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POLITICAL CHANGE IN SCOTLAND: THE RISE OF
SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND THE DEVOLUTION
ISSUE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA, PH.D., 1979

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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

POLITICAL CHANGE IN SCOTLAND: THE RISE OF SCOTTISH
NATIONALISM AND THE DEVOLUTION ISSUE

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY






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Norman, Oklahoma

1979

POLITICAL CHANGE IN SCOTLAND: THE RISE OF SCOTTISH
NATIONALISM AND THE DEVOLUTION ISSUE

APPROVED BY

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

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To
Effie and Papa

For
Julia, Christy, and Elaine

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Any errors of judgment or otherwise that have survived, are, as they must be, the responsibility of the author.

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INTRODUCTION

The emergence of a strong, effective nationalist party in Scotland after 260 years of governmental union with England and Wales is an important event for the future of British politics. The Scottish National Party's electoral successes have forced the British political system to consider seriously one of the most potentially significant constitutional and institutional changes in its history. The devolution proposal to grant a legislative assembly to the Scots contains broad implications for the maintenance of parliamentary sovereignty, the traditional unwritten constitution, the unitary governing system, and even the continuation of the United Kingdom as it is currently known.¹ Thus a comprehension of the factors behind this important change is essential for a appreciation of its seriousness.

Furthermore, an understanding of the origins of the contemporary situation in Scotland is of importance in itself. The various explanations that have been proffered as to why the nationalists have been effective, whereas they were politically insignificant only a few years before, are not very convincing. They focus upon

¹The immediate implications of this issue became obvious shortly after this study was completed. On March 28, 1979 the Labour Government lost a vote of confidence primarily because the SNP MPs withdrew their support. This, in turn, precipitated the fall of the Government; the first to fall after such a vote since 1924.

a variety of factors that acknowledge a basis for Scottish distinctiveness within the United Kingdom, such as national identity, or a basis for political grievances, such as Scotland's economic problems, without providing an explanation of their transformation into political action.² Most explanations also assume a continuity between the current nationalist movement and the home rule movement earlier in this century without demonstrating the actual extent of comparability.³ Such approaches as these obscure elements of continuity and discontinuity between the two periods by oversimplifying the complex political changes involved.

The emergence of the SNP and a comprehension of its origins is also of theoretical significance. Britain has long been cited as one of the most integrated and developed political systems. As a consequence, an understanding of why the Scottish nationalists have become so influential, especially in such a short time, may contribute to a broader perspective on similar movements. The utility and

²The following studies can be viewed as having this problem. John E. Schwarz, "The Scottish National Party: Nonviolent Separatism and Theories of Violence," World Politics, 22 (July 1970): 496-517; Tom Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism (London: NLB, 1977).; Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British Nationalism, 1536-1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Roger Allen Brooks, "Scottish Nationalism: Relative Deprivation and Social Mobility" (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1973).

³These studies tend to make this assumption. James G. Kellas, The Scottish Political System. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); H.J. Hanham, Scottish Nationalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969); Christopher Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics, 1707-1977 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977).

meaning of such concepts as political integration, political development, stability, homogeneous societies, fragmented societies, and others commonly used in comparative political analyses are currently being challenged by the presence of such movements in almost every Western political system. Thus an understanding of movements such as the Scottish nationalists may contribute to our theoretical knowledge about politics in these societies by focusing upon factors contributing both to continuity and to change.

There is, consequently, a need for a more complete explanation of the development of the contemporary Scottish nationalist movement and the rise of the devolution issue. Such an exposition can contribute to our knowledge of the current workings of the British political system and the implications of the proposed devolution policies for its future. Moreover, it may broaden our theoretical understanding of the development of nationalism, the policy response patterns of governments faced with similar demands, and the nature of political change itself. The construction of such an explanation is the purpose of this case study.

The thesis of this dissertation is derived from the observation indicated above, that alternative explanations have considered factors of probable importance, but generally failed to delineate how the Scots have come to perceive their national identity or socio-economic conditions to be of political importance. The linkage between perception of these factors and articulation of their political significance is not specified. Studies of nationalism as a historical phenomenon frequently attribute this role of linking perception and

articulation to the rise of the intelligentsia or the middle classes.⁴ That, however, is not the case in Scotland, where it appears that the actions of the SNP, the major British parties and the London government have provided the necessary linkage.

The primary thesis to be developed, consequently, is that the nationalist movement's effectiveness is largely the result of the cumulative effects of the SNP, and the reactions of the British political system to the party and Scotland's socioeconomic conditions. In other words, the rise of Scottish nationalism in recent years is not due solely to the actions of any single class or political actor. It is due, rather, to the combined effects of the activities of the important political participants involved. They have each responded to the decisions and indecisions of the others. This has had the consequences of redefining the political importance of Scottish national identity and the institutional relationships desired within the United Kingdom.

This thesis differs from the more common approaches to the development of nationalism by the extent of its emphasis upon political factors. In this case, the political institutions are the

⁴Anthony Smith places emphasis upon the role of the intelligentsia, as does Tom Nairn. Anthony Smith, Theories of Nationalism (Gerald Duckworth & Company Ltd., 1971; New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1972), pp. 241-46. Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain, pp. 153-5.

mobilizers of the nationalist movement, instead of being only the recipients of its demands. This role of the political is a paradoxical one and is derived from the increased importance of government in today's society. If this proposition is valid, then it has serious implications about the applicability of traditional conceptualizations of nationalism to movements such as the Scottish nationalists and the policies governments might utilize in addressing their demands.

The research approach to be used in developing this thesis is an analysis of the descriptive and empirical studies undertaken by other scholars, combined with an appraisal of the impact of recent political events. The evidence available to conduct this type of study is uneven in its quality and nature. There have been several good pieces on Scottish politics, but most studies have focused primarily upon one of another aspect of the general topic.⁵ More of the recent work has attempted to focus upon important relationships, though, much of it is still basically descriptive as political conditions have been changing rapidly. It should also be noted that there are significant voids in the historical information concerning Scottish politics. Important subjects such as the organizational development the Labour and Liberal Parties in Scotland,

⁵For good analytical considerations of different aspects of Scottish nationalism see: Milton J. Esman, "Scottish Nationalism, North Sea Oil, and the British Response," in Ethnic Conflict in the Western World, ed. Milton J. Esman (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p0. 251-86; Keith Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland (Glasgow: The Molendinar Press, 1977); William L. Miller with Bo Sarlvik, Ivor Crewe, and Jim Alt, "The Connection Between SNP Voting and the Demand for Scottish Self-Government," European Journal of Political Research, 5 (March 1977): 83-102; and Dean Jaensch, "The Scottish Vote 1974: A Realigning Party System?," Political Studies, 24 (September 1976): 306-19.

for example, have not yet received extensive historical treatment. Furthermore, there is a distinct shortage of reliable, comparable survey information, and the incompatibility of census data and electoral results make even long-term aggregate analyses infeasible. As a consequence of these data limitations, this study will attempt to integrate the existing diverse material rather than relying upon a single type of data base. Such a synthesis of the available evidence is the best method for developing the type of explanation sought given these conditions.

The analysis of the thesis's validity will begin in Chapter One with an examination of the ways in which Scotland has remained distinctive within the broader framework of the United Kingdom. In that vein the origins of this distinctiveness will be considered, along with the historical efforts of the home role movement to provide a governmental component to the other Scottish institutions. This will be followed by a discussion of the contemporary Scottish governmental structures and how they contribute to a sense of distinctiveness. Once the basis for Scottish national identity has been presented, the impact of this identity on political behavior will be evaluated. Lastly, the utility of Scottish national identity as an explanation of the current nationalism movement will be appraised. This chapter will permit an appreciation of the extent to which Scotland has become integrated with the rest of Britain and establish points of historical contrast with the contemporary phenomenon.

Chapter Two will consider how various contextual and political changes in the United Kingdom have affected the Scottish sense of distinctiveness. First, the extent of Scotland's economic problems and their political impact will be examined. This, in turn, will be followed by a discussion of the major Scottish political parties and their state of affairs at the time the SNP began having an impact. Finally, the impact of several changes in the context of British politics, such as the loss of the Empire and membership in the European Economic Community (EEC), will be considered for their influences on the success of the nationalist. The purpose behind considering these changes is to determine how they may have set the stage for the SNP to become an effective political party.

The primary aggregator and articulator of Scottish nationalism, the Scottish National Party, will then be examined in Chapter Three. The history, organization, and policy orientations of the party will be evaluated to ascertain their role in explaining its effectiveness. This will be followed by an investigation of the SNP's bases of support and their implications for possible explanations of the overall phenomenon. Contemplation of the SNP's role in generating the nationalist movement is essential to an understanding of the contributory relations involved. Political movements and parties develop in opposition to other organizations and their actions. The SNP could not, therefore, logically have become an effective mobilizer of political dissatisfaction entirely by its own efforts. Thus a determination of the party's relative role in the development of the contemporary situation is needed.

Chapter Four will consider the impact of the way in which the devolution issue arose and its handling by the political system. The actions of the major British political parties, both in and out of Parliament, as the devolution issue arose will be examined in detail. The purpose being to evaluate how they may have redefined the importance of Scottish national identity, thus granting it enhanced political significance.

The concluding chapter will then bring the findings of each of the separate chapters together to construct a balanced explanation of the development of Scottish nationalism. The relative weight of each of the contributing factors will be ascertained in terms of the others. This will permit a basis for comparing the contemporary situation with previous political movements and those of other societies. And finally, an assessment of the conceptual implications of the Scottish case for the study of nationalist and ethnic political movements will be undertaken. This will serve the purposes of placing Scotland in a broader theoretical perspective and raising further questions about concepts prevalent in comparative political theory.

CHAPTER ONE

ELEMENTS OF SCOTTISH DISTINCTIVENESS WITHIN THE UNITED KINGDOM

The fact that Scotland has retained the basic characteristics of a nation since the Act of Union joining it with England and Wales in 1707 is an important aspect in the development of Scottish nationalism.¹ That past provides a degree of mythological legitimacy to the idea of a separate Scottish state and an important basis for questioning its current situation. Probably of even greater significance for the development of Scottish nationalism, however, is the sense of national identity or distinctiveness that has been preserved. Reinforcement of this identity has been accomplished by the continued existence of uniquely Scottish societal institutions. It has also been maintained by the creation of various governmental institutions and practices that utilize this distinctiveness as part of their basis for existence.

¹This analysis accepts as a given fact that Scotland possesses the various attributes associated with a nation. Its focus is upon the political aspects of that nationhood and, consequently, attention will not be devoted at length to these other facets. See James G. Kellas, Modern Scotland: The Nation Since 1870 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968) for a discussion of Scotland along these lines.

In this chapter the manner in which the identity has been maintained and its impact on politics will be examined. Firstly, the historical record will be considered to indicate how past events may be related to the current situation. Secondly, the present governmental structures will be discussed to determine their impact on this sense of identity. Following this coverage of the macro-level elements of Scottish distinctiveness, attention will be devoted to the micro-level interaction of identity and political behavior. Finally, the impact of identity will be evaluated as a potential explanation of the existing state of affairs.

Historical Origins of Scottish Distinctiveness

A good point at which to begin consideration of the historical origins of Scottish distinctiveness for the purposes of this study is the Act of Union and its guarantees for Scottish cultural institutions. The Act was the culmination of a series of political moves directed towards the unification of Scotland and England. Both countries had been ruled by the same monarchs for over a hundred years, yet their governmental structures had remained separate. While merging the two Parliaments, administrative systems, and nobility, the Act guaranteed the independent position of the Presbyterian Established Church, the legal system, and the universities. These basic institutions have continued to be distinct from their English counterparts in many ways, while other provisions of the Act have been modified substantially over the years.²

²See James G. Kellas, The Scottish Political System, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 19.

What the Act did not do was provide a means by which Scotland or a body of individuals claiming to represent Scotland could challenge the validity of acts of Parliament in terms of the Act of Union. Any of the various procedures for contesting parliamentary actions could be dominated by Englishmen should the question divide along national lines. The prevailing constitutional argument has been that Acts of Parliament are supreme, even over the Act of Union, but this is not universally accepted, especially by Scottish lawyers.³ No real resolution has been made of the issue as it has been sidestepped a number of times and Parliament has been fairly prudent in its actions.

Scottish recognition of this inability to safeguard the guarantees within the Act of Union and the desire to have greater involvement in the governing process have been combined at different times to form the basis for political action. These actions have frequently attempted to further the institutional distinctiveness of Scotland by creating governmental bodies which would complement the social institutions. Thus in a sense they are antecedent activities to the current debate over devolution.⁴

In fact, if one considers the term "devolution" broadly, then almost immediately following the Act of Union in 1707 efforts were made

³Kellas, The Scottish Political System, pp. 20-22; and T. B. Smith, "Scottish Nationalism, Law, and Self-Government," in The Scottish Debate, ed. Neil MacCormick (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 34-51.

⁴For a discussion of the background of the term devolution, see Henry Drucker, "The Vulgar Mechanics of Devolution: A Word About the Language of the Debate," The Political Quarterly 48 (April-June 1977): 213-14; and, briefly, Harry Calvert, "Devolution in Perspective," in Devolution, ed. Harry Calbert (London: Professional Books, 1975), p. 18.

to transfer decision-making authority to various Scottish governmental bodies.⁵ In 1713, there was even an attempt to dissolve the Union which failed by only four votes in the House of Lords. Other efforts during the 1700s, though sporadic in nature, were made to secure a separate parliament for Scotland. If the term, however, is more narrowly viewed as referring to organized undertakings to transfer governmental authority that are supported by substantial numbers of citizens, then the origins of devolution as a policy can be traced to the mid-nineteenth century. The Chartist's movement of the 1840s included among its demands the establishment of a Scottish parliament. The National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights, formed in 1853, though, was the first organization with greater Scottish involvement in the governing process as its primary purpose. The fundamental demand of this group of well-known Scots was the restoration of Cabinet level representation for Scotland.

This goal was to receive increasing political support during the next few years. In 1869 a majority of the Scottish MPs asked Prime Minister Gladstone to appoint a Secretary of State for Scotland. He responded by appointing a Commission that later recommended the establishment of a parliamentary under-secretary attached to the Home Office.

⁵For good surveys of this period see Douglas Young, "A Sketch History of Scottish Nationalism," in The Scottish Debate, pp. 5-20, ed. Neil MacCormick (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); Gordon Donaldson et al., "Scottish Devolution: The Historical Background," in Government and Nationalism in Scotland, pp. 4-16, ed. J. N. Wolfe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971); and Alfred G. Donaldson, "Administrative and Legislative Devolution," in Independence and Devolution: The Legal Implications for Scotland, pp. 45-50, ed. John P. Grant (Edinburgh: W. Green and Son, 1976).

Neither Gladstone, nor Disraeli who succeeded him, though, acted upon the recommendation. Several years later Sir Gordon Campbell, MP for Kirkcaldy, proposed the creation of a Scottish Grand Committee as an initial step towards a federal system for Great Britain. After Gladstone was returned to office in 1880, the Earl of Rosebery, who had hosted the Liberal leader during the famous Midlothian campaign, and other Scottish peers proposed in the House of Lords that a Secretaryship be appointed. An Under-Secretaryship in the Home Office was created instead and the Earl of Rosebery was given the post. Two years later, however, he resigned dissatisfied with the inadequacy of his office.⁶

In January 1884, the Convention of Royal Burghs organized an all-party rally in Edinburgh. At the rally, support for a Secretaryship was secured from prominent Scottish Tories who had previously been reluctant to back the proposal. This type of coalition was to be more successful than the earlier efforts. In August of the next year, a Liberal bill creating a Secretaryship recieved the support of the Conservative Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, and was passed. The all-party cooperation that secured the Secretaryship was also influential in other devolutionary moves. The Scottish Home Rule Association was founded in 1886 and over the years it was to play a central role in the home rule movement. The primary goal of the new Association was a parliament for Scotland to legislate for Scottish affairs. While its leadership was mostly liberal in its political

⁶See H. J. Hanham, "The Creation of the Scottish Office, 1881-87," Juridicial Review (1965): 205-44.

persuasion, prominent Unionists and early Socialists, such as Keir Hardie and Ramsay Macdonald, were also members.

Parliamentary consideration of Scottish home rule was initially associated with activities of members of the Scottish Labour Party and, subsequently, the Liberal Party. The Scottish Labour Party was founded by Keir Hardie in 1888, and although he went to England in 1893 to help form the Independent Labour Party, he continued his support for home rule. A year later, the Scottish Labour Party became the Scottish Council of the I.L.P. and the socialist party adopted the principle of Scottish home rule. It was the Scottish Labour MP for Caithness and Vice-President of the party, D. G. B. Clark, who sponsored a home rule motion in the House of Commons in 1889. The bill failed badly--200-79. The margin of the vote was much closer among the Scottish MPs, but it was still negative--22-19. Dr. Clark tried again a year later and this time the Scottish MPs favored the bill by 26-15, but the overall vote was still unfavorable. A further try was made by Clark in 1891 with a motion for "Home Rule All Round" that would have set up parliaments in all four countries: Scotland, England, Wales, and Ireland. This measure failed, as did similar motions made during the next two sessions. Then in 1894, the Commons passed a Home Rule All Round resolution, but it again rejected a similar motion the very next year. The pattern in these motions was for a majority of the Scottish MPs to favor home rule, along with the Irish home rulers, and the majority of the other MPs, especially the Tories, to vote negatively.

In the meantime, the Scottish office was beginning to acquire more of the Home Office's responsibilities in Scotland. Additionally,

a Scottish Grand Committee was established in the Commons in 1894 and again in 1895. Though the Tory Government let the committee lapse when it returned to office, the Liberals revived it in 1907. Thus, although home rule was not progressing rapidly, other changes were occurring in the direction of increased Scottish representation.

The pre-war period was an active one for home rulers. In 1908, 1911, and 1912, home rule bills were passed on their first readings, but were not successful beyond that stage.⁷ A Scottish Home Rule Bill was again submitted in 1913, and this time passed both its first and second readings. Each of these efforts were backed by the Liberals and, in May of 1913, Prime Minister Asquith announced that his party would pass a Scottish Home Rule Act in the current session of Parliament. The proposal, however, was eventually dropped, due in part to the preparations for war and a recognition that the House of Lords would not agree to the measure. The actual coming of the war delayed implementation of home rule for Ireland and, in all actuality, ended the possibility of Scottish home rule.

⁷At this point it may be useful to mention the procedural stages through which bills progress in Parliament as this will be an important factor in the history of devolution legislation. The First Reading is the formal introduction of the bill into the Commons and has no implication for the final decision on the matter. The main principles of the legislation are then discussed at the Second Reading Stage. This is the important stage as the vote on the Second Reading is very likely to determine the final outcome of the bill. If it passes, then a majority for the Third Reading will probably exist. If it fails, then the bill is killed. After passing the Second Reading, the bill enters the Committee Stage where it is considered line by line and amendments may be moved. This is followed by the Report Stage. This stage is similar to the Committee Stage, but the parliamentary rules governing amendments and other actions are much stricter. The final stage is the Third Reading. After successfully passing this last stage, the bill is sent to the House of Lords where a similar set of procedures is used.

Following the war, Labour replaced the Liberals as the main alternative to the Conservatives, and as the primary supporter of devolution. The party continued its nominal support of home rule, going on record in 1918 as supporting legislative assemblies for Scotland, Wales, and England under a federal structure. Also the renewed efforts of the Scottish Home Rule Association were actively backed by the Labour leaders in Scotland. This contributed to the high enthusiasm for home rule during the early 1920s, and it was not surprising that a motion for a home rule bill was submitted during the first Macdonald Government in 1924.⁸ The Government, however, fell before the bill could be considered. The proposed bill was reputed to have the support of all fifty-six Scottish MPs. Had it succeeded, it would have established a parliament with approximately the same powers as had been granted Northern Ireland.

In 1926, an important shift occurred in the home rule movement with the holding of the Scottish National Convention. The Convention was endorsed by the Home Rule Association and was publicly backed by a number of prominent Scots. The primary difference of this new effort was its adoption of the principle of dominion status within a British Commonwealth. A bill to this effect was moved in the House of Commons by the Rev. James Barr in 1927, but it was subsequently killed during its second reading. This bill proposed even further separation of Scotland from England than had earlier Liberal and Labour motions.

⁸Michael J. Keating, "Nationalism in the Scottish Labour Movement 1914-74," United Kingdom Politics, 1977, Paper 10 (Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland, 1977).

Following the rejection of the Barr bill and the demands of the Scottish Convention, the National Party of Scotland was founded in 1928.⁹ Four groups came together to form the new organization, the Scots National League, the Scottish National Movement, the Glasgow University Scottish Nationalist Association, and a section of the Home Rule Association. The party's primary goal was the achievement of dominion status for Scotland. This organization was followed within a few years by the Scottish Party, which was made up of more conservative and less extremist elements. Unlike the Nationalist Party, it did not intend to compete for public office, but rather to act as a pressure group. The two parties united in 1934 to form the Scottish Nationalist Party. At that time, the push for dominion status was moderated somewhat, becoming one of the points of contention within the SNP, which eventually led to the expulsion of some of the more extreme members.

The failure to secure parliamentary passage of home rule was the last legislative consideration of devolution until the 1960s. Both the Liberal and Labour Parties, however, continued to include home rule in their election packages. Twice the Labour Party--in 1938 and 1945--reaffirmed its support for a separate legislature for Scotland. In practice, though, the party was in the process of backing away from home rule and concentrating instead upon gradual expansion of the Scottish Office and the Scottish parliamentary committees. The Liberals remained consistent in their advocacy of a federal system for Great Britain and by the 1950s were the only non-nationalist party to do so.¹⁰

⁹See John MacCormick's autobiography for a discussion of this period. J. M. MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind (London: Victor Gollanz, 1955); 12-54.

¹⁰For a recent statement of the Liberal position on federalism, consult: Scottish Liberal Party, Scottish Self-Government: A

The direct relationship of those earlier efforts to obtain home rule to the current debate is primarily one of precedence, although there is a degree of similarity between the two sets of proposals. This is more the case for the ideas of the SNP and the Liberals than for the Labour Government's Scotland and Wales Bills. The similarities are basically in the general framework of the suggested parliaments and their proposed policy responsibilities. Changes in the actual powers exercised by the government in the last seventy-five years, though, have made obsolete some of the specific home rule discussions of the powers and functions to be devolved.

One important difference between the two sets of proposals is the composition of the groups supporting them. The efforts at the turn of the century were largely the work of individuals from the middle and upper social classes who were willing to join the voluntary organizations endorsing home rule. These associations appear to have had general public support, but the extent of that backing is not entirely clear as they were not really mass-based organizations. By not competing for office and allowing members to belong to any party, these early associations were able to present a unified Scottish front and maintain an image of general support. This is probably a major factor in accounting for the degree of success which they had. Today, as will be seen, the various proposals are supported primarily, but not exclusively, along party lines. Thus no one, not even the SNP, is able to represent Scotland on the topic of devolution in quite the same non-partisan manner as did the Scottish Home Rule Association.

Fresh Start with Federalism (London: Scottish Liberal Party in conjunction with John Calder (Publishers), 1976)

There are other aspects of the home rule movement's legacy that provide a degree of continuity for today's pro-devolutionists. The long and complicated history of home rule questions in British politics, especially regarding Ireland, but Scotland as well, means that it is difficult for the opponents of devolution to maintain that consideration of the subject is inconsistent with the political traditions of the system. It also provides the current efforts somewhat more legitimacy in terms of their democratic nature as they may be viewed as a long-sought representational reform. Lastly, it places the Labour Party in a slight philosophical dilemma. Some of the most revered fathers of the Labour Party were home rule supporters, and the party is on record as having backed the idea as recently as thirty years ago. While time obviously changes political conditions, this represents something of a consistency problem for the Labour Party. Now that the party has become a major force in British politics, should it forget its earlier commitments? It is interesting that some of the most ardent opponents of devolution within the party are also among those who demand more consistency with socialist principles by the Government.

The legacy also contains negative implications for the future according to anti-devolutionists. While Scotland and Northern Ireland are vastly different in their political situations, the problems encountered in Northern Ireland are perceived as a refutation of the pro-devolution argument.¹¹ Scotland, however, lacks the deep reinforcing

¹¹For a discussion considering implications of the Northern Ireland example for Scotland see: W. D. Birrell, "The Mechanics of Devolution: Northern Ireland Experience and the Scotland and Wales Bills," The Political Quarterly 49 (July-September 1978): 304-19.

ethnic and socioeconomic divisions of Northern Ireland and has more competitive political parties than was the case there, making permanent dominance by one faction less likely. Also, the proposals of the Scotland and Wales Bill would have bound Edinburgh and Westminster closer than was Stormont. Nonetheless, some of the antidevolutionists continue to cite Northern Ireland as a negative example of the consequence of devolution.

There are several other aspects of the relationship between Irish and Scottish home rule that might be noted at this point. Without the Irish home rule campaign having been such a predominant issue at the turn of the century, it is questionable how far the movement would have gotten in Scotland.¹² While avoiding the violence of Ireland, the Irish demand for home rule was a powerful example for Scots desirous of the same objective. Additionally, acceptance of the legitimacy of the Irish demand, particularly by the Liberal Party, greatly eased the way for comparable consideration of Scotland's claim. The overwhelming predominance of Ireland, however, also meant that Scotland was of secondary importance. Scottish home rule was always an issue that could be dealt with once the more pressing problem of Ireland was handled. Finally, the Irish home rulers in Parliament, about eighty MPs, contributed significantly to the votes in favor of Scottish home rule. After the separation of Ireland those votes were sorely missed.

¹²A survey of some of the relations between Ireland and Scotland can be found in James Hunter, "The Gaelic Connection: The Highlands, Ireland, and Nationalism, 1873-1922," The Scottish Historical Review 54 (October 1975): 178-204.

The greatest impact of these efforts, though, was in their indirect support for growth of the Scottish Office. By pressuring for home rule and thereby presenting a series of demands for governmental change, the home rulers had the effect of justifying the Scottish Office's existence and growth. As a consequence, the Office was to organizationally develop into the important political institution that it is today with little opposition from those who might have feared a more extreme solution.

Current Scottish Governmental Structures

The governmental structures that resulted from the efforts to secure greater involvement in public decisionmaking have had the consequence of reinforcing the sense of identity fostered by an awareness of Scottish history and the existence of the cultural institutions. They go beyond identity alone, however, because they form a basis for questioning political issues and policies in terms of their impact on Scotland. Whether intended or not, the adoption of separate governing institutions and practices has institutionalized representation of Scottish interests within the broader framework of the British political system. That, in turn, has led to a situation in which further issues and policies may be viewed in terms of their national, rather than functional, impacts.

As indicated above, this set of circumstances is partly derived from the character of the Act of Union. One aspect of the treaty that is not fully appreciated for its continuing impact is the guarantee of the independent position of Scots law. In its original form

Scottish law was based upon Roman rather than Anglo-Saxon common law and it still remains substantially different, particularly in the areas of property and private law.¹³ As a consequence of these legal distinctions, legislation affecting Scotland must be considered separately by Parliament. Commonly, sections adapting the legislation to Scotland are simply addended to the English bill. Legislation that is strictly Scottish in substance is first heard in the Scottish Grand Committee, but it still requires the approval of the full Parliament to become law. This tends to strengthen the institutional differences between Scotland and England as interest groups and other organizations requiring substantial legal work sometimes find it more convenient to maintain separate branches in each country. Also the legal profession tends to consider Scots law a mainstay of Scottish culture and acts to protect its distinctiveness even though it complicates commercial and governmental business between Scotland and England.¹⁴

The administrative activities of the Scottish Office also contribute to this conception of distinctiveness. The Scottish Office was the first territorially rather than functionally organized Cabinet

¹³These differences are not trivial ones. They affect the lives of the people on a daily basis. For example, see: "Divorce Bill 'grave hardship to wives,'" The Glasgow Herald, July 5, 1975, p. 13; or "Commuters 'dodging divorce law,'" The Scotsman (Edinburgh), July 31, 1975, p. 7. Sometimes clashes develop between the English and Scottish legal systems over the differences. George Saunders, "Scottish judge refuses to uphold English orders," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), August 2, 1973, p. 1. Also see Kellas, The Scottish Political System, pp. 21-24.

¹⁴For contemporary examples of this point of view, see: G. Maher, "The Identity of the Scottish Legal System," The Juridical Review (April 1977): 21-37, and the essays in John P. Grant, ed., Independence and Devolution.

office.¹⁵ The post of Scottish Secretary was recreated in 1885 after having been allowed to lapse a hundred and thirty-nine years before.¹⁶ Seven years later it was given cabinet rank and, in 1926, it was elevated to principal cabinet rank when the post became the Secretary of State for Scotland.¹⁷

The functions of the Scottish Office was quite extensive and the claim that its importance is not well understood by most Scots is a reasonable one. The Secretary of State is both the representative of Scotland to the Cabinet and vice versa. As such, his job is rather complex. He is responsible for a broader range of topics than most of his colleagues as he is concerned with the impact of almost all government business in Scotland.¹⁸ Functionally, this policy range of the Scottish Office includes such diverse areas as economic planning,

¹⁵The Welsh Secretaryship of State was not created until 1964. E. Rowlands, "The Politics of Regional Administration: The Establishment of the Welsh Office," Public Administration 50 (Autumn 1972): 333-51.

¹⁶Scottish representation in upper level political circles was not completely absent after the Secretaryship lapsed. The Lord Advocate was continually appointed and until 1827 British Prime Ministers used a "Management" system in their dealings with the Scottish MPs and local politics. George S. Pryde, Scotland: From 1603 to the Present Day, A New History of Scotland, vol. II (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1962), pp. 191-92.

¹⁷For a historical discussion of the creation of the Secretaryship, see H. J. Hanham, "The Creation of the Scottish Office, 1881-87," pp. 205-44.

¹⁸Kellas, The Scottish Political System, pp. 25-27. See, also, for a brief sketch of all the various administrative bodies and functions incorporated in the Scottish Office, Great Britain, Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969-1972, "The Scottish Office, Lord Advocate's Department and the Crown Office, Written Evidence 2.

agriculture, fishing, education, health services, and forestry.¹⁹ Economic planning in particular has become extremely important and insures Scottish Office involvement in virtually every aspect of policy affecting the economic well-being of the country. Though the Scottish Office possesses extensive independence and responsibility, the division of authority between it and the other Cabinet departments is not always clear. Most major events or problems are not restricted to Scotland or England in terms of their impact; thus frequently the decisions of the other Cabinet offices constrain the independence of the Scottish Office. It is this uncertainty over exactly what powers and responsibilities the Scottish Office possesses that causes confusion among the public.

One additional institutional difference between Scotland and England which the Scottish Office accentuates is that of local government administration. As a result of its powers and responsibilities, the Scottish Office is able to act as an intermediary between local government bodies and London. English local governments, on the other hand, do not have this sort of dual representation. In this line it might also be remembered that Scotland had its own local government system prior to the Act of Union which, despite recent changes, is still different from English local government.²⁰

¹⁹Norman W. Graham, "The Administration of Education in Scotland," Public Administration 43 (Autumn 1965): 229-312; Herbert L. Edlin, "The Forestry Commission in Scotland: 1919-1969," The Scottish Geographical Magazine 85 (September 1969): 84-93; and John P. Mackintosh, "Regional Administration: Has It Worked in Scotland?" Public Administration 42 (Autumn 1964): 253-74.

²⁰See Kellas, The Scottish Political System, pp. 143-52; and Robert Eyestone, "Planning in Scotland's New Regions," paper presented

As mentioned, another governmental practice distinguishing policymaking for Scotland from the rest of the United Kingdom is the consideration Scottish legislation receives in Scotland. Special arrangements for Scottish legislation have been regular features of the House of Commons since 1907. The committee known now as the Scottish Grand Committee is made up of all seventy-one Scottish MPs and ten to fifteen others added to bring the party balance of the Committee in line with the House as a whole. The Committee functions as the main arena for debating Scottish legislation. In depth consideration of legislation occurs in the two Scottish Standing Committees. The first committee considers primarily major bills and the second, relatively minor ones.²¹ In addition to these committees, there is a Select Committee on Scottish Affairs. First appointed in 1969, this Committee is an investigative one and it has not been appointed each session.²² As the schedule of the House of Commons has become more crowded, the Scottish committees have become more important. The great bulk of the legislation affecting Scotland directly is now considered by them.

A partial consequence of the concentrated work of the Scottish committees is a relatively narrow focus on the part of Scottish

at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 21-23, 1977.

²¹G. E. Edwards, "The Scottish Grand Committee, 1958 to 1970," Parliamentary Affairs 25 (Autumn 1972): 303-25; J. H. Burns, "The Scottish Committees of the House of Commons, 1948-59," Political Studies 8 (October 1960): 272-96; and Kellas, The Scottish Political System, pp. 78-90.

²²P. Myers, "The Select Committee on Scottish Affairs," Parliamentary Affairs 27 (Autumn 1974): 359-70.

Mrs.²³ Most of their parliamentary careers are spent being involved in the activities of the Grand Committee. Their participation in debates of broader policy areas is low even compared to that of other backbenchers. There seem to be unwritten rules proscribing their involvement in English affairs and vice versa as well. In addition, as will be elaborated upon in the discussion of political parties in chapter two, the quality and background of the Scottish MPs does not seem to encourage their participation in such matters as foreign policy or economics. The MPs are not restricted, though, to the Scottish Office or Scottish affairs. A number of Prime Ministers have been Scots, the last being Lord Home; however, the tendency is to remain narrowly focused. This is especially so for MPs who are Scottish lawyers. Few lawyers can sacrifice their practices to serve in Parliament as there is little commercial need for their skills in London; consequently, the number of Scottish MPs who have an intricate understanding of Scottish law is small. The few who do serve then become influential in the workings of the Scottish committees and can go on to careers on the Scottish bench.

An impact of these various governmental arrangements and political practices is, as was suggested, a reinforcement of a sense of

²³ See the following for discussions of the Scottish MPs: David Judge and Donald A. Finlayson, "Scottish Members of Parliament: Problems of Devolution," Parliamentary Affairs 28 (Summer 1975): 278-92; William Mishler and Anthony Mughan, "Representing the Celtic Fringe: Devolution and Legislative Behavior in Scotland and Wales," Legislative Studies Quarterly 3 (August 1978): 377-408; and Michael J. Keating, "Parliamentary Behaviour as a Test of Scottish Integration into the United Kingdom," Legislative Studies Quarterly 3 (August 1978): 409-30.

Scottish distinctiveness by institutionalizing its representation.²⁴ Initially that institutionalization was very minor, dealing primarily with the administrative needs of a limited government and the need to modify legislation so that it could conform to Scottish law. Over time, however, the Scottish Office has greatly increased its administrative and policymaking responsibilities. This has occurred largely as a result of an overall increase in governmental functions in Britain and reflects an administrative norm of centralizing authority in the already operating Scottish Office. It would be difficult to attribute the growth of the Office or the increased role of the Scottish committees in Parliament to a continual pressure for self-government by the Scots. The historical record simply does not bear out the existence of such pressure or its effectiveness even when present. Such demands were important in the initial stages, but thereafter organizational and policy imperatives became more influential.

As the functions of government increased in Britain, this institutionalization of interests was furthered by the fact that more issues and policies could be considered in terms of their impact on Scotland. In that regard, rather than providing a means of centralizing governmental policy administration in Scotland, the Scottish Office may be seen as a decentralized agent. The very extensiveness of the Scottish Office's responsibilities may also be an important factor in the way devolution developed as an issue. Because there was little

²⁴ They have also had an impact by generating a sense of neglect on the part of an apparently large number of Scots who do not understand the governing process. That, in turn, fosters a sense of distinctiveness.

administrative authority of substantial importance that could be added to the Scottish Office as a response to the SNP, the British parties may have been constrained as to the kind of institutional changes they could make. A legislative assembly with significant powers may logically have been the next structural response to the institutionalization of interests that has already occurred.

A final note regarding the impact of the governmental structures that have been established in Scotland should be a reminder that they have served to integrate Scotland with the rest of the United Kingdom, as well as provide a basis for maintaining a sense of distinctiveness. Even though many policies may be administered separately, the basic policies themselves and the expectations of the public as to their purposes are the same. The Government has, in fact, utilized the Scottish Office to further integrate Scotland with England and Wales by including among its functions participation in various economic and social welfare policies. The goals of such policies are not to create separate conditions in Scotland, but rather to standardize employment, housing, and living conditions throughout the United Kingdom. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that either the Labour or Conservative Parties would have supported expansions of the Scottish Office's responsibilities as they have had they perceived them as other than administrative moves. A good case can be made that the expansions would have been of less importance and scope had the parties realized an institutionalization of identities was inadvertently taking place.

The Distinctiveness of Scottish Identity
and Political Behavior

Thus far in the analysis the existence of Scottish national identity and its bases for continuation have been considered. In addition, coverage has been given to how some of those bases may have contributed to a strengthening of the identity's potential political significance. Attention now needs to be devoted to the distinctiveness of Scottish identity and political behavior within the United Kingdom: it cannot be assumed that an identity is of political significance simply because it exists at a macro or institutional level. In some way that identity has to be related at the micro or individual level to political behavior. If the Scots have developed a nationalist movement, a necessary condition to that occurrence must, consequently, be a recognition of that identification and a linking of it to political action aimed at the securing of independence by a substantial portion of the Scottish populace. Thus one needs to know how important and deeply felt that identification actually is if inferences about its relationship to a political perspective such as nationalism are to be made. Consideration then must be given to the nature of Scottish national identity as it relates to political behavior.

A first step in considering this relationship is to note how the Scots may be distinctive and the extent of it. There are several aspects of Scottish political behavior that can be cited as examples of such distinctiveness, and the most general involves public awareness. Recognition of the distinctive nature of Scottish national identity and the institutions that support it, for example, appear to

be widespread among the Scottish populace. It is reinforced by various facets of daily life in Scotland aside from public interaction with the institutions that have been discussed. One common facet that performs this role is the money used in Scotland. Most of the currency does not bear the mark of the Bank of England, but rather that of one of the Scottish banks. Another continuing example may be found in the dialectical differences existing between the Scots and the English. It is not a situation of a totally separate language, such as between Welsh and English, because so few Scots speak Gaelic, but one of pronunciation or accent. It has the consequence, though, of reminding individuals of their place of origin. This conclusion is supported by several studies that have found empirical evidence that the Scots do indeed regard themselves as being distinct from the English and Welsh.²⁵ That distinctiveness may be, however, a fairly diffuse one as the respondents have not been required to choose between their potential identifications. Consequently, for many of the respondents (and Scottish citizens at large) it may be assumed that no contradiction exists between identifying themselves as Scottish and British simultaneously; neither identification necessarily requires the exclusion of the other.

²⁵Ian Budge and Derek Urwin, Scottish Political Behavior: A Case Study in British Homogeneity (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966); Janet Carter Hannigan, "Scottish Adolescents' Views of 'My Country': Variations in National Support," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Northeastern Political Science Association, Mt. Pocono, Pa., November 11-12, 1977; G. Mercer, "Political Contagion and Party Affiliation: A Case Study of Adults and Adolescents," Political Studies 22 (June 1974): 210-14; and Gustav Jahoda, "The Development of Children's Ideas About Country and Nationality," British Journal of Educational Psychology 33 (February 1963): 47-60, "The Development of Children's Ideas About Country and Nationality," British Journal of Educational Psychology 33 (June 1963): 143-53, and "Development of Scottish

Another aspect of Scottish political behavior that indicates distinctiveness on the part of the Scots is their historic patterns of partisanship. The Scottish tendency to be more supportive of the Liberals during the mid-to-late 1800s and the Labour Party in this century can be cited as examples of such divergent behavior.²⁶ It is, however, difficult to attribute such behavior, as some have tried, to the national identity of Scottish voters. Other factors, such as the nature of local party politics, religious affiliations, and social class relations in Scotland, are probably more significant than national identification in explaining these trends. It is certainly clear that the Liberals benefited greatly from the nature of local party politics in Scotland and that the Labour Party has reaped immense electoral benefits from its close ties to working class and Catholic voters in the Strathclyde region.²⁷ What is particularly important, though, about this situation is that both the Scottish voters and the British political leaders have recognized Scotland as behaving in a politically different manner from England. Perception of these differences, however, need not have led one to the premise that greater political independence was required to keep the loyalty of the Scots. Indeed, Labour leaders appear to have regarded the Strathclyde area as being distinct because

Children's Ideas and Attitudes About Other Countries," The Journal of Applied Psychology 58 (1962): 91-108.

