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    ASSEMBLY ROLL-CALLS, 1950-1971.

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AN ANALYSIS OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY ROLL-CALLS,

1950-1971

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

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degree of

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BY

JOHN KUO-CHANG WANG

Norman, Oklahoma

1977

UNITED NATIONS VOTING ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION:

AN ANALYSIS OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY ROLL-CALLS,

1950-1971

APPROVED BY

Oliver Benson

A. E. Sennest

Hugh G. MacNiven

V. Stanley Vardys

Paul A. Tharp Jr.

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

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1951-1971

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Research Problem

The problem of Chinese representation in the United

Nations first arose in 1949 as a result of the Communist

takeover of mainland China. Since the Communists had not

destroyed the Nationalist regime, which had entrenched itself

on the island of Taiwan, there were two governments, each of

which claimed the Chinese seat in the United Nations. How-

ever, there were no provisions in the UN Charter with respect

to the representation of governments. Thus, the issue was

an item that appeared repeatedly on the agenda of the UN

General Assembly until the end of 1971.

Because of the Cold War and the Korean War with

Chinese Communist intervention, the Nationalist Government of

China, supported by the United States and her allies, was

able to continue its participation in the United Nations as

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the government of the whole of China. Although the Soviet
bloc strongly supported the representation of Peking, the
Communist Government of China was excluded and even once
became an outlaw (aggressor) by UN resolution.

The subject, "China and the United Nations," has
been a favorite for students of both Chinese foreign policy
and United Nations affairs ever since the establishment of
the Communist regime on October 1, 1949. However, after
reviewing the literature, this writer has found that most
such research has been devoted to the subject of Communist
China's attitude or policy toward the United Nations, or to
legal analysis of the representation problem. One aspect of
the subject seems to have received very little attention -
namely, the analysis of roll-calls on Chinese representation
in the UN General Assembly.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the voting
behavior of the UN members in dealing with the issue of
Chinese representation. A second purpose is to measure the
cohesion and impact of the UN caucuses in the voting on
the Chinese representation issue. The variables that in-
fluenced the UN members' voting behavior will be examined,
with a view to further understanding the UN voting coalitions
on this Cold War issue. Furthermore, this study will also
examine the development of the UN toward the concept of
universality, with the seating of the Communist Government

of China in the Organization as the most significant incident
to be involved in that movement.

Working Hypothesis

The main feature of international relations in the
post World War II years has been bipolarization. World poli-
tics in the United Nations has been based upon a political
system in which the two power blocs, the Western and the
Communist, are analogous to two parties which compete for
the favor of the uncommitted "voters". Each party, including
a leader (U.S.A. vs. U.S.S.R.), and supported by its loyal
party members or "partisans," tries to convince voters that
it is best able to fulfill the voters' needs and respect their
normative prescriptions.[1] However, this bipolarity in terms
of East-West issues has been accompanied by a growing multi-
plicity of interests and of voting successes on the part of
different voting groups. This change has been largely due to
the enlargement of the UN membership. Thus, the United
Nations has been moving from a "tight" to a "loose" bipolar
system.

The influence of the two most powerful members of
the Assembly was of critical importance in determining the

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[1]Bruce M. Russett, "Toward a Model of Competitive
International Politics," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 25,
No. 2 (May 1963), pp. 227-28.

outcome of votes on Chinese representation. One would assume that most nations vulnerable to the exercise of influence by the United States or the Soviet Union should have been found to vote accordingly. In contrast, nations not particularly vulnerable to great power influence, such as the Afro-Asian countries, should have divided their votes much more randomly. It is here that aid and trade should have played an important role.

Research Design

A number of studies of General Assembly roll-calls exist in the literature. Two early studies by Ball[2] in 1951 and Chamberlin[3] in 1958 are concerned primarily with the voting solidarity within pre-existing groups. This is also true of Thomas Hovet's book, Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960). All of these are primarily verbal discussions of political alignments in the General Assembly, with descriptive statistical tables and graphs.

Beginning with Rieselbach's examination of "Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behavior in the UN General

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[2]M. Margaret Ball, "Bloc Voting in the General Assembly," International Organization, Vol. 5, No. 1 (February 1951), pp. 3-31.

[3]Waldo Chamberlin, "The North Atlantic Bloc in the UN General Assembly," Orbis, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter 1958), pp. 459-73.

Assembly,"[4] appearing in 1960, UN voting studies became much more preoccupied with methodology. The result is a vastly increased sophistication of statistical analysis that often overshadows concern for substance. The Rieselbach article proposed scalogram analysis, bloc analysis, indices of cohesion and likeness, and Guttman scale analysis. Arend Lijphart criticized other mathematical methods and recommended a particular one, the Rice-Beyle method to deal with abstentions in voting.[5]

Statistical sophistication in the identification of UN voting groups was carried out yet further by Alker and Russett through the use of factor analysis.[6] Rowe effectively used roll-call voting data on a number of colonial questions to demonstrate the growth of an anti-colonial consensus within the United Nations.[7] In an otherwise

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[4]Leroy N. Rieselbach, "Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behavior in the UN General Assembly," International Organization, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Spring 1960), pp. 291-304.

[5]Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," American Political Science Review, Vol. 57 (December 1963), pp. 902-917.

[6]Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965).

[7]Edward T. Rowe, "The Emerging Anti-Colonial Consensus in the United Nations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 1964), pp. 209-230.

traditional discussion of UN politics, Kay resorted to voting analysis to show the bloc alignments and growing political influence of new nations in the Assembly.[8]

Charles F. Wrigley used agreement analysis in the study of decision-making in the UN General Assembly.[9] Factor analysis as a method for delineating voting blocs and issue clusters has been used most effectively by Hanna Newcombe and others in the study of UN voting patterns,[10] following the rules of Wrigley in dealing with resolutions which were voted on in parts. Frederick H. Gareau used indexes similar to the Rice index of cohesion to study the Cold-War cleavages as seen from the General Assembly roll-calls, 1947-1967.[11] Edward T. Rowe devised a method for

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[8]David A. Kay, "The Politics of Decolonization: The New Nations and the United Nations," _International Organization_, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Autumn 1967), pp. 786-811; Kay, "The Impact of African States on the United Nations," ibid., Vol. 23, No. 1 (Winter 1969), pp. 20-47.

[9]Charles F. Wrigley, "Toward an Orderly System for International Decision-making: The Experience of the United Nations General Assembly," _Peace Research Society_ (International), _Third Conference_ (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, November 1965).

[10]Hanna Newcombe, et al., "United Nations Voting Patterns," _International Organization_, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter 1970), pp. 100- 121.

[11]Frederick H. Gareau, "Cold War Cleavage as Seen from the United Nations General Assembly: 1947-1967," _The Journal of Politics_, Vol. 32, No. 4 (November 1970), pp. 929-68.

calculating a "margin-of-support" score to measure the extent of support given to the United States on Cold-War issues by other UN members, as well as using the index of agreement suggested by Arend Lijphart to show the degree of vote similarity between any two nations in the UN on Cold-War issues.[12] In a 1971 article, Jack E. Vincent analyzed the four voting dimensions in the 1961 UN General Assembly.[13] With fourteen independent variables measuring several societal and governmental attributes of nations, he used the canonical correlation technique to determine which of the fourteen variables provides "the best overall predictor of the voting scores."[14] His conclusion is that economic development is by far the most important predictor.[15] In a subsequent study, he elaborated on the analysis, and arrived at the same conclusion.[16]

[12]Edward T. Rowe, "The United States, the United Nations, and the Cold War," International Organization, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter 1971), pp. 59-79.

[13]Jack E. Vincent, "Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly," American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 2 (June 1971), pp. 471-98.

[14]Ibid., p. 490.

[15]Ibid., p. 495.

[16]Jack E. Vincent, "An Application of Attribute Theory to General Assembly Voting Patterns, and Some Implications," International Organization, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Summer 1972), pp. 551-82.

However, most of the voting studies mentioned above
involved the analysis of UN voting behavior concerning a
number of issues. So far as the China issue is concerned,
there have been three studies of the UN votes on Chinese
representation. One was Sheldon Appleton's, The Eternal
Triangle? Communist China, the United States and the United
Nations (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University
Press, 1961), Chapter V. In this chapter, Appleton projected
the UN votes but with error on Chinese representation by the
combined alliance and trade indices. The other study was
Sydney G. Bailey, Chinese Representation in the Security
Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations
(Sussex, U.K.: Institute for the Study of International
Organization, 1970). In this monograph, Bailey simply
recorded the votes of Member states from 1961 to 1970 and
classified them by six groups: West, Eastern Europe, Asia,
Arab States, Tropical Africa, and Latin America and Caribbean.
No statistical analysis was involved in Bailey's monograph.
The most recent study was an article by Eugene J. Alpert and
Samuel J. Bernstein on U.S. foreign aid and the admission of
Peking into the United Nations.[17] Alpert and Bernstein used a
decision matrix which identified the proportion of nations

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[17]Eugene J. Alpert and Samuel J. Bernstein, "Inter-
national Bargaining and Political Coalitions: U.S. Foreign
Aid and China's Admission to the U.N.," The Western Political
Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2 (June 1974), pp. 314-27.

voting yes, no, or abstain on the Chinese representation question, 1961-68, given the receipt of aid from the United States and the Soviet Union. It was an analysis between two variables.

Since this dissertation research deals with only one issue - Chinese representation in the United Nations - covering more than twenty years, it will be a longitudinal study of General Assembly roll-calls on the problem. Therefore, this investigation will involve not only legal and statistical analyses, but also political history. In order to be comprehensive, the problem must be investigated with both qualitative and quantitative methods.

Historical Study in Terms of Qualitative Variables

The dependent variable in this study is Chinese representation in the United Nations, as shown in the roll-calls in the General Assembly. During the 1950's the issue was whether or not to consider the Chinese representation problem. During the 1960's the China issue became one of whether it was an important question under Article 18 of the Charter; and, further, whether it was merely a procedural credentials problem to seat the Communist Government and to remove the Nationalist Government. Finally, in 1971, the United States proposed a dual representation resolution, which would have seated both Chinese governments, Nationalist and Communist. The Resolution, due to circumstances, was

never voted on by the General Assembly.

This study will investigate the voting behavior of the UN members on the China issue chronologically in terms of the following qualitative variables:

1. U.S. policy toward China;

2. Korean War and Peace-loving requirement;

3. Membership in U.S. or U.S.S.R. alliance groups;

4. Chinese governments' attitudes toward the UN;

5. International conflict between Communist China and other nations, as well as the turmoil on the China mainland;

6. Government changes and foreign policy;

7. Norms of regimes supporting the positions of the two superpowers, as well as the two Chinese governments; and

8. Acceptance of the principle of universality of UN membership and the dual representation proposal.

Tables, scalograms, and time series graphs are used to map and present the data to indicate the cohesion and vicissitudes of the voting competition.[18]

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[18]Oliver Benson, _Political Science Laboratory_ (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1969), Chapters 3 and 7.

Multiple Linear Regression Analysis Based on Quantitative Data

The dependent variables in this analysis are the roll-calls of the General Assembly with regard to the three China issues; namely, postponement of consideration, recognition as an important question, and position on the question of whether to seat the Peking government and remove the Taipei government. Quantification for General Assembly voting over time on these three separate issues of China's seat are coded as follows:

Score 1 for a pro-Nationalist Government of China vote;

Score 0 for a pro-Communist Government of China vote;

Score .5 for abstention or absence, due to the fact that it is equally helpful or harmful to each contender.

Since aid, trade and diplomatic recognition are often used by nations as tools of foreign policy, these are used as the independent variables in the regression analysis. They are quantified as follows:

1. Diplomatic recognition of one of two Chinese governments (dummy variable), coded 1 (yes) or 0 (no);

2. Foreign aid to the UN members from the two Chinese governments. The Nationalist foreign aid is coded as "ever received" (coded 1) or not (coded 0),

because it was basically agricultural and technical know-how; while that of the Communist is in millions of US dollars;

3. Per capita economic aid to the UN members from the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is used so as to measure the political leverage of economic aid more accurately;·

4. Foreign trade of UN members with the two Chinas as well as with both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is in millions of US dollars.

As Thomas Hovet, Jr. stated, the UN bloc or "caucusing groups are the main political-interest groups that operate in the Assembly and are involved in behind-the-scene negotiations on most of the crucial issues."[19] Therefore, they are also be used as an independent variable in the regression analysis. Since there is an overlapping of membership between the UN caucuses, this writer follows Hovet's classification[20] with revision by assigning each UN member to one of the following UN caucuses (dummy variables):

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[19]Thomas Hovet, Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 32.

[20]Thomas Hovet, Jr., Africa in the United Nations (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963), pp. 17-18.

UN Caucuses	Code
Soviet Caucusing Bloc	1 for in-group member 0 for out-group member
Latin American Caucusing Group	1 or 0
Arab Caucusing Group	1 or 0
Commonwealth Caucusing Group (excluding Afro-Asian members except Malaya)	1 or 0
Western European Caucusing Group	1 or 0
Asian Caucusing Group	1 or 0
African Caucusing Group	1 or 0
Non-Caucusing Group Members	9 (missing data)

The OSIRIS III Statistical Package[21] is used to generate both standard and stepwise regression between one dependent variable and the independent variables, as well as their combinations through index construction. This analysis thus can determine the contribution of each quantified variable to the coefficient of determination. This analysis will allow the reader to know the percentage of the variance in the UN voting on Chinese representation which can be explained by each of the quantitative independent variables.

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[21]Michigan. University. Institute for Social Research, OSIRIS III: An Integrated Collection of Computer Programs for the Management and Analysis of Social Science Data, Vol. 1 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: 1973).

Data Base

Sources of information for data collection of the
dependent variable are the UN Yearbook for the years 1950-
1971, while those for the quantitative independent variables
are as follows:

1. Diplomatic recognition data are taken from Byron
   S. J. Weng, Peking's UN Policy: Continuity and
   Change (New York: Praeger, 1972), Appendix B,
   pp. 232-35.

2. Foreign aid data for both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.'s
   per capita economic aid to foreign countries are
   taken from Charles L. Taylor and Michael C.
   Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social
   Indicators (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
   Press, 1972), pp. 360-65.
   The data on economic aid from Communist China
   is from: (1) Kurt Muller, The Foreign Aid
   Programs of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China
   (New York: Walker & Co., 1964), pp. 234-37, and
   (2) Milton Kovner, "Communist China's Foreign
   Aid to Less-Developed Countries," in U.S. Congress,
   Joint Economic Committee, An Economic Profile of
   Communist China (Washington, D.C.: Government
   Printing Office, 1967), Vol. 2, p. 612. Foreign
   aid data from Nationalist China are obtained from

Sino-African Technical Cooperation Committee,
<u>Sino-African Technical Cooperation</u> (Taipei, Taiwan:
October 1971), p. 71.

3. International trade data for both the U.S. and
the Republic of China (Taiwan) are from the　　 .
<u>UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics</u>,
1955-1968, with the latter's figures to be
converted into US dollars based on the exchange
rate provided by I.M.F. <u>International Financial
Statistics</u>, 1957-1968. The Soviet Union trade
data are from Appendix Table 4 of James R. Carter,
<u>The Net Cost of Soviet Foreign Aid</u> (New York:
Praeger, 1969). The trade figures of Communist
China are from Table A3, Appendix to Part III in
Jerome Alan Cohen, et al., <u>China Trade Prospects
and U.S. Policy</u> (New York: Praeger, 1971).

4. UN caucusing groups data are from the following
two books and supplemented by this writer:
(1) Thomas Hovet, Jr. <u>Bloc Politics in the United
Nations</u> (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1960), pp. 30-32, (2) Thomas Hovet, Jr.,
<u>Africa in the United Nations</u> (Evanston, Ill.:
Northwestern University Press, 1963), pp. 17-18.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND OF THE REPRESENTATION PROBLEM

From the very beginning, China or The Republic of
China (ROC) was represented in the United Nations by the
Nationalist Government as a founding member and a permanent
member of the Security Council. Because of the Civil War,
the Nationalist Government was forced from the mainland to
Taiwan by the Communists in December 1949. The People's
Republic of China (PRC) represented by the Communist Govern-
ment was established in Peking on October 1, 1949. On the
next day, the U.S.S.R. recognized the Peking regime as the
legal government of China, and withdrew its recognition of
the Nationalist Government. General N. Roskin, former Soviet
Ambassador to the Nationalist Government, was appointed as
first U.S.S.R. Ambassador to Peking.[1] In reply to the Soviet
action, the U.S. State Department issued a statement two
days later, reaffirming American recognition of the Nationalist
Government of China.[2]

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[1]William L. Tung, The Political Institutions of
Modern China (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. 240.

[2]Ibid., p. 216.

The Communist states immediately followed the Soviet lead to recognize Peking.[3] Due to the fact that the Asian countries bordering mainland China wanted to maintain cordial relations with their giant neighbor, as well as the impact of British attitude toward early recognition of the PRC,[4] they were among the first group of nations to recognize the Communist regime in Peking.[5] The United Kingdom recognized the Communist Government in Peking and withdrew its recognition of the Nationalist Government in Taipei on January 6, 1950 because the British wanted to protect their business interests on the China mainland as well as their colonies of Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore so as to avoid confrontation with Communist China.[6] The Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands followed suit as soon as the United Kingdom recognized Peking, because their diplomacy had always followed

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[3]Bulgaria and Rumania (10/3/49); Hungary (10/4/49); Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Poland and Yugoslavia (10/5/49); Outer Mongolia (10/6/49); Albania (10/2/49); East Germany (10/27/49); and North Vietnam (1/15/50).

[4]U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Vol. 9, The Far East: China (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 1-149.

[5]Burma (12/16/49); India (12/30/49); Pakistan (1/5/50); Ceylon (1/7/50); Israel (1/9/50); Afghanistan (1/12/50); and Indonesia (4/13/50).

[6]"Personal Message from Mr. Bevin to Mr. Acheson," in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Vol. 9, The Far East: China (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 225.

the British line.[7]

The United States opposed hasty recognition[8] and did

not go along with the British in recognizing Peking, chiefly

because the Chinese Communists viewed the U.S. as their No. 1

enemy.[9] They ordered forcible detention of U.S. Consulate

General personnel in Mukden as well as inflicting a physical

beating upon Consul General Angus Ward.[10] The French Government

also did not follow the British with regard to recognition of

Peking, due to the fact that early recognition would constitute

moral support to the Communist Viet Minh, to the detriment of

the status of Bao Dai.[11] Thus, when the U.K. recognized

Peking, both the U.S. and France adopted a "wait and see"

policy toward the recognition of the P.R.C.

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[7]Dr. Hua-Cheng Wang, former Nationalist Ambassador to Portugal said that the Scandinavian countries as well as the Netherlands recognized Peking so quickly, because their diplomacy always followed the British. Dr. Wang delivered a lecture on "The Western European Attitudes Toward Peiping," Spring 1957, the present writer attended that lecture. The Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands granted recognition to Peking on the following dates: Norway (1/7/50); Denmark (1/9/50); Finland (1/13/50); Sweden (1/4/50); Swetzerland (1/17/50); and the Netherlands (3/27/50).

[8]Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Vol. 9, pp. 149 ff.

[9]Personal interview with Professor Dean Rusk, former U.S. Secretary of State, on June 23, 1977 at the University of Georgia.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Vol. 9, p. 136.

Consideration by the Security Council

The question of Chinese representation was first brought to the attention of the UN as a result of telegrams dated November 18, 1949, from Chou En-lai, the Foreign Minister of the PRC to Secretary General Trygve Lie and the President of the General Assembly, Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines, announcing the formation of a new Chinese Government and repudiating the delegation of the Chinese Nationalists.[12] The General Assembly, however, was in session at the time; the credentials of the Chinese representatives had already been approved and no action was taken.[13] On November 25, 1949, the Soviet Union and members of the Soviet bloc challenged the right of the Nationalist delegation to represent China at the meeting of the First Committee of the Fourth General Assembly.[14] This was the first debate on Chinese representation in a UN organ. No action was taken.

The Soviet representative raised the question of Chinese representation in the Security Council at a meeting held on December 29, 1949. He said that his Government

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[12]UN doc. A/1123, November 21, 1949.

[13]General Assembly Offical Records (hereafter as GAOR), 4th Session, 227th Plenary Meeting (September 24, 1950), p. 48.

[14]UN Yearbook, 1948-49 (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 295.

supported the request of Chou En-lai for the repudiation of

the representatives of the Chinese Nationalist Government,

but he did not submit any formal proposal of his own.[15] The

representative of the Republic of China, Dr. Tingfu Tsiang

declared:

> The statements just made by the representatives
> of the U.S.S.R. and of the Ukrainian S.S.R. strike
> a blow at the very legal and moral foundations of
> the Security Council and of the United Nations.
> If a minority of this Council could arbitrarily
> deny the authority of any of the other delegations,
> this Organization would be reduced to anarchy or to
> obeying the dictates of one or two of its delegations.
> Such a state of affairs would be intolerable. 16

The President of the Council (the Candian representative)

suggested that the Council, having heard the statements,

should pass to other business, and the Soviet representative

raised no objection.[17]

On January 8, 1950, Chou En-lai sent a note to

Secretary General Lie and members of the Security Council,

declaring that the illegal Nationalist delegate should be

expelled.[18] On January 10, 1950 the U.S.S.R. delegation,

supporting the PRC's request, introduced into the Security

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[15]UN Security Council Official Records (hereafter
as SCOR), 4th year, 458 Meeting (December 29, 1949), pp. 1-2.

[16]Ibid., p. 2.

[17]Ibid., p. 3.

[18]UN doc. S/1462, February 24, 1950, p. 2.

Council a resolution declaring that the Council should decide
not to recognize the credentials of the representative sitting
for China. Dr. T. F. Tsiang, representing the Nationalist
Government, answered that for two years the Council had
recognized his credentials; if that were the issue, there
could be no question. He submitted, however, that the ques-
tion was not one of credentials - which was a procedural matter-
but one of great political importance. He would veto the
Soviet resolution, if necessary.[19]

The U.S. representative stated that since his govern-
ment recognized the Republic of China, it considered the
credentials of the present representative valid. However,
he regarded the matter as a procedural question involving
the credentials of a representative of a Member; to this the
veto could not apply and his government would therefore accept
a seven-member majority decision of the Council.[20] On January
13, 1950 the U.S.S.R. resolution was rejected by the Council,
with only three in favor (India, Yugoslavia, U.S.S.R.), six
against (China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, U.S.A.), and
two abstaining (U.K. and Norway).[21] The six states voting
against (except the ROC herself), all recognized the Taipei

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[19]SCOR, V, 459 Meeting (January 10, 1950), pp. 1-4.

[20]SCOR, V, 460 Meeting (January 12, 1950), p. 6.

[21]UN Yearbook, 1950, p. 423.

Government. The two abstaining were both U.S. NATO allies;
however, they had already recognized the Communist Government
in Peking in early January of that same year. Thereupon, the
U.S.S.R. representative, Jacob Malik, left the Council in
protest - to begin a general boycott of UN organs by the Soviet
bloc. He did not return until August of that year after the
Council had assumed responsibility for dealing with the Korean
conflict. This was the first official decision by a UN organ
on the question of Chinese representation.

Ambassador Malik returned to the Council in August
1950 in his capacity as President - a position which rotates
monthly - and immediately raised the China representation
issue once more, again without success. At the meeting on
August 1, Malik, as Council President, ruled that the repre-
sentative of the Nationalist Government was not qualified to
participate in the meeting since he did not legitimately
represent China. This ruling was challenged by the United
States. The U.S. challenge was upheld, since eight members
voted in its favor, with three opposed (The U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia
and India).[22]

On August 3, the Soviet Union proposed the inclusion
on the Security Council's agenda of the item "Recognition of
the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of

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[22]SCOR, 5th year, 480th Meeting (August 1, 1950),
pp. 1-2.

China as the representative of China." The move did not get
the required seven favorable votes and it was not adopted.
Five voted in favor (India, Norway, U.K., U.S.S.R., and
Yugoslavia), five opposed (China, Cuba, Ecuador, France and
U.S.A.) and one abstained (Egypt).[23] While the Korean War
went on, the majority of the members of the Council had the
feeling that it was premature to discuss the Chinese repre-
sentation problem, since not even a majority of the Council
members recognized the Communist Government in Peking.

The question was raised directly in the Security
Council on three subsequent occasions: November 10, 1951,
January 31, 1955, and September 8, 1955. There was no vote
on November 10, 1951 or September 8, 1955.[24] On the second of
these occasions, the Council adopted a United States proposal
"not to consider any proposals to exclude the representative
of the Government of the Republic of China, or to seat repre-
sentatives of the Central People's Government of the People's
Republic of China." This U.S. motion of January 31, 1955 was
supported by Belgium, Brazil, China, France, Iran, New Zealand,
Peru, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. The only
negative vote was cast by the Soviet Union.[25] Since then,

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[23]SCOR, V, 482 Meeting (August 3, 1950), p. 22.

[24]SCOR, VI, 566 Meeting (November 10, 1951), p. 1;
SCOR, X, 700 Meeting (September 8, 1955), paras. 1-5.

[25]SCOR, X, 689 Meeting (January 31, 1955), paras. 1-27.

there has been no substantial debate and no voting in the Security Council on the question of Chinese representation. Communist representatives occasionally denied the Chinese Nationalists the normal diplomatic courtesies, and there were sometimes difficulties about consultations when it was the turn of Nationalist China to preside.[26]

Secretary General Lie's Proposal

The Security Council's decisions did not end the UN activity on the question of Chinese representation. Secretary General Trygve Lie feared that the UN would dissolve and a Communist counterpart to it would be formed.[27] Believing in the principle of universality and being obligated to "seek a solution in the best interest of the Organization," he actively sought to seat the Communist Chinese.[28] To this end, he requested the Legal Department of the Secretariat to prepare a Memorandum on recognition and representation. On March 8, 1950, Secretary General Lie made public a memorandum on the legal aspects of the representation of states in the

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[26]Personal interview on June 2, 1976 and telephone interview on January 16, 1977 with Dr. Chun-Ming Chang, former Chinese Nationalist Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

[27]Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations (New York: Macmillan Co., 1954), pp. 252-73.

[28]Ibid., pp. 254 & 261.

United Nations. The Memorandum read in part:

> The primary difficulty in the current question of
> the representation of Member States in the United
> Nations is that this question of representation has
> been linked up with the question of recognition
> by Member States .... The recognition of a new
> State, or a new government of an existing State, is
> a unilateral act which the recognizing government
> can grant or withhold .... On the other hand,
> membership of a State in the United Nations and
> representation of a State in the organs is clearly
> determined by a collective act of the appropriate
> organs; in the case of membership, by vote of the
> General Assembly on recommendation of the Security
> Council, in the case of representation, by vote of
> each competent organ on the credentials of the
> purported representatives 29

In addition, the Secretary General, by analogy of Article 4

of the Charter, suggested that the question of Chinese repre-

sentation or similar situations in the future be decided on

the basis of "whether the new government exercises effective

authority within the territory of the State and is habitually

obeyed by the bulk of the population."[30]

At the time of the initial claim of the PRC forty-

six nations recognized the Nationalist Government on Taiwan,

while only sixteen, including the U.K. and India, recognized

the new Communist government in Peking. The simultaneous

existence of two governments, each claiming to be the one

and only legitimate government for all China, brought up

the relationship between national recognition and United

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[29]UN doc. S/1466 (March 9, 1950).

[30]Ibid.

Nations representation. Thus, Lie's Memorandum was strongly
opposed by the Chinese Nationalist delegate as well as the
pro-Chinese Nationalist delegates within the UN. On March
13, 1950 the representative of the ROC lodged his Government's
formal protest against the Secretary-General's Memorandum:

> Your memorandum is ... an attack on the cause of
> freedom throughout the world ... If it is too much
> to expect you to use your influence against Communism,
> it is certainly not too much to expect you to remain at
> least neutral ... In the present instance you have
> supplied argument against my delegation and in
> favor of the Soviet Union delegation. You have
> destroyed public confidence in the impartiality
> of the Secretariat. 31

Furthermore, the Chinese Nationalist representative stated that
the Communist regime did not have the support of the Chinese
people, who regarded it as a puppet regime. The representa-
tive of the ROC considered that the question of Chinese
representation could not be considered to "threaten the
maintenance of international peace and security" within the
meaning of Article 99 of the Charter, the only Article that
assigned a sphere of political action to the Secretary-
General. For these reasons, Dr. T. F. Tsiang concluded that
the Secretary-General had intervened against the interests
of China on the basis of "bad politics and bad law."[32]

The Soviet Union supported the Secretary-General's
position, while the U.S. opposed it strongly. The U.S.

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[31]UN doc. S/1470 (March 15, 1950).

[32]Ibid.

disputed it in a legal memorandum of its own:

> A revolutionary government to be recognized for
> purposes of representation must exercise effective
> authority, be based on the consent of the population,
> be able and willing to achieve the purposes of the
> Charter and fulfill its obligations under the Charter
> and international law, and respect human rights and
> fundamental freedoms. [33]

The strong American and Nationalist Chinese pressure, made

evident in these statements, seemed to have prevented any

further action on Lie's proposal.

American Attitude Toward Chinese Representation

On January 5, 1950, only three months after the PRC

was proclaimed, President Harry S. Truman announced:

> The U.S. Government will not pursue a course which
> will lead to involvement in civil conflict in
> China. Similarly, the U.S. Government will not
> provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces
> on Formosa. [34]

This was the White House "hands-off" policy toward China in

early 1950. Some of the U.S. allies were considering

recognition of the Peking Government, and on January 6,

1950 the United Kingdom extended recognition. However, the

U.S. Government was concerned about the strong anti-Americanism

of the Peking regime and seemed to be withholding any definite

policy commitment pending further developments, particularly

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[33]Cited in Leland M. Goodrich, The United Nations
(New York: Crowell, 1959), p. 101.

[34]US Department of State Bulletin, January 16, 1950,
p. 79.

the PRC's reaction to the British recognition. The Communist Government of China did not reciprocate this recognition until 1954. On January 14, 1950 the Chinese Communists seized U.S. consular property in Peking, and the U.S. announced that it took a very serious view of this and accordingly was withdrawing all official U.S. personnel from Communist China.[35] At his news conference on January 18, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that the seizure of U.S. property in Peiping (Peking) had a very immediate effect on the question of recognition and that the question of recognition could not come up or be considered.[36] However, at the time of North Korea's invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, U.S. policy toward mainland China was still in the process of formulation.

On February 14, 1950 the U.S.S.R. signed a thirty-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance with the People's Republic of China.[37] Furthermore, Communist China adopted the Mao Tse-tung's "lean to one side" foreign policy to stand on the Soviet side in the Cold War.[38] Two days after the outbreak of the Korean War, on June 27, 1950,

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[35]Ibid., January 23, 1950, p. 119.

[36]Cited in Ibid., October 15, 1951, p. 606.

[37]Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1949-50 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 541-47.

[38]Franz Schurmann, and Orville Schell (ed.) Communist China: Revolutionary Reconstruction and International Confrontation 1949 to the Present (New York: Vintage, 1967), p. 242.

President Truman declared:

> I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any
> attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action,
> I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa
> to cease all air and sea operations against the
> mainland .... The determination of the future status
> of Formosa must await the restoration of security
> in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan or
> consideration by the United Nations. 39

Thus, the Korean War changed the American position drastically. The U.S. adopted a firm containment policy toward Communist aggression in Asia, including opposition to the seating of Chinese Communist Government in the United Nations.[40]

Consideration by the General Assembly

At Its Fifth Session

At the opening meeting (277th) of its fifth session on September 19, 1950, four draft resolutions were proposed at the General Assembly to deal with the question of Chinese representation. They were:

(i) By India (A/1365), which noting that the
Republic of China was a Member of the United
Nations and of its various organs, considering
that the obligations of a Member under the
Charter of the United Nations could not be
carried out except by a Government which, with
a reasonable expectancy of permanence, actually
exercises control over the territory of that

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[39] US Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1950, p. 5.

[40] U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Vol. 2, The United Nations (Washington: GPO, 1976), pp. 251-53.

Member and commands the obedience of its people, recognizing that the Central Government of the People's Republic of China is the only such Government functioning in the Republic of China as now constituted, would have the General Assembly decide that the aforesaid Central Government should be entitled to represent the Republic of China in the General Assembly; further, the draft resolution would have the Assembly recommend that the other organs of the United Nations adopt similar resolutions. [41]

(ii)   By the U.S.S.R. (A/1369):

"The General Assembly
"Decides that the representatives of the Kuomintang group cannot take part in the work of the General Assembly and its organs because they are not the representatives of China." [42]

(iii)   By the U.S.S.R. (A/1370), which would have the Assembly invite the representatives of the People's Republic of China accredited by the Central People's Government to take part in the work of the General Assembly and its organs. [43]

(iv)   By Canada (A/1386), which taking note of differences of view concerning the representation of China in the United Nations, would have the Assembly establish a Special Committee consisting of the President of the Assembly and six other representatives selected by the President to consider the question of Chinese representation and to report back, with recommendations, to the present session of General Assembly .... [44]

In the debate on the Chinese representation issue, especially the two Soviet proposals, Dr. T. F. Tsiang,

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[41]UN Yearbook, 1950, p. 426.

[42]GAOR, V, 277 Meeting (September 19, 1950), p. 3.

[43]UN Yearbook, 1950, p. 426.

[44]Ibid.

