HUMANISM, AS EXPRESSED BY A. E. HAYDON AND JOHN DEWEY, CONTRASTED WITH THEISTIC PERSONALISM, AS EXPRESSED BY E. S. BRIGHTMAN

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INTRODUCTION

Two widely divergent philosophical interpretations of religion found in our modern culture are those of the humanists and of the theists. The humanist interpretation has its belief in man as possessing altogether the ingredients for the "good" life, while the latter contend for the proper recognition of a personal God. It is the purpose of this study to contrast these opposing schools of thought in the light of their beliefs about God, immortality, good and evil, and religious values.

For the humanist there is no room for the supernatural. Spiritual values are restricted to those which produce a more richly satisfying life for the race. There is evidence of this in the following eight propositions which Corliss Lamont advances and which he believes are central in the thought of present day humanists;

"First, Humanism believes in a naturalistic cosmology or metahpysics or attitude toward the universe that rules out all forms of the supernatural and that regards Nature as the totality of being and as a constantly changing system of events which exists independently of any mind or consciousness.

"Second, Humanism, drawing especially upon the proven facts of science, believes that man is an evolutionary product of this great Nature of which he is part and that he is an inseparable unity of body and personality having no individual survival beyond death.

"Third, Humanism believes that human thinking is as natural as walking or breathing, that it is indivisibly conjoined with the functioning of the brain, and ideas, far from existing independently in some separate realm, arise and have reality only when a complex living organism such as man is interacting with its environment and is intellectually active.

"Fourth, Humanism believes that man has the power and potentiality of solving his own problems successfully, relying primarily on reason and scientific method to do so and to enlarge continually his knowledge of the truth.

"Fifth, Humanism believes, in opposition to all theories of universal predestination, determinism or fatalism, that human beings possess true freedom of creative action and are, within reasonable limits, the masters of their own destiny.

"Sixth, Humanism believes in an ethics or morality that grounds all human values in this-earthly experiences and relationships; and that holds as its highest loyalty the this-worldly happiness, freedom and progress---economic, cultural and ethical---of all mankind, irrespective of nation, race or religion.

"Seventh, Humanism believes in the widest possible development of art and of the awareness of beauty, including the appreciation of external Nature, so that the aesthetic experience may become a pervasive reality in the life of men.

"Eighth, Humanism believes in a far-reaching social program that stands for the establishment throughout the world of democracy and peace on the foundations of a flourishing and cooperative economic order, both national and international."[1]

These clear-cut, concise views of humanism provide an adequate working ground for a sharp contrast to views of theistic personalism which are based upon a belief in a personal God. This belief in a personal God is the foundation for the religious beliefs of the theist. Some of these beliefs are

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[1]Corliss Lamont, Humanism, A Philosophy (New York, Philosophical Library 1949) pp. 19-21.

described by Mullins when he says, "Personalism emphasizes the synthetic unity of consciousness. It recognizes all the factors of consciousness, including the will and feelings as well as the intellect. It emphasizes man's growth in knowledge and experience. Its conclusions are that the ultimate reality is a Person; that men as the creation of his hands are true persons; that man is endowed with freedom; that the divine Person is working out a purpose in human society; and that the goal of history is a perfect society of men and women in fellowship with God."[1]

Both humanism and personalism begin with the same thing, i.e. experience. From this beginning they travel different paths. Yet each is anxious to defend its position from the standpoint of experience. This seems to be the recognized starting point for any philosophy of religion or standard of values. Both of these positions begin with human experience, but through human experience arrive at their different conclusions. Surely, the question will arise as to how two such opposing structures can arise from the same foundation. This, I hope, will be answered in the following pages.

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[1]E. Y. Mullins, The Christian Religion In Its Doctrinal Expression (Philadelphia: The Judson Press 1917) pp. 112-113.

GOD

(a) Humanists' Position

In beginning an analytic contrast of two opposing religions, perhaps it would be well to first focus the attention upon the subject of God, since the idea of God or gods is so generally associated with religion.

Since the humanists begin and end with man, it is not surprising that they have little regard for a personal God, but only for the ideas which account for the belief in the existence of the "gods". The ideas of the gods, for them, have not been drawn from any accurate knowledge of the universe or of man's place and destiny within it. Rather, the humanists feel that these ideas are but products of the social life of man, and that their importance does not consist in control of the world, but in their influence upon the relations of men. The gods are merely man's helpers in the quest for the values of the good life.

Haydon accounts for the present day belief in God as stemming from the failure of primitive man to meet his own needs adequately and his consequent submission to the power of the gods. For even from the very earliest history, he says, man, in large or small social groups, was facing the issues of life in an environment partly kindly but often hostile. When confronted with hostile forces his emotion took charge and he defended himself with gestures, spells, or words of power. He found it necessary to bolster his own courage with something he did not possess. These "boosters of morale" in times of emotional stress were his gods. As the gods acquired more distinct personality and greater power, it became easier for the people to depend more and more upon them for help. In an unsatisfying world, they became the guarantors of satisfaction. The more helpless man was, the greater became the power of

the gods. Thus a simple, emotional response became a complex idea impregnated with meaning for the whole of life.

