

EARLY ASPIRATIONS OF THE  
UNITED STATES AS AN  
IMPERIALISTIC POWER

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By

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## IMPERIALISTIC FOREBODINGS

Just why did our progenitors who became the leaders in the closing days of the English colonial regime in America incline their thoughts and prepare a program that could be construed from tangible developments as imperialistic? Could it have been that our forefathers residing in the thirteen English colonies in America reminisced to the extent of recalling the gist of the famous proposal by Sir Humphrey Gilbert to Queen Elizabeth, in 1583, extolling the reasons why England must have, if she were to be a great state, colonies located in the different climatic regions of the world?<sup>1</sup>

Some vestiges of this imperialistic thought can be located in several of the colonies long before the days of Lexington and the Continental Congresses. More than one colony had at various times intimated its intention to acquire contiguous or even distant land. Massachusetts, in 1644, went so far in the Treaty of Boston as to enter an independent relationship with France to obtain special concessions in Acadia and beyond.<sup>2</sup> Similar imperialistic movements were prevalent throughout our early history. Some of these aggressive efforts elicited condemnation from the English authorities, while others prompted the French or

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<sup>1</sup> Henry S. Burrage, editor, Original Narratives of Early American History, pp. 179-184.

<sup>2</sup> Frances Gardiner Davenport, editor, European Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies to 1648, I, 347-352.

Indians to take serious recognition of the aggrandizement. Wars not infrequently ensued when peaceful solutions were unattainable. The need for more land could not have been the issue; the paramount motive was the need for a secure hinterland as a protection from undesirable neighbors.

These imperialistic gestures on the part of the colonists were closely intertwined with the foreign policies of England and France and with the desire of the former to make sure that her colonies in the New World would not be able to sever their bounds of unity with the homeland. Many English authorities, however, had arrived at the conclusion, in the 1770's, that the American colonists were inviting an issue that would prompt a movement of separation culminating in independence. Their diagnosis proved correct when Boston and the environs became the object of military surveillance.

Lexington and Concord were the opening engagements of a conflict which, in addition to independence, instilled in the colonists the spirit to establish many of those outposts that England herself had so long coveted in the New World. No sooner had the report of hostilities been received in many locales than their patriotic sons became interested in performing herculean deeds, not to perpetrate their names in the minds of their contemporaries, but to acquire for the colonies additional territory and subjects that would be valuable adjuncts in the crucial conflict. The Allan brothers of Vermont, Ethan, Levi and Ira, prompted the Second Continental Congress to arrange for the attempted conquest of Canada and the enlargement of the American Confederation to include most of the British possessions on the North

American Continent.<sup>3</sup> While these efforts proved futile, the motive is undeniable. The consummation of the French Alliance (1778), one clause of which gave the United States the right to capture and hold Bermuda and Canada, is irrefragible evidence of an ulterior motive--imperialism.<sup>4</sup>

Further evidences of this expansive motif are to be found in the plans of Thomas Jefferson, long before he actually purchased the Louisiana Territory, to send into the far Northwest, "the sacred terrain" of Spain, armed explorers with conflicting instructions in order to avert, if discovered, well warranted criticism from our western neighbor.<sup>5</sup>

The activities of some of our "respectable" citizens in Mississippi and Louisiana relevant to undermining the Spanish influence in West and East Florida are well known to most students of American history. The crudeness of their action, supposedly in keeping with the well established tenets of Manifest Destiny, mirrors the extremes to which some of our leaders would go to obtain those morsels of predestined land.<sup>6</sup>

The people in the United States, in the years immediately following the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, did not possess a monopoly on the imperialistic idea. Germs associated with this expansion movement were apparent in most of the European countries. The desires of some of the leaders to translate their dreams of foreign holdings into accomplished

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<sup>3</sup> Journal of the Continental Congress, 1775, III, 339-342.

<sup>4</sup> William M. Malloy, compiler, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements Between the United States of America and Other Powers 1776-1909, I, 479-482.

<sup>5</sup> Thomas Jefferson, The Jeffersonian Cyclopaedia, A Comprehensive Collection of the Views of Thomas Jefferson, John P. Foley, editor, pp. 495-496.

<sup>6</sup> Samuel Flagg Bemis, editor, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, III, 237-248.

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Facts prompted George Canning and Richard Rush to prepare the setting and to establish the plan by which the Western Hemisphere would be secluded from the machinations of European diplomats.<sup>7</sup> While the Monroe Doctrine did not seal the Central and South American States from the "Colossus of the North," it did establish a policy that warned other would-be transgressors to divert their colonial designs into other channels.<sup>8</sup>

For the time being the United States became the monarch of all it surveyed, but this paternalistic condition did not create the unanimity of thought and action that had been anticipated. With a land preserve once established, the ubiquitous bug--imperialism--became so rampant that even the religious and economic restrictions extended to migrants west and south of the Red River failed to stem the quest for greener fields, fertile valleys and free lands.

Mexico, with an antiquated political philosophy, a depleted treasury and a passive citizenry, proved no match for the proselyting zeal of these Americans determined to obtain for posterity God's given boundaries--the Pacific Ocean on the West and at least the Rio Grande in the South. Mexico's refusal to acknowledge the independence of Texas and her inability to control border ruffians, who frequently crossed the Rio Grande to perpetrate on peacefully inclined American citizens atrocious crimes, coerced us into a one-sided war--a war that culminated in our present southwestern and western boundaries.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., IV, 60-70.

<sup>8</sup> James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1908, II, 209, 218.

<sup>9</sup> Malloy, op. cit., I, 1009-1010.

While these particular events were taking place in the southwestern part of the United States, similar issues were being recognized in other parts of the world. From 1810 on we had more than once implied that the United States could not permit Cuba to fall under the control of any other European government; that if Spain were not able to administer it in a satisfactory way, we should employ a surveillance in keeping with our propinquity. Our ideas regarding the Hawaiian Islands are well known as well as our efforts to inveigle from New Granada, Nicaragua and Honduras territorial concessions for the construction of an inter-oceanic canal. Simultaneously, our missionaries had provided an approach for extra-territorial rights in China, a strong desire for insular possessions in the Western Pacific and markets in cloistered Japan. To many individuals these seemingly separate and distinct movements are in no way a part of a set program that emanated from the tenets of Manifest Destiny, but were in reality a movement, totally in harmony with our magnanimous attitude and generous nature, to extend to less fortunates the blessings whether spiritual, financial or social associated with the greatest nation in the world.

Sectional difficulties, long prevalent between the slave and non-slave districts in the United States, cast ominous forebodings periodically on the acquisition of territory that would be of particular advantage to either section. With an equal number of Senators from the slave and the free districts from the early days of our republic until the Compromise of 1850, it was impossible to obtain favorable Senate action on treaties affecting non-contiguous territory. The break in the Senatorial balance in 1850 gave the North a majority of votes at least, if not the necessary two-thirds, to expedite a promiscuous

expansive program.

Neither Mr. Seward's verbose assertion in 1846 that, "Our population is destined to roll its restless waves to the icy barriers of the North,"<sup>10</sup> nor his prophetic wish fourteen years later that, "I can look southwest and see, amid all the convulsions that are breaking the Spanish-American republics, and in their rapid decay and dissolution, the preparatory stage for their reorganization in free, equal, and self-governing members of the United States of America,"<sup>11</sup> was anachronistic with the predominate feeling of the large percentage of our policy-forming leaders of the time. Well was this illustrated by the subsequent purchase of our "National Icehouse," Alaska, in 1867.<sup>12</sup> And no less prominent individuals than Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Grant's Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, urgently advocated the incorporation of Canada as a means of pacifying momentarily the insatiable appetite for the land predestined for us by our Creator.<sup>13</sup>

In the three decades that followed the Civil War, one ebullition after another made its appearance on the horizon only to be deflated or destroyed by a non-imperialistic group that seemed to feel that the borders of the United States as then prevailing were equal to our desires and would provide a sufficiently large field for economic.

<sup>10</sup> Seward's Works, III, 409, quoted by Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 392.

<sup>11</sup> Seward's Works, IV, 333, quoted by Walter B. Morris, Visual Outline of American Foreign Policy, p. 45.

<sup>12</sup> Malloy, op. cit., II, 1521-1522.

<sup>13</sup> Bemis, op. cit., VII, 132-137.

social and political exploitation for many generations.

## II

## IMPERIALISTIC PANGS

With the establishment of a new South in the United States as a sequel to the Civil War there came into view a unanimous feeling that, if we were to become a great nation politically and economically, it would be necessary to anticipate this greatness with a national policy that would provide the wherewith to attain the goal. Our industries on the eve of the Civil War were few and scattered and in many respects dependent upon supplies from foreign lands to complete the cycle of production. Likewise, had the paucity associated with the war created in the minds of many the desirability for advantageously located enclaves from which we could obtain many of the necessities so imperative to our standard of living. Our expansionists buttressed with these new ideas encountered only negligible opposition in the 1890's to preparing our country for expansion into the Pacific Ocean. The time was auspicious, the fruits were desirable and the resistance largely non-existent.

## 1. Samoa

The Samoan Archipelago, with its fine harbor of Pago Pago on the island of Tutuila, commands a number of the important ocean lanes of the South Pacific. As early as 1838 the United States government, responding to pressure from the American whaling interests, sent a scientific expedition to the Pacific under Lieutenant Charles Wilkes.



who visited Samoa;<sup>1</sup> and since 1853 the United States has been represented by a commercial agent at Apia.<sup>2</sup> But it was not until after the Civil War and the building of the transcontinental railroad, which stimulated Pacific trade and demonstrated the desirability of a coal-  
 ing station in Samoa, that the American public began to show a real interest in the archipelago.

In 1872 an American naval officer, Commander Meade, drew up a treaty with the Great Chief of Fago Fago, providing that the United States was to have exclusive rights to establish a naval station there in return for "friendship and protection." But the Senate, being in a nonexpansive postwar mood, took no action on the treaty.<sup>3</sup>

American interest did not die with the treaty, however, for the next year the Department of State sent Colonel A. E. Steinberger to Samoa as a special observer.<sup>4</sup> The American representative won the confidence of the natives and ultimately became premier. Unfortunately, his humanitarian policies aroused the distrust of the English and German merchants, and in the end he was unceremoniously arrested and deported.<sup>5</sup> American public opinion was not at all friendly to President Grant's intermeddling on these distant islands, while investigations by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs elicited the fact that Steinberger had exceeded his authority by pledging the support of the

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<sup>1</sup> Senate Document 405, 29 Cong., 1st sess., VIII, 1-5.  
<sup>2</sup> House Report 212, 35 Cong., 2nd sess., p. 1.  
<sup>3</sup> House Executive Document 161, 44 Cong., 1st sess., p. 1.  
<sup>4</sup> Senate Executive Document 45, 43 Cong., 1st sess., p. 1.  
<sup>5</sup> John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, I, 538.

United States to the government he assisted in forming.<sup>6</sup>

The Samoan King, Le Mamea, came to Washington in 1873 where he made such a striking impression that negotiations resulted in a treaty which was approved by the Senate. It provided that in return for the rights to a naval station at Pago Pago the United States would employ its good offices to adjust any differences that should arise between Samoa and any foreign Power. This treaty did not form a protectorate, but the United States was now formally bound to support the weak native government against foreign intervention.<sup>7</sup>

The next year both Great Britain and Germany secured treaty rights in Samoa.<sup>8</sup> The consular representatives of the three nations were highly suspicious of the designs of each other, and the tiny islands seethed with the intrigues of merchants, naval officers and consuls. Robert Louis Stevenson, who arrived in Samoa in 1889, reported one politician as saying, "You can be in a new conspiracy every day!"<sup>9</sup> In 1884 the German consul raised his fatherland's flag over the royal hut in Samoa, and two years later the American consul proclaimed a United States protectorate over the islands. These acts were apparently somewhat presumptuous for the claims of both agents were repudiated by their respective governments.<sup>10</sup> Three years later Secretary of State Bayard conferred with the British and German ministers in Washington concerning a joint policy in the islands. Although the United States stood

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<sup>6</sup> H. Ex. Doc. 161, 44 Cong., 1st sess., p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> William M. Malloy, Treaties..., II, 1574.

<sup>8</sup> Foreign Relations of the United States, 1892, p. 244.

<sup>9</sup> Robert Louis Stevenson, A Footnote to History, p. 26.

<sup>10</sup> H. Ex. Doc. 238, 50 Cong., 1st sess., pp. 8, 19.

firm for the preservation of Samoan autonomy, the conference broke up without agreement.<sup>11</sup>

By 1888 the situation had become worse. The Germans brought demands upon the Samoan king for alleged wrongs, declared war upon him and deported him from the archipelago. Concurrently, the natives led by Mataafa revolted against the German-manipulated puppet government, whereupon the German warship Adler shelled the native villages and the Germans proclaimed martial law.<sup>12</sup> This belligerent act so perturbed the Samoans that they appealed to the United States to fulfill its treaty obligations and protect them from the German design. These disturbances were soon potent, and the leaders of England, Germany and the United States in order to secure "equitable" treatment dispatched Men-of-War (one British, three German and three American warships) to Apia.<sup>13</sup>

By this time public opinion had become genuinely aroused, and there was sober discussion of war with Germany. Congress promptly passed an appropriation of \$500,000 for the protection of American lives and property in Samoa and another \$100,000 for the development of the harbor of Pago Pago.<sup>14</sup> President Cleveland insisted that the autonomy and independence of Samoa should be scrupulously preserved by all according to their treaties with Samoa and their agreements and

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<sup>11</sup> For. Rel., 1894, App. I, 508.

<sup>12</sup> H. Ex. Doc. 238, 50 Cong., 1st sess., p. 71.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., pp. 99-100.

<sup>14</sup> The Statutes at Large of the United States of America, XXV, 699, 814.

understandings with each other.<sup>15</sup> Prince Bismarck, the German Chancellor, having no desire to antagonize the United States, suggested a renewal of negotiations by the three nations involved.<sup>16</sup>

The situation in Apia, however, remained dangerous with tense German and American seamen prepared to test their skill and strength. Then, on March 16, 1889, a hurricane swept the poorly protected harbor, wrecking all three American and all three German warships with heavy loss of life. Only the British vessel escaped. The common distress among the American and German survivors served to clear the maddled atmosphere and set the stage for peaceful settlement.<sup>17</sup>

Fortunate it was that an international conference had already been called to adjudicate other grave territorial issues. To this conference, which met in Berlin on April 29, 1889, the Samoan issue was presented. The minds of the diplomats were, in this early summer of 1899, too heavily engrossed in the affairs of the "sick man of Europe" to permit serious consideration of a problem in another hemisphere and far from the pulsating throbs that disturbed the peace of Europe. Much difficulty would have been avoided if the final partition of these islands had taken place then, but the United States was not ripe for tropical annexations, and Secretary of State Maine insisted upon the preservation of native autonomy. The only feasible solution seemed to be a three-Power protectorate over Samoa with the restored native dynasty nominally ruling. Germany and Great Britain were not altogether pleased

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<sup>15</sup> James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1908, IX, 44.

<sup>16</sup> S. Ex. Doc. 102, 50 Cong., 2nd sess., p. 3.

<sup>17</sup> Richardson, op. cit., IX, 44-45.

with this arrangement, but, on June 14, 1889, their representatives formally acquiesced.<sup>18</sup> This solution marked a significant trend in American diplomatic development. It placed the United States in cooperative agreement with European Powers in the Pacific--a reversal of the traditional policy of nonentanglement.

In 1893 Grover Cleveland, arch foe of expansion, again became president. In successive messages to Congress he used the Samoan entanglement as an illustration of the folly of departing from the policy of isolation. His Secretary of State, Walter R. Gresham, drew up a strong arraignment of the Samoan agreement:

Soberly surveying the history of our relations with Samoa, we may well inquire what we have gained by our departure from our established policy beyond the expenses, the responsibilities, and the entanglements that have so far been its only fruits.<sup>19</sup>

The tripartite protectorate proved inherently unworkable. Inevitable rivalries among the Powers and the Samoans again and again turned the islands into a battlefield. The decade, 1889-1899, was disastrous chiefly because of the bankruptcy of the island government and the friction which developed among the would be despoilers. The German agents complained of the behavior of Chambers, an American acting as Chief Justice of the Samoans, and of the British consul. They frankly confessed that the system of joint supervision had broken down. In its place they favored a final partition of the islands. The friction was not lessened when, on March 10, 1899, American and British naval forces, bombarded the troops of Matsafa, the German candidate for the Samoan

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<sup>18</sup> Malloy, *op. cit.*, II, 1595-1597.

<sup>19</sup> *For. Rel.*, 1894, App. I, 513.

throne.<sup>20</sup>

As a sequel feeling ran high in the three countries, but each foreign office was determined to avoid war. When the German government proposed that a joint commission be dispatched to Samoa with full powers to settle the affairs of the island group, it was, therefore, eagerly agreed to by both the United States and Great Britain. The instructions to the commissioners, largely shaped by Secretary Hay, stated that the object of the Commission was: (1) to investigate the causes of the recent troubles, (2) to establish peace and order in Samoa and (3) to propose means of guarding against them in the future.<sup>21</sup>

The report of the Commission, made in July, 1899, proposed the establishment of a new form of government which abolished the office of king.<sup>22</sup> The Commission went on to express the opinion that the tripartite administration of the islands was undesirable and that "the only natural and normal form of government for these islands" was government by a single power.<sup>23</sup>

By this time the Spanish War had wrought a change in the American mind. With the Philippines, Guam and Porto Rico recently acquired, Samoa seemed but a logical complement to the far-flung American empire. Consequently, in December, 1899, the Samoan Archipelago was divided between Germany and the United States. Great Britain withdrew entirely from the Samoan Islands and was compensated by a number of minor

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 1899, pp. 604-616.

<sup>21</sup> D. S., to German Embassy, XII, 369, quoted by Alfred L. P. Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896-1906, p. 109.

<sup>22</sup> For. Rel., 1899, pp. 636-648.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 636.

islands in the Solomon group. In the division agreed upon Germany received the two largest islands, Upolu and Savaii, but America secured the remainder of the archipelago including Tutuila with the harbor of Pago Pago.

Thus the embarrassing protectorate of Samoa was terminated and decades of squabbling were ended.<sup>24</sup> Ended at least as far as these particular islands were concerned. But the publicity of the acquisition proved so wholesome and other auspicious holdings so inviting that our pent up energy craved further expansion. It is not surprising that the luscious fruit in the form of the Hawaiian Islands also became our cynosure especially since the grooming process had been adroitly prepared.

## 2. Hawaii

The situation and resources of the Hawaiian Islands destined them to play an important part in the commercial and political affairs in the Pacific. Standing alone in the great ocean, the group must necessarily act as an outpost of the North American Continent. Lying in the track of navigation from that continent to the islands of the South Pacific, and in the direct course from the Isthmus of Panama to the Asiatic mainland, it was natural that their harbors should become the resort of the shipping of the world. The healthful, delightful climate, fertile soil and mountain elevations made Hawaii indeed the "Paradise of the Pacific."

The Sandwich Islands were discovered in 1778 by Captain James Cook, the English explorer.<sup>25</sup> But England did not awaken to the value

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., pp. 665-669.

<sup>25</sup> Walter Francis Frear, "Hawaiian or Sandwich Islands," Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th edition, XI, 271.

of the islands in time to take advantage of its unique opportunity to take possession of them when Captain George Vancouver persuaded King Kamehameha to cede the islands to Great Britain in 1794.<sup>26</sup> By failing to confirm the act, Great Britain lost the opportunity to acquire the naval base without dispute, an oversight rare in British colonial expansion.

By the 1790's American ships trading in the Pacific were using the islands as a halfway base for their China route. Deserters from American ships became a nucleus of an American colony.<sup>27</sup>

In 1815 a Russian agent, Dr. George Scheffer, induced a native chief to cede an island to which he had no real title to Russia and there raised the Russian flag. The Russian Government failed to take cognizance of the effort of Scheffer, and the Russians withdrew from the island the next year.<sup>28</sup>

Twice had Hawaiian independence been preserved because the governments concerned failed to support the acts of their agents and felt no real urge for the islands' occupation.

The first of the American missionaries entered the islands in 1820. These New Englanders looked to Hawaii as a permanent home. By entering into the social, economic and political life of the kingdom they established a remarkable influence over the natives, but their

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<sup>26</sup> Captain George Vancouver, A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean, III, 55-57, quoted by John W. Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, pp. 111-112.

<sup>27</sup> Frank A. Golder, Russian Occupation of the Hawaiian Islands, Publications of the Archives of Hawaii, No. 5, referred to by Foster Rhea Dulles, America in the Pacific: A Century of Expansion, p. 148.

<sup>28</sup> Richard J. Cleveland, A Narrative of Voyages and Commercial Enterprises, quoted by Dulles, op. cit., pp. 139-140.



natural leanings remained toward the United States.<sup>29</sup>

American whalers began using the islands as a base that same year. The whaling industry from that time until the Civil War gave the islands a new commercial importance and drew attention from official Washington. On September 19, 1820, John C. Jones was appointed to reside at the Sandwich Islands in the capacity of "Agent of the United States for commerce and seamen."<sup>30</sup>

Captain Thomas as Catesby Jones, Commander of the U. S. S. Peacock, negotiated a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation with the King in 1826. This was the first treaty formally negotiated by any foreign power with Hawaii. The treaty was never ratified by the United States, but for friendly purposes it was considered morally binding to both parties.<sup>31</sup>

The king and chiefs of Hawaii wrote, in 1836, to the United States for a legal adviser and instructor in the science of government, but no one was sent.<sup>32</sup>

"By 1830, the Americanization of Hawaii was well under way; British influence, long preeminent in the councils of the nation, had been superseded by American influence."<sup>33</sup>

During the 1830's England and France forced Hawaii into commercial treaties through "negotiations" from their warships. Although our

<sup>29</sup> For. Rel., 1894, App. II, 745-748.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., pp. 35-36.

<sup>32</sup> Ralph S. Kuykendall, "Early Hawaiian Commercial Developments," The Pacific Historical Review, III, 384-385.

<sup>33</sup> For. Rel., 1894, App. II, 10.

consular agent repeatedly requested visits from American ships-of-war in view of the islands importance to our commerce, we let both England and France enter into treaty relations with Hawaii before we took definite action.<sup>34</sup>

In 1842 William Richards and Timoteo Haalilio, a native Hawaiian, visited the United States, England and France to secure recognition of Hawaiian independence.<sup>35</sup> In consequence of this mission England and France signed a convention, November 28, 1843, "reciprocally, to consider the Sandwich Islands as an independent state, and never to take possession, either directly or indirectly or under title of protectorate,....of any part of territory of which they are composed."<sup>36</sup> But the United States was determined, even at this early date, to enter no compact which might restrict her freedom of action. The commission was cordially received here, but was granted no formal treaty guaranteeing independence.<sup>37</sup>

Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, brought the islands within the scope of the Monroe Doctrine in his letter to the Hawaiian commissioners on December 19, 1842, by stating, "of the vessels which visit the islands, it is known that the great majority belong to the United States. The United States, therefore, are more interested in the fate of the islands and of their government than any other nation can be."<sup>38</sup> President Tyler in his message to Congress on December 31,

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid., pp. 8-9.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 44.