Chairman of the Chinese Delegation to the Fifth Session of

the UN General Assembly, made the following statement on

September 19, 1950:[45]

> ... I represent the only legal government in China.
> My Government is based on a Constitution passed by
> the representatives of the Chinese people only
> three years ago ....
>
> The representative of the Soviet Union referred
> to my Government as that of the Kuomintang group.
> That description is grossly inaccurate. My Govern-
> ment is a coalition government. It has within its
> ranks three political parties ....
>
> This draft resolution states that the puppet
> regime should occupy the seat of China in the
> United Nations. Let us consider the puppet regime ....
>
> Last year, at the fourth session of the General
> Assembly, on behalf of my Government, I placed an
> item on the agenda called: "Threats to the political
> independence and territorial integrity of China and
> to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet
> violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship
> and Alliance of 14 August 1945, and from Soviet
> violations of the Charter of the United Nations."
>
> ... The Soviet army of occupation in Manchuria
> prevented my Government from re-establishing its
> authority in Manchuria. That army of occupation
> denied to us the use of the chief port of Dairen
> for the movement of troops. It hampered our use of
> the railways; it limited air transport. At the same
> time, it provided all the facilities for the movement
> of Communist troops into that important region. Then
> the Soviet army of occupation turned over to that
> insurrectionary force the arms left there by the
> Japanese. That is the origin of this puppet regime
> in Peiping ....

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[45]Republic of China. Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
_Struggle for Peace, Justice and Freedom: A Collection of
the Main Statements Made by the Delegation of the Republic
of China on China's Representation in the General Assembly
of the United Nations, 1950-1960_ (Taipei, 1961), pp. 1-8.

Now the United Nations is faced with its first
great crisis, namely, the Korean question. From
the first day of the North Korean question on 25
June, the radio and press under the control of the
puppet regime have not ceased to tell the Chinese
people, and have tried to impose on the Chinese
people, their idea that this is a war of aggression
on the part of the United States. The fourth report
of the Unified Command, as read out to us by the
United States delegation yesterday in the Security
Council, established beyond doubt that the Chinese
Communist regime has given substantial help to
North Korea.

This is the choice before the General Assembly:
do you want to seat the legitimate democratic regime,
which my Government is, or do you wish to have in
your midst a regime which is un-Chinese in its
origin and character, and which in no way represents
the Chinese people?

One argument advanced for the recognition of
the Chinese Communists is that of effective control ....
The puppet regime does not have effective control of
China. At this moment one million guerrillas are
fighting the Communists on the mainland ....
If effective control is the most important criterion,
then the country of our Secretary-General should
have accepted the Quisling regime. If effective
control were the only criterion, then France would
not be where it is. It was the men of the resistance
movement in France who refused to accept effect
control .... For the United Nations to act on this
basis would be to express a political view by endorsing
totalitarian despotism .... the aim of submitting
this issue to the United Nations without regard to
the political issue involved in the contrasting
characters of the two Chinese governments. More-
over, that would also be a most flagrant violation
of the Charter and ideals of the United Nations.

Everything that has transpired since this matter
came up has strengthened our conviction that this
Chinese issue before the United Nations can be
settled fairly and soundly only on the basis of
adhering faithfully to the provisions of Article 4
of the Charter. It is particularly on this basis
that we respectfully reaffirm and resubmit to the
General Assembly our position that the present
clique, hated by the Chinese people, is unfit for
and unworthy of membership in the United Nations

and entirely unqualified to represent the 450 million people in China. The Soviet Union Government wishes to complete the conquest of China by winning for its puppet regime the valued moral and political recognition of this body. I make bold to believe that this body will not co-operate with the Soviet Union in advancing that country's plan for world conquest.

As described above, because of the Korean War and the Chinese Communist intervention, at its first meeting in the fall of 1950, under the leadership of U.S., the UN General Assembly rejected the Soviet proposals to expel the R.O.C. and to seat the P.R.C., and it created a Special Committee to study the problem of Chinese representation. However, the Committee's report contained no recommendations, and the Assembly merely took note of the report.[46] There was a general feeling among the UN members that no decision should be taken. The representative of the U.S. called upon the Assembly to vote down the Indian draft resolution.[47] It was voted upon by roll-call and rejected by thirty-three votes to sixteen, with ten abstentions.[48] Those in favor

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[46]GAOR, 5th Session, 277 Meeting (September 19, 1950), paras. 8-191; 332 Meeting (November 5, 1951), paras. 6-33, Resolution 390 (V).

[47]UN Yearbook, 1950, p. 427.

[48]Ibid., p. 429. The votes were as follows: In favor: Afghanistan, Burma, Bvelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, India, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. Against: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraw, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, US, Uruguay, Venezuela. Abstaining: Argentina, Canada, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Guatemala, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen.

(27 percent) were either Communist states or nations that recognized the Chinese Communist Government in Peking. Those against (56 percent) or abstaining (17 percent) recognized the Chinese Nationalist Government in Taipei. As evidenced by this roll-call, there was a clear linkage between recognition and representation as concluded by Dr. T. F. Tsiang, the representative of the Republic of China.[49]

As the Korean War went on, on November 3, 1950, the UN General Assembly adopted the Uniting for Peace Resolution which the Communists saw as an attempt to undermine the veto power of the Soviet Union.[50] Following that, the General Assembly on December 14, 1950 adopted a British-sponsored resolution by thirty-six in favor, six against (Soviet bloc), nine abstaining, concerning the recognition by the UN of the representative of a Member state, which had often been referred to in UN debates on Chinese representation issue. The complete text of the Resolution read:

The General Assembly

Considering that difficulties may arise regarding the representation of a Member State in the United Nations and that there is a risk that conflicting decisions may be reached by its various organs,

Considering that it is in the interest of the proper functioning of the organization that there should be uniformity in the procedure applicable

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[49]Ibid., p. 425.

[50]UNGA res. 377 (V), November 3, 1950.

whenever more than one authority claims to be the
government entitled to represent a Member State
in the United Nations, and this question becomes
the subject of controversy in the United Nations.

Considering that, in virtue of its composition,
the General Assembly is the organ of the United
Nations in which consideration can best be given
to the views of all Member States in matters affecting
the functioning of the Organization as a whole,

1. Recommends that whenever more than one authority
   claims to be the government entitled to
   represent a Member State in the United Nations,
   and this question becomes the subject of
   controversy in the United Nations, the question
   should be considered in the light of the purposes
   and principles of the Charter and the circumst-
   ances of each case;

2. Recommends that the attitude adopted by the
   General Assembly or its Interim Committee
   concerning any question should be taken into
   account in other organs of the United Nations
   and in the specialized agencies;

3. Declares that the attitude adopted by the General
   Assembly or its Interim Committee concerning any
   such question shall not of itself affect the
   direct relations of individual Member States
   with the State concerned;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the
   present resolution to other organs of the United
   Nations and to the specialized agencies for such
   action as may be appropriate. [51]

This resolution implies that the Assembly should be a guide

for other UN organs. Thereafter, the entire debate on the

Chinese representation question was transferred to the

General Assembly.

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[51]General Assembly Resolution 396 (V), December 14,
1950.

PRC "Not Peace Loving"

Prior to the Korean War, the main argument heard against seating Communist China was that representation questions should be deferred until a majority of countries recognized Peking. On November 6, 1950, the UN Command informed the Security Council that Chinese Communist troops had entered the Korean War against UN forces. On November 10, 1950, the PRC refused a Security Council invitation to participate in a debate on the Communist Chinese aggression in Korea. On January 17, 1951, the Chinese Communist Government rejected the UN cease-fire order.[52] Then on January 23, 1951, the US Senate passed two resolutions that "the UN should immediately declare Communist China an aggressor in Korea," and that "the Communist Chinese Government should not be admitted to membership in the United Nations as the representative of China."[53]

On February 1, 1951, the General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning Communist China's act of aggression in Korea.[54] The vote was forty-four yes, seven no (Soviet bloc, Burma, India), nine abstain (Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia).

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[52]UN doc. A/C.1/653, January 18, 1951.

[53]US Department of State Bulletin, February 5, 1951, p. 208.

[54]UNGA res. 498 (V), February 1, 1951.

Another resolution three months later recommended a general trade embargo against the PRC.[55] The vote was forty-seven yes, none no, eight abstain. The Soviet bloc did not vote.

Thereafter, when the UN characterized Communist China as an aggressor, those opposed to seating the PRC used the argument that the Peking Government did not meet the UN Charter's prerequisites that members must be "peace-loving states." Even the UN Secretary-General seemed to change his public position. After this event, he thought that "permanent members just as much as new members are bound by the stipulations of Article 4"[56] - an article that requires an applicant for membership to be "peace-loving" and "willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter."

The majority of the UN members followed the U.S. lead, as initiated by the Chinese Nationalists, to adopt the "Membership School" attitude toward the Chinese representation issue. This position would require Communist China to apply for admission to the UN as if it was a new State in accordance with Article 4 (1) of the Charter, which stipulates that the applicant must be "peace-loving."[57] This school based its objections to seating the PRC on the grounds that

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[55]UNGA res. 500 (V), May 14, 1951.

[56]Lie, In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations, p. 274.

[57]Winberg Chai, "China and the United Nations: Problems of Representation and Alternatives," Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 5 (May 1970), p. 405.

the PRC was an illegal, immoral, as well as a nonpermanent government. The PRC's intervention in the Korean War and the General Assembly's finding of aggression underlined the "nonpeace-loving" character of the regime. To seat it would imply a condonement of aggression. According to this view, that might inspire other potential aggressors to try to "shoot their way" into the United Nations.

After boycotting the Security Council for a brief period, the Soviet Union returned in August 1950 (after the Korean War broke out) to demand that the PRC be seated promptly in all organs of the United Nations as the legitimate government of China and that the Nationalist Government be ousted. A minority of the UN members, including the entire Soviet bloc, supported this position. It was held that the state of China is under the effective control of the Communist Government, thus each UN organ ought to approve the credentials of the PRC. This is the so-called "Credential School."[58] It was also held that the United Nations would be more effective if it were universal; and to be universal it must seat the PRC. Some states also felt that Communist China might be checked more effectively inside the United Nations than out.

Thereafter, the discussion of the Chinese representation issue was postponed by simple majority votes from 1951

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[58]Ibid.

to 1960 under the U.S. engineered "moratorium technique."
This was a strategy to remove the entire problem from dis-
cussion for the duration of each session. After 1960, the
United States switched its position and was the leader of
the "Representation School."[59] This school rested its argu-
ments on the above-quoted UN Resolution on representation,
and insisted that the issue of Chinese representation was
a matter of an "important question" under Article 18 of the
Charter, so that the decision must be made by a two-thirds
majority of the General Assembly. The representation school
also argues that the ouster of the ROC would involve the
expulsion of a loyal member of the United Nations as well
as a violation of the principle of universality.[60] Thus, from
1961 to 1971, the Assembly's discussion and votes were based
on the American-sponsored draft resolution declaring the
Chinese representation issue an "important question" on which
a two-thirds majority vote was needed.

The Soviet Union was a strong proponent of the
"Credential School" in the 1950's, but because of the Sino-
Soviet rift was replaced by Albania in the 1960's as the
main spokesman for this position. However, the Peking-Moscow

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[59]Myres S. McDougal and Richard M. Goodman, "Chinese
Participation in the United Nations: The Legal Imperatives
of a Negotiated Solution," The American Journal of Inter-
national Law, Vol. 60, No. 4 (October 1966), pp. 675-76.

[60]UN doc. A/RES/1668 (XVI)(A/L. 372), December 15,
1961.

split did not bring any outward change in the Soviet Union's backing for Peking's representation in the UN. The next chapter will analyze the UN votes on Chinese representation under the moratorium device during the 1950's.

CHAPTER III

ROLL-CALLS ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION UNDER

THE MORATORIUM DEVICE, 1951-1960

Communist China's Attitude Toward the UN

After the Korean War broke out, Mao Tse-tung declared
on June 28, 1950 that President Truman "has torn to shreds
all international agreements regarding U.S. non-interference
in the internal affairs of China," and that the United States
had openly exposed "its true imperialist face." On the same
day, Premier Chou En-lai declared:

> Truman's statement of June 27 and the action of
> the U.S. Navy constitute armed agression against
> the territory of China and are a gross violation
> of the United Nations Charter .... On behalf of
> the Central People's Government of the People's
> Republic of China, I declare that, no matter what
> obstructive action U.S. imperialists may take,
> the fact that Taiwan is a part of China will remain
> unchanged forever .... The Chinese people, who have
> defeated Japanese imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek,
> the hiring of U.S. imperialism, will surely succeed
> in driving out the U.S. agressors and in recovering
> Taiwan and all other territories belonging to China.[1]

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[1] _Oppose U.S. Occupation of Taiwan and "Two Chinas"
Plot: A Selection of Important Documents_ (Peking: Foreign
Language Press, 1958), pp. 3-6.

In a cablegram to the UN dated September 18, 1950,
the Foreign Minister of the PRC declared that should the
fifth session of the General Assembly be held without the
participation of his government's delegation, all the resolu-
tions of the General Assembly concerning China would be
illegal, null and void.[2] Wu Hsiu-ch'uan, the PRC's delegate
to the UN for the discussion of the "Invasion of Taiwan"
case, said before the Security Council on November 28, 1950,
that:

> So long as the United Nations persists in denying
> admittance to a permanent member of the Security
> Council representing 475 million people, it cannot
> make lawful decisions on any major issues or solve
> any major problems, particularly those which concern
> Asia ... Without the participation of the lawful
> representatives of the People's Republic of China,
> the people of China have no reason to recognize
> any resolutions or decisions of the United Nations.[3]

Thus, all resolutions concerning Korea, whether adopted by
the General Assembly or by the Security Council, were deemed
by the Communist Government of China to be invalid because:

> The United Nations has been reduced to a
> belligerent in the Korean War and has long
> since lost the competence and moral authority
> to deal fairly and reasonably with the Korean
> question. Therefore, any resolution on the
> Korean Question adopted by the United Nations

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[2]*Compilation of Documents Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the People's Republic of China* (In Chinese),
Vol. 1, pp. 146-47.

[3]UNSCOR, (V), No. 69, November 28, 1950, p. 4.

is unilateral and null and void.[4]

Peking's Alliance with Soviet Bloc

The Soviet Union had from the beginning been the closest ally of the People's Republic of China, to which it accorded recognition immediately. Inside the United Nations, the Soviet Union had consistently demanded the seating of Communist Chinese representatives and the ousting of the representatives of the Taiwan-based Republic of China. The U.S.S.R. had supported in all ways the Communist Chinese demands for the removal of U.S. troops from the Taiwan area.

Soviet aid had included credits for large sums, beginning with 1950, when the U.S.S.R. provided Communist China with a $300 million credit for electric power stations and other heavy equipment.[5] Chinese trade, not only with the U.S.S.R. but with the Communist countries of East Europe, had grown rapidly since the West initiated an embargo, on May 18, 1951, on shipments to mainland China.

The countries of the Soviet bloc supplied most of the military equipment with which Communist China confronted the West in Korea. The Soviet bloc assistance included help

[4]Note on the Korean Question delivered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC to the Office of the British Charge d' Affaires in Peking on March 4, 1955, in Peking Review, Vol. 2, No. 10 (March 10, 1959), p. 21.

[5]Lynn and Amos Landman, Profile of Red China (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951), pp. 150-52.

to Communist China in building factories with which to make
armaments. All the Soviet bloc countries - without known
reservation - supported Communist China in its determination
to incorporate Taiwan under the mainland government. They
gave equal support to the Communist Chinese demand that the
United States evacuate all its troops, armaments and ships
from the Taiwan area.[6]

Consideration by the General Assembly
At Its Sixth Session

During the Assembly's sixth session, on November 6,
1951, the U.S.S.R. proposed (A/1941) that the question of
the representation of China in the United Nations be included
in the agenda of the sixth session. On November 10, the
General Assembly's General Committee met to discuss the Soviet
proposal. The representative of Thailand orally proposed a
draft resolution which would:

(1) note that the General Assembly, at its fifth
session, had determined that it did not wish
to take action on the question of Chinese
representation without serious consideration
and, for that purpose, had established a
committee to consider the question and to make
a recommendation;

(2) note that as recently as November 5, 1951 the
Assembly had expressed its desire not to refer
the matter for consideration to the sixth session,
thereby expressing the sense of the Assembly

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[6]A. G. Mezerik (ed.), China: Taiwan Problem, External
Relations, Representation in the UN (New York: International
Review Service, 1958), p. 3.

that the consideration of the question was
not opportune or appropriate;

(3) recommend that the Assembly reject the U.S.S.R
request for the inclusion of the item in the
agenda of the sixth session; and

(4) recommend that the Assembly postpone considera-
tion, for the duration of the sixth session,
of any further proposals to exclude representa-
tives of the National Government of China from
the Assembly or to seat representatives of the
Central People's Government of the People's
Republic of China to represent China in the
Assembly. 7

The Soviet and Polish representatives both strongly

objected to Thailand's proposal. Dr. T. F. Tsiang, China's

representative, immediately made a vigorous refutation of

the position taken by the Soviet Union and Poland. The

representative of the United Kingdom seconded the Thai pro-

posal, pointing out, however, that his reason for doing so

was that the United Kingdom deemed it improper to discuss

such a controversial problem during the peace negotiations

in Korea. Subsequently, by a vote of eleven to two with one

abstention, the proposal of Thailand was carried in the General

Committee. Eleven member-states, the United States, France,

the United Kingdom, Mexico, Iraq, Norway, Thailand, Chile,

the Dominican Republic, Canada, and China, seconded the Thai

proposal; while the Soviet Union and Poland voted against it,

and Yugoslavia alone abstained.[8]

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[7]UN Yearbook, 1951, p. 265.

[8]China Handbook, 1952-53 (Taipei: China Publishing Co.),
p. 126.

On November 13, the General Assembly convened to examine the report on the agenda submitted by the General Committee. When the question of representation of China was under discussion, the Soviet representative again moved that the item in connection with the question be included in the agenda. The representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia seconded the Soviet motion. Myint Thein, Chief Delegate of Burma and then Burmese Ambassador to Peking, asserted that the people of China desired very eagerly and sincerely to have their voices heard and to see their real representatives participating in international conferences and that the situation in Korea might not have been what it was if the new government of China had been recognized and its representatives sitting "in our midst." "If Free China under the leadership of the National Government should cease to struggle for freedom in China," Dr. T. F. Tsiang immediately retorted, "the independence of Burma should be gravely threatened." Dr. Tsiang further said: "In fighting for freedom in China we were also fighting for Burma's freedom and independence."[9] The representatives of the United States, Australia, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom successively took the floor and seconded the Thai proposal. Subsequently, a vote was taken and by a show of hands, thirty-seven to eleven with four abstentions, the draft resolution submitted by the General

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[9]Ibid., p. 127.

Committee to postpone consideration of the problem was adopted
by the General Assembly,[10] showing a substantial increase of
UN members opposed to the seating of the Communist Government
of China. This was the first vote on the "moratorium" resolu-
tion that took place yearly from 1951 to 1960.

Taiwan as Part of American Line of Defense

After the Korean War broke out, President Truman
declared, "The occupation of Formosa would be a direct threat
to the security of the Pacific area and to the U.S. forces
performing their lawful and necessary functions in that
area."[11] Thus, he ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to patrol
the Taiwan Strait, sent U.S. forces to help South Korea and
called for UN action to repel North Korean aggression. Further-
more, President Truman then said, "Determination of the future
status of Taiwan must await the restoration of security in
the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan or consideration
by the United Nations."[12]

Within the U.S., the Nationalist Chinese lobby proved
to be a smashing success. Washington abandoned its "hands-off"
policy regarding Taiwan. During the 1952 presidential campaign,
both parties were committed to prevent the seating and to outlaw

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[10]UN Yearbook, 1951, p. 265.

[11]US Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1950, p.5.

[12]Ibid.

Peking in the United Nations. American had also taken the new position that Taiwan was a part of America's "island chain" of defense, and military aid to Nationalist China was revived.[13] Instead of coming to Peking's support, the non-Communist members of the UN had either followed the American view that Peking was guilty of aggression in fighting the police force of the UN in Korea, or assumed a non-committal attitude toward the whole dispute.

In a speech on May 18, 1951, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk said:

> ... We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping
> (Peking) for what they pretend to be. The Peiping
> regime may be a colonial Russian government - a
> Slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the
> Government of China. It does not pass the first
> test. It is not Chinese. It is not entitled to
> speak for China in the community of nations ....[14]

In March 1952, Assistant Secretary of State John M. Allison stated: "We must prevent the spread of Chinese Communist imperialism and contain it within China."[15] These words marked a signpost of the American containment and isolation policy toward Communist China after the break of Korean War.

Consideration Postponed by U.S. Procedural Motion

At the General Assembly's Seventh Session, the representative of the U.S.S.R., on October 17, 1952, submitted to

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[13]Ibid., May 7, 1951.

[14]Ibid., May 28, 1951, p. 847.

[15]Ibid., March 24, 1952, p. 457.

the Credentials Committee a draft resolution (A/CR/L), in terms of which the Committee would recommend that the Assembly regard as invalid the credentials of the representatives of the "so-called Kuomintang Government" to the Seventh Session, since these credentials did not satisfy the requirements of rule 27[16] of the Assembly's rules of procedure.

On the same day, the Credentials Committee held its first meeting in which the Swedish representative announced that he could not recognize the validity of the credentials issued by the "Formosa Government," as Sweden had already recognized the Chinese Communist regime in Peking. Then the Soviet representative followed suit and suggested that the Committee make a recommendation to the General Assembly to the effect that it should declare the credentials of the "Kuomintang" representative invalid. This suggestion was seconded by the Burmese representative. The U.S. representative took the floor and pointed out that the Committee was not competent to make any decision on the issue raised by the representatives of Sweden and the Soviet Union.[17] Then the representative of the United States submitted a draft resolution (A/CR/L.2) which would:

(1) recommend that the Assembly postpone for the duration of its seventh session consideration

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[16]Rule 27 states, among other things, that credentials shall be issued either by the Head of State or Government or by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[17]China Handbook, 1953-54, p. 144.

of all proposals to exclude the representatives
of the Government of the Republic of China and
to seat representatives of the Central People's
Government of the People's Republic of China;
and

(2) find that the credentials of the representatives
of the Government of the Republic of China
conformed with the provisions of rule 27 of
the Assembly's rules of procedure.

By 6 votes to 3 the Credentials Committee adopted a

United States motion that the United States draft resolution

should be put to the vote first, and it was adopted by the

same vote. By 6 votes to 2, with 1 abstention, the Committee

adopted a United States motion that the U.S.S.R. draft resolu-

tion should not be put to the vote.[18]

In its report (A/2234) to the Assembly, the Creden-

tials Committee included China in the list of Member States

whose Governments had submitted to the Secretary-General

credentials for their representatives which completely satisfied

the requirements of rule 27. The Committee recommended that

the Assembly adopt a resolution: (1) approving its report;

and (2) deciding to postpone for the duration of the Seventh

Session consideration of all proposals to exclude the repre-

sentatives of the Government of the Republic of China and and

to seat representatives of the Central People's Government of

the People's Republic of China.[19]

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[18]UN Yearbook, 1952, p. 67.

[19]Ibid.

The report was considered at the Assembly's 389th plenary meeting on 25 October 1952, when the representative of the U.S.S.R. reintroduced (A/L.109) the draft resolution he had submitted to the Credentials Committee. After separate votes on the individual paragraphs, the Assembly adopted the draft resolution recommended by the Credentials Committee as a whole,by a roll-call vote of 42 to 7, with 11 abstentions. The resolution read:

"The General Assembly

"1. Approves the first report of the Credentials Committee;

"2. Decides to postpone for the duration of its seventh session consideration of all proposals to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China and to seat representatives of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China." 20

The roll-call vote was as follows:

In favor: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Against: Burma, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian SSR, USSR.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Bolivia, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia. 21

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[20] UNGA res. 609 A(VII). October 25, 1952.

[21] UN Yearbook, 1952, p. 67.

Those forty-two members which voted for the U.S. moratorium proposal were all U.S. allies,while the seven against were member of the Soviet bloc plus Burma and Sweden. The latter all recognized the Communist Government of China. Compared with the 1951 roll-call, Afghanistan, India, Israel, Pakistan, and Yugoslavia switched their positions from against the U.S. to abstaining, although they all recognized the Peking government. Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and United Kingdom switched their positions from against to support for the U.S. position this time. Obviously, the impact of the Korean War was reflected in the change of some members' positions.

Beginning with the Seventh Session of the General Assembly in 1952, until 1960, the U.S. moved at the beginning of each Session to postpone all consideration of Chinese representation for the duration of the session. This allowed countries which recognize Communist China to side with the U.S., such as United Kingdom and Pakistan, without stating substantive reasons for doing so or without taking a direct position as to wehther Taipei or Peking should represent China in the United Nations.

U.S. Policy Toward Chinese Representation in the UN.

After the conclusion of the armistice agreement on July 27, 1953 in Korea, the Soviet bloc together with a few pro-Communist countries tried hard behind the scenes to

secure the admission of the Chinese Communist regime into the United Nations. Against this background, the Taipei Government felt the need to call the attention of the governments of the free world to the maneuver of the Soviet bloc. Accordingly, the Nationalist diplomatic missions abroad were instructed to approach these governments to support the right of the Nationalists to represent China in the UN and to defeat the challenge from the Soviet bloc as well as from Peking.[22] The Nationalist maneuver for developing a voting coalition in the UN had the full support of the U.S. Department of State and diplomatic missions abroad.[23] In the U.S. Department of State, the preparation of position papers and other work connected with the issue of Chinese representation was the full-time assignment of at least one official, with many others contributing regularly to this task.[24] A strategy conference concerning the UN Chinese representation was held by the State Department before the yearly session of General Assembly, with representatives from the Chinese UN Mission in New York and Chinese Embassy in Washington.[25]

In the United Nations, the US Secretary of State, John F. Dulles in the eighth session (1953) of the General Assembly,

[22]China Handbook, 1954-55, p. 225.

[23]Personal interview with Dr. P. C. Chen, former staff member of the Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, R.O.C., June 12, 1976.

[24]Sheldon Appleton, The Eternal Triangle? Communist China, the United States and the United Nations (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1961), p. 190.

[25]Personal interview with Ambassador C. M. Chang, June 26, 1977 in New York City.

made a procedural motion of postponement of consideration of

the China problem, and made a statement in which he said in

part:

> Armed forces of Communist China still remain in Korea.
> The aggression is yet to be terminated and peace
> secured. The Chinese Communists have not shown in
> this matter convincing evidence of a genuine intention
> to end the aggression and to make peace, and, moreover,
> their continued actions elsewhere in Asia are far from
> reassuring. Therefore, I submit that, as things stand
> now, we should not even consider any proposals for the
> representation of the Chinese Communist aggressors in
> the Assembly, and following the practice of earlier
> sessions I urge prompt adoption of the motion to
> postpone consideration. Let me add that the fact that
> the motion I propose deals with the current year should
> not be interpreted as indication on the part of the
> United States to change its position after the current
> year. It is merely that we believe that it is appro-
> priate that a body of this character should deal with
> one year at a time. 26

After some discussion, the General Assembly by a show

of hands adopted the Dulles' motion by forty-four votes to ten

(Soviet Union, Byelorussia SSR, Ukraine SSR, Poland, Czecho-

slovakia, India, Indonesia, Burma, Yugoslavia, and Sweden)

with two abstentions (Afghanistan and Syria).[27] Later on, the

late Secretary of State justified the exclusion of aggressively

inclined regimes, such as Communist China on the ground that:

> The United Nations was not set up to be a reformatory.
> It was assumed that you would be good before you got
> in and not that being in would make you good. 28

During Eisenhower's Administration, the strength of

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[26]US Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 29, No. 744
(September 8, 1953), p. 413.

[27]China Handbook, 1954-55, p. 228.

[28]The New York Times, July 9, 1954.

U.S. sentiment toward the problem of Chinese representation
in the UN was manifested in mid-1954 when the Senate voted
ninety-one to zero in favor of a provision of the Foreign
Aid Bill reiterating the opposition of Congress "to the seat-
ing in the United Nations of the Communist regime as the repre-
sentative of China."[29] In July 1954, the U.S. Government declared
that if the question of actually seating the Central People's
Government came to a vote in the General Assembly, it would
insist that this is one of those "important questions" (Art.18)
requiring a two-thirds and not a majority vote.[30] If it came to
a vote in the Security Council, the U.S. threatened to use the
veto despite its previous position to permit a vote in 1950.[31]
Moreover, in December 1954, the U.S. Government signed a Mutual
Defense Treaty with the Government of the Republic of China to
defend Taiwan and the Pescadores against attack from the Main-
land.[32] In reply to the Chinese Communist attack on the offshore
islands, in January 1955, the U.S. Congress adopted the so-called
"blank check" resolution to give the President authority to act
"as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of security
and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores." The resolution

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[29]*Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Vol. 10 (1954),
p. 275; *The New York Times*, July 30, 1954, p. 3.

[30]*U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, July 19, 1954,
pp. 88-89.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Ibid., December 13, 1954, pp. 895-99.

included the protection of "related positions" - broad language which could include action in defense of the offshore islands at the President's option.[33]

In December 1955, Secretary Dulles declared, "The China problem is not about the admission of new members. China is a charter member of the UN. It is a question of credentials."[34] This meant that the U.S. recognized the Nationalist Government as the only legal government representing China in world community. In 1956, the U.S. Congress (both Houses) adopted the following resolutions on Communist China:

> ... The Communist regime in China should not be admitted to membership in the UN or any of its specialized agencies as the representative of China, ... such admission would gravely injure the UN and impair its effective functioning in accordance with the aims, principles, and provisions of the UN Charter. 35

Therefore, during the 1950's, U.S. delegates in the UN had opposed the representation for the Peking Government basing their arguments on a limited interpretation of Article 4 of the Charter and had specifically denied that the Charter supports the idea of universality. Pointing to the Chinese Communist acts in Korea and Tibet and refusal to renounce the use of force in the Taiwan Straits, the U.S. claimed that the

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[33]H. J. Res. 159, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.

[34]U.S. Department of State Bulletin, December 19, 1955, p. 1101.

[35]U.S. H. Con. Res. 265, 84th Cog., 2d Sess.

mainland government could not be considered "peace-loving"
and thus was automatically debarred under Article 4. Further-
more, the late Secretary of State, John F. Dulles stated in
San Francisco on June 28, 1957:

> Communist Russia, with its veto power, already
> seriously limits the ability of the United Nations
> to serve its intended purposes. Were Communist
> China also to become a permanent, veto-wielding
> member of the Security Council, that would, I fear,
> implant in the United Nations the seeds of its own
> destruction. 36

Analysis of the Vote

As described above, although the issue of Chinese
representation was regularly raised in all UN bodies either
by the U.S.S.R. or India, voting in the UN on the question
from 1952 to 1960 was based on U.S. proposals not to put the
item on the Assembly's agenda. These proposals required only
a simple majority for adoption. In 1950, the General Assembly,
by a vote of 33 to 16, with 10 abstentions, rejected a Soviet
motion to seat the Peking Government.[37] Since 1951, the
Assembly had annually agreed to postpone discussion of the
Chinese representation question, but the margin of victory
for this moratorium was diminished every year after the end
of the Korean War in 1953. This procedure was challenged at
the last four Assembly Sessions (11th-15th, 1956-59), when

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[36]U.S. Department of State Bulletin, July 15, 1957,
p. 93.

[37]UN Yearbook, 1950, p. 429.

India asked for a substantive debate - that is, to have the Chinese representation question discussed as a separate agenda item. The Indian proposal was rejected each time. Beginning in 1956, however, support for the U.S. policy of postponing consideration progressively lost strength. The voting figures are shown in Table III-1.

TABLE III-1

VOTING PATTERNS ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION

UNDER THE MORATORIUM DEVICE, 1951-1960*

Session	For	Against	Abstain-ing	Absent	Total	Percent Supporting the U.S. Position
**6th (1951)	37	11	4	8	60	61
7th (1952)	42	7	11	0	60	70
8th (1953)	44	10	2	4	60	73
9th (1954)	43	11	6	0	60	72
10th (1955)	42	12	6	0	60	70
11th (1956)	47	24	8	0	79	60
12th (1957)	48	27	7	0	82	59
13th (1958)	44	28	9	0	81	54
14th (1959)	44	29	9	0	82	54
15th (1960)	42	34	22	1	99	42

*Adopted from John G. Stoessinger, The United Nations & the Superpowers (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 34.

**In 1951 postponement of consideration was orally proposed by the representative of Thailand.

The impact of enlarging UN membership may be seen clearly in the voting records on the China issue. The absolute number of votes in favor of the moratorium remained fairly constant during the ten years, but since during this same period the UN membership grew by 65 percent, the relative percentage of states supporting the U.S. position declined significantly. The American position suffered its major losses in 1956 and 1960.

1956 was the first year in which the members admitted through the 1955 package deal (16 new members) as well as three newly admitted members (Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia) voted on the issue. Of the nineteen new members, four were Soviet-bloc nations - Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania; four were Western nations - Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; and eleven were uncommitted nations - Austria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Sudan and Tunisia. As a result, the percentage support of the American position dropped 10 points, and direct opposition to the American position doubled in strength. Much new strength came to the support of Peking's claim from the many new members admitted to the UN, including Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania of the Communist bloc, Nepal, Ceylon, Sudan and Ghana of the non-aligned group, who voted for the Indian proposal. Moreover, the Arab countries of the Middle East, on the other hand, were seething with anti-Western feeling. After the Bandung Conference of 1955, Nasser's Egypt's formal recognition

of Peking and the exchange of diplomatic missions took place in May 1956. Some of the Arab states followed suit.[38] The Suez War also broke out in the same year. Thus, the U.A.R., Syria, Yemen, and Sudan afforded full diplomatic recognition to Communist China and had consistently voted for her admission into the United Nations.[39]

On the other side, the twenty Latin American countries continued, in varying degrees, their support of the U.S. position. The U.S. position was also supported by the majority of its European allies (United Kingdom, France, Benelux, Italy, and Spain) and by those countries in Asia and Africa whose security was formally tied to the West. Support for the U.S. position moved from forty-two in 1952 to a peak of forty-eight in 1957. In 1958 the vote in favor of the U.S. position dropped to forty-four. The votes against grew from seven in 1952 to twenty-eight in 1958. This increase was almost entirely the result of the introduction into the UN of new Asian, African and Communist members.

