A STUDY OF CONFLICT BETWEEN ETHICS AND THE

NATIONAL INTEREST: THE APARTHEID CASE

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for the Degree of
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

South Africa has for sometime now been pursuing a national policy of separation of races known as apartheid. Apartheid is designed to physically separate, as much as possible, the Europeans (whites) from the non-Europeans (blacks, coloureds and Asians).[1] This racial separation extends into the labor force, education, living areas, health facilities, transportation, eating places, government, churches, and marriage. When apartheid has been fully developed, Europeans will only come into contact with non-Europeans at work under a labor-management contact, and on the city streets during the working day. Many analysts of African politics have described the racist policies of the government of the Republic of South Africa as a perpetuation of Hitler's racial philosophy.

The international community, since World War II, has adopted ethical standards as part of its effort to protect human rights. In the last decade the international community, possibly as a result of the emergence of independent black nations in Africa and other non-white states, has been showing growing disapproval of the racial policy of South Africa. The United Nations, as a forum for the voice of the

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[1]A black, is a member of a Bantu or other African tribe; a coloured, is a mixed-blood person of white and black parentage; and, an Asian is one who is of Asian nationality. This is an arbitrary definition found in South African law.

world's non-white opposition, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the voice of black Africa, have been the staging grounds for the condemnation of South Africa in a move to force it to rescind its racial policies and allow the non-Europeans to be represented in its government. South Africa's failure to respond to the demands made upon it by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity prompted the UN and the OAU to take action in the form of several resolutions to bring about those desired results. Those resolutions were expected to achieve such results by enforcing economic, political and social sanctions on South Africa and her nationals.

This thesis will endeavor to investigate why states and international organizations have been unable, in our international system, to regulate human rights in the nation state. The main hypothesis of this thesis is that nations may continuously stress ethical standards in their relations with other nations and in international forums, yet when they are called upon to act they invaribly tend to produce amoral decisions, based on reasons of national interest and security. This study will analyze the problems of ethics in international relations using selected cases relating to apartheid, namely the work of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity.

The United Nations has played an active role in trying to persuade South Africa to rescind its apartheid practices. Political and economic influences have been brought to bear on South Africa and political influences were considered in the chambers of the General Assembly and the Security Council, but none of these influences have been effective. Regardless of their personal feelings, delegates, when voting, especially on issues involving decisions of ethical connotations, tend to vote one

way for propagenda reasons while their states may act differently for reasons of national interest.

An analysis of United Nations activity to bring about an end to the practice of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa is necessary to show that apartheid does not present a threat to the national interest and/or security of the Member States of the United Nations; and this is why the enforcement of resolutions and sanctions against South Africa has not been effective.

The African states and other non-white states have attempted to have the Republic's racial policy declared by the Security Council a threat to international peace and security, thus involving Chapter VII of the Charter and making sanctions against South Africa binding on each member nation. Due to the failure to achieve this, the African States and other non-white national entities have pursued their goal through the UN created information agency, "Unit of Apartheid", to publicize the problems of racial discrimination, hoping by this to create greater awareness among the more influential white nations.

The Organization of African Unity is faced with a difficult task if it is to be effective in its appeal for African support against apartheid in South Africa. The OAU is a multi-purpose organization that attempts to provide political and economic direction for the African continent. As is the case with the United Nations, political and economic considerations influence the decisions of a Member State whether to implement approved resolutions against South Africa. Due to the lack of cohesion among the African states on most issues, this one included, the Member States of the OAU have been unable to provide the necessary influence required to force South Africa to consider a change

in its race policies.

Much of the literature on apartheid in South Africa attacks the problem of racial discrimination from a moral-ethical point of view. Commentators pursuing a moralistic stand see in apartheid a threat to world peace and a problem for the United Nations to handle through Chapter VII of the Charter. This study differs from those studies in that it attempts to show that South Africa's policy of apartheid is not really a threat to world peace, and that the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity being powerless to have their Member States enforce the resolutions of the said two agencies, the Republic of South Africa will not experience the necessary influence to change its policy.

Various authors have written on the problem of apartheid. John Paton is no doubt the most moralistic of the authors concerning apartheid. He attempts in his book The Long View,[2] to shame the white man for supporting race discrimination by calling upon the Judeo-Christian ethic for support and moral guidance. Brian Bunting expresses in his book, The Rise of the South African Reich,[3] the immorality of the Afrikaner-Dutch's apartheid as it is based on Hitler's super human race theories. John Laurence's Seeds of Diaster[4] tries to blame apartheid on the Dutch Reformed Church, the Afrikaner's church. In a more realistic vein, Laurence points out that the white South Africans are

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[2] Alan Paton, The Long View, ed., Edward Callan (New York, 1968).

[3] Brian Bunting, The Rise of South African Reich (Baltimore, 1966).

[4] John Laurence, The Seeds of Diaster (London, 1968).

willing to fight for the right to practice apartheid, and have built
one of the strongest armies on the African continent to do so. Colin
and Margaret Legum believe that the "racial crisis in the Republic of
South Africa cannot be resolved without international intervention."[5]
They go on to show examples of how international intervention may be
used effectively. Unlike other commentators, they consider many of the
political and economic ramifications of their plans, but still hope
against hope that morality will win out over political expediency.

The methodology of this thesis will be analytical and descriptive.
South Africa's racial policy will be analyzed in conjunction with the
international factors which might force South Africa to rescind this
policy, even if this is unlikely in the foreseeable future.

The second chapter will describe the political, economic and con-
stitutional climate in South Africa. Its purpose is to show how apar-
theid evolved and was applied to the non-European groups, and how ef-
fective the Nationalist government has been in enforcing its policies
upon the politically deprived non-European groups.

The third chapter will analyze the role the United Nations has
played in this issue. The United Nations will be studied to investi-
gate its effectiveness, its problems, and the plans that have been
posited hopefully to make UN action on this issue the first UN politi-
cal success in the area of human rights.

The fourth chapter will analyze the role the Organization of Af-
rican Unity is playing in trying to overthrow the white-minority
government of South Africa, how effective is this organization

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[5] Colin and Margaret Legum, South Africa: Crisis for the West (New York, 1964), p. 2.

considering that it bases its statements on moral convictions, and
whether the African nations are in a position to make effective their
threats against South Africa.

The fifth chapter will attempt to draw conclusions from these
findings and assess the extent to which the hypothesis has been sup-
ported by the evidence. If the evidence supports the hypothesis, the
conclusion will then be that since apartheid as a national philosophy
is not a major threat to the surrounding area and the world community,
then South Africa should be considered relatively free from effective
international intervention, either from the United Nations, or from
the Organization of African Unity.

This thesis will depend on such primary sources as the Statistical
Yearbook, The New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor, and United
Nations Official Records of the General Assembly and those of the Se-
curity Council, and sources the writer is ready to supply but which he
is not authorized to credit. Secondary sources will also be depended
upon for analyses of apartheid. Finally, various professional journals
will be used extensively for specific data--Foreign Affairs, the Jour-
nal of Modern African Studies, African Studies Bulletin, African Af-
fairs, Africa Today, International Studies (New Delhi), and Inter-
national Organization.

To summarize: the significance of this thesis is: first, it shows
that apartheid in the Republic of South Africa is not a threat to world
peace; and second, it shows that although the United Nations is spon-
soring verbal and physical condemnations of South African apartheid,
the UN is an institution which still operates on the basis of moral
authority and as such does not have the power to pass and to impose

effective resolutions in moral issues. Finally, before nations can agree to initiate political action, a definite political threat to their national interest and security must exist. In the case of apartheid in South Africa there is not such a political threat.

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa has always practiced racial discrimination. From the

time of the first white settlements, in 1652, the African has been

placed in a position of subservience. The Africans and the Coloured

(distinguished from the African by law) have held positions below the

Europeans in all sections of South Africa. Only in the Cape Province,

a predominately British settled area, have the Bantu and the Coloured

had a few rights uncommon to any other part of South Africa.

Race has been the main basis of hostility between the Afrikaner

and the Briton since South Africa became a state. The Afrikaner re-

jected the egalitarian philosophy of the British. After the Boer War

the British assumed political and economic leadership, but the differ-

ences of opinion never subsided. In 1908, Provincial delegates met at

Durban to write a constitution for a self-governing colony. The most

difficult problem was the issue of franchise for the Bantu. A compro-

mise was eventually reached, and the suffrage was restricted to the

Europeans in the Free State, the Transvaal, and Natal Provinces while

the Cape Province retained the franchise for the non-white. This com-

promise was protected by the South Africa Act, which provided that

changes in the color bar restrictions can only be adopted by two-thirds

of both Houses of Parliament sitting together and voting such a

change.[1] The Union of South Africa was created, but it was without
unity.[2]

At the time of Union the majority party was the Suid-Afrikaanse
Party (S.A.P.). The S.A.P. was a segregated party that had as its pri-
mary policy the desire to keep the Bantu subordinate to the European.
The S.A.P. tried to unite South Africa socially and economically, but
the Afrikaner's adamant racial stand made it impossible for the S.A.P.
leaders--Louis Botha, Prime Minister, and Jan Smuts, Minister of De-
fence, who was later to be Prime Minister after Botha's death in 1919--
to unite the British and the Afrikaners. In 1924 the first Afrikaner
dominated political party, the Nationalist Party, led by General J.B.M.
Hertzog, came to power. Hertzog felt his greatest threat was the
English-speaking section which could easily absorb the Afrikaans-
speaking section. In order to deliver a crippling blow to British
domination, Hertzog persuaded Smuts to unite the S.A.P. with the Na-
tionalist Party. In 1934 the S.A.P. and the Nationalist Party formed
the United Party with Hertzog as Prime Minister and Smuts as Deputy
Prime Minister.[3] This made the United Party the only major political
party in South Africa. Segregation laws were passed to appease the Af-
rikaners, but the United Party did not strictly enforce these laws.
D. F. Malan broke with the United Party and formed the Purified Nation-
alist Party in 1940 as he felt Hertzog had sold out to the British when
he united with Smuts to form the United Party.

