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WAGING PEACE: A DEFENSE OF INTERPERSONAL PACIFISM

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Abstract

In this dissertation, I argue for a universal, absolutist form of pacifism. In chapter 1, I note the various ways people have used and abused the terms “pacifism” and “violence,” and I argue that while “violence” should not be construed as broadly as many philosophers would like, “pacifism” (and therefore typologies of pacifism) ought to be construed broadly enough to allow for strictly interpersonal forms of pacifism—that is, moral opposition to violence at the personal but not necessarily the political level. In chapter 2, I argue against unitary conceptions of moral judgment; there are at least three distinct conceptions of how moral value applies to objects under evaluation (deontological, hypothetical, and evaluative). I introduce the term “moral health” as a placeholder for any normative ethical theory the evaluative judgments of which function analogously to biological health in important ways. In chapter 3, based on the moral health model, I posit and defend four evaluative moral judgments which jointly constitute a universal, absolutist form of pacifism which I call “moral health pacifism”—namely that violence is bad for everyone, there are alternatives to violence even in situations that appear to call for violence, becoming a person who can perform those alternatives well is very morally demanding, and there ought to be persons who can perform those alternatives. In chapter 4, I present seven common objections to pacifism and argue that each fails to refute moral health pacifism (as well as other forms of pacifism).

CHAPTER 1: Pacifism and Its Varieties

I took two of the men and went around the flank...to outflank them and take them out. Well, I got around to the side and pointed my M16 at them and this person turned around and just stared, and I froze, 'cos it was a boy, I would say between the ages of twelve and fourteen. When he turned at me and looked, all of a sudden he turned his whole body and pointed his automatic weapon at me, I just opened up, fired the whole twenty rounds right at the kid, and he just laid there. I dropped my weapon and cried.

(Keegan & Holmes, 257)

Then I cautiously raised the upper half of my body into the tunnel until I was lying flat on my stomach. When I felt comfortable, I placed my Smith Wesson .38-caliber snub-nose (sent to me by my father for tunnel work) beside the flashlight and switched on the light, illuminating the tunnel. There, not more than 15 feet away, was a Viet Cong eating a handful of rice from a pouch on his lap. We looked at each other for what seemed to be an eternity, but in fact, was probably only a few seconds. Maybe it was the surprise of actually finding someone else there, or maybe it was just the absolute innocence of the situation, but neither of us reacted. After a moment, he put his pouch of rice on the floor of the tunnel beside him, turned his back to me and slowly started crawling away. I, in turn, switched off my flashlight, before slipping back into the lower tunnel and making my way back to the entrance. About 20 minutes later, we received word that another squad had killed a VC emerging from a tunnel 500 meters away. I never doubted who that VC was. To this day, I firmly believe that grunt and I could have ended the war sooner over a beer in Saigon than Henry Kissinger ever could by attending the peace talks.

—Michael Kathman 'Triangle Tunnel Rat' (Grossman, 2)

1.1 Introduction

Violence is messy. Unfortunately, so is pacifism. Some disagree. Jenny Teichman points out that the term “pacifism” was coined in 1902 by a Frenchman attending an international peace conference who explained that he meant to refer to antiwarism (Teichman 1986, 1). On this basis, Teichman insists the term refers solely

to antiwarist positions and not to positions morally opposed to all violence (Teichman 1986, 3-4). Richard Norman defines the term more narrowly as “the unconditional rejection of war” (Norman, 197). Duane Cady, too, posits that pacifism is essentially antiwarist (Cady 2010, 17), though he includes opposition to all violence as a version of pacifism (Cady 2010, 64). The historian Peter Brock also insists that pacifism is essentially antiwarism, arguing that pacifism should be kept distinct from concepts like nonviolence (Brock 2000, 54). Elsewhere he considers Gandhi’s nonviolence and nonviolent resistance “a version of pacifism” (Brock 1998, 2). The apparent discrepancy among those who insist on a restricted meaning of the term is telling.

The ideas underpinning pacifism are far older than the term itself, as Teichman admits (Teichman 1986, 10). As Peter Brock notes, the pre-history of pacifism likely begins at least two-and-a-half millennia ago with the Jain religion (Brock 1998, 1).¹ Jain leaders advocated *ahimsa* (a Sanskrit word meaning non-injury) to a radical degree; persons should avoid killing even the tiniest insects. Some devout Jains carry brooms and sweep pathways as they walk to avoid trampling any creatures (Teichman 2006, 153). The earliest Buddhists advocated *ahimsa* as well, though less rigidly than Jains, and in both religions, the strictest adherence became obligatory only among monastic orders; consequently, pacifism in both religions became largely “vocalized” (Brock 1998, 2). One possible exception may be the Indian Emperor Asoka who, after being repulsed at the carnage of a war he had conducted, went to

¹ Jainism may be much older than this. See Bowker 2003.

great pains to make clear his disdain for and intention to avoid war and violence within his kingdom and in his dealings with neighboring states (Teichman 2006, 155).

Aside from these ancient Eastern examples, pacifism does not appear in recorded history until the Christian era and largely remains within Christianity until fairly recently (Teichman 2006, 10). Some historians maintain that the early church was largely pacifist in ideology though there is some dispute about this.² From the end of the New Testament period to around the year 170 AD, there is no evidence of Christians serving the military (Bainton, 67-68; Cadoux, 97). This does not establish whether the early church was pacifist, but it may be evidence that the matter was not in dispute during this period; this is understandable since military service of the period involved many police functions that Christians would not have found objectionable, and since the earliest Christians likely did not qualify for military service (Brock 1998, 5). Some third century Christian canons forbade Christian soldiers from killing even if they were ordered to do so (Bos & Forest, 43; Webster, 153). If they did so, they were excluded from communion for a prescribed period (Bainton, 66). Anyone who had killed privately or in battle was permanently barred from ordination into the clergy (Webster, 171). Early in the Christian church, clergy were held to a much higher standard to avoid all violence and participation in warfare (Webster, 165ff). Even

² For defense of the pacifist view of the early church, see Bainton 1960 and Cadoux 1919; for criticism of this view see Kopel 2008a.

accidental killing could get a priest deposed (Webster, 170), and St. Nicholas of Myra (yes, *that* St. Nicholas) was nearly deposed for punching the heretic Arius in the face.³

There are a handful of clear rejections of violence or military service in early church history. The third century Christian writer Tertullian wrote, “Christ, in disarming Peter, unbelted every soldier” (Bainton, 73; Bos & Forest, 103). A twenty-one year old Maximilian appeared in a North African court (in what is now Algeria) in 295 AD on account of refusing a summons to serve in the Roman army because, as Maximilian claimed, “I cannot serve. I cannot commit a sin. I am a Christian” (Brock 1998, 7-8; Webster, 187).⁴ In the early to mid-fourth century, during the reign of the Roman Emperor Julian, a young soldier named Martin (later to become the Bishop of Tours in 370 AD) requested discharge from the military, saying, “I am the soldier of Christ: it is not lawful for me to fight,” even offering to stand in the next day’s battle holding nothing but a cross to prove he was not motivated by cowardice (Brock 1991, 6; Hornus, 142-147; Webster, 187-188). Similarly clear statements against violence and military service were made by Lactantius (tutor to Constantine’s son) and Origen (Bainton, 73-74; Brock 1972, 10-21). But these instances appear to be islands in the midst of an ocean of Christian writers making less clear, more nuanced statements and, in the cases of Ambrose and Augustine, statements which consider war under certain conditions in some sense acceptable (Bainton, 89-93; Teichman 2006, 23).

³ See Harmon 2013 and “Nicholas the Wonderworker, Archbishop of Myra” 2008.

⁴ Whether Maximilian’s statement should be interpreted as an endorsement of pacifism is disputed. See Brock 1994.

Clearer Christian positions rejecting war and violence come much later with the advent of Christian splinter groups. Prior to the Reformation, pacifist Christian sects were scarce. The Waldensians formed late in the twelfth century in Lyons in modern France and rejected war and the death penalty (Brock 1991, 9), as did the English Lollards, followers of John Wycliffe formed in the mid-fourteenth century (Lowe, 405-406). In fifteenth century Bohemia, the Czech Brethren, led by Petr Chelčický, taught that to take a life was a sin in every instance (Brock 1972, 35). With the onslaught of the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century, various Christian pacifist sects appear especially among the Anabaptists, such as the Swiss Brethren, the Mennonites, and the Hutterites, all of which object in varying degrees to participation in state or worldly affairs in part because of the violence therein (Brock 1998, 13-26). Quakerism arose in seventeenth century England, separate from the Anabaptist movements; Quakerism was not immediately pacifist, but by the latter half of the seventeenth century the Quakers had declared they would never “fight a war against any man with outward weapons” (Brock 1998, 30). Christian sectarian pacifism continued to rise and splinter, but the nineteenth century saw the emergence of civic pacifist organizations such as The Massachusetts Peace Society in 1815, The London Peace Society in 1816 (Brock 1972, 378), The American Peace Society in 1828, and the New England Nonresistance Society in 1838, the latter of which was organized by William Lloyd Garrison, famous supporter of abolitionism and women’s suffrage (Brock 1968, 113ff).

Teichman’s claim notwithstanding, the term “pacifism” has been used retroactively to refer to some or all of these historical movements and to positions

other than mere antiwarism. The term has been used to describe Gandhian nonviolence (Lackey, 535).⁵ It has been used to refer to Tolstoyan nonresistance and the accompanying ascetic lifestyle (J. Lewis, 51), and the view that “I may not use violence to resist an attacker (or to protect innocents)” (Filice, 120). It has even been used to describe persons who agree with Aquinas’s just war criteria and persons who hold that war was perhaps once morally justifiable but is no longer so (Sterba, 35; Cady 2010, 70f).⁶ Albert Einstein used it to refer to opposition to force under any circumstances “except when confronted by an enemy who pursues the destruction of life as an *end in itself*” (Einstein 2005, 161), which Einstein held entailed support for the allies in World War II and the American development of a nuclear weapon (Einstein 2007). This is not to say that there is no room for criticism of the term’s use, but given the frequency with which the term is broadly used, it seems to me there is little to be gained at this point from playing gatekeeper.

In fact, there are reasons to resist such gatekeeping. To say that a person’s moral opposition to forms of violence other than warfare is only incidentally related to whether she is a pacifist seems mistaken; yet if the term refers solely to antiwarism, that is what follows.⁷ Admittedly, some pacifisms are strictly antiwarist and do not

⁵ In fact, Gandhian nonviolence has been treated by some social scientists as a paradigm case of pacifism; Gregory Elliot writes, “Gandhi’s precepts are probably the best available source for conceptualizing pacifism” (Elliot, 30).

⁶ Sterba’s use of the term was strongly resisted by some. See Neu 2011 and Reitain 1994. But if their criticisms are correct, it would also rule out “contingent pacifism” (See May 2011 and also Rawls, 382), “technological pacifism,” “nuclear pacifism,” “ecological pacifism” (Cady 2010, 70-74), and certainly Bertrand Russell’s “relative pacifism” as pacifisms (Russell 1943).

⁷ As a matter of course I use the feminine “she” when a singular pronoun is called for. I do not wish for this to suggest that I am ignoring the fact that issues of violence are significantly tied to issues

condemn all interpersonal violence.⁸ But some pacifists' opposition to warfare stems from their moral opposition to violence.⁹ It seems strange to say that Quakers are pacifists only in virtue of morally opposing warfare, but not in virtue of their general "peace testimony" which includes opposition to any interpersonal violence or that Tolstoy's opposition to all violence is not *constitutive* of Tolstoy's pacifism.¹⁰ Further, there seem to be clear examples of pacifism that are not antiwarist. One example is what Douglas Lackey calls "private pacifism"—the "pacifist who renounces violence in personal relations but condones the use of force in the political sphere" (Lackey, 536). Another example may be Mennonites who, while not condoning warfare, allow that violence may be in some sense permissible for states (Hershberger, 253). And lastly, the tired objection to pacifism, "What would you do if someone threatened to harm your loved one?" would make little sense as an objection if "pacifism" were strictly an antiwarist position.¹¹

of gender or that there are gender stereotype issues latent within many of the cases of violence I will discuss throughout; my standard use of "she" and "her" is merely a stylistic grammatical preference.

⁸ Both Cochran and Reitan present positions in which war is never justified though self-defensive killing is justified under certain conditions (Cochran 1996 and Reitan 1994). Both positions condemn war on the basis of the conditions under which any killing is justified. Consider also Bertrand Russell's "relative pacifism" and Cady's "technological pacifism" (Russell, 8; Cady 2010, 70). Robert Holmes opposes killing in warfare because it involves commanding others to kill and killing on command (Holmes, 398).

⁹ Perhaps it is better, as Richard Routley suggests, to say that some pacifisms are "comprehensive" in that they oppose warfare and interpersonal violence (Routley 1984, 118); however, rather than calling other pacifisms non-comprehensive, Routley refers to them as "standard pacifism," entailing that pacifist views about interpersonal violence are non-standard, which again relegates them to a secondary or fringe status.

¹⁰ Concerning Quaker "peace testimony," See "A Declaration of the Harmless and Innocent People of God, called Quakers" 1660. Concerning Tolstoy's rejection of all violence, see Tolstoy 1902.

¹¹ David Cochran responds to this objection on exactly these grounds—that because pacifism is essentially an antiwarist doctrine, objecting on the grounds of individual self-defense misses the point (D. Cochran 1996). Further, John Howard Yoder understands the thrust of this objection to be that the interpersonal and warfare cases are analogous (Yoder 1974, 87ff). Cochran is correct in the case of

My aim is not to police the terminology police, nor to claim that the term is hopelessly stretched,¹² but to point out that, for good or ill, pacifism is a big tent and the boundaries are fuzzy. A broad definition like “opposition to war or violence” probably suffices (Dombrowski, 5). Better, then, to organize the mess than to argue over who should be chucked out. And there are good reasons for attempting to organize the mess. Some pacifists agree on very little. Some objections to pacifism apply to some forms but not others. Thus, a typology of pacifisms may improve both internal and external analyses of pacifism.

I also have personal interests in offering a typology. Restricting pacifism to antiwarism (and any typology based on that restriction) undermines the importance of pacifism’s relationship to interpersonal violence. This is troublesome for pacifisms the primary (or sole) concern of which is interpersonal violence. And it seems strange in view of the inextricable relationship between warfare and interpersonal violence. As Noam Zohar observes, we cannot deal with the question of when a state may go to war without in some sense dealing with the question of when individual persons in one state may kill individual persons in another (Zohar, 606). Likewise, Soran Reader points out that arguing that war can be justified amounts to the claim that some harm against particular persons is justifiable (Reader, 169-170). Eric Reitan notes that

pacifisms that are solely antiwarist and Yoder is correct that the objection sometimes rests on the assumption of analogy between warfare and interpersonal self-defense or defense of third parties under attack, but as I will show in Chapter 4, a great many persons have objected to pacifism using the interpersonal case because moral opposition to interpersonal violence is *part and parcel* of the pacifism to which they were objecting. Cochran is right that pacifism need not include this tenet, but my point is it may.

¹² I am not quite as pessimistic as David Cortright who writes, “The meaning of pacifism has been distorted beyond the point where it can be restored to the original intent,” and therefore, Cortright concludes, the term ought to be discarded altogether (Cortright, 334).

distinguishing between persons who collectively commit violence one day then declare themselves a state the next day and commit violence again seems at least on first glance to be absurd (Retain 1994, 118-119). Adin Ballou writes with irony, “Verily there is magic in numbers!” as he finds no apparent qualitative difference between a small band of pirates raiding the high seas and Alexander the Great’s wars of conquest (Ballou 1845, 52). I hold a view that predominantly concerns interpersonal violence, and I believe it is a type of pacifism; a proper understanding of the term and its types ought to leave room for such a view.

Further, the primary purview of pacifism, it seems to me, is not warfare but violence.¹³ Even pacifisms that are strictly antiwarist are antiwarist in virtue of some feature of the violence that occurs therein.¹⁴ There is some view a person holds regarding violence of a certain scope or type in virtue of which that person is a pacifist and other persons not holding that view are non-pacifists—perhaps the view that some scope or type of violence is bad, immoral, or unjustifiable. Because violence is so central to pacifism, it is important to have a sufficiently clear conception of violence in order to categorize pacifisms properly. In what follows, I aim to clarify what is meant

¹³ Cheyney Ryan misses the mark in claiming that opposition to *killing* is at the heart of pacifist opposition to warfare (Ryan 1983, 509). Distinctions between “killing” and “violence” in discussion of pacifism seem sloppy, allowing for bizarre “pacifist” possibilities such as beating or torturing someone *nearly* to death. The only motivation I can see to justify the distinction is the possibility of violence-less killing (for instance, poisoning someone in a painless way). But this identifies a difficulty in defining violence, not pacifism.

¹⁴ Those who find this claim contentious might consider the possibility of a violence-less war—for example, an *utterly* technological battle in which the only objects of damage were machines or technological infrastructure (Routley 1984, 129-130). While there might still be good reason to oppose such a war, does it seem appropriate to call opponents of such a war “pacifists”? Even if the answer is “yes,” I take it that the answer is less obvious in this case than in the case of violent warfare, which shows that “pacifism” is intuitively linked to “violence” in a way that it is not so linked to “war.”

by “violence” and survey many unhelpful uses and abuses of the term. I will then survey several typologies of pacifism I think are flawed in significant ways. I will present and defend my own typology of pacifism and conclude by outlining the way in which I intend to develop and defend my own version of pacifism.

1.2 What is Violence?

“Violence” has suffered far more misuse and stretching than “pacifism.” Some have used the term so broadly that it is difficult to imagine what would not count as violence.¹⁵ According to Vittorio Bufacchi, these are “comprehensive conceptions of violence” (heretofore “CCV”) as opposed to “minimalist conceptions of violence” which focus solely on excessive or destructive uses of physical force (Bufacchi 2005, 197-198). Despite counterintuitive applications of the term “violence,” CCV appear to have significant support among scholars. CCV are certainly not without motivation. According to Bufacchi, defenders of CCV are likely inclined to define “violence” from the victims’ perspectives rather than the perpetrators’ or bystanders’ perspectives (Bufacchi 2005, 199). Joseph Betz argues that part of the function of the term “violence” is to express the seriousness of a phenomenon about which people might otherwise be dismissive or inattentive because describing things as “violent” or “violence” entails they are particularly worthy of vehement condemnation (Betz, 341).

¹⁵ As some have pointed out, some views are so broad that violence seems little more than a synonym for “social wrongdoing” (Betz, 341) or “everything that is evil or morally wrong” (Bufacchi 2005, 197).

According to Trudy Govier, CCV may be advantageous because minimalist conceptions allow critics to claim that violence can be remedied by mere “law and order” solutions while ignoring structural injustices that are antithetical to peace (Govier, 65).

Some CCV advocates have argued that “violence” should be understood as any violation of a person’s rights.¹⁶ According to Newton Garver, violence is etymologically linked to “violation,” violence violates persons, there are some rights that are essential to personhood—including the right to determine what one’s body does or what is done to it, and the right to make one’s own decisions—and thus violence is any violation of any such right (Garver, 257-258). In one sense, this view of violence is not broad enough, entailing that violence cannot be committed against non-persons. This would mean that the Oklahoma City man who in 2013 so severely abused a 10-week old puppy that the dog’s lip was severed and hanging from its face committed no violence.¹⁷ It would also mean that the last human on earth would be incapable of committing violence, even if she set about viciously destroying every animal or plant in her path.¹⁸ Both implications are clearly false. But, in another sense, views like Garver’s are far too broad. Acts such as doctors failing to inform patients of their medical conditions or filming persons without their permissions would constitute violence. Furthermore, such a view seems to undermine the seriousness of important social causes such as domestic violence or studies of the connection between

¹⁶ See Galtung 1969, Garver 1968, Riga 1969, and Salmi 1993.

¹⁷ See Manwarren 2013. On Garver’s account, the only way the man’s actions could have counted as violence is if ownership of the puppy was a right of some person, in which case, the man’s actions would count as violence against that person, but not against the puppy *per se*.

¹⁸ See Routley 1973.

masculinity and violence.¹⁹ Neither domestic violence nor studies of masculinity and violence concern mere violations of rights that involve no use of destructive or injurious physical force.

Some CCV advocates argue that “violence” is inherently evaluative or normative—that is, to call something violence entails that it is wrong, bad, immoral, etc.²⁰ According to Joseph Betz, use of physical force for helpful or socially constructive purposes (as in the case of police officers doing what their jobs require of them) should be called “coercive force,” whereas “violence” is the use of physical force for harmful, destructive, illegitimate purposes (Betz, 346-347). This view must be discarded for at least three reasons. First, it makes violence unobservable. Suppose I witness a beheading. On this view, I cannot know whether that beheading is an act of violence without somehow obtaining additional information about the legitimacy or socially constructive or destructive purposes of the act. I take it that anyone can recognize on sight that a beheading is, in the nature of the case, an act of violence. Second, on this view, the claim that “all violence is immoral” would be a tautology (Miller, 23), and thus, trivially true (Wyckoff, 340). But “all violence is immoral” is not a trivial claim (just ask any pacifist), and it is not true by definition (just ask any non-pacifist). Third, on this view, legitimate or helpful uses of “coercive force” would constitute *non-violence*. If I were to discover that the beheading I witnessed was a legitimate use of force by the state for the constructive social purpose of protecting

¹⁹ See for example Breines et al 2000, Wilson & Daly 1985, & Wiener 2004.

²⁰ See Betz 1977; Garver 1968; Gray 1970; Nielsen 1981; Wolff 1969.

itself from an otherwise unstoppable criminal, it would follow that the state disposed of the criminal *nonviolently*. This absurd consequence shows that moral evaluation does not follow from the mere use of the term (Bäck, 221).

Some CCV advocates argue that violence can be constituted by non-acts or committed by non-agents.²¹ According to Johann Galtung, mere structural or institutional injustice, in which there is no subject who is committing an act, counts as violence (Galtung, 170). Garver agrees that phenomena like systemic oppression of the poor count as violence (Garver, 264). Betz claims that damage caused by meteorological phenomena counts as violence (Betz, 343-344). I can only conclude that this view stems from a failure to recognize non-literal uses of language. Structural injustices and systemic oppression of the poor can be so severe and debilitating that it is *as though* the state killed or assaulted the poor. A weatherman may describe the wind as “biting” cold; it does not follow that the wind has a mouth nor does it follow that the literal use of the term “biting” refers to an act that requires no mouth. It simply evinces the pervasiveness of figurative language use.

I believe this also explains why many CCV advocates argue that mere psychological harms constitute violence.²² The *metaphorical* comparison of violence to psychological harms such as verbal abuse is apt, but it does not follow that the

²¹ See Betz 1977; Galtung 1969; Garver 1968.

²² See Audi 1971, Bäck 2004, Bufacchi 2005, Coady 2008, and Garver 1968.

literal application of “violence” to such instances is appropriate.²³ Govier analyses the inclination to call mere psychological harms violence in the following way:

[Psychological abuses] are harmful, as harmful sometimes as physically violent actions, and reasonably judged in light of that harmfulness to be bad. Thus, to some, it seems appropriate to label them violent, which implies a broad definition of violence. The underlying argument here is by analogy: if X involves physical force and is harmful and deemed violent, and Y, involving non-physical force, is just as harmful as X, then Y should be deemed violent too. (Govier, 74)

While Govier may correctly portray the rationale behind the position, she does not make it more plausible. Two diseases may cause similar symptoms and degrees of harm in those infected; it does not follow that one disease is an instance of the other.

Some CCV advocates argue that violence can be committed by omission.²⁴

According to John Harris, an act of violence “occurs when injury or suffering is inflicted upon a person or persons by an agent who knows (or ought reasonably to have known), that his actions would result in the harm in question” (Harris 1980, 19).

According to Bufacchi and Harris, this may occur not only when a person acts but also fails to act, such as burning food by *not* having turned off the stove (Bufacchi 2006,

²³ That this is a metaphorical use is highlighted by campaign ads launched in recent years aimed at increasing awareness of verbal abuse. In one advertisement produced by the Juvenile Protection Association, a crying child is depicted as being strangled, not by a human hand, but by a collection of harmful words formed in the shape of a hand (Kid 1 “Verbal Abuse is Still Abuse” 2009). In another advertisement produced by the Aware Helpline in Singapore, a man is pictured with his mouth wide open, an arm is protruding out of his mouth, and the fist at the end of the arm is making contact with a woman’s face (MacLeod 2008). The thrust of the ads is to disabuse relevant persons of the notion that verbal abuse is somehow okay or at least not as bad as or excusable in comparison to physical abuse. The point of the ads is not that both constitute violence, but that both constitute abuse.

²⁴ See Bufacchi 2006 and Harris 1980.

96).²⁵ Harris's definition is clearly too broad. On this view, if I failed to carry out putrid garbage, resulting in my wife suffering nausea at the smell, I would have committed violence (which, again, undermines the importance of the term "domestic violence"). Further, this view entails that I commit violence at virtually every moment; I could always be doing something else that would prevent harm to someone—charity work perhaps—and I am aware that my failure to do so entails that some persons will suffer that otherwise would not have suffered had I engaged in those activities. But this is true even if I do engage in a specific act of charity; I still fail to act in *other* charitable ways that benefit persons *other* than those I am currently helping. On this view, it is quite impossible to be nonviolent or practice pacifism at all. According to Harris, "A concept of violence must enable us to distinguish violent methods of dealing with people from methods that are not violence" (Harris 1980, 13). Harris's conception of violence fails on just this point (as does Bufacchi's for the same reason).

Despite their motivations and advantages, CCV, on the whole, constitute unhelpful misuses of the term "violence," and, unlike "pacifism," the stretches of the term are worth policing. Hopefully, I have somewhat clarified what violence is not. It is much harder to state exactly what violence is. If violence is not what most CCV advocates claim, then it must be closer to what advocates of minimalist conceptions of

²⁵ I concede we often attribute such incidents to what we fail to do, but in terms of identifying which event caused another, I take it this is just a sloppy use of language. The food on the stove burned not because of what I failed to do, but because I *did* put food on the stove and turn up the heat to a level sufficient to burn food over a certain amount of time. Suppose it was my intention to burn the food because I like burnt food; in that case, what caused the food to burn? Not my *failure* to turn off the heat sooner because I never intended to do any such thing. "Acts of omission" is in an important sense a misnomer.

violence claim—views that focus on the destructiveness of some acts of physical force. However, even minimalist conceptions of violence are not without problems. Issues of distance, instrumentality, forcefulness, intention, and success all raise significant difficulties even for minimalist conceptions. Is it an act of violence to program a bomb to detonate on Mars a million years from now?—and, if so, is it an act of violence now, when it detonates, or both? Is it violence to poison someone secretly and painlessly? Is it an act of violence for a child who is completely incapable of causing any detectable damage or discomfort to kick someone? Is it an act of violence if a gun in my hand malfunctions and *accidentally* discharges and kills people? Is it an act of violence if an assassin fires a bullet at someone but misses or is it an act of violence to throw a punch that does not make contact? Nearly any answer to such questions only raises more cases that are equally tricky. Richard Routley astutely observes that “violence (like pain) is a partly quantitative matter” and thus “there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the scale with small amounts of violence greater than zero” (Routley 1984, 127).²⁶ Thus, any “precise” definition of violence based on a minimalist conception of violence will likely involve arbitrary cut-off points.

Despite these difficulties that do not allow for a precise definition of violence, there is at least one reason to prefer a minimalist conception of violence for present purposes.²⁷ If, as I argued above, the primary purview of pacifism is some form of moral opposition to violence, then it is helpful to think of violence as essentially that to

²⁶ As of 1983, Richard Routley goes by the name Richard Sylvan, though all the works I will be citing by this author were published under the name “Richard Routley.”

²⁷ That is, one reason in addition to avoiding CCV’s bizarre attributions of “violence.”

which a pacifist *qua pacifist* is morally opposed. I think Routley is correct that violence picks out some subclass of acts of physical force. “Subclass” is significant because violence is clearly not synonymous with “force” despite several authors’ claims to the contrary.²⁸ Opening a stubborn jar of jam or performing CPR are both acts of physical force, and perhaps might even be done *violently*, but neither is an act of violence.²⁹ Nevertheless, it seems the important distinction between pacifists and non-pacifists is this: there are certain conditions under which non-pacifists judge some acts of physical force to be morally good, right, justifiable, or excusable whereas pacifists judge those acts of physical force under those conditions to be morally bad, wrong, unjustifiable, or inexcusable.³⁰ Thus, the concern of pacifism as a moral view about violence is the nature and character of such acts. I will add to Routley’s definition that violence should be thought of as a subclass of acts of physical force that are in some sense injurious by design or intent. I do not aim to posit this as a precise definition for which there are no troubling cases. This definition though provides sufficient clarity for understanding what is at stake between pacifists and non-pacifists.

²⁸ See the following for interchangeable uses of “violence” and “force”: Cady 2010, 64; Carhart, 1; Niebuhr 1928, 218; Teichman 1986, 4. Andrew Kelley also fails to recognize the important distinction between violence and force (Kelley, 222).

²⁹ As John Harris points out, “even a cup of tea may be stirred violently.” (Harris 1974, 215) The jar of jam example comes from Routley 1984, 119.

³⁰ I will argue in 3.1.3 these conditions fall under four types and will refer to them all as “pacifist dilemmas.”

1.3 A Typology of Pacifism

Several authors present typologies of pacifism each with its own strengths and weaknesses. In his book, *Varieties of Pacifism*, Peter Brock does not offer any means of categorizing pacifisms by ideological differences, but presents various pockets of pacifist adherents divided only by historical period (Brock 1998). This is quite unhelpful in cases of one historical period in which there are a number of pacifists with significant ideological differences. John Howard Yoder attempts to categorize pacifisms according to each pacifism's rationale, motivation, and ideological context (Yoder 1992a). As a result, Yoder lists as many as thirty distinct kinds of pacifism, a number far too numerous to be of much help in understanding *basic* ideological differences between pacifists.

A somewhat more careful treatment is that of Daniel Dombrowski who posits three basic types of pacifism: "Nuclear pacifism"—the view that wars could be just "except when nuclear weapons and other weapons that killed, or threatened to kill, innocents came into play," pacifism as an opposition to all warfare, and pacifism as an opposition to all violence (Dombrowski, 88). In addition, Dombrowski says there are three different "modes of approach" by which one might hold each of the three views—that the view in question is permissible, obligatory, or supererogatory for a person to hold (Dombrowski, 89).

Dombrowski's typology is defective for at least two reasons. First, separating "nuclear pacifism" in this way is arbitrary. Any military weapons from any era can

result in the death of innocents. Further, some might reject nuclear warfare not on the basis of non-combatant deaths, but on the basis of ecological damage (Cady 2010, 74). Second, Dombrowski's use of the permissible/duty/supererogatory scheme is an oversimplification; as I will argue in Chapter 2, there are moral claims (and therefore possible types of pacifism) that do not fit into this scheme.³¹

Duane Cady does not offer categories for pacifism, but presents pacifisms as a spectrum from most to least extreme (Cady 2010, 63). Cady suggests that at the extreme end is "absolute pacifism"—the view that it is always wrong "for anyone to use force against another human being" (Cady 2010, 64), and at the least extreme end is "pragmatic pacifism"—the view that generally "war tends to promote not relieve human misery" (Cady 2010, 75). Cady claims that pacifisms blur together along the spectrum partly because of the blurry nature of violence itself (Cady 2010, 66). This may be true, but Cady's spectrum is still unhelpful. There is more than one spectrum along which pacifists might be placed.³² Cady's spectrum does not allow that some pacifisms are vocational in nature—that participation in certain types of violence or warfare is in some sense bad or wrong *for certain parties*. Further, Cady acknowledges a distinction between one's position on interpersonal violence and one's position on the legitimacy of warfare (Cady 2010, 66). This difference in types of violence allows

³¹ In his defense, Dombrowski claims only to be categorizing types of *Christian* pacifism. But given his imposition of deontological modes of approach onto the categories, it is not clear that he succeeds even in accomplishing this much.

³² Cady claims that his spectrum represents the shift "from principles of obligation independent of possible results to moral judgments based on anticipated consequences" (Cady 2010, 76). As others have pointed out, Cady's continuum does not appear to leave room for pacifisms based in virtue-based theories of ethics (Kelley, 220). Even so, the spectrum should be discarded because a pacifist might be a pacifist in virtue of both concerns equally (a "pan-spectrum" pacifist).

for pacifisms that differ in kind rather than degree. Cady's spectrum, then, cannot accommodate different *ways* in which pacifisms might differ, and thus should be discarded altogether.

Douglas Lackey suggests a simple fourfold division of pacifisms: The universal pacifist opposed to all killing, the universal pacifist opposed to all violence, the private pacifist opposed to personal self-defense but not opposed to state violence, and the antiwarist pacifist that opposes warfare but not personal self-defense (Lackey, 530). While Lackey's inclusion of private pacifism is an improvement on previous systems, Lackey's typology still does not allow for vocational forms of pacifism.³³ Lackey also fails to distribute views about war and state violence across his categories consistently (since there are forms of state violence other than warfare) and strangely singles out the issue of self-defense despite there being other kinds of violence germane to pacifism such as violence committed in defense of third parties under attack.³⁴

Part of the flaw in all these typologies is the messiness of pacifism as such. So far as I can tell, no typology will be utterly immune from this difficulty. But I believe the previous attempts can be improved upon. The most helpful starting point for organizing pacifisms comes, interestingly, from a staunch opponent of pacifism, Jan Narveson, who clarifies the issue of pacifism with two basic questions: how much

³³ For example, Eastern Orthodox clergy are forbidden from warfare or killing in a way that the laity are not (Webster, 165ff). Jain and Buddhist monks are also forbidden from military service and are not even allowed to be present on a battle field (Brock 1998, 1). Other forms of pacifism are vocational or "two-tiered" (Brock 2000, 55).

³⁴ Andrew Fiala seems to provide a careful typology of pacifism, but appears to add to and even change the criteria of categories throughout his analysis (Fiala 2014a).

violence should be opposed and who should be subject to this opposition (Narveson 1965, 259-260)? I believe these two criteria are all that are needed to create a simple yet accurate conceptual map of the views known as “pacifism.”

The first criterion Narveson phrases in a strictly quantitative way (“how much?”), but I believe it should be phrased to include a qualitative distinction between types of violence: To how many types of violence does the moral opposition apply?³⁵ Some pacifists morally oppose all types of violence; some morally oppose some types of violence. The second criterion concerns the scope of persons who ought to refrain from violence: To whom does the moral opposition to (all or some) violence apply? Some pacifists hold that pacifism applies to everyone; some hold that pacifism applies to some. From these two criteria come four types of pacifism:

		Range of Violence	
		Absolutist	Non-absolutist
Range of Persons	Universal	Moral opposition to any persons committing any type of violence	Moral opposition to any persons committing some types of violence
	Non-universal	Moral opposition to some persons committing any type of violence	Moral opposition to some persons committing some types of violence

³⁵ The strictly quantitative formulation allows for the strange idea that a pacifist might be opposed to killing twelve people but not eleven or other arbitrary differences.

One apparent weakness in my typology is that its categories do not exclude *non-pacifist* positions. Nearly *anyone* falls in the non-universal, non-absolutist category, morally opposing *some* people committing *some* types of violence. This will likely be a feature of any typology that attempts to be inclusive of all pacifist positions due to the broad use of the term. My typology is not meant to test whether a given view is pacifist or non-pacifist; rather, it is intended to categorize a view *given* that it is pacifist. Further, the inclusivity of my typology is a strength because it does not unduly exclude legitimately pacifist views, and it allows for a diverse set of doctrines to be simply and clearly categorized. Another strength of my typology is that it does not specify the nature of the moral opposition to violence and therefore allows for a variety of normative ethical views that may underpin pacifism.

Universal absolutist pacifism would include such views as Leo Tolstoy's. Tolstoy advocates "non-resistance" which entails that no one's evil actions should be resisted by coercion; this includes not only interpersonal relations but also all state institutions, since, as Tolstoy argues, the state is little more than a convoluted mechanism for committing violence (Tolstoy 1902, 47). Many other forms of non-resistance such as that advocated by Adin Ballou, The New England Nonresistance Society, and many Mennonites also constitute forms of universal absolutist pacifism.³⁶ Gandhi's

³⁶ See Ballou 2006 and The New England Nonresistance Society 1838. Mennonites are somewhat difficult to categorize due to vague language in their confessions. For example, all violence is spoken of as bad but state violence is spoken of as acceptable in some sense "outside the perfection of Christ" (Sattler 1527). This might mean that Mennonite pacifism is a two-tier system where only some parties ought to refrain from violence, or it might mean that Mennonites have a nuanced view of normative value that is agent sensitive; consider, for example, Hershberger's distinction in "levels" and

nonviolence likely fits in this category too. His *ahimsa* [“nonviolence”] principle is meant to be absolute and apply to everyone despite his admission that some violence is necessary for life and unavoidable (Gandhi 2013, 443-444), and he admits that some people will be unable to practice *ahimsa* and therefore should choose violence as a second-best option (Gandhi 1948, 148).

Non-universal absolutist pacifism would include two-tiered systems of pacifism such as that of Eastern Orthodox clergy (Webster, 165ff)³⁷ and Buddhist monastics (Brock 1998, 1) who are subject to a stricter ethical standard than the laity. Personal pacifists such as Craig Ihara and Eric Reitan may be appropriately called non-universal absolutists; both posit a life of nonviolence as a moral ideal which only some persons might be duty bound to live.³⁸ Some Quakers may be non-universal absolutist pacifists in virtue of opposing interpersonal violence and warfare but allowing for the exception of the “magistrate’s protection of the innocent”—i.e., the basic police and judicial function of the state (Penington 1863; Teichman 1986, 31).

Universal Non-absolutist pacifists would include strictly antiwarist pacifists who hold that no one ought to engage in warfare but allow violence in personal self-defense or for defending third parties under attack. The term also describes what Lackey refers to as “private pacifism”—the view that state violence is acceptable but

use of the term “sub-Christian world” to describe the acceptability of state violence (Hershberger, 27, 253).

³⁷ The Orthodox case is somewhat tricky because the “upper” tier of the two-tiered system is intended to be a vocation by which one models adherence to the same ethical standard to which all Orthodox Christians are called (Webster, 180).

³⁸ See Ihara 1978; Ihara 1988; Reitan 2000.

violence used in personal self-defense is not, which, according to Peter Brock, is the view of Martin Luther and Reinhold Niebuhr (Brock 1998, 3-4).

Non-universal Non-absolutist pacifism describes views such as just war pacifism—the view according to which “due to the stringent requirements of just war theory, only very rarely will participation in a massive use of lethal force in warfare be morally justified” (Sterba, 35-36). Also among these views are what Cady calls “technological pacifism” and “ecological pacifism”—views according to which, while war may have been justifiable in the past, war is no longer justifiable due to the nature of modern weaponry and the kind or amount of damage it causes (Cady 2010, 70ff).