In counting votes in the UN, a majority is calculated on the total of those voting Yes and No. Countries which

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[38]A. M. Halpern, ed., Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 438-39.

[39]Joseph D. Ben-Dak, "China in the Arab World," Current History (September 1970), p. 147; Personal interview with Dr. C. M. Chang, former Nationalist Chinese Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, on June 12, 1976.

abstain from voting make it possible for a victory with
smaller than an absolute majority. In 1958, nine out of 81
countries abstained and the majority required to carry the
US resolution was thus thirty-seven. The vote in favor of
the US resolution was forty-four.

The second major drop in support of the moratorium
occurred in 1960, when seventeen additional new members joined
the Organization and Castro's Cuba was the first Latin American
nation to recognize Peking. The American position was in
serious jeopardy, because most of the new African members
abstained in the voting. Hence the supporters of the morato-
rium won by only a plurality, and the combined votes of the
opposition, abstainers and absentees exceeded the US position
by fifteen votes. Only forty-two percent of the membership
voted for postponement in 1960 - forty-two to thirty-four
with twenty-two abstentions. The patterns of UN roll-calls
on Chinese representation under the moratorium device in terms
of groups are shown in Tables III-2, and III-3.

Shifting of the Vote

The voting records of the Communist countries in
dealing with the China issue in the UN confirmed the defini-
tion of bloc politics defined by Thomas Hovet, Jr.:

> A bloc ... the members of which are bound in
> their votes in the General Assembly by the caucus
> decision .... there is present only one true
> bloc - the Soviet bloc, which ... operates as a

TABLE III-2

PATTERNS OF UN ROLL-CALLS ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION

UNDER MORATORIUM DEVICE, 1952, 1954-1960

Countries (by groups)	1952	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
SOVIET BLOC								
USSR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ukraine SSR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Byelorussia SSR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Czechoslovakia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Poland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Albania				-	-	-	-	-
Bulgaria				-	-	-	-	-
Hungary				-	-	-	-	-
Rumania				-	-	-	-	-
SCANDINAVIAN GROUP								
Sweden	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Denmark	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Norway	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Finland				-	-	-	-	-
Iceland	+	+	+	+	+	a	a	a
AFRO-ASIAN GROUP								
Burma	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
India	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Indonesia	a	a	-	-	-	-	-	-
Afghanistan	a	a	a	-	-	-	-	-
Ethiopia	+	+	+	+	+	+	a	-
Pakistan	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Liberia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Philippines	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Thailand	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Turkey	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Iran	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Nepal				-	-	-	-	-
Laos				a	a	a	+	a
Malaysia					+	+	+	a
Japan					+	+	+	+
Cyrus								a
ARAB GROUP								
Yemen	a	a	a	-	-	-	-	-
U.A.R. (Egypt)	+	a	a	-	-	-	-	-
Syria*	a	a	a	-	-			

TABLE III-2 (Continued)

Countries (by groups)	1952	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Saudi Arabia	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Iraq	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-
Lebanon	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ceylon				-	-	-	-	-
Sudan				-	-	-	-	-
Morocco				+	-	-	-	-
Cambodia				a	a	-	-	-
Tunisia				a	a	a	a	a
Libya				a	+	a	a	a
Jordan				a	+	+	+	+
WESTERN EUROPEAN GROUP								
Yugoslavia	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
France	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Greece	+	+	+	+	+	a	+	+
Ireland				+	-	-	-	-
Portugal				a	a	a	a	a
Austria				+	+	a	a	a
Italy				+	+	+	+	+
Spain				+	+	+	+	+
BENELUX GROUP								
Belgium	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Luxembourg	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
The Netherlands	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
COMMONWEALTH GROUP								
Australia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Canada	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
New Zealand	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
LATIN AMERICAN GROUP								
Argentina	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Brazil	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Chile	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Colombia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Costa Rica	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Dominican Republic	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ecuador	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
El Salvador	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Haiti	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Honduras	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Mexico	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

TABLE III-2 (Continued)

Countries (by groups)	1952	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Nicaragua	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Panama	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Paraguay	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Peru	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Uruguay	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Venezuela	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bolivia	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Guatemala	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Cuba	+	+	+	+	+	+	a	-
NON-CAUCUS MEMBERS								
Israel	-	+	a	a	a	a	a	a
South Africa	+	+	+	+	a	+	+	+
Republic of China	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
U.S.A.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
AFRICAN GROUP								
Ghana					-	-	-	-
Guinea							-	-
Mali								-
Nigeria								-
Senegal								-
Cameroun								a
Central African Republic								a
Chad								a
Congo (Brazzaville)								a
Dahomey								a
Gabon								a
Ivory Coast								a
Malagasy								a
Niger								a
Somalia								a
Togo								a
Upper Volta								a

Key: + = for   - = against   a = abstained/not voting

*In 1958, Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic, and Syria gave up her seat in the General Assembly. That union was dissolved in 1961.

Source: UN Yearbook, 1952, 1954-60.

TABLE III-3

SCALOGRAM OF UN ROLL-CALLS ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION

UNDER MORATORIUM DEVICE, 1952, 1954-60

Countries	Roll Calls							
	1952	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
U.S.A.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Republic of China	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Belgium	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Luxembourg	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
The Netherlands	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
France	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Turkey	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Canada	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Australia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
New Zealand	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Iran	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Lebanon	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Liberia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Philippines	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Thailand	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Argentina	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Brazil	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Chile	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Colombia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Costa Rica	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Dominican Republic	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ecuador	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
El Salvador	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Haiti	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Honduras	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Mexico	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Nicaragua	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Panama	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Paraguay	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Peru	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Uruguay	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Venezuela	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bolivia	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Guatemala	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Greece	+	+	+	+	+	a	+	+
Pakistan	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
South Africa	+	+	+	+	a	+	+	+
Cuba	+	+	+	+	+	+	a	-
Ethiopia	+	+	+	+	+	+	a	-

TABLE III-3 (Continued)

Countries	Roll Calls							
	1952	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Iceland	+	+	+	+	+	a	a	a
Israel	-	(+)	a	a	a	a	a	a
Saudi Arabia	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Iraq	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-
U.A.R. (Egypt)	+	a	a	-	-	-	-	-
Syria	a	a	a	-	-			
Yemen	a	a	a	-	-	-	-	-
Afganistan	a	a	a	-	-	-	-	-
Indonesia	a	a	-	-	-	-	-	-
Denmark	+	(-)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Norway	+	(-)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Yugoslavia	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sweden	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Burma	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
India	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Byelorussia SSR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Czechoslovakia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Poland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ukraine SSR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
U.S.S.R.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Italy				+	+	+	+	+
Spain				+	+	+	+	+
Jordan				a	+	+	+	+
Austria				+	+	a	a	a
Laos				a	a	a	+	a
Lybia				a	+	a	a	a
Portugal				a	a	a	a	a
Tunisia				a	a	a	a	a
Cambodia				a	a	-	-	-
Ireland				+	(-)	-	-	-
Morocco				+	(-)	-	-	-
Albania				-	-	-	-	-
Bulgaria				-	-	-	-	-
Hungary				-	-	-	-	-
Rumania				-	-	-	-	-
Finland				-	-	-	-	-
Ceylon				-	-	-	-	-
Nepal				-	-	-	-	-
Sudan				-	-	-	-	-
Japan					+	+	+	+
Malaysia					+	+	+	a
Ghana					-	-	-	-

Key: + = for   - = against   a = abstention
      no entry = no vote   ( )= inconsistency

Source: UN Yearbook, 1952, 1954-60.

single unit ....[40]

On the other hand, the UN votes supporting the U.S. position on this issue were not solid. Support for the American position was diminishing not only because of lack of enthusiasm on the part of some nations for the U.S. position, but for reasons not directly related to Chinese representation.

According to A. G. Mezerik,[41] in the 1958 vote, two NATO partners shifted their positions from supporting the U.S. to abstaining on the China issue. Iceland, because of NATO's inaction on its fisheries dispute with the British; Greece, because of its fight with Britain and Turkey over Cyprus. Austria no longer supported the U.S. on the Chinese question and abstained from voting, because it was insistent on establishing its position as a neutral state. Libya, under pressure of its anti-U.S. Arab neighbors, also changed its former support of the United States and abstained from voting. While these countries changed their positions because, at least in part, of peripheral considerations. Iraq in 1958 changed from outright support of the U.S. to a positive position favoring the seating of Communist China, whom it accorded recognition immediately after the Iraq revolt of July 1958. The scalogram of UN roll-calls of U.S. allies on Chinese representation under the moratorium device are presented in Table III-4.

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[40] Hovet, _Bloc Politics in the United Nations_, pp. 30-31.

[41] Mezerik (ed.), _China: Taiwan Problem, External Relations, Representation in UN_, p. 31.

TABLE III-4

SCALOGRAM OF US ALLIES' VOTING ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION

UNDER MORATORIUM DEVICE, 1952, 1954-1960

Countries	Roll Calls							
	1952	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
U.S.A.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Republic of China	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Belgium	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Canada	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
France	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
The Netherlands	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Luxembourg	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Turkey	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Australia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
New Zealand	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Philippines	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Thailand	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Iran	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Argentina	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Brazil	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Chile	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Colombia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Costa Rica	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Dominican Republic	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ecuador	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
El Salvador	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Haiti	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Hondruas	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Mexoco	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Nicaragua	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Panama	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

TABLE III-4 (Continued)

Countries	Roll Calls							
	1952	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Paraguay	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Peru	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Urguay	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Venezuela	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bolivia	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Guatemala	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Greece	+	+	+	+	+	a	+	+
Pakistan	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Iceland	+	+	+	+	+	a	a	a
Cuba[1]	+	+	+	+	+	+	a	-
Iraq[2]	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-
Denmark	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Norway	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Italy				+	+	+	+	+
Spain[3]				+	+	+	+	+
Japan				+	+	+	+	+
Portugal[4]				a	a	a	a	a

Key: + = for   - = against   a = abstained/not voting

Source: . UN Yearbook, 1952-60.

[1]The Castro regime took over Cuba in January 1959. Since then, Cuba is no longer a U.S. ally.

[2]Iraq withdrew from CENTO on March 24, 1959, after the revolt in July 1958.

[3]The present writer counts Spain as an ally of the U.S., since it receives U.S. aid and grants the U.S. use of bases on Spanish soil.

[4]Portugal's regular abstentions were due to its un-willingness to provoke Peking to take action against the Portuguese colony at Macao, according to the late Nationalist Ambassador to Portugal, Dr. Hua-chang Wang's lecture in Taipei, Spring 1957. The present writer attended that lecture.

At the end of the 1950's, it had been more than ten years since the establishment of the Chinese Communist regime on the mainland. It had become clear to many that the Communist regime was more than just a passing phase and was therefore probably entitled to UN membership. Moreover, an increasing number of members felt that the United Nations could hardly expect Communist China to observe the UN Charter unless it could participate in UN proceedings, as the Israeli delegate expressed it:

> According to the rules of international law
> concerning recognition, the Peking Government
> was undoubtedly the only government of China ....
> It might not be a democratic government, but
> it (would not be) the only government recognized
> by the United Nations to suffer from that defect
> .... it had become evident that the peace of
> Asia would in large measure depend on the relations
> between the United Nations and China and, on the
> other, that, by refusing representation to the
> Peking Government, the United Nations was depriving
> itself of all possibility of influence, negotiation
> and contact with that government. [42]

Because of the increased power of the Afro-Asian new nations in the United Nations as well as the pressures described above, the U.S. had to change her strategy and to adopt new parliamentary tactics in order to support the seat of Nationalist China in the UN. Hence, the U.S. shift the postponement of consideration tactic to the "important question" approach in 1961. [43]

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[42] UNGAOR, 5th Session, 1st Committee, 432nd Meeting, January 26, 1951, p. 558.

[43] John G. Stoessinger, The United Nations and the Superpowers: China, Russia, and America (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 35-36.

The Parliamentary Strategy of Voting

Since the U.S. was a super-military power and the leading financial contributor to the UN, the American position almost always carried the most weight in the General Assembly. Moreover, the American tradition in the intricacies of political lobbying, compromise and majority rule might have given it an advantage over the Soviet Union, which was relatively unfamiliar with these concepts under a one-party Communist dictatorship.[44]

Most of the General Assembly roll-calls on the question of Chinese representation during the 1950's, according to Sheldon Appleton,[45] were taken in the midst of, or immediately following, important international developments considered by many U.S. allies to be relevant to the Issue. The vote in 1955 followed an offshore islands bombardment by the Communists; it came in 1956 in the midst of a concerted UN effort to deal with the crises in Hungary and the Suez. The 1958 vote came, again, in the wake of serious tensions in the area of the Taiwan Strait; and the 1959 vote was taken on the heels of the Dalai Lama's escape from revolt-torn Tibet, Communist subversion in Laos, and the explosion of conflict by force of Sino-Indian border disputes.

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[44]Ibid., p. 30.

[45]Appleton, _The Eternal Triangle? Communist China, the United States and the United Nations_, p. 190.

The attack on India by the Chinese Communists antagonized that nation which for most of the 1950's had been the principal non-Communist champion of seating Peking in the UN. It also alienated some of those non-aligned countries which might have been friendly to the PRC. The 1960 vote came just after the admission of seventeen new nations into the UN - a development which had driven the UN toward universality. The vicissitudes of the voting competition in the UN on the China issue during the period of the 1950's are presented in Figure 3-1.

The Norms of Regimes and Their Votes
on the Moratorium Resolution

In Table III-5, the UN members are grouped in terms of the norms of their regimes and their votes on the China issue during the 1950's in accordance with Jean Blondel's classification with a few corrections,[46] so as to show the patterns between types of government and their votes in the UN on Chinese representation.

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[46]Jean Blondel, Comparing Political Systems (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 243-48; Corrections were made based on the advice of Dr. Richard Baker, Professor of Latin American Politics at the University of Oklahoma.

No. of
Votes

Fig. 3-1. UN General Assembly Voting on the Representation
of China under the Moratorium Device, 1951-1960.

TABLE III-5

UN ROLL-CALLS AND NORMS OF REGIME: PATTERNS OF

VOTING ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION UNDER THE

MORATORIUM DEVICE, 1952, 1954-60

Countries* (by Norm of Regime)	Roll-Calls							
	1952	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
RADICAL AUTHORITARIAN **(COMMUNIST)**								
U.S.S.R.	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Ukraine SSR	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Byelorussia SSR	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Czechoslovakia	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Poland	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Yugoslavia	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Albania				−	−	−	−	−
Bulgaria				−	−	−	−	−
Hungary				−	−	−	−	−
Rumania				−	−	−	−	−
AUTHORITARIAN CONSERVATIVE								
China (ROC)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Pakistan	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Thailand	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Greece	+	+	+	+	+	a	+	+
Argentina	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bolivia	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Brazil	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Chile	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Dominican Republic	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ecuador	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Guatemala	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Haiti	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Honduras	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Nicaragua	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Panama	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Paraguay	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Venezuela	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
South Africa	+	+	+	+	a	+	+	+
Cuba	+	+	+	+	+	+	a	−
Spain				+	+	+	+	+
Portugal				a	a	a	a	a
Ghana					−	−	−	−

TABLE III-5 (Continued)

Countries (by Norm of Regime)	Roll-Calls							
	1952	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
TRADITIONAL CONSERVATIVE								
Colombia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
El Salvador	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Peru	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Iran	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Liberia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ethiopia	+	+	+	+	+	+	a	–
Iraq	+	+	+	+	+	–	–	–
Saudi Arabia	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Afghanistan	a	a	a	–	–	–	–	–
Jordan				a	+	+	+	+
Malaysia					+	+	+	a
Loas				a	a	a	+	a
Cambodia				a	a	–	–	–
Morocco				+	–	–	–	–
Nepal				–	–	–	–	–
LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC								
U.S.A.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Philippines	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Turkey	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Lebanon	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Australia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
New Zealand	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Canada	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Belgium	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Luxembourg	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
The Netherlands	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
France	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Costa Rica	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Uruguay	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Iceland	+	+	+	+	+	a	a	a
Israel	–	+	a	a	a	a	a	a
Norway	+	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Denmark	+	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Sweden	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
India	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Italy				+	+	+	+	+
Ireland				+	–	–	–	–
Ceylon				–	–	–	–	–
Finland				–	–	–	–	–
Japan					+	+	+	+

TABLE III-5 (Continued)

Countries (by Norm of Regime)	Roll-Calls							
	1952	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
POPULIST								
Mexico	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
U.A.R. (Egypt)	+	a	a	-	-	-	-	-
Syria**	a	a	a	-	-			
Yemen	a	a	a	-	-	-	-	-
Indonesia	a	a	-	-	-	-	-	-
Burma	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lybia				a	+	a	a	a
Tunisia				a	a	a	a	a
Sudan				-	-	-	-	-

Key: + = for   - = against   a = abstained/not voting

*Those nations which voted only once or twice during the late 1950's are excluded from this table.

**Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic in 1958.

Source: UN Yearbook, 1952, 1954-60.

The results of Table III-5 are summarized in Table III-6, showing support, opposition, and abstentions for the China issue during the 1950's.

TABLE III-6

NORMS OF REGIME AND UN VOTES ON CHINESE

REPRESENTATION, 1952, 1954-60

(in percentages)

UN Votes	Types of Government*				
	AC	TC	LD	P	RA
For U.S. & R.O.C.	91	60	68	11	
(N)	(21)	(9)	(17)	(1)	
Against U.S. & R.O.C.	5	27	28	67	100
(N)	(1)	(4)	(7)	(6)	(10)
Abstaining	4	13	4	22	
(N)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100
(N)	(22)	(14)	(25)	(10)	(10)

*Normative Configuration:

AC = Authoritarian Conservation
TC = Traditional Conservative
LD = Liberal Democratic
 P = Populist
RA = Radical Authoritarian (Communist).

As Table III-6 indicates, the findings are:

1. The ten radical-authoritarian (Communist) regimes all voted as a solid bloc (100 percent) against the postponement of consideration of the China problem. They all supported the Soviet position of seating the PRC and removing the ROC. This is self-evident because the Chinese

Communist Government in Peking belongs to the same type of regime which has been founded on Communism.

2. Of the twenty-three authoritarian conservative regimes, twenty-one (91 percent) voted for Taipei, while the other two, one (Ghana) voted for Peking, one (Portugal) abstained. According to Blondel's classification, the Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan also belongs to the authoritarian conservative group. This confirms the point that the same type of regimes supports each other in international organization. The majority of this group consists of Latin American nations.

3. Of the fifteen traditional conservative regimes, nine (60 percent) voted for the Nationalist Government, four (27 percent) voted for the Communist Government, and two (13 percent) abstained. Nearly two-thirds of this conservative group supported the seat of the Nationalist Government of China in the United Nations.

4. Of the twenty-four liberal democratic regimes, seventeen (68 percent) of them voted for the Nationalist, seven (28 percent) for the Communist. Nearly three-fourths of this group supported the Taipei Government, while one-fourths supported Peking. The majority of the former were U.S. allies and supported the U.S. moratorium strategy.

5. Of the ten populist regimes, only one Latin American nation (Mexico) supported the UN seat of Taipei,

while six (67 percent) of them supported the seating of Peking, and two abstained from voting. This was due to the fact that the majority of the populist regimes had been established in the new nations after World War II. Generally speaking, they had strong anti-Western feelings as well as a leftist political orientation.

6. Nearly all the Asian UN members bordering Communist China, except Laos voted for Peking, no matter what the norms of their regimes were. This was a unique geopolitical factor in their foreign policies. They believed that having China as a friendly neighbor would be in their national interests. Their governments thought it would thus insure the friendship of a powerful neighbor and make easier the task of securing their frontiers. A basis for avoiding conflict and misunderstanding would be established through diplomatic recognition.[47] These Asian nations except Loas and Nepal were among the first group of countries to recognize Peking in the late 1949 and early 1950.

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[47]Halpern (ed.), _Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents_, pp. 203, 303, 329-30.

CHAPTER IV

ROLL-CALLS ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION UNDER

THE RESOLUTION DECLARING THE MATTER

AN "IMPORTANT QUESTION," 1961-70

Nonrecognition Policy Continued

Under Kennedy Administration

After winning the 1960 election by the slimmest of

majorities, President John F. Kennedy did not want to reopen

the China question, since he thought he had neither the man-

date nor the support of Congress.[1] Therefore, President Kennedy

thought that the question should be postponed until his second

term.[2] Due to this understanding, Secretary of State Dean

Rusk thus carried out President Kennedy's policy of maintain-

ing the status quo toward Peking without taking action on any

staff recommendations in regard to U.S. China policy.[3]

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[1]Dean Rusk, "Prospective Issue in U.S.-Chinese Rela-
tions," in Festus Justin Viser (ed.), China's Open Wall
(Memphis, Tenn.: Memphis State University Press,1972), p. 51.

[2]Personal interview with Professor Dean Rusk, former
U.S. Secretary of State, at the University of Georgia on
June 23, 1977.

[3]Ibid.

The new Kennedy Administration's China policy was outlined by the new U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, at a news conference on February 6, 1961. Rusk reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan. He said that the U.S. had "strong commitments to our ally," Nationalist China. "That commitment is firm" despite Communist China's view that it was "a major obstacle" to a settlement with the U.S. The question of Chinese representation in the UN was conditioned by "the highly complicated parliamentary situation" in the UN.[4] President Kennedy said at his news conference on March 8, 1961, that his Administration's first effort to negotiate an improvement of U.S.-Chinese relations had been rejected by Peking. Kennedy said that Communist China had shown itself to be "extremely belligerent toward us" and that perhaps this was due to Peking's recognition of U.S. commitments "to maintaining its connections with other countries," presumably Nationalist China. President Kennedy made it clear that the U.S. was "not prepared to surrender," to attain a relaxation of tensions with mainland China.[5] Secretary Rusk said at a Washington news conference on March 9, 1961, that Communist China itself had adopted a position that would preclude its admission to the UN unless Nationalist Chinese representatives

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[4]U.S. Department of State Bulletin, February 27, 1961, p. 303.

[5]Kwan Ha Yim (ed.), China & the U.S. 1955-63 (New York: Facts on File, 1973), p. 147.

were unseated. He expressed doubt that this could be done without creating "a very serious problem" for the UN's future.[6]

"Important Question" Strategy

The Charter says nothing to indicate that a decision to change the representation of a country is an "important question"; but any question declared "important" must be carried by a two-thirds majority under Article 18.

Until 1955, votes for a postponement consideration were carried with ease, there being at least three times as many votes in favor of the moratorium as those against. This situation gradually changed with the admission of new member states, especially from Asia and Africa, after 1955. In 1956, the votes favoring postponement were down to a two-to-one ratio. The gap continued to narrow and in 1960 the difference became a mere eight votes. Equally significant was the fact that all newly admitted African states either abstained from or opposed the annual U.S. proposal.

In 1961, this changing pattern of voting in the General Assembly forced the U.S. to reconsider its policy of keeping out Peking by this use of a procedural device requiring only a simple majority. U.S. strategy then moved the discussion into the substantive area by which those who

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[6]US Department of State Bulletin, March 27, 1961, p. 435.

wished to seat Communist China would need to muster a two-thirds majority to prevail.[7]

The first step in this process was taken by New Zealand which offered as an agenda item the "Question of Representation of China in the United Nations."[8] The New Zealand delegation indicated that this item was inserted with the desire to create a substantive discussion:

> Its purpose was to invite full and free considera-tion of a very complex problem. We had come to the conclusion that after ten years of silence, during which the composition of the Assembly had dramatically changed, much good could come from a renewed exposition of the issues, from a renewed attempt, through the process of general discussion and debate, to find common ground in dealing with one of the gravest and potentially one of the most explosive issues facing the community of nations.[9]

The second step in the move from procedural to sub-stantive consideration was taken by the U.S. in conjunction with Australia, Italy, Colombia and Japan. This was to offer a draft resolution which said:

> In accordance with Article 18 of the Charter of the United Nations, any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question.[10]

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[7]A. G. Mezerik (ed.), China Representation in the UN, Vietnam, Sino-Soviet Dispute, French Recognition, Atomic Bomb Explosion (New York: International Review Service, 1966), pp. 15-16.

[8]UN doc. A/4873, September 17, 1961.

[9]UN doc. A/PV. 1077, December 13, 1961, p. 57.

[10]UN doc. A/L372.

At the same time, the Soviet Union sponsored a draft resolution on October 27, 1961 for the adoption of the sixteen session of the General Assembly. It reads:

"The General Assembly,

"Considering it necessary to restore the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations,

"Bearing in mind that only representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are competent to occupy China's place in the United Nations and all its organs,

"Resolves to remove immediately from all United Nations organs the representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek clique who are unlawfully occupying the place of China in the United Nations,

"Invites the Government of the People's Republic of China to send its representatives to participate in the work of the United Nations and of all its organs." 11

The Assembly Debate: A Variety of View-Points

The Assembly debated the two Chinese items through twelve plenary meetings, fifty-six member states participating in the debate. A variety of viewpoints were presented, but the most important can be summarized as the policies of three groups: the Soviet bloc, the U.S. and allies, and the "two-China" group.[12]

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[11]UN doc. A/L360, October 27, 1961.

[12]The Annual Report of the Chinese Delegation to the 16th Session of the UN General Assembly (in Chinese) (Taipei: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1962), pp. 39-46.

Soviet Bloc Demands to Seat the PRC and to Exclude the ROC

The U.S.S.R. representative opened the debate. He observed that the Chinese people had twelve years earlier brought into power a people's government which had transformed China from a semi-colonial country into a rapidly advancing socialist state whose foreign policy was based on the principles of coexistence. It would have been a fitting thing for the United Nations to let the representatives of the People's Republic of China be seated in their lawful place in the Assembly. Instead, for twelve years, in complete violation of international law and the United Nations Charter, that seat had been occupied by those who represented nobody.

The Soviet bloc said that because some members of Western military blocs were unhappy with the success of the People's Republic of China in the construction of socialism, they had prevented a positive solution of the question of restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China. That still seemed to be their policy; thus, the five-power draft resolution was a new stratagem to block a solution by illegitimately complicating a simple question of credentials. There were not two Chinese Governments; Taiwan was an inalienable part of China, but, without the support of the United States, the Chiang Kai-shek group installed there would rapidly be swept away by the people. The rightful Government of the whole of China was that of the People's Republic of China, whose lawful rights had to be restored.

The U.S.S.R. position, thus stated, was supported
by representatives of Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma,
the Byelorussian SSR, Cambodia, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Cuba,
Finland, Ghana, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Poland, Romania,
Sweden, the Ukrainian SSR and Yugoslavia. Delegates from
all of those states also maintained in the debate that the
Central Government of the People's Republic of China was
legitimately entitled to representation in the United Nations,
and favored the exclusion of the Government of the Republic
of China.

Most Members supporting the U.S.S.R. text were against
the U.S.-sponsored five-power proposal. Sweden considered
that the question of Chinese representation, important as its
political implications were, remained a question of credentials.
Ceylon regarded the five-power draft as procedural obstruc-
tionism; the enforced isolation of the Chinese people weakened
the Organization and could only exacerbate existing tensions.
Ghana held that adoption of the five-power proposal would
set a dangerous precedent if a two-thirds majority were to
be required to seat the representatives of a new Government
whenever a revolutionary change of government took place in
a Member State. The issue, it added, was not what to do with
the former Government of China, or the fate of Taiwan, but how
to enable the effective Government of China to take its seat
in the United Nations. In the view of many of these delegations,

the contention that there were two Governments of China was
a fiction introduced to complicate the issue and avoid a
solution.

U.S. Allies: Two-Third Majority Required

Introducing the five-power proposal, the United States
stated that it would be unrealistic if the Assembly were to
respond to the demands of Peking to expel and replace the
Republic of China in the United Nations. Such a decision
would ignore the war-like character and aggressive behavior
of the leaders on the mainland of China who talked of the
inevitability of war as an article of faith. The regime in
Peking had demonstrated that it believed in a philosophy of
violence and fanaticism. The regime had carried out aggres-
sive military actions against Korea, against the Republic of
China and Taiwan, and against South and South-East Asia. It
had for twelve years acted in continuous and violent defiance
of the principles of the United Nations. The question of the
representation of China was, therefore, of transcendent im-
portance and should be considered in the light of the purposes
and principles of the United Nations Charter. Those advocat-
ing Peking's admission should seek rather to persuade its
rulers to accept the standards of the community of nations.
To expel a Member which supported the Charter, to make room
for a regime which defied the Charter and to arm that regime
with a United Nations licence to make war across the Taiwan

Straits, was morally and legally wrong.

Other representatives emphasized the far-reaching
political and moral issues involved. A complicated question
with profound implications for the Organization and for world
peace could not be resolved by a simple procedural means.
Any attempt to do so would, the representative of Australia
said, create at least as many problems as it would solve and
be damaging to the United Nations and the structure of inter-
national relationships in the North-West Pacific and North-
East Asia. The representative of Japan pointed out that two
authorities, each with treaty ties with a Great Power, claimed
the status of the lawful Government of China. In seeking a
solution all relevant factors and provisions of the Charter
must be considered.

Universality: Two-Chinas

Support for the five-power draft resolution was also
expressed by some Members who also favored the entry of the
Chinese People's Republic into the United Nations. Their
positions were based upon the principle of universality for
UN membership. Thus, the representative of Senegal rejected
the link that had been made between the seating of the People's
Republic and exclusion of the Republic of China and suggested
that the problem was a unique one which was undoubtedly
covered by the provisions of Article 18(2) of the Charter
(which specifies those matters on which a two-thirds majority

vote is required for adoption of an Assembly resolution).

The United Kingdom's representative said that his delegation's objective in supporting the five-power draft resolution was not to push the problem aside, since the facts of international life required the presence of the Chinese People's Republic in the Organization. The aim of the United Nations must be to reach solution acceptable to a wide majority of Member States and as fair to all interested parties as the circumstances permitted. The United Kingdom's vote for the Soviet draft resolution was without prejudice to the United Kingdom's position that sovereignty over the island of Taiwan was undetermined, as was the question of who was to represent Taiwan.

A number of Members, some of whom did not support the five-power draft, called for efforts to reach an equitable and orderly solution of the problem. Sierra Leone favored negotiations with the countries concerned on the basis of acceptance of the existence of the People's Republic, recognition of the right of the Nationalist Government of China also to be represented, with due regard being paid to the views of those countries which had championed the latter Government and were anxious to seek a satisfactory solution. Cyprus, the Federation of Malaya and Nigeria were among those who suggested the possibility of creating appropriate machinery for this purpose.

Nationalist Chinese Position

On December 1 and 14, 1961, the Nationalist Chinese
representative, Dr. T. F. Tsiang stated in the General
Assembly debate:

Ought not to Discuss the Problem

The right of representation of my government
in the United Nations should not be called into
question at all. The Republic of China is one of
the founding members of the United Nations ...
it should be remembered by all that the establish-
ment of the United Nations was only made possible
by the common victory of the United Nations over the
fascist powers in the Second World War. Towards
that victory, my government and people sacrificed
3,600,000 lives .... For this reason, China took
part in the preliminary drafting of the Charter
of the United Nations at Dumbarton Oaks ... the
Republic of China is named in Article 23 of the
Charter to be one of the five permanent members
of the Security Council. Yet today, some
delegations, forgetting history, wantonly call
into question the right of representation of my
government in this world organization.

The government which my delegation has the
honor to represent in the United Nations today is
the legitimate continuation of the government of
China represented in San Francisco. It is based
on a constitution drafted and passed by people's
deputies, elected by the 600 million people of
China ....

New Colonialism

In these years when we see the liquidation of
Western colonialism in Asia and Africa, we are
deeply troubled by the specter of the rise of a
new Soviet colonial empire. What we have on the
Chinese mainland may be called the classical
example of the new threat to the peace of the
world and the rights of peoples. If the United
Nations should ever yield to the demands of the
Soviet Union, this world organization would be
negating its own principles and ideals.

The United Nations could not admit the Chinese
Communists and at the same time remain true
to its mission.

Chinese Communist Regime is Tyrant

In the first five years of their rule, in
order to consolidate their power, the Communist
liquidated 20 million people whom they considered
counter-revolutionary. Two years ago, in fulfilling
their so-called "Leap Forward" movement, they drove
millions of men and women to work in the backyard
furnaces to produce iron and steel. With the
institution of the so-called people's communes,
the Chinese people were reduced to the status of
"animals in a zoo." ...

On this issue ... the will of the Chinese
people has been made clear. It has expressed
through the Chinese prisoners of war in Korea,
of whom about seventy-five percent, or 14,000,
chose of their own free will to be repatriated to
Taiwan and not the mainland of China. It has been
expressed through the Chinese people who have fled
and are fleeing daily from the mainland to freedom
in Hong Kong and Macao.

Chinese Communists are Aggressors

In considering the question of the admission
of the Chinese Communists to the United Nations,
we must ever keep in mind the requirements as
stated in Article IV of the Charter. The first
and preliminary requirement is that membership in
the United Nations is open only to peace-loving
states. Is the Communist regime on the mainland
of China "peace-loving"? We cannot forget that
regime participated in the aggression against
Korea. For that act of aggression, the Assembly,
in its resolution 498 (V), condemned the Chinese
Communist as aggressors. I do not have to remind
the Assembly that resolution is still on the books.
The United Nations cannot condone aggression.

If anyone still has any illusions about the
Communists' qualifications for membership in this
respect, let him be reminded of the use of force
by the Chinese Communists in their border disputes
with India ....

... could anybody really believe that the participation of the Chinese Communist would promote or facilitate disarmament? Just the contrary. The Chinese Communists are, at this moment, even more bellicose than their Russian comrades, if that is possible. They have applauded the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union. In regard to inspection and control, the Chinese Communists take exactly the same stand as the Soviet Union.

