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NAZI PARTY, 1919-1930

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

> . . . Nazi measures on the local level were a key to the establishment of totalitarianism in Germany. Before Hitler came to power he gained great support through the virtuosity and adaptability of his local party organizations. The actual seizure of power in the spring of 1933 occurred largely from below. . . . The Fuehrer reached the pinnacle of power because his followers were successful at the lowest levels, at the base.
>
> William Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power, ix

The Purposes and Objectives of This Study

The importance of the rank and file membership for the ultimate success of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (National Socialist German Workers Party, NSDAP or Nazis for short) has long been recognized by historians, as evidenced by the quote above. However, despite the enormous amount of material published about Adolf Hitler's movement, there have been relatively few attempts to determine which groups in society made up its membership. This is especially true of the party's

lean years, 1919-1930, before it became profitable or expedient to be a Nazi.

Hitler's biographers have correctly pointed out that without his charismatic personality and indomitable will the NSDAP almost certainly would have remained one of the obscure extremist parties which proliferated in Germany during the interwar period.[1] It is equally true, however, that without the fanatical devotion of his followers, the Fuehrer's seizure of power could never have occurred. These "little" men supported not only their own local organizations, but also--through dues and contributions--the leadership of the party. They gave freely of their time as well as their money, spending innumerable hours at political meetings, demonstrating on the streets of almost every city in Germany, and spreading the gospel of Hitler. Many of them also gave their blood--and even their lives--in violent clashes with rival political groups. Without the dedication and sacrifices of these unknown Nazis it is unlikely that Hitler could ever have attained power.

Who were these anonymous Nazis who played such a pivotal role in the creation of the Third Reich? Were they, as has been suggested, members of a clearly identifiable social class? Or did they, as has also been suggested, represent the dissatisfied youth of Germany? Did National Socialism find its greatest support in small

towns and rural areas, as has often been maintained, or was it actually an urban phenomenon? Did the same social groups make up the bulk of the membership of Hitler's party throughout the Kampfzeit of the 1920s? The purpose of this study is to answer these and other questions about the Nazi party membership, and to test the most commonly accepted generalizations about the social composition of the NSDAP.

Early Generalizations about the NSDAP Membership

Most of the currently accepted ideas about the social composition of the Nazi party derive directly from a few contemporary observers of Hitler's movement, along with several historians and sociologists who attempted to explain Nazism in the 1930s.

One of the most widely quoted sources on the social composition of the NSDAP membership is Adolf Hitler himself. Commenting on the party when he first entered it in 1919, Hitler characterized its members as coming "chiefly from the lower walks of life."[2] He said that he personally brought a number of disgruntled young ex-soldiers into the movement, giving birth to the theory that the early party was dominated by "young soldiers and workers" which is encountered in many works on party history.[3] He also confused the issue of how many members the party had at that time when he said that upon entering he ". . . received provisional membership card with

the number 7,"[4] and that for a long period there were only seven people in the movement.[5]

Hitler's statements were subsequently reinforced by the writings of several other early Nazis, among them Kurt Ludecke, who was a close friend of the Fuehrer during the early years of the party. Ludecke also wrote that Hitler was the seventh member of the Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (DAP)[6] and commented on the importance of soldiers in the early membership.[7]

The first scholarly attempt to chronicle the evolution of the NSDAP was made by Konrad Heiden in 1935. Seldom providing a source for his information, Heiden made a number of generalizations about the Nazis which still find their way into general histories of Germany, and even into more specialized tracts on the history of the Nazi party. The most pervasive idea passed on by Heiden to subsequent historians is that "the Nazis were a class party . . . ," and that the membership was drawn primarily from the "lower middle class."[8] Heiden was curious about the social composition of the NSDAP and realized its importance to any understanding of the nature of National Socialism, but he could do no more than suggest that "the leadership and nucleus of National Socialism in the years 1925-1930 consisted for the most part of failures. . . ."[9] This statement, like many of Heiden's other pronouncements on the social composition of Hitler's party, has been repeated

often in subsequent party histories. Heiden was also one of the first to attempt to establish the numerical strength of the party at various times during the 1920s. He gave a number of confusing figures which still obscure the issue today.[10]

Some other contemporary observers of the Nazis during the period 1919-1930 commented on the youth of the members[11] and on the small-town character of the party.[12] Both of these characterizations of the Nazi membership have been used by recent historians to explain who the Nazis were.

The weakness of the statements by early observers of the NSDAP is that they are all based on little more than personal impressions and not at all on empirical investigation. None made any attempt to systematically examine the party membership. Consequently, they are of very limited value in answering the question "who were the Nazis?"

A number of social scientists attempted to define German fascism in the 1930s. They sought to determine who Nazism benefited and to whom in German society it appealed. There was a general consensus that the NSDAP in the years prior to the Machtergreifung drew its members primarily from the "lower-middle class," but hardly anyone bothered to explain what this term meant.[13] Marxist writers of this period identified the NSDAP members as the petty

bourgeois "tools of big capital," but were willing to admit that some "demoralized elements" of the working class became Nazis.[14] Many identified the early party members as mostly demobilized soldiers unable to readjust to civilian life.[15]

The first attempt to construct a comprehensive picture of the social structure of the NSDAP membership was by an American sociologist, Theodore Abel. Advertising in Nazi newspapers in 1933, Abel announced an essay contest on the theme "Why I Became a Nazi," with a cash prize for the winner. He received 687 entries in his contest, 83 of which he rejected from his ensuing study.[16] Abel's statistics, constructed from the data gathered in the manner described above, are very interesting. However, they are of doubtful value owing to the obviously unsatisfactory method in which they were obtained. A sample of only six hundred out of a population of "around a million"[17] persons responding to a "prize essay" contest can not be considered a representative sample. Nevertheless, Abel made a number of sweeping generalizations about the Nazi membership based on his statistics which continue to influence historical opinion about the social composition of the NSDAP.[18]

During the Second World War, social scientists made attempts to systematically study the NSDAP membership. In 1940, Hans Gerth attempted to show exactly who the party members and their leaders were from an examination of the

"official party statistics."[19] By scrutinizing biographical information on only eight prominent Nazis, Gerth concluded that the NSDAP membership was largely made up of men who had been "failures in other spheres of life." "Princes without thrones, indebted and subsidized landlords, indebted farmers, virtually bankrupt industrialists, impoverished shopkeepers and artisans, doctors without patients, lawyers without clients, writers without readers, unemployed teachers, and unemployed manual and white collar worker [sic] joined the movement."[20] Gerth also pointed out the unusual youth of the NSDAP membership. Although others had commented on this, Gerth was the first to offer any sort of evidence.[21]

In 1942, Talcott Parsons made a number of plausible generalizations about fascist movements in general.[22] Parsons was one of the first to apply the methods of psychoanalysis to a study of the party membership. He pointed out several striking analogies between fascism and religious movements,[23] including the fact that both seem to flourish during periods of social disorganization and widespread anomie.[24] Anomie, Parsons suggests, was widespread during the 1920s in Germany, caused by a variety of factors growing out of World War I and the continuing industrialization of Europe. He concluded that the "vested interests" in Germany sided with fascism in an attempt to combat the dissatisfied and revolutionary elements of the

political left.[25] Parson's observations are interesting, but they fail to identify who these "vested interests" were.

In one of the earliest examinations of voting patterns, J. K. Pollock in 1944 attempted to show who the Nazis were by examining which areas of Germany showed the highest Nazi vote in certain significant elections.[26] Voting patterns cannot identify the NSDAP membership with absolute certainty, but it can be assumed that party activity and membership was greatest in the areas from which the Nazis received the greatest number of votes. Pollock concluded that "with few exceptions" big cities and industrial areas did not swing to Hitler, indicating that Nazi incursions into the ranks of the working class were not great and that Hitlerism was a small-town and rural movement.[27]

Current Historical Opinion on the Social Composition of the NSDAP

Since World War II, historical works on interwar Germany have revealed several divergent theories as to the identity of the membership of the Nazi party. The incompatability of these hypotheses have led to very different conclusions about the nature of National Socialism. The most widely accepted theories are as follows:

The "Marginal Man" Theory

Several recent studies have examined the "marginal men" theory of the identity of NSDAP members. Jakub

Banaszkiewicz, a Polish historian explains this thesis in the following terms:

> In the German fascist movement, a dominant role was played mainly by two social groups: the petty bourgeois and people of the social fringe. . . . the association of the petty bourgeois with the Nazi movement is a generally known and recognized fact. . . . all prominent historians and sociologists of the fascist movement agree that the social base of the Nazi party consisted of various segments of the petty bourgeois. . . . This subject has . . . been almost completely exhausted and it would be difficult to advance any new facts or propositions.[28]

Banaskiewicz does not define "petty bourgeois" or offer any proof for his contentions. Rather, he attempts to analyze the social structure of the Nazi party through speculation, without the benefit of original research. His definition of what constitutes the "social fringe," which is the primary topic of both his book and his article, is only vaguely formulated.[29]

A variation on the "marginal men" theme is the characterization of Nazi party members as "maladjusted men,"[30] or even as "a conglomeration of pimps, murderers, homosexuals, alcoholics and blackmailers,"[31] a view which has permeated popular historical writing on the subject. It has also found its way into more scholarly treatments of party history, as for example in Dietrich Orlow's study of the organizational history of the NSDAP,[32] and Joseph Nyomarkay's exploration of factionalism with the party ranks.[33] This interpretation also continues to be widely accepted among Marxist students of the NSDAP, as evidenced

by two recent studies by East European historians, Evelyn Pospisil[34] and Jerzy Holzer.[35] Two of the best known American studies on the same theme, both by Daniel Lerner, embody all the shortcomings of the "marginal man" hypothesis.[36]

In an introduction to Lerner's book, Franz Neumann wrote that "[this] study confirms the thesis that the Nazi movement was a middle-class and lower-middle class movement . . . [the] melting pot of the German middle class."[37] Lerner's conclusions were based on a "random" sample (every tenth name) from the Fuehrerlexicon, "Who's Who" in Nazidom published in 1934. Lerner thought that "this procedure gives us an adequate sample . . . to determine salient biographical characteristics of this elite."[38] Lerner promised that his study would show: (1) how the party elite compared with the membership as a whole, and (2) how the movement ("both elite and mass") compared with the general population of Germany.[39] In fact, he never did either. He attempted to define what he meant by "marginal men" by erecting several criteria of marginality, including birthplace, age, vocation, etc. He then examined how many Nazis in his sample fit the criteria.[40]

Lerner was able to prove from his statistics that 56.6 per cent of the Nazi elite was "marginal" (if an individual was marginal in one or more categories, he was considered a "marginal man"). The greatest surprise is that everyone in Lerner's sample did not fall into at

least one of the categories created by the author. Why is a Bavarian marginal? Catholics? Enlisted men? Artisans and peasants? Why should a person's father-in-law determine his marginality? Why is one who has studied abroad marginal? Lerner never answered these questions satisfactorily. Consequently, identification of the Nazis as "marginal men" or members of the "social fringe" remains speculative.[41]

Lerner also failed to show incontrovertibly that the party membership was made up primarily of persons from the middle class. He did not correlate his statistics--which came from the Nazi "elite" and not the rank and file--with those for the party as a whole. Thus they cannot be safely used for making generalizations about the total membership. This same objection holds true for the entire approach to the question of the social composition of the NSDAP membership which identifies the Nazis as "marginal men" and "people of the social fringe": they are unproven and largely unprovable.[42] Lerner's other contention--that no appreciable portion of the working class joined the Nazis and that the party membership was made up "primarily" of people from the lower-middle class[43]--does lend itself to historical investigation, and can be proven or disproven.

The NSDAP as a Class Movement

The hypothesis that the Nazi movement was primarily a class movement has found its way into almost every major

study of the party and of recent German history in general.[44] There have been a number of theoretical studies which have attempted to explain the supposed middle-class preponderance in the NSDAP, the most notable of which are those of Seymour Martin Lipset, Ernst Nolte, Karl Dietrich Bracher, and Heinrich August Winkler.[45]

Lipset, writing in 1960, identified National Socialism as "extremism of the center,"[46] and pointed out a number of factors in Weimar Germany which influenced the middle classes--especially the lower-middle class which he neglected to define satisfactorily--to seek radical political solutions to their problems, including (1) the real or imagined "red menace"; (2) the severe dislocations in the German economy resulting from World War I which produced the great inflation of 1923 and the world depression of the 1930s; and (3) the anomie in German society resulting from these specific issues, plus the general factors of industrialization and urbanization, and from the continuing decline of religion.[47]

Bracher used many of the same arguments, writing in 1966, but pointed out numerous other factors which inclined the middle classes toward fascism, including the intense nationalism of a large part of the middle classes which had been frustrated by the lost war and humiliated by the Treaty of Versailles. Bracher also identified the apparent ineptitude of the Weimar political system in dealing with

the multitude of problems which beset Germany during the 1920s and 1930s as a powerful factor inclining the middle classes toward Hitler's party. This was caused in part, Bracher wrote, by the instability of the various German governments, which in turn stemmed from the multiplicity of ideologically incompatible political parties, and in part by the inexperience of the Germans with democracy.[48]

Nolte, writing in 1969, claimed that the middle class turned to Nazism primarily for one reason: fear of Marxism. He characterized the Nazi movement as being "first and foremost a militant bourgeois resistance to the acute and incalculable threat of socialist revolution."[49] According to Nolte, all the factors discussed by previous writers which inclined the middle classes in Germany toward fascism are of secondary importance when compared to the "red menace."

Winkler, writing in 1972, modified several of the arguments of his predecessors. He pointed out the continuity of petty-bourgeois political ambitions from the nineteenth century into the twentieth century, and suggested that a movement such as National Socialism was a logical result. He did admit, however, that it took the catalyst of the Great Depression to trigger the mass influx of the middle classes into the NSDAP.[50]

All of these explanations of why the middle classes in Germany went over to the Nazis during the Weimar Republic

are perceptive and well-reasoned and make an excellent basis for discussion. Of Nazi party membership, however, they prove nothing at all except the pervasiveness of the ideas of early Nazi-watchers based on educated guesses about the social composition of the NSDAP. Of all the "common knowledge" about the Nazis, the lower-middle class hypothesis is the most popular, the most enduring, and the most convincing. However, it has yet to be proven conclusively.

The National Socialist Movement as a Youth Rebellion

Another explanation of Hitler's movement first formulated at almost the same time the party came into existence is the theory that the Nazis represented a rebellion of militant German youth. Like the lower-middle class hypothesis, some credence has been lent to the "youth" theory by the few statistical studies done on the social composition of the NSDAP for the period 1919-1930. According to this view, the National Socialist movement actually represented a "generational revolt." It was a turning away from traditional society by young Germans who were totally disillusioned with the world of their parents and wished to create a new society through National Socialism.

The first notable works after World War II which commented on this theme were by E. Vermeil and Rudolf Heberle, both writing in 1945.[51] However, Vermeil

mentioned the theme only in passing,[52] while Heberle merely speculated that the Nazis were largely young, unemployed, declassed elements in German society.[53]

In 1957, Bracher commented briefly on the attraction that the NSDAP seemed to have for students, but concluded that the young people began flocking into the party only after 1928.[54] In 1960, Walter Hofer mentioned that 38 per cent of the NSDAP members were under thirty years of age, but neglected to mention either the period of which he was speaking or the source of his information.[55] Hofer, like Vermeil, Heberle, and Bracher before him, apparently felt that age was not as significant a factor in the social composition of the Nazi membership as class affiliation.

In 1965, Dietrich Orlow mentioned the youth of party members, but did not seem to think it as important a sociological consideration as occupation and/or class affiliation.[56] A year later Jeremy Noakes noted the extreme youth of Nazi party members, particularly in 1925, but did not list the source of his information.[57] The first post-World War II historian to emphasize the importance of the youthful aspect of the NSDAP members was David Schoenbaum. Writing in 1966, he used the Parteistatistik and several secondary sources to point out that youth was one of the most striking characteristics of the Nazi party before 1930.[58] However, many of Schoenbaum's generalizations are less than convincing because of his selective use of

statistics and the unreliability of his sources for the pre-depression period.

Martin Broszat and F. L. Carsten, both writing in 1969, commented on the youth of the early NSDAP members, but neither went into any detail on the subject. Apparently they felt other factors than youth were more important in drawing an individual into the Nazi movement.[59] By 1969, Orlow had apparently concluded that the age of party members was more important than he had at first realized. In his study of the organizational history of the NSDAP, he pointed out that the northern wing of the party after 1925 in particular was made up of young people. "It appears likely," he commented, "that some two-thirds of the membership [in the north] in 1925 was not yet thirty."[60] He added, however, that any conclusions must be tentative because ". . . detailed statistical analyses of the Nazi party membership in the formative years are still lacking."[61]

Writing in 1970, Bracher was apparently still unconvinced of the significance of the youthful aspect of the party membership. However, he was aware of it, and realized that it applied not only to the period of expansion after 1928, which his earlier work had emphasized, but to the earlier years of the party as well.[62] The next year Michael Kater, in an innovative study of the early party membership forcefully pointed out that almost half of his sample of persons who entered the NSDAP in 1923 were

twenty-three years of age or younger when they joined the party.[63] This represented the first reliable proof to substantiate the "generational revolt" hypothesis that was suggested by some of the earliest observers of the party.

In 1971, Noakes also ascribed to the age structure of the Nazi party membership much more importance than it had received by most post-World War II historians. Confining his comments to the persons who joined the party after 1925, Noakes identified "youth and activism" as the most "outstanding characteristics" of party members after 1925.[64]

Harold Gordon, writing in 1972, was even more emphatic about the importance of youth in the NSDAP membership. "The most striking single social fact about the party," he wrote, "is that it was a party of the young."[65] According to Gordon, the Nazis even before the Beer Hall Putsch were "a heterogeneous mixture of people of all classes and all professions and trades,"[66] whose youth was the binding factor. ". . . [I]n many ways, the NSDAP represented a rebellion of dissatisfied youth against an elder generation that had not only stumbled into war but had failed to win it, and that had equally failed to create a world with which these young men could sympathize."[67]

There has been a trend in historical writing about the social structure of the NSDAP during the past few years toward an increasing awareness of the importance of the

youth of the party membership in understanding National Socialism. Whether or not Nazism indeed represented a "generational revolt" remains to be resolved by future historians. The statistics provided below on the age of party members before 1930 should provide invaluable data for reaching sound conclusions on the topic. After all, a youth rebellion is a considerably different creature than a class movement, which is how National Socialism is usually characterized.[68]

The NSDAP as a Refuge for the Unemployed

The Nazis have also been identified recently as the unemployed in German society, at least during certain periods of the Weimar Republic. Like most generalizations about the social composition of the NSDAP, the "myth of the unemployed" had its origins in the writings of contemporary observers.[69] The recent champions of this thesis usually point out the apparent correlation between the rise in the party membership and the rise in the numbers of unemployed in German society, especially during the years 1928-1932. They make the assumption that many of these jobless persons, seeking radical political solutions to alleviate their condition, were absorbed into the membership of the NSDAP. This was one conclusion reached by Odette Hardy-Hemery in 1971,[70] and by Otis Mitchell in 1972.[71] Z. A. B. Zeman made virtually the same arguments in 1973.[72] Even Bracher has speculated that a large part

of the NSDAP membership was made up of unemployed persons.[73] Thus far, there has been no evidence presented that any appreciable number of Nazis were unemployed at the time of their entry into the party. All available statistical evidence seems to refute this hypothesis.[74]

Nazism as a Small-Town and Rural Movement

As early as 1933, Miriam Beard noted that people from small towns seemed particularly susceptible to the Nazi appeal. In 1944, J. K. Pollock attempted to prove that Nazism drew its main support from outside the major metropolitan areas by an analysis of voting patterns in Reichstag elections during the period 1930-1932.[75] Pollock's findings suggested the majority of Nazis came from small communities.

In 1945, Heberle modified Pollock's generalization about the rural character of the NSDAP somewhat, saying that although the Nazis originated and initially flourished in the cities, after 1925 the "membership . . . became more and more rural; even in the cities a conspicuously large proportion of the membership had a rural or small town background."[76]

Similar statements about the identity of the Nazis were made the following year by C. P. Loomis and J. H. Beegle. Going further than Heberle, however, they labeled the National Socialist movement in some aspects a "green rebellion" of disgruntled farmers who were anti-urban and

anti-bourgeois. Loomis and Beegle dated the spread of Nazism to small communities and the countryside as occurring in the "late twenties."[77]

In 1952, Reinhard Bendix commented on the "anti-urban" aspects of National Socialism by suggesting that the membership was based outside metropolitan centers.[78] In 1959, Werner T. Angress explored the appeal of Nazism to German farmers in some detail and concluded that from 1928 on, farmers in Germany made up a disproportionately large percentage of the NSDAP membership.[79]

In 1962, evidence was presented that seemed to support these earlier generalizations about the spread of Hitler's movement from the cities. Gerhard Stoltenberg, drawing upon the Secret Reports of the State Criminal Police of Flensberg, showed that the NSDAP had only 800 members in all of Schleswig-Holstein in 1928, but that the figure had grown to over 10,400 by the end of 1929.[80] Although Stoltenberg's figures are not conclusive since they deal only with Schleswig-Holstein, they nevertheless indicate that Nazism was taking hold in the countryside and attracting a large number of farmers to the party in the late twenties.

In 1967, Horst Gies' investigation concluded that "Prior to 1930 the National Socialist Party made little headway in the countryside other than in Schleswig-Holstein."[81] However, two years later this view was

challenged by Carsten. He disputed the idea that Nazism came late into rural areas and only began to appeal to the farmers in 1928-1929. Basing his conclusions on an early party list from the Hauptarchiv collection, he concluded there were actually more farmers in the party percentage-wise before the Beer Hall Putsch than in German society as a whole. He went on to generalize that even in the early phase of the party its supporters came largely from small communities.[82]

The same year, Dietrich Orlow commented in passing that in 1928 the party changed from a primarily urban movement into a predominantly rural one.[83] Michael Kater's statistical study made in 1971 brought several surprising figures on this subject to light. His findings suggest that as early as 1923 the Nazi party had a significant percentage of farmers in its membership. Over 54 per cent of Kater's sample of persons who joined the NSDAP in 1923 came from rural areas.[84] These figures suggest that although Nazism originated in a large city (Munich), its spread throughout the countryside was very rapid in South Germany before the Beer Hall Putsch. Stoltenberg's work shows that the Nazis were not well established in Schleswig-Holstein in 1928, but grew rapidly thereafter.

The evidence presented on this subject to date is contradictory. Most studies have applied only to limited time periods and/or regions of the Reich, rather than to the entire pre-depression period and the whole of Germany.

The NSDAP: A "Mass Movement" of all Germans?

A final generalization about the social composition of the NSDAP membership is that Hitler's movement was a "mass party," drawing its members from every layer of German society. This also originated with early observers of the party and has been put forth in a refined form by historians and sociologists since 1945.

In 1936, Paul Sering in a critical examination of German fascism wrote that the NSDAP was a "mass party" which "recruited from members of all classes."[85] The idea that the Nazis came from every walk of life was apparently popular with the NSDAP leadership and most Nazi historians subscribed to it, pointing to the diverse social and geographical origins of selected party members as proof.[86]

In 1952, Reinhard Bendix described the NSDAP membership as "quite heterogeneous."[87] The same year, W. Ehrenstein anticipated later arguments by identifying National Socialism as the direct result of mass democracy and the Nazis as members of all segments of society.[88] Jean F. Neurohr, writing in 1957, made many of the same points and reached the same general conclusions.[89]

Raymond Martin concluded in 1957 that National Socialism was a creature of all the people of Germany regardless of class. However, Martin hedged a bit by saying it drew its main strength from the lower-middle class.[90] Joachim Fest, writing in 1964, also identified the Nazis

as coming from all walks of life but in particular the middle class.[91]

Wolfgang Zopf in 1965 wrote that persons of all occupations could be found in the NSDAP with one exception: "only the industrial proletariat was not represented in any numbers."[92] In 1968, Wolfgang Horn rejected out of hand the characterization of the NSDAP membership as a lower-middle class movement and suggested instead that it was a mass party.[93]

In his 1969 study, before concluding that the NSDAP drew its membership primarily from the Kleinburgertum, Carsten pointed out that the Nazis in his small membership list from the pre-putsch period "seem to represent a fair cross-section of the Munich population of the time."[94] In 1970, Bracher also paid lip-service to the mass party thesis, but said this was true only after 1928. Before that year, the NSDAP membership "was composed of the lower-middle class."[95] The same year Jerzy Holzer attempted to ascertain the social composition of the Nazi party for the period 1928-1930 by an examination of voting patterns during those years. His conclusions for the most part followed the official Marxist line, but one generalization did not. Before concluding that the Nazis came largely from the lower-middle class, Holzer identified the NSDAP as a mass party, drawing its members from every segment of society.[96]

The idea that National Socialism was a movement which incorporated all social classes into its membership has survived intact from the early Nazi period and has found a number of supporters recently. However, such statistical studies of the NSDAP membership as have been produced to date seem to show that a disproportionately large part of the party members (when compared to German society as a whole) came from the middle classes in Germany, especially the lower-middle class. This issue is presently unresolved and is still a matter of controversy.

Statistical Studies of the Social Composition of the NSDAP

A number of works since World War II have produced statistics on the social composition of the Nazi party based on membership lists. Most have tended to support the "class" interpretation of Nazism, but a few have produced some less expected results.

Many of these statistical studies are based on published sources: the Parteistatistik (compiled by the Nazis in 1936), or on Hans Volz, Daten die Geschichte der N.S.D.A.P., which is drawn largely from the Parteistatistik. Neither is reliable for the period before 1930. The statistics on the occupations of party members in these works are so general that the resulting information is of only limited value.[97]

Two studies in particular have used either Volz' work or the Parteistatistik or both to attempt to identify

the social/occupational groups in German society which made up the NSDAP membership: Wolfgang Schaefer, writing in 1957, produced statistics drawn from the Parteistatistik that have been widely quoted by succeeding historians of the party as a thoroughly reliable source.[98] Schaefer's study suffers from all the shortcomings of the Parteistatistik itself. His statistics are unreliable and misleading as a guide to understanding the identity of the Nazis. Martin Broszat's study of the Nazi state also drew its statistics from the Parteistatistik, but used them in a much more sophisticated manner.[99] Broszat compared the figures for party composition with a comparable breakdown of German society as a whole, thus showing the relative strength of occupational groups within the party and in the entire nation. However, the unsatisfactory occupational classification system used in the Parteistatistik limited Broszat to using the same system.

During the past twenty years, a number of studies have appeared which have used at least some statistics drawn from original research in an attempt to ascertain the social composition of the NSDAP. All have tended to reinforce the lower-middle class hypothesis. However, the samples of party membership on which they were based are all very small, and the criteria used for occupational classification is often questionable.

One of the earliest inquiries into the social identity of the Nazis by statistical analysis of surviving

biographical data on party members was made by Georg Franz-Willing in 1962.[100] From a party list of forty-five persons --whom he admitted may have been visitors at a Nazi rally rather than party members--Franz-Willing drew some amazing conclusions. The list "proves" (according to the author) the middle-class character of the early NSDAP. Aside from the questionable occupational classification system used by the author[101] and the uncertain nature of his sample, forty-five persons is not a representative number for a party of even modest size. Franz-Willing's statistics have been used in recent studies of the NSDAP and quoted by several historians as proof that the Nazis came primarily from the lower-middle class.[102]

Werner Maser made a more convincing attempt to construct a sociography of the early Nazi party in 1965.[103] Maser "proved" that over 50 per cent of the party membership was from the lower-middle class, using several different party lists.[104] His study has several flaws, including the unrepresentative nature of his sample and the unsatisfactory method of occupational classification he adopted which closely resembled that used by Franz-Willing.[105] Maser's statistics and conclusions have been widely accepted by historians of interwar Germany and are quoted in many respected works as authoritative.[106]

In 1967, Franz Josef Heyen edited a number of Nazi documents from the Mainz-Koblenz-Trier area which included

sociological statistics on the local membership compiled by the Ortsgruppen themselves.[107] Dealing with a later time period (1928-1929) than the studies by Franz-Willing and Maser, Heyen's documents displayed a striking dissimilarity to the earlier works, at least in some communities. Rather than a middle-class party, three of the five local organizations from the Rhineland were, according to Heyen's documents, made up overwhelmingly of industrial laborers and farmers.[108] The criteria by which persons were assigned to occupational classification or by which occupational groups were catagorized were not given. Heyen's figures must be considered a valuable source, even though they apply to only one region and to a specific time period. The discrepancies between the picture of the party given by Heyen's statistics and those of Franz-Willing and Maser are irreconcilable. This indicates the need for reliable figures on the social makeup of the NSDAP in all areas of Germany and in each of the years between its inception and the time Hitler seized power.

Several studies using statistical data on the occupations of party members appeared in 1969, all more or less confirming the middle-class character of the NSDAP membership. Dietrich Orlow, drawing his material almost exclusively from secondary sources, declared the Nazis to be overwhelmingly petty bourgeois.[109] Carsten, writing in the same year, reached the same general conclusions, but

with some reservations, especially concerning the early party (1919-1923).[110] Basing his observations on a party list from the Hauptarchiv collection which is undated but "clearly from this period,"[111] Carsten also concurred that the Nazis were largely from the lower-middle class.[112]

In 1971, Jeremy Noakes published a perceptive study of the development of the NSDAP in Lower Saxony.[113] Noakes pointed out the lower-middle class character of the party during the period 1921-1924,[114] but noted several dramatic changes in the social makeup of the NSDAP during the period 1925-1928, when a number of young people and industrial laborers entered the Nazi movement in Lower Saxony. He also showed that the party leadership in Hannover was directing its propaganda efforts at the industrial workers during this later period.[115] Noakes made the further observation that although a number of workers did join the party in these years, nearly as many soon left it.[116]

Noakes' contention that the Nazis made a determined attempt to win the workers to the party in 1925 is supported by the 1972 work of Max H. Kele.[117] Through an extensive examination of Nazi publications, correspondence between party leaders, and the memoirs, autobiographies and speeches of party dignitaries, Kele succeeded in showing that a good part of the NSDAP leadership was desirous of attracting workers into the party. He also pointed out that the Nazis expended a tremendous amount of effort to

accomplish this end. The one instance in which he investigated party lists to determine the class origins of party members produced some very curious results. He wrote that the "earliest membership list" of the party, dated May 29, 1920, is in the Hauptarchiv collection (why he decided that this is the earliest membership list is unclear). He concluded that of the 675 members on this list "27 per cent were skilled laborers and craftsmen, while only 2.9 per cent were unskilled laborers."[118]

If the propaganda efforts of the Nazis all over Germany during the period 1925-1928 were directed at the workers as those in Lower Saxony were--and Kele's study shows that they were--there is a good possibility that the social composition of the party during those years was considerably different than has been thought. Noakes went on to show that in 1928 the propaganda appeals of the Nazis in Lower Saxony were redirected toward the petty bourgeoisie and, especially, the farmers.[119] Basing his conclusions on figures from the Parteistatistik, Noakes observed that propaganda appeals along with severe dislocations in segments of the Germany economy, changed the social character of the party drastically in 1928-1930. From a lower and lower-middle-class movement with perhaps a large representation from industrial labor, it changed into a party of "peasants, artisans, shopkeepers and small businessmen and white collar workers."[120]

Noakes emphasized that the NSDAP was not a socially homogeneous movement throughout its years of incubation. The social composition probably changed considerably several times. Although Noakes' statements are far from conclusive as to the social structure of the party, his study represents a significant step toward an answer to the question "who were the Nazis?"[121]

Michael Kater, also publishing in 1971, contributed the most convincing statistics on the social composition of the party to date.[122] Using biographical information on 4,726 persons who joined the NSDAP in 1923, Kater submitted data on the age, sex, geographical origins, and size of community of origin of each Nazi to a computer, producing some unexpected results.[123] Several of the previously held assumptions about the Nazis had to be scrapped in light of Kater's research, including the idea that the party during the early period was largely confined to South Germany; that the party in the pre-1924 period was oriented around large urban centers; and that "soldiers and workers" made up a large proportion of the party membership during the early Kampfzeit of the NSDAP.

Kater's work, as valuable as it is, has several limitations, the most serious of which is that the list from which he drew his statistics contains the names only of persons who joined the party in 1923: that is, during a time of political and economic crisis in Germany.[124]

In 1972, Harold Gordon challenged most previously held opinions on the social composition of the NSDAP, and even many of the assumptions upon which prior social analyses of the party membership were based.[125] Using a sample of 1,126 persons who joined the party in Bavaria in 1923,[126] Gordon concluded that far from being overwhelmingly lower-middle class, the party membership was "a heterogeneous mixture of people of all classes and all professions and trades."[127] The primary reason for the dichotomy between Gordon's generalizations and most previously held notions of the social class origins of Nazi party members is that Gordon totally discarded the usual breakdown of German society used in all earlier studies in favor of a new system of his own which he considered "a more flexible system, representing modern society . . . [fitting] actual social conditions and the attitudes of the groups and individuals involved."[128] Among other differences from earlier studies, Gordon includes Angestellte (employees) under Arbeiter (workers), whereas other writers have usually included them with the lower-middle class as white collar workers.[129]

In 1973 Geoffrey Pridham took up the history of the NSDAP in Bavaria where Gordon left off, but he offered no original research on the social structure of the party.[130] He reached the conclusion that the Nazis were primarily lower-middle class from a rehashing of the Parteistatistik figures and several secondary sources.[131]

One further effort has been made to shed light on the social composition of the NSDAP by statistical methodology. In an article to be published in 1976, Kater has attempted to ascertain the social makeup of the party during the period 1925-1945.[132] Kater took a sample of two thousand biographies of persons joining Hitler's movement during this period from the Zentralkartei of the Nazi party now at the Berlin Document Center. In his analysis, he considered all the persons who joined the party before 1930 as one group, thus not showing what changes, if any, took place during the years 1925-1930. Kater's study has drawbacks, several of them serious. For one thing, the sample was drawn haphazardly, not randomly. For another, a sample of two thousand biographies from a total of 10.7 million (the approximate number of membership cards at the Berlin Document Center) will probably not yield reliable results.[133] As Kater himself points out, his study permits "nur einen ungenauen Eigenblich"[134] into the social structure of the NSDAP. Despite these objections, Kater's work is the only one that gives any real idea of who the Nazis were during the period 1925-1930. His statistics support the lower-middle-class hypothesis of the social character of the NSDAP.[135]

Who Were the Nazis? A Synopsis of Current Opinion

The present state of historical opinion on the social composition of the NSDAP based on the preceding works

runs as follows: (1) the Nazis came primarily from the middle classes in German society, especially the lower ranks of that middle class, although other strata of society were also represented; (2) the members of the NSDAP were exceptionally young, at least after 1928 and perhaps earlier; (3) although National Socialism began in metropolitan areas, it found its greatest support in small communities and in the countryside, especially after 1928; (4) there was no appreciable percentage of industrial laborers in the NSDAP before 1930. Many historians would still accept the "marginal men" hypothesis of the social makeup of the Nazi party but it is largely unprovable. A few historians would still agree that the party in its earliest phase contained an appreciable number of soldiers. All of these generalizations have some merit and will be tested below, as will the hypothesis that the Nazis were almost exclusively men.

The Numerical Strength of the NSDAP

Another matter on which there is a great deal of confusion is the number of Nazi party members in the years before 1930. Apart from general interest, this question takes on particular significance because of Bracher's assertion that when the party passed 100,000 members in 1928 it made the transition from a class party to a mass party.[136]

It is especially difficult to find any agreement on the numerical strength of the early party (1919-1924). All figures presented on the subject until recently have been little more than approximations. These estimates vary as follows (all figures are for December 31 of the designated year unless otherwise indicated):

1919 - 28 (September),[137] 64,[138] and 270.[139]

1920 - "over 2,000,"[140] 2,500,[141] and 3,000.[142]

1921 - "less than 1,000,"[143] and "around 6,000."[144]

1922 - 35,000.[145]

1923 - 15,000 (November),[146] 20,000,[147] 30,000,[148] and 55,787.[149]

Estimates for party strength during the years 1925-1930 show a great deal more unanimity, largely because they are based on the same source (sometimes at second or third hand): Volz' Daten die Geschichte der NSDAP. Volz gave the following figures for party strength (all numbers for December 31 of the indicated year):

1925 - 27,117
1926 - 49,523
1927 - 72,590
1928 - 108,717
1929 - 176,426.[150]

However, there have been several studies which have adopted figures which dispute those offered by Volz, a few of them based on solid evidence (all figures for December 31 of indicated year unless otherwise indicated):

1925 - 17,000,[151] 18,000,[152] 27,000,[153] and 30,000.[154]

1926 - 30,000,[155] 50,000,[156] and 54,000.[157]

1927 - 70,000,[158] and 81,000.[159]

1928 - 100,000.[160]

1929 - (Most agree with Volz.)[161]

This investigation of the social composition of the NSDAP will establish reliable figures on party membership strength for the years 1925-1930 by subtracting the percentage of persons who left the party during a given year from the highest membership number issued for that year. The results will show that the true strength of the NSDAP at a given time between 1925 and 1930 was considerably less than has been previously thought.

Organization of the Study

The pages that follow will attempt to clarify the muddled state of knowledge about the social composition of the NSDAP described above. Chapter II will explore the sociography of the "early" NSDAP, 1919-1924. The primary sources of the statistical information are several:

1. A bound volume of membership lists for the period 1919-October, 1921, entitled Adolf Hitlers Mitkaempfer. This volume is presently in the possession of the Berlin Documents Center. Its contents have not before been utilized in sociological analyses of the NSDAP.

2. The Hauptarchiv der NSDAP. This collection contains a number of early membership lists for the Nazi party. I have made use of those for the period October, 1921 to

November, 1922, which have not previously been submitted to statistical investigation. In addition I found it necessary to re-examine the sample used by Kater in "Zur Soziographie . . . ," because of the differences in occupational classification between his study and mine.

Chapter III will attempt to accomplish the same goals as outlined for the early party for the period 1925-1928. The biographical information on NSDAP members from this period which are reflected in the statistics are drawn entirely from a representative sample of the party membership for those years, taken from the Zentralkartei der NSDAP at the Berlin Documents Center. Chapter IV will examine the social composition of the Nazi party for the years 1928-1930 by the same methods as Chapter III. Finally, the Conclusion will summarize the findings of the entire study and offer some new generalizations about the social makeup of the NSDAP.

In addition, Appendix I gives a much more detailed explanation of my methodology, along with a description of the Berlin Documents Center and the master card file. Appendix II explores the difficult problems of occupational classification, and the criteria used for that purpose. Appendix III is concerned with the mathematical "proof" of the validity of the sampling technique used to gather the information in the 30,000-plus biographies utilized in Chapters III and IV.

CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

[1]See especially Alan Bullock, Hitler. A Study in Tyranny (New York, 1962) and Joachim C. Fest, Hitler (Munich, 1973).

[2]Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (New York, 1939), p. 292.

[3]Ibid., p. 493.

[4]Ibid., p. 301.

[5]Ibid., pp. 490-491.

[6]Kurt Ludecke, I Knew Hitler (New York, 1938), p. 49. The Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (DAP) was the original name of the Nazi party. Nationalsozialistische was added in 1920.

[7]Ibid., p. 181.

[8]Konrad Heiden, History of National Socialism (New York, 1935), pp. 18 and 28. Heiden never made it clear whether these generalizations applied to the entire period 1919-1933 or only to the years immediately preceding the Machtergreifung.

[9]Konrad Heiden, Der Fuehrer (New York, 1936), p. 258.

[10]For a comparison of Heiden's figures for party membership at various times during the 1920s with the numbers established by this study, see below pp. 68, 72, 78, 86, 94, and 100.

[11]For example, Alice Hamilton, "The Youth who are Hitler's Strength," New York Times Magazine, October, 1935, reproduced in John Weiss, ed., Nazis and Fascists in Europe, 1918-1945 (Chicago, 1969), pp. 83-90.

[12]Miriam Beard, "The Tune Hitlerism Beats for Germany," New York Times Magazine, October, 1935, reproduced in Weiss, ed., Nazis and Fascists, pp. 91-97.

[13]For examples of the lower-middle class hypothesis, see the following studies: Karl Lowenstein, Hitler's Germany. The Nazi Background to War (New York, 1940, rev. ed.), pp. 4-5; Frederick Schumann, Hitler and the Nazi Dictatorship. A Study in the Social Pathology and the Politics of Fascism (London, 1936), p. 102; David Saposs, "The Role of the Middle Classes in Social Development. Fascism, Populism, Communism, Socialism," Economic Essays in Honor of Wesley Clair Mitchell (New York, 1935), pp. 95, 97, 102-103; and Daniel Guerin, Fascisme et Grand Capital (Paris, 1936), p. 26.

[14]R. Palme Dutt, Fascism and Social Revolution (New York, 1935), especially p. 100; Guerin, Fascisme et Grand Capital, p. 9.

[15]Lowenstein, Hitler's Germany, pp. 4-5; Schumann, Hitler and the Nazi Dictatorship, p. 16.

