UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS AND THEIR LEADERSHIP:

CRISIS SCENARIOS AT INSTITUTIONS

OF HIGHER EDUCATION

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the requirements for
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
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Dedication

To My Parents

Blanche and E. B. Mills, Jr.

And

To the Memory of

Those lost in the campus tragedies recounted herein at

Oklahoma State University, January 27, 2001

Texas A&M University, November 18, 1999

Wichita State University, October 2, 1970

Acknowledgements

Of course, this study is not mine alone. The committee that led me along the way was outstanding in every regard. Dr. Ed Harris, the chairman and maestro, Dr. Ken Case, Regents Professor and CEAT-mate, Dr. Mike Gunzenhauser, fellow Tar Heel and math major, and Dr. Sarah Marshall, source of wonderful advice about program survivorship, provided all the guidance for which one could hope. They are remarkably talented and dedicated professionals. The value of this work results from their efforts and I thank each of them for their contributions to its worth. The flaws are mine, but I suppose that is well understood.

The case studies in this work focus on the actions and beliefs of some particularly gifted people. Most notably, the study focuses on the leadership of Dr. James E. Halligan. He was a greatly respected and admired President at Oklahoma State University. His contributions to the university and Oklahoma will remain for many years to come. Dr. Ray Bowen provided important and personal information that was critical to understanding his leadership following the Texas A&M University Bonfire tragedy. He led the university through perhaps its most difficult time such that the integrity and caring nature of the institution was maintained. President Donald L. Beggs provided a valuable perspective of the tragedy involving Wichita State University. Although he was not involved in the crisis at WSU himself, his leadership provided healing for suffering that had continued for more than 30 years.

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Chapter I

Introduction

Response to Crisis: The Ultimate Leadership Test

Perhaps no aspect of human social behavior has been studied with greater

regularity, diligence, and disagreement than leadership (Bogue, 1994). Indeed, there is

no culture or society that does not recognize leadership in some aspect of its social life

(Bass, 1990). Throughout human history, scholars and commentators have recognized

the importance of leadership. They have observed it, written about it, and studied it

carefully in order to gain a better understanding. Early concepts of leadership were not

based upon scholarly study, but upon the beliefs of social and military philosophers, as

well as practitioners of leadership and their followers. Those beliefs almost always

reflected the influence of strong cultural assumptions about the basis of human nature

(Chemers, 1997).

Leadership is also one of the most compelling and long-standing issues in higher

education. Although it is a relatively small part of the overall body of literature,

scholarly writing on leadership in the academy is extensive, and it is not without

disagreement. Indeed, there is considerable controversy about the leadership role of the

president of a college or university (Fisher & Koch, 1996).

The literature on leadership in higher education tends not to be directly based

upon theory (Bensimon, Neumann, & Birnbaum, 1989). It tends to be either descriptive

or prescriptive in nature with the earliest work done by practitioners rather than scholars

of leadership (Birnbaum, 1992).

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Beginning in the late 19th Century and continuing until the 1960s, literature on presidential leadership in higher education was limited almost exclusively to biographies and autobiographies of presidents (Castro, 1988). Since then, scholarly research has increasingly contributed to our understanding of it. Consequently, there are two basic lineages of literature concerning leadership in higher education: experiential-based biographies/autobiographies of presidents, and the research-based publications of scholars. Interestingly, these two perspectives tend to endorse very different concepts of the role and importance of presidential leadership.

The writings and commentaries of presidents strongly embrace the idea that leadership is a critically important, if not indispensable, factor in the life of a college or university. Conversely, many leading scholars tend to endorse the notion that a president's leadership is constrained by both internal and external factors to the extent that he or she is typically not able to significantly change the institution.

Many of the most highly regarded scholars of leadership in higher education, such as Birnbaum (1988, 1992), Bensimon (1989), and Tierney (1988), ascribe to this de-emphasized role of leadership. Birnbaum (1988) proposed "leaders in higher education are subject to internal and external constraints that limit their effectiveness and may make their roles highly symbolic rather than instrumental" (p. 28).

One of the most notable voices in leadership research, Bernard Bass (1990), took issue with the position of Birnbaum (1988), Cohen and March (1974), and others who disparaged the role of leadership in higher education,

> Worse still are the 'know nothings' who simply know little about the subject and do not take the time to find out. Yet, they declare that we know nothing about leadership. Or, what we know does not matter. Or, leadership does not exist. Or,

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if it does, it is antidemocratic and interferes with good team efforts. (Bass, 1990, pp. xi-xii)

Other scholars developed models that conceptualized presidential leadership along separate and distinct organizational processes. For example, Chaffee (1983), Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997), Kerr and Glade (1986), Birnbaum (1988), Bergquist (1992), and Bogue and Aper (2000) all created models for organizational and administrative processes. These models gave meaning to leadership through different perspectives of the leader-follower relationship such as bureaucratic structures and policies, human relationships and teams, political networks and coalitions, and shared symbols and meanings. Of these, the models of Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) developed perhaps the most widespread following (Bogue & Aper, 2000).

Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) developed four *cognitive frames of reference* to describe how an institution or organization may be perceived. These cognitive frames or "lenses" are the *bureaucratic, human resource, political*, and *symbolic* frames through which presidents see issues and implement solutions to problems (Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1991, 1997). They provide a framework for understanding organizations and interpreting institutional processes and the effectiveness of leader behavior (Birnbaum, 1992; Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997). Moreover, the frames characterize ways in which leaders think about and respond to everyday issues and problems.

A president's effectiveness as a leader has been associated with his or her ability to recognize and operate within multiple frames. Additionally, certain cognitive frames of reference have been identified as more critical than others to effective leadership (Bensimon et al., 1989; Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 1991, 1997).

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One of the many contexts in which a college or university president leads is a crisis or emergency situation such as an accident, natural disaster, or act of violence. However, this context has been widely ignored by researchers. Studies tend to focus on those functions, missions, and roles of the institution and its leadership that fit the norm of a college or university's operation. They do not tend to discuss the demands upon leadership during the most disruptive times that inevitably occur, when members of the institutional family are suddenly and violently threatened or taken away.

Crises and tragedies on campus have occurred with regularity in the past and will continue to occur in the future. After a bomb threat incident on his campus, Douglas Robinson, Vice President for Student Services at the University of California at Long Beach, concluded, "Inevitably, at some point, every campus in the country will be faced with some sort of crisis or emergency" (McCarthy, Margolis, Willits, & Gephart, 2001, p. 16). A panel of presidents attending an ACE conference on campus disasters concluded that emergency situations can be "the ultimate test for a president" (Campus disasters, 2001, p. 4).

Even within the past few years, there are vivid examples of unanticipated crises and catastrophes. Among these are the dormitory fire at Seton Hall University in 2000 which killed 3 students and injured 62, the fraternity fire at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill in 1996 which killed 5 students, the bonfire collapse at Texas A&M University in 1999 which killed 12 students and injured 27, and the airplane accident in 2001 which killed 10 members and associates of the Oklahoma State University basketball team. How does the president lead effectively in such instances? Unfortunately we know little about presidential leadership in such highly demanding, intensely focused circumstances.

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Statement of the Problem

The literature endorses Bolman and Deal's (1984, 1997) model of cognitive

frames of reference for understanding leadership behavior in a college or university

setting. The significance of cognitive frames of reference for this research resides in the

correlation between certain cognitive frames and effective leadership by presidents. For

example, studies by Bolman and Deal (1991) suggest that effective leadership is more

likely from presidents with high cognition of the symbolic frame of reference but is

largely unrelated to the bureaucratic frame. Those studies further conclude that the

variables predicting effectiveness of a manager are different from those predicting

effectiveness of a leader (Bolman & Deal, 1991).

Additionally, other studies strongly suggest that the effective leader is more likely

to be *cognitively complex*, or able to interpret institutional life through multiple lenses

(Bensimon et al., 1989; Birnbaum, 1992). The concept of cognitive complexity reflects

the abilities of *integration* and *differentiation* at both the organizational and personal

levels. Integration is the ability to combine awarenesses and differing social structures

while differentiation is the ability to perceive them independently of one another (Hunt,

1996).

However, research indicates that the realities associated with an important role of

the president—leadership in a crisis scenario—may call for alternative approaches to

leadership (Yukl, 1994). The literature has ignored a critically important scenario that is

a vital and fundamental part of a president's responsibilities, and for which a different

approach to leadership may be necessary.

Studies by Halpin (1954); Mulder and Stemerding (1963); Mulder, Ritsema van

Eck, and de Jong (1970); and Mulder, de Jong, Koppelaar, and Verhage (1986) found

effective leaders were more directive and authoritative in emergency or crisis situations than in less critical scenarios. For example, leaders consulted with subordinates less in crisis situation than in non-crisis situations. Subordinates expected the leader to be more assertive, directive, and decisive in crisis situations. Subordinates also expected leaders to show initiative in defining problems, identifying solutions, and directing the group's response to crises.

These characteristics of leadership conflict with assessments by researchers who have identified cognitive frames that are most important for effective leadership in the academy, such as the symbolic and human resource frames of reference (Bolman & Deal, 1991). They also conflict with researchers who contend that the president's role is more symbolic than instrumental (Birnbaum, 1988; Cohen & March, 1974, 1986).

There appears to be a research gap in the study of presidential leadership. This gap may exist for several reasons:

- First, it may be that the sense of urgency in a time-critical and highly intense scenario demands more directive and authoritative leadership from the president. A crisis changes the rules for decision-making and involves the president in decisions that would normally be delegated or arrived at in a more collegial and less directive manner (Kerchner, 1993).

- Second, it may be that the president's administrative staff responds to a crisis more as a crisis action cell, more structured and authoritative in its operation, and less as a collegial, deliberative body (Kerchner, 1993).

- Third, it may be that the symbolic role of the president assumes secondary importance to the instrumental role of guiding the institutional response to a crisis (Kerchner, 1993).

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Research outside the higher education environment suggests that subordinates are more willing to let the leader take charge in crisis situations. When lives are lost or the operation of the institution is threatened, internal and external constituents may demand an aggressive and appropriate response and may be more willing to allow the president to lead (Yukl, 1994). In any event, research into this problem is appropriate.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to address the research problem through study of cases of presidential leadership during crisis scenarios. A primary case and two secondary cases are included in the study. The secondary cases help provide an understanding of those aspects of crises that are common and those that are unique to specific scenarios.

The primary case in the study is an airplane crash that killed 10 people associated with the Oklahoma State University athletic department in January 2001. The first of the secondary cases is the collapse of a bonfire structure that killed 12 people and injured 27 on the campus of Texas A&M University in November 1999. The other secondary case is an airplane crash that killed 31 football players and coaching staff members from Wichita State University in November 1970.

The study considers those actions by the presidents and the cognitive frames of reference that seem to be most significant to those actions. Additionally, the study considers whether the leadership actions are primarily instrumental or they are primarily interpretive/symbolic. Specifically, the study addresses the following questions associated with presidential leadership during the crises:

- Is the president's leadership style during the crisis scenario different from his/her typical style?

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- What specific leadership action does the president take and what is the intent of those actions?

- In what ways is presidential leadership in crisis response and recovery situations instrumental in nature?

- In what ways is presidential leadership in crisis response and recovery situations symbolic/interpretive in nature?

- How do others perceive the president's leadership actions?

- What cognitive frames of reference are significant in the president's understanding of the crisis and the actions the president directs?

Rationale for Qualitative Design

This research effort used a qualitative research design. Qualitative research is an important mode of inquiry for the social sciences (Marshall & Rossman, 1989). Among the advantages a qualitative methodology offered this study was an opportunity to engage in an in-depth, holistic, and contextual examination of the people involved in the complexities of the leadership process within the time and activity-bounded scenario of crisis situations.

Leadership is fundamentally concerned with human behavior and the perceptions, subjectivities, and meanings associated with it. It has multiple realities that reflect the experiences and subjectivities of the people involved. Since the separate realities are interrelated within the case, we can have a holistic understanding only by understanding those separate experiences, subjectivities, and realities (Erlandson, Harris, Skipper, & Allen, 1993).

The study used open-ended, emerging data with the primary intent of developing themes about people's feelings, thoughts, and experiences. This study gave voice to the

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people most intimately involved in order to gain their perspectives of a social phenomenon that only has meaning through the human experience (Rubin & Rubin, 1995).

Bass (1990) referenced a host of researchers who concluded that the study of leadership and its many facets—leaders, followers, situations, processes, influences, symbols, cultures, cognitions, etc.—were most appropriately studied through qualitative methods. For example, Van Maanen (1979) and Smith (1975) concluded that inquiry into the meaning and significance of the behavior of both leaders and followers is most appropriately done through a qualitative design. Orpen (1987) concluded that more qualitative research into leadership is needed as the limitations of quantitative methods in examining organizational complexities are apparent. McCall and Lombardo (1978) advocated more leadership research using qualitative methods to detect the subtleties and nuances involved in the leadership process (Bass, 1990).

Theoretical Framework

Leadership in Higher Education

Works pertaining to presidential leadership in higher education can be divided into two schools of thought. One school is consistent with the overall evolution of leadership theory. The reflections of former college or university presidents such as Bogue (1994), Kennedy (1997), Kerr (1984), Rhodes (1998), Fisher (1984, 1991), Fisher and Koch (1996), Shapiro (1998), and Shaw (1999), as well as scholarly research from the late 19th Century and continuing until the late 1960s, tend to view effective leadership from the president as indispensable to a higher education institution. Their characterization of effective leadership is consistent with traditional concepts of leadership such as rational decision-making, political acumen, clear communications, and

interpersonal skills. These skills are applied to promote and gain buy-in to a common vision among followers (Bensimon et al., 1989; Fisher, 1984).

The second school of thought is most dramatically represented in the arguments of Cohen and March (1974, 1986). They contend that the president probably cannot have a significant long-term effect on the institution, which they characterize as an "organized anarchy." It is an organized anarchy because it exhibits problematic properties. First, it has ill-defined and often inconsistent goals. Second, it operates on a trial-and-error basis without clear and consistent ideas on how to be effective. Third, authority for decisions is dispersed and shifts with the changing nature and interests of the participants.

Cohen and March (1974, 1986) also contend that the president faces fundamental ambiguities of purpose, power, experience, and success that exacerbate effective presidential leadership (Cohen & March, 1986; Fisher & Koch, 1996; Nason, 1980). Many highly regarded scholars of leadership in higher education endorse this contrasting view of the role of leadership.

Bolman and Deal's (1984, 1997) four cognitive frames of reference provide a concept through which a leader's actions might be understood and interpreted as alternative ways in which institutional issues may be perceived and addressed. The following paragraphs describe the bureaucratic, collegial, political, and symbolic frames (Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997).

The bureaucratic frame, also referred to as the structural frame, is useful for understanding an issue in terms of rational decision-making, management through an organizational structure, and clear lines of authority and communication. Presidents who perceive issues using a bureaucratic frame are likely to emphasize their roles in

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making decisions, directing results, and establishing management systems (Bensimon 1989; Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997).

The human resource or collegial frame views the college or university as a community of scholars. The president who uses this frame seeks participative decision-making, works to meet people's needs, and helps them realize their potential and aspirations. The emphasis is on interpersonal skills, motivation of others, and placing the interests of the institution first (Bensimon et al., 1989; Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997).

The political frame views the institution as overlapping coalitions of both formal and informal groups that vie for power to control institutional processes and outcomes of issues. Presidents who view the institution through the political frame of reference attempt to build networks and alliances through persuasion, diplomacy, and political power to support their actions (Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997).

The symbolic frame perceives the institution as a cultural system of shared meaning and beliefs in which organizational structures and processes are invented. The president who views issues through the symbolic frame constructs and maintains systems of shared meanings through rituals, symbols, ceremonies, and myths that create a unifying system of beliefs for the institution (Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997).

Presidents may be able to perceive the institution through only one cognitive frame of reference, or he/she may be cognitively complex and be sensitive to multiple frames. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that the ability to operate in multiple frames is directly related to successful presidencies (Bensimon et al., 1989; Birnbaum, 1988, 1992).

Crisis Management

The president of a higher education institution is faced with an exceptionally broad range of leadership situations and scenarios. One of the most critical scenarios is a crisis or emergency that threatens people or facilities and mandates timely and appropriate leadership response. The full range of crisis management is a substantial and significant part of the responsibilities of the president.

Crisis management is normally divided into four parts: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. It is a continuum of planning and execution to minimize the impact of a crisis and return the institution to a normal operational state. The planning can conceivably involve virtually every facet of the university, and the president ultimately bears responsibility for it (Texas A&M-Texarkana Crisis Management Plan, 2003).

Mitigation is best described as the measures taken to avoid crises and prevent small emergencies from becoming large ones. Examples are as ubiquitous and far ranging as constructing buildings that meet appropriate fire safety codes or providing oversight for campus-sponsored events. For example, the president of Seton Hall may have had it within his power to mitigate the fire that killed three students in 2001 by having sprinklers installed, and the president of Texas A&M University may have had it within his power to ensure the bonfire tradition was appropriately supervised. Similarly, some might argue that the president of Oklahoma State University may have had it within his power to mitigate the risks of air travel in 2001 for the school's athletic teams by ensuring appropriate oversight of the flights, including donated flights.

Preparedness is the development of plans and procedures necessary to enable effective and efficient use of resources in the event of a crisis. Many colleges and universities have crisis management plans. In most cases, the president convenes and leads the crisis management or response team. Harvard University has an "incident support team" as well as a crisis management team that evolved from tabletop exercises to ensure preparedness (Gewertz, 2002).

This study is concerned with the last two phases of crisis management, crisis response and recovery. Response and recovery are closely aligned action phases of emergency management. During these phases the decision process may depart from what may be the norm at most institutions. Considerable research exists indicating that followers expect their leaders to be more assertive during crisis situations, show initiative in solving problems, and follow a more directive approach to leadership, which may not be the president's or the institution's usual style (Yukl, 1994). Additionally, a declared crisis may change the rules for decision-making and involve the president in decisions that would normally be delegated or arrived at in a more collegial and less directive manner (Kerchner, 1993).

Presidential Leadership and Crisis Management

A panel of presidents at an American Council on Education conference session on "*What to do When Disaster Strikes*" (2001) called emergency situations the ultimate test of both a president and an institution. They also noted that a crisis situation is ultimately a learning experience and that university leadership should review their actions and lessons learned following a crisis so that the institution is better prepared in the future (Campus disasters, 2001).

It is possible that the cognitive frames of reference that filter and frame a president's perceptions and leadership actions under more routine circumstances are appropriate and effective during crisis response and recovery scenarios. Similarly, it is possible that crisis scenarios may reflect the traditional view of leadership as instrumental to the institution's response and recovery. Alternatively it is possible that the president has largely interpretive/symbolic leadership impact during a crisis.

Within the unique and demanding context of a real-world crisis or emergency scenario, we simply do not know the most appropriate and important cognitive frames and the relevance of either of the two schools of thought. Indeed, there may be other cognitive frames of reference in addition to the four identified by Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997). There may also be aspects of presidential leadership in a crisis scenario that are not adequately addressed by either school of thought. The leadership implications for presidents and institutions are significant.

Significance of the study

To be significant, a study should be useful in three general and broad contexts. First, it should contribute to knowledge in some way. Second, it should be useful and meaningful to the relevant policy arenas in the research. Finally, the study should be useful for practitioners (Marshall & Rossman, 1989).

This study helps increase understanding of how presidents lead in crisis response and recovery situations. Specifically, the research increases understanding of specific cognitive lenses that frame a president's perceptions and actions when he or she is confronted with a crisis. Additionally, there is little in the way of specific research to suggest whether effective leadership in such scenarios is essentially instrumental or interpretive/symbolic. This is a fundamental disagreement between two existing schools

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of thought on presidential leadership when applied to other, more traditional contexts for presidential responsibility.

The study provides relevant information for policy. An invaluable strategy for a college or university in a crisis scenario is a pre-established crisis management plan. The plan typically provides for a crisis-action team or cell with checklists for ensuring the right actions are taken in the right sequence and by the right people to minimize the impact of a crisis. Study of specific crises and the best practices and mistakes of others helps administrators develop policies and plans that will help them be better prepared. Indeed, an increasingly common practice is for college and university administrators to conduct tabletop disaster scenarios to ensure all applicable considerations are included in crisis management planning (McCarthy et al., 2001).

Finally, presidents who have an opportunity to study the complete details of crises at other institutions can learn about the specific leadership challenges and be better prepared when disaster strikes. Our expectations for the president of a college or university are understandably and appropriately high. We should better understand our own expectations of the institutional leader, especially when things go horribly wrong. It is in those times when effective presidential leadership is most needed, and least understood. It may be, in the absence of other research on the subject, that many college presidents are not prepared to meet the challenges associated with the "ultimate leadership challenge" (Campus Disasters, 2001, p. 2).

In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, it is critical that our college and university leadership are prepared not only for accidents, natural disasters, and public disorder, but also for far worse scenarios. If we understand the role of presidential

leadership in crisis response and recovery, future presidents will be better prepared and higher education will benefit.

Limitations of the Study

As always, the findings of this study are subject to different interpretations. Indeed, one would be concerned if the findings were not subject to interpretation (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). Alternative interpretations on the part of participants are included where appropriate and are auditable through the availability of a confirmability audit trail consisting of transcripts and audiotapes.

Another significant limitation was the amount of time spent with some participants due to travel constraints. Some participants live in different regions of the country. Consequently, more than one face-to-face session with them was impractical. All follow-up interviews and discussions with these were through telephone communications only. One senior administrator and two other participants in the primary case under study were interviewed by telephone only.

The primary case study involves events that occurred in early 2001 and the two secondary cases occurred in 1999 and 1970; consequently, some memories have faded and perceptions have evolved. Those instances where recollections by participants were uncertain are identified as clearly as possible.

One of the two presidents involved in the secondary cases is deceased. Therefore, interviews were conducted with two people who were senior administrators at the time of the crisis as well as the current president of the institution. The current president's knowledge of the crisis event lacks first-person involvement. However, his understanding of the continued relevance of the event upon the campus and its people is significant. His perception of how the institutional lessons learned have been preserved

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is also relevant. Finally, his actions in dealing with surviving family members more than 30 years after the crisis event are important.

A small number of participants were reluctant to discuss the tragedy in which they were involved. While some participants suggested that the discussions were therapeutic for them, it was clear that none of them enjoyed speaking of the tragedy.

Finally, potential litigation against the institution and the estate of one of the key people in a secondary case study hampered data gathering to a degree. One participant was not able to respond to some questions due to legal issues. These instances are identified in subsequent chapters.

Definitions

The following terms and phrases are important to an understanding of this study:

Leadership

The word "leader" first appeared in the English language around 1300 A.D. and "leadership" originated in 1800 A.D., but the issues of leadership are as old as human civilization (Sinha, 1995). Consequently, there is no shortage of definitions for leadership and any number of available definitions would serve the purpose of this study. A restrictive or overly rigid definition is not necessary or desired. Leadership is broadly defined herein as Yukl (1994) defines it: "influencing processes affecting the interpretation of events for followers, the choice of objectives for the group or organization, the organization of work activities to accomplish the objectives, the maintenance of cooperative relationships and teamwork, and the enlistment of support and cooperation from people outside the group or organization" (p. 5).

Cognitive frames of reference

Cognitive frames of reference represent the conceptualization of different perspectives from which one may perceive and define ambiguous situations. They reflect how people construct social reality (Bolman & Deal, 1991). There are many synonyms for the concept in social science: lenses, mindscapes, schemata, perspectives and images, for example. The four frames developed by Bolman and Deal—bureaucratic, human resource, political, and symbolic—are important to this study, but they are not the only ones in the literature. For example, Tierney offered a fifth frame, the "cybernetic system" (Tierney, 1988). Bogue and Aper (2000) added another with the concept of the "hieratic priesthood" of the faculty. Other frames have been developed by other scholars and are referenced within the study.

A significant aspect of the cognitive frame concept is that each of the frames represents processes that are ongoing in separate dimensions at any given time within a college or university. The institution functions as a bureaucracy. At the same time, processes involving human networks of colleagues, coalitions of power and influence, and shapers of meaning operate as well. Each frame of reference represents a valid perspective, but the significance of a particular frame may be great or small depending upon the specifics of a particular issue (Bolman & Deal, 1991). This term reflects different perspectives that provide situational awareness, or how one perceives and understands organizational situations.

Instrumental leadership

Birnbaum (1992) defined instrumental leadership as those aspects of leadership that reflect technical competence, experience, and judgment. Examples of instrumental leadership include coordinating the activities of others, making sensible decisions,

meeting deadlines, representing the institution to others, and achieving goals through effective communication, administration, and management processes.

Interpretive/Symbolic leadership

Whereas instrumental leadership reflects the ability of the president to lead the institution through existing means and perceptions, interpretive leadership involves altering perceptions of the institution and the way it operates. Interpretive/Symbolic leadership emphasizes the management of meaning of situations and activities. Although instrumental and interpretive leadership are separate and distinct concepts, they can be represented in the same acts. Instrumental acts may often have symbolic significance and interpretive acts may affect the way people perceive events. Moreover, "all acts of presidential leadership reflect both forms (instrumental and interpretive) to different degrees" (Birnbaum, 1992, p. 152).

Crisis Management

Crisis management refers to coordinated actions to prevent, prepare for, offset, and recover from the consequences of natural disaster, accidents, terrorism, violence and other incidents that threaten an institution. Crisis management consists of four phases: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. This study is primarily concerned with the response and recovery phases. These consist of the actions taken once a crisis event has occurred in order to minimize damage or injury, and then, to restore the institution and its processes to a normal state.

Chapter II

Literature Review

This chapter is a review of the literature in three areas that are fundamental to this study. The first area consists of a discussion of basic leadership theory and its evolution. The second is a review of presidential leadership in higher education. Finally, the literature review discusses crisis or emergency management as it applies to higher education institutions.

Major Categories of Leadership Theory

Plato's *The Republic*, written more than 2,000 years ago, was probably the first serious attempt to construct a systematic theory of politics and leadership. Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, written between the fifth and third centuries B. C., is the oldest known military text. It contains leadership principles that are studied by military officers and many business executives today (Grint, 1997). Machiavelli wrote *The Prince* in 1513 to advise leaders how success was achieved and failure avoided. Napoleon expressed that he would rather have an army of rabbits led by a lion than an army of lions led by a rabbit (Bass, 1990). These classic examples illustrate that leadership has fascinated and puzzled us throughout the history of human society.

Theories attempting to explain or encompass leadership can be broadly grouped into as many as six major categories: trait theories, behavioral theories, contingency theories, power and influence theories, cultural and symbolic theories, and cognitive theories (Bass, 1990; Bensimon, Neumann, & Birnbaum, 1989; Birnbaum, 1988;

Hollander 1985; Vroom, 1976; Yukl, 1989, 1994). The first four of these have

substantial basis in literature. The last two, cultural and symbolic and cognitive theories,

have been developed more recently.

Trait Theory

Scholarly research on leadership did not begin until the early years of the 20th

Century (Chemers, 1997; Yukl, 1994). The first leadership theories attributed leadership

capability or greatness to heroic qualities or particular traits of personality and character

(Zaccaro & Klimoski, 2001). For example, several early theorists attempted to explain

leadership on the basis of inheritance. One, F. A. Woods in his *The Influence of*

Monarchs in 1913, studied 14 nations and their rulers over periods of several centuries

and found that the conditions of each reign approximated the ruler's capabilities.

Another, A. E. Wiggam in *The Biology of Leadership* in 1931, proposed that

intermarriage of an aristocratic class provided superior leaders, biologically different

from lower classes (Stogdill, 1974).

While these trait theories comprised the first systematic approach to the study of

effective leadership, it was the 19th Century philosopher, Thomas Carlyle, who proposed

a "great man" theory of leadership that was perhaps the most prominent of the early trait

theories. The great man theory contended that great leaders possessed special traits or

characteristics of personality and character that allowed them to attain prominence

regardless of other factors. Effective leadership was seen as dependent upon

extraordinary abilities such as boundless energy, perceptive intuition and foresight, high

integrity, strong intellect, and irresistible persuasive power. Trait theories focused upon

the individual leader with little regard for the followers, situation, or the organization

(Bass, 1990; Stogdill, 1974; Yukl, 1989).

From the early 1900s until World War II, trait investigations remained the dominant research strategy in leadership. The kinds of traits studied most often included physical characteristics, personality, and ability. During the 1930s and 1940s, hundreds of studies of traits of leaders were conducted to discover, define, and refine the qualities of effective leadership (Yukl, 1989).

In a classic review of literature in 1948, Ralph Stogdill analyzed the evidence from 124 trait studies from 1904 to 1948 that were in favor of the trait concept of effective leadership. Significantly, Stogdill (1974) found that the results varied considerably from situation to situation and, in fact, failed to support a basic premise of trait theorists, that a person must possess a particular set of characteristics in order to lead effectively (Bass, 1990; Stogdill, 1974; Yukl, 1989). The 1948 review by Stogdill (1974) discouraged many leadership scholars from studying traits of leaders.

In a subsequent review of 163 trait studies conducted between 1949 and 1970, Stogdill used an expanded variety of assessment and measurement procedures that resulted in stronger and more consistent results. Most of the same leadership characteristics were again determined to be significant to leadership effectiveness. Stogdill (1974) summarized his findings in the following trait profile:

> The leader is characterized by a strong drive for responsibility and task completion, vigor and persistence in pursuit of goals, venture-someness and originality in problem solving, drive to exercise initiative in social situations, self-confidence and sense of personal identity, willingness to accept consequences of decision and action, readiness to absorb interpersonal stress, willingness to tolerate frustration and delay, ability to influence other people's behavior, and capacity to structure social interaction systems to the purpose at hand. (p. 175)

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However, Stogdill (1974) made it clear that recognition of the relevance of leader traits was not a return to the trait approach. The fundamental concept, that certain leadership characteristics are absolutely necessary for effective leadership, had not been substantiated (Bass, 1990; Stogdill, 1974; Yukl, 1994).

Bass (1990) concluded that, "There is no overall comprehensive theory of the personality of leaders. Nonetheless, evidence abounds about particular patterns of traits that are of consequence to leadership, such as determination, persistence, self-confidence, and ego strength" (p. 87).

Behavior Theory

In the 1950s, researchers began to study more closely the things that leaders actually did, and how they behaved in their leadership roles. The most significant and comprehensive research into the behavioral aspects of leadership were initiated as part of the Ohio State University leadership studies by Carroll Shartle in 1945 (Bass, 1990; Bensimon et al., 1989; Chemers, 1997; Yukl, 1994).

At Ohio State in the 1950s and 1960s, J. K. Hemphill and associates developed a list of approximately 1,800 statements, eventually reduced to 150, describing different aspects of the behavior of leaders that ultimately became the Leader Behavior Description Questionnaire, or LBDQ. Ultimately, four questionnaires were developed. What emerged were two factors that described leadership behavior: *consideration* and *initiation of structure*. Consideration referred to the extent to which a leader demonstrated concern for the welfare of the other members of the group or organization. Initiation of structure referred to the extent to which a leader initiated and organized activity in the group and defined the way work was to be done. Initiation of structure included such behavior as maintaining standards, meeting deadlines, establishing clear

channels of communication, organizing patterns of work, and determining what work was to be done (Bass, 1990; Yukl, 1994).