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[1] Leo Marquard, The Peoples and Politics of South Africa (London, 1966), p. 23.

[2] Bunting, p. 21.

[3] Leonard M. Thompson, Politics in the Republic of South Africa (Boston, 1966), p. 91.

Malan's Nationalist Party's appeal was based on race. In the campaign of 1948 the Nationalist Party hit at the United Party's apparent laxity in maintaining segregation. The Nationalist Party coined the word "apartheid" to rally the Afrikaner voters to the cause of racial separation. It was not clear whether at the 1948 election the Nationalist Party had a clear cut definition of apartheid, but the word "apartheid" was sufficient to swing enough votes for the Nationalist Party in coalition with the small Afrikaner Party to become the majority in Parliament.

After the election, the Nationalist Party set out to define apartheid and carry out its goals. Professor Eiselen, organizer of the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) and later Permanent Secretary of the Native Affairs Department, defined apartheid in the classical intellectual fashion.

> Separating of the heterogenous groups, from the population
> of the country [South Africa], into separate socio-economic
> units, inhabiting separate parts of the country, each en-
> joying in developing such capabilities as its individual
> members may possess to their optimum capacity.[4]

Apartheid is in other words the separate development of each racial group.

Apartheid has a three pronged objective. The first is the problem of the Bantu in the cities. The Nationalist government believes that the cities belong to the Europeans, and no Bantu may own property or vote in the cities. They may own property and vote only in their own reserves or homelands called Bantustans. The second is the problem of Bantu labor. Although South Africa depends on the Bantu for its labor

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[4]
John Hatch, A History of Postwar Africa (New York, 1965), pp. 88-
89.

force, yet there are certain jobs, mostly skilled, that a Bantu may not
hold. The Nationalist government wants to create separate developing
places for the Bantu, but the "white capitalist" depends on cheap
labor; therefore, the government has allowed the Bantu to reside out-
side the city in shanty towns as a "temporary sojourner". The third
problem is the Bantu's political rights. South Africa has prohibited
the Bantu from participating in any organized political activity.

To achieve the goals of apartheid the Nationalist government has
passed the Group Areas Act, namely, the color bar laws. These laws
place economic and social restrictions on the Coloured and the Bantu.
The restrictions include the following: traveling without government
permission and proper identification; owning property within the "white"
areas; marrying outside their race; getting a job listed among jobs
their race is not "capable" of holding.

In spite of the Group Areas Act the Bantu have continued to emi-
grate to the cities because South Africa is an industrial country. In-
dustry needs workers and the Bantu provide cheap labor. It is pro-
jected that by 1990 the majority of the non-white population will be
living in the cities.[5]

The Nationalist Party revised four old laws, enacted four new
laws, and passed two laws to change the constitution so as to make
legitimate its apartheid policy. The 1947 Industrial Conciliation Act
was amended in 1954 and 1956. It, in part created what is referred to
as job reservations, another aspect of separate development. To re-
serve jobs for the Europeans, and austensibly to guarantee the European

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[5]William R. Frye, "A Nation Torn Asunder," Southern Africa: A Time
For Change (1969), p. 9.

a job in time of unemployment, jobs have been restricted to different
racial groups. The others may have what is left over. Yet South
Africa is industrialized, it has more jobs to fill than the government
is willing to open up for the non-white workers.

In 1936 the African voters were taken off the Common Roll in the
Cape Province and given separate representation. In doing so the
United Party followed the constitutional guidelines set down in the
1910 constitution. In 1951 the Nationalist government introduced a
bill to take the Coloured off the Common Roll. Four years of struggle
ensued between the Nationalist government and its major parliamentary
opposition, the United Party and the Labour Party, before the bill was
passed by simple majority. The Act was contested before the Court of
Appeal, which found the Nationalists' had failed to follow the constitu-
tional guidelines of the South Africa Act, and declared the bill null and
void. The Act required a two-thirds majority of both Houses of Parlia-
ment sitting together. In 1955, the Nationalist government changed its
strategy. It passed two laws that did not require a two-thirds major-
ity of both Houses of Parliament sitting together. The first was the
Appellate Division Quorum Act, which increased the size of the Appeal
Court from six to eleven and required all the eleven judges to hear any
case concerning the validity of Acts of Parliament.[6] The second act
was the Senate Act, which altered the constitution of the Senate to
create the necessary two-thirds majority of both houses in joint ses-
sion.[7] The Nationalists were thus able to pass and to enforce the

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[6]Marquard, p. 94.

[7]Bunting, p. 123.

provisions of the controversial bill and avoid the requirements of the South Africa Act, thus showing that they were ready to manipulate the constitution to enforce apartheid.

In 1948 the Nationalist government began its succession of voting restriction acts to restrict or to eliminate the non-white franchise.[8] In two acts, the Asiatic Law Amendment Act and the Pegging Act, the government withdrew Asian (Coloured) representation in Parliament and limited the representation of Indians on the Natal Provincial Council.[9] The Nationalist government, in order to create apathy among the non-whites, passed the Electoral Law Amendment Act, which provided that all Coloured voters must have an electoral officer or a police officer present to witness their application to vote.[10] In this way the Nationalist government was able to cancel out the potential non-white vote against it. The Bantu was finally disenfranchised in 1959 with the passage of the Bantu Self-Government Act, which abolished African representation in Parliament and established the Bantustans as the Africans' new tribal homelands.[11]

Two acts passed in the 1950's helped the Nationalist government to curb the activities of the Bantu during the 1960 riots. The 1950 Suppression of Communism Amendment Bill enabled the government to punish persons with past Communist sympathies and to close down any

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[8]Ibid., p. 124.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid., p. 125.

[11]Ibid., pp. 129-30.

journal considered Communist-inspired.[12] The 1953 Criminal Law Amend-
ment Act prohibited anyone from protesting or supporting the repeal or
modification of any law.[13]

These two laws were effectively used in curbing the 1960 anti-pass
law protests and to justify the arrest of peaceful demonstrators and
their leaders. Anyone in South Africa who attempts to help the Bantu
is labeled a Communist, so it is not surprising that many Bantu view
Communism as a kind of utopia.[14]

The Nationalist government's apartheid policy did not affect the
African population as much as it did the Coloured population. The Col-
oured, until 1948, enjoyed a status much higher than that of the Bantu;
he was almost a social equal if not a political equal of the European.
With the passage of the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 the
Coloured lost his "equality". The Act provided for personal identifi-
cation cards that specified the bearer's race. The intent was to stop
Coloured persons from "passing" as white.[15] The Population Registra-
tion Act of 1950 stepped in to provide definitions of each of the
three racial categories.

> A Native was a member of any aboriginal race of tribe of
> Africa. A Coloured person was not a White person nor a
> Native person. And a White person is a person who in ap-
> pearance is, or who is generally accepted as a White per-
> son, but does not include a person who, in appearance is
> obviously a white person, is generally accepted as a Col-
> oured person.[16]

[12]P.S. Joshi, Unrest in South Africa (Bombay, 1958), p. 176.

[13]Laurence, p. 101.

[14]Ibid., p. 271.

[15]Marquard, pp. 173-74.

[16]Joshi, p. 159.

The act further provided that on the payment of 10 pounds a person may challenge his classification. Such objections are to be heard by a board of three appointed by the Minister of Interior.[17]

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[17]Marquard, p. 79.

CHAPTER III

THE UNITED NATIONS AND APARTHEID

South Africa has been at odds with the United Nations since the

San Francisco Conference in 1945. While Prime Minister Smuts was in

San Francisco participating in the organization of the United Nations,

Dr. D. F. Malan, founder of the Purified Nationalist Party, was ex-

pressing misgivings about the international organization at home. He

felt that the United Nations Charter would "enable the U.N.O. to con-

duct an inquiry into race discrimination prevalent in his country."[1]

Prime Minister Smuts agreed that the United Nations Charter was against

racial discrimination but pointed out, in defense of the United Nations,

that the "UN could not interfere in matters essentially within the do-

mestic jurisdiction of the state."[2]

Although South Africa accepted Smuts' interpretation of the United

Nations Charter, the United Nations, as was the case in a number of

other issues, dismissed the domestic jurisdiction argument as a reason

to abandon the fight against racial discrimination. "The case against

South Africa is not that it is the world's only tyranny, or even neces-

sarily the worst tyranny, but that it is the world's only racial

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[1]Joshi, p. 103.

[2]Ibid., p. 104.

tyranny."[3]

In 1946 South Africa was criticized for the first time by the UN for its treatment of Indians and its administration of South West Africa; both subjects have been constantly on the agenda of the General Assembly ever since.

