

THE ROOSEVELT COROLLARY
TO THE
MONROE DOCTRINE

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PREFACE

In preparing this thesis the writer intends to show by means of diplomatic correspondence, documents of American history, private correspondence, Annals of Congress, American State Papers, and a wide range of secondary sources that the "Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine" was but the natural and logical product of the times and events of this period. The Roosevelt Corollary was the only method of preserving American soil from European aggression.

The United States had reached its natural boundary on the west in 1848, and many Latin Americans feared that the United States was preparing to expand south across the Rio Grande. The Industrialists of North America were looking across the Rio Grande with covetous eyes, but it is very doubtful if even they were in favor of the United States taking over the territory in Latin America, for their profits were huge, much greater than their investments produced in the United States. Their risks were greater but so were the proceeds from their investments.

The statesmen of Latin America professed to see in the Olney "fiat" and the Roosevelt Corollary a great danger hanging over them, and with Latin American impetuosity began a vitriolic attack upon the United States with tongue and pen. A latent fear had been in the breast of the Latin American since the War with Mexico in 1848. The Spanish American War and the events that rapidly followed

gave them much reason to fear their North American neighbor. Yet the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine and the various corollaries to that doctrine have shielded Latin America from the fate of Africa and Asia.

Much has been written in condemnation of the policy of the United States in Latin America, but looking upon the maps of Africa and Asia where no Monroe Doctrine existed, one is forced to conclude that there would in all probability be no independent nations in Central and South America had not the United States proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine or some other similar policy.

The materials for this study have been obtained from the libraries of the Oklahoma Agricultural College, the University of Oklahoma, the Western State Teacher's College of Colorado, and the Colorado University, and, also, a great amount of material from the personal collection of data in the office of Dr. T. H. Reynolds, Head of the History Department, Oklahoma A. & M. College.

The writer wishes to express his gratitude and thanks to the librarians and their assistants for their helpfulness, courtesy, and patience while making this study, also to the instructors in the history Department of Oklahoma A. & M. College the writer wishes to express his sincere appreciation for the advice and help given him while preparing this thesis.

W. I. M.

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CHAPTER I

The most influential figure at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 was Prince Metternich of Austria, who evolved the Metternichian principle of absolutism for Europe. One of the direct outcomes of this principle was the formation of the Holy Alliance by Prussia, Austria, Russia, and Spain. This Alliance had for its purpose the stamping out in Europe all republican ideas and movements fomented by the French Revolution, and scattered throughout Europe by the Napoleonic conquests.

Another question taken under advisement by the Holy Alliance was the re-conquest of the Latin American countries, to place them again under the domination of Spain. The Alliance considered the re-conquest of these countries imperative for two reasons: first, the restoration of the Spanish monarchical system over her former colonies; second, the uprooting of republican ideas engendered by the revolutions of these countries.

The Spanish colonies in America had refused to recognize the brother of Napoleon as king of Spain, and had declared their independence from the mother country during the period from 1809 to 1823. This created fifteen Spanish-American

republics extending from the Rio Grande in the north to Cape Horn on the South. Most of these republics had patterned their governments after that of the United States, their neighbor to the north. In the past Spain had reaped a rich harvest from her colonial empire and desired to re-attach them, but she realized her impotence to do so without the active aid of her sister monarchies.

The Holy Alliance made overtures to both England and France to join with it in this venture for, without the assistance of France and, at least, the neutrality of Great Britain, she knew the utter futility of its efforts. France, during the Napoleonic wars, had built up a strong veteran army, and Great Britain was supreme on the seas. As allies these two countries would be invaluable, but as enemies they would constitute an impassable barrier to the conquest of Latin America.

France, at first, was inclined to favor the move, but dallied until the policy of England might be ascertained. During the Napoleonic wars England had developed a lucrative trade with the Central and South American countries, and had no desire to see this trade revert to Spanish channels. Through the Polignac Agreement, sometimes called the Polignac Memorandum, England reached an agreement with France, whereby the latter country would take no active part in the reconquest.¹

¹ Palomeque, A., Origenes de la Diplomacia Argentina, Vol. I Paris, France. University of Paris Press, 1928. p. 67.

George Canning, the British Foreign Minister, was contemptuous of the Holy Alliance and its activities. In October, 1822, the powers of Europe had met at Verona to consider the feasibility of restoring the Spanish monarchy in the countries of Central and of South America. Great Britain had withdrawn from that conference in March, 1823. Canning instructed the British minister in Paris to inform the government of France that England could not permit France to acquire any of the former Spanish colonies in America, which resulted in what is commonly known as the Polignac Memorandum, stating:

That his government believed it to be utterly impossible to reduce Spanish America to its former relations to Spain.

That France disclaimed, on Her part, any intention or desire to avail Herself of the present state of the colonies, or of the present situation of France toward Spain, to appropriate to Herself any part of the Spanish possessions in America-----

That she abjured in any case any design of acting against the colonies by force of arms.²

There were many monarchists in France who became intensely angry at Canning's demands and at Polignac's humiliating commitment. The ardent French royalist, Chateaubriand wrote in 1822, "If the New World ever becomes entirely republican, the monarchies of the Old World will perish".³

On August 16, 1823, Canning made informal overtures to Rush, the United States minister to London, looking to a

² Bemis, Samuel Flagg, The Latin American Policy of the United States.
New York, Harcourt, Brace Company, 1943. p. 58.

³ Ibid. p. 60.

joint action between Great Britain and the United States on Latin American Affairs. The letter of August 20 contains a succinct statement of Canning's position. A portion of that letter follows:

Is not the moment come when our governments might understand each other as to the Spanish American colonies? And if we can arrive at such an understanding, would it not be expedient for ourselves, and beneficial for all the world, that the principles of it should be clearly settled and plainly avowed.

For ourselves we have no disguise.

1. We conceive the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless.
2. We conceive the recognition of them as independent states, to be a question of time and circumstance.
3. We are, however, by no means disposed to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between them and the mother country by amicable negotiations.
4. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other power with indifference.⁴

This call from Great Britain for a bi-lateral declaration brought forth hot debates in Congress. President Monroe, Henry Clay, Thomas Jefferson, and many others were in favor of accepting Canning's proposal. The American diplomats had not been in a position to know all the anti-American proposals at the congresses of Vienna and Verona, but they knew enough to be alarmed. They knew of Metternich and his anti-republican system which the monarchies of Europe had accepted. They knew, also, the attitude of the legitimists of Spain.

President Monroe showed his statesmanship by listening to the wily John Quincy Adams, his Secretary of State, who opposed any bi-lateral agreement with Great Britain and, finally,

⁴ Commager, Henry S. (Ed.) Documents of American History.
Third Edition. p. 235.
Binghamton, N. Y., The Vail Ballou Press, 1943.

in December, 1823, much to the confusion and chagrin of Canning, the State Department of the United States issued its unilateral declaration, known since as the Monroe Doctrine.

In essence this was:

----that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for the future colonization by any European power----

----that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system of government to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.

----with the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere.⁵

Probably the most important factor in our determination upon a unilateral declaration was the refusal of Great Britain to outright recognition of the independence of the Latin American republics. The United States had recognized these countries as fully independent states, and Canning's statement: "recognition is a matter of time and circumstance"⁶ made Adams fear future complications and misunderstandings. Then, also, Adams felt that the time had come for the United States to make herself felt in world councils. He said that a bi-lateral declaration with Great Britain would place the United States in the embarrassing position of a "cock-boat in the wake of a British man-of-war".⁷

⁵ Ibid. p. 236.

⁶ Commager, Loc. cit.

⁷ Perkins, Dexter, The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826. p. 9. Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1937.