Two-Chinas?

In the course of this debate, some speakers have, directly or indirectly, suggested a solution along the line of two-Chinas.

Such a solution is not acceptable to my government. The people on the mainland of China are our brothers and sisters. We have no quarrel with them. At the same time, we cannot forget their plight. They have been enslaved. They have been starved. We free Chinese, while enjoying our freedom, naturally wish to help our people on the mainland to regain their freedom. We cannot write them off. We will continue to struggle for the freedom of the entire Chinese people.

Universality

Some speakers have taken advantage of this debate to extol the concept of "universality." In past debates in the United Nations on this point, my delegation has stated again and again that we believe that the United Nations should try to approach universality in its membership. At the same time, we have affirmed that arithmetical universality is impossible and undesirable. Article IV of the Charter defines the qualifications for membership. Articles V and VI provide for the suspension and expulsion of members who have failed to live up to the obligations of membership. These Articles demand that we should not sacrifice the principles and ideals of the Charter in order to achieve arithmetical universality.

The United Nations should tolerate different political and social systems. Nevertheless, if the United Nations is to survive, their membership must have a minimum of likemindedness. To declare

that it is a matter of little importance whether
the Chinese Communists are peace-loving or not,
and whether they respect human rights or not,
amounts to the desecration and degradation of the
United Nations. 13

Two-Thirds Majority Required

On December 15, 1961, the Assembly voted on the two-draft resolutions. By a roll-call of sixty-one to twenty-one, with twenty abstentions, the General Assembly decided to vote first on the five-power proposal. This was adopted by a roll-call vote of sixty-one to thirty-four with seven abstentions. The text of the resolution is as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Noting that a serious divergence of views
exists among Members concerning the representation
of a founder Member who is named in the Charter
of the United Nations,

"Recalling that this matter has been described
repeatedly in the General Assembly by all segments
of opinion as vital and crucial and that on numerous
occasions its inscription on the agenda has been
requested under rule 15 of the rules of procedure
as an item of an important and urgent character,

"Recalling further the recommendation contained
in General Assembly resolution 396 (V) of 14 December
1950 that, "Whenever more than one authority claims
to be the government entitled to represent a Member
State in the United Nations and this question
becomes the subject of controversy in the United
Nations, the question should be considered in the
light of the purposes and principles of the Charter
and the circumstances of each case,"

"Decides in accordance with Article 18 of the
Charter that any proposal to change the representation
of China is an important question." 14

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[13]China Yearbook, 1961-62, Appendix (pp.991-1004).

[14]UN doc. A/RES/1668 (XVI).

Although this resolution required only a simple majority,
its adoption meant that a two-thirds majority would be re-
quired in order to seat the representatives from Peking.
This two-thirds was not obtained in the voting in the General
Assembly from 1961 to 1970.

The Assembly rejected the U.S.S.R. draft resolution,
by a roll-call vote of forty-eight against, thirty-six in
favor, and 20 abstentions. Norway subsequently asked that
its abstention be changed to a vote in favor of the draft
resolution.[15]

After 1961 there were two separate questions concern-
ing the Chinese representation on which votes were taken in
the Assembly. The first was simply whether to seat the
representatives of Peking or Taipei. On seven occasions,
this was preceded by a vote on the "important question"
resolution. In 1961 and 1965-1970, the Assembly was asked
to determine whether proposals to change the representation
of China were "important," as that word is used in Article
18 of the Charter.

States consistently favoring the representation of
Peking have voted that only a simple majority should be
required to effect the change. States consistently favoring
the representation of Taipei have voted for a two-thirds
majority. To the anti-Peking and pro-Taipei forces, this
voting strategy was a measure of guarantee to ensure the

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[15]UN Yearbook, 1961 (New York: UN Office of Public
Information), pp. 127-28.

defeat of the Communist proposal to seat the PRC and to exclude the ROC.

Analysis of 1961 Vote

The final voting on the two resolutions reflected various influences and affiliations - military, political and economic. Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) tended to vote with the U.S.; Denmark and Norway being exceptions. These latter two countries continued their long-standing policy of support for the seating of Peking. The United Kingdom voted for the Western resolution although it recognized the government of Mainland China. Nevertheless, once it had approved the measure designating the issue an "important" one, the United Kingdom also voted in favor of the Soviet resolution. Israel, although recognizing the Peking government, but with her strong Western ties, voted with the U.S. on its resolution but abstained on the Soviet draft. African nations which had strong economic ties to the West through the French Community or the British Commonwealth voted with the West on the "important question" resolution and opposed the Soviet measure or abstained from voting.

The Casablanca group of African nations (Ghana, Guinea, Mali, UAR, Morocco) voted against the Western resolution and in favor of the resolution to oust the Nationalist representatives. The Bandung group of Asian nations[16] largely opposed

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[16]Nineteen members - Afhanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, U.A.R., & Yemen.

the Western resolution and supported the U.S.S.R. resolution.

In all, sixty-one nations voted to support the U.S. and its allies on the "important question" resolution but the impact of this large vote was considerably diluted by the results of the vote on the Soviet resolution. This voting showed less than half of the UN Member States - forty-eight - voted against a move to evict the Nationalist representatives in favor of the Peking Government. The voting-down of the Soviet resolution, which gained only thirty-seven votes, saved the U.S. from the necessity of utilizing the "important question" tactic. This also proved to be true in 1962 and 1963.

The Two Chinas in Africa and the 1962 Vote

Any new African country can be assured of receiving immediate recognition from the two Chinas, the Nationalists on Taiwan and the Communists on the mainland. Both Chinas are involved in aid projects in Africa. The Communist Chinese have dealt with the more radical states of Africa, such as the Casablanca Group, while maintaining informal and covert relations with factions in other nations. Nationalist ties are with the more moderate states, mainly those former French states which are members of the Union Africaine et Malagache (U.A.M.).[17]

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[17]Leon M. S. Slawecki, "The Two Chinas in Africa," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41 (1963), pp. 398-99.

Out of the 104 U.N. members in 1961, twenty-nine were
African - enough to swing a vote one way or the other if
they voted together. This African bloc was thus crucial to
the Nationalist Chinese Government to keep its UN seat.
During the sixteenth session of the General Assembly in 1961,
the Soviet Union deliberately chose to link Outer Mongolia's
application with that of Mauritania, a newly independent
nation in Africa. Should Nationalist China veto Outer
Mongolia's admission, the Soviet Union would retaliate by
vetoing the parallel admission of Mauritania. Thus, the two
dozen African states would be expected to vote for the seat-
ing of Peking as a matter of revenge against Taipei.[18] Con-
fronted with this dilemma, Nationalist China finally yielded
to the U.S. urging and abstained from the vote in the Security
Council on Outer Mongolia's admission, while the U.S. promised
to postpone its recognition of Outer Mongolia indefinitely.[19]
Therefore, the member states of the Brazzaville African group
switched their positions from abstaining in 1961 to opposing
the seating of Peking in 1962.[20]

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[18]Personal interview with Ambassador Harlan Cleveland,
former U.S. Assistant Secretary for International Organization
Affairs (1961-64) at Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colorado on
July 5, 1977.

[19]James C. Thomson, Jr., "On the Making of U.S. China
Policy, 1961-9: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics," China
Quarterly, No. 50 (April/June, 1972), p. 225; Personal inter-
view with Professor Dean Rusk, former U.S. Secretary of State
on June 23, 1977.

[20]Peter Cheng, "Peking's Entry into the United Nations:
Review and Retrospect," Asian Forum (Oct.-Dec., 1972), p. 20.

In order to retain and enlarge African support in the UN, the Nationalist Government's Vice Foreign Minister, Yang Hsi-kung, had done an excellent job through his "personal diplomacy."[21] Yang was the alternate Chinese representative to the UN Trusteeship Council from 1947 to 1959. There he had made friends with many African leaders of the emerging nations. He initiated the "Project Vanguard" of agricultural technical assistance to the African countries. He had also headed the Chinese Goodwill Mission to Africa every year after 1960.[22] Beginning in 1961, the Chinese Nationalists provided technical assistance programs, mainly agricultural know-how, to developing nations. Taiwan enjoys a semi-tropical climate that permits the transfer of agricultural techniques to tropical Africa. The major rice crop of Taiwan parallels the extensive rice potentials of West Africa and Madagascar.

By the end of 1962, there had been sixteen Chinese Goodwill and Survey Missions to Africa, and five African nations (Liberia, Libya, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Niger) had signed technical cooperation agreements with the Republic China on Taiwan.[23] Owing to the great success of this down-

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[21]Personal interview with Professor P. C. Miao, former Nationalist Chinese Ambassador to Lebanon and Head, Department of Asian & Pacific Affairs, MOFA,at Palo Alto,CA on Dec. 27, 1976.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Sino-African Technical Cooperation Committee, Sino-African Technical Cooperation (Taipei, October 1971), pp. 57-58.

to-earth help, most other African nations followed suit to
request technical assistance from Taiwan. On the other hand,
Peking had set out both to woo and to subvert a number of
African nations.[24] Therefore, the Nationalist Chinese
"Project Vanguard's" efforts clearly had a bearing on the
ROC's annual UN battle to keep itself in the world forum and
the PRC out.

Despite the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations since
1959, the Soviet Union attacked the "important question"
resolution of 1961 as well as the two-China proposal and
declared in the 1962 General Assembly debate that "those who
speak out against the presence of the People's Republic of
China within the United Nations have missed the bus of
history."[25] When the vote was taken on October 30, 1962,
it appeared that it was the Communists who had missed the
bus that year. The Soviet resolution to exclude the ROC
and seat the PRC was rejected by a vote of fifty-six to forty-
two in favor, with twelve abstentions. This vote indicated
a definite shift against the PRC. The absolute number of
votes against the PRC increased by eight, while those in
favor increased by only five. The eight new votes against
the PRC were cast by African nations which had abstained the
previous year: Central African Republic, Chad, Congo

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[24]Slawecki, "The Two Chinas in Africa," pp. 404-405.

[25]UNGAOR, XVI (1962), Vol. 2, p. 547.

(Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Ivory Coast,

Niger, and Upper Volta.

Speaking for the delegations of the African and

Malagasy Union, Michel Gallin-Douathe of the Central African

Republic said:

> The existence of nearly 700 million people
> should not be ignored indefinitely because "today
> the People's Republic of China represents a powerful
> military state which is on the verge of becoming a
> nuclear power."
>
> However, the delegations of the African and
> Malagasy Union were the first to agree that the
> peace-loving intentions of China were subject to
> question. Therefore, they believed in the possibility
> of exerting diplomatic pressure in order to "bring
> to reason, to some extent, that power, and to bring
> it to adopt a policy of peace."
>
> In his [my] view, it could not be the question
> of the restoration of lawful rights which did not,
> in fact, exist. Rather, it was necessary to create
> rights in order to make it possible for Communist
> China to become part of the international community
> if it could fulfill all the conditions required of
> members by the Charter.
>
> The delegations of the African and Malagasy
> Union wanted it clearly understood that the eventual
> admission of the People's Republic of China should
> in no way bring about the exclusion of Nationalist
> China. Moreover, the Republic of China was one of
> the permanent members of the Security Council, and
> its behavior had always been above reproach. Its
> position in the United Nations was therefore a lawful
> one. "Therefore, we cannot think in terms of exclud-
> ing or expelling Nationalist China from the
> Organization." 26

All in all, the year 1962 showed a significant

reversal of the pro-PRC trend with much of the membership

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[26]United Nations Review, Vol. 9, No. 11 (November 1962), p. 32.

favoring a compromise solution: a qualified dual representation for both Chinas based on the principle of universality. But those favoring a compromise were now closer to the U.S. than to the Soviet position.

This Nationalist Chinese success in the 1962 UN roll-call vote was in large part a result of its successful personal diplomacy and agricultural aid programs in Africa, as well as the result of strong U.S. support and the Chinese Communist attack on India in their border disputes. In 1963, the voting pattern remained almost the same. An Albanian-sponsored draft resolution to oust the ROC and seat the PRC was defeated by a vote of fifty-seven against, forty-one in favor, with twelve abstentions. No vote was taken in 1964 due to the UN financial and political crisis stemming from the arrears case in the payment of the dues assessed on the UN peace-keeping operations.

Tables IV-1 and IV-2 summarize the African nations' diplomatic recognition of the two Chinas as well as their votes in the General Assembly on the question of Chinese seating .

TABLE IV-1

AFRICAN COUNTRIES GRANTING DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION

(With Year Of Recognition: As of August 31, 1971)

To Nationalist China (ROC)		Suspended	To Communist China (PRC)		Suspended
Botswana	'66		+Algeria	'62	
*Cameroon	'60	'71	Burundi	'63	'65
*Central African			*Cameroon	'71	
Republic	'62		*Central African		
*Chad	'62		Republic	'64	'68
*Congo			*Congo		
(Brazzaville)	'60	'64	(Brazzaville)	'64	
Congo			Dahomey	'65	'66
(Kinshasa)	'60		Equatorial		
*Dahomey	'62		Guinea	'70	
*Gabon	'60		Ethiopia	'70	
Gambia	'68		+Ghana	'60	'66
*Ivory Coast	'63		+Guinea	'59	
Lesotho	'66		+Mali	'60	
Liberia	'57		*Mauritania	'65	
Libya[1]	'59		+Morocco	'58	
*Malagasy	'60		Nigeria	'71	
Malawi	'66		Senegal	'64	'69
*Mauritania	'60		Sierra Leone	'71	
*Niger	'63		Somalia	'60	
Rwanda	'62		Sudan	'58	
*Senegal	'60		Tanzania	'61	
Sierra Leone	'63	'71	Tunisia	'64	'67
South Africa[2]	'31		+U.A.R.		
Swaziland	'68		(Egypt)	'56	
Togo	'60		Zambia	'64	
*Upper Volta	'61		Mauritius	'68	

Source: China Yearbook, 1956-1971.

*Members of the Union Africaine et Malagache.

+Members of the Casablanca Group.

[1]Libya originally belonged to the Casablanca group.

[2]A Chinese Consulate in Johannesburg, which has assumed many diplomatic functions, predates the establishment of the Nationalist Government in China in 1927. It became a consulate-general in 1931.

TABLE IV-2

VOTES OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND OF U.N.

AFRICAN MEMBERS ON THE QUESTION OF

CHINESE SEATING, 1959-1970*

	FOR Nationalist China	AGAINST Nationalist China	ABSTAINING	TOTAL
1959				
U.N.	44	29	9	82
African Members	2	5	3	10
1960				
U.N.	42	34	22	98
African Members	2	9	16	27
1961				
U.N.	48	37	19	104
African Members	9	9	11	29
1962				
U.N.	56	42	12	110
African Members	17	14	2	33
1963				
U.N.	57	41	12	111
African Members	17	14	4	35
1965				
U.N.	47	47	20	117
African Members	9	18	9	36
1966				
U.N.	57	46	17	122
African Members	15	17	6	38
1967				
U.N.	58	45	17	123
African Members	18	16	4	38
1968				
U.N.	58	44	23	126
African Members	19	15	7	41
1969				
U.N.	56	48	21	126
African Members	20	19	2	41
1970				
U.N.	49	51	25	127
African Members	17	19	5	41

*No vote was taken in 1964 due to UN financial crisis.

Source: UN Yearbook, 1959-70.

The 1965 Vote

French Recognition of PRC and Its Impact

France made an important change in its position when, on January 27, 1964, it recognized the Peking Government and then supported its seating in the United Nations. This move reflected the evolution of policy from hostility towards Communist China during the period of French involvement in the Indochinese and Algerian Wars, to a neutral position immediately thereafter, to outright support. Evolution of French policy toward mainland China had coincided with President de Gaulle's step-by-step march toward an independent policy vis-a-vis the United States.[27]

Several countries changed their policies following the shift in the French position. The Central African Republic and the former French Congo (Brazzaville) followed the French lead in the 1965 General Assembly, switching from opposition to support of the seating of Peking. Mauritania, with strong French ties, switched from abstention to a similar position of support. Senegal, a member of the French Community, abstained in the vote, no longer voting in opposition. Seven countries which had voted against Peking in 1963 abstained in 1965. These were Cameroon, Chile, Cyprus, Iran, Jamaica, Libya, and Rwanda. Nigeria, which abstained in 1963, voted in favor of admission in 1965.

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[27]Mezerik (ed), *China Representation in the UN,...* , p. 5.

Universality of UN Membership

Many countries, especially those of the Soviet bloc, espoused the seating of Peking because they believed Peking had the sole and only right to the seat now occupied unlawfully by the "Chiang Kai-shek regime."

Pope Paul, making his first appearance at the UN on October 4, 1965, took a position similar to that held by the first three UN Secretary-Generals - Trygve Lie, Dag Hammarskjold, and U Thant. All supported the principle of universality of membership and in this way favored the seating of Peking. Pope Paul, speaking to the UN membership, said, "Your vocation is to bring not only some of the peoples, but all of the peoples, to fraternize."[28]

Secretary-General U Thant, in a press conference at UN Headquarters on January 20, 1966, said, "I believe in universality. I believe that all countries and all states should become Members of the United Nations."[29]

In the General Assembly's debate concerning the China issue since 1961, the majority favored the principle of universality of UN membership. Thus, the majority opposed the condition to seat the PRC by simultaneously demanding the eviction of the ROC, which had been the proposals of both the

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[28]Pope Paul VI, General Assembly, October 4, 1965, p. 3; UN doc. A/PV. 1347.

[29]UN doc. SG/SM/436.

Soviet and Albanian resolutions. The majority of the Members hoped to see both Chinas have representatives seated in the General Assembly.

"Two Chinas" Opposed by Peking and Taipei

The American attitude toward the Taiwan problem during the 1960's, especially the late sixties, was best described by former Secretary of State Dean Rusk:

> I do not believe the people in Peking can claim Taiwan under such war-time declarations as the Cairo Declaration, which promised to return Taiwan to China. It seems to me those promises were completed by performance, because Taiwan was returned to those to whom we promised it during World War II. The separation of Taiwan from the mainland came about as the result of a civil war.[30]

This implied that the islands of Taiwan and Penghu (Pescadores) were not owned by the mainland China. Thus the future status of Taiwan was undetermined. As described earlier in the UN debate, many UN Members, including the United Kingdom and Canada, wanted to have a "two-China" solution to the problem of Chinese representation. This was rejected by both Peking and Taipei.

Peking had repeatedly denounced the "two-China" idea. On February 10, 1958, Premier Chou En-lai said, "We absolutely will not allow this scheme to materialize in any form on any occassion. There is only one China - the People's Republic of China."[31]

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[30]Rusk, "Prospective Issues in U.S. - Chinese Relations," p. 59.

[31]The New York Times, February 11, 1958.

At the opening of the 19th General Assembly, Peking once again rejected the "two-China" idea. On November 22, 1964, the official party organ in Peking said:

> China will have nothing to do with the United
> Nations as long as the latter fails to restore
> to the People's Republic of China her legitimate
> rights as the sole legal government representing
> the Chinese people, and as long as the illegal
> status of the representatives of the Chiang
> Kai-shek clique is not nullified. 32

The position of the Nationalist Government was expressed in equally vigorous terms in 1958 by the Ambassador to the United States, George K. C. Yeh: "We shall neither be cowed into submission nor be persuaded by any third party to accept a political solution over any part of our territory."[33] Chen Cheng, Vice President of the Nationalist Government on Taiwan, said that his government "would quit the United Nations rather than share Chinese representation there with Red China."[34]

Hence, the major obstacle preventing a compromise in regard to the Chinese representation in the UN was the attitude of the two Chinas themselves. The only thing that the ROC and the PRC were in agreement on was that neither would sit in the United Nations if the other China were also seated, because of strong nationalism based upon "one China," which

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[32]Editorial in _People's Daily_, Peking, November 22, 1964.

[33]Quoted in _New York Times_, September 13, 1958.

[34]_New York Herald Tribune_, July 6, 1961.

Professor Dapen Liang described:

> All Chinese think of themselves in terms of a nation
> although they are still under two widely different
> governments - Communist on the mainland and Nationalist
> on Taiwan. The two are seriously in conflict and
> each one is out to defeat the other for the same
> goal of national unification. All the Chinese are
> united in this, and therefore the so-called two-
> China policy would certainly be rejected by them,
> regardless of political differences.[35]

Moreover, the legitimacy of each of the two Chinese govern-
ments has been justified on the basis that it is the govern-
ment of the whole of China.[36] The superpowers, in particular
the Soviet Union, held to their opposing positions.

Chou's African Visit, 1964

Peking, well before its successful first atomic test,
had begun an active campaign to achieve leadership among
developing countries, particularly in Africa.

Premier Chou En-lai, seeking this objective, in early
1964 visited the UAR, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali,
Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. In the course of this
visit, or shortly thereafter, countries which extended diplo-
matic recognition to the PRC included Tunisia, Kenya, Tanganyika,
the Central African Republic, Dahomey, Zambia, and Senegal.
In July 1965, Mauritania also extended recognition to
Communist China.[37]

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[35]Dapen Liang, "Taiwan's Future," San Francisco
Chronicle, July 24, 1975.

[36]Personal interview with Ambassador P. C. Miao,
December 27, 1976.

[37]China Yearbook, 1964-65, pp. 583-85.

Following 1964, the PRC concluded economic and technical cooperation agreements with Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, and the UAR in Africa, and with Afghanistan, Cambodia, Indoesia, North Vietnam, and Pakistan in Asia.[38] However, not all these arrangements survived. In 1965 the upheavals in Africa and in Indoesia brought an abrupt end to the economic as well as political arrangements. These shifts would obviously be reflected in future voting on the representation question.

Non-Aligned Group Disappears in Vietnam War Partisanship

The changes which had occurred in the vote on the seating of Peking not only reflected the changed positions of leaders such as the Pope, and of Major Powers such as France, but also reflected the profound change in relationships among countries, forged in the crucible of the Vietnam War.

Before the escalation of the Vietnam War in 1965, most countries, by and large, could divided into recognizable categories: those identified with the U.S.; those aligned with the U.S.S.R.; and those outside both camps calling themselves non-aligned. Almost all countries were now identified on one side or the other in the Vietnam War. This had created a new line-up in which the former cold war categories shifted and the former non-aligned group merged into partisanship for one side or the other in the Vietnam issue.[39] This

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[38]Ibid., pp. 555-59.

[39]Mezerik (ed.), China Representation in the UN, p.6.

broad shift would only later make its impact on the voting pattern of the General Assembly on the question of seating the People's Republic of China.

Main Question Again Debated

The basic question was raised again in November, 1965 during the twentieth session of the General Assembly. The reason this could be done is that each Assembly is sovereign, and earlier decisions are not binding on future assemblies. The two approaches - (1) "important question," and (2) the expulsion of Taipei and its replacement with Peking, were again debated. New as well as old points of view were fully exposed.

The group sponsoring the resolution to keep Peking out of the UN was again led by the U.S. and included Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Gabon, Italy, Japan, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Philippines and Thailand. Their new resolution, reiterating the language of 1961, stated that "any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question."[40]

On the other side, supporters of Peking's sole right to the UN seat also followed the 1961 line. The sponsoring group, consisting of Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Pakistan, Romania, Somalia, and Syria moved, as in 1961, "to restore all its

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[40]UN doc. A/RES/2025.

rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations;" and also "to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it."[41]

Many delegations declared that the resolution designating the China issue as an "important question" was not what it seemed. They charged that the move was a maneuver, pure and simple, with the sole aim of denying the admission of Peking to the UN. Guinea said, "this question should have been the subject of proposals by the Credentials Committee which the Assembly could either accept or reject - of course by a simple majority."[42] Pakistan also argued that since the credentials of the delegation of a State which is, and had since the beginning been, a Member of the United Nations, Pakistan cannot agree that the question of Chinese representation is important in this purely technical sense."[43]

The U.S., however, rejected these arguments as being technical and not giving proper weight to the substance:

Serious and unpredictable consequences in Asia and in the United Nations itself, in connexion

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[41]UN doc. A/L. 469.

[42]UN doc. A/PV. 1379, p. 56.

[43]UN doc. A/PV. 1372, p. 32.

with all our efforts to maintain the peace, could
flow from a decision to expel representatives of a
State which was one of the founders of this
Organization in order to seat a regime which
explicitly rejects its most fundamental tenets
and which shows no interest in joining this
Organization except on outrageous terms.

It would be hard to conceive of a more important
decision in the real sense of the word. This was
the reality which the General Assembly recognized
in 1961, and it is a reality that cannot be
effectively challenged.[44]

Analysis of the 1965 Vote

The vote on the resolutions gave evidence of the

shift which had occurred since the 1961 test. Latin American

countries lined up solidly in support of the U.S., all except

Cuba voting in favor of the "important question" resolution.

The U.S. and its allies carried the "important

question" issue, fifty-six countries voted in favor of the

"important question" proposition with its two-thirds majority

requirement, forty-nine against, and eleven abstained. The

margin of victory, however, for the U.S. had declined five

votes from 1961 when sixty-one voted in favor.

The results of the vote for seating Peking and expell-

ing Taipei further diluted the U.S. victory. The vote was

forty-seven in favor, forty-seven against, with twenty

abstentions and three delegations not voting. Had Indonesia

not withdrawn from the UN in 1965, the supporters of seating

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[44]Ambassador Charles W. Yost, U.S. Representative,
General Assembly, November 16, 1965; UN doc. A/PV. 1380,
p. 7.

Peking would have gained a majority by one vote. In 1961, it had been thirty-seven in favor, forty-eight against and nineteen abstentions.

PRC Setbacks and the Cultural Revolution

PRC Setbacks in Asia and Africa

While Peking had been gaining strehgth in the UN, several governments, sympathetic to Peking, had been over-thrown since the General Assembly vote in November, 1965. In African and Asian countries, most of the new regimes were anti-Communist and anti-Peking.

The upheaval in Indonesia lost for Peking its closest collaborator in Asia. In Africa, political upheavals in a single year brought new governments to many countries - among them Algeria, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Dahomey, and Ghana - all supporters of PRC in the UN in the November 1965 vote. Some countries had broken relations with Peking. Burundi, as early as January 1965, severed all relations with the PRC as did the Central African Republic and Dahomey in January 1966.[45]

PRC Places Conditions on Entry into UN and Refuses Disarmament Conference Invitation

The debate and the voting had clearly shown that an increasing number of countries wanted Peking in the UN.

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[45]Mezerik (ed.), China Representation in the UN, p.7.

However, whether or not Peking wanted to enter the UN was
not so clear. People's Daily, the Chinese Communist Party
newspaper, stated on November 19, 1965 that "China may as
well stay out of a United Nations like this,"[46] and reiterated
the earlier demands made by Chinese Communist leaders for
reform of the UN. On September 29, 1965, Foreign Minister
Chen Yi had stated that the UN "has long been controlled by
the United States and has today become a place where two big
powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, conduct
political transactions." He said that even should the General
Assembly expel Nationalist China and restore Mainland China's
"legitimate rights," Peking would not be satisfied:

> The United Nations must rectify its mistakes
> and undergo a thorough reorganization and reform.
> It must admit and correct all its past mistakes.
> Among other things, it should cancel its resolution
> condemning China and the Democratic People's
> Republic of Korea as aggressors and adopt a resolu-
> tion condemning the United States as the aggressor;
> the UN Charter must be reviewed and revised jointly
> by all countries, big and small; all independent
> States should be included in the United Nations;
> and all imperialist puppets should be expelled.[46a]

Indonesia withdrew from the UN in 1965 and rumors abounded
that the withdrawal had been in expectation of joining with
Peking in the establishment of a rival organization.

In addition to Peking stating that it would not join
the UN as now constituted, Peking also said that as long as
PRC was not a full member of UN, it would not take any part

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[46]The New York Times, November 20, 1965.

[46a]Peking Review, Vol. 8, No. 41 (Oct. 8, 1965), p. 12.

in any international conference having any tie with the UN,
however remote. Peking declared on December 1, 1965 that
it "will certainly not take part" in a world disarmament
conference proposed in a resolution adopted by a unanimous
vote of the UN General Assembly.[47]

The Cultural Revolution and PRC's Isolation

By the end of 1965, the PRC had diplomatic representa-
tion in forty-eight countries. This situation had been
drastically changed during the period of the so-called Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-69). The convulsion
of the Cultural Revolution led to the recall of all the
Communist Chinese ambassadors abroad except Huang Hua in the
UAR, and made attacks on foreign diplomats and individuals
in Peking. A series of incidents both within mainland China
and abroad happened in 1967. Embassies and legations in
Peking were closed. And in a few extreme cases, diplomatic
relations were broken.[48]

All these developments alienated many UN members who
might have been friendly to Peking. The result was a precipi-
tous drop in Peking's prestige, and the creation of a very
unfavorable image in many parts of the world. The PRC suffered
an unprecedented isolation in international relations. Thus
the outcome of the voting in 1966-69 on the "important question"

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[47]The New York Times, December 2, 1965.

[48]Robert A. Scalapino, "The Cultural Revolution and
Chinese Foreign Policy," Current Scene, Vol. 6, No. 13 (August
1, 1968), pp. 6-8.

resolution and the Albanian resolution appeared to be a reversal of the previous trend toward ever increasing support for Peking's entry into the UN. The votes were as follows:[49]

1. "Important Question" Resolution

Year	For	Against	Abstention
1966	66	48	7
1967	69	48	5
1968	73	47	6
1969	71	48	7

2. Albanian Resolution

1966	46	57	18
1967	45	58	19
1968	44	58	24
1969	48	56	22

The above voting figures on the Albanian resolution for 1966-69 indicated that in 1968 the number of PRC supporters was forty-four, the lowest since 1965. As the PRC began to normalize her foreign relations, UN sentiment in her favor began to rise once again. In 1969 the "important question" was adopted by a vote of seventy-one in favor, forty-eight against, with four abstention, and Peking was barred by a vote of fifty-six against and forty-eight in favor, with twenty-two abstentions.

Reestablishment and the 1970 Vote

The cooling down of the Cultural Revolution in 1969

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[49]UN Yearbook, 1966-69.

marked the beginning of the period of re-establishment

(1969-1971). Since May 1969, Peking had refilled most of

its ambassadorial posts and adopted a policy of "revolu-

tionary pragmatism," giving rise to a sort of second Bandung

period in the evolution of Peking's UN policy.[50] Further-

more, Peking had embarked upon its aid program as well as

foreign trade. Limited tourism to the China mainland was

resumed. A Canadian Foreign Ministry Spokesman disclosed

on September 16, 1969 that Peking wanted Canada to support

its bid to China's seat in the United Nations.[51]

In Africa, Communist China gained recognition of

Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia in October and November 1970.

Table IV-3 gives a clear indication of the degree of Third

World support for Peking at the UN.

The total Third World membership had increased since

1955 from thirty-six nations (60 percent) to ninety (70.85

percent) in 1970. The Third World member nations that

supported Peking increased from five percent (three nations)

in 1955 to 23.62 percent (thirty nations) in 1970, while

those for the Taipei Government dropped from 46.7 percent

(twenty-eight nations) to 30.70 percent (thirty-nine nations).

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[50]Byron S. J. Weng, Peking's UN Policy: Continuity
and Change (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 167-70.

[51]New York Times, September 18, 1969, p. 1.

TABLE IV-3

THIRD WORLD NATIONS' SUPPORT OF PEKING'S SEAT AT THE UNITED NATIONS, 1955-70

Year	UN & Third World	For Peking Vote	%	For Taiwan Vote	%	Abst.-Absence Vote	%	Total Vote	%
1955	Un general	12	20.00	42	70.00	6	10.00	60	100.00
	Third World	3	5.00	28	46.70	5	8.30	36	60.00
1959	UN general	29	35.37	44	53.66	9	10.97	82	100.00
	Third World	14	17.10	28	34.10	5	6.10	47	57.30
1962	UN general	42	38.20	56	50.90	12	10.90	110	100.00
	Third World	25	22.70	41	37.30	7	6.30	73	66.30
1965	UN general	47	40.20	47	40.20	23	19.60	117	100.00
	Third World	29	24.78	32	27.35	19	16.24	80	68.37
1968	UN general	44	34.92	58	46.03	24	19.05	126	100.00
	Third World	26	20.63	44	34.90	19	15.07	89	70.60
1970	UN general	51	40.16	49	38.58	27	21.26	127	100.00
	Third World	30	23.62	39	30.70	21	16.53	90	70.85

Adapted from: King C. Chen (ed.), The Foreign Policy of China (Roseland, N.J.: East-West Who? Inc., 1972), p. 410.

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In addition, a low-keyed approach was assumed by the U.S. regarding the PRC-Canadian talks in Stockholm during 1969-70. Peking brought to a conclusion the negotiation for recognition by Canada in October 1970 by assenting to a formula regarding Taiwan that the Canadians would accept, since it required only that Ottawa "take note" of the Chinese position without necessarily endorsing it.[52] Peking's communique with Canada of October 13, 1970 stated:

> The Chinese Government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Canadian Government takes note of this position of the Chinese Government. [53]

This Canadian breakthrough in diplomatic recognition with Communist China had served as a model for the other nations to follow. Soon after, Italy established diplomatic relations with Peking on November 6, 1970.

President Richard M. Nixon, in his State of the World message in February 1970, referred to mainland China by its official name, the People's Republic of China. He spoke of a U.S. desire to improve relations with Peking because "a lasting peace will be impossible so long as some nations consider themselves the permanent enemies of others."[54] At

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[52]Statement by the (Canadian) Secretary of State for External Affairs made in the House of Commons on October 13, 1970, concerning recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and the People's Republic of China (mimeographed), mailed to the present writer by Ottawa Bureau, Central News Agency, p. 2.

[53]Ibid., p. 1.