Studies by Atwater and White (1985) indicated that considerate behavior by supervisors had a high degree of correlation with both loyalty and trust on the part of subordinates. Another finding was that the organization type effected the extent to which a leader initiated structure, was considerate, or both (Bass, 1990). The implication was that the organization type was a factor in determining effective leaders.

Hemphill (1955) used the LBDQ to study the leadership of heads of academic departments in a university. Results showed that the department head's reputation for administrative competence did not have a correlation with consideration but did have a correlation with initiation of structure. The results also showed that consideration and initiation of structure by the leader were influenced by personal and situational variables. Indeed, an important implication with behavior theory was the assumption that leaders could modify their behaviors and act differently as the situation warranted (Zaccaro & Klimoski, 2001).

During approximately the same period the Ohio State leadership studies were being conducted, another major research program at the University of Michigan found that three types of leadership behavior differentiated effective from ineffective leaders. The three types of behavior were *task-oriented, relationship-oriented,* and *participatory* (Yukl, 1994; Likert, 1967).

The University of Michigan researchers initially conceptualized relationship and task orientations as opposite ends of a single continuum. As more studies were completed, the researchers concluded that when the two behavior styles described by task-oriented or relationship-oriented actions were treated independently, leaders were

able to orient to both employees and production at the same time. These findings were similar to the Ohio State studies, according to R. L. Kahn in 1956 (Northouse, 1997). Participative management postulated that leaders should use group supervision instead of supervising subordinates individually. Group meetings were thought to facilitate subordinate participation in decision-making, improve communications, promote cooperation, and facilitate conflict resolution. However, results from research of participative leadership were not consistent, probably due to the fact that various forms of participation were effective in some situations but not in others (Yukl, 1994).

Conclusions from the Ohio State and Michigan studies led to Blake and Mouton's (1985) managerial grid, perhaps the most widely known model of leadership behavior. Blake and Mouton (1985) conceptualized leadership in terms of a grid or graph on which concern for people (consideration, relationship, or employee orientation) represented one axis and concern for production (task, initiation of task, or production orientation) represented another. The leader could rate either high or low on both scales, or high on one and low on the other. The leader who rated high in both concern for people and concern for the task developed followers who were committed to the task, and had a sense of interdependence through a common stake in the organizational purpose. The results were relationships of trust and respect. These conclusions were supported by research at the Ohio State University and the University of Michigan (Bass, 1990; Blake and Mouton, 1985; Northouse, 1997; Stogdill, 1974; Yukl, 1994).

There were various other behavior theories of leadership--such as authoritarian, democratic, and laissez-faire. These theories differentiated leadership behavior based upon whether it was directive or participatory, emphasized accomplishing tasks or

follower satisfaction, and encouraged interpersonal contact (Bass, 1990, Bensimon et al., 1989).

As with trait theories, research findings did not fully support the behavior theories. There was no absolute set of "correct" behavior categories for effective leaders (Yukl, 1994). Nonetheless, the behavior approach made several positive contributions to an understanding of the leadership process. It marked a significant expansion in the focus of leadership research outside the narrow scope of the traits of leadership. Perhaps most importantly, research from these behavioral studies showed that a leader's style was composed of primarily two major types of behaviors: task and relationship (Northouse, 1997).

A key aspect of Blake and Mouton's (1985) managerial grid concept was the recognized need for leaders to select specific behavior that was appropriate for a particular time or situation. Blake and Mouton (1985) believed effective leaders had a high concern for both task and people, but the way that concern translated into behavior varied with the situation and from one follower to another. In other words, it was contingent upon variables outside the leader.

The theory had both a universal and a situational feature. The universal feature of the theory was the value orientation used by an effective leader to select appropriate behavior. The situational aspect of the theory was that behavior must be relevant to the situation in order to be effective. Consequently, it was possible for a leadership theory to have both universal and situational aspects. Blake and Mouton (1985) never developed specific propositions about what actually constituted appropriate behaviors for different situations (Blake and Mouton, 1985; Yukl, 1994). That was left for other researchers.

Development of theories postulating that leadership was contingent upon situational factors evolved over time. The roots of those theories were also in the Ohio State leadership studies in which the two categories of leadership behavior, task-oriented behavior and relationship-oriented behavior, were initially constructed.

Hersey and Blanchard (1988) modeled the two leadership dimensions in such a way that different combinations of task and relationship behavior might be more effective in some situations than others. Additionally, they modeled the "maturity" of followers in terms of job maturity and psychological maturity. Job maturity was the amount of technical expertise or task-related knowledge, skill, experience, and ability the follower possessed. Psychological maturity was the level of self-confidence, commitment, motivation, and self-respect with respect to the task that the follower possessed. The theory described most appropriate leadership responses in terms of task or relationship behavior depending upon the maturity of followers for a given task (Hersey & Blanchard, 1988; Hughes, Ginnett, & Curphy, 1996).

The three main components of Hersey and Blanchard's (1988) situational approach to leadership were the leader, the follower, and the situation. The theory maintained that leaders who correctly modified their behaviors based upon follower maturity are more effective. The common thread in all situational approaches required the leader to behave in a flexible manner. The leader was able to diagnose the leadership style appropriate to the situation, and then to apply the appropriate style (Hersey & Blanchard, 1988).

Most scholars make an important distinction between Hersey and Blanchard's theory and other contingency theories. The majority of contingency theories and models

of leadership were based upon the premise that effective leadership was contingent upon situational variables; however, the implication was that the leader is much more consistent and less flexible in his/her behavior. Those contingency models suggested that leader effectiveness was primarily determined by selecting the right leader for certain situations or changing the situation to fit the particular leader's style (Hughes et al., 1996; Northouse, 1997; Yukl, 1989, 1994).

Among the leading contingency theory models were the *normative decision model* by Vroom and Yelton (1973); the *situational leadership model* by Hersey and Blanchard (1969); the *contingency model* by Fiedler (1967); and the *path-goal theory* by House and Dressler (1974). All four models were fairly similar in that they specified that leaders should make their behaviors contingent on certain aspects of the followers or the situation in order to improve leadership effectiveness (Hughes et al., 1996).

One of the most widely tested of the contingency theories was by Fred Fiedler (1967). Fiedler described how the situation moderated the relationship between leader traits and effectiveness. He used a "least preferred coworker" (LPC) measure. The relationship between a leader's LPC score and effectiveness depended upon a complex situational variable called *situational favorability* which was measured in terms of three aspects of the situation: leader-member relations, position power, and task structure. According to the model, the situation was most favorable for the leader when relations with subordinates were good, the leader had substantial position power, and the task was highly structured.

A number of studies since 1970 tested the LPC contingency model. The results of the studies tended to support the model (Yukl, 1994). However, the theory was criticized because it failed to explain fully why individuals with certain leadership styles

were more effective in some situations than in others. Fiedler (1993) called this a "black box" problem. A second major criticism concerned the LPC scale, discounted as a "measure in search of a meaning" by Schriesheim and Kerr (Hughes et al., 1996; Northouse, 1997; Yukl, 1994). While each of these theories provided insights into reasons for leadership effectiveness, each one had conceptual weaknesses that limited its utility (Yukl, 1994).

Each of the leadership theories previously discussed focused on the leader, follower, or situation. A category of leadership theory was conceived that focused upon the relationship between leaders and followers. This category was based upon the leadership process in terms of power and influence (Bensimon et al., 1989; Chemers, 1997; Northouse, 1997; Yukl, 1994).

Power and Influence Theory

One of the characteristics of the leader-follower relationship was that leaders exercised power. Amitai Etzioni (1965) initially distinguished between *position power* and *personal power*. While other scholars contributed to an understanding of the different sources/kinds of power, the framework provided by French and Raven (1959) became the most widely accepted (Stogdill, 1974).

French and Raven (1959) identified five bases of power: *coercive power, expert power, legitimate power, referent power*, and *reward power* (Bensimon et al., 1989; Yukl, 1994). Later, Raven and Kruglanski (1970) identified *information power*. Hersey and Goldsmith (1979) proposed a seventh power, *connection power* (Hersey & Blanchard, 1988). Within the framework of Etzioni (1965), expert, information, referent, legitimate, and connection power were types of personal power; whereas reward and coercive power were types of position power.

The research on these different power bases suggested that the use of personal forms of power typically led to greater satisfaction and performance of followers. Research also suggested that legitimate power tended not to correlate with the performance of followers, coercive power had a negative correlation, and the data supporting the influence of reward power was inconsistent (Bensimon et al., 1989; Yukl, 1989).

Transactional Theories.

A number of theories were developed using these definitions of power that focused upon the "transaction" between leader and follower. These theories were based upon transactional analysis, a method of analyzing and understanding behavior that was developed by Eric Berne (1964) and popularized in the works of Thomas Harris, Muriel James and Dorothy Jongeward and Abe Wagner (Hersey & Blanchard, 1988).

Edwin Hollander (1978) developed the first and most influential transactional leadership theory. Hollander (1978) defined leadership as a social exchange. The currency of the exchange was the legitimacy of power. Hollander's (1978) idiosyncrasy credit model incorporated the belief that leadership was a dynamic process involving continuous interpersonal evaluations by leaders and followers. In this evaluative process, the leader provided task-oriented vision, direction, and recognition to followers. Followers responded with increased responsiveness to the leader, thereby lending legitimacy to the leader's authority. When the leader's attempts to influence were successful, he/she earned "credits." Credits were earned through demonstration of competency in helping the group and individual members reach goals (Bass, 1990; Chemers, 1997; Hollander, 1978).

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Transactional theories of leadership served as the foundation for the next evolutionary breakthrough in understanding the leader-follower relationship, transformational leadership.

Transformational Theories.

The transformational approach has been the focus of much research since the 1980s. The term was first coined by Downton in *Rebel Leadership* in 1973, but its importance emerged in 1978 with the classic work, *Leadership*, by the political sociologist J. M. Burns (Bass, 1990; Bass & Avolio, 1994; Northouse, 1997). Burns (1978) distinguished transactional from transformational leadership. Transactional leadership motivated followers by appealing to their self-interest. Followers exchanged performance with the leader for the powers the leader held to the mutual attainment of goals. Later writers such as Kouzes and Posner (1995) characterized transactional leadership as closely resembling the traditional definition of the manager.

Transformational leadership, on the other hand, raised the consciousness of followers by appealing to higher ideals and moral values such as liberty, justice, equality, peace, and humanitarianism. Bass (1990) developed an expanded and more refined theory of transformational leadership in 1985. Bass' (1990) theory emphasized the leader's ability to transform followers. The transformational leader makes followers more aware of the importance and value of task outcomes. They induce followers to transcend their own self interest for the sake of the organization or team. They activate followers' higher order self-actualizing needs (Bass, 1990; Bass & Avolio, 1994; Northouse, 1997). Importantly, leaders not only influence followers by arousing emotions and identification with the organization, but also by serving as coach, teacher,

and mentor. In so doing, they provide additional self-actualizing opportunity (Bass & Avolio, 1994; Yukl, 1989).

Bass (1990) also offered a model for transformational and transactional leadership. The model suggests the functions for transactional leadership are the following: passive management by exception, active management by exception, and constructive transaction. Transformational leadership, on the other hand, provides charismatic or idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration for followers (Bass, 1990; Bass & Avolio, 1994; Northouse, 1997).

A primary measure of transformational leadership is the multi-factor leadership questionnaire (MLQ), developed by Bass and Avolio in 1990. Most of the research on the theory involved use of this questionnaire. Research showed that followers are more motivated, productive, and satisfied when leaders are characterized by parameters consistent with the transformational approach to leadership (Bass & Avolio, 1994; Yukl, 1994). Results also show that effective leaders use a mix of transformational and transactional behaviors (Yukl, 1994).

While Burns (1978) believed leaders were either transformational or transactional, the modifications by Bass recognize that transformational leadership augmented the effects of transactional leadership (Bass, 1990; Yukl, 1989). Some scholars criticized the transformational theories for lacking conceptual clarity. Further, there were concerns the theory was an elitist and undemocratic conceptualization of leadership (Northouse, 1997).

Charismatic Theories.

During the same timeframe in which J. Burns (1978) published *Leadership*, House (1976) published a theory of charismatic leadership that received significant

attention. House (1976) suggested that charismatic leaders have personal characteristics including dominance, a strong desire to influence others, self-confidence, and a strong sense of their own moral values (Bensimon et. al., 1989; Northouse, 1997). House (1976) pointed to two situational determinants that facilitated the rise of charismatic leaders. Followers were most likely to be susceptible to charismatic influence when the situation was very stressful. Additionally, situations that provided the opportunity to express goals in ideological terms were very conducive to charismatic leadership (Chemers, 1997).

The charismatic leadership theory developed by House spawned a series of popular books in the mid-1980s until the mid-1990s. Among the most popular of them were *Leadership: Strategies for Taking Charge* by Bennis and Nanus (1985); *The Transformational Leader* by Tichy and Devanna (1986), and *The Leadership Challenge: How to Get Extraordinary Things Done in Organizations* by Kouzes and Posner (1995).

The research of Kouzes and Posner (1995) reported five practices of outstanding leadership. Outstanding leaders challenge the process, inspire a shared vision, enable others to act, model the way, and encourage the spirit of their followers (Kouzes & Posner, 1995). The findings of Bennis and Nanus (1985) were very similar to those of Kouzes and Posner.

The research methods used to support the positions of these books included nonsystematic sampling, nonsystematic data gathering techniques, nonsystematic analysis, and relatively small data pool. The absence of any scientific methodology or evidence to support their assertions made their conclusions difficult to assess with certainty (Chemers, 1997).

Culture and Symbolic Leadership Theory

Another, more recent category of leadership study consisted of what may be called *cultural and symbolic theories* (Bensimon et al., 1989, Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Schein, 1985). These approaches to leadership were first explored in a 1970 case study (Bensimon, et al., 1989). Cultural and symbolic theories of leadership recognize another level of complexity, a change in the paradigm in which the organization is viewed (Lincoln, 1985).

The "naturalistic paradigm" provides an orientation of the world markedly different from one in which previous theories of leadership were developed. That paradigm is inherently systematic, rational, and objective. Peter Schwartz and James Ogilvy (1979) described the basic principles of the emerging paradigm, later to be defined as the interpretive or constructivist paradigm (Mertens, 1998). They contended that the human world is socially constructed and based upon the subjective as opposed to objective, heterarchy as opposed to hierarchy, complexity and diversity as opposed to simplicity and probabilism, holographic as opposed to mechanical, indeterminate as opposed to determinate, and mutually causal as opposed to linear causal (Huff, 1985). Organizations were seen as social inventions of the human mind; consequently, organizations were "whatever their designers and members think they are" (Downey & Brief, 1986, p. 168).

With the development of large and complex organizations, social scientists incorporated the conceptual foundation of the naturalistic paradigm in different ways. Their views reflected the perspectives of their particular disciplinary fields. Rational systems theorists, primarily sociologists, emphasized the organization in terms of structure, roles, goals, and technology. Human resource theorists, primarily scholars of

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psychology and organizational behavior, emphasized the relationship between people within the organizations and the interdependence of people and the organization. Political theories, developed by political scientists, emphasized power, conflict, and the competition for limited resources in the organization through power management, bargaining, and coalitions. Symbolic theorists, primarily anthropologists, emphasized images and their meanings (Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997).

Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) termed these various views of organizations a product of "conceptual pluralism" and used them to develop four "frames" of reference for viewing organizations: the structural frame, human resource frame, political frame, and symbolic frame (Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997). While three of the frames commonly assume a world that is relatively certain, rational, and with goals and measurements of effectiveness, one of them--the symbolic frame--does not.

The symbolic frame of reference assumes that the most important element of an organizational event is not the event itself, but the meaning of the event as interpreted by humans. It also assumes that most significant events and processes in organizations are substantially ambiguous. People create symbols and assign meanings in order to reduce ambiguity and confusion (Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997). The shared meanings helps define an organization's culture.

Bolman and Kennedy (1982) developed factors that distinguished symbolic leaders from others who were less attuned to the importance of culture. Symbolic leaders are sensitive to the cultural organization, its rituals, and their importance for long-term success.

In a longitudinal study of the development of managers, Schein (1985) concluded that the unique function of leadership is the creation and management of culture. In

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organizations with dysfunctional culture, leadership is needed to help the group unlearn some cultural assumptions and learn other assumptions. In organizations with strong or enabling cultures, one of the functions of leaders is to support and shape the culture. In so doing, the leader must be attuned to organizational values, heroes, and rituals (Deal & Kennedy, 1988).

A study by Bolman and Deal (1991) concluded that the variables that predict effectiveness as a manager are different from those that predict effectiveness as a leader, and that leadership effectiveness is particularly associated with high scores on the symbolic dimensions, but is largely unrelated to the structural frame. The study did not define the meaning of leader effectiveness and manager effectiveness but left it to the implicit meanings participants gave to the two concepts.

Cultural and symbolic theories are predicated upon leaders creating organizational reality for followers (Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997). Cognitive theories, on the other hand, are based upon the notion that followers invent their leaders (Bensimon et al., 1989).

Cognitive Leadership Theory

Cognitive theories of leadership were consistent with cultural and symbolic theories and the naturalistic paradigm from which they are considered. In 1975, Shaw demonstrated that group members' perceptions of concrete events could be influenced by whether the members believed that those events led to desirable outcomes. Group members were perceived to create visions of reality consistent with their beliefs of how groups operated. *Social cognition* was defined as the way people think about people, situations, and people in situations. A *cognitive schema* was defined as the mental structure that serves to organize knowledge in some systematic fashion, often operating

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unconsciously. It was "an abstract structure represented in thought which an individual used to represent real-world phenomena" (Downey & Brief, 1986, p. 166). A third term important to an understanding of cognitive leadership theory was the *cognitive script*, a schema devoted to understanding and enacting dynamic patterns of behavior. A script supplied knowledge about expected sequences of events and guided behavior so that it was appropriate in a given organizational situation (Gioia & Sims, 1986). Cognitive leadership theory was based upon the perception of the organization as a group of individuals attempting to create meaning and/or learning it from others who were also involved in its construction (Gioia, 1986; Downey & Brief, 1986).

Cognitive leadership theories emphasized the expectations followers have of their leaders, consistent with their cognitive schemas about how organizations worked, and postulated that leaders conformed to those expectations. The implicit expectations of followers tended to color their perceptions of what was and was not good leadership (Bass, 1990). Leaders may act in ways consistent with what followers believed was good leadership according to the cognitive script, whether it was or not.

Leader cognitions were important since leadership occurred in response to non-routine, ill-defined events, and required the formulation of abstract systems that shaped both internal and external processes. Therefore, the leader needed a schema as well to know what leadership actions were appropriate (Lord, 2001).

Continued Evolution of Leadership Theory

As the concept of leadership evolved, nothing useful was abandoned. As new ideas of leadership emerged, previous ideas were not discarded. Instead, every new idea contained previous ideas and built something new on them, using the older ideas as a base (Drath, 1998).

In the evolution of leadership theory, there has been a consistent tendency to increase equality between the leader and followers. From the ancient idea that the leader is the absolute ruler, to the idea that the leader's job is to influence people to do what the leader sees as needing to be done, to the idea that leaders and followers must share an inner commitment to a larger purpose, the gap between the power and role of the leader and that of the follower has narrowed (Drath, 1998).

The concepts and practice of leadership may be undergoing continued change. Although the new form is as yet unclear, the change in leadership appears to involve erasing fundamental distinctions between leaders and followers. In the future, leadership may be understood as a process that plays out in reciprocal actions between group or team members (Drath, 1998).

Presidential Leadership in Higher Education

Just as our understanding of leadership has evolved, so has our understanding of the role of leadership in higher education. In the 19th Century, American higher education presidents were characterized as bold, larger-than-life leaders who single-handedly shaped the course of their institutions (Gilley, Fulmer, & Reithlingshoefer, 1986). From the late 19th Century and continuing until the 1960s, the traditional leadership role of the president was characterized as one that provided guidance through rational decision-making and directives, albeit in a collegial manner (Bensimon et al., 1989; Fisher, 1984).

Following a "vintage" period for most colleges and universities during the late 1950s and early 1960s, the academy changed. Beginning in the 1970s, there was a growing perception of a progressive weakening of the presidency. The perception was that the college presidency was in trouble due to changes in both the external and internal

environment. By May and June of 1970, at least 1,000 campuses in the U. S. were on strike (Bogue, 1994; Fisher, 1984; Kerr 1984; Kerr & Gade, 1986).

Some scholars decried the absence of strong presidents in higher education. At a blue-ribbon conference entitled "Past, Present, and Future Leaders of American Higher Education" in the late 1990s, the general consensus was that the lineage of visionary leaders such as Charles William Eliot, Nicholas Murray Butler, and Robert Maynard Hutchins ended with Clark Kerr and Father Hesburgh (Chait, 2001).

Conversely, commentators and scholars of 2000-era presidents who responded to the question, "Where have all the leaders gone?" contended that there never really was a "golden age" of presidential leadership (Chait, 2001; McCorkle & Archibald, 1982). Nonetheless, Keohane (1998) acknowledged that, with a few exceptions, presidents "have been less visible, and less obviously authoritative, in recent decades" (p. 13).

Clark Kerr (1984) headed a commission chartered to investigate the condition of the presidency and to make recommendations for enhancing its role. The commission interviewed more than 800 presidents, former presidents, spouses, and others. They concluded that it was more difficult to get highly qualified people to serve as presidents than in earlier times—more specifically the early 1960s. The reason for the increased difficulty was widespread perceptions of growing pressures, more pressing current problems, and greater constraints on a president's ability to lead (Kerr, 1984).

The commission noted that only about one-half of top academic officers—the single greatest source of new presidents—indicated interest in becoming presidents. Furthermore, the commission concluded that presidents had become less engaged in long-term planning for the future of their institutions while becoming more focused on current, more pressing problems. The commission also concluded that U. S. colleges and

universities were in desperate need of leadership (Kerr, 1984). During this period the office of the president was seen as declining in educational significance and becoming more managerial in nature (Benezet et al., 1981).

Research by Kerr and Gade (1986) indicated that presidents frequently experienced loneliness, a sense of being driven and harried, a sense of being under constant observation, and a sacrificed family life. Kerr and Gade (1986) noted differences between the business model and higher education model for leadership. A business corporation had no tenured faculty and no guarantees of academic freedom. The corporation had single-service customers and a single bottom line—current profits. The corporation president had more control over expenditures of his/her time, much less social and cultural obligation, and many more internal sources of support.

Harold Stoke, in *The American College President* in 1959, defined the president's major function as clarifying the institution's purposes and selecting the appropriate means to achieve them. He also noted that the president's influence on education had been declining because of specialization that forced presidents to be managers.

Benezet, Katz, and Magnusson (1981) noted that assessments written by former presidents shortly after leaving office, such as Dexter Keezer's *The Light That Flickers* (1947), Warren G. Bennis' *The Leaning Ivory Tower* (1973), and Gail T. Parker's *The Writing on the Wall: Inside Higher Education in America* (1979), portrayed the position as being a largely futile exercise.

The perception of a diminished role of the president that emerged and grew from the late 1960s led to the development of presidential leadership theory to explain the change. Consequently, researchers developed theories that ran counter to the traditional theories that supported strong presidential leadership

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Traditional Presidential Leadership

Perspectives of Presidents.

Many former college and university presidents have reflected on the leadership role of the position. Examples include Kennedy (1997), Rhodes (1998), Fisher (1984, 1991), Bogue (1994), Shapiro (1998), and Shaw (1999). Virtually all of them tend to endorse the significance of the president in traditional, strong and influential leadership roles.

Fisher (1984) borrowed from the power topology of French and Raven (1959) by asserting that all forms of power or leadership fell under one or more of the following categories: coercion, reward, legitimate, expert, and referent or charisma. Fisher, Tack and Wheeler (1988) took exception to those, Birnbaum and others, who maintained that the solution to the problems in higher education resided in decision-making based on a consensus born of collegiality. Fisher (1991) also concluded that effective college presidents tended to retain final authority and make hard decisions. They also supported, praised, challenged, and encouraged creativity to the benefit of institutional colleagues, while remaining committed to shared governance (Fisher, 1991).

Writings by Kerr (1984), Kerr and Gade (1986), Fisher (1984, 1991), and Gilley et al. (1986), were among those who described the weakening of presidential leadership as a result of the constraints of more federal/state controls, courts, more influence by faculties, and unionization. They offered antidotes for what they considered to be a serious problem.

Research Supporting Traditional Leadership.

Many of these early writings were based on the experiences of presidents, with little empirical support. One of the early empirical studies of administrative style in 49 private colleges and universities between 1972 and 1977 came from the Exxon Education Foundation's Resource Allocation Management Program. Results of that study showed that presidential leadership styles were related to a number of faculty and student outcomes that seemed consistent with traditional, take-charge leadership style (Astin & Scherrei, 1980).

Gilley et al. (1986), in a study of 20 colleges that were widely recognized as performing well and successfully gaining new levels of excellence, concluded the following:

> A crucial component in the successful development and implementation of a strategic mission is leadership. Recognition of the importance of quality leadership, and of its necessity for institutional growth, was evident without exception at the schools we visited. While many on the campuses gave kudos to faculty, deans, vice presidents, and others, the primary credit for institutional achievement was given to presidents as those who made a significant difference. (p. 25)

Chaffee (1983) described five models for decision-making in higher education administration: the rational model—directed by values and supporting data, the collegial model—directed by consensus, the political model—directed by conflicting self-interests and power, the bureaucratic model—directed by traditional administrative patterns, and the anarchical model—directed by accidents of timing and interest. Chaffee's (1983)

research supported the thesis that the rational model can effect significant improvements in management as follows:

> The rational decision process is necessarily connected with values and this connection promotes predictability and fairness, using a rational decision process is a means of saving faculty and students from cynicism, possibly the greatest threat faced by higher education in the 1980s. (Chaffee, 1983, p. 4)

Chaffee (1983) also noted that it was traditionally assumed that colleges and universities make most of their decisions according to the "collegial model." She concluded that the collegial model might apply to academic decisions. The model did not describe the non-academic decisions that caused the greatest problems for administrators (Chaffee, 1983).

Astin and Scherrei (1980) postulated four presidential leadership styles: the bureaucrat, the intellectual, the egalitarian, and the counselor. These styles reflected how and to whom presidents tended to communicate most often, as well as how they were perceived by faculty and administrators. Astin and Scherrei (1980) also identified five administrative styles: hierarchical, humanistic, entrepreneurial, insecure, and task-oriented. They found that institutions with particular administrative styles tended to be led by a president with a particular leadership style. Hierarchical and task-oriented institutions were most often led by bureaucratic presidents; humanistic institutions, by egalitarians; and insecure institutions, by intellectuals. Entrepreneurial institutions were least often led by intellectuals.

Astin and Scherrei (1980, p. 4) viewed presidential leadership in terms of "power," and quoted Clark Kerr (1984), "of all the problems confronting higher education in the coming years, the greatest will be leadership." This position is

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consistent with the traditional view of strong, visionary, and authoritative presidential leadership.

Benezet et al. (1981) performed a study to determine whether the president was widely considered to be a leader or a manager. The Presidency Project, 1976-1979, consisted of interviews with presidents, senior academic administrators, faculty, and students at 25 public and private colleges and universities. A key highlight of the study was the near-unanimous expression that college presidents needed to carry out the full measure of their office. The study came to three conclusions: the president did make a difference through leadership and not just management, the job required an enormous expenditure of time and energy, and most presidents aspired to be leaders in education as well as administrative leaders. The conclusions were consistent with the view that higher education called for strong presidential leadership.

Benezet et al. (1981) identified six leadership styles: the take-charge president, the standard-bearer, the organization president, the moderator president, the explorer president, and the founding president. They found that the largest representation was the take-charge president. They concluded that "training for the college presidency is so sparse and unsystematic that it can hardly be said to exist in a formal sense" (p. 105). In addition, they reported somewhat prophetically, "the effective president of the future will be less a potentate of a small separate kingdom and more a catalyst of dynamic contacts involving faculty members, students, and a variety of educational environments" (Benezet et al., 1981, p. vii).

Fisher, Tack, and Wheeler (1988) measured five characteristics of presidents: management style, human relations, image, social reference, and confidence. They found that effective presidents were committed, thoughtful and deliberate in making decisions,

possessed strong self-control, believed in close collegial relationships, and tended to be unencumbered by bureaucracy. Furthermore, effective presidents were characterized by others as strong, confident, intelligent, insightful, and decisive.

While the Fisher et al. (1988) study indicated that effective leaders tended to be risk-takers and maintained social distance from others, work by Gilley, Fulmer, and Reithlingshoefer (1986) indicated effective presidents tended to be risk-averse and have strong orientation toward people. These conflicting results tended to support scholars who maintained there were no universal, static traits for presidential leadership effectiveness under all circumstances (Bensimon et al., 1989).

The Non-traditionalist Perspective.

Juxtaposed against the position taken by those whose findings supported strong presidential leadership was the view of Michael Cohen and James March in the influential *Leadership and Ambiguity* (1974, 1986). Cohen and March contended that the college president had more potential to influence the institution than any other person in the institution but had less power than commonly perceived. They believed that "egalitarian norms" of the institution result in the president being "resented because he is more powerful than he should be [and]...scorned and frustrated because he is weaker than he is believed capable of being" (Cohen & March, 1986, p. 116).

Cohen and March (1974, 1986) contested the "heroic" concept of the president, and argued that the hero theory only led to false expectations and disappointments. They also maintained that the president was probably mistaken to imagine he or she could have a significant long-term effect on the institution's position because of the nature of the higher education institution. They characterized the institution as an "organized anarchy."

It was an organized anarchy because it exhibited problematic properties. First, it had ill-defined and often inconsistent goals. Secondly, it operated on a trial-and-error basis without clear and consistent ideas on how to be effective. Finally, authority for decisions was widely dispersed and shifted with the changing nature and interests of the participants (Cohen & March, 1974, 1986).

The college president also faced fundamental ambiguities associated with the institution that exacerbated obstacles for effective presidential leadership. The institution had ambiguity of purpose, power, experience, and success. Cohen and March (1974, 1986) proposed the concept that leadership in colleges and universities was made difficult and even problematic because of the dual control systems—administrative and academic governance, conflicts between professional and administrative authority, unclear goals, and the special properties of professional organizations.

A number of leading scholars adopted and contributed to the organized anarchy concept. These scholars focused attention on the environmental and organizational constraints that limited presidential power and made a vision of strong presidential leadership an illusion. (Bensimon et al., 1989; Birnbaum, 1992; Nason, 1980; Walker, 1979)

The normative career ladder for almost 89 percent of college and university presidents was through the faculty and administrative ranks as "scholars or stewards" of the system. Consequently, presidents had the opportunity to learn how the organized anarchy functioned. This experience allowed them to be as effective as they appeared to be (Birnbaum & Umbach, 2001, p. 206; Cohen & March, 1974).

Continuing the perspective popularized by Cohen and March (1974, 1986), Tierney (1988) identified three problems associated with presidential leadership studies.

He contended that most research on leadership was either time-bound or time-free. Secondly, he believed that there had been little agreement on the concept of leadership. Finally, he argued that it was not possible to define good leaders without reference to a values framework and agreement as to what determinants should be measured.