²⁶Hechter's analysis relies upon the persistence of such distinctions as the basis for the growth of nationalist sentiments. Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

²⁷H. H. Hanham, Scottish Nationalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 71-2; and James G. Kellas and

of its solid support for the Labour Party. At the same time, this perception may have allowed them to extend the greater administrative independence to the Scottish Office without concern for the possible consequence of generating increased demands for other kinds of decisionmaking authority. It may also serve as a possible explanation for their "panic" in responding to the SNP victories of 1974. The Conservatives, too, seem to have regarded their bases of support in Scotland as being strong, orthodox repositories of Conservative virtues; consequently, there was no need to alter the situation.

As this discussion indicates, the Scots do conceive of themselves as being distinct and behave in a politically different manner from the English. Analysts, however, should avoid inferring too much from this situation on its face value. Politicians and scholars have long noted that Scotland has tended to differ politically from the rest of Britain. Those differences, though, were largely such that they could legitimately be interpreted as exaggerated examples of trends occurring in other parts of England and Wales. For the most part, the distinctive aspects of Scottish political behavior had little to no connection with political issues of an exclusively Scottish nature. As a result, it was to be expected that Scotland would be regarded as responding basically to the same trends and voting shifts as the rest of the United Kingdom.

A good example of this complicated blending of political perspectives and issues is what occurred in the EEC referendum.²⁸ In the

Peter Fotheringham, "The Political Behavior of the Working Class, in Social Class in Scotland: Past and Present, ed. A. Allan MacLean (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1977), pp. 143-65.

²⁸For discussions of the EEC campaign see the following: Anthony King, Britain Says Yes: The 1975 Referendum on the Common

end, Scotland voted much the same way as did the rest of the United Kingdom. Only the Western Isles voted against remaining in the European Economic Community. The overall YES vote in Scotland was 58 percent, compared to 67 percent for the entire United Kingdom. The issue in Scotland, however, generated cleavages beyond those of "for" and "against" membership that were common in other parts of Britain.²⁹ The presence of the Nationalists and their campaign against the EEC clearly complicated the issue, and it may reasonably be assumed that their efforts played a role in reducing the affirmative vote.³⁰ The campaign was also complicated by the fears of the agricultural and industrial communities, as well as consumers, that Scottish products would be placed at a further disadvantage. The fact that they were already disadvantaged compared to products and prices in the southeast of England was largely taken for granted. These reactions, however, were also reflected in the anti-EEC campaign in England. What made them more pronounced in Scotland was the greater importance of these particular economic sectors and their historic pattern of economic problems. The potential disadvantages were apparently perceived to be more direct and consequential. Still Scotland voted with the rest of the United Kingdom

Market (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977); David Butler and Uwe Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum (London: Macmillan, 1976); Philip Goodhart, Full-Hearted Consent: The Story of the Referendum Campaign--and the Campaign for the Referendum (London: Davis-Poynter, 1976).

²⁹ See Andrew M. Kirby and Peter J. Taylor, "A Geographical Analysis of the Voting Pattern in the EEC Referendum, 5 June 1975," Regional Studies 10 (1976): 183-91, for an interpretation of the Scottish results.

³⁰ As a NO vote could have been interpreted as a Nationalist victory, an interesting, and unanswerable question is whether this situation prompted some potentially NO voters to vote YES or to abstain rather than participate in an action that could benefit the SNP.

to continue membership in the EEC; on this, possibly the single most divisive issue of contemporary British politics. Few issues, though, have involved anything approaching this linkage between Scottish concerns and the decision outcome. Most of them can reasonably be interpreted in the same manner as they would be for the rest of the United Kingdom. This does not negate the fact or importance of Scotland's having been politically distinct in some regards, but it does put it into a broader perspective. It also indicates that a more concrete linkage needs to be made between identity and behavior before the relationship of Scottish national identity and nationalism can be classified.


Scottish Identity, the Desire for Self-
Government, and Political Action

One area of inquiry that can provide some indication of the extent to which the linkage between national identity and political action has been made is that of the Scottish desire for self-government. As has been noted, there has been considerable political activity over the past one hundred years centered around this general goal. Before exploring the depth of that desire, however, it would be useful to comment further on the underlying relationship involved. There has been a great deal of confusion as to whether what has been happening in Scotland is an example of regionalism or nationalism.³¹ Other writers have used terms such as cultural nationalism as opposed to political nationalism, implying a difference in the focal point of the movement and

³¹Vernon Bogdanor, "Regionalism: The Constitutional Aspects," Political Quarterly 48 (April-June 1977): 164-74. Brian Smith, "Confusions in Regionalism," The Political Quarterly 48 (January-March 1977): 14-29.

goals being sought.³² This situation can be clarified if usage of "nationalism" is restricted to the referencing of movements and ideologies with the principal goal of political independence for the nation. The nation may be a population grouping that formerly was culturally distinct and politically independent, or one which seeks such status for the first time. A nationalist, consequently, is one whose political philosophy is based upon this goal and whose national identity is coterminous with the nation on whose behalf he labors. In other words, a nationalist may not possess two co-equal national identities at the same instant. One of them must be subordinate to the other. When the two identities are no longer compatible, the individual must choose between them.

In the case of Scotland, it is possible for an individual to possess three different sub-identities, as indicated below:



³²Kellas, The Scottish Political System, persists in making this distinction. See chapter seven. Also see Iain McLean, "Devolution," The Political Quarterly 42 (April-June 1976): 221-27.

They may identify exclusively with Britain as a whole, Scotland alone, or blend both the British and Scottish components.³³ For an individual possessing both sets of identities, the Scottish component must ultimately be subordinate to the more encompassing British identity. For a Scot, however, to become a nationalist, he must have first surrendered his British national identity. Otherwise, the individual would be committed to two logically inconsistent political goals--preservation of British political unity and the securing of Scottish independence. This does not mean that a Scot may not use his Scottish identity as a basis for non-nationalistic political action. This can and has frequently occurred. Yet it does mean that when this occurs, it is not necessarily a nationalistic act. It may be, rather, an act which expresses political ethnocentrism or chauvanism.³⁴ The non-nationalist also frequently justifies use of his Scottish identity politically by indicating how it will further develop both his Scottish and British sense of identification. This is precisely what is occurring when a Scot senses governmental changes, such as an assembly, which he believes are needed in Scotland, while arguing that the final result will be an improvement of the British political system, thus preserving its unity.

To avoid confusion between the various uses of nationalism and the above usage, in this study those Scots holding truly nationalist


³³For a theoretical discussion of the coexistence of various sub-identities, see Simon N. Herman, Israelis and Jews: The Continuity of an Identity (New York: Random House, 1970), 12-26.

³⁴Anthony Smith makes a similar distinction. Theories of Nationalism (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1971); and "Ethnocentrism, Nationalism and Social Change," International Journal of Comparative Sociology 8 (March 1972): 1-20.

views will be referred to as "separatists" and those Scots whose primary identity is British will be called "unionists." These terms will have the added advantage of indicating the direction of the dominant loyalty of the groups under consideration. This can be seen in figure 2, which demonstrates the link between identity and these two types of political orientations. With this distinction in mind, the important question now

Figure 2

The Linkage Between Scottish Sub-Identities and Political Orientation



becomes one of the extent to which the development of the political circumstances that have given rise to the SNP and the devolution issue is due to separatism or unionism. Has the SNP received increased support because of a growth of separatist opinion? Or is it an example of unionists using the party and its support to reform the political system? Or, still, is it both of these?

The evidence that can be applied to these questions is of mixed quality. Empirical public opinion data about the desire for self-government have been available since the mid-1960s, but only sporadically until after the 1974 elections. Historical records about past self-government movements are also of limited utility. This is

partially due to the fact that these movements have been capable of accommodating considerable diversity of opinion about the extent of self government being sought as long as the issue was not pressed. Also, one has a very real problem extrapolating the extent of public support for various policy alternatives from the available records. This fact further complicates comparisons between the current survey results and the historical record. There is sufficient overlap between the historical information and the public opinion results, however, to suggest that not only has the proportion of Scottish citizens favoring separatism increased noticeably in recent years, but that the issue of self-government has become a more salient one as well.

Early political groups, such as the Scottish Home Rule Association and the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights, were umbrella organizations.³⁵ They incorporated a variety of individuals whose primary ideological bond was a desire to increase Scottish representation and control of governmental administration. In part, these groups were able to accommodate such diversity because of the generality of their overall goal. They were aided in this process by the ambiguous responses of the political parties. The vagueness of party support for home rule enabled the groups to avoid specification of their objectives and consequent conflicts over the proper degree of self-government. While it is true that some of their members held separatist views, the historical evidence indicates that the vast majority supported expansion of Scotland's interest within the confines of the British political system. It also appears that these movements were

³⁵Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, pp. 91-118.

composed primarily of middle-to-upper class Scots with little mass involvement. The mass of Scottish citizens seem to have been largely concerned with issues such as unionization and wage levels. The relatively mild support given to home rule by the Labour Party as it was developing is a good example of its low priority as an issue.³⁶

This situation apparently persisted until very recently. Even the Scottish National Party has accommodated a variety of opinions as to the extent that self-government should be sought.³⁷ In fact, this question was at the heart of the party's early internal splits.³⁸ The party also retained the limited class base of support of the earlier organizations. In terms of numbers, though, it probably held even fewer supporters than did the Scottish Home Rule Association. This seems to indicate how small the actual proportion of Scots favoring separatism was during those initial organizational years. The unionist orientation, though, was still present and active. This is evidenced by the continued support for an increased administrative role for the Scottish Office.

The unionist perspective was also preponderate in the most dramatic early example of the Scottish desire for self-government--the Covenant Movement of the early 1950s.³⁹ Over two million signatures

³⁶ See Keating, "Nationalism in the Scottish Labour Movement 1914-1974."

³⁷ Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, pp. 146-180; and J. M. MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind.

³⁸ This is still an important issue in the internal politics of the SNP. See chapter three for an elaboration.

³⁹ Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, pp. 169-72; and J. M. MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind, pp. 125-43.

were eventually collected on this petition for a Scottish Parliament. Despite the fact that some of the signatures were not genuine, it cannot be denied that the Covenant was a significant expression of Scottish desires for a change in the governmental system.⁴⁰ The movement caught on too quickly and obtained too much support to be totally discounted. It is also significant in that this was the first mass demonstration of support for Scottish self-government. The Covenant, however, was very much a unionist effort as it fully envisioned operating "within the framework of the United Kingdom. . . ."⁴¹ It may further be assumed most of the signatures were obtained under the impression that a reform of the governmental system, not a fundamental transformation, was being sought. One final bit of evidence of the unionist orientation of this movement's supporters is the lack of public reaction following the government's failure to take any subsequent action. Had the public been more separatist, a stronger reaction should have resulted.

Contemporary Expressions of the Scottish Desire for Self-Government

After the demise of the Covenant movement, organized expressions of Scottish desires for self-government temporarily disappeared from the political scene. It was during this period of the mid-1950s and early 1960s that the SNP became the primary spokesman for such sentiments. The party was still small, but it was beginning to attract

⁴⁰Tam Dalyell gives an example of the signature process in his book, Devolution: The End of Britain (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977), p. 68.

⁴¹J. M. MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind, p. 128.

new members. Aside from the gradual growth of the party's membership and electoral support, however, there is still little evidence as to the actual breakdown of public opinion. The major study of Scottish politics during this period, Budge and Urwin's Scottish Political Behavior, did find a sense of national consciousness existing in the Scottish public, but it also concluded class consciousness was a much more important influence for political beliefs. The authors were, however, able to make several other generalizations about Scottish opinions on the governmental system. Only 24 percent of the respondents were satisfied with the existing system. Random remarks by the respondents also indicated that many desired substantial change--22 percent wanted more Scottish say in running Scotland's affairs and 36 percent wanted a Scottish Parliament. While these remarks were unsolicited, they do suggest that the dissatisfaction went beyond mere disapproval or unhappiness with the then current state of affairs. Additionally, the results are noteworthy because they were obtained prior to the growth in support for the SNP. ⁴²

Following the SNP's advances in the 1964 and 1966 general elections and its 1967 Hamilton by-election victory, greater public and academic attention was focused upon the party. As a result, surveys indicating the distribution of Scottish public opinion began to be taken. These surveys were initially more concerned with determining who was voting for the SNP, but the results do indicate substantial

⁴²Budge and Urwin, cited in William L. Miller, with Bo Sarlvik, Ivor Crewe and Jim Alt, "The Connection Between SNP Voting and the Demand for Scottish Self-Government," European Journal of Political Research 5 (March 1977): 92.

support for changing the governmental system to permit more direct Scottish control. Independence was supported by a relatively small proportion of the respondents. The results from a 1968 Glasgow Herald survey yielded the following distribution of opinions:⁴³

No Change	14%
Complete independence	21
Some home rule but remain in U.K.	38
Greater local and regional freedom	27

Similar results were reported from other surveys taken in the 1967-1968 period.⁴⁴

The next bit of evidence bearing on this question of how much and what kind of changes in governmental structures have been sought came from the Royal Commission on the Constitution's public opinion survey.⁴⁵ While the survey had some prominent shortcomings, it remains important because the other public opinion polls ceased asking respondents about this issue after the apparent decline of the nationalists

⁴³ J. P. Mackintosh, The Devolution of Power: Local Democracy, Regionalism and Nationalism (Hammondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 154-55.

⁴⁴ J. P. Cornford and J. A. Brand, "Scottish Voting Behavior," in Government and Nationalism in Scotland, ed. J. N. Wolfe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969), pp. 25-30. This article also contains a good discussion of the reliability of these polls. Jack Brand, "These are the Scotnats," New Statesman, May 17, 1968, p. 648; Iain McLean, "Scottish Nationalists," New Society, January 9, 1969, p. 52, and "The Rise and Fall of the Scottish National Party," Political Studies 18 (September 1970): 375-77; and J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver, "The Decline of the SNP--An Alternative View," Political Studies 20 (September 1972): 311-16.

⁴⁵ See chapter four for a discussion of the Royal Commission on the Constitution.

in the 1970 general election.⁴⁶ The results for Scotland, as shown below, indicated that a large proportion of Scots desired changes in the governmental system.⁴⁷

Leave things as they are at present	6%
Keep things much the same as they are but make sure that the needs of Scotland are better understood by the government	19%
Keep the present system but allow more decision to be made in Scotland	26%
Have a new system of governing Scotland so that as many decisions as possible are made in the area	24%
Let Scotland take over complete responsibility for running things in Scotland	23%
Don't know	1%

The problem with the results, however, lies in their interpretation. Several regions in England registered opinions indicative of desiring change at almost the same levels as Scotland. Also, terms such as "federalism," "devolution," and "independence" were not used in the survey. Consequently, connections between the various stages of regional governmental and specific policy alternatives were, at best, tenuous in the minds of the respondents. The ambiguity of these results was, furthermore, recognized by the Commission as they provided the basis for both the minority and majority reports. Even with this problem of uncertain meaning, though, the results are such that one may say

⁴⁶H. Calvert, "Who Wants Devolution: Kilbrandon--A Different View of the Evidence," in Devolution, ed. H. Calvert (London: Professional Books, 1975): 41-62.

⁴⁷Great Britain, Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969-1973, Devolution and Other Aspects of Government: An Attitudes Survey, Research Paper 7 (HMSO, 1973) p. 62.

the Scottish respondents overwhelmingly desired greater regional influence in the governing process and that almost half of them desired substantial change. Going beyond this level of generalization, however, and making causal connections between degrees of regional government desired and motivations is risky given the poor quality of the survey.

The general format of the poll's questions, however, was modified to incorporate the more common policy alternatives once devolution became an issue.⁴⁸ This, consequently, has provided analysts with a relatively comparable data base since 1974 and, roughly, since 1970. The results from these various surveys indicate several things about the trend of Scottish public opinion.⁴⁹ First of all, the surveys confirm the conclusion that a large majority of Scots desire substantial change in the existing governmental systems. In fact, the proportion of Scots desiring change (aggregating all categories) is usually 65 to 75 percent. Secondly, the survey results have been basically stable in their overall patterns since the February 1974 election. The proportions "for" and "against" substantial change have barely altered, even with the extensive public debate of devolution. Neither has the proportion of "don't knows" fluctuated much, staying between 5 and 10 percent. Thirdly, shifts become detectable, however, when one considers

⁴⁸ A National Opinion Poll reported in The Times (London), February 17, 1970, gave results similar to this format. Twenty-three percent of the respondents favored full independence, 44 percent favored federal autonomy, 35 percent favored a regional legislature, and only 9 percent opposed any change or had no opinion.

⁴⁹ James G. Kellas and Raymond E. Owen, "Devolution and the Political Context in Scotland," paper presented at the 1977 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1977, p. 34. This paper presents a summary table of Opinion

the proportions favoring various policy alternatives for change. Support for the milder forms of devolution has declined substantially, while support for a Scottish assembly has increased by approximately the same proportions. The remaining alternative, independence, has fluctuated somewhat in its degree of support. It has generally received the support of 20 to 25 percent of the respondents. The fluctuations in support appear to be due to changes in the political context of devolution.⁵⁰ As the Labour Government has pushed its assembly proposal, public opinion has tended to crystallize around the idea, such that a majority of Scots probably want an assembly at least as powerful as that proposed.⁵¹

While the patterns evidence stability of opinion over the period since 1974, it would be difficult to extend that stability to the past ten years. It is true that the results obtained by the

Research Polls published in the Scotsman (Edinburgh) between April 1974 and February 1977. For other poll results, see the following: Glasgow Herald, October 18, 1976; Daily Record (Glasgow), November 29, 1976; Ronald Faux, "Third of Scots 'Oppose devolution,'" The Times (London), February 1, 1977, p. 2; Ronald Faux, "Poll indicates that Labour would lose 17 seats in Scotland," The Times (London), February 28, 1977, p. 3; "Concern at 'threat' to civil aviation in Scotland Bill," The Times (London), December 5, 1977, p. 2; Ronald Faux, "Scottish polls give boost to Labour," The Times (London), February 14, 1978, p. 2; and Fred Emery, "Tory vote at Hamilton may threaten Labour," The Times (London), June 2, 1978, p. 1.

⁵⁰Cited in Faux, "Poll indicates that Labour would lose 17 seats in Scotland," p. 3.

⁵¹The Glasgow Herald, October 9, 1978, reported the findings of a System Three poll which found 67 percent of the voters in favor of a Scottish Assembly. Anthony Finlay, "Two to one in favor of the Scottish Assembly," Glasgow Herald, October 9, 1978.

surveys taken during the late 1960s and by the Kilbrandon Commission are quite comparable to those of recent years. A major difference between the results, however, is in terms of the intensity of support for the various alternatives. Active public consideration of the devolution issue appears to have intensified public opinion as is indicated by shifts in the distribution of support within the major political parties for various policy alternatives. These trends are slightly more difficult to discern because of comparability problems between the surveys, but it seems clear that within each of the principal parties the direction of opinion shifts has been toward greater devolution.⁵² This is especially so for Labour and SNP voters. Conservatives, on the other hand, have fluctuated from poll to poll more than supporters of the other parties, but even in their case several surveys indicate more support for change than against it in an increasing pattern.

Moreover, SNP identifiers over the years have become much more supportive of the party's goal of independence. The surveys of the 1967 period indicate considerable uncertainty about whether or not independence was actually the party's ultimate goal and very little support for its attainment.⁵³ The more recent polls, though, place the

⁵²For survey results indicating the differences between the various political parties and their support for devolution, consult: Richard Rose, "The Future of Scottish Politics: A Dynamic Analysis," paper presented at the CPS Scottish/Norwegian Conference, Smaller Democracies in Time of Change, June 30-July 3, 1975, p. 25 (later published as a Fraser of Allander Institute Speculative paper). ORC Poll, The Scotsman (Edinburgh), June 3, 1975, pp. 1 and 11; Glasgow Herald, October 18, 1976; Daily Record (Glasgow), November 29, 1976; Ronald Faux, The Times (London), February 2, 1977, p. 2; and Jack Brand, "The Development of National Feeling in Scotland: 1945-1977," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1-4, 1977, p. 14.

⁵³In the Glasgow survey only 13 percent of the respondents favored independence. Cornford and Brand, "Scottish Voting Behavior," p. 27.

proportion of SNP identifiers supporting independence near the 60 percent mark, with almost all of the remaining respondents favoring an assembly with substantial powers.⁵⁴ When combined with the increased support of the party overall, this indicates more voters are favoring independence as a policy alternative and that the SNP is being identified more often as the vehicle for its achievement. Ironically, the results also suggest possible internal difficulties for the SNP should divisions arise over the goal of independence.

When the further aspect of "for-against" independence is considered, additional information about the direction of public opinion trends becomes available. Several surveys have posed the question of whether a person would vote "for" or "against" independence in a referendum.⁵⁵ These polls indicate a small increase in the support for independence when the issue is posed in this manner. This question generally obtains a more favorable response than does placing independence among several other political alternatives. As with other indicators, it too shows increased support for independence in all of the parties. The proportion generally supportive of independence is around the 25-30 percent level, with 60-65 percent favoring Scotland's remaining part of the United Kingdom and the remainder being undecided as to their preference.

⁵⁴Finlay, "Two to one in favor of the Scottish Assembly," reported that 87 percent of SNP supporters would vote "for" an assembly in a referendum.

⁵⁵"Scots still oppose independent status," The Times (London), February 10, 1978, p. 5; Faux, "Poll indicates that Labour would lose 17 seats in Scotland," p. 3; "Concern at 'threat'. . .," p. 2; and Emery, "Tory vote at Hamilton may threaten Labour," p. 1.

As mentioned, these various survey results clearly indicate there is substantial support for change in the Scottish public and that it has been on the increase. They also indicate the Scottish public is more intensely supportive of change than they previously were; in other words, the issue of governmental change has gained in its centrality and salience. Furthermore, the results show that while change is being actively sought, most Scottish voters wish to remain part of the British political system. It should not be overlooked, though, that the proportion supportive of separatist positions has also increased: one out of every four or five voters favoring independence is not an insubstantial bloc of supporters. Finally, when these results are compared to the historical record of earlier public opinion trends, they tend to confirm the idea that the current support for change is both qualitatively and quantitatively distinct from that experienced during the previous attempts to achieve home rule.

Scottish National Identity as an Explanation

Now that the nature of Scottish national identity and its relationship to political behavior has been considered, an assessment of its utility as an explanation for contemporary affairs must be made. In that vein, one should note that virtually every analyst attributes some role in the development of the current political situation to its presence. The question that then becomes important is, how significant a role does identity play in the development of Scottish nationalism?

According to all but the most ardent nationalists of a somewhat romantic vein, the role of Scottish national identity in the

success of the SNP and the rise of the devolution issue has been that of a necessary, yet not sufficient, cause.⁵⁶ It is recognized that a political party truly striving to be nationalistic must have a national identity upon which to base its organization. It is not, however, accepted that the existence of a national identity is sufficient alone to base a strong, viable political organization upon. Some other factor or set of factors must intervene to generate political salience for the possession of the national identity.

As mentioned, most analysts accept this general logic regarding national identity. There are, though, differences in terms of the amount of emphasis granted this factor by various analysts. The variation appears largely to be the result of differences in the authors' estimation of the continued persistence of the SNP's support. Some scholars, such as Professor Jack Brand, believe that the national identity of the Scots is a very important ingredient in the development of the national movement.⁵⁷ It was around this identity that other political grievances gathered to provide a basis of organization for the SNP. Others, such as Professor H. G. Hanham and Sir Reginald Coupland have acknowledged the persistence of Scottish national identity as an important factor, but clearly as a secondary one to economic and political discontent.⁵⁸ Their work does not perceive an enhanced awareness of

⁵⁶ Douglas Young has traced the campaign for Scottish self-government, for instance, back to 80 AD. "A Sketch History of Scottish Nationalism," in The Scottish Debate: Essays on Scottish Nationalism, ed. Neil MacCormick (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p.5.

⁵⁷ Jack Brand, "The Development of National Feeling in Scotland, 1945-1977."

⁵⁸ Hanham, Scottish Nationalism; and Reginald Coupland, Welsh Scottish Nationalism: A Study (London: Collins, 1954).

Scottishness in the same way as does Brand. Still others would probably rate the role of national identity a shade lower than even Hanham or Coupland.⁵⁹

The extreme perceptions of the importance of this factor belong to those individuals holding decidedly partisan views on the question of devolution and the SNP. Tam Dalyell, the ardent anti-devolutionary Labour MP from West Lothian, places little credence in the idea that the SNP has grown because it somehow represents Scottish national identity.⁶⁰ Instead, he perceives the party's growth as being due to protest voting over Government mismanagement of Scottish affairs. Once those errors are corrected the SNP and the sentiments it represents will subside. On the other extreme, there are nationalists who believe that their national culture and identity have been oppressed and are in danger of becoming nonexistent. This has largely come about as a result of the continued expansion of English values to Scotland. Others paint the repressive aspects of being part of the British political system in harsher terms, but the point is essentially the same. Scotland will cease to be Scotland unless her identity and those institutions which service it are preserved independently. Thus the growth of the SNP is

⁵⁹Kellas, The Scottish Political System; Anthony H. Birch, Political Integration and Disintegration in the British Isles (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977); and Milton Esman, "Scottish Nationalism, North Sea Oil and the British Response," Occasional Paper 6, Series 1, The Waverley Papers, Department of Politics, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, 1975. A revised version of this paper appeared in Esman's edited book, Ethnic Conflict in the Western World (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 251-66.

⁶⁰Dalyell, Devolution: The End of Britain.

seen as a public response to this endangering of Scottish national identity.

The evidence that has been considered in the preceding section does not support either of the extreme positions, but then neither is particularly dependent upon an evidentiary base as they are essentially polemical positions. The SNP does not appear likely to fade from the scene in the immediate future, and it is apparently becoming more identified as a genuine outlet for expressions of Scottish national identity. Likewise, it should be noted that the English have not been particularly aggressive in their oppression of Scotland. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain the continued existence of the Scottish institutions and Scotland's political prominence. This does not mean that changes in the cultural values and society of Britain have not affected Scotland, but that the impacts were largely unintended.

The more moderate interpretations, relying upon Scottish national identity as a necessary condition for nationalist political action, are, on the other hand, reasonably well supported by the available evidence. If nothing else, the pattern of events supports this interpretation. Scotland has maintained its own identity since the Act of Union, but nationalist political activity can be traced back only to the mid-1800s at the earliest. And, if one takes a strict interpretation of the meaning of nationalism as was done in the preceding section, then that initial activity was primarily reformist and unionist in orientation. Only with the growing acceptance of the idea of political independence can nationalism be accurately dated. Thus Scottish nationalism would need to be seen as basically a recent phenomenon. This coincides with the findings that those voters perceiving themselves as Scots

are supporting the SNP in greater numbers and the high levels of support among SNP identifiers for the more drastic forms of devolution indicates a developing nationalism.

Accepting this latter interpretation of Scottish national identity as valid, the question of what linked it to political action becomes the important one. This interpretation perceives identity as vital, but also as something needing assistance for it to be of political saliency. The governmental aspects considered have a potential for providing that linkage, as was suggested earlier, but the evidence does not indicate that they accomplished this feat. Consequently, Scottish national identity lacks utility as an explanation in its own right. Thus, more attention needs to be given to those aspects of Scottish and British politics which may have provided the necessary linkage for Scottish national identity to become the significant filter of political perceptions that it apparently is. It is to those factors that the analysis must now turn in the ensuing chapters.

CHAPTER TWO

CONTRIBUTORS TO CONTEXTUAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE

In the first chapter the macro/micro-level relationship of national identity to political behavior was analyzed. It was acknowledged that while a sense of national identity has been held by large numbers of Scots, the linkage between recognition of the identity and nationalistic political action has been a very weak one. Recent years, though, have witnessed an apparent upsurge in the proportion of individuals seeing themselves primarily as Scots and believing that Scotland deserves more self-government. Scottish national identity is, consequently, becoming more significant as a perceptual filter for the interpretation of political issues, but, as indicated, the presence of the identity alone is insufficient to account for the development of this phenomenon. Thus, a further explication of the linkage process is needed to determine why this has occurred.

As the thesis of this study suggests, the development of Scottish nationalism is not the result of a single factor, but rather that of political changes affecting Scotland and the United Kingdom. The impact of these changes has been a reconceptualization of public

issues, making it more acceptable for Scots to perceive matters in terms of their effects upon Scotland. The problem to be considered in this chapter is how a series of political changes and dilemmas may have contributed to this redefinition process, thereby facilitating the linkage between identity and behavior. A logical point at which to begin examination of these contributors to contextual and political change is with the socioeconomic conditions of Scotland. These frequently have been cited as a major factor in the receptivity of the Scots to the SNP and warrant a detailed investigation. Following this, consideration should be given to the state of the other political parties in Scotland with whom the SNP has had to compete. It is probable that their ability or inability to serve effectively as articulators of Scottish concerns affected the SNP's opportunities for growth. The extent, then, to which this occurred also needs delineation. Lastly, there is a set of broader political and economic changes that have affected the United Kingdom as a whole which should be evaluated for their potential impact. The domestic consequences of Britain's loss of the Empire, her membership in the EEC, and the increased volatility of electoral politics may have altered further the context within which issues have been perceived.

The Socioeconomic Context of Scottish Politics

Scotland's political unrest is believed by most analysts to be directly related to its social and economic conditions. A survey of these aspects serves, therefore, a dual purpose. It describes part of the context within which the nationalist movement has developed, and it suggests a possible activating agent linking identity to behavior.

Before this survey of Scotland's longstanding economic problems can be of use, though, there are several unclear aspects of these conditions that will require further attention in order that conclusions as to their impact may be drawn. For one thing, the extent to which these problems are distinguishable from those encountered by the rest of Britain is uncertain. Secondly, the degree to which government policies or the lack thereof are responsible for their existence is also an important unknown. And, finally, the impact of these macro-level phenomena on individual-level behavior should be evaluated as a possible factor in the redefinition. As with Scottish national identity, it cannot be assumed that the existence of socioeconomic problems necessarily means they are politically important as factors in the development of nationalism.

Discussion of Scotland's socioeconomic conditions usually begins with the prosperity attained during the industrial revolution.¹ The economic infrastructure built during the late 1700s and 1800s was largely dependent upon such industries as shipbuilding, steel production, and coal mining. Among the consequences of the early success of these heavy industries, however, was an almost total dependence, especially in the west-central region, on their productivity. Thus, the

¹Despite the economic growth that the Industrial Revolution brought, Scotland has been persistently less well off than England. The difficulties of this century are an accentuation of these problems in an era when government is perceived as being responsible for acting upon them. For a discussion of the pattern of disparity and its relationship to cultural differences, see Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). Also see Bruce Lenman's An Economic History of Modern Scotland (London: B. T. Batsford, 1977).

decline of these industries following the First World War and the Depression necessitated the development of alternative sources of employment. Problems of adequate investment capital, though, continued to plague Scottish industry through the early 1950s, meaning that for over thirty years little was done to alleviate the declining economic situation. Beginning, though, in the 1950s and continuing into the 1960s, more diversified investment was attracted to Scotland. A large proportion of these new industries were foreign firms, particularly American ones, many of whom located in Scotland because of the government's regional policies, which encouraged investment in the development areas away from the congested Southeast.

The net result has been that Scotland still has serious economic problems, but the opportunity for growth in the near future is quite real. The discovery of the oil in the North Sea and its projected economic impact has made that possibility even more realistic. However, while Scotland's economic prospects seem to be improving for the first time in fifty years, the rest of Britain, particularly the Southeast, has been having severe labor shortages and inflation. In the eyes of many Scots the cooling off of the economy precisely when Scotland's economy should be in the midst of a rapid growth period has meant that their economy and, subsequently, their future has been sacrificed in order to bail out the London area. Some see these economic policies as just another example of Scotland's needs coming behind those of England.

Population Change in Scotland

The historic disparity of economic conditions between Scotland and England and the resultant social conditions, coupled with these


current economic difficulties, are important factors in the debate concerning Scottish nationalism. Both the opponents and the proponents of the nationalist movement believe that its success is directly connected with these matters. One particular point at which their discussions of these consequences commonly begin is the trend of population growth in Scotland. (See figure 3 for population trends.) Since the turn of the century, Scotland's overall population growth has been so low that it has not even kept pace with its proportion of the population of the United Kingdom. The growth rate since 1901 has been 16 percent, while the United Kingdom as a whole has had a growth rate of 45 percent. This has reduced Scotland's proportion of the British population from 12 to 9.7 percent. Because of this decline in relative population, it is now possible to claim that Scotland is overrepresented at Westminster. The seventy-one Scottish MPs represent 11 percent of Parliament, but if their number were based upon current population, they would be reduced to sixty-two members.

A major reason why Scotland's population has grown so slowly and why many of its counties have lost population is the continued emigration of thousands of Scots.² Since the beginning of the 1950s, the emigration rate has averaged over 30,000 persons per year, with their destination being fairly evenly divided between the rest of Britain and overseas. (See figure 4 for the emigration trends.) Without this high rate of emigration, Scotland's population growth would have doubled, which would have virtually stabilized its position relative to England

²Huw R. Jones, "Migration to and from Scotland since 1961," Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 49 (1970), pp. 147-48.

FIGURE 3


POPULATION GROWTH OF SCOTLAND, AND ENGLAND
AND WALES, 1901/71, By Percent



SOURCES: Great Britain, General Register Office, Census of Scotland 1931, table 1; Great Britain, General Register Office, Census of Scotland 1951, table 1; and Great Britain, General Register Office, Census of Scotland 1971, table 2.

FIGURE 4

SCOTTISH EMIGRATION RATE AND DESTINATION, 1951/71



SOURCES: "Scotland: A Sense of Change," The Economist, February 21, 1970, p. xiii; "The Two Nations: A Survey of Scotland," The Economist, September 29, 1973, p. 31; and I. G. McIntosh and C. B. Marshall, The Face of Scotland, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1970), pp. 34-37.

and Wales. Emigration has been a traditional means of escaping the poor housing and employment prospects for the Scots just as it has been for the Welsh and the Irish. The effect over the long term has also been the same. Many of the country's younger and better educated individuals have left for brighter opportunities elsewhere. This drain, often noted with regards to university graduates, has deprived the country of the very people needed to rebuild itself.³ The overall emigration rate has declined somewhat in recent years and a possible effect of the retention of more young people may be more support for the SNP. It has been observed that many of the party's local leaders and MPs are younger people with middle class backgrounds who, just a few years ago, might have moved away. The renewed economic activity seems to be holding more people in the country, but these may be the same people most apt to be critical of Scotland's problems and the government's handling of them.

An additional aspect of population change of importance is the increased urbanization and concentration of the Scottish people. The rural areas of Scotland, the Borders region, the Highlands, and the Islands have lost population for more than one hundred years. Many of these people have moved to the central industrial belt which now contains 75-80 percent of Scotland's population. As a result, the span between Glasgow and Edinburgh is largely one extended urban area. The northeast of Scotland, especially the Aberdeen area, has been experiencing an increase in population because of the North Sea oil.

³G. Mercer and D. J. C. Forsyth, "A Scottish Brain Drain: The University Experience," The Scottish Geographical Magazine 90 (March 1970): 134-38.

This same trend is occurring in other areas along the North Sea coastline, and it may have a serious impact upon these regions. The local public services and transportation systems are not adequate for a large permanent influx of oil workers and their dependents; consequently, the existing facilities are being severely strained.

The economic and population differences of the various regions are among the major problems with which the 1975 reorganization of local government is an attempt to cope. Some of the areas require considerable planning and investment to revitalize them; others require similar efforts in order to manage their rate of growth. It may be that in the final analysis these internal differences are as significant in accounting for the success of the nationalists as the differences between Scotland and England.⁴


One characteristic of the Scottish population of interest, even if it probably is not a politically significant aspect, is the decline of the Gaelic language. English has long been the principal language of Scotland and, while the SNP has encouraged the government to have more radio and television programs broadcast in the ancient language, as an issue it seems to play no real role in their appeal. In fact, excepting a few rural areas, there are too few Gaelic speakers to be of substantial electoral significance.⁵ (See figure 5 and table 1 for trends of Gaelic language usage.) This is an important

⁴"The Two Nations: A Survey of Scotland," The Economist, September 29, 1973, pp. survey 1-50.

⁵Kevin Done, "Leaders Fail to Fire Gaelic," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), November 20, 1974, p. 12; Harry Reid, "Breakthrough for Gaelic in Schools," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), July 7, 1975, p. 9; and "Call on EEC to Accept Gaelic as Official," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), July 25, 1975, p. 9.

FIGURE 5

PROPORTION GAELIC SPEAKERS, SCOTLAND, 1901/71



SOURCES: Great Britain, General Register Office, Census of Scotland 1951, vol. 2; Great Britain, General Register Office, Census of Scotland 1961, Preliminary Reports; and Great Britain, General Register Office, Census of Scotland 1971, Preliminary Reports.

TABLE 1
 SCOTTISH COUNTIES WITH SUBSTANTIAL GAELIC
 SPEAKING POPULATION, 1951/71
 (Percent County's Population)

County	1951	1961	1971
Glasgow	1.2	1.5	1.4
Caithness	1.2	0.9	1.5
Nairn	1.6	1.7	1.6
Perth	1.8	1.5	1.6
Bute	2.2	1.6	1.8
Argyll	20.7	16.5	13.0
Sutherland	24.0	17.9	13.9
Inverness	29.1	24.6	20.9
Ross & Cromarty	43.6	39.3	33.5

SOURCE: Great Britain, General Register Office, Census of Scotland 1951, vol. 2; Great Britain, General Register Office, Census of Scotland, Preliminary Reports; and Great Britain, General Register Office, Census of Scotland 1971, Preliminary Reports.

distinction between the Scottish and Welsh nationalist movements; unlike the Welsh, the Scots do not place a major emphasis upon language and purely cultural issues. Their support comes from other issue areas.⁶

Social Class Structures and the Division of Wealth

By shifting focus from demographic changes to economic conditions, additional aspects of Scottish society important to this contextual survey can be noted. One of the most important of these is Scotland's social class structure and its subsequent distribution of wealth. Social class distinctions have been an important feature of Scottish politics for a long time and they remain influential, perhaps because of their continued prominence. In 1973, for instance, it was estimated that the middle class was approximately 15 percent smaller in Scotland than in England.⁷ This pattern has been maintained, but may actually be narrowing in recent years. The respective estimates from the 1966 sample census indicate that 20.2 percent of England's population belonged to social classes I and II, while the figure for Scotland was only 16.9 percent.⁸ This same pattern is repeated when self-appraisals of social

⁶Patricia Elton Mayo, The Roots of Identity (London: Allen Lane, 1974), pp. 59-92; Kenneth O. Morgan, "Welsh Nationalism: The Historical Background," Journal of Contemporary History 6 (1971): 153-72; and Philip M. Rawkins, "'Rich Welsh or Poor British?' A Sociological Analysis of Political Mobilization and Modes of Activism in the Welsh Nationalist Movement," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 29-September 2, 1974, Chicago, Illinois.

⁷"The Two Nations: A Survey of Scotland," p. survey 5.

⁸Great Britain, General Register Office, Sample Census 1966, Scotland, Economic Activity Tables, table 30.

social class are considered. The figures in this instance indicate 43 percent of the English respondents perceived themselves to be middle class, but only 33 percent of the Scots so identified themselves.⁹

These class differences are a more pervasive aspect of Scottish life than mere self categorization, as is evident when the distribution of wealth within the society is examined. While Scotland has 9.7 percent of Britain's population, it is estimated that it has only 17 percent of the total British financial wealth. This fact, though, only makes more apparent the concentration of that wealth when one considers that almost 11 percent of the individuals with capital holdings of over £ 40,000 live in Scotland.¹⁰

This pattern of disparity is continued when the distribution of personal wealth is noted. (See table 2 for trend of personal wealth distribution in Scotland.) While the percentage of wealth owned by the top ten percent has steadily declined since 1950 in England and Wales, it has remained relatively stable in Scotland. This difference in the distribution of wealth reached the point that for the 1967-69 period, the percentage of wealth owned by the top ten percent in Scotland was almost 14 percent higher than in the other two countries.¹¹ Not only do these trends indicate Scotland is a comparatively poorer country

⁹England, Wales & Scotland: Gallup Poll, 1974, cited by Richard Rose, The United Kingdom as a Multinational State, Survey Research Occasional Paper, no. 6 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1970), p. 18.

¹⁰"The Two Nations: A Survey of Scotland," p. survey 5.

¹¹Alan Harrison, The Distribution of Personal Wealth in Scotland, Research Monograph Number 1 (Glasgow: The Fraser of Allander Institute for Research on the Scottish Economy at the University of Strathclyde, 1975), pp. 10-15.

TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL WEALTH, SCOTLAND,
AND ENGLAND AND WALES, 1950/69

Year	Scotland		England and Wales	
	Percentage 1.0%	Owned by Top 10.0%	Percentage 1.0%	Owned by Top 10.0%
1950/52	41.4	78.3	41.5	79.6
1953/55	38.8	77.4	41.1	77.0
1956/58	35.7	73.8	40.8	75.3
1960/62	38.5	79.4	35.3	73.1
1964/66	36.5	78.9	31.8	70.1
1967/69	32.8	78.2	31.2	68.7

SOURCE: Alan Harrison, The Distribution of Personal Wealth in Scotland, Research Monograph Number 1 (Glasgow: The Fraser of Allander Institute for Research on the Scottish Economy at the University of Strathclyde, 1975), p. 13.

than England and Wales, but also that the wealth which is there is much more concentrated and its dispersion is a much slower process.

These conclusions are reinforced when one looks at estimates of per capita income in Scotland.¹² The estimates have been based upon various methods of calculation, but there is considerable agreement that the per capita income in Scotland has generally fluctuated between 87-92 percent of that for the United Kingdom as a whole. One factor which accounts for a portion of this lower per capita income, which is lower than average salaries would indicate, is the higher proportion of dependents per family found in Scotland. Even with this in mind, incomes in Scotland have been depressed in comparison to the rest of Britain, and this is reflected in the ownership of various common consumer items. For example, in 1975 only 37 percent of Scottish households possessed a car while the British average was 45 percent, and only 37 percent had a telephone against a United Kingdom average of 42 percent.¹³

These differences may be declining in the near future as the differential in average weekly wages between Scottish and British workers continues to decrease. In 1960, the average weekly earnings of the fulltime, adult male, manual worker was 91.6 percent of the United Kingdom average. By 1974, the figure was 96.3 percent, and in 1975 it was 99.5 percent.¹⁴ Within Scotland, though, the variation is still quite

¹²This same pattern of concentration is also reflected in land ownership. John McEwen, "highland Landlordism," The Red Paper on Scotland, ed. Gordon Brown (Edinburgh: EUSPP, 1975), pp. 262-69.

¹³Jane Morton, "Two Scotlands," New Society, April 10, 1975, p. 81.

¹⁴James Robertson, "Scots Economy 'Best in UK,'" The Scotsman (Edinburgh), July 22, 1975, p. 7.

distinct. In 1974, using the new local government regions as a base, the average weekly wage varied between £39.4 and £47.1, but even these figures represent something of a narrowing of the gap between the regions from the past.¹⁵

Housing and Unemployment

Perhaps the one aspect of Scottish life that most reveals the differences in income and living standards between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom is housing. According to the Scottish Office, about one in ten dwellings is sub-standard, giving Scotland some of the worst housing in all of Europe. Almost 40 percent of its 1.75 million dwellings were built prior to 1919 and 30 percent are more than eighty years old. The situation is particularly bad in the west, in Glasgow and its surrounding communities, where just under 50 percent of the Scottish population resides in 57 percent of the sub-standard housing. Many of these houses lack such basic amenities as: a fixed bath or shower, 20 percent; a hot water supply, 23 percent; and an internal water closet, 17 percent. Given these conditions, it is not surprising that local government politics frequently revolve around housing and rent questions.¹⁶

The provision of housing by local authorities is much more politically important in Scotland than elsewhere in Britain. In 1975, it was estimated that the British norm was 52 percent of households in

¹⁵Morton, "Two Scotlands," p. 81.

¹⁶"Scotland: A Sense of Change," The Economist, February 21, 1970, pp. x-xii.

ownership dwelling and 31 percent in council housing. The comparable Scottish figures were 32 and 53 percent; and in many areas the proportion of people living in council housing was as high as 75 percent.¹⁷

The difficulties with this pattern have been widely commented upon, and it is acknowledged that local government practices tend to perpetuate the poor conditions and overcrowding. But neither Labour nor the Conservatives have been too anxious to take the stringent measures necessary to restrict the practice of low rents and high rates. The tradition has had the effect of discouraging the construction of private homes or the renovation of privately rented property and the raising of the cost of private home construction. It has also tended to restrict the mobility of labor and the expansion of new towns as they have to charge higher rent. The end result is to make the local government authorities the owner and perpetuator of poor housing.¹⁸

Another characteristic of Scotland's economic condition which is important to an understanding of the political situation is the high rate of unemployment. Since the end of the Second World War, Scotland's unemployment rate has fluctuated between one and one-half to two times that of the United Kingdom. (See table 3 for a comparison of unemployment rates.) Even in 1975 with the new diversified industries and the impact of the oil beginning to be felt, Scotland's unemployment rate

¹⁷ Morton, "Two Scotlands," p. 81; and "Scotland: The Oil Fired Nation," The Economist, February 18, 1978, pp. survey 19-27.

¹⁸ Jane Morton, "Housing," New Society, August 31, 1972, p. 454; James G. Kellas, The Scottish Political System, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 203-95; and Robin Cook, "Scotland's Housing," The Red Paper on Scotland, ed. Gordon Brown (Edinburgh: EUSPP, 1975), pp. 334-42.

TABLE 3
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, SCOTLAND AND
UNITED KINGDOM, 1949/76

Year	Scotland	United Kingdom
1949	3.0	1.5
1955	2.4	1.1
1958	3.7	2.1
1960	3.6	1.6
1961	3.1	1.6
1962	3.8	2.1
1963	4.8	2.6
1964	3.6	1.8
1965	3.0	1.5
1966	2.9	1.6
1967	3.9	2.5
1968	3.8	2.5
1969	3.7	2.5
1970	4.3	2.7
1971	6.0	3.7
1972	6.4	3.8
1973	4.7	2.7
1974	3.9	2.5
1975	4.6	3.5
1976*	7.5	6.0

SOURCE: SOURCE: Great Britain, Central Statistical Office, Abstract of Regional Statistics, 1971, table 26; Gavin McCrone, Regional Policy in Britain (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), p. 154; Frank Stephen, "The Scottish Development Office," The Red Paper on Scotland, pp. 223-39; "Scotland," New Society, February 12, 1976, p. 334; and Melanie Phillips, "The Scottish Lion Gets More Teeth," New Society, December 9, 1976, pp. 502-03.

was 4.6 percent with the United Kingdom's average being 3.5 percent. This is a substantially smaller difference than in some previous years, but still a significant one for an area with lower wages and higher living costs. As a result, Scotland has tended to have between 15-20 percent of the United Kingdom's unemployed among its 10 percent of the population. The unemployment problem is compounded by the fact that there are regional differences within Scotland. It is not uncommon for for the Glasgow area to have an unemployment rate twice that of the United Kingdom, while other areas, particularly the Aberdeen area in recent years, have comparable or lower rates than the rest of Britain.¹⁹

One of the factors that has continued this high rate of unemployment despite increased investment in newer industries has been the loss of jobs in the traditional industries. Between 1951 and 1971, Scotland lost almost 200,000 jobs, especially during the 1952-64 period. The gains made in employment through the location of new industries have been substantial, but, without the loss of thousands of working age persons through emigration, the unemployment rate would have skyrocketed. Even with the growth potential of the Scottish economy, these problems will persist for some time. It has been estimated that Scotland needs between 16,000 and 27,000 new jobs each year if its economic problems in terms of unemployment are to end by 1980.²⁰

¹⁹ Morton, "Two Scotlands," p. 81; "Scotland's Two Nations," The Economist, January 10, 1976, pp. 56-57; and Vincent Cable, "Glasgow: Area of Need," The Red Paper on Scotland, ed. Gordon Brown (Edinburgh: EUSPP, 1975), pp. 232-46.

²⁰ Barry Moore and John Rhodes, "Regional Policy and the Scottish Economy," Scottish Journal of Political Economy 21 (November 1974): 215-32.

Partly because of this pattern of unemployment, labor relations in Scotland have not been particularly harmonious. Trade union affiliation is about 10 percent higher in Scotland than in England, although this is slightly less than the rate in Wales. The Scottish unions have tended to be protective of existing industries and jobs despite histories of low productivity. Work stoppage is more common and frequently of longer duration than in England. The Scots have consistently lost more working days per worker than the English, but in recent years the trend has worsened. During the 1963-73 decade, the Scots lost an average of 237 days each per 1,000 employees per year, while the English average was 133 days. This reputation of labor difficulties has hurt the government's efforts to induce new firms to locate in Scotland. It has also hurt the Clydeside region more than the others as this area has had the worst problems. As a consequence, it has tended to help perpetuate the dependence on the traditional industries and the high unemployment rate of the region.²¹

As has been indicated, Scotland's industrial structure has been changing considerably in recent years. The industrial west, once the economic heart of Scotland, continues to decline. It has been estimated that the area will lose more jobs in the future, perhaps as many as 400,000 by 1991.²² At the same time, the country as a whole is

²¹Ken Alexander, "A Strong Voice in the Land," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), November 8, 1974, p. 15; "I'm All Right, Jock," The Economist, November 2, 1974, pp. 79-80; Rose, "The United Kingdom as a Multi-National State," p. 19; Kellas, The Scottish Political System, pp. 161-63; and "The Two Nations: A Survey of Scotland," pp. survey 35-6, 48.

²²"Scotland's Two Nations," pp. 56-57.

picking up some valuable additions in the areas of automotive products, electronics, and petrochemical industries.

The Impact of North Sea Oil

The most dramatic changes in Scotland's economy have been a result of the discovery of the North Sea oil.²³ However, the impact on employment has been difficult to analyze with accuracy. In 1973, The Economist estimated that over 6,000 men already owed their jobs directly to the oil. The same article reported a Department of Employment survey of the Aberdeen area which found 2,600 jobs were oil-related--a figure not expected until 1975.²⁴ By 1974, the figures for Scotland rose to around 19,000, with the authors of a prominent study of the political economy of the North Sea oil estimating that they would rise above 27,000 by 1976, and then fall off to 21,000 by 1980.²⁵ But even their estimate was far short of reality as the number of oil related jobs rose to almost 50,000 by 1976, with 16,000 of them in the Strathclyde area alone.²⁶

²³Detailed consideration of the political aspects of the North Sea oil is beyond the scope of this survey. For discussions of those points, see D. I. Mackay and G. A. Mackay, The Political Economy of North Sea Oil (London: Martin Robinson and Co., 1975), pp. 18-49, 138-85; Peter Smith, "The Political Economy of North Sea Oil," The Red Paper on Scotland, ed. Gordon Brown (Edinburgh: EUSPP, 1975), pp. 187-213; Ian Fulton, "Scottish Oil," The Political Quarterly 45 (July-September 1974): 310-22; and Geoffrey W. Lee, "North Sea Oil and Scottish Nationalism," The Political Quarterly 47 (July-September 1976): 307-17.

²⁴"The Two Nations: A Survey of Scotland," p. 12

²⁵Mackay and Mackay, The Political Economy of North Sea Oil, pp. 111-37; Smith, "The Political Economy of North Sea Oil," pp. 187-213; and Maxwell Gaskin, "The Economic Impact of North Sea Oil on Scotland," Three Banks Review 96 (March 1973): 30-50.

²⁶Melanie Phillips, "The Scottish Lion Gets Some Teeth," New Society, December 9, 1976, pp. 502-03.

The problems of assessing the impact of the oil are due to the uncertainty of the quantity of petroleum resources that are recoverable, the difficulties to be encountered in the recovery process, the active life-span of the field, and the spinoff effects for related industries. At any rate, the benefits for the eastern regions are likely to continue and, at least for a period of years, increase, as active production of the oil has hardly begun. The west, on the other hand, must rely upon the spinoff effects; thus it is probable that the disparities between the two halves of the country will persist. The one thing which could turn the west around dramatically in a short time is the discovery of oil along the west coast, and this possibility is being explored.

An additional impact of the North Sea oil is the strain which has been placed upon the environment and the political institutions as more jobs are created in the Highlands and coastal areas.²⁷ These regions of Scotland are sparsely populated, dependent largely upon agriculture and fishing as their main economic base. The demand for workers has brought a sudden influx of people to these areas in a very short time. As a result, the transportation systems are not adequate to handle the increased traffic. The local governmental authorities are unprepared and do not have the financial resources to expand their services to meet these new demands. The housing situation is so bad that many

²⁷ George Rosie, Cromarty: The Scramble for Oil (Edinburgh: Canongate Publishing, 1974). This is a good account of the impact of the oil industry on the Cormarty Firth area. Also see David Taylor, "The Social Impact of Oil," The Red Paper on Scotland, ed. Gordon Brown (Edinburgh: EUSPP, 1975), pp. 270-81.

workers and their families are sharing houses. At one point hundreds of men were even living in an old ocean liner moored off Nigg Bay.

While it is recognized that this situation poses serious problems for these areas, there is a reluctance to make tremendous changes in the services provided. No one is sure how long the oil boom will last and local authorities are wary of the possibility that their tax base and clientele will be gone once the expansions have been completed. The possibility also exists that serious environmental damage may be done by the increased population and possible oil spillages. If such damage were to occur, it could substantially affect the ability of the fishing grounds and the agricultural lands to maintain their productivity once the oil is gone.

Regional Policy in Britain

The British government has officially recognized for over forty years that some regions of the United Kingdom have different economic problems. Since the Special Areas Act of 1934, the regional policies have changed considerably. The initial efforts concentrated upon unemployment and the training of individuals dislocated by declining industries. The scope of the policies expanded so that by the revisions of the early sixties the regional policies went beyond unemployment to such matters as investment inducement, urban renewal, physical and transport planning, and the creation of new towns. Among the main objectives for Scotland was the diversification of the economic infrastructure by the locating of higher, technologically modern industries in the central region and by dispersing the population more evenly.

This would be furthered by the urban renewal of Glasgow and the building of new towns.

These policies have had an impact upon the economic situation in Scotland, but the extent is unclear. Dr. Gavin McCrone has divided the post-war - 1966 era into three periods.²⁸ During the first period--the late 1940s to the mid 1950s--the policies seem to have contributed to the improved economic picture of the development regions which included most of Scotland as well as other areas of Britain. However, during the second period--mid 1950s to 1960, the economic boom which followed the war ended and regional disparities increased. In the third period--1960-1966--the situation worsened with the unemployment and emigration rates increasing. This is deceiving, though, as the unemployment levels of the traditional industries, especially shipbuilding and coal mining, declined substantially; yet employment created by new industries kept the overall effect from being much worse. In fact, it has been estimated that between 1963-1973 the regional policies created between 200,000 and 250,000 new jobs in the Development Areas of the United Kingdom, with 70,000-80,000 of them in Scotland.²⁹ Many of these new jobs were in American industries induced to locate in Scotland because of government incentives and the refusal to allow them to locate in the congested London area. As mentioned, these jobs alone were not enough to balance out the employment losses, but they were an important cushion in

²⁸Gavin McCrone, Regional Policy in Britain (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), pp. 99-166.

²⁹Moore and Rhodes, "Regional Policy and the Scottish Economy," pp. 216-18.

maintaining the economic situation and providing a base for the growth that began in the late 1960s.

The Significance of Scottish Socioeconomic Conditions

In short, Scotland does have serious economic problems which have resulted in significant differences in living conditions when compared with the rest of Britain. Substantial disparities also exist between the regions of Scotland, some of which are of long standing, such as the relative poverty of the Highlands and Islands.³⁰ It should also be noted, however, as is often done by opponents of the nationalists, that considerable variation exists within England as well. The North-east, in particular, has been pointed out as an area of high unemployment and poor housing. It is true that if Scotland is considered only as a region of the United Kingdom, it is not alone in its economic situation. This perspective overlooks, however, the fact that Scotland has a set of cultural and political traditions which, joined with the economic problems, could provide the basis for a political movement based around the Scottish identity. Other regions have pronounced economic differences, but they do not seem to have a strong enough identity around which a sustained political movement can be built. The persistence of these regional differences over time has, moreover, operated to perpetuate a sense of distinctiveness or consciousness on the part of the Scots as a people. In conjunction with the cultural traditions and

³⁰David Turnock, Scotland's Highlands and Islands (London: Oxford University Press, 1974); and Paul Harrison, "The Shetland's Separate State," New Society, January 27, 1977, pp. 169-71.

institutions, as well as political structures, this pattern of economic relationships has functioned so that this basic distinctiveness was preserved at the same time economic and political integration with England was proceeding.

As a consequence of this situation, Scotland's socioeconomic conditions appear to occupy a role similar to that of the governmental institutions in the development of nationalism. They have provided a base from which the identity could draw sustenance, and perhaps even prosper, but they too lack an essential element to be more than a contributor to the overall phenomenon. They are macro-level conditions which somehow have to be transformed into micro-level grievances in order to be politically salient. While it is reasonable to presume that the average Scot is more familiar with these socioeconomic conditions than the institutions governing him, that does not mean they have necessarily become significant factors in the generation of nationalist political behavior. In fact, the various surveys that have been taken to determine the role of perceptions of relative deprivation in the growth of Scottish nationalism have found little evidence for such a conclusion no matter how obvious it seems.³¹ These conditions do, however, provide something which the political institutions do not. They form a basis for nationalist agitation that is recognized by a broad

³¹Two scholars have attempted to test for the presence of perceptions of relative deprivation, but have found little support for their hypotheses. See John E. Schwarz, "The Scottish National Party: Nonviolent Separatism and Theories of Violence," *World Politics* 22 (July 1970): 496-517; and Roger Allan Brooks, "Scottish Nationalism: Relative Deprivation and Social Mobility" (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1973).

range of Scots, thus giving the SNP an issue foundation upon which to build their organization and credibility.

Change Within the Political Parties of Scotland

The next set of changes that needs to be considered in this analysis concern the political parties of Scotland. Each of the major British parties maintains a virtually separate organization in Scotland; thus, alterations in their capability to serve as articulators of Scottish demands to Westminster may be important contributors to the SNP's success. This focus upon the changing nature of the parties has been adopted because these bodies have been on the political scene longer than the SNP and have apparently been operating effectively for most of that time. They, like the governing institutions and the socioeconomic conditions, have provided a means for preserving a sense of distinctiveness through their structural separateness, while also integrating Scotland with the rest of the United Kingdom by their participation in the political process. The rise of the SNP, however, clearly suggests that these earlier parties are no longer fulfilling their balancing role in an adequate manner.

A new political party can grow electorally in a democratic system, thereby replacing an older party, under several possible circumstances.³² One of these is when the preceding parties become perceived as ineffective articulators for the issues or groups around

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These are not the only circumstances under which replacement of a major party may occur. For a discussion of various alternative situations, see James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973), pp. 11-25.

which they developed. And the second is when a new or previously unrepresented issue becomes a matter of intense public concern. Thus, an examination of the changes that have occurred within the older parties of Scotland and their internal state of affairs as the SNP began to grow is needed. This will assist in the determination of the circumstances which created the opportunity for the nationalists to mature into an effective organization.

The Labour Party in Scotland

The Labour Party in Scotland did not formally become part of the British Labour Party until 1915 when the Scottish Council was created. To date, the Scottish Council remains organizationally distinct within the British Labour Party. It holds its own annual conference, focusing mainly, but not exclusively, on Scottish affairs. As far as the National Conference is concerned, though, its decisions are advisory.

The Scottish central party organization's primary role is to assist the local constituencies in selecting their candidates and in running the campaigns. The party employs several professional workers for this purpose, but these efforts are not supported nearly to the extent that they are in England. Basically, the local constituency organizations choose their own candidates; however, the central party does have more influence over the local units than do the Conservatives

³³In late 1975, a splinter group broke with the Labour Party in Scotland and took the name "Scottish Labour Party." To avoid confusion of the two, references to the Labour Party in Scotland will be as the "Labour Party," References to the central Labour Party organization for Great Britain will be as the "British Labour Party."


for theirs. Another difference between the two parties is the fact that the Labourites have tended to limit their parliamentary nominations to Scots more strictly and for a longer time than have the Conservatives. In local government contests and concerns the central party organization plays little role.³⁴

Since 1945, Labour has been the major party in Scotland, losing only the 1955 general election. (See figure 6 for Scottish Electoral Trends, 1955/74.) Aside from their numbers, the Scottish MPs are also important in Parliament as they tend to be very party-oriented and have comparatively good attendance records. Additionally, the Scottish contingent is fairly orthodox in its approach to public issues and this has aided the British party leaders in their disputes with the left wing.

This orthodoxy has been attributed to the limited background and talents of the Scottish MPs. Labour's base in Scotland has been the industrial Clydeside belt and its primary recruiting source--local government councillors. As a result of its secure hold on this region, the party has tended to become a stale organization, functioning mainly to preserve this base. This limited focus has cost the party severely in terms of its local membership. After the 1974 elections, many constituency associations were found to be largely paper organizations, and since then the central party authorities have been trying to upgrade these local units. In addition, this background in municipal government has not provided the Labour MPs with a broad range of policy interests. The subsequent tendency has been for the MPs to play a very limited policy role in Parliament, confining themselves largely to

³⁴ Jack Brand, "Party Organization and the Recruitment of Councillors," British Journal of Political Studies 3 (October 1973): 476-78.

FIGURE 6



SOURCE: James G. Kellas, The Scottish Political System, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 99-101.

Scottish affairs. Descriptions of them as a group generally are not flattering, varying from dull to party hacks.

In recent years the leadership of the Scottish party has not been particularly more exciting. William Ross, Secretary of State from 1964/70 and 1974/76, was not a stirring public leader. One author has characterized him as a "drear old Scots Puritan." He maintained his position because of his loyalty to Harold Wilson and the mediocre character of the rest of Scotland's Labour MPs. In fairness to Ross, he also seems to have balanced out the differing factions within the party reasonably well. One consequence of his long tenure, though, was the unfortunate fact that not many of the other MPs had the opportunity to become experienced or well known public figures. Bruce Millan, who replaced Ross, is recognized as an intelligent, but not a colorful, dynamic leader capable of presenting a forceful counter-argument to the nationalists.³⁵

In recent years the party has split internally and has even adopted positions differing from those of the British Labour Party. At the 1975 Conference a majority of the party was against both remaining in the EEC, even on renegotiated terms, and granting any real powers or independent financial authority for the proposed Assembly, both of which were favored by the British Party leaders.³⁶ The EEC question greatly splintered the party. Even Willie Ross broke with Wilson under the Cabinet agreement permitting dissension and publicly spoke against the

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Colin Bell, "Labour: The Trouble Within," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), April 9, 1975, p. 8

³⁶For a detailed discussion of the devolution issue and the internal party reaction to it, see chapter four.

Common Market. Following the referendum, in which Scotland voted to remain in the EEC, the party continued to be divided over the issue of separate representation within the EEC for Scotland.³⁷

The Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association

The Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association, as the Tories are properly known, has seen its share of the vote decline steadily since the 1955 election. This trend reached the point that after the October 1974 election the Tories were Scotland's third party in terms of electoral support. In the nineteen years between these two elections, the Scottish Conservatives lost over 50 percent of their votes and twenty parliamentary seats. After losing four of these seats to the SNP in the last general election, the party again reviewed its situation in another of its continuing reevaluations as the party's fortunes have gone from bad to worse.³⁸

The party's problems stem from several factors, one of the most important being its structural weakness. Since its beginnings, the Tory organization in Scotland has been separate from that in England. The current party was formed in 1912 when the National Union of Scottish Conservative Associations and the Liberal-Unionists merged to become the Scottish Unionist Association. It was not until 1965 that they became the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association. This difference

³⁷Neal Ascherson, "Sillars Decides to Go It Alone," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), June 6, 1975, p. 1; and Robin Cook, "No Room for Separation in Europe," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), June 17, 1975, p. 8.

³⁸Ian McIntyre, "Why Tories Go Nationalist," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), November 2, 1974, p. 8; and Sir William McEwen Younger, "DTI Were Ignorant and Arrogant," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), November 2, 1974, p. 8.

in names is indicative of the separateness of the Scottish Tories within the British party.³⁹

The Conservatives are less centralized than Labour, with the local association having a tradition of considerable independence. Until 1965, the Unionists were even more decentralized than they currently are. The party had previously been divided into an Eastern and a Western Divisional Council with the Central Party Council having virtually no power. Under this structure, the local associations had substantial independence of action. Among the consequences of this organizational system was a lack of campaign coordination and professional assistance, as well as the perpetuation of local clique control. Frequently, disputes between various local associations and the central bodies of the party developed because of this confusing division of authority.

Reform of this organizational pattern had been suggested for a number of years, but the efforts had been consistently blocked. Yet, the continued loss of seats in the 1964 election made it clear that changes were needed. The first change accomplished was a symbolic one--the party's name. The second was agreement that the party should

³⁹The separation between the two organizations was virtually erased, however, by the changes adopted at the 1977 Scottish Party Conference. A basic reorganization of the party resulted in a shifting of administrative, organizational, and financial control from the Scottish headquarters in Edinburgh to the London Central Office under a Scottish director. Supposedly, this will permit the Scottish Chairman to concentrate on policy and political matters, rather than having his time preoccupied with administrative details. The centralization should also improve the party's poor financial situation. This was, however, an ironic move on the part of the Conservatives, coming at a time when separation of English and Scottish politics was one of the major issues before Parliament. Colin Bell, "Mrs Thatcher's Scottish policy," Spectator, January 14, 1978, p. 13.

compete actively in local elections, thus ceasing its understood pact with the Progressives at that level. Further structural changes resulted in the disbanding of the Divisional Councils and the creation of five Regional Councils over which the Chairman's Office would have greater control. Reforms were also made to provide for more professional party workers and to revise the financial system. The objective of these changes was to make the party structurally comparable to the English party in the belief that this would enable it to be more competitive with Labour. This was accomplished to the extent that the party was organized more along the English line, but the party is still technically separate and values that distinction.⁴⁰

Although the reforms increased the Chairman's control over the party, the local associations remain influential. They large determine whom to nominate for Parliament. At the community level, however, the Conservatives are not well organized. Only in recent years have they conducted campaigns at this level. Most frequently, they have continued to ally themselves with the Progressives in contesting local elections.

The Progressives are a loose association of citizens operating only at the local level, who have been active for about forty years. They are primarily anti-socialist, tending to represent the business interests of the community. They are not merely surrogates for the Conservatives. In fact, while many Conservatives participate in their

⁴⁰D. W. Urwin, "Scottish Conservatives: A Party in Transition," Political Studies 14 (June 1966): 145-56.

campaigns, the Conservative Party is not a particular recruiting ground for their candidates.⁴¹

The weakness of the Tories at the local level, combined with the influence of the constituency associations, has tended to deprive the party of an extensive organizational base in many areas and of candidates with a good feel for local concerns. This problems was recognized in the 1960s when the reforms were beginning to be made, but the impacts of the changes were slow in coming. Only in the last two general elections have the Conservatives made substantial changes in the types of candidates they have put forward. The Tory candidates have often not been representative of their constituencies. They were heavily drawn from the landed gentry (or lairds), lawyers, farmers, and retired military men. They were also more English than Scottish in their education and backgrounds. As a result, they tended to represent the controlling groups of the constituency associations who were largely self-perpetuating, especially in the rural areas that were considered safe seats. This pattern has changed in recent years as the impact of economic problems and change, redistricting, and the SNP began to be felt. Consequently, the Conservatives have been nominating younger, better educated, more locally connected middle class candidates, but the situation may have deteriorated so that these changes can be of little avail.⁴²

⁴¹Urwin, "Scottish Conservatives," p. 157; and Brand, "Party Organization and the Recruitment of Councillors," pp. 414-66.

⁴²Michael Dyer, "Why Tory Stronghold Crumbled," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), October 24, 1974, p. 10; and Christopher Harvie, "The Strange Death of Tory Scotland," New Statesman, February 7, 1975, pp. 167-68.

Like the Labour Party, the Conservatives have been having internal problems in recent years which have hurt the party's public image. The party was openly divided over reforms during the sixties. It was also split over the Common Market, but not as severely as Labour. Furthermore, the party has been subject to intra-personal disputes between its leaders which have frequently broken into the public view. This, as will be seen in chapter four, has occurred several times in the party's consideration of devolution, generating uncertainty as to the party's actual position on the issue.

The Scottish Liberal Party

One Scottish party which has not become internally convulsed because of the nationalists' success is the Scottish Liberal Party. The SNP has prevented the Liberals from making the progress that they have in England, but so far it has not cost them any of the seats previously held. What has apparently occurred in some areas, particularly the rural areas, is that the Liberal revival of the sixties prepared the way for the SNP in the seventies by loosening the ties of voter identification to the other parties.⁴³ The Scottish Liberal leaders have publicly noted similarities between their party's program and that of the SNP. In fact, they have tried to make electoral agreements with the SNP but have been continually rebuffed.

⁴³William Miller, "Four-Way Swing in Scotland 1955-74: Pathmakers in Scottish Politics" (paper presented at the CPS Scottish/Norwegian Conference, "Smaller Democracies in Time of Change, June 30-July 3, 1975, Helensburgh, Scotland). Also see J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver, "Liberal Vote May Be Decisive," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), October 12, 1974, p. 12.

The Scottish Liberal Party was formed in the early 1880s and has remained organizationally distinct from the British Liberals. Despite the structural separation, the leaders of both parties cooperate freely, and the Scots benefit from the publicity accorded the British leaders. The small size of both parties probably permits this kind of cooperation more than is possible for the Labour and Conservative Parties. Also because of the small size of the party, the central executive is not particularly powerful. As a consequence, the Liberal MPs are very influential in the party councils. The party is even small enough that its leaders at the local level, regional and municipal councillors, can play significant roles.

Unlike the other non-nationalist parties, the Liberals have not been internally divided in recent years. They favored the EEC, but wanted to renegotiate the terms of membership. They have also supported devolution for a long time. It was a Liberal MP, Russell Johnston of Inverness, who in 1966 introduced into Parliament the first home rule bill in forty years. The basic proposals of the Liberals regarding this issue have remained the same, not being subjected to the vacillations of the Labour and Conservative Parties. Also, unlike the other parties, the Liberals favor establishing a federal system in Britain.⁴⁴ The various units would have almost complete control over defense, foreign policy, and international economics. Both the Scots and the English Liberals accept this, differing only on whether or not England should have regional parliaments.⁴⁵

⁴⁴Unite with the Liberals: The Scottish Liberal Manifesto (Edinburgh: Scottish Liberal Party, September 1974), pp. 12-13.

⁴⁵Kellas, The Scottish Political System, pp. 109-15.

While the consistent position of the Liberals and the caliber of their MPs have been acknowledged, they still have not been able to make much of an impact electorally. Their most significant impact may come if proportional representation is adopted for the Scottish assembly --a proposal they have urged for many years. The other parties have recently been considering such a system as it may be the only way to prevent the SNP from gaining control of the assembly. Aside from this and the possibility of being a coalition partner in the assembly, the impact of the Liberals as a party has probably been made for the time being. They cleared the path for the SNP, but may now be cleared out as well. This situation has become apparent to the leadership and they have made efforts to alter it, but as with the rest of the parties, the outcome is uncertain.

The Impact of Political Party Changes

The significance of the conditions within the older Scottish political parties lies in their impact on the capacity of these organizations to compete with the SNP. Only the Scottish Liberals have been able to maintain a semblance of internal coherence in recent years. Both the Labour and Conservative Parties have experienced a degeneration of their structures, raising serious doubts about their capabilities to function as effective aggregators and articulators of Scottish concerns. Their local organizations have become staid, rigid bodies more concerned with perpetuating their parochial fiefdoms than with larger public issues. Also, neither party has developed a leadership cadre capable of projecting a dynamic, vibrant public image around which the party faithful could rally in a time of challenge.

This situation has made both transmission of Scottish political demands to Parliament and government policies to the Scots a tenuous proposition. It has also contributed to the sense of neglect to which the Scots have complained concerning Westminster's attention to their problems. The Scots were not adequately informed of the intentions of government policies. Moreover, this state of affairs probably accounts for some of the shock experienced in London by the rise of the SNP. They were simply not prepared for such an occurrence. And, finally, these conditions of organizational degeneration created a void into which the SNP could step. It could, as will be discussed in the next chapter, adopt for itself the role of "spokesman of Scotland" as there was no alternative party capable of effectively countering its claim.

Change Within the British Political System

The final set of factors needing to be examined in this discussion of political and contextual changes that have contributed to the growth of nationalism involves matters affecting the entire United Kingdom, not just Scotland. Since the end of the Second World War, the British political system has been undergoing a series of important changes. It has disposed of its Empire, joined the Common Market, and experienced substantial instability in its electoral politics to name but a few. These changes are potentially significant for the consideration of Scottish nationalism because they have affected the context within which political issues are perceived in Britain. The impacts of these broad changes are more diffuse and less capable of being specified in the same manner as has been done for the economy and party changes, but they still need to be noted.

Foremost among these factors are the changes that have occurred concerning Britain's international status.⁴⁶ After the war, she never regained the military and economic prominence she had previously possessed. Her Empire, slowly at first, then rapidly, broke away. Her economy was dramatically surpassed by most of the other Western European nations, including those she had nominally defeated during the war. The efforts of the Government to restore the economy met with setback after setback, including a humiliating rebuff of the initial attempts to join the Common Market.⁴⁷ Some analysts have speculated that this loss of status affected the growth of Scottish nationalism by removing one of the advantages of being part of the United Kingdom. The opportunities and prestige of being part of the governing system for the British Empire were no longer available to the Scots.

This interpretation has difficulty being of much explanatory value, though, because it presumes the Scots have only been content to remain in the United Kingdom as long as the Empire and its prestige afforded them benefits. The integration of Scotland into the British political system has been much more extensive than this perspective can logically support. The impact of these status changes on Scottish nationalism was most likely not in terms of the declining prestige of belonging to the United Kingdom, but rather in the form of the domestic

⁴⁶See Chris Cook and John Ramsden, eds., Trends in British Politics Since 1945 (London: The Macmillan Press, 1978) for a discussion of the impact of these changes on a wide spectrum of politics concerns. Especially see Gillian Peele's "The Developing Constitution," pp. 1-27.

⁴⁷Nora Beloff, The General Says No (Belmont: Penguin Books, 1963).

questioning of British society and politics that resulted. They had the effect of creating a climate and a propensity for serious questioning of the effectiveness of the British governing institutions: questioning which was implicitly recognized by the major political parties as their efforts to restructure British government in the 1960s and early 1970s testified. These doubts were combined in the case of Scotland with severe concerns about the sincerity and capability of London governments to cope with her economic problems. Both the Conservatives and Labour Parties, in turn, had promised abatement of Scotland's socioeconomic problems, but for a variety of reasons neither was particularly successful in fulfilling those pledges.

Another aspect of the government's role in this process of introspection is related to its centralized decisionmaking of economic policy. Documentation of the severity of Scottish socioeconomic conditions was largely accomplished and publicized through reports and investigations conducted under government authorization as preliminary steps in the development of policy. Thus, to a significant degree, it was the activities of the government itself which created the basis for questioning the applicability of its policies by making the public aware of the extent of the problems.

Also of probable impact in this internal reevaluation is the changing definition of viability needed for statehood.⁴⁸ This is difficult to gauge as a factor because of a lack of direct evidence, but

⁴⁸Eric Hobsbawm, "Some Reflections on 'The Break-Up of Britain,'" The New Left Review 105 (September-October 1977): 7-8.

the increased number of geographically small states, many of whom were previously part of the Empire, seem likely to have raised further doubts about the necessity of Scotland's remaining tied to England. It is logical to expect that some Scots were beginning to ask themselves "why not separate", where as before the historical precedents largely ruled against such action. No longer, though, was separation contrary to historical logic. This factor was likely operative only in the minds of a few Scots, but what is significant at this point is its probable presence as a serious question.

Lastly, a final contextual aspect that should be considered briefly is the increased volatility of British politics in recent years. The unpredictability of election outcomes, the fluctuations in the public opinion polls, the drop in voter turnout, the decline of the two-major parties share of the vote, and the possible changing class nature of party competition have all served to introduce an element of uncertainty into the interpretation of British politics that was not present during the immediate post-war period.⁴⁹ This tempestuousness is mentioned as it is very likely that some of the change that has been

⁴⁹For considerations of the volatility of British politics in recent years, see the following: Richard Rose, "The Polls and Election Forecasting in February 1974," pp. 109-31, and "The Polls and Public Opinion in October 1974," pp. 223-40, in Britain at the Polls: The Parliamentary Elections of 1974, ed. Howard R. Penniman (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975); Richard Rose, ed., The Polls and the 1970 Election, Survey Research Centre Occasional Paper, no. 7, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, 1970; Dennis Kavanagh, "Party Politics in Question," in New Trends in British Politics: Issues for Research, pp. 191-220, ed. David Kavanagh and Richard Rose (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977); David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974); and Ivor Crewe, Bo Sarlvik, and James Alt, "Partisan Dealignment in Britain 1964-1974," British Journal of Political Science 7 (April 1977): 129-90.

occurring in Scotland is derived from sources common to the United Kingdom as a whole. The problem, though, is one of separating the Scottish factors from those which are broader in origin. This is an impossible task to satisfactorily resolve at the moment, however, given the recentness of events and the conflicting evidence, but the changes should be kept in mind as affecting the context of contemporary politics. They have had the simultaneous effect of both sensitizing the political system to change and frustrating it because of the inability to reach conclusions on important public questions.

Contributors to Contextual and Political
Change: Conclusions

The factors discussed in this chapter have been significant in the development of Scottish nationalism. Their importance, though, is derived not from a causal relationship between them and the growth of the nationalist movement, but rather a conditional one. The socio-economic problems faced by Scotland in recent years provided a set of publicly recognized grievances. The organizational degeneration of the older parties accentuated those grievances by not providing the political system an efficient mechanism with which to confront them. Neither did it provide an outlet for articulation of the grievances. The broader changes involving the British public's evaluation of the effectiveness of their governing institutions affected this situation by creating a climate of questioning. The net result of these contributions was the conception of a reason, an opportunity, and a context within which a nationalist political party like the SNP could

effectively operate. By inadvertently generating this set of conditions, the possibility of a linkage between Scottish national identity and political action was produced. .

CHAPTER THREE

THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY: AGGREGATOR AND ARTICULATOR OF CHANGE

A basic assumption behind this analysis is that a linkage must be made between national identity and political behavior before a nationalist movement can develop. Public issues must be perceived according to their impact on the nation and, hence, the national identity. In this manner, politics becomes the means for fulfilling the goals of nationalism. Because of this assumption various aspects of Scottish society and politics have been considered. They demonstrated the basis of Scottish national identity, possible reasons for why that identity might take on political significance, and contextual changes creating an opportunity for that occurrence. They have not, however, forged the necessary linkage, but rather provided the building material for it. Yet, apparently, the linkage has somehow been made. The public opinion evidence discussed in Chapter One indicates that more and more Scots are interpreting politics in terms of their national identity and seeking a political means to achieve their goals whether it be through an assembly or independence. Thus, the question which now needs to be examined is how the linkage was constructed.

There have been two sets of participants involved in the politics surrounding the rise of Scottish nationalism who logically could have accomplished the linkage function. The first of these is the Scottish National Party, which will be examined in this chapter; the second, to be detailed in the next chapter, are the major British political parties and the government. Both sets must be scrutinized as each has acted and reacted to the other; consequently, their impact cannot be fully appreciated in isolation.

One of the functions performed by political parties for a political system is the aggregation of citizen demands into policy alternatives.¹ In a similar way one of the purposes of a nationalist political party is the redefinition of public issues and identity such that the two become inseparable. Even though it is the stated objective of the SNP to make that linkage, to bridge the gap between macro-level social, economic, and political distinctions and the micro-level behavior, it should not be assumed that it has been successful or that it is entirely responsible for the political changes that Scotland has experienced. That assumption, like all others, should be tested. Therefore, the Scottish National Party will be analyzed to determine how it may have been able to capitalize upon the contributions made by the previously considered factors. This examination will begin with a survey of the party's history, organization, and policy objectives. These will then be followed by an elaboration of the bases of SNP support and

¹Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 98-127.

a preliminary evaluation of the SNP's role in the deveopment of Scottish nationalism.

A Brief History, 1928-1974²

It has been the recent successes of the Scottish National Party which has revealed the internal weaknesses and dissatisfaction with the other parties. The SNP has been active in Scottish politics, however, since 1934 when the National Party, formed in 1928, and the Scottish Party, formed in 1932, merged.³ The party contested elections between the 1930s and 1950s, but its impact was not felt until the mid-1960s. (See table 7 for SNP General Election Results, 1929-1974.) During those early years, the party was largely the work of a few dedicated individuals. Its ranks consisted primarily of people from a middle class background with the main goal of their efforts not being the separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom, but rather home rule.⁴

One reason the party was not successful during the pre-war period was the unpopular connotations of nationalism. This hurt the acceptability of the party even though John MacCormack and others

²This historical survey will go only through the October 1974 general election. The party's history since then will be considered in chapter four as part of the coverage on the devolution issue.

