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



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Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

By
Cheryl G. Swanson
Norman, Oklahoma

1976

THE DECISION WHETHER TO INVOKE THE CRIMINAL PROCESS:
AN ANALYSIS OF ARREST POLICIES AMONG MAJOR U. S. CITIES

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THE DECISION WHETHER TO INVOKE THE CRIMINAL PROCESS:
AN ANALYSIS OF ARREST POLICIES AMONG MAJOR U. S. CITIES

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This study examined arrest patterns for criminal offenses among police departments in large U. S. cities. The research was based on the premise that variation in law enforcement activity cannot be explained solely by different levels of criminal behavior among communities. Research suggests that police officers exercise a great deal of discretion when enforcing the law and for a variety of reasons may decide not to make an arrest even when the offender is present and the evidence that a criminal violation has been committed is in hand. Explaining arrest variation, then entails identifying the factors which influence the manner in which police discretion is exercised.

A number of hypotheses were offered to explain why some police agencies invoke the criminal process more frequently than others. Possible influences on arrest variation were examined which in addition to the crime environment included a city's socioeconomic-cultural environment, the local political climate, local governmental institutions and processes, police system variables, and certain extra-community factors. In addition hypotheses were offered to assess the impact of certain patterns of arrest decisions.

In examining arrests variation, arrests were grouped into categories. It was hypothesized that arrests for Part I offenses would be more sensitive to the crime environment than those for Part II crimes on the assumption that the amount of discretion is inversely related to the seriousness of the crime. Part I arrests were further divided into property and nonproperty crimes and Part II arrests were divided into categories of victimless crime and order maintenance offenses on the premise that arrest policies may be responsive to different influences depending on the type of violation involved.

The data analyses indicated that there is a great deal of complexity associated with the law enforcement function, and as a result it is extremely difficult to make broad generalizations about the influences on arrest behavior. In many cases the independent variables did not behave consistently within categories of arrest suggesting that while some types of crimes may share certain characteristics, these shared characteristics are not necessarily a basis for assuming that arrests for these crimes will be similarly influenced by a common set of factors.

In general Part I arrests were more sensitive to the crime environment than less serious offenses, but a more firm conclusion is that arrests for Part I offenses involving an element of violence were the most responsive to the crime environment. The crime environment variables were the most important in explaining arrest variation for almost all arrest types, but the socioeconomic, police department and political climate variables were not unimportant in predicting arrest patterns. Two noncrime measures are noteworthy in this regard. One measure of police department style (task orientation) was positively related to all categories of arrest. A measure of a community's public-regarding orientation was positively related to all categories of order maintenance offenses suggesting the importance of citizen input in the exercise of police discretion.

In most cases the reasons why one community arrests more individuals than another was only partially explained by the data. Since measures of the crime environment leave a large part of the variation unexplained, there seems to be empirical as well as theoretical justification for further examining the more discretionary aspects of law enforcement.

The data on the impacts of police behavior suggested that various patterns of arrest for less serious offenses such as victimless crimes do not impair the ability of the police to apprehend individuals who have committed more serious crimes. On the other hand, greater arrest activity for less serious crime does not seem to deflate future crime rates.

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CHAPTER I

PERSPECTIVES ON LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICIES

This research proposes to examine patterns of arrest for various criminal offenses among police departments in large U. S. cities. It is suggested that arrest patterns constitute an important law enforcement policy output which has a major impact on the criminal justice system as well as on the quality of life in American society. It is also suggested that a systematic examination of these law enforcement policies will contribute toward an explanation of the policy-making process at the local level. Of particular interest is the nature and scope of the role which an administrative agency plays in the policy process in an urban setting.

What follows is a general discussion of police discretion in the invocation of the criminal process as well as a review of previous research which has attempted to explain police behavior and law enforcement policies. A framework for the analysis of arrest policies is then presented followed by a number of hypotheses which are designed to explain the major research question--why some police agencies are likely to invoke the criminal process more frequently than others.

The Exercise of Police Discretion

A question frequently asked in the study of public bureaucracies is the extent to which administrative organizations exercise discretion.

This is basically another way of asking about the role which public agencies play in the policy-making process, particularly the degree to which they perform political, rather than purely administrative, functions. Jones comments that public bureaucracies perform political functions to the extent that they exercise discretion or a certain amount of choice in applying general policies to particular problems.¹ He further notes that just as there may be a great deal of variation in the content of general directives that are passed by legislative bodies, there may also be a great deal of disparity in the manner in which these general directives are applied to specific problems and situations.² Furthermore, for some issues--such as racial discrimination--policy application may have as much or more significance than a legislative statute or a judicial ruling. Based on these general observations, it can be argued that the end product of administrative discretion constitutes a kind of policy output.

Police agencies have generally been described as being responsible for the exercise of a considerable amount of discretion in the performance of their law enforcement activities. One of the earliest accounts describing police discretion is found in Thurman Arnold's The Symbols of Government. Arnold assumed the necessity of police discretion because 1) it is physically impossible for police officers to enforce all laws at all times and 2) subject communities would find a policy of full enforcement unacceptable. Commenting on the latter point, Arnold suggests that "Most unenforced criminal laws survive in order to satisfy moral objectives to established modes of conduct.

They are unenforced because we want to continue our conduct, and unrepealed because we want to preserve our morals."³

In a similar vein, Herman Goldstein, a former assistant to the superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, points to the gulf between theory and practice in law enforcement. In theory and in law the police are supposed to enforce criminal statutes at all times against all offenders. If the officer observes a violation of the law or if a criminal offense is brought to his attention, the policeman is required to make an arrest.⁴ According to this viewpoint, the law enforcement agent assumes a ministerial role whereby his major function is to make an arrest whenever the law and the evidence dictate that he do so.

In contrast to the above description of ideal police behavior, Goldstein suggests that in practice and for a variety of reasons police officers may decide not to make an arrest even when the offender is present and the evidence that a criminal violation has been committed is in hand.⁵ Alternative behavior to arrest includes warning the offender, harassing the miscreant, or simply ignoring the fact that an offense was committed. Like Arnold, Goldstein attributes police discretion to limitations on police resources. He also cites the ambiguity of criminal statutes as a reason for police discretion. Statutes prohibiting disorderly conduct are a particularly good example of the wide range of interpretation delegated to a police officer in defining criminal conduct.⁶

In another account of police discretion, Kadish points to the deployment of resources as a major kind of discretionary judgement

exercised by law enforcement agencies which ultimately affects the kinds of people that will be subject to the criminal process as well as the types of crimes which will be sanctioned.⁷ Elected political officials may communicate the general level of enforcement they desire through the generosity of their police budget allocations, but in light of the multiplicity of statutes which must be enforced, police administrators must decide where and how the money will be spent. These kinds of decisions, according to Kadish, will have an impact on the manner in which state laws and city ordinances are enforced.

To summarize, a number of individuals have described the police system as characterized by a high degree of discretion based on one or more of the following assumptions: 1) limitations on manpower and other resources necessitate police discretion, 2) the ambiguity of criminal statutes results in a considerable amount of administrative leeway,⁸ and 3) community values are not supportive of a policy of full enforcement.

In contrast to the approach cited above where police discretion is taken as a given, a number of social scientists have sought to empirically verify its existence. Studies on police-juvenile relationships, for example, have demonstrated that the police exercise a considerable amount of choice in determining whether a juvenile offender will be processed formally or informally. Using participant observer techniques, Black and Reiss found that in the three communities they studied the probability was less than one in seven that the police will arrest a juvenile who has allegedly committed a delinquent act.⁹ A Chicago

study conducted in connection with a legal services program for juvenile delinquents established that out of 500 possible arrest situations, the police arrested only 100 individuals.¹⁰ Additional studies by Piliavin and Briar¹¹ and James Q. Wilson¹² point to the wide discretion exercised by police officers in dealing with youthful offenders.

Police discretion does not appear to be limited to juvenile cases. In a study based on twelve months of field work with the police department of two large Western cities, Bittner found that the police exercise a considerable amount of discretion in deciding whether to invoke the criminal process against violators of public drunkenness statutes.¹³ In a similar study, Petersen drew the following conclusion after four months of participant observer work with a metropolitan police forces in the Midwest:

Some persons are defined as "drunks" by members of the police force and sanctions are applied to them, while others, behaving in the same manner, are not defined as such. In terms of their behavior both sets of people are doing the same thing; that is, they are violating statutes pertaining to intoxication, but the response of the persons in authority, the police, is the key factor which determines whether or not they are arrested.¹⁴

In addition to research which focuses on police discretion in relationship to certain classes of actors or certain classes of offenses, a more broadly based study was conducted by Black in the cities of Boston, Chicago, and Washington, D. C. Using participant observer techniques, Black's research team observed almost 6,000 encounters between citizens and police. Their findings confirm the existence of police discretion with the qualification that the police officer's

choice appears to be more limited in situations involving crimes of a more serious nature.¹⁵

Finally, studies on arrest variation among cities provide more indirect evidence of the discretionary aspects of police work. Gardiner found a great degree of variation among cities in the enforcement of traffic laws. Differences did not recede after controlling for the possible effects of variations in state statutes.¹⁶

In research of a similar vein, Wilson noted differences in enforcement patterns for five different offenses among 146 cities with similar socioeconomic environments.¹⁷ Henderson and Neubauer found substantial differences in arrest patterns (among sheriffs departments in Florida) for 18 different kinds of crimes.¹⁸

On the basis of the research efforts outlined above, there is ample evidence that the police exercise discretion in performing their law enforcement duties. Furthermore, arrests--the major formal product of these discretionary activities--can be viewed as a kind of policy output because of the discretion or choice that is involved in invoking the criminal justice process. These choices ultimately determine arrest patterns--both the frequency as well as the kinds of arrests that are made.

Police Discretion--Impacts

As mentioned earlier activities which are purely administrative can be distinguished from those which are more political in nature by assessing their significance or impact. The political nature of arrest outputs can be further placed in perspective by highlighting the

significance of the arrest decision at the levels of individual, organization, and system.¹⁹

The implications of arrest for the individual have been pointed to by a number of students of the criminal justice system. Blumberg and Niederhoffer, for example, note that "in a simple situation arrest may cause a loss of job, a period of detention, the indignities of being handcuffed, fingerprinted, and photographed, immeasurable psychic pain, several court appearances, and expenses for a bail bond and lawyer."²⁰ Thus, at the individual level the arrest decision by itself has considerable consequences regardless of the outcome in a court of law.

Another major impact of arrest decisions is a systemic one. Police decisions when and how often to invoke the criminal process largely determine the boundaries or outer limits of the activities performed throughout the criminal justice system.²¹ This particular position of the police arises from the fact that, for the most part, there are few legal means with which to initiate an individual into the criminal justice process other than through an arrest (summonses and subpoenas are an exception).²² Thus, in making boundary transactions between the criminal justice system and the community at large, police decisions affect other subsystems within the criminal justice arena. For example, a police decision to largely ignore a particular crime precludes prosecutors from deciding to accuse, judges or juries from determining guilt or innocence, correction agencies from applying restraints, and parole boards from determining fitness for release.²³ Commenting on the significance of the arrest decision in this regard, sociologist Donald Black notes that:

. . . invocation of the criminal process accounts for more formal-legal cases, more court trials and sanctions, more public controversies and conflicts than any other mechanism in the legal system. As a major occasion of legal control, then arrest cries out for empirical study.²⁴

Police decisions when to invoke the criminal process may also have an impact on organizations which are not formally a part of the criminal justice system. For example, police decisions not to arrest large numbers of individuals for drunkenness or narcotics violations may deprive social welfare and rehabilitation agencies of a major method of gaining access to prospective clients.²⁵

Arrest outputs may also be important in terms of a number of aspects related to the quality of life in society. From a practitioner's standpoint, law enforcement policies which emphasize enforcement of certain laws over others may have a significant effect on the overall patterns of criminal activity within the community. The resulting crime environment in turn affects the safety and security of individual citizens.

Finally, arrest policies are significant from a more normative perspective. Community control over law enforcement agencies is an important value subscribed to by democratic societies. The question arises as to whether police agencies are sufficiently responsive to community values.²⁶ Reiss notes that potential conflicts between citizens and law enforcement officials may result from differences in the penetration of norms and laws in their respective populations. Although opinion may be fairly unanimous over the matters which may be criminal at law there may be far less agreement over the seriousness of certain

criminal offenses and the degree to which laws prohibiting certain behavior should be enforced.²⁷ The question of how these hypothetical conflicts are resolved, and in turn how police discretion is influenced and enforcement patterns are determined, becomes an interesting one for the political analyst.

Determinants of Law Enforcement Policies--Factors Which Influence Police Discretion

The preceding paragraphs have identified arrests as significant policy outputs. To this point, some attention has been given to why police discretion exists but not to the question of what factors or conditions determine how police authority is actually exercised. A number of studies have attempted to explain police behavior in general and arrest behavior in particular. A review of this body of research serves to identify some of the variables which may be important determinants of law enforcement policies. For purposes of discussion research efforts will be classified into five general categories according to the major perspective, theme, or framework utilized to explain police behavior and practices. As with many attempts at classification, the categories identified are not as clear-cut and distinct as we would like them to be. Furthermore it should be noted that studies of police behavior and law enforcement policies are not always easily grouped under one particular heading.

Psychological Perspective

Social scientists have traditionally viewed police officers as somewhat of a psychological curiosity as evidenced by a rather large

number of studies devoted to describing police attitudes, values, and personalities. A number of impressionistic pieces have attributed certain dominant traits to police officers. For example, they are described as unusually suspicious by Skolnick,²⁸ cynical by Westley,²⁹ and isolated and alone by Banton.³⁰ Chwast suggests that law enforcement personnel suffer from feelings of powerlessness and self-hate³¹ and Wilson states that law officers suffer from a lack of self-esteem.³²

While the above descriptions of the police may seem intuitively satisfactory, they nevertheless rest on scant empirical evidence. In contrast, a number of studies have attempted to introduce more objective and scientific methods into the analysis of police traits.

Alan E. Bent compared values of law enforcement personnel in the city of Memphis with those of a sample of citizens on the basis of an order-stability/democratic-active dichotomy. The findings indicated that police officers and the white citizens sampled tended to show common attitudes regarding expectations of police behavior--both favored an approach to law enforcement which emphasizes order and stability. In contrast, the black citizens surveyed favored what Bent described as a democratic active orientation--one which places a value on human relations and the protection of civil liberties.³³

A study similar in approach to Bent's was completed by Rokeach, Miller, and Snyder whereby value patterns of 153 members of a midwestern municipal police force were compared with a national sample of white and black Americans. Police tended to place a higher value on obedience to authority than the citizens surveyed. In addition, law enforcement

personnel tended to show a more punitive and unsympathetic orientation toward people in general than did the national group; they were more likely to devalue such modes of behavior as being broadminded, forgiving, helpful and cheerful. Finally, police ranked equality significantly lower than the national sample of whites and far lower than the black subjects.³⁴

Studies by Bayley and Mendelsohn³⁵ and by Niederhoffer³⁶ have attempted to measure the degree of anomie experienced by police officers. Both studies reached the conclusion that policemen score low on this particular trait.

The most popularized studies on police personality have been those associated with the measure of authoritarianism. McNamara administered F scales to several groups of police officers and on the basis of his findings concluded that 1) police officers have authoritarian personalities and 2) police officers with one and two years of tenure are more authoritarian than their less experienced associates.³⁷ McNamara's findings were later contradicted by those of Bayley and Mendelsohn³⁸ and Smith, Locke, and Walker³⁹ which suggested that police scores on authoritarianism are similar to those obtained by groups of comparable education. Furthermore, in a critique of McNamara's research, Niederhoffer observed that the mean score in the F scale for police was only slightly less than that reported for the working class sample in the Authoritarian Personality.⁴⁰

While the findings outlined above are mixed, there is not a great deal of support for the contention that the police as a group have

attitudes, values, and personality characteristics that are different or more pronounced than those exhibited by other members of society, especially the white working class. Indeed some individuals have commented that this is not surprising considering the diversity of people employed by police agencies and the fact that there are approximately 40,000 law enforcement organizations in this country.⁴¹

While studies which attempt to isolate a police personality may not be very fruitful in explaining police behavior, this does not negate the contribution that psychological studies may make in explaining the relationship between the predispositions of individual police officers and their performance in the field. Unfortunately most of the studies which have adopted what we describe as the psychological approach have not attempted to link certain cognitive tendencies with actual behavior. Thus, we do not know, for example, whether officers described as temperamentally lenient actually invoke the criminal law less frequently than other officers who are less tolerant of challenges to the established order. Part of the problem lies with the approach common to most psychological studies whereby the police are compared as a unit with the population at large or with certain subgroups within that population. Consideration is not given to variation within and among police departments and its possible consequences for behavior. Thus, while a psychological approach to the study of police behavior may hold some promise, findings from most of the current literature are not very helpful in terms of explaining arrest outputs.

One exception to the research outlined above is a study by Baehr and her associates with the Chicago police department. The Baehr study is distinctive in that a number of psychological and background variables of individual police officers were compared to a number of indicators of police performance. Performance variables included ratings by supervisory officers, tenure, awards, complaints, disciplinary actions, absenteeism, and arrest rates. The initial regression analysis showed very high multiple correlations for all criterion variables but as successive degrees of statistical rigor were applied, measures of association were reduced considerably.⁴² The Baehr study is an example of the kind of psychological research which may be useful in explaining police behavior such as arrest rates. It may serve as a model for the future research which would be necessary before any firm conclusions can be drawn regarding the influence of psychological traits on arrest behavior.

Situational Demands

A number of studies focusing more directly on police discretion and arrest practices have concluded that characteristics of the immediate situation strongly influence the arrest decision.⁴³ Most of this research has utilized participant observer techniques although in some cases conclusions are based on the results of in-depth interviews or on personal experience.

Some research has found that characteristics of the offender appear to be related to the decision whether to invoke the criminal process. Such factors as the suspect's appearance and grooming, race,

previous record, and demeanor are factors which the police may take into account in deciding on the appropriate response to an alleged violation. In their study of police-juvenile encounters Piliavin and Briar found that the suspect's previous arrest record appeared to influence the arrest decision, but that the youth's demeanor was the major criterion utilized by law enforcement officials.⁴⁴ Individuals who exhibited disrespectful behavior towards the police were more likely to be arrested whereas deferential offenders were released with a mild to severe warning. A differential arrest rate was noted for blacks and whites, but Piliavin and Briar suggest that these differences are not simply a result of a greater offense rate among blacks nor are they a result of police racial bias. Instead the authors conclude that blacks on the whole tend to exhibit more disrespectful behavior towards the police than do whites, and this in turn affects the frequency with which they are arrested.

Petersen's observation of police encounters with individuals who had violated public drunkenness statutes led him to conclude that deference towards the police is one of several important situational variables associated with police behavior. He notes that "certain inflammatory statements on the part of an offender are almost certain to result in his arrest."⁴⁵

On the basis of research in three large cities, Black concluded that in many cases the police are enforcing their authority rather than the law.⁴⁶ This observation was based on the finding that the probability of arrest increases when a suspect is disrespectful

toward the police. Studies by Westley⁴⁷ and Banton⁴⁸ also cite the offenders' demeanor as influencing police discretion.

Egon Bittner has identified another aspect of the offenders' behavior which affects the decision to take a suspect into custody. In his research on law enforcement in skid-row, Bittner found that the arrest decision was often based on the likelihood of the individual making a serious disorder rather than on the basis of guilt.⁴⁹ In another study Bittner noted that the police were more likely to commit mentally ill persons to a hospital if they were perceived as likely to create a major disturbance.⁵⁰

A second kind of situational variable which some researchers have linked to arrest behavior is the desire of the complainant or victim. Goldstein⁵¹ and LeFave⁵² cite complainants' preferences to be particularly salient in cases of felonious assault involving blacks. Apparently many police officers exercise a type of reverse discrimination by not exercising their police powers when a black victim refuses to sign a complaint against his assailant.

Black and Reiss found complainant preference to be the most important variable entering into the arrest of juveniles, but drew conclusions somewhat different from those of Goldstein and LeFave regarding race.⁵³ They observed that white complainants more readily express a preference for leniency towards young suspects than do blacks. However, like the LeFave and Goldstein studies, differential outcomes by race are explained on the basis of the complainants' behavior.

In addition to offender characteristics and citizen behavior a number of miscellaneous situational variables have been identified as influencing arrest behavior. For example, the location in which the police encounter an offender may determine the outcome. Petersen found that violators of public drunkenness laws were more likely to be arrested if they appeared in the downtown area as opposed to suburban locales.⁵⁴

Working norms may also influence when arrests are made. Police officers in a midwestern city were observed to ignore violations that occurred close to mealtime or near the end of the work day.⁵⁵

Finally, the police may have certain ulterior motives in exercising the prerogative to arrest. A number of individuals have noted that the police will sanction a certain level of criminal behavior if the offender has the status of informant.⁵⁵

A good portion of the studies on police discretion have located explanations of arrest behavior in what have been described as the demands of the situation. While this research provides some insight into police behavior and practices there are some problems with it. A preoccupation with immediate situational demands precludes looking at police encounters and arrest practices within the broader environmental context in which they occur.⁵⁶ This rather short-sighted approach may be in part a function of participant observer techniques--the methodology utilized in most of these efforts. Also, the research suffers problems similar to those identified with the psychological approach. The variables defined as important in influencing police

discretion are not conducive to explaining variations in law enforcement outputs on an intra or inter agency basis.

Class Conflict Model

The class conflict model takes what might be described as a Marxist viewpoint of police behavior and suggests that police behavior and arrest outputs can be explained in terms of class interests. The police are perceived as the protectors of dominant class interests; any conflict between the interests of the ruling class on the one hand, and those of the lower strata of society will be resolved by the police in favor of the former group.⁵⁷

The use of the class conflict model to explain law enforcement policies has been advocated by a number of individuals. Joseph Lohman, a former Dean of the School of Criminology of the University of California at Berkeley, and also a former police officer, expresses the viewpoint that "The police function (is) to support and enforce the interests of the dominant political, social, and economic interests of the town and only incidentally to enforce the law."⁵⁸ In Behind the Shield Niederhoffer suggests that law enforcement policy usually represents the interests of the power centers in the community.⁵⁹ And in his discussion of the role of policemen in society Cook complains that there is little recognition "that the process of law enforcement serves the interests of dominant groups in the society and either ignores or opposes the interests of those in the lower strata."⁶⁰

In her study of violence in American society Lynne Iglitzen cites historical as well as more recent examples of how the police

enforce the interests of the ascendant classes. She notes that challenges to the established order by union members, Indians, civil rights activists, and students have been met with police violence and massive arrests.⁶¹

In a very comprehensive and thorough analysis of the police role in the United States, Kieselhorst describes the police as unwitting participants in a struggle between the haves and the have nots.⁶² Commenting on the nature of the police function Kieselhorst states that:

The police are a political weapon used by a group that is concerned with maintaining the status quo in society. The law established a system based on the values and attitudes of the ascendant class, and the police serve to protect and preserve that system. In helping to impose the values and attitudes of the elite upon society through the enforcement of the law, the policeman is expected to act always in the interest of that elite.⁶³

Thus for Kieselhorst the legal system serves to legitimize the will of the ruling class. The police, acting somewhat in the capacity of servants, function to enforce the will of the dominant group.

Applying the class conflict theory to law enforcement behavior--specifically arrests--it can be inferred from the basic premises of the theory that arrest patterns are determined by the frequency and nature of challenges to the established order. The class conflict approach does have some problems, however.

Proponents of this particular view of law enforcement have failed to identify specific linkages between the wishes and desires of the dominant classes and the behavior of police officers. Certainly it can be argued that the will of the elite is in part communicated to the

police through passage of criminal statutes that circumscribe or prevent certain kinds of behavior. This explanation, however, does not account for the fact that all police departments do not enforce all laws in the same manner at all times. It is possible to argue that this kind of police discretion is based on the interests of the dominant class too. Variations in law enforcement practices among communities may be the result of various configurations of lower and upper class interests, that is, variations in class composition from community to community. Taking this perspective, Galliher argues, for example, that there might be a disproportionately larger differential between arrests of whites and blacks as the percentage of blacks increases in the community.⁶⁴ This is because blacks and other minorities symbolize a threat to the interests of the dominant groups within the community. Of course in an attempt to operationalize the class conflict model the problem of identifying the amorphous ruling class still remains. Does the ruling class, for example, constitute all property-owners who press the police to protect their possessions from lower-class intruders, or is this group comprised of a much smaller number of individuals? In applying the class conflict model to law enforcement practices, we are faced with many of the problems associated with the power elite and community power studies. Problems of definition as well as other constraints in operationalizing the model are numerous.⁶⁵

While the popularity of the class conflict theory may be based more on emotional appeal than empirical fact, this particular approach to explaining law enforcement outputs has some distinct advantages over

the psychological and situational approaches described earlier. The situational demand framework, in particular, tends to lend itself to a very low level of abstraction in explaining arrest practices.⁶⁶ On the other hand, the class conflict theory provides a conceptual framework whereby law enforcement activities are placed within the context of the total social-political-economic environment within which they occur. A number of researchers, while not adopting the class conflict model, have attempted to explain law enforcement outputs in terms of some of these environmental variables.

Socioeconomic and Socio-Cultural Approach

A number of studies have discussed how societies or communities seem to determine the characteristics of police organizations as well as law enforcement outputs. In this regard, some individuals have taken a cross cultural approach to the study of police behavior noting the importance of such factors as variation in cultural norms and values and differences in the degree of social integration.⁶⁷ Because of the decentralized character of the police function in the United States, however, it is possible to examine possible influences of socioeconomic and social cultural conditions on law enforcement using one country as a laboratory. Indeed this has been the nature of most social science research on this subject.

Table 1-1 shows a distribution of law enforcement agencies by level of government, indicating that the bulk of police organizations function at the local level and that the preponderance of police personnel are employed in what are designated as municipal police departments. Commenting on the decentralized nature of law enforcement in this country Harlan Hahn notes that:

. . . Law enforcement operations are profoundly influenced by the principles of American federalism. Whereas the enactment of most criminal statutes is a prerogative of the states, the enforcement of the laws is primarily a responsibility of local jurisdictions. Even though there have been extensive collaborations among national, state, and city law enforcement agencies, policing usually is regarded as almost a strictly local function. Ironically, therefore, law enforcement practices may be more vulnerable to the effects of diverse community characteristics than many other types of public policy. Although the fundamental tenets of organized society would appear to require absolute uniformity and impartiality in the administration of the law, the delegation of this task to municipal governments may introduce extensive variability into police activities.⁶⁸

Table 1-1
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN
THE UNITED STATES

Number of Personnel		Level	Number of Agencies		
<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>		<u>N</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
25,000	7.7	Federal		50	0.1
30,000	9.2	State		200	0.5
35,000	10.8	County		3,050	7.6
200,000	61.5	Municipal		3,700	9.2
		Townships, Towns, Boroughs, Villages			
<u>35,000</u>	<u>10.8</u>			<u>33,000</u>	<u>82.5</u>
Total	325,000 100.0			40,000	99.9*

*Error due to rounding.

Source: A. C. Germann, Frank D. Day, and Robert R. J. Gallati, Introduction to Law Enforcement (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1966), p. 153. For more recent figures on the distribution of law enforcement personnel, see the 1976 edition of the Germann text.

The manner in which the socioeconomic and socio-cultural conditions of a community influence local law enforcement has been approached from a number of perspectives, some of which are more directly related to arrest practices than others.

Some authors have identified the influence of environmental variables on law enforcement on the basis of their own study or experience but without specific empirical referents. Chwast, for example, states that external social processes in the community impinge on police activity, although he does not specifically identify the nature of these social processes.⁶⁹ Chwast also points to the influence of community values on police work when he tells us that "law enforcement personnel must know which values to enforce, which to learn more about, and which to leave alone."⁷⁰ Again, the author's comments on the relationship between the community and the police are very general in nature and do not provide us with specific examples of the kinds of values the police may be aware of when performing their duties.

Similarly Niederhoffer believes that police systems are best understood as institutions that interact with the social structure of the community.⁷¹ Like Chwast, he does not develop his ideas on this very fully nor does he provide any specific evidence to support his particular viewpoint.

In his analysis of discretion in the criminal justice process, Kadish gives a specific example of the manner in which community values, or more accurately the values of a subgroup within a municipality, may impinge upon arrest practices. While blacks often charge

that the police are harder on them than on whites, Kadish suggests that rather than overly strict enforcement against blacks, what instead is involved is a pattern of nonenforcement of certain laws against blacks, justified on the general grounds that a lesser standard of morality prevails in the black community.⁷² Practices of underenforcement against blacks have been most frequently observed for the offense of assault. Thus, while people are often concerned about whether or not the police are sufficiently responsive to community norms and values, the above instance illustrates some of the problems that may arise when customs, standards, and practices of the community are taken into account by the police.⁷³ Niederhoffer comments on the irony of the situation.

When the professionals attack this nonenforcement of the law, the articulate defender of the status quo has a powerful reposte: he can plead that the social sciences so profusely quoted by the professionals also teach the lesson of cultural relativity. This doctrine encourages an observer from one culture to respect the integrity of another. . . . The implication is that the policeman has some justification for accepting a minority groups' way of life on its own terms and thus for acting the way he does.⁷⁴

LeFave has also defined local community factors as important in shaping arrest policies. While LeFave, for the most part, takes a situational approach to explaining law enforcement outputs, he nevertheless concedes that variations in local attitudes may bring about differences in local enforcement levels. LeFave cites the criminal offense of gambling as an example where community standards may influence arrest practices.⁷⁵

Nimmer has attempted to explain differences in arrests for public intoxication among several cities on the basis of his personal

knowledge of the communities and police departments involved. In doing so a number of instances where community influence may be important are identified. Nimmer states that one of the reasons for the large disparity between the Chicago and New York City police departments for public drunkenness arrests is differences in the perception of community pressure to remove skid row men from the streets.⁷⁶ Nimmer suggests that New York officers perceive community values as being tolerant of public drunkenness and therefore fail to act in many cases even when violations are clearly observed.

Nimmer also identifies possible regional influences in his account of the extremely high number of intoxication arrests in Washington, D. C. He attributes the large number of arrests, in part, to Southern attitudes which may be less tolerant of alcohol-related activities. Of course, the fact that Washington, D. C. is the nation's capital may result in community pressure on the police to rid the streets of "undesirables," or at least the police may perceive this to be the situation.

In a general evaluation of the criminal justice system Reiss looks at community values and the police. Although not providing us with any direct evidence Reiss suggests that there may be substantial variation among and within communities concerning definitions of what constitutes a crime as well as the seriousness of certain offenses.⁷⁷ Along these lines he postulates that opinions of young people, businessmen, and ethnic or racial minorities regarding law enforcement may differ substantially.⁷⁸

The questions Reiss asks are important ones in terms of providing explanations of law enforcement policies because, as he points out, in many cases citizens actually initiate the arrest process either in the status of victim or complainant. After the police have been summoned by members of the community they may have considerable discretion as to whether or not to invoke the criminal process, but citizen input is important because their initial demands for police services to a certain extent define the parameters within which the law enforcement function is performed.

Recent studies suggest that many people are victimized by crime but do not report these crimes to the police.⁷⁹ These victimization studies have generally triggered an alarmist reaction whereby the lack of reporting is attributed to problems inherent in the criminal justice system. Generally the findings are interpreted as indicating that citizens do not call the police for help because 1) they have little faith in the abilities of the police and/or 2) they have little faith in the manner in which their problems will be handled by other organizations within the criminal justice system, particularly the courts. However, based on Reiss' premises regarding values and definitions of criminal activity, it is also possible to interpret the findings in light of differing perceptions of the nature of certain offenses. For example, Ennis found that a substantial proportion of citizens fail to report some crimes because they do not consider the crime a police matter. Among their specific reasons are that they consider the event a "private" matter; they regard it as too trivial for the police to be

bothered; or they do not want to bring harm to the offender.⁸⁰ While the Ennis study did not concentrate on systematic comparisons among communities, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the traits he describes may vary among communities and that these variations in turn will influence arrest outputs.

Research by Ennis brings us to a transition point in our review whereby studies on police behavior and law enforcement outputs of a more empirical nature can be examined. This body of literature varies in method from those of the predominantly case study variety to research which is more comparative and quantitative in nature.

In Justice Without Trial Skolnick looks at law enforcement within the context of the community and is particularly concerned with the compatibility between the authoritarian nature of police work and the generally democratic environment within which it must function. Skolnick bases his conclusions on interviews with police officers as well as field observations in one city of 400,000. He describes the police, at least supervisory personnel, as being very attentive to opinions expressed by the community and notes that they are not unlike the administrators of other large organizations whose role includes the task of mollifying various interests within the community.⁸¹

In this light Skolnick also describes potential conflicts police administrators may face in attempting to balance local interests. In many instances existing criminal statutes seem to function as an instrument for achieving what Skolnick describes as conventional morality. It may become extremely difficult to enforce certain moral ideals in a

diversified environment composed of groups with strong ethnic, racial and social class identifications. One of the results of the enforcement of conventional morality may be a more threatening environment for policemen.⁸²

A classic work on law enforcement practices is James Q. Wilson's Varieties of Police Behavior. While the primary focus of the book is on the relationship between different types of police organizations and arrest behavior, Wilson nevertheless provides us with some insights into the influence of certain socioeconomic/socio-cultural factors on police practices. In researching the police-community relationship, Wilson primarily relies on a comparative case study approach, using in-depth interviews complimented by field observation as investigatory tools.

Wilson posits the most direct relationship between community characteristics and arrest outputs for vice-related offenses. In this regard Wilson disagrees with the simple assumption that crimes such as gambling and prostitution could not exist unless the police tolerated them. Instead, the relationship is a more indirect one whereby the police obtain behavioral cues from the local citizenry. The community's level of tolerance as well as their demand for illicit services largely conditions enforcement policies. Wilson also suggests that class composition is a key factor related to public opinion as well as the market for vice-related activities. Wilson admits that members of all social classes may have tastes for illegal services but thinks that on the whole communities with a substantial lower class membership will show a greater demand and a higher toleration for them.⁸³

While Wilson identifies community characteristics as having some impact on arrest policies, he maintains that their primary influence is of a more indirect nature. That is, community values, attitudes and preferences are more likely to be manifested in the character of police personnel, police budgets, pay levels, and other organizational attributes.⁸⁴ The organizational type which emerges will in turn have an influence on the manner in which certain criminal statutes are enforced.

As mentioned earlier, Reiss has set forth the premise that members of the community have considerable input into law enforcement outputs by their discretionary decisions to mobilize the police. In The Police and The Public Reiss presents some evidence for his particular viewpoint on the basis of data obtained in three cities using participant observer techniques. Reiss observes that in many of the cases where an arrest was made the police were initially mobilized by a citizen complaint.⁸⁵ Thus, while the police in fact exercise considerable discretion in determining whether or not an arrest will actually be made, citizen input in many instances conditions the kinds of offenses that will be brought to the attention of the police.

While Reiss' findings are important in terms of assessing the role of the community in influencing law enforcement outputs, like the studies of the situational demand genre, he stops short of assessing citizen demands within the context of the underlying social structure of the community. Thus, Reiss reports that citizens fail to mobilize the police because of 1) lack of coverage by property insurance and 2)

negative attitudes towards the police.⁸⁶ He does not, however, provide us with any clues regarding the kinds of community characteristics which are associated with the underreporting of crime. Victimization studies not only indicate an underreporting of crime but show variation among cities in the difference between reported and unreported crime.⁸⁷ No attempt has yet been made to explain these differences either on an individual or aggregate level.

Goldman examined juvenile arrest records in four communities and on the basis of interviews with police personnel came to the conclusion that wide variation in arrests was due mainly to 1) differential community attitudes towards juvenile delinquency and 2) variation in community attitudes towards minor offenses.⁸⁸ In regard to the latter conclusion Goldman found that gross variations in arrest rates were accounted for principally by variations in arrests for minor offenses. This parallels Black's finding that the police generally exercise more discretion in cases where a less serious offense is involved.⁸⁹ As mentioned above, Goldman's findings regarding community influences are basically inferred from impressions gleaned from interviews.

Only two studies have actually attempted to measure the relationship between community characteristics and law enforcement outputs using aggregate data and fairly sophisticated statistical techniques. John Gardiner looked at the relationship between a number of socioeconomic variables and traffic citations issued by the police in 508 cities of 25,000 and over population. The demographic variables selected were in most cases not highly correlated with traffic ticketing policies but a

number of moderately strong negative correlations did appear for several indicators of stability. Gardiner thinks that stability influences police attitudes towards the public because in more highly mobile communities the police have less to fear from individuals who can bring political pressure to bear.⁹⁰

Finally, Henderson and Neubauer examined the relationship between ten environmental variables and arrests for certain categories of crime by county sheriff departments in Florida. Most of the demographic variables chosen were those often linked with criminal activity and criminal norms of behavior, the premise being that arrest rates are in part a response to the amount of crime which occurs in a community. Interestingly enough, the highest amount of variance explained by environmental variables for any of the categories of arrest was 28 percent.⁹¹ It might be intuitively expected that these kinds of variables would have a stronger impact on police behavior.

Overall, a number of individuals have identified certain socio-economic and socio-cultural conditions associated with the community setting as important determinants of police behavior. While in many cases observations regarding community-police relationships are based on impressions and opinion, these observations cannot be easily dismissed as grounded on careless impressions or uninformed opinion. In many cases the analyses from which these observations stem are based on careful study and/or a great deal of experience with police organizations. Clearly though, additional research needs to be done toward demonstrating the relationship between community factors and law enforcement outputs

based on more sound empirical methods and using a more systematic and wider basis of comparison.

Political System Characteristics as Determinants of Police Outputs

The political nature of police work has been previously alluded to in the general discussion of police discretion. The fact that arrests can be classified as a kind of policy output is suggestive of possible relationships between these outputs and what we broadly categorize as political system characteristics. The earlier discussion involving police behavior and the class conflict model also points to the possibility that certain political arrangements may have an impact on law enforcement. In this case it is hypothesized that the policies of local political agencies mirror the interests of the social, economic and political elites in the community.

While relationships between the police and the community power structure are largely untested, relationships between the police and elected representatives, particularly police chiefs and mayors, has been documented. For example in his study of over 400 cities in Iowa, Lunden found that very few police chiefs hold their positions for more than three or four years, and 46 percent held office for two years or less before they were replaced. Changes in administration as well as "other political reasons" were explanations frequently cited for the turnover rate.⁹²

A more precise example of the political nature of the police is provided by Bent in a fairly detailed summary of events surrounding the 1971 mayoral election in Memphis, Tennessee where the nature of

the police department was a major campaign issue. Following the ouster of the incumbent, newly elected Mayor Chandler proceeded to appoint a new police chief who in turn made a number of additional personnel changes at the top of the organization. According to Bent, these alterations in personnel resulted in a marked change in police style and behavior.⁹³

The fact that in many cases changes in administration are accompanied by changes of chiefs of police, suggests that elected political officials place a great deal of importance on working with a police administrator who holds attitudes and values on law enforcement similar to their own. Indeed, political repercussions may be felt in cities where elected officials, particularly the mayor and the police chief, disagree over certain points. The fairly recent altercation between Mayor Jackson of Atlanta and the incumbent police chief over the handling of demonstrators represents as example of political conflict which may result from opposing viewpoints on law enforcement matters.

As a result of reform pressures some cities have instituted measures designed to more effectively isolate the police from electoral politics.⁹⁴ A police chief with secure tenure may be able to effectively oppose the desired policies of the elected political leadership or at least bring matters to a standoff. Ruchelman describes New York City as a case where the police bureaucracy has demonstrated considerable success in opposing the mayor.⁹⁵

The kinds of police outputs in which we are interested are not typical of police activities that are likely to make newspaper

headlines or result in widespread community controversy. To be sure arrests connected with a spectacular drug raid are likely to receive front-page coverage, and charges of police abuse when invoking the criminal process may arouse community emotions. For the most part, though, day-to-day law enforcement is a relatively low-keyed affair. For this reason when attempting to explain police outputs resulting from more routine kinds of police behavior, some social scientists have focused on a number of political system variables that are often not considered in studies that focus on more overtly political issues in law enforcement.

City government. A few individuals have examined the role of certain city government variables in influencing arrest outputs. Characteristics associated with city government generally include 1) the policies and preferences of elected officials and 2) government form and structure.

No studies have attempted to measure the relationship between the policy preferences of elected city officials in regard to law enforcement and actual police practices. One of the reasons for this is that in most cases it is judged highly unlikely that mayors and other city councilmen will become directly involved in setting enforcement priorities or enforcement levels. This is in part due to the fact that city legislators apparently feel that law enforcement matters should be decided by the experts--mainly the police chief and other high ranking law enforcement personnel.

Perhaps a more important explanation for council reticence in the law enforcement area is that elected city officials as well as police administrators would be hesitant to admit that police departments employ anything less than a policy of full enforcement.⁹⁶ To acknowledge the exercise of discretion belies the image of impartiality before the law and may result in a serious public outcry as well as legal entanglements. Concerning the latter point, in Bargain City U. S. A. Inc., versus Dilworth, a case involving the selective enforcement of Sunday blue laws, the courts ruled that selective enforcement constitutes unconstitutional discrimination.⁹⁷ While the record concerning the conditions and circumstances under which discretionary behavior will be upheld by the courts is far from clear, legal uncertainties as well as political sensitivity render it unlikely that matters involving enforcement policies will be debated in a public forum such as a city council meeting. For this reason, any relationship between council preferences in the law enforcement arena and police outputs is apt to be a fairly indirect one.

In this regard, Goldstein points out that council input into law enforcement policies is often limited to the budget.⁹⁸ In a more direct manner elected representatives may instruct the police to increase their enforcement capability in areas such as traffic or drug control by authorizing increased appropriations for these specific purposes. However, according to Goldstein, it is more likely that the council will make a very general determination concerning the proportion of the total budget it is willing to allocate to law enforcement, leaving the

determination of law enforcement priorities to the police administrator.⁹⁹ Of course, council action concerning the amount of money it is willing to allocate to the police function may be interpreted as constituting support for the general level of enforcement it perceives as desirable for the community.

After observing law enforcement agencies in eight communities, Wilson essentially comes to the same conclusions as Goldstein regarding the indirect manner in which city councils may influence law enforcement outputs. He observes that deliberate choices on the part of the council may have an effect on police personnel, budgets, pay levels, and organization, and that these factors in turn may have an impact on police behavior.¹⁰⁰ On the other hand, due to the nature of police work as well as constraints concerning "political" involvement in the determination of enforcement practices, it is unlikely that council preferences will be directly translated into arrest policies.

Government form and structure. In the urban policy literature considerable attention has been focused on the importance of certain formal characteristics of city government in determining policy outputs, particularly the extent to which reform and unreformed structures influence outputs. As is the case with council preferences, government structure is usually posited as having an indirect relationship to police arrest practices in the law enforcement literature. Linkages between government form and law enforcement outputs are primarily described in terms of the influence that government type may have on police organization or style. For example, it is assumed that

professionalized police forces are more likely to be found in cities with reformed government structures.¹⁰¹ Professionalized police organizations, in turn, are likely to behave differently than their less professional counterparts, and these differences in behavior may result in varying arrest patterns.

Wilson examined arrest practices for certain kinds of crimes in 146 medium-sized cities according to form of government. While Wilson did not examine the relationship between government type and police organization type, he nevertheless found considerable support for the premise that "good government" regimes have different levels of arrest than less reformed cities.¹⁰² Table 1-2 displays Wilson's findings.

The data show differences in arrest outputs by political system type, although the kind of offense being considered clearly appears to influence these differences. Thus, the arrest rate for larceny and drunkenness is nearly twice as high in professional than in partisan cities, while the assault arrest rate is about the same for the two extreme city types.

Political culture and political climate. A few social scientists have commented on the relationship between certain characteristics associated with political climate or political culture and law enforcement outputs.¹⁰³ Skolnick, for example, while emphasizing the importance of the community's social structure on law enforcement policies, nevertheless cited the political complexion of the community as an important factor in influencing police behavior.¹⁰⁴ Skolnick, however, did not identify those political traits or attributes that may be important determinants of police outputs.

Table 1-2
ARREST RATES FOR CERTAIN COMMON OFFENSES BY
COMMUNITY POLITICAL SYSTEMS, 1960*

Offense	High professional council manager cities (n = 43)	Low professional council- manager cities (n = 43)	Non-partisan mayor council cities (n = 19)	Partisan mayor council cities (n = 34)
Larceny	251.1	204.6	230.1	121.9
Drunken- ness	1185.8	1113.6	918.0	656.5
Driving while intoxi- cated	194.6	159.2	136.8	132.2
Dis- orderly conduct	224.9	259.1	211.9	318.2
Simple assault	108.2	101.2	66.3	94.0

*Arrest rates are the total for all cities of that type; that is, the total number of arrests for all cities in each column is divided by the population for the cities in that column.

Source: James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 275.

In his study of police behavior in eight communities, Wilson was unable to survey community attitudes on law enforcement and instead indicated that the existence of certain attitudes and beliefs could be inferred from the nature of political institutions in the community. Thus Wilson hypothesized that:

. . . the more partisan the political system, the more politicians represent small geographic constituencies, and the more nonprofessional the

executive head of government, the more likely the city will have a political culture favorable to a watchman (less professional) police style. By contrast cities electing nonpartisan officials at large and vesting executive authority in a highly professional city manager will more likely have a political culture favoring the legalistic (more professional) police style.¹⁰⁵

For Wilson partisanship is associated with a political culture which is conducive to a certain law enforcement style. This particular style of law enforcement is, in turn, a major determinant of arrest policies. From Wilson's writing it can be inferred that a community's political culture may provide a set of cues and signals to individual policemen regarding the kind of enforcement behavior that is expected of them. More important though, according to Wilson, is the manner in which political culture affects the council's decision in selecting a police chief. "In some community's it is expected that he will be the 'best man available'; in others it is that he will be the 'deserving local fellow' or the man 'closest to the party'."¹⁰⁶ Confronted with a certain "zone of community indifference" regarding law enforcement matters, once in office the police chief will have a major influence on the direction of law enforcement policies.¹⁰⁷ However, the kind of individual preferred for selection by the community supposedly will serve to constrain and influence the kinds of policies that in effect will be pursued by that individual. Figure 1-1 depicts Wilson's conception of the relationship between political culture and arrest policies. While the relationships posited in Figure 1 can be inferred from Wilson's work, they are not systematically examined by the author.




Figure 1-1

For the most part, the influence of local political climate on police outputs has not been explored to a great extent in the literature. Two aspects of political climate--party affiliation and interest group activity--have been mentioned by some authors in relationship to law enforcement. Bent, for example, notes that Republicans tend to value order and stability more highly than Democrats, although these effects could be muddled by socioeconomic background variables.¹⁰⁸ While there are problems in inferring a particular conservative-liberal ideology on the basis of party identification, Bent's preliminary findings suggest that the relationships between party and law enforcement policies may be a useful area of inquiry.

Interest group involvement in law enforcement policies has not been systematically examined in the literature. Some individuals have conjectured that due to the nature of day-to-day police work, especially its low visibility, organized groups are not likely to become involved

in the determination of arrest practices. Gardiner, for example, characterizes citizen demands as being specific, isolated, and ad hoc.¹⁰⁹

While Wilson generally agrees with Gardiner's assessment that organized groups rarely become involved in day-to-day law enforcement practices, he nevertheless reserves a role, albeit more indirect in nature, for these groups in influencing police outputs. For example, good government groups such as the League of Women Voters may call for police organizational reform, while civil liberties and civil rights groups may complain about the nature of arrests practices.¹¹⁰ Church groups may demand more rigorous enforcement of vice-related offenses. Bent notes that Chambers of Commerce tend to press for police professionalism,¹¹¹ while Juris and Feuille observe that police labor unions may make demands for fuller enforcement of existing statutes.¹¹² Obviously the nature of these demands vary a great deal in the manner in which they may ultimately influence arrest outputs. Skolnick's observation that the police chief, as other administrators of large organizations, must balance various community interests in directing the course of his agency, suggests the need for further research into interest group activity and police outputs.

Organizational and agency characteristics. Some research has been geared toward examining the nature of police organizations and their possible implications for police behavior. Along these lines, a common method for classifying police organizations is along a professional-non-professional continuum, with the underlying assumption being that professional agencies not only have different formal characteristics than

their less professional counterparts, but that they also behave differently. For example, in contrasting the professional and nonprofessional in law enforcement, Banton suggests that professionalism may affect the relationship between the police officer and the community he serves. He states that:

The professional movement in law enforcement implies that the professional officer should be able to practice his profession anywhere in the country, and local control must give way to proven principles defining the most economic utilization of financial and human resources. Loyalty to a national ideal of law enforcement must take precedence over considerations of local popularity.¹¹³

Thus Banton's observation implies that professional police agencies may be less receptive to variations in local values and attitudes on law enforcement than would be the case among more traditional departments.

In a similar vein Blumberg and Niederhoffer suggest that professionalism instills a demand for efficiency as well as objective standards in police work. The consequence, they say, is that in practice a professional police force is "tougher" and more impersonal than the nonprofessional can be in dealing with such groups as minorities and juveniles.¹¹⁴

In an early essay Wilson distinguished between professional police organizations which tend to operate according to universalistic standards of conduct and "fraternal" or "system" departments which tend to enforce particularistic values and norms.¹¹⁵ Supposedly each kind of department would behave differently in arrest situations with the former more likely to use less personal discretion.

Some research has attempted to empirically verify differences in behavior between professional and less professional police forces. In a comparative study of the handling of juvenile offenders in two communities, Wilson found that the more professional police force tended to impose penalties according to the rules rather than through the exercise of personal discretion. As a consequence Western City's highly professionalized department made one and one half times more juvenile arrests than Eastern City's nonprofessional organization.¹¹⁶ Of course generalizations that can be made from Wilson's study are quite limited since only two cases were observed.

Henderson and Neubauer attempted a more comparative examination of professionalism and police behavior in their study of sheriff organizations in Florida.¹¹⁷ Using training as well as certain entrance and promotional criteria as indicators of professionalism, they found that this particular attribute accounted for only a small amount of the variance in arrest rates for various kinds of crimes. Henderson and Neubauer do note, however, that more sophisticated measures of police organization might have yielded different results.¹¹⁸

In another study Richard Chackerian analyzed the premise that professionalism leads to greater effectiveness and equity in law enforcement. He presumed that these qualities in turn would lead to more positive citizen evaluations of the police. Using nine Florida law enforcement agencies from four cities and five counties as units of analysis, Chackerian found that cities with more professional police departments experienced higher crime rates, lower arrest rates, and lower citizen

evaluations, than the less professional forces.¹¹⁹ Thus Chackerian's findings tend to contradict the "managerial view" of law enforcement whereby police effectiveness--at least as measured by arrests and crime rates--and positive citizen evaluation are conceived as concomitants of professionalism. Of course the findings outlined above might not be accepted as the final word on police professionalism and behavior since they are based on a small sample selected from a very narrow geographic area.

While the most common method of classifying police departments has been based upon the concept of professionalism some research has indicated that police departments might be classified other than according to a professional versus nonprofessional dichotomy. Morgan and Swanson, through factor analytic techniques, found that certain innovative police practices often associated with more modern or progressive police departments do not necessarily occur together in large city departments. While the Morgan and Swanson study did not relate organizational characteristics to police behavior and practices, they did find that the various departmental attributes associated with professionalism are not related to the same environmental influences.¹²⁰

As mentioned above Wilson's earlier work on police behavior focused on the professional-nonprofessional dichotomy. In a later volume, however, Wilson described three police prototypes including: 1) the watchman style which emphasizes the preservation of public order rather than law enforcement duties; 2) the legalistic style which focuses upon the vigorous and impartial enforcement of laws; and 3) the service style,

which stresses community relations.¹²¹ Wilson suggested that these various agency types would differ in arrests patterns for various kinds of offenses, and this hypothesis was generally supported by his case studies in eight communities.

Elinor Ostrom and her associates believe that police organizations can best be categorized according to the production strategy followed by the agency. They describe police departments as either patrol-oriented or task-oriented, i.e., specialized. The former can perhaps be equated with more traditional methods of policing, while the latter reflects a trend towards professionalization. While Ostrom and her colleagues did not relate organization type to arrest outputs, they did find that citizens tended to view patrol-oriented departments in a more positive manner.¹²²

Finally, in an economic analysis of police outputs, Jeffrey Chapman examines the relationship between police labor inputs and arrests in 77 medium-sized California cities. Chapman's investigation differs from those outlined above in that he does not attempt to classify police departments by organizational type. Nevertheless he does study the relationship between certain organizational attributes and arrest outputs. Using police per capita as a measure of labor inputs, he found a significant positive relationship between this variable and property and total arrests.¹²³ Other labor inputs such as per capita police cars were not found to be significantly related to arrests and expressed a negative relationship with the dependent variable.

The chief administrator. The influence of the police chief in shaping arrest policies has been alluded to earlier. Kadish for example explained that law enforcement outputs may be influenced by the manner in which the head of the department allocates police resources. Bent noted that following a change of command in the Memphis police department the agency seemed to assume a different character, although Bent failed to relate these perceived differences to behavioral changes on the part of the police.

