

INFORMATION TO USERS

This was produced from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure you of complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark it is an indication that the film inspector noticed either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, or duplicate copy. Unless we meant to delete copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed, you will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photographed the photographer has followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. For any illustrations that cannot be reproduced satisfactorily by xerography, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and tipped into your xerographic copy. Requests can be made to our Dissertations Customer Services Department.
5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases we have filmed the best available copy.

University
Microfilms
International

300 N. ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, MI 48106
18 BEDFORD ROW, LONDON WC1R 4EJ, ENGLAND

7908831

MILES, GENEVIEVE

THE DIALECTICS OF POLITICAL CHOICE: THE MODEL
OF R.G. COLLINGWOOD'S "NEW LEVIATHAN."

THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA, PH.D., 1978

University
Microfilms
International

300 N. ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, MI 48106

© 1979

GENEVIEVE MILES

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE DIALECTICS OF POLITICAL CHOICE:
THE MODEL OF R.G. COLLINGWOOD'S NEW LEVIATHAN

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

GENEVIEVE MILES

Norman, Oklahoma

1978

THE DIALECTICS OF POLITICAL CHOICE:
THE MODEL OF R.G. COLLINGWOOD'S NEW LEVIATHAN

APPROVED BY

Ronald M. Peters

John W. Wood

B. Swales

H. H. 582

V. G. Vandy

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | Page |
|----------------------------|------|
| Chapter | |
| I. INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| II. MAN | 21 |
| III. SOCIETY | 54 |
| IV. CIVILIZATION | 88 |
| V. CONCLUSION | 121 |
| APPENDICES | 166 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 168 |

The Dialectics of Political Choice:
The Model of R.G. Collingwood's New Leviathan.

-- Genevieve Miles

To the inspiration of Sister Julianna.

To the loyalty of my sister, Evelyn.

PREFACE

A dialectic of choice, when based upon the work of R.G. Collingwood, and particularly The New Leviathan, is involved in political philosophy. The subject of choice cannot be dealt with until the framework for its exploration emerges. First, there is the idea of the dialectic. Second, there is the philosophical framework which involves: a philosophy of mind, of society, and of civilization, each of which is concerned with choice. Third, there is the critique of the modern dilemma of choice.

Several problems have presented themselves in attempting to say something upon this subject. There is the complexity of Collingwood's work owing to the fact that no work presents the entire facet of understanding or a complete relationship to the whole of his thought. The New Leviathan, to be understood, must be put within the context of all of Collingwood's philosophy or the importance of choice within a dialectic and as a critique of the modern world collapses because it is not comprehended or if it is, it is too shallow for defense. A related problem is that such a compendious whole is not favoured reading in today's world. Instead of taking a theme and driving it home, the theme must emerge.

The format of The New Leviathan closely follows that of Hobbes's Leviathan. The reader may recall that, to Hobbes, it was important to find out why man acts or chooses to act as he does. Chapter I, "A Philosophy of Mind," deals with the same problem. Hobbes saw man not as an isolated actor but as one who is acted upon by his community, his society, and his culture or civilization and responded. The term,

civilization, is characterized by belief, a point which Hobbes was at
some pains to emphasize.¹ It is particularly pertinent today to look
at frameworks of belief in this manner because choice may not appear
to be, on the one hand, so capricious nor, on the other, so limited.
Thus, the framework for any concept of choice as emergent from action
based upon belief is both broad and complex.

What is particularly interesting and even exciting about this
approach is that it presents an overview, alternatives, and a critique.
It may not be necessary to "buy" the entire idea in order to find
choice alternatives. The question about overview, alternatives, and
choice prompts the rejoinder: How? The overview is provided, in the
case of *The New Leviathan*, by an examination of the European mind as
related to man's mind, his community, his society, and his culture.
Alternatives emerge accordingly as this overview is accepted or re-
jected. It is a way of thinking which is demanded and, surprisingly,
it adumbrates several movements appearing as separate enterprises in
today's world. It is, thereby, also a critique of belief or action
emergent from uncovered presuppositions which have not been thoroughly
examined. The critique emerges in man's search for community, a
category strangely lost and one for which we now search. It emerges
in a critique of the various premises of liberalism. It emerges in a
critique of the current concept of "non-being." It emerges in the end-
less debate as to how to organize mass society -- again a matter of
choice. It emerges in further presuppositions, again accepted but not

examined, as to how nature, man, and science stand in relation to each other.

The whole of Collingwood's work goes beyond a critique into suggestive possibilities for the re-examination of choice. This concerns the idea of progress, of ethics, of will, and finally, moves into an arena with hermeneutics and existentialism. It requires critical and reflective thinking. It is not only a dialectics of choice; it is a dialogue about choice.

1

Hobbes rebelled against a philosophical tradition and a religious tradition. He rejected the past as present, as able to exercise a decisive influence on his own time. Maureen Henry has suggested in "Tradition and Rebellion" that a study of the "structural and functional changes in the Western tradition" resulted from the rebellion of Thomas Hobbes. This also supports the idea of the dialectic since philosophy is a continuing dialogue between those who live in the present and those who have laid down Western thought in history -- a notion contained in most of the works of Collingwood. A good part of the rebellion of Hobbes stems from his desire for certainty; in order to attain this, some of the vital principles of tradition had to be excised. See Part I, Chapter II of the Leviathan. (Henry's work is to be found in The Southern Review, Volume 12, (Winter, 1976).

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Three centuries separate The Leviathan, written by Thomas Hobbes, and The New Leviathan, written by Robin George Collingwood. Yet both these authors are now the object of renewed interest by scholars in two fields, that of political science and that of philosophy. The pertinence or contemporaneity of Hobbes and Collingwood lies in the questions they posed, in their unique experiences, and in the epistemological, metaphysical systems each espoused. The interests of each are broad and neither was primarily a political philosopher although each lived in times of crises, that of a current political crisis and that of epistemological crisis. Hobbes anticipated some important contemporary problems; indeed, some aver that he, rather than Locke, is the architect of American constitutional thought.¹ The question is: Why did Collingwood, a twentieth century Waynflete professor of metaphysics at Oxford, desire to emulate Hobbes? The next question may be: What was Collingwood's view of Hobbes's Leviathan?

Collingwood stated that he used Hobbes as a model because he "set out to deal with the same groups of problems in the same order;" thus, he called the four parts of his New Leviathan, 'Man', 'Society', 'Civilization', and 'Barbarism'.² Pointing out two schools of interpretation of the work of Hobbes, Collingwood declared his purpose in emulating Hobbes could be taken either way:

If he is one of those who think of Hobbes's Leviathan as the classical exposition of a classical type of despotism, namely seventeenth-century absolutism, the portrait and anatomy of 'that great Leviathan called a Common-wealth, or State (in Latine Civitas)

which is but an Artificial Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall', he may take it to mean that I have set out in this 'New Leviathan' to portray and anatomize the new absolutism of the twentieth-century, based on the will of a people who in thus setting up a popular tyrant gave into his hands every right any one of them has hitherto possessed. For the immediate aim of this book is to study the new absolutism and inquire into its nature, causes, and prospects of success or failure; . . .³

On the other hand,

If he thinks of the Leviathan as a book which is unique in dealing with the entire body of political science and approaches its colossal subject from first principles, that is, from an examination of man, his faculties and interests, his virtues and vices; a book dealing first with man as such, then with political life as such, then with a well-ordered political life . . . and lastly with an ill-ordered political life . . . then he may take by title to mean . . . that in this book I have set out to deal with the same groups of problems in the same order . . .⁴

Collingwood felt that the second purpose was more his aim. War, he declared, had "taught some of us that there was more in Hobbes than we had supposed . . . to see political life as it really is, we must blow away the mists of sentimentalism which have concealed its features from us ever since the beginning of the eighteenth century."⁵

His work was "an attempt to bring the Leviathan up to date "due to the advances made in the interim in "history, psychology, and anthropology."⁶

The second question, What was Collingwood's view of Hobbes's Leviathan? is more difficult.

Undoubtedly, Collingwood saw Hobbes as the philosophical antecedent to all modern moral and political theory, the first philosopher to have attempted to give a competent account of human nature grounded upon natural philosophy. Secondly, in view of Collingwood's commitment to a dialectical inquiry, Hobbes must be seen as a unique political realist who founded his system upon a dialectical conception of human nature. This dialectic of Hobbes's philosophy of human nature leads to conclusions beyond the political, to that of the Cartesian view of rationality and reality in order to make humankind the master and possessor of nature itself. Humanity's needs are prior to the civil situation.⁷ Further, humans are historical in that they must remember past experiences in order to generate a future, particularly one which is independent of nature, the brute resistor.⁸ This separation or alienation of man and nature is psychological at the level of conscious desire. Humans desire both preservation and satisfaction yet they are driven by fear and anxiety to seek shelter in civil existence which, in turn, places them at war not only with nature but with others of his own kind. In regard to others, Hobbes's account of human effort is dialectically complex. A pursuit of pleasure is self-contradictory because, in the desire to preserve and to augment his needs and security, humans seek to compensate and to anticipate.⁹ Fear and desire are the fabric of existence for self-concerned human beings.¹⁰ In order to preserve both private and public good, humans then mediate via the civil authority. Humanity becomes the measure and authority for all things because the image of man is reshaped by

his own will. The premise of Hobbesian political theory was the notion of consent. He agreed with virtually all previous political theorists that speech was the chief quality distinguishing men from other animals.¹¹ Speech and reasoning depend upon self-willed action. Hobbes asserted:

There is no other act of man's mind, that I can remember, naturally planted in him, so, as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it, but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five senses. Those other faculties, of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to man only, are acquired, and increased by study and industry; and of most men learned by instruction, and discipline; and proceed all from the invention of words and speech. For besides sense, and thought, and the train of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by the help of speech and method, the same faculties may be improved to such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living creatures.¹²

Man's mind, Hobbes continued, is regulated or guided by trains of thought of thought such as "when one's thoughts are said to wander . . ."¹³ The train of regulated thought can be of two kinds: first, when we seek to reproduce causes and, second, when we imagine anything whatsoever.¹⁴ Regulated thoughts arise from desire which leads to memory resulting from experience. The first use of names is part of the registering of trains of thought so that we may recall or communicate them. Definitions are the process of making sure that the registering of such trains of thought proceeds accurately or of "settling the significations of people's words."¹⁵ Apparently, Hobbes saw naming as one way humans come to grips with facts. Hobbes then proceeded to outline three steps as a correct scientific procedure. It is not

important to go into these steps here but it is important for Collingwood because he undoubtedly associated Hobbes with the emergence of the basic scientific paradigm underlying assumptions which had, by the time of Collingwood, proved to be dialectically erroneous. For Collingwood, also, Hobbes's consideration of just versus unjust must have been important. That is, we cannot discover whether humans are just or unjust by any consideration of word meanings. We must refer to experience to know the extensions of the terms used and to know that "unjust is the name of the far greater part of men."¹⁶ Thus, we have two kinds of knowledge: that which is original sense and the other science or knowledge of the truth of propositions.

Hobbes appears to have said that the social contract represents man's reconciliation with an inability of reason to legislate man's passions. He was concerned with the problem of authority. As Hobbes has formulated authority in The Leviathan, he made a distinction between the reasons which motivate mankind to institutionalize a political system and the sanctions which provide for its maintenance once it is in existence. Hobbes accounted for the incentives to contract in terms of Reason and Religion. The idea of corporation enables a group of people to enjoy collectively the legal rights of an individual; it is also an artificial person in law because it may sue and be sued. In turn, it must conduct its business through the agency of a representative whose powers are vested in the office. A body politic as a corporation has two distinct characteristics: it is permanent and it is sovereign.¹⁷

Hobbes also appears to have said that religion represents an inability of reason to grasp and legislate for an unresponsive universe. Collingwood may have argued that Hobbes meant that the necessity of the argument for God as a first cause is founded upon the inevitability that the limited power of man will not be able to sustain an infinite endeavour. The proof of God's existence rests on the finitude of man (and for Hobbes, upon man's exhaustible human curiosity). The pursuit of good or of 'felicity' leads, in Hobbes, to the generation of new knowledge so that man can transcend the limits of nature. Such a liberation can be accomplished only when man realizes that the principles of order are found only within himself which leads to philosophy as the liberating discipline.

The series of crises which occurred in the West during Collingwood's life as he viewed them have been recorded in his Autobiography. First, there was the collapse of some basic democratic principles on which the English liberal tradition rests. Second, a possible cause of the grave situation in Western liberalism was possibly due to modern methods and principles of study. Third, there was the rival school to the Lockean notions as found in Marxian Socialism. All of these events plus the two World Wars, Collingwood reported, "broke up my pose of a detached professional thinker."¹⁸

Collingwood revealed that he had been a democratic liberal regarding himself as a citizen within a political system granting franchise with a concomitant duty to vote, with further franchises of free speech, free press, redress for grievances, a political system resting

upon a politically educated public opinion, a meritorious system worth defending. While the system was not free from faults, that was the function of government. A self-correcting system, it remained a bulwark so long as the majority remained well-informed and public-spirited. Disillusionment with these notions, for Collingwood, set in during the 1890s when the Daily Mail lost the "meaning of facts which a reader ought to know if he was to vote intelligently, and acquired the new¹⁸ meaning of facts, or fictions, which it might amuse him to read."

This, however, no longer taught him to vote but not to vote; politics became mere spectacle. "Mr. Lloyd George became to me a landmark . . . in the corruption of the electorate. . . During the first quarter of the present century, each of these corrupting influences underwent enormous²⁰ development."

Events reported in the English press before the outbreak of the Spanish civil war confirmed that either journalists were ill informed or that journalistic ignorance was acting under instructions to deceive²¹ its readers. When the war began, the British 'National' government adopted a policy of 'non-intervention' although, charged Collingwood, it did intervene actively on the side of the rebels. As such policies were questioned, the governmental answer was: "Trust us; we know what²² we are doing; we have given you peace." Yet no evidence was produced that other actions by the government would have threatened peace.

But though nothing was said, much was done. Failing any statement of the 'National' government's policy, I found myself obliged to infer their policy from the evidence of their actions. . . [which] admitted only one explanation. They wanted the rebels to win, and wanted to conceal that fact from the electorate.

Why were they so anxious for the rebels' success?
. . . The British government, behind all its disguises, had declared itself a partisan of Fascist dictatorship.²³

An open defiance of the "rules of parliamentary privilege" was seen in the year of 1938 when cabinet members suppressed parliamentary criticism. The third betrayal of liberal principles by the English government occurred when Czechoslovakia was sacrificed in the same manner as were Abyssinia and Spain. The methods used to accomplish such policy was a "carefully engineered war-scare in the country at large"; the "English prime minister did it by playing on sheer,
²⁴
stark terror."

World War I had already proved that in modern war there could be no victors; there was another defeat in modern war, that of parties and statesmen who could not rise to the occasion. While the war was a "triumph for natural science" as power and led to "improvements in transport," sanitation, surgery, medicine, psychiatry, commerce, and industry, it was also "an unprecedented disgrace to the human intellect" since it showed "the contrast between the success of modern European minds in controlling almost any situation in which the elements are physical bodies and the forces physical forces, and their inability to control situations in which the elements are human beings and the
²⁵
forces mental forces . . ." This was revealed in the "sheer ineptitude" of the Versailles treaty. In fact, the control of the forces of nature which had been proceeding for a three hundred year investigative period showed that men were yet in the Middle Ages who meant well

but who needed "more understanding of human affairs and more knowledge
26
of how to handle them."

The answer to these needs appeared to be forthcoming in psychology; to Collingwood, as he perused William James's Varieties of Religious Experience, the claim of psychology to throw light upon a knowledge of human affairs was a 'fraud'. First, psychology was not a young science but one "deliberately created".

It marched on the one hand with physiology, and on the other with the sciences of mind proper, logic and ethics, the sciences of reason and will. And it showed no desire to encroach on its neighbours' territories until, early in the nineteenth century, the dogma got about that reason and will were only concretions of sense and appetite. If that was so, it followed that logic and ethics could disappear, and that their functions could be taken over by psychology. For there was no such thing as 'mind'; what had been so called was only 'psyche'.²⁷

Any claim, theorized Collingwood has implications. In the case of psychology, the implications are that it must abolish "distinctions which, being valid for reason and will but not for sensation and appetite, constitute the special subject-matter of logic and ethics; distinctions like that between truth and error, knowledge and ignorance, science and sophistry, right and wrong, good and bad, expedient and inexpedient."²⁸ His conclusion, therefore, was that psychology is not only not a science but is what "'phrenology' was in the early nineteenth century, and astrology and alchemy in the Middle Ages and the sixteenth century: the fashionable scientific fraud of the age."²⁹ There was still a valid area of investigation for psychology in the area of sensation, appetite, and emotions.

How, pondered Collingwood, could humankind come to understand human affairs better? Could a study of history, vastly improved over that done before, become a living past so that events become process so that the past is seen to live in the present? Is it possible that history could "be a school of moral and political wisdom?"³⁰ History, he mused, could bring "to moral and political life . . . a trained eye for the situation in which one has to act."³¹ The bankruptcy of natural science lay "in its passion for ready-made rules" so that it neglected to develop an insight as to which rules apply in various situations. At times, rules aren't needed so much as an ability to see what the situation is. This latter case is particularly true of moral and political life. A person is an actor and the act he chooses in dealing with a situation is not so much dependent upon the situation as his belief concerning it. Our actions are often successful because a great part of them are acted according to rules wherein situations are viewed as of certain standard types. There are, however, two types of occasions when an actor must act without rules: (1) when the standard type of situation is unrecognized, and (2) when you find the standard type situation and refuse to deal with it in the rule-implied way. The first case is often dependent upon the agent's inexperience or ignorance of life. The second case arises when a situation is taken too seriously that not even desire or self-interest prevail. A major problem to solve, according to Collingwood, was to raise action to a higher potential. This implied that the situation must be seen more clearly and that its past, present, future should be understood.³²

A third crisis occurring during his lifetime, as Collingwood saw it, was that of the 'realist' or 'positivist' school of philosophers who inhabited Oxford from the early nineteenth century onwards. This philosophy utilized critical methods for an attack upon the theories of knowledge. They destroyed not only 'idealism' but 'realism itself' with complete scepticism.

The Oxford 'realists' talked as if knowing were a simple 'intuiting' or a simple 'apprehending' of some 'reality' . . . What all these 'realists' were saying, I thought, was that the condition of a knowing mind is not indeed a passive condition, for it is actively engaged in knowing; but a 'simple' condition, one in which there are no complexities or diversities, nothing except the knowing.³³

Collingwood expressed the idea that the end of the 'realist' movement would never be written as history although it is, in his words, a stumbling "from one temporary and patchwork philosophy to another in a kind of intellectual nightmare."³⁴

Another problem of the modern world was specialization; in such a society, agents of abstract specialism can utilize language in specialism's service to produce an inversion of the moral order and a subversion of the fabric of a rationalist civilization. The disease of his time, Collingwood identified as "the coexistence of overproduction on the one side with unsatisfied demand on the other."³⁵

On the one hand, there is an unsatisfied demand for art, religion, and philosophy. On the other, there is a crowd of artists, philosophers, and ministers of religion who can find no market for their wares. Every street and every village in the country contains people who are hungering for beauty, for faith, for knowledge, and cannot find

these things. And those who have them are starving for mere bread, because no one will buy. The producers and consumers of spiritual wealth are out of touch; the bridge between them is broken and only a daring spirit here and there can leap the gulf.³⁶

When, contended Collingwood, philosophy attempts to solve problems, it necessarily selects for its subject matter, the problems of the age; the modern age has been built on the premises of philosophy developed in the seventeenth century where the belief that nature as a single system of essences and controlled by a single system of laws was adopted. Thus, the promise of the "new science" ushered forth the modern world. We have three interrelated core problems of the time: the problem of overproduction and unsatisfied demand and the loss of belief in reason. To detach experience forms from one another makes "fragments of men" because life lies in the "whole man" who is nothing without his fellow men.

Collingwood has had many critics, some sympathetic and others almost hostile. Since the mid-1950s, his work has been increasingly noted with three fairly important books devoted to his thought since 1962, an incredible achievement for a man who died in 1943 and left little in the way of followers or critics until the latter half of the twentieth century. The authors of the mentioned three books, Louis O. Mink, Lionel Rubinoﬀ, and Alan Donagan, have had problems with the interpretation of Collingwood's work. Many other critics have taken an increasing notice of the efforts of Collingwood in academic journals. The work of Mink and that of Rubinoﬀ are, according to Mink, "so remarkably similar . . . in outline and detail as to convince me that we

must both be right -- no doubt because, unlike any previous critics, we have both simply undertaken to understand Collingwood's thought as exemplifying his own conception of dialectical philosophy." ³⁷ Rubinoﬀ appears to argue somewhat otherwise:

Finally, there is the recent work of Louis O. Mink who argues in favour of viewing Collingwood as a "systematic philosopher of sorts" whose books "to an unusual degree complement and explain each other."³⁸

What is the particular problem in interpreting or understanding R.G. Collingwood? Again, turning to Mink, he notes that "it is easier to account for the indifference to Collingwood by his philosophical colleagues than for the continued interest in him by a wider audience."³⁹ Due to the particular independence of Collingwood's thought, Mink contends that "he never reached a conclusion on an issue merely by deducing what he ought to think about it from general principles already formed."⁴⁰ Therefore, his work does not make up a system nor a "series of analyses of particular problems."⁴¹ Rather, Collingwood himself went through the process of dialectical development in his thought although he was not aware of this process. Rubinoﬀ points to the work of Alan Donagan and F.H. Heinemann in support of his theory that they are "radical conversion hypothesis" exponents of the work of Collingwood. What Rubinoﬀ means by the term, "radical conversion hypothesis", is that Collingwood departed somewhat radically from his early idealism and his later historicism to philosophy as a distinct form of thought in the New Leviathan.⁴² Dissent from reviewers who accept this point of view is to be found although not in many numbers; reviewers who are

sympathetic to a development of a line of systematic thinking in the work of Collingwood is inclusive of: E.W.F. Tomlin, W.J. Enblom, Louis O. Mink, and H.S. Harris. Those who find that Collingwood radically departed from earlier ideas are: Alan Donagan, E.E. Harris, R.H. Heine-mann, T.M. Knox, H.B. Acton. Leo Strauss dismisses the thought of Collingwood as one corrupted by historicism.⁴³ Other sympathetic, although both laudatory and critical, reviewers who have written articles upon Collingwood which are worth perusing include the following incomplete list: Sherman M. Stanage, A.J.M. Milne, Leon J. Goldstein, and Stephen Toulmin. A discussion of these divisions lies beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, due to the nature of Collingwood's thought, an aspect of critical reviews which is increasingly apparent to any reader perusing a number of them is the fact that when one aspect of the thought of Collingwood is explored, great care must be taken to link it with other facets scattered throughout his writings or great distortion of what he said is the result.

Some of the causes for the neglect of Collingwood until the last decade, particularly in respect to The New Leviathan, have been due to: (1) the excessive difficulty of The New Leviathan and to the use of poor examples to illustrate points in some of his other writings, (2) the complex problem of the relationship between the old Leviathan (that of Hobbes) and that of Collingwood's own work, The New Leviathan, as well as the controversy yet raging over the meaning of Hobbes, (3) the fact that Collingwood made little effort to link his works together and, more or less, assumed that the reader knew each successive work. Harold

Laski has expressed the inherent difficulties in The New Leviathan:

Professor Collingwood has made his book extraordinarily difficult for the reader to understand by the method it follows. It reads rather like a formidable arrangement of a great pile of notes than a clear and coherent account of its subject . . . One is doubtful if one grasps the argument which lies behind the whole.⁴⁴

While the complaint of Laski is undoubtedly valid, George Catlin hints that the effort may be worthwhile:

Some critics have expressed dissatisfaction with the extreme formalism of Professor Collingwood's style. There are, however, here great models, both of Hobbes himself and Spinoza; and this formalism, more geometrico, may be stimulating so far as it provides, as it pretends, a guarantee of exact thought.⁴⁵

R.G. Collingwood has been called a "lonely" thinker because of his isolation from the climate of thought prevailing in his lifetime. Intellectual convictions which separated him from his colleagues during his life-span (1889-1943) have been listed by William H. Johnson as his belief in the freedom of the will, the rise of specialization in academic disciplines, and finally, Collingwood's insistence upon doing both history and philosophy.⁴⁶ His intellectual independence has been attributed, at least in part, to his early education, his range of achievements, his breadth of learning, and the very large scope of his activities.⁴⁷ Until he was thirteen years of age, R.G. Collingwood was tutored by his father and mother at home. His father, W.G. Collingwood, was private secretary and biographer of John Ruskin, Oxford University's Slade Professor of ART, in the late nineteenth century. Both men exerted great influence upon R.G. Collingwood who was the recipient

of an education few have the opportunity to have. In 1902, he entered Rugby and in 1908, he entered Oxford University College which he never left the remainder of his life. Although Collingwood considered philosophy to be his vocation, at Oxford, he studied under F.J. Haverfield, Romano-British archaeologist, who influenced his work.

E.W.F. Tomlin has commented upon Collingwood's Essay on Metaphysics and The New Leviathan:

. . . [these] were attempts, somewhat hastily conceived by a man aware of his responsibilities as a professional thinker, to meet on the level of thought and the forces making for disintegration in the world of fact. That metaphysics and politics should unite in fulfilment of this task may appear strange; but the final direction taken by Collingwood's thought explains a twin preoccupation of long standing. The identification of philosophy and history was in effect an identification of theory and practice.⁴⁸

The other works also related to these volumes include: Speculum Mentis (1924), Religion and Philosophy (1916) and two volumes published posthumously, The Idea of Nature and The Idea of History. Tomlin explains that The New Leviathan is a lifetime's "reflection upon political theory" while The Essay on Philosophical Method, upon the science of metaphysics is its "prolegomenon."⁴⁹ Making a comparison of Collingwood with his contemporaries, Tomlin concludes that perhaps Ernst Cassirer is the closest to him in thought and words. In a unique tribute to Collingwood, Tomlin finished his small volume upon R.G. Collingwood:

In discussion the nature and purpose of art, religion, science, and history, Collingwood is not necessarily producing different or more impressive solutions to the problems

raised by these enquiries; but at least he is aiming to produce solutions where some others, with their reduction of all experience to the sensuous or the empirical, maintain that there is nothing to solve. To return to our starting: it is not an accident that the man justly described as the most original mind in British philosophy since Bradley should share with that thinker the distinction of being a master of English, thereby leaving behind him not only a foundation of thought upon which his successors may usefully build, but also a lasting contribution to what another English philosopher, equally skilled in the arts of expression and no less an enemy of departmentalism, described as the 'Republic of Letters'.⁵⁰

The tentative suggestion proffered here is that in this exploration of the dialectic of choice, we must develop a theory of knowledge holistic enough to incorporate a larger dimension than has heretofore been the case in order to meet the needs of the world in its demand for what Gustave Lagos has termed to be a "revolution-of-being." Both Collingwood and Heidegger maintained that truth is historical. Georg Gadamer has postulated that Being itself is time. This means that the past must be grasped in its historical context and, more radically, that the historical context is inclusive of the interpreter due to the fact that verstehen must grasp the totality of human world experience. Then notions of truth and objectivity must be re-examined because cultural understanding emerges dialectically from the present to the past in dialogue. For Collingwood, "civilization is a condition of communities" and both are "things of the mind" as is ethics and political theory. To achieve freedom whereby a just polity can emerge, humankind must arrive at a fairly advanced stage of mental development

in order to liberate the self so that decisions can be made since
choice is the essence of freedom.