1.4 Toward a Pacifism of Interpersonal Violence

In what follows, I aim to develop and defend a version of pacifism the focus of which is interpersonal violence. Strictly speaking, it is a universal absolutist pacifism—a moral opposition to any persons committing any violence. However, the pacifism I aim to develop is consistent with the fact that many persons who commit violence are neither blameworthy nor in breach of moral duty, and it is consistent with such claims as “there are persons who ought to commit violence.” These puzzling features of my pacifism result from the complexities and nuances that permeate moral judgments—complexities and nuances which, as I will argue, many ethical theorists fail to acknowledge. In Chapter 2, I will argue that there are distinct forms of value judgments which permeate our moral language and are not reducible to one another.

I will argue that some kinds of moral judgments operate in ways analogous to biological health. This analogy is advantageous because anyone in agreement with these analogues need not agree with my view of normative ethics to agree with the theses which constitute my version of pacifism. In Chapter 3, based on the health analogy, I will present and defend the four theses that constitute my pacifist view. In Chapter 4, I will consider seven common objections to pacifism and argue that all seven fail to refute my pacifist view and likely fail to refute other forms of pacifism as well.

Chapter 2: Deweyan Normativity and Morality as Analogous to Health

In this chapter, I will summarize John Dewey's work in his essay "Three Independent Factors in Morals." I will adapt Dewey's position to argue that morality and moral language are not conceptually unitary or univocal; rather, there are three distinct conceptions of moral value that are not reducible to one another. I will argue that moral claims can correspond to a sole conception and do not necessarily entail moral claims based on the other conceptions. I will present a model for morality based on only one conception; however, I do not aim to spell out the precise goods and principles of such a morality. I will instead present ten claims about biological health and argue that morality is analogous to health in at least these ten ways and present advantages to this model. If it is plausible to conceive of morality according to the claims I present, then (in the next chapter), I will advance a version of pacifism based on the health analogy.

2.1 Dewey's Three Independent Factors in Morals

According to John Dewey, there are three independent factors in morals. Each factor has a sound basis, the factors are not reducible to each other, and the factors are not reducible to a single commensurable principle. These three factors are present in most if not all moral situations, and they are the source of moral conflict. Conventional moral theories typically err in that they presuppose that all morality can be reduced to only one of these factors (Dewey 1966, 199).

Dewey identifies the three factors as the good, the right, and the virtuous. By claiming that each has a sound basis, Dewey means that each factor originates from concrete experience. The good arises in the appetites and desires of human beings. Human beings seek out certain ends, and by use of reason they determine the greatest means of fulfilling their appetites and desires. People come to recognize which appetites and desires are most important. Highly-ranked appetites and desires become values, and eventually, whatever can be described as the common thread between them becomes “the good.” They are ends that ought to be sought because the achievement of those ends is highly valuable for the achiever relative to competing ends (Dewey 1966, 201).

The right originates differently. When a person aims to fulfill her appetites and desires, she naturally (perhaps subconsciously) tries to bend others to cooperate in her “plan of life” in an attempt to achieve her ends (Dewey 1966, 201). Her attempts to enlist others into her end-seeking will not necessarily be met with resistance. Cooperating in her plan of life will sometimes help others achieve their own ends. Eventually, people make demands on each other to the extent that those on whom the demands are made do not rebel, but recognize a certain set of demands as legitimate. From the perspective of the demander, these demands are rights; from the perspective of those expected to comply, the demands are duties. This system of legitimate demands is the factor Dewey calls “the right.”

Many philosophers acknowledge the good and the right and that there is a distinction between them (though some find the legitimacy of this distinction debatable), but Dewey argues that there is a third distinct factor in morals: the virtuous (Dewey 1966, 203).¹ The virtuous refers to reactive attitudes persons manifest in response to the actions, thoughts, attitudes, or characters of others. “We praise or blame the conduct of other people; we approve or disapprove, encourage or condemn, reward or punish” (Dewey 1966, 203). Dewey is not referring to “virtue” in the sense of a disposition toward certain behaviors, attitudes, or emotions. Dewey’s use of “virtuous” focuses not on the person who engages in certain behaviors or manifests certain attitudes, but the reactions of others to certain behaviors or attitudes. For Dewey, then, “virtue” is that which elicits a positive reactive attitude in others, and “vice” is that which elicits a negative reactive attitude in others. According to Dewey, these reactive attitudes are spontaneous, instinctive, and natural (Dewey 1966, 203).

Why think that the three factors are independent? Is it not the case that the right, as described by Dewey, is just a function of the good? The demands made on each other are simply a means of achieving one’s personal ends; the only difference is that instead of considering the ends of one person, the ends of all persons in the group are being considered. Dewey responds that this objection equivocates on the use of “good” and “end.”

¹ Concerning the good/right distinction, see Thomson 1997. For criticism of this distinction, see Tappolet 2010.

There is a difference in nature both in origin and in mode of operation, between an object which seems capable of satisfying desire and which is thereby a good, and an object which sets up a demand on our conduct which we must acknowledge. (Dewey 1966, 203)

The demands a person makes on others do not acquire any moral weight merely in virtue of being means for that person's ends. Even if a certain demand on others would aid in a person's achieving some good, it does not thereby and on that basis alone become a right. As a mere demand, "it expresses power rather than right. To be right, it must be an acknowledged claim, having not the mere power of the claimant behind it, but the emotional and intellectual assent of the community" (Dewey 1930, 318). Since demands that are functions of the good are not necessarily rights, the right is not a mere derivative of the good; the good and the right are independent.

What about the virtuous? Is it not merely a function of the good? Perhaps people deliberate on the appropriate reactive attitudes to manifest and elicit in others as a means of achieving their desired ends. Dewey rejects this possibility as well. The reactive attitudes in question are so spontaneous and instinctive that they have nothing to do with the satisfaction of desires or appetites, nor with requirements toward others. The reactive attitudes that for Dewey constitute "the virtuous" lack both the element of deliberation on means to achieve ends characteristic of the good and the element of social constraint characteristic of the right (Dewey 1930, 319). Because the good, the right, and the virtuous all have independent origins and

different modes of operations, they are not reducible to each other nor is there some natural hierarchy between them.

For Dewey, most normative moral theories fail to acknowledge the independence and respective sound bases of these three factors—that they are all irreducible features found intertwined within moral situations (Pappas, 459). For Dewey, the moral life consists in navigating these three factors and in judging the situational importance of each. Because of this complexity, the moral life is naturally fraught with conflict and tension. What is good from the viewpoint of desire is bad from the viewpoint of social requirements; what is bad from a personal point of view may be warmly recommended by public opinion. Each conflict is real and sharp; the moral agent must attempt to reconcile opposing facts (Dewey 1966, 204).

If Dewey is right, conventional moral theories fail because they explain such conflict as merely specious or apparent. There is no genuine uncertainty in moral situations; people have simply made errors in judgment. For theories sourced in the good, if something is good, then the right is simply a means to achieving the good. If someone claims that something is right where that claim conflicts with achieving the good, that person is simply mistaken. If something is bad, the virtuous is simply a matter of having some negative reactive attitude toward it. If people have positive reactive attitudes toward something that is bad, then people are simply mistaken. Dewey rejects this as gross oversimplification; such assessments result from attachment to some unitary concept, and not from acknowledging moral situations as

they are. “The result is an abyss between the involved realities of practice and the abstract forms of the system” (Dewey 1966, 204).

For Dewey, there can be genuine conflict between the right and the virtuous, the right and the good, or the good and the virtuous. Moral agents in real moral situations often find themselves forced to choose between complying with duty and achieving the good, between doing what is praiseworthy and doing what duty demands, or between achieving good and avoiding blame, etc. And in this way, conventional moral theories “run counter to every empirical observation of fact” (Dewey 1966, 199).²

2.2 Three Distinct Conceptions of Moral Normativity

Dewey aims to identify distinct moral stuffs extant in concrete situations and to explain the development and origins of those stuffs. My aim is theoretical—to

² For example, Dewey mentions the consumption of alcohol, under U. S. Prohibition, was a practice “officially and legally forbidden” yet was “the object of tolerance or of encouragement” (Dewey 1966, 204). It is tempting to resolve this conflict by claiming either that the U.S. legal code is in error and that prohibiting consumption of alcoholic beverages is not a legitimate demand that U.S. citizens can make of each other or that the prohibition is legitimate and thus the appropriate reactive attitude is one of disapproval. Dewey’s point is that such resolution strategies evince that normative theorists are not so concerned with making concrete choices in concrete scenarios as much as with neat and tidy theories. In fact, the law resulted from genuine social problems stemming from alcohol abuse in the nineteenth century (Von Drehle 2010; Rorabaugh 1981); that is, people found themselves illegitimately hindered from pursuing personal goods on account of alcohol consumption on the part of others. Yet it was clear to many that not all alcohol consumption constitutes abuse and therefore does not seem equally worthy of scorn or reproach. (Interestingly, many early temperance movements were *not* teetotaler movements. See Temperance Movement 2003.) For Dewey, the *concrete* situation some Prohibition-era Americans faced contained moral conflict that was not merely apparent.

distinguish ways in which morality is systematically envisaged.³ Dewey's three independent factors are helpful because I believe each corresponds to a distinct way in which the function and application of moral value can be and is conceived. Similar to Dewey's claims, I claim that each conception has a sound basis, the three conceptions are not reducible to each other, and each can operate independently. In what follows, I will present the three distinct conceptions, I will argue for their distinctness, I will briefly present some important differences between Dewey's view and my own, I will present some advantages to this view, and I will conclude by connecting this view to my pacifist project.

By "conceptions" of morality, I mean distinct systematic applications of normativity all of which are moral in nature, distinct bases on which to form moral judgments, and distinct interpretations of moral claims. By claiming that each conception has a sound basis, I mean that each is useful for analyzing moral facets of situations in ways the other two are not. By claiming that they are not reducible to each other, I mean that the difference between the conceptions is not merely linguistic or descriptive. By claiming that each can operate independently of the others, I mean that judgments formed on the basis of one conception are neither equivalent to nor do

³ Christine Tappolet and Alan Voizard offer an interesting taxonomy of philosophical endeavors related to normativity. Hoping to "clear up" a lot of messy discussions, they offer five categories: (a) normative ontology (the relation between normativity and science, mental states, and social conventions), (b) normative semantics (the meaning and function of normative statements), (c) normative epistemology (whether and how we can know normative facts), (d) normative psychology (the intersection of normativity and psychology), and (e) substantive normative theory (determining what duties, values, or virtues there are). I take my project here to be primarily one of normative semantics, though, as the authors admit, these divisions are not mutually exclusive and are likely mutually informative (Tappolet & Voizard, 235).

they necessarily entail judgments based on the other two conceptions. These three claims constitute what I will call the “robust distinctness” of the three conceptions.

The conception to which Dewey’s “the good” corresponds I will refer to as the evaluative conception of morality (“ECM”). ECM envisages morality as value maximization or disvalue minimization. There is a good, there are means to bring about or increase that good, and a variety of things can be evaluated in relation to that good. Some things may be intrinsically valuable inasmuch as they partly or wholly constitute some good, some things may be instrumentally valuable inasmuch as they are conducive to bringing about some good, and some things may be indicatively valuable inasmuch as they correlate with some good. Emotions, attitudes, persons, states of affairs, institutions, dispositions—all of these (and more) may be the proper objects of ECM analysis and comparison.

The conception of morality to which the right corresponds I will refer to as the deontological conception of morality (“DCM”). DCM envisages morality as legal or juridical in character. There are rules, guidelines, or principles to which persons are amenable, and those rules divide the proper objects of DCM-evaluation into simple categories: obligatory (a person violates a rule to which she is amenable if she fails to *x*), permissible (a person does not violate a rule to which she is amenable whether she *x*-es or fails to *x*), or prohibited (a person violates a rule to which she is amenable if she *x*-es).⁴ Typically, the appropriate objects of DCM-evaluation are actions, though

⁴ Perhaps there are other categories of evaluation within DCM, for example, “supererogatory”

arguably, other things like attitudes, dispositions, or even emotions might be treated as obligatory, permissible, or prohibited.

The conception of morality that corresponds to the virtuous I will refer to as the hypological conception of morality (“HCM”).⁵ HCM envisages morality as a matter of coupling objects with appropriate reactive attitudes. There are a host of positive and negative reactive attitudes that seem moral in nature. Positive reactive attitudes may include praise, admiration, esteem, approval, adoration, compassion, sympathy, and attraction. Negative reactive attitudes may include disapproval, blame, contempt, horror, disgust, hatred, and aversion. Perhaps there is a “middle” set of reactive attitudes such as indifference, mildness, and tolerance. A variety of things might be the proper objects of evaluation for HCM. Actions, practices, emotions, persons, and even states of affairs might evoke disgust, horror, hatred, compassion, adoration, or attraction.

So far I have only posited that there are three distinct conceptions of morality. But why think they are distinct rather than mere redescriptions of the same phenomena? Why not think that there is a unitary, correct conception of moral value and one or more of these I have posited are simply *misconceptions* in need of

or even “gratuitous” and “optional” (See McNamara 2006). I think, though, that Dewey has already hinted at the explanation for why moral theorists introduce categories such as supererogatory—moral theories often conflate what are, in fact, independent factors in morals, and “supererogatory” is likely an attempt to explain solely in terms of DCM what properly belongs to a different conception of morality.

⁵ I borrow this term from Michael Zimmerman who says that judgments are hypological when they are an evaluation of the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of agents (Zimmerman, 554). I use the term more broadly to include other possible reactive attitudes.

reformulation or elimination? There are at least four reasons to accept the robust distinctiveness of ECM, DCM, and HCM.

First, moral judgments corresponding to each conception can be made of the same scenario where any two judgments are neither reducible to nor mere redescriptions of the third. Suppose Smith, Jones, and Williams are strolling through a park. At some point during each person's walk, each notices the same piece of litter on the ground. Each person upon seeing the litter imagines the person who littered and judges that the litterer has done something immoral.

Smith thinks: "Some people just won't follow the rules. That person has a moral obligation to keep this park clean, but she littered anyway. The litterer should be penalized or made to come back here and pick up this trash herself."

Jones thinks: "Some people are disgusting—carelessly mucking up communal space so the rest of us have to live with their filth. Shame on you, whoever you are, for having no sense of responsibility or reverence or pride in your community!"

Williams thinks: "Things sure would be healthier and prettier around here if this person hadn't littered. Too bad the litterer didn't care about health and beauty enough to make a little more effort and not waste an opportunity to keep things great."

Smith's moral judgment is deontological, Jones's is hypological, and Williams's is evaluative. Notice, no person's judgment commits her to agreeing with the

judgment of the other two. Smith might maintain that the litterer has done something immoral merely in virtue of having failed to keep a moral obligation; Smith may not think that any negative reactive attitude toward the litterer is appropriate or that anyone needs to take opportunities to maximize health and beauty. For Smith, issuing moral judgments is like being traffic court judge—hear a case, assess whether a rule was broken, look up the appropriate penalty or demerits, and issue a sentence. Jones might maintain that the litterer is worthy of scorn yet not think that there is a moral obligation not to litter or that anyone needs to take opportunities to maximize health and beauty. For Jones, moral judgments are a matter of recognizing when others constrain (or fail to constrain) their behavior in accordance with the appropriate gut reactions of others. Williams might maintain that the litterer wasted an opportunity to do good while disagreeing that there is any moral obligation not to litter or that the litterer is worthy of scorn. For Williams, moral judgments are looking at ways in which goods have been maximized or minimized. The fact that the three parties could disagree with the explication of the others' judgments shows that their judgments are neither reducible to each other nor mutually entailing; yet each party's particular judgment is *constitutive* of her judgment that the litterer did something immoral.

The second reason to accept the robust distinctiveness of ECM, HCM, and DCM is that moral discourse is permeated with moral judgments and moral language that correspond to one conception but not the other two. Many authors treat moral uses of the term “ought” as inextricably linked to obligations or prohibitions; so, examples

of deontological moral judgments and uses of moral language need not be advanced.⁶ At issue, then, is whether there are moral judgments and uses of moral language that are not deontological but strictly evaluative or hypothetical in nature. There are.

Consider first some examples of strictly evaluative judgments and language. Moral judgments such as “Things ought not to be this way,” “It would be better if children never suffered,” and “The Holocaust should never have happened” are evaluative. All three are moral judgments about states of affairs. To say such states of affairs “ought not to be the case” does not necessarily entail a moral obligation on anyone’s part and therefore these judgments are not deontological.⁷ Such judgments might express a reactive attitude, but they need not; the straightforward interpretation is that the situation instantiates a certain moral disvalue, and it would be morally better if it instantiated less of that disvalue. Thus, such judgments are evaluative.

Quite some time ago, a vandal spray-painted graffiti on my neighbor’s retaining wall; last I checked the graffiti was still there. It occurred to me that “someone really

⁶ As Rosalind Hursthouse notes, terms like “right” and “wrong” are naturally associated with the deontological categories of obligation, permission, and prohibition (Hursthouse 1995, 630). Bernard Williams appears to take for granted that a conflict between two moral judgments can only mean a “conflict of obligations” (B. Williams 1965, 108). Even when acknowledging that certain values can conflict, Williams cashes this out solely in terms of the obligations generated by those values (B. Williams 1981). Andrew Moore’s incompleteness and inconsistency objections against several non-deontological moral theories seem to be riddled with the assumption that moral theory and moral language can only be understood deontologically (Moore 2007). See also Beirlaen, 49-50.

⁷ For one thing, these might be states of affairs about which no one can do anything. If one accepts the principle that “ought” in the moral sense implies “can” (a principle that, in my view, should be discarded altogether, but which many philosophers accept nonetheless), then such judgments do not entail obligations for anyone. But this does not entail that they are not *moral* judgments. Thus, some philosophers, such as Ralph Wedgwood, are mistaken when they assume that “oughts” which violate the ought-implies-can principle must be non-moral (Wedgwood 2009, 504).

ought to do something about that graffiti.” I take that to be a moral judgment, but it is not clear to me that my neighbor has a moral obligation to remove the graffiti; and neither is it obvious that the vandal does (the vandal may now be deceased). If I am correct, the original judgment does not entail that anyone specific has a moral obligation and is therefore not deontological, though it is a moral judgment. Many cities specify the amount of time a resident may leave trashcans curbside before and after municipal waste collection. Underlying such a law may be the moral judgment that beauty is a value and ought not to be minimized; but it seems bizarre to say persons are morally prohibited from placing trashcans curbside at 11:59am the day prior to collection as opposed to noon, and such a moral prohibition is the basis of the law. Lastly, consider the judgment that persons ought to have certain traits like kindness or generosity. It does not follow from this that persons necessarily have an obligation to be kind or generous (especially considering it is possible to be more or less kind and generous, and thus arbitrary precisely what amount of kindness or generosity a person is obligated to be).

Consider also cases of strictly hypothetical moral judgments. In describing the spontaneity and non-deliberative nature of the virtuous, Dewey foresaw what psychologists have come to call “moral dumbfounding” in which subjects give moral judgments for which they cannot supply any supporting reasons (Haidt 2001, 817). In many cases, even when reasons were supplied, they were formulated in a post hoc fashion (Haidt 2001, 822). Subjects’ moral judgments were found to be affect-driven especially when presented with cases of wrongdoing that were isolated from issues of

harm (Haidt et al 1993). Such moral judgments appear “suddenly and effortlessly in consciousness, with an affective valence (good or bad), but without any feeling of having gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (Greene & Haidt, 517).

Two noteworthy cases are incest and flag desecration. Subjects were asked to respond to a one-time, consensual, incestuous encounter between adult siblings that could not result in a pregnancy; the majority of subjects condemned the act, but could not elaborate beyond “I don’t know, I can’t explain it. I just know it’s wrong” (Haidt 2001, 814). As Jonathan Haidt and Matthew Hersh note, in most of the United States, incest is a felony even between consenting adults and step-relatives or adoptive relatives (Haidt & Hersh, 192). The motivation for such statutes and for the subjects’ condemnation is based primarily (if not solely) in reactive attitudes and is therefore hypological.

Condemnation of flag desecration is not as widespread but still prevalent. My high school classmate was arrested outside a convenience store for using an American flag to wipe oil off his car’s dipstick.⁸ Why condemn someone for mundane use of what is apparently nothing but a certain pattern of colored fabrics? In my classmate’s case, his actions deeply offended witnesses for whom the object is not mere fabric. But what if no one else saw? When asked to assess a woman who found an old flag in her closet, no longer wanted it, cut the flag into pieces, and used the pieces as rags to

⁸ For media coverage of the event, see Brus & Beckloff 1995.

clean her bathroom (including the toilet), even among subjects who judged the incident to be harmless, a significant number still judged that she should be “stopped or punished” (Haidt et. al, 617ff).

Dan Kahan analyzes a particularly interesting case (Kahan, 66ff). In August 1988, Dennis Beldotti murdered Eugenia Haratsis, his female employee. After murdering her, Beldotti sexually mutilated and took nude photographs of her body. Beldotti then stuffed the body into trash bags and called the police claiming to have found the body in this condition. After being convicted and sentenced to life in prison without parole, Beldotti asked the Massachusetts court to surrender some of his possessions used as evidence in the trial to his representatives outside prison. The items included sex toys, bondage paraphernalia, several torture-themed pornographic videos, and one plastic-encased photo of the victim. The Massachusetts court denied Beldotti’s request. The state attorney argued that the only place the items belonged was in the trash; the court agreed, saying that the items offended the most basic concepts of decency.⁹

Kahan argues (correctly I think) that the only basis for this judgment is moral emotion—namely disgust (Kahan, 67). Given Beldotti’s life imprisonment and his request that the items be surrendered not to himself but to his representatives, consequential or duty-based rationales are insufficient bases for denying his request, and therefore deontological and evaluative judgments do not seem applicable. Kahan

⁹ See *Beldotti v. Commonwealth*, 669 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. Ct. App. 1996).

notes one exception. The court stated that returning the items would be so offensive to basic decency that it would undermine public confidence in the justice system. Undermining public confidence is certainly a consequential concern (and therefore, perhaps, evaluative). But why would public confidence be undermined? Kahan argues that some of our moral judgments based on moral emotions are reactions to others' failure to exhibit certain moral emotions. (We are horrified by the fact that others are not horrified.) Thus, the consequential judgment about public confidence only makes sense if returning the items warrants a certain negative reactive attitude *and* failing to have that negative reactive attitude also warrants a certain negative reactive attitude. In this case, even the evaluative judgment presupposes that the hypological judgments are more basic.

According to Kahan, moral emotions such as disgust are independent factors in appropriate civic condemnations of acts such as rape, child abuse, and torture (Kahan, 64). It is not enough to say that these acts are breaches of duty or harmful, it must additionally be said that they are outrageous and disgusting (Kahan, 65). Similarly, Joel Feinberg argues that there are cases of "harmless wrongdoing" which present difficulties for systems of law based strictly on harm prevention (i.e. that all legal obligations stem from certain disvalue minimization); condemnations of indecency or obscenity may be difficult to justify on strictly deontological or evaluative grounds, yet nearly everyone thinks *some* indecent or obscene things should be restricted or prohibited (Feinberg 1973, 41). I am by no means trying to conflate the law with

morality; the point is that some laws have bases in moral judgments, and some of those moral judgments are strictly (or at least primarily) hypological.¹⁰

The third reason to accept the robust distinctness of the three conceptions is that moral judgments can conflict. By “conflict,” I mean that three conceptions allow for three different senses in which any given objection of moral evaluation can be morally “positive” or morally “negative.” Thus, judgments across conceptions can be said to match or mismatch; the same object may be correctly assessed positively on all three conceptions, or positively and negatively on different conceptions. Recall the case of the litterer. Perhaps the litterer did breach a moral obligation, but if she littered as an act of defiance toward some deeply corrupt local politician who had acquired a great deal of social capital by feigning concern over clean streets, her act may warrant praise (deontologically negative yet hypologically positive). In virtue of national loyalties or contractual agreements, a state agent may be obligated to perform actions on behalf of the state which are negative-reactive-attitude worthy. Suppose a man, Rupert, had been present in the Whitechapel district of London in 1888. Suppose that Rupert by chance encountered Jack the Ripper during which time Jack was rather rude to Rupert. Rupert, being an irascible thug, broke a leg off a chair and bludgeoned Jack to death. Police later determined that Rupert’s victim is, in fact, Jack the Ripper (the serial killer for whom they have been searching). Arguably, there

¹⁰ As James Gilligan points out, there are cultures the moral codes of which seem entirely hypological, or, to use Gilligan’s term, a “pure shame culture” (Gilligan 1975, 146). The rules or laws of such cultures are codifications of how to secure the positive reactive attitudes and avoid negative reactive attitudes of others.

is a sense in which “Rupert ought to have murdered Jack the Ripper” is true and a sense in which “Rupert ought not to have murdered Jack the Ripper” is true given that each corresponds to a different conception.

Lastly, the fact that many normative ethical theories have been formulated primarily or solely on each of the three conceptions is some evidence for the veracity of each. Kant construes all morality as a system of obligations, prohibitions, and permissions sourced in human reason; while he includes goodness (the good will) and one reactive attitude (reverence) in his system, these are mere functions of reason or byproducts of deontology.¹¹ Some divine command theorists likewise construe morality as primarily deontological though sourced in God’s commands.¹² Some contractarians argue that morality is a set of obligations generated by “mutually advantageous moral agreements” (Gauthier, 168); others argue that the obligations are generated by persons’ indebtedness to justify their actions to one another.¹³ Even Nietzsche argued that creditor-debtor relationships underpin our notions of morality as rule-keeping and the guilt associated with breaking those rules.¹⁴

Others disagree. Utilitarians argue that morality is fundamentally a matter of value maximization—primarily pleasure. While utilitarians recognize a system of obligations, that system is a mere function of more basic moral judgments that are

¹¹ “Good will” seems to be Kant’s one evaluative concept (Kant, 393). And reverence seems to be Kant’s one moral reactive attitude (Kant, 400-401).

¹² For example, see Adams 1999.

¹³ See Scanlon 1998.

¹⁴ See sections 4, 5, and 6 of the second essay in Nietzsche’s *On the Genealogy of Morals* (Kaufman & Hollingdale 1969).

essentially evaluative. Aristotle's ethics is similarly evaluative though Aristotle's basic value maximization (human flourishing) generates a set of virtues humans ought to acquire rather than a set of obligations.¹⁵ Some forms of Buddhist ethics seem entirely evaluative, aimed solely at minimization of suffering and not having moral rules *per se* but sets of experience-tested suggested means for achieving that end (Velasquez, 492).

Then there are normative systems that are hypological. According to the ancient Confucian philosopher Mencius, human beings have natural moral "sprouts" — natural moral inclinations toward certain reactions to certain stimuli. Mencius's famous example is that of hearing the cries of a child trapped in a well. According to Mencius, an otherwise immoral person will still feel an initial flicker of compassion (Mencius, 2A6). For Mencius, morality is a matter of cultivating and being guided by these "sprouts." Adam Smith argues that moral rules and virtues are ultimately sourced in the human sentiment of sympathy.¹⁶ Similarly, David Hume claims morality is sourced in human sentiments, primarily the approval and disapproval that humans naturally exhibit toward similar objects (Hume, 2.1.7.3). Similarly to Hume and Smith, Patricia Churchland argues that morality is fundamentally a matter of sentiments and attitudes, which are more basic than any set of moral rules (Churchland, 163). Overall,

¹⁵ As Hursthouse describes it, "virtue ethics takes certain areteic concepts (good [well], virtue) as basic rather than deontic ones (right, duty, obligation)" (Hursthouse 2001, 69).

¹⁶ See Fleischacker 2015 & Smith 1790.

“from a biological point of view, basic emotions are Mother Nature’s way of orienting us to do what we prudentially ought” (Churchland, 175).¹⁷

Clearly ethicists disagree about the most basic nature of morality. I suspect any normative system could be categorized according to these three conceptions. The fact that so many examples can be found for each conception suggests that each conception is indispensable to moral life. The above four reasons are enough, I think, to support the view that the three conceptions are robustly distinct.

At this point, several important differences between Dewey’s position and mine are noteworthy. First, Dewey’s moral factors are present in moral situations as a matter of fact. For Dewey, there is little concern about whether others’ moral judgments are mistaken. People simply have reactive attitudes, and I as a moral agent have to navigate the moral situation as it is. My position concerns conceptions and judgments both of which can be mistaken. People might make certain deontological, evaluative, or hypothetical judgments, but those judgments can be false. Second, Dewey claims the moral life involves judging the factors’ situational hierarchy; for Dewey, then, no factor takes *a priori* primacy over the other two. I, however, do not deny that one conception might take primacy over the others *a priori*. Third, Dewey claims his three factors have independent origins. I have not made this claim for my conceptions; on my view, all three conceptions may share an ultimate source (even if

¹⁷ Some psychologists argue that many reactive attitudes arise from danger or contamination avoidance mechanisms, but that such attitudes are eventually “moralized” and become the basis for many moral judgments (Rozin et al, 67).

they do not share an immediate source). Further, my independence claim is not as pervasive as Dewey's. Correct judgments on one conception may be (at least in part) entailed or determined by correct judgments on other conceptions (we might come to know what our obligations are in virtue of knowing what value ought to be maximized); all I have argued is that this is not necessarily true in every case. Lastly, Dewey argues that normative theories are guilty of moral oversimplification. I have an analogous concern. Normative theories tend either to treat one or more of the conceptions as simply mistaken attempts to get at the correct conception or as mere functions of the conception taken as primary. I have argued that they err on both counts.

Accepting the robust distinctness of the three distinctions has advantages. First, the three distinctions illuminate some puzzling features of moral dilemmas. Some authors explicate moral dilemmas strictly in terms of conflicting *obligations* (B. Williams 1965, 108).¹⁸ Bernard Williams argues that many theories fail to account for the appropriateness of remorse, guilt, or regret that follows from whatever choice one makes when faced with a moral dilemma because those theories attempt to resolve dilemmas by identifying only one course of action as right (B. Williams 1965, 113). Williams describes that for which other theories fail to account as "moral remainder" (B. Williams 1965, 117).¹⁹ In cases of moral dilemmas, it seems a mistake to consider

¹⁸ Even in criticizing Williams, Philippa Foot does not seem to question Williams's construal of "moral dilemmas" as equivalent to "conflicts of obligations," but herself seems to construe "ought" only in terms of "right action" and then conflates that concept with "best morally speaking" (Foot, 44).

¹⁹ See also Hursthouse 1995, 619.

either decision “right” when regret, remorse, or guilt are appropriate hindsight reactions.

According to Rosalind Hursthouse, much of the debate between utilitarians and deontologists concerning moral dilemmas stems partly from equivocating “morally right decisions” and “right moral decisions” (Hursthouse 1995, 623). Even if there is a right moral decision to make given the options, it does not follow that either decision was morally right. Hursthouse argues that such decisions are neither right nor wrong, but “tragic” (Hursthouse 2001, 72). Martha Nussbaum also picks up this theme of “tragic” choices. Moral analysis of dilemmas often involves oversimplification because only the “obvious” question is addressed: which of the two options ought one to pick? But, according to Nussbaum, there is another important question: Is either option morally acceptable (Nussbaum, 1006-1007)? This is the “tragic question” which, according to Nussbaum, is indispensable to proper analysis of moral dilemmas.

Hursthouse, Williams, and Nussbaum are correct in charging other theorists with oversimplification. But none of them explores, normatively speaking, what it would take to underpin moral remainder or answers to tragic questions. Part of the underpinning concerns distinct conceptions of moral value; that is, there are different *kinds* of moral judgments that can conflict, and thus, conflicts of obligations may not be the only or even the most important kind of moral conflict. There may not be a resolution to any given dilemma that constitutes a match across the different conceptions of morality. As Richard Routley argues, the best thing to do may be in

violation of one's obligations, and this does not mean that one's obligations are eliminated (Routley 1984, 124).²⁰

A second advantage is insight into what Richard Routley calls "theory-saving devices" (Routley 1984, 124). Routley criticizes theories that posit "prima facie principles" in an attempt to recognize the importance of consequentialist concerns. For Routley, such devices are mere *ad hoc* attempts to rescue a theory from the difficulties of moral dilemmas. I prefer to say that various normative ethical theories employ "theory-saving devices" in an attempt to rescue a *unitary* conception from what are in fact *competing conceptions* of moral value. As Andrew Fiala argues, utilitarians and other consequentialists use elaborate hypothetical scenarios to show that "at some point the numbers matter" (Fiala 2014b, 33). Rather than admit this outright, some ethical theorists fabricate "prima facie principles"—principles that might be broken in just those cases where the numbers matter. Likewise, elaborate scenarios may be used to show that at some point, duties matter, and interestingly, *rule* utilitarianism may very well be a theory-saving device that suggests many consequentialists recognize this.²¹

An obvious case of a theory-saving device, I think, is deontologists' addition of "supererogatory" to the action categories of obligatory, permissible, and prohibited—a

²⁰ Despite a more nuanced analysis of Williams's own "Jim, Pedro, and the natives" scenario (which I discuss extensively in Chapter 3), Routley, unfortunately, treats "ought" as a strictly deontological term.

²¹ See Hooker 2000. Also, consider that John Stuart Mill argued for strict, inviolable individual rights as the best society ordered according to his own utilitarian principles (Mill & Mathias 2007).

term meant to describe actions that go “above and beyond the call of duty.”²² For instance, Ralph Wedgwood writes,

Thus, one might express the fact that an act is supererogatory by saying, for example, ‘Ideally, we ought to give more than this, but no one will be entitled to blame us if we don’t.’ In using the term ‘ought’ to indicate that it would be morally better to give more, one may be using it as a kind of moral ‘ought’, according to which what one ought to do is whatever is (a necessary component of) the morally best thing to do. (Wedgwood 2007, 131)

Wedgwood describes what is best to do and other’s reactive attitudes to one’s failure to do the best in an attempt to distinguish some moral acts from those which persons are obligated to do. Rather than forego a unitary conception of normativity, Wedgwood hopes to simply give the mysterious blob a name—“supererogatory”—as though a fancier deontological term will distract from two other factors present in his description that are clearly non-deontological. Wedgwood is only one “supererogatory”-peddler among many.²³ And their mistake, as Joel Feinberg puts it, is that they uncritically accept that the function of moral value is exhausted by models of “jural laws and institutional ‘house rules’” (Feinberg 1961, 276). Recognizing the

²² Supererogatory is arguably not as tortured a “theory-saving device” as is “Kantian consequentialism” (Cummiskey 1990). Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is likely also a theory-saving device.

²³ To be fair, discussion of “supererogatory” acts began as J. O. Urmson’s attempt to *correct* oversimplification (Urmson 1958). As many have noted, utilitarians seem guilty of eliminating categories such as “saint” or “hero” from moral discourse by means of equating right action with best action. Interestingly, even some utilitarians attempt to employ a theory-saving device in light of this objection by splitting the concept of “right action” into two categories: obligatory and “optimific” (Attfield, 319). Sadly, among Urmson’s critics are persons who simply take reducibility (and therefore oversimplification) for granted. For example, Elizabeth Pybus writes in response to Urmson, “I cannot at the same time say that something is a moral ideal, and feel that I have no sort of obligation to pursue it” (Pybus, 195). Not every un-ideal thing I do is a breach of duty. I find it strange that philosophers have such trouble entertaining the notion that *moral* normativity may not be univocal.

distinct conceptions of moral value avoids the need to put bandages on the cuts and scrapes of moral oversimplification.

The most important advantage of the three conceptions is the capacity for more careful analysis of moral language and understanding of moral normativity. Common uses of moral language can be imprecise and ambiguous, and (as has been shown) is often oversimplified in strictly deontological analysis. Terms like “good,” “bad,” “right,” “wrong,” “ought,” and “should” are not just multivocal but *morally* multivocal. The three conceptions model is an improvement. ECM, DCM, and HCM can be thought of as different evaluation devices—scales that provide specific moral measurements for appropriate objects of evaluation. A scale based on ECM (“E-scale”) would be a continuum from top to bottom of maximal instantiation to maximal lack of some value. An ECM-judgment, then, expresses some scale-reading that reflects a given object’s intrinsic, instrumental, or indicative relation to some good. Positive or negative moral terms or expressions understood evaluatively entail that the object of evaluation is somewhere above or below the midpoint of the E-scale.

A scale based on DCM (“D-scale”) would not have degrees but categories: obligatory, permissible, and prohibited. A DCM-judgment is a judgment about into which of these categories the object of evaluation properly falls. Positive moral terms or expressions understood deontologically likely place the object of evaluation in the “obligatory” or perhaps the “permissible” category. Negative moral terms place objects of evaluation in the “prohibited” category.

A scale based on HCM (“H-scale”) would be a combination of categories and gradations. The three major categories would be positive-reactive-attitude-worthy, “middle”-reactive-attitude-worthy, and negative-reactive-attitude-worthy. Within the major categories, each distinct reactive attitude might be categorically separated from the others, but within each reactive attitude would be a continuum measuring the intensity of the attitude. Positive, indifferent, or negative moral terms or expressions place the object in the appropriate major category, and a variety of things such as language, tone, or body language may indicate the degree of intensity.

The scale metaphor helps vivify ways in which moral judgments can differ in kind and operate independently. A moral judgment might register on one scale but not the others, and an object’s measurement on one scale does not necessarily entail measurements on the other two scales. Further, the scales metaphor illustrates that even when moral judgments are expressed imprecisely, there is a fact of the matter about precisely where on the relevant scale the object of evaluation falls.

The scales metaphor also illustrates that moral normativity is not unitary and ought-ness is not univocal. Each conception can generate moral judgments that place moral onus on agents to do or to be something. Straightforwardly, deontological normativity obligates (or prohibits). Hypological and evaluative normativity can both govern action by giving persons reasons to act (Tappolet, 17-18).²⁴ The more

²⁴ I have used “can” here to leave open other ways in which evaluative and hypological judgments may be normative. As Tappolet points out, normativity based on reasons to act assumes that

significant or abundant the reasons, the greater onus there is on a person to act. In the case of hypological normativity, social cohesion, inclusion, and ostracism may be major operators in constraining or guiding a person's behavior in light of hypological judgments.²⁵ Evaluative normativity can more or less encumber someone to act in the face of the importance of a given value's instantiation or a given disvalue's reduction. Notice, both hypological and evaluative normativity differ from deontological normativity. Moral "oughts" and "shoulds" even of the action-guiding variety come in at least three flavors.²⁶

What has all this got to do with pacifism? First, moral judgments are isolatable by type. That is, a moral claim might correspond only to one of the three conceptions. And thus, the moral claims which constitute a version of pacifism may be of only one type. Second, because moral judgments on one conception do not necessarily entail judgments on either of the other two conceptions, a pacifism the claims of which are of only one type is not by implication committed to moral judgments of other types. Third, because there are different kinds of moral normativity, a version of pacifism formulated on the basis of ECM or HCM can be morally action-guiding without entailing obligations. Lastly, objections to pacifism might depend on the moral claims being of a certain type. If a version of pacifism were formulated solely in terms of

reason is the central normative concept. Interestingly, normativity can be explained with ought-ness being the most basic normative concept (Tappolet, 14-17).

