

THE CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION OF 1916

By

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CHAPTER I
FORESHADOWING THE ISSUES

The 1916 presidential contest in the United States promised to be unusually interesting. In Europe a war was raging which threatened momentarily to engulf the nation and in Mexico a civil war menaced the southern border. In politics there was a continuing demand for liberal legislation. This liberalism had earlier found a definite outlet in the agrarian uprising which culminated in the organization of the Grangers in 1873 and the Populists in 1889. In 1896 the Populists united with the Democrats to fight for the election of William Jennings Bryan for the presidency. When Bryan was beaten by William McKinley, the Populist Party soon disappeared as an organization, but its ideas remained in the national consciousness in the following years. The progressive movement was concerned with an attempt to improve the condition of the common man and to care for the weak and unfortunate. The progressive idea found a champion in Theodore Roosevelt. In 1901, when he became president, Roosevelt declared war on the trusts that he believed to be "corrupt," and began to enforce the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Although Roosevelt had favored the election of William Howard Taft in 1908, some of the progressive Republicans of the West and Middle-West had become convinced that Taft had failed to live up to the standard of progressive reform established under Roosevelt during his presidency from 1901 to 1908. Taft lacked Roosevelt's ability to hold together the progressive and the conservative Republicans in congress. The inevitable schism in the Republican Party occurred when Republican insurgents opposed both the new tariff law in

1909 and the dictatorial leadership of the Republican Speaker of the House, Joseph Cannon. The insurgents were aided by the newly elected Democratic congressmen of 1910 in the reorganization of the House of Representatives for the purpose of depriving Cannon of his powers.¹

In 1912 the Republican pre-convention campaign resolved itself into a contest between Taft and Roosevelt. Senator La Follette of Wisconsin remained a candidate with only a meager following outside his own state.² When the convention and the balloting were over, Taft had received 561 votes and Roosevelt 107, with 344 of the delegates casting no ballots.³ On Saturday night, June 22, the Roosevelt followers, including the 344 delegates who had not voted at the convention, pledged their support to Roosevelt at a meeting held in Orchestra Hall. The delegates launched the Progressive party by setting up a committee to determine the future course of action. The first Progressive National Convention was held in Chicago, August 5, 1912. The majority of the delegates had never before taken part in politics; more than a score of them were women.⁴ Hiram Johnson of California was nominated as Roosevelt's running mate. He had won the approval of Progressives by his militant fight against corporations. The Progressive platform stood for the direct primary; popular election of the United States Senators; the short ballot; the initiative; the referendum; the recall; woman suffrage; registration of lobbyists; a

¹ Arthur S. Link. Wilson The Road to the White House. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1947), 307.

² F. A. Ogg. National Progress. (New York: Harper and Bros. Publishers, 1918), 191.

³ Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1931), 564.

⁴ Ogg, op. cit., 195.

greater publicity of campaign funds both before and after the election; and a more easy and expeditious method of amending the Federal Constitution. It urged legislation on minimum wage standards, child labor, industrial health and accidents, agricultural credit and co-operation, industrial education, social insurance, and the organization of a national department of labor. It denounced the Payne-Aldrich tariff and favored strengthening the Sherman Anti-Trust Law.⁵ When the campaign and election of 1912 were over the results showed Roosevelt had received 4,126,020 popular votes as against 6,286,124 for Woodrow Wilson and 3,483,922 for Taft.⁶ The Wilson victory marked the beginning of the end of the Progressive Party. Under the leadership of Senator Beveridge of Indiana, Senator La Follette, William Allen White, editor of the Emporia Gazette of Kansas, and Harold L. Ickes of Chicago, the movement held a precarious political foothold, hopeful of a resurrection of power as long as Roosevelt remained their chieftain. However, Albert Beveridge, the leading progressive next to Roosevelt, watched the Colonel's political maneuvering with a critical eye during 1915 and early 1916. In mid-summer of 1915 an incident occurred which appeared to indicate that Roosevelt had decided to return to the Republican Party. He proposed to leaders of both parties that Progressives and Republicans unite in the gubernatorial nomination of Harvey D. Hinman, a Republican of New York. Hinman had frankly announced his candidacy for the Republican nomination, leaving no doubt as to his party affiliations.⁷ Beveridge was disappointed when Roosevelt failed to come

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Frederic L. Paxson. Recent History of the United States, 1865 to the Present. (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1937), 571.

⁷ Claude Bowers. Beveridge and the Progressive Era. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1932), 450.

out strongly as the Progressive leader.⁸ Roosevelt's active participation in the campaign of 1916 was foreshadowed by his statement at Oyster Bay: "I am not for any particular Republican candidate for the presidency but I am against the re-election of Woodrow Wilson."⁹ Roosevelt cultivated a hatred for Wilson during his closing years. According to Pringle this had its beginning in the treaty negotiated with Colombia in 1915 during Wilson's administration offering an apology and an indemnity of twenty-five million dollars for the cession of Panama. This treaty was negotiated by Bryan, and Roosevelt considered it an insult to the actions he had taken in dealing with the Panama Canal question.¹⁰ He decided to lead the opposition against Wilson's re-election if he could be nominated by both the Progressives and Republicans in the Chicago conventions to be held June 7.¹¹ On April 16, he told a prospective delegate he was ready to become a candidate for the Republican nomination.¹²

A meeting of the Executive Committee of the Progressive National Committee was held in New York City May 10, 1916. It was attended by several party members in addition to the regular members. At the conclusion of the meeting George Perkins, the treasurer and titular head of the Progressive Party reaffirmed to the newspapers the pledge of the party made earlier in January, 1916, "to approach the consideration of the issues involved this year without any desire to revive partisan bitterness." Perkins said the Progressives would present Roosevelt as their choice to

⁸ Ibid., 485.

⁹ New York Times, March 11, 1916.

¹⁰ Pringle, op. cit., 581.

¹¹ New York Times, March 11, 1916.

¹² The Nation, April 6, 1916. 375.

the Republican National Convention. If he were not accepted then the Progressives would consider a nominee selected unanimously by the Republican Convention. Perkins was regarded with suspicion by William Allen White and Harold L. Ickes. The writings of both men¹³ indicate their adverse reaction to him. They felt that he was a tool of Wall Street because of his position as one of the partners of J. P. Morgan, and as a state representative of the New York Life Insurance Company. Also they were jealous of his seeming influence over Roosevelt. He was suspected of conniving for the eventual disappearance of the Progressive Party; a suspicion which later proved to be partially correct.¹⁴

Roosevelt was present at a luncheon at the Hotel Manhattan following the meeting and emphasized the importance of unity between the Progressive and the old Republican groups.¹⁵ Immediately preceding the convention the June 3rd issue of the Literary Digest stated that although Roosevelt had not formally realigned himself with the Republicans he was one of the two "most formidable" candidates for the Republican nomination.¹⁶ Roosevelt had made an arresting speech at Detroit May 19, in which he vigorously denounced Wilson's policy of non-intervention in the European war and declared that "the only right principle is to prepare thoroughly or not at all."¹⁷ He had chosen Detroit for this speech because it was the home of Henry Ford, an avowed pacifist, who had received more votes for the

¹³ Harold L. Ickes, "Who Killed the Progressive Party," American Historical Review, 1941, (Vol. 46), 316, and William Allen White, Autobiography, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946), 235.

¹⁴ Ickes, Ibid., 315.

¹⁵ Ibid., 316.

¹⁶ "Colonel Roosevelt's New Crusade," Literary Digest, LIII, (June 3, 1916), 1618.

¹⁷ Ickes, "Who Killed the Progressive Party," 235.

presidential nomination in the Michigan primary than a long time politician, William Allen Smith.¹⁸ At the June 7, 1916 national convention, Roosevelt was to make his last bid for national approval.

In 1912, it was evident that the Democrats would have to meet the demands for progressive reform that had disrupted the Republican Party. William Jennings Bryan, although not a candidate, was regarded as being the most powerful figure in the party. Twice defeated in a presidential election, his almost fanatical zeal for social reform as well as political reform, and his oratorical ability kept him in the foreground politically.

In the pre-convention campaign Woodrow Wilson, Governor of New Jersey, gained national prominence. The Wilson campaign movement was managed by William F. McCombs. Other Democratic leaders who assisted in the Wilson movement were William Jennings Bryan, Colonel Edward House, Henry Morgenthau, William McAdoo, and Colonel George Harvey, editor of Harper's Weekly. Wilson lost the support of Colonel Harvey early in 1912. This occurred when Wilson told Harvey the support of the conservative Harper's Weekly was damaging him in the progressive view. After conducting an active speaking campaign over the nation, Wilson gained the reputation of being the foremost champion of progressive reform in the Democratic Party. In May 1912, the New York World reversed its earlier position of outright opposition to Wilson by publishing a long editorial favoring his nomination.¹⁹ In spite of the vigorous activities of Wilson and his followers, Champ Clarke of Missouri, Speaker of the House and a progressive, was regarded as having the advantage over other possible presidential nominees, such as Governors Judson Harmon of Ohio, Wilson of New Jersey, and Thomas Marshall of

¹⁸ "Ford Against Smith," Harper's Weekly, (April 21, 1916), 420.

¹⁹ Link, op. cit., 362-429.

Indiana, and Congressman Oscar Underwood of Alabama. Clarke's victories in the primaries of Illinois, Nebraska, Iowa, and California were matched by Wilson's triumphs in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Oregon, and New Jersey. After the primaries were held, Clark was found to have the pledges of more delegates than any other candidate. On the second day of the National Democratic Convention, the progressive element scored a triumph when it secured the adoption of instructions to the chairman to make exemptions in the enforcement of the unit rule in favor of the states which had provided by statute for the nomination and election of delegates and alternates to national political conventions in congressional districts.²⁰ On June 27, Bryan attempted to carry a resolution which reaffirmed the party's position as "the champion of popular government and equality before the law"; declared against the nomination of any candidate representing or under obligation to any member of the privilege-hunting class and demanded the withdrawal from the convention of certain capitalists alleged to belong to this class.²¹ Only the first two resolutions were adopted after a furious debate over the third. On the first ballot, Clark received 440½ votes and Wilson 324. After the fourteenth ballot had been cast, Bryan created a sensation by announcing that as long as New York, which he considered to be contaminated by Tammany Hall, continued to vote for Clark, he would withhold his vote from him. This helped turn the tide for Wilson who went ahead of Clark for the first time, on the twenty-eighth ballot. Wilson received the nomination on the forty-sixth ballot when he received 990 votes to Clark's 84.

²⁰ Democratic National Convention of 1912, Official Proceedings, 3-5.

²¹ Ibid.

Bryan wrote most of the Democratic platform that year. It proposed such reforms as new trust legislation which would make private monopoly impossible; banking and currency reform; physical valuation of railways; pre-election publicity for campaign contributions; a constitutional amendment making the President ineligible for re-election and pledged Wilson to this principle; the exemption from tolls of American ships engaged in coastwise traffic passing through the Panama Canal; and the recognition of the independence of the Phillipine Islands as soon as a stable government could be established.²² The fact that this progressive platform was drawn up under the sponsorship of Bryan, who was chiefly responsible for Wilson's nomination after the convention met and who was the most powerful figure in the Democratic Party, must have been one of the determining factors in leading Wilson to attempt to carry out the platform resolutions after his election to the presidency. Disregarding his progressive or non-progressive views, it was politically expedient to advocate the progressive reforms in order to fulfill his pre-convention campaign statements and to attain a position of leadership in his party, a position occupied by Bryan as Wilson's first term began.

The Democratic nominee for president in 1916, was born in Staunton, Virginia, December 28, 1856. His father, Joseph Ruggles Wilson, was a Presbyterian minister and a son of a Scotch-Irish immigrant. His mother, Jessie Woodrow, was born in Carlisle, England, and was the daughter of a Presbyterian minister. Wilson was a typical southern gentleman who disliked career women and like his father, was a devout Presbyterian.²³

²² Ibid., 201.

²³ Link, op. cit., 1-2.

He graduated from Princeton in 1879. His scholastic record in college was not outstanding but he was very active in debating and literary circles. He was also student director of athletics. He achieved some renown due to a critical analysis of Congress, written in his senior year and published in the International Review. After graduation he studied law at the University of Virginia; practiced law briefly in Atlanta but gave it up to continue studying government and politics at John Hopkins University where he received his Ph. D. degree. His thesis, Congressional Government, (1885) was reprinted many times. In this same year, 1885, he began teaching at Bryn Mawr College as an associate professor of history and political economy. In 1888, he moved to Wesleyan College, where he remained for two years. In 1890, he joined the Princeton faculty as professor of jurisprudence and political economy and twelve years later became president. In this capacity he achieved distinction through his lectures and writings, which were notable for their phrasing and clarity.²⁴

During the period from 1907-1909, he became involved in a bitter controversy with the Dean of the Graduate School, Andrew F. West. Wilson sought to undermine West's power as administrator of the Graduate School and specifically opposed him in the matter of accepting a half-million dollar bequest by William Proctor of Cincinnati, for a graduate college and in selecting a location for the college. Wilson lost the fight but made it appear that he had been championing the cause of democracy.²⁵

It was not surprising then, since he was fighting a losing battle at Princeton, that he should resign to accept the Democratic nomination for

²⁴ Ruth Cranston, The Story of Woodrow Wilson. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 80.

²⁵ Link, op. cit., 228.

governor of New Jersey when it was offered to him by Colonel George Harvey and the Democratic State Boss, Senator James Smith. His vigorous campaign won the respect of the progressive elements in the state and gave him the election in November by a plurality of 49,000 votes. As Governor, he sought to fulfill his campaign promises over the protests of the party machine bosses and put through a series of reform measures, including a Direct Primary law; a Corrupt Practices Act; the creation of a Public Utilities Commission; an Employer's Liability Act; and reform of municipal administration. Wilson's reputation as a reformer led to his nomination for President of the United States at the Democratic National Convention in 1912. In the November election, he received 435 electoral votes; Roosevelt received 88; and Taft received 8.

The new president came into office lacking an intimate acquaintance with the leaders who must accept him in the party. However, the conduct of the new administration was influenced by the two intimate friends of the President, Joseph P. Tumulty and Edward M. House, a wealthy man from Texas. Tumulty had been his private secretary since January 1911, when he was chosen because of his knowledge of New Jersey politics.²⁶ When it came to the selection of the cabinet, he selected Bryan for Secretary of State. Bryan was chosen in order to keep him active within the administration instead of possibly being active against it and besides, his valuable assistance at the Convention deserved a reward. It was to his credit that he submerged his personal ambition for the good of the party.²⁷ His influence was always potent at the Capitol where he maintained party discipline and facilitated the passage of the legislation of 1913 and

²⁶ Ibid., 334.