[54]The New York Times, February 19, 1970, p. 1

the 1970 Session of the General Assembly, Christopher H. Phillips, U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, openly stated on the Assembly floor that "the U.S. is as interested as any in this room to see the People's Republic of China play a constructive role among the family of nations."[55] Without changing its voting position on the China issue, the U.S. delegation explained to the Assembly that the U.S. was only opposed to the Albanian resolution because it would admit the PRC at the expense of expelling the ROC.

As the situation changed, in the fall of 1970 for the first time, a majority in the General Assembly voted (51-49-25) that the Peking Government was entitled to the Chinese seat in the UN and thus favored excluding the Taipei Government. The motion failed because earlier in the Session a majority had voted (66-52-9) that this was an "important question," requiring a two-thirds majority for adoption.

The vote in support of the "important question" resolution for 1970 showed a corresponding change in attitude. Although some U.S. allies, such as Canada and United Kingdom, voted for both the Albanian and the "important question" resolutions in 1970, these countries were reluctant to continue this policy. The Canadian delegate made it clear in 1970 that if it became apparent that "continued support of this (important question) resolution will frustrate the will

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[55]Ibid., November 13, 1970, p. 1.

of the Assembly, my government will change its position."[56]

The 1970 vote reflected that Peking's worldwide campaign for entry into the UN gained momentum, while the split between the United States and her allies became even more obvious. Although a newly admitted member, Fiji, voted yes, the "important question" resolution lost five affirmative votes in comparison with that of 1969. Therefore, it was approved by the smallest margin, down from fifty-eight percent in 1968 to fifty-two percent in 1970.

The Voting Patterns for the 1960's

The voting patterns of the UN General Assembly roll-calls on the issue of Chinese representation from 1961 to 1970 under both the "important question" and the substantive question of seating Peking and removing Taipei are presented in Tables IV-4 to IV-8, and Figures 4-1 and 4-2. The U.S. allies' voting patterns on these two separate resolutions during the sixties are presented in Tables IV-9 and IV-10.

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[56]UN doc. A/PV. 1904 (1970).

TABLE IV-4

VOTING PATTERNS ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION FROM 1961 TO 1971

Session	Resolution Declaring the Matter an "Important" Question					Proposal to Seat the PRC and Exclude the ROC			
	For	Against	Not Voting	Total	Percent Supporting the U.S. Position	For	Against	Not Voting	Percent Supporting the U.S. Position
16th (1961)	61	34	9	104	59%	36	48	20	35%
17th (1962)	-	-	-	110	-	42	56	12	39
18th (1963)	-	-	-	110	-	41	57	12	37
19th (1964)				(no vote due to financial crisis)					
20th (1965)	56	49	12	117	48%	47	47	23	40%
21st (1966)	66	48	7	121	54	46	57	18	38
22nd (1967)	69	48	5	122	56	45	58	19	37
23rd (1968)	73	47	6	126	58	44	58	24	36
24th (1969)	71	48	7	126	56	48	56	22	39
25th (1970)	66	52	9	127	52	51	49	27	41
26th (1971)	55	59	17	131	42	76	35	20	59

Adapted from John G. Stoessinger, The United Nations & the Superpowers: China Russia, & America (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 40; revised and supplemented by the present writer.

TABLE IV-5

VOTING PATTERNS ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION UNDER

"IMPORTANT QUESTION" RESOLUTION, 1961, 1965-71

Countries (by groups)	Roll Calls							
	1961	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
NON-CAUCUS MEMBERS								
U.S.A.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Republic of China	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Israel	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
South Africa	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
LATIN AMERICAN GROUP								
Argentina	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bolivia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Brazil	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Colombia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Costa Rica	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Dominican Republic	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
El Salvador	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Guatemala	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Haiti	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Honduras	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Mexico	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Nicaragua	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Panama	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Paraguay	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Uruguay	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Venezuela	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Chile	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-
Peru	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-
Ecuador	+	+	+	a	a	+	+	-
SOVIET BLOC								
U.S.S.R.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Byelorussia SSR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ukraine SSR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Czechoslovakia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Poland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Albania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hungary	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rumania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mongolia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cuba	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE IV-5 (Continued)

Countries (by groups)	Roll Calls							
	1961	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
BENELUX GROUP								
Luxembourg	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Belgium	+	+	+	·+	+	+	+	a
The Netherlands	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	a
AFRICAN GROUP								
Brazzaville Group								
Ivory Coast	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Madagascar	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Niger	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Upper Volta	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Dahomay	+	a	+	+	+	+	+	+
Gabon	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Central African Republic	+	–	+	+	+	+	+	+
Chad	+	a	a	+	+	+	a	+
Cameroun	+	a	a	+	+	+	a	–
Senegal	+	–	–	–	+	+	+	a
Congo (Brazzaville)	+	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Mauritania	+	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Casablanca Group								
Morocco	–	–	–	–	a	–	–	a
Ghana	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	+
Guinea	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Mali	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
U.A.R. (Egypt)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Algeria		–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Non-Brazzaville/Casablanca Members								
Congo(Kinshasa)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Liberia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Togo	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	a
Sierra Leone	a	–	a	+	+	+	+	–
Libya*	+	+	+	+	+	–	–	–
Nigeria	a	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Somalia	a	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Tanzania	a	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Ethiopia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Sudan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Tunisia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	a

TABLE IV-5 (Continued)

Countries (by groups)	Roll Calls							
	1961	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Malawi		+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Gambia		+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Rwanda		−	+	+	+	+	+	+
Burundi		a	−	−	−	−	−	−
Kenya		−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Uganda		−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Zambia		−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Lesotho			+	+	+	+	+	+
Botswana			+	+	+	+	+	a
Swaziland					+	+	+	+
Mauritius					+	+	a	+
Equatorial Guinea					+	a	−	−
ARAB GROUP								
Jordan	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Lebanon	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Saudi Arabia	+	a	+	a	+	+	+	+
Iraq	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Syria	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Yemen	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Kuwait		a	−	−	−	a	−	−
Southern Yemen					−	−	−	−
Bahrain								a
Oman								a
Quatar								a
ASIAN GROUP								
Japan	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Philippines	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Thailand	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Laos	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	a
Turkey	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	a
Iran	+	a	a	+	+	+	+	a
Indonesia	−		+	+	a	a	a	+
Cambodia	−	−	−	−	−	−	+	+
Pakistan	a	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Afghanistan	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Ceylon	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
India	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Nepal	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Burma	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Singapore		−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Maldives		a	+	+	+	+	a	a
Bhutan								−

TABLE IV-5 (Continued)

Countries (by groups)	Roll Calls							
	1961	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
WESTERN EUROPEAN GROUP								
Greece	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Spain	+	+	+	+	(-)	+	+	+
Ireland	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Italy	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	a
Cyprus	a	a	a	+	+	+	+	a
Portugal	+	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Austria	a	a	a	a	a	a	+	a
Malta		+	+	+	+	+	+	a
France	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Yugoslavia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SCANDINAVIAN GROUP								
Iceland**	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Denmark	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Norway	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sweden	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Finland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
COMMONWEALTH GROUP								
Australia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
New Zealand	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Canada	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Malaysia	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-
Jamaica		a	+	+	+	+	+	+
Trinidad & Tobago		+	+	+	+	+	a	-
Guyana			+	+	+	+	a	-
Barbados				a	a	a	a	+
Fiji							+	+

Key: + = for   - = against   a = abstained/not voting

Source: UN Yearbook, 1961, 1965-71.

*Libya's position was a unique one. The Chinese Nationalist government has had diplomatic relations with Libya since 1959 and still retains an embassy in Libya, the Libyan voting switched from supporting Taipei to Peking since Khaddfi's takeover in 1969. Although Libya recognized Peking in 1971, it refused to let the Communists establish an embassy in Libya (Central Daily News, Taipei, September 19, 1977, p. 1).

**According to Ambassador Harlan Cleveland, Iceland was different from the other Scandinavian nations in supporting the US position, because it had a Communist problem domestically, thus it took a more anti-Communist attitude in the U.N. Personal interview on July 5, 1977.

TABLE IV-6

VOTING PATTERNS ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION: PROPOSAL
TO SEAT THE P.R.C. AND EXCLUDE THE R.O.C.
1950, 1961-1971

Countries (by groups)	'50	'61	'62	'63	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71
SOVIET BLOC											
U.S.S.R.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Byelorussia SSR	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ukraine SSR	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Czechoslovakia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Poland	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Cuba	-*	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Albania		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bulgaria		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Hungary		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Rumania		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Mongolia		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
NON-CAUCUS MEMBERS											
U.S.A.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R.O.C. (China)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South Africa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Israel	+	a	a	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
LATIN AMERICAN GROUP											
Brazil	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Costa Rica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dominican Rep.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
El Salvador	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Haiti	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Honduras	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nicaragua	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Uruguay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Venezuela	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guatemala	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Panama	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a
Bolivia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	-
Colombia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a
Argentina	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a
Paraguay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mexico	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Peru	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+
Chile	-	-	-	-	a	-	-	-	a	+	+
Ecuador	a	-	-	-	-	-	a	a	a	a	+

TABLE IV-6 (Continued)

Countries (by groups)	'50	'61	'62	'63	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71
BENELUX GROUP											
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	a
Belgium	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	a	+
The Netherlands	+	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
SCANDINAVIAN GROUP											
Denmark	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sweden	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Norway	+	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Finland		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Iceland	-	a	a	a	a	-	-	a	a	a	+
WESTERN EUROPEAN GROUP											
Yugoslavia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
France	a	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Austria		a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	+	+
Portugal		a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Cyprus		a	a	-	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Italy		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	+	+
Ireland		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	+
Greece	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a
Spain		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a
Malta					-	-	-	-	-	-	-
AFRICAN GROUP											
Brazzaville Group											
Congo (Brazzaville)		a	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Mauritania		-	-	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Senegal		-	-	-	a	+	+	a	-	a	+
Cameroun		-	-	-	a	a	-	-	-	a	+
Central Africa Rep.		a	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	a	-
Chad		a	-	-	a	a	-	-	-	-	-
Dahomay		a	-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ivory Coast		a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Niger		a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Upper Volta		a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gabon		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Madagascar		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE IV-6 (Continued)

Countries (by groups)	Roll Calls										
	'50	'61	'62	'63	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71
Casablanca Group											
U.A.R.(Egypt)	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Guinea		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Mali		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ghana		+	+	+	+	+	a	a	+	+	+
Morocco		+	+	+	+	a	a	+	+	+	+
Algeria			+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Non-Brazzaville/Casablanca Members											
Ethiopia	–	+	+	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sudan	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Somalia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Tanzania	–	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Nigeria	a	a	a	+	+	+	a	+	+	+	+
Burundi		+	+	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Kenya		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Uganda		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Zambia					+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Tunisia	a	+	+	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Sierra Leone	+	+	a	+	–	–	–	–	–	–	+
Lybia	–	–	–	a	–	a	a	+	+	+	+
Togo	a	a	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	+
Congo (Kinshasa)	a	–	–	a	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Liberia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Malawi				–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Rwanda		–	–	a	–	–	–	–	–	–	+
Gambia				–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Lesotho							–	–	–	–	–
Bostwana						a	–	–	–	a	+
Swaziland								–	–	–	–
Equatorial Guinea								a	a	+	+
Mauritius								a	+	–	a
ARAB GROUP											
Syria	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Iraq	–	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Yemen	a	+	–	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Lebanon**	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Saudi Arabia	a	a	a	a	a	–	a	–	–	–	–
Jordan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	a
Kuwait				a	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Southern Yemen								+	+	+	+
Bahrain											a
Oman											a
Quatar											a

TABLE IV-6 (Continued)

Countries (by groups)	Roll Calls										
	'50	'61	'62	'63	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71
ASIAN GROUP											
Afghanistan	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Burma	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
India	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Pakistan	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ceylon		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Nepal		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Cambodia		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-
Indonesia		+	+	+		+	+	a	a	a	a
Laos		-	+	+	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Iran	-	-	-	-	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a
Philippines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Japan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Singapore					+	a	a	a	a	a	+
Maldives					a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Bhutan											+
COMMONWEALTH GROUP											
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Canada	a	-	-	-	-	a	a	a	a	+	+
Australia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
New Zealand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malaysia		-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	+
Jamaica			-	-	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Trinidad & Tobago			a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Guyana						-	-	a	a	a	+
Barbados							-	-	-	-	a
Fiji										a	a

Key: + = for   - = against   a = abstained/not voting

Sources: UN Yearbook, 1950, 1961-63, 1965-71.

*Cuba originally belonged to Latin American Group.

**According to former Nationalist Ambassador to Lebanon, Prof. P. C. Miao, Lebanon abstained from voting due to the fact that domestically there was a pro-Peking pressure from Socialist Party; externally under pressure of its anti-U.S. Arab neighbors, although it had diplomatic relations with the ROC. Personal interview with Professor Miao on December 27, 1976.

TABLE IV-7

SCALOGRAM OF UN VOTES ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION:

"IMPORTANT QUESTION" RESOLUTIONS, 1961, 1965-71

Countries*	Roll Calls							
	1961	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
U.S.A.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Republic of China	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Israel	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
South Africa	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Luxembourg	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Argentina	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bolivia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Brazil	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Colombia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Costa Rica	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Dominican Republic	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
El Salvador	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Guatemala	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Haiti	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Honduras	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Mexico	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Nicaragua	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Panama	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Paraguay	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Uruguay	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Venezuela	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ivory Coast	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Madagascar	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Niger	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Upper Volta	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Congo (Kinshasa)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Liberia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Jordan	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Lebanon	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Philippines	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Thailand	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Australia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
New Zealand	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Japan	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Spain	+	+	+	+	(-)	+	+	+
Greece	+	+	+	+	+	a	+	+
Dahomey	+	a	+	+	+	+	+	+
Gabon	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Belgium	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	a
The Netherlands	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	a
Turkey	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	a
Laos	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	a

TABLE IV-7 (Continued)

Countries*	Roll Calls							
	1961	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Saudi Arabia	+	a	+	a	+	+	+	+
Togo	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	a
Malawi		+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Jamaica		a	+	+	+	+	+	+
Malta		+	+	+	+	+	+	a
Central African Rep.	+	(-)	+	+	+	+	+	+
Canada	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Ireland	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Italy	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Iceland	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Ecuador	+	+	+	a	a	+	+	-
Chad	+	a	a	+	+	+	a	+
Iran	+	a	a	+	+	+	+	a
Cyprus	a	a	a	+	+	+	+	a
Austria	a	a	a	a	a	a	+	a
Portugal	+	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Cameroun	+	a	a	+	+	+	a	-
Indonesia	-		+	+	a	a	a	+
Sierra Leone	a	-	a	+	+	+	+	-
Chile	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-
Peru	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-
Malaysia	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-
Rwanda		-	(+)	+	+	+	+	+
Lybia	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-
Trinidad & Tabago		+	+	+	+	+	a	-
Senegal	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	a
Morocco	-	-	-	-	a	-	-	a
Somalia	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tanzania	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pakistan	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nigeria	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Congo (Brazzaville)	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mauritania	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
France	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Norway	-	-	-	a	-	-	-	-
Denmark	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ghana	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Cambodia	-	-	-	-	-	-	(+)	+
Tunisia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a
Algeria		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guinea	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mali	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
U.A.R.(Egypt)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sudan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE IV-7 (Continued)

Countries *	Roll Calls							
	1961	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Iraq	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Syria	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Yeman	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Ethiopia	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	• −
Afghanistan	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Burma	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Ceylon	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
India	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Nepal	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Finland	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Sweden	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Cuba	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Yugoslavia	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
U.S.S.R.	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Ukraine SSR	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Byelorussia SSR	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Czechoslovakia	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Poland	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Albania	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Bulgaria	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Hungary	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Rumania	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Mongolia	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Kenya		−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Uganda		−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Zambia		−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Singapore		−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Gambia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Lesotho				+	+	+	+	+
Swaziland					+	+	+	+
Mauritius					+	+	a	+
Maldives			a	+	+	+	a	a
Guyana			+	+	+	+	a	−
Barbados				a	a	a	a	+
Southern Yemen					−	−	−	−
Figi							a	a

Key: + = for   − = against   a = abstention   no entry = no vote
( )= inconsistency

Sources: UN Yearbook, 1961, 1965-71.

*Those nations which voted only once are excluded.

TABLE IV-8

SCALOGRAM OF UN VOTES ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION:

PROPOSAL TO SEAT THE PRC AND EXCLUDE THE ROC

1950, 1961-63, 1965-71

Countries *	Roll Calls										
	'50	'61	'62	'63	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71
U.S.S.R.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ukraine SSR	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Byelorussia SSR	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Czechoslovakia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Poland	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Yugoslavia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Denmark	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Norway	+	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sweden	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Afghanistan	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Burma	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
India	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Pakistan	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Iraq	(-)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Syria	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
U.A.R.(Egypt)	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Yemen	a	+	(-)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ethiopia	(-)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Cuba	(-)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
France	a	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
The Netherlands	+	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Canada	a	-	-	-	-	a	a	a	a	+	+
Iceland	-	a	a	a	a	-	-	a	a	a	+
Lebanon	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Israel	+	a	a	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Iran	-	-	-	-	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Chile	-	-	-	-	a	-	-	-	a	+	+
Saudi Arabia	a	a	a	a	a	-	a	-	-	-	-
Ecuador	a	-	-	-	-		a	a	a	a	+
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	a
Belgium	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	a	+
Peru	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Mexico	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Paraguay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Greece	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a

TABLE IV-8 (Continued)

Countries *	Roll Calls										
	'50	'61	'62	'63	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71
Colombia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a
Panama	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a
Bolivia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	-
Guatemala	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Argentina	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a
Brazil	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Costa Rica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dominican Rep.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
El Salvador	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Haiti	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Honduras	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nicaragua	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Uruguay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Venezuela	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South Africa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Australia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
New Zealand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Philippines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Liberia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R.O.C.(China)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
U.S.A.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Albania		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bulgaria		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Hungary		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Rumania		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Mongolia		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Finland		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ceylon		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Nepal		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Somalia		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sudan		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Tanzania	(-)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Algeria			+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Burundi			+	+	a	+	+	+	+	+	+
Mali			+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Guinea			+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Uganda			+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ghana		+	+	+	+	+	a	a	+	+	+
Cambodia		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	(-)	-
Laos	-	(+)	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Tunisia	a	+	+	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Indonesia	+	+	+		+	+	a	a	a	a	a
Morocco	+	+	+	+	a	a	-	-	-	-	-
Soerra Leone	+	+	a	+	(-)	-	-	-	-	-	+

TABLE IV-8 (Continued)

Countries*	Roll Calls										
	'50	'61	'62	'63	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71
Congo (Brazzaville)	a	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Mauritania	-	-	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Senegal	-	-	-	a	+	+	a	-	a	-	+
Nigeria	a	a	a	+	+	+	a	+	+	+	+
Cyprus	a	a	-	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Austria	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	+	+
Portugal	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Trinidad & Tabago		a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Jamaica		-	-	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Italy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	+	+
Cameroun	-	-	-	a	a	-	-	-	-	a	+
Togo	a	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Rwanda		-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Ireland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	+
Malaysia	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	+
Libya	-	-	-	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	-
Central African Rep.	a	-	-	(+)	-	-	-	-	-	a	-
Chad	a	-	-	a	a	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dahomay	a	-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Congo (Kinshasa)	a	-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ivory Coast	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Niger	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Upper Volta	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jordan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a
Spain	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a
Japan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gabon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Madagascar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kuwait			a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Kenya					+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Zambia					+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Singapore					+	a	a	a	a	a	+
Maldives					a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Guyana						-	-	a	a	a	+
Malawi						-	-	-	-	-	-
Malta						-	-	-	-	-	-
Lesotho							-	-	-	-	-
Barbados							a	-	-	-	a
Equatorial Guinea								a	a	+	+
Mauritius								a	+	-	a
Southern Yemen								+	+	+	+

Key: + = for - = against a = abstention no entry=no vote
( )= inconsistency.

*Those nations which voted only once or twice are excluded. The scalogram is in two parts - those voting in 1950 and those admitted later.

Source: UN Yearbook, 1950, 1961-63, 1965-71.

Fig.4-1 UN General Assembly Voting on Chinese Representation
Under "Important Question" Resolution, 1961-71.

Fig.4-2 UN General Assembly Voting on "To Seat the PRC and Exclude the ROC," 1961-1971 (No Voting in 1964).

TABLE IV- 9

PATTERNS OF US ALLIES' VOTING ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION:

"IMPORTANT QUESTION" RESOLUTION, 1961, 1965-71

Countries (by Alliance)	Roll Calls							
	1961	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
NATO								
U.S.A.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Greece	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Luxembourg	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Belgium	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	a
The Netherlands	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	a
Turkey	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	a
Canada	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Iceland	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Italy	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Portugal	+	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
France	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Denmark	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Norway	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RIO PACT								
U.S.A.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Argentina	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bolivia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Brazil	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Colombia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Costa Rica	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Dominican Republic	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
El Salvador	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Guatemala	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Haiti	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Honduras	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Mexico	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Nicaragua	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Panama	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Paraguay	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Uruguay	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Venezuela	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Chile	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-
Peru	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-
Ecuador	+	+	+	a	a	+	+	-

TABLE IV- 9   (Continued)

Countries (by Alliance)	Roll Calls							
	1961	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
SEATO								
U.S.A.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Australia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
New Zealand	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Philippines	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Thailand	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	−
France	+	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Pakistan	a	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
CENTO								
U.S.A.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Turkey	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	a
Iran	+	a	a	+	+	+	+	a
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	−
Pakistan	a	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Iraq*	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−

Key: + = for   − = against   a = abstained/not voting

Sources: <u>Yearbook of International Organizations</u>, 1974; <u>UN Yearbook</u>, 1961, 1965-71.

*Iraq withdrew on March 24, 1959.

TABLE IV-10

PATTERNS OF US ALLIES' VOTING ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION:

PROPOSAL TO SEAT THE PRC AND EXCLUDE THE ROC

1950, 1961-1971

Countries (by Alliance)	Roll Calls										
	'50	'61	'62	'63	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71
NATO											
U.S.A.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Greece	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	a
Belgium	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	a	+
Italy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	a	+
Canada	a	-	-	-	-	a	a	a	a	+	+
Iceland	-	a	a	a	a	-	-	a	a	a	+
Netherlands	+	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Portugal		a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
France	a	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Norway	+	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Denmark	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
RIO PACT											
U.S.A.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Brazil	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Costa Rica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dominican Rep.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
El Savlvador	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Haiti	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Honduras	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nicaragua	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Uruguay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Venezuela	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bolivia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	-
Guatemala	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Argentina	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a
Colombia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a
Panama	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a
Paraguay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mexico	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Peru	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+
Ecuador	a	-	-	-	-	-	a	a	a	a	+
Chile	-	-	-	-	a	-	-	-	a	+	+

TABLE IV-10 (Continued)

Countries (by Alliance)	Roll Calls										
	'50	'61	'62	'63	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71
SEATO											
U.S.A.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Australia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
New Zealand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Philippines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a
France	a	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Pakistan*	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
CENTO											
U.S.A.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Iran	-	-	-	-	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Iraq**	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Pakistan	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

Key: + = for   - = against   a = abstained/not voting

Sources: <u>Yearbook of International Organizations</u>, 1974;

<u>UN Yearbook</u>, 1950, 1961-63, 1965-71.

*Pakistan withdrew on November 8, 1972.

**Iraq withdrew on March 24, 1959.

The Norms of Regimes and Their Votes on

Chinese Representation During the 1960's

In Tables IV-11 to IV-14, the UN members are grouped in terms of the norms of their regimes and their votes on the China issue under two separate resolutions during the 1960's in accordance with Jean Blondel's classification although with a few corrections.[57] The patterns are shown below.

TABLE IV-11

PATTERNS OF UN ROLL-CALLS ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION UNDER

"IMPORTANT QUESTION" RESOLUTION, 1961, 1965-1971

Countries*	Roll Calls							
(by Norm of Regime)	1961	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Radical Authoritarian (Communist)								
U.S.S.R.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ukraine SSR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Byelorussia SSR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Czechoslovakia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Poland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Albania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hungary	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rumania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mongolia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Yugoslavia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cuba	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

(To be continued on next page)

[57] Jean Blondel, An Introduction to Comparative Government (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 533-46; Corrections were made based on the advice of Dr. Richard Baker, Professor of Latin American Politics at the University of Oklahoma.

TABLE IV-11(Continued)

Countries (by Norm of Regime)	Roll Calls							
	1961	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971

Authoritarian Conservative

China (ROC)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Thailand	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Greece	+	+	+	+	+	a	+	+
Spain	+	+	+	+	(-)	+	+	+
Argentina	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Brazil	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Haiti	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Honduras	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Nicaragua	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Paraguay	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Central African Republic	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Congo (Kinshasa)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Dahomay	+	a	+	+	+	+	+	+
Liberia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
South Africa	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Togo	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	a
Upper Volta	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sierra Leone	a	-	a	+	+	+	+	-
Portugal	+	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Congo (Brazzaville)	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ghana	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Nigeria	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pakistan	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Burma	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Traditional Conservative

Columbia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
El Salvador	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Dominican Rep.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bolivia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Panama	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Jordan	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Saudi Arabia	+	a	+	a	+	+	+	+
Iran	+	a	a	+	+	+	+	a
Guatemala	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Maldives		a	a	+	+	+	a	a
Malaysia	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-
Laos	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	a
Ecuador	+	+	+	a	a	+	+	-
Libya	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-
Morocco	-	-	-	-	a	-	-	a

TABLE IV-11(Continued)

Countries (by Norm of Regime)	Roll Calls							
	1961	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Afghanistan	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Kuwait		a	−	−	−	a	−	−
Nepal	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Ethiopia	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Liberal Democratic								
U.S.A.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Australia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Belgium	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	a
Luxembourg	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
The Netherlands	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	a
New Zealand	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	−
Canada	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	−
Italy	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	−
Malta		+	+	+	+	+	+	a
Israel	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Lebanon	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Turkey	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	a
Japan	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Philippines	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Iceland	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	−
Costa Rica	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Uruguay	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Venezuela	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Peru	+	+	+	+	+	+	−	−
Trinidad & Tabago		+	+	+	+	+	a	−
Jamaica		a	+	+	+	+	+	+
Guyana			+	+	+	+	a	−
Chile	+	+	+	+	+	+	−	−
Madagascar	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Botswana			+	+	+	+	+	a
Gambia		+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Lesotho			+	+	+	+	+	+
Ireland	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	−
France	+	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Denmark	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Norway	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Finland	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Sweden	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Ceylon	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
India	−	−	+	−	−	−	−	−
Singapore		−	−	−	−	−	−	−

TABLE IV-11 (Continued)

Countries (by Norm of Regime)	Roll Calls							
	1961	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Somalia	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sudan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Austria	a	a	a	a	a	a	+	a
Barbados				a	a	a	a	+
Swaziland					+	+	+	+
Mauritius					+	+	a	+
Equatorial Guinea					a	a	+	+
Populist Right								
Ivory Coast	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Gabon	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Malawi		+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Indonesia	-		+	+	a	a	a	+
Tunisia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a
Kenya		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Populist Center								
Mexico	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Niger	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Chad	+	a	a	+	+	+	a	+
Cameroon	+	a	a	+	+	+	a	-
Rwanda		-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Senegal	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	a
Cyprus	a	a	a	+	+	+	+	a
Mauritania	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tanzania	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Burndi		a	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iraq	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Yemen	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Uganda		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Zambia		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Populist Left								
U.A.R.(Egypt)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Syria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guinea	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mali	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Algeria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Southern Yemen					-	-	-	-

Key: + = for   - = against   a = abstained/not voting

Sources: UN Yearbook, 1961, 1965-71; Jean Blondel, An Introduction to Comparative Government, 1969, pp. 533-46.

*Those nations which voted only once or twice are excluded.

The results of Table IV-11 are summarized in Table IV-12, showing support, opposition, and abstentions for the US sponsored "Important Question" resolution:

TABLE IV-12

NORMS OF REGIME AND UN VOTES ON THE "IMPORTANT QUESTION" RESOLUTION, 1961, 1965-71
(In Percentages)

UN Votes	Types of Government*						
	AC	TC	LD	PR	PC	PL	RA
For U.S.	79	74	70	67	47		
(N)	(19)	(14)	(31)	(4)	(7)		
Against U.S.	21	26	23	33	53	100	100
(N)	(5)	(5)	(10)	(2)	(8)	(6)	(12)
Abstaining				7			
(N)				(3)			
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
(N)	(24)	(19)	(44)	(6)	(15)	(6)	(12)

*Normative Configuration: AC = Authoritarian Conservative,
TC = Traditional Conservative
LD = Liberal-democratic
PR = Populist Right
PC = Populist Center
PL = Populist Left
RA = Radical-authoritarian (Communist)

The patterns of UN votes on the Soviet or Albanian sponsored resolution of seating Peking and removing Taipei, grouped by norms of regime, are shown in Table IV-13.

TABLE IV-13

VOTING PATTERNS ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION:

PROPOSAL TO SEAT THE P.R.C. AND EXCLUDE THE R.O.C.

1950, 1961-1971

Countries* (by Norm of Regime)	Roll Calls										
	'50	'61	'62	'63	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71
Radical Authoritarian (Communist)											
USSR	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ukraine	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Byelorussia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Czechoslovakia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Poland	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Yugoslavia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Cuba	–	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Albania		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bulgaria		+	+	+	+	+	÷	+	+	+	+
Hungary		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Rumania		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Mongolia		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Authoritarian Conservative											
Burma	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Pakistan	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ghana		+	+	+	+	+	a	a	+	+	+
Nigeria		a	a	a	+	+	+	a	+	+	+
Congo (Brazzaville)		a	–	–	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sierra Leone		+	+	a	+	–	–	–	–	–	+
Portugal		a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Central Africa Rep.		a	–	–	+	–	–	–	–	a	–
Dahomay		a	–	–	a	–	–	–	–	–	–
Congo (Kinshasa)		a	–	–	a	–	–	–	–	–	–
Togo		a	a	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	+
Argentina	a	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	a
Paraguay	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Greece	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	a
Upper Volta	a	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
China (R.O.C.)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Thailand	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	a
Spain	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	a

TABLE IV- 13 (Continued)

Countries (by Norm of Regime)	Roll Calls										
	'50	'61	'62	'63	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71
Liberia	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Brazil	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Haiti	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Honduras	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Nicaragua	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
South Africa	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Traditional Conservative											
Afghanistan	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Nepal		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ethiopia	−	+	+	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Morocco		+	+	+	+	a	a	+	+	+	+
Laos		−	+	+	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Iran	−	−	−	−	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Libya		−	−	−	a	a	a	a	+	+	+
Saudi Arabia	a	a	a	a	a	−	a	−	−	−	−
Kuwait				a	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Maldives					a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Malaysia		−	a	−	−	−	−	−	−	a	+
Jordan		−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	a
Bolivia	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	a	−
Colombia	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	a
Panama	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	a
Ecuador	a	−	−	−	−	a	a	a	a	a	+
Guatemala	a	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Dominican Rep.	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
El Salvador	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Liberal Democratic											
Denmark	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Finland	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sweden	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sudan	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ceylon	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
India	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Somalia		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Norway	+	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
France	a	−	−	−	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Iceland	−	a	a	a	a	−	−	a	a	a	+

TABLE IV- 13 (Continued)

Countries (by Norm of Regime)	Roll Calls										
	'50	'61	'62	'63	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71
Netherlands	+	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Lebanon	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Austria		a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	+	+
Singapore					+	a	a	a	a	a	+
Canada	a	-	-	-	-	a	a	a	a	+	+
Israel	+	a	a	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Trinidad & Tabago		a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Italy		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	+	+
Belgium	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	a	+
Chile	-	-	-	-	a	-	-	-	a	+	+
Jamaica			-	-	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Peru	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+
Guyana						-	-	a	a	a	+
Barbados							a	-	-	-	a
Equatorial Guinea								a	a	+	+
Botswana						a	-	-	-	a	+
Mauritius								a	+	-	a
Ireland		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	+
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
U.S.A.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Philippines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Japan		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Costa Rica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Madagascar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Uruguay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Australia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
New Zealand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Venezuela	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gambia					-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malta					-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lesotho							-	-	-	-	-
Swaziland								-	-	-	-
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	a
Populist Right											
Kenya			+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Indonesia		+	+	+	+		+	+	a	a	a
Tunisia		a	+	+	a	a	a	a	a	a	+
Ivory Coast		a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gabon		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malawi			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE IV-13 (Continued)

Countries (by Norm of Regime)	Roll Calls										
	'50	'61	'62	'63	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71
Populist Center											
Yemen	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Iraq	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Cambodia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-
Uganda		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Zambia		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Tanzania		-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Burundi		+	+	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Mauritania		-	-	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Senegal		-	-	-	a	+	+	a	-	a	+
Cyprus		a	a	-	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Cameroon		-	-	-	a	a	-	-	-	a	+
Chad		a	-	-	a	a	-	-	-	-	-
Rwanda		-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Niger		a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mexico	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Populist Left											
U.A.R.(Egypt)	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Syria	a	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Guinea		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Mali		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Algeria			+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Southern Yemen								+	+	+	+

Key: + = for   - = against   a = abstained/not voting

Sources: UN Yearbook, 1961-71;

Jean Blondel, An Introduction to Comparative Government (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 533-46.

*Those nations which voted only once or twice during the late 1960's are excluded from this table.

The results of Table IV-13 are summarized in Table IV-14, showing support, opposition, and abstentions for the Soviet or Albanian sponsored resolution of seating the PRC and removing the ROC.