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, Frank M. Coleman, Hobbes & America. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).
2. Collingwood, The New Leviathan from the Preface. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. iii.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. iv.
6. Ibid.
7. Hobbes, De Corpore from The English Works edited by Sir Wm. Molesworth. (London, 1945), Volume I, Chapter 25, Article 12, p. 407.
8. _____, The Leviathan from The English Works, ibid., Volume III, Chapter 13, p. 114.
9. Ibid., Chapter 6, p. 51.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., Chapter 21, p. 186.
12. Ibid., Chapter 22.
13. See Hobbes, The Leviathan, edited by C.B. McPherson, Pelican Edition, (1962), Chapter 2, p. 95.
14. Ibid., Chapter 3, p. 96.
15. Ibid., Chapter 4, p. 105.
16. _____, The Elements from Molesworth edition, op. cit., Volume I, Chapter 5, p. 22.
17. Ibid., Volume IV, pp. 119-123.
18. Collingwood, Autobiography, (Oxford: University Press, 1939), p. 167.
19. Ibid., p. 155.
20. Ibid., p. 156.
21. Ibid., p. 160.

22. Ibid., p. 162.
23. Ibid., pp. 163-64.
24. Ibid., pp. 166-67.
25. Ibid., p. 90.
26. Ibid., p. 92.
27. Ibid., p. 94.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 95.
30. Ibid., p. 99.
31. Ibid., p. 100.
32. Ibid., see Chapter IV.
33. Ibid., p. 25.
34. Ibid., p. 51.
35. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis. (London: Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 21.
36. Ibid., p. 21.
37. Louis O. Mink, Mind, History, and Dialectic: The Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood. (Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 1969), p. 258.
38. Lionel Rubinoﬀ, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 23.
39. Mink, Mind, History and Dialectic, op. cit., p. 2.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Rubinoﬀ, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 21.
43. Leo Strauss, "On Collingwood's Philosophy of History," Review of Metaphysics, Volume V (1952), p. 583.
44. Harold Laski, "A Tract for the Times," from New Statesman and Nation, (August 8, 1942), pp. 97-8.

45. George Catlin, "Review of the New Leviathan," Political Science Quarterly, LVIII, (September, 1943), pp. 435-36.
46. Wm. H. Johnston, The Formative Years of R.G. Collingwood. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), pp. 138-41.
47. Ibid., p. 6.
48. E.W.F. Tomlin, R.G. Collingwood. (London: Published for the British Council by Longmans, 1953), from writers and their works series, No. 42, p. 31.
49. Ibid., p. 33.
50. Ibid., pp. 37-8.

CHAPTER II

MAN

Collingwood's approach to a philosophy of mind was phenomeno-
logical.¹ Absolute mind, he averred, is pure act. The mind, as pure act, comprises a conscious self-making activity; its essence is change discovered through insight into its own errors. A philosophy of mind, according to Collingwood, includes a "critical review of the chief forms of human experience," an idea he explored in Speculum Mentis.² In this volume, he organized the various forms of experience into a dialectical scale of forms. The relationship of these various forms of experience, each of which is an activity of mind forming a life world, constitutes a dialectical history of errors. A phenomenology of experience creates insight into the structure of being as a concrete set of activities. Phenomenology is an analysis of mind as a system of categories such as "habits," "imagination," "faith," "understanding," and "reason." These categories, as exemplified in Speculum Mentis, become art, religion, science, history, and philosophy, as modes of experience of the mind. These modes are both transcendental and historical. Consciousness proceeds in a series: level one assumes there is a distinction between a subject and its object; level two yet assumes the distinction but perceives this experience now as but one among many; level three perceives the unity of subject and object as experience is recognized as overlapping in its modes. This is a feedback theory, an existential attitude, illustrating the behaviour of mind and its alteration, concomitantly, of itself.

Denying both extremes in theories of pluralism and monism, Collingwood wanted to know where the self-identity of the person lay in contrast to the bond which makes society one.³ It was his belief

that starting with personality would not answer the question nor could it be exactly stated that two persons could share the same knowledge. We find modern mind exemplified in Western civilization in the twentieth century. The primary question is: How does mind appear to itself? Collingwood, throughout all of his work, contended that civilization, community, and the individual were activities of the mind.⁴ His holistic approach to political philosophy may be seen in his query,⁵ what is life? "It is what physiologists investigate" while matter (man's body) is that which is investigated by physicists and chemists.⁶ Yet, "science's subject matter has no definition at all." Collingwood meant that the whole of man is either body or mind according to whether self-knowledge is approached by the methods of natural science or by "expanding and clarifying perception."⁷ If this contention is accurate, then science must eventually give way to philosophy as the most complete mode of self-knowledge.

The truth is that there is no relation between body and mind. That is, no direct relation; for there is an indirect relation. 'The problem of the relation between body and mind' is a bogus problem which cannot be stated without making a false assumption. What is assumed is that man is partly body and partly mind. On this assumption questions arise about the relations between the two parts; and these prove unanswerable. For man's body and man's mind are not two different things. They are one and the same thing, man himself, as known in two different ways.⁸

Not all common usages of the term 'body' are concerned with matter; some must be allied with feeling. In the writings of Plato,

Aristotle, and even in the New Testament, the term, 'bodily', is employed so that bodily appetite such as hunger is the outgrowth of feelings and sensations. The phrase, 'bodily pleasure', arises from feelings and may refer to mental sensations. 'Bodily exertion' refers to the consciousness of effort as found in motor sensations. Mental sensations or bodily pleasures refer to the "psyche" dimension, neither body nor mind. Feeling belongs to mind as an apanage although the essential "constituent of mind is consciousness." An apanage in the form of feeling is simple consciousness; it is ready-made. Feeling is either sensuous or it is an emotional charge. Feeling ". . . has the character of a foundation upon which the rational part of our nature is built; . . ." Thus, man's mind consists of consciousness rooted in its simplest form, in feeling. Knowledge is consciousness reflected upon which is second-order consciousness. A feeling is a "here-and-now" affair having a focal region of greatest intensity and a penumbral region of the fading away of feeling. Feeling provides the strength to the foundation of knowledge. That is, by the Law of Primitive Survivals, feelings constitute the basic materials through which knowledge is received, i.e., each level of a dialectical series of thought retains something of its former state. In order to avoid the threat of solipsism on the part of Collingwood, then, it is necessary to understand his theory of perception and its role in the experience of feeling. The essential characteristic of feeling is the givenness of sense data. Feeling is simplistic or given whereas thought involves distinctions such as doing a good or bad job of something. Feelings are more private than

thought in that they can be sensed by no other person in exactly the same way. Thoughts can agree or disagree, not a characteristic of feeling. Further, feeling is transient as contrasted with the relative permanence of thought.

Feeling has two elements, a sensual element and an emotional element although sensation takes precedence over emotion. Sensation and emotion are elements present in the structure of any psychical experience. The precedence of the sensational over the emotional element can be seen only upon reflection since experience is always complete and thereby, cannot actually be separated into particulars or parts. The activities of sensation such as seeing, hearing, and smelling are apanages which are feelings and its forms. This is simple consciousness. Because feelings are sensuous and emotional, feeling has no objects but has instead modes. This is first order consciousness but it is not knowledge. What is given in this 'here-and-now' state is diffused by second-order consciousness. In first-order consciousness, immediate experience is too sensuous or emotional to be knowledge. When some feelings are selectively blocked and others are attended to, as in second-order consciousness, distinctions begin to be made. People do not feel something until it is reflected upon even though the process may be unconscious or latent. If an attempt is made to study pure feeling or psychical experience, then consciousness must be analyzed to discover the relationship "to a more elementary kind of experience which it presupposes."¹⁶ A consciousness of feeling does not occur until the experience is named; that is, it occurs in language,¹⁷ an historical vehicle of the expressions of experience.

That is, in Collingwood's framework, vocabulary is emotion when it is expressed. Language is the expression of emotion or feeling. This notion is related to his other idea that questions can be answered only when asked.¹⁸ Another facet of feelings is that they are evanescent or they "begin to perish as soon as they begin to exist."¹⁹

Feelings cannot be remembered although a proposition about feelings can be remembered. If no form of consciousness is brought into existence by feeling, then what is it that produces consciousness?

Like Hobbes, Collingwood declared that reason is the function of language and that mind itself is dependent upon language. Language incorporates "not only speech" but also "any system of bodily movements," not necessarily vocal, whereby the persons who make them mean or signify something.²⁰ Hugh Walpole has explicated Collingwood's idea of language:

Traditionally, from Hobbes down, the cart has been put before the horse, and language has been regarded as a medium of communication . . . The speech and gestures of each of us constitute art . . . "The New Leviathan" devotes its linguistic interest to symbols - - but to that peculiar class of symbols used in "the human sciences." As contrasted with the physical and biological sciences Collingwood sees a separate group which he calls the "sciences of mind;"²¹

According to Walpole, Collingwood's coherent "view of the connections between language and thought, imply that language comes first and that thought is the consciousness of having named something."²² "We think in words."²³ Consciousness alters feelings into emotions; the essence of language is emotive expression. Feelings are retained as

ideas in imagination. This is the source from which feelings are evoked. When both the act of selective attention and the act of evocative thinking occurs, then the mind has arrived at conceptual thinking, a stage to be explained somewhat later in this section.

In Collingwood's theory of mind, mind operates as an entity through a set of activities or functions operating at various levels of consciousness. The lowest level has been described as consciousness of the sensuous-emotional state. Awareness of first level consciousness is manifest in appetite which is of two types: the practical type of hunger and the imaginative type expressive in language. Consciousness of appetite, however, leads to the third level of practical consciousness, desire; the third level of theoretical consciousness is imagination or perception. An awareness of desire leads to the fourth level of practical consciousness in will; perception is the fourth level of theoretical consciousness. In this process, the mind has gone through a transformation. The entire operation can be translated as a dialectics of consciousness.

To be aware of appetite, through the act of selective attention, consciousness is focused upon feeling.²⁴ Appetite is the name given to an "inherent restlessness of the mind" so that "choice,²⁵ reason, and goal" can be found as products of appetite. Physiological appetite refers to hunger while psychological appetite refers to love. Appetite is movement from an unsatisfactory feeling state towards a satisfactory state. Hunger, in both cases, is the appetite for an omnipotent self in the abstract. These two feeling states

can be differentiated as the actual self versus the ideal self. Hunger, as appetite for the omnipotent self, can neither find nor create itself whereas love is the appetite for a self that has established a relationship with something other than itself or a "relation with an object it can does create."²⁷ Collingwood believed this to be a very important part of mental development:

How does love come into existence? . . .
Love is a modification of hunger; it is the quest for a satisfaction derived from relation to a not-self. . . A hungry man wants to become omnipotent. That is impossible; he cannot become omnipotent without ceasing to be himself. He cannot come to know this except at a level of mental development far beyond what we have reached; . . . What he can do is to suffer repeated disappointments in his quest for omnipotence until blind appetite despairs of that quest and embarks upon another . . .²⁸

Psychological hunger desires strength resulting from dissatisfaction with a weak self. Psychological love is the desire to be attached.²⁹ In both, we find the movement from the self to the not-self. Human love is related to religion in feelings of dependence. Hunger is directed towards the restoration of energy. To satisfy either requires the removal of the weakness.³⁰ Both hunger and love, as activities, are subject to frustration; the forms of their frustration are the passions. To thwart hunger induces fear; to thwart love results in self-protection through anger.³¹ Thus, appetite is blind. Appetite is a drive toward a goal through its transformation into desire. It is the second level of practical consciousness or the level of feeling. From feeling, language, appetite, and desire (Hobbes's passions), we move in The New Leviathan to the level of choice and

will, the level of ethics involving rule and principle or the activity of choice.

Desire involves propositional thinking; "a proposition is an answer to a question; and a question offers alternatives."³² Thus, appetite or its absence is converted into an object of knowledge by asking and answering the question: 'Which do I want, a or b?' . . . which [then become respectively] desire and aversion."³³ Subjects and predicates of propositions are never first-order objects. Collingwood made this assertion because the object of appetite is not known; appetite, like love, only knows that it is thwarted and thus seeks an object. Likewise, the "predicate of a proposition . . . is never a first-order object but always a concept."³⁴ Pure feeling has both sensuous and emotional aspects. At the second level of consciousness, appetite, sensation, and emotion can be distinguished from each other; within sensation there are differences amongst different sense data. The two primary emotions of hunger and love correspond to such organic processes as nutrition and reproduction. Both seek possession or attachment to something but the concept of a self is not yet realized. Propositional thinking occurs as the activity of third-level consciousness.³⁵ A proposition may be true or false. On the practical level of experience, answers may be either true or false. On the theoretical level of consciousness, concepts of truth and falsity emerge.

The importance of the distinction between true desires and false desires becomes evident as soon as one reflects on the importance for all practical life of 'knowing what you want'.³⁶

Collingwood was observing that men do not know what they want; trial

and error are utilized to find out. "With the conversion of appetite into desire, beauty is converted into goodness. The difference is³⁷ that desire may be true or false." What Collingwood meant by this was that men, in general, desire the same things and that what they desire is called "good". Not always is that which is desired actually preferred because the object of desire is abstracted from the act of desiring. Desire is always conditional; that is, it is dependent upon qualifications of good, bad, or even shame arising from desire. What is proved is that "goodness is a thing of the mind; a thing bestowed upon whatever possesses it by mind's practical activity in the form of desire; and then discovered . . . by mind's reflective activity which³⁸ now for the first time assumes the form of knowledge." Desire is a specific form of consciousness; it is propositional thinking. This kind of thinking requires two forms of language and two forms of sentences: the question and the indicative sentence. What has been described is a series of levels of practical and theoretical consciousness extending to a series of logical dialectical levels as found in objects of knowledge which is Collingwood's philosophy of mind. Refer to Appendices A and B.

According to Collingwood, a proposition is always an answer to³⁹ a question; this is the "logic of question and answer." This aspect of Collingwood's philosophical thought has caused much disagreement amongst the reviewers of his work, a fact referred to previously and one which will be taken up again in a later chapter. The "logic of question and answer" was presented by Collingwood in his Essay on Metaphysics; it is a two-pronged notion involving a logic of question

and answer and a theory of metaphysics involving presuppositions. The "logic of question and answer" is that "every statement that anybody ever makes is made to answer a question." The mind, searching for answers, asks questions. "The power of causing a question to arise" is its "logical efficacy."⁴⁰ This "logical efficacy" of a supposition does not depend upon the truth of what is supposed or even upon its being thought to be true, but only its being supposed."⁴¹ Questions and their answers are always correlative. Two propositions cannot contradict each other unless they are answers to the same question. This argument, thus far, is not defensible. However, Louis O. Mink, in discussing this aspect of the thought of Collingwood, has suggested that "the logic of question and answer . . . a theory of the process of inquiry . . . a reflection on logic."⁴²

. . . the asking of a question . . . logically involves the presupposition of one and only one proposition, from which the question "arises"; and one, again, may not be aware that one is making a specific presupposition but must recover it analytically. . . The capacity of a supposition to cause a question to arise . . . [is called] its "logical efficacy"; and this efficacy depends neither on its being true nor on its being supposed or being entertained . . .⁴³

Critics, such as Donagan or Dykstra, have been taken to task by John Frederick Post:

Collingwood's theory of presuppositions has never been taken very seriously. But critics have completely overlooked its significance as a theory or model of inquiry intimately tied to certain aspects of discourse in a context of investigation. Viewed this way, Collingwood's theory is on very strong ground, especially when it is reconstructed with the

aid of a formal language. . . The reconstruction also provides a general framework within which recent discussion of pre-suppositions can be united.⁴⁴

Collingwood claimed this logic wherein propositions are neither true nor false to be revolutionary; Mink supports this assertion but adds that what Collingwood framed "is not a theory of logic at all . . .

⁴⁵ it is a hermeneutics." Mink is referring to the fact that the thought of Collingwood is extremely complex, one part relating to another so that it is difficult to present its many faceted nature.⁴⁶

The importance of the "logic of question and answer" can be seen in Collingwood's levels of consciousness; every specific form of consciousness is "done [in] a correspondingly specific form of language."⁴⁷

Walpole, in his discussion of Collingwood's concept of language, supports the contention of both Mink and Post:

His "thought," "desire," "will," and other terms do not have to be considered as representing any kinds of psychological mechanisms or facilities. They are words, that, through steady use in the community, have become settled. When spoken by persons who have not properly assimilated their use they are signs, or echo-words, rather than symbols. A word is not used appropriately until it has been earned in living experience . . .⁴⁸

Thus, if desire is the first reflective activity of the mind as it approaches knowledge and desire's object is good, then good, named "happiness," is the object of desire. Happiness is a combination of external and internal well-being, power and virtue concepts secured from the mind's reflection upon desire, a distinguishing of a desirable condition of the self and the not-self. Desire's starting

point is passion. Passion, "the power of the not-self" has two basic forms: fear and anger. Love becomes fear when a person perceives the not-self. Fear, confusing to the individual as a contrast between the self and the not-self, rests in the individual. Rebellion against fear promotes anger or aversion, although both are based upon love.

Anger is war against the not-self; its renunciation is shame. Shame, a critical point in the development of mind since it bridges the lower levels of consciousness going to those of the higher, calls forth desire as a wish, not as a want.

The mind has moved from propositional thinking to rational thinking. In the case the mind does not perceive its own error, it behaves abnormally, which on the rational level, becomes a form of corrupt dogmatism, the product of a corrupt consciousness, i.e. the refusal of the mind to move to the second and third

ontological levels:

What a man wishes for is usually termed happiness. Both happiness and unhappiness are second-order objects, the terminal points of desire.

"In relation to himself, happiness for a given man means goodness: freedom from every state of himself from which he wishes to be free; . . . In relation to what is not himself, it means power" so that "unhappiness is a negative ideal . . . the name for what we desire to get rid of . . ."

These are not the concepts of consciousness but abstractions "from the consciousness of desire."

If we look at what the mind abstracts from happiness and unhappiness, we find familiar themes in the history of the West; happiness is an ideal while unhappiness is a fact due to circumstances, a lack of

power, to a weakness of character, to the notion, or in the twentieth century, to the concept of nature as a machine.⁵⁷ The notion of unhappiness as generated in the nineteenth century was man's power over the natural world. In the twentieth century, that notion generates fear over the powerlessness of man "in the giant grip of economic and social and political structures."⁵⁸ The Leviathan, however, is a "creature formed by the art of man . . ."⁵⁹

Collingwood's theory of mind as exposed in The New Leviathan mediates between his dialectic of experience and that of the dialectics of concepts. It is a final extrapolation of his moral philosophy from the personal and cultural fields utilizing the dialectic of forms as presented in Speculum Mentis and the dialectic of concepts as presented in Essay on Philosophical Method.⁶⁰ Collingwood has moved in the development of a theory of mind from sensation to thought, passion, and desire. The connection between language and reason emerges in happiness and unhappiness as abstractions from desire to their re-appearance in moral terms, good and evil, the objects of desire or aversion. This could also be expressed as the mind's movement from sense, imagination, speech, the passions, and the virtues.

Before embarking upon the mind's activity in choice, Collingwood defined choice as a choosing amongst open alternatives in contradistinction to preference which is desire involving alternatives that are not open. Naturally, this presents the problem of freedom of the will. To Collingwood, most of the arguments upon free will were misplaced because a person cannot become free by mere choosing;

he becomes free through an act of self-liberation wherein decisions
are free from desire.⁶¹ Collingwood explained that the idea of freedom has a positive and a negative effect. Freedom implies the ability "to do something of a special kind;" "negatively, it is freedom from desire."⁶²

The freedom of the will is, positively, freedom to choose; freedom to exercise a will; and negatively, freedom from desire . . . This state of freedom is achieved by an act of which we know that it is (i)involuntary, (ii)done by the same person whom it liberates . . . Negatively, it is the act of refusing to let oneself be dictated to by desire.⁶³

Such a process, rather than portraying movement from unsatisfied appetite to satisfaction, shows instead movement from the "unhappiness of ungratified desire to the happiness of gratified desire,"⁶⁴ which is, necessarily, the acceptance of unhappiness. Through this process, a person can move into a "consciousness of being free"; he⁶⁵ can move into self-respect.

The man who denies himself and gains self-respect is richly rewarded; but that is not why he does it. His act of self-denial, not being a voluntary act, cannot be a utilitarian act, the exchange of one thing for something more valuable. And if he knew what he stands to gain, he would not value it. What charm has self-respect for a man whose desires are concentrated on happiness?⁶⁶

Here, Collingwood was pointing out that psychologists and utilitarians⁶⁷ "cannot have it both ways." The act can, possibly, be explained by inventing "psychological forces called instincts," and

this does appear to be the way men often act; however, some persons are not so motivated and "in consequence make the strange discovery of freedom."⁶⁸ How, then, does man liberate himself from desire? The compelling force of language as it frames thought and from which thought takes on meaning appears; liberation from desire begins by naming it. To form an idea means to think and "thinking is done in words."⁶⁹ Once the lesson is learned, the act can be performed again. Collingwood noted that the "technique of self-liberation," the "doctrine that a man acquires free will" and thereby conquers⁷⁰ his passions is fundamental to possibly four major religions. To deny this fact and to attribute its denial to paganism is "in essence a proposal to abandon freedom . . . in the shape of a scientific life . . . an inconsistent proposal."⁷¹ This is an important moment in the history of the West because it marks the stage of intellectual maturity. The "curious double fate" which Christianity has suffered in the "last two hundred years" is one of the paradoxes of our age, according to Collingwood.

Modern philosophy and science have admirably succeeded in a kind of distillation, by which the rational contents of the Christian faith have been separated out from the mass of superstitious ideas and magic rituals in which they were embodied. The "spirit" of Christianity, issuing from this alembic of the intellect, has been bottled clear and cold and labelled "principles of politics," "principles of scientific method," and the like. The residue . . . has been thrown away."⁷²

In order to understand what Collingwood meant by "thinking in words," it is necessary to explore further his ideas about language.

In Principles of Art, he developed an account of person as "speaker⁷³ and hearer."

In its most elementary form, language is not addressed to any audience. A child's first utterances are so completely in-addressed that one cannot even describe them as addressed to the world at large or to itself. The distinction between speaking to oneself, speaking to the world at large, and speaking to a particular person or group, is a later differentiation introduced into an original act which was simply the act of speaking.⁷⁴

Thought, before its utterance, is obscure, lying "unrealized in the⁷⁵ dark places of the soul . . ." It is through language or speech that a child discovers his world of persons. Persons construct "a new set of relations between themselves, arising out of their consciousness of themselves and one another; these are linguistic relations."⁷⁶ In this process, an emotion is converted into an idea and is then expressed in speech. The relationship between emotion and language may be seen in Principles of Art:

When language is said to express emotion, this means that there is a single experience which has two elements in it. First, there is an emotion of a specific kind, not a psychic emotion or impression, but an emotion of which the person who has it is conscious, and by which this consciousness he has converted from impression into idea. Secondly, there is a controlled bodily action in which he expresses this idea. This expression is not an after-thought to the idea; the two are inseparably united, so that the idea is had as an idea only in so far as it is expressed.⁷⁷

An understanding of Collingwood's presentation of the idea of self-liberation also involves his criticism of modern ways of thinking or

modern beliefs which, in his view, were not in accord with historical⁷⁸ development.

Although the achievement of free will marks the stage called intellectual maturity in European civilization, its arrival for each individual is rather precarious: the development may be interfered⁷⁹ with or a person may be unaware of possessing it. In the latter event, particularly in relation to governmental practices or education, there is a lack of the ability to make a decision. Collingwood advised the remedy of "arousing his self-respect, that is, making him⁸⁰ conscious that he is free without being aware of it." Sherman M. Stanage has written lucidly upon Collingwood's concept of what he has termed the "phenomenology of education":

Adducing the erroneous within a subject-matter is the growing edge in one's education. The history of the methods for dealing with a subject clarifies the errors of these ways and suggests the possibilities for their reconstruction. Thus a child must come to understand this process and to know in his own life that education is for 'real life', but not in it, for during his preparation for life he is allowed to run the risk of error without paying the penalties for this which might be exacted at a later date.⁸¹

Collingwood believed that there was such a thing as a false consciousness, a disowning of feelings. There were three alternatives whereby consciousness could convert an impression into an idea: first, it may be attended to; second, it may be ignored; and third, it may⁸² be attended to and recognized abortively. The third alternative can produce a false consciousness or a corrupt consciousness which must be deliberately broken. For Collingwood, this is an example of

evil, a discussion found in Principles of Art. A corruption of consciousness also infects the imagination. "When this happens, the corrupted consciousness of a man, a society, or a civilization infests all of the imaginative labours of that man, society, or civilization, and necessarily all of its intellectual products."⁸³

Choosing is intimately related to deed. It is also related to reason. To decide is a first-order object of consciousness; to decide what to do is a second-order abstraction. A deed, to be executed, needs the constant activity of will in thought.⁸⁴ "Rational thinking begins when a distinction between 'the that' and 'the why' is made. This is the simplest form of knowledge. Reason, primarily practical, is also theoretical. "Practical reason comes into existence when a man forms an intention."⁸⁵ Theoretical reason comes into existence when a man first, by propositional thinking, makes up his mind that something is so and needs a reason for confirming it. Theoretical reason is dependent upon free will or the ability to think this and not that. In all theoretical reason there is a survival of practical reason from which it developed. In European thought, there has been three types of practical reason: that called 'useful', that used because it is 'right', and that used in the name of 'duty'.⁸⁶

Before progressing onward in Collingwood's argument regarding choice and its outcome in practical action, it is necessary to digress into the complex problem of the interrelationship of Collingwood's thought as it is found in several volumes. Repeating the

point already made, The New Leviathan is, like The Principles of Art, concerned with analysis of individual consciousness. It is also, however, concerned with the history of Western civilization and the history of its fundamental ideas as found in The Idea of Nature, The Idea of History, and Essay on Metaphysics. His moral philosophy is also found in The New Leviathan and in The Principles of Art while his formal description of logic is found in the Essay on Philosophical Method. Reason, in Collingwood's works, is always philosophical. That is, while we think in the present or the future, we understand in retrospect. This presentation is underscored with the theme that, as both Mink and Rubinoﬀ have postulated, there is a unity in the thought of Collingwood. If this unity is to expose any insight into political philosophy, the three essential themes to be found in all Collingwood's works are: the idea of the dialectic, the idea of philosophy as self-reflecting, and the idea of a continuity or rapprochement between thought and action. The linchpin underscoring a dialectic of experience and a dialectic of concepts lies in the dialectic of mind. The dialectic of mind, concerned as it is with human faculties of sensation and thought, passion and desire, connects with language and reason and then emerges into moral philosophy through the uses of "good" and "evil" as explanations of the objects of man's desires or aversions. Choice is always bound up with judgments of value. Actions are purposive when we are aware of thinking or at the fourth level of consciousness. This latter statement must be viewed in two ways: first, it is the emotion yet underscoring higher level

activities of the mind and second, actions are linked in thought and action at the institutional level through the theory of absolute pre-suppositions. This same notion underlies Collingwood's concept of history. While his philosophy of mind does not square with Freudian analysis, it does fit the more recent theories of existential psycho-analysis which rejects concepts of the unconscious and finds that the individual is playing a role in a drama. Collingwood has supported this with an absolute theory of mind. Similarly, Collingwood and the existentialists are in agreement that freedom is an essential characteristic of consciousness. Such freedom is not, however, guaranteed. To abstract at the level of reason in self-reflection is radical freedom.

Collingwood has postulated the concept that practical reason and theoretical reason is developed through propositional thinking, the fourth level. To choose an alternative because it is useful means that an ends-means relationship has been constructed.⁸⁷ The answer to such a construction can be divided into two parts: the negative and the positive. The positive element will describe the rational parts of the relationship although such an explanation will be only partial.⁸⁸ In such planning, "the end precede[s] the mean in time."⁸⁹ That is, the goal is prior to the means of establishing it. "What is essential in the relation between means and end . . . is . . . that there should be a logical interrelation . . . such that each plan, the means-end plan and the end-plan alike is checked and corrected by reference to the other."⁹⁰ What happens instead is that time relations

become "symbols for logical relations."⁹¹ Collingwood demonstrated the logical necessity of his argument by explaining that a "y plan" necessitated an "x plan" although the plan in practice worked the other way. Thus, utility is a positive relation between a second-order choice x and y. The negative element in this plan lies in its partial explanation of act or its limited rationality. It is irrational in that choice must be made before action and thus does not consider end due to the fact that end is already implied. Utilitarian reasoning "stops short" because it explains only so much. First, it deals with individuals rather than universals; further, individuals are indefinite rather than specific.⁹² Both the means plan and the ends plan are abstract; the explanation for act is insufficient.⁹³ It is capricious.