The mood in the United Nations has gradually been changing. From 1946 to 1961 the United Nations General Assembly was content with holding seminars, investigations and passing resolutions, the first being in 1952 concerning the racial policies of South Africa.[4] These activities bound no Member State nor made any specific request of any, except to urge South Africa to voluntarily rescind its apartheid policies. It was evident by 1961 that South Africa was not going to change its domestic outlook toward race without stiffer condemnations and resolutions.

The United Nations became increasingly aware of its failure to persuade South Africa to abandon its racial policies with non-committal condemnations of apartheid and decided to take more drastic steps in an effort to force South Africa to change its policy of apartheid. The newly independent African nations began clamoring for collective resolutions against South Africa,[5] but there were a few countries afraid to initiate action against South Africa for fear of destroying the effectiveness of the United Nations.

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[3]Colin and Margaret Legum, p. 261.

[4]Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., _Nations in a Multipolar World_ (New York, 1968), p. 507.

[5]Colin Legum, _Africa: A Handbook to the Continent_ (New York, 1962), p. 388.

Mr. Nygese, of the Congolese delegation (Leopoldville) arguing in favor of stiffer action against South Africa, said that the Organization must take firm and effective measures. He expressed the hope that those delegations which believed that South Africa could be convinced by vague pronouncements would now realize that more effective means, such as economic pressure, would have to be used.[6]

Mr. Plimpton, the delegate from the United States, had argued against the Congolese delegation's contentions by saying that the failure to implement such a resolution could seriously weaken the authority of the United Nations--a consequence which all Members, and particularly the smaller nations, would wish to avoid. "It might be recalled that the decline of the League of Nations had been largely precipitated by that body's inability to enforce sanctions."[7]

Yet the growing agitation of the newly independent African nations, coupled with the Sharpville incident of March, 1960,[8] overshadowed any objections there may have been against economic or political sanctions by the General Assembly. At the Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly the African and Asian countries, supported by many other states, put forward a proposal for economic embargoes against South Africa. The proposal did not secure the required majority in the General Assembly. At the Seventeenth Session of the General Assembly, a resolution was passed recommending economic restraints by Member States against the

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[6]*Official Records of the General Assembly*, Seventeenth Session, 19 October 1962, Agenda Item 87, p. 36.

[7]Ibid., p. 38.

[8]The Sharpeville massacre was an incident in which many protesting Bantu were shot while peacefully demonstrating against the Pass Laws.

Republic of South Africa. Resolution 1761 (XVII) provided that Member States:

> (a) Break off diplomatic relations with the Republic of South Africa or refrain from establishing such relations;
> (b) Close their ports to all vessels flying the South African flag;
> (c) Enact legislation to prohibit their ships from entering South African ports;
> (d) Boycott all South African goods, and refrain from exporting goods, including all arms and ammunition, to South Africa;
> (e) Refuse landing and passage facilities to all aircraft belonging to South Africa and companies registered under the laws of South Africa.[9]

Throughout the United Nations' history, the failure of economic resolutions has been due to the reluctance of the members to enforce the resolutions. A table compiled for the Nineteenth Session of the General Assembly comparing the trade statistics of Member States with South Africa for 1962 and 1963 shows that many nations from the continents of Europe, America, and Asia chose to ignore resolution 1761 (XVII) and have not curtailed trade relations as suggested.[10]

South Africa occupies a unique position in the international economic community; it mines and sells over half of the world's gold.[11] South Africa is rich in other minerals that are necessary to the Western powers for defense and those that are necessary to the private sector for the manufacturing of consumer goods. In addition, several Western countries have invested heavily in business and industry throughout South Africa, since its economy is not only profitable but

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[9] General Assembly Resolution 1761 (XVII), 6 November 1962.

[10] See Appendix, Table I, pages 57-62.

[11] Thompson, p. 1.

also stable. South Africa has a lower tax on dividends at source (7½ per cent) than her trading partners. Some examples are: Australia, whose tax on dividends at source is 15 per cent; Germany, 30 per cent; Switzerland and the United States, 38 3/4 per cent.[12]

Those countries abiding by the resolutions have stopped trading with South Africa, only to leave a vacuum in the South African market that was readily filled by nations not so keenly opposed to South Africa's racial policies. It is clear, therefore, economic advantage has become more important than the moral conscience of nations.

An effort to provide greater pressure on South Africa brought about resolution 1899 (XVIII),[13] which calls on Member States to stop selling petroleum and petroleum products to South Africa. Such a boycott could not only be more easily enforced, but would also have had a greater effect on South Africa, since the Republic imports all its oil needs. An effective embargo of foreign oil supplies would progressively halt all forms of economic activity in South Africa.[14]

Resolution 1899 (XVIII) like the previous resolution was not effective. South Africa continued to import quantities of oil from the United States and Great Britain, but the majority of its crude oil came from Iran.[15] Again the reason why the Member States refused to comply was economic, and the United Nations again was unable to force South Africa to change its racial policy.

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[12]Colin and Margaret Legum, p. 125.

[13]General Assembly Resolution 1899 (XVIII), 13 November 1963.

[14]Colin and Margaret Legum, p. 286.

[15]"South Africa's Need for Oil," Petroleum Press Service, XXXIV (December, 1967), p. 456.

Despite existing resolutions against South Africa, foreign busi-
nessmen have invested large sums of money in South Africa and have con-
tinued to show full faith in its economic and political future. Such
businessmen as Mr. Charles Englehard, chairman of the American South
African Investment Company; Dr. Z. L. Rabid, director of export promo-
tion for Barton and Sons Limited; and a leading West German financier,
Dr. Hermann J. Abs, have gone on record in support of South African
economy, discounting the seriousness of its political situation.[16]

It was recognized at the UN in 1963 that in order for economic
resolutions to work every Member State would have to stop trading with
South Africa.[17] With the African nations pressing for stiffer action
to be taken by the United Nations against South Africa, the decision
was made to further isolate South Africa from the international com-
munity by its expulsion from the specialized agencies and the denial of
financial or economic assistance by international financial institu-
tions. As a result, three resolutions were passed during the Twenty-
second and Twenty-third sessions of the General Assembly to stop the
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development from loaning money to the Republic of South Africa,
and for the specialized agencies to withhold assistance of any kind to
the Republic until it abandoned the policies of apartheid.[18]

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[16]Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, 21
September-22 December 1965, Agenda Item 36, pp. 19-20.

[17]Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, 17
September- 17 December 1963, Annexes, Agenda Item 30, p. 47.

[18]General Assembly Resolutions 2307 (XXII) 13 December 1967; 2326
(XXII) 17 December 1967; and, 2426 (XXIII) 18 December 1968.

The Republic of South Africa has been expelled from active member-
ship of all the international specialized agencies, with the exception
of the International Telecommunications Union, whose provisions do not
allow for expulsion of members, and the Universal Postal Union, whose
members voted against expelling South Africa on 9 July 1964 by a vote
of 58 to 56 with 5 delegations absent.[19]

This limited isolation has failed to persuade the Republic of
South Africa to change its racial policies. Yet it cannot be said that
South Africa does not fear this attempt to isolate it. Even though
its economy is booming, South Africa fears isolation. Due to this
fear, South Africa has begun a new foreign policy that is intended to
counteract the political objectives of the United Nations. This for-
eign policy is called the "Outward-Looking" policy. Its intention is
to extend goodwill to the black independent nations directly north of
South Africa and to create buffer states as a protection from guerilla
incursions into South Africa's northern borders. Mr. Basie Van Rens-
burg, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, pointed out that to allow the
isolation of South Africa "could be playing directly into the hands of
our enemies because they wish to isolate South Africa in the hope that
it might lead to military and violent interference in our domestic af-
fairs."[20]

South African officials quickly point out that the "Outward Look-
ing" policy does not mean that South Africa intends to rescind its

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[19]Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session,
1964-1965, Annexes, Agenda Item 12, p. 99.

[20]Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth session,
1968, Supplement 25, p. 88.

policies of apartheid.

Malawi is the first independent black nation to which South Africa has applied successfully its "Outward-Looking" policy. The two nations have entered into cooperation as members of the African continent.[21] South Africa has extended aid to Malawi to help develop its Civil Service,[22] and medical aid in the form of conferences and advice.[23] Malawi seems to be greatful for the South African aid, and there is no sign that this independent black nation has been offended by South Africa's racial policy. The Ivory Coast also has indicated a willingness to enter into discussions with South Africa.

The United Nations' efforts to halt South Africa's policies have not stopped with the unsuccessful economic trade embargoes. In recent years the United Nations has passed and implemented resolutions to educate the world about apartheid.

In 1966 the General Assembly considered the establishment of a "Unit on Apartheid" to study and disseminate information concerning racial discrimination, especially apartheid. This action was implemented through resolution 2144 (XXI) on 26 October 1966.[24]

The "Unit on Apartheid" has been active in its role to expose apartheid through films, publications and the use of the mass media. The "Unit on Apartheid" is reported to have considered a radio network to be known as Radio Free Africa.

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[21]"Vorster Stresses Cooperation," News From South Africa, (No Vol. Listed), (May 26, 1970), p. 1.

[22]"Klopper on Aid to Malawi," (August 6, 1969), p. 3.

[23]"Tobias Offers Aid to Malawi."

[24]General Assembly Resolution 2144 (XXI), 26 October 1966.

