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FARMING AMONG THE KIOWA, COMANCHE,
KIOWA APACHE, AND WICHITA

A DISSERTATION
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degree of
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FARMING AMONG THE KIOWA, COMANCHE,
KIOWA APACHE, AND WICHITA

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INTRODUCTION

The Kiowa, Comanche and Kiowa Apache (KCA) are best known for their part in the culture history of the Great Plains in the period prior to their confinement on a reservation in Southwestern Oklahoma. Their tribal names correctly conjure images of their free life as mounted nomadic hunters and gatherers who subsisted primarily on bison, as far-ranging horse raiders/horse traders, and as superior horsemen and skilled warriors who frequently eluded the U.S. Cavalry.

Their cultural origins and reservation confinement period are less well known. The Kiowa and Kiowa Apache, though of different linguistic stocks, were apparently long term affiliates. Prior to the arrival of the horse on the Plains, both tribes were pedestrian hunters and gatherers and made use of the bison. The Comanche were also originally pedestrian hunters and gatherers. Their movement onto the Southern Plains from the Great Basin was relatively recent

and roughly coincides with their adoption of the horse-bison complex.

Following the Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867, the Kiowa, Comanche and Kiowa Apache were restricted to a single large reservation in Southwestern Oklahoma. Since that time U.S. Government agencies have made repeated efforts to remold these tribes in the image of "civilized" self-sufficient farmers. These efforts have taken a variety of forms from encouraging to cajoling and bribing to nagging to threatening and punishing to training and teaching to equipping and assisting in the fields. It is common knowledge that these efforts were largely unsuccessful. Today there are but a handful of Kiowa, Comanche or Kiowa Apache farmers.

When the question is asked, Why is this so?, one immediately apparent and glib answer comes to mind: The Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache were buffalo hunters who looked down upon neighboring farming tribes and were culturally and temperamentally resistant to becoming farmers. This cultural bias is certainly authentic and is present today, though its potency as a shaper of culture history and its universality among tribal members during the past century is just as certainly questionable.

Getting past the most superficial consideration of the problem, we are required to deal with three perplexing facts: (1) Throughout their culture history, the Plains tribes, including the KCA, certainly showed an ability to adapt. (2) The Wichita, a "peripheral Plains" village farming group, were located in the same area at the same time and are in the same situation today vis-a-vis success in farming. (3) There have been at various times since 1867 significant numbers of Kiowa, Comanche, Kiowa Apache, and Wichita (KCA/W) farmers.

It would seem, then, that the above mentioned answer, that a cultural bias prohibited the Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache from becoming successful farmers, is inadequate and that the question remains unanswered. From even a cursory consideration of the problem, it becomes apparent that any single factor answers, simple determinist hypotheses or limited time foci would be found wanting. All this is but a way of making a claim for the need to examine the historical complexity surrounding the problem.

As an indication of the welter of historically varying factors directly affecting the adoption and success of farming among the Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache, the following partial list is offered:

1. Periodically fluctuating federal policy with respect to treaty responsibilities and the legal status of American Indians and their property.
2. Treaty violations and hostile responses on both sides.
3. The frequency of turnover in local Indian agency administration and continuity between administrations.
4. The attitude and honesty of the local agents.
5. Inconsistent agent efforts to encourage farming (cajole/threaten; withhold rations/furnish rations).
6. The growth of agency paternalism and individual Indian dependence on the agent.
7. Varying soil conditions and rainfall in South-western Oklahoma.
8. The location of grain elevators, mills, and gins.
9. Fluctuations in local market prices for various commodity crops.
10. Commodity market fluctuations in the national economy.
11. The changes in the Department of Agriculture policy and application of crop reduction programs.
12. The relationship between farming technology and minimum acreage.

13. The variety of sources of Indian subsistence (bison/rations/gardens "grass money"/"lease money"/etc.).

14. Opportunities to lease or sell Indian land.

15. The size and suitability of Indian allotments for subsistence farming.

16. Indian land inheritance practices and the fractionation of original allotments.

17. The availability of capital to Indians to begin farming.

18. The availability of farming implements, seed, and agricultural training.

19. The effect of efforts to "civilize" the Indians upon the social organization of the Indian population.

20. Inter-tribal competition and intra-tribal factionalism.

21. Traditional Indian attitudes toward farming.

An answer as to why the KCA/W didn't become successful farmers is not to be found, however, in a list of variables. This list is only offered as a sample of the complex series of historically occurring factors at work.

The proposed explanation will be phrased in terms of an analysis from three directions. First, the application of government policy and resulting local farming programs

will be examined. Second, attention will be given to the sequential variance in the favored Indian adaptations and their fit in the developing local agro-economy. Third, the import of the development and maintenance of hindering paternalistic relations between the government and the KCA/W will be assessed as it can be seen to affect Indian farming.

An historical examination of administrative policy (federal government, military, Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the local agency policy) is seen as crucial in that there lies the motive force behind the early push toward Indian farming and the source of many of the economically significant conditions with which the KCA/W had to deal. In treating the sources of administrative policy, the events, assumptions, and politics behind the historical development of policy will be evaluated. The greatest attention, however, will be given to policy application and sanctions at the local level where the effect of administrative discontinuities, internal inconsistencies, restrictions, and policy violations can be fully appreciated. In the phrasing and application of administrative policy, numerous unrealistic expectations in the government's view of the problem of Indian self-sufficiency can be identified and subsequent frustrations and policy reversals better understood. In no

way, however, is the effect of government policy applications seen as determining, though it can certainly be sighted as greatly contributing to the defeat of the farming option.

The Indian's varying alternative economic adaptations will be treated in the context of historically developing environmental, technological, and economic conditions affecting farming in the KCA/W reservation and allotment area. The methodological frame of reference taken here is broadly ecological. Adaptation is used as a general term descriptive of the process whereby the KCA/W (and all populations) are seen to adjust or cope with varying conditions in their environment. The intent here is to emphasize the conditions surrounding Indian farming (and more broadly, survival) as they unfold and to provide the kinds of ethnohistorical information that will aid us in better understanding the KCA/W adaptations and present economic conditions. It will be seen that the stereotype of Indians having squandered a golden opportunity for economic success through farming is a grim joke indeed. Finally, a brief discussion and comparison of KCA/W patterns of adaptation over an extended period from pre-horse hunting to the present will be offered.

Also worthy of close examination is the historical development of paternalism, seen here as a reciprocal relationship which in this case served to perpetuate a critical dependence on the part of the Indians and helped defeat any design for Indian self-sufficiency. Paternalism, to be sure, is not all one way--neither completely a blessing nor totally a curse. On the reservation, the agency gave some real assistance to the KCA/W though the price was steep in terms of regulatory restrictions and eroded initiative. Even in post-allotment times, as the BIA sought to protect the financial and landowning interests of the Indians, much power of self-determination was lost. The bureaucracy that the KCA/W came to depend upon in so many ways was a great hindrance in its lack of sensitivity to their problems and its crippling over-protection.

The form of presentation used here can best be called ethnohistorical/ecological. The first chapter presents the general pre-reservation cultural ecological picture for the Southern Plains and emphasizes the adaptability of the Plains tribes in their precontact situation. The second chapter offers a brief ethnographic description of the KCA/W and a resume of their culture history and contact experience prior to the Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867. These chapters serve

as a baseline against which succeeding economic adaptation may be appraised. The following three chapters cover historical periods and offer material on administrative policy, KCA/W economic adaptation (especially farming), and paternalism. Each chapter concludes with an analysis of the condition of Indian farming in that period. The general conclusions chapter follows in which a summary analysis and answer to the Indian farming question is offered.

The sources used include such documentary evidence as the Annual Report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (ARCIA) and archival material from the Oklahoma Historical Society including KCA/W agency files and letter pressbooks. The viewpoint and recollections of the KCA/W are represented in the Doris Duke Oral History Project material and the score of interviews taken in Southwestern Oklahoma between January, 1973, and August, 1977. A half dozen key informants provided detailed life history accounts which proved to be invaluable. Standard ethnographic and historical sources involving the KCA/W and Southwestern Oklahoma are also used as are a variety of economic and agricultural references. The primary and unpublished secondary sources used will be evaluated in the chapter where they are first cited.

FARMING AMONG THE KIOWA, COMANCHE,
KIOWA APACHE, AND WICHITA

CHAPTER 1

CULTURAL ECOLOGY ON THE SOUTHERN PLAINS

The Great Plains Environment

The Great Plains are constituted by that vast and unbroken grassland extending from the central Canadian provinces to the Rio Grande border of Texas. The western margin is fairly distinct and is established by the foothills of the Rocky Mountains. The eastern margin is somewhat less distinct and is located on the Mississippi-Missouri River Valley or roughly congruent to the 97th meridian in the north and the 98th meridian in the south. The area contains the states of Kansas, Nebraska, and South Dakota and parts of Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Colorado, Missouri, Wyoming, Iowa, Montana, North Dakota, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta.

This great outwash plain from the Rocky Mountains which has been modified somewhat by erosion is characterized by a basically flat surface which is relatively treeless and is subhumid to semiarid. Though there is considerable local variation, these generalizations hold for the area as a whole. The generally uniform elevation is broken by the Black Hills of South Dakota, the Red River Valley of the North, and the Wichita Mountains of Oklahoma. There is a general elevation decline and subsequent drainage from west to east, just as there is an overall reduction in annual rainfall and foliage density from east to west. The local river valleys and creeks provide an important if variable water source and support the limited stands of trees in the area.

Wedel gives a succinct description of the climatic picture on the Great Plains:

Considering the region as a whole, its outstanding climatic features are the low precipitation, especially limited in winter; the irregular and uncertain distribution of moisture received over long and short periods; the pronounced daily and seasonal temperature ranges; the low relative humidity, high rate of evaporation, and frequent droughts; the abundant sunshine; and the persistent winds of relatively high velocity. In general, these characteristics become increasingly marked from east to west, and are especially typical of the High Plains (1961:30).

To amplify Wedel's statement somewhat, it should be noted that the pattern of moisture distribution and amount

are uncertain seasonally and annually. The spring and early summer storms are of short duration accompanied by damaging high winds and result in local flooding and quick run-off. With an average hourly wind velocity above 10 mph. for the area and above 12 mph. for Western Oklahoma and Kansas (Webb 1931:23), the little moisture acquired by the soil is quickly evaporated, keeping the area quite dry. As a result, even the low annual rainfall figures are misleading in their real effect on soil moisture. These factors combine to restrict the possibility of agriculture to the limited stream valley areas prior to the advent of modern agro-technology.

The temperature ranges from a summer high in excess of 110° F. from Texas to Alberta to a winter low of -16° F. in the south and -55° F. in the north (Wedel 1961:34). The Southern and Central Plains experience an annual growing season of 140-200 days while the Northern Plains have less than a 100 day growing season.

As noted earlier, trees are usually only found along a watercourse. For the rest of the area, a variety of grasses prevails. The 100th meridian, roughly congruent with the 20 in. annual rainfall line, serves as a transition area for the two major grassland ecozones on the Plains. The tall grasses with their permanently moist subsoil are found to the

east of this line while the short grasses with their permanently dry subsoil are found to the west (Wedel 1961:36). This line also serves as the rough divider between the Prairie and the High Plains and parallels the division between the area of prehistoric village Indians and nomadic bison hunting Indians.

Other than grasses, the area contains a locally varying supply of tubers, berries, fruits and nuts. However, due to the grassland environment, it is the herbivores which are the most important and prominent food source for man before the arrival of the plow. Unquestionably the most populous and important of the herbivores was the bison, though the pronghorn antelope and mule deer also thrived in great numbers. Other significant Plains fauna include the wolf, coyote, kit fox, jack rabbit, prairie dog, opossum, prairie chicken, grouse, wild turkey, turtles and fish. In the woods to the east and along major watercourses, white tail deer, elk, black bear, cougar, wildcat, beaver, otter, and raccoon were found (Wedel 1961:36-45).

The Great Plains environment described here is that which existed prior to European arrival but subsequent to the close of the Altithermal period some 4,500 years ago.

Prehistory on the Great Plains

The Great Plains have witnessed a variety of human adaptations over many thousands of years. Sometime before 11,000 years ago until about 7,000 years ago, Pleistocene era Big Game hunters roamed the Plains and left archaeological evidence of their occupation--from the Clovis mammoth hunters to the Folsom men to the Plainview ancient bison hunters of the Southern Plains. From 7,000 to 4,500 years ago the Plains experienced a dramatic environmental change characterized by a rise in temperature and a decline in moisture. For this Altithermal period there is at present only limited and somewhat ambiguous evidence of human habitation. The extent and conditions of human occupation of the Plains during this time remain a matter of some controversy though new evidence continues to come to light.

The next evidence of human occupation on the Plains is in the subsequent Medithermal period during which scattered groups roamed the Western Plains. Archaeological evidence indicates that these men subsisted chiefly on small game and relatively few bison by comparison with their Pleistocene predecessors. A further difference from the Big Game hunting culture is obvious from the presence of grinding stones which shows that gathering had become more

important in their subsistence though the technology remained lithic and lacked pottery (Wedel 1961:283).

At some yet undetermined time prior to 2,000 years ago, Woodland culture with its pottery made its first inroads onto the Eastern Plains from the Dakotas to Oklahoma. The Woodland variants include Hopewellian village sites, dating from about 200-300 A.D., with evidence of agriculture based on corn and beans and evidence of deer and bison hunting. Other Woodland hunters and gatherers were present along creek bottoms and their sites, dating from 1900 B.C. to 700 A.D., have yielded little evidence of agriculture. The ~~Woodland~~ era is still little known though of obvious importance, for here is found the first pottery and agriculture in the area, indicating the shift from food gathering to food production. Found principally in the tall grass Plains, the Woodland culture combines river valley agriculture with the hunting of woods game, chiefly deer, and grassland game, mainly bison (Wedel 1961:285).

The Woodland adaptation served as the basis for the rise of the succeeding Plains Village Indians beginning in about 800-900 A.D. and lasting for the next thousand years. The Plains Village Indians were more sophisticated than their Woodland predecessors. They occupied fortified villages with

substantial multifamily dwellings. Technologically superior, they had abundant and varied pottery, a great diversity of stone, bone, horn and shell tools, and a well developed fishing technology, as well as the bison shoulder blade hoe distinctive of the Woodland peoples. In the period prior to European contact, small villages are found on the Central and Southern Plains with square or rectangular houses and plain or cord marked pottery. From the Niobrara south, villages are characteristically found on lesser water courses.

The picture in general, from the Dakotas to Texas seems to be one of innumerable small, widely scattered communities, probably not often exceeding a few score inhabitants, the women tilling the gardens in the nearby creek bottoms and the men hunting along the valley margins and on the adjacent uplands. Many of the basic elements of the culture of these smalltown peoples, such as their pottery, their agriculture, and their community life, were rooted ultimately in the east; but the way of life had a much stronger Plains flavor than did that of the earlier Woodland groups. North of the Niobrara, the ancestral Mandans may have been among the people represented; farther south, the Pawnees and other Caddoan groups were possibly among these early-day farmers in the Plains (Wedel 1961:286).

After the mid-1500s and European contact, there is an apparent change in population distribution and community pattern among the Plains Village Indians. The small earth-lodge settlements on the westerly streams were abandoned (possibly the result of a shuffle to gain access to European

traders arriving in the East along the major rivers). During this period, the villages are fewer and larger and are located along major streams. The house patterns are circular and the pottery is stamped, incised or plain with no cord marking.

These characteristics persisted into the historic period among the sedentary tribes of the Middle Missouri, notably the Mandans, Arikaras, and Hidatsas, and among the Eastern Plains tribes farther south, such as the Pawnees, Omahas, Otos, and Kansas. On the Middle Arkansas and southward, the grasshouse villages of the Wichitas and other Caddoan-speaking groups had superseded the earlier settlements of wattle-and-daub and earth-lodge habitations. Some of these historic tribes were very likely lineal descendants of the early farmers of the prehistoric smalltown communities; others seem to have been later arrivals who adopted the way of life of the people they found residing in the region (Wedel 1961:287).

At about the same time, other peoples from the east were pushing out onto the prairie. In the eastern Dakotas and southern Manitoba, possibly such people as the ancestral Assiniboine were arriving from the Minnesota lakes area. Other groups possibly arriving at this time include the fore-runners of the historical period Western Plains Algonkians, like the Blackfeet. To the south in the Central Eastern Plains, several Oneota sites seem to give evidence of an early influx of Siouan-speaking peoples. These sites, showing a subsistence pattern based partly on agriculture and

partly on bison and deer hunting, are attributed to the early Iowa and Missouri and possibly Kansas as well. The Osage coming from the Ozark Plateau seem to have been clearly influenced by these Oneota peoples (Wedel 1961:288).

Relatively little is known of the more recent pre-history of the Western Plains border along the Rocky Mountains. We know that some Shoshoneans once commanded parts of the area but later retired to the periphery to become foragers making periodic seasonal incursions onto the High Plains for bison. The identity of the Plains Apache and the significance of the Dismal River material is still disputed, though it appears that some Apachean groups were on the Southern Plains after 1500 A.D.

The early Plains dwellers form the bases for what in historic times were two somewhat competing adaptations to the Plains: the Plains Village Indians occupying the eastern tall grass Plains and the Plains Nomadic Indians inhabiting the western short grass or High Plains. With their mixed horticultural/hunting subsistence pattern, relatively populous sedentary villages and early access to European trade goods and guns, the Plains Village Indians enjoyed a more secure, and for a time truly affluent, existence than did the nomads to the west. In terms of material abundance the

Plains Village Indians reached their climax from 1500-1700 on the Southern and Central Plains and from 1600-1750 in the Middle Missouri area. However, following the development of the horse/bison complex among the nomadic peoples and the arrival of European diseases in truly epidemic proportions among the village peoples, the positions were reversed. The period from 1750-1850 marks the ascendance and climax of the equestrian nomadic adaptation on the Plains. Though of shorter duration, it was no less successful than that of the Plains Village Indians and was terminated only by the virtual extinction of the bison and the overwhelming flood of immigrants from the east.

The Bison, the Horse, Trade and Warfare on
the Plains in Historic Times

No cultural ecological treatment of the Plains would be complete without a discussion of the parts played by the bison and the horse and the patterns of trade and warfare that flow from the attempts to appropriate these two animals. Oliver (1962) has made a lengthy and perceptive analysis of the impact of the requirements of bison hunting via the horse on the cultures of historic Plains Indians and the resulting cultural convergence of formerly pedestrian hunting and gathering and agricultural peoples. He demonstrates how, in

the realm of social organization, original agriculturalists became more flexible and original hunters and gatherers became more complex. Before continuing, a note of caution should be sounded here that environment does not determine but affords possibilities of exploitation and fit and that cultures adapt to environments while having pre-existing social structures, current external political relations and economic linkages that must be reconciled.

Oliver's painstaking analysis of bison natural history and human ecology on the Plains yields the following results:

That the bison was the most important single source of food and raw materials for the Plains Indians of historic times hardly needs stating and an exhaustive delineation of its uses would serve little purpose here. What is of concern is the habits and distribution of the bison and the effect these had on the hunting peoples. The bison was found over the entire Great Plains area and in fact well beyond, though not in the incredible numbers common to the Plains. Though individual bison ranged with the seasons from 100-400 miles north and south, bison were present on the Plains year round. In winter bison were found in herds of 20-100, seeking shelter from the freezing wind and pawing through the snow for

food. During this time individual small herds tended to move slightly south within their usual range, while in the summer heat they were found farther north. In exceptionally hot and dry years parts of the extreme Southern Plains were temporarily abandoned by the bison. With the plentiful spring grass, bison began congregating in somewhat larger herds until in the running season of August and September they formed the combined herds that truly blackened the Plains for miles on end. At this time the surrounding countryside would experience the temporary lack of bison except for a few old bulls.

These seasonal differences in the habits of the bison required a certain technical versatility on the part of the hunters. The situation is complicated by the additional fact that the location of bison season to season and year to year was unpredictable even to the Indian hunters so familiar with the animal. Scouts sent out in summer to locate the herds frequently were gone for many days before returning. It is apparent, then, that hunting bison was no simple matter of interception along seasonal game trails but required that the hunters literally "follow the herds around." It is sometimes assumed that the Indians engaged in immediate and wholesale slaughter once a bison herd was located. Ewers assures us,

however, that the maximum number of bison killed in a single chase by any one mounted hunter was 4 or 5 animals (1955: 325).

To best exploit the bison, most typical Plains groups made the following adjustments. First, a fluid social organization was needed since tribes dispersed into relatively small bands in the winter and established tribal camps in the summer to take advantage of the habits and varying supply of bison and fit the requirements of available horse forage. To best accomplish this when separate, bands composed of related families functioned under informal, prestigious, and charismatic leadership. During tribal encampment and group hunts a more formalized authority prevailed and was executed impartially by the military societies designated as police. Military society memberships cross-cut kinship lines. Second, group mobility became a prime necessity in order to hunt the shifting and unpredictable bison, to gain horses by raid, and to avoid easy location and attack by enemies. Third, due to the competition between tribes for bison and horses, military skills became an important feature of daily life and group organization as well as the basis for leadership. Fourth, resulting from their importance to subsistence and tribal power, horses became

not just a medium of exchange but the basis of wealth and status in Plains Indian society (Oliver 1962:15-18).

Ewers (1955) carefully traces the source of horses for the Plains Indians to the early 17th century Spanish stock raising settlements near Santa Fe. Horses were first acquired by Indians through friendly trade contacts from the ample supply of the Spanish who furnished examples of the advantages, use, and care of horses. Ewers agrees with Wissler (1914:2) that the Ute, Apache, Kiowa, and Caddo first got horses from the Spanish sometime in the 1630s through the 1650s, and the Shoshone and Comanche gained horses shortly thereafter (Ewers 1955:3). More specifically, ethnohistoric evidence indicates that the Ute had horses by 1640. Apache were raiding Spanish settlements for horses in the 1660s and the Kiowa and Kiowa Apache were reportedly trading horses to the Wichita or Pawnee in 1682. In 1705, the Comanche were also making raids on the Spanish for horses. By the early 1800s, the Kiowa, Comanche, Kiowa Apache, Cheyenne, and Arapaho had established themselves as middlemen in a vast and lucrative system of horse trading. Ewers (1955:8-9) cites the report of Antoine Tabeau, a French trader from St. Louis, who travelled among the Arikara in 1803-1804. Tabeau was told by the Arikara that they had formerly taken tobacco,

maize and European trade goods to the Black Hills to trade for horses from the Kiowa, Comanche, Kiowa Apache, Cheyenne, and Arapaho. The Arikara had been told at the time that the horses came from the Spanish at San Antonio and Santa Fe and that they were bought or stolen at will. It should be noted that while the Cheyenne and Arapaho were important middlemen in the horse trade, they neither were among the very first to get horses nor among those with the easiest access to Spanish horses.

In general, the system of horse trade followed along the lines of long standing trade relations. Where the nomadic hunters had traded meat and hides for vegetables and trade goods from the sedentary villagers, Spanish horses subsequently were traded for French and British guns in the 1700s. The arrival of horses and guns on the Plains had far reaching effects, resulting in the reshuffling of tribal territories and the rise or fall in power of virtually every Plains tribe.

Initially, the spread of horses proceeded by trade, but raiding rapidly became the chief means of gaining horses. The Comanche, Kiowa, and Kiowa Apache occupied the most advantageous position for horse raiding. From the Southern Plains they raided New Mexico and Texas with ease. Later they made incredibly large scale horse raids into Mexico.

Horses were individually owned as private property, and there was a wide range in the numbers owned not only from one tribe to the next but from individual to individual within the same tribe. As noted by Mishkin (1940), Richardson (1940), and Ewers (1955), this condition of differential horse wealth gave rise to the formation of class structure within formerly classless societies. The upper class included the horse rich, privileged but responsible leadership of the tribe. The middle class maintained a jealous independence and possessed relatively few horses. The lower class was comprised of the underprivileged and dependent members of the tribe who attached themselves to the upper class families as followers (Ewers 1955:338-339).

War raids on the Plains were conducted throughout most of the year, though large revenge raids were limited to the summer. Typically, raiding parties were comprised of quick moving groups of 5-30 male volunteers under temporary charismatic leadership. These aggressive raids culminated in a surprise attack during which each man operated independently and the raiders quickly withdrew. Military accomplishment was as important to social position as horse wealth, and war deeds were graded and honored accordingly. Horse raids were conducted on foot by small groups whose

chief aim was the stealthy theft of horses. Confrontation was to be avoided if possible since the raiders were outnumbered. The Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache differ slightly from this pattern in that they left for horse raids mounted (Mishkin 1940:59) and not infrequently raided Mexico for horses in parties numbering above a hundred. Revenge raids were conducted on horseback by somewhat larger groups whose purpose was the taking of enemy scalps to avenge the loss of comrades fallen on previous raids. A great deal of formal ritual accompanied the return of a successful revenge raid party.

From the foregoing material, a series of summary observations upon Plains cultural ecology is in order.

1. The general Plains environment offered a bountiful supply of bison and limited agricultural possibilities to the vicinity of watercourses in pre-reservation times.

2. Plains prehistory represents a succession of subsistence adaptations culminating in struggling pedestrian nomadic bison hunters in the west and reasonably secure sedentary village agriculturalists in the east. The relatively more bountiful subsistence of these peoples was due to the combined exploitation of agricultural possibilities and seasonal bison hunting opportunities.

3. The introduction of the horse allowed greater efficiency in bison hunting, stimulated heavy intertribal trade, and with the gun resulted in the rise and fall of various groups on the Plains. The attraction of this adaptation can be seen in the virtual abandonment of agriculture and the adoption of a thoroughly nomadic life way by the Cheyenne, Arapaho, Crow, Gros Ventre, and Teton Dakota.

4. The habits of the bison and the requirements of horses resulted in the cultural convergence of former hunters and gatherers and former agriculturalists and the emergence of dynamically flexible social organization among the "True Plains" tribes.

5. There was a concomitant rise in the importance of military capability due to increasing intertribal competition for bison and horses that was further augmented by the gun trade.

6. These conditions ultimately resulted in the nomadic equestrian bison hunters becoming dominant on the Plains from the mid-1700s until the mid-1800s with the decline in the bison herds and increasing American military presence. Sometime prior to 1800 the former advantageous position of the Plains Village Indians residing in their horticultural trade centers began to erode. The

commencement of a series of smallpox and cholera epidemics, frequent raids by the nomadic groups, the decline in the fur trade, and pressure from an unending stream of immigrants from the east combined to work against them in a deadly way. The passing of the Plains Village way of life did not occur overnight, but the equestrian nomads were still functioning without real hindrance while the villages held but a shadow of their former position of power and security.

CHAPTER 2

THE KIOWA, COMANCHE, KIOWA APACHE, AND WICHITA AND THEIR CULTURE HISTORY PRIOR TO THE MEDICINE LODGE TREATY OF 1867

The Kiowa

On the basis of ethnohistorical material, the Kiowa cannot be traced outside the Plains, so their origins remain somewhat of a mystery. Linguistically, the Kiowa are identified as speakers of a Tanoan related language and some scholars have speculated on the possibility of an ultimately Southwestern origin for the group (Harrington 1910:1; Lowie 1954:217; Trager & Trager 1959:335-350).

The lack of any agricultural traditions for them makes it most likely that the Kiowa were nomadic hunters long before the spread of the horse complex. Both Mooney (1898:153) and Mishkin (1940:24) promote the idea of the northern origin of the Kiowa sometime prior to 1700 in the mountains of western Montana. Upon their descent onto the

Northern Plains, they became allies of the Crow from whom they received horses and knowledge of the Sun Dance. If the Kiowa are in fact La Salle's "Manhroat," then their association with the Crow would have predated 1682. They subsequently moved farther south into the vicinity of the Black Hills and maintained a position to the east of the Crow where they were forced to contest the area with the Cheyenne and Dakota. At this time the Kiowa were engaged in trade with the Arikara and Mandan villages to the east where they traded horses gained on raids to the Southwest.

Losing ground to the Cheyenne and Dakota, the Kiowa moved still farther south into the area adjacent to the Wichita Mountains and came into conflict with the Comanche. Kiowa-Comanche relations continued to be hostile until about the last decade of the 1700s at which time an enduring alliance was forged between the Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache. The Southern Plains held great attraction for the Kiowa since this position offered easier access to supplies of horses at Santa Fe and San Antonio and to southern trade routes.

The Kiowa remained on generally friendly terms with the Mescalero Apache and the pueblos, with whom they exchanged captive slaves for horses. They were also engaged in amicable

trade relations with the Wichita and affiliates who served as middlemen in a lucrative horse trade with the French. In 1776, for example, they traded thousands of horses and mules through the Wichita to the French in the east (Mishkin 1940:6).

The longterm enemies of the Kiowa include the Caddo, Tonkawa, Osage, Navajo, Ute, and Jicarilla Apache. The Osage made a singularly devastating attack in 1833 and killed many Kiowa. The Cheyenne and Arapaho were also on an intermittently hostile footing with the Kiowa until 1840. The Kiowa, as well as the Comanche, Kiowa Apache and Wichita, suffered severely from smallpox epidemics in 1801 and 1816. Despite numerous enemies, the Kiowa experience on the Southern Plains was marked by increasing military power and horse wealth.

Estimates of pre-reservation Kiowa population run to about 1600 people.

The yearly round for the Kiowa is the same pattern familiar to most True Plains tribes. In the winter, the tribe was split into some 10-15 bands located in scattered stationary camps affording members shelter and protection. At this time there was relatively little economic activity. In spring the bands began to reassemble and hunt. By

mid-summer the tribe had congregated for the Sun Dance, group hunts and large scale raids. In Autumn, after the running season of the bison, the large tribal camp began to dwindle as bands once more went their separate ways.

The band (topadoga) was composed of a central patrilocal extended family and its friends and followers. This group had a stable nucleus and a relatively fluid body. The maximum winter membership of any single band is estimated at 400 people (Richardson 1940:8), with considerable range in size from one band to the next. Leadership was provided by an informally acknowledged band headman (topadoki) noted for his wisdom and generosity. The band headman was primarily responsible for maintaining law and order within the group, initiating camp movements, and organizing band defense. Voluntary cooperation was the principle upon which the group functioned. Band size was largely a reflection of the headman's prestige. Superior band size held a payoff in terms of economic benefits and adequacy of defense. Less wealthy followers were sought and even competed for as an advantageous labor source (Richardson 1940:6).

As Mishkin (1940:27) notes, each band was "a self-contained unit, economically, socially, politically and even religiously." The ten tribal medicine bundles or "Ten

Grandmothers" were distributed among the bands. Each bundle was equal in power and, in concert with the others, served as the supernatural source of tribal welfare. Custody of the bundles was inherited through ten family lines from father to eldest son. The bundle holders settled disputes by offering terms of reparation and a medicine pipe which had to be accepted by the disputants. They also maintained bundle sanctuaries in tipis where tribal members came to pray, entreat, or make vows to the bundles.

For 1-2 months during the summer, the entire tribe formed a camp circle with each band occupying its established position. At this time, the group hunt and Sun Dance (Kado) were held and the camp harmony rule prevailed. The keeper of the Sun Dance medicine (taime) organized the ceremonial program, and one of the military societies served to maintain law and order. Richardson (1940:9) lists five military societies: Koisenko, Daimbega, Tonkongya, Tsetamma, and Adltoyui. These societies, which cross-cut band divisions, each had two leaders and two whip bearers and functioned only during the tribal encampment. One of the military societies was also designated to police the summer hunt(s) and restrain young and ambitious hunters from starting ahead of time and disturbing the bison.

Raiding activities of the Kiowa conformed to the general pattern described in the last chapter. Horse raiding parties of 6-10 men and revenge raiding parties of 100-200 were launched under charismatic leadership. Recruitment for revenge raids was formalized with a pipe and a scalp dance was held and war deeds recounted on the group's successful return. Though there were many small horse raids during the year, the large revenge raid was possible only immediately after the Sun Dance.

The horse complex and accompanying horse wealth complex were of great importance in Kiowa society. A man had to have a good horse to join revenge or horse raiding parties and thereby gain prestige and acquire more horses. Despite the generosity of the rich, wealth accumulated in successful families and resulted in the class divisions noted by Mishkin (1940) and Richardson (1940). The Onde or first rank contained the bundle owners, great warriors, important band headmen, and the wealthy distinguished members of the tribe. The Ondegupa or second rank held the small band headmen and the moderately wealthy and distinguished. The Kwnn or commoners were "poor but honest" and much sought after as followers. Finally, the Dapom (also an epithet) were the non-productive and non-ambitious few (Richardson

1940:15). The sons of a wealthy family could afford to go to war and distinguish themselves while augmenting the family horse herd. The sons of commoners could seldom afford to go on raids and certainly could never lead one.

While wealth was important, war honors were of the most consequence in status validation. Raid leaders and individual warriors gained prestige and formal recognition for specific deeds which made them eligible for membership in the ranked military societies.

The Comanche

The Comanche speak a Shoshonean dialect which is part of the larger Uto-Aztecan language family. Formerly Great Basin hunters and gatherers, it is likely that in prehorse times they made limited pedestrian bison hunting excursions onto the Plains. Their relatively recent arrival onto the Plains appears to have originated from the southwestern Montana/northwestern Wyoming area (Jones 1968:13). By about 1700, the Comanche had made their descent onto the Plains from the Colorado Rockies in full possession of the horse/bison technology (Wallace and Hoebel 1961:117). Lowie (1954:216) notes that in 1701 they were found at the headwaters of the Arkansas in Colorado and by 1705 were engaged in horse raids into New Mexico. In the period from 1705

until about 1720, the Comanche and Ute collaborated in raids on the Spanish Southwest. During this time, the Comanche (lacking a supply of guns) were feeling pressure from the north due to the southern movement of the Blackfeet and the western shift of the Crow (Wallace and Hoebel 1961:10-11). Beginning in 1726, they were engaged in hostilities with their old allies, the Ute, in the competition for horses. Subsequently, the Comanche elected to move south for better access to Spanish supplies of horses.