²⁵ Consider, for example, Patrick Devlin's defense of constraining acts even if purely private on the basis of the reactive attitudes of society (Devlin 1959).

²⁶ These three types could be distinguished by the terms "dought" (deontological ought), "hought" (hypological ought), and "vought" (evaluative ought) (though this strikes me as one of those analytic-philosopher moves that makes even some analytic philosophers roll their eyes).

evaluative moral judgments, then it would be immune to objections that presuppose pacifist claims are or entail hypothetical or deontological claims.

2.3 Evaluating Health

I aim to advance a pacifism the claims of which are based solely in ECM. However, I do not intend to identify the specific good or goods I take the E-scale to measure when advancing these claims. If I did, anyone who does not share my conception of the good might dismiss my version of pacifism out of hand. More importantly, all of the values on which the claims are based are not clear even to me. I believe the claims that constitute my version of pacifism can be plausible for multiple conceptions of the supreme good or subsets of goods. In order to make the claims interestingly thick, I will posit that an E-scale can be used to measure human biological health, and I will argue that health is analogous to morality in ten ways. To be clear, I am not claiming that the evaluative good upon which my pacifist claims are based *is* biological health; I am claiming that whatever good they are based on *functions similarly* to biological health. Inasmuch as someone concedes that the supreme good or some subset of moral goods is analogous to health in the ways I specify, the claims that constitute the pacifism I advance will be clear and plausible even if her conception of the good differs from mine.

An E-scale could measure the biological health of humans. By “health,” I mean the general condition of a human that includes vigor, vitality, freedom from ailment or

disease, soundness of body and mind, etc. When measuring health on an E-scale, there are a variety of things which are the proper objects of evaluation: persons, actions, mental states, conditions, and states of affairs. That is, claiming that these things are “healthy” is appropriate inasmuch as anything listed either instantiates, is conducive to, or is indicative of some degree of health. So for any given E-scale measuring health (I will call it “E-h”), to say that *X* is located on the uppermost point of E-h is to say that *X* either instantiates, induces, or indicates health to a superlative degree; to say that *X* is located on the bottommost point of E-h is to say that *X* either instantiates, induces, or indicates being unhealthy to a superlative degree.

Persons instantiate health. Healthy and unhealthy are things that persons can *be*. And the ascription of either term also connotes some judgment of *how* healthy or unhealthy a person is. A maximally unhealthy person is arguably near death on account of injury, disease, extreme old age, or wildly self-destructive behaviors. A maximally healthy person is free of injury, disease, self-destructive habits, and also possesses vitality, vigor, and broad capacity for activity. Given an E-scale that measures the health of persons (“E-h_p”), on the whole, Olympians occupy a higher place on E-h_p than persons who are morbidly obese; on the whole, someone who has just been shot multiple times in the chest occupies a place lower on E-h_p than someone who has not been injured at all; on the whole, someone free of disease occupies a place on E-h_p higher than someone in the final stages of terminal cancer; on the whole, a heroine-addict occupies a place on E-h_p lower than a teetotaler. A person’s level of health is comparable to any other person’s level of health, and a

person's level of health is comparable to that same person's level of health at some past or future time.

Actions can also be healthy or unhealthy. Regular exercise is not only conducive to an increase in a person's level of health, but the practice of regular exercise is also partly constitutive of that person's healthiness. Describing actions as either "healthy" or "unhealthy" often includes some connotation of *how* healthy or unhealthy an action is. An action is maximally unhealthy when it is maximally detrimental to the health of the person who performs it. An action is maximally healthy when it is maximally instantiative, conducive, or indicative of the healthiness of the person who performs it. Given an E-scale that measures the healthiness of actions ("E-h_a"), on the whole, exercising occupies a place on E-h_a higher than overeating; on the whole, hand-washing occupies a place on E-h_a higher than sharing needles with drug addicts; on the whole, visiting the doctor for a check-up occupies a place on E-h_a higher than smoking; on the whole, eating vegetables occupies a place on E-h_a higher than attempting suicide. Actions are comparable to each other and to themselves at different times.

Mental states can also be healthy or unhealthy. Thus, beliefs, feelings, attitudes, purposes, intentions, tendencies, traits, and dispositions are all measurable on E-h. Given an E-scale that measures the healthiness of mental states ("E-h_m"), on the whole, optimistic thoughts occupy a place on E-h_m higher than suicidal thoughts; on the whole, feelings of depression occupy a place on E-h_m lower than feelings of

contentment; on the whole, beliefs indicative of severe paranoia occupy a place on E- h_m lower than beliefs indicative of a reasonable assessment of one's safety.

Conditions or circumstances can be healthy or unhealthy. Pollution levels in air or water, access to adequate nutrition, opportunities for mobility and exercise, access to medical care, and other conditions can all appropriately be called "healthy" or "unhealthy"—where "healthy" and "unhealthy" describe whether such conditions are conducive a person's health. The actions, habits, and healthiness of other persons around us are conditions which are either healthy or unhealthy. If a person's friends are couch potatoes who eat donuts and drink soda excessively, and if having such friends is conducive to a person imitating those practices, then that person lives under unhealthy conditions. An E-scale can measure the health of conditions ("E- h_c "), where the uppermost part of the scale represents conditions most conducive to healthiness in persons and the bottommost part of the scale represents conditions most conducive to unhealthiness in persons.

States of affairs are healthy or unhealthy—where measuring the health of a state of affairs just is the sum measurement of all or a subset of all conditions, persons, their actions, and their mental states in the world at any given point in time. A state of affairs at the uppermost part of an E-scale measuring the health of states of affairs ("E- h_s ") would be a world free from all disease, mental illness, injury, unhealthy foods, and full of vital, fit people, with broad capacities for activity. A state of affairs

that would fall near the lowest portion of $E-h_s$ would, perhaps, be the Black Death pandemic in 14th century Europe.

Thus far, the E -scales I have described only represent static pictures of health. But health is dynamic and evolving. A person's healthiness or unhealthiness changes over time. Given the acquisition or relinquishing of mental states, committing or refraining from certain acts, or experiencing change in health-evaluable conditions, a person can get healthier or unhealthier. If a horizontal axis measuring time were added to $E-h_p$, the trajectory of a person's health could be graphed. I will call such a graph $E-h_p \times t$. Whether a person is getting healthier, unhealthier, or maintaining her level of health could be represented on $E-h_p \times t$ by a positive, negative, or neutral trajectory.

The notion of "scale" or "measurement" should not be taken to conflate whether an object of health evaluation is *in fact* better or worse than another with our ability to *discern* that it is. Smith may indeed occupy a position on $E-h_p$ higher than Jones even if no one is able to tell. One action may be on the whole healthier than another even if no one ever learns this. This distinction allows for the conception of commensurability between objects of health-evaluation even if specific comparative relations between those objects seem puzzling or even counterintuitive. If we consider average conduciveness to health, a certain action could be more or less healthy than a mental state, a certain condition could be more or less healthy than an action, etc. It seems strange to say that brushing one's teeth is either more, less, or

equally as healthy as eating vegetables, but there is a fact of the matter even if we will never know it.²⁷

This distinction may explain apparent cases of strange exceptions. There might be persons who seem to suffer no detriment to their health despite, say, consuming large quantities of trans-unsaturated fats, or there might be persons who live near nuclear fallout zones that by all appearances are resistant to radioactive effects, or there might be persons who smoke heavily but by all accounts suffer no ill effects. Folkloristic anecdotes of such cases abound. But such cases do not disprove that nuclear fallout, excessive trans-fat consumption, and smoking are unhealthy on the whole. A person's healthiness or unhealthiness can be affected by a plethora of factors; measuring all factors that determine a person's level of health may be beyond our ability to calculate. Thus, persons who seem to be exceptions to the rules may, in fact, not be.

I mean for E-scales to function as conceptual devices that record the way things are before and without considering whether and how a person might come to know the way things are. But when making specific claims about scale readings for specific objects, whether things are as claimed and how this is known seem quickly conflated. This is why the qualifier "on the whole" is important. If for all we know apparent exceptions are not exceptions at all, then for all we know they are exceptions indeed.

²⁷ I am inclined to think that the only cases of incommensurability are between an object's instantiative level of health and another object's conduciveness to health. If a person instantiates health and if eating vegetables is conducive to health, I am not sure there is a fact of the matter about whether a given person is healthier or unhealthier than the practice of eating vegetables.

In either case, apparent anomalies do not dissuade us from drawing general conclusions about the healthiness and unhealthiness of health-evaluable objects.

2.4 Morality and Health

I will use the term “moral health” as a placeholder for a supreme morally intrinsic good (or perhaps a subset of moral goods). Whatever good “moral health” represents, it functions analogously to biological health in at least ten ways. I have a vague conception of the good for which I take “moral health” to be a placeholder, but I believe the points of analogy to biological health likely hold for conceptions of the good that differ from my own.²⁸ By claiming that biological health and moral health are analogous, I mean that an E-scale that measures moral health (“E-mh”) functions similarly to E-h in at least the following ten ways, and therefore, moral judgments function similarly to judgments about biological health in these ten ways.

2.4.1 Appropriate objects for moral health evaluation

In the case of biological health, persons, mental states, actions, conditions, and states of affairs can all affect levels of healthiness or unhealthiness. These same things (and perhaps more) are also the proper objects of moral health evaluation. So, just as

²⁸ Along the way I will assume particular objects instantiate the good as opposed to being merely instrumental to the good. I do not mean for these assumptions to narrow the scope of moral goods for which “moral health” could be a place holder. “Moral health” may represent conceptions of the good that assign instantiative, instrumental, and indicative relations to objects differently than I do.

there are E-scales that could measure the relationship of each of these objects to biological health, there are also E-scales that could measure the relationship of each of these objects to moral health. For whatever good the term “moral health” represents, persons, mental states, actions, conditions, and states of affairs can be good or bad inasmuch as each of those objects is either positively or negatively instantiative of, conducive to, or indicative of that good.

2.4.2 Moral health is gradational

“Healthy” is not a binary concept. There are different levels of “healthy” with reference to biological health. To say that a person is “healthy” involves the ascription of some degree of biological health to that person. This is also true of moral health. Moral health is not categorical, but can differ in degree. To say that a person is on the whole “morally healthy” entails that the person likely occupies a point above the midpoint of $E\text{-mh}_p$, yet this is consistent with the claims that the person might be morally healthier or morally unhealthier.

2.4.3 Moral health is holistic

Biological health is constituted by many things: freedom from injury and disease, vitality, capacity for activity, organ function, etc. Each of these things is affected by a broad number of factors such as mental states, actions, conditions, and

states of affairs. Each of these factors does not increase or decrease a person's level of biological health in a fixed or isolated way, but combinations of these factors interact and affect each other's effect on a person's level of biological health. While there is a fact of the matter about a mental state like optimism having an average level of conduciveness to health, the specific level of conduciveness for a given person will depend not only on other factors affecting that person's health but also how those other factors affect and are affected by that optimism. The factors that determine a person's level of health form a system, and as such they operate at varying degrees of interdependency. There are some combinations of measurements that are conceivable but are not nomologically possible. For example, it is conceivable that a person is riddled with disease yet somehow being riddled with disease has absolutely no effect on organ function, but arguably there cannot, in fact, be such persons.

The same is true of moral health. A person's position on $E\text{-mh}_p$ is determined by a broad number of factors that have varying levels of moral-health-conduciveness-or-instantiation and each of which can affect the level of moral-health-conduciveness of other factors. Further, these factors are interdependent and systemic. Thus, while it is possible to conceive of strange combinations of good and bad in the same person (e.g., a person who has all and only morally healthy mental states yet commits all and only morally unhealthy actions), it does not follow that there could, in fact, be such persons.

2.4.4 Objects of moral health evaluation are intra-commensurable

Objects of biological health have comparative health levels. Some actions are healthier than others; some mental states are unhealthier than others, etc. The same is true of moral health. Some actions are morally healthier than other actions, mental states can be more or less morally healthy than other mental states, a given condition can be morally healthier or unhealthier than another condition, and states of affairs can have comparative levels of moral health with other states of affairs. Two persons may be “morally healthy” and yet occupy different points on $E\text{-mh}_p$. All objects that are moral-health-evaluable are intra-commensurable. As in the case of biological health, the moral-health-conduciveness of one object type is commensurable with the moral-health-conduciveness of other object types. So, there are some cases of inter-commensurability between objects. But I do not think that objects which are conducive to moral health are commensurable with objects that are instantiative of moral health. I do not think an act of kindness’s moral-health-conduciveness can be morally better or worse than a given person’s moral-health-instantiation.

There are likely many moral health comparisons that hold true for various conceptions of the good. On the whole, law-abiding school teachers are morally healthier than serial killers, and persons with significant degrees of self-discipline, moderation, and sobriety are morally healthier than persons who are reckless, over-indulgent, and quarrelsome. On the whole, acts of kindness are morally healthier than acts of cruelty, charity is morally healthier than theft, and sympathizing with a friend is

morally healthier than being rude to a stranger. On the whole, thoughts of gratitude for a spouse's strengths are morally healthier mental states than hatred towards one's children, concern for a friend is morally healthier than plotting revenge, and thinking of ways to improve oneself is morally healthier than suicidal thoughts. On the whole, being friends with law-abiding school teachers is a morally healthier condition than being friends with human traffickers. On the whole, the state of affairs in which children are well cared for, well fed, and healthy is morally healthier than the state of affairs in which children are neglected, starved, and disease-ridden. I have tried to avoid much specific description of what moral health looks like in hopes of leaving the placeholder as flexible as possible, but any theory that rejects any of the above comparisons is clearly not one I aim to accommodate.

2.4.5 There are things which are, on the whole, morally healthy for anyone

In the case of biological health, there are actions, mental states, conditions, and states of affairs that are, generally speaking, healthy for anyone. In the case of an action, this means that for any given person, on average, that person will be healthier having performed that action than she would have been had she not performed the action. The same is true of moral health. There are actions, mental states, conditions, and states of affairs that are, on the whole, morally healthy for anyone. In the case of an action, performing it will have a positive effect on the performer's moral health trajectory. On a scale that measures a person's moral health across time ("E-mh_p x t"),

if the person performs the action at t_1 , there is a subsequent time t_2 such that the slope of the trajectory from t_1 to t_2 is greater than it would have been had the person not performed the action at t_1 . The temporal distance between t_1 and t_2 will vary; depending on the nature of the action, there will be some reasonable amount of time necessary for the action to have its effect. To say that the action will have a positive effect on the person's trajectory does not entail that the action will bring about a positive trajectory, nor does it entail that the action will positively affect everyone's trajectory to the same degree. A person's moral health trajectory may be negative. But the performance of the action will bring about a greater slope than if the person had not performed the action. In the case of biological health, there are actions like consumption of adequate nutrition or conditions like access to sanitary drinking water that are healthy for anyone. I believe there are also examples in the case of moral health (though, what counts as a proper example may depend on the good or subset of goods that "moral health" is taken to represent).

The qualifier "on the whole" is intended to allow for apparent exceptions. The positive effect on a person's trajectory could be indiscernibly slight, in which case the healthy-for-anyone-action (or other object of evaluation) would have no apparent effect. There might also be genuine exceptions—cases where the healthy-for-anyone-action may have, in fact, had no effect on a person's moral health trajectory. But as in the case of biological health, the possibility of a genuine exception does not disprove that certain things are morally healthy for anyone "on the whole."

2.4.6 There are things which are, on the whole, morally unhealthy for anyone

Living in significant proximity to nuclear fallout, excessive trans-fat consumption, and smoking are things which are on the whole biologically unhealthy for anyone. A person will be unhealthier with these actions and conditions than she would be without them. The same is true of moral health. Some objects of moral health evaluation are, on the whole, morally unhealthy for anyone. The performance of an on-the-whole-morally-unhealthy-for-anyone action will have a negative effect on a person's moral health trajectory. Such an effect can be represented between two temporal points on $E\text{-mh} \times t$. The temporal distance between points will vary, and "morally unhealthy for anyone" entails neither that the resulting trajectory will be negative nor that the negative effect will be discernible. And, again, "on the whole" allows for apparent and perhaps genuine exceptions.

The claims made in 2.4.5 and 2.4.6 allow for important descriptions of the moral health of states of affairs located near the top of a scale that measures the moral health of states of affairs (" $E\text{-mh}_s$ "). Ideally morally healthy states of affairs are states of affairs that fall at or within a range near the top of $E\text{-mh}_s$ and which contain nothing which is on the whole morally unhealthy for anyone. Even though all such states of affairs would contain nothing morally unhealthy for anyone, they may differ in their amounts of things morally healthy for anyone. The exact point at which states of affairs become ideal or non-ideal is arbitrary. Even so, there is some threshold on $E\text{-}$

mh_s above which states of affairs are ideally morally healthy if they do not contain anything morally-unhealthy-for-anyone.²⁹

2.4.7 Moral healthiness or unhealthiness is transmittable between persons

The biological health of one person can affect that of others. Persons contract diseases from one another, and antibodies from one person can be used to cure diseases in other persons. Moral health is analogous to biological health in that the moral health of one person can affect the moral health of others. I have already implied as much in that persons can be a part of conditions and the conditions under which a person lives are factors that in part determine her level of moral health. But making this point explicit is significant for three reasons.

First, our interactions and relationships with other persons are significant determiners of our biological healthiness or unhealthiness, and the same is true of moral health. Perhaps the mechanisms of transmission are similar; just as diseases can be spread genetically, if there are genetic proclivities toward certain behaviors or mental states, then moral health can in that sense be transmitted genetically. The more obvious mechanism by which moral health is affected between persons is influence. In either case, this means that not only do my interactions with other

²⁹ It is possible to conceive of states of affairs that contain morally-unhealthy things but which are so morally healthy otherwise that they are morally healthier than some ideally morally healthy state of affairs. While conceivable, I am not convinced such states of affairs are nomologically possible. In any case, they do not merit the description *ideally* morally healthy. Human moral progress bears this out; persons do not merely attempt to add good things to the world, but to eradicate bad things.

persons constitute part of the conditions under which I live and thereby affect my level of moral health, but my interactions with others also affect the moral health of others. I can engage in interactions with others that could have positive, negative, or neutral effects on their moral health trajectories.

Second, certain kinds of trajectory effects are particularly worth pursuing or avoiding. Especially significant are trajectory *reorienting* effects—for example, a case of a person with an overall negative moral health trajectory being affected in such a way that results in an overall positive trajectory. I will refer to this as the “Scrooge Effect” after Charles Dickens’ character who seems to embody just such a case. And the opposite effect is especially worth avoiding—a case of a person with an overall positive moral health trajectory being affected in such a way that results in an overall negative trajectory. I will refer to this as the “Lucifer Effect” after the story of the angel who rebelled and “fell from heaven.” It is particularly good when a Scrooge Effect occurs and particularly bad when a Lucifer Effect occurs.

Third, because persons can affect each other’s moral health, moral health can operate in a karmic fashion. While our interactions with other persons can affect their levels of moral health, the effects we bring about in their levels of moral health can be partially constitutive of conditions under which we, in turn, live and thus affect our own moral health. That is, there are a variety of ways in which the positive or negative effects we bring about in the moral health of others can come back to us.

2.4.8 Persons may have moral health limits

Given that Smith occupies some point on $E-h_p$ at t_1 , while it is conceivable that Smith could occupy any other possible point on $E-h_p$ at t_2 , it is not nomologically possible. The factors and the interdependency of those factors that determine Smith's biological health at t_1 will determine a limited range of possible t_2 positions that Smith could, in fact, occupy. In other words, it is not the case that from one moment to the next any person can become as healthy or as unhealthy as it is conceivably possible for that person to be.

The same is true of moral health. It is not the case that from one moment to the next any person can become as morally healthy or as morally unhealthy as it is conceivably possible for her to be. The range of possible moment-to-moment positions on $E-mh_p$ a person can occupy is determined by the factors that determined her moral health at previous points. Scrooge Effects and Lucifer Effects notwithstanding, persons have trajectory-limits. For any given person, given the factors that determine her position on $E-mh_p$ at t_1 , there is a limited range of possible t_2 positions for that person, and that person will not be able to occupy a position above or below that range. Some persons' trajectory-limits might be broader or narrower than others. And if relevant factors persist, then a person might experience a more or less fixed upper or lower limit—a moral health trajectory “ceiling” or a moral health trajectory “floor.” Factors that could create such ceilings and floors are not difficult to imagine. Severe addictions or psychological compulsions, as long as they

persist, could create trajectory-ceilings; enjoying good mental health, being around positive influences, and practicing multiple healthy habits could jointly establish a trajectory-floor.

In the case of biological health, there are actions or activities the performance of which requires a certain level of health. The same is true of moral health. There are actions and mental states the performance or acquisition of which requires a certain level of moral health. If such actions and mental states are above a person's moral health trajectory ceiling, then that person will not be able to perform those actions or have those mental states. People say things like "I don't think I can bring myself to forgive her," where the person may acknowledge that forgiving is the nobler or better course of action. There may be some subsequent point at which that person's ceiling is higher, and her range of possible positions will include the level of moral health needed to forgive. There are also actions or mental states the requisite level of moral health for which falls below a person's moral health trajectory floor. People say things like "I could never bring myself to do such a thing" in reference to some morally horrific act. Due to moral health trajectory ceilings and floors, the person who "can't bring herself to forgive" and the person who "can't bring herself to do such a heinous thing" may be quite correct.

As long as the conditions which determine trajectory-ceilings and floors persist, such actions or mental states will be unavailable. And it could be the case that the conditions in question are outside a person's control, or it may be the case that, for

the relevant factors which are under a person's control, that person never will make the needed changes for her ceiling or floor to move higher or lower on E-mh_p. In such cases, persons might have permanent trajectory-limits, meaning that there are actions or mental states that will never be available for them to perform or have.

Given the possibility of trajectory ceilings, it is possible for there to be actions which all persons ought to perform or mental states that all persons ought to acquire where such does not entail that any given person at any given time can, in fact, perform or acquire that action or mental state. There could be actions a person ought to perform that she cannot, in fact, perform. While there may be a number of reasons for her inability to do what she ought to do, one reason may be that she lacks the requisite level of moral health necessary to perform such an action. Given the possibility of *permanent* trajectory ceilings, a person may be performing the most morally healthy actions available to her even if it is true that she ought (in an evaluative sense) to be doing even better.

2.4.9 Persons can be ideally morally healthy

In the case of biological health, there are persons who embody exceptional levels of health—for example, Olympians or athletes who live “clean” in that they perform all and only actions conducive to or instantiative of biological health. Whereas it would be good if all persons enjoyed a higher level of biological health than they do, we would consider it a particularly excellent state of affairs if everyone

enjoyed the level of health embodied by such persons. Thus, those persons who do instantiate such high levels of health embody an *ideal* level of health. Not only are there such persons, but we consider it a good and beneficial thing that there are such persons.

The same is true of moral health. There is some threshold on $E\text{-mh}_p$ above which persons are ideally morally healthy. Ideally morally healthy persons can be exemplary, educational, and inspirational to others who recognize them as such. If Smith is ideally morally healthy, then Smith is exemplary in that Smith's moral healthiness is worthy of imitation; it would be a particularly excellent state of affairs if everyone occupied a similar position on $E\text{-mh}_p$.³⁰ Smith's level of moral health is educational in that Smith models in concrete ways a set of actions, mental states, and conditions that determine an ideal level of moral health. Further, inasmuch as Smith is an ideally morally healthy person, Smith embodies one part of an ideally morally healthy state of affairs; part of Smith's educational function is imparting a sense of what such states of affairs are like. Smith is inspirational in that recognizing Smith's ideal level of moral health may motivate others to aspire to greater levels of moral

³⁰ This likely puts me at odds with Susan Wolf who argues that it would not be a good thing if everyone attained "moral sainthood" (Wolf, 420). However, Wolf's analysis seems heavily dependent on categorizing things such as talents, pursuits, practical skills, and even connoisseur-ship as "nonmoral virtues" (Wolf, 421). I do not see why such characteristics should be considered *non*-moral. My own vague conception of the good for which "moral health" is a placeholder certainly does not exclude such characteristics from the realm of moral value. Thus, as far as I am concerned, the ideally morally healthy person has the "healthy, well-rounded, richly developed character" that Wolf seems to think "moral sainthood" excludes; and so, the ideally morally health person may be an excellent cook or oboe player, and such traits are not incidental but partly constitute her moral health.

health than they would have otherwise. Even if imitators do not achieve Smith's level, it is good to have imitated Smith's level of moral health to whatever degree possible.

Because ideal moral health is represented by a range of positions on $E\text{-}mh_p$, it is possible for some ideally morally healthy persons to be more or less morally healthy than other ideally morally healthy persons. Interestingly, the set of factors that bring about ideal levels of moral health need not be identical for all persons who are ideally morally healthy; there are multiple ways the good might be maximized. This means there are not only different levels of ideal moral health but also different ways of being ideally morally healthy. Within the range of ideal moral health, there is room for *style*. Someone might be ideally morally healthy in virtue of exceeding courage for worthy purposes; someone else may be ideally morally healthy in virtue of compassion for the disenfranchised. This, itself, is good for those who recognize persons of ideal moral health; the style of one ideally morally healthy person may be more feasible for me to imitate and generally more inspirational to me than the style of another.

Even persons who do not occupy the ideal moral health range on $E\text{-}mh_p$ can still play a similar role. Just as there are ideally morally healthy persons, there may also be relatively ideally morally healthy persons. That is, while Jones may not be ideally morally healthy, Jones may occupy a position on $E\text{-}mh_p$ considerably high relative to many people around her. Jones is not a moral-health role model for everyone, but she can still be exemplary, educational, and inspirational to some. In either case, the fact that it is good for there to be such persons—whether ideally or relatively ideally

morally health persons—means that it is also good for persons to aspire to become ideally or relatively ideally healthy persons. It is good for persons to engage in actions or acquire mental states or secure conditions needed to aim their moral health trajectory at the ideal or relatively-ideal range.

2.4.10 Facts about moral health can be normative

Self-assessments or specialist assessments of a person's biological health can provide reasons for that person to act. If Jones is currently performing actions which she learns are detrimental to her health, this gives her a reason to refrain from such actions. If some act a_1 is more conducive to Jones's health than some other action a_2 , then Jones has a reason to perform a_1 rather than a_2 . Or if some state of affairs s_1 instantiates a greater degree of biological health than some other state of affairs s_2 , and Smith can perform actions that will likely bring about s_1 rather than s_2 , then Smith has a reason to perform such actions. In all these cases, the reasons are at least partly a function of the value of biological health—or perhaps how valuable biological health is to *Smith*.

The same is true of moral health. Certain readings on E-mh can function normatively—they give a person a reason to act. That reason will at least in part be a function of just how valuable the good measured by E-mh is. Such reasons can place varying levels of “weight” or onus on a person to perform an act. In this sense, evaluative normativity may function in a way similar to deontological normativity in

that just as being obligated to perform an act puts significant onus on the person who is obligated, the reason a person has to perform an act may be so “weighty” that it places significant onus on a person to act. Of course, reasons for performing acts may be so “light” that they are easily defeasible, and being obligated to perform an act and having “weighty” evaluative-normative reasons for performing an act are not mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, evaluative-normative onus to act may be significantly “weighty” without this entailing an obligation to act.

Furthermore, given that the system of moral health as I have described it is purely evaluative, no mere evaluative claims about moral health entail an obligation always to act *optimally*—that is, an obligation always to opt for the available course of action that maximally produces or instantiates moral health or brings about the maximal possible positive affect on one’s own moral health trajectory. In the case of actions, for example, all that can be said is that while it may be good to perform a_1 , it would be better to perform a_2 . However, the reason for preferring a_2 over a_1 may be easily defeasible. Or it may be the case that a_2 is above a person’s trajectory-ceiling. Any number of factors may be relevant to why a person still opts for a_1 rather than a_2 even if a_2 is more conducive to moral health than a_1 .

One possible factor worth mentioning is this. Whether facts about moral health can be action-guiding for a person will in part depend upon that person’s ability to discern facts about moral health. A person may be performing the most morally healthy act available to her according to her discerning capacity even if, in fact, there

are better actions available to her. I take it that a person's ability to discern facts about moral health is at least in part a function of that person's level of moral health; that is, an effect of acquiring greater levels of moral health may be the development of greater discernment about moral health. If that is true, then some persons may require the guidance of others more morally healthy than themselves in order to know how they should act, what mental states they ought to acquire, or what conditions they ought to try to secure for themselves.

2.5 Advantages of the Moral Health Model

The first advantage of the moral health model is the ease with which evaluative judgments can be isolated from deontological or hypological judgments. Claims about moral health or E-mh readings do not commit a person to any particular judgment about, say, the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of a person or action or whether a particular action is obligatory, permissible, or prohibited. The claim that some action is better than others or that some action is morally healthy leaves open whether the action is obligatory, permissible, or prohibited, and it leaves open whether the action is positive-reactive-attitude worthy or negative-reactive-attitude worthy.

The second advantage of the moral health model is that it avoids the very problem Dewey raises against most normative theories—oversimplification by way of reducing the moral life to a single explanatory or commensurable principle. Unlike Dewey, I believe moral health has primacy over the deontological or hypological

factors of moral life, and so I am not open to quite the degree of messiness Dewey is. But moral health as I have modeled it does not entail the reduction of all moral judgments to evaluative claims. Consequently, it is compatible with the function of other additional forms of normativity. Evaluative claims may be true of a person or her actions even if she is normatively bound by obligations or prohibitions that are sourced elsewhere—say in a social contract to which she is a party. The moral health model allows for complex analyses like saying that Smith is meeting all of her obligations yet is not doing all she could to be all she could be, or that Smith is doing the best she can even though she ought to have done more in the past to empower herself to do and be more now, or that Smith is doing the best she can even though she ought to do even better even if a permanent moral health trajectory ceiling means she will never be able to do better. These assessments leave open what reactive attitude might be appropriate; perhaps Smith is scorn-worthy on all counts, perhaps she is compassion-worthy on some but not others, or perhaps she is praiseworthy on all. As Dewey argues, the moral life is complicated, and thus any systemization of value and value-judgments attempting to represent the moral life accurately must allow for such complications.

A third advantage of the moral health model is that it is compatible with multiple normative theories. Moral health can stand for various consequentialist or virtue theoretic conceptions of the good, and it can stand for sub-values or sets of values. This means that persons who do not share common conceptions of the good can nevertheless use and understand a common language about evaluative claims.

And while whether some evaluative claims are taken to be true depends upon what value or good a person understands moral health to represent, there is the possibility (a likely possibility, I believe) that some evaluative claims will be true across different values or goods.

A fourth advantage of the moral health model is that it captures some common sense judgments in a way that expresses those judgments more clearly. When persons express judgments with phrases like “That’s wrong” or “that’s bad” or otherwise simple language, qualification is often needed to avoid confusion or misinterpretation. People using such phrases follow up with disclaimers like “I’m not saying she’s blameworthy” or “I’m not saying that the act is shameful.” Expressing judgments in a way that isolates evaluative claims from hypological and deontological claims makes such disclaimers unnecessary. And the model allows for precise ways of expressing multiple evaluative claims. To say that act a_1 occupies a position on $E\text{-}mh_a$ higher than act a_2 expresses something more precise than saying “Act a_1 is good” and “Act a_2 is good.” And it leaves open how much higher a_1 is on $E\text{-}mh_a$ than a_2 .

In the next chapter, I will use the moral health model to posit and defend four claims that constitute my version of pacifism.

Chapter 3: Moral Health Pacifism

In this chapter, I will present a universal, absolutist version of pacifism based on the moral health model—a pacifism the tenets of which are solely evaluative (“moral health pacifism”). While I aim to explain and defend these claims to an extent, I do not mean for the following to constitute a comprehensive defense of moral health pacifism. My objective in this chapter is to present and explain four claims that jointly constitute moral health pacifism so that they are clear and plausible to someone who accepts the moral health model.

3.1 Violence is morally unhealthy for everyone

The first claim is this: Committing an act of violence is, on the whole, morally unhealthy for everyone (“MHP1”). In other words, committing an act of violence will have some negative affect on a person’s moral health trajectory. The qualifier “on the whole” allows that the negative effect may be indiscernibly slight, and it allows that, for all we know, perhaps there are genuine exceptions. Further, MHP1 is compatible with a case of a person being both morally healthy overall and a person who commits acts of violence even with relative frequency. The only qualification MHP1 adds is that such a person is morally healthy overall or has a positively moral health trajectory in spite of those acts of violence and not because of them. In what follows, I will survey reasons why violence is bad to show that MHP1 is plausible. I will then consider and

address an objection to MHP1 from a virtue theoretic perspective and from a consequentialist perspective in turn.

3.1.1 Why Violence is Bad

Why is violence such a bad thing? I will survey nine reasons why violence is bad advanced by various authors. These reasons vary in situational-importance and some readers might not find some of them persuasive; but jointly they show that violence is likely to be morally unhealthy for everyone. Some of these reasons hinge on whether the perpetrator or recipient of violence is in view. In either case, the reasons still support the claim that committing violence is morally unhealthy for everyone.

First, violence is bad because it tends to be connected with injury, damage, and destruction. This, according to Gerald MacCallum, is why we find violence to be “presumptively bad” (MacCallum, 113). Particularly, violence against persons seems *prima facie* bad because, according to MacCallum, it damages, destroys, or violates “integrities” (MacCallum, 120). Integrities are various parts operating as a system according to their own principles and inertias. “The more harmoniously the parts are related to each other, the greater the integrity of the system because the easier it is to identify as one complete thing” (MacCallum, 121). Both persons and persons’ bodies have integrities that can be violated, damaged, or destroyed, and the fact that violence constitutes a violation of a person’s integrity partly underlies the moral presumption against violence (MacCallum, 126).

Second, violence is bad because of its tendency to inflict psychological injury. Suffering an act of violence can damage the victim's sense of security and evoke a sense of fear that such an episode will occur again—instilling in the victim a social paranoia. This can undermine the victim's basic ability to trust others and lead to debilitating psychological maladies. Victims of violence may even socially withdraw and experience depression (Bufacchi 2004, 173).

Third, violence is bad because it fails to bring about what some have called "genuine peace." "Negative peace" refers to the mere absence of conflict. Positive or genuine peace refers to a state of affairs where a number of conditions are present that establish a sort of relationship between potentially conflicting parties. As Duane Cady argues, "violence cannot create and sustain the conditions of genuine positive peace because these conditions come from within individuals and groups by agreement and cooperation, not from the outside by force or threat" (Cady 2010, 101). According to Cady, violence is in the nature of the case inimical to the conditions that constitute genuine peace (Cady 2010, 53). Violence is to the establishment of genuine peace what lying is to the establishment of trust.

Fourth, violence is bad because it tends to result in more violence. As Adin Ballou argues, "What puts it into the heart or the head of the assailed party to repel injury with injury? It is like begetting its like: injury suggesting, prompting, and producing injury" (Ballou 2006, 81). The fact that there are violent assailants creates the market for learning how to employ violence defensively. Comparatively few

violent assailants bring it about that an exponentially larger group of persons aim to learn how to employ defensive violence. Interestingly, if I use violence in defense against an assailant, I have now placed the assailant in a position of needing to defend herself against violence and thereby invite more violence. If violence is bad for any of the other reasons I have mentioned, then the perpetuation of violence is also bad; and one thing that tends to perpetuate violence is violence itself.

Fifth, violence is bad because it restricts the freedom of the victim of violence in her choice set and her well-being at least for the duration of the injury suffered (Bufacchi 2004, 173). That is, while a person is the recipient of violent action, her options are limited, and they are continually limited by whatever physical injuries that endure even after the violence occurs. Inasmuch as freedom and a normal range of options are valuable, to the extent that violence restricts them, violence robs the victim of that value.

Sixth, violence is bad because suffering violence is, in a sense, insulting. To be the victim of violence is to have one's own vulnerabilities suddenly and vividly exposed to oneself. This is also true when a person is the victim of a natural disaster, but it is peculiarly so in cases of being the victim of violence (Bufacchi 2004, 175). James Gilligan remarks, "the most powerful way to shame anyone is by means of violence" (Gilligan 2003, 1163). If human beings are in the nature of the case worthy of a certain mutual regard, and if that regard precludes being the recipient of violence, then being the victim of violence is degrading, dehumanizing, and humiliating (King, 482). In the

case of suffering non-lethal violence, the victim has to live with the experience of that insult—with the awareness that others can subordinate her to their own power; the violence committed against her, in a sense, rubs her nose in her own social vulnerability. “In many ways, the insult (the sense of vulnerability and powerlessness) hurts as much as the physical injury” (Bufacchi 2004, 174-175).

Seventh, violence is bad because of the psychologically damaging effects it can inflict on the perpetrator. If the perpetrator of violence suffers regret or remorse over the act, she may experience some degree of self-alienation. She may experience the paradox of having done something yet being averse to accepting that she is the kind of person who could have done such a thing. If she experiences no remorse over what she has done, she may become hardened toward acts of violence such that future acts of violence are easier for her to commit. Inasmuch as her act of violence insults or dehumanizes the recipient, she may develop a lower view not only of the recipient but of others she perceives to be similar to the recipient, which may wear away at what Albert Schweitzer calls “reverence for life” (Schweitzer, 315). The perpetrator’s view of the value of others will in some sense be linked to her view of her own value. If the victim is ultimately the proper object of a certain regard merely in virtue of being human (where such regard includes not being treated violently), then for a perpetrator to behave in a way contrary to that regard calls into question whether the perpetrator herself is the proper object of such regard merely in virtue of being human. That is, if the perpetrator is not compelled to approach other humans with a certain reverence,

then she also loses a sense that she, herself, is due a certain reverence merely in virtue of being human.

Eighth, violence is bad because it is a kind of weakness. Kuang-Ming Wu argues that violence tends to be an impetuous rather than thoughtful act (Wu, 10).

Committing violence then tends to manifest a lack of deliberation or foresight. Wu argues that if we are aware that violence has negative effects but we still opt for violence as a course of action, we manifest a lack of ability to find and implement better means of achieving the same ends or better ends altogether. Violence is bad because it always entails some degree of loss; opting for violence then functionally constitutes a refusal or inability to devise win/win strategies (Wu, 11).