Tierney (1988) offered an alternative framework in which he contended that the thing holding people together in an organization was "not based upon interactionist principles or on psychological variations that offer individual-based interpretations of situations" (p.17). From the vantage point of Tierney's alternative frame, one could discover how things happened as a result of presidential leadership within the social constructs of the institution through analysis of time, space, and communications (Tierney, 1988).

Another important contributor to the research on presidential leadership in higher education, Birnbaum (1988), proposed the following:

> Common ideas about the efficacy of strong and decisive leadership may have some validity in business firms that are hierarchical and goal directed and in which subordinates expect to receive directives from superiors. But leaders in higher education are subject to internal and external constraints that limit their effectiveness and may make their roles highly symbolic rather than instrumental. (p. 28)

In subsequent writing, Birnbaum (1992) distinguished *interpretive* from *instrumental* leadership. Presidents provided interpretive leadership by changing perceptions through emphasizing some aspects of the institution and its environment and de-emphasizing others. This kind of leadership emphasized "management of meaning," a term attributed to Smircich and Morgan (1982). Birnbaum (1992) noted a natural

tendency for people in organizations to look toward leaders for guidance in making sense of an ambiguous world. Clearly, symbolism played a significant role in a president's interpretive leadership. Instrumental leadership, on the other hand, had to do with a president's actions with respect to decision-making, coordinating, and managing and emphasized qualities of technical competency, experience, and judgment (Birnbaum, 1992).

Birnbaum (1992) acknowledged and discounted as incomplete four different models of organization and governance in higher education institutions--bureaucratic, political, collegium, and organized anarchy--as invented systems designed to give meaning to leadership.

Benezet et al. (1981) argued that the Cohen and March (1974, 1986) concept of organized anarchy armed the professorate against a president. It also lessened administrators' guilt about not taking charge of the academic organization as they should. *Leadership and Ambiguity* was a popular book among presidents. Its popularity was explained, in part and somewhat cynically, because it reassured executives that a "transforming leadership" could be neither expected nor controlled (Benezet et al., 1981).

Benezet et al. (1981) described two divergent schools of thought for the conceptualization of presidential leadership in higher education. The first reflected the traditional belief that the presidency, with all its defects and inherent obstacles, retained a power and an obligation to move an institution in a chosen direction. The other school of thought placed the president amid a stream of forces that stressed the limitations of time, energy, funds, and a persistently problematic sociology for those who would seek to lead, consistent with Cohen and March (1974, 1986).

Cognition-Based Models.

A number of scholars altered the focus of the fundamental dimensions or "frames" of reference within higher education institutions that gave leadership its relevance. These researchers studied leadership from the perception of the "naturalistic" paradigm described earlier. Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) were instrumental in the origination of that perspective through the typology of "frames." Frames were different vantage points from which situations within organization and its leadership could be perceived.

Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) identified four frames: structural, human resource, political, symbolic. Each organizational frame contained implications for effective leadership.

The structural frame, exemplified by the theory of Max Weber, viewed the organization from the perspective of a rational-structural system. From this perspective, the organization was a machine-like structure, composed of interdependent parts. Leadership was a matter of directing actions on the part of organization members.

The human resource frame viewed the organization as an extended family with networks of relatives and obligations. Leadership was more concerned with relations and with the socialization and development of subordinates.

The third frame, the political frame, viewed the organization as a political system, a dialectic system of conflicting interests and coalitions. Leadership in the political frame was based upon power and the allocation of scarce resources.

The fourth view of the organization was the symbolic frame. From this perspective, the organization was symbolic, whereby members of the organization played roles that communicated meaning to others about what was happening (Bolman & Deal,

1984; Bass, 1990). This view of the organization appears to have had significant influence on scholars of leadership in higher education such as Tierney (1988), Birnbaum, (1988, 1992), Bensimon (1989), and others.

Additional research by Bolman & Deal (1991), and Bensimon (1989) showed that leaders in colleges and universities rarely used more than two frames and virtually no president used four frames. Presidents were found most likely to use the human resource frame and least likely to use the structural frame. They were also much more likely to use the symbolic frame than other higher education administrators. Another provocative finding was that researchers were able to predict a minimum of 74 percent of the variance in perceived leadership effectiveness. They also found that the structural frame was the best predictor of managerial effectiveness, but was the worst predictor of effectiveness for a leader. For the symbolic frame, the pattern was reversed (Bensimon, 1989; Bolman & Deal, 1991).

Most scholars contended that at least some of the organizational frames of reference conceived by Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) were helpful when considering various organizational perspectives of the university. If an observer had the perspective provided by the structural frame, the university was seen as a bureaucracy. If the perspective was of the human resource frame, the university was seen as a collegium or community of equals. The perspective of the political frame yielded an appreciation and understanding of the university as a political system. Finally, the perspective offered by the symbolic frame provided a vision of the university as the organized anarchy developed by Cohen and March (1974, 1986).

The symbolic perspective on leadership was criticized by proponents of the more traditional leadership approaches. Nonetheless, each of the frames provided a widely

endorsed perspective of the way the university worked and the way presidential leadership operated as well (Birnbaum, 1988).

Culture-Based Models.

In addition to the conceptualization of cognitive frames of reference, more recent scholars emphasized the cultural and symbolic aspects of presidential leadership. These perspectives also seem to be more compatible with the characteristics of the academy championed by Cohen and March (1974, 1986).

Similarly to the concept of organizational frames by Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997), and Birnbaum's (1988) perspective of four institutional types, Berquist (1992) described four cultures of the academy as a reference for insights into improving leadership in the collegiate setting. First proposed in a report during the 1970s, Berquist's conclusions were from a study that was based on more than 150 consultations at 300 colleges and universities with more than 800 faculty members and administrators.

The cultures Berquist (1992) identified were the *collegial culture, managerial culture, developmental culture,* and *negotiating culture.* The managerial and collegial cultures could be traced back to the origins of higher education in the U. S. However, developmental and negotiating cultures were new and resulted from the seeming failure of the other two to adapt to changes in society and higher education. Berquist (1992) defined the developmental culture as the creation of programs and activities to facilitate personal and professional growth for members of the institution. The negotiating culture was the establishment of equitable and egalitarian policies and procedures for distribution of resources and benefits. This culture valued bargaining, negotiation, and confrontation between competing interests (Berquist, 1992).

Berquist (1992) found that leaders operating within the different cultures tended to use different kinds of power. In the developmental culture, leaders tended to use expert power; in the managerial culture, they tended toward rational-legal power; in the collegial culture, they tended toward political power; and in the negotiating culture, they tended to use formal authority in collective bargaining scenarios (Berquist, 1992).

The Institutional Leadership Project

One of the most comprehensive research efforts studies ever conducted on leadership in higher education was the Institutional Leadership Project (ILP). The ILP was a five-year longitudinal study of 32 formal leaders of colleges and universities during 1986-1987 and 1988-1989. A total of 412 people were interviewed. The study served as the basis for a number of works by researchers in higher education leadership. It differed from other studies in that it viewed institutions as cultural systems in which leaders and other players constructed a social reality through interpretations they made of events. It was also the first study that gave attention to how academic leaders thought and the frames through which they made sense of their institutions and their own performance (Birnbaum, 1992).

The conclusions of the ILP led Birnbaum (1992) to identify certain "myths" of academic leadership. First was the myth of presidential vision. The myth was not that organizational vision was unimportant, but that the vision must be developed by the president from his/her own personal agenda. The study suggested the importance of a shared vision within the institution.

Secondly, Birnbaum (1992) identified the myth of the president as a transformational leader, concluding that transformational leadership was an anomaly in colleges and universities. Goals, values, and other "enduring purposes" of the institution

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were shaped more by its history, culture, and socialization processes than by its leader. Effective presidents could not be characterized as exclusively transactional or transformational. The ILP suggested that transactional presidents tended to place emphasis on maintaining the status quo, while transformational presidents tended to focus on incorporating change in the institution (Birnbaum, 1992).

A third myth concerned presidential charisma. The study showed that many successful presidents did indeed possess charisma, but so did many unsuccessful presidents. Birnbaum (1992) also identified the myth of presidential distance. He maintained that engagement and accessibility by important constituencies, particularly the faculty, was important for building support for a president. However, the benefit of a close relationship was contingent upon the culture of the institution. This was a counter-position to Fisher (1991), who maintained that the president must stay aloof.

A final myth identified by Birnbaum (1992) concerned presidential style and traits. The study found no evidence of "one style fits all" in terms of personality traits or style on the part of presidents. Any trait differences between successful and unsuccessful presidents were reflected in the perceptions by constituents. The successful leader was perceived to be competent, open to influence, and respectful of the institution's culture and traditions (Birnbaum, 1992).

The ILP study affirmed the significance of organizational frames or perspectives identified by Boleman and Deal (1984, 1991). It highlighted the importance of a president being able to operate in more than one frame. Birnbaum concluded that presidential leadership was important in both the instrumental sense and the interpretive sense. Instrumental leadership was important through technical competence and

judgment. Interpretive leadership was important through altering perceptions and similarly managing the meaning of events (Birnbaum, 1992).

In assessing why presidents appeared to succeed or fail, the ILP study concluded that failure almost always resulted from a president unilaterally executing a task-oriented, managerial act that appeared to be insensitive to the human aspects of the organization and faculty culture. Such acts typically caused a president to lose the support of faculty members, trustees, and other administrators. Exemplary presidents, on the other hand, were more likely to be cognitively complex and seen to be responsive and open to faculty influence (Birnbaum, 1992).

Bensimon (1991, p. 641) referred to responsiveness to faculty input and influence as "taking the role of faculty." Bensimon argued that the significance of a president's cultural and symbolic theories of leadership by constructing reality that was congruent with follower's beliefs and reflected desired ends. One important way new presidents did this was by taking the role of faculty through symbolic gestures. These gestures were perceived to put the president on the level of the faculty and allowed the voices of faculty to be heard and advocated faculty interests.

Neumann and Bensimon (1990) used data from the ILP to conceptualize four presidential types based on presidents' individual perceptions of their roles in three dimensions. The three dimensions consisted of a president's target of attention (internal or external), mode of action (initiating or reacting), and relatedness to the institution (connected or distanced). When analyzed in terms of two contextual features, financial stability and faculty morale at the institution, the results showed that presidents who were in more stable settings tended to be more initiating and connected to the internal institution. Presidents who were associated with less stable circumstances in institutional

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finances or faculty morale tended to be more reactive, more distant, and were oriented externally to the institution.

Neumann (1989) also used ILP data to determine which strategies for solving organizational problems were used by college presidents. The framework for the assessment was Chaffee's (1985) identification of three strategies used in finding solutions to organizational problems—linear, adaptive, and interpretive. The linear strategy involved a process of gathering and analyzing data, considering alternate solutions, and taking action based on the facts of the matter. The adaptive strategy involved adjusting or adapting the organization based on environmental threats and opportunities. The interpretive strategy placed less importance on reality, and more on perceptions and feelings about it (Bass, 1990). Neumann (1989) found that presidents tended to move toward more interpretive strategies as they gained experience.

Crisis Management

The president of a higher education institution is faced with a wide range of potential leadership situations and scenarios. One of the most critical scenarios is a crisis or emergency that threatens people or facilities and mandates timely and appropriate leadership response.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) describes an emergency as "any unplanned event that can cause deaths or significant injuries to employees, customers, or the public; or that can shut down ...operations, cause physical or environmental damage, or threaten the facility's financial standing or public image" (University of Wisconsin-Stout, 1998, p. 1). For a college or university, such events most often fall into the following general categories: natural

disaster, accident, death or injury/illness, terrorism, and campus violence/disruptive behavior (McCarthy et al., 2001).

There are four fundamental factors associated with an institution's preparedness in dealing with a crisis. These factors are the type of crisis, its phases, systems available to manage the crisis, and the constituents or stakeholders (Mitroff, Pearson, & Harrington, 1996; Zdziarski, 2001). There are numerous categorization schemes or typologies to identify crises. Crises may be categorized as physically violent or nonviolent; resulting in death, injury, or physical damage; intentional or unintentional; naturally occurring or man-made; accidental or malevolent; on-campus or off-campus, or in several other ways (Coombs, 1999).

Crisis management consists of four parts: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (Texas A&M-Texarkana Crisis Management Plan, 2003). It is a continuum of planning and execution to minimize the impact of a crisis and return the institution to a normal operational state.

Preparedness is the development of plans and procedures necessary to enable effective and efficient use of resources in the event of a crisis. Many colleges and universities have crisis management plans. In most cases, the president convenes and leads the crisis management or response team (Gewertz, 2002).

Awareness of the importance of campus plans to cope with an emergency or disaster scenario has grown in recent years. Terrorist actions against the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and White House on September 11, 2001 focused the attention of colleges and universities on the need for planning and preparedness in meeting crisis and emergency response situations. McCarthy et al. (2001) observed the following:

Nothing could have emphasized the importance of planning for the worst than the events of Sept. 11, 2001. Amid everyone's shock, horror, tears and fears, there must be uncluttered minds to provide the leadership and guidance to get your campus community back on track. The demonstration of strength generates a confidence from students, staff and faculty, that things will be fine, that you'll get through this in the finest tradition of your institution. (p. 1)

The Chairman of the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, Carl Renfro, observed, "Making sure that our public higher education institutions are doing all they can to be prepared for any campus crisis is extremely important and should not be taken lightly, particularly in light of September 11" (Crisis Management Experts, 2001, p. 2). Harvard President Lawrence Summers mandated that the university's emergency response procedures be evaluated and structured for optimal coordination after September 11 (Gerwitz, 2002). These are only examples of the new sense of urgency that many institutions now have in assessing their vulnerabilities and preparedness for disaster.

Mitigation includes measures taken to avoid crises and prevent small emergencies from becoming large ones. Examples of mitigation are as diverse as ensuring there are emergency call boxes on campus, sprinkler systems in dormitories, responsive student services for potential suicides, master plans that respect flood plans, drug/alcohol abuse programs, travel provisions for athletic teams, and emergency response teams that are well trained (Texas A&M-Texarkana Crisis Management Plan, 2003).

Response and recovery are closely aligned action phases of emergency management. During such situations the decision process may depart from what may be

the norm at most institutions, particularly in the absence of response and recovery plans. Research by Halpin (1954); Mulder and Stemerding (1963); Mulder, Ritsema van Eck, and de Jong (1970); and Mulder; de Jong, Koppelaar, and Verhage (1986) indicates that followers expect their leaders to be more assertive during crisis situations, show initiative in solving problems, and follow a more directive approach to leadership, which may not be the president's or the institution's usual style (Yukl, 1994). Additionally, a crisis changes the rules for decision-making and involves the president in decisions that would normally be delegated or arrived at in a more collegial and less directive manner (Kerchner & Schuster, 1982).

Crisis management systems consist of those mechanisms and structures that can either cause or prevent crises and typically consist of an institution's plan, procedures, and organizational structure. Examples include crisis management teams, the culture of the institution, and the character of the people working to counter crises (Mitroff, et al., 1996). Those institutions that have plans to guide the response to a crisis explicitly place the responsibility with the president. For example, Texas A&M University introduces its Crisis Management Plan with the following: "The President, Texas A&M University, has primary responsibility for effectively managing any crisis which might occur on or affect the Texas A&M campus" (Crisis Management Plan, 2002, p. 3).

A panel of presidents at an American Council on Education (ACE) conference session, "What to do When Disaster Strikes," concluded that an emergency situation is the ultimate test of both a president and an institution. They also noted that a crisis situation is ultimately a learning experience. University leadership should review its

actions and lessons learned following a crisis so that the institution is better prepared in the future (Campus Disasters, 2001).

Wilms and Zell (2002) found that when critical decisions had to be made, faculty and senior administration tended to act in concert with one another. Their research also indicated that when the faculty became seriously engaged in identifying problems and searching for solutions, they responded in a supportive and effective manner. However, engaging the faculty in planning for the university's long-term welfare seemed to be another matter. They tended not to be interested or involved in strategic planning even when given the opportunity (Wilms & Zell, 2002). The implications these conclusions have for presidents during crisis response are not known.

Summary

Benezet et al. (1981) described two divergent schools of thought for the conceptualization of presidential leadership in higher education. The first reflects the traditional belief that the presidency, with all its defects and inherent obstacles, retains a power and an obligation to move an institution in a chosen direction. It holds that the traditionally directive, authoritative, rational, and "strong" leadership style, tempered by the collegial nature of shared governance, is the model for effective leadership in higher education (Fisher, 1991; Fisher & Koch, 1996; Kerr, 1984; Kerr & Gade, 1986).

The other school of thought stresses the limitations of time, energy, funds, and a persistently problematic sociology for those who would seek to lead, consistent with Cohen and March (1974,1986). It emphasizes the constraints on the presidency due to the complexities of the higher education external environment and internal culture. The resulting constraints impair presidential leadership as traditionally defined. The

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organization tends to be viewed as a more complex system that values different kinds of social interaction depending on the perspective of the observer.

Leadership in academic organizations is viewed as taking different forms, depending on whether the university is regarded as a bureaucracy, collegium, political system, or organized anarchy. With this perspective, cultural/symbolic and cognitive theories of leadership, have greater significance and are more enlightening in explaining presidential leadership in higher education (Bolman & Deal, 1986; Cohen & March, 1974; Bensimon, 1991; Bensimon et al., 1989; Bensimon & Neumann, 1993; Birnbaum, 1992; Kennedy, 1997).

There is still no comprehensive theory of fundamental leadership. Moreover, presidential leadership in higher education institutions offers complexities that are not typical of organizations in which the concept of leadership has been studied more extensively. Research on presidential leadership has not included the role of the president in a crisis scenario. Yet, that role is increasingly recognized as an important and demanding test of leadership. Consequently, it is critically important that research be performed in this area. There is clearly more to be learned.

Chapter III

Methodology

This chapter describes the conceptual framework, assumptions, design, and implementation procedures of the study. It begins with a discussion of the theoretical and conceptual framework from which the study was conducted. This framework is based on the works of several leading scholars of leadership in higher education and organizational theory. The chapter then discusses the philosophical concepts and assumptions inherent in the study. These concepts and assumptions have to do with the nature of reality and knowledge, and the relevance of the human perception to both. Next, the chapter discusses and explains the rationale for selection of the methodology of the study and the methods that were used to gather and analyze the data. The chapter then outlines implementation processes. Finally, the chapter discusses measures of rigor of the data collection and analysis processes and conclusions.

Theoretical/Conceptual Framework

As leadership theory evolved into increasingly sophisticated explanations of the phenomenon, scholars in higher education incorporated those explanations into their own ideas. They created theories and models for understanding presidential leadership and the cultural environment of higher education institutions. Concepts such as the following informed the works of the most highly regarded scholars: transactional versus transformational leadership; collegial, cultural, and symbolic frameworks of the institution; instrumental and interpretive/symbolic leadership, cognitive frames of

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reference, and cognitive expectations (Bensimon et al., 1989). Among these concepts, two are central to this study. The first is the concept of instrumental and interpretive/symbolic leadership.

Instrumental and Interpretive/Symbolic Leadership.

There are two competing schools of thought on presidential leadership. The first, more traditional view is that the president leads the institution. He or she has both the power and the responsibility to guide and direct the institution using a rational decision process. Considerable research and the experiential writings of former and current presidents endorse the concept of this "take charge" presidential style (Astin & Scherrei, 1980; Berquist et al., 1981).

This view of the president emphasizes instrumental leadership. Instrumental leadership is based on technical competence, experience, and judgment. It is manifest in activities such as coordinating the activities of others, making sensible decisions, meeting deadlines, representing the institution to others, and achieving goals through effective communication, administration, and management processes (Birnbaum, 1988).

The other school of thought on presidential leadership is based on an alternative perception of the institution and the presidency. This concept approaches the institution from cognitive and cultural/symbolic perspectives. It embodies the view of the institution as an "organized anarchy" and emphasizes presidential leadership as primarily symbolic in nature with limited power to lead the institution. This concept highlights environmental and organizational constraints on presidential power and makes a vision of strong presidential leadership an illusion (Birnbaum, 1992). Indeed, Birnbaum (1988) asserted the following:

Common ideas about the efficacy of strong and decisive leadership may have

some validity in business firms that are hierarchical and goal directed and in

which subordinates expect to receive directives from superiors. But leaders in

higher education are subject to internal and external constraints that limit their

effectiveness and may make their roles highly symbolic rather than instrumental.

(p. 28)

Birnbaum (1992) developed the idea of interpretive leadership to reflect the

symbolic nature of the president's leadership role. Whereas instrumental leadership

reflects the ability of the president to lead the institution through existing means and

perceptions, interpretive/symbolic leadership involves changing perceptions of the

institution and the way it operates. Interpretive/Symbolic leadership emphasizes the

management of meaning of situations and activities. Although instrumental and

interpretive/symbolic leadership are conceptually distinct, they interact with one another

such that instrumental acts may have symbolic significance and interpretive acts may

affect the way people perceive events and generate actions on their part (Birnbaum,

1992).

There is considerable disagreement among leading researchers about the relative

significance of instrumental leadership versus interpretive/symbolic leadership.

However, questions concerning which leadership concept is more applicable to a

president's actions in a crisis scenario have not been addressed.

Cognitive Frames of Reference.

The second leadership concept central to this study is that of cognitive frames of

reference. One of the most widely acknowledged and accepted conceptual frameworks

for defining and perceiving leadership in higher education was developed by Lee Bolman

and Terrance Deal (1984, 1997). Table 1 provides a model of Bolman and Deal's (1984, 1997) concept. Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) identified four cognitive frames of reference or "lenses" that serve as conceptual maps for understanding the organization and interpreting the effectiveness of leaders' behavior (Birnbaum, 1992; Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997).

Table 1

The Bolman & Deal Cognitive Frames of Reference Model (Bolman & Deal, 1997)

	Structural	**Human Resource**	**Political**	**Symbolic**
Metaphor for Organization	Factory or machine	Family	Arena, Contest, Jungle	Carnival, temple, theater
Central Concepts	Rules, roles, goals, policies, technology, environment	Needs, skills, relationships	Power, conflict, competition, organizational politics	Culture, meaning, metaphor, ritual, ceremony, stories, heroes
Image of Leadership	Social architecture	Empowerment	Advocacy	Inspiration
Basic Leadership Challenge	Attune structure to task, technology, environment	Align organizational and human needs	Develop agenda and power base	Create faith, beauty, meaning

Note: From *Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice, and Leadership* (p. 15), by L.G. Bolman and T.E. Deal, 1997, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publications. Copyright 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Adapted with permission.

The frames characterize ways in which leaders think about and respond to everyday issues and problems. They also identify blind spots, or areas in which leadership might be ineffective due to a lack of perception in a particular frame. These

frames of reference imply that the institution has multiple realities. A leader who can recognize and use multiple lenses to perceive those realities is more effective than one who deals with problems from a single perspective (Bensimon, 1989).

Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) contend that presidents implicitly use the different cognitive frames to define their roles and understand organizational behavior. Each frame represents a distinctive cognitive realization or perception that helps the president determine what is important and what can be ignored, as well as how problems are defined and what courses of action should be taken (Bensimon, 1989).

The four cognitive frames described by Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) are the bureaucratic, human resource, political, and symbolic frames. The leader who views the institution through the bureaucratic frame focuses on the institution's formal structure and organization and emphasizes a rational process of setting priorities, making decisions, and communicating through established lines of authority. Leaders who use the human resource frame achieve goals through collective action, emphasizing consensus building and problem solving through a team approach. This frame of reference emphasizes human needs and how the organization can be tailored to meet them. When using a political frame of reference, leaders use influence and power relationships to mobilize and dispense resources, develop coalitions, and make compromises. Leaders who view the organization through the symbolic lens shape common organizational meanings through symbols, stories, icons, and rituals. These tools help overcome the ever-present ambiguity of actual events to provide a shared and managed meaning (Bolman & Deal, 1991, 1997).

The significance of cognitive frames of reference for this research resides in the correlation between specific cognitive frames and effective leadership by presidents. For

example, studies by Bolman and Deal (1991) suggest that effective leadership is more likely from presidents with high cognition of the symbolic frame of reference but is largely unrelated to the structural frame. Those studies further conclude that the variables predicting effectiveness of a manager are different from those predicting effectiveness as a leader (Bolman & Deal, 1991). Additionally, other studies suggest that the effective leader is more likely to be cognitively complex or able to interpret institutional life through multiple lenses (Bensimon, 1989; Birnbaum, 1992).

Philosophical Paradigm for the Research

Every inquiry, every quest for knowledge and understanding, contains assumptions about the world and the relationship of the human experience to it. These assumptions provide relevance and define the philosophical stance or paradigm upon which the research is based (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). The assumptions establish the framework that ground and legitimatize the logic of a research process and its criteria.

The philosophical paradigm of any research has four components or dimensions. First, it has *ontological* assumptions about the nature of reality and the human relationship to it. Second, it has *epistemological* assumptions about the nature of knowledge and how we "know." Third, it has assumptions about the *axiology* or the relationship of values such as ethics, aesthetics, and spirituality to the human experience (Guba & Lincoln, 2000). Finally, it has the methodological determination of how we can legitimately go about creating knowledge (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, 2000).

The philosophical paradigm from which this research was conducted fits in the often-combined *interpretivist/constructionist* paradigm (Creswell, 2003; Guba & Lincoln, 1989, 2000; Mertens, 1998). The following paragraphs examine the four dimensions of

the interpretevist/constructionist paradigm and discuss how they apply to this research effort.

The interpretivist/constructionist philosophy of the nature of reality disavows absolute truths and single realities in human perceptions and experiences (Crotty, 1998; Mertens, 1998). The philosophy assumes multiple, sometimes contradictory and conflicting, social realities that are the results of human intelligences. It implies an imperative to understand or *verstehen*[1] the nature and experiences of a person, society, culture, and historical context in order to comprehend its unique set of perceptions, or "truths." Additionally, on this side of the "great divide"[2] wherein human perception is recognized to give the world meaning, researcher subjectivity is not only acknowledged, it is embraced. Multiple, socially constructed realities are assumed for researchers as well as research participants (Crotty, 1998).

The ontological position of this research effort is based on the view that leadership results from the subjective perceptions of leaders and followers. It is based on their interpretations of reality through their own cultural lenses. Leadership actions do not speak for themselves; they must be interpreted (Birnbaum, 1992). Leadership is a wholly human invention without substance in the physical world. Therefore, our understanding of leadership is dependent on our understanding of the perceptions of people and the cultural environment in which they operate (Birnbaum, 1992).

The second component of a research philosophical paradigm is the epistemology or philosophy of the nature of knowledge. The theory of knowledge in the interpretivist/constructionist paradigm contends that each of us is presented throughout life with cultural sets of meanings. These meanings are taught to us in a "complex and subtle process of enculturalization" (Crotty, 1998, p. 79). Therefore, knowledge is not

discovered; it is constructed within the framework of meaning defined by human culture (Crotty, 1998).

The epistemological dimension for this research assumes that the meaning of leadership and followership have been framed and defined by the pre-existing cultural settings in which those processes occur (Schein, 1985). We can know those meanings only through understanding the meaning assigned by the people within those cultural settings (Crotty, 1998).

The distinction between *constuctivism* and *constructionism* is important to this research. Constructivism contends that the individual human being engages with objects in the world and makes sense of them. Constructionism contends that the culture framework for meaning is largely pre-established by society for an individual and not usually created by the individual when confronted with a social scenario. Meaning is provided for us and taught to us within a social environment; therefore, the cultural framework of existing society largely pre-empts the process of the creation of meaning implied in constructivism (Crotty, 1998). This research assumes that the cultural framework for perceptions of leadership effectiveness already existed within the contexts of the case studies.

The third dimension of the interpretivist/constructionist research paradigm, its axiology or value system, is based on assumptions that values are not separable from the human experience, either for research subjects or for researchers. A sense of what is right, important, and beautiful frames everything in the human experience. This dimension is undeniably part of any research perception or conclusion and should be identified (Guba & Lincoln, 2000).

The axiological position or value system of this study is a spirituality that endorses the sanctity of the individual and individual human rights. Additional values included respect for the rule of law, learning, and the aesthetic perceptions consistent with those of popular, U.S. culture in the early 21st Century.

The final dimension of the research philosophical paradigm is the methodology of the study (Crotty, 1998; Guba & Lincoln, 1998). This research follows a qualitative methodology. The word *qualitative* implies an emphasis on the qualities of entities, processes, and meanings that are not experimentally examined or measured in quantifiable terms such as amount, intensity, or frequency. Qualitative research stresses the socially constructed nature of reality, relationships, and situations (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003).

Rationale for a Qualitative Study

Mertens (1998) identified three fundamental reasons for choosing a qualitative methodology: the researcher's view of the world, the nature of the research question, and practical reasons associated with the nature of qualitative methods. A qualitative approach is most appropriate in this study for each reason.

Researcher View

First, the choice of methodology is somewhat constrained by the ontological and epistemological stands of the researcher. Guba and Lincoln (1989) tell us that a qualitative approach is preferable for research from the interpretive/constructionist paradigm, although it is possible to use quantitative methods as well.

The most distinctive characteristic of qualitative inquiry is its emphasis on interpretation (Stake, 1995). Interpretations of the meanings of various social constructions are based on an understanding of the participant's social constructions. The

nature of social constructions suggests that individual constructions can be understood only through interaction between researcher and participants under study.

From this perspective, the world may very well exist beyond human experience and comprehension; however, that existence is largely beside the point. It is the human experience that provides meaning to the world. Human behavior cannot be understood without a comprehensive understanding of the meanings and purposes associated by humans to their activities and behaviors. Qualitative inquiry has the potential to provide rich insight into that human behavior. It also provides contextual information that is largely transparent to quantitative research (Guba & Lincoln, 1989).

Nature of the Question

Second, the nature of the research question suggests a qualitative approach. The focus of the research is on the leadership process and its implementation in a particular type of scenario. Therefore, in-depth information is needed about the leadership phenomenon. The phenomenon is based on humanistic values that require personal contact and an understanding of the culture in which it occurred (Mertens, 1998). The focus of the inquiry is on participants' perceptions and experiences and the way they make sense of their lives in a particular scenario, requiring an appreciation and understanding of multiple realities (Creswell, 2003).

The literature on leadership theory indicates that cultures, perceptions, and experiences are integral to leadership and that qualitative means are essential to determine those facets of human society (Bass, 1990; Bensimon, 1991; Schein, 1985; Yukl, 1994). Additionally, qualitative methods are particularly effective in getting at the subtleties of how leaders think and how they frame their experiences (Bolman & Deal, 1991).

Numerous researchers such as Bass (1990), Van Maanen (1979), Smith (1975), Orpen (1987), and McCall and Lombardo (1978) advocate qualitative methods for the study of leadership. Van Maanen and Smith (1979) concluded that inquiry into the meaning and significance of the behavior of both leaders and followers is most appropriately done through a qualitative design in which the actions of people can best be explained in terms of the contexts in which they occur. Orpen (1987) concluded that more qualitative research into leadership was needed due to limitations of quantitative methods in examining organizational complexities. McCall and Lombardo (1978) advocated more leadership research using qualitative methods to detect the subtleties and nuances involved in the leadership process.

Practical Reasons for Qualitative Design

Finally, a qualitative approach is appropriate due to the need to provide an in-depth understanding of the total context, impact, experiences, and perceptions of participants. When a crisis or tragedy strikes a college or university campus, the institution's response indelibly and dramatically represents the values of the institution as a whole. Indeed, perhaps no single event better represents the institutional values that guide the campus under both routine and extraordinary circumstances (Campus disasters, 2001). This research cannot be done experimentally for practical reasons associated with the complexities and unpredictability of a crisis scenario (Marshall & Rossman, 1989). It is not possible to artificially create the system under study.