TABLE IV-14

NORMS OF REGIMES AND UN VOTES ON THE

RESOLUTION TO SEAT THE PRC AND EXCLUDE THE ROC

(in Percentages)

UN Votes	Types of Government*						
	AC	TC	LD	PR	PC	PL	RA
FOR USSR	21	26	23	50	60	100	100
(N)	(5)	(5)	(10)	(3)	(9)	(6)	(12)
Against USSR	71	47	52	50	33		
(N)	(17)	(9)	(23)	(3)	(5)		
Abstaining	8	27	25		7		
(N)	(2)	(5)	(11)		(1)		
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
(N)	(24)	(19)	(44)	(6)	(15)	(6)	(12)

*Normative Configuration: AC = Authoritarian Conservative
TC = Traditional Conservative
LD = Liberal-democratic
PR = Populist Right
PC = Populist Center
PL = Populist Left
RA = Radical-authoritarian
(Communist)

As presented above, the findings are:

1. The twelve radical authoritarian (Communist) regimes as well as the six populist-left regimes all voted (100 percent) as a solid bloc for the seating of Peking. They all voted against the U.S. sponsored "important question" resolution. This leftist group consisted of the Soviet bloc and the Casablanca group as well as Yugoslavia and Cuba.

2. Except for the above two groups, the radical-authoritarian and the populist-left, there were higher percentages of UN members in the other five groups supporting the U.S. sponsored "important question" resolution than against the Soviet or Albanian proposal of seating Peking and removing Taipei. Furthermore, many nations that voted for the U.S. preliminary proposal either voted for or abstained from the voting on the main question - Peking or Taipei. This double diplomacy was due to the fact that many U.S. allies were willing to support the "important question" resolution, but unwilling to vote against the Soviet position when they either recognized Peking or wanted to have a two-China solution, true of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Iceland.

3. Compared with the voting percentages in the 1950's, during the 1960's more authoritarian-conservative regimes supported the U.S.S.R. position, while more traditional conservative regimes supported the U.S. position. This was perhaps due to the political instability of the new nations. It might also have been due to the leftist political orientation

of the military regimes of the Third World countries.

4. The patterns of voting among the different groups
of regimes during the 1960's roughly followed those of the
1950's described earlier in Chapter III (pp. 74-79). As in
the fifties, all the Asian UN members bordering Communist
China except Laos voted for Peking, no matter what the norms
of their regimes were.

CHAPTER V

DUAL REPRESENTATION: THE TWO-CHINA PROPOSAL, 1971

Modification of the United States Attitude

President Dwight D. Eisenhower indicated in a press
conference in August 1954 that his position on the question
of Chinese representation in the United Nations might be
modified in the future if the actions of the People's Republic
warranted it.[1] On July 25, 1955, agreement on Ambassadorial
talks was reached between Washington and Peking and the actual
talks began August 1, that same year.[2] The talks were sub-
sequently institutionalized in Geneva and later in Warsaw.
The Chinese Communists agreed that disputes between the
United States and the People's Republic should be settled
through peaceful negotiations without resorting to the use of
force. But they would not agree to include the issue of Taiwan
since they viewed Taiwan as their territory.[3] At this point

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[1]The New York Times, August 5, 1954, p. 1.

[2]US Department of State Bulletin, August 8, 1955,
pp. 219-20.

[3]US Department of State, Renunciation of Force: US
and Chinese Communist Positions (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1965), pp. 15-16.

the talks were deadlocked. All of these events indicated that
the U.S. had adopted a more flexible position with regard to
China policy in the mid-50's.

The Johnson Administration

On December 12, 1963, Roger Hilsman, Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, delivered a
speech on an "Open-Door Policy" toward the Chinese Communists,
stating that the United States was "determined to keep the
door open" until changes occurred on the Chinese mainland.[4]
The United States was probing Peking on the "two-China" theory,
the significance of which was that if Peking gave its approval
of such a possibility, further negotiation would be greatly
facilitated.

The policy change was evidence in U.S. Secretary of
State Dean Rusk's statement of April 16, 1964, on his trip to
Taipei, in which he passed over the previous support for the
R.O.C. as the sole legitimate government of China, and in-
stead merely stressed American treaty obligations with the
R.O.C. and opposed handing over the China seat in the UN to
the Communists.[5] In other words, the U.S. did not object to
Chinese Communist admission into the UN as long as the R.O.C.
was not expelled. This American attitude was not acceptable
to the Taipei Government, and no joint communique was issued

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[4]US Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1964,p. 17.

[5]Central Daily News, Taipei, April 17, 1964.

during Rusk's visit in Taiwan, even though he held three
meetings with high-level leaders in the Republic of China.[6]

On the other side, this American "two-China" approach
was also rejected by the PRC. In People's Daily of February
19, 1964, an article, "US Policy Towards China Is in a Blind
Alley," condemned the so-called "two-China" formula:

> What it has opened is a door for accepting surrender -
> a demand that China should completely change its
> policy towards the United States. First of all,
> it demands that China should accept a situation of
> "two Chinas" in which the United States will be
> permitted to occupy China's territory of Taiwan
> permanently; and secondly China should drop its
> support for the national-liberation movements in
> the other Asian countries. In short, the U.S.
> policy of hostility to China and agression against
> Asia will remain unchanged while China must capitulate
> to the United States.
>
>   The preconditions advanced by U.S. imperialism
> for improving Sino-U.S. relations are utterly
> preposterous. Everybody knows that the tension
> in Sino-U.S. relations stems from the forcible
> occupation by U.S. imperialism of China's territory
> of Taiwan and its threats against China. Therefore,
> to improve Sino-U.S. relations, it is necessary for
> U.S. imperialism to get out of Taiwan and the Taiwan
> Straits, and not for China to relinquish its sovereign
> rights and territory. Likewise, tension in Asia
> derives from the U.S. imperialist policies of
> aggression and war there. Therefore, to relax tension
> in Asia, it is necessary for U.S. imperialism to get
> out of Asia and not for China to refrain from support-
> ing the peoples in their struggles to win and uphold
> national independence ....

After the first Chinese Communist atomic bomb test
in October 1964, in a TV interview on November 11, 1964,
Secretary Rusk indicated that the U.S. already had held 122

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[6]Personal interview with Professor Dean Rusk, former
US Secretary of State on June 23, 1977.

ambassadorial talks with Peking since Eisenhower's Administration, and the Administration had never ignored the existence of Red China.[7] The deadlock was that the Chinese Communists insisted that, if there was to be any improvement in relations, the U.S. had to turn over eleven million free people on Taiwan to mainland China, which the U.S., as the leader of free nations, could not do.[8]

All of this indicated that the U.S. had attempted to negotiate and compromise with Communist China and hoped it would accept the two-China formula in the UN during the Kennedy-Johnson administrations. The United States supported dual representation memberships for both Chinas in the UN, and Peking rejected the idea mainly because of the problem of Taiwan, while both the Nationalist and Communist governments rejected any two Chinas approach.

Containment Without Isolation

In the hearings of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee during March 1966, Professor A. Doak Barnett of Columbia University characterized U.S. China policy over the previous seventeen years as "containment and isolation." He called for "containment but not isolation":

> A policy that would aim on the one hand at checking military or subversive threats and pressure

[7] US Department of State Bulletin, November 30, 1964, p. 772.

[8] Ibid.

emanating from Peking, but at the same time would
aim at maximum contacts with and maximum involvement
of the Chinese Communists in the international
community. 9

As a way out of the impasse, the "two-China" solution

was indirectly proposed by Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Ambassador

to the UN, in a speech to the National Press Club in Washing-

ton on April 19, 1966. Goldberg outlined the minimum condi-

tions under which the U.S. would agree to the PRC's entry into

the United Nations. Peking would have to:

1. abandon its demand for expulsion of the ROC;

2. withdraw its demand that the UN rescind its

   condemnation of the PRC for aggression in Korea

   and brand the U.S. as the aggressor;

3. withdraw its demand that the UN be reorganized,

   and promise to observe the provisions of the

   UN Charter.[10]

As it adopted a more militant attitude toward its

foreign relations during the period of the Cultural Revolution,

the PRC did not reciprocate this friendly American gesture;

instead it condemned the "U.S. two-China plot."

Votes on the Italian Resolution, 1966-68

During the 1960's, there was substantial support in

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[9]U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China: Hearings
Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 89th
Cong., 2nd Session (Washington: GPO, 1966), p. 4.

[10]The New York Times, April 20, 1966.

the United Nations for the continued membership of the ROC.
However, a number of delegations stated that they favored a
"two-China" formula, representation in the UN for both the
Nationalist and the Communist governments. But both Chinese
governments rejected this concept. Each claimed to be the
sole legitimate representative of the Chinese people and
maintained that Taiwan was an integral part of China.

At the twenty-first Session of the UN General Assembly
in 1966, a plan was suggested by Paul Martin, Canadian Secre-
tary of State for External Affairs: The People's Republic of
China should replace the Republic of China as a permanent
member of the Security Council and both Chinas should be
represented in the General Assembly. Martin characterized
his suggestion as an "interim solution" pending the settlement
of the juridical dispute between the rival regimes.[11] The plan
was not submitted to the Assembly as a draft resolution be-
cause rejection by a majority of the members would have ended
the discussion of the plan.[12] However, a modified and ambigu-
ously worded draft resolution was proposed by Italy and co-
sponsored by Belgium, Brazil, Chile, and Trinidad and Tobago.
The text of the draft resolution read:

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[11]UNGA Provisional Verbation Record, 21st Session,
Plenary 2-17 (A/P.V. 1475), November 30, 1966.

[12]Poelin Dai, "Canada and the Two-China Formula at
the United Nations," Canadian Yearbook of International
Law, 1967, p. 222.

The General Assembly,
Having considered the question of the representation
of China,
Believing that a solution of the question of Chinese
representation, which accords with the principles
of the Charter of the United Nations and the aim
of universality, would further the purposes of the
United Nations and strengthen its ability to maintain
international peace and security.

Believing that the complexities of this question
require the most searching consideration in order
to pave the way to an appropriate solution, taking
into account the existing situation and the
political realities of the area.

1. Decides to establish a Committee of ... Member
States, to be appointed by the General Assembly,
with the mandate of exploring and studying the
situation in all its aspects in order to make the
appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly
at its twenty-second session for an equitable and
practical solution to the question of the representation
of China in the United Nations, in keeping with the
purposes and principles of the Charter;

2. Appeals to all Governments concerned to give
assistance to the Committee in its search for such
a solution. 13

In introducing the proposal to the General Assembly,

the Italian delegate, Signor Piccioni, explained that the

Italian position was intended to ascertain the official

intentions of the PRC and to avoid the sterile debate on

Chinese representation which had taken place at the United

Nations for years. The proposed committee was to consist of

a small number of eminent and experienced persons who would

find the facts, draw their conclusions, and make proposals

for an equitable and practical solution to the China problem

13UN doc. A/L. 500, November 21, 1966.

to the twenty-second General Assembly. Specifically, this committee would determine (1) whether the PRC wished to be represented in the UN, and (2) if so, whether it would abide by the UN Charter. Had the reply to these questions been affirmative, the committee would then proceed to determine the position of the Republic of China.[14]

This proposal, which had U.S. support, was regarded by many observers as a way to gain formal consideration of the so-called "two-China" solution, which would allow membership for both Taipei and Peking with the PRC presumably in the Security Council seat. This marked a significant change in the U.S. position, but failed to win majority support, partly because both Chinese governments, and especially Peking, rejected any such solution.

During the debate, the representative of Nationalist China said that there was only one China and one legal Chinese Government - the Government of the Republic of China. He categorically rejected any proposal that purported to resolve the question of representation through the "two-China" formula. He emphasized the point of view of his delegation that the right to determine who should represent China in the United Nations belonged exclusively to the Chinese people; it was not for Members of the General Assembly or any other organ to make the decision for them or to submit proposals that were at

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[14]The New York Times, November 30, 1966.

variance with the wishes and aspirations of the Chinese people.[15]

The Italian resolution was defeated 34-62-25 in 1966, but re-submitted in 1967 and 1968. It was again defeated by 32-57-30-3 in 1967 and 30-67-27-2 in 1968. The voting patterns are shown in Tables V-1 and V-2.

TABLE V-1

VOTES ON THE ITALIAN RESOLUTION

Year	For	Against	Abstain	Absent	Total
1966	34 (28%)	62 (51%)	25 (21%)	0	121
1967	32 (26%)	57 (47%)	30 (25%)	3 (2%)	122
1968	30 (24%)	67 (53%)	27 (22%)	2 (1%)	126

Source: UN Yearbook, 1966-68.

TABLE V-2

VOTING BY UN MEMBERS WITH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

WITH TAIPEI ON THE ITALIAN RESOLUTION

	1966	1967	1968
For	27 (45%)	24 (39%)	23 (37%)
Against	15 (25%)	16 (26%)	20 (32%)
Abstain	18 (30%)	20 (33%)	19 (31%)
Absent	0	1 (2%)	0
Total	60	61	62

Source: Peter Cheng, "Peking's Entry into the United Nations: Review and Retrospect," Asian Forum (October/December, 1972), p. 23.

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[15]The Annual Report of the Chinese Delegation to the 22nd Session of the UN General Assembly (in Chinese). Taipei: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, 1968, pp. 28-29.

Analysis of the Votes

In 1966, five of the six sponsors of the Italian

resolution maintained diplomatic relations with Taipei, and

of thirty-four members voting in favor of the resolution,

twenty-seven maintained relations with Taipei, four with Peking,

and another three with neither. In 1967, four of the five

sponsors (Belgium, Chile, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands)

maintained diplomatic relations with Taipei, and of thirty-two

members voting in favor of the resolution, twenty-four main-

tained relations with Taipei, five with Peking, and another

three with neither. In 1968, four of the five sponsors

(Belgium, Chile, Iceland, Italy, and Luxembourg) had diplomatic

relations with Taipei, and of the thirty members voting in

favor of the resolution, twenty-three had relations with

Taipei, five with Peking, and another two with neither. These

figures indicated that most of the allies of the Taipei govern-

ment wanted to have a "two-China" solution to the representa-

tion problem. This reflected a changing political climate in

the UN for not supporting the legal fiction that the Nationalist

Government on Taiwan was the government of mainland China as

well. However, in the midst of the Vietnam War and the Cultural

Revolution on the China mainland, the majority of the UN members

were reluctant to change the status quo; [16]thus the General

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[16]Peter Cheng, "Peking's Entry into the United Nations:
Review and Retrospect," Asian Forum (October/December, 1972),
p. 24.

Assembly rejected the Italian proposed resolution in three consecutive sessions.

The decreased support for the Italian resolution (from 28 percent in 1966 to 24 percent in 1968) and the increased opposition to the resolution (from 51 percent in 1966 to 53 percent in 1968) clearly indicated that the "two-China" solution to end the impasse would not be possible. Consequently, the Italian resolution was dropped in 1969. Thereafter, both Canada and Italy gave up the two-China approach, negotiated with Peking and in 1970 recognized the Communist Government as the legal government of all China.

The China "Breakthrough" Under
The Nixon Administration

In his article in _Foreign Affairs_ in October 1967, President Richard M. Nixon expounded his views toward Communist China, while he was a private citizen. He wrote:

> Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation ....
>
> The world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus our aim, to the extent that we can influence events, should be to induce change ....
>
> For the short run, then, this means a policy of firm restraint, of no reward, of a creative counterpressure designed to persuade Peking that its interests can be served only by accepting the basic rules of international civility. For the

long run, it means pulling China back into the
world community but as a great and progressing
nation, not as the epicenter of world revolution.[17]

Thereafter, when he became U.S. President in 1969,

Nixon made a long string of concessions to the rulers of Red

China as the price of his visit to Peking in 1972.[18] On the

other hand, the main reasons for a detente between Red China

and the U.S. were the split between the U.S.S.R. and mainland

China[19] and the Chinese Communists' willingness to postpone

the Taiwan problem.[20]

In his foreign policy message to Congress on February

25, 1971, President Nixon said:

> The evolution of our dialogue with Peking can-
> not be at the expense of international order or our
> own commitments .... We will continue to honor our
> treaty commitments to the security of our Asian
> allies. An honorable relationship with Peking can-
> not be constructed at their expense .... Among these
> allies is the Republic of China ....
>
> ... I wish to make it clear that the United States
> is prepared to see the People's Republic of China
> play a constructive role in the family of nations.
> The question of its place in the United Nations is
> not, however, merely a question of whether it should
> participate. It is also a question of whether Peking

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[17]Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Viet Nam," _Foreign Affairs_ (October 1967), pp. 121, 123.

[18]_US News & World Report_ (February 28, 1972), p. 15.

[19]Oliver Benson, "Changes in U.S. Diplomatic Relations with China," _The Oklahoma Daily_ (October 5, 1974), p. 4; Harold C. Hinton, _Peking-Washington: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United States_ (Beverly Hill, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1976), p. 31.

[20]Henry A. Kissinger, _American Foreign Policy_, Expanded Edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1974), pp. 232-33.

should be permitted to dictate to the world the
terms of its participation. For a number of years
attempts have been made to deprive the Republic of
China of its place as a member of the United Nations
and its Specialized Agencies. We have opposed these
attempts. We will continue to oppose them 21

On April 16, 1971, in an interview at the Newspaper
Editors' Meeting, President Nixon stated that the U.S. policy
toward China would be normalization of relations with the
Government of the People's Republic of China, and the ending
of the isolation of mainland China from the world community.[22]
On July 15, 1971, President Nixon announced on television,
that through the secret negotiations between his Assistant
for National Security Affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger, he had
accepted the invitation of the government of the PRC and would
go to Peking to meet Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou
En-lai sometime before May 1972.[23] These changes shocked the
world and thus many U.S. allies took quick action for a
rapprochement with Peking. This weakened their commitment
to Taipei.

Finally, on August 2, 1971, Secretary of State William
Rogers announced the U.S. policy on Chinese representation in
the UN as follows:

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[21]Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's:
Building for Peace. A Report to the Congress, February 25,
1971, pp. 105-9.

[22]US Department of State Bulletin, May 3, 1971, p. 566.

[23]Ibid., May 3, 1971, p. 566.

...No question of Asian policy has so perlexed the
world in the last 20 years as the China question -
and the related question of representation in the
United Nations. Basic to that question is the
fact that each of two governments claims to be
the sole government of China and representative
of all the people of China.

... Participation of both in the United Nations ...
would provide governments with increased opportunities
for contact and communication. It would also help
promote cooperation on common problems which affect
all of the member nations regardless of political
differences.

The United States accordingly will support
action at the General Assembly this fall calling
for seating the People's Republic of China. At the
same time the United States will oppose any action
to expel the Republic of China or otherwise deprive
it of representation in the United Nations. 24

To decision as to which of the two governments should occupy

the China's seat in the Security Council, Secretary Rogers

added, should be left to the members of the United Nations.[25]

Later, further consultation with "about 90 other

governments" having revealed "a good deal of support for

having the Security Council seat go to the People's Republic

of China."[26] President Nixon on September 16, 1971, offered

a modified statement of the U.S. position in the following

terms:

... We favor the admission and will vote for the
admission of the People's Republic to the United
nations and that will mean, of course (sic),
obtaining a Security Council seat.

[24]Ibid., August 23, 1971, p. 193.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Ibid., September 27, 1971, p. 327.

We will vote against the expulsion of the Republic
of China, and we will work as effectively as we
can to accomplish that goal. 27

How could the U.S. and the PRC establish a permanent

detente while the former still maintained its support of the

Nationalist Government on Taiwan? The Nixon Administration's

approach seemed to be summed up in the phrase "one China but

not now" policy. This policy was outlined by Richard Moorsteen

as follows:

> ... the handling of the Taiwan issue.
> Without initially committing ourselves to going
> very far, I think we should give Peking some
> indication that we might actively encourage
> movement toward the reunification of Taiwan with
> the mainland - under right conditions and over a
> long enough span of time.
>
> ... I would like to see the U.S. formally agree
> "in principle" that Taiwan is a part of China ....
> In adopting this policy, ... it accords with the
> official positions of both Peking and Taipei - but
> also that in practical terms, the policy appears
> to have different implications for each of them.
> Until these differences are ironed out, we will
> honor our contractual obligation to the G.R.C.
> [Government of the Republic of China] to defend
> Taiwan and the Pescadores. 28

Furthermore, Dr. Henry Kissinger at his press conference on

November 30, 1971 stated: "It is our judgement that the

future relationship between the People's Republic and Taiwan

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[27]President Nixon's News Conference of September 16,
1971, in _Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States,
1971_ (Washington: GPO, 1972), p. 950.

[28]Richard Moorsteen, "U.S. Policy Options: One China -
But Not Now," in Jerome Alan Cohen, et al., _Taiwan and
American Policy: The Dilemma in U. S. - China Relations_ (New
York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 133, 135-36. Parentheses added.

should be worked out between Taiwan and the People's Republic."[29] The Shanghai Joint Communiqué on February 28, 1972 issued by President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai confirmed the "one China but not now" policy.

Consideration by the General Assembly

At Its Twenty-Sixth Session

At the opening of the Twenty-Sixth Session of the Assembly, there were three draft resolutions submitted for debate and adoption. One was the Albanian proposal, co-sponsored by twenty-three powers, submitted on September 25, 1971, which read:

> The General Assembly,
>
> Recalling the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
>
> Considering that the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China is essential both for the protection of the Charter of the United Nations and for the cause that the United Nations must serve under the Charter,
>
> Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and that the People's Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council,
>
> Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it. [30]

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[29]Official press release from the Office of the White House Press Secretary, November 30, 1971, p. 7.

[30]UN doc. A/L. 630, September 25, 1971.

The other two resolutions were sponsored by the United States and her allies on September 29, 1971, and were submitted four days later than the Albanian draft resolution. This was due to the delay of approval of the U.S. proposal by the Nationalist Government on Taiwan.[31] In the meantime, President Chiang Kai-shek still hoped that the United States would maintain its "important question" strategy as before to block the admission of Peking, but his hope was unfruitful. The texts of the two American draft resolutions read:

(i) The General Assembly,

Recalling the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,

Decides that any proposal in the General Assembly which would result in depriving the Republic of China of representation in the United Nations is an important question under Article 18 of the Charter. 32

(ii) The General Assembly,

Noting that since the founding of the United Nations fundamental changes have occurred in China,

Having regard for the existing factual situation Noting that the Republic of China has been continuously represented as a Member of the United Nations since 1945,

Recalling that Article 1, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations establishes the United Nations as a center for harmonizing the actions of nations,

Believing that an equitable resolution of this

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[31]United Daily News, Taipei, October 6, 1971.

[32]UN doc. A/L. 632, September 29, 1971.

problem should be sought in the light of the
above-mentioned considerations and without
prejudice to the eventual settlement of the
conflicting claims involved,

1. Hereby affirms the right of representation
   of the People's Republic of China and
   recommends that it be seated as one of the
   five permanent members of the Security
   Council;

2. Affirms the continued right of representation
   of the Republic of China;

3. Recommends that all United Nations bodies
   and the specialized agencies take into
   account the provisions of this resolution
   in deciding the question of Chinese
   representation. 33

As the two American proposals indicated, the emphasis

was now placed on keeping the ROC in, rather than the PRC out.

In the American view, expulsion of the ROC would be subject

to a two-thirds vote. This was the strategy of "non-expulsion

important question resolution."

When the question of Chinese representation was

debated in the UN General Assembly in late October of 1971,

the U.S. delegate stated that it had become increasingly clear

that the past pattern of UN decisions was no longer sufficient.

The time had come to find a way to welcome the PRC in the UN,

but with due regard for realism, justice and the purposes and

principles of the Organization. It must be a way which would

avoid the unacceptable route of expelling a law-abiding and

faithful member.[34] Thus, the terms of the draft resolution,

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[33]UN doc. A/L. 633, September 29, 1971.

[34]UN Monthly Chronicle (November 1971), p. 40.

co-sponsored by the United States and eighteen other members on September 29, 1971, recommended that the PRC take over China's place as a permanent member of the Security Council and provide representation both for the PRC and the ROC in the General Assembly. Thus all the people of China would be represented in the UN by the Governments which, for over twenty years, had actually governed them.

On the other hand, the pro-Peking forces argued that it was merely a question of credentials. They felt that if both governments claimed to rule all of China, only one could be right. Accordingly, they maintained the Communist government, obviously in control of most of China, should be entitled to the seat; and the Nationalist Government on Taiwan should be expelled. They argued that the question before the General Assembly was not one of expulsion of an existing member, but rather one of representation, namely, which government should occupy China's seat in the United Nations.[35]

As quoted above, the Albanian resolution obviously raised the issue of expulsion of Nationalist China. To the U.S. and the ROC's allies, the course of expulsion was a dangerous precedent and an unacceptable price to pay for the entry of the PRC; since the ROC was a Member in good standing, a Government representing more than fourteen million people, served by decent men, with no Charter violations, no violations

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[35]Ibid., pp. 38-40.

against its name, and with a most constructive record, it should not be expelled from the United Nations.[36] The representative of the U.S. indicated that, in his delegation's view, a vote for the Albanian resolution would be a vote against universality. The "dual representation" draft resolution was a new approach responsive to a new and more hopeful situation in the relations between China and the world. By contrast, the expulsion of a Member in good standing was unrealistic and dangerous for the future of the United Nations.[37]

For that reason, the U.S. and its co-sponsors had proposed another draft resolution, the "non-expulsion important question" proposal described above, requiring that any draft resolution having the effect of depriving the ROC of representation must obtain a two-thirds majority to be adopted.[38] The representative of the U.S. moved that the General Assembly vote first on the draft containing the two-thirds majority requirement. The motion was adopted on October 25, 1971 by a roll-call voted of sixty-one in favor to fifty-three against, with fifteen abstentions.[39]

As the debate and the voting on the China issue proceeded in the UN, Henry Kissinger was in Peking to plan an

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[36]Ibid., pp. 40-41.

[37]Ibid.

[38]UN doc. A/L. 632, September 29, 1971.

[39]UNGAOR, 26th Session, Annexes: Agenda Item 93, p. 6.

agenda for President Nixon's trip to Communist China. This
was viewed as contradictory by many UN delegates. French
Ambassador Jacques Kosciousko-Morizet commented: "In order
to make the dual representation scheme a success, it would
have been better to avoid a dual diplomacy."[40] Moreover, the
"two-China" formula had been a blind alley; a majority of the
delegates wanted a showdown right then and there. Thus, in
spite of energetic U.S. and Japanese lobbying, the General
Assembly on October 25, 1971 rejected the "important question"
draft resolution by a roll-call vote of fifty-five in favor to
fifty-nine against, with fifteen abstentions.[41] The "important
question" resolution lost at the critical moment partly due to a
few delegates, such as Belgium, Morocco and Oman switching
their position from support to abstention at the last moment.[42]

With only a simple majority required for passage, there
was no way of holding off the Albanian resolution. Nationalist
Chinese Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai stood up, walked to the
rostrum and announced his delegation's withdrawal from further
proceedings of the Assembly:

> The rejection of the draft resolution contained in
> document A/L. 632 is a flagrant violation of the
> Charter, which governs the expulsion of Member States.
> In view of the frenzied and irrational manners that
> have been exhibited in this hall, the delegation of
> the Republic of China has now decided not to take part

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[40]The New York Times, October 21, 1971.

[41]UNGAOR, 26th Session, Annexes: Agenda Item 93, p. 6.

[42]Personal interview with Mr. Harry Thayer, Director
of PRC and Outer Mongolia Desk, US Department of State on June
28, 1977.

in any further proceedings of this General Assembly.[43]
He then led his delegation out of the Assembly. After he left
the Assembly Hall, Chou issued a public statement to the press
on China's (ROC) withdrawal from the United Nations.[44] There-
after, the U.S. delegate, George Bush, released the delegations
that had been committed to the U.S. position.

The General Assembly acted in the evening on the same
day (October 25) by adopting the twenty-three power Albanian
draft resolution by a vote of seventy-six in favor to thirty-
five against, with seventeen abstentions.[45] After the Assembly
decision, UN Secretary General U Thant cabled the text of the
resolution to the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
PRC in Peking, and the PRC replied that they were willing to
join the United Nations. Thus, after more than twenty years
the political issue of Chinese representation in the United
Nations came to an end; and no vote was taken on the U.S.-
sponsored "dual representation" resolution. On the following
day (October 26), U.S. Secretary of State, William Rogers
said at his news conference:

> Although we believe that a mistake of major propor-
> tion has been made in expelling the Republic of China
> from the United Nations, the United States recognizes
> that the will of a majority of the Members has been
> expressed. We, of course, accept that decision. [46]

---

[43]The Annual Report of the Chinese Delegation to the
26th Session of the UN General Assembly (Taipei: Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 1972), p. 108.

[44]Ibid., pp. 111-15. [45]UN Yearbook, 1971, p. 136.

[46]US Department of State Bulletin, November 15, 1971,
p. 541.

Analysis of 1971 Vote

"Non-Expulsion" Important Question Resolution

Compared with the 1970 vote, in 1971 twenty-nine members switched their votes on the "non-expulsion" important question resolution. They can be grouped as follows:

1. From yes to no - Canada, Ecuador, Iceland, Ireland, Sierre Leone, and United Kingdom.

2. From yes to abstain - Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Cyprus, Iran, Italy, Laos, Malta, the Netherlands, Senegal, Togo, and Turkey.

3. From abstain to no - Cameroon, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago.

4. From abstain to yes - Barbados, Chad, Indonesia, Mauritius, and Portugal.

5. From no to abstain - Morocco and Tunisia.

6. From no to yes - Ghana.

The four newly admitted members split: One yes (Bahrain), one no (Bhutan) and two abstentions (Oman and Quatar). As a result, the resolution lost eleven affirmative votes. With a net gain of seven negative votes and a substantial increase in abstentions, the "non-expulsion" important-question proposal was rejected by 59-55-17. There were 131 Members present when the vote on the resolution was taken. Among the sixty-three Members having diplomatic relations with Peking, the division was five yes, forty-nine no, and nine abstentions. Among the

fifty-five Members retaining diplomatic relations with Taipei, the division was forty-six yes, three no, and six abstentions. Among the twelve Members having diplomatic relations with neither, a division was three yes, seven no, and two abstentions. The defeat of the resolution was due to the combination of the members in the first three groups.

From the view of bloc voting distributions, pro-Peking forces won clear-cut support in every group except Latin America. Among the forty-eight U.S. allies, thirty-one voted yes, twelve no, and five abstained. The twelve negative votes included six NATO members (Canada, Denmark, France, United Kingdom, Iceland, Norway), five OAS members (Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago), and one SEATO member (Pakistan). Four NATO members (Belgium, Italy, Netherlands and Turkey) and Laos abstained.

The Albanian Resolution to Seat the PRC and Remove the ROC

As for the Albanian resolution voting, thirty-six members switched their votes as follows:

1. From no to yes - Israel, Mexico, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkey.

2. From abstain to yes - Belgium, Botswana, Cameroon, Ecuador, Guyana, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Kuwait, Laos, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Peru, Portugal, Senegal, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, and Tunisia.

3. From no to abstain - Argentina, Barbados, Colombia, Greece, Jordan, Mauritius, Panama, Spain, Thailand.

4. From abstain to no - Bolivia, Central African Republic.

5. From absence to abstain - Indonesia.

6. Among the four new members, one (Bhutan) voted yes, while the other three (Bahrain, Oman, Quatar) abstained.

With a net gain of thirty-five affirmative votes, the resolution was approved by 76-35-17.

An analysis of 130 (ROC withdrew) Members' voting records revealed the following findings:

1. Among sixty-three members that recognized Peking, sixty voted for the resolution; Cambodia voted no; Indonesia and Mauritius abstained.

2. Among fifty-five members having diplomatic relations with Taipei, the division was nine for, thirty-four against, and twelve abstaining.

3. None of the twelve members maintaining diplomatic relations with neither voted against the resolution; seven of them voted for, while five abstained.

4. As for the geographical and group voting distributions, the Peking forces did not fare well in Latin America, but gained a substantial increase on the margin of plurality in all other areas.

5. Less than a majority of U.S. allies voted against
   the resolution, as did the United States. A
   division among the forty-eight U.S. allies was
   twenty for, eighteen against, nine abstaining,
   and one absence. None of the NATO members voted
   with the U.S. against the resolution. Eleven
   NATO members joined eight members from Latin
   America (Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico, Chile, Peru,
   Trinidad and Tobago), Asia (Laos) and the Middle
   East (Israel) in voting for the resolution.
   Greece and Luxembourg joined seven members from
   Latin America (Argentina, Barbados, Colombia,
   Jamaica, and Panama), Asia (Thailand), and Western
   Europe (Spain) in abstaining.

In retrospect, the favorable vote for Peking's entry
in 1971 was the result of a long process of cultivation by the
PRC to establish diplomatic relations with free nations through-
out the world. The number of UN members extending such recogni-
tion increased from eighteen in 1950 to sixty-three in 1971.
Diplomatic recognition appeared to be significant in deciding
the outcome of the 1971 voting, because it substantiated the
basic concept that there was only one China and there was
only one seat for China in the United Nations. Many nations,
including the American allies, could not lend their support to
a precedent that would divide representation of a single state

in the United Nations between two governments. At the same
time, the U.S. played an ambiguous role in that, while it
fought to keep Taipei in, it did not fight with everything
it had. According to Edgar Snow, Nixon had already succeeded
in communicating to Peking his desire to end the deadlock in
Sino-American relations and to see Peking enter the United
Nations.[47] It was probably true that both Nixon and Kissinger
played "double diplomacy," to let Peking be admitted into the
UN at the expense of Taipei, because they did not want to risk,
especially during an election year, the souring of either the
Sino-American rapprochement or the President's forthcoming
trip to mainland China.

On the other hand, had the Nationalist Chinese Govern-
ment approved the U.S. dual representation proposal earlier,
had it been willing that its UN delegation should claim to
represent Taiwan only, the UN delegates then might have cast
their votes differently.[48] However, although the Chinese
Nationalist Government finally approved the U.S. proposal,
in their public statements they still used ambiguous words
claiming to represent China as a whole. Even in Foreign
Minister Chou Shu-kai's statement in the UN debate concerning
Chinese representation, he did not present the Nationalist

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[47]Edgar Snow, "A Conversation with Mao Tse-tung,"
<u>Life</u> (April 30, 1971).