The belief that utility is the only form of practical reason . . . was a deliberate challenge to the established doctrine that there is another form, namely right . . .⁹⁴

The appeal to language in the utilitarian position was that right and useful meant the same thing. The history of the term 'right' shows a process of development from the term 'straight'. It means 'rule'. This, reported Collingwood, was "why the utilitarian appeal fails; why 'right' as a matter of fact never means 'useful'. "A thing is useful . . . in relation to the end it achieves; it is right . . . in relation to the rule it obeys."⁹⁵ A rule exhibits generalized purpose or a regularian principle. To become regularian action, a person must make a decision to obey or to disobey the rule. While rules are often thought of in the social sense, they can be framed by an individual.

Persons behave in sharing or obeying rules much in the same fashion as was the case in utilitarian action except that, in regularian action, it may be spread over time or occur at various times with various agents or in various applications. Regularian action suffers from the same deficiency as does utilitarian action; explanations are partial because action is covered only by rule application. Such thinking is limited by what the rule leaves out; "what conduces to one end often frustrates another."⁹⁶ "If a 'right' means 'according to a rule' . . . the same action may be both right and wrong, according as it is judged by different rules . . ."⁹⁷ "Such generalized intentions "leave much to caprice or to accident."⁹⁸

To explain choice as 'duty' means defining the term as was done in utility and in right. Duty refers to the past as it is found in the terms, owe, debt, or obligation. The special character of duty as distinguishable from right and utility are determinacy and possibility.⁹⁹

In modern English, consciousness of obligation is distinguished from other forms of consciousness by the name 'conscience.' 'Conscience' has a first-order object, viz. the obligation itself.¹⁰⁰

Duty admits of no alternatives; it is specific and implies a freely willing agent.¹⁰¹

If the account of Collingwood's answer to the question, "Why did you do that?" is taken only from The New Leviathan, then the critique of his position as outlined by A.J.M. Milne in "Collingwood's Ethics and Political Theory" must be acknowledged as valid.¹⁰² Collingwood has, however, again assumed that his readers were familiar

with Speculum Mentis, First Mate's Log, Essay on Philosophical Method, and "What is the Problem of Evil" as well as Autobiography! (This last work should, perhaps be included since it was composed later; it does throw light on the whole thought.) The three answers Collingwood gave in response to the question, "Why does a person choose this action and not that?" were usefulness, right, and duty. These terms have been explicated with new meanings and they must be fitted into the framework of mind as developed. First, the three concepts are to be viewed on a scale of the forms of moral experience which then may move forward or backward as presuppositions are either accepted or rejected. The mind can also move beyond. The concept of utility as a first step on an ethical scale of forms presupposes that the value of action lies in its end or purpose. As the rationale for choosing such an act from amongst a totality of possible acts which may have been chosen in order to have achieved the same end, its explanation is limited in time and achievement. Such sequences, Collingwood pointed out in The New Leviathan, are neither universal nor common.¹⁰³ Time sequences do not form the essence of a means-end relation even though this fact may be supposed at the time; rather, time relations are used for "symbols in logical relations."¹⁰⁴ In First Mate's Log, Collingwood explained that the theory of good as pure utility is self-contradictory.

Sooner or later, the judgement that something is good because it is useful rests on the judgement that something is good in itself.¹⁰⁵

To further illustrate this point, Collingwood examined the problem of

good and evil. In concepts of utility, good is bestowed upon consequences, events, things, and conditions, or finally, as Kant had demonstrated, upon the will itself. Concepts of good and evil are concepts of the mind or of the will. Events cannot be either good or evil. Only actions can assume such connotations.

Taken a step further in the Collingwoodian scheme, the concept of utility, viewed above in a scale of overlapping forms can be put into the "logic of question and answer." A concept of action arises as an answer to a question. The premise of utility rests upon certain presuppositions. If these are abandoned, or if "stresses and strains" occur in the mind concerning them, a move to the next level of the dialectic is already set in motion. A utilitarian explanation for an action is now quite unacceptable. This "dialectical criticism of errors" has been explained by Collingwood in Speculum Mentis.

. . . thinking moves by the dialectical criticism of errors . . . its break-up under the stress of its internal contradictions -- to their denial: this denial is a truth, so framed as to negate the error just exploded, but generally falling into a new and opposite error by an exaggerated fear of the old. Any element of error in this new truth will, if thinking goes vigorously forward, initiate a new dialectical criticism and the process will be repeated on a higher plane. Thus thought in its progress . . . moves through a series of phases each of which is a truth and yet an error, but so far as the progress is real, each is a triumph of truth over a preceding error and an advance to what may be called a truer truth.¹⁰⁶

Collingwood has been discussing utilitarianism in the generic sense rather than in the Benthamite utilitarian sense. Utilitarianism in the English version takes the view that the morality of an action,

its rightness or wrongness, is derivative from the consequences of the action. Thus, "good" and "bad" in this doctrine are equated with "pleasure" or "pain".

The position of Collingwood on the three reasons for action now begins to emerge: rather than advancing a metaphysics of being, he has advanced a concrete metaphysics of pure act. Mind is changeless and eternal albeit the identity of mind presupposes change. His position further elaborates two other positions in his philosophy: the role of overlap and the dialectical, hierarchical concept of levels of knowledge and the dialectical levels of experience. Choice, taken upon these premises would appear to be evolutionary indeed, even in terms of Western civilization. It was for this reason that Collingwood was so concerned with barbarism.

The third choice, that of duty, must be seen in the scale of experience forms involving reason to some degree or at least deliberation. This choice is concerned with historical action in that it considers not only the self but the other or the community. It is a going beyond the self. The problem hinges upon opposing viewpoints according to Collingwood.

From the ethical point of view the problem [of pleasure and pain or of good and evil] is solely the problem of sin; the problem of pain is seen to be a quite different problem, presenting a quite different character. From the utilitarian point of view the real problem is the problem of pain; the problem of sin is either simply solved by the conception of human freedom, or else remains as a particular case of the problem of pain. If we regard the will as means (utilitarian view) the problem of the bad will disappears into the

problem of bad events or states of things, typified by pain. If we regard the will as end (ethical view) the problem of undesirable things or events, such as pain, is swallowed up in the problem of the evil will. But if, instead of adopting either of these views, we merely halt between two opinions, then our treatment of the problem of evil will fall into the two heads which we have enumerated.¹⁰⁷

With these ideas, Collingwood also implied two features to be explored later, that of his doctrine of intersubjectivity, of the benefits of historical study, and the freedom of will. These inevitably lead to the conditions of self-making through self-knowledge which is inherent in the past of Western civilization.

FOOTNOTES

1. The primary source for the phenomenological approach by Collingwood is The New Leviathan. I am indebted to the work of Lionel Rubinoﬀ in his interpretation of the works of Collingwood as found in his Collingwood and The Reform of Metaphysics: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind. (Toronto: University Press, 1970). For example, knowledge is based upon a primordial structure of experience. In Husserlian language, the noetic structure of experience is revealed through a phenomenology of experiences. Thereby, primary experience is related to feeling whereas reflective experience is "the return of the mind upon itself to study its own primary experience." (SM, 255). This example has been supplied by Rubinoﬀ on p. 55.
2. Speculum Mentis, op. cit., p. 9.
3. Ibid., p. 97.
4. The New Leviathan, op. cit., 1.65-1.67. Due to the fact that Collingwood has based his theories upon mind and that his work is modelled upon that of Hobbes, he reported, it may seem that he appears in the utilitarian liberalist position. Before that assumption is made, the difference between the position of Collingwood and those of Helvetius as a representative of French Utilitarianism or Hume as a representative of English Utilitarianism can be contrasted with the methodological imperative which the systems of the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries perceived and that which the systematic philosophy of Collingwood perceived. The psychological approach of the earlier period emphasized that the end of human conduct was simply to enjoy as much pleasure and suffer as little pain as possible although the difference between the French and the English positions lay in the realm of ethics. Helvetius made the pleasure principle one of legislative reform although both emphasized that men must of necessity pursue their own interests and that motion in both is akin to that seen in physics. This is quite removed from the complex system of Collingwood.
5. Ibid., 1.35.
6. Ibid., 1.43.
7. Ibid., 2.4-2.43.
8. Ibid., 3.5-3.54.
9. R.G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), p. 110. See also his Principles of Art. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938), p. 164.
10. The New Leviathan, op. cit., 2.4-2.43.

11. Ibid., 4.1.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid. See pages 25-27. See also Collingwood's Idea of History edited by T. M. Knox. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), pp. 306-307 as well as his Principles of Art, op. cit., pp. 163-64.
14. Ibid., 9.5-9.55. Collingwood was referring to the survival of of the primitive along with the more developed forms in an evolutionary series. That is, if the argument can be accepted by "evolutionary cosmologists," it is also evident in the actual workings of the mind. [Evolutionary cosmologists refers here to the history of cosmological theories concerning the generation of the existing universe in space and time from the Greeks onward.]
15. Ibid. If this tracing of the development of Collingwood's philosophy of mind appears to be kin to that of Rousseau, it is only a tangential appearance wherein both see man as social and believe in man's will. To diverge into the meaning of Rousseau lies beyond this paper. However, to the degree that Kant admired Rousseau, Collingwood's thought may be said to emerge from the same historical premises, chiefly with Plato. Collingwood's critique of the thought of Kant must also be considered. Primarily, Rousseau never developed a dialectical form of knowledge nor a complete philosophy of mind although there are those such as Donagan who would argue that neither did Collingwood. In espousing a religious and an ethical component, English idealism more nearly approaches Rousseau's thought. Collingwood, however, vigorously denied the application of the label "idealist" to himself. The affinity between Collingwood and Green is, however, notable in several respects: (1) in the relationship between the individual and the social community of which he is a member, (2) in the premise that government depends upon will and not force, (3) in the notion that a community of persons is a "Kingdom of ends", not means, (4) in the idea that right has two elements: (a) freedom of action, and (b) a social recognition that the right presumed in (a) is warranted. Beyond Green, Collingwood altered the conception of metaphysics, history, and philosophy of mind. For example, Collingwood did not support an idealized version of liberal utilitarianism. Thereby, he found support for his contention of the growth of "irrationalism" beginning with the late nineteenth century and continuing through both World wars.
16. Collingwood accepted the Freudian explanation of the unconscious only to a degree. He maintained that psychologists should be experts in the study of feeling and rejected claims made by the profession outside this field. It can be noted here also that Collingwood agreed with Descartes that the basis of philosophy lies in the cogito, i.e., I think therefore I am; thus, what I think actually exists at least in my experience. Mind is the object of philosophy.

17. Hugh Walpole, "R. G. Collingwood and the Idea of Language," University of Wichita Bulletin, No. 55, (May, 1963), pp. 4-5.
18. The New Leviathan, op. cit., 5.5.
19. Principles of Art, op. cit., p. 235. See also N.L., 5.5.
20. Walpole, "R. G. Collingwood and the Idea of Language," op. cit., pp. 4-5.
21. Ibid., p. 5.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. The New Leviathan, op. cit., 7.3.
25. Ibid., 7.69.
26. Ibid., 8.12.
27. Ibid., 8.44.
28. Ibid., 8.51-8.54.
29. Ibid., 8.14.
30. Ibid., 8.35.
31. Ibid., 11.22.
32. Ibid. For a good discussion of these ideas, see Louis O. Mink, Mind, History, and Dialectic: The Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), Chapter V.
33. Ibid., 11.24. In Chapter 6 of Hobbes's Leviathan, the general direction of goal and motion is built into his method. Motion towards objects continues the forward motion while movement away (called aversion) reverses the motion. The entire system rests upon logic. Some of the appetites and aversions are built into human nature but others are due to experience. This is a much simpler system than that of Collingwood. Both appetite and aversion, in Collingwood, rise from love or physiological needs. The Hobbesian system is based upon the individual whereas that of Collingwood is based upon the social nature of man and history. Similarly, Hobbes assumed a connection between the motion of bodies and motions of humankind. The latter was assumed to be connected with goods. Collingwood postulated that this paradigm was not in accord with the newer knowledge. Further, he believed that the particulars of science must, through history, give way.

34. Ibid., 11.34.
35. Ibid., 11.3-11.37.
36. Ibid., 11.36.
37. Ibid., 11.51. In speaking of "good", Collingwood has adopted the Aristotelian argument that the collective wisdom of a people is superior, i.e., the reason of the statesman in a good state cannot be detached from that found in law and custom within the community.
38. Ibid., 11.68.
39. Essay on Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 11.
40. Ibid., p. 39.
41. Ibid., p. 40.
42. Mink, Mind, History, and Dialectic, op. cit., Chapter V.
43. Ibid., pp. 124-25.
44. John F. Post, "A Defense of Collingwood's Theory of Presuppositions," Inquiry, Volume 8, (1967), p. 332.
45. Mink, Mind, History, and Dialectic, op. cit., p. 131.
46. The New Leviathan, op. cit., 34.18. See Appendix C.
47. Collingwood built his philosophical system throughout his several works never bothering to show their interrelationship and always appearing to assume that each reader had read what had gone on in the previous work. Even when he altered some of his concepts, he left the discovery of this up to the reader as well.
48. Walpole, "R. G. Collingwood and the Idea of Language," op. cit., p. 6.
49. The New Leviathan, op. cit., 12.28.
50. Ibid., 12.3.
51. Ibid., 10.5-10.51.
52. Ibid., 10.48. See also Speculum Mentis, pp. 245, 280-81. In his essay, "Aesthetic" (1927), Collingwood explored the psychological theories of imagination and those of philosophical imagination. The latter is termed "aesthetic." Collingwood's criticism of psychology's conclusions that all human activities

derive from imagination was that it regards imagination as diseased. On the other hand, if the imagination is aesthetic, there is no such thing as "right" and "wrong" distinctions. I am indebted to these ideas to Lionel Rubinoﬀ's Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 125.

53. Ibid., 11.1.
54. Ibid., 12.34.
55. Ibid., 12.55.
56. Ibid., 12.6.
57. Ibid., 12.81.
58. Ibid., 12.52-12.9.
59. Ibid., 12.91. Collingwood is quoting Hobbes's Leviathan here, p. 1.
60. Credit must be given to Louis O. Mink for advancing this thesis. See his Mind, History, and Dialectics, op. cit., p. 80.
61. The New Leviathan, op. cit., 13.23.
62. Ibid., 13.25.
63. Ibid., 13.25-13.27.
64. Ibid., 13.28-12.29.
65. Ibid., 13.31.
66. Ibid., 13.32-13.33.
67. Ibid., 13.38.
68. Ibid., 13.37-13.39.
69. Ibid., 13.45.
70. Ibid., 13.48. Collingwood here is specifying to Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity, and "its offshoot Mohammedianism."
71. Ibid., 13.51-13.54. Collingwood was referring to the doctrine of Marxian socialism.
72. Principles of Art, op. cit., p. 247.
73. R. G. Collingwood, "Fascism and Nazism," Philosophy, Volume 15, (1940), p. 170.

74. Ibid., p. 247.
75. R. G. Collingwood, "The Place of Art in Education," Hibbert Journal, No. XXIV, No. 3, (1926), p. 196.
76. Principles of Art, op. cit., p. 248.
77. Ibid., p. 279.
78. If these beliefs which Collingwood challenged were surveyed, we would find: the 'realists', the 'psychologists', the 'communists', and British twentieth-century liberalism as it was practiced.
79. The New Leviathan, op. cit., 13.59-13.61.
80. Ibid., 13.63.
81. Sherman M. Stanage, "Collingwood's Phenomenology of Education: Person and the Self-Recognition of the Mind," from Critical Essays on the Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood, edited by Michael Krausz. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 287.
82. Ibid., p. 288.
83. Ibid., quoted from Stanage, p. 289.
84. The New Leviathan, op. cit., 13.81-13.86.
85. Ibid., 14.32.
86. Ibid., 14.66-14.68.
87. Ibid., 15.2.
89. Ibid., 15.2-15.23.
89. Ibid., 15.32.
90. Ibid., 15.35.
91. Ibid., 15.4.
92. Ibid., 15.52.
93. Ibid., 15.74.
94. Ibid., 16.12.
95. Ibid., 16.23.
96. Ibid., 16.77.

- 97. Ibid., 16.64.
- 98. Ibid., 16.77.
- 99. Ibid., 17.5.
- 100. Ibid., 17.17.
- 101. Ibid., 17.51-17.52.
- 102. A. J. M. Milne, "Collingwood's Ethics and Political Theory," from Critical Essays edited by Michael Krausz, op. cit., pp. 296-326.
- 103. The New Leviathan, op. cit., 15.34.
- 104. Ibid., 15.4.
- 105. R. G. Collingwood, First Mate's Log. (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 150.
- 106. Speculum Mentis, op. cit., p. 289.
- 107. R. G. Collingwood, "What is the Problem of Evil?" reprinted from Theology, I (1920) taken here from Faith and Reason edited by Lionel Rubinoff. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968), p. 156.

CHAPTER III
SOCIETY

Part II of Hobbes's Leviathan and Part II of Collingwood's New Leviathan are concerned with society. Collingwood approached this term within a framework of hermeneutics, metaphysics, and the concrete whole plus the concepts previously developed in Part I. Perhaps the two ideas, those of hermeneutics and metaphysics can best be illustrated by placing a current philosopher of hermeneutics alongside Collingwood's double philosophical concept of the rapprochement between metaphysics and history. Collingwood never explored hermeneutics as such; Louis O. Mink contends that his 'logic of question and answer' is better understood as a "hermeneutics" since it is not a theory of logic nor a theory of semantics.¹ The logic of question and answer is better comprehended as "stages in the process of inquiry or of active thought in general."² It is, as was pointed out in Part I of this work, a dialectic of question and answer. For example, Hans-Georg Gadamer in Philosophical Hermeneutics has expressed the same concerns as has Collingwood in metaphysics and history:

The question of the foundations of an epoch, century, or age is directed at something that is immediately obvious . . . It sounds trivial perhaps to say that the foundations of the twentieth century lie in the nineteenth century.

[The task of philosophy] has remained the same to the present day. The answers it has found in the three centuries of the modern period sound different, but they are answers to the same question. Furthermore, the later answers are not possible without the earlier ones and must be tested successfully against them.³

Collingwood's expression of this idea may be found in his Essay on

Metaphysics:

All metaphysical questions are historical questions, and all metaphysical propositions are historical propositions. Every metaphysical question either is simply the question what absolute presuppositions were made on a certain occasion, or is capable of being resolved into a number of such questions together with a further questions arising out of these . . .⁴

The hermeneutical approach can also be illustrated through Collingwood's concept of the state as a concrete universal, an idea he explored in "Political Action" in 1929.⁵ Too often, observed Collingwood, the state has been taken to be an abstract universal as is the case in political science generally, i.e., where it is a substance having an essence and attributes. Collingwood approached political theory from another standpoint. In the place of the question, "What are the attributes of a state?" he asked, "What is political action?"⁶ Part II of both the works of Hobbes and Collingwood moved from a survey of the individual through mind and action as surveyed in Part I to the concept of society as corporate action and willing based upon individual choice. Collingwood appeared to believe that it was necessary to keep in mind the unity of the whole while considering the identity of differences. Within the concrete universal, differences become essential, that is, each "'moment' of a concrete universal expresses a different yet identical aspect of the whole, and so far as it is different, contributes essentially to the unity of the whole."⁷ Bernard Bosanquet's description of a concrete whole is very like that of Collingwood:

A world or cosmos [is] . . . a system of members, such that every member, being ex-hypothesis distinct, nevertheless contributes to the unity of the whole in virtue of the peculiarities which constitute its distinctness . . . the important point . . . is the difference of principle between a world and a class . . . The ultimate principle . . . is sameness in other; universality is sameness by means of other.⁸

The state, conceived of as a concrete universal, is discovered in its essence only within an historical concept of its developed moments. Further, a comprehensive understanding of its nature presupposes knowledge at each stage of its development. Collingwood believed that this understanding required knowledge of two types: first, that of historical knowledge of the past, and secondly, the imaginative reconstruction of what the universal has ideally become. It is knowledge mediated by the mind. The ideal nature of the state is to be discovered through the study of its conception as this occurs within political experience. The concrete universal is synonymous with experience. For this reason, Collingwood attacked all realists. To regard the state, as have the political realists, as a permanent entity means that the individual peculiarities of which the state is comprised must be ignored. This same point has recently been emphasized by Robert A. Isaak in Individuals and World Politics:

This primer on world politics assumes that individuals do matter . . . In contrast to most books introducing international politics this one assumes that mere abstract theories . . . are not as meaningful to human beings as principles that grow naturally out of concrete, everyday experiences of people . . .⁹

If the state develops, and concepts of the state develop historically through the experiences of a people, then an essential point to be considered is that the moment to moment historical presuppositions underlying that experience as enjoyed by its participants. On Collingwood's account, political experience in classical Greece, as defined by Plato in the Republic, relied upon the presuppositions of political experience of that period, particularly as found in the ideals of Plato's contemporaries. Likewise, Hobbes's Leviathan can be considered to be the epitome of the thought as derived from the interweaving of ideas in his historical era. Each, declared Collingwood, is an example of dogmatic philosophy since each believed himself to be a speaker for all time. Plato and Hobbes are moments in a series of specie. Today, an example of a series of specie within political experience as it is perceived in the eyes of our contemporaries may be that of Henry S. Kariel in Beyond Liberalism, Where Relations Grow.¹⁰ Kariel, as a modern political scientist alienated from the majority of those who practice its study as a profession, finds himself concerned with the same categories as are Hobbes and Collingwood, i.e., those of the individual, civilization, action, and the idea of freedom in choice. Undoubtedly, these are prime categories of concern to political theory. The problem as posed by Kariel is that of the underlying presuppositions inherent in the myth of liberalism. Collingwood believed that the political philosophical question concerning the nature of the state cannot be separated from the nature of its presuppositions. Thus, the statement of Collingwood in Speculum Mentis that the "state is an historical, not a scientific conception--

a concrete, not an abstract universal" can be summed in conjunction with his idea that a plurality of essences, each exemplified as a species of knowledge, can be seen in a scale of forms or activities, i.e., art, religion, science, history, and philosophy.¹¹ Collingwood searched for the nature of society as a part of civilization within the concepts sketched and yet also as correlated with the concept of an overlap in activities in mind proceeding dialectically.

Collingwood's approach to society hermeneutically explored the term by paring down its usage into historical essentials. As elaborated by Collingwood, society has two current meanings. 'Society' stands for a genus, an extension of the term, society, an older concept.¹³ Both are comprised of wholes and wholes are made up of parts.¹⁴ Society is distinct from class because society is an activity. The term 'society' in modern European language is borrowed from the vocabulary of Roman law. "Societas is a relation between personae whereby they join together of their own free will in joint action."¹⁵ "Such a relation comes into existence by what is called a 'social contract' or a 'contract of society . . .'"¹⁶ "A 'social contract' is a 'consensual' contract . . . ; its essence is simple agreement of will . . . valid at law . . ."¹⁷ Three indispensable elements of any social contract are: (1)reciprocal agreement, (2)common interest, and (3)"a bona fide intention to form a partnership."¹⁸ There are likewise three obligations: (1)to make a personal contribution to the partnership, (2)to promote the other's interest as your own, and (3)to share profit and loss.¹⁹ The Roman formula's basic concept was "the idea that a contract must be a joint activity of free agents,

their free participation in a joint enterprise."²⁰

A change in the meaning of the word, affecting its essentials, occurred in the late seventeenth century with the usage of the term, 'society', to classify plants.²¹ A. N. Whitehead, reported Collingwood, went a step further when he applied the term 'society' to electrons making up an atom.²² Here, the term no longer has connotations of class. Then, concluded Collingwood, a 'society' means something shared and "assigned a one-one relation to the members."²³ The English language has not chosen to provide a word to fit this idea.²⁴ ". . . the word 'society', thus used, implies . . . the fact which I call a *suum cuique* . . . a one-one relation between sharers or participants and shares."²⁵ Yet there is a condition where a commonality can be shared where there is no division as that found in 'society'.²⁶

The difference between a 'society' and a society is this: each of them has a suum cuique; in each of them the members have a share in something that is divided among them; but in a society proper the establishment and maintenance of the suum cuique is effected by the joint activity as free agents.²⁷

This means that non-belief in free activity rules out a belief in society. Collingwood believed that Karl Marx did just that because the classical economic order was imposed by brute force, not a meaning contained in Collingwood's definition of the term society.²⁸ This criticism by Collingwood springs from his theory of metaphysics, explained as an historical science in Essay on Metaphysics. Metaphysics has as its base certain presuppositions which are performed

by (a)reconstructing the absolute presuppositions of past thought in the mind of the metaphysician, and (b)exhibiting the process of change as one set of presuppositions is exchanged for another and then, (c) criticizing them thereby exposing limitations and showing that these have been overcome. Such an exercise is accompanied by the satisfaction of two criteria: (1)the logical criteria of "rightness", and (2)the guidance of a criterion of truth as outlined in Speculum²⁹ Mentis. By "rightness", Collingwood is referring to the fact that he believed that political action and economic action were nearly always entwined with moral action, i.e., that both political and economic actions have an ethical component. In this manner, the metaphysician becomes an organ of corporate consciousness whereby a people criticize themselves in order to create an identity in the same fashion as does the self. According to Collingwood, the work of metaphysics as outlined is important to society's continuance. The link between metaphysics and history lies in the dimension wherein humanity discovers its freedom to choose action. Metaphysics and history expose a dialectical history of errors resting upon two concepts: (a) that of 'logical efficacy' wherein concepts are judged as 'right' but not 'true' and (b)that of historical change wherein one set of propositions is slowly replaced by another in a process viewed as a progression towards truth.³⁰

Collingwood has taken infinite pains to define the two terms, 'society', as a state of affairs wheresomething is divided or shared, and society as a state of affairs wherein members are related by participation. The term community is then substituted for the term

'society' (or a state of affairs whereby something is divided or shared.) Community, society, and culture are the building blocks to Western conceptions of personality and political choice. A community, in becoming established, develops a *sum cuique* or "communal habits of acting."³¹ A community lives corporately. Society is a type of community sharing social consciousness or sharing a will.³² That is, the members have been historically involved through the socialization process in "an act (individually) of deciding to become a member and to go on being a member: [they have] a will to assume the function of partnership with others in a common undertaking and a will to carry out that function."³³

Social consciousness involves the consciousness of freedom. A society consists of persons who are free and know themselves to be free . . . What- ever is a society must be a community, because a society is a kind of community . . .³⁴

A community emerges into a society from a non-social community, that is, from a community ruled not by itself but by force. A chief difference between community and society lies in the fact that "society rules itself by the activity of its members' social will; a society is a "self-ruling community" whereas the "non-social community needs for its existence to be ruled by something other than itself."³⁵ The reader should be reminded here to delay judgment of the foregoing argument until it has been presented in its entirety. First, as conceived by Collingwood, the argument will proceed dialectically which may imply a progression although it is equally as possible to regress. Secondly, the idea of history, which is present in the formation of

a community, is itself found in a scale of forms, always in process. Thus, a people, a community, or a society, becoming aware of limitations or errors in its beliefs or thinking forces new questions to arise. Experience is then reconstituted in order to solve new problems demanding solutions. The New Leviathan is written in the language of dialectical logic so that the idea of a state constantly undergoes revision. There is no final question, "What is a state?" It is rather a question sustained throughout history.