[16]Theodore Abel, The Nazi Movement. Why Hitler Came to Power (New York, 1934). Of the 89 entries rejected, 48 were discarded because their authors were women (4). Abel justified this procedure on the grounds that National Socialism was predominantly a masculine movement. A woman, being an atypical Nazi, could only prejudice the sample. In fact, women made up over 5 per cent of the total membership throughout the pre-depression era.

A perceptive and exhaustive analysis of Abel's original data has recently appeared by Peter Merkl, Political Violence Under the Swastika (Princeton, 1975), which will be discussed below in some detail.

[17]Abel's own figure for the membership in 1933, The Nazi Movement, Appendix II, Table I.

[18]Abel's statistics will be compared to those derived in this study on later pages. For an example of the influence of Abel on recent works concerning the sociography of the NSDAP see Martin Broszat, "National Socialism, It's Social Basis and Psychological Impact," in E. J. Feuchtwanger, ed. Upheaval and Continuity. A Century of German History (Pittsburgh, 1974), pp. 134-151, especially p. 140.

[19]Hans Gerth, "The Nazi Party: It's Leadership and Composition," American Journal of Sociology 45 (July 1940): 517-541. The "official" party statistics that Gerth

referred to is the Parteistatistik which was not available to the general public in 1940 though a great deal of the data therefrom was published in Hans Volz, Daten die Geschichte der NSDAP (Berlin, 1938). The occupational classification system used in the Parteistatistik and in Volz' book are much too vague to be of great value for determining social class. Also, the data is incomplete or missing entirely for the period 1919-1930.

[20]Gerth, "The Nazi Party," p. 526. The idea that the Nazis represented the "failures" of German society has been adopted in several different forms by a number of historians since Gerth (see pp. 7-10 hereof).

[21]Ibid., pp. 529 and 530. Several comments had been made on the youth of party members before Gerth, but he was the first to support his statements with any sort of evidence.

[22]Talcott Parsons, "Some Sociological Aspects of the Fascist Movements," Social Forces 21 (December 1942): 138-147.

[23]Ibid., p. 138.

[24]Ibid., p. 139.

[25]Ibid., pp. 145-146.

[26]J. K. Pollock, "An Areal Study of the German Electorate, 1930-1933," American Political Science Review 2 (May 1944): 89.

[27]Ibid., pp. 90-91.

[28]Jakub Banaszkiewicz, "German Fascism and People of the Social Fringe," Polish Western Affairs 8 (August 1967): 251-288; by the same author, Powstanie Partei Hitlerowskiej 1919-1923 (Poznan, 1968). The latter work has an English summary on pp. 516-525.

[29]The only attempt by Banaszkiewicz at statistical analysis to test his generalizations is several references to statistical fragments from George Franz-Willing, Die Hitlerbewegnung. Der Ursprung 1919-1922 (Hamburg, 1962) and Wolfgang Schaefer, NSDAP. Entwicklung und Struktur der Staatspartei des Dritten Reichs (Hannover, 1957), both of which are discussed in some detail herein. Banaszkiewicz' explanation of exactly what constitutes the "social fringe" of a society is confusing. Apparently, anyone who had been a member of Germany's armed forces during World War I was a "marginal man" according to Banaszkiewicz'

definition, as was anyone affected adversely by the economic crises in Germany during the period 1919-1924. Clearly, this includes a great majority of the male population of the Reich. At best, these two works, which are representative of the "marginal man" theory of the social composition of the NSDAP, are unconvincing.

[30]Michael John Thornton, Nazism, 1918-1945 (London, 1966, p. 27.

[31]William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. A History of Nazi Germany (New York, 1960), p. 122.

[32]Dietrich Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party: 1919-1933 (Pittsburgh, 1969). Orlow, basing his conclusions on a statistical analysis of a very limited sample of the early party membership in Werner Maser's Die Sturm auf die Republik. Die Fruehgeschichte der NSDAP (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1965), concluded the party membership was made up of "declasses or displaced students and often unemployable pseudo-intellectuals . . ." (p. 56). For a critique of Maser's book and methodology, see p. 26 hereof.

[33]Joseph Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party (Minneapolis, 1967). Nyomarkay characterizes the NSDAP, especially its leadership, as being "gradually" taken over by "military men and another group, the 'armed bohemians'--ideologists, adventurers, dissenters of all kinds, failures, and underworld characters" (p. 60). Nyomarkay offers no original research to support his contentions. He bases his analysis on secondary sources, primarily Schaefer, NSDAP.

[34]Evelyn Pospisil, "Diskussionbeitrag: Die Massenbasis des Faschismus," Jenaer Beitrag fuer Parteigeschichte 19 (February 1969): 31-40. Pospisil argues that "the declassed and ideologically untrained and politically reactionary| in German society made up the bulk of the Nazi party membership (p. 33).

[35]Jerzy Holzer, "La Partei sociale des NSDAP dans les annés 1928-1930," Acta Poloniae Historica 22 (October 1970): 283-293. Holzer's generalizations are less dogmatic than those of Pospisil. Although he concludes that " . . . le NSDAP avait exerce une influence particulurement forte sur des representants declasse les couches moyennes (Lumpenkleinburgertum)" (p. 299), he also points out that "Le NSDAP est devenu un partei a l'echelle nationale et son action a porte sur tous les milieux, independamment de facteurs tels que le lieu d'habitation, la stratification soziale, la confession, le sexe et l'age" (p. 299). Holzer based his generalizations on

analyses of the Reichstag elections of 1928 and 1930. He felt that the same sorts of persons who voted for the Nazis were likely to be party members.

[36]Daniel Lerner, The Nazi Elite (Stanford, 1951) and Lerner with Ithiel de Sola Pool and George K. Schueller, "The Nazi Elite" in Howard D. L. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites. Studies in Coersive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 194-313. This article contains much of the material in Lerner's earlier study somewhat updated.

[37]Lerner, The Nazi Elite, p. v.

[38]Ibid., p. 1.

[39]Ibid., p. 2.

[40]Lerner, "The Nazi Elite," p. 288. To determine who was marginal, Lerner used fourteen criteria: (1) birthplace--anyone born in Bavaria, the Rhineland, Alsace and the Saar, or outside Germany was considered marginal; (2) age--"youth" equates with marginal, but Lerner did not say how old one must be to leave the ranks of marginal people; (3) employment changes--anyone who ever changed jobs at any time during his life is marginal; (4) geographical movement--anyone in the party who moved from one region of Germany to another or from a small community to a city is marginal; (5) religious affiliation--Roman Catholics, Deutschglaeubig and atheists are considered marginal; (6) lifework--peasants and artisans are marginal by Lerner's definition; (7) occupation of father--again, peasants and artisans are marginal; (8) education--anyone who attended but did not graduate from any school is marginal, as is anyone who attended no higher school than grade school; (9) father-in-law's occupation--having a father-in-law who was a peasant or artisan makes one marginal; (10) military career--all enlisted men are considered marginal by Lerner; (11) date of entry into the party--anyone who joined before 1925 is marginal; (12) spouse--anyone who married a non-German is marginal; (13) college--anyone who studied abroad is marginal, and (14) occupation--anyone who ever worked outside Germany is marginal.

[41]Many of these same objections to Lerner's work have been raised in Merkl, Political Violence Under the Swastika, pp. 116-117. Merkl describes Lerner's criteria of marginality as a "preposterous choice of indices" (p. 116).

[42]This is equally true for the variation of the marginal man hypothesis which calls the Nazis "losers" and

National Socialist ideology an "ideology of the losers." See Otis Mitchell, Nazism and the Common Man (Minneapolis, 1972), especially pp. 5 and 18. Also Wolfgang Sauer, "National Socialism: Totalitarianism or Fascism?" American Historical Review 72 (December 1967): 408-422.

[43]One great weakness of this argument is the ambiguous nature of the term "lower-middle class." It has become a catchall which can refer to a number of socially and ideologically diverse groups in society. For a good discussion of the problems involved in identifying the lower-middle class, see Arno J. Mayer, "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problem," Journal of Modern History 47 (September 1976): 409-436, in which the author argues that the concept of the lower-middle class is a valuable historical tool when carefully defined and used. For a definition of the term as used in this study see below, Appendix II.

[44]A partial list of only some of the more important works includes Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure and Effects of National Socialism (New York, 1970), trans. Jean Steinberg, p. 101; Bracher, Die Aufloesung der Weimarer Republik. Eine Studie zum Problem des Machterfalls in der Demokratie (Stuttgart and Dusseldorf, 1957), p. 170; Martin Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers. Grundlegung und Entwicklung seiner innern Verfassung (Munich, 1969), pp. 50-52; William Carr, A History of Germany, 1815-1945 (London, 1969), pp. 343-344; F. L. Carstens, The Rise of Fascism (Berkeley, 1969), pp. 143-144; Joachim Fest, Das Gesicht des Dritten Reich. Profile einer totalitarien Herrschaft (Munich, 1964), p. 40; William S. Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy. A Political History of the Reich from 1918 to 1933 (New York, 1946), p. 226; Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New York, 1960), pp. 127 and 148; Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism (New York, 1969), passim; Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, especially pp. 47-48.

[45]Lipset, Political Man; Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism; Bracher, The German Dictatorship; Heinrich August Winkler, Mittelstand, Demokratie und Nationalsozialismus (Cologne, 1972). See also the review article by Erich Volkmann, "Mittelstand und Nationalsozialismus in der Weimarer Republik," Historische-Politische Buch (1973): 97-98. Volkmann discusses the current state of the middle-class hypothesis in the light of the most recent publications on the subject. Lipset, Bracher, and Nolte discuss the bourgeois character of fascism in terms of voters, but all clearly feel that those motivated to vote for the Nazis were also the most likely candidates for party membership.

[46]Lipset, Political Man, pp. 129-130.

[47]Ibid., pp. 127, 140, and 146-148.

[48]Bracher, The German Dictatorship, pp. 155-157 and 162.

[49]Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, p. 399.

[50]Winkler, Mittelstand, Demokratie und Nationalsozialismus, pp. 17 and 163-170.

[51]E. Vermeil, L'Allemagne. Essai d'explication (Paris, 1945), and Rudolph Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism (Baton Rouge, 1945).

[52]Vermeil, L'Allemagne, pp. 294-295.

[53]Heberle, Democracy to Nazism, pp. 9-10.

[54]Bracher, Die Aufloesung der Weimarer Republik, pp. 117-120.

[55]Walther Hofer, Die Diktatur Hitlers. Bis zum Beginn des Zweiten Weltkrieg (Konstanz, 1960), p. 11.

[56]Orlow, "The Conversion of Myths into Political Power: The Case of the Nazi Party, 1925-1926," American Historical Review 72 (April 1967): 906-924.

[57]Jeremy Noakes, "Conflict and Development in the NSDAP, 1924-1927," Journal of Contemporary History 1 (October 1966): 3-36.

[58]David Schoenbaum, Hitlers Social Revolution. Class and Status in Germany 1933-1939 (London, 1966), pp. 11 and 30.

[59]Carsten, Rise of Fascism, p. 94; Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, p. 50.

[60]Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, p. 56.

[61]Ibid.

[62]Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 91.

[63]Michael Kater, "Zur Soziographie der fruehen NSDAP," Viertelsjahrhefte fuer Zeitgeschichte 22 (September 1971): 124-160.

[64]Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, 1921-1933 (Oxford, 1971), p. 95. To substantiate his

generalizations, Noakes quotes the following statistics taken from the Schumacher file in the Bundesarchiv at Koblenz, which contains a number of membership lists from the pre-1930 period: Hamburg, 64.5 per cent of persons joining the party during the period 1925-1930 were under twenty-five years of age; Halle, 66.1 per cent under thirty. Noakes did not say how many individuals his statistics represent or how complete these lists are. His study is an excellent indicator of the trends toward youth within the party, but cannot be considered conclusive.

[65]Harold Gordon, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch (Princeton, 1962), p. 68.

[66]Ibid., p. 82.

[67]Ibid., p. 71. Gordon's data on the age of party members consists largely of eyewitness observations of the pre-putsch Nazis and one membership list of 994 party members. Of these 610 were under thirty-one years of age (p. 70). See also Mitchell, Nazism and the Common Man, p. 5.

[68]Another recent study which lends credence to the "generational revolt" hypothesis is Anselm Faust, Der Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Studentbund. Studenten und Nationalsozialismus in der Weimarer Republik, 2 vols. (Dusseldorf, 1973). Faust is concerned with the appeal of the Nazis to German students rather than party membership, but he does point out a number of factors which inclined German students "by the thousands" toward Hitler's party (especially pp. 27-28 and 45-46).

[69]For early proponents of this argument, see Lowenstein, Hitler's Germany, especially pp. 4-6; also Michael T. Florinsky, Fascism and National Socialism. A Study of the Economic and Social Policies of the Totalitarian States (New York, 1936), especially p. 43.

[70]Odette Hardy-Hemery, "Le nazisme: passe et actualite," Revue des Nord 48 (April-June 1971): 307.

[71]Mitchell, Nazism and the Common Man, p. 13.

[72]Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda (London, 1973), p. 28.

[73]Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 91.

[74]See Kater's statistics below p. 101 and those from the parteistatistik and Noakes study. None of these indicate any unemployed in the party ranks. There exists the

possibility, however, that persons joining the Nazis, when asked their occupations, would not admit to being unemployed, but would rather give their previous occupations. Karl O'Lessker, "Who Voted for Hitler? A New Look at the Class Basis of Nazism," American Journal of Sociology 13 (July 1968): 63-69, concluded that a number of persons from the expanding ranks of the unemployed voted for Hitler. Assuming this is true it tells us nothing conclusive about party membership. O'Lessker's generalization has been challenged by R. I. McKibbin, "The Myth of the Unemployed: Who Did Vote for the Nazis?" Australian Journal of Politics and History 12 (August 1969): 25-40. McKibbin analyzed the same material from which O'Lessker drew his conclusions and decided that the bulk of the Nazis' electoral support did not come from the unemployed, but from "new voters."

[75]Pollock, "An Areal Study of the German Electorate," pp. 89-94.

[76]Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism, p. 21. Heberle also pointed out the appeal the NSDAP apparently had for farmers without pursuing the point, except to date the mass defection of the farmers from their traditional political parties to Nazism as having occurred only after the beginning of the depression (p. 87).

[77]C. P. Loomis and J. A. Beegle, "The Spread of German Nazism in Rural Areas," The American Sociological Review 11 (1946): 724-734.

[78]Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification and Political Power," The American Political Science Review 6 (February 1952): 357.

[79]Werner T. Angress, "The Political Role of the Peasantry in the Weimar Republic," The Review of Politics 21 (July 1959): 530-549.

[80]Gerhard Stoltenberg, Politische Stroemmungen im Schleswig-Holsteinischen Landvolk, 1918-1933 (Dusseldorf, 1962), pp. 146-147.

[81]Horst Gies, "NSDAP und landwirtschaftliche Organisationen in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik," Viertelsjahrhefte fuer Zeitgeschichte 15 (March 1967): 341-376 (quote from 360).

[82]Carsten, Rise of Fascism, pp. 143-144, 145. Carsten apparently did not quantify the information on the party list in question.

[83]Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, p. 138.

[84]Kater, "Zur Soziographie," p. 140. It should be noted that Kater's definition of a "rural area" included all communities with under 10,000 population.

[85]Paul Sering, "Der Faschismus," Zeitschrift fuer Sozialismus 24-25 (September-October 1936): 765-792.

[86]See Rudolf Billung, NSDAP: Die Geschichte einer Bewegnung (Munich, 1931). Even staunch opponents of the Hitler movement like Theodor Heuss, Hitlers Weg. Eine historische-politische Studie ueber den Nationalsozialismus (Stuttgart, 1932), noted the heterogeneity of the party membership.

[87]Bendix, "Social Stratification," p. 357.

[88]Wilhelm Ehrenstein, Daemon Masse (Frankfurt, 1952).

[89]Jean F. Neurohr, Der Mythos vom Dritten Reich. Zur Geistsgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus (Stuttgart, 1957).

[90]Raymond Martin, Le National Socialisme hitlerien. Une Dictature Populaire (Paris, 1959).

[91]Fest, Das Gesicht des Dritten Reich, p. 40.

[92]Wolfgang Zopf, Wandlungen der deutschen Elite. Eine Zirkulationmodel Deutscher Fuehrungsgruppen, 1919-1961 (Munich, 1965). Zopf's thesis about workers has been disputed by Kater's statistical study of the party, at least in 1923, and in statistical analyses of the party membership by Gordon and Noakes, see below p.

[93]Wolfgang Horn, "Hitler und die NSDAP. Neuere Untersuchung zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus," Neue Politische Literature 4 (April 1968): 466-484. Horn was probably influenced by the work of Gerhard Ritter, particularly an article in Maurice Baumont, John Fried, Edmond Vermeil, and others, eds., The Third Reich (New York, 1955), pp. 389-412, in which Ritter denied any class character in the National Socialist movement. Ritter did not attempt to prove his contentions, and neither he nor Horn specified what period they meant. This is an important consideration, since it is very possible that the social composition of the party changed several times during the years between 1919 and 1933.

[94]Carsten, Rise of Fascism, p. 95.

[95]Bracher, The German Dictatorship, pp. 154-155, 157.

[96]Holzer, "La Partee soziale des NSDAP," p. 299.

[97]Volz' study has only a few generalizations about the occupational makeup of the party membership. The Parteistatistik differentiates between the following occupational classifications:

(1) Arbeiter--no criteria listed for inclusion within this group. It is unclear whether agricultural laborers were included, or apprentices and journeymen in the artisanal trades, or clerks, etc.

(2) Land-u. Forstwirtschaft--no information on which occupational groups are included in this category.

(3) Industrie u. Handwerk (Handwerker und Gewerbetriebende)--those included in this group are actually made up of at least two social classes.

(4) Freie Berufe--no information about which occupations are included.

(5) Beamte--divided into "lehrer" and "anderer." No information about who the anderer were.

(6) Angestellte--no information on which occupations this category included.

(7) Mithelfende Fam.-Angehartige.--again, no information.

Attempting to ascertain the social class of most party members using only the above information would be extremely difficult at best. Nevertheless, many have attempted to do just that.

[98]Schaefer, NSDAP, pp. 11-19.

[99]Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, pp. 50-54.

[100]Franz-Willing, Die Hitlerbewegnung.

[101]Franz-Willing included under "free professions" such occupational groups as "salespeople" and "bankpeople" (ibid., p. 126). In addition, he made no distinction between skilled laborers and artisans (ibid., p. 130).

[102]In addition to Banaszkiewicz (see above p. 9), a number of other historians have been influenced by Franz-Willing including Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution, p. 18.

[103]Maser, Fruehgeschichte der NSDAP.

[104]Maser used five different party lists from as many different party Ortsgruppen. The first is, according

to Maser, the oldest surviving list containing biographical data on the first 675 party members and dating from May, 1922. The authenticity of this "oldest surviving list" has been convincingly challenged by Kater in "Zur Soziographie," p. 106 (see below p. 76). The remaining lists, all from 1922, contain a total of 803 biographies.

[105]Many of the same objections voiced here have been made by Kater in "Zur Soziographie," pp. 126-127. Like Franz-Willing, Maser failed to distinguish between skilled laborers (Facharbeiter) and artisans (Handwerker), a crucial distinction in determining class affiliation, see Appendix II hereof.

[106]Among many others, Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 126. Bracher's work is considered by many historians, including this writer, to be the definitive work on the Nazi period to date.

[107]Franz Josef Heyen, Nationalsozialismus im Alltag. Quellen zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus voranehmlich im Raum Mainz-Koblenz-Trier (Boppard-am-Rhein, 1967).

[108]Ibid., p. 53, abt. 403 NA 16737, 5,515f.

[109]Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, pp. 17, 47-48, and 130-131. Orlow largely concerned himself with the organizational history of the NSDAP and relied on Maser for the statistics he used on its social composition (p. 17). His one original attempt to ascertain who the Nazis were is presented in an analysis of the occupations of twelve Nazi Reichstag delegates elected in 1928 (p. 131). This is interesting in its own right, but sheds little light on the NSDAP membership as a whole.

[110]Carsten, The Rise of Fascism.

[111]Ibid., p. 95, n. 14.

[112]Ibid., p. 95.

[113]Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony.

[114]Ibid., pp. 18-19. Noakes based his observations on a list of the "first 25 members" of the party from the Hauptarchiv. These persons were, by occupational grouping, overwhelmingly lower-middle and middle class. Again, the observation must be made that this is not a large enough sample upon which to base firm conclusions.

[115]Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, p. 101, based on the correspondence between leading Nazis in the area.

[116]Ibid., p. 194, based on membership lists.

[117]Max H. Kele, Nazis and Workers. National Socialist Appeals to German Labor, 1919-1933 (Chapel Hill, 1972).

[118]Ibid., p. 36. Kele argues that Angestellte and Handwerker should be considered as skilled workers. Many of the occupations he considers skilled labor are included in this study as unskilled laborers for reasons discussed in Appendix II hereof.

[119]Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, p. 105, again based on correspondence between party leaders in the area. Noakes is not clear about whether or not he considers farmers to be a part of the lower-middle class.

[120]Ibid., p. 141. Noakes' attempt to turn the Parteistatistik figures into understandable occupational categories yielded the following results for persons joining the NSDAP in 1929: farmers, 2.7 per cent; workers (industrial and agricultural), 22 per cent; self-employed, 18 per cent (including artisans and the professions); white collar workers, 18 per cent; civil servants, 4 per cent; and "others," 7 per cent. The difficulties of the Parteistatistik as a guide to the social class of party members are discussed above, pp. 24-26.

[121]Ibid., pp. 141-142.

[122]Kater, "Zur Soziographie," pp. 124-160.

[123]A table summarizing Kater's results from ibid., p. 139, is included below, p. 101, with Kater's permission, for which I gratefully express my thanks.

[124]Kater, "Zur Soziographie," p. 129. There is good evidence pointing to the probability that the social character of the NSDAP changed radically several times during the period 1919-1930. One should not draw conclusions about the social origins of the Nazis who joined the party after 1924 from Kater's statistics. Even to consider them representative of the party membership for the years before 1933 is most questionable. Also, there is some question as to whether Kater's 4,726 party members are a representative sample even of those persons who joined the NSDAP in 1923. The highest party number on Kater's list is above 55,000, indicating that over 48,000

persons joined the party during that year. Since the Hauptarchiv list (Kater's source) is the only one known to have survived from 1923, Kater had little choice in sampling procedure. One further difficulty of Kater's study is that of occupational classification, discussed in some detail in Appendix II hereof.

[125]Gordon, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch.

[126]Gordon supplies no information on his source, or how his sample was selected, ibid., pp. 80-82.

[127]Ibid., p. 82. For a more detailed analysis of Gordon's statistics, see below p. 101.

[128]Ibid., p. 72.

[129]Ibid., p. 73. One of the most perplexing problems of a study of this nature is occupational classification. For a detailed discussion of this problem and of Gordon's proposals, as well as an exhaustive explanation of the classification system used to construct the statistics below, see Appendix II hereof.

[130]Geoffrey Pridham, Hitler's Rise to Power. The Nazi Movement in Bavaria, 1923-1933 (New York, 1973).

[131]Ibid., p. 185. Pridham relied heavily on Lipset, Political Man; Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York, 1965); and Harold Lasswell, "The Psychology of Hitlerism," The Political Quarterly (1934), for his social analysis of the NSDAP.

[132]Kater, "Sozialer Wandel in der NSDAP in Zuge der nationalsozialistischen Machtergreifung." To be published in Wolfgang Schieder, ed., Zur Sozialgeschichte des Faschismus. Deutschland und Italian im Vergleich, by Hoffman and Carupe in Hamburg in 1976. I appreciate Professor Kater's kind permission to quote from this study.

[133]See Appendix III hereof.

[134]Kater, "Sozialer Wandel," p. 1.

[135]Ibid., statistical Table 5. It should be noted, however, that Kater's classification system differs radically from Gordon's and from earlier studies. See below p. 101.

[136]Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 133.

[137]Heiden, History of National Socialism, p. x.

[138]Ludecke, I Knew Hitler, p. 40.

[139]Florinsky, Fascism and National Socialism, p. 37.

[140]Albrecht Tyrell, Fuehrer Befiel . . . Selbstzeugnesse aus der "Kampfzeit" der NSDAP. Dokumentation und Analysis (Dusseldorf, 1969), p. 13.

[141]Franz-Willing, Der Hitlerbewegnung, p. 103. Later (p. 254) he agreed with Volz that the actual figure for the beginning of 1921 was 3,000.

[142]Abel, The Nazi Movement, App. II, A, I; Volz, Daten die Geschichte der NSDAP, p. 7; Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, p. 25.

[143]Ludecke, I Knew Hitler, p. 49.

[144]Volz, Daten die Geschichte der NSDAP, p. 8; Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 100.

[145]From the Official Report of Captain Truman Smith, 25-11-22, quoted in Gordon, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, p. 64.

[146]Heiden, History of National Socialism, p. 39; Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy, p. 226; both of these may have originated from an obscure remark in Volz, Daten die Geschichte der NSDAP, pp. 7-8.

[147]Thornton, Nazism, pp. 27-31.

[148]Louis Smyden, Hitlerism. The Iron Fist in Germany (New York, 1932), p. 19.

[149]Abel, The Nazi Movement, App. II, A, I. A number of other works give the figure 55,000. All are based on the largest number found on the Hauptarchiv lists. Many of the numbers between 8,000 and 40,000 are missing, as are many between 45,000 and 55,000. The actual number of members in 1923 is still not definitely known.

[150]Volz, Daten die Geschichte der NSDAP, p. 21. Other studies which have adopted Volz' figures (sometimes rounded off) include Schumann, Hitler and the Nazi Dictatorship, p. 72; Hofer, Die Diktatur Hitlers, p. 20; Abel, The Nazi Movement, App. II, Table A, p. 1; Schaefer, NSDAP, p. 17; Shirer, Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p. 120; Ernst Deuerlein, Der Aufsteig der NSDAP in Augenzeugenberichten (Dusseldorf, 1968), pp. 254, 266, 291, and 293; Carsten, Rise of Fascism, p. 130; Holzer, "La Partee soziale des NSDAP," p. 283; Kele, Nazis and Workers, pp.

155-156; and Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, p. 28. Volz' figures are based on the highest membership number issued in a given year and therefore do not take into account the number of persons who left the party or the manner in which numbers were allotted. This makes his figures highly inaccurate in attempting to ascertain the number of members in the NSDAP at a given time. See also George Browder, "Problems and Potentials of the Berlin Documents Center," Central European History 5 (1972): 362-380, on the number of persons who left the party.

[151]Heiden, History of National Socialism, p. 113; Bullock, Hitler, p. 109; Fest, Gesicht des Dritten Reich, p. 55.

[152]Reinhad Kuehnl, Die Nationalsozialistische Linke, 1925-1930 (Meisenheim-am-Glan, 1966), p. 134.

[153]Tyrell, Fuehrer Befiel, p. 352.

[154]Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 133.

[155]Heiden, History of National Socialism, p. 113. He says (p. 124) the real strength of the party was 40,000 at this time.

[156]Tyrell, Fuehrer Befiel, p. 362.

[157]Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 133.

[158]Tyrell, Fuehrer Befiel, p. 352.

[159]Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 133.

[160]Ibid., and Tyrell, Fuehrer Befiel, p. 352.

[161]The only estimate of party strength based on anything approaching convincing evidence which differs considerably from Volz' figures is one made by Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, p. 49. Broszat uses the figures for the numerical strength given in the Parteistatistik which give the total strength of the party in September, 1930, as only 121,000! The only possible way to reconcile this with Volz' figures is to conclude that a great number of members left the party.

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIOGRAPHY OF THE EARLY NAZI PARTY, 1919-1923

> . . . when the National Socialist party appealed for the first time to the German people it resolutely refused . . . to support either religious or economic interests within the nation: Its appeals were from the first directed to the heroic instincts of the German people . . . in all social strata of the nation.
>
> Adolf Hitler
> Nuremberg, 1934

The Creation of the Weimar Republic

On September 29, 1918, the chief of the German General Staff, General Erich von Ludendorff, informed Kaiser Wilhelm II that an immediate armistice was necessary if Germany was to avoid invasion and dismemberment by the Allies. He also insisted that Germany should immediately establish a democratic parliamentary system in order to facilitate peace negotiations on the basis of Wilson's Fourteen Points. On October 3, at Ludendorff's suggestion, Prince Max of Baden became Imperial Chancellor. Prince Max was well-known for his liberal political views and it was hoped the Allies would negotiate more willingly with him than with his predecessor. His suggestions

followed, Ludendorff resigned on October 26 to leave the odious task of capitulation to others.

As Ludendorff was leaving office, the Reichstag carried out his instructions to create a true parliamentary democracy by resolving that the Imperial Chancellor must possess the confidence of the parliament. Wilhelm acceded to this limitation of his power in an effort to preserve his throne, but it was too late. On November 3 the German fleet at Kiel mutinied, and revolt quickly spread to Berlin. The German Communist Party,[1] led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, was preparing to proclaim a Soviet Republic on the Russian model. To avert this, Prince Max announced the abdication of Whilhelm II, and Philipp Scheidemann of the Social Democratic Party[2] proclaimed a republic. Prince Max resigned his office in favor of Friedrich Ebert, also of the SPD, in an effort to avoid a Bolshevik revolution. Ebert, who had labored mightily to preserve the monarchy, thus became the last Imperial Chancellor. Meanwhile, on November 9, Wilhelm fled to the Netherlands after being told that the army would not support him against the revolution. The conservative General Staff and the reformist SPD had together carried out a revolution from above.

On November 10 the workers' and soldiers' councils of Berlin endorsed Ebert's government. At the same time, Ebert entered into an agreement with the Army high command which guaranteed the Army's support for Ebert's regime in

return for which he would resist radicalization of the revolution (in other words, bolshevization). On December 23, revolutionaries occupied the chancellory in Berlin and took Ebert prisoner. He was rescued the next day by regular army troops. In protest against the provisional government's counterrevolutionary policies its three Independent Socialist[3] members resigned at the end of December. This left Ebert a free hand to deal with the mounting revolutionary tide. He commissioned Gustav Noske to raise a volunteer force to combat the revolutionaries, which he did.

The dismissal of Emil Eichhorn, the Independent Socialist police president of Berlin, on January 4, 1919, was the signal for mass demonstrations by the revolutionaries. On January 11 Noske's troops entered the capital city and in four days of bloody street fighting routed the insurgents. Liebknecht and Luxemburg were arrested on January 15 and executed by Noske's officers.

On January 19 elections for a National Assembly were held. Social revolution had been averted. A parliamentary democracy was created which perpetuated much of the old economic order and class structure of the Imperial regime. The elections for the National Assembly held in January did not return a majority for any one political party.[4] When the assembly met at Weimar on February 6, 1919, Scheidemann, as leader of the largest party, formed

a coalition cabinet based on his own party (SPD), the Catholic Center Party,[5] and the Democratic Party.[6]

Ebert was elected the first President of the Reich. A constitution for the new republic was written by Hugo Preuss of the DDP and accepted by the assembly on August 11. This constitution has been severely criticized for the system of proportional representation it introduced which encouraged the perpetuation of small political parties, and also for the wide emergency powers granted to the president. However, the collapse of the republic in 1933 owes far more to the ensuing course of events than to flaws in its constitution.

A number of measures for the nationalization of segments of the economy were introduced by the SPD when the new parliament convened for the first time, but few were effective. German industry during the Weimar period, as during the Kaiserreich, was dominated by cartels and other combines of monopolistic character with control concentrated in the hands of a few. The German working class definitely improved its political and economic status under the republic, but the hoped-for sweeping social reforms never materialized. This insured the left-wing opposition to the government strong support from the working class and weakened the SPD. Economic power remained with those groups in society who were at best lukewarm to the republic and at worst worked actively for its overthrow.

The Treaty of Versailles and the Crisis Years of the Republic, 1919-1924

The German hope that the peace settlement granted by the allies would be more equitable if negotiated with a democratic Germany was soon crushed. In fact, there were no negotiations. The settlement, which seemed unbearably harsh to many Germans, was dictated by the Allies. The terms presented to the German delegation at Versailles on May 7, 1919, demanded that Germany cede Alsace-Lorraine to France; Danzig was to become a free city; East Prussia would be separated from the Reich by the Polish Corridor; Upper-Silesia with its large industrial plant was given to a resurrected Poland, along with West Prussia and most of Posen; Northern Schleswig was given to Denmark and several small districts in western Germany to Belgium; union with Austria was strictly forbidden. In all, Germany was forced to cede 27,188 square miles of territory with more than 7 million inhabitants, not counting overseas colonies which were totally confiscated and divided among the Allies.

In addition, the left bank of the Rhine was to be occupied by Allied troops for an indefinite period to insure Germany's compliance with the other terms of the treaty, and the right bank was to be permanently demilitarized for a distance of thirty miles. The coal of the Saar region was to go to France for fifteen years, after which time a plebiscite would be held to decide which nationality its population desired. A final decision on the total

amount of reparations to be taken from Germany was put off until 1921, but Germany was forced to make an initial payment of 20 billion marks in gold and produce immediately. All German financial holdings in foreign countries were confiscated by the Allies and the merchant marine was reduced by 90 per cent.

Further, the German Army was to be reduced to 100,000 officers and men, all volunteers; the General Staff was to be abolished, and most war material was to be destroyed or handed over to the Allies. The possession of submarines, tanks, or military aircraft was forbidden to Germany.

To justify these terms, the Allies inserted Article 231 into the Versailles Treaty, which made the Germans admit that their own aggression was the sole cause of the war. Unremarkably, the "war guilt" clause in particular and the entire treaty in general were not popular in Germany. The German political parties united in outspoken opposition to acceptance of the terms. Newspaper editorials accused the formulators of the Versailles Treaty of deliberately ignoring the provisions of Wilson's fourteen points. However, the Allies were not interested in these protestations. An ultimatum was presented to the Germans in June to sign or be invaded. Scheidemann resigned rather than sign the treaty. His successor, Gustav Bauer, formed a coalition of the SPD and the Zentrum, but the DDP joined

the Germans People Party[7] and the Nationalist Party[8] in opposition to acceptance of the treaty. Nevertheless, the German delegation at Versailles signed under duress on June 23. There can be little doubt that the forced acceptance of a settlement so humiliating to the German people considerably weakened the new republic and strengthened its enemies in the Reich. The republic in general and the SPD in particular were never able to overcome the stigma of their association with defeat and Versailles. The Dolchstoss legend that the German Army was never defeated in the field but was stabbed in the back by the "November Criminals," the socialists, and particularly the Jews, became a powerful weapon in the hands of Adolf Hitler and other enemies of the republic.

The elections of March, 1920, took a heavy toll among the parties that signed the treaty. The DNVP, the DVP, and the USPD all gained heavily at the expense of the SPD and the Center Party. In June the SPD went into opposition and a new coalition was formed by the DDP, the DVP, and the Center Party, led by Konstantin Fehrenbach of the Zentrum. But this political change was not the only repercussion of the acceptance of the Versailles Treaty.

Concurrently with the March elections an attempt by right-wing elements to overthrow the republic was made, led by Wolfgang Kapp and General von Luettwiz of the Reichswehr. The putsch was poorly planned and organized

and was quickly defeated by a general strike called by the trade union leaders who supported the government. The putsch demonstrated, however, that there were powerful forces on the right in Germany unalterably inimical to the republic, and that factions in the army supported these forces. Furthermore, the Kapp Putsch also demonstrated that the republic was unacceptable to the radical left as well. Shortly after the putsch was suppressed the Communists in the Ruhr attempted an armed uprising of their own.

The army soon restored order in the area, but only with the aid of the para-military Freikorps. Once again the Weimar Republic was saved from enemies of the left by relying on its not only anti-bolshevik but also anti-republican allies on the right.

The Treaty of Versailles also contributed heavily to Germany's mounting economic problems during the period 1919-1924. The value of the mark decreased steadily for the first four years following the war, due in part to reparation payments and to the increasingly unfavorable balance of payments which were both traceable directly to the Versailles Treaty, and in part to the general exhaustion of the German economy by the war. The government also resorted to the practice of printing paper money in order to meet its expenses, which added to the inflation. By 1922 it required more than seven thousand Reichsmarks to buy one United States dollar (1914 value, 4.2 Dm=$1).

In January, 1923, the French and Belgians declared Germany delinquent in the payment of reparations and occupied the industrial heartland of Germany, the Ruhr Valley. Another Z-DVP-DDP coalition government headed by Wilhelm Cuno declared a state of passive resistance to the occupation and on Franco-Belgian attempts to run the mines and factories of the Ruhr. Cuno also ordered a ban on reparations payments until the occupation troops were withdrawn. The French and Belgians retaliated with mass arrests and an economic blockade which cut off the entire Rhineland from the rest of Germany. Germans in the occupied areas, particularly the Communists, resorted to sabotage and guerrilla warfare.

The German government, again adopting the expedient of printing huge volumes of paper money to meet emergencies, finally pushed the mark over the precipice. By July, one dollar was worth 160,000 marks; by October, a dollar would buy 242,000,000 marks; and by November the figure was a preposterous 4,200,000,000. The German economy reverted to a barter system because the currency was literally not worth the paper on which it was printed. Food riots were common, persons on fixed incomes suffered greatly, and the savings of the middle classes were wiped out. Conversely, many businessmen and industrialists prospered greatly, and the heavily indebted farmers were able to pay off their mortgages for literally nothing.

Once again, it seemed as though the republic would dissolve into civil war and anarchy. On the left the Communists fomented revolution in Saxony and Thuringia and in Hamburg; on the right, extremist groups, especially in Bavaria, were advocating a march on Berlin. The Bavarian government not only tolerated these groups, but encouraged and subsidized them as well.

On August 26 a new coalition government was formed by Gustav Stresemann, composed of his own party (the DVP), the Z, the DDP, and (initially) the SPD. Stresemann ordered an end to passive resistance and an immediate return to work in the Ruhr. He also resumed reparation deliveries. Using Article 48 of the Constitution, he declared a state of emergency and quickly dealt with the Communists. Fortunately for Stresemann, Hitler overplayed his hand in Bavaria, so that the threat from the right dissolved before reaching Berlin.

The danger of civil war averted, Stresemann issued a new currency on November 20 which ended the inflation. Despite his success in dealing with the crises, Stresemann received a vote of no confidence on November 23 and resigned the chancellorship. He retained, however, the post of foreign minister, at which he performed admirably until his death in 1929.

Post-War Bavaria and the Birth of the Nazi Party

When the Great War broke out in Europe, Bavaria was one of the least industrialized regions of the Reich.

Aside from a few machine and textile factories in the large cities of Munich, Nuremberg, and Augsburg, this southernmost state of Germany had very little heavy industry. The Bavarian government enjoyed considerable autonomy within the federal system of the empire and largely regulated its own affairs. All this was changed by the war. Urbanization began during the war years, spurred by the establishment of war industries in Bavaria. The number of workers in factories employing two hundred or more workers rose to almost a quarter of a million by the end of 1917. This belated industrialization was accompanied by all the ills associated with newly-industrialized societies.

The war also forced greater interference by the federal government into Bavarian affairs. Bavaria's domestic agricultural produce was regulated by the government in Berlin by price ceilings on grain and dairy products. Later in the war, the Kaiser empowered a Central Economic Planning Board for the Reich to establish a maximum quota of foodstuffs that could be consumed locally and to confiscate the surplus for the war effort.

Bavarians, ever jealous of their independence and mistrustful of Prussia and the federal government, did not take well to these social and economic changes. As early as 1916, Bethmann-Hollweg (the Imperial Chancellor) was alert to the "not unmenacing intensification of Bavarian particularism."[9] This resentment became more and more

common throughout Bavaria as the war dragged on. The Bavarian minister of war, von Hellingrath, noted in the middle of 1917 that the initial enthusiasm with which the war was greeted in Bavaria had been replaced by pessimism throughout the countryside as well as in the cities.

In 1917 the issue of local governmental and social reform which had been shelved by the war was reopened. A bill was introduced in December, 1917, which proposed sweeping reform.[10] Although the bill was defeated, it pointed out the inequities of the system and the existence of strongly antagonistic forces in Bavarian society.

In November, 1918, there was to be a state election in Bavaria as a result of the long awaited constitutional reforms the previous month. This was prevented by the outbreak of revolution. When news of the mutiny at Kiel reached Munich, Kurt Eisner, an Independent Socialist, capitalized on the change of ministries necessitated by the reforms of the previous month to stage a putsch. That night, King Ludwig III fled the capital bringing the ancient Wittelsbach monarchy to an end. Eisner, as the elected leader of the soldiers' and workers' councils of Munich, proclaimed a Bavarian republic, whose government was to be made up almost exclusively of socialists.[11] Eisner promised that the ultimate form of the republic would be decided by a national assembly to be elected at some unspecified time in the future. The elections were

finally held in January, 1919, and were disastrous for Eisner's regime.[12] Eisner tried, unsuccessfully, to save his own position by reuniting with the SPD.