In contrast to the above viewpoints, Banton expresses the opinion that due to the nature of police work, particularly the low visibility of police work and lack of direct supervision in the field, the extent to which the chief can successfully implement his own policies and preferences is highly circumscribed.¹²⁴ Wilson takes the middle ground by postulating that police chiefs have more leverage in some areas of law enforcement than in others. For example, he suggests that chiefs may take the lead in the areas of vice and traffic enforcement, but other kinds of offenses are more likely to be subject to other kinds of influences. It is also noted that the chief may indirectly influence law enforcement outputs through his administrative and organizational preferences.¹²⁵

The only study which has attempted to assess the role of the police chief in influencing law enforcement outputs on a somewhat more systematic basis is Gardiner's research on traffic policies. As mentioned earlier Gardiner found that for the most part environmental variables were not highly correlated with traffic citations in the 508 cities he

examined. Then based on interviews with police chiefs and other law enforcement officers in 30 Massachusetts cities, Gardiner deduced that variations in traffic enforcement policies among communities can be primarily attributed to preferences of the department administrator. These preferences were reflected in the allocation of labor, time, and other resources among the various functions assigned to the department.¹²⁶

Intergovernmental influences. No attempts have been made to systematically examine the influence of intergovernmental influences on police outputs, other than perhaps to study the effects of federal monies on state and local spending.¹²⁷ As has been mentioned earlier, law enforcement in the United States has been traditionally a local function and strong pressures exist to keep state and especially federal influence at a minimum. Former Attorney General Saxby's stern warning that unless skyrocketing crime rates are curbed we might have to resort to a national police force is evidence of the generally negative feelings associated with centralization of the police function.

In spite of strong support for local control over law enforcement there are some pressures--mainly from the federal level--toward uniformity in practice. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation sponsors an academy aimed toward raising performance standards, and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) awards grants to state and local government and has issued policy guidelines and recommendation in the form of special studies and reports. As noted above, however, little or no research has attempted to assess the impact of these kinds of activities on police behavior and practices.

One additional aspect of intergovernmental relationships in regard to the police deserves some mention. Several social scientists have commented on the influence the courts may have on police attitudes and behavior. In very general terms, decisions handed down by the courts have supposedly circumscribed certain kinds of police activities most notably arrest without probable cause, search and seizure, and the nature and method of obtaining confessions of guilt. In addition to these influences, some individuals have suggested that more routine kinds of court decisions may affect law enforcement outputs. For example, Reiss and Bordua observe that court decisions to dismiss charges may be perceived by police officers as a rejection of their own decisions.¹²⁸ Banton goes one step further and suggests that court decisions influence police discretion. Apparently the police will be more reluctant to enforce the law if they feel their decisions will eventually be rejected by the courts.¹²⁹ While the relationship between court decisions and arrest outputs could be an important one, no empirical research exists to date on the subject.

Overview

Table 1-3 shows a summary of previous research on police behavior and law enforcement policies arrayed by the five categories or frameworks we utilized to organize the studies as well as by certain features descriptive of the methods and research design utilized in these studies. As noted earlier a major criticism of research using the psychological and situational demand approaches is that it fails to examine police

activities within the context of the community environment. The class conflict approach meets this criticism to a certain extent, but its premises have been largely unexplored by empirical research.

Some studies have identified socioeconomic and cultural as well as political variables as salient to the explanation of law enforcement policies. A good number of these efforts, however, have been based on a prior reasoning, are nonquantitative, or lack a fairly broad comparative base.¹³⁰ In addition, very few of these studies have attempted to systematically examine law enforcement policies within a framework whereby the relative importance of certain categories of variables in explaining police policies can be identified and assessed. In the next chapter such a framework is suggested. We begin with a general discussion of the systems framework and then suggest certain relationships within the context of the framework which we believe are important to the explanation of police policy variation.

Table 1-3

SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON POLICE BEHAVIOR
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OUTPUTS

Framework	Data Base ¹	Analysis ¹		Variable System
		Quantitative	Comparative	
<u>Psychological Approach</u>				
Skolnick	study and/or experience	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a
Westley	study and/or experience	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a
Banton	study and/or experience	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a
Chwast	study and/or experience	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a
Wilson	study and/or experience	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a
Bent	interview/survey	quantitative	non-comparative ² among agency units	bivariate
Rokeach, Miller, Snyder	interview/survey	quantitative	non-comparative ² among agency units	univariate

Table 1-3 (continued)

Framework	Data Base ¹	Analysis ¹		Variable System
		Quantitative	Comparative	
Baley & Mendelsohn	interview/survey	quantitative	non-comparative among agency units	univariate
Niederhoffer	interview/survey	quantitative	non-comparative among agency units	univariate
McNamara	interview/survey	quantitative	non-comparative among agency units	univariate
Smith, Locke, Walker	interview/survey	quantitative	non-comparative among agency units	univariate
Baehr, et al	interview/survey	quantitative	non-comparative among agency units	multivariate
<u>Situational Demand</u>				
Piliavin & Briar	participant observation	quantitative	non-comparative among agency units	multivariate
Petersen	participant observation	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a
Black	participant observation	quantitative	non-comparative among agency units	multivariate
Westley	participant observation	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a

Table 1-3 (continued)

Framework	Data Base ¹	Analysis ¹		Variable System
		Quantitative	Comparative	
Banton	participant observation	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a
Bittner	participant observation	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a
Black & Reiss	participant observation	quantitative	non-comparative among agency units	multivariate
<u>Class Conflict Model</u>				
Lohman	study and/or experience	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a
Niederhoffer	study and/or experience	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a
Iglitzen	study and/or experience	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a
Kieselhortz ^{Sc}	study and/or experience	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a
Galliher	study and/or experience	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a

Table 1-3 (continued)

Framework	Data Base ¹	Analysis ¹		Variable System
		Quantitative	Comparative	
<u>Socio-Economic and Socio-Cultural Approach</u>				
Chwast	study and/or experience	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a
Niederhoffer	study and/or experience	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a
Kadish	study and/or experience	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a
LeFave	study and/or experience	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a
Nimmer	study and/or experience	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a
Ennis	interview/survey	quantitative	non-comparative among agency units	bivariate
Skolnick	participant observation interview/survey	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a

Table 1-3 (continued)

Framework	Data Base ¹	Analysis ¹		Variable System
		Quantitative	Comparative	
Wilson	participant observation interview/survey	non-quantitative	comparative	n/a
Reiss	participant observation interview/survey aggregate statistics	quantitative	non-comparative among agency units	bivariate
Goldman	interview/survey	non-quantitative	comparative	n/a
Gardiner	aggregate statistics	quantitative	comparative	bivariate
Henderson & Neubauer	aggregate statistics	quantitative	comparative	multivariate
<u>Political system approach</u>				
Goldstein	study and/or experience	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a

Table 1-3 (continued)

Framework	Data Base ¹	Analysis ¹		Variable System
		Quantitative	Comparative	
Wilson	participant observation interview/survey aggregate statistics	both quantitative and non quantitative	comparative and comparative-limited	bivariate
Skolnick	study and/or experience	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a
Bent	interview/survey study and/or experience	both quantitative and non-quantitative	non-comparative among agency units	bivariate
Banton	study and/or experience	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a
Blumberg & Niederhoffer	study and/or experience	non-quantitative	non-comparative	n/a
Henderson & Neubauer	aggregate statistics	quantitative	comparative	multivariate
Chackerian	interview/survey aggregate statistics	quantitative	comparative-limited	bivariate

Table 1-3 (continued)

Framework	Data Base ¹	Analysis ¹		Variable System
		Quantitative	Comparative	
Morgan & Swanson	aggregate statistics	quantitative	comparative	multivariate
Ostrom	interview/survey aggregate statistics	quantitative	comparative	bivariate
Chapman	aggregate statistics	quantitative	comparative	multivariate
Gardiner	interview/survey	non-quantitative	comparative	n/a
Reiss & Bordua	study and/or experience	non-quantitative	comparative	n/a

¹Category adopted from Charles O. Jones, "State and Local Public Policy Analysis: A Review of Progress," in Political Science and State and Local Government (Washington, D. C.: The American Political Science Association, 1973), p. 31.

²Indicates that the study did not make comparisons among law enforcement units although more than one law enforcement unit may actually have been examined. The study is comparative in the sense that comparisons are made among groups, individuals or categories within the law enforcement unit(s) or between the law enforcement population and some other non-law enforcement population.

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⁹¹Henderson and Neubauer, "Police Professionalism and Arrest Behavior," 33-38.

⁹²Walter A. Lunden, "The Mobility of Chiefs of Police," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 49 (May-June, 1958), 178-183.

⁹³Bent, The Politics of Law Enforcement, Chapter 6.

⁹⁴For a discussion of police reform see Stephen M. David and Paul E. Petersen, "Urban Politics and the Police," in Urban Politics and Public Policy: The City in Crisis, ed. by Stephen M. David and Paul E. Petersen (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 241-244.

⁹⁵Leonard Ruchelman, Police Politics: A Comparative Study of Three Cities (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1974), p. 99.

⁹⁶Goldstein, "Police Discretion: The Ideal Versus the Real," 141.

⁹⁷Kadish, "Legal Norms and Discretion," 907.

⁹⁸Goldstein, "Police Discretion: The Ideal Versus the Real," 142.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior, p. 227.

¹⁰¹Albert J. Reiss, Jr. and David J. Bordua, "Environment and Organization: A Perspective on the Police," in The Police: Six Sociological Essays, p. 54.

¹⁰²Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior, pp. 274-275.

¹⁰³We can detect some overlap here between those community characteristics which some researchers might classify as descriptive of local political culture and those attributes described earlier as part of the broader socio-cultural environment of the community. Part of the problem lies with a certain lack of rigor in defining the term political culture. Our selection of certain articles for review under the category of political culture and climate is primarily based on the authors' classification or specification of certain variables as being of a "political" nature.

¹⁰⁴Skolnick, Justice Without Trial, p. 11.

¹⁰⁵Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior, p. 272.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 233.

- 107Ibid., p. 234.
- 108Bent, The Politics of Law Enforcement, p. 104.
- 109Gardiner, Traffic and the Police, p. 116.
- 110Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior, p. 70.
- 111Bent, The Politics of Law Enforcement, p. 72.
- 112Hervey A. Juris and Peter Feiulle, The Impact of Police Unions (Springfield, Virginia: U. S. Department of Commerce, 1972), p. 342.
- 113Banton, The Policeman in the Community, p. 160.
- 114Blumberg and Niederhoffer, "The Police in Social and Historical Perspective," 11-12.
- 115Wilson, "The Police and Their Problems," 189-216. Also see James Q. Wilson, "What Makes a Better Policeman," in Urban Politics and Public Policy: The City in Crisis, pp. 256-268.
- 116Wilson, "The Police and the Delinquent in Two Cities," 173-195.
- 117Henderson and Neubauer, "Police Professionalism and Arrest Behavior," 1-45.
- 118Entrance and promotional criteria consisted of the number of exams administered to prospective recruits or to individuals seeking promotion. No attempt was made to weigh more traditional kinds of criteria, e.g., physical dexterity, against those criteria which reflect more professional interests.
- 119Richard Chackerian, "Police Professionalism and Citizen Evaluations: A Preliminary Analysis," Public Administration Review, 34 (March-April, 1974), 141-148.
- 120David R. Morgan and Cheryl Swanson, "Analyzing Police Policies: The Impact of Environment, Politics, and Crime," Urban Affairs Quarterly, 11 (June, 1976), 489-510.
- 121Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior.
- 122Elinor Ostrom, et al, Community Organization and the Provision of Police Services (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973), pp. 1-95. Also see Elinor Ostrom and Gordon Whitaker, "Does Local Community Control

Make a Difference?" American Journal of Political Science, 17 (February, 1973), 39-58; Elinor Ostrom, et al, "Do We Really Want to Consolidate Urban Police Forces? A Reappraisal of Some Old Assertions," Public Administration Review, 33 (September-October, 1973), 423-432.

¹²³Jeffrey I. Chapman, The Impact of Police on Crime and Crime on Police: A Synthesis of Economic and Ecological Approaches (Los Angeles: Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of California at Los Angeles, 1973).

¹²⁴Banton, The Policeman in the Community, p. 117.

¹²⁵Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior, p. 77.

¹²⁶Gardiner, Traffic and the Police, pp. 154-159. For a general discussion of the role of the police chief in the formulation of law enforcement policies see Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, "The Police Department," in Urban Politics and Public Policy, 248-255.

¹²⁷For example see Seymour Sachs and Robert Harris, "The Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures and Intergovernmental Flow of Funds," National Tax Journal, 17 (March, 1964), 74-85. See also James I. Moore, "Law Enforcement Planning in the American States: An Examination of Factors Influencing Policy Outcomes," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1971).

¹²⁸Reiss and Bordua, "Environment and Organization," 33.

¹²⁹Banton, The Policeman in the Community, p. 147.

¹³⁰Studies by Henderson and Neubauer and by Chapman which are comparative in terms of the number of cases observed, are limited to a narrow geographic region--in both of these cases, one state.

CHAPTER II

A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICIES

In the preceding chapter it was noted that research on law enforcement policies has for the most part been lacking in terms of a systematic framework for the analysis of these policies, particularly one which can account for a number of variables which may be importantly related to police outputs. In this section it is argued that a systems framework is highly conducive to the study of police outputs, particularly arrest patterns. To begin with, the basic elements of the systems framework are presented together with some comments on its application, criticisms of the approach and suggestions for improvements which can be made over previous applications of the model. The suitability of the framework for the study of law enforcement policies is discussed followed by an outline of the general relationships which will be examined in the present research within the context of the systems model.

The Systems Framework

Although a systems approach is not new to the hard sciences and the biological sciences, it was not introduced to the study of politics until the 1950's. It's proponent, David Easton, advocated this particular approach on the basis that it was a first step in a move from the more traditional treatment of political life which was both normative

and formalistic in nature to an approach which saw as its basis the explanation of political behavior through the use of empirical methods.¹

The systems framework as introduced by Easton contains several elements or concepts which more or less define the range of phenomena to be considered. These elements also serve as a set of general categories around which relationships can be posited and data can be classified.² The concept of system connotes any set of interrelated and interacting objects, elements, or variables. More specifically, for Easton the political system consists of those interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for society.

As mentioned above, the systems framework contains certain components which serve to organize information about the real world and which theoretically are posited to be in relationship to one another. The basic elements of the systems model include the concepts of environment, inputs, the political system (often referred to as the conversion process), outputs, and feedback. Very briefly certain inputs which originate in the environment of the political system are processed or converted by that system into outputs. This is the process whereby values are authoritatively allocated for society, and it is this activity which distinguishes political behavior from other kinds of social behavior. The concept of feedback is suggestive of a relationship in which the consequences of outputs are made known to authoritative decision-makers through the input process. The systems framework is represented in Figure 2-1 and the elements of the model are described in somewhat more detail below.




Figure 2-1

Representation of the Systems Framework

Environment. The environment of the political system consists of other systems e.g. social, economic, cultural, which do not function to authoritatively allocate values for society. The environment is important to the functioning of the political system because it is the source of inputs into that system. The notion of environment also suggests the concept of a boundary which differentiates political from non-politically related activities.

Inputs. Inputs refer to the carrying of stimuli from the environment to the political system and can be subcategorized according to their dominant features. Easton identified one kind of input as a demand. A demand may be defined as "expression of opinion that an authoritative allocation with regard to a particular subject matter should or should not be made by those responsible for doing so."³ The second major category of inputs is called supports, and these refer to activities whereby someone orients himself favorably towards an object, group, policy, idea,

or institution.⁴ Both demands and supports are considered to be integrally related to the functioning of the political system. Demands provide the system with its reason for being but at the same time may serve as a source of stress. In a similar manner the quality of support rendered the political system may have a major impact on its performance.

Conversion process. The conversion process is for the most part synonymous with the political system and refers to those activities associated with allocating values and making decisions for society. The input-conversion-output relationship refers to a process whereby demands emanating from the environment are converted or processed by authoritative decision-makers into outputs. The assumption here is that the political process is an open system in which inputs from the environment actually influence decision making.⁵

Also associated with the conversion process is the concept of withinputs. Withinputs consist of certain factors internal to the political system which influence the manner in which values are allocated for society.

Outputs. Outputs refer to the authoritative allocation of values for society or the authoritative decisions about the manner in which society's resources will be committed.⁶ Outputs may be of a tangible sort, e.g., goods and services or of a more intangible quality, e.g., symbolic outputs.

Feedback. As mentioned earlier the concept of feedback refers to the process whereby the consequences of authoritative decisions are communicated to decision-makers. Another way of thinking about feedback is the process whereby outputs at one period in time interact with

features in the environment and are transmitted back to the conversion process as inputs at a later point in time. In an operational sense outputs, which are frequently conceptualized as dependent variables, are conceived as independent variables when the feedback process is considered.

The above discussion constitutes a description, although somewhat brief, of the systems framework proposed by Easton. It is obvious that the Easton framework is extremely general, comprehensive, and abstract in nature, and because of this any application of the model to the reality of law enforcement policies can perhaps benefit from a review of the manner in which the model has been applied to the study of police outputs in previous research.

Application of the Systems Framework

As mentioned above, an examination of the manner in which the systems framework has been applied to previous policy research may provide some useful guidelines for the study of law enforcement policies. The purpose here is not to provide an exhaustive review of the literature on state and local policy research; this has been done by other individuals in the field.⁷ Instead the intent is to comment on the general nature of these policy studies in regard to their focus and their findings.

Most of the comparative state and local policy studies of more recent vintage have relied directly or indirectly on a framework which resembles Easton's paradigm. Reliance on the Easton model has led to the classification of information into three broad categories--environmental variables, political system variables, and policy outputs. The focus of these studies is on the identification of determinants of

public policy on the assumption that their identification will elucidate the manner in which the political system operates.

Various measures of policy outputs have been utilized in the literature, but state and local expenditures for various governmental functions or activities seem to predominate. Environmental measures include such factors as a state or community's population size, ethnic and class composition, income distribution, and economic base, and these characteristics are usually described as a source of demands on the political system. Finally, the political category may include among others measures of party competition, political participation, government form or structure, and inputs from other levels of government. Relationships are generally hypothesized between political and environmental variables and indicators of policy outputs to determine which have the greater impact or explanatory power. A good number of studies have found that socioeconomic variables have greater predictive value in explaining urban (and state) public policies, although critics aptly point out that these findings may be a result of the tendency of researchers to utilize expenditure data to operationalize the dependent variable. They note that environmental variables, particularly those which are indicators of system resources, may matter more than political variables in explaining expenditure levels. On the other hand, alternative conceptualizations of policy outputs may show political variables to have more impact.⁸

A prototype of policy research using a systems framework is Thomas Dye's Politics, Economics, and the Public.⁹ In this particular study Dye examined the relative effects of selected environmental and


political variables on a number of policy outputs at the state level ranging from education to public regulation. Characteristics of the political system included major party control of state government, inter-party competition, voter turnout, and degree of malapportionment; these variables were selected in part because in previous studies political scientists had postulated that they were important influences on public policy.¹⁰ In addition to the political system variables, certain environmental variables were selected by Dye to measure level of economic development. These included education, industrialization, urbanization, and wealth.

Using bivariate and multivariate statistical techniques, Dye concluded that a state's level of economic development results in pressures and demands which influence both policy outputs and political system characteristics. These findings as well as those in subsequent policy research led Dye to postulate two models of the policy-making process (see Figure 2-2) with each showing different relationships between environment, political system, and policy. For either model, however, the influence of political variables is clearly subordinate to that of environmental factors.

At the local level policy studies have often mirrored Dye's approach although some differences appear in variable selection due to data availability as well as the exigencies of local political systems. For example, apportionment and party control of government are not commonly examined in urban research; instead the extent to which the political variable, institutional reform, is related to policy outputs is commonly examined within the context of urban policy research. While

findings in this regard are mixed, the classic piece on government reform by Lineberry and Fowler suggests that less reformed structures are more responsive to social and economic cleavages than their more reformed counterparts.¹¹

Model 1. Environmental



Model 2. Hybrid Environment




Figure 2-2

Models of Policy Determination

Source: Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 261.

Another variable which has been frequently examined at the local level is political ethos or political culture.¹² Historian Richard Hofstadter authored the concept of ethos,¹³ but it was operationalized and introduced to political science by Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson.¹⁴ Research by these individuals lends some support to the premise that communities characterized as having a public-regarding ethos will exhibit different policy preferences (demands) than those in communities where a private-regarding ethos prevails.

Another area of interest to the urban researcher is the influence of extra-community variables, particularly inputs from the federal and state political systems, on policy outputs. Many studies of this nature have looked at the effects of federal and/or state grants-in-aid on local spending with the usual finding being that there is a positive relationship between the two.¹⁵ Thus, outside monies seem to stimulate spending at the local level. Interestingly enough, at the state level Dye found that federal aid provided no significant increase in the amount of variance explained for police protection.¹⁶

Evaluation of the Policy Literature

Most of the criticism of state and local policy research has been aimed at the manner in which the systems framework has been applied rather than at the systems framework itself. To be sure, the systems framework can be criticized on a number of grounds--one being that it is so general and comprehensive in nature that its use may result in very superficial explanations of political behavior.¹⁷ Still its generality and comprehensiveness can also be viewed as a strength, particularly when looking back to a period of time when explanations of political phenomenon were largely confined to a very small number of formal-legalistic kinds of variables. At any rate, social scientists in the field have been much more ready to make specific criticisms of the application of a particular model than to advocate the abandonment of the framework.

A frequent criticism of the policy literature is that researchers have failed to identify linkages between environmental variables and the political system. Thus, critics such as Rakoff and Schaeffer as well as

Jacob and Lipsky point out that in much of the policy research relationships are examined between measures of the environment and the political system, skipping a crucial step in the political process--the process whereby problems in the environment are first perceived and defined and then formulated into demands on the political system.¹⁸ Thus, Rakoff and Schaeffer note that "political processes operate on concepts and variables that are verbal and social, but scattered statistics are not verbal concepts. Rather inputs are verbal phenomena, and hence and are made by men, not by concepts such as industrialization."¹⁹ In a similar vein, Jacob and Lipsky argue that "social structure, political culture, political institutions, and elite perceptions intervene between a given environment and the articulation of demands."²⁰

In spite of this well-made point, a very real problem exists in observing and measuring inputs into the political system, particularly while attempting at the same time to generate findings on a comparative basis. While the perceptions and activities of various actors in the political process are no doubt crucial to the understanding of public policy, few social scientists have the resources available to undertake such an endeavor.

Rather than abandoning previous approaches to policy analysis altogether, some intermediate steps might be taken. For example, social scientists can improve the quality of policy research by offering specific hypotheses which are designed to explain how certain environmental features are expected to be linked to policy outputs. While this procedure may still necessitate inferring certain kinds of actions and behavior from environmental features, firm hypothesizing would lead to more informed

explanations of policy variation than is often the case with studies which subject a large number of variables to tests of association with little regard or justification for variable selection.

Closely related to the above observation is the need to develop more of a working knowledge of the substantive policy areas that one is examining. It is not uncommon to find research which subjects policies as diverse as welfare, education, health, and public regulation to the same framework without regard to, and identification of factors peculiar to these particular policy areas which may be integrally related to the understanding of policy variation. In reviewing some of the more diverse policy studies one is left with the impression that the writer has a much wider knowledge of statistical techniques and methods than he has substantive knowledge of the policy areas under examination. Thus it might be argued that as a prerequisite to the study of public policy, researchers should show some amount of familiarity with the substantive areas they are examining. While a major goal of policy research is an explanation of the political process which transcends specific policy problems, it nevertheless seems unrealistic to assume that a single system or process operates in the same manner for a wide range of public policies.²¹ Indeed, Jacob and Lipsky point out that some previous research, such as Dahl's study in New Haven, indicates that different kinds of policy arenas have different sets of decision-makers associated with them. Jacob and Lipsky suggest that "we need maps of the subsystems which are responsible for output decisions in various subject areas."²²

Another problem very closely related to the identification of subsystem maps is the need to first identify and differentiate policy

types. Coulter cites this as a crucial problem in policy research and notes that in addition to developing new policy typologies we might also review some existing taxonomies such as that offered by Lowi--public policies are distributive, regulatory and redistributive--and the scheme outlined by Almond and Powell whereby policies are regulative, distributive, symbolic, or extractive.²³

Finally, in addition to the failure to identify policy types in the literature, a major criticism of this mode of research is the manner in which policies are operationalized. As mentioned earlier, a large portion of the policy analysis literature, particularly that which is more comparative in nature, utilizes expenditure data to operationalize policy outputs. While expenditures are no doubt an important indicator of policy commitments and represent an authoritative allocation of society's resources, a number of critics argue that more substantive and qualitative aspects of public policy need to be reviewed.²⁴ As mentioned at an earlier point, previous research which finds socioeconomic factors to be more important determinants of policy outputs than political indicators may be challenged when nonexpenditure measures of policy are employed. Also, some critics argue that impacts of public policy--those aspects of the policy process related to feedback--should be examined more closely. Jacob and Lipsky argue that outputs and outcomes (impacts) may be sensitive to different kinds of demands.²⁵ This premise is supported by the initial research of Fry and Winters who found that redistributive policies are more closely related to selected political variables than to "environmental factors."²⁶

The above review has pointed to some of the problems associated with applying the systems framework to studies of public policy. We

believe that most of the criticisms offered find fault with the manner in which the systems framework has been applied to policy research and do not constitute grounds for rejection of the approach per se. While some of the criticisms offered may be difficult to meet because of the limited resources often available to social scientists, nevertheless some steps can be taken in terms of improvements over previous applications. In the discussion that follows, the study of law enforcement policies is examined within the context of the systems framework with particular attention given to the suitability of this approach to the study of policy variation among police departments as well as to some departures and improvements over previous policy applications. First, however, a few comments are offered concerning law enforcement as a subject for urban policy research.

The Study of Law Enforcement Within the Context of
Urban Policy Research

The present study falls within the tradition of the urban policy analysis literature in that an attempt is made to gain an improved understanding of the local political system by focusing on the possible determinants of policy outputs. In this particular instance we are interested in explaining variations in local law enforcement policies--specifically arrest policies. It is suggested that the comparative study of urban law enforcement activities is closely related to several basic theoretical issues in the field of urban policy analysis, particularly the relative effects of political system versus environmental variables on local governmental activities.

Furthermore, it is suggested that law enforcement policies are particularly amenable to the kinds of analysis which focuses on the diverse effects of community characteristics on public policies. As mentioned previously, both the structure of law enforcement in the United States as well as norms and expectations regarding the law enforcement function have seemed to mitigate against a great deal of federal influence on the manner in which law enforcement practices are conducted. At least at the state level, among a host of policy outputs, activities associated with public regulation appear to be one of the policy categories least affected by federal outputs. Thus, police practices may be more sensitive to community characteristics than many other types of public policy. In light of this, the comparative study of the law enforcement function seems a particularly appropriate focus of urban research.²⁷

Certain concerns of a more normative nature also emerge and these are not necessarily inconsistent with our quest to empirically verify certain relationships within the urban political system. For example, a continuing concern voiced by students of urban affairs as well as students of the criminal justice system is the extent to which police practices reflect community attitudes, values, and preferences. In examining police policies within the systems framework we are particularly interested in the extent to which police organizations are responsive to demands from the environment. From observations of this nature it is possible to draw certain conclusions regarding community control over the law enforcement function.

A Systems Approach to the Study
of Law Enforcement

One of the dominant characteristics of much of the previous research on police behavior and practices is the failure to relate the nature of law enforcement practices to the communities within which police departments operate. Thus while it has been documented that police policies vary from community to community, the socioeconomic, political, and cultural environment of the police is often treated as a given across communities. A number of studies have identified certain features of the police organization's environment which may have an influence on law enforcement outputs. These include such diverse factors as government structure, political culture and climate, class composition, and outputs from other political institutions. However, most of this research has failed to provide a conceptual framework within which the relationships between these variables and police policies may be systematically examined.

It is suggested here that a systems framework is highly conducive to meeting some of the problems identified with previous police research and to gaining a better understanding of the manner in which law enforcement policies are determined at the local level. The suitability of the framework can be particularly underscored by its emphasis on the dynamic relationship between political institutions and their environments. Indeed some students of law enforcement have commented on the systemic properties of municipal police departments. For example, Reiss and Bordua comment that a local police organization is especially adapted to

an analysis which stresses its relations and boundary transactions with its organized environment because "police have as their fundamental task the creation, maintenance of, and participation in external relationships."²⁸ The authors also observe that "police departments have clearly defined boundaries, yet they must continually engage in the management of highly contingent relationships that arise outside them."²⁹ These transactions and external relationships include such activities as directing traffic, testifying in court, responding to citizen complaints, and of course arresting individuals suspected of breaking the law. The kinds of activities performed by police organizations seem particularly conducive to a mode of analysis which provides a focus on the relationship between a political structure and its surrounding environment.

One important point that needs to be considered in the use of a systems framework to study police policies, and arrest policies in particular, is the fact that arrest decisions are actually made by individual police officers. The individual nature of the arrest decision, however, does not preclude examining this particular type of law enforcement policy within the context of a systems framework.

In her review of theoretical concerns in policy analysis Enid Curtis Bok Schoettle identifies two levels of analysis: 1) the participant in the policy-making process and 2) the system of policy formation. She observes that the student of policy analysis should strive toward an understanding of how the individual policy maker operates within an ongoing political system.³⁰ With this observation in mind, one of the major premises of this research is that arrest decisions of individual police officers are conditioned by properties of the larger social,


political, and organizational networks within which the police operate. This is another major reason why a systems approach is particularly appropriate to an explanation of arrest variation among cities, even though arrest decisions are ultimately made by individual officers on what often appears to be a rather isolated and ad hoc basis.

Law Enforcement As An Administrative System

As mentioned earlier, most of the previous policy research at the state and local level including studies of law enforcement outputs has examined policies primarily in terms of expenditure levels. Because of the manner in which policies have been operationalized, the focal point of this research has been on the outputs of legislative bodies, e.g., state legislatures or city councils, and variables have been selected to represent the kinds of influences that were thought to shape policies made by representative bodies. These kinds of policies are no doubt important because they reflect the manner in which decision makers allocate basic resources for the community. Nevertheless, it remains that a large portion of the goods and services produced for society are the product of administrative agencies, and because of this the study of the determinants of the nature, quantity, and quality of these services seems of equal importance to the study of the determinants of spending levels (legislative outputs). In spite of this obvious fact, the role of administrative agencies in the policy process at the local (and state) level has been largely overlooked.³¹

In the quest for an explanation of variation in arrests among communities the analysis will focus on the outputs of an administrative

agency--local police departments. Because of the nature of our inquiry the political process can be conceptualized somewhat differently than in previous policy studies. The major difference is that the conversion process is associated solely with administrative activities that convert inputs into outputs. Excluded from the conversion process are activities of other governmental institutions, e.g., legislative bodies and courts. For our purposes the latter activities, although part of the political system, can be thought of as part of the environment of the administrative system and may serve as a source of inputs to the conversion process of that system. Figure 2-3 shows a conceptual framework of the administrative system where administrative activities are the focal point of the political process.



Environment: e.g. clients, members of the public as well as other governmental officials who support or oppose agencies, administrators, or policies.

Figure 2-3

The Administrative System

Source: Ira Sharkansky, Public Administration: Policy Making in Government Agencies, (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1972), 5.

At this point general manner in which certain environmental variables as well as certain factors associated with the conversion process may influence arrest outputs will be considered. Some attention will also be given to the concept of feedback. The more general relationships posited in this section are operationalized in Chapter III.

Environment and Inputs

Because of the nature of the boundary transactions between police organizations and their environments, an examination of these organizations within the context of these environments seems highly appropriate. A police agency's environment consists of two general categories; those factors which are nonpolitical in nature and those factors commonly assigned to the political system.

The nonpolitical environment. Arrest outputs are related to the nonpolitical environment in two important ways. First, police officers respond to a very obvious cue from the environment--the amount of crime committed by individuals in the community.³² Thus, some relationship between a city's crime environment and arrest rates should be found.

The relationship between community crime levels and arrests, however, may not be as simple or as direct as it appears at first. When a police officer makes an arrest after observing a crime being committed, or when he makes an arrest in response to an alarm triggered by law-breakers, the relationship between criminal activity and police behavior is a rather direct one. However, in many instances the police do not respond directly to cues from the crime environment. Instead citizens often intervene in the process either in the status of complainant or

victim. In these cases it is the citizen who decides whether or not an event will be brought to the attention of the police.³³ In this regard citizens enter the criminal justice system not only as violators, but also as "enforcers" of the law. They have considerable influence over what becomes a police matter through their decisions whether or not to mobilize the police.³⁴ Of course once a police officer is summoned by a citizen he still has considerable discretion in deciding whether or not to process the case formally through an arrest or informally through a nonarrest alternative. The citizen role is an important one, however, in the sense that his decision in many cases affects what the police officer will investigate. These kinds of decisions serve to define the parameters within which the officer operates.

It might be argued that while citizens acting in the role of complainant or victim create many of the inputs into the administrative system, their behavior is predicated on the amount of criminal activity which occurs in the community. But as mentioned in Chapter I, some of the literature on law enforcement as well as recent studies on criminal victimization suggest otherwise. Reiss noted that different interests within the population may result in differences in expectations concerning the standards of behavior and law enforcement that should prevail in the community.³⁵ Wilson pointed to differences in community preferences in his study of law enforcement in eight cities,³⁶ and in his examination of juvenile offenders Goldman concluded that differences in community definitions of criminal behavior are a major factor accounting for arrest variation.³⁷ Criminal victimization studies further support the premise

that definitions of criminal activity may vary among populations.³⁸ While the victimization studies did not investigate citizen evaluations of the seriousness of various kinds of illegal behavior, the findings nevertheless indicate a variation among cities in terms of the difference between reported and unreported crime. These differences may be accounted for by differing perceptions of the quality of the police and the criminal justice system among communities. But it is also reasonable to assume that they reflect differences in what local residents define as delinquent behavior.

In addition to demands from citizens to enforce certain laws, police officers' perceptions of the environment may serve to influence arrest behavior. For example, an official may choose to behave in a certain manner based on his assessment of the demand activity which would likely follow each alternative course of action. While it is possible to conceptualize police perceptions of the environment as a factor internal to the police system, i.e., as a withinput, we choose to classify this factor as an environmental influence based on the premise that the nature of the environment affects police perceptions and attitudes toward the public and ultimately affects attitudes toward the performance of their job.³⁹

This kind of relationship may be important in understanding law enforcement policies. As mentioned earlier, Gardiner found a relationship between various measures of population stability and ticketing policies and concluded that this particular community characteristic influenced police perceptions of how they should behave.⁴⁰ In addition several students of the criminal justice system have noted that the police are

very much a part of the community in which they work and therefore may have a knowledge of or even come to incorporate certain values held by dominant and visible groups within the community.⁴¹

While it is beyond the scope of this research to examine the line officer's perceptions of the environment and how it affects his behavior, the relationship between certain environmental factors and arrest outputs is examined on the assumption that the objective environment does influence an officer's perception of that environment which, in turn, may affect his actual behavior.

In summary, the police officer may receive two kinds of signals from the environment. One is associated with criminal activity that occurs within his working environment and the other is associated with local norms regarding desired levels of law enforcement. In addition to demand behavior, police officers' knowledge and perceptions of their environment may influence the manner in which the law is enforced. In this research we examine a number of variables associated with a police agency's nonpolitical environment in an effort to explain variations in arrest outputs. In addition to a city's crime environment certain social, economic, and cultural factors are examined as a source of demand behavior within the context of the arrest decision. Based on previous policy research as well as some of the research associated with the criminal justice literature, a number of relationships are posited between specific environmental features and arrest outputs. These are outlined in detail in Chapter III.

The police agency's political environment. As noted in Chapter I, much of the literature on law enforcement behavior suggests a rather

indirect relationship between a community's political environment and law enforcement outputs--particularly arrest outputs. This is due to both the nature of police field work, i.e., its low visibility, as well as norms which render it undesirable to submit questions of law to the public forum. While the relationship between the political environment and police outputs may be indirect, this does not mitigate against its possible importance. Furthermore, the influence of political variables on police policies needs to be examined on a more comparative and systematic basis than has been done in the past.

For our purposes, the political environment of the administrative agency is conceptualized along two dimensions--one set of political variables is associated with the private sector and the other with the public (government) sector.⁴²

From the private sector the community's expressed support for government services may influence police performance in a rather indirect manner. Community support for the public sector may be translated into financial support, which in turn may affect levels of government service including those for the police. Demand inputs from the private sector may be somewhat more direct in nature. For example, demands for more aggressive police work may be associated with populations expressing more conservative political preferences.⁴³ Also, while interest group activity is less frequently associated with law enforcement than with many other kinds of policy areas, a review of the law enforcement literature suggests that in the past civil liberty groups and civil rights organizations have not been indifferent to local police practices.⁴⁴ Activities associated with the private sector of the police organization's

political environment are referred to collectively as the community's political climate and are operationalized in the next chapter.

Demands and supports from the public or government sector of the police agency's political environment should also be considered in assessing law enforcement policies. Outputs from government institutions may serve as inputs to the police system and may color the manner in which law enforcement duties are performed. An obvious example of this is the level of support given to the local police by city councils in their budget allocations. Wilson cites the selection of the police chief as well as council preferences and orientations towards professionalism as government outputs which may ultimately have an influence on police policies.⁴⁵ Again, political variables of this nature are considered to exert an indirect effect on arrest policies.

The relationship between police agencies and other local government institutions can be described as the police organization's horizontal ties.⁴⁶ Horizontal relationships represent the interaction of the agency with political as well as social, economic, and cultural subsystems at the community level. However, in addition to these kinds of relationships police agencies also interact with public organizations which are not directly integrated with the local community structure. These relationships constitute the police organization's vertical ties. Outputs from extra-community governmental institutions which are most likely to influence arrest outputs are those associated with the criminal justice system. We categorize the primary relationships within this system as 1) relationships between the police and the judicial system and 2) relationships between the police and certain federal agencies with grant authority.

At a more general level the literature on bureaucratic responsibility has focused on the impact of the judiciary on administrative decision-making.⁴⁷ At a more specific level outputs from the courts may influence police behavior, e.g. judicial decisions may be interpreted by the police as a source of support for their own decisions.⁴⁸

In the second case, we noted previously that penetration from the federal to the local level has been slight for law enforcement policies in comparison to other policy arenas. It is possible, that the input of federal resources to local police departments may have some effect albeit indirect on arrest levels. Relationships which characterize the police organization's vertical ties are detailed in the next chapter.

The Conversion Process--Withinputs

One of the major criticisms of previous policy research is that researchers have failed to take account of factors which intervene between a given environment and the policies which are produced by the political system. A particular criticism in this regard is that studies have neglected to examine those variables internal to the conversion process which may have an influence on public policy. In this research we take the opportunity to examine some of these factors. Keeping in mind the focus on the police as an administrative system, we propose to examine certain organizational characteristics of police departments as well as perceptions of agency heads in relationship to arrest outputs. These phenomena collectively are referred to as withinputs. Thus, withinputs represent factors internal to police organizations which may have an influence on law enforcement policies.

Organizational structure and type. Organizational features of police departments are explored as possible determinants of arrest variation. Although few studies have examined police organizations on a comparative basis, much of the police literature implies that organizational features do indeed affect the manner in which police officers enforce the law. Most of this discussion has revolved around the concept of professionalism,⁴⁹ although some social scientists such as Ostrom and Wilson have identified important police organizational variables in addition to professionalism.⁵⁰ The source for much of the discussion on organization and police behavior lies in concepts and premises originating in the public administration literature, particularly that associated with organization and administrative theory which suggests that organizational variables may have an effect on administrative outputs. Few attempts have been made in urban policy research to assess these kinds of relationships. At this point it might be helpful to review some general premises on the relationship between organizational characteristics and organizational behavior.

Max Weber was one of the first individuals to differentiate organizations according to their dominant traits and to suggest a relationship between these traits and organizational behavior.⁵¹ The most well known of Weber's organizational types is the rational bureaucratic model. Weber suggested that organizations possessing characteristics of the bureaucratic model, e.g. specialization, hierarchical ordering, and the recording of information, would be associated with a comparatively rational and efficient standard of performance.

Writers since Weber have studied organization and performance, often taking a more applied and prescriptive approach to the problem. In this context, the concepts of specialization and centralization have been examined most closely. For example, the work of Gulick and others in the scientific management school identified specialization with increased efficiency and heightened productivity.⁵²

Centralization is an organizational characteristic thought to be linked to administrative performance. Simon notes that centralization may have the effect of securing coordination and responsibility by limiting the discretion of subordinates. The result of centralization is "to take out of the hands of the subordinate the actual weighing of competing considerations and to require that he accept the conclusions reached by other members of the organization."⁵³

In a similar vein Blau and Schoenherr point out that greater variability of decisions results from decentralization and that fundamental structural conditions such as centralization may exert constraints on organization members that make their decisions highly independent of their own personal predispositions.⁵⁴

In his study of the United States Forest Service, Kaufman noted that the decentralized nature of Forest Service operations posed the problem that local preferences and interests would take precedence over national policy. Kaufman identified a number of traits characteristic of the Forest Service which served to mitigate against this possibility. These included central review of subordinates' decisions, frequent rotation of personnel, and induction and training which stresses professional norms as well as identification with agency goals.⁵⁵

The Kaufman study as well as some of the other literature in the field of organization theory suggests that organizational structures are important intervening variables between a given environment and policy outcomes. In the next chapter possible relationships between the environment, police organization variables, and law enforcement outputs are hypothesized.

Perceptions and preferences of police elites. A second major variable which is internal to the police organization and may have an impact on law enforcement outputs are the perceptions and preferences of police elites--in this case police chiefs. While most of the policy research has not examined the impact of individual policy makers on policy outputs, a few studies have identified political and administrative leaders as "crucial intervening agents between the perception of a problem and its resolution through adopted policies."⁵⁶

One of the most notable studies in this regard is one conducted by Eulau and Eyestone on city councils in the San Francisco Bay area.⁵⁷ The authors found that environmental characteristics or pressures such as city size, density, and growth rate were related to policy development. Nevertheless, what Eulau and Eyestone describe as policy maps of city councilmen were also found to be important variables related to public policy. They conclude that

Policy makers' willingness to set their city on a course of development depends on the content of their policy maps--how they perceive the problems facing the city, what preferences they entertain with regard to policy alternatives, and how they envisage the city's future. It also appears, in general, that the various components of the policy map are meaningfully related to the stage or phase of city policy development.⁵⁸

Martha Derthick also notes the influence of the preferences of agency heads in her study of public assistance programs in Massachusetts. In attempting to explain differences in policy outcomes between two agencies, Derthick found that the personal values of agency directors were likely to be translated into public policy and that this variable was more important than community characteristics in explaining variation.⁵⁹

In a similar vein, Mohr examined attitudes of health officers in local health departments to determine whether their orientations were related to innovative policies. He found some support for the premise that the head administrator's public health ideology as well as his inclination towards activism were related to the introduction and adoption of non-traditional programs.⁶⁰

There is also some support in the law enforcement field for the belief that administrators' preferences and predispositions influence police policies. In his case studies of eight communities Wilson notes examples where changes in police chiefs were accompanied by marked changes in law enforcement patterns. Wilson cautions that for a number of policy areas the role of the police chief is highly circumscribed in terms of his ability to dictate and obtain conformity with his own policy preferences.⁶¹ Still, he cites some areas where the chief's policy preferences are likely to be quite salient--most notably in the categories of vice arrests and juvenile arrests.

Gardiner also points to the importance of the policy leadership role of police chiefs in his study of ticketing policies. He observes that

the effective level of traffic law enforcement in a community is the product of the interests, attitudes, and activities of the local police chief setting law enforcement policy in each department; his preferences will be reflected in the allocation of men, time, and other resources among the various functions assigned to the department.⁶²

While Gardiner's conclusions are based largely on impressions gleaned from informal interviews, they nevertheless suggest the need for a more systematic effort to examine the relationships he identified.

Based on previous research in both the police and nonpolice-related policy areas, we suggest that an examination of the relationship between policy preferences of the chief administrator and law enforcement outputs might be fruitful. As mentioned in previous sections of the paper, in terms of policy leadership roles, there is reason to believe that police chiefs may exert considerably more direct influence over enforcement policies than elected political representatives. Thus, the role of city councils vis-a-vis police departments is likely to be confined largely to personnel selection and budgetary allowances. Students of law enforcement have observed that guidelines from elected representatives regarding enforcement patterns have generally been intermittent, ambiguous, or nonexistent.⁶³

Policy Outputs and Feedback

Not only do arrests fall within the broad category of one particular policy type--regulatory outputs--we expect that explanations for variation in arrest behavior may vary somewhat according to the kind of offense being considered. For example, economic interests in the community may have an influence on arrest levels for property crimes such as armed

robbery and burglary, but it is less likely that they will evidence a very strong relationship with arrests for assault. In Chapter III we outline the major categories of arrest which will be considered in this research as well as their operationalization.

The discussion of previous policy research indicated that the study of impacts as well as what is referred to as the feedback process has been largely ignored in the literature. While the present effort is mainly a study into the explanation of variation in policy outputs, some attention is given to the question of impacts. In this regard the investigation is limited to only short-term kinds of impacts; no effort is made to trace the policy process through what is conceptualized as the feedback loop (see Figure 2-3).

The assessment of the impacts of arrest policies is based on two criteria which Rourke outlines as being basic to an evaluation of a bureaucratic system: 1) its effectiveness and 2) its responsiveness.⁶⁴ While realizing that there are a number of ways to evaluate organizational effectiveness we choose to examine the ratio between arrests made for more serious kinds of crimes and crime reported within a community as an indicator of service effectiveness. In part, this selection is based on popular discussion regarding optimal ways to allocate police resources including questions concerning the amount of time that police officers should devote to performing certain kinds of activities.⁶⁵

The second criteria for evaluation--police responsiveness--will in part be assessed by examining the closeness of the relationship between environmental variables and arrests. In addition, agreement between the police and the public over enforcement goals may be reflected in the

amount of violence directed against the police. Thus, if the police frequently engage in enforcement behavior which many members of the community do not perceive as legitimate, the police are more likely to be confronted with violent behavior.⁶⁶ The relationship between outputs and impacts will be detailed in the following chapter.

Overview

In this section the systems framework has guided the selection and organization of information which we believe is important to the understanding of the law enforcement policy process. In this chapter and in the next chapter we have attempted to make some improvements over the application of the framework in previous policy research by explaining the manner in which environmental variables may be linked to arrest policies and by including an assessment of the manner in which factors internal to the conversion process may have an impact on these policies.

Arrest decisions are made by individual actors and the personal predispositions of these actors may influence arrest decisions. However, it is suggested that police departments will experience common responses from police personnel to the extent that the range of experience of these personnel is sufficiently alike to result in common behavior.⁶⁷ Factors or system characteristics which may influence these responses include both features of the police organization's environment as well as characteristics internal to the police organization. In this chapter these relationships were discussed in a very general manner. They are elaborated upon and operationalized in the next section.

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⁵For a more lengthy discussion of the concept of open systems see Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (New York: John Wiley, 1966).

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¹⁷David R. Morgan and Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, "A Systems Framework for the Analysis of Urban Politics," in Urban Political Analysis: A Systems Approach, edited by David R. Morgan and Samuel A. Kirkpatrick (New York: Free Press, 1972), p. 9.

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⁶⁴Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy, Chapter 1.

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CHAPTER III

HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH DESIGN

In this section some of the relationships are operationalized that were outlined in the previous chapter between law enforcement policies and other system characteristics. A number of hypotheses are offered toward the explanation of variation in police policies from community to community. Variable selection is discussed as well as the methods that will be used to examine relationships among variables.

Major Research Question

The major question which this research proposes to examine is why some police agencies are likely to invoke the criminal process more frequently than others. Previous research suggests that police work is not a discretionless technical function where the police merely respond to a certain level of criminal activity with a corresponding number of arrests. Instead for a variety of reasons police make decisions whether to handle certain classes and cases of criminal activity formally, e.g., through the arrest process or informally, e.g., warning the individual lawbreaker, harassing the individual, or simply ignoring certain classes of criminal behavior. At another level, discretion may be employed in the allocation of police resources so that some classes of violations are likely to be enforced more frequently than others. At any rate, it is suggested that police departments will vary across communities in their response to

criminal activity. The task of this research is to identify those variables which serve to shape these varying responses. To test the relationship between arrest behavior and various system characteristics, data on arrest outputs will be examined for 40 of the largest U. S. municipalities.

The Dependent Variable

In studying arrest patterns among communities, variation in total arrests will be investigated, but a primary focus is on arrest outputs for various categories or classes of criminal offenses. The rationale for examining arrests within the context of certain categories is based on the premise that arrest policies may be responsive to different influences depending on the type of violation involved. Studies by Wilson, and Henderson and Neubauer represent two of the few efforts to determine whether certain kinds of arrests are shaped by different classes of variables.¹ Both studies tend to confirm the hypothesis that arrest policies are responsive to different kinds of influences, although Wilson's findings are somewhat more supportive of this conclusion than those of Henderson and Neubauer. At any rate, we believe that a treatment of arrests by category is superior to one which is restricted to the aggregate of the numerous kinds of law enforcement activities in which police officers engage.

Table 3-1 shows the four categories of criminal arrest which will be considered in this research as well as a listing of the specific offenses included under each category. The four classifications are violent crimes against persons; property crimes; victimless crimes; and order maintenance offenses. The selection of these categories has some basis in their use in the literature as well as among police practitioners.

Table 3-1
CATEGORIES OF ARREST FOR VARIOUS KINDS
OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES

Crimes Against Persons^a

Murder
Rape
Aggravated Assault

Part I Offenses

Property Crimes

Armed Robbery
Burglary
Larceny

Victimless Crimes

Prostitution
Narcotics
Gambling

Part II Offenses

Order Maintenance Offenses

Disorderly Conduct
Public Drunkenness^b
Driving Under the Influence
Simple Assault
Illegal Possession of Weapons

^aArrests are computed as a rate per 100,000 population. Most of the arrest data was obtained from the FBI although in some instances the data was obtained directly from the cities.

^bIn some states public drunkenness has been decriminalized. A list of these states along with the date when this offense was decriminalized has been obtained. For cities located within these states the category of public drunkenness will be coded as missing data.

The category of crimes against persons is fairly self explanatory. The three offenses listed under this category comprise three of the seven crimes that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) designates as Part I crimes or index crimes. Part I crimes are so designated by the FBI because of their seriousness and are defined as "serious" either because of "their seriousness, frequency of occurrence, and likelihood of being reported to police."² The use of FBI categories of Part I and Part II crimes is widespread among local police departments, and the use of the FBI classification tends to provide for uniformity in the recording of crime information. The Part II category serves as somewhat of a catch-all for those offenses not falling within the Part I category.

The second category utilized in this research is crimes against property. The offenses listed under this classification are more or less formally defined by the FBI in their relationship to property.³ The crime of armed robbery is somewhat of an anomaly because as defined it represents a threat to property as well as the threat of violence to an individual. We classify this particular offense under the property category because the primary motive to commit the crime is the securing of property.⁴ The three offenses listed under property crimes in Table 3-1 are also designed by the FBI as Part I offenses.

The victimless crime category has numerous reference points, although this particular category is more likely to be used by certain reform-oriented groups and academicians than by members of the law enforcement community.⁵ A stance common to certain reform groups is that crimes such as prostitution, gambling, and in some cases narcotics represent acts which harm no one except possibly those who voluntarily engage

in them. It is argued that laws prohibiting these activities should be rescinded on several counts the most common being that 1) the laws are merely an attempt to legislate morality and 2) enforcement of these laws diverts the police from attending to more important and serious matters. While there is some controversy over whether or not behavior in the victimless crime category is truly "victimless," most criminologists utilize the concept based on the definition offered by Herbert L. Packer, a law professor at Stanford University. He describes victimless crimes as "offenses that do not result in anyone's feeling that he has been injured so as to impel him to bring the offense to the attention of the authorities."⁶ Based on Packer's definition, another way of thinking about crimes such as gambling, narcotics and prostitution is that they are crimes with "willing victims." Crimes with "willing victims" fall within the FBI classification of Part II offenses.

The final category of criminal arrests consists of those for order maintenance offenses. The concept of order maintenance offenses has its roots in the academic literature rather than among practitioners or reform groups. James Q. Wilson introduced the term order maintenance as a method of classifying arrests and made the distinction between order maintenance activities and law enforcement activities. Wilson's definition of order maintenance activities is somewhat difficult to convey and can perhaps best be described using Wilson's phraseology.