<div align="center">

Rationale for a Case Study

</div>

This research is based on case studies of presidential leadership during crisis management scenarios. A case study is the study of the complexities, intricacies, and multiple perspectives of scenarios, activities, or circumstances within a bounded,

integrated system (Stake, 1995). It is one of the most common ways to do qualitative inquiry (Stake, 2003). It is an appropriate method for a qualitative research approach since it examines a complex system of relationships and events, and requires a thorough understanding of that system. Understanding is developed through extensive description and analysis of the system and its context, as well through the realities of people within the system (Mertens, 1998). Indeed, the case study is the most appropriate tool to understand complex social phenomena since it includes all factors and dimensions involved with the phenomena (Yin, 1994).

Another advantage of the case study method is that it preserves the context and provides a holistic view of the leadership process in a real-world scenario, thereby preserving the qualities that make qualitative research meaningful. Additionally, the case study approach provides the opportunity to give voice, texture, and context to people deeply involved in the case (Stake, 1995).

Finally, other qualitative approaches are impractical due to the exceptionally localized nature of crisis events. Crises tend to be of high intensity and short duration, infrequent, and highly unpredictable.

The study is focused primarily on presidential leadership in a single or primary case. A less extensive examination of two other cases of presidential leadership in crisis scenarios at two other institutions provides an additional perspective. These two scenarios are referred to as secondary cases. The secondary cases present an opportunity to identify commonalities and differences in leadership initiatives, effectiveness, environments, and outcomes.

Case study research has several purposes including the following: to chronicle events, to depict or characterize, to instruct, and to prove or test (Marshall & Rossman,

1989). These different purposes require different approaches and yield different products. The primary purpose of this research was to characterize the leadership actions and perceptions of the president in a crisis scenario.

Methods Employed

Qualitative interviewing is a versatile tool of research to learn about the feelings, thoughts, perceptions, and experiences of people (Stake, 1995). Primary data was obtained from a series of face-to-face and telephone interviews with participants. Interviews were conducted with 17 participants, 14 of which were face-to-face interviews. Interview follow-up for the purposes of confirmation and triangulation of previously gathered data was typically through telecommunications.

In-depth interviews were conducted with the presidents of the three institutions involved in the cases in this study—one primary and two secondary cases. Interviews in the primary case were also conducted with people who were central observers or participants in the president's actions and decision-making during the crisis. This included senior members of the president's administrative staff and members of important constituencies. Perceptions of effective leadership depend on the perceptions and support of many constituents of the institution. Senior administrators, trustees, and faculty are the most prominent and critical to perceptions of effective presidential leadership; consequently, the input from these constituencies was particularly relevant (Birnbaum, 1992).

Initial selection of participants was based on a bureaucratic model of the higher education institution. This model identified people most likely to be involved in the decision making and decision implementation process. Participant selection was modified as the study unfolded and revealed other potential participants who had more

prominence in the president's leadership actions than the bureaucratic model of the institution suggested. Some interview participants were selected based on the recommendation of the president. Selection of participants from constituencies outside the administrative staff was based on their ability to provide meaningful and typical, yet divergent and multi-dimensional data, insight, and understanding of the research questions (Erlandson, Harris, Skipper, & Allen, 1993).

Interviews with the presidents of the universities involved in the secondary cases served to identify commonalities and differences in leadership responses during crisis response and recovery. Those interviews provided a frame of reference to identify both similar and dissimilar circumstances, responses, and outcomes of three different campus tragedies. One of the two presidents involved with the secondary cases, President Donald Beggs of Wichita State University, was not in office at the time of the crisis. Two senior administrators at Wichita State who were key participants in the crisis were interviewed along with Dr. Beggs.

Information was also gathered from document, audio/visual material, and artifact analysis. These media provided a significant amount of meaningful data that helped develop the following: the nature of the case, historical background, thematic contexts, and informants through whom the case could be known. Monuments and mementos provided important information as artifacts and physical symbols of remembrance of the victims (Stake, 1995).

Public documents such as newspapers and other periodicals, accident investigation reports, letters, and calendars of public officials were reviewed. Private documents such as journals, letters, photographs, and email discussions were also reviewed. This data provided background material and historical reference. In some

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cases the data confirmed information obtained through interviews. Audio/visual materials such as photographs and videotapes provided detailed contextual information.

Data Collection Procedures

Interviews were conducted in accordance with the philosophy, techniques, and objectives of the *long interview*, as described by McCracken (1998). The long interview is a four-step process of inquiry that provides a formalized, disciplined, and robust framework for interview processes and standards. It contributes to an appropriate balance between formality and informality in the relationship between researcher and respondent. It also facilitates an unobtrusive inquiry and addresses time constraints and privacy issues. The long interview process insists on a questionnaire for the actual interview and a rigorous *a priori* literature review that serves to focus the interview process on critical analytical categories in designing interview questionnaires (McCracken, 1988).

The first step of the process was to conduct a comprehensive literature review to identify analytic themes or categories. The literature review not only served to provide a foundation for creation of the interview questionnaire but also provided an intellectual backdrop against which I was able to identify data that defied expectations (McCracken, 1988).

The second step of the process was a review of cultural categories to provide a detailed and systematic appreciation of my own personal experience with the topic. Extensive researcher familiarity with the cultures under study has the potential to provide both benefits and hazards. Cultural familiarity provides insight during the analysis process. On the other hand, familiarity may dull the researcher's potential for sensitized

observation and analysis by seeing through the lens of a known perspective (McCracken, 1988).

The review of cultural categories both familiarized and defamiliarized me with cultural experiences in order to preclude interference from personal cultural assumptions as much as possible. Therefore, this step in the long interview allowed me to "manufacture distance" between my expectations and the data in order to "see the familiar in unfamiliar ways" (McCracken, 1988, p. 22, 24). Mason (1996) refers to this as critical self-scrutiny by the researcher, or *active reflexivity*. I also maintained a reflexive journal of insights, decisions, and schedules as an aid to the transferability, dependability, and confirmability of the study (Ehrlandson et al., 1993).

The third step of the interview process consisted of construction of the questionnaires, selection of respondents, and the interviews themselves. One portion of the interview questionnaire called for biographical and background information to help cue the analysis to factors that framed and informed respondent testimony. Another portion of the questionnaire was constructed such that two general principles important to the qualitative data collection process were followed. The first was that the respondents express their own perceptions in their own terms. This required that the phrasing of questions be general and non-directive in nature. The second general principle allowed me to unobtrusively prompt the respondent toward areas of interest that failed to surface spontaneously.

Interview protocols or questionnaires for interviews ensured all aspects of key events, sequences, and issues were covered fully and in the same order for each interviewee. A review of analytic categories drove the initial design of the interview questionnaires for participants (McCracken, 1988).

The last step of the process was the analysis portion. This analysis determined the categories, relationships, and assumption that informed the respondent views of the world and the specific topic of interest. This was done through a process that accessed the data in increasingly generalized levels of categories. The conclusions of the literature review and culture review were used to identify the systematic properties of the interview data that resulted in patterns and themes of interest. Once all themes were identified, an analysis of interrelationships of themes was conducted (McCracken, 1988). Specific application of the long interview process is reflected in the data analysis portion of this chapter.

Letters of introduction served to initiate contact with the participants and are in Appendices A and B. The letter to each participant advised that he or she would be contacted to schedule a face-to-face, audio taped interview. Interview locations were at the discretion of the participants. Some topical/biographical questions were answered prior to any interview sessions through review of curriculum vitae, news accounts of the crisis events, and archived material (Stake, 1995).

A list of study participants is in Appendix C. Without exception, each participant provided permission for use of his or her name in the research documentation and subsequent reports. A Prospectus and Information Sheet for the study was provided to each interview participant, an example of which is in Appendix D, and each was provided an Advisement and Consent for Participation form in Appendix E.

The interviews were both open-ended and structured. Structured portions of the interviews consisted of questions to determine relationships and roles of participants with respect to the institution, the victims, and the president and any incomplete biographical data. Interview protocols are in Appendices F, G, and H.

During the unstructured portion of the interviews, each participant had the opportunity to describe the following in his/her own words: perceptions of the president's leadership, the sequence of events associated with the crisis from his/her perspective, the observed leadership actions on the part of the president, and the perceived degree of effectiveness of those actions in coping with and recovering from the event. Multiple open-ended interviews of the president in the primary case were required. The interview sessions ranged from one and a half to two hours in duration for each participant, consistent with the long interview practice. All interviews were audio taped with one exception. One participant declined to have the interview audiotape recorded.

The interview questionnaires were tailored to two groups of participants: the presidents, and other interested/involved members of the institution such as administrative associates of the president, governing board members, and faculty.

Interviews with the three presidents focused on the following: general leadership philosophy and perspectives, identification of specific actions following the crisis, priorities and rationale during the crisis, and guidance provided both during the crisis recovery and its aftermath. The intent was to determine the following: the extent to which the president provided direction for actions associated with the crisis event, the nature of those actions, the intended outcomes, and the extent to which the ideas of others were solicited. Interviews consisted of initial and in some cases follow-up sessions to ensure emerging themes were adequately identified and explored.

Interviews of administrative associates were intended to determine perceptions of the president's leadership actions and their outcomes from those who were in the best positions to observe the president and his involvement in the crisis response and recovery. Interviews of members from other constituent groups were intended to

determine the perceptions of those who could provide representative impressions from key constituent groups.

Perceptions of presidential leadership actions, intentions, and effectiveness were classified in two ways. The first classification was in terms of cognitive frames of reference using the concept and approach developed and used by Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) to determine cognitive characteristics.

The second classification was in terms of whether the president's leadership appeared to be essentially instrumental or essentially interpretive/symbolic in guiding the response and recovery phases of the crisis. Additionally, assessments of the president's leadership style and effectiveness in the primary case under non-crisis conditions were included. The assessments provided a baseline against which any change of leadership method could be seen (Birnbaum, 1992; Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1991; Neumann & Bensimon, 1990).

Data Analysis

Data analysis is the process of bringing order, structure, and meaning to collected data. Data analysis in qualitative studies is an ongoing process throughout the duration of the research effort. It does not occur only at the end of the study. Analysis of qualitative data tends to be recursive, with themes and relationships among the data emerging into patterns and ultimately into conclusions. Consequently, the analysis process is systematic and comprehensive, but it is not rigid in nature (Marshall & Rossman, 1989).

Data analysis was conducted on the premise that qualitative research uses inductive analysis of the evidence or data in an iterative process of making sense of the total context of leadership (Mertens, 1998). The analysis was intended to determine in what ways presidential leadership was perceived to have made a difference in the

effectiveness of the institution's response to crisis using the cognitive frames developed by Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997).

The analysis presumed to categorize leadership activities into one or more cognitive frames. Interview transcripts were reviewed to determine factors associated with presidential leadership that were consistent with one or more cognitive frames of leadership. Additionally, interview transcripts and other documents were reviewed to determine whether the president's leadership actions could be classified as either instrumental to the institutional response and recovery, or interpretive/symbolic.

Analytic Categories.

The literature review defined the problem, precipitated analytic categories for investigation, informed the knowledge basis from which the questionnaires were created, and established expectations against which the data was measured and analyzed (McCracken, 1989; Stake, 1995). The goal was to define categories during the process of research with the expectation that the nature and definition of the categories will change in the course of the project (McCracken, 1989). Consequently, the analytical categories were modified as the study unfolded. The literature review consisted of literature concerning three areas: the evolution of basic leadership theory, leadership theory and experiences of presidents in higher education institutions, and crisis management at colleges and universities. The analytic categories suggested by the literature review were the following:

- Fundamental leadership philosophies of the president vis-à-vis six major categories of leadership theory.
- Presidential leadership perspectives by the president.

- Use of multiple cognitive frames of leadership (Bolman & Deal, 1991; Birnbaum, 1992).

- Effective leadership actions of the president and cognitive frames as perceived by constituent members.

- Decisions, sources of decisions, and effectiveness during crisis management response.

- Consistency of presidential action with exemplary crisis management response in accordance with literature.

Cultural Categories.

The cultural perspectives from which the research was conducted were the human resource, bureaucratic or structural, symbolic, and political perspectives.

The human resources culture is present in the interactions of the president, administrators, faculty, and students. Personal relationships are significant to the higher education institution. They are important in the way both the formal and informal networks of the institution function. The culture of human resources within the institution in the primary case study is shaped by its status as a public, land grant institution in a rural setting. Many of the students and most of the staff are from the rural areas of the state.

The bureaucratic culture reflects the organizational structure of the institution. The bureaucratic culture of a college or university is concerned primarily with the fundamental missions of the institution: instruction, research, and outreach. These missions are presumed to require collegial relationships and coordination between the administration and the faculty. There is a widely recognized system of dual governance

and presumed collegiality between the administration, the faculty, and the board of governance (Birnbaum, 1988).

The bureaucratic culture is also concerned with the practical mandates of managing the institution efficiently and effectively. These concerns are most prominent within the senior administrative staff. The institution must adhere to its budget, pay its bills, police its grounds, balance student recruitment and retention dynamics, and heat/cool its classrooms, among other tasks.

The culture of symbolism of each higher education institution is somewhat unique, based on its own set of myths, legends, and symbols. Factors such as institution size, mission, and academic programs also contribute to differences between institutions. There are forces that drive similarities such as the national educational system and the need for educated citizens, the academic profession, and the academic discipline (Birnbaum, 1988). The institution in the primary case uses symbols to identify it as a land grant institution with a western and agricultural heritage.

The political culture of a college or university is active on many levels. Internal to the institution, political liaisons and alliances are formed within units of the institution and across departments. Faculty members, staff, and students organize among themselves to identify common concerns and increase their political power. The president must work with these political entities and form alliances that further his/her own goals. External to the institution, the president must cultivate alliances with various political forces such as the legislature and other elected officials, civic and industrial partners, and other institutions.

There were three contexts within which the cultures operated for the cases in this study. The first was the context of a higher education institution. The second was the

context of a relatively small administrative staff or "team" with both general and specific responsibilities to a central authority figure—the president. The third context was a crisis management team that is typically ad hoc and convenes infrequently, but with levels of great intensity when it does meet.

My most relevant experience in the cultures reflected in higher education institutions consisted of six years at two institutions as a department head. One department was an administrative support organization and the other was a small, specialized academic department. Both institutions were public, land grant universities. Additionally, I served on and led crisis management teams prior to this study.

Consequently, as a result of prior education and experiences as well as the literature review, I had clear expectations and preconceived notions about the dynamics of presidential leadership and its effectiveness. These notions encompassed the four cultural perspectives within the contexts of routine institutional activities, administrative staff dynamics, and crisis management team.

Issues of Rigor

Criteria and techniques for ensuring that qualitative research meets standards of rigor and "trustworthiness" are discussed in the following paragraphs. A summary of the criteria, techniques, and actions taken in this study to ensure criteria were met is in Table 2 (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Mertens, 1998).

Table 2

Issues of Rigor

Criterion Area	Technique	Action
Credibility	- Triangulation - Peer debriefing - Terminal and in-process member checks - Multiple cases	- Triangulation of interview sources and of methods (interviews, printed material, pictures) - Post-interview follow-up - Reviews of narrative by participants - Peer Debriefing (2) - Three cases
Transferability	- Multiple Cases - Thick Description	- Three cases - Heavy direct quotes
Dependability	- Dependability Audit	- Audiotaped interviews, professional transcription - Heavy use of direct quotes
Confirmability	- Confirmability Audit	- Audiotaped interviews, professional transcription - Heavy use of direct quotes
All of the above	- Reflexive Journal	- Reflexive journal, updated following each interview

Credibility and Transferability

Credibility, representing the qualitative equivalent to internal validity of the

research, was ensured through triangulation of sources, member checking, and external

auditing. Triangulation of sources and methods was used for factual data, but total

consistency across sources was not possible or expected for subjective impressions (Guba

& Lincoln, 1989). Consequently, member checking through post-interview reviews of

transcripts and review of the study narratives by members was the primary tool for

credibility. Two colleagues provided peer debriefing. Additionally, credibility is

increased when multiple cases are involved and the data reflects core concepts and

themes that occur consistently in multiple cases in different settings (Rubin & Rubin,

1995). Consequently, the inclusion of interview data from two other crisis scenarios at two other institutions enhance the study's credibility.

Transferability, representing the qualitative equivalent to external validity, was based on thick, detailed description and the heavy use of detailed, direct quotations. These descriptions assist in determining whether the findings are transferable to other settings. Additionally, the inclusion of two other, secondary cases strengthened external validity of the research (Mertens, 1998; Yen, 1994).

Confirmability and Dependability

Confirmability, the qualitative parallel to objectivity, assures that the influence of the researcher's judgment is minimized. Dependability, the qualitative parallel to reliability, confirms that the study evidence/analysis preserves the quality of stability over time. Both confirmability and dependability were ensured through a confirmability audit and a dependability audit to provide a "chain of evidence" or audit trail for all conclusions of the research. This ensured that data could be linked to its original source and that the compilation of information could be confirmed (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, Mertens, 1998). The audits were done in conjunction with one another through maintenance of a case study protocol that detailed each step in the research process. The protocol permitted review of field notes, interview transcripts from audio tapes, and other documents by research peers. Heavy use of direct quotations from participants also contributed to both dependability and confirmability. Finally, a reflexive journal was maintained to provide a chronology of researcher thought and provide added support for data analysis and conclusions (Erlandson et al., 1993).

Chapter IV

Case Studies of Leadership in Crisis Events

This chapter begins with a discussion of President James E. Halligan's leadership

philosophy and style. It includes the significant changes that occurred at Oklahoma State

University during his presidency, and the manner in which his leadership style guided

those changes. The chapter then describes and analyzes the actions and perceptions of

the president and members of his administrative staff who had to deal with a tragedy that

struck the OSU community on January 27, 2001. It was then that an airplane crash killed

ten people associated with the University's basketball team. Finally, the chapter will

describe the actions and perceptions of the presidents and administrators at two other

institutions as they dealt with tragedies in their campus communities at Texas A&M

University and Wichita State University.

A President's Leadership

Leadership Philosophy and Style

By January 2001, Dr. Jim Halligan was a seasoned veteran. Seven years into his

presidency at Oklahoma State University and 65 years old, he had served as president of

public institutions of higher education for more than eighteen years--seven years at

Oklahoma State, ten years at New Mexico State University, and more than a year as

interim chancellor at the University of Arkansas in Fayetteville, spanning a 28-year

academic career (Gonzales, 2002).

He followed the normative career ladder for 89 percent of college presidents up through the ranks in faculty and administrative positions at six different institutions. He served as chemical engineering faculty, department chair, dean of engineering at two institutions, vice chancellor for academic affairs, and finally president (Birnbaum & Umbach, 2001; Halligan Curriculum Vitae, 2003).

Over the course of that career, he developed a clearly defined leadership philosophy based upon his perception of the way a public university works and how an effective president leads. And, he developed a leadership style to match his philosophy.

The President's Perception.

Halligan describes the foundation of his own leadership style as participatory and team-oriented, with the goal of creating a sense of personal commitment from followers. He believes that, "you get more by offering people a sense of ownership than you do by instilling a sense of fear" (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003). He worked to gain buy-in and commitment to a common vision based upon his belief that, "Success has a thousand fathers, and defeat is an orphan. Everybody wants to be on a winning team" (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003). He felt it was essential to "celebrate everyone who has contributed...do not claim credit for yourself" (Halligan Notes, 2003).

His typical approach was to solicit, and in some cases demand, input from his staff and others before rendering an opinion or decision himself. He recommends the following when leading a meeting:

> In an important meeting, the leader should speak last, unless he/she senses the
> situation is getting out of control...When meeting with your administrative team,
> set up the problem or issue and then be quiet, let everyone else speak before you

voice an opinion.... It is amazing how people change their tack once they know which way the wind is blowing. (Halligan Notes, 2003)

He believes in setting up an executive staff that is team-oriented, having an inner circle of very trusted colleagues, and having a limited number of people who report to him directly. Beyond that, he routinely let his senior staff attend to the daily business of the University.

His philosophy of the president's proper relationship with the institution's governing board is captured by the phrase "Noses in, fingers out" (Halligan Notes, 2003). In other words, board members were always welcome to look at any area of the institution at whatever depth; however, if the board or any member tried to get directly involved with the operation of the institution, it was time to find a new president. Halligan applied a similar operating principle to his own supervisory and administrative role, and did not micromanage OSU academic or support units.

Halligan believes his effectiveness as president was the result of personal relationships or alliances, and "having previously developed relationships whereby people would trust me. Keeping my word at times when it was pretty tough" (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003). These personal relationships were with students, faculty, senior staff, legislators, alumni, donors, and local citizens.

Halligan believes there is important relevance for personal relationships from a political perspective as well. He feels, "Politics is as essential to social life as sex is to biological life—it is the way the really important work gets done. It is the process human beings use to make really important decisions." He practiced good campus politics in ways great and small: "Walking into the composition room of the student newspaper or

the offices of student government is particularly advisable. It is just tougher to criticize someone who you see on a regular basis" (Halligan Notes, 2003).

At a higher level of political involvement, "Cultivating good relationships with the appointment secretary and Chief of Staff to the Governor are crucial…Personal involvement in lobbying is extremely important. The President must spend considerable time in this area to ensure success" (Halligan Notes, 2003).

Perceptions of Others.

While an understanding of Halligan's views of his own leadership style are important, the views of those who worked most closely with him are even more informative. His senior administrative staff at OSU, those who were most directly involved with his leadership, had perceptions of Halligan's leadership that were consistent with his own. Those staff members also had observations of other strong features including a team orientation, decisiveness, compassionate nature, and deep personal commitment. They had an understanding of his style that mirrored his intent and his own perception of what he hoped to accomplish and how to go about it.

Halligan's staff members understood his team-oriented approach to leadership precisely as he intended. Everett Eaton, OSU Director of Public Safety and Chief of Police, describes the usual flow of a meeting with Halligan:

> He typically would let everybody say his or her piece in a meeting. Then he would go around the room individually and make sure that everybody had a recommendation—what do you think? What is your opinion? And then he would come to a decision after it had been kicked around discussed, and fussed, and then after everybody had made a recommendation. (E. Eaton, personal communications, October 7, 2003)

Another senior administrator, Dr. Harry Birdwell, Vice President for Budget and

External Relations, recalls the same practice:

> (He) would ask our opinions on virtually every significant issue that came down
>
> the pike. And if you were a 'yes' person, you didn't serve his interests at all. If
>
> you disagreed with him, he wanted you to disagree, because he believed so
>
> strongly that multiple opinions force a better think tank decision, if you will. I
>
> think that's one of the things I admired most about him, is that he always asked
>
> our opinion. (H. Birdwell, personal communication, October 21, 2003)

The development of personal relationships that Halligan credits for his leadership

effectiveness is perceived by virtually all of his senior staff to reflect a remarkably caring

and compassionate man. He was personally affected when Natalea Watkins, the

Assistant Vice President for Communications, was seriously injured in an automobile

accident and when his executive vice president suffered a heart attack. His

compassionate nature was apparent to his senior staff. Natalea Watkins describes that

compassion:

> He leads by doing the right thing, by caring--his personal sense of caring and
>
> responsibility and pain and all of those things were very much guiding the way
>
> that OSU handled things. It was very personal and empathic. He put himself in
>
> the role of people who would be suffering whatever the issue was." (N. Watkins,
>
> personal communication, October 1, 2003)

Another senior staff member, Dr. Terry Don Phillips, Director of Athletics during

Halligan's tenure as president, describes it further: "There is a personal touch to his style.

He cares about what happens to you individually, your family, and the things that impact

you personally. Jim has a very personal touch, both he and (his wife) Ann" (T.D. Phillips, personal communication, December 5, 2003).

Observations and perspectives of his vice presidents and other senior staff members reflect not only a participatory leadership style but also a decisive style and total personal commitment from both Halligan and his wife, Ann, that inspired commitment from others. Dr. Marvin Keener, Executive Vice President of OSU, describes his view of Halligan's commitment as follows:

> He was able to put together a team of people who wanted him to be successful. (His predecessor) never got that. The other big factor, and it is hard to quantify, but he worked himself incredibly hard. He and Ann just willed it, and just would not let it fail. He was just not going to allow it. And just by sheer force of personality and hard work, he was willing to do and go and be a part of whatever it took. It inspired everybody else to do the same thing. (M. Keener, personal communication, October 9, 2003)

There was also no question among the staff of his focus on the institution and not on personal achievement. Phillips notes, "(Halligan) was unequivocal and unapologetic about what he was doing and what he believed to be important. It wasn't about (Halligan), it was about how OSU could be the best it could be" (T.D. Phillips, personal communication, December 5, 2003). Birdwell adds, "He is ego-less. Not looking for credit, but for success in the organization. Success in the organization is more important than whether or not there is credit that comes to the head of the organization" (H. Birdwell, personal communication, October 21, 2003). Birdwell's description rings of Halligan's view that "success has a thousand fathers and defeat is an orphan."

Among others, Dr. Lee Bird, Vice President for Student Affairs of OSU, notes another recurring theme among his staff--Halligan's ability to be a decisive leader:

He was very strong. On some issues, it was very much a conversation to solicit information and 'what do you think?' In other cases, it was clear that this was not a democracy, and that ultimately it would be his decision and his responsibility, but he would most often, on most issues, solicit a great deal of input and then make his decision. (L. Bird, personal communication, October 13, 2003)

Phillips summarizes the same observation:

You understand that he is in charge. That is very clear, but at the same time, he has a very congenial style. You understand he is the boss, but he handles his authority in such a fashion that you want to do a good job for him. (T.D. Phillips, personal communication, December 5, 2003)

Birdwell concludes the following:

He was decisive.... Most of the time when you were in a meeting with him, you decided the issues that you were meeting about. You rarely put it off to another time. I thought that was one of his stronger leadership characteristics, is the ability to decide difficult issues rather than not dealing with them. (H. Birdwell, personal communication, October 21, 2003)

Once a decision was reached, a common perception was that, "He let others do their jobs," expresses Dr. David Bosserman, Vice President for Administration and Finance, and Controller (personal communication, November 5, 2003). Birdwell summarizes, "He is hands-on in the sense that he sets the tone, and then he lets others do their work." (H. Birdwell, personal communication, October 21, 2003)

Keener believes Halligan had another ability:

(Halligan) was extraordinarily gifted in understanding how people would perceive

something, far better than anyone else at OSU.... He understood bully pulpits and

saying things publicly that presented the right kind of image. For example,

having students out to his house all the time, giving them food, treats, all the time.

The students loved him. (M. Keener, personal communication, October 9, 2003)

While he may have seemed gifted in foreseeing the perceptions of others,

Halligan also paid due diligence to understanding those perceptions. He solicited

feedback and listened to it well. He recalls one episode that was helpful to him:

I actually had them (faculty members) come to my office...Because what I was

really getting was their perspective of what other people were saying about it

when I wasn't there, which was terribly important because you can go out and

interact with people, that's one thing, but to have people who you grow to respect

because they'll be honest with you, to have them come and talk is just invaluable.

(J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003).

Additionally, Halligan observes that, "Walking into a professor's lab can be

exciting for everyone including the relevant dean and the president. If no one else is

there you may get some straight talk concerning how the rank and file perceive"

(Halligan Notes, 2003).

The image that emerges from Halligan's views and the perceptions of his staff is

clear. President Halligan led through a team whose contributions and feedback helped

guide his decisions. He let his senior staff work within the larger decisions for which he

took responsibility. He was decisive and committed, and he listened well. Perhaps most

importantly, he led through personal relationships that conveyed a strong sense of caring

to those who worked with him.

Leadership Impact

Halligan subscribes to the traditional view of the president's leadership impact on a college or university and bristles at the suggestion of an "organized anarchy." He does not believe a president is constrained by competing constituents to the extent that the position is largely a symbolic one, unable to lead the institution in a particular direction (Cohen & March, 1974, 1986). There is substantial evidence to suggest his leadership had enormous impact at OSU. The following paragraphs discuss some of the most significant areas of Halligan's impact as president.

Enrollment.

One of the things of which Halligan is most proud is the reversal of a downward trend in enrollment during his tenure as president. Oklahoma State University enrollment had declined in each of the twelve years before his arrival, and had increased during each year of his presidency. He summarizes the significance as follows:

> The impact of 12 years in a row of declining enrollment on an institution is just enormous, because there is a general reduction in morale on the part of the faculty. If you are a good faculty person, you certainly start looking at your options at other institutions. And whenever a faculty position opens up, the administration is under tremendous pressure to take it out of the budget...and so the impact on the institution in just every quarter is just enormous and so we had to turn that around. And of course, we did. Dramatically.
>
> So I would have to say that I have a lot of pride, and our team should have a lot of pride because if you don't solve (the enrollment problem)...They actually had a study that said OSU should go down from 17,000 to about 12,000 to 14,000 students. (J.E. Halligan, personal communications, October 21, 2003)

Sense of Community.

Declining enrollment was only the most significant symptom of an overall

malaise that plagued OSU when he first arrived on campus. When Halligan arrived at

OSU there was an obvious morale problem. Keener summarizes, "You can't imagine

how low the University had sunk. Students were mad, the faculty were mad, the staff

were mad, the alumni were mad, the legislators were mad" (M. Keener, personal

communication, October 9, 2003). Halligan recalls his own early perception of the

demoralized institution:

> When we first took our trip through Oklahoma, in Bartlesville and Ponca City in
>
> particular, but on numerous occasions, we were surrounded by alums who were
>
> just furious with the institution. One person came up and gave me a pin and said
>
> that he had intended to give his estate to Oklahoma State but he had lost so much
>
> pride in the institution that he gave it to me and said he could never wear it again.
>
> (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003)
>
> Halligan set about to fix the general malaise that hung over the institution.
>
> Natalea Watkins recalls the following:
>
> He said from the very beginning that one of his goals was to create a sense of
>
> community at OSU that he felt was missing…a sense of community in the
>
> University family that extended far beyond Stillwater, the alumni and just all
>
> around. It is increasing a sense of pride, a sense of ownership, and a sense that we
>
> are all in this together. (N. Watkins, personal communication, October 1, 2003)
>
> Harry Birdwell, Vice President for Business and External Relations, summarizes,

"He took us out of the doldrums of the (previous) administration. He got us moving

together as an institution rather than opposed to each other" (H. Birdwell, personal

communication, October 21, 2003). Bird agrees, "I think building a campus culture that was very positive was something he was proud of, and should be" (L. Bird, personal communication, October 13, 2003).

OSU-Tulsa.

In a watershed event for the University, Halligan took the lead and convinced key members of the legislature and Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education to select OSU as the institution to take over what was then the University Center at Tulsa. The goal was to develop it into a large public campus in Tulsa, but on terms that were acceptable to the OSU campus at Stillwater and the existing OSU System.

Halligan feels it would have been a disaster for the rural Stillwater campus if another independent public campus were established in urban Tulsa. "If Tulsa had its own separate governing board, I think it would be a disaster. We would have had two governing boards fighting for the same turf, going to the state regents and (both) claiming, 'We're OSU' (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003).