²⁷ Ibid.

1914. By the latter date the President was enjoying the leadership that Bryan had possessed and there was as yet no sign of any break between them.²⁸ Bryan's appointment met with bitter criticism from those who had long fought his "Free Silver" money policy which they considered inflationary. His most serious blunder was in seeking to repay with government positions, all those "deserving Democrats" who had assisted him in his two presidential campaigns.²⁹ In the more important posts, Wilson appointed men of letters or active partisans to replace Republican predecessors. Walter Hines Page was sent to the Court of St. James, Thomas Nelson Page to Rome, Brand Whitlock to Brussels, Henry Van Dyke to the Hague, and James W. Gerard, a wealthy New York judge, to Berlin.³⁰

When the Democrats came into power in 1912, they inherited legislative projects relating to banking reform, child labor, and rural credit. They were confronted with the opportunity to mold themselves into a majority party through the passage of the reform legislation demanded by the people. They were beset by two potential dangers, their inexperience in national affairs and the conflict within their ranks between radical and conservative elements.³¹ The conservatives who could be expected to obstruct progressive legislation were Marsh Henry Watterson, editor of the Louisville Courier Journal; Thomas Ryan, Virginia tobacco magnate; George Harvey, publisher of Harper's Weekly; William Randolph Hearst, newspaper publisher, and the "Golden Wing" group that had opposed Bryan's "Free Silver" policy. During his first term, Wilson pushed through more important legislation

²⁸ Paxson, Recent History of the United States, 462.

²⁹ Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People. (New York: F. S. Croft and Co., 1946), 593.

³⁰ Paxson, Op. cit., 463.

³¹ Ogg, Op. cit., 210.

than any president since Lincoln. In meeting the demand for progressive legislation, the Wilson Administration from 1912 to 1916, passed the major legislative acts as listed: The basic Eight-Hour Day for government employees; The Federal Reserve Act; The Rural Credit Bill; The Income Tax Law; The Underwood Tariff Act; The Federal Trades Commission Act; The Clayton Anti-Trust Bill; The Good Roads Law; and the Smith-Lever Agricultural Education Law.³²

The Wilson foreign policy involving relationship with Europe and the Mexican civil disturbances was strongly opposed by Roosevelt and his followers. Wilson advocated a policy which appeared to differ³³ from that advocated by Roosevelt who had felt the United States had gained enough prestige to warrant domination of Latin-American countries in obtaining economic and other concessions. This was popularly known as the "big stick" policy. From 1908 to 1912, Taft had employed his "dollar diplomacy" policy in encouraging the investment of American dollars in foreign enterprises, a practice which led to the exploitation of foreign property. Both of the previous administrations had won enemies for the United States, especially in South America and Central America. At first Wilson tried arbitration in his foreign policy whenever possible, but these efforts were not always successful. Later, when threatened by the European War, he advocated "strict neutrality" and preparedness. Toward the Mexican trouble he employed "watchful waiting." The difficulties of Wilson's policy were amply illustrated by relations with Mexico. For

³² Theodore H. Price, "President Wilson and Prosperity," Outlook, 113, August 23, 1916, 998.

³³ In practice it was not so different for Wilson intervened in Haiti in 1915 and 1916, and by The Bryan-Chamorro Treaty with Nicaragua in 1916, gained dominance over that country.

thirty-five years Mexico had been under the tyrannical rule of Porfirio Diaz, who reduced his own people to peonage while he sold out his country to foreign mining and business interests. In 1911, the middle classes and peons rose in revolt, drove Diaz out, and replaced him with a liberal, Francisco Madero. But within two years a counter-revolutionary movement under the leadership of Victoriano Huerta overthrew Madero who was assassinated several days later. The foreign investors who saw a return of the fat days of Diaz, were jubilant and most of the great nations hastened to recognize the new president. But Wilson, in refusing to recognize Huerta, who represented the de facto government of Mexico, inaugurated a new policy in Latin America which was not to be definitely abandoned until 1930 when Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State in the Hoover Administration, recognized a rebel government in Brazil.³⁴ Wilson believed that such recognition would be to condone murder and he was unmoved by the arguments of the American businessmen who were interested only in their own profits. He not only refused recognition to Huerta; he also persuaded Great Britain not to interfere. Britain's cooperation was secured by timely concessions on the Panama Canal tolls question.³⁵ Relations with Mexico, however, rapidly grew worse and when Huerta arrested some American sailors at Tampico, Admiral Mayo demanded that Huerta apologize and salute the American flag. Huerta did apologize but refused to salute the flag. Wilson departed from "strict neutrality" when he sent marines to Vera Cruz to force Huerta to perform the flag salute. Huerta refused to comply with the demands and Vera Cruz was captured by the American forces.³⁶ War

³⁴ Bailey, op. cit., 730.

³⁵ Paxson, Recent History of the United States, 436-451.

³⁶ Bailey, op. cit., 606-607.

appeared inevitable, but the President did not let the situation get out of hand. By drawing a distinction between the Mexican people, whom he wished to befriend, and the Mexican government which he was determined to destroy, he succeeded in restraining the war clamor at home while maneuvering Huerta into an untenable position. Argentine, Brazil, and Chile, fearful of the consequences of another Mexican war, offered their services as mediators. A conference was held at Niagara Falls, Canada, in May 1914. By accepting the offer of arbitration Wilson gained the approval of Latin America and avoided war with Mexico. Although the proposals of the conference were not acceptable to Carranza, he came into power as leader of the constitutionalists. Huerta fled the country. In March trouble flared up again when Pancho Villa's raiders sacked Columbus, New Mexico, killing seventeen Americans. General John J. Pershing and several thousand cavalrymen were sent into Mexico to capture Villa and to end the border raids. The punitive expedition failed to capture Villa but remained to guard the border at El Paso until February 1917, when they were withdrawn.³⁷ The policy of "watchful waiting" combined with arbitration had succeeded in its dual purpose of aiding Mexico and gaining the confidence of the Latin American republics.³⁸

It was Europe that presented the most serious threat to American peace. On June 28, 1914, a Serbian patriot fired a shot which within five weeks had plunged all Europe into the greatest war it had known. President Wilson proclaimed American neutrality and counseled neutrality in thought as well as in action. Yet the Americans could not be indifferent

³⁷ Ibid., 607.

³⁸ Paxson, op. cit., 463-466.

to the war. Ties of culture, tradition, and common outlook existed with the British people, and there was a memory of French aid in the Revolutionary war; also there was admiration for the resistance of the French and Belgium people. Comparatively small elements, chiefly German-Americans and the Irish-Americans, who had an inherited hatred for Britain, sympathized with the Central Powers.

The policy of "Strict Neutrality" was difficult to administer. In actual practice it involved furnishing war material to the Allies. The United States was neutral only in the fact that she was not engaged in a shooting war with Germany.³⁹ The neutral people of the United States were first alienated by the German invasion of Belgium on August 5, 1914. In February, 1915, German submarines began the wholesale sinking of Allied ships, but this did not discourage American citizens from sailing on merchantmen belonging to belligerent nations. The German Ambassador, Count Von Bernstorff, published an advertisement in the New York newspapers May 1, 1915, warning Americans that they sailed on Allied vessels at their own risk.⁴⁰ On this same day, 197 Americans sailed from New York on a supposedly unarmed British Liner, the Lusitania. On May 7, 1915, this ship was sunk by a torpedo from a German submarine with a loss of 1198 persons, 128 of whom were citizens of the United States.⁴¹ This turned the tide of feeling definitely against the Germans. Wilson was shocked by the disaster but determined not to let it precipitate war with Germany. In an address in Philadelphia, three days later, he proclaimed America's great

³⁹ Bailey, op. cit., 623.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 626.

⁴¹ Ibid., 627.

moral mission and asserted "there is such a thing as a nation being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right."⁴² The phrase "Too Proud to Fight" was taken from its context and used tellingly against Wilson by Roosevelt. Wilson sent such strong notes of protest to Germany over the Lusitania affair that Bryan, an avowed pacifist, as already indicated, feared they would precipitate war. Unable to influence Wilson toward a milder course, Bryan resigned from the Cabinet. His resignation caused widespread criticism of the administration for it created the impression that the government was badly divided. In an attempt to settle the dispute, a number of diplomatic notes were exchanged but Germany never changed from her defense that since the Lusitania was actually carrying a cargo of 4,200 cases of rifle cartridges, the sinking had been an act of "just self defense." Wilson's handling of the affair was severely criticized by his opponents. The sinking of the Channel steamer, Sussex, March 24, 1916, with the loss of two American lives brought the fear of war ever closer.⁴³ Colonel House and Secretary Robert Lansing urged Wilson to sever diplomatic relations with Germany immediately but Wilson resisted their pleas.⁴⁴ He believed the United States could help to bring the war to a close more quickly by mediation as a neutral than by entering it as a belligerent. However, he sent a note to Germany on April 18, saying that:

Unless the Imperial Government should immediately . . .
effect an abandonment of its . . . submarine warfare against

⁴² Ibid., 628.

⁴³ Paxson, Recent History of the United States, 473.

⁴⁴ Charles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1938), 496.

passenger and freight carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether.⁴⁵

The firmness of this stand convinced the German Government it would be necessary to comply with the President's demands in order to avoid war and announced that the German Government was, "prepared to do its utmost to confine the operations of war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents." The German pledge was a definite diplomatic victory for Wilson for it reassured the Allies who had been uneasy about his adherence to a policy of neutrality.⁴⁶

In the beginning Wilson had obstructed the army and navy in their efforts at preparedness by failing to recommend any enlargement of their establishments but before the Lusitania correspondence came to an end a new policy was under way. He could no longer rely on "unarmed peace as a defender of American safety." The President became an advocate of preparedness and in early 1916 went on a speaking tour in the Mid-West advocating defense. A bitter controversy had been developing over the need for preparedness. The pacifist wing of the peace advocates denied there was any need for defense and that defense measures were provocative of war. Those advocating preparedness argued that the United States was nearly defenseless in her unarmed condition. There were some who thought preparedness was merely a device of the munitions makers to gain war profits. In his efforts to arouse the nation to the realization of the need for defense, Wilson was opposed by certain Democratic leaders in the

⁴⁵ Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916 Supplement of the World War. (Washington: The Government Printing Office, 1929), 234.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Senate and House, including Senator John W. Kern and Claude Kitchen, Democratic Floor Leader.⁴⁷ After a long controversy in Congress the United States Shipping Board was created May 18, 1916; The National Defense Act was passed June 3, providing for a regular army to be gradually enlarged to 175,000 men; and the Council of National Defense was created on August 29, 1916.⁴⁸

Early in 1916, Congress threatened to get out of hand and destroy the President's leadership. Petitions began to pour into the White House urging the President to support a drive being made in both Houses of Congress for the passage of a resolution warning or forbidding Americans to travel on passenger ships belonging to the Allies. While many supporters of this resolution were innocent and sincere, the President felt that back of it was the sinister purpose of German sympathizers to give Germany full freedom on the high seas in order that she might carry on unrestricted submarine warfare. A resolution to bar Americans from sailing on vessels of belligerent nations was introduced by Representative Jeff McLemore of Texas and quickly received the support of Senator Thomas P. Gore of Oklahoma. Wilson was advised by his cabinet officers that he would encounter serious opposition throughout the country if he opposed the resolution. However, Tumulty advised him that he could "afford to be defeated in making a fight to maintain American rights upon the high seas."⁴⁹ The President himself felt the honor of the nation was involved. He took a strong stand against the Gore-McLemore Resolution and it was

⁴⁷ Paxson, Pre-War Years 1913-1917. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1936), 285-305.

⁴⁸ U. S. Stat. L. 39, 167-217.

⁴⁹ Joseph P. Tumulty. Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday-Page and Company, 1921), 202.

tabled by a vote of 275 to 135. Most of the votes favoring the resolution were cast by Republicans.⁵⁰

As the convention period approached in 1916, it seemed obvious that there would be no serious contender in the Democratic Party to run against the President. At the beginning of the pre-convention campaign Democrats were pessimistic about the outcome, finding cause for optimism only in the record of accomplishments of the administration. Nevertheless, Democratic prospects brightened as Progressives pledged themselves to Roosevelt or nothing; as Wilson nominated the radical Boston lawyer, Louis D. Brandeis for the Supreme Court, a move pleasing to the Progressives; as the President adopted a preparedness program and sent John J. Pershing into Mexico after Pancho Villa, in March, thus evading the Republican attacks on his European and Mexican policies.⁵¹

On the Republican side there was much indecision as to a possible candidate. Elihu Root, a former Senator, and the most distinguished of the Republican elder statesmen, was a possibility but his friendship with Roosevelt worked against him for he too disapproved Wilson's policies and hated Germany; a fact sure to repel the German-American vote. He did not actively seek the nomination for he foresaw that his early clients as a New York corporation lawyer would be a hindrance to him. He had been a counsel in the defense of Boss Tweed thirty years before and during the intervening years he had been connected with obtaining franchises for corporations and with the reorganization of corporations in financial difficulties—a type of practice which caused him to be inevitably

⁵⁰ Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 4 Vols., II, 1926), 217.

⁵¹ Paxson, Pre-War Years, 335.

associated in the public mind with "Big Business." Progressives would not consider such a background as suitable for a president. Similar considerations eliminated most of the other names that were suggested. The problem was to find a man who had not been closely identified with either progressives or conservatives and therefore acceptable to both since the Republicans were intent on the problem of wooing the Progressives back to the fold. Only one important figure met this requirement, Charles Evans Hughes. As Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, he had been out of politics since 1910.⁵² Hughes' background had much that appealed to the Republicans. His public utterances had revealed nothing pro or con concerning the German-Americans, a fact that would be helpful in winning their vote. His position on the Supreme Court had made it necessary for him to be neutral on controversial subjects. His views on current administrative policies were unknown to the people in general which would enable the campaign managers to map the strategy without fear of embarrassment from any previous statements that he might have made. His advocates could point to his successful record as a lawyer, Governor of New York, and Supreme Court Judge. Added to these desirable qualities, he had successfully fought corrupt practices in the Insurance Companies and had fought for a direct primary in New York. These liberal practices would surely appeal to the progressive vote.⁵³ Although Hughes was the choice of the Republican National Committee, he was not favored by the Old Guard Leaders such as Elihu Root, Boies Penrose, and Reed Smoot. By convention time Hughes had not indicated that he would accept the nomination if it were offered him.