Ruling, according to Collingwood, may be of two types: immanent and transeunt; immanent rule implies that the ruler and the ruled are the same thing in activity while transeunt rule is that "which³⁶ rules something other than itself." Immanent ruling requires that rule is both self-originating and self-maintaining although this³⁷ cannot apply to the members' dependents as in the case of children. In a partial reply to those readers who may feel that he or she is excluded from community, Collingwood averred that the term, 'force' within a social community having immanent rule "never means 'physical force' but 'moral force' or mental strength. Moral force is relative. Mental strength may take the forms of passion, will, mental development or desire but "development from any stage to the next above it is conditional on a certain quiescence in the activities of the lower³⁸ and is impeded by any violence on their part. . . ." To suffer force, a person finds that "the origin of the force is always something within himself . . ."³⁹ (Obviously, Collingwood was referring to a possible dialectical development here which may move in either direction.)

Collingwood has been discussing, to some extent, the element of social contract by turning to history, tracing the origin of the term society as it developed in Roman law and the experience of the European people as it reshaped itself during the first fifteen centuries of the Christian era.⁴⁰ In summation, Collingwood found the following to be the chief characteristics of modern European society:

- (1) Society is a partnership, between persons exercising a free will.⁴¹
- (2) A social contract exists only when it is consensual through declaration.⁴²
- (3) Obligation in the social contract is limited to the pursuit of the common aim.⁴³
- (4) Society is the sharing of social consciousness without economic implications.⁴⁴

Social consciousness arises from free will and is always related to the concept of something other than itself.⁴⁵ It is a free agent. A person, to engage in the enterprise, must be aware of his allotted share.⁴⁶ Ruling is perhaps the only activity of a society. This social consciousness can be contrasted with that found in a non-social community where members share a communal order held together by "some force brought to bear upon them."⁴⁷ Social consciousness comprises an awareness of a particular society as well as a universal society.⁴⁸ ". . . the aim of a particular society is always twofold . . .": the establishment of social relations and the aim of pursuing a particular enterprise.⁴⁹ Collingwood did not believe that a universal society could be realized in an actual society because the facts of history disputed its possibility.⁵⁰ The reason

for this, as presented by Collingwood, was that "traces of the non-social community out of which it has emerged" remain. Social consciousness and its aims remain incomplete.⁵¹

Membership in a society presupposes equality and inequality. Inequalities are compensated, turned into assets, or built upon by the initiatives of its members. Inequalities arise from the natural endowments of members; these endowments are not innate but "are products of pre-social experiences."⁵² Authority in a non-social community is force.⁵³

Reward and punishment have no weight with free men, and the theory of them has no place in the theory of society. It belongs to the theory of the non-social community to which it is essential . . . so long as the men thus controlled are sufficiently foolish, they can be just as easily controlled by an insincere or impossible promise as by a truthful one . . .⁵⁴

Then, the "corrupting influence of power" arises by a return to a non-social community. "Power means the exercise of force; it is the corruption of a member's will. Should societal members degenerate from free decision, the society may revert back to a non-social community. To prevent this, two steps can be taken: when the society is organized, "the duty of given orders [can be] assigned to those . . ." who can best resist social strains on the machinery can be so designed as to remove the leader whose will gives way.⁵⁵ Such machinery is found in criminal law although this "is not a universal feature of social life."⁵⁶

Crime is an action by one member of a society prejudicial not to the rights

of another member but to the pursuit of its self-appointed task by the society as a whole. This is a somewhat lately invented idea in the history of law; among the ancient Greeks and many so-called primitive peoples it is unknown; even among the Romans it exists only in an incipient form.⁵⁷

Where crime occurs, the society has already to some extent become a non-social community. While no society lasts forever, there are permanent and temporary enterprises. It must be remembered that a society is formed to jointly execute an enterprise.⁵⁸

A family is a good example of a mixed community since it contains both a society and a non-social community, the nursery. The aim of most European marriages is procreation and its base is the social contract.⁵⁹ Its joint will varies the position of the partners to the contract in regard to authority according to custom; it is based upon the notion of choice or freedom as a partner to the social contract. The dialectical process of negating the non-social element and the emergence of a social community can be viewed in two Steps: (1) a social consciousness is developed through participation or (2) a vague awareness of human social nature may lead to participation in particular societies in the community. Most likely, both will occur. The result is the emergence of a society from a mixed community. Parenthood is an object of will and the dialectical development of social consciousness proceeds from the leadership of the rulers over the ruled.

The history of a non-social community turning into a society shows the limitations in conceptions of society. First, in Greece,

we find that citizenship was quite limited. Further, the aim of society was divided into public and private spheres. Ancient political life and political theory were born in the city whereas medieval political life and theory were theories of the state; here, however, an important change occurred in the conception of the body politic.⁶⁰ It had become but a collection of human animals.⁶¹ Social relations were maintained by means of 'estates' so that one 'estate' was supreme over the others. By the late Middle Ages, a new conception of the body politic emerged; there were sovereigns and subjects as well as liberties given to subjects. As was observed by Machiavelli, this pattern began to break down in the Renaissance. While allegiance was purchased through the bestowal of liberties, the end result was bankruptcy for the prince.⁶² The power of the prince lay only in the will of his subjects. There is a further problem: liberty given has not insured a like concept of obligation.⁶³ For Collingwood, the great discovery of Hobbes was that he recognized that political theory was dialectical, that the English subjects of that era had achieved a social life and could, thereby, confer authority.⁶⁴ This solution had been worked out by Plato when he distinguished two types of discussions: the eristical and the dialectical. The difference between the two is that a dialectical aims to reconcile apparently opposing views while an eristical discussion aims to prove only that each discussant is right.⁶⁵

Collingwood held that there were three laws of politics holding good in every body politic: (1)"that a body politic is divided into a

ruling class and a ruled class," (that it has a nursery) (2)"that the barrier between the two classes is permeable in an upward sense", and (3)that the "relation between the two have to be solved by the council. These three problems make up the "constitutional problem."⁶⁶

Because these problems remain and cannot be solved for all time, the state is a permanent society. Therefore, it cannot 'wither away' in Marxian terms. For the same reason, society cannot be viewed, as Spengler does, as developing in stages of growth similar to the visions of Cavour and Bismark. A simple analysis of the state reveals that it not only rests upon the ruled and the rulers but also presumes that the members have reached a mental stage of development where they can exhibit a will. "Will depends on freedom; and freedom is a matter of degree."⁶⁷ Due to the different degrees of development in the ability to make a decision by those who rule, there is a "multiplicity of graded sub-classes" or a hierarchy based upon strength of will.⁶⁸ The hierarchy repeats itself in the ruled class although here the subdivision is based upon what Collingwood has termed "induction." Induction means "the inspiration of a weak will by a stronger one."⁶⁹ ". . . induction is not radically different from education."⁷⁰

Always between the ruled and the ruling class, there is a vigorous effort on the part of the ruling class to train the ruled class in political action. Collingwood expressed this as a "percolation" of freedom throughout the body politic.⁷¹ Whether the freedom percolates upward or downward makes little difference. It is, rather, the "advancement of freedom," the development of the "ability to solve political problems" which is important.⁷² ". . . freedom in the ruling

class is nothing less than the fact that the ruling class rules . . ."⁷³

By this, Collingwood meant that when the ruling class ceased to rule, as was the case in Nazism and Fascism, the ruling class has lost this freedom and has opened the gates of human irrationality. The doctrinaire democrat as well as the doctrinaire aristocrat both deny the first law of politics because each only partially answers the question: "How shall we make the ruling class as strong as possible?"⁷⁴

Both democrats and aristocrats are but the positive and negative aspects of a dialectical process.⁷⁵ What both democrats and aristocrats do is to falsely abstract from the entire process two opposing elements which are each parts of the whole. Collingwood explained this apparent contradiction in the following manner:

The rise of doctrinaire democracy or doctrinaire aristocracy happens when these elements are considered in false abstraction from the process to which they belong, and then considered eristically as competing for the politician's loyalty. . .⁷⁶

False abstraction is the same thing complicated by a falsehood . . . that these two opposite elements are mutually independent and hostile entities.⁷⁷

Early modern Europe, or Christendom, renounced the Greek quest for super rulers because, so often, experience showed that they could easily turn into tyrants. Neither in Greek nor in Roman political thought was the concept of aristocratic elements within the democratic elements abolished. Both terms, 'demos' and 'populus,' have an aristocratic flavor.⁷⁸ These concepts survived in the Papacy, in the Empire, and in feudalism. By the end of the Middle Ages, the

democratic element was contained in common law whereas the aristocratic element was contained in Roman law.⁷⁹ Thus, the Hobbesian articulation of a Tudor monarchy was democracy pushed to a logical conclusion.⁸⁰ For the same reason, the French Revolution cannot be seen as entirely democratic as it was also aristocratic due to the fact that the bourgeoisie was the "original body corporately possessed of economic power."⁸¹

Political thought in the nineteenth century for the most part allowed itself to be dazzled partly by the French Revolution . . . and partly by a misunderstanding of its nature; failed to . . . apprehend its continuity with the long historical process . . . failed to see it as the legitimate offspring of that process . . .⁸²

In fact, asserted Collingwood, the whole notion of a "revolution" was due to "bad history."⁸³ The historian of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had a linear conception of history. Today, the use of the word 'revolution' has fallen out of use by historians although it remains in the vocabulary of politics; in the latter, its tone is primarily emotional. Changes such as the French Revolution must be seen as a part of the "dialectical process of political life."⁸⁴

Both family life and political life have indispensable elements of force.⁸⁵ Since, however, a body politic is based on the idea that the ruled must eventually become rulers, then the degree of freedom or will-power in the ruled should not be forgotten. This limitation, in practice, means: (1) a ruler must not bluff unless the bluff can

be enforced, (2) a ruler must never lie unless the lie can stand or not be found out; (3) a ruler must not practice deceit or hypocrisy if he can be found out. These ideas fit with the dialectic of aristocracy/democracy. The aristocracy is the principle of force while the democracy is the principle of self-government.⁸⁶ An error of the nineteenth century was to imagine that the eristical process could replace the dialectical process.⁸⁷ This is a dangerous idea because when an opposing opponent in a dialectical process fails to understand the dialectic, the result is an eristical battle.

Without the three rules of politics, there is no social life. Political action can be equated with will, i.e., the joint will of the society, will exercised as self rule, and will exercised as force⁸⁶ on the non-social community. Will does not need to be rational. Here, the extreme importance attached by Collingwood to language can be viewed. If, without language, there can be no thought, then without language, there can be no dialectical process. An eristical process, on the contrary, can go on without thought because its aim is victory; here, violence or force is in order. A dialectical political process aims at agreement. It is for this reason that Parliaments are established. It is the debating forum for the joint will to work through the necessary dialectical process.⁸⁷ A command issued by a society upon the non-social community does, or may, involve force. Yet, the "more completely the whole body politic can share in its rulers' will", the stronger will be the body politic.⁸⁸

A "decree is the simplest form of political action"; as the simplest form of will, it is "caprice transposed into the key of politics."⁸⁹ Three forms of political action correspond to reason; these are: utility, rightness, and duty. As with individual action, political utility implies a "distinction between ends and means."⁹⁰ A political end is the joint will of the ruling class for the entire body politic imposed by force although it "is immediately expressed as the object of a decree."⁹¹ Such political action is called policy.

The end is an object of will pursued by the ruling class: the means is an object of will pursued by a ruling class in order thereby to realize the end.⁹²

Since the means entails achievement of the end, it is unnecessary for the ruling class to explain the means; the "end may be concealed."⁹³ This is a Machiavellian form of political action; moral questions lie outside the realm of political consideration or questions.⁹⁴

The second rational form of political action is law which is regularian action in its political form. As with the individual, such action involves two decisions: (1) "a generalized decision to do many things of a specific kind on occasions of a specific kind", and (2) "an individualized decision to do one act of the specified kind now."⁹⁵ This is called law and the act of making it is called legislation. Compulsion here of the rulers upon the ruled is called administering the law.⁹⁶ In Europe, legislation as a normal political act begins to appear in the thirteenth century; it is customary law rather than positive law because it involved no legislation.⁹⁷ Law, for the Greeks, meant custom. The formal essence of law is: (1) "that it should be an

act of will on the part of the rulers," and (2)"that it should be obeyed by the rulers themselves," and (3)"that it should be obeyed by members of the non-social community."⁹⁸ The 'material' essence of law is its specified mode of life. It is much better for the body politic to be able to understand law because enforcement otherwise involves⁹⁹ not only a loss of political efficiency but huge expense as well. International law thus does not need legislation to be effective; indeed, international law is very old customary law dating back to the¹⁰⁰ Islandic sagas.

The third form of rational action is duty.

A man's duty is a thing which for him in his present position, both internally or with respect to his 'character' and externally or with respect to his 'circumstances', is both possible and necessary: something he can freely decide to do.¹⁰⁰

Duty as a form of political action is the case where a decision made by a ruling class and enforced by them upon the corresponding ruled class is made because no alternative is possible.¹⁰¹

In duty, the element of caprice has disappeared. Choice is now limited to one alternative; that is the only way open.

The idea of action as duty . . . is inevitable to a person who considers it historically. History is the science of the individual; the individual is the unique; . . . The more a man accustoms himself to thinking historically, the more he will accustom himself to thinking what course of action it is his duty to do, as distinct from asking what it is expedient for him to do and what it is right for him to do . . .¹⁰²

Political utilitarianism, as a theory, was inevitable to the

ancients, the medievalists, and to Renaissance man who drew from those two sources. It was a doctrine utilized in the nineteenth century by liberals as a concession to an industrial and commercial situation. The implications of what Collingwood has been saying will be taken up in the next chapter.

As in political action, there are three logically distinct stages in political life.¹⁰³ "The first stage is society," "a joint activity of various wills in which a number of persons immanently rule themselves."¹⁰⁴ "The second stage is transeunt rule" while the third stage is the activity whereby the body politic attends to problems arising out of its relations with other bodies politic," external politics. These stages exist in a series and each logically pre-supposes the other.¹⁰⁵ Problems connected with transuent rule are internal; they must be confronted by a joint social consciousness and a joint social will.¹⁰⁶ "Internal politics presupposes social or immanent rule."¹⁰⁷ The stages represent separate dialectical Heraclitan worlds. "The dialectic of society is the conversion of what begins as a non-social community into a social community," although the transformation remains incomplete. Further, the operation of the dialectic is conscious.¹⁰⁷

Thinking historically about politics will produce [questions], will ask, . . . how they can do the one thing which is open to them as self-respecting men, conscious of their several freedom and each other's, agreeing upon a joint action in doing which each will be doing his duty.¹⁰⁸

The implications of Collingwood's ideas here are profound in terms of

the family, of relations between the sexes as well as in terms of production/consumption and ideas of the private/public dichotomy. Collingwood has discussed his ideas upon education rather randomly throughout his several works. Taken seriously, these are, in their total aspect, revolutionary indeed, perhaps going beyond his own vision.

Collingwood stressed in various ways the importance of the dialectic in internal politics which is the "conversion of a ruled class into collaborators in the act of ruling . . ."¹⁰⁹ In case the act of ruling is not an act of will, what is circulated throughout the body politic is servility; the third law of politics operates negatively. Should the ruling class become entirely dialectic, every element of force would be eliminated. Because there is a proportional relationship between the harmonious elements of the ruling class to that of the ruled, the mere granting of a constitution never achieves more than the ruling group already had to give and thus can accomplish nothing without cooperation and harmonious social awareness by the rulers. Elements of force in internal political affairs of a community are due to: (1)"political immaturity on the part of the ruled;"¹¹⁰ and (2)"social immaturity on the part of the rulers; . . ."

The dialectic of external politics is concerned with problems arising from relationships amongst different bodies politic. A dialectic is a process from non-agreement rather than disagreement. It is true that non-agreement may harden into disagreement although a certain amount of non-agreement between two foreign bodies politic is irremovable. These differences may be due to conflicts of the same

type as are internal politics, i.e., a conflict of interests, a¹¹¹ conflict of rights, and conflict of duties. Again, there are only two ways of settling conflicts: the eristical and the dialectical. To adopt the former position means to make war which is a state of mind.¹¹² War, as a state of mind, means "believing that differences between bodies politic have to be settled by one giving way to the other and the second triumphing over the first."¹¹³ Both victory and defeat are also states of mind. To yield to threat, fraud, or fear is to think defeat.¹¹⁴ Thus, a proposition involving economic sanctions is tantamount to a reversal of the dialectic and the adoption of an eristical stance. To do this is to reverse "a policy on which belligerents depend for their very existence."¹¹⁵ For the same reason, to punish an aggressor as was done by the League of Nations after World War I, war cannot be viewed as entirely due to the party who instigated it. Did Collingwood advocate a policy of non-resistance? On the contrary, he believed that a pacifist stance¹¹⁶ is pro-war because such a ruler has done nothing to decrease it. Further, pacificism is not only pro-war but it casts that party in the¹¹⁷ role of defeatism.

Wars happen in the modern world because external politics are handled eristically.¹¹⁸ It results in a breach of internal social life. Since modern states do tend to handle external policy eristically, and yet policy implies a voluntary act, "is war an extension of policy or a breakdown of policy?"¹¹⁹ In the former case, no explanation is needed although in the latter case, how can this breakdown be explained? As there is an element of force in every society,

even as the job of a body politic is to maintain harmony through the
 joint will in a joint aim, this is never entirely achieved.¹²⁰ Be-
 cause force is more conspicuous in a body politic whose act of ruling
 established law and order, war must be viewed as "the breakdown of
 policy."¹²¹ The primary question is: "Why does such a breakdown
 occur?"¹²² Collingwood has suggested three reasons: (1)"because
 men charged with the conduct of external politics are confronted by
 a problem they cannot solve," (2)"because the internal condition of
 the body politic is unsound," and (3)"because the rulers are at
 loggerheads."¹²³ Then, Collingwood has concluded, the "ultimate
 cause of war is disharmony among the rulers" due to the fact that
 traces of "non-sociality are not completely overcome by the 'dialectic
 of society'."¹²⁴ War must be viewed as a breakdown of policy and it
 is due, not to political strength but to political weakness. Through
 the technique of the utilization of an imaginary "yahoo" herd, Colling-
 wood attempted to portray Hobbes's Leviathan as a society where the
 "life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short" is that of
 the non-social community.¹²⁵ The picture, according to Collingwood,
 must be corrected because the herd would be "gregarious," "imitative,"
 and the leader of the herd would rule eristically so that a policy of
 war would be an extension of its internal policy.¹²⁶ The picture is
 an abstraction; its intent is to describe non-social human life.
 The reason for its presentation is to control a process of change
 wherein the "initial and terminal points" are abstractions from the
 fact of change.¹²⁷ Previously, to face change in this manner was
 unnecessary because, in the centuries before the twentieth century,

128

"people believed in a law of progress." The Yahoo herd, or the elements of non-sociality, remain; such social defects are the source of war. Defects are not curable but they are changeable so that war will continue to differ from that we previously knew. The only good cause of society is peace; however, the Yahoo destroys this cause. In this case, war "would be justified as serving the cause of intelligence, the cause of wil, the cause of political vigour, scientific efficiency, and everything else that is included in the one word peace."¹²⁹

Classical physics, arising in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, held sway for over two-hundred years until its recognized defects made it obsolete. The principle of classical physics is a double one: the mathematical or the 'matter' of an inquiry must be sound and its 'form or logic must be right.'¹³⁰ The error lay in identifying logic with mathematics. Hobbes, in the middle of the seventeenth century, worked out classical politics which may be described as "an attempt at a science of human life . . . in political life."¹³¹ It too can no longer be regarded as the final word on this subject yet we have no successor although we do have some "agreement as to where it needs correction."¹³² Like classical physics, to anyone who desires to learn the subject, it must not be forgotten. Hobbes's philosophy also rests on a double foundation: facts ascertained by observation or experiment and abstractions.¹³³ What the scientist does is to take crude facts and convert these into laws which are the body of a science. These laws are hybrids. "Ancient sciences aimed at an unlimited objective."¹³⁴ Modern science, in

contrast, limits its objective. Authors of classical politics aimed at a "science of politics which would explain a certain class of political facts by reference to the idea of society."¹³⁵ Authors of classical politics aimed at a "science of politics which would explain a certain class of political facts by reference to the idea of society."¹³⁵ A principle of limited objective means the renunciation of explanation of other facts at the present. They did not attempt to explain 'secondary qualities.'¹³⁶ "The principle of explanation from which the classical politics began was the idea of society."¹³⁷ They drew their idea of partnership from the 'social contract', the ensuing obligations, the conditions of its making, the 'free will' of the parties.¹³⁸ From this experience of partnership, Collingwood wanted to bring these notions into a "harmony with the European use of words."¹³⁹ The problem of classical politics was the limited objective of a "study [of] the social elements in political life."¹⁴⁰ While the classical politicians recognized the non-social element of political life, they "did not profess to explain this "nautre," the negative partner of any society."¹⁴¹ Thus, "classical politics gives a positive, detailed, and adequate account of society'. "Politics is a process whereby one condition of human life is converted into another."¹⁴² "The great merit of the classical politics is that it knows political life to be dynamic or dialectical." "The life of politics is the life of political education."¹⁴³

Collingwood's account of the reception of the theory of the non-social community by the Germans is unusual; he believed the German

readers of classical politics misunderstood the natural condition of mankind to be the opposite of civilization or savagery rather than the nursery.¹⁴⁴ There were, according to Collingwood, certain qualifications for understanding classical politics and that was some understanding of the two sciences: the theory of customary morals and the theory of law. The Germans had no experiences for such an understanding of the two. Instead, the German's subject's experiences were primarily non-social.

The subject lived, moved, and had his being in a non-social community ordered and maintained partly by what passed for the immemorial tradition of the German people; partly for the docilely accepted despotism of this or that princeling and his still more despotic officials.¹⁴⁵

The other alternative of the German people was ancestor-worship or autocrat-worship, ideas which Collingwood termed "herd-worship."¹⁴⁶

This is a type of religion expressing the feeling of man's powerlessness in the grip of a non-social community. When the Germans rediscovered Greek philosophy, they rejected classical politics on Greek authority (they thought). While Hobbes's 'artificiall Man' represents the joint social will, Kant and his successors saw the state neither as "artificial in origin nor human in its essence, but natural in origin and divine in its essence."¹⁴⁷ For this reason, Hegel and

Marx could insist upon an objective character of social and political spirit.¹⁴⁸ Collingwood expressed the belief that the Germans, from

the fifteenth century, had praised obedience in preference to freedom because of their tradition of herd-worship.¹⁴⁹ The Reformation merely exchanged the yoke of Rome for that of the Prince. To Collingwood,

this was a somewhat tragic situation; the Germans could accept natural science without conflict although truth had a tendency to be subordinated to a quest for the "glory of the German people."¹⁵⁰ When the German people began to deal with classical politics, and to translate this into social or political philosophy or theory, the result can be viewed in Marx whose doctrine of the 'withering away of the state' shows his lack of a conception of the 'ruling class', an idea¹⁵¹ meaning, in Machiavellian terms, 'state.' For Marx, the non-social community is translated into state; the term, capitalists, becomes the opponent of German herd-worship. It is in this vein that Marx's obsession with dialectical materialism can be understood. Whereas 'dialectic' for Plato meant a peaceful, friendly discussion, for Hegel it became a 'dialectic of words' while for Marx, it became a 'dialectic of things.'¹⁵² In Hegelian terms, a dialectical world "argued¹⁵³ itself into existence." Thus, a 'dialectic of words' set a pattern for a 'dialectic of things.' This scheme is, however, bankrupt in regard to historical method.

The fashion of taking its Marxian inversion seriously still flourishes, but it is no better based; because neo-Marxism has blown the gaff by declaring that 'truth' means historical truth, and 'bourgeois', as usual in Marxist terminology, is merely an expression of disgust; and the whole declaration means: 'dialectical materialism does not lead to historical knowledge.'¹⁵⁴

In Collingwood's view, the substitution of a dialectical materialism denied freedom of the will and meant the German expression of herd-worship.

FOOTNOTES

1. Louis O. Mink, Mind, History, and Dialectic: The Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood, op. cit., p. 131.
2. Ibid.
3. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, translated and edited by David E. Linge. (Berkeley, California: University Press, 1976), pp. 108-09.
4. Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 49. The reader may wish also to refer to the current problems in studies in hermeneutics. These have been discussed by Thomas M. Seebohm in "The Problem of Hermeneutics in Recent Anglo-American Literature: Part I and Part II" from Philosophy and Rhetoric, Volume 10, (Fall, 1977). Seebohm makes the point that Paul Ricoeur's work in hermeneutics supports a theory of historical understanding and methodology. This position would appear to make him supportive of Collingwood's position.
5. Collingwood, "Political Action," Aristotelian Society, Volume XXIX, (1928-29).
6. Ibid., p. 155. See also Lionel G. Rubinooff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970).
7. Ibid., quoted from p. 155.
8. Bernard Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value. (London: Macmillan, 1912), pp. 37-8.
9. Robert A. Isaak, Individuals and World Politics. (Belmont, California: Duxbury Press, 1975), p. xi.
10. Henry S. Kariel, Beyond Liberalism, Where Relations Grow. (San Francisco, California: Chandler & Sharp, Publishers, Inc., 1977).
11. See Collingwood's Speculum Mentis, pp. 229-31 and Idea of History, pp. 162-63.
12. See Collingwood's Essay on Metaphysics, pp. 36-43 and Essay on Philosophical Method, pp. 48-9.
13. Collingwood, New Leviathan, op. cit., 19.1.
14. Ibid., 19.2.
15. Ibid., 19.51.

16. Ibid., 19.52.
17. Ibid., 19.53.
18. Ibid., 19.54.
19. Ibid., 19.55.
20. Ibid., 19.57.
21. Ibid., 19.59.
22. Ibid., 19.6.
23. Ibid., 19.61.
24. Ibid., 19.62.
25. Ibid., 19.64.
26. Ibid., 19.66.
27. Ibid., 19.66.
28. Speculum Mentis, p. 45. Also, in The New Leviathan, Collingwood wrote: "If . . . 'the social consciousness of men' [had] 'determined their social existence'". . . this proposition would have been true if "it were fundamental to the essence of society." (N.L. 19.92, 19.94.) However, "the words society, social, contain reference to free will." Collingwood found two worlds: those of the social and those of the economic world. This is, as he has demonstrated, linguistically correct. However, whether it is possible to now leave economics outside politics is quite another matter.
29. Ibid.
30. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 264.
31. New Leviathan, op. cit., 20.17.
32. Ibid., 20.2.
33. Ibid., 20.21.
34. Ibid., 20.23-20.3.
35. Ibid., 20.36.
36. Ibid., 20.39.

37. Ibid., 20.44.
38. Ibid., 20.54.
39. Ibid., 20.59.
40. Ibid., 20.6.
41. Ibid., 20.62.
42. Ibid., 20.63.
43. Ibid., 20.66.
44. Ibid., 20.82-20.94.
45. Ibid., 21.1-21.19.
46. Ibid., 21.2.
47. Ibid., 21.3.
48. Ibid., 21.4-21.42.
49. Ibid., 21.43.
50. Ibid., 21.44.
51. Ibid., 21.5-21.51.
52. Ibid., 21.6.
53. Ibid., 21.72.
54. Ibid., 21.74.
55. Ibid., 21.82-21.83.
56. Ibid., 21.85.
57. Ibid., 21.86.
58. Ibid., 21.95.
59. Ibid., 22.1-22.34.
60. Ibid., 24.31.
61. Ibid., 24.33.
62. Ibid., 24.43-24.45.

63. Ibid., 24.47.
64. Ibid., 24.48-24.49.
65. Ibid., 24.57-24.59.
66. Ibid., 25.26.
67. Ibid., 21.8 and 25.41.
68. Ibid., 25.57-25.59.
69. Ibid., 25.2-25.56.
70. Ibid., 25.59.
71. Ibid., 25.94-25.96.
72. Ibid., 25.97.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., 26.1-26.3.
75. Ibid., 26.16.
76. Ibid., 26.17.
77. Ibid., 26.19.
78. Ibid., 26.48.
79. Ibid., 26.59.
80. Ibid., 26.6.
81. Ibid., 26.66.
82. Ibid., 26.7.
83. Ibid., 26.77.
84. Ibid., 26.92.
85. Ibid., 27.1.
86. Ibid., 27.42-27.47.
87. Ibid., 27.51-27.52.
88. Ibid., 28.12.

