok merchant by the king of Korea.<sup>15</sup> The Tsar and several other government officials were financially interested in this company. They used this apparently innocent concession to create fortified posts along the railway.<sup>16</sup> When Russia stopped her military evacuation it became obvious that she wanted war with Japan.<sup>17</sup>

If Manchuria and Korea had been a wilderness there would have been no clash of ambitions. This conflict of interests brought about diplomatic correspondence regarding their rights in China.<sup>18</sup>

Japan, in August, 1903, signified her willingness to enter negotiations with regard to Russia's interests in the Far East.<sup>19</sup> Japan offered as a basis for negotiations the

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(13) House of Representatives, 57th Congress, 2d Sess., Document 1, Foreign Relations with the Annual Message of the President 1902, Washington, 1903, pp. 280-81.

(14) Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, Garden City, 1925, pp. 129-30.

(15) Robert K. Douglass, Europe and the Far East, New York, 1928, p. 420.

(16) Ibid.

(17) Dennett, op. cit., pp. 138-41.

(18) Henry Fowler Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt a Biography, New York, 1931, p. 373.

(19) House of Representatives, 58th Congress, 2d Sess., Document 1, Foreign Relations with the Annual Message of the President 1903, Washington, 1904, p. 619.

following points: (1) definition of the interests of Japan in Korea and of Russia in Manchuria; (2) mutual agreement as to what measures each might take in protecting the defined interests; (3) mutual agreement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea, and to maintain the principle of equal opportunity in both Empires for the commerce and industry of all nations.<sup>20</sup>

Russia's counter proposal was presented to Japan November 3, 1903. It was unsatisfactory to Japan in that Russia wanted to regard Korea only. Russia did not mention the territorial integrity of China or her interests in Manchuria, and refused to treat Manchuria with any country except China herself.<sup>21</sup>

The two countries continued to exchange notes, Russia answering Japan only after long delay and usually unsatisfactorily. Russia finally wanted to make the discussion a pure and simple Korean question.<sup>22</sup>

Japan returned Russia's answer with a request for reconsideration, signifying that she would not wait more than a reasonable length of time for a reply. War seemed very imminent unless Russia should recede from her position.<sup>23</sup>

Russia's new reply embraced two points: (1) she proposed to establish a neutral zone in Korean territory lying between the Korean and Manchurian frontier and the thirty-ninth parallel north latitude, (2) Japan should recognize

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(20) Ibid.

(21) Ibid., pp. 610-20.

(22) Ibid., p. 620.

(23) Griscom to Hay, Ibid., p. 622.

that Manchuria was outside her sphere of interest, and Russia should not interfere with the privileges belonging to Japan and other nations under existing treaties with China, exclusive of the establishment of foreign settlements.<sup>24</sup>

Japan's answer insisted that they (1) drop the point in regard to the neutral zone in Korea; (2) modify the Russian proposal in regard to Manchuria in three ways, (a) Japan would recognize that Manchuria was outside her sphere of interest and Russia would respect the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria, (b) Russia should not interfere with the rights of any country in Manchuria as made by treaties with China, (c) Russia should recognize that Korea was outside her sphere of interest.<sup>25</sup>

Mr. Lloyd C. Griscom, the United States Minister to Japan, wrote to Mr. Hay February 5, 1904, saying that Japan thought she had waited long enough for an answer from Russia, and that Japan was preparing for war.<sup>26</sup> The following day, Mr. Griscom wrote Mr. Hay that Japan had terminated negotiations and broken off diplomatic relations with Russia.<sup>27</sup>

Mr. Robert S. McCormick, the United States Ambassador to Russia, in writing to Mr. Hay February 7, 1904, said that the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs had sent the Russian government's reply to Japan. Mr. McCormick also said that

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(24) Griscom to Hay, January 8, 1904, House of Representatives, 58th Congress, 3d Sess., Document 1, Foreign Relations with the Annual Message of the President 1904, Washington, 1905, p. 410.

(25) Griscom to Hay, January 13, 1904, Ibid., pp. 410-11.

(26) Ibid., pp. 411-12.

(27) Ibid., p. 412.

the Japanese Minister had asked for his passport and would probably leave that night, February 7, 1904.<sup>28</sup>

The war started on February 9, 1904, with the Japanese torpedo boats firing upon the Russian fleet at Port Arthur.<sup>29</sup> War was not formally declared until February 10, 1904. In her declaration of war Japan said she had always tried to promote peace in the Far East and to secure the future of her country without injury to the rights and interests of other countries.<sup>30</sup>

Japan gave as reason for the war the fact that Russia, while delaying the question of negotiation, advocated peace, yet made military and naval preparations to accomplish her wishes in the Far East. Japan further said that her safety depended upon the separate existence of Korea and that Russia had disregarded her solemn treaty pledges to China and had failed to evacuate Manchuria as she had promised to the other powers. Instead, Russia had strengthened herself to try to hold Manchuria.<sup>31</sup>

Kogoro Takahira, the Japanese Minister to the United States, asked Secretary Hay to let the United States embassy in St. Petersburg and the United States consulates elsewhere in Russia, look after her interests in Russia if Russia

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(28) McCormick to Hay, February 7, 1904, Ibid., pp. 708-09.

(29) Ibid., p. 709. The majority of authorities agree that the Japanese fired on the Russians first, but according to a letter Griscom to Hay, February 9, 1904, Ibid., p. 413, the telegram announcing the engagement said that the Russian gunboat Koriets started the battle by firing upon the Japanese torpedo boats February 9, 1904.

(30) Ibid., p. 414.

(31) Ibid.

would consent.<sup>32</sup> On February 9, 1904, in a letter from McCormick to Hay, Russia informed the United States that she had no objection to the American representatives looking after the interests of Japan after Japan had withdrawn her diplomatic and consular representatives.<sup>33</sup>

The United States Department of State informed her consular officers to take charge of the Japanese consulates and archive when requested to do so by Japan, with the understanding that the United States officials should have no consular duties or authority. They should be permitted to use their good offices only for the protection of Japanese subjects and their interests.<sup>34</sup>

Secretary Hay corresponded with both Russia and Japan on February 10, expressing the desire of the United States that the belligerents respect the neutrality of China and her administrative entity. He asked that the area of hostilities be localized and limited to prevent undue excitement to the Chinese and their trade.<sup>35</sup>

In response to Hay's letter, Japan agreed to respect China's neutrality if China assumed such an attitude and if Russia agreed to respect the same.<sup>36</sup> Russia answered

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(32) Ibid., p. 430.

(33) McCormick to Hay, February 9, 1904, Ibid., p. 714.

(34) Loomis to McCormick, February 9, 1904, Ibid., pp. 714-15.

(35) House of Representatives, 56th Congress, 2d Sess., Document 551, John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, Washington, 1906, V, 552.

(36) Griscom to Hay, February 15, 1904, Foreign Relations 1904, op. cit., p. 419.

favorably to the safeguarding of China's neutrality, giving three rules by which she agreed to do same: (1) China must respect all clauses of neutrality; (2) the Japanese government must observe the engagements entered into with the powers, as well as the principles of international law; (3) the neutralization should not include Manchuria.<sup>37</sup>

Given this understanding between the belligerents, the Chinese Empire agreed to remain neutral.<sup>38</sup>

The United States proclamation of neutrality during the war was issued by President Roosevelt February 11, 1904. He reminded the people of the United States to observe our law of neutrality passed April 20, 1818. This law prohibits persons in the United States from joining or helping raise forces to aid either side in case of foreign war, from attempting to fit out or arm any vessel intended for either belligerent, or from repairing or adding any equipment to any war vessel of either belligerent.<sup>39</sup>

The proclamation issued by President Roosevelt further provided that no supplies should be furnished the ships of either country except food necessary for the subsistence of the crew or enough coal to get them to their nearest home port. All ships must depart within twenty-four hours unless they were being repaired, a severe storm held them up, or

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(37) McCormick to Hay, February 19, 1904, Ibid., p. 724.

(38) Ibid., p. 422.

(39) United States Statutes at Large, 58th Congress, XXXIII, part 2, Private Laws, Concurrent Resolutions and Proclamations, Washington, 1905, pp. 2332-33.

if an enemy ship had departed less than twenty-four hours previous. If several belligerent vessels were in a port they must leave in alternate order every twenty-four hours. All privileges granted one of the belligerents must also be granted to the other. The following principles, as agreed to by Russia July 22, 1854, were binding: (1) goods belonging to citizens of either belligerent, unless it was contraband of war, when on board a neutral ship was not subject to confiscation; (2) property of neutrals aboard an enemy ship, unless it was contraband of war, could not be confiscated. The United States would not protect any citizen who attempted to break blockade, transport contraband of war or soldiers.<sup>40</sup>

At the beginning of the war each of the countries issued its rules of conduct for the war. The question of contraband caused many controversies between each of the belligerents and other countries of the world.<sup>41</sup>

Several months later, on January 5, 1905, the Kaiser had Speck von Sternberg, his Ambassador to the United States, wire President Roosevelt his pleasure at hearing that Roosevelt firmly adhered to the policy of the Open Door and the actual integrity of China. The Kaiser seemed assured that a European coalition headed by France planned to convince the belligerents that peace could not be made without compen-

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(40) Ibid., pp. 2333-35.