⁵² Ibid., 339-340.

⁵³ Ibid., 342.

CHAPTER II
THE CONVENTIONS

A. Pre-Convention Maneuvers

The minor parties approached the convention period in 1916, with no hope of doing more than to bring out the dissenting vote. The Socialist Party conducted a mail-primary among its dues-paying members and nominated Allen L. Benson and George R. Kirkpatrick in March. A socialist-Labor ticket was present in April; Arthur Reimer of Massachusetts was their nominee. J. Frank Hanley and Ira M. Landrith were nominated at Nashville by the Prohibitionists. A demonstration in the form of a convention was arranged by the women suffragists to meet in Chicago two days ahead of the Republicans to organize a National Woman's Party.¹

The German-Americans were bitter at the administration because Wilson had classed them as hyphenates and because they regarded his avowed neutrality as a fraud. The term "hyphenism" had been defined by Wilson before the outbreak of the war when he dedicated a monument to a great Irishman, John Barry, who laid the foundation of the American Navy in the Revolutionary War. "Some Americans," Wilson said, "need hyphens in their names because only a part of them came over, but when the whole man has come over, heart and thought and all, the hyphen drops of its own weight out of his name."² On February 27, 1916, representatives for the German-

¹ Frederic L. Paxson, Pre-War Years, 1907-1917, 336.

² Frederic L. Paxson, Recent History of the United States, 1865 to the Present, 490.

language press met in Chicago for a conference led by representatives from the newspaper offices of the New York Staatszeitung and the Chicago Abendpost. They formed the National Association of German Newspaper Publishers to map out a program for opposing the major parties and the government. The confidential nature of the meeting allowed only a few facts to be made public. They were pledged to prevent an American entry into the war and were opposed to the re-election of Wilson with the proviso that Roosevelt's nomination might force them to take Wilson after all. The German-Americans received moral support from the Irish who were more anti-British than ever since the Easter Rebellion in Dublin.³ Just before the Republican Convention, the German-American Newspaper Publishers Association met again in Chicago at the Kaiserhof. The resolution they released on May 29 revealed their opposition to both Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson with Elihu Root holding a position only slightly more acceptable.⁴ Obviously any party containing large numbers of these German and Irish Americans would not be able to ignore their importance as a voting block.

The Progressive National Committee met in Chicago January 11, 1916, to set a date for their convention. They decided to hold their convention simultaneously with the Republican Convention at Chicago on June 7, for the purpose of securing the same nominee for both parties. The radical element felt there was certain to be a stampede for Roosevelt that would win the Republicans to his support. Colonel Roosevelt campaigned in his

³ Paxson, Pre-War Years, 336-37.

The Easter Rebellion was an uprising of Irish extremists at Dublin, for the purpose of obtaining "Home Rule" from Great Britain who promptly suppressed the rebellion and shot most of the leaders.

⁴ Ibid., 339.

own behalf by making speeches in which he advocated preparedness and denounced the Mexican policy of the administration and the Old Guard tactics that had kept him from being nominated in 1912. In May he accepted the support of the Roosevelt Non-partisan League and stated he was willing to accept the nomination if it were tendered him.⁵

The Republicans opened their pre-convention session in Chicago June 1 to arrange for their convention, to hear the contests, and to prepare the list of delegates upon which the preliminary organization would be based. Most of the delegates were the choice of the primaries. The National Committee ruled that such as were legally chosen in their own states were legal as delegates. Charles D. Hilles, chairman of the Republican National Committee in 1912, was still the acting chairman, while Warren G. Harding, a new Ohio Senator, was chosen for the temporary and permanent chairmanship. He was also selected to make the keynote speech because he was a regular party member and had few enemies.⁶ The Republicans were divided into two groups: Those who wanted Hughes, and the Old Guard who opposed him. They were united only in a determination not to nominate Roosevelt.⁷

William F. McCombs, who had done much of the pre-convention work in 1912, still presided over the Democratic National Committee. However, his health had broken and William McAdoo had taken over much of the actual work since Wilson's first term began. Most of the Democrats believed that Wilson would beat any rival. They were especially encouraged by his

⁵ Paxson, Pre-War Years, 334-335.

⁶ Ibid., 335.

⁷ New York Times, June 11, 1916.

increasing interest in a preparedness program and his new firmness with Germany. This would help counteract the criticism of his foreign policy.

B. The Progressive and Republican Conventions

On June 7, 1916, two parties met in Chicago to hold their conventions. The Republicans were meeting in the old Coliseum and the Progressives in the Auditorium Theatre, where Benjamin Harrison was nominated in 1888. Plans were carefully pre-arranged by those leaders of both parties who sought to re-unite the Progressive and Republican Parties in order to win the presidential election that year. Each party wished to fix the terms of reconciliation but the real power was in Republican hands.⁹

Leaders of both parties began to arrive several days before the conventions opened. The progressive leader George W. Perkins, former partner of J. P. Morgan and Company, arrived on June 1, and began giving out news releases to the press. One read:

There is no denying the fact that many of our delegates are in favor of nominating Roosevelt without waiting. Just what will be done no one can tell at this time. Personally, I am in favor of waiting until we see the temper and atmosphere of the Republican convention before making a nomination.¹⁰

Other arrivals in Chicago on June 1 were George Won L. Myer and a group of busy Roosevelt boomers connected with the Republican Roosevelt Committee. The Roosevelt boom was also being advanced from three other headquarters: The Roosevelt Non-Partisan League, the Progressive Roosevelt Committee, and the Bull Moose group. Roosevelt was standing firm and was in no mood to deal with Old Guard leaders on a basis that

⁸ Paxson, Pre-War Years, 335.

⁹ Harold L. Ickes, "Who Killed the Progressive Party," 316.

¹⁰ Paxson, Pre-War Years, 320.

would be to his disadvantage. He was not ready to discuss his attitude toward Justice Hughes unless the Justice said something first. Neither was he content to permit the Old Guard to use him to get Hughes out of the way in order to nominate another whom they would prefer for president.¹¹ His leadership over the Progressive Party had not weakened, although there were Progressives who had always objected to him. His friends remained loyal and were hopeful he could win the Republican nomination.¹² The hundreds of delegates at the Progressive Convention, including a score or more of women, were in general an eager idealistic group intent upon nominating their leader, Roosevelt. However, the bluntness and passion of Roosevelt's recent speeches had made new enemies for him.¹³

There was two groups among the Progressives, one wanted to nominate Roosevelt immediately, while the other group wanted to avoid the appearance of attempting to force a candidate on the Republicans.¹⁴ On the night of June 6, George Perkins conferred with Charles Hilles. They planned to mark time until there was an indication of what the Republicans would do. Perkins proposed to the Progressives that there be a conference of committees representing both the Progressives and the Republicans and that each committee should set forth its proposed candidate and his principles. If the Republicans should name Hughes without giving his principles, the Progressives could propose a recess while they sought to find out from Hughes exactly where he stood on current issues, but the Progressives were unable to unite on this idea.¹⁵ The Republicans gave the impression they

¹¹ New York Times, June 6, 1916.

¹² Paxson, Recent History of the United States, 462.

¹³ New York Times, June 4, 1916.

¹⁴ Outlook, (June 7, 1916), 356.

¹⁵ New York Times, June 6, 1916.

were trying to force the Progressives to a surrender but the latter insisted on their rights as a separate and treaty making power. They had gained one important concession from the Republicans who agreed to put in their platform anything Roosevelt wanted concerning Americanism and preparedness.¹⁶ Up until June 7, Roosevelt was still regarded as being sure to head a third party if he were not nominated by the Republicans or if any favorite son or Old Guard Republican unfavorable to him should be nominated.¹⁷

Although the regular Republicans were opposing Hughes, they were not able to stop a boom developing for his nomination. On June 6, the first definite organization was effected toward that end. Delegates who favored Hughes met in open conference and decided that the time had arrived to work together. Charles W. Fulton, ex-Senator from Oregon, with his nine fellow delegates, was pledged by state primary to Hughes. Fulton issued a call through Chicago newspapers to all delegates in favor of the nomination of Hughes to meet with the Oregon delegates in the Sherman Hotel that afternoon to talk things over. Governor Charles F. Whitman of New York, and Frank H. Hitchcock, ex-Post Master-General and ex-chairman of the Republican National Committee, were among those who attended the meeting. Hitchcock was the leader in promoting the Hughes boom. On the eve of the convention, Hughes had not indicated whether he would accept the nomination if it were offered him. Senator Reed Smoot, of Utah, regarded Elihu Root as the man best fitted to be president but thought he could not defeat Wilson. One anti-Hughes faction made public a letter from Hughes to ex-Governor Edward S. Stokes of New Jersey in which he took an emphatic stand against dragging the Supreme Court into politics by resigning to run

¹⁶ New York Times, June 5, 1916.

¹⁷ New York Times, June 7, 1916.

for public office.¹⁸ As the Republican Convention convened, Hughes sent word to the assemblage that he "was not a candidate, that no one had a right to speak or work in his behalf."¹⁹

After the Progressive Convention had assembled on June 7, Raymond Robins of Illinois was elected by acclamation to be temporary chairman. In his keynote speech, Robins seemed to be attempting to avoid any suggestion that would invite discord. He mingled the idea that there should be union between the Progressives and the Republicans with the idea that "Roosevelt was the one man on whom the eyes of the nation were resting." When he referred to Roosevelt as "the foremost private citizen of the world," he touched off a demonstration that lasted ninety-three minutes; breaking the previous record set by Bryan's supporters in 1908, by four minutes.²⁰ Observers suspected it to be a planned demonstration for there were signals for renewed enthusiasm when the noise showed signs of dying. The only spontaneous applause came when the chairman attempted to restore order. Roosevelt was listening from Oyster Bay through a telephone to the speaker's table. The forced effect of the demonstration and the empty galleries were depressing to those who remembered the wild enthusiasm of 1912. The temporary chairman continued his speech in which he outlined domestic policies; declared for universal suffrage and universal military service. He touched on repudiating the hyphenate vote.²¹

As the convention progressed it became evident that the liberal element, headed by Hiram Johnson of California, and the conservative element,

¹⁸ New York Times, June 2, 1916.

¹⁹ Irving Stone, They Also Ran, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Doran and Co., Inc., 1945), 99.

²⁰ New York Times, June 8, 1916.

²¹ Ibid.

led by Perkins, could find little basis for agreement. The liberals had their own definite program. They believed that if Roosevelt's nomination could be brought about by Thursday, then there would be no reason for him to refuse. Then the Republicans would nominate Hughes who would refuse to accept because of fearing to run against Roosevelt, or the Republicans would nominate a favorite-son who would make the presidential race a three-cornered one, giving Roosevelt a chance at the election, or, who would be replaced in the convention by a united clamor for Roosevelt. Perkins had a far different plan. He sought to delay action by the Progressives, believing that the Republicans would nominate Roosevelt, or, that they would nominate Hughes who would make such a radical statement of policy that it would satisfy Roosevelt and the radical group of the Progressive Party, thereby eliminating any reason for a third party.²² Perkins was backed by a group of big businessmen who were delegates from New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Delaware. Perkins was the chairman of the executive committee and had been holding early conferences with Republican delegates from which Victor Murdock, a member of the committee, was barred.²³ The left-wing group headed by Johnson, Harold Ickes, and William Allen White, were determined to keep in touch with the Republican Convention, so that no deals would be made without their knowledge. It was planned that White would sit by the telegraph instrument at the back of the Auditorium stage and listen to the news coming in from the Coliseum. Donald Richburg was to have a similar post in the Republican Convention Hall. They were to keep each other posted.²⁴

²² The Daily Oklahoman, June 11, 1916.

²³ William Allen White, Autobiography, 522.

²⁴ Ibid.

On June 7 formal approval of the platform tentatively drawn up by Dean William Draper Lewis, of the University of Pennsylvania, and other leaders, was postponed until the next day by the Resolutions Committee, of which Dean Lewis was chairman. They heard delegates and individuals advocating the insertion of special planks.²⁵ The next day Raymond Robins was accepted as permanent chairman. The first delegate recognized by the chair was James R. Garfield, son of the former president, who was welcomed by the conservative members, for he urged the convention to appoint a committee for conferring with a Republican committee on the subject of selecting a nominee acceptable to both Progressives and Republicans. The next speaker was Gifford Pinchot who urged a policy of strength and self-respect. Victor Murdock was arousing the crowd with demands for Roosevelt's nomination, when Robins announced, "Mr. Kirkwood from Missouri has a communication from Oyster Bay." Immediately there was silence as O. K. Davis, the Secretary of the convention read the message. The long telegram from Roosevelt was a surprise to the radicals for it was conciliatory towards the Republicans. He told of his invitation by William Jackson, of Maryland, to appear before the Republican Convention and that he had replied that he would be glad to address their convention if he were invited to do so.²⁶ After the clamor of dissent aroused among the radicals had been quelled by Robins, a resolution was passed to appoint a committee to meet that night in a conference with the Republicans at the Chicago Club. The Progressives sent an invitation to the Republicans and it was accepted. Progressives who were in the conference were: George Perkins, chairman; Governor Hiram Johnson; Horace Wilkenson of New York; Colonel

²⁵ New York Times, June 8, 1916.

²⁶ New York Times, June 9, 1916.

John N. Parker of Louisiana, and ex-Attorney-General Charles Bonaparte of Maryland. The Committee on Rules reported the rules for the convention after which the Committee on Resolutions brought in the platform. It reaffirmed the platform of 1912 in its plank on social and industrial justice, but added planks for the maintenance of America's position in international affairs, for undiluted Americanism, for adequate military preparedness, and equal suffrage for men and women. The suffrage plank received the most cheers.²⁷

Meanwhile, relations between Perkins and the left wing group were becoming increasingly strained. Perkins had a private telephone line connecting his room with Oyster Bay. William Allen White first learned of it when he was summoned to answer a call from Roosevelt in Perkin's room. When Roosevelt complained that his friends had failed to communicate with him, White informed him that they had been making unsuccessful attempts to reach him by telephone, none of them knowing about the private wire. Roosevelt insisted the private wire was put in with the understanding that White, Johnson, Garfield, Robins, and Pinchot would have access to it. In the conversation that followed, Roosevelt said that it would be a mistake for the Progressives to nominate him and that he would suggest the names of Senator Lodge, John W. Weeks, or even Elihu Root as possible alternates.²⁸ That he would suggest such reactionary Republicans, came as a surprise to Mr. White.