Eisner came under increasing criticism from both the right and the left. The Communists were trying to radicalize the revolution, using the slogan "den Raeten Gehoert das Macht" ("power belongs to the councils") which to the conservatives sounded very much like the Bolshevik slogans in Russia in 1917. The bourgeois parties were also demanding Eisner's resignation. On February 21, 1919, Eisner prepared to go to the Landtag and tender his resignation. On the way, he was assassinated by Count Anton Arco-Valley, who was himself shot down by Eisner's bodyguards. An hour later the leader of the SPD was shot in the Landtag itself by a Communist. This initiated a period of bloody civil war in Bavaria which produced great bloodshed and bitterness. Freikorps and Wehrverbaende proliferated. Units of the regular army, aided by the Wehrverbaende captured the city from the Communists in May, after widespread atrocities on both sides.

After the Kapp Putsch, the BVP[13] secured the appointment of Gustav von Kahr as Ministerpresident. A Bavarian particularist, Kahr provoked a number of conflicts with the federal government. He refused direct orders from the allied command to suppress the Wehrverbaende. In 1921, after yet another impasse between Kahr and the Reich

government, the BVP withdrew their support and replaced him with Hugo von Lerchenfeld, who followed a more conciliatory policy with the government in Berlin.

In 1923, the conflict between Bavaria and the federal government came to a head. Eugen von Knilling, who had replaced Lerchenfeld, was forced by the public outcry against Stresemann's Ruhr policy to appoint von Kahr as Bavarian state commissioner with dictatorial powers. The Reich government, suspicious of Kahr, declared a state of emergency. Kahr enlisted the aid of Bavarian Reichswehr commander, General von Lossow. The confrontation with Berlin ended with Hitler's Beer Hall Putsch in November.

It was against this backdrop that the NSDAP was born and initially flourished. In a series of meetings held at a popular Munich beer hall from January 2 to January 5, 1919, Anton Drexler and a group of approximately twenty-five other men founded the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (DAP).[14] The ideological ancestors of the fledgling party were legion, and have been adequately explored in other works.[15] The immediate precursor of the DAP, however, deserves a brief examination.

Drexler and his fellow "patriots" from the first had close connections with a peculiar organization in Munich called the Thule Society. There is even some evidence to suggest that this elitist group conceived and subsidized the DAP, hoping to create through it a mass-based political movement which the Thule Society itself

could never become. From the Thule Society the DAP inherited several of the ideological planks which distinguished the later NSDAP until its destruction in 1945. The Thule Society owned a newspaper, the Voelkischer Beobachter which later became the main propaganda organ of the Nazi party. Through the medium of the Beobachter, the Thule Society expressed the same rabid anti-Semitism and super-nationalism that were so important in later Nazi propaganda appeals.[16] The Thule Society was also violently anti-Marxist and exhibited the same mystical fascination for German antiquities and pseudo-scientific racial theories so integral a part of the National Socialist Weltanschauung.[17]

To this ideological platform Drexler and some of his collaborators added a muddled brand of vaguely defined socialism, an antipathy toward capitalism and bourgeois society, and an amazing collection of esoteric economic and financial theories. It remained for Adolf Hitler to add the finishing touches to what may be loosely defined as the National Socialist "ideology,"[18] and to convert the DAP, which was little more than a debating society and social club when he found it, into an effective political organization.

The Sociography of the Pre-Hitler DAP

The men who founded the DAP along with Drexler have generally been dismissed as his fellow "workers" and/or "soldiers."[19] The reality is quite different. Of the

fifty-four persons who joined the NSDAP before Hitler, fifty-three are listed in the bound volume of membership lists at the Berlin Documents Center described earlier. The early members of the party were relatively young,[20] as shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1

THE AGES OF PERSONS WHO JOINED THE DAP BEFORE HITLER

Age Group	No. in Party	% in Party	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 20	6	11.1	3,897,555	9.0
20-29	18	33.3	11,458,015	26.6
30-39	12	22.2	8,863,091	20.5
40-49	6	11.1	7,754,071	17.9
50-59	3	5.6	6,561,314	14.9
Over 60	-	-	4,841,919	11.1
No Entry	8	16.7	-	-
Totals:	53	100.0	43,375,965	100.0

To characterize the pre-Hitler DAP as a party of youth would be inaccurate. Its members were somewhat younger than the average in German society, as shown in Table 1, but not overwhelmingly so. Agewise, the early party can best be described as fairly representative of the Reich population, tending toward youth.

The occupations of the first party members, as listed in Table 2, are somewhat surprising considering previous characterizations.[21] To call the pre-Hitler DAP a party of "soldiers and workers" is clearly a

TABLE 2

THE OCCUPATIONS OF PERSONS JOINING THE DAP BEFORE HITLER

Occupational Categories	No. in Party	% in Party	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Unskilled Laborers	2	3.8	10,679,848	35.3
Skilled Laborers	2	3.8	1,146,945	3.8
Agricultural Laborers	1	1.9	2,499,945	8.3
Totals:	5	9.5	14,326,738	47.4
Artisans	10	18.9	4,488,428	14.8
White Collar	10	18.9	5,274,232	17.4
Foremen	-	-	Included under white collar	
Managers	2	3.8	250,335	0.9
Civil Servants	2	3.8	No figures available	
Self-Employed	2	3.8	No figures available	
School Teachers	1	1.9	308,741	1.0
Totals:	27	51.1	10,321,736	34.3
Farmers	-	-	2,139,878	7.1
Large Landowners	-	-	Included with farmers	
Totals:	-	-	2,139,878	7.1

Military (enlisted)	1	1.9	104,000	0.3
Military (officers)	-	-	No figures available	
Totals:	1	1.9	104,000	0.3
Professional	4	7.5	237,850	0.7
Professors	1	1.9	No figures available	
Industrialists/ Manufacturers	1	1.9	No figures available	
Financiers	-	-	No figures available	
Private Incomes	1	1.9	2,944,872	9.2
Totals:	7	13.2	3,182,722	9.7
Clergy	-	-	No figures available	
Unemployed	-	-		3.7
Students	4	7.5	No figures available	
Housewives	-	-	15,650,000	
Arts	3	5.6	134,236	0.5
Retired	-	-	No figures available	
No Entry	6	11.2	-	-
Totals:	13	24.3	134,236	0.5
All Categories:	53	100.0	30,259,310	100.0

NOTE: Occupational percentages for the Reich are computed without the "housewives" category. The percentages for "unemployed" are taken from Angell, The Recovery of Germany, 370-371, and are based on the percentage of trade union members receiving benefits. It is likely the unemployed among non-trade union members was higher than the figure given. The percentage of unemployed is not computed into the total Reich percentage.

misrepresentation.[22] Workers of all types are actually highly underrepresented vis-à-vis their strength in German society as a whole. The most overrepresented groups, when compared to their relative strength in the Reich, is the professional classification and persons from the arts. As is obvious from Table 2, the lower-middle class was present in strength in the party from its inception, although the membership was not overwhelmingly drawn from this stratum of society. This sample is also notable for the absence of any farmers on the list, and for the lack of anyone calling themselves "unemployed." It can be deduced from the absence of farmers that the party was still confined to the city of Munich before Hitler joined and had not yet begun to spread to the surrounding countryside. From the absence of unemployed persons, it may be concluded that the DAP was not a refuge for the derelicts of Munich society as has sometimes been argued.

The Social Composition of the DAP at the End of 1919

These were the "twenty to twenty-five people, chiefly from among the lower walks of life" found by the young army observer, Adolf Hitler, when he attended a DAP meeting in a Munich beer hall during the late summer of 1919.[23] In September, after a great deal of soul-searching, Hitler decided to join the party. The DAP leadership did not immediately exploit Hitler's considerable oratorical talents and his early political activities were limited.[24]

At the end of 1919 the DAP was still one of a multitude of obscure political groups of only 213 members. Biographical data on 202 of these persons were available for this study, taken from Adolf Hitlers Mitkaempfer.[25] The age distribution of the party membership at the beginning of 1920 did not differ markedly from the pre-Hitler party, as seen in Table 3.

TABLE 3

THE AGE STRUCTURE OF THE DAP MEMBERSHIP AT THE END OF 1919

Age Group	No. in Party	% in Party	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 20	23	11.4	3,897,555	9.0
20-29	59	29.2	11,458,015	26.6
30-39	46	22.8	8,863,091	20.5
40-49	21	10.4	7,754,071	17.9
50-59	12	5.9	6,561,314	14.9
Over 60	5	2.5	4,841,919	11.1
No Entry	36	17.4	-	-
Totals:	202	100.0	43,375,965	100.0

The DAP membership at the end of 1919 contained a number of young people, but it could hardly be described as a youth movement. Although the movement contained more people from the under-forty age groups than did German society, all age categories were represented.

The occupational origins of the DAP members changed very little after the admission of Hitler (see Table 4),

TABLE 4

THE OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE DAP AT THE END OF 1919

Occupational Categories	No. in Party	% in Party	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Unskilled Laborers	10	5.0	10,679,848	35.3
Skilled Laborers	10	5.0	1,146,945	3.8
Agricultural Laborers	6	2.9	2,499,945	8.3
Totals:	26	12.9	14,326,738	47.4
Artisans	34	16.8	4,488,428	14.8
White Collar	41	20.3	5,274,232	17.4
Foremen	-	-	Included under white collar	
Managers	6	2.9	250,335	0.9
Civil Servants	4	2.0	No figures available	
Self-Employed	4	2.0	No figures available	
School Teachers	3	1.5	308,741	1.0
Totals:	92	45.5	10,321,736	34.3
Farmers	-	-	2,139,878	7.1
Large Landowners	-	-	Included with farmers	
Totals:	-	-	2,139,878	7.1

Military (enlisted)	14	6.9	104,000	0.3
Military (officers)	4	2.0	No figures available	
Totals:	18	8.9	104,000	0.3
Professional	13	6.4	237,850	0.7
Professors	3	1.5	No figures available	
Capitalists	3	1.5	No figures available	
Financiers	-	-	No figures available	
Private Incomes	3	1.5	2,944,872	9.2
Totals:	22	10.9	3,182,722	9.9
Clergy	-	-	No figures available	
Unemployed	-	-		3.7*
Students	12	5.9	No figures available	
Housewives	-	-	15,650,000*	
Arts	8	4.0	134,236	0.5
Retired	-	-	No figures available	
No Entry	24	11.9	-	-
Totals:	44	21.8	134,236	0.5
All Categories:	202	100.0	30,258,310	100.0

*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an average for the year compiled from Angell, Recovery of Germany, 370, based on the number of union members unemployed. It is likely that the figure for non-union workers was higher.

indicating that the party continued to appeal, through its modest propaganda efforts, to the same sorts of people.

Workers were not as numerous in the party as in German society. The professions, on the other hand, were greatly overrepresented in the movement compared to their strength in the Reich. The percentage of white collar workers entering the DAP increased considerably during the period from September, 1919 to January 1, 1920, while artisans declined somewhat. Overall, the membership of the DAP at the beginning of 1920 exhibited a decidedly middle-class character, with the upper-middle class present in much greater relative strength than their numbers in German society. Although some military persons came into the party, the DAP was in no danger of being submerged under a deluge of soldiers. The charge that Hitler brought a number of soldiers into the movement can be supported by the figures in Table 4,[26] but we may wonder if the persons who listed military occupations were still in the army, or whether perhaps they had already been discharged and had not yet found civilian occupations.

That the DAP was still confined to Munich, and had not yet spread into rural areas is shown by the absence of farmers in the membership.[27] Only eighteen (8.9 per cent) of the pre-1920 members were women. Overall, there was nothing particularly remarkable about the social origins of DAP members before 1920. The party seemed to attract representatives from all segments of Munich society.

1920--The NSDAP in Transition

The year 1920 was a crisis year for the German republic and a year of considerable accomplishment for the DAP. In March, it added the words "National Socialist" to its name, becoming the NSDAP or Nazis.[28] It also found a new oratorical star to preach the party gospel. At the first "mass" meeting of the party in February, 1920, Hitler, though not the featured speaker, upstaged the principal orator, speaking on the inequities of Versailles. At the same meeting, Hitler proclaimed the new name of the party and announced its platform in the form of twenty-five "points," which attempted to spell out the vaguely formulated ideology of National Socialism.[29]

The speeches of party leaders throughout the year emphasized the importance of the role of the "workers" and the young people in the coming "rebirth" of Germany.[30] As the year progressed, Hitler waxed stronger and stronger in influence within the movement and his reputation as a speaker grew in all parts of southern Germany. In December, the NSDAP acquired the Voelkischer Beobachter. Apparently purchased with secret army funds, the newspaper proved invaluable in providing a platform for Hitler and a medium for the dissemination of Nazi propaganda.[31]

While the NSDAP prospered in 1920, the republic tottered. Sporadic Communist uprisings continued in several parts of Germany even though the worst of the Red

storm had been weathered.[32] In March, the Republic faced a new threat in the form of a right-wing putsch supported by elements of the army. When Ebert, now president of the Reich, asked the commander of the Truppenamt, General von Seeckt, whether or not the army would support the Republic in the face of this threat, he received an evasive answer. In fact it was the socialist trade unions that rallied to Ebert's aid and saved the Republic by calling a general strike.

The economic situation in Germany had not improved noticeably over 1919.[33] In the elections held in June, the parties who supported the Republic lost their majority in the Reichstag, never to regain it.[34] In addition, the first collections were made of the onerous reparations payments from Germany which further strained her economy. All of these factors could not help but aid an ably led, radical political movement which promised to alleviate the desperate conditions in which many Germans found themselves. At the same time, the NSDAP offered everyone a scapegoat to blame for all their troubles: the Jew.[35]

The NSDAP greatly increased in strength to 2,138 total members by December 31, 1920--a net gain of 1,935 members.[36] Adolf Hitlers Mitkaempfer contains the records of 1,765 of these new Nazis, providing a reasonably reliable sample for ascertaining the sociography of the group.

The age distribution in the incoming membership is not markedly different than the distribution in German

society, except in the over-fifty categories as shown in Table 5.

TABLE 5

THE AGE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP IN 1920

Age Group	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 20	143	8.2	3,897,555	9.0
20-29	545	30.9	11,458,015	26.6
30-39	313	17.7	8,863,091	20.5
40-49	282	16.0	7,754,071	17.9
50-59	142	8.1	6,561,314	14.9
Over 60	36	2.0	4,841,919	11.1
No Entry	304	17.1	-	-
Totals:	1,765	100.0	43,375,965	100.0

Although the membership of the NSDAP at the end of 1920 was somewhat younger than the average in the Reich, it was still not a youth movement. A substantial number of the persons joining the movement in 1920 were over forty years of age. There was nothing remarkable about the age structure of the party membership in 1920.

The number of women among the new recruits totaled 212 or 12 per cent of the total, only one-third of whom listed their occupations as "housewife." This represents a net gain of 4 per cent in new female members over the previous year, which may or may not be attributable to Hitler, who was now the party's chief speaker and was

supposedly attractive to women.[37] Whatever the case, this was the highest proportion of women among new members for any year before 1930.

As seen in Table 6, several striking changes occurred in the occupational origins of the persons entering the NSDAP in 1920. The proportion of workers among incoming members in 1920 increased substantially over the previous year. Several factors may be considered instrumental in this increase, the most important being Hitler's success as a political speaker and the apparent left-wing program of the party as promulgated in the twenty-five points in February.[38] Hitler emphasized the socialistic planks in the party platform in his speeches during 1920,[39] and it is probable that the new Nazi recruits from the working class considered the party to be a part of the political left, and not a reactionary splinter group of the radical right, as it is often characterized today. With the apparent demise of the KPD in Germany,[40] the more militant workers were left without a political home, without a party which offered action and immediate redress of their grievances. The Nazis, according to their own propaganda, filled this void.

The percentage of military personnel coming into the NSDAP decreased significantly in 1920, dispelling the contentions of several historians that the party during this early period drew heavily from the army for its membership.

TABLE 6

OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP IN 1920

Occupational Categories	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Unskilled Laborers	275	15.5	10,679,848	35.3
Skilled Laborers	78	4.4	1,146,945	3.8
Agricultural Laborers	8	0.5	2,499,945	8.3
Totals:	361	20.4	14,326,738	47.4
Artisans	286	16.2	4,488,428	14.8
White Collar	326	18.5	5,274,232	17.4
Foremen	21	1.2	Included under white collar	
Managers	20	1.1	250,335	0.9
Civil Servants	129	7.3	No figures available	
Self-Employed	43	2.4	No figures available	
School Teachers	19	1.1	308,741	1.0
Totals:	844	47.8	10,321,736	34.3
Farmers	21	1.2	2,139,878	7.1
Large Landowners	3	0.2	Included with farmers	
Totals:	24	1.4	2,139,878	7.1

Military (enlisted)	10	0.6	104,000	0.3
Military (officers)	23	1.3	No figures available	
Totals:	33	1.9	104,000	0.3
Professional	88	5.0	327,850	0.7
Professors	10	0.6	No figures available	
Industrialists/ Manufacturers	15	0.8	No figures available	
Financiers	3	0.2	No figures available	
Private Incomes	9	0.5	2,944,872	9.2
Totals:	125	7.1	3,182,722	9.0
Clergy	1	0.1	No figures available	
Unemployed	7	0.4		3.8*
Students	134	7.6	No figures available	
Housewives	71	4.0	15,650,000*	
Arts	19	1.1	134,236	0.5
Retired	30	1.7	No figures available	
No Entry	116	6.5	-	-
Totals:	378	21.4	134,236	0.5
All Categories:	1,765	100.0	30,259,310	100.0

*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an average for the year compiled from Angell, The Recovery of Germany, 370, based on the number of union members unemployed. It is likely that the figure for non-union workers was higher.

Persons from the professions joining Hitler's movement also decreased somewhat percentagewise in 1920, but were still present among the new members in numbers disproportionately higher than their strength in the Reich. Only a few farmers came into the party in 1920, but their presence is significant. It shows that the Nazis had begun to spread to the countryside and were no longer confined to Munich. Even a very few Gutesbesitzer (gentlemen farmers/large landowners) joined the NSDAP in 1920.[41]

The percentage of business owners, industrialists and financiers coming into the party appears low in 1920, but those groups could not have made up any appreciable proportion of German society. We may wonder why these occupational groups would find their way into a party which represented itself as "socialist." A glance at the twenty-five points will show that the Nazi version of socialism was very unlike that of the Marxists parties, and that Hitler's propaganda appeals, both in his speeches and in the party newspaper, offered something for everyone, and made some special appeals to German businessmen.[42]

Although their total percentage among new entrants into the NSDAP declined somewhat in 1920, white collar workers still represented the largest single classification in the party. Hitler appealed to this group not as members of the middle class, but as workers--"Hand u. Kopfarbeiter" (workers of the hand and head)--integral and

important members of a "socialist" Volksgemeinschaft of all Germans.[43] The anti-Marxist planks in the Nazi platform also appealed strongly to this group, as it did to the artisans, the second largest occupational group among new recruits in 1920.[44] Artisans in the party continued to be appreciably more numerous than in German society.[45]

The NSDAP drew its new members in 1920 from all segments of German society. The working classes were underrepresented in the party relative to their strength in the Reich, but nevertheless were present in great enough strength to lend credence to Hitler's claim that the National Socialist movement was the representative of all classes in the Reich. The NSDAP in 1920 had a distinctly middle-class character, with strong contingents from both the old and new middle class, and a disproportionately high number of persons from the upper ranks of the bourgeoisie.[46] In addition, the party had spread outside the confines of Munich and was beginning to attract support in the countryside.[47]

Judging strictly from the persons who joined the NSDAP in 1920 and the propaganda spread by Hitler, the Nazis were a popular movement attempting--and succeeding--to bridge the gulf between the proletariat and the middle class, and in fact in drawing representatives from all segments of German society into a single movement intent on creating a German "national" socialism. The crisis

atmosphere in Germany and the continued "red menace" were instrumental in the growth of Hitler and the Nazis, as was the unstable political situation in the Reich and the resentment provoked in German society by the Versailles Treaty. National Socialism thrived on controversy and crisis, and as a party of action, was increasingly successful in the turbulent early years of the Weimar Republic.

1921--Hitler Takes Over

The year 1921 witnessed little alleviation in the economic difficulties Germany had been experiencing since the end of the war. Real wages did not approach the prewar level, and there were still many shortages in market goods. The inflationary spiral (which had actually begun during the war) continued to rise slowly, gradually draining away the purchasing power of German workers and the German lower-middle class.[48]

There was still considerable concern among the German bourgeoisie in 1921 about a Communist uprising. Wehrverbaende all around the Reich--but particularly in Bavaria--were armed and ready to resist a Red revolution.[49] The Republic remained unpopular with a great many Germans; strong elements from both extremes of the political spectrum plotted its overthrow. Ebert's government, hobbled by Allied restrictions imposed through the Treaty of Versailles on the one hand and by the inability of the minority cabinets of the Weimar Republic to effect a consistent

policy, proved by and large unable to deal with the multitude of problems which beset the Reich in 1921. The crisis atmosphere of 1920 did not subside. German society remained fertile ground for recruitment for a party such as Hitler's which promised to do something, promised action.

For the NSDAP, 1921 was a decisive year. Hitler, through a power play within the party, managed to dislodge the founders of the NSDAP from positions of leadership, establishing himself as leader (Fuehrer) of the National Socialist Movement. On July 11, 1921, Hitler announced his resignation from the party, at the same time listing his conditions for rejoining, which included making him the absolute ruler of policy and tactics within the party. It has previously been thought that Hitler's resignation was a sham and that he never left the party. This apparently is not the case. There was a lag of almost two weeks between the date on which Hitler left the party (July 11) and the date on which he rejoined (July 24). During this two-week period the "old guard" in the party perhaps decided that Hitler was indispensible to the continued progress of the movement, or else were forced aside by Hitler's supporters. In any event, Hitler rejoined the party on July 24 as member number 3680, and from that time on was the dictatorial leader of the Nazi party.[50]

The last entry in Adolf Hitlers Mitkaempfer is from October, 1921. A few lists in the Hauptarchiv collection

date from the period October, 1921 to January, 1922, and are included in this sample, but they almost certainly are not complete. The NSDAP numbered approximately 4,100 members at the end of 1921, meaning that about 1,950 new members entered the party during that year.[51] Of these, biographical data on only 1,021 were available for investigation. The sample for 1921 lacks the accuracy of those samples for 1919 and 1920, and must be used with greater caution.[52]

The persons who joined the Nazi party in 1921 (9.8 per cent of whom were women) were younger than in previous years, as noted in Table 7. An absolute majority of the

TABLE 7

THE AGES OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP IN 1921

Age Group	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 20	160	15.3	3,897,555	9.0
20-29	412	40.5	11,458,015	26.6
30-39	170	16.7	8,863,091	20.5
40-49	126	12.4	7,754,071	17.9
50-59	49	4.8	6,561,314	14.9
Over 60	12	1.2	4,841,919	11.1
No Entry	92	9.1	-	-
Totals:	1,021	100.0	43,375,965	100.0

new members in 1921 were under thirty years of age. Over 70 per cent were under forty. It is not difficult to see why someone viewing only the new recruits in 1921 might

characterize the Nazi movement as a rebellion of disgruntled German youth. It is probable that these young people were the most active in the street demonstrations that were staged more and more frequently by the Nazis, and in the newly formed Sturmabteilung (SA, the "storm troopers" or military auxiliary of the party). The young people in the party were probably more visible than the older people, but the NSDAP was far from being anything so simple as a youth movement, as attested by the number of older members already in the party and the still appreciable number of older persons joining it in 1921. The program of the NSDAP as enunciated by Hitler appealed to a broad range of the societal spectrum in Germany, and the Nazi emphasis on action not surprisingly was attractive to impatient youth.[53]

The occupational structure of the party continued to shift toward the working classes, as shown in Table 8. Workers of all classifications made up over one-fourth of the total new membership in 1921. Even with this increase in members from the proletariat, workers were still greatly underrepresented in the party relative to their strength in German society as a whole. Nevertheless, the presence of such a large contingent from the working-class categories is inconsistent with previous views of the social composition of the NSDAP. Nazi propaganda as expounded by Hitler in speeches and by the columns of the Voelkischer Beobachter

TABLE 8

OCCUPATIONS OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1921

Occupational Categories	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Unskilled Laborers	217	21.2	10,679,848	35.3
Skilled Laborers	47	4.6	1,146,945	3.8
Agricultural Laborers	12	1.1	2,499,945	8.3
Totals:	275	26.9	14,326,738	47.4
Artisans	171	16.7	4,488,428	14.8
White Collar	145	14.2	5,274,232	17.4
Foremen	8	0.8	Included under white collar	
Managers	12	1.2	250,335	0.9
Civil Servants	72	7.1	No figures available	
Self-Employed	25	2.5	No figures available	
School Teachers	5	0.5	308,741	1.0
Totals:	438	43.0	10,321,736	34.3
Farmers	7	0.7	2,139,878	7.1
Large Landowners	2	0.2	Included under farmers	
Totals:	9	0.9	2,139,878	7.1

Military (enlisted)	3	0.3	104,000	0.3
Military (officers)	6	0.6	No figures available	
Totals:	9	0.9	104,000	0.3
Professional	48	4.7	237,850	0.7
Professors	4	0.4	No figures available	
Industrialists/ Manufacturers	6	0.6	No figures available	
Financiers	3	0.3	No figures available	
Private Incomes	4	0.4	2,944,872	9.2
Totals:	65	6.4	3,182,722	9.9
Clergy	-	-	No figures available	
Unemployed	2	0.2		2.8*
Students	102	10.0	No figures available	
Housewives	25	2.4	15,650,000*	
Arts	10	1.0	134,236	
Retired	15	1.5	No figures available	
No Entry	70	6.9	-	-
Totals:	224	22.0	134,236	0.5
All Categories:	1,021	100.0	30,259,310	100.0

*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an average for the year compiled from Angell, The Recovery of Germany, 370, based on the number of union members unemployed. It is likely that the figure for non-union workers was higher.

continued to emphasize the socialist aspects of the Nazi program.[54] Despite previous arguments, it is obvious from these figures that Nazism was not just a movement of the lower-middle class, at least not in 1921.[55]

Persons listing the military as their occupations continued to decline percentagewise among new Nazis in 1921, as did representatives from the professions and teachers. However, professional people continued to be much more numerous in the NSDAP membership than in German society. Farmers also declined somewhat proportionately in 1921 compared to the figures for 1920,[56] while the percentage of business owners and industrialists increased. Civil servants continued to constitute a significant portion of converts to National Socialism.

The largest decline percentagewise in an occupational classification among new members in 1921 came in the white collar occupations. However, white collar workers and artisans (who increased slightly percentagewise among new members in 1921) continued to represent over 30 per cent of the total recruits, considerably higher than their strength in German society. Not too surprisingly considering the youth of the new members, the proportion of persons listing their occupations as "student" in 1921, increased considerably.

All segments of German society were represented in the membership of the Nazi party at the end of 1921. The

party retained a distinctly middle-class character, but not overwhelmingly so. The rural districts of Germany were still greatly underrepresented in the party relative to their strength in German society, judging from the low number of farmers coming into the party in 1921. Hitler continued to enjoy his greatest popularity in urban areas. The accent within the movement was very definitely on youth, and a majority of the new recruits in 1921 were under thirty. However, the number of new members in the older age brackets precludes the definition of the party as just a youth movement. Despite the usual emphasis on lower-class elements, the early party continued to exhibit an attraction for members of the professions, businessmen, industrialists, and financiers. Only a very small percentage of the new members in 1921 stated that they were unemployed.

1922--The Embourgeoisment of the NSDAP

Another crisis year came in 1922 for the Weimar Republic. The inflationary spiral rose rapidly, encouraged by unwise fiscal policies of the German government. Real wages tumbled to new lows;[57] the minority governments seemed incapable of accomplishing anything positive. A number of political groups continued to agitate openly against the Republic, blaming the government, the Communists, and especially the Jews for Germany's woes. Among the most vocal of these critics was the growing NSDAP.

The National Socialist movement prospered greatly in 1922, both in increased membership and in securing financial support from very conservative circles in German society. It was during this year that Hitler acquired the title "king of Munich," and through his friend "Putzi" Hanfstaengl was introduced to high society in the Bavarian capital. He especially took the fancy of two wealthy ladies, Frauen Bechstein and Bruckmann, who made substantial contributions to the struggling party which up until this time had operated on a shoestring. In addition, Hitler was introduced to and spoke at the prestigious National Club in Berlin. Although no financial records of the early party have survived, there has been considerable speculation that contributions flowed into the party coffers (and into Hitler's pockets) from the wealthy members of the National Club.[58]

Nazi propaganda in 1922 as expressed in the columns of the Voelkischer Beobachter and in Hitler's speeches continued to appeal to all sectors of society to join or support the NSDAP. In particular, Hitler tried to attract workers and ex-soldiers and especially the youth of Germany, while at the same time he attempted to assure Germans about Nazi religious policy and bewailed the "Destruction of the Middle Class."[59]

The number of new members coming into the Nazi party in 1922 can only be estimated. The highest party number on

the membership lists in the Hauptarchiv collection for 1922 is 7,768, for September. This is a net gain of about 3,000 members for the first nine months of the year, or slightly more than 300 per month. Extrapolating on to the end of the year, we may estimate that approximately 3,900 persons became Nazis during the year, making the total strength of the party around 8,100 at the beginning of 1923.[60] The Hauptarchiv collection contains records for only 369 of these 1922 entrants, or less than one-tenth of the total. Obviously, this is a totally unsatisfactory sample on which to base firm conclusions, and the results of the tabulations for the year must be suspect and used with great caution.

The percentage of women among new entrants into the NSDAP in 1922 continued to decline relative to the first three years of the party. Only 8.7 per cent of the recruits were female. The trend toward younger and younger members which had been so evident in the party since its inception also continued, although the percentage of new Nazis under twenty declined somewhat from 1921 as seen in Table 9.

Persons under thirty entering the party in 1922 continued to make up an absolute majority of new members. Over three-fourths of the recruits were under forty years of age. If the 369 persons in this sample are representative of all persons entering the party in 1922, the NSDAP was indeed becoming a party of youth.

TABLE 9

THE AGES OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP IN 1922

Age Group	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 20	52	14.1	3,897,555	9.0
20-29	162	43.9	11,458,015	26.6
30-39	64	17.3	8,863,091	20.5
40-49	39	10.6	7,754,071	17.9
50-59	16	4.3	6,561,314	14.9
Over 60	8	2.2	4,841,919	11.1
No Entry	28	7.6	-	-
Totals:	369	100.0	43,375,965	100.0

As striking as the youth trend in the new membership was in 1922, the most dramatic changes in the social structure of the recruits occurred in their occupational origins (see Table 10). The first three years of the NSDAP was marked by more and more new members from the working classes and a corresponding decline in the percentage of new members from the middle classes, particularly the white collar workers. The abrupt reversal of this trend in 1922 revealed by the statistics in Table 10 is startling. The working class, which had furnished over one-fourth of the new members in 1921, furnished less than one-tenth in 1922. At the same time there was a huge increase in new Nazis from the middle classes, particularly from what in this study is considered the lower-middle class.

Several factors may have influenced this sudden reversal of the trends of the previous years of the party's

TABLE 10

THE OCCUPATIONS OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP IN 1922

Occupational Categories	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Unskilled Laborers	26	7.0	10,679,848	35.3
Skilled Laborers	4	1.1	1,146,945	3.8
Agricultural Laborers	1	0.3	2,499,945	8.3
Totals:	31	8.4	14,326,738	47.4
Artisans	92	24.9	4,488,428	14.8
White Collar	101	27.4	5,274,232	17.4
Foremen	2	0.6	Included under white collar	
Managers	6	1.6	250,335	0.9
Civil Servants	13	3.5	No figures available	
Self-Employed	19	5.1	No figures available	
School Teachers	3	1.0	308,741	1.0
Totals:	236	64.1	10,321,736	34.3
Farmers	7	1.9	2,139,878	7.1
Large Landowners	1	0.3	Included under farmers	
Totals:	8	2.2	2,139,878	7.1

Military (enlisted)	1	0.3	104,000	0.3
Military (officers)	1	0.3	No figures available	
Totals:	2	0.6	104,000	0.3
Professional	10	2.7	237,850	0.7
Professors	-	-	No figures available	
Industrialists/ Manufacturers	7	1.9	No figures available	
Financiers	-	-	No figures available	
Private Incomes	1	0.3	2,944,872	9.2
Totals:	18	4.9	3,182,722	9.9
Clergy	-	-	No figures available	
Unemployed	-	-		1.4*
Students	16	4.3	No figures available	
Housewives	7	1.9	15,650,000*	
Arts	7	1.9	134,236	0.5
Retired	6	1.6	No figures available	
No Entry	38	10.3	-	-
Totals:	74	20.0	134,236	0.5
All Categories:	369	100.0	30,259,310	100.0

*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an average for the year compiled from Angell, The Recovery of Germany, 370, based on the number of union members unemployed. It is likely that the figure for non-union workers was higher.

existence. The rapidly increasing inflationary spiral fell much harder on the middle classes than on the workers. The life savings of the Angestellte and the artisans were being steadily eroded away. These two groups had no political party through which to seek redress other than the Nazis. The same is true of the self-employed who more than doubled in percentage among the new members in 1922. In addition, Germany approached full employment during the inflationary period 1922-1923 for the only time during the Weimar period.[61] With full work days, laborers may have been less inclined toward an activistic, radical political party which made great demands on their time and energy.

The new recruits coming into the National Socialist movement in 1922 had a pronounced lower-middle class character. The percentage of workers coming into the party declined markedly. The NSDAP had still apparently failed to make any significant gains in the rural areas of Germany and retained its predominantly urban make-up. The new members in 1922 still came from all segments of German society, but the lower-middle class as represented by small businessmen, white collar workers, and artisans in particular, clearly became the strongest pillar of new Nazi support.

1923--Growth and Disaster for the NSDAP

The year 1923 began disastrously for the Weimar Republic when French and Belgian forces occupied the

industrial Ruhr region of Germany because of the failure of the Germans to meet reparations payments on time. France and Belgium intended to mine the coal and iron fields of the Ruhr for their own benefit, using German labor, but the German government (a shaky coalition of the Center party, the DDP, and the DVP led by Wilhelm Cuno) declared a policy of passive resistance. It not only subsidized the mine owners for their losses but also paid the miners for not working.

To raise the money for these subsidies, the government adopted the simple expedient of printing huge quantities of paper money. This had the not too surprising effect of exacerbating the already disastrous inflation to a fantastic degree. By August 1, 1923, 1.1 million marks were required to purchase one United States dollar. By October a dollar cost 6 billion marks and by November the figure was an unbelievable 530 billion Reichsmarks to the dollar.

A state of undeclared war existed in the Rhineland and the Ruhr. Real wages plunged to a twentieth century low, while the economy was practically reduced to a barter system by the inflation.[62] There were food riots in several parts of the Reich. Persons on pensions and fixed incomes suffered greatly, while the middle classes were virtually wiped out financially.

The Weimar government seemed totally incapable of dealing with the situation, and it appeared likely that

the Weimar Republic was in its death throes. There was a renewed threat of Communist revolution, especially in Saxony and Thuringia. On the right, the various Wehrverbaende and Voelkisch groups in Bavaria and elsewhere were preparing for a coup.[63] The situation seemed to require only that a leader appear on the right, capable of welding the various nationalist factions into one cohesive organization, and the Republic would topple. Hitler attempted to fill this role. After forming an alliance with General Ludendorff and other Voelkisch leaders, he attempted to seize control of the Bavarian government, after the successful completion of which he intended to lead a march on Berlin, as Mussolini had seized power in Italy the previous year by a march on Rome.[64]

The putsch was poorly planned and ineptly executed. It ended in a hail of bullets which sent Hitler into headlong flight. He was subsequently captured and tried for treason. Hitler gained a national reputation by the publicity given his sensational trial by the German press.[65] He spent eleven months in a relatively comfortable "prison," Landsberg Fortress, dictating Mein Kampf to his secretary Rudolf Hess. Most accounts of the Nazi party during the period of Hitler's imprisonment imply that the party was in a state of total disarray, leaderless, and split into antagonistic factions.[66]

The Hauptarchiv collection has several party membership lists containing biographical information on altogether

4,787 persons who joined the Nazi movement in 1923.[67] Since this is apparently only 10 per cent of the total number of new members for that year,[68] and since this is not a scientifically derived sample, the resulting statistics should be viewed as an indicator of the social composition of new members in 1923, not as definitive.[69]

As shown in Table 11, the great majority of Nazi recruits in 1923 were young people. Almost one-fourth of

TABLE 11

THE AGES OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP IN 1923

Age Group	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 20	1,135	23.7	3,897,555	9.0
20-29	2,155	45.0	11,458,015	26.6
30-39	839	17.5	8,863,091	20.5
40-49	423	8.8	7,754,071	17.9
50-59	107	2.3	6,561,314	14.9
60 & Over	90	1.9	4,841,919	11.1
No Entry	38	0.8	-	-
Totals:	4,787	100.0	43,375,965	100.0

the new members were teenagers, and 68 per cent were not yet thirty. Over 86 per cent were under forty. This was due in part to the increasing emphasis in Nazi propaganda on the importance of young people in the movement and on efforts by the Nazis to create National Socialist youth organizations.[70] It would not be a misrepresentation to

characterize the National Socialist Movement as a rebellion of German youth based on the new members of 1923.[71]

Occupationally, as seen in Table 12, the converts of 1923 differed considerably from those who joined Hitler's party the previous year. As in the first three years of the party, workers made up a significant part of the new membership.[72] This suggests that the small sample used in Table 10 for 1922 may well be unrepresentative of persons joining the party in that year. The new members in 1923 had, however, a distinctly middle-class character. Artisans and white collar workers, considered in this investigation as part of the lower-middle class, made up over 52 per cent of the total recruits.[73] For the first time, farmers were virtually as numerous in the NSDAP as in the Reich, indicating the Nazis were at last beginning to gain support in the rural areas of Germany.[74] Surprisingly, considering the youth of the new members, the number of persons listing their occupations as students declined in 1923, indicating that most of the young people coming into the party were employed.[75]

1919-1923--Summary

The cumulative statistics for the social composition of the NSDAP for all the years 1919 to 1923 present a picture considerably different than most previous works on the subject have suggested, as indicated by Table 13. That the membership of the Nazi party was not the exclusive domain

TABLE 12

THE OCCUPATIONS OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP IN 1923

Occupational Categories	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Unskilled Laborers	809	16.9	10,679,848	35.3
Skilled Laborers	119	2.5	1,146,945	3.8
Agricultural Laborers	69	1.4	2,499,945	8.3
Totals:	997	20.8	14,326,738	47.4
Artisans	1,182	24.7	4,488,428	14.8
White Collar	1,322	27.6	5,274,232	17.4
Foremen	9	0.2	Included under white collar	
Managers	7	0.1	250,335	0.9
Civil Servants	54	1.1	No figures available	
Self-Employed	125	2.6	No figures available	
School Teachers	40	0.8	308,741	1.0
Totals:	2,759	57.1	10,321,736	34.3
Farmers	331	6.9	2,139,878	7.1
Large Landowners	5	0.1	Included with farmers	
Totals:	336	7.0	2,139,878	7.1

Military (enlisted)	16	0.3	104,000	0.3
Military (officers)	36	0.7	No figures available	
Totals:	52	1.0	104,000	0.3
Professional	137	2.9	237,850	0.7
Professors	2	0.1	No figures available	
Capitalists	51	1.1	No figures available	
Financiers	20	0.5	No figures available	
Private Incomes	18	0.4	2,944,872	9.2
Totals:	228	5.0	3,182,722	9.9
Clergy	0	0.0	No figures available	
Unemployed	0	0.0	No figures available*	
Students	149	3.1	No figures available	
Housewives	113	2.4	15,650,000*	
Arts	37	0.8	134,236	0.5
Retired	69	1.4	No figures available	
No Entry	67	1.4	-	-
Totals:	435	9.1	134,236	0.5
All Categories:	4,787	100.0	30,259,310	100.0

*Not included in totals. There are no reliable estimates of the percentage of the German work force which was unemployed during 1923 due to the economic chaos created by the Great Inflation.

TABLE 13

THE AGES OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP, 1919-1923

Age Group	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 20	1,513	18.5	3,897,555	9.0
20-29	3,333	40.8	11,458,015	26.6
30-39	1,432	17.6	8,863,091	20.5
40-49	891	11.0	7,754,071	17.9
50-59	326	4.0	6,561,314	14.9
60 & Over	151	1.9	4,841,919	11.1
No Entry	498	6.2	-	-
Totals:	8,144	100.0	43,375,965	100.0

of the middle class in general and the lower-middle class in particular, and that National Socialism did have a considerable appeal for workers is demonstrated in the first column. Over one-fifth of the total membership of the party before the Beer Hall Putsch was made up of people from the working class. Although their percentage within the NSDAP was less than half the figure for German society, workers certainly constituted a large and important part of Hitler's movement.[76]

The cumulative statistics also dispel the oft-stated myth that military personnel made up an appreciable part of the early party membership. Even at the inception of the party, soldiers and officers made up only a minor part of the total party membership. In the ensuing years, military personnel in the party declined to the point of becoming

negligible. If the army dominated the NSDAP as some authorities have suggested, it was not through the enrollment of members in the party.[77]

The numbers of professional people and persons with college degrees in the Nazi party during the early period is much higher than previous studies have indicated. The percentage of those persons within the NSDAP is actually considerably higher than their total percentage in German society. Their presence in such numbers gives the early Nazi party a much more respectable look than many earlier studies have led us to believe.[78] Whether or not these were "doctors without patients, [and] lawyers without clients" is not ascertainable from the data available for study. It is clear, however, that the intelligentsia of German society was attracted to the NSDAP despite the inconsistencies of its ideology and the frequent shifts in policy and emphasis that it displayed during the years 1919-1923.