(41) For a list of contraband and the rules for warfare as issued by Russia, see Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of Statistics, Monthly Consular Reports, Washington, 1904, LXXX, no. 284, pp. 397-98. For the Japanese rules see same, pp. 392, 93-96. For a discussion of the various cases in which the United States citizens were a part see Foreign Relations 1904-05.



sation for the neutral powers. The Kaiser suggested that this plan could be frustrated if Roosevelt would send a letter to every country having interests in the Far East asking whether they would pledge not to demand compensation for themselves in China or elsewhere for their efforts toward peace.<sup>42</sup>

Secretary Hay sent a circular letter on this subject through our Ambassadors to Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Portugal, January 13, 1905. In this letter Hay asked what the Kaiser had suggested. He pledged the United States to continue to maintain the integrity of China and the Open Door with equal commercial opportunity for all.<sup>43</sup> All of the countries replied favorably, showing either that the Kaiser was wrong about the coalition or that it was headed off.<sup>44</sup>

The most important battles of the war, Port Arthur, Muckden, and the Sea of Japan, were won by the Japanese. Russia never had her complete army in the Far East, because, although protected by her alliance with France, she was afraid to leave her German frontier unguarded.<sup>45</sup>

The Kaiser had encouraged the Tsar in the Far East

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(42) Thayer, Hay, op. cit., pp. 385-86.

(43) House of Representatives, 59th Congress, 1st Sess., Document 1, Foreign Relations With the Annual Message of the President 1905, Washington, 1906, pp. 1 ff.

(44) Thayer, Hay, op. cit., pp. 262-63.

(45) J. H. Gubbins, The Making of Modern Japan, London, 1922, pp. 262-63.

but at the beginning of the war he shed no tears over the Russian reverses, for the weaker Russia became, the less need he had to fear her as a neighbor. At the same time, when Japan continued to win, all European powers felt sure that the defeat of Russia might cause a readjustment of world politics. Also it would bring up the question that the Kaiser had called the "Yellow Peril."<sup>46</sup>

The war continued throughout 1904 and 1905. All during the war, the Russian people opposed the fighting while the opposite was true in Japan where the people were eager to fight.<sup>47</sup> In spite of her great losses, Russia with her vast population could continue replenishing her army, whereas Japan, though victorious, was showing the loss of men.<sup>48</sup>

Several countries made peace overtures during 1904 and 1905 but found Japan unwilling to accept, yet it was Japan who asked President Roosevelt to intervene in the summer of 1905.<sup>49</sup>

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(46) William Roscoe Thayer, Theodore Roosevelt, an Intimate Biography, New York, 1931, p. 225.

(47) Gubbins, op. cit., p. 258.

(48) Thayer, Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 226.

(49) Dennett, op. cit., pp. 175-77.

## Chapter II

### ROOSEVELT EXTENDS HIS GOOD OFFICES

The attitudes of the different countries toward a peaceful conclusion of the Russo-Japanese war can be better understood after studying their feelings toward the belligerents.

In Germany, Kaiser William II, although apparently friendly toward Russia, had impatiently awaited the outbreak of the war. "...he had hoped that the stress of a great conflict abroad would force Tsar Nicholas to seek support and above all, good advice, from his German colleague."<sup>1</sup>

France was an ally of Russia though she took no part in the war. Later on it was rumored that she planned to try to end the war by a concert of nations.<sup>2</sup>

England was allied with Japan and had promised to aid her in case of the entrance of a third party. They had signed their first treaty January 30, 1902, and a new one August 2, 1905.<sup>3</sup>

Public opinion in the United States was favorable toward Japan, whose war loans were floated on the American

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(1) Geoffrey Danlop, Memoirs of Prince von Bulow, Boston, 1931, p. 70.

(2) See Chapter I, p. 11.

(3) Alfred L. P. Dennis, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Berkeley, 1923, p. 1.

money market.<sup>4</sup> President Roosevelt was pleased with every Japanese victory, and was ready to join Japan if Russia had seized an American vessel. Although in sympathy with Japan, Roosevelt wanted peace between these countries.<sup>5</sup>

Efforts to restore peaceful relations between Russia and Japan were advocated according to four different methods by peacemakers: (1) mediation through England and France, (2) mediation by the United States, (3) direct negotiations between Japan and Russia, (4) an international conference of powers. "Over all hung the shadow of intervention by a concert of powers."<sup>6</sup>

The method of intervention by a concert of nations in a conference had been thwarted by Roosevelt at the suggestion of the Kaiser, when Roosevelt asked the countries to pledge that they would not demand concessions in China for their efforts toward peace, as explained in Chapter I.

On December 27, 1904, Roosevelt wrote Spring Rice, secretary of the British embassy in Russia, that he had decided definitely what he would do in regard to the Far Eastern situation if the opportunity presented itself; however he said it was best not to write his conclusions.<sup>7</sup> Roosevelt

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(4) The Memoirs of Count Witte, Translated from the Original Russian Manuscript and Edited by Abraham Yarmolinsky, Garden City, 1921, p. 140

(5) Alfred L. P. Dennis, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Berkeley, 1923, p. 1.

(6) Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, Garden City, 1925, p. 170.

(7) Stephen Gwynn, The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, Cambridge, 1929, I, 443-44.

went on to say that he could not trust the British Ambassador and that he would like to have Spring Rice come over to visit him. Roosevelt summarized the situation thus:

...we must trust in the Lord and keep our powder dry and our eyes open. ...I intend, as your people should intend, to be vigilant and reasonably ready to adopt whatever course is called for.<sup>8</sup>

In a letter to George Otto Trevelyan, British statesman and historian, on March 9, 1905, Roosevelt said that six weeks earlier he had written to the Russian government, and later expressed the same idea through the French government, advising Russia to make peace. He had told Russia that unless they were confident of turning defeat into victory they should make peace, because Japan would give more favorable peace terms at that time; in a letter to King Edward of England the same day, Roosevelt expressed the same idea again.<sup>9</sup>

Roosevelt told John Hay by letter March 30, 1905, that both Takahira, the Japanese Minister to the United States, and Count Cassini, the Russian Ambassador to the United States, had been to see him about peace negotiations. Roosevelt said that very little progress had been made as neither one wanted to make the first advances. Cassini told the President that he personally wanted peace but that his country wanted to continue the war. Roosevelt said it appeared that no other country wanted to act as peacemaker

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(8) Ibid., p. 446.

(9) Joseph Bucklin Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Times, New York, 1920, II, 376.

(10) Ibid., p. 377.

and he told Hay that he wished anyone besides himself would act in that capacity.<sup>10</sup>

Roosevelt wrote Speck von Sternberg, the German Ambassador, March 31, 1905. He assured the Ambassador that he, like the Kaiser, opposed the peace negotiations being considered in a congress of nations, adding that like views were held by the British and Japanese governments. Roosevelt said he had again advised the Russian Ambassador to make peace.<sup>11</sup>

The President reviewed the progress behind the scenes in a letter to Secretary Hay on April 2, 1905. He had seen Cassini twice; Takahira, Durand, the British Ambassador to the United States, and Jusserand, the French Minister to the United States, once each; and Speck von Sternberg three or four times during the week past. The information gleaned from these interviews was to the effect that the Kaiser was worried because he did not want a congress of powers to make peace; that Germany and Great Britain distrusted each other, each suspecting the other of an unfriendly alliance; that although the Russian government had announced officially that they wished to extend the war, Ambassador Cassini said that undoubtedly Russia would make peace on honorable terms; Takahira said that Japan would ask for an indemnity, and Roosevelt added that if

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(10) Ibid., p. 377.

(11) Ibid., pp. 377-78.

Japan continued winning, she would probably demand a still greater indemnity.<sup>12</sup>

France, the ally of Russia, made the first suggestion of mediation on the occasion of a diplomatic reception April 5, 1905. Delcassé in talking with the Japanese Minister, Montrono, suggested that he thought he could bring Russia and Japan together in an effort to negotiate peace if Japan would not ask for any Russian territory or an indemnity. Japan seemed pleased that France was interested in helping make peace, and asked Delcassé if he could confirm his belief that Russia was sincere in her desire to make peace. Delcassé answered in the affirmative. Japan pointed out, however, that they were being asked to agree to certain conditions previous to the negotiations, while Russia was not making any pledge.<sup>13</sup>

The Japanese government considered the French overture for over a week, then Komura through Takahira informed Roosevelt about the offer. Their message went to Secretary Taft who was in charge of diplomatic affairs while President Roosevelt was in the west on a speaking tour and hunting trip. Takahira asked Taft to relay the information to the President immediately.<sup>14</sup> Taft did so, keeping the communication strictly confidential as Takahira requested.

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(12) Ibid., pp. 378-79.

(13) Dennett, op. cit., pp. 174-75.

(14) Ibid., p. 175.

Takahira said to explain that "the Japanese have no intentions to close the door to friendly offices exerted purely for the purpose of bringing the belligerents together."<sup>15</sup> Komura relayed further through Takahira that the good offices of some power might be necessary, though he held the opinion, as he thought President Roosevelt did, that it would be unwise to depart from direct negotiations regarding the peace.