³Two interesting pieces discussing the program of the National Party, one of precursors of the SNP, are Lewis Spence, "The National Party of Scotland," The Edinburgh Review 248 (July 1928): 70-87; and John Barbour, "Scotland--The New Dominion," The Edinburgh Review 249 (April 1929): 211-31.

⁴For historical discussions of the SNP, see J. M. MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind (London: Victor Collanz, 1955); H. J. Hanham, Scottish Nationalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); and Reginald Coupland, Welse and Scottish Nationalism: A Study (London: Collins, 1954).

disclaimed any similarity with Hitler's National Socialism. Also, the war deflected the potential for sustained public interest despite the attention generated by the trial of Douglas Young for refusing military conscription on the grounds that it was England's war. Interestingly enough, though, it was because of the war that the SNP was able to win its first parliamentary seat. Dr. Robert McIntyre, the current SNP President, won the Motherwell seat in an April 1945 by-election. The major parties were still under their wartime electoral agreement not to contest each other's seats should a vacancy occur. This, plus a low turnout, helped the SNP to win, but they only held it for a few weeks, losing it in the general election.

Another significant event of the war years was the division of the party. MacCormick lost control of the party to Douglas Young and his associates who took a more strident line. This division corresponds to the split which had occurred in the early 1930s when some "extremist" literary element were forced out of the party. Following this later split, some of the individuals who had left ten years prior returned. The period after the Motherwell election until the 1960s was a low one for the SNP; they contested few elections and their ranks dwindled.

The most successful nationalist effort of this period was outside the SNP. After leaving the party, John MacCormick had founded a new organization, the Scottish Convention, with its primary purpose being the Covenant Movement. This consisted of a petition calling for Scottish home rule and, in signing it, the participants pledged to work towards that end. Over two million signatures were collected before the drive ended. Despite the claim that many of the signatures

false, it cannot be denied that a substantial portion of the Scottish populace favored greater home rule for Scotland. The Covenant, however, was largely ignored by the Government. It appointed a Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs in 1952, but very little came of it.⁵

During the 1950s, two changes did occur which were of importance for the future of the party.⁶ First, the party was reduced to its hard core supporters for some of its more romantic, but less reliable, elements left. Secondly, economic conditions made the idea of greater Scottish involvement in the governing process a plausible remedy for a small number of younger individuals. This combination of activists was more serious about presenting a reasonable public appearance than the party had in recent years. They began making by-election attempts in the early sixties, and, although the results were not spectacular, they were sufficient to indicate to the party that it had potential. (See table 4 for SNP by-election results, 1961-1973). In all, the party contested six by-elections before the 1964 general election. The first two efforts were the most successful; however, all of them served the purpose of attracting public attention and as a campaign training exercise for party workers.⁷

⁵J. MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind, pp. 199-206.

⁶For a discussion of some of the issues facing the SNP during the 1950s, consult Sidney Burrell, "The Scottish Separatist Movement: A Present Assessment," Political Science Quarterly 70 (September 1955): 358-67.

⁷H. M. Begg and J. A. Stewart, "The Nationalist Movement in Scotland," Journal of Contemporary History 6 (1971): 140-47; and Billy Wolfe, Scotland Lives: The Quest for Independence (Edinburgh: Reprographia, 1973), pp. 10-77.

TABLE 4
SNP BY-ELECTION RESULTS
1961/73

	Turnout %	Con	Lab	Lib	SNP	Other
Glasgow, Bridgeton 11/16/61	41.9	20.7	57.5	--	18.7	3.1
West Lothian 6/14/62	71.1	11.4	50.8	10.9	23.3	3.6
Glasgow Woodside 11/22/62	54.7	30.0	36.0	22.0	11.1	0.9
Kinross & West Perthshire 11/7/63	76.1	57.4	15.2	19.5	7.3	0.6
Dundee, West 11/21/63	71.6	39.4	50.6	--	7.4	2.6
Dumfriesshire 12/12/63	71.6	40.8	38.5	10.9	9.8	--
Glasgow, Pollok 3/9/67	75.7	36.9	31.2	1.9	28.1	1.9
Hamilton 11/2/67	73.7	12.1	41.5	--	46.0	--
Glasgow, Gorbals 10/30/69	58.6	18.6	53.4	--	25.0	3.0
South Ayrshire 19/3/70	76.3	25.6	54.1	--	20.4	--
Stirlingshire, Stirling & Falkirk 6/16/71	60.9	19.0	46.5	--	34.6	--
Dundee East 3/1/73	70.6	25.2	32.7	8.5	30.1	3.6
Glasgow, Govan 9/8/73	51.7	11.7	38.2	8.2	41.9	--
Edinburgh North 9/8/73	54.6	38.7	24.0	18.4	18.9	--

SOURCES: James G. Kellas, The Scottish Political System, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 123; and Chris Cook and John Ramsden, By-Elections in British Politics (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 295-97.

In the 1964 general election, the party ran more candidates than at any previous time and captured 2.4 percent of the total vote. While no seats were won--in fact, twelve deposits had been lost--the results were heartening and the party prepared for the next general election, which was expected soon. During the 1966 election, the party contested twenty-three seats, saved thirteen of its deposits, and won a total of 5.0 percent of the vote.

These results further encouraged the nationalists who then anxiously awaited the first by-election, which came in March 1967 in the Glasgow Pollok constituency. The SNP candidate came in a close third with 28.1 percent of the vote and, as a result, threw the election to the Conservatives. Although this was a loss, it was the best showing of the SNP since the war years. The next by-election, Hamilton (November 1967), had been a previously secure Labour seat, but Mrs. Winifred Ewing won it for the SNP in a close race. Her campaign was a well run, organized effort which used the services of a large number of canvassers, many of them from all over Scotland. This success brought considerable public attention to the party. Two more by-elections were contested--Glasgow Gorbals (November 1969) and South Ayrshire (March 1970)--before the 1970 general election with the SNP candidates polling 25.0 percent and 20.5 percent respectively.

The SNP was making progress in other ways as well as by-election which contributed to the impression that it had a substantial base of public support. In contesting local government elections, the party began, in 1966, with only 4.1 percent of the vote and by 1968 it was receiving almost one-third of all votes cast in the municipal

elections. (See table 6 for local government election results, 1966-1977, p. 118.) The SNP's share of the vote, however, fell off after 1968 to 12.6 percent in 1970 and dropped even lower in the following years. The party fortunes did not fare any better in the regional and district elections for the new local government system in 1974, but it contested less than 25 percent of the seats. The third aspect of the nationalist movement that indicates its growing support was the party's membership figures (see table 5, p. 117). These figures demonstrated the same basic pattern as the municipal election results--a sharp increase after 1966, peaking in 1968, and then a falling off in the following years. Unlike the local elections, though, party membership picked up again.

It was against this background of rapid growth in the late sixties that the Labour and Conservative Parties began to react with their devolutionary moves. The results of the later by-elections, the decline in the municipal elections support, the downturn in membership, and the 1970 general election results, however, convinced many that the rise of the SNP was over. Although the party had increased its overall percentage of the votes by more than twofold, rising to 11.4 percent, and ran more candidates than ever before, the general consensus was that the phenomenon was over. Even Winnie Ewing had not been able to hold on to her seat in Hamilton. Only the Western Isles was won and this was a surprise, explainable by local factors.⁸

⁸James G. Kellas, "Scottish Nationalism," in The British General Election of 1970, David Butler and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky (London: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 446-62; Iain McLean, "The Rise and Fall of the Scottish National Party," *Political Studies* 18 (September 1970): 357-72;

Thus, depending upon one's perspective, the future of the SNP seemed questionable. Those outside the party were skeptical; those inside were relatively pleased. The party had anticipated winning more seats than it did, but the results were still encouraging. Both groups appear to have been partially accurate in their evaluations. The local strength of the party had declined in terms of membership and municipal election returns, but these were not necessarily the best indicators of SNP support.

The decline in membership seems to have been due to the loss of people attracted to the party during the late sixties who had peripheral, but not sustainable, interest in nationalism or who had used the SNP as a protest mechanism during the interim between general elections. Additionally, some of the local associations had been hastily put together and, consequently, were not organized well enough for continued activity at the local level between general elections. Also, the membership figures for the late 1960s seem to have been inflated somewhat in the first place, reflecting hopes more than members.⁹

The municipal election results were not necessarily a good indicator of the party's support because of the weakness of many local associations and the lack of identification of the SNP with local issues. Furthermore, it seems that some of the SNP councillors elected in the 1960s were inexperienced and ill-prepared for local government,

⁹Interview with Miss Muriel Gibson, SNP National Secretary, August 1975. Miss Gibson commented that the party organizer in the late sixties did not keep good records and frequently used whatever estimate of the party's strength that he wished.

bringing home the SNP's lack of local relevance even more dramatically.¹⁰ Nevertheless, those in the Labour and Conservative Parties who opposed devolution were able to interpret these events as indications of the SNP's decline. In so doing, they failed to consider what actions the SNP was taking to correct its problems and the impact of their own parties's actions and/or inactions.

During the period between the 1970 and 1974 general elections, the party consolidated some of its weaker local associations and improved its organizational structure. The party also contested several by-elections which should have indicated that it still had a base. In the Stirling and Falkirk contest in 1971 the party more than doubled its 1970 percentage, and in a 1972 race in Dundee East the SNP candidate tripled the party's share of the vote, coming close to winning the seat. Then, in November 1973, Margo MacDonald won the Glasgow Govan seat in a close election. This was particularly important as Govan had been a safe Labour seat for almost twenty years. In the Edinburgh North by-election held at the same time, the SNP won 18.9 percent of the vote, coming in third. Both elections were influential coming so soon after the release of the Kilbrandon Commission's Report.

In addition to strengthening its organizational base during these years, the SNP's position on several major issues was given credibility by economic and political events. The issue of the North Sea oil and the use of its revenues had been raised in the 1970 general election; however, it was only afterwards when sufficient information became

¹⁰Jane Morton, "Scot Nats in Office," New Society, October 10, 1968, pp. 513-14.

available that the SNP's argument of an independent Scotland's economic viability became plausible. Also the economic problems of the early 1970s raised questions as to the use of the oil revenues and the size of Scotland's proper share. These problems raised doubts about the ability of the Conservative Government to cope with Scotland's economic difficulties similar to those developed about the Labour Party a few years prior. Finally, the vacillation of both major parties on the issue of devolution contrasted sharply with the recommendations of the Kilbrandon Commission which had given legitimacy to the SNP's demands for more self-government.

The consequences of this situation became obvious with the February 1974 results which surprised everyone, excluding the nationalists (or so they say). Besides holding on to the Western Isles seat with an increased majority, the party won six new seats, but lost Govan. Four of these seats were won from the Conservatives and two from Labour. The party's share of the popular vote rose from 11.4 percent in 1970 to 21.9 percent. This performance was followed by even greater success in October when the SNP contested all seventy-one seats for the first time and won 30.4 percent of the vote, making it Scotland's second party. Four additional seats were won from the Conservatives and for the first time no deposits were lost. Thus, with eleven seats and forty-two second place finishes the SNP emerged ready for the next general election.

The Organization of the Party

The structure of the SNP has been described as polyarchical.¹¹ Local branches and associations are quite influential. They are

¹¹Richard W. Mansbach, "The Scottish National Party: A Revised Political Profile," Comparative Politics 5 (January 1973): 201-10.

responsible for most of the fundraising which is frequently done by the sponsoring of social activities. In part, this influence is derived from the relative youth of the party and the continued importance of the early branches, but it is also due to the structural openness of the party. There have been moves to strengthen the central organs, but these have primarily been directed towards increasing the professionalism of the party's research and campaigning, not the direct authority of the party leaders. The National Conference, which is the "supreme governing body of the Party," is relatively open. It is not unheard of for the decisions of the Conference on particular issues to differ from the opinions of some of the major leaders without either considering the situation a crisis.¹²

Leadership within the party is diffused. There are individuals of obvious prominence such as Dr. Robert McIntyre, William Wolfe, Winifred Ewing, Arthur Donaldson, Margo McDonald, and several of the MPs who can always command an audience, but none appears to be in a position to force the party to concur with their particular position. As a result, the leadership of the party is fairly collegial. It provides elaboration and publicity of the party's basic policies. This is an important function as the party's candidates and positions are not necessarily well known in all of the districts. By the National Chairman campaigning extensively all over Scotland, as Billy Wolfe has done in the past, public attention is attracted that the local associations would not have been able to generate. Also the public recognition of the SNP MPs as diligent

¹² Neal Ascherson, "The Day the SNP became a 'normal' political party," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), June 2, 1975, p. 5.

representatives has added credence to the party's contention that only it really looks out for Scottish interests.

The eleven SNP MPs appear to be hardworking, constituency oriented representatives, intent upon making a good record for themselves. They have divided their areas of responsibility based upon their background and interests, thus being dependent on each other for leadership in areas outside their own.¹³ Their actions are closely followed in the Scottish press in part because of the public interest in them, but also because they try to be involved in all aspects of government that affect Scotland. This publicity contributes to their good image as it is something which other Scottish MPs do not receive in nearly the same quantity.

Policy Objectives of the Party

The goals of the party stem largely from its primary objective of self-government for Scotland. This has been the party's basic goal since its formation, though today self-government means more than the home rule desired by MacCormick and his associates. Today the aim is Scottish independence within the Commonwealth as is indicated by this quotation from the Party Constitution:

The Aims of the Party shall be:

- (a) Self-Government for Scotland--that is, the restoration of Scottish National Sovereignty by the establishment of a democratic Scottish Parliament within the Commonwealth, freely elected by the Scottish people, whose authority will be limited only by

¹³David Scott, "SNP open battle over Assembly," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), October 15, 1975, p. 8.

such agreements as may be freely entered into by it with other nations or states or international organizations for the purpose of furthering international co-operation and world peace:

(b) the furtherance of all Scottish interests.¹⁴

As this also indicates, the other goals of the party flow from that of self-government. The party works to secure the achievement of these other aims, but there is an inherent implication in its statements and efforts that real progress cannot be made until self-government is a reality.

The SNP considers Labour's devolutionary proposals for a Scottish assembly to be weak and ineffective. It believes that the Assembly must have substantial economic powers if it is to be anything meaningful. The party is willing, however, to accept an assembly as a beginning point towards its objective of an independent Scottish Parliament because it believes that it can only gain from such an institution. If the assembly is granted substantial powers, it will be a vindication of the SNP's claim that Scotland is deserving of this representation and has been denied it by the older, English led parties. On the other hand, if the assembly is given only weak powers, then the responsibility for its ineffectiveness will lie with the major parties. Either way the SNP thinks that the actions of the Labour and Conservative Parties will work to its benefit.¹⁵

¹⁴Constitution and Rules of the Scottish National Party (Edinburgh: Scottish National Party, 1974), p. 1.

¹⁵For the SNP's reaction to the devolution proposals in greater detail see Chapter Four. On other issues, though, the SNP MPs have been misled in their support for the Labour Government. During the brief 1974 Parliament they backed the Government in almost 66 percent of the division votes. Between 1974 and 1977, however, they voted with the Government only about 36 percent of the

One vague aspect of the SNP's approach to self-government is the process by which it will be determined that a majority of Scots want independence. Following demonstration of this, the process through which self-government will be achieved must also be determined. Policy statements indicate that the party believes an SNP majority of the Scottish Parliamentary seats would be "an unquestionable mandate for self-government. The Westminster government would then have to comply with the wishes of the Scottish people."¹⁶ After negotiations on the Scottish Parliament are completed, then the new Constitution would be submitted to a referendum vote. If accepted, elections for the new parliament would then be held.

There is an implicit faith in this line of reasoning that the Westminster government would automatically accept an SNP majority as a vote for self-government. Given recent government actions, it would not be unreasonable to expect more administrative decentralization or, perhaps, substantial devolution. Self-government that would really mean independence, however, is a questionable expectation. There are no constitutional guarantees that require Parliament to comply with the wishes of the Scottish people" or even to recognize the SNP vote as an independence referendum. In the face of this

time. In the 1977-78 session of Parliament the support level rose to 63 percent. This last period was when the first devolution bill was being considered and reflects those votes. "How SNP MPs Voted," Scots Independent, September, 1978, p. 1; and Scott, "SNP open battle over Assembly," p. 8; Interviews with Mrs. Margo MacDonald and Miss Muriel Gibson, August 1975.

¹⁶SNP & YOU: Aims and Policy of the Scottish National Party (Edinburgh: Scottish National Party, 1974), p. 4.

uncertainty, the SNP reacts with almost blind faith that Parliament will simply have to acquiesce.¹⁷ If they do not, presumably the party will continue to work within the system for as much change as is possible.

The party manifesto is a well written document that discusses a broad range of policy problems.¹⁸ In fact, it appears to be more comprehensive than any of the other parties' manifestoes. This has been done with the objective of demonstrating that the SNP is not a one issue party without positions on Scotland's other problems. As mentioned, the SNP policies on other issues flow from its belief that Scotland's problems can best be approached through self-government. Consequently, most issues are discussed from the perspective that 'once self-government is achieved, these will be our policies.'¹⁹

Two policy areas with which the SNP has been particularly identified are the Common Market and the North Sea oil. The party waged an extensive campaign against the Common Market because it considered membership in the EEC to be a further reduction of Scottish sovereignty. The following excerpt indicates the SNP's basic argument against the EEC.

¹⁷Andrew Hood, "The whole hog," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), October 5, 1974, p. 10.

¹⁸Scotland's Future: S.N.P. Manifesto (Edinburgh: Scottish National Party, August 1974).

¹⁹See the following for more detailed discussions of party policies. Keith Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland (Glasgow: The Molendinar Press, 1977), pp. 105-27; Gavin Kennedy, ed., The Radical Approach: Papers on an Independent Scotland (Edinburgh: Parlingenes Press, Ltd., 1976); and, Duncan MacLaren, "The Quiet

While welcoming international moves to reduce tariff barriers, the SNP opposes membership of the E.E.C. for political and economic reasons. The E.E.C. is highly bureaucratic, centralist and undemocratic--remote from the control of ordinary people. It also restricts our freedom to plan and develop our agriculture, industry, energy and fishing.

The SNP would favor an independent Scotland negotiating an agreement with the E.E.C. similar to that negotiated by Norway, encouraging trade but maintaining genuine sovereignty. However, the final decision must rest with the Scottish people through a referendum.²⁰

After the referendum was held on the EEC in May 1975 and Scotland, as well as the rest of the United Kingdom, approved Britain's membership, the SNP moved to secure Scottish representation. As a result, Mrs. Ewing was appointed to the British Parliamentary delegation.

The SNP's position on the North Sea oil is indicated by one of its slogans, "It's Scotland's oil." The party believes that the revenue generated by the oil should be used in Scotland and that the production should be spread over a long period of time in order to maximize recovery and economic growth. The revenues would be used to revitalize Scotland's older industries and to further diversify investment so that when the oil is gone the standard of living will not decline. The party also indicates that it would be stricter on the development of the fields with regard to protection

Revolution: Scotland and Devolution," Contemporary Review, 228, 1320 (January 1976): 13-20.

²⁰SNP & YOU, p. 6.

of the environment than either the Labour or Conservative Parties.²¹ The importance of the oil and the oil revenues to the SNP should not be underestimated. Until the oil, the SNP's argument that Scotland could go it alone economically was open to serious debate, but the oil makes an effective counter-argument possible.²² Also, many voters are apparently very sympathetic to the notion that Scotland will not get its share of the oil monies and, consequently, support the SNP's efforts to get more for the country.²³ Ironically, it is the oil revenues which will be one of the most serious stumbling blocks to the SNP's idea of Parliament simply complying with the Scottish vote as a mandate for independence.

Thus far the SNP has remained fairly united over issues. By focusing its attention on the actions of the Labour and Conservative Parties, it has been able to remain a movement as well as a political party. It has been able to mobilize support and take stands on a variety of issues without becoming factionalized. The party has also been helped in this by not having an assembly where it must play a major role in actual policymaking. Once the assembly is in operation, however, the party may not be able to maintain this unity

²¹Scotland's Future, pp. 12-5.

²²Gavin McCrone, Scotland's Future: The Economics of Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969). Also see the following exchange on the economic questions of independence. David Simpson, "Independence: the Economic Issues;" K.J.W. Alexander, "The Economic Case against Independence;" K.J.W. Alexander, "A Reply to Dr. Simpson;" and David Simpson, "A Reply to Professor Alexander," The Scottish Debate, ed. Neil MacCormick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 121-53.

²³See James G. Kellas and Raymond E. Owen, "Devolution and the Political Context in Scotland," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington,

as completely as it has. The SNP leaders shy away from discussing internal party divisions, but it appears that the party does have its left and right wings, especially on economic issues. These differences may become more open, although much will depend upon the type of attack mounted on the SNP by the other major parties once assembly elections are held. Considerable speculation has been made as to the future of the party, and several writers have indicated that they think the SNP could function well as a social-democratic party.²⁴ This would enable it to remain something of an umbrella party. Additionally, the party appears not to be worried about the possibility of public splits. As Margo MacDonald has indicated, the SNP can hold itself together, at least until after the assembly, thus preserving its unity for electoral purposes while the other parties are unlikely to be able to do likewise. Thus the SNP will still be the most unified and positively oriented of a major Scottish parties.

The Bases of SNP Support

The above discussion leads one to the important question of "who" is supporting the SNP. If the direction of Scottish opinion is toward greater degrees of self-government, then the extent and makeup of the support for the SNP becomes a critical aspect as more voters are identifying it with the extreme policy alternatives. In

D.C., September 1977, pp. 38-42: and Bill Miller, "Three main parties find SNP 'good for Scotland'," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), October 14, 1975.

²⁴ Neal Ascherson, "Post-referendum prospect is reassuring," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), May 28, 1975, p. 11.

this section trends in the extent of the party's support will be examined and, following that discussion, consideration will be given to identifying "who" is supporting the SNP according to their political and socioeconomic characteristics. Attention will also be given to the impact of structural factors on the extent and nature of SNP support.

Changes in the Level of SNP Support

There are several indicators of the overall extent of SNP support in the Scottish public. These include the party's membership, local government election results, general election support, and public opinion surveys of party identification. Each of these is individually imprecise because of temporal and measurement complications, but taken as a whole they can provide a reasonable indication of the degree of public support for the SNP.

Accurate measurement of the SNP's membership is a difficult task in part because the party no longer gives out such information. Furthermore, incomplete recordkeeping during the 1960's makes the commonly cited figures somewhat questionable, but the general pattern indicated in Table 5 appears to be reasonable. The party experienced a rapid surge of growth during the late 1960's after being essentially a fringe group for many years. The membership rolls subsequently declined following the late 1970 general election and, when they began expanding again, it was at a slower rate than before. The party's electoral successes in 1974 attracted additional members and, while there is no solid evidence, the membership seems to have grown only a little beyond the 100,000 mark.

TABLE 5
SNP MEMBERSHIP
1962/75

Year	Membership
1962	2,000
1963	4,000
1964	8,000
1965 (June)	16,000
1965 (November)	20,000
1966	42,000
1967	80,000
1968	120,000
1971	70,000
1974	85,000
1975	100,000

SOURCES: James C. Kellas, The Scottish Political System 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 128; and interview with Miss Muriel Gibson, then Secretary, Scottish National Party, August 1975.

As already noted, a similar pattern of fluctuation may be found in the party's performance in local government elections. The party began contesting local elections in 1966, managing only to take 4.1 percent of the vote, but within two years it received almost a third of the votes cast. Then, as Table 6 shows, the SNP's share of the vote fell off sharply. After Scotland's local government system was reorganized, the SNP began to do better once more. In 1974 the party obtained 12.4 percent of the vote. Then in 1977 district elections the SNP registered an impressive 24.7 percent of the vote, gaining 100 council seats, many of them located in areas traditionally

TABLE 6
SNP LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION RESULTS
1966/77

Year	% of Total Scottish Vote
1966	4.1
1967	15.6
1968	30.1
1969	22.0
1970	12.6
1971	8.0
1972	6.1
1974	22.4
1977	24.7

SOURCES: James C. Kellas, The Scottish Political System, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 136; "Labour Gains as Nationalists crush in Scots Local Elections," The Times (London), May 5, 1971, p. 1; "Labour, with 80 gains, consolidates domination of Scottish cities and burgh," The Times (London), p. 3; and "The Real Victors in District Voting," Scots Independent, June 1977, p. 6.

supportive of the Labour Party.²⁵ However, in the 1978 regional elections the SNP suffered severe losses, especially when compared to the previous year's gains. While a Scotland-wide percentage of the vote is not available, the SNP lost approximately 10 percent of

²⁵Ronald Faux, "Scotland expects a sweeping rearrangement of district council seats," The Times (London), April 20, 1977, p. 4. _____, "SNP seizes 107 seats but overall success less than expected," The Times (London), May 5, 1977, p. 1. Peter Pulzer, "Half shares is the most the SNP can expect in Scotland," The Times (London), May 6, 1977, p. 16. "Scotland points the way, but where to?," The Economist, May 7, 1977, p. 19-20. "The Real Victors in District Voting," The Scots Independent, June 1977, p. 6.

its vote in the major urban areas, suggesting that its level of support was approximately 20-22 percent.²⁶ Whether or not this represents the beginnings of a downward trend is problematic at this point, but when considered in connection with the recent Garscadden and Hamilton by-elections, it does strongly suggest that the growth has topped off.²⁷

The party's share of the vote in general elections does not reveal the same fluctuating pattern as do membership figures and local government elections, but this may be an artifact of the timing of these elections and aggregation of the results. The results do show an impressive rate of steady growth between 1964 and October, 1974, as may be seen in Table 7. The 1950s were a period of very little change in the level of votes received. Beginning in 1964, though, the party went through a period in which it approximately doubled its previous general election vote in each subsequent election.

Extension of this growth trend to the past four years would obviously be difficult as there is less room for expansion without altering the party identification of committed Labour and Conservative

²⁶Peter Pulzer, "Supporters drift back to Labour, but it would be wrong to write SNP's death notice," The Times (London), May 18, 1978, p. 2. "Labour licks Nats in Scotland," The Economist, May 6, 1978, pp. 20-23.

²⁷Labour won Scotland's first by-elections since the October, 1974 general election, beating the SNP by a 45.4 -- 32.9 percent margin at Garscadden and a 51.0 -- 33.5 percent margin at Hamilton. Both contests were important as they were considered indicators of the upcoming general election's results. Ronald Faux, "Labour votes shocks nationalists," The Times (London), April 15, 1978, p. 2. Ronald Faux, "Hamilton seen as a victory for devolution," The Times (London), June 2, 1978, p. 2.

TABLE 7
 SNP GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS
 1929/74

Election	Number of Candidates	MPs Elected	Deposits Forfeited	Votes Received	% of Total Scottish Vote
1929	2	0	2	3,313	0.1
1931	5	0	2	20,954	1.0
1935	8	0	5	29,517	1.3
1945	8	0	6	30,595	1.2
1950	3	0	3	9,708	0.4
1951	2	0	1	7,299	0.3
1955	2	0	1	12,112	0.5
1959	5	0	3	21,738	0.8
1964	15	0	12	64,044	2.4
1966	23	0	10	128,474	5.0
1970	65	1	43	306,796	11.4
1974 (Feb.)	70	7	7	632,032	21.9
1974 (Oct.)	71	11	0	839,628	30.4

SOURCE: James G. Kellas, The Scottish Political System,
 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 99-101.

voters. In fact, the survey results since the last general election reveal considerable fluctuation in the public's support for the major parties, as can be seen in Table 8.²⁸ The SNP has usually obtained about 30 percent of the party identifiers, with Labour receiving two to five percent more and the Conservatives receiving about the same as the nationalists. The party's position in the polls went up substantially, to the 36 percent range, after the February 1977 defeat of the Scotland and Wales Bill and remained there until the summer. During the 1977-78 session of Parliament the Labour Party, though, tended to edge up slightly and the SNP fell just below the 30 percent level. Recent polls, though, indicate that the SNP has lost a substantial portion of its support back to the Labour Party.²⁹ While these trends appear to indicate that Scotland has developed a three major party system in terms of party identification, they can not be extended to representation in either parliament or the proposed assembly. The elections to both of those bodies involve a first-past-the post system, consequently legislative representation

²⁸For survey results showing levels of party support consult the following: Kellas and Owen, "Devolution and the Political Context in Scotland," p. 30, presents a summary table for polls between February 1974 and June 1977. A similar chart for the period of January 1975 to September 1977 may be found in "Nats still ride high," The Economist, October 8, 1977, pp. 25-6. Also see: Ronald Faux, "Poll indicates that Labour would lost 17 seats in Scotland," The Times (London), February 28, 1977, p. 3; _____, "SNP advance at Labour's expense," The Times (London), April 13, 1977, p. 2; _____, "Scottish polls give boost to Labour," The Times (London), February 14, 1978, p. 2; and, Anthony Finlay, "Two to one in favor of the Scottish Assembly," Glasgow Herald, October 9, 1978.

²⁹Finlay, "Two to one in favor of the Scottish Assembly."

TABLE 8
NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION AND PARTY VOTE

Party	<u>1970^a</u>		<u>1974 (Feb.)^a</u>		<u>1974 (Oct.)^b</u>	
	British	Scottish	British	Scottish	British	Scottish
Conservative	33.8	27.6	31.5	18.2	27.4	23.1
Labour	60.7	61.4	53.9	53.7	56.5	39.1
SNP	4.5	10.1	9.7	24.3	12.6	35.5
Other	1.0	0.9	4.8	3.8	3.5	2.3

SOURCES: a. Jack Brand and Donald McCrone, "The SNP: from protest to nationalism," New Society, November 20, 1975, p. 218. b. Jack Brand, "The Development of National Feeling in Scotland: 1945 to 1977," Paper presented at the 1977 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1-4, 1977, p. 16.

is heavily subject to geographic concentrations of voters and voter preference shifts of even small amounts. However, the results indicate that a substantial base of support for the SNP has persisted over the past four years. This, in turn, implies that the party has a relatively firm base to build upon. And the longer it can maintain it, the better its chances for further growth as voters should develop more entrenched habits of party identification.


The Political Characteristics of SNP Support

In considering the sources of the SNP's increased support one may divide the topic into three general aspects: political, socioeconomic, and structural. Each of these may contribute to an overall understanding of the source of SNP support. The first aspect, the political characteristics of SNP voters, involves the topics of the linkage between national identity and party identification, the previous party background of SNP identifiers, the question of tactical voting, and the relationship between the Liberals and the SNP.

National Identity. Probably the basic question regarding support for a nationalist political party such as the SNP is "how nationalistic are its supporters/". As was noted in Chapter One, SNP identifiers do favor the more extensive forms of governmental change, than do identifiers of the other parties. An alternative way of approaching this aspect is to consider the relationship between national identity, political goals, and party identification. If one were to consider Scottish politics in these terms, then one would expect the nationalist party to be composed of individuals

who see themselves almost entirely in terms of their own national identity. Likewise, the parties which appeal to several identities should be composed of members blending the possible identities or holding the more encompassing one. Using the same figure as before to indicate the logical location of the Scottish parties in terms of the national identity of their members and the party's ultimate goal, one would thus expect them to be placed in the following positions.

FIGURE 7
SCOTTISH SUB-IDENTITIES, POLITICAL ORIENTATION,
AND PARTY SUPPORT



The Conservative, Labour and Liberal Parties would bridge the British and Shared identities, while the SNP would be almost exclusively aligned with the Scottish identity.

The actual relationship, however, is not quite so clear cut. Public opinion evidence of this aspect of national identification is limited, but the results reported by Jack Brand and Donald McCrone clearly indicate a shift in the expected direction.³⁰ (See Table 8). They found no change in the percentage of respondents claiming to be Scots during the years 1973 and 1974, with the results being 67.5 and 67.2 percent respectively. However, when the

³⁰ Jack Brand and Donald McCrone, "The SNP: from protest to nationalism," New Society, November 20, 1975, 416-18.

respondents were asked to identify the party they voted for in 1970 and February, 1974, a shift of Scots identifiers occurs toward the SNP. Both the Labour and the Conservative parties lost primarily Scots identifiers to the SNP in the February election. A similar pattern was observed for the October 1974 election as well. This seems to suggest that although the support for independence has increased only modestly, the SNP is being backed more by those who place their Scottish identity above their British identity. This coincides with the shift toward support for independence amongst SNP identifiers. The results also show that a majority of those voters who perceive themselves as Scots first support other political parties. The SNP, however, is the only party with a majority of its supporters claiming that their Scottish identity is paramount. That, in turn, suggests the party is developing a relatively distinct base of supporters.

Previous party background. A companion aspect of this shift in national identification toward the SNP is the question of previous party backgrounds of SNP identifiers. There is no reliable information on this topic prior to the mid-1960's, but it can be noted that many of the earlier leaders of the SNP had ties to the Liberal or Labour Parties, although a few also had links to the Conservatives. The survey results obtained during the SNP's flurry of activity in the late 1960's, however, indicate that the party was much more attractive to Labour identifiers than Conservatives.³¹ This result

³¹J.P. Cornford and J.A. Brand, "Scottish Voting Behavior," in Government and Nationalism in Scotland, ed. J.N. Wolfe (Edinburgh:

was fairly constant across the several surveys taken during this period and was supported by the SNP's municipal election victories in traditionally Labour areas. Because of this disproportionate backing by Labour identifiers and the fact that most of these voters retained their identification with Labour Party, while declaring their intention to vote SNP in the next election, several analysts have spoken of the SNP as a protest party. Supporting the SNP allowed disenchanted Labour voters to voice their opinions, something which Conservative voters could do without leaving their traditional party. Once the time for an actual voting decision arrived, however, most of them returned to the Labour Party.

One other source of support during this period which attracted some attention was that of previous non-voters. Several studies, and the SNP itself, claimed that the party was attracting more new voters and abstainers than were the other parties.³² This was taken to be evidence of the party's tapping of a deep-seated concern on the part of Scottish voters. The evidence about first time voters will be discussed later, but the data regarding abstainers does not lend itself to the interpretation that the SNP was attracting many habitual non-voters to the polls during this period. They were attracting more of these voters than any other single party, but the difference was only a few percentage points. The overwhelming tendency for abstainers was to continue their abstention.

Edinburgh University Press, 1968], pp. 24-5; Jack Brand, "These are the Scotnats," New Statesman, May 17, 1968, p. 648; Iain McLean, "Scottish Nationalists," New Society, January 9, 1969, p. 52; _____, "The Rise and Fall . . .," pp. 375-77; and, Bochel and Denver, "The Decline of the S.N.P. . . .," pp. 311-16.

The results of the 1970 general election and the subsequent decline in SNP support as measured by membership and local election votes confirmed for several analysts the idea that the SNP was primarily a protest vehicle.³³ While the party's share of the total vote cast had increased from 5.0 to 11.4 percent, the party did not do as well as was expected given the high levels of support in 1967 and 1968. Most of the individuals who had indicated they would vote for the SNP, apparently did return to their past allegiances. Even Winnie Ewing had not been able to hold on to her by-election seat at Hamilton. The only parliamentary seat that the SNP won was in the Western Isles and that victory was largely explained by local factors. This decline was more apparent, however, than real as it ignored the fact that the party's vote had doubled over its previous level and the greatly increased number of candidates. The results were not nearly as great as the party had hoped, but they were evidently sufficient to provide a base for later growth.

In terms of the previous party identification the SNP was apparently more attractive during the 1970 campaign to previous Liberal supporters and, Labour and Conservative voters in areas where their party was clearly the weaker of the two major parties.³⁴ For

³²See McLean, "The Rise and Fall...;" and, Bochel and Denver, "The Decline of the S.N.P....," for a discussion of this aspect.

³³McLean, "The Rise and Fall...;" Bochel and Denver, "The Decline of the S.N.P....," and, Kellas, "Scottish Nationalism," pp. 446-62.

³⁴Michael Steed, "Appendix II: An Analysis of the Results," in The British General Election of 1970, David Butler and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, (London: MacMillan, 1971) pp. 389-90.

marginal constituencies, though, the SNP seemed to pull votes from both the Labour and Conservative parties in roughly equal proportions. As a result, the intervention of the SNP did not appear to affect the amount of swing between the major parties. Public opinion data on previous party ties is not available for the 1970 election; consequently, an exact analysis of shifts in party identification is not possible.

The February 1974 general election ended with the SNP being in much better shape. The party managed once more to approximately double its previous share of the vote and to pick up six new parliamentary seats. Two of the seats were won from the Labour Party and four from the Conservatives. Also, once again the SNP appeared to be taking votes from the Labour Party in Conservative dominated rural seats and vice versa in Labour dominated urban areas. The net result was that the SNP apparently pulled a nearly equal portion of votes from both major parties. Richard Rose has calculated the actual swing from Labour to the SNP between 1970 and 1974 at 9.3 percent and from Conservatives to the SNP for the same period at 7.8 percent.³⁵ To those voters must be added the support of many persons, particularly in the rural constituencies, who might otherwise have been expected to vote anti-Conservative by voting Liberal.³⁶

³⁵Richard Rose, "The Future of Scottish Politics: A Dynamic Analysis," Paper presented at the CPS Scottish/Norwegian Conference, Smaller Democracies in Time of Change, June 30-July 3, 1975, p. 16. This paper was later published as a Fraser of Allander Institute Speculative Paper.

³⁶William Miller, "Four-Way Swing in Scotland 1955-1974: Pathmakers in Scottish Politics," Paper presented at the CPS Scottish/

Tactical voting and the SNP. The situation above has been interpreted as evidence that some voters, especially Labour voters, have used the SNP tactically.³⁷ Rather than voting for their own party which had no real chance of winning, they joined the SNP's supporters to defeat the other major party's candidate. Obviously part of the SNP support came from individuals making such moves, but caution should be used in crediting too much of the SNP support to this factor. Voters do engage in tactical voting under certain circumstances; however, without good corroborative public opinion data it is impossible to ascertain accurately their motives.³⁸

There are two possible motives for voting tactically, each of which has a different implication for the future of the SNP. One may vote tactically to deny another party potential victory or to support one's second preference in the sincere hope that it will win. In both cases the voter casts his ballot for the party that is his second preference, but in the first instance there is likely to be less weakening of party attachments to the first preference party. The decision is a calculated move made to strengthen the future electoral chances of the first preference party by

Norwegian Conference, *Smaller Democracies in Time of Change*, June 30-July 3, 1975. Kellas, *The Scottish Political System*, p. 130; and, Steed, "Appendix II: An Analysis of the Results," *The British General Election of 1970*, pp. 389-90.

³⁷ Michael Steed, "Appendix II: The Results Analysed," *The British General Election of February 1974*, David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), pp. 317-22.

³⁸ For a discussion of the circumstances under which tactical or strategic voting may occur, see Bruce E. Cain, "Strategic Voting in Britain," *American Journal of Political Science*, 22 (August 1970): 639-55.

weakening the main opposition. In the second case, though, the voter chooses his second preference because his primary preference has no chance of winning and no likely future prospects. Under these circumstances the voter's identification with his original party should be much more susceptible to weakening, than was likely in the first case. At this point, it is unknown how many of those who used the SNP tactically fall into which category. Consequently it is uncertain whether the SNP picked up some converts as a result of the experience of voting for the party's candidate or not. It should be recognized, though, that the SNP's tactical support was probably of both types and not just a calculated move.³⁹ This will not be possible to determine more precisely until future elections are held and the voting patterns are examined, but it should be remembered that a tactical vote for the SNP need not mean the voter will not support the party again.

This conclusion is borne out by the results of the October, 1974 election, which indicated increased support for the SNP candidates and a reasonable amount of voter consistency. The total SNP vote rose to over 30 percent, putting it in second place in terms of total voters. The Conservatives were a distant third with 24.7 percent and Labour was first with 36.3 percent. Four more parliamentary seats were won from the Conservatives bringing the

³⁹ Ronald D. Hedlund has studied an American electoral situation that is somewhat comparable to the circumstances under which tactical voting should occur in Britain. He found no evidence of a widespread mischief vote in the 1976 Wisconsin Open Presidential Primary. This suggests that voters make reasonably sincere decisions in these kinds of situations. If that is also the case in Scotland, then it would be more supportive of the second category of tactical voting. "Cross-over Voting in a 1976 Open Presidential Primary," Public Opinion Quarterly, 41 (Winter 1977-78): 498-514.