The NSDAP clearly began as an urban movement and spread only slowly to the countryside. It was only in 1923, probably due largely to the absorption of various other Voelkisch groups, that any appreciable number of people from rural areas came into the party.

The number of self-employed persons in the party at the time of the Beer Hall Putsch is considerably lower than earlier studies have suggested. It has long been speculated

that the economic problems of many small businessmen during the early Weimar period prompted them to seek radical political solutions to their problems, and that the Nazis were the beneficiaries of the radicalization of this normally conservative socio-economic group.[79] This hypothesis is not supported by the statistics, and in fact small businessmen constituted a very small segment of the NSDAP membership. Obviously a reassessment of the role of this group in early Nazi party history is in order. The supposed flood of small businessmen into the ranks of the NSDAP as an effect of the financial disasters of the period 1919-1923 did not take place.

One generalization made by many historians about the social composition of the early NSDAP that <u>is</u> supported by the cumulative statistics for the party membership in 1919-1923 is the preponderance of white collar workers in the movement. This group easily constituted the largest single category in the party, although they were not an overwhelming majority as some earlier studies have theorized.[80] The white collar workers combined with the artisans <u>do</u> make up an absolute majority in the early party, supporting the thesis of the lower-middle-class character of the early NSDAP. However, this should not be construed as proof that the movement was merely a lower-middle-class movement. Other social groups joined in considerable numbers as well. It is far too simplistic to characterize

National Socialism as a lower-middle-class movement. Clearly, it was a much more complex phenomenon.[81]

The "myth of the unemployed" in the early Nazi party membership is not supported by the statistics above. The number of people declaring their situation as "unemployed" was negligible.[82] Likewise, the category of "housewives" does not constitute a significant fraction of the party membership. This is consistent with the relatively small percentage of women in the party, which in turn is consistent with most previous assessments of the early Nazi party as the most male-oriented German political party. The number of pensioners in the party is also very small. This, too, is quite unremarkable if we consider that the old people and the physically infirm are not particularly fitted for an activistic and militant political movement.

The number of students in the early party is quite high and in line with the youth of the total party membership, which shows that an absolute majority of party members were under thirty years of age when they joined the party. The statistics in Table 14 indicate that, as several earlier studies have suggested, there was a considerable amount of dissatisfaction with German society among its younger members. To characterize the Nazi movement before 1923 as <u>only</u> a "youth rebellion"[83] on the strength of these figures, however, would be as misleading as to characterize it as <u>only</u> a lower-middle-class movement.

TABLE 14

THE OCCUPATIONS OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP, 1919-1923

Occupational Categories	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Unskilled Laborers	1,339	16.4	10,679,848	35.3
Skilled Laborers	258	3.2	1,146,945	3.8
Agricultural Laborers	96	1.2	2,499,945	8.3
Totals:	1,693	20.8	14,326,738	47.4
Artisans	1,765	21.7	4,488,428	14.8
White Collar	1,935	23.8	5,274,232	17.4
Foremen	40	0.5	Included under white collar	
Managers	51	0.6	250,335	0.9
Civil Servants	272	3.3	No figures available	
Self-Employed	216	2.7	No figures available	
School Teachers	70	0.9	308,741	1.0
Totals:	4,359	53.5	10,321,736	34.3
Farmers	366	4.5	2,139,878	7.1
Large Landowners	11	0.1	Included with farmers	
Totals:	377	4.6	2,139,878	7.1

Military (enlisted)	44	0.5	104,000	0.3
Military (officers)	70	0.9	No figures available	
Totals:	114	1.4	104,000	0.3
Professional	296	3.6	237,850	0.7
Professors	17	0.2	No figures available	
Capitalists	82	1.0	No figures available	
Financiers	26	0.3	No figures available	
Private Incomes	35	0.4	2,944,872	9.2
Totals:	456	5.5	3,182,722	9.9
Clergy	1	0.0	No figures available	
Unemployed	9	0.1		2.4*
Students	413	5.0	No figures available	
Housewives	216	2.7	15,650,000*	
Arts	81	1.0	134,236	0.5
Retired	120	1.5	No figures available	
No Entry	315	3.9	-	-
Totals:	1,155	14.2	134,236	0.5
All Categories:	8,144	100.0	30,259,319	100.0

*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an average for the period 1919-1924 compiled from Angell, The Recovery of Germany, 370, based on the number of union members unemployed. It is likely that the figure for non-union workers was higher.

The Nazis during the period 1919-1923 assuredly benefited in membership recruitment from the financial plight of the lower-middle class, especially after 1921. It also benefited from the disillusionment of German youth, to whom it held out the hope of a society based on more lasting values than those of the materialistic society created by their parents. However, within the lower-middle class and the young people--and in other sections of German society--many were attracted to the NSDAP for a variety of reasons. For example, the Nazis appeared to champion an egalitarianism, a "front socialism" that appealed to many ex-soldiers and offered workers an alternative to Marxism, in both its extreme and more moderate forms. The Nazis also appealed to a broad cross section of German society through its militant super-nationalism, its unshakable opposition to the Treaty of Versailles, and its rationalization of the loss of the Great War through perpetuation of the "Dolchstoss" legend.

Furthermore, Hitler was able to appeal to practically every stratum of German society with his outspoken anti-Semitism, which was especially well received in the numerous Voelkisch groups proliferating in post-war Germany. The violent anti-Marxism of Hitler's party won him many admirers among the upper as well as the lower-middle class, as is reflected in the statistics above. That the party could attract a considerable percentage of farmers during a

period of relative prosperity in the countryside and with a land program which made very little sense, suggests that the Nazis appealed to something more in Germans than just their financial interests.

The seeming inability of the Weimar governments to deal with the problems of the inter-war period also influenced Germans toward an authoritarian alternative. The Weimar governments, forever stigmatized in the eyes of many Germans as the signers of a dishonorable peace, was colorless and lacklustre when compared to the imperial regime and was never accepted by a large segment of the German population. Even the army indicated its lack of devotion to the Republic during the Kapp putsch of 1920. Hitler presented himself and his movement as a stark contrast to the drab Weimar regime and many persons responded to this appeal.

The Nazi movement during the period 1919-1923 attracted a cross section of German society into its membership. By uniting a number of diverse and dissimilar currents in post-war German society through skillful use of propaganda and his own speaking ability, Hitler, by 1923, had built a political movement which recruited members from all strata of German society. The economic travails of many of Hitler's recruits undoubtedly played a major role in their decision to join the NSDAP, but ideological factors were also important in Nazi recruitment, as was the dissatisfaction of a large segment of German youth.

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

[1]Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, KPD previously the Sparticists.

[2]Sozialdemocratische Partei Deutschlands or SPD, the largest of the Marxist parties.

[3]Unabhaengige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands or USPD, formerly a part of the SPD which had split off from the mother party during World War I.

[4]The Weimar political parties sent the following number of delegates to the first national assembly: USPD, 8; SPD, 38; DDP, 19; Zentrum, 20; DVP, 4; DNVP, 10; and other parties, 2.

[5]Zentrum or Z, the party of the German Catholics.

[6]Deutsche Demokratische Partei or DDP, made up of the old Progressive Party of the Kaiserreich and the more liberal wing of the old National Liberal Party.

[7]Deutsche Volkspartei or German Peoples Party, the more conservative remnants of the National Liberal Party representing large industrial interests.

[8]Deutschnational Volkspartei or German National Peoples Party, made up of elements of the old Conservative Party from the empire and representing agrarian interests.

[9]Quoted in Allan Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, 1918-1919 (Princeton, 1965), p. 24.

[10]The bill contained the following provisions: (1) Elimination of the Upper House and adoption of a unicameral system, (2) Direct and universal suffrage with proportional representation, (3) Legislative initiative of the Landtag, (4) Abolition of the royal veto power, (5) Nomination of

ministers by the Landtag, (6) Self-determination of convocation and adjournment by the Landtag, (7) Annual budget, (8) Abrogation of aristocratic titles and privileges, (9) Prohibition of tax-free hereditary holdings, (10) Elimination of royal exemptions from taxation and judication, and (11) Separation of Church and State. Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, p. 28.

[11]Of the nine ministers of the new government, four were from the USPD, four from the SPD, and one with no party affiliation.

[12]Eisner's party received only 2.5 per cent of the total vote, the SPD received 33.0 per cent, while the Bavarian Peoples Party (BVP, a particularist Catholic party) received 35 per cent. The vote also confirmed the desire of a majority of Bavarians to remain a part of the Reich.

[13]Bayerische Volkspartei or Bavarian Peoples Party, a particularist Catholic party.

[14]There are a number of good accounts of the founding of the DAP. One of the best in English is in Bracher, The German Dictatorship, pp. 79-81.

[15]See especially Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair. A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology (New York, 1961); George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York, 1964); and Andrew G. Whiteside, Austrian National Socialism Before 1918 (The Hague, 1962).

[16]Regardless of the principle subject of any article in the pre-Nazi Voelkischer Beobachter, anti-semitism was a dominant theme. The early issues of the newspaper exhibited militant opposition to Bolshevism (for example, see the front page lead article on February 20, 1920, "Der Bolschewismus vor den Toren!"); it featured appeals to German labor to forsake the Marxist SPD and USPD and join with their "racial brothers" from other social classes in rebuilding Germany (this was a recurring subject in the early VB, but see especially the lead article in the January 7, 1920, issue, and a long article on p. 3 of the May 4, 1920, issue condemning the bondage of the German worker by international Jewery); it called on German youth to join with German workers to lead the Voelkisch movement for "national regeneration" (see especially the April 17 issue on p. 2); and it tried to bridge the gap between the workers and the middle classes (for example, see an article on p. 4, June 20, 1920, entitled "Arbeiter und Burger").

For an overwhelming summary of the racial stand of the pre-Nazi VB, see the entire front page of the April 22 issue, consisting of excerpts from and analyses of the Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion.

[17]There is a good account of the relationship between the early DAP and the Thule Society in Reginald Phelps, "Before Hitler Came: Thule Society and Germanen Orden," The Journal of Modern History 35 (November 1963): passim.

[18]A number of students of National Socialism have denied that there really was a consistent ideology of Nazism. That Hitler's movement did have a central Weltanschauung from which it never deviated and was basically as described above is the central argument in Eberhard Jaeckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung (Tuebingen, 1969), passim.

[19]For example, Friedrick Schumann, Hitler and the Nazi Dictatorship, p. 16, dismisses the early party as "ambitious soldiers and political adventurers." (Numerous historians since have said something similar.)

[20]The figures for the Reich are based on the 1925 census, which means they will not be exact for 1919. However, there is no reason to suppose the age distribution above fifteen would change significantly between 1919 and 1925. The Reich figures are compiled from Statistische Jahrbuch des Deutschen Reich (Berlin, 1928), pp. 16-17.

[21]The occupational distribution of the German Reich is compiled from Statistik des deutschen Reichs, Band 402, vols. I and II, Die Berufliche und soziale Gliederung der Bevoelkerung des Deutschen Reich (Berlin, 1927), which is based on the 1925 census. As in the case of age distribution, there is no reason for concluding that the occupational structure of Germany changed significantly between 1919 and 1925.

[22]It is difficult to reconcile this picture of the party with Maser's description of the pre-Hitler DAP in Fruehgeschichte der NSDAP, p. 107: "Until Hitler joined the party, the German Workers Party was a group of workmen, especially railway workers. . . ." Although there were some railway workers in the party, the above statistics show that the early DAP was much more than just a "group of workmen." It is equally difficult to reconcile the statistics in Table 2 with Joseph Nyomarkay's characterization of the DAP membership before Hitler in Charisma and Factionalism, p. 58: "The DAP," Nyomarkay said, "at its inception . . . was composed of people of working class origins."

[23]Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 292. This same description of the early party is repeated in Reginald Phelps, "Hitler and the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei," American Historical Review 68 (July 1963): 975, without quotation marks.

[24]Hitler did speak at two Nazi rallies in 1919, but was not the featured speaker either time. Ernst Deuerlein, "Hitlers Eintritt in die Politik und die Reichswehr," Viertelsjahrhefte fuer Zeitgeschichte 16 (April 1959): 177-227.

[25]Heiden, History of National Socialism, p. 39, gives the total party strength at the end of 1919 as sixty-four. He does not reveal the source of his misinformation. Abel, The Nazi Movement, App. II, Table A-I, gives the same figure, also without a source. No other well-known works on Nazi party history offer any estimate of the numerical strength at the end of 1919.

[26]This misconception, like others, was caused by Hitler himself in Mein Kampf, p. 493. The above statistics do not, however, substantiate Nolte's claim in Three Faces of Fascism, p. 399, that there was a preponderance of soldiers in the early party, or Nyomarkay's generalization in Charisma and Factionalism, p. 54, that the DAP was transformed into a party of soldiers after Roehm joined in May, 1919 (actually Roehm joined after Hitler, as proven by his higher party number).

[27]Franz-Willing, Die Hitler Bewegnung, pp. 129-130, working from what he characterizes as the "oldest known party list" from January, 1920 (which is now, he says, in private hands), gives the following breakdown of the social composition of members contained on his list (without, unfortunately, telling how many persons are included): Average age--between thirty and thirty-two years old; women--10.5 per cent of the total; Facharbeiter and Handwerker--33 per cent; Freie Akademische Berufe--14.5 per cent; Beamte and Angestellte--14 per cent; Soldaten and Offiziere--13 per cent; Kaufleute--12 per cent; Studenten --7 per cent; Geschaftshaber--4 per cent; Ungelernte Arbeiter--2.5 per cent. Carsten, Rise of Fascism, p. 94, looked at a membership list with 193 entries which is undated but "clearly from this period" (1919--early 1920) at the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz. He did not submit the list to statistical analysis, but concluded after looking at it carefully that the membership "seems to represent a fair cross section of the Munich population of the time, looking much more respectable than has often been thought, with a clear preponderance of the small people and the lower classes." He did not define "small people" or

"lower classes." Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 91, characterizes the recruits who joined the party after Hitler as "ex-soldiers and Freikorps elements." After Hitler came into the party, according to Bracher, ". . . the working-class element diminished. At the same time, many unemployed found their way into the party. . . ." These conclusions are in direct conflict with the statistics in Table 4, above. Nor is there any evidence that "many members of the protestant clergy embraced the new gospel at an early date" as Lowenstein argues in The Nazi Background to War, pp. 5-6. Clergymen of any denomination were never present in the party in appreciable numbers. Maser, Fruehgeschichte der NSDAP, pp. 107-108, gives a somewhat misleading picture of the party at the end of 1919, characterizing party members as follows: "Hitler brought the party salespeople, business owners and intellectuals as members, and soldiers and, remarkably, many women as supporters." These groups did come into the party in some numbers after Hitler's entry (excluding the women), but so did persons from a number of other occupational groups, most notably the professions. The percentage of professional persons in the early DAP was actually seven times greater than their percentage in German society. Yet another "oldest party list" was submitted to statistical analysis in Maser, ibid., p. 255. Maser dates his list, which contains 675 entries as May 29, 1920. Maser's occupational categories are different from those used in this study, and he does not describe his criteria for assigning occupations to particular categories. This makes an exact comparison of his statistics with those above very nearly impossible. Kater, "Zur Soziographie," p. 129, casts grave doubts on the authenticity of Maser's list, calling it a "peculiar document" ("Merkwurdiges Dokument"). Maser's statistics: Facharbeiter and Handwerker--27 per cent; Akademische Berufe--8.5 per cent; Beamte and Angestellte--14.6 per cent; Soldaten and Offiziere--5.2 per cent; Kaufleute--13.3 per cent; Geschaftsinhaber--3.1 per cent; Studenten--7.2 per cent; Ungelernte Arbeiter--2.9 per cent; Frauen, Schuler, and "Members who made unclear statements"--18.2 per cent.

[28] Volz' semi-official Daten die Geschichte der NSDAP, p. 5, says the change of name was announced at the February rally and officially and legally changed on March 4, 1920.

[29] This account of Hitler's first major speech is based on Phelps, "Hitler als Parteiredner im Jahre 1920," Viertelsjahrhefte fuer Zeitgeschichte 11 (November 1963): passim. The twenty-five points were reprinted in their entirety in the May 15, 1920, issue of the Voelkischer Beobachter, p. 4. The issuance of the program in February

drew only a brief announcement in the February 28 issue of the VB on page 3 which said that the party's program was "very similar" to that of the Deutschsozial Partei (DSP). This indicates that the NSDAP became much more powerful in the Voelkisch movement during the intervening months.

[30]For example, the following speakers and topics were announced in advertisements in the Voelkischer Beobachter for upcoming Nazi rallies: Bernhard Koehler, "Das Arbeitende Volk als Zinssklave des Leihkapitalismus" (March 13, p. 4); Adolf Hitler, "Politik und der Jugend" (April 24, p. 3). At the same time, the newspaper, still owned by the Thule Society, was also attempting to lure the youth of Germany and German workers into the movement with such articles as "Deutsche Jugenden" (April 17, p. 2), and "Arbeiter erwached!" (May 4, p. 3). These articles typically called on the workers and the youth to join and lead the Voelkisch movement.

[31]According to Volz in Daten die Geschichte der NSDAP, p. 27, the newspaper was purchased for 120,000 marks, but he does not say where the money came from. Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 88, suggests the money was furnished by the Army, as do a number of other historians. However, no conclusive evidence has been forthcoming to substantiate this claim.

[32]This generalization does not hold true for the Ruhr area, where the KPD seized short-lived control of Essen, Dusseldorf, and other cities in March and April of 1920. They formed a "red" army which was only put down by the Reichswehr after considerable bloodshed.

[33]James W. Angell, The Recovery of Germany (New Haven, 1929), pp. 18, 393 and 397. Agricultural production was actually declining, which added to Germany's miseries. Industrial production increased somewhat, although it remained well below the 1913 level.

[34]The percentages of valid votes received by the major parties in Germany in the elections of June, 1920 were as follows: KPD--2 per cent; USPD--18 per cent; SPD--22 per cent; DDP--9 per cent; Z--14 per cent; BVP--4 per cent; DVP--14 per cent; DNVP--15 per cent; others --3 per cent.

[35]Anti-Semitism was the most recurrent theme in the pages of the Voelkischer Beobachter, both before and after it was purchased by the Nazis. The defeat in 1918, the November revolution, Communism, corruption in government, the inflation--in fact all the troubles of the

world--were blamed on international Jewery. The Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion were quoted almost daily in the columns of the newspaper, and many speeches which were advertised in its pages had the Jews as their principle topic.

[36]Most previous estimates of party numerical strength at the end of 1920 have given the figure 3,000, including the following: Heiden, History of National Socialism, p. 39 (quotes no source); Schumann, Hitler and the Nazi Dictatorship, p. 16 (quotes no source); Volz, Daten die Geschichte der NSDAP, p. 8 (quotes no source); Vermeil, L'Allmagne, p. 330 (quotes no source); Abel, The Nazi Movement, App. II, Table A-I (quotes no source); Helga Grebing, Der Nationalsozialismus. Ursprung und Wesen (Munich, 1959), p. 56 (quotes no source); Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, p. 25 (quotes no source); Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 88 (quotes Schafer, NSDAP, who quotes Volz). Franz-Willing, Die Hitlerbewegnung, p. 103, says Munich alone had 2,500 members by January 1, 1921. Later, without divulging the source of his information, he says the total strength of the party in January, 1921, was 3,000 (p. 254). Tyrell, Fuehrer Befiel, p. 13, says the membership strength at the end of 1920 was "over 2,000," but lists no source for his information. The figures arrived at in this study derive from the simple expedient of looking at the highest party number for December of the year in question and the lowest number for January of the next year, keeping in mind that the numbering sequence began with 501. If the two are not consecutive, the number most nearly in the middle is given.

[37]Maser, Fruehgeschichte der NSDAP, p. 107, says that "20 to 30 per cent of the participants in the Hitler-assemblies were women," and on the same page argues that Hitler brought with him into the party "many women" as supporters ("Anhaenger").

[38]A number of historians are very skeptical whether or not Hitler ever took the socialistic planks in the Nazi program seriously, but that did not prevent him from emphasizing them in his speeches. See Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 86.

[39]Phelps, "Hitler als Parteiredner," p. 136, and Kele, Nazis and Workers, pp. 47-48.

[40]The KPD was outlawed in several parts of Germany, and made a dismal showing in the 1920 general election, winning only 2 per cent of the total vote. In addition,

it received instructions from Moscow to stop its terroristic methods. For this see Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy, p. 201.

[41]The Voelkischer Beobachter also directed propaganda appeals to the German farmers in 1920, encouraging them to join or at least support the movement (April 10 issue, p. 3).

[42]For example, small businessmen would undoubtedly favor point sixteen of the twenty-five-point party platform, which called for the dissolution of chain department stores. The Voelkischer Beobachter continually called on Germans of all classes to unite against the common enemy: the Jew.

[43]For example, see the Voelkischer Beobachter, May 15, p. 4 and March 16, p. 4.

[44]Warnings of the danger of an eminent Bolshevik revolution appeared in every issue of the Voelkischer Beobachter. A typical article (February 14 issue, p. 1) was entitled "Der Bolshewismus vor den Toren!"

[45]However, it is likely that artisans constituted a greater part of the total work force in Bavaria than they did in other areas of Germany due to the belated industrial development in that area discussed above.

[46]This does not at all substantiate Orlow's contention that in 1920 "the DAP's still relatively small membership was, socially and economically, a very homogeneous body. For the most part the members came from the same social milieu as Drexler and the old guard." History of the Nazi Party, p. 17.

[47]Whether the party spread "all over the country" in 1920 as Heiden suggests in History of National Socialism, p. 39, is doubtful. In the "aus der Bewegnung" column of the Voelkischer Beobachter which appeared daily the functions of the party all over Germany were discussed. Even in 1923 there were very few Ortsgruppen mentioned from north Germany and none at all in East Prussia, Schleswig-Holstein, or the Ruhr.

[48]See Angell, The Recovery of Germany, pp. 17-60. The value of German currency dropped from $1=Dm 15.5 in January, 1921 to $1=Dm 62.5 in November (ibid., p. 366). Wages rose, but not as quickly as the cost of living (ibid.).

[49]See Robert G. L. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism. The Freicorps Movement in Postwar Germany, 1918-1923 (New York, 1952), pp. 183-239.

[50]For Hitler's resignation from the party, see Maser, Fruehgeschichte der NSDAP, p. 23; Franz-Willing, Der Hitlerbewegnung, p. 110, and Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 91. See also the reproductions of Hitler's two entries on the party lists from Adolf Hitlers Mitkaempfer, below Appendix II. Hitler's new position in the party was not announced in the Voelkischer Beobachter until August4, page 1.

[51]The only previous estimate of the NSDAP membership strength at the end of 1921 is Able, The Nazi Movement, App. II, Table A-I, who writes that there were "about" 6,000 members in the party at this time. Bracher, The German Dictatorship, gives the same figure for some unspecified time in 1922 (p. 100).

[52]There are no other known party lists from 1921. Since this is not a scientifically derived sample, the possibility exists that it is not representative of all persons joining the NSDAP in 1921.

[53]It is also true, however, that the Nazis made special propaganda appeals to the young people of the Reich. For example, an article on page 6 of the January 1, 1921, Voelkischer Beobachter entitled "Deutsche Studentum" emphasized the pivotal role the youth of Germany must play in creating a new and better Vaterland. The February 20 issue of the newspaper carried excerpts from a speech by Hitler to German students on page 4 in which he delineated the importance of young people of all classes for the coming "rebirth" of the Reich. An article on page 5 of the August 14 VB entitled "an Unsere deutsche Jugend" exhorted party members to recruit young people into the movement.

[54]An article by Anton Drexler on page 1 of the August 21, 1921, issue of the Voelkischer Beobachter is typical of Nazi propaganda aimed at the workers. It went into great detail on the "failure" of the German revolution and the betrayal of the working class by the SPD. It then outlined the Nazi plans for a true social revolution.

[55]Contrast these figures with Wolfgang Zopf's contention in Wandlungen der deutschen Elite, p. 52: Persons of all occupations could be found in the Nazi movement in its early years, including a representative portion of the

old German elite. "Nur die Industriearbeiterschaft war nicht sehr zahiberich vertreten." Also Evelyn Pospisel, "Diskussionbeitrag: Die Massenbasis des Faschismus," p. 33: "The NSDAP did not succeed in penetrating the ranks of the working class." That the Nazis did expend considerable propaganda efforts to attract workers is supported by Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, pp. 18-19, and by Kele, Nazis and Workers, pp. 47-48.

[56]This despite the fact that a greater amount of propaganda was directed at them in the columns of the Voelkischer Beobachter. See, for example, "Nationalsozialistische Agrarrevolution" (March 31, p. 1), and "Der Bauer" (August 18, p. 3).

[57]The value of the mark decreased from $1=Dm 45.5 in January to $1=Dm 1,810 in December. At the same time the cost of living rose 3,000 per cent. Wages rose spectacularly, but did not keep pace with the cost of living. Angell, The Recovery of Germany, p. 366.

[58]Actually, Hitler's introduction to the Nationalen Klub and his subsequent meetings with leaders of North German Voelkisch groups through the Vereingte Vaterlaendische Verbaende Deutschland took place in December, 1921. See Volz, Daten die Geschichte der NSDAP, p. 9.

[59]For examples, see the Voelkischer Beobachter, January 7, 1922, page 1: full page attack on SPD and its "betrayal" of the workers; March 22, page 1: article entitled "Vernichtung des Mittelstands"; May 13, page 2: appeal to all ex-soldiers to join the movement; same issue, page 2: appeal to German students; same issue, page 3: synopsis of a Hitler speech in Landshut on the subject "Ist unser Kampf gegen die judische Weltdiktatur kapitalistische, reactionaer, gewirkschaftlich usw, oder entspricht er den Interessen der Arbeiterschaft?" and finally an article on December 22, page 2: article entitled "Christentum und Nationalsozialismus" proclaiming the religiosity of the movement.

[60]Previous estimates of party strength at the beginning of 1923 include Eliot Wheaton, Prelude to Calamity. The Nazi Revolution (New York, 1968), p. 58, guessing that in November, 1922, the party had "about" 10,000 members; Kurt Ludecke, I Knew Hitler, p. 40, says the party had "less than a thousand inscribed members in 1922." Gordon, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, p. 64, estimates 35,000 members at the end of 1922, based on eyewitness accounts. This would mean that over 27,000 persons joined the party during the last three months of the year. Bracher, The

German Dictatorship, p. 100, estimates the party had "only about 6,000 members," in 1922, but did not say upon what his estimate was based. Grebing, Der Nationalsozialismus, p. 56, also says 6,000 and also lists no source. Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 94, and Maser, Fruehgeschichte der NSDAP, p. 111, both state that the Nazis absorbed the DSP in December, 1922. Neither give any estimate of how many members that party had. Volz, Daten die Geschichte der NSDAP, p. 7, says the DSP was incorporated into the National Socialist movement in October, 1922, but also does not say how many people this involved. If it was large, the number of party members at the beginning of 1923 could have been considerably higher than the 8,100 estimated here. Volz, ibid., p. 9, gives an estimate of "rund 6000 eingeschriebene Mitglieder" in the party at the beginning of 1923.

[61]Unemployment was under 1 per cent for six months of 1922 and never more than 3.3 per cent of the total work force, which figure was recorded for January, 1922. Angell, The Recovery of Germany, p. 371.

[62]Angell, The Recovery of Germany, p. 366. The inflation was reflected in the price of the Voelkischer Beobachter: In January and February the newspaper sold for 100 marks per copy; by June it was 400 marks; in the middle of July the price had risen to 1,200 marks; at the beginning of the next month the VB sold for 5,000 marks per issue; and by the end of August it went for 80,000 marks; the issue for September 23-24 went for 1.5 million marks; but the next day the price had risen to 2 million marks. The final issue on November 9, 1923, sold for 8 billion marks.

[63]Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, pp. 248-259.

[64]The best account of the preparations for Hitler's putsch and the putsch itself is Gordon's exhaustive, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, passim.

[65]The best account of the "hitlerprocez" in English is in Bracher, The German Dictatorship, pp. 119-121.

[66]Two excellent accounts of the party from the failure of the putsch to the refounding of the NSDAP in 1925 are in Bracher, The German Dictatorship, and Orlow, History of the Nazi Party. Both give the impression that the party was in a state of total collapse during 1924.

[67]Hauptarchiv Collection, microfilm reel 10.

[68]The highest membership number listed for the pre-putsch party is 55,787. Subtracting 500 from this number, we may estimate the total strength of the NSDAP in November, 1923, as 55,287 members. This does not take into consideration persons who may have quit the party.

[69]These same lists were quantatively analyzed by Kater, "Zur Soziographie" in 1971. However, since Kater's categories and classification systems differ considerably from those used in this study, it was necessary to re-analyze the Hauptarchiv lists.

[70]A new daily column was begun in the Voelkischer Beobachter on February 25-26, page 6, entitled "aus der Jugendbewegnung." Numerous articles such as "deutsche Jugend!" (August 10, p. 5) appeared in the newspaper calling on young people to join the movement to revitalize the fatherland. Nazi speakers, especially Adolf Hitler, also appealed to young people in particular. For example, see excerpts from a Hitler speech in the February 24, 1923, VB, p. 2, entitled "German Students and German Workers as the bearers (traeger) of the German future."

[71]Kater used only two age groups in his analysis of the above data: under 23 and over 23. In Kater's study 48 per cent of the total were under twenty-three years of age.

[72]Nazi propaganda was being directed at the workers no less than at young people in 1923. For example, see the Voelkischer Beobachter, January 13, page 1 lead, berating the SPD for not nationalizing industry and calling on workers to desert the marxists and join the Nazis; in the same issue an article on page 2, "Student und Arbeiter," argued that only these two groups could end the corruption in Berlin and save Germany from the international Jewish/Marxist conspiracy. Hitler's speech "German Students and German Workers as the Bearers of the German Future" mentioned above, followed much the same theme. These appeals continued throughout the year.

[73]These groups received little direct attention in Nazi propaganda because they were considered "workers" by the Nazis. In fact, the predominantly young artisans and white collar workers probably did have more in common with young workers than with the middle classes.

[74]That the party leadership was making a conscious effort to win farm support for the movement is illustrated

by the appearance in the Voelkischer Beobachter in 1923 of such articles as "Nationalsozialismus u. Bauernverein" in the January 13 issue on page 2, which emphasized the bad treatment accorded farmers by the Berlin government and outlined the Nazi agricultural program.

[75]Kater's occupational statistics for this same sample differs in several important respects from those presented above largely because of the different occupational classification system used. Kater's tables read as follows: Unskilled laborers--448 or 9.5 per cent of the total; Servants--80, 1.7 per cent; Skilled laborers--401, 8.5 per cent; Military--28, 0.6 per cent; Academicians--80, 1.7 per cent; Farmers--491, 10.4 per cent; Retail merchants--66, 1.4 per cent; Contractors--122, 4.0 per cent; Lower and middle employees--524, 11.1 per cent; Lower and middle executives--293, 6.2 per cent; Sales people--652, 13.7 per cent; Higher employees--18, 0.4 per cent; Higher executives--18, 0.4 per cent; Unemployed--none; Students--198, 4.2 per cent; Housewives--51, 1.1 per cent; Welfare--14, 0.3 per cent; Artisans--945, 20.0 per cent; Apprentices--61, 1.3 per cent; No entry--179, 3.8 per cent.

Kater's statistics do not agree with those derived by Gordon, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, pp. 80-82, from a sample of 1,126 persons who joined the party in 1923. Gordon pointed out the notable absence of peasants and nobles in the party, and marshalled not only the results of his statistical study but also eyewitness accounts (ibid., p. 74) to support his case. Gordon broke his sample into the following occupational categories: Technical University Teachers and Gymnasium Teachers--20; Lawyers--6; Clergymen--3; Economists--1; Medical Doctors--18; Dentists--8; Veterinarians--8; Nurses--1; Students--119; Grammar School Teachers--27; Writers and Editors--27; Publishers--5; Book Dealers--8; Artists--40; Factory Owners--13; Managers and Directors--8; Shopkeepers--27; Landowners--14; Bureaucrats--6; Farm Renters--2; Private Incomes--3; Real Estate Dealer--1; White Collar Workers--242; Chief Clerks or Foremen--13; Technicians--22; Skilled Workers--230; Unskilled Workers--25; Semi-skilled Workers--7; Engineers--28; Architects--11; Government Civil Servants--76; Policemen--26; Forsters--4; Reichswehr Employees--3; NSDAP Employees--20; Apprentices--22; and Women without occupations listed--35. On p. 78, ibid., Gordon says that "only" thirty-one persons out of a sample of 1,672 persons in the Nazi party were "nobles." He does not give the source of his sample, how he ascertained the nobility of the members, or tell how many nobles were contained in German society as a whole. From this, Gordon concluded on ibid., p. 82, that

the early Nazi party was "a heterogeneous mixture of people of all classes and all professions and trades." Gordon's sample of persons joining the NSDAP in 1923 is significantly different from Kater's, but not vastly from the figures derived by this investigation.

[76]That the Nazis did attract sizeable numbers of workers into their party has already been suggested by Gordon, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, especially pp. 74-76. Gordon marshalls a great deal of eyewitness reports of Nazi rallies including some from leaders of the KPD and SPD to support his case. Contrast this with Hardy-Hemery's statement in "Le Nazisme," p. 306, that at the time of the putsch only 3 per cent of the NSDAP membership were workers ("travailleurs"), and Halperin's unsupported generalization in Germany Tried Democracy, p. 436, that only an "insignificant fraction" of the workers went over to the Nazis.

[77]Heiden, History of National Socialism, p. 90, was clearly wrong in insisting that the "backbone of the Nazi movement was composed up until 1923 of the Reichswehr and the police." A number of subsequent works have quoted this mistaken assumption of Heiden's, which he made no attempt to prove. There is, however, a definite possibility that many Nazis were ex-soldiers. There is no doubt that the party leadership made efforts to attract this group into its ranks in articles in the Voelkischer Beobachter mentioned above and like that in Der Nationalsozialist, no. 4, p. 2, appealing to "Frontsoldaten" to support the movement.

[78]Contrast this with Michael Thornton, Nazism, p. 27, who says it was only the "bigoted lower class mind" that was attracted to Hitler's movement.

[79]In Marxist tracts, small businessmen are often identified as a mainstay of Nazi support. For example, Dutt, Fascism and Revolution, p. 103.

[80]For example, Carr, History of Germany, pp. 343-344. "During the lean years the hard core of Nazi support came from the 'white collar proletariat.'" Whether they were the "hard core of Nazi support" is not determinable from the statistics above, but they were certainly present in strength in the NSDAP membership.

[81]Contrast this with Heiden, History of National Socialism, who continually throughout his study characterizes the NSDAP members as coming almost exclusively from the lower-middle class (see especially p. 18).

[82]These statistics are in direct conflict with Bracher's contention in The German Dictatorship, p. 91, that "many unemployed found their way into the party" in the pre-putsch era.

[83]Gordon, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, p. 68, argues that "the most striking single social fact about the [early] party is that it was a party of the young." Gordon is certainly right, but what he calls "the most striking single social fact" may be legitimately questioned. He goes on to say that " . . . in many ways the NSDAP represents a rebellion of dissatisfied youth against an elder generation that had not only stumbled into a war but had failed to win it, and that had equally failed to create a world with which these young men could sympathize" (ibid., p. 71).

CHAPTER III

DISSOLUTION, RESURRECTION, AND GROWTH: THE NSDAP, 1924-1928

> Princes! Workers of the hand and the brain! Artisans! Farmers! Anti-Semites! German men and women of all classes! Unite behind Hitler, join the National Socialist Movement!
>
> Voelkischer Beobachter
> March 24, 1926

Interregnum

After a sensational trial in early 1924, Hitler was convicted of high treason and received a very mild sentence considering the gravity of his crime. He used the trial itself as a platform from which to attack the republic. The press, which gave the trial great publicity, presented Hitler with the opportunity to disseminate his views throughout Germany. He was subsequently imprisoned at Landsberg Fortress in Bavaria where he enjoyed a great deal of liberty and received visitors practically at will. During his stay at Landsberg he dictated the first volume of Mein Kampf to Rudolf Hess (later deputy Fuehrer of Germany), and to his chauffeur, Emil Maurice. The turgid and pretentious style of the book makes it very difficult

to read. However, the "new course" that Hitler determined for the future activities of the Nazi party was laid out in great detail.

Apparently sobered by the failure of his putsch, Hitler decided he would come to power legally, within the framework of the Weimar Constitution. Then and only then would he overthrow the very institutions that had brought him to power. Hitler's "new course" was to win mass electoral support for his party which necessitated a highly organized and dedicated party membership. The new weapon was to be the "truth" as revealed by Hitler and spread by the party faithful through a massive propaganda effort--not the militaristic and overtly revolutionary "movement" of the 1919-1923 period.

During the fifteen-month interval between the Beer Hall Putsch in November, 1923, and the refounding of the Nazi party in February, 1925, the NSDAP, banned by the government, dissolved into several antagonistic groups. Alfred Rosenberg, former editor of the Voelkischer Beobachter (also banned) and Hitler's handpicked successor, was unable to hold together the diverse elements that the Fuehrer had united in the NSDAP. Rosenberg joined forces in early 1924 with several non-nazi racist groups in Bavaria in order to participate in the May elections for the Reichstag and the Bavarian state parliament. Several factions of the NSDAP in south Germany opposed

this "legal" course to power, and, led by Julius Streicher and Hermann Esser, formed a rival organization of former Nazis called the Grossdeutsche Volksgemeinschaft. This group spurned electoral participation and maintained the putschist character of the earlier Nazi party.

Many former Nazis outside Bavaria joined with the Deutschvoelkische Freiheitspartei (DVFP) in the electoral campaigns of 1924. The DVFP had been founded in 1922 by three Reichstag deputies from the Deutschnational Volkspartei (DNVP) who felt that party too conservative. However, a great many former Nazis from north Germany, particularly the younger and more activistic, denounced the DVFP as too conservative and its goals as reactionary and bourgeois. These northern opponents of the DVFP joined with Streicher's and Esser's groups for awhile, then broke with them also. They appealed to Hitler, still imprisoned at Landsberg, for support. Hitler declined to enter the debate. Most historians have maintained he deliberately encouraged this dissension in the party ranks during his imprisonment so that no single rival might arise to challenge his leadership upon his eventual release.

A degree of unity was restored to the NSDAP in August, 1924, when Gregor Strasser, the leader of the northern party, joined with Ludendorff and a leader of the DFVP to form an electoral bloc calling itself the Nationalsozialistische Freiheitsbewegnung which enjoyed

some electoral success in the December elections. Strasser himself was elected to the Reichstag but a number of former Nazis remained unreconciled to the new party.

When Hitler was released from prison in November, 1924, he found the political and economic crises had passed on which much of his earlier success had been based. Germany was entering into a brief period of prosperity. Unemployment abated, real wages rose, and the political situation became more stabilized. The situation appeared anything but promising for a radical bent on overthrowing the Weimar system. Nevertheless, the refounded party grew much more rapidly (in sheer numbers) than did the early party. Within a year it had spread to all parts of the Reich. During the most halcyon years of the Weimar Republic Hitler was able to establish a small but fanatical party membership from which sprung the electoral successes after the onset of the Great Depression.

False Dawn: Weimar Germany after the Great Inflation

The crisis atmosphere prevailing in postwar Germany which had greatly aided the growth of the Nazi party diminished significantly during the first three years following Hitler's release from prison. Economic crises produced by the prolonged exertions of the war and exacerbated by the reparations payments and territorial losses Germany was subjected to by the Treaty of Versailles had

culminated in the Great Inflation of 1922-1923. A wave of prosperity which lasted, except for a brief recession during the last two months of 1925 and the first half of 1926, swept away many of the effects of those years. The unstable Weimar coalitions which had seemed powerless to cope with the many problems of the Reich before the Beer Hall Putsch were still the rule in Germany during 1925-1928. However, they gained a measure of confidence from the public largely through the international successes of the foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann. Working largely out of the limelight, Stresemann was also responsible to a great degree for the relative stability of post-inflation cabinets and for the new-found ability of the ideologically diverse political parties of Weimar to work together.

During a brief stint as chancellor in 1923, Stresemann had ended the runaway inflation which had struck Germany. As foreign minister in 1924, he had worked out the Dawes Plan with the Allies, putting the payment of reparations on a sound footing which the German economy could bear.[1] The Dawes Plan brought in its wake the ingredient which was indispensable for German economic recovery: foreign loans, primarily from America. These loans, which amounted to more than 19 billion marks by 1928, began funnelling into Germany in 1924.[2] As a result, the economy of the Reich made an immediate recovery. Unemployment fell to 4.1 per cent in May, 1924.[3] Concurrently, real wages began a steady rise which was not to

end until the onset of the Great Depression. The cost of living in Germany also increased during this period, but much more slowly than wages, indicating that the material well-being of Germans definitely improved.[4] The only negative aspect apparent in this period of prosperity was the high rate of unemployment that prevailed and the generally depressed state of German agriculture.