1842, further stated:

Considering, therefore, that the United States possess so very large a share in the intercourse of those islands, it is deemed not unfit to make the declaration that their Government seeks, nevertheless, no peculiar advantages, no exclusive control over the Hawaiian Government, but is content with its independent existence and anxiously wishes for its security and prosperity. Its forbearance in this respect, under the circumstances of the very large intercourse which American vessels have with the islands, would justify this Government, should events hereafter arise to require it, in making a decided remonstrance against the adoption of an opposite policy by any other power.<sup>39</sup>

While the Hawaiian Commission was still negotiating with the British and French, Captain Lord George Paulet of H. B. M. S. Carverfort, to protect British subjects and support the British Consul, sent an ultimatum to the Hawaiian King. The King shrewdly declared he was unable, as an independent ruler, to meet the British demands and therefore made formal cession of his kingdom to Great Britain. Paulet accepted the islands and raised the British flag February 25, 1843, without regard for international complications.<sup>40</sup> The King then appealed to President Tyler for justice and to induce Britain to withdraw.<sup>41</sup>

On June 13, Secretary of State Legare stated in a letter to the American Minister in London:

Yet there is something so entirely peculiar in the relations between this little commonwealth and ourselves that we might even feel justified,....in interfering by force to prevent its falling into the hands of one of the great powers of Europe.<sup>42</sup>

Twelve days later the British Minister at Washington informed the State Department that the seizure was "entirely unauthorized by Her

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<sup>39</sup> Richardson, op. cit., IV, 212.

<sup>40</sup> For. Rel., 1894, App. II, 49-52.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., pp. 53-54.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 113.

Majesty's Government." And on July 31, Rear Admiral Thomas, R. U., restored the Hawaiian flag, and the British officially withdrew.<sup>43</sup>

This same year, Commissioner George Brown, a diplomatic agent, was sent to Hawaii to reaffirm our interest in their independence and to get favorable and impartial treatment of Americans. The King promised him that, "You may assure your Government that I shall always consider the citizens of the United States as entitled to equal privileges with those of the most favored nation."<sup>44</sup>

In 1845 Ten Eyck, the American Consul, tried to negotiate a formal treaty of friendship and commerce with Hawaii to secure most favored nation treatment for the United States; but due to minor issues over deserters, whaling privileges and property rights, Hawaii refused to accept the treaty. This left the United States in the same disadvantageous position of having no formal treaty rights with Hawaii.<sup>45</sup>

Four years later James was appointed to replace Ten Eyck and completed negotiations for a "Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation and Extradition," ratified on August 24, 1850, which guaranteed the United States most favored nation treatment.<sup>46</sup> This first perfected treaty between the United States and Hawaii remained in force, except as modified in later treaties, until 1898. It constituted a complete recognition of Hawaiian independence.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Moore, op. cit., I, 478.

<sup>44</sup> For. Rel., 1894, App. II, 85.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 69.

<sup>46</sup> Malloy, op. cit., I, 908-915.

<sup>47</sup> For. Rel., 1894, App. II, 85.

In 1849 a dispute arose between France and Hawaii respecting their convention of 1846, and French marines took possession of the fort and government offices of Honolulu. By leaving the Hawaiian flag flying, Admiral de Tromelin argued that they did not violate their agreement with England.<sup>48</sup> G. P. Judd was sent as the King's Commissioner to England, France and the United States with full powers to adjust the difficulty. He sought American and British aid and even had the power to cede the Islands to either power.<sup>49</sup> The American government complied by sending formal protests to the French government and offering the good offices of the United States for mediation.<sup>50</sup>

In March of 1851, Severance, the American Commissioner accepted from the King a sealed deed of cession of the Islands to the United States. In case of further French aggression, an American flag would be raised above the Government office and the sealed cession was to be opened. The terms of the cession provided that the kingdom was to be held by the United States until the satisfactory adjustment of the dispute. If no satisfactory agreement could be made with France "then it is our wish and pleasure that the protection aforesaid under the United States be perpetual."<sup>51</sup> Severance in his report to Washington urged annexation.<sup>52</sup>

The situation proved embarrassing to Washington. Oregon and

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 73.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 78.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., pp. 88-96.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., pp. 99-102.

California had recently been annexed and the spirit of expansion was still strong. But the Whigs were back in power, and the banner of expansion had officially been lowered. Although Secretary of State Daniel Webster still believed that we could not hold Oregon, much less Hawaii without the risk of disunion, he put up a brave show, announcing that the United States would honor Hawaiian independence and would never consent to see the islands taken over by European Powers.<sup>53</sup> In a confidential dispatch to Severance, however, he ordered him to return the deed of cession and not to encourage annexationist sentiment.<sup>54</sup>

President Fillmore told Congress that:

We were also influenced by a desire that those islands should not pass under the control of any great maritime state, but should remain in an independent condition, and so be accessible and useful to the commerce of all nations. I need not say that the importance of these considerations has been greatly enhanced by the sudden and vast development which the interests of the United States have obtained in California and Oregon, and the policy heretofore adopted in regard to those islands will be steadily pursued.<sup>55</sup>

Fortunately, a solution to the controversy was reached without further intervention by the United States.

With the return of the Democrats to power in 1853, the Pierce Administration explored possibilities of outright annexation even without the excuse of a voluntary offer of the islands. The Perry expedition to Japan centered new interest on the Pacific. Secretary of State Marcy instructed our Minister in Paris to sound out the attitude there toward American annexation of the islands. He spoke of the

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<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 101-102.

<sup>55</sup> Richardson, *op. cit.*, V. 120.

inevitability of their coming under our control: "...the powers should acquiesce in such a disposition of them, provided the transference was affected by fair means."<sup>56</sup>

In 1854 Marcy instructed Commissioner Gregg "to treat with the present authorities of the Hawaiian Government for the transfer of the Sandwich Islands to the United States."<sup>57</sup> A Treaty of Annexation was forthwith drafted, but the Senate refused to ratify it, largely because it provided for the immediate admittance of the islands into the Union as a state.<sup>58</sup>

Secretary Marcy next attempted to secure a commercial reciprocity treaty. But the Senate refused to ratify it, due chiefly to the opposition of the sugar producing state of Louisiana.<sup>59</sup>

By this time the conditions on the islands were not so favorable for annexation. The American element still longed for annexation, but on the other hand the English party was opposed to American influence. In 1855 the King died, and his successor was opposed to the treaty and to annexation.<sup>60</sup>

In the United States, problems of slavery and States rights were overshadowing the Hawaiian issue. So the independence of the Islands was given a new lease on life. During the Civil War, American influence in Hawaii suffered, while the English made efforts to undermine

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<sup>56</sup> For. Rel., 1894, App. II, 106.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., p. 121.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., pp. 121-131.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., p. 131.

American predominance. However, European statesmen foresaw the eventual annexation of the Islands by the United States. Lord Palmerston is reported to have told a Hawaiian Commission that:

Such is the destiny of the Hawaiian Islands, arising from their proximity to the States of California and Oregon and the natural dependence on those markets for exports and imports, together with the probable extinction of the Hawaiian aboriginal population and its substitution by immigration from the United States.<sup>61</sup>

In 1867 Secretary of State Seward gave private consent to the American Minister to Honolulu, Edward McCook, to take up possible purchase of the Islands. The communications between the two were confidential and in mysterious terms. On July 13, Seward wrote, "You are at liberty to sound the proper authority on the large subject mentioned in your note and to ascertain probable conditions."<sup>62</sup> Seward had little success with his imperialistic ventures, and since he had no popular support behind him, he reluctantly gave up the plan.

President Johnson favored annexation, but his official attitude veered to a policy of reciprocity as a guarantee of good will "until the people of the islands shall of themselves, at no distant day, voluntarily apply for admission into the Union."<sup>63</sup>

A second reciprocity treaty negotiated in 1867 was defeated by American sugar interests and by annexationists who feared that its acceptance would postpone their aims.<sup>64</sup> In 1871, President Grant transmitted to Congress without comment a dispatch from Pierce, Minister

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 140.

<sup>63</sup> Richardson, op. cit., VI, 639.

<sup>64</sup> For. Rel., 1894, App. II, 140.



in Honolulu, recommending annexation.<sup>65</sup>

On March 25, 1873, Secretary of State Fish wrote:

There seems to be a strong desire on the part of many persons on the islands, representing large interests and great wealth, to become annexed to the United States....those of influence and wise foresight....see a future that must extend the jurisdiction and the limits of this nation, and that will require a resting spot in the mid-ocean, between the Pacific coast and the vast domain of Asia.<sup>66</sup>

In 1874 the King died without naming a successor, and there was danger of revolution and anarchy. The Hawaiian Minister of Foreign Affairs appealed to Pierce, and a force of American marines landed to suppress riots. Kalakaua, who favored the United States, was chosen as King, and a peaceful revolution provided a new Constitution containing certain reforms demanded by the foreign element.<sup>67</sup>

In 1874 the King, Kalakaua, visited the United States to promote a third attempt to secure a reciprocity treaty.<sup>68</sup> The treaty, as ratified in 1876, provided that Hawaii could make no territorial concessions to foreign Powers, and in return was permitted to export sugar to the United States duty free.<sup>69</sup> This treaty brought about an unprecedented boom to the Hawaiian sugar industry, and bound the economic life of the islands to the United States in such a way as to make political union practically inevitable.

In 1881 Secretary of State Blaine became alarmed at the possibility

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16-19.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>69</sup> Malloy, *op. cit.*, I, 915.

of European influence in Hawaii. He stated that faced with the choice of material annexation or commercial assimilation we had chosen the less responsible alternative; nevertheless, Hawaii had become an integral part of the American system, we could never consent to share what responsibility we had, and our position in the islands had to be maintained both because of our duty to Hawaii and because the islands represented the key to the domain of the Pacific. Benevolent neutrality rather than annexation or a protectorate was our policy, but should neutrality be found unpractical "this Government would then unhesitatingly meet the altered situation by seeking an avowedly American solution for the grave issues presented."<sup>70</sup>

A second reciprocity convention was ratified, in 1887, renewing the provisions of the treaty of 1875, and in addition granting to the United States "the exclusive right to enter the harbor of Pearl River in the Island of Oahu, and to establish and maintain there a coaling and repair station for the use of vessels of the United States."<sup>71</sup>

Both England and France formally protested Hawaii's cession of Pearl Harbor and suggested that the United States join them in guaranteeing Hawaiian independence and neutrality.<sup>72</sup> But Secretary of State Bayard replied that we could admit no foreign restraint on our Hawaiian policy.<sup>73</sup> Cleveland supported Bayard's policy. He favored Hawaiian autonomy, but it was his "unhesitating conviction that the intimacy of

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<sup>70</sup> For. Rel., 1894, App. II, 169-170.

<sup>71</sup> Malloy, op. cit., I, 920.

<sup>72</sup> For. Rel., 1894, App. II, 24.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., p. 25.

our relations with Hawaii should be emphasized.<sup>74</sup> It is ironic that during the administration of Cleveland, who absolutely opposed any vestiges of imperialism, the first step toward annexation was taken.

As the nineteenth century neared its end, Hawaii was losing its native character and was becoming a country of white traders and planters supported by oriental labor. The native Hawaiians were a dying race. With the impact of Western Civilization and the resulting importation of liquor, foreign habits and diseases, the native population began declining. Americans and Europeans were replacing the natives and were dominating the government and industry of the islands. This change in the population made the idea of an independent native Hawaiian kingdom an anachronism.

In 1837 the foreign residents and better class natives rose up against the corrupt court of the decadent native dynasty. The King was forced to sign a new Constitution depriving him of many of his prerogatives.<sup>75</sup>

The native element was antagonistic to the new Constitution because it increased the privileges of the foreign residents and allowed them political rights without having to renounce their foreign citizenship.<sup>76</sup> Two years later a half-breed American led the natives in an insurrection against the foreign controlled government. The insurgents were compelled to surrender by volunteer troops.<sup>77</sup> This served to intensify bitter party feeling and race hatred.

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<sup>74</sup> Richardson, op. cit., VIII, 500.

<sup>75</sup> For. Rel., 1894, App. II, 663-665.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

Blaine invited the King of the Hawaiian Islands to participate in the International American Conference meeting in Washington in 1890. The feeling was growing that the Islands were really a part of the Western Hemisphere.<sup>78</sup>

The McKinley Tariff of 1890 placed sugar on the free list, thus giving Cuban sugar equal opportunity with the Hawaiian industry on the American market. It also provided a bounty of two cents a pound for American producers to subsidize our national sugar industry.<sup>79</sup> This dealt the Hawaiian sugar industry a double blow. Annexation by the United States was the only safeguard against such discrimination. This obvious economic motive for annexation was somewhat offset, however, by the fear that the contract labor laws of the United States would cut off the Oriental labor supply.

In 1891 King Kalakaua died in the United States. His sister, Liliuokalani, who had been acting as regent during his absence was proclaimed Queen.<sup>80</sup> In August her husband, an American, who had acted as Prince Consort, died. The old chiefs were dying out, and a group of native reactionaries allied with foreign adventurers gained a great influence over the Queen. Adopting the platform of "Hawaii for Hawaiians" the Queen attempted to counteract foreign influence, restore the Hawaiian monarchy to its old prerogatives and strengthen Hawaiian independence. The resulting misgovernment weighed heavily

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Statutes at Large, XXVI, 583-585.

<sup>80</sup> For. Rel., 1894, App. II, 26-27.

upon both natives and foreigners. Bitter friction arose between the Queen and the American residents, who considered Hawaii their own country and resisted the reactionary measures of the Queen, who defied the legislature, largely controlled by American planters.<sup>81</sup> Seeing little hope for the preservation of liberties or of Hawaiian progress under Queen Liliuokalani, the American element turned to annexation by the United States as the only possible solution.

John L. Stevens, the American Minister, sent home outspoken pleas for annexation. On February 3, 1892, he sought instructions in case of revolution:

At this time there seems to be no immediate prospect of its being safe to have the harbor of Honolulu left without an American vessel of war....Annexation must be the future remedy, or else Great Britain will be furnished with circumstances and opportunity to get a hold on the islands, which will cause future embarrassment to the United States.<sup>82</sup>

By the fall of 1892 there was a deadlock between the Queen and the legislature, which refused to give her new cabinet a vote of confidence.<sup>83</sup> The white leaders, fearing for their position and property, began taking steps to organize a revolution. Since the great majority of them were of American ancestry, they sought the support of Stevens. On January 14, 1893, Hukalaksana, a native political society, petitioned for a new Constitution, and the legislature was called to hear it proclaimed.<sup>84</sup> This Constitution, so arbitrarily proclaimed, provided that the Queen must approve all bills, that the Queen appoint all nobles and

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., pp. 181-182.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., pp. 183-187.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., p. 450.

Judges, and that only subjects had the right to vote.<sup>85</sup> When the ministers refused to sign the new Constitution, the Queen postponed its promulgation, but the American party was not satisfied.<sup>86</sup>

A mass meeting of 1,300 foreign residents of Honolulu proclaimed that a state of emergency existed. And on January 16, the resident Americans organized a Committee of Safety,<sup>87</sup> which consisted of six Hawaiian subjects (two of American origin), five Americans, one Englishman and one German.<sup>88</sup> That same day the Committee asked Stevens to safeguard American interests, because "we are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and therefore, pray for the protection of the United States' forces."<sup>89</sup> Stevens immediately ordered the landing of 160 marines for the preservation of law and order. However, Admiral Skerrett later expressed the opinion that the troops were stationed so as to support the revolutionists rather than to protect American interests.<sup>90</sup>

On January 17, the Committee of Safety issued a proclamation abrogating the Hawaiian Monarchy and establishing a Provisional Government "to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon."<sup>91</sup> The government was composed

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., pp. 1047-1056.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., p. 581.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., pp. 582-584.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., pp. 387-388.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., p. 584.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., pp. 459-463.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., p. 210.

of two councils, the Executive Council and the Advisory Council, both predominantly American.<sup>92</sup> The Executive Council took over the government buildings and asked Stevens for de facto recognition of the new regime.<sup>93</sup> Stevens granted the revolutionists recognition that same day, implying that it had complete control of the islands.<sup>94</sup>

The Queen, overawed by the American forces and the obvious hostility of the United States, yielded to the revolutionists under protest and surrendered her power. In her proclamation she declared she had yielded "to the superior force of the United States of America."<sup>95</sup>

On January 15 a special committee was appointed by the Provisional Government to negotiate a treaty of annexation and left immediately for the United States.<sup>96</sup> Stevens enthusiastically acceded to the request of the Provisional Government for an American protectorate and raised the American flag over the government buildings on February 1, 1893. He informed Washington that his prompt action prevented Britain and Japan from intervening and asked for a naval force to support the position.<sup>97</sup> Stevens reported to the State Department: "The Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe, and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it."<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid., p. 593.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., p. 210.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., p. 218.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., p. 219.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., p. 222.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., p. 244.

Secretary Foster was forced to disavow the protectorate. He did not rebuke Stevens, but warned him against any infringement of Hawaiian sovereignty.<sup>99</sup>

On February 14, 1893, less than a month after Queen Liliuokalani's downfall, the treaty of annexation was completed.<sup>100</sup> It proposed the incorporation of Hawaii into the United States as a territory.<sup>101</sup>

Secretary of State Foster reported to the Senate:

This report shows that from an early day the policy of the United States has been consistently and constantly declared against any foreign aggression in the Kingdom of Hawaii inimical to the necessarily paramount rights and interests of the American people there, and the uniform contemplation of their annexation as a contingent necessity.<sup>102</sup>

And President Harrison told the Senate that he preferred annexation in the interests of both the United States and Hawaii: "These interests are not wholly selfish. It is essential that none of the other great powers shall secure the islands. Such possession would not consist with our safety and the peace of the world."<sup>103</sup>

A little more than two weeks of Harrison's Republican administration remained when the treaty was rushed to the Senate. And unfortunately, the Senate did not act with the promptness which had been expected. Before any action was carried through, the anti-imperialistic Grover Cleveland returned to the presidency, March 4, 1893. A few days later he resorted to the unusual step of withdrawing the treaty from

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid., pp. 240-242.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., p. 233.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., pp. 202-205.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., p. 201.

<sup>103</sup> Richardson, op. cit., IX, 348-349.



the Senate. He next appointed James H. Blount as a special commissioner to investigate the facts of the revolt.<sup>104</sup> Public opinion was divided. There was still strong popular demand for annexation, but the Democrats supported Cleveland's stand that the United States could not allow Hawaiian annexation to be colored by the suspicion of unfair tactics.

Blount's instructions placed him in paramount authority in all matters concerning our relations with Hawaii and ordered a full report on events leading to the Queen's deposition. He was, however, accredited to the President of the Provisional Government, Sanford B. Dole.<sup>105</sup> Thus Cleveland indirectly recognized the Provisional Government as the legitimate government of the islands. Blount, upon his arrival in Hawaii, hauled down the American flag, sent the marines back to the U. S. S. Boston<sup>106</sup> and conducted a thorough but somewhat high-handed and partisan investigation. In July he reported to Cleveland that Stevens had improperly interfered in the revolution, and that a majority of the voters were opposed to annexation. The actions of Stevens had here allegedly indicated his support of the revolutionary plan which was confirmed by his speedy recognition of the new government without due respect to its stability or its authority. His report did not convict Stevens of conspiring to bring about the uprising but left the impression that the revolt would not have taken place and certainly could not have succeeded except for the Minister's support.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Par. Rel., 1894, App. II, 1190.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., p. 469.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., p. 472.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., pp. 459-463.

A wave of moral indignation and sentimental sympathy for the Queen swept the United States after the publication of Blount's report. Meanwhile, there was dangerous unrest in Hawaii. The Provisional Government remained in power, but the supporters of the Queen actively hoped that further intervention by the United States might eventually lead to her restoration. Secretary of State Gresham urged that the great wrong be undone by restoring the legitimate government, since "Our Government was the first to recognize the independence of the islands, and it should be the last to acquire sovereignty over them by force and fraud."<sup>108</sup>

Cleveland hoped to settle the problem by executive responsibility without having to consult Congress on the use of force. He sent Albert S. Willis to replace Blount in Honolulu and gave him secret instructions to arrange for the Queen's restoration and to provide for status quo ante by peaceful measures.<sup>109</sup> Willis first attempted to secure a pledge from the Queen that amnesty would be granted to the revolutionaries, even though they had been threatened with property confiscation and death.<sup>110</sup> Later she was persuaded by her foreign advisers to agree to the American terms and promised a general amnesty for all.<sup>111</sup> Willis then advised the Provisional Government that it was expected to relinquish to the Queen her constitutional authority.<sup>112</sup> But the arrival at

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<sup>108</sup> Ibid., p. 463.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., p. 463.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., pp. 1241-1243.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., p. 1269.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., p. 464.

this time of an American warship in Pearl Harbor excited fear among the annexationists that the United States planned to reestablish the Queen by force.<sup>113</sup>

When it finally occurred to Washington that the Provisional Government might resent the American program for upsetting the regime which it had just brought into power, Willis was sent new instructions, and warned that "the President cannot use force without the authority of Congress."<sup>114</sup> On December 23, President Dole protested that the United States had no right to interfere in the domestic affairs of a government which had been formally recognized. He declared that the independence and sovereignty of his government could not be questioned, and requested Willis to inform Cleveland that the Hawaiian Government "respectfully and unhesitatingly declines to entertain the proposition of the President of the United States that it should surrender its authority to the ex-Queen."<sup>115</sup> Willis soon received orders from Cleveland to "consider that your special instructions upon this subject have been wholly complied with."<sup>116</sup>

Cleveland then washed his hands of the whole affair by surrendering the responsibility for determining our future policy to Congress. In his message to the legislators he stated that he would be gratified to cooperate with any legislative plan devised for the solution of the problem which was "consistent with American honor, integrity, and

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid., p. 1275.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., p. 465.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., p. 1282.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., pp. 1283-1284.

and morality," and would hand the problem "to the broader authority and discretion of Congress."<sup>117</sup> Congress agreed with the President's refusal of annexation but saw nothing else to be done. Only forcible intervention could restore the Queen to power and public opinion would never sanction the use of force for the restoration of a monarchy. Congress thereupon passed two resolutions of non-interference in Hawaiian affairs and dropped the problem with universal relief.<sup>118</sup>

On July 4, 1894, the Provisional Government proclaimed a Constitution and organized itself on a permanent basis. The United States promptly recognized the Hawaiian Republic thus formed.<sup>119</sup> That annexationist dreams were not entirely forgotten was evidenced by Article thirty-two of the new Hawaiian Constitution which authorized the President of the Republic to conclude whenever possible a treaty of commercial or political union with the United States.<sup>120</sup>

Many American statesmen, or politicians, also were still convinced that we must acquire the islands. Naval leaders, less concerned with the ethics of annexation, regretted our failure of 1893. They regarded the territory as essential for American naval power. Admiral Mahan warned that "whether they will or not, Americans must now begin to look outward."<sup>121</sup> He stressed the strategic position of Hawaii. "It is rarely that so important a factor...is concentrated in a single position

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<sup>117</sup> Ibid., p. 458.

<sup>118</sup> Congressional Record, 53 Cong., 2nd sess., XXVI, 8010, 8626.

<sup>119</sup> For. Rel., 1894, App. II, 1350.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., p. 1325.