At the same time, it was essential to convince the Tulsa community and their political representatives that an OSU-administered Tulsa campus would be a priority for the president. He convinced the state legislators and executive branch to charter the institution in a way that was an opportunity, and not a threat, to the existing system. He also convinced the Tulsa community leaders and their representatives that the Tulsa campus would indeed be a priority of the institution. This would establish the OSU System as the future "political centerpiece of the state's higher education system," Halligan believes (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003).

Infrastructure.

Other substantive, milestone initiatives completed through Halligan's personal involvement were an expansion of the basketball arena, planned expansion and upgrade of the football stadium, and lengthening of the Stillwater airport runway. All three projects were considered essential for OSU to remain in the Big 12 athletic conference and, most importantly, remain a peer with the members of that group, particularly the University of Oklahoma. Halligan recalls, "The perception was that if OSU did not remain in the Big 12, it would have an enormously difficult time in the state legislature maintaining parity in funding with OU" (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003).

He also was responsible for gaining approval and funding for building more than $225 million of critically important student housing—reversing a trend of students moving away from campus--and turning a $160 million fund raising campaign into a $270 million achievement (OSU James Halligan, 2003).

These accomplishments during Halligan's tenure as president were indeed significant to altering fundamental characteristics and prospects of the institution. The manner in which he went about getting those things done is profoundly informative of his leadership approach and is discussed in the following section.

How Leadership Drove Change

The significant achievements during President Halligan's tenure that are described above provide a mosaic of his approach to guiding the university and leading planned change. An examination of how these difficult and significant changes were implemented speaks to the effectiveness of Halligan's leadership style and provides insight into the character of the man.

Enrollment.

The enrollment issue was galvanized for Halligan by a conversation with the

president of another state institution. As related by Keener, the Executive Vice President,

We were just over 17,000 students when (Halligan) started and in his first year he

visited the presidents of all the other institutions (in Oklahoma) and when he went

to (one institution), the president there told him, 'We are going to bury you.' I

think that is a quote, 'We are going to bury you. You will be the fourth largest

institution in another four years.' Right after that, Halligan came back, came

down to my office, sat down in a chair and said, 'That's what (he) said, and it is

up to you to grow this institution.' So, we did (M. Keener, personal

communication, October 9, 2003).

The specific tactics of turning around enrollment consisted of more aggressive

recruiting and improved retention through initiatives to enhance the undergraduate

experience. Such initiatives included a "no rookies on rookies" approach in providing

experienced faculty for first-year students—making it a more personal experience, more

residence halls that enabled more students to have a greater connection with the campus,

an addition to the student union that brought offices serving students under one roof, and

increased use of tuition waiver. However, the key feature was the resolve and

commitment of Halligan and the commitment of his senior staff to ensure it happened

based upon creating personal relationships from top to bottom.

Sense of Community.

Halligan's own view of a collegial environment for the institution was that

"Community is just so important. If you get people together and they're in common

cause, it is astonishing what they can accomplish" (Halligan Notes, 2003). He gave his

senior staff a "little lecture" early on in his presidency about what sort of "body messages" they were giving:

> I was known for walking across campus and smiling. Saying hello to people. So we as an administration needed to exude that feeling. That we have some challenges and all that sort of business, but you know what, we're going to get our arms around it and we're going to figure out solutions to them. We're not down in the dumps here. So dig up the box. Shoot off the lock, and spend it. By God, it's going to get better around here and it's going to get better right now. (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003)

He was known for having students visit his home and developing a rapport with many of them. "Students can quickly sense whether or not the president is interested in them," (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003). Halligan invariably would talk to students as he walked across campus, starting conversations with them, buying whatever they were selling outside the Student Union, and hosting frequent meals and events for students at his residence.

He also set the bar for his senior staff in terms of standards for the vision he would establish—"Oklahoma State University, the University of Choice in Oklahoma." Keener reflects,

> He more or less communicated, and not necessarily directly, but also indirectly what his expectations were. And I would say, the expectations were that the University would be first class in its responses. Whether it was responding to a legislator, student, or parent, we were not to think about what would make things easy for the University, but what would make things easy for them. (M. Keener, personal communication, October 9, 2003)

During the news conference wherein he announced his intention to retire as president, Halligan said, "The vast majority of students, when I walk across campus, say 'Hello,' and it is my assessment that they know who I am and I really think that is important to developing a community on campus" (Gonzales, 2002).

OSU-Tulsa.

Initially, the nod for assuming responsibility for the University Center at Tulsa campus and establishing a large-campus presence there was widely perceived to be going to the University of Oklahoma. Halligan recalls the following:

> A prominent person called me and said the cause was lost and I should just try to make the best deal I could for Stillwater (OSU campus). And I go home about a quarter to midnight and I left him a message. I said that this was Ensign Halligan reporting in, and that we installed a bilge pump and we were pumping as fast as we could but we were still under water, but the surface was in sight.
> And I would have to say that…knowing how to get into the governor's office and talk to the governor's chief of staff after hours. That's when we really turned it around. (The University of Oklahoma) was winning, and we were losing. And I think from that moment on, the momentum went from one side of the field to the other. And then it was a question of putting in the structure. (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003)

There remained the problem of OSU-Tulsa becoming a stand-alone, comprehensive university in Tulsa. If that occurred, Halligan feels, "Stillwater faced a very bleak future" (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003). He adds,

> I would have to say that there was a crucial moment in the negotiations, I said there should be a provost at Tulsa, and he should be part of the system. One of

the senators in very colorful language said he didn't know if it was pra-vost or provost; he didn't know if it was a janitor. He used very direct language. And I said, 'Senator, I think we can make a deal. We can call that person *President*, but if I agree to that, I want you to make the board an advisory board and not a governing board for Tulsa.' And he stuck out his hand, and I shook it as fast as I could (laughs). (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003)

When it was clear that OSU would be established as the lead for the flagship public higher education institution in Tulsa, Halligan went about establishing credibility for the concept of OSU-Tulsa as a viable campus in the OSU system. He leased an apartment in Tulsa and maintained a presence there that was designed to convince the citizens of Tulsa of the University's commitment to developing an institution of "20,000 students by 2020." He stayed on average two nights per week at the leased apartment. He attended church in Tulsa regularly, virtually every week for two years. He attended Tulsa Chamber of Commerce events, Lions Club, Rotary Club, and a host of other local citizens' groups. He and his wife attended cultural events there regularly and were very visible to the local community. Halligan recalls the following:

We really tried to work on that. To convince the people, and the essential issue was, if this is given to OSU, will they just try to keep it in the bottle and let nothing happen to protect their position in Stillwater. When you cooked it all down, that's what it was. I had lunch with some leaders in Tulsa, and that's no longer a concern of theirs. They now believe that OSU will allow that to come to full flower. (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003)

Infrastructure.

In order to achieve the improvements in infrastructure necessary to remain in the Big 12 conference, Halligan had to generate the funding for expansion of the basketball arena and extension of the airport runway. He did so by winning support from the students and then the city of Stillwater to convince them it was essential to the future of the institution. As Halligan remembers it,

> We went to the students first. They voted to service $15 million of debt, and then we went to the city, and said, you're going to benefit a lot from this, and we want you to pass a tax such that you'll service $9 million in debt, and in both places, without being threatening, people needed to know that if we couldn't accomplish it we really needed to get someone else that they had greater confidence in who could accomplish these things because they were essential for the institution. (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003)

As the centerpiece to his approach to getting things done, Halligan's emphasis on personal relationships was instrumental in the fund raising campaign as well. Keener speaks of the mini-lecture Halligan gave his staff about the many guests they were entertaining at the president's home:

> Having people out to his house all the time; he and Ann, especially in his first few years, had something about every day. And he told us what he expected from the leadership. I remember a day, we (executive staff) sat around the (senior staff meeting) table and he said, 'When you guys come you act like you're invited guests. You're not there to participate, get free food, and have a good time. You're there to work. You're there to make the other people feel like they are the most important people that ever walked through the doors of that place. So, yes,

you can have something to eat but that's not the reason you're there.' (M. Keener, personal communication, October 9, 2003)

Halligan recollects the same session and reflects that it was an opportunity for his senior staff to learn about personal relationships:

(Laughing) I gave them a real talking to. We were trying to develop those relationships. I was not interested in (the senior staff) once or twice a week coming to the house and having a nice time and seeing me sort of dance in front of them. That was not what we were talking about. This was a team effort. We needed all these people, particularly since we launched the fund raising campaign. We started out with something like $160 million in the campaign and ended up with $270 million. You can't raise that kind of money if you haven't had a lot of people out to the house and schmoozed them big-time. And that means everybody. Everybody's in the game. (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003)

Halligan himself recalls an off campus after-dinner session with a donor of large potential. When the self-made, wealthy rancher offered up a toast of large shots of whiskey, Halligan knew that to enhance rapport with the man, it was not the time to request a diet soft drink or Chardonnay. The relationship eventually paid off in the form of a large donation to OSU (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003).

Interpretive/Symbolic Leadership.

Halligan expresses an appreciation and understanding of the application of symbols to his presidency as well: "The importance of symbolism cannot be overstated. When the symbols are wrong, it can be more important than substance." Halligan recognizes that symbolism is even important in the non-verbal messages a leader sends,

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"It is worthwhile to think about your persona. Trudging around campus with a glum look on your face does not give cheer to the troops.... Someone has to project the feeling that things are getting better and hope for the future is well founded" (Halligan Notes, 2003).

In another reflection of the importance of the messages that the president sends, as well as the need for understanding the perceptions of others, Halligan observes,

> Your style has to match your personality, but it is advisable about once a week to reserve some time to eat in the food court of the Student Union and to walk around the campus. People want to know that you have some sense of their world and what they are experiencing at the institution...Things are going on the campus and you need to have a feel for the pulse. (Halligan Notes, 2003)

When an OSU social fraternity posted photos on a web site of two whites oppressing a black student in civil war garb from a party, the OSU campus was outraged. There were widespread calls for the expulsion of the students involved, and banishment of the fraternity from the campus. The campus newspaper and African-American student group led the demands for Draconian, punitive action against those responsible.

Instead of taking action that would harm the campus community and likely generate opposing cries of political correctness, Halligan gave the fraternity leadership a chance to recover. He offered them "an opportunity to volunteer" to perform community service, to undergo multicultural awareness sessions, and apologize. He also met with and involved the African-American student group to gain their buy-in to the plan (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003).

He sponsored and attended a candlelight vigil at which the president of the fraternity provided an emotional apology. The vigil was an opportunity for the campus community to come together, recognize the seriousness and impropriety of the act, and

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resolve to eliminate racial bias from the campus. What could have been an extraordinarily divisive event on the campus became one of symbolic unification through the leadership of the president.

Halligan took baskets of cookies to the campus newspaper staff and was keenly aware of the benefits of that relationship in human resource, political, and symbolic terms. "There are few constituencies on the campus that the president should devote more thought to than the editorial board of the student paper. Bringing them a basket of cookies (six dozen) at the beginning of the fall semester and sitting for a detailed interview can pay tremendous dividends" (Halligan Notes, 2003). He also made it a practice to present baskets of cookies to winners of a "Celebrate State" award for staff and faculty who distinguished themselves or made a noteworthy contribution to the university in some way. The award was conceived and developed by administrative staff members before his arrival but he recognized the value of it and adopted it as a presidential award, personally delivered without announcement and without orchestrated fanfare except for gathering of faculty and staff in the recipient's home department (M. Keener, personal communication, October 9, 2003).

The disillusioned alumni who returned the pin to Halligan on his inaugural trip around the state asked to have the pin back seven years later.

The overwhelming opinion among those who knew him is that the most significant of the hallmarks was Halligan's leadership following the airplane crash in January 2001.

Crisis Event: Aircraft Accident, Oklahoma State University

On January 27, 2001 a twin-engine Beech King Air 200 aircraft, call sign Eight One Papa Foxtrot, crashed in rangeland approximately 30 miles east of Denver,

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Colorado. The aircraft had departed Jefferson County, Colorado en route to Stillwater, Oklahoma. There were eight passengers and a crew of two on board. None survived. The ten were returning from a men's college basketball game in Boulder, Colorado between the University of Colorado and Oklahoma State University. It was one of three aircraft carrying team members, coaches, trainers, and other members of the athletic department, in addition to a well-known sports broadcaster and the pilots back home. The souls on board consisted of two players, 20-year-old freshman guard Nathan Z. Fleming and junior guard Daniel P. Lawson, Jr., 21; broadcast engineer Kendall C. Durfey; sports information employee William R. Hancock III; director of basketball operations Pat Noyes; trainer Brian W. Luinstra; student manager Jared G. Weiberg; play-by-play announcer William B. Tietgans (Teegins); pilot Denver R. Mills; and co-pilot Bjorn G. Falistrom (Aircraft Accident Report, 2003; Schmitt & McCabe, 2001).

The National Transportation Safety Board concluded that the primary cause of the accident was spatial disorientation of the pilots following a failure of a primary flight instrument. At the time of the crash, weather conditions necessitated instruments to maintain spatial orientation and aircraft control (Aircraft Accident Report, 2003).

January 27--The First Response

On the evening of January 27, 2001, Jim and Ann Halligan returned home at about 8:30 p.m. following a football recruit dinner and had started to "decompress from the day." The president and his wife were normally invited to the recruiting dinners and the Halligans attended when his schedule permitted. There was a telephone message waiting, but at the end of the message Halligan was not sure what it meant. The message was that one of three airplanes carrying the OSU men's basketball team back from their

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game at the University of Colorado was overdue at Stillwater Airport and presumed to be "down" (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003).

Halligan decided to go to the airport because he thought, if the plane was down, maybe it had an emergency landing somewhere and they would probably have the best information at the airport. Before leaving, he specifically stopped and put on a shirt and tie, for which he would be thankful as the evening progressed.

Halligan drove the 10-minutes from the OSU president's residence to the Stillwater Airport. Upon his arrival, he was faced with the stunning realization that the airplane wasn't "down," it had crashed. Halligan made some calls to the OSU Police and to his Vice-President for Business and External Relations, Dr. Harry Birdwell, to notify them and find out where the head basketball coach, Eddie Sutton, was at the time. After learning that Coach Sutton and a number of the basketball players were at the basketball offices on campus, Halligan proceeded there (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003).

When he arrived, he found players and coaches who were inconsolable. The basketball offices were chaotic and packed with people, many of the people from the other two airplanes, and others from the athletic department. Halligan felt it was critically important that the circumstantial evidence pointing to a crash from which there were no survivors was confirmed before notification to families was made. By this time, local television stations in Oklahoma City and Tulsa were interrupting broadcasts with news alerts that one of the planes carrying members of the basketball team was missing. Shortly, they began to carry live feeds from a Denver television news team on site at an airplane crash in which there appeared to be no survivors. Still, there was no confirmation that the plane was the one carrying the OSU people.

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Dr. Terry Don Phillips, OSU Athletic Director, notified Everett Eaton, Chief of OSU Police, that it was believed the plane had crashed but that confirmation was needed and asked for Eaton's assistance. Chief Eaton began to make telephone calls from his home to law enforcement and other agencies in Colorado to get confirmation. While making those calls, Eaton also received several more calls from Phillips, as well as from Halligan and Birdwell. Halligan asked to be given a call on his cell phone as soon as Eaton learned something and indicated three or four places he might be.

Dr. Suzanne Burks, Director of University Counseling, received a call from an assistant director of Residential Life telling her to turn on the television. It was approximately 9:00 p.m. She saw it as a breaking news television bulletin from her home—radar contact with the plane had been lost. The plane was missing. She contacted Dr. Lee Bird, six months at OSU as Vice President for Student Affairs, to notify her. Bird was at a friend's house playing cards and Burks picked her up on the way to the basketball offices. On the way, Burks called several of her key people and sent them to various places where they thought there was a need. As it turned out, there were people at the airport, basketball offices, and at least two residence halls who were anxiously awaiting word. "It was a bit chaotic, as you can imagine, as we found out there were people at the airport. There were people at the residence halls. There were people at the basketball offices, and the media was descending," Burks recalls (S. Burks, personal communication, October 6, 2003).

Many of the counseling staff were also learning of the missing plane through television and were already moving in the direction of the campus. Burks remembers, "We had people mobilizing from that first 30 minutes and we had people mobilizing themselves to see how they could be of assistance" (S. Burks, personal communication,

October 6, 2003). Burks and Bird spent the next couple of hours helping at the basketball offices, helping people, and meeting with basketball players and support staff, helping with phones, helping in every way they could, before making rounds to visit with people and counselors at various residence halls on the campus. At one point, they decided to provide food. Bird recalls that evening in the following:

We decided to open up the cafeteria because in a time of disaster, what do people do? They eat. So we opened up the cafeteria and the cafeteria workers just showed up…and there was no concern about (charge) swipes or anything. It was like, let's make some sandwiches and if anyone wants a sandwich and a drink; they've got it. (L. Bird, personal communication, October 13, 2003)

The phones at the basketball offices were "ringing off the walls." Players' families and others were calling in, trying to find out who was on the plane. There was pacing and flying paper as the search for names, phone numbers, and addresses of those on the plane were collected.

Dr. Marvin Keener, OSU's Executive Vice President, received a call from Halligan asking him to notify the members of the OSU Board of Regents that the plane was missing and presumed crashed with no known survivors. Later, Keener was asked to call the regents to advise them that the team working the response was "calling it quits for the night and they would be called the next day." The next day, it was Halligan who was keeping the regents informed (M. Keener, personal communication, October 9, 2003). This followed a pattern that continued during the crisis response and recovery. Keener was to handle the internal organizational constituents—the deans, faculty, staff, and students--on matters concerning the tragedy. Keener was "Mr. Inside" to Halligan's "Mr. Outside," as Halligan recalls (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003).

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Upon gaining confirmation that the aircraft crash site in Colorado was indeed the plane carrying the OSU contingent, President Halligan and Coach Sutton called the families of each of the people on board to tell them the airplane had crashed and all indications were that there were no survivors. Halligan recalls,

People were, they were just so sad…. Just calling people, some of whom you had never met in your life, and saying the plane was down and that the assessment is that they are all dead. It really drained everything out of you. (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003)

By this time, news reporters and television stations had set up outside the basketball offices and at the Stillwater Airport. Prior to any acknowledgement of the crash, Halligan ensured the families were notified. He then had the athletic department media representative advise the media that a news conference would be held at the airport shortly.

At the brief news conference, the Director of Media Relations for the Athletic Department, Steve Buzzard, made opening comments addressing the fact that an aircraft had crashed and identified the people on board, then introduced President Halligan. Halligan spoke for 1 minute and 20 seconds at the news conference, expressing the deep sadness that Oklahoma State University shared with the families. Then Birdwell and Phillips spoke briefly and Birdwell and Buzzard answered questions from the media. Halligan did not take any questions from the assembled media, but was later "cornered" by a television reporter and answered a couple of questions on camera. Over the next 48 hours, Birdwell, Buzzard, Watkins, and Nestor Gonzalez, the News Bureau Manager, would handle the brunt of the media questions.

Following the press conference, Halligan convened his senior staff at the offices of Athletic Director Phillips. The offices were temporarily located in an off-campus building since renovation of Gallagher-Iba basketball arena and athletic offices was underway. Selection of the meeting site was a conscious decision to get away from the media and others who would distract from an intense period of crucial decision-making.

It was well after midnight when Halligan and his staff met. Most of his "inner-circle" vice-presidents, along with several members of the athletic department, Counseling, and Communications Services were there, along with Ann Halligan. The people who were involved in the early morning session recall it as a time filled with an extraordinary number of key decisions in an emotionally charged context. Throughout, Halligan's leadership style remained consistent with the style that those familiar with him had come to know. Natalea Watkins recalls his handling of the assembled group:

> It really wasn't his style to stand up and give orders like a general. It was really more to set a tone, if you will …to listen to what each person thought believed needed to be done from their area of expertise. He listened to the police, he listened to the public relations people, he listened to the athletic department, he listened to the counselor about stages of grieving, all of those sorts of things enabled him to decide what he would personally do, and he would give a thumbs-up or thumbs-down on what people were going to do. (N. Watkins, personal communication, October 1, 2003)

There were a number of very significant decisions made that morning from after-midnight until approximately 4:00 a.m. and during a follow-up session from 9:00 a.m. until 11:00 a.m. that same day. Most of those decisions concerned the surviving family

members and required both short-term and long-term actions and commitments from the

institution to "do the right thing by them."

First, it was decided that representatives from OSU would depart later that same

day for Strasburg, Colorado to provide on-scene representation and assistance by the

institution. There was a strong feeling that OSU people needed to be the ones to provide

timely and accurate information to the families and represent them. It also seemed

important at the time that someone from OSU "be the last person to hold the victims'

hands" recalls Birdwell (H. Birdwell, personal communication, October 21, 2003).

Included on that team were Dr. David Bosserman, who was then the Associate

Vice President and Controller. Bosserman had qualifications and experiences that

seemed to make him uniquely suited for the role. As a senior member of the

administration and one authorized to commit university funds, he possessed the gravitas

to make on-scene decisions and commitments on behalf of the university. Additionally,

as a retired lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, Bosserman had experiences with aircraft

accidents and mortuary affairs from tours of duty in Vietnam (H. Birdwell, personal

communication, October 21, 2003). Finally, Bosserman had an unpretentious style and

personality that related well to people. The people with whom he dealt at the crash scene

were pleased to work with one who did not conform to their preconceptions of how an

academician operated, recalls Captain Roger Engelsman of the Adams County, Colorado

Sheriff's Department (R. Engelsman, personal communication, November 26, 2003).

The second person on the team was a member of the OSU Police Department,

Sergeant Leon Jones. Jones spoke the language of security, understood the perspectives

of law enforcement and fire protection professionals, and was able to work well with

local public safety agencies and their representatives (E. Eaton, personal communication, October 7, 2003).

The third team member was Carter Matson, an assistant athletic director who had a juris doctorate and was working on a Ph.D. in history. Matson sent back detailed reports to Phillips and Halligan every evening while at the crash site in Colorado. Bosserman provided similar reports to Birdwell each night between 11:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m. that were relayed to Halligan. These three people, Bosserman, Jones, and Matson, provided a broad range of expertise and were able to establish an exceptionally strong professional relationship, a bond, with the people who were caring for the recovery of the OSU crash victims and the crash site (R. Engelsman, personal communication, November 26, 2003).

The team's first trip to Colorado lasted seven days, until the victims had been identified and were in route to their final destinations. Over the course of the next several months, until the crash-site memorial dedication in August, 2001, Bosserman would make five additional trips to the crash site to make the arrangements for return of the victims and their personal effects, purchase land for a memorial site, coordinate construction of the memorial, and dedication of the memorial itself. He also made arrangements for ongoing maintenance of the memorial site.

In retrospect, Halligan considers the decision that he not go immediately to the crash site a good one: "When I tried to figure out what I could do there and what I could do here, there was no question. I should stay here and send people with great expertise to the crash site. We sent a lawyer, a policeman, and Bosserman, who had the authority to commit the institution" (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003). Perhaps most importantly, Halligan believed that the president should "go where the

situation is worst," and the situation was worst where the grieving families and friends were (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003). Halligan did go to the accident site in mid-March and viewed the aircraft wreckage, which was laid out in a hangar for analysis.

Other significant decisions in those first hours reflect a commitment by the institution to do whatever it could for the families of those killed and to always remember the victims. That commitment was vocalized as the standard by Halligan to his staff and was central to the university's response.

First, with input from his staff, Halligan decided that two liaisons from the university would be assigned to each family. The primary liaison was to handle all matters associated with the deceased family member. It was up to the liaison to ensure that correct and timely information was provided to the family and that all the needs of the family were met to the degree possible. In most cases one of the liaisons was someone from the athletic department who knew the victim. Included in those liaisons were Dean Lee, Vina Spickler, Mart Sargent, Cathey Jo Warner, Dave Martin, Steve Buzzard, Rick Allen, and Tom Johnson (T.D. Phillips, personal communication, March 5, 2004). Phillips recalls the value of those liaisons to the families of the victims: "The tremendous role the family liaisons and Suzie Burks played in the relationships with the families cannot be overstated. But for their very caring and unselfish work, the relationships between the families and OSU could possibly have unraveled" (T.D. Phillips, personal communication, March 10, 2004).

The second liaison for each family was a trained counselor from University Counseling Service to provide support for the grieving and healing process. Both liaisons

turned out to be very valuable to the surviving family members (S. Burks, personal communication, October 6, 2003).

A second key decision was to conduct a memorial service at the campus as soon as possible. It was decided a memorial service would be held just three days later and would include family members of the victims. This would be the first time the families would be brought to the campus as a group to be "enveloped with the love and care of the institution" (H. Birdwell, personal communication, October 21, 2004). As with the other major decisions, this one decision drove countless other questions and issues that had to be resolved immediately. For example, what access should the media have? A decision was made that the media would be provided a single picture feed out to them, and television cameras would not be permitted in the service. Subsequently, a last-minute decision was made to not lower the lights at the ceremony so that the implicit promise to the media would not be broken.

While the larger decisions were made at Halligan's two meetings with his staff on Sunday, the smaller decisions and "thoughts of care" came from the people who actually handled the details of the memorial service. For example, someone thought to put a box of tissue under each family member's chair. Another thought to have digital pictures taken of every floral arrangement and placed in identical books for each family. Small teddy bears were also given to each family (L. Bird, personal communication, October 13, 2003). Kerri O'Keefe Shepard and Watkins were central figures in the planning of the memorial service at Gallagher-Iba Arena. Watkins describes it as a reflection of leadership:

> It was just a myriad of people working together to make it so personal by thinking of those small personal details. I give Dr. Halligan credit, his personal leadership

style causing those kinds of things to happen. There would be no way somebody could have ordered those kinds of things to happen. It happened because people were trying to hold or meet his example. (N. Watkins, personal communication, October 1, 2003)

Another decision made that first day was that memorials would be constructed at both Gallagher-Iba Arena and at the crash site. It was also decided that a commitment to the surviving families would be made in the form of scholarships to children of the victims. Later, this was expanded to include minor siblings of the victims.

Other matters discussed in the first meeting were any benefits for the families that might be expedited; and who would take the lead on coordinating and communicating with the news media.

The discussion turned to ways that everyone on the campus and others could demonstrate their grief for the victims and show their support for the families. In order to provide a way for people who were not close to the accident victims to share the grief with families and friends of the victims, it was decided that orange folded ribbons would be made available to the campus community as a visual, outer symbol of remembrance for the deceased and support to their families. It was agreed that several thousand ribbons would be made prior to the memorial service three days hence. Later, a modification of the symbol of the orange ribbon with a superimposed "10" would be displayed as decals on auto windows across the campus. A very large board was set up inside Gallagher-Iba Arena to allow people to write messages and condolences to the families. Additionally, an area outside Gallagher-Iba Arena next to the "Spirit Rider"—a full-sized bronze statue of a cowboy with an OSU flag flying at full gallop--was set up

for people to leave flowers, stuffed animals, and other mementos to demonstrate their caring and sorrow.

The practical issue of funding for construction and maintenance of the memorials; transportation, lodging, and meals for the families; and scholarships for the surviving children was raised. Halligan quickly concluded that the amount of funding should not be a fundamental issue: "I was still trying to decide do we have the money, and finally concluded that this is not an arithmetic problem. We just have to do it and figure out how the hell we're going to fund it" (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003).

There was no discussion of any legal implications in the accident or any of the planned actions by the university. Later on, there was some effort to gain an understanding of how the arrangements for the donated flight of the mishap aircraft were made and to what degree the OSU travel policy had or had not been followed. When Halligan came to the conclusion that the travel policy had not been complied with, and that the existing policy appeared to be inadequate, he directed that it be revised and rewritten such that it would be the model for team-travel policies for higher education.

It was Ann Halligan who suggested an end to the early morning meeting of the president and the others. She leaned over and touched his arm, "You need your rest. Tomorrow will be a long day" (L. Bird, personal communication, October 13, 2003). It was 4:00 a.m. on Sunday, less than 11 hours after the crash.

Within the first 24-36 hours following the accident, Halligan called Dr. Ray Bowen, President of Texas A&M University, to ask for his counsel and lessons-learned from the Bonfire tragedy on the A&M campus in 1999. Bowen recalls he offered to help in any way possible, but did not offer specific advice: "I did not think it was appropriate

to give a lot of advice at that stage" (R. Bowen, personal communication, February 8, 2004). Halligan also received a call from Dr. Jim Rhatigan, Vice President Emeritus of Student Affairs at Wichita State University. Rhatigan was Dean of Students at WSU in 1970 when an airplane accident killed 31 football players and others associated with the team. Both contacts were beneficial in framing the OSU response by Halligan. Indeed, Halligan borrowed remarks from Wichita State's experience to use at the memorial service at Gallagher-Iba Arena on January 31, 2001 (J. Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003).

Birdwell recalls Halligan's efforts to reach out to those who might provide counsel in the following:

> He talked to a lot of people, asking their opinions, asking what should we do, how can we use this as a tragedy to pull our families together. How can we, and he used the word repeatedly, "envelope" these families. What can we do to fold them into a circle that says this is not just a university; this is family. (H. Birdwell, personal communication, October 21, 2003)

The touchstone of each of the early decisions was a commitment to the families of the victims that the OSU family would always remember the ten people. The theme of "do the right thing by them" was established by the president, and in the days and weeks to come, it became apparent that he was the one most committed to it (H. Birdwell, personal communication, October 21, 2003).

Post-Tragedy Recovery

The memorial service at Gallagher-Iba Arena on January 31, less than four days after the accident, was a time of intense emotions for the surviving families and for the University. More than 14,000 people attended. Both Governor Frank Keating and

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Lieutenant Governor Mary Fallon of Oklahoma attended and spoke. Kevin Ogle, a television news broadcaster and friend and colleague of Bill Teegins, the announcer killed in the crash, served as the "master of ceremonies." Both Dr. Phillips and Coach Sutton spoke as well. A composed and eloquent Harry Birdwell offered the most extensive remarks. An OSU alumnus and holder of a law degree, Birdwell delivered what was the centerpiece summary of what the ten victims meant to the university. When a visibly distressed Halligan spoke, he spoke directly to the families and told them of the love with which the institution wished to envelope them and pledged a commitment to the memory of their lost loved ones by the institution. He then asked those in attendance, "Join me in resolving that every time you enter this building.... you will remember. Resolve that we will never forget them" (OSU Memorial Service Video, 2001).

In the days and weeks that followed the memorial service at Gallagher-Iba, Halligan hosted the families at his home for meals and visited the homes of the families. He played with the young children of the victims. He read to them and played dress-up with young daughters. At least one widow took pictures of him on the floor reading to her children so she could show them in years to come that the President of OSU cared enough about their father to do it (S. Burks, personal communication, October 6, 2003; J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003).

Halligan's own perception was that it was not necessarily his role, the role of the president, to form a personal bond and become a grieving family member along with those most impacted, but in this case, "It was circumstances. You could just look at the people involved, talk to them, and you knew. You're it." And besides, "They (the families) understand 'the President.' They understand that word" (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003). Moreover, it fit his belief in the value of

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personal relationships and the caring nature, widely known by his staff. Indeed, Birdwell recalls Halligan's stance concerning people in the following:

> There were four or five times during (Halligan's) presidency that I can remember him being very personally affected by something. And if I am not mistaken, every single one of them was either student safety or the safety of people who were university-involved. In four or five instances, he just sort of assumed so much of the burden that it became such a personal issue...When it involved the safety of kids and this plane crash, he almost brooded over the incident to a point of personal ownership. It was just one of those things that was so intensely personal to him. (H. Birdwell, personal communication, October 21, 2003)

Halligan attended all the funerals he could and his wife attended all that he was not able to attend. Early on, he was asked to speak at some of the funerals and found himself phoning back to Stillwater to get more information on the victims. Halligan remembers some of the demands placed on him at those funerals.