[48]Personal interview on June 2, 1976 with Ambassador
C. M. Chang, former Nationalist Deputy Permanent Representative
to the UN.

position clearly as to whether or not he accepted the "dual representation" arrangement.[49] Thus, it caused confusion with regard to the Nationalist position.[50] In a word, the United States and the Nationalists lost largely because what the two were trying to accomplish was close to impossible.

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[49]The Annual Report of the Chinese Delegation to the 26th Session of the UN General Assembly (Taipei: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1972), pp. 83-89.

[50]The New York Times, October 19, 1971.

CHAPTER VI

AID, TRADE, UN CAUCUSES AND DIPLOMATIC

RECOGNITION AS DETERMINANTS OF UN VOTES

ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION

Diplomatic Recognition as a Technique
of Foreign Policy

Recognition of a new government has always been

determined by international politics, not by legal criteria.[1]

"De jure" recognition is generally full and complete in

nature, while "de facto" recognition is halfway between

recognition and non-recognition.[2] The basic question involved

in recognition or non-recognition has been whether to recog-

nize all governments which are actually in effective control

of their particular nations, or whether to recognize only

those governments which pass certain minimum standards of

moral and political respectability. Some nations have attempted

to answer these questions by granting "de jure" recognition

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[1]William L. Tung, _International Law in an Organizing
World_ (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1968), pp. 49-50.

[2]Ibid., pp. 51-52.

to governments they approve, and "de facto" recognition to governments they disapprove but recognize as being in control of their nations.[3]

The United States, however, has on occasion refused to grant any kind of formal recognition to certain governments, even though they were in full control of their particular nations. The most notable cases are America's refusal to recognize the Communist government of Russia from 1917 to 1933 and her refusal to recognize the Communist government of China since 1949. However, the US may be considered to have extended "de facto" recognition to Peking with the establishment of liaison offices in both Peking and Washington in 1973. The US policy was one of non-recognition of the People's Republic of China because of the effective functioning of the Nationalist Government on Taiwan and the American treaty commitment to defend Taiwan and other areas in Asia against Communist expansion.[4] Furthermore, the withholding of American recognition of the Chinese Communist regime was

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[3]Urban G. Whitaker, Jr., Politics and Power: A Text in International Law (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 272-73.

[4]"U. S. State Department Memorandum, Circulated to Overseas Missions, on Question of Recognition of the PRC, August 12, 1958," in Department of State, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 1138.

a part of a program designed to prevent that government from

displacing the Nationalist Government as the representative

of China in the United Nations.[5]

Moreover, in the realm of diplomatic relations, the

two Chinese regimes have throughout the years adopted a

course of action similar to the so-called "Hallstein Doctrine"

adhered to by the Federal Republic of Germany[6] during the

1950's and the 1960's: that is, extending diplomatic recogni-

tion to either one of the disputants by a third country would

likely provoke the withdrawal of recognition to the other.

The only exception is the case of Libya. Libya, a UN member,

recognized the ROC in 1959 and the PRC in 1971, but she has

diplomatic relations only with the ROC.[7] Under the circum-

stances, the US continued to recognize the Nationalist Govern-

ment as the only legal government of China and supported the

Nationalist Government as the representative of China in the

United Nations. Thus, in the context of the Cold War, a

majority of the UN members followed the American lead of non-

recognition toward the Chinese Communist regime, while the

Soviet bloc recognized Peking and members of the non-aligned

group were split on the question. As of August 9, 1971, the

patterns of UN members' diplomatic recognition toward the

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[5]Ibid., p. 1139.

[6]Poeliu Dai, "Canada and the Two-China Formula at the United Nations," Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 1961, p. 227.

[7]Central Daily News, Taipei, International Edition, September 19, 1977, p. 1.

two Chinese governments are presented in Table VI-1.

Non-recognition by individual states had the following results: the PRC was excluded from membership in the United Nations and other international organizations for more than twenty years; the PRC was hampered from establishing normal trade relations as well as being denied access to resources that the Nationalist regime maintained abroad; the PRC's opportunities for obtaining international financial assistance were narrowed; the PRC's access to foreign courts was restricted; and the foreign areas in which the PRC's laws received respect were circumscribed.[8]

As described in Chapter II (pp. 33-34), there was a clear linkage between diplomatic recognition and the UN votes on the problem of Chinese representation. Diplomatic recognition was thus an important variable in deciding the outcome of the UN votes on the China issue. For that reason, in the statistical analysis presented below, this writer uses diplomatic recognition as a "dummy" variable for regression analysis, following the convention of coding "1" for recognition and "0" for non-recognition.[9]

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[8]Jerome Alan Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, People's Republic of China and International Law: A Documentary Study,Vol. 1 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 205.

[9]N. R. Draper and H. Smith, Applied Regression Analysis (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), pp. 134-35.

TABLE VI-1

UN MEMBERS' DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF THE TWO CHINAS

(As of August 9, 1971)

Countries Having Diplomatic Relations with the ROC (Taipei)

Argentina	The Gambia	New Zealand
Australia	Greece	Nicaragua
Barbados	Guatemala	Niger
Belgium	Haiti	Panama
Bolivia	Handuras	Paraguay
Botswana	Iran	Peru
Brazil	Ivory Coast	Philippines
Central Africa	Jamaica	Portugal
Republic	Japan	Rwanda
Chad	Jordan	Saudi Arabia
Colombia	Lebanon	Senegal
Congo	Lesotho	South Africa
(Kinshasa)	Liberia	Spain
Costa Rica	Libya*	Swaziland
Cyprus	Luxembourg	Thailand
Dahomey	Malagasy Republic	Togo
Dominican Republic	Malawi	United States
Ecuador	Maldive Islands	Upper Volta
El Salvador	Malta	Uruguay
Gabon	Mexico	Venezuela

Countries Having Diplomatic Relations With The PRC (Peking)

Afghanistan	France	Poland
Albania	Guinea	Romania
Algeria	Hungary	Sierra Leone
Austria	India	Somalia
Bulgaria	Iraq	Southern Yemen
Burma	Italy	Sudan
Cameroon	Kenya	Sweden
Canada	Kuwait	Syria
Ceylon	Laos	Tanzania
Chile	Mali	Turkey
Congo	Mauritania	Uganda
(Brazzaville)	Mongolia	United Arab Republic
Cuba	Morocco	United Kingdom
Czechoslovakia	Nepal	U.S.S.R.**
Denmark	Netherlands	Yemen
Equatorial Guinea	Nigeria	Yugoslavia
Ethiopia	Norway	Zambia
Finland	Pakistan	

TABLE VI-1 (Continued)

Countries Recognizing the ROC But Having No Diplomatic Relations:

Iceland

Countries Recognizing the PRC But Having No Diplomatic Relations:

Burundi	Indonesia	Tunisia
Cambodia	Israel [++]	
Ghana	Mauritius	

Countries Recognizing Neither:

Figi	Malaysia	+Bahrain
Guyana	Singapore	+Bhutan
Ireland	Trinidad and Tobago	+Oman
		+Quatar

Source: Adapted from US Department of State, Communist China: Current Information Supplement (Washington: Government Printing Office, August 1971), p. 6.

*Libya, a UN member, recognizes both the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China and has diplomatic relations with the Republic of China.

**U.S.S.R. has three votes in the General Assembly due to the fact that Byelorussia SSR and Ukraine SSR joined the United Nations as original members.

+Bahrain, Bhutan, and Quatar were admitted to the UN on September 21, 1971; Oman was admitted on October 7, 1971. They all voted on the Chinese representation resolutions, October 25, 1971.

[++] For political reasons, Israel's recognition of Peking (1/9/50) has not been reciprocated.

UN Caucuses and the Roll-Calls

Using Thomas Hovet's definition of UN caucus[10] for the analysis of UN votes on Chinese representation, there was only one true caucusing bloc - the Soviet bloc. Hovet considered the other informal political organizations in the General Assembly as caucusing groups, which did not necessarily vote as a single unit.[11] However, they were the main political interest groups that operated in the Assembly and were involved in the behind-the-scene negotiations on most of the crucial issues, including the China problem. Therefore, the UN caucuses are an important variable influencing the outcome of votes on the China issue. This writer simplified Hovet's UN caucuses into one caucusing bloc and six caucusing groups (already described in Chapter I, p. 13) by assigning each of the UN members exclusively into one of them. The codes for the caucuses are "1" for in-group and "0" for out-group. They are used as dummy variables for regression analysis.[12]

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[10] Thomas Hovet, Jr., _Africa in the United Nations_ (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963), pp. 16-17.

[11] Ibid., p. 17.

[12] Jacob Cohen and Patricia Cohen, _Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences_ (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1975), pp. 173-74.

Political and Strategic Motives of Foreign Aid

Foreign aid policy is motivated by both political and strategic factors. Aid becomes an instrument of foreign policy to buy support for the policies of the assisting country in the United Nations.[13] According to Joan M. Nelson, one of the purposes of U.S. foreign aid involved delaying recognition of Communist China and its admission into the United Nations.[14] On the other hand, the Soviet objectives of economic aid were to deflect the policies of the developing nations in directions favorable to the Soviet objectives, and to weaken the influence of the West, particularly that of the United States.[15] Thus aid has been used as an effective weapon in the Cold War by both camps to win the support of the non-aligned group of nations for their respective positions.

This has been especially true of aid programs for the new nations of Africa. The aid commitments of Communist China, the Soviet Union and the United States to the newly independent nations of Africa are summarized in Table VI-2.

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[13]J. M. Healey, The Economics of Aid (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971), p. 4.

[14]Joan M. Nelson, Aid, Influence, and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 11, 113.

[15]Joseph S. Berliner, Soviet Economic Aid: The New Aid and Trade Policy in Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Praeger, 1958), p. 17.

TABLE VI-2

P.R.C., SOVIET UNION, AND UNITED STATES ECONOMIC

AID COMMITMENTS TO AFRICA THROUGH 1965

(in millions of US dollars)

	China (PRC)	Soviet Union	United States
Algeria	51.8	228	162
Congo (Brazzaville)	25.2	9	4
Ethiopia		102	150
Ghana	42	82	166
Guinea	26.5	61	69
Kenya	18	3	36
Mali	19.6	61	14
Morocco			484
Senegal		7	17
Somalia	21.6	52	47
Sudan		22	89
Tanzania	45.5	42	44
Tunisia		29	449
UAR	84.7	821	1,081
Uganda	15	16	17
Zambia	.5		24
TOTAL	350.4	1,535	2,853

Sources: Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade (New York, 1966), p. 307; Marshall L. Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid (New York, 1967), p. 206; and Milton Kovner, "Communist China's Foreign Aid to Less-developed Countries," in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Economic Profile of Mainland China (Washington, 1967), p. 612.

As Table VI-2 indicates, the United States had made by far the largest aid commitment to Africa through 1965. Among the sixteen African nations listed, Communist China competed with the United States in aid in eleven of them;[16] in three cases, the Congo (Brazzaville), Mali, and Tanzania, Communist China's aid commitments exceeded those of the United States. The Soviet Union made the second largest aid commitment; it was the leading aid donor to Algeria, Mali, and Somalia. Communist China competed with the Soviet Union in aid in ten African countries.[17] Communist Chinese aid commitments exceeded those of the Soviet Union in only four of them: Congo (Brazzaville), Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia. Communist China was the leading aid donor in only two African countries: Congo (Brazzaville) and Tanzania. Only in the Congo (Brazzaville) did Communist Chinese aid commitment exceed the combined total aid commitment of the United States and the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, the Nationalist Chinese competed with the Communists in economic aid in twenty-four African states. The aid projects of Nationalist China to African states are summarized in Tables VI-3, and VI-4. As the tables illustrated, the main purpose of the Nationalist aid was to win the African votes in the UN to sustain its representation and to keep Peking out.

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[16]George T. Yu, "China's Competitive Diplomacy in Africa," in Jerome Alan Cohen (ed.), The Dynamics of China's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 78.

[17]Ibid.

TABLE VI-3

ROC AGRICULTURAL MISSIONS SENT TO AFRICA

UNDER PROJECT "VANGUARD"

(As of October 1971)

Country	Date of Establishment	Remarks
1. Botswana	February 1, 1968	
2. Cameroon	November 7, 1964	*Withdrawn in March 1971
3. Central African Republic	November 13, 1968	
4. Chad	April 17, 1965	
5. Dahomey	March 10, 1963	Withdrawn in April 1965 and resumed on October 11,1966
6. Gabon	October 23, 1963	
7. The Gambia	June 11, 1966	
8. Ghana	November 1, 1968	
9. Ivory Coast	March 15, 1963	
10. Lesotho	January 24, 1969	
11. Liberia	November 28, 1961	
12. Libya	March 4, 1962	Withdrawn on April 12, 1969
13. Malagasy Republic	December 20, 1966	
14. Malawi	December 24, 1965	
15. Mauritius	October 10, 1969	
16. Niger	July 27, 1964	
17. Rwanda	January 30, 1964	
18. Senegal	April 29, 1964	
19. Sierra Leone	June 15, 1964	Withdrawn in August 1971
20. Swaziland	September 23, 1969	
21. Togo	August 6, 1965	
22. Upper Volta	April 15, 1965	
23. Zaire (Congo, Kinshasa)	August 12, 1966	

Source: Sino-African Technical Cooperation (Taipei: Sino-African Technical Cooperation Committee, 1971), p. 71.

*There was a perfect correlation between the severence of diplomatic relations and the withdrawal of agricultural missions.

TABLE VI-4

ROC TECHNICAL MISSIONS SENT TO AFRICA

(As of October 1971)

Country	Mission	Date of Establishment	Remarks
Chad	Oil Plant Mission	August 16, 1968	
Ethiopia	Veterinary Mission	August 21, 1963	*Withdrawn on Dec. 1, 1970
Ivory Coast	Seed Multiplication Center	April 3, 1968	
Malagasy Republic	Bamboo Handicraft Mission	April 15, 1969	
Rwanda	Sugar Mill Mission	August 1, 1968	
Libya	a. Doctors & Nurses	December 27, 1962 & January 1, 1964 respectively	
	b. Engineers	May 15, 1963	
	c. Meteorological Experts	March 29, 1964	

Source: Sino-African Technical Cooperation (Taipei: Sino-African Technical Cooperation Committee, 1971), p. 72.

*The withdrawal of the Veterinary Mission took place because Ethiopia recognized Peking and established diplomatic relations with the PRC on November 24, 1970.

Owing to availability and compatibility, in this
analysis the economic aid figures to foreign countries of
the United States (1958-65) and Soviet Union (1954/5-65) are
per capita in US dollars. The aid data of Nationalist China
(1961-71) are not in terms of US dollars, but are used as a
dummy variable coded either "ever received" (1) or not (0)
in order to run a regression analysis.

The Cold War and East-West Trade

During the Cold War, trade was seized upon by each
of the two camps, Western and Communist, as a weapon for
strengthening its own position and weakening the adversary.[18]
The United States trade policies, such as embargo and denial
of most-favored-nations treatment, aimed to limit for the
Communists the military and economic benefits that were
presumed to flow from unhampered trade with the United States
and other nations of the free world.[19]

Nikita Khrushchev frankly told a group of United
States senators visiting Moscow, "We value trade least for

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[18] Jozef Wilczynski, The Economics and Politics of
East-West Trade (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 237.

[19] Mose L. Harvey, East West Trade and United States
Policy (New York: National Association of Manufacturers,
1966), p. 25.

economic reasons and most for political purposes."[20] Chou

En-lai told a groups of Japanese businessmen visiting Peking

in 1962 that "trade and politics are inseparable."[21] When

testifying before the United States Senate Committee on

Foreign Relations in 1964, Secretary of State Dean Rusk

said:

> Our trade policy toward Communist countries is
> an integral part of our overall policy toward
> international communism, and we must view it in
> this framework ... trade with the Communist
> world cannot be effectively used as a blunt
> instrument. It must be flexibly adapted and
> flexibly applied on the basis of political,
> military and economic realities. 22

Trade offers were also made at one time or another

by the Soviet Union, Communist China and East Germany to

court diplomatic recognition. However, the greatest initia-

tive in politicizing trade has been displayed by Peking. To

the 1958 trade agreement with Japan, the Communist Government

of China attached two political strings. They were that a

Chinese trade delegation be stationed in Japan and be accorded

diplomatic privileges, and that a flag of the Peking regime

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[20] *The New York Times*, September 18, 1955.

[21] Kao Hsiang-kao, *Chinese Communist Foreign Trade and Diplomacy* (Taipei: China Chapter, Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, 1964), p. 2.

[22] US Senate, *East-West Trade*, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Part I (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1964), pp. 4 & 18.

be hoisted over the headquarters of the delegation.[23] These stipulations amounted to forcing Japan to extend "de facto" diplomatic recognition to the Chinese Communist Government. After the 1958 flag-tearing incident in Nagasaki, the PRC broke off all its formal trade relations with Japan and this situation continued for the next four years.[24]

Thus, it is beyond doubt that trade was used as a positive instrument of foreign policy by both camps to court the support of uncommitted nations. According to Professor Gene T. Hsiao of Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, the Peking regime cleverly used trade as a diplomatic weapon.[25] Therefore, trade is used as an important variable in the regression analysis. All the trade figures for the US, USSR, PRC, and ROC are in millions of US dollars for the period from 1955 to 1968.

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[23]Gene T. Hsiao, "The Role of Trade in China's Diplomacy with Japan," in Jerome Alan Cohen (ed.), The Dynamics of China's Foreign Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 43.

[24]Ibid., pp. 46-47.

[25]Personal interview with Professor Gene T. Hsiao on April 30, 1977; this point will be elaborated in his forthcoming book, Foreign Trade of China: Policy, Law and Practice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 26-40.

Multiple Regression Analysis

As described above, this writer identifies aid, trade, UN caucuses and diplomatic recognition as the most important quantifiable variables in determining the outcomes of the UN votes on Chinese representation. This study is a non-experimental research in which there are several independent variables and one dependent variable - Chinese representation. The dependent variable assumes three forms: the "moratorium" on voting during the 1950's; and the important question and seating of Peking issues during the 1960's, which ran simultaneously. Moreover, this analysis includes a series of dummy variables: UN caucuses, diplomatic recognition, and "ever received foreign aid."

Figure 5-1 presents the Model of UN Voting on Chinese Representation based upon the discussion above. The Model

Figure 5-1 Model of UN Voting on Chinese Representation

shows voting as a product of aid, trade, UN caucuses and diplomatic recognition. It lends itself to an empirical testing through multiple regression analysis. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to describing how the model is operationalized and tested through regression analysis.

Multiple linear regression has been chosen for the statistical analysis, since multiple linear regression can explain and predict one dependent variable by a number of independent variables, including dummy variables.[26] Regression analysis enables us to measure the combined effect of any number of independent variables on a dependent variable. The multiple linear regression equation may be written.[27]

$$Y' = a + b_1(X_1) + b_2(X_2) + \ldots, + b_n(X_n)$$

where Y' represents the estimated values of the dependent variable, X_1 represents the first independent variable, X_2 the second, a the intercept on the Y axis, and the b's the respective regression coefficients.

Furthermore, computer programs for multiple regression and correlation are available in the OSIRIS III Statistical Package. OSIRIS III computer programs can perform not

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[26]Fred N. Kerlinger, and Flazar J. Pedhazur, _Multiple Regression in Behavioral Research_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973), pp. 444-45.

[27]Dennis J. Palumbo, _Statistics in Political and Behavioral Science_ (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), p. 210.

only the regular regression analysis, but also the stepwise

regression analysis in which the variables are taken into

the regression equation in the order of their importance in

explaining the variation in the dependent variable.[28] The

program first takes the independent variable with the highest

correlation with the dependent variable and computes the

simple regression for these two, giving the a and b coeffi-

cients of each variable not yet included in the equation.

It then selects, as the next variable, the one that makes the

greatest additional contribution to explained variance in the

dependent variable, and so on.[29]

The analysis which follows, then, uses multiple linear

regression, both regular and stepwise, to obtain a statistical

explanation of the main features of the UN voting behavior

under study. Such a predictive type of explanation can and

does pinpoint the relative importance of the independent

variables, and is a very useful variable screening device.[30]

Variables Used in the Regression Analysis

The data base of the quantitative variables used in

the regression analysis has already been described in Chapter I.

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[28]Michigan. University. Institute for Social Research,
OSIRIS III: An Integrated Collection of Computer Programs
for the Management and Analysis of Social Science Data, Vol.
1 (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1973), pp. 499-510.

[29]Palumbo, Statistics in Political and Behavioral
Science, p. 216; Cohen, Applied Multiple Regression/Correla-
tion Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, pp. 102-4.

[30]Cohen, Ibid., p. 235.

The number of cases or countries in this analysis was 129 as
of October 1971, because the U.S.S.R., Ukraine SSR, and
Byelorussia SSR were counted as one nation, even though they
had three votes in the Assembly. The original variables
used in this analysis are shown in Table VI-5.

TABLE VI-5

VARIABLES USED IN THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Variable Name	Numerical Unit
Seating PRC Support Score, 1950, 1961-63, and 1965-71	1 for pro .5 for abstention 0 for con
Moratorium Support Score, 1952, 1954-60	1-.5-0
Important Question Resolution Support Score, 1961, 1965-71	1-.5-0
Soviet Caucusing Bloc	1 or 0
Latin American Caucusing Group	1 or 0
Arab Caucusing Group	1 or 0
Euramera Commonwealth Caucusing Group	1 or 0
Western European Caucusing Group	1 or 0
Asian Caucusing Group	1 or 0
African Caucusing Group	1 or 0
Ever Recognized ROC	1 or 0
Withdrew Recognition of ROC	1 or 0
Year of Withdrawal of Recognition of ROC	50-71
Ever Recognized PRC	1 or 0
Ever Severed Diplomatic Relations with PRC	1 or 0
Year of Severence	50-71
Ever Received US Aid, 1958-65	1 or 0
Per Capita US Aid, 1958-65	US$
Ever Received Soviet Aid, 1954/5-65	1 or 0
Per Capita Soviet Aid, 1954/5-65	US$
Ever Received ROC Aid, 1960-71	1 or 0
Ever Received PRC Aid, 1956-65	1 or 0
Amount of PRC Aid, 1956-65	Millions of US$
Amount of US Trade, 1955-68	Millions of US$
Amount of Soviet Trade, 1955-68	Millions of US$
Amount of PRC Trade, 1955-68	Millions of US$
Amount of ROC Trade, 1955-68	Millions of US$

In order to understand the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable - represented by three kinds of votes on the China issue (Pro, Con, Abstention), certain variables were combined through the OSIRIS III index construction (ICON) program. For reason of compatibility, US aid and ROC aid figures as well as those of USSR aid and PRC aid can not be combined as new variables, because the aid data of the US and USSR are per capita figures, while that of PRC are total figures for each recipient nation, and that of ROC is a dummy variable (1 or 0). The newly combined or transformed variables for analysis consist of the following variables:

Variable Name	Numerical Unit
Ever Received Both US & ROC Aid	1 or 0
Ever Received Both USSR & PRC Aid	1 or 0
Ever Received Both USSR & US Aid	1 or 0
Ever Received Both ROC & PRC Aid	1 or 0
Amount of US & ROC Trade	Millions of US$
Amount of USSR & PRC Trade	Millions of US$
Amount of US & USSR Trade	Millions of US$
Amount of PRC & ROC Trade	Millions of US$

Multicollinearity and Data Reduction

After running the simple (zero-order) correlations
for all the variables listed above, we encounter the problem
of multicollinearity among independent variables. Lack of
independence among independent variables tends to confound
the relationships that are supposed to explain the dependent
variable. When independent variables are closely correlated
with one another, it is difficult to determine which of these
variables is causing variation in the dependent variable and
which are related to it spuriously. With the hope of making
reasonably accurate statistical inferences between independent
and dependent variables, it is imperative that the degree of
multicollinearity be reduced as much as possible; that is,
the independent variables must also be relatively independent
of one another in a statistical sense.[31]

Furthermore, when there is a high level of multi-
collinearity among the independent variables, it may become
impossible to calculate the partial correlation and regres-
sion coefficients. In such cases the imposition of statisti-
cal control is impossible, because matrices of highly inter-
correlated variables cannot be inverted.[32] In addition,

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[31]Michael R. Fitzgerald, The Vertical Dimension of
Local Public Policy: A Comparative Study of Urban School
Desegregation in the United States (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Ph.D. Dissertation, 1975), p. 200.

[32]Ibid.

according to the principle of parsimony in research, it is
sensible to use the least number of explanatory variable
necessary. If a single measure carries nearly as much
explanatory power as several, it is better to use the one
variable. To solve the problem of multicollinearity in
this analysis, a data reduction strategy was imposed which
reduced the number of independent variables and assured a
minimum amount of interdependence among these variables.

To determine the extent of multicollinearity among
the independent variables, a simple correlation matrix was
calculated through the OSIRIS III Pearson's Product-Moment
Correlation (MDC) computer program. Any simple correlation
between two independent variables of .7 or above was taken
to indicate collinearity and one of the variables was elimi-
nated from the set.[33] The reduced set of independent variables
was again correlated and an attempt to partial this matrix
was made. Any partial correlation coefficient between
independent variables of .7 or above was taken to indicate
continuing intolerable collinearity and one of the variables
involved was removed. Finally the reduced variable set were
correlated with the appropriate dependent variable.

Through the above data reduction process, the inde-
pendent variables dropped out in this analysis are as follows:

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[33]Ibid., p. 201.

Withdrew Recognition of the ROC

Year of Withdrawal of Recognition of the ROC

Ever Severed Diplomatic Relations with the PRC

Year of Severence

Ever Received Soviet Aid

Ever Received the PRC Aid

Amount of Soviet Trade

Amount of the PRC Trade

Amount of the ROC Trade

Ever Received Both US & ROC Aid

Ever Received Both Soviet & US Aid

Ever Received Both ROC & PRC Aid

Amount of US & Soviet Trade

Amount of ROC & PRC Trade

The final correlation matrix for analysis through the MDC computer program is presented in Table VI-5. In the regression analysis there are three dependent variables:

Seating PRC Support Score, 1950, 1961-63, 1965-71

Moratorium Support Score, 1952, & 1954-60

"Important Question" Resolution Support Score, 1961, & 1965-71

The regression analysis is then performed separately between each of the three dependent variables and the following reduced independent variable set, presented in Table VI-7.

TABLE VI-6

CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE REDUCED LIST OF VARIABLES

Variable Name	Variable	Y_1*	Y_2	Y_3	X_1	X_2	X_3	X_4	X_5	X_6	X_7	X_8	X_9	X_{10}	X_{11}	X_{12}	X_{13}	X_{14}	X_{15}	X_{16}	X_{17}
Moratorium Support Score, 1952, 1954-60	Y_2	-0.6717																			
"Important Question" Resolution Support Score, 1961, 1965-71	Y_3	-0.8753	0.7566																		
Ever Recognized ROC	X_1	0.0244	0.0041	-0.0324																	
Ever Recognized PRC	X_2	0.3366	-0.1776	-0.3481	0.5554																
Ever Received US Aid, 1958-65	X_3	-0.1617	0.4048	0.1777	-0.0010	-0.0728															
Per Capita US Aid, 1958-65	X_4	-0.2167	0.2646	0.2188	0.0135	0.0001	0.1812														
Per Capita Soviet Aid, 1954/5-65	X_5	0.2754	-0.1635	-0.2640	0.0622	0.0732	0.0333	-0.0716													
Ever Received ROC Aid, 1961-71	X_6	-0.3327	-0.1257	0.2722	-0.0173	-0.1857	0.0610	-0.0518	-0.1323												
Amount of PRC Aid, 1955-65	X_7	0.4430	-0.4122	-0.4519	-0.0854	0.1123	-0.1809	-0.1576	0.3470	-0.1463											
Amount of US Trade, 1955-68	X_8	0.0070	0.1310	-0.0316	0.0850	0.1724	-0.3764	-0.0969	-0.0407	-0.1116	-0.0523										
Ever Received Both Soviet & PRC Aid	X_9	0.3145	-0.2536	-0.3295	-0.0418	0.0956	0.0729	-0.0970	0.6888	-0.1299	0.6837	-0.0637									
Latin American Caucusing Group	X_{10}	-0.3415	0.5023	0.3581	0.0069	-0.2121	0.2423	0.2259	-0.0816	-0.2093	-0.1469	-0.0873	-0.0392								
Arab Caucusing Group	X_{11}	0.1663	-0.0937	-0.1759	0.0742	0.0571	0.1269	0.2422	0.3690	-0.0956	0.0651	-0.0761	0.2080	-0.1501							
Commonwealth Caucusing Group	X_{12}	-0.0911	0.2234	0.1691	-0.0533	-0.1107	-0.1162	-0.0857	-0.0876	-0.1413	-0.1105	0.1110	-0.0836	-0.1299	-0.1014						
Western European Caucusing Group	X_{13}	-0.0183	-0.0001	0.0325	-0.0383	0.0069	0.0113	-0.0920	-0.0816	-0.1966	-0.1877	-0.0814	-0.1163	-0.1807	-0.1410	-0.1220					
Asian Caucusing Group	X_{14}	0.1506	-0.1353	-0.1645	0.0212	0.2214	-0.1203	0.0015	0.1025	-0.2093	0.2627	0.3570	0.2146	-0.1923	-0.1501	-0.1299	-0.1807				
Non-Brazzaville African Caucusing Group	X_{15}	0.0824	-0.0924	-0.0837	-0.1686	0.0130	-0.0304	-0.0468	-0.1264	0.4128	-0.0035	-0.1065	-0.1348	-0.2093	-0.1633	-0.1413	-0.1966	-0.2093			
Brazzaville African Caucusing Group	X_{16}	-0.2147	-0.1300	0.1473	0.0052	-0.1044	0.1809	-0.1853	-0.1176	0.5456	-0.1164	-0.0733	-0.0924	-0.1435	-0.1120	-0.0969	-0.1349	-0.1435	-0.1562		
African Caucusing Group **	X_{17}	-0.0699	-0.1685	0.0245	-0.1422	-0.0573	0.0925	-0.1707	-0.1875	0.7149	-0.0854	-0.1401	-0.1772	-0.2750	-0.2146	-0.1857	-0.2584	-0.2750	0.7610	0.5220	
Soviet Caucusing Bloc	X_{18}	0.3338	-0.4226	-0.3493	0.2399	0.1326	-0.3978	-0.1496	0.0794	-0.1253	0.3278	-0.0585	0.0657	-0.1152	-0.0899	-0.0778	-0.1082	-0.1152	-0.1253	-0.0860	-0.1647

*Y_1 is Seating PRC Support Score, 1950, 1961-63, 1965-71.

**African caucusing group consists of Brazzaville and non-Brazzaville African caucusing groups.

TABLE VI-7

THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES USED IN THE

REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF UN VOTING

ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION

Name	Numerical Unit
AID	
Ever Received the US Aid, 1958-65	Ever Received = 1 Never Received =0
Per Capita US Aid, 1958-65	US$
Per Capita Soviet Aid, 1954/5-65	US$
Ever Received ROC Aid, 1961-71[a]	1 or 0
Amount of PRC Aid, 1956-65	Millions of US$
Ever Received Both Soviet and PRC Aid	1 or 0
TRADE	
Amount of US Trade, 1955-68[b]	Millions of US$
DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION	
Ever Recognized the ROC	1 or 0
Ever Recognized the PRC	1 or 0
UN CAUCUSES[c]	
Latin American Caucusing Group	1 or 0
Soviet Caucusing Bloc	1 or 0
Arab Caucusing Group	1 or 0
Commonwealth Caucusing Group[d]	1 or 0
Western European Caucusing Group	1 or 0
Asian Caucusing Group	1 or 0
African Caucusing Group[a]	1 or 0

[a]ROC aid and African caucus were not included in the regression analysis for "moratorium," because ROC aid started in 1961 and most African nations joined the UN during the 1960's.

[b]There is a high multicollinearity among the trade variables. US trade was selected and the other trade variables dropped, because the US trade data are more reliable.

[c]The following nations were not included in any UN caucuses: China (ROC), Iceland, Israel, South Africa and the United States.

Originally this writer used eight separate UN caucuses, namely: Latin American, Soviet, Arab, Commonwealth, Western European, Asian, Brazzaville African, and Non-Brazzaville African. A series of experimental regression analyses revealed that the Asian, Brazzaville African, and non-Brazzaville African caucuses were never significant predictors of voting patterns; moreover, the use of so many caucus dummy variables in a single prediction equation generated a singular matrix incapable of a complete regression solution in the OSIRIS III routine. Therefore, in the regression analyses for the UN votes during the 1960's, the Asian caucusing group was dropped, and the Brazzaville and non-Brazzaville caucuses were combined as one African caucusing group.

[d]The Commonwealth group used here consists of its non-Afro-Asian members except Malaya. They are United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaya, Fiji, Canada, Barbado, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trindad-Tobago.

UN Votes on Chinese Representation:

Multiple Regression Analyses

Voting on Moratorium: A Regression Analysis

Using the reduced independent variable set presented in Table VI-7 (excluding ROC Aid and African Caucusing Group) and the dependent variable, the UN voting score on the moratorium of Chinese representation (1952, 1954-60), the OSIRIS III regression analysis program performed both the standard and stepwise regression analyses. The findings are displayed in Tables VI-8 and VI-9.