However, Haydon tells us, sometimes the gods failed in their usefulness. The tribe may have been destroyed, or a consistent failure on the part of the gods to produce the desired result would necessitate adopting other gods. Graves of dead gods are still being uncovered by modern archaeologists digging in ancient ruins. The gods lived only because they helped. When they did not help, they died.[1]

But a change came in the conception of the gods when the philosopher and the theologian came upon the scene, according to Haydon. There was an attempt on their part to unify all the gods into one single great figure or principle. The idea became more of an abstraction than the former belief in gods of wind, rain, and vegetative power. So from a social reality to a philosophical speculation the idea of the gods developed. The final step in speculation was reached in the idea of supreme gods of cosmic scope. But the process and the purpose were the same, or as Haydon says: "If more recent thinkers had taken the trouble to discover how the gods came into being, and their function through the years, they might not have been so willing, in defense of god ideas, to neglect the real values of life which alone gave the gods meaning."[2]

Haydon further contends that the social implications of the ideas of the gods cannot be overlooked. In all of the religious searching after gods there was merely an attempt to find in the final meaning of the universe a support for human hopes. If all the definitions of God from every age and every

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[1]See A. E. Haydon, The Quest of the Ages (New York: Harper and Bros. 1929) pp. 73-80.

[2]Ibid.

religion were gathered together, one idea would seem to pervade them all---man's trust that the universe is on the side of human ideals. These gods "were not a way of understanding the universe, but a means of asserting the victory of human ideals in it. Their existence was not in the eternal realm. They were indigenous to human society, in which they lived and moved and had their being. They were given cosmic significance by attributing to them creation, providence, and purposive control over the events of historic times."[1]

But with the beginning of a more modern age came a criticism more discerning than that of any of the gods of earlier eras. "Men began to consult not their wishes, but the facts; to ask regarding the cosmic support of human values, not--what may we hope? But, what do we actually find?"[2]

Thus Haydon sees the necessity for the idea of gods decreasing as man awakens to reality and experience in life. In Christianity, for instance, where the Western world had felt its greatest impact, he says there were ladders leading up to God. But as the medieval world gave way to the modern world, one by one these supports gave way until finally there was no support.

When the authority of the Church was questioned by the protestant reformers, Haydon affirms, the trusted revelation which had belonged to the Church crumbled under the challenge. When the rationalism of the eighteenth century attacked the miracles of Scripture it was reflected in questions concerning the existence of God. When Hume examined the arguments for God from the standpoint of reason, on this basis he said they could not be proved. When the mystic loudly proclaimed his own experience as ample proof, this

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[1]Ibid., pp. 96.

[2]Ibid., pp. 97.

"proof" failed to stand the test of objective analysis. The knowledge given in the mystic's experience was found to be no greater than the knowledge of his social environment.

With the falling away of these old beliefs, says Haydon, man began to see himself in a new light, in the light of his own possibilities. For Compte, who was devoted to ideal values, and whose religion consisted in reverence for human personality and in altruistic endeavors to better man's condition, God was humanity itself.

Dewey believes that God can be found in man's endeavors as he defines God as "the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desire and action."[1] But if man waits upon some power external to himself and to nature to do the work which he himself is responsible for doing, he never fully uses the power he possesses to advance the good in life. Further, Dewey says, religion is a function of experience that synthesises and supports our ideals and prompts us to seek to realize them. God is not a single Being with a particular existence or possessing personal characteristics, but rather the unity of loyalty of all our ends and ideals that has the power to stir and hold us. These ideals are presented to us through our imagination and are translated into physical and social experience. Thus the realizing of our ideals becomes a continuous process. What we believe and act upon will depend upon what others have done before us and are doing around us. As beliefs in ideas or ideals are applied to experience, some of them will be discarded, some will survive, while many will be modified. It is this active relation in which the ideal becomes the actual that Dewey considers as "God."[2]

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[1]John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934) pp. 42.

[2]See Common Faith pp. 43-50.

(b) Theistic Personalist's Position

In contradistinction to the position of the humanists, the theistic personalists have the conception of God as a person. The theists define God as a "conscious mind (spirit or person), immanent both in physical nature and in value experience."[1]

Brightman defines theism as a form of monotheism, but differentiated from other forms such as pantheism and deism. Pantheism holds that God is immanent in man and nature. There is one divine spirit, God, and this spirit includes all that there is. Deism holds that there is one divine spirit, God, but contends that he is external to both nature and to man. Even though God may have created the world, after creation he left it to run on its own accord. Theism, he continues, might be considered as a synthesis of both pantheism and deism.[2]

Furthermore, Brightman explains the theists hold that God is in nature, but that he is more than nature and man, and transcends both. He emphasizes that they do not believe that God has withdrawn from the world: "Theists in general agree that although God is more than all that is revealed in physical nature, He is present (immanent) within all physical events to such a degree that those events are expressions of his power and control."[3]

If this position is to be held, how then is God to be known? What experiences are to bring us to a certainty of the knowledge of God? Brightman says that "no knowledge is absolute certainty; all knowledge is subject to revision." "In fact," he says, "all knowledge is belief (more or less well-grounded)

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[1]Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946) pp. 157.

[2]Ibid. See pp. 157-158.

[3]Ibid. pp. 158.

that the referent of the knowledge is as described."[1] This is to claim that complete and adequate knowledge of God is beyond us. But such lack of logical certainty need not prevent sincere devotion and even assurance about the religious referent.

Brightman, examining the knowledge-claims of religious men when they have declared that they know God, calls these claims "ways of knowing God."