The United Nations, in an effort to further the peaceful fight against apartheid and help those injured by it, in 1968 created a Trust Fund for: (a) persons persecuted for taking part in the campaign against apartheid; (b) relief for their dependents; (c) education for dependents; and, (d) relief for South African refugees.[25] Financial assistance for refugees of apartheid has been provided for since 1964, but few countries have contributed financially to help these people.[26] The 1968 resolution has not fared much better.

The United Nations' most overt action in its twenty-four year struggle to encourage racial desegration in South Africa has come within the last few years. The United Nations has indirectly recognized through several resolutions the guerilla activity of South African nationals and other people opposed to the purpose of the governments of South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonies. These resolutions were intended to condemn anti-liberation action by the Republic of South Africa, such as the Rivonia political treason trial. General Assembly resolution 1881 (XVII) asked that South Africa free its political prisoners and stop all political trials.[27] When South Africa failed to heed these UN resolutions, the General Assembly produced two more resolutions. Resolution 2394 (XXIII) condemned the use of a capital punishment against people who opposed apartheid in South Africa, Rhodesia, and Nambia (South West Africa).[28] Resolution 2396 (XXIII)

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[25] General Assembly Resolution 2397 (XXIII), 2 December 1968.

[26] General Assembly Resolution 1978 (XVIII), 16 December 1963.

[27] General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, p. 10.

[28] General Assembly Resolution 2394 (XXIII), 26 November 1968.

called upon all Member States and independent organizations to give

moral, political and material assistance to the South African libera-

tion movements. The resolution also asked that the members of these

movements caught by South African or Rhodesian officials be treated as

prisoners of war according to the 1949 Geneva Convention.[29]

Feeling isolated and faced with the recognition of the cause of

the underground groups, South Africa has increased its military expen-

diture. South African officials have recognized the existence of a

"fifth column" within their country. In 1962 Major-General Sir Francis

De Guingand said, "As regards a fifth column, I hope we have sufficient

internal forces to deal with that."[30] In 1963 the Verwoerd government

took the view that South Africa was faced with "a black invasion from

the north."[31] For the 1964-65 fiscal year, Parliament has been asked

to approve a defense and security budget of $362.7 million, which is

more money than was spent by South Africa on defense during World War

II.[32]

The Republic of South Africa has been working on plans to become

self-sufficient in the manufacture of weapons for its own defense. Be-

fore South Africa can attain self-sufficiency it must have the coopera-

tion of other countries to supply the weapons it needs and to license

South Africa to make certain weapons within its borders.

The United States announced during the Eighteenth session of the

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[29]General Assembly Resolution 2396 (XXIII), 2 December 1968.

[30]Colin and Margaret Legum, p. 204.

[31]Ibid., p. 205.

[32]Robert Conley, "South Africa Building Military Forces to A
Peak," New York Times (March 20, 1964), p. 4.

General Assembly that:

> It has adopted and is enforcing the policy of forbidding
> the sale to the South African Government of arms and
> military equipment, whether from Government or Commer-
> cial sources, which can be used by that Government to
> enforce apartheid either in South Africa or in the Ad-
> ministration of South West Africa. It expects to bring
> to an end the sale of all military equipment to the
> Government of South Africa by the end of 1963.[33]

Great Britain has had difficulty in stopping the sale of arms to

South Africa due to extensive arms contracts which come under exten-

sions to the Simonstown Base Agreement.[34] The sale of arms to South

Africa has now ceased although the present British Government is recon-

sidering this matter.

South Africa does get arms, ammunition and military vehicles from

other countries, mainly Belgium, France, and Italy. South Africa is

now building military aircraft which at one time were made from com-

ponents imported from Britain and Italy and assembled in South Africa.[35]

South Africa since 1968 has had its own guided missile, which was part-

ly financed by the French government with technical aid supplied by a

French electronics firm.[36] The Defense Minister, P. W. Botha, announced

to the South African Senate on 12 March 1968 that South Africa had de-

veloped its own napalm bomb, and that the country was self-sufficient

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[33]General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, p. 9.

[34]Eric A. Walker, A History of Southern Africa (London, 1957), p. 573. The Simonstown Agreement is a defense agreement concluded by Great Britain with South Africa in February, 1921, that guarantees to all ships of the British navy at all times the use of the British-built naval dockyard at Simonstown under the protection of South Africa.

[35]Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, 17 October, 1967, Agenda Item 31, p. 123.

[36]Report A/7625 of Special Committee to the General Assembly appearing in the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, p. 82.

in a wide range of weapons such as rifles, mortars, ammunition, grenades, smoke bombs, aerial bombs, and explosives and apparatus.[37]

France has sold submarines to South Africa and trained the men who will man them. But South Africa refuses to remain dependent on other countries for its naval supplies and, as a result, has begun talks with Mr. Cornelis Verholme, Chairman of the Verholme United Shipyards of the Netherlands. The latter reported that his company plans to construct a shipyard near Cape Town that will be able to build ships weighing 300,000 tons of dead weight and would be capable of building submarines also.[38]

The Security Council has also joined the other United Nations bodies in trying to make South Africa abandon its racial policies. Although a late-comer to such efforts, its resolutions have never gone beyond suggestions. Since the African nations' summit conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 1963, which produced the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Security Council has been under pressure to either take action to expel the Republic of South Africa from the United Nations, or invoke Chapter VII of the Charter to make all resolutions passed by the Security Council and the General Assembly mandatory to Member States to enforce the resolutions.

Expulsion has to many African delegations been the ideal action to take against South Africa, since it has for years refused to heed the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly or the Security Council. The Ghanaian delegation was the first to introduce such a resolution at

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[37]Report A/6864 of Special Committee to the General Assembly appearing in the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, p. 124.

[38]Ibid., p. 123.

the Special Political Committee's 327th meeting. The Congolese delega-
tion (Leopoldville) supported such action, since South Africa had re-
fused to obey the many resolutions asking it to cease its practice of
apartheid.

The movement for the ouster of South Africa from the United Na-
tions appeared at first to be widely supported by many of the small
"neutral" nations. The great powers and a few of these nations did not
go along. Mali, an African nation, during the 336th meeting argued
against the expulsion of South Africa. Mali's delegate, Mr. Toure, said
that:

> ...expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations would
> not be enough to induce that country to abandon its policy
> of apartheid. The delegation...believed that South Africa
> would be more sensitive to economic sanctions, since its
> expolitation of African labor was the basis of South Afri-
> can economic interests.[39]

Mr. Plimpton of the United States pointed out that expelling South
Africa from the United Nations would take her away from the one place
that the full weight of world public opinion could be brought to bear.
He said that apartheid could not be terminated by diminishing South
African contact with the outside world, but only by expanding South
Africa's contacts.[40]

France ably capped the discussion by drawing an analogy between
the United Nations and a family. Mr. Millet said that the UN was not a
club where one chose one's friends, but a family, and one does not
choose one's relations. Thus, South Africa would be least likely to
pay attention to the wishes of the United Nations after being expelled

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[39] General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, p. 52.

[40] Ibid., p. 38.

from it.[41]

The debate to expel the Republic of South Africa took place one year before the debate to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter in order to make all UN resolutions binding on Member States. This debate occurred in the Security Council between July and August, 1963. Security Council Resolution 181 (1963)[42] did not invoke Chapter VII of the Charter, nor did it express the belief that apartheid in South Africa was a threat to international peace and security. The Security Council meeting marked the beginning of collective action on the part of African nations to stop verbal condemnation of apartheid and demand concerted action by the United Nations to end apartheid in South Africa, yet it failed to produce such action.[43]

This irritated the delegates representing the African nations, who worked hard to point out the danger South Africa presented to their continent. They denounced the military buildup within that country. Mr. Quaison-Sakey of Ghana at that meeting tried to show the anxiety felt by the African nations due to the South African arms build up. He quoted President Nkrumah's address to the Ghanaian Parliament on 21 June 1963:

> Have they asked why so many small arms should be needed
> for the protection of South African whites? For what
> purpose do these States consider that aparthied in South
> Africa requires aircraft capable of, and designed for,
> carrying nuclear rockets and weapons? The 'Buccaneer'
> aircraft, with its limited range, and about which there
> has recently been controversy in Britain, is not such
> as could be employed against say, the Soviet Union or

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[41]Ibid., p. 55.

[42]Security Council Resolution 181 (1963), 7 August 1963.

[43]Colin and Margaret Legum, p. 236.

the United States of America. Against whom on the African
continent, then, are they intended to be employed? There
are questions all the independent African States are asking
and would like to have answered.[44]

Mr. Quaison-Sakey pointed out,

One need not be a military strategist to see the threat
that this huge military build-up in South Africa is posing
to the African States. One aspect of this is the likeli-
hood that this will generate an arms race development, be-
cause, as we all know, African States today need all their
resources for their economic and social development to
raise the standard of living of their peoples.[45]

The African delegates also expressed displeasure with the Western powers

who were continuing to trade with South Africa and supply it with mili-

tary equipment without any apparent care as to what the weapons were

intended for.

The United States, Britain and France were not willing to accept

the argument that the arms build-up or the racial policy of apartheid

in South Africa were reasons to believe that South Africa's action was

a serious danger to international peace and security. Mr. Stevenson,

the United States delegate, pointed out that the impasse with South Af-

rica should be dealt with in the way the impasse between the United

States and the Soviet Union over the nuclear test ban treaty was

broken.[46] That is, that the US and the USSR came to a mutual agreement

concerning the testing of nuclear weapons after months of talking

rather than other less satisfying actions that may not have resulted in

the mutual agreement.