President Roosevelt answered the letter from Taft on April 20, 1905, reemphasizing his belief that peace should be direct between Russia and Japan. He did not mention what he thought the terms of peace should be except to say that Japan should maintain her policy of the Open Door in Manchuria and of restoring it to China.<sup>16</sup>

This information was sent on to Komura, who answered Roosevelt's letter April 25, 1905. Komura declared that Japan was in favor of the Open Door in Manchuria and of restoring Manchuria to China. He said the Japanese government would be gratified if Roosevelt would make any suggestions "in regard to the steps to be taken or the measures to be adopted by Japan in order to pave the way for the inauguration of such negotiations."<sup>17</sup>

The Japanese seemed to be getting anxious to make peace. Lloyd C. Griscom, the United States Minister to

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(15) Barnes, the assistant secretary of war, to Loeb, the President's secretary, Ibid., pp. 176-77.

(16) Roosevelt to Taft, Ibid., p. 178.

(17) Barnes to Loeb, Ibid., pp. 179-80.



Japan, wrote that Dennison of the Japanese Foreign office said that Japan was eager to make peace through Roosevelt. Takahira asked again for strict secrecy about all communications. Taft asked Roosevelt if it would be wise to begin negotiations through Jusserand, the French Ambassador to the United States. Japanese officials were seemingly less insistent on a money settlement and also were willing to avoid a naval battle.<sup>18</sup>

Roosevelt was not satisfied with the way negotiations were progressing so he decided to return to Washington one week sooner than he had planned. He told Taft to ask Takahira if it would be advisable for Taft to see Cassini and tell him that the President on his own motion directed Taft to see whether the two countries could not get together and negotiate direct.<sup>19</sup> Roosevelt told Taft that if he did see Cassini on this question he should suggest that the representatives should have a free talk as a preliminary without any intermediary.<sup>20</sup>

Secretary Taft sent Roosevelt Komura's answer with a comment on his interview with Takahira. Komura expressed appreciation to Roosevelt for shortening his vacation in the interest of peace. Komura said that the Japanese government doubted whether Roosevelt's plan would be successful because of the views and temperament of Count Cassini.

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(18) Ibid.

(19) Roosevelt to Taft, April 27, 1905, Bishop, op. cit., p. 380.

(20) Ibid.

Komura stated that his government believed, like Roosevelt, that the time had come when the question of peace could be hoped for in the near future. Komura said that they expected to be able to give Roosevelt a plan of procedure by the time he returned to Washington.<sup>21</sup> In his interview with Taft, Takahira intimated that Japan wanted to make peace before they had a "naval battle in order that Russia might make peace with honor."<sup>22</sup>

Takahira had told his government that popular sentiment in the United States would support an indemnity and territorial demand. Takahira had begun to doubt the advisability of an indemnity and said that Roosevelt's opinion of the question of territory and indemnity would bear strength in Japan. He wanted to know Roosevelt's idea about the situation in Japan. Takahira said that the country was divided, some in favor of peace and others in favor of continuing the war. Personally he thought Japan had accomplished her war aims when she drove the Russians out of Manchuria and gained control of the railroad.<sup>23</sup>

It is evident that Taft had telegraphed Roosevelt the results of the interview previous to this letter.<sup>24</sup>

On April 30, 1905, Roosevelt answered that he agreed with the Japanese that the peace terms should be direct.

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(21) Taft to Roosevelt, May 2, 1905, Dennett, op. cit., pp. 183-84.

(22) Ibid., p. 184.

(23) Ibid.

(24) Bishop, op. cit., p. 380.

I heartily agree with the Japanese terms of peace, in so far as they include Japan having control over Korea, retaining possession of Port Arthur and Dalney, and operating the Harbin, Mukden, Port Arthur Railway, while restoring Manchuria to China with the guarantee of the Open Door. As to the proposed indemnity and the cession of Russian territory I am not yet prepared to express myself definitely; and indeed, do not as yet feel called upon to express myself definitely.<sup>25</sup>

Roosevelt returned to Washington May 13 but found no new indications of peace.<sup>26</sup> That day he wrote to Spring Rice, expressing a desire for Germany and England to be more friendly. In this same letter the President considered what results the Russian fleet would have in eastern waters, saying the Russian fleet was materially somewhat stronger than the Japanese, but that he believed this would be more than offset by Japanese superiority in morals and training.<sup>27</sup> Roosevelt's judgment was proved right when the Japanese completely defeated the Russian fleet in the battle of the Sea of Japan, May 26 and 27.<sup>28</sup>

Roosevelt went on to say in this letter that he wished the Japanese and Russians had made peace after the battle of Mukden. He had told the Japanese officials before that a continuation of the war would cost more than any indemnity she could collect, but that he thought, "Just at this time, Russia is riding a high horse and will not talk

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(25) Ibid., pp. 380-81.

(26) Ibid., p. 381.

(27) Gwynn, op. cit., pp. 469-71.

(28) Paul Hibbert Clyde, A History of the Modern and Contemporary Far East, New York, 1937, p. 396.

peace."<sup>29</sup>

In writing to George Otto Trevelyan on May 13, Roosevelt said that he liked the Russian people but found those men at the head of the government untrustworthy. He said that the Japanese would be a valuable factor in the civilization of the future. He thought, though, that the Japanese would be prejudiced against the white race.<sup>30</sup> In this letter he stated, "It is evident that Japan is now anxious to have me try to make peace."<sup>31</sup>

Komura wrote to Roosevelt through Takahira a letter asking him to act as mediator. Komura said that since they had just completely destroyed the Russian navy they expected Russia to be desirous of making peace, and that Japan was ready to negotiate peace directly after some neutral power in whom the Japanese had confidence had brought them together for that purpose. He hoped that the President would be disposed to undertake this service and "entirely of his own motion and initiative to invite the two belligerents to come together for the purpose of direct negotiation."<sup>32</sup> It was to be understood that this letter was neither a direct nor an indirect approach to Russia on the subject of peace. Komura said he was willing to leave it to President Roosevelt to decide on a course of procedure and whether

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(29) Gwynn, op. cit., pp. 469-71.

(30) Bishop, op. cit., p. 381.

(31) Roosevelt to Lodge, May 15, 1905, Ibid.

(32) Dennett, op. cit., p. 215.

he would consult other powers about the suggested invitation.

Roosevelt saw Cassini, the Russian Ambassador, soon after receiving this communication, and asked him to tell the Tsar that he thought Russia could not win the war and they should make peace. He said further that if he could get the consent of Russia and Japan he would like to have them meet and reconcile their differences. Roosevelt felt certain that he could get Japan to consent if Russia would.<sup>33</sup>

Meyer, who had been transferred as Ambassador in Italy to Russia, communicated (June 2, 1905) with Mr. Adee, the Assistant United States Secretary of State, about conditions in Russia. The Russian press laid the blame for misfortune of war on the Bureaucracy and asked the people to say what should be done. Meyer predicted some reform by the government.<sup>34</sup>

The Kaiser informed Roosevelt June 3, 1905, that he thought Russia should make peace. He promised that he would tacitly support any peace effort that Roosevelt might make.<sup>35</sup>

Mr. Tower, the United States Ambassador to Germany, wired Roosevelt the substance of a note from the Kaiser, the same day. The Kaiser said that when news of the recent defeat of the Russian fleet reached St. Petersburg, the life of the Tsar would be in danger.<sup>36</sup>

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(33) Bishop, op. cit., p. 384.

(34) Dennett, op. cit., p. 217.

(35) Bishop, op. cit., 384.

(36) Dennett, op. cit., p. 217.

The Kaiser wrote to the Tsar June 3, urging him to make peace immediately, impressing upon him the fact that the Japanese respected the Americans and their President and that he would appeal to Roosevelt to bring the Japanese to reasonable proposals. The Kaiser suggested that the Tsar communicate with Roosevelt either through Meyer or himself.<sup>37</sup>

Upon receiving the note from the Kaiser on June 3, Tower had a personal interview with him. The Kaiser again expressed fear for the life of the Tsar. With apprehension he pictured the disastrous results to the world as well as to Russia if the Tsar should die, as this would leave his throne to an infant heir and necessitate a long regency under a Grand Duke.<sup>38</sup>

The Kaiser's suggestion did not satisfy Roosevelt. He did not want to bring pressure against Japan to make certain peace terms to suit Russia. He felt that he could not trust Cassini or Lamsdorff, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, so he instructed Meyer to see the Tsar in person.<sup>39</sup>

President Roosevelt directed Meyer as follows, that he should: (1) call on the Tsar at once, telling him that he did so at the request of the President, to press upon him the advisability of sending representatives to meet with the Japanese representatives to see if peace could

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(37) Kaiser to the Tsar, Bishop, op. cit., p. 385.

(38) Tower to Roosevelt, Dennett, op. cit., p. 219.

(39) Roosevelt to Meyer, Bishop, op. cit., p. 385.

not be made; (2) tell the Tsar that all the powers believed Russia's cause was lost and that if the war went on she would lose all her possessions in the Far East; (3) say that he [Roosevelt] thought that representatives of the two countries should meet direct without any intermediary; (4) tell the Tsar that an intermediary power would arrange to have the representatives meet if both sides consented. After the meeting there should be plenty of time to confer or get suggestions from any outside friend as to what the peace terms should be.<sup>40</sup>

If Russia will consent to such a meeting the President will try to get Japan's consent, acting simply on his own initiative and not saying that Russia has consented, and the President believes he will succeed.<sup>41</sup>

The President agreed to keep the answer and all communications secret until Japan agreed. Roosevelt then would send out identical letters asking each government to agree to meet, after which they could meet. Roosevelt suggested that they meet some place between Harbin and Mukden.<sup>42</sup>

The following day Meyer had a private interview with the Tsar. Had Meyer not carried important news from the President he would have had to wait till the following day to see the Tsar as this day was the Tsarina's birthday. Meyer delivered the President's message orally first but when the Tsar asked for time to consider, he read it sentence by sentence.