The claim is made by a great many religious individuals that they have known God through immediate certain experience. These mystics, for such they are called by Brightman, claim an intuitive apprehension of God. Perhaps every human being has at some time or other felt himself so overcome or awed in the presence of beauty or goodness or truth that he believes he has experienced an affinity with God. And if the experience were to be prolonged or to repeat itself quite frequently, that person might become a great mystic, Brightman asserts. But mystics do declare that there are experiences in which God himself is actually present in the soul, and such experiences give to them a certain knowledge of God. "We may say," Brightman asserts, "(1) that mystical experience is immediate, but cannot be called immediate experience of God; it is rather an immediate experience of the self which may be taken as a sign of the reality of God; (2) that mysticism is not necessarily optimistic in the sense of denying all tragedy or evil, but is optimistic as a present experience of the dominance of good over evil; and (3) that it is not necessarily monistic in the sense of pantheism or absolutism, but is monistic in the sense of being a vision of the world's unity."[2]

Then there are some religious groups who believe that man's nature and experience would not lead him to God unless God first spoke, Brightman continues. What He speaks is called "Revelation." This does not come as a result

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[1] Ibid. pp. 166.

[2] Ibid. pp. 171.

of man's reaching up to God, but rather is a gift of God to man. Such men as Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and Paul Tillich insist on revelation as being the true way of knowing God. Since Brightman feels that these men are Scholars of distinction and men for whom religious experience is a reality, he contends that their belief concerning revelation as a way of knowing God should not be dismissed lightly.

However, since there are two views on the subject of revelation, it would be well to distinguish between them. One is the fundamental or dogmatic while the other is the modern or dynamic. The dogmatic view of revelation, according to Brightman, asserts belief in revelation as consisting in the communication of supernatural and infallible truths or dogmas. It treats revelation as being essentially the communication of ideas, that is, intellectual content, from the divine mind to selected and receptive human minds. On the other hand the dynamic view holds revelation not as the communication of infallible truths, but as the guidance of human life to higher levels by divine power. That is while God does not impart dogmatic eternal truths to men's minds in some supernatural way, yet the divine purpose so acts on human history that men are given impulses which lead them to move toward God.[1] The dogmatist may say that special revelation has imparted infallible knowledge about God, continues Brightman, and the dynamist may say that no revelation is a source of infallible knowledge, yet that all revelatory experience is a source of knowledge about the purpose of God for the creation and continuation of values. The fact remains, however, that revelation is claimed by religious men to be a way of knowing God or of knowing about God.

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[1] Ibid. See pp. 175-178.

A third claim, Brightman says, to the way of knowing God is faith, that is, faith as trust or obedience. Faith, as trust, implies something that is trustworthy, and, as obedience, an authority worthy of obeying. Both of these are value words meaning loyalty to what is believed to be of true value and action in accordance with what is believed to be the supreme authority. Both trust and obedience are usually thought of as directed toward God, and both are attitudes of will.

Brightman says that according to this conception of faith, there is no reason why the religious man should regard any experience as a valid revelation-claim or should treat any experience as a supernatural gift of God unless that experience commends itself to his reason as embodying ideal value.[1] Thus faith is in no conflict with reason, for such faith needs reason.

Since these above mentioned claims are made by religious men as ways of knowing God, Brightman feels that they cannot be overlooked if a sincere investigation is under way. However, the validity of these claims must be proved, according to Brightman, by the theory of coherence, that is, by the consistency and relation between the ways of discovering and the ways of testing truth about God. This demands a consistency between the descriptions given and the facts, themselves, including their relations, connections, laws, and purposes. Thus it is that coherence becomes the arbiter of all the other ways of knowing God. Immediate religious experience must be set in relation with the total range of experience and thought; revelation-claims must all be judged by their coherence with our whole view of life; faith must be seen in relation to its results, its functions, and its relations to actual experience.

There are at least three stages in Brightman's coherence theory of the

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[1] Ibid. See pp. 181.

knowing process. First, there is the gathering of the facts. This would include prescientific data of experience, and also their scientific formulation, plus their investigation, plus their relatedness to the more specifically religious facts. Second, comes the formulation of some working hypothesis to interpret the facts that have been gathered. The third stage is the verification of the hypotheses, which consists in the relating of the data to the hypotheses and considering whether the hypotheses include all the data, and whether they organize all the data coherently.[1] Brightman feels that these verified hypotheses, if not finally demonstrated truths, are at least means of moving toward the truth.

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[1] Ibid. pp. 189-193.

IMMORTALITY

(a) Humanists' Position

Our consideration now turns to another belief which demands the attention of humanists and theists alike. The belief in personal immortality has exerted tremendous influence upon the actions of men.

As the humanists reject the idea of a personal God, so also do they reject the idea of personal immortality. They feel their position is well-grounded as they offer explanations of the origin and development of the idea of the soul and other-worldliness from early human thought.

The origin of the word "soul," Haydon says, dates back to the time when its simple meaning was merely some function of the individual. That is, breath, intelligence, or heart might have been indicated by the word "soul," when that function was thought of as different from the body. It might have been that dreams were responsible for the soul-body concept, Haydon continues. In dreams the dead would return to life, and the unreflective people would consider the experiences of their dreams to be as real as those of their waking hours. But these early ideas of the soul were vague. Man was still considered a part of this world.[1]

Haydon continues his explanation by referring to early Chinese thought where the individual is held to be composed of two elements, one earthly, the other heavenly. After death, each of these elements returns to its source. Further, the Hindus of India sought for reality behind or beyond the present world. The idea of an immortal soul fits perfectly in this role, so to them there became a part of man that lived on after death.

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[1]See Haydon op. cit. pp. 53-54.

The Greeks were content to live for this world alone until their city-states began to crumble and their souls were pointed to the beyond. For Plato, man was an immortal soul traveling the unreality of this world to reach the real world in the realm of ideas. Haydon says that this idea of immortality was accepted by the Jews.