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[44]Security Council, Official Records, S/PV, 1052, Eighteenth Year,
2 August 1963, p. 7.

[45]Ibid.

[46]Ibid., p. 17.

The Western powers' argument was not satisfactory to the African nations but, not wishing to risk a permanent member veto, the delegates did not press their demand that the phrase "apartheid was a serious danger to international peace and security" be inserted, nor did they force the issue of invoking Chapter VII of the Charter.

After the resolution with the appropriate changes demanded by the Western nations was adopted by the Security Council (9-0-2, France and Great Britain abstaining), Mr. Yost, the United States representative, expressed his thanks to the sponsors for changing the wording of the eighth preambular paragraph from "is seriously endangering international peace and security" to "is seriously disturbing international peace and security."[47] The United States further stressed that the resolution did not invoke Chapter VII of the Charter, as that Chapter VII "does not speak in terms of disturbances of the peace, even serious ones, but only of actual threats to the peace or breaches of peace or acts of aggression."[48] Mr. Yost practically took the U.S. out of the resolution when he closed his address with the observation that the United States did not consider paragraphs two and three[49] as being

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[47] Security Council, Official Records, S/PV, 1056, Eighteenth Year, 7 August 1963, p. 6.

[48] Ibid.

[49] (2) Calls upon the Government of South Africa to abandon the policies of apartheid and discrimination, as called for in Security Council Resolution 134 (1960), and to liberate all persons imprisoned, interned to subjected to other restrictions for having opposed the policy of apartheid;
(3) Solemnly calls upon all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms and ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa.

mandatory.[50] Faced with this, the African delegations chose to bide

their time, allowing the West to make verbal concessions to them on the

question of apartheid.[51]

The United Nations has continued to actively condemn apartheid

through non-binding recommendations. Although some Members have not

given up their efforts to encourage other nations to support the econo-

mic resolutions against South Africa, the emphasis has now shifted to

propaganda pressures on South Africa. The "Unit on Apartheid" is now

operating to inform the world about South Africa's domestic racial poli-

cies and about the United Nations' efforts to persuade South Africa to

abandon its apartheid policies.

The United Nations has not been as successful as the African dele-

gations hoped it would be when they asked for more stringent condemna-

tions against South Africa. Failing to accept apartheid as a threat to

their security, the Member States still prefer moral condemnations to

serious action. South Africa seems to have won a little more time to

prove that:

> (a) separate development--apartheid--is the right answer
> for South Africa; (b) apartheid's internal contradictions
> will prove it unworkable and that other solutions, such
> as racial federation of a qualified franchise, can then be
> investigated; or (c) in any case South Africa's economic
> boom will eventually force integration.[52]

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[50]Security Council, Eighteenth Year, p. 7.

[51]Colin and Margaret Legum, p. 238.

[52]Frederick Hunter, "Quite Simmers in South Africa," Christian
Science Monitor, June 9, 1970, p. 6.

CHAPTER IV

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND APARTHEID

The African unity or Pan-African movement has existed since the
1940's. For a time it was the special project of Ghana's former Presi-
dent Kwame Nkrumah, but now Pan-Africanism comes in many forms which
are usually based on regional concepts. For example, the Union of Afri-
can States and Malagasy (UAM) (the Brazzaville twelve and Monrovia
group) was comprised of the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Niger,
the Central African Republics, Congo (Brazzaville), Chad, Cameroom,
Gabon, Senegal, Malagasy, and Mauritania. The Monrovia group was a
conservative group believing in equality among nations, non-intervention
in internal affairs and respect of sovereignty.[1] The Casablanca group
was a small group comprising of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the
United Arab Republic. The Casablanca group was a radical, leftward
oriented, anti-colonial and socialistic group.[2]

In 1963, Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia invited the African
heads of state and foreign ministers to Addis Ababa to discuss African
unity. Two plans were discussed. The first was Nkrumah's plan of the
continental government of Africa; the second was Emperor Haile Selas-
sie's plan to organize a body that would function as the foundation for

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[1]Rupert Emerson, "Pan-Africanism," Governing in Black Africa.
Marion E. Doro & Newell M. Stultz, eds. (Englewood Cliffs, 1970), p. 321.

[2]Ibid.

African unity by acting as a mediator of disputes and as council for
the settlement of African problems.

African unity was not the only question to discuss at Addis Ababa.
Other important questions to Africans were considered and proposals
were submitted in an effort to find a solution to the problem of white-
minority governments in South Africa and Rhodesia and colonialism in
the Portuguese territories of Africa. Addressing himself to these
problems Haile Selassie called on the delegates to remember:

> Our liberty is meaningless unless all Africans are free.
> Our brothers in the Rhodesias, in Mozambique, in Angola,
> in South Africa, cry out in anguish for our support and
> assistance. It would be betrayal were we to pay lip
> service to the cause of their liberation and fail to
> back our words with action...[3]

Although the Addis Ababa conference was only intended to discuss
problems, it nevertheless did produce a resolution condemning the racial
activities of South Africa and charged the thirty-two independent Afri-
can nations to: (a) boycott South Africa and Portuguese trade; (b)
break off diplomatic relations with South Africa and Portugal; (c) deny
the use of African airport facilities to ships flying Portuguese or
South African flags; and directing itself to the Great powers, called
on them to, (d) stop direct or indirect support of Portugal and South
Africa.[4] President Sekou Toure of Guinea, realizing that nations are
ready to produce verbal and written moral condemnations but not enforce
them, cautioned the Member States not to pass resolutions they did not
intend to enforce, for such an act would be fatal to the

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[3]Haile Selassie I, "Towards African Unity," The Journal of Modern
African Studies I (September, 1963), p. 282.

[4]Writer is ready to supply the source which cannot be credited.

organization.[5] A Sanctions Bureau was formed to follow up the matter

and to bring to the attention of the Member States any failure on their

part to enforce any or all the resolutions of the OAU, considering that

like most organizations whose membership is made up of sovereign states,

the enforcement of the OAU resolutions was left up to the governments

of the Member States.[6]

The Organization of African Unity also established a special com-

mittee to coordinate liberation movement activities against the colonial

and racist regimes in southern Africa.[7] Various African states volun-

teered training camps, men and supplies to the liberation movement. A

budget of $4,200,000 was pledged, but in the long run only $675,000 was

received, which was contributed by Algeria and Nigeria.[8]

One might say that the expectations were high and the spirit of

the new African organization great, but in spite of that, Emperor

Selassie was left to establish a secretariat and convert the "paper or-

ganization into a working entity" without being provided the money to

pay for the approved project.[9]

Only one part of the four part 1963 resolution was enforced and

that was the denial of the use of African air space to South African

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[5]Ibid.

[6]John Markakis, "The Organization of African Unity," The Journal
of Modern African Studies, IV (October, 1966), p. 151.

[7]Southern Africa includes South Africa, Rhodesia, Angolia, and
Mozambique.

[8]Clyde Sanger, "Toward Unity in Africa," Foreign Affairs, XLII
(January 2, 1964), pp. 277-78.

[9]Jay Walz, "Africa's Unity Charter," The New York Times (May 27,
1963), p. 8.

companies. This prohibition increased the operating costs of South Af-
rican companies by 25 per cent.[10] At the conference at Lagos in 1964,
the African delegates were so pleased with the results, however minimal
they might appear, that they began preparing another resolution for
consideration by the Heads of State and Government Assembly at its Cairo
meeting in July, 1964. The resolution was to provide for the banning
of all shipping and air companies which continue to serve South Africa
from overflying Africa and using African ports and airports.[11]

Such a rise in costs may not have meant much under normal opera-
ting conditions, but South Africa during this time was undergoing an
economic crisis. It was suffering from a large outflow of capital as
well as budgetary inflation, credit inflation, and protectionist in-
flation all at the same time.[12] That is why the ability to aggravate
economic conditions in South Africa was considered to be an OAU accom-
plishment.

Haile Selassie, the "father" of the OAU, admonished his colleagues
for having overlooked the more important aspects of the organization.
In a speech in Cairo, he stressed his desire to see the OAU become re-
sponsible for building Africa into a modern continent through coopera-
tive deeds such as a common economic market that would break down trade
barriers and coordinate plans for internal as well as international
trade, instead of spending their time passing more and more resolutions

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[10]Writer is ready to supply the source which cannot be credited.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Norman Macrea, "A Survey," The Economist, CCXXVII (June 29,
1968), pp. xxvii-xxviii.

on racial problems.[13]

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government paid no attention to the Emperor. Although they did reject the resolution formulated by the Council of Foreign Ministers in Lagos, they did resolve to place an embargo on the sale and delivery of petroleum products to South Africa.[14] They, for all practical purposes, dismissed President Sekou Toure's (Guinea) cautions about the passage of resolutions that could not be enforced and seem to have accepted President Apithy's (Dahomey) excuse for failure to fully implement the 1963 resolution. He had told the Assembly:

> Our half failure is partly due to the fact that we adopted them without preparation. We did not take the time to examine our statistics for foreign trade with Portugal and South Africa, and to arrange for other markets to replace them.[15]

The Ghanaian Times had an eye on the future when it said after the Foreign Ministers meeting at Lagos that "...nine months of post Addis Ababa has proved beyond a doubt that the OAU is inadequate for...political decisions in Africa,"[16] since 1965 was the year of reckoning for the OAU and its fight against the blacklisted southern African states.