The mid-1700s saw heavy raiding by the Comanche in New Mexico. The Spanish repeatedly sought amicable means of relieving the Comanche threat since the Comanche served as a buffer to the expanding influence of the French and English in the east (Jones 1968:16). The Comanche were simultaneously seeking treaties with northern tribes in order to secure markets for their horse trade and acquire French guns. It was Spanish policy not to trade guns to the Indians.

In the late 1700s, the Spanish decided to move against the Comanche in southeastern Colorado with the assistance of the Ute. Peace was not concluded between the Spanish and the Comanche until 1786 (Wallace and Hoebel 1961:286). Shortly thereafter, renewed hostilities broke out between the Ute and Jicarilla Apache and the Comanche.

It was in about 1790 that the northern Comanche bands formed an alliance with the Kiowa and Kiowa Apache. This alliance greatly strengthened the positions of all three tribes in the face of their numerous common enemies.

The threat of the Osage, with their ample sources of guns and powder, was first really felt by the Comanche in 1802. Intermittent war raged between the two groups until they were restricted to their separate reservations.

After the Cheyenne and Arapaho had moved south to the Arkansas River, the Comanche, Kiowa, and Kiowa Apache intensified their hostile activities against them. Apparently the Cheyenne and Arapaho had been attempting to cut themselves in as additional middlemen in the lucrative horse trade with the northern Plains villages.

In 1820, Major Long met the Comanche, among others, on the upper great bend of the Arkansas River.

In their heyday, the Comanche were the largest and most powerful nomadic group on the Southern Plains. Ranging from the Platte to the Red River to the Rio Grande, their horse wealth, gained from far flung raids, was truly incredible. One band was reported to have had as many as 15,000 horses and several hundred mules (Oliver 1962:23).

Changes in Comanche culture from their early Great Basin foraging pattern to their later equestrian bison hunting adaptation have been noted by Jones (1968:21). Power shifted from the hands of the old peace chiefs to the younger war chiefs with the increased emphasis on raiding. The bands became larger and more independent and captives began to be taken and assimilated into the group. Bison subsistence replaced gathering and rabbit hunting and the adoption of the horse resulted in greater mobility, increased the size of their range and allowed the amassing of great wealth.

It should be noted, however, that the Comanche had their cultural differences from the bulk of the "True Plains" tribes. The Comanche lacked the characteristic pattern of summer tribal camps and winter dispersal. The Comanche never united in one place as a tribe but lived in scattered mobile bands of varying sizes. Not infrequently bands were temporarily joined by other bands and band membership was flexible.

The Comanche had at least five large bands (Oliver 1962:72; Jones 1968:26-27). The Penateka were the southernmost band and were early associates of the Caddo and the Wichita. The Nokoni occupied a position north of the Penateka, while the Kotsoteka lived on the Canadian River.

The Kwahada of the Staked Plains were the most warlike and were the last to surrender to the U.S. Army. Finally, the Yamparika maintained the latest contact with their Shoshonean traditions and were the northernmost band.

The Comanche had no tribal chief but headmen of family encampments, one of which served as a band chief or headman. Positions of authority were filled on the basis of charismatic leadership. The band peace chief decided when and where to move camp, while the war chief was responsible for organizing raids and establishing truces (Oliver 1962:23). Within the band, an informal council of influential men functioned in an advisory capacity. Decisions affecting the band apparently were arrived at on a consensual basis. Status commonly was established on the basis of war honors and horse wealth.

Though there were no age grade or military societies, the Comanche did have small loosely organized medicine societies. By comparison with other Plains tribes, their religious patterns were simple and lacked the characteristic ceremonialism and ritual (Jones 1968:22). The Comanche had no Sun Dance prior to reservation times.

There has been much speculation as to why the Comanche had no hunt police. Wallace and Hoebel (1961) look to

the Shoshonean origins of the Comanche and a characteristic "Shoshonean atomism." Colson (1954) states that they were in the "best buffalo country" and therefore didn't place as much emphasis on the summer hunt as other Plains tribes did and didn't feel the need for hunt police. It should be noted, however, that in hot and dry years it was not uncommon for bison to abandon completely large portions of the Southern Plains.

Oliver (1962:73-75) directs our attention to a set of characteristics of the Comanche and offers a plausible explanation for their lack of hunt police. First, the bands were widely scattered across Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, Kansas and Oklahoma and many bands "were not seriously involved with the buffalo." It should be remembered that it is probable that the various bands left the eastern periphery of the Basin at different times and adapted to different conditions on the Plains. Second, some of the bands were more deeply involved with horses than any other Plains group. A case could be made for some bands even subsisting on horse raid/horse trade. We know that horses were traded for food in the eastern villages. And just as the summer was optimal for group hunts, it was also optimal for raiding and trading horses. In times of food shortage, the horse was even eaten

by the Comanche. Certainly, it was the horse more than the bison that made the Comanche prominent. Third, the ecological situation of the bands was varied and encouraged local adaptations. The effect of summer heat on the bison in the Southern Plains already has been noted. As the Comanche moved south to gain easier access to horses, they occasionally lost access to large bison herds. If their gains in horses had not outweighed their losses in bison, one would not expect them to have continued their move south. Finally, the Comanche show every indication of having been quite able to hunt cooperatively and effectively without hunt police. Since the tribe never came together, the number of hunters engaged in a group hunt was much smaller than for other tribes and therefore the group hunt was easier to coordinate. Hunt discipline was maintained by the hunt leader and by peer group.

The Kiowa Apache

Despite Mooney's (1898:246-247) early conviction of a Northern Plains origin for the Kiowa Apache, subsequent linguistic and cultural analysis has made a Southwestern origin more probable (see Opler 1936; Hoijer 1938; Brant 1951; Jordan 1965; Beals 1967; Bittle 1971; Bittle n.d.). Ultimately the Kiowa Apache derive from the Western

Sub-Arctic Athabaskan stock and left the area on a move south at about 900 A.D. Apparently associated with the Lipan and Jicarilla, they arrived in the Southwest at about 1400 A.D. and later moved independently out onto the High Plains. Their earlier affinity with the Lipan and Jicarilla can be seen in terms of linguistics, social organization, and culture hero myths (Brant 1951:83-89).

The Kiowa Apache are most likely descended from those pedestrian bison hunting Apache found on the Plains by the first explorers (Coronado and others) and, along with the Kiowa, have probably maintained the longest Plains residence to be found among later "True Plains" tribes (Jordan 1965: 1-2). If in fact La Salle's "Gattacka" and "Manhroat" are the Kiowa Apache and Kiowa, then these two tribes were mounted and trading horses from the Spanish Southwest to the Pawnee by 1682. From Lewis and Clark in 1805 we learn that the "Cataka" (Kiowa Apache?) were in the vicinity of the Black Hills associated with the Kiowa and trading horses for guns with the Arikara and Mandan villagers on the upper Missouri River. Mooney (1898:248) has the Kiowa Apache with the Kiowa in 1780 and already moving south. We know that after their move south trade with the northern villages tapered off and was replaced by trade with the Cheyenne and

Arapaho (Jordan 1965:2). Brant offers the following reconstruction of this early period:

Quite possibly the known Comanche movement southward in the early eighteenth century cut the Kiowa Apache off from other Apaches living marginal to the Plains, while it forced the Jicarilla Apache to retreat to the northern New Mexican highlands and the Lipan Apache to move southward toward the Texas gulf area.

If it be granted that the Kiowa Apache movement to the Plains took place in these general circumstances, we can assume that their subsequent history, judging from documentary sources, consisted of joining the Kiowa, moving about the Plains a great deal in the 18th century, and then, in the late 18th century and 19th, moving southward to the area they have occupied since (Brant 1951:133).

Sometime after 1805, then, the Kiowa Apache moved south of the Platte River, relinquishing their active trade with the northern villages, and traded at Bent's Fort on the Arkansas River for guns and trade goods. They also made trading trips to western New Mexico settlements and were visited by itinerant Mexican traders. Prior to the 1830s the Kiowa Apache inhabited an area centering in southwestern Oklahoma though they continued to range far and wide on raids (McAllister 1955:99; Lowie 1954:217). In the 1830s hostilities between the Kiowa and Cheyenne, the Kiowa Apache maintained a careful neutrality. Together with the Arapaho, they are credited for helping arrange peace between the two warring tribes in 1840 (Jordan 1965:4). After the truce,

relations were generally friendly between the Kiowa, Comanche, Kiowa Apache, Cheyenne and Arapaho. Old enmities continued with the Ute, Navajo, Pawnee, and Osage.

It has been suggested by Wedel that the Kiowa Apache were at one time agriculturalists and are to be associated with the Dismal River material from Nebraska and Kansas. According to Wedel (1961:115), the Kiowa Apache joined a group of pueblo people seeking refuge after the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 and together hunted, farmed, and made pottery in sedentary villages. The Dismal River people are thought to have been displaced and scattered by the mounted Comanche. This account conflicts with our interpretation of La Salle's information that the Kiowa Apache were near the Black Hills trading horses to the Pawnee by this time. Further, it seems highly unlikely that the Kiowa Apache would lose all trace of pottery and agriculture by historical times. Morris Opler's detailed analysis (1971) of the evidence strongly supports the conclusion that no Apachean peoples are represented in the Dismal River material.

As with his treatment of Kiowa Apache origins, Mooney comes to some hasty and erroneous conclusions as to their cultural position. He states: "As the Apache are practically a part of the Kiowa in everything but language,

they need no extended separate notice" (1898:248).

McAllister (1955), Brant (1951), Jordan (1965), Opler and Bittle (1961), Bittle (1971), and Bittle (N.D.) refute this claim.

Though the Kiowa Apache frequently participated in Kiowa summer encampments and large raids, their actual closeness has been exaggerated. Except for those summers when the two tribes camped together, they remained separate and distinct. McAllister notes that the Kiowa Apache were never subservient to or dependent upon the Kiowa but maintained a relationship of "social symbiosis" (1955:100-101). Their limited numbers, never exceeding 350 people, made summer affiliation with a larger tribe a virtual necessity during those years when enemies were many and raids were frequent. During the 19th century they camped variously with the Kiowa, Comanche, Cheyenne, Arapaho or, in peaceful years, alone (Jordan 1965:4).

Kiowa Apache subsistence activities follow the pattern common to nomadic equestrian tribes with the exception that when camped alone their bison hunting endeavors were necessarily on a much smaller scale. Bison were taken by stalking, ambush or chase without any particular hunt leader while the surround was used when participating in group

hunts with the Kiowa. Secondly, antelope and deer were hunted. The Kiowa Apache made use of a wide range of plants for food including plums, prairie turnips, mesquite beans, and other berries, fruits, nuts, and tubers. A variety of other plants were also used for their medicinal properties (Jordan 1965). Corn and squash were gained in trade with farming villages to the east since the Kiowa Apache knew nothing of agriculture.

The Kiowa Apache are described as having been "like one large, endogamous band, with a keen feeling of unity" (McAllister 1955:99). During much of the year the tribe broke down into smaller camps though they routinely stayed close to one another. Bilateral descent and initial matrilineal residence was the rule and the extended family was the basic unit of individual allegiance. Bittle (n.d.) notes that "the family seems to have been the sole functional unit of organization and it had enormous independence of decision and movement."

The Kiowa Apache had no single head chief and their political structure appears to have been quite loosely organized and based on informal leadership.

There were four dancing societies: the Rabbit Society, the Blackfeet Society, the Horse Society and an old

women's society. All children were members of the Rabbit Society (Dasowe) whose dances conferred health and long life on participants and gave lessons in discipline and obedience. The principle tribal medicine bundle holder organized and supervised the dances and disciplined reluctant or inactive dancers (Bittle n.d.).

The Blackfeet Society (Manatidie) was the principle men's military society. Since membership conferred not only honor but burdensome duties and increased personal danger, it was sometimes avoided. Members formed close relationships with "special partners" and lived as almost inseparable twins. The society held an annual Spring dance but could have dances at any time of the year before a raid. At these dances especially brave men served as the four staff bearers and the whip. The Blackfeet Society was also responsible for policing camp movements and, on those occasions when the Kiowa Apache participated in the Kiowa summer hunt, they served as hunt police (McAllister 1955:153).

The Horse Society (Klintidie) was composed of 10-16 of the tribe's oldest and bravest members and functioned as a "contrary" society.

Twenty of the oldest women and one old man, serving as drummer, formed the Izuwe or old women's secret

organization. This society prayed for sick tribal members and actively participated in scalp dances (McAllister 1955:156).

As with other nomadic Plains tribes, the most respected men in the tribe were those who could combine outstanding war records with sizeable horse herds gained from raiding.

Personal "power" was acquired most frequently by simple vision encounters with animal, plant or natural force "power" sources. The vision quest was not often attempted. "Power" was considered dangerous and was sometimes shunned by those who had had an encounter vision. Those who accepted and developed their "power" served as shamans for the tribe (Brant 1951:39).

The maintenance of four tribal medicine bundles gave health and long life and protected the supernatural interests of the tribe. The bundles, like the Blackfeet Society staffs, were inherited through the male line. The bundles conferred particular blessings on those who came and entreated their assistance. As with the Kiowa, bundle owners had the power to forcefully settle disputes between tribal members (Jordan 1965:8). Though the Kiowa Apache frequently joined the Kiowa during their Sun Dance and

thought their presence was beneficial to the tribe, their own medicine bundles were considered of much greater importance to their tribe's welfare.

The Wichita

The term "Wichita" refers to a group of related village dwelling agricultural peoples. The Wichita proper, Waco, and Tawakoni share the closest linguistic affiliation, while the Kichai are more remotely associated. These four groups, together with the Caddo, Pawnee, and Arikara, are members of the Caddoan branch of the Hokan Siouan language family. Though in close association with the Wichita proper, the Waco and Tawakoni seem always to have ranged somewhat to the south. The Kichai were a separate tribe but in the 1700s became affiliated with the Wichita speaking groups and ultimately merged completely with them.

The origins of the Wichita as well as those of the other members of the large Caddoan group were treated in the last chapter. Suffice to say, the Wichita were early Plains dwellers whose origins can be traced to the southeast periphery of the Plains.

The Wichita first were contacted in 1541 by the Coronado expedition to Quivira. At that time they were found living in villages of grass-covered houses practicing

agriculture and hunting bison. They were located within the great bend of the Arkansas River in south central Kansas (Newcomb and Field 1967:243). The same conditions prevailed in 1601 when the Onate expedition located the Wichita in the same general area.

By the mid 1600s the Wichita were engaged in trade with the French. Sometime in the last half of the century they acquired horses, though farming continued to remain important to subsistence. It was in 1718 and La Harpe's expedition into Oklahoma that the Wichita were first observed raising horses. La Harpe was impressed by their thriving villages. By this time, the Wichita were in conflict with the Lipan and Comanche (Newcomb and Field 1967: 249).

A year later, DuTisne, venturing out from the Illinois country, encountered two Wichita villages and observed that they had both guns and horses. The Wichita apparently were being forced south at this time by the Osage.

Between 1747 and 1749, the Wichita and Comanche formed an alliance which gave the Comanche access to guns from the Wichita, furnished a supply of horses to the Wichita which augmented their position as prosperous

middlemen, and allowed the French to reach the Spanish settlements in New Mexico. Newcomb and Field (1967:241) make the following observations on the relationship between the Wichita and the Comanche:

The Wichita-Comanche relationship extending through many years was an intimate and complex one, and although we have not yet pursued all of its ramifications, it is clear that in the earlier period the two peoples were hostile and the Wichitas dominant. The Wichitas continued their dominant role after the alliance was concluded in the 1740's, but the Comanches were in the ascendancy. By the nineteenth century their positions were reversed.

In 1757, the Spanish established the San Saba Mission for the Lipan to the southwest of the Wichitas. The following year, a war party of Wichita, Comanche, and Tonkawa attacked and destroyed the mission. The next year (1759) Parrilla launched a punitive campaign and was soundly defeated when he attacked the fortified Wichita villages on the Red River. Supplied by horses from the Comanche and with plenty of guns and powder from their heavy trade with the French, the Wichita easily routed the Spanish (Newcomb and Field 1967:261). The Wichita realized, however, that war with the Spanish could be costly and sent word to Calahora that they wanted peace. Calahora made visits to the southern Wichita on the Sabine River in 1760, 1761, and 1762. He brought gifts and assurance that the Spanish were

also desirous of an amicable relationship. To show their good faith the Wichita returned their Spanish captives. While the southern Wichita villages remained friendly to Calahora, the Wichita on the Red River continued to exchange attacks and counterattacks with the Lipan at San Saba.

In 1762 Louisiana was transferred to the Spanish, though the Wichita and the French continued to trade vigorously--hides, captives, and horses for guns and trade goods. Later, in 1769-1771, the Spanish licensed the French traders in their territory and forbade them to trade for horses or slaves and restricted the trade in guns. Consequently, the Wichita power position based on the horse and gun trade began to decline from this point on.

In 1771, Mezieres, a Frenchman in the Spanish service, gained peace with all of the Wichita for the Spanish. It was an uneasy peace, though, which gradually deteriorated. In 1784 the Wichita and Comanche raided San Antonio for horses. The period from 1785 to 1787 saw the Osage attacking the Wichita and the Wichita again attacking the Lipan and raiding San Antonio for horses. In their effort to maintain peace with the Wichita, the Spanish launched no punitive campaigns after the horse raids (Newcomb and Field 1967: 272-282).

During the last two decades of the 1700s, the Wichita lost the powerful position that they had gained as middlemen between the Southern Plains nomadic tribes and the French. The new basis of trade with the Spanish was unsatisfactory. One can hardly blame the Spanish for being less than enthusiastic to buy back horses stolen from their own settlements at the price of equipping the raiders with guns.

In this period, the Wichita grew poor in the trade goods upon which they had come to depend. Their shortage of guns made them increasingly vulnerable to the Osage. Severe blows were also dealt them by the epidemics of 1801 and 1816. By the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, the power position of the Wichita was a thing of the past, though they continued to effectively subsist by farming and bison hunting. In 1808, the Wichita were found on the Brazos and Red Rivers drawn together for defense against the Osage. They suffered severe casualties in an attack by the Osage in 1833.

The following description of the Wichita is taken from Schmitt and Schmitt (1952), Newcomb (1961), and Newcomb and Field (1967).

The Wichita occupied sedentary villages of grass houses adjacent to the fields where they grew corn, beans,

squash, and melons. After the harvest, the produce was dried and stored in cache pits. The women tended the gardens while the men hunted near the villages. During the fall or winter bison hunts, the village grass houses were abandoned for a more mobile existence in tipis. There was some gathering of wild fruits and vegetables, and garden produce was traded for meat from the Comanche and Kiowa.

The Wichita warfare pattern generally parallels the larger Plains Indian tradition. Overall, however, the Wichita bear a strong cultural similarity to other Plains village dwellers, especially to the Pawnee.

Among the Waco, Tawakoni, Wichita proper, and Kichai there were only minor cultural differences, and even those disappeared as the constituent groups merged in identity during reservation times.

Each village was independent and had its own village chief, sub-chief, and lesser officials to handle its external affairs. The chiefs were elected by an informal council of warriors.

The primary social and economic unit was the matrilineal matrilocal extended family. The oldest woman served as the household head and managed internal affairs. This

matrilineal emphasis was significantly eroded by the influence of European contact.

The Wichita had no actual vision quest, though "power" was encountered in dreams and visions. There were semi-secret religious dance societies and a ceremonial deer dance was held for the tribal welfare by medicine men three or four times during the year.

The Kiowa, Comanche, Kiowa Apache,
and Wichita, 1834-1867

The following reconstruction of this period in Southern Plains Culture History is based upon Schmitt and Schmitt (1952), Brant (1951), Levy (1961), Oliver (1962), Jordan (1965), Newcomb and Field (1967), and Bittle (1971).

The first probable U.S. contact with the Southern Plains tribes was made during the Dragoon Expedition to the Wichita village at Devil's Canyon in 1834. As a result of this expedition, the Wichita, Kiowa, Comanche, and probably the Kiowa Apache, were invited to a council at Fort Gibson in early September of that year. At this time some of the Waco, Tawakoni, and Kichai were still in Texas. The council served as prelude to a meeting a year later (August, 1835) which resulted in the Camp Holmes Treaty. The treaty established peace between the KCA/W and the U.S. and between

the KCA/W and the Osage, who had been recently engaged in a military contest over access to bison hunting grounds. Though formally stipulated in the treaty, peace between the warring tribes was short lived.

The summers of 1835 and 1836 found the Kiowa and Kiowa Apache raiding for horses among the Mexican settlements in Texas. These two tribes were attacked by the Cheyenne in 1836 and there followed a long series of hostilities.

In May, 1837, the Kiowa, Kiowa Apache, and Tawakoni met with General Stokes and Colonel Chouteau at Fort Gibson. Peace with the Osage and Creek was again agreed to and peaceful relations were reaffirmed with the U.S., Texas, and Mexico. This agreement, however, did not stop the raids for horses and captives into Texas and Mexico.

The southern Comanche endured a hungry summer in 1838, since the bison temporarily had abandoned their extreme southern range. During the same summer, hostilities ran high between the Cheyenne and the Kiowa. A lasting peace was established between these tribes in 1840, and attention again was turned to summer raids in Mexico. The preceding winter was marked by a severe smallpox epidemic on the Southern Plains.

The period of 1840-1848 found the KCA/W engaged in uninterrupted raids into Texas and Mexico though raids lessened on the Santa Fe Trail. In deciding upon military retaliation or renewed peace efforts, the U.S. agencies involved were much confused as to which groups of which tribes were raiding when and where, either singly or in combination.

In October, 1848, Thomas Fitzpatrick concluded an amicable and successful meeting with the Cheyenne, Arapaho, Kiowa, Kiowa Apache and a few Sioux. The tribes were warned against making further raids in Mexico. Nevertheless, the following year the Wichita, Comanche, and Lipan made raids along the Mexican border. Meanwhile, a cholera epidemic had a truly disastrous effect on the combined Kiowa and Kiowa Apache summer encampment causing them to disperse. Later in the year, Fitzpatrick again met with the tribes, but little was accomplished. The evident lack of coordination between the Department of Indian Affairs and the military did nothing but cause suspicion among the Kiowa and Kiowa Apache.

In 1851, Fitzpatrick set up a meeting with Southern Plains tribes for September at Fort Sumner, Kansas to arrange a new treaty. The Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache, however, initially refused to venture so far out of their

own territory. The following year (1852), while camped near Fort Atkinson (formerly Fort Sumner) the Cheyenne, Arapaho, Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache decided to move against the Pawnee but subsequently were routed. By this time, the Wichita proper and Waco had established villages near Rush Springs, Oklahoma, while the Tawakoni and part of the Waco remained in Texas.

The second Fort Atkinson Treaty was agreed to in July, 1853. The government, recognizing the effect of increased white travel through Indian hunting grounds, agreed to provide annuities of food and clothing for ten years to the Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache. In return, the tribes were to release all captives, cease intertribal war, stop raids to Mexico and Texas, and allow the government to put roads and military posts on their land. The terms were accepted, though the treaty had little real effect. The annuities were chronically short or late, and the Kiowa immediately resumed their raids. The Kiowa Apache began associating with the Cheyenne and Arapaho.

During the summer of 1854, the Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache met at the Pawnee Fork with some Cheyenne, Arapaho, and Osage for a group campaign against the Sauk, Fox, and Pottowatomie. The attackers were soundly defeated

and the Kiowa and Comanche returned to Fort Atkinson to pick up their annuities. By the same time, part of the Wichita, along with the Caddo, Penateka Comanche, and Tonkawa, had accepted lands on the Brazos Reserve in Texas. In 1855, they were reported to have had 600 acres under cultivation, making good crops, raising cattle, and attracting other Wichita to the reserve. They were met with hostility, however, from the surrounding Texans. The result was an ambush in 1858 and the abandonment of the reserve in the following year. Those Wichita who had remained in Oklahoma took up residence near Fort Arbuckle in the summer of 1855.

The Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache suffered a dry, hungry summer in 1855. The next year they resumed their attacks on the Santa Fe Trail. The summer of 1857 was again a hot, dry, and hungry one marked by a Kiowa raid against the Navajo and another raid into Mexico. Though the Kiowa and Comanche travelled to Fort Atkinson for annuities, the Kiowa Apache again remained separate and received no annuities. A similar situation presented itself the following year (1858): annuities were distributed regardless of the tribes' recent raiding activities, the Kiowa raided in Mexico, and the Kiowa Apache camped with the Cheyenne and

Arapaho. In October, the Rush Creek Massacre took place. Major Van Dorn's cavalry attacked a Wichita village while it was being visited by some Comanche on their way to Fort Arbuckle for a peace talk. Knowing that the Comanche suspected them of collusion and fearing for their safety, the Wichita removed themselves to the near vicinity of Fort Arbuckle.

The years 1859 and 1860 were quiet ones, though the Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache were forced to move to the north for their summer hunts due to drought conditions in the south. The Wichita in southwestern Oklahoma suffered cruelly during this time due to crop failure. The Civil War period (1861-1865) found the Wichita removed to what is now Wichita, Kansas, where they shared an agency with the Caddo, Shawnee, Delaware, Creek, and Cherokee. Their condition remained poor and a flood in 1863 wiped out their hopes for what had otherwise promised to be a good crop.

In 1862, the Kiowa Apache were informally adopted by the Arapaho and joined them on a reserve shared with the Cheyenne in southeastern Colorado. They continued to camp separately, however. In the winter and spring, another smallpox epidemic hit the Southern Plains tribes which already were suffering from lack of food. The tribes once

more resorted to raids on the Santa Fe Trail and to stealing cattle. After a hard winter, the Kiowa Apache temporarily rejoined the Kiowa for the summer camp in 1863.

Following the Sand Creek Massacre of Cheyenne and Arapaho in 1864, a general Indian War ensued. At Fort Larned, the Kiowa stole horses and engaged the cavalry in a skirmish. The government issued an order prohibiting the fall bison hunt. After the Sun Dance that year, the Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache were attacked and put to flight by troops led by Kit Carson in the Texas panhandle.

In October, 1865, the Treaty of the Little Arkansas was concluded. The Cheyenne, Arapaho, and Kiowa Apache actually signed the treaty and made assurances that their captives would be returned. The Kiowa and Comanche, complaining of former annuity irregularities, abstained. At this time the Kiowa Apache formally affiliated with the Cheyenne and Arapaho. As it turned out, agent neglect caused the annuities again to be irregular in the following years.

The summer of 1866 found the Southern Plains tribes on good terms with each other though their relationship with the government continued to be tense due to some small raids by unknown parties. Some politicians at this time

considered the advisability of a war of extinction. On October 21, 1867, the government entered into its last major peaceful effort to settle with the Cheyenne, Arapaho, Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache. The result was the Treaty of Medicine Lodge. At this point, the Kiowa Apache once more rejoined the Kiowa and Comanche.

From the 1830s on, the decline of the bison was notable. The Kiowa, Comanche, Kiowa Apache, and Wichita were forced to compete for the dwindling herds on the Southern Plains with the hostile eastern tribes as well as with white hunters. In addition, Levy (1961:23) notes that a major dry cycle in the Southern Plains climate began in 1846 and lasted through 1874. The individual effect of many of those dry years has already been noted. The southern tribes were forced to range northward out of their home territory for bison and the same conditions brought crop failure to the already economically reduced Wichita villages.

In the major epidemics of 1801, 1816, 1839-1840, 1849-1850, and 1861-1862, it is estimated that the nomadic tribes lost as much as one quarter of their population in a single bout, while the sedentary villages lost as much as one-half of their population. It is evident that by 1867,

the Kiowa, Comanche, Kiowa Apache, and Wichita were in a stressful ecological position. When the reduction of the bison and the frequent epidemics are coupled with the decline of the horse and gun trade and the increasing U.S. military presence in their territory, their situation appears even more grim. Though they were increasingly threatened by these conditions, as long as they had horses and bison, some hope remained.

The government failed to gain control of the situation, partly through the remoteness of its agents, partly through the lack of realism in the treaties it made, and partly due to the fact that a supply of bison, though reduced, was at hand to the tribes. Through the treaties, both the government and the Indians learned a lesson in mutual unreliability that was continued from that point on. As the game diminished and treaties were made prohibiting raids, the government, in effect, encouraged Indian reliance on undependable annuities. Indian frustration with their condition and governmental attempts to find alternatives to bison or rations are dealt with in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 3

THE RESERVATION PERIOD, 1867-1901

Developments in Federal Indian Policy

The development of federal Indian policy through 1901 can be organized into three succeeding stages: (a) antecedent British Crown policy; (b) the push for tribal pacification and concentration upon isolated reservations; (c) the move toward individual allotment and tribal dispersal and atomization, i.e. the breakup of reservations and forced assimilation of Indian populations. In the latter two stages Indian self-sufficiency through agriculture was a consistent goal of federal policy makers.

As Officer (1971:10-11) notes, British Crown policy recognized that the Indians had "a compensable interest in the lands they occupied and used" and required certain protection by the government. The British colonies and later the U.S. government "acknowledged certain rights of sovereignty and entered into treaties" which included the

regulation of Indian trade and land sale. It was after the War of 1812, however, that U.S. Indian policy took the familiar form of territorial acquisition and Indian isolation and removal (Officer 1971:13).

In 1849, Congress created the Department of Interior and transferred responsibility for Indian affairs from the War department to the Secretary of the Interior, where the source of federal Indian policy remains to this day. This move was not without controversy. There was significant pressure to return authority over the Indians to the military for thirty years following the transfer to the Department of Interior (Officer 1971:26; Priest 1942:15-27). The military did retain authority over off-reservation hostile groups until pacification was accomplished. This apparently practical division of authority proved to be a source of problems in the late 1860s and early 1870s in dealing with the KCA/W. It disallowed any well coordinated, effective means of dealing with Indian problems (see below the problems encountered by agents Tatum and Haworth of the KCA).

Also in 1849, Superintendent Mitchell (cited in Bittle 1971:8-9), made some interesting observations concerning the Southern Plains tribes nearly 20 years prior to

their reservation confinement. He noted that the bison soon would be eliminated, that the agricultural prospects for the area were not good, and that cattle herding appeared a much more likely subsistence pursuit for the Indians in the future. Later, many KCA agents would come to the same conclusion, though the goal would never be realized.

Commissioner of Indian Affairs Manypenny called for the policy of Indian removal to be abandoned in 1853 in favor of the establishment of permanent reservations which would allow the Indians to settle in security and develop agricultural self-sufficiency. He also envisioned the beginning of a voluntary allotment program. Consistent with this vision, the Omaha Treaty of 1854 included just such an allotment clause (Officer 1971:26), though the Dawes Act, calling for general allotment, was not passed for another 33 years.

Twelve years prior to the Medicine Lodge Treaty the federal government already had a farm plan in mind for the KCA/W (Bittle 1971:17).

The preceding prophetic visions and events were much in advance of their eventual general applications and are not to be taken as indicative of the ordinary concerns of the Department of Interior and the Congress at the time.

Pacification and reservation confinement were yet to be accomplished on the Southern Plains and remained the chief immediate goals until 1875. During 1865-1867, a joint committee was established to investigate the conditions of the Indians. The committee reported increasing white trespass onto Indian lands, the rapid destruction of the bison, and deplorable reservation conditions, but no actions were immediately taken to alter the situation (Officer 1971:27).

In 1866, Congress authorized the Indian Peace Commission to make treaties with the Western tribes. Western Oklahoma was designated for the Southern Plains tribes' reservations. For this purpose, 5,546 square miles were ceded to the government by the Chickasaw and Choctaw (Wallace and Hoebel 1952:309). The following year, the Medicine Lodge Treaty defined reservations for the KCA and Cheyenne and Arapaho.

The Board of Indian Commissioners was created as a source of recommendations for improvements to the Indian Bureau. The Board, composed of nine "philanthropist" advisors, functioned until 1934. For nearly 20 years, the Board's potentialities were held in check by bureaucratic opposition due to the "joint control clause," dividing policy-making authority between the Board and the Department

of Interior without any clear definition of roles or jurisdictions (Priest 1942:42). This conflict was continually carried to the Congress but was never resolved.

As part of President Grant's Peace Policy, missionaries were placed in charge of the reservation agencies in 1869. This move was largely a response to the problem of inept and fraudulent handling of annuities for the Indians prior to the Civil War (Officer 1971:29). The Quakers were given control of agencies in Indian Territory.

Church nomination of Indian agents continued for nearly 10 years. During this time problems arose in intra-Church coordination, government support, inter-Church rivalry, Church/Indian Bureau resentment, and Church/military antagonism (Priest 1942:28).

Church nomination generally upgraded agent honesty and sympathetic concern for the Indians. The honest, concerned, and inexperienced churchmen, however, proved to be incompetent administrators (Priest 1942:37). The overall failure of these agents helped emphasize the need for fundamental reform in the Indian Affairs administration. Clearly, honest and concerned agents were not all that the situation required.

The Indian Appropriation Bill of 1871 brought an end to the treaty-making era and the fiction of Indian tribes as autonomous political powers. It was anticipated that the bill would assist in getting better policy and policy applications by making the process public. In reality, it did little to improve conditions. With the end of treaty-making came the end of direct Indian input and their requisite acceptance of the policies affecting them (Priest 1942:102).

The annuity system was many things to many people. To Congress, it was an unpopular fiscal drain, though a recognizable treaty obligation. To westerners, it was a means of pacifying a dangerous neighboring population. To the Indians, it was something owed them and needed by them, despite frequent prodigal usage and, just as frequent, late delivery of useless goods. To annuity contractors, it was big business and a chance to cash in on governmental corruption and mismanagement. The result was that the government, taxpayers and Indians were cheated, the annuity profiteers became wealthy, and the Indians often either got what they didn't need or want or got rotten food and flawed goods (Priest 1942:106). A further, as yet largely unnoticed, result was that the Indians were becoming

increasingly dependent upon the annuity system for survival.