In Christianity the idea of immortality was carried over from the belief of Israel, developed from that of the Greeks into the notion of bodily resurrection. This idea, according to Haydon, came about as a guarantee to the faithful and heroic ones of a share in the world to come. It was not, however, until their national life was troubled and they feared a dissolution of social customs that they projected the idea of a world to come. This was to compensate for any failure or lack which might be theirs in this life. This is the heritage Christianity has received from the Israelites.[1]

When the hope of the Kingdom of God on earth grew dim, they developed the idea of life after death where the Kingdom of God might forever prosper. From the days of Augustine to the present time Christianity has placed the ultimate value on the soul. The important thing has not been this present life, but the perfect world beyond the gates of death. This idea is seen quite clearly in the following quotation:

"It will be abundantly clear------that the quest for the good life determines the way in which the emphasis shall fall in the interpretation of human nature. The primitive tribesman and savage preceded the theologian. The division of man into bodily organism and separate soul, the seat of life, emotion, and will, is a heritage from that earlier age. So long as the good life was read in terms of the values of this world, the intangible soul was

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[1]See Haydon op. cit. pp. 55 ff.

of secondary importance. But when man failed to win the completely satisfying life in the body, and religions established the real world of happiness and peace in a supernatural realm, then the invisible and separable soul took the central place as over against the body.[1]

Thus it is discovered that a longing for a better life and failure to realize his goals and ambitions in this world, caused man to reach out beyond this world and postulate another world for his soul after death.

If, then, as the humanists say, there is no immortality man must make his own heaven on earth. He must satisfy his own desires, bring to fruition his own ambitions, and find the method of the good life.

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[1]Haydon op. cit. pp. 65.

(b) Theistic Personalist's Position

The question which confronts the theist as he investigates the problem of immortality is primarily whether or not man's belief in it is true. Does personal consciousness survive the death of the body? If so, does it continue to exist forever?

It is admitted that this belief does not arise from observation by the senses, but because of belief in the purpose and value of the personality. The primary argument for belief in immortality grows out of the belief in the goodness of God. So Brightman states, "If there is a God--a supreme, creative, cosmic person--then there is an infinitely good being committed to the eternal conservation of values. That being is the controlling and directing power in all natural processes and is engaged in a process of immanent cooperation with all other persons. Since all true values are experiences of the fulfillment of ideal purposes by persons, the existence of values depends on the existence of persons. Value is personality at its best. God, the conserver of values, must be God the conserver of persons."[1]

According to Brightman, a belief in God is also a belief in the power of God to control the universe, and in this control to conserve value. If man has any intrinsic value, there is an obligation on God's part to maintain it in existence, else this value would be lost and a total failure of God's purpose would result. If death were the absolute end for man, then God would either have to go on creating new persons forever, or else at some point he would give up the whole act of creation. Neither of these two alternatives presents God or man in a favorable light, according to Brightman.[2] The idea concerning the nature of God would have to undergo considerable change, if He were this

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[1]Brightman, op. cit. pp. 401.

[2]Ibid. pp. 401.

kind of God.

It cannot be denied that there is religious value in the belief in immortality, says Brightman. It might be said that "the good life is a life of goal-seeking; it is a life of forward-looking purpose. Immortality symbolizes the faith that good purpose never fails to all eternity. The taproot of all human endeavor is in the hope that purpose can achieve values. If courage and meaning are imparted to life by a short look into the future, how much more dignity, hope, and perspective arise from the faith that every life capable of purposive development is eternal. Immortality symbolizes the intrinsic value of the individual person, the intrinsic value of shared, cooperative living, and the goodness of God.[1]

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[1] Ibid. pp. 409.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

(a) Humanists' Position

Another topic which may serve to show an additional contrast between the two positions under discussion is the problem of evil. The difference between this topic and the two former ones which have been discussed, is that in this one both humanists and theists acknowledge the presence of evil, but disagree as to its origin and purpose.

The humanists do not consider evil as a metaphysical problem. It has come about rather as man's failure to adapt himself to natural or social events. As Dewey says, "Objects that possess and import qualities of struggle, suffering, defeat are regarded not as ends, but as frustration of ends, as accidental and inexplicable deviations."[1]

As man adjusts himself to his environment, evil will proportionatly decrease. "On a planet which has produced the various forms of life revealed by its geologic and historic record, evil is relative to the nature of the environment and its capacity for adjustment."[2]

Haydon classifies all evil under one of two headings, "natural" and "social." Natural evils are those things such as storms, floods, etc., or diseases of the body; while social evils are those situations which deny satisfaction to, and thwart the creative potentialities of the individual.

Natural evils have beset man from the earliest days and continue to do so. Such things as floods, droughts, earthquakes, storms, etc. make up a part of the evils that relate to man's environment. Although for centuries it was felt that nothing could be done about these forces, except to submit to them,

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[1]John Dewey, Experience and Nature, New York, Van Rees Press, pp. 105.

[2]Haydon, op. cit. pp. 140.

in more recent times science has partially come to man's rescue in overcoming this particular type of evil. Science has done much in overcoming the fear of drought or the dread of cold, just as it has made strides in overcoming other natural evils.[1]

Or if we were to consider the ravages of disease or defects of the body or mind as natural evils, once again the progress which man has made in combating and overcoming these evils is comforting. Whereas little or nothing was formerly done for the treatment of disease-ravaged bodies, medical science has continued with persistance until it has found the cause and cure of many diseases. Some which used to terrorize a whole nation now hold no fear for twentieth-century medical science. Thus, if natural evils were his only menace, modern man might fare forward toward the future, lifting a confident song of triumph.[2]

However, natural evils are by no means the most besetting ones for man. Those evils that tend to supress or prohibit happiness and to restrain the individual from a full realization of himself are social. The ideal society, no doubt, is the one where individuality is encouraged, where everyone is in happy, harmonious relationship with every one else, and there is the maximum amount of attending happiness for each person. But these conditions do not now exist anywhere in society because of the presence of social evils.