SNP's delegation in the House of Commons to eleven members. Additionally the SNP was the second place party in forty-two of the remaining sixty Scottish seats. The party swing toward the SNP in this election was from the Conservatives rather than Labour, with an 8.2 percent swing being registered.⁴⁰ Labour's share of the total vote remained stable, falling only a few tenths of a percent from the February figures. Also, the results of the election suggested that some tactical voting on the part of Labour and Conservative voters occurred, which apparently contributed to the SNP's close victories in several seats.⁴¹

Survey results obtained during the October campaign tend to confirm these trends. Jack Brand has reported that 74 percent of those who voted for the SNP in October thought of themselves as SNP members.⁴² This compared to the 96 percent of those voting for the Labour and Conservative Parties identifying with their respective parties and 73 percent of the Liberals. Of the remaining 26 percent of the SNP voters, 15 percent saw themselves as Conservatives, 8 percent as Labourites, and 3 percent as Liberals. This confirms the recent tendency for Conservative voters to shift to the SNP more than Labour supporters, contrasting somewhat with the trend of the late 1960's.

⁴⁰Rose, "The Future of Scottish Politics," p. 17.

⁴¹Michael Steed, "Appendix II: The Results Analysed," in David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of October 1974, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975): 346.

⁴²Jack Brand, "The Development of National Feeling in Scotland, 1945-1977," Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1977, pp. 6-8.

Similar patterns are revealed when actual vote shifts are examined. The tables below are from the Brand paper and indicate rather clearly the voting patterns that have contributed to the SNP's success.⁴³ As Table 9 shows the movement of voters to the SNP between February and October is from the Conservatives more than the Labour Party, but it is the Liberals who lost the greatest share of their supporters. It also shows that 80 percent of the February SNP voters supported their party again in October, a rate exceeded only by Labour voters.

TABLE 9
THE MOVEMENT OF THE VOTE IN 1974

Vote October 1974	Vote February 1974			
	Conservative	Labour	Liberal	SNP
Conservative	71	1	--	1
Labour	2	82	6	8
Liberal	5	1	57	2
SNP	14	8	23	80

SOURCE: Jack Brand, "The Development of National Feeling in Scotland, 1945-1947," Paper presented at the 1977 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1-4, 1977, p. 7.

Table 10 shows a similar pattern for voting shifts between 1970 and October, 1974. A third of those voters who supported the Liberals in 1970 voted for the SNP in October. The difference between the Conservative and Labour shift was less than between

⁴³Also consult Bill Miller, "Scottish voting patterns unrelated to class or income," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), October 15, 1975.

TABLE 10
THE MOVEMENT OF THE VOTE 1970 - OCTOBER 1974

Vote October 1974	Vote in 1970			
	Conservative	Labour	Liberal	SNP
Conservative	61	2	7	1
Labour	4	73	9	7
Liberal	5	3	44	4
SNP	19	16	32	78

SOURCE: Jack Brand, "The Development of National Feeling in Scotland, 1945-1947," Paper presented at the 1977 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1-4, 1977, p. 7.

February and October. This indicates that more of the Labour shift to the SNP took place between 1970 and February, 1974 and more of the Conservative shift occurred between the two 1974 elections. The other interesting finding of the survey was the consistency of SNP supporters. Seventy-eight percent of those respondents who voted for the SNP in 1970, voted for it again in October, 1974, which was the largest proportion of consistent voters for any of the parties. This finding raises doubts about the suggestion that the SNP is simply a protest mechanism, for apparently its voters remain loyal regardless of their reasons for initially supporting it. It also, consequently, implies that the party has some staying power and may be able to survive a series of electoral setbacks such as have been postulated for the upcoming general election.

The SNP and the Liberal Party. One final aspect of the political influences on the growth of the SNP is its relationship to the Liberal Party. The above analysis has indicated that

substantial numbers of potential Liberal voters have instead supported the SNP. This should not be interpreted as if the SNP is simply the Scottish variant of the Liberal increase that has occurred southward. Scotland has its own Liberal Party which has been experiencing an increase in its share of the vote, although not as much as in England. What has apparently happened is that the Liberals have prepared the way for the SNP, particularly in the rural areas of Scotland dominated by the Conservatives. William Miller and Michael Dyer have both interpreted the shift of Liberal voters of the 1960's to the SNP in 1974 as evidence of the weakness of party identification in these areas.⁴⁴ Two party competition between Labour and Conservatives was not really operative in these areas; as a result, anti-conservatives tended to support the Liberals, but without much conviction. Additionally, the Liberal advocacy of federalism may have eased the way for general acceptance of the SNP's goal of independence. Thus by breaking voter ties to the two-party system, the Liberals prepared the way for the SNP which matched the voter preferences more completely. In more urban areas of Scotland a similar shift occurred, but at a lower rate. It should also be remembered in considering the relationship between these two parties, that the Liberals are a small party. October 1974 was their best showing and that was only 8.3 percent of the total vote. Consequently, while the proportion of Liberal supporters who have joined the SNP may be great in terms of the Liberal

⁴⁴ Miller, "Four-Way Swing in Scotland 1955-1974;" and Michael Dyer, "Why Tory Scotland crumbled," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), October 24, 1974.

Party itself, it is only a small portion of the SNP's overall support.

The Socioeconomic Characteristics of SNP Support

The socioeconomic characteristics of the SNP's support contribute to an understanding of the party's growth by demonstrating how broadly based it has become. The findings from examination of these characteristics are among the most consistent in the analysis, suggesting that the party is fulfilling a political need for a substantial number of Scots. Among these aspects that will be discussed below are: the geographic dispersal of the SNP's support, the social class characteristics of its voters, their religious backgrounds, and their age characteristics.

Geographic dispersion. Geographically the SNP became dispersed throughout Scotland on a substantial scale during the 1974 elections. The October election was the first in which the party contested every constituency. It had contested most of the seats in 1970, but its level of support was very uneven. This successful dispersion was somewhat unexpected as the SNP has usually been much more active in the central belt between Edinburgh and Glasgow. Prior to 1970 its by-election victories, most of its local government successes, and leaders were from this area. As a result, this was the region where the party was expected to make its initial parliamentary breakthroughs. Contrary to expectations, though, the party's first general election victory was in the fringe constituency of the Western Isles. This was followed in 1974 by the SNP's successes in the Highlands, where three-quarters of its seats

are located. The party did reasonably well in the central belt, but this area clung more tightly to its traditional allegiances. The SNP was probably hurt by the competitive nature of many of these seats (between Labour and Conservatives) and the single party dominance that the Labour has in many of its Strathclyde seats. This dispersal of the party continued after the 1974 elections as was evidenced by the 1977 district council elections. The recent by-elections and regional council elections, however, suggest that the SNP will continue to finish second in most of the central belt parliamentary races. Inroads have been made into the Labour areas, but they are apparently not sufficient to ensure success in a general election. The SNP will also likely face stiffer competition from both the Labour and Conservative Party organizations in this region if the recent by-elections are good indicators of their performance in the next general election.

Social class background. The social class characteristics of SNP identifiers have been remarkably consistent since the first surveys were taken in the mid-1960's. Those polls revealed a fairly even distribution of support for the SNP amongst all social classes.⁴⁵ A similar distribution was obtained in 1974 and there has been no indication of a shift since that time.⁴⁶ Along the class dimension, the SNP lies between the Labour and Conservative Parties.

⁴⁵ Cornford and Brand, "Scottish Voting Behavior," p. 26; Roger Allen Brooks, "Scottish Nationalism: Relative Deprivation and Social Mobility," Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1973, pp. 228-29.

⁴⁶ Brand and McCrone, "The SNP from protest to nationalism," p. 416; Brand, "The Development of National Feeling...", p. 8; and, Miller, Scottish voting patterns..."

Both of them are much more identified with their respective class backgrounds. As far as social class mobility is concerned, SNP identifiers are much more likely to be upwardly mobile.⁴⁷ In fact, they are virtually as upwardly mobile as are Conservative identifiers. The party leadership exhibits a similar pattern. Most of the leaders are from middle class backgrounds and they fall between the Labour and Conservative Party leaders in terms of how strongly they identify with their background.⁴⁸ These findings raise doubts about individual relative deprivation being of much explanatory value as to why the SNP has grown.⁴⁹ They do, however, suggest that the SNP is now broadlybased party, transcending class lines.⁵⁰ That, in turn, indicates considerable dissatisfaction with the orientation of the two other major parties and their public policies.

There are, unfortunately, no hard data on the social class background of the party's supporters prior to the 1960's. The memoirs of the party leaders, however, suggest that most of the activists were from the middle class.⁵¹ That impression

⁴⁷Brand, "The Development of National Feeling...", p. 10.

⁴⁸A similar pattern has been found amongst SNP MPs in comparison to Labour and Conservative MPs from Scotland. William Mishler and Anthony Mughan, "Representing the Celtic Fringe: Devolution and Legislative Behavior in Scotland and Wales," Legislative Studies Quarterly, 3 (August 1978): 377-408.

⁴⁹Brooks, "Scottish Nationalism."

⁵⁰For another set of comments on this topic see: Dean Jaensch, "The Scottish Vote in 1974: A Realignment Party System?," Political Studies, 24 (September 1976): 306-19.

⁵¹J. MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind; and, Billy Wolfe, Scotland Lives: The Quest for Independence (Edinburgh: Reprographia, 1973.)

further implies that the first major involvement of the working class with the SNP occurred during the sixties. The growth of the party was so extensive in this period, though, that it would be difficult to make too much of this difference in the timing of attraction for the various social classes. It is probably more reflective of the greater support given the SNP in the sixties by Labour identifiers than anything else. Given the history and goal orientations of the SNP before its growth, it should not be surprising that it began as a middle class organization.

Religious background. The religious background of SNP identifiers is important in this consideration of their socioeconomic characteristics for several reasons. One criticism which has been directed at SNP is that it is the Scottish version of the Protestant reaction in Northern Ireland. As such the party is supposedly anti-Catholic. It is also important because the Catholic population in the Strathclyde area has been extremely supportive of the Labour Party. As a consequence, any shift toward the SNP on their part would be a significant indication of a weakening in Labour's position. Scotland has its own Orange Order and Catholic-Protestant disputes, but they are almost entirely confined to a few annual marches and football rivalries. The SNP does not endorse such prejudices in any way, nor does it condone the Protestant actions in Northern Ireland. In fact, it tries to maintain as much distance as it can from the example of Northern Ireland because of the potential negative implications which might be drawn about the consequences of self-government.

Overwhelmingly, though, the primary religious preference of the SNP's supporters, is the protestant Church of Scotland. This too has been a very consistent finding since the mid-1960's, but the party did manage to pick up more Catholic votes in the 1974 elections than in 1970.⁵² The greatest gains, however, were made among Protestant voters. The substantial SNP vote during the 1977 district council elections in the Glasgow area, however suggest that the party had to have more votes from local Catholics than in previous years. Although the regional council elections and the two parliamentary by-elections in that area went against the SNP, the solid tie between Catholic voters and the Labour Party may no longer be inviolate. Some voters apparently broke it once and may be willing to do so again.

Iain McLean has speculated that the tendency for Catholics not to shift as readily to the SNP as Protestants is due to the fact that the party is based around Scottish identity and culture. Many of the Catholics in the Glasgow area originally migrated from Ireland and, consequently, the SNP has no meaning for them.⁵³ It is also likely that the correlation between being Catholic and possessing a working class background is higher than for Protestants. That would, in turn, tend to reinforce the ties of the Catholic voters to the Labour party.

⁵²Brooks, "Scottish Nationalism," pp. 214-15.

⁵³McLean, "Scottish Nationalists;" Brand, "These are the Scotnats;" and, Cornford and Brand, "Scottish Voting Behavior."

Voter age. The remaining social characteristic of importance to this analysis is the age factor. Once again there is no hard evidence of which age groups were more supportive of the SNP before the 1960's. Writings by the party leaders leave the impression that the most active members were relatively young at the time of their most intense involvement. Certainly Billy Wolfe's account implies that the new activists attracted to the SNP during the late 1950's and early 1960's were younger individuals.⁵⁴ These generalizations were basically supported by the opinion polls of the mid-sixties, but they were also a point of controversy in terms of significance that should be granted the finding. The surveys clearly indicated that the SNP was both attracting more younger voters than older ones, and more young voters than any other single party. There is no real evidence, though, that the party was encouraging more young voters to participate than would be the case if it were not present. The over-riding tendency of young voters was still to abstain from participation altogether. As a result, the SNP may have been receiving more support from new voters, but it was a small portion of the party's total vote.⁵⁵ The trend for the SNP to be more attractive to voters under the age of thirty-five has continued, with the gap between age groups narrowing somewhat in the 1974 elections.⁵⁶

⁵⁴Wolfe, Scotland Lives, especially the early chapters; and, Jane Morton, "Scot Nats in Office," New Society, October 10, 1968, pp. 513-14.

⁵⁵McLean, "The Rise and Fall...;" and, Bochel and Denver, "The Decline of the S.N.P...."

The implications of this tendency are important for considerations of the SNP's future. Normally, younger voters are less consistent than middle-aged voters in their political participation. If the SNP, however, has been able to instill a sense of attachment in its younger identifiers, then it should be easier to maintain its current level of support. A significant portion of an entire political generation will be identifying with the party and its goals. This is a major reason why the SNP needs a continuing set of electoral victories. They are likely to be the most influential factor in keeping the loyalty and enthusiasm of the younger voters until their sense of party identification is well formulated.

The Structural Aspects of SNP Support

Before drawing all of this information and its implications together, there is one remaining set of influences on the amount of support the SNP has received that requires evaluation. These aspects may be categorized as structural influences since they refer to factors associated with the elections themselves, rather than the political or socioeconomic characteristics of individual voters. They include: the impact of increased numbers of candidates on the party's share of the vote, the impact of repeated constituency competition, the relationship between turnout and SNP vote, and the relationship between party support at the local and parliamentary levels.

⁵⁶Kellas, The Scottish Political System, p. 131; and, Brand and McCrone, "The SNP: from protest to nationalism," pp. 416-17.

Increased SNP candidatures. The consequences of having an increasing number of SNP candidates are important. Fielding more candidates certainly contributes to a party's image of growing appeal. It could also raise the total number of persons voting for the party, even if many of the candidates do poorly, and as a result, increase the party's percentage of the total vote. Thus it is conceivable that a party could have an image of growth when, in fact, its level of support is not actually increasing. One measure of the impact of increasing numbers of candidates is the average vote obtained. Table 11 gives this information for the SNP during 1955 to 1974.

TABLE 11

AVERAGE VOTE PER SNP CANDIDATE, 1955/74

Election	Average Vote	# Candidates
1955	14.8	2
1959	8.6	5
1964	10.4	15
1966	14.5	23
1970	12.4	65
1974 (February)	22.7	70
1974 (October)	30.6	71

The average for 1955 was distorted because of one constituency in which the SNP candidate fared reasonably well. Beginning with 1959, however, the average vote per candidate probably gives an accurate picture of the SNP's pattern of growth. The party slowly picked up support through 1966 and, while its share of the total vote increased

to over 11 percent in 1970, the election was something of a setback. The average vote per candidate fell by more than 2 percent, indicating just how weak the party was in many constituencies. The substantial increase of February, 1974 suggests, though, that the 1970 effort and the organizational work conducted between elections laid the basis for the party's eventual success. Consequently, 1970 was not entirely a loss. The results from the 1974 elections also indicate the extensive growth of the party by suggesting a fairly even distribution of support throughout Scotland, a conclusion which is supported by the fact that no SNP candidate in October 1974 lost his electoral deposit.

Repetitive constituency competition. Another structural aspect which support the idea of a nation-wide pattern of growth is the impact of repeated constituency competition. It is reasonable to question whether the SNP has found greater acceptability in those constituencies in which it has competed a number of times. Perhaps such repeated efforts have made the party more attractive to the voters in a gradual manner. There seems to be no reason, however, to believe that repeated competition before 1970 has had much effect in the constituencies that the SNP did well in during the 1974 campaigns. The only one of the constituencies held, East Perth, had the party competed since 1955, and it was not won until the October, 1974 election. Three of the other seats possessed by the SNP were first challenged in 1964 and 1966, each initially receiving 9 percent of the vote or less. The remaining seven seats were competed for first in 1970 and in each the SNP candidate received

above 20 percent of the vote for the first time out. Thus the pattern of growth suggested by considering repeated competitions indicates that the 1970 election was indeed an important one for the later development of the party.

Voter turnout. An additional aspect which has been speculated to be of influence on the level of SNP support is voter turnout. As was mentioned earlier, during the late 1960's claims were made that the SNP was attracting nonvoters to the polls. The survey evidence, though, tended to downplay this group as an important source of SNP votes. That negative conclusion is further supported by the consistent lack of a statistical relationship between turnout and the SNP.⁵⁷ Turnout neither goes up or down with the presence of SNP candidates, nor does it appear to contribute to the party's level of support. Thus the idea that the SNP is bringing more non-voters into the participatory system is not supported by the voter turnout information. That, in turn, implies that the party must rely upon convincing voters who would "normally" support the other political parties in order to be successful.

Local/parliamentary elections and the SNP. The remaining influence that needs to be considered is the relationship between support for the SNP in local government elections and in parliamentary elections. It is reasonable to wonder whether a relationship exists between these two levels. Plausibly, success at the

⁵⁷ Charles Lewis Taylor, "Why Vote SNP?," Paper presented at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 2-5, 1975, pp. 17-18.

local level should provide the SNP with a base for its parliamentary challenges. This is also an interesting aspect of SNP politics because there is something of a contradiction in a nationalist party, that seeks independence, competing for local government positions. One might think the local levels would be avoided as a means of symbolizing the party's rejection of the entire political system.⁵⁸ Whether to compete in these areas, or not, has been a point of conflict within the SNP, but the party has been expanding its participation and in 1978 it contested over 50 percent of the regional council seats. Local government elections are apparently seen as a means of registering voter dissatisfaction with the Westminster Government, as well as a training exercise for party activists. They also serve the added function of maintaining voter interest in the party.

As far as a connection between support at the two levels is concerned, however, there is no clear relationship. More than anything, SNP activity in local government elections appears to be an artifact of the degree of party organizational work in the local area. The party has contested and done better in local government elections in Scotland's central belt, even though this area has held fairly firmly for the Labour Party at the parliamentary level. This was the case in the 1970 general election and indications are

⁵⁸Or as a rejection of the local government system, which the SNP has indicated it would eliminate if it got control of the Assembly.

that this will be the situation in the next general election.⁵⁹ In the rural areas where the SNP has managed to capture more parliamentary seats, the practice of relatively non-partisan local elections and the influences of unaligned groups such as the Progressives, appear to be major reasons why the party has not done better in its local government challenges.

Consequently, one should not infer too much about parliamentary elections in Scotland from the outcomes of local government elections. They are sufficiently separate in the voters' minds and in the structure of the contests to provide only a limited indication of voter preferences at the higher level. They also appear to fluctuate more readily than do parliamentary elections, if the 1977 district and 1978 regional elections are valid examples. What probably is of considerable influence for the general election, though, is the image that the local election results convey about the trend of party support. The 1968 results gave the impression that the SNP would do quite well in the 1970 general election, as the 1977 district council elections would have for the upcoming general election had the 1978 regional elections had not been held in the meantime. Unrealistic expectations, as a result, are generated; expectations which have an impact on the actions of the Government and the various political parties, including the SNP.

A Preliminary Evaluation of the SNP's Impact

This chapter has thus far been an attempt to synthesize the available information concerning the Scottish National Party and

⁵⁹"Scotland is different," pp. 20-21.

its bases of support. As such, the discussion clearly shows that Scottish politics has been undergoing a fundamental transformation in recent years. It suggests that the SNP is unlikely to be merely a temporary aberration. It is also unlikely, though, that the SNP will become the majority party of Scotland in terms of popular support. Furthermore, the trends considered indicate the party is fulfilling political needs for many Scots that the older, class-based parties are not. This is evidenced by the broad base of support the SNP has attracted from all the major political parties, social classes, geographic regions and age groups. It is likewise evidenced by the consistent support given the SNP by its identifiers.

The question of how this transformation has occurred, however, has not yet been addressed. The intention has been to first clearly indicate the breadth of the phenomenon at hand. That in itself indicates something about how the SNP may have formed the linkage between identity and behavior. After a point the party became of such size and influence that its perspective was widely recognized. In other words, once the party grew sufficiently that its electoral impact was important then it automatically attracted a certain amount of public attention and individual interest. That greatly eased the party's communications problems as its potential audience was more receptive to hearing its messages. This helps explain the SNP's ability to mobilize voters after the 1974 elections, but it cannot account for how the party succeeded in getting to those elections.

There are several factors, though, that can be cited as contributing to the SNP's success. The first of these must be the quality of the party's local organizations. They were very active during the interim between the 1970 and 1974 elections, building a cadre of party activists. This was in sharp contrast to the weakened conditions prevalent in the older parties. After the 1974 elections this contrast would become all too obvious, but it was not until 1978 that the efforts of the British parties to counter it began to show an impact.

Similarly the quality work of the SNP's central organization should be noted as an important ingredient in its achievements. The party leaders did a effective job of keeping the SNP before the public through the media and personal appearances. Individuals such as Billy Wolfe, Winnie Ewing and Margo McDonald represented their party quite well. They were able to speak out on public issues in Scotland and receive recognition that was not open to leaders of the other parties whose comments were ascribed to partisan politics. The research staff of the party also did an efficient job, contributing to the SNP's success by enabling it to overcome the stigma of being a single-issue party.

A third factor that may be cited at this point is the competitive campaign tactics adopted by the party. In comparison to the older parties, the SNP has utilized a much more dynamic, aggressive campaign style, making good use of large numbers of volunteer canvassers and media attention. In fact, in this regard the party's campaign efforts, especially in the early by-elections,

resembled recent American presidential primary campaigns more than a typical British election campaign. The effect, though, was a more thorough mobilization of their potential supporters than the other parties were able to effect.

A final element of great significance in explaining the SNP's success is the fact that already by 1974 the party was perceived as a spokesman for Scotland. William Miller in reporting the findings of a British Election Study's survey taken after the October 1974 election has noted that over two-thirds of the respondents, regardless of party, believed the SNP's existence and election successes had been good for Scotland.⁶⁰ It was also found that the Scottish voters tended to prefer the issue stances of one of the British parties on issues clearly identified as affecting Britain as a whole. This included even the Nationalist's supporters. On issues identified as Scottish in nature, however, the SNP had the largest proportion of public support, picking up identifiers from the other parties. Overall the British issues were rated as being more important in the October election, thus accounting for why the SNP was not more successful. The survey results, though, indicate the depth of the transformation taking place in Scotland. Here was a political party with only one previous general election victory in its history and after having been written

⁶⁰See Bill Miller, "Three main parties find SNP 'good for Scotland'," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), October 14, 1975 and "Catch-22 for Labour," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), October 16, 1975.

off as dying following the last election, being more representative of the Scottish public than any other party.

This status of a spokesman for Scotland, in combination with the other facets discussed above, can partially account for the dramatic changes that have happened. It is not difficult to understand how the party, utilizing these factors and taking advantage of the opportunities available to it, was able to forge a linkage between Scottish national identity and public issues; and, thus, behavior. This explanation relying upon the SNP's performance as an aggregator and articulator of political change cannot be considered complete, however, as these factors may be viewed in part as repercussions of still other undertermined factors. It has taken into perspective the actions of the SNP alone, but the party did not develop in that isolated condition. Consequently, before the conclusions reached above as to how the SNP was able to make the necessary linkage may be accepted as final the remaining influences need to be assessed.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE RISE OF THE DEVOLUTION ISSUE AND ITS IMPACT

The one aspect of political change involved in the development of Scottish nationalism that has been outside the SNP's direct control, but which has nonetheless been significant, is the agenda of public issues. In the British political system that agenda is largely set by the Government and the Opposition in Parliament. The Government prepares its program of legislation and the Opposition presents its counter-proposals as the parliamentary debates proceed. Issues from outside Westminster are considered when their import is such that a divergence from the existing proposals is perceived as warranted. Yet even in those few cases where major issues arise from outside, the Government controls the agenda in terms of how and when the issue will be considered by Parliament. Because this type of agenda setting system prevails in Britain, the actions of the Government and major British political parties related to the rise of the devolution issue need to be examined. It is a basic contention of this analysis that the responses of these bodies to the Scottish Nationalists have in themselves played a major role in redefining public issues in Scotland.

After the SNP's unexpected victories in February 1974 both major British parties perceived the nationalists to be an electoral

threat to their ability to form a government. The outcome of the election was so close that neither party could afford to lose any additional marginal seats. They reacted, consequently, to counter this challenge through proposals for various forms of devolution. The manner in which these proposals were developed, both in and out of Parliament, however, generated a continuing set of pressures of which the SNP was able to take advantage. This cyclical situation of action and response was accentuated by the Labour Government's precarious margin of Parliamentary support and the continued threat of further SNP gains in Scotland. As a result, the political status of the SNP and the devolution proposals were greatly enhanced. That, in turn, attracted more public attention to the SNP and the devolution issue. This elevation of devolution to a major political issue by the Government and the British political parties thus accentuated the changes wrought by the SNP in a way the party was not capable of accomplishing on its own. And through this combination of factors and linkage between national identity, public issues, and political behavior was cemented.

Given this contention it is necessary that these reactions be considered in depth to determine how this redefinition process was achieved. This will be done through a chronological analysis of the political responses of the Government and parties to the SNP between 1967 and 1978. This approach will be utilized because the redefinition of issues was not an intentional consequence of carefully thought-out decisions, but rather an aftereffect. The detail of the discussion will thus serve as documentation of the premist. The final section will then evaluate the impact of the pattern of events in terms of how they contributed to the growth of Scottish nationalism.

The Royal Commission on the Constitution

The process of redefining public issues so that they would be perceived primarily in terms of their impact on Scotland began in the mid-1960s as a response to the electoral successes of the Scottish and Welsh nationalists. The immediate catalyst of this reaction was Winnie Ewing's close victory in the November 1967 Hamilton by election that gave the SNP its first seat in Parliament since 1945. This followed a similar win by the Welsh Nationalists during the previous year. These successes and the resulting public attention drawn to the nationalists were concurrently accompanied by dramatic increases in the party membership and municipal election support. Thus by 1968 it appeared that the SNP would be a major factor in the next general election.

As a result, the Labour and Conservative Parties perceived a need to develop policies that would halt the flight of their voters to the ranks of the SNP. The Conservatives approached the problem in 1968 by setting up a committee to consider the establishment of a Scottish assembly. Although the idea had not been enthusiastically accepted by the Scottish Conservatives, a report was issued two years later endorsing the concept of a directly elected assembly with powers to discuss legislation affecting Scotland.

The Labour Government subsequently made its move to accommodate public opinion by appointing the Royal Commission on the Constitution. The Wilson Cabinet was divided on the question of pursuing a policy of devolution as a means of containing the nationalists. While the opponents of devolution prevailed for the moment, it was decided that a Royal Commission should be appointed to study the matter. If

the nationalists won a number of seats in the upcoming general election, then its recommendations would be considered. If not, they could be forgotten.

To a degree, the creation of the Commission seems to have been a public relations move designed to appease the nationalists at a very low cost. The Commission's impact was largely intended for the moment of its creation, or so thought many politicians in the Labour and Conservative camps.¹ This was especially so after the apparent downturn in nationalist support following the 1970 general election. Both parties more-or-less dismissed the Commission from their minds as they accepted the conclusion that the SNP's growth during the sixties had been a temporary protest movement. Voters had used the party as a means of expressing their discontent with economic conditions, but at the important point they returned to their traditional class-oriented partisan attachments. Consequently, when the Royal Commission issued its Report in October 1973 proposing a Scottish assembly, neither party had a detailed position on the issue. The Report presented the political parties with a predicament as it highlighted their evasion of devolution and the apparent lack of sincerity of their earlier positions. This situation was rapidly compounded a week later by an SNP victory in the previously solid Labour seat of Govan.

Thus the Kilbrandon Commission's Report, as the Commission is commonly known, was not well received. To the politicians who had

¹See the following: Tam Dalyell, Devolution: The End of Britain? (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1977): 87-91; John P. Mackintosh, "The Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969-1973," The Political Quarterly, 45 (January-March 1974): 115-6; and, Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970 (Middlesax Weildenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1971; Pelican Books, 1974), p. 725.

forgotten the issue of devolution, the recommendations were an embarrassment. The Report was ignored so completely by both major parties that its findings were not even considered in the House of Commons. Publicly the reaction was only slightly warmer. The nationalists were not satisfied with the specific recommendations of the Commission, yet they were pleased that devolution, in some form, had been suggested by all of the Commissioners. The reaction of much of the general public was one of confusion as the Report was a lengthy document with a high degree of internal dissension.

The Report did, however, set the stage for public debate by legitimizing the concept of devolution, and by its timing. The SNP's victory at Govan and its successes in the February 1974 general election convinced the leaders of the major parties that they would have to consider some form of devolution. While the politicians did not extensively adopt the Commission's recommendations, the proposals nevertheless became an important basis of public comparison and, subsequently, were of greater influence than perhaps some critics originally believed.

Because of the inability of the Commissioners to agree upon their final recommendations, both a majority and a minority report were issued.² The authors of the majority report accepted the claim that the national identities of the Scots and the Welsh deserved some form of governmental recognition beyond the current Cabinet offices.

²Great Britain, Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969-1973, Report, Volume I; and Great Britain, Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969-1973, Memorandum of Dissent, Volume II.

They then attempted to develop a separate scheme for each of the two countries. With regards to Scotland, eight of the Commissioners favored legislative devolution, two executive devolution, and one an advisory role for the Scottish Council. The majority report further suggested devolution of most of the administrative functions associated with the Scottish Office and the discontinuance of the Secretary of State's post.

Two members of the Commission, Lord Crowther-Hunt and Professor A.T. Peacock, did not accept the belief of the majority that the Scottish and Welsh deserved special treatment because of national sentiment. They interpreted the public opinion evidence available to the Commission to indicate that there was no real difference between Scotland and Wales and other United Kingdom regions in terms of their desire for regional autonomy. Consequently, their recommendations proposed regional assemblies for England, as well as the other two countries, and a substantial transferal of central government powers to the new units. Central to their scheme was the belief that each of the regions of Britain should be governed in the same manner.

Critics attacked the Commission's work on a number of points. They noted the instability of its membership and the lack of unity regarding its recommendations. Two members of the Commission including its original chairman, died and three others resigned.³ This, coupled with the divisions over the recommendations, detracted from the idea that the Commission's conclusions were of a highly considered nature.

³The Commission was originally referred to as the Crowther Commission after its first Chairman. Lord Kilbrandon became the Chairman after Lord Crowther's death in 1972.

Critics also focused upon the political circumstances of the Commission's creation and the reception of its Report to indicate its lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the politicians.⁴

Among the more serious criticisms of the Report were the lack of a clearly stated purpose in the Commission's mandate and the imprecision of its terms of reference. The body of the Report dealt with devolution and how different schemes might be applied; however, the Commission's mandate was not specifically or exclusively about devolution. The mandate was extremely general, involving the entire constitutional structure of the British system.⁵ The Commissioners, though, chose to limit the scope of their work to the one topic. Their terms of reference were also ill-defined. No real distinction of basic constitutional principles was made. In fact, the Report dealt hardly at all with the constitutional issues raised by devolution. Neither did the Report clearly distinguish between the devolution of functions to various lower levels of government and alternative means of coping with political dissatisfaction in Scotland and Wales. They assumed that public discontent was synonymous with dissatisfaction with the existing governmental arrangements: a fact not necessarily proven by their evidence.

⁴For a review of the Report and the Memorandum of Dissent see: Mackintosh, "The Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969-1973;" Nevil Johnson, "Editorial: The Royal Commission on the Constitution," Public Administration, 52 (Spring 1974): 1-12; "A Stillborn Report," The Economist, November 3, 1973, pp. 18-23; D. G. Boyce, "Dicey, Kilbrandon and Devolution," The Political Quarterly, 46 (July-August 1975): 280-92; Brian Smith, "Confusions in Regionalism," The Political Quarterly, 48 (January-March 1977): 14-29; and Terrance Daintith, "The Kilbrandon Report: Some Comments," in Devolution, ed. Harry Calvert (London: Professional Books Ltd., 1975), pp. 23-40.

While an overall negative appraisal of the Commission's work may seem justified, there are several mitigating circumstances and positive aspects that should be noted. It should be remembered, for instance, that the mandate was ambiguous, giving the Commission little direction as to how it should proceed. Additionally, the Commission conducted most of its hearings during a time when the nationalists were apparently in decline and constitutional issues were not being prominently raised by anyone. In fact, the whole devolution debate has been void of extensive consideration of constitutional issues.⁶ Part of the problem may be, as has been suggested by Nevil Johnson, that it is difficult to consider constitutional questions in a system where the constitution is dependent upon implicit political traditions and customs.⁷

⁵Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969-1973, Report, pp. iii-iv.

⁶Several studies have made initial examinations of these aspects. Vernon Bogdanor, "Regionalism: The Constitutional Aspects," The Political Quarterly, 48 (January-March 1977): 14-29; _____, "Devolution and the Constitution," Parliamentary Affairs, 31 (Summer 1978): 352-67; R. Rose, "Options for Constitutional Unity in Great Britain Today," Papers on Devolution, Intro. by D. W. Parsons, (York: Joseph Roundtree Social Service Trust, 1977), pp. 23-34; and, Harry Lazar, "Constitutional and Political Implications of Devolution;" Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the British Politics Group, New York, NY, September 1978. Also consult the following for essays discussing the legal and constitutional implications of independence for Scotland. John P. Grant, ed., Independence and Devolution (Edinburgh: W. Green & Sons Ltd., 1976).

⁷Johnson, "Editorial: The Royal Commission on the Constitution," p. 2.

Aside from serving as a basis for public discussion, the Report has made several other contributions to the devolution debate. The hearings, and their public testimony constitute the most extensive collection of evidence on differing opinions concerning devolution to date. A similar comment can be made of the Commission's Report and accompanying research. The Report is the most comprehensive discussion available on many of the issues raised by devolution and some of the research pieces, particularly the public opinion survey and the economic studies are important in their own right.⁸ This is especially so when they are compared to the public documents issued since the Report which have been strikingly poor in quality.

Finally, the proposals contained in the Scotland and Wales Bill bear considerable resemblance to some of the recommendations of the majority report. It is uncertain how much influence the Kilbrandon Commission had on the civil servants working on the Government's devolution proposals; however, it is likely that the Commission was of influence in at least two ways. First, the Commissioners and the civil servants attached to them were committed to maintaining the existing system as much as possible. The changes they suggested were minimal and were designed to preserve the system, rather than destroy

⁸Great Britain, Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969-1973, Research Papers 10, Financial and Economic Aspects of Regionalism and Separatism; Great Britain, Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969-1973, Survey of the Welsh Economy, Research Papers 8, and, Great Britain, Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969-1973, Devolution and Other Aspects of Government: An Attitude Survey, Research Papers 7. Also see Harry Calvert's article for a critique of the public opinion survey. "Who Wants Devolution? Kilbrandon -- a different view of the evidence," in Devolution, ed. Harry Calvert (London: Professional Books, Ltd., 1975), pp. 41-62.

it. Secondly, the preparation of evidence for the Commission is likely to have forced the bureaucrats in such departments as the Treasury to develop their perspective on devolution more completely, thus placing them in a reasonably good position to defend their prerogatives once the Government actually began considering devolution legislation. This may be the basis for some of the charges that some of the Government's proposals reflected the position of the bureaucrats more than anyone else.

The eventual place of the Royal Commission in the history of British devolution is uncertain. Too much about the internal decision-making of the Government on this issue is unknown and is likely to remain so, making an accurate evaluation difficult. It may be, though, that those most critical of its work had expectations unsuited to its topic and that its most important trait will be that it served as a preliminary version of the later debate.

The Political Parties and the Beginnings of the Devolution Issue

Consideration of devolution by the major political parties began after the SNP demonstrated the extent of its popular backing in the 1974 general elections. By obtaining an unexpected 21.9 percent of the vote in the February election and 30.4 percent in October, the SNP changed the context within which devolution could be considered. No longer was it an issue that could be avoided or passed to a royal commission. The major parties now had to confront the issue in order not to lose any more ground to the SNP.

The need to confront the nationalists was more immediate for the Labour Party than for the Conservatives. Not only had the party

previously supported Scottish aspirations, but it was Harold Wilson who had appointed the Kilbrandon Commission during his previous administration. An additional reason why it was more important for the Labour Party to act was the fact that Scotland was politically important to the party's ability to form a Government. Only twice, in 1945 and 1966, was the party able to win a majority of the parliamentary seats in England; thus it was dependent upon the support of Scotland and Wales. If the SNP continued to grow, Labour might lose any future chance of being in office. The precariousness of this position was highlighted for the party leaders by the narrowness of Labour's 1974 victories, making a successful countermove all the more imperative.

Labour actually began its devolutionary moves before the February election. The manifesto for that election treated the subject vaguely, preferring to recommend a broadening of the powers of the Scottish Grand Committee in Parliament, rather than the recommendations of the Constitutional Commission. The election results, however, worried the Labour leaders, especially the British ones, and the new Government reiterated its intention to pursue devolution. As an indication of their seriousness, the Queen's speech opening the new Parliament stated that the Government would initiate discussion of the Kilbrandon Commission's Report and bring forth its own proposals. The reassessment of the Labour position that followed testifies to the divisions created by this situation within the party. After evaluating the election results the National Executive of the British Labour Party requested the Scottish Executive to prepare a new devolution statement. This was accomplished in March 1974 when a resolution favoring an assembly was adopted by the Scottish Party Conference.

The resolution, though, was subsequently rejected in June by the Scottish Executive Council. The action was taken at a poorly attended meeting of the Council, only eleven of twenty-nine members were present, and the vote was quite close, six to five. Labour leaders in the Government found this situation embarrassing as it conflicted with the National Executive Committee's decision of a month before which had endorsed the assembly proposal and promised a Green Paper to serve as the basis for discussion of devolution. Consequently, they pressured the Scottish party leaders to call a special conference on devolution.⁹ In the meantime, the Government issued its Green Paper summarizing the main points of the Kilbrandon Report and outlining some of the more significant aspects of the issue that would require further elaboration.¹⁰ When the special conference finally met in August, it reaffirmed the party's support for a Scottish assembly by a four to one margin, largely because the trade unions switched their votes to support devolution. This then became the official policy of the Labour Party when the Government issued a White Paper on September 18th, the day the October election was announced.¹¹

Following the election, however, the Labour Party's internal differences reappeared. At the March 1975 Scottish Conference, the

⁹Jack Brand, "The Scottish Assembly: Some Decision Premises," paper presented at the CPS Scottish/Norwegian Conference, Smaller Democracies in Time of Change, June 30-July 3, 1975, Helensburgh, Scotland, pp. 14-5; and Dalyell, Devolution: The End of Britain?, pp. 100-10.

¹⁰Great Britain, Office of the Lord President of the Council, Devolution within the United Kingdom: Some Alternatives for Discussion 1974, Cmd. N.A. (H.M.S.O., 1974).

¹¹Great Britain, Office of the Prime Minister, Democracy and Devolution Proposals for Scotland and Wales 1974, Cmd. 5732 (H.M.S.O., 1974).

anti-devolutionists were able to successfully reject the idea of giving the proposed assembly any economic trade, or industrial powers, thus gutting the assembly proposal of its substance. A major factor in their success was the change in the position of the General and Municipal Workers Union. Before the election the leaders of the SMWU believed a devolution policy was necessary to effectively counter the SNP's appeal, but with the possibility of the next general election being several years away devolution was once more an issue to be downplayed. While not being open about it, Willie Ross and other Labour leaders in Scotland seemed pleased with the outcome as they had never been enthusiastic about the idea of devolution and this was a dramatic way of reminding the Cabinet's devolution committee.¹²

The Scots were not the only ones having second thoughts about the Government's promise of a Scottish Assembly in 1977. As the summer began, rumors about divisions within the Cabinet circulated widely. It appeared that some of the more conservative members of the Cabinet such as Roy Jenkins, Reg Prentice, Shirley Williams, Anthony Crossland and Denis Healey desired to delay the submission of the devolution bill. They argued that the devolution plans were unworkable and would "threaten the efficient government of Scotland and the integrity of the United Kingdom."¹³ They also pointed out that the favorable vote on remaining in the Common Market indicated the Nationalists had been rejected by the Scots.

¹²"Yet another gift for the Nats," The Economist, March 29, 1975, pp. 23-24.

¹³Arnold Kemp, "'Scrap Assembly' move threatened," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), June 6, 1975, p. 1.