89. Ibid., 28.2.
90. Ibid., 28.25-28.26.
91. Ibid., 28.3.
92. Ibid., 28.4.
93. Ibid., 28.41.
94. Ibid., 28.5.
95. Ibid., 28.51.
96. Ibid., 28.52.
97. Ibid., 28.61.
98. Ibid., 28.62.
99. Ibid., 28.64.
100. Ibid., 28.7.
101. Ibid., 28.74.
102. Ibid., 28.79.
103. Ibid., 28.82.
104. Ibid., 28.83.
105. Ibid., 28.9.
106. Ibid., 29.1.
107. Ibid., 29.11.
108. Ibid., 29.13-29.14.
109. Ibid., 29.15.
110. Ibid., 29.3.
111. Ibid., 28.91.
112. Ibid., 29.4.
113. Ibid., 29.45.

114. Ibid., 29.54-29.58.
115. Ibid., 29.63.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid., 29.66-29.69.
118. Ibid., 29.75.
119. Ibid., 29.94.
120. Ibid., 19.98.
121. Ibid., 30.1.
122. Ibid., 30.18.
123. Ibid., 30.2-30.24.
124. Ibid., 30.28.
125. Ibid., 30.3.
126. Ibid., 30.31-30.37.
127. Ibid., 30.39.
128. Ibid., 30.6.
129. Ibid., 30.61-30.69.
130. Ibid., 30.76.
131. Ibid., 30.78.
132. Ibid., 30.85-30.93.
133. Ibid., 31.1-31.17.
134. Ibid., 31.21.
135. Ibid., 31.22.
136. Ibid., 31.24-31.25.
137. Ibid., 31.62.
138. Ibid., 31.81.

139. Ibid., 31.84.
140. Ibid., 31.9.
147. Ibid., 31.9.
142. Ibid., 31.93.
143. Ibid., 32.16.
144. Ibid., 32.19.
145. Ibid., 33.32.
146. Ibid., 33.2.
147. Ibid.,
148. Ibid., 33.32.
149. Ibid., 33.35.
150. Ibid., 33.42.
151. Ibid., 33.43.
152. Ibid., 33.5.
153. Ibid., 33.67.
154. Ibid., 33.79.
155. Ibid., 33.84.
156. Ibid., 33.84.
157. Ibid., 33.93.

CHAPTER IV

CIVILIZATION

The heart of Collingwood's New Leviathan lies in Part III entitled "Civilization," where his solution to the problem of order and civility, an updating of Hobbes, is produced. Barbarism, the anti-thesis of civilization, which is the last section of The New Leviathan, will also be incorporated into this section. It is the premise of Collingwood that humankind creates itself, both individually and collectively, in communities and societies, ultimately producing a unique civilization. Before Collingwood began to explore solutions, he delved into the generic meaning of the term, 'civilization':

A word is a linguistic habit of the community using it . . . Civilization is a thing of the mind; an inquiry into its nature, therefore, belongs to the sciences of the mind, and must be pursued by the method proper to those sciences.¹

Civilization, as a part of the science of mind, is, like other sciences, based upon fact; in this case, facts are gleaned from "mental facts ascertained by reflection."² As thinking "is done in words", then it is necessary to reflect upon language. Here, it will be recalled that Hugh Walpole has credited to Collingwood a high service in the area of linguistics.³

"The New Leviathan" devotes its linguistic interest to symbols -- but to that peculiar class of symbols used in "the human sciences." As contrasted with the physical and the biological sciences Collingwood sees a separate group which he calls "the sciences of mind"; . . . These sciences are truly scientific in method and purpose, but share certain peculiarities that put them in a class by themselves. Empirical data and objective facts are

germane to the pursuit but interpretation takes on increased importance. These human sciences are intrinsically influenced by the fact of being studied.⁴

Etymologically, in the history of the term, civilization, it is a technical term of law. In the sense of a process, civilization is something which happens to a community. Such a process always concerns humans collectively. "Civilization is an approximation to an ideal state."⁵ The contradictory of an ideal state is barbarity.⁶ Collingwood's etymological investigation into the term poses three sense usages to this point: (1)It is a process; (2)It is the result of a process; (3)It is equivalent to civility. When an inquiry is made as to how the process differs from others, the three constituents of civilization are: (a)It is "civilization within the community as affecting the relation of any one member to any other"; (2)It is "civilization outside the community as affecting the relation between members of the community and things in the world of nature"; and (3)It is "civilization outside the community as affecting the relation between members of the community and members of other communities."⁷ To behave civilly to another means to respect his feelings by: "abstaining from shocking him, annoying him, frightening him, or arousing in him any passion or desire which might diminish his self-respect." -- in other words, to threaten his freedom in regard to choice. While complete civility is but a "counsel of perfection," it is, nevertheless, a goal to be constantly kept in mind. In respect to point two above, the goal of civility towards things in the realm of nature, this concept stems from the Renaissance wherein the central idea "is that man

can increase his ability to get what he needs out of the natural world by coming to understand it better, and that to advance in such understanding of the natural world is to become more 'civilized' in relation to it." ⁸ According to Collingwood, there are no "necessaries" in that standards are constantly being altered. The difficulty here is that of differing standards in other communities. In respect to point three above, Collingwood averred that "civility requires civil demeanour to whatever is recognized as possessing it." "If foreigners are human, civility requires that we should treat them civilly . . . If the answer is 'no', foreigners are a part of the natural world," ⁹ they are then there to be exploited as scientifically as possible. Yet, in even relatively high civilizations, while strangers are treated with civility, they are "murdered with impunity and a clear ¹⁰ conscience." Common action sets up a social consciousness. One such action is that of commercial action. Any action which does not accord with the demeanor of a civilized man is movement or regression towards barbarity.

According to the degree of civilization (of barbarism) thus produced the community will treat non-members with more or less complete lack of civility; in all cases, more or less, where civility could be used, replacing it by force.¹¹

This will involve a more or less ruthless exploitation; or, to be more exact, scientific or intelligent exploitation . . . ¹²

Collingwood explained that torture and cruelties inflicted upon strangers or non-community members could not be considered to be exploitative. When the argument is advanced that such action is due to

a "psychological need to inflict suffering," he observed that passion and desire could be governed by the will or be a policy of deliberate choice. A sadist is to be pitied but this is not civilization; it is barbarism.¹³

In a non-social community, there is no hope that humankind can live other than eristically. Such communities are not held together by the collective community except through psychological forces or 'instincts' or brute force generating some type of harmony.¹⁴ In a civilization approaching mental maturity, it is possible to decide through will to create a society of quite another type through a dialectical process involving the self-assertion of individual will.¹⁵ The mainspring of the process of civilization is "the spirit of agreement" based upon the practical knowledge of custom and civility.¹⁶

Civility as between man and man, members of the same community, is not only what constitutes the civilization of that community relatively to the human world; it is also what makes possible that community's civilization relatively to the natural world.¹⁷

These reflections pose the question: How is civility acquired? Collingwood's answer appears to be: first, it is an historical process of slow development; second, it is the sharing rather than hoarding of the entire knowledge and inventions of the community. To have a dialectical community or civilization, there must be those who are willing to teach and those who are willing to learn.¹⁸ Neither of these desires has been lost; however, there is the reverse desire, that of the ability to gain power through the monopolization of knowledge.¹⁹

This is the origin and essence of civilization. Civilization, even in its crudest and most barbarous form, in part consists of civility and in part depends on civility: consists on it so far as it consists in relations of man to nature.²⁰

Hobbes, the utilitarian, believed "that men were naturally enemies of each other"; while this is correct, they are friends as well.²¹

Co-operation, rather than resting upon a feeble foundation of reason as Hobbes thought, rests instead upon two contrary appetites, those of pleasure and pain towards humankind or the tendency to like some

human beings and to dislike others.²² Collingwood, it will be recalled, expressed the idea that the "self is correlative to the not-self," that is, others are regarded in relation to ourselves.²³ It

is only through the level of will that we can escape or rise above these two courses and this is deliberate choice.

Now Collingwood believed that a negation of free will lay in the lack of development of intelligence or mental maturity, in the dependence upon emotion rather than reason. These groups achieve communal life only through a leader or a hierarchical establishment amongst the community members. This type community was the "natural condition of mankind" according to Hobbes. For these, life may be "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short . . ."²⁴ Even so, their

tendency, as humans, would be toward gregariousness. Humankind is inherently imitative.²⁵ Since individuals do imitate others, if such a community were surrounded by a truly social community, the promise of a social community is enlarged. To abstract from a non-social community in this case, from anthropological discoveries,

means to attempt to control the process of change, a basic challenge of political thought.

At first, the "will to civilization is just will."²⁶ To will civilization means taking charge of a situation corporately and individually to reason in the process of civilizing humankind. A community can become civilized only when individual members are free and also possess free will.²⁷ A consciousness of freedom stems from self-respect as well as respect for others. Collingwood argued that the two terms, civility and servility, are often confused. While both connote demeanor, civility towards others implies the demeanor of a self-respecting person toward another who is also respected whereas servility implies a non self-respecting person's demeanor toward another whom he fears.²⁸ Self-respect is achieved by the exercise of one's will. Contrarily, a will to barbarism is the will to treat others servilely producing the lack of respect for oneself as well as for others.²⁹ In this case, the will of the ruled has become suicidal.

Civilization, it will be recalled, was defined as process wherein members become free agents possessing and exercising a free will. It is also "the process of converting a non-social community into a society" or the process of socializing.³⁰ Civility is the ideal condition of sociality whereby each community member "respects himself and all his fellow-members, treats them accordingly, and expects them to treat him likewise."³¹ Yet the ideal condition is impossible to achieve because "every particular society has about it a trace of the non-social community out of which it emerged."³² The process of socialization is dialectical and "exists in its purest form in the

family."³³ The family or parents, as socializing agents, is far superior to our modern practice of using specialists for two reasons: (1)"their power over the child is much greater," and (2)"the parent as educator has the resourcefulness, the versatility of the non-specialist."³⁴ The emotional control of parents over children is the great advantage enjoyed by them over the specialist. It provides the motivation to do something well.

It is more than pitiable, it is ghastly to see Plato, after his long and heroic struggle against the professional educators or 'sophists,' enthusiastically giving in to them on what he knew to be the vital issue of all politics, the care of children: taking children out of their parents' hands and turning them over to state-employed professionals . . .³⁵

The parent, as educator, unlike the professional, "has no failures."³⁶ If Collingwood can be supported in his pronouncement that humankind is far more imitative than Hobbes allowed for, then his theory of education or the process of socialization must not be left up to the professional educator is strong. Children, wishing to be like their parents, will learn to do many things well plus having more time to explore their unique selves in the world. [It must be realized here that Collingwood also does not view a world where parents must spend so much of their time away from home a civilized state either.] It is a matter of record, of course, that any state employing devices of control must indoctrinate the young. Collingwood announced that when a civilization turns over the socialization process to the professional, it is tied to a method, to a bureaucracy, and to a tyranny of time.

What, then, should become of those trained as professional educators? That question now has become a most difficult problem because people no longer have self-confidence in themselves to do anything without the expert. Yet there is a vast domain of experience which has resisted professionalization such as pasttimes, eating, sleeping, and making love.³⁷ This latter area "includes almost that is enjoyable in life"; in deed, "life would be impoverished, brutalized, uglified if everything in it were handed over to experts and the spirit of irresponsibility banned."³⁸ Collingwood recommended to parents with children the following solutions: (1)Spend more time in the company of your children; (2)Share meals and bedrooms; (3)If work or dirt appear to preclude the children, let the former go; (4)Should your children get on your nerves, neglect them some; don't take them too seriously.³⁹ His solution for the educator's job was: (1)Let him teach those who want to learn, inclusive of parents and children;⁴⁰ (2)Let him go on researching. Much of Collingwood's work presents an implicit or heuristic philosophy of education since he espoused a unity and a wholeness in the life of the mind, a growing unity as the person becomes conscious of his own self-creativity. The life of the mind is liable to err; adducing the erroneous within a subject-matter is the growing edge in a person's education. A child must come to understand this process and to know that education is for 'real' as he is permitted to risk error without paying the penalties which might accrue later. Collingwood believed that "consciousness is thought in its absolutely fundamental and original shape.

Consciousness owns to itself its feelings although a false consciousness⁴¹ disowns them. On the other hand, consciousness may attend to a feeling and ignore it laying the foundation for a corruption of consciousness. A corrupt consciousness is an aborted consciousness; it cannot accept a given idea nor persevere in the process. This corruption implies that the imagination is likewise corrupt; the corrupted consciousness whether of a person, a society, or a civilization affects all dimensions of its intellectual products. The imagination plays a key role in Collingwood's theory of education since it is the first step in a growth of knowledge; it is here that encouragement must be given to the child because through imaginative constructions the mind becomes embodied in knowledge. Collingwood has discussed knowledge and experience as having overlaps or levels. While in no meaningful sense can a succeeding stage be said to be determined by the previous one, at each level the power of selective attention permits the entire field of consciousness to determine the next level or a regression or a "false consciousness." While this takes place below the level of choice than that involved in "conscious" choice, there is a kind of freedom in that the higher levels of consciousness are not determined by the lower. Further, freedom is manifest in the creativity which is involved in the progression from lower levels to higher levels because this progression is made possible through the imaginative construction of elements and links. This imaginative creativity becomes increasingly important as one moves from one level to the next.

The concepts of Collingwood concerning education as a socialization process fits in with several of his other theories, notably those of language, of experience, and of that already mentioned, consciousness and thought. It is well worth reviewing here since political thought is seen as a dialectical, critical, and continuous, a process whereby the socialized (the rulers) coopt the non-social community into the ruling class. First, language is viewed as a crucial structure and is a function in the mind's odyssey. The statement has already been made that language and thinking overlap. As a speaker, the child is his first listener demonstrating the overlap and eventual fusion of activity. A child's first utterances are a form of unaddressed speaking until the distinction is made between speaking to the self and to the not-self. Learning proceeds by making more and more careful distinctions. For this reason, compartmentalized and fragmented or specialized facts are not knowledge in the eyes of Collingwood. It is an example of what a professional educator will attempt to do to the child.

In his concepts upon language, to some degree Collingwood adumbrated the work of Noam Chomsky in linguistics. Chomsky has challenged social scientists in three general ways: (1) in an anti-behavioral stance, (2) in empiricist-structionalist themes, and (3) in a skeptical stance towards current concepts of human nature. If these challenges of Chomsky are compared to Collingwood's ideas upon psychology, upon experience, and upon self-consciousness, certain similarities present themselves. First, Collingwood charged psychology with pretense when it claimed to be a "science of mind."⁴² Psychology

proper is, rather, the "science of sensation, appetite, and the emotions connected with them."⁴³ Reporting upon his encounter with the study of the works of Freud, Collingwood wrote:

But when I came to study his works I was not unprepared for the discovery they they reached a very high-scientific level when dealing with problems in psychotherapy, but sank beneath contempt when they treated of ethics, politics, religion, or social structure.⁴⁴

Chomsky, in his attack on behaviorism, concentrated upon the extension of psychological learning theory to linguistic behavior:

. . . if the conclusions I attempted to substantiate in the review are correct, as I believe they are, then Skinner's work can be regarded as, in effect, a reductio ad absurdum of behaviorist assumptions . . . I do not . . . see any way in which his proposals can be substantially improved within the general framework of behaviorist or new-behaviorist, or, more generally, empiricist or ideas that has dominated much of modern linguistics, psychology, and philosophy.⁴⁵

The passage by Chomsky might have been written by Collingwood except that the statement was written twenty-five years subsequent to the death of Collingwood! Chomsky goes on to assert that both behaviorism and empiricism are central to the liberal ideology because it is in these terms that the liberal ideology has been formulated. These two writers, although a generation apart, are pointing to the necessity of a new vision of the nature of human nature. Chomsky's critique is that liberal ideology's intent is to control but that what is necessary⁴⁶ is a radical extirpation of mind. Collingwood regarded positivism and utilitarianism as examples of philosophical dogmatism, a critique he lodged in Speculum Mentis. As presented by Collingwood, positivism

as well as "logicism" are merely formalisms which are but examples of an "attempt to reduce the flow of concrete existence to mere abstraction."⁴⁷

Positivism is the name of a philosophy greatly favoured in the nineteenth century whose motives were a good deal like those of eighteenth-century materialism. Its central doctrine was that the only valid method of attaining knowledge is the method used in the natural sciences, and hence that no kind of knowledge is genuine unless it either is natural science or resembles natural science in method.⁴⁸

It did not matter to the positivists that "thought had occurred but what did matter was whether it "satisfied the scientific criterion of validity."⁴⁹ The problem, for Collingwood, was that he believed that scientific inquiry fell into two stages: (1) the ascertainment of facts, (2) the classification of facts. Facts were only those observable upon which a hypothesis was then framed. Collingwood quarrelled with the definition of fact: first, it was based upon the senses, an error born in the Middle Ages, and secondly, fact more truly belongs to the "vocabulary of historical thought."⁵⁰ Even here, the error became compounded because positivists maintained that every "notion is a class of observable facts."⁵¹ This is tantamount to saying that science itself has no presuppositions because the "function of thought is to classify observed facts" and yet there must be facts for classification before thought can begin. To observe facts as historical thinking is not only complex but it also involves numerous presuppositions. Thus, the positivist was against metaphysics although

he indulged in metaphysics under the rubric of scientific thinking. Collingwood's critique of the positivists is related to his other notions upon language and activity as phenomena of mind and thought. Imagination, faith, abstract and concrete thinking, when taken as a whole, are implied in all thought. When this process is abstracted from the rest as a separate standpoint, it then becomes an error.

About nine years after the death of Collingwood, Michael Oakeshott was expressing political education as activity and as a concrete whole:

For to understand an activity is to know it as a concrete whole; it is to recognize the activity as having some source of its movement within itself . . . In the understanding of some people, politics is what may be called an empirical activity. This understanding of political activity may be called politics without policy . . . to understand politics as an empirical activity is to misunderstand it, because empiricism by itself is not a concrete manner of activity at all . . .⁵⁴

This quote has been made for several reasons: first, those who lean upon culture, history, etc. have been labelled "humanists" or as those political theorists who can be put into a humanist framework by

⁵⁵

Michael Weinstein. Secondly, Hanna Fenichel Pitkin has labelled

Oakeshott as a conservative although this author has praised him for being able to teach "much about . . . 'the need for roots' . . . He

sees the damage done to people when their lives become fragmented and chaotic . . ."⁵⁶ Pitkin sums up Oakeshott's Rationalism in Politics

by showing that tradition can serve as a basis for political decisions through:

First, do not introduce principles or institutions alien to the indigenous traditions. Second, strive always to enhance coherence within the existing tradition(s); where the existing patterns conflict, act so as to reduce that conflict. Third, do not hope to find answers in any abstract principle, but immerse yourself in concrete knowledge of your community.⁵⁷

While this presentation does pretend to critique either Oakeshott or Pitkin, the facile generalizations found in Weinstein and in Pitkin, particularly in the third reason given in the above quote, demonstrate quite precisely the complaints of both Chomsky and Collingwood since it appears that Collingwood, Chomsky, and Oakeshott are all three expressing dissatisfaction with our manner of knowing, empiricism.

In the same vein, Collingwood challenged another empirical study, that of economics. In an article, "Economics as a Philosophical Science," written in 1925, wherein he explored the relationship between economics and value, Collingwood held that, philosophically,⁵⁸ economics cannot be understood apart from moral action. While all "moral action . . . has within it a subordinate element of economic⁵⁹ action," this does not appear to be the case with economic action. There are three forms of action: impulsive action, economic action, and moral action. In all action, "impulse or desire play a part" and,⁶⁰ in some sense, "all action is impulsive." "In economic action,⁶¹ impulse is . . . subordinate to duty." Economic acts usually assert a relation between two things: the immediate act and the⁶² mediate act. An immediate act is the means and it is considered useful or prudent; a mediate act is the end, possessing desiredness.

Contrary to the usual economic language, philosophy asserts that "all economic exchange is an exchange between a person and himself. If the appeal is made to more than one person in such a discussion, the rejoinder is that a desired activity cannot be transferred.

Now because, in an economic act, I am answerable to myself only for driving with myself a bargain which shall satisfy myself, it follows that there is no appeal from this act: there is no fixing the right price of anything except by finding out the price which, at the moment of purchase, the purchaser is willing to pay.⁶³

Thus, demand as it is used by empirical economicists is not synonymous with desire. The notion that price is dependent upon demand is fallacious in its assumption because "I really pay for . . . my eating
⁶⁴
of this piece of bread;"

Prices are thus fixed afresh by every single act of exchange that takes place. Every such act is a determination of value; and value in the economic sense of the word cannot be determined in any other way.⁶⁵

The formula "buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest" is a definition of buying and selling, generating a conflict within the act between the means and the end. Each economic act, therefore, attempts to evade or to minimize the means. In other words, it is a conflict of interest. In this case, it is impossible for prices to be fixed with reference to justice or to moral conceptions. Collingwood has condemned the idea of "consumerism" and "bargaining" in the labour market. These are contradictions in terms. When a moral motive is imputed into an economic question, the demand is

then a gift. Yet the demand for a just wage or price has both an unsound and a sound motive.

. . . the demand for a just wage . . . is a rational demand and deserving of respectful attention if it is based on the belief that special circumstances, which ought not to exist, induce certain wage-earners to accept a lower wage than that which they would accept if these circumstances were removed. If such circumstances exist, they ought to be removed, for instance by legislation . . .⁶⁶

What legislation should do, as Collingwood envisioned it, is to amend a condition of society, not to fix wages. On the other hand, when the demand for a just wage is merely a dissatisfaction with existing wages, a rationalization, this is not a serious propounding of a standard but is merely a demand for more, an irrational demand. Yet it is predictable of economic action. ". . . it is only when we cease to bargain that we cease to be dissatisfied with our bargains."⁶⁷ "Conflict of interest, competition, the will to drive a hard bargain, is the essence of economic action, and a society in which economic action has no place is certainly a utopia."⁶⁸ Cooperation is necessary in any economic system. The utopian dreams, however, are not to be condemned "against the worship of gain and the acquiescence in a competitive system . . ."⁶⁹ Since empirical science reduces all concepts to the level of generalizations, it is important to a civilization to see exchange as well as the balance of means against ends.

The foregoing discussion illustrates Collingwood's criticism of empiricism, his notions of a civilized community, and the latter's relationship to the natural world. A civilized community, he said,

has now learned to "exploit the natural world in a scientific and intelligent way."⁷⁰ Our needs of the natural world are constantly in flux. Then what is the meaning of civilization?

Wealth is a comparative term; it must be distinguished from riches.⁷¹ "The adjective 'wealthy' applies primarily to a community and only in a secondary sense to its individual members" whereas 'rich' is more applicable to individuals.⁷² Collingwood believed that it was in this sense that Adam Smith conceived The Wealth of Nations.⁷³ A comparative term involves reference to a standard in that it measures up to a standard of goodness.⁷⁴ A relative term is contrasted "with its own correlative."⁷⁵ While terms may be both relative and comparative, those which are purely relative have no standard.

The existence of the contrast between rich and poor is an offence against the ideal of civility; for it involves the constant use of one kind of force by the rich in all their dealings with the poor; economic force; the force whose essence it is to compel the poor to accept or give unjust prices in all their dealings with the rich.⁷⁶

Even though Collingwood asserted that a "contrast between rich and poor is an offence against the ideal of civility," he declared that it was not necessarily an offence against a particular civilization.⁷⁷ Even so, "those responsible for the institutions of a particular civilization . . . must recognize . . . that the existence of a contrast between rich and poor, even a slight contrast, is an element of barbarity in it."⁷⁸ Perhaps a slight contrast could be considered acceptable provided that the richer element pays in service to the

entire community. A wise community "will examine its economic life" carefully to see if the contrast can be justified without too much inroad on its capital.⁷⁹ The only reason for the existence of a body politic is to perpetuate Aristotle's "good life", which is called⁸⁰ civilization.

To accumulate wealth in order to create by its means a contrast between rich and poor is to use it for the destruction of civilization, or the pursuit of barbarism.⁸¹

Civilization, generically, implies a process under way in a community; it is a process of becoming in a double sense: first, that of an individual's relationships with his fellows and the absence of the use of force and, second, that of an individual's relationship⁸² to the natural world showing industry and intelligence. These two ideas are linked by a dialectical process, that of thinking upon the same subject with others and then arriving at agreement with them without the use of force.

Being civilized means living, so far as possible, dialectically . . . in a constant endeavor to convert every occasion of non-agreement into an occasion of agreement.⁸³

The first example of civilization which has been given has been that of the education of children or the ruled class, the non-social element in the community and the importance of the family; the second comment upon civilization has been concerned with wealth within a community and its necessary diffusion throughout the community so that both poverty and riches are abolished. Civilization can be viewed in the first example as a task and in the second

example as a product.

In the European community, the rule of law has been viewed as a necessary element of civilization. The rule of law contains four implications for European civilization: (1) that law is made, (2) that those under the law "can find out what it is," (3) that courts must be established where judgments can be given according to law, (4) that "there must be equality before the law."⁸⁴ The European community became accustomed to a standard of law under Rome as a part of the dialectical process. Law has carried the implication that litigation dispelled the blood feud and the eristical argument. In the twentieth century, we have encouraged the notion that going to law is an eristical process rather than a dialectical process. Law has meant peace and order to the people coming under the sway of the Roman civilization. Force has been used for the sake of agreement. Law and order has come to mean "what civilization demands of you just as peace and plenty have become "a familiar name for the fruits of civilized life."⁸⁵ The value inherent in the rule of law is justice; this value is intrinsic. Peace and plenty, on the other hand, is what the standard of civilization promises you. This latter can be had without the rule of law. Yet law and order are characteristic of a communal life. As a by-product, a community of law and order "is a life of peace and plenty."⁸⁶

Surely, we can remark that, in the latter half of the twentieth century, not only is the rule of law an eristical process, it seldom is likewise a dialectical process. Have we reversed the process of civilization? The question, under the under the scrutiny of Collingwood's

standard of philosophical scholarly standards, would appear to be a negative reply. While we are taught to think of the law as an institution serving the entire community, it has become increasingly discomforting to discover that the law is both written and enforced in a manner which has been deemed racist, class-conscious, and sex-biased.

The meaning of peace and plenty means exertion in activity. Peace is dynamic; it is both internal and external. The former means the suppression of civil war, a complex and strenuous task. Civil war, which shouldn't happen if the ruled class does its job well, can be settled only through repression and conciliation.⁸⁷ Representative of the repressive type is the gangster who brings problems of civil disorder; representative of the conciliatory type of civil disorder is the man who feels he has been unjustly used.⁸⁸ If being civilized means to live dialectically, this means that a person's passions and desires have been overcome through an assertion of one's free will; this is to live at a rather "high and arduous level of mental adulthood."⁸⁹ Gangsterism is the breakdown of mental maturity; this type can pretend to be clothed in the garment of grievance. The test of such an act is each person's amenability towards agreement.

In communities where the rulers quarrel, should the quarrel lead to violence, the community is either ill-governed or it has the eristic habit.⁹⁰ It is vitally important to see that if the entire burden of keeping the peace is left up to the state, this means that the state is perceived by the populace as being inefficient so that the Third Law of Politics does not operate, i.e., that no share of

the socialization process is shared by the ruled.⁹¹ The tradition in English law has been that each person kept his own peace. To take education from the hands of the parents and to put in into the hands of the state is to ensure that the job of socialization cannot be adequately be done.⁹² A community wherein "peace is adequately kept" and quarrels are averted before they happen "is called a well-mannered community."⁹³ This is due to tradition and custom.