All the old terms for social evils have a suggestion of a moral code behind them. Whatever is wrong in a group is a violation of what ought to be done. Whatever is a crime is the breaking of a legal code. And whatever is sin is a transgression of the will of God.[3] But with a changing society,

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[1]See Haydon pp. 140-143.

[2]See Haydon pp. 143.

[3]See Haydon pp. 145.

with revisions in legal codes constantly being made, with groups who have no personal God, these terms have little meaning in trying to describe social evils. Nor are they sufficient to account for these evils. In some groups a person need do no wrong, commit no crime, nor be guilty of sinning, yet could be the victim of social evils. For, actually, "situations which deny satisfaction and thwart the creative potentialities of the individuals spell evil."[1]

So efforts must be put forth for satisfactory adjustments to be made by all members of society. Dewey regards such an emphasis upon the exercising of our own powers for eliminating the evil not as egoistical, nor as just blind optimism. "It is not egoistical," he says, "for it does not isolate man, either individually or collectively, from nature. It is not blind optimism, because it makes no assumption beyond that of the need and responsibility for human endeavor, and beyond the conviction that, if human desire and endeavor were enlisted in behalf of natural ends, conditions would be bettered."[2]

In a more complex world such as ours today, with greater conflicts, it is more difficult to reach this goal than is the case in a simpler world. However, evil can be removed by intelligent adjustment of personal relations. When man recognizes that evil is not something imposed upon him, when he sees that he doesn't have to fold his hands and accept its presence, when, in other words, man discovers that he can remove it, it will become a challenge for all humanity to drive toward such a goal.[3]

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[1]Haydon, op. cit. pp. 145.

[2]Dewey, A Common Faith pp. 46.

[3]See Haydon op. cit. pp. 147-148.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

(b) Theistic Personalist's Position

The existence of evil is more of a problem for the theist than it is for the humanist. The problem is to reconcile a good God who is creator and sustainer with the presence of evil in the world. Brightman seems to feel that the solution to the problem depends largely on the relation between God's power and his goodness. Theistic absolutism explains evil on the basis of God's power while theistic finitism accounts for its presence through an interpretation of the goodness of God.[1]

Further, Brightman contends that evil cannot be explained away. Some, like the Christian Scientists, believe that evil is merely subjective and can be explained by asserting that it is just a product of the mind and does not really exist. But if this were true of evil, it might just as well be true of good--thus you would deny the objectivity of all value as well as of all disvalue. Nor, does Brightman feel that it is satisfactory to say that all evil is really good. That is, to say that because we're limited in our view of the total picture, we see "evil" as evil, but if we could see the final cause of all things, or the true function of all experience, we would be able to see evil as really being good. This view is not only irreconcilable with the facts of evil, but also it does away with the difference between good and evil and this would undermine all ethics and religions.

The thing that needs to be done is to admit that evil is evil, and that good is good, and yet to arrive at some belief concerning their relations to purpose in the universe. Brightman believes this can be done adequately only

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[1] Brightman op. cit. pp. 281-282.

by adopting theistic finitism. He says, "A theistic finitist is one who holds that the eternal will of God faces given conditions which that will did not create, whether those conditions are ultimately within the personality of God or external to it----there is something in the universe not created by God and not a result of voluntary divine self-limitation, which God finds as either obstacle or instrument to his will."[1]

This idea of a finite God poses no problem for Brightman in connection with the presence of evil. God has not voluntarily imposed evil upon man and the world. Although he is powerful, he is not all powerful. So God, rather than being responsible for evil is exercising all of his power against evil and is continually helping man to overcome it. Evil then is part of "the Given"[2] which consists of the eternal, uncreated laws of reason and the eternal, uncreated processes of nonrational consciousness. God is absolute in the sense of being the source of all creation (this of course would not include the Given since it is not created), and it might be more correct, says Brightman, to speak of a God whose will is finite rather than of a finite God. The blame for the presence of evil, then, is not laid to God, since it is part of the uncreated Given.[3]

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[1]Brightman op. cit. pp. 313-314.

[2]Ibid. See pp. 337.

[3]See Brightman Ibid. pp. 336-340.

RELIGIOUS VALUES

(a) Humanists' Position

Taking religious experiences to be experiences of value, it would be well for us to consider the emphasis placed upon these values by both the humanist and the theist. Concerning some values there is mutual agreement while concerning others there is a complete disagreement.

The humanists feel that the motive power behind the religious ideals has been the search of human nature for satisfactions both material and social. Only when man felt that he could not supply these satisfactions for himself did he turn to his gods. Only when it seemed that he could not realize his desires in this life did his thoughts turn to a life beyond this one. Neither gods nor immortality would have been necessary if man's confidence had been placed in, and his energies directed toward, the realization of these values through the use of human intelligence and scientific method.

So religious value is not to be found in dogmatice teachings of religions. Ideals are not realized merely in submitting to the "will of God." True, these are efforts to discover value and ideals, but these paths leading to fulfillment will lead their followers along devious routes and if the securing of value comes, it will be by chance and not because the paths led directly to it.[1]

Some people believe that religious values can be realized in this life, some believe it will come in a future time in the history of this world, while some are entirely other-worldly and wait for that world to be ushered in. The ideal for our day must be a social one and in an entirely this-worldly sense.