To the people of the United States the Monroe Doctrine meant, even in that early day, that "America shall be for Americans".⁸ The American people believe in the Monroe Doctrine as an article of faith and as the basis of the foreign policy of the United States. In an advertisement published by The New York Times, December 2, 1923, the centennial of the issuance of the famous Doctrine, Augusta E. Stetson expressed the belief that the Monroe Doctrine is "As binding upon America as our God-inspired Constitution".⁹ An English author once wrote: "The American people, east and west, joined in a paroxysm of enthusiasm for a doctrine of which a hundred conflicting explanations were on their lips".¹⁰ Through the passage of time the principle has become a sentiment, and like every sentiment, it has as many interpretations as there are kinds of people who deal with it.

Although the ideas of the average American become vague and conflicting when he makes an attempt to define the Monroe Doctrine, "its diffuse character is both the difficulty and the advantage, according to circumstance, of using the Monroe Doctrine as a basis for national policy".¹¹

⁸ Reddaway, W. F., The Monroe Doctrine. p. 146.
London. Oxford University Press, 1928.

⁹ New York Times, December 2, 1923.

¹⁰ Reddaway, op. cit. p. 147.

¹¹ American Foreign Relations Vol. I, 1928. p. 579.

President Monroe expressed the Doctrine in his annual message to Congress, December 2, 1823, yet the principles of the Monroe Doctrine had long been in existence. Hamilton forecast it in the Federalist: "Our situation invites and prompts us to aim at an ascendancy in American affairs". Thomas Jefferson considered the United States so remote from the rest of the world that he likened it to China, but he knew it would no longer be remote if European quarrels and reactionary politics penetrated its quietness. In 1830 he wrote to our representative, Short, at Madrid:

The advantages of a cordial fraternization among all the American nations, and the importance of their coalescing in an American system of politics, totally independent of and unconnected with that of Europe, are so great that to overlook them would be antithetical to our national interest. The day is not far distant when we may formally declare a meridian of partition through the ocean which separates the hemispheres, on the hither side of which no European gun shall ever be heard, nor an American on the other; and when, during the rage of the eternal wars of Europe, the Lion and the Lamb, within our regions, shall be drawn together in peace.....The principles of society there and here, then, are radically different, and I hope no American patriot will ever lose sight of the essential policy of interdicting in the seas and territories of both Americas the ferocious and sanguinary contests of Europe.¹²

Madison expressed the same views in 1811 when he wrote of West Florida:

The United States could not see without serious inquietude, any part of a neighboring territory, in which we have, in different respects, so deep and so

12 Thomas, David Y. One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine. p. 61. New York, D. Appleton Company. 1925.

just a concern, pass from the hands of Spain into those of any other foreign power.¹³

The quotations given above show the determined desire of the Americans of this early date to keep European complications from this country, yet the principle was not worked into a systematic policy. For instance, the United States offered no protests when Spain transferred Haiti to France in 1795, but great concern was expressed by this government when a rumor reached Washington of the proposed transfer of Louisiana from Spain to France. But in 1795 France was in the throes of an internal disturbance and the cession of Haiti offered no threat to the security of the United States, while in 1800 Napoleon was becoming powerful, and the autocracy of a dictatorship being transplanted to the Mississippi Valley was to be avoided at all costs.

John Quincy Adams delivered a speech in a Cabinet meeting in 1819 in which he advanced a second motive for the extension of the influence and authority of the United States in the western hemisphere which four years later he included in the Monroe Doctrine. A portion of that speech is as follows:

The world must be familiarized with the idea of considering our proper dominion to be the continent of North America. From the time we became an independent people it was as much a law of nature that this should

¹³ Richardson, James D. (ed.) Messages and Papers of the Presidents. Vol. I. p. 488.

become our pretension as that the Mississippi should flow to the sea. Spain has possessions upon our southern, and Great Britain upon our northern borders. It is impossible that centuries should elapse without finding them annexed to the United States.¹⁴

By the year 1823 the Spanish claims to Florida and Louisiana had been removed, but Great Britain, Russia, and the United States still faced one another in North America. The forty years just coming to a close had seen the population of the United States grow from four million to ten million, and the area increase from 892,000 to 1,792,000 square miles. These forty years marked great changes in other parts of the western hemisphere. Central and South American colonies had obtained their independence.

Hart says:

Never till the present decade has the United States had such a glorious field for diplomacy; in Europe a syndicate of great powers undertook to rule the world, in America a complexus of feeble powers looked to the United States for sympathy, commerce, recognition, aid and comfort.¹⁵

Echoes from Latin America during the first decade following the issuance of the Monroe Doctrine were those of relief and gratitude. Almost invariably they felt that in the United States was found a champion for the weaker nations south of the Rio Grande. Las Heras, the new governor

¹⁴ Perkins, op. cit. pp. 9-10.

¹⁵ Hart, Albert Bushnell, The Monroe Doctrine, An Interpretation. p. 141.
Boston, Massachusetts. Little Brown and Company, 1916.

at Buenos Aires, in a message to the Congress of the La Plata provinces declared:

We are under a large obligation towards the United States of North America. That republic, which since its formation, has presided over the civilization of the New World, has solemnly recognized our independence. At the same time it has made an appeal to our national honor by supposing us capable of struggling single-handedly with the power of Spain, but it has constituted itself the guardian of the field of battle in order that no other foreign power may interfere and give aid to our rival.¹⁶

Russia claimed jurisdiction in Alaska as far south as the fifty-first parallel with the right to colonize. Adams strenuously denied this right for he wished to make the North American continent a special preserve for the United States, to the exclusion of the rest of the world. This dispute came at a time that the reactionary forces of the Holy Alliance in Europe opened an opportunity for the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine.

The attitude of the rest of continental Europe was a reflection of that of Russia toward the Monroe Doctrine. Metternich said that great calamities would be brought upon Europe by the establishment of these vast republics in the New World. Bismarck described it as "an international impertinence". No doubt to most of the minds of European diplomats the Monroe Doctrine was not only a most startling declaration but a statement impossible to enforce.

¹⁶ Robertson, W. S., "South America and the Monroe Doctrine", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XXX. (March, 1915) p. 100.

Never before in the history of nations had a country sealed even one continent from the aggression and expansion of all other nations---Napoleon had attempted it in his Continental Decree but had failed utterly---and here was the United States, not even a second-rate nation, sealing off not one but two continents, both North and South America, from the colonizing aspirations of the imperialistic nations of the Old World.

The two motives for the declaration of the message in 1823 relating to European activities in the New World were: the assurance to the United States of room for expansion, and the fear for American safety if the European powers should increase their influence in the Americas and entrench their political systems in this hemisphere. The histories of the European nations were filled with incontrovertible proof that the American fear was well grounded. The fate of Africa and of Asia would probably have been the fate of Central and South America had the European powers had full sway.

For the first decade following the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine very little adverse criticism came from Latin America. But in 1833 came the British occupation of the Falkland Islands. These islands were claimed by Argentina, who appealed to Washington for redress under the Monroe Doctrine. Andrew Jackson, the President of the United States at that time, was a hater of all things British but, even so, the State Department could see no reason why the

Falkland Island situation should be applicable to the Monroe Doctrine. In the words of the State Department:

----as the new occupation of the Falkland Islands by Great Britain was effected in accordance with a title acquired previously and preserved by that government, it is not seen that the Monroe Doctrine invoked by the Republic of Argentina is applicable in the case.¹⁷

Had the Argentine claims to the Falkland Islands been tenable, Andrew Jackson, with his strong dislike for the English, could not have resisted challenging the British occupation with, at least, some caustic communications.