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(40) Dennett, op. cit., pp. 221-22.

(41) Ibid.

(42) Ibid.

Meyer then summed up conditions in Russia to impress the Tsar with the need to make peace. Finally the Tsar confessed that Meyer had come at a psychological time as Japan had not been on Russian soil yet. The Tsar said that it was important that the meeting to make peace take place before that happened.<sup>43</sup>

In his letter informing the President of the Tsar's answer, Meyer said that the Tsar was convinced that the people would support him in continuing the war. Nevertheless, he authorized Meyer to say that he accepted and consented to the President's instructions as sent by Meyer; that is, if the President on his own initiative would get the consent of the Japanese to send plenipotentiaries to meet with the Russian plenipotentiaries without intermediary to endeavor to make peace, he would consent. The Tsar felt that it was very necessary to keep his acceptance secret until Japan had accepted. The President would then ask both powers to agree to meet. The Tsar expressed his confidence in the President and hoped the old friendship would return between them.<sup>44</sup>

The opposite orders were sent to Count Cassini on June 6, 1905. Cassini said that Meyer must have misunderstood the Tsar's answer. He showed a communication from Lamsdorff saying that the Tsar would not ask for mediation

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(43) M. A. DeWolfe Howe, George von Lengerke Meyer His Life and Public Services, New York, 1920, pp. 157-62.

(44) Ibid.



but would accept the efforts of a friendly country which might be able to cause Japan to moderate terms and get her views. Lamsdorff verified Meyer's report, however, on the exchange of a cable message.<sup>45</sup>

Having received favorable answers from both Japan and Russia, Roosevelt sent identical notes to each country through Ambassadors Meyer and Griscom. The notes were as follows:

The President feels that the time has come when, in the interest of all mankind, he must endeavor to see if it is not possible to bring to an end the terrible and lamentable conflict now being waged. With both Russia and Japan the United States has inherited ties of friendship and good will. It hopes for the prosperity and welfare of each, and it feels that the progress of the world is set back by the war between these two great nations. The President accordingly urges the Russian and Japanese Governments, not only for their own sakes, but in the interest of the whole civilized world, to open direct negotiations for peace with one another. The President suggests that these peace negotiations be conducted directly and exclusively between the belligerents--in other words, that there may be a meeting of Russian and Japanese plenipotentiaries or delegates without any intermediary, in order to see if it is not possible for these representatives of the two powers to agree to terms of peace. The President earnestly asks that the Russian Government do now agree to such meeting, and is asking the Japanese Government likewise to agree. While the President does not feel that any intermediary should be called in in respect to the peace negotiations themselves, he is entirely willing to do what he properly can if the two powers concerned feel that his services will be of aid in arranging the preliminaries as to the time and place of meeting; but if even these preliminaries can be arranged directly between the two powers, or in any other way, the President will be glad, as his sole purpose is to bring about a meeting which the whole civilized world will pray may result in peace.<sup>46</sup>

The Japanese government answered favorably to Mr.

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(45) Dennett, op. cit., p. 195.

(46) Loomis to Meyer, June 8, 1905, Foreign Relations 1905, p. 307.

Roosevelt's communication on June 8, two days later. The message said that Japan, after very serious consideration, had concluded that in the interest of the peace of the world at large as well as of Japan, the Imperial Government agreed to

appoint plenipotentiaries of Japan to meet plenipotentiaries of Russia at such time and place as may be found to be mutually agreeable and convenient, for the purpose of negotiating and concluding terms of peace directly and exclusively between the two belligerent powers.<sup>47</sup>

On June 12, 1905, the Russian answer was received. Count Lamsdorff answered Roosevelt's communication using the President's very words to express reply. The Emperor, he said, was pleased to have Roosevelt's note, further proof of the friendship of the United States and Russia. The Tsar was glad that Roosevelt expressed a like desire as his for universal peace.

With regard to the eventual meeting of Russian and Japanese plenipotentiaries "in order to see if it is not possible for the two powers to agree to terms of peace," the Imperial Government has no objection in principle to this endeavor if the Japanese Government expresses the desire.<sup>48</sup>

By comparing the two replies of acceptance, it can be seen that the Russians were more evasive. They accepted in Roosevelt's own words and did not make any definite commitment.

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(47) Griscom to the Secretary of State, *Ibid.*, p. 809.

(48) Lamsdorff to Meyer, June 12, 1905, *Ibid.*, p. 811.

### Chapter III

#### PEACE TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

In the identical letters sent to Russia and Japan by President Roosevelt June 8, 1905, he had asked that Russia and Japan send plenipotentiaries to meet and make peace.<sup>1</sup> He told them that he was entirely willing to do what he properly could if the two powers concerned felt that his services would be of aid in arranging the preliminaries as to the time and place of meeting.<sup>2</sup>

At first Russia proposed to meet at Paris, and Japan proposed Chefoo. Since each country had proposed a different place, Roosevelt suggested the Hague. Japan objected to going to any European city and suggested that they assemble in some city in the United States.<sup>3</sup> In the meantime, Cassini told Roosevelt that his government preferred Washington to the Hague if Paris was objectionable for any reason. Russia desired Washington "especially since the presence of the President, initiator of the meeting, can exercise a beneficent influence toward the end we all have in view."<sup>4</sup>

Lamsdorff tried to change the meeting place June 16, 1905, even though he had instructed Cassini to accept

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(1) Chapter II, p. 27.

(2) Foreign Relations 1905, p. 807.

(3) Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, Garden City, 1925, p. 199.

(4) Ibid., p. 228.

Washington. He told Meyer that he objected to Washington because of the great distance from Russia, the extreme summer heat, and because the Russian Ambassador, Cassini, was being replaced.<sup>5</sup> Meyer assured Lamsdorff that this desire for a change of the place of meeting was out of order since the President had waited until both countries had agreed before accepting any city.<sup>6</sup>

Roosevelt wrote Meyer June 16, 1905, that he had announced publicly that Washington would be the meeting place and he regarded the selection settled. Roosevelt told Meyer that if Lamsdorff refused to accept Washington, he should see the Tsar and explain that it would be impossible to change meeting places.<sup>7</sup>

In a letter June 18, 1905, Meyer wrote that he had just received word from Lamsdorff that "His Majesty the Emperor sees no objection to the choice of Washington as a place of conference for the Russian and Japanese plenipotentiaries."<sup>8</sup>

As previously stated Russia answered the President's invitation to make peace in exactly his own words. This was interpreted by Japan as suggesting that the Russians might send men of an inferior rank without power to make

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(5) Ibid., p. 228.

(6) Ibid.

(7) Ibid., p. 226.

(8) Meyer to Roosevelt, June 18, 1905, Foreign Relations 1905, p. 811.

peace.<sup>9</sup>

Experience has taught the necessity of caution, and the Japanese Government thought that by securing at the outset a common understanding upon the subject they would preclude possibility of any difficulty arising in the initial stage of negotiations and would smooth the way for the real work of the negotiators...<sup>10</sup>

The Japanese said they would accept the President's opinion of the Russian intentions. They said they would appoint plenipotentiaries in time to be in Washington by the tenth of August, "with full powers to negotiate and conclude terms of peace."<sup>11</sup>

The Secretary of State suggested on June 23 that he have the Russian government send the names of her probable plenipotentiaries to President Roosevelt, who planned to exchange the names at Washington before he publicly announced them.<sup>12</sup>

Because of fear by the Japanese of trickery, Roosevelt asked that at the time of appointment the Russians announce that "they are named plenipotentiaries to negotiate and conclude a treaty of peace with Japan."<sup>13</sup>

All of the other arrangements were to be completed before the question of an armistice would be raised.<sup>14</sup>

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(9) Griscom to Secretary of State, June 18, 1905, Ibid., pp. 811-12.

(10) Ibid.

(11) Ibid.

(12) Secretary of State to Meyer, June 25, 1905, Ibid., 812.

(13) Ibid.

(14) Ibid.

Secretary Hay wrote Meyer to see if the Russians could meet the first ten days in August, 1905.<sup>15</sup> The Minister of Foreign Affairs for Russia answered in the affirmative, although the Tsar thought the date rather distant.<sup>16</sup>

Roosevelt urged both countries to send their most capable men. He kept each country informed about who he thought would be appointed by the other power.

Mr. Roosevelt wrote Meyer July 1, 1905, that he would make public the names of the plenipotentiaries on the following Monday.<sup>17</sup> The Japanese appointed Baron Jutaro Komura and Kogoro Takahira, while Russia at length selected Sergius Witte and Baron Rosen.<sup>18</sup>

The Tsar had first appointed Nelidov, the Russian Ambassador to France, who did not accept the commission. Then Mouravieff, the Russian Ambassador to Paris, was selected, but was taken ill and forced to decline. Finally the Tsar appointed Sergius Witte, former Minister of Finance.<sup>19</sup> The other official delegate was the Russian Ambassador at Washington, Baron Rosen.

Besides the two main delegates, a force of secretaries, international law experts, and newspaper correspondents

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(15) Secretary of State to Meyer, June 24, 1905, Ibid., p. 813.