<sup>121</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future, p. 22.

and the circumstances render it doubly imperative upon us to secure it if we righteously can.<sup>122</sup> A Senate Resolution passed in 1894 stated that steps should be taken by this government without unnecessary delay to annex those islands to the United States.<sup>123</sup> Nothing, however, could be accomplished until Cleveland's term was ended in March, 1897.

Upon the inauguration of McKinley, a treaty of annexation was speedily concluded by American and Hawaiian commissioners and submitted to the Senate.<sup>124</sup> McKinley stated that annexation was "the inevitable consequence of the relation so steadfastly maintained with the mid-Pacific domain."<sup>125</sup> The administration sought quick ratification of the treaty. A committee drew up five specific reasons for annexation: (1) to secure strategic control of the Pacific, (2) to prevent possible Japanese control, (3) to promote our commerce, (4) to develop our shipping interests, and (5) to promote peace in the Pacific.<sup>126</sup> But in spite of determined administrative effort, the treaty was blocked in the Senate by enough Democrats to prevent its being passed by the necessary two-thirds majority.

In 1893, Japan had voiced no opposition to annexation plans, but by 1897 it had gained a victory over China and felt a new strength in the Pacific. When the new Hawaiian Republic refused to admit some Japanese immigrants, one of her warships visited Honolulu. Hawaii appealed to the United States for support, and for the first time a

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<sup>122</sup> Ibid., pp. 48-49.

<sup>123</sup> Cong. Record, 53 Cong., 3rd sess., XXVII, 1408.

<sup>124</sup> Senate Report 681, 55 Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 96-99.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., pp. 65-67.

<sup>126</sup> S. Rep. 681, 55 Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 27-39.

protectorate was officially authorized by Washington.<sup>127</sup> There was widespread belief that Japanese immigration was a means of peaceful invasion used to undermine American influence. On June 19, 1897, while the treaty of annexation was pending, the Japanese Government made formal protest against the proposed annexation of the islands. Japan stated that the maintenance of the status quo in Hawaii was essential to peace in the Pacific and that annexation by the United States would jeopardize the rights of Japanese subjects in Hawaii. At the same time Japan denied "the mischievous suggestion" that it entertained designs against the territorial integrity of the islands.<sup>128</sup> The controversy, however, was gradually settled through diplomatic channels; and Japan patched up her quarrel with Hawaii and withdrew her protests against annexation.<sup>129</sup>

The Spanish American War in 1898 brought added impetus to the cause for annexation. Dewey's victory over the Spaniards at Manila aided the argument that Hawaii would be indispensable as a base for supplies and reinforcements for the Philippines. Advocates of the new navy renewed the old argument that the United States needed Hawaii as a first line of defense for our west coast. And finally the new conception of "national destiny" could not be denied. Consequently, the administration decided not to wait for the slow process of Senate approval. As a war measure, a resolution for annexation, requiring only a simple majority vote, was submitted to Congress. The joint

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<sup>127</sup> Moore. op. cit.. I, 506.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.. p. 504.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.. pp. 507-509.

resolution passed both houses of Congress by large majorities and was signed, July 7, 1898, by President McKinley,<sup>130</sup> who remarked, "Annexation is not a change; it is consummation."<sup>131</sup> On August 12, 1898, the Hawaiian Islands were formally transferred to the United States,<sup>132</sup> and the Organic Act of 1900 established the Islands as an incorporated territory of the Union.<sup>133</sup>

Had imperialism now become a dominant issue in the political policy of the United States? Were we now, after more than a century of "isolation," to emerge as a nation interested in the exploitation of the less fortunate peoples of effete powers or of mavericks that were so undesirable to others that their natural status had been impaired? From future developments it appeared that the dye was cast and that the imperialistic avalanche was to reap greater and more salubrious accessions before a halt could be called.

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<sup>130</sup> Statutes at Large, XXX, 1750.

<sup>131</sup> S. Rep. 681, 55 Cong., 2nd sess., p. 67.

<sup>132</sup> Statutes at Large, XXX, 750.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., 141.

## III

## RAMPANT IMPERIALISM

As the nineteenth century neared its close, the American people were revealing unmistakable evidence of a desire for a larger part in world affairs. This attitude was not entirely new but had been recalled from its lethargy as a result of the new wave of prosperity subsequent to the panic of 1893, a surplus of manpower eager for action at home or abroad, a new generation that had not tasted the horrors of war and by a citizenry sufficiently gullible on issues of a grandiose nature not to distinguish between advocations good and bad that appeared periodically in the current press. Ever since Thomas Jefferson in 1809 had made his famous assertion to President Madison that if and when war came it would be impossible for Cuba to evade the tentacles of the United States, many individuals had seemed to feel our national domain had been deprived of a few of the jewels of the contiguous area until the "Ever Faithful Isle" flew the Stars and Stripes.<sup>1</sup> Our efforts to inveigle, to intimidate or to cajole the Spanish rulers into a mood of compliance had repeatedly failed, and our efforts to incite the natives to rebellion, as a rule, had proved abortive as far as independence was concerned and extremely destructive from an economic point of view. But with the appearance of the "yellow" journals, such as the New York Journal and the New York World, with streamers ever urging expansion to the West Indies, a clientele was speedily created that knew no bounds

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<sup>1</sup> J. K. Winkler, W. R. Hearst, p. 144, quoted by Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 497.



in the province of propriety on the issues of etiquette in dealing with an appendage of the effete Spanish empire.<sup>2</sup> With William Randolph Hurst's assertion, "You furnish the pictures, and I'll furnish the war," it was not surprising to find a state of expansion and belligerency entering the national administration. In time this feeling became so general that even Theodore Roosevelt, in an impetuous manner, castigated Mr. McKinley as having "no more backbone than a chocolate éclair." These statements undoubtedly had a profound influence on the action of the average politician, and in due course are to be translated into deeds that border seriously close on an imperialistic wave of feeling that is to provoke a war to obtain the morsels so earnestly desired.

#### 1. Cuba

In addition to her marvelous productivity, geographically Cuba occupies an unique strategic position in that she commands both the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. In the possession of an unfriendly sea power, Cuba could at any time jeopardize the Caribbean communications of the United States, threaten our control of an Isthmian route, bottle up our gulf ports and virtually close the mouth of the Mississippi.

From an early date American statesmen were fully aware of the importance of Cuba to the United States. Their solicitude was definitely stimulated by the purchase of Louisiana and by the threatened break-up of Spain's colonial empire, but during the first period of our Cuban diplomacy the American policy was not to acquire Cuba but to prevent

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<sup>2</sup> Millis, The Martial Spirit, p. 130, quoted by Bailey, op. cit., p. 506.

its acquisition by a strong sea power such as England or France.<sup>3</sup>

President Madison expressed his views on the Cuban question in a letter to William Pinkney on October 30, 1810, in which he stated that the position of Cuba gave the United States so deep an interest in the destiny of the island that "they could not be a satisfied spectator at its falling under any European government which might make a fulcrum of that position against the commerce and security of the United States."<sup>4</sup> This was the first statement in the evolution of a Cuban policy consistently adhered to by the United States until the successes of the Mexican War superinduced larger ideas of Manifest Destiny.

During the Napoleonic Wars, while Spain lay prostrate before the victorious armies of France, the Spanish provinces in America adopted constitutions, set up republics and attained a certain degree of independence, until at last only the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico remained of the Spanish imperial possessions. When all of Spain's other American colonies fell away from her it was not certain whether Cuba also would break the bonds holding her to the mother country. Her large slave population made the question of independence different from that of the South American states and Mexico, and it was doubtful whether she could have maintained such independence unless protected by some other Power.<sup>5</sup>

Upon the restoration of the Spanish monarchy in 1814, the South

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<sup>3</sup> John H. Latane, "The Diplomacy of the United States in Regard to Cuba," Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1897, p. 232.

<sup>4</sup> Madison's Works, II, 488, quoted by Latane, op. cit., p. 220.

<sup>5</sup> James Morton Callahan, "Cuba and Anglo-American Relations," Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1897, p. 195.

American provinces, which had enjoyed practical self-government for several years, refused to submit again to the yoke of absolute authority. Spain was then too weak to protect her two West Indian dependencies, but her very weakness attached the islands to her. The naval and commercial importance of Cuba, "The Pearl of the Antilles," made it a prize too valuable to be acquired by any one of the great maritime Powers without exciting the jealousy and opposition of the others.<sup>6</sup>

As early as 1817 apprehensions of alarm as to the fate of Cuba were raised in the minds of the American public by newspaper reports to the effect that England had proposed a relinquishment of her claims of 15,000,000 against Spain in return for the cession of the Island of Cuba.<sup>7</sup> The question assumed greater importance in 1819 when the treaty for the cession of the Floridas to the United States was being negotiated. It was then insisted by the British press that the acquisition of Florida would give the United States such a prepondering influence in the West Indies as to render necessary the occupation of Cuba by Great Britain as the natural offset to American aggrandizement.<sup>8</sup> However, the Spanish Minister to Britain, M. Onis, declared that Spain had no intentions of ceding Cuba to Britain, and the sentiment among the ambassadors at London was that the Powers would not allow any transfer of Cuba whatsoever.<sup>9</sup>

In March, 1820, the array which Ferdinand VII of Spain had assembled

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<sup>6</sup> Latane, op. cit., p. 219.

<sup>7</sup> Niles' Weekly Register, XIII, 174.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., XVII, 231.

<sup>9</sup> Fish's Residence, p. 112, quoted by Latane, op. cit., p. 221.

to be sent against his rebellious colonies revolted and restored the republican Constitution of 1812. Similar movements throughout Europe aroused the fear of the Holy Alliance, which had been organized by the monarchs of Europe after the downfall of Napoleon to preserve the status quo and to stamp out all such dangerous democratic tendencies. The Congress of Verona met in October, 1822, to discuss intervention in the affairs of Spain. France was thereby intrusted with the invasion of Spain, the suppression of the Constitution and the restoration of Ferdinand to absolute power. The possibility was then discussed of sending a powerful Franco-Spanish force to America for the purpose of restoring to Spain her old empire, and it was widely rumored that France would receive Cuba as her reward for assisting Spain to regain her colonies.<sup>10</sup>

Meanwhile, the Cubans were talking of independence. In September, 1822, a secret agent notified the United States Government that plans were matured for Cuban independence and that they only wanted the assurance their effort would be approved by the United States in case they declared their independence and then sought admission into the Union. But Secretary of State John Quincy Adams feared that, if the taking of Cuba by us should lead to war, it would for a long time result in British possession of the island. He, therefore, replied that the executive was not competent to promise their admission into the Union and that our relations with Spain would not allow us to encourage such a proposal. At the same time, however, he took the opportunity to mention the "common interests which point to intimate connections

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<sup>10</sup> Niles'..... XXIV, 343.

between Cuba and the United States."<sup>11</sup>

The relations between England and Spain in the West Indies had assumed a very serious character by this time. During the wars with Napoleon, an extensive commerce had sprung up between England and the Spanish-American states, and a restoration of Spanish despotism would mean an abrupt cessation of this trade. It was reported that Great Britain had engaged to give the Constitutional Government of Spain financial support in return for the occupation of Cuba. The presence of a British squadron in Cuban waters in 1823, ostensibly to protect British interests from pirates and privateers, caused considerable uneasiness in Washington.<sup>12</sup>

On April 28, 1823, Secretary Adams sent a memorable dispatch to the American Minister to Spain in which he asserted:

It seems scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our federal republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself.... There are laws of political as well as physical gravitation;.... Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connexion with Spain, and incapable of self support, can gravitate only towards the North American Union, which, by the same law of nature cannot cast her from its bosom.<sup>13</sup>

President Monroe received more temperate advice at this time, however, from the octogenarian Jefferson, who wrote from his retirement at Monticello:

I candidly confess that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of States.... Yet, as I am sensible that this can never be obtained, even with her own consent, but by war; and its independence,

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<sup>11</sup> John Quincy Adams, The Diary of, edited by Allan Nevins, p. 283.

<sup>12</sup> Wiles'....., XXIV, 24.

<sup>13</sup> House Executive Document 121, 32 Cong., 1st sess., p. 6.

which is our second interest (and especially its independence of England), can be secured without it. I have no hesitation in abandoning my first wish to future chances; and accepting its independence, with peace and the friendship of England, rather than its association, at the expense of war and her enmity.<sup>14</sup>

At first the Holy Alliance and its anti-democratic tendencies had caused little concern in the United States, but by the autumn of 1823, following the French invasion of Spain, the American public seemed to be more disturbed by the designs of this group than by any other foreign problem. Concern spread to the Administration in Washington, where Monroe was alarmed with the fear that the Holy Alliance was about to restore all South America to Spain immediately.

The idea of cooperation between the United States and Great Britain in a policy concerning Cuba had been several times suggested. Early in 1823 the question arose as to whether it would not be wise to propose to England that she join the United States in a mutual guarantee of Cuba to Spain. It was agreed, however, that the United States should make no mutual promise not to take Cuba.<sup>15</sup>

In August, 1823, British Foreign Secretary George Canning proposed to Richard Rush, the American Minister in London, that America and Great Britain unite in a common understanding designed to prevent the possible danger of action by the Holy Alliance in the New World.<sup>16</sup> President Monroe's first reaction was rather favorable, but Secretary Adams, intensely nationalistic and individualistic, strongly opposed

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<sup>14</sup> Thomas Jefferson, The Jeffersonian Cyclopedia, edited by John P. Foley, pp. 585-586.

<sup>15</sup> Samuel Flagg Bemis, editor, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, IV, 60-61.

<sup>16</sup> John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, VI, 386-392.

associating with any other Power in this important enterprise. "It would be more candid, as well as more dignified," he declared, "to avow our principles explicitly to Russia and France, than to come in as a cock-boat in the wake of the British man-of-war."<sup>17</sup> But there were far more compelling considerations than these. Conspicuous in the Canning proposal was the proviso that neither the United States nor Great Britain would appropriate any part of Spanish America. Adams feared that England was trying to inveigle the United States into a self-denying trap. He also suspected that there was little danger of interference by the members of the Holy Alliance. Although the United States was not prepared to fight, neither were the interested European states. Adams surmised that even if the European Powers attempted to intervene in the Western Hemisphere, England, with her mastery of the seas, probably would not let them. Indeed, it was Adams who first championed the doctrine of the two separate hemispheres. He urged that the United States make "earnest remonstrance against the interference of the European powers by force with South America, but to disclaim all interference on our part with Europe; to make an American cause, and adhere inflexibly to that."<sup>18</sup>

The now famous Monroe Doctrine was embedded in the President's annual message to Congress of December 2, 1823. Its terms incorporated in substance the policies proposed by Secretary Adams. The so-called Doctrine consisted of two widely separated passages:

The occasion has been judged proper for asserting....that the American continents, by the free and independent condition

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<sup>17</sup> Adams, *op. cit.*, pp. 301-303.

<sup>18</sup> Moore, *op. cit.*, VI, 399-401.

which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.

.....

The political system of the allied powers is essentially different....from that of America....We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.

With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence....we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at the early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers.<sup>19</sup>

The fundamental ideas of the Monroe Doctrine were neither new nor original. Monroe merely codified such existing ideas as those of the two hemispheres, no transfer of territory, nonintervention and nontanglement. The people of the United States, on the whole, responded cordially if not enthusiastically to the President's pronouncement. The commercial world was gratified at this further assurance that the Spanish American markets would not be closed. More than that, the doctrine was exhilarating to our national spirit.<sup>20</sup>

Public opinion in England seemed to react favorably to the "bold American message," for Englishmen were quite content to let the United States pull their South American chestnuts out of the fire. Canning,

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<sup>19</sup> James D. Richardson, The Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 209, 218-219.

<sup>20</sup> Moore, op. cit., VI, 404-409.



however, was annoyed because the United States had stolen his thunder; he perceived that the noncolonization principle could be invoked against his own country as well as against the members of the Holy Alliance.<sup>21</sup>

Continental Europe, meanwhile, viewed the Monroe Doctrine with mingled annoyance and contempt. Indeed, if anything, European interest in intervention was stimulated by America's "international impertinence." If they had been willing and prepared to intervene, their first reaction probably would have been to do so just to put the Yankee in his place.<sup>22</sup>

The people of the United States are prone to believe that the southern Republics were duly grateful for their deliverance from the Holy Alliance by chivalrous Uncle Sam. But in reality some quarters greeted the message with rejoicing, others with indifference and still others with dissatisfaction--on the whole with no more than moderate enthusiasm. It was evident to the Latin Americans that the new policy was essentially selfish, that the United States, as was quite natural, had clearly been thinking first of its own safety and only secondarily of that of its neighbors.<sup>23</sup>

What came to be known as the Monroe Doctrine is not law, national or international. It is merely a simple, unilateral, presidential enunciation of foreign policy. It is no stronger than the power and influence of the United States to enforce it. When the Monroe Doctrine was first announced it commanded relatively little attention at home and even less respect abroad. Yet by mid-century the Powers were aware

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 411.

<sup>22</sup> Bemis, op. cit., IV, 76-77.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., pp. 78-79.

that such a policy existed and that it was backed by a sturdy and growing American Union.<sup>24</sup>

Henry Clay had espoused the cause of the South American Republics at an early period of their struggle and had labored incessantly for their independence.<sup>25</sup> As Secretary of State, he urged upon Spain the necessity of terminating hostilities as the only means of preserving her dominion over the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, for the Governments of Mexico and Colombia had determined, in case of a continuance of the war by Spain, to seize Cuba for purposes of defense. "Of all the European powers, this country prefers that Cuba and Porto Rico should remain dependent on Spain," Clay declared. "But if those islands became a theater of the revolt," he continued, "their fortunes have such a connection with the prosperity of the United States that they could not be indifferent spectators."<sup>26</sup>

The American policy toward the Panama Congress of Spanish-American Republics in 1826 was largely connected with the Cuban question. The southern Congressmen were united in their opposition to a Panama mission or any closer alliance with the new republics, because they had adopted the principle of emancipation and any further extension of their influence would jeopardize the institution of slavery in the United States. For the same reason Southerners were opposed to the transfer of Cuba to any other European Power. If a change from its connection with Spain were necessary, they favored annexation by the United States.

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<sup>24</sup> Moore, *op. cit.*, VI, 404, 427.

<sup>25</sup> Richardson, *op. cit.*, II, 116-118.

<sup>26</sup> Senate Report 351, 35 Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 3-4.

and meantime they were strongly opposed to the Government entering into any engagement with foreign Powers or in any way committing itself on the Cuban issue.<sup>27</sup>

By 1830 Spain was forced by her weakened condition and by popular sentiment at home to discontinue her attempts for the reconquest of her former colonies, though she did not recognize their independence for several years after the war closed. Both Britain and the United States were satisfied at that time to see Cuba remain in the hands of depleted Spain.<sup>28</sup>

Soon thereafter, however, the open violation by Spain of her treaty obligations to Great Britain and to France gave rise to rumors that both Powers were contemplating taking possession of the island of Cuba. In view of this threat, Secretary of State Forsyth informed our Minister Vail in Madrid on July 15, 1840:

You are authorized to assure the Spanish Government that in case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from her this portion of her territory, she may securely depend upon the military and naval resources of the United States to aid her in preserving or recovering it.<sup>29</sup>

Until the Mexican War the attitude of the United States toward Cuba had been defensive and protective. With the coming of that war, however, and the resulting consciousness of national expansion and the growing conviction of "Manifest Destiny," our foreign policy assumed a much bolder and more aggressive character. Cuba then became an object of desire not only in the eyes of the slaveholding population

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<sup>27</sup> American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 863.

<sup>28</sup> Callahan, op. cit., pp. 214-215.

<sup>29</sup> H. Ex. Doc. 121, 32 Cong., 1st sess., p. 35-37.

of the South but of a large part of the nation by reason of its strategic importance in commanding the interoceanic transit routes of Central America, which formed the most available line of communication with our rapidly developing interests in California.<sup>30</sup>

In 1848, Secretary of State Buchanan directed the American Minister to Spain, Saunders, to open negotiations with the Spanish government for the purchase of Cuba. After referring to the dangers of British occupation and to the advantages of annexation, he prudently added, "Desirable, however, as this island may be to the United States, we would not acquire it except by the free will of Spain. Any acquisition not sanctioned by justice and honor would be too dearly purchased." Saunders was authorized to offer as much as \$100,000,000 for the island, but the Spanish Government refused to consider parting with her western "jewel."<sup>31</sup>

With Cuba so desirable and Spain so obstinate, the thoughts of adventurous Americans next turned to filibustering expeditions as a means of shaking the tree of Manifest Destiny. A leader appeared in the person of General Marciso Lopez, a Venezuelan adventurer, who had been involved in recent uprisings in Cuba. He apparently planned to land in Cuba with a considerable force, summon the Cubans to raise the banner of freedom, wrest the island from Spanish dominion and then offer it to the Americans. Hundreds of restless Mexican War veterans, attracted by dreams of bearing the torch of liberty to Cuba and by promises of lavish rewards such as confiscated sugar plantations, were

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<sup>30</sup> Latane, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

<sup>31</sup> H. Ex. Doc. 121, 32 Cong., 1st sess., p. 42.

eager to join Lopez in carrying out the dictates of Manifest Destiny. The movement gained such momentum that, on August 11, 1849, President Taylor issued a proclamation warning all citizens of the United States against taking part in such expeditions: "No such persons must expect the interference of this Government in any form on their behalf, no matter to what extremities they may be reduced in consequence of their conduct."<sup>32</sup>

In 1849 and again in 1850 Lopez organized expeditions which were broken up by American officials before they could accomplish their purpose. Undaunted by these failures, the third and last Lopez expedition, consisting of over four hundred men, mostly Americans, left New Orleans on August 3, 1851. Upon landing in Cuba, however, the tiny army was defeated by Spanish troops, Lopez and fifty of his followers were speedily executed and more than one hundred of the remaining prisoners were condemned to penal servitude. The severity of the punishment was doubtless designed to discourage these perennial descents upon the island.<sup>33</sup>

When the news of the executions reached New Orleans the excitement was intense. A mob rose up and wrecked the Spanish Consulate and destroyed the property of Spanish residents. In Spain there was much talk of dismissing the American envoy and of declaring war. It was fortunate that the Whigs, less aggressively expansionist than the Democrats, were in power. Secretary Webster acknowledged the wrong and promised the necessary apologies. His conciliatory attitude pacified Spain to the

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<sup>32</sup> Richardson, *op. cit.*, v. 7.

<sup>33</sup> H. Ex. Doc. 2, 32 Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1-7.

extent that the Queen, as an act of grace, pardoned the American survivors of the Lopez expedition. Congress in turn voted \$25,000 as compensation for the damage done to Spanish property by the New Orleans mob, and the dangerous situation was peacefully settled.<sup>34</sup>

During this crucial moment, the British and French representatives at Washington notified our Government that orders had been issued to their West Indian squadrons to repel by force any attempts at the invasion of Cuba from any quarter. They were warned that such action would be regarded by the United States with grave disapproval, "as involving on the part of European sovereigns combined action of protectorship over American waters."<sup>35</sup> Fortunately, Lopez's failure prevented serious international complications.