When the recession of 1925-1926 struck, unemployment zoomed to almost 15 per cent of the total work force in December, 1925. Never again during the Weimar period did the figure drop to under 7 per cent. In 1925 the high point was July, with 22.1 per cent of the total work force unemployed. For the entire period 1925-1928, unemployment averaged over 10 per cent.[5]

Agricultural production during the period 1925-1928 was never equal to pre-war production even though more acreage was utilized. This was due in part to outmoded agricultural methods and in part to soil exhaustion caused by lack of necessary fertilizers. As a result, there was considerable dissatisfaction in rural Germany which undoubtedly contributed directly to the "green rebellion" of the late twenties.[6]

The most important political event of the period 1925-1928 in Germany was the death in February, 1925 (the same month in which the NSDAP was refounded) of the President of the Weimar Republic, Friedrich Ebert. This was

followed by the election of Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg, an avowed monarchist, as President of the Reich. The significance of Hindenburg's election only became apparent during the crisis years of 1930-1933. During this period the old man was manipulated by a succession of shrewd self-seekers into using the extraordinary emergency powers delegated to his office by the Weimar Constitution in ways definitely detrimental to democracy in Germany.[7]

Other than Hindenburg's election, nothing exceptional happened in Weimar politics before 1928. Gains made by the radical parties in the national elections of May, 1924, at the expense of the moderate republican parties were lost in large part seven months later. In 1928, the republican parties made further gains, with the result that another Grand Coalition could be formed. The Weimar picture had brightened considerably. All German governments during this period retained Stresemann as foreign minister, the post which he held until his death in 1929. Stresemann was able during 1925-1928 to accomplish several notable gains for Germany internationally, including admission to the League of Nations, the Locarno Agreement with the Western nations, and the Treaty of Berlin with the Soviet Union. All of these were advantageous for Germany and increased the prestige of the Weimar government both at home and abroad.[8]

The Refounding of the NSDAP

At the time of Hitler's release from Landsberg in November, 1924, he found the Nazi party banned all over Germany. State governments had also suppressed its principal newspaper, the Voelkischer Beobachter. The former members and leaders of the party had dispersed. Many of them had been partially or completely absorbed by other radical Voelkisch parties. Those left, divided into a number of competing factions surrounding Hitler's former lieutenants, most notably Rosenburg, Strasser, and Streicher. Furthermore, the recovering economy of the Reich and the somewhat stabilized political situation described above seemed to offer little chance of success for a radical political movement which thrived on societal discontent and crisis. Undismayed, however, Hitler set about to reorganize his party and turn it toward the conquest of power in Germany, this time by a new route--legality.

The first problem confronting Hitler was the governmental ban on the party and its newspaper. By making a deal with the Bavarian government through one of its ministers--assuring him of the "legal" intentions of the Nazis and of their devotion to the existing government--Hitler was able to have the restrictions removed (at least in Bavaria).[9] The first issue of the new Voelkischer Beobachter appeared on February 26, 1925. It announced

the refounding of the NSDAP, the beginning of its "new course," and the new and rather stringent requirements for membership. Membership cards were to be issued, duplicates of which were to be kept in a central file at party headquarters in Munich. A new number sequence for party members was begun with Hitler himself receiving membership card number one of the "new" party.[10]

During the years 1925-1928 the Nazis did not direct their propaganda appeals to any particular group in Germany. Their appeals to the German people through newspapers and speeches were directed to all segments of society.[11] A typical issue of the Voelkischer Beobachter during the period contained articles discussing the problems of farmers, workers, white collar workers, shopkeepers, and all other socio-economic groups in the Reich. These articles generally blamed the "corrupt" Weimar politicians, the Versailles Treaty, and above all, the Jews for those problems and went on to propose "National Socialist" solutions.[12]

In July, 1927, Joseph Goebbels initiated the publication of a particularly offensive, sensationalist Nazi newspaper in Berlin--Der Angriff. It has been suggested that the crude propaganda appeals of Goebbels' paper were directed mainly at Berlin's workers.[13] A survey of the pages of Der Angriff for 1927 reveals that it did indeed contain a great number of articles emphasizing the benefits

workers could derive if they joined the National Socialist movement. However, the newspaper also contained appeals to German youth (students in particular), small businessmen, artisans, and practically every other occupational group with the exception of farmers.[14] Based on the columns of the most infamous Nazi propaganda organs, Hitler's party remained true to its stated intention of unifying all segments of German society into one mass movement.

After the refounding of the NSDAP, Hitler quickly eliminated all persons posing a threat to his absolute leadership and those who opposed the new course.[15] Among those who left the party was Roehm, who clashed with Hitler over the role and organization of the SA. He resigned his post in April and subsequently left the country.[16] Hitler's power within the movement was demonstrated during the presidential campaign which began almost concurrently with the refounding of the NSDAP. He initially supported the Voelkisch candidate, Ludendorff, his former putschist partner. Ludendorff received only an embarrassing 200,000 votes in the general election and Hitler prevented his reentry into the Nazi party.[17]

1925--Modest Beginnings

When the "new" Nazi party was born in February, 1925, the economic boom which had begun in 1924 was getting into full swing. Unemployment was at its lowest point

since the end of the inflation and wages were rising rapidly.[18] Only in the agricultural section was there a note of discord in the otherwise harmonic German economic situation.[19] Politically, the poor showing by the Communist candidate Thaelmann and by Ludendorff in the presidential election indicated a turning away from the political extremes by the German electorate.[20] On the international scene, Stresemann was on the verge of consummating the Locarno agreement and securing several important concessions for Germany from the Allies. Despite all this, the Nazi party grew in size much more rapidly than it ever had in the pre-putsch era, except for 1923.

Over 27,000 people joined the NSDAP in 1925.[21] Of that total, 5,225 biographies are used in this sample.[22] In addition to data on the age, sex, and occupation available for the early party period, it was also possible to retrieve the following information about party members who joined in the pre-depression period: the size of the communities in which each new member lived; the region of Germany from which each new party member came; the date on which each member left the party, where applicable; and the date on which those members who left the party rejoined, if applicable. This makes possible several more definitive conclusions about the social composition of the party membership in the 1924-1930 period than was possible with the limited information available about members in the early period.

The percentage of women among new members entering the NSDAP in 1925 continued the decline evident from the first year of the early party. Only 8.2 per cent (427 individuals) of the sample of new Nazis for 1925 were women.

Although many of those persons joining the NSDAP in 1925 were undoubtedly drawn from the pre-putsch membership, this could not have been true of all the new members. This is evidenced by several striking dissimilarities in the age and occupational classification of members from the two periods. The age structure of those joining the party in 1925 was as follows in Table 15.

TABLE 15

AGES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1925

Age Group	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 20	631	12.1	3,897,555	9.0
20-29	1,992	38.1	11,458,015	26.6
30-39	821	15.7	8,863,091	20.5
40-49	631	12.1	7,754,071	17.9
50-59	327	6.3	6,561,314	14.9
Over 60	93	1.8	4,841,919	11.1
No Entry	730	13.9	-	-
Totals:	5,225	100.0	43,375,965	100.0

The trend toward extreme youth among new Nazis noted in 1921-1923 abated slightly during 1925, but there

were still a great number of young people among incoming members. It is obvious from these figures that despite the economic recovery of Germany noted above, there remained a large residue of dissatisfaction with German society among the younger generation.[23] The figures for the areas of Germany from which the new members of 1925 came are especially interesting as shown in Table 16.[24]

TABLE 16

GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1925

Geographic Area	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
South Germany	1,741	33.3	16,485,000	25.2
Rhineland	1,035	19.8	13,950,000	21.3
North Germany	2,212	42.4	24,567,000	37.6
East Prussia*	156	3.0	4,397,000	6.7
Schleswig-Holstein	81	1.5	5,983,000	9.2
Totals:	5,225	100.0	65,382,000	100.0

*Includes Danzig

One conclusion must be drawn from these figures: either the assertion that the pre-putsch party was predominantly a South German organization is wrong and the early party was already well established all over Germany by 1923, or else the characterization of the party as totally disorganized, paralyzed, and retrogressive in the

fifteen months between the failure of the Beer Hall Putsch and the refounding of the party is mistaken. The latter is probably the case because by the end of 1925 the NSDAP was already well established nationwide, with the possible exceptions of Schleswig-Holstein and East Prussia. Although South Germany is overrepresented in the party in relation to its percentage of the total German population, it is far from being even the most heavily represented region. That dubious honor belongs to North Germany.

East Prussia is underrepresented in the Nazi membership of 1925, as is Schleswig-Holstein and the Rhineland, when compared to their total populations in relation to the Reich. However, both Schleswig-Holstein and East Prussia have at least the beginnings of an organization with a definite potential for growth. The Rhineland, a predominantly industrial region and a stronghold of the SPD and KPD, had a representation only slightly smaller than its total population relative to that of the Reich. Taken collectively, these figures indicate that at least by the end of 1925 the NSDAP was a nationwide movement with its greatest strength in North and South Germany, somewhat weaker on the eastern and western borders.

The statistics for the size of communities from which those who joined the Nazis in 1925 came are very revealing as seen in Table 17.[25] The conception of Germany as a largely urban representative of modern industrialized nations held by many is in error. In 1925 the

TABLE 17

COMMUNITY SIZE FROM WHICH PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1925 CAME

Community Size	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 10,000	1,220	23.3	33,048,820	52.6
10-50,000	1,293	24.7	9,777,134	15.6
50-200,000	1,028	19.7	6,246,998	9.9
Over 200,000	1,654	31.7	13,755,048	21.9
Totals:	5,225	100.0	62,828,000	100.0

majority of the German population still lived in small communities or in the countryside, and the Nazis had not yet made any considerable number of converts in rural Germany. The main strength of the NSDAP was still concentrated in the large urban centers with over 200,000 population, as well as in the smaller metropolitan areas. It is obvious that those who have characterized Nazism as a small-town phenomenon are mistaken--at least in relation to the party membership as it stood in 1925.[26]

The occupational statistics for those who joined the NSDAP in 1925 are notable for several differences in the party structure from the trends indicated in the last two years of the pre-putsch party--see Table 18. The apparent trend toward fewer workers among new members coming into the NSDAP which appeared in the statistics for 1922 and 1923, in Chapter II above, was reversed in the incoming

TABLE 18

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 1925

Occupational Categories	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No in Reich	% in Reich
Unskilled Laborers	915	17.5	10,679,848	35.3
Skilled Laborers	168	4.2	1,146,945	3.8
Agricultural Laborers	70	1.8	2,499,945	8.3
Totals:	1,153	23.5	14,326,738	47.4
Artisans	973	18.5	4,488,428	14.8
White Collar	1,278	24.4	5,274,232	17.4
Foremen	63	1.1	Included under white collar	
Managers	80	1.4	250,335	0.9
Civil Servants	205	3.8	No figures available	
Self-Employed	205	3.8	No figures available	
School Teachers	51	1.0	308,741	1.0
Totals:	2,855	54.0	10,321,736	34.3
Farmers	187	3.6	2,139,878	7.1
Large Landowners	13	0.2	Included with farmers	
Totals:	200	3.8	2,139,878	7.1

Military (enlisted)	14	0.3	104,000	0.3
Military (officers)	0	0.0	No figures available	
Totals:	14	0.3	104,000	0.3
Professional	144	2.7	237,850	0.7
Professors	0	0.0	No figures available	
Capitalists	43	0.7	No figures available	
Financiers	6	0.1	No figures available	
Private Incomes	27	0.5	2,944,872	9.2
Totals:	220	4.0	3,182,722	9.9
Clergy	3	0.05	No figures available	
Unemployed	0	0.0		6.3*
Students	222	4.1	No figures available	
Housewives	171	3.2	15,650,000*	
Arts	71	1.3	134,236	0.5
Retired	76	1.4	No figures available	
No Entry	234	4.4	-	-
Totals:	777	14.45	134,236	0.5
All Categories:	5,225	100.05	30,259,310	100.0

*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an average for the year compiled from Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399, based on the number of trades union members unemployed. It is likely that the figure for non-union workers was higher.

members of 1925. Unskilled laborers among the new members for 1925 were more numerous percentagewise than in any year except 1921, although still very low relative to the percentage of that occupational category in German society as a whole. The percentage of skilled laborers in this sample, although not as high as in 1919-1921, was still much higher than 1922 and almost equal to the percentage of that group in the Reich work force. Agricultural laborers were better represented among the new members in 1925 than in any previous year, indicating the Nazis were making some progress in the countryside. However, that group was still strongly underrepresented in the NSDAP compared to their numbers in all of German society.

The Reichswehr had enacted strict regulations against its members belonging to a political party in 1924.[27] Although this rule was violated by a few officers and enlisted men, military personnel made up no appreciable segment of the party during the period 1925-1930. However, the percentage of enlisted men coming into the party in 1925 was approximately equal to their percentage in the German work force.

The percentage of new Nazis from the ranks of the professions was slightly higher than in 1922 and 1923, but was still much lower than the figures for the first three years of the party. The figure of 2.7 per cent of new professional members among Nazi recruits for 1925 is over

twice as high as that group's representation in the Reich, indicating there was still a residue of discontent among the educated in German society.[28] School teachers, who have been maligned as one of the chief sources of support for the Nazis in Weimar Germany,[29] made up only 1 per cent of new members for the NSDAP in 1925, exactly equal to the strength of that group in society as a whole. No one listing their occupation as professor appeared in the sample for 1925, and only three clergymen.

Farmers and large landowners in this sample for persons entering the NSDAP in 1925 made up a larger part of the whole than in 1919-1923. However, the percentage of farmers entering the NSDAP in 1923 showed a decided increase over the first four years of the party. Therefore, the increase in this category is not greatly surprising.

Self-employed persons among new members in 1925 declined somewhat percentagewise as compared to the pre-putsch era, but still made up a considerable part of the total membership. Capitalists and financiers continued to constitute only a small part of the NSDAP membership, but large if one considers how small those groups were in German society as a whole. The percentage of persons with private incomes in this sample is about the same as for the period 1919-1923, well below that group's representation in the Reich. The number of civil servants entering

the party in 1925 was slightly higher than in 1922 percentagewise, but still appreciably lower than that group's total during the party's first three years.

By far the largest single occupational group in the sample is the white collar workers. The percentage for this group is slightly lower than in 1922-1923, but still significantly higher than the figure for Germany as a whole. The occupational classification of foremen constituted a slightly higher percentage of members entering the party in 1925 than it did in 1923, and managers were about the same. Persons from the arts were slightly fewer in 1925 percentagewise than in 1923. Artisans showed an appreciable decline in 1925 as compared to 1923 but still made up a somewhat larger part of the NSDAP membership than they did of the total German work force. All of these occupations taken together with self-employed represent the urban lower-middle class. They make up a majority of party members but clearly do not overwhelm the membership. Characterizations of the NSDAP as "overwhelmingly" lower-middle class are demonstrably wrong for the party as it was constituted at the end of 1925.

The percentage of students was almost the same for those entering the NSDAP in 1925 as in 1923. Both were considerably lower than for the first three years of the party's existence. The housewives made up a slightly higher portion of the party membership in 1925 than in

1922-1923, but they were still nowhere near the strength of that group in the Reich. Retired persons constituted about the same percentage in the party in 1925 as in 1922, still well below their representation in society as a whole.[30]

Another datum not available for the early party membership that is contained on the membership cards for the period 1925-1930 is the number of people who left the NSDAP. The percentage of persons leaving the party in 1925 in this sample is not great (5.7 per cent), but becomes much greater in succeeding years. Even this trickle of quitters means that the party had at least 1,600 fewer members at the end of 1925 than the membership numbers quoted by Volz indicated. Thus, at the beginning of 1926 the party had approximately 25,400 members.[31]

Taken as a whole, 1925 must be considered a successful year for Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party. From a state of leaderless disorganization the NSDAP became a nationwide movement with strong leadership and purpose. The party membership was overwhelmingly male and very young, with the middle class overrepresented, but with sizeable representations from all segments of German society. The membership as portrayed in this sample was largely urban, but substantial inroads had been made into the rural areas of Germany. The party was strongest in North and South Germany, but all sections of the country

were represented, including a strong showing by the Rhineland, a region previously supposed to be a stronghold of Social Democracy. In 1925 also a small number of persons left the Nazi party after less than a year of membership. This trend was to become more and more pronounced in succeeding years. As is sometimes the case with persons who are "saved" at religious revival meetings, a number often backslid; so it was at emotional meetings of the NSDAP.

1926--Nazi Incursions into the Proletariat

The business recession which struck the German economy in the last months of 1925 continued well into the summer of 1926. Only during the latter part of July did a renewed flow of foreign capital once again prompt a recovery, lasting until the onslaught of the Great Depression.[32] One immediate effect of the recession was a sharp rise in unemployment which reached as high as 22.1 per cent of the total work force by July, only slightly lower than the worst days of 1923. Even in December, with the business recovery well underway, the jobless rate declined only to 12.8 per cent of the total work force. Unusually high rates of unemployment continued throughout the Weimar Republic, belying the apparent prosperity of the years 1926-1929.[33]

The agricultural crisis continued unabated in 1926. Production of most agricultural products remained below 1913 levels in Germany, and despite high protective

tariffs, foreign agricultural products continued to undersell domestic produce.[34]

The recession took a large toll of small and/or undercapitalized and marginal businesses. During the first seven months of 1926 bankruptcies averaged almost 2,000 per month. By the end of the year the staggering number of 4,000 incorporated companies and 13,000 limited liability companies in Germany had failed.[35]

Despite this gloomy picture of the German economy in 1926, there were a few bright spots. For the first time since the war (except for the unnatural period of the Great Inflation), wages in Germany surpassed the 1913 level. The cost of living remained at about the same level as 1925, while wages took a hefty jump. This meant that real wages rose sharply in 1926, making for a substantial improvement in the situations of many Germans--at least those who were employed.[36]

On the political and international scene 1926 witnessed new triumphs for Stresemann's foreign policy and new fiascoes for the chronically weak Weimar governments. In April, Stresemann concluded the Treaty of Berlin with the USSR, which reassured the Russians about the Locarno agreement reached the preceding year with the Western nations, and at the same time reaffirmed its provisions. In September, Stresemann brought Germany into the League of Nations. However, the instability of the Weimar government was emphasized in May when Luther's second cabinet

fell over a minor dispute. On the other hand, there were no national elections, Communist revolts, or rightist putsches. All in all, 1926 was a good year for the republic politically.

Over 22,000 people joined the NSDAP in 1926. A total of 4,433 biographies, or almost one-fifth of the entire new membership are used in this sample.[37]

Male dominance became even more pronounced among persons entering the NSDAP in 1926 than it had been in previous years. Only 5.4 per cent of the incoming members were women. Concurrently, the persons under thirty years of age entering the party remained an absolute majority as shown in Table 19.

TABLE 19

AGES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1926

Age Group	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 20	859	19.5	3,897,555	9.0
20-29	1,971	44.5	11,458,015	26.6
30-39	762	17.3	8,863,091	20.5
40-49	473	10.8	7,754,071	17.9
50-59	202	4.6	6,561,314	14.9
Over 60	83	1.3	4,841,919	11.1
No Entry	86	2.0	-	-
Totals:	4,436	100.0	43,375,965	100.0

The number of persons over forty years of age in this sample of persons who entered the Nazi party in 1926

is extremely low in relation to their total strength in German society. For the first time in its history, the Nazi movement--when judged by its recruits--began to take on the appearance of a "youth rebellion."[38] However, there were still a great number of older persons coming into the party. To attempt to identify the NSDAP as only a rebellion by the disillusioned youth of Germany would be misleading, even though 81 per cent of the incoming members in 1926 were under forty years of age.

The areas of Germany from which the new members came is very revealing in assessing the social composition of new Nazis in 1926--see Table 20. The most striking

TABLE 20

GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGINS OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP IN 1926

Geographic Area	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
South Germany	1,359	30.6	16,485,000	25.2
Rhineland	1,195	26.9	13,950,000	21.3
North Germany	1,631	36.8	24,567,000	37.6
East Prussia*	127	2.9	4,397,000	6.7
Schleswig-Holstein	112	2.5	5,983,000	9.2
Not Given	12	0.3	-	-
Totals:	4,436	100.0	65,382,000	100.0

*Includes Danzig.

change from the statistics for 1925 is in the substantial increase in new members from the Rhineland, which suggests

that the Nazis made inroads into industrial labor in 1926.[39] New members from the Rhineland actually exceeded their relative strength in the Reich as a whole in 1926. The new members from Schleswig-Holstein in this sample rose slightly over the previous year, but were still considerably lower than the size of Schleswig-Holstein's population relative to Germany's total population, as was East Prussia's percentage of the new Nazis. New recruits from North and South Germany decreased somewhat percentagewise in 1926, but remained above their population size relative to the rest of Germany.[40]

There was a decided shift in the size of the communities from which new members of the NSDAP came in 1926 as seen in Table 21. The percentage of new members declined in all categories except communities of under

TABLE 21

SIZE OF COMMUNITIES FROM WHICH NEW NSDAP MEMBERS CAME IN 1926

Community Size	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 10,000	1,314	29.6	33,048,820	52.6
10-50,000	1,035	23.3	9,777,134	15.6
50-200,000	711	16.1	6,246,998	9.9
Over 200,000	1,346	30.3	13,755,048	21.9
No Entry	30	0.7	-	-
Totals:	4,436	100.0	62,828,000	100.0

10,000 persons. All of the other categories, however, supplied a higher proportion of Nazi recruits than their share of the total population of the Reich warranted. The only category of community size which was underrepresented relative to its percentage strength in the nation as a whole was the "under-10,000" classification.

The occupational breakdown of Nazi recruits in 1926 reflected the changes in the size of the communities from which they came (see Table 22). The most striking changes in the occupational structure of the new party members are these: a substantial decrease in the percentage of new members from those occupations which we may call the "new" middle class--white collar workers, professional people and school teachers, foremen and managers. Concurrently, there was a sharp increase in the proportion of new Nazis in this sample from the "old" middle class--artisans, self-employed persons, and farmers. For the first time, the percentage of farmers coming into the party was approximately equal to the strength of that group in German society, substantiating the generalization made possible by the statistics on the size of the communities from which new members came. National Socialism was at last well on its way toward becoming solidly established in the rural areas of Germany.[41]

Workers in the sample of new converts to Nazism in 1926 increased substantially percentagewise over the

TABLE 22

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 1926

Occupational Categories	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Unskilled Laborers	894	20.2	10,679,848	35.3
Skilled Laborers	185	4.2	1,146,945	3.8
Agricultural Laborers	81	1.8	2,499,945	8.3
Totals:	1,160	26.2	14,326,738	47.4
Artisans	944	21.3	4,488,428	14.8
White Collar	777	17.5	5,274,232	17.4
Foremen	3	0.1	Included with white collar	
Managers	45	1.0	250,335	0.9
Civil Servants	169	3.8	No figures available	
Self-Employed	189	4.3	No figures available	
School Teachers	39	0.9	308,741	1.0
Totals:	2,166	48.9	10,321,736	34.3
Farmers	273	6.2	2,139,878	7.1
Large Landowners	6	0.1	Included with farmers	
Totals:	279	6.3	2,139,878	7.1

Military (enlisted)	0	0.0	104,000	0.3
Military (officers)	6	0.1	No figures available	
Totals:	6	0.1	104,000	0.3
Professional	103	2.3	237,850	0.7
Professors	0	0.0	No figures available	
Capitalists	15	0.3	No figures available	
Financiers	0	0.0	No figures available	
Private Incomes	18	0.4	2,944,872	9.2
Totals:	136	3.0	3,182,722	9.9
Clergy	5	0.1	No figures available	
Unemployed	0	0.0		18.3*
Students	238	5.4	No figures available	
Housewives	122	2.8	15,650,000*	
Arts	59	1.3	134,236	0.5
Retired	61	1.4	No figures available	
No Entry	201	4.5	-	-
Totals:	686	15.5	134,236	0.5
All Categories:	4,436	100.0	30,259,310	100.0

*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an average for the year compiled from Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399, based on the number of trades union members unemployed. It is likely that the figure for non-union workers was higher.

previous year. Workers from all three categories exceeded one-fourth of the incoming recruits for the first time since 1921. A combination of Nazi propaganda appeals to laborers and the high rate of unemployment in Germany in 1926 contributed to the number of work rs entering Hitler's movement.[42] The percentage of new members in this sample falling into the other occupational categories in 1926 remained relatively unchanged from 1925.

Proportionately, persons who left the party in 1926 increased substantially from the 1925 figure. Of those who joined the party in 1925, 16.2 per cent (846 individuals) left the movement in 1926. A further 329 persons (7.4 per cent of the total sample for 1926) did not complete a year in the party. When these percentages are extended to the total membership of the NSDAP it means approximately 4,400 of the 27,000 persons who joined the party in 1925 left it in 1926 and that about 1,700 of the approximately 22,000 new members who joined in 1926 left it the same year.

Instead of the almost 50,000 membership claimed by the Nazis for the beginning of 1927, the total strength of the party at that time was probably closer to 42,000.[43] This indicates that a number of persons attracted to the Nazi movement by its propaganda and its emotional mass meetings concluded very soon that it did not actually meet their needs as they had hoped. Seventeen persons

in the sample who left the party in 1925 rejoined it in 1926, receiving new membership cards with new numbers. The old numbers were left vacant which further complicates efforts to ascertain the true numerical strength of the NSDAP.[44]

The social composition of the NSDAP was undergoing a basic transformation in 1926. The strength of the party was shifting from the larger cities to smaller communities, particularly smaller communities in the more industrialized regions of Germany. At the same time, the membership was becoming overwhelmingly masculine and predominantly young. The "new" middle class, formerly the largest single occupational category in the party, was being displaced by the "old" middle class and by the worker classifications as the backbone of Nazi strength. For the first time (discounting 1923), farmers made up a significant percentage of new members entering Hitler's party in 1926. The exodus from the party which had begun in 1925 reached rather large proportions in 1926, indicating that the Nazis did not deliver everything they promised.

Considering the high rate of unemployment in Germany in 1926, along with the great number of business failures and the continuing agricultural depression, Nazi gains in membership were not impressive. One conclusion that may be tentatively drawn from this is that those who see the Nazi successes as directly tied to unemployment

and economic crises are not entirely correct. The relative lack of success of the Nazis in attracting new members in the economic recession of 1926 indicates that factors other than material were instrumental in the decisions of Germans to join the National Socialist movement.[45]

It is tempting to suggest that the relative political stability of Germany in 1926 along with several apparent gains in foreign policy dissuaded the masses from seeking radical political solutions to their problems, but this, too, is overly simplistic. A great number of factors--economic, emotional, political, psychological, ideological, etc.--entered into the attraction of individuals for the Nazi party. In 1926 these many factors were not present in sufficient amount to attract any large percentage of the German population to the ranks of Hitler's movement.

1927--Floodtide of Youth in the NSDAP

As far as Germany was concerned, 1927 was a relatively uneventful year both in international relations and in internal politics. The German economy reached boom proportions in response to the steady flow of foreign capital--mainly American--into the country. The Weimar Republic, benefiting from the growing prosperity of the nation, had apparently become, if not popular, at least accepted by most Germans. However, there were ominous signs that all was not as well as it seemed in Germany.

The agricultural depression not only continued, but deepened, creating the beginnings of a "green rebellion." The high rates of unemployment reached in 1926 were not repeated, but nevertheless the unemployed continued to constitute an alarmingly large portion of the total German work force.

Industrial production in Germany in 1927 exceeded that for 1913 for the first time since the war.[46] At the same time, real wages increased substantially as the cost of living rose slowly and wages took a healthy jump.[47] Unemployment was still quite high, averaging about 8 to 9 per cent of the work force.[48] In the countryside, agricultural production was still less than the 1913 total as the agricultural depression continued.[49] The Nazis, particularly Joseph Goebbels,[50] attempted to exploit the worsening conditions in rural areas and to make inroads among the workers in industrial regions by an intensified propaganda campaign. In 1927 Goebbels was appointed Gauleiter of Berlin, a stronghold of the Marxist parties. Here he initiated a weekly newspaper aimed largely at the workers, especially in Berlin, called Der Angriff (The Attack). An indication of his success was the Nazi rally in the Wedding district of Berlin--an old Marxist stronghold--where he attracted over one thousand workers.[51] However, party propaganda on the national level continued to be directed at all segments of German society, particularly the middle classes. Hitler (who could now speak

anywhere in Germany except Prussia)[52] continued to attack the ineptness of the Weimar regime, labeling its officials as "November Criminals" and Jews intent on the complete subjugation of the German people to the interests of "international finance capital." Other prominent Nazi speakers continually pointed out the social inequities in the Reich and the helplessness of the "little man" against the "establishment." Nazi newspapers called for the creation of a Volksgemeinschaft in which all members of society would share equally in its products.

The NSDAP grew slowly in 1927, gaining only about 23,000 new members. This brought the total number of persons who had joined the refounded party since 1925 to approximately 72,000, but the actual strength of the membership was considerably less due to attrition.[53] For this study, 3,970 biographies were available, or slightly more than one-sixth of the total number of new recruits for 1927.

These new Nazis were even more overwhelmingly male than in previous years. Only 4.7 per cent of the incoming members were women. Despite the professed legality of the NSDAP, women were not attracted to its ranks in any numbers, partly because of the Nazi's rather chauvinistic philosophy of the role of women in society.

The youth explosion in the party membership reached its zenith in 1927. The age distribution of new members

was as shown in Table 23. Persons under thirty years of age constituted over 70 per cent of the total incoming

TABLE 23

AGES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1927

Age Group	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 20	851	21.3	3,897,555	9.0
20-29	1,957	49.2	11,458,015	26.6
30-39	566	14.2	8,863,091	20.5
40-49	323	8.5	7,754,071	17.9
50-59	162	4.1	6,561,314	14.9
Over 60	86	2.1	4,841,919	11.1
No Entry	28	0.6	-	-
Totals:	3,973	100.0	43,375,965	100.0

membership in 1927. New recruits over forty years of age represented less than 15 per cent of the total. These figures indicate that at least in the relatively prosperous year of 1927, the radical political appeal of the NSDAP was by far the most effective among young Germans. One possible explanation for this is that younger Germans did not share proportionately in the economic prosperity of 1927. It is probable that the high unemployment rates contained a disproportionately large percentage of young people.

The surprisingly large percentage of persons under thirty years old coming into Hitler's party might be explained also as the rejection of bourgeois, materialistic

society by a younger generation that was determined to build a new and better world. In searching for paths to this brave new world, many hit upon National Socialism. There is evidence that a considerable amount of Nazi propaganda was structured to appeal to exactly these sentiments among German youth.[54] The Nazi movement, through a steady infusion of new members under thirty years of age, continued to be a young and dynamic movement, in direct contrast to many of its political rivals. For example, only 7.7 per cent of the members of the SPD were under twenty-five and a further 9.6 per cent between twenty-five and thirty years of age at the beginning of 1927. The thirty to forty age group made up slightly more than 25 per cent of the total membership at that time, while well over half of the members were over forty years old.[55]

The geographical origins of the new party members in 1927 were very little changed from the previous year except in one notable case--see Table 24. The percentage of new members from East Prussia and from Schleswig-Holstein increased slightly, but both remained substantially below their total strength relative to the Reich. This indicates that despite the agricultural depression in Germany during the period, the people of these two primarily rural districts had not yet turned to the radical solutions to their problems offered by the Nazis in any great degree.[56]

TABLE 24

GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF PERSONS
JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1927

Geographic Area	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
South Germany	1,370	34.5	16,485,000	25.2
Rhineland	797	20.1	13,950,000	21.3
North Germany	1,513	38.1	24,567,000	37.6
East Prussia*	136	3.4	4,397,000	6.7
Schleswig-Holstein	137	3.4	5,983,000	9.2
No Entry	20	0.6	-	-
Totals:	3,973	100.0	65,382,000	100.0

*Includes Danzig.

The surprising jump in the percentage of new members from the Rhineland coming into the NSDAP in 1926 was not repeated in 1927. The percentage of converts to Nazism coming from that region declined substantially to 20.1 per cent--almost exactly the same as the population of the Rhineland relative to the population of the Reich.

The representation of new members from North Germany was also very close to the percentage of that area's total population relative to the national total. Only South Germany, the birthplace of Hitler's movement and still its headquarters, had a substantially higher representation than its population relative to the Reich. In 1927, the Nazis continued to do better in membership

recruitment in the more industrialized and urban areas of Germany than in the predominantly rural, agricultural areas, although slow progress was apparent in these latter regions.

However, new members from smaller communities continued to increase, percentagewise, in the NSDAP in 1927 as seen in Table 25. The percentage of new members joining the party in small and rural communities continued to

TABLE 25

SIZE OF COMMUNITIES FROM WHICH NEW NSDAP MEMBERS CAME IN 1927

Community Size	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 10,000	1,397	35.1	33,048,820	52.6
10-50,000	941	23.7	9,777,134	15.6
50-200,000	503	12.7	6,246,998	9.9
Over 200,000	1,104	27.8	13,755,048	21.9
No Entry	28	0.7	-	-
Totals:	3,973	100.0	62,828,000	100.0

increase in 1927, but still remained substantially below the total proportion of persons living in such communities in Germany. It is apparent that although the Nazis were making progress in rural areas of Germany, the main strength of the party remained concentrated in urban centers. The percentage of new members from small cities/ large towns of from 10,000-50,000 population showed a very

small increase and remained well above the figures for communities that size in the Reich, as did the percentages of members from the two larger-city categories, although both of these declined somewhat in total proportion of new members of the Nazi party in 1927 as compared to 1926. The overall results are plain: new members entering the NSDAP in 1927 in this sample overwhelmingly came from urban areas. The characterization of Hitler's movement as anti-urban does not hold up--at least in 1927.

The urban character of the Nazi party was once again demonstrated by the occupational structure of those entering the movement in 1927 as shown in Table 26. The percentage of workers among incoming members reached its peak in 1927, totaling 28.7 per cent in the three worker categories and surpassing the previous high of 1921. Although the total proportion of workers in German society continued to be considerably higher than their representation among the recruits for Hitler's movement, it is clear from these figures that the Nazi propaganda directed at the workers, along with the continued high rate of unemployment in Germany, was definitely attracting growing numbers of workers into the NSDAP.

The percentage of military personnel among new members continued to be negligible. The trend already seen in the membership of the NSDAP in the previous years of a slow but steady increase in the numbers of new Nazis from

TABLE 26

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 1927

Occupational Categories	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Unskilled Laborers	888	22.4	10,679,848	35.3
Skilled Laborers	148	3.7	1,146,945	3.8
Agricultural Laborers	105	2.6	2,499,945	8.3
Totals:	1,141	28.7	14,326,738	47.4
Artisans	901	22.7	4,488,428	14.8
White Collar	810	20.4	5,274,232	17.4
Foremen	32	0.8	Included with white collar	
Managers	54	1.4	250,335	0.9
Civil Servants	122	3.1	No figures available	
Self-Employed	123	3.1	No figures available	
School Teachers	30	0.8	308,741	1.0
Totals:	2,072	52.3	10,321,736	34.3
Farmers	229	5.8	2,139,878	7.1
Large Landowners	9	0.2	Included with farmers	
Totals:	238	6.0	2,139,878	7.1

Military (enlisted)	11	0.3	104,000	0.3
Military (officers)	0	0.0	No figures available	
Totals:	11	0.3	104,000	0.3
Professional	60	1.5	237,850	0.7
Professors	3	0.1	No figures available	
Capitalists	9	0.2	No figures available	
Financiers	5	0.1	No figures available	
Private Incomes	30	0.8	2,944,872	9.2
Totals:	107	2.7	3,182,722	9.9
Clergy	0	0.0	No figures available	
Unemployed	0	0.0		8.8*
Students	120	3.0	No figures available	
Housewives	61	1.5	15,650,000*	
Arts	39	1.0	134,236	0.5
Retired	28	0.7	No figures available	
No Entry	156	3.9	-	-
Totals:	404	10.1	134,236	0.5
All Categories:	3,973	100.0	30,259,310	100.0

*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an average for the year compiled from Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399, based on the number of trades union members unemployed. It is likely that the figure for non-union workers was higher.

the upper middle class was continued in 1927, with fewer recruits in the categories of "professional," "professors," self-employed," and "capitalists." The only exception to this trend was a minute increase in the percentage of the category of "managers." There was a decrease in the proportion of farmers among NSDAP members in this sample, but the percentage remained very close to that group's total in German society. The number of school teachers coming into the party remained very low in 1927 again disproving the generalization that this group made up a disproportionately large part of the Nazi party membership.

The total percentage of the lower-middle class represented here by the "old" lower-middle class category of artisans and the "new" lower-middle class classification of white-collar workers continued to grow, reaching more than 43 per cent of the total new members in 1927, compared to their national total of only 30 per cent. This indicates that although the NSDAP was becoming increasingly attractive to the workers in Germany, its main strength still lay in the lower-middle class. Surprisingly--considering the youth of the new members in 1927, particularly the number of those under twenty--the proportion of new members listing their occupations as "student" decreased substantially in 1927 compared to 1926. This suggests that the new members were largely

young blue and white-collar workers, young artisans, and young farmers. Despite the high unemployment rates in 1927, none of the incoming members in this sample listed their occupation as "unemployed."

The stream of persons leaving the NSDAP became quite pronounced in 1927. Of the total number of new members in this sample who joined Hitler's party in 1925, 22 per cent left it in 1927. Of the 1926 recruits, 22.5 deserted in 1927 and 12.3 per cent of those who joined in 1927 did not stay out the year.[57] If these figures are applied to the entire membership of the party, it means that by the end of 1927 approximately 13,800 persons had left the Nazi party. Although membership numbers reached over 72,000 by the beginning of 1928, the actual strength of the party was probably less than 59,000.[58] Of those who left, twenty-four persons in the sample re-entered the party in 1927 with new party numbers and were included with new entrants.

The trends indicated by the statistics for 1925 and 1926 continued and in fact culminated in 1927 with two exceptions. The "youth explosion" among the new members in 1927 reached its peak as did the "prolitarization" of the party. Concurrently, the representatives from the lower-middle class among new members also reached its peak for the pre-1930 period. The new Nazis from communities of less than 10,000 persons continued to rise percentage-wise; however, the urban centers continued to be the

largest suppliers of recruits for Hitler's movement. The number of persons leaving the party continued to increase at an accelerating rate. North Germany continued to be the largest supplier of new recruits, but in relation to its total population in the Reich, South Germany remained the chief Nazi stronghold.

One of the trends indicated by the statistics for 1925 and 1926 was that the Nazis would draw increasingly large numbers of new members from the Rhineland. This did not prove true in 1927. Another indication of the 1925-26 figures was that fewer new Nazis would come from the ranks of the white-collar workers of Germany. Again, this did not turn out to be true in 1927.

Despite the general prosperity of Germany in 1927 and the relative lack of controversy in international affairs and in internal politics, the Nazis continued to be successful in attracting new converts into a political movement whose rhetoric demanded fundamental changes in the political and social structure of German society. However, the Nazi party remained in 1927 a very small splinter party whose voice was much stronger than its numerical strength.

The NSDAP during 1925-1928--Summary

The social composition of the NSDAP membership underwent a number of changes between its refounding in February, 1925, and January 1, 1928. To begin with, the

average age of new members entering the party became progressively younger as seen in Table 27. The membership of the early party was youthful, but not overwhelmingly so. In contrast, the refounded party could, by the end of 1927, justifiably be characterized as a party of youth. Of its new members, 61 per cent were under thirty years of age at the time they joined the movement. This characteristic will be explored in some detail in the conclusion of this investigation of the social composition of the Nazi party. At the same time it was becoming younger, the NSDAP membership was becoming markedly more masculine as shown in Table 28.

Significant changes were also evident in the year-by-year occupational structure of the Nazi party membership in the period 1925-1928. The percentage of laborers among new recruits became progressively greater, as did the percentage of artisans. Professional people declined steadily proportionately. New members listing their occupations as "farmers" fluctuated percentagewise, but was still appreciably higher in 1927 than in 1925. The proportion of white-collar workers among new recruits also fluctuated. Although the total percentage of this occupational group was lower in 1927 than it was in 1925 (the peak year percentagewise for white-collar workers) it was still appreciably above the total of that group in German society as a whole. Occupationally, Hitler's party at the

TABLE 27

CUMULATIVE STATISTICS FOR THE AGES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NAZI PARTY BETWEEN 1925-1928 COMPARED WITH THOSE FOR 1919-1923 AND THE REICH

Age Group	No. in Party 1919-23	% in Party 1919-23	No. in Party 1925-28	% in Party 1925-28	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 20	1,513	18.5	2,341	17.2	3,897,555	9.0
20-29	3,333	40.8	5,920	43.8	11,458,015	26.6
30-39	1,432	17.6	2,149	15.7	8,863,091	20.5
40-49	891	11.0	1,427	10.4	7,754,071	17.9
50-59	326	4.0	691	4.9	6,561,314	14.9
60 & Over	151	1.9	262	1.8	4,841,919	11.1
No Entry	498	6.2	844	6.2	-	-
Totals:	8,144	100.0	13,634	100.0	43,275,965	100.0

TABLE 28

CUMULATIVE STATISTICS FOR THE SEX OF PERSONS JOINING THE NAZI PARTY BETWEEN 1925-1928 COMPARED WITH THOSE FOR 1919-1923 AND THE REICH

Sex	No. in Party 1919-23	% in Party 1919-23	No. in Party 1925-28	% in Party 1925-28	No. in Reich (over 16)	% in Reich (over 16)
Male	7,457	91.6	12,780	93.7	19,511,514	45.1
Female	642	7.9	854	6.3	23,764,451	54.9
Undeter.	45	0.5	-	-	-	-
Totals:	8,144	100.0	13,634	100.0	43,275,965	100.0

beginning of 1928 was decidedly middle class, particularly lower-middle class but with a much larger representation from other segments of society than has been previously supposed--see Table 29.