Perhaps the existence of the Liberation Committee was too much of a temptation for antagonistic African statesmen to overlook the propaganda advantages available from the presence of refugees and training

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[13]Walz, "African Leaders Assail Two Nations," The New York Times (July 19, 1964), p. 3.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Writer is ready to supply the source which cannot be credited. Also see Appendix, Table II, pages 63-65.

[16]Ibid.

camps in many African states and they readily used them in the propaganda war among the African states. That is perhaps why, President Sekou Toure said, "The OAMCE was created with the unconfessed aim of weakening African unity."[17]

Regardless of their real motives, nine members of the Union of African States and Malagasy (UAM) decided not to attend the OAU conference to be held in Accra, Ghana in October, 1965. The reasons they gave for the boycott was that Ghana was training refugees to return to their homelands to overthrow the existing governments.

At a Council of Ministers meeting in Lagos, called especially to settle this dispute, Ghana refused to be intimidated by its antagonists. Ghana's spokesman, Foreign Minister Kojo Botsio, denied the existence of any training camps in Ghana, but he reassured the delegates that Ghana would take the necessary precautions to insure the safety and happiness of all delegates in Accra.

Despite Ghana's profuse assurances of safety, the governments of the Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo, Upper Volta, and Dahomey refused to send delegates to the Accra meeting because of reports that Ghana was harboring refugees trained in Red China to be launched in attacks against the government of Niger.

The eighteen OAU delegations met to decide, among other things, what role the OAU would play if Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence of Britain. The decision of the OAU was to warn Britain and the white-minority government of Rhodesia that political and economic measures would be taken if the Rhodesian government were to make a

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[17]Ibid.

Unilateral Declaration of Independence.[18]

With its reputation on the line, the OAU had to consider the fiscal side of its responsibility. With the Secretariat of the OAU in arrears by $2.5 million,[19] and half of the thirty-six members not paying at all and six paying only part of their dues,[20] the organization nevertheless failed to provide funds for the Secretariat or the Liberation Committee. The Liberation Committee was organized to provide direction for the freedom fighters in their war against apartheid and the Portuguese colonies in southern Africa.

The Liberation Committee, as well as the OAU itself, was viewed at the time as a panacea for African troubles, with high expectations for a quick victory over the white governments of southern Africa. Such expectations were echoed by Sir Ubabukar Balewa of Nigeria, who said, "as long as parts of Africa suffer under the humiliating yoke of colonialism and apartheid, our freedom and independence will not be complete."[21] Sekou Toure, President of Guinea, was heard to say that the Liberation Committee should set a deadline for the colonists of Mozambique and Angola and the racists of South Africa and Rhodesia to be out of southern Africa or "African armies should intervene" in "self-defense."[22]

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[18]Ibid.

[19]Lloyd Garrison, "Meeting in Accra Winds up Quietly," The New York Times (October 27, 1965), p. 9.

[20]Lloyd Garrison, "Debts Endanger African Group," The New York Times (October 25, 1965), p. 22; and "Africans Seek Unity Formula," The New York Times (October 24, 1965), Sec. IV, p. 4.

[21]Writer is prepared to supply the source which cannot be credited.

[22]Ibid.

But the Liberation Committee became, instead, a political football that was kicked about by different African nations, which were either left out of the Committee or had other reasons for wanting to obstruct action. Ghana was never satisfied with the activity of the Committee and accused it of being inefficient and, therefore, refused to support it financially.[23] The Union of African States and Malagasy sought to discredit the Liberation Committee by charging that it not only endeavored to overthrow the governments of the white-minority countries, but also of black independent nations with which it did not agree.[24]

It is surprising therefore to see the individual delegates, as the Assembly of Heads of State and Government closed in Accra, rejoice at the apparent progress of the summit conference. Prime Minister Margai of Sierra Leone said that the conference was the first real working conference.[25] President Sekou Toure of Guinea applauded the progress made with respect to resoultions on South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonies.[26] The general atmosphere was one of optimism despite the lack of attendance and the problems faced by the organization. The OAU as well as the Liberation Committee continued to have financial difficulties,[27] and the Liberation Committee was in need of reconstruction.

Rhodesia declared its independence of Britain on 12 November 1965

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[23]Arnold Rivikin, "The Organization of African Unity," Current History, XLVIII (April, 1965), p. 240.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Writer is ready to supply source which cannot be credited.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Ibid.

and the OAU had to decide how to implement the political and economic resolutions taken in October. The Council of Ministers met in December and it decided to serve an ultimatum on Britain to solve the Rhodesian crisis or be faced with a mass breaking of diplomatic relations by all African nations. Ultimately only nine of the thirty-four members did so. Having failed to pursue effective measures the responsibility for the enforcement of sanctions on Rhodesia passed from the OAU to Britain.

The Liberation Committee proved to be both inept and incompetent. Its purpose was to work to overthrow the colonial powers in Mozambique and Angola and the white-minority governments of Rhodesia and South Africa, but in planning its strategy the Liberation Committee seemed to forget that there were black independent nations whose economic existence depended on the blacklisted southern African countries. Malawi, as explained in the previous chapter, was willing to trade with those countries, since its economic well-being depended on it, regardless of how such action was received by the other independent African states. Zambia, on the other hand, would have preferred to adhere to the recommendations of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, but was unable to do so because of its dependence on Rhodesia, Mozambique and South Africa for trade and transportation. One must not forget that Zambia is the second largest copper producer in the world,[28] but is landlocked and depends on the railways of Rhodesia and Mozambique to get its copper to a seaport; thus Zambia is at the mercy of two countries it has publically critized.

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[28]Pierre-Albin Marter and Pierrer Chassing, eds., _Africa 69/70_ (New York, 1969), p. 195.

A few days before Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Indepen-
dence, an Anglo-American aviation team studied the possibility that
Zambia might be able to handle a Berlin-type airlift in the case of an
emergency, but it was found that Zambia's two airstrips were not suf-
ficient to cope with such traffic.[29]

When Rhodesia did announce its independence the United Nations in
1966 instituted an oil embargo that not only cut off Rhodesia's oil
supply, but also that of Zambia. It was at this time that the OAU
recognized Zambia's economic problems and established a Solidarity Com-
mittee to help Zambia in its hour of need.[30] Whether Zambia can rely
on the Solidarity Committee remains to be seen. Zambia has been busy
working on alternate actions.

In the latter half of 1965, Zambia applied to the World Bank for a
loan to build a railway to Tanzania for its copper shipments, but was
turned down.[31] Britain and Canada volunteered to survey a possible
route for a railway, but made no promise to build the line. In 1967,
Red China agreed to build the railroad for 100 million pounds interest
free.[32] The Chinese are now building this railway.

The Council of Foreign Ministers met in March, 1966, to try to
patch up the differences between those states that had followed the De-
cember resolution and broken diplomatic relations with Britain and those

[29]Writer is ready to supply the source which cannot be credited.

[30]Anirudha Gupta, "The Rhodesian Crisis and the Organization of
African Unity," International Studies (New Delhi) IX, (July, 1967-
April, 1968), p. 61.

[31]Writer is ready to supply the source which cannot be credited.

[32]Martel and Chassing, p. 195.

that had not. They came to a decision to draw up a resolution to pro-
vide a way for the nine states to re-establish relations with Britain
without losing face. Four delegations withdrew from the meeting on the
eve of the discussion of the resolution--Mali, Guinea, Tanzania, and
the UAR.[33] The following morning three more delegations left--Somalia,
Algeria and Kenya--with the Mauritanian delegation remaining but not
participating.[34] The walkouts shook the remaining delegations, who
later decided to strike the offensive resolution from the record. It
was decided to pass two more moralistic resolutions concerning Rhodesia
and South Africa, and not to mention the failure of the December, 1965
resolution again.[35]

The omission of a formal mention of the 1965 resolution to break
relations with Britain did not help the status of the OAU nor did it
mend the antaganistic feelings among the delegations for the up coming
November meeting. Two new resolutions were approved concerning Rho-
desia and South Africa. These established the Solidariaty Committee,
resolved to fight colonialism and racism, deplored the increase in
trade with South Africa by France, Italy, West Germany and Japan,[36] and
finally resolved to continue the fight against racism and colonialism.

The record shows that while the OAU and other African groups can
freely talk about ethical actions against South Africa, they are

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[33]Drew Middleton, "More Countries Quit African Talk," The New York
Times (March 5, 1966), p. 2.

[34]Ibid.

[35]"African Parley Mutes Rhodesia Stand," The New York Times (March
6, 1966), p. 9.

[36]Ibid.

unwilling to take political actions that conform with their moralist intentions. The efforts of the OAU to imitate the UN with similar resolutions has magnified the problems both of them have had to face since 1948, nations have tended to be very moralistic at international forums, but when the time comes for them to initiate actions, the nations suddenly become amoral and they seek action based on national interests and security and naturally fail to enforce their promises.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis tested the hypothesis that nations will not resort to
effective pressure against other nations unless the policies of those
nations threaten their national security. This being the case we
should not expect effective action from an international organization
to force the Republic of South Africa to rescind its apartheid policies
in the foreseeable future. In testing this hypothesis, we considered
apartheid at both the United Nations and the Organization of African
Unity. We have seen how certain Member States have attempted to rally
support for sanctions against South Africa by charging that apartheid
is a threat to world peace and security. They then asked the United
Nations and the Organization of African Unity to apply their legal,
economic and political influence against the Republic of South Africa
in order to compel it to change its racial policies. In each case the
results were very minimal.