In discussing the function of order maintenance Wilson first states that

By 'order' is meant the absence of disorder, and by disorder is meant behavior that either disturbs or threatens to disturb the public peace or that involves face-to-face conflict between two or more persons. Disorder. . .

involves a dispute over what is 'right' or 'seemly' conduct or over who is to blame for conduct that is agreed to be wrong or unseemly.⁷

In addition to the primary motive of "keeping the peace" the concept of certainty is a characteristic which is also linked to the order maintenance function. Wilson relies on the concept of certainty to distinguish order maintenance from law enforcement arrests. Thus, "in a law enforcement situation the guidelines for action are relatively clear; the officer need only assess guilt or innocence. In an order maintenance situation. . . the police officer must also apply standards of right conduct to the dispute."⁸

Some specific examples can serve to clarify Wilson's point concerning the distinction based on certainty. Prostitution or gambling represent law enforcement offenses because even though there may be disagreement over whether or not laws against these activities should be enforced, it is not difficult to determine when one of these activities has actually occurred. The activities of prostitution or gambling are more or less readily defined and easily recognized by the police officer. On the other hand, the law enforcement officer must use considerable judgement in deciding whether or not behavior constitutes public drunkenness, disorderly conduct, drunken driving, or even nonfelonious (simple) assault. Behavior which comprises these kinds of activities is not so clearly defined or identified for the local authorities. Like the victimless crime offenses, order maintenance violations also fall within the official FBI category of Part II offenses.

Since a major concern of this research is to explore the discretionary aspects of law enforcement, the categories of victimless crimes

and order maintenance offenses will be emphasized to a greater extent than violent and property crime arrests. It is expected that the former categories will involve greater discretion than the latter groupings. This is because the specific offenses included under violent and property crimes are more universally defined and accepted as "serious" crimes, and the vigorous enforcement of these activities is more universally agreed upon as being within the proper scope of police activity. For example, there is likely to be much more agreement on enforcement goals involving the apprehension and arrest of those suspected of such crimes as murder and burglary than for those involving gambling, disorderly conduct, or even narcotics violations.¹¹ To be sure the amount of money and manpower allotted to prevent and to investigate more serious offenses is a discretionary decision which may affect arrest rates for these kinds of crimes. However, we think that for the reasons cited above arrests for order maintenance and victimless crime offenses will be less sensitive to what we designate as the "crime environment" than will activities designated as Part I offenses. Some support for this viewpoint exists in the literature. Field studies indicate an inverse relationship between the seriousness of an offense and the amount of discretion exercised by police officers.¹²

In addition to examining variation for arrests for specific categories of criminal offenses, this research will examine arrest variation for two specific categories of people--juvenile arrests and minority arrests. Juvenile arrests are included because the criminal law pertaining to juveniles is marked by a great deal of discretion.¹³ Furthermore,

previous research, particularly that authored by Wilson, suggests that the police exercise a considerable amount of discretion in handling juvenile matters.¹⁴

Variation in minority arrests will also be examined because controversy and allegations surrounding minority arrests suggest that discretion may play a major role in this particular aspect of law enforcement.

Finally, in addition to the emphases described above, a measure of total arrests will be included in the research design as a gross indicator of arrest behavior.¹⁵

Hypotheses

As stated previously the decision whether to invoke the criminal process ultimately depends on the choices of individual police officers. Also as noted earlier, on the basis of certain cues and influences, police officers within similar settings may exhibit a certain amount of uniformity in the manner in which they exercise discretion over arrests. Thus while the personal predispositions of police officers may have some influence on the frequency and kinds of arrests that are made, the broader setting within which police officers operate also serves to condition the manner in which they make arrest decisions. These common influences will tend to produce common responses among police officers, and arrest patterns which are characteristics of certain communities are the product of these similar responses.

Another discretionary aspect of law enforcement that may have an impact on arrest outputs is the manner in which police chiefs allocate

resources within their respective departments. Commitment of resources in a certain direction may serve as an additional cue to the rank and file policemen in terms of the kinds of law enforcement activities which merit priority.

Two very broad categories of factors thought to influence arrest outputs were identified in Chapter II--the environment of the police system and factors internal to the administrative (police) system. The former consists of variables which comprise both the political and non-political environments of the police organization.

We spoke of two important aspects of the police agency's political environment--those relationships which express the agency's horizontal or community ties and those representative of the agency's vertical or extracommunity ties.

Two kinds of conditions associated with the police agency's non-political environment were identified as important to the analysis of arrest outputs. The first is the community crime environment, and the second is a host of social, economic, and cultural factors associated with certain preferences and demands for law enforcement.

Finally, factors internal to the police system were identified as possibly having an impact on community arrest levels. These consist of variables associated with police organization and style as well as perceptions and preferences of police elites.

The preceding chapter also pointed out that the present study is a departure from much of the previous urban policy research since our focus is on the conversion activities of an administrative agency. For this reason the law enforcement policy process was discussed within the

context of an administrative system where some of the activities normally assigned to the "black box" or political system were conceptualized as part of the environment of the administrative system.

In Figure 3-1 the law enforcement policy process is diagrammed in a manner consistent with that of previous policy studies depicting the major categories of environment, political system, and outputs. For present purposes relationships among variables can be most clearly and easily diagrammed using this schema. However, many of the hypothetical relationships outlined in Figure 3-1 center either directly or indirectly on the police (administrative) system, and variables which impinge on this system can be distinguished by their political or nonpolitical origins. While certain variables are assigned to the political system, they can also be conceptualized as part of the police system's political environment in a manner consistent with the discussion in Chapter II.

The analysis of variation in arrest outputs among cities will involve the testing of a number of hypotheses which generally follow the basic relationships discussed in Chapter II and outlined in Figure 3-1. The theoretical basis for these hypotheses stem from concepts and findings particular to the state and urban policy research, certain concepts and premises prevalent within the public administration literature--particularly organization theory--and previous research in the area of police policy analysis.

A. The Police System's Nonpolitical Environment:
The Crime Environment.

A major premise of this research is that arrest behavior is not merely a reflexive reaction to the volume of criminal activity in the




Figure 3-1

community. Still, it is likely that the degree of criminal activity within a community will have some relationship to arrest rates, particularly arrests that are more universally defined as serious crimes. Unfortunately, no direct measures are available of the amount of criminal activity which occurs in the cities we are examining. Crime rates provide a rough measure of criminal behavior, but their use is subject to a great deal of criticism, and furthermore crime rates are only available for Part I offenses.¹⁶

In spite of these drawbacks it is necessary to provide a control measure for a city's crime environment. For this purpose a number of demographic variables which have been linked to levels of criminal activity in previous research are used.¹⁷ These indicators are identified in Table 3-2. It should be noted that the crime environment measures are not assumed to be causally related to levels of crime. For example, race and age obviously do not in themselves cause crime. They are included as measures of the crime environment only because they have been shown to be highly correlated with measures of reported criminal activity in a community.

The following hypotheses are offered to test the relationship between crime environment and arrest outputs.

Hypothesis A₁. Cities with environmental characteristics associated with greater levels of criminal behavior will exhibit higher arrest rate for all categories of crime.

Hypothesis A₂. Arrests in the categories of violent crimes against persons and property crimes will be more sensitive to the crime environment than arrests in the victimless crime and order maintenance categories.

The crime environment may have a further impact on arrest behavior. An increase in more serious crimes, e.g., robbery, murder, rape, may lead

Table 3-2

OPERATIONALIZATION OF CRIME ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES

Crime Environment*

Income Inequality^aRace^bAge^cFamily Stability^dDensity^eCrime Increase^f

*All information was obtained from the census of the individual states or from the U. S. Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1972). Crime rate data were obtained from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports for the years specified.

^aGini coefficient (families), 1969.

^bPercent nonwhite, 1970.

^cPercent males age 15-29.
Percent males under age 17.

^dPercent family with female head, 1970.

^ePopulation per square mile, 1970.

^fCrime increase is measured as a percent increase in the 1972 crime rate over the 1970 rate.

to greater demands for police effectiveness. Since these crimes are inherently more elusive and difficult to solve, police may meet public demands for increased police productivity by making arrests of more readily available offenders. Based on this reasoning the following relationship will be examined.

Hypothesis A₁. A major increase in serious crimes will lead to an increase in victimless crime and order maintenance arrests.

B. The Police System's Nonpolitical Environment:
Social, Economic, and Cultural Factors.

Certain other features characteristics of a police agency's nonpolitical environment may influence arrest policies. Citizens may demand certain levels of arrest as reflected in the frequency and nature of complaints registered with the police. The characteristics or composition of a community's population may temper the nature of these demands.

In addition to these more direct kinds of inputs into the police system, the nonpolitical environment may influence the way a police officer uses discretion in a more indirect fashion. Certain environments may dictate certain kinds of arrest behavior based on police perceptions of the kind of behavior appropriate to a particular environment or based on their anticipation of the kinds of demands and supports which are likely to follow a certain level of law enforcement. While we are unable to directly distinguish these two effects in the data, a number of hypotheses are offered which make inferences concerning the nature of the relationships between environment and arrest behavior. Operationalization of various environmental variables is presented in Table 3-3.

Hypothesis B₁. Communities which are more heterogeneous in terms of income and occupation will have lower arrest rates for victimless crimes and order maintenance offenses.

Table 3-3

OPERATIONALIZATION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES^a WITH
VARIOUS MEASURES OF THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC,
AND CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT

Social Class Heterogeneity

Percent income less than \$3,000
Percent income more than \$15,000
Percent occupation white collar

Ethos

Percent of native population with foreign or mixed parentage
Percent of elementary school children in private school

Propertied Interests and Economic Prosperity

Retail sales per thousand population, 1967^b
Percent owner occupied housing
Median income

Mobility

Percent population change, 1960-1970
White net migration
Median age

^aUnless otherwise noted all variables are for 1970 and are taken from the population census of the individual states.

^bCounty and City Data Book, 1972.

Hypothesis B₁ is based on the premise that the heterogeneity of a city means that different social classes will live side by side with varying conceptions of the public interest. In Chapter I we noted Reiss' observation that the penetration of norms and laws may differ among subgroups or populations. It is suggested that police officers operating within the context of more heterogeneous environments will be the recipients of conflicting enforcement demands and in the face of these conflicting demands will enforce the law less universally than would be the case in more homogeneous communities. In heterogeneous communities police officers will be more likely to adapt the universalistic demand of law enforcement to the structure of the locale through a variety of informal methods, i.e., methods short of arrest.¹⁸

Much of the previous state and local policy research has found support for the premise that heterogeneity is associated with increased demands on the political system and these demands in turn are associated with high levels of policy outputs.¹⁹ This relationship might hold for demands associated with the enforcement of more serious kinds of crimes, but for the reasons cited above a negative relationship is posited between heterogeneity and arrests for Part II offenses.

Table 3-3 lists the indicators selected to represent heterogeneity. The income groupings represent those at the two ends of the income spectrum. Communities with a larger number of individuals in these categories are expected to hold more diverse kinds of interests than cities with larger populations in the middle income bracket.²⁰ Cities with greater numbers of citizens working in white collar occupations are thought to reflect a more homogeneous and typically middle class environment as opposed to a heterogeneous environment.

Hypothesis B₇. Communities characterized as having a private-regarding ethos will experience a lower rate of arrest for victimless crimes.

The basis for this hypothesis stems from the literature on public and private-regarding behavior.²¹ While this literature has for the most part dealt with more overtly political behavior, e.g., voting, some of the general premises of the ethos theory may be applicable to the relationship between community characteristics and arrest behavior. Two measures--the percent of the native population with foreign or mixed parentage and private school enrollment--have been frequently used in previous research as indicators of a community's private-regarding ethos and are adopted for this study.

Characteristics ascribed to the private-regarding group would suggest that these individuals would be less likely to perceive the activities associated with victimless crimes as a threat to the public interest.²² In contrast, demands to "clean-up the streets" of vice-related behavior are more likely to emanate from the more public-regarding sector.

Hypothesis B₈. The relationship between ethos and order maintenance will vary by specific offense, but arrest levels will generally be lower in private-regarding communities.

Violation of laws in the order maintenance category generally implies that an individual has committed an act which disturbs or threatens to disturb the peace. It is suggested that in general public-regarding communities would wish to quash disorderly behavior; it would be perceived as inimical to the public interest.

Wilson suggests, however, that those generally characterized as having a private-regarding orientation may also place a high premium on

order maintenance.²⁴ The major difference between public and private-regarding behavior is that for the latter, demands for order maintenance are more particularistic, e.g., an anti-war demonstrator should be arrested for disorderly conduct, but an anti-bussing advocate should be allowed to create a disturbance. Thus, while both the public and private-regarding subgroups may value order maintenance, violations within this category will elicit demands for more universal enforcement from the public regarding sector, and this in turn should result in higher arrest rates.²⁵

Hypothesis B₄. Communities characterized as having a private-regarding ethos will experience a lower rate of arrests for juveniles.

The relationship between ethos and juvenile arrests is suggested by Wilson's comparison of juvenile arrests in two cities.²⁶ While Wilson's focus was on organization type, he observed that the preferences of certain ethnic groups and social classes to handle juvenile misbehavior privately rather than formally through the arrest process might have an impact on arrest levels.

Hypothesis B₅. Arrest rates for order maintenance and victimless crimes will be higher in southern cities.

Another possible source of variation in demands for law enforcement is linked to the concept of region. Previous policy research has found region to be an important variable in explaining policy outputs, although a precise explanation of what the concept of regionalism actually implies has never been satisfactorily established.²⁷

While it is difficult to pinpoint the exact meaning and significance of region, we think that differentiation among cities according to arrests can be explained to some degree by the part of the country in

which the city is located. The above hypothesis is based on the premise that southern attitudes may be characterized by a lower tolerance for "morals" crimes as well as a lower tolerance for activities which might be interpreted as disruptive of the public order.²⁸

Hypothesis B6. Communities which exhibit a greater proportion of propertied interests as well as economic prosperity will have higher arrest rates for property crimes.

This hypothesis is based on the premise that property owners, particularly smaller propertied interests which cannot afford to employ a "private" police force (as opposed to large manufacturing concerns), will make greater demands on municipal police departments to allocate their resources toward the enforcement of crimes against property.²⁹

In the operationalization of variables related to economic interests (see Table 3-3) median income is also included as an indicator of economic prosperity. It is expected that wealthier communities, because they have more to fear from crime, will make more demands for the protection of their private interests.³⁰

Another way of looking at community economic characteristics is that they render some communities more crime prone than others.³¹ It might be argued that the presence of greater amounts of wealth and property makes a city more vulnerable to crime and that greater levels of property crime account for higher levels of arrest.

Hypothesis B7. Arrests for order maintenance and victimless crimes as well as juvenile arrests will be higher in cities which exhibit a greater degree of mobility.

The hypothesis on mobility is an example of the manner in which perceptions and knowledge of the environment on the part of the police may influence their behavior. A positive relationship between certain

categories of arrest and mobility is posited on the assumption that in more mobile communities the police have less to fear from individuals who can bring political pressure to bear on them. The environment in mobile communities is more conducive to impersonal law enforcement, and this particular style of policing is in turn associated with higher arrest rates.³²

C. The Police Organization's Political Environment:
Political Climate.

The category of political climate encompasses a number of political system characteristics which are associated with the private as opposed to the public (government) sector. In assessing the impact of a community's political climate on police outputs, three general categories of variables are considered. The first is labelled revenue effort. This variable represents the degree to which a community is willing to tap its economic resources for local public purposes and is determined by dividing the per capita general revenue for the city by its per capita income.³³ While admittedly most taxation decisions are ultimately made by public authorities, we feel that the measure is sufficiently indicative of the general support of citizens towards government to be included as a component of political climate.

Hypothesis C1. Communities which exhibit a greater willingness to tax themselves will have higher arrest rates.

It is suggested that communities which show a greater willingness to tax themselves will be more inclined to appropriate greater sums for their police departments as well as for other government services. The positive relationship between these factors and arrests is predicated on

the notion that police departments with greater resources will be able to increase their manpower, mobility, etc., and these factors will result in a greater number of arrests. This relationship will be examined more directly at a later point when the relationship between police resources and outputs is considered.³⁴

The second subcategory included under political climate is associated with interest group activity in the local community. One of the major criticisms of the policy research literature has been the crudity of measures designed to gauge political demands. For example, the use of the percentage of blacks within the community to measure minority demands is considered a poor quality indicator because the presence of a certain number of blacks cannot be directly translated into political activism.³⁵

This research attempts to improve somewhat over the selection of previous indicators by using organizational membership as a surrogate for political demands. While this measure is still admittedly a rather crude one, it is selected on the basis that organization size is a political resource which in addition to others, e.g., expertise, commitment, prestige, may affect the extent to which demands associated with certain interests are translated into public policy.³⁶

In the realm of law enforcement policy four types of interests are identified as having a potentially significant impact on arrest policies. These include business associations, civil liberties groups, civil rights groups, and reform-oriented groups (see Table 3-4).

Hypothesis C₂. Communities with more business group membership will have higher arrest rates for property crimes.

Table 3-4

OPERATIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL CLIMATE VARIABLE

Political Interest Groups

Business	Chamber of Commerce per capita membership, 1973 ^a
Civil Liberties	American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) membership per capita, 1973 ^a
Civil Rights	Civil Rights Group Mobilization Index (CRGM) ^b
Reform	League of Women Voters per capita membership, 1973 ^a

Political Conservatism

Percent Republican (Goldwater) vote, 1964^c
 Percent American Independent Party vote, 1968^d

^aMembership figures were obtained from the local organizations.

^bThe CRGM index was obtained for the 40 cities from Albert K. Karnig, Texas Tech University. The index consists of the number of civil rights groups located in a city from among the possibility of four organizations--the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP); the National Urban League (NUL); the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE); and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC).

^cThe 1964 presidential data are taken from Richard Scammon, ed., America Votes 7 (Washington, D. C.: Government Affairs Institute, 1968) and were for the most part available for individual cities although in some cases only county data were presented.

^dThe 1968 presidential data are taken from Richard Scammon, ed., America Votes, 8 (Washington, D. C.: Government Affairs Institute, 1972).

Hypothesis C3. Communities with more civil liberties group membership will have lower arrest rates for all crime categories including juvenile arrests and will exhibit a lower percentage of nonwhite arrests.

Hypothesis C4. Communities with more civil rights group membership will have a lower percentage of minority arrests.

Hypothesis C5. Communities with more reform group membership will have a higher arrest rates for victimless crimes, order maintenance offenses, and juveniles.

The relationship between organized group interests and arrest outputs is likely to be indirect. The most direct relationship is likely to be those involving economic interests and property crime arrests. Business groups may be expected to make specific demands on the police to protect their interests.

In contrast, civil liberties groups are not likely to demand certain levels of enforcement for specific types of crimes. Instead, their activities may influence arrest levels in a more indirect manner. Civil liberties groups like the ACLU champion what Packer describes as the due process model.³⁷ Emphasis is placed on subjecting the criminal process to certain controls to guarantee the protection of individual rights.

~~Quality is valued over production and efficiency. A practical consequence~~
is that output is necessarily reduced.³⁸

In contrast police departments are more likely to subscribe to a crime control model. Among other things, an emphasis is placed on representing criminal conduct and processing large numbers of cases.³⁹ As a result of these two conflicting orientations, the police and civil liberties groups often find themselves in an adversary relationship. Where civil liberties groups are successful, more zealous arrest practices may be discouraged. This in turn may result in lower arrest rates.

The relationship between civil rights group representation and arrests is also likely to be somewhat indirect. Civil rights groups are not likely to make specific demands for certain levels of enforcement on the basis of offense type. They may, however, publicly charge that police practices tend to discriminate by race, with nonwhite individuals being overrepresented in the arrest population. Police sensitivity to minority group demands may result in lower arrest rates among nonwhites, and as mentioned in Chapter I, may even eventuate in the police overlooking offenses if they are committed by individuals of minority status.

League of Women Voters membership constitutes another organizational measure of a community's political climate. It is not proposed that the League makes frequent and specific demands on the police in regard to enforcement levels. Instead, League representation is chosen to gauge the extent of reform and public-regarding interests in the community. In this respect it is not unlike other indicators chosen in previous research to measure a reform or public-regarding orientation, e.g., ethnicity. League membership, however, might be a stronger measure of a community's reform orientation, and it is certainly a measure which is more directly political.⁴⁰

As indicated in hypothesis C₅, a positive relationship between reform group representation and arrest rates is postulated due to the emphasis of the former on the universal application of rules, regulations, and laws. Thus, an orientation toward impartiality and fairness in government application of rules and regulations may ultimately affect law enforcement policies. Also, more "public-spirited" communities may be more likely to perceive violations of minor offenses as inimical to the public interest.

The reporting of crimes as well as arrest practices may reflect this particular orientation.

A final category of variables included under political climate represents a conservative-liberal dimension. As indicated in Table 3-4, Goldwater and Wallace support are considered as a manifestation of a somewhat more conservative political climate. Keeping in mind the problems inherent in using voter support for a particular party and candidate as an indicator of conservatism,⁴¹ it is hypothesized that more conservative political climates will initiate demands for greater law enforcement outputs.

Hypothesis C6. Cities which exhibit a more conservative orientation as measured by party support will have higher arrest rates for all categories of crime.

D. The Police Organization's Political Environment:
The Public Sector--Local Governmental Institutions,
Structures, and Processes.

Variables under this particular category for the most part include those which are characteristic of government structure or form and are usually represented along a reform-unreformed continuum. It is suggested that government structure will have only an indirect effect on police policies; it is more likely to affect organizational characteristics of the police department which in turn may affect arrest outputs (see Table 3-5).

Hypothesis D1. Government structure will not be directly related to arrest policies.

Hypothesis D2. Reform governments will be more likely to have professional police departments.

As with government structure, it is expected that elected government representatives (mayors and council members) will not have a direct impact on arrest policies. Although data are not available to test this hypothesis, as mentioned in Chapter II, there is some support for it in the literature. Goldstein, for example, suggests that local officials are more concerned with making value judgements as to what proportion of the total budget should be devoted to law enforcement than they are with the degree to which the law should be enforced.⁴² These kinds of judgements (policy outputs) of city councils are important for our consideration to the extent that police resources and arrest performance are linked. Thus, the following relationship is examined.

Table 3-5
OPERATIONALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE VARIABLE

Government Structure^a

Government Type (manager/nonmanager)
Partisanship
Election Type (at large/ward)

Council Outputs

Police Budget per capita^b
Percent Total Municipal Budget Allocated to Public Safety^c

^aThe Municipal Yearbook 1965 (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1965), 98ff.

^bData were obtained from the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department's annual General Administrative Survey, 1973.

^cCounty and City Data Book, 1972.

Hypothesis D₃. There will be a positive relationship between council (budget) support for the police function and arrest rates.

A final consideration in our discussion of local government institutions is the relationship between the police chief and elected officials. While police chiefs are traditionally thought to be politically accountable officials who may stand or fall with the fortunes of their elected supervisors, the relationship between law enforcement elites and elected political officials may vary. For example, in his comparative study of police policy making in three cities Ruchelman notes that some chiefs exert considerably more independence from the mayor than others.⁴³ Using turnover (number of police chiefs during the last 10 years) as an indicator of a police department's independence from the political leadership, the following hypothesis is offered.⁴⁴

Hypothesis D₄. The greater the independence of the police chief from the politically elected leadership, the weaker the relationship between demands associated with certain community characteristics and political climate variables on the one hand, and arrest policies.

Examination of the above relationship provides an indirect method of assessing the role of elected officials in arrest policies to the extent that police insularity from the political leadership affects their responsiveness to community demands.

E. The Police Organization's Political Environment:
The Public Sector-Extracommunity Ties.

Outputs from government institutions that are not directly a part of the local community structure are considered at this juncture. In Figure 3-1 we depict the most important of these in terms of local arrest policies as those related to the criminal justice system.

Looking first at the judicial system, it is suggested that outputs from the judicial system may influence arrest behavior. While no previous attempts have been made to empirically assess the relationship between arrests and judicial policies, the literature is replete with references to the possibility of such a relationship. For example, Goldstein observes that the anticipation of dismissal by the judge or district attorney may affect the development of arrest policy.⁴⁵ Reiss and Bordua state that continuous rejection by the courts of police decisions in the form of acquittals may lead to an informal rather than a formal response to law enforcement.⁴⁶ And Nimmer notes that judges who disagree with certain arrest policies may actually respond with a high number of acquittals.⁴⁷ Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis is offered.

Hypothesis E₁. There will be an inverse relationship between acquittals and outputs for various categories of arrest.⁴⁸

Decisions of agencies with grant authority are also identified as having an influence on arrest policies. To operationalize this particular dimension two extracommunity agencies are examined which have attempted in one way or another to influence police policies at the local level.

The first agency, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), has issued policy guidelines to police agencies and administers an extensive grant system. While these grants are not expected to directly affect arrest policies they may have an indirect impact on them by shaping organizational characteristics or production strategies of the agency. For example, the availability and use of "community relations money" may have an impact on police performance. Of course it is

recognized that police department characteristics themselves may determine whether or not a grant is applied for in the first place. While no specific hypotheses are offered at this juncture, an attempt will be made to assess the relationship between LEAA grants, police department characteristics, and arrest policies.⁴⁹

To further assess the impact of federal grants on arrest policies, the effect of a Department of Transportation project called the Alcohol Safety Action Program (ASAP) will be analyzed. The analysis necessitates dealing with a subset of the data--arrests for driving under the influence of alcohol. ASAP represents an attempt by a federal agency to change the perceptions of law enforcement officers in terms of enforcement priorities. The activities of this particular federal agency may be important in explaining variation in local law enforcement policies. Approximately one-third of the communities studied are participants in ASAP programs.⁵⁰

F. Withinputs: Characteristics of the Police System.

In addition to the police system's external environment factors internal to the police system may have an influence on arrest outputs, and these features are referred to collectively as withinputs.

In examining the effects of withinputs on policy outputs, two major categories of variables are examined--the first concerns what will broadly be labelled as police department characteristics and the second concerns preferences and perceptions of police elites.

Police department characteristics. The category of police department characteristics treats 1) organization structure, 2) production

strategies, and 3) organizational resources. The operationalization of these three groupings of characteristics can be found in Table 3-6.

In Chapter II some of the organization theory literature was reviewed that points to a relationship between formal, structural characteristics and administrative outputs. Choosing centralization and specialization as structural attributes which could conceivably have an impact on law enforcement policies, the following hypotheses are offered.

Hypothesis F₁. More centralized police departments will show higher numbers of arrest outputs for victimless crimes, order maintenance offenses, and juveniles.

Hypothesis F₂. More centralized police departments will show a weaker relationship between demands associated with certain community characteristics and political climate variables and arrest policies.

In the above hypothesis, centralization is viewed as a means by which the discretion of the rank and file police officer may be limited. By limiting discretion, higher arrest rates may be achieved. The second hypothesis is based on the notion that in more centrally controlled departments the police are likely to be more insulated from the particularistic demands of the community. In this sense, the characteristics of the conversion process may have an impact on the manner in which it responds to inputs from the environment.

Hypothesis F₃. More highly specialized police departments will show higher numbers of arrest outputs for victimless crimes, order maintenance offenses, and juvenile arrests.

Hypothesis F₃ is based on the premise that specialization like centralization limits discretion and this in turn is likely to result in higher arrests. The assumption is that when assigned a specialized task, the officer is not placed in the position of determining enforcement priorities.

Table 3-6

OPERATIONALIZATION OF POLICE DEPARTMENT
CHARACTERISTICS VARIABLE^a

Group I. Organization Structure

Centralization

Ratio of ranking officers to patrolmen
Number of police stations
Unionization, 1968^b

Specialization

Percent of force assigned to specific nonpatrol activities
Percent of force assigned to vice squad
Traffic enforcement officers/vehicles per capita

Group II. Production Strategies

Professionalism

Salary of chief
Salary beginning patrolman
College incentive pay^c
Promotional criteria to sergeant^d
Time in grade required before promotion (seniority versus merit)

Community Orientation

Assigned or rotated beats
Percent beats assigned to foot patrol
Police-community relations training, 1969^e
Police review board
Minority employment in juvenile division, 1970^f
Off duty patrolmen in school programs, 1970^f

Task Orientation

Number of functional areas computerized
Computer technicians per 1000 population
Helicopters per capita
Percent two-man patrols
Percent civilian (support) personnel

Table 3-6 (continued)

Group III. Organizational Resources

Resources

Police officers per capita
Police patrol cars per capita

^aUnless otherwise indicated measures of police department characteristics were obtained from the Kansas City Missouri Police Department's annual General Administrative Survey for the year 1973.

^bNational union membership coded 0=0%; 1=1-19%; 2=20-39%; 3=40-59%; 4=60-79%; 5=80-100%. Source: Municipal Yearbook (Washington, D. C.: International City Manager's Association, 1969).

^cCoded as a dichotomous variable with absence of college incentive pay program coded as 0 and the presence of the program coded as 1.

^dThe promotional criteria variable is an index based on the following point system: written exam = 1; performance evaluation = 2; oral exam = 3; psychological evaluation = 4; group interview = 4.

^eMunicipal Yearbook (International City Management Association, 1970).

^fMunicipal Yearbook (Washington, D. C.: International City Management Association, 1971), 64ff.

There is some support in the literature for the relationship between specialization and police outputs. Gardiner found that police departments with specialized traffic units had higher traffic citation rates.⁵¹ In the traffic case, the highly specialized traffic officer pursues his enforcement duties with the same diligence that the detective pursues the perpetrator of a more serious offense. It should be noted that specialization may also result in a closer relationship between policy preferences of the chief administrator and arrest outputs. This assumption is based on the premise that police administrators will use enforcement priorities as a criteria for allocating resources within the department.

A second group of police department variables thought to be related to arrest outputs is labelled production strategies.⁵² Production strategies may refer to certain structural aspects of a police department but, at this stage, they are distinguished from structural attributes such as centralization and specialization on the basis that they are a reflection of an orientation of a police department toward a particular style of policing.⁵³ Three categories of production strategies are identified at this point--a professional orientation, a community orientation, and a task orientation.⁵⁴

Professionalism is one of the most frequently discussed organizational attributes in the police literature. Several hypotheses are forwarded in terms of the relationship between professionalism and arrests.

Hypothesis F4. More professional police departments will exhibit higher police outputs especially for the order maintenance, victimless crime and juvenile categories. They will also show higher percentages of nonwhite arrests.

Hypothesis F₅. More professional police departments will show a weaker relationship between demands associated with certain community characteristics and political climate variables and arrest policies.

As is the case with centralization and specialization, the above hypotheses are based on the premise that professionalism limits discretion. Wilson notes that professional police departments are likely to use less discretion than their less professional counterparts.⁵⁵ The professional officer is more likely to perceive his job as one entailing the universal and impartial application of all laws to all situations. In contrast, the members of the less professionalized police department perceives his job in a more particularistic manner. He is more prone to enforce the law intermittently depending on circumstances and the individuals involved. Many circumstances will elicit an informal rather than a formal (arrest) response from the police officer in the less professional departments like other "reform" institutions will show a weaker relationship with socioeconomic and political cleavages because they are comparatively closed systems.⁵⁶

An additional comment on that portion of Hypothesis F₄ which pertains to minority arrests is warranted at this point. The direction of the relationship between professionalism and minority arrests could be argued from two different perspectives. On the one hand, it is possible that less professional police departments would exercise their discretion to overenforce the law against nonwhite individuals. From another viewpoint, as mentioned in Chapter I, discretion can also be used to underenforce the law against minority peoples on the grounds that a lesser standard of morality prevails in the minority community. Since our hypothesis deal with classes of offenses which involve questions of

morality as well as certain standards of conduct, we choose the latter perspective as a basis for the hypothetical relationship between professionalism and minority arrests.

Hypothesis F₆. Police departments with a community relations orientation will have lower arrest outputs particularly in the victimless crime, order maintenance, and juvenile categories. They will also show lower percentages for nonwhite arrests.

Hypothesis F₆ is based on the premise that a community relations view of law enforcement will be linked to an emphasis on the personal motivation of the offender as well as a preoccupation with how policemen are perceived in the community.⁵⁷ It is likely that this kind of orientation would result in less emphasis on arrest outputs, at least for certain offenses.

Hypothesis F₇. Police departments characterized as more task oriented will have higher arrest outputs.

In contrast to the community relations orientation, Hypothesis F₇ examines departments characterized by what is described as a task orientation. Departments which are task oriented are concerned with adopting procedures, processes, methods, and techniques which will maximize production and also to display a decided preference for "hardware." This particular orientation should result in a greater number of arrests due to the emphasis on production.

It should be noted that some of the distinct sets of variables conceptualized and cited in the preceding paragraphs may be fairly highly related to one another empirically. For example, centralization and specialization may be found with more professionalized forces. The relationships among these variables will be examined at a later point, but

at present we choose to retain our categories of distinct groups of variables as outlined above.⁵⁸

A final police department characteristic which can be considered in attempting to explain arrest variation may be largely dependent on the resource mix that enters into making an arrest. For example, a police department with more manpower or more mobility might have the capability to make a greater number of arrests than a less well-endowed department. We would expect to find a fairly strong relationship between council support (budget allocations) for the police and more tangible departmental resources, such as manpower and patrol cars per capita.

Hypothesis F8. There will be a positive relationship between departmental resources and arrest outputs.

Preferences and perceptions of police elites. The second major variable which will be examined under the category of withinputs of the police system is attitudes of police elites--mainly police chiefs--regarding their own policy preferences for law enforcement.

Previous research does not make it clear as to the extent to which chief administrators' policy preferences are translated into arrest outputs. On the one hand, the organization of the police department with its strict subordination and chain of command would suggest that police chiefs could fairly effectively implement their own policy goals. On the other hand, in some ways policing can be viewed as a fairly decentralized operation where large numbers of men are deployed alone or in small units and where control by actual command is difficult. Of course record-keeping and centralized communications systems may serve to mitigate against

the pressures of decentralization.⁵⁹ At any rate, it is uncertain as to what degree the policy preferences of police chiefs have an impact on actual arrest outputs.

In assessing the role of decision makers on policy outputs Eyestone notes that a distinction must be made between a decision makers' perceptions and preferences. Perceptions for the most part refer to the decision makers awareness of certain political or environmental pressures and, in turn, acting on these pressures. In this case the decision maker simply reacts to outside forces. In contrast to the former situation, decision makers may have certain preferred images concerning the kinds of policies which they feel should be put into effect. Eyestone suggests that there will be instances when a decision maker has the opportunity to have an independent effect on city policies by effectuating what he believes to be the preferred policy.⁶⁰

Through questionnaire techniques an attempt will be made to gauge both the police chief's preferences regarding enforcement policies and his perceptions of desires by city residents concerning enforcement priorities. While no specific hypotheses are offered at this juncture, it is suggested that police chief's preferences are likely to be more strongly related to certain kinds of arrest outputs over others, particularly those which are most closely linked with the manipulation of departmental resources. Administrator's preferences may also be more highly related to arrest outputs under certain kinds of conditions--for example, in more mobile communities, in more highly centralized and specialized departments, and in communities where the police department is more

independent of the elected political leadership. Because of limitations in the size of the data base as well as problems with return rates, it may not be possible to systematically examine this second set of relationships.

Finally, it might be argued that the chief administrator's preferences will be reflected in certain organizational arrangements (or production strategies) and that these in turn will affect arrest policies.⁶¹ While there is certainly merit in examining this type of relationship, we feel somewhat constrained in doing so. While a police chief will have considerable flexibility in allocating resources within the department, decisions by his predecessors regarding organizational structure and in some cases production strategies may not be readily amenable to change by the incumbent administrator. Therefore, we have chosen to obtain a more direct measure of chief administrators' policy preferences and treat police agency characteristics as independent factors.

G. Intervening Relationships.

For the most part, the direct relationship between a number of system characteristics and arrest outputs has been emphasized in the foregoing hypotheses. However, some of the relationships alluded to earlier may be modified by more indirect effects. Environmental variables, for example, may have an indirect rather than a direct effect on arrest outputs, e.g., middle class communities may have more professionalized police forces; wealthier and more conservative communities may spend more on the police function; all of which, in turn, may effect arrest rates.

We will be cognizant of these kinds of intervening relationships in the course of the analysis.

H. Policy Impacts.

While policy impacts are not a central concern of this research, a limited attempt is made to assess the impact of arrest policies on the local community using bureaucratic effectiveness and responsiveness as criteria for evaluation.

There is likely to be a great deal of disagreement over what constitutes effective law enforcement. One measure of effectiveness is the number of arrests which law enforcement officials make for more serious crimes (Part I or FBI index crimes) in relationship to the number of crimes committed (reported to the police). The crime/arrest ratio can be considered as a rough indicator of effective apprehension. A survey conducted by Chakerian suggests that in their evaluation of the police, citizens give apprehensions great deal of priority.⁶²

As noted earlier, police department policies which emphasize the enforcement of certain laws over others may have a significant impact on the overall pattern of criminal activity within the community. Some critics argue that the police spend too much time enforcing laws in the victimless crime and order maintenance categories (Part II offenses), and that this deters them from effectively apprehending perpetrators of more serious crimes. On the other hand, some argue that the apprehension of Part II offenders is integrally related to the effective control of more serious crimes--that is, criminal activity in the Part II range may escalate to a more serious level. To test the relationship between our

definition of police effectiveness (apprehension of those suspected of committing Part I crimes) and enforcement patterns, the following hypotheses will be tested.

Hypothesis H₁. There will be a positive relationship between the number of arrests for certain Part II crimes and the crime/arrest ratio for Part I crimes.

Also examined is the following relationship.

Hypothesis H₂. There will be an inverse relationship between arrests for certain Part II offenses and the level of reported criminal activity for Part I crimes within a community.

To measure police responsiveness we can look at the closeness of the relationship between environmental variables and arrest outputs. Another way to approach the problem is to assess the relationship between assaults directed against the police and arrest policies. As mentioned earlier, it is possible that frequent enforcement activity that is not perceived as legitimate by the community may result in violent behavior directed against the police. Wilson suggests that there is likely to be much more disagreement regarding the legitimacy of enforcement activity when it is directed at victimless crimes and order maintenance offenses.⁶³

Hypothesis H₃. In communities where arrests are higher for victimless crimes and order maintenance offenses, there will be a higher number of police assaults.

On the premise that some types of police departments will be more responsive to community demands and preferences the following hypothesis are offered.

Hypothesis H₄. Police assaults will be higher in cities with more professional police departments.

Hypothesis H₅. Police assaults will be lower among departments which have adopted a community relations orientation.

Data Base and Method of Analysis

To examine variation in arrest policies data have been gathered for 40 of 42 U. S. cities in the population range from 300,000 to 1,000,000 (see list of cities in Appendix A). Selection of cities within this population group is based primarily on data availability. Much of the police organizational information which is central to the analysis is available only for the cities within this population range. It is believed that the opportunity to incorporate various measures of police organization into the design warrants the sacrifice in quantity or number of units analyzed. The 40 cities are representative in terms of both region and local political structure. An initial analysis of environmental and certain police department variables suggests that there is considerable variation among these indicators for the 40 cities.

The analysis of law enforcement policy variation will proceed at several levels. In Chapter IV a general overview of arrest outputs will be given presenting some descriptive information on the 40 cities. For example, we are interested in the relative amount of variation in arrest rates for the different categories of arrest. The extent to which the specific offenses within each of the four general arrest categories are interrelated or show consistency is also of major interest.

Also, in Chapter IV an initial examination of the hypotheses offered in this chapter will be conducted through the use of simple and partial correlation analysis. The data analysis will focus on variables within each of the major system components outlined in Figure 3-1. A major purpose of this preliminary analysis is to select from a rather

large number of independent variables a smaller set of indicators representative of the various components in the design.

In Chapter VI the reduced variable set will be submitted to a multivariate analysis to determine the relative effects of system components on police policies. This stage of the analysis will be organized around various categories of dependent variables. An additional concern is to determine the extent to which variation in arrests can be accounted for by the explanatory framework. Finally, the results of a survey on police chiefs' attitudes towards law enforcement policies will be presented in Chapter V.

SOURCES

¹James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968). Thomas A. Henderson and David Neubauer, "Police Professionalism and Police Behavior," (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1973).

²Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, 1975 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 1.

³Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1974), 1-34. A fourth index crime in the property offense category--auto theft--is not included in the analysis. Among the four index crimes involving loss of property, auto theft accounts for the lowest number of arrests in the 40 cities.

⁴It should be noted that in the 1975 Uniform Crime Reports the FBI lists murder, forcible rape, aggravated assault and robbery in the violent crime category. However, in a factor analysis of Part I offenses James Moore found that the crime rate increases for armed robbery clusters with those for the two other property crimes of larceny and burglary. See James I. Moore, "Law Enforcement Planning in the American States: An Examination of Factors Influencing Policy Outcomes," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1971), 105.

⁵The police are likely to refer to this particular category as morals or vice offenses.

⁶Edwin Kiester, Jr., Crimes With No Victims: How Legislating Morality Defeats the Cause of Justice (New York: The American Jewish Committee, 1972), p. 3.

⁷Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior, p. 16.

⁸Henderson and Neubauer, "Professionalism and Police Behavior," 9. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior, p. 85.

⁹As indicated in Table 3-1, weapons offenses are classified under the order maintenance category. Using the criterion of certainty, weapons violations do not fit very neatly within the order maintenance category. However, we feel that the nature of the weapons arrest qualifies this particular offense for the order maintenance category. In some cases weapons arrests are made incidentally to arrests for other violations,

but in many cases this kind of arrest is made as an end in itself because the individual who is carrying the weapon represents a potential threat to the peace, order, and stability of the community. Also, there may be a certain amount of uncertainty in making a weapons arrest, provided that the weapon is not in plain view of the officer prior to making the arrest. Finally, the categorization of weapons offenses is supported by the findings of Henderson and Neubauer who observed that weapons arrests correlate fairly well with other types of arrests which we classify as order maintenance offenses.

¹⁰The 90 percent figure represents the average figure for the 40 cities.

¹¹Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior, p. 21.

¹²Donald J. Black, "The Social Organization of Arrests," Stanford Law Review, 23 (June, 1971), 1087-1111.

¹³Henderson and Neubauer, "Professionalism and Police Behavior."

¹⁴James Q. Wilson, "The Police and the Delinquent in Two Cities," in City Politics and Public Policy edited by James Q. Wilson (New York: John Wiley, 1968), pp. 173-195. Also see Irving Piliavin and Scott Briar, "Police Encounters with Juveniles," American Journal of Sociology, 70 (1964), 206-214; Donald J. Black and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Police Control of Juveniles," American Sociological Review, 35 (February, 1970), 63-77.

¹⁵Minority arrests are measured as a percentage of total arrests. Juvenile and total arrests are computed as a rate per 100,000 population.

¹⁶For a critique of the use of crime rates in social science research see Elinor Ostrom, "Institutional Arrangements and the Measurement of Policy Consequences: Applications for Evaluating Police Performance," Urban Affairs Quarterly, 6 (1971), 447-476; Robert C. Link and John P. Lipsky, "The Measurement of Police Output: Conceptual Issues and Alternative Approaches," Law and Contemporary Problems, 36 (August, 1971), 566-588. For a defense of the use of crime rates for certain kinds of research see Wesley G. Skogan, "The Validity of Official Crime Statistics: An Empirical Investigation," Social Science Quarterly, 55 (June, 1974), 25-38.

¹⁷For studies of the correlates of crime see Council on Municipal Performance, "City Crime," Municipal Performance Report (May-June, 1973), 2-73; Karl Schuessler, "Components of Variation in City Crime Rates," Social Problems, 9 (November, 1962), 314-323; and Alvin Rudoff, "Soaring Crimes Rates: An Etiological View," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 62 (December, 1971), 543-547.

¹⁸Albert J. Reiss, Jr. and David J. Bordua, "Environment and Organization: A Perspective on the Police," in The Police: Six Sociological Essays (New York: John Wiley, 1967), pp. 25-55.

¹⁹For a general discussion of the relationship between heterogeneity and policy outputs see Brett W. Hawkins, Politics and Urban Policies (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), pp. 114-120.

²⁰Banfield and Wilson suggest that income groups can be divided into three sectors--low, medium, and high, and that the interests of the lower and upper classes are often similar and in contradiction to those of the middle class. Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 35. It should be noted that our measure of heterogeneity is based on income and class, but other variables included in the research design such as ethnicity can also be thought of as a component of the general concept of heterogeneity.

²¹Banfield and Wilson, City Politics; Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, "Public Regardness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," American Political Science Review, 58 (December, 1964), 876-887.

²²Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior, pp. 140-142.

²³Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), p. 9.

²⁴Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior, Chapter 5.

²⁵The alleged preference of the public regarding sector for impartiality and an orientation towards general principles and abstract laws are supportive of the relationship suggested here. See Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, p. 41.

²⁶Wilson, "The Police and the Delinquent in Two Cities," 190-193.

²⁷For examples of criticisms of the use of region to explain policy variation see Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, 61 (September, 1967), 701-717; Philip B. Coulter, "Comparative Community Politics and Public Policy: Problems in Theory and Research," in Urban Political Analysis: A Systems Approach, edited by David R. Morgan and Samuel A. Kirkpatrick (New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 376-377. In their classic piece on region to which many of the criticisms on the variable region are addressed, Wolfinger and Field found that region is more important than ethnicity as a determinant of urban government forms. See Raymond E. Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," American Political Science Review, 60 (June, 1966), 306-326.

²⁸The variable region is dichotomized on a South-nonsouth basis. Cities located in the following states are classified as southern in location: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. Some researchers also classify the following border states as southern: Maryland,

Oklahoma, Tennessee, Washington, D. C., and West Virginia. The 40 cities will be examined using the latter classification.

²⁹For a general discussion on economic motivation regarding crime and arrest see Jeffrey I. Chapman, The Impact of Police on Crime and Crime on Police: A Synthesis of Economic and Ecological Approaches (Los Angeles: Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of California at Los Angeles, 1973).

³⁰Ibid., p. 16.

³¹David J. Bordua and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Law Enforcement," in The Uses of Sociology, edited by Paul Lazarsfeld, William Sewell, and Harold Wilensky (New York: Basic Books, 1967), p. 279.

³²For a discussion of the political implications of population mobility see Hawkins, Politics and Urban Policies, pp. 32, 35-37. Also see John A. Gardiner, Traffic and the Police: Variations in Law Enforcement Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 147.

³³The revenue/income ratio is based on 1970 data available from the U. S. census.

³⁴It is possible that a city which exerts a greater revenue effort may in the long run have less money to spend on government than a city with a lower revenue effort because it has a lower resource base which can be tapped. For our purposes, however, we feel that the revenue effort measure is sufficient. In a previous study using the 40 cities examined in this research, Morgan and Swanson found a fairly high correlation between revenue effort and various measures of police resources. Community resources (affluence) were not as strongly related to police resources as was revenue effort and were negatively correlated with revenue effort. David R. Morgan and Cheryl G. Swanson, "Analyzing Police Policies: The Impact of Environment, Politics, and Crime," Urban Affairs Quarterly, 11 (June, 1976), 489-510. Findings concerning the relationship between resource base and policy outputs are mixed. For a general overview of the literature in this area see Hawkins, Politics and Urban Policies, pp. 72-78.

³⁵Karnig makes this point in his study of local private regarding policies. Albert K. Karnig, "Private Regarding: Policy, Civil Rights Groups, and the Mediating Impact of Municipal Reforms," American Journal of Political Science, 19 (February, 1975), 91-106.

³⁶Michael Aiken and Robert R. Alford, "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Public Housing," American Political Science Review, 64 (September, 1970), 859.

³⁷Herbert L. Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal Process," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 113 (November, 1964), 1-68.

³⁸Ibid., 15-16.

³⁹Ibid., 9-10.

⁴⁰While ethnicity is frequently chosen as an indicator of political culture, ethnicity is used here as an environmental variable which relates to the manner in which crime is perceived by individuals in the community. It is a measure of community culture and is not as directly related to the political system as our measure of reform group representation. Therefore, it is assigned to the nonpolitical environment in contrast to reform group representation which is more directly linked to attitudes, feelings, and preferences about government.

⁴¹Robinson, Rusk, and Head present a scale that Selznick and Steinberg applied to a national probability sample that yielded an impressive correlation with voter intention for Goldwater in 1964. The authors suggest that the scale, in large part, did seem to be tapping pre-existing beliefs rather than those induced by a particular campaign. "One of the major findings. . . was that conservative beliefs did appear to affect voter preference when a candidate clearly declared his agreement with those beliefs." John P. Robinson, Jerrold Rusk, and Kendra Head, Measures of Political Attitudes (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1969), p. 81. For a similar argument see Philip Converse, Aage Clausen and Warren Miller, "Electoral Myth and Reality," American Political Science Review, 59 (June, 1965), 321-336. Kirkpatrick offers a different orientation arguing that "Much of the evidence suggests that division of the electorate into two strongly ideological camps is a myth, although there is a strong division on certain welfare issues." See Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, "Issue Orientations and Voter Choice," Social Science Quarterly, 49 (June, 1968), 99.

⁴²Herman Goldstein, "Police Discretion: The Ideal Versus the Real," Public Administration Review, 23 (September, 1963), 143.

⁴³Leonard Ruchelman, Police Politics: A Comparative Study of Three Cities (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1974), p. 99.

⁴⁴Longer tenure is associated with greater independence for the police chief. It is suggested that chiefs who have held office for longer periods of time are more likely to have developed a power base independent of the current political leadership. Information on police chief tenure was computed from the listing of police chiefs by name from the Municipal Yearbook for the years 1964 through 1973.

⁴⁵Joseph Goldstein, "Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Los-Visibility Decisions," Yale Law Journal, 69 (March, 1960), 565-583.

⁴⁶Reiss and Bordua, "Environment and Organization," 33.

⁴⁷Raymond I. Nimmer, Two Million Unnecessary Arrests: Removing a Social Service Concern from the Criminal Justice System (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1971), p. 69.

⁴⁸Data on acquittals were obtained from the FBI. While data were available for only 31 of the 40 cities, it was decided that this was a sufficient number for inclusion in the overall analysis. Finally, the data on court decisions represent an amalgamation of different levels of government, e.g., local, county, state, and federal. Thus, while we assign judicial outputs to the category of extracommunity variables, some of the court decisions undoubtedly represent those of local authorities.

⁴⁹Data on LEAA grants are obtained from the Third Annual Report of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Fiscal Year, 1971, Table 2--discretionary grant abstracts, 269-377.

⁵⁰ASAP data were obtained from LeRoy Hansen, Project Director, Oklahoma City Alcohol Safety Action Program.

⁵¹Gardiner, Traffic and the Police, p. 159.

⁵²Elinor Ostrom, et al, Community Organization and the Provision of Police Services (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973), p. 62.

⁵³The term police style is used by Wilson in Varieties of Police Behavior, p. 140ff.

⁵⁴The latter two categories are adopted from Ostrom, et al, Community Organization, p. 62.

⁵⁵James Q. Wilson, "The Police and Their Problems: A Theory," Public Policy, 12 (1963), 189-216.

⁵⁶For example see Lineberry and Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies," and Karnig, "'Private-Regarding' Policy." It should be noted that since the police departments we are examining are in large cities, most of them probably have many of the features associated with professional police departments. Therefore, in examining professionalism within this context, professionalism is viewed as a continuous rather than as a dichotomous variable.

⁵⁷Rodney Clarke Sherman, "A Study of the Need for Training in the Behavioral Sciences for the Metropolitan Atlanta Police Departments" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Georgia State University, 1972).

⁵⁸A number of studies have examined the extent to which organizational characteristics cluster or occur together. For example, see John Child, "Organization Structure and Strategies of Control: A Replication of the Aston Study," Administrative Science Quarterly, 17 (June, 1972),

163-176; D. S. Pugh, et al, "Dimensions of Organization Structure," Administrative Science Quarterly, 14 (March, 1969), 91-114; Jerold Hage and Michael Aiken, "Relationships of Centralization to Other Structural Properties," Administrative Science Quarterly, 12 (June, 1967), 72-92.

⁵⁹David J. Bordua and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Command, Control and Charisma: Reflections on Police Bureaucracy," American Journal of Sociology, 72 (July, 1966), 68-76.

⁶⁰Robert Eyestone, The Threads of Public Policy: A Study of Policy Leadership (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), pp. 29-30.

⁶¹Thomas A. Henderson, "The Relative Effects of Community Complexity and of Sheriffs Upon the Professionalism of Sheriff Departments," American Journal of Political Science, 19 (February, 1975), 107-132.

⁶²Richard Chackerian, "Police Professionalism and Citizen Evaluations: A Preliminary Analysis," Public Administration Review, 34 (March/April, 1974), 141-148.

⁶³Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior.

⁶⁴Terry N. Clark, "Urban Typologies and Political Outputs," City Classification Handbook, edited by Brian Berry (New York: Wiley Interscience, 1972), pp. 152-178.

CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH FINDINGS--A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

In this chapter the hypotheses outlined in Chapter III are examined in light of the research findings. Variables are examined within system components, e.g. crime environment, political climate, and therefore results should be interpreted as somewhat tentative. Relationships may change somewhat when variables are assessed across components.