In the first meeting of the Progressive and the Republican joint committee, the Progressives learned that the Republicans had not settled on any definite candidate but they would not accept Roosevelt. This was

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ White, op. cit., 524-25.

made plain when Senator Reed Smoot, a representative from the Republican Convention, bluntly announced that his party would accept anyone but Roosevelt.²⁹ In the second conference of the joint committees, there was no evidence of an early adjustment of differences, but before the day was over the conservative Republicans had arranged an agreement of their own to eliminate both Roosevelt and Hughes from consideration. This group, called the "Allies," comprised forces favorable to Root, Fairbanks, Weeks, and Burton. Finally they agreed to combine in one grand vote for Root.³⁰ Senator Borah of Idaho, argued carefully that it would not be wise to nominate Roosevelt in the Republican Convention, due to the complexity of the problems already facing it in caring for its own favorite sons.³¹ In the end the committee conferences failed because the Republican committee would not accept Roosevelt and would make no definite nomination of its own. Even on the third day of the convention, Roosevelt felt confident of being chosen by the Republicans. Up until that time Hughes had not sent any word to the Republican Convention.³²

When the Progressive convention opened Saturday morning, the radical wing, headed by White, Ickes, Robins, and Bainbridge Colby, was secretly determined to nominate Roosevelt as soon as possible. Accordingly Colby asked for recognition from the floor. When Colby was recognized by Robins, Perkins leaped to his feet shouting something that was not understandable in the confusion, White suspected he was trying to tell of the message

²⁹ Claude G. Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 450.

³⁰ New York Times, June 10, 1916.

³¹ Ibid.

³² New York Times, June 10, 1916.

from Roosevelt that he had been withholding from the convention for more than a day. Robins pushed Perkins back into his chair and Colby made the nomination of Roosevelt in less than one-hundred words. There was a tremendous burst of applause. In a few minutes John N. Parker was nominated for vice-president. Perkins still withheld the Roosevelt message while a money raising campaign went on during which over a hundred thousand dollars was raised. At last, late in the afternoon, at five o'clock, the message from Roosevelt giving his conditional refusal was read to the convention:

I am very grateful for the honor you confer upon me by nominating me as President. I cannot accept it at this time. I do not know the attitude of the candidate of the Republican Party toward the vital questions of the day. Therefore if you desire an immediate decision, I must decline the nomination. But if you prefer to wait, I suggest that my conditional refusal to run be placed in the hands of the Progressive National Committee. If Mr. Hughes's statements, when he makes them, shall satisfy the committee that it is for the interest of the country that he be elected, they can act accordingly and treat my refusal as definitely accepted. If they are not satisfied, they can so notify the Progressive Party, and at the same time they can confer with me, and then determine on whatever action we may severally deem appropriate to meet the needs of the country.³³

Men shouted in rage and tore their Roosevelt badges off and threw them on the floor when they heard the words, "I cannot accept it at this time." With these words Roosevelt pronounced the end of the Progressive Party as an effective working group in national affairs. However, one last official act was performed Monday, June 26, when the Progressive National Committee voted to make no other nomination but to approve the nomination of Mr. Hughes. "Under such circumstances," said Mr. Roosevelt, "our duty is to do the best we can and not sulk because our leadership is rejected."³⁴

³³ Harold Howland, Theodore Roosevelt and His Times, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921), 232-239.

³⁴ "Hughes, Roosevelt, and Union," The Outlook, (July 5, 1916), 381.

Opinion about Roosevelt's repudiation of his party differed according to the individual. The radical element felt that he had betrayed his party while the more conservative element, represented by an editorial in the New York Times of June 12, regarded his actions as a wise effort to bring about a reconciliation with the Republican Party.

When the Republicans gathered at the Coliseum June 7 for their National Convention, there was a lack of enthusiasm in the gathering. It was 11:29 o'clock A.M. when Charles D. Hilles called the convention to order. Only polite applause greeted the keynote speaker, Warren G. Harding, who spoke for one hour and forty minutes, stressing party unity. He declared for a scientific tariff, industrial preparedness, and government protection of American rights at home and abroad. On the Mexican question he merely denounced the policy of Wilson's Administration. It was an able speech but he spoke in a monotone which failed to arouse the desired enthusiasm. He pleased some Middle-Western delegates when he praised the German-Americans who had become Americanized. When he had finished speaking, there was no demonstration. The various delegations handed up the names of their respective members of committees, some formal announcements were made, and the convention was adjourned to meet again at eleven o'clock the next day.³⁵ During the next session when the convention received and adopted the reports of committees, the delegates from Hawaii, Porto Rico, and the Philippines received the right to vote in the convention. It had been agreed that "Americanism" would be the theme of the convention; accordingly Chauncey M. Depew made a speech favoring "Americanism." He did not mention Mr. Roosevelt by name but referred to him as "a great American," for the order had gone out that his name was not to be

³⁵ New York Times, June 8, 1916.

mentioned. Joe Cannon, who was eighty years old at the time, made a speech on undivided allegiance and "America First." Senator Borah came out strongly against Hyphenism.³⁶ Before the presentation of the platform, June 8, the Committee on Resolutions spent several hours discussing the plank on woman suffrage, then finally adopted it by a vote of 35 to 11 after it had been amended to pledge the Republican Party to accept the action of the various state legislatures rather than an amendment of the Federal Constitution as demanded by the National American Woman Suffrage Association and the Congressional Union for Woman Suffrage.³⁷ Senator Lodge read the platform which contained the following planks:

1. **Protection of American Rights**
Pledged the protection of American citizens abroad and the desire for a peace of justice and right. Asserted that the Wilson Administration had weakened United States influence abroad.
2. **Mexico**
Expressed sympathy for the Mexican people and pledged the aid of the United States in restoring order.
3. **Monroe Doctrine**
Expressed approval of the Monroe Doctrine.
4. **Latin America**
Favored closer commercial, financial, and social relations with Latin America.
5. **Philippines**
Condemned the Democrats for neglecting the Philippines and favored aiding them.
6. **Treaty with Russia**
Favored the right of expatriation for Russian subjects.
7. **Protection of the United States**
Favored an adequate national defense.
8. **Tariff**
Advocated the protection of American industry and labor. Declared the Underwood Tariff Act to be a complete failure in every respect and favored the creation of a Tariff Commission.
9. **Business**
Encouraged American business but declared against over-regulation.
10. **Rural Credits**
Favored an effective system of Rural Credits and opposed the ineffective one adopted by the Democrats.

³⁶ New York Times, June 9, 1916.

³⁷ Ibid.

11. Rural Free Delivery
Favored the extension of the Rural Free Delivery and condemned the Democrats for crippling it.
12. Merchant Marine
Encouraged shipping interests but opposed government ownership of the vessels.
13. Transportation
Favored Federal control of Transportation.
14. Economy of the National Budget
Favored a simple business-like budget.
15. Conservation
Expressed a belief in the need for conservation of national resources.
16. Civil Service Reform
Favored reform and condemned abuse of the service by the Democrats.
17. Territorial Matters
Declared that officials administering territories should be "bona fide residents thereof."
18. Labor Laws
Favored the safety, conservation, and protection of labor.
19. Woman Suffrage
Favored woman suffrage by states rather than by an amendment of the Federal Constitution.³⁸

Only a few lines were given to Rural Credits, Rural Free Delivery, Conservation, Territorial Matters, Labor, and Transportation. Most of the space was given to Protection of American Rights, Mexico, and the Tariff.

E. G. Gross, the Wisconsin member of the Resolutions Committee, read the minority report. It contained all of the La Follette planks, such as: A demand for government operation of coal mines, approval of the La Follette Seaman's Law, and Workmen's pensions. The most important point was the declaration against the export of munitions and the demand for government ownership of munitions plants. The plank dealing with munitions was the only one voted on in the committee and it lost by a vote of forty-five to one.³⁹ It was at this juncture that the invitation came from the Progressive Convention inviting them to meet in a conference

³⁸ New York Times, June 9, 1916.

³⁹ Ibid.

of joint committees. The committee appointed consisted of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman; ex-Senator Winthrop Murry Crane of Massachusetts; Senator William E. Borah of Idaho; Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler of New York; and ex-Congressman Rosellus Johnson of Ohio.⁴⁰ The convention adjourned until eleven o'clock the next day, Friday, June 9.

On Friday the Allies faced a last stand against the Hughes forces. Steps were taken against desertions. All were agreed that if Roosevelt would make a selection of some other candidate they would abide by his decision and attempt to nominate that man. Former Senator Root was favored because those who were opposed to Hughes' nomination argued that they must consider the supposed ambition of Roosevelt to get the Republican nomination in 1920, while the advanced age of Root would cause him to seek no further term if elected. After sitting ten hours and listening to eleven nominating speeches for Roosevelt and the favorite sons, Root, Fairbanks, Weeks, and Burton, Hughes was nominated on the third ballot.⁴¹ On the first ballot Senator Weeks had received 105 votes; Root 103; Cummins 85; Fairbanks 74½; Sherman 66; Roosevelt 65; and Knox 36. Henry Ford got 32 votes from Michigan by instruction. William H. Taft got 14 from Texas, then there were scattering complimentary votes for Borah, Willis, and McCall. Thomas Fairbanks was the vice presidential nominee.

Hughes' nomination was a personal triumph for Mr. Hitchcock over the Old Guard. Hughes immediately resigned his position on the Supreme Court bench to accept the nomination. He believed that he had no choice but

⁴⁰ New York Times, June 9, 1916.

⁴¹ This was the first time since 1888 that a Republican Convention had taken more than one ballot to nominate a presidential candidate. The Daily Oklahoman, June 10, 1916.

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to accept the nomination in order to preserve the unity within the Republican Party.

C. The Democratic Convention

Woodrow Wilson was the vital force that shaped events in the Democratic Convention which was held in St. Louis, beginning June 14, 1916. His ideas dominated the plans for the convention. He wished the keynote of the convention program to be Americanism with demonstrations hinging on nationalism and the flag, and purposely set the date of the convention on a day already designated as annual Flag Day.⁴² Wilson remained at the White House while the convention was in session, keeping in touch with proceedings by telephone. He sent Newton D. Baker to the convention as his representative to appear before the various committees and to collaborate with the committee on resolutions in drawing up a platform, a draft of which he took with him. Wilson selected Martin Glynn of New York as temporary chairman of the convention, and Ollie M. James as permanent chairman. But when he sent word to replace William F. McCombs with William McAdoo as chairman of the National Democratic Committee, the National Committeemen rebelled and selected Homer S. Cummings, of Connecticut, who was already serving as vice-chairman of the committee. There was some opposition to Thomas Marshall as the vice-presidential nominee but it was decided it would be expedient to name him in order to draw the Indiana vote away from Fairbanks.⁴³ The Democrats were annoyed by the Republican's use of their own idea of "Americanism" as the keynote of their convention. Accordingly the Democrats planned to stress

⁴² Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson Life and Letters. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 8 Vols., 1939). Facing War 1915-1917, VI, 263.

⁴³ New York Times, June 12, 1916.

Americanism so fervently that it would force the Republicans on the defensive.⁴⁴ "Peace, Prosperity, and Preparedness" was the slogan used to augment the "Americanism" idea.

The assemblage was aroused to a high pitch of enthusiasm by the ten-thousand word keynote speech of temporary chairman Martin Glynn who gave a ringing defense of Wilson's policy of neutrality. In his speech he said:

This policy may not satisfy those who revel in destruction and find pleasure in despair. It may not satisfy the fire-eater or the swash-buckler but it does satisfy those who worship at the altar of peace . . . It does satisfy the fathers of the land and the sons of the land who will fight when reason primes the rifle, when honor draws the sword, when justice breathes a blessing on the standards they uphold.⁴⁵

When the Resolutions Committee presented the platform there was a long period of discussion concerning the relative merits of the proposed planks. Wilson recommended a strong stand on the issue of hyphenism. The hyphenate plank adopted condemned as subversive the activities of all groups interested in the advancement of a foreign power and condemned any political party which surrenders its integrity or modifies its policy to meet the demands of the conspirators. This issue of the hyphenate vote was highly controversial during the campaign, but was magnified out of proportion to its actual importance. The total number of hyphenates in the United States was relatively small. However, the Democrats seized an advantage by coming out strongly from the beginning on this issue.⁴⁶

The most serious debate of the convention concerned woman suffrage. Although he had opposed woman suffrage in 1912, Wilson's prepared statement on woman suffrage which Baker carried to St. Louis expressed the opinion

⁴⁴ New York Times, June 14, 1916.

⁴⁵ Joseph P. Tumulty, Wilson as I Knew Him, 184.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 191.

that suffrage should be adopted but that it should be left to state action. The suffrage plank read: "We recommend the extension of the franchise to the women of the country by the states upon the same terms as to the men."⁴⁷

The last sentence in the nominating speech for Wilson contained the phrase, "He Kept Us Out of War" which became a much-used slogan during the campaign. Wilson himself never used this slogan which implied that since he had "Kept us out of war," he would continue to do so. Nor did he ever condemn its use as a campaign slogan. His theme of "Americanism" became overshadowed by this idea, a development that was considered dangerous by certain leaders who were well aware of the Republican criticism on that score. They felt it more than ever necessary to rally behind Wilson's "American" plank because it would not do to have the Democrats represented as the "peace at any price party." Wilson sanctioned their stand in a telegram from Washington, urging the adoption of the plank.⁴⁸ A plank was rejected by Wilson that would have condemned Hughes for leaving the Supreme Court to run for office. The anti-dumping clause of the tariff plank aroused opposition because it was a departure from the Democrat policy of tariff for revenue only and would provide some protection for American manufacturers against cheap foreign imports.⁴⁹ Although party leaders opposed the anti-dumping clause, the tariff plank was adopted by the convention because it had the approval of the President.

In general, the platform adopted by the convention followed the

⁴⁷ Baker, op. cit., VI, 259.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Congressional Record, Vol. 50, 63 Congress, 1st session, 1913, 1235.

suggestions of the President.⁵⁰ It was a comprehensive platform and gave first place to the record of achievement in Wilson's Administration, stressing particularly the Federal Reserve Act, the creation of the Federal Trade Commission, tariff revision downward, improved labor laws, and the creation of a self-supporting postal system. The platform stood for a tariff for the purpose of providing sufficient revenue for the operation of the government and unreservedly indorsed the Underwood Tariff Law. It also indorsed a nonpartisan tariff commission. It condemned disloyalty to the American Government and declared the nation should render itself secure against the hazard of interference from any quarter and should be able to protect itself upon the high seas or in any part of the world. It favored the establishment and maintenance of the closest relations of amity and mutual helpfulness between the United States and the other Republics of the American continent. It reaffirmed the Monroe Doctrine. It favored the conservation and development of natural resources, the Federal Reserve Act, and the Rural Credit Act which would make credit constantly available to the farmer. It sponsored a Grain Trades and Warehouse Bill and the construction of adequate highways and rural roads. It came out boldly for improvement in the rules governing government relations to its employees by stressing seven definite reforms:

1. A living wage for all employees.
2. Eight-hour working day.
3. Adoption of safety appliances and sanitation.
4. Accident compensation.
5. Standards of the child labor Laws wherever minors are employed.
6. Improved health and comfort provisions for working women.
7. An equitable retirement law.