Ninth, violence is bad because of its potential karmic-like effects. Persons operating within a social context depend on their communities for opportunities, freedoms, and possibilities. If I commit acts of violence against someone in my community, I have affected the victim's opportunities, freedoms, and possibilities. Inasmuch as the victim also operates in a social context, the effect to her opportunities, freedoms and possibilities will affect those of others—which, in turn, to some degree affects my own. The violent harm I inflict on others can constitute indirect harm to myself (Fortune, 185). Inasmuch as “we are all caught in an inescapable network of mutuality” (King, 254), there is likely no potential victim of violence that will be completely isolated from a social web of which the perpetrator is also a part.

There may be other reasons why violence is bad, but I take these nine reasons to establish the plausibility of what some have called the “presumption against violence.” Jack Lewis, while arguing against pacifism, asserts that “violence remains an evil, under all circumstances” (Lewis, 26). Jan Narveson, also while arguing against pacifism, asserts that even non-pacifists accept the claim that “violence is evil,” saying “this is a view that every person with any pretensions to morality doubtless holds” (Narveson, 259). Kai Nielsen, who takes for granted that pacifism is not a rationally defensible moral position, also accepts the claim, saying, “It should hardly be necessary to add that a humane person, who understands what it is to take the moral point of view, will deplore violence” (Nielsen, 23). MHP1, then, is likely only to be challenged by someone who believes either that having a certain kind of disposition to commit violence may be beneficial to a person’s moral health, or by someone who thinks that committing certain types of violence will likely lead to a net gain in moral health. I will consider each of these challenges in turn.

3.1.2 Can There Be Virtue in Violence?

Rowland Stout argues that the presumption against violence is false. Those who adhere to the presumption against violence assume that even in cases where an act of violence may be morally justified, it is justified only in the sense that the goodness of the end for which the violence is employed outweighs the badness of the act itself; so, according to the presumption against violence, even when an act of

violence is morally justified, the act of violence remains bad as such. Stout holds that those who adhere to the presumption against violence are mistaken on this point, and inasmuch as this point is inextricable from the presumption against violence, the presumption itself is false.

Stout argues that a certain disposition toward violence in certain circumstances counts as a virtue in Aristotle's sense. If Stout is right, then acts of violence committed in those circumstances that were a product of that disposition would not be bad as such, but rather would be virtuous acts. Stout's argument poses a problem for MHP1. I have claimed that according to MHP1, if a person is morally healthy overall yet commits acts of violence, that person is morally healthy in spite of those acts of violence rather than because of them. This conflicts with Stout's claim that there are acts that are virtuous *qua* violent. Further, I have also formulated MHP1 in a way compatible with genuine exceptions; *prima facie*, this allows for Stout's virtuous violence to count as genuine exceptions. This option, however, is not open to me given my overall project. Moral health pacifism depends on certain types of non-violent acts being morally preferable to violent acts in precisely the kind of circumstances in which Stout holds some violent acts to be virtuous. In this section, I will survey Stout's argument and advance three reasons why Stout's argument fails.

According to Stout, Aristotle's notion of a virtuous person can be extended to persons who use retaliatory violence in a fight (Stout, 324). Stout is not referring to the use of self-defensive violence where a person uses physical force solely to prevent

an attacker from doing harm (Stout, 327). Stout refers to committing violence out of retaliation for violence done by an attacker (that is, violence justified by a backward-looking reason) (Stout, 323). This kind of retaliatory violence is appropriate within the normatively constituted social practice of fighting (Stout, 324). Stout claims that having the disposition to commit such retaliatory violence in a fight earns you a valuable status—namely, that you are “a strong, serious person—to be respected and not to be messed with” (Stout, 329). Stout mentions Norberto Bobbio’s claim that meekness is a virtue and meekness entails the refusal to commit violence against anyone (Bobbio, 17). Stout states that meekness in Bobbio’s sense is a vice (Stout, 330). It is a vice because if you fail to engage in retaliatory violence during a fight, “you identify yourself as a feeble person, a loser, a sap, a quitter—not someone to be taken seriously” (Stout, 329).

The disposition toward violence which Stout claims to be a virtue in an Aristotelian sense is an inclination “to violence in all and only those situations where that is the right response” (Stout, 330). And while retaliatory violence may be justified within a fight, it may never be justifiable to be in a fight (Stout, 328). Stout admits that “this might mean that in normal circumstances, [a virtuous disposition toward violence] is never applied” (Stout, 334). Nevertheless, given that fighting back is a part of our ancestral history and given that through dominant social norms we are

encouraged from early ages to fight back (Stout, 332-333), acting on this sort of disposition is virtuous provided that one is in the relevant circumstances.¹

What circumstances might those be? Under normal circumstances, if someone attacks you in a way that constitutes an invitation to fight, there will likely be a peaceful resolution, and you can depend upon state police and judicial institutions to settle the matter (Stout, 334). And there are, Stout admits, “powerful countervailing social models” such as Christ who urges his followers not to fight back (Stout, 333). So, by good use of Aristotelian practical wisdom, we may conclude that fighting back or being in a fight is never justified. But, Stout writes, “equally it might turn out that practical wisdom recommends developing the disposition to fight back” (Stout, 334).² If you are facing circumstances where you are not protected from further attack and powerful people are out to get you, then “Wild West morality” may be practically wise (Stout, 334), in which case being too slow to fight back is a vice just as is being too quick to fight back (Stout, 329). This is just to say that for persons *in* such circumstances, practical wisdom *will* recommend developing and acting on the disposition to fight back. Therefore, a disposition toward committing retaliatory violence against the right people to the right degree in the right circumstances is a

¹ Stout says it is important to recognize circumstantial differences because this enables a nuanced criticism of some violence—that if a person were virtuous, properly applying practical wisdom, “they would not apply [the disposition toward violence] here” (Stout, 335).

² I am puzzled by Stout’s use of the term “equally” in this sentence. Does Stout mean that there is as much evidence for fighting back as against it for practical wisdom to consider? Does Stout mean any given person is as likely to inhabit circumstances that warrant a disposition to fight back as not? Does Stout mean that for any social practices with roots in our ancestral history, practical wisdom is as likely to recommend developing a disposition to *s* as it is to recommend not developing that disposition? None of these interpretations seem to help Stout’s case.

virtue in Aristotle's sense of virtue, and therefore, if a person were in the right circumstances, acts of violence committed under these conditions are virtuous acts.

The first reason for rejecting Stout's position concerns Aristotle's doctrine of the mean—that virtues can be conceived as midpoints on spectrums between the extremes of excess and deficiency. According to Aristotle, not every action or feeling can be virtuous because not every action or feeling admits of a mean between extremes. Aristotle mentions adultery, theft, and murder as specific actions that “in doing these things we can never be correct” (NE 1107a10-18).³ Aristotle warns that the doctrine of the mean cannot be applied to every feeling or action because the feeling or action in question may be vicious in the nature of the case. Given that not every action has a mean, and given that Aristotle provides examples of actions that do not, then for any given act to be virtuous, its basis for being virtuous must not also be a basis for adultery, theft, and murder being virtuous.

This elucidates how an act might fail to be virtuous for Aristotle. Suppose some basis *b* has been posited as a justification for the claim that some act *a* is virtuous in Aristotle's sense (or that some disposition to commit acts of type *a* toward the right people to the right degree and in the right circumstances is a virtue in Aristotle's sense). If it could be shown that *b* also justifies the claim that acts of adultery, theft, or murder might be virtuous, then it could be shown that *b* does not preclude adultery, theft, or murder from being virtuous; and therefore neither does *b* show that *a* might

³ This quote is taken from the Irwin translation of *Nicomachean Ethics*. See Aristotle 1999.

be virtuous in Aristotle's sense. I believe this strategy can be used to show that Stout's case for virtuous violence fails.

I take it that Stout's basis for virtuous violence consists of four basic parts: (a) the act of retaliatory violence is a move within a social practice that is normatively constituted—namely, fighting, (b) the social practice of fighting has roots in our ancestral history, and we experience some form of encouragement to be disposed to commit acts of retaliatory violence when in a fight, (c) having this disposition toward fighting back and acting on it in the right circumstances secures a valuable reputation, and (d) there are circumstances in which practical wisdom recommends developing and acting on the disposition to commit retaliatory violence. For Stout (a), (b), (c), and (d) jointly entail there is such a thing as an act of violence that is virtuous *qua violent*.

Could adultery, theft, or murder be justified on bases similar to that of (a), (b), (c), and (d)? Consider adultery. Within circumstances similar to those portrayed in the television series *Mad Men*, some acts of adultery seem virtuous on bases similar to that of (a), (b), (c), and (d). *Mad Men* is set primarily in the 1960s at a fictional advertising agency located on Madison Avenue in New York City. Some viewers find the excessive smoking, drinking (even while working), and rampant infidelity historically unbelievable and therefore an obvious case of artistic exaggeration.⁴ But others who were "there" attest that, if anything, these features of the show are

⁴ See Stephens 2010.

underplayed compared to the way it really was.⁵ The acts of adultery portrayed in the show are not mere acts of infidelity; they are portrayed as a significant and integral part of the careers, lifestyles, and culture the main male characters inhabit.⁶ They are portrayed as part of a normatively constituted practice with its own set of rules that are socially enforced. There is considerable cultural encouragement for the main male characters to engage in the practice (and to learn to do it according to the rules). For males who inhabit such circumstances, engaging in the practice of adultery earns them a valuable reputation within the environment—being successful, powerful, respectable, capable, and manly (in fact, some *Mad Men* characters are shunned by others in virtue of refusing to engage in these practices). While the show is a work of fiction, the practice it depicts is not. The practice of a certain class of males being expected to engage in sexual conquest has deep roots in history and perhaps even biology.⁷ Adultery, thus, meets Stout’s criteria for being a virtue.

⁵ See Altman 2009.

⁶ Aristotle may have an understanding of what constitutes adultery that differs from our own. Irwin suggests Aristotle understood it to be “the unjust use of a wife who justly belongs to another man” (Irwin in Aristotle 1999, 198). But K. J. Dover’s research suggests adultery in ancient Greece meant “to seduce the wife, widowed mother, unmarried daughter, sister or niece of a citizen” (Dover, 209). This latter definition limits the number of cases of infidelity that would count as adultery more than the former definition. Someone might object, then, that my *Mad Men* example is dependent on a contemporary understanding of adultery rather than on Aristotle’s. The instances of infidelity on the show are so numerous that I am fairly confident at least one would count as adultery for Aristotle even under the more permissive definition and would be a case that the main male characters considered fair play within the norms of the practice. But even if that were not the case, I could stipulate conditions slightly different than the ones from the show (call them the “*Schmad Men*” conditions) where the norms of the practice allowed for *Aristotelian* cases of adultery to be virtuous in Stout’s sense. That may mean the conditions I describe are virtually nonexistent. But if Stout can use circumstances he admits to be so abnormal that his alleged virtue might “never be applied,” then I do not see why I cannot also stipulate significantly abnormal conditions.

⁷ Concerning the historical roots, that sexual conquest (including extramarital affairs) is linked to male dominance across a variety of cultures is fairly well-documented. Steven Pinker notes, citing a

What about theft? Within an environment like a pirate ship during the golden age of piracy, it seems easy to imagine that theft could be virtuous given Stout's criteria. Thievery among pirates was a normatively constituted practice. In several cases, there were codified rules regulating the practice.⁸ Pirates were encouraged to engage in the practice.⁹ In fact, pirates who were timid during dangerous excursions were punished.¹⁰ Theft arguably has significant historical roots in view of raids between neighboring tribal societies, Viking pillaging, colonialism, powerful nations forcing other nations to pay tribute, and the general human tendency to aid in-group members at the expense of out-group members.¹¹ Predation for gain is nothing new or novel (Pinker, 509). And engaging in the practice would earn a pirate a valuable reputation—being a good in-group member by contributing effort to securing the

plethora of studies and data, "In nonstate societies, dominant men have more wives, more girlfriends, and more affairs with other men's wives. In the six earliest empires ... emperors often had thousands of wives and concubines, princes had hundreds, noblemen had dozens, upper-class men had up to a dozen, and middle-class men had three or four" (Pinker, 517-518). See also Buss, 63-64. Concerning the biological roots, Pinker writes, "in any species in which one sex can reproduce at a faster rate than the other, the participation of the slower-reproducing sex will be a scarce resource over which the faster-reproducing sex competes" (See Pinker, 395-397). According to David Buss, "the motivations for male infidelity are clear, since ancestral men who had extramarital affairs had the possibility of siring additional offspring and thereby gaining a reproductive advantage over their more loyal counterparts" (Buss, 154). See also Symons, 143, 239.

⁸ A number of complete sets of pirate codes are extant, some of which make clear penal distinctions between stealing common property (that is, goods *stolen* during *collective* raids) and stealing between individual pirates (Bederman, 715-716). Thus, there were norms that regulated what constituted *piracy* (joint-venture thievery) and intra-communal wrongdoing.

⁹ There are even extant codified incentive structures that specified greater shares of plunder to pirates who were the first to spot potential targets for theft (Leeson, 1074).

¹⁰ In the pirate code attributed to Captain George Lowther, "He that shall be found Guilty of Cowardice, in the Time of Engagement, shall suffer what Punishment the Captain and Majority shall think fit" (Dow & Edmonds, 133).

¹¹ It is baffling how serious out-group derogation can be easily fabricated under controlled conditions even among very similar persons. One classic example took place at Robbers Cave State Park in Oklahoma where a sample of all white, middle-class, Protestant, two-parent, generally-well-behaved boys was separated into two groups and within days developed such intergroup animosity that they engaged in vandalism, theft, and violence against each other. See Sherif et al 1988.

livelihood of all group members.¹² Theft, also, appears to meet Stout's criteria for a virtue.

I do not wish to belabor the argument, but in view of hitmen-for-hire, political assassins, organized crime, and the mafia, it could likely be established that murder is also virtuous given Stout's criteria. As Stout says, given the circumstances in which most people live, practical wisdom may recommend never developing or acting on a disposition to commit adultery, theft, or murder. Under normal circumstances, perhaps, as Stout says, such a "virtuous" disposition is never applied. But if a person were in such circumstances, then it may turn out that practical wisdom recommends adultery, theft, or murder. In the right circumstances, such acts may gain me a valuable reputation.

Of course, as noted before, Aristotle does not allow for virtuous acts of adultery, theft, or murder. But the bases Stout posits for virtuous violence *do* allow for virtuous adultery, theft, and murder. Therefore, they cannot establish that a disposition to retaliatory violence is virtuous in Aristotle's sense. This is the first way in which Stout's argument fails. Someone may object that the circumstances I refer to are outlandish, and it is a stretch to compare them to circumstances in which a person ought to engage in fighting. But I believe the comparisons are appropriate. Latent

¹² This is also evinced by the bonus system. A pirate who showed incentive for theft would earn a reputation in the eyes of the captain and crew and on that basis earn the bonuses; possession of the items that constituted the bonus [for example, in one case, the motivated pirate was "entitled the best Pair of Pistols on board, over and above his Dividend" (Johnson, 204)] would perpetuate that reputation.

within Stout's argument is an assumption about the degree to which Aristotelian virtues are circumstantially relative. Stout argues that given the fact that we live in "the cultured developed world" in which "the State will defend us and threaten potential attackers," this might mean the virtuous disposition toward retaliatory violence is "never applied" (Stout, 334). This opens the way for two startling possibilities: first, that virtuous persons develop dispositions even for circumstances they will never encounter simply because such dispositions *would* be virtuous *were* those circumstances ever encountered, or second, that virtues are so context-relative that sufficiently dissimilar circumstances will determine conflicting lists of virtues.

Neither possibility seems desirable, but both raise the same question: To what degree does Aristotle think the constitutive parts of eudaimonia (human flourishing) will vary by circumstance? Even if Aristotle thinks the virtues are context-dependent to some degree, he would not concede the degree of relativity Stout's position requires. It is possible to imagine numerous circumstances in which normally bad acts (even acts with significant roots in human history and biology) would be advantageous—almost *virtuously* so. It is not too difficult to imagine a Viking-like culture where, given domestic scarcity of goods, one's willingness to rape or pillage could be so socially advantageous that those with a certain disposition to rape and pillage would out-flourish those without it. However, for Aristotle, such an environment does not evince the context-relative moral value of raping or pillaging; rather, such acts being advantageous reveals the moral deficiency of that context. If asked the question, "What if circumstances made the disposition to rape and pillage

conducive to flourishing?”, I take it that “Well, I suppose in those circumstances, raping and pillaging would be virtuous acts” is not the right answer. Rather, if that is how things are, then *things ought not to be that way*.

Aristotle does not envision the virtuous person living in a utopia inhabited only by other virtuous people. And inasmuch as people ought to be virtuous but are not, then for Aristotle, *pro tanto*, things are not as they should be. But Aristotle did not consider a society filled with all and only vicious persons or circumstances of extreme scarcity, oppression, or imminent danger appropriate venues for virtue. There are circumstances in which the locus of moral deficiency is not in any given person lacking dispositions needed to thrive, but in the circumstances themselves that would enable such dispositions to be beneficial. According to Aristotle, the natural progression of human development includes circumstances of families, then villages, and then the polis, and the polis is the environment in which virtues are possible.¹³ Circumstances that deviate significantly from that environment are not circumstances in which Aristotle’s virtue theory applies.

Stout admits that under normal conditions, a person may very well be able to rely on state institutions, peaceful resolutions, and “turning the other cheek” to prevent and deter interference from would be attackers; but, Stout argues, if and when there are powerful people out to get you and if and when “Wild West morality” is applicable, then a disposition to fight back might be virtuous. Trouble is, the “Wild

¹³ See The Politics, 1252a34 – 1252b27. See Aristotle & Sinclair 1981.

West” is not an environment for determining Aristotelian virtues.¹⁴ Despite the appearance that some people thrive and do well in very *un-polis*-like circumstances, for Aristotle, such persons are not flourishing. This means that either those circumstances constitute a pre-polis state of human development in which case more progress is required before the virtues are possible, or else the circumstances are simply deviant and thus, in an important sense, ought not to be. The context Stout describes is surely of the deviant variety. As Steven Pinker notes, “dominance is an adaptation to anarchy” (Pinker, 528). For Aristotle, there are no such things as flourishing Mad Men, flourishing pirates, or flourishing Wild West fighters. Such persons doing well reveals more about the moral nature of the context than the context does about the moral nature of those persons.

The fact that Stout contrasts such circumstances with “normal” circumstances reveals a lack of connection in Stout’s position between Aristotle’s ethics and Aristotle’s politics. If Stout’s disposition to fight back is only virtuous given circumstances which are admittedly abnormal, then Aristotle would likely say that persons ought not to inhabit such circumstances; they ought instead to alter existing circumstances or live somewhere else. This means that even in the Wild West, persons should not develop Stout’s retaliatory tendencies, but, perhaps, whatever

¹⁴ Some cross-cultural and historical research shows that societies with comparably high homicide rates are characterized by the predominance of fights between men in public space (where observers can easily assess the retaliatory ability of the combatants) (Eisner 2008). In light of this research, the circumstances in which Stout claims retaliatory violence is beneficial are not circumstances in which humans flourish (Eisner, 49).

dispositions would “tame” the “Wild” out of the “West.” This is the second way Stout’s argument fails. But I believe there is at least one more.

Even if a person were so situated that it appears “Wild West morality” applies, is a disposition toward retaliatory violence the proper way to thrive? Examples abound of persons who fared well in such circumstances in virtue of their lack of a disposition to fight back. Thomas Chalkley notes that the 18th century Native-Americans who inhabited Pennsylvania during the time of William Penn were “very barbarous in the destruction of the English inhabitants,” but did not attack Quakers who by reputation and practice offered no violent resistance to anyone (Chalkley, 59). Interestingly, Chalkley mentions reports of three Quaker deaths at the hands of Native Americans, which occurred only *after* those persons abandoned their Quaker practices and began visibly brandishing defensive weapons (Chalkley, 61ff). In 1777, a group of Native-Americans entered into a Quaker meeting house with the intention of killing all those present, but killed no one; one of the Native-Americans explained to the Quakers, “When we saw you sitting with your door open, without weapons of defense, we had no disposition to hurt you” (Fry, 18). Noah Worcester notes that in 1812, while others in Indiana were being harassed by Native American incursions, the Shakers (who adhered to pacifist principles similar to Quakers) also were never attacked; the Native Americans considered it a disgrace to harm a peaceable people (Ballou 2006, 107). In 1703, a band of Irish rebels were deterred from their intended attack upon a Moravian settlement by the obvious meekness (in Bobbio’s sense) of the Moravians (Ballou 2006, 107). Jonathan Dymond writes that Quakers were similarly unharmed by

Irish rebels for the same reason (Dymond, 74-75). These are but a few of dozens of similar examples.

I admit that while I have attempted to present cases of stereotypical “Wild West” conditions and cases where there are powerful people “out to get you,” I have not presented cases of the normatively constituted practice of fighting that Stout describes. The cases I mention bear more similarity to war, terror, or otherwise potential violent assaults that would not count as fights in Stout’s sense.¹⁵ But the cases I mention illustrate that a reputation for harmlessness can achieve the effect that Stout claims for the reputation for fighting back. And in virtue of a reputation for harmlessness, the potential assailants were not even willing to make moves that constituted invitations to violent conflict. That is, the potential assailants did not need to test whether the reputedly harmless persons had a disposition to fight back to learn they were not to be messed with.

I agree with Stout that fighting in many cultures is a normatively constituted practice. But the very norms which govern the practice reveal the advantages of a reputation for harmlessness over fighting back. Stout describes well the moves that might constitute invitations and accepting invitations to a fight. But there are more rules governing fighting—namely, rules about who is the proper recipient of an

¹⁵ Arguably, though, the comparison is appropriate given that Stout connects the historical roots of fighting with primitive uses of spears, arrows, and traps (Stout, 333).

invitation to fight. Boys are taught not to hit girls.¹⁶ Fit young males should not be fighting elderly, infirm males. Physically or mentally disabled persons are off limits as potential opponents. Perhaps others are ruled out as well. But why are there such rules? At least one reason why such persons are “out of bounds” is that the parties involved are unequal in ways that make the fight seem blatantly unfair—so unfair that it seems “low” or beneath the dignity of an aggressor to pick a fight with an “out of bounds” party. In picking a fight with such persons, an aggressor does not acquire a reputation for being tough but for being cruel, immoral, criminal, or even cowardly. What makes these persons out-of-bounds in just this way? One reason has to do with perceived harmlessness. That is, in virtue of the perceived harmlessness of such persons, the person who makes a violent move in order to invite such parties to a fight has clearly violated the norms of fighting regardless of whether the out-of-bounds party makes a violent move to accept that invitation.

“Perceived” is an important qualifier of “harmlessness.” Any given girl, elderly person, or disabled person may be able to inflict harm equal to or greater than that which the would-be opponent could inflict. But the perception of harmlessness is

¹⁶ Stout says without further comment, “fighting is taught to us all—*boys and girls*” (Stout, 333; emphasis mine). This seems to me to ignore stark gender disparities concerning violence, such as the fact that the lion’s share of all violence is committed by fifteen-to-thirty-year-old men (Eisner 2009, 47; Pinker, 104). More importantly, these disparities seem to be latent *within the norms governing violence*. For example, the psychiatrist James Gilligan notes, “[men are] taught that there are many circumstances and situations in which one has to be violent in order to maintain one’s masculinity or sense of masculine sexual identity and adequacy, and in which a nonviolent man would be seen as impotent and emasculated, a coward, wimp, eunuch, boy, homosexual, or woman...Those who are socialized into the gender role of women under conditions of patriarchy, by contrast, are not allowed to be violent, nor are they shamed and considered sexually inadequate as women for being nonviolent; rather, they are more likely to be shamed and considered ‘unfeminine’ if they attempt to assume the male prerogative” (Gilligan 2003, 1166-1167).

attached to these parties in virtue of being the parties that they are—girls, elderly, or disabled—whether that perception is accurate or not. Thus, hitting a disabled person violates the norms of fighting even if the disabled person in question is, in fact, well-equipped to fight the aggressor. And while such persons may have a reputation for being feeble, they do not have the saps/quitters/losers reputation Stout thinks is bad. Rather, it is in virtue of their perceived harmlessness that such persons have the not-to-be-messed-with status that Stout finds valuable.

The way in which their status functions is more valuable than gaining such a status by way of a disposition to fight back. If I rely on a disposition for fighting back to secure a not-to-be-messed-with status, I am still fair game as a potential fighting partner to anyone who wants to test whether I have that disposition or who wants to test whether my prowess at fighting warrants that reputation. Thus, my disposition to fight back may very well *invite* others to invite me to fight. This is especially the case since a disposition toward retaliatory violence affords a person a not-to-be-messed-with reputation only if one has at least a reputation (if not the ability) for employing violence with a degree of skill comparable or superior to that of would-be opponents. As Pinker notes, retaliation works as a deterrent only if one's reputation for it involves "willingness to carry it out even when it is costly" (Pinker, 536). But this reputation is precisely what some would-be fighters may want to put to the test; and if I ignore even one challenge or trespass, my policy of deterrence is no longer credible (Pinker, 34). Further, the fact that the retaliation needs to be costly is precisely why it will likely not be conducive to a person's flourishing. A person will have to engage in

violent conflicts that pose significant risk to her own safety and well-being. It hardly makes sense to engage in activities in hopes of acquiring a not-to-be-messed-with reputation if those very acts involve being potentially injured to the point of no longer posing much threat to anyone.

Perceived harmlessness works preventatively. Even if a person has a disposition to fight back, if she falls within the category of perceived harmless persons, then anyone who attacks her in hopes of inviting her to fight has already broken the rules of fighting. Thereby, the fight-inviter does not secure for the target a reputation for being a sap or loser, rather the fight-inviter secures a negative reputation for herself—dishonorable, cruel, cowardly, etc. So, perceived harmlessness means that any attack from a would-be fighter is already a move against the would-be fighter's own reputation or status. Being in the harmless category means it is not in the would-be fighters' interests to attack in the first place. This is not true in the case of someone who has a disposition to fight back but lacks perceived harmlessness.

I take it the reputations of the Quakers and Moravians described above function similarly. They fall within the class of persons perceived to be harmless. The social norms underlying their perceived harmlessness are not the same as those underlying that of girls, elderly persons, or disabled persons. But their status nevertheless renders them out of bounds to potential fighters. Accordingly, even in the circumstances Stout describes, arguably practical wisdom recommends dispositions that make for a status as a person of perceived harmlessness. Even in the

Wild West, retaliatory violence is not necessarily a virtue. This is the third way in which Stout's argument fails.

Even in the circumstances in which Stout takes retaliatory violence to be virtuous, at least some of the nine reasons violence is bad I surveyed in 3.1.1 are still applicable, in which case the violent acts even of Stout's virtuous retaliator are bad to that extent. As Ballou and Tolstoy have argued, there are dispositions I could exhibit which would not only likely dissuade any would-be attackers, but those dispositions would to some extent function as moral correctives to morally deficient circumstances (Ballou 2006, 169-170; Tolstoy 1902, 217 – 218). Inasmuch as a disposition to retaliatory violence fails to do as well, it should not be preferred to such dispositions.

3.1.3 Can Violence Pay Off?

Some may object that MHP1 is weak. MHP1 allows for exceptions, and there are plenty of exceptions. There are, so the objection goes, types of cases where, on the whole, violence tends to pay off. That is, even though an act of violence in that type of case would be morally unhealthy as such, committing violence in such cases is, on the whole, the correct decision inasmuch as violence in such cases appears to have the greatest chance of producing a net gain or securing the least loss of moral health. This might mean that the act of violence might result in a net positive effect on the moral health trajectory of the perpetrator, or that the act of violence may have a positive effect on the moral health of others immediately involved in the

circumstances in which the act is committed. So, while MHP1 might establish a general presumption against violence, it does not provide any substantial reason not to commit violence in those specific case-types. Those case-types, so the objection goes, are well-established, intuitive exceptions to the presumption against violence. I believe all examples used to support this objection fall into at least one of the following four types.

Honor violence is violence committed in order to establish, maintain, or restore a sense of dignity or respectability.¹⁷ The practice of dueling was a means by which the offended party could ensure that “honor was satisfied.”¹⁸ The satisfaction of honor was typically determined by elaborately detailed, often codified sets of rules.¹⁹ Another example is gang violence. When a gang member violates norms taken to govern gangs, the offended party is honor bound to respond in certain ways.²⁰ U.S. engagement of Britain in the War of 1812 was in part motivated by the sense that American’s honor had been insulted by the British.²¹ Another example is the stoning of Muslim women by their own brothers, fathers, and husbands if those women

¹⁷ Steven Pinker astutely observes that honor is “the strange commodity that exists because everyone believes that everyone else believes that it exists” (Pinker, 23).

¹⁸ See H. Cochran 1963.

¹⁹ For example, see Hamilton, 1-24, which presents the British Royal Code of Honor consisting of sixty rules, any violation of which allowed the opponent to refuse to recognize the violator “as a gentleman.”

²⁰ See Horowitz and Schwartz 1974.

²¹ See Tucker 2006.

commit acts that dishonor the family such as marrying a man without the fathers' consent.²²

State violence is violence committed to serve state interest. Here I mean to refer mainly to acts of violence committed in wars or by police forces. But there are other acts of violence that would be rightly categorized as state violence—perhaps violence carried out by spies or non-military state agents to accomplish their assigned missions. State executions and state-conducted acts of torture or violent interrogation would also be examples.²³

Self-defensive violence is violence committed in order to prevent injury to oneself when under attack or threat. Assaulting a home intruder, mugger, or rapist would be examples of self-defensive violence. Wars fought to fend off an invasion force would also be an example.

Interventionist violence is violence committed in defense of a third-party who is under attack or threat. Such could take place individually if, say, a person witnessed a mugging in progress and intervened violently or collectively if a state intervened violently in a war between two other nations.²⁴

²² See McCoy 2014.

²³ The vast majority of what I will cover and argue concerns non-state violence; I will explain the reason for inattention to state violence in 4.4. But briefly I will here state that state violence is rarely presented in pure form; it is typically cast as a state level instance of honor violence, self-defensive violence, or interventionist violence.

²⁴ A rather important distinction in such cases is whether the party carrying out the assault is innocent (unintentionally harming or threatening the victim's life or safety) or morally culpable. See McMahan 1994 and Thomson 1991. With the possible exception of a grizzly bear, throughout the dissertation I assume assailants are morally culpable.

The four case types are not mutually exclusive; state violence can be self-defensive, acts of interventionist violence can also be acts of honor violence, etc. The order in which I present them represents, I believe, the ranking of importance from least-to-greatest as kinds of cases alleged to be exceptions to the presumption against violence. That is, interventionist violence is often assumed to settle decisively that there are clear exceptions to the presumption against violence, while cases of honor violence may provide exceptions but less clearly so.

One important feature is shared by all four case types. Acts of violence in all four cases have the appearance of being morally compelling. In cases of each type, there appears to be an urgent or crucial need to do *something* to prevent a bad state of affairs or secure a good state of affairs, and, given the nature of the case, violence appears to be the obvious candidate for that something. That is not to say that every token act of violence committed for honor, state, self-defense, or even intervention is, in fact, morally good, right, justifiable, or excusable. Rather, given the nature of the case type, *prima facie* a person ought (in some sense) to commit violence. I will call acts of violence committed on the basis of the apparent, urgent moral need to do so in one or more such case types *morally compelling violence* (heretofore, “MCV”).

These case types constitute the critical point of disagreement between any given pacifist and her non-pacifist dialectical opponent. That is, in some case of one or more of these types, the pacifist believes that MCV would be bad, wrong, unjustifiable, or inexcusable and the non-pacifist believes that MCV would be good, right, justifiable,

or excusable. More importantly, within the pacifist/non-pacifist dialectic, the non-pacifist holds that one or more of these case types serve as evidence against pacifism—the mere description of the case should make obvious that MCV would be good, right, justifiable, or excusable.²⁵ And thus, the non-pacifist holds that such cases present pacifists with a dilemma: What should a person so situated do?²⁶ If the pacifist says the person should commit MCV, she thereby gives up pacifism. If the pacifist says the person should not commit MCV, she recommends that the person should *fail* to do what is good, right, justifiable, or excusable (to fail to do what she seems most compelled to do for moral reasons given the stakes of the case).

I will refer to cases of one or more of these types in which the person so situated has yet to commit or opt not to commit MCV as *pacifist dilemmas*. This generic term can be modified to make clear which case type is under consideration: *honor pacifist dilemmas* (cases in which a person seems morally compelled to commit violence for the sake of honor), *state pacifist dilemmas* (cases in which a person seems morally compelled to commit violence for the sake of state interest), *self-defensive pacifist dilemmas* (cases in which a person seems morally compelled to commit violence to prevent harm to herself when under attack), and *interventionist pacifist dilemmas* (cases in which a person seems morally compelled to commit violence against an assailant to prevent harm to a third party victim).

²⁵ For example, Cheyney Ryan writes, “All my adult life, when I’ve said I’m a pacifist, people respond: ‘What about self-defense?’ This is typically followed by a ‘Gotcha!’” (Ryan 2015, 17).

²⁶ In the case of non-universal types of pacifism I mentioned in Chapter 1, this question assumes that the person so situated is one who falls within the class of persons who the pacifist believes are subject to a moral opposition to violence.

Some may object that MHP1 is unconvincing in view of pacifist dilemmas and the obvious need for MCV. In the case of Albanian vendettas, failing to avenge oneself can result in economic hardship and public ridicule (Hasluck, 231 – 232), and the social ostracism that results can be crippling (Elster, 864).²⁷ In the case of an active shooter on a school campus, a police officer firing sooner rather than later can make a difference in the number of lives saved. In the case of a home invasion, whether I fire a gun or swing a bat at the intruder may determine whether I live out the night. In the case of witnessing an attempted mugging or rape, whether I violently assault the mugger or rapist may determine whether the intended victim loses her property or her psychological well-being. Given the stakes or urgency involved, why not commit violence in such cases? Who could possibly find the person who did so blameworthy or bad or wrong? In fact, it seems strange—perhaps even morally suspicious—to think a person would refuse on moral grounds to commit violence when so situated. Even if MHP1 is true, *within the category of pacifist dilemmas*, that presumption against violence is so circumstantially weakened that it is negligible.

What can a pacifist say about pacifist dilemmas? I aim for the remaining claims that constitute moral health pacifism to address pacifist dilemmas and make clear what certain persons can do when situated in these four types of cases. I will maintain that the practice of moral health pacifism involves refraining from violence even in

²⁷ See also "Albanian blood feud," 2013.

pacifist dilemmas, and that even in pacifist dilemmas, the practice of moral health pacifism is morally better than MCV.

3.2 There are Morally Healthier Alternatives

The second claim of moral health pacifism is this: Even in pacifist dilemmas, on the whole, there are alternative courses of action that occupy positions on E-mh_a (an evaluative scale measuring actions) higher than MCV (“MHP2”). That is, generally speaking, for any given act of MCV, there is some alternative action that is not an act of violence that is morally healthier. I will call such actions *pacifist alternatives*. To be a pacifist alternative, an action must be either by intent or character an attempt to do something in response to the morally compelling nature of pacifist dilemmas. And either by intent or character, they are attempts to do more than MCV—to prevent a greater degree of moral unhealthiness or to secure a greater degree of moral healthiness.

MHP2, as stated, is weaker than it appears. I have maintained that the qualifier “on the whole” allows for the possibility of genuine exceptions and that moral health claims can be satisfied by E-mh readings which are indiscernibly slight. Further, if a pacifist alternative prevented as much bad or secured as much good as an act of MCV, then it is morally healthier merely in virtue of not being an act of violence (that is, not

being bad for the nine reasons listed in defense of MHP1).²⁸ I admit MHP2 as stated is weak in these ways. But I believe that characteristically, pacifist alternatives are significantly morally healthier than their violent counterparts, and I aim to argue to that end.

In this section, I will present five ways in which pacifist alternatives are morally healthier than MCV. Before this, two things should be noted. First, there is an important difference between MCV and pacifist alternatives. MCV are all acts of the same type—acts *of violence*. While that term does not tell us whether the act in question was kicking, shooting, stabbing, etc., violence as a type of act is defined tightly enough to be a handy or quick option to fulfill the need to do *something* in pacifist dilemmas. Pacifist alternatives are not formulaic in this way. Many types of acts might count as pacifist alternatives. Thus, pacifist alternatives constitute a much harder category of action to characterize. The ways in which they are morally healthier will give some indication of their character; but more than this, I intend to present a significant number of examples that, I hope, will clarify their nature.

Secondly, in some instances I will defend MHP2 by claiming that pacifist alternatives are more likely than MCV to have some morally preferable feature. Baldly, this is an empirical claim about relative frequencies. If there were a representative sample *S1* of acts of MCV and a representative sample *S2* of pacifist

²⁸ So, given *ceteris paribus* or *mutatis mutandis* clauses, pacifist alternatives will always be morally healthier than acts of MCV. But MHP2 is also consistent with the claim (which contains no such clauses) that any given act of MCV may be morally healthier than any given pacifist alternative.

alternatives relevantly comparable to the acts in *S1*, then the occurrence of some feature *f* would be relatively more frequent in *S2* than in *S1*. I stand by that claim. But this is data I do not have, and I foresee several daunting obstacles to conducting such an analysis.²⁹ Nevertheless, I believe I can make plausible these comparative claims using features characteristic of the acts in question.

3.2.1 Pacifist Alternatives Avoid the Badness of Violence as such

Pacifist alternatives are more likely than MCV to avoid the negative effects of violence. According to Bufacchi, violence is bad because it restricts the freedom of the victim, it results in psychological damage of the victim, and it humiliates the victim by vividly exposing to the victim her own vulnerabilities. In pacifist dilemmas, MCV advocates hope to restrict the freedom of the perpetrator and for good reason. But if there were a way to prevent the perpetrator from committing violence while also respecting the perpetrator's freedom, then such would be better given Bufacchi's account of the badness of violence. Pacifist alternatives engage perpetrators in a way

²⁹ Assembling *S1* and *S2* would require clearer criteria for "morally compelling." Formulating those criteria involves issues that still plague self-defense debates. Must violence be morally compelling in fact or will a person's justified belief that it is morally compelling suffice? According to objectivist theories of self-defense, the person's justified belief is not sufficient to justify violence (Thomson 1991, 295). According to subjectivist theories, it is (Greenawalt, 1903). There also is the issue of imminence. How temporally near does an attack have to be for an act of violence to be morally compelling? For example, if a battered wife kills her physically abusive husband in his sleep, is that an act of self-defense? And if so, was she morally compelled to do it (Baron, 228)? What if someone threatens to harm my loved ones a year from now? If I attack that person now, is it interventionist violence, and even so, is the attack morally compelling? Assembling *S2* would be particularly difficult not only because of the need to give clear criteria for pacifist alternatives, but as I will argue throughout, examples of MCV are abundant whereas the practice of pacifist alternatives is both difficult and rare. I doubt whether a sufficient sample size could be achieved for *S2*.

that neither psychologically damages nor humiliates the perpetrator, yet still aims to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts of violence. Rather than humiliate, some pacifist alternatives seek to restore a violent perpetrator to a level of dignified self-awareness such that even the perpetrator is distanced from the thought of committing violence.