Since the study incorporates a large number of variables it will be necessary to reduce the variable set prior to comparing relationships among system components.¹ A second function of this chapter is the examination of the various indicators for the eventual purpose of reducing the variable set. Assuming a certain amount of intercorrelation among variables, this can be accomplished by using partial correlation analysis to rank the relative importance of independent variables within categories. In some cases it was possible to reduce the variable set prior to the partials analysis after assessing the simple relationships among indicators. Some variables were eliminated because they were fairly strongly correlated with other variables in the set and thus posed problems of multicollinearity. Also, examination of some of the intercorrelations led to a reassessment of the validity of some measures, and certain variables were eliminated on this basis. Any additional criteria

which may have been used to reduce the variable set under particular circumstances will be outlined in the course of the analysis.² When the variable set was fairly small, an attempt was made to retain all variables for the partials analysis.

The Arrest Variables

Prior to examining relationships within system components it is useful to look at the dependent variables descriptively. The intercorrelations among arrest variables will also be analyzed.

In spite of the fact that the 40 cities represent a fairly narrow population range, previous research indicates a considerable amount of variation among them for various socioeconomic and police department characteristics.³ Likewise, Table 4-1 shows that there is sufficient variation for the policy indicators to warrant further analysis.

Generally, the relative variation among cities for victimless crime and order maintenance arrests is higher than for violent crime and property offenses. There are exceptions, however. The coefficient of relative variation is larger for murder than for narcotics and drunk driving arrests and the CRV for murder arrests equals that for public drunkenness. The CRV is highest for disorderly conduct arrests and lowest for larceny.

Intercorrelations among the various indicators of each crime-arrest category are shown in Tables 4-2 through 4-5, and the correlation matrix for the major categories of arrest is presented in Table 4-6. Arrests for violent crimes against persons and property crimes show a high degree of consistency by virtue of the strength of their intercorrelations. On

Table 4-1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ARREST VARIABLES

Arrest Variables	Descriptive Statistics				
	Range		Mean	S. D.	CRV
	Low	High			
<u>Violent Crimes Against Persons</u>					
Murder	52.9	3.2	16.1	11.4	70.8%
Rape	37.8	.3	16.9	9.3	55.0
Aggregated Assault	299.3	18.5	110.9	76.6	69.3
<u>Property Offenses</u>					
Armed Robbery	244.1	27.3	86.5	52.3	60.5
Burglary	345.0	49.2	128.4	62.2	48.4
Larceny	743.1	138.6	327.0	123.4	37.7
<u>Victimless Crimes</u>					
Prostitution	288.5	7.8	82.0	72.3	88.0
Narcotics	751.9	95.7	298.4	163.4	54.8
Gambling	350.8	1.4	99.6	99.9	100.3
<u>Order Maintenance</u>					
Simple Assault	1131.1	12.2	247.8	241.0	97.2
Weapons	611.3	32.9	127.2	96.0	75.5
Driving Under the Influence	1183.6	14.6	534.0	362.5	67.9
Public Drunkenness	7115.5	91.7	1835.2	1302.4	71.0
Disorderly Conduct	3460.8	48.6	367.6	565.2	153.8
<u>Juvenile</u>	2618.4	301.5	1057.4	512.9	48.5
<u>Nonwhite</u>	85.7	5.2	46.3	19.8	42.8
Total Arrests	8845.1	1400.0	3505.2	1600.0	45.6

^aN = 31

Table 4-2

INTERCORRELATION AMONG ARREST VARIABLES FOR OFFENSES
CLASSIFIED AS VIOLENT CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS

Variable	X_1	X_2
Murder. X_1		
Rape. X_2	.58	
Aggravated Assault. X_3	.65	.77

Table 4-3

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG ARREST VARIABLES FOR OFFENSES
CLASSIFIED AS PROPERTY CRIMES

Variable	X_1	X_2
Robbery. X_1		
Burglary. X_2	.75	
Larceny. X_3	.39	.67

Table 4-4

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG ARREST VARIABLES FOR OFFENSES
CLASSIFIED AS VICTIMLESS CRIMES

Variable	X_1	X_2
Prostitution. X_1		
Narcotics. X_2	.23	
Gambling. X_3	.27	-.23

Table 4-5

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG ARREST VARIABLES FOR OFFENSES
CLASSIFIED AS ORDER MAINTENANCE CRIMES

Variable	X_1	X_2	X_3	X_4	
Simple Assault.	X_1				
Weapons	X_2	.14			
Driving Under the Influence . . .	X_3	.03	.19		
Public Drunkenness.	X_4	-.05	.70	.26	
Disorderly Conduct.	X_5	.26	.86	.27	.66

Table 4-6

CORRELATION MATRIX FOR MAJOR CATEGORIES OF ARREST

Variable	x_1	x_2	x_3	x_4	x_5	x_6
Violent Crimes Against Persons. . . x_1						
Property Crimes x_2	.53					
Victimless Crimes x_3	.68	.52				
Order Maintenance x_4	.30	.32	.44			
Juveniles x_5	.00	.50	.18	.38		
Nonwhites x_6	.56	.20	.32	.14	-.10	
Total Arrests x_7	.59	.49	.72	.81	.33	.37

the other hand, it is somewhat surprising that the correlation coefficients among victimless crime arrests are as low as indicated in Table 4-4. The highest coefficient is .27 between gambling and prostitution. Arrests for gambling and narcotics show a fairly low, negative association (-.23). Order maintenance arrests show varying degrees of consistency. Public drunkenness, disorderly conduct, and weapons arrests exhibit fairly high intercorrelations. However, arrests for simple assault and drunk driving do not correlate strongly with the other three variables. These two offenses also show low correlations with the variables which comprise the other categories of arrest (see Appendix B).

For ease in comparison the specific arrest variables are collapsed to form an index for each of the four crime-arrest categories, and their intercorrelations are tabulated in Table 4-6 along with those for juvenile, nonwhite and total arrests. The indices simply consist of the total number of arrests for all crimes within each of the four broad crime categories standardized by 100,000 population.

The four crime-arrest categories are more closely related than might be expected. Of particular interest is the fairly high correlation coefficients between victimless crime, violent crime and property crime arrests. Still, since none of the intercorrelations approach unity, and since there appears to be a fairly good theoretical basis for differentiation by the four categories, the analysis will proceed on the basis of the classification formulated in Chapter III.

Likewise, in spite of some problems with consistency, the variables selected in Chapter II will continue to be used as measures of the various dimensions of law enforcement activity. Problems with consistency do suggest that various indicators of the crime-arrest categories might best be analyzed independently rather than through their incorporation into an index. As the analysis proceeds the utility of the various arrest categories can be further evaluated. It will be possible to determine whether common influences are associated with variation for different types of arrest.

The Crime Environment

The zero order relationships among crime environment indicators suggest two clusters of variables (Table 4-7). The first grouping

Table 4-7

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG MEASURES OF CITY CRIME ENVIRONMENT

Variable	X ₁	X ₂	X ₃	X ₄	X ₅	
Income Inequality.	X ₁					
Percent Nonwhite	X ₂	.37				
Female Head.	X ₃	.36	.84			
Density.	X ₄	.04	.42	.71		
Males 15-29.	X ₅	-.01	-.07	-.08	-.11	
Males Under 17	X ₆	-.23	.00	-.14	-.41	-.34

includes income inequality, percent nonwhite, female heads of families, and population density. Because of its high intercorrelation with race, and density, family stability was excluded from further analysis.

The second cluster of variables consists of the two age composition measures. With the exception of population density, these two variables have very low correlation coefficients with the other crime environment indicators and are correlated with each other at $-.34$.

In Chapter III it was hypothesized that community characteristics associated with criminal activity would be more highly correlated with arrests for Part I offenses than with those for Part II offenses. In part the selection of crime environment indicators is somewhat biased towards confirmation of the hypothesis because most of the research on which variable selection is based has examined the correlates of crime rates (Part I offenses). Still it is not unreasonable to suggest that social conditions often associated with the incidence of Part I crimes and represented by such variables as age, income inequality, density, and race may also be related to the occurrence of Part II crimes. Thus while income inequality is a social condition which may be related to the commission of property crimes, it is not unlikely that it may also be associated with narcotics trade and prostitution. In spite of obvious deficiencies in the measures selected to represent a city's crime environment, in the absence of crime rate data for Part II offenses, these are probably the best ones available.

The data (Tables 4-8 through 4-10) indicate some support for the hypothesis with a number of important qualifications.⁵ Arrests for certain Part I offenses can be distinguished from arrests for most of the

Table 4-8
SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR CRIME ENVIRONMENT
VARIABLES AND PART 1 ARREST RATES

Crime Environment Variables	Arrest Variables											
	Violent Crimes Against Persons						Property Crimes					
	Murder		Rape		Aggravated Assault		Robbery		Burglary		Larceny	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
Income Inequality	.36	.13	.14	-.12	.37	.26	.41	.30	.31	.08	.38	.18
Percent Nonwhite	.79	.72	.64	.54	.67	.47	.77	.63	.49	.42	.31	.34
Density	.28	-.06	.55	.31	.50	.34	.58	.42	.17	-.11	-.04	-.28
Males 15-29	-.18	-.18	.02	.09	-.11	-.08	-.07	.02	-.01	-.06	.12	.00
Males Under 17	.06	.04	-.20	-.08	-.10	.09	-.17	.02	-.14	-.17	-.23	-.27
	$R^2 = .656$		$R^2 = .531$		$R^2 = .539$		$R^2 = .706$		$R^2 = .279$		$R^2 = .280$	

Table 4-9

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR CRIME
ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES AND PART II ARREST RATES

Crime Environment Variables	Arrest Variables															
	Victimless Crime Arrests						Order Maintenance Arrests									
	Prostitution		Narcotics		Gambling		Simple Assault		Weapons		Drunk Driving		Public Drunkenness		Disorderly Conduct	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
Income Inequality	.18	-.01	.30	.22	.05	-.11	-.03	-.21	.47	.28	.15	.16	.34	.08	.29	.07
Percent Nonwhite	.40	.30	.19	.09	.54	.47	.28	.38	.61	.56	-.28	-.11	.26	.40	.44	.47
Density	.38	.10	.09	.02	.20	.06	.01	-.16	.06	-.23	-.46	-.43	-.15	-.46	-.05	-.28
Males 15-29	-.05	-.11	.16	.14	-.09	.03	.28	.24	-.10	-.10	.16	.01	.00	-.21	.16	.14
Males Under 17	-.28	-.23	-.19	-.06	.20	.20	-.09	-.12	.04	-.02	-.08	-.24	-.21	-.46	-.05	-.11
	R ² = .262		R ² = .135		R ² = .347		R ² = .218		R ² = .489		R ² = .325		R ² = .335		R ² = .312	

Table 4-10

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR CRIME ENVIRONMENT
VARIABLES WITH JUVENILE, NONWHITE AND TOTAL ARRESTS

Crime Environment	Arrest Variables					
	Juvenile Arrests		Nonwhite Arrests		Total Arrests	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
Income Inequality	-.02	-.04	.36	.04	.39	.12
Percent Nonwhite	-.10	.01	.81	.77	.51	.55
Density	-.17	-.16	.57	.21	.00	-.35
Males 15-29	.25	.16	-.15	-.30	.08	-.01
Males Under 17	-.10	-.11	-.26	-.27	-.14	-.26
	$R^2 = .094$		$R^2 = .774$		$R^2 = .413$	

Part II offenses by virtue of their fairly strong relationships with various crime environment indicators. These variables include murder, rape, aggravated assault, and robbery arrests. The fact that the same variables seem to operate with similar strength and direction on robbery arrests as with arrests for crimes against persons points to the dual nature of the robbery offense and suggests that at least with respect to the crime environment variables, arrests for robbery more closely approximate the violent crime-arrest dimension than the property crime-arrest dimension.

Nonviolent property crime arrests cannot be distinguished so easily from Part II arrests on the basis of their relationship to the crime environment measures as shown in Table 4-9. Many categories of Part II arrests seem to exhibit a closer relationship to the crime environment indicators than do burglary and larceny arrests.⁶

Among Part II offenses the variance accounted for by crime environment variables--without consideration of the contribution of other components in the research design--is highest for weapons arrests. While a weapons arrest does not necessarily imply the actual use of the weapon by the suspect, weapons are usually involved in the commission of violent crimes. This may account for its similarity to violent crime arrests with respect to the relationship with crime environment measures.

Among all arrest categories juvenile arrests express by far the weakest relationship to the independent variables. Nonwhite arrests are strongly related to the crime environment by virtue of their association with nonwhite population. When crime environment variables are considered

independently of the other variables in the research design, they explain 41.3% of the variance in total arrests among cities.

In reference to the hypothesis, it cannot be said with certainty that a city's crime environment is more closely related to arrests for violent crimes than to arrests for nonviolent property crimes and non-violent Part II offenses. It is possible that crime incidence for the latter offenses is related to more complex kinds of social phenomena that are difficult to capture with the measures available. A more modest conclusion is that the selected crime environment variables appear to best capture arrest variation for crimes which are directly or indirectly violent by nature. With the exception of weapons arrests, these offenses fall within the Part I category.

Since there is a disparity in the amount of variance explained by crime environment indicators even among Part I arrests, it may be useful to examine these arrests with respect to more direct measures of crime incidence. Table 4-11 shows the correlation coefficients between Part I arrests and their corresponding crime rates.

Table 4-11

ZERO ORDER CORRELATIONS FOR CRIME RATES WITH PART I ARRESTS

Crime Rate	Arrest Rate
Violent Crimes Against Persons	
Murder	.94
Rape	.66
Aggravated Assault	.58
Property Crimes	
Robbery	.84
Burglary	.43
Larceny	.39

As with the socioeconomic measures of crime environment, the relationship between crime rates and Part I arrests is uneven. The correlation coefficients are quite high for murder and robbery arrests, moderately high for rape and aggravated assault arrests and lowest for burglary and larceny arrests. No doubt, part of the reason for the disparities in the size of the correlation coefficients among arrest categories can be found in the nature of the crimes with reference to the ability of law enforcement officials to solve or clear them. Thus, homicide is usually committed by someone the victim knows, and this factor usually facilitates the identification and arrest of a suspect. In contrast, burglary is a crime of stealth, is usually not committed in the presence of witnesses, and is often committed by someone unknown to the victim. The latter offense provides police officers with fewer clues or "leads" on which to base an arrest.

In summary, it is easier to make an arrest for some crimes than others, and this probably accounts for the differences in the strength of the relationships across categories of Part I crimes. Even for serious offenses, the crime environment does not uniformly predict arrest outcomes.

At this point the relationships with individual crime environment measures are considered. The simple correlations in Tables 4-8 through 4-10 show income inequality, race, and population density to be moderately to highly correlated with a number of police outputs. An overview of the partial relationships indicates the importance of the race variable across almost all categories of arrest. Race exhibits the strongest

relationship to nonwhite, murder and robbery arrests and the weakest relationship with juvenile, narcotics, and drunk driving arrests. It is positively associated with all arrest rates except those for drunk driving.

Population density shows moderate partial correlations with a number of arrest variables, but the direction of the relationship is mixed. Partial relationships of .30 or higher are shown for rape, aggravated assault, and robbery arrests (positive association) and for drunk driving, public drunkenness and total arrest outputs (negative association).

While income inequality shows moderate simple relationships with several of the arrest variables including all three property crimes, when the effects of the other variables are controlled, the relationships are substantially reduced. The highest partial for income inequality is with robbery arrests (+.30).

Surprisingly, the age variables are not very strongly related to any of the categories of arrest. While juvenile population (males under 17) was not expected to be related to adult arrests, its partial correlation with juvenile arrests is also quite low (-.11). The negative direction of the relationship is contrary to our expectations. The juvenile variable has a fairly high negative partial correlation (-.46) with public drunkenness arrests. One possible explanation is that the relevant "criminal" population for public drunkenness offenses is related to the juvenile variable. Legal restrictions on alcohol consumption make it less likely that juveniles will become candidates for a public drunk

arrest. Furthermore, much of the "skid row" population which is frequently a target for these kinds of arrests is in the older age bracket. Support for these suppositions is provided by the data. The juvenile variable is negatively related to the mean age of city residents at .67. In general cities with populations having a greater percentage of males in the 15-29 year age bracket do not appear to exhibit higher arrest rates.

One other aspect of the crime environment which remains to be examined is the relationship between crime increase and arrest behavior. In Chapter III it was suggested that cities experiencing the pressures of rising crime rates may make greater number of arrests for offenses in the Part II range. Table 4-12 shows that in some cases the relationships are in the opposite direction predicted.

Table 4-12

ZERO ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INCREASES IN THE
CRIME RATE (PART I OFFENSES) AND ARRESTS FOR PART II OFFENSES

Crime Increase	Arrest Rate
Victimless Crimes	
Prostitution	-.14
Narcotics	-.19
Gambling	-.08
Order Maintenance Offenses	
Assault	.00
Weapons	-.03
Drunk Driving	.13
Public Drunkenness	.20
Disorderly Conduct	.03

One explanation for the mixed findings is that cities which are experiencing crime increases have traditionally made fewer arrests for victimless crime offenses and more arrests for many order maintenance offenses. In all cases, however, the correlation coefficients are very low. The major conclusion is that crime rate increases do not appear to bear a very strong relationship to arrest activity for Part II offenses.

Social, Economic and Cultural Factors

Most of the hypotheses formulated for police outputs and a police department's social, economic and cultural environment focus on victimless crime, order maintenance and in some cases juvenile arrests. This is based on the premises that arrests of this kind involve the greatest amount of police discretion, and that the crime environment will capture most of the arrest variance for Part I offenses. While in many cases crime environment measures are fairly strongly related to Part I arrests, certain exceptions and inconsistencies are apparent. Therefore, in examining the hypotheses we will continue to assess the relationship between selected independent variables and all categories of arrest outputs.

After reviewing the interrelationships among the social, economic, and cultural indicators, several variables were dropped from the analysis (Table 4-13). Median age does not correlate well with the other two indicators of mobility. It was excluded from further consideration because it is deemed a less direct indicator of mobility than the other two measures available. Since population change and white migration show

Table 4-13
INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL VARIABLES

Variable	X ₁	X ₂	X ₃	X ₄	X ₅	X ₆	X ₇	X ₈	X ₉	X ₁₀	X ₁₁	X ₁₂
<u>Social Class Heterogeneity</u>												
Income Less Than \$3000. . . X ₁												
Income More Than \$15,000. . X ₂	-.73											
White Collar. X ₃	-.54	.65										
<u>Ethos</u>												
Foreign or Mixed Parentage. X ₄	-.12	.23	.01									
Private School. X ₅	-.44	.56	.32	.17								
<u>Propertied Interests and Economic Prosperity</u>												
Retail Sales. X ₆	-.14	-.07	.12	-.05	-.13							
Owner Occupied Housing. . . X ₇	-.34	.06	.20	-.22	-.02	-.26						
Median Income X ₈	-.90	.91	.58	.20	.50	.02	.17					
<u>Mobility</u>												
Population Change X ₉	-.22	.25	.21	-.19	-.06	-.28	.38	.25				
White Migration X ₁₀	-.40	.38	.44	-.19	.41	-.24	.46	.33	.54			
Median Age. X ₁₁	-.10	-.01	-.10	.06	.07	.60	-.22	-.02	-.26	-.12		
<u>Population Size</u> X ₁₂	.01	.23	.05	.03	.22	-.15	-.18	.14	-.04	-.30	-.07	
<u>Region</u> X ₁₃	.52	-.45	.01	-.46	-.34	-.05	.06	-.48	.24	.12	-.23	.00

a moderately high relationship (+.54), in the interest of economy only one of the variables--population change--was retained.

The private school measure was omitted on the basis of its very low correlation with ethnicity (foreign or mixed parentage) in contrast to its fairly high relationship with the several measures of income. In the 40 cities private school enrollments seem to better reflect populations that are able to afford the higher costs of private schooling than it does populations composed of religious minorities that are associated in the literature with a private-regarding ethos.

The variables low income, high income, white collar and median income show rather high intercorrelations and for this reason their role in the subsequent analysis was reassessed. The low and high income measures were originally included as indicators of social class heterogeneity on the assumption that they would operate consistently with respect to the dependent variables. However, these two variables show a rather strong negative correlation with each other (-.73), and in examining the overall pattern of their relationships with dependent variables (see Appendix B) it is suspected that a linear as opposed to a curvilinear relationship is operating here. With the measures available it is extremely difficult to capture the concept of social class heterogeneity.⁷ For further analysis two measures of social class were selected--one income measure (median income) and one occupation measure (percent white collar).

After reclassifying the median income variable, two measures of propertied interests remain--retail sales and owner occupied housing.

These two variables exhibit a rather low, negative relationship. Neither of the indicators were excluded at this stage in the analysis because they essentially represent two different kinds of private interests--one residential and the other commercial.

After reviewing the relationships among independent variables, the variable set was reduced from 13 to 8. The simple and partial correlations for various social, economic, and cultural variables and police outputs are outline in Tables 4-14 through 4-16. It should be noted that in Table 4-15 it was necessary to treat public drunkenness arrests somewhat differently from the other arrest categories. As noted in Chapter III, several states had decriminalized public drunkenness prior to 1973. Therefore, it was necessary to eliminate a number of cities from the data set for this particular variable.⁸ Because of the smaller number of units, distortions were produced in the partial calculations when two variables with moderately high intercorrelations--median income and region--were included. Therefore one of the variables--median income--was excluded from the partials calculations for public drunkenness.

The reader should be mindful of problems in comparability with the public drunkenness variable due to the smaller number of cases. Because of the importance attributed to the discretionary aspects of public drunkenness arrests in the criminal justice literature, the variable was not excluded from the analysis.

It is expected that police officials in communities with more typically middle class populations will experience more consistent and perhaps greater demands for the enforcement of victimless crime and

order maintenance offenses. These demands should be expressed in a positive relationship between certain social class measures and arrest levels.

As shown in Table 4-15 the two social class indicators frequently are not associated in the same strength and direction with the dependent variables. A social class measure shows a partial relationship of .30 or higher with arrest outputs for two victimless crime offenses and two order maintenance offenses. The direction of these moderate relationships is as expected for narcotics, drunk driving, and public drunkenness arrests. The partial between white collar population and gambling (-.44), however, is in the opposite direction predicted. It is possible that the case of gambling really reflects the impact of the crime environment. People with middle class, white collar occupations may violate gambling statutes less frequently than members of the working and lower classes.⁹

An equally plausible explanation is that the police are less likely to arrest middle class gamblers. This is in part a function of the social setting in which the illegal activity takes place with respect to class. Gambling among individuals of higher social status tends to take place in private homes or clubs while a great deal of gambling activity among lower class individuals occurs in public places. The legal institution of privacy renders it more likely that gambling arrests will fall disproportionately on members of the lower class.¹⁰ Thus, from the perspective of arrest behavior, it might be argued that the police have fewer opportunities to make gambling arrests in more middle class communities--not necessarily because less illegal activity takes place, but because it occurs in certain social settings.

Tablo 4-14

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR VARIOUS MEASURES OF
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT AND PART I ARRESTS

Social, Economic, Cultural Variables	Arrest Variables											
	Violent Crimes Against Persons						Property Crimes					
	Murder		Rape		Aggravated Assault		Robbery		Burglary		Larceny	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
<u>Social Class</u>												
White Collar	-.40	-.51	-.09	.04	-.12	.00	-.23	-.06	.03	.22	.25	.34
Median Income	-.27	.21	-.11	.09	-.19	-.12	-.25	-.11	-.12	-.22	-.09	-.17
<u>Ethos</u>												
Foreign or Mixed Parentage	-.36	-.44	-.13	-.31	-.10	-.12	-.11	-.29	-.15	-.25	-.17	-.16
<u>Propertied Interests</u>												
Retail Sales	.17	.26	.23	.16	.18	.17	.20	.09	.13	.04	.19	.07
Owner Occupied Housing	-.36	-.30	-.42	-.31	-.46	-.41	-.63	-.58	-.29	-.28	-.12	-.11
<u>Mobility</u>												
Population Change	-.18	-.13	-.34	-.18	-.06	.16	-.29	-.04	-.12	.05	-.16	-.14
<u>Region</u>	.26	.27	-.16	-.14	.18	.04	.07	-.05	.00	-.20	.18	.02
<u>Population Size</u>	.30	.28	.40	.43	.29	.27	.29	.28	.15	.16	.04	.05

Table 4-15

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR VARIOUS MEASURES OF THE SOCIAL,
ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT, AND PART II ARRESTS

Social Economic, Cultural Variables	Arrest Variables															
	Victimless Crime Arrests						Order Maintenance Arrests									
	Prostitution		Narcotics		Gambling		Simple Assault		Weapons		Drunk Driving		Public Drunkenness		Disorderly Conduct	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
<u>Social Class</u>																
White Collar	.07	.10	.24	.38	-.47	-.44	-.17	-.02	-.12	-.26	.35	.30	.24	.22	.14	-.05
Median Income	.02	-.05	.02	-.26	-.25	.15	-.18	-.06	-.15	.24	.12	-.07	.08	--	.03	.30
<u>Ethos</u>																
Foreign or Mixed Parentage	.11	.06	-.08	-.18	-.26	-.30	-.30	-.40	-.39	-.31	-.36	-.35	-.32	-.16	-.31	-.25
<u>Propertied Interests</u>																
Retail Sales	.44	.39	.05	-.02	-.12	-.10	.05	-.09	.29	.29	.03	-.01	.62	.66	.34	.27
Owner Occupied Housing	-.38	-.21	-.15	-.20	-.14	-.06	-.18	-.25	-.22	-.18	.31	.20	-.08	.01	-.14	-.11
<u>Mobility</u>																
Population Change	-.27	-.06	.00	.10	-.15	-.17	-.12	-.06	-.08	-.11	.10	-.07	-.02	.01	-.15	-.28
<u>Region</u>																
Region	-.09	-.04	-.03	-.25	.13	.12	.03	-.14	.36	.36	.20	-.10	.36	.46	.32	.38
<u>Population Size</u>																
Population Size	.22	.26	.22	.23	.26	.28	-.12	-.16	.15	.17	-.04	.00	-.03	.09	.08	.05

Table 4-16

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR VARIOUS MEASURES OF SOCIAL,
ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT AND JUVENILE, NONWHITE AND TOTAL ARRESTS

Social, Economic, Cultural Variables	Arrest Variables					
	<u>Juvenile Arrests</u>		<u>Nonwhite Arrests</u>		<u>Total Arrests</u>	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
<u>Social Class</u>						
White Collar	.16	.17	-.48	-.50	.02	.06
Median Income	.12	-.08	-.26	.19	-.14	-.04
<u>Ethos</u>						
Foreign or Mixed Parentage	-.14	-.20	-.11	-.32	-.45	-.46
<u>Propertied Interests</u>						
Retail Sales	-.03	-.04	.25	.22	.26	.22
Owner Occupied Housing	.09	.01	-.56	-.46	-.22	-.24
<u>Mobility</u>						
Population Change	.09	.07	-.43	-.30	-.07	-.03
<u>Region</u>	-.07	-.18	-.20	.08	.20	.04
<u>Population Size</u>	.08	.10	.24	.27	.25	.24

The partial relationship of .38 between the white collar measure and narcotics arrests is of particular interest in light of the literature on the subject. In a Chicago study De Fleur found that drug arrests tend to correlate poorly with actual community drug behavior.¹¹ She observed that for narcotics crimes both community and cultural definitions of appropriate control practices are important in influencing official enforcement policies. De Fleur further noted that pressures for strict drug enforcement have been strongest from middle class populations.

In his study of police-juvenile relationships, Wilson suggested that middle-class communities will favor a formal rather than an informal approach to police handling of juvenile offenders.¹² Table 4-16 shows a positive relationship between one of the class measures (percent white collar) and juvenile arrests. The association is extremely weak for both social class indicators, however.

The white collar variable exhibits a moderately high negative correlation with nonwhite arrests. It is possible that the white collar variable is associated with the race variable and this may account for the relationship reported in Table 4-16. This possibility will be examined at a later stage in the analysis. Total arrests show almost no association with class indicators.

Among Part I arrests social class indicators appear to be importantly related to only two offense types--murder (-.51) and larceny (.34). As with nonwhite arrests, the correlation between white collar population and homicide arrests may be a product of their relationship to the race

variable. While no specific hypotheses were offered for the larceny variable and social class, it is possible that white collar populations generate more demands for enforcement of this particular property crime.¹³

It was hypothesized that communities with a more private-regarding ethos will have lower arrest rates for victimless crimes, order maintenance offenses, and juveniles. While the strength of the association between ethnicity and police outputs varies, the sign of the relationship is negative in all cases except for prostitution arrests. Among Part II offenses the simple and partial correlation coefficients are generally higher for order maintenance than for victimless crime arrests.

The correlation coefficients between ethnicity and arrests are also negative for all categories of Part I offenses. This finding might lead us to suspect that the negative relationship between ethnicity and arrests may be less important in terms of culture or ethos (i.e., demand patterns associated with ethos), than it is by virtue of the fact that ethnic populations may inhabit less crime-prone environments. The relationship between ethnicity and arrest policies can be clarified in subsequent stages of the analysis when it is examined within the context of the crime environment variables. An examination of the relationship between ethnicity and crime rates indicates that, at least with respect to Part I offenses, ethnicity is not strongly associated with the crime environment. The variable does show a moderate negative correlation (-.35) with the murder rate. However, its association with rates of

other categories of crime is considerably lower.¹⁴ The correlation coefficient between the total crime index and ethnicity is a mere .06.

Another aspect of culture and arrest behavior can be examined with reference to region. It was predicted that cities located in the South would have higher victimless crime and order maintenance arrests. While the hypothesis is not supported with respect to victimless crime arrests, it is supported for three out of five of the order maintenance offenses. All three arrest types exhibit partial coefficients of .30 or higher with region. The correlation coefficients between region and all other categories of arrest are relatively low.

Communities with a greater proportion of propertied interests would generate more demands for property arrests. Table 4-14 indicates that the correlation coefficients between these measures and robbery, burglary, and larceny arrests are generally not impressive. The relationship between owner housing and property arrests is actually in the opposite direction of that predicted. The moderately high relationship with robbery arrests may be the result of multicollinearity. Owner occupied housing is fairly highly associated with both race and population density, and the latter variables are in turn associated with robbery arrests.¹⁵

While the property measures were not predicted to be related to Part II offenses, the retail sales variable shows a partial coefficient of .39 with prostitution arrests and a partial of .66 with public drunkenness arrests. Nimmer observes that merchants may be a major source of pressure on the police to remove social deviates from the streets.¹⁶

This is likely to be the case if their presence is deemed harmful to business interests. Cities whose interests are more strongly tied to retail trade may be particularly sensitive to behavior which could render the downtown area less attractive to potential customers.

It was predicted that population mobility would be more conducive to impersonal law enforcement, and this in turn would result in higher arrest rates. Among Part II offenses the partial relationship with population change is in most cases a negative one and the correlation coefficients are very low. The mobility measure exhibits a similar relationship with Part I arrests and shows no association with the juvenile arrest variable. The highest partial is with nonwhite arrests at $-.30$.

Tables 4-14 through 4-16 shows a positive partial relationship between population size and all the dependent variables with the exception of simple assault arrests. The highest partial is with rape arrests $(.43)$.

The Police Organization's Political Environment: Political Climate

In Chapter III the political component of the police agency's environment was categorized along three dimensions--political climate, local government structures and processes, and extra-community relationships. The relationships between the indicators of local political climate are presented in Table 4-17. A liberal/conservative dimension is discernable for a number of the interest group and party variables. The American Party and Goldwater support variables are positively related at $.63$. Conservative party support is in turn negatively associated with

Table 4-17

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG MEASURES OF LOCAL
POLITICAL CLIMATE

Variable	X_1	X_2	X_3	X_4	X_5	X_6
Revenue Income Ratio. X_1						
Chamber of Commerce Membership. X_2	-.39					
ACLU Membership X_3	.25	-.39				
League Membership X_4	-.06	.26	.34			
Civil Rights Group Mobilization Index. X_5	.35	-.12	-.14	.11		
Goldwater Vote. X_6	-.62	.30	-.46	.06	-.06	
American Party Vote X_7	-.24	.24	-.49	-.13	.14	.63

ACLU membership and positively correlated with Chamber of Commerce membership. Cities with more conservative political climates as measured by Goldwater and American Party support tend to pay lower taxes relative to their respective incomes.

Revenue/income ratio is thought to be positively related to arrest outputs on the assumption that communities which show greater support for the public sector through their financial contributions to government will both demand and receive more government services. Table 4-19 shows moderate simple relationships between the revenue/income ratio and certain Part II arrests, and except for drunk driving arrests, the relationships are in the predicted direction. However, most of these relationships are reduced when the effects of other political climate indicators are taken into account. Revenue effort exhibits the strongest partial relationships with arrests for a number of Part I offenses-- robbery, murder, rape, aggravated assault, and larceny (Table 4-18).

It should be noted that revenue effort is probably more important to arrest outputs as it operates through the budget. Police budget size shows a simple correlation coefficient of .72 with the revenue variable. The relationship between budget size and police behavior will be examined at a later point.

It was predicted that Chamber of Commerce membership would be positively related to property crime arrests. Burglary and larceny arrests show a positive association with this variable, but the partial correlation coefficients are extremely low. Chamber membership is also of interest in light of the relationships between retail sales and

Table 4-18

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN POLITICAL
CLIMATE VARIABLES AND PART I ARRESTS

Political Climate Variables	Arrest Variables											
	<u>Violent Crimes Against Persons</u>						<u>Property Crimes</u>					
	<u>Murder</u>		<u>Rape</u>		<u>Aggravated Assault</u>		<u>Robbery</u>		<u>Burglary</u>		<u>Larceny</u>	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
Revenue/Income Ratio	.37	.16	.65	.47	.59	.44	.66	.51	.28	.30	.11	.26
Chamber of Commerce Membership	-.13	-.01	-.20	.03	-.19	.08	-.33	-.06	-.17	.03	.19	.19
ACLU Membership	.10	.09	.20	-.04	.18	.09	.27	.14	.15	.20	.05	.08
League Membership	-.01	.00	.11	.11	.01	-.04	.07	.04	.01	-.11	.27	.16
Civil Rights Group Mobilization Index	.51	.37	.51	.40	.40	.23	.47	.29	.32	.20	.11	.00
Goldwater Vote	-.13	-.17	-.37	.02	-.31	.04	-.33	.11	.01	.29	.10	.18
American Party Vote	.24	.35	-.16	-.11	-.08	.01	-.11	.00	.00	-.09	.08	.01

Table 4-19

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN POLITICAL
CLIMATE VARIABLES AND PART II ARRESTS

Political Climate Variables	Arrest Variables															
	Victimless Crime Arrests						Order Maintenance Arrests									
	Prostitution		Narcotics		Gambling		Simple Assault		Weapons		Drunk Driving		Public Drunkenness		Disorderly Conduct	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
Revenue/Income Ratio	.40	.26	.09	.12	.37	.11	.28	.30	.17	.18	.40	.01	.17	.07	.11	.20
Chamber of Commerce Membership	-.06	.29	-.17	-.18	-.24	-.05	.11	.00	.16	.17	.28	.17	.34	.26	.22	.22
ACLU Membership	.35	.35	.13	.02	-.05	-.06	-.13	-.24	-.06	.10	-.03	.26	.16	.29	.12	.15
League Membership	.06	-.16	.25	.20	-.44	-.35	.27	.37	.28	.22	.32	.16	.54	.41	.38	.26
Civil Rights Group Mobilization Index	.37	.26	.26	.22	.24	.20	.16	.00	.35	.21	-.08	-.10	.05	-.09	.17	.03
Goldwater Vote	-.30	-.16	.11	.29	-.29	-.25	-.02	-.01	.07	-.03	.55	.44	.30	.12	.04	.03
American Party Vote	-.13	-.01	-.08	-.21	.08	.20	.15	.13	.28	.30	.22	-.03	.26	.32	.12	.17

arrests for prostitution and public drunkenness. Chamber membership is positively associated with prostitution and public drunkenness arrests, but the relationships are weaker than those expressed with the retail sales variable.

Contrary to the hypothesis, ACLU membership does not show a negative relationship with most Part II arrests and exhibits almost no association with nonwhite arrests. All partial relationships are below .30 with the exception of prostitution. The significance of the modest positive relationship with this particular variable is not readily apparent.

The correlation coefficients with League of Women Voters membership are more impressive particularly the partials with simple assault and public drunkenness. The direction of the relationships are as predicted for order maintenance and juvenile arrests, but they do not support the hypothesis with respect to all types victimless crime arrests. The League measure has a modest negative relationship (-.35) with arrests for gambling.

An inverse relationship was expected between the Civil Rights Group Mobilization (CRGM) measure and nonwhite arrests, but as shown in Table 4-20 the relationship is actually positive. The positive relationship does not necessarily indicate that civil rights activity does not have an impact on arrest behavior in the manner predicted. The relationship reported in the table is more likely a product of the fairly high intercorrelations among nonwhite population, nonwhite arrests and the CRGM measure (see Appendix B). Explanations of nonwhite arrests suffer in

Table 4-20

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN POLITICAL CLIMATE
VARIABLES AND JUVENILE, NONWHITE AND TOTAL ARRESTS

Political Climate Variables	Arrest Variables					
	Juvenile Arrests		Nonwhite Arrests		Total Arrests	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
Revenue/Income Ratio	.00	.18	.60	.28	.20	.30
Chamber of Commerce Membership	-.09	-.14	-.29	-.14	.05	.13
ACLU Membership	.06	-.02	.26	.03	.12	.19
League Membership	.24	.21	.03	.13	.26	.15
Civil Rights Group Mobilization Index	.03	-.02	.52	.37	.37	.16
Goldwater Vote	.19	.34	-.39	-.31	.12	.19
American Party Vote	-.07	-.23	.04	.35	.22	.17

particular from a lack of data on the amount of criminal activity actually committed by both racial groups.

A positive relationship was predicted between the indicators of political conservatism and arrest outputs. No clear pattern is evident with respect to the conservatism measures. The Goldwater variable expresses both positive and negative relationships with the policy variables. Of particular interest are the positive partial associations of .44 and .34 respectively with drunk driving and juvenile arrests. The American Party vote is also not consistently related to arrest outputs in terms of sign. This variable shows a modest positive association with arrest outputs for weapons, public drunkenness, murder and nonwhites. It is not readily apparent why measures of conservatism have a positive impact on arrest levels for some types of crimes but not for others.

The Political Environment: Local Governmental Institutions,
Structures, and Processes

Table 4-21 shows the interrelationships among variables representative of certain aspects of local governmental institutions, structures and processes. The variables which comprise a city's government reform score--government form, election type, and partisanship are not as highly intercorrelated as might be expected. Still they are related in the predicted direction, and the relationships are of sufficient strength to justify their replacement with a single score.¹⁸

Both the police budget and public safety variables were retained for further analysis because they were not as highly correlated as expected and are negatively related. It is not unlikely that cities with

Table 4-21

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG MEASURES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS,
STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

Variable	X_1	X_2	X_3	X_4	X_5	X_6	
Government Form	X_1						
Election Type	X_2	.29					
Partisanship.	X_3	.36	.22				
Reform Score.	X_4	.81	.51	.58			
Police Budget Per Capita. . . .	X_5	-.06	-.07	-.07	-.28		
Percent Budget Allocated to Public Safety.	X_6	.03	.18	.01	.04	.32	
Chief Tenure.	X_7	-.45	-.15	.14	-.40	-.11	.14

very high police budgets also spend more relative to other cities for non-police services. The public safety spending variable in contrast provides a measure of the level of council support for police services in proportion to support for other government services.¹⁹

Table 4-21 indicates a moderate relationship between reform score and police chief tenure. Police chiefs appear to enjoy greater job security in more reformed cities. Reform cities also tend to allocate less funds to the police, but the relationship is not a particularly strong one.

It was predicted that the impact of reform institutions on arrests would be a rather indirect one. The major influence of reformism is thought to be on police department characteristics and this relationship will be reviewed at a later point in the chapter. At any rate, the correlation coefficients in Tables 4-22 through 4-24 support the expectation that reformism would not show a very strong direct relationship to police outputs. The highest partial with any arrest category is .26.

Police budget size is fairly strongly related to nonwhite arrests and to a number of police outputs in the Part I range--particularly those for rape, aggravated assault, and robbery. The fairly strong relationship between the latter variables and crime environment measures suggests that police budgets may also be strongly related to the level of serious criminal activity in the community. The simple correlation coefficients between crime rates and budget size (Table 4-25) generally support this view although there are exceptions. Burglary and larceny crime rates show almost no association with police budget size. The extent of crime

Table 4-22

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN MEASURES OF
LOCAL INSTITUTIONS, STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES AND PART II ARRESTS

Measures of Local Institutions, Structures, and Processes	Arrest Variables											
	<u>Violent Crimes Against Persons</u>						<u>Property Crimes</u>					
	<u>Murder</u>		<u>Rape</u>		<u>Aggravated Assault</u>		<u>Robbery</u>		<u>Burglary</u>		<u>Larceny</u>	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
Reform score	-.23	-.01	-.37	-.16	-.12	.21	-.26	.06	.02	.21	.14	.25
Police Budget	.36	.36	.34	.58	.62	.63	.67	.66	.31	.35	.16	.18
Public Safety Expenditures	-.09	.00	-.38	-.29	-.26	-.12	-.21	-.05	-.14	-.06	-.27	-.24
Chief tenure	.24	.27	.15	.24	.11	.31	.17	.33	.11	.24	.03	.18

Table 4-23

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN MEASURES OF
LOCAL INSTITUTIONS, STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES, AND PART II ARRESTS

Measures of Local Institutions, Structures, and Processes	Arrest Variables															
	<u>Victimless Crimes</u>								<u>Order Maintenance Offenses</u>							
	<u>Prostitution</u>		<u>Narcotics</u>		<u>Gambling</u>		<u>Simple Assault</u>		<u>Weapons</u>		<u>Drunk Driving</u>		<u>Public Drunkenness</u>		<u>Disorderly Conduct</u>	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
Reform score	-.02	.08	-.08	.08	-.12	-.04	.12	.15	-.08	.03	.22	.08	.16	.19	.00	-.01
Police Budget	.44	.41	.20	.19	.14	.10	-.06	-.17	.24	.20	-.29	-.30	.16	.22	.19	.08
Public Safety Expenditures	-.13	.02	-.16	-.13	-.09	-.06	-.45	-.51	-.17	-.12	-.07	-.17	.00	.07	-.33	-.28
Chief tenure	-.14	-.06	.18	.24	.10	.10	.05	.17	.08	.13	-.12	-.10	-.12	-.01	-.16	-.11

Table 4-24

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN MEASURES OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS,
STRUCTURES, AND PROCESSES AND JUVENILE, NONWHITE, AND TOTAL ARRESTS

Measures of Local Institutions, Structures, and Processes	Arrest Variable					
	<u>Juvenile</u>		<u>Nonwhite Arrests</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	Simple	Partial	Simple	Partial	Simple	Partial
Reform Score	.23	.17	-.42	-.21	.08	.20
Police Budget	-.02	-.06	.51	.51	.16	.14
Public Safety Expenditures	-.28	-.29	-.04	.13	-.34	-.29
Chief tenure	-.18	-.07	.24	.23	.06	.19

in the armed robbery category seems to elicit the greatest support for police services.

Table 4-25

SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN
CRIME RATES AND POLICE BUDGETS

<u>Crime Rate</u>	
Murder	.39
Rape	.48
Robbery	.70
Aggravated Assault	.34
Burglary	.01
Larceny	.06
All Crimes	.31

This suggests that the level of criminal activity for certain offenses influences budget allocations. These budget allocations are then translated into the kinds of resources, e.g., labor, equipment, which allow the police to make more or fewer arrests, depending on the size of the budget.²⁰ These relationships seem obvious and not very surprising. What is somewhat surprising, however, is that budget allocations are not more closely related to arrests for Part II crimes than is indicated in Table 4-23. While budgets are more likely to be formulated in response to the level of serious criminal activity as opposed to petty offenses, it would seem that increased arrests in the Part II range would be an

offshoot of greater police activity made possible by higher budgets. The only arrest variable among Part II offenses that shows a positive partial relationship of .30 or higher with police budget size is prostitution. The more direct relationship between police resources and arrest measures is examined in a subsequent section of the paper.

In almost all cases public safety expenditures as a proportion of the total budget are inversely related to arrest outputs. This is contrary to what might be expected if the proportion of total expenditures devoted to public safety is interpreted as a rough indicator of the general level of enforcement policy makers are willing to support. The rather high negative relationship between this variable and arrests for simple assault (-.51) is particularly perplexing.

One possible explanation for the general nature of the findings is that cities with fewer serious crime problems (and therefore fewer arrests) may be spending less money on police budgets but proportionately more of the total city budget for the police function. This relationship might be influenced by the degree of conservatism in the community. Thus, a high crime environment creates demands for larger police budgets. However, many of the same environmental factors associated with crime incidence may also be related to expenditures in other policy areas such as welfare, health, and transportation. Therefore, in high crime communities police budgets are less likely to be framed at the expense of budgets in other policy areas.

The relationship between conservatism and public safety expenditures is suggested on the premise that more conservative communities

demand a greater budgetary commitment to the law enforcement function, regardless of the objective level of crime. These demands may be realized to the extent that more conservative communities are characterized by populations which make fewer demands for the kinds of services that strain the budgets of many large municipalities.

An examination of the data provides some, although very limited, support for this particular thesis. As noted earlier, police budget size and percent public safety expenditures are inversely related. Also public safety expenditures are negatively associated with crime rates for three Part I offenses--murder (-.06), rape (-.26), and robbery (-.14)--although these relationships are certainly not very strong. The proportion of city funds spent on public safety shows a very low positive relationship with one of the measures of conservatism (.16 with the Goldwater vote), and the latter variable in turn expresses a negative relationship with some crime rate measures.²¹

The direct relationship between police chief tenure and arrests does not appear to be particularly important for Part II arrests. Turnover among police chiefs is moderately related to arrest rates for aggravated assault and robbery. The relationship between turnover and arrests is positive for all Part I crimes. A number of factors may be at work here, but it is possible that cities with more serious crime problems (and in turn higher arrest rates) experience more turnover among police administrators due to greater pressures of the job as well as higher expectations among policy makers.

In Chapter III it was suggested that tenure may be important as an indicator of police responsiveness. Police chiefs who are more insulated from the vagaries of city politics may also be more isolated from public opinion. It was intended to test this proposition by comparing the variance explained by selected environmental variables in low tenure cities with that explained by the same set of variables in cities with greater turnover among police chiefs. Two socioeconomic variables--ethnicity and percent white collar--and one political climate variable--Goldwater vote--were selected as measures of community characteristics. However, the size of the partial correlation coefficients and the multiple coefficients of determination suggested that the comparisons were not very sound due to the small number of cases included in each subgroup. Thus the hypothesis that the police chief's relationship to the political leadership affects the relationship between community characteristics and arrest policies awaits further testing.

Extra-Community Political Relationships

Since only three variables were selected to represent a police agency's extra-community ties, and since these variables appear to be fairly distinct conceptually, partial correlation techniques will not be used to rank their relative importance to the dependent variables. Instead we will focus on their simple relationships with arrest outputs.

The relationship between acquittals and arrests was predicted to be negative. For five of the Part II offenses the relationship is in the direction hypothesized, but the correlation coefficients in these cases are very weak (Table 4-26). It is interesting to note that acquittals

Table 4-26
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
FOR ACQUITTALS AND LEAA FUNDING WITH ARRESTS

<u>Arrest Rate</u>	<u>Acquittals</u>	<u>LEAA Funding</u>
<u>Violent Crimes Against Persons</u>		
Murder	.19	-.19
Rape	.39	-.25
Aggravated Assault	.21	-.05
<u>Property Crimes</u>		
Robbery	.05	.06
Burglary	-.13	-.04
Larceny	.11	-.06
<u>Victimless Crimes</u>		
Prostitution	.17	-.11
Narcotics	-.03	.02
Gambling	-.08	-.28
<u>Order Maintenance Offenses</u>		
Simple Assault	.37	-.27
Weapons	-.16	-.01
Drunk Driving	-.21	.07
Public Drunkenness	-.08	.22
Disorderly Conduct	.15	-.08
<u>Total Arrests</u>	.17	-.09

have a moderate positive relationship with rape and simple assault arrests. In contrast to other offense types, acquittals for these two crimes are probably more a result of the victims' unwillingness to prosecute than a decision by a judge or jury, although it is difficult to determine what effect this difference might have on police behavior.

No specific hypotheses were offered for LEAA funding and police outputs. In most cases the relationship is a negative one and the correlation coefficients are not very high. Clearly LEAA money does not produce higher arrest rates in the cities under study.

The relationship between cities with Alcohol Safety Action Programs (ASAP) and drunk driving arrests is not very strong (.27). This finding does not necessarily indicate that federal efforts to influence local police behavior are not effective. Factors other than a lack of police responsiveness to federal initiatives may account for the moderately low association. For example, ASAP money is allocated to other agencies in the criminal justice system such as the courts. Grants may also be spent on such activities as rehabilitation. Given the data available it was not possible to determine the proportion of ASAP funds spent on law enforcement among cities.

Perhaps a more important factor explaining the fairly low association between ASAP and DUI arrests is that the arrest variable does not measure change over time. It is possible that ASAP cities with traditionally low number of DUI arrests have significantly increased arrest outputs. However, these increases may only bring them equal to non-ASAP cities which have traditionally made a large number of drunk driving

arrests. What is significant for the present analysis is that in explaining variation in arrest levels across cities, the ASAP variable would not appear to be extremely important.

Police Department Characteristics

Table 4-27 shows the correlation matrix for 24 police department characteristics. The variables are grouped according to the categories outlined in the previous chapter. There are problems with consistency among variables selected to represent certain categories of police department characteristics. In light of these inconsistencies as well as the fact that a large number of variables were selected for the initial analysis, it was necessary to make some fairly arbitrary decisions as to which indicators would be retained for further consideration. The major goal was to select two variables for further analysis from each subcategory of departmental characteristics.²²

The three variables selected to represent centralization--number of police stations, percent ranking officers (span of control) and unionization--show low intercorrelations and they are negative interrelated. The number of police stations operating within a police department and percent ranking officers were retained for further analysis.²³ The former seems to be a fairly direct and valid measure of centralization. The ratio of ranking officers to patrolmen (span of control) is a variable which has been frequently examined in the literature on organizational structure. The unionization measure was eliminated from the variable set. While unionization may result in a devolution of power from the police chief to the rank-and-file officers, it does not fall so clearly within

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Table 4-27

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG POLICE DEPARTMENT CHARACTERISTICS VARIABLES

Variable	X ₁	X ₂	X ₃	X ₄	X ₅	X ₆	X ₇	X ₈	X ₉	X ₁₀	X ₁₁	X ₁₂	X ₁₃	X ₁₄	X ₁₅	X ₁₆	X ₁₇	X ₁₈	X ₁₉	X ₂₀	X ₂₁	X ₂₂	X ₂₃	
<u>Resources</u>																								
Police Officers	X ₁																							
Police Cars	X ₂	.14																						
<u>Centralization</u>																								
Ranking Officers	X ₃	-.20	.07																					
Police Stations	X ₄	.70	.17	-.23																				
Unions	X ₅	-.07	-.05	-.08	-.11																			
<u>Specialization</u>																								
Specific Nonpatrol Duties	X ₆	-.26	-.34	.14	-.23	.32																		
Vice Assignment	X ₇	.19	-.04	-.02	-.02	.21	.30																	
Traffic Assignment	X ₈	.32	.25	-.08	.30	-.24	-.10	.00																
<u>Professionalism</u>																								
Salary Chief	X ₉	.48	.02	-.16	.32	-.19	-.32	.08	.47															
Salary Patrol	X ₁₀	.23	-.40	-.22	.13	-.24	-.16	.08	.27	.67														
Promotional Criteria	X ₁₁	.20	.12	.20	-.02	.15	-.07	-.09	-.12	-.08	-.01													
College Incentive Pay	X ₁₂	-.16	-.14	.09	-.18	.13	.06	-.03	-.14	-.07	-.20	-.05												
Seniority	X ₁₃	-.12	.14	.33	-.06	-.28	.12	-.18	-.08	-.18	-.17	.07	-.05											
<u>Community Orientation</u>																								
Beat Assignment	X ₁₄	-.08	-.26	-.04	-.04	-.05	.22	.00	.28	.30	.23	.18	.15	-.08										
Foot Patrol	X ₁₅	.62	-.04	-.25	.34	-.41	-.23	-.03	.46	.26	.29	-.25	-.10	-.14	.00									
Minority Employment	X ₁₆	.12	.21	.25	-.19	.20	-.23	.10	-.01	-.04	-.11	.01	.00	-.06	.00	-.24								
<u>Community Relations</u>																								
Training	X ₁₇	.50	-.18	-.08	.40	-.10	-.19	-.13	.11	.26	.29	.14	.08	-.10	.24	.59	-.16							
Review Board	X ₁₈	.19	.45	.12	.00	.13	-.16	.08	.18	.31	-.10	.10	-.10	.03	-.02	-.07	.28	.09						
School Programs	X ₁₉	.18	-.06	-.14	.08	-.08	-.06	.09	.14	.31	.22	-.26	-.07	-.05	-.01	.32	-.26	.24	-.04					
<u>Task Orientation</u>																								
Computerization	X ₂₀	.03	.02	-.35	.11	-.02	-.20	.10	.00	-.06	.02	.11	.03	-.26	-.03	.20	-.07	-.01	-.26	.12				
Helicopters	X ₂₁	-.04	.12	.17	-.09	-.19	-.31	-.05	-.05	.10	-.18	-.02	.03	-.06	-.04	-.19	.09	-.16	.18	.05	.08			
2-Man Patrol	X ₂₂	.33	-.28	-.08	.41	-.33	-.11	-.04	.31	.07	.35	-.32	-.24	.01	-.04	.51	-.06	.29	-.40	.05	-.12	-.26		
Civilian Support	X ₂₃	.17	.15	.17	-.23	-.04	-.12	.08	.17	.22	-.04	.22	.21	-.11	.08	-.17	.09	-.09	.13	-.02	.13	.40	-.45	
Computer Technicians	X ₂₄	.33	.07	-.03	.13	.03	-.05	.26	.14	.12	.13	.01	-.04	-.04	.24	.10	.15	.22	.00	-.04	.17	.05	-.06	.18

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the range of structural variables frequently examined in the literature on centralization. Furthermore, unionization may have important impacts on police policies apart from those which can be attributed to its effects on centralization and control within a police department.