The refusal of the United States to apply the Monroe Doctrine to the Falkland Island situation brought forth the first really adverse criticism from Latin America. Carlos Pereyra of Argentina sarcastically held up the Monroe Doctrine to ridicule in a series of articles entitled, Mr. Monroe Sleeps. In relation to the above case Pereyra declared:

----The Argentine Republic called in vain at the doors of the Department of State. Mr. Monroe slept profoundly.¹⁸

Again in 1838 two other incidents brought forth from the vitriolic pen of this same author another castigation of the United States for her failure to apply the Monroe Doctrine. Excerpts from these articles are given here:

¹⁷ American State Papers. Foreign Relations, Vol. V. p. 250.
Washington, D. C., Government Printing Press, 1834.

¹⁸ Reynolds, Thomas Harrison, As Our Neighbors See Us,
p. 127.
Stillwater, Oklahoma, (Private Printing).

San Juan de Ulua of Veracruz---was bombarded by the French to demand payment of debts, uncollectible and fraudulent, among which figured that of a pastry firm, because of which that conflict has been called the "Pastry War". Mr. Monroe was not at Veracruz. Many times he has excused his absence saying that Monroism is not concerned with conflicts of this sort, but he has not made exceptions when he had an interest involved.¹⁹

and,

Admiral Leblanc not only blockaded the ports of the Plata but bombarded them as well. Mr. Monroe would have nothing to do with this. ---this matter was arranged with France about the middle of 1850 without the aid of Mr. Monroe.²⁰

Mr. Pereyra is misleading when he states that the United States made no exceptions when she had an interest involved. Prior to the Veracruz incident there is no record of a violation of the Monroe Doctrine since its inception and, in only one case had it been invoked, namely, the Falkland Islands controversy. Mr. Pereyra in writing these articles some seventy-five years after the incidents mentioned above was viewing the whole panorama of violations down the long three quarters of a century and then forming a precept with the three incidents given above.

In the three cases mentioned there is little reason to believe that the fundamentals of the Monroe Doctrine had been violated. In each case the Department of State gave valid reasons, acceptable even to most Latin Americans, why

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 132.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 132.

the Monroe Doctrine was inoperative. The Monroe Doctrine was not conceived to protect irresponsible governments from wrongdoing, but as a formula for the independence of the American republics.

But by the end of the century there was coming from Latin America criticism of the very essence of the Doctrine, i. e., the cession of American territory to European countries. Octavio N. Brito, another writer from Buenos Aires, writes:

Territorial cessions are many times reciprocal interest; the world beheld England transfer to Germany the island of Heligoland without the interests of the participating parties suffering in the least. Also it saw Portugal transfer Soler to Holland for colonial conveniences. ---But today there is denied to the American republics the right to enter upon such transactions; the existing Monroe Doctrine does not permit it. It would permit Chile and Peru to expand, dividing between them Bolivia, and that the latter should disappear from the list of nations, as Poland disappeared, but-----²¹

The opposition to the Monroe Doctrine from Latin America was more or less passive and spasmodic from 1833 to 1848. A few Latin American statesmen like Pereyra and Brito felt that the Monroe Doctrine became operative or inoperative in direct proportion to the material interest of the United States in the case in question and, when operative, that the vigor of the United States in applying the Doctrine varied widely with the various administrations. They felt, with reason, that there was no established policy of en-

²¹ Ibid. p. 137.

forcement. But there were many other statesmen in Latin America who were grateful to the United States, feeling that the Monroe Doctrine served as a line of defense against European aggression.

It is not too surprising that between 1823 and 1848 most of the Latin American opposition to the Monroe Doctrine came from the Republic of Argentina. This opposition stemmed primarily from the agricultural similarity of Argentina and the United States. Wheat, wool, cotton, corn, and the ranching industry were competitive in world markets. The United States led in all these products and erected tariff walls against Argentine competitive products. The similarity of the climate of these two countries led them to embark in similar industries other than agriculture. This did nothing to aid a friendly feeling in the breast of the Argentine. Argentina had the ambition to be the dominant nation in Latin America, and the Monroe Doctrine had placed the United States in the position of tutor-nation to all the Latin American republics. This made Argentina feel that the United States was usurping a position among the Latin American nations that rightfully belonged to Argentina, religiously, linguistically, culturally, and geographically. It is easy to see why the proud national-minded Argentine can see little good in anything proposed by his North American competitor.

With the annexation of Texas and the acquisition of Oregon other Latin Americans began to look upon the United States

with suspicion. But with the war of 1848 between Mexico and the United States, which resulted in the United States taking much land formerly owned by Mexico, the countries South of the Rio Grande turned an almost united front against their neighbor to the north. Their suspicions changed to fear. Where before only a few had the courage of their convictions to openly warn their peoples of the intentions of the "octopus" of the North, now there was scarcely a writer or statesman from the Rio Grande to Cape Horn that dared openly champion the United States.

Latin Americans re-read the Monroe Doctrine, and realized to their consternation, that it forbade European aggression, but made no such provision against the New World aggression. The declaration of the "American fiat" by the Department of State in 1895 followed two years later by the Spanish American War gave to the suspicious Latin American mind the last bit of evidence needed to convince it that the "manifest destiny" of the United States was not the Pacific Ocean but Cape Horn.

CHAPTER II

There had been a disagreement between Great Britain and Venezuela over the boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela. This disagreement had been one of long standing, almost from the time of the formation of the Venezuelan republic, but, as the territory concerned in the dispute was uninhabited, except by a few roving bands of semi-civilized Carib Indians, nothing was done to settle the dispute until 1876. At that time Venezuela called upon the United States to use her influence with Great Britain in this controversy. Hamilton Fish, the Secretary of State at that time, showed little more than a friendly interest. After tentatively feeling out the attitude of Great Britain and finding her indisposed to arbitration, Fish let the matter slide. Public opinion in England was rather hostile to the United States at this time, due to the adverse decision rendered by the Geneva Tribunal on the Alabama claims and, possibly, Fish did not want to heighten that hostility. Whatever the reason may have been, the State Department did not push the Venequelan request.

Ten years later in 1886 Bayard, then Secretary of State, tendered the services of the State Department as mediator of the boundary dispute, but Great Britain was indisposed to

the request for mediation.¹ As a result diplomatic relations between the two disputing countries were severed. The succeeding secretaries of State, Blaine in 1890, and Gresham in 1894, in turn offered their offices as mediator, but again and yet again Great Britain refused to mediate. Because of the non-economic value of the territory neither country cared to assume the cost of mediation procedure, but with the discovery of gold in the disputed territory the question suddenly became of acute importance.

Olney, President Cleveland's Secretary of State, carried on a voluminous correspondence with Lord Salisbury, striving to convince Great Britain of the necessity for negotiating this dispute through mediation or arbitration. Olney maintained that the Monroe Doctrine required American intervention on behalf of arbitration. Salisbury replied to the effect that the question was not applicable to the Monroe Doctrine. The inept manner in which Olney stated his arguments, and the suave method used by the shrewd Salisbury in confuting these arguments cannot be better shown than by quoting here verbatim portions of this correspondence.