In 1852 these two Powers, at Spain's instigation, proposed that the United States join them in a tripartite convention by which Cuba would be guaranteed to Spain.<sup>36</sup> Secretary Webster replied that the United States had no design upon Cuba and that as long as Spain refrained from a voluntary cession of the island to any other European Power she might rely on the friendship of the United States to assist her in the defense and preservation of that island, but that the Government of the United States could not be expected to acquiesce in the cession of Cuba to any other European power. Webster declined to sign the convention proposed, however, on the ground that the policy of the United States uniformly had been to avoid, as far as possible, alliances or agreements

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<sup>34</sup> H. Ex. Doc. 1, 32 Cong., 1st sess., p. 27.

<sup>35</sup> Curtis, Life of Webster, II, 551, quoted by Latane, op. cit., p. 237.

<sup>36</sup> Senate Executive Document, 13, 32 Cong., 2nd sess., p. 3.

with other states, and to keep itself free from national obligations, except such as affect directly the interests of the United States themselves.<sup>37</sup>

With the growth of the slavery conflict in the United States, which had now become paramount to all other questions, the annexation of Cuba had become a party issue, and the return of the Democratic party to power in 1853 was hailed by Southern extremists as a signal for the acquisition of the island. In his inaugural address, President Pierce stated: "The policy of my Administration will not be controlled by any timid forebodings of evil from expansion."<sup>38</sup> For the critical position of Spanish Minister, Pierce chose Pierre Soule, a naturalized American exiled from France for his unrestrained republicanism. His views on the Cuban question were well known to be of a radical character.

Secretary of State Marcy's instructions to Soule emphasized the importance of our relations with Spain in view of the rumors of contemplated changes in the internal affairs of Cuba. Soule was warned to do nothing to disturb the island's present connection with Spain, unless the character of that connection should be so changed as to affect our security. Marcy stated that while the United States would resist at every hazard the transference of Cuba to any European nation, they would exceedingly regret to see Spain resorting to aid from any other power to uphold her rule over it, for "Such a dependence on foreign aid would, in effect, invest the auxiliary with the character of a

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>38</sup> Richardson, op. cit., V, 198-199.

protector, and give it a pretext to interfere in our affairs, and also generally in those of the North American continent." He concluded that while the United States would favor the voluntary separation of Cuba from Spain, the time was not auspicious to negotiate for the purchase of the island and instructed Soule to enter negotiations for a commercial treaty with Spain favorable to our trade with Cuba.<sup>39</sup> The beginnings of Soule's mission were singularly inauspicious. The attitude of his diplomatic colleagues was unfriendly, and he found that Calderon, the head of the Spanish Cabinet, was strongly opposed to any commercial treaty or agreement which would promote any intercourse between the United States and the dependencies of Spain.<sup>40</sup>

In the meantime, the Black Warrior affair had strained the relations of the two countries almost to the point of rupture. As a result of the Lopez expeditions the Spanish officials in Cuba developed a bitterness toward the United States that was reflected in the offensive enforcement of shipping regulations. A long series of vexatious incidents culminated in the seizure, on February 28, 1854, of an American steamer, the Black Warrior.<sup>41</sup> The incident roused a wave of indignation throughout the United States. President Pierce, influenced by the strong southern element in his cabinet, submitted a special message to Congress in which he announced that satisfaction proportionate to the magnitude of the offense would be secured.<sup>42</sup> Soule was directed to

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<sup>39</sup> H. Ex. Doc. 93. 33 Cong., 2nd sess., p. 3.

<sup>40</sup> Latane, *op. cit.*, pp. 241-242.

<sup>41</sup> Bemis, *op. cit.*, VI, 188.

<sup>42</sup> Richardson, *op. cit.*, V, 234-235.



demand of the Spanish Government a prompt disavowal of the act and the payment of an indemnity of \$30,000 to the owners of the vessel. On April 8 Soule presented the formal request on the part of his government; three days later the impetuous minister repeated his demands in the form of a virtual ultimatum. Calderon replied that the peremptory tone of Soule's note suggested "an incomprehensible pretext for exciting estrangement, if not a quarrel, between two friendly powers."<sup>43</sup>

The British and French governments sympathized with Spain in the Black Warrior crisis, but they had their own hands full with the Crimean War. Although this European misfortune strengthened the United States diplomatically, Spain had one powerful and unexpected ally within the United States--slavery. War with Spain over Cuba at this time would have alienated the Northern wing of the Democratic party and hopelessly disunited the entire country. Meanwhile the aspects of the case were altogether changed by a private agreement between the Havana officials and the owners of the Black Warrior. But the affair continued to be a diplomatic problem between Soule and Calderon for several months.<sup>44</sup>

Though unprepared to go to war with Spain, the Pierce administration thought the time opportune to reopen negotiations for the purchase of Cuba. On April 3, 1854, Secretary Marcy directed Soule to make a determined effort in this direction, authorizing him to offer a maximum sum of \$130,000,000 for the island. If Spain proved unwilling to accept this magnanimous offer, Soule was told to direct his efforts to the next most desirable object, "to detach that island from the Spanish

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<sup>43</sup> H. Ex. Doc. 93, 33 Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 70-73.

<sup>44</sup> Latane, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

dominion and from all dependence on any European power."<sup>45</sup>

Two weeks later Marcy sent additional instructions to Soule which were apparently prompted in part by the fear that the blacks might seize control of Cuba and in part by the preoccupation of the powers with the Crimean War. He suggested that Soule arrange a conference with James Buchanan and John Y. Mason, the American Ministers to England and France respectively. The three envoys were to discuss the Cuban situation and report their conclusions in a dispatch to the Department of State.<sup>46</sup>

The ministerial trio met at Ostend, Belgium, in October, 1854. Apparently desiring greater privacy, they left Ostend for Aix-la-Chapelle in Rhenish Prussia where they completed their work. The recommendations of the three ministers were embodied in a memorable diplomatic dispatch to Marcy subsequently known as the Ostend Manifesto. After recommending that an immediate effort be made to purchase Cuba for a price not to exceed \$120,000,000, the ministers then proceeded far beyond the scope of their instructions to discuss what should be done if Spain refused to sell:

Our past history forbids that we should acquire the Island of Cuba without the consent of Spain, unless justified by the great law of self-preservation....

After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to consider the question, does Cuba, in the possession of Spain, seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union?

Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting

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<sup>45</sup> H. Ex. Doc. 93, 33 Cong., 2nd sess., p. 24.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 124.

it from Spain if we possess the power; and this upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home.<sup>47</sup>

The semitransparent machinations of the three ministers excited much hostile comment in Europe and in antislavery and anti-Democratic newspapers in the United States. After prolonged Cabinet discussions the perturbed Marcy framed a reply in which he refused to accept the suggestions of his agents.<sup>48</sup> Soule regarded this dispatch as a personal repudiation, and declining "to linger here in languid impotence" he resigned his commission.<sup>49</sup>

It will be noted that the term Ostend Manifesto is a misnomer. In the first place the document was signed at Aix-la-Chapelle; and in the second place a manifesto is a public declaration of policy, while this so-called Manifesto was a confidential dispatch, drawn up in secrecy, which received the official cognizance of neither the American nor the Spanish governments.

The Cuban question figured conspicuously in the campaign of 1856. The Democratic platform was strongly in favor of acquisition, while the new Republican party stigmatized the Ostend Manifesto. The relations with Spain during Buchanan's administration, were, nevertheless, in a very uneasy condition. Although Buchanan continued to urge Congress to purchase Cuba, his appeals fell on deaf ears.<sup>50</sup> The Republicans wanted to pass the Homestead Act to open the West to white settlers.

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<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 129-131.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 134.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 135.

<sup>50</sup> Richardson, *op. cit.*, VI, 510, 535, 561.

while the Southern Democrats desired to obtain Cuba to open new land for slave owners. Neither would agree to the gratification of the aspirations of the other. While the Cuban question remained at this impasse, serious domestic conditions within the United States--the Civil War, knotty reconstruction problems and amazing internal expansion--completely overshadowed all foreign issues. By the time America was again ready to look outward, the United States was no longer interested in slave territory and the completion of the transcontinental railroad had decreased the pressure for an Isthmian Canal, so agitation for the annexation of Cuba declined for a time.<sup>51</sup>

The Spanish Revolution of September, 1868, was the signal for the uprising of the native or Creole party against the Spanish authorities or Peninsulars in Cuba--an uprising which resulted in ten years of desultory warfare. The Cubans hoped to effect the complete separation from Spain either through their own efforts or with assistance from the United States. From the outbreak of the insurrection the Cuban patriots had the sympathy of the great mass of the American people and that of the Administration, although Secretary of State Hamilton Fish kept the latter within the bounds of public laws, so as to avoid giving offense to Spain. The Government did all that treaty obligations demanded of it to prevent the violation of the neutrality laws; numerous filibustering expeditions, however, did escape from American ports, and those that were arrested usually were acquitted for want of evidence.<sup>52</sup> At an early stage of the contest Spanish authorities conceived it to be

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<sup>51</sup> Latane, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 260.

necessary to issue certain decrees contrary to public law, and, in so far as they affected citizens of the United States, in violation of treaty obligations. The situation became worse when American property was destroyed in Cuba and American citizens (mostly of Cuban birth) were shot or imprisoned.<sup>53</sup>

President Grant determined at the beginning of his administration to offer the good offices of the United States for the purpose of bringing to a close the civil war ravaging the Island of Cuba. The Spanish Government was willing to accept the mediation of the United States but only with the inclusion of certain important modifications with which the insurgents could not be expected to comply. Spain insisted that it was beneath the dignity of the mother country to treat with the insurgents while they were in arms and that whatever agreement was arrived at must be in the nature of a voluntary concession on the part of Spain and not as a treaty between armed powers.<sup>54</sup>

Upon the failure of the American plan, General Sickles, our Spanish Minister, emphasized the necessity for the abolition of slavery in Cuba. After the Civil War the United States was as strenuous in its efforts to effect the emancipation of slaves in Cuba as it had been before the war to prevent that measure. As early as 1866 Seward had urged upon the Spanish Government the propriety of speedy emancipation in Cuba, hinting of the possibility of a combined movement of the South American republics against Cuba with that purpose in view.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> S. Ex. Doc. 7, 41 Cong., 2nd sess., p. 1.

<sup>54</sup> H. Ex. Doc. 160, 41 Cong., 2nd sess., quoted by Latane, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-256.

<sup>55</sup> S. Ex. Doc. 113, 41 Cong., 2nd sess., p. 18.

Throughout these negotiations the Spanish Government insisted that emancipation was a part of the liberal program for reform that would be extended to Cuba as soon as the insurrection could be suppressed. But the Spanish Government refused to enter into any definite engagement on the subject. Indeed, Spain could hardly take definite action, for while the United States and Great Britain were urging the immediate abolition of slavery, the most influential upholders of Spanish rule in Cuba were the slaveholders themselves.<sup>56</sup>

When news of the tendering of the good offices by President Grant got out, the press accepted it as indicating the purpose of the United States to recognize the Cubans as belligerents if his offer of mediation were refused. And indeed many Americans favored recognizing the belligerency of the insurgents, even though such a step would probably result in war with Spain. Personally General Grant was disposed to grant the Cubans belligerency rights, but his judgement was overruled by Secretary Fish. Grant, therefore, sent a message to Congress, June 13, 1870, to the effect that the facts did not justify the recognition of a state of war in Cuba, and that therefore strict neutrality should be maintained.<sup>57</sup> The conclusion of an agreement the next year whereby claims of American citizens against the Spanish authorities in Cuba were settled took away all our pressing grievances against Spain, and for more than two years our diplomatic relations were on a comparatively friendly basis.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., pp. 20-21.

<sup>57</sup> Richardson, op. cit., VII, 64-69.

<sup>58</sup> William M. Malloy, Treaties...., III, 1661.

Unfortunately, however, such happy relations did not long continue. On October 31, 1873, the steamer Virginus, owned by Cubans but flying the American flag, was captured on the high seas by a Spanish war vessel. The passengers and crew were taken to Santiago, Cuba, where, after hasty court-martial, fifty-three of them were executed as pirates, among them a number of Americans and Englishmen.<sup>59</sup> This insult to the American flag caused a great outburst of national anger, and indignation meetings were held throughout the United States. There were, however, certain factors in America which made for peace--the horrors of the Civil War were still fresh; the United States had no pressing desire to annex Cuba; internal problems absorbed American energy; and the decrepit navy was in a pitiable condition. Secretary Fish at first dispatched a virtual ultimatum to Spain for the restoration of the Virginus, the surrender of the survivors, the salute of the United States flag and the punishment of the guilty officials.<sup>60</sup> But he later moderated his demands and made adjustments with the Spanish Minister in Washington, whereby both countries were to investigate the conditions involved in the Virginus affair.<sup>61</sup> The decision by the Attorney-General of the United States that "the Virginus, at the time of her capture, was without right and improperly carrying the American flag,"<sup>62</sup> did much to quiet public agitation for the restitution of our national honor. The crisis was eventually settled when Spain paid to the United States an

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<sup>59</sup> Foreign Relations, 1874-1875, I, 922.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., p. 928.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 987.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 1113.

indemnity of \$80,000 for the families of the executed Americans.<sup>63</sup>

With the settlement of the Virginian reclamations the United States addressed itself once more to the task of forcing a settlement of the Cuban question in general. In his instructions to Minister Cushing, Secretary Fish stated, "Withal the President cannot but regard independence, and emancipation, of course, as the only certain, and even the necessary solution of the question of Cuba."<sup>64</sup> After the elapse of nearly two years, the Grant administration determined, in view of the unchanged condition of the Cuban struggle, to bring matters to an issue and to force the hand of Spain. On November 5, 1875, Secretary Fish informed Cushing, "The time is at hand when it may be the duty of other governments to intervene, solely with a view of bringing to an end a disastrous and destructive conflict and of restoring peace in the island of Cuba."<sup>65</sup> In the course of a few days copies of this note were sent to our representatives throughout Europe with instructions to seek the intervention of the powers with Spain in the interests of terminating the state of affairs existing in Cuba.

The success of this move depended upon the attitude of the British Government. If Great Britain cooperated with the United States, Spain would be forced to whatever terms the two governments might dictate. But if Great Britain refused to cooperate, Spain would conclude that she had the sympathy of all European powers and would resist any foreign intervention in the Cuban conflict. The reply of Lord Derby to our

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 990.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., p. 859.

<sup>65</sup> Moore, op. cit., VI, 91.



suggestion for intervention stated in substance that he was convinced that Spain would not listen to mediation and the British Government was not prepared to bring pressure upon her in case she refused. The answers from the other powers were equally unsatisfactory and evasive.<sup>66</sup>

The substance of Fish's note threatening intervention attracted such attention in Europe and America that the House of Representatives called for whatever correspondence had taken place with foreign powers in regard to Cuba. Efforts by Fish to evade the issue reveal that he was trying to shield either the administration or himself and did not wish the American public to know that he had reversed the time-honored policy of the State Department by appealing to the powers of Europe to intervene in what had been treated, from the days of John Quincy Adams, as a purely American question.<sup>67</sup>

The Cuban struggle continued for two years longer. Finally, in February, 1878, the insurrectionists were suppressed and the terms of pacification were made known. They embraced representation for Cuba in the Spanish Cortes and amnesty for political offenses. The powers of the Captain-General, however, the most objectionable feature of the Spanish rule, continued uncurtailed. That the termination of hostilities did not completely rectify the unhappy relations between the United States and Spanish authorities in Cuba is evidenced by President Cleveland's message to Congress on December 3, 1894, in which he stated that unreasonable fines imposed by Spain on the vessels and commerce of the United States had demanded from time to time the "earnest

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid., pp. 100-102.

<sup>67</sup> S. Ex. Doc. 213, 54 Cong., 1st sess., p. 1.

remonstrance on the part of our government" and that "no satisfactory settlement of these vexatious questions" had yet been reached.<sup>68</sup>

Peace had been restored in Cuba in 1878 as a result of the exhaustion of both forces and the promise of definite reforms by Spain. But the promised reforms were not carried out in good faith, and the old policy of exploitation was continued. In February, 1895, therefore, a new, and the last, insurrection against Spanish rule on the island began, which soon developed the same features that made the "Ten Years' War" so objectionable. The policy of Maximo Gomez, the insurrectionary chief, was to fight no pitched battles but to keep up incessant skirmishes, to devastate the country and to destroy every possible source of revenue, with the end in view of either exhausting Spain or forcing the intervention of the United States. All laborers who continued to work on plantations or in sugar factories were considered traitors to their country and were to be shot.<sup>69</sup> General Weyler, Governor and Captain-General of Cuba, soon retaliated by inaugurating a "reconcentration" policy whereby all inhabitants were directed to stay in the towns occupied by Spanish troops. Any individual found outside these towns was considered a rebel and tried as such.<sup>70</sup>

The United States was not a disinterested spectator to the execution of policies which paralyzed the industries of Cuba and destroyed its commerce, for American citizens owned at least \$50,000,000 of property on the island.<sup>71</sup> Aside from these special pecuniary considera-

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<sup>68</sup> Richardson, *op. cit.*, IX, 529-530.

<sup>69</sup> *S. Doc.* 25, 58 Cong., 2nd sess., p. 125.

<sup>70</sup> *For. Rel.*, 1898, p. 739.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 1896, LXXX.

tions the American people as a whole felt a traditional interest in the Cubans and in the struggles of the Latin-American races for freedom. From the beginning of the insurrection the authorities in Washington were seriously embarrassed by numbers of Cubans who had sought naturalization in the United States, only to return to their native isle and there to claim a privileged status under the protection of the American government.<sup>72</sup> Other Cubans worked out their revolutionary schemes on American soil and furnished the insurrectionists with military supplies.

In order to meet this situation President Cleveland issued a proclamation, June 12, 1895, in which he warned all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States against taking part in the insurrection against the established government of Spain by doing any of the acts prohibited by American neutrality laws.<sup>73</sup> Notwithstanding this proclamation, illegal expeditions were constantly being fitted out in the United States by Cuban agents, and while a great majority of them were stopped by port officials, a number did succeed in reaching Cuba.<sup>74</sup> Cleveland's proclamation recognized insurgency as a status distinct from belligerency. It merely put into effect municipal statutes instead of bringing into operation the rules of neutrality under international law. Such a result, he considered, could be brought about only by the recognition of the Cubans as belligerents, which the President consistently refused to do.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Compilation of Reports, VII, 581-585.

<sup>73</sup> Richardson, op. cit., IX, 591.

<sup>74</sup> Moore, op. cit., VII, 1024.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., I, 242-243.

Meanwhile, Cleveland was following another line of action. Secretary of State Olney addressed a note to the Spanish Minister reiterating the predominating interests of the Americans in Cuba and offering the good offices of the United States to pacify the two warring factions by securing the rights of local self-government for the Cubans while leaving Spain her rights of sovereignty on the island.<sup>76</sup> The Spanish Minister rejected Olney's offer, however, by claiming that Cuba already enjoyed "one of the most liberal political systems in the world."<sup>77</sup>

In his last message to Congress, President Cleveland discussed the Cuban situation at length. After rejecting as inexpedient the recognition of either belligerency or independence, and holding the purchase of the island to be impracticable, he prophetically declared:

When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurgents has become manifest and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its reestablishment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge.<sup>78</sup>

The McKinley administration, which began March 4, 1897, was not long in addressing itself to the task of securing peace and independence for Cuba. Unfortunately, at this critical juncture a political maneuver placed the management of the State Department in the feeble

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<sup>76</sup> Robert McElroy, Grover Cleveland, II, 249-250, quoted by Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy, p. 65.

<sup>77</sup> For. Rel., 1897, p. 544.

<sup>78</sup> Richardson, op. cit., IX, 722.

hands of the seventy-four year old John Sherman, whose mind was beginning to show old-age weaknesses, and in spite of the fact that he had in Judge William R. Day a very able assistant, the conduct of the department was far from satisfactory. The attitude of the new administration was first communicated to Spain in a note which protested in the name of humanity and the interests of the United States the decrees and acts of General Weyler.<sup>79</sup> The instructions to General Stewart L. Woodford, the newly appointed Minister to Spain, stated, "It may not be reasonably asked or expected that a policy of mere inaction can be safely prolonged."<sup>80</sup>

Meanwhile General Woodford, on his way to Madrid, conferred with the American ambassadors to Great Britain, France, and Germany. He reported to the State Department that he believed that most Europeans regarded Cuba as within the legitimate zone of American influence and would not resent any action by the United States "to protect our great interests in Cuba so long as we do not contravene the law of nations."<sup>81</sup>

On September 23, 1897, General Woodford presented a note to the Spanish Government tendering the good offices of the United States in the adjustment of Cuban affairs, presumably on a basis of independence, and requested an early answer.<sup>82</sup> As a result of the crisis thus forced upon it the Spanish Ministry resigned, and the liberal government of Sagasta ultimately took office. This Cabinet proposed to put into

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<sup>79</sup> For. Rel., 1897, p. 507.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 1898, p. 558-561.

<sup>81</sup> D. S., from Spain, Vol. 131, quoted by Dennis, op. cit., p. 67.

<sup>82</sup> For. Rel., 1898, p. 568.

effect more liberal measures for Cuba though military pressure continued. General Weyler was removed as Captain-General of Cuba, the reconcentration methods were modified and decrees were published in Madrid, on November 27, granting a moderate degree of autonomy to Cuba and guaranteeing to the islanders all rights enjoyed by Spaniards at home.<sup>83</sup>

It was soon evident that the grant of autonomy had come too late. The Cubans now spurned any concessions short of independence. In January, 1896, riots broke out anew in Havana. The American Consul-General to Cuba, Fitchugh Lee, had earlier suggested to the State Department that a naval force be stationed at Key West from which warships could be speedily sent to protect American life and property should the need arise. Upon the occasion of the riots of January 13, Lee telegraphed that "ships may be necessary later but not now." Soon thereafter he received a dispatch to the effect that the Maine was being sent to Havana for the purpose of "resuming friendly naval visits at Cuban ports." Lee at once advised the postponement of the visit to give the last excitement more time to disappear. Unfortunately his dispatch arrived too late, for the Maine had already sailed for Havana, where she arrived January 25 without any demonstration on the part of the populace.<sup>84</sup>

While the Maine lay at anchor in Havana harbor, a sensational revelation occurred in the United States. Enrique de Lome, the Spanish Minister in Washington, had written an indiscreet private letter which fell into the hands of Randolph Hearst. It was printed on February 9,

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid., pp. 616-644.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., p. 1025.

1898, in his New York Journal. The letter not only revealed bad faith in de Lome's dealing with the United States on commercial matters but included a most unflattering commentary on the President:

It once more shows what McKinley is, weak and a bidder for the admiration of the crowd, besides being a would-be politician who tries to leave a door open behind him while keeping on good terms with the jingoes of his party.<sup>85</sup>

The Spanish government made what amends it could by accepting the unhappy minister's resignation before the demand for his recall could be presented. The matter soon became, diplomatically at least, a closed incident, but the public mind, already inflamed, was slow to forget.<sup>86</sup>

Before the excitement of the de Lome incident had subsided, the whole world was startled by the news of the catastrophe that befell the Maine in Havana harbor. On February 15, at 9:40 P.M., an explosion utterly wrecked the battleship and killed two hundred and sixty of her crew.<sup>87</sup> Although our officials in Cuba urged that the American people suspend judgement until an investigation could be made, the yellow journals flooded the country with "war-extras" and gave additional stimulus to jingoism. Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, wrote, "I would give anything if President McKinley would order the fleet to Havana tomorrow."<sup>88</sup> Responding to the wave of hysteria sweeping the country, Congress unanimously voted \$50,000,000

<sup>85</sup> Moore, op. cit., VI, 176.