Three variables were initially included under the category of specialization. The number of individuals working on vice assignments is moderately and positively correlated with the proportion of police officers assigned to specific nonpatrol duties. Since the nonpatrol variable contains a component which registers the number of personnel assigned to vice activities, only the nonpatrol measure was retained for future consideration. The allocation of manpower and vehicles to traffic work is included as the second measure of specialization.²⁴ While it does not correlate in the direction predicted with the other measure of specialization, there can be little argument that traffic assignments entail greater specialization than work associated with general patrol duties. The variable seems to be a fairly good indicator of the organizational trait we are attempting to measure.

A number of the measures selected to represent police professionalism do not intercorrelate in the expected direction. Two indicators--the salary of the police chief and the salary awarded beginning patrolmen--do correlate positively at .67. One of these measures, the chief administrator's salary, is retained for further analysis. The other three measures included in the research design are negatively associated with salary. It was decided to include one additional variable, college incentive pay, as a measure of the educational component of professionalism. Salary levels and education appear to be legitimate measures of

professionalism although empirically they are not strongly associated for the police departments in the 40 cities. It should be noted that the police chief's salary shows modest correlations with several of the community relations measures. Thus, as mentioned in Chapter III, empirically the distinction between police department categories may not be so clear cut. More professional police departments may be more inclined to adopt community relations programs. Or the same factors which "cause" departments to professionalize may also work toward their adoption of a community relations orientation.

Most of the variables originally selected to represent a department's community orientation are positively correlated with each other, although there are some exceptions. Two of the six variables--community relations training and participation in school programs--were selected to represent the community relations component in the subsequent analyses. These two measures are positively but not highly correlated.

Five variables were initially selected as measures of a police department's task orientation. Helicopters and civilian support are moderately correlated in the direction expected. The helicopter variable will be retained in the variable set.

Computerization evidences a low positive association with the helicopter measures and becomes the second indicator of task orientation. Conceptually, computerization seems to be a fairly good measure of a department's commitment to technique and method. The 2-man patrol variable is omitted from further consideration because of its moderate correlations with a large number of very diverse kinds of variables. The decision to

eliminate the computer technicians variable is largely dictated by the necessity for economy, but consideration was also given to the fact that one measure related to computer technology is already represented in the variable set. It is interesting to note, however, that these computer related variables are correlated at only .17.

Police officers and police patrol cars are both retained as measures of police resources. They are positively associated but not as strongly as might be expected. The police manpower variable shows fairly strong relationships with one measure of centralization and two of the community relations indicators. Again, it is possible that the same environmental factors which create pressures for larger police forces also create demands for more decentralized and community-oriented departments.

In summary, the relationships among police department variables does not allow us to empirically identify clear cut and distinct dimensions of agency traits. It was necessary in most cases to make some fairly arbitrary decisions about which indicators to retain in the variable set and about whether or not these variables are valid indicators of the concepts we are trying to measure. The number of variables was reduced from 24 to 12. The simple relationships between arrests and variables eliminated from the partials analysis can be found in Appendix B.

The simple and partial relationships between the reduced variable set and the policy measures are shown in Tables 4-28 through 4-30. It was predicted that less centralized police departments would make fewer arrests on the premise that the greater discretion associated with less centrally

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Table 4-28

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN
POLICE DEPARTMENT VARIABLES AND PART I ARRESTS

Police Department Variables	Arrest Variables											
	Violent Crimes Against Persons						Property Crimes					
	<u>Murder</u>		<u>Rape</u>		<u>Aggravated Assault</u>		<u>Robbery</u>		<u>Burglary</u>		<u>Larceny</u>	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
<u>Centralization</u>												
Police Stations	.14	-.39	.51	-.01	.31	-.34	.37	-.36	.06	-.21	-.06	-.12
Ranking Officers	.02	.06	-.38	-.40	-.22	-.11	-.15	.06	-.12	-.05	-.08	-.03
<u>Specialization</u>												
Specific Nonpatrol Duties	-.18	-.02	-.22	.07	-.30	-.04	-.26	.00	-.21	.02	-.22	-.07
Traffic Assignment	.16	.10	.37	.29	.35	.22	.29	.07	.24	.10	.16	.08
<u>Professionalism</u>												
Salary Chief	.26	-.07	.36	-.15	.45	.10	.46	.14	.36	.20	.23	.11
College Incentive Pay	.09	.17	-.05	.19	.03	.14	-.18	-.16	-.07	-.06	-.01	.04
<u>Community Orientation</u>												
Community Relations Training	.27	.08	.20	-.19	.36	.16	.34	.65	.09	.05	-.10	-.12
School Programs	.07	-.07	.19	.07	.18	-.06	.23	.02	.15	-.02	.30	.28
<u>Task Orientation</u>												
Helicopters	.21	.26	.15	.35	.13	.19	.08	.09	.24	.21	.30	.20
Computation	-.02	.00	.19	.08	.20	.24	.15	.27	.20	.22	.22	.18
<u>Resources</u>												
Police Officers	.54	.61	.72	.66	.64	.57	.76	.68	.26	.19	.04	.01
Police Cars	.04	-.04	.14	-.01	.09	.02	.11	.02	.17	.03	.07	.12

Table 4-29

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN
POLICE DEPARTMENT VARIABLES AND PART II ARRESTS

Police Department Variables	Victimless Crimes						Simple Assault		Weapons		Order Maintenance Offenses						Disorderly Conduct	
	Prostitution		Narcotics		Gambling						Drunk Driving		Public Drunkenness					
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.		
<u>Centralization</u>																		
Police Stations	.26	-.03	.00	-.13	-.08	-.35	.04	.08	-.02	-.38	-.36	-.07	-.22	-.28	-.04	-.25		
Ranking Officers	-.05	.07	-.25	-.20	.09	.12	-.03	.00	.01	.00	-.04	-.06	.10	.05	-.06	-.03		
<u>Specialization</u>																		
Specific Nonpatrol Duties	-.35	-.19	-.16	-.06	-.24	-.17	-.05	-.23	-.11	.07	.22	.25	.07	.13	-.19	-.16		
Traffic Assignment	.35	.22	.27	.20	.06	.15	-.11	.02	.12	.06	-.16	-.10	-.01	-.07	-.02	-.09		
<u>Professionalism</u>																		
Chief Salary	.56	.32	.26	.09	-.07	-.38	-.24	-.40	.18	-.06	-.07	.09	.21	.18	.14	-.03		
College Incentive Pay	.08	.12	-.07	.00	.07	.10	-.06	.02	.10	.16	.26	.34	.25	.28	.15	.26		
<u>Community Orientation</u>																		
Community Relations Training	.49	.37	-.14	-.20	.28	.23	-.13	-.30	.14	.06	-.37	-.25	-.04	-.10	-.10	-.30		
School Programs	.28	.08	.19	.12	-.03	-.09	.22	.40	.22	.16	.11	.24	.28	.27	.18	.22		
<u>Task Orientation</u>																		
Helicopters	.17	.18	.15	.11	.17	.20	.03	-.02	.24	.26	.26	.35	.17	.13	.17	.05		
Computerization	.02	.02	.18	.09	.08	.10	.02	-.14	.04	.05	-.15	-.28	-.08	-.05	.04	-.02		
<u>Resources</u>																		
Police Officers	.37	.00	.10	.09	.37	.51	.04	.19	.34	.46	-.35	-.15	.04	.22	.24	.42		
Police Cars	-.07	-.14	.10	-.01	.15	.07	.01	-.14	.13	.14	-.04	.11	-.04	.05	.11	.03		

Table 4-30

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN POLICE
DEPARTMENT VARIABLES AND JUVENILE, NONWHITE AND TOTAL ARRESTS

Police Department Variables	Arrest Variables					
	<u>Juveniles</u>		<u>Nonwhite Arrests</u>		<u>Total Arrests</u>	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
<u>Centralization</u>						
Police Stations	-.15	-.15	.42	-.10	-.05	-.32
Ranking Officers	-.04	-.19	.07	.09	-.06	-.12
<u>Specialization</u>						
Specific Nonpatrol Duties	-.27	-.42	-.07	.18	-.18	.02
Traffic Assignment	-.10	-.09	.26	.03	.10	.09
<u>Professionalism</u>						
Chief Salary	-.09	-.23	.31	-.03	.15	-.10
College Incentive Pay	-.29	-.27	-.14	-.05	.06	.13
<u>Community Orientation</u>						
Community Relations Training	-.04	-.28	.26	-.08	-.31	-.10
School Programs	.05	.24	.28	.26	.20	.16
<u>Task Orientation</u>						
Helicopters	.08	-.04	.03	.03	.45	.45
Computerization	-.28	-.47	.04	.16	.09	.02
<u>Resources</u>						
Police Officers	-.08	.07	.70	.65	.24	.41
Police Cars	.25	.11	.18	.13	.14	.08

controlled structural arrangements results in less uniform applications of the law, and in turn lower arrest rates. For Part II arrests the relationship between number of police stations and Part II offenses generally supports the hypothesis. However this indicator of centralization also shows moderate negative partials with arrests for four of the more serious Part I crimes--crimes which by their nature would seem to allow for much less police discretion. In general the simple and partial relationships are lower for the other other measures of centralization--span of control (ratio of ranking officers to patrolmen). This variable has the highest partial with rape arrests (-.41), and the direction of the relationship is the opposite of what might be expected.²⁵

Specialization was predicted to be positively related to police outputs. The nonpatrol variable is not consistently related to Part II arrests with respect to sign. It is positively associated with weapons and public drunkenness arrests but the correlation coefficients are not high. It is somewhat surprising that this variable is negatively related to all three categories of victimless crime arrests. It is also interesting to note the moderately high partial with juvenile arrests. Police departments which allocate more personnel to certain specialized functions arrest fewer youthful offenders.

The traffic variable does show the relationship expected with victimless crime arrests but not with a number of the order maintenance arrests. In all cases the partial correlation coefficients are not very impressive. The low negative relationship with drunk driving arrests is contrary to what we would expect. Police departments with a greater

specialization in traffic also show an inclination to make more Part I arrests. Along these lines, police departments which allocate more resources to the traffic function may have higher arrest rates for reasons other than those related to specialization per se. The traffic stop may be used as a pretense to search persons suspected of committing more serious offenses. Thus, cities with more highly developed traffic departments may be more successful in making arrests for certain kinds of offenses. The data for the 40 cities do not provide very strong support for this kind of relationship, however, since the partials are not very high.

It is expected that the more uniform application of the law by relatively more professionalized police forces will yield higher arrests. Again, the evidence is mixed. For Part II offenses the college incentive pay variable is consistently related to outputs in the positive direction. This variable tends to be more closely related to order maintenance than to victimless crime arrests. Its highest partial is with drunk driving arrests (.34).

The salary variable shows no clear pattern in its relationship to Part II arrests. It is positively related to prostitution arrests with a partial of .34 but negatively associated with gambling (-.38). It also shows a modest negative partial correlation (-.40) with simple assault arrests for reasons which are not readily apparent. In general the professionalism variables shows stronger partial relationships with Part II arrests than with outputs for Part I crimes. While the salary variable exhibits modest simple relationships with Part I arrests in the positive

direction, these relationships are reduced when controls for the other police department variables are introduced.

It is interesting to note that both measures of professionalism are negatively associated with juvenile arrests. While the partials are not very strong, the findings do contradict the expectation by Wilson and others that more professional forces will have higher juvenile arrest rates.

A positive relationship was predicted between the degree of professionalism and nonwhite arrests. The relationship is negative, but the partials are so low as to indicate no association.

A community relations orientation is expected to result in lower arrest rates. While both of the measures of community relations are positively associated with each other, in more cases than not they operate differently on the dependent variables with respect to sign.

Contrary to predictions the community relations training variable is positively related to arrests for two of the three victimless crimes. The school programs variable is positively associated with all but one (gambling) of the Part II categories of arrest. The relationship between community relations training and order maintenance offenses is supportive of the hypothesis, however, the relationship is negative for all categories except for weapons arrests.

The partial relationships with the community relations component are generally lower for Part I than for Part II arrests. For index crimes, the highest partial correlation is with larceny arrests (.28). The community relations training variable is negatively related to juvenile,

nonwhite, and total arrests. The sign is positive between participation in school programs and these three arrest categories.

It was suggested that more task or production oriented departments would have higher arrest levels. The relationships between the helicopter variable and various categories of Part II arrests supports the hypotheses; the only negative relationship is with simple assault arrests and its partial is low enough to suggest essentially no association. The direction of the relationships between the computer variable and victimless crime arrests also support the hypothesis but this is not the case with respect to order maintenance offenses. In general, the partials for the task oriented component and Part II arrests are quite low. The strongest relationship is between helicopter capability and drunk driving arrests (.35).

Both measures of a police department's task orientation are related in the manner predicted to all categories of Part I arrests, and the highest partial is with rape arrests. One of the task indicators (helicopters) also shows a moderate association (.45) with total arrests. The task component measures are negatively related to juvenile arrests and while the helicopter variable shows almost no association with this dependent variable, the partial with computerization is fairly strong (-.47).

One of the indicators of police resources, number of police officers, is importantly related to arrest rates for a number of offense categories. It is positively and fairly highly correlated with arrests for one victimless crime offense, gambling (.51), and for two order

maintenance offenses--weapons and disorderly conduct. The only police output that is not positively associated with this variable is drunk driving arrests.

The partial relationships between arrests for murder, rape, aggravated assault, and robbery and the size of the police force are quite high (and positive). The relationship is also strong with nonwhite arrests. As with the crime environment variables, the association between non-violent property crime arrests and the manpower variable is very weak by comparison. Finally, there is almost no association between larceny arrests and the number of police personnel. Police mobility, as measured by the size of the motor fleet, does not appear to be importantly related to arrest levels.

Intervening Relationships

While this is not a study of the correlates of police department characteristics, these characteristics do appear to be related to certain classes of arrest activity. In light of this finding, it may be of interest to observe which kinds of environmental circumstances favor the adoption of certain production strategies and structural arrangements. Of course, it is possible that the relationships observed between police department characteristics and arrest outputs will diminish in light of their common association with environmental variables. This possibility will be examined in subsequent stages of the analysis.

Eight environmental variables, both political and nonpolitical, were selected to represent certain categories of variables thought to be importantly related to the structure and orientation of local police

departments.²⁶ For example, we would expect to find more professional police departments in more reform-oriented or public regarding political climates (League membership) and in cities with more reformed political structures. Some authors have cited business groups as a source of pressure for upgrading police departments. Middle class communities may also prefer the image of a more professional department.

Civil rights organizations may be a source of pressure on the police to emphasize relationships with the community. Conservative political climates, particularly those which emphasize the law and order theme, are expected to support larger police departments. A city's crime environment may also be an important determinant of police department resources.

Table 4-31 shows the results of the simple and partial correlation analysis. Several of the interest group measures show moderate simple relationships with certain organizational traits. However, their relationships are reduced when the effects of the other environmental variables are held constant.

In Chapter III we predicted that government structure would have an indirect effect on police policies through its influence on professionalism. The findings support the hypothesis in the sense that reform government is positively associated with both measures of professionalism. The relationship between reform score and the salary measure is .29. However, the partial relationship between reformism and the education measure is so low as to suggest no association. Government reform seems to be most importantly related to one of the centralization measures and

Table 4-31

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN
SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES AND POLICE DEPARTMENT CHARACTERISTICS

Independent Variables	Police Department Characteristics											
	Centralization				Specialization				Professionalism			
	<u>Police Stations</u>		<u>Ranking Officers</u>		<u>Specific Non-Patrol Duties</u>		<u>Traffic</u>		<u>Chief Salary</u>		<u>College Incentive Pay</u>	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
Percent Nonwhite	.34	-.02	.10	.04	-.09	-.18	.24	-.01	.23	.30	.03	.04
Density	.62	.50	-.21	-.05	-.16	.14	.52	.43	.54	.47	-.23	.06
Percent White Collar	-.08	.37	-.06	-.04	-.24	-.26	-.11	.18	.16	.41	.16	.24
Chamber of Commerce Membership	-.26	-.02	.04	-.06	.29	.15	-.25	-.01	-.35	-.12	.22	.18
League Membership	-.02	-.16	-.08	.01	-.01	.14	-.08	-.16	.14	.02	-.06	-.16
Reform Score	-.61	-.48	.10	.08	.05	-.07	-.20	.04	.04	.29	.10	.07
American Party Vote	-.21	.05	.40	.29	.42	.44	-.18	.07	-.46	-.25	.36	.26
Civil Rights Group Mobilization Index	.46	.14	.00	-.02	-.20	-.28	.22	.06	.08	-.08	.02	.04
	$R^2 = .618$		$R^2 = .176$		$R^2 = .374$		$R^2 = .311$		$R^2 = .572$		$R^2 = .208$	

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Table 4-31 (Continued)

Independent Variables	Police Department Characteristics											
	<u>Community Orientation</u>				<u>Task Orientation</u>				<u>Resources</u>			
	<u>Community Relations Training</u>		<u>School Programs</u>		<u>Helicopters</u>		<u>Comput-erization</u>		<u>Police Officers</u>		<u>Police Cars</u>	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
Percent Nonwhite	.22	-.02	.16	.29	.08	.12	.05	.19	.71	.69	.20	.29
Density	.54	.44	.29	.31	-.26	-.15	.03	-.03	.72	.42	-.12	-.46
Percent White Collar	-.30	-.04	.06	.15	.28	.28	.22	.23	-.26	.18	.10	.02
Chamber of Commerce Membership	-.22	.06	.12	.28	-.08	-.12	.18	.26	-.36	.00	-.25	-.21
League Membership	-.06	-.23	.26	.17	-.06	-.15	.16	-.02	.00	-.04	-.02	.14
Reform Score	.10	.17	.07	.13	.21	.23	-.14	-.16	-.54	-.37	-.25	-.29
American Party Vote	.36	.01	-.18	-.07	.20	.07	-.16	-.21	-.25	-.41	-.16	-.28
Civil Rights Group Mobilization Index	.14	.04	-.08	-.26	.10	.22	.08	.00	.51	.06	-.01	-.25
	R ² = .359		R ² = .316		R ² = .265		R ² = .184		R ² = .810		R ² = .473	

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one of the indicators of police resources. Police departments in communities with more reformed city governments hire fewer personnel and tend to be more centralized.

The remaining political variable, American Party support, is negatively related to both measures of police resources. Thus, in spite of a seemingly greater commitment to the police function, cities with greater Wallace support do not have larger police forces.

It is possible that the relationship between Wallace support and resources is a function of region. The regional variable shows a fairly strong negative relationship with income, suggesting that southern cities (where Wallace support would be expected to be quite strong) may be less able to afford greater police resources. However, the simple relationship between income and the measures of police resources suggests that income per se does not seem to play a very large role in determining these resources.²⁷

Among nonpolitical variables, police departments in communities with larger white collar populations are more likely to adopt a task orientation, although the relationships are not very strong. The white collar variable shows a fairly strong positive relationship with one of the measures of professionalism and there is also evidence that more middle class communities have more decentralized police departments.

The crime environment indicators emerge as very important variables according to the strength of their association with several departmental traits. Nonwhite population exhibits a very strong relationship with the police manpower variable and is moderately correlated with one

of the measures of professionalism as well as one of the community relations variables. Population density shows moderately high relationships with one of the measures of decentralization, one of the indicators of specialization, one of the measures of professionalism, and both of the community relations and resource variables.

Thus, the crime environment seems to be importantly related not just to the size of the police force but to other organizational characteristics as well. This suggests that communities which face serious crime problems are more likely to adopt organizational strategies which offer the promise of improving a police department's capabilities to deal with those problems. These strategies may range from attempts to professionalize or bureaucratize police organizations to attempts to build community support for the police.

It should be noted that a number of variables that were not included in this stage of the analysis show very strong simple relationships with certain police department traits. These variables were omitted to avoid problems of multicollinearity. Most notably revenue/income ratio and police budget size are both very strongly correlated with police manpower. These three variables are also highly associated with both measures of the crime environment. As suggested earlier, it appears that the crime environment is an important factor in determining police budgets which are in turn translated into more tangible kinds of police resources, e.g. police manpower. The data also suggest that these same environmental variables may have an impact on revenue effort. Thus, as indicated earlier, cities with environments which contribute to serious crime

problems no doubt experience their fair share of other social problems which necessitate more government services and, in turn, larger city budgets. To meet these budgetary needs, citizens are likely to pay higher taxes relative to their respective incomes.²⁸

Finally, of some interest is the extent to which the eight environmental and political variables are successful in explaining variation among cities for police department characteristics. The table indicates that the variables are most successful in explaining variance for one of the measures of police resources, one of the measures of centralization, and one of the measures of professionalism. The variable set accounts for less than half of the variance for the remaining police department indicators.

Policy Impacts

Several hypotheses were offered concerning the consequences that might follow certain patterns of policy outputs and the adoption of certain production strategies. It was predicted that police departments which channel more resources towards the enforcement of victimless and order maintenance offenses may be less successful in apprehending those who commit more serious crimes. On the other hand, a strategy of strict enforcement of Part II offenses may pay off in the long run. Cities with high enforcement levels for the latter offenses may realize lower overall crime rates.

Arrests for Part II offenses in 1973 are actually negatively related to the crime/arrest ratio at $-.42$. The findings do not support

the contention of some critics that the enforcement of petty offenses detracts from more important aspects of police work.

The hypothesis that arrests for Part II offenses will be inversely related to the crime rate is not supported either. Arrests for Part II offenses in 1970 are positively associated with the 1973 crime rate (.34). The Part II arrest rate does show a negative relationship with crime rate increases, but the relationship is so low (-.02) as to suggest no association.

Since policy impacts are not a central concern of the research, we decided to look only at their simple relationships and to review them with respect to all of the organizational variables originally included in the research design. The relationships between the impact measures and 24 police department characteristics is shown in Table 4-32. The simple relationships indicate that, in general, communities which have adopted a community relations orientation arrest fewer suspects relative to reported crimes. On the other hand, more task oriented departments show a tendency to arrest more individuals relative to crimes reported, although the correlations coefficients are extremely weak. Police departments with more resources have lower crime/arrest ratios. The findings for centralization, specialization, and professionalism are mixed.

In addition to police effectiveness, we are interested in the relationship between police policies and the incidence of violence between the police and the public. It was predicted that greater enforcement of less serious crimes would lead to higher assault rates against the

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Table 4-32

ZERO ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN
POLICE DEPARTMENT CHARACTERISTICS AND IMPACT MEASURES

<u>Police Department Characteristics</u>	<u>Crime/ Arrest Rate</u>	<u>Assault Rate</u>
<u>Centralization</u>		
Police Stations	-.13	.24
Ranking Officers	.10	-.07
Unions	.23	-.14
<u>Specialization</u>		
Specific Nonpatrol Duties	.31	-.03
Traffic Assignment	-.12	.49
Vice Assignment	.11	-.15
<u>Professionalism</u>		
Salary Chief	-.02	.26
Salary Patrol	.07	.10
Promotional Criteria	-.10	-.04
College Incentive Pay	.38	-.28
Seniority	.12	.01
<u>Community Orientation</u>		
Beat Assignment	.30	-.05
Foot Patrol	.24	.22
Minority Employment	.30	.15
Community Relations Training	.07	.09
Review Board	-.03	.25
School Programs	-.31	.04
<u>Task Orientation</u>		
Computerization	-.02	-.22
Helicopters	-.26	-.24
2-Man Patrol	-.04	.11
Civilian Support	-.14	.00
Computer Technicians	-.04	-.12
<u>Resources</u>		
Police Officers	-.27	.29
Police Cars	-.23	.24

police. However, Part II arrests for 1970 show almost no association with the assault rate for that year (.04). It was also expected that a police department's production strategy--in particular professionalism and community orientation--would be related to assaults.²⁹ One measure of professionalism, the chief's salary, is positively related to police assaults (.26), but the education measure is not associated with the dependent variable in the direction predicted (-.28). The other measures of professionalism show almost no association with assault levels.

The community relations variables are not highly related to assault levels, and in most cases the direction of the relationship is the opposite of that predicted.

While no specific hypotheses were offered for the specialization variables, it is interesting to note that the traffic indicator shows a fairly high positive association with assaults. One possible explanation for this finding is that confrontations between the police and the public arising over traffic violations frequently escalate into violent encounters.³⁰

Summary

In the preceding pages a number of hypotheses between arrest variables and components of the police (administrative) system were examined. As noted earlier, the findings here may differ somewhat when viewed in relationship to other categories of independent variables. In addition, some indicators were not included in the partials analysis. Their simple relationships with the dependent variables can be examined, however, by referring to Appendix B. Also, in Appendix C expected and

actual relationships are presented in summary form according to the sign (direction) of these relationships. Information is presented for all independent variables originally included in the research design. The signs reported for the actual relationships are based on a simple correlation analysis.

This chapter found that a number of crime environment variables were related to arrest outputs in the manner predicted and that they seemed to be more closely related to arrests for crimes which are directly or indirectly violent by nature. While direct measures of the crime environment were not available for all offenses, the measures selected to represent the potential for crime activity failed to explain half of the variance in arrests for juveniles, Part II offenses, and nonviolent property crimes. This provides some evidence that factors other than levels of criminal activity may be important in explaining arrest outputs.

Certain variables which were selected to represent the police agency's social, economic, and cultural environments were related to police outputs in the manner predicted, although these variables often did not behave in the manner hypothesized with respect to all variables comprising a particular category of arrest. The variables white collar, median income, foreign born or mixed parentage, retail sales, and region showed a partial relationship of .30 or higher with at least one of the Part II arrest variables.

For the political climate component the findings for League membership showed fairly consistent support for the hypothesis with respect to order maintenance offenses. Goldwater and American Party vote

showed positive relationships of .30 or higher with arrests for at least one of the order maintenance crimes.

Among other categories of political variables, police budget seemed to bear some relationship to arrest levels. On the other hand, reformism seemed to be more important as a correlate of police department characteristics than arrest policies. In some cases the findings for extra-community variables supported the hypotheses forwarded in Chapter III but the correlation coefficients were not strong. While the measures certainly did not exhaust sources of extra-community influences, the data suggested that local factors were more important determinant of arrest policies.

In many cases, the relationships between police department characteristics and arrests appeared to be fairly inconsistent. Still a number of these measures showed modest relationships with certain arrest types and this would seem to warrant additional consideration. In light of the examination of organizational correlates, there may also be some overlap with respect to environment, police department characteristics, and arrests.

A number of the hypotheses on policy impacts were not supported by the data. For example, the data did not support the premise that cities which arrest more petty offenders have poorer records of arrest for serious crimes. The capability of the traffic department seemed to be more closely related to assault levels than overall police activity for Part II arrests. However, it should be noted that assaults arising from traffic encounters were in most cases likely to be a response to the enforcement of less serious offenses.

While the findings in the preceding section were often not as clear-cut as it was hoped they would be, they do suggest that factors other than those more directly associated with a city's crime environment may have some influence on arrests. In Chapter VI the various components of the administrative system are examined on a comparative basis to determine their relative influence on arrest outputs.

Prior to this endeavor, the perceptions and preferences of the administrative leadership are examined as possible explanatory variables for arrest variation. While the analysis heretofore has been based on aggregate data, in the following chapter some survey information is introduced.

SOURCES

¹The rather large number of variables included in the research design was dictated by the state of research in the area as well as the availability of data. The criminal justice literature suggests a number of factors that may be important to explaining arrest policies, few of which have been examined empirically. Previous research provides few clues as to which variables might be the most important ones to include in a research design. In addition, it was necessary to rely on rather indirect indicators of many of the concepts employed in the design. Because more direct measures and measures of demonstrated validity were not available, the decision was made to include a rather large variable set at the initial stages of the analysis.

²The variable set for police department characteristics proved the most troublesome since 22 variables were included in the original design. Relationships among independent variables were assessed and an attempt was made to select variables judged to be fairly representative and direct indicators of the concepts to be measured. While a number of organizational variables were eliminated prior to the partials analysis, their simple relationships with the dependent variable are reported in Appendix B.

³David R. Morgan and Cheryl Swanson, "Analyzing Police Policies: The Impact of Environment, Politics, and Crime," Urban Affairs Quarterly, 11 (June, 1976), 489-510.

⁴Inclusion of the family stability variable caused distortion in the partials calculations. The simple relationships between family stability and police outputs can be found in Appendix B.

⁵Throughout this reaseach tests for statistical significance will not be used on the grounds that we are looking at the total population rather than a randomly selected sample. Therefore, if the word significant is used it should be interpreted to reflect the perceived importance of a relationship rather than a comment on the reliability of a sample. For a discussion of tests of significance using the above rationale see Denton F. Morrison and Ramon E. Henkel, "Significance Tests Reconsidered," The American Sociologist, 4 (May, 1969), 131-140.

⁶This observation is based on the relative strength of the correlation coefficients as well as the size of the multiple coefficients of determination. As noted earlier, the contribution of the crime environment to explaining arrest variance may change during subsequent stages of the analysis. The multiple coefficient of determination is shown for

the crime environment variables at this stage to give a rough indication of the extent to which arrest variation is not captured by these variables. However, since a primary purpose of this chapter is to reduce the variable set for subsequent analysis, r^2 will not be presented for the remaining categories of independent variables.

⁷For a discussion of problems associated with using traditional indicators of heterogeneity taken from census data see Albert K. Karnig, "'Private-Regarding' Policy, Civil Rights Groups, and the Mediating Impact of Municipal Reforms," American Journal of Political Science, 19 (February, 1975), 93.

⁸The total number of cases for public drunkenness arrests is 31.

⁹For a general discussion of social class behavior along these lines see Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970).

¹⁰Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Institutions of Privacy in the Determination of Police Administrative Practices," American Journal of Sociology, 69 (September, 1963), 150-160. Also see Albert J. Reiss, Jr., The Police and the Public (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 101-102.

¹¹Lois B. DeFleur, "Biasing Influences on Drug Arrest Records: Implications for Deviance Research," American Sociological Review, 40 (February, 1975), 88-103.

¹²James Q. Wilson, "The Police and the Delinquent in Two Cities," in City Politics and Public Policy, ed. by James Q. Wilson (New York: John Wiley, 1968), pp. 173-195.

¹³It is also possible that middle class populations are victimized more frequently for larceny. See James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime (New York: Basic Books, 1975), p. 34.

¹⁴Simple correlation coefficients with crime rates are rape, -.22; aggravated assault, -.17; robbery, .02; burglary, -.05; larceny, .02.

¹⁵The simple relationships between owner occupied housing and percent nonwhite population and population density are -.55 and -.75 respectively.

¹⁶Raymond T. Nimmer, Two Million Unnecessary Arrests: Removing A Social Service Concern from the Criminal Justice System (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1971), p. 102.

¹⁷Brett W. Hawkins, Politics and Urban Policies (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), p. 66.

¹⁸Lineberry and Fowler's four-point index of reformism was used to compute a city's reformism score. Cities range from those with none of the reformed institutions (i.e., the government is mayor-council, elections are partisan, and constituencies are wards) with a low score of 1 to a high score of 4 whereby cities have all three reformed institutions (i.e., the government is either manager or commission, elections are nonpartisan, and constituencies are at large). See Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, 61 (September, 1967), 701-717.

¹⁹The public safety expenditure measure is not an ideal one since it also includes expenditures for the fire department. Still the measure was the only readily available one and is considered adequate for the present purposes.

²⁰The simple relationship between budget size and police manpower is .87.

²¹Negative relationships with crime rate measures are as follows: murder, -.19; rape, -.27; robbery, -.46; all Part I crimes, -.01.

²²Problems with consistency among variables was further illuminated when factor analysis was performed on the variable set. The analysis yielded a large number of factors, many with split loadings. The factor exercise was not helpful in identifying distinct groupings of variables which would be conceptually useful.

²³The police station variable is fairly strongly correlated with the number of police officers in the community (.70). While this association poses potential problems in terms of multicollinearity, it was decided to retain both measures--at least at this stage of the analysis--because they seem the most direct measures available of two conceptually distinct departmental traits we are attempting to measure.

²⁴Because of the form in which the traffic variable was available, it was not possible to combine traffic into a single measure of specialization.

²⁵Because of the problems noted earlier with respect to the size of the research population, the relationship between police responsiveness and measures of centralization and professionalism will not be examined.

²⁶Variables were selected on the basis of relationships suggested by the law enforcement literature.

²⁷The relationship between income and police cars per capita is positive but not very strong (.28). The correlation coefficient with police personnel is actually negative (-.17).

²⁸In the research design, revenue/income ratio was designated as an indicator of a community's general support for government services. Even though most tax decisions are ultimately made by elected political officials, it was suggested that the measure would serve as an indicator, albeit rather crude and indirect, of citizens' willingness to support the public sector. However, after looking at the relationships between certain environmental variables and the revenue/income ratio, it seems likely that the citizen's tax burden is to a large extent dictated by the seriousness and complexity of community problems rather than by a particular political or philosophical orientation toward the optimum size of the public sector.

²⁹Complete assault data was not available for 1973, the year for which police organizational data was collected. Assault data for 1970 was used since it was the most complete. Correlations between data sets for the two time periods were nevertheless computed on the premise that major organizational changes would not likely be evidenced over the four-year time span.

³⁰Samuel G. Chapman, et al, A Descriptive Profile of the Assault Incident (Norman, Oklahoma: Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma, 1974), pp. 35-41.

CHAPTER V

PERCEPTIONS AND PREFERENCES OF POLICE

ELITES: A SURVEY

In his discussion of bureaucratic policy making, Henderson identifies two school of thought on the determinants of policy outputs.¹ One credits environmental pressures as having the most influence on the character of the organization. Another assigns a major role to the leadership of the chief executive. According to the latter viewpoint, the administrator's preferences and values have a major impact on the nature of public policies.

In the previous chapter the relationship between various environmental characteristics and arrest levels was examined. In this chapter the attitudes of police chiefs towards various aspects of law enforcement are assessed in light of the policies pursued by their respective departments.

Questionnaire Design

Ideally we would like to be able to tap one or two attitudinal dimensions that are likely to influence the manner in which police departments perform the law enforcement function. Unfortunately the literature does not provide a basis for choosing a particular set of attitudes relevant to explaining arrest variation. Single measures of conservatism or authoritarianism--traits previously examined in the police literature--

seem neither very helpful nor very appropriate in explaining arrest levels for various categories of offenses, particularly from the perspective of the role of the chief administrator.

Wilson comes the closest to identifying those orientations or preferences that might have an impact on arrest outputs. In doing so, Wilson is very crime specific. For example, juvenile arrests in Highland Park are explained by the chief administrator's views on enforcement peculiar to juvenile delinquency.² He does not identify an attitude set which would allow generalizations beyond juvenile arrests to other kinds of offenses.

Following Wilson's lead, the survey instrument was designed to measure police chiefs' enforcement preferences by specific offense. To economize on questionnaire length, it was not possible to tap opinions on all of the arrest types included in the research design. Police chiefs were asked to register their opinions on the enforcement of three property crimes, two victimless crimes, three order maintenance offenses, and juvenile arrests.

In most cases three questions were formulated for each offense type. Two of the three questions were designed to probe the level of enforcement deemed appropriate considering the nature or characteristics of the offense. In some cases these questions contained a component which allowed for the evaluation of enforcement levels in light of their consequences for the department or for crime prevention in general.

A third question asked the chief to identify the extent to which a crime poses a serious problem to the community. The purpose of this

question was to obtain another measure, although somewhat crude, of the relative importance attached to the enforcement of particular laws. The questionnaire format consisted of a statement and a Likert-type response set.³ The questionnaire and the distribution of responses are reproduced in Appendix D.

The survey instrument also included a set of questions designed to measure the police chiefs' assessment of community sentiment on crime. This component was referred to in Chapter III and is to be distinguished from the police chiefs' personal or professional viewpoints on law enforcement matters.⁴

Finally, a question on promotional criteria was included as a control variable. Students of law enforcement have noted that departmental promotional policies may impinge on arrest performance. Higher arrest rates may result from policies specifically designed to maximize output, and some categories of offenses may be more sensitive to these policies than others.

Administration of the Questionnaire

The questionnaire was mailed to individuals who held the office of police chief in 1973. Thirty-two questionnaires were returned for a response rate of 80%, and the results were tabulated for 31 (77.5% of the total N) cities. In most cases respondents completed all of the survey items so that no response item consists of an N of less than 30 cases.⁵

An important consideration in the analysis of a mail survey is the possibility of response bias, and to the extent possible, it is desirable to ascertain the nature of the bias.⁶ The following cities did not

complete and return a questionnaire: Baltimore, Cincinnati, Cleveland, New Orleans, Pittsburgh, Portland, San Diego, and Washington, D. C. In addition, a questionnaire completed by the St. Louis police department was excluded from the analysis.⁷

Among the 40 municipalities, four of the above cities rank in the top quarter by population size. Baltimore, Washington, D. C., and Cleveland rank among the top four largest cities. Thus some bias is introduced by the omission of several of the very large cities. The 12 cities do seem to represent communities with differing levels of crime problems. Only two of the nonresponding cities (St. Louis included) are among the ten cities with the highest overall crime rates. Finally, nonparticipating cities are fairly well dispersed geographically. While three nonresponding cities are classified as southern, a total of 13 southern cities did participate in the survey.

Method of Analysis

Response items were scored on a range from 10 to 60 points, with the highest score assigned to responses which indicate a preference for higher enforcement levels. The set of responses for police chiefs' perceptions of community attitudes on crime was scored on a range from 10 to 40 points. A higher score was given to responses which indicate greater concern for certain crime problems.

Each questionnaire item was treated as a separate variable. Responses were examined to determine whether sufficient variation was present to warrant further analysis.⁸ If sufficient variation was found, the relationship between questionnaire items and arrest levels was

assessed through simple correlation analysis. While there may be some objection to treating the response items as interval data, this procedure is not without precedent in research of a similar nature.⁹ The distribution of responses to questionnaire items is presented with the survey instrument in Appendix D.

Data Analysis

Property crimes. Police chiefs were asked their perceptions on the extent to which robbery and burglary offenses pose a serious problem in their respective communities. In addition they were asked to indicate how strongly they would be inclined to allocate additional monies toward combatting these crimes. Because of the nature of the property offenses it was difficult to design additional questions which would tap opinions important to explaining arrest variation. Furthermore, it was predicted that most police chiefs would not differ in their perceived seriousness of these offenses.

As expected, police chiefs showed very little variation in their responses to the perceived seriousness of the two property crimes. Ninety-four percent of the subjects either strongly agreed or agreed with the statement that "robbery is one of the more serious problems facing my city." Fully 100% of the chiefs registered similar responses for the crime of burglary.

While police chiefs would be expected to hold similar views on the seriousness of robbery and burglary offenses in their communities, it is possible that their willingness to commit funds to solve or prevent these particular crimes might vary. While there was slightly more disagreement

on how additional departmental funds might be spent, in general a vast majority of chiefs either strongly agreed or agreed with the statement, "If I was given more money to spend on my department, I would seriously consider spending a large part of it in ways to combat the crime of armed robbery (burglary)."¹⁰ Thus, chiefs' opinions on resource allocation do not appear to be an important source of explanation for arrest variation among cities.

It is possible that police chiefs may allocate resources for enforcing property crime laws on the basis of their perception of community preferences. Some chiefs may feel more pressure than others "to do something" about the incidence of robbery and burglary. While the measures used are admittedly crude, police chiefs seem to perceive similar levels of community concern for these crime problems. Seventy-seven percent of the respondents think that members of the community show a great deal of concern over the problem of robbery. The figure for burglary is even higher at 84%. While Wilson and others have suggested that community indifference characterizes most law enforcement matters, the survey indicates that citizens are communicating a rather strong concern over property crimes to the police.

Although it is generally hypothesized that burglary and robbery offenses involve relatively little police discretion, Wilson attributes more discretion to arrest behavior for the property crime of larceny. This is based on the premise that larceny is viewed as a much less serious criminal matter than either burglary or robbery. Property is obtained illegally without breaking and entering and without the threat or use of physical force.

A major source of discretion may lie in the relative emphasis placed on the handling of larceny cases privately (through restitution) or publicly (through government sanction), and this may be particularly important for cases involving shop lifting. Community preferences may play a major role in arrest outcomes for larceny.¹¹ However, it is also possible that police administrators may adopt a policy stance on the issue.

In general responses to the questions on the desirability of handling larceny cases publicly or privately did not show sufficient variation to warrant further analysis. For both questions on the subject over 70% of the respondents expressed a preference for strict enforcement of laws against the crime.

As expected, chiefs tend to perceive larceny as a less serious problem than robbery, and they also show greater variation in their responses to this item. However, the correlation coefficient between the opinion variable and larceny arrests shows almost no association (-.06). Similarly, police chiefs evidence more variation in their perception of citizen views on the problem of larceny. However, the citizen variable has absolutely no relationship with arrest levels.

Victimless crimes. In his analysis of the enforcement of crimes with willing victims, Kiester suggests that decriminalization of such activities as gambling and prostitution is not only favored by civil libertarians and other liberal groups, but has also been embraced by certain members of the law enforcement community.¹²

In this regard, police chiefs' preferences may vary for a number of reasons. The administrator's personal value system or his tolerance for

diversity may influence the relative emphasis or importance attached to the enforcement of laws against narcotics, gambling, or prostitution. A thorough analysis of these kinds of attitudes and values would entail a much more extensive and complex research instrument and is beyond the scope of this study. Instead police chiefs were asked two rather direct questions on the enforcement of victimless crimes. One question dealt with the chiefs' opinions on whether or not enforcing morals crimes is a proper function of the police. This question is based on the premise that if for professional reasons a chief administrator does not see the enforcement of victimless crimes as within the proper scope of police activity, less emphasis may be placed on their enforcement. The police chiefs' views on this matter may be communicated in several ways ranging from budgetary allocations to informal policy statements.

A second related question taps opinions on the importance of enforcement as it may affect the performance of other law enforcement duties. This question is addressed to the frequently expressed opinion by some law enforcement personnel that victimless crimes and more serious offenses do not represent two separate dimensions, but instead are integrally related.

Two offenses were the subjects of the above questions--gambling and narcotics. While these two crimes are often classified together in the literature, we noted in the previous chapter that among the 40 cities, arrest levels for these offenses are inversely related. It is expected that gambling and narcotics enforcement will be viewed quite differently by police chiefs.

For narcotics offenses respondents overwhelmingly selected a response which indicated a preference for strong enforcement. Over 80% of the administrators disagreed with the statement that "the police should not have to spend a lot of time and money enforcing laws against narcotics users because narcotics use is a moral problem, not a police problem." There also is little disagreement over at least one of the reasons why narcotics is perceived as a major police concern. Over 90% of the subjects either strongly agreed or agreed that "arrests for narcotics are very important because in the long run they aid in preventing more serious crime."

A third question asked police chiefs to rank the extent to which narcotics violations pose a major problem in the community. Again, there is very little variation among chiefs. Over 80% strongly agree or agree with the statement that "violation of narcotics laws is one of the more serious problems facing my city." Thus, the homogeneity of responses suggests that the opinions tapped relative to narcotics enforcement are not very important to explaining arrest variation in the 40 cities.

Police chiefs' perceptions of citizens' concerns for narcotics violations did show sufficient variation to warrant an additional step in the analysis. The correlation coefficient between this variable and narcotics arrests is a positive .30 and indicates some support for the premise held by DeFleur and others that citizen input is an important factor in explaining levels of narcotics enforcement.

As expected, police chiefs showed more differences in opinion on gambling enforcement, and in general they view gambling violations as a

much less serious matter than narcotics violations.¹³ Variation was considered to be sufficient to examine the relationships between chiefs' opinions and arrest levels.

Responses to the question on whether or not the enforcement of gambling laws is within the proper scope of police activity is only weakly associated with arrests (.10), and there appears to be no association between opinions on the impact of gambling enforcement and police outputs (-.01). However, there is a moderate, positive relationship (.39) between the police chiefs' identification of gambling as a serious community problem and arrest outputs. There is also some evidence that citizen input may have an impact on arrest rates for gambling. The correlation coefficient between police chiefs' perceptions of citizen concern for the crime and arrest rates is a positive .30.

Order maintenance offenses. Police administrators' opinions were sought on the enforcement of three kinds of order maintenance offenses--driving under the influence of alcohol, simple (nonaggravated) assault, and disorderly conduct.

Four questions were asked for drunk driving offenses. Three relate to probable consequences of certain enforcement levels and the fourth is the standard question identifying the perceived seriousness of the crime in the community.

The first three questions failed to differentiate well among cities. In spite of the fact that some communities arrest a much higher number of individuals for drunk driving than others, the vast majority of police chiefs selected responses which would indicate a preference for strict

enforcement of this particular crime. Eighty-three percent of the chiefs strongly agreed or agreed with the statement that "the police should spend a lot of effort in making arrests for driving under the influence of alcohol because. . . it makes the streets safer for citizens. . ."; 87% strongly disagreed or disagreed with the opinion that drunk driving arrests should be circumscribed in the interest of maintaining good public relations; and 77% strongly disagreed or disagreed with the premise that the enforcement of drunk driving laws diverts the police from more important law enforcement concerns. In contrast, police chiefs do register a fairly considerable difference of opinion on the extent to which they view the offense as a serious community problem.

These findings suggest that while police chiefs in general subscribe to a policy of strong enforcement, some cities may be better able to meet these enforcement goals than others because of competing demands for resources. Police chiefs in cities with fewer serious crime problems may be more likely to rate drunk driving arrests as a relatively serious community problem. The results of the correlation analysis, however, do not support this premise. Responses to the question on perceived seriousness of drunk driving offenses show little association with any of the crime rate measures, although for some measures the relationship is in the negative direction.¹⁴ Furthermore, the questionnaire item exhibits a very weak negative association with drunk driving arrests (-.12).

Responses for perceived citizen concern did not show enough variation to justify additional analysis. Seventy-seven percent of the chiefs believe that members of the community show some concern for the drunk

driving problem. This fairly high percentage is somewhat surprising. It was expected that police chiefs would attribute citizens with a higher degree of indifference towards this particular offense.

Only one of three questions pertaining to simple assault offenses showed sufficient variation to warrant additional analysis. In general police chiefs do not view assault as a very serious community problem. Eighty percent of the respondents strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement that ". . . cases of nonaggravated assault arising from domestic disturbances are one of the more serious problems facing my city."¹⁵ Police administrators also showed little disagreement over a preference for policies which would encourage citizens to treat cases of assault arising from domestic disturbances privately. The subjects did, however, display a varying range of opinions on the extent to which a policy of full enforcement should be encouraged to dissuade citizens from relying on the police to mediate their private quarrels.¹⁶ Nonetheless, the variable shows a very low negative association with assault arrests (-.09). Finally, 87% of the chiefs perceive citizens as having little or no interest in the assault problem.

Police chiefs also showed considerable variation in their responses to all three questions on disorderly conduct. However, higher arrest rates are inversely related to response scores and the relationships are not strong. The variable attesting to the perceived seriousness of the problem in the community shows a correlation coefficient of -.04. The two other indicators of enforcement preferences had zero order correlations of -.11 and -.28.

Police chiefs' responses on citizens' views on disorderly conduct also showed considerable variation, but again, they express a low negative relationship (-.15) with the dependent variable.

The vast majority of respondents (90%) strongly agreed or agreed with the statement that ". . . juvenile delinquency is one of the more serious problems facing my city." However, chiefs did show a variety of viewpoints on how juvenile offenders should be treated by the police. The two indicators of enforcement preferences were positively but not strongly related to arrest outputs. The correlation coefficient with arrests for the question indicating that "juvenile offenders should be treated informally rather than submitting them to the arrest process" is .25. The variable measuring agreement with the statement that "juvenile offenders should not be given special treatment by the police," shows almost no association with arrests (.01). The relationship between perceptions of community concerns and juvenile arrests is somewhat higher (.30) and is in the expected, positive direction.

Finally, the variable measuring police chiefs' beliefs on whether arrest rates should be a criteria in assessing an officers' fitness for promotion is not related to the dependent variables in the expected direction. The association is negative for most types of arrest and indicates that promotion policies, at least those espoused as the preferences of police chiefs, do not serve to inflate arrest rates.¹⁷

Conclusion

The preceding analysis represents an exploratory effort to evaluate the relationship between a police chief's views on law enforcement practices

and priorities, and department behavior. We would not want to make too much of the findings for a number of reasons. The questionnaire design lacks the scope and sophistication necessary to tap police chiefs' opinions in depth. Furthermore, the data analysis is based on a fairly limited number of cases.

With these reservations in mind, the findings indicate that police chiefs' opinions on certain law enforcement matters do not appear to be importantly related to arrest outputs. For a number of offense types, the results are not contrary to expectations. They support the hypothesis of Wilson and others that due to the decentralized nature and low visibility of most police work, the chief's role in influencing arrest policies is highly circumscribed. However, Wilson does identify certain areas where an administrator's influence might be realized. Vice and juvenile arrests are among the examples given. Gardiner also attests to the importance of the administrators' discretion in determining traffic arrest rates.

A moderate relationship was found between gambling arrests and one of the opinion variables. No such relationships were evident, however, for narcotics, juvenile, or drunk driving arrests. Of course the lack of findings cannot be interpreted as evidence that the policy preferences of chiefs do not have an impact on arrest levels for these offenses. The data only indicate that the opinions tapped do not show an association with them. Furthermore, it is possible that the opinions that were examined are related to arrests in a more indirect manner as, for example, in the allocation of resources within the organization.

Finally, there are other administrative actors whose opinions were not measured whose role may be important to understanding arrest policies. These include the heads of various divisions and units within the police organization. Views of these organizational participants may be particularly important in light of the large size of the police departments surveyed, whereby it might be expected that the chief administrator's span of control would be strained at best.

The modest correlations between several categories of arrest--gambling, narcotics, and juvenile--and police chiefs' perceptions of citizen concern for these offenses are of some interest. While the measures are very crude, they do suggest the possibility of a role for citizen input and police perceptions of citizen input in the arrest process for certain crimes. A more detailed analysis is needed to specify the relationships that may be in effect. For example, it is possible that relationships important to arrest outputs bypass the chief administrator altogether. Rank-and-file police officers may hold the same perceptions as the chief relative to citizen opinion through their interaction with members of the public or as a result of their membership in the community.¹⁸

SOURCES

¹Thomas A. Henderson, "The Relative Effects of Community Complexity and Sheriffs Upon the Professionalism of Sheriff Departments," American Journal of Political Science, 19 (February, 1975), 115.

²James A. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 177.

³Subjects were given a range of six response choices--strongly agree; agree; slightly agree; slightly disagree; strongly disagree. For the items on perceptions of citizen concerns on crime the following choices were available--a great extent; some extent; little extent; no extent.

⁴The name and address of the individuals who occupied the office of chief in 1973 was obtained from the city clerks in the respective cities. In several cities those who held office in 1973 were retired. In these cases it was necessary to request the subject to answer the questions to the best of his ability as he would when he formerly held the office of chief.

⁵Responses from 32 cities were obtained after sending three follow-up packets. The response rate was improved by 22.5% through the follow-up procedure.

⁶A. N. Oppenheim, Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement (New York: Basic Books, 1966), p. 34.

⁷The questionnaire for the city of St. Louis was excluded from the analysis because contrary to instructions, the police chief asked a member of the planning division to complete the survey items. Of course, one of the problems posed by mail surveys directed at department heads is that it is difficult to verify whether or not the agency head or a member of his staff actually answered the questions. For this research the cover letter accompanying the questionnaire stressed the importance of obtaining opinions on law enforcement directly from the chief. Also, the cover letter was personalized so as to maximize the possibility that the department head would indeed complete the items. For a general discussion of personalization strategies and mail questionnaires see Roger A. Kerin, "Personalization Strategies, Response Rate, and Response Quality in a Mail Survey," Social Science Quarterly, 55 (June, 1974), 175-181.