Olney to Salisbury:

----there are circumstances under which a nation may

¹ House Executive Documents, 1887.
Foreign Relations of the United States. pp. 698-701.

justly intervene in a controversy to which two or more nations are the direct and immediate parties----is an admitted canon of international law. It is declared in substance that a nation may avail itself of this right whenever what is done or proposed by any of the parties primarily concerned is a serious and direct menace to its own integrity, tranquility and welfare.²

The right of intervention in international law has never been, and perhaps cannot be, precisely defined. The phrase which Olney used to define it is not an altogether unwarrantable extension of its scope, though the word "welfare" is a term of rather elastic proportions. Olney himself admitted that this wide scope of the rule had only too often been made a cloak for schemes of spoliation and aggrandizement.³

Olney to Salisbury:

----distance and three thousand miles of intervening ocean make any permanent political union between a European state and an American state unnatural and inexpedient----that the above would hardly be denied.⁴

It was very unfortunate for the American case that Olney made the above statement, for the wily Salisbury confuted the argument by citing to Olney the possessions that England had in the western hemisphere, and that the political union between them and the mother country was becoming stronger. Furthermore, England had every right to believe

² Perkins, Dexter, The Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907.
p. 154.

³ Ibid. p. 158.

⁴ Ibid. p. 161.

that the union would be permanent. Salisbury was more than ready to 'deny' the above.

In describing the relations between the United States and the Latin American countries, Olney writes:

---by geographic proximity, by natural sympathy, by similarity of governmental constitutions, we are friends and allies, commercially and politically.⁵

But Olney was extravagant and inaccurate in this statement as Salisbury was not slow to point out to him. Salisbury pointed out that many of the capitols of the South American republics were farther from Washington than from the capitols of Europe. He also quoted trade balances to show that the trade between England and some of the Latin American countries far exceeded that of the United States, showing that Latin American commercial interests were closer to European centers than to those in Yankee-land.

In this correspondence Olney advanced the "big brother" feeling of the United States for the Latin American republics. It would have been well had he stopped there, but he stressed the "superiority" of the United States over other American commonwealths. A portion of that letter follows:

Today the United States is practically supreme on this continent, and its fiat is law upon such subjects to which it confines its interposition. ---because, in addition to all other grounds, the infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practi-

⁵ Ibid. p. 161-162.

cally invulnerable as against all powers.⁶

This doctrine was disquieting, not only to European nations with interests in America but, also, to the nations of Latin America, to whom the talk of an American "fiat" had an ominous ring. Lord Salisbury's answer to Olney is extremely important in that it denied the applicability of the Venezuelan situation to the Monroe Doctrine, unless the United States chose to place an entirely new interpretation upon that doctrine. The interpretation according to Salisbury was:

-----such a claim would have imposed upon the United States the duty of answering for the conduct of these states, and consequently the responsibility of controlling them. It follows of necessity that if the Government of the United States will not control the conduct of these communities, neither can it undertake to protect them from the consequences attaching to any misconduct of which they may be guilty toward other nations.⁷

This interpretation is included in the premises of the Roosevelt Corollary which came a decade later. Theodore Roosevelt, by virtue of his position in the War Department in the administration of William McKinley which followed the second Cleveland administration, was familiar with the Olney-Salisbury correspondence, and doubtless, formed his famous Corollary upon this reply of Salisbury to Olney. This interpretation, in many instances, would mean active intervention in the internal disturbances of Latin America, a step the framers of the Monroe Doctrine did not

⁶ Richardson, James D. (ed.), Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. IX. p. 637.

⁷ Ibid. p. 576.

conceive. The Cleveland administration evidently accepted this interpretation, for the President placed the entire Olney-Salisbury correspondence in the hands of Congress on December 17, 1895. This, together with his message on that date, was nothing more nor less than an ultimatum to Great Britain to accept arbitration in the Venezuelan boundary dispute or, to consider herself at war with the United States.

England was faced with a war with the Boers in her south African colonies and, when on January 3 Kaiser William of Germany sent his famous telegram of sympathy to Paul Kruger⁸, the Boer leader, Salisbury realized that a war with Germany might easily result. With these troubles facing her in the eastern hemisphere, England could ill afford a conflict in the Americas. Lord Salisbury acquiesced in the American demands for arbitration, not that he was convinced of the justness of the demand but from pressing necessity.

The Latin American countries were watching rather uneasily and anxiously this contest between the United States and Great Britain. Their sympathies were wholeheartedly with Venezuela in the boundary dispute, but they were hesitant to accept the United States as their champion. After Olney's declaration of the American "fiat" in his correspondence with Salisbury, the countries to the south indignantly

⁸ Brice, Right Hon. James, M. P., Briton and Boer. p. 134. London, Harper Brothers Publishing Co. 1909.

protested with tongue and pen. They were afraid of the unpredictable North American "octopus" that considered herself all-powerful in the Western Hemisphere. They lauded the arbitration decision of Great Britain as a magnanimous gesture, but looked with canny uneasiness upon the nation that brought that decision. Olney attempted to soften his "fiat" statement by calling personally upon the ministers of these countries that resided in Washington, but was met with cool suspicion. These nations strongly suspected a State Department that talked to Great Britain in one vein, and to Latin America in another.⁹

Many Latin American statesmen in reading Salisbury's reply to Olney saw the threat of intervention by the United States hanging over all these southern republics. Immediately Washington was flooded with appeals from Latin America to the State Department for a definition of the conditions under which the United States might consider intervention necessary. The State Department replied by quoting the Guatemalan Decree No. 491:

The intervention of a foreign government in behalf of its citizens, either directly or through its diplomatic or consular agents, is admissable and proper only in case of denial of justice or the willful delay in its administration after all the usual means established by law have been exhausted.¹⁰

⁹ Martin, Prof. P. A., "Arbitration in the Caribbean". p. 1-48. Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. IV, No. 1, Feb. 1921.

¹⁰ House Executive Documents, 3rd Session 53rd Congress, 1894-95. Vol. I. Guatemalan Decree, No.491, p. 317-331.

The Latin American countries were not satisfied with this answer. They were familiar with this phase of intervention under international law. Most of the countries of the world recognized this general interpretation, and had conceded that under the above conditions any foreign country had the right of intervention. But what these Spanish American republics desired was a concise statement of the conditions under which the United States might intervene in America according to the new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, so clearly outlined by Salisbury in his answer to Olney. They wanted the United States to state its policy of intervention when applied to an American republic.

Finally the State Department gave them the following answer:

If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Inability to do the above may require intervention by some civilized nation, and, in the Western Hemisphere, the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctant, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.¹¹

This blunt and almost insulting answer to the question they had been asking brought forth a barrage of protests and vitriolic condemnations from Latin America.

The Spanish-American War, coming quickly after the giving of the above answer, found a divided Latin America. All the

¹¹ Ibid. Title VI, Art. 71, p. 211.

republics were in sympathy with the Cuban revolutionists, as they were with Venezuela in her boundary dispute with Great Britain but, yet again, they were loath to accept the United States as the Latin American champion. The treaty ending the war, followed by the Platt Amendment, increased their suspicion of the ultimate intentions of the United States.

Dr. Rios Calvo, an eminent Argentine authority on international law, took up the cudgel for the Latin American republics. In his condemnation of the intervention idea he went so far as to deny the right of intervention for any cause. Dr. Calvo writes:

It is certain that foreigners who establish themselves in a country have the same protection as nationals, but they cannot lay claim to a protection more extended. If they suffer any wrong they have the right to expect the government to pursue the delinquents, but they should not, in any case, claim from the state to which the violence belongs any indemnity whatever.¹²

Another Argentine, A. Palomeque, like Dr. Calvo, maintained that when a person entered a country, or invested money in a country, he risked the hazards of that country, whether those hazards be political, social, or economic. And, furthermore, that person had no right to appeal to the country of his citizenship for redress should he meet loss. In the words of A. Palomeque:

It is to be presupposed that he estimated and evaluated his chances before entering or investing in the country. Only in case of danger to his person may he appeal to his government for protection, and

¹² Thomas, David Y., op. cit. p. 212.

then only when all the resources of local authority has failed to give him that protection.¹³

The feeling in Latin America became so strong that many of the ministries and consulates of the United States were endangered. Repeatedly, the State Department had to warn the republics to the south against permitting these disorders. In Costa Rica and Guatemala marines were landed to protect our consulates. Feeling ran so high that diplomatic relations were badly strained.