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[1]See Haydon op. cit. pp. 205-207.

Religion, for the modern world, Haydon feels, should seek a synthesis of the sciences in the service of human ideals. Scientific knowledge ought not to be used merely to turn out material products that contribute to the comfort and ease of those people who can afford such products, but they should be used as aids in releasing the spiritual potentialities of men. They need to be put into service to enrich the shared social culture of all the world.

The modern world has experienced a new type of confidence, Haydon continues, not in gods, but in man--in the value of this life, and a greater faith in human powers. We have turned more recently to the hope of finding the life that satisfies here and now. The satisfying life--or the good life in the good world which is what we're after--must be based on the acceptance of belonging to this world. If all thoughts of another world could be removed, and men could understand he was made for this world only, the desire to increase human value would expand, our latent powers would be awakened and put to use here and now.[1]

There must also be a conscious, deliberate attempt to develop personality to its fullest extent. Every person must be recognized for his potentialities, and should strive to realize them. The universe would be presented and each person made aware of his place in that universe. This is similar to Spinoza's theory that every man needs to understand his place in the world, and in so understanding he can adapt himself to its events. The difference would be that man would not wait for the world to unfold, but would see the part that he plays in its unfolding.

Regardless, however, of personal achievement, Haydon affirms, the satisfying life is a social life, so there must be the joy of human comradeship. Whether it be in the home, economic situations, or political states, each person

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[1]See Haydon op. cit. pp. 222-225.

is craving a happy communion with his fellow-man. Social idealism is in the making. With the awakening to the this-worldly feeling, with the knowledge that if our joys are to be satisfied at all, they must be satisfied in this life, surely mutual sympathy and understanding will increase to bring man to the social satisfaction which he craves and which is a prerequisite to a good world. "The good life for the many waits upon the good society, and the program of religion, to be effective, and not simply another dream, must be a way of organizing the flexible social structure which will produce the individuals capable of giving it intelligent direction and, by their cooperative creation, make available the values of the good life."[1]

When we see how much science has done for mankind in the last two centuries, it gives us a new ground for hope. With the advance of method in the social sciences, one is led to believe that intelligence may replace blind groping in harmonizing human relationships. Intelligence must be given over to scientific research if the way is to be discovered. Dewey feels that such intelligence should become the object of our faith and loyalty, so necessary is it in ascertaining these values. He says "To claim that intelligence is a better method than its alternatives, authority, imitation, caprice and ignorance, prejudice and passion, is hardly an excessive claim. These procedures have been tried--the result is not such as to make it clear that the method of intelligence, the use of science in criticizing and recreating the casual goods of nature into intentional and conclusive goods of art, the union of knowledge and values in production, is not worth trying."[2]

Reliance upon intelligence does not decrease religious value, but rather

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[1]Haydon op. cit. pp. 206.

[2]John Dewey, Experience and Nature pp. 437.

it places it in a new light. Instead of being dependent upon the supernatural, man can make a deliberate choice of all events that would lead to a realization of his possibilities. Deference to illusion and fantasy fades away as the facts of everyday experience make themselves felt and man begins to see that he needs only to call into play that which he has, or that which he is capable of becoming as he relies on his own ability, ingenuity, and intelligence. Or as Dewey says in his summary of A Common Faith (pp. 87). "The ideal ends to which we attach our faith are not shadowy and wavering. They assume concrete form in our understanding of our relations to one another and the values contained in these relations. Ours is the responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the heritage of values we have received that those who come after us may receive it more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared than we have received it. Here are all the elements for a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class, or race. Such a faith has always been implicitly the common faith of mankind. It remains to make it explicit and militant."

RELIGIOUS VALUES

(b) Theistic Personalist's Position

In approaching a discussion of values, Brightman says at the outset that every religious experience is an experience of value. He defines value as "Whatever is actually liked, prized, estoemed, desired, approved, or enjoyed by anyone at any time."[1] Further, he says, that values may be intrinsic or instrumental. Intrinsic values are those values which are enjoyed or desired for their own sake, as ends in themselves. Instrumental values are facts or experiences that would tend to produce an intrinsic value.

From this it can readily be seen that there will be a great variety of experiences of value both intrinsic and instrumental. Many values will be a combination of the two, for in addition to serving as ends in themselves, they are also instrumental in leading to other values. Our concern, however, will be with those values which are primarily intrinsic.

The theist would not object to the value which humanists attach to the personality of the individual. Nor would he stress only personality value. In addition to emphasis upon personality, he would also place an emphasis upon the physical side of man's development. For instance, he sees there is value in the enjoyment of health, in having a sound body, not only as an end, but instrumentally, in order that higher values might be claimed. The individual then, in body, personality, and mind has value for the theist, since without the individual nothing else could be enjoyed.

Social value is another value that we find both humanists and theists hold. Although there is a difference as to the purpose of this value nevertheless the value itself is present in both positions. Many values which have

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[1] Brightman, op. cit. pp. 88.

stood the test of experience and have steadfastly remained consistent with the standards of value have been those which are received from associating with other individuals. Here we find a greater appreciation of the individual as he stands in relation to a group. Each member of the group contributes to the other members. There is a sharing, a cooperating, a working together, a mutual concern that is valuable and its value can only be felt as man becomes a social being.