The Republic of South Africa is an independent nation which has
accepted the Charter of the United Nations. As a Member State the Re-
public has certain rights and obligations, one of which is the "domes-
tic jurisdiction" clause which exempts the domestic actions of a Member
State from international scrutiny and could in fact be intrepreted to
support the Republic's right to practice apartheid. Article II, para-
graph 7 of the Charter states:

> Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
> the United Nations to intervene in matters which are es-
> sentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state
> or shall require the Members to submit such matters to
> settlement under the present Charter...[1]

South Africa has as such considered all these resolutions condemn-

ing it or establishing embargoes by the United Nations as being ultra

vires of the United Nations's Charter. The Organization of African

Unity's Charter has a provision similar to that of Article II, para-

graph 7 of the United Nations Charter: "The Member States...solemnly

affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles:...(2)

non-interference in the internal affairs of states..."[2] Since the

Charters of the UN and the OAU do not give them jurisdiction over the

internal affairs of a sovereign nation, it could be argued that they do

not have legal grounds to sanction South Africa on its apartheid poli-

cies.

The Republic of South Africa may be within its legal rights to de-

termine what domestic policies it wants to follow, even if this includes

a racial philosophy, nevertheless the world community has established

through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights norms it wants the

nations to follow, in order to protect and guarantee certain elementary

freedoms to all peoples. Because this does not lie within the area of

political necessity for the survival of the national interests, nations

have used such Declarations to acquire approbation from other nations

in the international community, even if these Declarations still await

ratification. As a result, the United Nations and the Organization of

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[1] United Nations Charter, Article II, paragraph 7.

[2] Organization of African Unity Charter, Article II, paragraph 2.

African Unity have passed various resolutions with the purpose of exerting economic and political pressure on the Republic of South Africa. These resolutions have partially isolated the Republic in the economic and communication fields. South Africa's gold exports have insured for it continued trade with Western nations regardless of the economic sanctions and of the differing views on racial issues. Western nations have preferred to continue trade relations while diplomatically attacking South Africa's policy of apartheid. Some of the African states which voted to cease trade with South Africa, have failed to do so either because of their dependence on South Africa or the lack of concern once outside the halls of the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity. Trade statistics given before have demonstrated that many OAU members continued to trade with South Africa. Due to the failure of the UN and the OAU economic embargo resolutions, South Africa does not seem to feel the need to change its racial policies.

The communication embargoes have fared better. They almost isolated South Africa from the world community as witnessed by its ouster from many of the specialized agencies as well as its denied use of many African sea ports and air facilities. Even though the various embargoes have not succeeded in their primary goal, namely to force South Africa to rescind apartheid, they have made that country feel the pinch of isolation. This prompted South Africa to increase its military spending and to embark on a new foreign policy vis-a-vis many independent African states, which seems to be somewhat effective.

Within the United Nations, at the beginning, numerous resolutions were passed which merely condemned South Africa's racial policies. These resolutions appeared to many United Nations Member States to be

sufficient to persuade South Africa to abandon the apartheid policy.

As more African nations became independent during the 1960's pressure

was exerted within the UN to apply sanctions against South Africa.

These sanctions based on ethical considerations were designed to iso-

late South Africa from the world, weaken it militarily and with econom-

ic and social pressure force South Africa to give up its announced

policies. Although the resolutions gained substantial support in the

OAU, and the UN General Assembly and qualified approval in the Security

Council, with many Western nations voting in favor of them, the results

have been meager and ineffectual. Instead of a decrease in South Afri-

can trade, there has been an increase, instead of a decrease in South

Africa's military power there has been an increase, and South Africa is

not so isolated from the world. As a result, the white Nationalist

government of South Africa has not been receptive to United Nations and

Organization of African Unity pressure to modify its racial policy, and

the nations of the world have not backed their moralistic arguments

with effective actions.

Throughout the history of this conflict the African states seems

to have operated along William Zartman's model. He suggests that when

a weaker group of nations, either individually or collectively, comes

into contact with stronger nations, collectively or individually,

usually colonial or former colonial powers, the weaker nations will be-

little the power theory as a basis for international relations and

stress the idealistic theory of justice.[3] Since Africa as a continent

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[3]William Zartman, "Africa as a Subordinate State System in Inter-
national Relations," Governing in Black Africa, eds., Marion E. Doro
and Newell M. Stultz, (Englewood Cliffs, 1970), p. 331.

does not possess necessary power for action it has espoused this theory of justice as a means to bring about its ends vis-a-vis South Africa and the other African problems. To the Africans, this theory of justice proved its validity in a practical manner when the European colonial powers withdrew from the African continent with relatively little actual pressure or power applied to them.[4] This may explain why Africa as a unit rejected the classical means of reaching an end through the adaptation of the "might makes right" theory to the "right makes might" theory, only to be shattered when the more powerful states continued to use the power theory in their relationship with weaker African states. As a result, the ideological outlook on international relations has not helped the OAU in its battle against apartheid in South Africa. Because of the unrealistic nature of this philosophy, the OAU has lost much of its integrity, especially during the Rhodesian crisis. The OAU attempted to apply the "right makes might" notion toward solving the "illegal" independence of Rhodesia. Because the OAU accepted Britain as solely responsible for solving the problem, the OAU presented itself as an organization too weak to cope with the problems it was organized to settle, and so jeopardized its integrity in the world community.

This thesis has studied the actions of two international organizations to overcome a common problem. The methods used by nations-- the ethical-moralistic approach, although proven again and again to be ineffective, seems to be the only method that can rally the support of all the Member States. The main problem is that nations pursue a

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[4]Ibid., p. 332.

policy entrenched in the national interests, and consequently ethical-
moralistic resolutions end up as resolutions with no effective backing
to enforce them.

What about the days ahead for the United Nations and the Organi-
zation of African Unity? The evidence gathered shows that both organi-
zations must overcome many problems before effectiveness can be
achieved. The United Nations cannot assume the responsibility of a
world government and inherit police powers without the approval of all
Member States. If being a world government is the purpose of the UN,
its attempt at the legislation of moral standards has not been success-
ful and will continue to fail as long as an ideological bloc is not
able to control the enforcement of those resolutions by each member
nation.

The big power unaminity the Security Council, has made the Council
the best UN organ to be entrusted with international peace and secur-
ity. As shown in this thesis, the Security Council realizing the
limitations of the world community is not ready to concede that apar-
theid in South Africa is a threat to international peace and security,
and as such has refused to adopt measures that would purge South Africa
of its racial policies.

The Organization of African Unity has not been effective because
of its failure to maintain unity among its members and because of its
clear weakness as a world force. The Organization of African Unity has
therefore competed with the United Nations in its moralistic approach
and the actions it has taken have alternated between weak economic boy-
cotts and lack of political enthusiasm.

South Africa will only reconsider its racial policies once it

faces a world community, whether the UN or the OAU, in which the ef-
fective and influential members honestly believe it is their national
interest to have South Africa change its policy.

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APPENDIX

TABLE I

DIRECTION OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA*

Republic of South Africa: IMPORTS--COUNTRIES:

Country of Origin	1963 Rand	per cent	1962 Rand	per cent
AFRICA				
Morocco	1,399,956	0.1	2,306,485	0.2
Congo (Leopoldville)	21,601,943	1.8	22,540,831	2.3
Congo (Brazzaville)	732,165	0.1	951,771	0.1
Angola	1,481,515	0.1	856,750	0.1
South Africa	2,287,145	0.2	1,241,459	0.1
Rhodesia & Nysasland	32,816,008	2.7	27,478,471	2.7
Mozambique	6,092,091	0.5	2,769,783	0.3
Kenya	4,161,197	0.3	2,423,234	0.2
Other Africa	10,226,493	0.9	9,930,870	1.0
Total, Africa	80,798,513	6.7	70,499,743	7.0
EUROPE				
Norway	4,564,939	0.4	3,582,713	0.4
Sweden	22,023,789	1.8	18,582,713	1.8
Denmark	4,633,599	0.4	3,605,282	0.4
United Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland	361,434,208	30.4	303,040,918	30.3
Belgium	13,746,151	1.1	12,438,655	1.2
Netherlands	30,095,780	2.5	24,823,669	2.5
Federal Republic of Germany	129,675,983	10.3	102,243,323	10.2
France	31,316,398	2.6	21,045,586	2.1
Switzerland	19,615,067	1.6	15,897,824	1.6

*General Assembly Official Records, Nineteenth Session, 1964-1965, Annexes, Agenda Item 12, pp. 121-123.