Then followed a number of connecting events that made the alienation from Latin America more complete, namely: The negotiations with Colombia for the right to build an isthmian canal; Colombia's refusal to accede to the treaty provisions relative to the canal; the revolution in Panama and the immediate recognition of the independence of Panama from Colombia by the United States, and the active intervention of the latter in preventing Colombian troops from stamping out the revolution; the treaty with Panama concerning the Canal Zone.

Many of the republics had invited investments from the financiers in the United States. These investments covered practically all their natural resources and economic products of the soil, such as: mines, nitrate fields, hardwoods, and plantations of sugar, bananas, coffee, and rubber. After the Canal Zone incident, these countries that contained

¹³ Palomeque, A., op. cit. pp. 39-42.

heavy American investments, felt that the United States flag might follow its capital. This fear seemed well grounded.

In December, 1902, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy established a blockade of Venezuelan ports with a view to forcing the payment of debts. The United States minister to Venezuela immediately proposed arbitration. Great Britain readily accepted the proposal, probably because her acceptance of arbitration in the earlier Venezuelan boundary dispute had served as a precedent. Italy soon followed the lead of Great Britain in accepting arbitration, but Germany, at first, flatly refused to arbitrate the question.

Theodore Roosevelt, who was President of the United States at the time, was devoted to the Monroe Doctrine, and was one of the most ardent champions of the Cleveland-Olney policy in Latin America in 1895. He was a firm believer in the "big brother" attitude of the United States toward the Latin American republics. He went even further than the Cleveland administration in defining the intervention policy of the United States in America. Roosevelt in his message to Congress, December 6, 1904, stated, unequivocally, the role the United States would play in regard to the American republics. The statement follows:

-----inasmuch as we permit no European nation to intervene in the affairs of the Latin American countries, we must ourselves assume the responsibility of preserving life and property in these countries.¹⁴

14 Commager, op. cit. p. 213.

This statement is called the "Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine". Never, at any previous time, had the United States denied any European nation the privilege of protecting its citizens in Latin America. The United States had, to be sure, prohibited European countries from establishing their governments on territory regularly constituted within the boundaries of any American republic; to wit, the Maximilian episode in Mexico during the Civil War.¹⁵ But to constitute itself the guardian over all Latin America, to shield these countries from European intervention from without and dissensions from within, was an entirely new role for the United States. She had compelled Great Britain to arbitrate the Venezuelan boundary dispute, but that involved territory claimed by the Venezuelan republic, also an extension of a European colony, both of which would have been an infringement upon the Monroe Doctrine. This "corollary" if carried out, would necessitate intervention for almost any cause or, at the behest of any European country that might have a real or an imagined complaint against any Central or South American republic. This statement was even more direct than the blunt answer given in 1895 defining the intervention policy of the United States.¹⁶

In the Venezuelan debt controversy of 1902, Roosevelt upheld the Monroe Doctrine in compelling Germany to arbitrate,

¹⁵ Richardson, op. cit. Vol. III, pp. 89-101.

¹⁶ Hart, op. cit. pp. 145-153.

for there was a real threat in the German attempt to occupy "temporarily" Venezuelan soil. The suspicion which Roosevelt had toward all foreigners and foreign nations probably had as much to do with his attitude toward Germany in Venezuela as his desire to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. He had denounced the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty with indignation as a surrender of the principles of 1823.¹⁷ But in his "corollary" he was following the logical conclusions of the Olney "fiat" doctrine. He was in full agreement with the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine that Salisbury suggested to Olney in 1895.¹⁸

Mr. Roosevelt, however, was not consistent with his "Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine". In his correspondence with Mr. Dodge, our ambassador to Germany, he disavows any responsibility of the United States government for any liabilities incurred in Venezuela. He writes:

It gives me great pleasure to say that I would be glad if such an arrangement could be made as might obviate the necessity of any exhibition of force on the part of Germany and Great Britain. You will understand, however, that the United States Government assumes no obligation whatever in the nature either of a material or moral guarantee of any liabilities created by the transaction.¹⁹

¹⁷ Rippey, James Ford, Latin America in World Politics, p. 226. New York. F. S. Crofts & Company, 1938.

¹⁸ Richardson, James D. (ed.), Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. IX. p. 637.

¹⁹ Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 419.

This statement is in direct variance with the statement made in his Corollary December 6, 1904, the following year. No doubt the attitude of Germany in this situation forced Mr. Roosevelt to conclude that if the United States did not desire European occupation in the Western Hemisphere, the best method to gain our desire would be to remove all excuse for European intervention by guaranteeing to the European countries that life and property would be safe in Latin American countries.

When Germany refused to arbitrate the Venezuelan debt controversy, the United States asked Germany to state her intentions toward Venezuela. This she refused to do for some time. Roosevelt, in his correspondence with Henry Cabot Lodge, shows plainly his suspicion of German intentions. In his letter he says:

Some friends of mine who have been at the German field maneuvers last year were greatly impressed with the evident intention of the German military classes to take a fall out of us when the opportunity offers. I find the Germans regard our failure to go forward in building up the Navy this year as a sign that our spasm of preparation, as they think it, has come to an end; that we shall sink back, so that a few years hence they will be in a position to take some step in the West Indies or South America which will make us either put up or shut up on the Monroe Doctrine; they are counting on their ability to trounce us if we try the former horn of the dilemma.²⁰

and in another letter he states:

I am anxious to keep on friendly relations with Germany----I do not desire to see the United States gain any territory in South America itself, and that, so far as I am concerned, I will do all in my power to have the United States take the attitude that no

European nation, Germany or any other, should gain a foot of soil in any shape or way in South America, or establish a protectorate under any disguise over any South or Central American state.²¹

Herr von Hollebin, the German ambassador to Washington, denied that Germany had any territorial ambitions in America, and, that enemies of Germany had been trying to disturb the friendly relations that existed between Germany and the United States by making assertions of that nature.²² Nevertheless, the German ambassador intimated that it might be necessary for Germany to occupy temporarily some of the ports or islands along the Venezuelan coast.

Roosevelt felt that his suspicion of the intentions of Germany was justified. Admiral Dewey was ordered to maneuver the American fleet in the Caribbean area, and in a supposed conversation with Hollebin, Roosevelt said:

Tell the Kaiser that I have put Dewey in charge of the fleet maneuver in the West Indian waters--- that popular feeling is such that I shall be obliged to interfere by force, if necessary, if the Germans take any action which looks like acquisition of territory, there or elsewhere along the Caribbean.²³

Whether this above conversation took place or not, is not pertinent to the point in question, yet the action of Dewey in the Caribbean is evidence that Roosevelt was more than willing to carry out the above threat. Germany

²¹ Ibid. p. 485.

²² Pringle, H. F., Theodore Roosevelt. p. 389.
New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931.

²³ Ibid. p. 402.

evidently thought so, also, for she immediately consented to the arbitration of the Venezuelan debt issue.

Yet, this enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine does not cover all the implications of the corollary which Roosevelt stated a year later. In the above case the threat of territorial aggression by a European power was a reality, as any student of German history will verify, which would have been a direct infringement upon the Monroe Doctrine. It was not until the Santo Domingo affair and the Nicaraguan occupation by our marines that the United States lived up to the full implications of the "corollary". The Roosevelt Corollary imposed obligations upon the United States which were in no way intended by the framers of the Monroe Doctrine, and which have been deeply resented by the Latin American peoples.