A number of differences between the cumulative occupational statistics for the early Nazi party membership and the figures for 1925-1928 are evident in Table 29. One of the most notable is the apparent success of the party's propaganda apparatus in attracting workers to the NSDAP. The percentage of white-collar workers and artisans entering the party between 1925 and 1928 also increased significantly, as did the proportion of farmers. Concurrently, the percentage of professional people among new converts declined by more than one-half, although it remained considerably above the proportion of that group in German society.

Another striking change was the dramatic decrease in the percentage of civil servants among the new members for the period 1925-1928 compared to that of the early party, perhaps indicating an increased confidence in the government on the part of its employees. Overall, the occupational structure of the refounded party had a much broader base than the early movement had had. Its main strength at the beginning of 1928 clearly lay in the old and new lower-middle class (white-collar workers, artisans, and farmers), but the upper-middle class and the

TABLE 29

CUMULATIVE STATISTICS FOR THE OCCUPATIONS OF PERSONS JOINING THE NAZI PARTY BETWEEN 1925-1928 COMPARED WITH 1919-1923 AND FOR THE REICH

Occupational Group	No. in Party 1919-23	% in Party 1919-23	No. in Party 1925-28	% in Party 1925-28	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Unskilled Laborers	1,339	16.4	2,697	19.8	10,679,848	35.3
Skilled Laborers	258	3.2	501	3.7	1,146,945	3.8
Agricultural Laborers	96	1.2	256	1.9	2,499,945	8.3
Totals:	1,693	20.8	3,454	25.4	14,326,738	47.4
Artisans	1,765	21.7	2,818	20.7	4,488,428	14.8
White-Collar	1,935	23.8	2,865	21.0	5,274,232	17.4
Foremen	40	0.5	98	0.7	Included with white-collar	
Managers	51	0.6	179	1.3	250,335	0.9
Civil Servants	272	3.3	496	3.6	No figures available	
Self-Employed	216	2.7	517	2.8	No figures available	
School Teachers	70	0.9	120	0.9	308,741	1.0
Totals:	4,359	53.5	7,093	52.0	10,321,736	34.3
Farmers	366	4.5	689	5.1	2,139,878	7.1
Large Landowners	11	0.1	28	0.2	Included with farmers	
Totals:	377	4.6	717	5.3	2,139,878	7.1

Military (enlisted)	44	0.5	25	0.2	104,000	0.3
Military (officers)	70	0.9	6	0.04	No figures available	
Totals:	114	1.4	31	0.24	104,000	0.3
Professional	296	3.6	307	2.2	327,850	0.7
Professors	17	0.2	3	0.02	No figures available	
Capitalists	82	1.0	67	0.5	No figures available	
Financiers	26	0.3	11	0.08	No figures available	
Private Income	35	0.4	75	0.5	2,944,872	9.2
Totals:	456	5.5	463	3.3	3,182,722	9.9
Clergy	1	0.0	8	0.05	No figures available	
Unemployed	9	0.1	-	-	3.1% & 11.1%*	
Students	413	5.0	580	4.3	No figures available	
Housewives	216	2.7	354	2.6	15,650,000*	
Arts	81	1.0	169	2.21	134,236	0.5
Retired	120	1.5	165	1.2	No figures available	
No Entry	315	3.9	600	4.4	-	-
Totals:	1,155	14.2	1,876	13.76	134,236	0.5
All Categories:	8,144	100.0	13,634	100.0	30,259,310	100.0

*Not included in totals. The percentages of unemployed is an average for the periods compiled from Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 298-399, and Angell, The Recovery of Germany, pp. 370-371.

working class were still solidly represented in the party membership.[59]

Although the geographic origins of new NSDAP members fluctuated between 1925 and 1928, the total percentages of the five geographical regions of Germany were very little different at the beginning of 1928 than they had been in 1925. One notable change was in the larger proportions of new members from primarily agricultural areas at the expense of more industrialized regions. The large percentage of new members from the Rhineland area in 1926 was apparently an anomoly[60]--see Table 30.

TABLE 30

CUMULATIVE STATISTICS FOR THE GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP IN 1925-1928 COMPARED TO COMPARABLE STATISTICS FOR THE GERMAN REICH

Geographic Area	No. in Party	% in Party	No. in Reich	% in Reich
South Germany	4,470	32.8	16,485,000	25.2
Rhineland	3,011	22.1	13,950,000	21.3
North Germany	5,356	39.3	24,567,000	37.6
East Prussia*	419	3.1	4,397,000	6.7
Schleswig-Holstein	330	2.4	5,983,000	9.2
No Entry	48	0.3	-	-
Totals:	13,634	100.0	65,382,000	100.0

*Includes Danzig.

The size of the communities from which new Nazis came underwent a very pronounced change during the period

between the refounding of the NSDAP and January 1, 1928. New recruits from rural communities (under 10,000 population) grew steadily percentagewise during the period, while the proportion of new members from all the other categories progressively declined. However, the number of Nazi converts from these rural areas remained substantially below the percentage of the total number of people in Germany living in such communities. At the same time, the percentage of new Nazis from all three urban categories was higher than the proportion of all Germans living in such areas[61]--see Table 31.

TABLE 31

CUMULATIVE STATISTICS FOR THE SIZE FROM WHICH PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP 1925-1928 CAME WITH COMPARABLE STATISTICS FOR THE REICH

Community Size	No. in Party	% in Party	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 10,000	3,931	28.8	33,048,820	52.6
10-50,000	3,269	24.0	9,777,134	15.6
50-200,000	2,242	16.4	6,246,998	9.9
Over 200,000	4,104	30.2	13,755,048	21.9
No Entry	88	0.6	-	-
Totals:	13,634	100.0	62,828,000	100.0

Thus, the NSDAP was increasingly successful in recruiting new members in the rural areas of Germany. However, its main strength still lay in the cities, particularly the large urban population centers with over 200,000

inhabitants, the largest supplier of new members percentagewise of the four categories.[62]

The final observation concerning the refounded party between 1925 and 1928 is that an amazingly large percentage of those who joined the NSDAP left it shortly after joining. Of those who joined the Nazis in 1925, 45 per cent had left the party before January 1, 1928. Almost 30 per cent of those entering the party in 1927 did not remain with the Nazis until the end of the year. Apart from the obvious importance of these figures in determining the actual numerical strength of the NSDAP during its crucial formative period, the surprisingly high number of quitters poses several very interesting questions which will be pursued at some length in the conclusion.

CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

[1]For a concise summary of the main provisions of the Dawes Plan and its importance in the ensuring recovery of the German economy, see Angell, The Recovery of Germany, pp. 61-76. For the instrumental role of Stresemann in the negotiations for the plan and attracting foreign capital into Germany, see Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy, pp. 280-295.

[2]Angell, The Recovery of Germany, p. 79.

[3]Gerhard Bry, Wages in Germany, 1871-1945 (Princeton, 1960), pp. 398-399.

[4]Wages in Germany rose from 142.4 per cent of the 1913 average in January, 1925, to 157.1 per cent in 1927. At the same time, the cost of living went from 142 per cent of the 1913 average, to 148 per cent during the same period, meaning that real wages increased from 95 per cent of the 1913 total in 1925 to 104 per cent at the end of 1927. Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 464, 467, and 473.

[5]Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399.

[6]For exact agricultural production figures for 1925-1927, see Angell, The Recovery of Germany, pp. 248-251.

[7]For an account of the presidential election campaign, see Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy, pp. 311-322. For critical evaluations of Hindenburg's role in the crises of 1932, see ibid., pp. 498-517, and Bracher, The German Dictatorship, pp. 169-214.

[8]The importance of Stresemann to the Weimar Republic is graphically illustrated in Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., Stresemann and the Politics of the Weimar Republic (Princeton, 1963). Stresemann's maneuverings during 1925-1928 are related on pages 182-220.

[9]This account is based largely on Georg Franz-Willing, "Munich: Birthplace of National Socialism," The Journal of Modern History 27 (December 1957): 319-334. According to Franz-Willing, Hitler visited the police-president of Munich before Christmas in 1924 in an attempt to have the sanctions against the party lifted. The policeman advised him to talk to Heinrich Held, the minister-president of Bavaria. "Hitler had a long talk with [him] and the result was that he was allowed to found the party again in Munich" (ibid., p. 333).

[10]For further data on the Zentralkartei, see Appendix II. For a synopsis of the requirements and regulations for admission to the NSDAP, see Hans Bucheim's article in Gutachten des Institutes fuer Zeitgeschichte (Munich, 1958), pp. 313-321. Hitler's membership card is in the Hauptarchiv collection. A duplicate is in the Berlin Documents Center under lock and key. Phelps, "Hitler and the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei," p. 981, looked at Hitler's card in the Hauptarchiv collection and concluded that it was a fraud--that number 555 had been erased and the number "7" put in its place. The number on the card in question is not a "7" but a "1," and it is not a fraud. Hitler was the first member of the refounded party in 1925.

[11]Nyomarkay, "Factionalism in the National Socialist German Workers Party, 1925-1926: The Myth and Reality of the 'Northern Faction,'" Political Science Quarterly 80 (July 1965): 26, marshalls a great deal of evidence to show that the party organization in the north wooed the workers above all other groups in 1925-1926. He speculates that as a result of this propaganda the bulk of the northern membership was "socialistic, working class." Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, p. 104, presents convincing evidence that Nazi propaganda in Hannover during the period 1925-1927 was designed to garner support from industrial labor. However, he concluded that the NSDAP attracted into its membership not workers but "predominantly students, apprentices, and young white-collar workers" (ibid., p. 86). Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, p. 56, concluded (largely on the strength of Noakes' findings) that "significant differences" existed in the Nazi membership between the "northern" party and the "southern," at least in 1925. This difference resulted, according to Orlow, from the difference in the propaganda appeals of the two regions. "The Northerners were far younger; a large percentage of those joining in 1925 were under 25 years of age . . . ," who were ". . . often declassed or displaced students and often pseudo-intellectuals. . . ." Kele, Nazis and Workers, pp. 113 and 118, also makes much

of the Nazi efforts to attract workers into the movement. Although Nazi propaganda in different local situations may have been directed at specific occupational groups, the Nazi publications of national stature were not, and there is no convincing evidence that any "significant differences" existed in the social composition of the Nazi party membership in the north and south of Germany. As Bullock points out in Hitler, p. 51, Hitler wanted the party to appeal to all social classes, and it was with this end in mind that the formulators of National Socialist propaganda worked. There is some evidence, however, that local variations in the party membership did exist. This being the case, it becomes even more imperative to secure a representative sample of party members from the entire Reich if we are ever to identify the Nazis.

[12]For example, during the first month of 1926, the Voelkischer Beobachter carried feature length articles on the youth movement (January 9, p. 4, emphasizing the importance of young people in the Nazi movement); the plight of German labor (January 9, p. 3); against chain stores (January 1, p. 1); the problems of farmers and farm workers (January 3, p. 3); against Bolshevism and its threat to the German middle class (January 28, headline story); against "finance capitalism" (January 17 and 18, p. 1 in each issue); and daily diatribes against the Jews of Germany and the menace they represented to all "true Germans."

[13]See Kele, Nazis and Workers, pp. 92-93 and 105.

[14]Der Angriff from its inception had a weekly column aimed at the "workers," another at white-collar workers, and carried frequent articles aimed at students. Still others were directed at small shopkeepers, in the form of attacks on chain stores. The most characteristic feature of Goebbels' paper, however, was a particularly virulent and obnoxious anti-Semitism which depicted all Germans as brothers who must unite to combat the "parasite" that was destroying the Reich: the Jew.

[15]Bracher, The German Dictatorship, pp. 131-132.

[16]Roehm returned in 1930 to resume the leadership of the SA, only to be purged in 1934.

[17]Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 131.

[18]Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399, 464, and 467.

[19]Angell, The Recovery of Germany, p. 248.

[20]In the presidential runoff election on April 26, 1925, Hindenburg received 14,655,766 votes for a narrow victory over Wilhelm Marx of the Zentrum, who garnered 13,751,615. Thaelmann was far behind with 1,931,151, while Ludendorff received only slightly more than 200,000.

[21]According to Volz, Daten die Geschichte der NSDAP, pp. 21, 27, and 117, persons joined the Nazi party in 1925.

[22]For a detailed explanation of the sampling procedure used in this study see Appendix I. For a statistical analysis of the accuracy of the sampling method, see Appendix III.

[23]Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, p. 56, concluded on the basis of Noakes study ("Conflict and Development in the NSDAP," pp. 3-36) that the persons joining the NSDAP during this period were very young in the north, but not in other regions of Germany. These statistics indicate that Noakes' figures were indicative of a national trend and that the main basis of Nazi support all over the Reich came from young people. Noakes gives more detailed statistics on the youth of party members in 1925 in The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, p. 60, which are based on surviving membership lists for several areas of Germany. Noakes' figures are very similar to those above for the lower age groups.

[24]The total populations of the five regional divisions of Germany used in this study were compiled from the 1925 census recorded in Statistik des Deutschen Reich, Band 402, I, pp. 14-15. The figures probably will not be absolutely accurate for the years after 1925, but there is no reason to assume the population distribution in the various regions changed radically between 1925 and 1930.

[25]The size of the communities from which each member came was determined by the use of a compilation of the 551 towns and cities in Germany with populations of over 10,000 persons as of June, 1925, in Statistik des Deutschen Reich, Band I, pp. 12-13. The figures on the number of persons living in each size of community are also derived from this list. It is probable that the populations of some of the communities rose during the period 1925-1930 due to the increasing population of the nation. Therefore, the figures for the Reich will be slightly less accurate in each year after 1925. See also Appendix II.

[26]For examples of descriptions of Hitler's movement as a "small town" phenomenon, see Bendix, "Social

Stratification," p. 371, and Beard, "The Tune Hitlerism Beats for Germany," p. 94.

[27]Friedrich von Rabenau, Seeckt. Aus Seinem Leben, 1918-1936 (Leipzig, 1941), p. 492.

[28]This would seem to refute, at least for 1925, Mitchell's contention in Nazism and the Common Man, p. 7, that the Nazis were largely uneducated and anti-intellectual. It would seem that Lipset was correct when he speculated in Political Man, p. 146, that Nazism had even more appeal for the upper-middle class than for the lower-middle.

[29]For example, see William Ebenstein, The Nazi State (New York, 1943), p. 65.

[30]This picture of the NSDAP membership at the end of 1925 is considerably different in several respects than that offered by Noakes in "Conflict and Development in the NSDAP," p. 34. Although Noakes points out the youth of party members, he apparently believes that the rank and file of the party at this time was composed "predominantly of students, apprentices, and young white-collar workers." The statistics above illustrate that these groups were represented in the party in 1925, but were far from the only or even the largest groups in the Nazi party.

[31]Other estimates for the numerical strength of the NSDAP at the end of 1925 vary widely. Heiden, History of National Socialism, p. 124, says 17,000, as do a number of others including Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, p. 32; Carsten, Rise of Fascism, p. 130, says 27,000. He speculates that the party grew during the period 1925-1928 mainly through "absorbing most of the many racist and voelkisch groups" in Germany. His conclusions are based on a list of 124 persons who joined the party between 1924-1927.

[32]Angell, The Recovery of Germany, pp. 217-218.

[33]Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399.

[34]Angell, The Recovery of Germany, pp. 248-251.

[35]Ibid., p. 217.

[36]Wages in Germany at the end of 1926 stood at 147.7 per cent of the 1913 level, while the cost of living remained at 142 per cent of the 1913 total, the same

figure recorded for 1925. This meant that real wages in Germany reached 102 per cent of the figures for 1913--the first time since the war that real wages exceed that level. Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 464, 467, and 473.

[37]Volz, Daten die Geschichte der NSDAP, p. 21, says 49,523 persons had joined the Nazis by the end of 1926, meaning 22,406 new members entered the party in 1926.

[38]Orlow, "The Conversion of Myths into Political Power: The Case of the Nazi Party, 1925-1926," American Historical Review 72 (April 1967): 914, suggests that the Nazis north of the Main River were very young, but gives the impression that in the south the membership continued to come from older, more conservative segments of society. It would appear that in reality new members from all geographic regions were very young. This is the conclusion of Fest in Hitler, p. 288. Fest characterized the party during this period "for a while" at least, as "a new kind of youth movement." In February, 1926, the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Studenten Bund was founded by Helmut Podlich and Wilhelm Tempel in Munich. According to Faust, Der Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Studentbund, pp. 45-46, by June there were twenty affiliated groups in as many universities with a substantial number of students enrolled. Apparently, membership in the NSDSB did not necessarily require membership in the party. Faust outlined a number of reasons why students in particular were attracted to National Socialism. For example, their economic predicament at this time was acute, and their chances of obtaining a job in their professions were not particularly good (ibid., pp. 117-118). Also, Faust argues that anti-Semitism was more pronounced among students than any other group in German society due in part to the large numbers of Jews in the professions when compared to their numbers in the Reich.

[39]This indicates that Noakes' findings in The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, p. 104, that a number of workers were attracted into the party in Lower Saxony, were not peculiar to that region. The Nazis attracted workers in all regions of Germany. Fest, Hitler, p. 285, was apparently incorrect in concluding that the Nazis had their "first successes" among the workers only after the beginning of the depression.

[40]These figures do not at all substantiate Nyomarkay's claim in "Factionalism in the National Socialist German Workers Party," p. 25, that the membership in North Germany "underwent a period of stagnation" in 1925-1926. The North German party organization was still

recruiting more new recruits than any other region of Germany, and its percentage of the total membership was still substantially higher than the population of North Germany relative to that of the Reich.

[41]This conflicts with Gies' generalization in "NSDAP und landwirtschaftliche Organizationen," p. 346, that "prior to 1930 the National Socialist Party made little headway in the countryside other than in Schleswig-Holstein. . . ."

[42]The increase in the percentage of workers might have been predicted by the rise in the number of new members from the Rhineland and the overwhelmingly urban character of the party--see Tables 20 and 21.

[43]Previous estimates of party strength at this time vary widely. Heiden, History of National Socialism, p. 113, guessed 30,000; however, on ibid., p. 124, he said the party grew from 17,000 to 40,000 in 1926. The same figures are given by Bullock in Hitler, p. 109. Fest, Face of the Third Reich, p. 32, estimated 40,000, but in Hitler, p. 259, he gave the figure 108,000. Carsten, Rise of Fascism, p. 130, said 49,000. Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 133, gave the figure 54,000.

[44]The old numbers were generally left blank, although there were several instances in which someone who joined the NSDAP in the years after 1934 received party numbers below 40,000. See also Orlow, History of the Nazi Party; and Tyrell, Fuehrer Befiel, p. 352, for other comments on the "empty numbers."

[45]That the decisions of individuals to join the NSDAP were based on a variety of different factors and not simply on the material interests of each recruit is graphically illustrated in Merkl, Political Violence under the Swastika. Many of the life histories of early Nazis who joined the party before 1930 examined by Merkl defy any attempt at categorization into specific social groups--see especially pp. 82-84 and 132.

[46]Angell, The Recovery of Germany, p. 218.

[47]The cost of living rose from 142 per cent of the 1913 level in 1926 to 148 per cent at the end of 1927. During the same period, wages rose from 147.7 per cent of the 1913 average to 157.1 per cent. This means real wages during 1927 rose from 102 per cent to 104 per cent of the figure recorded for 1912. Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 464, 467, and 473.

[48]Ibid., pp. 398-399.

[49]Angell, The Recovery of Germany, pp. 248-251.

[50]Goebbels eventually became the propaganda minister of the Third Reich. He is important to this narrative because he controlled one of the main organs of Nazi propaganda--Der Angriff. Goebbels has often been identified with the Nazi "left," those who wanted to emphasize the "socialist" part of the party name. See Kele, Nazis and Workers, pp. 92-93, and Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, pp. 56-57.

[51]Martin Broszat, "Die Anfange der Berliner NSDAP, 1926-27," Viertelsjahrhefte fuer Zeitgeschichte 8 (January 1960): 102-110.

[52]Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, p. 123, says the emphasis of Nazi propaganda changed in 1927 in an effort to "capture" the bourgeoisie. However, Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, p. 101, forcefully shows that the Nazi organizations in industrial centers in Lower Saxony were still devoting the major part of their propaganda efforts to winning the workers well into 1928. According to Noakes, it was only after 1928 that the emphasis in Nazi propaganda changed to appeal to the farmers and the petty bourgeoisie (ibid, p. 105).

[53]Volz, Daten die Geschichte der NSDAP, p. 21, gives the total number of persons who had joined the NSDAP between February, 1925, and December 31, 1927, as 72,590. This means that 23,063 new members entered the party in 1927.

[54]See Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, pp. 86 and 95, and the articles in the Voelkischer Beobachter and Der Angriff, mentioned above. Another factor that may have influenced this "youth explosion" was an SA regulation enacted in March, 1927, requiring all SA members to also be members of the NSDAP. The rank and file of the SA was probably composed largely of young men due to the strenuous activity required of them. See Heinrich Bennecke, Hitler und die SA (Munich, 1962), p. 247.

[55]Figures from Richard N. Hunt, German Social Democracy, 1918-1933 (New Haven, 1964), p. 107. Without giving exact figures, Ossip K. Flechtheim, Die KPD in Der Weimarer Republik (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1969), p. 65, said that the members under forty in the KPD were twice as numerous as in German society, while the over fifty age groups were greatly underrepresented.

[56]This substantiates Stoltenberg's contention in Politische Stroemungen im Schleswig-Holsteinischen Landvolk, 1918-1933, that the Nazis made no substantial inroads into Schleswig-Holstein until 1928--see especially p. 146.

[57]Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, p. 104, has noted the heavy attrition in new Nazis in Hannover in 1927. He pointed out that while 542 persons joined the party in that year, 376 left it. His information is based on surviving local party lists.

[58]Fest, Face of the Third Reich, p. 32, made a remarkably close guess at the numerical strength of the party considering the quitters. He gave the figure 60,000 for the beginning of 1928, but did not say on what his estimate was based. Bullock, Hitler, p. 109, also said 60,000, also without listing a source. Carsten, Rise of Fascism, p. 130, says 72,000 at the beginning of 1928. Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 133, says there were 81,000 members in the party at the end of 1927.

[59]This does not at all agree with Martin's evaluation of the social composition of the NSDAP in Le National Socialisme hitlerien, p. 212. "Le NSDAP devait recruter le gros de ses troups parmi ces classes Moyennes, parce qu'elles etaient les premieres victims de l'inflation d'abord, de la crise economique ensuit. Le national-socialisme fut surtout la revolte des classes moyennes, des moutons devenus enrages." Martin is correct that the middle classes were strong pillars of Nazi support, but as the statistics above show, so were several other segments of German society. Table 29 also contradicts Lerner's conclusion in The Nazi Elite, p. v, that "the Nazi movement was a middle-class and lower-middle-class movement." Obviously, the National Socialist movement was much more complex than Lerner's generalization suggests. Kuehnl, Die Nationalsozialistische Linke, pp. 59 and 135, also insists that the NSDAP was predominantly a "kleinburgerlich" party after 1925. Again, this is a misrepresentation. As Horn says in "Hitler und die NSDAP," pp. 466-484, the claim by Kuehnl and others that the Nazis were anything so simple as just a kleinburger party "cannot be taken seriously." Eugene Weber's characterization of Fascists in "Varieties of Fascism" in Gilbert Allerdyce, ed., The Place of Fascism in European History (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1971), p. 107, is perhaps not completely inappropriate to the social composition of the NSDAP at the end of 1927: Weber sees Fascism as the conjunction of the political left and right, "The Jacobin's of the 20th Century, the younger generation against the old." This is at least partially correct.

[60]This is somewhat different than the impression given in Norman Rich, Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion (New York, 1973), p. 19. Rich characterizes the period 1925-28 in Nazi party history as one of slow expansion of the party "to every part of Germany." Actually, the party was already established all over Germany at the end of 1925.

[61]This indicates that, at least at the end of 1927, Talcott Parsons was correct in characterizing the NSDAP as "by-and-large" an urban movement, "Some Sociological Aspects of the Fascist Movements," p. 144. Bendix, "Social Stratification," p. 371, seems to have been incorrect in his assessment of Nazism as an "anti-urban" movement, at least in relation to the composition of the NSDAP membership at the end of 1927.

[62]This largely agrees with the generalization of Loomis and Beegle, "The Spread of German Nazism in Rural Areas," p. 724, that Nazism spread slowly from the cities to the countryside in "the late twenties." It conflicts with Gies' argument in "NSDAP und landwirtschaftliche Organizationen," p. 46, who insists the Nazis made "little headway into the countryside" before 1930. Broszat's generalization in Der Staat Hitlers, p. 37, that the party was "gar nicht vertreten" in the countryside before 1929-1930 also appears to be mistaken.

[63]Abel, The Nazi Movement, p. 81, analyzed the 124 party members in his sample (see above p. 6) who joined the party during 1925-1927. His study yielded the following results: 71 per cent of the sample were between seventeen and thirty-two years of age. None were women. Of the sample, Abel characterized 44 per cent as "workers, skilled or unskilled." He did not indicate what criteria he used for assigning persons to this group or which occupations are included. A further 44 per cent of the sample is designated "lower-middle class." Again, no explanation of the classification system used was given. Of Abel's sample, 9 per cent came from the "professions," and a further 4 per cent from "agriculture." There are a number of important differences in the occupational structure of Abel's sample and that revealed in the statistics above. This is not surprising considering the inadequacies of Abel's sample and his sampling method. Abel also included data on the social composition of his sample not available on the membership cards which are of some interest: 54 per cent of Abel's sample had only public school educations; 20 per cent graduated from high school or professional schools; and 10 per cent had university degrees. Veterans of the World War made up 40 per cent and a

further 20 per cent had participated in various Wehrverbaende activities after the war. At the time they joined the party, 9 per cent were unemployed or in financial difficulties, 60 per cent exhibited no anti-Semitism, and 4 per cent were openly critical of the party's racial stand.

CHAPTER IV

THE RADICALIZATION OF THE RURAL AREAS OF THE REICH

> The cry of distress of the peasantry has become a battle cry! At last the complaints and protests are at an end! Our era has produced enough empty words and rhetoric! By are we able to fight? Can we oppose the terroristic actions of armed bands of leftists? Of lockouts by industry? The corruption of the bloodsucking finance-capitalists? . . . The National Socialists will provide the political leadership to a legal redress of grievances!
>
> Voelkischer Beobachter
> April, 1928

The End of Weimar's Prosperity

For both Germany and the Nazi party, 1928 and 1929 were crucial years. Economic and political conditions in the Reich changed dramatically during this two-year period, leading directly to huge Nazi gains at the polls in the general elections of 1930. The economic prosperity that Germany had enjoyed since 1924 ended abruptly in 1929 when the American stock market crashed in October. Short-term loans that had been in large measure responsible for the industrial expansion and the Wirtschaftswunder in the Reich were not only no longer extended, but existing notes

were called due. The rosy haze of borrowed affluence in which Germany had lived for five years dissipated in 1929, even as Stresemann predicted must eventually happen.

German farmers were at last provoked into violent protest by the years-long agricultural depression during the early months of 1928. A crisis atmosphere" was created in the countryside by the radicalization of German farmers which the Nazis wasted no time in exploiting. Ironically, the depression in the agricultural section of the German economy ended in the summer of 1928. But in spite of abundant harvests and rising prices for farm goods, the damage had already been done. Farmers from all sections of the Reich, but particularly Schleswig-Holstein, swelled the ranks of the Nazis in 1928 and 1929.

Unemployment, which had remained alarmingly high even during the prosperous years, rose sharply in 1928 and skyrocketed in 1929. However, those who have maintained the Nazi party recruited heavily from the ranks of the unemployed during this period will be surprised at the occupational statistics of new members.

The period 1925-1928 can be characterized as an era of political calm in Germany. Not so 1928-1930. In addition to the Reichstag elections of 1928, the last two years before the Great Depression also witnessed a national campaign of great bitterness waged by powerful anti-republican elements. Stresemann, doggedly pursuing

his objective of a peaceful revision of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles through diplomacy, succeeded in securing a favorable new reparations schedule in 1929. German nationalists, led by Hitler and Alfred Hugenberg, launched a poisonous propaganda offensive against Stresemann's plan and against the republic itself. Although the new plan was finally adopted, Hitler and the Nazis received an enormous amount of publicity from which they benefited greatly the following year at the polls.

In 1928-1930 the Nazis extended the social base of their party to include every strata of society. By the end of 1929 these diverse social elements had been welded into an organization which was largely responsible for the amazing electoral gains the Nazis registered in the general elections of 1930.

It has been suggested by several historians that the propaganda appeals of the Nazi party were redirected in 1928-1939. The implication is that during the period 1925-1928 the Nazis had devoted most of their energy to winning the workers. When this proved unsuccessful, the party leadership decided to win the support of the middle class in the upcoming elections.[1] Judging from the two best known Nazi organs, this is a misrepresentation. The Voelkischer Beobachter and Der Angriff did devote more articles to the problems of various middle-class groups in 1928,[2] particularly the farmers.[3] However, this did

not mean fewer articles aimed at workers.[4] Nazi propaganda in 1928 continued to be directed at all segments of German society based largely on a militant nationalism, anti-Marxism, and anti-Semitism.[5]

1928--Electoral Disappointment for the NSDAP

The economic boom which characterized the period 1925-1928 in Germany leveled off in 1928. Industrial production peaked in 1928 and began a small but perceptible decline in 1928.[6] At the same time, wages continued to go up sharply while the cost of living rose much more slowly, meaning that real wages were substantially higher at the end of 1928 than at the beginning.[7] The agricultural "depression" of 1924-1928 subsided in the summer of 1928 as agricultural prices rose even as production increased.[8] Seemingly the only incongruous note in this symphony of increasing prosperity was the still high percentage of unemployed which began to reach alarming proportions by the end of the year.[9]

On the international scene, 1928 was, like 1927, a relatively uneventful year for Germany. This was not the case, however, in domestic politics. In 1928, Germany witnessed a national election, the results of which reflected the economic prosperity Germany had enjoyed since the last national election in December, 1924, and the relative domestic political tranquility that had characterized the period. Predictably, the extremist parties--

in particular the Nazis and the Communists--did not do well, while the parties which supported the republic made their best showing since 1919. The results of the May, 1928, national elections in Germany were as shown in Table 32.[10]

TABLE 32

RESULTS OF THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN GERMANY, 1928

Party	No. of Votes	% of Total Vote	No. of Deputies
KPD	3,264,793	10.6	54
SPD	9,152,979	29.8	153
DDP	1,479,374	4.8	25
Z	4,657,796	15.2	78
DVP	2,679,703	8.7	45
DNVP	4,381,563	14.2	73
NSDAP	810,127	2.6	12
Others	4,326,912	14.1	51
Totals:	30,753,247	100.0	491

The election was followed by the formation of the "great coalition" government in June led by Hermann Mueller of the SPD. Mueller's government had the support of all the parties which supported the republic. This was the first government in which the largest of the Weimar parties, the SPD, had participated since 1923.

The most influential member of the government continued to be the foreign minister, Stresemann of the DVP, who had no small share in creating the grand coalition.[11] This alliance of the major political parties seemed to

indicate that the Weimar parliamentary system had at last reached a level of political stability which it had not enjoyed since the republic's inception. However, the stability was illusory, and the grand coalition survived barely two years. After its fall, no reliable coalition was achieved until the NSDAP-DNVP alliance in 1933 which brought the end of parliamentary democracy in Germany.

The unimpressive showing of the Nazis was a source of severe disappointment and embarrassment to part of the leadership of the party.[12] Despite their poor performance at the polls, the Nazis had their best single year of party recruitment since the party's founding (with the exception of 1923). In 1928, 36,000 new recruits joined Hitler's party, swelling the membership numbers to over 108,000.[13] However, the considerable number of withdrawals in 1928 appreciably reduced the actual number of members. Of these 36,000-plus new members, 6,137 biographies are used in the sample below, or more than one-sixth of the total.

The percentage of women coming into the NSDAP continued to decline in 1928, falling to its lowest point ever. Of the 6,137 new Nazis in the sample, only 270 (4.4 per cent) were women.

The trend toward recruitment of younger and younger members was reversed in 1928 as seen in Table 33. The proportion of new members falling into the first two

TABLE 33

AGES OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP IN 1928

Age Group	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 20	1,142	18.6	3,897,555	9.0
20-29	2,667	43.5	11,458,015	26.6
30-39	1,193	19.4	8,863,091	20.5
40-49	682	11.1	7,754,071	17.9
50-59	315	5.1	6,561,314	14.9
Over 60	103	1.7	4,841,919	11.1
No Entry	35	0.6	-	-
Totals:	6,137	100.0	43,375,965	100.0

categories declined appreciably from the 1927 figures, although it remained well above the relative strength of persons from those age groups in German society. Concurrently, there was a sharp rise in the percentage of persons from the 30-39 age group coming into the party, which brought that group's strength in the NSDAP almost equal to its percentage in society as a whole. The other age groups remained relatively unchanged. Although a considerable portion of new recruits for Hitler's movement in 1928 continued to be very young, there was a substantial influx of more mature persons.[14]

There were several interesting changes in the geographical origins of the new Nazis in 1928 when compared to earlier years--see Table 34. The two areas which gained the most percentagewise in 1928 relative to 1927

TABLE 34

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1928

Geographic Area	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
South Germany	1,657	27.0	16,485,000	25.2
Rhineland	1,041	17.0	13,950,000	21.3
North Germany	2,399	39.0	24,567,000	37.6
East Prussia*	281	4.6	4,397,000	6.7
Schleswig-Holstein	749	12.2	5,983,000	9.2
No Entry	10	0.2	-	-
Totals:	6,137	100.0	65,382,000	100.0

*Includes Danzig.

were East Prussia and Schleswig-Holstein--both largely agricultural regions. The area which showed the largest decline in the percentage of new party members furnished was the Rhineland, the most heavily industrialized region in the Reich. North Germany's share of Nazi recruits increased slightly in 1928, while that of South Germany declined somewhat. Both remained very near their percentages of the population of the nation as a whole.[15]

From the geographic origins of persons in this sample it could be deduced that new members in the NSDAP from small communities continued to increase in 1928. This was exactly the case as seen in Table 35. The proportion of new Nazis in 1928 coming from small communities and/or the countryside increased considerably. However,

TABLE 35

SIZE OF COMMUNITY OF ORIGIN OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1928

Community Size	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 10,000	2,688	43.8	33,048,820	52.6
20-50,000	1,179	19.2	9,777,134	15.6
50-200,000	663	10.8	6,246,998	9.9
Over 200,000	1,541	25.1	13,755,048	21.9
No Entry	66	1.1	-	-
Totals:	6,137	100.0	62,828,000	100.0

this group remained appreciably below their strength in the Reich. The percentage of new members from urban communities of all sizes declined somewhat in 1928, but remained higher than the proportion of the total population living in such areas. It is clear that the Nazis were infiltrating more and more into the countryside in 1928, but the largest part of the membership was still being recruited in the urban areas.[16]

The statistics concerning the geographic origins of persons entering the NSDAP in 1928 and those on the size of communities from which they came suggest that the occupational breakdown of the new members should show an increase in rural occupational groups. This was the case as seen in Table 36.

The percentage of workers in this sample of persons entering the NSDAP in 1928 shows a substantial decrease

TABLE 36

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 1928

Occupational Categories	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Unskilled Laborers	1,128	18.4	10,679,848	35.3
Skilled Laborers	196	3.2	1,146,945	3.8
Agricultural Laborers	143	2.3	2,499,945	8.3
Totals:	1,467	23.9	14,326,738	47.4
Artisans	1,188	19.4	4,488,428	14.8
White-Collar	1,175	19.1	5,274,232	17.4
Foremen	44	0.7	Included with white-collar	
Managers	73	1.2	250,335	0.9
Civil Servants	189	3.1	No figures available	
Self-Employed	168	2.7	No figures available	
School Teachers	58	0.9	308,741	1.0
Totals	2,895	47.1	10,321,736	34.3
Farmers	929	15.1	2,139,878	7.1
Large Landowners	25	0.4	Included with farmers	
Totals:	954	15.5	2,139,878	7.1

Military (enlisted)	7	0.1	104,000	0.3
Military (officers)	13	0.2	No figures available	
Totals:	20	0.3	104,000	0.3
Professional	110	1.8	237,850	0.7
Professors	0	0.0	No figures available	
Capitalists	14	0.2	No figures available	
Financiers	6	0.1	No figures available	
Private Incomes	12	0.2	2,944,872	9.2
Totals:	142	2.3	3,182,722	9.9
Clergy	6	0.1	No figures available	
Unemployed	0	0.0		8.6*
Students	262	4.3	No figures available	
Housewives	106	1.7	15,650,000*	
Arts	67	1.1	134,236	0.5
Retired	28	0.5	No figures available	
No Entry	190	3.1	-	-
Totals:	659	10.8	134,236	0.5
All Categories:	6,137	100.0	30,259,310	100.0

*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an average for the year compiled from Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399, based on the number of trades union members unemployed. It is likely that the figure for non-union workers was higher.

from 1927. Concurrently, there is a similar decrease in the representation from the lower-middle class, especially the artisans and white-collar workers, while the upper-middle class held approximately steady. The occupational category which showed the greatest change was the classification "farmer" which nearly tripled its representation in the party over the 1927 figure. If we accept the farmers as part of the "old" lower-middle class in Germany, then the petty bourgeoisie in 1928 constituted an absolute majority of the total new members. None of the other occupational categories of new entrants in the NSDAP changed appreciably percentagewise in 1928 from the figures for 1927.[17]

It is difficult to reconcile the dramatic increase in the proportion of farmers coming into Hitler's party in 1928 with the conclusion of many economic historians that the agricultural depression which had hung on in Germany since 1924 ended in 1928. Supposedly, conditions improved markedly for the German farmers in 1928 as production and prices rose sharply. If this is so, why did so many German farmers turn to a radical political party like the Nazis?

The answer to this question apparently lies in the fact that the prolonged slump in agricultural production and prices finally provoked a violent response among many farmers <u>before</u> the recovery began. There were a number

of protest demonstrations by members of several agrarian groups during January, 1928, especially in Schleswig-Holstein. Some of these sparked violence and conflict with the police. The agrarian areas had already been alienated from the government before the recovery began, and the Nazis increasingly found the countryside to be a fruitful recruitment ground.[18]

The number of persons who left the NSDAP in 1928 increased sharply over the percentage for 1927. Of those persons in this sample who joined the Nazis in 1925, 11.5 per cent left the party in 1928; 16.3 per cent of those who joined in 1926 and 23.0 per cent of those who entered in 1927 were gone by the end of 1928. Of those who joined Hitler in 1928, 11.6 per cent had left by the end of the year. If these figures are translated to the total party strength, it means that over 16,000 people quit the NSDAP in 1928. Although the party membership numbers went to more than 108,000 in 1928, the actual numerical strength of the Nazi party was probably little more than 79,000 active members.[19] Fifty-two members who had previously left the party rejoined in 1928, complete with new membership numbers. They are considered among the new recruits.

The new members coming into the Nazi party in 1928 exhibited several important differences compared to the membership in previous years. The percentage of persons under thirty years of age, though still quite high,

declined substantially. This indicates that Nazism was becoming acceptable to the more mature segments of German society, even as many fads of the young are adopted by the older generation in our own society (witness the now widely accepted longer hair styles among men). At the same time, the Nazi party showed increased strength in rural areas of Germany and a surprising increase in the number of farmers among new recruits. The percentage of workers among the new converts to Nazism declined markedly, as did other urban occupational categories, including white-collar workers and artisans.

The NSDAP can be characterized through its new members in 1928 as a truly national party with its main strength lying slightly more in urban areas. Its social structure showed it to be a party of all occupational groups, although it appealed more to the lower-middle class than to any other segment of society. It is apparent from the number of persons who left the party that conversion to Hitlerism was not necessarily a permanent affliction. Many people found the NSDAP did not meet their needs.

1929--The Young Plan and the Freedom Law Bring the Nazis National Prominence

For Germany, 1929 was an eventful year in a number of respects. On the international scene, Stresemann's policy of cooperation with the Allies in order to bring

about slow but steady revisions of the Treaty of Versailles finally appeared to be succeeding. A new and more favorable (for Germany) plan for reparation payments was accepted by the Allies in June, 1929--the so-called Young Plan. At the same time, France agreed to commence the evacuation of the Rhineland ahead of the schedule envisioned in the original terms of the Versailles Treaty.