The basic commitment of the Government to devolution was reiterated, however, in mid-June at a meeting of the Cabinet's devolution committee. The conservatives expressed their doubts, but in the end a majority of the committee supported Edward Short's proposal to submit and pass a devolution bill in the next session of Parliament. It was also decided that a new White Paper elaborating on the decisions reached in the September White Paper would be issued. It would further develop the proposals for the assembly and, by coming out in the fall, contribute to discussion of the constitutional complexities raised by devolution that were scheduled for decisions at that time.¹⁴

Following these basic decisions the major remaining questions concerned the range of powers to be granted to the assembly. This point raised considerable controversy as different groups within the Labour Party lobbied with the Cabinet and the devolution committee for their particular viewpoint. Government officials, however, remained secretive concerning their preparations. As a result, much of the public discussion of devolution and the Government's future actions was speculation over the success of one of another group's lobbying efforts. Public attention was also diverted during the summer months by the question of EEC representation for Scotland and the problems of establishing the new regional and local government system.

Despite the summer lull, internal pressures within the Labour Party continued to build. Tom Fulton, Chairman of the Labour Party's

¹⁴Tom James, "Cabinet majority for an early assembly bill," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), June 17, 1975, p. 1.

Executive Council in Scotland, led a delegation to London, opposing the granting of any powers over trade, industry, or the Scottish Development Agency to the assembly. They wished to prevent the assembly from having any real powers of its own. In this effort, they had the tacit support of Willie Ross, the Labour Secretary of State for Scotland, who did not wish to see the Secretaryship become a subordinate position to the assembly. Several others, though, went even further in their opposition. Among the most vocal was Tam Dalyell, MP for West Lothian, Vice-Chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party and Chairman of Labour's Scottish Parliamentary Group. He accepted the SNP's argument that an assembly would be the prelude to separation and, consequently, rejected the whole idea. He further believed that an assembly would be tremendously expensive and overly bureaucratic. This led him to conclude that the Labour Party ought to adopt a policy of direct confrontation with the SNP over the issue of separation.¹⁵

Still others, generally individuals not holding official party positions aside from their parliamentary seats, believed that the party's approach toward devolution was too ambiguous and cautious. As a result, Labour was playing into the hands of the SNP. What was needed was a definitive bill giving the assembly substantial economic, financial and industrial authority. Only by confronting the Scottish desire for more self-government in a forthright manner could Labour restore public confidence in itself and rob the SNP of its position as the leading proponent of devolution. They further argued that this would

¹⁵Dalyell's book, Devolution: The End of Britain?, is the most complete statement yet of the anti-devolution perspective.

undercut the SNP's ability to appear as a nonpartisan spokesman on this issue, thus restricting its listening audience to its hardcore supporters.¹⁶

As the Government continued its preparation of the White Paper, there was little indication that support for the Nationalists had fallen off dramatically despite the outcome of the EEC referendum. In fact, in September the SNP mounted an effective campaign to capture a former Labour seat on the Lothian regional council. The Labourite who held the seat had resigned, dissatisfied with Labour policies and had written a public letter supporting the SNP. This was the first SNP victory in the Edinburgh area since 1969 and was interpreted as an indication of its broadening base of support at the local level.¹⁷ Thus, pressure still existed for the Government to develop an effective alternative to the SNP.

The pressure to develop a devolution stance that would appeal to the Scottish voters was also being felt in the Conservative Party. After all it had been Mr. Edward Heath, Leader of the British Conservative Party, who had proposed an elected Scottish assembly with substantial powers for domestic affairs back in 1968, prior to the appointment of the Royal Commission on the Constitution. He made this proposal while addressing the Scottish Party Conference and it led to the establishment of a Constitutional Committee headed by Sir Alec Douglas-Home to study the matter. The Committee's report, released in 1970,

¹⁶For a good discussion on these divisions consult Keith Raffan, "Preparing for Battle," The Spectator, November 15, 1975, pp. 628-9.

¹⁷"One in the eye for Labour," The Economist, September 13, 1975, p. 32.

proposed a directly elected assembly which would discuss Scottish legislation and, in essence, replace the Scottish parliamentary committees. This proposal was accepted by the Party Conference by a three to one margin, but it was clear that it was not an enthusiastic endorsement.

However, when the policy did not have any immediate electoral success and the SNP's position in local elections declined, indicating a decrease in their popular support, the policy of devolution was repudiated at the May 1973 Party Conference. It has also been suggested that some Conservatives thought they would be in an even weaker position of elections for an assembly were held. At any rate, the Conference decisively defeated a motion urging that the Conservative Government hasten the establishment of a Scottish Assembly. In addition, Gordon Campbell, the Conservative Secretary of State for Scotland, stated that there would be no chance of an assembly being established during the current parliament. Thus when the Kilbrandon Commission issued its report in October, the party had no definite devolution policy.¹⁸

This vacillation continued through the February 1974 election when their manifesto vaguely discussed devolution and concluded that "much administrative devolution has already been carried out. Our aim is to achieve the most effective and acceptable form of devolution."¹⁹

¹⁸Brand, "The Scottish Assembly: Some Decision Premises," pp. 12-4.

¹⁹Firm Action for a Fair Britain, (Edinburgh: Scottish Conservative and Unionist Central Office, February 12, 1974), p. 12. This is the Scottish Conservative's supplement to the British Conservative Party campaign manifesto.

The loss of four seats to the SNP in the election made it painfully clear that further elaboration of "the most effective and acceptable form of devolution" would have to be made. As with the Labour Party, the British party leaders had to pressure the Scots into accepting devolution. The resultant compromise was an indirectly elected Council whose members would be selected by the new regional authorities. The Council would have substantial authority over domestic affairs, but would remain responsible to Parliament. Yet even with this proposal the Conservatives had difficulty convincing the public that they actually did favor devolution. Several parliamentary candidates publicly indicated their doubts about the wisdom of the policy. The party's stances on land nationalization and oil contributed to this air of uncertainty. After the October 1974 election the leader of the Scottish Conservatives, Alick Buchanan-Smith, felt compelled to reaffirm the party's commitment to devolution because of the doubts raised during the campaign.

During the spring and summer of 1975 the divisions within the Tory ranks became more open. Mrs. Thatcher, the new British Conservative Party Leader, publicly backed the idea of an assembly, but there were indications that she had been receiving considerable pressure from other British and Scottish leaders to soften her public position. It was also rumoured among senior Scottish MPs that she wished her predecessor, Mr. Heath, had never promised an assembly, and that she might oppose the Government's devolution bill on its second reading.

Within the Scottish contingent support for substantial devolution was almost nonexistent; only the Shadow Secretary of State for

Scotland, Alick Buchanan-Smith, favored such a position. Ten of the remaining fifteen Scottish MPs favored an assembly, but they differed significantly on the extent of the powers which they were willing to allow it. The remaining five MPs campaigned actively among their English colleagues in the hope of pressuring the Shadow Cabinet to oppose the Labour Government's devolution proposals. The diversity of these opinions can be seen in the positions of Iain Sproat, MP for Aberdeen South, and Malcolm Rifkind, MP for Edinburgh Pentlands. Mr. Sproat believed that the assembly would become an expensive, bureaucratic monster. He indicated that the new regional governments and a Scottish assembly would be too much government. Mr. Rifkind, on the other hand, took the position that an assembly ought to be established immediately and its particular powers worked out in detail later. He believed that any delay would play into the hands of the SNP and further weaken the Conservatives.²⁰

Thus by the fall of 1975, both the Labour and Conservative Parties were in a similar state. Both had lost votes and seats to the SNP; and, both perceived devolution as the issue responsible for their decline. Both had also been forced, to a large degree, by their British (English) leaders to commit themselves to uncertain policies and both were internally divided over those policies. Ironically, in their efforts to recover their former electoral positions they divided themselves even further and committed themselves to some form of assembly which had the potential for even further disruption.

²⁰ Neal Ascherson, "State of the Unionists," The Scotsman (Edinburgh), July 11, 1975, p. 13.

The Beginnings of Parliamentary Consideration
of Devolution: The November White Paper

The devolution debate moved into the House of Commons when the Government finally issued the White Paper, Our Changing Democracy: Devolution to Scotland and Wales 1975 in late November 1975. The immediate public response was a deluge of negative feedback.²¹ The Scottish reaction was one of frustration and betrayal. In England the reaction was less emotional, but not substantially less negative. In fact the intensity of the response was such that the pro-devolutionist Economist predicted devolution would be set back at least a year and possibly indefinitely.²²

The response was to negative largely because of the seemingly contradictory nature of some of the main provisions of the White Paper and its alleged intent. That intent is summarized in the following excerpt from the White Paper.

E. SUMMARY OF THE SCHEME FOR SCOTLAND²³

169. The proposals will create for Scotland an elected Assembly which across a great range of subjects will take over the work of Parliament; and they will create a Scottish Executive which, in these subjects, will have wide responsibilities now borne by the Government.

²¹ See the following for discussions of the reaction: Martin Meadows, "The Constitutional Crisis in the United Kingdom: Scotland and the Devolution Controversy," The Review of Politics, 39 (January 1977): 50-3; Samuel MacPherson, "Wake up, Mr. Wilson," The Spectator, December 6, 1975, pp. 721-2; C. Chinwoke Mbadinuju, "Devolution: The 1975 White Paper," The Political Quarterly, 47 (July-September 1976): 286-96; and J.G. Kellas, "Political Reactions to 'Our Changing Democracy'," in Our Changing Scotland: A Yearbook of Scottish Government 1976-77, eds. M.G. Clarke and H.M. Drucker, (Edinburgh: EUSPB, 1976) pp. 62-71.

²² "The Devolution Fling," The Economist, November 29, 1975, pp. 13-5.

170. There are some specific restrictions and some general constitutional safeguards, but in practice formal intervention by the Government should be exceptional. Within the devolved fields--notably local government, extensive law functions, health, social work, education, housing, physical planning, the environment, roads and traffic, crofting, most aspects of forestry and many aspects of transport--the Scottish Executive will control administration. Organization and policies in these fields will be a matter for them. To finance what they want to do they will have a block grant from United Kingdom taxation which they can allocate as they wish. They will be able, if they choose, to levy a surcharge on local government revenue.

171. Scottish Ministers--the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Lord Advocate--will continue to have a major role, as Part V explains. In broad terms however control of the great bulk of public services which affect the people of Scotland will be in the hands of the new Scottish institutions.

These paragraphs are indicative of other aspects of the Government's proposals besides the structure and powers of the assembly; they are indicative of the White Paper's generality and ambiguity. It appears as if the assembly is to have substantial decisionmaking authority over most domestic Scottish concerns. However, as the White Paper is developed in its elaborating sections, it is difficult to determine exactly what powers the assembly would possess.

Several aspects of the proposals contributed to this confusion, possibly the most significant of which was the role of the Secretary of State for Scotland. While many of the Scottish Office's functions would be assigned to the assembly, the Secretary of State

²³ Great Britain, Office of the Lord President of the Council, Our Changing Democracy: Devolution to Scotland and Wales 1975, Cmnd. 6348 (H.M.S.O., 1975), paragraphs 169-71.

would retain extensive authority in almost every aspect of economic decisionmaking. In fact, the White Paper proposed to expand his responsibilities in these areas. He would also retain responsibilities for the electrical industry, agriculture, fishing, and economic planning. The rationale for this division of authority was that the Government, through the Secretary, must preserve control over those economic activities in which decisions could have national and international ramifications.²⁴ The net result, however, was a severe constriction of the range of options open to the assembly in many essential policy areas.

Another facet of the Secretary of State's powers that raised questions was his veto capability over assembly decisions. If the Secretary determined that an assembly measure exceeded its authority or was "unacceptable on policy grounds," he could reject it and inform the assembly of his reasons.²⁵ Procedures were provided by which the assembly could challenge the Secretary's decision, but it would be highly unlikely for Parliament to reverse his decision and in the end that would be required. This power, plus the Secretary's authority to designate who would form the assembly's Executive, greatly disturbed the pro-devolutionists. From their perspective the Secretary could act as a Viceroy and, consequently, the proposals were not really offering any more effective Scottish involvement in the governing process.

²⁴Our Changing Democracy, paragraphs 278-85.

²⁵Our Changing Democracy, paragraphs 55-62.

In addition to the vague division of authority, the White Paper also left unclear the financial powers and resources of the assembly.²⁶ A block grant was to be the principal means by which the assembly would pay for its activities. A second possible source of funds was a surcharge that could be attached to local government taxes, or rates. It is likely, however, that this would be extremely unpopular, making it an unlikely major revenue source. In effect, this arrangement meant that the assembly's financial resources would be set by the Government and Parliament, not by the Scots. Both the pro- and anti-devolutionists agreed that this system would encourage conflict between the assembly and Parliament; which the jumbled division of functions already insured would be plentiful.

While the above aspects were the most controversial of the White Paper, they did not exhaust the list. Among the other unresolved issues of importance were: the question of Scottish and Welsh representation in Parliament which was currently higher than it should be by a one man, one vote standard; the type of voting system by which the assembly would be chosen; the fate of the new local government system and the assembly's powers over it; whether or not a referendum on the assembly would be held before it was established; the impact of the assembly's decisions on the EEC and vice versa; the position of the Scottish Office's civil servants and the legislative body to which they should owe loyalty; the question of a judicial review system for appealing assembly decisions and settling disputes over the division of authority; and, finally, whether or not a Bill of Rights should be

²⁶ Our Changing Democracy, paragraphs 101-11.

included in the devolution package. The difference between the powers and functions suggested for the Welsh assembly, as compared to the more extensive devolution for Scotland, was the basis for even further objections.

All of these points served as foci for dissatisfaction. The pro-devolutionists regarded the proposal as a sell-out, a halfway measure designed to appease London civil servants who were afraid of devolution, but desired to appear otherwise. The SNP denounced the assembly proposal because it saw no real decisionmaking power being devolved. Scottish affairs would still be decided by Englishmen in the Cabinet and Parliament. The anti-devolutionists, on the other hand, attacked the proposals as being unworkable because of the conflicts which would be generated over funds and the division of authority. They also believed that the proposals would give the assembly too much power, thus leading to the breakup of the United Kingdom.

During the weeks between the publication of the White Paper and the parliamentary debate of it, the Government was confronted with several examples of the public discontent besides that which could be read in the headlines and editorials. Approximately one week after the White Paper's appearance the SNP impressively won two regional council by-elections.²⁷ At Bø'ness, in Tam Dalyell's district, the SNP won with 48.5 percent. In the other contest, Bishopbriggs, a middle-class Glasgow suburb, the SNP won with 42 percent of the vote in a four-way race, Labour, which had held the seat, came in third.

²⁷"Scottish Labour's Worst Week," The Economist, December 6, 1975, pp. 32-5.

These results were probably more reflective of disappointment with Labour economic policies and local conditions than the voters' opinions of the White Paper, but they were suggestive of the SNP's growing local strength in Labour areas. There was even evidence that the previously solid Labour Catholic vote was beginning to switch to the SNP.

A few weeks later the Labour Party was confronted with the resignations of several influential Scots, making their embarrassment even more acute. Alex Neil, the party's research officer in Glasgow denounced the Government's proposals and resigned his position.²⁸ He was followed in his actions by Jim Sillars, a popular and outspoken MP from South Ayrshire who resigned from the party's Executive Council. About a week later, a group of individuals, most of whom were Labour supporters, met in Glasgow to consider the formation of a new Scottish Labour Party in order to campaign for a strong assembly. One of the initial decisions of the group, which Mr. Neil was now leading, was to invite Mr. Sillars to join their efforts. Mr. Sillars accepted the invitation and, shortly thereafter, was accompanied by another Labour MP, Jim Robertson of Paisley. In addition to these political leaders, four Labour Party constituency secretaries joined the new group. Thus within a month of its inception the Scottish Labour Party appeared to be fairly well established. The party was attempting to strike an independent position for itself on the issue of the assembly while avoiding a complete split from the Labour Party. It did this

²⁸ Neil stated some of his criticisms of the Labour Party in "British Labour's Scottish Dilemma," Contemporary Review, 228 (July, 1976): 288-92.

by permitting dual memberships and by declaring that it would not contest elections for the moment. In this way it hoped to pressure the Labour Party leaders in Scotland to agree to a stronger assembly.

Labour's Scottish Council was undecided as to how to deal with the situation. There were vague public warnings issued to the rebels, but in a close vote, 13-11, the Council decided neither to invite the dissidents to discuss matters, nor expel them. It chose, instead, to do nothing. The problem, however, was not solved.²⁹ The party's annual conference was only two months away and if the decisions reached there were not sufficiently popular the new group could pick up additional supporters.

An Opinion Research Centre poll taken in mid-December provided the Government with another example of public discontent. It gave the SNP the lead in Scotland with 37 percent of the vote, Labour 30 percent, and the Conservatives 28 percent. Translated into trends and seats this would indicate a 6.5 percent swing from Labour to the SNP giving them 30 seats, Labour 24, Conservatives 15, and the Liberals 2. The survey also revealed that 49 percent of those polled wanted more powers devolved to Scotland than the White Paper advocated, while only 10 percent were satisfied. Many of the respondents indicating their dissatisfaction with the Government's limited devolution proposals were Labour supporters, further demonstrating the seriousness of the situation for the party.³⁰ As if these figures were not demoralizing

²⁹If Scottish Labour fails, it may be a Disunited Kingdom," The Economist, December 20, 1975, pp. 17-8; and "Thorns all the way," The Economist, January 17, 1976, p. 20.

³⁰"If Scottish Labour faile, it may be a Disunited Kingdom," p. 20.

enough, John P. Mackintosh, a long-time devolutionist and Labour MP from Berwick and East Lothian, calculated that if the same swing that had occurred in the recent local by-elections were to occur at the next general election, the SNP would win 53 Scottish seats, Labour 11, the Conservatives 4, and the Liberals 3.³¹

Consequently, when Parliament met to consider the Government's plans, the discontent was obvious. The Government, though, was faced with unpleasant prospects no matter what action it took. It could not withdraw the White Paper nor recommend substantial weakening of its provisions without incurring further Scottish wrath which it could ill afford. Confronted with this situation the Labour Government decided to proceed with its proposals as they were and; a "take note" motion was submitted for debate in mid-January.

The debate on the Government's motion was largely a repetition of sentiments already expressed. Prime Minister Wilson had to defend the White Paper against criticisms from within his own party as well as the opposition parties. Mrs. Thatcher, Leader of the Conservative Opposition, attacked the proposals in general terms, while avoiding any future commitments for herself. At the end of the debate, the Government was able to pass its motion with a majority of 258. Despite the size of the majority the future prospects for a devolution bill were not very good. The Conservatives had abstained from the vote, as had nineteen Labour MPs in defiance of the party whip,

³¹ John P. Mackintosh, "Labour and Scotland," New Statesman, January 16, 1976, pp. 55-6.

and an additional three Labour MPs had joined twenty seven Tories in voting no. This indicated that substantial opposition was likely to develop at the bill's second reading and in the committee debates, making passage of a devolution bill similar to the White Paper highly improbable.³²

The events of the spring of 1976 added further complications to this uncertain situation. The incidents began less than two weeks after the parliamentary debate with the East Kilbride regional council by-election. The Labour Party made this contest a virtual referendum on their policies. They fielded a good candidate with a solid local organization and utilized the efforts of seven Scottish junior ministers, yet it was not enough. The SNP candidate won a resounding victory, receiving almost 58 percent of the turnout, one thousand more votes than the Labour, Conservative and Communist candidates combined. This loss was particularly embarrassing given the importance that Labour had publicly placed on it. Additional distress was incurred at almost the same time by the Scottish Council's decision to expel those members who had joined the rebel Scottish Labour Party. That decision had the potential for making the Government's slim parliamentary majority even more unstable.³³

The Labour Party Conference (of Scotland) held in March was indicative of the strains caused by the SNP's by-election successes and several years of bitter internal dissension. The Scottish leaders, intent upon presenting a unified front on the devolution issue,

³²"Thorns all the way," p. 20; and "The first hurdle is easiest in the devolution steeple-chase," The Economist, January 24, 1976, p. 17.

³³"Bodyblow for Labour," The Economist, February 7, 1976, p. 25.

were able to pass a motion backing a strong assembly with trade and industrial powers, as well as an independent means of raising revenue. While this represented a change from the conference's previous position, it was not a complete reversal. Many points of conflict were overlooked for the moment in order to obtain a semblance of unity.³⁴

Harold Wilson's resignation as Prime Minister and the subsequent Cabinet personnel changes further confounded the situation. Edward Short was replaced as Leader of the House of Commons and chief devolution spokesman by Michael Foot. Also Willie Ross was replaced as Secretary of State for Scotland by his subordinate, Bruce Millan. These changes resulted in a reconsideration of the Government's devolution proposals. The draft of the bill prepared by Mr. Short was placed aside and Mr. Foot began reevaluating various options for improving the November White Paper.³⁵

The resulting changes were intended to eliminate the most aggravating sections of the White Paper.³⁶ The assembly was to have more economic powers and control over the Scottish Development Agency. The Secretary of State's veto powers were diminished, thus reducing the Government's ability to reject assembly measures on political grounds. Reserve powers, however, were retained, permitting intervention by

³⁴"Three years late," The Economist, April 3, 1976, pp. 27-8.

³⁵"Second Thoughts," The Economist, May 15, 1976, pp. 18 + 31; and "Strengthening the Scottish Brew," The Economist, May 29, 1976, p. 28.

³⁶The Government tried to address some of these objections in its supplementary White Paper. Great Britain, Office of the Lord President of the Council, Devolution to Scotland and Wales: Supplementary Statement 1976, Cmnd. 6585 (H.M.S.O. 1976).

Westminster if necessary. Any conflicts regarding the propriety of the assembly's actions would now be resolved by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Secretary of State would not become an insubstantial post because of these changes. He would remain influential through his economic powers in the areas of regional planning, agriculture, and fishing. Furthermore, in announcing these changes, the Government noted that it was reconsidering such aspects of the White Paper as the assembly's taxation authority, the block grant arrangement, the legal system and the universities. The idea of a referendum on devolution, a question which would shortly be more important, however, was tentatively rejected.

While the Labour Government was concentrating on the revision of its devolution proposals, the Conservatives were busy trying to determine their own position on the issue. The party had endorsed a modified assembly in 1970, but had rejected the idea three years later, only to resurrect it again for the October 1974 election. On paper they were still pledged to an assembly, but the party was internally divided in much the same way as was Labour. Most of the Scottish Conservative MPs were anti-devolutionists and on the Shadow Cabinet, only Alick Buchanan-Smith, Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland, was convinced devolutionist. However, as the party had lost several seats to the SNP in 1974 many Conservatives believed some type of pro-devolution policy was needed. With this in mind, the Scottish Conservative Party Conference again endorsed the idea of a modest assembly along the lines of the 1970 Home Report. In her speech to the Conference, Mrs. Thatcher indicated that although the party should adopt this posture, its support for devolution would not extend to the Labour

Government's proposed legislation. Additionally, there were indications that both she and Mr. Whitelaw, the Shadow Cabinet's spokesman on devolution, were receiving increased pressure from English MPs to discard the whole devolution proposition.³⁷ Thus the position of the Conservatives remained basically the same, with the certainty of how active their opposition would be still an undertermined matter.

The Scottish Nationalists continued their pressure for a stronger assembly as they believed themselves to be "well on the road" to independence. At the same time, though, they tried to present themselves as reasonable, responsible public leaders. Their purpose was to dispel the negative images of the party held by the opponents of devolution. To that end, the party's leaders tried to tone down their rhetoric. In fact, their Annual Conference in May was a staid affair compared to previous years. They were successful in their efforts to a limited extent; George Henderson, MP from Aberdeenshire East, however, was able to rouse the Conference's anti-English sentiments, which were the basis of many negative stereotypic images of the party. The SNP maintained this same basic pattern of behavior throughout the development of the devolution bill; actively speaking out and pressuring in Scotland, while trying to keep a relatively low profile elsewhere. They did not wish to antagonize any potential supporters of devolution.³⁸

During these months before the bill's actual introduction into Parliament, the center of activity and controversy about devolution

³⁷"A bone to the English dog," The Economist, May 22, 1976, p. 16.

continued to be the Labour Party. Both the proponents and the opponents lobbied hard with the undecideds. Many Scottish institutions, including the public schools, the universities, industries, and jurists, attempted to impress their particular perspectives on the drafting of the bill. It was clear that the Government intended to pursue its devolution plans and these institutions were maneuvering to safeguard their interests. The basic arguments presented during this period changed little. Each of the various groups had stated their opinions numerous times and all that remained was for the final alignments to be solidified. This positioning was to continue throughout Parliament's consideration of the devolution bill.³⁹ Within both the Labour and Conservative Parties the question of the party's final posture on the bill caused extensive factionalization. As a result, by the time the Government was ready to move its motion limiting debate on the Scotland and Wales Bill, these divisions crossed both party and ideological boundaries.

In the development of the final alignments a number of significant points and questions about devolution were raised which are indicative of the extensive diversity of opinion that existed on this particular bill and the issue in general. They are also instructive as to the complexity of substantial constitutional change in a democratic political system. It is improbable that any devolution bill

³⁸"Banging the tataran drum," The Economist, June 5, 1976, pp. 19-20. Also see the SNP newspaper, Scots Independent, for July 1976. Most of the issue is devoted to the conference.

³⁹See the following for examples of these various moves and arguments: John P. Mackintosh, "Scotland for Aye," New Statesman, March 5, 1976, p. 281; Ludovic Kennedy, "Along the slippery slope,"

could have been presented without raising these or similar considerations. The bitterness may have been less, but the concern no less serious. Devolution is perceived by many as going to the heart of the British constitutional system and there seems to be no way that it can be implemented without extensive and complicated argument.

The Scotland and Wales Bill

The Scotland and Wales Bill as submitted to Parliament on November 29, 1976, was a massive document, containing 115 clauses and 166 pages. Because of the importance of the measure, the remainder of the Government's legislative program for this session of Parliament was modest. Indeed, it was the thinnest such package since the Second World War. The major reason for this was that fully half of the parliamentary time allotted for discussion of Government business was to be devoted to the devolution bill. Thirty days were set aside for this one issue with the committee stages of the bill's consideration being held on the floor of the Commons.⁴⁰

As parliament began its deliberations, the bill's prospects did not appear to be much better than earlier in the year as its basic provisions differed little from those of the White Paper. While several of the initial problems had been resolved in the revision process,

The Spectator, May 8, 1976, pp. 10-2; Eric Heffer, "Devolution and the Labour Party," New Statesman, December 19, 1975, 777-8; Neil Kinnock, "Devolving through panic and despair," The Spectator, October 2, 1976, pp. 11-2; and Richard West, "Painless Politics in Scotland," The Spectator, August 14, 1976, p. 5.

⁴⁰"Voting for devolution," The Economist, November 27, 1976, pp. 10-11.

most of the provisions considered to be defective remained in the bill. The most important of the changes dealt with the problem of the civil servants' divided loyalties. This was settled by the inclusion of provisions restricting any civil servant from having dual responsibility for devolved and non-devolved functions. The Secretary of State, however, continued to retain influential economic powers and the division between the powers of the assembly and those of Parliament was still blurred. There were no changes in the problem areas concerning proportional representation of the assembly elections, Scottish and Welsh over-representation in Parliament, the local government system, or the revenue raising question. One reason the financial provisions were not changed was the Government's inability to determine a suitable alternative, although it indicated that a compromise might be made on this aspect if such a proposal could be found. Finally, the ability of Westminster to intervene in the assembly's decisions was largely restored. The Secretary of State did lose his ability to dismiss the assembly Executive, but he could still reject measures that were not in the public interest as he perceived it.⁴¹

Thus it was evident from the moment of its introduction that the bill would have to be amended in order to secure passage. The Government indicated its willingness to consider alternative proposals as a means of building a sufficient voting block and it took several steps towards that end. One of the most interesting of these moves concerned the extent of the Government's commitment of the bill's

⁴¹"Fit for amendment," The Economist, December 4, 1976, pp. 22-24.

success. The parliamentary majority of the Labour party was dependent upon the support of some of the smaller opposition parties, such as the Liberals, the SNP and the Welsh Nationalists. Yet even with these votes, the Government's margin was exceedingly slim and the loss of three seats in by-elections during the late fall did not ease this burden. If the Government regarded the bill as a no-confidence measure it would serve as a signal to the Scottish and Welsh voters of its determination to obtain substantial devolution. Choosing that course, however, ran the risk of forcing a sizeable block of Labour MPs to either abstain or vote against the bill. That possibility could force the Conservatives to unite their divided ranks against the bill in hopes of driving the Government out of office.

Given these alternatives, the Government decided to take its chances and not consider the devolution bill as a confidence vote. This might make the Scots doubtful as to the extent of the Labour's sincerity and it was likely to further encourage dissident Labourites to vote against the bill, but the measure would not bring down the Government. It might also enable pro-devolution Conservatives to defy the Shadow Cabinet's decision to oppose the bill. If the Labour defections could be minimized and sufficient Tory support obtained, then the bill might be passed.

In choosing not to make devolution a confidence measure, the Government by implication made several other decisions. As the bill would be dependent upon the support of a diverse coalition, it was apparent that some concessions would have to be made to those who only mildly opposed devolution, thereby strengthening the bargaining position of the anti-devolutionists within the Labour Party. In addition,

this strategy promised a lengthy, complicated debate during the committee stages as it permitted the development of a series of shifting coalitions by the opponents of various provisions. It also clearly suggested that the bill would become interminably bogged down in committee if the Government did not impose a guillotine on debate. Passage of the bill, consequently, depended upon the number of MPs who could be persuaded to vote with the Government on the timetable motion. Paradoxically, success on the timetable motion was contingent upon the bill's progress and the compromises made when the Government considered it necessary to call for such a vote.

The primary concession made by the Government during the debate was on the referendum issue. Debate at the British Labour Party Conference in October 1976 made it clear that the lack of a referendum was one of the key objections by many left-wing Labour anti-devolutionists. They believed that a referendum should be held over the Government's bill and the issue of separatism. They hoped to place the SNP in the awkward position of opposing the bill rather than run the risk of having its support be interpreted as a compromising of their goal of independence. They also believed that the outcome would indicate the lack of support for a separate Scotland, thus reducing the need for the Labour Government to appease that desire by advocating substantial devolution. Others within the Labour Party took a different perspective. They wanted a referendum to indicate the substantial Scottish and Welsh support for devolution, this undercutting both the Nationalists with their desire for

separation and the anti-devolutionists by convincing them of the need for change.⁴²

Consideration of the referendum idea was not limited to the Labour Party. Mr. Heath, the former Conservative Prime Minister who had originally proposed devolution within the party, broke with the Shadow Cabinet and called for a referendum. He wanted the Scots to have the opportunity to demonstrate their position and sponsor a stronger assembly.⁴³ The SNP also welcomed the thought of a referendum and was not disturbed by potential contradictions in the phrasing of the questions. They believed this would provide them with the first opportunity to show the extent of Scottish support for their policies. They obviously believed that they would not be discredited by the outcome.⁴⁴

The Government yielded to the demands for a referendum after considerable debate, but without much resistance.⁴⁵ It tied the second reading of the devolution bill to the referendum question in hopes of attracting additional votes. On the second reading vote, the Government was thereby able to secure a majority of forty-five. That, however, did not completely settle the issue. The Government now had to decide how many questions would be asked; what questions should be asked, would they be on the bill, on separation, or on

⁴²"Running scared, but running on," The Economist, October 2, 1976, pp. 25-26.

⁴³"Mr. Heath stays free to oppose devolution bill or abstain," The Times (London), December 7, 1976, p. 2.

⁴⁴Margo McDonald, "Massive enthusiasm for the fight," Scots Independent, December 1976, p. 1.

both; and, who would be permitted to vote in the referendum, only Scotland and Wales or would Northern Ireland and England be included. There were also problems over the contribution of public monies for the referendum campaign and procedural questions about whether the outcome would be mandatory or consultative for Parliament. These were perplexing questions which had further potential for exacerbating the already precarious situation. During the ensuing weeks the Government decided to limit participation in the referendum to Scotland and Wales. It also indicated that the results would not be binding on Parliament and that the referendum would consist of a single question based upon the Government's proposals, not separation.

At this stage in the development of the bill, the Government was not alone in trying to consolidate its supporters. The Conservatives were faced with the same problem. Even before the bill was introduced in the House of Commons, there were signs that some old divisions might be renewed by the devolution issue. Both Mr. Heath and Lord Home, the two former Conservative Prime Ministers, indicated their continued support for the principle of devolution. They further stated their belief that the proposal for an assembly which they had made seven years prior was no longer adequate. Yet it was that proposal to which the Shadow Cabinet was still pledged. Mr. Heath indicated that he would remain true to his principles and vote his conscience, even if it meant going against the party whip.

⁴⁵Hugh Noyes, "45 majority for devolution after referendums package," The Times (London), December 19, 1976, p. 1.

This situation raised the possibility that other supporters of Mr. Heath, still upset by his loss of the party leadership to Mrs. Thatcher, might also defy the Shadow Cabinet.⁴⁶

Thus the debate within the Conservative Party during the weeks preceeding the opening of Parliament was over the question of whether or not the Tory MPs should be allowed a free vote on the second reading of the devolution bill. For a time it appeared that the division was of sufficient intensity that a free vote was mandated, but on December 8th the Shadow Cabinet decided to impose a three-line whip against the second reading. This development brought about the resignation of the pro-devolution members of the Shadow Cabinet's front bench, Alick Buchanan-Smith, the Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland, and Malcolm Rifkind, a junior spokesman on Scottish Affairs. The resignation offer of John Corrie, a party whip, was refused at this time, but later, at the second reading vote, he again resigned and it was then accepted. As the new Shadow Secretary of State, Mrs. Thatcher appointed Edward Taylor of the Glasgow Cathcart seat. He was chosen over other more respected members of the Scottish Conservative contingent, in part, because he was at least nominally supportive of devolution.⁴⁷

⁴⁶"Heath speech on devolution opens up some old sores but leads to closing of Conservative ranks," The Times (London), December 8, 1976, p. 2; and "New demand by Lord Home for referendum adds to confusion in Scottish Tory high command," The Times (London), December 11, 1976, p. 2.

⁴⁷David Leigh, "Tories may be allowed free vote on devolution," The Times (London), November 15, 1976, p. 1; "20 Tory MPs expected to ignore whip on devolution vote," The Times (London), December 6, 1976, p. 2; "Tory spokesman on Scotland resign in devolution clash," The Times (London), December 9, 1976, p. 1.

The anti-devolution English Conservative backbenchers continued their efforts by emphasizing the impact of devolution upon England and the possible breakup of the United Kingdom.⁴⁸ They combined with the anti-devolutionists from Scotland and Wales to provide most of the Opposition's criticism of the Government's proposals. Among the aspects that they focused upon was the separation of Wales from the bill in the belief that devolution was even less necessary for it than Scotland; consequently, the two should be dealt with in separate pieces of legislation. In this effort, they knew they had the tacit support of several Labour MPs. The official Conservative policy was one of providing constructive criticism to improve the Government's bill, but it was the back-benchers who provided the core to that policy by their persistent amendments and debate eventually leading to the bill's demise.⁴⁹

In addition to the opposition of dissident Labour MPs and the Tories, the devolution bill had to contend with the increased

⁴⁸The Government tried to allay some of the concerns being raised in England over devolution by issuing another White Paper, but it was not very effective. Great Britain, Office of the Lord President of the Council, Devolution: The English Dimension--A Consultative Document 1976; (mnd. N.A. (H.M.S.O., 1977). and John Griffith, "The English Connection, " New Statesman, December 17, 1976, p. 864.

⁴⁹For considerations of the Tory strategy see: Geoffrey Smith, "The dilemma facing Mrs. Thatcher as the Scots wait reassurance," The Times (London), December 13, 1976, p. 14; "Tory fears that Bill could precipitate constitutional crisis," The Times (London), December 15, 1976, p. 4; "Tory aim to improve Bill on home rule," The Times (London) December 20, 1976, p. 1; David Leigh, "Tory Leaders back devolution 'Bill of Rights'," The Times (London), January 15, 1977, p. 2; "Minister attacks Tory move to exclude Wales from devolution bill," The Times (London), January 19, 1977, p. 9; and "Harvie Anderson's filibuster," The Economist, December 25, 1976, p. 17.

objections of local government authorities in the north of England, and the Orkney and Shetland Islands. Local authorities in northern England, a poor region, opposed devolution as they believed that an assembly would add political weight to the Scots, thus placing them at a disadvantage in the competition for limited regional development funds.⁵⁰ The peoples of the Orkney and Shetland Islands based their objections to devolution on several points. These Islands had been given to Scotland as part of a dowry in the 15th century and they had remained distinctive in many ways. It was also in their waters that much of the North Sea oil, claimed by the SNP for Scotland, had been found. As a result of legal provisions enabling them to tax the oil coming ashore, the Islands were in very good economic shape. It was feared that they would lose this special status and their cultural distinctiveness if they were placed under a Scottish assembly or an independent Scotland. Consequently, the Islands pressured Parliament to secure special consideration. They were supported in this by their Liberal MP and several Conservatives, who made the point that if the Scots and Welsh deserved greater say

⁵⁰ John Chartres, "Call for effective northern regional voices to counter political power of Scotland," The Times (London), December 10, 1976, p. 4; "North-east of England puts case against devolution proposals," The Times (London), January 11, 1977, p. 2; and "Council asks northern MPs to oppose devolution guillotine," The Times (London), February 19, 1977, p. 4.

in their government, so did the Islanders. They wanted to have a separate vote in the Islands to determine whether they would be under the assembly or Parliament.⁵¹

During these proceedings the SNP continued much as it had before. It continued to develop the announce policies concerning the governing of Scotland after independence. The MPs presented amendments to the devolution bill and participated actively in the debates, but there was no doubt of their voting with the Government. Several party leaders, however, did become involved in an internal dispute as to how rapidly the party should pursue independence once the assembly was established. The parliamentary members favored a more gradual approach than did the party leaders in Scotland. The first priority, though, was the assembly and the other matters could wait, so the dispute was not too serious.⁵²

Considering all of the divisions and issues which the question of devolution raised, it was not surprising that by mid-February, following the settlement of the referendum aspect, the

⁵¹John Chartres, "Shetland unhappy over government by Scots," The Times (London), January 8, 1977, p. 2; George Clark, "Grimond proposal to offer Orkney, Shetland islanders separate decision on devolution," The Times (London), January 11, 1977, p. 2; "Maintaining sturdy independence of Orkney and Shetland islanders," The Times (London), January 20, 1977, p. 9; Paul Harrison, "The Shetlands' separate state," New Society, January 27, 1977, pp. 169-71; and J.M. Fenwick, "The Shetland Experience: A Local Authority Arms itself for the Oil Invasion," in The Scottish Government Yearbook, 1978, eds. H.M. Drucker and M.G. Clarke (Edinburgh: Paul Harris Publishing, 1978), pp. 32-50.

⁵²Michael Hatfield, "SNP split on push for election," The Times (London), November 26, 1976, p. 2. Also see February 1977 issue of Scots Independent for SNP MPs speeches during second reading debate.

Government decided to try for a guillotine motion. The bill was making painfully slow progress and it was obvious that without limiting the time available for debate, it would never even come to a vote. After seven of the eighteen days allotted to committee consideration of the bill, the Commons was only on the third of the 115 clauses. It was not clear whether or not the Government could muster enough support to pass the timetable motion. While it had been able to convince some of the dissidents to support it, twenty to thirty Labour MPs were still threatening to oppose the motion. It was also uncertain how many Conservatives would defy their party leadership and abstain or vote with the Government. The position of the Liberals was a further unknown. On principle the Liberals opposed cutting off debate on any question and it was not clear whether or not their support for the devolution bill would override their distaste for the motion limiting debate.⁵³

This was the situation which the Government faced when it decided to try for the timetable motion. On February 22, 1977 Mr. Foot moved that the Commons limit debate on the bill to twenty more days. Mr. Francis Pym, opposition spokesman for devolution, argued that this was not an ordinary issue. It had grave constitutional implications and, therefore, deserved full consideration

⁵³David Leigh, "Hostility to guillotine may wreck devolution," The Times (London), February 3, 1977, p. 1; and David Wood, "Government will ask Commons next Tuesday to approve guillotine on devolution bill," The Times (London), February 18, 1977, pp. 1-2.

which could not be done in twenty days. The final vote was 312 against, 283 for. The Government lost the measure by twenty-nine votes with more than forty Labour MPs voting against or abstaining.⁵⁴

The Aftermath of the Bill's Defeat

The immediate response of the Government to the defeat was a renewal of its pledge to establish Scottish and Welsh assemblies, although it was unclear how this would take place. The SNP reacted to this by calling on the Government to consider the vote as one of no-confidence, thereby mandating new elections. The Conservatives, for their part, called for the withdrawal of the bill and the convening of a constitutional conference on devolution. Instead of complying with either set of demands, the Government invited the other parties to participate in an inter-party discussion for the purpose of working out their differences.