Annuity reforms commenced in the late 1870s affected the types of items furnished and emphasized economic usefulness. The period from 1878 to 1889 saw a decrease in rations, an increase in domestic, educational and agricultural annuities, and the abandonment of the use of tribal leaders as annuity distributors (Priest 1942:110). As Priest notes, however, "the Congressional practice of providing as little as possible for the conduct of Indian affairs seriously impeded reform" (1942:119).

Levels for the funding of annuities were established early, at a time when bison still provided many tribes with the bulk of their subsistence. With the demise of the bison, Congress continually acted to cut rather than expand its already conservative Indian budget, reducing not only rations but also agency personnel. The Indian Appropriation Bill of 1875 allowed only \$6,000 per reservation for all agency employees (Priest 1942:119), limiting personnel at the initial critical phase in the promotion of Indian self-sufficiency through agriculture. Another example can be found in 1884 when Congress provided what it thought was a generous \$25,000 for farm instructors on all reservations--

enough for one farmer for every three reservations that required one (Priest 1942:119). Of course, there were significant fluctuations in the level of yearly Indian appropriations. Congress, however, consistently sought to cut the level of funding and consistently provided less than was required to expect reasonable success in achieving the goals it had in mind for the Indians, viz. independence, self-sufficient farming, and Christian citizenship. As Priest notes:

There was no relation between the miracles Congress wished the Indians to accomplish and the means it provided to help them do so. . . . more employees and men of considerably greater ability were necessary if annuities were to be reduced, for while anyone could distribute rations in one day, farming instructors had to exert intelligent effort over a long period (Priest 1942:119).

The wisdom of spending more now on instructional personnel in order to save later on rations was apparently not accepted by Congress.

The Congressional battles over Indian appropriations largely reflected party and sectional differences. The Democrats in the House pushed for cutbacks in Indian funding, while the Republicans in the Senate from New England and the West fought to maintain current levels of spending. The result was usually a compromise budget (Priest 1942:117).

Corruption was widespread in the upper levels of the Indian Affairs administration in 1869-1880. In this connection, Priest notes that "until President-elect Hayes announced the appointment of Carl Schurz as Secretary of the Interior in 1877, no positive action was taken to check the spread of crimes against the American Indians" (1942:68). Secretary Schurz started housecleaning over significant opposition and extensive corruption turned up in the wake of the investigation. The new commissioner, Hayt, pursued a ruthless hatchet job of reform, but was later found corrupt himself and was dismissed in January, 1880. Though Hayes and Schurz had failed to accomplish the reform they sought, their investigations exposed the extent of the corruption in Indian Affairs, roused popular support for reform, and directed public concern to problems in Indian administration (Priest 1942:68).

By the 1870s and 1880s, some reformers were regretting the reservation isolation of the Indians which prevented Indian-white contact which they imagined would have a civilizing effect on the Indians. In 1877, the Board of Indian Commissioners recommended allotment of the Indians. In 1879, the first general allotment bill was introduced in Congress. Reform-minded Secretary Schurz promoted the severalty bill,

saying that he thought it was the Indians' wish to have "a white man's title to their lands" (Washburn 1975:7). Allotment, however, was not quickly accepted or passed.

By the 1870s, flagrant white encroachment onto reservations required constant governmental vigilance to hold it more or less in check. The weakness of the government in the face of greed is illustrated by the Black Hills gold rush war and the forced sale of Sioux reservation land.

In April, 1879, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs alerted President Hayes of a plot by surrounding settlers to seize forcibly Indian land in Indian Territory. The plot was foiled and its exposure served to retard rather than hasten the opening of the reservations (Washburn 1975:6; Priest 1942:75).

Gradually, however, defenders of the reservation system were recognizing the impossibility of maintaining the status quo and were concluding that a voluntary allotment plan seemed the best alternative (Washburn 1975:6).

Both Washburn (1975:5) and Priest (1942:77) agree that the event which started the organized public concern with Indian rights was the Ponca removal. In 1876, the government decided to remove the Ponca from their original reservation in Nebraska to one in Indian Territory. The Ponca sought in

vain for permission to return to their original reservation. Their flight back to the north and ensuing court case in 1879 did much to highlight not only their plight but also the various problems in Indian administration.

By 1880, the tide of public sentiment had turned in favor of the Indians' cause. This was brought about by the exposure of fraud and corruption in the Commissioner's office, white encroachment onto Indian land, and the Ponca removal tragedy (Priest 1942:66).

The following organizations, founded at this time, were to play major roles in the debate over allotment that was brewing, and each in its way attempted to represent the best interests of the Indians. The Women's National Indian Association was founded in Philadelphia in 1879. It originally was formed to oppose the opening of Indian Territory. Rapidly its scope widened, and by 1886 it had 60 branch organizations. The Indian Rights Association also was founded in Philadelphia, in 1882. In 1883, the influential annual Lake Mohonk Conferences commenced. These conferences played an important prelegislative role by providing an arena in which different opinions could be aired and compromises worked out. The National Indian Defense Association,

known for its conservative position favoring Indian isolation, was formed in 1885 in Washington.

In his annual report in 1880, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs stated that "the demand for title to lands in severalty by the reservation Indians is almost universal" (quoted in Washburn 1975:8). Was this a lie or just a serious error? The authentic wishes of the Indians on this issue went unheeded, in any case. By no stretch of the imagination was it true that the Indians were in favor of allotment.

An interesting example is provided by the Five Civilized Tribes who were economically successful agricultural peoples living on reservations in eastern Indian Territory. They were well organized enough and prosperous enough to send vocal lobbyists to Washington (Washburn 1975:8). Though they were able to gain exemption from the initial allotment act, however, later they were forced to accept allotment by the Curtis Act of 1898 and the Burke Act of 1906. If wealthy Christian agricultural tribes with constitutional governments could not prevail against the push for allotment, what tribes could?

Early versions of the allotment bill called for gradual allotment, Indian consent, and the guarantee of

tribal patent. Almost immediately, the idea of gradual allotment was swept aside in the haste to make land available and to assimilate the Indians "for their own good" (Priest 1942:124).

At the 1884 Lake Mohonk Conference, it was resolved by the participants that tribal organization was a serious hindrance to civilizing the Indians, that immediate allotment should be extended to all Indians wishing it, and that all other Indians should be allotted "as soon as practicable" (Washburn 1975:12). The conference, attended by representatives of the government, the reform organizations, and various churches and universities, went on to endorse the Coke Bill calling for voluntary allotment. As with the other general allotment bills introduced in Congress since 1879, the Coke Bill neither passed nor failed, but was shuffled back and forth and debated (Washburn 1975:15).

The debate that raged during the 1885 Lake Mohonk Conference dramatized quite well the central issue. General S. C. Armstrong and Dr. Lyman Abbott advocated forced allotment and the abrogation of all prior treaty obligations. Senator Henry Dawes of Massachusetts and Herbert Welsh of the Indian Right Association opposed the forced or hasty application of allotment in favor of a voluntary, gradual

approach (Washburn 1975:17). Both arguments were couched in terms of seeking justice and equality for the Indians and the best opportunity for their advancement. The rhetoric was a thin disguise for the multiplicity of other motives.

The Board of Indian Commissioners canvassed 49 Indian agents on the allotment question in November, 1885. All of the agents said that their tribes were not ready, and over half said that allotment would fail to accomplish its intended goal (Washburn 1975:19).

Senator Dawes, who staunchly opposed forced allotment, either capitulated to what he saw as the inevitable forces of land greed or vacillated in his opinion (Washburn 1975:12, 18, 21). In any case, the bill requiring general allotment that was passed in 1887 bears his name. Whether or not adherence to his original position would have done more than delay forced allotment for a year or two is problematic.

The Dawes Bill was passed in the Senate during February, 1886. It gave the executive branch the power to allot individual Indians tracts of 40-60 acres based on age and marital status, and to buy the remainder of the reservation and open it to white settlement. Ten days prior to this, the House passed an amendment requiring the consent of

the male majority of each tribe to be allotted. A joint Congressional committee was called and finally succeeded in eliminating the amendment. The bill was passed by the House in January, 1887, stood approved by the Senate, and was signed into law by the president on February 8, 1887 (Washburn 1975:24-26).

The Dawes Act became the cornerstone of federal Indian policy until 1934. It provided for 160 acres to each family head, 80 acres to each single adult, and 40 acres to each child under 18 years. "Trust" patents were to be issued making the land inalienable for 25 years, after which time "fee" patents would be issued. Some tribes, including the KCA/W, were initially exempted from the Dawes Act.

After passage of the Dawes Act, protest by the opposing forces was heard only briefly. In general, interest in and concern for the Indians waned greatly, and little enthusiasm was found to provide the kind of follow-through that would make the goal of the legislation a reality. This sudden decline in interest accurately reflected the true source of interest in Indian reform at the time--self-interest. Within two years of the passage of the Dawes Act, regretful soul searching and recognition of its

failure to achieve its goal was heard at the annual Lake Mohonk Conference where the bill originally was framed and approved (Washburn 1975:30). The floodgates, however, were open, and there was no going back. Avarice and ignorant righteous concern had won out, and the Indians paid for this white adventure with their land.

The bill which eventually passed was a skillful compromise and blending of the interests of land speculators and humanitarians, westerners and easterners, frontiersmen and intellectuals. When the promise of the legislation proved abortive, humanitarians, in the opinion of one historian, sought to blame its failure on greedy westerners and insensitive administrators rather than their own fantastic expectations (Washburn 1975:30).

In 1891, the Dawes Act was amended to limit allotments to 80 acres and provide for the leasing of Indian allotments under certain conditions. It was further modified in 1894 and 1897 with regard to the specifics of the leasing provision. This was done despite the objection of Dawes and other reformers who correctly assessed the practice of leasing as a major contributor to continued non-productivity among the allotted Indians (Washburn 1975:29). Supporters of leasing argued that some allotted Indians were too young, too old, or too sick to farm their allotments and that their land should not be wasted when it could be used to benefit them by leasing (Otis 1973:124). In

1898, the Sac and Fox agent in Oklahoma defended leasing as furnishing a good example in the white "leaseman." One agent went so far as to say that the Indians got more out of leasing their land to whites than if they had farmed it themselves (Otis 1973:125). The result of this travesty on the original intent of the allotment program is obvious and will be dealt with specifically in the following chapters. It is sufficient to note here that by allowing what developed into uncontrolled white leasing of Indian allotments any potential for even limited success of the allotment program was eliminated. Not until the Great Depression and the New Deal was an effort made to reverse the failure of the allotment program (Washburn 1975:30).

Though the phrase comes from Lyman Abbott who was somewhat of an embarrassment to fellow severalty supporters, the notion that "barbarism has no rights which civilization is bound to respect" (quoted in Washburn 1975:16), is indicative of the general attitude, if not the rhetoric, which prevailed in Indian policy once the Indian military threat was eradicated and tribal sovereignty became a legal convenience. It was Colonel William McMichael of the Board of Indian Commissioners who said during the severalty debates

that "we must protect the Indian, not against himself, but against ourselves" (Washburn 1975:18).

The Farming Frontier in Areas Adjacent
to the KCA/W Reservation

The area immediately to the southwest of Indian Territory was settled late relative to the rest of the Plains Frontier. Indian raiding activity posed a barrier until their pacification in 1875. The area also offered unfavorable climatic conditions for agriculture. Indian Territory itself was officially closed to all settlement until 1889.

In the 1860s, Indian depredations actually caused a loss of population for much of west Texas (Fite 1966: 195). After 1875, west Texas boomed with the influx of pioneers and cattlemen. The cattle empire greatly expanded in the 1870s in the Texas area surrounding southwestern Indian Territory. In the 1880s and 1890s ranching was still the dominant use of land in this area (Fite 1966: 199).

The farmers initially planted gardens and fodder for their livestock. Corn was unquestionably the dominant crop in the 1860s through the 1880s. Gradually, winter wheat made its entry. Winter wheat offered the dual

advantages of winter pasturage and suitability to local climatic conditions. The development of interest in cotton during the 1870s and 1880s was severely hindered by the unavailability of gins (Fite 1966:197). Small scale agriculture required a combination of crops and livestock in a pattern of diversified subsistence farming. An additional requirement of considerable cost to the settlers was adequate fencing, given the dominance of cattle raising in the area.

On the northern border of Indian Territory, squatters from Kansas continually made a nuisance of themselves in the 1870s. The policy prohibiting trespassing on Indian reservations was hard to enforce, even though army troopers repeatedly attempted to clear the squatters out (Fite 1966:203-204).

Indian Territory finally experienced massive white settlement in 1889-1901. In April, 1889, the "unassigned lands" in Indian Territory were opened to settlement. The area is located in what is now north central Oklahoma adjacent to the former KCA/W and Cheyenne and Arapaho reservations. In opening the area, the "land run" was used for the first time (Fite 1966:205).

In rapid succession former reservation land was opened to settlement. The lands of the Sac and Fox, Iowa, Shawnee, and Potawatomi were opened in 1891. The Cheyenne and Arapaho reservation was opened in 1892. The run for the Cherokee Outlet was made in 1893. In 1901, the KCA/W surplus lands were dispersed by lottery. Of the 170,000 people registered for the lottery, only 6,500 received land (Fite 1966:208). Though the anxious settlers soon faced discouragement from the environment and market conditions, Oklahoma offered the best land available at the time of the opening (Fite 1966:214). It should be noted, however, that when land was opened there was routinely much large and small scale speculation and that not everyone who staked a claim was a homesteader. Frequently, homesteaders arrived too late and had to buy claims from speculators at rapidly inflating prices. Fite states that "the great majority of entries filed on government land after about 1898 were made by petty speculators who had no intention of farming" (Fite 1966:215).

1867-1875, Years of Military Conflict and the Beginning of Reservation Life

The advent of the Medicine Lodge Treaty in October, 1867, found the Southern Plains tribes in varying

circumstances. The Arapaho were peaceful but short of food. Some of the Cheyenne young men were making sporadic raids. The KCA had returned from a raid against the Navajo (Nye 1968:106-107).

The white participants of the treaty council, including Commissioner Taylor and other prominent officials, assembled at Fort Larned and then proceeded to Medicine Lodge Creek in Southern Kansas. While on their way, many white men in the party tactlessly engaged in shooting bison for sport and succeeded in outraging the Indians (Debo 1970:186).

As the council convened, the commissioner made his charges against the tribes and sternly warned them to stop their raids. Ten Bears of the Comanche, followed by Santanta of the Kiowa, was quick to reply. They both justified their deeds and said that all they wanted was to be left alone to continue their free roaming, hunting life. Taylor responded that they would have to change before the bison were all gone, and he urged them to accept a reservation where they would be fed, clothed, housed and educated (Nye 1968:107-108; Debo 1970:187-188).

The Kiowa and Comanche refused to sign until it was agreed that they would be allowed to go off the reservation

to hunt bison. In the course of a week's time all five nomadic Southern Plains tribes signed the treaty in which they agreed to accept restriction to Indian Territory, stop raiding, allow traffic across their lands, and permit the building of railroads and army posts. In return, the government promised to safeguard their reservations, provide an agency, schools, a blacksmith, a doctor, agricultural equipment and instruction, a new suit of clothes at the annual census and \$30,000 appropriated yearly for thirty years "for the judicious purchase of such articles as may seem proper to the conditions and necessities of the Indians (KCA)" (Mooney 1898:184-185; Brant 1951:138; Nye 1968:109; Pennington 1972:507). This appropriation amounted to something less than \$10 per person (KCA) per year. It is unclear why the tribes signed the treaty; whether from a desire for presents and rations or from the threat posed by the council's escort troops. In any event, after signing the treaty the KCA moved to the vicinity of Fort Cobb and agent Leavenworth established a temporary agency in Eureka Valley. The agency was not equipped and no rations arrived for the Indians during the winter of 1867-1868 (Nye 1965:111).

The Wichita and affiliated tribes who had been living on a crowded reservation in Kansas returned to Indian

Territory in 1867. The incredible conditions and circumstances under which they were removed from Butler County, Kansas to a reservation adjacent to the KCA are well described in Buntin (1934:1-17). The relatively short trip took close to a year, cost much in rations and Indian lives, and represents an excellent example of the ineptness with which Indian affairs frequently were carried out. Plagued by cholera and arriving too late to begin farming, the Wichita were demoralized, unsettled, and completely dependent upon the government during the winter of 1867-1868 (ARCIA 1867:323. ARCIA indicates the annual agent's reports to the Commissioner published in the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs).

Up to the mid-1700s, the Wichita population had exceeded 10,000 persons. During the last half of the 1700s, they experienced a rapid decline in numbers. This decline slowed somewhat in the 1800s, though by 1867 only 758 Wichita remained (Bell 1967:348).

The years from 1867 to 1875 were confusing and violent ones for the KCA/W. Drought, scarcity of bison, and lateness or shortage of rations posed a subsistence problem for all four groups. Raiding parties of uncontrollable young men from the Kiowa and Comanche perpetrated

acts for which their entire tribes were held responsible and, therefore, punishable. The stressful and frustrating reservation conditions also led to competition among the leaders of the various tribal factions. The army responded to raids with punitive actions against raiding and non-raiding factions alike. These punitive actions, in turn, aroused the fear, anger, and hostility of entire tribes. The cycle of escalation was complete by 1874 and ran its course until the tribes were worn to exhaustion and straggled in to the agency to surrender in February, 1875. During this period, the Wichita and most of the Kiowa Apache remained as non-combatants, though they did flee the agency at times. The early development of agriculture among the KCA/W was retarded by the frequent military campaigns in the area.

In the winter and spring of 1868, the frustrated and hungry Kiowa and Comanche victimized the Wichita crops and stock, raided the Wichita agency for food, and threatened their own agent, Leavenworth, who fled (ARCIA 1868:287-288; Nye 1968:113). In May, most of the Kiowa and Comanche moved north for bison.

During the summer, numerous raids were made into Texas and a campaign against the Navajo resulted in attack

and rout at the hands of the Ute. In mid-July, the KCA and Cheyenne and Arapaho converged on Fort Larned for their annuities.

As a result of Indian raids in late summer and fall, Sheridan's punitive winter campaign was launched, during which Custer led the attack against the Cheyenne and Arapaho winter camps along the Washita (Nye 1968:127; Debo 1970: 189-190). After the cavalry's successful attack, the Indians fled and later were forced into Fort Cobb to join the KCA held there.

In January of 1869, construction was begun on Fort Sill and a nearby agency for the KCA was established. After their move to the vicinity of their new agency, the KCA remained peacefully on the reservation for a year with the exception of a few raids into Texas.

Grant's Peace Policy, initiated in the same year, gave a big push to the program of reservation localization of Indians and their training as agriculturalists. At this time the first two farm instructors were hired for the KCA. In payment they received \$60 per month, a daily ration, and 10% of the Indian crops (Pennington 1972:11). The Kiowa and Kiowa Apache had 55 acres plowed for them and planted in corn and vegetables. Agent Tatum stated that they showed

"little interest in their crops" and that they preferred to hunt (ARCIA 1869:385). Their horses ruined the crop. The corn meal ration given the Indians was bad and caused diarrhea, so it was fed to their horses. When the clothing annuity arrived, it contained fancy dress clothes which were completely unsuited to the Indians' needs. Despite these problems, Tatum had confidence in his plan for educating and making self-sufficient farmers of the KCA (ARCIA 1869:385). Tatum initially was a concerned, energetic, and ambitious agent, though he was more than a little unrealistic in expecting the Indians to act like and take the same responsibilities and outlook as Quaker farmers in the East.

At the Wichita agency, though the Indians expressed a desire for implements and seed for the next season, little was accomplished other than limited gardening. The Penateka Comanche and some Pawnee were included on the Wichita reservation at that time. The Penateka had acquired some farming skills on their former reservation in Texas and had 71 acres in corn and vegetables (ARCIA 1869:384).

During 1869, the Wichita suffered from short rations of poor quality. In his annual report, their agent estimated that the government had paid six times what the

rations were worth and as a result had run short of funds for other necessities (ARCIA 1869:393).

During the spring and summer of 1870, the KCA went off reservation to hunt and also engaged in various small, sporadic raids in Texas. In order to discourage raiding, sale of stock and purchase of guns and ammunition by Indians was prohibited. Tatum noted that the peaceful tribes received much less than the raiding tribes in the way of rations and annuity goods and that this served to encourage raiding, since the Indians were also well aware of the correlation (ARCIA 1870:261-262).

General Hazen of Fort Sill assisted Tatum in getting land plowed for Indians to farm and gave him \$3,000 for implements and seed. Tatum's budget apparently had been cut back and such assistance was greatly needed. Despite this aid, the Indian farming picture for the year was grim.

The Wichitas prefer their small patches in the edge of the woods to a field. The Comanches, Kiowas, and Apaches had made no effort to raise a crop this year (ARCIA 1870:265).

In the past, Indian captives usually had been ransomed by the government. Tatum refused to do this and withheld all rations until the captives were brought in. This move was decisive and effective and served to discourage the further taking of captives. However, it does herald a trend

of growing autocratic power concentrated in the hands of individual agents. Coupled with increasing Indian dependence on rations, it constituted a basic feature of the emerging paternalistic relationship between the Indians and their agents.

Raiding among the KCA intensified during 1871. Tatum attributed much of it to the presence of traders from Mexico and New Mexico who illegally offered Indians guns and ammunition for stolen horses, mules, and cattle (ARCIA 1871:503). The series of raids into Texas and Mexico culminated in the attack on the Warren Wagon Train in Texas on May 18, 1871, in which seven wagoneers were killed. The Kiowa leaders, Santanta, Big Tree, and Satank, were arrested at the agency for leading the raid. On their way to Texas for trial, Satank was killed after he attacked a guard. Santanta and Big Tree were tried, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Originally, the sentence had been execution, but the threat of Indian reprisals caused the sentence to be changed. The two leaders were imprisoned at Huntsville (ARCIA 1871:502-503; Nye 1968:165-166; Debo 1970:192).

The Quahada Comanche continued their raids, but the Kiowa were somewhat restrained by their leader's imprisonment. After a meeting at the Wichita agency and a trip to

Washington, Lone Wolf and other Kiowa leaders were eventually able to secure the release of Santanta and Big Tree late in 1873.

Tatum's attitude had changed toward his charges. He felt that the KCA had "forfeited their treaty" and stated further that "they are wards and paupers of the United States, and should be treated as such, and not as nations" (ARCIA 1871:503).

Meanwhile, on the Wichita reservation, drought destroyed much of what had been done in Indian farming during the previous winter and spring (ARCIA 1871:477).

Due to continued KCA raids into Texas in 1872, Tatum once again punished the Indians by withholding rations. Though he recognized that he was unable to control the tribes, he objected very strongly to what he saw as buying further atrocities by paying for temporary peace after raids. The cycle of raid . . . treaty and payoff . . . governmental neglect . . . raid . . . treaty and payoff . . . appeared obvious to Tatum.

The natural ability of the Indian is little, if any, inferior to the Anglo-Saxon, and he should be held responsible for his actions, especially when he receives no provocation for them. The leniency of the Government in letting guilty ones go unpunished is accepted on their part as cowardice or imbecility on the part of the whites (ARCIA 1872:248).

On the Wichita reservation, progress in agriculture still was painfully slow. The first effort by men working in the fields was aborted mid-season. The women continued tending their garden plots. During the year, widespread sickness resulting in many deaths disrupted even these modest farming endeavors. The agency physician attributed the illness to bad flour rations.

I know that the Indian country makes a good market for millers and dealers to dispose of an article that could find a market nowhere else; but it is bad for Indians to have to suffer for their benefit (ARCIA 1872:254).

The Wichita reservation was also plagued by the stealthy operations of whiskey dealers and horse thieves from Texas.

In 1873, the KCA received a new agent. Tatum was replaced by agent Haworth, a fellow Quaker with a very different style. Haworth was a benign paternalist. He saw himself as the KCA/s "new father" and referred to them as the Government's "wild red children" (ARCIA 1873:219).

As with Tatum, Haworth was initially quite optimistic about Indian farming and the effects he thought he could have on the KCA. In the spring, land was plowed and planted for a few Comanche and Kiowa Apache. Some men, but mostly women, worked in the fields. The year's drought was

hard on the crops, though a slight increase in interest was shown in wanting to farm the following year.

In his report for the year, Haworth boasts that following horse raids into Texas,

I did not make any threats of stopping their rations, or anything of the kind; simply reminded them of their promises, and appealed to their better natures with the very satisfactory result referred to (i.e., the horses were returned), (ARCIA 1873:219).

He goes on to state that a few Comanche made raids into Texas and Mexico but that the Kiowa and Kiowa Apache remained quietly on the reservation. According to Nye (1968:167), this report of peaceful conditions is inaccurate. He notes that there was increasing agitation among the KCA due to the activities of white bison hunters, horse thieves, and whiskey traders and due to inadequate rations. The year's drought had caused the bison to range farther north than usual during the summer, and the KCA faced another bleak winter without sufficient food.

Conditions among the Wichita were not much better.

Agent Richards reports:

The summer has been a very dry one here and the crops have suffered greatly, particularly the corn; all of which that was planted early will be almost an entire failure (ARCIA 1873:225).

The Wichita also continued to be plagued by white horse thieves and whiskey traders, by the scarcity of bison, and by poor and insufficient rations.

Though raids into Mexico and Texas were made by the KCA during the spring of 1874, the Southern Plains Indian War of 1874-1875 properly began with the attack at Adobe Walls in the Texas panhandle on June 27th and 28th. The attack was led by the Comanche and was motivated by the desire to rid the Southern Plains of white bison hunters. At Adobe Walls, the white hunters, though outnumbered, were able to withstand the Indian attack. Their hunting rifles gave them superior fire-power. Later, both non-combatant Indians and those directly involved in the attack showed up at the Wichita agency for rations. A fight ensued and all of the Indians fled (ARCIA 1874:220; Nye 1968:168; Debo 1970:198).

Following this outbreak General Sheridan was given authority to launch a full-scale campaign to subdue the KCA once and for all. Sheridan's plan involved enrolling all friendly Indians and having them camp together at Fort Sill. Those not so camped and enrolled would be assumed hostile and subject to attack. By repeated attacks the hostile Indians gradually would be worn down and forced to surrender.

They could then be safely disarmed and dismounted and the leaders would be sent to prison (Nye 1968:168).

After a series of encounters in July and August, the hostile factions of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Cheyenne took refuge in Palo Duro Canyon. The spot was unknown to the military. The Indians, however, eventually were tracked to the canyon and MacKenzie led a devastating attack on September 27. Though some of the Kiowa surrendered at Fort Sill, the pressure was maintained by continued attacks on those groups still out. The last of the hostile Indians surrendered in February, 1875.

As planned, the Indians were disarmed and dismounted, and many of their leaders were sent to Fort Marion, Florida. Santanta and Big Tree were returned to prison in Texas. Santanta committed suicide in prison, but Big Tree and those sent to Fort Marion eventually were released (Nye 1968:174-177; Debo 1970:198-199).

As can be imagined, little in the way of farming was accomplished by the KCA during 1874. Haworth did note, however, that he felt that they would make better stock men than farmers and he urged his superiors to follow a suitable course of action (ARCIA 1874:221). This estimation and suggestion was heard repeatedly in succeeding years from nearly every agent.

Though not involved in the hostilities, the Wichita had a bad farm year due to severe drought.

It took the government ten years to pacify the Southern Plains tribes, limit them to reservations, and make them totally dependent. At the conclusion of the 1874-1875 outbreak, the hostile Cheyenne, Kiowa, and Comanche were sent to Fort Marion, Florida (Mooney 1898:215). Never again was there a raid or outbreak among the KCA.

It should be noted that the Indian position during the latter 1860s and early 1870s was one of real desperation. White hide-hunters had been slaughtering the bison in incredible numbers since the 1830s. The carnage was greatest in the 1870s. By 1878-1880, there were few bison left on the Southern Plains. As was seen in the preceding chapter, the KCA economies depended upon bison hunting and horse trading. The bison were being annihilated rapidly by white hunters and horse raiding/trading was prohibited by treaty and punished by the military. Though there were some other game animals, the Plains Indian ecological adaptation was based upon bison hunting. The rations provided at the agency, even when they arrived and were edible, were clearly inadequate to the needs of the Indians.

From the Indian viewpoint, then, the Southern Plains Indian Wars were part of a fundamental struggle for survival. It is worth noting that the years of peak raiding activity and reservation outbreak (1871, 1873, and 1874) were precisely those years when drought conditions prevailed on the Southern Plains and the already depleted bison herds ranged farther north than usual and out of the effective range of the KCA camped on the reservation. These desperate conditions were augmented by the uncontrollable and illegal activities of white horse thieves and whiskey and gun traders (ARCIA 1874:222; ARCIA 1874:238; Nye 1968:151; Debo 1970:198).

If it is clear that the KCA saw the whites in the area as a threat to their survival, it is just as clear that the whites saw the KCA as murderous outlaws and as a barrier to the acquisition of desirable unused lands. The Indian threat was managed alternately by capricious military bullying and by periodic "honest" peace-making. When the inevitable breaches of treaty occurred, escalating armed conflict was resumed until a new peace was established. In the course of events any mutual trust or respect became a bad joke.

From the vantage point of history, it is easily seen that the white treaty-makers were quite unrealistic in

expecting an armed and mounted, nomadic raiding population to accept restriction of their normal subsistence-getting activities and a great reduction of their territory while the wherewithal to resist was still at hand and no really viable alternatives were available. Admittedly, the Indians were a difficult population with which to deal. With their multidimensional crosscutting political organization (tribes, bands and military societies), accountability for Indian treaty violations was nearly impossible to establish. Only by the destruction of the bison and the death or imprisonment of their military leaders were the KCA effectively pacified. Once pacified, it was just as unrealistically expected that with insufficient agricultural equipment and inadequate instruction and supervision they could be rapidly transformed into self-sufficient farmers.

Agents Tatum and Haworth both were faced with enormous obstacles. The Quaker agents frequently were at odds with the military (Buntin 1931:41-42). They were held accountable for the misdeeds of licensed traders. They had to face the Indian's complaints over the lateness, size or quality of rations and annuity goods. Their superiors required incredible amounts of paperwork which took them out of contact with the Indians. And their repeated and urgent

requests for farm equipment and instructors either were ignored or responded to with a meager concession and a demand for immediate farming results.

The early Indian farming program strategy involved plowing and planting fields for groups of Indians and then encouraging them to tend and harvest the resulting crops. The sod, however, had to first be broken with a special plow and extra horses. It was a slow and expensive process. Even though the initial work was done for them, the KCA preferred to hunt and take rations. Their horses destroyed many of the fields, and the raiding factions ridiculed any fellow tribesmen who farmed (Pennington 1972:29). Prior to 1875, nearly all of the farming done among the KCA/W was done by Wichita or by Penateka Comanche who had previous farming experience. In succeeding years, this picture gradually changed until significant numbers of KCA were actively engaged in farming.

A Brief Estimation of Sources

The following presentation of the remaining reservation years is drawn from four major sources: The Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (ARCIA); "Government Policy and Farming on the Kiowa Reservation: 1869-1901" by William D. Pennington (1972); "History of the

Kiowa, Comanche, and Wichita Indian Agency" by Martha L. Buntin (1931); Carbine and Lance: The Story of Old Fort Sill by Wilbur S. Nye (1969).

The annual reports of the KCA/W agents contained within the ARCIA, were of greatest assistance in putting the reservation picture together. Usually the agents' reports covered the period from September of the preceding year to late August or early September of the current year. These narrative reports are a valuable presentation of the agent's view of the events and circumstances involving the KCA/W during the previous year. However, since they also represent the agent's annual accounting of his stewardship of the reservation to his superiors, the reports must be treated somewhat skeptically as regards the Indians' progress in agriculture. The agency statistics for the year are found in the appendix of each report and also must be viewed critically. Not only are the agents of varying veracity, but discrepancies can be found between the figures quoted in the narrative reports and those presented in the statistical tables (viz. ARCIA 1882, the tables report 38,000 bushels of wheat for the KCA/W agency while the agent notes that no wheat was grown). Further, it is quite clear that the yearly farming statistics are routinely estimates.

In spite of the need for caution and a critical evaluation of the information contained in the agents' reports and the statistical tables, a reasonably consistent picture of the year-to-year developments on the KCA/W reservation can be put together. The long sequence of years and the general continuity of agricultural progress lend credibility to the overall picture. There were conscientious agents and their reports fit in the developmental sequence quite well. Also, in the course of frequent controversy between agents and commissioners, additional information was presented to help corroborate, or at best evaluate, the agents' accounts and figures. In the following presentation, specific discrepancies will be noted.

Pennington's work helps in establishing the validity of particular reports. His unpublished doctoral dissertation for the Department of History at the University of Oklahoma is based largely upon Congressional reports and a detailed study of the correspondence between the agency and commissioners. He has unearthed much specific information regarding agency supplies and crops, but he offers little in the way of analyses, generalizations, or conclusions. Overall, his presentation is disjointed and frequently more confusing than informative.

Buntin's work is also unpublished and is a master's thesis presented to the Department of History at the University of Oklahoma. Buntin's reconstruction is largely based upon agents' correspondence and concerns itself more with agency bureaucratic history and the agents' personalities than with the progress of Indian farming. She demonstrates little sympathy for or understanding of the KCA/W. She evaluates Indian progress in farming as nil and portrays it as a history of ample opportunity and monumental sloth on the part of the Indians (viz. Buntin 1931:85-86). Still, her treatment of individual agents provides valuable additional information that helps to evaluate the careers of various agents.

Nye, a retired military man, bases his work on army records and diaries and on interviews with some key Indian informants. Carbine and Lance is primarily concerned with the role played by Fort Sill in reservation history. His work is clearly pro-military but valuable, none the less, for its frequently sympathetic treatment of the Indians and its criticism of various agents. Nye also devotes much space to the problem of white trespass, stock theft, and whiskey trade.