After Germany, England, and Italy had agreed to arbitration a commission was set up to adjust the claims against Venezuela. The disputants agreed that the United States should take over the revenues from the custom houses at Guayra and Puerto Cabello, and thirty per cent of these customs should be applied upon the debt. Then came the question of what country or countries should have preferential rights. Venezuela was in debt to many countries other than the three that had intervened. This question was placed before the Hague Court of Permanent Arbitration. The court rendered the following decision:

Venezuela having agreed to put aside thirty per cent of the revenues of the customs of La Guayra and

Puerto Cabello for the payment of the claims of all nations against Venezuela, the three countries named have a right to preferential payment of their claims by means of these thirty per cent of the receipts of the two Venezuelan ports mentioned above, for the following reasons-----

Germany, Great Britain, and Italy have a right to preferential treatment for the payment of their claims against Venezuela.

Done at The Hague, in Permanent Court of Arbitration, 22nd February 1904.²⁴

Unequivocally, this decision that Germany, Great Britain, and Italy, the intervening powers that had used force, had preferential rights in receiving the payment of their claims ahead of the nations who had been content with a peaceful solution, placed a premium in international law upon forced intervention against a delinquent state. In so doing it put to American diplomacy a very serious dilemma. Within the strategic radius of the Panama Canal there were other Latin American countries in the Caribbean and Central American Zone whose irresponsibility toward their just obligations to foreigners was almost as confirmed as Venezuela, and whose political stability was continuously uncertain.

Either the United States must recognize this sanctioned right of European intervention, now juridically sanctioned, and the contingent possibility of foreign danger to the Monroe Doctrine in the neighborhood of the Panama Canal or it must itself vicariously assume responsibility for the justice to the foreign nationals so that their governments would not have to intervene. The assumption of such responsibility entailed intervention by the United States itself. This

²⁴ Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, 61st Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Document No. 357. pp. 1879-1881.

was the dilemma, then: Should the United States stand by with folded arms while non-American powers, backed in principle by a Hague Court decision, intervened and perhaps ensconced themselves in strategic positions from which in the future they might cut the Panama life line and the security of the Continental Republic; or, Should it intervene itself to guarantee justice and responsibility in strategically located countries whose condition invited foreign intervention, and thereby run the risk of incurring by its own intervention the misunderstanding and animosity of the neighboring republics.²⁵

This was not a new question by any means. Before the Civil War Senator Sam Houston of Texas advocated establishing a protectorate over Mexico and placing a service on her foreign bonds to extricate her from British debt.²⁶ In 1869 Secretary Seward favored taking over the collection of Venezuela customs to pay the foreign debt of that country,²⁷ and in 1881 Secretary Blaine suggested a similar procedure for that same republic.²⁸

In December, 1858, Senator Sam Houston introduced a resolution in the Senate advocating the protectorate over Mexico. The resolution is given here:

The events connected with the numerous efforts of the people of Mexico to establish, upon a reliable basis, an orderly system of self-government, have invariably resulted in complete failure; and whereas the condition of Mexico is such as to excite alarming apprehensions that she may precipitate herself into a wild condition of anarchy; and the more so, as she has

²⁵ Bemis, op. cit. pp. 151-153.

²⁶ Malloy, op. cit. pp. 893-895.

²⁷ Ibid. pp. 1366-1367.

²⁸ Ibid. pp. 1694.

demonstrated, from time to time her utter inability to suppress internal commotions and to conquer the hords of bandits by which she is inhabited; and whereas the United States of America, on account of the Continental policy which they cherish and desire to enforce, can never permit Mexico to be resubjugated by Spain, or placed under the dominion of any foreign power; and whereas one of the most important duties devolving upon civilized governments is to exact from adjoining nations the observance of good neighborhood, thus shielding themselves against impending or even remote injury to their border security: Therefore---

Resolved, That a select committee of seven be raised to inquire into and report to the Senate whether or not it is expedient for the government of the United States of America to declare and maintain a protectorate over the so-called republic of Mexico, in such form and to such an extent as shall be necessary to secure to this Union good neighborhood, and to the people of said country the benefits of an orderly and well regulated republican government.²⁹

This committee of seven was selected but as five of the seven were from the South, and the Civil War soon followed no report was ever presented to the Senate. The conditions in Mexico directly following the Civil War, that is, the overthrowing of the Mexican government by the French, revealed to the United States what could happen when an irresponsible government was permitted to go its own way. Then, too, the Maxmillan affair in Mexico showed to what lengths a European power might go to obtain holdings in the new world. William Seward, Secretary of State during the Lincoln-Johnson administrations, was highly in favor of the protectorate idea, but he was dealing with Russia for Alaska,

²⁹ Miscellaneous Documents, 1st Session 35th Congress,
Vol. 3, 1857-58.

and as Alaska bordered on English possessions in Canada, it behooved him to step lightly in Mexico for fear of British antagonism.³⁰ The United States had just gone through a devastating four year civil war--a war in which England had shown decided Southern sympathies--and was not in a position to push matters in foreign diplomacy to the extent she might otherwise have.

President Roosevelt in his message to Congress December 4, 1906, intimated that ill-feeling might result in Latin America in regard to the carrying out of the Corollary he had pronounced to the Monroe Doctrine. In this message he said:

In many parts of South America there has been much misunderstanding of the attitude and purposes of the United States toward the other American republics. An idea has become prevalent that our assertion of the Monroe Doctrine implied or carried with it an assumption of superiority and of a right to exercise some kind of a protectorate over the countries to whose territory that Doctrine applies. Nothing could be further from the truth.³¹

In this message he quoted words from a speech by Elihu Root, the Secretary of State, to the Pan-American conference at Rio de Janeiro. The portion quoted is as follows:

We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest

30 Lodge, Henry Cabot, William Henry Seward, pp. 23
New York, N. Y., Houghton Mifflin Company. 1892.

31 Congressional Record, 59th Congress, 2nd Session. p. 32
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
"Division of Intercourse and Education, Publication
No. 17."

empire and we deem the observance of that respect the chief guarantee of the weak against the oppression of the strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights or privileges or powers that we do not freely concede to every American Republic.³²

Mr. Roosevelt in his message to Congress, December 6, 1904, had outlined what the policy of the United States would be toward Latin America. A rather lengthy portion of that speech applying to Latin America is given here:

It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards the other nations of the Western Hemisphere save such as are for their welfare. All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. If every country washed by the Caribbean Sea would show the progress in stable and just civilization which, with the aid of the Platt Amendment, Cuba has shown since our troops left the island, and which so many of the republics of both Americas are constantly and brilliantly showing, all questions of interference by this nation with their affairs would be at an end. Our interests and those of our southern neighbors are in reality identical. They have great natural riches, and if within their borders the reign of law and justice obtains, prosperity is sure to come to them. While they thus obey the primary laws of civilized society they may rest assured that they will be treated by us in a spirit of cordial and helpful sympathy. We would interfere with them only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or

³² Richardson, James D., Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Volume X, 1897-1909, pp. 831-832.

unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States, or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations. It is a mere truism to say that every nation, whether in America or anywhere else, which desires to maintain its freedom, its independence, must ultimately realize that the right of such independence cannot be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it.³³

In the correspondence between the Department of State and the intervening powers in the Venezuelan debt controversy, Mr. Hay recognized the right of foreign intervention under certain conditions. The Secretary of State said:

---that the government of the United States, although it regretted that European powers should use force against Central and South American countries, could not object to redress for injuries suffered by their subjects, provided no acquisition of territory was contemplated.³⁴

When the intervening powers were offering objections to the right of the United States in asking arbitration, Mr. Hay replied:

Quite independently of the Monroe Doctrine, however, there is a rule of conduct among nations under which each nation is deemed bound to render the good offices of friendship to the others when they are in trouble. The rule has been crystallized in the provision of the Hague Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Under the head of "The Maintenance of General Peace" in that Convention substantially all the powers of the world have agreed.³⁵

This Hague Convention which Mr. Hay used to combat the arguments of Great Britain, Italy and especially of Germany is given here in its entirety:

33 Ibid. pp. 841-842.

34 Ibid. p. 723.

35 Ibid. p. 724.

With a view to obviating as far as possible recourse to force in the relations between States, the Contracting Powers agree to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement of international differences.