"Plenty means a life of mutual adjustment between the positive or commodity-creating elements of the economic process and the negative or commodity-destroying elements."⁹⁴ To keep a civilization, a balance must be struck which enables a person to maintain himself, take care of the education of children, and to maintain health as well as to prepare the entire community from enemy attack.⁹⁵ Commodity-creating elements are those contributing to consumption but this does not include keeping prices up nor to promoting a life of mere consumption.⁹⁶ Plenty can be maintained by controlling both distribution and consumption. Commodity-destroying elements are those promoting power and display as consumption. There is also the element of thrift displayed by both the individual and the collective. To distinguish between the "king's thrift" and "private thrift" still means seeing that every person has peace and plenty so that he can provide his own thrift.

In contrast to civilization, there are two ways of being uncivilized: that of barbarism and that of savagery.⁹⁷ Savagery, negatively, connotes being civilized only to a certain point; barbarism implies hostility towards civilization. These are important

distinctions. If the correct meaning of verbs ending in 'ize' is sought, in the Greek reference, these were derivative from a reference to imitative distinction.⁹⁸ Two other classes then derive from 'ize' verbs: 'ism', "denoting an act of imitation," and 'ist', "denoting an imitator."⁹⁹ Searching for the ground of meaning in the terms civilized versus uncivilized, Collingwood found the data as "the sentiment of approval or disapproval."¹⁰⁰ Now sentiment is both emotional and intellectual. "It begins in an emotional form as an impulse . . . ; it ends with what may be called a rationalization of the same emotional impulse, viz a reasoned case for going in this direction or that."¹⁰¹ Although the term rationalization must today be used cautiously, there are moral sentiments yet attached. A sentiment is social when it concerns "acts done by a society."¹⁰² In social sentiment (action) (rationalization), the aim is to control the things we do. The moral element here lies in its concern for free action, "action for which every member of the society in question is jointly responsible."¹⁰³ The primary aim of sentiment as it operates in societal members' minds is to civilize.

When the sentiment is near the emotional end of its scale, the agent in whom it works is relatively unaware of its working; he does what it bids but without thinking that he acts at the bidding of sentiment, let alone a sentiment which is civilizing his actions.¹⁰⁴

When the sentiment approaches the intellectual end of its scale, the agent in whom it works is relatively aware of its working; he does what it bids no less and no more than he did, but he does so in the awareness

that he acts under the influence of sentiment, and to this may be added the further consciousness that this influence is a civilizing influence.¹⁰⁵

The former method is an infallible sign of political incompetence in rulers and fertile source of weakness in their rule.¹⁰⁶

Barbarism works in reverse; it works negatively near the emotional end of the scale. If a barbarist is bent upon destroying civilization, he knows what civilization is.

The process of socializing the non-social community is the process of civilizing it.¹⁰⁷

The advantage of the barbarist lies in the unpreparedness of his
¹⁰⁸opponent. Yet the eventual defeat of barbarism is assured because there always remains partisans of civilizations. The very term barbarism implies a quarrel between himself and any civilized person;
¹⁰⁹quarrels are often pushed to the point of war.

A constant theme running throughout this effort to investigate the political philosophy of Collingwood and the "Dialectics of Political Choice" has been the complexity of Collingwood's thought as well as the absolute necessity to see the interrelationship of the whole. Another underlying theme, perhaps not stressed enough, has been the directly opposing viewpoints of commentaries upon the work of Collingwood; some of the reviewers of his work have refused to approach him in an entirely scholarly manner due to: (1) reviewing his work piecemeal or (2) belabouring a point in order to support a more popular position, (3) missing elements, such as the importance of his

philosophy of mind or the 'dialectic' concept so that the whole is 'skewed'.

Rather than detailing an account of the four barbarisms presented by Collingwood at the conclusion of The New Leviathan, two important theories of Collingwood inherent in them, since they are based upon history, are his 'idea of history' and his 'dialectic'. In order to deal with 'the idea of history' succinctly, two short articles by Louis O. Mink and Leon J. Goldstein plus some comments by Lionel J. Rubinoﬀ will be utilized. Some authors who are more critical of Collingwood's work than are these three authors may object to an apparently "biased" selection; however, these reviewers have defended their more supportive position of Collingwood quite carefully. For example, Goldstein's criticism of Collingwood's reviewers is that they have: (1)refused to "approach his view on his own terms," (2)made "no effort . . . to place The Idea of History in its own proper context."¹¹³ Mink contends that: (1)"the growing critical literature on Collingwood's philosophy of history has taken its proof from The Idea of History . . . [although] few attempts [have been made] to range Collingwood's theoretical reflections against his own actual practice as a working historian of Roman Britain . . ."¹¹⁴ Mink makes the point that the 'recessive' ideas of Collingwood have almost escaped notice so that attention has been riveted on 'dominant' ideas. The answer supplied by Goldstein to the charges of critics of Collingwood's concerns the concept of "rethinking or re-enacting past thought" and that of human action,

an important idea in the philosophy of Collingwood and one which is very pertinent to the idea of a 'dialectic of choice'. Goldstein has taken care to provide several examples in order to prove his point; these examples will not be related here. The linkage between the concept of rethinking or re-enactment of past thought, action, and its place in the philosophy of Collingwood has also been emphasized by Lionel Rubinoﬀ in his study, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics. Rubinoﬀ emphasizes the stress placed by Collingwood on looking at a body of knowledge in a purely descriptive, or on a subjective and narrow level (ab intra) and that on a normative or metaphysical level which is then divided into three further ontological levels (ab extra).¹¹⁵

The gist of Collingwood's concept of history, as expressed by Goldstein, in a rebuttal to Collingwood's critics is as follows:

- (1) Historical events are human actions.
- (2) Thought is the inside of an action.
- (3) Re-enactment is rethinking relevant past thought which is provided in a body of historical evidence because:
 - (a) cultural traditions are unconsciously carried on in one's thinking,
 - (b) human action is not behaviorist in Collingwood's terms; human action stems from the facts plus the thought of the actor as based upon (a).¹¹⁶

In Mink's account of Collingwood's philosophy of history, he postulates the following list of factors to keep in mind:

- (1) Historical knowledge is dialectical.
- (2) History is a science of mind; psychology is not.
- (3) History is a form of consciousness reflecting "rational and

deliberate individual action (re-enacted in the 'mind of the historian' as exactly as possible as it was enacted and known to be enacted by the agent), but also process of change of which no participate could have given the account which historical inquiry can give.¹¹⁷

(4) History is that "'thought' which historical inquiry seeks to re-enact does not exclude but includes emotions, desires, motives, attitudes, and acts of will -- all those non-rational aspects of human life which Collingwood has been thought by critics of his 'idealism' to have forcibly expelled from the field of historical knowledge."¹¹⁸

(5) Collingwood used the term history empirically to "refer to the specific class of activities and products ordinarily called by that name, but also often philosophy to refer to a form of consciousness; "Collingwood's philosophy of mind is not an entity but is a set of "activities effective of consciousness . . . "¹¹⁹

Mink's logical reply to those who criticize Collingwood's idea of history must begin with "Collingwood's dialectical philosophy which awaits the unsparing criticism which is its due and which it has not yet received."¹²⁰

Collingwood drew a distinction between history and 'pseudo-history.'¹²¹

History concerns "narratives of purposive activity";¹²² in pseudo-history, "there is no conception of purpose." He expressed this "new conception of history" in the phrase: 'all history is the history of thought'.¹²³ We can know the history of a thought through language or in one of the many forms of expressive activity.

If Collingwood's ideas upon history are linked with his efforts in metaphysics, the notion of a relative presupposition appears implicitly in questions arising about evidence which presupposes knowledge. An absolute presupposition is something which goes unverified, unquestioned, and undiscovered. Donagan takes a portion of

Collingwood's meaning to be that any series of questions and answers would be "logically impossible" except for absolute presuppositions; he then interprets "logical impossibility" in terms of deductive logic so that a refutation of the notion arises from the facts so that "no presupposition can be self-evidently a necessary truth or a contradiction" as well as the idea that "any absolute presupposition can be converted into a relative one."¹²⁴ Collingwood, however, argued that "no two propositions can contradict one another unless they are answers to the same question."¹²⁵ If knowledge in history is questioned, we have no further knowledge and our question becomes one of mere suspicion. Three important factors have contributed to Collingwood's notion of rethinking. First there is his concept of history as a whole; second is his introduction to the theory of historical imagination by which one can interpolate between known facts to produce the whole; third there is the idea that the historian must treat as separate entities what happened in the past in terms of thought and what happened in terms of the evidence and what the historian can say.¹²⁶

FOOTNOTES

1. Collingwood, The New Leviathan, op. cit. 34.12, 34.14.
2. Ibid., 34.16.
3. Hugh Walpole, "R.G. Collingwood and the Idea of Language," op. cit., p. 3.
4. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
5. New Leviathan, op. cit., 34.5.
6. Ibid., 34.51.
7. Ibid., 35.38.
8. Ibid., 35.55.
9. Ibid., 35.63-35.64.
10. Ibid., 35.66.
11. Ibid., 35.82.
12. Ibid., 35.83.
13. Ibid., 35.90-35.93.
14. Ibid., 36.85.
15. Ibid., 36.87-36.88.
16. Ibid., 36.46.
17. Ibid., 36.51.
18. Ibid., 36.59.
19. Ibid., 35.44, 35.55.
20. Ibid., 36.7.
21. Ibid., 36.72.
22. Ibid., 36.77.
23. Ibid., 36.78.
24. Hobbes, Leviathan, op. cit., p. 62.

25. New Leviathan, op. cit., 30.64
26. Ibid., 36.93.
27. Ibid., 36.88, 37.1.
28. Ibid., 37.17.
29. Ibid., 37.19.
30. Ibid., 37.22.
31. Ibid., 37.25.
32. Ibid., 21.5, 37.28.
33. Ibid., 37.31.
34. Ibid., 37.33-37.36.
35. Ibid., 37.39.
36. Ibid., 37.37.
37. Ibid., 37.86.
38. Ibid., 37.88.
39. Ibid., 37.9-37.94.
40. Ibid., 37.97-37.98.
41. Collingwood, Principles of Art, op. cit., pp. 273-336.
42. Harry M. Bracken, "Minds and Learning: The Chomskian Revolution," Journal of Philosophy, Volume 4, No. 3, (July, 1973), pp. 229-245.
See also Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1966).
43. Collingwood, Autobiography, op. cit., p. 94.
44. Ibid., p. 95.
45. Chomsky, "Review," from Readings in the Psychology of Language, edited by L. A. Jakobvits and M. S. Miron. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 142.
46. Chomsky, "Linguistics and Politics," New Left Review, No. 57, (Sept-Oct., 1969), pp. 21-34.

47. Lionel Rubinoﬀ, "Between Thought and Action," from Critical Essays in the Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood edited by Michael Krausz, op. cit., p. 80.
48. Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 143.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p. 145.
51. Ibid., p. 146.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., pp. 148-49.
54. Michael Oakeshott, "Political Education," Inaugural Address printed in Sources in Twentieth-Century Political Thought edited by Henry S. Kariel. (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964) pp. 120-141.
55. Michael Weinstein, Philosophy, Theory, and Method in Contemporary Political Thought. (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1971). See Chapter IV, "Civilized Humanism," Part II.
56. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, "The Roots of Conservatism: Michael Oakeshott and the Denial of Politics," from The New Conservatives revised and edited by Lewis A. Coser and Irving Howe. (New York: New American Library, 1977.), p. 245.
57. Ibid., p. 259.
58. R.G. Collingwood, "Economics as Philosophical Science," International Journal of Ethics, XXXVI, (1925), p. 162.
59. Ibid., p. 165.
60. Ibid., p. 166.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., p. 167.
63. Ibid., p. 172.
64. Ibid., p. 173.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., p. 176.

67. Ibid., p. 177.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Collingwood, The New Leviathan, op. cit., 38.1.
71. Ibid., 38.2-38.3.
72. Ibid., 38.35-38.36.
73. Ibid., 38.37.
74. Ibid., 38.39-38.4.
75. Ibid., 38.41.
76. Ibid., 38.74.
77. Ibid., 38.75.
78. Ibid., 38.77.
79. Ibid., 38.8.
80. Ibid., 38.81.
81. Ibid., 38.83.
82. Ibid., 39.1.
83. Ibid., 39.15.
84. Ibid., 39.31-39.34.
85. Ibid., 40.1-40.11.
86. Ibid., 40.17.
87. Ibid., 40.34.
88. Ibid., 40.35-40.37.
89. Ibid., 40.42-40.44.
90. Ibid., 40.53-40.57.
91. Ibid. The italics are mine.

92. Ibid., 40.67-69. The italics are mine.
93. Ibid., 40.71.
94. Ibid., 40.82.
95. Ibid., 40.84-40.89.
96. Ibid., 40.99-40.89.
97. Ibid., 41.1.
98. Ibid., 41.15.
99. Ibid., 41.16.
100. Ibid., 41.3.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid., 41.4.
103. Ibid., 41.41-41.43.
104. Ibid., 41.44.
105. Ibid., 41.45.
106. Ibid., 41.52.
107. Ibid., 41.62.
108. Ibid., 41.63.
109. Ibid., 41.76-41.77.
110. Leon J. Goldstein, "Collingwood on the Constitution of the Historical Past," from Critical Essays on the Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood, op. cit., p. 241.
111. Louis O. Mink, "Collingwood's Historicism: A Dialectic of Process," from Critical Essays, op. cit., p. 155.
112. Lionel J. Rubinoﬀ, R.G. Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, op. cit.

116. Goldstein, "Collingwood on the Constitution of the Historical Past," op. cit., pp. 241-267.
117. Mink, "Collingwood's Historicism: A Dialectic of Process," op. cit., p. 157.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid., p. 165.
120. Ibid., p. 178.
121. Collingwood, Autobiography, op. cit., p. 109.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
124. Goldstein, "Collingwood on the Constitution of the Historical Past," op. cit., p. 255. See Alan Donagan, "The Verification of Historical Theses," Philosophical Quarterly, VI, (1956), pp. 193-208. See Donagan, The Later Philosophy of Collingwood, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 72.
125. For a further extrapolation of these ideas refer to L.B. Cebik, "Collingwood: Action, Re-enactment, and Evidance," from Philosophical Forum, II, No. 1, (Fall, 1970), pp. 68-90.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

Collingwood's New Leviathan is concerned with the epistemological problem of a general theory of human action.¹ A fundamental assumption therein is that to be concerned with the individual in the social world implies concern for the characterization of the "person", the "social world", and "civilization". To do this with the rigour expected by Collingwood means that a social scientist must be concerned with philosophy, with the phenomena of the "self" and the "not-self" or the social intersubjective reality. To properly achieve this goal, the whole must be grounded in the phenomena of mind within an historical focus. Collingwood's phenomenological philosophical approach has four features: it is hermeneutic (the logic of question and answer); it is experiential, or mind and thought are identical to act as expressed; it is dialectical;² it is historical.

There is an ambiguity in the term "action" because it has a time reference such as an on-going course of an action's development, the current development (epistemological framework) of the individual and of his society, and the reflection (philosophy in Collingwoodian terms) upon the completed act. Action may be presented in time references such as current, future, and terminated. Action or an act is subject-bound. Action or act, considered phenomenologically as Collingwood has done, and meaning are integral in their epistemic function. That is, meaning is bound to the very conception of action and is vital to its formation. Further, action is situated in a world of others. The human reality is intersubjective, personal, and historical. An analysis of social action cannot be limited to the sphere of contemporaries. Collingwood has rooted action in an epistemological

framework involving the person in a phenomenological, existential experience which is dialectical. Alfred Schutz wrote: "Whoever . . . wishes to analyze the basic concepts of the social sciences must be willing to embark on a laborious philosophical journey, for the meaning-structure of the social world can only be deduced from the most private and general characteristics of consciousness."³

Collingwood's first sentence in Speculum Mentis is: "All⁴ thought exists for the sake of action." He combatted any categorical distinction between thinking and acting or between the theoretical and the practical. Both thinking and acting are stages of a single, continuous process. Mind is an activity. Collingwood's forms of experience or forms of consciousness are modes of action. To recapitulate, Collingwood's basic exposition of mind, we find, first, the level of mind where action originates in pure feeling, an unlocalized an undifferentiated awareness of an organic state. Consciousness originates when a person becomes aware of a state of feeling. Collingwood did not regard mind as an entity; rather, mind is an activity with expressive functions. In Speculum Mentis, Collingwood began by defining perception as the standpoint wherein an individual becomes aware of an object; however, perception ". . . is not abstract immediacy (sensation) but contains implicitly an element of mediation⁵ (thought) . . ." Perception is fundamentally mediation or interpretation since each starting point of thought must already be the product of thought.⁶ Perception in this sense must be understood as reason, not understanding. When Donagan contends that perception implies reason, he has misconstrued Collingwood's scale of forms as

levels of perception equated with reasoning. Collingwood differentiated between perception, reason, and understanding. The perception to which Collingwood referred in Speculum Mentis was not later rejected in The Idea of History. The moot point that Collingwood made was that history is separated from perception as reasoning because it is at the scale level of history that the mind perceives understanding as opposed to reasoning.

Taken as a whole, imagination, faith, abstract and concrete thinking are all implied by any given act of thought although each may be a basis for a separate standpoint. In any act of knowing, there must always be a concrete identity between my mind and its object in that my mind perceives the object only as I know it. The esse⁸ of mind is de hac re cogitare. For this reason, the mind is identical with its thoughts. Collingwood combined the epistemological doctrine that all knowledge is mediation with the metaphysical doctrine of the concrete universal. The evidence of the concrete universal is notable in Collingwood's claim that the object of a particular mind is only one moment in a totality inclusive of the contributions of other minds. The perception of an object is dependent upon the existence of all other moments. Each person contributes to the fact that there is a world of ideas and ideals for others but also, as well, each person indicates his peresence as a knowing subject who desires the existence of a world whereby the other has a responsibility to act in similar ways. This is a dual responsibility indicative of the condition of intersubjectivity.

In Religion and Philosophy, Collingwood elaborated upon the

identity of differences:

Any truth or ideal of conduct expresses itself under infinitely various aspects. A single truth never means quite the same thing to different minds; each person invests it with an emphasis, an application, peculiar to himself. This does not mean that it is not the same truth; the difference does not destroy the identity any more than identity destroys difference. It is only in the identity that the difference arises.⁹

The ontological character of the self, its source of identity, comes from specific acts through which the mind relates itself and thence, constitutes itself; at the same time, these are the acts whereby the mind differentiates itself.

Collingwood's system of levels of consciousness was developed by about 1933 with the publication of An Essay on Philosophical Method. In dealing with questions of moral philosophy, Collingwood worked out a series of mental functions relating the forms of emotion, activity, and value at different levels of consciousness. These strands are involved in an analysis of action. In The New Leviathan and The Principles of Art, Collingwood also presented the connections between the levels of consciousness as a series of cognitive activity. Practical activity and cognitive activity are distinguished into four levels of consciousness. In level one, these activities are not yet distinct while at levels two and three, although they are interconnected, they may be separately analyzed. At the fourth level, a re-union¹⁰ occurs. The reader is referred to Chapter II on "Man: A Philosophy of Mind."¹¹

According to Louis O. Mink, "The process of abstraction is . . .

the originative power of consciousness at all levels . . . one will not understand Collingwood if he thinks of abstract concepts as products of an intellectual process categorically different from "non-rational activities of appetite and imagination, desire, and perception."¹² For example, the terms, "attention" and "selective attention" are the first simple products of abstraction from undifferentiated feeling.

Satisfaction is the form in which value appears at the second level; but although appetite can be satisfied, it is not aware of itself as satisfied. It can be recognized as such only by an act of third-level consciousness. To complete the series: third-level consciousness has the concept of satisfaction, but is not aware of itself as having this or any concept. The concept of a concept is a fourth-level abstraction, and the description of third-level consciousness abstracting the concept of satisfaction from second-level appetitive activity is itself the result of fourth-level abstraction from third-level activity.¹³

Collingwood was convinced that all thinking (i.e. activity)¹⁴ depended upon moral qualities as much as upon intellectual qualities. In the complexity of Collingwoodian thought, moral and ethical qualities are bound up with knowledge in a specific fashion as in the case of religion, the second level of knowledge (in Collingwood's conceptual scheme) and his rather famous position upon "absolute presuppositions", related to knowledge or epistemology. In Religion and Philosophy, E.W.F. Tomlin points out that Collingwood raised "almost all the problems with which during the next three decades [he] was to concern himself."¹⁵ The aim of this volume was to: (1) show that

religion was a form of knowledge, (2) provide the source of Collingwood's differences with the new science of psychology, and (3) relate the interconnectedness of emotion and knowledge.¹⁶

Collingwood defined religion as a necessary mode of human consciousness. In order to examine the relationship of religion to the other activities of consciousness, Collingwood posed the following questions:

1. What is the relationship between religion "and the intellect, that activity of the mind by which we think and know . . ."?¹⁷
 - a. Ceremony is based upon creed.
 - b. Truth and conduct are related; conduct and knowledge are not divorced.¹⁸ If ceremony or action is based upon creed stemming from belief, "a morality assisted by creed is morality founded upon the intellect, for to judge something as true is the characteristic function of the intellect."¹⁹
 - c. "There is no emotion which does not entail the activity of the other so-called faculties of the mind. Religion . . . is not emotion in the abstract apart from other activities."²⁰ Further, the term feeling generally denotes "not a particular kind of activity but any state of mind of a somewhat vague, indefinite, or indistinct character . . . But religion as a whole is not distinguished from other things by its vagueness and indefiniteness."²¹ At times, the word feeling is used as absolute conviction "coupled with inability to offer proof or explanation of the conviction. In that case, to "feel" the truth of a statement would merely mean the same as to know it; and this use of the word therefore already asserts the intellectual content of religion . . ."²²
2. ". . . religion cannot exist without a definite belief as to the nature of God . . . [a] statement of belief . . . is the intellectual content of religion."²³
3. "If religion as creed is identical with theology, . . ." and if "the philosophy of any subject means careful reflection upon that subject," then we have a "philosophy of art, of conduct, of science, and so on." For example, committing a crime is action while reflecting upon the crime is ethics; conducting an argument is science and reflecting upon it is logic. "Consciousness of truths is common to religion and all other kinds of thought; . . ."²⁴

The conclusion from the above arguments is that philosophy is to be distinguished from other forms of knowledge by its lack of method and its employment of the free activity of critical thought.²⁵ In this sense of the word, philosophy and religion are rather identical because "the aim of each alike [is] to transcend particular points of view, to overcome the limitations of individual interest."²⁶ The ultimate questions of philosophy are those of religion, science, and all forms of existing knowledge.²⁷

Action is not separable from thought or knowledge unless it is some type of automatism springing from the unconscious; action is customarily based upon a number of judgments, either true or false. Collingwood has argued that the "converse is equally true"; if knowing is activity, if thinking requires effort, if these are the outcome of choice, then "there can be no activity of thought apart from activity of the will."²⁸ On this premise, the "distinction between a life of thought and a life of action" is false. If thought and action are necessary to each other, and if religion is established as having a compound of philosophy and morality, philosophy always involves morality and thus, all of life "shows the composite character which is the mark of religion." Collingwood's belief as established by these arguments was that knowing and acting cannot be separate nor two parts of the mind because "the whole self wills, and the whole self thinks."²⁹

. . . consciousness and volition . . . always exist side by side . . . all consciousness is volitional, and . . . all volition is conscious . . . the mind is what it does; it is not a thing that thinks, but a consciousness; not a thing that wills, but an activity.³⁰

reference to reality . . . In conduct generally we have certain actions, individual or social, designed to attain the ends of morality, utility, or the like; psychology will study these actions without asking whether they are right or wrong, but taking them merely as things done.³³

Collingwood's attack on psychology denied the possibility of a psychological science of mind whose conclusions take the form of general hypotheticals. He did not deny the validity of psychology as a study of feeling. In his Autobiography, he defined psychology as "the science of sensation, appetite, and the emotions connected with them" and also at times with "psychopathology and psychotherapy."³⁴ His attack upon psychology as a pseudo-science of the mind would not invalidate the more contemporary views of psychology as an experimental science of behaviour. If Collingwood's dialectical structure of mind is viewed as providing a requisite background for understanding reflective thought at the level of will and choice, it is easier to comprehend his attack upon psychology and psychotherapy. Experience, according to Collingwood, at the first, second, and third levels of consciousness is a collection of temporal sequences. For example, appetite and imagination are modes of consciousness of feeling. At the third level, desires and perceptions are activities without objects. At the fourth-level, consciousness forms a self-referential series so that, while the lower level states remain, they are now modified. Psychoanalytic theory maintains that many actions are symbolic enactments of the actor's unconscious desires and that reasons given then are "rationalizations". Two objections to the statements

In his discussion of religion and feeling or emotion, Collingwood had to be concerned with the study of psychology. While the philosophical sciences such as logic, ethics, etc., also attempt to study the mind, they are not psychological. If psychology as a science cannot be set apart from philosophy as a study of mind by its subject matter or by its inclusion of conduct (a title already claimed by ethics), then the peculiar nature of psychology is due to its method; Collingwood described the method as follows:

The psychology of knowing differs from logic or the philosophical theory of knowledge in that it treats judgment -- the act of knowing something -- as an event in the mind . . . It does not go on to determine the relation of this mental event to the "something" known, the reality beyond the act which the mind in that act, apprehends. Such a further investigation would be metaphysical in character and is therefore avoided by psychology. Now this formula can be universalized, and thus gives us the definition of psychological method. Take the mental activity as a self-contained fact; refuse . . . to treat of its metaphysical aspect, its relations with real things other than itself; and you have psychology.³¹

Collingwood's complaint was that psychology refused to raise ultimate questions; thus, he claimed that psychology was "external" meaning that the "air of concreteness and reality" assumed by psychology was a delusion because the psychologist "declines to join in the question whether it is true" and thus cuts himself off from participation or even the subject of study, the mental life and its experiences.³²

. . . in scientific thought as studied by logic we have a judgment in which the mind knows reality; psychology, treating the judgment as mere event, omits its

of psychology from the Collingwood standpoint are: (1) while some explanations of behaviour such as tics stammers, etc. may be the outcome of physical processes, the theory more crucial for politics is that regarding purposive action wherein psychoanalytic theory holds that what an agent thinks he is doing may not be what he is really doing. If this point is conceded, it is not possible to discover what is the purpose without discovering first what the agent believes himself to be doing or one could not describe the act to be explained; (2) in Freud's notion of the preconscious or unconscious, there appears to be unconsciously purposive acts of which the agent is unaware or in which there is no reflective thought in the Collingwoodian sense. In modern existential psychoanalysis, the concept of the unconscious is rather rejected and action is regarded as a chosen course by the actor. This theory is compatible with Collingwood's theory of mind although the theory of mind is not more developed than that presented by Collingwood.³⁵

N. K. O'Sullivan in "Irrationalism in Politics" has explained Collingwood's extreme stand upon psychology; Collingwood felt that the science of psychology had been understood in too narrow a sense. In actuality, philosophy since the seventeenth century, "including moral and political philosophy, has been psychology in this sense."³⁶ Those who have elevated psychology to the master discipline include: Hobbes, Locke, Hume, J.S. Mill, and Freud. Psychology, an irrationalism in the Collingwoodian perception, has "penetrated to the heart of our political tradition" due to its theory of knowledge.³⁷

We have now to consider first how and when, and secondly with what degree of success, psychology decided to abandon its status as a mere science of feeling and to capture for itself the business formerly done by the sciences of thought.³⁸

In the theory of knowledge the same revolt was at work. Here it took the form of maintaining that intellectual activities, or operations of thought, were nothing but aggregations and complexes of feelings and thus special cases of sensation and emotion. Theoretical reason or knowledge was only a pattern of sensations; practical reason or will, only a pattern of appetites. Just as the aim of materialistic biology was to wipe out the old biology with its guiding notion of purposive function, so the aim of what I will call 'materialistic epistemology' was to wipe out the old sciences of thought, logic and ethics, with their guiding notions of truth and error, good and evil.³⁹

O'Sullivan believes that Collingwood has stated that the "irrationalism produced by this identification of psychological with philosophical method has a disastrous consequence for politics: since all argument is, from the Collingwoodian psychological point of view, merely the expression of feeling or emotion, it destroys the possibility of rational political argument."⁴⁰ Public discussions of principles, of facts, public debate, etc., have been "replaced by a style of politics in which the tendency is to choose leaders."⁴¹ While O'Sullivan's points are accurate and poignant for democratic politics, what Collingwood has argued has a wider impact and scope than that. It has to do with the scientific paradigm as the fashion for all knowledge, with relativity theories doing away with concepts of justice which can be respected, with the concept of civilization in history,

with theories of personality, and so on. For this reason, Collingwood's work is well worth reconsideration.