(16) Meyer to Secretary of State, June 29, 1905, Ibid., p. 815.

(17) Roosevelt to Meyer, July 1, 1905, Ibid., p. 815.

(18) Ibid., pp. 814-17.

(19) Meyer to Secretary of State, July 13, 1905, Ibid. p. 819.

were sent to the conference.<sup>20</sup>

Baron Jutaro Komura, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Kogoro Takahira, the Japanese Ambassador at Washington, headed the Japanese delegation. They were accompanied by a staff of assistants.<sup>21</sup>

Roosevelt, having kept in close communication with William II, informed him of his efforts to make peace between Russia and Japan. In answer to a communication received from Roosevelt on June 7, the Kaiser agreed with the President's views regarding the peace, and said he had done everything possible to second his action. He said that as far as he could tell, all countries on the continent were hoping that his plan would succeed. "There is but one power, not on our continent, which I am afraid will hold aloof and create difficulties..." [England].<sup>22</sup>

(20) Foreign Relations 1905, op. cit., pp. 819-20. These included: Th. Martens, privy counselor, member of the counsel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; J. Schipoff, privy counselor, chief of the treasury division at the Ministry of Finance; Major-General Ermoloff, Colonel Samoiloff, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Russia at Peking, and Prince Koudacheff, formerly first secretary of the legation of Russia to Japan. These men were designated as special delegates.

(21) Ibid., p. 817. Those accompanying Baron Komura: H. W. Dennison, legal adviser to the foreign office; Aimaro Sato, minister resident; Yenjiro Yamoza, director of the political bureau in the foreign office; Mineichiro Adachi, first secretary of legation, counselor in the foreign office; Colonel Tachibana, military attache to the Japanese legation in Washington; Kumataro Honda, secretary in the foreign office and private secretary to the minister of foreign affairs; Kotaro Konishi, attache of legation.

(22) Dennett, op. cit., p. 233.

A few days later the Kaiser answered Roosevelt's letter telling him how pleased he was with Roosevelt's diplomatic action. He said that Germany was interested because the Kaiser had every reason to believe that if Roosevelt's plan failed that

M. Delcassé had formed a plan by which peace was to be made between Russia and Japan through the mediation of France and England, and that under it, an arrangement was contemplated by which not only Russia and Japan were to obtain portions of China, but that France and England were also to be indemnified by Chinese territory as a price of their intervention.<sup>23</sup>

The Kaiser felt that England would like to see the war go on and be ended in this manner. In conferring this message to Tower for the Kaiser, Prince von Bulow added that the German Emperor constantly kept in close personal correspondence with the Tsar, urging him to support Roosevelt's efforts and using the strongest arguments to encourage him to cooperate with the plan.<sup>24</sup> Von Bulow imparted this information in strictest confidence, saying that should the fact about this correspondence be known the whole country would turn against the Tsar, causing failure of the plans immediately.<sup>25</sup>

It might be well here to say that the correspondence mentioned was made public by the Bolshevists after the Russian Revolution. In one of these letters the Tsar revealed that he had heard about the President's plan from

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(23) Ibid., p. 234.

(24) Ibid., p. 235.

(25) Ibid.



the Kaiser before it was officially presented to him by Ambassador Meyer. He went on to say that he had accepted Meyer's proposition only after receiving the latter's promise of complete secrecy. Then of course he could break off negotiations if the demands were too great.<sup>26</sup>

After settling the meeting place, announcing the date of meeting, and making public the names of the representatives, Roosevelt, at the request of the Russian government (made June 30, 1905) asked Japan for an armistice. The Japanese refused for fear that "magnanimity on her part would be misinterpreted and turned to bad account against her."<sup>27</sup>

The President succeeded in getting a copy of Japan's terms before the delegates met. At his suggestion the term which provided for Vladivostok to be dismantled and to be made essentially a commercial port, and for Japan to have the right to station a consul there, was never presented at the conference. Also at his suggestion a different phrase was substituted for the word "indemnity".<sup>28</sup>

Roosevelt decided to hold the meeting away from the city of Washington because of the summer heat there. Newport was considered, but rejected, for the people there might be partial to the Russians, as members of the white race,

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(26) Herman Bernstein, The Willy-Nicky Correspondence, New York, 1918, p. 103.

(27) Dennett, op. cit., pp. 399-400.

(28) Ibid., pp. 232, 244.

and thus offend the Japanese.<sup>29</sup> It was finally decided to meet at the Naval Yard at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The Portsmouth Naval Yard is on an island in the Piscataqua river, but within the township of Kittery, Maine.<sup>30</sup> The plenipotentiaries lived at the Wentworth Hotel at New Castle, New Hampshire.<sup>31</sup> Portsmouth had in reality nothing to do with the peace conference except that the inhabitants could see the peace commissioners twice a day motoring through its streets.<sup>32</sup>

Before the actual meeting of the delegates, Roosevelt had several conferences with Baron Kaneko, who was "generally recognized as the confidential agent of the Mikado in this country."<sup>33</sup> The President also had a talk with Baron Rosen upon his arrival.

On Saturday, August 5, 1905, President Roosevelt entertained the plenipotentiaries on his yacht, the Mayflower. The Japanese were brought to the reception on the Tacoma and the Russians on her sister ship the Chattanooga. This

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(29) The Memoirs of Count Witte, Translated from the Original Russian Manuscripts and Edited by Abraham Yarmolinsky, Garden City, 1921, p. 147.

(30) "Portsmouth," The Encyclopaedia Britannica, A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, Literature, and General Information, XXII, 132-33.

(31) Louis E. van Norman, "The Making of a Modern Treaty of Peace," The American Review of Reviews, XXXII (October, 1905) p. 420.

(32) Baron Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy, New York, 1924, I, 262.

(33) --"The Progress of the World," The American Monthly Review of Reviews, XXXII (September, 1905). pp. 259-61.

(34) Ibid.

meeting was a test of Roosevelt's tact and diplomacy. The guests were served by Chinese waiters;<sup>34</sup> supper was arranged buffet style with the guests standing, to prevent having the touchy problem of seating order.<sup>35</sup>

After the reception the men sailed to Portsmouth, the Russians in the Mayflower and the Japanese in the Dolphin escorted by the cruiser Galveston.<sup>36</sup>

President Roosevelt sent Mr. Herbert D. Pierce, third assistant Secretary of State, to Portsmouth to represent him at the conference.<sup>37</sup>

The first session of the conference was held at the naval building, later called the Peace Building, August 9, 1905 at ten o'clock.<sup>38</sup> The plenipotentiaries agreed to the use of both English and French. They further agreed that the official treaty would be in French if one were made.<sup>39</sup>

Contrary to the custom practiced before this time, Japan did not inform Russia ahead of the conference the exact terms she was going to ask.<sup>40</sup> We know as previously

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(34) Ibid.

(35) Count Sergius Witte, "Memoirs, My Visit to America and the Portsmouth Peace Conference," The World's Work, XLI (March, 1921), p. 488.

(36) "The Progress of the World," loc. cit.

(37) Ibid.

(38) Ibid., p. 264.

(39) Ibid.

(40) E. J. Dillon, "The Official Narrative of the Peace Conference," Harper's Weekly, XLIX, pt. 2 (September 16, 1905), pp. 1334-37.

stated that Roosevelt had seen a copy of Japan's terms.

On August 10 the Japanese presented their terms according to twelve points:

(1) Russia, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, military, and economical interests, to engage not to obstruct or interfere with any measures of guidance, protection, and control which Japan finds it necessary to take in Korea.

(2) Engagement on the part of Russia to completely evacuate Manchuria within a period to be specified, and to relinquish all territorial advantages and all preferential and exclusive concessions and franchises in that region in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.

(3) Japan to engage to restore to China, subject to the guarantee of reform and improved administration, all those portions of Manchuria which are in her occupation saving only the regions affected by the lease of the Liao-tung Peninsula.

(4) Japan and Russia reciprocally to engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce and industries of Manchuria.

(5) Sakalin and all islands appertaining thereto and all public works and properties to be ceded to Japan.

(6) The lease of Port Arthur, Talien, and adjacent territory and territorial waters, together with all rights, privileges, concessions, and franchises acquired by Russia from China, in connection with or as a part of such lease and all public works and properties to be transferred and assigned to Japan.

(7) Russia to assign and transfer to Japan, free of all claims and encumbrances, the railway between Harbin and Port Arthur and all its branches, together with all rights, privileges, and properties appertaining thereto, and all coal-mines belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway.

(8) Russia to retain and work the Trans-Manchurian Railway, subject to the terms and conditions of the concession under which it is constructed, and subject also to the condition that it is to be employed exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes.

(9) Russia to reimburse to Japan the actual expenses of the war. The amount as well as the time and manner of such reimbursement to be agreed upon.

(10) All Russian ships of war which, in consequence of damage received in battle, sought asylum in neutral ports and were there interned, to be surrendered to Japan as lawful prizes.

(11) Russia to engage to limit her naval strength in the waters of the Extreme East.