In case of serious disagreement of dispute, before an appeal to arms, the Contracting Powers agree to have recourse, as far as circumstances allow to the good offices of mediation of one or more friendly powers.

Independently of this recourse, the Contracting Powers deem it expedient and desirable that one or more Powers, strangers to the dispute, should on their own initiative and as far as circumstances allow, offer their good offices or mediation to the States at variance. The exercise of this right can never be regarded by either of the parties in dispute as an unfriendly act.

The part of the mediator consists in reconciling the opposing claims and appeasing the feelings of resentment which may have arisen between the States at variance.³⁶

At the Second International Conference held at Mexico City, Mexico, in 1901, the convention drew up a similar arbitration clause for the American Nations to take care of cases involving investment losses and other property damages. The clause is as follows:

The High contracting parties agree to submit to arbitration all claims for pecuniary loss or damage which may be presented by their respective citizens and which can not be amicably adjusted through diplomatic channels and when said claims are of sufficient importance to warrant the expense of arbitration.³⁷

President Castro of Venezuela evidently thought he could depend upon the United States enforcing the Monroe Doctrine, hence his rather arrogant consideration of Great Britain, Italy, and Germany, and of their demands upon his

³⁶ Ibid. p. 724.

³⁷ Latane, John Holliday, America as a World Power, p. 282. New York. Harper & Bros. Publishers, 1907.

country. At first he opposed arbitration thinking that he would gain more by invoking the Monroe Doctrine than from an arbitration court. But when Secretary Hay conceded the right of the intervening powers to look after the interests of their respective citizens if the acquisition of territory was not contemplated,³⁸ Castro immediately declared himself favorable to arbitration.

The reluctance of Germany to accept arbitration created a strong suspicion of her intentions in the mind of President Roosevelt, and the State Department demanded that Germany state unequivocally her intentions in Venezuela. When Hollebin couched his answer in ambiguous diplomatic language, Roosevelt took immediate action to safeguard the Panama Canal and other Caribbean territory by ordering our Navy to alert. It is merely guesswork to say that Germany would have permanently occupied Caribbean territory had not Roosevelt taken such forceful steps to prevent it, but the diplomatic Bismarck was no longer at the helm of Germany, but an unpredictable, arrogant, ambitious autocrat who had shown himself only too willing to create in other quarters feelings of uneasiness and disquietude, as was indicated by the Kaiser's telegram of congratulation to Paul Kruger of the Boers.³⁹

³⁸ Ante. p. 34.

³⁹ Brice, Loc. cit.

This suspicion followed by the decision of the Hague Tribunal giving preference to Great Britain, Italy, and Germany, the intervening powers, in receiving payments on their debts,⁴⁰ gave the Roosevelt administration little choice in deciding its Latin American policy if the United States still adhered to the Monroe Doctrine. There were many warm arguments in the Cabinet meetings but the members of the Cabinet lined up with Roosevelt in his determination to forestall any excuse for European intervention in the Americas by promulgating the "Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine."

There has been considerable criticism of Roosevelt and his Caribbean policy. This criticism has come from all quarters of the globe where nations and historians exist. But if one looks closely at the Monroe Doctrine itself and the conditions which called it forth it is easy to see the twofold purpose of the original framers of the Doctrine had in mind. In 1823 only a half-century had elapsed since the United States had declared its independence from England, whose idea of a colonial possession was that it existed solely for the benefit of the mother country. At the time the Monroe Doctrine was issued England had progressed somewhat from that idea, yet the continental nations of Europe were extremely reactionary and held to the merchantile theory of colonial expansion. These nations were aggressive autocratic nations, and had combined in the Holy Alliance to the

⁴⁰ Ante. p. 30.

primary purpose of stamping out all republican ideas. Monroe, Adams, and other statesmen of the United States desired to keep the American continents free of that political system which, being diametrically opposed to the principles of the government of the United States, they felt would have brought these two political ideologies into sanguinary conflict upon these continents. The American statesmen also desired that the Americas be open to the free expansion of the United States.

This two-fold purpose of the Monroe Doctrine does not imply necessarily an arbitrary unilateral assumption of power. Democracy was in danger of being stamped out by the autocratic countries from whom the American nations had won their independence. The Monroe Doctrine was the continental declaration of the determination of the United States to keep that independence intact. The more backward nations of Latin America have in the past resented the methods of the United States in enforcing the Doctrine, especially when the enforcement has seemed to conform to the economic interests of the United States. But time has vindicated the stand of the latter, in that in the Hemispheric Solidarity program the nations of the Americas have made the Monroe Doctrine their own. Today the American nations are united behind the two-fold purpose of the Monroe Doctrine: to preserve the American continents for American nations, and to keep out of America the autocratic nations of Europe and Asia.

As conditions changed the methods of carrying out the purposes of the Monroe Doctrine necessarily changed. At the time of the Roosevelt administration the only effective method of preventing European nations from absorbing American territory seemed to be for the United States to assume the position of "big brother" to the less developed weaker nations of Latin America. This was irritating to the Latin American countries, for they felt the humiliation in being forced to accept the protection of the United States.

The Monroe Doctrine is not a past issue of merely historical interest. It is the living symbol of dedication of purpose. It is a declaration of challenge to autocracies that democracy will determine its own destiny. It is the consecration of the soil of the Americas to the democratic way of life. There have been desecrations of this ideal within the borders of America itself, yes, even within the borders of the United States, but they have come primarily from within our collective body politic, like the eruption of boils on an otherwise healthy physical body, and not from European aggressiveness.

Theodore Roosevelt has given expression to the ideals which have been held before the American people in the Monroe Doctrine when he said in 1905:

If we had refused to apply the Doctrine to changing conditions it would now be completely outworn, it would not meet any of the needs of the present day, and indeed would probably by this time have sunk into complete oblivion. It is useful at home, and is meeting with recognition abroad because we have adapted our application of it to meet the growing and changing needs of

the Hemisphere. When we announce a policy, such as the Monroe Doctrine, we thereby commit ourselves to the consequences of the policy, and those consequences from time to time alter.⁴¹

Many Latin Americans and Europeans have accused the United States of following a policy of self-interest in the application of the Monroe Doctrine.⁴² Every phase of the Monroe Doctrine has been in the interest of the United States, but not of the United States alone. Why promulgate a policy that would not be of interest to the nation promulgating it? Since when has it become disgraceful for statesmen to advocate a policy advantageous to their nation? But the advantage has not been to the United States alone, but to every nation in the Americas by insuring them against the imperialistic autocratic expansion of the European nations. The method used by the United States has at times been arbitrary in the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, but that method has been efficacious, the results have been salutary for the American nations. In 1904 and 1905 had the United States waited to ask the opinion of all the other American nations in a called convention, Germany would have had ample time to perfect her intentions in Venezuela whatever those intentions may have been, and had they been aggressive occupation of Venezuelan territory, a costly and sanguinary conflict might have resulted.