Reservation Period Statistical Tables and Charts

The following tables and charts should prove useful in helping keep individual years and agency regimes in perspective. They are presented in advance of the text related to them and are intended as a reference source. Table 1 covers 1867-1885 and Table 2 covers 1886-1904. These tables present corrected raw figures for each category listed. Initially they were drawn from the ARCIA but were revised in light of further evaluation. It should be noted that they are based partly on yearly estimates by agents and partly on actual counts or measurements. Their general consistency with corroborating material makes them credible as estimates.

Table 3 covers the same material but the figures have been converted into percent of maximum year figures. In addition, the KCA/W acreage farmed ratios are presented, and the droughts and changes of agents are indicated. Of special note in this table is the frequency of drought years and the fluctuation of bushel yield per acre. Attention also should be given to the slow and sporadic development of oats and wheat as Indian crops. The several peak years for Indian cattle herds are due to large scale purchase and distribution of breeding stock. At maximum, Indian cattle

numbered only 25,000 or six head per person, and this number was not sustained for any length of time. The maximum number of acres farmed by Indians is 19,525 and represents slightly less than 5 acres per person.

In Charts 1-12, it is much easier to note the gradual developmental growth. The charts are plotted on percent of maximum year figures. The relatively slow but reasonably steady growth in acres farmed and number of cattle should be noted. The year 1900 is the year of maximum for yield per acre, corn, wheat, and oats. Its significance, however, is tempered by the fact that rainfall and other climatic factors were especially favorable (as reported by Randlett in ARCIA 1900) and the acreage farmed that year was only 41 percent of maximum.

Final Years of the Quaker Agents, 1875-1877

In 1875, significant progress in farming was made for the first time by the Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache. Agent Haworth reported that following a meeting with the tribes, the KCA plowed, planted, and cultivated several large fields. With the assistance of two farm instructors, cooperating groups of Indian men carried out the work and a yield above 25 bushels of corn per acre was expected. The

Table 1

Census Figures for Combined KCA/W (1867-1885)

Agent and Year		Pop. No.	Horses No.	Cattle No.	Hay Tons	Swine No.
Leavenworth-KCA	1867	5905 ¹	---	---	---	---
	Shanklin-W	1868	5980 ¹	---	134	---
Tatum-KCA	1869	5770 ¹	17464	109	20	---
	1870	6258 ¹	---	---	---	---
	Boone/Richards-W	1871	6588 ¹	11190	597	20
	1872	5015 ¹	17700	---	---	---
Haworth-KCA	1873	6500 ¹	23096	1524	---	1700
	1874	6343 ¹	20189	1925	210	---
Richards/Williams-W	1875	3282 ¹	9360	1650	---	---
	1876	4205	11028	1942	---	1974
	1877	---	8144	3123	250	2000
Hunt-KCA/W	1878	4274	8144	2598	120	2000
	1879	4117	8910	3168	4000	2800
	1880	4123	9250	3600	50	3000
	1881	4157	9850	6600	---	3000
	1882	4214	9550	6900	---	3000
	1883	4181	9200	7800	150	2500
	1884	4127	9725	7200	20	3500
	1885	4057	9200	7500	120	4000

¹Prior to 1875 the population for the Wichita reservation included temporarily many members of other tribes. The figure for 1875 is low due to the dead, absent, and prisoners at Fort Marion that resulted from the previous year's military activities.

Table 1 (continued)

Agent and Year		Worked Acreage No.	Corn Bu. No.	Bu./ Acre No.	Oats Bu. No.	Wheat Bu. No.
Leavenworth-KCA	1867	57	1140	20	---	---
	Shanklin-W	1868	---	---	---	---
Tatum-KCA	1869	292	8065	28	---	---
	1870	---	---	---	---	---
	Boone/Richards-W	1871	825	12900	16*	---
	1872	---	---	---	---	---
Haworth-KCA	1873	1111	18525	17*	---	---
	1874	1778	1778	1*	1120	---
	Richards/Williams-W	1875	1915	54875	29	---
	1876	2203	51200	24	688	500
Hunt-KCA/W	1877	2520	40000	16	400	---
	1878	2563	69500	28	3000	400
	1879	2535	17800	8*	500	1000
	1880	3360	40800	12	---	---
	1881	3400	3400	1*	---	---
	1882	3500	38500	11	---	---
	1883	3900	47000	12	---	---
	1884	3500	12000	3*	---	---
	1885	3500	52500	15	---	---

*Drought by year as reported by agent.

The figures above reflect Indian production alone. Where no entry is given, "None Reported (NR)" was entered in the ARCIA for the year. For 1868, 1870, and 1872, clearly no statistical information was provided by the agent. In the columns for oats and wheat, no entry indicates none harvested.

Table 2

Census Figures for Combined KCA/W (1886-1904)

Agent and Year		Pop. No.	Horses No.	Cattle No.	Hay Tons	Swine No.
Hall	1886	4182	8012	5491	280	1278
	1887	4219	8660	6668	1900	3643
White	1888	4015	10734	9601	3300	4011
Miles or Myers	1889	4088	10750	18000	150	500
Adams	1890	4121	10505	19983	300	911
	1891	4166	11660	21000	450	1200
Day	1892	3782	10300	25000	500	3000
3 Army Men	1893	3722	10303	10000	500	5000
Able	1894	---	---	---	---	---
Baldwin	1895	3721	9737	8991	5000	2679
	1896	---	23194	10000	---	2380
	1897	3786	---	25000	120	---
Walker	1898	3833	---	---	---	---
Randlett	1899	3696	12410	10000	1000	500
	1900	3733	23236	18599	3228	1843
	1901	---	15403	17144	732	1931
	1902	3661	16439	12234	885	822
	1903	3696	9240	8552	1350	1090
	1904	3676	6303	12052	1040	760

Table 2 (continued)

Agent and Year		Worked Acreage No.	Corn Bu. No.	Bu./ Acre No.	Oats Bu. No.	Wheat Bu. No.
Hall	1886	3094	8500	3*	---	---
	1887	5101	55000	11*	---	3500
White	1888	7985	76850	10	200	2625
Miles or Myers	1889	4445	45000	10	---	---
Adams	1890	4445	17500	6*	8500	---
	1891	4715	38000	10	8000	---
Day	1892	5000	50000	11	5500	1500
3 Army Men	1893	5000	10000	4*	7300	2000
Able	1894	---	---		---	---
Baldwin	1895	5000	100000	20*	2300	---
	1896	---	---	*	---	---
	1897	13421	---		---	---
Walker	1898	15000	---		---	1100
Randlett	1899	15800	60000	4*	2800	3000
	1900	8065	243000	35	11145	25000
	1901	5955	15485	3*	---	962
	1902	5598	69925	15	1150	12612
	1903	13390	120300	10*	4100	13600
	1904	19525	48350	3*	650	4840

*Drought year as reported by agent.

Table 3

Percent of Maximum Figures for Combined KCA/W

Year	Pop.	Horses	Cattle	Swine	Acres	KCA:W Acres	Corn	Bushel Yield/ Acre	Drought	New Agent	Wheat	Hay	Oats & Barley
1867	90	---	---	---	0	0:1	0	57		*	0	---	0
1868	91	---	1	---	---	---	---	---			---	---	0
1869	88	75	0	0	1	---	3	80		*	0	0	0
1870	95	---	---	---	---	---	---	---			---	---	---
1871	100	48	2	13	4	1:10	5	46	*	*	0	0	0
1872	76	76	---	---	---	---	---	---			---	---	---
1873	99	99	6	34	6	---	8	49	*	*	0	0	0
1874	96	87	8	---	9	1:8	1	3	*		0	4	10
1875	50	40	7	---	10	1:4	23	83			0	0	0
1876	64	47	8	39	11	1:3	21	69			2	0	6
1877	---	35	12	40	13	1:3	16	46			0	5	4
1878	65	35	10	40	13	1:3	29	80		*	2	2	27
1879	63	38	13	56	13	1:2	7	23	*		4	80	5
1880	63	40	14	60	17	1:2	17	34			0	1	0
1881	63	42	26	60	17	---	1	3	*		0	---	0
1882	64	41	28	60	18	---	16	31			---	---	---
1883	63	40	31	50	20	---	19	34			0	3	0
1884	63	42	29	70	18	---	5	9	*		0	0	0
1885	62	40	30	80	18	---	22	43			0	2	0
1886	63	34	22	26	16	1:1	3	9	*	*	0	6	0
1887	64	37	27	73	26	1:1	23	31	*		14	38	0

Table 3 (continued)

Year	Pop.	Horses	Cattle	Swine	Acres	KCA:W Acres	Corn	Bushel Yield/ Acre	Drought	New Agent	Wheat	Hay	Oats & Barley
1888	61	46	38	80	41	1:1	32	29		*	11	66	2
1889	62	46	72	10	23	---	19	29		*	0	3	---
1890	63	45	80	18	23	---	7	17	*	*	0	6	76
1891	63	50	84	24	24	---	16	29			0	9	72
1892	57	44	100	60	26	---	21	31		*	6	10	49
1893	56	44	40	100	26	---	4	11	*	*	8	10	66
1894	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		*	---	---	---
1895	56	42	36	54	26	---	41	57	*	*	0	100	21
1896	---	100	40	48	---	---	---	---	*		---	---	---
1897	57	---	100	---	69	---	---	---			---	2	---
1898	58	---	---	---	77	---	---	---		*	4	---	---
1899	56	53	40	10	81	---	25	11	*	*	12	20	25
1900	57	100	74	37	41	---	100	100			100	65	100
1901	---	66	69	39	30	---	6	9	*		4	15	0
1902	56	71	49	16	29	---	29	43			50	18	10
1903	56	40	34	22	69	---	50	29	*		54	27	37
1904	56	27	48	15	100	---	20	9	*		19	21	6

Chart 1

KCA/W Population
(Percent of Maximum by Year)




Chart 2

KCA/W Horses
(Percent of Maximum by Year)




Chart 3
KCA/W Cattle
(Percent of Maximum by Year)




Chart 4

KCA/W Swine
(Percent of Maximum by Year)




Chart 5

KCA/W Farmed Acreage
(Percent of Maximum by Year)




Chart 6
KCA/W Corn
(Percent of Maximum by Year)




Chart 7

KCA/W Bushel Yield Per Acre
(Percent of Maximum by Year)




Chart 8
KCA/W Wheat
(Percent of Maximum by Year)




Chart 9
KCA/W Hay
(Percent of Maximum by Year)




Chart 10

KCA/W Oats and Barley
(Percent of Maximum by Year)




Chart 11

KCA/W Cattle (—) and Farmed Acreage (---)
(Percent of Maximum by Year)





Chart 12

KCA/W Bushel Yield Per Acre (—) and Farmed Acreage (---)
(Percent of Maximum by Year)



Kiowa farmed 175 acres, the Comanche (excluding the Penateka) had 80 acres, and the Kiowa Apache used 35 acres (ARCIA 1875:273-274). There were also numerous vegetable gardens. This initial success led to a further extension of farming efforts in the following year.

Despite the encouraging season, the agent included an estimation of the reservation's suitability to agriculture in his report.

Of the 3,549,440 acres of this reservation, but a small part is adapted to agricultural purposes, and a large part unfit even for grazing purposes, on account of its alkaline soil and waters. The east part of the reservation is the best portion of it . . . (ARCIA 1875:274).

The KCA were exempted from the government regulation requiring all reservation Indians to work for their rations; however, their rations continued to be woefully inadequate in any case. The agent blamed the situation on the problem of transportation from the distant railhead depot.

At this time, Haworth maintained an Indian roll call and count every three days. Indians going off the reservation to hunt were required to get a pass from the agent and a military escort (Buntin 1931:45).

In the agent's estimation, since peace had returned to the reservation and his "red children" were farming, the

most serious problem was that of white horse thieves from Texas. During the outbreak in 1874, they had taken over 2,000 Indian horses from the reservation (ARCIA 1875:274).

On the Wichita reservation, agent Richards reported renewed farming activity among the Wichita and affiliated tribes as well as among the Penateka Comanche. He also reported an ongoing serious problem with inadequate rations and noted that only successful bison hunts off reservation kept the tribes from starving (ARCIA 1875:288).

In 1876, Haworth reported that:

Last year was the first for most of them (KCA) to put their hands to the plow. It was very seasonable; the rain seemed to come just as it was needed, and gave them a bountiful yield for their labor. . . . this year more of them engaged in the work than last (ARCIA 1876:52).

However, though there was more acreage, the yield was inferior to that of the previous year due to damaging rains in mid-season.

Rations were issued by family and not by band, as before, and continued to be no more than a supplement to the bison hunted off reservation. The agent felt that the Congressional failure to furnish agencies with badly needed supplies and rations would surely result in the failure of the Indian farming program (ARCIA 1876:53).

Houses were built for ten prominent KCA but were not lived in by their owners. The houses represented prestigious gifts at this time rather than desirable housing (Nye 1969:250). The KCA continued to live in group camps along the creeks near the agency.

The new agent for the Wichita reservation, agent Williams, reported the same mid-season problems with weather, as did Haworth. The corn planted later in the season, however, promised to make a good crop (ARCIA 1876:66). His estimates of Indian progress in farming differed from those of his predecessor. He felt that the Wichita were "more interested in raising horses than cattle or crops" (ARCIA 1876:64). He noted that the enthusiastic progress of the Penateka made them more exemplary Indian farmers than several of the traditional farming groups on the reservation.

Williams also had much to say concerning difficulties with agency supplies, annuity goods, and rations. A number of problems plagued the area agencies in this connection. The goods and rations were insufficient due to stinting appropriations. At best, favored contractors furnished goods that were useless or frivolous, and, at worst, they simply defrauded the government and the Indians in quality and quantity. The governmental red tape involved greatly delayed

most shipments, and the various transportation problems caused additional delay. These several delays resulted in the spoilage even of that food and seed which was initially unspoiled.

Climate conditions for farming during 1877 were worse than either of the two previous years, and the harvest figures illustrate this condition. At the culmination of his five years of experience, Haworth reflected on the prospects for Indian farming: "This is not a good agricultural district and cannot be relied upon for farming purposes . . . " (ARCIA 1877:87). He advocated a stock raising program instead. His scheme involved increasing cattle issues over a five year period until the Indians would be able to subsist on the yearly natural increase of their herds. He noted that the KCA took reasonably good care of their stock, though they still preferred to eat bison. The bison rapidly were disappearing, however, and off reservation hunting was increasingly restricted (Buntin 1931:50).

The Wichita and Penateka Comanche continued to enlarge their acreage and cattle herds. It should be noted that their land on the Washita River was more conducive to farming than was the area farmed by the KCA.

With agent Haworth's resignation, the years of Quaker administration came to a close. In a letter to Secretary of Interior Schurz, clerk Oden R. Smith found the Quaker Indian farming program among the KCA a dismal failure:

I reach the conclusion that the so-called Quaker years of peace policy has been a failure here. In a pronounced progressive sense, a failure. It has been to grant everything and exact nothing in return, the result of which has been to create an army of dependents, content to live off the beef and flour of the Government, in short without any purpose in life except nomadic vagabondism, and very certainly without any desire to work for any portion of the "daily bread" which they receive (quoted in Pennington 1972:59).

However dependent the KCA were upon the government, Smith's estimation of farming progress during these years is faulty. Though the subsistence import of Indian farming was slight, it is evident that cultural resistance to farming was breaking down and farming skills were being acquired. By 1877, the Indians were breaking some land, plowing, planting, cultivating, and harvesting most of their acreage and fencing all of their fields. In the past three years 605 acres and 1599 cattle had been added to the KCA/W totals. The KCA from meager beginnings had advanced to farming roughly 25% of the total KCA/W acreage--clearly a start. Considering the poor quality of their short rations and the small amount of instruction, seed, and implements furnished, the KCA made

significant progress. The weather was favorable to farming only once and the Indians were forced by short rations to spend considerable time hunting bison off reservation. In light of these handicaps, progress in farming was considerable.

The P. B. Hunt Administration, 1878-1885

On April 1, 1878, P. B. Hunt was appointed agent to the KCA. Commissioner Hayt told Hunt at the outset that the Indians soon would be forced to rely upon their own resources for subsistence and that they should be prepared for that eventuality while time remained to do so (Pennington 1972:61).

Hunt reported that the Indian ponies had a hard time drawing plows and that there were not enough implements for those who wished to use them. The KCA had a total of 19 plows and 39 wagons (Pennington 1972:73). Lack of rain early in the growing season required that the corn be replanted. Overall, however, Hunt was pleased with the progress he saw and reported that the KCA would need only one more year to become self-sufficient (ARCIA 1878:60). Of course, this report was absurdly optimistic.

Though the KCA were still exempted from the "work-for-ration" provision, the agent was allowed to withhold

sugar, coffee, and tobacco from non-working Indians. These commodities were the ones most desired by the KCA. Permission was granted once more to go off reservation to hunt bison with a military escort and the trip was a success.

Even in his first year as agent, Hunt became aware of the uncertainties of farming in the area and began urging his superiors to adopt a stock raising emphasis with the Indians.

In 1879, the Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache reservation was consolidated with that of the Wichita under one agency. This was one of 11 such agency reductions made by the government at the time. The presidential order for the move was signed in August, 1878, but due to official red tape the move took over a year to complete. The new agency was located on the Washita River between the two former reservations and required the KCA to move north with the agent. It was thought that the KCA would profit by access to better farm land and the example of the Wichita.

At the same time, the Commissioner was pressing Hunt to double the acreage farmed by the KCA/W. Chronically short funds made the goal impossible to attain. With a restricted personnel budget, Hunt had only enough funds to hire one farm instructor and one assistant for the entire

reservation. The distance from the agency to the Indian camps and the distance between camps, as well as the number of reports and agency duties required of the farm instructors, gave little opportunity for actual farming instruction. Lack of funds also limited the number of acres broken for new fields. Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, the number of acres broken severely limited the amount of Indian farming possible.

The drought of 1879 reduced the yield of the Indian fields well below that of the previous year. The KCA had 860 acres in corn and the Wichita had 1,675 in corn, 75 in wheat, and 30 in oats. The average yield was 8 bushels per acre (ARCIA 1879:67).

In July, 474 cattle were bought for the KCA herds, but the heat and drought killed many of them. The Indians had no alternative but to eat many of the remaining cattle due to meager rations and an unsuccessful bison hunt.

Hunt issued weekly rations by family in an effort to undermine the various bands (ARCIA 1879:66). The Indians spent much of their time enroute between their camps and the agency. Hunt issued "longer" rations to those who were farming.

The bison hunt for the year resulted in little meat and few hides. Formerly, the Indians had gained some income

from hides, but the bison were rapidly disappearing as a source of food and income. The Indian income from hides for 1876-1879 was:

1876 - \$70,400

1877 - \$64,500

1878 - \$26,375

1879 - \$ 5,068

(ARCIA 1879:65)

To heighten the tragedy, while on an approved and escorted hunt off reservation the Kiowa were attacked by Texas State Troopers. Several Indians were killed and scalped (ARCIA 1879:64).

To speed the delivery of supplies and rations to the agency, the Indians began being hired to haul the freight from the railhead. They also were hired to cut and haul wood.

Hunt reported that the Wichita were making good progress in farming and were "nearly able to support themselves without any assistance from the government" (ARCIA 1879:63). Some of their leaders, in fact, had become prosperous farmers.

In his annual report for 1880, Hunt announced:

I have endeavored to destroy the tribal relations as much as possible, and also to destroy the

influence of certain chiefs. I have allowed relatives to band together and would appoint one of the number a chief or headman and suggest to him to take his people off to some good locality and make permanent houses. Of course, every band formed this way weakens the influence of some chief in proportion as it took individuals from his band. Bands that at one time numbered over a hundred people, have been reduced in this way to less than twenty. I have had many houses made in this way by Indians who never worked before. The advantage to the man appointed by me was that he became more prominent and controlled the funds derived from the sale of beef hides (ARCIA 1880:73).

It is apparent that Hunt was blind to any cooperative advantages to traditional band organization and saw it as an obstacle to his authority and to the transformation of the KCA into individual self-sufficient farming families. The advisability of some alternative to this policy of tribal atomization will be discussed further in the conclusions. It is enough to note here that Hunt underestimated the difficulty of making the KCA/W into self-supporting farmers through the use of the paternalistic manipulations recounted in his reports.

Following initially unfavorable weather for farming, sufficient rain fell to produce a fairly good corn crop. Even so, Hunt appreciated the discouraging effect of the climate on Indian farming and stated that he was "satisfied that old, experienced farmers would have been discouraged

at the seasons and conditions of the crops the past three seasons" (ARCIA 1880:73). Indian interest in farming was evident from the continually greater request for farming equipment and instruction. Many of these requests went unfulfilled.

Hunt officially controlled all sales involving the KCA/W. He required a high price on Indian corn sold to local traders in an effort to keep the Indians from selling their harvest and being without food, feed, or seed for the following year (Pennington 1972:90). The KCA, however, preferred wheat flour to corn meal and fed what corn they couldn't sell to their stock. This situation, offering so little return on the effort invested, certainly did little to encourage rapid progress in Indian farming.

The government bought 600 more cattle for the Indian herds and Hunt distributed them "to those the most worthy" (ARCIA 1880:74). Unfortunately, short rations again resulted in many of the cattle being killed by the Indians for food.

Hunt reported that the Indian freighters were doing a good job and earned a total of \$14,278.87. The rate was \$.75/100 lbs./100 mi. (ARCIA 1881:81).

The Wichita were again noted as being almost completely self-supporting.

The year 1881 proved to be a very difficult one for the KCA/W and their agent. The reservation was hit by a severe drought that killed most of the Indian crops. The bison were gone and the rations were cut back still further by the government in an ill-advised effort to force the Indians to farm. It is to Hunt's credit that he opposed the reduction. The situation worsened until the military had to be called in to quell the threat of an outbreak due to the short rations (ARCIA 1881:79-80).

Weather conditions were somewhat more favorable in 1882. The Commissioner, however, would allow the KCA/W only enough seed to plant 1,600 acres, though 3,500 acres were ready to plant. In spite of the previous year's drought, he felt that the Indians should have saved enough seed for the year's planting (Pennington 1972:115-117). Hunt received a reprimand for pursuing his seed request but was able to get a loan of seed corn from Fort Sill. As frequently happened, the seed from the government contractors was late in arriving and greatly delayed the Spring planting.

Problems with farming instruction continued and no new positions were budgeted. As a consequence, the KCA

primarily learned farming techniques by trial and error or from each other. Corn remained virtually the only crop which the Indians knew how to raise. Cotton was experimented with at the agency with good results but nothing came of it.

Since the eradication of the bison, the rations continued to be reduced by the government and covered only 8 months of the year (ARCIA 1882:66). In 1882, the government appropriation for the KCA was \$100,000 and covered agency maintenance and personnel, farming equipment and seed, and annuities and rations. It is fair to estimate that the government was spending less than \$1/person/month to feed the KCA. Due to the critical shortage of rations during the winter, Hunt made an unofficial arrangement with certain cattle companies in Texas. In return for short term grazing privileges on the reservation, the Indians were to receive cattle to supplement their rations and to add to their herds (ARCIA 1882:68; Buntin 1931:71). Unfortunately, the cattle companies continued to graze their cattle on the reservation illegally after the unofficial lease had expired, and their herds became a constant problem for Hunt and the Indian police. Once the trespassing cattle were rounded up, the owner was notified and gladly paid the small fine. The owner took his cattle off reservation but

immediately allowed them to disperse and wander back onto Indian land.

In his annual report, Hunt complained that the government's tight-fisted appropriations were ruining the chance of successful Indian farming and stock raising (ARCIA 1882:66). As a result of the short rations, the KCA were steadily eating their cattle herds. In view of the reservation's environment being little suited to farming, Hunt advanced a detailed 5-year plan. He suggested that part of the money obligated by the Medicine Lodge Treaty be advanced to purchase sizable cattle herds for the KCA, who then could subsist on the herd's natural increase and what their farming could provide (ARCIA 1882:67). His plan had two fatal flaws. He planned on the continued availability of the entire reservation for grazing though by then allotment was a foregone conclusion, and he failed to anticipate the opposition of white cattlemen who wanted to lease large tracts within the reservation for their own herds.

Hunt noted with optimism that the KCA/W were eager to work but that the agency offered too few opportunities for wage labor. Indian freight hauling suffered due to the weakness of Indian horses following the drought of 1881 (ARCIA 1882:65).

In his annual report for 1883 Hunt stated:

The Kiowa, Comanche and Apache tribes, although they have been a much shorter time following the whiteman's way than the affiliated bands (Wichita), are, I think, changing their condition more rapidly. Their progress in opening up farms since they moved up to the Washita has been very marked. Their fields are all well fenced, and the majority of them are of good size. I regret that because of a want of funds I have not been able to have the sod broken for those who wished to commence farming this year (ARCIA 1883:70).

The year was a seasonable one for Indian corn and the harvest was a fair one. The lack of proper storage facilities and markets for the surplus, however, remained problems for the Indian farmers.

Though the agency operating budget was further reduced, Hunt succeeded in getting \$30,000 to purchase cattle for an experimental Indian herd that was not to be divided among individual Indians. The money for the project came partly from the KCA/W clothing budget for the year to come.

In 1884, the KCA/W reservation was again struck by severe drought and the Indian fields yielded an average of only 3 bushels/acre. It mattered little that there were no funds available for additional farm implements and seed or for breaking land for new fields.

The 1,082 breeding stock that Hunt purchased for the "Indian herd" in 1883 were herded with 1,669 cattle for the

beef ration onto 50,000 unfenced acres in the northeastern part of the reservation. When a grass fire burned much of the pasture in the area, the cattle were released onto the rest of the reservation. During the course of a year, the herd's number was greatly reduced by white rustlers who moved into the area adjacent to the reservation, apparently for that specific purpose (ARCIA 1884:80). The severe winter and hungry Indians also contributed to the herd's reduction. Though Hunt had been successful in getting the money to buy the cattle, he lacked the funds to fence their pasture or to hire a sufficient number of Indian herders.

The KCA/W had only a fair corn crop in 1885, yielding only 17 bushels per acre. In spite of the hardships of recent years, those Indians who were farming continued to farm on the same scale. As usual, there were no funds to break the sod for new fields. The Indians lacked the plows and horses as well as the skill to break their own fields.

The grass-for-cattle arrangement that Hunt had worked out in 1881 continued through 1885. Though the cattle given in trade added to the Indian's beef ration, they did little to increase KCA herds. The Commissioner's attitude toward the unofficial grass leases was one of official detachment. He specified only that the leases be short term (Pennington

1972:152). In 1885, the KCA began leasing their land to cattlemen for \$.06/acre/year.

Hunt was visited by a series of government inspectors throughout his career as agent to the KCA/W. He eventually resigned in 1885, partly as the result of an investigation by P. H. Folsom during the preceding year. Hunt was charged with permitting cattle trespass, allowing timber and hay to be stolen from the reservation, altering agency records, and antagonizing the Indians (Pennington 1972:113). Upon close inspection, however, it appears that Hunt was more properly guilty of antagonizing the cattlemen and traders by his attention to duty. He was also critical of his superiors and of departmental policy. Part of Hunt's annual report for 1884 titled "Indian herds" was deleted from the published version.

Hunt originally tried to establish good relations with the cattlemen. In 1879, he allowed the local beef contractors to deliver beef in large numbers before they were needed to save them frequent trips to and from the agency. He was censured by the Commissioner for doing so and was ordered to require weekly trips of the contractors (Buntin 1931:65-66). Cattle trespass was a serious problem even before grass leasing began. The Indian police and the

military from Fort Sill spent much of their time rounding up and sorting out cattle. The light fine of \$1/head did little to discourage the cattlemen from deliberately turning their cattle onto the reservation (Nye 1969:257). In 1885, the cattlemen tried to get Hunt replaced by falsely claiming that he refused to allow contractors to drive cattle across the reservation (Buntin 1931:75).

Hunt was successful in keeping unauthorized traders off the reservation. Of the three licensed traders, two of them gave Hunt a great deal of trouble and worked to get him replaced. In 1885, Hunt returned cattle to the Indians that they had illegally sold to W. G. Williams. Williams complained, and Hunt's order was countered. Hunt was informed that there was no such law prohibiting the Indians from selling their breeding stock. As a result, many Indians began selling what stock they had, and Hunt's hopes for a successful Indian stock raising program were dashed (ARCIA 1885:85). He became so discouraged and bitter that he wrote in his annual report:

At this point I would throw the Indian upon his own resources and let him "sink or swim" as he himself elects (ARCIA 1885:88).

Despite the pessimism with which Hunt concluded his career as agent, it is clear that the KCA/W made significant

progress in farming during his regime. In 1878, the Indian fields totaled 2,563 acres. When he left, seven and a half years later, the total was 3,500 acres. By 1885, the KCA were responsible for over one-third of the total Indian acreage. At that time, the Kiowa had 450 acres, the Comanche had 840 acres, and the Kiowa Apache had 135 acres, for a KCA total of 1,425 acres (Pennington 1972:190-191). Their farms included some 150 separate fields of from 1-50 acres each, farmed by approximately 200 Indian families (ARCIA 1885:87; Pennington 1972:142).

Hunt's claims concerning the progress of the KCA, quoted earlier, are corroborated by J. B. Wicks, the Episcopal missionary for the reservation (ARCIA 1883:73). From 1880 to 1885, Indian acreage remained static not from lack of effort by the KCA/W or Hunt, but from lack of funds to open any new fields. When agent Hall took over from Hunt, he reported that over 4,000 acres needed to be broken to meet the needs and requests of the Indians (Pennington 1972:141). It is absurd that the government refused to appropriate the funds necessary to carry out its own policy of expanding Indian farming.

The corn raised on the reservation during the Hunt years was used primarily for feeding Indian livestock,

though traders bought some of the surplus for resale at Fort Sill (Pennington 1972:134 and 138). Due to the absence of an accessible and dependable market for their crops, even favorable growing conditions resulted in little gain for the Indian farmers.

Until the bison were gone, in 1879, the KCA/W got most of their meat, as well as hides for sale, from off reservation bison hunts. When the bison were gone and the rations continued to be reduced, the Indians turned to their cattle herds for food and income. Even Commissioner Price noted that while the government spent \$1,000/year to feed and clothe a soldier in 1884, only \$7 was expected to do the same for an Indian (Pennington 1972:121).

Short rations were only one of several obstacles to Hunt's Indian stock raising plan. The Indians were allowed, over his objection and in spite of official regulations to the contrary, to sell their cattle and hides at will to traders, cattlemen, and settlers, usually for much less than what they were worth. Also, from the mid-1870s on, white rustlers made off with an incredible number of Indian stock each year. Nevertheless, Indian herds grew from 2,598 in 1878 to 7,500 in 1885.

After considering the events of the Hunt years and the conditions which prevailed on the KCA/W reservation, it is surprising that any progress was made at all in Indian farming and stock raising. Though the Congress and the Commissioners continually voiced their concern with making the Indians self-supporting, the funds to help realize that goal nearly always were withheld.

The Political Agent Years, 1886-1891

Following the continuity of the Hunt regime, the KCA/W reservation experienced two periods of rapid agent turnover. The first of these periods is aptly termed the "Political Period" by Buntin (1931:80-106). In six years the agency changed hands four times. All four agents (Hall, White, Miles and Adams) were short-term political appointees who had little, if any, Indian Affairs experience.

Lee Hall succeeded Hunt as agent to the KCA/W. In March, 1886, he received a letter from Commissioner Hayt outlining what the Commissioner expected of the agency employees and the Indians. In reading the following letter, note that passage of the General Allotment Act is imminent, and though the Indians are threatened with the termination of rations, 11 years remain of Medicine Lodge Treaty obligations.

3/23/1886

Sir:

The one great object this department has now in view, is the civilization of the Indian, and to enable him to support himself by agriculture as soon as possible. I therefore expect and will require all Indian agents and agency employees who wish to be retained in the service, to use every means at their command to instruct, encourage and assist the Indians to this end, and their marked progress in successful agriculture, commencing with the current year, is indispensably necessary to prove the agent and employees of any agency qualified for their positions. Nothing less than a very great improvement over former years will be satisfactory, as the law requiring all able bodied male Indians to perform service on their reservations for themselves or their tribe, to entitle them to subsistence, (sec. 18 stat. 176, and sec. 346, Regulations 1884), has not been strictly enforced at some agencies hitherto, but it will now be applied to the fullest extent possible, that an increase in production and a decrease in estimates for the purchase of subsistence may at once result.

That the area of land cultivated by Indians may be increased this year, to its utmost possible extent, those who have already made a beginning, in a small way, must be encouraged to enlarge their operations and those who have as yet made no effort toward cultivating, even a small piece of land, must be urged to make a commencement, and given all possible advice and assistance, that they may need, to encourage them.

The season being nearly at hand for spring farm work to commence, you should devote your close personal attention to the timely and careful preparation of your Indians for plowing, sowing, planting, etc., which you must follow up by watching that they have the necessary tools, know how to use them and actually do properly cultivate and care for what they plant, as without this and the proper preparation of the ground in the beginning, nothing but

failure and discouragement need be expected. To do this, you and your farmer and any other employees, who can be spared from their regular duties, should go amongst the Indians every day and hour from the time farm work commences, until the crops are saved, working with first one, then another, showing them how to direct their energies so that they may not expend them unprofitably, and by personal example, that you do not consider it degrading to honestly labor with your own hands for independence, and also that you are in earnest when you tell them that they can support themselves and that the time has come when they must do so or starve.

As soon as practicable after you receive this, I would be glad to have you write me your views, making such suggestions and recommendations as you think would further the work. What do you propose to do in the way of steps in advance of the old unsatisfactory routine, so as to increase the acreage under cultivation by Indians and the yield per acre; to care for the crop after it is gathered, both grain and root and what market is there for the sale of such as will not be needed by the Indians either for present use or next year's planting? . . . (Farmers File, Indian Archives Division, Oklahoma Historical Society).