> (I was) requested to give comments about people, some of whom I had never met. So I had my staff get information about them. You can't stand up and say, 'You know, I'm an executive person. I don't have a clue who some of these people were.' You can't do that. So, I told the staff I want to know what were they like? What were their characteristics? What was important to them? All that happened very quickly. It was like a dream. (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003)

At the crash site, Bosserman represented the university to the local authorities and emergency response units and also represented the families. He coordinated with the local police, coroner, and the National Transportation Safety Board team to identify

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victims, identify personal effects, and serve as the OSU liaison for the public safety agencies. He was the communications focal point between the public agencies and the families.

Phillips recalls the value to the families of Bosserman's on-site presence: The assurance that each of the deceased was handled with extreme care and dignity from the time of recovery, transportation to their home site, and through their funerals is something that was a critical first step in the healing process. Additionally, the in-person conference call between Dr. Bosserman, the coroner, me, and the families during that first week, while tremendously difficult, was a critical moment in the assurance that OSU would reach out, in unqualified fashion, to each family. (T.D. Phillips, personal communication, March 10, 2004)

Captain Roger Engelsman, the Sheriff of Adams County, Colorado was one of the first responders on the scene and remained involved throughout the recovery of the aircraft and remains, accident investigation, and the construction of the memorial at the site and the ceremony in August 2001. Engelsman and representatives of the other public assistance groups were relieved to have assistance in contacting and coordinating with the family members and both he and the NTSB documented it in their after-action reports (R. Engelsman, personal communication, November 15, 2003). For example, the coroner needed information to confirm the identity of the victims and requested assistance in contacting the families. Bosserman arranged a teleconference with the ten families on the Tuesday after the accident and the coroner was able to ask them about distinguishing clothing, jewelry, or characteristics. (D. Bosserman, personal communication, November 5, 2003)

Bosserman also formed a good professional relationship with the NTSB team on the site. He was initially told he could not come to the NTSB briefings, but after his first visit to the crash site with the chief investigator, Bosserman was invited to attend their briefings and had access to documentation such as radar plots almost immediately. It became apparent through Bosserman that the NTSB report would convey concern about university policy and its implementation, even though the NTSB would state that such was not causal to the accident. By university policy, the OSU Flight Manager must approve all flight contracts, whether donated or not, and they had not been involved in coordinating or certifying the accident flight. The final NTSB report would note:

> OSU's former air transportation policy was not causal to the accident. In fact, the policy was not likely different from those in place at other universities of the same size as OSU. However, even though the university's athletic department knew the accident pilot, the Flight Department had no records on file regarding him, the second pilot, or the accident airplane, as required. Also, because the accident flight was a donated flight, it was not coordinated with the Flight Department Manager, as were charter flights and flights involving university airplanes. Thus, OSU did not provide any significant oversight for the accident flight. (Aircraft Accident Report, 2003)

An effort was made to determine how the arrangements for the donated flight of the mishap aircraft were made and to what degree the OSU travel policy had or had not been followed. When Halligan came to the conclusion that the travel policy had not been complied with, and that the existing policy could be improved, he directed that it be revised and rewritten with the intent that the resulting document would be the model for team-travel policies for other institutions of higher education.

Phillips recommended to Halligan that someone outside the athletic department chair a task force to review the tragedy. Halligan formed the task force and asked Birdwell to chair it. The task force recommended ways to improve the safety and oversight policy for its athletic team transportation and to produced a revised transportation policy. The task force included family members of the victims. On April 22, 2002 OSU issued a revised team travel policy. The stated purpose of the policy was to "provide a framework for safe and efficient athletic team travel" for the OSU Athletic Department, and also to "assign responsibility and accountability for enforcement." The revised policy was included in the NTSB final report and was also forwarded by the NTSB to the President of the National Collegiate Athletic Association as a safety recommendation for other institutions (Aircraft Accident Report, 2003). Bosserman recalls,

> I was given the opportunity to review the draft (report). I had no input, but if I saw something that didn't make sense, I certainly told them that...We did tell them we would have (a revised travel policy) and they asked when will it be ready because they would like to include it. (D. Bosserman, personal communication, November 5, 2003)

Dealing with the impact to the internal university fell to "Mr. Inside," the Executive Vice President, Dr. Keener. He emailed a memorandum to all faculty and staff expressing the sorrow of the entire university community and asking each member to be mindful of those who were suffering among them and to be watchful for them. It read in part,

> It is nearly impossible to identify all close friends and acquaintances of the deceased students and athletic department personnel, so we ask that you please be

alert to the emotions and behavior of students in your classes and staff within your area. (Keener, 2001)

In the months to come, Keener never received any negative feedback from any source in the university about the way the institution was handling the aftermath. It was rare for a significant action by the administration to receive no criticism whatsoever. Keener recalls, "My sense was that the campus thought it was handled beautifully. I heard no complaints, and that's unusual. Usually someone would complain, complain about something" (M. Keener, personal communication, October 9, 2003).

Dr. David Buchanan, a past president of the Faculty Council, heard no complaints about the way the administration responded to the airplane crash. The only suggestion of a complaint he heard was from a colleague from another institution. The colleague saw the memorial service on television and observed that the religious overtone of Birdwell's comments seemed inconsistent with a secular institution (D. Buchanan, personal communication, January 28, 2003).

Edward F. Keller, member of the Board of Regents for the Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical Colleges, the governing board for OSU, also heard no complaints. He believes, "The manner in which they handled and supported the families was a credit to the university. I can't think of anything they didn't think about" (E. Keller, personal communication, March 17, 2004).

If the memorial service at Gallagher-Iba Arena on January 31 was a time to come together and "envelope" the grieving families with love and bond with them in sorrow, the dedication of the memorial at the crash site in August was a time when, "We ripped open all of the wounds," as Bird describes (L. Bird, personal communication, October 13, 2003). Halligan remembers it as "undoubtedly the most difficult time" (J.E. Halligan,

personal communication, October 24, 2003). By then he had come to know the family members and felt their sadness even more.

The day prior to the memorial dedication, it was warm and sunny in the Colorado eastern plains and people were advised to dress lightly and bring sunscreen. Overnight, the weather changed dramatically. The weather for the dedication was cold and rainy. The local sheriff's office provided blankets for the family members, most of whom were not dressed for the weather. Halligan recalls it was such a sad occasion, someone remarked to him, "Even the heavens are crying" (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003).

Halligan had some difficulty maintaining his composure in the overwhelming emotions the family members were experiencing, but he knew it was important for him to do so. It was left to Ann to put a gentle hand on his knee and offer a family-traditional encouragement to be strong. "Buck up," she said (L. Bird, personal communication, October 3, 2003).

The memorial to the ten victims at Gallagher-Iba Arena was dedicated on February 22, 2003. It features three black granite walls with the likenesses of the 10 victims and with words chosen by the families. In the center of the memorial is a large and very poignant statute of a cowboy, head down, kneeling with his hat in both hands, the brim lightly resting on the ground. It was sculpted by noted Oklahoma artist Harold Holden. Birdwell recalls how the statue came to be. Birdwell visited with Holden and told him of the need for a centerpiece for the memorial:

> All I said to him was we need something that expresses the grief of the Cowboy
>
> Nation over this, that will not let it go away. He took a single sheet of paper (rips
>
> a legal sheet from a pad on his desk), and on the corner of my desk in about a

minute, he drew the statue. And it did not change…The lock of hair right in the front is the only thing that changed at all, from that initial sketch to the time it was erected out there. And I said to him later, when we were up there seeing the clay model of this large piece, 'How did you do that so quickly? That must have already been there.'

He said, 'It was. One Sunday afternoon a couple of years ago, my wife and I were out riding in the pasture when one of our friends came to tell us that our grandson had been killed. I just fell off my horse. That statue is me.'

He said a cowboy never touches the ground with his hat, unless he's been bucked off or unless he is in incredible grief, in incredible pain. (H. Birdwell, personal communication, October 21, 2003)

After Thoughts

When asked what insight they now have into the adequacy of the institution's response following the tragedy and what they would do differently, few of the senior administrative staff have significant changes to suggest. Most of them seem to have intensely personal reasons for the changes they would make.

Suzanne Burks regrets she did not immediately visit family members who lived outside the local Stillwater area, believing that she was able to help those she met within the first few days more than those she met later on (S. Burks, personal communication, October 6, 2003)

Marvin Keener notes that at least one scholarship awarded in the name of one of the student-athlete crash victims was not adequately coordinated. The lack of coordination resulted in some embarrassment when the award temporarily ran afoul of

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NCAA guidelines and restrictions (M. Keener, personal communication, October 9, 2003).

David Bosserman wishes he were more insistent that the university accept the offer of the governor's airplane to transport his team to Colorado the day following the crash. It would have placed Bosserman and the team at the crash site earlier, while the bodies were recovered, something for which he regrets an OSU person was not present. The plane was a Beech King Air, the same basic model as the crash airplane, and President Halligan declined the governor's offer for that reason. Bosserman also regrets and was amazed to discover that there were no fingerprint samples of the victims, other than the two pilots, to aid in identification following the crash. He believes fingerprinting of teams and other groups for potential identification purposes should be part of a policy on group travel (D. Bosserman, personal communication, November 5, 2003).

Cynthia Washington is an OSU clinical counselor and one of the key people associated with administering to the counseling needs of the families and other students. She notes that the university had never funded a critical incident response cell for responding to such incidents before the crash. Almost immediately following the crash, money was made available to fund a response cell. OSU, not unlike most institutions across the country, suffers 7-10 student fatalities a year from incidents such as automobile and other accidents, illness, and suicide. However, it often takes a stunning incident such as the airplane tragedy to generate movement toward creating an adequate counseling response unit (C. Washington, personal communication, November 6, 2003).

Speaking about the tragedy and the university's response to it, Halligan mentions the travel policy on two separate occasions without prompting. It seems to haunt him to think that there may have been something that the university, that he, might have done

differently. Intellectually, he understands there was nothing he could have done. He remembers the policy being discussed in his presence at a meeting, but it was something of which he had only a surface awareness. "It was just so far below the radar...It never entered my consciousness. The first lady (of OSU) flew on the plane. The guy who donated (the flight) was a wonderful person" (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003).

When asked about the tragedy's impact on the institution and themselves, the university people involved respond overwhelming that it is both profound and long term. Executive Vice President Keener offers the following:

I think it had a profound effect on the president. I think it shortened his life as president. It shortened all our lives essentially. All of us became less tolerant about the petty things that come through administration. A lot of the stuff we have to put up with as administrators, even though it's pretty important to a dean or a faculty member, is just petty in comparison....And the people not directly effected by (the accident) don't understand. (M. Keener, personal communication, October 9, 2003)

Natalea Watkins believes that, "The energy that the whole episode, the whole event, and just all of the things related to it, took from him may have shortened his time at OSU" (N. Watkins, personal communication, October 1, 2003). Bosserman believes the reports communicated to Birdwell every evening while at the crash site were being relayed to Halligan and "were just eating him alive" (D. Bosserman, personal communication, November 5, 2003). Burks recalls, "I just know (Halligan's) heart, it broke for those families" (S. Burks, personal communication, October 6, 2003).

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Halligan's assessment of the impact to his own presidency is consistent with

Keener's view, "I don't think there's any question it sort of hastened the decision by quite

a few members of the team. Look, we've been here. We've had our turn in the left seat.

It's time someone else had a time in the left seat" (J.E. Halligan, personal

communication, October 24, 2003).

In the future, the senior staff will continue to remember. Phillips, currently the

Athletic Director at Clemson University, writes to the family members about three times

a year (T.D. Phillips, personal communication, December 5, 2003). Bosserman travels to

the crash site each year with two of his staff members "to reaffirm my commitment to

remember" (D. Bosserman, personal communication, November 5, 2003). Halligan

offers,

> We recently had a discussion of how we would assemble for a memorial this year,
>
> to refresh our commitment, and I said, I don't look forward to this. It's tough, but
>
> (the current OSU President) was not acquainted with the victims or their families.
>
> He doesn't know who they are, so it kind of falls...

He stops mid-sentence and then, "We try our best, always." (J.E. Halligan,

personal interview, October 24, 2003)

Halligan's assessment confirms the view that the tragedy provided a new

perspective for him and for the others as well:

> Suddenly some of the, well, the dance with the faculty council became so trivial
>
> in light of the interactions we'd had with the families...I am sure someday it will
>
> diminish in intensity but it certainly has not. It made me say, boy, you'd better
>
> pick a few roses here at the end. Better pick a few roses. It's just there all the

time. It's there all the time. (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003)

Regent Keller believes that "the most important thing is that Jim demonstrated the heart and soul of the university. It was not an institution without a soul. He conveyed that in a manner that was very believable" (E. Keller, personal communication, March 17, 2004).

Birdwell offers a perspective that captures a near-universal sentiment among Halligan's administrative team:

You sort of take a leadership tone from the president all the way down. And if this had not been such a priority, if doing the right thing by these families and expressing the empathy and sympathy and grief of the university and the goodness of the university, were not a priority of the president, not nearly so much would have happened to benefit the families or heal the university. The tone comes from the top. (H. Birdwell, personal communication, October 21, 2003)

Secondary Case Crisis: The Bonfire Collapse, Texas A&M University

In the early morning hours of November 18, 1999, approximately 70 current and a few former students at Texas A&M University were working at the campus Polo Grounds on what was simply known as "Bonfire." Bonfire had been an institutional hallmark leading up to the Texas A&M versus University of Texas football game for ninety years, and was an important event in the tradition of "Aggie Spirit." Bonfire itself had grown to enormous size over the years. When completed, it was 7,000-8,000 logs stacked upright in a six-tier wedding cake design in excess of 55 feet high (Kavanagh, 1999; Special Commission 2000; Tang, 2000).

At approximately 2:45 a.m. that morning, as students worked on each of the four tiers that had been erected to that point, the 2 million pound, 4,000-log Bonfire structure fell. Eleven students and one former student were killed; 27 were injured. Many of the dead and injured were pinned in the stack of logs for hours. Approximately 3,200 paid personnel and volunteers participated in the intense, 23-1/2 hour response operation. The last living person was removed from the stack after being pinned for seven hours. He spent the next five months in a hospital (Crissey, 2000; Kavanagh, 1999; Special Commission, 2000; Whitmarsh, 2000).

An independent commission, chartered by the University to identify the causes of the tragedy would conclude that both cultural and structural changes over time contributed to the collapse. Its report faulted a lack of oversight by current and past university officials (Special Commission, 2000).

The First 30 Hours

The morning of the accident, Texas A&M President Ray Bowen returned home at 1:30 a.m. to his on-campus residence following a recruiting trip. His wife was out of town. A couple of students were also living there at the time due to a dorm fire. One of the phones in the residence was disconnected, so when the university police first tried to call him, they could not contact him. He did not get a call until 3:15 a.m. It was from the Vice President for Student Affairs. Upon notification, the first question that went through Bowen's mind was, "who is in charge?" As it turned out, the Vice President for Administration, a retired Air Force colonel, was on the scene and in control, providing security and communications coordination for the university. He remained the operational focal point for most of the rescue operation. Most of the emergency response control was through the several emergency response and safety agencies that responded.

By the time Bowen arrived at the accident site on the campus, three people had been

pulled from the stack and parents were calling in, panicked because they had heard the

stunning news on radio or television (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13,

2003).

"I felt completely useless out there," Bowen said. "At the site, everyone had a

task. I basically stood there and felt helpless. I didn't bring any equipment, get the food

and water to the workers, or manage the phones. I didn't tell the parents their child had

died. I wanted to climb on top of that stack and lift those logs one by one. It was an

overwhelming feeling of great frustration" (Brown, 2001).

The University Student Affairs staff immediately began the process of working

with residence hall students, Corps of Cadets students, and others to create a list of all

those who may have been working on the stack at the time. Experienced, knowledgeable

staff members were dispatched to both local hospitals to provide a communication link in

those locations. A "command center" was established in the offices of the Vice President

for Student Affairs. The university's landline phone and computer systems were

overwhelmed by messages from people all over the world (LeBas, 1999). Bowen recalls

that University responders ended up relying a lot on cellular phones and feels that the cell

phones probably saved the day (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13,

2003).

An information center was set up on campus for family members to receive

updates. Staff and counselors, telephones and food were available around the clock in

that location. Additional smaller rooms were set up nearby for families to use when staff

came to bring updates about their students. Each family member was assigned a staff

liaison to stay with them throughout their time there. Students organized a memorial

service that was held on the afternoon of November 18 and attended by 13,000 people. Another memorial service was held after rescue and recovery operations were over. More than 40,000 people attended (Kibley, 2000).

The university's Media Relations handled the crush of the media. There were 25-30 satellite dishes set up around the accident site. Television stations were flying helicopters overhead. Fear of a mid-air collision led to the establishment of a no-fly zone over the accident site. Bowen remembers that when the cameras were on, the news people reported professionally, but when the cameras were turned off, they were very emotionally involved as well.

Bowen contacted the members of the Board of Regents. Governor George W. Bush, on a trip to Iowa, called at 6:15 a.m. Both of them were crying on the phone. Bowen decided that classes should not be cancelled that day because he didn't want 40,000-50,000 students with nothing to do but come to the accident site (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003).

It took 24 hours to get the stack down and the university held a series of press conferences during that time. The president ended up speaking at all the press conferences. A representative from Media Relations would open it up. Bowen would give the hard data, and then the president of the student body would speak. Bowen was shielded from the media for the most part except for the press conferences. But the media grabbed anyone they could to make on-air statements. During those 24-hours of rescue and recovery, Bowen recalls that his staff "never stood together and developed a strategy but were mindful of what they said, knowing that if they said the wrong thing, it could hurt students later on." The last press conference was held 30 hours after the collapse (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003).

The last living person was removed from the collapsed structure after seven hours. Rescue and recovery efforts ended after less than 24 hours when workers removed the last body from beneath the pile of logs (Kavanagh, 1999). All total, about 50 agencies worked the recovery. Approximately 3,200 paid professionals and volunteers participated in the intense 23-plus hour response operation. Members of Texas Task Force I, the state's elite emergency response team, located in the home town of Texas A&M University, were on the scene within minutes of the collapse, bringing with them high-tech equipment to assist in locating and removing trapped victims (Brown, 1999, 2000; Whitmarsh, 2000).

The Recovery

On Friday, the same day rescue operations ended, Bowen called together his senior staff and others to discuss what they should do within the next 48-hours and beyond. Their focus was on ways to provide help to the victims and to help the university community get through the tragedy. Bowen was somewhat surprised that the university lawyers were in attendance.

At that meeting, Bowen announced he intended to request an independent special commission to investigate the causes of the accident. The lawyers present were very much opposed to the idea, since it would mean losing control of what was released to the public. Nonetheless, Bowen insisted on the independent commission and was subsequently supported by the governing board for the university. It was not a court proceeding or a prosecutor/special counsel determined to prove a particular case, but was a fact-finding body committed to ascertaining the truth (Brown, 1999). Bowen has no doubt that if he had not insisted, the independent commission would not have happened (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003).

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Following another meeting with lawyers and two Regents the following Wednesday, Bowen decided to collect every piece of paper associated with Bonfire and put it in a special place in the library. He had previously discussed this with various members of his staff but did not discuss at a staff meeting. The purpose of the library collection was to have a central, unassailable source for all Bonfire-related information. So when the media started the second round of coverage, focused on identifying who was to blame, the university was able to tell them that everything about Bonfire was available there. It helped them avoid massive requests for information from the media. It also avoided attacks by the media saying that the university refused to comment or was withholding information.

Establishing the archive was not an attempt to avoid answering questions, Bowen says. It was an attempt to manage the requests for information and ensure only correct information was disseminated (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003). The university placed more than 2,000 memos, letters, emails and other documents relating to the 90-year old Bonfire in a special library collection (Brown, 1999; Emails Discuss Bonfire, 1999).

Bowen recalls that there were regular interactions with the families:

We had a lot of interaction with the parents at the time of the tragedy and during the many weeks afterward. Our Student Affairs Division essentially made available a person to work with each individual family. In addition, we held a group meeting with them prior to the release of the Bonfire Commission report. We have had other meeting with them as a group…In addition, we had many individual meetings as individual issues came up. Today, we remain rather close

to about half of the families. (R. Bowen, personal communication, February 8, 2004)

In early December, the local newspaper reported that university officials announced they no longer would answer media questions. "Since the Special Commission on the 1999 Bonfire has begun its work, the university will be taking the position that its personnel will refrain from commenting on any aspect of the inquiry or on any of the multitude of documents it has placed on file for public review," Cynthia Lawson, Executive Director of University Relations, was quoted as saying (Brown, 1999).

Bowen feels that, in many ways, they were incredibly lucky the way things came together and the way the big issues were taken care of. There was a crisis action plan for the university, at least on paper, but it was not used. Nonetheless, he feels the university did most of the important things well. Most significantly, he believes they dealt with the families well. In fact, one family of a survivor who lived in Tennessee moved to College Station because of the connections and relations they'd made with university people in the community (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003).

Another objective that Bowen believes was successfully achieved was the credibility of the institution was preserved, even though there were charges against it. The university relied to a large degree on families they had helped to respond to allegations that the university was not caring for their needs (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003).

Another critically important thing the university did was to shield the students from accepting blame. The *Wall Street Journal* was going to write an article putting blame on the students; Bowen felt it was wrong and would have been very harmful. So,

he went to a friendly media source and did an interview. The interview promulgated the message that, if you want to blame anyone blame the president (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003). In that interview, Bowen stated, "I personally take responsibility for everything that happens at A&M," Bowen said. "At the end of the day, the buck stops here." If the commission concluded the accident was the product of poor leadership on the part of the administration, Bowen said he would resign. Bowen now believes that was a mistake. He probably should not have answered the question because it directed attention away from the families (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003). And it did generate criticism from some quarters when he did not resign following the findings of the special commission. Nonetheless, the statement was made with the good faith principle of not placing blame on the students (Bonfire Should Not Cost, 2000).

The advisor to Bonfire, Bill Kibler, outlined the University's guiding commitment during an interview with the local newspaper:

> In the days and weeks that followed we focused primarily on our concern for the families and loved ones of the victims and the injured. We committed to our students that anyone who wanted to attend any one of the 12 funerals would be provided a way to do that. We organized transportation, food, and funds for students to travel throughout the state. We chartered a plane to transport over 130 people to a funeral in California. The president and/or one of the vice president and many students and staff attended each funeral. (Former Bonfire Advisor, 1999)

The University raised $700,000-800,000 for funerals and transportation costs to funerals and created a memorial scholarship for the families. Included in the total

expenditure of almost a million dollars were significant personal items needed by certain of the students, including two automobiles (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003).

From his office and at home, Bowen used email to keep in touch with the world on the issue of the Bonfire collapse. Hundreds of people contacted him and he responded to many of them. The emails were made public through open records. Reading the messages and responding was a type of therapy for him, "It kept me from sitting and crying. It gave me something to do between meetings and on the plane to or from a funeral" (Bowen Leads A&M Through, 1999).

Bowen says he tries to change the subject whenever someone asks him how he's holding up:

A lot of people will try to characterize this as a personal tragedy for Ray Bowen. It's not. It's a personal tragedy for the people who lost their sons and daughters, and it's a personal tragedy for the young people who were hurt and their families. (For Bowen Memories, 2000)

The local newspaper offered that,

Dr. Bowen, say those who know him well, is a man who keeps his innermost thoughts and emotions private. Bowen expresses concern that discussing how the bonfire tragedy has affected him personally could be construed as drawing attention to himself. That's something he wants to avoid." (For Bowen Memories, 2000)

There is a two-year statute of limitation for filing a lawsuit in Texas. The first lawsuit against the university was filed within a couple of weeks of the expiration. All

total, twenty lawsuits were filed against the university, but many families did not file lawsuits (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003).

In 1999, the Texas A&M Bonfire was cancelled for only the second time in its 90-year history. The only other time it was not lighted was in 1963 after President Kennedy's assassination (Kavanagh, 1999). Bonfire will not be lit again until it can be done safely. Bowen thinks it unlikely the Bonfire event will be restored. The university cannot buy enough insurance to cover the risk, and it cannot afford to spend $5 million on having professionals build it, even if the cultural bias that it must be student built and of a certain size can be overcome. So for safety, cost, and litigation issues, Texas A&M University probably will never be able to have a Bonfire that remotely resembles previous ones and do it within the cultural constraints that still exist (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003).

Bowen views his own leadership style reflects a tendency to delegate. He believes he listens well. He doesn't mind people telling him he's made a mistake and has an open door policy. He attributes his success to the fact that he is usually dealing with high quality people. On those occasions when he has not been successful, he believes it is often due to lack of information. He is confident that he tends to make good decisions when he has good information (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003).

When asked what he is most proud of while president, Bowen tells you that he was able to create a consensus that academics was the top priority. He wanted to be known as an academic president and he thinks he achieved that. It took about a year and a half because Texas A&M is a "huge place, and always going in twenty different directions" (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003). Indeed, when he

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retired in 2002, he was remembered in media statements by his senior staff and faculty for "Vision 2020," a plan for A&M to become a top university while retaining its unique traditions and character. The other thing for which he was remembered was the Bonfire collapse:

> As his legacy takes shape, Bowen's supporters will no doubt praise him for steering Texas A&M through the horror of the Bonfire collapse...His critics, though, will continue to blame Bowen's administration for failing to make sure Bonfire was safe. An investigation into the collapse blamed generations of administrators for letting the tradition grow dangerous, but some said Bowen—an engineer—should have been particularly keen on Bonfire's faulty design.
> (LeBras, 2002)

Bowen feels that the impact of the Bonfire tragedy on Texas A&M University will last forever. A monument to those lost in the Bonfire collapse is being built on the Polo Grounds site of the Bonfire. The monument will be completed on November 14, 2004 (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003).

Secondary Case Crisis: Aircraft Crash, Wichita State University

On October 2, 1970, a Martin 404 chartered airplane, N464M, one of two aircraft transporting members of the Wichita State University football team from Wichita, Kansas, to Logan, Utah crashed in the mountains of Colorado. After a refueling stop in Denver, the flight crew deviated from the flight path and proceeded via a "scenic" route with mountains on both sides of the flight path. The aircraft, which was overloaded by 5,165 pounds, flew into a box canyon (Aircraft Accident Report, 2003; NTSB Identification, 1970; Plane Crash, 2003).

Confronted with steeply rising terrain, the pilot made a sharp bank trying to turn around in the narrow valley and stalled, crashing into a mountainous forested area on Mt. Trelease. The pilot had only 123 total hours in a Martin 404, the copilot, 30 hours. The aircraft, operated by Golden Eagle, crashed into a mountain in Clear Creek Canyon eight miles west of Silver Plume, Colorado. Thirty-one of the 40 people aboard the plane died in the crash. The pilot was one of the survivors. Most of those who died perished when the full load of fuel exploded and burned. The few survivors had gotten out of the crashed plane before the explosion.

The cause of the crash was ruled by the National Transportation Safety Board to be pilot incompetence. Other factors included overload conditions, lack of flight planning, and minimum qualifications of the crew (Aircraft Accident Report, 2003; NTSB Identification, 1970; Plane Crash, 2003).

Two senior administrators at Wichita State University, Dr. Jim Rhatigan, Dean of Students in 1970, and Roger Lowe, Vice President for Administration and Finance in 1970 until the present day, have vivid recollections of those days.

First Response

The President of Wichita State University in 1970, Dr. Clark D. Ahlberg, traveled to Colorado the morning after the crash. He took with him the Director of University Communications, Max Schaible; Director of Planning, Dr. George Platt; Director of Research and Sponsored Programs, Fred Sudermann. They set up at a motel and one room in the motel was manned at all times, usually by Platt and Sudermann, to ensure that there would be no delay in communicating with the campus. They also made travel arrangements for a number of family members. None of the family members of the

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fatalities traveled to the crash site, but at least some family members of each of the injured traveled to Colorado.

Ahlberg made rounds at the hospital, met with parents of the injured, and called back to the campus relaying what he learned on those visits. One football player and one WSU staff member died while in the hospital. Those deaths created significant additional stress for everyone, even for the families of those who were less seriously injured (J. Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003).

At the campus, an impromptu command post was established in the basketball arena. There was a campus plan to counter student unrest, a not uncommon phenomenon in 1970, but there was not a plan to handle other kinds of crises. Lowe remembers that, with the president at the accident site, there was no meeting of the campus leadership to develop a plan, "I would say we were pretty much in charge (of the campus response)…We were decentralized. We didn't meet. I don't know who got it together. I don't remember" (R. Lowe, personal communication, November 4, 2003). Rhatigan adds, "I don't recall that Clark Ahlberg got us together" (J. Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003).

After two days, Dr. D. Cramer Reed, Dean of the College of Health Professions, went to Colorado as well. He was a medical doctor and longtime friend of the president. He joined Ahlberg on the hospital rounds and took over for a number of days after Ahlberg returned to Wichita. Also within the first few days, the campus minister traveled to Colorado of his own volition and joined in the rounds of hospital visits and talked with players and their families.

Roger Lowe remembers, "The people at the crash site were there for nurturance and for grief sharing. At the site, those people were invisible (to us at the campus)" (R.

Lowe, personal communication, November 4, 2003). Lowe remembers also that the president was not able to communicate back to the campus to give guidance to the campus leadership in Wichita, "He was gone about 5-7 days. That's why he didn't have time to write anything or think about—he asked we have a memorial service...There was no email or cellular phones," recalls Lowe (personal communication, November 4, 2003).

The Assistant Director of University Communications was the director of the command post, since the information going out was receiving so much attention. Lowe and the Vice President for University Advancement, Dick Reidenbaugh, were in charge of operations at the command post and in dealing with all the family members in the very early hours. They were the ones who made initial contact with families to advise that a loved one survived or had not survived. The primary responsibility of the command post was to communicate with and attend to the needs of the families of those who were killed. The Director or Assistant Director of University Communications handled contacts with the media with statements and press releases (R. Lowe, personal communication, November 4, 2003).

The Recovery

Ahlberg returned to the campus after 5-7 days and brought Schaible back as well because "the whole matter was too much for him to handle" (J. Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003).

Upon his return to campus, President Ahlberg was "the picture of stability throughout." Rhatigan and Lowe both remember Ahlberg as "an administrator." One of his strong points was that "He was a highly stable man. He was not an emotive man.... When we went through that tragedy, he just wanted to distance himself. He occupied himself fully on the crash." Rhatigan, Dean of Students at the time, describes President

Ahlberg as "an administrative president. His whole history of work was administrative. He was Vice President for Research at Syracuse and the Director of the Budget for the state of New York (under Governor Averill Harriman). His whole life was administration" (J. Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003).