As to labor, the platform declared its faith in the Seaman's Act, and favored a federal child labor law and the creation of a Federal Bureau of

⁵⁰ New York Times, June 15, 1916.

Safety in the Department of Labor. The platform also favored the establishing of Federal tuberculosis sanitariums, the alteration of Senate rules of procedure for greater efficiency, an economic budget, enforcement of civil service laws, the promotion of self-government for the Philippines, woman suffrage, the protection of American citizens at home or abroad, drastic reform of penal institutions, pensions for soldiers and their widows, flood control, and the granting of territorial government to Alaska, Hawaii, and Porto Rico.⁵¹

The "Record of Achievement" plank, which was given first place in the platform was in fact the most important of all the planks, for in the final analysis it appeared to be this record that led to the re-nomination of Wilson. If his administration had not enacted the progressive legislation demanded by the people, the Democrats would have had less chance of winning the election. Increasing international tension made the "preparedness" plank necessary for political reasons as well as for purposes of security, for Wilson's slowness in adopting a preparedness program had been ridiculed by the Republicans. The plank on "Americanism" stressed anew the theme of the convention. The platform stand on Mexico reiterated Wilson's determination not to intervene in the struggle of the Mexican people to select their own leader. The farm vote would be important in winning the election and was wooed by a plank citing farm legislation pending in the Senate. In adopting the plank on woman suffrage the convention was seeking to gain the votes of the militant suffragists who had used pressure methods to gain its adoption. The plank for the protection of American citizens abroad was especially pertinent because of the war situation in Europe

⁵¹ The Democratic Textbook 1916. (New York and Chicago: The Democratic National Committee, 1916), 26.

and Mexico, and because the same problem had drawn criticism of the administration from the Republicans.

When the time arrived to nominate the candidate for president, John W. Wescott placed Wilson's name in nomination, as he had done in Baltimore in 1912.⁵² On the motion of Senator Hughes of New Jersey, the rules were suspended and no ballots were taken. Woodrow Wilson and Thomas Marshall were nominated by acclamation at 11:52 o'clock Thursday night, June 15. The nomination was over in four minutes. Wilson was notified of his nomination by Tumulty at one o'clock A.M. Wilson's only comment was, "I am very grateful to my generous friends." The convention ended at eight o'clock P.M., Friday, June 16.⁵³

⁵² The Daily Oklahoman, June 13, 1916.

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CHAPTER III

THE CAMPAIGN

There was much in common between the two presidential candidates. Both Mr. Hughes and President Wilson were sons of clergymen, both had shown strong mental powers at an early age, both had been teachers and university professors, both had been progressive governors of their states, both had fought for the people against the trusts, both had cast off the rule of party bosses, and alike they had brought the divergent factions within their party to work in harmony. In fact, Roosevelt referred to Mr. Hughes as the "bearded Wilson."¹

Hughes was born in Glen Falls, New York, April 11, 1862. At the age of fourteen, he entered Madison (now Colgate) University. He received his M.A. Degree at Brown University in 1884. He taught school at Delhi, New York, and studied law in his spare time. He received a law degree from Columbia Law School in 1884, and in the same year was admitted to the New York Bar where he practiced law until 1891, when he became a professor of law at Cornell University.² In 1905 he was employed as counsel for the Stevens Gas and Electric Lighting Commission, a committee appointed by the State Legislature to investigate the cost of gas. During the next two years he acted as counsel for the Armstrong Life Insurance Commission which investigated the affairs of the life insurance companies operating under state charters. In 1906, he was retained by the Interstate

¹ Irving Stone, They Also Ran, 111.

² Ibid., 104.

Commerce Commission to investigate alleged violations of the Sherman law by the coal-carrying railroads.³ His successful conduct of these investigations helped to launch the liberal revolt against the bosses of business and politics. It was in 1906 that he won the governorship of New York. During his regime as governor he distinguished himself by the initiation of far-reaching reforms including the formation of a Public Service Commission, legislation respecting women and children in factories, and stricter election laws. He resigned as governor October 6, 1910, when he was appointed Associate Justice of the Supreme Court by President Taft. He remained in this position for six years.

The highest honor of his career came to him when he was nominated for the presidency of the United States by the Republican National Convention at Chicago in 1916. He appeared to regret leaving the Supreme Court for he had been a happy and well adjusted figure in that position. At the opening of the campaign it seemed that no better selection could have been made. His high character and proved ability made him the logical choice of the Republicans.⁴ He had fought in New York for the direct primary, and was expected to be progressive. He was acceptable to the conservative Republicans because of his record as a capable judge.⁵

Hughes began his campaign only a week after the Republican convention and opened his headquarters at the Hotel Astor in New York City.⁶ He decided at once that he could not trust the exclusive management of his campaign to the Republican National Committee. This committee was

³ "Charles E. Hughes," Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. XI. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 24 vols., 1921), 865.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Fredrick L. Paxson, Pre-War Years 1913-1917, 341.

⁶ New York Times, June 13, 1916.

controlled by Melrose Crane, Boise Penrose, and Reed Smoot.⁷ They wanted Hughes no more than they did Roosevelt and agreed to his nomination only because they were willing to accept "anybody to beat Wilson." Accordingly he set up a campaign committee of his own consisting of eleven Republicans and six Progressives. They were:

Republicans

John T. Adams of Iowa,
 William H. Crocker of California,
 F. W. Eastbrook of New Hampshire,
 James Hemanway of Indiana,
 Robert B. Howell of Nebraska,
 Alvin H. Martin of Virginia,
 Herbert Parsons of New York,
 Albert Perkins of Washington,
 Charles F. Warrens of Michigan,
 Ralph E. Williams of Oregon,
 Alvin T. Hert of Kansas.

Progressives

Everett Colby of New Jersey,
 James R. Garfield of Ohio,
 George W. Perkins of New York,
 Chester Howell of Colorado,
 Oscar Strauss of New York,
 Harold L. Ickes of Illinois.

In choosing Progressives who supported Roosevelt, Hughes was making a direct bid for the Bull Moose vote. Senator Sherman of Illinois and William H. Thompson, Mayor of Chicago, made a special trip to New York to protest to Hughes his selection of Progressives. These two men were received coldly by the candidate and told that his committee would stand as it was.⁸ He could not afford to yield to the demand of the conservative element of the party because it would alienate the progressive and independent vote and jeopardize his control of the campaign.

William R. Wilcox was chosen chairman of the Republican National Committee. He was not the first choice of the Crane steering committee

⁷ The Daily Oklahoman, June 14, 1916.

⁸ Harold L. Ickes, Autobiography of a Curmudgeon. (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1943), 460-489.

but was the personal choice of Hughes and was approved by Roosevelt. Hughes had appointed him chairman of the Public Service Commission during his governorship of New York. Wilcox had the added advantage of having served two and a half years by appointment of Roosevelt as Postmaster of New York City. He had of late been practicing Law and had not participated in the schism between the Republicans and the Progressives in 1912, a fact that enabled the conservatives to accept him. Frank Hitchcock was chosen as principal advisor to Wilcox.⁹ Warren G. Harding performed the notification ceremonies.

In his search for a vulnerable spot in Wilson's administration, Hughes selected the Mexican problem. He devoted almost half of his first speech to scoring the "blunders" Wilson had made in handling the situation, declaring that the administration had made enemies instead of friends of the Mexican people.¹⁰ Among his listeners was Colonel Roosevelt, who received a three or four minute ovation when he entered his box. When the speech was over Roosevelt told reporters that he thought the speech admirable and that he liked the way in which Mr. Hughes exposed Wilson's "Mexican Policy" and his handling of foreign affairs in general. But there was something lacking in Hughes's speech. The New York Evening Post stated that: "While Hughes has taken the offensive forcefully, he has not clearly indicated the positive policy which he himself would pursue."¹¹

Hughes was able to choose his own issues during the first two months of the campaign because Wilson did not engage in a speaking campaign until

⁹ The New York Times, (June 28, 1916).

¹⁰ "Why Hughes Finds Wilson Wanting," Literary Digest, LIII (August 12, 1916), 335.

¹¹ Literary Digest, LIII (August 12, 1916), 335.

after his acceptance speech in September. Nevertheless, the President was actually campaigning in a subtle way when he let it be known by his actions that he felt the affairs of state held precedence over campaign tours. Hughes made the first blunder of his campaign when he sent a curt letter of resignation from the Supreme Court to the President soon after receiving the Republican nomination. The Wilson family had held the warmest feeling of admiration and friendship toward Mr. Hughes and the brief note which read, "I hereby resign the office of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States," angered Wilson by its cold tactlessness.¹² Senator Ollie M. James of Kentucky advised him not to answer the note but the President said, "No, my dear Senator, the President of the United States must always do the gentlemanly thing." He answered as follows:

I am in receipt of your letter of resignation and feel constrained to yield to your desire. I therefore, accept your resignation as Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States to take effect at once.¹³

The opening of the campaign in 1916, found Wilson busy with his presidential duties which were rendered more than normally burdensome by the continuing conflict in Europe and the unrest in Mexico. He was faced with the rising antagonism of financial interests in the East who opposed his progressive reforms and the isolationists who opposed foreign entanglements and were worried by his efforts at preparedness. Since he had been elected by only a minority of the popular votes in 1912, when he had faced a divided Republican vote, the contest in 1916 promised to be doubly hard, for he would face a united Republican Party. The united party, though, would not include those independent voters who were opposed to war, those

¹² Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him, 192.

¹³ Ibid.

confirmed Progressives who continued to hold out against reunion with the Republicans, or a small part of the pro-Germans who would favor Wilson.¹⁴ It was this combined vote that loomed as a potential source of victory for the Democrats if they were to win in November. It would be an easier matter to win the Progressive vote than the independent vote because the Progressives were more interested in domestic reforms. Many independents were uneasy about foreign developments.¹⁵ Since this segment of the vote showed more strength in the West, Democratic campaign leaders early planned a strategy for winning that section to the Democratic cause. Certain advantages lay with Wilson: First, the fact that as leader of the party in power he could shift the issues at will by sponsoring certain legislation or by vetoing certain bills coming up from Congress; Second, he was experienced in the job of being President; Third, was the administration's record of legislation, which was designed to appeal to the masses; and a Fourth factor was the President's capable leadership of a united Democratic Congress.¹⁶

A major factor in the success of a campaign is the calibre of the campaign manager. Wilson's choice of Vance McCormick as chairman of the Democratic National Committee was an astute political move. In 1914, when McCormick had been the Democratic candidate for governor of Pennsylvania, he had enlisted the Progressives in his behalf. They were willing to champion him because of his fight against machine elements. Roosevelt had thrown his support in with McCormick, but the opposition was too strong and McCormick lost the election. His background of Progressive affiliation

¹⁴ Baker, Woodrow Wilson Life and Letters, VI, 263.

¹⁵ Ibid., 264.

¹⁶ Fredrick Austin Ogg, National Progress, 374.

was expected to do much toward winning the Progressive vote. At the time of his selection, McCormick was forty-four years old. He was a successful business man; a good organizer and administrator. He owned two Democratic newspapers that had been successful in the Republican state of Pennsylvania. At the age of twenty-nine, he was elected Mayor of Harrisburg, and became the most successful Mayor that city ever had.¹⁷ With the aid of Henry W. Palmer, another Democrat, McCormick had succeeded in getting control of the corrupt Democratic political machine of Pennsylvania out of the hands of Colonel Guffy, the staunch political boss of that state. Wilson looked to McCormick for campaign strategy and was thoroughly pleased with the methods used.¹⁸

House played an important part in the campaign. It was his plan to divide the country into small units. In each unit local workers were to segregate the voters certain to be Republican or Democratic. He estimated that there would be twenty per cent of the voters left who could be influenced by argument. The intensive work of influencing this twenty per cent was under the direction of Daniel C. Roper. House classified New York, Maryland, Missouri, Arizona, and Wyoming as the states where the Democrats would have to exert the most effort because of the number of electoral votes involved or because they were regarded as doubtful states.¹⁹

Among the important problems facing the President in July and August were the threat of a serious railroad strike, the controversy with Great Britain over the Black List policy, the vexing Mexican situation, and the opposition in Congress to certain politically significant pending

¹⁷ Baker, op. cit., VI, 265.

¹⁸ Thomas Sugrue, Starling of the White House. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 73.

¹⁹ Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, II, 358.

legislation. In the spring of 1916, the demands of the railroad workers for an eight-hour day became increasingly insistent. On March 30, the demands of more than 300,000 railroad men were formally submitted to the managers of 458 roads. The managers rejected the shortened day and made several counter-proposals. Negotiations were resumed in New York City June 1. A. B. Garretson, head of the conductors, was chief spokesman for the workers and Elisha Lee, General Manager of the Pennsylvania railroad, headed the managers' fight. The Brotherhoods were against compromise or arbitration, but the managers were determined to arbitrate. Negotiations were broken off June 16, but were resumed August 8, again without results. Following this lack of action, Wilson called a conference of both sides. He suggested arbitration and again the Brotherhoods objected and made plans for a general strike effective September 4. The President asked the Brotherhoods to postpone the strike, but they refused by saying that the authority to suspend the strike lay with the men. The President then appeared before a joint session of Congress and asked for the enactment of an eight-hour law for railroad transportation employees. The measure passed the House September 1st, and passed the Senate the next day. It was signed by the President September 3, one day before the strike order was to become effective. The law, known as the Adamson Eight-Hour Law, established the basic eight-hour day for train service employees effective January 1, 1917, and authorized a commission appointed by the President to investigate its workings. Although the threat of an immediate strike was averted the controversy was not actually settled until March 18, 1917, when the railways of the United States agreed to establish the basic eight-hour day and the constitutionality of the Adamson Act was upheld by the Supreme Court, March 19, 1917.²⁰

²⁰ 243 U.S., 756-791 (1917).