(12) Russia to grant to Japanese subjects full fishery rights along the coast and in the bays, harbors, inlets, and rivers of her possessions in the Japan, Okhotsk, and Bering seas.<sup>41</sup>

Two days later, August 12, 1905, the Russian delegates gave their reply to the twelve points. With only minor differences the Russians accepted articles one, two, three, four, six, seven, eight, and twelve. They agreed in part to articles ten and eleven, but disagreed altogether on points five and nine. Since these two points so nearly caused the conference to fail, parts of the Russian objections to each are quoted.<sup>42</sup>

Regarding point 5: The ancient rights of Russia to the island of Sakhalin already existed at a period when Japan did not possess, or, at any rate, did not exercise any right of property over the larger part of this island. On the other hand, Sakhalin is but the natural continuation of Russian possessions in Asia in as much as this island is divided from the continent by very shallow straits seven versts broad.<sup>43</sup>

Regarding point 9: Russia is unable to consent to the stipulation of this clause. None but vanquished countries reimburse war costs. And Russia is not vanquished. No country could acknowledge itself

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(41) Ibid.

(42) Ibid.

(43) Ibid.

vanquished whose territory has scarcely been attacked by the enemy.<sup>44</sup>

The plenipotentiaries finally agreed to record their divergence and to pass on to the other articles, coming back to these after they had dealt with all the others.<sup>45</sup>

On August 18, 1905, Speck von Sternberg wrote Roosevelt that England and France planned to offer their good services to bring the conflict to an end if the conference should fail. Sternberg said that it was believed in Germany that France and England were "not waiting for the dissolution of the conference," but would "take advantage of the first hitch so as to place themselves in your [Roosevelt's] position."<sup>46</sup>

It was on August 18, 1905 that the delegates again directed their attention to the disputed points. They could not agree and the conference seemed to be deadlocked; however, Witte and Komura had had a personal conference at which a compromise was considered.<sup>47</sup> It is a disputable point as to which offered the compromise.

Komura told Kaneko to ask Roosevelt not to intervene<sup>49</sup> but his request came too late as the President had already,

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(44) Ibid.

(45) Ibid.

(46) Dennett, op. cit., p. 265.

(47) "The Progress of the World," op. cit., p. 264.

(48) Dennett, op. cit., pp. 250-51.

(49) Ibid., pp. 250-51.

early on August 19, 1905, summoned Baron Rosen to Oyster Bay.<sup>50</sup> Roosevelt asked Rosen to send a compromise plan to the Tsar.<sup>51</sup>

This plan was explained when Roosevelt wrote Meyer August 21, 1905, asking him to see the Tsar and deliver a message. Roosevelt said that as a well-wisher of Russia he was offering his advice. He said that Japan had given up points ten and eleven for the limitation of Russian naval power in the Pacific and for possession of the Russian interned ships in neutral ports. He thought they should have given in on these two points but he found that the

Japanese are willing to restore the northern half of Sakhalin to Russia, Russia of course, in such case to pay a substantial sum for the surrender of the territory by the Japanese and for the return of Russian prisoners.<sup>52</sup>

The President said he thought it would be a calamity to continue the war if peace could be had on such just and honorable terms. If an agreement could be made on these two points then the amount could be a subject for negotiation. Roosevelt thought it would be a financial strain on Japan to continue the war but Russia was sure to be driven out of her Eastern Siberian provinces. The only change of territory if peace were made now would be that Japan would get that part of Sakhalin which was

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(50) Rosen, op. cit., p. 269.

(51) Ibid.

(52) Herman Bernstein, Celebrities of Our Time, New York, 1924, p. 327-29.

hers thirty years before. Roosevelt had Meyer point out all advantages that Russia would have by accepting this modification made by Japan on points five and nine and making peace at that time.<sup>53</sup>

August 22, 1905, President Roosevelt wrote Kentaro Kaneko, a Harvard law graduate who was an unofficial delegate to the peace conference,<sup>54</sup> explaining that he had heard much complaint over the prospects of Japan continuing the war for a large money indemnity. He said that American sentiment would turn against Japan under such terms. Roosevelt suggested that if Japan was willing to retrocede the northern half of Sakhalin, surely she could make enough to repay her in part. He thought six hundred million was too great a sum. Of course Roosevelt said he was willing for Japan to collect any amount that Russia would pay but that if she refused he thought there would be nothing gained by continuing the war except bloodshed and expense. He said this letter was strictly confidential but he would like for Kaneko to cable it to his home office at once.<sup>55</sup>

On this same day the Tsar sent Witte the following order:

the negotiations are being broken off because of the intractability of the Japanese as regards the

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(53) Ibid.

(54) Melville E. Stone, Fifty Years a Journalist, London, 1922, p. 286.

(55) The Memoirs of Count Witte, op. cit., p. 156.



question of indemnity; we must stop then and there.<sup>56</sup>

In a supplementary letter written to Kaneko the following day, August 23, 1905, Roosevelt said the Japanese should make peace "for two reasons: 1, self-interest, 2, the interest of the world, to which she owes a certain duty."<sup>57</sup> Roosevelt then offered two sets of reasons for making peace even without getting a money indemnity:

(1) It is Japan's interest now to close the war. She has won the control of Korea and Manchuria, she has doubled her own fleet in destroying that of Russia, she has Port Arthur, Dalney, the Manchurian railroad, she has Sakhalin. It is not worth her while to continue; it would probably eat up more money than she could at the end get back from Russia. She will be wise now to close the war in triumph, and to take her seat as a leading member at the council table of the nations.

(2) Ethically it seems to me that Japan owes a duty to the world at this crisis. The civilized world looks to her to make peace, the nations believe in her, let her show her leadership in matters ethical no less than matters military. The appeal is made to her in the name of all that is lofty and noble, and to this appeal I hope she will not be deaf.<sup>58</sup>

According to a letter, Meyer to Roosevelt, August 23, 1905, the Tsar received Meyer at four o'clock in the afternoon, for an interview of two hours. At the end of the talk, the Tsar said he would make peace if he

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(56) Ibid.

(57) Stephen Gwynn, The Letters and Friendships of Cecil Spring Rice, Cambridge, 1929, II, 488-89.

(58) Ibid.

believed it to be honorable and lasting, but he would not pay a war indemnity. He agreed to pay a generous amount for the care and maintenance of the Russian prisoners but not such a sum as could be interpreted as a war indemnity. He would agree for Japan to retain the southern half of Sakhalin island with Russia retaining the northern half. He insisted that Japan give up her claim for the interned ships and limitation of naval power in the Pacific. The Emperor expressed his thanks for the President's efforts in behalf of peace.<sup>59</sup>

In a letter written on August 25, 1905, Meyer explained more thoroughly his interview with the Tsar. He said that Roosevelt's original instructions reached him first at 8 a. m. August 22. Only a part of the message was delivered. Meyer said he thought the remainder of the message was held up purposely, and that he was sure the Russian officials had read the message, because they had the American code.<sup>60</sup> The fact that the Emperor knew where to turn in Meyer's translation of the message to find the phrase "substantial sum" was evidence that he had a knowledge of the contents of the code message. Meyer believed that the Emperor and other important officials had held a conference until late the previous night at Peterhof.<sup>61</sup> During the interview

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(59) Dennett, op. cit., pp. 270-71.

(60) M. A. De Wolfe Howe, George von Lengerke Meyer His Life and Public Services, New York, 1920, pp. 197-98.

(61) Ibid.

the Emperor read Meyer a part of a telegram he had sent to the Kaiser that morning, saying that "much as he wanted peace it must be an honorable one for Russia and therefore he could not give up Russian territory or pay a war indemnity in any form."<sup>62</sup>

Meyer presented his argument in favor of these concessions on the part of the Tsar but it was evident that the Tsar had made promises to his government officials not to concede anything. Meyer said he believed that the Emperor would have favored Roosevelt's suggestions if the ministers and influential men had not seen him first, after they had intercepted Roosevelt's message.<sup>63</sup>

After the two hour interview the Tsar informed Meyer of the terms upon which he would make peace.

Acceptance of the eight points substantially agreed upon by the plenipotentiaries at Portsmouth, no payment of war indemnity but a liberal and generous payment for care and maintenance of Russian prisoners but not such a sum as could be interpreted for a war indemnity, withdrawal of Japan's claims for interned ships and limitations of naval power in the Pacific, Russia to possess north half of Sakhalin while Japan was to retain southern half.<sup>64</sup>

After the President received Meyer's cable stating the results of his interview with Tsar Nicholas, he sent

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(62) Ibid. It was at this interview that the Emperor remarked "that it was quite a coincidence that each time I [Meyer] came to see the Emperor he had a telegram from the German Emperor (in their private code) urging him to make peace." This really was not a coincidence since Roosevelt was having the Kaiser exert his influence on each occasion.

(63) Ibid.

(64) Ibid.

Meyer another cable, asking him to make it clear to the Tsar that if he accepted Roosevelt's terms then the whole question as to what a "reasonable amount to be paid for the retrocession of northern Sakhalin and the return of the Russian prisoners" would remain a subject for further negotiation.<sup>65</sup> Roosevelt said that he was not sure that Japan would accept these terms but that he thought they should and that he would try to get them to agree.<sup>66</sup>

Meyer answered the President August 24, stating that he had forwarded the President's last message to the Tsar. Meyer did not know that Roosevelt had received his letter of August 23 before sending his second cable of instructions. He opined that the Tsar would consent to pay land value for the north half of Sakhalin.<sup>67</sup>

This bit of encouragement caused Roosevelt to cable Meyer August 25, 1905, more instructions. Mr. Roosevelt told Meyer to tell the Tsar that he did not want to force his advice upon him but "for fear of misapprehension I venture again to have these statements made to him," and goes on to show that an extension of war will involve Russia in a great calamity, and that since Sakhalin was

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(65) Dennett, op. cit., p. 267.