Pacifist alternatives do not merely aim to restrain violence and prevent injury; some pacifist alternatives aim at resolutions conducive to what I referred to before as “genuine peace.” To establish conditions of genuine peace in a community, there likely need to be changes both in the violent perpetrator and the person who would opt for pacifist alternatives. If the practice of pacifist alternatives were conducive to the establishment of such conditions, then pacifist alternatives are of more value than MCV inasmuch as violence cannot in the nature of the case establish genuine peace. A commitment to pacifist alternatives avoids the character weakness which Wu argues accompanies violence—that is as long as the pacifist alternatives employed do not bear any of the same defects which Wu argues are had by violence.

And some pacifist alternatives avoid perpetuating violence unlike MCV. If I commit MCV, say, in self-defense, the person I assault now has a reason also to commit an act of violence in self-defense. Admittedly, some MCV can decisively end a violent conflict (a lethal or debilitating assault, for example), and even having some apparent preparedness to commit MCV may deter attacks. But such deterrents are ineffective against an attacker who believes she can employ violence more effectively

or more ruthlessly than her target. Pacifist alternatives do not enter into the contest of violent posturing in the first place, but attempt to remove any apparent need for posturing on either party's part.

Further, pacifist alternatives avoid the various degrading effects of violence. The person who opts for pacifist alternatives does not have to become a perpetrator of violence to engage a perpetrator of violence. One who employs pacifist alternatives will not suffer any self-alienation on account of acts she may commit in pursuit of a worthy goal. She need not behave as a degrader or a dehumanizer nor does she accept the self-and-others-degradation being promulgated by the violent perpetrator. Pacifist alternatives communicate to the violent perpetrator what Dorothy Samuel calls "an absolute rejection of thing-dom" (Samuel, 35). Inasmuch as the person who employs a pacifist alternative refuses to behave as a victim or a mere thing, the violent perpetrator does not confront a mere thing, but a living, feeling person. In some cases, this compels the violent perpetrator to cease being a violent perpetrator and instead to behave in kind (Samuel, 40). Pacifist alternatives seek not to degrade or dehumanize, but rather to dignify both the one who employs them and the violent perpetrator against whose violence the pacifist alternatives are employed, thus increasing mutual reverence for life. In this way the degrading effects of violence are avoided by use of pacifist alternatives.

3.2.2 Pacifist Alternatives lead to Less Death and Injury

Pacifist alternatives lead to less death or injury than MCV. Whether this is true may depend upon the truth values of counterfactuals that are unknowable. Suppose a police officer shoots a perpetrator she reasonably believes is in the middle of an attempt to kill hostages. How much death and injury did the police officer prevent? In a sense this is unclear without comparing the case to the instance in which the same officer similarly situated does not shoot and allows the perpetrator to act in which case it will be evident how much death and injury the perpetrator would have caused had the officer not shot and comparing it to the case in which the same officer similarly situated does not shoot but employs a pacifist alternative. But since neither comparative case actually happened, precise answers are speculative at best. Rather than defending speculations that favor the pacifist alternative counterfactual, I will present two cases where pacifist alternatives were used and no death or injury occurred.

Edward Richards was a relief worker living amongst the Kurds and Turks in West Persia in 1917. On one occasion he encountered a man brandishing a gun in public. The obviously intoxicated man was running amuck and endangering people nearby. Richards had access to guns and several places from which he could have taken aim and shot the drunken gun-wielder undetected. Rather than shoot, Richards approached the man unarmed and extended his hand, offering to shake hands as a sign of friendship. The drunken gun-wielder saluted Richards and handed over the

gun. The next day, after sobering up, the gun-wielder found Richards and apologized profusely. "Throughout this entire affair," writes Richards, "no one was killed or even injured" (Richards, 626-627).

Terry Dobson recalls riding on a train near Tokyo when a large, drunken man entered. As soon as the man entered the train, he screamed at passengers and attempted to punch and kick some of them. Dobson was young, in good shape, and had been studying martial arts for years. He was confident he could decisively neutralize the threat by use of force. Dobson stood up and taunted the drunk to approach him. The drunk took the bait and headed for Dobson. Before the two men met, an elderly gentleman on the train shouted at the drunk, "Hey! Come here and talk to me." The old man patted the empty seat next to him invitingly. The drunk approached the old man and bellowed back, "Why should I talk to you?" The old man asked the drunk what he had been drinking. The drunk admitted to drinking sake. The old man told the drunk how much he, too, enjoyed drinking sake in his garden with his wife every evening. The old man then asked about the drunk's family. The drunk noticeably softened and began to sob. He explained to the old man how his wife had died, how he no longer had a job or a home, and how ashamed he felt. The old man asked the drunk about his troubles. Dobson got off at the next stop as the drunk was still pouring his heart out, and the old man offering sympathetic looks and words of comfort. Dobson writes of the incident, "what I had wanted to do with muscle had been accomplished with kind words" (Dobson, 190).

Arguably, though, Dobson is mistaken. The kind words of the old man actually achieved more than Dobson would have done through force. Dobson might have injured the drunk and risked injuring himself and bystanders in the process. True, Dobson's skillful use of martial arts may have prevented greater injury to bystanders, but the old man's kind words prevented unintended injury to bystanders that might have resulted from Dobson's attack, injury to the drunk himself, and quelled the drunk's desire to injure. Richard's friendly handshake and the old man's kind words both show that pacifist alternatives can prevent death or injury.

3.2.3 Pacifist Alternatives lead to Scrooge Effects

Pacifist alternatives are more likely than MCV to produce Scrooge Effects on the violent perpetrator.³⁰ The previous two anecdotes suggest that the violent perpetrators experienced Scrooge Effects as a result of the interactions. There are many more examples. I offer the following three.

In the late seventeenth century, while travelling down a road, Leonard Fell was confronted by a robber. The robber, brandishing a pistol, threatened to kill Fell if Fell did not hand over his money and horse. Fell surrendered both. The robber holstered his gun to sort out the booty, and Fell began to warn and admonish the robber severely about the error of his ways and told the robber it was not too late to change.

³⁰ "Scrooge Effects", as I described them in Chapter 2, are meant to parallel what many pacifists and nonviolence advocates have called "transforming power" (Apsey 2012 & Retain 2000) and perhaps the interpersonal aspects of what Andrew Fiala calls "transformational pacifism" (Fiala 2014).

The robber, surprised by Fell's gall, became enraged at what he perceived to be Fell's audacious hypocrisy. The robber called Fell a "cowardly dog," pointing out that Fell had simply forfeited his money and horse, failing to "pluck up" the courage to engage in self-defense, yet Fell dared to preach to the robber about moral shortcomings. The robber in his rage drew his pistol at Fell. Fell responded calmly that he would not risk his life to save his money or horse, but he would risk his life to save the robber from wrongdoing. The robber, conscience-stricken by Fell's response, returned Fell's things and said, "If you are such a man as that, I will take neither your money nor your horse" (L. Hodgkin, 427).³¹

Ballou records an incident between two university students in which one of them felt quite insulted by the other. The insulted student, being a Southerner accustomed to Southern honor codes, demanded satisfaction. The offending student gave assurance that he intended no offense or injury, but if he could clearly be shown in the wrong, he would gladly make ample reparations; but he refused to engage in a duel with a friend. The Southerner "boiled over with chivalrous indignation" and "discharged a volley of reproachful epithets, and threatened to chastise" his friend for being such a coward. The offending student responded calmly and fearlessly, explaining that the two had been good friends thus far, he intended to continue to be friendly toward the Southerner, and that talk of dueling, violence, reproaches, and insults was behavior quite unworthy of the man he knew to be his friend. The

³¹ See also Webb 1884.

Southerner instantly blushed with shame and responded, “I have spoken and acted like a fool; can you forgive me?” (Ballou 2006, 88).

Whether these are instances of Scrooge Effects is debatable. The violent perpetrators’ responses are consistent with moral health trajectories that continued to decline, and the perpetrators’ initial acts may be consistent with positive trajectories. I take it though that prima facie the Scrooge Effect interpretation is the most plausible, and that the pacifist alternatives in these instances characterize types of acts that are more likely to produce that effect than if the parties in question had committed MCV. Many pacifist alternatives are attempts to create change within the perpetrator. As Mary Crane puts it while suggesting nonviolent ways to resist attempted rape, “change created in the heart and mind of the opponent...is more likely to be of a permanent nature” (Crane, 9).

3.2.4 Pacifist Alternatives Address the Causes of Violence Directly

Pacifist alternatives, unlike their violent counterparts, directly address the causes of violence; and this is a superior way to counter acts of violence. MCV as a category presupposes there are circumstances where violence has been made (perhaps) necessary due to others’ violent or potentially violent acts. That there are persons who behave in ways that make a violent response morally compelling is taken as a given. MCV fails to embody the judgment that things ought not to be this way. There ought not to be violent assailants in the first place.

In the case of self-defensive violence, interventionist violence, and some honor violence, MCV is designed to prevent, restrain, or incapacitate *acts* of violence. MCV does not, however, neutralize or supplant violent intentions, tendencies, or their causes. In other words, MCV presupposes that the prevention of there being violent assailants (and thus the prevention of that which gives rise to the need for MCV) is no longer an option.

The difference between the two is analogous to caging a wild animal (restraining the animal's wild behaviors) versus taming an animal (dispelling the animal's wildness). Pacifist alternatives are also designed to prevent, restrain, or incapacitate violent acts, but by directly addressing and dispelling the underlying causes of violence. If MCV succeeds, the outcome is a violent perpetrator who is "caged." If pacifist alternatives succeed, the outcome is a person who is no longer violent. There are at least two ways in which pacifist alternatives bring about this outcome.

James Gilligan argues that the basic cause of violence is shame (Gilligan 2001, 29ff).³² That is, a person feels such an acute lack of the respect and esteem from others, that the harmfulness of such feelings of humiliation is overwhelming.³³ To

³² See also Gilligan 1997. Gilligan uses the term "shame" quite broadly to include "feelings of being slighted, insulted, disrespected, dishonored, disgraced, disdained, slandered, treated with contempt, ridiculed, teased, taunted, mocked, rejected, defeated, subjected to indignity or ignominy; feelings of inferiority, inadequacy; feelings of being weak, ugly, a failure, 'losing face,' being treated as if you were insignificant, unimportant or worthless" (Gilligan 2001, 30).

³³ What then are the causes of such acute feelings of shame? Gilligan argues that the causes are basically social: income inequality, lack of opportunity and upward mobility, lack of education and employment. Gilligan argues that there are strong positive correlations between a society's rate of

protect the self from being overwhelmed, a person commits acts of violence.³⁴ Those acts of violence offer the perpetrator a facsimile of the social regard she is lacking (Gilligan 2001, 36).³⁵ When she threatens or commits violence, her victim is fearful and at her mercy. The victim listens acutely to the perpetrator and cowers at the power the perpetrator has assumed. This gives the perpetrator some sense of being respected and respectable. It is not the same kind which she is lacking, but a kind that diminishes the intensity of her shame, thus preventing her from being overwhelmed (Gilligan 1997, 111).

MCV is less likely than pacifist alternatives to dispel the shame causing a perpetrator's violence. Violence is in the nature of the case degrading or dehumanizing to the victim. Acts of MCV, however morally compelling they may be, are acts of *violence*. As such, MCV *shames* the recipient. Even if they incapacitate or restrain the perpetrator, they can only serve to increase or compound the perpetrator's shame—the shame which is at the root of the perpetrator's aggressive acts of violence. At best, MCV treats the symptoms but not the disease. And really it is worse; even when MCV lessens the symptoms, it does so in a way that allows the

violence and the degree to which such social problems are present in that society (Gilligan 2001, 38-49). Gilligan's evidence suggests that in order to address the causes of violence directly, pacifist alternatives can also consist of acts that are preemptive of violent conflicts—acts of mercy, charity, kindness, and compassion. Such acts can serve to reduce the potential for violence in the communities in which they are performed.

³⁴ Gilligan is careful to point out that shame is a necessary but not sufficient condition for committing violence (since there are ample cases of shamed persons who are not violent) (Gilligan 2003, 1165).

³⁵ I should make clear that Gilligan's use of shame is entirely social; violent persons do not disregard themselves, rather they feel unduly disregarded by others. It is important to clarify that Gilligan does not argue that violence stems from lack of self-esteem, and thus, Gilligan's analysis is compatible with the various studies that struggle to establish definite positive or negative correlations between violence and self-esteem (Bushman & Baumeister 2002; Salmivalli 2001).

pathogen to thrive.³⁶ Therefore, even if MCV restrains a perpetrator's immediate violence, it is likely to make a perpetrator even more violent in the long run.³⁷

Pacifist alternatives treat the disease—the cause of violence within the perpetrator. Pacifist alternatives prevent or restrain a perpetrator's acts of violence by addressing the shame from which the violent intentions and tendencies stem. Pacifist alternatives do not give the violent perpetrator the counterfeit dignity or respect her acts of violence are designed to achieve. Pacifist alternatives give the perpetrator the real thing—the social capital which she is lacking and the lack of which has brought about her shame. In the case of the two university students, the offending student told his Southern friend that hurling reproaches and demanding duels was behavior *unworthy* of him. In the case of the Tokyo train drunkard, rather than compounding the shame over various plights underlying the drunk's violence, the old man spoke compassionately to the drunk as though he were speaking to anyone whom he valued. Edward Richards made a gesture of friendship to a threatening and angry gun-wielder. The gun-wielder's return and profuse apology suggests that Richards' gesture helped him recognize that such behavior was *beneath* him.

³⁶ Gilligan refers to shame as the "pathogen" which causes violence, and a pathogen which can be transferred from person to person (Gilligan 1997, 103-105). In my system, then, it could be said that shaming is a process by which moral unhealthiness is transmitted like a contagion. (Concerning the contagiousness of emotions, see also Pinker, 575-576.)

³⁷ On reviewing his extensive work with prisoners, Gilligan observes, "the more violent an inmate was, the more severely he would be punished, and the more severely he was punished, the more violent he would become" (Gilligan 2001, 17).

Consider also the case of Antoinette Tuff. Tuff was a bookkeeper for the Ronald E. McNair Learning Academy, an elementary school in Decatur, Georgia. On August 20, 2013, Michael Brandon Hill, a 20-year-old mentally ill male, entered the front office of the school carrying an AK-47 and approached Tuff. Hill told Tuff, "We are all going to die today." Hill demanded that Tuff call the police and the media. After talking with a 911 operator, Hill left the front office to shoot at police officers assembled outside. Tuff, still in the front office, called out to Hill: "Sweetheart, come back in here. Bullets don't have no names. And those bullets gonna kill me and you. I need you to come back in here and it's gonna be you and me and we will work this thing out." Hill complied, returned to the front office, slumped in a chair, and calmly said that he felt badly about his life; he was off his medication and knew he should have gone to the hospital instead of the school. Hill mentioned suicide, and Tuff quickly interjected, "No. You don't want that. You gonna be okay. I thought the same thing. You know, I tried to commit suicide last year after my husband left me, but look at me now. I'm still working and everything is okay." Hill was convinced the police would shoot him. Tuff offered to help Hill surrender so that they would not hurt him. Hill placed his weapon on a desk and laid down. Tuff told Hill, "It's gonna be all right, sweetheart. I just want you to know that I love you, though, okay? And I'm proud of you. That's a good thing that you're just giving up and don't worry about it. We all go through something in life." The police entered the school, apprehended Hill, and Tuff and eight hundred elementary school children survived the ordeal without injury.³⁸

Tuff consistently related to Hill in value-conferring ways. Coaxing him back into the building communicated to him that his safety was worth someone's concern. Discouraging him from suicide and relating her own experiences communicated that Hill was worth her encouragement and worthy of trusting him with her own experiences. Tuff told Hill she was proud of him for resolving the situation without any further violence. Tuff illustrates that pacifist alternatives combat the cause of violence by conferring to violent perpetrators a sense of dignity and value—the very dignity and value that they lack and the lack of which underlies their having become violent perpetrators.

But pacifist alternatives address the cause of violence in another way. Consider the following cases. In early twentieth century Britain, Muriel Lester was leading an anti-war activist meeting when a mob violently disrupted the gathering. Lester calmly approached the leader of the mob and gestured to take his arm in the traditional manner in which a lady would receive proper escort from a male. The mob leader quickly complied and took her arm. She walked the mob leader out of the meeting hall and across the street, which also quelled the violent energy of the rest of the mob who, after witnessing the act, dispersed without further incident (Samuel, 22).

During the 1970's, the police of Louisville, Kentucky implemented new techniques during crisis intervention calls. Whereas they would once burst onto a scene with weapons drawn, they developed techniques to break the tension and avoid

³⁸ See Blake 2014 and Cornish 2013.

any officer injury. In one instance, the police entered an apartment in which a husband and wife were clearly in the midst of an altercation. Rather than violently engage the husband, one officer calmly took off his hat and asked the husband, “Mind if I smoke? Some people don’t like the smell of cigars” (Samuel, 62). The husband suddenly shifted his frame of mind from abuser to hospitable host. All the techniques were similarly designed to throw a violent scenario out of focus. Upon implementing this new approach, police responded to twelve hundred crisis calls without a single officer being injured.

Consider an event in the life of Angie O’Gorman who relates a case of attempted assault and perhaps even rape.

I was awakened late one night several years ago by a man kicking open the door to my bedroom. The house was empty. The phone was downstairs. He was somewhat verbally abusive as he walked over to my bed. I could not find his eyes in the darkness but could see the outline of his form. As I lay there, feeling a fear and vulnerability I had never before experienced, several thoughts rushed through my head: First, the uselessness of screaming. Second, the fallacy of thinking safety depends on having a gun hidden under one’s pillow. Somehow I could not imagine this man standing patiently while I reached under my pillow for my gun. I believe the third thought saved my life. I realized with some clarity that either he and I made it through this situation safely—together—or we would both be damaged. Our safety was connected. If he raped me, I would be hurt both physically and emotionally, *and* he would be hurt as well. If he went to prison, the damage would be greater. That thought disarmed *me*. It also released me from paralysis and a desire to lash out. It freed me from fear’s control over my ability to respond even though I still had feelings of fear. I found myself acting out of concern for the safety of us both, reacting with firmness but with little hostility in my voice. I asked him what time it was. He answered. That was a good sign. I commented that his watch and the clock on my night table had different times. His said 2:30, mine said 2:45. I had just set mine. I hoped his watch wasn’t

broken. When had he last set it? He answered. I answered. The time seemed endless. When the atmosphere began to calm a little, I asked him how he had gotten into the house. He'd broken through the glass in the back door. I told him that presented me with a problem: I did not have the money to buy new glass. He talked about some financial difficulties of his own. We talked until we were no longer strangers and I felt safe to ask him to leave. He didn't want to; he said he had no place to go. Knowing I did not have the physical power to force him out, I told him firmly but respectfully, as equal to equal, that I would give him a clean set of sheets, but he would have to make his own bed downstairs. He went downstairs, and I sat up in bed, wide awake and shaking for the rest of the night. The next morning we ate breakfast together and he left. (O'Gorman, 242-246)

In another case, an older woman was walking down a city street carrying bags full of shopping. She noticed that men were walking behind her quickly enough to catch up to her. Once they were near, they began to surround her. She was confident they meant to attack. Before either of them could touch her, she looked at both and grinned, thrusting out her shopping bags. She shouted that she was so glad they came along because she was starting to feel nervous walking alone on the street and her bags were becoming very heavy. She asked them, "Would you please help me?" The men seemed instinctively to take the bags from her and walked her home as she cheerily thanked them for their kindness (Gish, 20).

These four cases illustrate the previous means by which violence is combatted. In each case, arguably, the perpetrator was dignified—related to in a way that conferred the social capital the perpetrator was lacking. But the examples illustrate another way in which pacifist alternatives combat violence. Violent conflicts are instances of a script. Persons have conceptual representations of stereotyped event sequences—"scripts"—and these scripts are activated when persons involved expect

events to unfold in a way sufficiently similar to that stereotype (Abelson 1981, 715). In violent conflicts, perpetrators are engaged in acting through that script. Within that script, there is some room for variety and improvisation, but there are definite limits; that is, there are only certain types or a limited number of obstacles or “errors” that a script can overcome (Abelson 1981, 724). If the person with whom the violent perpetrator is interacting does not react or respond within that range of variety, then the scripted intentions and actions of a violent perpetrator are not prompted. By playing the part well, so to speak, the violent perpetrator can compel the victim to engage in those scripted responses. And so it is easy for the victim to give the violent perpetrator the kind of responses demanded by the script unwittingly, and therefore, it is easy for the victim to allow the violent-conflict script to control the scenario. The victim responds to the perpetrator with flight, fight, posturing, or submission—the last of which gives the counterfeit respect the perpetrator is looking for (Grossman, 5-6).

However, the victim need not allow the violent-conflict script to control the scenario. There are what Robert Abelson calls “distractions”—events “of sufficient salience or importance to interrupt script action” (Abelson 1981, 724). One type of distraction, I believe, could be a script-change. The victim could initiate a different script altogether—one the responses and actions of which are incompatible with the violent-conflict script. This would involve committing an action that is, first, an error outside the violent-conflict script’s range for variety, thus violating the violent-conflict script’s “internal coherence” (Abelson 1981, 726), and, second, an invitation to a different script. If the victim initiates such a script compellingly enough, it may, in

turn, become quite easy for the perpetrator to play along with the new script rather than continue trying to enact the violent-conflict script.

This is not as metaphorical as it sounds. Humans often experience interactions with people where the flow of those interactions is second nature.³⁹ Upon reaching adulthood, many of us have been thoroughly habituated in various interaction-types. We know how to play out basic small talk interactions, meal time interactions, guest/host interactions, work-related interactions, etc. In fact, inasmuch as we have participated in those interaction-types a considerable number of times, we have, in a sense, rehearsed them in preparation for future occurrences of those interactions. This rehearsal is important because it ensures we will not have to think much about the proper response at any given time because we can produce proper responses instinctively or spontaneously.⁴⁰ This is what the violent perpetrator is counting on.⁴¹ If the violent perpetrator initiates the violent-conflict interaction compellingly enough, then the victim will instinctively produce the responses needed for the interaction to occur more or less as the perpetrator predicts.

Pacifist alternatives involve both a refusal to accept the script initiated by the violent perpetrator and an initiation of a different script altogether, prompting the

³⁹ See Abelson 1976.

⁴⁰ In fact, responses can be produced in such an autopilot fashion that we can confuse responses within the same family of script prompts, for example, responding “Thanks, *you too*” to someone who wishes us a happy birthday.

⁴¹ In the case of confrontations with fellow humans, our tendency to flee, fight, posture, or submit may be due more to nature than nurture (Grossman, 7f). But these responses can be reinforced by enculturation, and more importantly to my argument, these scripted responses (whether that script is written neurologically or socially) operate amidst a host of other scripts that function similarly even if those other scripts are primarily or solely social rather than neurological.

perpetrator's instinctive responses to some non-violent script. In so doing, the violent intentions of the perpetrator are, in a sense, "turned off" or set aside, and a new set of intentions and instincts are "turned on." A person committed to the implementation of such pacifist alternatives, in effect, refuses to be "infected by the weaknesses of any attacker" (Samuel, 38), but instead aims to infect the attacker with moral healthiness by way of enacting a script in which the would-be perpetrator plays a far more dignified role than that of a violent perpetrator.⁴² Inasmuch as pacifist alternatives dispel or supplant violent intentions and confer lost dignity and respect, they do more to reduce violence than MCV. Therefore, pacifist alternatives are morally healthier than acts of MCV.

3.2.5 Pacifist Alternatives do not Legitimate or Enable Perpetrators

Pacifist alternatives, unlike their violent counterparts, neither legitimate violence nor enable the violent perpetrator. Consider some examples. In his critique

⁴² There is perhaps another mechanism by which pacifist alternatives directly address underlying causes of violence. Alan Fiske and Philip Tetlock argue that social relationships are governed by four separate relational models, two of which are *communal sharing* (relational models of family, tribe, and community) and *equality matching* (relational models that govern fairness and perhaps contractual agreements). In most cultures, the moral significance, valuation, and motivational strength of the communal sharing model outweigh the equality matching model (Fiske & Tetlock, 278). It is a myth that violence stems from lack of moral motivation; rather, a great deal of violence is motivated by what the perpetrator sees as moral concerns (Pinker, 83-84; Black, 34). Inasmuch as violent perpetrators feel shamed, their actions likely fall within the equality matching model—the model within which tit-for-tat or justice for unfair treatment is appropriate (Fiske & Tetlock, 258). Pacifist alternatives are largely characteristic of the communal sharing model, and therefore have greater moral significance and motivational strength. Inasmuch as they motivate a would-be perpetrator to give up framing the interaction according to the equality matching model and adopt the communal sharing frame, they create social interactions in which even the would-be perpetrator can see that violence (even morally motivated violence) is inappropriate. MCV, on the other hand, represents acceptance (or, more accurately, *acquiescence*) of the perpetrator's equality matching frame.

of utilitarianism, Bernard Williams presents the following hypothetical scenario (Smart & Williams, 98 - 99). Jim is a botanist on a research expedition in South America. The country in which he is conducting research is politically volatile. Jim stumbles into a small village where a captain of military forces loyal to the government is holding natives hostage because he suspects they are rebels. The captain notices Jim and involves him in the hostage scenario. There are twenty natives along a wall, and several members of the captain's regiment are holding them at gunpoint. The captain hands Jim a gun and gives Jim a choice: either Jim kills one of the natives and the captain will free the other nineteen, or else the captain will order his men to kill all twenty. Jim lacks the skills necessary to shoot his way out of the scenario. The captain seems quite resolved, and even the natives begin to implore Jim to comply and kill one of them.

Consider a similar example. In the movie *The Dark Knight*, there is a scene in which The Joker, a psychopathic criminal, conducts "a social experiment." There are two ferries: one carrying commuters and the other transferring prisoners. With the boats in sight of each other, the Joker disables the engines. The Joker tells both sets of passengers both boats have been rigged with explosives. On the commuter ferry, there is a device that will detonate the bomb on the prisoners' ferry. On the prisoners' ferry, there is a device that will detonate the commuter ferry's bomb. If the prisoners choose to use their detonator, the Joker will let the prisoners live, and likewise for the commuters. If neither detonator is activated within a time limit, the Joker will detonate both bombs. The commuter ferry decides to put the decision to a vote. It

turns out the majority of the commuters are in favor of using their detonator. Just as the results are announced, they realize a significant amount of time has passed without blowing up; the prisoners have not decided to blow up the commuters. This causes hesitation among the commuters. On the prisoners' boat, a large, intimidating inmate approaches the prison warden who has possession of the detonator. The inmate calmly and quietly tells the warden,

You don't want to die, but you don't know how to take a life. Give it to me; these men would kill you, and take it anyway. Give it to me. You can tell 'em I took it by force. Give it to me, and I'll do what you shoulda did ten minutes ago. (Nolan 2008)

The bewildered warden slowly hands the detonator to the prisoner who immediately throws the detonator out the ferry window into the water. In the end, the commuter boat never uses their detonator to blow up the prisoners, and the Joker is apprehended before he can blow up both ferries.

In both scenarios, the perpetrators (the captain and The Joker) claim that the targets (Jim and the ferry passengers) already inhabit circumstances in which it is certain there are only the possible outcomes the perpetrators claim. But, in fact, whether they are the only possible outcomes is not at all certain. There are numerous imaginable outcomes to both scenarios other than those the perpetrators mention. So, in making this claim, the perpetrators assume a certain role—that of assuming the power to control and dictate the circumstances, options, and outcomes to the targets. However, the claim is presented to the targets in such a way that the targets appear not to have the chance either to question the perpetrators' legitimacy to assume that

power or to consider the targets' own role in granting the perpetrators that power. Thus, participating according to the terms as dictated in a sense skips this consideration.

For Jim to choose to shoot one native to save nineteen would be tacit acceptance of the terms the captain dictated; it would imply an agreement to play a game constructed by the captain. For Jim to shoot the one enables the captain to play the role of situation-dictator. (Arguably, Jim would also enable the captain to continue to initiate such games in the future.) It would validate the terms and the captain as dictator of those terms in a way that refusing to shoot (or even taking the gun in the first place) would not. The prisoner's act of throwing the detonator out the ferry window indicated not only a refusal to accept The Joker's terms and the legitimacy of the Joker to dictate such terms, but also a refusal to act in any way that might constitute participation in The Joker's perpetrator script. Using the detonator would be, in a sense, choosing to play the Joker's game and would validate the game in a way that refusing to play does not. If we engage perpetrators according to the terms they dictate, we *enable* them to be term-dictators, and we allow them to make us participants in terms that ought not to be the case and perpetrators of acts we would otherwise not commit. The prisoner's act of throwing the detonator out the window signifies that to participate would concede more to a perpetrator than just the possible death of the commuter ferry passengers. Much more.⁴³

⁴³ And in a significant moral sense, the act does *not* concede the commuters' deaths. The

There are examples of this refusal-to-legitimate outside bizarre fictional cases. Consider when someone asks childish, inane questions or engages in petty insults. One standard response is: "I'm not even going to dignify that with a response." Of course, this phrase may merely be an assertion of one's own moral superiority and thus little more than smugness. But I take it there are occasions upon which the most appropriate thing to do is not to respond in any way that validates the prompt or prompter. Perhaps any direct response would be on par with the prompt and thus would involve a tacit bestowal of more credit or value than ought to be given to such prompts or prompters.⁴⁴ To do so would cheapen the responder. A similar rationale underlies the belief that we should not negotiate with terrorists. Even to begin to negotiate with terrorists concedes too much; it legitimizes the terrorists' means and methods and gives a tacit acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the terrorists' organization as a political entity.⁴⁵ Even if terrorists can make good on threats and do real damage, to negotiate with them concedes too much and perhaps taints the one

prisoner likely recognized that throwing the detonator out the window did not eliminate the possibility that the commuters might die by The Joker's hand. But since the act constituted a refusal to accept The Joker's terms, it constituted a rejection that those passengers ought to die according to The Joker's terms. Philosophers who hold there is no significant moral difference between killing and letting die fail to appreciate the significance of such actions. The prisoner did *not* let passengers die; his act constituted a refusal to accept that their death was his to allow or disallow.

⁴⁴ Interestingly, even some forms of honor violence acknowledge this dynamic. In the case of dueling, only members of a certain social status were eligible to duel. To accept a duel-challenge would be an acknowledgement of the challenger's eligibility and thus social status. A duel could be (honorably) refused on the grounds of refusing to acknowledge the challenger's social status. In other words, refusing a duel challenge may signal that the challenger lacks the social capital to purchase the right to make the challenge. See Allen and Reed 2006.

⁴⁵ Harmonie Toros argues that certain methods of negotiation may transform terrorists, causing them to forego their means and methods (Toros 2008). But Toros's point is that not all forms of negotiation constitute legitimizing terrorists *qua terrorists*, and therefore, her argument is compatible with my own.

willing to negotiate inasmuch as it is what Thomas Merton calls “collaboration with evil” (Merton, 40).

Pacifist dilemmas are relevantly similar to the cases above. In the cases of honor, self-defensive, and interventionist dilemmas, there is an initiator. Someone is (at least partly) responsible for placing us in the situation where we are morally compelled to commit violence. There is a person who makes an assault on our honor, our life or well-being, or the life or well-being of some third party. That initiator has, in effect, invited us to play a game—a game where each player has conflicting goals and seems to have a fixed set of options to accomplish her goal at the expense of the other person’s goal; and assuming the stakes or circumstances are as the initiator has dictated, the best option appears to be violence. Granted, there are those who take up that invitation to play the game who have worthy goals to play for. They aim to prevent themselves or their family from suffering socially-imposed consequences of dishonor. They aim to prevent their own deaths. They aim to prevent some third party from being harmed. They aim to prevent the initiator from causing whatever harm or damage is intended. But in an evaluative sense, there is something wrong with the game itself. Sometimes when things go too far and we have a sense of tragedy over what we feel compelled to do, we ask questions like, “Why did it have to come to this?” We have a strong sense that there is something bad about the fact that it *has* “come to this.” I believe what we are expressing is that such states of affairs ought not to obtain. In the case of pacifist dilemmas, there ought not to be such games.

Acts of MCV legitimize the initiator's violence by overlooking the moral importance of the point of invitation to the game. Of course, when a person finds herself in pacifist dilemma, it does not seem as though she received an invitation. Terms are not always laid out as carefully as the captain's or The Joker's. Rather, in pacifist dilemmas, the game initiator often performs some act that presupposes both parties are *already* playing the game. But the point of invitation is key to the issue of legitimacy. To commit MCV is to accept the invitation. And so, MCV concedes altogether that the state of affairs that ought not to obtain *has* obtained, that the kind of game that should not be played *is* being played, and that it *has* "come to this." As a result, legitimacy is granted to the game and the initiator.

The question of legitimacy is often skipped because it is so often assumed there are no other options but to win or lose according to the initiator's terms, and it is also assumed that refusing to commit MCV entails accepting loss under those terms, resigning the achievement of ends which make the need to commit violence so morally compelling in the first place. John Lewis criticizes pacifism on these grounds, equating the refusal to commit MCV with an attempt to "contract out of the situation" (Lewis, 37-38). This is short-sighted. Pacifist alternatives are morally healthier than acts of MCV because by design they constitute a refusal to contract *into* the "situation"—that is, the terms the perpetrator attempts to dictate.⁴⁶ The violent

⁴⁶ As Hannah Arendt notes, "power is never the property of an individual...When we say of somebody that he is 'in power' we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people" (Arendt, 44). Arendt's point concerns political power, but it is quite applicable to pacifist dilemmas. Non-pacifists advocating MCV fail to address the question of whether violent perpetrators

perpetrator is the one who, in effect, claims that the only options for the target are to commit MCV or allow the perpetrator to carry out her will; and the perpetrator does so in a way that gives the target the impression there never was a chance to refuse those terms. By criticizing pacifists for attempting to “contract out of the situation,” Lewis has, in effect, conceded that the perpetrator is always right.⁴⁷

Pacifist alternatives are responses to such situations as they are and not as the perpetrator attempts to dictate them to be. Consider an example involving a young bank trainee. An armed robber approached her and slid a classic bank robbery note across her teller counter. He had a gun cradled under his arm but plainly visible to her. Upon reading the note, she spontaneously burst out, “You can’t do that, it’s against the law” (Samuel, 33-34). The crook stood befuddled. What could he possibly do if she would not even entertain the idea of playing his game? The robber simply turned and ran out of the bank. Not only did the young woman not give the robber any money, but she did not even entertain that the person across from her had legitimate place to assume such a role and dictate such terms.

ought to be *empowered* to control the scenario or limit the targets options *in the first place*. The violent perpetrator can only maintain control for as long as the target is willing to cooperate according to the violent perpetrator’s terms. From the perspective of moral health pacifism, non-pacifist MCV advocates hand over power too easily.

⁴⁷ Psychologist Robert Abelson points out that for scripted behavior to occur, there are three conditions: first, the individual must recognize the script, second, the individual must be presented with a context that evokes the script, and most importantly, and third, *the individual must enter the script* (Abelson 1981, 719). Lewis ignores this third condition—that it is up to a person whether to participate in a script (Abelson 1976, 42-43). I am contending here that pacifist alternatives are better than MCV because violent-conflict scripts do not merit (in an evaluative sense) participation, acts of MCV constitute participation, and pacifist alternatives do not.

Williams' Jim-and-the-Natives case is interesting in this regard because of its eerie similarity to a real world case. In 1987, farmers living in the La India region of Columbia were confronted by a military captain. The captain issued them an ultimatum: either join his ranks and engage in killing suspected rebels, or he would take their refusal to join as proof they themselves were rebels, in which case he would kill them. One farmer responded to the captain more or less by pointing out that the captain's ultimatum was a false dichotomy. He spoke on behalf of the group and refused to select either option the captain presented, and then chided the captain for the captain's obvious moral failure. Interestingly, the situation resolved peacefully (Lederach, 13-16).

Pacifist alternatives aim to prevent harm and save lives. But pacifist alternatives can do something more than their violent counterparts: they can avoid legitimizing violence, legitimizing the terms initiated by violent perpetrators, and legitimizing violent perpetrators *qua* violent perpetrators. Thereby, these pacifist alternatives are more effective than their violent counterparts at ensuring that states of affairs that ought not to obtain do not, in fact, obtain. I maintain that in virtue of having some or all of the above five features, pacifist alternatives are more morally healthy than acts of MCV.

3.3 Pacifist Alternatives require Moral Healthiness

The third claim of moral health pacifism is this: Pacifist alternatives, on the whole, have prerequisite levels of moral health (“MHP3”). The previous claim, MHP2, is worded to focus on actions that constitute pacifist alternatives in isolation from the persons that might perform those actions. MHP3 concerns the relation between pacifist alternatives and persons that might perform them. While there may be (on the whole) a pacifist alternative (*action*) in any given pacifist dilemma, it is not the case that any given person could perform that pacifist alternative.

MHP3 entails that persons who lack the prerequisite level of moral health will not be able to perform certain pacifist alternatives. Prima facie, this is a weak claim. The same could be said of telling the truth or refraining from murder. I intend MHP3 to convey something more robust. Not all pacifist alternatives will have the same level of prerequisite moral health, but, on the whole, pacifist alternatives have prerequisite levels of moral health that are higher than the levels required by acts of MCV.

Further, meeting the level requirements may be insufficient. Recall that a person’s location on $E\text{-mh}_p$ is determined by a broad range of factors. While a certain location on $E\text{-mh}_p$ indicates the overall moral health of a person, it alone does not indicate the combination of factors determining that location. To make effective use of pacifist alternatives to violence, in many cases a person needs not only a certain level of moral health, but a certain combination of moral health determining factors. To defend MHP3, I will present five cases of pacifist alternatives which represent the

demanding nature of pacifist alternatives on agents who perform them, I will identify some common elements included in the moral health required to perform pacifist alternatives, and I will briefly consider the agent-centered nature of moral health pacifism given MHP3.