1. Standard Regression Analysis

In the standard regression analysis, the multiple correlation coefficient (R) is 0.791, and the coefficient of determination (R^2) is 0.625. This means that nearly sixty-three percent of the variance of UN votes on Chinese representation during the 1950's can be explained by the combined effect of the independent variables presented in Table VI-7, excluding the ROC Aid and African Caucusing Group due to the fact that the ROC aid started in 1961 and most African nations joined the United Nations during the 1960's. The significance level of this coefficient can be determined by means of a F test. The F ratio for this regression equation is 13.58, which is statistically significant at the .001 level or at the extremely low probability of $P = 7.75^{-17}$. This extreme

TABLE VI-8

STANDARD REGRESSION EQUATION FOR VOTING ON MORATORIUM

(1952, 1954-60)

Variable Name	b*	Beta**
Recognition of the ROC	1.5472	0.0636
Recognition of the PRC	- 2.4581	-0.0709
Ever Received US Aid	35.1731	0.3647
Per Capita US Aid	0.0014	0.1429
Per Capita Soviet Aid	0.0074	0.1197
Amount of PRC Aid	0.0001	0.0092
Amount of US Trade	0.0001	0.2926
Ever Received Both Soviet and PRC Aid	-38.2540	-0.2423
Latin American Group	44.3583	0.4042
Arab Group	- 9.2282	-0.0700
Commonwealth Group	39.8268	0.2686
Western European Group	10.0135	0.0974
Asian Group	- 5.1483	-0.0469
Soviet Bloc	-28.9747	-0.1763

R	0.79066
R^2	0.62514
F-Ratio	13.579
DF's	(14, 114)
P < .001 or P	$= 7.75^{-17}$

*Unstandardized regression coefficient, or slope.

**Standardized regression coefficient (b multiplied by the ratio of standard deviations of the independent and dependent variables).

value merely indicates the very unlikely chance that the true R^2 is zero for the universe of roll-calls correlated with these independent variables.

While statistically significant, this regression model fails to explain 37.5 percent of the variance in UN voting behavior on the China issue. Clearly the qualitative factors discussed in Chapters II-V would help us explain the residual variance.

2. Stepwise Regression Analysis

The most powerful predictors of moratorium voting as shown through the stepwise regression are summarized in Table VI-9.

TABLE VI-9

MORATORIUM VOTING: STEPWISE ANALYSIS OF

COEFFICIENT OF DETERMINATION

Step No.	Variable Name	Cumulative Coefficient of Determination (R^2)
1	Latin American Group	25.23 %
2	Soviet Bloc	38.71
3	Commonwealth Group	45.35
4	Amount of PRC Aid	49.83
5	Ever Received US Aid	53.43
6	Amount of US Trade	58.27
7	Ever Received Both Soviet and PRC Aid	59.48
8	Per Capita US Aid	60.50
9	Western European Group	61.37
10	Per Capita Soviet Aid	61.87
11	Arab Group	62.03
12	Asian Group	62.17
13	Recognition of PRC	62.28
14	Recognition of ROC	62.51

As Table VI-9 indicates, the most powerful predictors of moratorium voting as shown through the stepwise regression are, in order, membership in the Latin American group, the Soviet bloc, Commonwealth group, amount of PRC aid, US aid and trade, Soviet and PRC aid, as well as membership in the Western European group. These ten variables cumulatively explain 61.87 percent of the variance. The contribution of the rest (.64 percent) is negligible.

Voting on "Important Question": A Regression Analysis

Based upon the reduced independent variable set presented in Table VI-7 and the dependent variable, the UN voting score on the "Important Question" resolution of Chinese representation (1961, 1965-71), the OSIRIS III regression analysis program performed both the standard and stepwise regression analyses. The findings are displayed in Tables VI-10 and VI-11.

1. Standard Regression Analysis

In the standard regression analysis, the multiple correlation coefficient (R) is 0.7295, and the coefficient of determination (R^2) is 0.5322. This means that more than fifty-three percent of the variance of UN voting on the "Important Question" resolution of Chinese representation during the 1960's can be explained by the combined effect of the independing variables presented in Table VI-7, excluding

TABLE VI-10

STANDARD REGRESSION EQUATION FOR VOTING ON

"IMPORTANT QUESTION" RESOLUTION

(1961, 1965-1971)

Variable Name	b	Beta
Recognition of ROC	2.8995	0.1139
Recognition of PRC	- 7.4058	-0.2041
Ever Received US Aid	- 0.1656	-0.0016
Per Capita US Aid	0.0013	0.1256
Per Capita Soviet Aid	0.0002	0.0026
Ever Received ROC Aid	46.8143	0.4252
Amount of PRC Aid	- 0.0019	-0.1167
Amount of US Trade	- 0.0000*	-0.0048
Ever Received Both Soviet and PRC Aid	-20.5787	-0.1245
Latin American Group	32.1872	0.2801
Arab Group	-17.8804	-0.1296
Commonwealth Group	26.8181	0.1728
Western European Group	8.1250	0.0677
African Group	-21.0612	-0.2243
Soviet Bloc	-39.1838	-0.2278

R   0.7295

R^2 0.5322

F-Ratio   8.569

DF's   (15, 113)

$P < .001$ or $= .0000000000039$

*Zero coefficient due to computer rounding of very low non-zero $\underline{b}$ value.

the Asian group due to its insignificance in predicting of
UN voting on the China Issue. The significance level of this
coefficient can be determined by means of a F test. The F
ratio for this regression equation is 8.57, which is statis-
tically significant at the .001 level or at the small pro-
bability level of 1^{-11}.

While statistically significant, this regression
model fails to explain nearly half of the variance in the UN
voting behavior on the China issue. As with the moratorium
voting, clearly the qualitative variables discussed in the
previous chapters help us explain the residual variance.

2. Stepwise Regression Analysis

The most powerful predictors of "important question"
voting as shown through the stepwise regression are summarized
in Table VI-11. As the table indicates, the most powerful
predictors are, in order, PRC aid, diplomatic recognition of
the PRC, Latin American group, ROC aid, Commonwealth and
Western European groups, per capita US aid, Soviet bloc,
diplomatic recogntion of the ROC, Arab and African groups,
and "ever received both Soviet and PRC aid." These twelve
variables cumulatively explain 53.21 percent of the variance.
The contribution of the rest (.01 percent) is negligible.

TABLE VI-11

"IMPORTANT QUESTION" VOTING: STEPWISE ANALYSIS OF

COEFFICIENT OF DETERMINATION

Step No.	Variable Name	Cumulative Coefficient of Determination (R^2)
1	Amount of PRC Aid	20.42 %
2	Recognition of PRC	39.38
3	Latin American Group	35.15
4	Ever Received ROC Aid	40.71
5	Commonwealth Group	44.59
6	Western European Group	46.71
7	Per Capita US Aid	48.75
8	Soviet Bloc	49.85
9	Recognition of ROC	50.74
10	Arab Group	51.39
11	African Group	52.54
12	Ever Received Both Soviet & PRC Aid	53.21
13	Amount of US Trade	53.22
14	Per Capita Soviet Aid	53.22
15	Ever Received US Aid	53.22

Voting on Seating Peking and Removing Taipei: A Regression

Analysis

Based upon the reduced independent variable set pre-

sented in Table VI-7 (excluding the Asian group) and the

dependent variable, UN voting score on "seating Peking and

removing Taipei" of the China issue (1950, 1961-63, 1965-71),

the OSIRIS III regression analysis program performed both the

standard and stepwise regression analyses. The findings are displayed in Tables VI-12 and VI-13.

1. Standard Regression Analysis

TABLE VI-12

STANDARD REGRESSION EQUATION FOR VOTING ON

SEATING PEKING AND REMOVING TAIPEI

(1950, 1961-63, 1965-71)

Variable Name	b	Beta
Recognition of ROC	- 2.6884	-0.1124
Recognition of PRC	6.9625	0.2041
Ever Received US Aid	1.7215	0.0181
Per Capita US Aid	- 0.0012	-0.1238
Per Capita Soviet Aid	0.0037	0.0607
Ever Received ROC Aid	-48.9832	-0.4732
Amount of PRC Aid	0.0024	0.1590
Amount of US Trade	- 0.0000*	-0.0295
Ever Received Both Soviet and PRC Aid	6.3852	0.0411
Latin American Group	-28.8711	-0.2672
Arab Group	14.2741	0.1100
Commonwealth Group	-13.6955	-0.0938
Western European Group	- 6.3833	-0.0566
African Group	19.5110	0.2210
Soviet Bloc	32.9571	0.2038

R   0.7203

R^2 0.5189

F-Ratio   8.125

DF's   (15, 113)

$P < .001$ or $= .00000000000053$

*Zero coefficient due to computer rounding of very low non-zero b value.

In the standard regression analysis, the multiple correlation coefficient (R) is 0.7203, and coefficient of determination (R^2) is 0.5189. This means that more than fifty-one percent of the variance of UN voting on the resolution of seating Peking and removing Taipei during the 1960's can be explained by the combined effect of the independent variables presented in Table VI-7, excluding the Asian group due to its insignificance in predicting of UN voting on Chinese representation. The significance level of this coefficient can be determined by means of a F test. The F ratio for this regression equation is 8.125, which is statistically significant at the .001 level or at the low probability level of 1^{-12}.

While statistically significant, this regression model fails to explain nearly half of the variance in the UN voting behavior on seating Peking and removing Taipei. Once again the qualitative variables discussed in the previous chapters clearly help us explain the residual variance.

2. Stepwise Regression Analysis

The most powerful predictors of UN voting on seating Peking and removing Taipei as shown through the stepwise regression are summarized in Table VI-13.

TABLE VI-13

VOTING ON SEATING PEKING AND REMOVING TAIPEI:

STEPWISE ANALYSIS OF COEFFICIENT OF DETERMINATION

Step No.	Variable Name	Cumulative Coefficient of Determination (R^2)
1.	Amount of PRC Aid	19.62 %
2	Recognition of PRC	27.96
3	Latin American Group	33.09
4	Ever Received ROC Aid	42.08
5	African Group	44.57
6	Soviet Bloc	47.11
7	Arab Group	48.86
8	Per Capita US Aid	49.94
9	Recognition of ROC	50.58
10	Per Capita Soviet Aid	51.19
11	Commonwealth Group	51.60
12	Western European Group	51.70
13	Amount of US Trade	51.81
14	Ever Received Both Soviet and PRC Aid	51.87
15	Ever Received US Aid	51.89

As Table VI-13 indicates, the most powerful predictors of the UN voting behavior on seating Peking and removing Taipei as shown through the stepwise regression are PRC aid, diplomatic recognition of the PRC, Latin American

group, ROC aid, African group, Soviet bloc, Arab group, per capita US aid, diplomatic recognition of the ROC, and per capita Soviet aid. These ten variables cumulatively explain 51.19 percent of the variance. The contribution of the rest (.70 percent) is negligible.

Regression Analyses of UN Voting on China Issues: A Comparison

As the above analyses show, the important variables in deciding the outcomes of the three separate votes on the China issue in the United Nations were aid, diplomatic recognition, and UN caucuses (particularly the Latin American and the Soviet caucuses). Although the Soviet caucus voted as a solid bloc, it was not as important as the Latin American caucusing group in the UN voting on Chinese representation, due to the latter's group size which was double that of the former.

During the 1950's, because of the Cold War and the Korean War, the Latin American and Soviet caucuses, the Commonwealth caucus, as well as US aid and trade were the important variables in the voting on Chinese representation under the moratorium device. The statistical importance of the Commonwealth group was enhanced by the exclusion of its overlapping Afro-Asian members in this analysis.

During the period from 1961 to 1971, due to the enlargement of UN membership as well as the East-West detente,

the Third World UN members played an important role in the
UN voting on the issue of Chinese representation. Thus, both
PRC and ROC aid to the Third World nations, as well as diplo-
matic recognition, contributed more to the explanation of
voting variance than the UN caucuses, while the US aid and
trade as contributors are negligible under both the "important
question" and the "seating Peking and removing Taipei" resolu-
tions. This writer proposes that the reason why both the PRC
and the ROC aid contributed the most was due to the fact that
both the Chinese Nationalist and Communist governments used
aid as a strategic weapon to win diplomatic recognition from
the new nations.

The regression analyses show that US aid and trade
were not a very effective weapon, as Joan M. Nelson contended
earlier in this chapter, in blocking the admission of Peking
into the United Nations. While there might be an implied
impact, the United States government never went so far as to
use aid and trade as diplomatic tools to influence the UN
members for the purpose of voting for the Chinese Nationalist
representation, but only urged the U.S. allies as well non-
aligned countries to support the U.S. position concerning the
China issue in the United Nations.[34] Diplomatic recognition
of Peking played a more important role than that of Taipei

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[34]Personal interview with former U.S. Secretary of
State, Professor Dean Rusk on June 23, 1977.

in deciding the UN voting on Chinese representation. This
was due to the fact that more ROC allies abstained from
voting than did supporters of the PRC. Diplomatic recognition
of the ROC was sustained by other factors, such as U.S. in-
fluence. For example, in the early 1950's, the Italian
Cabinet decided to recognize Peking and withdraw recognition
of Taipei, because the Italian Communist Party was the biggest
party in the Parliament.[35] However, before this decision
was announced, the former Nationalist Ambassador to Italy,
Dr. James Yu stopped the Italian withdrawal of recognition
of the ROC by asking the U.S. Ambassador in Rome to use
American influence in this regard.[36]

In the "important question" voting, Commonwealth
and Western European caucuses played a more important role
than the African and Arab caucuses did. This was because
many U.S. allies, such as the United Kingdom and the Nether-
lands, voting for the "important question" resolution, but
due to their diplomatic recognition of the PRC, they either
voted for the seating of Peking or abstained from voting.

The combined effect of the reduced independent
variable set as shown through the regression analyses only
explains a little more than half of the voting variance of

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[35]Ambassador James Yu delivered a lecture on Sino-
Italian relations in Taipei, Spring 1958. The present
writer attended that lecture.

[36]Ibid.

the three China issues in the United Nations: moratorium,
"important question," and seating Peking and removing Taipei.
This clearly indicates that the qualitative factors discussed
in Chapters II-V are important in explaining the residual
variance - such factors as U.S. policy toward China, the
case that the PRC was not peace-loving, and the principle
of universality of UN membership as well as the two-China
proposal.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The issue of Chinese representation in the United
Nations began at the end of 1949 when the Communists took
over mainland China, while the Nationalist Government retreated
to Taiwan. There were two governments claiming the China seat
in the United Nations. The Republic of China was an original
Member of the United Nations under Article 3 of the Charter
as well as a permanent Member of the Security Council under
Articles 23 and 110 of the Charter. Since neither the
Nationalist Government in Taipei nor the Communist Government
in Peking contended that China had been split into two parts
or that a new state had been formed, the question was a pro-
blem of credentials - which of these two governments was to
represent China in the United Nations. It was difficult to
see how the two-China solution or dual representation could
be effected without amending the Charter or admitting one
"China" or the other as a new Member.

The Charter is not clear as to whether decisions on
representation require a two-thirds vote or merely a simple
majority vote in the General Assembly, or whether they may
be decided in the Security Council. The fact that no Charter

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provision deals specifically with questions of representation
opened the way for interested nations to bring forward their
own interpretations which were generally well suited to advance
their own political goals. This was how the "moratorium" and
"important question" resolutions were adopted by the General
Assembly to postpone the problem of Chinese representation so
as to retain the Nationalist delegation in the United Nations.

The preceding research has presented a longitudinal
study of UN voting behavior on the China issue. This research
involves not only legal and statistical analyses, but also
political history. Therefore, the investigation should not
and can not be pursued solely through either the qualitative
or the quantitative analysis. It must be investigated with
both approaches in order to be comprehensive. As was postulated
in the working hypothesis in the Introduction, the political pro-
cess in the General Assembly has involved a close relationship
between the outcomes of votes and the effective exercise of
influence by the two superpowers (U.S.A. vs. U.S.S.R.). The
validity of this assumption is supported by the analyses pre-
sented in the previous chapters as well as the personal inter-
views.

The important quantitative variables (UN caucuses,
U.S. aid and trade, Chinese foreign aid and diplomatic recogni-
tion of either Taipei or Peking) identified and analyzed in Chapter
VI can explain from 52 to 63 percent of the variance of UN votes
on Chinese representation. As alliances often do seem to

promote solidarity in voting, the UN caucuses did play the most important role in the UN votes on the China issue in the fifties. The UN members included, without overlapping, in the caucuses are the Soviet bloc, the Latin American group, the Arab group, the Commonwealth group, the Western European group, the Asian group and the African group, with Iceland,[1] the United States, Republic of China, Israel and South Africa belonging to no group. U.S. aid and trade reflected an influence in the Assembly. Thus, the majority of the UN Members voted for the U.S. position to postpone the problem and to retain the Nationalist representation in the United Nations.

During the 1960's, both Chinese governments, Nationalist and Communist, used aid as a strategic weapon to compete for diplomatic recognition among the new African nations so as to seek votes in the General Assembly on the issue of which government should represent China in the United Nations. Hence Chinese foreign aid and diplomatic recognition played the most important roles in the outcomes of General Assembly roll-calls on the issue of Chinese representation in the sixties.

The residual variance of UN votes on Chinese representation can only be explained by the qualitative variables described in Chapters II-V. The most important factor in

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[1]Iceland belongs to Scandinavian caucusing group, but not a member of Western European group. Thus, it is not included in one of the six caucuses in this analysis.

deciding the UN votes on the China issue was the containment

policy of the United States toward the Communist regime in

China, which pervaded the country and the Congress. As Dr.

Henry A. Kissinger said, "The United Nations cannot settle

disputes among the great powers because each of them has a

veto in the Security Council, because each of them can muster

enough votes in the General Assembly on most issues to prevent

a two-thirds resolution ....."[2] Thus the majority of the UN

Members voted for the U.S. position to retain the Nationalist

delegation to represent China and/or the admission of Peking

without expulsion of Taipei. Furthermore, the military inter-

vention of the Chinese Communists in the Korean War strengthened

the American as well as the other Members' opposition to the

seating of Peking in the United Nations. From May 1950 to

July 1955, no new nations recognized the Communist regime on

the China mainland.

In the 1950's, both Nationalist China and the United

States had advocated the "subjective-selective" approach to

UN membership so as to block the admission of any Communist

states, including mainland China. The General Assembly roll-

calls on the "moratorium" resolution of Chinese representation

during the fifties proved that the majority of UN Members were

in favor of selectivity. However, universality was virtually

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[2]Henry A. Kissinger, <u>American Foreign Policy</u>, Expanded
Edition (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974), p. 238.

established as a principle at the United Nations with the
adoption of the "Package Deal" in 1955 and with the admission
of Cyprus and sixteen new African nations in 1960. These
steps were taken despite the conditions of membership set
forward in Article 4 of the Charter requiring independence,
peace-loving character, and a willingness to carry out the
obligations of the Charter.

During the 1960's, the majority of the UN members
preferred a "universal-objective" approach to membership and
thus wanted to have a "two-China" solution to the representa-
tion problem in the United Nations, according to the principle
of universality. However, the unwillingness of the Soviet
bloc and Peking to consider any compromise whatsoever on the
Chinese representation question by insisting on the expulsion
of Taipei had the effect of aiding those opposed to the seat-
ing of Peking during the sixties. The Nationalist representa-
tion in the United Nations was sustained in the sixties mainly
with the help of the African votes, due to their belief in
universality and their strong support of dual representation
for China.

In addition to the above, Chinese Communist militant
hostility toward the West, its military attacks on India in
their border disputes, its apparent unwillingness to compromise
on the problem of Taiwan as well as on the dual representation
proposal, and its self-imposed isolation during the Cultural
Revolution also had the effect of alienating those who might

be friendly to Peking as well as aiding those opposed to the
seating of Peking. Moreover, the Nationalist Government also
strongly opposed the two-China proposal. Thereafter, the
gap between continued occupancy of the China seat by the
Republic of China in the United Nations and international
political realities was too great, and time was running out
to deal with the problem politically through any form of dual
representation arrangement.[3]

The available data indicates that there was an asso-
ciation between UN voting on Chinese representation and the
norms of regimes in the Member states. The authoritarian
conservative regimes supported Nationalist representation,
while the Communist and populist regimes supported the seat-
ing of Peking, with the liberal-democratic and traditional
conservative regimes split on the issue. The only exception
was that nearly all the Asian nations bordering mainland China
voted for the seating of Peking, no matter what types of govern-
ment they had. This was due to the geopolitical factor that
these nations wanted to protect themselves and to maintain
cordial relations with their giant neighbor.

In the superpower confrontation over the issue of
Chinese representation in the Security Council and the General
Assembly, the United Kingdom played an important role in the
struggle by influencing and supporting the United States

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[3]Personal interview with Professor Dean Rusk, former
US Secretary of State, on June 23, 1977.

strategies, such as the "moratorium" in the fifties and the "important-question" resolution as well as the two-China idea in the sixties.[4]

Finally, the General Assembly's vote for the admission of Peking and expulsion of Taipei on October 25, 1971 was due to the change of U.S. policy as well as more states' establishing diplomatic relations with Communist China. Thus the movement to bring Communist China into active participation in the United Nations gained much more additional support than ever before. The defeat of the U.S. sponsored "non-expulsion important question" draft resolution of 1971 in the UN General Assembly occurred because this change of U.S. policy to dual representation came too late to serve its purpose. The rush of many Western states to establish diplomatic relations with Peking during the summer and early fall of 1971, and the sudden announcement from Washington in July that the President of the United States was going to visit mainland China created an atmosphere which made a compromise settlement of the problem no longer possible. Moreover, the lack of support for the Nationalists in 1971 was, to a certain extent, due to a lack of strong support by Nationalist China toward the Third World position in the United Nations during the past, because of the

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[4]Personal interview with Dr. C. M. Chang, former Nationalist Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations on June 26, 1977.

pressure of United States and its European allies.[5]

In a word, political, rather than legal, complications posed the main obstacle to the solution of Chinese representation in the United Nations. Plainly, international politics rather than law finally decided the problem on October 25, 1971, after the issue had repeatedly appeared on the Assembly agenda for twenty-two years. According to the initiator of the U.S. parliamentary strategies, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, he originally expected each of the strategies to be effective perhaps only for three or four years, because of the steady erosion of support for the U.S. position on China representation in the General Assembly.[6] However, these strategies functioned effectively for two decades. The 1971 U.S. proposal for dual representation with non-expulsion of the ROC was submitted and the vote held at the time when President Nixon had announced his trip to Peking and his National Security Assistant, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, was in Peking to negotiate the agenda of his visit. This dual diplomacy destroyed the American creditability in the United Nations.[7] Kissinger's main purpose was to play balance of power politics

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[5]Personal interview with the Honorable Minister T. C. Chen (former Nationalist Ambassador to Liberia) at the Chinese Embassay in Washington, D.C. on June 24, 1977.

[6]Personal interview with former Secretary of State Dean Rusk on June 23, 1977.

[7]Personal interview with Ambassador Charles W. Yost, former U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN on July 5, 1977, at Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colorado.

and thus to weaken the UN Members' commitment to the U.S.
position with the view of using detente with Peking to force
more concessions from Moscow for East-West detente.[8] Under
these circumstances, there was no way that the United States
could muster enough support in the Assembly for its position
on the China seat issue and its defeat was almost certainly
expected even in Washington.[9]

Support for the U.S. position eroded as nation after
nation recognized the Chinese Communist Government as the
legal government of China. When action taken in the General
Assembly to seat the PRC finally succeeded, it came as a
result of actions by the Third World countries and defections
by U.S. NATO allies. By October 1971, ten of the fifteen
NATO countries had already recognized Peking. Therefore, the
China vote of October 25, 1971, had definitely ended the
honeymoon between the United States and the United Nations.
The American defeat made clear that no single member state
could any longer dominate the Organization by mustering auto-
matic majority votes. This defeat signified the end of the
bipolar world of the superpowers both inside and outside the
United Nations.

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[8]Personal interview with Ambassador C. M. Chang,
former Chinese Nationalist Deputy Permanent Representative
to the United Nations in New York City on June 26, 1977.

[9]Personal interview with former U.S. Secretary of
State Dean Rusk on June 23, 1977.

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APPENDIXES

RECORD OF UN VOTING ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION, 1950-1971

PREPARED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

498 (V)   Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea

(Resolution adopted on the report of the First Committee)

The General Assembly,

Noting that the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in regard to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea,

Noting that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has not accepted United Nations proposals to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement, and that its armed forces continue their invasion of Korea and their large-scale attacks upon United Nations forces there,

1. *Finds* that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against United Nations forces there, has itself engaged in aggression in Korea ;

2. *Calls upon* the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to cause its forces and nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against the United Nations forces and to withdraw from Korea ;

3. *Affirms* the determination of the United Nations to continue its action in Korea to meet the aggression ;

4. *Calls upon* all States and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea ;

5. *Calls upon* all States and authorities to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressors in Korea ;

6. *Requests* a Committee composed of the members of the Collective Measures Committee as a matter of urgency to consider additional measures to be employed to meet this aggression and to report thereon to the General Assembly, it being understood that the Committee is authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee referred to in the following paragraph reports satisfactory progress in its efforts ;

7. *Affirms* that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests the President of the General Assembly to designate forthwith two persons who would meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices to this end.

327th plenary meeting,
1 February 1951.

The President of the General Assembly, on 19 February 1951, informed (A/1779) the members of the General Assembly that Dr. Luis Padilla Nervo (Mexico) and Mr. Sven Grafstrom (Sweden) had accepted his invitation to form with him the Good Offices Committee, as provided in the above resolution.

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500 (V).   Additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea

(Resolution adopted on the report of the First Committee)

The General Assembly,

Noting the report of the Additional Measures Committee dated 14 May 1951,

Recalling its resolution 498 (V) of 1 February 1951.

Noting that :

(a) The Additional Measures Committee established by that resolution has considered additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea,

(b) The Additional Measures Committee has reported that a number of States have already taken measures designed to deny contributions to the military strength of the forces opposing the United Nations in Korea,

(c) The Additional Measures Committee has also reported that certain economic measures designed further to deny such contributions would support and supplement the military action of the United Nations in Korea and would assist in putting an end to the aggression,

1. *Recommends* that every State :

(a) Apply an embargo on the shipment to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities of arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war ;

(b) Determine which commodities exported from its territory fall within the embargo, and apply controls to give effect to the embargo ;

(c) Prevent by all means within its jurisdiction the circumvention of controls on shipments applied by other States pursuant to the present resolution ;

(d) Co-operate with other States in carrying out the purposes of this embargo ;

APPENDIX B (Continued)

(e) Report to the Additional Measures Committee, within thirty days and thereafter at the request of the Committee, on the measures taken in accordance with the present resolution ;

2. *Requests* the Additional Measures Committee :

(a) To report to the General Assembly, with recommendations as appropriate, on the general effectiveness of the embargo and the desirability of continuing, extending or relaxing it ;

(b) To continue its consideration of additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea, and to report thereon further to the General Assembly, it being understood that the Committee is authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee reports satisfactory progress in its efforts ;

3. *Reaffirms* that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea, and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests the Good Offices Committee to continue its good offices.

330th plenary meeting,
18 May 1951.

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eleven members of the United States armed forces under the United Nations Command captured by Chinese forces when undertaking a mission on 12 January 1953, at the direction of the United Nations Command,

Recalling the provisions of article III of the Korean Armistice Agreement[3] regarding the repatriation of prisoners of war,

1. *Declares* that the detention and imprisonment of the eleven American airmen, members of the United Nations Command, referred to in document A/2830,[4] and the detention of all other captured personnel of the United Nations Command desiring repatriation is a violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement;

2. *Condemns*, as contrary to the Korean Armistice Agreement, the trial and conviction of prisoners of war illegally detained after 25 September 1953;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in the name of the United Nations, to seek the release, in accordance with the Korean Armistice Agreement, of these eleven United Nations Command personnel, and all other captured personnel of the United Nations Command still detained;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make, by the means most appropriate in his judgment, continuing and unremitting efforts to this end and to report progress to all Members on or before 31 December 1954.

509th plenary meeting,
10 December 1954.

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906 (IX). Complaint of detention and imprisonment of United Nations military personnel in violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item proposed by the United States of America as the Unified Command regarding

[3] See *Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953,* document S/3079.
[4] See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Session, Annexes,* agenda item 72.

APPENDIX C

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UN CAUCUSES AND THEIR MEMBERS

(as of November 1971)

SOVIET BLOC: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechslovakia, Hungary,
   Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Byelorussia, the Ukraine,
   and the Soviet Union.

LATIN AMERICAN GROUP: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
   Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
   El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
   Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

ARAB GROUP: Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco,
   Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Republic,
   Yemen, and Southern Yemen.

WESTERN EUROPEAN GROUP: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark,
   Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
   Malta, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
   Turkey, and Yugoslavia.

COMMONWEALTH GROUP: Australia, Barbado, Canada, Fiji, Guyana,
   Jamaica, Malaya, New Zealand, Trindad-Tobago, and the United
   Kingdom.

ASIAN GROUP: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bhutan, Burma, Cambodia,
   Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kuwait, Laos,
   Maldive Island, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Quatar,
   Singapore, and Thailand.

AFRICAN GROUP: Brazzaville (or AMU) Group: Cameroun, Central
   African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon,
   Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and
   Upper Volta. Non-Brazzaville: Botswana, Burundi, Congo
   (Kinshasa), Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana,
   Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius,
   Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Swaziland,
   Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia.

NON-CAUCUS MEMBERS: China (ROC), Iceland, Israel, South Africa,
   and the United States of America.

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*The present writer follows Thomas Hovet's classification
with revision by assigning each UN member to one of the above
UN caucuses without overlapping of membership.

COMMUNIST CHINA'S AID TO, AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH, THE THIRD WORLD,
1949-April 1972 (Aid as of January 1970)

Nation	Recognition	Diplomatic Relations	Total Economic Aid (millions of US dollars)	Present Changes in Diplomatic Relations
Burma	Dec. 1949	June 1950	88 (1958, 1961)	
India	Dec. 1949	April 1950		
Pakistan	Jan. 1950	May 1950	109 (1964, 1967-68)	
Ceylon	Jan. 1950	Feb. 1957	62.5(1957-58, 1963-64)	
Afghanistan	Jan. 1950	Jan. 1950	28 (1965)	
Indonesia	April 1950	June 1950	105 (1956,1958-59,1964)	suspended in Oct. 1967
Nepal	Aug. 1955	Aug. 1955	62 (1956,1960,'66,'68)	
UAR(Egypt)	May 1956	May 1956	106 (1956,1964,1967)	
Syria	July 1956	Aug. 1956	16 (1963)	
Yemen	Aug. 1956	Sept. 1956	40 (1958,1964)	
Cambodia	July 1958	July 1958	50 (1956,1960,1965)	severed in May, 1970. Peking recognized Sihanouk's exile regime
Iraq	July 1958	Aug. 1958	-	
Morocco	Oct. 1958	Nov. 1958	-	
Sudan	Nov. 1958	Dec. 1958	-	
Guinea	Oct. 1959	Oct. 1959	25 (1960)	
Ghana	July 1960	July 1960	40 (1961,1964)	suspended in Oct. 1966
Mali	Oct. 1960	Oct. 1960	23 (1961,1964)	
Somalia	Dec. 1960	Dec. 1960	22 (1963)	
Tanzania	Dec. 1961	Dec. 1961	53 (1963,1966)	
Laos	June 1962	June 1962	-	
Algeria	July 1962	July 1962	50 (1963)	
Uganda	Oct. 1962	Oct. 1962	15 (1965)	
Kenya	Dec. 1963	Dec. 1963	18 (1964)	
Burundi	Dec. 1963	Dec. 1963	-	suspended in Jan. 1965; restored in Nov. 1971
Tunisia	Jan. 1964	Jan. 1964	-	suspended in Sept. 1967; restored in Oct. 1971
Congo (Brazzaville)	Feb. 1964	Feb. 1964	25 (1964-65)	
Central African Republic	Sept. 1964	Sept. 1964	4 (1964)	severed in Jan. 1966; recognized the ROC
Zambia	Oct. 1964	Oct. 1964	17 (1967)	
Dahomey	Nov. 1964	Nov. 1964	-	severed in Jan. 1966; recognized the ROC
Senegal	Nov. 1964	Nov. 1964	-	severed in July 1969; restored in Dec. 1971
Mauritania	July 1965	July 1965	4 (1967)	
Southern Yemen	Jan. 1968	Jan. 1968	12 (1968)	
Mauritius	March 1968	-	-	no relations
Equatorial Guinea	Oct. 1970	Oct. 1970	-	
Ethiopia	Nov. 1970	Nov. 1970	-	
Chile	Jan. 1971	Jan. 1971	-	
Nigeria	Feb. 1971	Feb. 1971	-	
Kuwait	March 1971	March 1971	-	
Cameroon	April 1971	April 1971	-	
Sierra Leone	July 1971	July 1971	-	
Iran	Aug. 1971	Aug. 1971	-	
(The R.O.C. Withdrew From the UN on Oct. 25, 1971)				
Peru	Nov. 1971	-	-	
Ecuador	Nov. 1971	-	-	
Lebanon	Nov. 1971	-	-	
Libya	Nov. 1971	-	-	relations with Taipei remain
Rwanda	Nov. 1971	-	-	
Cyprus	Jan. 1972	-	-	relations with Taipei remain
Togo	Jan. 1972	-	-	relations with Taipei remain
Argentina	Feb. 1972	-	-	
Malta	Feb. 1972	-	-	
Mexico	Feb. 1972	-	-	

TOTAL   US$ 974.5 million

Note: Peking's aid credit for the 1,116-mile Tan-Zam railroad, which was under construction by November, 1970, is approximately $412 million. A loan of $43 million was granted to Southern Yemen in 1970 for the construction of a 380-mile road from Aden to the port of Mukalla. Neither figure is included in this table. Communist China has also agreed to finance the projected Guinea-Mali railroad, but the amount of aid is not yet known. According to the U.S. State Department, Communist China's aid in 1970 totaled $709 million (not included in this table).

Sources: Yuan-li Wu (ed.), China: A Handbook (New Abbot, UK: David & Charles, 1973), pp. 376-77, 845-46.

China Yearbook (Taipei), 1971-72, p. 381.