The Black List affair was important because the manner of handling would either lose or win votes for the President. On July 18, 1916, the British drew up a list of eighty-five persons or firms in the United States who were suspected of giving aid to the Germans and with whom the subjects of Britain were forbidden to trade. This was a blow to the American exporters because it curtailed their shipping activities. The British resorted to the unprecedented action of issuing directives to American shippers. A circular was issued by the British Consulate-General in New York, March 4, 1916, stating how American shippers to Scandinavian countries could improve their chances of escaping seizure and search by filling out a detailed application blank which gave:

1. The name and address of the consignor,
2. The complete description and quantity of the goods,
3. The name and address of the consignee,
4. The name of the steamship line which would transport the goods, and the date of sailing and the name of the vessel when known.

On September 20, 1916, the British vice-consul at Newport News, Virginia, issued directions warning American coal operators that they must sign an affidavit in which they agreed "not to deal directly or indirectly with her enemy ships or concerns. . . that every delivery of bunker coal made to them and elsewhere would be reported to the British Consul."²¹ President Wilson asked and received from Congress the necessary authority to employ retaliatory measures (which were never used) including an embargo and sent a vigorous note of protest to Great Britain.²² This action, whether calculated for the purpose or not, was pleasing to the Irish who hated England for their own reasons and the German-Americans who felt the President

²¹ Foreign Relations Papers of the United States, September 20, 1916, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1929), 457-496.

²² Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 637-38.

had been Pro-British rather than Pro-German all along; it was certain to win votes among them.

The situation in Mexico was basically unchanged. The troops under John J. Pershing were still stationed at El Paso.²³ Wilson's policy of "watchful waiting"; his determination to allow the Mexican people to work out their own salvation without foreign intervention was galling to his opponents, especially Roosevelt who was now campaigning for Hughes. Then too, the Catholics of the United States resented Wilson's recognition on October 19, 1915, of the Carranza government, for they regarded him as an enemy to their faith. Wilson chose to pursue a policy of "hands off," rather than yield to the clamor of the opposition. He continued this policy and in February, 1917, Pershing's troops were removed from the Mexican border. A joint American and Mexican Commission recommended the recognition of the Carranza government and Wilson sent Ambassador Fletcher to Mexico City.²⁴

In the closing weeks of the Congress, which adjourned September 8, the President sought the enactment of measures having great political significance. One of them was the Federal Farm Loan Act enacted in July. This act provided for the establishment of banks which would lend on mortgage and were equipped at the start with federal funds. This bill was expected to quiet the discontent of farmers, especially those in North Dakota who had bolted the Republican Party ticket more than once.²⁵ In mid-July Wilson began his fight for a child labor law. The President based his demands on the fact that all three platforms favored such an act,

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Paxson, Pre-War Years, 351.

²⁵ New York Times, July 22, 1916.

and made a personal visit to Congress to impress his views on the Senate leaders. There was the threat of a serious party revolt on this question for it was opposed by southern Democrats. Nevertheless, Wilson postponed his acceptance speech until it was passed and he signed it September 1. The Keating-Owen bill, which provided for the restriction of child labor by barring its products from inter-state commerce, was the first attempt in this direction by the United States Government. The bill later was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.²⁶ Again Wilson approved it, this time under the taxing clause, but again the Supreme Court declared it void. In spite of this the President made gains among the laborers because of his stand on the question. On the last day of the session, advocates of high tariff were appeased by the signing of a bill creating the United States Tariff Commission.²⁷

With a busy legislative program completed the President moved his household to Shadow Lawn, New Jersey, on September 1. Shadow Lawn was an estate of eight or ten acres near Asbury Park. The large house had a speaker's platform built in front of it to be used during the campaign. The notification ceremony was held on the portico September 2, with Senator James performing the ritual of notification. In his acceptance speech, Wilson told the 25,000 listeners that the Republicans had lost their political power. "The Republican Party was put out of power," he said, "because it served special interests and not the country at large . . . because it had lost touch with the thoughts and deeds of the Nation."²⁸ He went on to give a vivid review of the achievements of his

²⁶ *Hammer v Dagenhart*, 247 U.S., 1101 (1919); also, V. 39 *Stat. L.* pt. 1, 675-76.

²⁷ Paxson, *Pre-War Years*, 353.

²⁸ *The Democratic Textbook*, 1916, 30.

administration, citing specifically the revision of the tariff downward; the Clayton Anti-Trust Act; the Federal Trade Commission Act; The Federal Reserve Act, and the Federal Farm Loan Act. In this speech he avoided any reference to the campaign slogan of keeping the nation out of war and declared that "America could no longer successfully pursue a policy of isolation."²⁹ This was in keeping with an effort to appease those who thought him lax in his preparedness program.

During the summer, Mr. Hughes was busy making a vigorous campaign. He was able to deliver a telling blow against the President by being the first to come out for the constitutional amendment providing for woman suffrage as advocated by Susan B. Anthony. When Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, president of the American Woman Suffrage Association, learned that Mr. Hughes was in favor of a federal amendment, she called on the President and urged him to do likewise. He was, however, unwilling to sacrifice his convictions on this point in order to win votes. It was at this point of the campaign that the Republican National Committee injected something new into the party's strategy by sending a trainload of socially prominent women into the West to campaign for Hughes by appealing to the suffragists who were expected to favor him over Wilson after Hughes's definite stand in favor of a national amendment for woman suffrage. Unfortunately the women campaigners were unable to make the desired impression on the women of the West and instead of gaining popular approval, the train was dubbed "the millionaire's special," and according to Ickes, proceeded to lose votes along the way.³⁰ The next blunder Hughes committed was making a tour of the West. On August 6, he and Mrs. Hughes began the western

²⁹ Baker, op. cit., VI, 273.

³⁰ Ickes, Autobiography, 180.

campaign tour against the advice of the western committeemen who feared his dignified reserve would not appeal to the masses and were doubtful of the wisdom of a tour of California where the Progressives and Republicans were in a struggle for power. Neither side wanted Hughes to enter the state before the primary election, which was to be held August 29, for fear the other side would benefit from his presence.³¹ Hughes, however, had ideas of his own. He had well understood what his advisers had been trying to tell him, but was determined to show everyone, including his advisers, that he was a candidate for all the people, that he had emotions and that he wanted to know every group and its problems. In Detroit, he first displayed his "humanness" by jumping upon the roof of the baseball players dugout to shake hands with the players and to chat with Ty Cobb. In Butte, Montana, he got into miner's clothes and went down into a copper mine. In Reno, Nevada, he attended a barbecue and a rodeo, and mingled with the cowboys. He was warm, hearty, and cordial. The newsmen in his entourage reported to the papers that he was genuinely human and responsive.³² The New York Post for August 17 reported that he was making the most remarkable record of successful campaigning of any presidential candidate in recent years.

In California, Progressive leaders made an effort to reunite with the Republicans but the Old Guard rejected these overtures by selecting William H. Crocker, a conservative, as the California member of the Republican National Committee. Conservative Republicans were also seeking to eliminate Governor Johnson as a Progressive-Republican³³ candidate

³¹ Ibid., 181.

³² Irving Stone, op. cit., 112.

³³ The California law permitted a candidate to run in more than one party.

for the United States Senate in the primary of August.³⁴ When it was learned that Hughes planned a visit to California, Mr. Francis H. Keesling, chairman of the Republican State Central Committee, joined Mr. Crocker in sending a telegram to Wilcox asking that Hughes delay his visit until after the primary election. Hughes did not allow this to alter his plans. Johnson had been causing some anxious moments among the Republicans. On June 12, he went to New York to confer with Progressives to determine future plans. While there Wilcox took him to the Hotel Astor to talk with Hughes. It was not known what they talked about. On the train returning home Johnson met Crocker, who expressed the hope that Johnson would be with the Republicans in the National Campaign. The Governor replied that he intended to support Hughes and would so announce publicly when he reached Sacramento. He did make a speech on June 27, in which he announced his support for Hughes, and at a conference of Progressives in San Francisco on July 8, before about one thousand delegates, again pledged his support for Hughes.³⁵ The Republicans arranged the Hughes itinerary so that he would travel the length of the state as far down as San Diego. The greatest of the party rallies was to be held in San Francisco, August 18.³⁶ Chester H. Rowell, Progressive National Committeeman, met Hughes at Portland, Oregon. He was a close political friend of Johnson who was acting in accordance with a telegram from Wilcox. Rowell talked to Hughes at length and in detail about all the conditions in the state. Hughes listened attentively but made no comment. When the train reached

³⁴ Paxson, Pre-War Years, 351.

³⁵ E. G. Lowery, "What Happened in California," Colliers LVIII. (New York: February 17, 1917), 5.

³⁶ Paxson, Pre-War Years, 357.

the state line Friday, August 18, Hughes was met by Crocker and Keesling. When these two members of the Old Guard came aboard the train, Rowell retired to give them a chance to tell their side of the story.³⁷ Arriving at San Francisco, Crocker and Keesling rode in an automobile with Hughes to the Palace Hotel, leaving Rowell to follow in another car. In his first speech in San Francisco, Hughes said, "I came here as a spokesman for the National Republican Party. With local differences I have no concern." It now appeared to the Progressives of that state that Hughes was in the state to aid the regular party members and that Johnson and his friends could not expect any support from his visit. Rowell, displeased, excused himself from accompanying the campaign train the next day by saying that his wife was going to the hospital. It was on that day, too, that one of the worst misadventures of the California tour occurred. It happened at the Commercial Club in San Francisco where the Republican State Committee was giving a luncheon for Hughes. There was a waiter's strike at the club and Mr. Hughes and his friends were served by strike breakers who were hastily brought in from other clubs to fill the places of the striking waiters. Being in a place where the help was on strike probably cost him the union labor vote in San Francisco. Hughes unwittingly did another thing that counted against him. He had his picture taken on the roof of the San Francisco Chronicle building in company with Crocker, Keesling, and M. H. de Young, with no Progressives present. This picture, which was spread over six columns in the next issue of the Chronicle, served to strengthen the belief that he had aligned himself with the regular Republicans to the exclusion of Johnson and the Progressives.³⁸

³⁷ Lowery, op. cit., 5.

³⁸ Ibid.

Although there is no proof that the Republicans deliberately planned these incidents, it is obvious that they could have prevented them had they so desired. The most unfortunate of all the incidents occurred in Long Beach at the Virginia Hotel. When Hughes arrived at the hotel Governor Johnson was in his rooms on the sixth floor. Johnson knew of Hughes's arrival but Hughes was unaware of Johnson's whereabouts. Mr. Johnson thought he was being deliberately ignored when Hughes left without seeing him. Mr. Hughes did not learn of this awkward situation until he was back in Los Angeles. He at once sent his train manager, Charles Farnham, back to Long Beach to see Johnson. Johnson gave Farnham his opinion of the matter in no uncertain terms. He believed Farnham and Keesling used the Hughes trip to gain control of California for the Republicans. A little later Johnson sent Farnham a telegram in Los Angeles saying:

The men surrounding Mr. Hughes in California and who have been in charge of his tour are much more interested in my defeat than in Mr. Hughes's election, and they have made it manifest both publicly and privately that they would vote for Mr. Wilson if the commonest courtesies were exchanged between Mr. Hughes and myself.³⁹

This failure of Hughes to meet Governor Johnson, who was very popular in his state, was the last untoward event of his stay in California. He reached the California state line on Friday, August 16; he left the state on the evening of Tuesday, August 22, and in that brief and crowded period of time he lost the state and subsequently the election. Why Hughes went to California at all remains a mystery.⁴⁰

After returning from the western tour, Hughes directed his attack against the President and Congress for surrendering to the Railroad

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

Brotherhoods for party expediency. He declared that he stood for arbitration and would not be dictated to if he were president. His managers made a canvass of sentiment among labor men and believed that there was enough opposition to the law to justify making it a campaign issue without alienating the labor vote. On September 20, Hughes opened his second tour, this time in Illinois. His five car campaign special was one of the most complete ever sent out of New York. Between Chicago and Peoria this special grew into a nine car train, overrun by political leaders and workers of the Progressive and Republican parties. Before beginning the tour Hughes had spent hours in studying the Eight-Hour Law and made it his chief campaign subject in Illinois. He called it a "force measure following a deplorable abdication of moral authority."⁴¹

The Hughes campaign was receiving the assistance of Roosevelt. On September 7, three days after his entry into active campaigning, the Old Guard represented by Crane, Penrose, and Smoot, demanded that Hughes get a new campaign manager. They favored the Roosevelt tactics and declared that Hughes was not attacking Wilson with the proper vigor. Hughes was unmoved by this criticism for he was elated over the apparent success of his tour of the Middle-West. His critics were unable to change his arguments or his campaign policy.⁴² At about the same time Wilson yielded to the pressure of the suffragists. In a speech given on September 8, he pledged his aid to the women toward obtaining legislation favorable to them. Wilson said that he would not quarrel about the method used in securing the legislation, which was an indication that he would no longer oppose the amendment to the Federal Constitution.⁴³

⁴¹ New York Times, September 20, 1916.

⁴² New York Times, September 8, 1916.

⁴³ Ibid., September 9, 1916.

When Wilson agreed to aid the suffragists, the Republicans tried to offset this gain by renewing their efforts to gain more of the rebellious Progressive vote. Republican leaders, led by Elihu Root, succeeded in bringing Taft and Roosevelt into a reconciliation at the Union League Club in New York City. Taft was more easily persuaded than Roosevelt. The move was expected to have a salutary effect upon those members of the Progressive Party who still felt resentment toward Republicans for the way in which they nominated Taft in the 1912 convention.⁴⁴

At South Bend, Indiana, Hughes's voice failed him as he was addressing a crowd of twenty-thousand people. His physician, Dr. L. D. Alexander, ordered him to make no more speeches in the open air. However, the next day his voice was so improved he was able to speak to a crowd of 75,000 persons in Fairbanks's home town of Indianapolis. It was the first time that Fairbanks had appeared on the platform with him.⁴⁵

As late as September 19, Wilson denied that he intended to make a campaign tour, but four days later he made a campaign speech at Shadow Lawn, to a group of about two-thousand. In this speech he answered Hughes's attack on the Eight-Hour Law by declaring it was not arbitrable. He went on to pay tribute to the Progressive Party, saying it was "great . . . because it had the real red blood of human sympathy in its veins and was ready to work for mankind and forget the interests of a narrow party."⁴⁶ The President's failure to get out and fight caused great uneasiness in Democratic ranks. This uneasiness was augmented by the fact that the Republicans were getting front page headlines about the

⁴⁴ Ibid., September 22, 1916.

⁴⁵ New York Times, September 23-24, 1916.