Although these values which have been mentioned are religious values in its widest sense, there is a certain type of value, much narrower in scope, to which the name "religious," might be attached. "Religious values," Brightman says, "are experienced when man takes an attitude toward value experience as a whole and toward its dependence on powers beyond man---- religious values are an organization of the total value experience from a special standpoint,----the standpoint of worship of and cooperation with the objective cosmic source of value.[1]

Although Brightman says that each intrinsic value has a unique quality of its own to contribute to the total value experience, yet each tends to coalesce with the others. Without the unique contribution of each value, Brightman continues, our value experience would have no variety and would become a monotonous one, yet no single value can be defined or experienced without some reference to all the other values. This line of thought, Brightman asserts, points toward the conclusion that there is really only one value, namely the systematic whole of our value experiences. But, Brightman says, "the coalescence of values is a normative ideal rather than a universal experience."[2]

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[1] Ibid. pp. 99-100.

[2] Ibid. pp. 99-100.

Because of the coalescence of values, it is easy to see how difficult would be the job of showing precisely in what the unique contribution of religious value consists. But even if attempts to identify this unique contribution have failed, Brightman continues, it is still possible to point out numerous marks of religious value that distinguish it from other types. He summerizes these as follows: "A unique sense of dependence (unique, because the sense of dependence on the ground of the universe is radically different from our dependence on particular local conditions in our environment); a mystical experience of worship and prayer; awareness of illumination or revelation; a consciousness of divine aid (cosmic support, salvation, atonement); acknowledgement that God does for man what man cannot do for himself (divine initiative, grace); consciousness of cooperation with or submission to cosmic purpose (the will of God)."[1]

Although religious value in this more restricted sense is intrinsic, it is also instrumental in actualizing religious value in the broader sense. For values are inter-related and each makes a genuine contribution to the others.

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[1] Ibid. pp. 103.

CRITICAL EVALUATION

The purpose of this thesis is to set forth some of the contrasting beliefs of the humanists and the theists, and to point out the weakness or limitations of them where I believe such limitations exist. My purpose is twofold; (1) to show the more important points of the strength and weakness in the views; and (2) to show that of the two the position of the theists is the more acceptable.

God

The humanists do not set up arguments against a belief in God. They merely try to show how the idea of God originated and developed. Their purpose appears to be simply to discredit theism, saying that one can determine the truth or falsity of an idea on the basis of its historic origin. Actually, however, the origin of an idea and its truth and value should be distinguished.

The argument that the idea of God has arisen simply because man felt himself inadequate to satisfy his own desires, and that such an idea would not be necessary if man felt that he could satisfy those desires does not annul other arguments and experiences which point to His existence.

The traditional philosophical arguments for belief in God are completely ignored by the humanists. While these arguments are no longer accepted as proof of God's existence, it is the contention of this thesis that they are still of value in showing that it is within the bounds of reason to believe in God's existence.

The cosmological argument attempts to prove God as a first cause sufficient to account for the universe. Even Hume's criticism does not destroy this argument, for if the world is in existence, either (1) there was something before the world which accounts for its presence, or (2) the world

itself has existed eternally, or (3) it just began by some sort of "spontaneous generation." Surely the first hypothesis is as acceptable as either of the other two.

The teleological argument attempts to prove God's existence from evidence of design or purpose in the world. There is order and function in plant life, in animal life, and in the reason or intellect of man. Such design, according to this argument, demands a designer, such order calls for an orderer. The designer is designated as God.

The ontological argument for belief in the existence of God proceeds as follows: Man has in his mind a conception of the perfect being. A perfect being cannot be dependent, but must be self-existent. Now since God is the perfect being and existence an attribute of perfection, God must exist.

These arguments, however, seem to be regarded as of little consequence by the humanists, who appear to confuse the creature with the creator. They attribute to science a finality and a basis that are quite unwarranted. The humanists fail to recognize that science itself is a venture in faith. As F. R. Tennant says in his Philosophical Theology, "Mankind did not begin its intellectual career with knowledge or knowing, but with learning; and that, chiefly through doing." He continues by saying, "Mankind attained his science, as his religion, and in particular his belief in uniformity, as pragmatic substantiation of the hoped for and unknown, of what was desired to make wise."[1] Science works upon the assumption of uniformity in nature. The assumption of the scientist is the conviction of the theist. The theists' belief in God is an assertion of a metaphysically coherent universe, a universe organized by rational purpose for the realization of rational values.

The principal support of the theists' claim to a belief in God is the

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[1]F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology Vol. I, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928) pp. 262-263.

coherence theory, which has reference not merely to theoretical consistency, but also to a relation between facts and experiences. Some theories may be self-consistent, yet irrelevant to and incoherent with experienced facts. In addition to theoretical consistency, there must be consistency between theories and the facts of experience. But the coherence theory is concerned with more than mere absence of contradiction; it is also concerned with the presence of relation. There is a systematic relatedness which discovers connections, laws, and purposes. If there is a God who is to be known by man, and if that God is to be of importance to man and to human values, then the idea of God must be free from contradiction with itself and with known facts, and the idea of God must be needed to interpret the facts coherently. Brightman says it is futile to assert the existence of God unless the facts can be connected in detail with the asserted purpose. And the facts of human experiences are connected with the belief in a coherent universe, a universe organized by rational purpose for the realization of rational values.

But neither uniformity in nature, which the scientist assumes, nor a metaphysically coherent universe, which the theist asserts, can be verified. Therefore, there is no absolute certainty in either science or religion. But belief in God is no more a venture in faith than are the works of science.