While Germany was experiencing diplomatic success and domestic political turmoil, the false economic prosperity evaporated almost overnight with the crash of the American stock market. Unemployment, already high, soared to its highest level since the months immediately following the great inflation.[20] Economic production fell off drastically. Strangely, wages continued to rise much faster in 1929 than did the cost of living, which meant that real wages in Germany showed a healthy increase in 1929 over the figures for the preceding year.[21] The farmers, radicalized the previous year, continued to turn away from the political parties which supported the republic as farm prices began once again to fall, along with agricultural production, wiping out the gains of 1928.

On the domestic scene, the parties antagonistic to the Weimar Republic launched a vitriolic and well-publicized campaign, ostensibly against the adoption of the Young Plan and for the adoption of the so-called "freedom law," but actually against the republic itself.

This campaign was led by the most powerful figure in the DNVP, Alfred Hugenberg, who controlled several newspapers, radio stations, and motion picture studios. But the man who became the most vocal critic of the republic and who gained a national reputation through the campaign for the freedom law was Adolf Hitler.

When Germany was forced to sign the Treaty of Versailles, no definite sum had been set for her to pay as reparations. The Allies had justified the reparations by the unacceptable (from the German viewpoint) "war guilt" clause. This clause, Article 231 of the treaty, stated that Germany and her allies were solely to blame for World War I. The amount Germany must pay was to be fixed by a reparations commission no later than May 1, 1921. On April 27 of that year the reparations commission presented Germany with a bill for 132 billion gold marks, plus interest.[22] The Germans proved either unwilling or unable to meet the payments, which led to the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 in an attempt to coerce Germany into paying. The occupation contributed to the great inflation discussed in Chapter I above which so completely disrupted the German economy. During his brief chancellorship in 1923, Stresemann initiated negotiations with the Allies for a new reparations schedule. The negotiations resulted in the adoption of the Dawes Plan on April 15, 1924.

The Dawes Plan provided that Germany was to pay one billion gold marks during the first year of the plan, with

an escalation in payments over the next four years until the figure of 2.5 billion gold marks was reached in the fifth year. The payments were then to remain at that level for an unspecified period--debt plus interest. To ensure payment, the Allies placed controls over certain German industries, most notably the railroads. It was merely a stopgap measure, something to serve until a final, definitive agreement could be reached. The French demanded that a new settlement must be reached before they would consider the evacuation of the Rhineland. This occupation was a sore spot with most Germans and a constant target of the extremist political parties in Germany.[23]

A "committee of experts" was convened in Paris on February 9, 1929, under the chairmanship of an American, Owen Young. Their objective was to effect a final plan for reparations payments and for the evacuation of the Rhineland.[24] After considerable haggling by the representatives of Germany and France, Young finally succeeded in drafting a plan acceptable to both sides. What came to be known as the Young Plan called for an initial payment of 1.7 billion gold marks the first year, with a gradual annual increase in the payments until a peak amount of 2.42 billion gold marks was reached in 1966. From 1966 until 1988 (when the bill would be considered paid) Germany would pay an average of 1.65 billion annually.

The total payment called for by the Young Plan amounted to slightly more than 111 billion gold marks, including interest--a considerable reduction from the 132 billion plus interest demanded by the Allies after the Treaty of Versailles. Also, a provision was made for a revaluation of Germany's capacity to pay in the event of a major crisis in the German economy. It further stipulated that should the United States cancel the war debts owed her by the Allies, Germany's obligations would be correspondingly reduced.[25]

Mueller's cabinet formally accepted the plan as a basis for a conference on reparations and called for concurrent discussions on the Rhineland question. The ensuing conference convened at the Hague on August 6, 1929. Stresemann managed, not without difficulty, to secure an agreement with the Allies based on the Young Plan. At the same time, he convinced the French to set up a definite timetable for the evacuation of the Rhineland, which was to begin on September 15, 1929, and to be completed by June 30, 1930. This agreement is usually seen as a resounding success for Stresemann's foreign policy.[26]

Many German nationalists did not see the Young Plan as a success but rather as a disaster for Germany. Led by Hugenberg, the various nationalist parties united against acceptance of the Young Plan, arguing that Germany's already unfavorable balance of trade on the

international market dictated that no more funds should leave the country in the form of reparations. Hugenberg, with the support of most of the German nationalist parties and the endorsement of the Federation of German Industry, announced on June 15 a plan to submit for a vote to the people of Germany a law which would officially deny the war guilt clause of the Treaty of Versailles. This clause was the basis for the Allied claims for reparations (this was the "freedom law"). The law also forbade the assumption of any new reparation payments and made the chancellor and his ministers liable to a charge of treason should they agree to such payments.

While Nationalists in the Reichstag staged a number of bitter debates as a holding action to prevent the immediate adoption of the Young Plan, a petition was circulated throughout the country in an effort to put the freedom law before the Reichstag. A "Reich Committee for the German Referendum" was created to push the petition, headed by Hugenberg, Hitler, Franz Seldte (leader of the Stahlhelm), and Heinrich Class (chairman of the Pan-German League). The committee eventually was able to gather over four million signatures, more than enough to put the proposed law before the Reichstag. During the petition drive, German democracy was dealt two staggering blows from which it never recovered: the death of the Reich's ablest statesman, Gustav Stresemann, on October 3,

1929; and the crash of the American stock market on "Black Thursday," October 24, 1929, which heralded the beginning of the Great Depression. The extremism of the law proposed by Hugenberg and Hitler had caused a schism in Hugenberg's own party. A faction led by Gotfried Treviranus came out in open opposition to Hugenberg's policies. When the proposed law was put up for debate in the Reichstag on November 29 it immediately became apparent that it would fail. The major outcome of the entire process was the elevation of Hitler to a nationally known personality.

The political attacks on Mueller's government and the republic coincided with the crash of the American stock market which heralded the onset of the Great Depression. In several local elections in 1929 the Communists made spectacular gains, once again raising the specter of the "red menace" in Germany and frightening the middle classes. The era of prosperity and seeming progress of democratic institutions had ended. Once again a crisis atmosphere was created in which a radical political movement like the Nazis could flourish, by appearing to offer a viable alternative to the existing system.

The Nazis enrolled over 67,000 new members in 1929, its largest one-year gain ever, which practically doubled its strength as of December, 1928. NSDAP membership

numbers reached more than 176,000, but due to the continued heavy attrition in the party ranks, the actual numerical strength was considerably less than that figure.[27] In this sample 12,186 biographies are used--more than one-sixth of the total new members. Of these, only 601 or 4.9 per cent were women. The membership of the NSDAP remained overwhelmingly masculine in 1929.

The proportion of persons joining the Nazi party in the very low age groups continued to decline in 1929 as seen in Table 37. All of the older age groups became

TABLE 37

AGES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1929

Age Group	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 20	1,959	16.1	3,897,555	9.0
20-29	5,011	41.2	11,458,015	26.6
30-39	2,448	20.0	8,863,091	20.5
40-49	1,583	13.1	7,754,071	17.9
50-59	827	6.7	6,561,314	14.9
Over 60	297	2.4	4,841,919	11.1
No Entry	61	0.5	-	-
Totals:	12,186	100.0	43,375,965	100.0

better represented in the Nazi party in 1929 at the expense of the two younger groups. It is apparent that in 1928 and 1929 the National Socialist movement did not appeal just to the "romantic youth" of Germany, but to more mature members of society as well. Certainly, the

young people continued to supply an absolute majority of new Nazi recruits which kept the party dynamic and vital, but it is obvious also that the appeal of the NSDAP began to reach an increasing number of the more settled members of German society.

The geographic origins of the new members in this sample from 1929 show a continuation of the trends begun in 1928, as seen in Table 38. The predominantly rural-agricultural areas of East Prussia and Schleswig-Holstein continued to rise in the total proportion of new members

TABLE 38

GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1929

Geographic Area	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
South Germany	2,742	22.5	16,485,000	25.2
Rhineland	1,977	16.3	13,950,000	21.3
North Germany	5,059	41.5	24,567,000	37.6
East Prussia*	724	5.9	4,397,000	6.7
Schleswig-Holstein	1,650	13.5	5,983,000	9.2
No Entry	34	0.3	-	-
Totals:	12,186	100.0	65,382,000	100.0

*Includes Danzig.

supplied to the NSDAP.[28] East Prussia still did not supply quite as many recruits to the Nazis as its percentage in the total population of the Reich, while Schleswig-

Holstein supplied somewhat more. The percentage of new members from North Germany continued to increase in 1929 and stood somewhat higher than the percentage of its population in the Reich. The proportion of new Nazis from South Germany and the Rhineland continued to decline in 1929. For the first time, South Germany's share of new Hitler recruits fell below its total of the German population. The highly industrialized Rhineland fell to its lowest point percentagewise in new Nazi party members since the refounding of the party.

These figures suggest that the main source of strength of the Nazis was shifting in 1928-1929 from urban areas to rural areas, from industrial centers to predominantly agrarian areas. This conclusion is supported by the statistics for the size of the communities from which the new NSDAP members came in 1929--see Table 39.

In 1929 the number of new members coming from large cities declined to the point where they supplied a lower proportion of new Nazis than their percentage of the total population of the country. The other three categories of rural, small city, and medium-size city all increased in the percentage of new members supplied to the NSDAP. Rural areas remained slightly lower in the number of new members supplied than the relative strength of the populations of those communities in the Reich.

TABLE 39

SIZE OF COMMUNITY OF ORIGIN OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1929

Community Size	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 10,000	5,935	48.7	33,048,820	52.6
20-50,000	2,440	20.0	9,777,134	15.6
50-200,000	1,406	11.5	6,246,998	9.9
Over 200,000	2,316	19.0	13,755,048	21.9
No Entry	89	0.8	-	-
Totals:	12,186	100.0	62,828,000	100.0

Medium-sized cities were slightly above and small cities appreciably above the percentages of their respective populations in Germany. The Nazi movement had evolved by 1929 from a primarily urban phenomenon to one near a perfect balance throughout the country considering the distribution of the population of the Reich.[29]

From the above statistics on the geographic origins of new members in 1929 and the size of the communities from which they came, it might be predicted that the occupational structure of the new Nazis in 1929 would show an increase in "rural" occupations and a decrease in the proportion of new members from typically urban occupations. This is only partially the case as shown in Table 40.

Predictably, the percentage of laborers (skilled and unskilled) coming into the Nazi party in 1929 declined

TABLE 40

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 1929

Occupational Categories	No. of New Members	% of New Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Unskilled Laborers	1,919	15.7	10,679,848	35.3
Skilled Laborers	318	2.6	1,146,945	3.8
Agricultural Laborers	390	3.2	2,499,945	8.3
Totals:	2,627	21.5	14,326,738	47.4
Artisans	2,367	19.4	4,488,428	14.8
White-Collar	2,112	17.3	5,274,232	17.4
Foremen	34	0.3	Included with white-collar	
Managers	113	0.9	250,335	0.9
Civil Servants	423	3.5	No figures available	
Self-Employed	510	4.2	No figures available	
School Teachers	63	0.5	308,741	1.0
Totals:	5,622	46.1	10,321,736	34.3
Farmers	2,080	17.1	2,139,878	7.1
Large Landowners	70	0.6	Included with farmers	
Totals:	2,150	17.7	2,139,878	7.1

Military (enlisted)	28	0.2	104,000	0.3
Military (officers)	15	0.1	No figures available	
Totals:	43	0.3	104,000	0.3
Professional	147	1.2	237,850	0.7
Professors	3	0.02	No figures available	
Capitalists	65	0.5	No figures available	
Financiers	7	0.04	No figures available	
Private Incomes	70	0.6	2,944,872	9.2
Totals:	292	2.36	3,182,722	9.9
Clergy	5	0.04	No figures available	
Unemployed	8	0.1		13.3*
Students	425	3.5	No figures available	
Housewives	206	1.7	15,650,000*	
Arts	107	0.9	134,236	0.5
Retired	156	1.3	No figures available	
No Entry	539	4.5	-	-
Totals:	1,446	12.04	134,236	0.5
All Categories:	12,186	100.0	30,259,310	100.0

*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an average for the periods compiled from Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399, based on the number of trades union members unemployed. It is likely that the figure for non-union workers was higher.

from the previous year, reaching its lowest total since the refounding of the party. Also predictably, the proportion of agricultural laborers increased slightly. The largest gain percentagewise of any category in this sample was by the farmers--but their gain was not nearly as spectacular as the gain they recorded in 1928.[30] The percentage of students coming into the party declined somewhat, as might be expected from the decline in the proportion of new members from the younger age groups.

The only other notable changes in the occupational structure of this sample of persons joining the NSDAP in 1929 compared to former years was the small decline in the proportion of white-collar workers and a small increase in the percentage of business owners converting to Nazism. The latter possibly reflects the deteriorating economic situation in 1929. A similar rise was noted in this category during the recession of 1926. The former might be explained as a result of the general urban to rural shift in the incoming membership.[31]

The decline in the percentage of workers entering the party coincided with a period of rising unemployment. This would seem to disprove the contention that it was the unemployed industrial workers who furnished much of the support of Hitler's movement in the pre-1930 period. The percentage of new members who listed their occupations as unemployed in 1929 remained as in previous years,

negligible.[32] The lower-middle class continued to constitute an absolute, but not overwhelming, majority of new members in 1929.[33]

Of the persons who joined the Nazi party in 1925, 5.2 per cent left it in 1929. They were joined by 8.7 per cent of those who joined in 1926, 13.3 per cent of those who joined in 1927, and 20.6 per cent of those who joined in 1928. Of those persons in this sample who joined Hitler's movement in 1929, 7.7 per cent had left it before the end of that year. If these percentages are extended to the party as a whole, it means that more than 19,000 people left the NSDAP in 1929. Instead of the 176,000 members claimed by the Nazis at the beginning of 1930, the actual figure was probably closer to 125,000. The party continued to have only a brief appeal for many of its converts.[34] One hundred fifty-four persons in this sample who had left the party in previous years re-entered it in 1929 with new party numbers and are considered with the new members.

The social structure of the new Nazis in this sample of persons entering the NSDAP in 1929 largely reflects the trends already apparent in 1928. The average age of the new members continued to rise. Although more than half of the new members were under thirty, representatives from the older age groups increased appreciably. The geographical stronghold of the Nazis shifted

significantly in 1929. South Germany for the first time supplied a lower proportion of new Nazis than its percentage of the total population in the Reich. The highly industrialized Rhineland continued to decline in the proportion of new Nazis furnished, while the relative number of new members from the rural/agrarian areas of East Prussia and Schleswig-Holstein increased substantially. The proportion of new Nazi party members coming from smaller communities came very close to equaling the percentage of persons living in such communities in the nation as a whole. For the first time in 1929 the new Nazis were not predominantly from urban areas but were dispersed among the different-sized communities in approximately the same proportion as the total population of the Reich.

The occupational structure of the Nazi recruits in 1929 also showed a continuation of trends apparent in the statistics for 1928. The relative strength of urban workers entering the party continued to decline, apparently establishing a negative correlation with the unemployment rate in Germany, which rose considerably in 1929. The proportion of business owners increased, perhaps in response to the economic crisis, as did the percentage of farmers. The relative strength of white-collar workers among new members decreased slightly, reflecting the urban to rural shift in the geographical origins of new members.

The entering members of the NSDAP in 1929 can be characterized as young, although increasing numbers of older people were joining the party. The new Nazis came from all parts of Germany, but Schleswig-Holstein and North Germany had replaced South Germany and the Rhineland as the most prolific producers of new recruits for Hitler. At the same time, smaller towns and the rural areas of Germany replaced large cities as the primary source of new members. Those persons joining the NSDAP in 1929 came from all occupational groups but were more likely to come from lower-middle-class jobs than from any other. The flow of people from the party reached flood proportions in 1929. Perhaps one-fifth as many persons left the party as joined it. Judging from past years, the odds were better than even that those persons who joined the party in 1929 would leave it within three years.

1928-1930--Summary

A number of changes are evident in the social composition of party members in 1928-1930 compared to those entering the NSDAP during the previous three years. The predominance of men among new members became overwhelming. Over 95 per cent of the converts to Nazism in 1928-1930 were male. The trend toward more and more recruits from the younger age groups evident in the earlier period ended as seen in Table 41.

TABLE 41

AGES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 1928-1930, COMPARED TO AGES OF THOSE ENTERING THE PARTY IN 1925-1928

Age Group	No. of Entrants 1925-28	% of Entrants 1925-28	No. of Entrants 1928-30	% of Entrants 1928-30	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 20	2,341	17.2	3,101	16.9	3,897,555	9.0
20-29	5,920	43.4	7,678	41.0	11,458,015	26.6
30-39	2,149	15.8	3,641	19.9	8,863,091	20.5
40-49	1,427	10.5	2,265	12.4	7,754,071	17.9
50-59	691	5.0	1,142	6.2	6,561,314	14.9
Over 60	262	1.9	400	2.2	4,841,919	11.1
No Entry	844	6.2	96	0.5	-	-
Totals:	13,634	100.0	18,323	100.0	43,375,965	100.0

New converts to Hitlerism continued to come predominantly from the under-thirty segment of society during the period 1928-1930, but not to the same extent that the figures indicate for 1925-1928. Although the older age groups remained underrepresented in the new members entering the party compared to their strength in the Reich, they constituted a not inconsiderable percentage of incoming Nazis. However, the Hitler movement of 1928-1930 still exerted its greatest appeal to the youth of Germany.

The geographic origins of new members entering the NSDAP in 1928-1930 showed significant changes from the figures for 1925-1928 as seen in Table 42. The major change that emerges from this comparative table is the great increase in the percentage of new members from predominantly rural, agricultural areas and the corresponding decrease in the proportion of new members from the Rhineland and from the birthplace of Hitlerism, South Germany. This reflects both the Nazi success in capitalizing on the "green revolt" among German farmers, and the continuing diffusion of Nazism from the cities to the countryside, which is shown by the figures in Table 43 for the size of the communities from which the new recruits in 1928-1930 came.

All the urban categories declined considerably percentagewise in 1928-1930, while new members from rural areas increased dramatically, although the figure remained

TABLE 42

GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 1928-1930
COMPARED TO THOSE ENTERING IN 1925-1928

Geographic Area	No. of Entrants 1925-28	% of Entrants 1925-28	No. of Entrants 1928-30	% of Entrants 1928-30	No. in Reich	% in Reich
South Germany	4,470	32.8	4,399	24.0	16,485,000	25.2
Rhineland	3,011	22.1	3,018	16.5	13,950,000	21.3
North Germany	5,356	39.3	7,458	40.7	24,567,000	37.6
East Prussia*	419	3.1	1,005	5.5	4,397,000	6.7
Schleswig-Holstein	330	2.4	2,399	13.1	5,983,000	9.2
No Entry	48	0.3	44	0.2	-	-
Totals:	13,634	100.0	18,323	100.0	65,382,000	100.0

*Includes Danzig.

TABLE 43

SIZE OF COMMUNITY OF ORIGIN OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1928-1930 COMPARED TO THOSE ENTERING THE PARTY IN 1925-1928

Community Size	No. of Entrants 1925-28	% of Entrants 1925-28	No. of Entrants 1928-30	% of Entrants 1928-30	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 10,000	3,931	28.8	8,623	47.1	33,048,820	52.6
10-50,000	3,269	24.0	3,619	19.8	9,777,134	15.6
50-200,000	2,242	16.4	2,069	11.3	6,246,998	9.9
Over 200,000	4,104	30.2	3,857	21.0	13,755,048	21.9
No Entry	88	0.6	155	0.8	-	-
Totals:	13,634	100.0	18,323	100.0	62,828,000	100.0

slightly below the total proportion of all persons in Germany living in rural areas as defined in this study. It is clear that during the period 1928-1930 National Socialism became well established all over Germany, in the countryside as well as the cities, to a much greater extent than it was in earlier years.

The occupations of those persons joining the party during the period 1928-1930 reflected, to some extent, the changes evident in their geographical and community origins as shown in Table 44. The most notable change in the statistics for 1928-1930 compared to those for the earlier period is in the tripling of the percentage of farmers entering the party and the corresponding decline in the proportion of new members in the laborer categories, the white-collar workers, and artisans. However, the percentages of the latter two categories entering the party remained higher than the relative strength of those two groups in the Reich. The proportion of professional people coming into the party continued its slow decline already apparent in earlier years. The percentage of incoming members from the other occupational categories remained approximately the same for the period 1928-1930 as they had been in 1925-1928. Although all occupational segments of German society were represented among new members entering the NSDAP in 1928-1930, the largest group was the "old" lower-middle class--artisans and farmers.

TABLE 44

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 1928-1930
COMPARED TO THOSE ENTERING IN 1925-1928

Occupational Categories	No. of Entrants 1925-28	% of Entrants 1925-28	No. of Entrants 1928-30	% of Entrants 1928-30	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Unskilled Laborers	2,697	19.8	3,047	16.6	10,679,848	35.3
Skilled Laborers	501	3.7	514	2.8	1,146,945	3.8
Agricultural Laborers	256	1.9	533	2.9	2,499,945	8.3
Totals:	3,454	25.4	4,094	22.3	14,326,738	47.4
Artisans	2,818	20.7	3,555	19.4	4,488,428	14.8
White-Collar	2,865	21.0	3,287	17.9	5,274,232	17.4
Foremen	98	0.7	78	0.4	Included with white-collar	
Managers	179	1.3	186	1.1	250,335	0.9
Civil Servants	496	3.6	612	3.3	No figures available	
Self-Employed	517	3.8	678	3.7	No figures available	
School Teachers	120	0.9	121	0.7	308,741	1.0
Totals:	7,093	52.0	8,517	46.5	10,321,736	34.3

Farmers	689	5.1	3,009	16.4	2,139,878	7.1
Large Landowners	28	0.2	95	0.5	Included with farmers	
Totals:	717	6.3	3,104	16.9	2,139,878	7.1
Military (enlisted)	25	0.2	35	0.3	104,000	0.3
Military (officers)	6	0.04	28	0.2	No figures available	
Totals:	31	0.24	63	0.5	104,000	0.3
Professional	307	2.2	257	1.4	237,850	0.7
Professors	3	0.02	3	0.02	No figures available	
Capitalists	67	0.5	79	0.4	No figures available	
Financiers	11	0.08	13	0.07	No figures available	
Private Incomes	75	0.5	82	0.4	2,944,872	9.2
Totals:	463	3.3	434	2.29	3,182,722	9.9
Clergy	8	0.05	11	0.06	No figures available	
Unemployed	0	0.0	8	0.05	11.2 & 10.9*	
Students	580	4.3	687	3.7	No figures available	

TABLE 44--Continued

Occupational Categories	No. of Entrants 1925-28	% of Entrants 1925-28	No. of Entrants 1928-30	% of Entrants 1928-30	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Housewives	354	2.6	312	1.7	15,650,000*	
Arts	169	1.21	174	0.9	134,236	0.5
Retired	165	1.2	184	1.1	No figures available	
No Entry	600	4.4	735	4.0	-	-
Totals:	1,876	13.76	2,111	11.51	134,236	0.5
All Categories:	13,634	100.0	18,323	100.0	30,259,310	100.0

*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an average for the periods compiled from Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399, based on the number of trades union members unemployed. It is likely that the figure for non-union workers was higher.

This lends credence to the characterization of the Nazi movement by some historians as anti-urban and anti-modern. However, Nazism was much more than this explanation implies.[35]

As the exit of members from the party had changed from a trickle to a sizable stream during the period 1925-1928, it became a veritable flood in 1928-1930. By the beginning of 1930, 60.8 per cent of the persons who joined the party in 1925 had dropped out. Before the end of 1929, 54.9 per cent of the 1926 entrants and 48.6 per cent of the 1927 recruits were gone. By the beginning of 1930, 32.2 per cent of those who joined in 1928 and 7.7 per cent of those who entered in 1929 had quit the party. The ramifications of these figures will be considered in some detail in the Conclusion below.

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

[1]Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, pp. 105-106, says the propaganda of the party in Lower Saxony was primarily designed to attract the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry after 1927. This redirection supposedly resulted from a suggestion from Hitler. Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, p. 123, dates the change of emphasis in the party propaganda efforts as 1927. It was an effort, Orlow said, to "capture" the bourgeoisie. Kele, Nazis and Workers, p. 122, also gave the impression that the NSDAP despaired of ever winning the workers in 1927 and redirected their appeals to the middle class.

[2]Articles dealing with the problems of small businessmen and Handwerker became more frequent in both newspapers in the early months of 1928 and continued through 1929 in addition to the daily columns aimed at those groups already carried on back pages.

[3]A number of articles on agricultural problems, which had not previously been numerous, began to appear in the columns of both newspapers in January, 1928. From January through most of May there was at least one story in each issue aimed directly at the farmers. The quotation at the beginning of this chapter is typical of the content of these articles.

[4]The daily column in Der Angriff on German labor continued throughout 1928 and 1929. During the same period, articles extolling the benefits to be derived by workers from affiliation with National Socialism did not diminish in either newspaper.

[5]The front pages of the respective newspapers continued to be devoted almost exclusively to politics and foreign affairs. The main theme in these articles was the domination of the German government by a group of corrupt Marxist Jews who were exploiting the country for their own benefit, helped along by the Versailles Treaty.

[6]Angell, The Recovery of Germany, p. 220. The German production index for all industries declined from 117 to 113 in 1928 (1913=100) (ibid., p. 393). For detailed production tables in key industries see ibid., pp. 377-392.

[7]The cost of living in Germany increased from 148 per cent of the 1913 average in 1927 to 152 per cent at the end of 1928. Concurrently, wages went from 157.1 per cent of the 1913 level to 169.3 per cent. As a result, real wages took their highest jump of the entire Weimar period in 1928: from 104 per cent of the 1913 total to 110 per cent. Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 464, 467, and 473.

[8]Angell, The Recovery of Germany, p. 248. For exact production figures of the most important agricultural products, see ibid., p. 397.

[9]The unemployed in the trade unions totaled 7.4 per cent of the total membership in April, 1928 (the lowest figure for the year), and rose to 11.9 per cent by December. Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399.

[10]These figures are from Fritz Stern, ed., The Path to Dictatorship, 1918-1933, trans. John Conway, with an introduction by Fritz Stern (New York, 1966), pp. 206-207.

[11]Turner, Stresemann, pp. 239-242.

[12]Kele, Nazis and Workers, pp. 129-131, says the leaders of the Nazi "right" rationalized the poor electoral showing of the party in 1928 into a victory (using Frick as an example), while the "left" leadership blamed the defeat at the polls on the failure of the party to win the workers. As a result, Goebbels and Otto Strasser redoubled their appeals to German labor. Kele marshalls convincing evidence to support his thesis.

[13]Volz, Daten die Geschichte der NSDAP, p. 21, says 108,717 persons had joined the party by December 31, 1928. This means 36,127 Germans became Nazis in that year.

[14]This conflicts with Bracher's generalization in Aufloesung der Weimarer Republik, p. 120, that the NSDAP began to attract young people in great numbers in 1928. Actually, the youth trend did not begin in 1928, it subsided slightly from previous years while remaining at a high level.

[15]This substantiates Stoltenburg's contention in Politische Stroemungen, p. 145, that the NSDAP membership in Schleswig-Holstein increased sharply in 1928-1929.

[16]It is incorrect, however, to conclude as did Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, p. 37, that the party was "gar nicht vertreten" in the countryside before 1929-1930.

[17]This constitutes ample evidence for the radicalization of the German farmers discussed above.

[18]Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 154, and Angress, "The Political Role of the Peasantry in the Weimar Republic," pp. 540-546. Angress also suggests that Hitler's "clarification" of point 17 of the Nazi platform (the land appropriation plank) was a powerful factor in winning the farmers for the NSDAP (ibid., p. 546).

[19]Most estimates of party strength have been very close to the 108,000 figure. One notable exception is John E. Rodes, The Quest for Unity. Modern Germany, 1848-1970 (New York, 1971), pp. 233-234, who guessed 60,000 persons were members of the NSDAP "at the end of 1928."

[20]The percentage of trades union members unemployed dropped to 11.7 in April, but had risen to 15.6 by October. The figure for the entire labor force was probably much higher. Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399.

[21]The cost of living in Germany rose from 152 per cent of the 1913 level at the end of 1928 to 154 per cent at the beginning of 1930. During the same period, wages increased from 169.3 per cent of the figure for 1913 to 180.0 per cent. Consequently, real wages went from 110 per cent of the 1913 total to 115 per cent. Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 464, 467, and 473.

[22]Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy, p. 202.

[23]Waldo E. Stevens, Revisions of the Treaty of Versailles (New York, 1939), p. 233.

[24]The Committee set itself the following objectives:

1. The final determination of Germany's liability for reparations. This included the fixing of the amount of annuities which Germany should pay and the period of time over which they should be paid.

2. The abolition of foreign controls in Germany and the setting up of a new organization for the receipt and disbursement of the annuities.

3. The development of a plan for the mobilization and ultimate issuance for sale on the world market of a certain portion of the German annuities.
From Thomas Lamont, "The Final Reparations Settlement," Foreign Affairs 8 (1929-1930): 336.

[25]The proposal also included other important advantages for Germany over the Dawes Plan: the exact amount and duration of payments was firmly established, and the index of prosperity was abolished. Also, Germany regained her financial autonomy and could, if necessary, postpone part of the payments for two years without permission of the Allies, and Germany was absolved of responsibility for the debts of the other former Central Powers. Stevens, Revisions of the Treaty of Versailles, pp. 236-238.

[26]The Nationalist cause was pleaded by Count Westarp of the DNVP. He argued that reparation payments were being used by France to build up their army on a huge scale. By making more payments, Germany would continue to strengthen her greatest enemy militarily and ensure that France would continue to be the dominant power in Europe. Stresemann, answering for the government, pointed out that Germany had but three alternatives: she could accept the Young Plan; she could continue to pay reparations under the old schedule of the Dawes Plan, or she could refuse to pay and be invaded. The final two alternatives were clearly unacceptable. Several debates were staged, a record of which are in Martin Vogt, ed., Akten der Reichskanzlei (Boppard-am-Rhine, 1970), I, No. 192, R 43 I/1437, pp. 624-627.

[27]Volz, Daten die Geschichte der NSDAP, p. 131, gives the total number of persons who had joined the party by the end of 1929 as 176,426.

[28]This agrees in substance with Stoltenberg's findings in Politische Stroemungen im Schleswig-Holstein Landvolk, pp. 145-146, 148-150, and 162, that the Nazi party in Schleswig-Holstein grew very rapidly beginning in 1928.

[29]Parson's generalization in "Sociological Aspects of the Fascists Movements," p. 144, that fascism was by and large an urban movement is correct for the period before 1930. However, the trend toward more and more new members from smaller communities entering the party apparent before the beginning of the depression suggests that Parson's thesis may not apply after 1929.

[30]The large increase in the percentage of farmers among new party members in 1928-1930 substantiates the

generalizations of Loomis and Beegle in "The Spread of German Nazism in Rural Areas," p. 734, of the "green revolt" in Germany during that period. The Nazis made significant gains among farmers before 1930, contrary to Gies, "NSDAP und landwirtschaftliche Organizationen." It may have been this facet of the complex phenomenon of National Socialism that led Bendix, "Social Stratification," p. 371, to identify the movement as "anti-urban."

[31]Hans Momsen, Beamtentum im Dritten Reich. Mit Ausgewalten Quellen zur Nationalsozialismus in Beamtenpolitik (Stuttgart, 1966), p. 21, said the Nazis made special appeals to officials "in and after 1929." By 1930, Momsen said, they "als Berufsgruppe ueberrepraesentiert waren," in the party membership. Momsen's generalization is not supported by the occupational statistics for persons joining the NSDAP in 1929 above.

[32]This, indicates Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 157, was mistaken in concluding the Nazis made some inroads among unemployed workers in 1928-1929. It also contradicts Schoenbaum's statement in Hitlers Social Revolution, p. 22, that 30 per cent of the party membership was unemployed in 1930. It appears that Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, p. 175, was at least partially correct in attributing the "sharp rise in membership" in 1929 to middle-class "fear" of the depression. Orlow was also correct in concluding in ibid., p. 177, that the unemployed did not go over to the Nazis. Florinsky, Fascism and National Socialism, p. 43, suggests unemployed persons swelled the ranks of the party after 1928, as does Mitchell, Nazism and the Common Man, p. 13. According to Mitchell, "waves of unemployed" poured into the party with the beginning of the depression. Hardy-Hemery, "Le Nazisme," p. 307, makes a similar generalization about new members being unemployed.

[33]Heyen, Nationalsozialismus im Alltag, p. 52, gives the following occupational breakdown of the members of Ortsgruppe Koblenz in the autumn of 1929, based on regional records: farmers, 1.5 per cent; artisans and small businessmen, 40 per cent; white-collar workers, 23.5 per cent. In ibid., p. 53, Heyen gives a similar breakdown of 170 Nazis in Ortsgruppen Brohl, Sinzig, and Bad Neumahr at about the same time: workers, 5 per cent; professional, 15 per cent; artisans and small businessmen, 60 per cent; and white-collar workers, "etwas," 20 per cent. On the same page, Heyen gives the following occupational breakdown for 150 members in five new Rhineland Ortsgruppen: farmers, 20 per cent; artisans and small businessmen, 15 per cent; white-collar workers, 15 per

cent; workers, 40 per cent; farm laborers, 5 per cent; and professional, 5 per cent. "Annaehernd 70% der mitglieder sind junge Leute im alter von 18 bis 25 Jahren." The figures are based on persons in the party in the autumn of 1929, not on new members. Heyen's figures suggest there was appreciable local variation in the NSDAP membership before 1930.

[34]The only estimates of party strength for 1929 that differ radically from Volz' figures are Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, p. 49, and Hardy-Hemery, "Le Nazisme," p. 307. Broszat says there were no more than 121,000 members in the party as late as September, 1930. Hardy-Hemery gives the figure 389,000 as the number of Nazis at the end of 1929.

[35]Jerzy Holzer, "La Partee sociale des NSDAP dans les annes 1928-1930," analyzed the Nazi vote in the Reichstag elections of 1928 and 1930. His conclusion was that although the Nazis received their strongest support in North and South Germany, from the young, and from the middle-class districts, they nevertheless received many votes from all areas of Germany and from all social strata regardless of religion, wealth, or age. This is entirely consistent with the cumulative statistics produced above for the social composition of the Nazi party, 1928-1930.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Testing the Most Popular Generalizations about the NSDAP Membership. Were the Rank-and-File Nazis Largely from the Lower-Middle Class?

In the Introduction to this study I showed that the most pervasive characterization of Nazi party members by social scientists is as members of the lower-middle class. A major problem with this thesis is one of definition: Which groups in society constitute the lower-middle class? What criteria should be adopted for assigning a particular individual to those groups? Few historians subscribing to the hypothesis that the Nazis were a class party have bothered to deal with this question.[1]

If the system of class assignation which I have used in this investigation is accepted,[2] then the definition of National Socialism as primarily a class movement is not substantiated. Table 45 shows clearly that those occupational groups considered here as the lower-middle class, although admittedly overrepresented in the NSDAP relative to their numbers in German society, were far from being the overwhelming majority which alone would justify

TABLE 45

OCCUPATIONS OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 1919-1923 AND 1925-1930

Occupational Categories	No. of Members 1919-24	% of Members 1919-24	No. of Members 1925-30	% of Members 1925-30	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Unskilled Laborers	1,339	16.4	5,744	18.0	10,679,848	35.3
Skilled Laborers	258	3.2	1,015	3.2	1,146,945	3.8
Agricultural Laborers	96	1.2	789	2.5	2,499,945	8.3
Totals:	1,693	20.8	7,548	23.7	14,326,738	47.4
Artisans	1,765	21.7	6,373	19.9	4,488,428	14.8
White-Collar	1,935	23.8	6,152	19.3	5,274,232	17.4
Foremen	40	0.5	176	0.6	Included with white-collar	
Managers	51	0.6	365	1.1	250,335	0.9
Civil Servants	272	3.3	1,108	3.5	No figures available	
Self-Employed	216	2.7	1,195	3.7	No figures available	
School Teachers	70	0.9	241	0.8	308,741	1.0
Totals:	4,329	53.5	15,610	48.9	10,321,736	34.3

Farmers	366	4.5	3,698	11.6	2,139,878	7.1
Large Landowners	11	0.1	123	0.4	Included with farmers	
Totals:	377	4.6	3,821	12.0	2,139,878	7.1
Military (enlisted)	44	0.5	60	0.2	104,000	0.3
Military (officers)	70	0.9	34	0.1	No figures available	
Totals:	114	1.4	94	0.3	104,000	0.3
Professional	296	3.6	564	1.8	237,850	0.7
Professors	17	0.5	6	0.02	No figures available	
Capitalists	82	1.0	146	0.5	No figures available	
Financiers	26	0.3	24	0.1	No figures available	
Private Incomes	35	0.4	157	0.5	2,944,872	9.2
Totals:	456	5.8	897	2.92	3,182,722	9.9
Clergy	1	0.0	19	0.1	No figures available	
Unemployed	9	0.1	8	0.03	3.2 & 13.3*	
Students	413	5.0	1,267	4.0	No figures available	

TABLE 45--Continued

Occupational Categories	No. of Members 1919-24	% of Members 1919-24	No. of Members 1925-30	% of Members 1925-30	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Housewives	216	2.7	666	2.1	15,650,000*	
Arts	81	1.0	343	1.1	134,236	0.5
Retired	120	1.5	349	1.1	No figures available	
No Entry	315	3.9	1,320	4.1	-	-
Totals:	1,155	14.2	3,972	12.53	134,236	0.5
All Categories:	8,144	100.0	31,957	99.95	30,259,310	100.0

*No included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an average for the periods compiled from Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399, and Angell, The Recovery of Germany, pp. 370-371.

the definition of Nazism as a class movement. While it is true that the lower-middle class made up the largest single block of the membership, a majority of the pre-1930 Nazis came from other segments of German society. This was also true of the early NSDAP.

Undoubtedly, many persons from the lower-middle class joined the Nazi party for the variety of reasons discussed by historians who hold that National Socialism was a class movement: there was definitely a great fear of Bolshevism among the lower-middle class; this group did suffer greatly during the great inflation; along with most other Germans, the petit bourgeoisie did have its national pride severely damaged by the defeat in 1918 and was outraged by the Treaty of Versailles; the lower-middle class was also alienated by continuing industrialization and confused and disoriented by the anomie of modern society; this did make them susceptible to the appeal of a radical political party promising immediate redress of their problems.[3] However, the basic argument underlying the class hypothesis of Nazism is that a certain segment of German society was motivated by its own economic interests to support Adolf Hitler and his party. The statistics in the preceding chapters cannot prove or disprove this thesis, but they do suggest that since the party attracted such widely divergent groups, factors other than strictly material ones might be important in the decisions of

individuals to join the movement. This generalization is supported by Peter Merkl's recent work.[4]

While the various appeals National Socialism held for the lower-middle class have been exhaustively explored, it is not at all clear why the other groups present in the party in strength should have become followers of Hitler. Why would members of the proletariat join a movement that is usually characterized today as reactionary? Why did farmers in great numbers join a political party with an agricultural program that was little short of ridiculous? Why would persons from the upper and upper-middle classes support a movement that called for egalitarianism and an end to privilege? These questions deserve much more attention than they have received.

Max Kele has shown convincingly that the Nazis made a continuing effort to draw workers into the movement through propaganda in the years before 1930.[5] These appeals were based on three issues which the Nazis felt would win the proletariat away from Marxism--Nationalism, anti-Semitism, and the contention that the Marxist parties had betrayed the social revolution begun after the war. The super-nationalism of the NSDAP was attractive to many workers who had been infused with national pride since childhood,[6] and felt, along with many other Germans, a deep sense of humiliation because

of the lost war and the Treaty of Versailles. That large sections of the proletariat were intensely nationalistic is demonstrated by the behavior of the workers' parties during the First World War. Hitler's party, by constantly appealing to the national pride of Germans--workers and others--made itself more attractive to many workers than the avowedly internationalist KPD or the pacifist SPD.

The anti-Semitism of the NSDAP was also attractive to certain workers who preferred it to the outspoken anti-anti-Semitism of the SPD.[7] It has been shown that hatred of Jews was not as pervasive in the proletariat as in other classes in Germany,[8] but it was nevertheless present.

There was widespread resentment in the ranks of German workers against the SPD for its "counterrevolutionary" actions in 1919 which many felt prevented any true or meaningful social changes in the Reich.[9] Most of these dissatisfied workers found their way into the KPD, but after that party went into decline[10] they were left without a political home. Some gravitated to the Nazis.[11] As it became less and less likely that the SPD was going to pursue the socialization of the country, many members left it--especially younger members who could see no hope of dislodging the old leadership of the party or convincing them to adopt a more activistic policy. To these young workers the Nazis offered a brand of socialism

and action, as well as a chance to move into positions of leadership within the party.[12]

Thus, although the proletariat was not present in the Nazi party in numbers commensurate with its strength in German society, there was nevertheless a large and dedicated group of proselytizers from the ranks of German labor working for Adolf Hitler by 1930. Their presence alone in the NSDAP precludes the characterization of National Socialism as a movement of the lower-middle class. But apart from the workers there were also several other segments of society well represented in the pre-depression Nazi party.