⁴⁶ Tumulty, op. cit., 212-213.

campaign tour Hughes was making in the West. When Tumulty, the President's private secretary, suggested that he should "get out and do something," he smiled and said, "The moment is not here. Let them use up their ammunition and then we will turn our guns upon them."⁴⁷

From the beginning of the campaign the opposition press attacked the two planks of the Democratic platform dealing with hyphenism and the tariff. On the issue of hyphenism, Wilson continued his stand as outlined in the party platform. He aroused the antagonism of the German-Americans for they believed he had favored England and naturally resented the charges of hyphenism made against them. An Irish agitator, Jeremiah O'Leary, president of the American Truth Society, had been campaigning against the President through organizations and speeches. This Society had black-listed all Democratic nominees for Congress except Henry Buckner. Ten thousand circulars were sent out to members blacklisting the Congressmen because they failed to support the McLemore Resolution.⁴⁸ O'Leary even sent an insulting note to the President criticizing his pro-British policies. Wilson won the good will of many pro-ally voters by his blunt reply to the note. He immediately called a newspaper conference and handed the newspaper men his reply which read: "I would feel deeply mortified to have you or anyone like you vote for me. Since you have access to many disloyal Americans and I have not, I will ask you to convey this message to them."⁴⁹ Believing that most of the hyphenates were Republicans anyway, Wilson continued his denunciation of them in his succeeding campaign speeches. His stand forced Hughes to explain: "I

⁴⁷ New York Times, October 1, 1916.

⁴⁸ Ibid., September 30, 1916.

⁴⁹ Ibid., September 30, 1916.

don't want the support of anyone to whom the interest of this country is not supreme."⁵⁰ As to the tariff issue, the Republicans fell back on the old argument that wages and prices were dependent upon high tariffs. The Democrats answered by citing the prosperity of the nation since Wilson's downward revision of the tariff.⁵¹

All political observers were predicting a close election in November, and with that in mind, the Democratic leaders urged the President to go before the people on a personal appearance tour across the country. Opinion in high Democratic circles was summed up in a remark made by Senator Stone to Tumulty: "Dignity is all right, but it will not in this instance compensate for defeat. The leader must lead."⁵² Finally Wilson agreed to make two addresses at Omaha on October 5th, three at Indianapolis October 12th, three at Chicago October 19th, and four at Cincinnati on October 26th.⁵³

In the meantime, Hughes met unexpected opposition in Ohio in particular and the Middle-West in general, for as he spoke before a crowd of workmen in the Willys-Overland automobile factory in Toledo, he was heckled by workers who shouted at him derisively and cheered Wilson. At several stops on the way to Cleveland he was challenged to discuss his part as a member of the Supreme Court in the Danbury Hatters Case decision.⁵⁴ At Sioux City, Iowa, October 17, Hughes was again heckled and frequently interrupted by questions. One person asked if he would repeal

⁵⁰ Baker, op. cit., VI, 290.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Baker, op. cit., VI, 279-280.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ New York Times, September 22, 1916.

In 1915, the Supreme Court upheld a fine for triple damages, \$234,000, imposed by a lower court against workmen who had boycotted the D. E. Loewe Hat Company of Danbury, Conn. Lawler vs Loewe, 59 U.S.: 341.

the Eight-Hour Law if he were elected, and he answered, "A surrender cannot be repealed."⁵⁵ An incident which occurred in Springfield, Missouri, showed the attitude of the railroad workers of that section for the Republican candidate. He was to speak at one o'clock P.M. and the trainmen deliberately held up the arrival of his train, which delayed his speech for an hour and a half.⁵⁶ At Omaha, October 17, Hughes replied to a previous statement made by Wilson in which he had said that success for the Republicans would mean that the invisible government of money would rule the United States. Mr. Hughes's reply was that at the present time Colonel Edward M. House was the invisible force behind the Wilson Administration, and that, "I desire government through two houses and not three."⁵⁷

Just a month before the election, six British merchant vessels were sunk off Nantucket by German submarines. Wilson said, "The country may rest assured that the German Government will be held to the complete fulfillment of its promises to the government of the United States. I have no right now to question their willingness to fulfill them."⁵⁸ The sinkings created much excitement and war talk filled the papers. During a speech in Philadelphia the next day Hughes was going over the same material that he had used in his previous speeches and when he took up the Lusitania affair, was interrupted by a heckler asking just what action he would advise in the sinking of the six vessels, but Hughes refused to discuss the situation saying that he was not in control of the official agencies

⁵⁵ New York Times, October 17, 1916.

⁵⁶ Interview with Dr. L. E. Meador, Drury College, Springfield, Missouri. July 5, 1950.

⁵⁷ New York Times, October 17, 1916.

⁵⁸ Ibid., October 17, 1916.

and was not in receipt of official information.⁵⁹ In the same speech another heckler asked him to describe his part in the Danbury Matters Case. Hughes went into detail as to why he had ruled against labor and added:

Now I stand here to say that whether as a judge, or, if elected, as president, on any question coming before me I shall enforce the law of the land. And it makes no difference whether the question is raised by labor or raised by capital.⁶⁰

Although Roosevelt's speeches were attracting attention and the approval of the Old Guard by being definitely anti-Wilson, anti-hyphenate and anti-pacifist, his attacks against the hyphenates were a positive embarrassment to Hughes who tried to avoid losing the support of the pro-Germans without arousing the disapproval of the majority of voters who were anti-German in sentiment. Roosevelt would make no concessions to prudence but spoke privately in contempt for the way Hughes hedged on issues. He criticized Hughes for just, "withdrawing into his whiskers," when confronted with a vital issue.⁶¹ On October 24, Roosevelt spoke in Chicago and disregarded the wishes of the Republican National Committee by making the most violent anti-hyphenate speech of his campaign.⁶² Immediately, the Democratic National Committeemen seized the opportunity to embarrass Hughes by charging that he had been in conference with the hyphenates and had formed a secret alliance with them. The Committee based its charges on the alleged minutes of the American Independence Conference. Hughes issued a statement admitting that in September he had

⁵⁹ On October 20, however, in a speech at Louisville, he said emphatically that he would have broken off diplomatic relations with Germany if he had been president. New York Times, October 20, 1916.

⁶⁰ New York Times, October 10, 1916.

⁶¹ Paxson, Pre-War Years, 349-50.

⁶² New York Times, October 27, 1916.

met a committee of five, of which O'Leary was the head. He said that he had received them at their own request but that he had told them nothing that he had not said in public. He denied having made any sort of an agreement with them.⁶³ Then he sought to improve his own position by following his denial with a speech in a German section in which he said he wanted no vote from men whose "allegiance is not single and complete."⁶⁴ In an effort to draw the eyes of the public away from the alleged defection of the Republican candidate, Henry Cabot Lodge charged that Wilson attached a post-script to his Lusitania note, informing the German Government that the stiff language of the note was not meant to be taken seriously.⁶⁵ The President denied the charges in a statement issued from Long Branch saying, "no postscript to the Lusitania note was written or contemplated by me!" The next day Lodge retracted his charge by seeking to shift the blame to Mr. Henry Breckinridge, a former Assistant Secretary of War. Lodge said that he based his charge on the word of Breckinridge who claimed to have seen the note.⁶⁶

One of the unpleasant features of the American political campaigns is the habit of smearing the reputation of an opponent. This campaign was not without a touch of it. A whispering rumor was started about the private life of the President to the effect that he had been neglectful to his first wife, Ellen Axon Wilson. There were those who professed to look askance at the early remarriage of Wilson, in 1915, to Edith Bolling Galt of Washington, D. C. By October this gossip had gained such headway that

⁶³ Ibid., October 23, 1916.

⁶⁴ Ibid., October 25, 1916.

⁶⁵ New York Times, October 31, 1916.

⁶⁶ Ibid., November 1, 1916.

Stockton Axon, a brother of the first Mrs. Wilson, wrote an article entitled, "The Private Life of President Wilson," which was published in many newspapers and helped to undo the harm already done by the falsehoods.⁶⁷

As the campaign wore on, and the issues became clearly defined, Hughes devoted more and more of his time to sharp criticism of Wilson's administration, particularly the Eight-Hour Law and the Mexican Policy. He emphasized that it was not a question of the justice of the Eight-Hour Law but the manner in which it was enacted. He complained that the President, in yielding to the Railroad Brotherhoods, had acceded to the demands of a special group in the country under compulsion of force and that the President and Congress had enacted the Law without due consideration and debate.⁶⁸ President Wilson justified his position in his second campaign speech at Shadow Lawn, saying in part: "The reasonable thing to do is to grant the Eight-Hour Day, not because the men demand it, but because it is right."⁶⁹ Wilson answered the criticism of his Mexican policy in his acceptance speech, when he said: "The Mexican People are entitled to attempt their liberty. . . and so long as I have anything to do with the actions of our great government I shall do everything in my power to prevent anyone standing in their way."⁷⁰

Of all the issues of the campaign, the most important one for the Democrats was the tacit promise to maintain neutrality. Placards carrying

⁶⁷ Baker, *op. cit.*, VI, 285.

The contents of this article and the names of newspapers in which it was published are unavailable.

⁶⁸ "Mr. Wilson Justifies the Eight-Hour Law," Harpers Weekly, (October 2, 1916), 9.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ "The Record of the Democrats," Independent, (September 8, 1916), 45.

the slogan, "He Kept Us Out Of War," were seen in prominent places all over the country. The New York Times on November 4th, carried a Democratic appeal to workmen in the form of a paid advertisement:

YOU ARE WORKING
 NOT FIGHTING
 ALIVE AND HAPPY
 NOT CANNON FODDER
 WILSON AND PEACE WITH HONOR
 OR
 HUGHES AND ROOSEVELT AND WAR

The Woodrow Wilson Independent League published a full-page advertisement in the July 29th Literary Digest which read:

WILSON IS THE MAN
 ALL REAL INDEPENDENTS
 ALL REAL PROGRESSIVES
 WILL VOTE FOR

and went on to say, "A National League has been formed outside party lines to work for the President." This advertisement stated that voluntary contributions were not necessary for membership but would be received gladly. A detachable membership and contribution coupon was a part of a full-page layout.

Just before the election Wilson expressed to McCormick and Colonel House his irritation at the excessive Republican expenditure of money to defeat him. He was referring particularly to the full-page advertisements that were appearing in the newspapers and periodicals.⁷¹ One typical example appeared in the Literary Digest of October 28. It was sponsored by the National Hughes Alliance and featured a photograph of Hughes accompanied by three columns devoted to sharp criticism of Wilson's foreign and domestic policies.⁷²

⁷¹ Seymour, op. cit., II, 376.

⁷² Literary Digest LIII, (October 28, 1916), 1133.

In the middle of October there were certain signs pointing toward a Wilson victory in November. He was gaining important support from various quarters. On October 16, two Republican manufacturers, George Johnson and H. B. Endicott of the Endicott-Johnson Shoe Company at Binghamton, New York, announced they would support the Eight-Hour Law, and would put it into practice in their factory. This would effect twelve thousand workers. After conferring with Wilson on October 25, Henry Ford announced a new policy toward women workers in which they would be paid a minimum of five dollars per day, the same as men.⁷³ Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, campaigned for Wilson, vigorously attacking Hughes's judicial record. He especially disliked the way Hughes voted on the Danbury Hatters Case.⁷⁴ Gompers himself had helped raise the \$234,000 fine imposed on the workers. Two notable Progressive leaders came over to the Democrat side: Raymond Robins, permanent chairman of the 1916 Progressive National Convention, and John M. Parker, Progressive vice-presidential nominee. Josephus Daniels obtained letters endorsing Wilson from two famous independents, Thomas A. Edison and Henry Ford.⁷⁵ The trend of popular sentiment toward Wilson was demonstrated as he completed his campaign. As he passed through the Republican territory of upper New York State, Wilson was greeted by fifty thousand cheering people who shouted: "Hurrah for Eight-Hour Wilson!" The President went from New York to Chicago and on October 19, made a speech which was greeted warmly,

⁷³ New York Times, October 16, 1916.

⁷⁴ New York Times, October 25, 1916.

⁷⁵ Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era, 1910-1917. (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), 462-466.

even "wildly,"⁷⁶ when he mentioned the need for the foreign born to transfer their allegiance to the United States and become part of America.

In the last days of the campaign, Wilson made two addresses in Buffalo on the first day of November and three the next day in New York City. Plans were made by Colonel House without Wilson's knowledge for an address to be given in Madison Square Garden.⁷⁷ When Wilson learned of this he was very angry because he thought the meeting was being backed by Tammany Hall. However, he did make the speech and the meeting proved a success. About thirty thousand Democrats led by Sheriff Alfred E. Smith marched in his honor while a crowd of twenty-five thousand milled around outside in the streets. The entrances were so congested that the Presidential party had to enter through a fire escape. The demonstration lasted for over a half an hour.⁷⁸ Wilson in closing his campaign at Shadow Lawn November 4, scoffed at the Republican plea to labor and referred to the Republicans as those who, "ground it down to the disgrace of civilization."⁷⁹

Wilson made one of the strangest decisions in history. He determined to resign if Hughes were elected.⁸⁰ It is probable that he was influenced by his long held admiration for the British parliamentary system, in which a leader surrenders his position when he is repudiated by popular vote. The President made known his decision in a personally typed confidential letter to Secretary Lansing. He wrote that during the months that would elapse after the election, if Mr. Hughes should be the choice, crises might

⁷⁶ New York Times, October 20, 1916.

⁷⁷ George Sylvester Viereck, The Strangest Friendship in History. (New York: Liveright, Inc., Publishers, 1932), 158.

⁷⁸ New York Times, November 3, 1916.

⁷⁹ New York Times, November 5, 1916.

⁸⁰ According to his Diary, House suggested this idea to the President before the election. Seymour, op. cit., II, 378-380.

arise which would have to be met by the President who would be called upon to act in the ensuing months. He felt that if defeated, the welfare of the country could be advanced if he should resign in favor of the new President. Since there was no method provided for such an emergency in the constitution, he would ask Lansing to resign as Secretary of State and would name Hughes as his successor. The President would resign as Chief Executive and would ask Vice-President Marshall to resign his office. Then, under the law, Hughes would at once succeed to the Presidency for the intervening four months and in the following March enter upon his four-year term.⁸¹ If Hughes had been elected and Wilson had carried out this plan he would have been the first President of the United States to have resigned that office.