It is ironic that the Commissioner/agent relationship in some ways parallels the agent/Indian relationship. In both we find bullying and threats and unrealistic expectations on the part of the superior, slow response to the reasonable requests of the subordinate, and the application of rigid policies ill-suited to the immediate situations.

In 1886, Hall fared no better than his predecessor in getting the additional farm instructors he requested.

He estimated at the time that it would take the agency's two farm instructors two months to visit all of the Indian farms if they spent only 1/2 hour each at each (ARCIA 1886:130). Since the position offered long hours and little pay, the agency was ordinarily unable to attract capable and enthusiastic men to do the job.

Hall was successful in getting a good number of farm implements for distribution to the KCA/W, though half arrived too late to be of much assistance during the current season. The Commissioner threatened Hall with personal financial liability if he did not see to the proper maintenance of the tools (Pennington 1972:174-175). The tools furnished by the contractors were of inferior quality and the KCA had less training in tool maintenance than they had in farming. Consequently, many tools were broken but never repaired, and others that were out of adjustment or poorly maintained were abandoned.

The year's seed request was only partially met due to the continued policy of trying to force the Indians to save their own seed. The allotted 1,500 bushels of winter wheat seed arrived a month later than the last favorable planting date and had to be saved for the next year (Pennington 1972:175).

In 1886, the Indians began fencing their fields with barbed wire rather than rails as they had done previously. The barbed wire allowed them to complete the task more rapidly and enclose more acres, though from 1886 through 1888 only 1/2 the amount needed was available to complete the job.

Hall was authorized to break 4,000 acres of KCA/W land to enlarge present farms and establish new ones. Of the total, 3,000 acres were to be broken in tracts of 10-25 acres (Pennington 1972:179-180). The total Indian acreage farmed in 1886, however, was 400 acres less than the previous year, and the total for 1887 was only 1,600 more than in 1885. The answer to this puzzle may lie in the fact that Hall was indicted for embezzlement of agency funds in 1887, but more on that will be seen later.

The Indian farms suffered from the severe drought of 1886 and only yielded an average of 3 bushels/acre. There was also an apparent reduction in Indian cattle herds of 2,000 head. The KCA grass lease was lucrative, though, and the tribes received \$56,000 in grass money from various cattlemen (ARCIA 1886:130).

Hall reported that the Wichita were nearly self-supporting and recommended that their rations be cut off

and the money used to buy stock for them. He felt that if this were done, they would then be totally independent (ARCIA 1886:128).

Drought once again struck the reservation in 1887, and the Indian fields yielded an average of only 11 bushels/acre. Hall reported that corn, winter wheat, and cotton were the only crops suited to the soil and climate conditions on the reservation. Most of the winter wheat was planted late that year and wasn't worth harvesting. Little was done with cotton during the remainder of the reservation period.

Hall urged the government to buy the Indian's surplus wheat for issue as seed so that 1/3 of the KCA/W acreage could be planted in wheat (ARCIA 1887:82). Though winter wheat was relatively well suited to environmental conditions on the reservation, the agency had no flouring mill, and there was no market within range. The KCA/W had only one "thrashing-machine" which was difficult to transport between farms and, as a result, much of the wheat crop was lost.

On the positive side, the agency was granted two additional assistant farmers for six months, and the Indian cattle herds were increased by 1,177 head.

Consistent with Hall's suggestion of the preceding year, the Wichita rations were cut off, but the poor crop yield forced them to eat a good number of their stock (ARCIA 1887:81).

It is to Hall's credit that he opposed passage of the Dawes Act and its application to the KCA/W. Part of his annual report for 1886 was devoted to criticism of the allotment plan and was deleted from the annual publication by the Commissioner (Pennington 1972:166). In the report, Hall correctly assessed the true motives and impact of allotment. Fortunately, even the Commissioner agreed that the KCA/W were not yet ready to be allotted.

E. E. White investigated the Hall administration and served as a witness during the indictment. Hall was charged with neglect of duties, drunkenness, selling whiskey to the Indians at the agency, and embezzlement of \$14,008 grass money (ARCIA 1888:98; Buntin 1931:92; Pennington 1972:169).

White succeeded Hall as a temporary agent in 1888. His reported figures for KCA/W acreage and cattle were quite high, and the apparent increase was unaccounted for in his annual report. It appears most likely that the acreage figure of 7,985 acres, representing close to 3,000 acres

above the previous year's total, was in error since the following seven years showed a maximum of only 5,000 acres. The reported number of Indian cattle should also be treated skeptically, though it is consistent with the larger pattern of growth.

Though no drought as such was reported, Indian crops yielded only 10 bushels/acre. White corroborated Hall's report that the agency lacked a flouring mill and that the wheat crop was worthless to the Indians (ARCIA 1888:97). There was also a problem with the beef rations. The contractors were delivering the total winter beef supply to the agency in early fall to save themselves the rigors of making winter deliveries. By mid-winter, many of the cattle had died, and those remaining were so thin that they were hardly worth eating. White also reported that all of the reservation tribes were opposed to allotment and to the building of railroads through their reservation.

In 1888, peyote was mentioned in White's report. He confused peyote, which he called "woqui," with mescal beans but clearly saw its use as unquestionably evil. He took a very firm stand against it at first.

I issued an order, in writing, forbidding any Indian to use the beans or have any in his possession, and declared that I would punish

any violation of the order by withholding rations, annuity goods, and lease money (ARCIA 1888:99).

However, the Comanche raised such vocal opposition that White conceded to the winter use of peyote.

The incident illustrates quite well a fairly common agent style in dealing with the Indians. Typically hasty conclusions were drawn from limited information and a policy formulated. Paternalistic authoritarian restrictions were used in an attempt to force conformity from the Indians, i.e., the agent used his custodial position to gain compliance by selectively withholding the food, goods, and favors that the Indians were dependent upon. When the policy or tactics proved to be unworkable, the agents backed down. This pattern was found in the promotion of farming and in the suppression of the tribal activities.

The agent for 1889 was L. J. Miles. He estimated that the reservation's total acreage was 3,594,240 acres. Of this, he noted that no more than 40% could be used for agriculture. Much of the remaining acreage was sandy and covered by upland native grasses. He warned that the soil beneath was fragile and would be ruined if it were plowed (ARCIA 1889:187).

According to Miles, 1/2 the Indian men on the reservation were "very prosperous farmers in a small way," but many of the KCA men were uninterested in farming. To promote farming, Miles required every male Indian, 20 years of age or older, to plant and cultivate 10 acres or lose his ration to those who did (ARCIA 1889:188). Miles was replaced before he could put this policy into effect.

The year's oat crop failed because the seed arrived late. The corn and millet crops made but the yield was again only 10 bushels/acre. The wheat flouring mill was completed in 1889, but wheat seed was not sent to the agency from 1889-1897, except for 40 bushels in 1891 (Pennington 1972:215).

The Kiowa asked for permission to hold a Sun Dance, but Miles was opposed to the idea.

After making diligent inquiry about the manner in which the dance was celebrated, it was obvious to me that it was both demoralizing and degrading and that it should not be permitted (ARCIA 1889:190).

The Commissioner gave his approval for Miles to use force, if necessary, to prevent the Kiowa from holding their ceremony.

C. E. Adams replaced Miles as agent. In describing the Indian farms, he stated that the farms averaged 10-15 acres in corn and some vegetable gardens. There were 64

farms in excess of 20 acres and 8 farms of 50 or more acres (Pennington 1972:224). Among the over 300 farmers there were only 115 plows. Drought again hit the area and Indian farms yielded an average of 6 bushels/acre.

After reading an inspector's report, the Commissioner concluded that the grass leases were detrimental to Indian farming and should be stopped. He thought that by further impoverishing the Indians, they could be more easily forced to farm. Unfortunately, by terminating the grass leases two months early, Commissioner Morgan lost the \$33,000 in grass money and \$75,000 in land improvements due the KCA (Pennington 1972:239; Board of Indian Commissioners Report 1890:31).

The Commissioner visited the KCA/W reservation in 1891 to inform the Indians of the impending allotment and to urge them to prepare themselves for that eventuality (ARCIA 1891:350).

Adams gave little information in his reports bearing directly on Indian farming. He did report in 1891 that the seed oats arrived too late for planting. From the annual statistics for the agency, it is apparent that the Indian corn crop yielded only 10 bushels/acre. For both years that Adams was agent, an unexplained annual increase

of about 2,000 head of cattle is recorded for the Indian herds (ARCIA 1890:475; ARCIA 1891:101)

Adams was investigated and spent the last months of his career as agent answering charges of using his office to assist friends in gaining contracts and making leases (Buntin 1931:82, 102, 104).

During this "Political Period," the Commissioners clearly gave the agents less discretionary power than Hunt or his predecessors had enjoyed. In 1888, the Commissioner began demanding detailed monthly progress reports from the agents based upon accurate records rather than estimates (Pennington 1972:186). This policy not only required more clerical work of the agents but increased the amount of time the farm instructors spent keeping records, allowing less time for actual farm instruction. Agency farmer Madera's reports for May-August, 1888, appear representative of the situation. In May, he assisted 25 Indian farmers; in June, he saw only 7 Indian farmers because 16 days were taken up with agency duties; in July, he visited only 2 Indian farms and spent most of the month at the agency; in August he was at the agency stacking hay and was unable to instruct any Indians (Pennington 1972:197).

In 1889, the Commissioner began requiring that the agency farm instructors live in the local areas of the reservation for which they were responsible in order to cut their travel time to and from the agency (Pennington 1972: 221). In the same directive, however, the Commissioner re-emphasized the required monthly farmer reports and thereby helped undercut his own plan for greater efficiency.

The program of farm instruction was hampered during this period by too few instructors, who were expected to do too many things for too little pay. In 1886, the head farmer received \$700/year for his services and his assistants were hired for only 6 months out of the year for \$40/month. In 1887, the head farmer's salary was reduced to \$600/year (Pennington 1972:185). With little pay, and with detailed reports and agency farm duties in addition to the rigorous travel and instructional duties, it is little wonder that the job attracted few farmers with much ability and did not fire them with enthusiasm for their assignments. The farm instructors also were hampered by the general lack of implements and seed which made instruction in wheat farming especially difficult.

Nevertheless, the yearly reports indicate that some progress in Indian farming was made during this period.

Despite the discouraging effect of severe drought, occurring three years out of six and with a crop yield never exceeding 11 bushels/acre, Indian acreage had increased by 1,200 acres at the end of the period. The maximum reached in 1891 was 4,715 acres. Though this represents only slightly more than one acre farmed per Indian, it was an increase over the preceding period and during a time when any increase must have been miraculous.

The increase in acreage for the period must be attributed to the KCA. By 1887, they were responsible for more than half the total Indian acreage. There were still some cooperative group farming endeavors at this time among the KCA and the major crop continued to be corn which was mainly used as feed for their cattle. Besides their large corn fields, the Indian farmers commonly tended large vegetable gardens.

The two most promising cash crops for the area, cotton and wheat, were given little support or encouragement by the government during the "Political Period." When experimented with, cotton showed good results but was abandoned when the government gave it no support. Wheat was fairly well suited to the area, but was a useless crop until a flouring mill was installed at the agency. When the mill

became operable, however, wheat seed was withheld by the Commissioner.

Without fanfare in the annual reports, the Indian cattle herds were significantly enlarged during this period. In 1886 they totaled 5,491 head and by 1891 their number had reached 21,000 or slightly more than 5 head per Indian. Of course, certain prosperous individuals, like Quannah Porker, accounted for much of the total.

In 1886-1887, the KCA took half their lease payments in cattle and half in cash. Beginning in 1888, they took the total in cash (Pennington 1972:204). Freight hauling offered another source of cash income, though the Indians made less from it than they had previously (ARCIA 1888:97; ARCIA 1889:190).

The Final Years; From the Jerome Agreement (1892)
to Allotment and Opening (1901)

The agency saw a rapid agent turnover in the final years of the reservation period. In nine years time, seven agents took their turns at the agency.

Upon his arrival, agent Day met with the KCA/W. He found that they were concerned about the length of time remaining in the Medicine Lodge annuity period and that they wanted their grass leases reestablished (ARCIA 1892:385).

After making a trip to Washington, Day was successful in renewing the grass leases. Shortly afterward, back grass money payments were made in the lump sum of \$69,000. The Indians used the money to buy wagons and to buy houses on a cost-sharing basis with the government. From this point on, the government pushed the housing project nearly as much as Indian farming. In each of the remaining reservation period years, additional houses were paid for by the Indians. The Indians paid for the lumber and assisted in construction and the government paid for the carpenter (ARCIA 1892:385).

The year 1892 was not a fair one for reservation crops which yielded only 11 bushels/acre. The total acreage increased over the previous year, however, and 4,000 head of cattle were added to the Indian herds, though apparently not through government cattle distributions (Pennington 1972: 236).

On October 6, 1892, the Jerome Agreement was made by which the Indian signers, supposedly representing the KCA/W, agreed to an allotment of 160 acres for each Indian with title held in trust for 25 years. The remainder of the reservation was to be bought by the government and opened to white settlement. The Jerome Agreement was almost immediately denounced as a fraud, and its Congressional ratification

was vigorously opposed by both the Indians and the cattlemen. It was not until 1900 that it was finally ratified and allotment applied to the KCA/W.

There was no annual narrative report filed for 1893. During the year, two Army men (Brown and Nichols) filled in until the new agent arrived. A statistical report was filed which indicates that severe drought limited the Indian crop yield to 4 bushels/acre. In a letter to the Commissioner, Brown claimed that a great number of white sharecroppers were working Indian land (Pennington 1972:235). Since this is the only direct report on white sharecropping, it is difficult to determine the actual extent of the practice.

Agent Able's statistical report for 1894 resubmitted figures from the preceding year and he provided no narrative report.

When agent Baldwin took charge of the agency in December, 1894, he found it a complete shambles. "Retained copy letter books were being used as toilet paper in the closets . . . " (ARCIA 1895:250). Though Baldwin was new to the Indian Affairs department, he was an enthusiastic clerk and soon had the agency back in order.

Baldwin launched a major effort to improve the manner in which tool and seed distribution was handled. He demanded

that all requests be validated by an agency farm instructor before they were filled.

In his annual report, Baldwin stated that due to drought, only late or replanted crops had any chance of making harvest. The accompanying statistical report, however, shows 100,000 bushels of corn were harvested (ARCIA 1895:588). It is more likely that this figure is off by a factor of ten and that the corn crop yielded 10,000 bushels. A severe drought year yielding 20 bushels/acre is certainly a contradiction in terms.

Though Baldwin recognized the unsuitability of much of the reservation to agriculture, his solution to the Indian farming problem was an old one. He felt that the KCA could farm or starve (ARCIA 1895:251-252). On the other hand, he found the Wichita to be almost self-supporting.

The seed issued during 1895 consisted mainly of corn, millet, sorghum, and oats. Baldwin used the money for wheat and rye seed to buy more oat and millet seed, despite the suitability of winter wheat and the presence of a flouring mill (Pennington 1972:249).

At a general council, the KCA decided to use the money from the grass leases to buy additional breeding stock for distribution. Baldwin used \$50,000 of the grass money

each year to purchase the cattle for the Indians. The local traders, however, complained that the project was unfairly diverting money from their businesses.

During the 1890s, the Indian farming program was assisted by the four government and five mission schools on the reservation which included farming instruction in their curriculums. Baldwin went a step further and advocated that Indian children be taken off to boarding schools at two years of age in order to mold them properly (ARCIA 1895: 252).

Though Baldwin referred to his statistical report for 1896, no such report accompanied his annual narrative report. He claimed that during the year one-third more land was opened than ever before. The recurrence of drought conditions, however, led him to conclude that agriculture on any large scale would be impossible on the reservation (ARCIA 1896:253). He saw stock raising as the only real possibility for Indian self-sufficiency. He noted that the grass money was providing each Indian with one head per year and that the government, by buying the cattle for the beef ration from the Indians, could provide a good local market for them. Unfortunately, the circularity and

destructiveness of this process to the stock raising effort eluded Baldwin.

The industriousness of the KCA was testified to by Baldwin when he reported that they were actively engaged in hauling freight and cutting and hauling wood and hay. He noted, however, that though the desire for wage labor was obvious, there were only limited opportunities on the reservation (ARCIA 1896:254).

By 1896, the KCA/W were becoming alarmed about the possible ratification of the Jerome Agreement. The Indians protested that those who signed were forced to do so and that some signatures were forged. Baldwin also opposed immediate allotment, but his overly enthusiastic accounts of the progress he was making in transforming the KCA/W into farmers and cattlemen did little to discourage ratification.

In 1897, Baldwin reported:

There has been an increased acreage under cultivation by the Indians over that of last season, which, with the abundant rainfall, has placed these people (KCA/W) beyond a chance of want or hunger during the coming winter, besides having something to put on the market (ARCIA 1897:231).

He observed that such a good crop year was to be looked for only once every six or seven years. Though no crop yield statistics accompanied his report, he claimed that 13,421

acres were under Indian cultivation. Baldwin noted that cotton was well suited to the environment but that it required a great amount of field labor and that there was no market for cotton nearby (Pennington 1972:272).

The year was also a good one for Indian cattle herds which were estimated at between 20,000 and 30,000 head. Baldwin stated that the Indians were selling better quality beef to the government than was supplied by the beef contractors (ARCIA 1897:231). Unfortunately, due to the Indians' ignorance of fair stock prices, they were being victimized by unscrupulous local whites. Baldwin saw complete governmental control of all Indian stock sales as the only alternative.

During 1897, KCA/W income reached its peak for the entire reservation period. Baldwin reported that by taking agency jobs, plus stock and crop sales and grass leases, the KCA/W income had reached \$127,205 for the year (ARCIA 1897:232). This total results in an unimpressive per capita figure of \$32. There still were not enough job opportunities to satisfy the Indian requests for work. It should be noted also that even this modest level of income was entirely dependent upon the existence of lands to lease, an agency with jobs, and a need for supplies to be hauled,

and a neighboring Army post with needs that could be fulfilled by the Indians without local white competition. In other words, the situation even with these limited opportunities was an artificial one that was bound to change once allotment and white settlement came to the reservation.

The allotment and opening of the Cheyenne and Arapaho reservation provided an example that much worried the KCA/W. Baldwin supported the Indian opposition to allotment and agreed that the Jerome Agreement had been "made and completed by coercion and fraud" (ARCIA 1897:233). He wrote a letter to this effect to the House Committee on Indian Affairs.

Usually a change of agent was made in August or September, following the yearly report; however, Walker took over from Baldwin in May of 1898. According to Walker, various urgent agency duties made it impossible for him to compile and submit a statistical report for the year, though he did claim that 15,000 acres were being farmed by the KCA/W. This acreage figure appears to be fairly accurate since it fits between Baldwin's 1897 total of 13,421 and Randlett's 15,800 acres for 1899.

Walker noted in his report, as so many agents had done before, that the reservation was ill-suited to farming

and that Indian stock raising should be encouraged (ARCIA 1898:237). No further information on Indian farming was given for 1898, other than a report of fair weather and the expectation of a good crop.

Walker served as agent for 14 months and then absconded with agency Indian funds (Buntin 1931:142).

Agent Randlett replaced Walker in July, 1899. He remained as agent for seven and a half years. The agency records were in disorder when he arrived, so his annual report for 1899 was a bit thin. Randlett stated, however, that 15,800 acres were farmed by the KCA/W and that their cattle herds had 10,000 head. The reservation was once again hit by severe drought which limited Indian crop yield to 4 bushels/acre. Randlett was quick to report to the Commissioner on the area's unsuitability to agriculture (Kiowa Agency Letter Press Book - KALPB 1899:K-72, #s 158 and 162).

By 1899, the reservation had been divided into five farming districts, each with its own farm instructor. A subagency also had been established at Fort Sill to better coordinate agency affairs in the southern part of the reservation.

From Randlett's letters to the Commissioner, it is apparent that ration commodities of unacceptable quality frequently were received and distributed due to the hardship to the Indians if the rations were further delayed (viz. KALPB 1899:K-72, #230). By October the agency had been connected to Chickasha by the Rock Island and Pacific Railway, making the hauling of rations by wagon unnecessary.

In 1898 and 1899, the grass money was paid on a per capita basis. Many Indians made house deposits and paid for wagons that were to be delivered during the last months of Walker's administration. Walker made no records of the deposits and left with the Indians' money (ARCIA 1899:288; KALPB 1899:K-72, #s 246 and 342).

By 1899, not only the KCA/W, but the cattlemen and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs were raising vocal opposition to the ratification of the Jerome Agreement. Randlett helped compose a letter to Commissioner Jones stating the Indians' case against allotment. The letter stressed that, though the KCA/W were making progress, they were not ready for allotment. The uncertainty of farming in the area was pointed out, and a request was made that if allotted they be given sufficient grazing land to raise cattle so that they could subsist upon the natural increases of their herds.

In his annual report for 1900, Randlett again described the environmental conditions that made farming on the reservation all but impossible (ARCIA 1900:331-332). This was done not only as a report of fact but as another effort to forestall allotment. As luck would have it, the year turned out to be the best year for agriculture of the entire reservation period. Though only 8,065 acres were planted, the season yielded a bumper crop in corn, oats, and wheat. The average yield was 35 bushels/acre.

Well before the crop was in, however, the Jerome Agreement was ratified, and plans for allotment were made. Each Indian was to receive 160 acres of his choice. Several large tracts totaling 480,000 acres were set aside for Indian cattle grazing. The rest of the reservation was to be sold to white settlers by lottery.

The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the Board of Indian Commissioners, and the Secretary of Interior had done everything in their power to block ratification. In the last months prior to passage, they had even submitted greatly biased reports exaggerating the poor condition of the Indians and the inhospitable reservation environment (Pennington 1972:353-357), as if the real situation were not grim enough.

In his annual report for 1900, Randlett anticipated that with the KCA/W taking most of the good farm land in allotment, the white settlers coming into the area would be eager to lease or sharecrop Indian allotments (ARCIA 1900:333). Randlett proved to be correct, and, as will be seen, the leasing of allotments completely undid any possible good that could have resulted from the allotment.

By all accounts, 1901 was a trying year for the KCA/W. Allotment and the opening of the reservation to white settlement had an unsettling effect on the Indians, and only 5,955 acres were farmed in 1901. Randlett reported, however, that the KCA had made good choices in their allotments and that they were satisfied with the quality of their land. Due to the speed with which allotment was accomplished many Wichita had to have land selected for them though, in general, they too were satisfied (ARCIA 1901:320).

Once again, severe drought struck the area, and Indian crops yielded only 3 bushels/acre. Drought, however, was not the major disaster of the year. A smallpox epidemic broke out and took a heavy toll in Indian lives, especially among those still living in group camps along rivers and streams. The Comanche suffered the most and lost 163 people to the disease (ARCIA 1901:321). Vaccination reduced the

number that would have died otherwise, but still great numbers of children and old people succumbed.

Indian cattle herds were down somewhat over the previous year's total. The year's statistical report records 17,144 head for the KCA/W or an average of slightly more than four head per person. There were many large herds, however, especially among the Comanche, and these herds were grazed in the "Big Pasture."

Following registration of applicants, the unallotted portion of the reservation was sold by lottery on August 6, 1901. The KCA/W had chosen their land wisely, and there was relatively little good farm land left. Immediately following the lottery, the area was flooded by land sharks and potential tenant farmers seeking land (Nye 1969:304). In his annual report, Randlett noted that Indian cattle and horses were stolen daily in good number by local whites and that Indian homes left unattended were frequently ransacked (ARCIA 1901:322).

The final years of the reservation period saw a rapid succession of agents and agency personnel that provided little continuity or efficiency. The KCA/W reservation became a focus of great political and economic pressure during the 1890s. Land speculators, homesteaders, merchants,

and railroads attempted to force allotment while the Indians, the Department of Interior, and the cattlemen vigorously opposed such a move (Buntin 1931:120). In the end, of course, the pro-allotment forces won out.

During this period, the farm instructor's and agent's reports were frequently patchy and incomplete. For some years they were non-existent. A detailed picture of the condition of Indian farming is not available, though the pieces that remain support the following conclusions.

From 1892 up to 1899, there was a gradual increase in the number of acres farmed by the KCA/W; from 5,000 to 15,800. Due to the turmoil caused by the allotment and opening of the reservation, the total acreage declined markedly during 1900 and 1901. Out of the last ten years (1892-1901), five years brought severe drought and only one clearly resulted in a good crop yield.

Though a breakdown of acreage by tribe is not possible for this period, it appears likely that the KCA were responsible for much of the increase in total Indian acreage for the period. In 1900, Randlett observed that all of the tribes were willing to farm when "profitable results appear(ed) attainable" (ARCIA 1900:463). "Profitable results," unfortunately, were seldom attainable and most

Indian farms ranged from 10-70 acres, with few exceeding 100 acres (Pennington 1972:320). Despite generally favorable experiments with wheat and cotton, corn remained the main Indian crop throughout the reservation period. Given the limited utility and market for corn and the unrelenting droughts, it is little wonder that the Indians felt disinclined to farm on a larger scale. It is true that there were some exemplary, successful Indian farmers, but after 32 years of governmental "efforts" to transform the KCA/W into self-sufficient farmers, this group included but a handful. For 1900, Randlett estimated that 22% of Indian subsistence came from the government and 70% came from grass money, wage labor, stock sales and farming (Pennington 1972: 346).

During 1899-1901, the government curtailed seed and small implement distributions to the KCA/W and bought some large and expensive implements for them to share. This equipment was kept at the agency and district farm stations. Prior to 1895, there were two farming districts and only two farm instructors. In 1895, an additional district was formed and an instructor was added. A fourth farm district and instructor were added in 1897, and in 1899, the number of districts and instructors reached five (Pennington 1972:

260, 262, 318). Both the farm machinery and increased farm instruction, however, arrived too late to have much effect prior to the allotment and opening.

The "final years" saw much fluctuation in the size of the Indian cattle herds. From a total of 25,000 head in 1892, there was a decline to 8,991 head in 1895. After two years, the herds once more reached 25,000 head but immediately began to decrease again. By 1901, there were only 17,144 head, and in the following three years the number dwindled still further. Both the agency and Fort Sill needed beef and favored Indian cattle since they were closer and arrived in better shape for butchering. Though the sales provided the Indians with badly needed cash, the demands of the government installations, which included the Indian's own beef ration, far exceeded the natural increase of the herds. The result was that while the government provided a fair market for Indian cattle, it reduced the number of breeding stock in the herds.

The agents for the period reported no breeding cattle distributions by the government. It seems most likely that when the Indian herds increased, they did so as a result of grass lease payments, horse for cattle trades, and natural increases.

Though Randlett apparently was a diligent and sympathetic agent, his judgment certainly can be questioned on the subject of leasing Indian allotments. In his annual report for 1900, he correctly anticipated that white homesteaders would be anxious to lease Indian allotments after the opening, and he urged that the government adopt stringent rules to cover the situation. It was not that he was opposed to leases so much as that he was concerned with the quality of the white tenants (ARCIA 1900:333). He advocated sharecropping rather than outright lease for cash arrangements. In 1901, Randlett wrote the Commissioner and actually pleaded the case for the settlers who had lost in the lottery and who wanted to lease Indian allotments (Pennington 1972:344). In the same year he supported the leasing of parts of the "Big Pasture" to one man who could then sublease small tracts to white tenant farmers (Pennington 1972:349). It is difficult to keep from questioning his motives. There were two conflicting ideas on the subject. In one view it seemed reasonable that land which was not tilled or grazed by the KCA/W should be made useful to them by leasing to white tenants. On the other hand, it was thought that if leasing were encouraged, the marginal progress that had been made in Indian farming would be abruptly halted, if not

erased. As will be seen in the next chapter, leasing was permitted on a large scale, and Indian farming suffered.

Conclusions

Immediately following the Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867, the federal policy with regard to the KCA/W was concerned with tribal pacification, concentration onto isolated reservations, and the Indians' transformation into self-sufficient farmers. By 1880, new goals in the government's Indian policy were emerging: tribal atomization, individual Indian allotment and independent farming, and the opening of reservations to white settlement. The eradication of Indian culture, social organization, and bison hunting subsistence and their replacement with "Christian" values and family-farming subsistence were long term goals throughout the reservation period.

The various branches of government had differing priorities and tactics for "civilizing" the Indians. The Congress imagined no serious obstacles to the project. Grandiose plans for Indian progress happily were concocted, though the Congress consistently withheld adequate funding to accomplish its own plans. In an effort to please the taxpayers, the Congress usually voted to cut Indian

appropriations while at the same time new programs were being endorsed. When funds were forthcoming for a specific project, dramatic results were expected immediately, and when they did not come, funds again were reduced. Much of the money that was appropriated did little to benefit the Indians, but lined the pockets of crooked government contractors.

The Indian Affairs branch of the Department of Interior continually wrangled for larger Indian appropriations, though it too was laced with corruption. The Commissioners expected miracles of the agents and the Indians and frequently enforced rigid policy directives that were ill-fitted to actual reservation conditions.

By 1900, there was ample evidence to show that the KCA/W reservation was not environmentally suited to farming and that the KCA/W had not attained a scale of farming that was adequate to compete with white settlers. Nevertheless, Congress bowed to the demands of homesteaders and various economic interests and allotted the Indians and sold the balance of the reservation. Despite Congressional rhetoric concerned with Indian improvement, the real driving force for allotment was avarice for Indian land. Washburn, in his analysis of the push for allotment, suggests that the

railroads were a major behind-the-scenes force, and he notes that they gained the most from the land openings (Washburn 1975:20-21). Though unverified, his proposition certainly appears likely.

Ironically, Commissioner Jones stated in his 1901 annual report that the intent of the government concerning the KCA/W at the time of the reservation opening was to protect the rights of the Indians, to establish opportunity for self-support, and then to allow them to sink or swim (ARCIA 1901:45). Indian rights were not protected, and reasonable opportunity for self-support was never established, but the KCA/W were allowed to sink or swim.

From Medicine Lodge to Allotment, significant progress in Indian farming was made despite great handicaps. Though the Indians did some farming during the turmoil of the military campaign years, farming really began for the KCA/W in 1875. From only 292 acres in 1869, the Indian acreage grew to 15,800 acres by 1899. Indian cattle herds also increased from 109 head in 1869 to 18,599 head in 1900. The increased acreage and stock are significant, though they were not of a scale adequate for self-support or competition with white settlers.

The Wichita were clearly not the only Indian farmers. By 1871, the KCA accounted for 10% of the total Indian acreage, by 1888 over 50%, and by 1900, it can be assumed, even more.

Frequent drought was likely the greatest discouragement to Indian farming. In the 32 years between 1869 and 1901, severe drought struck the reservation 15 times. Further discouragement was provided by the lack of markets or a valued use for Indian crops. Though the government promised much in the way of seed, tools, and instruction, what actually was furnished was never sufficient for the needs and requests of the Indians. The local agencies were always understaffed and, following Hunt, the agents considered their positions temporary and were reluctant to give the job the monumental effort it required.

Cattle raising really was not considered by the government as an alternative to farming. It would have taken too much money to start. It also would have required the KCA/W to keep large tracts of land for grazing. It also would not have promoted tribal break-up, private property or sedentariness, all of which were seen as requisite to "civilizing" the Indian.

From Medicine Lodge onward, the KCA/W became increasingly dependent upon the government and the local agent for their subsistence. The paternalistic relationship, however, went beyond the simple disbursement of rations and annuity goods to include the distribution of seed, tools, breeding stock, and agency jobs. The agent's authority extended even to control over Indian financial dealings with traders, as well as Indian education, religious activities, and socio-political organization. If an agent disapproved of any individual or group, he had the power to punish and force apparent conformity to his wishes by withholding goods vital to subsistence. The agent's favorites, those Indians discerned as most "progressive," frequently were rewarded by more than their fair share of goods and opportunities. From the preceding historical account, it is apparent that most agents used the paternalistic authority of their position to reward and punish as they saw fit. In either case, however, the Indians remained dependent upon the government agent. Given the constraints of the reservation situation, such a relationship is understandable. Unfortunately, paternalism served to undermine Indian self-reliance and replaced it with a helpless dependence upon the agent. Of course, the process referred to here was neither immediate

nor complete, but characterized a pervasive attitude and relationship that eroded the Indians' independent spirit and ambition. There were notable exceptions among the culturally conservative Indians and among the few relatively successful Indian farmers.

Indian Subsistence Alternatives

From the agents' statistical reports included in the ARCIA came the following figures on the percent of Indian subsistence gained from various sources.

		<u>Farming and Stock Raising</u>	<u>Hunting and Gathering</u>	<u>Rations and Annuities</u>
1878	KCA	3	15	82
	W	33	33	34
1885	KCA/W	20	5	75
1891	KCA/W	35	15	50
1894	KCA/W	50	0	50

No agent estimates are available for any year between 1895 and 1901. It should be remembered that the above figures are but rough estimates made by various agents in their yearly reports to the Commissioner. It is likely that the farm and stock percentages were padded somewhat to help the agent validate his progress in transforming the Indians.

Given that probability, the figures still retain some worth as approximations for an agent couldn't afford to report a condition that was too much at variance with that observed by the frequent investigators and special agents.

If the historical data presented earlier in the chapter are analyzed, seven alternative sources of Indian subsistence emerge for the reservation period. These are (1) hunting and gathering, (2) horse raiding and trading, (3) rations and annuities, (4) farming, (5) stock raising, (6) grass leases, and (7) wage labor.

(1) Though the KCA/W continued to hunt and gather throughout the reservation period, it was limited to a marginal or supplementary basis after 1879, and the virtual elimination of bison from the Southern Plains. Traditionally, hunting and gathering had been the chief source of subsistence and, in the 1870s, the Indians had earned cash from the sale of bison hides. From 1880 onward, hunting and gathering had little significance in KCA/W subsistence.