Table I (Continued)

Country of Origin	1963 Rand	per cent	1962 Rand	per cent
Austria	7,052,425	0.6	6,230,671	0.6
Portugal	2,236,597	0.2	2,402,169	0.2
Spain	1,674,481	0.1	1,232,272	0.1
Italy	34,096,546	0.1	28,811,079	2.9
Finland	5,665,843	0.5	4,621,627	0.5
Eastern Germany	1,785,380	0.1	899,269	0.1
Poland	767,797	0.1	409,473	0.1
Czechoslovakia	3,491,128	0.3	2,697,341	0.3
Hungary	951,244	0.1	799,361	0.1
Other Europe	913,788	0.1	706,863	0.1
Total, Europe	675,742,152	52.2	553,539,747	55.3
AMERICA				
Canada	40,614,763	3.4	24,933,628	2.5
United States	204,519,560	17.0	166,762,610	16.7
Mexico	2,537,962	0.2	2,392,824	0.2
Netherlands Antilles	2,192,035	0.2	1,485,100	0.1
Venezula	529,793	...	1,209,250	0.1
Brazil	6,194,277	0.5	4,716,456	0.5
Uruguay	1,141,688	0.1	1,084,397	0.1
Argentine	1,399,665	0.1	2,400,812	0.2
Peru	650,018	0.1	658,703	0.1
Other America	1,306,086	0.1	1,353,799	0.1
Total, America	261,085,811	21.7	206,997,579	20.7
ASIA				
Israel	1,171,223	0.1	1,179,848	0.1
Saudi Arabia	2,637,309	0.2	3,720,121	0.4
Aden	8,444,896	0.7	10,007,034	1.0
Qatar	2,323,092	0.2	. . . . .	...

Table I (Continued)

Country of Origin	1963 Rand	per cent	1962 Rand	per cent
Bahrain	9,565,680	0.8	9,343,577	0.9
Iraq	1,804,160	0.2	874,020	0.1
Iran	31,063,582	2.6	36,736,892	3.7
Pakistan	12,771,389	1.1	17,019,071	1.7
Ceylon	13,254,567	1.1	12,879,598	1.3
Thailand	663,178	0.1	860,161	0.1
British Borneo	628,222	0.1	502,006	0.1
Hong Kong	7,496,571	0.6	4,493,652	0.4
China	1,815,913	0.2	962,911	0.1
Japan	56,420,036	4.7	41,464,245	4.1
Other Asia	18,135,649	1.5	13,884,491	1.4
Total, Asia	168,195,467	14.0	153,927,627	15.4
OCEANIA				
Australia	12,419,872	1.0	13,739,463	1.4
New Zealand	1,738,651	0.1	1,646,703	0.2
Other Oceania	11,766	...	29,780	...
Total, Oceania	14,170,289	1.2	15,415,946	1.5
Total, All	1,199,992,210	99.8	1,000,380,610	99.9

Total excludes the optional ship stores, parcel post, and customs value of emigrants' effects.

Summary of Imports and Exports of South African produce (excluding space) according to countries of destination, reflecting the percentage that each country hears to the total export or import, along with comparative figures for the corresponding period of the previous year.

Republic of South Africa: EXPORTS--COUNTRIES:

AFRICA

United Arab Republic	401,548	...	627,337	0.1

Table I (Continued)

Country of Origin	1963 Rand	per cent	1962 Rand	per cent
Congo (Leopoldville)	6,137,725	0.7	7,473,293	0.8
Angola	1,137,462	0.1	1,021,245	0.1
Rhodesia & Nyasaland	75,142,477	8.3	84,670,008	9.7
Mozambique	13,705,665	1.5	12,131,767	1.4
Mauritius	3,480,756	0.4	4,173,849	0.5
Kenya	3,850,870	0.4	5,474,023	0.6
Other Africa	3,302,793	0.4	4,032,629	0.5
Total, Africa	107,368,296	11.8	119,604,151	13.8
EUROPE				
Norway	1,957,284	0.2	2,704,552	0.3
Sweden	5,066,322	0.6	5,562,867	0.6
Denmark	784,544	0.1	1,457,992	0.2
Ireland	3,278,218	0.4	1,669,173	0.2
United Kingdom of Great Britain & North Ireland	272,028,414	29.9	241,933,604	27.8
Belgium	38,566,483	4.3	37,866,598	4.4
Netherlands	24,526,870	2.7	25,180,720	2.9
Federal Republic of Germany	49,114,892	5.4	42,759,300	4.9
France	31,422,934	3.5	31,306,238	3.6
Switzerland	5,009,194	0.6	5,713,683	0.2
Austria	1,470,311	0.2	3,045,867	0.3
Portugal	3,403,088	0.4	1,591,357	0.2
Spain	5,948,381	0.7	3,843,817	0.4
Italy	49,322,960	5.4	44,258,626	5.1
Finland	903,683	0.1	1,568,963	0.2
Eastern Germany	2,082,418	0.2	1,627,694	0.2
Poland	2,436,761	0.3	2,122,388	0.2
Czechoslovakia	770,670	0.1	581,463	0.1

Table I (Continued)

| | 1963 | | 1962 | |
Country of Origin	Rand	per cent	Rand	per cent
Albania	648,955	0.1	. . . . .	...
Greece	1,074,442	0.1	1,053,302	0.1
Other Europe	676,512	0.1	1,021,927	0.1
Total, Europe	500,493,399	55.1	456,870,159	52.1
AMERICA				
Canada	13,290,111	1.5	10,385,104	1.2
United States	80,575,740	8.9	78,107,917	9.0
Mexico	4,768,949	0.5	379,474	0.1
Colombia	430,757	...	660,778	0.1
Chile	451,670	...	530,431	0.1
Argentina	1,213,783	0.1	1,578,994	0.2
Other America	1,806,913	0.2	1,934,649	0.3
Total, America	102,537,923	11.3	93,577,347	10.8
ASIA				
Turkey	1,330,435	0.2	1,012,280	0.1
Israel	2,838,517	0.3	2,886,724	0.3
Aden	583,517	0.1	339,664	...
Iraq	451,486	...	802,044	0.1
Iran	613,268	0.1	2,448,111	0.3
Pakistan	794,592	0.1	1,545,140	0.2
Ceylon	1,224,099	0.1	1,768,885	0.2
Thailand	483,629	0.1	468,493	0.1
Hong Kong	8,539,854	0.9	8,627,925	1.0
China	4,263,359	0.5	938,346	0.1
Japan	70,518,246	7.8	72,394,653	8.3
Republic of Korea	11,746,478	1.3	13,749,906	1.6
Total, Asia	103,517,129	11.4	107,474,422	12.5

Table I (Continued)

Country of Origin	1963 Rand	per cent	1962 Rand	per cent
OCEANIA				
Australia	11,717,016	1.3	8,667,057	1.0
British Pacific Island	357,551	...	429,169	0.1
New Zealand	1,628,075	0.2	1,619,888	0.2
Other Oceania	53,903	...	46,237	...
Total, Oceania	13,756,545	1.5	10,763,251	1.2

Excluding the optional ship stores, parcel post and customs value of emigrants' effects.

GRAND TOTAL	827,673,292	91.1	788,289,330	90.4

TABLE II

TOTAL TRADE BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES*

Country	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	Currency
Central African Republic							
Imports	18	12	9	6	11	11	million francs
Exports	39	43	77	77	64	104	C.F.A.
Chad							
Imports		9	9	5	10	12	million francs
Exports		3	0	0	0	117	C.F.A.
Congo (Brazzaville)							
Imports	90	121	95	49	46	48	million francs
Exports	152	167	317	329	297	379	C.F.A.
Congo (Leopoldville)							
Imports	225.1	...	4856	5302	6339	3911	million francs
Exports	23.5	...	2531	3942	6857	1946	
Ghana							thous. new cedis
Imports	0	0	0	4	0	1	(1963-67)
Exports	0	0	0	0	8	0	thous. pounds (1962)
Ivory Coast							
Imports	55	41	...	...	...	...	million francs
Exports	684	779	...	...	...	...	C.F.A.
Kenya							
Imports	3266	2433	23	0	2	0	thous. pounds
Exports	1103	1884	1	0	0	...	

*Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (1962-1967)

Table II (Continued)

Country	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	Currency
Madagascar							
Imports		126.1	135.9	118.9	...	...	millions francs
Exports		14.4	29.3	37.8	...	...	M.G.
Malawi							
Imports			857	1092	1991	1960	thous. pounds
Exports			577	565	557	457	
Mauritius							
Imports		30772	32262	34561	27272	30600	thous. rupees
Exports		1249	2273	11790	1309	3400	
Morocco							
Imports	1.1	1.0	...	...	1.1	2.0	million dirhams
Exports	19.9	10.8	...	...	3.7	2.8	
Nigeria							
Imports	43	5	3	16	3	65	thous. Nigerian
Exports	20	13	19	39	21	40	pounds
Senegal							
Imports	208	211	81	59	20	23	million francs
Exports	33	113	240	341	389	250	C.F.A.
Sudan							
Imports	...	9	1	0	...	...	thous. Sudanese
Exports	...	103	0	0	...	...	pounds

Table II (Continued)

Country	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	Currency
Tanganyika							
Imports	415	181	7	0	0	0	thous. pounds
Exports	837	551	0	...	0	...	
Togo							
Imports	22.8	12.3	15.6	0.1	8.6	0.0	million francs
Exports	19.6	25.3	27.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	C.F.A.
Tunisia							
Imports	1.0	1.1	...	...	...	...	thous. dinars
Exports	251.5	321.4	...	...	...	...	
Uganda							
Imports	385	265	4	0	0	0	thous. pounds
Exports	740	1152	0	0	0	0	
Zambia							
Imports			37736	41984	59954	74543	thous. kwachas
Exports			26400	25008	28112	25594	

VITA γ

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