<sup>86</sup> For. Rel., 1898, pp. 1007-1020.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., p. 1029.

<sup>88</sup> Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress, quoted by Bailey, op. cit., p. 502.

for war preparations.<sup>89</sup> This gesture, together with other military and naval activity, strengthened the determination of the Cubans to hold on and aroused strong doubts in the Spanish mind as to the sincerity of American professions of peace.

On March 21, an American Naval Court of Inquiry reported that the Maine was destroyed by an external explosion caused by a submarine mine, but the court was able to obtain no evidence to indicate the responsibility for the accident.<sup>90</sup> A Spanish board of inquiry made a report the next day stating their conclusion that the destruction of the ship was caused by an internal explosion in the forward magazine.<sup>91</sup> The real responsibility for the explosion was never determined, but it is hard to believe that the Spanish government either plotted or countenanced the destruction of the Maine. Irresponsible Spanish loyalists may have taken matters in their own hands, or Cuban insurgents may have perpetrated the deed themselves to bring the United States to their aid. Despite the lack of positive evidence for any such decision, the lid was now off. To the unthinking masses the report by our naval court meant that Spain had deliberately blown up the ship. The slogan of the hour became: "Remember the Maine!"

The McKinley administration was essentially a businessman's administration, and big business except for the relatively small group who had investments in Cuba was solidly opposed to war. Consequently, the President still attempted to seek a peaceful solution to the critical

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<sup>89</sup> Statutes at Large, XXX, 274.

<sup>90</sup> For. Rel., 1898, pp. 1042-1043.

<sup>91</sup> S. Com. on For. Rel., op. cit., VII, 900.



situation. On March 29, General Woodford presented the following outspoken ultimatum to Spain:

The President instructs me to say that we do not want Cuba. He also instructs me to say, with equal clearness, that we do wish immediate peace in Cuba. He suggests an armistice, lasting until October 1, negotiations in the meantime being had looking to peace between Spain and the insurgents, through the friendly offices of the President of the United States.<sup>92</sup>

The Spanish Ministry was in a precarious position indeed--if it yielded too much it faced revolution at home; if too little, war with the United States abroad. As usual, it vacillated. Although proposing submission of the Maine question to arbitration, it agreed to grant an armistice to the Cubans only if they ask for it--which they patently would not do. In transmitting these proposals to his government General Woodford, who was earnestly striving to avoid war, said that they did not mean peace but a "continuation of this destructive, cruel, and now needless war." But he reported that the Ministry had gone as far as it could, for, "I am told confidentially that the offer of an armistice by the Spanish Government would cause revolution here."<sup>93</sup>

While these lengthy negotiations were going on in Spain, public feeling in America was at the highest pitch of excitement. The "yellow" press was clamoring for war, and Congress was now so completely dominated by public opinion that a reference of the question to that group would mean war. Nevertheless, after the rejection of his ultimatum, McKinley reluctantly decided to shift the responsibility to Congress.<sup>94</sup>

Meanwhile, Archbishop Ireland had come to Washington at the

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<sup>92</sup> For. Rel., 1898, pp. 711-713, 718-724.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., p. 727.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., pp. 732-733.

direction of the Pope to work for peace. The Spanish Government expressed itself as willing to grant a suspension of hostilities at the request of the Pope, provided the truce should be accompanied by the withdrawal of the American squadron from Cuban waters.<sup>95</sup> Wednesday, April 6, arrived with no word from Spain that hostilities had been suspended. On that day, however, the representatives of Great Britain, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy made a formal appeal to the United States for peace.<sup>96</sup>

The President at this point suddenly decided to withhold his message to Congress until the following Monday, not because of the representations of the Powers as was supposed by some at the time, nor in the hope that Spain would make concessions, but as a result of a telegram from General Lee, who urged that he be given that much time to get Americans safely out of Havana.<sup>97</sup>

On Saturday, April 9, the Spanish Foreign Minister notified Woodford that the Spanish Government "directs the general-in-chief of the army in Cuba to grant immediately a suspension of hostilities for such length of time as he may think prudent to prepare and facilitate the peace earnestly desired by all."<sup>98</sup> And the next day the Spanish Minister at Washington informed the Secretary of State that the Queen had yielded to the wishes of the Pope and had directed General Blanco to suspend hostilities; that after May 4, the date on which the Cuban

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<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 732.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 740.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 743.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 746.

parliament was to convene, the Cubans would have all the liberty they could expect.<sup>99</sup>

Woodford then optimistically cabled to McKinley:

In view of action of Spanish Government....I hope that you can obtain full authority from Congress to do whatever you shall deem necessary to secure immediate and permanent peace in Cuba by negotiations, including the full power to employ the army and navy, according to your own judgement, to aid and enforce your action. If this be secured I believe you will get final settlement before August 1 on one of the following bases: either such autonomy as the insurgents may agree to accept, or recognition by Spain of the independence of the island, or cession of the island to the United States.

I hope that nothing will now be done to humiliate Spain, as I am satisfied that the present Government is going, and is loyally ready to go, as fast and as far as it can. With your power of action sufficiently free you will win the fight on your own lines.<sup>100</sup>

The issue was now in the hands of the President. There can be no doubt that the kindly McKinley abhorred the thought of war. But Spain had pursued such a tortuous course that our leaders had little faith in her promises or in her ability to carry such promises out even if they were sincerely made. The tidal waves of sentiment in America would not wait. McKinley was an able politician and was by no means blind to political considerations. If he tried to thwart the popular will he would undoubtedly jeopardize his chances for reelection in 1900. Lashed by the yellow press, Congress responded to the clamor of the masses. The Republicans feared that if they did not give the country the war it wanted they would be unseated by the Democrats in the approaching fall elections. Overborne by this tremendous pressure, McKinley made a momentous decision. On April 11,

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<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 747-749.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 747.

1898, two days after the Spanish capitulation, he sent his famous war message to Congress:

The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop.

In view of these facts and of these considerations I ask the Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes.<sup>101</sup>

With an hysterical Congress clamoring for war, McKinley's request for authority to use warlike measures needed no urging. But the two Houses were in conflict over the question of recognition of the "Cuban republic." After a week of debate Congress passed a fateful joint resolution that was tantamount to a declaration of war:

First, That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

Second, That it is the duty of the United States, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuban waters.

Third, That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States....to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

Fourth, That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished,

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<sup>101</sup> Richardson, *op. cit.*, X, 1473.

to leave the government and control of the island to its people.<sup>102</sup>

This last stipulation, the so-called Teller Amendment, was approved without dissent and gave the war the appearance of altruism. However, American sugar interests, who wanted Cuba to remain outside the tariff wall, may have unduly influenced the opposition to annexation. This decision to rule out cession to the United States as a solution to the problem put an end to the century-old dream held by many of our statesmen for annexing Cuba.

As soon as these resolutions were approved by the President, on April 20, the Spanish Minister asked for his passports, thus severing diplomatic relations between the two countries. Woodford, our Minister to Spain, left Madrid the following day. An act of Congress, approved April 25, declared that a state of war had existed between the United States and Spain since April 21, 1898.<sup>103</sup>

The pressure for peace on the part of European influences had been strong. The Continental European Powers were virtually unanimous in viewing with various shades of disapproval what seemed to them a war of unprovoked aggression against Spain. They were motivated in large part by dynastic sympathies, concern for investments in Spain and Cuba, distrust of American democracy and her commercial expansion and solicitude for the monarchical principle. Moreover, the European powers did not relish the prospect of America's strengthening both herself and the Monroe Doctrine by elbowing Spain out of the Western Hemisphere. Germany, France and Austria-Hungary appear to have favored effective

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<sup>102</sup> Statutes at Large, XIX, 738.

<sup>103</sup> For. Rel., 1898, pp. 764-769.

mediation or intervention, but none of these three powers was willing to assume the responsibility for leading such a movement, for the United States was by this time too powerful to be lightly offended.<sup>104</sup>

Great Britain, alone among the powers of Europe, was conspicuously friendly to the United States during the crisis with Spain. The might of an ominous rising Germany to say nothing of other European complications, had awakened British statesmen to the dangers of "splendid isolation" and the necessity of finding allies. A powerful young America, formerly a poor relation, was now decidedly worth cultivating. Although Great Britain adhered to the strict letter of her neutral obligations throughout the war, there could be no doubt as to where her sympathies lay.<sup>105</sup>

The Spanish-American War, though short, provided more than its measure of thrills. The American people embarked on this war with enthusiasm, eager to test their national strength. Every movement of army and navy was closely watched, and the public was almost hourly informed by the newspapers of what was going on. A tiny, ill-equipped American army blundered into Cuba, where Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, who had resigned from the Navy Department, won enormous publicity by his spectacular antics with the volunteer "Rough Riders." The Spanish fleet, which had scurried into the harbor of Santiago, Cuba, steamed out to save the honor of Spain and was completely destroyed by the American navy. The war, however, revealed many serious defects in our military system, especially in the quartermaster and medical

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<sup>104</sup> State Department Records, used as references by Bailey, *op. cit.*, pp. 512-513.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*

departments. Casualties resulting from "embalmed" beef and yellow fever far exceeded those in actual engagements with the Spaniards.

By the end of July, 1898, the American as well as the European press was beginning to ask why the war should not be brought to a close, a consumation earnestly desired by the business interests of both hemispheres. There was a still more cogent reason why Spain should sue for peace--the dispatch of American troops to the Philippines and to Porto Rico served to show that, although the war had been undertaken for the liberation of Cuba, the United States government did not feel obligated to confine its military operations to that island. Having met all the demands of honor, Spain asked the French government to authorize her Ambassador at Washington to arrange with the President of the United States the preliminary terms of peace.<sup>106</sup> On July 26, Ambassador Cambon presented to President McKinley a note in which the Spanish government frankly acknowledged the futility of further resistance and requested to know on what basis the Cuban question might be settled.<sup>107</sup>

In his reply President McKinley reviewed the causes of the war and outlined the following terms of peace: (1) the immediate evacuation of Cuba and the relinquishment of Spanish authority; (2) the cession of Porto Rico and one of the Ladroneas by way of indemnity; and (3) the occupation by the United States of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace.<sup>108</sup>

As the war presumably had been fought for Cuba, Spain endeavored

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<sup>106</sup> Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, p. 200, quoted by Latane, America as a World Power, p. 65.

<sup>107</sup> For. Rel., 1898, p. 819.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., p. 820.

to limit the negotiations so far as possible to the adjustment of the Cuban question, suggesting even that the money indemnity should be assessed on Cuba, in whose behalf the war had been waged.<sup>109</sup> But the formal protocol, drawn up by Secretary Day and presented to Spain as a virtual ultimatum, contained the same demands as those formerly stated. On August 12, Cambon signed the protocol on behalf of Spain. The document contained further provisions for the appointment within ten days of commissioners to arrange for the evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico; for the appointment of peace commissioners to meet in Paris not later than October 1; and for the immediate suspension of hostilities.<sup>110</sup>

Ever the astute politician, McKinley appointed the five American commissioners with an eye to placating the Senate. Three of them were members of that body--William P. Frye, Cushman K. Davis and George Gray, the only Democrat and anti-expansionist. Whitelaw Reid, the fourth member, was a prominent journalist and imperialist. The delegation was headed by William R. Day, who resigned as Secretary of State to act as chairman of the mission.<sup>111</sup>

The peace negotiations opened in Paris on October 1, 1898. Nearly a month was consumed in a discussion of the Cuban question, the difficulty being the arrangement of the Cuban debt. The Americans insisted that Spain should relinquish her sovereignty over Cuba. But the Spanish commissioners proposed that Spain should cede Cuba to the United States, to be transferred later to the Cuban people. Spain

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<sup>109</sup> Sp. Dipl. Corres. and Docs., p. 214, quoted by Latane, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

<sup>110</sup> For. Rel., 1898, p. 824.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., p. 831.



relinquishing and transferring all prerogatives, and "all charges and obligations of every kind in existence" to the United States. This was an effort to saddle on the United States the Cuban debt of \$400,000,000, the greater part of which had been incurred by Spanish authorities in trying to suppress the insurrection. The American commissioners refused to assume the burden of the so-called Cuban debt, either in behalf of the United States or of Cuba.<sup>112</sup> According to the terms of the treaty signed December 10, 1898:

Spain relinquishes all claims of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result from the facts of its occupation, for the protection of life and property.<sup>113</sup>

The President transmitted the Treaty of Paris to the Senate on January 4, 1899, together with the protocols and accompanying papers. For a month it was the main subject of senatorial debate and attracted the close attention of the entire country. A strong opposition to the treaty developed, and the debate took a wide range, involving a discussion of the fundamental principles underlying the American constitutional system. The treaty was finally approved by the Senate on February 6, 1899, by a vote of fifty-seven to twenty-seven.<sup>114</sup>

The United States had entered the war with Spain disclaiming any intention of annexing Cuba and had committed herself to a policy of assuring independence for the island. Although our expansionists may have deplored this altruistic resolution, the terms of the peace

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<sup>112</sup> *S. Doc.* 62, 55 Cong., 3rd sess., p. 15.

<sup>113</sup> Malloy, *op. cit.*, II, 1691-1692.

<sup>114</sup> *S. Journal*, 55 Cong., 3rd sess., p. 216.

arranged for its eventual fulfillment. However, conditions in Cuba were such that it was impossible to secure immediate self-government, so the Treaty of Paris provided for military occupation by the United States upon the evacuation of the island by Spain.

President McKinley stated the American policy in regard to Cuba in his message of December 5, 1898:

As soon as we are in possession of Cuba and have pacified the island it will be necessary to give aid and direction to its people to form a government for themselves. This should be undertaken at the earliest moment consistent with safety and assured success. It should be our duty to assist in every proper way to build up the waste places of the island, encourage the industry of the people, and assist them to form a government which shall be free and independent, thus realizing the best aspirations of the Cuban people....Neither revenge nor passion should have a place in the new government. Until there is complete tranquillity in the island and a stable government inaugurated military occupation will be continued.<sup>115</sup>

Reporting a year later on affairs in Cuba, McKinley stated:

All the administrative measures adopted in Cuba have aimed to fit it for a regenerated existence by enforcing the supremacy of law and justice; by placing wherever practicable the machinery of administration in the hands of the inhabitants; by instituting needed sanitary reforms; by spreading education; by fostering industry and trade; by inculcating public morality; and, in short, by taking every rational step to aid the Cuban people to attain to that plane of self-conscious respect and self-reliant unity which fits an enlightened community for self-government within its own sphere, while enabling it to fulfill all outward obligations.

This nation has assumed before the world a grave responsibility for the future good government of Cuba....The new Cuba yet to arise from the ashes of the past must needs be bound to us by ties of singular intimacy and strength if its enduring welfare is to be assured....Our mission, to accomplish which we took up the wages of battle, is not to be fulfilled by turning adrift any loosely framed commonwealth to face the vicissitudes which too often attend weaker states whose natural wealth and abundant resources are offset by the incongruities of their political organization and the recurring occasions for internal rivalries to

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<sup>115</sup> Richardson, X, 97-98.

sap their strength and dissipate their energies.<sup>116</sup>

On September 15, 1900, the first general election in Cuba was held, under the orders of the Military Governor, for the purpose of choosing delegates to a Constitutional Convention.<sup>117</sup> The resulting Convention, consisting of thirty-one delegates, assembled in Havana on November 5.<sup>118</sup> General Wood instructed the delegates, "It will be your duty, first to frame and adopt a constitution for Cuba, and, when that has been done, to formulate what, in your opinion, ought to be the relation between Cuba and the United States."<sup>119</sup> The Convention finally adopted a constitution for the republic of Cuba on February 21, 1901, which provided a form of government similar to those of the other American republics. The constitution also made provision for the recognition of public debts legitimately contracted by the insurgent government, but it was silent on the subject of future relations with the United States.<sup>120</sup>

Secretary of War Root subsequently instructed General Wood to insist upon the incorporation in the Cuban constitution of certain provisions considered by the Cabinet as necessary for future Cuban-American relations.<sup>121</sup> The delegates were unwilling to accept several of these proposals on the ground that they impaired the independence and sovereignty of the island, and that it was their duty to make Cuba "independent

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid., pp. 152-153.

<sup>117</sup> For. Rel., 1902, p. 358.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., 1900, xli.

<sup>119</sup> Root, op. cit., p. 195.

<sup>120</sup> Secretary of War, Annual Report, 1902, I, pt. 1, 84.

<sup>121</sup> Root, op. cit., p. 212.

of every other nation, the great and noble American nation included. 122

The United States was, however, master of the situation and had no intention of withdrawing from the island until this matter was satisfactorily adjusted. Meantime, the President was anxious to conclude the matter before the adjournment of Congress on March 4. A provision, known as the Platt Amendment, was therefore attached as a rider to the army appropriation bill of March 2, 1901, directing the President to leave the control of the island to its people as soon as a government should be established under a constitution which defined the future relations of Cuba with the United States as follows:

I. That the government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said island.

II. That the said government shall not assume or contract any public debt, to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of the island, after defraying the current expenses of the government shall be inadequate.

III. That the government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba.

IV. That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful rights acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected.

V. That the government of Cuba will execute, and as far as necessary extend, the plans already devised or other plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the island....

VI. That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereof being left to future adjustment of treaty.

VII. That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.

VIII. That by way of further assurance the government of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States.<sup>123</sup>

Despite the strong pressure from civil and military officials, the Platt Amendment was defeated in the Cuban Convention, on April 6, by a vote of twenty-four to two. A committee was sent to Washington to negotiate with Secretary Root for more lenient terms. They returned to Cuba hopeful that, as a price for acceptance of the American demands, advantageous commercial relations would be established between the two countries in the following year. The pressure of economic force was so powerful that acquiescence was inevitable. The Convention gave way on June 12, 1901, and the Platt Amendment was accepted as an appendix to the Cuban Constitution. This action served for all practical purposes to make Cuba a virtual protectorate of the United States.<sup>124</sup>

The last act of the Convention was the provision for a general election to be held December 31, 1901, which resulted in the choosing of Tomas Estrada Palma as president of the new republic.<sup>125</sup> Secretary Root then instructed General Wood "to provide for the inauguration.... of the government elected by the people of Cuba; and upon the

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<sup>123</sup> Statutes at Large, XXXI, 897-898.

<sup>124</sup> Root, op. cit., p. 219.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

establishment of said government to leave the government and control of the island of Cuba to its people.<sup>126</sup> The new Cuban government entered on its "independent" career, at which time the American occupation of the island officially ended.<sup>127</sup>

Although the United States had yielded "to the demands of humanity" when it entered the war with Spain for the avowed purpose of securing the blessings of liberty and independence for Cuba, its altruism did not extend to the peaceful settlement of that conflict. When the Spanish Government requested the terms by which the United States would be willing to terminate hostilities, Secretary Day included in his reply:

The President, desirous of exhibiting signal generosity, will not now put forth any demand for pecuniary indemnity. Nevertheless, he cannot be insensible to the losses and expenses of the United States incident to the war, or to the claims of our citizens for injuries to their persons and property during the late insurrection in Cuba. He must therefore require the cession to the United States, and the evacuation by Spain of the islands of Puerto Rico and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladroneas to be selected by the United States....On similar grounds the United States is entitled to occupy, and will hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines.<sup>128</sup>

## 2. Porto Rico

The fourth largest island in the West Indies, Porto Rico, with an area of about thirty-six hundred square miles and a populace largely comprised of mestizos and negroes, had remained loyal to the Spanish homeland during the revolts of her other American colonies for virtually the same reasons that had kept Cuba bound to Spain for nearly a

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<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., pp. 221-222.

<sup>128</sup> For. Rel., 1895, p. 820.

century after the other Latin American states had set up independent republics. The United States had long eyed the tiny island as a desirable acquisition but considered it of secondary importance to Cuba. The same conditions which prevailed to keep Cuba from falling under the Manifest Destiny of the expanding Union safeguarded Porto Rico to Spain.

William H. Seward, Secretary of State in 1861, voiced the American desire for the island when he said that the United States "have constantly indulged the belief that they might hope at some day to acquire those islands (Cuba and Porto Rico) by just and lawful means, with the consent of their sovereign."<sup>129</sup>

After the outbreak of hostilities with Spain, 1898, Admiral Sampson bombarded San Juan, the principal city of Porto Rico. Upon the surrender of Santiago, Cuba, in July, General Miles with a force of some three thousand men invaded the island. But the peace protocol, signed August 12, suspended hostilities before the conquest of Porto Rico was completed.<sup>130</sup>

The terms by which the United States was willing to make peace were transmitted to Spain on July 30, only a few days after General Miles landed on Porto Rico. One of the conditions, as already stated, was the cession of Porto Rico to the United States by way of indemnity.<sup>131</sup> Spain sought to limit the negotiations as far as possible to the adjustment of the Cuban question. She was especially anxious to retain Porto Rico, "the last memory of a glorious past," and asked that some other

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<sup>129</sup> Moore, *op. cit.*, I, 589.

<sup>130</sup> *Report of Major General Commanding the Army, 1898*, pp. 246-266, referred to by Latane, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

<sup>131</sup> *For. Rel.*, 1898, p. 820.

form of territorial compensation might be substituted.<sup>132</sup> But she capitulated to the American ultimatum and signed the peace protocol which provided for the immediate evacuation of the island.<sup>133</sup>

On October 18, Spain transferred her authority in Porto Rico to the United States.<sup>134</sup> This action was confirmed in the Treaty of Paris signed December 10, 1898, which further provided that "the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress."<sup>135</sup>

A military government established by the War Department controlled the island for eighteen months, which was then supplanted by an organic civil government, organized under the Foraker Act of April 12, 1900. Several features of this act made it plain that Congress had no immediate intention of incorporating the island fully within the territory of the United States, in the sense that the Constitution should extend over it or that its inhabitants should become entitled to the full privileges of citizens of the United States.<sup>136</sup> According to the terms of the Act, the inhabitants of the island were to be considered "citizens of Porto Rico, and as such entitled to the protection of the United States."<sup>137</sup>

Upon the question of including Porto Rico within the customs

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<sup>132</sup> Sp. Dipl. Correa. and Docs., p. 214, quoted by Latane, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

<sup>133</sup> For. Rel., 1898, p. 324.

<sup>134</sup> Moore, *op. cit.*, I, 313.

<sup>135</sup> Malloy, *op. cit.*, I, 1693.

<sup>136</sup> Root, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

<sup>137</sup> Statutes at Large, XXXI, 80.



boundary of the United States, a decision was not easily reached, although President McKinley in his message of 1899 urged that the islands be brought within the tariff limits at once.<sup>138</sup> The principal difficulty in Porto Rico was that its transfer from Spain had actually resulted in a decrease of prosperity. Prior to the war fully one-half its exports had gone to Spain, less than one-sixth to the United States. After its transfer to the United States, Spain erected tariff barriers against it; and at the same time the United States maintained its protection against its products. The result was a wall built around the industry of the island which prevented a return to prosperity.<sup>139</sup> But the beet-sugar and other protected interests were strongly arrayed against the president's proposal, and by the Foraker Act a special tariff, amounting to fifteen per cent of the Dingley rates, was imposed on all merchandise coming into the United States from Porto Rico and coming into Porto Rico from the United States.<sup>140</sup> By a compromise extorted by public opinion, this special tariff was not to continue after March 1, 1902, and the duties collected under it were to be paid into the Porto Rican treasury.<sup>141</sup> Congress thus held the view that Porto Rico was not a part of the United States within the meaning of the clause in the Constitution requiring that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Richardson, op. cit., X, 154.