(66) Ibid. In Bishop, op. cit., p. 410, Witte told Takahira that the Emperor upon receipt of Roosevelt's second message through Meyer wrote on the letter "no further consideration" and put it aside.

(67) Dennett, op. cit. p.271.

in the hands of the Japanese they would not be giving anything for peace because if the war continued Japan would surely take more than that much territory. Roosevelt said that peace made on the terms he had previously suggested would leave Russia substantially unharmed and her national honor would be saved.<sup>68</sup>

On August 26, 1905, the Mikado sent his reply to the appeal made by Roosevelt through Kaneko on August 22 in regard to peace terms. He expressed his thanks for Roosevelt's efforts and wrote

The Imperial Government will have no hesitation in acting on the advice, and they will accordingly, in the matter of the amount of compensation, consent to make still further concessions.<sup>69</sup>

Melville E. Stone, a journalist, said that the conference was again deadlocked on Friday, August 25, 1905.<sup>70</sup>

However, Bishop says

The promised "concessions" [as explained in previous paragraph] did not apparently reach the Japanese envoys on August 27, 1905, or if received were not satisfactory to the Russians, for on that day the Japanese envoys abandoned all hope of peace.<sup>71</sup>

Upon advice from the Tsar, Witte had informed the Japanese plenipotentiaries that the conference would come to a close; however, Witte agreed to a final meeting on Monday afternoon.<sup>72</sup> Later the final meeting was

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(68) Bernstein, <sup>celebrities,</sup> op. cit., pp. 329-332.

(69) Bishop, op. cit., pp. 408-09.

(70) Stone, op. cit., p. 286.

(71) Bishop, op. cit., p. 409.

(72) Ibid.

postponed until Tuesday.<sup>73</sup>

On Sunday, August 27, 1905, Baron Kaneko received permission to see Melvin E. Stone on an important matter. Kaneko said that he thought Witte and Rosen were bluffing but Stone disagreed and expressed the opinion that Russia would not pay a cent of indemnity.<sup>74</sup> Kaneko then said that even if they waived that point the conference would end anyway because Witte and Rosen were not sympathetic with it.<sup>75</sup> Stone said there was but one man who could save the situation and that was the Emperor of Germany.<sup>76</sup>

Kaneko and Stone then agreed upon what course to take. Baron von dem Bussche-Haddenhausen, counsellor and first secretary of the German Embassy who was in charge since Ambassador von Sternberg was not in America, and President Roosevelt were conferred with. Stone suggested that Roosevelt write a message to the Kaiser concerning the situation.<sup>77</sup>

Roosevelt then sent the German Emperor a message, August 27, 1905, as follows:

Peace can be obtained on the following terms:  
 Russia to pay no indemnity whatever and to receive back the north half of Sakhalin, for which it is to pay Japan whatever amount a mixed commission may

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(73) Ibid., p. 410.

(74) Stone, op. cit., p. 287.

(75) Ibid., p. 288.

(76) Ibid.

(77) Ibid., p. 289.

determine. This is my proposition to which the Japanese have assented reluctantly and only under strong pressure from me.<sup>78</sup>

Roosevelt explained the plan for selecting a commission to make final settlement on this point. Roosevelt told the Kaiser that he considered these terms moderate. He asked the Kaiser if he would not present these terms to the Tsar as he knew the Kaiser would have more influence upon the Tsar than anyone else. Roosevelt asked the Kaiser to present the plan immediately "...if in your [the Kaiser's] wisdom you see fit to make it."<sup>79</sup>

Roosevelt also sent a copy of this letter to the Mikado.<sup>80</sup> While Bussche was putting the President's message into code, Stone happened to think that Kaneko was only an unofficial commissioner to the conference and might not speak with authority. Stone tried to phone Komura but was unable to reach him because a storm had destroyed phone connections. Bussche sent the message to the Kaiser with an explanation of the circumstances. In an exchange of wires with another correspondent at Portsmouth, Stone learned that Takahira denied that Kaneko was in any way authorized to speak for the commission.<sup>81</sup>

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(78) Ibid., p. 289. On page 290 Stone explains that this last sentence was added "after deliberation, as a diplomatic phrase to avoid saying that the offer came from the Japanese."

(79) Ibid.

(80) Bishop, op. cit., p. 411.

(81) Stone, op. cit., pp. 290-91.

On the same day, August 27, 1905, Witte wrote the Foreign Minister to tell him that he had postponed the end of the conference until Tuesday, due to the fourteen hours difference in time between the United States and Russia. The Emperor wrote the following remark on the margin of this dispatch when he received it:

Send Witte my order to end the parley tomorrow in any event. I prefer to continue the war, rather than to wait for gracious concessions on the part of Japan. Dated Peterhof, August 28, 1905.<sup>82</sup>

Roosevelt sent Baron Komura a letter August 28, explaining that he had had several interviews with Baron Kaneko and had assumed that he was acting at Komura's request. Roosevelt said that Kaneko had shown him several telegrams apparently prepared by Komura for that purpose. Roosevelt explained about the letter that had been sent to the Kaiser, about Takahira's denial of Kaneko's authority, and that he would retract his cable and not communicate with Kaneko unless Komura assured him of Kaneko's authority.<sup>83</sup>

The President and Stone then decided to publish Japan's willingness (1) to waive their claims for a war indemnity and (2) to cede back to Russia the northern part of Sakhalin at a price to be fixed by a mixed commission, thus to seal the Japanese pledge.<sup>84</sup>

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(82) The Memoirs of Count Witte, op. cit., p. 158.

(83) Stone, op. cit., pp. 291-92.

(84) Howe, op. cit., pp. 203-05.



Success for Roosevelt's last appeal to the Mikado came August 29, 1905. The Japanese envoys gave him the Mikado's answer:

The Emperor, after presiding at a Cabinet Council, decided to withdraw the demand of a money payment for the cost of war entirely, if Russia recognizes the occupation of Saghalien Island by Japan, because the Emperor regards humanity and civilization far more than his nation's welfare.<sup>85</sup>

On Tuesday, August 29, 1905, Komura assured Roosevelt that Kaneko was a responsible plenipotentiary and that they had made no mistake in receiving him and dealing with him.<sup>86</sup>

Before the opening of what seemed would be the final session of Tuesday, Komura had a private conversation with Witte. Witte assured Komura that this would be the end of the conference as he had instructions to break off today if the Japanese did not agree to the Emperor's decision.<sup>87</sup> Witte left this interview, so certain of success that he sent a message to the Foreign Minister expressing that idea.<sup>88</sup>

What had been planned as the last meeting of the conference<sup>89</sup> turned out to be the end of the controversial points. The Japanese plenipotentiaries withdrew

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(85) Bishop, op. cit., pp. 411-12.

(86) Stone, op. cit., p. 295.

(87) The Memoirs of Count Witte, op. cit., pp. 158-59.

(88) Ibid.

(89) Stone, op. cit., pp. 295-96. Witte had planned to give a signal, which meant continuation of the war, if the Japanese had still insisted on an indemnity.

their claims as previously agreed to by the Mikado to Roosevelt.

The treaty in its final form was written by two international law experts, Professor Theodore Martens for Russia and Mr. Henry W. Dennison, an American, for Japan.<sup>90</sup> The treaty as prepared was formally signed by the plenipotentiaries at 3:50 p.m. in the Portsmouth Naval Yard Building where the sessions had been held, August 29, 1905.<sup>91</sup> A copy of the treaty will be found in the appendix.

On October 14, 1905, the treaty was signed by both the Japanese and Russian Emperors.<sup>92</sup>

President Roosevelt received letters of thanks for his efforts in regard to peace and for his friendship from both Emperors.<sup>93</sup>

As a fitting climax to his efforts President Roosevelt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. He kept the medal and diploma but turned the prize check for \$36,734.79 over to a committee of United States citizens for trust to be used as a "foundation for promoting the cause of industrial peace in this country [United States]."<sup>94</sup>

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(90) Van Norman, loc. cit., p. 421.

(91) Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy, New York, 1922, I, 272.

(92) Foreign Relations 1905, p. 820-22.

(93) Ibid., p. 823.

(94) Bishop, op. cit., p. 422.

## APPENDIX I

TREATY OF PEACE  
Russia and Japan, September 5, 1905

This copy of the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 is found in John V. A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements With And Concerning China 1894-1919 (New York, 1921) I, 522-525.

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan on the one part, and His Majesty the Emperor of the Russias on the other part, animated by the desire to restore the blessings of peace to Their countries and peoples, have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace, and have, for this purpose, named Their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan,

His Excellency Baron Komura Jutaro, Jusammi, Grand Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, His Minister for Foreign Affairs, and

His Excellency M. Takahira Kogoro, Jusammi, Grand Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, His Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States of America;

And His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias:

His Excellency M. Serge Witte, His Secretary of State and President of the Committee of Ministers of the Empire of Russia, and

His Excellency Baron Roman Rosen, Master of the Imperial Court of Russia and His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States of America;

Who, after having exchanged their full powers which were found to be in good and due form, have concluded the following Articles:

ARTICLE I. There shall henceforth be peace and amity between Their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of all the Russias and between Their respective States and subjects.

ARTICLE II. The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Corea paramount political, military and economical interests, engage neither to obstruct nor interfere with the measures of guidance, protection and control which the Imperial Government of Japan may find it necessary to take in Corea.