(2) The other major traditional source of Indian subsistence was horse raiding and trading. After their military pacification was complete in 1874, the KCA/W were restricted to the reservation and made no further horse raids into Texas or Mexico. In fact, the Indians themselves

became the target of unrelenting horse thieves from Texas during the remaining reservation years. Even before 1874, the horse raid/horse trade system had been disrupted by the government.

(3) After the disappearance of the bison, the KCA/W depended most heavily upon government rations and annuities for their subsistence. This dependence was by necessity rather than choice. The level of ration support was determined while the bison still provided most of the Indian's needs and was even inadequate in those days. After the bison were gone and the rations had to be depended upon, they proved to be far from sufficient. The rations and annuities habitually arrived late, were of shockingly poor quality, and many commodities and items were useless to the Indians. The amount of rations provided was continually reduced by Congress. Indian dependence upon the rations gave the agents a basis from which to threaten effectively and to coerce the Indians into some conformity with their wishes. The ration situation presented the KCA/W with a "double-bind." Rations were frequently withheld from those who refused to attempt farming, thus forcing nearly every Indian family to plant a few acres. Yet, those who became proficient farmers (viz. the Wichita) had their rations cut

off and suffered when their crops were destroyed by the frequent droughts.

(4) As already mentioned, farming on the reservation was limited by the lack of much suitable land and by the occurrence of severe drought. Other factors also conspired to discourage Indian farming. Even in the late 1890s, both agents and commissioners still were thinking of Indian subsistence farming in unrealistically small scale. They believed that 15-25 acres and a few head of cattle per family were all that would be necessary to establish Indian self-sufficiency. Admittedly, a start had to be made somewhere, but the scale of farming they had in mind was clearly too small to be self-supporting, let alone competitive. Throughout the reservation period, the KCA/W were given only minimal seed, tools, and training. The frequent complaints by agents about the Indians' laziness and unwillingness to work are tempered by the equally frequent unfulfilled Indian requests for wage labor jobs and for the materials and instruction necessary for farming. The unavailability of local markets for their crops further limited the recognizable incentive to engage in the back-breaking work that was Indian farming during even a good year. Only a couple of years prior to allotment the reservation was connected by

rail with the larger agro-economic system. Though both wheat and cotton were found suited to the reservation environment and commanded good prices at market, corn remained the predominant Indian crop. Yet, even when the crop was "made," it was of little worth other than as feed for Indian stock. As a result of these factors, it is little wonder that there was no great Indian enthusiasm for farming. In fact, it is marvelous that the KCA/W farmed as much as they did by 1900, and likely reflects the inadequacy of other sources of subsistence.

(5) The reservation lands were best suited to cattle raising. The government, however, did not consistently support Indian stock raising since it did not fit with the goal of small-scale family farming and allotment. At the same time that stock raising brought the best profits to the Indians, its future was being undermined by heavy government purchase of the best cattle in their herds. The Indian desire for cash was exploited and their herds severely depleted in the years just prior to allotment.

(6) The grass leases, whereby large tracts of reservation land were leased to cattle companies, provided another source of support to the KCA. At first, payment was made in beef and breeding stock. Later, the Indians

were paid in cash. Though the grass leases were periodically suspended by various Commissioners, the KCA usually received between \$30,000 and \$90,000 per year from the leases. These figures look like a great deal of money until it is remembered that when divided among over 3,000 Indians, the result is \$10 to \$30/person/year. The individual payments were further reduced since they were usually made on a semi-annual basis. The money was used to pay debts with the traders, to buy cattle, implements or houses, or to gamble. Needless to say, the per capita grass money didn't go very far, even when used prudently.

(7) Many KCA/W showed great enthusiasm for wage labor jobs. Unfortunately, the reservation offered few opportunities and little pay. Indians hauled freight for the agents and traders for \$.75/100 lbs./100 miles and also cut and hauled lumber and hay. The Indian police made \$8-\$12/month for their arduous and invaluable services, and the few Indian assistant farmers made \$40/month for full-time heavy work. The few jobs and little pay made only a slight contribution to Indian subsistence.

Due to the inadequacy of each of the subsistence alternatives, a composite with partial commitment to a variety of alternatives was required. Rations and annuities

formed the base and were augmented by small scale farming and stock raising. Supplemental cash was brought in by grass money, wage labor and occasional stock sales. Light hunting and gathering efforts continued through the reservation period, but overall made a small contribution to Indian subsistence.

Reservation restriction and government policy quickly destroyed the basis of the traditional KCA/W ecological relationship and undermined tribal social organization as a supporting structure. The pre-reservation pattern was replaced by dependence upon government rations and the paternalistic agency administration. The official policy of tribal atomization did away with a possible transitional structural option--cooperative "band" stock raising. As individual families, the Indians lacked the capital, breeding stock, manpower, and, later, grazing land to make a go of cattle herding. As an intermediate step on the way to becoming self-sufficient family farmers, such a cooperative band unit might have provided the subsistence security necessary to make a gradual transition. A plan of this type was never tried since it conflicted with the popular goal of individual "civilized" self-sufficiency, would have taken too long, and would also have kept too much land in Indian

ownership. As it was, the government gave the KCA/W only one generation to make the move from nomadic raiders and hunters and gatherers to independent family subsistence farmers. By all accounts the government attempted to accomplish too much, too quickly with too little support, and with no transitional structure other than paternalism to replace the traditional socio-economic structure which its policies largely destroyed.

CHAPTER 4

POST-ALLOTMENT AND PRE-INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT PERIOD, 1901-1934

Developments in Federal Indian Policy

In 1902, a major amendment to the General Allotment Act (Dawes Act) was passed. The amendment permitted multiple heirs to sell their inherited allotment and divide the proceeds. The framers of the bill saw it as a measure whereby the problems of fractionated land inheritance could be overcome (Officer 1971:37). The net effect, however, was to open the door for the premature fee patenting and sale of Indian allotments which originally were intended to remain in trust for 25 years. From this point on the tempo of Indian land base erosion increased rapidly until it was halted temporarily with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. During the intervening 32 years an incredible amount of Indian land was lost through sale.

The Burke Act of 1906 furthered the rapid sale of allotments by allowing the issuing of fee patents to any Indian judged competent to handle his own affairs. Fee patents thereafter were issued automatically on all inherited allotments (Officer 1971:37).

Fortunately, under Commissioners Leupp and Valentine (1904-1913) fee patenting proceeded slowly, and the judging of competency was not an automatic process.

The Omnibus Bill of 1910 enlarged the Secretary of Interior's discretionary authority in determining heirs, conferring fee patents, partitioning inherited property, selling inherited allotments, and establishing lease arrangements (Officer 1971:38).

By 1913, the stage was set for the rapid liquidation of Indian allotments through the exercising of the Commissioner's authority. Cato Sells was just the Commissioner (1913-1921) for the job. He was "a firm believer in removing the restrictions from the titles of Indian allottees and giving them full control of their property" (Officer 1971:38-39). Under Sells a disastrous program of forced fee patenting began in 1916. By 1920, he was proud to note in his annual report that approximately 135,000 of the 175,000 allotments were fee patented. Given the post-allotment

economic difficulties which most Indians were experiencing, the opportunity to sell their allotments proved irresistible.

Commissioner Charles Burke quickly abandoned the forced fee patent program upon taking office in 1921. Thereafter, fee patents were issued only after they had been applied for, and there was a great decline in the number of such patents issued (Officer 1971:40).

The tragic condition of Indian land and water rights was highlighted in the early 1920s by the controversies over the Bursum Lands Bill and the diversion of water from the Maricopa and Pima Reservation. Popular interest in the Indians' plight was once again stirred. In 1926, a government contract was given to the Institute of Government Research to conduct a study of the condition of the American Indians. Under the direction of Lewis Meriam the report, The Problem of Indian Administration, was issued in 1928.

Commenting on the general conditions of Indian life, the Meriam Report stated:

The poverty of the Indians and their lack of adjustment to the dominant economic and social systems produce the vicious circle ordinarily found among any people under such circumstances. Because of interrelationships, causes cannot be differentiated from effects. The only course is to state briefly the conditions found that are part of this vicious circle of poverty and maladjustment (Meriam 1928:3).

Two implications flow from the above findings. First, the Indians' condition was not the result of unique cultural factors, but of more general social and economic forces acting upon them. Second, the Indians' condition was the result of a failure to adapt on their part. The first implication is supported though the second implication is contradicted by the bulk of the material in this study.

A little further on, the report characterized the Indian economic situation as follows:

He generally ekes out an existence through un-earned income from leases of his land, the sale of land, per capita payments from tribal funds, or in exceptional cases through rations given him by the government . . . the main occupations of the men are some outdoor work, mostly of an agricultural nature, but the number of real farmers is comparatively small.

In justice to the Indians it should be said that many of them are living on lands from which a trained and experienced white man could scarcely wrest a reasonable living. In some instances the land originally set apart for the Indians was of little value for agricultural operations other than grazing (Meriam 1928:5).

With little modification this description fits the allotted KCA/W of the late 1920s perfectly.

Later in the report attention again was given to the topic of Indian farming:

Although a few Indians were visited who could really be called farmers in the ordinary sense

of that word, they were distinctly exceptional. The agricultural activities of a great majority of them are very limited, and are considerably below any satisfactory standard for subsistence farming (Meriam 1928:491).

The report proceeded to correctly cite inadequate farm instruction and lack of working capital as chief obstacles to Indian farming, but it retained an inappropriate subsistence farming focus consistent with the emphasis of the Dawes Act. By way of a solution, the report proposed a vague "Five year Agricultural Program" which would transform not only the Indian farmers but their families and local communities as well (Meriam 1928:497).

On the subject of Indian stock raising, the report stated:

Ample evidence demonstrates that stock raising is the most promising form of agricultural and, in fact, the most promising of all pursuits for a large number of Indians. Not only does the average Indian show considerable aptitude for this work, but enormous areas of Indian land, tribal and individual, are of little value except for grazing (Meriam 1928:504).

A general Indian stock raising plan was suggested which was to commence with tribal herds started with government backing and later proceed to stock raising on an individual basis. Clearly, this plan was not a new one.

In general, the Meriam Report offered a thoughtful and sympathetic analysis of the 1928 conditions of Indian life and roundly criticized the Department of Interior and Bureau of Indian Affairs for their negligence. With the appointment of John Collier as Commissioner in 1933 and the passage of the Wheeler-Howard Indian Reorganization Act in 1934, many of the findings and suggestions of the Meriam Report were brought before Congress for action.

Agricultural Developments Prior to 1900

The period following the Civil War was one of economic distress for the American farmer. From 1867 to 1898, though prices were favorable, the situation was dampened by rising transportation and production costs and a labor shortage. The balance gradually was tipped in favor of the farmer as technological improvements were made and new farmlands were opened to production. From 1898 to 1914, the farmers enjoyed a rare period of prosperity.

Prior to 1898, complex marketing problems plagued the farmer. Schlebecker claims that "Even with free transport of products, some commodities would still not have paid their cost of production" (1975:162). By the 1890s, however, marketing conditions were becoming more favorable,

and better and cheaper transportation was available. Also by the 1890s, grain harvesting technology, including the combining of wheat, had greatly improved production.

Until the 1890s, Indian Territory (Oklahoma) was marginal to the national farm economy. Homesteaders were avid for land in Indian Territory in the 1890s and early 1900s because of the emerging conditions favorable to farming. However, in retrospect, we can see that the tide already had turned against small scale farming by the 1890s. To that extent, then, the terms of Indian allotment and white homesteading in Indian Territory were out of step with the larger developing trends.

It is worth noting the circumstances of white farmers in North Central Indian Territory during the 1890s. The average farm consisted of 160 acres with 40 acres under cultivation and the remainder in pasture. All implements were horse drawn and rudimentary. Capital was limited. Corn was clearly the preferred crop, followed by cotton, wheat, sorghum, and oats (Dale and Wardell 1948:406). At the same time, white farmers in Western Indian Territory were devoted to ranching on a small scale since the distance to the nearest market precluded anything other than subsistence and feed crops. By 1900, however, and the arrival

of the railroads, small scale diversified cash crop farming had become widespread. Corn and cotton dominated the scene, but wheat was becoming more popular and was gradually taking over (Dale and Wardell 1948:408). The foregoing conditions would seem to indicate that the KCA/W, limited farmers as they were in the 1890s, were not outclassed completely by local white farmers.

Sources for 1901-1977

The Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs offer coverage of varying depth and completeness for the KCA/W from 1901 to 1920. For 1901-1904, both the local agent's reports and annual statistics are presented. For 1905-1907, only the agent's reports are to be found, and for 1911-1920, only statistical information is offered. The same problems exist with this source of data as were reported in the last chapter.

The Indian Archives of the Oklahoma Historical Society contain little information on the KCA/W past the immediate allotment period. The two notable exceptions are the partial surveys of Indian farmers for 1915 and 1925. The first survey appears to cover only Kiowa farmers, and the second survey seems to focus chiefly on Comanche

farmers. Neither survey is complete nor are tribal affiliations noted. Yet, though the surveys are incomplete, they offer an informative sample profile of some of the Indian farmers at the time. The agency records for the post-allotment period are in a federal repository in Dallas and are to be found in a maze of unindexed storage crates (Jordan 1973: private correspondence).

The quest for current information collected by the Anadarko Agency's Soil and Moisture Committee is foiled by the fact that their records include no tribal designations and focus solely upon recent information directly related to their soil conservation programs.

The Doris Duke Oral History Project (DDOHP) collected interviews in the late 1960s from many KCA/W on a variety of topics, including farming. The interview transcripts are housed at the University of Oklahoma Library in the Western History Collection. The interviews usually are spotty in their references to farming. However, a few interviews offer some in-depth information, though even in these, chronological referents are quite vague.

The author conducted interviews with KCA/W farmers during the summers of 1973 and 1974. These interviews are relied upon heavily in the present chapter and even more

heavily in the following chapter and are the source for the Indian farmer profiles offered prior to the conclusion of Chapter 5.

Finally, the Biennial Reports of the Oklahoma State Board of Agriculture (BROSBA) offer some important county farming statistics which help keep the Indian farming picture in perspective.

Allotment Selection and Settlement Patterns

At the outset it should be noted that the KCA/W agent's pessimistic opinions of the agricultural potential of the reservation lands prior to allotment were conditioned by the agricultural technology available at the time. By allotment, improvements in farm machinery and seed were making it more possible to farm many parts of Western Indian Territory. Frequent drought conditions, however, continued to plague the farmers.

In choosing their allotments, the KCA/W were encouraged to select quarter sections that offered water, grass, and wood. This mixture, while providing the ingredients for survival, limited the tillable land to 80-100 acres per allotment. While at first this limitation was of little significance, it later was to further reduce the

chances of Indian farmers successfully competing in the emerging agribusiness complex.

In general, members of the four tribes chose allotments in the same area as their fellow tribesmen. Kiowa allotments centered around what is now Carnegie, Oklahoma and ranged somewhat to the west and south. The Kiowa Apache chose allotments in the area between what is now Fort Cobb and Apache, Oklahoma. The Comanche allotments spread to the south and west of Apache, extending to Walters, Oklahoma. The Wichita and affiliated tribes took allotments to the north of Anadarko, north of the Washita River near contemporary Gracemont, Oklahoma.

Within each general tribal area, family members usually took allotments adjacent to each other, sometimes at the expense of overall land quality. Several informants reported that their parents had selected virtually worthless allotments for them solely because the land was near their own. It appears that band divisions and tribal factions also were reflected in the areas selected for allotments. This is clearly the case for the Comanche and the Kiowa Apache.

The government assumed that allotment would magically transform the Indians into self-sufficient farming families,

though from the start this assumption was obviously in error. Nevertheless, the policy of "allotment, sink or swim" remained in force until the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act. Though some KCA/W immediately moved onto their allotments and made an attempt to farm and raise cattle on a small scale, many more lived in group camps of tipis during the first decade or more following allotment. Though the camp dwelling groups did some gardening and had some horses and cattle, their primary sources of income were per capita payments, allotment and tribal leases, and occasional land sales. Group camps were clearly not limited to one tribe but were found among all four tribes (Evgenia Mausape, DDOHP, T-138:3; Ray Blackbear, DDOHP, T-332:18; Joseph Wheeler, DDOHP, T-288:2). The existence of many such group camps among the Wichita is especially noteworthy given their farming origins and reservation period farming success. It seems likely then that the 1890s and early 1900s farming statistics do not represent simply the success of the Wichita with only minimal participation in farming from the other three tribes, but rather that by allotment times all four tribes were on much the same footing.

1901-1910

Nationally, farm acreage expanded until 1914 under the thrust provided by a ready world for domestic surplus. The development of the gas powered tractor had much to do with the general increase in farmed acres. While there were only five tractors in use in 1900, there were over 17,000 in use by 1914 (Schlebecker 1975:174). Though tractors were expensive, they required no fodder, and the acres that would have been devoted to feed were planted in cash crops.

Improvements in transportation, handling, and storage made national marketing possible and, while the farmers certainly were not the biggest gainers in the developing commodity economy, they made sufficient profits to justify calling the period from 1898 to 1914 the "Golden Age" of American Agriculture.

Oklahoma only partly shared in this period of agricultural prosperity due to the recency of the areas' opening to farming and the homesteading subsistence basis of Oklahoma farming.

The following national figures for farmers as a percentage of the work force is an indication of the emerging agribusiness complex in which fewer farmers were farming more acres with greater mechanical assistance.

1870 - 53.0%

1880 - 49.4%

1890 - 42.6%

1900 - 37.5%

1910 - 31.0%

Homesteading and subsistence farming clearly were losing out to large scale cash-crop operations nationally by 1910. To that extent, not just KCA/W farmers but much of Oklahoma agriculture was developmentally behind the times during the first decade of the 20th Century.

During 1900-1910, Oklahoma achieved statehood, became linked by railroad to the national commodity economy, and initiated various state agencies and programs aimed at bringing Oklahoma agriculture up to date. The farm institutes and the State Board of Agriculture paid scant attention to the KCA/W except as a source of land that could be leased inexpensively by local white farmers.

Statewide figures for 1906-1907 show that corn still was the major crop by acreage and was followed by cotton and wheat, though cotton yielded the greatest income (Dale and Wardell 1948:411; Biennial Report of the Oklahoma State Board of Agriculture, BROSBA 1908:105). This picture corresponds quite well with the 1907 crop acreage and price

figures for the three counties containing the majority of the KCA/W allotments--Caddo, Comanche, and Kiowa counties (BROSBA 1908:113, 121, 141).

In 1908, the state average profit per harvested acres was \$9.55 (BROSBA 1908:14). The 1908 average wage per day for field labor ranged between \$1.09 and \$1.17, depending upon the type of work done, and a man with a working team of horses or mules could earn between \$1.76 and \$2.12 per day (BROSBA 1908:12). This information will become more pertinent as we turn to the level of Indian income from various sources in 1911-1920.

From the Biennial Reports it is apparent that 1908-1909 was a pivotal period in the shift from homesteading to sharecropping in the KCA/W allotment area. In 1908, Caddo, Comanche, and Kiowa counties had roughly half as many farm tenants as farm owners, while by 1909 the same counties reported farm tenants and farm owners in nearly equal numbers (BROSBA 1910:212-213). Many of the new tenants were farming land leased from individual KCA/W allottees.

After allotment and before the KCA reservation was opened to white settlement, 480,000 acres were set aside for common tribal pasture. The several large pastures, including the "Big Pasture," were located in the southeastern

part of the former reservations and were not liquidated until 1906 and a second allotment and land opening.

In his annual report for 1901, Agent Randlett noted that the Indians did little farming due to the excitement of the opening and the disruption caused by selecting allotments (ARCIA 1901:321). It mattered little, however, since severe drought again visited the area. Further turmoil among the KCA/W was caused by an outbreak of smallpox and the widespread white theft of Indian cattle and horses.

In 1902, Randlett was unable to report much farming progress and blamed it on the shortage of farm instructors. Those instructors that he did have had their time monopolized by agency bookkeeping duties and had little time for Indian farmers. Randlett reported that white burglary of unattended Indian houses and theft of Indian stock was proceeding on a routine wholesale basis. He noted also that since the KCA/W had become citizens they had been harassed repeatedly by their white neighbors and the one-sided application of property laws (ARCIA 1902:288).

In 1902, much of the common pasture land was leased for \$132,369.90 per year. This money was distributed among the KCA in semiannual per capita payments (ARCIA 1902:290).

By Congressional Act on May 27, 1902, the sale of inherited Indian allotments was approved. Randlett mistakenly anticipated few sales among the KCA/W. Previously (1900 and 1901), Randlett predicted that the policy of allowing widows, children, and the infirm to lease their allotments would result in few leases and would have an overall beneficial effect. Yet, in less than a year (October 1, 1901-September 1, 1902), 443 leases had been filed (ARCIA 1902:290). As we proceed with the treatment of the post-allotment years prior to 1934, we will have ample opportunity to see just how wrong he was on both the popularity and effects of KCA/W land sales and leases.

Randlett's report for 1902 also included an impassioned plea for custodial power over the funds of "non-competent" Indians. His plea was answered, and the judgment of competency was left up to the agent. Under this arrangement the Indians were protected in their financial dealings with the predatory elements of the local white communities but remained financially dependent upon the agent's judgment as to what was best for them. This particular paternal relationship still exists today between the KCA/W and the B.I.A. Area Office at Anadarko.

Randlett wrote in his 1903 report:

Almost all the able-bodied married male adults of the tribes have done something in the way of personal labor on their allotments for improvement of land and obtaining products for self-support, some of whom have been quite successful in producing small grain and vegetables (ARCIA 1903:262).

In light of the growing number of leased allotments and the presence of many group encampments, it is apparent that Randlett's portrayal was an overstatement of the prevailing conditions. In any event, flood and drought again severely limited the Indian farmer's crop yield. Randlett went on to note that the shortage of implements and farm instruction seriously hampered the development of Indian farming (ARCIA 1903:261).

The enthusiasm with which Randlett discussed the leasing policies and the presence of 1,200 leased allotments is alarming.

Results of leasing individual allotments. Regulation of the Department disallowing the leasing of the entire allotments of able-bodied male Indians is observed. The larger number of the 1,200 leases that have been made are in favor of incapables, the old and infirm, and women and children. Leases covering allotments of women are all made in the name of the women, whether married or single, the money received being paid to the women. Moneys received in payment of leases of allotments of minor children that are orphans is deposited in the United States Treasury to their credit, to be held until they become of age. All leases provide

that the land shall be fenced with three wires, posts 1 rod apart; that a two or three room frame house shall be constructed on the land, a well dug, and at least 100 acres of land be broken up and put in cultivation, besides money rent ranging from \$40 to \$80 per annum. Leases run for three or five years, except in cases of minor children who are to reach their majority in less time. The design of the system is to bring the allotment into condition so that when the leases expire the able-bodied males will be able to handle them personally and profitably. It insures a living to the cripples and men too old and infirm to work; also to the widows and orphans, and makes promising provisions for orphan boys who, when becoming of age, will find their lands improved, and with the money saved from rents can provide themselves with teams and implements for farming and have hopeful chances of establishing homes for themselves. It is reasonable to anticipate that the plan for leasing allotments, which has been so carefully guarded by departmental regulations, if faithfully observed by agents entrusted with the execution of its provisions, will incite courage, ambition, and hope among the enlightened Indians, and that they will accept and maintain with profit the great ultimate advantages designed by the system and thus attest the wisdom of its having been adopted (ARCIA 1903:263).

Apparently he had become oblivious to the danger to Indian farming progress that the leases presented--the danger which he had correctly foreseen in his report for 1900. A further note of alarm should have been sounded, but was not, when he reported the sale of 22 inherited allotments (ARCIA 1903:263).

Randlett, however, had troubles of his own in 1903 as local grafters joined with the dissident Lone Wolf faction

(upset over allotment) in seeking his removal. Francis Leupp's investigation and report on the situation resulted in Randlett's complete exoneration and the handing down of several indictments to some of his antagonists for fraud and perjury (ARCIA 1903:449-497).

In 1904, Randlett reported that "a large number" of Indians had been trying to farm their allotments while others hired out as cotton-pickers. The chief Indian crops continued to be corn, Kaffir corn, and some cotton. Indian farming again, however, was devastated by severe drought.

Indian stock theft continued unabated. Randlett was more concerned with the activities of local money lenders. He reported that not only pawnbrokers but even national bank officers routinely charged the Indians usurious interest rates of 25-200%. It was not uncommon for loans to be seductively offered to Indians who could not afford to meet the loan deadlines. The Indians' collateral in implements and stock subsequently was seized and sold to local white buyers.

By 1904, Randlett began feeling significant pressure to advocate the breakup and sale of the remaining KCA tribal pasture land. He loudly opposed the bill which he clearly

demonstrated was not in the economic best interests of the tribes (ARCIA 1904:294).

Indian cattle numbered 18,599 in 1900 (see Table 4) and then rapidly declined after the opening of the reservation. This decline was due largely to white theft. A similar and simultaneous decline in the number of Indian horses can be seen. However, in 1904, while the horses continued to dwindle, the cattle took a sudden upturn. Randlett reported no government cattle distribution to the Indians. Did such a distribution go unnoted in his report? Were horses suddenly being traded for cattle in great numbers? Were a great number of Indians using available funds to purchase cattle? The answer is not readily apparent.

From 1899 to 1902, the Indians' worked acreage fell, but rose sharply in 1903 and 1904 until it surpassed the reservation period high of 15,800 acres in 1899. By 1912, only 20,000 acres were cultivated by the KCA/W. If these figures are reliable, then it would seem that Indian farming reached its pre-World War I plateau by about 1904.

Further examination of the tables indicates that between 1899 and 1904, drought struck four years out of six, and oat and wheat farming fluctuated crazily.

Table 4

KCA/W Farm Statistics, 1899-1904

Year	Worked Acres	Corn Bu.	Avg. Yield Bu./Acre	Drought Years	Oat Bu.	Wheat Bu.	KCA/W Pop.	Horses	Cattle	Hay Tons	Swine
1899	15800	60000	4	*	2800	3000	3696	12410	10000	1000	500
1900	8065	243000	35		11145	25000	3733	23236	18599	3228	1843
1901	5955	15485	3	*	---	962	---	15403	17144	732	1931
1902	5598	69925	15		1150	12612	3661	16439	12234	885	822
1903	13390	120300	10	*	4100	13600	3696	9240	8552	1350	1090
1904	19525	48350	3	*	650	4840	3676	6303	12052	1040	760

It is sad to read the pessimism and despair written between the lines of Randlett's final report as he summed up the general condition of the KCA/W in 1905:

Since my last annual report these Indians as a whole have made as much progress in the matter of civilized living and ways of self-support as could reasonably be expected by those conversant with the influences calculated to serve as impediments. Very many of them have worked upon their lands and made fair crops of cotton, corn, and small grains to which their allotments are generally well adapted. They have experienced drawbacks in various forms, the chief originating from inherent disposition to depend upon provisions made by the Government for their support. The matter of dissipating this disposition has been much retarded by the unfavorable influences that were brought among them with the opening of this country, to settlement by the whites. Very many of them who were well supplied with animals with which to work their lands have found themselves stripped of this indispensable advantage by the horse thieves, who took the occasion of the influx of actual settlers to locate themselves in the vicinities where their vocations could most conveniently be practiced. The civil authorities for a long time were unable to meet all the demands for service in ridding the new country of the horse thieves and other criminals with which it was infested. Much success has resulted from the efficient efforts of officers of the law, and it is now possible for the Indians to trust their work horses out of sight. Under such conditions it is unreasonable to expect mature Indians who have passed their lives in habitual idleness, unable to receive instructions except through an interpreter seldom at hand, to make their living by farming with two or three seasons of experience. With few exceptions none have been able to do it, and but for the annuity funds they receive these tribes would have to be chiefly supported by the Government or by the communities that have come among them to live.

The older ones of the Indians generally are improvident and utterly wanting in anxiety to provide for the future, and are most easily led into extravagances of all sorts and become victimized by the sharpers and sharks that lay in wait for trade with them; therefore, always in debt, either to legitimate vendors of the necessities of life or its luxuries, or to the money lenders, who gamble in loans to them usually at the rate of from 150 to 3,000 percent. This practice in usurious rates of interest from them is not confined to the despised professional gamblers, but is most generally found to be a habit of senior officials of national as well as State banks (ARCIA 1905:300).

It should be noted that the "habitual idleness" of many of the Indians to which he referred was hardly an epidemic of lazy welfare sponging. Remember that hunting as a means of support had been eliminated by the white hide hunters' destruction of the bison; that the environment was ill-suited to farming, and farming was further limited by the absence of markets for produce and by the government's reluctance to properly fund its own programs; and that in the absence of employment opportunities the bulk of the Indian population prior to allotment was left with little alternative other than subsistence on meager government rations.

Further, as will be seen when the results of the 1925 Indian farming survey are presented, the great majority of Indians still farming in 1925 started farming in 1901

and therefore must have learned to farm with "only two or three seasons of experience." Admittedly, few Indians ever farmed on a scale that was competitive in the area's agricultural economy.

Finally, Randlett failed to see the danger that allotment lease and sale posed to the possible future of Indian farming. By 1905, 1,701 of the 3,716 KCA/W allotments were being leased to white tenant farmers. Of the leased allotments, 519 belonged to women, 741 to children, and 441 to men (ARCIA 1905:301). It is apparent that by 1905 the lease policy was being abused. It is even more tragic to note that according to Randlett, lease revenue was the main source of support for the Wichita and affiliated tribes who during reservation times had been nearly self-sufficient by farming (ARCIA 1905:301).

Randlett went on to report that he was pleased with the new regulation giving the agent control over Indian money gained from land sales (ARCIA 1905:301). The agent was thereby authorized to dispense the money in the form of a monthly allowance as he saw fit. This arrangement was not the only paternalistic relationship with which the Indians were involved. The credit system of the nine licensed traders had much the same effect. Many Indians lived on

credit much of the time and were, in fact, quite dependent upon the traders for their survival (ARCIA 1905:301).

Randlett's clerk, Blackmon, replaced him as agent. Blackmon's first report viewed the Indian farming situation of 1906 in largely optimistic terms. According to Blackmon, the KCA/W had enlarged the number of tilled acres and were favored by good weather conditions during the season. He noted that 2,000 of the 3,716 allotments were leased by the time he filed his report (ARCIA 1906:309). These figures indicate that during the previous year 300 additional leases were arranged.

By March, 1906, it was established that the tribal pasture lands were to be sold to white bidders after all of the KCA children born since June 6, 1900, were allotted (ARCIA 1906:309). On December 6, 1906, bidding was opened with \$5/acre as the minimum bid and 160 acres as the largest tract. Most 160 acre tracts went for between \$1,200 and \$1,800 (ARCIA 1907:686).

Little other information is available on the closing years of this decade other than that between August 15, 1908, and June 30, 1909, there were 598 additional allotments leased (ARCIA 1909:95).

Though the available information is far from complete, it appears that following the trauma of allotment and opening, the major obstacles to Indian farmers were drought, lack of farm instruction, inadequate farm tools, and a general shortage of capital. Given the reported scale of farming (20-40 acres) and the 1904 figure of close to 20,000 worked acres, it would appear that over half of the adult male KCA/W were farming. Initially, the Indian scale of farming was not greatly different from that of the first homesteaders and it appears that leasing did not drastically reduce the Indian's farmed acreage, though it did curtail growth. In the following decade, however, as Oklahoma agriculture shifted to a larger scale cash crop basis, the Indians' small acreages proved to be a handicap to those who were inclined to farm.

For 1901-1910, then, the following picture emerges. The KCA/W farming effort continued to be plagued by many of the same obstacles that were present during the reservation period. New hazards took the form of white stock theft and loan sharking. Nevertheless, it appears that a number of Indians were growing feed crops for their stock, gardening, and attempting cotton as a cash crop only on a limited basis. Most families continued to maintain a few horses

and cattle. Indian income was supplemented by per capita payments of approximately \$100/year (ARCIA 1909:91), by allotment leases, and by some field labor. Until 1906, the KCA received approximately \$35/year/person from the leasing of part of their tribal pasture land.

1911-1920

American farmers continued to experience rare prosperity until 1915, when commodity prices started to fall. This decline, however, was only temporary, for in 1916 and the advent of U.S. involvement in World War I, prices again rose. On August 10, 1917, government controls were imposed on farming through the Food Production Act and the Food and Fuel Control Act. The effect of this legislation was to encourage farming, to establish minimum wheat prices, and to control the distribution of food, fuel, feed, fertilizer, and farm machinery (Schlebecker 1975:210). Additional controls were added by the creation of the Food Administration, the Railroad Administration, and the Shipping Board. Through one government agency or another virtually every aspect of farming was controlled during the War. Clearly, production was stimulated and farm prices were held at a relatively high level. However, there is some dispute

over the net results of such thorough government control. Would farmers have fared better if foreign and domestic buyers had had to compete for their produce? One obvious side effect of government stimulation of farming during the war years was that following the war with the reduction of the foreign market, American farmers were overextended, producing too much for the domestic market to absorb and commodity prices fell steadily.

During the war when farm labor was in even shorter supply than usual, machines were required as substitutes for human laborers. Great advances in farm technology were made during this time. The tractor became commonplace, and major improvements in implements and seed varieties were introduced. Improved wheat varieties based on Russian and Turkish wheat strains allowed the wheatlands to increase by 27 million acres between 1914-1919. With the spread of Spring Wheat on the Northern Plains and Winter Wheat on the Southern Plains, the well known Plains wheat harvest cycle came into being (Schlebecker 1975:265). During the war, wheat farmers made enormous profits. With the spread of dependable feed crops (viz. sorghum, milo, Kaffir, and broom corn) areas ill-suited to food crops could be utilized to support the cattle industry (Schlebecker 1975:267).