Immortality

Just as the humanists have not set up any argument against a belief in God, neither have they set up any argument against belief in immortality. Rather, once more they attempt to find the origin of the idea of immortality, and when the claim is made that the origin of the idea can be accounted for in a natural way, they assume that there is no longer any necessity for believing in immortality. For example, if, as they say, it was through dreams that the idea of immortality began, why is this to discredit the idea itself if positive arguments supporting the belief are available? Dreams may as reasonably be taken to be merely the mechanism used by God for suggesting the idea of immortality to man.

The theists' argument for immortality, which has been given previously, is based upon a belief in the goodness of God and in His power to conserve persons as the fulfillment of value. The theists' arguments for God, which also have been stated, are either based upon the meaning of personality or else point to traits in nature which reveal personality at work. Brightman is correct when he states, "all true values are experiences of the fulfillment of ideal purposes by persons, and the existence of values depends on the existence of persons. Value is personality at its best. God, the conserver of values, must be God, the conserver of person."[1]

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[1]Brightman, op. cit. pp. 401.

The Problem of Evil

For the humanist the problem of evil is not a metaphysical problem. Rather, the existence of evil is due to man's failure to adapt himself to his environment, his lack of intelligent operation or application of scientific principle, or his own inability to cope with social problems.

But the question arises, "Can man eliminate all evil from the world?" For example, can we rely upon science to eliminate tornadoes altogether? Can we depend upon science to eliminate the evils of volcanic eruptions? Can scientific method or its application do away with all disease in every human being? If death or its attending grief is an evil, can science hope to eliminate this?

Among the broader social evils, is there the possibility that through the application of scientific principles alone that war will be done away with? Or will man's exploitation of man cease merely through the endeavors of intelligence or science?

Assuming that this is a moral universe, and that the end of man is to develop moral character, which assumption seems to be more in accord with human experience and conviction than that the end of man is pleasure--it is not difficult to see the necessity of the presence of evil. For evil is present in order that the good may be developed. In fact, evil is necessary for the development of moral character. Just as in nature certain qualities can be achieved only through opposition, so in moral development certain qualities can come only through struggle. The tree that is able to withstand the strongest winds is the tree that is sturdy. The birds that are able to maintain sustained flight over long distances are those which have developed their wings and flight powers. The athlete who builds his body does so through the development of muscles. So in a moral universe, where

the end of man is moral character, the presence of evil is necessary for moral development.

In order to account for the presence of evil in a world created by a good God, Brightman is led to conclude that God is limited in His power, and is not responsible for evil. But Brightman does not satisfactorily account for the existence of evil. He says it is The Given, a part of the eternal and uncreated non-rational consciousness. And it is co-existent with God. Then too, God is supposed to subject this Given to law and to use it as an instrument to the good. Yet sometimes God is defeated by it temporarily and must find new methods of approach. But if the Given can even temporarily defeat the purposes of God, how can it be under His control and subjected to His laws? It is on this problem that Brightman reaches an unsatisfactory conclusion. For he says that only by believing in a finite God can one satisfactorily account for the presence of evil.

Further, since we have already stated that we are assuming this to be a moral universe, and the end of man to be the development of moral character, it seems to be impossible for man to be a moral creature except through freedom of choice. The only way to have a moral being is to have the possibility of being immoral. Evil, then, was not made necessary by God in creating men free, but it was made possible.

Perhaps some would ask, "If God is infinite why did He not create man in such a way that he wouldn't need opposition and struggle to have character?" But to say God is infinite, is not to say that He is self-condradictory, and that He can do the logically impossible. There are some things which are intrinsically impossible by their very nature. An object could not be both completely black and completely white at the same time. One could not go forward and backward at the same time. Likewise, it seems to be intrinsically

impossible for man to develop character without opposition. So it is consistent with the character of a good God to create man free, and in creating man free to make possible the choice of evil by man.

Religious Values

There is admittedly great value in emphasizing the potentialities of every person and in seeking to lead each one to a full realization of his possibilities, as do the humanists. To encourage social adjustment and satisfactory relations among people is surely of paramount value in a social world. However, the humanists ignore the values of both the individual and society in their relationship to God. To do so is to fail to recognize the source of the greatest values.

Since the mind or reason sets man off from other animals, man's intellectual pursuits are his distinguishing features. Assuming man is a personality or a spirit, the distinguishing values which he can receive are spiritual satisfactions.

The feeling of serenity and the calm confidence which come to the person who has recognized the purposive will of a personal God and who has submitted to it are of such great value that they demand recognition. To deny the existence of a higher power is to deny any value which would come to oneself from a reliance upon divinity.

The testimony of men whose word in other fields has been accepted surely will have some weight when they declare they have received value in worship of God, or in a personal relationship with a personal divine being.

The dignity of man and the worth of the individual are emphasized in the theists' treatment of values, and they are related properly to the value of the worship of God. The contention of this evaluation is that the theists have given a very adequate discussion of religious values and how they are to be secured.

Theism, for instance, emphasizes the proper relation between the individual and society, and between the individual and his object of worship. There is an admission of divine aid, of man's need for such aid, and an

adequate account of the value recieved from it.

Further, theism stresses no single phase of man's experience, either as an individual or as a member of society, to the exclusion or minimizing of the others. The values received in worship, it contends, are not vague and elusive, but are as genuine as those received from society, or from any other source, and generally are more lasting and forceful.

Truly these are the real values in life.

Such are the beliefs of the humanists and the theists about God, immortality, the problem of evil, and religious values. It has been the endeavor of this thesis to present both postitions as they are expressed by Haydon and Dewey on the one hand, and Brightman on the other. It has been shown that the theists' position is sounder and more in accord with human experience.

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