It is understood that Russian subjects in Corea shall be treated exactly in the same manner as the subjects or citizens of other foreign Powers, that is to say, they shall be placed on the same footing as the subjects or citizens of the most favoured nation.

It is also agreed that, in order to avoid all cause of misunderstanding, the two High Contracting Parties will abstain, on the Russo-Corean frontier, from taking any military measure which may menace the security of Russian or Corean territory.

ARTICLE III. Japan and Russia mutually engage:

1. To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria except the territory affected by the lease of the Liao-tung Peninsula, in conformity with the provisions of additional Article I annexed to this Treaty; and

2. To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria now in the occupation or under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops, with the exception of the territory above mentioned.

The Imperial Government of Russia declare that they have not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.

ARTICLE IV. Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries, which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.

ARTICLE V. The Imperial Russian Government transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, with the consent of the Government of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Talien and adjacent territory and territorial waters and all rights, privileges and concessions connected with or forming part of such lease and they also transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan all public works and properties in the territory affected by the above mentioned lease.

The two High Contracting Parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Chinese Government mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.

The Imperial Government of Japan on their part undertake that the proprietary rights of Russian subjects in the territory above referred to shall be perfectly respected.

ARTICLE VI. The Imperial Russian Government engage to transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, without compensation and with the consent of the Chinese Government, the railway between Chang-chun (Kuancheng-tzu)

and Port Arthur and all its branches, together with all rights, privileges and properties appertaining thereto in that region, as well as all coal mines in the said region belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway.

The two High Contracting Parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Government of China mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.

ARTICLE VII. Japan and Russia engage to exploit their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes and in no wise for strategic purposes.

It is understood that that restriction does not apply to the railway in the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula.

ARTICLE VIII. The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia, with a view to promote and facilitate intercourse and traffic, will, as soon as possible, conclude a separate convention for the regulation of their connecting railway services in Manchuria.<sup>(1)</sup>

ARTICLE IX. The Imperial Russian Government cede to the Imperial Government of Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty, the southern portion of the Island of Saghalien and all islands adjacent thereto, and all public works and properties thereon. The fiftieth degree of north latitude is adopted as the northern boundary of the ceded territory. The exact alignment of such territory shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of additional Article II annexed to this Treaty.

Japan and Russia mutually agree not to construct in their respective possessions on the Island of Saghalien or the adjacent islands, any fortifications or other similar military works. They also respectively engage not to take any military measures which may impede the free navigation of the Straits of La Perouse and Tartary.

ARTICLE X. It is reserved to the Russian subjects inhabitants of the territory ceded to Japan, to sell their real property and retire to their country; but, if they prefer to remain in the ceded territory, they will be maintained and protected in the full exercise of their industries and rights of property, on condition of submitting to Japanese laws and jurisdiction. Japan shall have full liberty to withdraw the right of residence in, or to deport from, such territory, any inhabitants who labour under political or administrative disability. She engages, however, that the proprietary rights of such inhabitants shall be fully respected.

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(1) Such a convention was concluded June 13, 1907.

ARTICLE XI.<sup>(2)</sup> Russia engages to arrange with Japan for granting to Japanese subjects rights of fishery along the coasts of the Russian possessions in the Japan, Okhotsk and Behring Seas.

It is agreed that the foregoing engagement shall not affect rights already belonging to Russian or foreign subjects in those regions.

ARTICLE XII.<sup>(3)</sup> The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and Russia having been annulled by the war, the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia engage to adopt as the basis of their commercial relations, pending the conclusion of a new treaty of commerce and navigation on the basis of the Treaty which was in force previous to the present war, the system of reciprocal treatment on the footing of the most favoured nation, in which are included import and export duties, customs formalities, transit and tonnage dues, and the admission and treatment of the agents, subjects and vessels of one country in the territories of the other.

ARTICLE XIII. As soon as possible after the present Treaty comes into force, all prisoners of war shall be reciprocally restored. The Imperial Government of Japan and Russia shall each appoint a special Commissioner to take charge of prisoners. All prisoners in the hands of one Government shall be delivered to and received by the Commissioner of the other Government or by his duly authorized representative, in such convenient numbers and at such convenient ports of the delivering State as such delivering State shall notify in advance to the Commissioner of the receiving State.

The Governments of Japan and Russia shall present to each other, as soon as possible after the delivery of prisoners has been completed, a statement of the direct expenditures respectively incurred by them for the care and maintenance of prisoners from the date of capture or surrender up to the time of death or delivery. Russia engages to repay to Japan, as soon as possible after the exchange of the statements as above provided, the difference between the actual amount so expended by Japan and the actual amount similarly disbursed by Russia.

ARTICLE XIV. The present Treaty shall be ratified by Their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of all

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(2) A fisheries convention was concluded between Japan and Russia on July 28, 1907.

(3) A treaty of commerce and navigation with separate articles, protocols and exchange of notes attached thereto, and a protocol relating to certain Japanese and Russian consulates, were concluded between Japan and Russia on July 28, 1907.

the Russias. Such ratification shall, with as little delay as possible and in any case not later than fifty days from the date of the signature of the Treaty, be announced to the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia respectively through the French Minister in Tokio and the Ambassador of the United States in Saint Petersburg and from the date of the later of such announcements this Treaty shall in all its parts come into full force.

The formal exchange of the ratifications shall take place at Washington as soon as possible.<sup>(4)</sup>

ARTICLE XV. The present Treaty shall be signed in duplicate in both the English and French languages. The texts are in absolute conformity, but in case of discrepancy in interpretation, the French text shall prevail.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and affixed their seals to the present Treaty of Peace.

Done at (New Hampshire) Portsmouth this fifth day the ninth month of the thirty-eighth year of Meiji, corresponding to the twenty-third day of August (fifth September) one thousand nine hundred and five.

(Signed) Jutarō Komura [L. S.] (Signed) Serge Witte [L. S.]

(Signed) K. Takahira [L. S.] (Signed) Rosen [L. S.]

#### ADDITIONAL ARTICLES

In conformity with the provisions of Articles III and IX of the Treaty of Peace between Japan and Russia of this date, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have concluded the following additional articles:

##### I To Article III

The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia mutually engage to commence the withdrawal of their military forces from the territory of Manchuria simultaneously and immediately after the Treaty of Peace comes into operation, and within a period of eighteen months from that date, the Armies of the two countries shall be completely withdrawn from Manchuria, except from the leased territory of the Liao-tung Peninsula.

The forces of the two countries occupying the front positions shall be first withdrawn.

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(4) Ratifications were exchanged at Washington, November 25, 1905.

The High Contracting Parties reserve to themselves the right to maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria. The number of such guards shall not exceed fifteen per kilometre and within that maximum number, the Commanders of the Japanese and Russian Armies shall, by common accord, fix the number of such guards to be employed, as small as possible having in view the actual requirements.

The Commanders of the Japanese and Russian forces in Manchuria shall agree upon the details of the evacuation in conformity with the above principles, and shall take by common accord the measures necessary to carry out the evacuation as soon as possible and in any case not later than the period of eighteen months.

## II To Article IX

As soon as possible after the present Treaty comes into force, a Commission of Delimitation, composed of an equal number of members to be appointed respectively by the two High Contracting Parties, shall on the spot, mark in a permanent manner the exact boundary between the Japanese and Russian possessions on the Island of Saghalien. The Commission shall be bound, so far as topographical considerations permit, to follow the fiftieth parallel of north latitude as the boundary line, and in case any deflections from that line at any points are found to be necessary, compensation will be made by correlative deflections at other points. It shall also be the duty of the said Commission to prepare a list and description of the adjacent islands included in the cessions and finally the Commission shall prepare and sign maps showing the boundaries of the ceded territory. The work of the Commission shall be subject to the approval of the High Contracting Parties.

The foregoing Additional Articles are to be considered as ratified with the ratification of the Treaty of Peace to which they are annexed.

Portsmouth, the 5th day, 9th month, 38th year of Meiji, corresponding the 23rd August (September 5th), 1905.

(Signed) Jutarō Komura  
(Signed) K. Takahira

(Signed) Serge Witte  
(Signed) Rosen



## APPENDIX II

PROTOCOL OF ARMISTICE BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA  
September 1, 1905

"The undersigned Plenipotentiaries of Japan and Russia duly authorized to that effect by their Governments have agreed upon the following terms of armistice between the belligerents, pending the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace:

"1. A certain distance (zone of demarcation) shall be fixed between the fronts of the armies of the two Powers in Manchuria as well as in the region of the Tomamko (Tumen).

"2. The naval forces of one of the belligerents shall not bombard territory belonging to or occupied by the other.

"3. Maritime captures will not be suspended by the Armistice.

"4. During the term of the armistice reinforcements shall not be dispatched to the theatre of war. Those which are enroute shall not be dispatched to the north of Mukden on the part of Japan and to the south of Harbin on the part of Russia.

"5. The commanders of the armies and fleets of the two Powers shall determine in common accord the conditions of the armistice in conformity with the provisions above enumerated.

"6. The two Governments shall give orders to their commanders immediately after the signature of the Treaty of Peace in order to put this protocol in execution.

"Portsmouth, 1st September, 1905.

"(Signed) Jutaro Komura  
"K. Takahira  
"Serge Witte  
"Rosen"

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