<sup>139</sup> Root, op. cit., p. 170.

<sup>140</sup> Statutes at Large, XXXI, 77.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid., p. 78.

<sup>142</sup> Constitution of the United States, Sec. 8.

The Foraker Act also outlined a constitution for Porto Rico essentially different from any form of territorial government previously adopted by Congress. It provided for a governor and an executive council of eleven members, appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. The executive council consisted of the heads of the six administrative departments and five other persons; at least five members must be native Porto Ricans. The heads of departments had an unusual degree of authority, including the appointment of all subordinates in their respective departments.<sup>143</sup> This practically took the administration of affairs out of the hands of the people of the island. The legislative power was vested in an assembly of two houses: the executive council and a house of delegates elected biennially by the qualified voters of the island.<sup>144</sup> The judiciary was composed of a system of insular courts; the judges of the supreme court appointed by the president, those of the district courts by the governor.<sup>145</sup> Instead of a delegate to Congress, like the other territories of the United States, Porto Rico was allowed "a resident commissioner to Washington, who shall be entitled to official recognition as such by all the Departments."<sup>146</sup> On May 1, 1900, the government of Porto Rico was transferred to the civil authorities.<sup>147</sup>

Meanwhile the constitutionality of many of the acts adopted by

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<sup>143</sup> Statutes at Large, XXXI, 81.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., pp. 82-83.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., p. 84.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., p. 85.

<sup>147</sup> Root, op. cit., p. 177.

the President and Congress was hotly contested in the courts. Did the Constitution extend of its own force over newly acquired territory, or was an act of Congress necessary to extend it there? When Congress did act for such territory, was it bound by the limitations imposed by the Constitution upon its powers? Although many Democrats declared that the Constitution must automatically follow the flag, McKinley's administration took the view that the Constitution did not apply to newly acquired territory unless extended there by Congress; consequently the collection of duties on goods imported from Porto Rico continued. A number of cases involving these questions in their various phases, and known as the "Insular Cases," were carried to the Supreme Court in 1900, and decided May 27, 1901. In the case of De Lima vs. Bidwell the court held that although Porto Rico had not been formally embraced within the customs union of the States, it was no longer "foreign country" and that the Dingley law providing for duties upon articles "imported from foreign countries" did not apply to it.<sup>148</sup> In the decision of Downes vs. Bidwell it was further stated that the island, by the treaty of cession, became a territory belonging to the United States, but not necessarily a part of the United States, and that the imposition of duties by the Foraker Act was a constitutional exercise of the power of Congress.<sup>149</sup>

The status of these new annexations was practically settled, on commercial and political grounds, before the constitutional questions involved came up for adjudication. The dominant business interests of

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<sup>148</sup> Moore, op. cit., I, 314.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., p. 318.

the country were opposed to the full incorporation of the new possession. When it came to the test the American nation applied the doctrine of inferior races and denied the inhabitants of Porto Rico equal rights under the Constitution.

### 3. Guam

According to the provisions of the peace protocol terminating the Spanish-American War, Spain agreed to cede to the United States as partial indemnity an island in the Ladrone<sup>s</sup>.<sup>150</sup> One of these islands, Guam, had been captured without opposition on June 20, 1898, by an American expedition en route to the Philippines. President McKinley instructed the peace commissioners, September 16: "This Government has selected the island of Guam, and you are instructed to embody in the treaty of peace a proper stipulation of cession...."<sup>151</sup> This provision was incorporated in the treaty of peace signed December 10, 1898,<sup>152</sup> and the island, with an area of about one hundred eighty square miles and a population of some ten thousand, became important to us mainly as a coaling station in the far Pacific.<sup>153</sup>

### 4. Philippines

The war with Spain found the navy much better prepared for action than the army. For fifteen years we had been building up our navy, and at the outbreak of hostilities, the aggressive Theodore Roosevelt was serving as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. It was he who was

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<sup>150</sup> *For. Rel.*, 1898, p. 829.

<sup>151</sup> *Moore, op. cit.*, I, 527.

<sup>152</sup> *Malloy, op. cit.*, I, 1692.

<sup>153</sup> *Moore, op. cit.*, I, 555.

instrumental in having Commodore George Dewey placed in command of the American Asiatic Squadron. On February 25, taking advantage of the absence of the Secretary of the Navy, the bellicose Roosevelt cabled secret orders to Dewey: "Order squadron....to Hong Kong. Keep full of coal. In event of declaration of war Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands."<sup>154</sup> Although America was fighting to free Cuba, not the Philippines, an elementary rule of warfare is to beat the enemy by striking him wherever he is vulnerable. And there was a possibility that the Spanish fleet in the Pacific might be sent to the Caribbean.

On April 24, the day Spain declared war, Dewey was cabled the orders: "War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors." These were the last instructions Dewey received.<sup>155</sup>

At 11:30 P.M., April 30, 1898, the American naval force entered Manila Bay. Although Dewey's squadron of six vessels was superior to the Spanish fleet, the latter had the support of shore batteries. On May 1, the battle of Manila began. When Dewey warned the governor-general that the city of Manila would be shelled if the shore batteries continued firing, they ceased supporting the Spanish vessels. Shortly after noon the American squadron withdrew and anchored off Manila. In this remarkable battle the American ships escaped with but slight

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<sup>154</sup> Secretary of Navy, Annual Report, 1898, App., p. 23.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., p. 63.

damage, and seven wounded men. On the Spanish side ten ships were destroyed.<sup>156</sup> Washington received news of the victory on May 6. Up to this time the public had known little of Dewey's movements, but now the eyes of the nation were turned to the Philippines.

In spite of his great victory, Dewey's position was critical. A few days after the battle he cabled that he could take Manila at any time, but did not have the men to occupy it. Ammunition and men were forwarded as soon as possible, but they did not leave San Francisco till May 21. Thus for more than two months Dewey was left without reinforcements. Spain still held the city of Manila and it was alleged a Spanish fleet with reinforcements was on its way.<sup>157</sup> Dewey was a month's journey from home with no neutral ports open to him for supplies. However, the Hawaiian Republic, to further her own desires for annexation, flagrantly violated her neutrality to keep Dewey's squadron supplied.

While Dewey was blockading Manila by sea, it was being besieged on land by native insurgents led by Aguinaldo. With the treaty of Brice-na-Cato, Spain had been successful in terminating a rebellion in the islands in December, 1897, by paying Aguinaldo and his associates \$800,000 to leave the islands.<sup>158</sup> This insurrection had been organized in 1896 among the Tagalog tribes in Luzon. The object of the movement at that time was not independence, but the correction of abuses in local administration. After the defeat of the Spanish fleet at Manila

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<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 63-93.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 94-108.

<sup>158</sup> *Foot. op. cit.*, p. 39.

Bay, however, the insurrectionists met at Hong Kong and made new plans, this time for Philippine independence:

There will be no better occasion than the present for the expeditionary forces to land on those islands and to arm themselves at the expense of the Americans and to assure the attainment of our legitimate aspirations against those very people.

The Filipino people, unprovided with arms, will be the victims of the demands and exactions of the United States, but provided with arms, will be able to oppose themselves to them and struggle for their independence, in which consists the true happiness of the Filipinos.<sup>159</sup>

Aguinaldo then informed the American Consul at Hong Kong that he was ready to arrange for cooperation between the insurgents and the American forces. Dewey then brought back Aguinaldo to Luzon and gave him arms that he might gather the forces of Filipinos to aid the American army.<sup>160</sup> Thus from May till August, while Dewey was waiting for additional American forces, the Filipinos organized without opposition. On July 3, Aguinaldo, after having established a revolutionary government, proclaimed the Filipino Republic.<sup>161</sup>

Another serious cause for embarrassment for Dewey was the presence in Manila Bay of the warships of European Powers, rushed there to observe the maintenance of the blockade and to protect their national interests. Germany sent five warships; Great Britain, three; France, one; and Japan, one.<sup>162</sup> Although Germany's financial interests there were very slight, the German squadron was not only the most powerful

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<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>161</sup> *Report of (Schurman) Philippine Commission*, I, 171, quoted by Charles Russell Fish, *The Path of Empire*, p. 123.

<sup>162</sup> *Sec. of Navy, Report*, 1898, App., p. 109.

neutral force at Manila, but it was considerably stronger than Dewey's fleet. Having entered the colonial scramble late, Germany was eager to pick up insular and other possessions that might come her way. German dispatches of that period disclose that if American forces had abandoned the Philippines, Germany would have attempted to form a protectorate over the islands.<sup>163</sup> The dispatch of Admiral von Diederichs to Manila with a squadron so unreasonably large, soon gave rise to considerable friction with Admiral Dewey. The German force displayed open sympathy for the Spaniards. Diederichs disagreed with Dewey's interpretation of international law and failed to observe punctiliously the American blockade regulations. But when her attempts to interest Great Britain and France in a plan for neutralization of the Philippines failed completely, the greater part of the squadron was withdrawn.<sup>164</sup>

The Spanish fleet which was being sent to the Philippines never reached its destination, for it was ordered back to protect the Spanish coast from possible American attack. And in July, Dewey's reinforcements began arriving. On July 25, there were 10,000 American soldiers in the Philippines under the command of General Merritt.<sup>165</sup> By this time a similar number of Filipino insurgents were besieging Manila on the land side. General Merritt had been instructed not to recognize Aguinaldo but to organize a provisional government under American auspices. As a consequence relations between the Americans and the

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<sup>163</sup> G. P., XV, Nos. 4145-4146, quoted by Dennis, *op. cit.*, p. 76-77.

<sup>164</sup> G. P., XV, Nos. 4146-4146, quoted by Dennis, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

<sup>165</sup> S. Rep. 331, 57 Cong., 1st sess., p. 1406.



insurgents were strained. Merritt decided to hold no direct communications with Aguinaldo until he was in possession of the city.<sup>166</sup>

Meanwhile the situation inside Manila was desperate. Spanish officials longed to surrender to the American forces, who would preserve order and protect property from the looting natives. But as a point of honor, surrender could be made only on assault. On August 9, Dewey gave notice of impending action and ordered foreign vessels out of range of fire. Under the auspices of the Belgian Consul, however, a verbal understanding was arranged between the two forces that the Americans should attack but that the Spaniards should make no real resistance and surrender as soon as honor was saved. The Filipino forces were restless and dissatisfied, however, and it was with difficulty that they were quieted and kept from entering the city.<sup>167</sup>

In marked contrast with the German attitude, the British Commander at Manila, Captain Chichester, had displayed conspicuous sympathy for the American cause. On August 13, whether by design or accident, he moved his British vessels into a position between our fleet and the German squadron. The foreign vessels, however, made no interference during the battle. That day the city of Manila fell to the Americans and our troops faced the Filipinos outside the city, who were neither friend nor foe. On September 3, General Otis, Merritt's successor, informed Aguinaldo that the United States and Spain were the only recognized belligerents in the war and directed the insurgent forces to withdraw from the entire city of Manila by September 15.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2944.

<sup>167</sup> *Sec. of War, Report*, 1899, I, pt. iv., p. 9.

<sup>168</sup> *E. Doc.* 331, 57 Cong., 1st sess., p. 2944.

According to the Articles of Capitulation:

This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its educational establishments, and its private property of all descriptions, are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army.<sup>169</sup>

Unknown to Dewey, the war was already over. The day before the fall of Manila, on August 12, 1898, a protocol had been signed which brought the hostilities to an end and roughly outlined the terms of peace.<sup>170</sup> According to the final provision of the protocol the army of the United States was to occupy and hold, "the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines."<sup>171</sup> This clause was left purposely vague because the McKinley administration did not know what it wanted to do with the islands. The Cabinet was divided, the President was perplexed, and the American public had not made up its mind on the issue.

In early September, Japan cautiously suggested that in case the United States did not wish to assume responsibility alone for the Philippines, a joint protectorate with another Power having identical interests might be arranged.<sup>172</sup> This suggestion was kept strictly confidential, but it revealed to Washington that the islands were now practically derelict and should the United States decide not to assume control over the archipelago other states would probably engage in a scramble for it. Great Britain had already urged the United States

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<sup>169</sup> Sec. of War, Report, 1899, I, pt. iv., p. 9.

<sup>170</sup> Root, op. cit., p. 49.

<sup>171</sup> For. Rel., 1898, pp. 824-830.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid., p. 829.

to occupy the archipelago.<sup>173</sup>

Peace negotiations opened in Paris on October 1, 1898. Three members of the five-man commission were "avowed imperialists" and favored the acquisition of the Philippines. The platitudinous instructions from McKinley on this subject read:

The Philippines stand upon a different basis. It is none the less true, however, that, without any original thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the presence and success of our arms at Manila imposes upon us obligations which we cannot disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human action,....the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization.

Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship cannot be indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American trade....

In view of what has been stated, the United States cannot accept less than the cession in full rights and sovereignty of the island of Luzon.<sup>174</sup>

At the first meeting of the peace commission the Spanish commissioners demanded a restoration of status quo in the Philippines as of August 12. The Americans refused to consider this question on the premise that it had already been discussed by the State Department and was not properly within their powers.<sup>175</sup>

These discussions in regard to Cuba occupied the Commission during the entire month of October. Meanwhile, American public opinion regarding the Philippines had been crystallizing. During the period when

<sup>173</sup> Ibid., pp. 904 et. seq.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid., p. 907.

<sup>175</sup> S. Doc. 62, 55 Cong., 3rd sess., pt. ii., p. 21.

public opinion was most ill-informed, there was much sentiment in favor of giving immediate independence to the Filipinos. But as evidence began to pile up from competent observers as to the great economic and strategic value of the archipelago, less was said about the capacity of the natives for governing themselves. There were also moral considerations; Kipling's White Man's Burden renewed the idea throughout the Anglo-Saxon public that it was the duty of the civilized to promote the civilization of the backward; and the powerful church element in America strongly urged the United States to take her share in the regeneration of mankind.

At Paris the American peace commissioners had private hearings with General Merritt and other American officers and experts. The burden of their testimony was expressed in a memorandum drawn up by General F. V. Greene:

If the United States evacuate these islands, anarchy and civil war will immediately ensue and lead to foreign intervention.... The Spanish Government is completely demoralized and Spanish power is dead beyond possibility of resurrection. Spain would be unable to govern these islands if we surrendered them.... On the other hand, the Filipinos cannot govern the country without the support of some strong nation.<sup>176</sup>

Decided differences of opinion developed in the Commission. On October 25, they submitted their views to the President by cable and asked for explicit instructions. Former Secretary of State Day favored taking only Luzon; Davis, Frye and Reid, all Republican Senators, were of the opinion that it was not feasible to divide the group, and therefore the United States ought to acquire all the islands; while Gray, the only Democratic delegate, was opposed to taking any part of the

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<sup>176</sup> Ibid., pt. 1., p. 374.

group, on the ground that there was no place in the American system for the colonial administration of subject people.<sup>177</sup>

To McKinley there seemed to be no acceptable middle ground between taking all and taking none. In response to an old habit, his ear sought the ground. References to "duty," "destiny," and "Dewey" brought such enthusiastic responses that he reached the conclusion the sovereign people welcomed the idea of far-flung dependencies. Republican leaders were saying that "where the flag once goes up, it must never come down." To prove this assertion a poll, conducted by the Literary Digest, showed that an overwhelming majority of newspaper editors favored outright annexation.<sup>178</sup> As a last resort, McKinley prayed:

The truth is I didn't want the Philippines, and when they came to us as a gift from the gods, I did not know what to do about them....I sought counsel from all sides--Democrats as well as Republicans--but got little help,....and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night.

And one night late it came to me this way--I don't know how it was, but it came: (1) that we could not give them back to Spain--that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany--our commercial rivals in the Orient--that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves--they were unfit for self-government--and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died.<sup>179</sup>

It has been suggested, however, that McKinley may have confused the voice of the people with the voice of God, for he touched upon

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<sup>177</sup> For. Rel., 1898, p. 932.

<sup>178</sup> Literary Digest, XVII, 307-308.

<sup>179</sup> Christian Advocate, January 22, 1903, quoted by Bailey, op. cit., p. 520.

"almost every string in the familiar harmony of imperialism."<sup>180</sup>

So on October 26, Secretary of State Hay telegraphed the commissioners:

The information which has come to the President since your departure convinces him that the acceptance of Luzon alone, leaving the rest of the islands subject to the Spanish rule, or to be subject of future contention, cannot be justified on political, commercial, or humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible and the former must therefore be required.<sup>181</sup>

Again two days later, Hay telegraphed the commissioners:

The sentiment in the United States is almost universal that the people of the Philippines, whatever else is done, must be liberated from Spanish domination. In this sentiment the President fully concurs. Nor can we permit Spain to transfer any of the islands to another power. Nor can we invite another power or powers to join the United States in sovereignty over them. We must either hold them or turn them back to Spain.

Consequently, grave as are the responsibilities and unforeseen as are the difficulties which are before us, the President can see but one plain path of duty--the acceptance of the archipelago.<sup>182</sup>

The commission took up the Philippine question and spent most of their time in November on the issues involved. Meetings at which proposals and counter proposals were presented were held two or three times a week. The Spanish commissioners fought strenuously to salvage the Pacific islands, and their cause was strengthened by the fact that American troops had captured Manila after the official ending of hostilities. The Spaniards claimed that demands for annexation violated the protocol, which provided only the provisional occupation of Manila

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<sup>180</sup> F. T. Moon, Imperialism and World Politics, p. 394, quoted by Bailey, op. cit., p. 520.

<sup>181</sup> For. Rel., 1898, p. 935.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid., pp. 937-938.

and did not impair Spanish sovereignty over the islands. They threatened to break off negotiations, which would have put the United States in the awkward position of continuing a war, begun to liberate Cuba, for the purpose of securing possession of the Philippines.<sup>183</sup>

On November 3, the commissioners cabled McKinley that demands for annexation would very likely lead to a rupture, and that they were convinced that the occupation of Manila did not constitute a conquest of the islands.<sup>184</sup> They again cabled Washington on November 11, urging the necessity of paying for the Philippines and asking for definite instructions.<sup>185</sup> Two days later Hay replied that the United States was entitled to an indemnity for the cost of the war. This was not an argument for procuring the money but to give a technical basis for American claims to the Philippines. In the same cablegram the commissioners were instructed to offer Spain \$10,000,000 to \$20,000,000 for the islands.<sup>186</sup> The commissioners made an offer of \$20,000,000 to Spain for the Philippine Archipelago on November 21, requesting a reply by November 28. The Spanish commission recognized this as an ultimatum, and, upon consultation with their government, yielded under protest.<sup>187</sup>

Soon after the signing of the Treaty of Paris, Spain withdrew her troops from the islands, and on December 21, the President directed General Otis to extend the military government of Manila to the whole

<sup>183</sup> S. Doc. 62, 55 Cong., 3rd sess., pt. 11., p. 107.

<sup>184</sup> For. Rel., 1898, p. 940.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid., p. 945.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid.

<sup>187</sup> S. Doc. 62, 55 Cong., 3rd sess., p. 2745.

archipelago. Meanwhile Aguinaldo had taken advantage of the uncertain status of affairs to send agents of his republic throughout the provinces to strengthen his insurrectionist government.<sup>188</sup>

The debate over the Spanish treaty, in and out of Congress, was most heated. Anti-imperialists pointed out that hitherto the United States had acquired no territory that could not be Americanized and erected into states; yet the Philippine Archipelago was remote and populated by seven million people of an alien race and language. They further argued that the forcible annexation of millions of people against their will violated the spirit of the Constitution, and the very terms of the Declaration of Independence--"governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." Moreover, the United States did not need land, least of all expensive colonial dependencies; and by projecting itself into the Far East, the Republic would become involved in European entanglements and lose the strong moral position it had formerly occupied under the Monroe Doctrine.<sup>189</sup>

The expansionists, on the other hand, advanced the familiar arguments about economic and strategic advantages, national honor and responsibility, destiny and the cowardice of "hauling down the flag" and uplifting the benighted "brown brother."

The outbreak of an insurrection on February 4, 1899, against the American troops in the Philippines<sup>190</sup> removed the last doubt in the minds of many, who now felt that national honor was involved and that

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<sup>188</sup> S. Doc. 331, 57 Cong., 1st sess., p. 2745.

<sup>189</sup> Root, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81.

<sup>190</sup> Sec. of War, Report, 1899, I, pt. iv., p. 365.



the country could not withdraw from the islands in the face of an uprising. On these developments McKinley stated:

Until Congress shall have made known the formal expression of its will, I shall use the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes to uphold the sovereignty of the United States in those distant islands as in all other places where our flag rightfully floats.<sup>191</sup>

The Democratic press backed McKinley's policy in curbing the insurrection. The Atlanta Constitution, February 6, 1899, printed:

There now remains but one course for the American Government to pursue, and that is to conquer the forces of Aguinaldo....as long as an armed foe stands in the way, the only work ahead of us will be to vindicate the authority of the flag.<sup>192</sup>

More than two weeks before the ratification of the treaty, McKinley had appointed a commission, headed by Jacob Gould Schurman, to advise a permanent system of government for the Philippines and to try "to facilitate the most human, pacific, and effective extension of authority throughout those islands, and to secure with the least possible delay, the benefits of life and property, to the inhabitants."<sup>193</sup> In the meantime the military government was continued under the authority of the President, as Commander-in-Chief.

The Philippine Commission arrived in the Islands on March 4, 1899, but the state of hostilities prevented the discharging of those duties intrusted to it. They investigated the conditions in the islands and reported their conclusions to the President:

Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn, the commission believes that the government of the Philippines would speedily

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<sup>191</sup> Root, op. cit., p. 72.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid., pp. 73-74.

<sup>193</sup> Schurman, Philippine Affairs: A Retrospect and Outlook, p. 8, quoted by Latane, op. cit., p. 153.

lapse into anarchy, which would excuse, if it did not necessitate, the intervention of other powers and the eventual division of the islands among them. Only through American occupation, therefore, is the idea of a free, self-governing and united Philippine Commonwealth at all conceivable.... Thus the welfare of the Filipinos coincides with the dictates of national honor in forbidding our abandonment of the archipelago.<sup>194</sup>

By an act of March 2, 1899, Congress authorized an increase of the regular army to 65,000 men and the recruiting of a new volunteer force of 35,000. By the end of August our army in the Philippines numbered over 30,000.<sup>195</sup> General Otis reported to Secretary of War Root concerning the period from May, 1898, to autumn, 1899:

Under Tagalog domination, which was really the irresponsible dictatorship of Aguinaldo, cruelly enforced by his military officers, there was no individual liberty of any kind. The so-called insurgent government, whatever it might have been at its inception, degenerated into a military despotism of low order, in which neither property nor life had the least security.<sup>196</sup>

On November 24, General Otis telegraphed Washington:

Claim to government by insurgents can be made no longer under any fiction. Its treasurer, secretary of the interior, and president of congress in our hands; its president and remaining officers in hiding, evidently in different central Luzon provinces; its generals and troops in small bands scattered.<sup>197</sup>

As a result of the report of the Schurman commission (during January, 1900, all formal and open resistance to the Americans ceased for the time being), President McKinley appointed a second Philippines Commission on March 16, 1900, headed by Judge William Howard Taft as president. The commission received its instructions from Secretary of War Root, April 7, 1900, to organize a civil government to supersede

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<sup>194</sup> Root, op. cit., p. 44.