⁸Criteria for determining whether sufficient variation was present for further analysis was somewhat different for the six item than for the four item response sets. For the former, if approximately three fourths of the responses were in the strongly agree (disagree) or agree (disagree) categories, correlation analysis was not performed. For questions with fewer response choices, the additional analysis was performed if a large portion of responses were distributed over two adjacent categories, but was not performed if they fell almost exclusively in one category.

⁹For example, see Robert Eyestone, The Threads of Public Policy: A Study of Policy Leadership (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), Appendix B and Lawrence Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation in Organizations," American Political Science Review, 63 (March, 1969), 111-126.

1080.6% of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the statement for robbery and 90.3% strongly agreed or agreed with the statement for burglary.

¹¹For a discussion of local political culture and preferences to treat legal matters publicly or privately see Herbert Jacob, "Wage Garnishment and Bankruptcy Proceedings in Four Wisconsin Cities," in City Politics and Public Policy, edited by James Q. Wilson (New York: John Wiley, 1968), pp. 197-214.

¹²Edwin Kiester, Jr., Crimes With No Victims: How Legislating Morality Defeats the Cause of Justice (New York: The American Jewish Committee, 1972), p. 3.

¹³In spite of the fact that gambling is generally viewed as a less serious community problem than narcotics, approximately two thirds of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed that gambling enforcement is important to combatting more serious crime. The same proportion strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement that gambling enforcement is not within the proper scope of police activity. Thus, there does not seem to be a great deal of support for removing gambling activity from the sphere of law enforcement concerns.

¹⁴The correlation coefficients between perceived seriousness of the drunk driving offense and crime rates are as follows:

murder	-.13
rape	-.15
aggravated assault	.11
robbery	-.03
burglary	.07
larceny	.00
total crime rate	.03

¹⁵Assault arrests arise from a number of circumstances other than domestic quarrels. However, on the advice of police personnel who reviewed the draft questionnaire, the item was worded to specify domestic disturbances. The law enforcement consultants felt that police chiefs would experience difficulty in responding to a question based on the broad category of assaults with no qualification as to their origin or nature. Furthermore, the officers noted that most assault arrests originate with the domestic quarrel.

¹⁶The basis for this question derives from Wilson's observation on assault enforcement. Wilson observed that assault arrests in Oakland were much higher than in a number of other cities even when population characteristics were considered. While an officer cannot arrest an individual for a misdemeanor without a warrant unless the crime was committed in his presence, the police can follow policies which serve to encourage citizens to press charges against the assailant. This was accomplished in Oakland by providing citizens with a printed form which allows the citizen to arrest his attacker. See Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior, p. 133.

¹⁷The simple correlation coefficients between the promotion variable and arrest rates are as follows:

Robbery	-.02	Simple assault	.07
Burglary	-.24	Drunk driving	-.20
Larceny	-.32	Disorderly conduct	-.21
Narcotics	-.11	Juvenile	-.09
Gambling	.29	Total arrests	.01

¹⁸One possible way to measure the extent to which police responsiveness to citizen input is a product of rank and file police officers' identification with community norms and values is to compare arrest activity between departments that have residency requirements and those that do not require their personnel to reside in the city.

CHAPTER VI

RESEARCH FINDINGS--THE RELATIVE EFFECTS OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS ON POLICE OUTPUTS

In this chapter the relationship between measures of various components of the administrative system and arrest outputs are assessed through the use of multiple correlation analysis. Those variables which were shown in Chapter IV to have a partial correlation coefficient of .30 or higher with two or more arrest variables were selected for the final analysis. A total of 12 indicators are included in the explanatory framework. They are listed in Table 6-1 and are identified by categories and in some cases subcategories of the concepts they represent.¹ The measures consist of two crime environment variables, four variables from the component designated as the agency's social, economic, and cultural environment, two political climate indicators, and four attributes or characteristics of the police organization.

It should be noted that in using the foregoing selection criteria, some variables which may have an impact on a single kind of arrest output are excluded from the analysis. While an important consideration is maximizing explained variance in arrests, a more important theoretical consideration is the relative effects of various system components on these policies. Considering the number and variety of dependent variables, these comparisons can be made more clearly and generalizations can be

Table 6-1

VARIABLES SELECTED FOR THE MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

Crime Environment

Percent Nonwhite
Population Density

Social, Economic and Cultural Environment

Percent White Collar (social class)
Percent Native Population with Foreign Born or Mixed Parentage
(culture, ethos)
Region (culture)
Retail Sales (propertied, economic interests)

Political Climate

League of Women Voters Membership (political culture)
American Party Vote (conservatism)

Police Department Characteristics

Number of Police Stations (centralization)
Salary Chief (professionalism)
Community Relations Training (community relations orientation)
Helicopters per Capita (task orientation)

facilitated if one set of independent variables are used for the central part of the analysis. Selection of variables which show the strongest relationship with each dependent variables would simply make the analysis too unwieldy.

It is possible that the elimination of a variable important to explaining variation for one particular arrest type could result in different conclusions than would be reached had the variable been incorporated into the framework. This can be compensated for, in part, by identifying those variables which might be significantly related to arrest levels but which nevertheless did not meet the selection criteria. This may be particularly important for those outputs where explained variation is relatively low. An overview of the multivariate analysis in Chapter IV indicates that very few variables with moderate correlations with one as opposed to two or more arrest variables were excluded from the analysis.

Finally, the survey information on preferences and perceptions of police elites was not considered appropriate for inclusion in the multivariate analysis. As noted earlier, since data were available for only 31 cities, it was not possible to obtain opinions for all categories of arrest, and variation was not sufficient for a number of arrest categories to warrant further consideration.

The data analysis in this section will be presented from three different perspectives. First, a number of the hypotheses offered in Chapter III will be briefly reviewed in light of the 12 variable set. Second, we will look at the various categories of dependent variables

paying particular attention to the significance of relationships with individual arrest types within categories, and the extent to which the model is successful in explaining variance for them. Where the variance explained is quite low, an attempt will be made to identify additional factors which might be important considering the particular characteristics of the offense type. Finally, a comparison of the relative effects of the categories of independent variables will be made.

Predicted and Actual Relationships: An Overview

In Appendix C predicted and actual relationships between all independent variables and the various categories of arrest are summarized in tabular form. Following selection of a smaller and more manageable data set, the predicted and actual relationships are again summarized in Table 6-2. These represent the results of the partial correlation analysis across categories of independent variables. The information in Table 6-2 is intended only to convey whether the findings support the hypotheses in terms of the direction of the various relationships; it is not intended to indicate support of the hypotheses by virtue of the strength of the correlation coefficients.

As mentioned earlier, one of the indirect measures of a city's crime environment--nonwhite population--is consistently positively associated with all categories of arrest with the exception of driving under the influence of alcohol.² The latter finding is not surprising in light of the frequently held observation that in contrast to most crimes, drunk driving is more commonly identified as a "white collar" crime, and of course, a disproportionate number of nonwhite Americans

Table 6-2

PREDICTED AND ACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SELECTED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND ARRESTS

Independent Variables	Arrest Type											
	<u>Violent Crimes Against Persons</u>					<u>Property Crimes</u>						
	<u>Murder</u>		<u>Rape</u>		<u>Aggravated Assault</u>		<u>Robbery</u>		<u>Burglary</u>		<u>Larceny</u>	
	<u>p¹</u>	<u>A²</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
<u>Crime Environment</u>												
Percent Nonwhite	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Population Density	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
<u>Social, Economic Cultural Environment</u>												
White Collar	np ³	-	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
Foreign Born or												
Mixed Parentage	np	+	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	+	np	+
Region	np	-	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	-	np	+
Retail Sales	np	-	np	+	np	-	+	-	+	+	+	+
<u>Political Climate</u>												
League Membership	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	-	np	+
American Party Vote	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+

Table 6-2 (continued)

Independent Variables	Arrest Type													
	Violent Crimes Against Persons							Property Crimes						
	Murder		Rape		Aggravated Assault		Robbery		Burglary		Larceny			
	<u>p1</u>	<u>A2</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
<u>Police Department Characteristics</u>														
Police Stations	np	-	np	+	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-		
Salary Chief	np	+	np	-	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+		
Community Relations														
Training	np	+	np	-	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+		
Helicopters	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		
	<u>Victimless Crimes</u>							<u>Order Maintenance Offenses</u>						
	<u>Prostitution</u>		<u>Narcotics</u>		<u>Gambling</u>		<u>Simple Assault</u>	<u>Weapons</u>	<u>Drunk Driving</u>	<u>Public Drunkenness</u>	<u>Disorderly Conduct</u>			
	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
<u>Crime Environment</u>														
Percent Nonwhite	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
Population Density	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	na ⁴	+	-

Table 6-2 (continued)

Independent Variables	Arrest Type															
	Victimless Crimes								Order Maintenance Offenses							
	Prostitution		Narcotics		Gambling		Simple Assault		Weapons		Drunk Driving		Public Drunkenness		Disorderly Conduct	
	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
<u>Social, Economic, Cultural Environment</u>																
White Collar	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	na	+	-
Foreign Born or																
Mixed Parentage	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+
Region	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	na	+	+
Retail Sales	np	+	np	-	np	+	np	-	np	+	np	-	np	+	np	+
<u>Political Climate</u>																
League Membership	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
American Party Vote	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	na	+	-
<u>Police Department Characteristics</u>																
Police Stations	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	na	-	-
Salary Chief	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Community Relations																
Training	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	na	-	-
Helicopters	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

Table 6-2 (continued)

Independent Variables	Arrest Type					
	<u>Juvenile, Nonwhite, and Total Arrests</u>					
	<u>Juvenile</u>		<u>Nonwhite</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
<u>Crime Environment</u>						
Percent Nonwhite	+	+	np	+	+	+
Population Density	+	+	np	-	+	-
<u>Social, Economic, Cultural Environment</u>						
White Collar	np	+	np	+	np	+
Foreign Born or						
Mixed Parentage	-	-	np	+	np	+
Region	np	-	np	-	np	-
Retail Sales	np	-	np	+	np	+
<u>Political Climate</u>						
League Membership	+	+	np	+	np	+
American Party Vote	+	-	np	-	+	-
<u>Police Department Characteristics</u>						
Police Stations	-	-	np	+	np	-

Table 6-2 (continued)

Independent Variable	Arrest Type					
	<u>Juvenile, Nonwhite, and Total Arrests</u>					
	<u>Juvenile</u>		<u>Nonwhite</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
Salary Chief	+	-	+	+	np	+
Community Relations						
Training	-	-	-	-	np	+
Helicopters	+	+	np	+	+	+

¹predicted relationship

²actual relationship

³no relationship predicted

⁴not applicable, partial correlation analysis not performed for this variable

are not employed in white collar occupations. The other measure of crime environment--population density--does not support the hypothesis across all arrest categories, but the direction of the relationship is as predicted for all categories of violent crimes.

Looking at the social, economic, and cultural environment, it was predicted that middle class cities and southern communities would create demands for more arrests for Part II offenses while more private-regarding ethnic communities would press for fewer arrests. The predicted relationship for the white collar variable holds for prostitution, narcotics, and drunk driving arrests but not for the other categories of petty offenses. The relationships for the ethnicity variable show slightly more consistent support for the hypothesis, although the sign is positive for prostitution, weapons, and disorderly conduct arrests. Also, the relationship between ethnicity and juvenile arrests is negative as predicted.

The hypotheses for region and police policies is refuted for all victimless crime arrests. Among order maintenance offenses, police in southern cities appear to be more aggressive in enforcing laws for weapons and disorderly conduct, but the positive association does not hold for simple assault and drunk driving offenses.

It was predicted that propertied interests would express greater demands for the enforcement of property crimes. The sign of the relationship is as hypothesized for burglary and larceny arrests, but as will be shown later, the values of the correlation coefficients are so low as to suggest no relationship.

While the ethnicity variable showed only partial support for the hypothesis in terms of sign, a more directly political measure of public-regardingness, League membership, is much more consistently related to arrests in the predicted direction. The only dependent variable for which the sign is contrary to our expectations is gambling arrests. The other measure of political climate, American Party vote, shows less consistent support for the hypothesis in terms of sign. Conservatism was not expected to be negatively related to gambling, simple assault, disorderly conduct, juvenile, and total arrests.

Among police organization variables, the measures of centralization and task orientation show the most consistent support for the hypotheses across categories of arrest while the professionalism and community relations indicators exhibit the least support. Cities with a greater task orientation make more arrests for all types of crimes examined; more decentralized departments make fewer arrests for all Part II two offenses with the exception of simple assault. They also arrest fewer juveniles.

Arrests for Violent Crimes: Murder, Rape,
and Aggravated Assault

Examination of the partial correlation coefficients indicates the importance of one of the measures of crime environment as a correlate of murder arrests, even when additional variables are introduced into the analysis (Table 6-3). While the partials analysis does not allow us to make causal statements about the data, the findings nevertheless

Table 6-3

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES AND PART I OFFENSES

Independent Variables	Arrest Type											
	<u>Violent Crimes Against Persons</u>						<u>Property Crimes</u>					
	<u>Murder</u>		<u>Rape</u>		<u>Aggravated Assault</u>		<u>Robbery</u>		<u>Burglary</u>		<u>Larceny</u>	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
<u>Crime Environment</u>												
Percent Nonwhite	.79	.68	.64	.47	.67	.49	-.77	.66	.49	.48	.31	.42
Population												
Density	.28	-.28	.55	.29	.50	.23	.58	.19	.17	-.08	-.04	-.10
<u>Social, Economic, Cultural Environment</u>												
White Collar	-.40	-.47	-.09	.15	-.12	.18	-.23	.02	.03	.13	.25	.17
Foreign Born or												
Mixed												
Parentage	-.44	.01	-.13	-.23	-.10	-.04	-.11	-.04	-.15	.08	-.17	.21
Region	.26	-.01	-.16	.01	.18	.24	.07	.24	.00	-.21	.18	.02
Retail Sales	.17	-.02	.23	.06	.18	-.16	.20	-.17	.13	.02	.19	.02

Table 6-3 (continued)

Independent Variables	Violent Crimes Against Persons						Property Crimes					
	Murder		Rape		Aggravated Assault		Robbery		Burglary		Larceny	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
<u>Political Climate</u>												
League												
Membership	.01	.29	.11	.01	.01	.10	.07	.24	.01	-.01	.27	.23
American Party												
Vote	.24	.01	-.16	-.32	-.08	-.18	-.11	-.26	.00	.01	.08	.00
<u>Police Department</u>												
<u>Characteristics</u>												
Police Stations	.14	-.12	.51	.25	.31	-.16	.37	-.12	.06	-.20	-.06	-.19
Salary Chief	.26	.33	.36	-.13	.45	.12	.46	.14	.36	.16	.23	.05
Community												
Relations												
Training	.27	.29	.20	-.17	.36	.25	.34	.22	.09	.08	-.10	.02
Helicopters	.21	.32	.15	.21	.13	.16	.08	.18	.24	.17	.30	.24
	$R^2 = .780$		$R^2 = .679$		$R^2 = .644$		$R^2 = .762$		$R^2 = .409$		$R^2 = .381$	

support the premise that arrests for very serious crimes such as murder are closely tied to the size of the community's nonwhite population.³

A number of moderate relationships are evidenced with variables which are not categorized as part of the crime environment. The white collar variable shows a negative association of $-.47$ with murder arrests. Previous research has not identified this particular social class indicator as being significantly related to crime rates for murder.⁴ The findings do suggest, however, that communities with larger white collar populations make fewer murder arrests. It does not seem likely that white collar populations make fewer demands on the police to enforce homicide violations. It is more probable that middle class communities experience a lower incidence of murder. For this particular offense, and for the 40 cities under examination, the white collar variable appears to be more of a component of the crime environment.

Positive relationships with murder arrests of $.30$ or higher are also shown for the salary and helicopter variables. While murder arrests are probably largely determined by crime incidence, the data suggest that all other things being equal, more professional and task oriented departments make a greater number of homicide arrests. Together the 12 variables account for 78 percent of the variance in arrests for murder.

Both measures of the crime environment are positively related to rape arrests, although again, nonwhite population appears to be a more important indicator than population density. The variance explained by all dependent variables is somewhat lower for rape (67.9%) than for

murder arrests. Nonwhite population is the most important determinant of arrest outputs, but the partial correlation coefficient is lower than that for homicide.

The significance of the modest negative relationship between the measures of political conservatism and rape arrests is not readily apparent. It is possible that this particular measure is closely associated with other indicators in the variable set, e.g. measures of the crime environment, which might account for the modest inverse relationship. However, these hypothetical relationships are not confirmed by the data. The Wallace vote is positively related to both nonwhite population (.26) and to the actual crime rate for rape (.10) and the coefficients are not strong enough to suggest problems with multicollinearity.

Aggravated assault arrests are positively associated with both measures of the crime environment, but nonwhite arrests appear to be the most important predictor variable. While no other variables exhibit a partial of .30 or higher with the policy measures, the amount of variance explained by the 12 indicators is fairly respectable (65.4%).

Arrests for Property Crimes: Armed Robbery,
Burglary, and Larceny

Arrests for robbery resemble those for homicide in that nonwhite population shows a very strong partial relationship (.66) with this particular category of police outputs (Table 6-3). The explanatory framework accounts for 76.2% of the variance in arrests among cities.

Nonwhite population shows a moderately high partial with burglary arrests (.48). All other partials are quite low. The findings for larceny arrests largely mirror those for burglary. In both cases the amount of explained variance is much lower than for arrests for crimes which involve an element of violence.

It was observed earlier that the crime environment variables seem to best capture variation in arrests for offenses which are directly or indirectly violent by nature. It should also be noted that previous research on the ecological correlates of crime rates has generally been much more successful in identifying the determinants of violent crimes than nonviolent property crimes. For example, Cho was able to explain only 44.2% of the variance in reported crime for burglary and 40.9% of the variance for larceny crime rates in 49 of the largest U. S. cities.⁵ Thus the correlates of these kinds of crimes are difficult to pinpoint. Even when more direct measures of the crime environment are employed, their relationship to nonproperty arrests fails to explain most of the variance among the 40 cities. As noted in Chapter IV, the crime rate for burglary shows a simple correlation of .43 with those arrests and that for larceny a correlation of .39. This strongly suggests that factors other than the incidence of crime have a bearing on arrest variation for nonviolent property offenses.

Other variables for which measures were not readily available might be important in explaining arrest levels for nonviolent property crimes. While the dependent variable is not a measure of police effectiveness per se, some departments may make more burglary arrests than

others even when the crime environment is taken into consideration because they possess greater expertise. Votey and Phillips point out that the solving of different kinds of crimes is dependent on very different kinds of resources. They identify the analytical abilities of detectives as a major factor in solving and making arrests for crimes of burglary.⁶ While expertise is not a direct measure of the discretionary aspects of police work, it may nevertheless be a factor important to understanding arrest variance for certain kinds of offenses. The measures of professionalism and specialization may bear a relationship to the expertise variable, but in the multivariate setting these measures continue to exhibit a weak association with the dependent variable. At best they are very indirect measures of the expertise factor that Votey and Phillips identify.

The allocation of police personnel may also be important to explaining arrest variation for nonviolent property crimes. This is a more discretionary aspect of law enforcement and is presumably largely guided by the policy decisions of the chief administrator. The questionnaire did not distinguish major differences among chiefs regarding preferences for allocating funds to combat burglary and larceny crimes. However, the questions were designed to tap opinions on a broad range of law enforcement issues and precluded asking the kinds of detailed questions that might be important to identifying variation in policy preferences on a number of matters that might be important to explaining arrest levels.

In this regard, Walton notes that in many large city police departments personnel are allocated on a geographical basis according to fairly elaborate formulas which may include such variables as the nature and number of business establishments, arrest and crime rates for the previous year, and a weighting system for various kinds of Part I crimes.⁷ The factors which enter the formula are essentially a policy decision. Presumably they reflect the chief administrators' thinking on these matters, although considerable discretion may also be exercised by staff members of the planning and research division within the department. While decisions regarding factors such as weighting could conceivably have an impact on arrest levels for other Part I crimes, they are of particular interest for property crimes where the allocation of personnel for crime prevention purposes would seem to be most salient.

Walton gives an example of the kinds of weighting systems that may be in effect. In the Los Angeles police department purse snatchings are given triple weight while burglaries are given double weight.⁸ The factors that enter these decisions as well as identification of the actors responsible for making them are interesting questions for policy analysis in themselves.

An additional variable which was not examined in this research--the content of state laws governing larceny crimes--could also have an impact on arrest variation. State codes may differ in the dollar amounts set to differentiate felony from misdemeanor cases. Thus, in some states theft of small items is a felony while in others it is only a misdemeanor. Consideration of the seriousness of an offense as defined by the law may

influence attitudes of the police as well as those of the victim toward enforcement. The police and victims alike may be less likely to settle larceny cases informally through restitution if the law defines the offense as a relatively more serious one. It was observed in Chapter V that police chiefs do not show much variation in their views on treating larceny cases formally or informally, but it is possible that the patrolman on the beat or the victim may perceive the matter differently.

Finally, it should be noted that variation in state laws and local ordinances may affect law enforcement policies for a number of offenses considered in this research. Moreover, the literature suggests that larceny may be one of the offenses most sensitive to these kinds of influences.⁹

Arrests for Victimless Crimes: Prostitution,
Gambling, and Narcotics

The explanatory framework is more successful in predicting variation in prostitution arrests than for nonviolent property crime arrests (Table 6-4). The nonwhite variable is again importantly related to arrest outputs, but a number of variables not directly linked to the crime environment also share modest relationships with the dependent variable. The community relations variable continues to show a fairly strong relationship (.47) with prostitution arrests even when other system components are introduced into the analysis, and as noted earlier, the direction of the relationship is contrary to that predicted.

More professional police departments tend to make more arrests for this particular vice offense. The relationship between ethnicity

Table 6-4

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES AND PART II OFFENSES

Independent Variables	Arrest Type															
	<u>Victimless Crimes</u>								<u>Order Maintenance Offenses</u>							
	<u>Prostitution</u>		<u>Narcotics</u>		<u>Gambling</u>		<u>Simple Assault</u>		<u>Weapons</u>		<u>Drunk Driving</u>		<u>Public Drunkenness</u>		<u>Disorderly Conduct</u>	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
<u>Crime Environment</u>																
Percent Nonwhite	.40	.48	.19	.20	.54	.48	.28	.27	.61	.62	-.28	-.34	.26	.18	.44	.56
Population Density	.38	-.17	.09	.18	.20	-.02	.01	.02	.06	-.33	-.46	-.09	--	--	-.05	-.31
<u>Social, Economic, Cultural Environment</u>																
White Collar	.07	.21	.24	.27	-.47	-.22	-.17	-.14	-.12	-.25	.33	.00	--	--	.14	-.01
Foreign Born or Mixed																
Parentage	.11	.29	-.08	-.03	-.26	-.11	-.30	-.06	-.39	.19	-.36	-.32	-.32	-.21	-.31	.14
Region	-.09	-.26	-.03	-.08	.13	-.02	.03	-.11	.36	.16	.20	-.12	--	--	.32	.23
Retail Sales	.44	.20	.05	-.18	-.12	.06	.05	-.04	.29	.01	.03	-.16	.62	.45	.34	.31

Table 6-4 (continued)

Independent Variables	Arrest Type															
	Victimless Crimes								Order Maintenance Offenses							
	<u>Prostitution</u>		<u>Narcotics</u>		<u>Gambling</u>		<u>Simple Assault</u>		<u>Weapons</u>		<u>Drunk Driving</u>		<u>Public Drunkenness</u>		<u>Disorderly Conduct</u>	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
<u>Political Climate</u>																
League Membership	.06	.03	.25	.18	-.44	-.35	.27	.32	.28	.52	.32	.30	.54	.35	.38	.25
American Party Vote	-.13	.14	-.08	.04	.08	-.35	.15	-.08	.28	.02	.22	.25	--	--	.12	-.27
<u>Police Department Characteristics</u>																
Police Stations	.26	-.18	.00	-.19	-.08	-.12	.04	.04	-.02	-.20	-.36	-.05	--	--	-.04	-.04
Salary Chief	.56	.30	.26	-.07	-.07	.28	-.24	-.32	.18	.16	-.07	.33	.21	.06	.14	-.02
Community Relations																
Training	.49	.47	-.14	-.05	.28	.14	-.13	-.08	.14	.34	-.37	-.01	--	--	-.10	-.13
Helicopters	.17	.23	.15	.09	.17	.29	.03	.13	.24	.31	.26	.06	.17	.10	.17	.06
	R ² = .640		R ² = .270		R ² = .618		R ² = .360		R ² = .691		R ² = .495		R ² = .552		R ² = .558	

and prostitution is somewhat higher than that observed in Chapter IV, and is mentioned here because the relationship is in the opposite direction hypothesized. It was expected that communities with more private-regarding cultures would have a greater toleration for vice-related activity which in turn would be manifested in lower arrest rates.

The 12 variables also explain a fairly good share of the variance in gambling arrests (61.8%). Again, nonwhite population is the strongest indicator of police outputs, but similarities with prostitution arrests end at this point. While police professionalism is positively related to prostitution arrests, it is negatively associated with arrests for gambling. Furthermore, League membership--the variable associated with more reform-oriented, public-regarding political climates--continues to show a modest negative relationship with the dependent variable. It is possible that less gambling activity takes place in these reform-oriented environments, although the League measure is relatively independent of the crime environment indicators.¹⁰

Another possibility is that while in general higher arrest rates would be expected in more reform oriented and public-regarding communities, lower arrest outputs might be predicted for certain areas of law enforcement. For example, the movement to remove social gambling from the sphere of law enforcement is often tied to reform or "good" government interests. However, if this is the case, we might expect these same interests to affect arrest rates for other victimless crimes such as prostitution. Still, there is virtually no relationship between prostitution arrests and League membership (.03). It is possible,

however, that other factors may intervene in the relationship between reform sentiment in the community and arrests for various types of victimless crimes. In Chapter IV it was noted that the owners of retail trade establishments may press the police for full enforcement of prostitution laws. While the relationship between the retail trade variable and prostitution arrests is reduced considerably (from .39 to .20) when variables from other system components are introduced into the analysis, it is possible that because of its visibility in comparison with social gambling, greater pressure is placed on the police from other sources in the community to make prostitution arrests. Thus it may be easier for the police to heed the demands for less than full enforcement for some kinds of victimless crimes than for others. Unfortunately the measures used in this study are not of sufficient sensitivity to register these kinds of considerations. The modest relationship with League membership does suggest that further investigation into the relationship between public-regardingness and law enforcement outputs might be warranted.

The white collar variable continues to express a negative relationship with gambling arrests, but the relationship is lower when other system components are considered. The moderate negative relationship with American Party vote is again unexpected in light of the hypothesis, and no explanation is readily apparent for this particular finding.

In contrast to the other vice offenses, the explanatory framework accounts for very little of the variance in narcotics arrests

across cities (27.0%). The narcotics variable is the only one examined to this point where nonwhite population is not the most important arrest correlate. While its relationship to law enforcement policies is in the positive direction, the partial correlation coefficient is only .20. White collar population reflects the strongest relationship with the dependent variable, although the correlation coefficient is not high (.27) and is lower than that registered prior to the introduction of variables representative of other system components. An overview of variables which did not meet the selection criteria fails to identify measures that might improve the amount of explained variance. Among those indicators not included in the final analysis a measure of conservatism, Goldwater, vote expresses the highest partial with the dependent variable (.29).

Unfortunately, there are very few clues in the literature concerning additional variables that might be important to explaining variation in narcotics arrests. In Chapter V a modest correlation was observed between police chiefs' perceptions of community concern for the drug problem and arrests. It is possible that more sensitive measures of community attitudes towards drug use and drug violations might be productive.

Another consideration is the possibility that drug arrests may correlate with major centers of drug trafficking. While it is not possible to identify these locations at this juncture, it is interesting to note that four of the seven cities with the highest rate of narcotics arrests are located in California, a state which has long been popularly associated with a high level of drug activity.¹¹

Order Maintenance Offenses: Simple Assault, Weapons, Driving Under the Influence, Disorderly Conduct, and Public Drunkenness

Among order maintenance offenses the explanatory framework accounts for the least amount of the variance for simple assault arrests (36.0%) (Table 6-4). Simple assault comprises the second offense type encountered so far where the crime environment variables do not exhibit the strongest partials with arrests.¹² The League measure is positively related to simple assault arrests with a partial coefficient of .32 which suggests that cities characterized by a stronger public-regarding sentiment show a lower toleration for violations of the public order. Another related explanation is that these same public-regarding cities show less of an inclination to privatize disputes related to assault cases.¹³

It is interesting to note that a nonpolitical measure of a city's public-regarding orientation--ethnicity--showed a fairly moderate negative partial correlation with assault arrests in Chapter IV. However this variable shows almost no association (.06) with assault arrests when other system components are introduced into the analysis.

More professional departments actually make fewer arrests for assault. This is contrary to our expectations in light of the characteristics attributed to more professional organizations. It has been suggested that more professional departments are less likely to handle criminal cases privately or informally. In this regard, the relationship with reform-oriented and public-regarding environmental characteristics (League membership) may be theoretically the most important one, since most assault arrests are initiated by citizens rather than by the police.¹⁴

Two variables which did not meet the selection criteria showed moderate partials with simple assault arrests. One of the community relations variables--police participation in school programs--had a partial of .40 with the dependent variable in the within-component analysis in Chapter IV. The direction of the relationship is the opposite of that generally predicted for departments with a greater community orientation. While the data do not measure citizen attitudes and behavior, it is possible that citizens feel more encouraged to approach the police with an assault case in cities with better developed community relations programs. This might be the case in particular for the large portion of assaults which arise from domestic disturbances. The other measures of community relations orientation shows almost no association with the dependent variable (-.08).

A second variable, public safety expenditures had a negative partial of .51 with assault arrests and as noted earlier, the reason for this fairly substantial relationship is not readily apparent.

Since the expenditure and community relations variables exhibited fairly sizeable partials with assault arrests when considered within system components, it was decided to determine whether their inclusion in the model would improve its explanatory capability. The public expenditure variable replaces the political variable with the lowest partial with arrests, American Party vote, and the school programs measure supplants the community relations training variable. The modified 12 variable set provides a considerable increase in the amount of variance explained with an R^2 of .620. However, theoretically the

modified framework presents problems in the sense that it is difficult to explain the significance of what appears to be the most important arrest correlate--public safety expenditures. In the partials analysis for the modified variable set the partial correlation coefficient for public safety expenditures increases to $-.62$. However, the community relations variable shows almost no relationship ($.12$) to assault arrests when introduced into the cross component analysis.

Almost 70% of the variance in arrests for weapons violations is accounted for by the explanatory framework. Nonwhite population shows the highest partial with police outputs ($.62$), and the other crime environment measure, population density, is negatively associated with arrests ($-.33$). The high positive partial with League membership ($.52$) suggests that more reform-oriented communities may press for more vigorous and uniform enforcement of this particular offense. Cities whose police departments show a stronger community relations orientation as well as a strong task orientation also make more weapons arrests.

The variable set explains 49.5% of the variance in police outputs for driving under the influence of alcohol. To this point in the analysis drunk driving arrests represent the only dependent variable with which nonwhite population is correlated in the negative direction.

In Chapter V it was suggested that there might be an inverse relationship between police perceptions of the seriousness of the DUI problem in a community and crime rates. While no strong support was found for this premise, the negative association with one of the crime

environment variables again suggests the possibility of this kind of relationship. A more direct test can be provided by examining the simple relationships between DUI arrests and crime rates (Table 6-5).

Table 6-5

SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN CRIME RATES AND ARRESTS
FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL

<u>Crime Rate</u>	<u>Drunk Driving Arrests</u>
Murder	-.10
Rape	.06
Aggravated Assault	-.05
Robbery	-.28
Burglary	.23
Larceny	.20
Total Crime Rate	.07

The simple relationships show almost no association with the overall crime rate, and the relationship with three of the index crimes is in the positive direction. The association is negative, however, for murder, aggravated assault, and robbery, although the correlation coefficients are not very high. The strongest correlation coefficient is with robbery. It was noted earlier that the incidence of robbery seems to elicit the greatest budget support for a city police department, and this may be some indication of the importance placed on combatting this particular crime relative to other law enforcement problems.

Since the drunk driving offense is associated with the ownership of an automobile, the negative association with nonwhite population may

be tied to certain economic concerns. More affluent communities may experience greater use of the automobile and in turn would provide the police with more opportunities to make drunk driving arrests. The social class measure, white collar population, can be considered as an indirect indicator of affluence. However, it shows no relationship with the dependent variable (.00). The income measure was not included in the explanatory framework. However in Chapter IV it exhibited almost no association with police outputs for drunk driving with a partial correlation coefficient of $-.07$. It would be interesting to explore further whether or not the police do employ a double standard in enforcing drunk driving laws. Since drunk driving arrests are in most instances initiated by the police, it is possible that this particular offense is tolerated by them to a greater extent in minority communities. But given the nature of the data, these kinds of conclusions are certainly not warranted without benefit of further research.

Table 6-4 indicates that there may be some relationship between a community's social and political ethos and the DUI arrest rate. Ethnicity shows a modest negative association with arrests and the League measure has a partial correlation coefficient of $.30$ with the dependent variable. While these correlation coefficients are not extremely high, they suggest that more public-regarding communities place greater emphasis on the enforcement of this particular offense. The partial relationship of $.33$ with police chief salary is also of interest and suggests that more professional departments may place greater priority on the enforcement of drunk driving laws.

The nonwhite population measure is again the most important explanatory variable for disorderly conduct arrests. More densely populated cities arrest fewer individuals for this particular crime, and cities which show a greater volume of retail trade make more of these kinds of arrests. Given the relationship between the retail sales variable and public drunkenness arrests in Chapter IV, it is possible that the association between disorderly conduct and retail sales represents some overlap in this regard. It is not uncommon for the police to charge individuals who are intoxicated in public with violations of disorderly conduct statutes. For disorderly conduct, over half of the variance in arrests is explained by the variable set.

As mentioned earlier, the findings for public drunkenness arrests are not directly comparable to those for other offenses because the population consists of a smaller number of cases. Still, it was argued that the emphasis in the law enforcement literature on the discretionary aspects of this particular kind of police work warrants its inclusion in the analysis.

Due to the reduced size of the population, a smaller number of independent variables were chosen for the analysis of public drunkenness arrests. Six variables were selected on the basis of the strength of the partial correlation coefficients in the previous analysis. Selection was also guided by the desire to represent various categories of independent variables in the final partials analysis. The selected indicators include one crime environment variable, two measures representing the social, economic, and cultural component, one political indicator, and two police department traits.

The results of the partials analysis is shown in Table 6-4. When variables from other system components are introduced, the retail sales variable retains its importance (.45). The measure of local political climate also bears some relationship to public drunkenness arrests (.35). Over half of the variance is explained by the six variable set.

Juvenile, Nonwhite, and Total Arrests

Among arrest categories the variable set explains the least amount of variance for juvenile arrests with an R^2 of .161 (Table 6-6). None of the independent variables have a partial higher than .17 with police outputs.

Three variables showed fairly high partial correlation coefficients with juvenile arrests in the analysis within system components but did not meet the selection criteria. These include one measure of political conservatism, Goldwater vote, and two measures of police department characteristics--specialization (percent of the force assigned to certain nonpatrol duties) and task orientation (computerization).

It was decided to determine whether the inclusion of these three variables would improve the amount of explained variation. Goldwater vote replaces the American Party measure, and the two police department indicators replace two variables from the same component which exhibit the lowest partials with arrests. The explained variance is increased considerably with an R^2 of .498. All three variables have partial

Table 6-6

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES AND JUVENILE, NONWHITE, AND TOTAL ARRESTS

Independent Variables	Arrest Type					
	<u>Juvenile, Nonwhite, and Total Arrests</u>					
	<u>Juvenile</u>		<u>Nonwhite Arrests</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
<u>Crime Environment</u>						
Percent Nonwhite	-.10	.02	.81	.74	.51	.51
Population Density	-.17	.00	.57	-.08	.00	-.15
<u>Social, Economic, Cultural Environment</u>						
White Collar	.16	.03	-.48	-.52	.02	-.09
Foreign Born or Mixed Parentage	-.14	-.10	-.11	.19	-.45	.03
Region	-.07	-.06	-.20	-.21	.20	-.01
Retail Sales	-.03	-.07	.25	.30	.26	.11
<u>Political Climate</u>						
League Membership	.24	.17	.03	.15	.26	.30
American Party Vote	-.07	-.13	.04	-.09	.22	-.07

Table 6-6 (continued)

Independent Variable	Arrest Type					
	<u>Juvenile, Nonwhite, and Total Arrests</u>					
	<u>Juvenile</u>		<u>Nonwhite Arrests</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
<u>Police Department</u>						
<u>Characteristics</u>						
Police Stations	-.15	-.05	.44	.22	-.05	-.16
Salary Chief	-.09	-.09	.31	.06	.15	.01
Community Relations						
Training	-.04	-.09	.26	-.20	-.31	.03
Helicopters	.08	.06	.03	.26	.45	.44
	$R^2 = .161$		$R^2 = .827$		$R^2 = .586$	

correlation coefficients of .35 or higher with police outputs. The relationship with the Goldwater variable is positive (.35) and supports the hypothesis for conservatism and arrest outputs. However, the negative association with measures of specialization (-.55) and task orientation (-.49) is somewhat perplexing and is contrary to our predictions.

Over 80 percent of the variance in nonwhite arrests is accounted for by the 12 variable framework and nonwhite population appears to be the most important predictor variable (partial, .74). The white collar measure also shows a strong partial relationship (-.52) with the dependent variable. The latter finding could be interpreted from a number of perspectives. It provides some support for the contention of Galliher and others that blacks will suffer a disproportionate amount of arrests in communities where the more advantaged classes are less numerous.¹⁵ The argument is that in their "minority" status, members of the privileged classes will feel more threatened by racial groups, and this in turn will affect the style of law enforcement.

It is also possible that the fairly high partials with both nonwhite arrests and white collar population are a result of multicollinearity. However, the simple relationship between the two variables does not support this interpretation. While the variables are negatively related, the correlation coefficient is not extremely strong (-.35). Finally, the retail sales variable shows a modest positive relationship with nonwhite arrests (.30) which did not appear in the previous analysis.

Two variables appear to be influential in explaining overall arrest activity--nonwhite population and a police department's task

orientation. League membership also has a moderate partial correlation coefficient (.30) with overall police activity.

A Comparison of the Effects of Various Categories of Independent Variables on Arrests: A Multiple Partial Exercise

At this point variables within categories are compared collectively to determine the relative strength of the various system components on arrests. Multiple-partial correlation analysis is used to compare the effects of crime, socioeconomic-cultural, political, and police department variables on police policies. Based on the preceding analysis only the two variables with the strongest partials in each category are selected for further study. This procedure was used to avoid biasing the equations in favor of those categories, such as police organization, where a greater number of indicators are available. Since the two highest partials in each category are not the same for all equations, different combinations of independent variables are included in the multiple-partial analysis. The multiple-partial relationships for each arrest type are presented in Table 6-7.¹⁶

Looking first at the violent crime category, the findings show that the two crime indicators (nonwhite and density) are of the greatest importance in every case when all other categories of independent variables are held constant. The multiple-partial between the crime component and rape arrests is somewhat lower (.39) than it is with murder (.53) and aggravated assault arrests (.49). In comparison with the other violent crime arrests, arrests for murder are of interest because both the socioeconomic (.28) and police department variables (.22) exert more influence on the dependent variable.

Table 6-7

MULTIPLE-PARTIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TWO STRONGEST INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES IN EACH CATEGORY AND ARREST OUTPUTS

Dependent Variable	Multiple-Partial Correlations				
	Crime Environment ^a	Social, Economic, Cultural Environment	Political Climate ⁱ	Police Department Characteristics	R ²
<u>Violent Crimes Against Persons</u>					
Murder	.53	.28 ^b	.04	.22 ^j	.758
Rape	.39	.08 ^c	.11	.10 ^k	.664
Aggravated Assault	.49	.10 ^d	.10	.07 ^l	.621
<u>Property Crimes</u>					
Robbery	.69	.03 ^e	.19	.01 ^m	.752
Burglary	.33	.07 ^d	.00	.09 ^k	.377
Larceny	.23	.11 ^f	.06	.04 ^k	.329
<u>Victimless Crimes</u>					
Prostitution	.15	.06 ^g	.05	.42 ⁿ	.566
Narcotics	.16	.12 ^b	.06	.06 ^k	.258
Gambling	.26	.10 ^f	.26	.10 ^j	.598

Table 6-7 (continued)

Dependent Variable	Multiple-Partial Correlations				
	Crime Environment ^a	Social, Economic, Cultural Environment	Political Climate ^l	Police Department Characteristics	R ²
<u>Order Maintenance Offenses</u>					
Simple Assault	.14	.03 ^d	.17	.13 ^j	.350
Weapons	.34	.09 ^f	.27	.14 ^m	.614
Drunk Driving	.28	.14 ^h	.14	.14 ^j	.487
Disorderly Conduct	.34	.14 ^e	.18	.02 ^m	.549
<u>Juvenile, Total and Nonwhite Arrests</u>					
Juvenile	.01	.00 ^h	.06	.02 ⁿ	.136
Nonwhite	.59	.26 ^b	.10	.10 ^k	.800
Total	.35	.02 ^b	.13	.24 ^k	.585

^aPercent nonwhite and population density^bWhite collar and retail sales^cForeign born or mixed heritage and white collar^dWhite collar and region^eRegion and retail sales^fWhite collar and foreign born or mixed heritage^gForeign born or mixed heritage and retail sales^hForeign born or mixed heritage and retail salesⁱLeague membership and American Party vote^jSalary chief and helicopters^kPolice stations and helicopters^lPolice stations and community relations training^mCommunity relations training and helicoptersⁿSalary chief and community relations training

Turning to property crimes, the crime environment multiple partial again dominates, although as mentioned earlier, the selected crime variables seem to be much more effective in predicting outcomes for robbery arrests than for the two nonviolent property crimes. Among the remaining categories of variables, the multiple partials are quite low for all three arrest types. The highest noncrime multiple partial is with political environment measures and robbery arrests (.19).

The relative effects of system components is much less consistent across arrests for victimless crimes. The highest multiple partial for prostitution arrests is with the police department component (.42) while the crime (.26) and political environment (.26) multiple partials are the highest and of equal weight for gambling arrests. For the narcotics variable the crime (.16) and socioeconomic (.12) multiple partials are of approximately the same strength.

With respect to victimless crimes, the multiple partials analysis generally confirms the expectation that crime environment variables will be less important in explaining arrest variables among less serious offenses than among Part I crimes. This is particularly true if Part I offenses involving violence are compared with victimless crimes. The contrast is much less clear-cut when nonviolent property crimes are considered. Furthermore, the utility of categorizing prostitution, gambling, and narcotics arrests in the same category is questioned by the analysis. While all three crimes may logically fall within the category of victimless crimes, arrest behavior for each of the three offenses seems to be influenced by a quite different combination of factors.

For order maintenance offenses the crime environment is the most important with the exception of arrests for simple assault. For the latter, the political multiple-partial is the strongest, but crime and police organization variables make an almost equal contribution.¹⁷

In spite of the fact that the crime environment is the most powerful for all but one order maintenance offense, the effects of the political variables are not inconsequential for all four types of arrest. The same observation can be made for socioeconomic variables with respect to drunk driving (.14) and disorderly conduct arrests (.14) and police department variables with respect to simple assault (.13), weapons (.14), and drunk driving offenses (.14). Thus while the crime environment is the most important in explaining variance for most order maintenance offenses, this set of dependent variables differs from arrests for Part I crimes in that, overall, the crime environment variables are not as dominant.

The impact of the various categories of independent variables on juvenile arrests is virtually insignificant. This is not surprising considering the low R^2 (.136). It should be noted that the data set used in the multiple-partial analysis is the one selected according to the criteria outlined at the beginning of the chapter. A revised data set for juvenile arrests showed that replacement of three variables in the original data set with two police department indicators and a different measure of conservatism resulted in an increase in explained variance from 16.1 percent to 49.8 percent. If the multiple partial analysis had been performed on the revised data set, it is most likely that the police organization component would be the most significant.

Nonwhite arrests show the highest multiple partial with the crime environment (.59), and the second strongest multiple partial is for the socioeconomic environment (.26). For total arrests the crime component is again the strongest (.35), but the police (.24) and the political climate variables (.13) are not unimportant in explaining arrest variance.

In conclusion, while a city's crime environment is no doubt importantly related to arrest activity, the research findings suggest an explanatory role for a number of factors that are not directly related to crime incidence. These findings are reviewed and elaborated upon in the concluding chapter.

SOURCES

¹Five indicators which met the selection criteria were not included in the analysis--police manpower, police budget, owner occupied housing, revenue/income ratio, and Goldwater vote. The first three measures are highly correlated with at least one of the crime environment measures and presented problems of multicollinearity. Their introduction into the analysis resulted in spuriously high partial correlation coefficients. In the multivariate setting the crime environment variables did show a stronger relationship with the dependent variables than did the measures related to police resources (police manpower and budget). Also, crime environment variables are fairly strongly related to resource variables. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that the level of crime "causes" cities to both allocate more resources to law enforcement and to make more arrests. Based on this information it was decided to include the crime environment variables in the analysis rather than the resource variables. To minimize the size of the variable set we decided to include only one measure of political conservatism in the final analysis. American Party rather than Goldwater vote was selected because it is generally more directly linked to support for the law and order theme. Finally, based on the fairly strong correlation coefficients with crime environment variables, the housing measure was judged a less useful indicator of demands associated with certain economic interests.

²As mentioned earlier, it is not suggested that certain racial characteristics "cause" crime. The variable race was selected because of its class association with measures of the incidence of certain types of crimes as reported in previous research.

³As noted earlier, more indirect measures of crime environment were used to allow comparisons between Part I and Part II arrests. However, if we examined the relationship between the crime rate for murder and murder arrests without consideration of other factors, the amount of variance explained by the crime environment would be more impressive. The multiple coefficient of determination for these two variables is .884.

⁴For example see Yong Hyo Cho, Public Policy and Urban Crime (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 1974).

⁵Ibid., pp. 148-149.

⁶H. L. Votey, Jr. and L. Phillips, "Police Effectiveness and the Production Function for Law Enforcement," Journal of Legal Studies, 1 (June, 1972), 423-437.

⁷Frank E. Walton, "Selective Distribution of Police Patrol Force: History, Current Practices, Recommendations," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 49 (May-June, 1958), 165-171.

⁸Ibid., 169.

⁹Wayne R. LeFave, Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into Custody (Boston: Little Brown, 1965), p. 27.

¹⁰The correlation coefficients between League membership and nonwhite population and population density are -.08 and .02 respectively.

¹¹California cities include San Diego, San Francisco, Oakland, and Long Beach. Non California cities include Denver, Atlanta, and New Orleans.

¹²The fairly weak partials contrast with Wilson's findings in 41 New York cities. The simple correlation between assault and percent nonwhite was .67. James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 131.

¹³Ibid., p. 142.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 128ff.

¹⁵John F. Galliher, "Explanations of Police Behavior: A Critical Review and Analysis," The Sociological Quarterly, 12 (Summer, 1971), 308-318. Also see Barry Krisberg, Crime and Privilege: Toward a New Criminology (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1975).

¹⁶The multiple coefficients of determination are included in the table and are in most cases smaller than for the 12 variable set. Still, the amount of variance explained does not change a great deal when only 8 variables are used. The greatest change in R^2 is for weapons (.691 to .614), prostitution (.618 to .566) and larceny (.381 to .329) arrests. Public drunkenness arrests were not included in the analysis due to problems with comparability.

¹⁷Given the finding that a political variable, public safety expenditures, is negatively associated with simple assault arrests (partial correlation coefficient, -.62), inclusion of this variable in the analysis would probably not have altered the ranking of system components.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

One of the major observations resulting from the preceding analysis is that there is a great deal of complexity associated with the law enforcement function which makes it extremely difficult to offer broad generalizations about arrest behavior. The discussion of law enforcement activity began with the assumption that certain kinds of offenses share commonalities and that they can be grouped into categories on the basis of their shared characteristics. A closely related assumption was that arrest behavior for similar offense types will be influenced by a common set of factors. Thus, it was hypothesized that, on the whole, arrest outputs for Part I offenses would be more sensitive to the crime environment than those for Part II crimes. This prediction was based on the premise that the amount of discretion involved in an arrest decision is inversely related to the seriousness of the crime. Part I offenses were further divided into property and nonproperty crimes on the grounds that the economic nature of the former offense types might be associated with a unique set of variables that could be important in explaining arrest variance.

A number of hypotheses were offered to explain the more discretionary outcomes for Part II crimes. In general, similar relationships were hypothesized for all Part II offenses. Nevertheless, a broad

distinction was made among these offenses on the grounds that while all Part II arrests may be affected similarly by a common set of variables, the intensity of these relationships might vary. Thus, arrests involving questions of morality (victimless crimes) might behave more similarly than those pertaining to questions of order maintenance. Many of the same relationships posited for Part II crimes were made for juvenile arrests and to a lesser extent for nonwhite arrests.

It was found, however, that in many cases the independent variables did not behave consistently within categories of arrest. For example, the reform political climate indicator was positively related to arrests for narcotics but negatively associated with gambling arrests. In some cases the sign of the relationship was consistent with respect to arrests for similarly typed crimes, but the strength of the relationship varied a great deal.

What this points to is that while some types of crimes may share certain characteristics, these shared characteristics are not necessarily a basis for assuming that arrests for these crimes will be similarly influenced by a common set of factors. Furthermore, any attempt to categorize offenses using existing legal definitions of the crime is complicated by the fact that an arrest for a particular crime may be motivated by different kinds of concerns. For example, a police officer may arrest a group of individuals engaged in social gambling at a neighborhood tavern because he believes this kind of activity violates the norms and social mores of the general community. On the other hand, the officer's reasons for invoking the criminal process may be quite

different. He may have seen many of these social gambling events lead to disagreements among the participants, and these disagreements, in turn, have escalated into full scale barroom brawls. In this instance the officer's actions have been motivated by a desire to keep the peace. The arrest for gambling then falls within the category of an order maintenance offense. These kinds of problems and concerns must be kept in mind in attempting to make generalizations about arrest policies. They also may account for some of the problems in explaining variance for certain types of arrest.

The decision to analyze arrests separately rather than forming indices for broad categories of arrest seems justified not only on logical grounds but also by virtue of the findings. While an underlying goal of social science research is to formulate generalizations about political behavior rather than focusing on the unique, oversimplification may impair our understanding of the political or social process. Focusing on the correlates of individual arrest types may serve to complicate the analysis, but a comparison of the findings with those of a similar study point to the advantage of the design used in the present research.

In their 1973 study Henderson and Neubauer attempted to explain arrest variation among county sheriff departments in Florida.¹ They formulated an index for various categories of law enforcement, and in almost all cases, explained variance was much lower for the Florida study than for the 40 city analysis. Using an eight variable set, Henderson and Neubauer were able to explain only 29% of the variance in

a combined index for victimless crimes. While we were able to account for only 25.8% of the variance in narcotics arrests, using an eight variable set, the R^2 for gambling and prostitution arrests was much higher at 59.8% and 56.6% respectively. Again, the Florida study accounted for 28% of the variance in order maintenance offenses.² The present research explained the lowest amount of variance for simple assault (35.0%) and the greatest amount for illegal possession of weapons (61.8%). Explained variance for most order maintenance offenses fell toward the higher end of the range.

It might be argued that the different findings resulted from the fact that Henderson and Neubauer used a somewhat different variable set. The greater success at explaining variation obtained here may be a result of the choice of better predictor variables. While variable selection is no doubt an important factor in the different findings, there is also some evidence that the treatment of the dependent variable may have played a role. For example, the variable percent nonwhite was used in both research designs. However, the zero order correlations between arrest rates and the crime environment indicator were much lower in the Florida study. It is possible that this particular component of the crime environment is less important in Florida counties than in large U. S. cities. Still, another explanation is that the grouping of seemingly like variables into a single index may have muted the effects of the crime environment measure so that its importance in explaining variation for certain distinct types of arrests that comprise index is not apparent.

As mentioned earlier, the independent variable often did not behave consistently within categories of offenses making it necessary to focus on individual arrest types. Still, certain generalizations can be made from the data although like most generalizations, it is possible to find exceptions to the rule. It has been noted previously that Part I arrests are generally more sensitive to the crime environment than arrests for less serious offenses. A more firm conclusion is that arrests for those Part I offenses involving an element of violence are the most responsive to the measures of crime environment. When arrests are ranked according to their relationship to the crime environment, police outputs for robbery, murder, aggravated assault, and rape occupy the top four positions.³

While one of the crime environment indicators (percent nonwhite) is fairly consistently related to the dependent variables both in terms of sign and strength of the relationship, two noncrime measures also are noteworthy in this regard. First, a measure of a police department's task orientation (helicopters), is positively related to all of the categories of arrest. This variable does not operate very consistently with respect to strength, but interestingly enough it had a moderately high relationship with total arrest activity. Thus, there is some evidence that the production strategy of a police organization will have an impact on its overall arrest performance.