The above arguments can be illustrated by Collingwood's belief that man makes himself, by the growth of irrationalism in the nineteenth century, and the recent recurring doubt that our methodology will solve much more than we already have been able to solve with it, and that it is a great source of limitation as well as creativity. The studies of myths are illustrative of covert value judgments which determine the limits of human self-making and human responsibility. These have been termed "self-fulfilling" prophecies. Some which have been current in the twentieth century are: 'rational man', 'irrational man', man as a tabula rasa whose nature and character are entirely products of the environment, the 'existential' man who begins as a 'nothingness' and, finally, that now under attack, the myth of the value-free social sciences because they are 'scientific'. It could be asserted that they have become scientific in order to appear to be value free! Michael E. Kirn has voiced this concern in his discussion, "Behavioralism, Post-Behavioralism, and the Philosophy of Science: Two Houses, One Plague."⁴² Kirn voices a Collingwoodian complaint some forty or more years after Collingwood:

It is the central argument of this essay that this phenomenon -- the appeal by political scientists to the authority of, and the resulting dependence on, various studies of the natural sciences -- tends to obstruct the clarification of the philosophical and social foundations of the systematic study of politics, and to hinder the articulation of an adequate concept of political science.⁴³

Kirn points to a central tenet of Collingwood, that of "clarification resulting from philosophical and empirical studies of what one is actually doing, of what presuppositions lie behind one's work . . ." ⁴⁴ He finally asserts the central importance of this work of Collingwood through his concern with method, philosophy, history, and the likelihood that political science is, as yet, pre-paradigmatic.

Only through detailed philosophical, historical and sociological inquiries can progress be made toward understanding the philosophical and social functions of political science.

Perhaps the problem is to determine in what specific sense political science is a pre-paradigmatic science.

These questions -- methodological, historical, sociological -- have yet to be systematically and thoroughly investigated. So long as political scientists persist in assuming that the natural sciences provide a model for all scientific inquiry they will remain to be studied. So long as political scientists continue to engage in ritualistic invocations of the authority of one or more schools of the philosophy of science when questions of method are raised, the philosophical and methodological foundations of political inquiry will remain obscure . . . ⁴⁵

These observations made by Kirn have also been asserted by Hans-Georg Gadamer:

The logical self-reflections which accompanied the development of the human sciences in the nineteenth century is wholly dominated by the model of the natural sciences . . . The word Geisteswissenschaften was made popular chiefly by the translator of John Stuart Mill's Logic . . . From this very context. . . it is apparent that it is not a question

of recognising that the human sciences have their own logic but . . . to show that it is the inductive method, basic to all experiential science, which alone is valid in this field too. In this Mill stands in an English tradition of which Hume has given most effective formulation . . .⁴⁶

But, objected Gadamer, the socio-historical world cannot be raised to a science by such a procedure. For one thing, "historical research does not endeavour to grasp the concrete phenomenon as an instance of a general rule."⁴⁷ Thus, the peculiar character of the social sciences is the practice of induction which is tied to particular psychological conditions requiring tact, a well-stocked memory, the acceptance of authorities in contrast to the "self-conscious inferences of the natural scientist [which] depend entirely on the use of his own reason."⁴⁸

Gadamer is particularly pertinent to Collingwood's critique of the condition of politics in the twentieth century and the latter's effort to begin anew "classical politics" as it had been inherited from Hobbes through Rousseau, especially in relationship to an understanding of choice and freedom in action. Gadamer put the epistemological question thus:

. . . history does not belong to us, but we belong to it. Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society and state in which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. That is why the prejudices of the individual, far more than his

judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being.⁴⁹

Gadamer finds that the "division of prejudices into those of authority and those of 'over-hastiness', . . . is obviously based on the fundamental presupposition of the enlightenment, according to which a methodologically disciplined use of reason can safeguard us from all error."⁵⁰ The deformation of the concept of authority in the enlightenment period posed the concept of authority as reason and freedom opposite that based upon persons. Authority, objects Gadamer, cannot be bestowed; it must be acquired through knowledge rather than through obedience.⁵¹

Gadamer provides the link to Collingwood's attack upon the denial of religion as a form of knowledge or action, to his historical philosophy, to his premises upon absolute "presuppositions," and to his charge of irrationalism. The essence of mind as action is 'historicity,' neither pure universality nor pure particularity but a concrete synthesis of both. Historical understanding is necessary to each experience and is expressed in a body of categorical and singular judgments. They are categorical due to the fact that the subject judgment is concerned with something actual and because thinking about the subject must be concerned with singular events. Only as the individual is an embodiment of the universal can he be a genuine individual. A universal, in Collingwoodian terms and as opposed to that of Ryle, is a "common nature to a number of things so that it is the ratio essendi of the class as such."⁵² In this statement, Collingwood interpreted universals as abstract and purely ideal when they

dealt with cases in nature such as those occurring in science wherein attempts to relate them are hypothetical. When dealing with mind, universals were concrete or a synthesis of "individual" concrete universals, then differentiated, which, in turn, presuppose statements whose object is the universal itself. When implicit universality is rendered explicit, history itself is transcended into philosophy. This would imply that philosophy is history at a higher level of thinking, knowing, or acting, especially since Collingwood viewed philosophy as the science of mind qua mind. If the mind is viewed as mind qua concrete mind, then the philosophical standpoint is that of the individual philosopher.

Many of the differences amongst reviewers of Collingwood's concept of The Idea of History lie here:

The vague phrase that history is knowledge of the individual claims for it a field at once too wide and too narrow: too wide, because the individuality of perceived objects and natural facts and immediate experiences falls outside its sphere, and most of all because even the individuality of historical events and personages, if that means uniqueness, falls equally outside it; too narrow, because it would exclude universality, and it just the universality of an event or character that makes it a proper and possible object of historical study, if by universality we mean something that oversteps the limits of merely local and temporal existence and possesses a significance valid for all men at all times. These too are no doubt vague phrases; but they are attempts to describe something real: namely the way in which thought, transcending its own immediacy, survives and revives in other contexts; and to express the truth that individual acts and persons appear in history not in virtue of their individuality as such,

but because that individuality is the vehicle
of a thought which, because it was actually
theirs, is potentially everyone's.⁵³

These ideas are immediately involved with Collingwood's other ideas so that standing alone, the above quote, is not easily interpretable. Collingwood was a distinguished historian. If, for instance, the example of his historical study of the interrelationship of religion (Christianity in the Western world) is utilized to explicate the concepts of Collingwood upon history, The Idea of History becomes clearer. The historical aspect of religion was subjected to the new techniques of history from about 1883 onward. This historical movement took two chief forms: that of comparative religion and that of historical theology. To Collingwood, "the danger . . . is not so much that the religious importance of history may be forgotten as that it may be overrated . . ."⁵⁴ This importance led to too much expectation on the part of theologians as well as the tendency to find historical methods the only way to religious truth. Yet historical positivism, according to Collingwood, introduced by analogy with Comte's thought, seemed to imply an anti-philosophical skepticism, a negativism inclusive of two positions: comparative religion and historical theology. Comparative religion has the aim of determining the precise beliefs of a people or a sect; this, however, involves the comparison of various human types and of determining the religious beliefs of individuals as individual members of classes, sects, or nations. It thereby becomes a type of psychology of religion. Psychology treats judgment as an event in the mind not going to the reality beyond the act because to go beyond would be a metaphysical investigation. To

classify beliefs as congruent with action designed with moral conduct in mind is a refusal to come to grips with the consciousness of the individual mind involved. On the other hand, historical theology by cataloguing the heresies of early Christianity has not extended some degree of sympathy with the problems that the heresy was to solve; the problem is always a philosophical one. For example, the historical Jesus does not exist outside an idea in theology and an understanding and sharing of his consciousness. Thus, "history cannot exist without philosophy;" to be accurate, history must proceed with philosophical presuppositions highly complex in character in order to describe⁵⁵ historical action whose meaning is fixed by ethical thought. It is here that Collingwood's notion of the universal and the particular as necessarily existing at once together becomes pertinent:

History, it is sometimes said, is knowledge of the particular, philosophy knowledge of the universal. But the particular is no mere particular; it is a particular of this or that universal; and the universal never can exist at all except in the form of this or that particular. "The universal" and "the particular" considered as separate concrete things are fictions; . . .⁵⁶

Louis O. Mink has summed up a concept of Collingwood's Idea of History which also serves as a reply to those who have been critical⁵⁷ of certain ideas contained within it.

. . . if one considers what The Idea of History does, as well as what it says, it is clear that in tracing the history of the idea of history Collingwood is giving an account of the development throughout the history of Western civilization of a particular concept whose stages of development

are not only exemplified in the thought of individual historians and philosophers but are at the same time characteristic of the way in which whole societies and segments of society have thought about themselves in relation to what they understood as their past and their knowledge of it.⁵⁸

The essential point here is that what men think of in regard to their world and themselves reflects a constellation of absolute presuppositions, varying from society to society and from epoch to epoch which is inclusive of an a priori concept of history.⁵⁹ In conjunction with this, Collingwood also developed an historical analysis of the concept of nature so that this is in itself a history but there is another, the concept of nature itself which is also a history. Mink further points out that it is here that Collingwood's criticism of Spengler, Toynbee, or Marx emerges: they do not see their ideas in terms of what they explain as also being a process of historical change.⁶⁰ Both Mink and Gadamer link the historical ideas of Collingwood to his theory of absolute presuppositions and, in historical analysis, these appear as the following argument:

1. Positivism is to be understood in terms of a constellation of absolute presuppositions applying equally to concepts of history and nature.⁶¹
 - a. Absolute presuppositions are not "idiosyncratic or personal" but are thoughts of individuals.⁶²
 - b. Absolute presuppositions correspond with the differences to be found in the fabric of civilization.⁶³
 - c. Absolute presuppositions provide a link between the thought of an individual and institutions because the latter are constructed by individuals. (Herein occurs the concept of hierarchy as well as competition).⁶⁴
 - d. Conceptual systems which are a priori are primarily corporate in nature.⁶⁵

(1) Economic theory is filled with both philosophical and "empirical" concepts, i.e., wealth, exchange, supply and demand are philosophical while money and credit, capital and manufacture are empirical. Again, the difference here is that philosophical concepts are universal while empirical concepts are particular classes of acts.

(2) Political theory is another study comparative to economic theory, i.e., in Collingwoodian terms, "classical politics" would refer to those philosophical concepts whereas empirical studies would be particular classes such as voter preferences, etc. The source of the universal is the constellation of absolute presuppositions. For example, Kant's theory knowledge made explicit Newtonian scientific absolute presuppositions in relation to Western institutions of law and regularian politics.

2. The primary function of thought is practical action and its derivative is theoretical which is the activity of asking and answering questions. Mink explains the idea by Collingwood's concept of action:

Hence the conceptual schemes in terms of which men come to understand their own actions are also the conceptual schemes presupposed in all objective inquiry; and changes in practical consciousness therefore bring in their train changes in the organization of theoretical thought. The utilitarian conception of action has the same presuppositions as the teleological conception of nature; and the regularian conception of action has the same presuppositions as the conception of nature governed by universal laws.⁶⁶

3. Gadamer explains the logic of question and answer in hermeneutical terms: (The reply also explains the historical-philosophical identification.)

He clearly saw what was missing in naive hermeneutics founded on the prevailing philosophical critique . . . the practice that Collingwood found in English universities of discussing 'statements', . . . obviously failed to take account of the historicity that is part of all understanding. Collingwood argues thus: We can understand a text only when we have

understood the question to which it is an answer. . . since this question can be derived solely from the text and accordingly the appropriateness of the reply is the methodological presupposition for the reconstruction of the question, any criticism of this reply from some other quarter is pure mock-fighting.⁶⁷

What Gadamer is referring to is the rapprochement between philosophy and history but it applies as well to the rapprochement between philosophy and mysticism and the idea of philosophy as transcendental knowledge revealed in the structure of mind as pure act. The only way to understand that ultimate truths can be apprehended by intuition is to recognize the mediative quality of what passes for intuition. That is, the mind does not know how it reached truth. Collingwood contended that it was the business of both scientific and philosophical thought to "lay bare this concealed process, to render explicit the mediation which in the mystical experience itself was only implicit . . ."⁶⁸ Herein also lies the rapprochement between faith and reason.

When the mind aspires to truth, the truth to which it aspires is only a system of appearances but the transcendence of philosophy refers to the process of change which, in concrete life, is a ceaseless act of achieving balance. The mind as "pure act" is a self-creating activity whose essence is to change as commitments formerly made are later conceived to be founded upon some type of error so that the mind transcends itself to apprehend a new truth. Collingwood demonstrated this notion in his discussion of art:

Art as a whole . . . is the pure act of imagination, and this act has its life in a process of self-differentiation and self-concentration . . . which generates

the various forms and phases of aesthetic activity within the unity of the imagination itself . . . The act does not find a material, given from without, to unify which is the problem of its life; it generates the material out of itself and thus sets itself the problems which it lives by solving. In the same way the life of the spirit differentiates itself into art, religion, and the rest in order that it may exhibit its own unity in this diversity; or rather, that it may through this diversity bring into existence a unity which is not the bare unity with which it began but a unity enriched by all the differentiations through which it has passed.⁶⁹

The process of discovery is already the beginning of criticism. Collingwood's metaphysical analysis is the process of discovering what question is presupposed and this is a method of criticism. On the basis of a total experience, in the light of the given proposition from which we begin has meaning and significance, we can develop its implications and discover what we have presupposed. This process by which confusions are clarified is a systematic structure of experience. As absolute presuppositions change, the series of changes is continuous so that critical thought is dialectical. The specification of the philosophical universal into overlapping classes always takes the form of an ascending scale so that overlapping classes are not mere differences in degree nor kind. When these differences are combined (that is, if they overlap), we have a generic concept specified into a scale of forms such that each embodies a variable element in a specific degree, the distinctions between the species occurring at critical points on the scale of gradations. Then the variable element and the generic essence are the same thing and the scale is one throughout

so that the generic essence is successively displayed by the specific forms in continuously increasing fullness. The specific forms are, then, both opposites and distincts, so that the scale consists of a gradation of forms, each embodying the generic essence more fully than the one before but each as distinct from every other and each the opposite of its predecessor in the scale, i.e., as Collingwood maintained that goodness and badness are at once distinct and opposite moral conditions. Eternal philosophical problems are relative to philosophical universals which become specified in a scale of forms.

What has been traced in this chapter thus far is a dialectic of action as purposive although changing in successive historical periods due to a constellation of absolute presuppositions upon which human beings hang their beliefs and prejudices and which form their subjective reality in an historical epoch within a culture or civilization. The moot question remaining is: What has been the contribution of this line of thought and of The New Leviathan to the discipline of political philosophy? N. K. O'Sullivan has begun the answer to this question in his review, "Irrationalism in Politics," when he asserted with Ernest Barker that "there could not be better thinking than there is in the first two parts of The New Leviathan"; O'Sullivan added that it is also "the only major treatise on twentieth-century politics constructed within the convention of classical political philosophy, according to which the concern of the political philosopher is not merely the clarification of concepts and the elucidation of our ordinary political vocabulary but rather the study of the form of polity best suited to an age, the obstacles hindering its

realization, and the conditions necessary for its achievement."⁷⁰

If O'Sullivan is correct, this is no mean achievement particularly when it is recalled that The New Leviathan has been largely ignored since its appearance in 1942 and interest in it has not revived except as it has pertained to Collingwood's "more general philosophical ideas."⁷¹ John Laird, in 1943, also accorded the work distinction in

"both matter and manner . . . and has gone a long way towards emphasizing certain structural relationships indispensable to any political theory worth the name."⁷² Classical political philosophy has

been defined by both these reviewers as that "founded by Hobbes" much as "classical physics" was founded by Newton."⁷³ Laird believes that

"classical political theories . . . remain substantially . . . the "social contract" theory derived from the Roman conception of *societas* and adapted to modern nation-states."⁷⁴ A. J. M. Milne points to two

of the leading ideas of Collingwood in political theory as: (1) freedom and practical reason and (2) the body politic.⁷⁵ Milne continues:

Collingwood's ideas in ethics and political theory need to be criticized, revised, and reformulated, if what is of value, and I think there is much of value, in his account of civilization . . .⁷⁶

In rebuttal to Milne's essay, it appears that Milne was not well acquainted with Collingwood's works and their relationship to political theory in their entirety.

Perhaps the first point to be made concerning The New Leviathan is that the aim of its author was concern with civilization, its danger of collapse, and the phenomena of irrationalism. In the Prologue to Speculum Mentis, he wrote concerning the demise of

civilization:

Today we can be as artistic, we can be as philosophical, we can be as religious as we please but we cannot ever be men at all; we are wrecks and fragments of men, and we do not know when to take hold of life and how to begin looking for the happiness we do not possess.⁷⁷

Lionel Rubinoﬀ in The Pornography of Power has made a summary of the corruption of culture which is pertinent to the epidemic Collingwood described:

But whether we can, as Commager urges us to, "square our conduct with principles of law and of morality that will withstand the scrutiny of public opinion everywhere and the tests of history as well" . . . In its most dangerous form, the propaganda of irrationalism brings about the substitution of the pseudo-morality of power and expediency for the genuine morality of honor and truthfulness. It is also the dynamism which feeds what Lewis Mumford has called the 'forces of anti-life now swarming through our inner world, proclaiming that mechanical automation is superior to personal autonomy, that empty confusion is authentic design, that garbage is nourishing food, that bestiality and hate are the only honest expressions of the human spirit.'⁷⁸

From this quote, political theorists are into very familiar issues: the nature of human consciousness as exposed by Marx and Freud, now elaborated by Theodore Roszak and thence the meaning of liberation; critical issues in sociology as presented by Alvin W. Gouldner and the problem of "objective truth"; the complaint of "abstractness" and "mass" as it is to be found in the target of existentialists.⁷⁹

For Collingwood, the major phenomenon underlying irrationalism and preventing its solution was "the mists of sentimentalism" or the

realist method with its underlying assumptions and analytical method which, to him, carried the seeds of irrationalism. Realism has already been described as the doctrine propagated by G. E. Moore, Prichard, Russell, Alexander, and Whitehead, that the known is independent of the knower. The teaching of such a doctrine corrupted the ruled class because there was no connection between theory and practice and it rendered political theory nugatory. It further promoted an air of scientific detachment so that a public-spirited frame of mind acknowledging a common good was denied. It further insisted that all goods were private and undermined the civic sense necessary to a democratic parliamentary system. This doctrine also undermined the position of T. H. Green and gradually infected the tissue of everyday life. Most of this account is to be found in Collingwood's Autobiography. In that work, he gave a series of illustrations of what he considered the disease of civilization: (1) the loss of meaning in facts in the Daily Mail when it acquired an amusement character of facts and fictions; (2) the adoption of methods of social legislation which encouraged the electorate to seek their own good rather than that of the community as a whole.

Collingwood followed the above attack in his publication of Essay on Metaphysics. Therein, he described the characteristic features of a civilization sharing the common features of: a belief in truth, in scientific, systematic, orderly thinking, in the value of pursuing these activities with energy, skill, and care. A "few examples" of the civilization's most characteristic features would be somewhat the following:

Religion would be predominantly a worship of truth in which the god is truth itself, the worshipper a seeker after truth, and the god's presence to the worshipper a gift of mental light. Philosophy would be predominantly an exposition not merely of the nature of thought, action, etc., but of scientific thought and orderly (principled, thought-out) action, with special attention to method and to the problem of standards by which on reflection truth can be distinguished from falsehood. Politics would be predominantly the attempt to build up a common life by the methods of reason (free discussion, public criticism) and subject to the sanction of reason (i.e. the ultimate test being whether the common life aimed at is a reasonable one, fit for men who, no matter what differences divide them, agree to think in an orderly way). Education would be predominantly a method for inducing habits of orderly and systematic thinking. Social structure would be predominantly of such kind as to place the most honourable and commanding position those who were intellectually the elite . . . Economic life would come into line with the prevailing habit of mind by converting customary methods of production, distribution, transport, etc., into 'scientific' ones; that is, by applying the notion of orderly and systematic thinking to economic matters no less than to any others.⁸¹

In a sort of fantasy, Collingwood imagined the development of a civilization which had been long in existence, which could apply its fundamental principles in a rather elaborate development. If, for example, the "rationalization of economic life" had acquired such proportions that populations could either not be kept alive or only could exist barely through a ceaseless exertion of many scientists, what would happen if this civilization rejected the fundamental principles of its civilization? It would be, asserted Collingwood, something like an epidemic disease resulting in a withering in the belief

in truth and in a denial of the obligation to act in a systematic and orderly way. It would infect religion until it was no longer a worship of truth but one of emotion or emotional states. It would infect education until the ruled would abandon the habit of orderly thinking. It would infect politics by substituting for the ideal of orderly thinking immediate and emotional thinking. It would substitute for the political leader one who personified mass emotions into an "emotional communion with him." It would substitute for the dialectic style of politics the persuasion of conformity to patriotism⁸² by an emotional or terroristic means. Should there be resistance to the disease, the "result will be that the infection can progress only by concealing its true character behind a mask of conformity to the spirit of the civilization it is attacking."⁸³ The disease could still prevail particularly if it were "done in an academic society where scientific specialization is so taken for granted that no one dare criticize the work of a man in another faculty."⁸⁴ Finally, Collingwood suggested that his readers ask themselves the following questions:

1. Has the prevailing religion . . . in the past been a worship . . . of a truth which has been regarded as in principle the same for all human beings?
2. Has the traditional philosophy of our civilization in the past expounded ideals of rational thinking and rational acting . . . which are called forming and carrying out a policy or acting like a man of principle . . . ?
3. Has the political tradition of our civilization been based on the idea of a political life lived according to a plan whose chief recommendation has been its claim to reasonableness?⁸⁵

Should the reader answer affirmatively, Collingwood postulated the statement that: civilizations can perish due to the armed attack of either enemies from without or revolutionaries within but never from this cause alone. It can perish only "if the people who share a civilization are no longer on the whole convinced that the form of life which it tries to realize is worth realizing . . ."⁸⁶ If only one consequence is considered, that affecting economic life, a number of technicians could be compelled to retain the results of their inquiry; these could then become helots and "terror would make them⁸⁷ incapable of thinking systematically."

Collingwood addressed his repair of the infection he described in An Essay on Metaphysics with his New Leviathan wherein he attempted to supply classical politics with the theory it lacked, the theory of the non-social community. Hobbes had provided no method whereby men or humankind in a state of nature attained a moral and psychological condition permitting them to leave a state of nature. The theory was, in that case, static. What was needed was the diffusion of civilized values through a transmission process. Collingwood's theory of political education is dependent upon a theory of free will. It was here that the political situation as it existed in the first half of the twentieth century disturbed Collingwood; the "favourite nightmare of the twentieth century" was "our powerlessness in the giant grip of economic and social and political structures."⁸⁸ Free will is also dialectical in that choice also ascends a scale of knowledge or rationality. Collingwood's choice of examples, the utilitarian, the regularian, and that of duty have already been discussed; they have

been roundly attacked by Milne. It is true that a theory of duty carries with it an idea of necessity which can be but an excuse of an irrational or an unfree agent. In this case, as elsewhere in his writings, Collingwood assumed that his concept of duty had already received a wider audience. In Faith and Reason, he had already explained the concept of "good will" and "duty".

It seems to be a necessary axiom of ethics that on any given occasion there can be only one duty. For duty means what a man ought to do; and it cannot conceivably be a duty to do something impossible. Therefore if I have two duties at the same time, it must be possible for me to do both . . . the distinction between "ought to do" and "ought not to do" is not a question of degree . . . If it is true that my duty can never contradict itself, it is equally true that my duty cannot contradict anyone else's . . . A real duty . . . is a good not for this or that man, but for the whole world.⁹⁰

"Man's life," asserted Collingwood, "is a becoming; and not only becoming, but self-creation . . . The force that shapes him is his own will. All his life is an effort to attain to real human nature . . . This self-creation must also be self-knowledge . . . the examination
91
of the self that is to be."

Perhaps because he was not primarily a political philosopher, Collingwood had little time to consider the problems of polity as power and authority although he recognized these as being there; they were not discussed except incidentally in his other works. His writings upon the problem of evil is particularly pertinent to the political sphere. Power has not appeared in Collingwood's terms except as a dialectical political process and yet, power appears to be

almost without a history although it repeats itself revealing the paradox of evil in choice upon which Collingwood did dwell. In political terms, Collingwood often spoke of this as the paradox of rationality versus irrationality. The "good" of the community or the fundamental will of people in a culture as expressible through the ruling class appears, in history, to foster evil in two ways: political power and its corollary, economic exploitation. Collingwood provided a philosophical beginning for a framework to consider economics and politics outside the usual channels of separate disciplines. The solution, as Collingwood perceived it, lay in the individual and the socializing process (the development of civility). The ruling class, in Collingwood's account, has not functioned effectively since the late nineteenth century. While the problem has been identified as lying in the "three laws of politics", a necessary task now is to tackle rationality within the polity as a political evil. Collingwood concentrated, in most of his works, upon the individual and his development through civilization. In the period of time since Collingwood wrote, the aim must be to understand politics as an overarching reality since human choice is either expanded or limited in that sphere.

The Collingwoodian tradition lies within that explicated by Aristotle, Rousseau, and Hegel; it goes back to the roots of Western civilization to the Greek and Roman notions to form a philosophical dialogue with history, the roots of ourselves and our heritage, and the necessity to continue to develop successive stages of the dialectic as well as the "logic of absolute presuppositions", to expose these latter as the new frameworks appears. Collingwood denied this

tradition and those in the process of creating anew within it in the classical political tradition especially when what was created was less than that encompassing both the universal and the particular. What Collingwood has persevered in presenting to us is a vision of man's becoming. The social contract underlies the basic equation; it is not, as Hobbes believed, the exchange of savage liberty for security but the passage into civil existence through the development of civility. Collingwood has likewise promoted a concept of history not only philosophical but hermeneutical. What he did not do was to investigate specific evils fostered by political power. His insistence upon the link of morality with all action as thought is another imperative for scholarship. Yet the problem of political evil cannot be reduced, as Collingwood averred, to a socio-economic evil; this is merely illusion. An essential area to investigate is the dynamics of the dialectics of the persons who make up the polity. The center of the social contract idea remains freedom founded in rationality. Collingwood has demonstrated that democracy cannot be reduced to a melange of scepticism and relativism. Freedom, responsible action, respect for the individual are parts of the liberal heritage to which Collingwood subscribed, based as those values are upon formal procedures of a certain kind. Perhaps these procedures are not so essential to the dialectic as other aspects of civilization which collingwood mentioned such as community, the ideal of equality or civility, the notion of the "common good"; what has been lacking is group substance. It is to Collingwood's credit that he has pointed out the relational patterns of acting, patterns of order and stability so that an ordered unity and wholeness

appears in the life of the mind. The liberal premise has degenerated into a nihilism or negative freedom.