3.3.1 Five Cases of Pacifist Alternatives

Case 1: Gladys Aylward was conducting relief work in China in the 1930's; she was authorized by a provincial governor in northern China to enforce a new law forbidding foot-binding for young girls.⁴⁸ Once, the governor summoned her to come to the prison during a riot. Though her work was unrelated to prisons, she went. Upon arrival, she learned the riot was beyond the guards' control. The officials were convinced Aylward could stop the riot. Apparently, when Aylward had explained her presence to locals as *religious* missionary work, many took her to claim supernatural abilities. This is, of course, not what she meant. But every officer present expected her to go in and stop the riot.

She entered the prison courtyard where cages lined the wall. There were bloodied carcasses on the ground, some prisoners in the throes of altercations, and one prisoner holding an ax, chasing several others; in all, fifty or sixty men were involved. She commandingly approached the ax-wielder and demanded he give it to

⁴⁸ Concerning the practice of foot-binding, see Ebrey, 160-161.

her. All the prisoners were stunned. He complied, and she demanded they form a line in front of her (which they did), scolded them, and demanded an explanation.

The prisoners only ate if relatives sent food to the prison. Prisoners were allowed an ax for an hour a day to cut whatever food they were sent. If no food was sent to a prisoner, he sat in his cage and watched the others eat. No one was certain how the riot started. Prisoners had argued about who got the ax first, others joined the dispute, a riot ensued, and eventually all prisoners managed to get out of their cages. The prisoners explained how bleak their conditions were. She told them she would speak to the governor but that they had better have their “mess” cleaned before he entered the prison. When she approached the governor, he was beaming with gratitude for Aylward’s success. Irately, she told the governor the riot was his fault given the conditions under which he expected the prisoners to live. She demanded the governor give the prisoners a means of labor and employment while in prison so they could earn enough money to buy food and regain some self-respect (Burgess 1996).⁴⁹

Case 2: According to Flavius Josephus, Pilate, procurator of Judea, introduced Caesar’s effigies into Jerusalem. The Jews took this as a violation of their religious laws concerning idols. Multitudes of Jews travelled to see Pilate and spent days imploring him to remove the images. Pilate refused on the grounds that removing the images would injure Caesar’s rule. On the sixth day of the ordeal, the Jews again pled for the

⁴⁹ Aylward’s life story is depicted in the film *The Inn of the Sixth Happiness* (Robson 1958).

images to be removed. Pilate ordered soldiers to surround the Jews and threatened the Jews with death unless they ceased their requests. The Jews threw themselves on the ground, showing their necks. They said they were willing to die rather than see their laws transgressed. Pilate was jarred by their commitment to their laws and promptly commanded that the images be removed.⁵⁰

Case 3: Nineteenth century abolitionist, pacifist, and New England Non-Resistance Society member Henry C. Wright once engaged in a conversation about non-resistance in a Philadelphia hotel. A military officer overheard Wright's conversation and was enraged by Wright's position. The officer approached Wright and struck him. Wright took no notice of being hit and continued the conversation. The officer hit him a second time with the same result. The officer hit him a third time so hard that Wright was knocked down. Recovering himself and visibly injured, Wright took the officer's hand and said, "I feel no unkindness towards you, and hope soon to see you at my house." At dawn the next morning, the officer came to Wright's house, explaining to Wright he had been in agony all night. The officer was convinced Wright would become violent when attacked, but Wright did not. The officer was conscience-stricken by this and begged Wright's forgiveness (Ballou 2006, 134-135).

Case 4: Consider the case of a Czech couple who owned an inn. As they slept one night, the wife was awakened by the sight of a man with a knife approaching the bed. She spoke calmly to him, "You can kill us, but first let me make you a cup of

⁵⁰ See Josephus's Antiquities 18:3:1.

coffee.” The man put away his weapon, accepted her offer, and lost all his violent intentions (Aukerman, 18).

Case 5: Once, a man was at a bus station. As he came out of the station, a man approached him with a gun and muttered something about money. The man ignored the gun and exclaimed, “It’s cold! Why don’t you take my jacket?” The man proceeded to put his jacket around the gunman, but before the gunman could respond, the man continued, “I was just going for something to eat. Why don’t you join me?” The man later offered the gunman money, but the gunman refused to accept it (Samuel, 89-90).

3.3.2 The Demanding Nature of Pacifist Alternatives

The above five cases illustrate how prerequisite moral health levels for performing pacifist alternatives can be relatively stringent. Pacifist alternatives do not all require the same level of moral health, and perhaps some pacifist alternatives can be performed with a lowered degree of effectiveness by persons with lower moral health levels. Generally, though, pacifist alternatives require demanding levels of moral health comprised of certain factors. This is so for at least four reasons.

First, pacifist alternatives are alternatives to MCV. Because pacifist dilemmas are cases where the stakes are high or the sense of urgency to do something is great, they require agents to pull from at-the-ready resources. There is no time for careful deliberation or option weighing. The person in a pacifist dilemma must act in a way that requires little of either. Whatever action the person performs will likely be a

product of that person's non-deliberative functions (instincts, second-nature, etc.).

Violence in such cases is thought to be just such a response—visceral, instinctive, or at least ingrained.

Performing pacifist alternatives effectively requires such actions to be second-nature for the persons. The sense of urgency is a function of the situation, not the actions being performed. The stakes of the situation compel the person to respond *somehow*. To perform a pacifist alternative, a person must have engaged in activities prior to encountering a pacifist dilemma that allowed pacifist alternatives not only to be an at-the-ready resource, but an at-the-ready resource that dominates other visceral responses to pacifist dilemmas.

Second, consider the reactions illustrated in the above five cases and the kinds of preparation they might require. In Case 4 and Case 5 (and perhaps Case 3), the targets reacted to the violent perpetrators with hospitality. The hospitality likely undercut the violent intentions of the perpetrators for a couple of reasons. The show of hospitality likely enacted a script-change, and the perpetrator instinctively reacted as a guest rather than a perpetrator. The show of hospitality conferred social value on the perpetrator—"you are worth regarding as a guest whom I have the honor to host."⁵¹ In any event, a hospitable gesture was an at-the-ready response for such persons in urgent situations in which other persons may have instinctively committed acts of self-defensive violence.

⁵¹ Underlying the script change may also be a switch from a zero-sum game to a positive-sum game which changes the incentives for violence (Pinker, 76).

In Case 1, Aylward's response to the prison riot involved sympathy and compassion. Arguably, Aylward's reaction involved a script-change that prompted prisoners' intuitive response to an authority figure against which they would not be inclined to rebel—perhaps a mother. But additionally, Aylward's actions characterize the prisoners as fellow persons of whom better ought to be expected and who ought to expect better of themselves. Asking the prisoners to explain and offering to speak to the governor validated the prisoners' experiences and plight, thus conferring social value. Aylward's handling of the situation expresses a sense of tragedy about the prisoners' actions and conditions—a sense that things ought not to be this way and even the prisoners know this. Aylward's resources of sympathy and compassion had to be not only at-the-ready, but more at-the-ready than the instinct to commit MCV.

In Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3, the (potential) targets evinced some degree of fearlessness or control over fear. All three targets were in situations that involved threats to their safety. Some of the prisoners may have turned their violent energies onto Aylward. For all the Jews knew, Pilate may have ordered their beheading. And the military officer inflicted bodily harm on Wright. Perhaps all the targets were simply not afraid. Or if they were afraid, they were not as motivated by fear of threat to protect themselves as they were motivated by other things—pity, compassion, commitment to principle, etc. Such fearlessness allowed them to resist the perpetrators' attempts to dictate or control the situation. Fearlessness “breaks down” such scenarios inasmuch as it obstructs the perpetrators' violent script (Samuel, 40).

The use of pacifist alternatives does not always prevent harm. Some perpetrators may not be swayed by compassion or hospitality and will attack. But willingness to suffer may also be a pacifist alternative. In Case 2, Pilate and the Jews had incompatible goals. Pilate's power over the Jews consisted in nothing more than his threat to commit violence against them. If the Jews were undeterred by violent threat, what more could Pilate do? He could have had them killed anyway, but that is not what he wanted. If they would not yield to his request under threat of death, then he could not win the conflict. The Jews' willingness to suffer prevented them from having to suffer. In Case 3, Wright's willingness to suffer injury is what deterred the violent perpetrator.⁵² In both cases, the Jews and Wright had to be in some sense more inclined to suffer attack than to commit acts of MCV.

Some may object that there are violent perpetrators whose lone goal is the infliction of injury or death; such perpetrators are disanalogous to Pilate and the military officer, and thus, willingness to suffer is useless against them. First, it is not clear this is true. The perpetrator who merely wishes to injure may still be moved by how apparently *unmoved* the target is by threat of injury or death. Secondly, this objection also applies to MCV. If a person commits MCV, she has already risked death or injury inasmuch as she has initiated (or accepted the perpetrator's initiation of) a

⁵² Willingness to suffer attack is recommended by both Ballou and Gandhi as the alternative superior to interventionist violence. Concerning cases of third parties under attack, Ballou writes, "one may nobly throw his body as a temporary barrier between the destroyer and his helpless victim, choosing to die in that position, rather than be a passive spectator" (Ballou 2006, 4). Gandhi was convinced that interposing oneself between the perpetrator and victim and willingly receiving attack without retaliation would sway the perpetrator: "I give you my promise that the whole of the violence will be expended on you and [the victim] will be left unscathed" (Gandhi 2013, 443).

violent conflict with a perpetrator bent on killing or injuring her. If she would inevitably suffer severe injury or death after having expressed a willingness to suffer, there is no guarantee she would have avoided such had she committed MCV. The relevant question concerns counterfactual probabilities: would she have been more likely to avoid injury and death had she committed an act of MCV? Again, I cannot refer to statistical data to defend my position here, but I maintain that on the whole she will fare better using pacifist alternatives for all the reasons mentioned in defense of MHP2.

The point remains that pacifist alternatives require persons to develop tendencies toward act-types which are likely not instinctive for most persons, especially not in pacifist dilemmas. Pacifist alternatives may require of persons a tendency to offer hospitality, compassion, or sympathy even to violent perpetrators.⁵³ Pacifist alternatives may require of persons fearlessness and willingness to suffer even under lethal threat. These responses are likely not enculturated in most persons and may even require overcoming one's instinctive tendencies to perform them effectively.

Third, part of the preparation required to perform pacifist alternatives effectively may be significant changes to a person's moral judgment-making

⁵³ John Lewis writes, "Very many pacifists, perhaps most, would lose their pacifism in an instant if anything they seriously valued were threatened by violence" (J. Lewis, 62). Sadly, I think Lewis is probably right. But, of course, what any given person who professes pacifism *would* do in such a case does not entail that pacifism is false, only that she is unwilling or unable to practice it. But, more importantly, Lewis has inadvertently detected that pacifism (at least the moral health kind) requires significant changes to what one values. According to St. Maximus the Confessor, it likely requires the renunciation of possessions and the ability to value money and positions significantly less than people (Merton, 37-38).

tendencies. Various theories based primarily in DCM are predicated on notions of rights, indebtedness, duties, penal codes, merit, etc. The habit of making judgments on these bases can create a strong tendency toward thinking, as Henry Hodgkin describes, there are people toward whom we ought to be hard-hearted, “closing the channels of pity toward them” (H. Hodgkin, 39). The tendency toward judgments of these kinds, then, can serve as a significant obstacle to performing pacifist alternatives in pacifist dilemmas. Being quick to perceive people as rule-breakers and assess what they are owed, deserve, or have merited can easily lead to the judgment that perpetrators do not deserve compassion, sympathy, or hospitality. Thus, tendencies toward primarily deontological judgments can be inimical to developing the second nature required to perform pacifist alternatives effectively.⁵⁴ One’s hypological judgments likely also need to be retrained if one tends to see wrongdoers as primarily the appropriate objects of contempt or rage. The effective use of pacifist alternatives requires habituating oneself away from moral judgments that are acutely condemnatory or censorious of parties at fault.

Fourth, pacifist alternatives require overcoming psychological social distance. Generally, persons have a strong natural resistance to using lethal violence against other humans (Grossman, 4). One factor that allows some persons to overcome that

⁵⁴ In this respect, moral health pacifism is of the variety which Angelo Corlett claims “denies the importance of punishment and its key underlying concepts” (Corlett, 947). I am basically arguing that moral health pacifists must become persons who relinquish all claims to the role of interpersonal punishers. This makes moral health pacifism particularly demanding in view of evidence that persons’ decisions are often driven by concerns of merit and desert even when they report strong concern for mere deterrence (Carlsmith et al 2002).

resistance is psychological distance between the subject and object of violence. There is a strong connection between one's ability to engage in destructive, aggressive behaviors and emotional withdrawal from the object of those behaviors (Fromm, 123). Persons who commit acts of MCV likely need the presence of moral and social distance between themselves and perpetrators (Grossman, 160ff).⁵⁵ But inasmuch as persons identify with perpetrators and are not emotionally withdrawn from the perpetrators, they will be less able to overcome that natural resistance (Grossman, 169).

However, there are ways persons can develop that psychological distance over time. If there is sufficient social input to form perpetrator stereotypes, and if a stereotype has features which generate psychological distance between the person and others the stereotype represents, then there is already psychological distance between the person and potential perpetrators before and without having actually encountered such persons.⁵⁶ Reacting to perpetrators with compassion, sympathy, or hospitality likely requires the ability to identify with them. Thus, to perform pacifist alternatives that rely on such reactions, a person will likely have to cultivate in herself

⁵⁵ Even Locke compares violent aggressors to "wild savage beasts" when justifying violence against such persons (Locke, §11).

⁵⁶ Such a process suggests how psychological distance may causally contribute to their having become perpetrators which in turn reinforces the psychological distance. The psychological distance may motivate behaviors which fail to confer social value on persons who appear to resemble the stereotype. The failure to be valued creates shame in certain persons. Such shamed persons seek some substitute for respect by way of violence. Such persons act as perpetrators and provide more fodder for the formation of perpetrator stereotypes. This psychological distance may constitute a form of ostracism or social exclusion the experience of which has been shown to correlate positively with aggression (Warburton et al 2006).

the ability to identify with persons toward whom she may previously have developed psychological distance.⁵⁷

Summarily, the effective use of pacifist alternatives likely requires significant commitment and preparation. Some may object by claiming that pacifist alternatives could be employed as a ruse or trickery to deflect violent intentions and not as genuine expressions of, say, hospitality, in which case pacifist alternatives do not seem terribly demanding. However, even feigned hospitality may not come easily for many people in pacifist dilemmas, and thus would still require preparation. If one were to go to the trouble of preparing to have feigned hospitality at-the-ready, why not prepare to offer genuine hospitality? More to the point, though, genuine expressions of hospitality are more effective as pacifist alternatives than insincere ones. It is the genuineness that partly contributes to the effective script change and undercuts violent intentions. And being able to offer genuine hospitality to persons who, from deontological and hypological points of view, do not deserve it and deserve much worse will likely require significant moral judgment retraining.

⁵⁷ Some research shows that engaging in a variety of activities all of which constitute identifying with members of outgroups and other races can reduce various types of subconscious biases a person has against such parties. See Farmer et al 2014, Inzlicht et al 2012, Maister et al 2013, and Peck et al 2013.

3.3.3 Pacifist Alternatives, Ceilings, and Agent Assessment

The nature of pacifist alternatives entails that moral health pacifism is agent-centered in important ways. Even if pacifist alternatives are morally healthier than acts of MCV, it does not follow that any given person in a pacifist dilemma can perform a pacifist alternative rather than an act of MCV. Given that pacifist alternatives have demanding prerequisite levels of moral health, pacifist alternatives are not options open to everyone—perhaps not even to most persons. Recall that the conditions which determine a person's location on $E\text{-}mh_p$ at t_1 also determine that person's moral health ceiling and floor at t_2 ; if ceiling relevant conditions persist, ceilings can be permanent. This means there may be persons for whom the effective use of pacifist alternatives to violence is simply not an option and never will be; their trajectories will never be sufficiently positively oriented to meet the level of moral health required to perform pacifist alternatives at some future point.

Even if there are acts which are morally healthier, a person's act may be the most morally healthy action available to her; she is doing the best she can.⁵⁸ Given that the claims of moral health pacifism are strictly evaluative in nature, they do not necessarily entail D-scale or H-scale readings of a person who commits MCV. Moral

⁵⁸ Thus, moral health pacifism is consistent with the claim that MCV is *choice-worthy*. As Ralph Wedgwood explains, "The degree to which an option is (all things considered) a good thing for you to do now is the same as the degree to which it is appropriate or fitting for you to *choose* to perform that option now...Choiceworthiness is not a kind of absolute goodness...it is both *agent-relative* and *time-relative*" (Wedgwood 2009, 502).

health pacifism does not entail that the person who commits MCV is blameworthy.⁵⁹ It does not entail that any given person who performs a pacifist alternative is more praiseworthy than any given person who performs MCV. It does not entail that any given person is obligated to orient her moral health trajectory toward pacifist alternative prerequisite levels. This lack of obligation is consistent with the claim that everyone ought (in the evaluative sense) to have positively-oriented moral health trajectories. Moral health pacifism entails that some acts are morally better than acts of MCV, and it takes morally better people to perform them. So, moral health pacifism allows that having committed acts of MCV, a person may have done the best she could (in an evaluative sense), she may have done the right thing (in a deontological sense), and she may be praiseworthy for having done so (in a hypothetical sense), even if such states of affairs ought not to be the case and conceivably there are better things to be done (in an evaluative sense).

Interestingly, it also does not follow from moral health pacifism that a person with the requisite moral health to perform some pacifist alternatives will be able to perform any possible pacifist alternative. Not all moral health pacifists will be able to do what Gladys Aylward did (not even if they were similarly situated). The fact that different combinations of factors can comprise a person's level and trajectory of moral health suggests that certain pacifist alternatives may be options only for persons with certain combinations of factors but not others. This means that within moral health

⁵⁹ This point does not originate with me. In 1916, John Wright Buckham, for example, points out that pacifism does not entail that soldiers ought to be condemned or scorned nor does it deny that they may behave nobly and admirably (Buckham, 89).

pacifism and the use of pacifist alternatives there is room for *style*. Two persons similarly situated both with levels of moral health sufficient for the use of some pacifist alternatives may be inclined to act in two different ways, and perhaps neither could have acted in the way the other did, though both persons acted in ways evaluatively better than MCV.

3.4 Pacifists are ideally or relatively-ideally morally healthy persons

The final claim of moral health pacifism is this: Persons who acquire pacifist alternative prerequisite moral health levels and who perform pacifist alternatives in pacifist dilemmas are ideally or relatively-ideally morally healthy persons, and there ought to be such persons (“MHP4”). Basically, there ought to be moral health pacifists. There is something good about there being such persons, or if there are no such persons, it would be better if there were such persons because such persons are morally valuable.⁶⁰

A moral health pacifist engages in behaviors or practices that prepare her to make at-the-ready use of pacifist alternatives in pacifist dilemmas. If, through the relevant behaviors and practices, a person acquired a moral health level that enabled her to perform virtually any pacifist alternative, arguably such a person would be ideally morally healthy. Whether such a person is ideally morally healthy may be a

⁶⁰ Craig Ihara points out that the fact that some who are considered saintly (Buddha and Christ) are also considered pacifists suggests some agreement that there is something morally preferable about the renunciation of violence as a way of life (Ihara 1978, 369-370).

spurious claim to some, and some might insist that there are no such persons. The claim that such a person is ideally morally healthy is not critical to my case. It is enough that such a person is relatively-ideally morally healthy. And, more importantly, such a person is relatively-ideally morally healthy in virtue of her moral health pacifism.

If a moral health pacifist is relatively-ideally morally healthy, her pacifist practices are exemplary and worthy of imitation. She is educational in that she models in concrete ways actions, habits, attitudes, and traits that constitute relatively-ideal moral health. And to that degree she embodies an ideally healthy state of affairs. She gives others a clearer idea of what an ideally morally healthy state of affairs would be like. She may also be inspirational; she shows that such ideal levels of moral health are achievable. This can motivate observers to aspire to greater levels of moral health than they would have otherwise in order to imitate her pacifist practices.

In describing the different ways in which pacifist alternatives are morally healthier than MCV, I have suggested explanations for how pacifist alternatives work. But these explanations are not exhaustive. There are likely a variety of reasons why pacifist alternatives do what they do. I suspect some will remain skeptical whether pacifist alternatives really work. If there were a person practicing moral health pacifism, she would show that exhaustive explanations of how pacifist alternatives work are unnecessary for being justified in believing that, in fact, they do work. So, even if my suggested explanations are false or if I cannot understand how or why

pacifist alternatives work, in view of the moral health pacifist's life and example, I can still be motivated to aspire to greater levels of moral health and thus to less violent ways to behave than I otherwise would have. For at least this reason, there ought to be moral health pacifists. There is at least one more reason.

Recall that in pacifist dilemmas a great deal might be at stake. In cases of honor violence, there are many things on the line. Failing to commit honor violence could be devastating to children's futures or a family's economic stability and freedom of movement. In cases of self-defensive violence, a person's life, bodily integrity, or psychological integrity may be at stake. In cases of interventionist violence, the life or bodily integrity of some third party under attack is at stake. In all these cases, if such persons commit acts of MCV, those persons may be doing as well as they can do given their moral health levels and trajectory orientations. Persons in such situations may do something honorable and praiseworthy. They may have even done the right or permissible thing given their deontological constraints. And they may have brought about desirable states of affairs—prevented significant loss of life, loss of psychological integrity, injury, etc.

But it remains the case that such states of affairs ought not to obtain. Even if some persons in some circumstances ought to commit violence, it ought not to be the case that persons ought to commit violence. It ought not to be the case that anyone commits acts of self-defensive, interventionist, or honor violence because it ought not to be the case that anyone should have to. Acts of MCV may bring about desirable

states of affairs, but they represent a resignation to the fact that there are states of affairs in which persons should have to act in this way. MCV in the nature of the case cannot prevent such states of affairs from obtaining. Moral health pacifists engage in behaviors and practices that do prevent such states of affairs from obtaining. Given that it would be better if states of affairs which make acts of violence seem morally compelling did not obtain, there ought to be moral health pacifists.

Someone might object that since moral health levels can be determined by different combinations of factors, then conceivably there could be relatively-ideally morally healthy persons who are not moral health pacifists—that is, they could still commit acts of violence. Such persons would still be imitable, educational, and inspirational. Inasmuch as such persons were relatively-ideally morally healthy and not pacifists, their non-adherence to pacifism would be imitable.

In reply to this objection, I must point out that relatively-ideally morally healthy persons are not imitable in every respect. There may be factors present that are detrimental to their overall moral health level. If those persons are relatively-ideally morally healthy, they are so in spite of those factors and not because of them. Such persons are imitable only in the sense that the moral-health-conducive features which they embody are imitable. Many people consider Martin Luther King Jr. to be a moral exemplar and for that reason we ought to imitate his relentless pursuit of social justice; but no one is suggesting that because Martin Luther King Jr. is a moral

exemplar, we ought to imitate his plagiarism or infidelity.⁶¹ Consider also the possibility of an Olympic athlete who smokes. That athlete is relatively ideally biologically healthy despite her smoking rather than because of it. She is imitable to the extent that the features which contribute to her relatively-ideal level of biological health are imitable. This would be true even if her smoking brought about other health-conducive effect such as forming friendships with other smokers where such friendships contributed to her mental health. Acts of MCV are analogous to smoking in this way.

Moral health pacifists who are relatively-ideally morally healthy persons are imitable in virtue of their pacifist practices. And if there are other persons who are comparably morally healthy but who commit MCV, they too are imitable, but they are not imitable in virtue of committing MCV.⁶² Persons who commit no other violence than MCV may be imitable to significantly less morally healthy persons—say, persons who are generally violent. But the acts of MCV are not imitable, rather the fact that such relatively-ideally morally healthy persons are less violent is imitable.

Summarily, I have argued that violence is morally unhealthy for everyone, there are better alternatives, these alternatives are hard to perform, but that someone ought to perform them. These four claims constitute moral health pacifism. And these four claims are normative in that they give persons moral reasons to act. The moral health pacifist is a person who acts in light of these or similar claims. In light of

⁶¹ See Stone 2013.

⁶² Though, such persons may be imitable in virtue of doing that which is choice-worthy.

the badness of violence, she judges pacifist alternatives to be options morally preferable to MCV. But to perform pacifist alternatives, she must renounce violence and engage in behaviors and practices that will supplant violence as her at-the-ready option with pacifist alternatives. That is, she will have to engage in behaviors and practices that positively orient her moral health trajectory so that she acquires the requisite levels of moral health for performing pacifist alternatives. She is someone who aspires to ideal or relatively-ideal levels of moral health by her renunciation of violence and her cultivation and practice of pacifist alternatives. She sees pacifist dilemmas and violent perpetrators as indicative of a moral health disease. They indicate the presence of crippling shame within the perpetrators and disruption of community and cooperation. And her mission, then, is “curative” (Hershberger, 243).

Chapter 4: Objections & Replies

I began in Chapter 1 by arguing that given the history of its use, “pacifism” is best understood inclusively whereas “violence” is best understood minimally—that is, according to a minimalist conception where violence is understood to refer generally to destructive uses of physical force. Accordingly, pacifisms are best understood as (a) universal absolutist (everyone ought not to commit any violence), (b) universal non-absolutist (everyone ought not to commit some types of violence), (c) non-universal absolutist (some persons ought not to commit any violence), and (d) non-universal non-absolutist (some persons ought not to commit some types of violence). In Chapter 2 I argued that moral terms and judgments should not be understood univocally because there are three distinct conceptions of how moral value functions: deontologically, hypologically, and evaluatively. Based on these distinctions, it is possible for moral judgments to be of only one type, and therefore, the moral claims which constitute a version of pacifism may be strictly evaluative in nature. Rather than present the specific normative ethical theory underpinning my version of pacifism, I introduced the term “moral health” as a placeholder for any normative ethical theory that functions analogously to human biological health in ten specific ways. In Chapter 3, based on that moral health model, I advanced and defended four claims all of which are solely evaluative in nature and which jointly constitute a universal absolutist pacifism that I called moral health pacifism. Those claims were: (1) violence is bad for everyone; (2) in pacifist dilemmas there are morally healthier pacifist alternatives

to MCV (morally compelling violence); (3) the ability to perform pacifist alternatives is rather morally demanding; and (4) some persons ought to meet that moral demand and become moral health pacifists because it is good for there to be such persons.

In this chapter I will present and respond to seven objections commonly advanced against pacifism. In 4.1 I will address what I take to be the most extreme objection to pacifism—that pacifism entails a contradiction and is therefore necessarily false. Next, I will cover a string of objections all based on interventionist pacifist dilemmas. All of these involve some claim about the necessity of violence in such cases. There are multiple senses in which violence is alleged to be necessary in interventionist pacifist dilemmas, and objectors often fail to distinguish those senses. In 4.2 I will address the objection that violence is necessary to aid the victim because, in fact, there simply are no other means by which a bystander can intervene. In 4.3 I will address the objection that even if there are other means of intervening, a bystander is nonetheless obligated to intervene violently and therefore violence is morally necessary. In 4.4 I will address the objection that if violence were the only way to aid a victim, then the bystander ought to commit violence. In 4.5 I address the objection that violence is practically necessary because it may be the only means of aiding the victim so far as the bystander can tell. In 4.6 I will shift focus away from interventionist pacifist dilemmas and address whether pacifists are hypocrites. And I will conclude in 4.7 by addressing the objection that pacifism does not work.

4.1 Is Pacifism Necessarily False?

In his 1965 article, Jan Narveson argues that pacifism is self-contradictory (Narveson 1965, 259).¹ Narveson claims the only form of pacifism of philosophical interest is “the doctrine that everyone ought not to resist violence with force” (Narveson 1965, 260).

The pacifist is generally thought of as the man who is so much opposed to violence that he will not even use it to defend himself or anyone else. And it is precisely this characterization which I wish to show is far from being plausible, morally inconsistent. (Narveson 1965, 265)²

Narveson’s case amounts to this: the basic moral claims of pacifism entail certain claims about rights because moral claims are connected with rights claims in certain ways, but rights claims are necessarily connected to claims about the use of violence to prevent rights infringements; therefore, pacifism entails non-pacifism. Narveson’s argument depends a great deal on the connection between the terms “ought,” “morally wrong,” “obligation,” and “right.” Narveson’s argument can be constructed in the following way:

NP1: If x is morally wrong, then persons ought not to do x .³

NP2: If persons ought not to do x , then persons have an obligation not to

¹ Narveson has written about this argument multiple times (Narveson 1968 & Narveson 2013). Despite Narveson’s extensive comments in subsequent articles, I do not think they add anything substantive to the original argument. I will refer to the subsequent articles strictly as needed, but I will focus largely on the 1965 piece.

² Some have pointed out that Narveson is not careful to distinguish “violence” from “force” (Miller 1971 & Routley 1984). As I already established in 1.2, they are clearly distinct. I aim to render Narveson’s argument solely in terms of “violence” so that this conflation is less distracting.

³ See Narveson’s use of these terms on pp. 259-260.

do x.⁴

NP3: If persons have an obligation not do to x, then persons have a right not to have x done to them.⁵

NP4: If persons have a right not to have x done to them, then persons have a right to whatever is necessary to prevent x from being done to them.⁶

NP5: If persons have a right to whatever is necessary to prevent x from being done to them, then persons have a right to the use of violence to prevent x from being done to them.⁷

NP6: If persons have a right to the use of violence to prevent x from being done to them, then violence (to prevent x from being done to them) is not morally wrong.

NP7: If pacifism is true, then violence (even to prevent violence from being done to persons) is morally wrong.⁸

NC1: If violence is morally wrong, then violence is not morally wrong.

NC2: Pacifism is self-contradictory.

According to Narveson, "In saying that violence is wrong, one is at the same time saying that people have a right to its prevention, by [violence] if necessary,"

⁴ Narveson uses the terms "obligation" and "duty" interchangeably and applies both to pacifism (Narveson 1965, 260, 263-264).

⁵ See Narveson 1965, 266.

⁶ Narveson claims a right "just *is* a status justifying preventive action" (Narveson 1965, 266).

⁷ According to Narveson, "it is a logical truth, not merely a contingent one, that what *might* be necessary is [*violence*]" (Narveson 1965, 267).

⁸ Narveson takes this to be definitive of pacifism (Narveson 1965, 263).

and “we cannot characterize [violence] as being wrong if preventive violence is not simultaneously being characterized as justifiable” (Narveson 1965, 268-269). If Narveson is right, pacifism is not merely false, but necessarily false.

Several philosophers have argued (quite correctly in my view) that NP4 is false.⁹ Jay Whitman points out that even if persons have a right not to be lied to, it does not follow that persons have a right to whatever means are necessary to prevent being lied to (Whitman, 308). Carlo Filice argues that even if I have a right to my shoes, I am not justified in shooting someone dead who means to steal them even if that is the only way of preventing the theft (Filice, 136). According to Michael Martin, “The problem with Narveson’s argument is simply that he gives no good reason to suppose that the term ‘right’ as it is used in ordinary discourse does entail what he says it entails” (Martin, 438). Martin argues that even if rights justify preventative action, there is no reason why constraints on that preventative action cannot be built into the concept of a right.

Legal rights make clear the possibility of built in constraints. A state may commit to preventative action to protect a citizen’s right, but the state has not thereby committed to go to whatever conceivable extreme may be necessary to protect that right. In fact, a right recognized by the state may not entail any preventative action *per se*, but only the guarantee that a citizen has recourse to state judicial or penal processes against rights violators *after* a violation has

⁹ See Whitman 1966, Filice 1992, and Martin 1974. See also Regan 1972 for a different objection.

occurred. That recourse may be characterized as “preventative” in the sense that to some degree it deters violations, but it does not constitute any form of intervention at the moment the person’s right is under threat of violation. Thus, even if a person has a right not to have *x* done to her, and even if that means she has a right to *some* means that prevents *x* from being done to her, it does not necessarily follow that she has a right to *interventionist violence* to prevent *x* from being done to her. As Martin argues, Narveson merely assumes that the meaning of “right” is univocal. Narveson’s argument is unsound at least for this reason.

Jenny Teichman’s presentation of Narveson’s argument compresses NP1, NP2, and NP3 into just one premise that states something being “morally wrong” is a sufficient condition for persons having a right not to have it done to them (Teichman 1986, 30). Teichman rejects this premise, arguing that both boasting and snobbery are morally wrong, but neither boasting to people nor being snobby to people necessarily violates their rights (Teichman 1986, 31-32). I think Teichman is correct and has shown that Narveson’s argument fails in yet another respect.

Unfortunately, though, none of these authors examines Narveson’s assumed connections between “morally wrong,” “ought,” and “obligation.”¹⁰ These connections show how Narveson’s argument fails in a deeper respect.

¹⁰ Whitman appears to come closest when he argues that Narveson’s case depends on “some general contract theory of obligation” (Whitman, 308)—a charge which Narveson denies (Narveson 1968, 149).

Narveson assumes that “ought” claims are solely deontological in nature. Statements like “the Holocaust ought not to have happened,” “someone really ought to do something about the graffiti on the wall,” “children ought not to have to starve,” and “things ought not to be this way” show there are moral uses of the term “ought” that are not deontological and do not entail that anyone has a moral obligation. As I argued in 2.2, there are at least two other moral senses in which moral judgments can be understood—hypologically and evaluatively—both of which may function normatively and thus both of which can generate “ought” claims that do not entail moral obligations. NP2 is false.

Narveson concludes by saying: “If [pacifists] attempt to formulate their position using our standard concepts of rights, their position involves a contradiction” (Narveson 1965, 269). As noted, Narveson’s conception of rights is by no means standard and it is not obvious we have *one* “standard” concept of rights. But more importantly, Narveson assumes “the doctrine that everyone ought not to resist violence with [violence]” can only be formulated using concepts of rights. This is false. To claim that violence is wrong or that everyone ought not to commit violence does not commit a pacifist to any rights-based formulation of her doctrine. Authors have tended to challenge Narveson’s conception of rights and rightly so. But there’s a sense in which beginning the critique at the point of rights-talk already gives Narveson’s argument too much credit.

Narveson accuses pacifists of “verbal hocus-pocus” and treating language like “private property” if they “affirm that we *have rights*” but “deny that they ought ever to be defended” (Narveson 1968, 150). Arguably, though, Narveson has treated the terms like private property. Pacifism (certainly *moral health* pacifism) neither affirms nor necessarily entails that anyone has rights.¹¹ Neither rights nor obligations necessarily follow from the claim that everyone ought not to commit violence. I have argued this not by treating language like private property, but on the basis of substantive moral assertions that permeate moral discourse.

4.2 Is Violence Necessary to Aid Victims?

Reinhold Niebuhr argues that to have relative peace and social justice, someone has to dirty her hands; the pacifist’s refusal of moral compromise can only mean foregoing those goals.¹² According to John Lewis, by refusing to participate in violence, the pacifist attempts to “contract out of a situation” and opts to “do nothing” (J. Lewis, 37-38). While Lewis admits that even defensive wars are evils in a sense, attempting to avoid them altogether entails “allowing aggression to rage and spread unchecked” (J. Lewis, 66). In refusing to commit

¹¹ I tend to think there are no such things as rights humans have merely in virtue of being humans. Pre-political rights are a fiction as far as I can tell, and a political “right” seems to me little more than jargon which serves as a shorthand way of codifying certain political constraints or practices that could also be described without using that term. But because I hold this view for unrelated reasons, I have decided here to make the less committal claim that moral health pacifism neither affirms nor denies that persons have rights. Whether persons ought to commit violence to prevent wrongdoing is a matter I hope to make clear in my treatment of subsequent objections.

¹² See R. Niebuhr 1937.

interventionist violence, Lewis assumes the pacifist “refrains from assisting the victim” and, in fact, refuses to act at all; thus, pacifism must be false since “surely one owes an immediate duty to the victim” (J. Lewis, 83-84). Tom Regan suggests that pacifism entails a woman cannot so much as attempt to free herself from a rapist’s grasp (Regan, 86).¹³ C. S. Lewis, criticizing pacifism, writes, “if a homicidal maniac, attempting to murder a third party, tried to knock me out of the way, [must I] stand aside and let him get his victim” (C. Lewis, 86)? Eric Puryear rejects pacifism because he “cannot join in the naive and dangerous belief that a person should allow a violent criminal to kill them or another innocent person.” Puryear rejects pacifism because he does not “wish to see innocent people suffer and die at the hands of a criminal” (Puryear 2009). Narveson equates the pacifist’s refusal to kill or to use force against anyone as “refusing to help when help is needed” (Narveson 2003, 159).¹⁴

Several pacifist authors mention this objection. Guy Hershberger writes, “It is also generally assumed that nonresistance means doing nothing” (Hershberger, 308). Thomas Merton writes, “Very often people object that nonviolence seems to imply passive acceptance of injustice and evil” (Merton, 40). Advocating non-

¹³ While not using the term “pacifism,” William Marty seems to think that commitment to acting nonviolently in all circumstances entails that rapists must simply be allowed to rape (Marty, 9).

¹⁴ George Hartmann surveyed 65 American philosophers in 1944 concerning pacifism. When asked what they took to be the strongest argument against pacifism, one philosopher wrote, “As long as any man or group of men sufficiently ruthless confront full-fledged pacifists they can have their way as wolves with a pack of sheep” (Hartmann, 130).

resistance around the time of World War 1, Edward Richards says he was frequently asked questions like the following:

Do you mean to tell me that, if you were in a room full of women and children, and some of those wild Turks and Kurds from the mountains of Turkey should come and begin to break in the door, you would stand aside, like a coward, and let them come in, refusing to fight to protect the women and children? (Richards, 619)

In interventionist pacifist dilemmas, so the objection goes, there are, in fact, only two options: commit violence against the assailant or do not intervene; since pacifism entails one ought not to commit violence and since one ought to intervene, pacifism entails non-intervention and must be false.

Before addressing the objection, the degree to which these objectors have oversimplified interventionist pacifist dilemmas and thus how these objectors differ from others who object on interventionist grounds must be made clear. Even when moral analysis focuses as exclusively as possible on the bystander, there are three distinct factors that allow for distinct analysis and distinct problems. The first factor is the bystander's actual intervention options versus her perceived intervention options. There may be more actual intervention options than she perceives, fewer than she perceives, or only those she perceives. Arguably, a bystander could be evaluated differently in all three cases; at issue, in

part, is whether actual options or perceived options should be the primary basis on which bystanders are morally evaluated.¹⁵

A second factor is a bystander's capabilities. Bystanders may differ in ways that dictate either or both of their actual and perceived intervention options. And, arguably, a bystander genuinely unable to perceive any intervention options is not morally equivalent to a similarly-situated bystander that perceives multiple intervention options.