In the years to come, there was some criticism from players and from some family members about the degree of Ahlberg's involvement and concern. Many apparently felt that Ahlberg did not share their grief. Those senior administrators most closely associated with the event believe the criticism was unfounded. Rhatigan recalls,

> As it turned out, it was an incident of misunderstanding that President Alhberg's demeanor was one of stability and calm. While a lot of people were suffering, they thought he wasn't suffering any. He didn't shed any tears. So it was a complete misreading...Players told me, 'Well, the President didn't seem to care.' He didn't come to a lot of the ceremonies (annual observances) didn't mean he didn't play any role. He would always be there. Well, they thought he didn't want to do it. He couldn't do it—and he knew that. It was just too hard. (J. Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003)

After the round of funerals, a memorial service was held at the campus for all the victims. A faculty member was assigned for each family of a victim. According to Lowe,

> The faculty member was to have all the answers. No one was allowed to wander around, wondering what to do next. In fact, we had one faculty member for every family member who came to that memorial service, and for the funerals. (R. Lowe, personal communication, November 4, 2003)

Rhatigan remembers that, "The president had his grief but it was not apparent in his conduct of business. He spoke very tenderly at the memorial service and did not falter" (J. Rhatigan, personal communication, November 13, 2003).

Funding of the memorial service, transportation of family members, and funerals was a significant issue. President Ahlberg decided early on to disregard the lack of identified funding and do what seemed to be the right things for the families. Within a matter of weeks, the idea of a fund-raising event was developed which resulted in "The Night of Stars." Seats were sold at $1,000 and each seat in the basketball arena was sold. Entertainers such as Minnie Pearl, New Christie Minstrels, Bill Cosby, and Flip Wilson volunteered, although Wilson and Cosby ultimately cancelled---something that is still resented by Rhatigan and Lowe (R. Lowe, personal communication, November 4, 2003).

The Night of Stars was the first opportunity Rhatigan and Lowe had to meet some of the parents and other family members of victims they had spoken with on the phone. Roger Lowe relates the following:

> You can kind of imagine how high the emotion was, but for those of us, Reidenbaugh and myself who had communications with those family members, and, Jim, I'm sure you had quite a bit yourself, when it came to the Night of Stars, and those people were there, and you then put a face to the name that you had talked to over the phone. It was enormously emotional. (R. Lowe, personal communication, November 4, 2003)

At this point, the voice of the vice president who dealt with the tragedy more than thirty years ago, breaks.

Within six weeks of the Wichita State crash, an aircraft carrying the Marshall University football team back to Morgantown, West Virginia, crashed near the Tri-state

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Airport, killing all aboard. The Night of Stars was being put together at the time, and President Ahlberg decided it was appropriate to invite Marshall University to participate and share in the funding. Jim Rhatigan relates,

> And so, right in the middle of that, six weeks later, was the Marshall crash, and so the President said the very next day, 'We can't have this. We can't have a national television telethon money raiser and not include Marshall.' (J. Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003)

Marshall did participate and share in the proceeds; however, "After the event was over, the interim president of Marshall called and said he wanted an audit of the finances to ensure they got their part of it. So, I always hoped he'd never become president anyplace," recalls Lowe, with some bitterness (R. Lowe, personal communication, November 4, 2003).

Roger Lowe was also responsible for the on-campus memorial that was built. There was concern that placing it in an area that was too conspicuous might not be the appropriate thing to do. A monument to a disaster might not be suitable as a campus centerpiece. Therefore, a relatively peripheral area of the campus was selected for the memorial site. Regardless, in the years to come, a main campus road would be built along side the monument area that highlights it to most visitors (R. Lowe, personal communication, November 4, 2003).

In the years after the WSU plane crash, Jim Rhatigan would make it a point to call other colleges to offer advice when disaster struck there. He and others called Marshall University after its airplane crash, and he believes they provided valuable lessons-learned that helped Marshall dealt with its own tragedy. He believes he was the first to call Texas

A&M to offer support after the Bonfire collapse, and he called President Halligan after the OSU plane crash (J. Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003).

Dr. Don Beggs, current President of Wichita State University, observed, "It is almost like a network. When you've had the accident, you try to help whoever has that episode. You try to help them get ready for it. And until it happens to you, you don't understand" (D. Beggs, personal communication, November 4, 2003).

In retrospect, the senior administrators of WSU who were a part of the response to tragedy in 1970 believe they did some things very well. They believe they took good care of the accident survivors and the families of the fatalities immediately after the event, and that was what they considered to be most important.

There are two things the senior leaders would change about how they dealt with the accident. First, they believe they did not pay enough attention to the impact the accident had on the football players:

> We realized later on that the culture of the football players was stoic, manhood, and all that. And we had unbelievable suffering by our football players we didn't address in even the most primitive manner, and we paid a real price for that. (J. Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003)

Secondly, and long after the fact, the senior leaders would have handled the survivors and family members as a group differently, with the president taking a central role. Wichita State University holds a memorial service every year on October 2nd and has a series of other events to remember the tragedy every five years. The presidents were always there, but they played no particular role. Rhatigan comments, "We try to observe it on October 2 and between 50 and 100 people always come and are predictable.

The same people with a few coming on and a few dropping off" (J. Rhatigan, personal

communication, November 4, 2003).

In 2000, the current WSU President, Don Beggs, decided to invite them to come

together as a group at his home,

> I just thought in my role it was my job to do something for them. We had done
>
> something about providing facilities, by encouraging, by being supportive, but we
>
> had not, as an institution, been involved. Individuals had, but not the institution.
>
> (D. Beggs, personal communication, November 4, 2003)

So, Beggs sponsored an "outdoor buffet" at his home to which the surviving

family members, teammates, and coaches of the 1970 football team were invited. It was

the first time the people had been together as a group "where they could all sit down and

talk to each other." The result was "phenomenal! It was probably the most dramatic

thing we did after this crash, as people met, ate, laughed, and cried together" (J. Rhatigan,

personal communication, November 4, 2003). Rhatigan remembers the following:

> The president would always attend these (memorial service) events, and so forth,
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> but this was the first time we ever had the president extend himself in a significant
>
> way. President Ahlberg just didn't know how to deal with it after it was over
>
> with. It was a terrible part of his life. But people that night (the outdoor buffet)
>
> actually said, to our just unbelievable surprise, 'We didn't realize the institution
>
> cared. We actually thought that they were hiding. Actually ashamed of the event,
>
> that they were hiding, as though it were an embarrassment to the institution. (J.
>
> Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003)
>
> President Beggs adds,

A bunch of us had those comments made, and it really surprised us. At least I thought the things that were going on, that I was told about, were very appropriate things. Allow people to have distance. You don't want to hover around a person who doesn't want it. (D. Beggs, personal communication, November 4, 2003)

In any case, the gathering of those who were most impacted by the tragedy appeared to be significantly beneficial for them even 30 years later.

President Beggs, Roger Lowe, and Jim Rhatigan believe most people view the campus memorial to the victims of the airplane crash in 1970 as a caring and supportive icon of an institution that remembers its past. But to those who lived the experience--as did Lowe, Rhatigan, and President Clark Ahlberg—it remained a painful reminder. Ahlberg would serve as WSU President for another 12 years, but the aircraft accident and its aftermath were the defining moments in his presidency. As Rhatigan says, "How you handle it will never be forgotten" (J Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003).

Jim Rhatigan closes with a sentiment that is identical to Halligan's perspective, "It never goes away. It's just a terrible part of my life" (J. Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003). That sentiment is the single most commonly shared observation by those involved with the tragedies at Oklahoma State University, Texas A&M University, and Wichita State University.

Chapter V

Theoretical Analysis

This chapter discusses the presidents' leadership with respect to the two

theoretical concepts previously discussed. First, the chapter examines the relationship

between the cognitive frames of reference of Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) and the

actual actions and perceptions of the presidents at each institution. The chapter also

discusses the degree to which individual frames of reference contribute to the presidents'

effective leadership during the crises. Secondly, the chapter identifies the more

significant leadership actions by the presidents as either instrumental or

interpretive/symbolic.

Leadership Response and Cognitive Frames of Reference

To understand which cognitive frames of reference are significant in a president's

response to a crisis or tragedy, it is helpful to understand those perspectives in the context

of non-crisis circumstances. Halligan's ability to perceive situations and issues through

multiple lenses is clear under both crisis and non-crisis situations.

Non-Crisis Context

The literature suggests a correlation between effective presidential leadership and

the ability to perceive events through multiple cognitive frames of reference (Bensimon,

1989). The literature also suggests that some cognitive frames of reference, specifically

the symbolic frame, correlate with the president's leadership effectiveness (Bolman &

Deal, 1991). Halligan's actions and perspectives of leadership reflect a president who is

cognitively complex in his ability to understand situations in terms of multiple realities. Indeed, the evidence suggests his cognitive awareness of people, symbols, and politics are highly developed.

Human Resource Frame.

First, Halligan's focus on interpersonal relationships was fundamental to his approach to creating a team orientation and commitment, listening to trusted staff, courting donors, hosting local citizens, and in creating rapport with students. It was through personal relationships that he believes he was most effective in achieving important milestones for the university and fostering a sense of community and optimism on the campus.

Additionally, his participatory style led others to believe that their actions and thoughts were important and would have an impact. The human resources frame focuses on human needs. Leaders who perceive issues through this frame value relationships and feelings (Bolman & Deal, 1991). Presidents who use a human resource or collegial frame seek participative decision-making and place emphasis on interpersonal skills, motivating others, and putting the interests of the institution first (Bensimon, 1989). These characteristics were strongly evident in Halligan's leadership practices.

Symbolic Frame.

Halligan's understanding and use of symbols were highly refined. He noted that symbols can be more important than substance, and his actions reflect an awareness of sending the right symbolic messages in everything he did. This included paying attention to the messages his persona projected as he walked around the campus. He was always careful to project the image that things were going well and optimism was appropriate.

Perhaps the most quintessential, cognitively complex practice of Halligan was his habit of taking baskets of cookies to various individuals. He used the occasion to recognize people and create personal relationships. At the same time, he created political alliances, and sent a powerful symbolic message that the president was interested in them and in their needs.

Bureaucratic Frame.

The bureaucratic frame was less evident in Halligan's perceptions. There is little evidence that he placed emphasis on a structural approach to framing issues and problems. To be sure, he used the structure effectively. He believed in getting input from his executive staff, having an inner circle of very trusted colleagues, and limiting the number of people who reported to him directly. His senior staff operated without detailed guidance. They were empowered to get the job done. His style of managing the bureaucracy of the institution worked for him and gave his staff room to work the issues. His philosophy of the institution's governing board role, "Noses in, fingers out," appeared to also apply to his own supervisory and administrative roles (Halligan Notes, 2003).

Political Frame.

President Halligan clearly was skilled in understanding and creating political alliances and believed that, "It is the way the really important work gets done. It is the process human beings use to make really important decisions" (Halligan Notes, 2003). He created alliances at every level and at every opportunity. Examples are the efforts he made to establish relationships with the editors of the student newspaper and leaders of student government as well as state elected officials and their staffs. Halligan also noted that the president's personal involvement in lobbying was extremely important.

Under traditional conceptualizations of a college president's role as senior manager, first among faculty equals, head fund raiser, political stakeholder, and symbolic leader, Halligan's leadership was effective by virtually any standard of excellence. His ability to perceive the institution, its issues, and its constituents from several frames of reference was fundamental to his ability to change the course of the institution in multiple dimensions. His ability to communicate to his senior administrative staff the importance of personal relationships, symbolic messages, and political alliances was central to their effective participation as well. The total personal commitment that he demonstrated to his staff was important, and perhaps indispensable, to sustaining a strong commitment from them. The comments, recollections, and descriptions of virtually all of the OSU participants support that assessment. A summary of the actions by Halligan that illustrate specific cognitive frames of reference in non-crisis scenarios is in Table 3.

Table 3

President Halligan's Non-crisis Leadership Actions

	Human Resource	Symbolic	Bureaucratic	Political
Halligan	- Participatory - Interpersonal - Empowered others - Commitment by example - Cookies	- Positive persona - Cookies	- Small inner circle - Decisive - Noses in-Fingers out	- Multi-Alliances -- News Editor -- Legislators - Lobbying - Cookies

When it came time to respond to a less-traditional concept of a president's role, the tragedy of January 27, 2001, Halligan's leadership reflected a similar ability to understand and communicate the event through multiple frames of reference and respond accordingly.

Crisis Context

Halligan's leadership during the crisis response of the aircraft crash reflects a level of cognitive complexity that is fundamentally unchanged from his approach in non-crisis situations. It reflects integration and differentiation of frames of reference at both organizational and personal levels.

Human Resource Frame.

First and foremost, the initial actions and guidance by Halligan reflect concern for the surviving people and establishment of a personal relationship with each of the families to "envelope" them in care. His guidance and standard for the response was for the university to "do the right thing by the families." His first action was to "go where the situation was worst." He and Coach Sutton, who had the closest relationship with those killed, personally notified the families (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003).

Indeed, throughout the crisis response and recovery, Halligan made caring for the families on a very personal level the guiding principle of the institutional response. He hosted them at his home. He visited their homes and played with their children. He took the lead in caring for the families to the extent that he virtually became a grieving family member himself. Some of his senior staff members think he may have became too involved for his own health and were worried about him. In any event, the hallmark of the president's leadership was an overwhelming personal caring for the surviving family members.

Symbolic Frame.

Secondly, Halligan took great care that the right and appropriate symbolic messages of concern and remembrance were part of the response and recovery.

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Memorials reflecting the significance of the lives of those killed were built at the crash site and at Gallagher-Iba Arena and included words provided by the families. Inviting the families to provide the words for portions of the memorial for each individual was significant. Instead of the monument being an OSU memorial for the ten people, it became a family memorial to their loved ones as well. Services were held at the campus and for the dedication of each memorial. Halligan spoke at each one and it was a painful experience for him.

Symbols and venues such as ribbons, a message of condolence board, designated site for flowers, and other mementos were created so that each person in the university community could share the grief and a commitment to remember with the families. Halligan went to the crash site in March, not because there was any practical merit for him to actually see the site and the aircraft wreckage, but because it was an important and appropriate symbolic gesture for him to go there.

Finally, it was an important symbolic gesture that the group that revised the OSU travel policy included surviving family members. It was also symbolically important that the NTSB report included the revised policy in its report and that the NTSB forwarded the revised policy to the NCAA President as a benchmark for other institutions. These acts symbolized a caring institution, one that is clearly committed to doing the right things. Through the use of symbols, the institution was able to carry the message of loss and grief to a much larger audience than was possible through personal relationships. Conversely, the symbols conveyed from a larger audience a sense of shared grief to the families themselves.

Bureaucratic Frame.

Halligan effectively used the existing university bureaucracy to respond to the crisis. The way he used it did not differ significantly from his normal operational practice. He assembled his senior team and with their input laid out a response and recovery plan. He tended to be heavily involved in the decision-making on the big picture issues, but empowered his senior administrative staff to work the details. He had a great deal of confidence in his team and they responded exceptionally well by all accounts. Halligan himself tended to do the things that resulted in symbolically enveloping the grieving families with caring and also establishing personal relationships with them to share their grief.

One form of bureaucratic structure that was appropriate for Halligan and his staff to use as part of a crisis management system was a crisis response plan. Crisis management systems consist of mechanisms and structures that help deal with crises and typically consist of an institution's plan, procedures, and organizational structures—such as a crisis management team (Mitroff, et al., 1996).

Some of the senior administrators erroneously believed that OSU had a crisis response plan in place in 2001, but that it was not used. In fact, there was no such plan in existence at that time. What was used in 2001 was a telephone roster or "tree" to make notification to the senior staff. Since then, OSU has developed a comprehensive plan (L. Bird, personal communication, October 13, 2003).

Virtually every senior administrator believes that a crisis response plan would not have been beneficial in the response and recovery, since the crisis was beyond the scope of planning. However, they misunderstand the value of having pre-established communications lines, recall procedures, coordination procedures, and various functional

area plans. For example, the entire notification process was disjointed. Notification of many of the senior staff came through subordinates or newscasts. Support staff seemed to operate effectively on instinct and on their own initiative, but not a pre-established plan.

Political Frame.

Certainly the alliances and political goodwill Halligan had previously developed were available to him and the institution during the crisis response and recovery. There is no indication that any new political alliances were developed.

There appears to have been none of the hallmarks of a political perspective such as negotiations, conflicts, or competition for resources or power between the president and other political entities within the context of the crisis response and recovery (Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997). However, Halligan did use some of the existing political coalitions. For example, invitations were extended to the governor and lieutenant governor to speak at the memorial service, and the governor offered his airplane to fly Bosserman and the others to the crash site. Existing political alliances were nurtured during the crisis, but the ability to perceive the crisis situation through the political frame was least significant to the crisis response and recovery.

Crisis Context: Secondary Cases

Data gathered from the secondary cases are less extensive, and deal only with leadership during the crisis contexts. However, the presidents' leadership at Texas A&M and Wichita State do inform the relative significance of different cognitive frames of reference in executing an effective crisis response and recovery.

In some important aspects, the presidential responses were shaped by significant differences from the Oklahoma State crisis situation. Wichita State's accident had

survivors. Texas A&M's not only had survivors but had students still at risk as well, and the accident was on the campus. These differences defined "where the situation was worst," and both presidents went first where the situation was the worst.

Institutionally, both Texas A&M and Wichita State set the families of victims and survivors as the top priority, and they were committed to it. During the recovery phase, both institutions established memorials, provided funding and counseling, offered education to siblings, and established a dialogue for meeting the needs of the families. The presidents of both institutions seemed instrumental in the decisions that drove those actions.

Human Resource Frame.

From a human resource frame of reference, Ahlberg at WSU either did not sense the importance of leading the caring for the families on a personal level, or he was not able to do it. The descriptions by Rhatigan and Lowe give the impression of a man who was deeply impacted by the tragedy. But Ahlberg apparently "was not an emotive man" in a manner that led the families and surviving players to believe he cared. As Rhatigan recalls, "He couldn't do it—and he knew it. It was just too hard." Consequently, surviving players commented, "Well, the president didn't seem to care" (J. Rhatigan, personal communications, November 4, 2003).

The consequence of Ahlberg's actions lends credence to the observation of Birdwell (personal communication, October 21, 2003), "If expressing the empathy and sympathy and grief of the university were not a priority of the president, not nearly so much would have happened to benefit the families or heal the university. The tone comes from the top."

Ultimately, it would be 30 years before the families and survivors would feel personally embraced by the institution, by the president, in the form of an outdoor buffet at the president's residence. Individual members of the institution would make those personal connections from the beginning, as did Rhatigan and Lowe, but without the president's personal relationship, families and survivors apparently felt estranged from the institution. As one noted, "We didn't realize the institution cared" (J. Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003).

Symbolic Frame.

From a symbolic perspective, each of the presidents established appropriate symbols for sharing grief and expressing the loss of the institution. Both presidents provided memorial services and monuments to the victims. They both presented statements to the media concerning the grief and sense of loss the institution shared with the families. Provisions were made at both universities to offer education benefits to surviving siblings and to fund travel to funerals. Personalized support was provided in the form of individual liaisons and counseling to grieving families.

At Texas A&M, Bowen decided not to cancel classes while injured people and bodies were still being removed from the Bonfire site. This decision was based on his belief that it would not be good to have 40,000 students with nothing to do but go to the disaster site. While this was a rational decision, it may have sent the wrong symbolic message. Similarly, his statement to the news media that he would resign if the independent investigation commission faulted the administration in any way was intended to divert any blame from the students. It did indeed divert blame, but the symbolic damage done to the president and the institution when he later did not resign was potentially significant.

Bowen's decision to create an archive of all information associated with the Bonfire was a practical decision, to be sure. It helped ensure the same information would be available to all inquiries, and that no misstatements would be made. It freed up the administration from managing individual requests for information. It was also a symbolic message that the institution and its administration had nothing to hide. When the independent investigation commission convened, the administration announced it would no longer discuss the Bonfire accident or any material in the archive. That sent another symbolic message. The independent commission was indeed independent. The university had no intention of influencing its work.

At the Wichita State accident scene in Colorado, Ahlberg's limited opportunity to personally interact with the grieving families was a symbolic message that the institution was not grieving with them. Ahlberg's non-emotive style and stable persona may have contributed to the perception. In any event, the president, the symbolic leader of the institution, did not effectively embrace the families and survivors.

Bureaucratic Frame.

Both presidents appear to have used the existing bureaucratic structures well and adjusted them to meet the needs of the crisis. Indeed, in both cases it seems the institutional bureaucracy made important and timely adjustments without direct guidance from the presidents.

President Bowen was not notified immediately due to the happenstance of an inoperative phone line at his residence. By the time he was notified, an operations cell had coalesced to provide security and communications. His Vice President for Administration was leading it. The immediate concerns of the families of victims and the survivors were handled by a "command post" over the course of 30 hours operated by

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Student Affairs. The rapid arrival of several highly qualified rescue units was a godsend to the immediate response to free trapped students and recover those fatally injured. Although the university had a crisis action plan, it was not used.

Over the course of the 30 hours, the situation was the worst at the Bonfire site, and before the searing eye of national news coverage as trapped students and bodies of victims were recovered. Bowen was at the site throughout and was the key representative to the national press. The most significant impact Bowen appeared to have on the bureaucratic response to the tragedy was later.

At a follow-up meeting of his senior staff, Bowen decided to establish another bureaucratic entity, an independent commission, to study the accident, against the advice of legal counsel. This, he concluded, was the right thing to do. Additionally, Bowen established an archive of all records associated with the Bonfire and made it available for any inquiry. This clearly established that the institution was responding to the incident with honesty and with a bureaucratic system to ensure that the integrity of the investigation was assured.

Similarly, Ahlberg immediately departed Wichita for the accident site and the local hospital where the survivors were taken. That was where things were worst. Consequently, much of the immediate response from the bureaucratic structure of Wichita State was without his direct guidance and oversight. The response was "decentralized." Ahlberg was kept informed by his senior administrators and did provide some guidance from Colorado, although communications were difficult. In his absence, his senior administrators established a command post and provided notification, counseling, and other considerations for the victims' families. They handled the media as

well. Wichita State also did not have a crisis response plan, except for one that dealt with student unrest. That plan was not used for the response.

At both institutions, the bureaucratic structure was able to operate during the crisis response without direct, detailed guidance from the presidents. Competent and motivated senior administrators acted to provide the necessary structural support for the crisis, even without a formal crisis response/recovery plan.

Both institutions were also able to effectively provide the organization and infrastructure for liaisons for the families, counseling, transportation, education for siblings, and other forms of administrative support. While these provisions are symbols of caring for the family members, they also reflect and require a bureaucracy that can execute effectively.

Political Frame.

The political frame of reference seems the least significant to the effective crisis response and recovery of the secondary cases, as it was in the primary case. Existing alliances were cultivated, as when Bowen and the governor spoke on the morning of the Bonfire collapse. Additionally, some actions on the part the presidents can be perceived from a political perspective, such as Bowen's request for a special commission and creation of an archive of Bonfire data and Ahlberg's invitation to Marshall University to join in the fund rising effort, Night of Stars. However, any political alliances were previously established and they appeared to play the least significant role in the way the presidents responded to the crisis events.

Summary of Significance of Individual Frames

Each of the cognitive frames of reference is relevant and has meaning in the context of a crisis situation. However, the ability to perceive issues and situations from

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the perspective of some frames appear to be more important for effective presidential leadership in the response and recovery from crisis.

The measurement of effective leadership is ultimately based on the priorities of the president and the institution: Does leadership result in the institution successfully achieving those things that are its highest priority? The top priority of Halligan and of Ahlberg was to take care of the families of the victims and do the right thing by them in memory of their lost loved ones.

The top priority of Bowen was also to take care of the surviving families. But early in the response, he had an additional and even higher priority of preventing additional loses by rescuing those trapped in the collapsed Bonfire. Because his arrival on the scene was delayed, and because a host of highly skilled professionals were actually orchestrating and executing the recovery of the injured, Bowen's leadership was not a factor in that aspect of the response. It seems clear that preservation of life would be the top priority for any president, but that did not apply for the crises Halligan and Ahlberg faced.

Human Resource Frame.

The human resource frame of reference is most suited for caring for people—the top priority. Halligan's response was framed primarily by a concern for the people who were impacted most. This was consistent with his focus in non-crisis scenarios but it was more intense in the aftermath of the airplane crash. It reflected his personality and belief in the importance of personal relationships, and it certainly played a key role in how the institution responded to the crisis. Indeed it provided the overall framework within which every aspect of the response and recovery was executed.

The response by Wichita State University was also oriented toward taking care of the families but the president was not successful in leading from a human resource perspective. His senior administrators did make individual human relations a priority but were not able to overcome the fact that the president did not. Consequently, individual family members did not feel "the institution" cared.

In order to effectively achieve the highest priority, providing care for the families and any accident survivors, a human relations perspective is imperative.

Symbolic Frame.

The symbolic frame of reference is also imperative. However, it is less imperative for the highest priority--taking care of the people most severely impacted in a crisis. Symbols are shorthand for communicating, for conveying meaning and establishing a common understanding. They provide the best way of communicating a message to the largest number of people for the longest duration. But symbols pale in comparison to personal interaction in caring for the people who are most severely impacted. Even symbolic gestures such as funding funerals and education for siblings are not as effective in caring for people. Symbols are effective in communicating to the world at large, the campus community, campus visitors, and anyone who happens to view them, but they cannot replace the caring that is directly conveyed through a personal relationship with a grieving family member or teammate.

Additionally, memorials and ribbons are symbols that allow people to share grief and demonstrate a sense of loss. Therefore, they are helpful to the larger community. They allow the larger community to demonstrate solidarity with the grieving families and friends. But, by and large, they are less helpful than interpersonal relationships to those most adversely impacted, especially in the short term.

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Bureaucratic Frame.

Effective bureaucracies are also critical in responding and recovering from crisis situations. However, effective bureaucracies are not built overnight. If an effective bureaucracy or structure is in place, the president will likely not get involved except to provide fundamental priorities and overarching guidance. That happened at OSU in the early morning meeting following the crash wherein Halligan made several key decisions. It happened at Texas A&M during a meeting wherein Bowen decided to ask for an independent commission—one of the most critical bureaucratic decisions made. Due to difficulties in communications with Ahlberg as he attended to the matters at the crash site, senior administrators at Wichita State modified the bureaucratic structure, and created a "command post," on their own volition.

If there are people still at risk of injury or death in a crisis situation, an effective use of bureaucracy becomes the most important frame of reference. That did not apply in any of the three cases under study. Even at Texas A&M, where there were people still in danger, the key bureaucratic structures and systems were provided by outside agencies and professionals. Those external bureaucracies and structures dealt with the emergency medical and rescue efforts. In none of the three crisis cases in this study did the president's guidance appear to be indispensable to the effective operation of the bureaucracy in its crisis response.

Political Frame.

A summary of the leadership actions of the three presidents in the crisis scenarios and specific cognitive frames of reference through which the actions can be perceived is in Table 4.

Table 4

Presidents' Actions in Crisis Scenario

	Human Resource	Symbolic	Bureaucratic	Political
Halligan	- Enveloped families - Provided Liaisons - Visited homes - Hosted families - Established relationships	- Memorials - Ribbons - Message Board - Visit to site - Included families in planning - Traveled to site	- Met with staff - Scholarships - Funded family expenses	- Invited Governor & Lieutenant Governor to memorial - Governor offered plane
Bowen	- Provided Liaisons - Group meeting of families prior to report	- Memorials - Ribbons - Media focal point - Included families in planning	- Met with staff - Requested Special Commission - Scholarships - Funded family expenses - Classes met - Set up archive	- Spoke with Governor - Requested Special Commission - Set up archive
Ahlberg	- Traveled to site - Met with injured - Provided Liaisons	- Memorial - Traveled to site - Met with injured	- Funded family expenses - Scholarships	- Invited Marshall University to join fund-raising venture

There were no explicit or overt areas in any of the three crises wherein a political frame of reference contributed to or inhibited an effective response. Nonetheless, political alliances were undoubtedly exercised during the course of the crisis event and in the aftermath.

In particular, at Texas A&M the potential for political factors to become involved in the crisis aftermath seem significant. Each of the institutions in the three crisis cases was eventually faced with litigation over the tragedy that visited its community. Due to the circumstances of the tragedy, Texas A&M University seems particularly vulnerable to plaintiffs who claim the institution was responsible for the loss of life that occurred.

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Without significant political capital and political alliances, it is conceivable that Bowen could have been in political trouble. He seems to have been particularly vulnerable following the independent commission's conclusion that a cause of the Bonfire collapse was inadequate oversight, when he had verbalized his intention to resign if that was a conclusion of the commission. In fact, it seems reasonable that political capital, the confidence that the Texas A&M Governing Board placed in him, allowed Bowen to remain as president.

Leadership Response: Instrumental or Interpretive/Symbolic

Many acts of presidential leadership reflect both instrumental and interpretive forms to different degrees (Birnbaum, 1992). Such is the case in crisis scenarios as well.

Each of the three presidents demonstrated instrumental leadership in non-crisis situations. Each displayed technical competence, experience, and judgment through effectively coordinating administrative activities, making rational decisions, meeting deadlines, representing the institution to others, and achieving goals through effective communication, administration, and management processes. Each of them demonstrated these skills in the crisis scenario as well.

Instrumental Leadership.

Presidential leadership in crisis situations is instrumental in nature. The president should ensure that the right actions are taken in response to a crisis. An adequate response and recovery cannot be based on human caring, relationships, and symbols alone. Efficient and effective actions in preventing further loss of life or damage to infrastructure and providing timely support of accident victims and their families are critical. Response activities must be effectively coordinated, communicated and

managed if the institution is to successfully maintain its good intentions and integrity to do the right things.

Good intentions without effective actions are inadequate if the institution is to respond and recover from a crisis. Indeed, the emotions and inherent stress of crisis response makes execution more difficult and more important than under more normal circumstances. However, it is possible for instrumental leadership to take place without direct input from the president. Good administrative staff leadership and teamwork can substitute. These observations are reinforced without exception in each of the crisis cases under study.

Interpretive/Symbolic Leadership.

There is no incongruence in concluding that presidential leadership in a crisis situation is also interpretive/symbolic in nature. Interpretive/Symbolic leadership emphasizes the management of meaning of situations and activities. When tragedy strikes, an institution's fundamental values and relationships are challenged and must be affirmed. What value does the institution place on people and how is it demonstrated? Is the institution a business, or is it family? Is a student a customer, or is he/she family? When members of the university community perish, or the institution is harmed in some catastrophic way, what does it mean for the institution? It appears that only the president can provide the leadership, communicate the meaning, and represent those things the university truly values. That meaning comes from the top.

The senior administrators of Oklahoma State University say that Halligan provided the key decisions within the first 24 hours that guided the response and recovery of the institution. The effective management of the institution's actions and the countless details to provide support for the family members fell largely to the senior administrators.

The experience and commitment of the senior administrators, and the team orientation Halligan engendered, enabled them to proceed from there. That is not to say Halligan was not involved further in the instrumental response, just that his broad guidance at the beginning shaped the response throughout the recovery process.

The senior administrators at OSU also say that the president framed the response and interpreted the meaning of the event for the institution such that the families, the other members of the university community, and outsiders as well knew that the university cared about its people and cared about things that mattered. It was Halligan's interpretation of the tragic event that most gave meaning to the institutional response in an extraordinarily personal way.