The conclusion of N. K. O'Sullivan appears to be appropriate enough for a summary of Collingwood's political contribution:

. . . it must be based upon those important elements in his vision of a free and rationally organized political order which were less affected by the shadow of Nazism. These would include his diagnosis of the general nature of irrationalism as consisting in the confusion of philosophy with psychology; his identification of the realist tradition of philosophy as the source of the divorce between theory and practice that has led contemporary political philosophy to abandon its task of identifying the threats which confront the modern body politic and stating the conditions for their removal; his description of the various stages through which rational conduct passes; and above all, his pin-pointing of the major deficiency of the classical politics, viz. its failure to provide a dynamic political theory which would prevent the spread of irrationalism by making adequate provision for political education.⁹²

The conclusion of this dissertation is that Collingwood, through a life-time of disciplined effort, began a dialogue about politics as choice involving action as knowledge or mind. His specific challenge to those who consider themselves members of the intellectual community is to improve, elaborate, and to make practical the applicability of a dialectics of political choice based upon a theory of free will so that rapprochement between theory and practice is thereby effected.

FOOTNOTES

1. Epistemology as the term is used here is a branch of philosophy which investigates the origin, structure, methods, and validity of knowledge. For further elucidation, see Glossary or The Dictionary of Philosophy edited by Dagobert D. Runes. (Totowa, N. J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1972), pp. 94-96.
2. Dialogue means dialectics. Refer to Glossary.
3. Alfred Schutz, Phenomenology of the Social World translated by I. Schutz with an Introduction by Aron Gurwitsch. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), p. 12. Schutz explained that phenomenological analysis ". . . shows . . . that there is a pre-predicative stratum of our experience, within which the intentional objects and their qualities are not at all circumscribed; that we do not have original experiences of isolated things and qualities, but that there is rather a field of experiences within which certain elements are selected by our mental activities . . .", from Collected Papers, Vol. I. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 112.
4. Speculum Mentis, op. cit., p. 15.
5. Ibid., p. 204.
6. R.G. Collingwood, "Sensation and Thought," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XXIV, (1923-24), pp. 74-75.
7. See Alan Donagan, The Later Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 203. Donagan has contended that to view perception in the terms of what Collingwood has called a scale of forms or a series of the mind's errors revealed to itself, then it follows that the kind of perception that Collingwood is talking about in Speculum Mentis is then rejected as a model for history by Collingwood in The Idea of History. Collingwood differentiated from Donagan's interpretation by referring to perception as that of reason rather than that of understanding. It is notable that Rubinoff has in Reason and Faith turned the level around while contending that Donagan has misunderstood Collingwood's dialectic of perception.
8. R.G. Collingwood, Religion and Philosophy. (London: MacMillan & Co., 1916), p. 172.
9. Ibid., p. 106. See also page 177. Collingwood is supported in analysis of society and the face-to-face relationship as the matrix of all forms of social relations. Both Berger and Luckmann combine the sociological insights of Weber, Marx, and Durkheim into an attempted synthesis. This would contrast with that of Parsons who took a systemic view of action. See Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1967).

10. I am indebted here to Louis O. Mink, Mind, History, and Dialectic, op. cit., p. 92.
11. Refer to Appendices A and B.
12. Mink, Mind, History, and Dialectic, op. cit., p. 109.
13. Ibid.
14. For Collingwood, intellectual qualities referred to thinking above the level of imagination while moral qualities exemplified moral philosophy, i.e. philosophical psychology and an analysis and critique of ethical theories. In Essay on Philosophical Method, see pp. 131-32.
15. Tomlin, R.G. Collingwood. (London: British Council by Longmans, 1953), p. 15.
16. Collingwood believed that all existence is inter-existential and that all understanding is inter-cognitive or interdisciplinary. In Religion and Philosophy, we find religion viewed not as the activity of one faculty alone but as a combined activity of all elements of the mind.
17. Collingwood, Faith and Reason: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion, edited and with an introduction by Lionel Rubinoff. (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1968), p. 43.
18. Ibid., p. 47.
19. Ibid., p. 48.
20. Ibid., p. 49.
21. Ibid. Collingwood noted that "the word intellect is sometimes used to distinguish one type of cognition from other types called reason, intuition, and so on. Such distinctions are, in my belief, based on mistaken psychology; and accordingly I use the various words indiscriminately to cover the whole of the facts of knowing." See p. 50.
22. Ibid., p. 50.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 53.
25. Collingwood assessed Plato's contribution to the theory of philosophical method as "the conception of philosophy as the one sphere in which thought moves with perfect freedom, bound by no limitations except those which it imposes upon itself for the duration of a single argument. . ." in Essay on Philosophical Method, p. 15.

Later, Collingwood appeared to renounce this view because of his difficulties in Speculum Mentis. He does use the scale of forms.

26. Ibid., p. 55.
27. Collingwood asserted that: "Atheism itself, if it is a positive theory and not mere scepticism, is in this abstract sense a "theory of God"; the only thing that is not a theory of God is skepticism, that is to say, the refusal to deal with the problem at all." And "since religion, on its intellectual side, is a theory of the world as a whole, it is the same thing as philosophy; the ultimate questions of philosophy are those of religion too. But can we say the same of science" Is not science . . . a view of the universe not as a whole but in minute particular details only?" " . . . Philosophy as well as science is concerned with detail . . . Nor does science take its facts in absolute isolation one from another and from a general scheme of the world; it is essential to science that the facts should be related to one another and should find each its place in the scientist's view of the whole. And any religion must take account of detail . . ." pp. 56-57.
28. R.G. Collingwood, "Religion and Morality," from Faith and Reason, op. cit., p. 67.
29. Ibid., p. 69.
30. Ibid., p. 70.
31. _____, "Religion and History," from Faith and Reason, op. cit., p. 76.
32. Ibid., pp. 76-77.
33. Ibid., p. 76.
34. _____, Autobiography, op. cit., p. 95.
35. W. H. Walsh in "Collingwood and Metaphysical Neutralism" from Critical Essays, op. cit., p. 151 has commented upon the views of psychology of Collingwood which may assist in the interpretation of this sentence. "Collingwood is prepared to allow that psychology is, or could be, a genuine science, but only if it is recognized that it concerns not mind proper but the natural basis of mind -- 'the blind forces and activities in us which are part of human life as it consciously experiences itself, but are not parts of the historical process: sensation as distinct from thought, feelings as distinct from conceptions, appetite as distinct from will" (See Idea of History, p. 231.) This makes psychology a natural and not a social science. Walsh explained that Collingwood is urging the view of man as a free and rational agent who thinks and acts freely. Thus, history cannot be

explained by reference to the "operation of economic, social or psychological forces" which are blind to these facts. To attempt to import a scientific explanation into history devalues the person into automata.

36. N. K. O'Sullivan, "Irrationalism in Politics: A Critique of R.G. Collingwood's New Leviathan," from Political Studies, Volume XX, No. 2, (June, 1972), p. 143.
37. Ibid.
38. Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 112.
39. Ibid., pp. 113-14.
40. O'Sullivan, "Irrationalism in Politics," op. cit., p. 143.
41. Ibid.
42. Michael E. Kirn, "Behavioralism, Post-Behavioralism and the Philosophy of Science: Two Houses, One Plague," from Review of Politics, No. 1, (January, 1977).
43. Ibid., p. 86.
44. Ibid., p. 89.
45. Ibid., pp. 100-102.
46. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method. (N.Y.: Seabury Press, 1975), p. 5.
47. Ibid., p. 6.
48. Ibid., p. 7.
49. Ibid., p. 245.
50. Ibid., p. 246.
51. Ibid., p. 247.
52. Correspondence with Gilbert Ryle, May 9 and June 6, 1935, now deposited in the Bodleian Library, (1964), taken from the work of Lionel Rubinoff.
53. Collingwood, "Religion and History," op. cit., p. 31.
54. Ibid., p. 50.
55. Ibid., p. 51.

56. Ibid.
57. Mink, Mind, History, and Dialectic, op. cit. There are several interesting reviews of Collingwood's concept of history taken from various angles. See W. H. Dray, "Historical Understanding and Re-thinking," University of Toronto Quarterly, XXVII, (Jan., 1958); Morris Ginsberg, "The Character of an Historical Explanation," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, XXI, (1947), pp. 69-77; C.K. Grant, "Collingwood's Theory of Historical Knowledge," Renaissance and Modern Studies, Vol. 1, (1957), pp. 65-90.
58. Ibid. I owe a great deal to the researches of Mink and to his philosophical concepts.
59. Ibid., p. 176.
60. Ibid. The error of each of these, according to Collingwood, is that they do not see the process of historical change in ideas which also belong to history. Toynbee utilizes a conceptual system which does not consist of something applicable to civilization but is related by an external relationship into categories such as those utilized by natural science. Individuality then becomes sharply distinguishable from their environments. Collingwood believed that Toynbee did not historically understand his own conceptual system. See p. 177.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 72. See also Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 332.
64. See the revolt in organizational theory as applicable to political epistemological theory, i.e., Frederick C. Thayer, "Organization Theory as Epistemology: The Demise of Hierarchy and Objectivity," Address at the University of Pittsburgh, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, (1977). Thayer defines epistemology as "nothing more or less than the outline of a decision-making process for the legitimation of knowledge. . ."
65. Mink, Mind, History and Dialectics, op. cit., p. 180.
66. Ibid., p. 181.
67. Gadamer, Truth and Method, op. cit., p. 233.
68. Collingwood, "Can the New Idealism Dispense With Mysticism?" Aristotelian Society, Volume XXIV, (1923-24), p. 173.

69. Collingwood, Outlines of a Philosophy of Art. (London: Oxford University Press, 1925), p. 94.
70. Ernest Barker, "Review," The Oxford Magazine, (February 4, 1943), pp. 162-63. See also George Catlin, Political Science Quarterly, (September, 1943), pp. 435-36 and John Laird, Philosophy, (April, 1943), pp. 75-80. These latter are also reviews.
71. O'Sullivan, "Irrationalism in Politics," op. cit., p. 141.
72. John Laird, "Review," Philosophy, Volume 18, (1943), p. 75.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. A. J. M. Milne, "Collingwood's Ethics and Political Theory," from Critical Essays, op. cit., p. 297.
76. Ibid.
77. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, Prologue, op. cit.
78. L. Rubinoff, The Pornography of Power, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), p. 43.
79. Many other works could be cited. Here, the references are: Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter-Culture. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1969); Alvin W. Gouldner, For Sociology: Renewal and Critique in Sociology Today. (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1973); Wm. Barrett, Irrational Man. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1958).
80. Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 135.
81. Ibid., pp. 135-36.
82. Ibid., pp. 134-35.
83. Ibid., p. 136.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid., pp. 137-38.
86. Ibid., p. 140.
87. Ibid., pp. 140-41.
88. _____, The New Leviathan, op. cit., 12.9.

89. See A.J.M. Milne, "Collingwood's Ethics and Political Theory," op. cit., pp. 302-03. "Collingwood says that Right and Duty are different forms of practical reason. But in terms of his account, they are not really different." The argument by Milne is correct if only the New Leviathan is used. It is incorrect in relation to the total works of Collingwood.
90. Collingwood, "The Devil," from Faith and Reason, op. cit., p. 225.
91. Ibid., p. 232.
92. N.K. O'Sullivan, "Irrationalism in Politics, op. cit., p. 151.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ABSOLUTE PHILOSOPHY -- philosophy of pure act, equivalent to absolute knowledge (Speculum Speculi)

ABSOLUTE PRESUPPOSITIONS -- all questions rest on a foundation of absolute presuppositions. A change in the set of absolute presuppositions raises new questions and vice versa.

ABSTRACTION -- "to abstract is to consider separately things that are inseparable . . . One cannot abstract without falsifying." (SM 160)

APANAGE -- simple consciousness in the form of undifferentiated feeling.

BARBARISM -- hostility towards civilization

CLASSICAL POLITICS -- political philosophers from Hobbes to Rousseau.

CONCEPTUAL THINKING -- second level or above, consciousness wherein features in the objective field of consciousness are discriminated by selective attention.

CONCRETE IDENTITY IN DIFFERENCE -- the same as immanence-transcendence, (1)the relationship between God and man and (2)the doctrine of the universal and the particular.

CONCRETE UNIVERSAL -- a synthesis of particular expressions as this occurs at the third ontological level.

CONSCIOUSNESS -- the generic name for mental functions regarded as activities of a given level. Simple consciousness refers to feeling.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM -- the relationship between the ruling class, the ruled class, and the upward permeability between the two. The ruled class refers to mature adults capable of free will and choice.

CORRUPT CONSCIOUSNESS -- a corruption of the imagination which also corrupts the forms of knowledge.

DIALECTIC -- the stresses and strains of an existential or logical nature giving rise to a new standpoint. The dialectic in Collingwood's usage is a complex idea, modelled after that of Hegel, representing an elucidation of the concept of development . . . applicable to process, i.e., there is no dialectic of nature although there can be a dialectical history of the concept of nature.

EPISTEMOLOGY -- that branch of philosophy which investigates the origin, structure, methods, and validity of knowledge. The relationship between psychology (behavioral sciences) and epistemology is particularly intimate since both are concerned with cognitive processes such as: perception, memory, imagination, conception, and reasoning.

ERISTICAL -- an argument made for the sake of winning rather than for settling differences.

EXPERIENCE -- primary (immediate, unsystematic, unmediated)
secondary (mediate, reflective)

FAITH -- religious consciousness. Collingwood described faith as "theoretical, practical, and emotional"; this does not imply irrationality.

FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS -- refusal to pay attention to the entire field of consciousness.

FREEDOM -- the spontaneity of consciousness at any level in giving rise to activities through selective attention.

GOOD -- any object of desire -- an abstraction from the activity of desiring.

HERMENEUTICS -- stages in the process of inquiry or of active thought in general. This is considered the art and science of interpreting especially in authoritative writings, equivalent to exegesis. Paul Ricoeur has explored hermeneutics as a theory of historical understanding using a historical method which is both critically objective and subjective. Obviously, the term is bound up with philology and rhetoric as well. It is with Gadamer and Ricoeur in his later work that hermeneutics appears as Collingwood expressed it in a type of intersubjectivity wherein communication becomes a dialogue so that the result is dialectic. For a discussion of this see Thomas M. Seebohm, "The Problem of Hermeneutics," Philosophy and Rhetoric, Volume 10, (Fall, 1977), pp. 263-275.

HUNGER -- the appetite to be omnipotent.

IMAGINATION -- aesthetic consciousness or the second level of theoretical consciousness prompted by the conversion of feeling to selective attention

IMMANENT-TRANSCENDENT DOCTRINE -- the doctrine understood in terms of a metaphysics of concrete universality, also characterizes the relationship between God and man. (Any particular mind can show the nature of God as well as any other.) In this doctrine, Collingwood argued that there are three types of universal judgment which, although appropriate to science, are not appropriate to philosophical analysis. First, there is that derived as a generalization from instances; second, there is the concept of the universal as a genus; third, there is the judgment which finds the universal element which binds a species together (a variation of the second.) To arrange all of these judgments on a scale is to frame a synthesis which is 'concrete identity in difference'.

IRRATIONALISM (PROPAGANDA OF) -- an epidemic withering of belief in the idea of an obligation to think and act in a systematic and orderly fashion, i.e., the preference for technical and vocational training as education or, in politics, the substitution of order for virtue.

INTERSUBJECTIVITY -- the transcendence of the subject-object dichotomy wherein genuine freedom occurs. This would be action beyond duty. Collingwood expressed this idea in Speculum Mentis, on pages 304-05. In absolute ethics, an agent identifies "himself with the entire world of fact," and then prepares to act in a unique situation in full responsibility as "identifying himself with the absolute mind"; thus his act becomes one of pure self-creation. It is "identical with self-knowledge" so that the abstract distinction between the will and the intellect is transcended.

LAW OF PRIMITIVE SURVIVALS -- survival of a former state in an ascending scale.

LOGICAL EFFICACY -- power of causing a question to arise.

LOGIC OF QUESTION AND ANSWER -- Collingwood's metaphysics wherein he raises the ultimate questions; in Kuhn's terms, the paradigmatic framework.

LOGIC OF OVERLAP OF CLASSES -- recognition of internal but not external relationships on an overlapping scale of forms.

LOVE -- a form of appetite and desire such as the consciousness of appetitive love resulting from hunger and changing into fear. The abstract concept of contrast between the self and the not-self.

METAPHYSICS (dogmatic) -- the vindication of experience or the discovery of its absolute presuppositions and the experience of the origins and relationships to other sets of propositions, a synthesis of descriptive and normative activities.

METAPHYSICS (genuine) -- vindicates experience on three ontological levels. Collingwood contended that metaphysics was both experiential and historical. Metaphysics conceived as a particular philosophical science would be the science of absolute mind experiencing itself as absolute mind. Absolute mind is the unity of the activities of the mind. From this standpoint, Collingwood can argue that metaphysics is not separate but is identical with particular standpoints (dogmatic). It confirms, then, the rapprochement between philosophy and history already contained in Speculum Mentis. See L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, pp. 207-08.

MIND -- phenomenological or intentional. . . consciousness is concerned with thought which is always particular, including thoughts and things.
Identity of Minds -- basis of the intersubjective communication. Two minds are identical to the extent that they have knowledge of the same object.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY -- giving an "account of how people think they ought to behave . . ." (EPM, pp. 131-32.)

PHENOMENOLOGY -- analysis of habits of mind or successive categories particularly emphasizing experience. Collingwood has been termed a "phenomenologist" because this, in Merleau-Ponty, affirms the subjective meaning of the world and attempts to free this thesis from the accusation of psychologism to drive towards an ontology of nature. See Joseph Duchene, "World and Rationality in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenologie de la Perception," International Philosophical Quarterly, Volume XVII, (December, 1977), pp. 393-414.

PRACTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS -- consciousness above the first level concerned with action.

PROPOSITIONAL THINKING -- consciousness at the third level of mind.

RADICAL HISTORICISM -- tendency to treat the whole of reality in historical terms, i.e., Nietzsche, Ortega, Heidegger, Cassirer.

RAPPROCHEMENT -- restoration of unity of life through a rapprochement between the forms of experience.

REASON -- historical and philosophical consciousness.

REGULARIAN PRINCIPLE -- rule of generalized purpose

SATISFACTION AND DISSATISFACTION -- abstractions from appetitive activities.

SCIENTIFIC CONSCIOUSNESS -- reason (At times, it appeared that Collingwood called this understanding.)

SOLIPSISM -- a variety of idealism which maintains that the individual self of the philosopher is the whole of reality -- also methodological when the doctrine considers the individual self and its states as the only possible starting point for philosophical construction.

SUUM CUIQUE -- a one-to-one relationship between participants and shares.

THEORETICAL CONSCIOUSNESS -- level of consciousness where truth and falsity emerge; consciousness above the first level concerned with cognition. At the fourth level, this would be the difference between capricious and rational choice.

TRANSEUNT RULE -- that which rules something other than itself.

UTILITARIANISM -- used generically by Collingwood, i.e., the morality of an action is derivative from an acts' consequence.

APPENDIX A

| Levels of Consciousness | Series of Logical Dialectical Levels | Object of Knowledge |
|---|---|--|
| <p>Level I</p> <p>(passions)</p> <p>↓</p> | <p>pure feeling --> pure imagination --> no subject-object distinction --> fundamental mode of existence --> only true view of reality --> sensational and emotional</p> | <p>Art</p> <p>↓</p> |
| <p>Level II</p> <p>(control of passions)</p> <p>↓</p> | <p>may be emotional --> moves to practical level --> moral existence based upon pure faith --- assumes historical character --> presupposes false distinction based upon appearance and reality --> retains emotional basis --> aesthetic-logical (one of a number of attitudes ---> affirms identity in difference --> ground of reason --> assertion of truth</p> | <p>Religion</p> <p>↓</p> |
| <p>Level III</p> <p>(desire)</p> <p>↓</p> <p>(happiness-unhappiness)</p> <p>↓</p> <p>(good-evil)</p> <p>↓</p> | <p>abstract distinction between subject-object ---> finds knowledge as species of genus --> abstract universal is conceived of as the whole of reality --> presupposition of faith --> level of reason --> separates universal and particular --> movement from realm of holy to realm of abstract reality --> theory of hypothesis</p> | <p>Science</p> <p>↓</p> |
| <p>Level IV</p> <p>(will)</p> <p>↓</p> <p>(capricious-rational)</p> <p>↓</p> <p>(choice)</p> <p>1. Utility</p> <p>2. Right</p> <p>3. Duty</p> | <p>consciousness transcends itself --> dialectical identity between subject and object --> rapprochement of overlapping scale of forms --> community of intersubjectivity --> nature of presuppositions are exposed --> synthesis of permanence and change --> historical perception = act of judgment --> history = science of mind --> state of genuine freedom</p> | <p>History and Philosophy</p> <p>↓</p> |

LANGUAGE AS SOCIAL PHENOMENA

| LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE | LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS | LANGUAGE | WORKS |
|--|---|--|--|
| Aesthetic | Primitive form of consciousness | Bodily expression of emotion (activity renders emotion conscious) | <u>Principles of Art</u> |
| Practical reason to theoretical reason | Reason (always a rationalization) Natural sciences Human sciences (reflection upon data) | Symbols (things and their referents) | <u>New Leviathan</u> |
| Transcendence | Self- reflective | Linguistic semantics-- philology | <u>New Leviathan</u> <u>Idea of History</u> |

APPENDIX B

*This is only a tentative sketch based upon the ideas gleaned from the three works cited.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Works of Collingwood: (in the order of their publication)

Religion and Philosophy, edited by Lionel Rubinoff,
(Chicago: Quadrangle, 1968) originally published by Macmillan
& Co., London, 1916.

"What is the Problem of Evil?" Theology, I, reprinted in
Religion and Philosophy edited by Rubinoff.

Speculum Mentis, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1924).

Outlines of a Philosophy of Art. (London: Oxford University
Press, 1925).

"Economics as a Philosophical Science," International Journal
of Ethics, XXXVI.

"Political Action," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
XXIX, (1928-29).

An Essay on Philosophical Method. (Oxford: The Clarendon
Press, 1933).

The Principles of Art. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1938).

An Essay on Metaphysics. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1940).

"Fascism and Nazism," Philosophy, XV.

The Three Laws of Politics, L.T. Hobhouse Memorial Trust
Lectures, No. 11. (London: Oxford University Press, 1941).

The New Leviathan. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1942).

The Idea of Nature, edited by T.M. Knox. (Oxford: The Claren-
don Press, 1945).

The Idea of History edited by T.M. Knox. (Oxford: The Claren-
don Press, 1946).

MEMOIRS:

An Autobiography. (London: Oxford University Press,
1939).

Barker, Ernest, "Review," The Oxford Magazine. (February 4, 1943).

Barrett, Wm., Irrational Man. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1958).

Berger, Peter and Luckmann, Thomas, The Social Construction of Reality. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1967).

Bosanquet, Bernard, The Principle of Individuality and Value. (London: MacMillan, 1912).

Bracken, Harry M., "Minds and Learning: The Chomskian Revolution," Journal of Philosophy, Volume 4, No. 3, (July, 1973).

Catlin, George, "Review of The New Leviathan," Political Science Quarterly, LVIII, (September, 1943).

Cebik, L.B., "Collingwood: Action, Re-enactment, and Evidence," Philosophical Forum, Volume II, No. 1, (Fall, 1970).

Chomsky, Noam, Cartesian Linguistics. (N.Y.: Harcourt Brace, 1966).

Chomsky, Noam, "Linguistics and Politics," New Left Review, No. 57, (Sept-Oct., 1969).

Chomsky, Noam, "Review," from Readings in the Psychology of Language edited by L.A. Jakobvits and M.S. Miron. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967).

Coleman, Frank M., Hobbes and America. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).

Debbins, Wm., "The Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood," Ph. D. dissertation, Yale University, (1952).

Donagan, Alan, The Later Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood. (Oxford: Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962).

Donagan, Alan, "The Verification of Historical Theses," Philosophical Quarterly, Volume VI, (July, 1956).

Dray, W.H., "Historical Understanding and Re-thinking," Volume XXVII, University of Toronto Quarterly, (Jan., 1958).

Emblom, W.J., "The Theory of Reality in the Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood," Ph. D. dissertation, University of Illinois, (1962).

Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Philosophical Hermeneutics translated and edited by David Linge. (Berkeley, California: University Press, 1976).

Ginsberg, Morris, "The Character of an Historical Explanation," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, XXI, (1947).

Goldstein, Leon J., "Collingwood on the Constitution of the Historical Past," from Critical Essays on the Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood, edited by Michael Krausz, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).

Gouldner, Alvin W., For Sociology: Renewal and Critique in Sociology Today. (Meddlessex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1973).

Grant, C.K., "Collingwood's Theory of Historical Knowledge," Renaissance and Modern Studies, Volume I, (1957).

Henry, Maureen, "Tradition and Rebellion," Southern Review, Volume 12, (Winter, 1976).

Hobbes, Thomas, De Corpore, The English Works edited by Sir Wm. Molesworth. (London, 1945).

Hobbes, Thomas, The Elements, The English Works edited by Sir Wm. Molesworth, (London, 1945).

Hobbes, Thomas, The Leviathan, The English Works edited by Sir Wm. Molesworth. (London, 1945).

Isaak, Robert, The Individual and World Politics. (Belmont, California: Duxbury Press, 1975).

Johnston, Wm. H., The Formative Years of R.G. Collingwood. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967).

Kaufmann, Gordon, "The Problem of Relativism and the Possibility of Metaphysics: A Constructive Development of Certain Ideas in R.G. Collingwood, Wilhelm Dilthey and Paul Tillich," Ph. D. dissertation, Yale University, (1955).

Kirn, Michael, "Behavioralism, Post-Behavioralism and the Philosophy of Science: Two Houses, One Plague," Review of Politics, No. 1, (January, 1977).

Krausz, Michael, Critical Essays on the Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).

Laird, John, "Review of Speculum Mentis," Philosophy, Volume 18, (1943).

Laski, Harold, "A Tract for the Times," New Statesman and Nation, (August 8, 1942).

Milne, A.J.M., "Collingwood's Ethics and Political Theory," edited by Michael Krausz, Critical Essays on the Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972).

Mink, Louis O., Mind, History, and Dialectic: The Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970).

Oakeshott, Michael, "Political Education," Inaugural Address printed in Sources in Twentieth-Century Political Thought edited by Henry S. Kariel. (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

O'Sullivan, N.K., "Irrationalism in Politics: A Critique of R.G. Collingwood's New Leviathan," Political Studies, Volume XX, 2, (June, 1972).

Pitkin, Hanna, "The Roots of Conservatism: Michael Oakeshott and the Denial of Politics," from The New Conservatives revised and edited by Lewis A. Coser and Irving Howe. (N.Y.: New American Library, 1977).

Post, John, "A Defense of Collingwood's Theory of Presuppositions," Inquiry, Volume VIII, (1965).

Roszak, Theodore, The Making of a Counter-Culture. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1969).

Rubinoff, Lionel, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970).

Rubinoff, Lionel, Faith and Reason, edition of Collingwood's work. (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1968).

Rubinoff, Lionel, The Pornography of Power. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967).

Runes, Dagobert, The Dictionary of Philosophy, editor. (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1972).

Schutz, Alfred, Phenomenology of the Social World translated by I. Schutz with an Introduction by Aaron Gurwitsch. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

Seeborn, Thomas M., "The Problem of Hermeneutics in Anglo-Saxon Literature," Parts I and II, Philosophy and Rhetoric, Volume X, (Fall, 1977).

Stanage, Sherman, "Collingwood's Phenomenology of Education: Person and the Self Recognition of the Mind," from Krausz, Critical Essays. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).

Stanage, Sherman, "The Role of Overlap in Collingwood's Philosophy," Ph. D. dissertation, University of Colorado, (1959).

Strauss, Leo, "On Collingwood's Philosophy of History," Review of Metaphysics, Volume V, (1952).

Thayer, Frederick C., "Organization Theory as Epistemology: The Demise of Hierarchy and Objectivity," Address at the University of Pittsburgh, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, (1977).

Tomlin, E.W.F., R. G. Collingwood. Writers and Their Works Series, #42. (London: Longmans, 1953).