<sup>195</sup> Sec. of War. Report, 1899. I. pt. iv., p. 115 et. seq.

<sup>196</sup> Root, op. cit., p. 240.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid., p. 233.

gradually the military government then in control. The commission was authorized to assume the legislative power of the islands on September 1, leaving the executive authority to the military governor. Root concluded:

I charge this commission to labor for the full performance of this obligation, which concerns the honor and conscience of their country, in the firm hope that through their labors all the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands may come to look back with gratitude to the day when God gave victory to American arms at Manila and set their land under the sovereignty and the protection of the people of the United States.<sup>198</sup>

As armed resistance ceased island by island, the Civil Commission headed by Judge Taft substituted civil government for military government.

At a council of war held at Bayambang, November 12, 1899, Aguinaldo and his staff adopted a resolution and issued orders to the effect that the insurgents were incapable of further resistance in the field; that they had decided to disband the army; and that the generals and men were to return to their own provinces with a view to organizing the people for general resistance by means of guerilla warfare.<sup>199</sup> This action was misunderstood by the Americans and on June 21, 1900, General MacArthur issued a proclamation of amnesty. Five thousand insurgents took an oath to "renounce all allegiance to any and all so-called revolutionary governments in the Philippine Islands and recognize the supreme authority of the United States of America therein."<sup>200</sup>

After a period of inactivity which was necessary for the redistribution of the insurgent forces for the new method of warfare, it became

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<sup>198</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 193-194.

<sup>199</sup> Sec. of War, Report, 1900, I, pt. v., p. 59.

<sup>200</sup> Root, *op. cit.*, pp. 242-243.

evident that the proclamation had not had the desired effect and that the insurrection had merely taken on a new form. On June 27, Aguinaldo instructed his guerillas to continue their tactics even more strongly:

because its fulfillment just now is very necessary for the advantage of the cause of independence of the Philippines in the approaching presidential election in the United States of America ....It is imperative that before that day comes....we give such hard knocks to the Americans that they will rescound in our favor in all parts and set in motion the fall of the Imperialist Party, which is trying to enslave us.<sup>201</sup>

The guerilla warfare which the insurgents now began was waged with great cruelty, treachery and ferocity. It was something wholly new to American experience, but our troops soon learned to retaliate in kind. Murder, rape, torture and other crimes were too frequently committed by American soldiers. In February, 1902, the Senate Committee on the Philippines began an investigation of the conduct of the army. While many of the charges were unproved, the record is none the less humiliating.<sup>202</sup>

Although McKinley was successfully reelected in 1900 and the Republican platform had endorsed his policy in the Philippines, while the Democrats had favored eventual self-government and independence for the islands, the issues of the campaign had been so varied and confused that the results of the election cannot be considered a public vindication of his Philippine policy.

The Spooner Amendment to the Army Appropriation Act of March 2, 1901, provided:

All military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands....shall, until otherwise provided by

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<sup>201</sup> Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>202</sup> S. Doc. 331, 57 Cong., 1st sess., pts. i-iii.

Congress, be vested in such persons and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct, for the establishing of civil government and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion.<sup>203</sup>

Never before had a president received such a degree of arbitrary power from Congress. The statute enabled McKinley to complete the separation of civil and military powers in the islands.

Secretary of War Root by order of the President directed:

On and after the fourth day of July, 1901, until it shall be otherwise ordered, the President of the Philippine Commission will exercise the executive authority in all civil affairs in the government of the Philippine Islands...and to that end the Hon. William H. Taft, President of the said Commission, is hereby appointed governor of the Philippine Islands....<sup>204</sup>

Within a year after the appointment of Governor Taft, about thirty-five provinces were organized. With the exception of a few sparsely settled districts these provinces included all the Christian Filipinos, thus leaving still unorganized and under military rule only the country occupied by the Moros. But the provincial and municipal governments did not constitute local self-government in the American sense of the term at all.<sup>205</sup>

The annexations of 1898 raised new questions to the Constitution. The McKinley administration took the view that the Constitution and laws of the United States did not apply to newly acquired territory until extended by Congress, while the Democrats insisted that the Constitution automatically "followed the flag." In the Insular Cases

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<sup>203</sup> Statutes at Large, XXXI, 895.

<sup>204</sup> Root, op. cit., p. 262.

<sup>205</sup> Philippine Commission, Reports, 1900-1903, pp. 293-295, referred to by Latane, op. cit., pp. 159-163.

the Supreme Court sustained the Administration that Porto Rico and the Philippines were neither foreign countries nor completely parts of the United States, though Congress was at liberty to incorporate them at any time.<sup>206</sup>

On March 23, 1901, Aguinaldo was captured by the American forces, and acknowledged "the sovereignty of the United States throughout the Philippine Archipelago."<sup>207</sup> There was some subsequent fighting throughout the following months. But peace was gradually restored. General Mulver, the last insurgent leader to hold out, surrendered to the American forces on April 27, 1902. This put an end to guerilla warfare in the Philippines.<sup>208</sup>

The Philippine Government Act of July 1, 1902, substituted congressional for presidential authority. This act contained organic or constitutional provisions as well as general legislation. It provided that the government as organized by the Philippine Commission was to be continued in all essential features. The only immediate change was that in the future the Senate was to approve all presidential appointments to the Islands. The act also declared the inhabitants of the islands to be "citizens of the Philippine Islands, and as such entitled to the protection of the United States." Practically all the provisions of the Constitution guaranteeing the protection of life, liberty and property were extended to the Filipinos by enumeration in the statute, except that of trial by jury. The act provided for the

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<sup>206</sup> Moore, *op. cit.*, I, 313-318.

<sup>207</sup> Sec. of War, *Report*, 1901, I, pt. v., 122.

<sup>208</sup> Root, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

election of a legislative assembly, two years after the completion of a general census. The legislature of the Islands should then consist of two houses--the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly. the legislature was to elect two delegates to the House of Representatives who should have seats but no votes.<sup>209</sup>

On July 4, 1902, the last remnant of military government in the Philippines was terminated and civil government was established by order of President Roosevelt:

The insurrection against the sovereign authority of the United States in the Philippine Archipelago having ended, and provincial civil government having been established throughout the entire territory of the archipelago not inhabited by Moro tribes,....the general commanding the Division of the Philippines is hereby relieved from the further performance of the duties of military governor, and the offices of military governor in said archipelago is terminated.<sup>210</sup>

Thus did our "humanitarian" war unfurl the Stars and Stripes over the far-flung islands of Porto Rico, Guam and the Philippine Archipelago.

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<sup>209</sup> Statutes at Large, XXXII, pt. 1., 691.

<sup>210</sup> Root, op. cit., p. 317.

## IV

## ISTHMIAN IMPERIALISM

The dream of a new and shorter passage from Europe to the riches of the Far East was the inspiration that prompted the voyages of Christopher Columbus. Thus from the very discovery of the vast Western Hemisphere, the Central American Isthmus has been a keystone in American history. Soon after Balboa's momentous journey across the narrow neck of land that separates the mighty Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (1513), the Spaniards conceived the idea of a transisthmian waterway--a great idea which found fulfillment only after four centuries of exploration, conflict, diplomacy and experiment. The isthmian area assumed a pivotal importance in almost every great policy or movement in United States history. It was involved in the establishment of the Monroe Doctrine; the westward expansion of the United States; and it determined American policy and diplomacy in the Caribbean and Central American areas.

Interest in the canal project was evidenced in the United States from the very inception of its independent existence. In 1788, Thomas Jefferson wrote:

With respect to the Isthmus of Panama, I am assured by Burgine,....that a survey was made, that a canal appeared very practicable, and that the idea was suppressed for political reasons altogether....This report is to me a vast desideratum, for reasons political and philosophical.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Jefferson, The Jeffersonian Encyclopedia, p. 126.



The revolts for independence by the Spanish American colonies resulted in the organization of the Colombian (1821) and the Central American Confederations (1823) which together controlled all possible canal-route areas. The Central American Confederation immediately negotiated with American financiers for the formation of a corporation to construct a canal on the Nicaraguan route, but efforts to raise capital for the enterprise failed.<sup>2</sup> Simon Bolivar, liberator President of Colombia and the first important official to take an active interest in the canal project urged that construction be undertaken by the united efforts of the Latin American States.

The first Inter-American Conference of Nations, which met in Panama on June 22, 1826, had the transisthmian canal as one of its points of discussion. The United States, fearing an antislavery resolution by the Congress, delayed the appointment of delegates to the extent that it had no part in the discussions concerning the canal; but Secretary of State Clay's instructions to the delegates covered the canal matter and stated for the first time the policy that permeated our canal diplomacy throughout the nineteenth century:

If the work should ever be executed so as to admit of the passage of sea vessels from ocean to ocean, the benefits of it ought not to be exclusively appropriated to any one nation, but should be extended to all parts of the globe upon the payment of a just compensation or reasonable tolls.<sup>3</sup>

Dissent in the Latin American federations and their consequent disintegration into separate republics dissipated united action on canal construction. The United States had encouraged the Confederations

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<sup>2</sup> House Report, 145, 30 Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 37-39.

<sup>3</sup> Moore, Digest of International Law, III, 2.

in an effort to secure canal rights for the United States, while the British had followed the contrary policy of encouraging disunion in order to further their own power in the areas they could dominate. In 1835, and again in 1839, the Senate passed resolutions authorizing the President to enter into negotiations with other nations, particularly Central America and New Granada, for the purpose of protecting by treaty either individuals or companies who might undertake to open communication between the two oceans and of insuring "the free and equal navigation of the canal by all nations." Presidents Jackson and Van Buren both commissioned agents with a view to carrying out these resolutions but without success.<sup>4</sup>

France for the first time became definitely interested in Panama in 1838, when the Republic of New Granada granted to a French firm a concession for the construction of roads, railroads or canals across the Isthmus at Panama.<sup>5</sup> In September, 1843, M. Guizot, Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent to Panama Napoleon Carella, a French engineer, to investigate canal possibilities.<sup>6</sup> France thus took the lead in the early scientific investigation of the Panama route.

It must be remembered that the first half of the nineteenth century was an era of westward movement. By 1845, the United States was planted on the Pacific. The absence of transcontinental railroads, the lack of roads across the country and the hardships encountered in crossing the Rocky Mountains and the western deserts forced men to seek other means

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., pp. 3-4.

<sup>5</sup> Colombia, Codificacion Nacional, VIII, 187-190, quoted by Miles P. DuVal, Cadiz to Cathay, p. 31.

<sup>6</sup> H. Rep. 145, 30 Cong., 2nd sess., p. 571.

of travel. This demand developed a lucrative transisthmian trade, and freedom of transit became a pressing question.

While the United States was engaged in the Mexican War, New Granada had made efforts to secure from both England and France a guarantee of neutrality for the Isthmus and of her own territorial integrity without success. Although devoid of instructions, the American Minister in Bogota, Bidlack, took advantage of the situation and negotiated a treaty (December 12, 1846) which greatly strengthened the Isthmian foothold of this country. By its terms New Granada agreed to grant the United States transit rights through the Isthmus of Panama "upon any modes of communication that now exist or that may be hereafter constructed." In return the United States bound itself to guarantee the "perfect neutrality" of the route and of New Granada's sovereignty over it.<sup>7</sup>

In his message forwarding the treaty to the Senate, President Polk stated:

The importance of this concession to the commercial and political interests of the United States cannot easily be overrated. The route by the Isthmus of Panama is the shortest between the two oceans, and from the information herewith communicated, it would seem to be the most practicable for a railroad or canal.<sup>8</sup>

Despite the valuable commercial concessions involved, the Senate was suspicious of the entangling nature of the arrangement and delayed approval of the treaty nearly a year. Ratifications were finally exchanged on June 3, 1848.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Malloy, Treaties....., I, 312.

<sup>8</sup> Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IV, 511-513.

<sup>9</sup> Malloy, op. cit., I, 302.

Under the protection of this treaty the Panama Railroad Company, composed mainly of citizens of the United States, secured a charter from New Granada and between 1850 and 1855 constructed a railroad across the isthmus along the line of the proposed Panama Canal.<sup>10</sup>

The British, who viewed with alarm the recent territorial acquisitions of the United States and its treaty with New Granada with misgivings, were also vitally interested in the Caribbean region, where they had important colonies. As the commercially dominant power, they would sacrifice much before permitting the Yankees to secure a monopoly over the Isthmus--one of the most important economic nerve centers of the world.

The eastern terminus of the proposed Nicaraguan Canal was the San Juan River, near the mouth of which lived a tribe of savages known as the Mosquito Indians, over whom Great Britain claimed a protectorate. The mouth of the San Juan River, so important diplomatically, was claimed by Nicaragua, Costa Rica and the Mosquito Indians. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, Britain had enlarged her interests and holdings in Central America by backing the claims of the Mosquito tribe. Although this was a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, which so bravely pronounced that "we should consider any attempt on their (the European Powers) part to extend their system to any portion of this Hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety,"<sup>11</sup> the relatively weak North American "protector" made no serious effort to enforce its policy in Central America during this period. In 1848, Great Britain

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<sup>10</sup> H. Rep. 145, 30 Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 1-31.

<sup>11</sup> Richardson, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

seized San Juan, at the entrance of the San Juan River, ostensibly to protect its ward, "His Mosquito Majesty," against the Nicaraguans.<sup>12</sup> The next year a British naval officer seized Tigre Island near the possible western terminus of the canal, thus establishing British power over both sides of the Isthmus.<sup>13</sup>

By mid-century, however, the expanding North American Union was ready to assert its "protective" position in the New World that had been so grandiloquently voiced some twenty-five years previously. As a result of the Mexican War the imperial domain of the United States was extended across the continent, and national prestige both at home and abroad reached new heights. The acquisition of California and the discovery of gold there in 1849 started one of the great population movements of history. Control of water communications with American territory on the Pacific coast rapidly became a question of vital importance to the United States. While the Mexican War was still in progress, zealous American agents in Central America had negotiated several transit treaties conveying to the United States exclusive canal-route privileges.<sup>14</sup> American public opinion was so aroused by the British aggression in Nicaragua that Secretary of State Clayton wrote, "a collision will become inevitable if great prudence is not exercised on both sides."<sup>15</sup>

While crises in Central America were being so narrowly averted,

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<sup>12</sup> House Executive Document, 75, 31 Cong., 1st sess., pp. 4, 222.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 233.

<sup>14</sup> Senate Report, 1, 57 Cong., 1st sess., pp. 313-327.

<sup>15</sup> Senate Executive Document, 27, 32 Cong., 2nd sess., p. 13.

the home governments in Washington and London were desirous of avoiding a conflict. Discussions between Secretary of State Clayton and the British Minister at Washington, Henry Lytton Bulwer, made it evident that neither Britain nor the United States would consent to the sole control of a canal route by the other. Nor did England show the slightest desire to relinquish her elastic Mosquito protectorate. The United States' position was strengthened, however, by the treaties concluded with the Central American republics. Moreover, several of the Central American states, including Nicaragua, had become so apprehensive of British aggression that they were looking to the United States for protection. As Clayton bluntly informed Bulwer:

There is not one of these five Central American states that would not annex themselves to us tomorrow if they could.... Some of them have offered and asked to be annexed to the United States already.<sup>16</sup>

After protracted negotiations, the famous Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was signed, April 19, 1850. The object of this treaty was declared to be to fix the "views and intentions" of the contracting parties "with reference to any means of communication by ship canal which may be constructed between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by the way of the San Juan de Nicaragua." Both parties agreed to cooperate in facilitating the construction of an Isthmian canal. According to treaty terms the United States and Great Britain bound themselves never to obtain or maintain any exclusive control over the said ship canal, never to colonize or exercise dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast or any part of Central America and never to make use of any alliance or influence with any of these states to obtain any unequal

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<sup>16</sup> Bemis, American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, VI, 57.

advantages in regard to commerce or navigation through the said canal.<sup>17</sup>

This treaty, which remained in force until 1901, called forth more discussion and unpopularity than any other treaty which the United States has ever signed. The references to territorial ambitions in Central America had been vague. Britain interpreted the terms to exclude the settlement of British Honduras and the Mosquito protectorate and to pertain only to further occupation.<sup>18</sup> American opponents of the treaty, led by former Secretary of State Buchanan, declared that it was a self-denying pledge that would thwart the southward expansion of the American people and violate the principle of the Monroe Doctrine by permitting Britain to keep what she had illegally seized in Central America.<sup>19</sup> On the credit side of the balance sheet the United States, at no great cost to itself, averted serious difficulties--possibly war--with Great Britain and at the same time stemmed the tide of British expansion in Central America.

The decade from 1850 to 1860 was one of misunderstanding and bickering over the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, inflamed by difficulties arising elsewhere, particularly with reference to alleged designs of the United States on Hawaii and Cuba. In his message of December 8, 1857, President Buchanan suggested the abrogation of the treaty by mutual consent as the wisest course that could be pursued in view of the increasing complications to which the varying constructions to it were

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<sup>17</sup> Malloy, *op. cit.*, I, 659-662.

<sup>18</sup> Moore, *op. cit.*, III, 137.

<sup>19</sup> American Historical Review, V, 98-102.

giving rise.<sup>20</sup>

The immediate problems in dispute between the two countries in the isthmanian region were finally settled when Great Britain made separate treaties with the interested Central American republics. By a treaty of 1860 with Nicaragua, Britain relinquished her claims to the Mosquito territory.<sup>21</sup> On the eve of the Civil War, Buchanan reported:

The discordant constructions of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty between the two governments which at different periods of the discussion bore a threatening aspect, has resulted in a final settlement entirely satisfactory to this government.<sup>22</sup>

The preoccupation with domestic affairs that attended the Civil War in the United States during 1861-1865 interfered with the prosecution of canal projects. In 1862 New Granada notified the United States that a revolutionary chief had sent an armed force to occupy the Isthmus of Panama and the government of Granada called upon the United States to enforce its guarantee to protect the rights of New Granada in the area. The United States instructed its naval commander at Panama to protect the safety of the transisthmian railroad, but it rejected Granada's request that it land a body of troops there. Secretary of State Seward expressed the opinion that the guarantee by the United States of Granadian sovereignty was only against foreign governments and did not authorize the United States to take sides in the internal troubles of the nation. He concluded, "This government has no interest in the matter different from that of any other maritime power."<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Richardson, *op. cit.*, V, 442-443.

<sup>21</sup> Hunter Miller, editor, Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, V, 801-802.

<sup>22</sup> Richardson, *op. cit.*, V, 639.

<sup>23</sup> Moore, *op. cit.*, III, 13.



In 1869, President Grant instructed our minister to Colombia to obtain the authority for a survey by the United States, in order to determine the practicability of a canal through the Panama Isthmus, and "a charter for the right of way to build, by private enterprise, such a work, if the survey proves it to be practicable."<sup>24</sup> But the opening of the transcontinental railroad that same year, binding California to the rest of the Union, lessened the pressure for a canal.

The Interoceanic Canal Commission, appointed by Grant, reported its decision in 1776--the Panama route was regarded as impracticable because of climate, danger of landslides, excessive excavations and high cost of construction. It recommended the Nicaraguan route as the most profitable project.<sup>25</sup>

A French Company, headed by the dynamic Ferdinand de Lesseps, builder of the Suez Canal, obtained in 1878, a concession for the construction of a canal across the Panama Isthmus.<sup>26</sup> The prospect of the speedy construction of a canal under French control produced a sudden and radical change of policy on the part of the United States. On March 8, 1880, President Hayes sent a vigorous message to Congress:

The policy of this country is a canal under American control. The United States cannot consent to the surrender of this control to any European power or to any combination of European powers....

An interoceanic canal across the American isthmus will essentially change the geographical relations between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States, and between the United States and the rest of the world. It will be the great ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and our Pacific shores, and virtually a part of the coast line of the United States....

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<sup>24</sup> Richardson, *op. cit.*, VII, 33.

<sup>25</sup> S. Ex. Doc. 15, 46 Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1-9.

<sup>26</sup> Moore, *op. cit.*, III, 13.

I repeat--that it is the right and duty of the United States to assert and maintain such supervision and authority over any interoceanic canal....as will protect our national interests.<sup>27</sup>

The French having meanwhile started in Panama, the resentment of the United States was aroused at what was considered a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. To compete with the French, a corporation was formed in New York which obtained a concession to construct a Nicaraguan canal.<sup>28</sup> Both the French and the American canal enterprises collapsed in the general panic of 1893.

In the closing days of the Hayes administration, Congress passed a joint resolution that the President take immediate steps to abrogate any treaty interfering with the administration's canal policy.<sup>29</sup> President Garfield, in his inaugural address, 1881, approved the position taken by his predecessor on the canal question.<sup>30</sup> Soon after assuming the portfolio of State, James Blaine outlined the new policy to our representatives in Europe, affirming that it was "nothing more than the pronounced adherence of the United States to principles long since enunciated by the highest authority of the government." The dispatch completely ignored the existence of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Blaine first called attention to the rights and duties devolving upon the United States from the treaty with Colombia of 1846. In the second place, Mr. Blaine declared that the passage of armed vessels of nations hostile to the United States through a canal could not be admissible.

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<sup>27</sup> Richardson, *op. cit.*, VII, 569-570.

<sup>28</sup> S. Rep. 1, 57 Cong., 1st sess., pp. 443-491.

<sup>29</sup> H. Rep. 224, 46 Cong., 3rd sess., pp. i, xi.

<sup>30</sup> Richardson, *op. cit.*, VII, 585.

The dispatch concluded that the United States would object to any concerted action of the European Powers for the purpose of guaranteeing the canal or determining its status.<sup>31</sup>

Without waiting for a reply to his first communication, Blaine sent a special dispatch to Minister Lowell at London (November 19, 1881) urging upon the consideration of the British government modifications of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of such a radical character as to amount to a complete abrogation of the treaty. The grounds of objection to the treaty were stated in full; the treaty had been made more than thirty years before under exceptional conditions which had ceased to exist; the remarkable development of the United States on the Pacific coast had created new duties for the American government; the treaty restrained the United States from using its power to protect the canal; it embodied a misconception of the relative positions of Great Britain and the United States with respect to interests on this continent; and it had been made with the implied understanding that British capital would be available for the construction of a canal. In conclusion Blaine proposed modifying the terms of the treaty to leave the United States free to fortify the canal and to hold political control over it in conjunction with the country in which it might be located.<sup>32</sup>

The reply of the British government was given in two dispatches drafted by Lord Granville. In the view of her Majesty's government, the changes desired by the United States would not improve the situation as regards the canal, while the declaration that the United States

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<sup>31</sup> For. Rel., 1881, pp. 537-538.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 554.

would always treat that waterway "as part of her coast-line" threatened the independence of the territory lying between the canal and the United States. Granville believed that the only way to relieve the situation was to extend the invitation to all maritime states to participate in an agreement based on the stipulations of the convention of 1850.<sup>33</sup>

The task of replying to Granville's dispatches fell to Blaine's successor in the State Department, Frelinghuysen. His dispatch on May 8, 1882, reiterated in the main the arguments advanced by Blaine. He adduced evidence to show that the treaty was a special contract for the accomplishment of a specific object, which had never been achieved, and was no longer binding.<sup>34</sup> Correspondence on the subject continued until November, 1883, without arriving at a satisfactory compromise. The attempts of Blaine and Frelinghuysen were premature; at this time the United States had nothing suitable to offer in exchange for the desired British renunciation. The result was that Great Britain refused to consent to a modification of the treaty, and the United States saw before it the alternative of abiding by the terms of the treaty or ultimately resorting to war with England. However, with the decline of the French activities in Panama, the demand for modification of the treaty decreased also.