Following the war, however, with the loss of their lucrative foreign market, American farmers entered a period of economic distress that was not alleviated until 1941 and the Second World War.

In the 1911-1920 period Oklahoma shared in much of the farming prosperity but still was faced with several problems: the poor quality of farm to market roads, the slow construction of railroad networks, inadequate farm machinery, and the deterioration of land caused by the poor farming methods of the droves of tenant farmers.

The available information on Indian farming for this period is limited to the statistics found in the Annual Reports to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and to a 1915 Kiowa farmers survey. The statistical data is presented in Tables 5 through 9.

From the Population Table it appears that KCA/W population grew steadily between 1911 and 1920, and that houses gradually were replacing tents as family living quarters.

Table 6 shows the various sources of Indian income for the period.

Just as 1915 was a depressed year for American farmers, it was a meager year for the KCA/W. Prior to 1915,

Table 5
KCA/W Statistics - ARCIA 1911 - 1920¹
Population²

Year	Pop.	Births	Deaths	Families	Houses	Tents
1911	4,081	234	93	1,300	700	600
1912	4,174	---	---	---	---	---
1913	---	---	---	---	---	---
1914	4,369	183	151	1,612	1,062	550
1915	4,410	222	163	1,518	1,214	304
1916	4,514	190	114	1,654	1,323	331
1917	4,554	189	140	1,162	1,012	150
1918	4,583	210	178	1,200	1,100	100
1919	4,574	186	202	1,200	1,100	100
1920	4,631	---	---	---	---	---

¹For fiscal years ending on June 30 of the year cited.

²All figures are for the combined KCA/W listed under Oklahoma and the Kiowa Superintendency.

Table 6

Income (\$)

Year	Crops Value	Average Per Capita Income ¹	Wages	Land Leases	Land Sales
1911	67,000	374.03	18,704	329,525	599,642
1912	41,000	271.21	20,083	186,380	338,841
1913	---	---	---	---	---
1914	35,500	207.46	21,150	369,276	85,736
1915	15,170	107.15	24,246	365,000	61,749
1916	23,600	111.21	21,449	402,500	46,513
1917	305,240	203.69	22,773	507,098	80,577
1918	293,600	211.90	26,128	567,096	72,187
1919	204,850	230.52	24,320	610,000	205,041
1920	208,871	267.93	17,420	610,000	396,967

¹Calculated from ARCIA statistics (Tot. Income - Trust Interest ÷ Pop. = Per Capita Income).

Table 6 (continued)

Year	Misc.	Per Capita Payments	Rations and Issues	Trust Interest	Total
1911	17	509,276	2,235	168,792	1,695,191
1912	84	545,568	81	171,092	1,303,129
1913	---	---	---	---	---
1914	7,329	387,394		166,018	1,072,403
1915	6,351			157,827	630,343
1916	7,952			150,978	652,992
1917	11,931			140,056	1,067,675
1918	12,126			126,160	1,097,297
1919	10,175			110,810	1,165,196
1920	7,452			109,665	1,350,465

Table 7
Employment¹

Year	Regular	Irregular	Total No.	Total Wages
1911	40	19	59	18,704
1912				20,083
1913				
1914	75	11	86	21,150
1915	85	58	143	24,246
1916				21,449
1917	46	135	181	22,773
1918	53	16	69	26,128
1919	50	25	75	24,320
1920	37	25	62	17,420

¹No Indians employed by anyone other than the government.

Table 8
KCA/W Land Sales

Year	No. of Tracts	Acres	Price	\$/Acre Avg.
March, 1907- June, 1909	40	5,386	118,619	22.02
1911	73	8,113	189,934	22.17
1912	43	3,968	96,283	24.26
1913				
1914				
1915	1	155	3,255	21.00
1916	4	188	7,396	39.34
1917	60	7,181	165,241	23.01
1918	36	3,924	108,216	27.58
1919	35	5,021	141,044	28.09
1920	65	7,586	278,586	36.72

Table 9
Farming and Stockraising

Year	Allotted Indian Land	Acres Cultivated By Indians	Indian Farmers	Acres Grazed by Indian Stock	Indian Stockmen	No. of Leases	No. of Leased Allot- ments	Leased Acres	Annual Rent
1911	700,520	16,000	821(823) ²	82,000	187	3,641	3,641	598,280	329,535
1912	642,421	20,000	1,000(852) ²	82,000	185	3,343	3,343	528,000	186,380
1913		20,350	1,003						
1914	641,901	20,480	1,003(857) ²	82,000	185				369,276
1915	641,746 ¹	20,480	1,003(1,024) ²			4,000	3,800	621,901	365,000
1916	641,558 ¹	20,000	1,000(1,017) ²		525	4,000	3,800	621,901	402,500
1917	634,377 ¹	40,822	1,002(1,002) ²	6,711	428	3,990	3,600	594,368	507,098
1918	630,453 ¹	40,822	1,200(982) ²						567,096
1919	625,432 ¹	40,822	1,200(951) ²	6,711	500	4,047	3,600	594,368	610,000
1920	617,846 ¹	9,600	925(1,061) ²	37,933	756	4,047	3,600	594,368	610,000

¹Estimates calculated from ARCIA statistics (Previous Year's Allotted Land - Current Year's Land Sales = Current Year's Allotted Land).

²Able bodied adult males as reported in ARCIA.

the chief sources of income were per capita payments, land sales, and leases. From 1917 through 1920, farm produce made a significant contribution to Indian income, though even during this period of agricultural prosperity land leases and sales accounted for two-thirds of the total KCA/W income. Note that per capita payments stopped in 1914.

Wage labor was of little import throughout the period. According to official statistics (ARCIA 1911-1920), the government was the sole Indian employer. Even a quick glance at Table 7 is enough to see that wages earned per year per regular employee never amounted to more than \$500 in the best of years.

Approximately 83,000 acres of allotted land were sold by the Indians between 1911 and 1920. As can be seen from Table 8, the average price per acre fluctuated between \$21.00 and \$39.34. The agency policy was to solicit bids on all land up for sale. Usually a minimum bid price per acre was established. One can imagine that rather low bids frequently were accepted.

It would appear from Table 9 that prior to 1917, about 20 acres per farmer was the average. During the war years the total acres cultivated were 40,822 or roughly 40

acres per farmer. Then in 1920, the KCA/W tilled only 9,600 acres for an average of about 10 acres per farmer. The overall contours of these figures are correct, though the figures themselves are misleading. When the number of Indian farmers is compared with the number of able-bodied adult males and then compared with the number of families for each year (Table 5), certain logical improbabilities present themselves. It seems most likely that gardeners (some of them women) and large gardens (of several acres) were being included in the tallies. Probably no more than a third of the farms contained 20 or more worked acres and only half of this number had more than 40 worked acres. Correspondingly, the number of farmers likely could be cut to a third of the reported figure. The 1915 Kiowa Farmers Survey supports this interpretation and scaling down of the reported figures.

The number of Indian farmers during the war years did, in fact, increase, as did the scale of farming. With the collapse of the foreign market in 1920, commodity prices fell and Indian farming declined once more. Throughout this period not a single KCA/W farmer had a tractor.

The reported figures for Indian grazing land and stockmen (Table 9) fluctuate greatly and at times make

little sense. In 1915, for example, there were no stockmen, though the following year they numbered 525. In 1919, 500 Indian stockmen grazed their herds on 6,711 acres, or 13 acres per stockman. In 1911-1914, Indian stockmen numbered only 185-187 and used 82,000 acres, while in 1917-1919, Indian stockmen numbered 428-500 and used only 6,711 acres. In the absence of further information, an accurate interpretation of this data is not possible.

It would also appear from Table 9 that at least during the 1911-1920 period most of the KCA/W allotments were leased whole or in part. Consistent with our picture of increased Indian farming during the prosperous war years, some 200 fewer allotments were leased between 1917 and 1920.

The Kiowa farmers file of the Indian Archives Division at the Oklahoma Historical Society contains the 1915 Kiowa Farmers' Survey covering the 1914 season. From this survey comes the following information (Table 10). Of the 64 Kiowa farmers included, all had a few horses or mules though only half had cattle. Of those with cattle, only six had more than ten head. About half the farms had swine and, in general, swine outnumbered cattle. Commonly, fowl were present in good numbers with some farms having more than 100. Almost all farmers reported having gardens.

Table 10
1915 Kiowa Farmers' Survey¹

Farmer	Age	Horses and Mules	Cattle and Cows	Swine	Fowl	Garden	Wagons	Plows and Listers	Other Im- plements	Corn Acres	Corn Bushels	Oat Acres	Oat Bushels	Wheat Acres	Wheat Bushels	Tons Hay
1	36	4	5	12	<u>284</u>	+	1	2	2	19	171					18
2	30	4		2	<u>5</u>	+			1	10		<u>60</u>				
3	67	4				+	1			1	5					
4	23	2		25	190	+	1		1	45	<u>900</u>					3
5	34	1				+		1								
6	56	8		5		+	2	2	7	15	50					
7	30	11	3	14	70	+	1	2	3	30	200					2
8 ²	35	6	6	13	36	+	1	<u>6</u>	6	80	500					5
9	54	2			2	+		<u>1</u>	1							
10	29	8	4		4	+			3	20	100					7
11	20	4	3	6			1		5	80	500					7
12	21	2		2					1	20						12
13	53	15	28	12	40	+	1	2	2	60	<u>900</u>					<u>900</u>
14 ³	41	4		6	46	+	1	1	7	50	<u>600</u>					<u>7</u>
15	20	6		2				2		15	200					4
16	32	1		11	13	+		1	1							
17	57	4			17	+	1	2	2	40	300					
18	24	4	1	2	50	+	1		1							
19	38	4			38	+	1	2	7	5	50					

Table 10 (continued)

Famer	Age	Horses and Mules	Cattle and Cows	Swine	Fowl	Garden	Wagons	Plows and Listers	Other Im- plements	Corn Acres	Corn Bushels	Oat Acres	Oat Bushels	Wheat Acres	Wheat Bushels	Tons Hay
20	37	4			16	+	1	1		20						6
21	36	5				+	1	2	5	40	360					
22	30	5	2		20		1	1	3	20	200					
23		10	10	22	22		1	1	6	40	200					
24	41	3		2		+	1	2	7	22	550					9
25	72	3	19	20	34	+			4							5
26	42															
27	45	2				+	1		3	18	50					4
28	19	6			3		1	1	5	20	150					
29	53	3			10	+	1	1	1	8	80					
30	24	3		11	114	+	1	1	3	30	300	8	364			4
31	47	7	22	5	20	+	1	2	4			8				104
32	67	<u>39</u>	<u>67</u>	15	25	+	1	2	<u>12</u>	<u>116</u>		8				302
33	34	2					1	1	<u>1</u>	<u>12</u>	100			17	170	
34	43															
35	54				3	+		2	4	15	200					4
36	33	3	3	26	54	+	1	1	7	20	50			8	80	6
37	54	2				+	1	3	7	20	50	10	150	28	<u>605</u>	10
38	27	6			24	+	1	3	4	6	60			17	<u>170</u>	3
39	4				13	+	1	2								4
40	53	2			53	+	1	2	2		166					13

Table 10 (continued)

	Farmer	Age	Horses and Mules	Cattle and Cows	Swine	Fowl	Garden	Wagons	Plows and Listers	Other Im- plements	Corn Acres	Corn Bushels	Oat Acres	Oat Bushels	Wheat Acres	Wheat Bushels	Tons Hay
41	25	4				40	+	1	1	5	20						7
42	40	11		12	3	35	+	2	2	11	10	100	10	300	26	600	
43	58	8		2	8	20	+		2	2	30	250					5
44	27	2					+		1	3	10	75					4
45	23																
46	48	2															
47	44	2		1			+	1	3	3	50	500	5	200			3
48	21	6			1						20	100					
49	30	2			2	50	+	1	2	5			20	<u>800</u>	<u>40</u>		1
50	66	4				15	+	1	1	5	10	168					3
51	33	2					+	1	1	1	58						
52	58	2					+	1	3	7							
53	50	2						1									
54	43	8		4		102	+	1	2	5	27	300	12	200			8
55	21	4		2		11	+	1	1	1	22	300					5
56	<u>77</u>	2					+	1	1	2							
57	<u>29</u>	2					+		1	1	20	120					3
58	55	2				12	+	1		1	30	600	5				5
59	22	1					+	1	3	3							
60	45	5					+	1	1	3					10		
61	50	2				5	+	1		1	8	105					2

Table 10 (continued)

Farmer	Age	Horses and Mules	Cattle and Cows	Swine	Fowl	Garden	Wagons	Plows and Listers	Other Im- plements	Corn Acres	Corn Bushels	Oat Acres	Oat Bushels	Wheat Acres	Wheat Bushels	Tons Hay
62	28	11	12	<u>29</u>		+	2	1	4	20	125	5	90	20	195	7
63	34	2							2	10						
64	17	1							2							

¹From Kiowa farmer's file, Indian Archives, Oklahoma Historical Society (crop figures are for 1914).

²Farmer No. 8 also had 20 acres in cotton yielding 9 bales.

³Farmer No. 14 also had 32 acres in cotton yielding 16 bales.

The farm implement situation appears to have been quite limited with most farmers having only a couple of implements. Several farmers were forced to borrow plows and other tools from their neighbors. The acres in corn ranged from 1 to 116 among the 45 farms reporting corn, with the average at 28 acres. Only 11 farms had oat acreage, with their average at 14 acres. Fewer still had wheat acreage. Only 8 of the 64 farms reported wheat, and their average was 21 acres. Unfortunately, the survey did not directly inquire as to acres in cotton. Only 16 of the farmers had any savings, and their average was \$427.

In general, it appears that of the 64 Kiowa farmers covered in the survey, only between one-third and one-half had enough stock or were farming enough acres that they could be considered successful subsistence farmers. The shortage of implements and working capital as well as the limited number of acres devoted to crops other than corn are indications of the underdeveloped status of Indian farming during this period. Though corn was a dependable crop in the area, the market value was minimal.

The survey covers only the Kiowa farmers and the 1914 season; however, the results are indicative of the overall KCA/W farming situation before World War I. Clearly,

the wartime conditions and prices gave some incentives to farming and there was in fact an increase in both farmed acres and farmers and a corresponding decline in leased allotment acreage. These conditions, however, lasted only as long as the wartime market did. In 1902, as soon as the farm economy became depressed, Indian farming rapidly lost ground and fell far below the pre-war level. By 1920, the old obstacles of limited capital, implements, and know-how caught up with most of the KCA/W farmers. After the war, cash crop farming required a sizable acreage in wheat or cotton and expensive farm machinery. Without access to working capital, the majority of Indian farmers were doomed.

1921-1934

In the 1920s and 1930s, American farmers paid for the prosperity of the "Golden Age" and the war years. The deadly crossfire between rising production costs, production scale, and production efficiency and falling commodity prices and a shrinking market had several effects. First, the average farm acreage continued to rise from 148 acres in 1920 to 174 acres by 1940 (Schlebecker 1975:207). Second, the percent of farmers in the national work force fell from 27% in 1920 to 17.6% by 1940 (Schlebecker 1975:224). And thirdly,

mechanization of farm work proceeded rapidly. There were 158,000 tractors in operation in 1919, while their number reached 1,445,000 by 1939 (Schlebecker 1975:223). Self-defeating overproduction was furthered by improved seed varieties. In 1926, for example, hybrid corn had more than doubled the previous yield in those areas where it was used (Schlebecker 1975:264).

The government removed all of its controls on agriculture after the war, and it was hoped that prices eventually would stabilize at a favorable level. When this manifestly did not happen, the government intervened. In 1928, the Agricultural Marketing Act was passed creating the Federal Farm Board. The plan was to stimulate voluntary cooperation among the farmers by making loans to assist the establishment of farm co-ops and stabilization corporations (Schlebecker 1975:236-237). This effort at market control failed, and the Federal Farm Board was dissolved in 1933 with losses of \$184,000,000. In the same year, the first Agricultural Adjustment Act was passed. It sought a solution by reducing production. The problems of this program and its effect upon the Indian farmers will be treated in the next chapter. It is enough to note here that the farm

depression was not significantly alleviated until 1941 and the return to wartime commodity market conditions.

For the 1920s, the only source of information on KCA/W farming is the 1925 U.S. Agricultural Census found in the Indian Archives Division of the Oklahoma Historical Society. Only 178 Indians are contained in the survey, and most of the entries are from Comanche County. The survey certainly is incomplete, and most entries probably are Comanche, though tribal designations are lacking.

The great majority of the farmers reporting began farming in 1901. Only four Indian farmers who had started prior to allotment were still farming by 1925. Most of the farmers owned exactly 160 acres, though a good number owned between 50 and 100 acres. Few farmers owned less than 50 acres, and fewer still owned more than 160 acres. Of the farmers in the survey, only eight rented farm land, and all of these rented 160 acres or less. But a fraction of the land owned or rented was under cultivation. The average farmed acreage, excluding pasture, was less than 40 acres (23 farmers used 1-20 acres; 27 used 21-40 acres; 41 used 41-80 acres). Only nine farmers had more than 80 acres under cultivation, and only one of these used more than 120 acres.

Not one farmer owned or had access to a tractor.

It can well be imagined that horse drawn machinery, even in its most sophisticated form, would limit the number of acres that could be farmed by a single family. Only eight of 178 farmers reported any farm debts (one owed \$600; one owed \$200; one owed \$150; five owed \$100 or less). The first response to this information is likely to be congratulatory. Though the Indian farmers were operating on a painfully small scale, at least they were not deeply in debt. Upon further consideration, however, another thought arises. Indian farmers were limited by the small number of tillable acres they owned, by lack of modern mechanized implements (tractors, etc.), and by lack of capital. The smallness of their farm debt indicates their inability to get much needed loans rather than their ability to remain solvent. Several of the farmers interviewed bore out this conclusion.

The following list of Indian crops and the total number of acres for each is compiled from the 1925 survey:

Sorghum	1,066 acres
Oats	889
Cotton	790
Wheat	650

Corn	331
Barley and rye	25

Indian farmers usually cultivated a combination of feed and cash crops. The feed crops went to maintain their draft animals and the small number of cattle, milk cows, swine, and chickens that they raised for their own consumption. All farmers had several horses or mules, and half had a few cattle or milk cows. A third had swine and three-quarters had chickens and/or turkeys.

A typical pattern for successful small scale Indian subsistence farming can be pieced together from the survey. This pattern includes 40-80 cultivated acres, part in cash crops (wheat or cotton), part in feed crops (sorghum, alfalfa, milo, and Kaffir) and/or part in corn or oats which can be sold or used as feed; 6-10 horses or mules for traction; a few cattle and dairy cows; and 20-30 chickens. The number of acres in cash crops in a few cases were traded off for additional cattle and acres in feed crops. Only 43 of the 178 Indian farmers covered in the survey roughly conform to this pattern. None were farming or ranching on a scale that would allow expansion or real participation in the commodity market economy.

From the figures reported in A Socioeconomic Atlas of Oklahoma (Burril 1936) for Caddo, Comanche, Cotton, and Kiowa Counties (1929-1935), the following conclusions can be drawn. The four county area, which includes virtually all KCA/W allotments, experienced a general decline in the number of farms of 5-10%. The average farm size increased in the five years between 1930 and 1935 as follows: Caddo County, from 130 to 143 acres; Comanche County, From 195 to 198 acres; Cotton County, from 186 to 194 acres; and Kiowa County, from 171 to 205 acres. Cotton was clearly the dominant crop and was followed by wheat. Corn was third by acreage and during this period it was reduced by half. Cotton also lost acreage though it remained very much in the lead. Wheat acreage showed the greatest stability during 1930-1935. The number of farm owners increased, and the number of tenant farmers greatly declined, though by 1935 tenants still outnumbered owners two to one.

The Burril Atlas also offers a county by county breakdown by race for 1935 which is summarized in Tables 11 and 12. The category of "Colored Farm Owners" for Caddo, Comanche, Cotton, and Kiowa Counties undoubtedly includes some black farm owners. Of the total of 313 "Colored Farm Owners," however, it seems likely that one-half to

Table 11
1935 "Colored" Farm Owner Statistics for
Caddo, Comanche, Cotton,
and Kiowa Counties

	Caddo	Comanche	Cotton	Kiowa
"Colored Farmers"	193	77	30	13
Acres Owned	12,091 Avg. 63	7,994 Avg. 104	4,326 Avg. 144	1,347 Avg. 104
Acres Harvested	3,616 Avg. 19	1,753 Avg. 23	1,358 Avg. 45	282 Avg. 22
Value of Farm	524,590 Avg. 2,718	197,350 Avg. 2,563	139,500 Avg. 4,650	42,600 Avg. 3,277

Table 12

1934 Farm/Farmer Averages for Caddo, Comanche,
Cotton, and Kiowa Counties

	No. of Farms ¹	Average No. of Acres ¹	Average No. of Harvested Acres ²
"Colored Owners"	313	82.29	22.39
"Colored Tenants"	227	100.27	37.58
"White Owners"	3,482	160.97	66.11
"White Tenants"	8,215	152.02	68.54

¹The figures for number of operators and number of acres used are for 1935.

²The figures for number of harvested acres are for the 1934 harvest.

two-thirds were KCA/W farmers. In any event, the figures are enlightening as to the condition of Indian farming in 1935. The average number of acres owned was 82.29, and the average number of acres harvested was 22.39. It is clear that Indian farmers suffered a major setback in the 1930s consistent with the plight of all small scale farmers during the farm depression and "dust bowl" period.

It is interesting to compare averages for "Colored Owners" with those for "Colored Tenant Farmers," "White Owners," and "White Tenant Farmers" for the same counties and the same year (Table 12). That Indian farming had declined well below its 1925 level is not surprising, nor is it surprising that in 1935 the neighboring white farm owners owned twice the acreage and harvested three times the number of acres. What is startling and appalling is that black tenant farmers also were farming and harvesting on a scale that averaged well above the Indian farm owners. Here it is assumed that the "Colored Tenant Farmers" were nearly all blacks. There is certainly no reason to believe that Indian farmers suddenly began renting land to farm after the 1925 survey.

It is quite clear that Indian farming had been reduced to a pitiful scale, largely due to the inaccessibility

of working capital. After 1919, banks were loath to loan Indian farmers money unless they put their land up as collateral. The KCA/W had suffered terribly at the hands of loan sharks and bank officials during the early post-allotment years, and farming was too uncertain to risk losing the means of even the marginal subsistence that their land afforded them.

The result was that the KCA/W farmers were forced to operate within a deteriorating marginal farming system. Indian farmers were limited by the number of acres they had been allotted or had inherited. As mentioned previously, nearly all allotments contained a certain amount of agriculturally useless land. The scale of Indian farming was further limited by the horse or mule drawn machinery and the requirements of feed for the stock. Without sizable acreage in cash crops, there was no way to accumulate working capital to keep up with the technological innovations and the demand for even larger cash crop acreages.

In other words, the KCA/W farmers, and any other small scale subsistence farmers for that matter, were locked into a simple struggle for subsistence survival. Without working capital, there was no way to expand, mechanize, and compete in the commodity market economy.

Gradually, as subsistence became more and more uncertain, many Indian farmers began leasing most of their land, keeping just enough for a house, a garden, and a few acres of feed for their horses and a handful of cattle and swine. With the income they could gain by doing wage labor on neighboring white farms, as well as the lease money and what they raised themselves, many former Indian farmers were able to put together a better existence than they had experienced previously.

Conclusions

From 1887-1934, concern with allotment and Indian assimilation dominated federal policy in Indian Affairs. Following allotment, individual families were to be allowed to "sink or swim" according to the effort they invested in supporting themselves. The federal government was little concerned with whether the Indians had adequate training, land, or implements to realize this goal. Emphasis was placed on right effort rather than realistic opportunity.

The General Allotment Act was amended in 1902 to permit the sale of inherited allotment land and the allotments of the non-competent. With this measure, the sales of allotted lands increased rapidly. The amendment made a mockery of the 25-year trust status of all allotted lands

which was originally provided for in the General Allotment Act. Land sales were much accelerated during 1913-1920 by the ill-advised policy of Commissioner Cato Sells who urged fee patents upon the Indians and for several years actually forced fee patents upon them.

After Commissioner Sells was replaced, fee patenting declined until 1934, when Indian land policies were revised.

Public concern over the plight of the Indians was once again stirred in the 1920s and resulted in the Meriam investigation of 1926-1928. With the appointment of John Collier as Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1933, a major attempt was made to implement many of the findings and suggestions of the Meriam Report and to reverse the course of Indian policy since passage of the Dawes Act. Though the innovative and progressive Indian Reorganization Act was passed in 1934, its implementation met with great opposition in Congress and was further undercut by the economic effects of the Depression and the Second World War.

The national farm economy enjoyed rare prosperity between 1898 and 1914 and again during the war years, 1916-1919. By 1920, however, many of the conditions and developments which had contributed to this prosperity, when combined with the shrinking foreign market for commodities

after the war, helped produce the farmer's depression which lasted until 1941 and the outbreak of another world war. Throughout the period, 1901-1934, American agriculture shifted away from subsistence farming toward efficient agribusiness. Production efficiency was greatly improved by better varieties of seed, by mechanization, and by enlarged farm scale. Capital investment was key, and with the stressful conditions of the Depression, small scale farmers were forced out of existence by their own limitations.

Since Oklahoma (Indian Territory) was not opened for white settlement and economic development until 1889-1906, it lagged somewhat behind the national trends in agriculture during the early part of the 20th Century. Initially, the state was hampered by the slow expansion of the railroad and the farm-to-market road system. Since homesteading had occurred so recently, the scale of farming was limited at first, as was the level of technology employed on most farms. From the start farm tenancy posed a great problem for the growth of Oklahoma agriculture.

In the early years prior to the war small scale subsistence farming and stock raising dominated the scene in Western Oklahoma. At this time the major crops were corn and feed crops with some wheat and cotton cash crops. As

Western Oklahoma agriculture developed, the scale was gradually increased, farms became more mechanized, and cotton and wheat became dominant. Corn rapidly lost ground. The number of tenant farmers in the 1920s and 1930s rapidly declined, though by 1935 the KCA/W area still had twice as many tenants as owners farming.

The KCA/W were initially traumatized by the opening of their reservation to white settlement and Indian farming suffered. In the early years following allotment many Indians lived in group camps along the creeks. Between 1901 and 1910 many Indians appear to have been engaged in farming on a limited basis. As the number of leases and land sales increased, the number of KCA/W farmers decreased, though the number of acres farmed increased slightly.

Over three-fourths of the allotted land was leased to white farmers by 1911-1920. Indian interest in farming was stimulated by the wartime commodity prices, but with 1920 and the onset of the farm depression, the total acreage farmed by Indians fell to one-half of the pre-war total. During 1911-1920, though Indian farmers were handicapped by limited working capital, their farm size and horsedrawn implements probably put them on a par with half of their white neighbors.

The Indians' land base continued to be eroded by allotment sale and fractional inheritance between 1921 and 1934. During the farm depression, the Indian farmers lacked the working capital necessary to purchase additional land and more efficient farm machinery. They probably numbered no more than 150 to 200 by 1934 and no more than 50 of those were economically surviving as subsistence farmers.

Not just Indians but all small scale subsistence farmers suffered after the war due to the mechanization/land scale take off and their own inability to generate working capital with the limited means available to them. In the KCA/W area in 1934, however, Indian farmers operated at a level averaging even below that of the neighboring black sharecroppers. As subsistence farming became more and more uncertain, Indian farmers quit farming in favor of leasing their land and doing wage labor on nearby farms.

Land leasing began among the KCA/W in 1890 when white farmers were allowed on the reservation to work 160 acres on a sharecropping basis for some aged or handicapped Indians (Pennington 1972:233). By 1894, the policy only required "inability" of Indians. In 1897, even the word "inability" was dropped, though it was replaced in 1900 (ARCIA 1900:13; Pennington 1972:340). From 1901 onward, any Indian could

lease his allotment, though initially able bodied men could lease only three-fourths of their allotment in return for one-third of the crop.

Leasing involved the Indians in paternalistic relationships with both their white "lease men" and the local agent. Most Indians were dependent upon their "lease men" for small advances on the next year's lease money to scrape by through especially hard times or occasional emergencies. In so doing, however, they committed themselves to a largely unnegotiable lease renewal. The Indians also were dependent upon the area office of the B.I.A. The local agent appraised the land, set the conditions of the contract, collected the lease money, and distributed it. Throughout the process, the Indian land owner remained a dependent spectator and gained no practical experience in handling his own financial affairs. The Indian land owners were in both cases locked into dependent relationships which severely limited the options open to them.

In view of the uncertainties of subsistence farming in Western Oklahoma, allotment leasing certainly can be understood. It reached epidemic proportions rapidly, however, and by 1911, over three-fourths of the allotments were leased. Leases yielded an important source of survival

income to a population with few alternatives, but that was all that they offered. If Indian farmers had had adequate instruction, implements, and seed shortly after allotment, individual families with multiple adjacent allotments would have been in a position to capitalize on the period of wartime farm prosperity and possibly could have launched themselves into the competitive cash crop agribusiness system. Without adequate training and capital, Indian farmers were forced to lease their land or struggle for existence as small scale subsistence farmers.

The major alternative sources of subsistence for the 1901-1934 period were:

- (1) allotment leases;
- (2) land sales;
- (3) per capita payments, up to 1914;
- (4) wages from farm labor or government jobs;
- (5) subsistence farming;
- (6) a combination of the above.

This last alternative, a combination of selective partial leasing, sale of inherited land, wage labor, and limited farming, was in fact the option that offered the greatest rewards during this period. Those who lived off their lease money and meager wages found it worthwhile to

put in large gardens and raise chickens and, if they could afford them, a few cattle. Most of those who attempted to farm gradually discovered that by leasing most of their land, doing farm labor, and continuing to grow enough feed for their stock and garden produce for their family, they could improve their condition somewhat.

CHAPTER 5

INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT AND AFTER, 1934-1974

Federal Indian Policy

The Wheeler-Howard Indian Reorganization Act was passed in 1934 and was largely a response to the findings of the Meriam Report. Under provisions of the Act, allotment was halted, "surplus" reservation lands were restored to tribes, and additional land was purchased for tribal use. The Act also called for the formation of tribal organizations and corporations and the establishment of a revolving loan fund to stimulate tribal business enterprises (Officer 1971:43).

Under John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs between 1933 and 1946, the attempt was made to implement the Indian Reorganization Act and to initiate a "New Deal" for the Indians. Due to the economic problems of the Depression and the Second World War, however, Collier found money in short supply, and there was little Congressional or

departmental enthusiasm for his programs. Even the Indians were divided on many of his proposals. As a result, the Indian Reorganization Act accomplished little in the way of changing the living conditions of most Indians.

The Indian Claims Commission Act, which allowed tribes to bring suit against the federal government for treaty violations and loss of tribal lands, was passed in 1946. In many cases the cash settlements were large, though legal fees reduced the usable portion of the settlements.

Two other important events closely followed the Indian Claims Commission Act. These were the introduction of a bill calling for termination of the "special status" of Indians and the commencement of the Bureau of Indian Affairs' Indian Relocation Program. Under termination, the legal assimilation of the Indians would have been complete, and the reservations and the B.I.A. would have been scrapped. Predictably, this proposal met with vocal opposition from most Indians. The pilot relocation program involved the vocational training and job placement of Hopi and Navajo off-reservation in major cities. Because the introduction of termination and relocation were simultaneous, many Indians perceived them as connected, though they were not, and therefore they rejected both programs (Officer 1971:47).

The push for termination peaked in 1953 but failed to pass in Congress and thereafter lost support. It eventually resulted in a voluntary termination policy that was adopted in 1958. The B.I.A. continued to push vocational training and relocation during the 1950s and 1960s, though the program met with limited success. In the 1960s, the B.I.A. began decentralizing its programs, and the government began subcontracting programs and encouraging state and local agencies to accept more responsibility for the Indians. There is some justification in calling this "decentralized reorganization" simply another guise for gradual termination.

Besides vocational training and relocation, housing and tribal business programs were pushed in the 1960s and 1970s. Since the 1940s, however, the government made no attempt to develop Indian farming.

Developments in Agriculture, 1933-1974

The Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) was first passed in 1933. It called for the voluntary reduction of certain key crops because overproduction was resulting in extremely low prices. The key crops included wheat, cotton, and corn, among others. Under the AAA program, the government rented farmland that had been in these crops and, in

effect, paid the farmers not to produce. Rye, barley, grain sorghum, and peanuts were added to the list of restricted crops in 1934 and 1935 (Schlebecker 1975:238).

A program of "non-recourse loans" under the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) was initiated in the fall of 1933 to accomplish the same goal as the AAA. Under the CCC, the government loaned the farmers 60-70% of parity on their crops. If the commodity price rose above parity at harvest time, the farmers repaid the loan and sold their crops. If the price fell below parity, the farmer kept the amount loaned and the government confiscated the harvest and in effect bought it for the amount loaned. Parity was the established unit price for the various crops based upon their average market value in 1910-1914 (Schlebecker 1975:239).

The AAA and CCC programs did serve to reduce production and stabilize prices somewhat, and it did put some money into the farmers' hands which enabled them to survive marginally during the economic hard times of the 1930s. The programs, however, fell far short of their intended goals. Though the farmers initially cooperated with the AAA, the drought of 1934 helped raise commodity prices, and there was widespread cheating on the program. Some farmers began growing and selling crops that they had been paid not to produce.

Though the AAA and CCC helped the farm situation, even the 1929 price level was not regained until 1941 and the outbreak of war, and 1929 had been a depression year for farmers (Schlebecker 1975:239-240).

The AAA and CCC were declared unconstitutional in 1936, and a hasty stopgap measure called the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act was passed to replace them. The new Act was simply a rewording of its predecessors with additional money offered for soil conservation projects.