The third factor is success. Whether any given intervention option will succeed is distinguishable from whether any given bystander ought to believe it will. Even this description of success is an oversimplification in an important sense. There is no such option as violence *simpliciter*. To say that violence will successfully aid a victim must mean violence of a certain form or degree. A tackle may succeed where a punch would not, and a kick with some degree of force may succeed where any kick of lesser force would not. Further, both in-fact success and bystander belief about success introduce the issue of probability of success. We may be able to determine that some intervention option, in fact, has n probability of succeeding, but this is distinguishable from whether a bystander ought to believe that option has n probability of succeeding. While these three factors are distinguishable, they are clearly interdependent.

¹⁵ This parallels one fundamental debate in the self-defense literature over whether the justification of self-defense is grounded in objective or subjective factors. See Chapter 3 Footnote 29 for sources covering each side of the dispute.

Some object that even if a bystander perceives intervention options other than violence or even if there are actual intervention options other than violence, the bystander still ought to commit violence against the assailant and thus violence is morally necessary. I will address these objectors in 4.3. Other objectors acknowledge there may be both other perceived and actual intervention options, but there may be (at least hypothetically) an interventionist pacifist dilemma in which violence is the only actual and perceived intervention option. In such a case, a person ought to commit violence. I will address these objectors in 4.4. Still others object that whether there are multiple actual intervention options, there are cases in which violence is the only perceived intervention option. In those cases, persons ought to commit violence. I will address these objectors in 4.5. The objectors under present consideration claim something different and more extreme. The numerous objectors quoted above assume that in interventionist pacifist dilemmas, there are two and only two actual and perceived intervention options: violence or non-intervention.

The ubiquity of this objection is jarring especially when it is so obviously a false dichotomy. I find it incredibly unlikely for there ever to be only two options except perhaps in thought experiments that *stipulate* such constraints. Having only these options is by no means a necessary feature of interventionist pacifist dilemmas. The objection ignores the factor of bystander capability. Different bystanders will have different actual and perceived options and differing option-perceiving abilities. Perhaps some bystanders will be unable to perceive more

options than violence or non-intervention. But in most real world scenarios, there are other actual options and many agents can come to perceive and perform them. The examples of pacifist alternatives I have already presented show as much. Thus, not all bystanders in all interventionist pacifist dilemmas have or perceive only these two options.

Ballou writes that in cases of interventionist violence, “one may nobly throw his body as a temporary barrier between the destroyer and his helpless victim, choosing to die in that position, rather than be a passive spectator” (Ballou 2006, 4). Similarly, Gandhi describes interposing one’s self between assailant and victim to willingly suffer the attack (Gandhi 2013, 443). Leo Tolstoy wrote that a child under threat could be protected by “interposing one’s own breast to receive the murderer’s blow” (Tolstoy 1909, 58).¹⁶ Mark Thomas, a nonviolence educator in San Francisco, interposed himself between an elderly lady and a man attempting to attack her; he asked the attacker about the conflict, then listened and responded sympathetically. After a few brief sympathetic exchanges, the attacker calmed down, and Mark escorted the lady away without further incident (Thomas 2007). The old man in the Tokyo train car incident intervened by inviting the assailant to speak with him (Dobson, 188). A person can also attempt to seize the victim and flee.¹⁷ There is an international organization, the *Alternatives to Violence Project*, in operation since the 1970s, the function of which is to train

¹⁶ See also Ryan 1994, 25.

¹⁷ See, for example, Thomas 2008 in which a woman describes being rescued from an attacker in this way.

people in various milieus how to implement creative strategies for violent conflict resolution (in a sense, a third-option training camp).¹⁸ Clearly, there are more than two options.

Why, then, is this false dichotomy between violence and non-intervention so widely accepted? I suspect the objectors themselves perceive no other intervention options. Why is that? Alfred North Whitehead describes certain assumptions characteristic of cultures or epochs of history as so entrenched that “people do not know what they are assuming because no other way of putting things has ever occurred to them” (Whitehead, 48). Duane Cady compares this to what he calls “warism”—the view that war is justifiable in principle and often in fact (Cady 2010, 17). According to Cady, warism is so entrenched that “peace advocates are not seriously considered because ‘everybody knows’ how patently implausible, politically naïve and romantically idealistic peace theorists and activists must be” (Cady 1989, 210). For some, then, perceiving more intervention options may require an immense paradigm shift.

The objection, then, likely reveals more about the objectors than about pacifism.¹⁹ As I argued in 3.2.4, persons can be deeply inculcated with social interaction scripts. Inculcation of the violent-conflict script explains in part the

¹⁸ See *Our Mission*. Research has already demonstrated the effectiveness of the Alternatives to Violence Project at reducing violence and recidivism among prison populations and in schools (Deeney 2013 & K. Williams 2012).

¹⁹ It is interesting to reflect that those who cannot think of any more options tacitly or uncritically assume that this reveals more about pacifism than about themselves.

broad advocacy for the false dichotomy. The script is so entrenched that persons are unaware of how that entrenchment precludes possibilities from their decision-making. The problem lies not in the situation itself but in the way it is framed (Werhane, 76).

Patricia Werhane defines “moral imagination” as the “ability to envision and actualize possibilities that are not context-dependent but encouraged by or project a fresh schema” (Werhane, 85). A schema is a cognitive framework individuals impose on information or situations to understand them (Gioia & Poole, 449 – 450). Scripts, then, are a type of schema. According to Dennis Gioia, the entrenchment of a schema in a decision-making procedure can limit one’s ability to make use of one’s own internal resources (Gioia, 385). It might be said, then, that advocates of the false dichotomy do not recognize it as such due to lack of moral imagination; they are imaginatively inhibited by violent-conflict script entrenchment.

I am somewhat leery of the terms “fresh” and “imaginative”; they might connote that moral health pacifists are doing something new or novel. But hospitality, compassion, and sympathy are neither. Rather, there are scripts of which there ought not to be instances (for instance, violent-conflict scripts). And some scripts are better than others (for instance, hospitality scripts are better than violent-conflict scripts). The practice of moral health pacifism involves entrenchment of better scripts and thus the reduction of script constraints.

Such actions are “fresh” in that they deviate from the norm. This is an interesting twist given that pacifists are sometimes charged with rigid absolutism and refusing to allow for rule-breaking. John Lewis writes, “Moral responsibility implies the ability to break the rules when the occasion demands. It is the power to do the novel and unexpected thing, to escape from the customary and also from the rut of moral habit” (J. Lewis, 60). The “novel,” “unexpected thing” of which Lewis writes is an act of MCV. But in light of widespread failure to recognize a false dichotomy, an act of violence would not “break the rules.” Rather, violence *is* the rule. The moral health pacifist aims to break out of the entrenchment of the violent-conflict script. Inculcating better scripts more deeply than the violent-conflict script enables a moral health pacifist to see options others cannot, and, in this sense, moral health pacifism is the power to do novel and unexpected things.

4.3 Are Bystanders Morally Obligated to Commit Violence?

According to Maria Gel’fond, several of Tolstoy’s critics argued that Tolstoy’s offer-one’s-breast-to-the-murderer’s-blow solution did not annul the obligation to commit violence against an assailant. Taking the blow, they argued, would simply result in the death of the protector, in which case, the assailant would still injure the victim. Further, refusing to commit violence pays inadequate attention to the victim’s interest (Gel’fond, 52). Thus, no one could refuse to commit violence and “at the same time preserve his moral ... adequacy” (Gel’fond,

50).²⁰ Tolstoy's critics do not deny that he identifies an intervention option other than violence, and therefore they acknowledge there are more perceived and actual intervention options than just violence or non-intervention. But, they argue, the bystander is nonetheless obligated to commit violence against the assailant; Tolstoy has ignored the importance of the success factor and further, Tolstoy's option fails to acknowledge the important moral difference between victims and assailants. For these two reasons, violence is still morally necessary. Are they correct?

First, Tolstoy's critics are too quick to assume Tolstoy's method will fail. There are examples of success. In July 2016, as Tomiesha Abraham was being stabbed by her friend, Ashanti Daniels, during an argument, Michele Kenny (Tomiesha's mother) interposed herself between them, was stabbed to death by Daniels, and Daniels stopped attacking Abraham.²¹ In June 2016, an Orlando mother shielded her son from gunfire aimed at him; she died and the shooter did not make further attempt on the son's life.²² It is not difficult to imagine why Tolstoy's method might succeed. Killing someone other than the intended victim may be jarring *even to the assailant*—jarring enough to cause her to reframe her actions and intentions altogether. Further, Tolstoy's critics are too quick to assume

²⁰ Narveson also characterizes the pacifist's refusal to commit acts of violence as "failing in the defense of his fellows" (Narveson 2003, 159).

²¹ See Prendergast et al 2016.

²² See Andrews 2016.

violence will succeed. Even a *violent* intervener can be incapacitated, freeing the assailant to resume violence against the victim.

Second, I have already presented examples of pacifist alternatives that succeeded, and given that in interventionist pacifist dilemmas pacifist alternatives aim at preventing harm to the victim and not legitimizing assailants, they clearly make a moral distinction between victims and assailants. Thus, there are intervention options other than violence which satisfy Tolstoy's critics' conditions for favoring violence. Their objection seems not to apply to moral health pacifism. Nevertheless, there is a third and more important critique to be made of their objection.

Moral health pacifism consists of strictly evaluative claims one of which is that persons ought (in an evaluative sense) not to commit violence. Moral health pacifism allows that this could be true while also true that some person ought (in a deontological sense) to commit violence. Strictly speaking, then, even if Tolstoy's critics are correct that bystanders are obligated to commit violence, this is only a problem for moral health pacifism if it is assumed that deontological normativity always trumps evaluative normativity. It is not obvious to me that it does, especially in a case where a bystander could both succeed and differentiate between assailant and victim without the use of violence. But it is not necessary to settle which type of normativity takes priority because the objection should be rejected on more obvious grounds.

The objection of Tolstoy's critics depends on obscuring the factor of bystander capability. I have claimed that everyone ought (in an evaluative sense) not to commit violence, but that for some bystanders violence is the best (evaluatively) action they are able to perform. So, even though in one sense they ought not to commit violence, in another sense they ought to. I have introduced moral health pacifism as a practice one might undertake to be able to perform actions that are better (evaluatively) than violence. Thus, the purview of moral health pacifism includes the importance of bystander capability in the moral analysis of interventionist pacifist dilemmas. Tolstoy's critics' alleged obligation depends on this factor in a clandestine way yet this very factor shows how they are mistaken.

Is any given bystander obligated to commit violence against an assailant?

Implicit in the objection is the assumption that the agents involved are only of certain types or descriptions.²³ The hypothetical need for interventionist violence

²³ Pacifist writers claim the objection is typically presented with the victim is described as a wife, mother, daughter, or child of a bystander who is a male. (See Aukerman 17; Ballou 2006, 171; Brown, 159; Fabre, 824; Filice, 125; Hershberger, 308; Richards, 619; Tolstoy 1896, 3-4; and Yoder 1992b, 81.) None of these writers cite a published form of the objection. Among non-pacifist writers, nearly all present it without much agent description; some include that the victim is "innocent," "old," or "weak" and that the assailant is "criminal," a "brawny thug," or "a homicidal maniac." (See Gel'fond, 49; C. Lewis, 86; J. Lewis, 83; Narveson 2003, 159; Pinker, 35; and Puryear 2009.) Several propaganda posters from World War 1 and World War 2 depicting Japanese or German soldiers/leaders attacking American or British women aimed at recruiting male soldiers suggest the highly gendered version of the objection was then present in the Western mind. (See *Destroy This Mad Brute, Keep These Hands Off, Keep This Horror From Your Home*, and *This is the Enemy*.) A study commissioned by the U.S. Government concluded that posters depicting women and children in danger were more effective recruitment tools than other poster types (Young & Rubicam 1942). Similarly, I am arguing that the strength of the objection depends at least on a broad range of implicitly supplied agent-descriptions and at most on outright sexist, age-ist, and able-ist stereotypes.

presupposes three agents—an assailant, a victim, and a bystander. The scenario provides no details about the agents, but details may reveal whether there is any such obligation.

What if the bystander were an elderly male that required a walking frame, a middle-aged blind woman using a white cane, or a woman significantly smaller in stature and strength than the assailant? What if the victim was a young male built like a football linebacker who had four years of military combat training and the bystander was wheelchair bound? In these cases, it is less obvious that if bystanders so described refrained from committing violence against the assailant, they would be morally wrong for having done so. If altering agent-descriptions alters the intuition that bystanders are obligated to commit violence, then the objection depends on the assumption of some agent-descriptions and operates on the listener's/reader's tendency to supply those agent-descriptions. That is, the intuitive obviousness that bystanders so situated are obligated to commit violence does not result from considering the bare minimum required to conceive of an interventionist pacifist dilemma (a *non-descript* bystander); rather, it results from the arguer or audience considering only certain types of bystanders while under the impression that intuitions about *any* given bystander have been tested. But is it obvious even of bystanders of craftily supplied types that they are obligated to commit violence against the assailant? I do not believe so.

Suppose the bystander is Smith—an average-sized male. Suppose the victim is Smith’s child—a three year old female toddler. Suppose the assailant is not a person, but a six hundred pound grizzly bear. If Smith witnesses the grizzly bearing down on his daughter’s location with a grizzly facial expression, is Smith morally obligated to commit violence against the bear? Suppose Smith seizes his daughter and attempts to flee. Surely this is a better response than attempting to fight the bear. If Smith is not obligated to commit violence against the bear, and if Smith is not morally wrong for having seized the victim and fled, why would the same not be true in the case of a human assailant? I do not see why Smith is obligated to commit violence against an assailant because the assailant is a human rather than a bear. If Smith is not obligated to intervene violently, then bystanders in the undescribed-agents version of the scenario are not obligated to intervene violently.

Tolstoy’s critics claimed that his pacifism failed to give due focus to victims’ interests—to recognize what Jeff McMahan calls the “critical asymmetry” between assailant and victim (McMahan, 274). David Kopel claims the “profound flaw” in Tolstoy’s position is the implication that the lives of the murderer and the victim are equivalent (Kopel 2008b, 37). According to Narveson, pacifism “fails to distinguish morally between aggressors and their victims, and so between the innocent and the guilty” (Narveson 2003, 159). According to G. E. M. Anscombe, “pacifism teaches people to make no distinction between the shedding of innocent blood and the shedding of any human blood” (Anscombe, 58). But Smith does not

fail to distinguish between the bear and his daughter if Smith seizes his child and flees; I do not see why this would change if the assailant had been a human rather than a bear.²⁴ Thus, violence is not required to make a proper moral distinction between assailants and victims.

4.4 Are Bystanders Obligated to Commit Violence If Necessary?

Some objectors stipulate the condition that violence is necessary to aid the victim. That is, it is assumed that in some interventionist pacifist dilemma, violence is the only intervention option that will successfully aid the victim. George Hartmann records one American philosopher's objection to pacifism as "if there is no other way to prevent murder than by using force I ought to use force" (Hartmann, 129). Ihara considers this objection, describing the problematic cases for pacifism as "those of failing to use violence when necessary to defend others" (Ihara 1978, 371). Though she is concerned primarily with *lethal* violence, Cécile Fabre argues that some bystanders are obligated to commit violence against aggressors *assuming* that violence is the only way to save the victim's life (Fabre 2007, 364). So the objection goes, in a case where violence is necessary to aid the

²⁴ Someone may object that in virtue of being non-human, the bear does not count as "guilty" or an "aggressor" in the moral sense and that this is an important difference. But this objection entails either that a bystander is obligated to do *more* than merely aid the victim (prevent harm to the victim) or that when the assailant is human, aiding the victim necessarily includes injuring the assailant. Neither seems plausible.

victim, a bystander is obligated to commit violence; inasmuch as pacifism entails refraining from violence even in such cases, pacifism is false.

Craig Ihara offers two responses to this objection. First, a pacifist may have a special obligation to refrain from violence due to some previous action. Perhaps a man who has led a violent life promises his dying mother to renounce violence. Or perhaps upon joining a monastic community a person takes vows that include renouncing violence. Such persons have an obligation to refrain from violence that others do not have (Ihara 1978, 371-372).

Ihara's first response fails for two reasons. First, it entails the pacifist's special obligation is arbitrary. The obligation has nothing to do with violence as such. If the man had worked an oppressive job at a shoe factory, he might have promised his mother never to wear the factory's shoes in protest. Someone may join an eccentric monastic community the vows of which include consuming thirty-seven marshmallows per day. A person could have an agent-specific obligation to do or not do anything on this basis. At best, Ihara illustrates that persons are obligated to keep promises.

The second reason Ihara's first response fails is that persons cannot promise their way out of moral obligations. The claim is that persons so situated are obligated to commit violence. Ihara's response is basically "not if they promised not to." This response assumes that obligations to keep promises take priority over other moral obligations. But making a bizarre promise to torture

children does not give me a special moral obligation to do so nor does it abrogate my obligation not to do so.

Ihara offers a second response to the objection. Ihara argues that the duty to aid victims does not entail going to any conceivable extreme to do so (Ihara 1978, 372). At issue is whether pacifists are required to go to the extreme of foregoing their moral principles.

Everyone has not only a right to life, but a right to live it in a manner of his own choosing, provided that his way of life does not actively harm others (like the life of an assassin). The pacifist is one who chooses a way of life ... To undertake such a life is, for him, not a matter of frivolity or "mere taste" but a matter of ultimate seriousness and concern for an ideal more important than his life or his property. ... According to this way of looking at the matter, requiring a pacifist to act violently is equivalent to forcing him to sacrifice that which is both most precious to him and that to which he has at least a prima facie moral right. The case against the pacifist gains in plausibility when we focus our attention on the harm that might befall others if he does not use violence. The case on his behalf, I am suggesting, is more understandable if we shift our focus to include the rights of the pacifist himself. (Ihara 1978, 373-374)

I find Ihara's move here deeply unsatisfying. Pleading for pacifist's rights when victims are injured or killed seems morally hollow. Such pacifism is "a pious luxury, something [the pacifist] can indulge in if he wants to feel himself to be exceptionally virtuous" (Merton, 40).²⁵ Ihara claims that pacifism is a "moral ideal" to which a person may "aspire" (Ihara 1988, 269). The pacifist, then, ought to be

²⁵ Arguably, this would be an example of what Tony Lynch and A. R. J. Fisher call "pure hypocrisy"—a person so sincerely convinced in her status as a "force for good" that she can thereby justify *any* of her actions as part of that cause (Lynch & Fisher, 39-41).

someone who would forego her rights for the sake of doing good. Ihara's focus on pacifist rights suggests pacifism is not a moral ideal but something for which the pacifist needs an excuse.

Interestingly, though, Ihara never directly challenges whether persons so situated are obligated to commit violence, only whether the pacifist is exempt. Eric Reitan argues that whether there is such an obligation is a key difference between the pacifist and the non-pacifist (Reitan 2000, 33-34). Strictly speaking, whether persons so situated are obligated to commit violence is not a problem for moral health pacifism since, as noted throughout chapter 3, its claims are formulated to allow for genuine exceptions. One of moral health pacifism's significant contributions to the pacifist/non-pacifist debate which I will advance both in this section and in 4.5 is to challenge the ways non-pacifists assume that there are far more genuine exceptions than there actually are. Because this assumption is so rarely exposed, I tend to think that Reitan is correct and that the appropriate pacifist response is to challenge whether persons so situated are obligated to commit violence. I will argue that the current objection fails, but that even if it succeeds, it gains the objectors far less ground than is typically assumed.

As Daniel Statman argues, necessity conditions like the one the objection stipulates presuppose a success condition. Statman, concerned with self-defensive violence, formulates his success condition in the following way:

Assume that Aggressor is posing an illegitimate threat to Victim, say, a threat to Victim's life, body, property, and so forth, and that by

carrying out some defensive action, A, which would otherwise be immoral, Victim can prevent Aggressor from carrying out the threat. According to the success condition, Victim is justified in carrying out A only if, by so doing, Victim is likely to stop Aggressor from realizing the threat. (Statman, 660)

Statman points out that at first blush the term “likely” is misleading. It seems to some that, especially in hindsight, justifiability depends on *actual* success especially if necessity conditions are under consideration (Statman, 661). Whether an act of self-defense is justified, then, depends on whether justification is grounded in objective or subjective factors, and therefore Statman’s success condition is ambiguous since it can be interpreted on objective or subjective grounds (since even events that are *certain* are also *likely*).

This ambiguity is also present in the objection currently under consideration and is strongly linked to my earlier distinction between actual and perceived options. According to the objection, it is stipulated that violence is necessary to aid the victim. This may be interpreted objectively, meaning that violence of a certain form and degree will, in fact, prevent or curtail harm to the victim, which entails that violence of a certain form and degree is an actual option for the bystander, and this is true regardless of what the bystander perceives her options to be or is justified in believing. It may also be interpreted subjectively, meaning that violence of a certain form and degree is the only intervention option the bystander is justified in believing will succeed and that violence of a certain form and degree is among the bystander’s perceived options. The stipulation may also be interpreted on both grounds, meaning violence will, in fact, prevent or

curtail harm to the victim, violence of a certain form and degree is the only intervention option the bystander is justified in believing will succeed, and that violence of a certain form and degree is among both the bystander's actual and perceived options.

I believe that of the three interpretations, the strictly subjective interpretation least likely represents the intention behind objections like those mentioned by Ihara and Hartmann. So, I will not consider this interpretation until 4.5 where I address different objectors whose objections more closely resemble this interpretation. The strictly objective interpretation is a somewhat better representation of the objection, but should likely still be dismissed. The strictly objective interpretation allows for bystanders who are utterly unaware that they could or should commit violence against assailants even though, in fact, that is the only intervention option that will prevent or curtail harm to the victim and those bystanders ought to do it. Thus, this interpretation may allow us to test who has failed to keep their obligations, but it lacks any action-guiding function for bystanders. The most likely interpretation is the objective-and-subjective interpretation. And even if some objector insisted on the strictly objective interpretation, any analysis of the objective-and-subjective interpretation would also apply to the strictly objective interpretation.

In view of the objective-and-subjective interpretation, I believe Statman's self-defense success condition can be commandeered for present purposes. The

self-defense scenario will need to be replaced with the interventionist pacifist dilemma, which involves three parties instead of just two. And while Statman is concerned with the justifiability of self-defense, at issue in the interventionist pacifist dilemma is whether the bystander is obligated to commit violence. Changing the purview from one of permissibility to obligatory-ness also involves changing Statman's use of "only if" to just "if." That is, the objection under consideration involves the claim that if violence against an aggressor is the only means to aid the victim, then a bystander is obligated to commit violence against that aggressor. So, the way in which violence is necessary is allegedly a sufficient condition for the obligation. Further, the term "likely" should be retained since it is compatible with both the objective (again, *certain* events are *likely*) and subjective interpretations. In light of these changes, Statman's success condition can be reformulated to cover the interventionist pacifist dilemma in the following way:

Assume Assailant poses an illegitimate threat to Victim (say, to Victim's life or body), and that by carrying out some act, A, an act of violence of some form and degree, Bystander can prevent or curtail Assailant from carrying out that threat. According to the success condition, Bystander is obligated to carry out A if, by so doing, Bystander is likely to stop Assailant from realizing or continuing the threat.

In the interventionist pacifist dilemma, the necessity condition presupposes the success condition for the same reason Statman provides in the self-defense case:

Not having anything else to do except A in order to achieve some goal already assumes that doing A can achieve that goal; otherwise this would be no argument for A. For some course of action to be a last resort, it must first be a resort, as it were. When people say things like "I had no choice but to do x (in order to achieve y)," they

mean not just that *x* was the only means of achieving *y* but also that *x* was a means of achieving *y*. (Statman, 663)

Given that necessity conditions presuppose success conditions, if there is an obligation to commit violence against assailants, it would apply only to bystanders who meet the success condition according to the objective-and-subjective interpretation.²⁶

Is it the case that bystanders who meet the success condition are obligated to commit violence against assailants? Consider a case from the television series *As Time Goes By*.²⁷ A young adult woman, Sandy, enters the house after walking home at night and exclaims, “He’s followed me home again!” Upon hearing this, Lionel, the upper-middle-aged “man-of-the-house,” immediately tears out the front door looking for Sandy’s stalker. Sandy and Jean (Lionel’s wife) stand at the front door begging Lionel to come back inside. Later that night Jean tells Lionel it was “silly” to have run outside, and he should have acted “more responsibly.” When Lionel is dumbfounded by Jean’s analysis, Jean exclaims, “He could have been young!”—a comment Lionel receives with wounded expression. The next

²⁶ Statman is keen to argue that it is permissible for a person to act in self-defense even when that person does not meet the success condition (Statman, 666ff). Similarly, someone may object that even bystanders who do not meet the success condition are nevertheless obligated to commit violence against assailants; even the unsuccessful violence would still be a gesture of recognition of the victim’s value or the wrongness of the assailant’s actions. I think this attempt to rescue the objections fails. Is a feeble, unarmed, elderly lady in a wheelchair obligated to punch or scratch a brawny thug attempting to attack an NFL linebacker, justifiably believing that her attempt at violence will likely do more damage to her than the assailant, just to show the linebacker she recognizes he is an innocent victim? I do not believe so.

²⁷ See Larbey et al 1997.

morning Judith (Jean's adult daughter) tells Lionel she thought what he did was very brave but a bit "foolhardy."

The scenario is illuminating. Suppose Lionel reasonably believed he could nab the assailant, and suppose he could, in fact, have done so. Does it follow that he was morally obligated to do so and that the other characters were simply mistaken in their moral judgments that his act was silly, irresponsible, and foolhardy? Given that the scenario is not, strictly speaking, an interventionist pacifist dilemma, perhaps whether he was obligated is not in dispute. But the scenario illustrates that some agents may meet the success condition and yet may be persons who ought not to engage assailants violently. That is, even if the objectors' claim that a bystander so situated is obligated to commit violence seems intuitive, this objection, like the previous, operates on the covert assumption that the bystander is only of a certain type.

Recall a bystander described earlier: the elderly man with a walking frame. In some interventionist pacifist dilemmas, he may, in fact, meet the success condition and reasonably believe that he does. Is he morally obligated to commit violence against the assailant? It is not obvious to me that he is and for reasons resembling the characters' reactions to Lionel's attempt to apprehend Sandy's stalker. If you were the man's spouse, child, or grandchild, should you recommend that he intervene violently? Would it be unreasonable as a witness or in hindsight to judge that his act was silly, irresponsible, or foolhardy? If "no" to either, then

either you ought to recommend that he fail to meet a moral obligation, or else your elderly walking-frame-dependent grandpa is not morally obligated to commit violence against the assailant *even if he meets the success condition*. The latter is more plausible than the former. And it shows that even when it is stipulated that violence is necessary to aid the victim, the objection still obscures important differences between bystanders.

Even if I am mistaken and the elderly man is obligated to commit violence, the objection still fails due to the existential fallacy. Even if in all cases where violence is the only means of aiding the victim, the bystander is obligated to commit violence, it does not follow that there are, in fact, any such cases. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that if there are such cases, then there is such an obligation. If there are no cases in which the necessity condition holds, there are no bystanders who are so obligated. And if there are no such cases, then no pacifist fails to meet her obligations merely by refraining from violence in interventionist pacifist dilemmas.

How is it possible to determine whether there are such cases? If a bystander stops an assailant with violence, it does not follow that violence was necessary to aid the victim. Some other course of action might also have succeeded. If a bystander attempts to stop the assailant nonviolently but fails, it does not follow that violence would have succeeded. For a bystander to

determine that violence is necessary would require exhaustive knowledge of all options available to her and their outcomes.

Even if there were cases in which the necessity condition holds, we would never know it. So, we would never know whether a bystander was obligated to commit violence. Ignorance does not entail there are no such cases. But it does mean that even if successful, the objection achieves far less than it seems. The objection fails to show that any actual bystander is, in fact, obligated to commit violence. If the objection succeeds, it succeeds only against pacifisms that entail that even in principle no one is ever obligated to commit violence. Many pacifisms (including moral health pacifism) include no such claim. Interestingly, the objection does not even show that pacifisms of the type that maintain that all bystanders are morally obligated *not* to commit violence against the assailant are false. As Richard Routley points out, the objection can only achieve this provided an additional claim—that moral obligations never truly conflict (Routley 1984, 124). At best, this objection shows only that some strictly hypothetical bystander is obligated to commit violence. And, in view of Lionel or the walking-frame dependent grandfather, I maintain that it does not even achieve this much.

4.5 Is Violence Ever Practically Necessary?

Some objectors argue that violence is necessary in interventionist pacifism dilemmas because for some bystanders, the only perceived options are violence or

non-intervention and violence is the only intervention option the bystander is justified in believing will succeed in preventing or curtailing harm to the victim. Granted, for all the bystander knows, there are other actual options and one of them might succeed. But a bystander so situated must make a decision about what to do. So, as far as some bystanders can tell, violence is necessary to aid the victim; such bystanders ought to commit violence against the assailant.

Aaron Fortune, for example, acknowledges that persons are irreducibly social; so, acts of violence against others always constitute acts of damage to oneself (Fortune, 185). Violence is self-perpetuating (Fortune, 186). Thus, many pacifists correctly observe that unmerited suffering can stop a violence cycle (Fortune, 189). Fortune argues that even so, pacifism is untenable in a world where violence exists because “there are times when the loving act is to sacrifice one’s person and end violence violently” (Fortune, 184). Some assailants are insatiably violent like rabid dogs, in which case “it is better to shoot the dog than let it eat everyone” (Fortune, 189). Fortune does not argue that violence is sometimes a practically necessary *evil*. Rather, it can serve as a moral high ground—another way in which persons, like pacifists, can morally sacrifice themselves for the sake of peace. “[Pacifists] are wrong to limit artificially the possible modes of self-sacrifice” (Fortune, 189).

Similarly, David Kopel acknowledges the uncertainties in intervention cases. The bystander cannot be certain whether the assailant will follow through or

whether the victim will escape or survive (Kopel 2008b, 36). The bystander can merely judge the likelihood of outcomes (Kopel 2008b, 38). But Kopel argues that pacifists like Tolstoy grossly misuse these uncertainties. Tolstoy argues that killing the assailant means “killing for certain,” whereas the bystander is not certain of the outcome of the scenario; therefore, the bystander ought not to kill the assailant (Tolstoy 1896, 4). Kopel argues that the bystander still ought to protect the victim violently; the bystander has no obligation to the assailant because the assailant *qua* assailant forfeits the right to life (Kopel 2008b, 37). Kopel concludes that the moral action is for the “Good Samaritan” to shoot the assailant (Kopel 2008b, 38).

According to Kopel, Tolstoy mistakenly treats these cases as hypothetical. When William Jennings Bryan asked Tolstoy about such cases, Tolstoy remarked he had never personally seen such a criminal (Kopel 2008b, 34). In a letter to Ernest Howard Crosby, Tolstoy writes, “No one has yet seen the imaginary robber with the imaginary child” (Tolstoy 1896, 5). In response, Kopel recounts three cases in which children were attacked or kidnapped by assailants and in which the assailants were not stopped until shot or held at gunpoint (Kopel 2008b, 34-35). Contrary to Tolstoy’s claims, such cases do occur, and such cases show that sometimes bystanders ought to commit violence.

These objections largely do not apply to moral health pacifism. Moral health pacifism is consistent with the claim that sometimes violence is practically

necessary. As Gandhi writes, “If the capacity for non-violent [defense] is lacking, there need be no hesitation in using violent means” (Gandhi 1948, 260).

Elsewhere he writes, “Where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence...But...non-violence is infinitely superior to violence” (Gandhi 2013, 442). The last claim is the crux of moral health pacifism. It ought (evaluatively) not to be the case that some persons ought to commit MCV. Everyone ought (evaluatively) to be able to perform acts morally healthier than MCV.

But bystanders have different capabilities, and those capabilities are determined by a range of factors that determine moral health. Some of those factors may be under a bystander’s control. Some may not. The mental states, actions, conditions, and states of affairs of one bystander may enable her to perform intervention options morally healthier than MCV. The same factors of another bystander may restrict her now but make it possible for her to perform morally healthier intervention options at some future point. For now violence is practically necessary for that bystander to aid a victim, but she ought (evaluatively) to do what she can to orient her trajectory toward a level of moral health sufficient for having morally healthier intervention options. Of course, she may never do so, and so she may never have those options, in which case, for her, violence is practically necessary. For other bystanders, those factors may bring about a permanent moral health trajectory ceiling; for such bystanders, MCV is the morally healthiest intervention option they will ever have. For them, violence against the

assailant is practically necessary. Such bystanders ought (evaluatively) to commit MCV against assailants; they are doing their best.

Despite immunity to the objection, it is imperative not to leave the matter here. Moral health pacifism allows for a significant analysis of such objections—an analysis the seeds of which Kopel misses in his interpretation of Tolstoy.²⁸ Tolstoy told William Jennings Bryan he had never seen such a criminal “but he had seen wars in which millions of people were killed.” Concerning the imaginary robber and child, Tolstoy continues, “and all the horrors, which fill history and contemporary events, have been produced only because men imagine that they can know the consequences of the possible acts” (Tolstoy 1896, 5). To Ernest Crosby, Tolstoy writes:

It is generally assumed... there can be no other answer to the question than that the robber ought to be killed in order to save the child. But this answer is given so emphatically and so quickly only because we are not only in the habit of acting in this manner in the case of defending a child, but also in the case of expanding the borders of a neighboring state to the detriment of our own...or in the case of defending the fruits of our garden against ravage by passers-by... Such imaginary cases and the conclusions drawn from them prove only that there are men who know that it is not right to steal, to lie, or to kill, but who are so loathed to stop doing these things that they use all the efforts of their mind in order to justify their acts. (Tolstoy 1896, 4-5)

In a newspaper article, Tolstoy writes,

²⁸ In Kopel’s defense, Tolstoy is easy to interpret uncharitably. As Gel’fond points out, Tolstoy is partly to blame for misinterpretations because of his indulgent use of “sharp words” and a “sarcastic and peremptory tone” (Gel’fond, 50).

They are greatly interested and disturbed by the question of how to deal with a man who slays a child before their eyes. ... In reality, however, what concerns these people who wish to justify violence is not the fate of the imaginary child at all, but it is their own fate, their own way of life, supported by violence, and not maintainable if violence is repudiated. (Tolstoy 1909, 58)

Hidden under Tolstoy's uncharitable rhetoric is this: focus on hypothetical or rare cases obscures that at issue is violence as a lifestyle. Fascinatingly, in three different places, Kopel takes for granted that "Good Samaritans" will be armed (Kopel 2008b, 35-37). No one just *happens* to be carrying a gun *by accident*. A range of contingencies and choices over time determine what people will be like and what they will likely do in such cases. Becoming a violence-skilled bystander is a process that involves a significant number of choices and practices. Even if Kopel is correct that there are exceptional cases in which violence is practically necessary, he does not sufficiently acknowledge that this tends toward the justification of a great deal more violence (*and violent-ness*) than just the practically necessary kind. When Kopel lists real instances of what Tolstoy cavalierly dubs "imaginary," the effect is not merely that Tolstoy's claim is false, but that a great many other choices and practices related to becoming a violent bystander are in no need of further moral scrutiny.

This is the danger of exceptions. As Andrew Fiala argues, even if there may be exceptions, arguing for them can have a normalizing or precedent-setting effect on the exceptional act or practice (Fiala 2006, 127). Failing to recognize the tragic nature of these cases makes them easier to regularize (Fiala 2006, 140). This may

lead to “exceptional thinking” in which persons have a tendency to grant exceptional status to non-exceptional cases (Fiala 2006, 138-139).

When we spend most of our time trying to justify exceptions to the general rule ... we end up forgetting that the most important thing is the rule and not the exceptions. ... The long-term goal is to transform the conditions that make ... peace difficult or impossible. (Fiala 2014b, 39-40)

Focus on exceptions obscures the importance of what I have called trajectory. Moral health is dynamic and directional. The goodness a person instantiates has a *flow*. If one’s primary concern is best conceptualized as a matter of direction, talk of “exceptions” is simply out of place. Exceptions operate against a background conception of rules and therefore treat the claims in question as deontological in nature. Exceptions talk suggests the original claims are juridical or legal in character. Against that background, arguing for exceptions amounts to carving out space that demarcates exemption from the status of rule-breaking—“Here are the conditions under which persons who act thusly are exonerated.” But even if this is in some sense true, this method of moral analysis is inept.

Consider the case of limb amputation. Amputation suggests that something tragic has become practically necessary. No other means of saving the limb appear available to the doctor. But the *tragic-ness* motivates relevant parties to find alternatives to amputation. The tone with which Kopel advocates self-defensive and interventionist gun violence is like a recommendation to acquire the skill and equipment necessary to perform amputations without any further concern for discovering alternatives because amputation works just fine as far as it

goes. I concede to Kopel that violence can bring about desirable states of affairs. *So can amputation!* But Kopel fails to recognize the badness of violence *as such*, the *tragedy* involved in its use, the tragic *direction* which it takes persons, and therefore, the importance of finding ways to do without it. And this failure is in part because Kopel examines the issue solely through a legal framework.²⁹

Fortune, however, recognizes the problem. He argues that his conception of violence as self-sacrifice is superior to exceptional or “necessary evil” conceptions because it places greater limits on the use of violence (Fortune, 189). Fortune, though, argues that sometimes amputation is necessary, or, to use his metaphor, the rabid dog must be shot. And so, someone must do the shooting. Fortune takes the danger-of-exceptions point seriously, recognizing that exception advocates likely “fail to capture the bitterness of their medicine” (Fortune, 184). Even so, he may not take it seriously enough.

For Fortune, an act of violence constitutes self-sacrificial violence only if it ends the assailant’s violence, it does not provoke retaliation, and it ends one’s own violent response to the assailant (Fortune, 190). To meet these conditions, a person would have to prepare by acquiring the degree of skillful use of violence necessary to neutralize aggressive violence in a way that sufficiently disables the assailant from retaliating. Frankly, this sounds like a significant degree of violence

²⁹ Kopel’s paper is essentially an indirect defense of gun ownership rights. Kopel makes no direct application of pacifist philosophies to the issue of gun control. Rather, Kopel examines several modern version of “compulsory pacifism” and concludes that their basic philosophical grounds are unsound (Kopel 2008b, 12).

training. And that calls into question whether the third condition could ever be met. Could a self-sacrificially violent person refrain from becoming more violent generally or avoid Fiala's "exceptional thinking"? Fortune briefly considers the problem: "Could a violent agent willingly put down the sword and wait for others to decide when to take it back up? I do not know" (Fortune, 190).