⁴¹ House Documents, Vol. I, 59th Congress 1st Session.
p. 49.

⁴² Reynolds, Loc. cit.

Dr. Carlos Rodriguez Larreta, the Argentine minister of Foreign Affairs, in 1905 expressed his deep appreciation and that of his country for the forthright method of the Roosevelt administration in handling the menace involved in the Venezuelan debt controversy.⁴³ President Diaz of Mexico also sent a personal telegram of congratulations to President Roosevelt upon the satisfactory conclusion of the Venezuelan trouble.

⁴³ House Documents, Vol. I., 59th Congress 1st Session.
p. XXXIII.

CHAPTER III

The reaction from South and Central America was not all favorable, however. From Argentina came the writings of Carlos Pereyra who criticized bitterly not only the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, but the Monroe Doctrine itself. In his book entitled: El Meto de Monroe he states, "from its inception in the message of Monroe in 1823, to 1895, Monroism has been subject to eclipses, sometimes partial and at other times total".¹

In many cases the "corollary" aroused so much suspicion and hatred that American lives were jeopardized, American investments suffered, and American trade fell off considerably. European trade increased in proportion. From 1900 to 1933 very few of the Latin Americans looked favorably upon the United States. Dr. Larreta of Argentina and President Diaz of Mexico were two Latin American statesmen who stood forth boldly in favoring Roosevelt's policy as briefly stated in his Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Pereyra, Calvo, Drago, and many other Ibero-American statesmen were among those who showed marked antagonism toward the Roosevelt interpretation of the Doctrine.

¹ Reynolds, op. cit. p. 131.

With the exception of Alaska and a few island possessions the expansion of the United States had been at the expense of Spanish America. The Louisiana Purchase was territory wrested from Spain by Napoleon by the treaty of San Il de Fonso in 1800, Florida was an outright purchase from Spain in 1819, while West Florida was land seized by the United States in 1811 which belonged to Spain. The annexation of Texas and the Mexican cession, together with the Gadsden Purchase in 1854, were effected at the expense of Mexico, a former colony of Spain. Panama Canal Zone, the islands of the Caribbean, Phillipines, Hawaii, and the other Pacific islands once were portions of the domain of Spain.

Latin Americans who had studied the history of the territorial expansion of the United States could not but see that it followed the path of least resistance. With the expression of the Ostend Manifesto in 1854,² the Manifest Destiny,³ and other like statements of pseudo-statesmen, it is difficult to understand how the peoples of Latin America could look other than with suspicion upon the United States. To many of them the Mexican War seemed a war of deliberate aggression followed by the imperialistic treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo. It seemed to them that whatever

² Weinberg, Albert Katz, Manifest Destiny, pp. 38-75.
Baltimore, Md., The John Hopkins Press, 1935.

³ Hart. op. cit. pp. 54-59.

the United States desired and could not obtain by treaty or purchase, she took by force of arms.

This feeling became prevalent in all the countries south of the Rio Grande, and remained hostile even after the United States retreated somewhat from her territorial imperialistic policy under the administrations following Theodore Roosevelt. The Platt Amendment forced upon Cuba in 1901,⁴ the Olney "fiat" statement in 1895,⁵ the method used in obtaining the Panama Canal Zone,⁶ and the statement of the Roosevelt "corollary", none of these was any assistance in recovering the lost prestige of the United States in Latin America, but only served to antagonize still further the countries of Central and South America.

Woodrow Wilson in his Mobile speech said that the United States would never seek an additional foot of territory by conquest, and that he deplored diplomacy based upon the economic interests.⁷ Latin Americans received this speech with elation, but the intervention in Haiti⁸, Nicaragua⁹,

⁴ Commager, op. cit. p. 321.

⁵ Richardson, (ed.) Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. IX. p. 637.

⁶ Wish, Harvey. Contemporary America, pp. 110-113. New York, N.Y., Harper & Brothers, 1945.

⁷ Ibid. p. 183.

⁸ Ibid. pp. 184-185

⁹ Ibid. p. 186.

and Mexico¹⁰ that occurred during Wilson's administration, along with his refusal to recognize governments set up by revolutionary means,¹¹ seemed inconsistent with his message. Although Latin American friendship was dear to Wilson's heart, he did more to further estrange them than any administration since that of Polk.¹²

The Harding-Coolidge Administrations left no doubt in the minds of Latin Americans that the policy of the United States in Ibero-America had changed from territorial expansion to economic penetration. The "dollar diplomacy" of these two administrations was more dangerous in the mind of the average Latin American than that of aggressive expansion, but the reaction south of the Rio Grande took the form of expropriation of natural resources which really began during the Wilson administration in Mexico.

The Hoover administration saw the removal of United States marines from Central American soil which was a step in regaining the confidence of these countries. "Goodwill ambassadors", exchange professorships, Pan-American educational programs, and a general enlightenment in the United States for Latin America, and visa versa, has done much toward removing the ill-feeling that had developed during the one hundred years of the Monroe Doctrine.

¹⁰ Ibid. pp. 187-191.

¹¹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913, p. 7.

¹² Wish, op. cit. p. 191.

The F. D. Roosevelt administration, especially during the thirties was one of studied attempt to regain the friendship of the countries to the south. The Second World War found only Argentina in opposition to the United States. The countries of the Americas have formed a Hemispheric Solidarity program for the protection and mutual understanding and common benefit for all the nations within the Western Hemisphere.

One of the beneficial results of the Cleveland and T. R. Roosevelt policy in Latin America was the formation of the Drago-Calvo Doctrine. Dr. Luis Drago, Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1902, was a great Latin American statesman, and had studied closely the relations between the United States and Latin America. At the beginning of the Venezuelan debt dispute, Dr. Drago, before he knew that the United States was working on the case, wrote the State Department:

The only principle which the Argentine Republic maintains, and which it would with great satisfaction see adopted, in view of the events in Venezuela, by a nation that enjoys such great authority and prestige as the United States, is the principle already accepted, that there can be no territorial expansion in America on the part of Europe, nor any oppression of the peoples of this continent because an unfortunate financial situation may compel some one of them postpone the fulfillment of its promises. In a word, the principle which she would like to see recognized is that the public debt cannot occasion armed intervention, nor actual occupation of the territory of American nations by a European power.¹³

¹³ American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. V.
p. 93.

Dr. Drago included the principle given above into the doctrine called by his name. A portion of that doctrine is quoted here:

---and intervention for the collection of debts would be a violation of the sovereignty of these debtor nations; and that all nations enjoy credit according to their degree of civilization and culture and their conduct in business transactions; and these conditions are measured and weighed before making any loan, the terms being made more or less onerous in accordance with the precise data concerning them which bankers always have on record.¹⁴

The Drago-Calvo Doctrine, or Drago Doctrine, as it is generally called, has been written into International Law by the Geneva convention in 1907, and has met with universal approval. The acceptance of this doctrine has eliminated much of the cause for intervention in Latin America by European countries, and serves as the Latin American safeguard against the United States.

The Monroe Doctrine stands forth among the most famous political doctrines of the world. It is not international law for its regional nature does not make it applicable internationally. There have been abuses and digressions in the name of the Monroe Doctrine, but with all these abuses and digressions the Doctrine has been a formula for American independence, and an insurance against old world conquest.


¹⁴ Commager, op. cit. pp. 203-205.

The Monroe Doctrine, The Drago Doctrine, the Hemispheric Solidarity program--these three, the one growing out of the other, and into each other--in the minds of American statesmen hold out to the Americas a greater hope for prosperity, security, and peace than all the lingering ties we may make with the bickering nations of Europe and Asia.

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