There was, however, little question that the talks would be unproductive given the vast diversity of opinions and the instability of the Government's position in Parliament without the Nationalist's support. The death of Anthony Crosland, the Foreign Secretary, a few days before the guillotine vote had eliminated the Government's numerical majority in the Commons, making its survival totally dependent upon the actions of the smaller parties. This set of circumstances prompted the Conservatives and SNP each to submit a no-confidence motion to the House of Commons and the

⁵⁴Hugh Noyes, "Government defeated on guillotine motion by 29 votes," The Times (London), p. 1; and "Power v. protest, or how to gum up a guillotine," The Economist, February 26, 1977, pp. 21-2; Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates, (Commons), 1976-77, Vol. 926, February 22, 1977, pp. 1234-1367.

eventual negotiation of a pact between the Labour Government and the Liberal Party.

A week prior to the submission of the motions, the Labour Party in Scotland held its Annual Conference.⁵⁵ The activities of the Conference were indicative of the uncertainty which pervaded the party as a result of its defeat. An acceptance of the inevitable loss of a significant number of parliamentary seats to the SNP at the next general election surrounded the proceedings. As a result among the basic objectives of the Conference were the preservation of party unity and discouragement of attacks on those who had opposed the Government on the final vote.⁵⁶ Unity was accomplished to a reasonable degree. A disagreement did arise, however, between the Conference and the Cabinet. A resolution endorsing an immediate referendum on devolution was adopted; a position not supported by Mr. Foot, who renewed the Government's pledge for assemblies during his speech to the meeting. The Conference also indicated that it would not accept a weakening of the bill's proposals to secure the approval of the other parties. Pro-devolutionary sentiments, however, were not the only ones present at the Conference. A substantial portion of the party had never accepted

⁵⁵David Leigh, "Labour delegates in Scotland call for an immediate referendum to break deadlock on devolution," The Times (London), March 12, 1977, p. 2; David Leigh, "Scottish conference fails to ease Labour Party pessimism over fate of the devolution Bill," The Times (London), March 14, 1977, p. 3; and "Naked Truths," The Economist, March 19, 1977, p. 18-21.

⁵⁶Only two of the Labour MPs from Scotland voted against the Government on the guillotine motion, Mr. Tam Dalyell of West Lothian and Mr. William Hamilton of Central Fife.

the devolution policy and their opinions were heard in addition to those which eventually carried the votes.

The sense of foreboding of the Scottish Conference was shortly given substance by the tabling of the non-confidence motions. This was followed in quick succession by statements from almost all of the smaller parties that might have supported the Government declaring that they would vote against it. The only alternative for the Labour Cabinet was an agreement with the Liberals. Negotiations were entered into by the two parties and an agreement was reached several days later. Neither party was successful in getting the other to accept all of its demands. The Labour Government, however, basically agreed to discontinue consideration of any additional socialist legislation during the pact's period of existence. Furthermore, consultations between the leaders of both parties were to occur on proposed legislation and policies, although neither was committed to support the other's measures ahead of time. Among the specific agreements reached on issues was a promise by the Cabinet to consider the Liberal's devolution proposals and a free vote on proportional representation for the Scottish assembly. The pact was to last until the end of the current parliamentary session in October when it could be renegotiated or terminated. In exchange for these promises and others, the Liberals agreed to support the Government on the confidence motion.⁵⁷

While the pact was potentially divisive for the Labour Party given its left wing's desire for more socialist legislation,

⁵⁷"How to put off an election--or start a new way of ruling," The Economist, March 26, 1977, pp. 19-24.

the Cabinet believed that the time bought by the agreement was worthwhile as it might be enough for the economy to show an upturn and to consolidate its support. The final outcome of the no-confidence motion was clear before the actual balloting took place. The Labour Government was sustained by a twenty-four vote margin, 324-300. Had the Liberals voted against, rather than with it, the Government would have lost by two votes. The end result of the episode was a strengthening the Government's overall position in Parliament at least until the fall and, quite possibly, longer; a prospect not anticipated by the Conservatives and the SNP when they filed their motions.

The most detailed proposals of the Liberals to the Government during the early weeks of the pact concerned the devolution issue. These ideas were submitted to Mr. Foot about a week after the no-confidence vote. The advocated a separate bill for Scotland and Wales, with a clearer definition of the division of authority to be allotted the assemblies and Parliament. They further advocated the establishment of a constitutional court to settle disputes between the levels of government, thus reducing the potential for political conflict between them. In the area of financing, the Liberals recommended substantial changes. The Scottish assembly would be given greater independence by the transference of Scottish income tax revenues to its treasury, by a 12 1/2 per cent royalty on the oil landed in Scotland and by an equalization grant which would bring the total money available to the assembly to the level proposed in the block grant section of the bill. The

Scots could raise or lower their income tax rates without affecting the equalization grant as it would be determined on the basis of equal tax rates. In addition, the Liberals also suggested that the posts of Secretary of State for Scotland and Wales be abolished.⁵⁸ Mr. Steel, the Liberal Party leader, indicated to the Government that if an agreement could be reached regarding these devolution proposals and the Cabinet's commitment to recommend proportional representation for the upcoming elections in the European Parliament, then a renewal of the pact would be more likely.

The reaction in Scotland was varied, but generally evidenced discontent with the turn of events. One poll taken only a few days after the defeat of the guillotine motion suggested that the Labour Party could lose seventeen seats if the election were held immediately. The SNP's percentage of the committed voters was 36 percent, while Labour's was 28, with 27 for the Conservatives and 7 for the Liberals. This represented a significant increase for the SNP over the results of similar poll taken only three weeks earlier.⁵⁹ In that poll Labour had the lead with 32 percent of the electorate, the SNP 31 percent and the Conservatives 29 percent.⁶⁰ The later poll also indicated an increase in the level of

⁵⁸"Don't forget devolution," The Economist, April 2, 1977, p. 22.

⁵⁹Ronald Faux, "Poll indicates that Labour would lose 17 seats in Scotland," The Times (London), February 28, 1977, p. 3; and "Scots still oppose independent status," The Times (London), February 10, 1977, p. 5.

⁶⁰A poll taken approximately a month later indicated similar results to the late February poll. It gave the SNP a nine percentage point lead over the Labour Party. Mentioned in Neal Ascherson, "How Sleep the Brave?", New Statesman, April 15, 1977, 454-55.

Scottish support for independence. Thirty-one percent of the respondents favored an independent Scotland, while 63 percent desired to remain part of the United Kingdom. The earlier survey placed the support for the two options at 24 and 65 percent respectively.

Further evidence of the public reaction can be seen in the political activity that followed the vote. As Neal Ascherson has noted, the reaction was not so much one of bitterness, as that it should not have been expected that a British Parliament would pass a home rule measure for Scotland.⁶¹ As a consequence, there were increased political efforts to find a means of pressuring Westminster. John P. Mackintosh and others began promoting the idea of a Home Rule Front made up of assembly supporters from all the parties. The Liberals also discussed the possibility of an all-party campaign before they entered their agreement with the Government. The cross-party efforts were joined in early May by the former Conservative Shadow Secretary of State, Alick Buchanan-Smith, giving these moves an even broader public base.

An additional consequence of the bill's failure may have been an intensification of the attitudes on the extremes of the devolution issue. Some anti-devolutionists were hardened in their opinions as the Scottish Conservative Conference would soon indicate. On the other hand, there was an increase in the attention paid to the idea of independence. Both the Glasgow Herald and The

⁶¹ Neal Ascherson, "The Strange Death of Devolution," New Statesman, March 4, 1977, 276-7.

Scotsman, the major Scottish newspapers, ran a series of articles on an independent Scotland's prospects. They were followed in this action by a television series of five shows on BBC-Scotland dealing with the same topic. The general conclusion of each of these, while considering the negative aspects, was that an independent Scotland might not fare badly at all and could possibly do quite well.⁶²

The reaction of the SNP to the matter, as previously mentioned was the withdrawal of its support from the Government. All eleven of the SNP MPs voted against the Labour Government on the no-confidence motion. Prior to the vote the party had introduced its own devolution bill calling for the establishment of an assembly in September 1977. The elections for the assembly would be held on September 15th and its exact powers would then be worked out between the assembly, the Secretary of State and the Parliament. As was to be expected, the proposal was not given extensive consideration by the other parties.⁶³ During the remainder of April the party's attention, as with the other parties, was devoted to the upcoming district council elections which were the first in three years.

The results of the local elections were not as dramatic a swing to the SNP as had been predicted by some, but the party did

⁶²Ascherson, "How Sleep the Brave?," pp. 484-5.

⁶³"An SNP Bill to establish a Scottish Assembly," The Scots Independent, April 1977, p. 6.

fairly well.⁶⁴ It made a net gain of 100 district council seats and captured 38.4 percent of the votes in the wards contested. This compared with 33.8 percent for Labour, 25.1 percent for the Conservatives, and 1.7 percent for the Liberals.⁶⁵ All the parties had significant areas in which they did not contest elections, so the final pattern of the results of difficult to determine. Labour's worst losses came in its Glasgow stronghold where it lost sixteen seats to the SNP and eight to the Conservatives, costing the party control of the city council for the first time in over thirty years. More modest losses were incurred by Labour in Dundee and Aberdeen, with the Conservatives retaining control of the city council for the first time in over thirty years. More modest losses were incurred by Labour in Dundee and Aberdeen, with the Conservatives retaining control in Edinburgh. In terms of vote change in the four large cities, the SNP far outdistanced the other parties, gaining 10.8 percentage points upon its 1974 showing to the Conservative's 2.1, Labour's -9.8 and the Liberal's -3.3.

⁶⁴Colin Bell, "Lib-Lab blues," Spectator, April 9, 1977, pp. 13-4; "Angst in Scotland," The Economist, April 23, 1977, pp. 2406. "Scotland points the way, but where to?", The Economist, May 7, 1977, pp. 19-20; "The Real Victors in District Voting," Scots Independent, June 1977, p. 6; and J. Bochel and D. Denver, "The District Council Elections of May 1977," in The Scottish Government Yearbook 1978, eds. H.M. Drucker and M.G. Clarke (Edinburgh: Paul Harris Publishing, 1978), pp. 129-148.

⁶⁵These figures are based only on those seats contested by the parties. They do not include those taken by independent candidates.

The Conservatives did not make nearly the substantial gains that had been recorded earlier in the spring in the English local elections, suggesting that a general election swing to the Conservatives in Scotland would likely be considerably less than in the south. The results further suggested that the SNP was making significant inroads in the strong areas of the other major parties, but that where the SNP was not a significant factor, Scotland appeared to be holding more for Labour than anticipated. The net implication of the results is that the SNP is likely to gain a substantial number of seats, primarily from Labour, with the Conservatives possibly making a few gains as well. No party will emerge with a clear majority of the votes, although the SNP might come close in terms of seats.

Following the local elections the Scottish Conservatives held their Annual Conference and the transactions of the meeting confirmed the suspicions of many that the party was in the process of backing away from its devolution commitment. Neither Mrs. Thatcher, nor Mr. Pym reaffirmed the party's previous pledge. Instead, the Conference passed a resolution calling for a "searching re-examination of the entire structure of government as a basis of fresh proposals for effective devolution."⁶⁶ While the resolution was bland enough to accommodate both sides of the question, the anti-devolutionists left the Conference convinced they had had

⁶⁶ Adam Fergusson, "The Tories at Perth," Spectator, May 7, 1977, p. 14.

the upper hand.⁶⁷ The anti-devolutionary stance of the Conference was probably more consistent with the overall position of the party's supporters in Scotland, but it further isolated Alick Buchanan-Smith and the other pro-devolutionists. That in turn, has increased the likelihood of their having to bolt the party in order to remain true to their principles. Another move of the Conference indicative of its Unionist sentiments was the reorganization of the party's structure. Still, though, this centralization, at a time when most other Scottish political groups are proudly proclaiming their distinctiveness, will not escape the pro-devolutionists. It may, consequently, cast doubt upon the sincerity of any future Conservative devolutionary proposals.

Three weeks later the SNP held its Annual Conference in Dundee.⁶⁸ The Conference is noteworthy in several respects, among the most interesting of which is the fact that devolution was not considered at all. The failure of the devolution bill further broadened the gap between the gradualists and extremists within the party. As a result, the gradualists maintained a very low profile, while those favoring more immediate independence dominated the Conference. The atmosphere of the Conference was not conducive to moderation on the issue; in the opinion of most of the delegates that route had been tried. Other aspects of the Conference of significance included Margo McDonald's challenged reelection

⁶⁷"Tartan ostrich," The Economist, May 21, 1977, pp. 25-6; and Geoffrey Smith, "Tory chances in Scotland," Spectator, May 28, 1977, pp. 12-3.

⁶⁸Ronald Faux, "Scottish National Party plugs the theme that voters are left with not alternative but independence," The Times (London), May 27, 1977, p. 2.

as Senior Vice-Chairman of the party, support for direct elections to the European Parliament, and a variety of policy positions as such issues as taxation and education. Mrs. McDonald handily won reelection against several opponents, including two MPs, in one of the party's rare public splits. She favored more immediate independence moves and more control by the party leadership over the parliamentary delegation, positions not completely acceptable to all of the MPs.

After the local elections and the party conferences the devolution issue faded from public attention to a large extent. There were, however, several public actions taken to influence the Government as it once again considered modifications in the devolution bill. The first of these was an announcement by several Scottish businessmen that they had registered their companies in England as a precaution against an independent Scotland. These industrialists were fearful of the economic consequences of a devolved assembly and independence. Their announcement was intended to serve as a warning both to the Government and to the Scottish public.⁶⁹

Further pressure was placed on the Government by local officials in England.⁷⁰ The Association of Metropolitan Authorities,

⁶⁹Ronald Faux, "Scottish industrialists voice fears over the economic consequences of devolution," The Times (London), May 6, 1977, p. 4. Also see C.J. Risk, "Devolution: The Commercial Community's Fears," in The Scottish Government Yearbook 1978, eds. H.J. Dricker and M.G. Clarke (Edinburgh: Paul Harris Publishing Ltd., 1978), pp. 120-28; and, Dalyell, Devolution: The End of Britain? pp. 177-227.

⁷⁰"Unhappy England," The Economist May 14, 1977, p. 20; and, Christopher Warman, "English call for share in devolution benefits," The Times (London), May 10, 1977, p. 4.

which represents London and the other large urban centers in England and Wales, issued an anti-devolution statement, maintaining there was a danger that Scotland and Wales might get more than their fair share if devolution occurred. The statement noted that there was no one in the Cabinet to represent the specific interests of England, as there was for the other two countries. It also pointed out that if devolution proceeded as planned, English MPs would not be able to vote on Scottish or Welsh affairs, but MPs from those regions would still be able to vote on English matters. While these were not the only concerns of the Association, they all suggested fear that devolution would be disadvantageous for England. They further indicated an increasing awareness of the issue in the south and possibly more pressure on the English MPs as a consequence when devolution is again considered in Parliament.

Two other examples of maneuvering on the issue may be seen in the actions of the Scottish Council of the Labour Party and Malcolm Rifkind, a Conservative MP from Scotland. A delegation from the Scottish Council met with Mr. Foot and urged the passage of a bill in the next session of Parliament. They were worried that Scottish voters would interpret another failure "as final proof of the inability of Westminster to cater for Scotland's needs."⁷¹ In essence, they were trying to remind Mr. Foot of Labour's marginal position in Scotland. Mr. Rifkind, on his part, indicated the tensions within the Conservative Party by calling for allround devolution, including an assembly for England. This would permit each

⁷¹"Scottish Labour plea for devolution move before next poll," The Times (London), June 11, 1977, p. 2.

of the countries to make decisions on its internal priorities without interference by the others, leaving Parliament to consider international and defense policies.⁷²

These various events and pressures clearly reminded the Government of its need for a new devolution bill in order to remain in office and to maintain its electoral position; consequently, its response was to continue reconsideration of the devolution bill. The process took longer than anticipated, but by late April there were indications of the way in which the Government would proceed. The first major suggested change was the separation of Scottish and Welsh devolution into two distinct bills. In reply to a question in the Commons, Mr. Foot acknowledged separation was being considered, but denied that a decision had been reached. At the same time he reasserted the Government's intention to secure devolution for both countries regardless if there is one bill or two.⁷³ The idea of separate legislation for Scotland and Wales was not enthusiastically welcomed by the Nationalists.⁷⁴ The SNP was afraid that while the change may appease the Liberals and enable them to vote for a devolution bill, it might also cost the support of left-wing Labourites. Thus the Government could lose more than it gained

⁷²"An assembly suggested for England as well," The Times, (London), June 21, 1977, p. 5.

⁷³David Leigh, "Devolution promise to the Welsh repeated," The Times (London), April 22, 1977, p. 1.

⁷⁴Ronald Faux and Trevor Rishlock, "Welsh and Scots cool over split devolution," The Times (London), April 22, 1977, p. 2.

by the action. The Welsh nationalists regarded the move as a betrayal of Labour's commitment as they were depending upon the support for Scottish devolution spilling over to their cause. Some hard-line nationalists, though, perceived an advantage in the separation. They believed the decision would result in the failure of Welsh devolution and would therefore serve as another example of Labour's broken promises. That in turn would drive more voters to the nationalist's ranks.⁷⁵

With the devolution proposals undergoing this process of amendment, the Government formally withdrew the Scotland and Wales Bill on June 14th. A few weeks later, however, Prime Minister Callaghan reiterated the Government's devolutionary intentions, and in the process, warned dissident Labour MPs that the next bill would be considered a confidence measure. His statement was intended both as an admonition to the Labour MPs and as a reassurance to the Scottish and Welsh voters of the Government's seriousness.

The revised devolution proposals were revealed on July 26th with the publication of another White Paper.⁷⁶ The new proposals differed from the earlier bill in several bills. Westminster's reserve powers were reduced, to be used only when non-devolved areas of responsibility are involved. The Secretaries of State would lose some of their power to intervene in assembly matters as well.

⁷⁵Ronald Faux and Trevor Fishlock, "Welsh and Scots cool over split devolution," The Times (London), April 22, 1977, p. 2.

⁷⁶Great Britain, Office of the Lord President of the Council, Devolution: Financing the Devolved Services, CMND 6890 (H.M.S.O. 1977).

The ambiguity of which areas were to be devolved, though, persisted. The White Paper still attempted to define the devolved powers, with the remaining ones being retained by Westminster. Hence considerable confusion about the actual division continued. The role of Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was further clarified, making it the final authority on the propriety of assembly actions. Also the Scottish assembly was to be given authority to dissolve itself prematurely providing the motion had the support of two-thirds of its members.⁷⁷

While these changes appear largely to have been the result of Liberal pressure, there were several significant aspects that they were unable to convince the Government to amend. The Government agreed to allow a free vote on proportional representation, but it would not endorse the idea. The Liberals feared the first-past-the-post electoral system would allow the SNP to dominate the assembly even though it might not have a majority of the popular votes. As a result, they desired a proportional system. Without Government support, though, it is unlikely that such a system would be approved. The matter of the Scottish and Welsh overrepresentation at Westminster was also not altered. No provisions were made to correct the imbalance.

⁷⁷"White Paper rejects separate tax powers for assemblies and suggests new formula on financing," The Times (London), July 27, 1977; and, "Could still do better," The Economist, July 30, 1977, p. 15.

The other major aspect that the Government did not substantially revise was the financial system suggested for the assembly. The assembly was not to be permitted independent revenue raising powers. While such powers were not completely ruled out, the White Paper contained various arguments against the proposals that have commonly been suggested and it established a set of criteria by which any future proposal would be judged. The assembly was still to be financed through a block grant scheme. The system was, however, altered so that the grant would be made for a period of years, with four being the usual figure cited. The size of the grant would be based upon a formula that would periodically be renegotiated. In the process of deciding the expenditure formula an assessment would be made of Scotland's needs relative to those of the rest of the United Kingdom. Additionally, an independent board would be appointed to assist in the establishing of the formula. By adopting this system the Government hoped the potential for conflict between Westminster and Edinburgh would be lessened. The formula and the independent board would assist in this by further removing the decision from the political process. Also the provision requiring funding to be in terms of relative need would serve as a safeguard against Scotland receiving more than its due amount.

Overall these proposals strengthened the bill by removing some points of contention and clarifying some of its ambiguous sections. For example, the changes lessened the potential for continual strife between Westminster and Edinburgh. It was uncertain,

though, if the alterations were sufficient to eliminate the objections of a substantial number of MPs. Most opposition to the devolution bill was not based solely upon one or another offending provision, but upon principle. Thus, though the anti-devolutionists may be pleased with some of the changes, they probably have not completely reversed their opinion. Also some of the revisions tended to strengthen the assembly and that possibly may offend a few MPs who could accept a weak form of devolution, but might balk at a stronger dose. Furthermore, it should be noted that not all of the pro-devolutionists were pleased with the changes. Many considered the failure to include a taxing power for the assembly to be a serious weakness that would severely restrict the range of its possible actions. They were likely to try strengthening the bill even more, which could alienate the anti-devolutionists further. As a consequence considerable uncertainty about the prospects of the bill remained. Passage during the next session of Parliament would still depend upon renewal of the agreement with the Liberals and the support of the nationalist parties -- just as it had in the beginning.

As the nationalists had indicated their hostility to the Government's survival, the centerpiece of the Cabinet's devolution strategy remained the Liberal-Labour pact. This was solidified two days after the new proposals were presented to the House of Commons when Mr. David Steel, Leader of the Liberals, exchanged letters with the Prime Minister renewing the agreement for the next

session.⁷⁸ Both leaders were able to renegotiate the accord despite serious reservations about its desirability within their own ranks. It appears that the prospect of a fall election and a likely Conservative victory were more repugnant than a continuation of the consultations. The new agreement, however, differed from the first one in that it was not for a definite period of time. It was intended to last through the next session of Parliament, but if the Government was unable to live up to the Liberal's pay rise proviso of 10%, the agreement might be voided. This restriction clearly showed that devolution was not the only issue of concern for the Liberals and that their future actions in support of the bills would depend upon what occurred in these other areas. The new agreement, though, did lay the basis for passage of the new bills in the next session.

Parliament and Devolution: The Second Time Around

The primary events providing for the redefinition of public issues had already occurred by the end of the 1977 session, but a brief discussion of Parliament's second consideration of the devolution issue can be useful. While the basic issues and arguments concerning devolution changed little during the 1977-78 session of Parliament, the reaction of the parties in Scotland was

⁷⁸ George Clark, "Liberals insert pay rise proviso into their renewed agreement with the Government," The Times (London), July 29, 1977, p. 1; and, "Text of letters between Mr. Callaghan and Mr. Steel," The Times (London), July 29, 1977, p. 2.

visibly altered. For the first time since the devolution question became a major issue the Labour and Conservative Parties each went on the offensive against the SNP's exclusive position as Scotland's spokesman on the issue. This shift in strategy was ostensibly made possible by the likelihood of a devolution bill's passage and, thus, needs to be examined for potential insights on the importance of political reactions to nationalistic demands.

As the opening of Parliament neared it was clear that the Labour Government was intent upon pressing ahead with its devolution legislation and that the electoral consequences in Scotland were still a major factor behind its determination. The probability of a general election in the near future and the threat of a Conservative victory were also prominent factors behind the Government's desire to pass the devolution bills quickly. To counter these challenges, the Government introduced the bills early in the session, while stressing the need to maintain party at every available opportunity.⁷⁹

The Scotland Bill that was submitted basically elaborated upon the changes proposed by Mr. Foot during the summer.⁸⁰ It contained less detail on the working arrangements of the assembly, leaving those to be decided once the body was under way. It also left the matter of handling maladministration complaints to the

⁷⁹"Labour closes ranks--at least until the election," The Economist, October 8, 1977, pp. 17-8.

⁸⁰Great Britain, British Information Services, Survey of Current Affairs, December 1977, pp. 452-7. This summarizes the

assembly, altering the proposed procedures of the first bill. The confusion over the reserve powers of Parliament was addressed by the Government's proposing that intervention be restricted to those areas of policy affecting the interests of the United Kingdom as a whole. An additional clarification of the assembly's powers concerned the implementation of British obligations under the European Community and other international agreements. Rather than being reserved to Parliament, these too were to be devolved. Finally, the bill provided for further legal recourse in questions of the assembly's authority with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council being the final court of appeal.

Despite these changes and the pact with the Liberals passage of the bill was still not a certainty. Consequently, the Government persisted in its efforts to find a means of placating the internal opposition that had defeated the previous spring's bill. Shortly after the bill was introduced in the Commons plans were announced to increase the National Enterprise Board's activities in the north of England. While this fell short of a regional development agency like Scotland's as demanded by some MPs, it was hoped that the increased economic aid would lessen this region's fears of devolution diverting funds from them to Scotland and Wales.⁸¹ Mr. Callaghan also continued to stress the need for party unity by implying, but not stating outright, that the guillotine

new devolution bills and indicates the changes that have been incorporated in them.

⁸¹Michael Hatfield, "Plan for regions to avert 'English backlash'," The Times (London), November 5, 1977, p. 2.

vote might be considered as a confidence issue. By behaving in this manner the importance of the bills was stressed, but the stakes were left indeterminate.

By the time the Government was ready to move its second reading motion on the Scotland Bill, though, passage was fairly well assured. The final vote on the motion gave the Government a comfortable margin of forty-four votes, 307 to 263. The number of Labour dissidents had been cut from forty-three in the spring to thirteen.⁸² This, plus the support of the Liberals, constituted the bulk of the difference in the Government's favor. Four Conservatives, including Alick Buchanan-Smith, voted with the Government and approximately fifteen others abstained.⁸³ The following day the Wales Bill was also given its second reading, though, by a slightly smaller margin.

The Government's guillotine motion came up for decision on Wednesday, November 16th, two days after the second reading vote on the Scotland Bill. It too passed by a larger than anticipated margin of twenty-six votes, with the final tally being 313 to 287. The last minute efforts by Labour opponents to devolution failed to materialize; only sixteen members abstained or opposed the motion as compared to forty-three the previous February.

⁸²Hugh Noyes, "Devolution Bill gets majority of 44 votes," The Times (London), November 15, 1977, p. 1, and "Devolution gets the green light from a cynical commons," The Economist, November 19, 1977, p. 21; and Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates, (Commons), 1977-78, Vol. 926, November 14, 1977, pp. 51-214.

⁸³"Four Tories defy party on the Scotland Bill," The Times (London), November 15, 1977, p. 1.

The passage of the guillotine motion meant that the devolution bill would be approved by the Commons later in the session, but it would be incorrect to assume that this would occur because of a change in enthusiasm. The vote changes that enabled the motion to be successful this time were due to the dissidents' desire not to bring down the Government, rather than their conversion to the devolution cause. This was made clear when several of them announced that they would campaign against the assembly during the referendum.

The lack of enthusiasm for devolution rapidly became evident as the Government was defeated by a loose coalition on its motion to approve the first clause of the bill.⁸⁴ This made it clear that while the bill would ultimately be passed, it would not go through unaltered. Defeats were subsequently sustained by the Government on several clauses later in the committee stage. Two of the most important of these were on amendments to the proposed referendum on devolution. The first imposed the requirement that a minimum "yes" vote of 40 percent of the total electorate was necessary to pass the Scotland Bill. If that figure was not attained, then the Secretary of State would have to take steps to repeal the Act and report these to the Commons. This amendment had the effect of mandating a very high favorable turnout in order for the assembly to be established. The proponents of the 40 percent minimum based it upon the average voter turnout in Scotland at the

⁸⁴Fred Emery, "Government is defeated on first devolution Bill clause," The Times (London), November 23, 1977, p. 1. The final tally was 199 to 184.

general elections since 1950. A "yes" vote of 50.1 percent with the 77.4 percent average turnout would yield the needed 40 percent minimum. The figure of 77.4 percent, however, was higher than that obtained in recent elections and was over 16 percent higher than the turnout for the EEC referendum. This meant that a 57 percent "yes" vote was needed with a 70 percent turnout and a 65 percent "yes" vote would be required if the turnout fell to 65 percent.⁸⁵

The Cabinet was very disturbed at the passage of this amendment, but it was unable to devise an acceptable alternative for its proponents.⁸⁶ It later tried substituting a 33 percent minimum in place of the 40 percent, but was again defeated. Later, at the third reading of the bill, the Government finally announced it would accept the provision and not try to change it in the House of Lords. This decision was made more agreeable by recognition that the referendum was consultative, not mandatory. As a result, failure to attain the necessary minimum, even with a favorable majority, would force the Secretary of State to draft a repeal motion, but the Commons need not accept it. This would mean another difficult vote in the House, yet it need not effectively kill the bill.

⁸⁵Ian Bradley, "'Two fifths' clause may not prove an insurmountable obstacle to assembly," The Times (London), February 17, 1978, p. 2.

⁸⁶One of the objections to the 40 percent minimum was that no such requirement had been imposed for the EEC referendum.

The second amendment on the bill's referendum clause would permit the Orkney and Shetland Islands to separate administratively from the rest of Scotland should they vote against devolution in the referendum, while it was approved in the rest of Scotland. If this occurred, a commission would be appointed to recommend the proper governmental structure for the islands. The commission could, if inclined, recommend inclusion in the assembly, but it is likely that considerable compromising would have to take place for it to be agreeable to the islands' councils. Since Parliament began considering the issue of devolution the islands have voiced concern at the possibility of losing their privileged status and have actively lobbied for their cause. They were very fortunate to get their amendment heard as it moved only two minutes before the guillotine on the day's debate was to fall. In an expression of the intensity of opinion on this issue, the Shetland Islands Council held a referendum on the amendment in mid-March, some six weeks after its passage. The vote in favor of separate status for the Shetland Islands was nine to one.⁸⁷

Though the bill made it through the remainder of the committee stage without further difficulties, the Government's troubles were not at an end. During the two days allotted for the report stage the Cabinet was to lose twice more on important questions, raising doubts about its ability to complete the bill's

⁸⁷Craig Seton, "Shetlanders jubilant over 'victory'." The Times (London), January 27, 1978, p. 2; Ronald Faux, "Shetlanders count votes on devolution tomorrow," The Times (London), March 15, 1978, p. 3; and, "Shetland against devolution by nine to one," The Times (London), March 17, 1978, p. 5.

passage successfully. In both instances, as in the previous defeats, dissident Labour MPs provided the needed margin for the Conservative opposition making their continued dissatisfaction with the legislation obvious. After the loss on the 40 percent minimum there was some concern that the Government would attempt timing the referendum in such a way as to maximize the turnout. Devolution opponents feared the referendum might be held in conjunction with the general election that was anticipated in the fall. They were not alone in the belief that such a situation or even the holding of the referendum in close proximity to the election would work to the benefit of the SNP. The Liberal Leader, David Steel, concurred with this appraisal, noting that the Labour Party would gain by holding the election in October.⁸⁸ It could go the Scottish voters promising a referendum on devolution if it were returned to office. The Conservative, though, would only be able to offer their constitutional conference proposal which would mean a further delay in the granting of substantial devolution. Interestingly, while the holders of this perspective were not publicly stating it, their reasoning seems to betray a belief that the referendum would receive a favorable response and, as a consequence, the SNP would be advantaged at least temporarily.

⁸⁸Michael Hatfield, "Referendum would rule out election," The Times (London), February 13, 1978, p. 2.

This coalition of Liberal devolution supporters, Conservatives and Labour dissidents was able to move an amendment that required the postponing of the referendum should Parliament be dissolved and an election be called. The referendum could not be held within three months of the polling date. John Smith stated for the Government that it had no intention of tying the referendum to an election. He further objected to the amendment as being unnecessarily restrictive, but it was to no avail. The Government lost 242 to 223.⁸⁹

The second defeat at this point in the legislative process came the next day when the Government tried again to eliminate the 40 percent minimum on the referendum. The Commons rejected both a proposal to totally purge the minimum turnout provision and a compromise of a 33 percent minimum.⁹⁰ As indicated these losses raised serious questions as to whether the Government's fragile coalition which had passed the guillotine motion could be held together for a third reading vote. They also increased the possibility of exacerbating the internal problems of the Labour Party as party leaders from Scotland expressed bitterness at the failure of their English colleagues to support the Cabinet.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Hugh Noyes, "Government again defeated on devolution," The Times (London), February 15, 1978, p. 1; and, "Government defeat referendum delayed if election comes first," The Times (London), February 15, 1978, p. 7.

⁹⁰ "Referendum 'Yes' vote must be over 40% of Scottish electorate," The Times (London), February 16, 1978, p. 7; and, Michael Hatfield, "Scottish Assembly in doubt after two government defeats," The Times (London), February 16, 1978, p. 1. Also see the following for a general review of the amendments made in the bill. J.P.M., "The Killing of the Scotland Bill," The Political Quarterly, 49 (April-June 1978): 127-32.

The Cabinet, though, decided to proceed with the bill despite its objections to the various amendments that had been attached. Mr. Callaghan continued to decline to make the vote a confidence measure despite the urgings of some Scottish party leaders.⁹² The Government did, however, make several decisions which had the effect of partially mollifying the concerns of opponents to the bill within its own ranks. During the debate on the third reading motion, Mr. Millan, the Secretary of State for Scotland, acknowledged that while the Government was not pleased with the changes, it would not seek to reverse them in the House of Lords.⁹³ Once again the Conservatives reiterated their position on the issue, objecting to the guillotine and calling the result a farce since sixty-one of the eighty-three clauses in the bill had gone undebated. In the end the motion was carried by a comfortable margin of forty votes, 297 to 257; thus sending the Scotland Bill to the House of Lords for its consideration.⁹⁴ The date was February 22, 1978, one year to the day that the Government had been defeated on the guillotine motion for the first devolution bill.

⁹¹George Clark, "Confidence vote urged on Scotland Bill," The Times (London), February 20, 1978, p. 3.

⁹²Fred Emery, "Cabinet to press on with Scotland Bill," The Times (London), February 17, 1978, p. 1.

⁹³"Government unhappy about changes in Scottish devolution bill but will not seek to reverse them," The Times (London), February 23, 1978, p. 1.

⁹⁴Amongst the Conservatives only Alick Buchanan-Smith and David Knox voted with the Government. Mr. Heath abstained from voting. Hugh Noyes, "Commons passes Scotland Bill by 40 votes," The Times (London), February 23, 1978, p. 1.

The kind of response which the bill would receive once it reached the Lords was highly problematic prior to its actual submission.⁹⁵ If the Conservatives so desired they could greatly complicate the bill's prospects given their substantial majority over the Government. The uncertainty of this situation was further compounded when it was announced that the spokesman for the Opposition on the bill would be Lord Ferrers, joint deputy leader of the Opposition and an outspoken opponent of devolution. As matters developed, however, the bill received a thoughtful hearing in the House of Lords. Over two hundred amendments were passed by the Lords, but most did not seriously alter the basic provisions of the legislation.⁹⁶

The amendment that was considered most serious by the Government established a waiting period for purely English legislation passing its second reading vote on the basis of a majority of Scottish MPs. In other words, if a bill received a majority on the motion, but would not have done so without the support of MPs from Scotland, then the bill would not be considered as having passed unless the Commons reaffirmed the decision within fourteen days. Nicknamed the "West Lothian Question" after its supporter, Tam Dalyell, this controversial amendment was accepted by the Commons during its

⁹⁵Michael Hatfield, "Ministers plan moves to salvage Scotland Bill as Tories prepare for battle in the Lords," The Times (London), January 28, 1978, p. 2.

⁹⁶In fact many of them were accepted by the Government without opposition. Hugh Noyes, "Government steers clear of clash with Lords," The Times (London), July 19, 1978, p. 1.

consideration of the Lords' amendments by a margin of one vote. The object of the change was to prevent the Scottish MPs from being the deciding force on legislation affecting England alone. The Government did not believe such a separation was warranted, but its arguments were defeated.⁹⁷

While the bill was being heard by the Lords, several important events with serious implications for the future of devolution occurred in Scotland. The annual spring party conferences were being held and this year they were highlighted by two parliamentary by-elections, the first since this Parliament began in 1974, and the regional local government elections. Both sets of elections were widely held to be indicators of the Scottish electorate's opinion of the Government's devolution plans and the consequent appeal of the SNP. They were also perceived as reasonable predictors of the upcoming general election. Consequently, attention needs to be given to these occurrences in order to evaluate their impact properly.

The first conference of the spring was held in mid-March by the Labour Party. Devolution, though, was a secondary issue at the meeting. Most of its time was devoted to economic issues and nationalization resolutions. Opponents of the assembly did contest resolutions endorsing devolution and the use of party funds for the referendum campaign, but they lost handily. Little attention,

⁹⁷Hugh Noyes, "Government lose last battle on devolution," The Times (London), July 27, 1978, p. 1. After this vote the Scotland Bill was returned to the Lords for final consideration. The Lords completed their review the next day, thereby sending the bill to the Queen for Royal Assent.

though, was given to the Scotland Bill, the SNP, the Conservatives, or the upcoming elections aside from the address by Donald Dewar, the party's candidate in the upcoming Garscadden by-election. All in all it was an oddly self-centered conference given the importance generally attributed to the elections that were about to be held and those expected in the fall.⁹⁸

The next conference was that of the Scottish Conservatives in mid-May after the Garscadden and regional elections. As at the Labour Party Conference devolution did not dominate the meeting, however, it was a more prominent topic of discussion. A resolution to actively oppose the Government's proposed assembly in the referendum campaign was overwhelmingly approved. Despite Mr. Pym's remarks to the contrary, it was evident that the Conference delegates regarded this to be the end of their party's support of devolution. The decision may also have been an expression of their optimism over the prospects of the next general election. The public opinion polls suggested that a recovery of some Scottish seats was a likely prospect even with their opposition to devolution.⁹⁹

An important ingredient in the renewed optimism of both the Conservative and Labour Parties was the outcome of the

⁹⁸Ronald Faux, "Devolution on sideline at Dunoon," The Times (London), March 17, 1978, p. 5; Ronald Raux, "Labour Party's Scottish council endorses devolution and use of party funds in referendum fight," The Times (London), March 18, 1978, p. 4; and, "Blast from Dunoon," The Economist, March 25, 1978, pp. 16-9.

⁹⁹Fred Emery, "Scots Tories vote to oppose an assembly," The Times (London), May 13, 1978, p. 1; Ronald Faux, "Tories weigh attractions of voting 'No' on Scotland," The Times (London), January 9, 1978, p. 2; and, Colin Bell, "Mrs. Thatcher's Scottish policy," Spectator, January 14, 1978, p. 13.

spring's elections. These began with the Garscadden parliamentary by-election on April 13th. The sitting Labour MP, William Small, died unexpectedly precipitating the first by-election in Scotland since the last general election. As a consequence, the contest was immediately perceived as a pre-test of the upcoming general election and a miniature referendum on the Government's performance. Prediction of the outcome was complicated by a series of factors; a situation which of itself tended to heighten the importance attributed to the election. Labour had won the seat with a 20 percent margin in the last election in this solidly working class area of Glasgow. The SNP had, however, won all six of the district council seats from Garscadden in May, 1977, increasing their vote by 12 percent in the process. If the SNP could build upon that base and overcome Labour's percent margin, then the Nationalists would appear to be in a very good position to significantly increase their Westminster representation in the next election, an increase that would be largely at Labour's expense. If, on the other hand, they were held to second place, the Labour Party would then be able to enter the general election with more self-confidence.

The uncertainty surrounding the election was compounded by the candidates themselves and the characteristics of the constituency. The importance of the election's outcome highlighted the need to select a good candidate instead of the old party loyalist that the party in the Strathclyde area had tended to promote.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰Colin Bell, "Scotland's political test," Spectator, January 28, 1978, pp. 15-6.

Donald Dewar, a former MP for Aberdeen South from 1966 to 1970, was finally chosen to be Labour's candidate. Dewar was an experienced politician, seasoned campaigner and a public personality from his appearances on local radio. He was not, however, without problems in the constituency. Of principal concern was his support for the Abortion Act during his previous service in Parliament, as the issue had not died down and approximately 35 percent of the residents in the constituency were Roman Catholics.¹⁰¹ Mr. Dewar's task was also complicated by the district's high unemployment rate, 9 percent on the whole and well over 30 percent in some sections. Normally the working class nature of the area and the extreme proportion of publicly housed residents, 90 percent, would virtually guarantee a Labour victory, but the unemployment aspect was coupled with a possible break-down of the old Labour ties. The construction and relocation of residents in the huge Drumchapel housing development had apparently weakened the party ties of the residents by altering their political contacts. Within the party it was thought this situation was responsible for the shift to the SNP in the district council elections and its implications for the by-election were feared.