When the campaign was over and the expenses calculated it was found that the Republicans had received the most money in campaign contributions. Cornelius N. Bliss, treasurer of the Republican National Committee, in filing his report with the clerk of the House of Representatives, reported that the Republicans spent \$1,578,934.⁸² The number of contributors was 22,226. H. P. Whitney led the list with a contribution of \$30,000. Names of the other major contributors are listed as:

J. P. Morgan	\$10,000
John D. Rockefeller	\$ 8,000
Vincent Astor	\$ 3,000
J. H. Flagler	\$ 1,000
Charles H. Morse	\$ 1,000
Arthur C. Jones	\$25,000
George Baker, Jr.	\$25,000
R. T. Crane, Jr.	\$25,000. ⁸³

⁸¹ Daniels, op. cit., 475-476.

⁸² New York Times, October 29, 1916.

⁸³ Ibid.

Wilbur W. Marsh, treasurer of the Democratic National Committee, reported that the total Democratic campaign gifts were \$1,006,283. Cleveland H. Dodge, a classmate of Wilson at Princeton in 1879, gave \$79,000 in honor of his class. Bernard Baruch was listed as giving \$25,000.⁸⁴ The President contributed \$2,500 to his own campaign. The total number of persons contributing to the Democratic chest was 41,832.⁸⁵

The campaign had been a bitter one but the bitterness had been directed not at the candidates as men but at the policies they sponsored. There were three high spots in the campaign: The legislative record of the Democratic Administration; the Administration's foreign policy, which had suffered the greatest criticism from Roosevelt; and the Adamson Eight-Hour Law which rated Hughes's most bitter attacks.

Both candidates spent the day before the election resting from their campaign, Hughes at the Hotel Astor and Wilson at Shadow Lawn, where he issued a warning to every state and county chairman to watch for "coercion and corruption."⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Chester Field, Bernard Baruch, Park Bench Statesman. (New York: Whittlesey House, 1944), 115, states that Baruch gave \$50,000.

⁸⁵ New York Times, October 28, 1916.

⁸⁶ New York Times, November 6, 1916.

CHAPTER IV
THE ELECTION

As late as October it appeared very likely that Hughes would win, in spite of the strength of Wilson's position. In Wall Street, where betting is usually based upon shrewd judgment, the odds were 10 to 8½ in Hughes's favor. Wilson wrote to his brother October 16, "I hear all sorts of reports, most of them encouraging. . . but never let myself form confident expectations. I do believe that the independent vote. . . is going to play a bigger part in this election than it ever played in any previous election, and that makes the result truly incalculable."¹ On the day of the election, November 7, both candidates appeared calm and confident. Hughes went to vote early in the morning, at the Eighth Avenue Laundry. The President cast his vote at Princeton that morning and afterwards played a round of golf for relaxation.²

On election night an enormous electric sign on the roof of the Hotel Astor, where Mr. Hughes and his family were stopping, blazoned the signal word, "Hughes," to the crowds in the square below.

Leaders of the Democratic Party were pessimistic on the evening of election day. Henry Morgenthau gave a large dinner party at the Biltmore Hotel, for cabinet members and party managers which was intended to be a jubilee. The evening began with merry-making, but when the returns began to pile up, silence and then gloom spread over the gathering.³

¹ Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, VI, 290.

² New York Times, November 7, 1916.

³ Baker, op. cit., VI, 296.

The first returns came from small fishing towns in Massachusetts early in the afternoon of election day showing a slight gain for Wilson over election returns of 1912. Early returns from Colorado and Kansas showed great gains for Wilson. Indications up to seven o'clock that night forecast the President's re-election. The tide turned in an unusual way. Between seven and nine-thirty the returns coming in slowly from east and middle-west showed a drift against the Democrats. New York, New Jersey, and every other eastern state north of the Potomac except Maryland and New Hampshire had gone Republican. At nine-thirty that night the New York World put out a bulletin conceding the election to Hughes.⁴ When newspaper men asked Tumulty if he were going to throw in the sponge, he dictated the following statement: "Wilson will win. The West has not yet been heard from; sufficient gains will be made in the West and along the Coast to offset the losses in the East."⁵

That evening when Wilson, who had remained at Shadow Lawn, talked to Tumulty over the telephone he seemed aware of defeat and was relieved at the prospect of being a private citizen again. At 8:30 P.M. a peculiar incident occurred. Tumulty received a telephone call from a mysterious person who refused to give his name but said that he was in touch with Republican headquarters and would keep Tumulty constantly informed of how things were going there. The stranger warned them not to give up the fight, nor concede Hughes the election. He said the Republican policy was to exaggerate the early returns. He declared the Wilson fight would be won in the West.⁶

⁴ Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him, 217.

⁵ Ibid., 218.

⁶ Ibid., 218.

Up until 11 P.M. all the news was against the Democrats. The Brooklyn Eagle and the New York Times had already conceded Hughes the election. But the Democrats would not admit defeat. The mysterious informant continued to give accurate information through the night. The next morning the New York Times carried full-page headlines reading: "Election Closed, Hughes leading 253 to 200; Ten States in Doubt; House Republican."⁷ Just at day break came the first big drift towards the Democrats side. Ohio, at first reported Republican, now turned Democratic with a Wilson majority of 60,000. Kansas, Utah, and South Dakota followed with reports favorable to Wilson. At this point Colonel House telephoned the World and other newspapers, as well as the United Press, and urged them to undo, as far as possible the harm done by the morning press in conceding so much to Hughes.⁸

At 5 A.M. November 9th, the New York Times and New York World recanted and reported the election of Hughes was very doubtful. Headlines in the New York Times had changed to: "Election Unsettled; Wilson 251, Hughes 247. Depends on California and Minnesota."⁹ Tumulty and his private secretary, Warren Johnson, were worried but the President was completely calm. He asked his advisors what effect his defeat would have on Europe. He was informed that it would be construed as a rejection by the country of his peace aims. It was for this reason more than any other that he wanted to be re-elected.¹⁰

⁷ New York Times, November 8, 1916.

⁸ Seymour, op. cit., II, 384.

⁹ New York Times, November 9, 1916.

¹⁰ Thomas Sugrue, Starling of the White House, 74.

The last message from the mystery man came at one o'clock the day following the election saying: "George Perkins is now at Republican Headquarters and is telephoning Roosevelt and will soon leave to inform him that the 'jig is up' and that Wilson is re-elected."¹¹ Some months later, the stranger visited the White House Offices and without identifying himself informed Tammaly that he was the individual who had kept him informed on activities within the Republican Headquarters. By wire he had listened in on every conversation that passed between Wilcox, Hughes, Perkins, Harvey, and Roosevelt on election day and the day following.¹²

Hours of uncertainty lengthened into days, while public interest rose to heights untouched during the campaign. In several states the vote was so close, a recount was necessary and finally, the situation so resolved itself that Wilson could win by carrying either of the two closest states, Minnesota or California. In the Minnesota recount, Hughes kept his original lead and the state's twelve electoral votes fell to him on the official popular plurality of 396, but California's thirteen electoral votes went into the Democratic column by a margin almost as narrow, and decided the election. Until November 9th, Wilcox and his assistants continued to be optimistic. They assured Hughes that when all the returns were in, his election would be verified. Hughes's immediate associates had begun to refer to him as "Mr. President." It was not until Thursday night that Hughes was forced to admit defeat. A reporter called Mr. Hughes by telephone and was told by his secretary that, "The President has retired, he cannot be disturbed." "Well," replied the reporter, "when he awakes, you might tell him that he is no longer President."¹³

¹¹ Tammaly, op. cit., 223-25.

¹² Ibid., 235.

¹³ Henry Luther Stoddard, Presidential Sweepstakes. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1948), 156-57.

Since the election depended on the outcome in California, Mayor Meredith Snyder of Los Angeles made sure the ballot boxes were not tampered with before the votes could be counted, by ordering that every ballot box be sealed, and stationed policemen in every booth with orders to shoot any man who should lay the weight of his hand on the ballot box.¹⁴ The Republicans would not concede the election until after all the doubtful states were canvassed. Many party faithfuls were raising the cry of fraud but Hughes quieted this quickly by saying they must not allow the Presidential title to be clouded, unless good cause could be found. He was willing to await the official recount. Party leaders set guards to watch for errors that might result in the recount. Wilcox announced he was making no charge of fraud but pointed to the possibility of mistakes.¹⁵ Both sides were making preparations to take the election to court if it became necessary. Hughes, Wilcox, and Perkins conferred with George W. Wickersham, former Attorney-General of the United States. On the Democrat's side McCormick conferred with Alton B. Parker, former Democratic candidate for the presidency, M. J. O'Brien, Delancy Nicoll, and John B. Stanchfield, all prominent New York lawyers.¹⁶

After the President was certain that he had carried the election he expressed himself in an address at Williamstown:

I am glad that the political campaign is over and that we can settle down in soberness and unity of spirit to work for the welfare of the country without thinking of the advantage of parties.¹⁷

It was not until November 22, when the returns were all in that Hughes

¹⁴ Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era, 1910-1917, 460-492.

¹⁵ New York Times, November 11-12, 1916.

¹⁶ The Daily Oklahoman, November 10, 1916.

¹⁷ Baker, op. cit., VI, 299.

sent a congratulatory message to Wilson, saying:

Because of the closeness of the vote I have awaited the official count in California and now that it has been virtually completed, permit me to extend to you my congratulation upon your re-election. I desire also to express my best wishes for a most successful administration.¹⁸

Two major factors contributing to the Hughes defeat appeared to be his substitution of criticism for a positive program of his own and his failure to draw the more radical segment of the combined labor, progressive and independent vote, due to his stand on the Adamson Law, the Danbury Hatters Case and the foreign policy of the administration.

On November 7, more than eighteen and a half million voters, almost one-fourth of them women, registered their choice at the polls.¹⁹ The total number of electoral votes was 531, with 266 required to elect. Wilson received 277 electoral votes and Hughes 254. Wilson received a popular vote of 9,128,837 and Hughes received 8,536,380. In the Senate 53 Democrats, 42 Republicans, and one independent were elected. In the House of Representatives 216 Republicans, 210 Democrats, and 9 Independents were elected. The Democrats had the majority in the Senate while the Republicans gained a plurality in the House of Representatives. The balance of power had been captured by the Independents. Of the minority candidates, the Socialist candidate Allen Benson, received 590,415 votes, the Prohibitionist candidate Frank Hanley, received 221,196 votes, and the Socialist-Labor candidate Arthur Reimer, received 13,922 votes.²⁰

In winning the election, Wilson proved to be stronger than his party. The Literary Digest published a cross section of opinions gathered from

¹⁸ Baker, op. cit., VI, 299.

¹⁹ Ogg, op. cit., 379.

²⁰ Stoddard, op. cit., 212.

over the country concerning the reasons for the re-election of the President. This resume of opinion indicated that in general it was a contest of town against country, industry against agriculture. The Democrats were saved from defeat by the support of the farming population in the West who regarded Wilson as thoroughly progressive and because they approved his foreign policy. Four normally Republican states—Kansas, Ohio, New Hampshire, and New Mexico—went Democratic. In Kansas it was the war-hating women and the prosperous farmers who wanted to preserve the status quo. Wilson had by far the best newspaper support in the state of Ohio.²¹ The election made a reality out of Mr. Bryan's dream that the West would someday decide a presidential election. Aside from the solid South, Wilson's majorities came mainly from the territory in which Mr. Bryan did his campaigning.²² The dreaded "Hyphenate" vote did not materialize in sufficient numbers to cause Wilson's defeat. Of the seven states containing the largest number of German-Americans, the Democrats carried three.²³ The part played by women and the woman suffrage issue was notable. Women voted for president and vice-president in a fourth of the states, and both of the leading candidates declared for the enfranchisement of women. In Illinois, the only state in which the votes were tabulated separately, the two sets were divided in almost the same ratio, indicating that the political psychology of one sex is not unlike the other. Illinois was carried by the Republicans but all the remaining woman-suffrage states, except Oregon, went Democratic.²⁴ The developing trend of

²¹ "Why Wilson Won," The Literary Digest, LIII, (November 18, 1916), 1314.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ogg, op. cit., 382.

²⁴ Ibid.

progressive reform was expressed by the voters who elected Wilson in 1916 because they knew by experience that he could be trusted to sponsor legislation championing the rights of the people.

APPENDIX
THE ELECTION OF 1916
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RETURNS BY STATES

<u>State</u>	<u>Wilson</u>		<u>Hughes</u>	
	<u>Popular</u>	<u>Electoral</u>	<u>Popular</u>	<u>Electoral</u>
Alabama	99,409	12	22,809	
Arkansas	112,148	9	47,148	
Arizona	32,273	3	30,924	
California	466,200	13	462,394	
Colorado	178,816	6	102,308	
Connecticut	99,786		106,514	7
Delaware	24,753		26,001	3
Florida	55,984	6	14,611	
Georgia	125,845	14	11,225	
Idaho	70,054	4	55,368	
Illinois	950,229		1,152,549	29
Indiana	334,063		341,005	15
Iowa	221,699		280,439	13
Kansas	314,990	10	277,658	
Kentucky	269,990	13	241,854	
Louisiana	79,875	10	6,466	
Maine	64,127		69,508	6
Maryland	138,359	8	117,347	
Massachusetts	247,885		268,784	18
Michigan	285,151		339,097	15
Minnesota	179,152		179,544	12

Election Returns, Continued.

Mississippi	80,422	10	4,253	
Missouri	398,025	18	369,339	
Montana	101,063	4	66,750	
Nebraska	158,827	8	117,257	
Nevada	17,776	3	12,127	
New Hampshire	43,781	4	43,725	
New Jersey	211,645		269,352	14
New Mexico	33,693	3	31,163	
New York	759,426		869,115	45
North Carolina	168,383	12	120,890	
North Dakota	55,208		120,890	5
Ohio	604,161	24	514,753	
Oklahoma	148,113	10	97,233	
Oregon	120,087		126,813	5
Pennsylvania	521,784		703,823	38
Rhode Island	40,394		44,858	5
South Carolina	61,846	9	1,550	
South Dakota	59,191		64,217	5
Tennessee	153,282	12	116,223	
Texas	286,514	20	64,919	
Utah	84,025	7	54,137	
Vermont	22,739		40,295	4
Virginia	102,824	12	49,356	
Washington	183,388	7	167,244	
West Virginia	140,403		143,124	8
Wisconsin	193,042		221,323	13
Wyoming	28,316	3	21,698	

Election Returns, Concluded.

Popular vote for president in 1916,

Wilson 9,129,606 Hughes 8,538,221

Electoral vote for president in 1916,

Wilson 277 Hughes 254¹

¹ The World Almanac And Book Of Facts. (New York: Published Annually
by the New York Telegram, 1949), 62-69

New York Times, November 10, 1916.

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