I tend to think that violent persons cannot "put down the sword," at least not easily. Consider again the case of Terry Dobson on the Tokyo train. Dobson mentions that his years of martial art training included significant stress on the need to use that training only as a last resort; engaging in an altercation was treated as proof the martial artist had already failed as a conflict-resolver (Dobson, 188). Nevertheless, as Dobson tells the story, when the raucous drunkard entered the train car, Dobson's *first* inclination was to use violence against him, yet the old man's kind and sympathetic words showed that violence was unnecessary. Dobson's training led him to Fiala's "exceptional thinking."³⁰

That aside, my contention is that a person who aimed to make use of pacifist alternatives could not also be a person who made preparations to commit self-sacrificial violence. The preparations necessary for the effective use of self-sacrificial violence is inimical to the preparations necessary for the effective use of pacifist alternatives. In trajectory language, they constitute different directions

³⁰ Consider Grossman's treatment of the process by which Vietnam soldiers became significantly more effective killers than soldiers in previous wars and the kind of psychological damage that this entailed in their postwar years (Grossman, 251-299).

and flows. Thus, even if there are the exceptions Fortune claims, those exceptions determine an entire trajectory for a person—a trajectory significantly different from the nonviolence Fortune respects. Thus, even on Fortune’s suggestion, in practice, the exception will take priority over the rule.

Acts and persons do not exist in a vacuum. Persons’ acts are in part the products of nature, nurture, or previous choices. Acts require persons to have the internal or external resources necessary to perform them.³¹ Hypothetical, exceptional cases can obscure this point and therefore obscure a point of contention between pacifism and non-pacifism. Even if the hypothetical bystander ought to commit violence, real persons have to decide what kind of bystanders they will become. They cannot be effectively-violent bystanders without previously having become violent.³²

For both Fortune and Kopel, some ruthless assailants make it practically necessary for some persons to become violent. Both Fortune and Kopel mention Hitler as a significant problem for pacifism (Fortune, 184; Kopel, 14ff). Fortune and

³¹ Alasdair MacIntyre argues that a flowing narrative is necessary for any act a person commits to be intelligible (MacIntyre, 214-215). I take MacIntyre’s point to be an epistemological one. My claim is metaphysical. Acts as such are not isolatable, but are what they are in virtue of their connections to previous events including previous choices.

³² Narveson likewise misses the importance of trajectory when he writes, “The intelligent firefighter knows that in some cases fire is his best weapon. Not to use it in those cases would defeat the purpose of firefighting, rather than subtly promoting it by promoting ‘good habits.’ The habit of not starting fires is *not* a good one in those cases where that’s the only way to stop the major fires one is trying to stop. Yet the danger of turning people into firebugs thereby is also small” (Narveson 1992, 487). Narveson fails to acknowledge that fighting fires without starting fires is, *ceteris paribus*, still always preferable to fighting fires by starting them. And if a person is habituated into using fires to fight fires in some cases, that person will likely develop exceptional thinking with respect to that technique and never attempt to discover alternative techniques let alone acquire the capacity to implement them.

Kopel are not alone. Narveson also uses the Nazis as a counterexample to the effectiveness of pacifism (Narveson 1965, 263). George Hartmann records one philosopher's objection to pacifism as "successful pacifism would introduce a Fascist world" (Hartmann, 132).³³ Robert Brimlow's book defending a version of nonviolence is entitled "What about Hitler?" (Brimlow 2006).³⁴ Do such international threats make it obvious that pacifism should be altogether abandoned?

I do think a group of persons could make effective use of pacifist alternatives. For example, in 1875, citizens of Monterey, California used a welcoming parade to deter seven Chinese war vessels from attacking in retaliation for the town's poor treatment of Chinese immigrants (Fry, 85-86). I also think pacifist alternatives could be effectively performed by state agents. Many police agencies require officers to learn de-escalation techniques some of which may be forms of pacifist alternatives.³⁵ The point I have attempted to make in multiple ways is that the flora and fauna of moral agents is diverse. This is most obvious, I think, at the interpersonal level. Morally speaking, some persons can do more and be more than others; and even among equally moral persons, their *moral-ness* can

³³ Hartmann's paper, a summary of a questionnaire sent to several dozen philosophers about the strengths and weakness of pacifism, was published in 1944; surely the respondent quoted here has a particular set of fascists in mind.

³⁴ I am reminded of "Godwin's Law" which states, "As an online discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches one" (Godwin 1994). Godwin's law apparently applies to discussions of pacifism as well.

³⁵ See Sweeney 2016. Interestingly, a police policy of favoring de-escalation is ineffective without officers being trained in de-escalation techniques (Griffith 2016), and de-escalation training is often resisted by officers who already have significant training and experience in the effective use of violence (T. Williams 2015).

vary stylistically. There is no rigid line or cut off point between the interpersonal level and the level of groups or states where that diversity is no longer apparent. The reason is that, as noted in Chapter 1, to speak of state action is unintelligible without speaking of the individual persons carrying out certain actions.

However, I do think there is an important dividing line between the interpersonal and the state level, and that dividing line exists because of the nature of states as such. As Steven Pinker writes, states are “almost by definition in the violence business” (Pinker, 317). The individuals that comprise “the state” are essentially persons to whom has been granted a monopoly on the use or direction of violence against domestic and foreign threats. In fact, Charles Tilly (among others) argues that concerning the historical origins of states, the explanatory power of organized crime syndicates that succeeded among competitors far exceeds the explanatory power of social contract theories.

Eventually, the personnel of states purveyed violence on a larger scale, more effectively, more efficiently, with wider assent from their subject populations, and with readier collaboration from neighboring authorities than did the personnel of other organizations. (Tilly, 173)³⁶

Inasmuch as states can be thought of as agents, they are violent agents *qua* states. States can certainly be more or less violent, and, on the whole, less violent states are better than more violent ones. But so far as I can see, Guy Hershberger is quite correct that if a state were to become the kind of entity that could practice the

³⁶ See also Rothbard 1975.

kind of pacifism I describe, “Such a state would be so different in character from any state which we know today that it should have another name to describe it” (Hershberger, 311-312).³⁷

Given their very nature, then, states have moral health trajectory ceilings that largely preclude pacifist alternatives as options. Some forms of violence are the morally healthiest options states have. Moral health pacifism is consistent with the claim that in some cases states ought to commit violence and with the claim that some persons ought to act as agents of the state. Moral health pacifism, then, is essentially an interpersonal practice, and in that sense it is a project separate from political and state life. As John Middleton Murry observes, pacifism in an important sense cannot be “translated into political terms.” Its aim is “not to prevent war, but to create individuals for whom war is impossible as an activity” (Murry, 33-34).

Since states are by nature violent agents and since the practice of moral health pacifism is a practice of becoming a non-violent agent, moral health pacifists ought not to become agents of the state (at least when that entails being the agent through whom the state commits violence). Those two types of agents have moral health trajectories with discordant directions or flows. This does not mean that moral health pacifism is politically inert. A thorough practice of moral health

³⁷ Interestingly, Richard Routley argues that becoming such an entity is likely not in a state’s self-interest, not because of likelihood of defeat from foreign threats, but because of the domestic threat of its own citizens undermining its use of force to impose order by implementing those very nonviolent means (Routley 1984, 132).

pacifism may be subversive—a form of what Dorothy Day describes as “gentle sabotage” against various political, cultural, or social power structures that depend in important ways on violence (Day, 6).³⁸ But it does mean that the moral health pacifist cannot deny that perhaps the state she inhabits ought to engage in a defensive war or that its police forces ought in some cases to engage in certain forms of violence. The moral health pacifist’s criticism is that such exceptional forms of violence are often grossly misused by non-pacifists to justify all manner of unnecessary violence—especially at the interpersonal level. Non-pacifists like Kopel and Fortune fail to recognize the tragic nature of such cases and thus fail to recognize the need to discover better means to better ends.

4.6 Are Pacifists Hypocrites?

John Lewis writes that the pacifist “does not realize that his pacifism can only exist in a society protected by force from being overwhelmed by a paganism that would not tolerate it for a moment” (J. Lewis, 113). Reinhold Niebuhr writes, “Let such pacifism realize that it is a form of asceticism and that as such it is a parasite on the sins of the rest of us, who maintain government and relative social

³⁸ A lovely illustration of such subversion takes place in the film *Babette’s Feast* (Alex et al 1987). A former French chef is transplanted to a small Danish village to live among a group of austere and conflict-ridden Protestants. The *female* chef finds incredible ways to operate within the rigid and patriarchal social structure of the village in a way that subverts its oppressive features without ever acting coercively or stirring conflict. The climax of the story occurs when she uses her lottery winnings to cook the Protestants a traditional French feast, the hospitable experience of which overwhelms them and causes them to resolve their conflicts.

peace and relative social justice” (R. Niebuhr 1937, 1391).³⁹ According to Paul Gallant, pacifists would all be killed “if not for the protection provided for many generations by the Anglosphere’s soldiers and sailors” from tyrants like “Hitler, Tojo, Stalin, and bin Laden,” and thus “if you’re a pacifist who hasn’t been murdered or enslaved, thank a soldier” (Gallant 2003). George Hartman records one philosopher’s objection to pacifism as “One cannot dare be a pacifist except on assurance either that everybody else is one or that someone will fight to guarantee him the right to be one” (Hartman, 128). According to Andrew Fiala, “Critics of the war-system are viewed as hypocrites, since it is the material reality of the war-system that makes it possible for intellectuals to freely criticize the war system” (Fiala 2014b, 34). Brian Orend writes,

The pacifist, it is said, refuses to take the brutal measures necessary for the defense of himself and his country, for the sake of maintaining his own inner moral purity. It is contended that the pacifist is thus a kind of free rider, gathering all the benefits of citizenship while not sharing all its burdens. (Orend, 4)⁴⁰

The objectors do not concur on precisely what it is the pacifist depends on others’ violence for or whether this makes pacifists parasites, hypocrites, or free-riders. But I believe these objectors’ comments are similar enough to represent them as forms of a single objection that consists of four basic parts. First, there is a counterfactual dependency between violence committed by others and some state

³⁹ Niebuhr wrote during escalating international relations that led to World War II. By “such pacifism,” Niebuhr partly has in mind his own brother who had previously argued that in the case of Japan’s aggressive moves against China in the late 1930s, the absolute pacifism of Christianity required Christians to invoke “the grace of doing nothing” (H. Niebuhr 1932).

⁴⁰ Arguably, any citizens of a country with a volunteer military are guilty of unfairly off-loading social burdens onto others to some degree. See Robillard & Strawser 2016.

of affairs. That is, if it were not the case that persons other than the pacifist committed some violence, some state of affairs that does obtain would not obtain. For some objectors like Lewis and Gallant, the relevant state of affairs is the pacifist's own safety or survival. For other objectors like those represented by Hartmann and Fiala, it is the pacifist's legally protected and violently defended right and freedom to be a pacifist. And for objectors like Niebuhr and Orend, the relevant state of affairs is the fulfillment of social responsibilities especially those related to the defense or maintenance of justice.

Second, the counterfactual dependency of that state of affairs on violence shows that the pacifist is reaping benefits at the expense of or to the detriment of others without any symbiotic or off-setting contribution. The pacifist is thus a kind of parasite or free-rider.

Third, there is an assessment of what Neal Tognazzini and Justin Coates call the pacifist's "moral standing," which concerns whether a person who advances a moral claim is in an appropriate moral position to do so (Tognazzini & Coates, 2.2). Being a parasite or a free-rider in the nature of the case undermines the moral standing of one's moral judgments. This is the basis of the pacifist's alleged hypocrisy. The pacifist is not guilty of pretense or insincerity, nor is she guilty of what Roger Crisp and Christopher Cowton call "hypocrisy of blame," in which a person castigates others for deeds which she herself commits unremorsefully or while being guilty of greater faults than those for which she criticizes others (Crisp

& Cowton, 344).⁴¹ Rather, there is an allegedly acute conflict or inconsistency between the pacifist's moral judgment against violence and the fact that she benefits from states of affairs brought about by violence—what Dan Turner calls a “disparity pair” (Turner, 265).

Fourth, pacifism is rejected as moral-standing self-undermining. Because any given person depends on some violence, anyone morally critical of that violence is already in some sense parasitic or free-riding on others committing violence. Adherence to pacifism necessarily involves a person in depending on the very activity of which she is morally critical, and therefore pacifism necessarily involves a person in a disparity pair that constitutes hypocrisy.

This objection seems to pose a particular problem for the moral health pacifist, since I have argued that states ought to commit some violence but moral health pacifists ought not to be agents of the state. I have claimed that moral health pacifists are relatively-ideally morally healthy agents, yet they appear to be the very hypocritical free-riding parasites the objectors condemn. Is this true? It is not as obvious to me as it must be to the objectors that the various counterfactual dependency claims are true. But this ultimately does not matter

⁴¹ John Lewis's version of the objection may include this characterization of hypocrisy. Pacifism, he argues, “may actually involve the infliction of suffering upon multitudes of non-pacifists” since, metaphorically speaking, in order for the pacifist to be a “saint,” he has to “crucify others to save himself” (J. Lewis, 53, 113). I believe my responses to the characterization of hypocrisy more common to the other objectors will also address Lewis's charge.

since even if they are true, none of them entails that a pacifist is a hypocrite, free-rider, or parasite.

First, a political freedom or right to be a pacifist is not a necessary condition for the belief in or practice of pacifism. Pacifists can be pacifists even under political oppression. Inhabitants of any state are capable of adhering to ideologies, holding beliefs, and engaging in practices their state has declared illegal. This is not news. And history contains examples of beliefs and practices to which persons ought to have adhered despite lacking legal protection (for example, racial equality). Whether adherence to pacifism is a legally protected right or freedom only affects the potential consequences of being a pacifist, it does not determine whether a person may or ought to be one.

Second, even if a pacifist's freedom or right to be a pacifist depends on others' violence, it does not follow that she is a hypocrite. A person may rightly criticize the activities that brought about a state of affairs that benefits her. If Smith were a white male, he may recognize that his current professional success is to some degree due to white male privilege. Smith may be grateful for his job and intend to keep it. It does not follow that Smith is hypocritical if Smith morally judges white male privilege to be a bad thing. Suppose Smith receives the shocking news that his grandfather who had long suffered from a terminal disease died by doctor-assisted suicide. Smith may be grateful and relieved that his grandfather is no longer suffering. It does not follow that Smith is hypocritical if Smith still

morally opposes euthanasia. If it is hypocritical for a person to benefit from a state of affairs brought about by means to which that person is morally opposed, most if not all early 18th and 19th century U.S. and British abolitionists would be hypocrites; they likely could not escape at least the indirect benefits of an economy and society that profited from slavery.

Certainly, there are benefit receiving arrangements that seem straightforwardly hypocritical—a prohibitionist receiving income as part owner in a liquor store or a person morally opposed to fossil fuels owning stock in oil and coal companies.⁴² What then is the relevant difference between these cases and the cases above? At least one important difference is the degree to which the person actively sought or had the ability to refuse or avoid the benefits. Becoming part owner in a liquor store or buying stock in oil companies suggests a level of active participation in that which the prohibitionist or environmentalist morally opposes sufficient to constitute a disparity pair. To be morally consistent, it seems incumbent on the prohibitionist or environmentalist either to refuse these benefits or not to have sought them in the first place. But neither Smith nor the abolitionists actively sought the benefits they received, and it is unclear to what

⁴² I find the case of Karl Marx to be unclear in an interesting way. Marx was a fervent critic of capitalism—particularly the working conditions of industrial factory workers in light of the wealth of factory owners. Marx often depended for financial support on his colleague Friedrich Engels. Engels's money largely came from his stake in two different industrial factories (Brown & Fee, 1248-1249). Whether this makes Marx a hypocrite may depend on the nature of his criticisms; it is unclear to what degree Marx intended his criticisms to be moral. Supposing his criticisms were moral, was Marx a hypocrite? Accepting financial help from a friend does not seem hypocritical, but if he were aware of the source of that money, that awareness does make Marx's acceptance of it seem suspect.

degree they could refuse or avoid them. The precise ways in which Smith benefits at any given time from white male privilege may be inscrutable or perhaps unavoidable. If Smith attempted to exploit or insist on benefitting from white male privilege, or if Smith failed to refuse certain benefits obviously and acutely brought about by white male privilege (for instance, if Smith was offered a job by a white boss who told him, “the other candidate was black, and white people take care of their own”), then Smith would be a hypocrite. But Smith is not a hypocrite merely in virtue of happening to be a white male born into and consequently benefitting from a society that systemically privileges white males.

Similarly, the pacifist is not a hypocrite merely in virtue of inhabiting and thereby benefitting from a society that uses violence or threat of violence to secure those benefits. As with Smith, the pacifist ought neither to demand violence-caused benefits nor fail to refuse benefits obviously or acutely brought about by violence on pain of hypocrisy.⁴³ But surely the pacifist’s moral standing cannot be suspect if the pacifist did not participate in the violence that brought about the benefits, does not insist on receiving the benefits, and cannot for all practical purposes refuse or avoid them.⁴⁴ If a pacifist can be charged with

⁴³ A pacifist ought not to insist or request that police, military personnel, or other agents of the state commit acts of violence in her defense. This may entail in some cases not dialing 911, not taking anyone to court, not serving on juries in at least some types of cases, and never serving as a judge at least in some types of cases (Tolstoy 1902, 26-27, 31). If such moral consistency or non-hypocrisy results in a pacifist’s death or injury, so be it; that is a risk of being a pacifist. Further, it seems to me a pacifist ought not to insist on exemption from penalties a state may impose on persons who refrain from such activities (for example, jail-time for conscientious objectors).

hypocrisy on these grounds alone, it seems very difficult for someone ever to oppose any feature of her state or regime without incurring the hypocrisy charge. For the same reason, pacifists cannot rightly be called parasites since unlike parasites they do not actively pursue a host in hopes of extracting benefits at that host's expense. Whatever benefits the pacifist cannot practically refuse or avoid can hardly be said to be gotten *parasitically*.

Third, the pacifist cannot be a free rider merely in virtue of non-participation in police or military services because not all of a state's inhabitants are expected to participate, and those not expected to participate are not thereby free riders. Narveson writes, "The true test of the pacifist comes, of course, when he is called upon to assist in the protection of the safety of others persons" (Narveson 1965, 269); John Lewis writes that the pacifist fails "to face as a neighbor and comrade the demands made upon him by the needs of his fellow-men" (J. Lewis, 51).⁴⁵ Narveson and Lewis are two examples among many, but it is nonetheless jarring that neither recognizes the significance of his use of *masculine* pronouns. Narveson's and Lewis's objections are problems for pacifism only if pacifism requires being the type of person one's society expects to participate in defensive violence; otherwise, Narveson and Lewis succeed, at best, in showing only that pacifists of a certain type shirk their responsibilities. But they do not

⁴⁴ The extent to which a pacifist ought to attempt to avoid participation fuels debates among pacifists about whether to pay taxes or even work in certain industries that indirectly benefit a war effort (Hershberger, 100, 317).

⁴⁵ Recall also Narveson's previous quote, "The pacifist is generally thought of as *the man who...*" (Narveson 1965, 265 emphasis mine).

succeed in showing even this much since it is not the case that social responsibilities can only be fulfilled by committing violence. There are contributions a society needs from its citizenry other than soldiering. As Hershberger points out, there are a variety of civilian public services by which a person may contribute societally, including relief work for war sufferers (Hershberger, 203f, 268).⁴⁶ Surely, persons who engage in such activities are not shirking their civic responsibilities during wartime.

Most importantly though, moral health pacifists neither fail to defend fellow citizens nor fail to contribute socially. The practice of moral health pacifism includes implementing pacifist alternatives to prevent assailants from harming victims, thereby *defending* the victim. Even Niebuhr admitted that it was good to have pacifists inasmuch as it is good to have those who aim to model moral ideals (Niebuhr 1937, 1391). Tolstoy held that part of pacifist practice included works of service and charity to those in need (Tolstoy 1902, 217 – 218). As I argued in the previous chapter, pacifist alternatives may consist of acts that are preemptive of violent conflicts—acts of mercy, kindness, and hospitality. Through pacifist alternatives, the moral health pacifist aims to undertake a curative mission that

⁴⁶ Hershberger insists that such service should never consist in any form of military participation; “noncombatant” or “service unit” participation is as much a part of the machine of violent destruction as is soldiering (Hershberger, 267). I am sympathetic to Hershberger’s position, though I am not convinced that every possible military-related service would be inconsistent with practicing moral health pacifism; perhaps positions like chaplain or medic would be consistent with adherence to moral health pacifism, though I have not explored this carefully.

reduces violence in the immediate world around her; such acts constitute social contribution and responsibility.

None of the ways in which the pacifist is alleged to depend on violence show that she is a parasite, free rider, or hypocrite. It is interesting to consider, though, whether violence or the threat of violence may be a systemic form of hypocrisy.

The whole system of our social life, the complicated mechanism of our varied institutions, which all have violence for their aim, bear witness to the degree to which violence is contrary to human nature. Not a single judge will consent to strangle with a rope the man whom he has condemned to death in his court. No one of higher rank will consent to snatch a peasant from his weeping family and shut him up in prison. No general, nor soldier, save in obedience to discipline, to his oath, and in time of war, would kill hundreds of Turks or Germans and destroy their villages; he would not so much as wound one of them. These things are due to that complicated machinery of Society and the State, which makes it its first business to destroy the feeling of responsibility for such deeds, so that no man shall feel them to be as unnatural as they are.
(Tolstoy 1902, 46-47)

Maybe Tolstoy exaggerates (or maybe not), but he suggests a telling thought experiment. Suppose a judge could only issue a death sentence on the condition that she personally conducts the execution. Suppose a prosecutor could only request a death sentence on the condition that she personally conducts the execution. Suppose political leaders could only vote in favor of going to war on the condition that their vote required them to fight on the front lines. Suppose citizens could vote in favor of war only if that vote constituted automatic combat enlistment. Would such conditions reduce the number of executions and wars? If

so, then at least some who advocate violence depend on others to commit it for them, and arguably in a hypocritical manner.

4.7 Is It True That Pacifism Does Not Work?

Paul Gallant argues against pacifism based on the history of the Moriori tribe of the Chatham Islands (Gallant 2003). The Moriori were likely Polynesians that migrated from New Zealand to the Chatham Islands around the 1300s.⁴⁷ They were so bellicose and cannibalistic that eventually a blood-weary chief prohibited all violence. This prohibition was never rescinded, not even when Europeans and the Maori (a rival tribe) invaded the islands. Between the early 19th and 20th centuries, the Maori nearly exterminated the Moriori tribe.⁴⁸ Gallant argues that all pacifists would be as doomed as the Moriori if not for military forces ready to defend them violently. Thus, pacifism does not work because pacifists either do not survive or they survive despite their pacifism. David Kopel argues against pacifism on the same basis, and both Gallant and Kopel concur with Michael King's assessment of the Moriori that the best hope pacifism has of working is "against an adversary who shares your conscience" (Michael King, 75). Have Gallant and Kopel shown that pacifism does not work?

⁴⁷ See Michael King 1989. Gallant and Kopel both rely solely on King as a source, but apparently there is dispute about the origin of the Moriori, though there does not appear to be any significant dispute over the Moriori's refusal to resist 19th century invaders violently.

⁴⁸ The Moriori were exterminated as an extant tribe and culture as early as the 1870's. The last full-blooded Moriori, Tommy Solomon, died in 1933. But persons of mixed Moriori ancestry survive to this day and have worked to revive Moriori culture. See Davis & Solomon 2014.

One case does not establish that pacifism does not work. I have provided several cases in which it did work. There are more. Charging, bayonet-drawn soldiers have been deterred with as little as a hug and a smile (Yoder 1992b, 91-94). Under William Penn, Colonial Pennsylvania was largely occupied by pacifist religious groups and remained virtually unarmed for 70 years despite being surrounded by hostile native tribes who were aggressive to other colonists (Brock 1998, 31).⁴⁹ Despite a language barrier, an elderly woman prevented a Russian soldier from raping Heinz Kraschutzki's daughter when the woman touched the soldier's cheek and said, "You are not a bad fellow. I know you are not! You will not do any harm to this girl, will you?" (Fry, 87). A son once stopped his drunken, axe-wielding father from attacking his mother by quietly whispering, "You know you oughtn't to do that, dad" (Yoder 1992b, 60). British soldiers were deterred from carrying out orders to burn down a suspected American rebel house by a simple invitation to tea (Gummere, 306). According to Alfred Page, the Maori (the very tribe that nearly wiped out the Moriori) prevented a British attack by overt displays of welcome and hospitality toward British soldiers (Hunter, 122-123).

More importantly, arguing against pacifism on the basis of one failed case is a straw man. It only establishes that pacifism does not *always* work. The same can be said of violence. People have been slaughtered in genocidal fashion

⁴⁹ See also H. Hodgkin, 254-255.

despite their violent resistance.⁵⁰ Some persons commit self-defensive or interventionist violence yet fail to prevent death or injury.⁵¹ Violence does not always work. So what? No pacifism of which I am aware depends on the claim “violence *never* works” or “pacifism *always* works.” Rather, some pacifisms claim to work better than violence in important respects. Kopel concedes that sometimes they do, but not often (Kopel 2008b, 21).⁵²

But the claim that pacifism does not “work” compared to violence can obscure what is at issue. The comparison suggests there is one and the same end the achievement of which constitutes “working,” MCV is a means of achieving that end, and pacifist alternatives ought to be evaluated merely as alternative means to that end. My own comparison of pacifist alternatives to MCV and the very use of the term “pacifist *alternatives*” may suggest this notion. But it is an oversimplification. Something significant is lost in discussions of whether pacifism “works.”

One loss is the relation between means and ends. Suppose a state of affairs *S* is good. *S* may be quantitatively good (good in virtue of the amount of good it instantiates), qualitatively good (good in virtue of the kind of good it instantiates),

⁵⁰ In what some have called the first genocide of the 20th century, German General Lothar von Trotha ordered troops to annihilate all men women and children belonging to the Herero tribe of German South-west Africa (present day Namibia) in 1904; but this edict came in response to the Herero’s armed revolt against the Germans’ oppressive rule and took place during that armed conflict (See Ball 2011).

⁵¹ A Virginia man was killed by home invaders despite firing gun shots in self-defense (See Covil 2016).

⁵² Specifically, Kopel mentions Gandhi’s nonviolent campaign for Indian independence as an example.

or resultantly good (good in virtue of the combination of quantity and quality of good it instantiates).⁵³ Part of being resultantly good may be the means by which S was brought about. Suppose a person was awarded an educational degree or professional certification. Whether the degree or certification was obtained through bribery or through diligent study and training clearly affects the resultant goodness of that state of affairs. If a magic pill granted Smith instant optimum health and fitness, Smith's optimum health and fitness seems less resultantly good than, say, Jones's optimum health and fitness achieved by healthy diet and exercise. The same end is resultantly better when achieved by better means.⁵⁴ Another point lost is whether "working" amounts to achievement of one and the same end. Pacifist alternatives do aim at death-and-injury reduction. But, unlike MCV, the practice of moral health pacifism aims also at the redemption of formerly violent persons, the reduction of violent intentions, and the remedy of underlying causes of violence.

MCV, then, differs from pacifist alternatives as amputation differs from attempting to save the limb. Suppose Smith, a potential amputee, considers a one-legged or prosthetic-legged life to be better than dying from gangrene and considers the available methods for trying to save the limb too arduous, painful, or risky. Smith's friend, Jones, implores Smith to reconsider. Jones points out that

⁵³ See Regan, 78ff for how this distinction poses problems for Narveson's arguments against pacifism.

⁵⁴ Or perhaps different means result in distinctly different ends: end *E*-brought-about-*X*-ly is arguably not the same end as *E*-brought-about-*Y*-ly.

Smith could one day run marathons, be a professional athlete, and have overall greater mobility if only Smith would consent to lengthier, more painful courses of treatment and persevere through some arduous physical therapy. Smith retorts, “I don’t want to be an athlete or run marathons; I enjoy my sedentary lifestyle! It’s true, I might like those things if I tried them, but given how strongly I feel about them now, I doubt it. So, I’m willing to forego those options, especially if it means avoiding the intense pain and hard work of trying to save the limb, which definitely sounds worse than the pain of losing it. Besides, so far as I can tell, amputation works just fine, whereas it’s not clear trying to save the limb will work.”

The pacifist and non-pacifist differ not primarily over whether pacifism is an efficient, reliable means to non-pacifist ends; rather, the pacifist and non-pacifist envision different ends as worthy of achievement. The moral health pacifist does not claim the non-pacifist can preserve her life, property, and lifestyle without the aid of guns, knives, or street-fighting prowess. Rather, the moral health pacifist claims that significant parts of common lifestyles need remedying. There are better lifestyles worth attaining even at apparently significant risk. Those better lifestyles likely involve very different views and practices regarding property, safety, community, and other persons (even potential perpetrators).⁵⁵ (They may

⁵⁵ John Lewis argues that for consistency’s sake, “[pacifists] must cast off all fear and anger, and have no need for these material things for which men fight” (J. Lewis, 52). Lewis is likely right. Gandhi says that tenants should evacuate lands belonging to tyrants, robbers should be willingly given more than they intend to steal, and possessions should be made easily accessible to robbers with doors and windows unlocked (Gandhi 1961, 375; 1910, 49). Martin Luther King Jr. writes, “I know where we can store [surplus] food free of charge—in the wrinkled stomachs of the millions of

even involve different dietary practices.⁵⁶) The non-pacifist may examine pacifist alternatives and conclude, “on the whole, I don’t think pacifism will work.” But if by that assessment, the non-pacifist means that pacifism is not an effective way to preserve a non-pacifist lifestyle, the pacifist can reply unfazed, “guilty as charged.”

Gallant and Kopel fail to consider that MCV works only if potential assailants have less violence-prowess than potential victims. If persons aim to rely on MCV to work, they must, in effect, be willing to be or become more violent than their would-be assailants. For Gallant and Kopel, perhaps this is a limb worth severing. “Sure it is,” they might say, “our violence is justified whereas assailants’ is not, and, by our lights, MCV works just fine; if assailants need to be lethally injured to secure our rights to home, property, and family, so be it.”

I do not dispute that rights may be secured in this fashion. But Gallant and Kopel do not fully appreciate the question: *is violence really working?* Should persons have to own guns or other deadly weapons to secure themselves? Should persons have to prepare themselves to be willing and able to make effective and perhaps lethal use of those weapons against others—to engage in mental rehearsals of injuring, maiming, and perhaps killing other persons just to secure

God’s children in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and even in our own nation, who go to bed hungry at night” (M. L. King, 254). Saint Maximus the Confessor writes, “Because we are attached to [material] things we fight against other men, whereas we ought to prefer love for our fellow man to every visible thing and even to love for our own body” (quoted in Merton, 37). Hershberger holds that views about violence are inextricably bound to views about economic practices and material goods (Hershberger, 225). I do not offer these quotes with full endorsement. But they show that swaths of pacifism have recognized a significant connection between violence and property, safety, and social unity.

⁵⁶ Prisoners given dietary supplements are less violent than prisoners who are not (Bohannon 2009).

themselves, their families, or their material possessions? Should persons have to bar their windows or avoid going out at night? Should persons have to avoid “shady” parts of town or walking on certain streets? Should people have to think of every stranger at the door as a threat? Should people have to live this way?

“No, but that’s just the way things are,” the non-pacifist might retort; so, pacifists are just “refusing to acknowledge reality” (Kopel 2008b, 36).⁵⁷ I do not deny that this is the way things are. I affirm what some non-pacifists do not take seriously enough: *things ought not to be that way*. If all this fear, suspicion, alienation, anxiety, mobility inhibitions, and willingness to maim and kill is the state of affairs that constitutes violence “working,” then so much the worse for “working.” For the pacifist, either violence is not working, or else the value of what non-pacifists consider “working” is dubious.

Even if that is the way things are, things do not have to be that way. As Martha Nussbaum observes, “Many tragedies are produced not by natural necessity ... but simply by habit and tradition, treated as natural and inevitable. ... That is just the way life is, and it cannot be otherwise” (Nussbaum, 1015). That someone should be willing to put a bullet in the skull of someone else’s son or daughter to prevent that son or daughter from stealing a plasma screen television is tragic. That in order to prevent someone else from putting a knife in the throat

⁵⁷ Consider also Frederick Wilhelmsen who argues that pacifism represents “a principled refusal to look at reality” (Wilhelmsen, 3). George Hartmann records objections to pacifism by American philosophers, one of which is that pacifism is “non-realistic” and “fails to face the facts” (Hartmann, 129).

of my son or daughter I should become a person willing (if need be) to put a knife in the throat of someone's son or daughter is tragic. It does not have to be this way. It can be otherwise. The moral health pacifist recognizes the tragedy and makes rigorous efforts to become a person on a curative mission, aiming to make things the way they ought to be. And to *that* end, violence does not work.

CONCLUSION

According to Stephen Pinker and other social scientists, violence is declining; in fact, we live in the least violent period in history. According to Pinker, two major factors led to this decline: the consolidation of state power and the spread of free trade (though Pinker suggests many other factors have played small parts in the decline).⁵⁸ By consolidation of state power, Pinker largely means something like Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan story. Due to human nature and scarcity of goods, humans have strong incentives to commit violence against one another. But the establishment of strong states changed people's social incentive structures so that otherwise violent persons became more and more deterred by state enforced penalties from committing violence. Similarly, establishing larger networks of trade relationships eliminated the incentive to acquire goods from those parties by violence. While Pinker aims to show that violence has declined dramatically and test various explanations for that decline, James Gilligan makes several proposals for further reducing current levels of violence, all of which,

⁵⁸ See Pinker 2011.

though, are as “top-down” as Pinker’s. For example, Gilligan suggests changes to structures of employment, education, gun laws, and media portrayals of violence (Gilligan 2001, 91ff). Despite Gilligan’s diagnoses and analysis of the causes of violence seeming so personal and interpersonal, Gilligan’s prescriptions are largely political and collective.

I consider my project in a sense the interpersonal, “bottom-up” counterpart to Pinker’s and Gilligan’s. Further, Pinker’s and Gilligan’s works appear to me to manifest degrees of what Thomas Sowell calls the “constrained” vision of human nature. According to the constrained vision, to some degree, human beings are tragically limited, but their selfish and dangerous impulses can be contained by use of social contrivances “which themselves produce unhappy side effects” (Sowell, 35). The key is to determine which trade-offs between contained impulses and unhappy side effects are worth making. While I agree that humans are constrained in important ways, I have tried to argue in numerous ways that not all humans are equally constrained. And so I also see moral health pacifism as the unconstrained vision counterpart to Pinker’s and Gilligan’s constrained visions.

If we want there to be less violence and less threat of violence, then people need to become less violent and less likely to threaten violence. As one high school student remarked concerning metal detectors in schools to prevent school shootings, “The only way to get kids not to hurt each other is to get kids not to want to hurt each other” (Leblanc, 4). Throughout his book, Pinker argues that as

governments consolidate power more, people want to hurt each other less.

Unfortunately, this means only that people want to hurt each other less than they want to suffer being hurt by the state. This is quite different from people not wanting to hurt each other *simplicitir*.

To achieve the latter, *someone* needs to do it. Someone needs not to want to hurt *anyone*—not even those who want to hurt her. Someone needs to become less violent. And she needs to do so in a way conducive to others becoming less violent. Thus, instead of the violence or threat of violence from potential assailants infecting her with the need to become more violent, her peaceableness could infect others, disarming potential assailants and targets alike.

My worry is that reliance on MCV makes us persons less worth being and tends to get us stuck in that condition. Trouble is, becoming persons more worth being is hard. Very hard. So far as I can see, I am not one of these people. I am at best a moral health pacifist who is, as some Catholics say, “non-practicing.” Perhaps this means little more than I have good pacifist-like intentions about which I am not doing a whole heck of a lot. Even so, the point is I do not have to settle for oversimplifying the moral life. I can aspire to brave its messiness, with its multiple types of value judgments, and aspire to be a person whose aim is, as Joan Baez describes, “to build a floor, a strong new floor, beneath which we can no longer sink. A platform which stands a few feet above napalm, torture, exploitation, poison gas, A and H bombs, the works” (Baez, 34). Whereas Baez

seems concerned with inter-state violence, I am primarily concerned with “the works”—interpersonal violence. On my view, some persons ought to consider what kind of persons they ought to be and accept the difficult training necessary to rid themselves of “the presumption that violence is necessary for living life well” (Hauerwas, 101-102). Pacifism, then, does not proceed from the naïve assumption that everyone is trustworthy or good. Quite the opposite. The pacifist recognizes the human condition and thus recognizes the need for pacifism. As professor of theological ethics Stanley Hauerwas says, “I’m a pacifist because I’m a violent son of a bitch” (Colman, 24).

In my view, in the realm of interpersonal violence, non-pacifists have settled. And sometimes, persons just should not settle. A drug addict may manage to be “high-functioning,” but however high-functioning she is, she ought not to settle for a life of addiction. Spouses may learn to manage a rather emotionally toxic relationship, but, however well-managed, neither ought to settle for an emotionally toxic relationship. Hartmann records one philosopher’s objection to pacifism: “It is better to die in defense of liberty than to live as a slave—or to live in indifference to the enslavement of others” (Hartmann, 129). These sentiments seem clear and noble. There are some things better to die for than live with. Funny thing is, I believe those very sentiments *favor* pacifism.

It is true—non-pacifists make clear by their preparations to use MCV that they will not tolerate the violence of assailants; and in many cases, by committing

MCV, non-pacifists prevent or quell assailants' violence, saving themselves and others from injury and death. Nevertheless, they have acquiesced. They have allowed assailants, real or imaginary, to determine too much—their choices, attitudes, lifestyles, and, to a significant degree, who they are. And even if non-pacifists acknowledge the morally tragic nature of this state of affairs, inasmuch as they oppose pacifism, they have concluded there is no need to try for better. This is just the way things are; "it cannot be otherwise."

The practice of moral health pacifism is a refusal to settle. Things ought not to be this way and do not have to be this way if only someone would swim against the current hard enough to create a wake. It is precisely because of the messiness of moral life that I can so believe and so aspire without implying that persons who rely on MCV are wrong, bad, blameworthy, impure, value-less, ill-intentioned, poorly-motivated, or any other morally negative inference that depends on a unitary conception of normativity. I admit that what I am describing sounds so "against the current" and normal flow of things that it is still just plain hard to believe. As Robert Stevenson writes, "The program of [pacifism] is far too strenuous for the bulk of mankind" (Stevenson, 443).

This is precisely why there ought to be moral health pacifists—change agents that model concretely how things ought to be. Often, the significance of explaining and understanding how it could be done cannot compare to seeing it done. Some non-pacifists are so convinced they can thrive only by waging war;

persons both near and far ought to be viewed as potential rivals, assailants, enemies, and threats within a Hobbesian trap of mutual animosity—an animosity only kept at bay by threat of greater retaliatory animosity. I cannot help but think this is at least in part because they have yet to see or recognize someone clearly and unmistakably *wage peace*.

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