The election of Grover Cleveland (1885), the first Democratic President since the Civil War, brought into being an administration determinedly opposed to imperialism, protectorates and other foreign

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 1882, pp. 302-305.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 271.

entanglements. On December 8, Cleveland stated his canal policy, which reverted to our earlier views:

Whatever highway may be constructed across the barrier dividing the two greatest maritime areas of the world, must be for the world's benefit, a trust for mankind, to be removed from the chance of domination by any single power, nor become a point of invitation for hostilities or a prize for warlike ambition.<sup>35</sup>

In 1885, the Colombian government, which was embarrassed by civil war, called upon the United States for the fulfillment of the treaty of 1846, to secure the neutrality and sovereignty of the isthmus.

Cleveland at once sent troops to Panama with instructions to confine their action to preventing the transit and its accessories from being interrupted or embarrassed. As soon as peace was reestablished, the American troops were withdrawn.<sup>36</sup>

Secretary of State Olney in reviewing the canal situation, in 1896, said:

Upon every principle which governs the relations to each other, either of nations or of individuals, the United States is completely estopped from denying that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty is in full force and vigor. If changed conditions now make stipulations, which were once deemed advantageous, either inapplicable or injurious, the true remedy is not in ingenious attempts to deny the existence of the treaty or to explain away its provisions, but in a direct and straightforward application to Great Britain for a reconsideration of the whole matter.<sup>37</sup>

The United States emerged from the Spanish-American War a Caribbean as well as a Pacific power. This changed status brought about a remarkable resurgence of interest in an Isthmian canal. Such a waterway now seemed imperatively necessary if the American people were to

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<sup>35</sup> Richardson, *op. cit.*, VIII, 327.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 326.

<sup>37</sup> Moore, *op. cit.*, III, 209.

take full advantage of their new trade opportunities in the Pacific, and at the same time unfetter their fleet. The recent hostilities and desperate voyage of the Oregon had provided a dramatic object lesson in naval needs.

In his message of December 5, 1898, President McKinley declared:

That the construction of such a maritime highway is now more than ever indispensable to that intimate and ready inter-communication between our eastern and western seaboard demanded by the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands and the prospective expansion of our influence and commerce in the Pacific, and that our national policy now more imperatively than ever calls for its control by this Government, are propositions which I doubt not the Congress will duly appreciate and wisely act upon.<sup>38</sup>

Two days later Secretary of State Hay instructed the American Charge d' Affaires in London, Henry White, to start negotiations with the British government to remove the objections of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty to the construction of a canal under the auspices of the Government of the United States, since authorities were convinced that private capital could never build the canal without government aid.<sup>39</sup>

Conditions in Europe this time fostered the desires of the United States. The London government, already involved in the Boer War and faced with an unfriendly Europe, decided that rather than risk the new Anglo-American friendship it would make concessions without insisting upon an equivalent. The British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Julian Pauncefote, was authorized to conduct the negotiations directly with Secretary Hay. The original draft of the treaty, drawn up by the two officials and sent to the Senate on February 5, 1900, provided for the construction of the canal by the United States but retained the

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<sup>38</sup> Richardson, op. cit., X, 101-102.

<sup>39</sup> Moore, op. cit., III, 210.

principle of neutralization as stated in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.<sup>40</sup>

The United States Senate, harkening to the rumblings of public opinion, undertook to make provision for fortification of the proposed canal.<sup>41</sup> Its amendments were so sweeping and so definitely to America's advantage, that the British government, supported by the robust English press, refused to accept them. The entire negotiations collapsed in March, 1901, and nearly a year elapsed before an agreement was reached. Throughout the months that followed the failure of negotiations, there was much talk in the United States of abrogating the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty outright, or of going to war to end England's thwarting of American aspirations. All this was profoundly disturbing to the British. America was powerful; her friendship was valuable; the Boer War was exhausting; and relations with Germany were growing worse. Once more the distresses of Europe were operating to America's advantage. On November 18, 1901, the London government went the whole way when the second treaty was concluded.

The new Hay-Pauncefote Treaty abrogated in express terms the Clayton-Bulwer convention and provided that the United States might construct a canal under its direct auspices and exclusive management. The principle of neutralization was nominally retained but under the sole guarantee of the United States who had the power to police the canal.<sup>42</sup> Ratifications, exchanged on February 21, 1902, brought to a close the long conflict for supremacy in Central America which at times had

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid., pp. 210-211.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Malloy, op. cit., I, 782-784.

brought the two countries so close to war. Following this agreement, Britain gradually reduced her West Indian fleet, thus recognizing the supremacy of the United States in the Caribbean.

Two months before the signing of the second treaty, William McKinley died from an assassin's bullet, and Theodore Roosevelt assumed the presidency. This colorful individual had long been interested in making the United States a leading naval power. Eager to prove to the American people his qualifications as an executive, he energetically pushed the canal project.

The Hay-Fauncefote Treaty had cleared away the diplomatic obstacles for canal construction. The next question was that of a choice between the Panamanian and Nicaraguan routes. For twenty years the United States had been investigating the relative merits of the two routes. The findings of commissions appointed for this purpose favored the Nicaraguan route, and the failure of the French company in Panama served further to discredit the project along that route. By 1896, it was generally accepted throughout the United States that the Transisthmian canal would be built through Nicaragua. But this question now became a political rather than an engineering problem.

The Panama Canal Company, organized by the De Lesseps Charter, had concluded that its only hope lay in transferring its concession and property to the American government. To this end an active lobby was maintained at Washington. But its rival, the Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua, was also urging Congress to make its enterprise a national one. The Isthmian Canal Commission appointed in 1899 and headed by Admiral Walker submitted a preliminary report in November, 1901, recommending Nicaragua as the most feasible route. The report stated that



although a Panama Canal would be cheaper to construct and shorter than a Nicaragua Canal, the terms by which the Panama Canal Company were willing to transfer their holdings were so exorbitant as to make the project unpractical.<sup>43</sup> But when the French Company in desperation offered to sell its rights and property in Panama for \$40,000,000, President Roosevelt persuaded the Commission to change its recommendation and support the Panama Canal, which it did in January, 1902.<sup>44</sup>

Before the reversal of the opinion of the Commission, the House of Representatives had voted in favor of a Nicaraguan waterway. But the astute lobbying of the clever Frenchman, Bunau-Varilla, who discouraged the Nicaraguan route by raising the bogey of volcanic activity there, and the oratory of Senator Mark Hanna, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, influenced the Senate to amend the bill so as to provide for a Panama Canal. Drafted by Senator Spooner, the law as passed, June 28, 1902, authorized the President: (1) to acquire the rights and property of the Panama Canal Company at a cost not exceeding \$40,000,000; (2) to acquire from the republic of Colombia, upon such terms as he might deem reasonable, perpetual control of a strip of land, not less than six miles in width, extending from the Caribbean Sea to the Pacific Ocean, with jurisdiction over said strip; (3) to proceed as soon as these rights were acquired, to construct a canal through the Isthmian Canal Commission. In case of failure to obtain a satisfactory title to the property of the French Company, and the control of the necessary territory of the republic of Colombia within

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<sup>43</sup> S. Doc. 54, 57 Cong., 1st sess., p. 263.

<sup>44</sup> S. Doc. 123, 57 Cong., 1st sess., p. 10.

"a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms," then the president was instructed to secure control of the necessary strip through Nicaragua and proceed to construct a canal there.<sup>45</sup>

An editorial in the New York Sun of March 19, 1903, entitled "The Battle of the Routes," called attention to the fact that on January 9, 1902, the Hepburn Bill for a Nicaraguan Canal passed the House with an overwhelming vote, and that before this time practically the entire national sentiment as exhibited in the press was definitely for Nicaragua. It points out a complete reversal of national policy concerning the canal, and gives credit for the Panama victory to President Roosevelt, Secretary Hay, Senator Hanna, Senator Spooner, the eruption of Monotombo, and especially to Bunau-Varilla.<sup>46</sup>

#### 1. Panama

When serious consideration of the Panama Canal began, Colombia was in the throes of an internal revolution which had started in October, 1899. This revolution was not an isolated event in history. The Panamians had long evidenced their discontent with the rule of Bogota by numerous uprisings--fifty-three in fifty-three years, according to Roosevelt's count.<sup>47</sup> As early as 1887 the historian Hubert Howe Bancroft prophetically wrote:

What is to be the future status of the Isthmus? A strong government is doubtless a necessity, and must be provided from abroad. Shall it assume the form of a quasi independent state under the protectorate of the chief commercial nations, eliminating Colombia from participation therein? Or must the United

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<sup>45</sup> Statutes at Large, XXXII, pt. 1., 481.

<sup>46</sup> New York Sun, March 19, 1903, quoted by Du Val, op. cit., p. 212.

<sup>47</sup> Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography, p. 516.

States, as the power most interested in preserving the independence of the highway, take upon themselves the whole control for the benefit of all nations? Time will tell.<sup>48</sup>

By threatening to turn to Nicaragua and by using other methods of persuasion, Secretary Hay finally succeeded in extorting a treaty from the Colombian Charge in Washington, Tomas Herran, who signed under protest on January 2, 1903. There is reason to suspect, however, that he did so without express authorization from his government. The terms of the Hay-Herran Treaty provided that the United States was to obtain a canal zone six miles wide for a cash payment of \$10,000,000 and an annual rental of \$250,000. Colombia was to retain sovereignty over the strip, but the United States was authorized to protect the canal in case Colombia could not effectively do so.<sup>49</sup> Although objection was raised against this provision because it failed to secure for the United States full governmental authority over the zone, it was nevertheless ratified by the Senate, March 17, 1903.<sup>50</sup>

Dr. Herran in submitting the treaty to his government stated that he knew very well that it was not perfect but that it was the best possible solution to make of a very difficult question. He urged its acceptance by Colombia:

If we do not approve the treaty it is easily understood that the Nicaragua route may be definitely chosen, and in this case the United States will not permit any other interoceanic canal to be constructed in America.... But even supposing that they may insist upon the Panama route, another danger even more grave presents itself, and that is, that the "Republic of Panama" may declare itself independent and the treaty be made

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<sup>48</sup> E. H. Bancroft, History of the Pacific States of North America, III, 558, quoted by DuVal. op. cit., p. 130.

<sup>49</sup> S. Doc. 474, 63 Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 277-268.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 277.

with it. By this Colombia would not only lose all the advantages direct and indirect which she has today in prospect but also she would bring upon herself new outbreaks and humiliations.<sup>51</sup>

Despite Herran's warning, the treaty struck a snag in Colombia, where the American Minister wrote Secretary Hay that there was a "tremendous tide" of public opinion against the canal.<sup>52</sup> The Colombian Congress met in an extra session, June 20, mainly for the purpose of considering the treaty. When the vote was finally taken August 12, 1903, the treaty was rejected unanimously.<sup>53</sup> The primary motive for Colombia's opposition appears to have been dissatisfaction with the financial arrangement and the infringement of her sovereignty in Panama. The best chance for Colombia to obtain more money from the transaction lay in conducting independent negotiations with the French Company to secure a part of their \$40,000,000. But, due to the foresight of Sausse-Varilla, this privilege was specifically reserved to the United States by the treaty terms.<sup>54</sup> There was, however, another approach for Colombia. The French concession would expire in 1904.<sup>55</sup> When this happened Colombia could confiscate the property of the French Company and dispose of it to the United States for the tempting \$40,000,000. It was obviously to the advantage of Colombia to delay action.

With the failure of the Hay-Herran Convention the advocates of the Nicaragua route began to take courage and to demand that as the

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<sup>51</sup> Herran Papers, quoted by Du Val, op. cit., pp. 191-217.

<sup>52</sup> S. Doc. 51, 58 Cong., 2nd sess., p. 5.

<sup>53</sup> For. Rel., 1903, p. 179.

<sup>54</sup> S. Doc. 474, 63 Cong., 2nd sess., p. 286.

<sup>55</sup> Cong. Record, XXXV, pt. vii., pp. 6653-6654.

"reasonable time" had expired, it was now the president's duty to turn to Nicaragua. As time marched on, the impatient Roosevelt, who ardently desired the Republican nomination in 1904 and who was determined not to adopt the alternative of the Spooner amendment and go to Nicaragua, became practically apoplectic. He insisted that the "blackmailers of Bogota" should not be permitted "permanently to bar one of the future highways of civilization." He went so far as to draft a message, which he did not send to Congress, suggesting that the canal strip be taken by force.<sup>56</sup>

The inhabitants of the Isthmus were also greatly excited at what they considered a sacrifice of their interests. Disappointment rapidly gave way to anxiety when the Panamanians realized that the United States might next turn to Nicaragua. Plainly the situation was ripe for revolt. The conspirators carried on their work both in Panama and in the United States. Dr. Samuel Amador joined Bunau-Varilla in New York and there worked out many of the necessary details. Bunau-Varilla conferred with Roosevelt, Hay and others in Washington and came to the conclusion that the United States would not allow a Panama revolution to fail.

President Roosevelt realized that if a choice of routes had not been made when Congress convened in December, he would be forced to proceed with Nicaragua. His views were expressed in a private letter to Dr. Albert Shaw, October 10, 1903:

There was absolutely not the slightest chance of securing by treaty any more than we endeavored to secure. The alternatives were to go to Nicaragua, against the advice of very competent engineers....or else to take the territory by force without any attempt at getting a treaty....Privately, I would

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<sup>56</sup> Roosevelt, *op. cit.*, pp. 530-531.

say that I should be delighted if Panama were an independent state, or if it made itself one at this moment; but for me to say so publicly would amount to an instigation for a revolt, and therefore I cannot say it.<sup>57</sup>

By the terms of the Treaty with Colombia of 1846 the United States had bound itself to maintain the "perfect neutrality" of the Isthmus so that "free transit" might not be interrupted. At the time the treaty was drawn up it was designed to prevent some outside Power, especially England, from seizing Panama; and Colombia certainly would never have approved it if she had suspected that it would some day be invoked against herself. During the numerous revolutionary outbursts in Panama prior to 1903, the United States had on seven different occasions landed troops to protect "free transit," but only with the approval of the Colombian authorities. It was generally acknowledged that if the Colombian Congress adjourned without further action on the treaty, an uprising would follow in Panama. On October 16, Roosevelt directed the Navy Department to send ships to the Isthmus to protect American interests in case of a revolution. The next day, Colombia proposed to send a mission to the United States to deal with the canal question. In reply to that, Secretary Hay wired that it would be "useless to send a special envoy."<sup>58</sup> The day for negotiations was passed.

The Colombian Congress adjourned, October 31, without reconsidering the treaty, and two days later orders were cabled to American naval commanders at Colon to maintain a free and uninterrupted transit and

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<sup>57</sup> Roosevelt Papers, XIII, 2, quoted by Du Val, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

<sup>58</sup> Panama Correspondence, I, 5-6, quoted by Du Val, *op. cit.*, p. 313.

<sup>59</sup> For. Rel., 1903, p. 216.

to "prevent landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either Government or insurgent."<sup>60</sup> On November 3, 1903, the day after the arrival of the U. S. S. Nashville, the patriot "army" of Panama revolted. The American naval forces, acting under orders, kept the Isthmus clear by preventing the Colombian troops from landing, and thus insured the success of the uprising.<sup>61</sup> Events continued to follow one another with startling rapidity. The next day, November 4, the infant republic proclaimed itself a member of the family of nations.<sup>62</sup> A little more than an hour after receiving the news, Roosevelt authorized recognition of the "de facto" government by the United States. This was granted on November 6, only three days after the outbreak of the revolution.<sup>63</sup>

On the same day, Bunau-Varilla, though a French citizen, was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister extraordinary of the Panama republic at Washington. On November 13, the new envoy was officially received by President Roosevelt; and on November 18, only fifteen days after the outbreak of the revolution, he signed a canal agreement.<sup>64</sup> The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty conveyed to the United States in perpetuity "the use, occupation, and control" of a zone ten miles wide in return for an initial payment of \$10,000,000 and an annual fee of \$250,000 a year; in return the United States guaranteed the independence of the Panama republic.<sup>65</sup> The terms served to make Panama virtually a

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid., p. 247.

<sup>61</sup> H. Rep. 32, 62nd Cong., 1st sess., pp. 386-387.

<sup>62</sup> For. Rel., 1903, p. 232.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 233.

<sup>64</sup> Bunau-Varilla, Panama, p. 349, quoted by Du Val, op. cit., p. 339.

<sup>65</sup> Malloy, op. cit., II, 1439-1457.

military outpost of the United States. The treaty was approved on February 23, 1904, without undue difficulty.

An act approved April 23, 1904, appropriated \$10,000,000 to pay the sum stipulated in the treaty, and vested temporary governmental powers of the canal zone in the President.<sup>66</sup> By executive order, May 9, Roosevelt placed the government of the territory as well as the construction of the canal in the hands of the Isthmian Canal Commission.

Roosevelt's "diplomacy" aroused a vast amount of criticism both in the United States and in Europe. Nevertheless, his tactics commanded considerable support at home, particularly among Republicans. Public Opinion, November 19, 1903, thus summarized sentiment:

No one can deny that the majority opinion of the country approves the course of the administration, little as this course can be justified on moral grounds....The sum of public opinion in this matter being simply that we want an isthmian canal above all things and that the government has taken the surest means of attaining this object.<sup>67</sup>

Roosevelt, himself, defended his actions on the ground that Colombia was not entitled "to bar the transit of the world's traffic across the isthmus," and that the intervention of the United States was justified by our treaty rights, by our national interests, and by the interests of collective civilization--"If ever a Government could be said to have received a mandate from civilization....the United States holds that position with regard to the interoceanic canal."<sup>68</sup> But as time wore on he became more belligerent and less discreet in

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<sup>66</sup> Statutes at Large, XXXIII, pt. i., 429.

<sup>67</sup> Public Opinion, XXXV, 643, quoted by Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 543.

<sup>68</sup> Am. Rel., 1903, p. 275.



defending his course. In 1911, he wrote, "I am interested in the Panama Canal because I started it....I took the Canal Zone."<sup>69</sup>

Roosevelt's desperate determination to "make the dirt fly" did bring results. But with patience, diplomacy would have secured control of a canal route in a more creditable way. The episode created a dangerous precedent and antagonized all Latin America. Public opinion then began to brand the sponsor of the Monroe Doctrine with the accusation of conquest in that part of the world which it professed to have liberated from European interference. It has taken much diplomacy and a generation of time to soften this stigma.

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<sup>69</sup> New York Times, March 25, 1911, quoted by

## V

## IMPERIALISM: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

A historian, a pseudo-historian, or even a casual reader of the history of the United States is confronted with many issues that beggar a successful solution. Politics unquestionably is the paramount issue in the organization and operation of a democracy, but closely associated with it are many factors that tend to make or break any political machine. Of the more important planks in such a framework some are predicated on certain definite national policies and dedicated to their fulfillment in a manner that is acceptable to a majority of the constituents. Since constituents are human beings, or should be, they are an easy prey to those blandishments whether maliciously or constructively fabricated that attain for them and their descendants accessions of a tangible nature. To designate one single issue that always provides a solace to rich and poor, educated and illiterate, the term "land" carries a connotation that is salubrious to all.

Long before we were born the word served as the magnetic force that prompted Spain, France and England to vie for possession of the North American continent. Gradually, as their spheres of influence were clearly designated, their lines of demarcation became the starting points for new acts of aggression on the part of the nation that was most covetous and best equipped militarily. After some century and a half of activity, the English colonists became obsessed with the tenets of the mother country, and, with the movement toward independence, their action for acquiring additional territory was not long in

appearing. The attempted conquest of Canada in 1775-76 was the transmutation of pent up thoughts into nationalistic deeds. The failure of the enterprize did in no way detract from the spirit of aggression that prevailed in the newly created nation.

In the subsequent one hundred and seventy years similar movements of an imperialistic nature have appeared on our political agenda under one label or another for the purpose of obtaining those "morsels" of land allegedly necessary for our economic, social and political security. The Louisiana Purchase, the Florida acquisitions, the Mexican concessions, and the Spanish contributions were all a part of the expansionist pattern developed at different times and under ever-changing conditions. For many, the Peace of Paris, of 1898, concluded our dream of territorial additions. Opportunity and necessity intervened, however, some few years later to prompt our president and his henchmen to perpetrate in Panama against her protector, Colombia, acts and deeds of a most indiscreet nature. Imperialism or its equivalent, sobriquetted in a more palatable manner was thus revived momentarily.

Similar outbursts of aggression have subsequently been negligible, and the few additions made to our terrestrial domain are limited mainly to the Danish purchase of 1917.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, an era of anti-expansion and satiation inaugurated the "Good Neighbor" policy and action to release Cuba from the trammels of the Platt Amendment,<sup>2</sup> to remove the inequities of our relations with the Republic of Panama<sup>3</sup> and to provide

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<sup>1</sup> Malloy, Treaties..., III, 2553-2644.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., IV, 4054-4055.

<sup>3</sup> Statutes at Large, LIV, pt. ii., 1811.

for the eventual independence of the Philippine Islands.<sup>4</sup> In regard to naval and aviation bases, however, the United States has continued a policy of expansion; in view of the recent outbursts of aggression throughout the world, who can say what the future American policy will be and should be?

Fallacious it would be to deny the accusation that we have been imperialistically inclined since the early days of our existence. Though our accessions have, on the whole, been contiguous except for a few isolated islands and other advantageously located holdings, the idea of land and still more land has never ceased to be considered. For the most part, however, we have been discreet in the expansion of our terrain from some 900,000 square miles in 1783 to the approximate 3,700,000 square miles we hold at present. While this indicates better than a 300 per cent increase in the size of the United States, the economic, social and educational advantages tendered to those peoples brought under the American influence have in part compensated for the crimes perpetrated. It is not the purpose here to justify or condemn the movements that have made the United States one of the leading powers in the "One World" that has evolved in the twentieth century. As Secretary May put it: "The United States of today cannot go back to what the country was fifty or a hundred years ago. Whether we will or not, whether for better or for worse, we must go forward."<sup>5</sup>

The eternal tide of mankind has forever moved westward, and with the movement the United States has gradually even though intermittently

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., XLVIII, pt. 1., 456-465.

<sup>5</sup> Public Opinion, XXIX, 553, quoted by Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 531.

found itself by virtue of circumstances the possessor or the guardian angel of isolated holdings far, far beyond even the most imaginative interpretation of the Natural Boundary Theory. Shall she, as the protagonist of the rights of suppressed peoples, not heed the call of the weak and extend to them the blessings of the greatest of all democracies of all times?

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