As a result, the commitment to remember Nate Fleming, Dan Lawson, Kendall Durfey, Will Hancock, Pat Noyes, Brian Luinstra, Jared Weiberg, Bill Teegins, Denver Mills, and Bjorn Falistrom will be fulfilled.

Chapter VI

Conclusions and Recommendations

Presidential Leadership

This study shows how presidents lead during periods of crisis. Additionally, the study relates leadership in crisis scenarios to concepts of presidential leadership in the traditional roles of the position. Existing literature is divided on the role of the president's leadership. Most presidents and former presidents contend that presidential leadership is indispensable to the direction and speed of the institution, and the president is largely responsible for both. Most importantly, they contend that the president has the power to match that responsibility.

Others, consisting primarily of scholars of leadership in higher education, contend the institution has the characteristics of an organized anarchy to the extent that the role of the president is largely interpretive/symbolic and that the concept of a "heroic" leader in the president's office results in false expectations and disappointments.

The president's importance in interpreting the meaning of things for the institution and using symbols to convey the meaning is irrefutable. However, interpreting meaning is only one manifestation of a president's power. Instrumental leadership, the ability to make things happen directly by making decisions, setting a course, providing guidance, managing people, and through other means, is at least as important to the institution. President Halligan's non-crisis leadership is possibly testament to what our expectations for the office should be.

Instrumental and Interpretive/Symbolic Leadership in Crisis Scenarios

Both instrumental and interpretive/symbolic leadership seem essential in a crisis scenario. It is important in those highly intense, time-critical situations that the president makes the right decisions and gets the right things done without fail and in a timely fashion. It is also important during those situations that the right messages and interpretations of events are provided by the president in an emotionally charged situation from which there also is no room for error.

For an effective response in getting the right things done, the cases in this study demonstrate that capable and committed senior administrators can respond without necessarily receiving detailed guidance from the president. Indeed, a crisis situation is not the time for micromanagement by the president. Time constraints do not allow it and there is too much that must be done immediately. An experienced and capable senior staff can respond effectively provided they know the priorities. Hopefully, the president has already communicated priorities such that the senior staff can take coordinated, effective action. Hopefully, the tone comes from the top well before a crisis situation develops.

In crisis cases where life or property continues to be threatened, such as the first 24 hours of the Bonfire scenario at Texas A&M University, instrumental leadership of an effective, well-coordinated response is most essential. It can indeed be a life or death proposition. Arguably, all else is insignificant by comparison. In the Bonfire crisis scenario, the life-saving structure came primarily from outside the university, but if that support had not been available, instrumental leadership of the institution would literally mean the difference between students living and dying.

If the threat to life and property has passed, such as in the crises involving Oklahoma State University and Wichita State University, an instrumental response is still necessary. It is necessary in order to effectively do the right things for those injured, the families of victims, and for the integrity of the institution. It is then that instrumental leadership results in timely and effective benefits for survivors such as scholarships for siblings, travel to funerals, changes to travel policies, and review of unsafe practices and traditions.

When the potential for additional loss of life or property has passed, it appears that an effective interpretive/symbolic response becomes more important to an effective response. It is then that the institutional response should be a symbolic and personal one as well. Interpersonal relationships and symbols are essential to not only express the meaning of the crisis to the institution for all to see and understand, but also to convey solidarity with grieving family members over the loss.

One approach that seems helpful is to establish those relationships at the earliest possible opportunity. In addition to personal contact with family members, it also seems beneficial to bring any surviving family members together as a group so a bonding between those who share individual loses can help them cope and understand that they are truly not alone.

Symbols cannot replace the human interpersonal response. Symbols are particularly inadequate to meet the needs of those most devastated by the crisis or tragedy. The interpersonal response is essential for survivors and family members to feel their loss is indeed shared by the institution. And, it is apparent from the Wichita State University scenario that only the president can effectively convey the sense of shared loss for the institution.

Presidential leadership in the aftermath is indispensable to an effective interpersonal response for the surviving family members and friends. Symbols, such as ribbons or memorials, demonstrate to a wider audience the significance and the meaning of the loss. They also provide comfort to the surviving families as visible manifestations of shared loss and commitments to remember, but not to the extent that people do, as representatives of the institution, through shared personal grief.

Consequently, the interpretive/symbolic leadership role of the president assumes secondary importance to the instrumental role of guiding the crisis during the response phase, particularly when life and/or property are still at risk. During the recovery phase, when the focus is on returning the institution to a more normal, pre-crisis existence, the interpretive/symbolic role of the president is more prominent in providing meaning that will comfort and endure. The president thereby pronounces what the institution holds most dear.

Cognitive Frames of Reference in Crisis Scenarios

Perceptions through each of the cognitive frames of reference are critical for a president to effectively lead during a crisis scenario, with the exception of the political frame. During a crisis or emergency, political forces subside. The entire community and each constituency tend to let the president respond. Although outside the scope of this study, it is reasonable to believe that political forces reemerge if the crisis response or recovery is flawed, or if the administration is deemed responsible for the crisis in some way that could not be absorbed.

The institutional response to a crisis will be largely determined by the leadership style and even the personality of the president. In the three cases under study, the highest

priorities dealt with caring for the families of the victims and maintaining the integrity of the institution. In all three cases, the best efforts of presidents were toward those ends.

One can only guess how the outcomes would have differed had, for example, President Halligan been the leader for the Wichita State University tragedy and President Ahlberg been the president for the Oklahoma State University accident, or if President Halligan had been at Texas A&M at the time of the Bonfire collapse. Similarly, if President Bowen had been persuaded by the Texas A&M legal representatives that the investigation commission should not be independent, the outcome and impact to the integrity of the institution might have been radically and irretrievably changed.

No matter what changes would have occurred with different presidents in the lead, it seems clear the response and recoveries would likely have been different, and perhaps significantly so. Presidential leadership was perhaps the overriding factor in framing the institutional response in each of the three cases.

Personal Toll

Compared to the non-crisis roles of the president, the demands upon a president when a crisis strikes is indeed the ultimate test. It may well be the standard against which a president's entire tenure will be measured. It will likely be the most stressful, harrowing, and demanding period of his or her life. It will forever change a president. It will similarly change the senior administrators who deal with it.

I did not anticipate the depth of personal anguish virtually every respondent expressed in dealing with the crises scenarios. Even the tragedy of the Wichita State University airplane crash, after more than 30 years, is a deeply emotional remembrance for the senior administrators who were involved there.

Without exception, the participants in this study responded that the experiences they had in dealing with crisis changed them forever. Suddenly, for those who remained in senior administrative positions, "the dance with the faculty seemed so trivial" (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2004). Virtually every person who was close to a crisis response and recovery expressed the sentiment of Rhatigan and Halligan. Rhatigan has carried the experience with him for more than 30 years and "it just never goes away" (J. Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003).

A university the size of Oklahoma State University suffers approximately seven to ten student fatalities a year. Texas A&M University had already experienced the deaths of 7 students by the late fall of 1999, before the Bonfire collapse: two of five people killed in a skydiving plane crash, one of six killed in a pickup rollover, three others killed in separate car accidents, and one suicide (Brown, Nov 20, 1999). Yet, the impact of those losses typically does not seem to be acknowledged by the institution in a meaningful way. They are personal losses for those who know the individuals, to be sure, but the institution hardly takes note.

However, when the losses occur all at once, it is a tremendous impact upon the institution and its people. Even people who did not know those killed are enormously affected. None of the presidents and few of the senior administrators personally knew the people lost in the crisis events. However, that did not lessen the personal impact to the people who responded to the crises. Many of them sought counseling in the aftermath. Many more perhaps should have.

Awareness of the responses that a president and an institution make when confronted with a crisis event is important. However, understanding and awareness of the toll it takes upon the president, senior administrators, and others is critical. The

personal toll upon the participants of this study in dealing with a crisis was an unforeseen but important issue.

Significance of the Study

Contribution to Knowledge

The study contributes to knowledge by identifying those cognitive frames of reference that are important to effective presidential leadership in the context of a crisis. Bolman and Deal (1991) reported that the effectiveness of a leader tends to be most associated with the symbolic frame of reference. In this study, the human resource and symbolic frames appeared to be most significant for effective presidential leadership, particularly in the recovery phase of the crises. In the recovery phase, leaders are likely to be involved with conveying the sense of loss to surviving family members on behalf of the institution. Additionally, they are more likely to make lasting commitments, both real and symbolic, to the surviving members.

Bolman and Deal (1991) also reported that the bureaucratic frame of reference was least identifiable with effective presidents but most identifiable with effective managers. Most of Bolman and Deal's (1991) scenarios and illustrations do not deal with crisis situations. None of them deal with the life and death issues university presidents may face. A bureaucratic perspective appears to be most important for the crisis response phase, particularly if lives or property are at risk. However, it is during the crisis response phase that an effective bureaucracy is most able to operate without presidential involvement. If an effective bureaucratic structure is in place, a well-qualified senior administrative staff can function without detailed guidance and oversight, but the senior staff must have an understanding of the priorities of the president. During the recovery

phase, an effective bureaucratic structure is necessary to follow through on commitments made to survivors.

The study also contributes to understanding the significance of instrumental and interpretive/symbolic presidential leadership during a crisis scenario. Both instrumental and interpretive/symbolic leadership are important in effectively managing a crisis. The importance of each kind of leadership varies with the circumstances of the crisis. For example, the circumstances define where the situation is worst and may demand that the president be relatively isolated from the bureaucratic structure that must respond to the crisis. This significantly reduces the instrumental leadership role of the president.

The personality of the president involved also appears to influence the relative importance of instrumental and interpretive/symbolic leadership. It appears that only the president can adequately represent the institution in some contexts that require interpretive/symbolic leadership. For example, surviving family members of the WSU tragedy did not feel the institution grieved when the president did not personally appear to be grieving with them.

Relevance to Policy

The president sets the tone before, during, and after a crisis. The study suggests that institutions and presidents must be prepared for crisis situations before they occur. Policies are also symbolic statements of priorities and values. They will help establish a tone before a crisis occurs. Higher education institutions should have policies in place that provide guidance and direction for efficient and effective response to crisis. Policies should address the full range of crisis management processes and activities. Crisis mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery procedures are all part of a comprehensive crisis management plan. Crisis management plans should also include

stipulations for crisis response teams or cells, crisis counseling, and coordination of plans with external law and safety organizations. The plans should be exercised regularly.

Crisis management plans from other types of institutions do not typically address the levels of caring and commitment that colleges and universities provide for surviving family members. Policy should recognize both the near-term and long-term commitments that typically accompany campus crises scenarios.

Use to Practitioners

The study contains important implications for practitioners. It provides insight into how a crisis affects the institution and its people. It suggests that a crisis event affects an institution more pervasively and deeply than just managing the event and its aftermath.

Perhaps the most significant implication of this study for practitioners is that a crisis event will not be just an intellectual challenge or activity that must be managed. It will affect the mind, body, and spirit. It will be a significant emotional event that may persist for many years to come. Personal counseling may be an important consideration for the president and senior administrators as well as for students and family members.

Recommendations for Further Study

The study raises issues and questions that are beyond the scope of its design but that demand consideration nonetheless. The readiness of a president to respond to a crisis is a relatively new concern. It is an area of responsibility that is still not typically considered in discussions of the role of the president. Without question, it is one of the most significant.

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Crisis Management Planning

Additional research is required to provide the most comprehensive and effective plans for dealing with crises involving higher education institutions. Plans developed by government and public safety agencies focus most heavily on crisis preparation, mitigation, and response phases that are devoted to preventing loss of life or property. These are important considerations for higher education as well. However, those plans do not focus upon the long-term recovery, which is a significant part of crisis management for a college or university.

Crisis management plans from government agencies provide a good departure point; however, colleges and universities have unique features that require creation of plans for crises tailored to them and their specific campuses. As we have seen, the president of a college or university is faced with a response and recovery phase that is tied much more extensively to the welfare of those deeply affected by a crisis and for a longer period of time. Our understanding of how best to prevent and mitigate such adverse and long-term effects is not fully developed.

Crisis Management Education

Leadership by the president during a crisis scenario is certainly more than just ensuring there is a crisis management plan. Most presidents progress through their careers and enter the presidency with no experience and no training for the eventuality of a crisis event.

A crisis situation is a learning experience. Therefore, after a crisis situation has been resolved, it is vital that the institutional leadership revisit and review their actions. Other institutions can learn from the experiences of those who experience a crisis as well. Conferences and workshops such as "Best Practices: Crisis Management Planning for

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Higher Education" which met in Oklahoma in August, 2002 are essential for generating a body of knowledge that will help institutions be prepared (Crisis Management Experts, 2002).

Personal Toll

Perhaps the subject most worthy of additional research is the issue of personal impact to presidents and other administrators when dealing with institutional tragedies. Presidents need to understand that the emotional strain upon them and their senior staff will be profound and they must be prepared to ameliorate the impact.

Presidential Leadership in Crisis Management

Our most significant voids of understanding continue to be in leadership in higher education. Indeed, there are voids in our understanding of leadership at every level of leadership: in basic leadership theory, in the traditional roles of the president, and in the president's role during a crisis scenario.

The evolution of basic leadership theory continues. We still have no comprehensive theory of the leadership phenomenon. Leadership in higher education is even less refined. We have no consensus of our leadership expectations for the president. The gap between what many scholars and practitioners believe about presidential leadership persists. This divide must be bridged if we are to have appropriate expectations for presidents. Additional research is clearly necessary.

Moreover, our understanding of presidential leadership during a crisis, the ultimate leadership challenge, is not as developed as our concepts of the traditional roles of the office. Comprehensive study of how a president leads in a crisis will have significant value to presidents and the institutions they lead.

The president of a college or university is responsible for a great deal even under normal circumstances. The demands of the job can be immense. A crisis scenario is a uniquely demanding circumstance that calls for the ultimate in leadership. For Drs. Jim Halligan, Ray Bowen, and Clark Ahlberg, the men who set the tone from the top, the ultimate challenge was arguably the most significant event in their respective presidencies. There is no question it was one of the most significant events in their lives. There is no question Jim Halligan speaks for all three presidents and a number of other administrators when he concludes, "I am sure someday it will diminish in intensity but it certainly has not…It's just there all the time. It's there all the time" (J. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003).

[1]   *Verstehen* is the infinitive form of the German "to understand". It is a

fundamental concept to interpretivism and contrasts to the explicative approach of

Erklaren which is "to explain," as through a cause-effect relationship. The concepts are

based upon the philosophy of the German social scientist Max Weber. Wilhelm Dilthey

contrasted Verstehen and Erklaren, proposing the natural reality and social reality were

fundamentally different kinds of reality and called for different methods into the

investigation of each (Crotty, 1998)

[2]   On one side of the "Great Divide" is the philosophical position

characterized by positivism and postpositivism. Positivism is based on the philosophy

of Aristotle, Bacon, Locke, Comte, and Kant that there is a method for studying both

the physical and social worlds that is value-neutral and provides cause-effect

explanations to a single, knowable reality. Postpositivism developed from 19th century

writers such as Comte, Mill, Durkheim, Newton, and Locke. Postpositivism also

acknowledges the existence of a single reality but contends that it can be known

imperfectly because of human limitations. Postpositivism continues the deterministic

philosophy in which causes probably determine outcomes (Creswell, 2003; Mertens,

1998).

On the other side of the divide is the philosophical contention that social

constructs and people define the social world and one cannot understand or explain

reality independent of the meaning that people within those constructs assign to those

constructs. The interpretivist/constructivist paradigm is based on phenomenology,

which defines experiences from the participants' perspective, and hermeneutics, which focuses on interpretive understanding or meaning. It is a socially constructed concept with no absolutes and no meaning outside of the human concept. Reality is multiple and relative.

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STREET ADDRESS   DATE
OWENS STATE University
CITY STATE ZIP

Dear President HAWKINS,

Congratulations on your retirement! The legacy of commit, service, and integrity with which you leave us, manifested in numerous outstanding achievements and successes for the Owens State University system, will not go away soon. You have shaped the course of the institution for many years and many people to come. As a doctoral student at Oklahoma State University, I understand just how truly fortunate Owens State University was to have you as their leader.

I write you this letter with the hope that you will be willing to offer your support to my dissertation research. My dissertation topic is in the broad area of presidential leadership in higher education. Specifically, I plan on researching the leadership role of the president during and in the aftermath of crisis or emergency situations involving members of the campus community, using as cases for study specific tragedies such as the collapse of the bonfire at Texas A&M University and the dormitory and fraternity fires at Seton Hall University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, respectively.

The central case study of the research effort will be one with which you are painfully familiar, the tragic airplane crash that resulted in the fatalities of ten members of our Owens State University family. You were the leader who framed the response on behalf of the University, a response based upon a sincere commitment to remember all that they meant to us. I believe the way the University, under your leadership, responded to that tragedy could serve as a guide for other presidents during similar circumstances. It could also help us to understand what constitutes effective leadership under the most difficult of circumstances.

I would like to contact you in the near future to explore your availability to participate in this research effort. Until then, please accept my heartiest congratulations on a career of service that has culminated in wonderful and lasting achievements for the Owens State University system.

Sincerely,

Randy Mills

DATE

MR./MRS/DR. PROSPECTIVE STUDY PARTICIPANT
STREET ADDRESS
CITY STATE ZIP

Dear PROSPECTIVE STUDY PARTICIPANT,

I write you this letter with the hope that you will be willing to offer your support to my dissertation research. As a doctoral student at Oklahoma State University, I have selected a dissertation topic in the broad area of presidential leadership in higher education. Specifically, I plan on researching the leadership role of the president during and in the aftermath of crisis or emergency situations involving members of the campus community, using as cases for study specific tragedies such as the collapse of the bonfire at Texas A&M University and the dormitory and fraternity house fires at Seton Hall University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, respectively.

The central case study of the research effort will be one with which you are very familiar, the tragic accident that resulted in the fatalities of ten members of the Owens State University family. You were involved in the crisis recovery phase of this event and helped the President frame the response on behalf of the University, a response based upon a sincere commitment to remember all that they meant to us. I believe the way the University responded to that tragedy could serve as a guide for other institutions during similar circumstances. It could also help us to understand what constitutes effective presidential leadership under the most difficult of circumstances.

I would like to contact you in the near future to explore your availability to participate in this research effort.

Sincerely,

Randy Mills

APPENDIX C--Research Participants:

Study Participant (Pseudonym):	Title	Role in Crisis Management	Role in Case Study
Owens State University Case			
President Hawkins	President, Owens State University	President, Primary Case	Key Participant
Dr. Kelley	Provost	Provost	Central Participant
Ms. Ethers	Secretary to the President	Support Staff	Support Information
Dr. Prather	Athletic Director	Senior Administrator	Support Participant
Ms. Banks	Director Counseling Services	Administrator	Central Participant
Dr. Bartley	Vice President, Administration	Senior Administrator	Central Participant
Dr. Kelly	Vice President, Financial Affairs	Senior Administrator	Support Information
Mr. P. Ellington	Chief, Campus Police	Administrator	Support Information
Ms. Watterby	Director, Public Affairs	Administrator	Central Participant
Captain Engels	Local Sheriff at Disaster Site	Local Official	Support Information
Dr. Bingley	Vice President of Student Affairs	Senior Administrator	Central Participant
Mr. Wilcox	Member, Board of Governors	Board Member	Support Participant
Dr. Farley	Chair, Faculty Council	Faculty Member	Support Information
Participant, Williams State University Case			
President Avery	President of Williams State University	President, Secondary Case	Key Participant in Secondary Case
Participant, Treller State University Case			
President Barlow	President of Treller State University	President, Secondary Case	Key Participant in Secondary Case

APPENDIX D--Prospectus and Information Sheet for Study Participants

Randy W. Mills
Ed.D student in higher Education Administration
Oklahoma State University
Prospectus and Information Sheet for Study Participants

Introduction: You are invited to participate in a doctoral dissertation research study. This prospectus and information sheet will provide you with information about the study and highlight the purpose and procedure of the research.

Purpose: The purpose of the study is to examine presidential leadership in the aftermath of tragedy through a case study during and following an institutional crisis and distinguish those leadership actions on the part of the president that appear to be effective or ineffective, instrumental or symbolic, and the perception of constituents of those actions.

Significance of the Study: This study has implications for future and current presidents. The research will discover and examine the leadership actions of a president in the aftermath of a tragic occurrence/crisis. It will help determine the impact of leadership actions and the overall impact of presidential leadership. The study will help institutions and presidents identify those actions that are effective or ineffective and will help prepare them for future tragedies.

Statement of Research Question: The research question is concerned with the role of presidential leadership in crisis management and recovery. What is the nature of effective presidential leadership in such circumstances?

APPENDIX E--Advisement and Consent for Participation in Research

Invitation to Participate: You are invited to participate in a research study. The following information is provided to give you information about the study and to describe your rights as a participant in accordance with the requirements of the Oklahoma State University Institutional Review Board.

Research Title: In the Wake of Disaster: The President's Ultimate Leadership Test.

Study Purpose: The purpose of the study is to examine a case of presidential leadership at a university during a crisis response and recovery scenario, the aircraft crash in January, 2001 that killed 10 people associated with the Oklahoma State University athletic department. The focus will be on the president's leadership actions and the perceptions of them by people associated with the scenario

Information and Study Parameters: Research will be conducted through a series of interviews. Interviewees will consist of the president emeritus of Oklahoma State University as well as presidents of two other institutions involved with similar crisis scenarios, executive-level administrators and other staff members, as well as other constituents of the University. To facilitate the gathering of data, interviews will be tape-recorded. Each participant has the option of requesting that his/her interview(s) not be taped. Data will be analyzed as it is collected so that it can be used in guiding further data collection. Once the data collection and analysis are completed, participants will be asked for feedback. The audiotapes will be destroyed after the dissertation is filed and data gathered from the study will be securely stored and kept confidential.

Benefits: This study has implications for current and future presidents. The research will examine the leadership actions of a president in the aftermath of a tragedy. It will help determine the impact of leadership actions and the overall impact of presidential leadership. The study will help institutions and presidents identify those actions that are effective or ineffective and will help prepare them for future tragedies.

Confidentiality: All notes and recoded data will be kept confidential and in the possession of the researcher. Every effort will be made to provide confidentiality. If names are used in the final report, they will be in pseudonyms or the individual will be referred to in terms of group or constituent membership, such as "senior administrative official." No participant will be identified by specific administrative position unless full disclosure is authorized by that participant. The research may be submitted for presentation at a professional conference or for journal publication.

Due to the nature of specific scenarios involving presidents, specific tragedies/crises discussed in the study can be linked with specific universities, presidents, and other participants. Consequently, anonymity cannot be guaranteed. However, participants will be explicitly informed of this through the consent form.

Contact: If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, you may contact the researcher, Randy Mills at 2026 Iba Drive, Stillwater, OK 74074; phone:

(405) 385-0086; email: millsfamily2@aol.com or millsrw@okstate.edu. You may also contact the advisor to the research: Dr. Edward L. Harris, 308 Willard Hall, Stillwater, OK, 74078; telephone, (405) 744-7932; email: elh@okstate.edu. Questions about your rights as a participant in this project may also be directed to the Institutional Review Board, Sharon Bacher, Executive Secretary, 415 Whitehurst, Stillwater, OK 74074, telephone: (405) 744-5700.

Participation: Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may decline to participate without penalty. If you decide to participate, you may withdraw from the study at anytime. If you withdraw from the study before data collection is completed, your data will be destroyed immediately.

Consent for participants who agree to be identified in research reports: The following statements of consent reflect your decision with respect to permission for the research to use your real name in reports that are produced from this study and to have your comments audio-tape recorded:

Statement of Consent

PART 1: Please sign one of the following statements:

I acknowledge receiving a copy of the <u>Advisement and Consent for Participation in Research</u> form/statement. I have read and understand the consent section and I agree to participate and <u>AGREE</u> to be identified in reports that are produced from this research study.

_____   _____
Participant's Signature   Date

I acknowledge receiving a copy of the <u>Advisement and Consent for Participation in Research</u> form/statement. I have read and understand the consent section and I agree to participate <u>BUT DO NOT AGREE</u> to be identified in reports that are produced from this research study. Please use either a pseudonym or classification category in reports that are generated from this study.

I understand that, due to the nature of specific scenarios involving presidents, specific tragedies/crises referred to can be linked with specific universities, presidents, and other participants. Consequently, anonymity of participants cannot be guaranteed. I understand that I may also decline to answer any questions or provide partial answers to questions.

_____   _____
Participant's Signature   Date

PART 2: Please sign one of the following statements:
I agree to participate <u>AND AGREE</u> to the audio-tape recording of my comments:

_____   _____
Participant's Signature   Date

I agree to participate <u>BUT DO NOT AGREE</u> to the audio-tape recording of comments:

_____   _____
Participant's Signature   Date

If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, you may contact the researcher, Randy Mills at 2026 Iba Drive, Stillwater, OK 74074; phone: (405) 385-0086; email: <u>millsfamily2@aol.com</u> or <u>millsrw@okstate.edu</u>. You may also contact the advisor to the research: Dr. Edward L. Harris, 308 Willard Hall, Stillwater, OK, 74078; telephone, (405) 744-7932; email: <u>elh@okstate.edu</u>. Questions about your rights as a participant in this project may also be directed to the Institutional Review Board, Sharon Bacher, Executive Secretary, 415 Whitehurst, Stillwater, OK 74074, telephone: (405) 744-5700.

APPENDIX F--Interview Protocol: Biographical

1. Name:

2. Telephone:

3. email:

4. Education:

5. Title/position at the time of the crisis:

6. Years associated with the University:

7. Relationship to president:

8. Experience with crisis management/response:

APPENDIX G--Interview Protocol: Presidents

Leadership Background and Perspectives:

1. How would you describe your philosophy of leadership as the president?
2. What are the things of which you are most proud in your tenure as president?
3. In those instances where you believe you were effective as a leader, to what do you attribute your effectiveness as president?
4. If there were instances in which you believe you were ineffective as a leader, to what do you attribute that ineffectiveness?
5. Describe the most significant leadership challenges you encountered as president?
6. How did you deal with them?
7. When do you seek input from each of the following: governing board, executive group, deans, faculty council or faculty members, students, local or state officials?
8. Describe any previous experiences in crisis/emergency or tragic occurrences?

Leadership in Crisis Response: First Session

1. What are your memories from the day of the accident?
2. Describe what you were doing when you first learned of the crisis.
3. What were your first thoughts after learning of it?
4. What were your first actions and priorities?
5. What directions did you give?
6. What suggestions did others make?
7. Whom did you seek out or call?
8. To what extent did you rely upon the existing institutional structure?
9. Did any of the relationships of your administrative staff change over the course of the crisis response? In other words, did you grow to rely more on some colleagues over time and less on others?
10. What contact did you have with constituencies outside your immediate staff? (e.g., family members of the victims, board members, students, faculty)?
11. What do you think was done well in responding to the crisis?
12. What changes would you now make in the response?
13. In what ways was the leadership style you used during the crisis response different from your normal leadership style?

Leadership in Crisis Recovery: Second Session

1. In the weeks and months following the memorial service and funerals for the victims, what were your concerns with respect to the tragedy?
2. What actions did you take?
3. What directions did you give?
4. What suggestions did others make?
5. Upon whom did you rely?
6. What contact did you have with family members of the victims?
7. What do you think was done well in recovering from the crisis?

8. What changes would you now make in the recovery effort?
9. In what ways was the leadership style you used during the recovery different from your normal leadership style?
10. What are your thoughts on the long-term impact of the tragedy upon the University?

APPENDIX H--Interview Protocol: Administrative & Other Participants
(Where applicable, questions prefaced with "To the extent that you could observe...")

1. How would you describe the president's philosophy of leadership?
2. What are the things of which you believe the president is most proud about his presidency?
3. To what do you attribute his effectiveness as president?
4. In those instances where you believe he was ineffective as a leader, to what do you attribute the ineffectiveness?
5. Describe some of the most significant leadership challenges you believed the president faced?
6. How did he deal with them?
7. Describe any previous experiences in crisis/emergency or tragic occurrences?

Leadership in Crisis Response: First Session

1. What are your recollections from the day of the accident?
2. Describe your overall role in the response to the crisis.
3. What you were doing when you first learned of the crisis.
4. What were your first thoughts after learning of it?
5. What were your first actions and priorities?
6. What thoughts or directions did the president give?
7. Whom did he seek out or call?
8. What suggestions did others make to him?
9. Upon whom did he rely?
10. What contact did he have with constituencies outside his immediate staff? (e.g., family members of the victims, board members, students, faculty)?
11. What do you think was done well in responding to the crisis?
12. What changes would you now make in the response?
13. In what ways was the leadership style the president used during the crisis response different from his normal leadership style?

Leadership in Crisis Recovery: Second Session

1. In the weeks and months following the memorial service and funerals for the victims, what were the president's concerns with respect to the tragedy?
2. What actions did the president take?
3. What directions did he give?
4. What suggestions did others make?
5. Upon whom did he rely?
6. What contact did he have with family members of the victims?
7. What do you think was done well in recovering from the crisis?
8. What changes would you now make in the recovery effort?
9. In what ways was the leadership style the president used during the recovery different from his normal leadership style?

10. What are your thoughts today on the tragedy and the long-term impact upon the president and the University as a whole?

Oklahoma State University
Institutional Review Board

Protocol Expires: 9/23/2004

Date :   Monday, March 29, 2004

IRB Application No   ED0425

Proposal Title: University Presidents and Their Leadership: Crisis Scenarios at Institutions of Higher Learning

Principal
Investigator(s) :

Randy W. Mills
201 ATRC
Stillwater, OK 74078

Edward Harris
308 Willard
Stillwater, OK 74078

Reviewed and
Processed as: Expedited

Approval Status Recommended by Reviewer(s) : Approved   **Modification**

Please note that the protocol expires on the following date which is one year from the date of the approval of the original protocol:

Protocol Expires: 9/23/2004

Signature :

Carol Olson

Monday, March 29, 2004

Carol Olson, Director of University Research Compliance

Date

Approvals are valid for one calendar year, after which time a request for continuation must be submitted. Any modifications to the research project approved by the IRB must be submitted for approval with the advisor's signature. The IRB office MUST be notified in writing when a project is complete. Approved projects are subject to monitoring by the IRB. Expedited and exempt projects may be reviewed by the full Institutional Review Board.

VITA

Randy Wayne Mills

Candidate for the Degree of

Doctor of Education

Thesis: University Presidents and their Leadership: Crisis Scenarios at Institutions of Higher Education

Major Field: Higher Education Administration

Biographical:

   Personal Data: Born in Yadkinville, North Carolina, on August 1, 1947

   Education: Graduated from Yadkinville High School, Yadkinville, North Carolina, in June, 1965; received a Bachelor of Science degree in Mathematics from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina in June, 1969; received a Master of Public Administration degree from the University of Colorado, Colorado Springs, Colorado, in December, 1978; completed the requirements for the Doctorate of Education degree with a major in Higher Education Administration at Oklahoma State University in May, 2004.

   Professional Experience: As a member of the United States Air Force, served as faculty member of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1984-1985; commander of the 72nd Air Base Wing (1991-1996), and as department chairman and professor in Department of Aerospace Studies, The Ohio State University, 1996-1999.

   Professional Membership: American Educational Research Association; Association for the Study of Higher Education; Phi Kappa Phi.