The SNP candidate, Ken Bovey, also added to the perplexing character of the race. Bovey had been chairman of Margo McDonald's winning by-election campaign in Govan and had contested the Garscadden seat in October 1974; thus he too was an experienced

¹⁰¹"Double trouble for Labour," The Economist, April 1, 1978, pp. 17-18.

public figure. He complicated matters, however, with his pacifist views. Very early in the campaign he suggested that the arms work being done at the nearby Yarrows shipyard should be phased out. This position was not very well received, though, as many of the yard's workers resided in the constituency and most of its business came from military contracts. The Nationalists tried during the campaign to smooth the controversy over by claiming that non-military alternatives could be found, but it was difficult in an area in which unemployment was primary concern to be very convincing.

The candidates from the other political parties further supplemented the confounding aspects of the campaign by raising the question of who would suffer from their presence. The break-away Scottish Labour Party was running a candidate and, while she was not expected to do very well, it was likely that she would take more votes away from the Labour candidate than the SNP which could be a critical factor in a close race. The lack of a Liberal candidate was also anticipated to advantage Bovey over Dewar. The Liberals had received almost 1,200 votes in the last election, most of which would probably favor the SNP this time. The Conservative candidate, Iain Lawson, was the final complication. In October 1974 the Conservative share of the vote had dropped to 12.9 percent, but Lawson's aggressive campaign was expected to increase that portion. Unlike the other two small parties, his presence in the contest was probably going to cost the SNP votes.¹⁰²

¹⁰²"Mother government in Garscadden," The Economist, April 8, 1978, p. 18.

The campaign itself was an intense one. Both major parties focused most of their attention upon the state of the economy. Dewar was apparently advantaged somewhat by this issue as he was given credit for forestalling some job closures in the constituency through his Government contacts and by the improved employment figures released during the campaign. Bovey attacked the Labour Government for its economic and housing record, clearly suggesting that things would improve in an independent Scotland. In focusing upon the issues in this way, though, he may have hurt his own candidacy by opening himself up to counterattack. His statement about the Yarrow shipyard was brought up continually, as was the record of the SNP local government officials. After Bovey spoke out against the housing conditions in the constituency, the Labour canvassers quickly reminded voters that the six SNP members of the Glasgow District Council had opposed a large allocation of funds for improvements in the area only a short time before. Dewar also hammered away at the SNP's advocacy of separatism, on the basis that while most Scots may desire an assembly, they do not want separatism. The Conservative candidate entered the fray with vigor, campaigning against both his Labour and SNP opponents and apparently managing to be a fairly effective gadfly. In the end it appears as if Mr. Dewar was able to raise sufficient questions about the capabilities of the SNP to deal with the problems of the constituency. He won the election with a reduced majority and a swing of only 3.2 percent towards the SNP.¹⁰³

¹⁰³Brian Wilson, "The SNP: a Bandwagon in Disrepair," New Statesman, April 21, 1978, pp. 517-8.

If the by-election were to be the only election of the spring, its result would not be too significant. It would be, as it was, a needed morale booster for Labour after a long dry spell. It would not, though, necessarily be disastrous for the nationalists as they had been able to increase their vote by 3.2 percent. If that swing could be matched nationwide the party would pick up several more seats in the next election. Furthermore, answers to the question of which contest, the district council elections of the previous May or this by-election, was more predictive of future Scottish voting trends would simply be conjecture.

This, however, was not to be. The regional local government elections were to follow in approximately a month and, because of another unexpected Labour MP's death, a second by-election was a real possibility.¹⁰⁴ The symbolic implications of this by-election were even more prominent than for Garscadden at this time the by-election would be in the Hamilton constituency, the scene of Winnie Ewing's victory eleven years before, and the Nationalist candidate would be Margo MacDonald, winner of the 1973 Govan by-election. If the SNP could be held to the modest gain of the Garscadden election, then Labour would indeed have reason for renewed confidence. Interestingly, the possibility of the SNP losing support was not considered.

The regional local government elections in early May were held against the backdrop of the 1977 district council elections,

¹⁰⁴For a while there was speculation that a by-election would not be held for Hamilton. It was thought that Mr. Callaghan might simply hold the seat open until the fall election, thereby not risking a defeat to the Nationalists.

the Garscadden by-election, and the public opinion polls which since January have given Labour a comfortable lead. Once again uncertainty surrounded the outcome. All three major parties mounted extensive campaigns, with the Conservatives and Nationalists competing for seats they had not previously contested. The SNP was expected at least to pick up a couple of seats in the Strathclyde region and in the Central region, given their strong showings of the year before. The final results, consequently, were something of a surprise. Labour, followed distinctly by the Conservatives, were the gainers in the election. Both tended to recoup previous losses to the Nationalists. The drop in SNP support was particularly noticeable in three-way contests between the major parties. The loss of about 10 percent of their vote in these races put the Nationalists back to the position they held in May, 1974. It also suggested a shifting of voters back to their old allegiances. A similar share of the vote in the general election would cost the party several of its seats.¹⁰⁵

Not unexpectedly the Labour Party was extremely pleased with the outcome of the regional elections and particularly with the 9 percent swing it received in the Hamilton wards. As its by-election candidate the party chose George Robertson, a full-time trade union organizer and, at the age of thirty-two, the immediate past

¹⁰⁵ Alan Hamilton, "Labour success in Scottish polls seen as rejection of separatism," The Times (London), May 4, 1978, p. 1; Peter Pulzer, "Supporters drift back to Labour, but it would be wrong to write SNP's death notice," The Times (London), May 18, 1978, p. 2; and, "Labour licks Nats in Scotland," The Economist, May 6, 1978, pp. 20-23.

Chairman of the Labour Party in Scotland. Margo MacDonald, as mentioned, was the Nationalist candidate. She was one of the party's most well-known figures even though she had not been in Parliament for over four years. As a consequence the contest was between two of the most attractive and articulate candidates that either party could field.

Labour's lead in October 1974 over the Nationalists had only been 8.5 percent, thus an SNP victory was not an impossibility. Much depended, however, on the performance of the smaller parties. As in Garscadden, a chance of winning rested only with Labour and the SNP, but the smaller parties could determine which of them it was to be. The Scottish Labour Party had been bitterly disappointed with its showing in the earlier by-election and declined to run anyone. The Liberals and the Conservatives had each received less than 10 percent of the vote in the last general election, but both decided to compete again. Their presence was likely to cost the SNP support, especially if as the Conservatives anticipated, their share of the poll increased substantially.¹⁰⁶

The campaign dealt squarely with the issues of the economy and independence. Labour saw this by-election as an important opportunity to defeat the Nationalists, and Robertson hammered away at separatism as the means to do so. The following quotation illustrates his approach.

¹⁰⁶"Scottish Labour Party not to contest Hamilton poll," The Times (London), April 24, 1978, p. 4; and, Fred Emery, "Tory vote at Hamilton may threaten Labour," The Times (London), June 2, 1978, p. 1.

The Main issue will be the endorsement or rejection of the nationalists' policies of separatism. There is no better place than Hamilton for people to say what they think about the SNP's ultimate objectives. The nationalist tide started in Hamilton, and it will end there.¹⁰⁷

Mrs. MacDonald focused particularly on the unemployment record of the Government and its likely continuation. She did not, however, shrink from campaigning for independence as the only real answer to these problems. Only Scotland would be able to make the necessary decisions to correct the economic ills of unemployment and inflation.

Each of the major candidates canvassed the constituency extensively with hardly a doorstep going uncontacted by either. As the polling date approached, though, public opinion surveys were indicating that the outcome would not be as close as thought. One poll even predicted a 28 percent lead for Labour.¹⁰⁸ The final result was not that overwhelming, but it was clearly decisive. Mr. Robertson won the election with a 17.5 percent lead, 51 percent to 33.5 percent for Mrs. MacDonald. The margin meant a 4.5 percent swing towards Labour, not as great as in the regional elections, yet very welcome. Mrs. MacDonald was disappointed, but she did point out a potentially important aspect of the election; a third of the vote in a campaign dealing so directly with independence was not necessarily a bad showing.¹⁰⁹ If the pattern were projected to

¹⁰⁷ Alan Hamilton, "Battle lines are drawn for Hamilton by-election," The Times (London), May 10, 1978, p. 5.

¹⁰⁸ "SNP disbelief greets poll forecast of 28% lead for Labour," The Times (London), May 30, 1978, p. 2.

¹⁰⁹ Ronald Faux, "Hamilton seen as a victory for devolution," The Times (London), June 2, 1978, p. 2.

Scotland as a whole, though, the implications for securing independence were not promising, as Labour would retain its current number of MPs, the Conservatives would gain six, the Liberals would remain at three, and the SNP would lose six of its eleven seats.¹¹⁰

Conclusion: The Impact of the Devolution Issue

This detailed survey of the way in which the British Government and major parties have responded to the SNP documents the complexity and confusion surrounding the devolution issue. It also reveals how these reactions have served to legitimize the SNP's claims of Scotland's need for self-government, thereby redefining public issues. By creating a situation in which devolution for Scotland became the major public issue, the Government and British parties forced a reconsideration of priorities upon the Scottish public. This response made the SNP and the question of devolution even more important, thus enhancing the linkage between Scottish national identity, devolution, and nationalism.

The actions of the major British institutions tended to legitimize the ideological position of the SNP almost from the beginning. Both parties made their initial moves in the mid-1960s as the SNP was beginning to become a potential electoral force. Once that threat apparently dissipated in the 1970 general election, however, both parties shelved their concern for Scottish devolution. It was no longer a viable electoral threat. This pattern of response

¹¹⁰"Scotland's lion not so rampant," The Economist, June 3, 1978, p. 17-8.

served to authenticate the position of the SNP that Scotland was being underrepresented in Westminster. The Conservative's consideration of a weak legislative body and Labour's appointment of the Royal Commission implicitly told the Scots that they may be deserving of a greater degree of governmental control. The rejection of those concerns after the election, however, communicated to them the remoteness and insincerity of the British parties.

This same pattern was repeated when the Royal Commission released its recommendations that were ignored by the Government and the parties. Only after the SNP was again a threat, following the Govan by-election and the approach of the February election, did the parties consider devolution important. Even then, though, the British party leaders had to drag their screaming Scottish compatriots along. This again served as an indicator of the English domination of Scottish issues and of the insincerity of the response. Devolution's purpose as a mechanism to prevent further electoral erosion was painfully obvious, and other possible reasons for restructuring the government, democratic or representational and administrative ones, were just as obviously minor secondary excuses.

The pattern was repeated once devolution became a matter of Parliamentary concern. The Government's proposals were a hodge-podge of institutional changes and problems capable of pleasing no one. While this consequence might seem the only possible one given such a complicated issue, the Government's actions gave little indication that the proposals were well thought-out and the best ideas confronting a difficult problem. The complicated

maneuvering that ensued only served to increase the public attention given the devolution proposals and to convince large numbers of people of their inadequacy. This situation was greatly facilitated by the SNP and the failure of the other Scottish parties to counter its criticisms. Matters were only exacerbated once the devolution bills came up for Parliamentary action. The problems contained within the bills were highlighted, as was the electoral importance of their passage to the Labour Government.

The net result of this pattern of political responses over a ten year period was a legitimization of the SNP's political grievances, acceptance of its role as spokesman for Scotland, and a discrediting of the existing British governmental institutions. This was accomplished by the creation of a public issue, devolution, which had the effect of displacing other issues. The SNP was able to capitalize upon this situation and the other parties were not. The British parties, instead, responded in a manner of rapid acceptance of the SNP's ground rules; however, they possessed no coherent arguments of policies with which to attack.

A paradoxical aspect of this response pattern is the failure of the British parties to consider other policy alternatives to counter the SNP. Almost from the initial appearance of the Nationalists as a electoral power, the British parties accepted it as a representative spokesman for Scottish self-government. There was, however, little proof of the SNP being representative or of the motivations behind its supporters. Yet the parties reacted by proposing institutional changes to grant the Scots more self-government.

This was probably done because institutional representation was perceived to be the easiest and quickest method of diffusing the SNP's momentum. It may also have been an implicit acknowledgment that the economic and social problems concerning many Scots could not be alleviated in the near future, thereby admitting the accuracy of the SNP's arguments. The decision, though, ignored the potential secondary consequences of such a reaction, particularly given a lack of simultaneous moves in other areas. By responding in this manner the Government tended to restrict itself to consideration of a legislative assembly with substantial decisionmaking authority. With the important powers already lodged in the Scottish Office, the inadequacy of a lesser response would likely have been a grave public relations error, as was seen in the debates over the assembly's powers. The lines of authority were inexorably intertwined. A good case may be made that alternative policies were also politically and economically proscribed, but the point is that there is no evidence that those avenues were even explored.

It is also ironic that the major Scottish parties failed to respond to the SNP. They developed almost no arguments against the SNP, reacting rather in a panic to its presence. They relied instead upon their British affiliates to construct counter-proposals. They then, in turn, divided themselves over those policies. Little attention was devoted to attacking the SNP's vulnerabilities or rebuilding their local organizations. Consequently,

until 1978 the SNP was given a fairly free hand in the public debate about devolution and its impacts. Only after the devolution bill was reasonably assured of passage and the Government's position in the public opinion polls rose, did the Labour Party go on the offensive. The Conservatives followed a similar pattern of delay. The spring 1978 elections indicated that the SNP was indeed vulnerable. Serious questions are, consequently, raised about the situation that would exist in Scotland had the major parties done this two or three years earlier.

The Government, however, acted instead to diffuse the SNP by institutional representation. The manner in which it went about this, though, allowed the issue to develop for over five intense years, thereby redefining the perception of public issues such that Scottish nationalism became a political reality. The Scots were made more aware of their national identity, the seriousness of their socioeconomic problems, and their potential need for more extensive forms of self-government. This, in turn, provided the additional mobilization needed to link identity, issues, and behavior.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS: A POLITICAL INTERPRETATION OF SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

This study has attempted to develop a more complete, coherent explanation of the factors behind the rise of Scottish nationalism. Its thesis was that the growth of Scottish nationalism has been due to the cumulative effects of the SNP and the reactions of the British political system to the party and Scotland's socio-economic problems. This thesis differed from the more common explanations of the development of nationalism by its emphasis upon political factors as the mobilization catalysts.

Central to this thesis was a basic premise about the development of nationalism by a nation incorporated within a broader political system. The identity of the nation must first acquire political saliency for its citizens in order for a nationalism movement to develop. It is not enough for the citizens to perceive themselves as being historically or culturally distinct. The identity must take on political connotations such that political issues

and problems are perceived in terms of their impact on the nation. This premise provided the analysis a means by which the various explanations and information concerning Scottish nationalism could be evaluated in order to determine their role in the growth of the nationalist movement. The evidence could be judged by the manner in which it contributed to an understanding of how Scottish national identity acquired political saliency.

With this premise in mind, the study revealed that Scotland has had a continuing basis for national distinctiveness and potential problems of a sufficiently grave nature to foster a political movement. However, it has only been recently that a nationalist movement has grown. Thus the question for investigation became how a linkage could have been created between the macro-level conditions and micro-level behavior. This, in turn, mandated a focus upon those participants in the process capable of bridging the gap. Two sets of such participants appeared to have been active enough to have performed this role in the Scottish case: the Scottish National Party and the British governing institutions. Their actions were hypothesized as having provided the collective definition of issues, conditions, and identity necessary to convert general feelings of dissatisfaction into nationalism.

Now that each of these aspects has been examined in some detail it is possible to bring their individual contributions together. This will permit a more thorough statement of Scottish nationalism's development as interpreted by this study's thesis. Following the interpretation will be an examination of its

implications. First, the political implications of the situation discussed in these pages for the future of Scottish nationalism and the British political system will be considered. Then the analytical implications of the interpretation for comparative political analyses of other nationalist movements will be examined. This will enable the utility of the interpretation as a conceptual tool to be considered.

A Political Interpretation of Scottish Nationalism

With the idea in mind that over time the combined actions of the government and the various political parties have served to mobilize Scottish nationalism, thereby linking the macro-level bases of distinctiveness and micro-level behavior, an interpretation of the development of this phenomenon may now be constructed. The base element in this interpretation must be Scottish national identity. As already noted, this identity has persisted since the Act of Union and, has, in part, been maintained by the continuation of major social institutions. It has also unwittingly been maintained by different political and governmental practices. The guarantees of the Scottish religious, educational and legal institutions have served this purpose, as did the practice of having a parliamentary manager for Scotland during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This situation was furthered by the strong support given the Liberal Party in Scotland and the identification of MPs from Scotland as belonging to a distinct group within Parliament. Likewise the establishment of the the Scottish Office and the gradual expansion of its responsibilities had the same consequence.

These provided a substantial precedence for thinking of the governing process for Scotland as being distinct from that of the rest of the United Kingdom and maintained the importance of national identity. These aspects probably acted more to maintain the distinctiveness of the politically aware middle and upper classes, however, they were paralleled at the other levels of society as well through dialect and cultural differences.

The initial expressions of Scottish identity in politics were focused upon reform goals, not nationalistic ones, as they were intended to strengthen Scotland's union with England. The historic socioeconomic conditions of Scotland did not become a matter of major political concern until the early part of this century and even then the portion of Scots identifying the cause of the conditions to be the union with England was relatively small. The SNP and some of the other political groups operative in the 1920's and 1930's did make this connection, but they had only minute followings such that their range of influence was probably quite narrow. Of much greater influence at this time were the continuing pressures for further integration between Scotland and England. The intelligentsia was, as Nairn noted, effectively integrated into the mainstream of British culture and those few writers who did focus on Scotland avoided politics.¹ Only a few poets of very limited influence were active in trying to focus attention on Scotland's problems. Politically, the focus of attention was still on Britain-wide

¹Tom Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism (London: NLB, 1977), p. 154-56.

concerns. The Labour Party tentatively supported home rule, but the primary focus of its efforts was directed toward building a party capable of forming a government. Additionally, its socialist policy orientation mandated greater centralized decisionmaking on the part of the London government, not a division of its authority. This focus remained relatively constant until after the Second World War. Public attention, even in Scotland, was drawn to the problems of recovery from the two wars and the great depression. Only a few persons were beginning to make the necessary cognitive connections.

After 1945, however, the context within which the Scots (and the British people as a whole) perceived themselves, their government and their country began to be transformed. The Covenant Movement was the initial expression of this new perception for the Scots. Its importance lay not in its failure to bring about a change in the governmental system, but in the fact that it was the first involvement of most of the Scottish citizenry with the question of Scotland's place in the United Kingdom. As such, it served as an indication of a general, diffuse dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs. Probably the basic factor in this discontent was the condition of the economy. For the first time Scotland's greater severity of problems was beginning to appear as if it would not be eased, especially in comparison to England's. A principal indicator that these matters and their consequences for life in Scotland were on the minds of the Scottish people was the high rate of emigration during the late 1950's and 1960's. This conclusion would

later be supported by the consistently high ranking given the economy in public opinion polls of the importance of various issues.

Several other contextual changes occurred during this period that affected perceptions of politics.² Foremost among these were the changes in Britain's international status. Militarily and economically Britain no longer was the world power that she had previously been. Her empire was slowly, but definitely breaking away. The impact of these changes on Scottish nationalism came most likely not in terms of the declining prestige of belonging to the United Kingdom, but rather in the form of the internal questioning of British society and politics that resulted. All of these status changes raised serious questions about the effectiveness of the British governing institutions. These questions were combined in the case of Scotland with severe doubts about the sincerity and capability of London governments to cope with her economic problems. Both the Conservative and Labour Parties, in turn, had promised abatement of Scotland's socioeconomic problems, but for a variety of reasons neither was particularly successful in fulfilling those pledges.

Another aspect of the government's role in this process is related to its centralized decisionmaking of economic policy. Documentation of the severity of Scottish socioeconomic

²See Chris Cook and John Ramsden, eds., Trends in British Politics Since 1945 (London: The MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1978) for a discussion of the impact of these changes on a wide spectrum of political concerns. Especially see Gillian Peele's article, "The Developing Constitution," pp. 1-27.

conditions was largely accomplished and publicized through reports and investigations conducted under government authorization as preliminary steps in the development of policy. Thus, to a significant degree, it was the activities of the government itself which created the basis for questioning the applicability of its policies by making the public aware of the extent of the problems.

One final contextual change of probable impact in this reevaluation process was the changing definition of viability needed for statehood.³ This is difficult to gauge as a factor because of a lack of direct evidence, but the increased number of geographically small states, many of whom were previously part of the Empire, seems to have raised further doubts about the necessity of Scotland's remaining tied to England. It is logical to expect that some Scots were beginning to ask themselves "why not separate?," where as before the historical precedents largely ruled against such action. No longer was separation contrary to historical logic. This factor was likely operative only in the minds of a few Scots, but what is significant at this point is its probable presence as a serious question.

It is at this phase that the Scottish National Party begins to become an effective mechanism for the expression of this general discontent. The party was not, however, simply a reflection of those feelings. Important internal organizational changes

³Eric Hobsbawm, "Some Reflections on the 'Break-Up of Britain'," The New Left Review, No. 105 (September-October 1977): 3-23.

were taking place within the SNP that would enable it to survive fluctuations in public opinion. The quality of its leadership during this period was an important factor as the emphasis became one of building an effective organization, not just the articulation of an ideology. Extensive efforts were put into forming local branches and to developing a complete set of policy programs. Also the party quickly adopted modern campaign techniques that enabled it to marshal its limited resources more efficiently. In line with this, the party made good use of the media opportunities available to it. The end result was the development of a hard core of effective, experienced party activists who would outlast the fluctuations in general public support during the late 1960's. The largest part of the SNP's support during this period probably was as a protest vote against the Labour government, but to consider all of it as such is to ignore these more important, though, less obvious changes within the SNP.

The pattern of party and governmental actions that followed the 1970 general election intensified this questioning and, in the final analysis, legitimized the grievances articulated by the SNP. Both major parties had made moves to adopt policies that would grant greater decisionmaking authority to the Scots, yet with the apparent decline of the SNP in the general election they effectively disclaimed those moves. This would later place both major British parties in a very bad public light as to their motivations in backing devolution. At the same time Scotland's socioeconomic problems continued to be a focal point of public concern. That aspect was somewhat ameliorated by the discovery of the North Sea oil

with its accompanying visions of increased employment and investment opportunities. The oil, however, created another set of perceptual incongruities when it became clear that most of the economic benefits would be directed southward and even those in Scotland would be primarily confined to rather isolated areas. This situation gave the SNP the occasion to voice the feelings of an apparently large number of Scots that the decisionmaking process was unfairly biased against their interests. It also greatly strengthened the credibility of the SNP as a programmatic political party. The only argument the other parties had mounted against the SNP prior to the finding of the oil was that Scotland was not sufficiently self-supporting to separate from England. Now that argument was no longer valid. Furthermore, upon reflection that line of reasoning was in itself an admission of the seriousness of Scotland's problems and her dependence upon England. These incongruities were compounded with the embarrassment caused the major parties by the release of the Kilbrandon Commission's recommendation of a legislative assembly for Scotland. The insincerity of their earlier devolutionary moves was quickly revealed by their reaction to the recommendation. And once again as with the economy and the oil, the position of the SNP that Scotland was not being treated justly received official legitimization.

The situation created by these events was further complicated when the SNP made such dramatic and unexpected gains in the 1974 general elections. The results revealed the effective organizational work of the SNP and, in comparison, the weak state of the

constituency organizations in the Labour and Conservative Parties. The panic that ensued in the major parties, especially within the Labour Party, betrayed the leadership's recognition that their own organizations were no longer reliable aggregators of public opinion in Scotland. That, in turn, prompted them to act as if the SNP and its support were such an indicator. It was, consequently, toward the alleviation of their grievances that the devolution policies were directed, with the expressed purpose of recapturing those lost votes. The whole pattern, however, of indecision and confusion that pervaded the development of these policies in the parties, in Parliament and in Scotland, only served to raise additional doubts about the motives and eventual effectiveness of the government. The gap between Scottish national identity and British identity increased so that more and more Scots perceived public issues and solutions as being Scottish in nature, not British. Throughout the process the SNP maintained its effective activity, taking advantage of every opportunity afforded them by the government and the other parties. The final result is the contemporary situation in which large numbers of Scots seek fundamental changes in their governmental system, and a smaller, but still significant, number seek their own national state.

Implications for the Future of Scottish Nationalism

The implications of this interpretation for the future of Scottish nationalism and the SNP are indefinite. Events are still occurring which will have an important impact on this question. I would, however, argue that it is unlikely that either Scottish

nationalism or the SNP will cease to be major political factors. Moreover, the longer the nationalists can be an active force, the more likely they will ultimately be successful in restructuring the British political system. They may not obtain a powerful legislative assembly in the immediate future, especially given the outcome of the recent referendum, but some further concessions will probably be made.

A principal unknown in this discussion of the future of the SNP is the extent of the party's electoral support, particularly considering the spring 1978 elections. The Garscadden by-election was important to the Nationalists because it was assumed that they should win. They had done well in the 1974 elections, most of the recent local government by-elections, and the 1977 district council elections. It seemed only natural with Garscadden being the first Scottish parliamentary by-election in this Parliament that the SNP should win it as well. The constituency had high unemployment and Labour's ties in community were apparently weakening, thus it was obvious that here was the place for the electorate to register their dissatisfaction and vote against the Government.

This assumption appears to have been operative in the minds of many, especially the Labour Party in Scotland. It was a revealing assumption in that it acknowledged publicly their fears regarding the strength of their own political organizations and community contacts. It was also an ironic admission that the SNP may indeed be more representative of the voting public than the Labour Party. The difficulty of the assumption was, though, that it was

not based upon an analysis of the factors responsible for the past shifts in support to the SNP. It was based upon the belief that those shifts would continue, not that they might have depended upon evaluations of Governmental performance or other dynamic factors.

This raises the additional question, though, of why the SNP did so poorly in the elections of the spring, 1978. There are several factors which may have come to play in these elections. One important factor being that they have been too successful. Because the SNP has done so well, even in areas formerly considered Labour strongholds, both major opposing parties have been trying to revamp their local organizations and to recruit better candidates. Labour chose two very capable, articulate candidates for the recent by-elections and there are signs that the Conservatives are trying to do likewise. A revitalization of local political organizations may make it difficult for the SNP to recruit new voters and to maintain the support of earlier switchers.

An additional factor which needs to be noted is that the SNP was beginning to build up a record for itself in local government. There are indications, as in Garscadden, that this record has not been an entirely satisfactory one. As such it may have raised questions concerning the ability of the SNP to govern the country. This probably played a role in each of the elections of the spring, but there is no way at this point of being certain to what extent. It is also unlikely that the party's advocacy of phasing out the regional level of the local government system once the assembly is operating did much to convince voters of the seriousness of

the Nationalist candidates for those posts. Another aspect which should be noted with regards to the regional elections, and parliamentary by-elections for that matter, is that such contests are highly constituency specific. As a result, the extrapolation of trends based upon them is an extremely speculative enterprise.

Public opinion may also have been a factor in the recent elections. The SNP has been able to claim that it is the only party looking out for Scotland's interests. They have been able to capitalize upon the desire of the Scottish public for a larger voice in governmental decisionmaking, while the other parties have been evasive. As a consequence, the lead on the issue passed to the SNP. With the impending passage of the devolution bill, however, Labour may have regained the post position. Thus the Nationalist party can no longer effectively claim to be the only Scottish spokesman. A corollary to this proposition is that the shift implies that subsequent elections will be based on other issues. The public opinion polls have long noted that devolution is not regarded as one of the more pressing problems by the Scottish public. Economic issues tend to be rated first in almost every instance. The position of the devolution bill at the time of the elections may have been such that the issue was no longer perceived as a major one. Thus the electorate was left to decide on the basis of more traditional class-based issues, such as the rate of unemployment and prospects for economic growth. The SNP could not help but lose in a comparison with the Labour Party in this kind of circumstance. It has no way of demonstrating its capabilities in these policy areas because it cannot

form a Government. The Labour Party tried very hard to make this point about performance potential during the elections when focusing on the SNP's goal of independence. They attempted to conjure up the uncertainty of "separatism" as a means of raising doubts about the capabilities of the Nationalists. They may have been successful, especially if the public was already inclined to weight traditional issues more heavily.

Lastly, it should not be forgotten that in both by-elections the SNP did run against a party having a substantial majority in the last election and in constituencies traditionally supportive of that party. Leads such as Labour had are difficult overcome. It may well be that the district elections of 1977 were something of a fluke and that temporary animosities over the failure of the Scotland and Wales Bill were expressed as a vote for the SNP. That does not mean, though, that they would be extended to the 1978 elections.

As this discussion has endeavored to demonstrate the general assumption that the SNP should have won the spring's elections neglects to analyze the current situation. Its presence, though, in the mind of the public, the politicians, and the media may have significant negative implications for the party. The losses have tended to shatter the party's image of being a winner and this is not an unimportant development with the general election approaching. By having been ready to campaign at a moment's notice almost anywhere in Scotland the SNP has been able to be a threat to each of the other political parties. That threat has now lost some

of its impact. The loss of its winner's image may, consequently, hurt the party by raising the morale and confidence of its opponents. It may also be a factor in redoubling the SNP's own campaign efforts. At least, that is the impact that the party newspaper, The Scots Independent, has tried to give the results.⁴ One thing is certain, though, these losses will take on added significance if the SNP does not do well in the next general election.

The reaction of the party to this state of affairs will be an important factor in itself for the SNP's future. Understandably influential elements within the party have urged the adoption of a more militant stance, as the moderate approach has apparently not been successful. The frustration of failure and the need to remain consistent with the final goal can be seen as good reasons for advocating immediate independence. Pressure for this shift increased after the 1977 defeat of the Scotland and Wales Bill and it may continue with the defeat of the referendum. Should this become the dominant position it would likely affect the SNP in several ways. The party has thus far been able to act as a spokesman for Scottish affairs. If the party becomes too radical on the independence issue, it may lose the tacit support of many voters who approve of its efforts to secure better representation for Scotland, but who are unwilling to go as far as independence. The highest survey results for independence have been only around 30 percent, not all of whom were SNP supporters. Self-restriction to this portion of the electorate would probably consign the party to only occasional victories.

⁴See the lead article in the Scots Independent, May 1978.

Such a pattern of developments would also be likely to cost the SNP in terms of its credibility. The party must be able to deliver or be perceived as having caused delivery of its objectives. This may have been an important factor in the party's successes while the Labour Government was trying to pass the devolution legislation. However, that role may no longer be available. A possible alternative was an assembly. If the SNP really desires independence, the experience of governing under the assembly is likely to be a crucial factor in granting credibility to its claimed capabilities. It will also be the testing ground upon which the party must convince the overwhelming majority of the Scottish public that remaining part of the United Kingdom will not provide the kind of government they desire. This alternative may, though, also be closed for the time being.

Another implication of these circumstances concerns internal relationships within the party. In recent years the party has been able to remain something of an umbrella organization with its collegial leadership united behind the goal of independence. This lack of conflict over internal policies and personalities has aided the party in putting forward a positive image, which is something the Labour and Conservative Parties have had difficulty in doing. If the party becomes publicly divided over the question of demanding independence now or gradually, it could significantly damage that image. It might also further endanger the party's credibility with the voters. How can it present a credible argument if its own membership are divided over the matter?

What becomes important during the next several years is, consequently, the problem of whether or not the SNP can further cement the bond between itself and those who have voted for its candidates. The Labour and Conservative Parties have a reservoir of identifiers that the SNP does not, thus it needs to continue actively attracting the loyalty of its supporters. This is why the SNP needs to maintain its image of being a "winning" party. It is also why the outcome of the upcoming general election is critical. This election will be vital for solidifying the support of the younger voters attracted to the party and for further developing the party's organization in many constituencies. The election will also be critical for the other major parties in terms of influencing their organizational strategies and policies. Scotland appears to be developing a three-main party political system, but it is not certain whether the SNP will be the first, second or third party. It is the outcome of such positioning in the next several elections and the reactions of the various parties to the results which will determine the future of the SNP; whether the party will be a party of secondary influence or the dominant force in Scottish politics.

Implications for the Future of British Politics

The interpretation's implications for the future of British politics are also indeterminate. There are, however, several comments that can be made with a certain degree of certainty. Foremost among these is that conflict over devolution and its consequences will not cease with the failure of the referendum to reach the needed 40 percent affirmative level. The debate will simply

move to another stage of conflict which will, in turn, depend greatly upon the outcome of the next general election. If the SNP does well in the election, whichever British party forms the Government will likely make some new moves to diffuse its support. Should Labour win, its devolutionary actions would probably be predicated on the performance of its organization in Scotland. A rout of the SNP might mean a discontinuation of devolution. On the other hand, continuation of their minority government status might impel them to seek the aid of the SNP by pushing the bill once more. If the Conservatives win the general election, the idea of an assembly will probably be dismissed, but a lesser form of devolution may be advocated. This would especially be the case if the Tories felt they could strengthen their position in Scotland by such a move. Whatever happens this analysis clearly indicates that short term goals are still likely to be predominant in either parties' thinking and, thus far, these have had consequences beneficial to the SNP.

Moreover, whether or not the assembly is approved in the immediate future may be immaterial. The questions raised by this state of affairs are not likely to fade away even if the SNP experiences the unlikely occurrence of a complete collapse. The political system as a whole and factions within both major parties have begun to define issues in terms of nationality. This became the case in terms of devolution by their refusal to consider extending the principle to all regions of the United Kingdom equally. As a result, devolution was automatically defined in terms of Scotland and Wales. In some ways, this has been occurring in numerous

policy areas for many years. What has been forgotten is the fact that once a political system has been altered to provide a more institutionalized means of representation for a group or interest, then that change tends to take on a life of its own organizationally. Thus the demand for an assembly can be seen as a logical step extension of previous decisions granting substantial authority to the Scottish Office. But even if Scottish politics would return to its former balance between the Labour and Conservative Parties, it is unlikely that public issues could be defined in the old manner. Both parties would be continually looking over their shoulder, so to speak, in fear or anticipation of a revived SNP. Consequently, they would tend to cater to Scotland's needs and accuse each other of ignoring her problems.

Conflict will also persist because of the changed context of the British political system. Even with the failure of the referendum, further devolution in terms of the administrative aspects of policy implementation is likely to occur. The need for more representative governmental structures is fairly commonly accepted. The context, though, has been changed even beyond this aspect. The presence of the SNP and the responses by the Labour and Conservative Parties to that presence, have stimulated an awareness of Scottishness that exceeds the bounds of nationalism. Many Scots and Scottish institutions, i.e., the Kirk, are more conscious of this identity is likely to be manifested in demands for governmental action regardless of the establishment of the assembly or the continued electoral success of the Nationalists. Politicians from the

major parties will be cognizant of this and will, at least, appear to respond. Some will do so out of belief that this is the proper response according to their political principles; others will do so because they fear the electoral consequences of not doing so. Either way it will occur.

The context has been changed in another important way and again it is likely to generate conflict whether or not an assembly is established. Since the beginning of Parliamentary consideration of devolution local governmental authorities, particularly in northern England have been exhibiting a sort of regionalism. This regionalism has so far taken the form of economic apprehensions. It has been pointed out that even without an assembly, Scotland receives more government funds per capita than most other economically underdeveloped areas of the United Kingdom. Local officials in the North have stated their fear that this disparity will increase if the assembly is approved. They have, consequently, pressed their local MPs to vote against the devolution bills and to obtain more development funds for the region. They have even begun to advocate governmental institutions, like the Scottish Development Agency, being established for this purpose. Should the assembly not be established, it is unlikely that this reaction will fade. More probably governmental authorities in these areas will continue to pressure for the removal of the aid disparity. Thus far the regionalism appears to be solely in the actions of local government officials and is not a matter of public involvement. Continued economic troubles in these areas, however, may provide the basis for a more populist response.

Britain is also likely to face another series of important questions arising from its preoccupation with devolution and the Constitution in recent years.⁵ Already serious discussion is underway on changing the electoral system, the advisability of a written constitution, a Bill of Rights, judicial review and even federalism. In that regard, the analysis suggests that a theoretical reexamination of the nature of constitutional change in Britain might be warranted. If devolution is a typical example, then immediate political interests may be more important in the making of fundamental decisions than are their constitutional ramifications. The constitutional significance may come afterwards. As a consequence, the British Constitution may have appeared to be more stable over time than was actually the case. Thus this analysis indicates that Britain will continue to face a most interesting, and significant number of serious constitutional issues in the near future.

Implications for Comparative Political Analysis

The interpretation presented above also has several implications for the comparative analysis of ethno-national political movements that I regard as important. They are basically derived

⁵Scholars are beginning to evaluate the possible impacts of the rise of the devolution issue. For example see: Vernon Bogdanor, "Devolution and the Constitution," Parliamentary Affairs, 31 (Summer 1978): 352-67; and, Harry Lazar, "Constitutional and Political Implications of Devolution," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the British Politics Group, New York, N.Y., September 1978.

from the fact that the Scottish case is considered an example of ethno-national politics, not necessarily a prototype. The interpretation presented in these pages is, consequently, not a rigid one. It accepts the idea that there is no single key variable capable of explaining the rise of Scottish nationalism, but rather that it is due to a complex set of variable interactions. The role of the analyst then, in attempting to theoretically explain the phenomenon, is to specify those interactions in their proper order. With this perspective in view, some of the conceptual implications of this analysis may now be considered.

First, this interpretation questions the utility of relying upon macro-level factors to explain micro-level political behavior. Factors such as national identity and conditions of uneven economic development have to become politically salient in order to be related to nationalistic political behavior. For the Scottish case this conceptualization based upon political action has the advantage of providing the linkage between identity and perceived inequalities on the one hand, and political behavior on the other. The actions of the political parties and government serve as the means for focusing attention on the perceived inequalities and articulating the grievances in terms of the national identity. They perform the important role of creating and transmitting perceptions in both directions. Without the performance of this role by the political institutions of the society and/or an other agent, the the perceptions may only be related to behavior by some kind of osmosis. Both identity and historical conditions of inequality

require an agent to make themselves politically salient. Thus all three factors are important in the process of developing nationalism.

Second, this analysis also suggests that the traditional theories of nationalism need to be broadened to include the cumulative effects of political institutions. There has been a tendency to consider politics as a reflection of conflicts and demands generated by other sectors of society.⁶ It has been forgotten that political actions may have some independent origins and consequences of their own. The importance of the Scottish case may be in its demonstration that different groups can perform the mobilization role for nationalism at different times in the history of a society. Those who have focused only upon the middle class or the intelligentsia as being capable of performing this role may have based their conclusions on a set of time-bound cases. This difference in who performs the mobilization task may also be the most significant distinction between the old nationalisms of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the contemporary ethno-national movements that are active in several Western societies. Analysts, consequently, need to be continually cognizant of the fact that politics and government have become central institutions in many societies and have impacts of their own on the generation of identities and societal conflicts.

⁶For a recent deprecation of the role of political institutions see Philip Rawkins, "Outsiders as Insiders: The Implications of Minority Nationalism in Scotland and Wales," Comparative Politics, 10 (July 1978): 519-34.

Third, the conclusions reached above also indicate that analytically the contemporary ethno-national movements of Western Europe may have more in common with examples of such politics in the Third World than is sometimes believed. Nationalist movements in the newer states of Africa and Asia were deliberately fostered by political parties and governments because other forces were not perceived capable of providing societal integration. In the Scottish case, the government did not intend to stimulate the growth of nationalism, but that was a consequence of its actions. The same situation may well exist in other Western societies. Thus comparability may be found between the two sets of cases in terms of the role played by politics in the formation of nationalism.

Fourth, furthermore, this interpretation has the advantage of reducing the oversimplifications required to make generalizations about the development of nationalism. There is a tendency to describe the process by which nationalism develops as a natural or inevitable outcome. In this model, nationalism is not inevitable. By drawing a balance between the three central factors it acknowledges that the actions taken by those in decisionmaking positions, both in and out of government, may have an impact. They may make wise or unwise, effective or ineffective policies. They are not, however, bound by irreversible laws of history. This does not mean that their actions may not be circumscribed by past decisions, time, and the availability of resources. It simply means that men have an opportunity to influence the nature of political change.

Fifth, this interpretation has an advantage over the other approaches that have been considered because of its ability to account for both political change and its absence. By focusing the analyst's attention on those conditions likely to spawn a nationalist movement and those agents capable of linking them to behavior, this interpretation can be useful in explaining why changes occur and why they have not. It recognizes thusly the fluid nature of political identities and movements, while appreciating the difficulties of altering past patterns of identification and behavior.

These implications are important for the comparative analysis of ethnic and nationalist politics because they suggest some future areas for research. By recognizing that differing agents, including political institutions, may perform the necessary linkage role between the macro- and micro-levels, this interpretation directs the analyst to look not only for conditions of identity and grievance, but also for the means by which they may acquire political saliency. That, in turn, may assist scholars in bringing a degree of unity and theoretical synthesis to a disparate field of inquiry.

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