Perhaps the most interesting finding is that a political measure of a community's reform or public-regarding orientation is positively related to all groups of order maintenance arrests. Furthermore, the

correlation coefficients are more consistently strong than was the case for the police organization variable.⁴

While this finding seems important, there are some problems with its interpretation. For example, do more public spirited communities report crime incidents more frequently to the police, or do they communicate to the police in some other manner a desire for a higher and more uniform level of enforcement? The former argument might seem more plausible for simple assault arrests because in most cases they are initiated by citizens. However, the second explanation seems more feasible for the other types of order maintenance offenses because in most cases arrests for them are police invoked. Problems with data interpretation will be discussed again at a later point in the Chapter.

While most of the other independent variables showed a unique influence with respect to one or two arrest types, perhaps one additional variable should be mentioned at this juncture. A measure of police professionalism (police chief salary) was moderately related to four arrest types and positively related to three out of four of them. The relationship between professionalism and performance is one of the most strongly touted in the law enforcement literature. While the findings give some support to the contention of Wilson and others that more professional departments enforce the law more evenly than less professional ones, the support is certainly not overwhelming. The evidence at hand suggests that professionalism is likely to affect arrest outputs in only a few limited areas.⁵ This should not be interpreted to mean that professionalism has little or no impact on arrest behavior. As Henderson and

Neubauer point out, professionalism may affect the manner in which arrests are made, and this in turn may have important implications for citizens' perceptions of the police.⁶

One question which comes to mind as a result of the data analysis is whether or not it suggests alternative ways for grouping offenses on the basis of the correlates of arrest activity. In many instances arrests were influenced by a fairly unique combination of either socioeconomic, political, organizational or crime environment factors so that no new typology was suggested. The only basis for a reclassification of the dependent variables has been mentioned previously. Arrests for crimes involving an element of violence seem to be the most strongly influenced by the crime environment measures. Among Part I offenses this holds true even when more direct measures of the crime environment are used. In this regard arrests for robbery seem to have more in common with those for violent crimes against persons than with the other property crime arrests.

Explaining the Unexplained Variance in Arrest Outputs

While the amount of variance accounted for by the explanatory scheme varies by arrest type, in general the reasons why one community arrests more individuals than another community is only partially explained by the data. In Chapter IV variables were identified that might improve variance explained within the context of specific types of offenses. At this point it might be useful to explore more general categories of variables that might be expected to have a more uniform effect on arrest levels.

One possibility is that most of the unexplained variance for Part II and juvenile arrests might be accounted for if more direct measures of crime incidence were available for these types of offenses. Thus it is possible that much of the variation in arrest activity for less serious offenses is not explained by discretionary factors at all. Differences among communities may largely be due to differing rates of criminal activity.

The possibility of obtaining more direct and accurate measures of these offense rates is slim, however. Crime rates are reported for index crimes largely because people are motivated to bring them to the attention of the police. The motivation for reporting Part II crimes is much lower and in some cases nonexistent. The findings indicate that there may be some motivation for business interests to report certain misdemeanors to the police, e.g. public drunkenness and disorderly conduct. However, this is not the case for most petty offenses. For example, the majority of individuals with direct knowledge of vice crimes are either producers or consumers of the illicit activity. Thus, the possibility of improving the data base for Part II crime incidence seems highly impractical.

While more accurate crime environment data might contribute to an understanding of arrest behavior, a number of alternative research avenues might be more profitable. While the importance of crime environment measures has been shown across arrest categories, there is certainly evidence that noncrime factors are not unimportant in explaining arrest outcomes. Thus, socioeconomic factors as well as political and police department

characteristics seem to have some influence on arrest policies for Part II as well as for some Part I offenses. Also, as noted in Chapter IV, even when direct measures of the crime environment are available, a considerable amount of the variance remains unexplained for some of the more serious crimes. Thus, there seems to be empirical as well as theoretical justification for further examining the more discretionary aspects of arrest outputs.

Within this context two general areas of research can be identified. One is the discretionary role of the citizen in influencing arrest behavior, and the other is the discretionary role of the police officer. Several measures of a community's social, economic, and political environment were found to be associated with arrests. Still, there are problems with the data. Some of the variables, particularly the socioeconomic ones could serve as measures of social problems (the crime environment) as well as a surrogate for community attitudes towards those problems. Therefore, interpretation of the data becomes difficult particularly when the social indicators operate with less than perfect consistency within major categories of arrest.

More direct measures of citizens attitudes toward crime, the police, and the criminal justice system in general would be useful in examining arrest variation. Very little work has been done in this area. At any rate, pinpointing the characteristics of populations which are more predisposed to invoke the criminal process may be of interest to policymakers as well as social scientists. While both the ability and desirability of government to engineer attitude change is open to

question, the nature and distribution of attitudes toward crime and law enforcement may be helpful to government officials in designing and implementing policy.

Of particular interest along these lines is the suggestion of Wilson and others that policy improvement efforts should be shifted from their present emphasis on the police to a focus on the prosecution and the courts.⁷ Wilson thinks that the discretion exercised by the prosecutor's office and the courts should be reduced. He suggests that the failure of district attorneys and judges to stringently and consistently enforce the law at the stages of the criminal justice process for which they have responsibility has not only encouraged certain citizens to break the law, but has also adversely affected the attitudes of citizens towards the criminal justice system in general.

While there has been little systematic investigation of these possible impacts, results of the LEAA criminal victimization studies indicate that many citizens fail to report crimes to the police because they feel, "it wouldn't make any difference."⁸ Whether this type of response reflects a realistic assessment of the ability of the police to apprehend the perpetrators of certain kinds of crimes that are difficult to solve, e.g., burglary, or whether it reflects a lack of faith that "justice will be carried out" at later stages in the process, awaits further research. This analysis of the 40 cities suggests that acquittal rates do not have much of an effect on arrest levels per se. However, judicial policies as well as policies of the prosecutor's office may be shown to have an impact on arrest behavior to the extent that they are

linked to more direct measures of citizens' and police officers' attitudes on the desirability of invoking the criminal justice process.⁹ At any rate, attempts to reform the criminal justice system in the manner suggested by Wilson should be preceded by an analysis of the probable impacts of these policy changes on the various actors in the criminal justice system.

A second area where further research seems warranted is the discretionary role of law enforcement personnel. This role cannot be neatly isolated from the discretionary role of the citizen. Obviously, citizens may influence arrest levels through their decisions whether or not to invoke the criminal process. But even where law enforcement activity seems to be largely police initiated, citizen influence may be felt. Enforcement levels may be dictated in part by police perceptions of citizen concern for particular areas and levels of enforcement.

The rather crude attempt to measure police chiefs' perceptions of citizens' opinions on crime in this research showed some relationship between perceptions and gambling, narcotics, and juvenile arrest rates. Perhaps the relationships would have been stronger if the perceptions of rank and file police officers had been solicited.

Even if an association between citizens' opinions and arrest policies is established, it is difficult to account for linkages between these two variables. Research by Black and Reiss reveals that the police often defer to the decisions of citizens who have initiated arrest activity.¹⁰ But this certainly does not explain the association between citizen opinion and arrests that are largely police-invoked, e.g., for gambling and narcotics.

The question of bureaucratic responsiveness to public opinion is an important one for democratic theory and a particularly complex one for police administration. Of course like other administrators, the police do not respond to one public but instead react to the demands of several publics. The question of which groups the police are more or less responsive to is an interesting one for the policy analyst. Criticism by some black leaders that the criminal justice system is overly responsive to white liberals' demands for more lenient treatment of disadvantaged black offenders is illustrative of the complex environment in which the police must function. To add to this complexity, this research suggests that arrests are not uniformly affected by one or more kinds of interests. Instead, various configurations of environmental variables seem to exert a unique influence on arrests depending on the nature of the offense.

While bureaucratic responsiveness is an ideal toward which democratic government aspires, the value of equity is also an important one in a democratic society. Achieving both of these values, however, may be fraught with problems to the extent that they represent mutually exclusive goals. Getting bureaucrats to treat all cases alike on the basis of clear rules known in advance certainly conflicts with inducing these same administrators to meet the quite different needs and desires of various publics.

A major theme of this research was that through certain organizational arrangements and production strategies police departments may maximize one of these two values--equity and responsiveness--over the

other. This is another way of saying that organizations have an independent influence on policy outcomes.

The results of this portion of the analysis did not provide any clear-cut answers to the relationship between police department characteristics and arrest levels, but the findings were such as to suggest a need for further exploration into this particular area. A major problem was, and is, obtaining adequate measures of the various departmental variables. While the measures used in this study were an advancement over those employed in previous research, questions of validity were raised, especially when an attempt was made to use multiple indicators of a single concept. Future efforts might be aimed toward obtaining more direct measures of police department characteristics. For example, the concept of professionalism might be better measured by surveying attitudes of policemen rather than using measures of operating procedures. All of this becomes more difficult, of course, as the size of the sample becomes larger.

Another problem in assessing the effects of police department characteristics on arrests was the small sample size. Even where organizational variables may have been adequate, it was not possible to adequately assess the relative effects of these variables on police responsiveness to environmental factors using multivariate analysis.

Another source of independent influence on police policies is the policy preferences of police elites. In general the survey findings did not support a linkage between these preferences and policy outputs. This may in part be attributed to the lack of an in-depth interview,

but another possibility is suggested by the findings. As mentioned earlier, Wilson and Gardiner attributed a great deal of influence to police chiefs for certain kinds of arrest policies. However, Wilson and Gardiner were examining police departments in small to medium sized cities. The large size of the police departments in the 40 cities could very possibly curb a police chief's ability to exert much influence on policy. Therefore, it is suggested that future research efforts focus on the heads of various subunits within the police department, e.g., vice, traffic, or even further down the line.

A final observation on future research needs relates to the question of policy impacts and police effectiveness. Our preliminary analysis indicates that various patterns of arrest for less serious offenses do not seem to impair the ability of the police to apprehend individuals who have committed more serious crimes. Indeed, police departments that make more Part II arrests are actually more successful in reducing the crime/arrest ratio. On the other hand, greater arrest activity for less serious crimes does not seem to deflate future crime rates.

Before any policy recommendations could be made with respect to arrest patterns and the allocation of resources toward various areas and levels of enforcement, a much more refined and in depth study would be needed. A longitudinal study of arrest and crime rate data would be most desirable, although changes in reporting patterns over time creates serious data problems. Improved reporting practices in recent years

have been initiated by LEAA, state regional planning offices, and police departments themselves, and these changes should facilitate future research efforts. At any rate, given the current emphasis on evaluation and planning, the kind of research suggested above would be most timely.

In conclusion, this study has attempted to empirically examine some of the correlates of arrest policies. As the foregoing discussion suggests, a great deal more needs to be done before a clear understanding of the causes of arrest variation can be attained. Such research is warranted on the basis of its possible contribution to theory building in the area of administrative behavior and policy analysis as well as its potential use to those with policy-making responsibility.

SOURCES

¹Thomas A. Henderson and David Neubauer, "Police Professionalism and Arrest Behavior," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, May 3-5, 1973.

²Ibid. The offenses included in the order maintenance category differ somewhat in the Henderson and Neubauer study from the present research. Their category of "police invoked order maintenance" included disorderly conduct, weapons, public drunkenness, vagrancy and drunk driving arrests.

³Rankings are based on the results of the multiple-partials analysis. Only arrests for specific offense types are included in the ranking. Thus nonwhite, juvenile and total arrests are not included in the ranking.

⁴The lowest partial correlation coefficient is with disorderly conduct arrests at .25. Other partials range from .30 to .35.

⁵As noted earlier, Wilson does qualify the kinds of situations in which police department characteristics are likely to affect arrest behavior. However, even keeping these qualifications in mind, the findings do not consistently support Wilson's hypothesis.

⁶Henderson and Neubauer, 29.

⁷James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime (New York: Basic Books, 1975). See also, Ernest van den Haag, Punishing Criminals: Concerning a Very Old and Painful Question (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

⁸Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Crime in the Nation's Five Largest Cities: Advance Report (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of Justice, National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, April, 1974).

⁹One of the problems in positing linkages between decisions made by district attorneys and the courts and citizens opinions and behavior is the low level of visibility attributed to these kinds of decisions. Still, both district attorneys and judges often earn reputations based on their performance in office. To the extent that these reputations are communicated by the press or by opinion leaders, we might expect them to have an influence on attitudes and behavior.

¹⁰Donald J. Black, "The Social Organization of Arrest," Stanford Law Review, 23 (June, 1971), 1087-1111. Also see Donald J. Black and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Police Control of Juveniles," American Sociological Review, 35 (February, 1970), 63-77.

APPENDIX A

LIST OF CITIES

LIST OF CITIES

Atlanta	Nashville-Davidson County
Baltimore	Newark
Birmingham	New Orleans
Boston	Norfolk
Buffalo	Oakland
Cincinnati	Oklahoma City
Cleveland	Omaha
Columbus (OH)	Phoenix
Dallas	Pittsburg
Denver	Portland
El Paso	St. Louis
Fort Worth	St. Paul
Honolulu	San Antonio
Indianapolis	San Diego
Jacksonville	San Francisco
Kansas City (MO)	San Jose
Long Beach	Seattle
Memphis	Toledo
Miami	Tulsa
Minneapolis	Washington, D. C.

APPENDIX B

SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG ALL DEPENDENT
AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES

SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG ALL INDEPENDENT
AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Variable	X ₁	X ₂	X ₃	X ₄	X ₅	X ₆	X ₇	X ₈	X ₉	X ₁₀	X ₁₁	X ₁₂
Income Inequality X ₁												
Percent Nonwhite. X ₂	.37											
Males Age 15-29 X ₃	-.01	-.07										
Males Under Age 17. X ₄	-.23	.00	-.34									
Percent Family with Female Head . X ₅	.36	.84	-.08	-.14								
Population Density. X ₆	.04	.42	-.11	-.41	.71							
Total Crime Rate. X ₇	.16	.11	-.16	-.23	.19	.23						
Crime Rate Murder X ₈	.51	.79	-.23	.01	.75	.34	.34					
Crime Rate Rape X ₉	.16	.61	-.06	-.16	.58	.40	.46	.61				
Crime Rate Assault. X ₁₀	.42	.48	-.27	-.26	.54	.43	.55	.61	.43			
Crime Rate Robbery. X ₁₁	.32	.70	-.21	-.27	.86	.79	.49	.76	.64	.68		
Crime Rate Furglary X ₁₂	.17	-.05	-.17	-.19	.00	-.01	.89	.23	.38	.40	.29	
Crime Rate Larceny. X ₁₃	.02	-.22	.08	-.10	-.34	-.23	.73	-.12	.04	.14	-.11	.64
Crime Rate Increase X ₁₄	-.20	-.26	-.10	.34	-.30	-.29	.11	-.15	-.14	-.25	-.29	.22
Income Less Than \$3000. X ₁₅	.53	.52		.18	.61	.21	.02	.53	.18	.45	.36	-.06
Income More than \$15,000. X ₁₆	-.27	-.33	.19	-.19	-.50	-.17	-.01	-.40	-.22	-.42	-.30	-.01
White Collar. X ₁₇	-.04	-.34	.37	-.25	-.46	-.38	.04	-.42	-.04	-.34	-.34	.13
Foreign or Mixed Parentage. . . . X ₁₈	-.23	-.34	.01	-.07	-.04	.40	.06	-.35	-.22	-.17	.02	-.05
Private School. X ₁₉	-.09	-.27	.17	-.28	-.33	-.13	-.02	-.23	-.18	-.28	-.18	.08
Retail Sales. X ₂₀	.06	.11	-.24	-.54	.26	.33	.33	.25	.31	.40	.45	.32

Continued

Variable	X ₁	X ₂	X ₃	X ₄	X ₅	X ₆	X ₇	X ₈	X ₉	X ₁₀	X ₁₁	X ₁₂
Owner Occupied Housing. X ₂₁	-.32	-.55	-.16	.43	-.72	-.73	-.11	-.43	-.23	-.37	-.66	.04
Median Income X ₂₂	-.46	-.36	.13	-.11	-.52	-.19	-.01	-.40	-.16	-.46	-.30	.02
Population Change X ₂₃	-.06	-.31	-.01	.32	-.50	-.48	-.11	-.16	-.33	-.19	-.40	-.04
White Migration X ₂₄	.06	-.59	.09	.11	-.78	-.71	.00	-.52	-.46	-.22	-.67	.19
Median Age. X ₂₅	.24	.00	-.38	-.67	.12	.43	.29	.08	.06	.38	.35	.27
Population Size X ₂₆	.00	.31	-.04	-.03	.26	.22	.00	.28	.27	.08	.29	-.16
Region. X ₂₇	.59	.06	.12	.08	.07	-.29	-.03	.31	-.05	.25	-.09	.02
Revenue/Income Ratio. X ₂₈	.17	.64	.04	-.26	.75	.76	.14	.43	.41	.34	.72	-.07
Chamber of Commerce Membership. X ₂₉	-.03	-.26	-.05	.06	-.22	-.38	.01	-.10	-.05	-.14	-.30	.22
ACLU Membership X ₃₀	.03	.06	.01	-.40	.17	.28	.24	.06	.17	.11	.29	.16
League Membership X ₃₁	.22	-.08	.08	-.44	.04	.02	.23	.02	.13	.11	.08	.32
Civil Rights Group Mobilization X ₃₂	.11	.55	-.33	-.05	.53	.35	.05	.46	.51	.20	.48	-.03
Goldwater Vote. X ₃₃	.12	-.17	.08	.19	-.38	-.65	-.01	-.12	-.07	-.04	-.46	.16
American Party Vote X ₃₄	.34	.26	-.02	.19	.05	-.41	-.21	.26	.10	.12	-.16	-.09
Government Form X ₃₅	.00	-.25	.13	-.12	-.31	-.26	.16	-.21	-.37	.02	-.24	.18
Election Type X ₃₆	-.01	-.29	.00	-.03	-.28	-.04	-.03	-.36	-.28	-.08	-.25	-.02
Partisanship. X ₃₇	.00	-.23	.19	-.09	-.13	-.04	.34	-.01	.15	.00	-.02	.35
Reform Score. X ₃₈	.05	-.35	.14	-.08	-.46	-.06	.24	-.18	-.27	.03	-.32	.32
Police Budget Per Capita. X ₃₉	.14	.57	-.07	-.28	.59	.64	.30	.39	.48	.34	.70	.02
Percent Budget Allocated to Public Safety. X ₄₀	-.04	-.27	-.42	.14	-.22	-.09	.10	-.06	-.26	.05	-.13	.07

Continued

Variable	X ₁	X ₂	X ₃	X ₄	X ₅	X ₆	X ₇	X ₈	X ₉	X ₁₀	X ₁₁	X ₁₂
Chief Tenure. X ₄₁	.09	.24	-.03	.23	.27	.16	-.14	.23	.22	-.08	.11	-.13
Alcohol Safety Action Program . . X ₄₂	-.08	-.15	-.20	.08	-.04	-.12	.10	-.09	-.01	-.01	.00	.16
LEAA Funding. X ₄₃	.48	-.24	-.19	-.28	-.14	.09	.18	-.03	-.36	.47	.05	.24
Acquittals Murder. X ₄₄	-.29	.33	-.11	.30	.17	.10	-.13	.06	.19	-.08	.04	-.32
Acquittals Rape X ₄₅	-.24	.29	-.21	.24	.24	.18	.08	.29	.33	.10	.24	.02
Acquittals Aggravated Assault . . X ₄₆	.14	.23	-.19	.01	.22	.23	.16	.32	.23	.12	.28	.08
Acquittals Robbery. X ₄₇	-.15	.14	-.07	.13	.11	.15	-.07	.09	.25	-.18	.12	-.18
Acquittals Burglary X ₄₈	-.07	.09	-.17	.22	.02	.03	-.20	.05	.11	-.18	.00	-.24
Acquittals Larceny. X ₄₉	.20	-.14	-.35	-.18	.03	.14	.16	.16	.02	.20	.16	.18
Acquittals Prostitution X ₅₀	-.04	.17	-.24	-.02	.24	.18	.12	.12	.29	.02	.17	.14
Acquittals Narcotics. X ₅₁	.27	.02	-.31	-.01	-.01	.01	.07	.08	.00	.07	.06	.02
Acquittals Gambling X ₅₂	.15	.19	-.13	-.11	.14	.10	.07	.16	.16	.03	.15	.07
Acquittals Simple Assault X ₅₃	.11	.36	-.07	-.22	.50	.43	-.04	.26	.32	.01	.43	-.03
Acquittals Weapons. X ₅₄	.12	-.08	-.37	-.27	.20	.39	.12	.01	.03	.13	.20	.10
Acquittals Drunk Driving. X ₅₅	-.05	.00	-.20	-.22	.12	.10	-.11	-.11	.05	-.02	.10	-.13
Acquittals Public Drunkenness . . X ₅₆	-.13	-.12	-.24	.06	-.05	.08	-.33	-.23	-.14	-.07	-.07	-.41
Acquittals Disorderly Conduct . . X ₅₇	.18	.38	-.30	-.05	.42	.25	-.11	.23	.08	.05	.27	.00
Total Acquittals. X ₅₈	.23	.11	-.26	-.19	.23	.27	.15	.16	.13	.16	.30	.17
Police Officers X ₅₉	.16	.71	-.19	-.15	.80	.72	.17	.56	.54	.44	.79	-.09
Police Cars X ₆₀	.09	.20	-.09	.13	-.07	-.12	.00	.04	-.06	.03	-.02	.00

Continued

Variable	X ₁	X ₂	X ₃	X ₄	X ₅	X ₆	X ₇	X ₈	X ₉	X ₁₀	X ₁₁	X ₁₂
Ranking Officers. X ₆₁	.12	.10	-.07	.04	-.12	.21	-.10	-.01	-.07	.04	-.12	.00
Police Stations. X ₆₂	-.02	.34	-.03	-.23	.56	.62	-.02	.16	.28	.12	.50	-.25
Unions. X ₆₃	.13	-.05	-.06	.16	-.14	-.27	-.22	-.07	-.33	-.02	-.30	-.26
Specific Nonpatrol Duties. X ₆₄	-.04	-.08	-.04	.10	-.11	-.16	-.16	-.12	-.11	.10	-.28	-.10
Vice Assignment. X ₆₅	.12	.18	-.03	-.06	.10	.14	-.08	.08	.10	-.03	.07	-.15
Traffic Assignment. X ₆₆	.19	.24	-.22	-.27	.23	.52	.23	.21	.29	.31	.37	.10
Salary Chief. X ₆₇	.15	.23	.01	-.48	.28	.54	.48	.27	.29	.28	.53	.28
Salary Patrol. X ₆₈	-.16	-.02	.02	-.46	.18	.59	.39	.02	.11	.10	.40	.23
Promotional Criteria. X ₆₉	-.16	-.08	.02	.15	-.15	-.22	.02	-.08	-.20	-.12	-.09	-.03
College Incentive Pay. X ₇₀	.05	.03	.14	-.02	-.06	-.24	.10	.06	.27	.00	-.07	.14
Seniority. X ₇₁	-.29	-.15	-.16	.38	-.20	-.25	.01	-.13	-.02	-.24	-.20	.03
Beat Assignment. X ₇₂	-.10	-.29	-.14	-.25	-.19	.10	.11	-.12	.00	.07	.01	.14
Foot Patrol. X ₇₃	.10	.37	-.14	.05	.56	.70	.24	.37	.35	.30	.62	.10
Minority Employment. X ₇₄	.00	-.16	-.19	-.04	-.23	-.13	.01	-.09	-.19	-.07	-.14	.07
Community Relations Training. X ₇₅	.08	.22	-.20	-.02	.53	.54	.24	.44	.19	.32	.61	.09
Review Board. X ₇₆	.09	.12	-.18	.18	-.02	.04	-.10	.02	-.17	.15	.06	-.18
School Programs. X ₇₇	.31	.16	.28	-.34	.23	.29	.12	.18	.14	-.03	.24	.14
Computerization. X ₇₈	.18	.05	.07	.00	.10	.03	.07	.04	.26	-.19	.09	.15
Helicopters. X ₇₉	.12	.08	.01	-.07	-.14	-.26	-.01	.18	.24	.02	.04	.14
Two-Man Patrol. X ₈₀	-.16	.09	-.17	-.14	.35	.57	-.06	.05	.13	.01	.30	-.18

Continued

Variable	X ₁	X ₂	X ₃	X ₄	X ₅	X ₆	X ₇	X ₈	X ₉	X ₁₀	X ₁₁	X ₁₂
Civilian Support. X ₈₁	.43	.06	.04	-.17	-.11	-.20	.34	.16	.11	.10	.03	.36
Computer Technicians. X ₈₂	.00	.16	-.14	-.16	.21	.21	.13	.05	.16	.11	.23	.13
Murder Arrests. X ₈₃	.36	.79	-.18	.07	.69	.28	.24	.94	.64	.47	.68	.15
Rape Arrests. X ₈₄	.14	.65	.02	-.20	.66	.55	.21	.58	.66	.46	.71	.02
Aggravated Assault Arrests. . . . X ₈₅	.37	.67	-.11	-.10	.68	.50	.49	.74	.59	.58	.78	.30
Robbery Arrests. X ₈₆	.41	.77	-.07	-.17	.80	.58	.34	.73	.50	.56	.84	.13
Burglary Arrests. X ₈₇	.31	.49	-.01	-.14	.40	.17	.50	.51	.39	.39	.53	.43
Larceny Arrests. X ₈₈	.39	.31	.12	-.23	.21	-.04	.60	.44	.45	.38	.34	.62
Prostitution Arrests. X ₈₉	.18	.40	-.05	-.28	.44	.38	.49	.51	.49	.32	.61	.41
Narcotics Arrests. X ₉₀	.30	.20	.16	-.19	.18	.09	.37	.32	.56	.24	.31	.30
Gambling Arrests. X ₉₁	.05	.54	-.09	.20	.40	.20	-.12	.46	.36	.18	.32	-.14
Simple Assault Arrests. X ₉₂	-.03	.28	.28	-.09	.22	.02	-.14	.08	.06	.01	.02	-.10
Weapons Arrests. X ₉₃	.47	.62	-.10	.04	.50	.06	.29	.82	.56	.46	.50	.28
Drunk Driving Arrests. X ₉₄	.15	-.23	.16	-.08	-.33	-.46	.07	-.10	.06	-.05	-.28	.23
Public Drunkenness Arrests. . . . X ₉₅	.34	.26	.00	-.21	.13	-.15	.35	.47	.32	.39	.26	.44
Disorderly Conduct Arrests. . . . X ₉₆	.29	.44	.16	-.05	.35	-.05	.13	.55	.46	.31	.33	.19
Juvenile Arrests. X ₉₇	-.02	-.10	.25	-.10	-.12	-.17	.24	-.06	-.07	.08	-.06	.22
Nonwhite Arrests. X ₉₈	.36	.81	-.15	-.26	.75	.57	.12	.66	.49	.49	.70	.00
Total Arrests. X ₉₉	.39	.51	.08	-.14	.39	.00	.29	.65	.56	.45	.42	.32
Crime/Arrest Ratio. X ₁₀₀	-.38	-.36	-.19	.19	-.35	-.10	.08	-.36	-.13	-.19	-.30	.06
Arrests Part II 1970. X ₁₀₁	.35	.10	.15	-.35	.06	-.14	.34	.36	.27	.41	.13	.40
Arrests Part II 1973. X ₁₀₂	.35	.28	.12	-.11	.12	-.25	.24	.51	.39	.35	.16	.35

Continued

Variable	X ₁₃	X ₁₄	X ₁₅	X ₁₆	X ₁₇	X ₁₈	X ₁₉	X ₂₀	X ₂₁	X ₂₂	X ₂₃	X ₂₄
Crime Rate Increase. X ₁₄	.23											
Income Less Than \$3000 X ₁₅	-.24	-.17										
Income More Than \$15,000 X ₁₆	.31	.10	-.73									
White Collar X ₁₇	.32	-.01	-.54	.64								
Foreign or Mixed Parentage X ₁₈	.02	.04	-.12	.23	.01							
Private School X ₁₉	.06	.05	-.44	.56	.32	.17						
Retail Sales X ₂₀	-.01	-.16	-.14	-.07	.12	-.05	-.13					
Owner Occupied Housing X ₂₁	.26	.20	-.34	.06	.20	-.22	-.02	-.26				
Median Income. X ₂₂	.27	.19	-.90	.91	.58	.20	.50	.02	.17			
Population Change. X ₂₃	.17	.18	-.22	.25	.21	-.19	-.06	-.28	.38	.25		
White Migration. X ₂₄	.45	.27	-.41	.38	.44	-.19	.41	-.24	.46	.33	.54	
Median Age X ₂₅	.05	-.21	-.10	-.01	-.10	.06	.08	.60	-.22	-.02	-.26	-.12
Population Size. X ₂₆	-.04	-.31	.01	.23	.05	.03	.22	-.15	-.07	.14	-.04	-.30
Region X ₂₇	.02	.02	.57	-.36	-.08	-.18	-.17	-.02	.02	-.48	.05	.10
Revenue/Income Ratio X ₂₈	-.26	-.16	.29	-.06	-.21	.13	-.07	.16	-.76	-.16	-.31	-.62
Chamber of Commerce Membership X ₂₉	.05	.25	-.12	-.22	.11	-.20	-.02	.21	.53	-.07	-.08	.23
ACLU Membership. X ₃₀	.14	-.35	-.17	.23	.24	.24	-.02	.35	-.18	.19	-.32	-.32
League Membership. X ₃₁	.20	-.10	-.24	.05	.35	-.10	.01	.52	-.11	.17	-.15	.01
Civil Rights Group Mobilization. X ₃₂	-.28	-.36	.15	-.25	.17	-.22	-.15	.28	-.25	-.17	-.28	-.49
Goldwater Vote X ₃₃	.24	.14	.06	-.09	.21	-.48	.01	-.06	.37	-.08	.23	.56
American Party Vote. X ₃₄	-.21	.06	.44	-.46	-.13	-.58	-.27	-.06	.18	-.44	.23	.13
Government Form. X ₃₅	.41	.07	-.15	.20	.18	-.21	-.02	.03	.15	.10	.13	.38

Continued

Variable	X ₁₃	X ₁₄	X ₁₅	X ₁₆	X ₁₇	X ₁₈	X ₁₉	X ₂₀	X ₂₁	X ₂₂	X ₂₃	X ₂₄
Election Type. X ₃₆	.15	.07	-.06	.14	.14	.08	-.03	-.05	.00	.04	.08	.37
Partisanship X ₃₇	.55	.18	-.07	-.01	.15	.04	.03	.21	-.02	.02	-.10	.22
Reform Score X ₃₈	.52	.19	-.15	.16	.27	-.26	.04	.09	.25	.11	.28	-.16
Police Budget Per Capita X ₃₉	.30	-.34	.03	.14	.08	.07	-.09	.26	-.51	.07	-.28	-.49
Police Budget Allocated to Public Safety X ₄₀	.10	-.03	.01	-.09	-.35	.17	-.04	.05	.24	-.06	-.07	.10
Chief Tenure X ₄₁	-.14	-.18	.34	-.27	-.36	.10	.00	-.20	-.21	-.29	-.14	-.19
Alcohol Safety Action Program. . . X ₄₂	.10	-.03	.02	-.02	.13	-.08	.04	.06	.12	-.05	-.11	-.07
LEAA Funding X ₄₃	.18	-.11	.05	-.03	-.11	.13	-.06	.18	-.17	-.10	.08	.37
Acquittals Murder. X ₄₄	-.13	.03	.12	-.18	-.27	-.05	-.01	-.15	-.03	-.06	-.42	-.31
Acquittals Rape. X ₄₅	.08	.01	.09	-.21	-.18	-.26	-.30	.10	-.03	-.12	-.31	-.33
Acquittals Aggravated Assault. . . X ₄₆	.16	.06	.13	-.07	-.28	-.02	.11	-.03	-.19	-.06	-.29	-.29
Acquittals Robbery X ₄₇	-.07	-.06	-.06	.04	-.13	.07	.13	-.07	-.02	.09	-.34	-.31
Acquittals Burglary. X ₄₈	-.20	-.02	-.07	.12	-.06	.05	.20	-.19	.02	.13	-.21	-.18
Acquittals Larceny X ₄₉	.08	-.06	-.02	.00	-.02	.12	-.25	-.22	.04	-.02	-.19	-.16
Acquittals Prostitution. X ₅₀	.02	-.01	.13	.00	-.11	.20	-.30	.30	.10	-.05	-.37	-.47
Acquittals Narcotics X ₅₁	.12	-.06	.02	.16	-.04	.06	.20	-.02	-.02	.06	-.15	-.02
Acquittals Gambling. X ₅₂	-.02	.06	-.02	.27	.06	.19	.33	.06	-.09	.17	-.16	-.13
Acquittals Simple Assault. X ₅₃	-.33	-.02	.15	-.24	-.27	.06	-.09	.29	-.34	-.17	-.49	.00
Acquittals Weapons X ₅₄	.00	-.03	.16	-.10	-.27	.44	-.17	.27	-.08	-.19	-.37	-.59
Acquittals Drunk Driving X ₅₅	-.20	-.34	-.05	.06	.14	.17	-.03	.32	.02	.03	-.30	-.40

Continued

Variable	X ₁₃	X ₁₄	X ₁₅	X ₁₆	X ₁₇	X ₁₈	X ₁₉	X ₂₀	X ₂₁	X ₂₂	X ₂₃	X ₂₄
Acquittals Public Drunkenness. . . X ₅₆	-.34	-.22	-.13	.00	.05	.29	.10	.15	.09	.02	-.06	-.23
Acquittals Disorderly Conduct. . . X ₅₇	-.31	.24	.29	-.25	-.36	.01	-.08	.28	-.37	-.25	-.26	-.09
Total Acquittals X ₅₈	.01	.06	.03	.01	-.14	.10	.13	.22	-.22	-.03	-.37	-.48
Police Officers. X ₅₉	-.23	.01	.24	-.14	-.26	.04	-.23	.29	-.60	-.17	-.41	-.20
Police Cars. X ₆₀	.10	-.32	-.10	.40	.10	-.03	.37	-.06	.03	.04	.25	.19
Ranking Officers X ₆₁	-.01	.07	-.10	.02	-.06	-.25	.14	.14	-.51	-.11	-.34	.43
Police Stations. X ₆₂	-.33	.03	.14	-.08	-.08	.29	-.03	-.10	.10	-.15	.17	-.56
Unions X ₆₃	.00	-.28	.16	-.08	-.06	-.35	-.32	.04	.12	-.28	-.07	.10
Specific Nonpatrol Duties. . . . X ₆₄	-.11	.02	.23	-.34	-.24	-.13	-.18	.04	.12	-.28	-.07	.11
Vice Assignment. X ₆₅	-.07	-.05	.02	.07	-.07	-.04	.06	-.13	-.12	.02	-.16	-.13
Traffic Assignment X ₆₆	.04	-.08	.16	.05	-.11	.24	.09	.13	-.37	-.03	-.16	-.27
Salary Chief X ₆₇	.28	-.11	-.18	.38	.16	.33	.06	.33	-.47	.33	-.17	-.33
Salary Patrol. X ₆₈	.18	-.16	-.23	.24	.01	.43	.10	.37	-.43	.25	-.30	-.34
Promotional Criteria X ₆₉	.14	.06	-.08	.25	.23	-.08	.03	-.03	.04	.15	.17	.12
College Incentive Pay. X ₇₀	.10	.27	-.05	-.05	.16	-.45	-.19	-.03	.19	.02	.12	.08
Seniority. X ₇₁	.14	.26	-.19	.01	-.06	.00	.11	-.20	.26	.14	.11	.24
Beat Assignment. X ₇₂	.04	.15	-.34	.13	.23	.08	-.11	.50	.04	.24	-.03	.06
Foot Patrol. X ₇₃	-.17	.06	.28	-.17	-.30	.40	-.06	.07	-.59	-.16	-.21	-.44
Minority Employment. X ₇₄	.18	-.04	-.26	.12	-.06	-.06	-.16	.03	.24	.18	.46	.12
Community Relations Training . . X ₇₅	-.23	.01	.29	-.22	-.30	.20	-.19	.34	-.50	-.27	-.15	-.37

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Continued

Variable	X ₁₃	X ₁₄	X ₁₅	X ₁₆	X ₁₇	X ₁₈	X ₁₉	X ₂₀	X ₂₁	X ₂₂	X ₂₃	X ₂₄
Review Board.X ₇₆	.01	-.06	.00	.26	-.06	.07	-.04	-.17	-.04	.16	.22	-.01
School ProgramsX ₇₇	-.05	.10	.05	.06	.06	.04	.22	.15	-.43	-.01	-.22	-.01
ComputerizationX ₇₈	.01	-.09	.06	.07	.21	.04	-.04	-.05	-.07	-.01	-.18	-.16
HelicoptersX ₇₉	.00	-.15	-.16	.21	.28	-.39	.23	.04	.19	.17	.31	.19
Two-Man Patrol.X ₈₀	-.38	-.09	.14	-.25	-.31	.42	-.08	.16	-.33	-.20	-.19	-.37
Civilian Support.X ₈₁	.43	-.01	.09	.20	.18	-.24	.21	-.20	.11	.02	.14	.18
Computer Technicians.X ₈₂	.01	-.09	-.06	-.01	-.04	-.17	-.02	.21	-.21	.01	-.13	-.15
Murder Arrests.X ₈₃	-.16	-.10	.39	-.33	-.40	-.36	-.18	.17	-.36	-.27	-.18	-.54
Rape Arrests.X ₈₄	-.18	-.42	.20	-.13	-.09	-.13	-.06	.23	-.42	-.11	-.34	-.63
Aggravated Assault Arrests. . . .X ₈₅	.08	-.30	.34	-.14	-.12	-.10	-.14	.18	-.46	-.19	-.06	-.48
Robbery ArrestsX ₈₆	-.08	-.41	.35	-.16	-.15	-.11	-.17	.20	-.63	-.25	-.29	-.55
Burglary Arrests.X ₈₇	.22	-.22	.40	-.17	-.23	-.15	.05	.13	-.29	-.12	-.12	-.22
Larceny ArrestsX ₈₈	.39	-.11	.27	-.02	.03	-.17	.23	.19	-.12	-.09	-.16	.07
Prostitution Arrests.X ₈₉	.08	-.14	.20	-.01	.25	.11	.10	.44	-.38	.02	-.27	-.34
Narcotics ArrestsX ₉₀	.23	-.19	.07	-.01	.10	-.08	.16	.05	-.15	.02	.00	.02
Gambling Arrests.X ₉₁	-.31	-.08	.06	.07	.07	-.26	-.13	-.12	-.14	-.25	-.15	-.34
Simple Assault Arrests.X ₉₂	-.12	.00	.18	-.24	-.17	-.30	-.08	.05	-.18	-.18	-.12	-.22
Weapons ArrestsX ₉₃	.00	-.03	.26	-.26	-.12	-.39	-.09	.29	-.22	-.15	-.08	-.21
Drunk Driving ArrestsX ₉₄	.20	.13	-.18	.04	.33	-.36	.18	.03	.31	.12	.10	.43
Public Drunkenness Arrests. . . .X ₉₅	.18	.20	-.06	-.05	.24	-.32	.08	.62	-.08	.08	-.02	.09

Continued

Variable	X ₁₃	X ₁₄	X ₁₅	X ₁₆	X ₁₇	X ₁₈	X ₁₉	X ₂₀	X ₂₁	X ₂₂	X ₂₃	X ₂₄
Disorderly Conduct Arrests. X ₉₆	.03	.03	.04	-.10	.14	-.32	-.03	.34	-.14	.03	-.15	-.20
Juvenile Arrests. X ₉₇	.37	.02	-.14	.11	.16	-.14	.26	-.03	.09	.12	.09	.26
Nonwhite Arrests. X ₉₈	-.29	-.38	.35	-.24	-.48	-.11	-.08	.25	-.56	-.26	-.43	-.68
Total Arrests X ₉₉	.04	-.18	.23	-.16	.02	-.45	.04	.26	-.22	-.14	-.07	-.14
Crime/Arrest Ratio. X ₁₀₀	.13	.36	-.24	.06	-.04	.13	-.36	-.05	.31	.17	.29	.16
Arrests Part II 1970. X ₁₀₁	.20	-.02	.19	-.22	.08	-.51	.07	.36	-.05	-.25	.02	.24
Arrests Part II 1975. X ₁₀₂	.13	.00	.10	-.14	.14	-.49	.06	.36	-.04	-.06	.09	.14

Continued

Variable	X ₂₅	X ₂₆	X ₂₇	X ₂₈	X ₂₉	X ₃₀	X ₃₁	X ₃₂	X ₃₃	X ₃₄	X ₃₅	X ₃₆
Population Size. X ₂₆	-.07											
Region X ₂₇	-.23	.00										
Revenue/Income Ratio X ₂₈	.13	-.28	-.08									
Chamber of Commerce Membership . . X ₂₉	-.09	-.54	.20	-.39								
ACLU Membership. X ₃₀	.39	.28	-.28	.22	-.41							
League Membership. X ₃₁	.32	-.13	-.10	-.06	.26	.33						
Civil Rights Group Mobilization. . X ₃₂	.24	.46	-.08	.35	-.12	.13	.11					
Goldwater Vote X ₃₃	-.21	-.24	.28	-.62	.30	-.41	.06	-.06				
American Party Vote. X ₃₄	-.14	-.18	.61	-.24	.24	-.50	-.13	.14	.63			
Government Form. X ₃₅	.04	-.24	.08	-.18	.07	.16	-.03	-.40	.06	-.22		
Election Type. X ₃₆	.02	-.21	.02	-.18	-.17	-.15	-.15	-.31	.15	-.01	.29	
Partisanship X ₃₇	-.14	-.27	-.07	-.18	.25	.07	.10	-.26	.26	-.08	.36	.22
Reform Score X ₃₈	-.03	-.35	.16	-.38	.11	.06	.06	-.50	.32	.02	.81	.51
Police Budget Per Capita X ₃₉	.24	.49	-.07	.72	-.42	.49	.09	.39	-.52	-.36	-.06	-.08
Percent Budget Allocated to Public Safety X ₄₀	.29	-.09	-.22	-.50	-.08	.06	-.10	-.07	.16	-.08	.03	.18
Chief Tenure X ₄₁	-.27	.10	-.06	.01	.02	-.30	-.15	.28	.15	.17	-.45	-.15
Alcohol Safety Action Program. . . X ₄₂	.02	.24	-.09	.05	.00	.25	.07	.28	.06	-.12	.06	-.06
LEAA Funding X ₄₃	.48	-.38	.16	-.19	-.02	.06	.27	-.44	.08	-.13	.33	.24
Acquittals Murder. X ₄₄	-.15	.07	-.28	.02	-.11	-.14	-.30	.17	.09	.13	-.27	.22
Acquittals Rape. X ₄₅	-.13	.16	-.05	.08	.11	-.04	-.10	.42	-.18	-.12	.12	.08

Continued

Variable	X ₂₅	X ₂₆	X ₂₇	X ₂₈	X ₂₉	X ₃₀	X ₃₁	X ₃₂	X ₃₃	X ₃₄	X ₃₅	X ₃₆
Acquittals Aggravated Assault. . . X ₄₆	.09	.27	-.16	.14	-.16	.28	-.09	.14	-.33	-.23	.12	.20
Acquittals Robbery X ₄₇	-.14	.31	-.29	.01	-.16	.07	-.20	.19	-.31	-.27	-.10	.19
Acquittals Burglary. X ₄₈	-.13	.36	-.15	-.10	-.17	.06	-.21	.19	-.23	-.23	-.07	.27
Acquittals Larceny X ₄₉	.32	.16	.15	-.19	.12	.19	.30	-.01	-.34	-.26	.13	.07
Acquittals Prostitution. X ₅₀	.21	.26	-.20	.10	-.17	.50	.13	.08	-.31	-.26	-.31	-.06
Acquittals Narcotics X ₅₁	.27	.27	-.06	-.11	-.22	.14	.04	.12	-.11	-.25	-.08	.33
Acquittals Gambling. X ₅₂	.20	.15	-.15	.12	-.08	.20	.25	.03	-.11	-.09	-.52	-.35
Acquittals Simple Assault. X ₅₃	.29	-.04	-.25	.32	-.08	.31	.36	.27	-.42	-.21	-.28	-.12
Acquittals Weapons X ₅₄	.53	.06	-.13	.03	-.17	.54	.16	-.04	-.45	-.28	-.19	.14
Acquittals Drunk Driving X ₅₅	.40	.14	-.23	-.06	-.27	.42	.07	.28	-.09	-.03	-.20	.11
Acquittals Public Drunkenness. . . X ₅₆	.21	-.20	-.17	-.13	.00	.11	-.05	.16	-.11	-.01	-.36	.14
Acquittals Disorderly Conduct. . . X ₅₇	.26	-.23	-.08	-.40	.06	.11	.24	.16	-.24	.07	-.12	-.17
Total Acquittals X ₅₈	.31	.11	-.17	.13	-.02	.18	.29	.04	-.34	-.36	.02	.16
Police Officers. X ₅₉	.19	.42	-.03	.82	-.36	.37	.00	.51	-.58	-.25	-.19	.29
Police Cars. X ₆₀	-.09	.37	.00	.22	-.25	.00	-.02	-.01	-.16	-.16	-.10	-.22
Ranking Officers X ₆₁	.03	-.09	.13	-.19	.04	-.28	-.08	.00	.39	.40	-.09	.17
Police Stations. X ₆₂	.13	.46	-.21	.70	-.26	-.19	-.02	.46	-.54	-.21	-.41	-.14
Unions X ₆₃	-.13	-.06	.32	-.19	.08	-.11	.00	-.13	.22	.25	.33	.38
Specific Nonpatrol Duties. X ₆₄	.00	-.47	.05	-.30	.29	-.20	-.01	-.20	.49	.42	-.06	.12
Vice Assignment. X ₆₅	.16	-.05	-.06	.12	-.18	.37	-.04	.02	-.11	-.04	-.09	.14

Continued

Variable	X ₂₅	X ₂₆	X ₂₇	X ₂₈	X ₂₉	X ₃₀	X ₃₁	X ₃₂	X ₃₃	X ₃₄	X ₃₅	X ₃₆
Traffic Assignment. X ₆₆	.43	.22	-.14	.42	-.25	.08	-.08	.22	-.24	-.18	-.17	-.06
Salary Chief. X ₆₇	.40	.33	-.23	.42	-.35	.58	.14	.08	-.47	-.46	.14	-.01
Salary Patrol X ₆₈	.44	.07	-.59	.25	-.32	.50	.13	.13	-.35	-.57	.19	.06
Promotional Criteria. X ₆₉	-.14	.01	-.04	-.08	-.03	-.04	-.14	-.08	.22	.04	.06	.02
College Incentive Pay X ₇₀	-.10	-.06	.26	-.14	.22	-.33	-.06	.02	.30	.36	.07	.14
Seniority X ₇₁	-.28	-.02	-.20	-.23	.22	-.25	.04	.02	.27	-.03	-.18	-.23
Beat Assignment X ₇₂	.38	-.36	-.14	-.08	.25	.09	.16	-.17	.00	-.07	.08	.18
Foot Patrol X ₇₃	.00	.06	-.06	.66	-.17	-.22	-.13	.20	-.44	-.24	-.37	-.03
Minority Employment X ₇₄	.30	.00	-.02	-.13	-.07	.33	.15	.11	-.13	-.01	-.01	-.04
Community Relations Training. . . . X ₇₅	.11	.05	-.07	.56	-.22	.01	-.20	.14	-.39	-.19	-.08	.11
Review Board. X ₇₆	-.01	.35	.10	.13	-.48	.32	-.16	-.16	-.23	-.25	.18	.10
School Programs X ₇₇	.09	-.19	-.01	.34	.12	.00	.26	-.08	-.20	-.18	.10	.00
Computerization X ₇₈	-.08	-.05	-.06	.06	.18	.02	.16	.08	-.09	-.16	-.15	-.01
Helicopters X ₇₉	-.02	.28	.23	-.08	-.08	.10	-.06	.10	.12	.20	.00	-.01
Two-Man Patrol. X ₈₀	.23	-.05	-.25	.35	-.12	.00	-.14	.29	-.39	-.11	-.31	-.08
Civilian Support. X ₈₁	.14	.17	.20	-.04	-.08	-.02	-.10	-.10	.22	.21	.15	.08
Computer Technicians. X ₈₂	.23	-.06	-.22	.37	.00	.37	.16	.09	-.23	-.21	.22	.06
Murder Arrests. X ₈₃	.00	.30	.26	.37	-.13	.08	-.01	.51	-.13	.24	-.25	-.44
Rape Arrests. X ₈₄	.07	.40	-.04	.65	-.20	.20	.11	.51	-.37	-.16	-.19	-.50
Aggravated Assault Arrests. . . . X ₈₅	.08	.29	.18	.59	-.19	.18	.01	.40	-.31	-.08	-.04	-.30

Continued

Variable	X ₂₅	X ₂₆	X ₂₇	X ₂₈	X ₂₉	X ₃₀	X ₃₁	X ₃₂	X ₃₃	X ₃₄	X ₃₅	X ₃₆
Robbery Arrests. X ₈₆	.08	.29	.18	.59	-.19	.18	.01	.40	-.31	-.08	-.04	-.30
Burglary Arrests. X ₈₇	.15	.13	.00	.28	-.18	.19	.02	.32	.01	.00	.14	-.36
Larceny Arrests. X ₈₈	.03	.04	.18	.11	.19	.03	.27	.11	.10	.08	.04	-.24
Prostitution Arrests. X ₈₉	.25	.22	-.08	.40	-.06	.34	.06	.37	-.30	-.13	-.06	-.14
Narcotics Arrests. X ₉₀	.08	.22	-.03	.09	-.18	.20	.25	.26	.11	-.08	.00	-.42
Gambling Arrests. X ₉₁	-.17	.26	.13	.37	-.24	-.09	-.44	.24	-.29	.08	-.07	-.13
Simple Assault Arrests. X ₉₂	-.16	-.12	.03	.28	.11	-.15	.27	.16	-.02	.15	.10	-.16
Weapons Arrests. X ₉₃	-.03	.16	.37	.17	.16	.03	.28	.36	.07	.28	-.19	-.40
Drunk Driving Arrests. X ₉₄	-.04	-.04	.09	-.40	.28	.02	.32	-.08	.54	.22	.16	-.25
Public Drunkenness Arrests. X ₉₅	.16	-.04	.40	-.17	.34	.12	.54	.05	.30	.26	-.08	-.13
Disorderly Conduct Arrests. X ₉₆	-.13	.08	.30	.11	.22	.10	.38	.17	.04	.12	-.08	-.35
Juvenile Arrests. X ₉₇	-.07	.08	-.08	.00	-.08	.10	.24	.05	.19	-.08	.22	-.20
Nonwhite Arrests. X ₉₈	.34	.24	.00	.60	-.29	.19	.03	.51	-.38	.04	-.28	-.20
Total Arrests. X ₉₉	-.04	.20	.25	.20	.06	.11	.26	.34	.12	.22	.03	-.42
Crime/Arrest Ratio. X ₁₀₀	.03	-.24	-.20	-.32	.01	-.06	-.08	-.25	.10	.00	-.01	.42
Arrests Part II 1970. X ₁₀₁	.16	.03	.31	-.06	.16	-.07	.25	.19	.41	.41	.22	-.21
Arrests Part II 1973. X ₁₀₂	-.06	.07	.34	-.11	.19	.04	.36	.23	.40	.36	.05	-.28

Continued

Variable	X ₃₇	X ₃₈	X ₃₉	X ₄₀	X ₄₁	X ₄₂	X ₄₃	X ₄₄	X ₄₅	X ₄₆	X ₄₇	X ₄₈
Reform Score. X ₃₈	.58											
Police Budget Per Capita. X ₃₉	-.07	-.28										
Percent Budget Allocated to Public Safety. X ₄₀	.01	.04	-.32									
Chief Tenure. X ₄₁	.14	-.40	-.12	-.14								
Alcohol Safety Action Program . . X ₄₂	-.03	-.02	.04	-.09	-.22							
LEAA Funding. X ₄₃	.11	.30	-.13	.33	-.15	-.19						
Acquittals Murder X ₄₄	.10	-.16	.15	.31	.25	-.04	-.41					
Acquittals Rape X ₄₅	.05	.02	.23	.19	.10	.12	-.42	.44				
Acquittals Aggravated Assault . . X ₄₆	.21	.20	.40	.28	.05	.13	-.12	.43	.62			
Acquittals Robbery. X ₄₇	.07	-.07	.25	.28	.24	.02	-.42	.59	.67	.79		
Acquittals Burglary X ₄₈	-.14	-.09	.06	.35	.21	.01	-.34	.52	.65	.73	-.90	
Acquittals Larceny. X ₄₉	-.09	.04	.08	.35	-.24	-.02	-.19	-.21	.34	.25	.22	.27
Acquittals Prostitution X ₅₀	-.41	-.29	.24	.24	-.13	.14	-.23	.05	.00	.22	.12	.22
Acquittals Narcotics. X ₅₁	-.30	-.04	.17	.52	-.07	.19	.15	.20	.27	.60	.57	.68
Acquittals Gambling X ₅₂	-.44	-.56	.16	.08	.02	.02	.01	-.13	-.36	-.07	-.16	-.03
Acquittals Simple Assault X ₅₃	-.12	-.30	.35	.11	.16	.11	-.10	.13	.28	.52	.47	.38
Acquittals Weapons. X ₅₄	-.14	-.15	.18	.51	-.07	.00	.10	-.04	-.03	.30	.17	.20
Acquittals Drunk Driving. X ₅₅	-.41	-.25	.22	.29	-.16	.28	-.16	.04	-.02	.12	.27	.30
Acquittals Public Drunkenness . . X ₅₆	-.31	-.27	-.09	.30	.05	-.13	-.10	.35	.08	.25	.37	.49
Acquittals Disorderly Conduct . . X ₅₇	-.06	-.07	.02	-.14	.11	.18	-.06	-.04	-.11	.19	.00	-.01
Total Acquittals. X ₅₈	-.11	.03	.34	.26	-.09	.13	.18	.00	.26	.64	.45	.46