A new Agricultural Adjustment Act was passed in 1938. Under this program, the government estimated the crop acreage needed to meet the market demand. This acreage was then distributed to states, counties, and individual farmers on the basis of past production. Farmers were paid to keep within their crop allotments.

From 1933 through 1940, the AAA succeeded in reducing crop acreage but production continued to increase due to the rise in bushel per acre yields from technological improvements, especially mechanization. As a result, commodity prices continued to decline and fell 25% between 1938 and 1940 (Schlebecker 1975:243). The AAA simply kept the farmers' situation from deteriorating even further than it did. The major failure of the AAA was that it contributed

to the process whereby the small scale farmers were economically forced out of existence as farm scale and mechanization continued to increase. The larger the farm size and cash crop acreage, the more support that was received from the government. Yet it was the size of the harvested cash crop acreage that really counted. Without government support, all farmers would have suffered grievously. As it was, the small farmers were left to feel the real weight of the hard times. By the mid-1930s they could afford to plant only a few acres. This acreage was then greatly reduced by the government and they were only partially compensated. Expensive technological innovations gave the large scale farmers even greater bushel per acre yields. The small scale farmers, with their horse drawn implements and small cash crop acreages, were forced out of business.

With World War II, commodity prices rose, and the foreign and domestic markets increased so that once again American farmers experienced prosperity. Wartime governmental controls were re-established in 1940 under the Office of Agricultural Defense Relations in the Department of Agriculture. Prices were controlled, parity was guaranteed, and maximum production was encouraged (Schlebecker 1975: 213). After the U.S. declared war on December 7, 1941, the

armed forces began buying farm commodities in vast quantities. During the war, the farmers couldn't produce enough to keep up with the market demands, even though 50% more food was being produced per year than during the First World War. With less land under cultivation and 10% fewer workers, American farmers were able to compensate through the increased efficiency provided by costly technological improvements. Those farmers not wiped out by the depression of the 1930s and who could afford advanced farm technology were able to recover and make substantial gains during the war years. With the wartime stimuli to farm production, land scale and mechanization also made significant advances.

	<u>Tractors</u>	<u>Farm Size</u>	<u>Farms</u>
1940	1,567,000	173.99 acres	6,350,000
1945	2,354,000	199.96 acres	5,967,000

The above figures from Schlebecker (1975:207 and 251) illustrate this trend. The areas producing corn and wheat, including Oklahoma, led in mechanization and farm scale.

It was the large scale farmers who suffered least and were best able to survive during the 1930s. It was again the large scale farmers who could produce the most and profit the most during the war and thus gain the capital

needed to keep pace with the expensive advances in farm technology. The small scale farmers who survived the depression enjoyed a brief respite during the war, but few were able to afford additional acres and mechanized farm equipment. After the war they continued to lose ground and to founder economically.

After the Second World War, American farmers again were producing more than the market demanded and commodity food prices fell. The problems of the farm economy since the war, however, have been more than the result of simple overproduction. The situation presents an admittedly complex and confusing picture.

Following the war, farm production gradually declined and market demands shifted away from wheat and dairy products toward meat and potatoes (Schlebecker 1975:279 and 289). The Marshall Plan, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and federal price supports all served to cushion the post-war letdown for the farmers and put surplus commodities to use. Nevertheless, in 1949-1950, the farmers experienced a brief recession. The Korean War (1950-1953), however, once again restored a favorable commodity market situation.

The farmers suffered as prices fell after the Korean War. The "flexible" price supports of 1954 and the Soil Bank programs of 1956-1958 had little effect upon the failing farm economy. In the late 1950s, export sales increased, and an overall export boom was experienced in the 1960s (Schlebecker 1975:287).

After the Second World War farm mechanization and farm scale continued to increase, while the number of farms and farmers declined and the elimination of small scale farmers was accelerated. In 1945, there were 2,354,000 tractors in use on American farms. By 1965, the number reached 4,625,000 (Schlebecker 1975:279). After 1946 most wheat was harvested by combine.

Some wheat farmers owned their own combines, but most hired combines and crews. Since most wheat in a given area was ready for harvest at much the same time, those with the biggest wheat acreages had their crops combined first, while those with smaller wheat acreages waited their turn. On the Southern Plains, with its notorious thunderstorms accompanied by damaging wind, rain, and hail, the timing of the wheat harvest was frequently quite critical. A matter of a day or two could make a great difference in yield. In fact, it could make the difference between a successful crop

and a failure. It seems reasonable that those with the most to lose should be the first to harvest. They also offered the most employment to the free lance harvest crews. The small scale farmer, however, not infrequently lost part or all of his crop to the weather while waiting his turn.

Mechanization was not the only expensive technological innovation to become a necessity after World War II. Fertilizer in the form of anhydrous ammonia offered a great boost to crop yield and, though it was expensive, it became a necessity for the wheat farmers.

Oklahoma farmers followed the national trends in agriculture; mechanization, production, and farm scale rapidly increased while the number of farms and farmers decreased. In 1940, there were 179,687 farms in Oklahoma, and in 1967, there were only 93,000. The average farm size was 193.7 acres in 1940, and it had jumped to 401 acres by 1967 (Dale & Wardell 1948:422).

When American agriculture prospered in the 20th century, it did so by virtue of its tremendous scale and efficiency of production that was made possible through technological innovations and supported by temporarily expanded world and domestic markets. When it failed, it did so as a result of market shrinkage. During these times,

the ability to produce in such abundance was turned against the farmers and resulted in even lower commodity prices than might have been expected otherwise. With the turn of the century, the age of subsistence farming was passed, and those farmers who did not change with the requirements of the American farm economy gradually were forced out of business.

The KCA/W and Farming, 1934-1974

This period in Indian farming is somewhat anticlimactic by comparison with preceding periods. The economic promise of the Indian Reorganization Act clearly was never realized among the KCA/W tribes which continued to operate on the same footing as they had previously. Land sales did slow after 1934, but sales never ceased. The Anadarko Area Office continued to arrange the sales and to determine how the sellers would receive their money. During the 1930s, most of the Indian subsistence farmers quit farming and turned to leasing their land and doing farm labor.

Indian farming was undermined also by the continual fractioning of inherited Indian land. By the time a 160 acre allotment was divided even once among several heirs, there was not enough land left in one piece to farm. After

several generations of inheritance, even leasing became a joke. In one case, the 35 heirs to one tract each received an annual lease payment of \$.97 (DDOHP Roberta Tohay T-606: 11).

The Agricultural Adjustment Acts, though initially voluntary, had a county option clause where with the consent of two-thirds of the farmers crop reduction became mandatory and enforced. The large scale farmers were reduced by the same percentage as the small scale farmers, but they tended to compensate by more efficient production--i.e., they could afford the farm machinery and fertilizer. The Indian farmers had little acreage in cash crops prior to the AAA. What they did have was reduced to one-half and later reduced again. They were not allowed to enlarge their cash crop acreage or add new cash crops under the county option since virtually all cash crops came under the AAA restrictions. Earlier they had squeezed by on what subsistence crops they grew and on the meager cash income from the few acres of wheat or cotton that they could afford to plant. With crop reduction, their cash income was further reduced, and survival became even more problematic. The problem of getting small acreages of wheat harvested by combine crews already

has been mentioned. After crop reduction, many Indian farmers could not afford the combine crews in any event.

It is little wonder that by the 1940s, probably there were no more than one or two dozen KCA/W still farming. Unfortunately, there are no statistics available on Indian farming for this period, though the above estimate is borne out by numerous interviews with Indian farmers.

The Second World War and the accompanying commodity market expansion and price increase allowed some Indian farmers to hang on for a few more years. The respite, however, was brief. Following the war, it became even more obvious that 160 acres and a team of mules were not adequate for survival in farming. Nevertheless, the Washita Valley Loan Association was founded after the war to offer loans to capable and deserving young Indian veterans who wanted to make a start in farming. The association functioned in conjunction with both the KCA Intertribal Council and the Anadarko Area Office. There was only enough money, however, to fund the best three proposals and the loans had to be paid back in five years. Tragically, three of those years held widespread crop failures. Two of the three men were unable to pay their loans back, and they and their loan co-signers had to repay the loans from their lease money

over several years. The third veteran used his loan to buy earth-moving equipment and went into business for himself. He was able to make his loan payments and support his family by hiring out his services.

Pervasive job discrimination and failing small town economies in Southwestern Oklahoma have kept the KCA/W from gaining full employment and equal economic opportunity in the area. The only jobs routinely open to Indians are farm labor or menial in-town jobs such as gas station attendant or cafe help (Bittle 1971:29).

Though educational, vocational-technical training, and relocation-job placement programs have been in operation in the area for several decades, they are only now beginning to have any effect and only upon some of the young adult KCA/W.

The primary sources of support for the bulk of the KCA/W continue to be land leases, farm labor, and public assistance (for those who qualify). Land sales and an Indian Claims Commission settlement have provided only short periods of relief from the ordinary conditions of poverty. The Indians have continued to maintain their relations of mutual assistance whereby relatives and in-laws freely share during times of individual abundance/individual need.

This form of windfall reciprocity serves to level economically the traditional rural Indian population. This contemporary system of reciprocity, including its traditional public form, the "give-away," is worthy of detailed study and presentation.

Though its central importance has diminished over the years, the B.I.A. still maintains a strong paternalistic relationship with many KCA/W through its control of land leases and sales and other areas of finance.

Three Successful Indian Farmers

The following sketches are offered as a way of illustrating the plight of 20th century KCA/W farmers. The period from allotment to 1968 is covered by the farming experiences of the two Kiowa farmers and one Kiowa Apache farmer introduced here. Though all three men were among the small number of periodically successful Indian farmers, their stories are not atypical and illustrate the way in which most KCA/W farmers were forced out of farming by the prevailing farm economy.

Hicks Boyiddle, a Kiowa farmer

Hicks was born in 1894, and he farmed on his own from 1921 to 1936. His first memories of farming go back

to 1898-1899 when he was five years old. At that time his cousin was farming southwest of Mountain View on Rainy Mountain Creek. Using simple implements issued by the government, 5 acres of corn, 8 or 9 acres of milo maize, and a few acres of millet and squaw corn were cultivated as a family effort.

Hicks and his parents took allotments near his cousin's place in 1900. He recalls that "living was good there" on the adjacent family allotments. They had 20-25 horses, 30-40 beef cattle, milk cows, a dozen hogs, and many chickens. The family went to town infrequently for lard, sugar, coffee, and bacon. Hicks remembers that a white family was "living with them" at the time and presumably was sharecropping some allotted acreage. He says that in the early 1900s farming and living conditions were essentially the same both for Indians and for whites in the area.

In the early 1900s, the family moved several miles away to a brother's allotment that afforded easier access to water. After the move, Hicks and his parents leased their allotments. It was on his brother's place that he learned to farm. They had cotton, wheat, Kaffir corn, and a large garden and fruit orchard.

In 1919, the family had 120 acres in wheat. The wartime wheat prices of \$2.60-\$2.65/bushel had led them to turn cotton acreage into wheat acreage. The grain was hauled by wagon many miles to the elevator at Mountain View.

In 1921, Hicks and his wife and two children moved onto his wife's allotment southwest of Carnegie. After buying basic horse drawn implements on time (1 or 2 years) at a store in Gotebo, Hicks began farming on his own. At first, he had only 20 acres of corn and a garden with the rest of the land in pasture. The next year he worked 40 acres and leased 101 acres to a white farmer.

In 1926, Hicks took over the entire 160 acres. He put 80 acres in cotton, 22 acres in wheat, 20 acres in Kaffir corn, one acre in garden and the rest in pasture for his horses, mules, and cows. He also kept hogs and chickens. During the depression, he recalls that cotton prices got as low as \$.05/pound and that \$1.30/bushel of wheat was not uncommon.

Hicks continued to farm his wife's allotment and to lease his own until 1936, when he quite farming for himself. At that time, his wife leased her allotment except for a few acres for the house, garden, and stock. Hicks did farm labor and drove tractors for neighboring white

farmers. He and his wife discovered that they could make a better and surer living by leasing their allotments and working than if they farmed for themselves.

In general, Hicks recalls that his farm supported only his immediate family. They did all of the farm work themselves except chopping cotton, for which they hired Indian boys. Seed was saved from year to year, and fertilizer was never used. Without a tractor, Hicks used simple horse drawn implements and hauled his grain to the elevator at Carnegie by wagon. Most of the meat that the family ate was purchased because there was not enough water or pasture to raise beef cattle. All debts accumulated during the year were paid at harvest time. Hicks says that he was never visited by anyone from the Department of Agriculture or the B.I.A. in connection with his farm, and he never joined the farmers co-op or any farmers associations. He clearly recalls that the best years were the war years.

James Silverhorn, a Kiowa farmer

James is now in his late 70s and farmed for himself between 1924 and 1947. He remembers that his father farmed an allotment located between Apache and Stecker from 1906 to 1918 when he got a government job at Fort Sill as a painter. James married in 1919 and learned to farm while

living with his brother-in-law. With the exception of a Mr. Cook, whom he knew from 1918 to 1920, he recalls no farming assistance being given by the Anadarko Area Office.

After getting a loan for implements from the Apache Bank, he began farming his 80 acre allotment. He had been allotted in 1906, and his father had chosen a tract for him near his own. Unfortunately, it was too sandy to be of much use for farming. James inherited his mother's 160 acres in 1924 and was able to expand his farming operation. He had acreage in cotton, corn, and various feed crops. He pastured 4 horses, 4 mules, and 28 beef cattle and milk cows. He also kept hogs and chickens.

In 1926, James inherited 135 acres from an uncle and further enlarged his scale of farming. At that time, he had the use of 375 acres, though at times he leased some land to get money for farm implements.

At first, he relied upon credit at the general store in Apache for seed, groceries, and other supplies. In time, he became more independent and self-sufficient and only bought coffee, flour, and sugar. All accumulated debts at the store were paid at harvest time.

The good farming years for James were 1924 through 1929. From 1932 onward he says that farming became

increasingly difficult. James never used a tractor and preferred simple 1 or 2 row implements. He sometimes hired out with his team for \$4 or \$5 a day to supplement his farming income. James and his wife had 10 children and 8 or 9 nephews and cousins living with them. Everyone helped with the farm work, and James only hired help chopping cotton.

James usually saved his own seed for the next year and never used fertilizers or insecticides. The family had a garden of several acres each year and a fruit orchard as well. James was never a member of a farmer's co-op or association. He recalls that a few of his contemporaries farmed, and those who did had only 20-30 acres of corn. When he was doing well, friends and relatives would come by and ask for money, food, or meat, and he didn't refuse them. "A man gets a good reputation by being generous and a bad reputation by being tight." James has an exceptionally good reputation, and his generosity is recognized by the whole tribe.

In the early 1930s, James had 80 acres in cotton, his main cash crop. During the AAA crop reduction program his cotton acreage allowance was cut and then cut again until he was allowed to plant only 12 acres of cotton. He

says that the county agricultural agents checked crops closely.

James quit farming in 1947 because he "couldn't make any money at it," and because it was "too expensive to farm." He kept 140 acres and sold the rest. He did farm labor for a number of years and leased what land he had left after allowing for his house, garden, and stock. He knows of no Kiowa still farming today.

Alfred Chalepah, a Kiowa Apache farmer

Alfred was born in 1910 and missed the last allotment by several years. He farmed on his own from 1949 to 1959.

It was in the late 1920s that he learned to farm from the local white farmers he worked for. In 1931, Alfred inherited his grandfather's 160 acre allotment. For the next 18 years, however, he rented his land, sharecropped, and did farm labor simultaneously. In 1949, he began farming for himself. He had enough money in an account at the Anadarko Area Office to purchase fairly sophisticated implements, including a tractor. At first he had only 75 acres under cultivation, but he gradually enlarged it until he had 105 tilled acres. Of the total, 37 acres were in wheat, 7 acres in cotton, 15 acres in corn, and the rest was

in feed crops. He kept 4 beef cattle, a milk cow, hogs, and chickens.

Alfred recalls that he was the only Indian farmer in the Boone area. He did one form or another of farm work from 1927 to 1968. Even when farming on his own, he supplemented his farming income by hiring out with his tractor or by repairing farm machinery. He learned different farming techniques by working for others but was unable to apply what he learned to his own farm because he couldn't afford the cost of the innovations.

Alfred bought or saved seed on alternating years, and he did not use fertilizer. He had a half acre garden, and his corn crop was kept for home use and for feed. He took his grain and cotton to market at Apache and remembers that \$1.25/bushel of wheat was not uncommon. He was a member of the farmers' co-op at Apache, and he "felt it was an honor." He clearly recalls, however, having trouble getting his wheat combined at the right time. He also recalls wanting to trade his 7 acre cotton allowance for wheat acres and being refused. A few years later he lost his cotton allowance entirely when he failed to plant one season.

Alfred quit farming in 1959 because he was "just breaking even." He felt that without more land and a combine

his farming effort was pointless. After quitting, he sold most of his implements for \$1500 and did farm work until 1968. He leased 105 acres of crop land but kept the rest for his house, garden, and stock.

Alfred has pondered the problems of Indian farming for quite some time and believes that limited land scale, fractional inheritance, and the lack of financial backing or capital are the main obstacles to success.

The farming experiences of Hicks, James, and Alfred overlap chronologically and represent a variety of approaches to farming. All three men, however, learned by doing farm work for relatives or neighbors and came up with the money and land to start farming without government support. All three men fall into the category of "successful Indian farmers," yet all three quit farming for the same reason and adopted the alternative combination of leasing land, doing farm labor, gardening, and limited stock raising.

Hicks successfully farmed his wife's 160 acre allotment for 15 years and was backed up by the lease money from his allotment which was located too far away to farm simultaneously. Supported and assisted by just his immediate family and limited by his simple horse drawn implements, he quit in 1936 in the middle of the depression.

James was able to put together 375 acres and farmed on a larger scale than Hicks or Alfred. Though he was limited to horse drawn technology, James had many children and relatives helping him farm. Though he farmed on a larger scale, he was supporting an extended family and many friends and relatives. James successfully farmed for 23 years but was greatly hampered when his cotton allowance was cut from 80 acres to 12 acres. He survived the depression but quit farming during the post-war depression in 1947 because he could no longer continue to live on his meager cash crop allowance.

Alfred's experience was slightly different. He inherited 160 acres from his grandfather but did not farm it for 18 years. During this time, he leased his land, share-cropped, and did farm labor. By 1949, when he began farming on his own, he had been able to buy modern farm implements, including a tractor. Between 1949 and 1959, he successfully farmed 105 acres but was limited to 37 acres of wheat and 7 acres of cotton. After 10 years of trying to farm too small an acreage, he quit, leased his crop land, and hired out to neighboring farms with his tractor.

All three of these men had a better experience than most of their farming Indian contemporaries. All three were

industrious and knowledgable farmers, yet all three quit because they could make a better living with a lease-labor-garden-stock combination. Though they were uncommonly successful Indian farmers, their eventual choice of an alternative was typical of most Indian farmers.

It is interesting to note that today many white farmers in the area have opted for a similar combination of rural income sources. On the basis of casual observation and cafe conversations, it appears that many white farmers own and/or lease several hundred acres on which they raise cattle and grow cash crops such as wheat, cotton, or peanuts. At the same time, they hold down semi-skilled jobs in town or hire out with their tractors to supplement their farming income. It appears that few farmers in the area can afford to operate on the scale needed to survive in today's agricultural commodity economy without alternative sources of income.

Conclusions

The Indian Reorganization Act was passed in 1934, and the Indians' "New Deal" commenced. Though many of the problems were better understood, the solutions were blocked in Congress as funding priority was given to the depression

and the Second World War programs. The promise of the Indian Reorganization Act was never realized, and an undeclared policy of gradual termination and assimilation emerged. From the 1950s on, the main push in federal Indian programs was in the direction of vocational-technical training and relocation in urban centers. Unfortunately, the programs met with little success. The government has given no support to Indian farming since the 1940s.

The government initiated various farm relief programs in the 1930s including the AAA and the CCC. The farmers' condition did not improve, however, until the U.S. went to war in 1941. The high wartime commodity prices gave at least temporary relief. At the same time, however, government controls were increased and the upward spiral of land scale and mechanization continued to drive small farmers out of business. Another farm depression followed the war and lasted until the beginning of the Korean Conflict. Again after peace was negotiated, the farmers were stung by the sudden market shrinkage. There has been a gradual adjustment to market conditions in the 1960s and 1970s, though the commodity situation is unstable and prices vary from year to year. The scale and cost of farm production has increased consistently throughout the 20th century.

One major result has been the virtual extinction of the small scale subsistence farmer.

During the depression of the 1930s, most KCA/W farmers quit and turned to leasing their land and doing farm labor. Since they had been only marginal subsistence farmers beforehand, the depression and crop reductions simply pushed them over the edge and out of business as independent farmers. Those few who survived the depression experienced a brief respite during the war years, but were operating on too limited a scale to do more than just hold on a little while longer. After the war, many more Indian farmers quit, and by 1950, there were no more than a dozen left. Of the Indian farmers interviewed in the mid-1970s, only one still farmed and none of them knew of any other KCA/W still farming. From the testimony of two Wichita farmers, Frank Miller (DDOHP T 64:13-14) and Arthur Punley, it is clear that Wichita farmers suffered the same fate as the other Indian farmers in the area.

In sum, the 1934-1974 period was anticlimactic and simply saw the completed deterioration of the small scale subsistence farmers' position. The plight of the KCA/W farmers was not a unique cultural experience, but was one shared by most small scale farmers in the area. The Indians'

sources of capital and supplementary job opportunities were more limited than those of the white farmers, but the major forces at work operated similarly on both Indians and non-Indians. Given the emerging conditions of the commodity economy, it is hardly surprising that Indian farmers opted for the security and better income afforded by a lease-labor-garden-stock combination.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

The Plains environment, with its intractable sod, meager and unreliable rainfall, and threatening weather, limited aboriginal farming to the shelter of river drainage systems. Even the hearty Indian strains of corn and squash could not survive the rigors of the open Plains climate. Where practicable, however, farming offered an attractive and reasonably secure way of life, and it supported the relatively dense populations found in the sedentary farming villages.

Well before the arrival of the horse on the Plains, nomadic groups certainly were aware of the advantages that farming offered. The major obstacles that stood in the way of their adopting agriculture and incorporating it into their life-way were the limits imposed by the environment and the mobility required of them as bison hunters. It is significant that even though farm produce was prized and commodities

traded for, farming was so ill-suited to their situation that it appears not to have been even temporarily or partially adopted.

Many peripheral groups were attracted to the Plains following the introduction of the horse. The subsequent cultural convergence and synthesis was strongly affected by the requirements of bison hunting, horse acquisition, and trade. Various tribes gained or lost power, though in general it can be said that the sedentary farming villages lost their former prosperous position, and the advantage went to the nomadic tribes. In the course of events, some tribes abandoned farming to become mounted nomadic hunters.

The Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache were formerly pedestrian hunters and gatherers, but they quickly adapted to the equestrian revolution and became wealthy horse traders and capable mounted bison hunters. The Wichita easily integrated the horse complex into their village farming way of life and became more active as bison hunters and raiders.

By the 1850s, however, the Southern Plains tribes, including the Kiowa, Comanche, Kiowa Apache, and Wichita, were in a stressful position. White hide hunters were reducing the bison herds, and conflict with displaced eastern

tribes was becoming more frequent and more desperate. A major drought cycle hit the southern Plains and adversely affected the movements of the bison and the farming villages' crops. The trade network deteriorated, while epidemics of European diseases became more frequent and the U.S. military presence became more threatening, especially after the Civil War.

The U.S. government saw the Indians as an obstacle to be overcome. Indian raids disrupted westward migration, commerce, and the settlement of surrounding areas. Since the tribes were originally viewed as sovereign nations with certain rights, the government attempted to solve the problem by treaty. This attempted solution resulted as much from the government's initial inability to subjugate the Plains tribes as it did from any recognition of aboriginal rights.

At any rate, there was a series of peace treaties with each one calling for stricter terms of tribal confinement and greater territorial cessions to the whites. The treaties, however, were nothing more than negotiated interruptions in the hostilities and were agreed to for mutual convenience or were at times coerced from the tribes. It

is hard to believe that the treaties were ever actually intended to be permanent agreements.

The treaty cycle commonly consisted of Indian raids, military reprisals, general war, settlement bribes or threats, treaty, renewed Indian raids, military reprisals, etc. Both the government and the Indians were inconsistent, uncoordinated, and mutually unaccountable. Treaty violations on both sides generated the cycle of periodic military escalation and renewed treaty making. With each new treaty, the southern Plains tribes saw their territory pared down and their subsistence further threatened. It is little wonder that they continued to resist. They found themselves in a deteriorating position, however, as the bison were rapidly exterminated and their military capability in terms of horses, guns, and warriors was steadily eroded.

The Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache were restricted to a reservation in 1869 and effectively were pacified by 1875 after a series of outbreaks. By this time, they no longer had the means to resist or subsist and were forced to rely upon government rations for survival. While the U.S. government failed to pacify them with treaty bribes and promises or with military threats, eventually it succeeded in reducing them to a position of nutritional dependence.

The government, however, found that the price of peace and reservation confinement was higher than it wished to pay and immediately sought means to alleviate this burden.

During the reservation period, the government attempted to "civilize" and "Christianize" the Indians as well as to transform them into self-supporting subsistence farmers. With the passage of the Dawes Act, further steps were taken to detribalize, allot, and assimilate the Indian population. The government held to its plan of making farmers of the Indians throughout the period, though Congress continually refused to allocate the funds needed to achieve this goal.

The Kiowa, Comanche, Kiowa Apache, and Wichita adapted to the reservation situation by utilizing a combination of subsistence sources (rations, hunting, farming, stock raising, wage labor, and grazing leases). No single source was adequate to insure survival in the reservation context. The bison were gone by 1880, and other game was too scarce to support the Indian population. Farming was drastically hampered by environmental conditions and inadequate instruction, seed, and implements, as well as other factors. Stock raising, though environmentally suited, was handicapped by the lack of government support for the project,

by the meagerness of rations which forced the Indians to eat their breeding stock to keep from starving, and by white theft of Indian cattle. Wage labor opportunities were few and the wages appallingly low. Understandably and tragically, the Indians were forced to depend upon government rations for 33 years. They could not support themselves, and yet the government rations were always short and undependable. Their reservation experience installed the KCA/W in a cycle of economic marginality in which most of them are still entrapped.

It is important to keep in mind that the KCA/W did farm, at least to the extent that farming was possible under reservation conditions. By 1900, it appears that the majority of families in all four tribes had some acreage in feed, corn, and/or gardens, though they had little or no cash crops. They had made a beginning, but the reservation opening found them ill-equipped to hold their own as the area was developed. If the KCA/W had received little support in making the transformation into self-sufficient farmers before allotment, they received even less support after allotment. Without even the support of meager government rations, subsistence farming proved difficult at best.

Though those KCA/W who farmed shared in the periods of American farming prosperity (1898-1914 and WWI 1916-1919), they also shared the hardships of the post-war farm depression.

By the turn of the century there was a clear national trend away from small scale subsistence farming toward larger cash crop enterprises. The bulk of the Oklahoma homesteaders, as well as the allotted Indians, soon found that being limited to 160 acres was a severe handicap.

Though the First World War brought four years of quite favorable commodity prices, it also accelerated the pace of farm mechanization and enlarged the scale of cash crop production. The farm depression was the result of overproduction and the shrinkage of the commodity market. All farmers suffered during the depression, but the small subsistence farmers were the first to be driven under.

Immediately following the allotment and opening, many KCA/W farmers were interrupted by having to move and open new fields and became the victims of cattle rustlers and loan sharks. Many KCA/W quickly were lured into leasing their allotments and trying to live off the rent. Approximately three-fourths of all KCA/W allotments were leased by 1911. Nevertheless, several hundred Indians farmed before

the First World War, and their number was enlarged significantly during the war as a result of the high prices paid for commodities. By 1920 and the beginning of the farm depression, the number of Indian farmers had dropped well below the pre-war level, and it continued to decline from that point on. Even the most capable and well established Indian farmers were marginal to the larger farm economy. Many Indians quit farming independently during this period. They typically turned to farm labor and to leasing most of their land, keeping just enough acreage for a house, a garden, and feed for a few horses and cattle. In most cases, this combination offered a better income and greater security than if they had continued to farm.

The Wheeler-Howard Indian Reorganization Act was passed in 1934, and the government's Indian policy was revised. Despite the best efforts of Commissioner John Collier, the promise of the Indians' "New Deal" went largely unrealized. National depression and a world war eclipsed the momentarily renewed concern for the Indians' plight. Collier resigned in 1946 after having accomplished but a fraction of what he had envisioned. Rural Indians largely were ignored until the 1960s and 1970s, and then they

received little direct assistance. After the 1940s, the government gave no further support to Indian farming.

The Agricultural Adjustment Act was passed in 1933, and sought to improve and stabilize commodity prices by cutting farm production. Though crop acreages were reduced, expensive but effective technological improvements helped to maintain the condition of overproduction. The AAA was designed to provide farm relief; however, it gave little aid to the small scale farmer who was crippled by the reduction of his already small cash crop acreage. As a result, many small scale farmers were forced to quit during the late 1930s.

The Second World War brought favorable commodity prices. The big mechanized farms prospered while the few remaining small scale farmers merely were given a respite in their struggle for survival. Following the war, there was a return to farm depression conditions, though the Korean Conflict temporarily alleviated the situation. From 1950 on, the farm economy experienced a complex series of fluctuations. It is clear, however, that from 1934 to 1974, there was a rapid increase in farm size, mechanization, and production cost and an equally rapid decline in the number of small-scale farms.

Those few Indian farmers not wiped out by 1933 suffered from the AAA cash crop reductions. Most of them quit farming in favor of the labor, lease, and garden combination. Fractional inheritance and land sales steadily reduced the land holdings of many Indians to the point that lease income became negligible. As a result, another combination became prevalent: that of wage labor, help from relatives, and/or public assistance.

Those Indians still farming by the close of the Second World War were unable to keep up with their large scale mechanized neighbors, and soon they too quit farming. With one exception, none of the former Indian farmers interviewed knew of any KCA/W still farming.

In sum, it can be seen that government policy affecting Indian farming was continually in flux. The funding required to realize the goal of self-sufficient Indian farming never was made available by Congress. Stinting appropriations and reduction of Indian land holdings were the only two consistent elements in federal Indian policy.

The Indian adaptation to the Southern Plains environment appears (with one brief but spectacular exception) typically to have been one in which a broad combination of sources was tapped to provide subsistence. Such an approach

is necessary where the environment is highly variable and where no single subsistence alternative can guarantee survival.

Prior to the introduction of the horse, it can be seen that both the nomadic hunters and gatherers and the village farmers utilized a broad spectrum of food resources on the Plains. The 1750-1850 period provides the exception. The effectiveness of hunting bison from horseback allowed the Plains tribes to specialize to a great extent. It drew many tribes with markedly different cultures from adjacent areas onto the Plains and into a largely uniform pattern of adaptation. With their restriction to a reservation and the extermination of the bison, the KCA/W turned to a combination of variable sources of subsistence (rations, annuities, crops, stock, game, wage labor, and grass money). Though the government tried to force them to adopt the farming specialization, the environment continually demonstrated how impracticable such a move was. The one viable specialization, cattle raising, was never supported since it required that the Indians retain too much reservation land.

The subsistence farming option was tried by many KCA/W families after allotment, but with the onset of the farm depression there was a fairly rapid shift toward a new

combination of income sources (lease, farm labor, garden, and stock). With the passage of time and the fractioning and sale of allotments, still another combination of income sources came to be relied upon by many KCA/W (casual labor, help from relatives, and public assistance).

Recently, many young men have at least temporarily left the area when they joined the armed forces and were stationed elsewhere. There also has been a growing number of young people who have received technical training and who have taken jobs in major cities in the region.

Though no claim is made here that paternalism is the key factor in the failure of Indian farming, it has clearly exercised a pervasive influence upon the KCA/W and served to help perpetuate their condition of chronic dependence and economic marginality. From the first treaty onward, the government's relationship with the Indians was one in which minimal bribes were offered in exchange for cooperation and acquiescence to new territorial reductions. With the destruction of the bison, the Indians were not only pacified, but they were reduced to a fundamental dependence upon congressional appropriations. The government immediately sought to eliminate this fiscal drain and at the same time meet the godlike demands of the "white man's burden."

The piecemeal manner of issuing individual rations, annuities, per capita payments, and grass money kept the Indians continually dependent upon a "nickel and dime" dole system and lined the pockets of government contractors and local merchants. It should be noted that the Indians themselves appear to have been in favor of such periodic individual disbursements rather than the use of available funds to accomplish grander long-range goals. Various agents advanced proposals and designs for achieving the goal of Indian self-support but were ignored since their schemes required either too much money at one time or called for too much land to be retained in Indian ownership.

Conditions changed little in the 20th century. The KCA/W remained dependent upon the Anadarko Area Office in the handling of most financial matters. An enormous bureaucracy, rather than government contractors, received the lion's share of the Indian appropriations. Though much money has been spent annually on "the Indians," the amount of actual direct assistance has been minimal. In fairness, it should be recognized that program design, agency coordination, Indian cooperation, and adequate funding are all monumental problems in themselves and unless they can be overcome simultaneously little can be accomplished.

A few points appear obvious:

(1) The KCA/W reservation environment was ill-suited to farming prior to the application of 20th century agricultural technology.

(2) The government singlemindedly was committed to the idea of making the Indians self-supporting farmers, yet the funds needed to realize this goal never were forthcoming.

(3) Between allotment and the onset of the farm depression, significant numbers of KCA/W were engaged in subsistence farming. As farm conditions worsened, however, most quit farming and adopted a land lease, farm labor, gardening, and stock raising subsistence.

(4) The demise of the KCA/W farmers in the 20th century was less a product of their cultural background and more directly linked to the economic conditions that worked against all small scale farmers.

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