Continued

Variable	X ₃₇	X ₃₈	X ₃₉	X ₄₀	X ₄₁	X ₄₂	X ₄₃	X ₄₄	X ₄₅	X ₄₆	X ₄₇	X ₄₈
Police Officers. X ₅₉	-.19	-.53	-.87	-.23	.06	.01	-.18	.21	.32	.34	.25	.12
Police Cars. X ₆₀	-.54	-.24	.18	-.19	-.20	.21	.06	-.21	-.17	.07	-.04	.06
Ranking Officers. X ₆₁	.04	.10	-.15	-.02	.04	-.21	.28	-.07	-.54	-.34	-.44	-.33
Police Stations. X ₆₂	-.33	-.61	.65	-.30	.10	.12	-.34	.23	.14	.21	.25	.12
Unions X ₆₃	.08	.33	-.08	.20	.02	.19	.19	.31	.34	.37	.26	.32
Specific Nonpatrol Duties. . . . X ₆₄	.17	.05	-.39	.29	.27	-.22	.34	.46	-.08	-.11	-.21	-.14
Vice Assignment. X ₆₅	.04	-.03	.19	.18	.02	-.13	-.04	.50	.17	.48	.41	.46
Traffic Assignment X ₆₆	-.08	-.19	.39	-.12	.01	.06	.25	.02	-.01	.23	-.03	-.10
Salary Chief X ₆₇	.21	.04	.68	-.10	-.20	-.09	.26	-.10	-.01	.30	.05	-.05
Salary Patrol. X ₆₈	.37	.09	.34	.20	.08	-.11	.12	.09	.18	.19	.19	.06
Promotional Criteria X ₆₉	-.03	.07	-.04	-.01	-.13	.33	-.13	.14	-.07	-.12	-.10	-.11
College Incentive Pay. X ₇₀	.03	.10	-.13	-.04	-.25	-.02	-.16	.15	.25	-.05	.04	.10
Seniority. X ₇₁	.19	-.15	-.11	.03	.19	.11	-.09	.06	-.27	-.30	-.24	-.31
Beat Assignment. X ₇₂	.21	.16	.00	.01	-.40	.02	.39	.07	-.01	-.04	-.17	-.23
Foot Patrol. X ₇₃	.06	-.34	.47	-.18	.28	-.15	-.03	.02	.21	.07	.10	.04
Minority Employment. X ₇₄	-.32	.02	-.07	.15	-.29	.19	.24	-.42	-.21	-.03	-.20	-.17
Community Relations Training . . X ₇₅	.16	-.10	.33	.03	.02	.09	.03	.02	.10	.11	-.09	-.14
Review Board X ₇₆	-.22	.06	.29	.03	-.31	.22	.40	-.15	-.23	.19	-.15	.02
School Programs. X ₇₇	.35	.07	.22	-.30	.20	-.14	.17	-.24	-.09	.12	-.11	-.15
Computerization. X ₇₈	-.05	-.14	.05	-.05	.29	.00	-.14	-.01	.36	.33	.51	.45

Continued

Variable	X ₃₇	X ₃₈	X ₃₉	X ₄₀	X ₄₁	X ₄₂	X ₄₃	X ₄₄	X ₄₅	X ₄₆	X ₄₇	X ₄₈
Helicopters X ₇₉	.06	.21	.12	-.28	-.08	.09	-.15	-.27	-.07	.11	.04	-.01
Two-Man Patrol X ₈₀	.00	-.35	.17	-.01	.28	-.22	-.18	-.02	.03	-.11	.09	-.04
Civilian Support X ₈₁	.08	.29	.03	-.12	-.17	.14	.12	-.10	-.33	.03	-.11	-.14
Computer Technicians X ₈₂	.12	.19	.29	-.20	-.26	.30	.05	.15	.11	.29	.13	.02
Murder Arrests X ₈₃	-.01	-.23	.36	-.09	.24	-.11	-.19	.19	.35	.35	.24	.17
Rape Arrests X ₈₄	-.14	-.37	.64	-.38	.15	.03	-.25	.12	.39	.27	.27	.13
Aggravated Assault Arrests X ₈₅	-.06	-.12	.62	-.26	.11	-.12	-.05	-.12	.27	.21	.08	.06
Robbery Arrests X ₈₆	-.10	-.26	.67	-.22	.17	-.05	.06	-.10	.17	.20	.05	-.04
Burglary Arrests X ₈₇	.00	.02	.31	-.14	.11	.00	-.04	-.18	.07	.05	-.08	-.13
Larceny Arrests X ₈₈	.18	.14	.16	-.27	.03	.10	-.06	-.24	.08	.10	-.04	-.13
Prostitution Arrests X ₈₉	.16	-.02	.44	-.13	-.14	.06	-.11	.01	.26	.29	.03	-.02
Narcotics Arrests X ₉₀	.07	-.08	.20	-.16	.18	-.02	.02	-.23	-.04	-.07	-.06	-.06
Gambling Arrests X ₉₁	-.14	-.12	.14	-.09	.10	-.06	-.28	.17	.40	.42	.32	.28
Simple Assault Arrests X ₉₂	.02	.12	-.06	-.45	.05	.17	-.27	-.05	.10	.08	-.01	-.14
Weapons Arrests X ₉₃	.02	-.08	.24	-.18	.08	-.09	-.01	-.06	.17	.22	.01	.02
Drunk Driving Arrests X ₉₄	.31	.22	-.29	-.07	-.12	.27	.07	-.12	-.20	-.12	-.24	-.22
Public Intoxication Arrests X ₉₅	.20	.16	.16	.00	-.12	-.16	.22	-.12	.04	-.06	-.18	-.12
Disorderly Conduct Arrests X ₉₆	.04	.00	.19	-.33	-.16	.02	-.08	-.07	.10	.11	.02	.02
Juvenile Arrests X ₉₇	.12	.23	-.02	-.28	-.18	.40	-.08	-.40	-.34	-.24	-.29	-.39
Nonwhite Arrests X ₉₈	-.32	-.42	.51	-.04	.24	-.14	.06	.18	.12	.35	.21	.16

Continued

Variable	X ₃₇	X ₃₈	X ₃₉	X ₄₀	X ₄₁	X ₄₂	X ₄₃	X ₄₄	X ₄₅	X ₄₆	X ₄₇	X ₄₈
Total Arrests. X ₉₉	.14	.08	.16	-.34	.06	.15	-.10	-.16	.14	.22	.04	-.02
Crime/Arrest Ratio X ₁₀₀	.04	.10	-.19	.44	-.12	-.20	.05	.56	.19	.04	.06	.11
Arrests Part II 1970 X ₁₀₁	.31	.31	-.12	-.12	-.02	.20	.01	-.25	.22	.19	-.07	-.15
Arrests Part II 1973 X ₁₀₂	.27	.24	-.07	-.19	.03	.10	-.01	-.19	.10	.13	-.09	-.10

Continued

Variable	X ₄₉	X ₅₀	X ₅₁	X ₅₂	X ₅₃	X ₅₄	X ₅₅	X ₅₆	X ₅₇	X ₅₈	X ₅₉	X ₆₀
Acquittals Prostitution. X ₅₀	.33											
Acquittals Narcotics X ₅₁	.35	.49										
Acquittals Gambling. X ₅₂	.11	.65	.31									
Acquittals Simple Assault. X ₅₃	.21	.49	.50	.33								
Acquittals Weapons X ₅₄	.59	.68	.44	.39	.50							
Acquittals Drunk Driving X ₅₅	.23	.62	.45	.40	.48	.52						
Acquittals Public Drunkenness. . . X ₅₆	-.06	.27	.47	.37	.32	.38	.52					
Acquittals Disorderly Conduct. . . X ₅₇	.09	.39	.10	.27	.62	.42	.24	.16				
Total Acquittals X ₅₈	.50	.57	.74	.35	.71	.60	.44	.31	.51			
Police Officers. X ₅₉	.07	.22	.07	.12	.43	.22	.18	-.02	.30	.26		
Police Cars. X ₆₀	-.03	.23	.35	.54	-.02	-.12	.03	-.17	.00	.24	.14	
Ranking Officers X ₆₁	-.27	-.24	-.12	.13	-.32	-.19	-.13	.15	.04	-.13	-.20	.07
Police Stations. X ₆₂	-.05	.16	.06	.18	.32	.18	.33	.38	.13	.23	.70	.17
Unions X ₆₃	.08	-.31	.22	-.32	-.02	.00	-.03	.12	-.06	.02	-.07	-.05
Specific Nonpatrol Duties. X ₆₄	-.34	-.14	-.23	.02	-.21	-.02	-.33	.38	-.04	-.30	-.26	-.34
Vice Assignment. X ₆₅	-.15	.13	.30	.19	.17	.30	.00	.60	.04	.04	.19	-.04
Traffic Assignment X ₆₆	-.02	.12	.30	.23	.13	.02	-.08	-.26	.14	.17	.32	.25
Salary Chief X ₆₇	.35	-.01	.00	.07	.02	.22	-.04	-.40	-.06	.16	.48	.02
Salary Patrol. X ₆₈	.15	-.12	-.08	-.19	.18	.22	.06	-.04	.02	.04	.24	-.40
Promotional Criteria X ₆₉	-.10	.00	.08	.34	-.06	-.12	.34	.31	.09	.02	-.19	.12
College Incentive Pay. X ₇₀	.04	-.02	.07	-.22	-.08	-.21	-.18	-.25	-.35	-.07	-.16	-.14

Continued

Variable	X ₄₉	X ₅₀	X ₅₁	X ₅₂	X ₅₃	X ₅₄	X ₅₅	X ₅₆	X ₅₇	X ₅₈	X ₅₉	X ₆₀
Seniority. X ₇₁	-.27	-.15	-.18	.11	-.23	-.28	-.33	-.21	-.04	-.15	-.12	.14
Beat Assignment. X ₇₂	.14	-.09	-.06	.00	-.06	.01	.09	.09	-.09	-.03	-.08	-.26
Foot Patrol. X ₇₃	-.04	-.08	-.04	-.09	.13	-.02	-.26	-.10	.12	.06	.62	-.04
Minority Employment. X ₇₄	.09	.10	.19	.06	.09	.27	.09	.10	.04	.04	-.12	.21
Community Relations Training . . . X ₇₅	.04	.07	.00	-.01	.22	.18	.02	-.07	.20	.23	.47	-.18
Review Board X ₇₆	.11	.19	.59	.19	-.04	.17	.00	-.10	.10	.31	.19	.45
School Programs. X ₇₇	-.10	-.15	-.14	.13	.32	-.08	-.34	-.34	.25	.19	.18	-.06
Computerization. X ₇₈	.21	.32	.44	.16	.52	.23	.26	.28	.21	.50	.03	.02
Helicopters. X ₇₉	-.02	-.11	-.02	-.12	-.11	-.14	.00	-.17	-.05	.04	-.04	.12
Two-Man Patrol X ₈₀	-.04	-.08	-.22	-.12	.23	.18	.18	.22	.13	-.15	.33	-.28
Civilian Support X ₈₁	-.02	.08	.12	.09	-.31	.00	-.15	-.32	.00	-.04	-.17	.15
Computer Technician. X ₈₂	-.08	.05	.08	-.18	.21	.07	.00	-.14	.36	.23	.33	.07
Murder Arrests X ₈₃	.14	.08	.04	.08	.27	-.07	-.12	-.24	.21	.10	.54	.04
Rape Arrests X ₈₄	-.09	.08	-.05	.07	.34	-.25	-.04	-.09	.09	.15	.72	.14
Aggravated Assault Arrests X ₈₅	.02	.06	.04	.01	.09	-.15	-.20	-.17	.01	.10	.64	.09
Robbery Arrests. X ₈₆	.00	.05	-.01	.15	.31	-.06	.05	-.13	.28	.19	.74	.11
Burglary Arrests X ₈₇	-.14	.03	-.05	.14	.07	-.24	.07	-.19	.14	.05	.26	.07
Larceny Arrests. X ₈₈	.12	.06	.01	.27	.07	-.24	-.10	-.34	.06	.18	.04	.17
Prostitution Arrests X ₈₉	.14	.17	.04	.06	.21	.01	.03	-.20	.04	.21	.37	-.07
Narcotics Arrests. X ₉₀	-.17	-.10	-.03	.18	.00	-.36	-.03	-.15	-.18	-.12	.10	.10

Continued

Variable	X ₄₉	X ₅₀	X ₅₁	X ₅₂	X ₅₃	X ₅₄	X ₅₅	X ₅₆	X ₅₇	X ₅₈	X ₅₉	X ₆₀
Gambling Arrests. X ₉₁	.10	.22	.11	-.08	.26	.04	-.08	-.16	.26	.26	.37	.15
Simple Assault Arrests. X ₉₂	-.21	-.09	-.20	-.19	.37	-.20	-.16	-.17	.56	.15	.04	.01
Knives Arrests. X ₉₃	.10	.09	.07	.22	.22	-.16	-.09	-.20	.14	.18	.34	.13
Drunk Driving Arrests. X ₉₄	-.13	-.28	-.26	-.07	-.32	-.32	-.21	-.46	-.09	-.22	-.35	-.04
Public Drunkenness Arrests. . . . X ₉₅	.12	.04	.06	.21	.15	-.06	-.06	-.08	-.09	.11	.04	-.04
Disorderly Conduct Arrests. . . . X ₉₆	.09	.13	.06	.20	.26	-.21	.03	-.12	.15	.20	.24	.11
Juvenile Arrests. X ₉₇	-.33	-.22	-.24	.01	-.21	-.37	-.01	-.32	.02	.17	-.08	.25
Nonwhite Arrests. X ₉₈	.02	.31	.26	.35	.55	.23	.23	.09	.39	.35	.70	.18
Total Arrests. X ₉₉	.01	-.04	-.02	.06	.18	-.26	-.04	-.32	.26	.17	.24	.14
Crime/Arrest Ratio. X ₁₀₀	.15	.16	.15	-.15	-.09	.39	-.03	.22	-.34	-.02	-.27	-.23
Arrests Part II 1970. X ₁₀₁	.03	-.29	-.05	-.13	.07	-.26	-.08	-.36	.02	.04	-.12	-.07
Arrests Part II 1973. X ₁₀₂	-.03	-.18	-.06	-.03	.06	-.35	-.11	-.34	.07	.01	-.04	.00

Continued

Variable	X ₆₁	X ₆₂	X ₆₃	X ₆₄	X ₆₅	X ₆₆	X ₆₇	X ₆₈	X ₆₉	X ₇₀	X ₇₁	X ₇₂
Police Stations. X ₆₂	-.23											
Unions X ₆₃	-.08	-.11										
Specific Nonpatrol Duties. . . . X ₆₄	.14	-.23	.32									
Vice Assignment. X ₆₅	-.02	-.02	.21	.30								
Traffic Assignment X ₆₆	-.08	.30	-.24	-.10	.00							
Salary Chief X ₆₇	-.16	.32	-.19	-.32	.08	.47						
Salary Patrol. X ₆₈	-.22	.13	-.24	-.15	.08	.27	.67					
Promotional Criteria X ₆₉	.20	-.02	.15	-.07	-.09	-.12	-.08	-.02				
College Incentive Pay. X ₇₀	.09	-.18	.13	.06	-.03	-.14	-.07	-.20	-.05			
Seniority. X ₇₁	.33	-.06	-.28	.12	-.18	-.08	-.18	-.17	.07	-.05		
Beat Assignment. X ₇₂	-.04	-.04	-.05	.22	.00	.28	.30	.23	.18	.15	-.08	
Foot Patrol. X ₇₃	-.25	.34	-.41	-.23	-.03	.46	.26	.29	-.25	-.11	-.14	.00
Minority Employment. X ₇₄	.25	-.19	.20	-.23	.10	-.01	-.04	-.11	.01	.00	-.06	.00
Community Relations Training . . X ₇₅	-.08	.40	-.10	-.19	-.13	.11	.26	.29	.14	.08	-.09	.24
Review Board X ₇₆	.12	.00	.13	-.16	.08	.18	.31	-.09	.10	-.10	.03	-.02
School Programs. X ₇₇	-.14	.08	-.08	-.06	.09	.14	.31	.22	-.26	-.07	-.05	-.01
Computerization. X ₇₈	-.35	.11	-.02	-.19	.10	.00	-.06	.02	.11	.03	-.26	-.03
Helicopters. X ₇₉	.17	-.09	-.19	-.31	-.06	-.05	.10	-.18	-.02	.03	.06	-.04
Two-Man Patrol X ₈₀	-.08	.41	-.33	-.11	-.04	.31	.07	.35	-.32	-.24	.01	-.04
Civilian Support X ₈₁	.17	-.23	-.04	-.12	.08	.17	.22	-.04	.22	.21	-.11	.08
Computer Technicians X ₈₂	-.03	.14	.03	-.05	.26	.14	.12	.13	.01	-.04	-.04	.24

Continued

Variable	X ₆₁	X ₆₂	X ₆₃	X ₆₄	X ₆₅	X ₆₆	X ₆₇	X ₆₈	X ₆₉	X ₇₀	X ₇₁	X ₇₂
Murder Arrests. X ₆₃	.02	.14	-.14	-.18	.09	.16	.26	.04	-.15	-.09	-.04	-.18
Rape Arrests. X ₈₄	-.38	.51	-.23	-.22	.03	.37	.36	.19	-.20	-.05	-.17	-.08
Aggravated Assault Arrests. . . . X ₈₅	-.22	.31	-.21	-.30	.03	.35	.45	.23	-.14	.03	-.27	-.14
Robbery Arrests X ₈₆	-.15	.37	-.20	-.26	.08	.29	.46	.33	-.02	-.18	-.17	-.18
Burglary Arrests. X ₈₇	-.12	.06	-.40	-.21	-.13	.24	.36	.33	.13	-.07	-.09	-.14
Larceny Arrests X ₈₈	-.08	-.06	-.29	-.22	-.21	.16	.23	.02	.08	-.01	-.06	-.12
Prostitution Arrests. X ₈₉	-.05	.26	-.48	-.35	-.09	.35	.56	.39	-.04	.08	-.18	.16
Narcotics Arrests X ₉₀	-.25	.00	-.40	-.16	-.07	.27	.26	.28	-.02	-.07	.02	-.06
Gambling Arrests. X ₉₁	.09	.08	-.10	-.24	.04	.06	-.07	-.15	-.09	.07	-.21	-.26
Simple Assault Arrests. X ₉₂	-.03	.04	.13	-.05	-.18	-.11	-.24	-.13	-.06	-.05	-.03	-.30
Weapons Arrests X ₉₃	.01	-.02	-.17	-.11	-.02	.12	.18	-.17	-.15	.10	.09	-.02
Drunk Driving Arrests X ₉₄	-.04	-.36	.00	.22	-.04	-.16	-.07	-.17	-.09	.26	.26	.10
Public Drunkenness Arrests. . . . X ₉₅	.10	-.22	.01	.07	-.07	-.01	.21	-.09	-.15	.25	-.08	.22
Disorderly Conduct Arrests. . . . X ₉₆	-.06	-.04	-.20	-.19	-.10	-.02	.14	-.19	-.04	.15	-.05	.07
Juvenile Arrests. X ₉₇	-.04	-.15	-.06	-.27	-.20	-.10	-.10	-.04	.13	-.28	.14	-.25
Nonwhite Arrests. X ₉₈	.07	.42	-.06	-.07	.22	.26	.31	.13	-.22	-.14	-.23	-.18
Total Arrests X ₉₉	-.06	-.05	-.21	-.18	-.14	.10	.15	-.07	-.07	.06	-.03	-.12
Crime/Arrest Ratio. X ₁₀₀	.10	-.13	.23	.31	.11	-.12	-.02	.07	.04	.38	.12	.30
Arrests Part II 1970. X ₁₀₁	-.07	-.17	.08	-.06	-.22	.09	-.04	-.02	.04	.17	-.15	.01
Arrests Part II 1973. X ₁₀₂	.03	-.27	-.07	-.03	-.19	.00	.03	-.14	-.10	.11	.02	-.02

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Continued

Variable	X ₇₃	X ₇₄	X ₇₅	X ₇₆	X ₇₇	X ₇₈	X ₇₉	X ₈₀	X ₈₁	X ₈₂	X ₈₃	X ₈₄
Minority Employment. X ₇₄	-.24											
Community Relations Training . . . X ₇₅	.59	-.16										
Review Board X ₇₆	-.07	.28	.09									
School Programs. X ₇₇	.32	-.26	.24	-.04								
Computerization. X ₇₈	.20	-.07	-.01	-.26	.12							
Helicopters. X ₇₉	-.19	.09	-.16	.17	.05	.08						
Two-Man Patrol X ₈₀	.51	-.06	.29	-.40	.05	-.12	-.26					
Civilian Support X ₈₁	-.37	.09	-.09	.13	-.02	.13	.40	-.45				
Computer Technicians X ₈₂	.10	.15	.22	.13	-.04	.17	.05	-.06	.18			
Murder Arrests X ₈₃	.32	-.11	.27	.00	.07	-.02	.21	.08	.11	.06		
Rape Arrests X ₈₄	.46	-.32	.20	.02	.19	.19	.15	.15	-.03	.19	.58	
Aggravated Assault Arrests X ₈₅	.59	-.12	.36	.04	.18	.20	.13	.15	.18	.13	.65	.77
Robbery Arrests. X ₈₆	.47	-.19	.34	.12	.23	.15	.08	.18	.11	.23	.67	.78
Burglary Arrests X ₈₇	.16	-.26	.09	-.05	.15	.20	.24	-.02	.34	.03	.47	.55
Larceny Arrests. X ₈₈	.12	-.26	-.10	-.18	.30	.22	.30	-.21	.37	-.07	.37	.38
Prostitution Arrests X ₈₉	.38	-.08	.49	.01	.28	.02	.17	.12	.11	.09	.48	.40
Narcotics Arrests. X ₉₀	.14	-.27	-.14	-.16	.19	.18	.15	.03	.20	-.10	.31	.52
Gambling Arrests X ₉₁	.25	.03	.28	.21	-.03	.08	.17	-.05	.03	.22	.52	.30
Simple Assault Arrests X ₉₂	-.01	.05	-.13	-.08	.22	.02	.03	-.07	-.09	.22	.13	.24
Weapons Arrests. X ₉₃	.23	-.08	.14	.01	.22	.04	.24	-.14	.08	.02	.80	.51
Drunk Driving Arrests. X ₉₄	-.34	-.17	-.36	.00	.11	-.15	.26	-.46	.26	.05	-.05	-.03

Continued

Variable	X ₇₃	X ₇₄	X ₇₅	X ₇₆	X ₇₇	X ₇₈	X ₇₉	X ₈₀	X ₈₁	X ₈₂	X ₈₃	X ₈₄
Public Drunkenness Arrests.X ₉₅	-.02	.02	-.04	-.10	.28	-.08	.17	-.24	-.08	-.28	.41	.12
Disorderly Conduct Arrests.X ₉₆	.08	-.14	-.10	.05	.18	.04	.17	-.29	.00	.04	.58	.44
Juvenile Arrests.X ₉₇	-.14	.15	-.25	-.06	.05	-.28	.08	-.13	.15	.04	-.05	.07
Nonwhite Arrests.X ₉₈	.24	.02	.26	.10	.28	.04	.03	.19	-.01	.12	.64	.59
Total ArrestsX ₉₉	.09	-.17	-.04	.02	.20	.09	.45	-.22	.24	.20	.66	.59
Crime/Arrest Ratio.X ₁₀₀	-.15	.30	.07	.03	-.31	-.02	-.26	-.04	-.14	-.04	-.34	-.51
Arrests Part II 1970.X ₁₀₁	-.10	-.08	-.04	-.26	.22	-.04	.29	-.16	.19	-.02	.30	.20
Arrests Part II 1973.X ₁₀₂	-.07	-.08	-.22	-.09	.20	-.08	.43	-.28	.10	-.06	.52	.29

Continued

Variable	X ₈₅	X ₈₆	X ₈₇	X ₈₈	X ₈₉	X ₉₀	X ₉₁	X ₉₂	X ₉₃	X ₉₄	X ₉₅	X ₉₆
Robbery Arrests. X ₈₆	.84											
Burglary Arrests X ₈₇	.68	.75										
Larceny Arrests. X ₈₈	.48	.39	.67									
Prostitution Arrests X ₈₉	.55	.44	.50	.55								
Narcotics Arrests. X ₉₀	.51	.54	.75	.54	.24							
Gambling Arrests X ₉₁	.25	.26	.06	.01	.28	-.23						
Simple Assault Arrests X ₉₂	.00	.13	.08	.18	-.03	-.06	.26					
Weapons Arrests. X ₉₃	.60	.54	.44	.54	.49	.41	.26	.14				
Drunk Driving Arrests. X ₉₄	-.20	-.17	.06	.19	-.14	.33	-.31	.03	.19			
Public Drunkenness Arrests X ₉₅	.26	.07	.12	.41	.46	.19	-.15	-.05	.70	.26		
Disorderly Conduct Arrests X ₉₆	.40	.36	.30	.50	.42	.32	.18	.26	.86	.27	.66	
Juvenile Arrests X ₉₇	-.01	.08	.18	.29	-.13	.34	-.18	.36	.09	.36	-.02	.21
Nonwhite Arrests X ₉₈	.51	.67	.36	.22	.37	.11	.49	.22	.46	-.38	.16	.29
Total Arrests. X ₉₉	.53	.57	.62	.67	.41	.55	.29	.41	.78	.40	.39	.73
Crime/Arrest Ratio X ₁₀₀	-.36	-.51	-.44	-.49	-.22	-.42	-.18	-.34	-.39	-.16	-.05	-.42
Arrests Part II 1970 X ₁₀₁	.17	.15	.43	.66	.26	.46	.06	.33	.42	.46	.55	.36
Arrests Part II 1973 X ₁₀₂	.28	.24	.40	.59	.34	.47	.08	.32	.76	.51	.74	.73

Continued

Variable	X ₉₇	X ₉₈	X ₉₉	X ₁₀₀	X ₁₀₁
Nonwhite Arrests.X ₉₈	-.10				
Total ArrestsX ₉₉	.33	.37			
Crime/Arrest Ratio.X ₁₀₀	-.48	-.33	-.60		
Arrests Part II 1970.X ₁₀₁	.40	.04	.66	-.35	
Arrests Part II 1973.X ₁₀₂	.36	.14	.85	-.42	.78

APPENDIX C

PREDICTED AND ACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ALL
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND ARRESTS

PREDICTED AND ACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ALL
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND ARRESTS

Independent Variables	Arrest Type											
	Violent Crimes Against Persons						Property Crimes					
	Murder		Rape		Aggravated Assault		Robbery		Burglary		Larceny	
	P ¹	A ²	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A
<u>Crime Environment</u>												
Income Inequality	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Percent Nonwhite	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Fertile Head	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Population Density	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Males 15-19	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Males Under 17	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
<u>Social, Economic, Cultural Environment</u>												
Income Less than \$3000	np ³	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
Income More than \$15,000	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
White Collar	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Foreign or Mixed	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Parentage	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Private School	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Retail Sales	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
Owner Occupied	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Housing	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Median Income	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
Population Change	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
White Migration	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Median Age	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Population Size	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
Region	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
<u>Political Climate</u>												
Revenue Income Ratio	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Chamber of Commerce	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Membership	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
ACLU Membership	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
League Membership	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Civil Rights Group	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
Mobilization	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+

Continued

Independent Variables	Arrest Type											
	Violent Crimes Against Persons						Property Crimes					
	Murder		Rape		Aggravated Assault		Robbery		Burglary		Larceny	
	P ¹	A ²	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A
Goldwater Vote	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+
American Party Vote	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+
<u>Local Governmental Institutions, Structures, Processes</u>												
Government Form	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	+	np	+
Election Type	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Partisanship	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	+	np	-
Reform Score	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	+	np	+
Police Budget Per Capita	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Percent Budget Allocated to Public Safety	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
Chief Tenure	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
<u>Extra Community Variables</u>												
Acquittals Murder	-	+	np	+	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Acquittals Rape	np	+	-	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
Acquittals Aggravated Assault	np	+	np	+	-	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
Acquittals Robbery	np	+	np	+	np	+	-	+	np	-	np	-
Acquittals Burglary	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	-	-	-	np	-
Acquittals Larceny	np	+	np	-	np	+	np	-	np	-	-	+
Acquittals Prostitution	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
Acquittals Narcotics	np	+	np	-	np	+	np	-	np	-	np	+
Acquittals Gambling	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
Acquittals Simple Assault	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
Acquittals Weapons	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Acquittals Drunk Driving	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Acquittals Public Drunkenness	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-

Continued

Independent Variables	Arrest Type											
	Violent Crimes Against Persons						Property Crimes					
	Murder		Rape		Aggravated Assault		Robbery		Burglary		Larceny	
	P ¹	A ²	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A
Acquittals Disorderly Conduct	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
Total Acquittals	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
LEAA Funding	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	-
Alcohol Safety Action Program	np	-	np	+	np	-	np	-	np	+	np	+
<u>Police Department Characteristics</u>												
Police Officers	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Police Cars	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ranking Officers	np	+	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Police Stations	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
Unions	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Specific Nonpatrol Duties	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Vice Assignment	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	-	np	-
Traffic Assignment	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
Salary Chief	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
Salary Patrol	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
Promotional Criteria	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	+	np	+
College Incentive Pay	np	+	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Seniority	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Beat Assignment	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Foot Patrol	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
Minority Employment	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	-
Community Relations												
Training	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	-
Review Board	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
School Programs	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+
Computerization	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Helicopters	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Two-Man Patrol	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Civilian Support	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Computer Technicians	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-

Continued

Independent Variables	Arrest Type										
	Victimless Crimes					Order Maintenance Offenses					
	Prostitution	Narcotics	Gambling	Simple Assault	Weapons	Drunk Driving	Public Drunkenness	Disorderly Conduct			
	P	A P	A P	A P	A P	A P	A P	A P	A P	A	
<u>Crime Environment</u>											
Income Inequality	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
Percent Nonwhite	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Fertile Head	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Population Density	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Males 15-19	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Males Under 17	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-
<u>Social, Economic, Cultural Environment</u>											
Income Less than \$3000	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	+
Income More Than \$15,000	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
White Collar	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
Foreign or Mixed Parentage	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Private School	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	-
Retail Sales	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	+
Owner Occupied Housing	np	-	np	-	np	-	np	+	np	-	np
Median Income	np	+	np	+	np	-	np	+	np	+	np
Population Change	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
White Migration	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
Median Age	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	-
Population Size	np	+	np	+	np	-	np	+	np	-	np
Region	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
<u>Political Climate</u>											
Revenue Income Ratio	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Chamber of Commerce Membership	np	-	np	-	np	+	np	+	np	+	np
ACLU Membership	-	+	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+
League Membership	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Civil Rights Group Mobilization	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np	+	np
Goldwater Vote	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
American Party Vote	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

Continued

Independent Variables	Arrest Types										
	Victimless Crimes					Order Maintenance Offenses					
	Prostitution	Narcotics	Gambling	Simple Assault	Weapons	Drunk Driving	Public Drunkenness	Disorderly Conduct			
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P
<u>Local Governmental Institutions, Structures, Processes</u>											
Government Form	np	- np	- np	- np	- np	+ np	- np	+ np	- np	-	-
Election Type	np	- np	- np	- np	- np	- np	- np	- np	- np	-	-
Partisanship	np	+ np	+ np	- np	- np	+ np	+ np	+ np	+ np	+ np	+
Reform Score	np	- np	- np	- np	- np	+ np	- np	+ np	+ np	+ np	+
Police Budget Per Capita	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+
Percent Budget Allocated to Public Safety	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	-
Chief Tenure	np	- np	+ np	+ np	+ np	+ np	+ np	- np	- np	- np	-
<u>Extracommunity Variables</u>											
Acquittals Murder	np	+ np	- np	+ np	+ np	- np	- np	- np	- np	- np	-
Acquittals Rape	np	+ np	- np	+ np	+ np	+ np	+ np	- np	+ np	+ np	+
Acquittals Aggravated Assault	np	+ np	- np	+ np	+ np	+ np	+ np	- np	+ np	+ np	+
Acquittals Robbery	np	+ np	- np	+ np	+ np	- np	+ np	- np	- np	- np	+
Acquittals Burglary	np	- np	- np	+ np	+ np	- np	+ np	- np	- np	- np	+
Acquittals Larceny	np	+ np	- np	+ np	+ np	- np	+ np	- np	- np	- np	+
Acquittals Prostitution	-	+ np	- np	+ np	+ np	- np	+ np	- np	+ np	+ np	+
Acquittals Narcotics	np	+ np	- np	+ np	+ np	- np	+ np	- np	+ np	+ np	+
Acquittals Gambling	np	+ np	+ np	- np	- np	- np	+ np	- np	+ np	+ np	+
Acquittals Simple Assault	np	+ np	+ np	+ np	+ np	+ np	+ np	- np	+ np	+ np	+
Acquittals Weapons	np	+ np	- np	+ np	+ np	-	- np	- np	- np	- np	-
Acquittals Drunk Driving	np	+ np	- np	- np	- np	- np	-	- np	- np	- np	+
Acquittals Public Drunkenness	np	- np	- np	- np	- np	- np	- np	-	- np	- np	-
Acquittals Disorderly Conduct	np	+ np	- np	+ np	+ np	+ np	+ np	- np	+ np	+ np	+
Total Acquittals	na	+ np	- np	+ np	+ np	+ np	+ np	- np	+ np	+ np	+
LEAA Funding	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	-
Alcohol Safety Action Program	np	+ np	- np	- np	- np	+ np	- np	+ np	- np	- np	+

Continued

Independent Variables	Arrest Types									
	Victimless Crimes					Order Maintenance Offenses				
	Prostitution	Narcotics	Gambling	Simple Assault	Weapons	Drunk Driving	Public Drunkenness	Disorderly Conduct		
	P	A P	A P	A P	A P	A P	A P	A P	A	
<u>Police Department Characteristics</u>										
Police Officers	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+
Police Cars	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+
Ranking Officers	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-
Police Stations	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-
Unions	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Specific Nonpatrol										
Batons	+	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
Vice Assignment	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	+	-
Traffic Assignment	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	-
Salary Chief	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
Salary Patrol	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
Promotional Criteria	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
College Incentive Pay	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
Seniority	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Beat Assignment	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+
Foot Patrol	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+
Minority Employment	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	-
Community Relations										
Training	-	+	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-
Review Board	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+
School Programs	-	+	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+
Computerization	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Helicopters	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Two-Man Patrol	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	+
Civilian Support	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+
Computer Technicians	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+

Continued

Independent Variables	Arrest Type					
	Juvenile, Nonwhite, and Total Arrests					
	Juvenile		Nonwhite Arrests		Total	
	P	A	P	A	P	A
<u>Crime Environment</u>						
Income Inequality	+	-	+	+	+	+
Percent Nonwhite	+	-	+	+	+	+
Female Head	+	-	+	+	+	+
Population Density	+	-	+	+	+	+
Males 15-19	+	+	+	-	+	+
Males Under 17	+	-	+	-	+	-
<u>Social, Economic, Cultural Environment</u>						
Income Less Than \$3000	-	-	-	+	-	+
Income More Than \$15,000	-	+	-	-	-	+
White Collar	np	+	np	-	np	+
Foreign or Mixed Parentage	-	-	np	-	np	-
Private School	-	+	np	+	-	-
Retail Sales	np	-	np	+	np	+
Owner Occupied Housing	np	-	np	+	np	+
Median Income	np	+	np	-	np	-
Population Change	+	+	np	-	np	-
White Migration	+	+	np	-	np	-
Median Age	-	-	np	+	np	-
Population Size	np	+	np	+	np	+
Region	np	-	np	-	np	+
<u>Political Climate</u>						
Revenue Income Ratio	+	+	np	+	+	+
Chamber of Commerce Membership	np	-	np	-	np	+
ACLU Membership	-	+	-	+	-	+
League Membership	+	+	np	+	np	+
Civil Rights Group Mobilization	np	+	-	+	np	+
Goldwater Vote	+	+	np	-	+	+
American Party Vote	+	-	np	+	+	+
<u>Local Governmental Institutions,</u>						
<u>Structures, Processes</u>						
Government Form	np	+	np	-	np	+
Election Type	np	-	np	-	np	-
Partisanship	np	+	np	-	np	+
Reform Score	np	+	np	-	np	+

Continued

Independent Variables	Arrest Type					
	Juvenile, Nonwhite, and Total Arrests					
	Juvenile		Nonwhite Arrests		Total	
	P	A	P	A	P	A
Police Budget Per Capita	+	-	np	+	+	+
Percent Budget Allocated to Public Safety	+	-	np	-	+	-
Chief Tenure	np	-	np	+	np	+
<u>Extracommunity Variables</u>						
Acquittals Murder	np	-	np	+	np	-
Acquittals Rape	np	-	np	+	np	+
Acquittals Aggravated Assault	np	-	np	+	np	+
Acquittals Robbery	np	-	np	+	np	+
Acquittals Burglary	np	-	np	+	np	-
Acquittals Larceny	np	+	np	+	np	+
Acquittals Prostitution	np	-	np	+	np	-
Acquittals Narcotics	np	-	np	+	np	-
Acquittals Gambling	np	+	np	+	np	+
Acquittals Simple Assault	np	-	np	+	np	+
Acquittals Weapons	np	-	np	+	np	-
Acquittals Drunk Driving	np	-	np	+	np	-
Acquittals Public Drunkenness	np	-	np	+	np	-
Acquittals Disorderly Conduct	np	+	np	+	np	+
Total Acquittals	np	-	np	+	-	+
LEAA Funding	np	-	np	+	+	-
Alcohol Safety Action Program	np	+	np	-	np	+
<u>Police Department Characteristics</u>						
Police Officers	+	-	np	+	+	+
Police Cars	+	+	np	+	+	+
Ranking Officers	+	-	np	+	np	-
Police Stations	-	-	np	+	np	-
Unions	-	-	np	+	np	-
Specific Nonpatrol Duties	+	-	np	-	np	-
Vice Assignment	+	-	np	+	np	-
Traffic Assignment	+	-	np	+	np	+
Salary Chief	+	-	+	+	np	+
Salary Patrol	+	-	+	+	np	+
Promotional Criteria	+	-	+	-	np	-
College Incentive Pay	+	-	+	-	np	+
Seniority	-	+	-	-	-	-
Beat Assignment	-	-	-	-	np	-

Continued

Independent Variables	Arrest Type					
	<u>Juvenile, Nonwhite, and Total Arrests</u>					
	<u>Juvenile</u>		<u>Nonwhite Arrests</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
Foot Patrol	-	-	-	+	np	+
Minority Employment	-	+	-	+	np	-
Community Relations Training	-	-	-	+	np	-
Review Board	-	+	-	+	np	+
School Programs	-	+	-	+	np	+
Computerization	+	-	np	+	+	+
Helicopters	+	+	np	+	+	+
Two-Man Patrol	+	-	np	+	+	-
Civilian Support	+	+	np	-	+	+
Computer Technicians	+	+	np	+	+	+

¹Predicted Relationship

²Actual Relationship

³No Relationship Predicted

APPENDIX D

QUESTIONNAIRE AND FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR RESPONSE ITEMS

Directions: It is important to circle or underline an answer for all of the questions listed below. After circling an answer for each of the questions, please feel free to add any comments on the space provided at the end of the questionnaire.

Part I. The questions below are designed to measure your assessment as an experienced police administrator of various general issues and problems in law enforcement. Some questions ask your opinions about the seriousness of a problem in your community. You may use your own definition of what you regard to be a "serious" problem. In other words, definitions of what constitutes a serious problem are expected to vary from city to city. The basic format of the items below consists of a statement with a series of responses whereby you can indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement with the statement.

1. The police should not have to spend a lot of time and money enforcing laws against gambling because gambling is a moral problem, not a police problem.
 - 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
2. Arrests for gambling violations are very important because in the long run they aid in preventing more serious crime.
 - 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
3. In my opinion, the violation of gambling laws is one of the more serious problems facing my city.
 - 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree

4. The police should spend a lot of effort in making arrests for driving under the influence of alcohol because in the long run it makes the streets safer for citizens in the community.
 - 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
5. In my opinion, driving under the influence of alcohol is one of the more serious problems facing my city.
 - 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
6. The police should not spend a lot of time and effort arresting people for driving under the influence of alcohol because it tends to create tension between the police and the community.
 - 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
7. The police should not spend a lot of time and effort making arrests for driving under the influence of alcohol because it diverts the police from combatting more serious crimes.
 - 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
8. The police should not have to spend a lot of time and money enforcing laws against narcotics users because narcotics use is a moral problem, not a police problem.
 - 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree

9. Arrests for narcotics violations are very important because in the long run they aid in preventing more serious crime.
 - 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
10. In my opinion, the violation of narcotics laws is one of the more serious problems facing my city.
 - 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
11. In my opinion, larceny is one of the more serious problems facing my city.
 - 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
12. Shopkeepers and the like should be actively encouraged to press charges for crimes like larceny rather than merely settling the matter privately.
 - 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
13. If a property crime such as larceny can be handled informally through restitution, this is a better way of handling the matter than through an arrest.
 - 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree

14. In my opinion, armed robbery is one of the more serious problems facing my city.
- 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
15. If I was given more money to spend on my department, I would seriously consider spending a large part of it in ways to combat the crime of armed robbery.
- 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
16. In my opinion, burglary is one of the more serious problems facing my city.
- 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
17. If I was given more money to spend on my department, I would seriously consider spending a good part of it in ways to combat the crime of burglary.
- 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
18. In cases of nonaggravated assault arising from domestic disturbances, citizens should in many cases be encouraged to treat the matter privately and informally rather than going through the arrest process.
- 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree

19. Unless a policy of full enforcement for nonaggravated assault arising from domestic disturbances is encouraged, citizens will tend to "use" the police to solve their private quarrels.
 - 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
20. In my opinion, cases of nonaggravated assault arising from domestic disturbances are one of the more serious problems facing my city.
 - 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
21. In my opinion, instances of disorderly conduct are one of the more serious problems facing my city.
 - 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
22. Instances of disorderly conduct should be treated very seriously because they tend to threaten the peace and safety of citizens in the community.
 - 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
23. Arrests for disorderly conduct are one of the best ways the police have to keep people from bothering and disturbing the more law-abiding citizens in the city.
 - 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree

24. In my opinion, juvenile delinquency is one of the more serious problems facing my city.
- 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
25. Except for very serious offenses, juvenile offenders should be handled informally rather than submitting them to the arrest process.
- 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
26. Juvenile offenders should not be given special treatment by the police and in most cases should be arrested if they violate the law.
- 1) strongly agree
 - 2) agree
 - 3) slightly agree
 - 4) slightly disagree
 - 5) disagree
 - 6) strongly disagree
27. To what extent should individual arrest rates of police officers be used as a criteria for their promotion.
- 1) a great extent
 - 2) some extent
 - 3) little extent
 - 4) no extent

Part II. The questions below are designed to measure what you believe to be the major law enforcement concerns of citizens in your community. These may or may not differ from what you as an experienced administrator define as major law enforcement concerns. At any rate, I would like to know how you think the citizens in your community feel about these law enforcement areas. Of course it is not possible for you to know how all types of citizens feel about these topics. You are only asked to make a "guesstimate" based on things that have been communicated to you in the past. Again, please answer all questions.

28. To what extent do citizens in your community show a concern over the problem of gambling.
- 1) a great extent
 - 2) some extent
 - 3) little extent
 - 4) no extent

29. To what extent do citizens in your community show a concern over the problem of driving under the influence of alcohol.
 - 1) a great extent
 - 2) some extent
 - 3) little extent
 - 4) no extent
30. To what extent do citizens in your community show a concern over the problem of narcotics violations.
 - 1) a great extent
 - 2) some extent
 - 3) little extent
 - 4) no extent
31. To what extent do citizens in your community show a concern over the problem of armed robbery.
 - 1) a great extent
 - 2) some extent
 - 3) little extent
 - 4) no extent
32. To what extent do citizens in your community show a concern over the problem of burglary.
 - 1) a great extent
 - 2) some extent
 - 3) little extent
 - 4) no extent
33. To what extent do citizens in your community show a concern over the problem of larceny.
 - 1) a great extent
 - 2) some extent
 - 3) little extent
 - 4) no extent
34. To what extent do citizens in your community show a concern over behavior that might be described as disorderly conduct.
 - 1) a great extent
 - 2) some extent
 - 3) little extent
 - 4) no extent
35. To what extent do citizens in your community show a concern over the problem of nonaggravated assault.
 - 1) a great extent
 - 2) some extent
 - 3) little extent
 - 4) no extent

36. To what extent do the people in your community show a concern over the problem of juvenile delinquency.
- 1) a great extent
 - 2) some extent
 - 3) little extent
 - 4) no extent

Comments:

Please check box if you would like a research abstract: ☐

Return address:

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FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE ITEMS

Question 1.

	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
strongly agree	1	3.2
agree	4	12.9
slightly agree	3	9.7
slightly disagree	3	9.7
disagree	16	51.6
strongly disagree	<u>4</u>	<u>12.9</u>
Total	31	100.0

Question 2.

strongly agree	2	6.4
agree	19	61.3
slightly agree	6	19.4
slightly disagree	0	0.0
disagree	4	12.9
strongly disagree	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	31	100.0

Question 3.

strongly agree	0	0.0
agree	2	6.4
slightly agree	9	29.0
slightly disagree	2	6.4
disagree	16	51.6
strongly disagree	<u>2</u>	<u>6.4</u>
Total	31	99.8*

Question 4.

strongly agree	9	30.0
agree	16	53.3
slightly agree	3	10.0
slightly disagree	2	6.7
disagree	0	0.0
strongly disagree	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	31	100.0

*Totals may not equal 100% due to rounding

	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Question 5.		
strongly agree	5	16.1
agree	8	25.8
slightly agree	10	32.2
slightly disagree	3	9.7
disagree	5	16.1
strongly disagree	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	31	99.1

Question 6.		
strongly agree	0	0.0
agree	0	0.0
slightly agree	1	3.2
slightly disagree	3	9.7
disagree	16	51.6
strongly disagree	<u>11</u>	<u>35.5</u>
Total	31	100.0

Question 7.		
strongly agree	0	0.0
agree	1	3.2
slightly agree	1	3.2
slightly disagree	5	16.1
disagree	19	47.5
strongly disagree	<u>5</u>	<u>12.5</u>
Total	31	99.9

Question 8.		
strongly agree	0	0.0
agree	1	3.2
slightly agree	1	3.2
slightly disagree	2	6.4
disagree	12	38.7
strongly disagree	<u>15</u>	<u>48.4</u>
Total	31	99.9

	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Question 9.		
strongly agree	14	45.2
agree	14	45.2
slightly agree	2	6.4
slightly disagree	1	3.2
disagree	0	0.0
strongly disagree	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	31	100.0

Question 10.		
strongly agree	15	48.4
agree	11	35.5
slightly agree	4	12.9
slightly disagree	1	3.2
disagree	0	0.0
strongly disagree	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	31	100.0

Question 11.		
strongly agree	5	16.1
agree	16	51.6
slightly agree	8	25.8
slightly disagree	1	3.2
disagree	1	3.2
strongly disagree	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	31	99.9

Question 12.		
strongly agree	10	32.2
agree	16	51.6
slightly agree	4	12.9
slightly disagree	1	3.2
disagree	0	0.0
strongly disagree	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	31	99.9

	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Question 13.		
strongly agree	0	0.0
agree	1	3.3
slightly agree	2	6.7
slightly disagree	5	16.7
disagree	14	46.7
strongly disagree	<u>6</u>	<u>26.7</u>
Total	30	100.0

Question 14.		
strongly agree	23	74.2
agree	6	19.4
slightly agree	1	3.2
slightly disagree	1	3.2
disagree	0	0.0
strongly disagree	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	31	100.0

Question 15.		
strongly agree	10	32.2
agree	15	48.4
slightly agree	5	16.1
slightly disagree	1	3.2
disagree	0	0.0
strongly disagree	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	31	99.9

Question 16.		
strongly agree	20	64.5
agree	11	35.5
slightly agree	0	0.0
slightly disagree	0	0.0
disagree	0	0.0
strongly disagree	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	31	100.0

	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Question 17.		
strongly agree	13	41.9
agree	15	48.4
slightly agree	2	6.4
slightly disagree	1	3.2
disagree	0	0.0
strongly disagree	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	31	99.9

Question 18.		
strongly agree	13	43.3
agree	10	33.3
slightly agree	5	16.7
slightly disagree	0	0.0
disagree	2	6.7
strongly disagree	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	30	100.0

Question 19.		
strongly agree	2	6.7
agree	10	33.3
slightly agree	4	13.3
slightly disagree	5	16.7
disagree	5	16.7
strongly disagree	<u>4</u>	<u>13.3</u>
Total	30	100.0

Question 20.		
strongly agree	0	0.0
agree	0	0.0
slightly agree	4	13.3
slightly disagree	2	6.7
disagree	19	63.3
strongly disagree	<u>5</u>	<u>16.7</u>
Total	30	100.0

	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Question 21.		
strongly agree	3	10.0
agree	0	0.0
slightly agree	7	23.0
slightly disagree	4	13.3
disagree	13	43.3
strongly disagree	<u>3</u>	<u>10.0</u>
Total	30	99.9

Question 22.		
strongly agree	3	9.7
agree	5	16.1
slightly agree	12	38.7
slightly disagree	5	16.1
disagree	4	12.9
strongly disagree	<u>2</u>	<u>6.4</u>
Total	31	99.9

Question 23.		
strongly agree	2	6.4
agree	7	22.6
slightly agree	12	38.7
slightly disagree	4	12.9
disagree	6	19.4
strongly disagree	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	31	100.0

Question 24.		
strongly agree	14	46.7
agree	14	46.7
slightly agree	0	0.0
slightly disagree	2	6.7
disagree	0	0.0
strongly disagree	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	30	100.1

	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Question 25.		
strongly agree	3	9.7
agree	13	41.9
slightly agree	5	16.1
slightly disagree	1	3.2
disagree	7	22.6
strongly disagree	<u>2</u>	<u>6.4</u>
Total	31	99.9

Question 26.		
strongly agree	2	6.7
agree	8	26.7
slightly agree	3	10.0
slightly disagree	4	13.3
disagree	8	26.7
strongly disagree	<u>5</u>	<u>16.7</u>
Total	30	100.1

Question 27.		
a great extent	0	0.0
some extent	8	25.8
little extent	14	45.2
no extent	<u>9</u>	<u>29.0</u>
Total	31	100.0

Question 28.		
a great extent	0	0.0
some extent	11	35.5
little extent	16	51.6
no extent	<u>4</u>	<u>12.9</u>
Total	31	100.0

	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Question 29.		
a great extent	0	0.0
some extent	24	77.4
little extent	7	22.6
no extent	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	31	100.0

Question 30.		
a great exte	15	48.0
some extent	15	48.0
little extent	1	3.2
no extent	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	31	100.0

Question 31.		
a great extent	24	77.4
some extent	7	22.6
little extent	0	0.0
no extent	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	30	100.0

Question 32.		
a great extent	26	83.9
some extent	5	16.1
little extent	0	0.0
no extent	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	31	100.0

Question 33.		
a great extent	4	12.9
some extent	20	64.5
little extent	7	22.6
no extent	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	31	100.0

	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Question 34.		
a great extent	2	6.4
some extent	13	41.9
little extent	14	45.2
no extent	<u>2</u>	<u>6.4</u>
Total	31	99.9

Question 35.		
a great extent	1	3.2
some extent	3	9.7
little extent	22	71.0
no extent	<u>5</u>	<u>16.1</u>
Total	31	100.0

Question 36.		
a great extent	12	38.7
some extent	15	48.4
little extent	4	12.9
no extent	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	31	100.0

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