Farmers were present in the movement at the beginning of 1930 in much greater strength than in German society.[13] Some historians have included the farmers as a part of the lower-middle class,[14] but since the traditional political affiliations of the two groups were always different in imperial Germany,[15] and for several other reasons,[16] they are considered here as separate categories. The great increase in the percentage of farmers among new members in 1928-1929 coincides with a period of recovery in the economic situation of German agriculture. Agricultural prices were higher and production greater in the last two years before 1930 than at any time since the war.[17] It is tempting to conclude from this that farmers were less motivated to join the

NSDAP by economic considerations than by fear of Bolshevism, disgust with the Weimar regime, wounded national pride, etc. However, Rudolf Heberle's work on the farmers in Schleswig-Holstein suggests that it was primarily the small farmers in that region, practically destroyed by the agricultural depression of 1924-1928 financially, who joined Hitler's party in desperation because of the Weimar government's inability to do anything about their problems.[18] Heberle's contentions cannot be substantiated or disproved by the statistics derived in this study. However, the figures for the early party argue against the conclusion that farmers joined the Nazis primarily in reaction against their financial plight.

The great inflation, according to several authorities on German agriculture, worked to the benefit of German farmers. Many of them were able to pay off heavy indebtedness with the practically worthless currency of 1923. Nevertheless, there was apparently a large influx of farmers into the NSDAP during that year. This indicates that the qualities of the Nazi movement which appealed to all segments of German society were as important in attracting farmers into the party as the economic problems of German agriculture.

The upper and upper-middle classes were also present in the NSDAP in some strength.[19] Professional persons were more than twice as numerous in the Nazi party as in

German society and six times as numerous in the early party. The percentage of capitalists and financiers in German society was not ascertainable, but it could not have been much greater than the percentages of those groups in Hitler's party. The presence of these groups in the NSDAP, even in the modest numbers indicated above, is not compatible with the definition of National Socialism as a movement of the lower-middle class.[20] Why persons from the upper strata of German society would be attracted to a party which espoused an egalitarian program inimical to the established positions of those upper strata is not readily apparent. It is not, however, totally inexplicable.

The upper ranks of the bourgeoisie were not immune to the Nazi super-nationalist appeals, and neither they nor the upper classes were fond of the Treaty of Versailles which Hitler promised to demolish. Further, the outspoken anti-Semitism of the NSDAP propaganda apparatus found a sympathetic audience not only in the upper-middle class but in the old aristocracy and the super-rich of the Reich.[21] Predictably, the anti-Marxism of National Socialism was also well received in the social classes under discussion.[22] However, these factors alone would not be sufficient to explain the presence in a radical "socialist" party of any appreciable representation from the upper classes.

A plausible explanation for the attraction of Hitler's party to these upper classes has been provided recently by Walter Struve.[23] Struve, although convinced that the lower-middle class provided the great bulk of Nazi support,[24] points out convincingly that many ideas of the "neoconservative" intellectual spokesmen for the upper classes were interchangeable with the tenets of National Socialism. This was also true, Struve argues, even in the case of many of the more moderate liberal intellectuals of the Weimar period, especially the recurring demand in both Nazi propaganda and liberal philosophy for the creation of an "open-ended elite."[25] As a result of this affinity of ideas, according to Struve, not only did many members of the upper ranks of German society sympathize with the Nazi cause, but--as shown by the statistics above--many joined the party and actually worked for its political triumph.

It should also be pointed out that there was a great deal of discontent among aspiring professionals in Germany during the period 1925-1930 owing to the fact that many more new professionals were produced each year than there were positions for in Weimar society.[26] It would not be surprising if the less successful of these would-be professionals, denied the opportunity to practice the professions for which they spent long years in preparation, gravitated toward radical political parties which held

out hope of eventual redress for their problems and an immediate opportunity to move into responsible positions in the party ranks. The NSDAP certainly met these criteria. It may well be that Hans Gerth was correct when he characterized professional people in Hitler's party as "doctors without patients, lawyers without clients, [and] writers without readers."[27] However, this is not probable one way or the other by the statistics produced above.

To summarize, the membership of the Nazi party was not comprised overwhelmingly by persons from the lower-middle class. The petty bourgeoisie was much more numerous in the NSDAP than in German society but not to the degree that National Socialism may accurately be described as a class movement. Nazis before 1930 came from all segments of German society--from the proletariat to the nobility. Its propaganda was designed to attract support from all regions of the Reich, from all religious persuasions, and all classes. As Hitler himself insisted in the quotation at the beginning of Chapter II, above, the Nazis attempted and succeeded in bridging the political gap separating the many classes in Germany.

National Socialism: A Youth Movement/ Generational Revolt?

The figures in Table 46 substantiate the generalizations of several historians that the Nazis before 1930 were very young. Whether or not National Socialism was a generational revolt, however, is much more problematical.

TABLE 46

AGES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1919-1924 AND 1925-1930

Age Group	No. of Members 1919-24	% of Members 1919-24	No. of Members 1925-30	% of Members 1925-30	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 20	1,513	18.5	5,442	17.0	3,897,555	9.0
20-29	3,333	40.8	13,498	42.6	11,458,015	26.6
30-39	1,432	17.6	5,790	18.1	8,863,091	20.5
40-49	891	11.0	3,692	11.6	7,754,071	17.9
50-59	326	4.0	1,833	5.7	6,561,314	14.9
Over 60	151	1.9	662	2.1	4,841,919	11.1
No Entry	498	6.2	940	2.9	-	-
Totals:	8,144	100.0	31,957	100.0	43,375,965	100.0

Recently two studies have appeared which attempt to explain the phenomenon of National Socialism wholly or in part as the result of a generational revolt. Peter Loewenberg has stated categorically that "the relationship between the period 1914 to 1920 and the rise and triumph of national socialism . . . is specifically generational. The war and post-war experiences of the small children and youth of World War I explicitly conditioned the nature and success of national socialism."[28] Peter Merkl, in his reworking of the Abel biographies, has also pointed out numerous aspects of the Nazi movement which resemble a classic youth revolt but identifies three distinct generations in the NSDAP which differed greatly in their motivation for joining Hitler's party.[29]

The major difficulty with the generational hypothesis is defining exactly what is meant by a "generation." There is no consensus among social scientists on this point.[30] For the purposes of this study, the following definition of a generation has been formulated: A generation is composed of all persons in a given society of roughly the same age who have experienced events during their formative years which imparted to them a world view significantly different than that held by younger or older groups in the same society. The more profound the shared experiences of the group, the more cohesive it becomes, with age outweighing factors such as class and geographic

background.[31] If this definition is accepted, it follows that the dramatic events of the First World War must have produced at least one extremely cohesive generation, with a homogeneous world view despite its class content. This is precisely the argument advanced by Lowenberg and, with variations, by Merkl.

The "Under 20" group in the early party column in Table 46 represents those persons who were children and adolescents during the war. They were present in the NSDAP in numbers twice as great as in German society at large. This same group is represented in the "20-29" category for the post-1925 party. Once again, they are proportionately far more Nazis of this age than there are common citizens. Lowenberg and Merkl, both drawing evidence from the Abel biographies, argue convincingly that it was the shared experiences of wartime Germany that predisposed people in this age group toward Nazism.[32]

It is at this point that Merkl's work diverges from Lowenberg's. Merkl argues that two other related but distinct generations were also attracted to the NSDAP: a prewar generation which came of age shortly before or during the war and furnished Germany's soldiers, and a postwar generation which experienced the war as very young children and were still adolescents in the turbulent early years of the Weimar Republic.[33] Merkl points out that the professed egalitarianism of the Nazi party especially

appealed to the "front generation" which often longed for the comraderie of the trenches and close relationships formed in combat. The "front socialism" often commented on by veterans of the war seemed closely akin to the Nazi brand of socialism. As seen in preceding chapters, the Nazis made specific propaganda appeals to the "front-soldaten." The "20-29" and the "30-39" categories in Table 46 represent the front generation for the period 1919-1924. Part of the "20-29" group, all of the "30-39" group, and part of the "40-49" category from the 1925-1930 period were of conscriptable age during World War I. The front generation in the early party was strongly overrepresented compared to its strength in German society. Merkl's argument that many of this age group were still dazed by the experiences of the war during the early Weimar period, angry at the outcome of the war and the Versailles Treaty, disgusted with the government and hence fertile recruiting ground for militant political movements, seems to be substantiated by the statistics produced by this investigation. However, it would appear that by 1930 most of the war generation had settled into Weimar society. Their strength in the NSDAP was certainly no greater than their relative numbers in German society, and probably was less. They were displaced as the primary source of Nazi recruits by Merkl's other generation, the post-war children.

This generation, very young children during the war itself, grew up with the civil war of the early post-war years, the great hue and cry raised against the Treaty of Versailles, the constant real or imagined "red threat," and the great inflation. Represented in the 1925-1930 party by the "Under 20" and most of the "20-29" age categories, they provided an absolute majority of the rank-and-file of Hitler's party before the Great Depression. To further support the generalization that National Socialism "received its virulance from the youth rebellion of the Weimar Republic." Merkl pointed out that over 70 per cent of the respondents to Abel's prize essay contest had belonged to youth groups. It would thus appear that Herbert Moller's argument that youth invariably plays a pivotal role in revolutionary movements applies to the Nazis.[34] The class affiliations of persons joining the NSDAP before 1930 are not as important a sociological datum as their ages.

However, two important considerations argue against defining Hitler's movement solely in terms of a generational revolt. Firstly, approximately one-fifth of the party membership did <u>not</u> belong to any of the war generations discussed above. That these older men played an important role in the leadership of the party and the formulation of its policies is demonstrated by the ages of the Nazi <u>Reichstag</u> delegations in 1928 and 1930.[35]

Secondly, National Socialism was not an invention of the German youth movement. Its basic themes--supernationalism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Marxism--had a long history in imperial Germany and were shared, in one form or another, by other political movements not oriented around youth.[36]

The conclusions suggested by the above data are these: there was a broad stratum of young Germans born between 1890-1910 who shared the traumatic experiences of the First World War and the revolution of 1918, the humiliation of Versailles, civil war, and the great inflation as the formative events of their lives. Because of these shared experiences, these young people were much more susceptible to the appeal of the Nazi party during the period 1919-1930 than was the rest of the German population, regardless of class affiliation. The Nazi leaders recognized the potential value of these young people and made continued efforts to attract them into the party through propaganda. The result was a young and dynamic political movement which out-competed all others in the early 1930s. The Nazi movement was not initially a youth movement or a generational revolt, but it did capitalize on the widespread dissatisfaction among German youth to gain the fanatical supporters who turned the political tide for the party after 1930.[37]

Other Generalizations

The Sex of NSDAP Members

As has usually been assumed, the Nazi party membership was overwhelmingly masculine--see Table 47. The reasons why women made up no appreciable part of the party

TABLE 47

SEX OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 1919-1923 AND 1925-1930

Sex of Members	No. of Members 1919-24	% of Members 1919-24	No. of Members 1925-30	% of Members 1925-30
Male	7,457	91.6	30,232	94.6
Female	642	7.9	1,725	5.4
No Entry	45	0.5	-	-
Totals:	8,144	100.0	31,957	100.0

membership relative to their numbers in German society are reasonably clear. To begin with, the NSDAP was from 1920 on a highly militant, combative organization. Its members frequently took to the streets in violent clashes with rival political groups, particularly the Marxists. This is not the sort of activity to which women are usually attracted. Also, the more glamorous areas of the party, the SA and the SS, were closed to women in the 1920s. Finally, the party took the unofficial stand that the place of women was in the kitchen. Women were prohibited from holding high positions in the party, which

would discourage militant "modern women" like, for example, Rosa Luxemberg of the KPD, from pursuing a party career. As a result, the NSDAP remained largely the preserve of men before 1930.

Was National Socialism a Regional Movement?

From its refounding in 1925 to January 1, 1930, the NSDAP was never confined to any particular region in Germany. The cumulative statistics in Table 48 show that the percentage of members in the party from each of the five regions of Germany was approximately equal to the percentage of the total population of the Reich living in those regions.

TABLE 48

GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 1925-1930

Geographic Area	No. of Members	% of Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
South Germany	8,869	27.8	16,485,000	25.2
Rhineland	6,029	18.9	13,950,000	21.3
North Germany	12,814	38.1	24,567,000	37.6
East Prussia*	1,424	4.5	4,397,000	6.7
Schleswig-Holstein	2,729	8.5	5,983,000	9.2
No Entry	92	0.2	-	-
Totals:	31,957	100.0	65,382,000	100.0

*Includes Danzig

It is very probable, however, that for the first few years of its existence the party's recruits were drawn largely from South Germany. The membership lists in Adolf Hitlers Mitkaempfer almost invariably listed only a street address under the "address" column, indicating they were probably from Munich. During 1921-1922 the party began spreading to surrounding communities in South Germany. Even during the great period of membership expansion in 1923 the bulk of the new members probably came from South Germany.[38]

The involvement of the interim leaders of the movement during Hitler's imprisonment with political groups of similar persuasion apparently resulted in the rapid spread of National Socialism to all parts of the Reich in 1925. Thus, although the official NSDAP itself drew its members primarily from South Germany before 1925, the basic tenets of Nazism were accepted by Germans from around the nation prior to that time. National Socialism was not a regional movement, but drew its support from all areas of Germany.

Did the Nazis Come Primarily from Small Towns or Rural Areas?

The contention that Hitler's movement was a small town and rural phenomenon before 1930 is refuted by the statistics in Table 49. From 1925 to 1930 persons from small towns and rural areas were underrepresented in the

TABLE 49

SIZE OF COMMUNITY OF ORIGIN OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1925-1930

Community Size	No. of Members	% of Members	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 10,000	12,554	39.3	33,048,820	52.6
10-50,000	6,888	21.6	9,777,134	15.6
50-200,000	4,311	13.5	6,246,998	9.9
Over 200,000	7,961	24.9	13,755,048	21.9
No Entry	243	0.7	-	-
Totals:	31,957	100.0	62,828,000	100.0

NSDAP relative to their numbers in German society. Nazism was overwhelmingly an urban phenomenon before 1930. It is true, however, that a greater and greater percentage of new members in the party came from small towns and/or rural communities in each of the years between 1925-1930. Nevertheless, the party was, at the beginning of the Great Depression, a largely urban movement with its strength in the cities of Germany.

The same generalization is probably even more true of the early party, at least up until 1922. The majority of the members were almost certainly from Munich before this time, a major population center. The size of the communities from which those persons came who joined the party in 1923 is not certainly known, but there is some evidence to suggest that a great many of them were from small towns and rural areas.[39]

The Quitters: Who Left the NSDAP, and Why?

An unexpected discovery about the NSDAP membership brought to light by this investigation is the large number of persons who quit the party. Of the 31,957 persons in this sample who joined the Nazi party before 1930, 10,500 had left it by the beginning of that year (32.9 per cent). By the time Hitler assumed the Chancellorship of the Reich in February, 1933, only 13,412 of those who had joined during the Kampfzeit were still in the party (42 per cent). The question immediately arises as to whether these persons who left the party came from a particular age group, region, social class, etc. If they did, their very numbers could considerably alter the model of the social structure of the NSDAP membership constructed in Chapters III and IV, above. Statistical Tables 50 through 54 show the number of Nazis who fell into each of the social and demographic categories examined and how they compare percentagewise with the sample as a whole and with the population of the German Reich.

Table 50 shows that sex is not a reliable guide in predicting whether a given member might leave the party. The men who joined the NSDAP before 1930 appear to have been only slightly more prone to leave the party then women but not to any significant degree. The overwhelming masculinity of Hitler's movement demonstrated in Table 47 was not altered by the great flow of members from the party.

TABLE 50

SEX OF PERSONS WHO LEFT THE NSDAP BY 1930, BY 1933, AND IN THE REICH

Sex	No. of Members 1925-1930	% of Members 1925-1926	No. of Quitters 1930	% of Quitters 1930	No. of Quitters 1933	% of Quitters 1933	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Male	30,232	94.6	9,946	94.7	17,578	94.8		
Female	1,725	5.4	554	5.3	967	5.2		
Totals:	31,957	100.0	10,500	100.0	18,545	100.0		

Table 51 shows that Germans from the younger age groups who joined the NSDAP before 1930 were somewhat more likely to drop out of the movement than were those members who were thirty years of age or more when they became Nazis. This prediliction on the part of younger persons to drop out of the party is not great enough to significantly alter the age structure of the party presented in Table 46. Even with more persons under thirty years of age leaving the party proportionately than the older age groups, the NSDAP clearly retained its extremely youthful character.

The geographic origins of the individual party member had very little to do with whether or not he left the movement, as shown by Table 52. The two slight exceptions to this were the areas of the Rhineland and Schleswig-Holstein. Persons from the Rhineland who joined Hitler's party before 1930 were somewhat more likely to quit the Nazis than persons from other areas. The exact reverse is true for Schleswig-Holstein. It appears that persons from this region were the least likely to leave the National Socialist movement once they had joined.

Since the Rhineland was the most heavily industrialized region of Germany during the period under consideration, while Schleswig-Holstein was a largely agricultural section of the Reich, it is tempting to suggest that this explains the disparity in the number of quitters

TABLE 51

AGES OF PERSONS WHO JOINED THE NSDAP BEFORE 1930 COMPARED TO THE AGES OF NAZIS WHO LEFT THE PARTY BY 1930 AND BY 1933

Age Group	No. of Members 1925-1930	% of Members 1925-1930	No. of Quitters 1930	% of Quitters 1930	No. of Quitters 1933	% of Quitters 1933	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 20	5,442	17.0	2,052	19.5	3,430	18.5	3,897,555	9.0
20-29	13,589	42.6	4,612	43.9	7,959	42.9	11,458,015	26.6
30-39	5,790	18.1	1,517	14.5	2,998	16.2	8,863,091	20.5
40-49	3,692	11.6	996	9.5	2,016	10.9	7,754,071	17.9
50-59	1,833	5.7	420	4.0	929	5.0	6,561,314	14.9
Over 60	662	2.1	170	1.6	374	2.0	4,841,919	11.1
No Entry	940	2.9	733	7.0	839	4.5	-	-
Totals:	31,957	100.0	10,500	100.0	18,545	100.0	43,375,965	100.0

TABLE 52

GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF PERSONS JOINING THE NAZI PARTY, 1925-1930 COMPARED TO THOSE WHO HAD LEFT THE NSDAP BY 1930 AND BY 1933

Geographic Area	No. of Members 1925-1930	% of Members 1925-1930	No. of Quitters 1930	% of Quitters 1930	No. of Quitters 1933	% of Quitters 1933	No. in Reich	% in Reich
S. Ger.	8,869	27.8	2,937	28.0	5,145	27.7	16,485,000	25.2
N. Ger.	12,814	40.3	4,336	41.3	7,491	40.4	24,567,000	37.6
Rhlnd.	6,029	18.8	2,306	21.9	3,920	21.1	13,950,000	21.3
E. Prus.*	1,424	4.4	485	4.6	854	4.6	4,397,000*	6.7
Sch.-Hol.	2,729	8.5	417	4.0	1,106	6.0	5,983,000	9.2
Totals:	31,957	100.0	10,500	100.0	18,545	100.0	65,382,000*	100.0

*Includes Danzig.

from the two areas. However, East Prussia was also a largely rural, agrarian area, like Schleswig-Holstein; the percentage of persons from East Prussia who left the NSDAP was almost exactly the same as the proportion of persons from that area in the total party membership before 1930. The same generalization is true of North Germany, a relatively more industrialized region. The answer may lie in the different effects of the depression on the Rhineland as compared to Schleswig-Holstein. The electoral support of the KPD in the former region increased enormously between 1928 and 1933, while that in the latter area did not. It appears possible that in a period of acute economic crisis, the Communists had greater appeal in industrial areas than did the Nazis.

At first glance, the size of the communities from which persons joining the NSDAP before 1930 came (Table 53) seems a significant determinant of whether a particular individual might leave the party. The percentage of persons from all the urban categories who dropped out of the movement prior to that date was higher than their percentages in the party. The proportion of persons from rural areas and communities of under 10,000 population was lower than their party strength. This means the structure of the party membership presented in Table 49 is somewhat inaccurate when the sizable number of quitters is taken into consideration. However, the figures in

TABLE 53

SIZE OF COMMUNITY OF ORIGIN OF PERSONS WHO JOINED THE NAZI PARTY, 1925-1930 COMPARED TO PERSONS WHO LEFT THE NSDAP, BEFORE 1930 AND BEFORE 1933

Community Size	No. of Members 1925-1930	% of Members 1925-1930	No. of Quitters 1930	% of Quitters 1930	No. of Quitters 1933	% of Quitters 1933	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Under 10,000	12,554	39.3	3,203	30.5	6,848	36.9	33,048,820	52.6
10-50,000	6,888	21.6	2,410	23.0	4,079	22.0	9,777,134	15.6
50-200,000	4,311	13.5	1,670	15.9	2,671	14.4	6,246,998	9.9
Over 200,000	7,961	24.9	3,162	30.1	4,867	26.3	13,755,048	21.9
No Entry	243	0.7	55	0.5	77	0.4	-	-
Totals:	31,957	100.0	10,500	100.0	18,542	100.0	62,828,000	100.0

columns six and seven of Table 53 show that by 1933 this discrepancy had largely disappeared. The number of drop-outs from the urban areas were still slightly higher in 1933 than their percentages in the party membership but not significantly so. The proportion of persons from rural areas and small communities who left the party before the Machtergreifung was only a little lower than their percentage in the NSDAP. As in the case of the geographic origins of those who left the movement, there appears to be a direct correlation between exits from the Nazi party and the electoral success of the Nazis during the period 1930-1933.

As Table 54 illustrates, the occupations of party members did not play a significant role in proclivity to leave the party. Nazis from the laborer classifications were somewhat more likely to drop out of the movement than members of other occupational groups, while recruits from the white-collar and artisan categories were slightly more likely to stay in the party once they had joined it. Members from the other occupations left the NSDAP in more or less the same proportion as they joined it. The occupational model of the party membership up to 1930 was not changed significantly from the picture presented in Table 45 by exits from the party.

How can we explain the incredible number of defectors from the ranks of Hitler's movement? The reasons are

TABLE 54

OCCUPATIONS OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 1925-1930 COMPARED TO THOSE WHO LEFT THE PARTY BEFORE 1930 AND BEFORE 1933

Occupational Group	No. of Members 1925-1930	% of Members 1925-1930	No. of Quitters 1930	% of Quitters 1930	No. of Quitters 1933	% of Quitters 1933	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Un. Lab.	5,744	18.0	2,255	21.5	3,776	20.4	10,679,848	35.3
Sk. Lab.	1,115	3.2	412	3.9	686	3.7	1,146,945	3.8
Ag. Lab.	789	2.5	252	2.4	542	2.9	2,499,945	8.3
Totals:	7,548	23.7	2,919	27.8	5,004	27.0	14,326,738	47.4
Artisans	6,373	19.9	2,216	21.2	3,794	20.5	4,488,428	14.8
W.-Collar	6,152	19.3	2,187	20.8	3,433	18.5	5,274,232	17.4
Foremen	176	0.6	60	0.6	115	0.6	Included with white-collar	
Managers	365	1.1	118	1.1	209	1.1	250,335	0.9
Civ. Ser.	1,108	3.5	286	2.7	530	2.9	No figures available	
Self Emp.	1,195	3.7	347	3.3	645	3.5	No figures available	
Teachers	241	0.8	64	0.6	123	0.7	308,741	1.0
Totals:	15,610	48.9	5,278	50.3	8,849	47.8	10,321,736	34.3

Farmers	3,698	11.6	631	6.0	1,685	9.0	2,139,878	7.1
Large Landons.	123	0.4	22	0.2	56	0.3	Included with farmers	
Totals:	3,821	12.0	653	6.2	1,741	9.3	2,139,878	7.1
Military (enl.)	60	0.2	14	0.1	35	0.2	Lo4,000	0.3
Military (off.)	34	0.1	7	0.1	16	0.1	No figures available	
Totals:	94	0.3	21	0.2	51	0.3	104,000	0.3
Profes-sionals	564	1.8	189	1.8	305	1.6	237,850	0.7
Profes-sors	6	0.02	-	-	3	0.02	No figures available	
Cptlists.	146	0.5	41	0.4	80	0.4	No figures available	
Finan.	24	0.1	11	0.1	11	0.1	No figures available	
Pvt. Inc.	157	0.5	38	0.4	93	0.5	2,944,872	9.2
Totals:	897	2.92	279	2.7	492	1.02	3,182,722	9.9

TABLE 54--Continued

Occupational Group	No. of Members 1925-1930	% of Members 1925-1930	No. of Quitters 1930	% of Quitters 1930	No. of Quitters 1933	% of Quitters 1933	No. in Reich	% in Reich
Clergy	19	0.1	8	0.1	11	0.1	No figures available	
Unemployed	8	0.03	-	-	-	-	13.1 & 33.8*	
Students	1,267	4.0	498	4.7	842	4.5	No figures available	
Housewives	666	2.1	194	1.8	330	1.8	15,650,000*	
Arts	343	1.1	93	0.9	177	0.95	134,236	0.5
Retired	349	1.1	76	0.7	171	0.9	No figures available	
No Entry	1,320	4.1	481	4.6	867	4.7	-	-
Totals:	3,972	12.53	1,350	12.8	2,398	12.95	134,236	0.5
All Categories:	31,957	99.95	10,500	100.0	18,545	100.0	30,259,310	100.0

*Not included in totals. The percentages of unemployed are averages for the periods compiled from Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399.

probably as complex and numerous as the reasons why these people joined the Nazis to begin with. Without interviewing the individual party member to ascertain why he left the NSDAP, it is impossible to make positive generalizations. It is apparent, however, that many people found the Nazi party did not live up to their expectations.

Toward a Definition of National Socialism

The Nazis capitalized on the "fear" of the middle classes in Germany--especially its lower ranks--to swell its membership from the ranks of the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, National Socialism cannot be characterized as a class movement because of the presence in its adherents of representatives of all strata of German society in large numbers. Neither was Nazism a youth movement/generational revolt. The opportunistic NSDAP leadership exploited the widespread dissatisfaction among the young people in Germany and absorbed many of them into its ranks, but the party's direction remained in the hands of more mature men. Hitler's movement was not regional, nor was it an anti-urban revolt of persons from small towns and the countryside. What, then, was it?

National Socialism was designed to appeal to all segments of society regardless of age, social class, or regional origins. The statistics on the preceding pages show that it was successful in this design. Nazi propaganda and the National Socialist platform were designed

to appeal to something more in man than just his own economic interests. The explicit purpose of Hitler's party was to wipe away the undesirable features of modern society, in particular its impersonality and materialism, and to end the corruption and exploitation of the national government. The program of the NSDAP was also designed to stir the irrational, paranoid nature of men by blaming the problems of the world and of each individual on a group of conspirators and offered them a scapegoat to blame for their misfortunes. Therefore, Nazism was more than a political movement. It was--as Hitler himself insisted--also a spiritual movement, thus creating the confusion in attempting to define its nature solely in political or economic terms. The ideological structure of National Socialism encompassed the entire political spectrum by designing its appeals to attract persons of all political persuasions. At the same time, it held itself above politics by insisting it was a movement of the Volk.

National Socialists in the pre-depression period were by and large men of ideals, convinced that it was possible--through Hitler-- to create a new and better society. Theirs was not the first dream of a brave new world to become a Huxlyian nightmare. There is general agreement in historical circles that without the severe dislocations in German society caused by the loss of the

First World War, the great inflation of 1922-1923, and, above all, the Great Depression, Hitler could never have come to power in Germany. This argument is advanced by those who maintain National Socialism was an anomaly, an accidental phenomenon outside the mainstream of the development of Western civilization. The critics of this argument point out that a number of other nations underwent experiences similar to those of Germany, and that in no case did they submit to a regime of the inherent brutality and inhumanity displayed in the Third Reich. These theorists conclude that Nazism was a logical result of previous German history and was in some way due to a vaguely defined "flaw" in the character of the German people.

This racism directed at Germans is as unpalatable as the Nazi brand directed against the Jews. The potential for the development of a movement similar to Nazism is inherent in every society. Given the extraordinary circumstances which facilitated the Nazi rise to power and, above all, a leader with the fanatical dedication and almost extrasensory rapport with the masses like Adolf Hitler, something like Nazism could arise anywhere in the industrial world.

The social and demographic origins of the members of the National Socialist German Workers Party revealed in the preceding pages emphasize that the phenomenon of National Socialism is susceptible to understanding and

explanation only by a multi-causal approach. To attempt to "explain" Hitler's success in attracting fanatical and dedicated disciples in the period before 1930 as a youth movement, a green revolt, or a reaction of the lower-middle class crushed between big capital and Marxism, is to see only one facet of an incredibly complex whole. Hitler was able to capitalize on all those elements in German society and a number of others. By the end of 1929 the NSDAP was solidly entrenched in every area of Germany with a cadre of capable and fanatical members from all segments of German society.

CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES

[1]Mayer, "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problems," pp. 409-436, has recognized the inconsistencies associated with the lower ranks of the middle class. He has argued persuasively that the lower-middle class is a cohesive and important group in modern politics. His occupational classification system (p. 427) is similar to the one used in this study.

[2]See Appendix II below for a comprehensive explanation of exactly which occupations are included in each occupational category used in the statistics above.

[3]For the leading exponents of this argument, see especially Lipset, Political Man; Heinrich August Winkler, "Extremismus der Mitte?" Viertelsjahrhefte fuer Zeitgeschichte 20 (April 1972): 175-191; and Winkler, Mittelstand, Demokratie und Nationalsozialismus.

[4]Merkl, Political Violence under the Swastika. Most of the respondents to Abel's prize essay contest whose biographies Merkl examined in great detail exhibit less concern with their own financial interest than with an idealistic desire to create a new and better society.

[5]Kele, Nazis and Workers.

[6]On this see especially Walter C. Langsam, "Nationalism and History in the Prussian Elementary Schools under Wilhelm II," in E. M. Earle, ed., Nationalism and Internationalism (New York, 1960). According to Langsam, the teaching of history in German public schools during the Wilhelmine period in Germany amounted to little more than nationalist and militarist indoctrination. It was designed primarily for the purpose of producing "patriots" eager for war and the opportunity to die gloriously for Kaiser, Volk und Vaterland.

[7]Donald L. Niewyck, Socialist, Anti-Semite, and

Jew (Baton Rouge, 1971), convincingly points out that the SPD vigorously and outspokenly opposed anti-Semitism.

[8]This is a central thesis in Peter G. Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria: 1867-1918 (New York, 1964).

[9]Flechtheim, Die KPD in Der Weimarer Republik, p. 321.

[10]The KPD went from 380,000 members in 1922 to 267,000 in 1923 and 180,000 in 1924. By 1928 the Communists could count only 130,000 members. Flechtheim, Die KPD, p. 157.

[11]The Nazis were very fond of giving great publicity to persons who had formerly been Communists, had left that party, and joined the NSDAP. Goebbels in particular made a number of propaganda attempts to lure the KPD members into the ranks of the NSDAP. See especially Der Angriff, October 22, 1927, p. 2.

[12]The ages of the delegates sent to the Reichstag in 1930 by the NSDAP and the SPD, respectively, is very revealing on this subject:

Age	NSDAP	%	SPD	%
Over 70	-	-	1	0.7
50-70	12	11.4	73	51.0
40-50	21	20.0	49	34.2
30-40	63	60.0	20	15.0
Under 30	9	8.6	-	-

Obviously, younger men had a much greater possibility of advancement to responsible positions in the NSDAP than with the Social Democrats. Sigmund Neumann, Die Parteien der Weimarer Republik (Berlin, 1965), p. 120.

[13]Merkl, Political Violence under the Swastika, p. 14, erroneously gives the percentage of farmers in German society as 20.7. This figure, taken from the Parteistatistik includes everyone employed on the Land: lumberjacks, forest rangers, game wardens, fishermen, etc. The figure used in the occupational studies is taken directly from the Statistik des deutschen Reichs, and contains only persons actually engaged in agriculture.

[14]See especially Mayer, "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problems," p. 411.

[15]For the traditional political affiliations of these two groups see the following: R. M. Berdahl, "Conservative Politics and Aristocratic Landholders in

Bismarckian Germany," Journal of Modern History 10 (March 1972): 1-20; and Neumann, Die Parteien der Weimarer Republik.

[16]The economic goals of the two groups were basically incompatible. The farmers desired a policy of tariffs against importation of foodstuffs and to keep the prices of farm goods at unnatural highs. The artisans and other city dwellers naturally desired low food prices and a free-trade policy. Also, the urban dwellers were much more drastically effected by the financial crises of Weimar like the great inflation and the depression.

[17]Angell, The Recovery of Germany, p. 248.

[18]Rudolf Heberle, Landbevolkerung und Nationalsozialismus. Eine soziologische Untersuchung der politischen Willensbildung in Schleswig-Holstein 1918-1932 (Stuttgart, 1963), especially, pp. 133-134.

[19]See Appendix III for a complete list of occupations in this category.

[20]Previous historians of the Nazi movement have recognized that the upper-middle class was an important part of the party membership. See especially Lipset, Political Man, p. 140, and Walter Struve, Elites Against Democracy. Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political Thought in Germany, 1890-1933 (Princeton, 1973), p. 410.

[21]Niewyck, Socialist, Anti-Semite, and Jew, p. 9.

[22]See Hermann Lebovics, Social Conservatism and the Middle Classes in Germany, 1914-1933 (Princeton, 1969), pp. 188-189.

[23]Struve, Elites Against Democracy.

[24]Ibid., p. 419.

[25]Ibid., p. 410. "Here then is the basic source of the affinity between Nazi and liberal elitism: Both called for an elite which would ineluctably function within the parameters of bourgeois society and whose members would be selected in accordance with the basic values of that social order."

[26]Walter M. Kotschnig, Unemployment in the Learned Professions (London, 1937), pp. 118-119. According to Kotschnig, an average of over 25,000 students graduated from German universities in the 1920s, while there were positions available for less than half that number.

[27]Gerth, "The Nazi Party," p. 426.

[28]Peter Loewenberg, "The Psychohistorical Origins of the Nazi Youth Cohort," American Historical Review 75 (March 1971): 1457-1502.

[29]Merkl, Political Violence under the Swastika, pp. 142, 152-153.

[30]For several different definitions see the following: S. N. Eisenstadt, From Generation to Generation: Age Groups and Social Structure (Glencoe, 1956); Bennett M. Berger, "How Long is a Generation?" British Journal of Sociology 11 (May 1960): 10-23; Marvin Rentala, "A Generation in Politics: A Definition," Review of Politics 25 (January 1963): 409-522; Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Modern Theme (New York, 1971); Julian Marias, Generations. A Historical Method (University of Alabama, 1970). A definition very similar to the one used in this study can be found in Allen B. Spitzer, "The Historical Problem of Generations," American Historical Review 78 (December 1973): 1353-1385.

[31]This argument has been developed in some detail in Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. Paul Kecskemeti (Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 302-303.

[32]See especially Loewenberg, "Psychohistorical Origins," pp. 1467-1468, and Merkl, Political Violence under the Swastika, pp. 132-133.

[33]Merkl, Political Violence under the Swastika, pp. 152-153.

[34]Ibid., p. 289.

[35]See above, n. 12.

[36]For example, the Pan-German movement and the Thule Society.

[37]Herbert Moller, "Youth as a Force in the Modern World," Comparative Studies in Society and History 10 (July 1968): 237-260.

[38]Of eighty-five Gauen listed in the Aus der Bewegnung column in the 1922 Voelkischer Beobachter, eighty-one were in south German towns and cities.

[39]The Gauen mentioned in n. 38 were largely from

very small communities. Another bit of evidence that points in this direction is the rising percentage of farmers in the party in 1922 and especially 1923.

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APPENDIX I

A NOTE ON THE BERLIN DOCUMENTS CENTER AND THE HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION OF THE MASTER MEMBERSHIP CARD FILE OF THE NSDAP

The Master Membership Card File of the Nazi party is stored at the Berlin Documents Center, a United States government installation instituted in 1945. The Center is located in a plush residential district of a section of West Berlin called Zahlendorf. The building was once a secret SS complex which monitored all phone lines in Berlin. It is now staffed largely by Germans, but its director is an American and the deputy director is a naturalized American--a German Jew who fled the Nazis in 1938.[1]

A number of captured Nazi documents are held at the BDC, but the most voluminous is the Zentralkartei of the NSDAP. This file was found by U.S. occupation forces in a paper mill near Munich where it was about to be used for pulp in 1945. The cards were transported to Berlin in that year in a state of complete disorganization. There are actually two sets of membership cards. One was

arranged geographically according to Gau by the Nazis, then alphabetically within each Gau. The other was arranged alphabetically for the national membership. The German-American staff at the BDC was faced with the considerable task of putting the cards back into some sort of usable order. They rearranged both files in alphabetical order, separately, but did not attempt to use the geographical separation for the Gau files used by the Nazis.[2]

Somehow, over the years, the German personnel at the Documents Center have confused the two files and now refer to the more complete Gau file as the Reich file, and to the less complete alphabetical file as the Gau file. The original Reich file was chosen as the source for this study for two reasons. First, a different form of card was used from 1925-1930 which was slightly larger and clearly distinguishable from cards for later years. This made the cards for the first five years of the re-founded party much easier to locate than in the Gau file in which all cards were alike. Second, the entries for Austritt (exits from the party) are much easier to read from the original alphabetical file than from the more ambiguous Gau cards.[3]

The Reich file contains approximately 5.72 million cards, making it about 53.4 per cent complete. The missing cards appear to be from several readily identifiable

letters of the alphabet rather than from all of the file (see below, Appendix III). The cards which commenced with the refounding of the NSDAP in February, 1925, contains the following information: name, date of birth, occupation, address, Ortsgruppe, Gau, membership number, date of entry into the party, and date of exit from the party. Some cards have a place for return to the party.[4]

In addition to the card file, I was fortunate enough to find a volume entitled Adolf Hitlers Mitkaempfer, a bound collection of membership lists whose history no one at the Documents Center was able to trace with any certainty. There is little doubt of the authenticity of the lists but when the volume was compiled, why, and by whom, is unknown. The lists contain the following data: party number, name, occupation, address (usually only a street address), date of birth, and date of entry into the party. These lists, arranged alphabetically, contain the records of members who joined the party between its inception and October, 1921. There are no records in the volume for persons who entered the party after that date. The pages from Adolf Hitlers Mitkaempfer containing Hitler's two membership entries are reproduced on the following pages. On the next page are reproductions of typical membership cards from both the alphabetical file and the geographical file.

APPENDIX I

FOOTNOTES

[1]Mr. Richard Bauer, deputy director of the Documents Center, related his story to me personally. He also told me the history of the complex of buildings now known as the Berlin Documents Center.

[2]The history of the Zentralkartei is traced in "Who Was a Nazi? Facts about the Membership Procedure of the Nazi Party," a pamphlet compiled by the 7771st Document Center, Omgus, 1947. The mission of the Documents Center is to furnish evidence in war-crime trials.

[3]Browder, "Problems and Potentials of the Berlin Documents Center," pp. 362-380, made a survey of the Zentralkartei in 1972. He was struck by the huge number of persons who apparently left the party but concluded that the entries were too confusing to make any meaningful generalizations possible. Browder apparently looked only at the geographical file. From the reproductions of typical cards from both files at the end of this appendix it is apparent that exits from the party as recorded from the alphabetical file used in this study are not at all difficult to interpret. For further evidence that Browder considered only the geographical file, see the following footnote 4.

[4]Browder, "Problems and Potentials of the Berlin Documents Center," p. 366, said the membership cards contained information on the marital status of party members. This applies only to the geographical file, not to the alphabetical file.

544	Habisreitinger Jos	Fabrikant	Rosenmüllerstr. 6/2	2.2.71		
545	Harber Emanuel	Diener	Amalienstr. 26/1	23.12.88		
546	Hartmann Ludwig	Schlosser	Arnulfstr. 130/1	11.9.92		
547	Hauber Berta	Zimmerfräulein	Lindwurmstr. 29/1	2.3.01		
548	Haag Josef	Möbelschreiner	Briefstr. 4/1 S.O.	16.6.81		
549	Heusser Johann	Kaufmann	Gabelsberg. 8	7.5.72	7.8.19	
550	Heinrich Dr. Rudolf	Arzt	Rosenstr. 1	30.7.70		
551	Hessa R.	Fabrikant	Mannlstr. 3a	25.1.71		
552	Heisner Johann	Arzt	Klingenstr. 31/1	3.2.86		
553	Herbich Jenny	Kaufmannsgattin	Arnulfstr. 22/1	22.10.72		
554	Haussing Georg	jetzt. Mann.	Schwanthalerstr. 7/1	1.10.85		
555	Hiller Anna	Hausbesitzerin	Kaulbachstr. 4/II	20.4.79		
556	Hobel Josef	Tischler	Reichenbachstr. 4/II	14.11.96		
557	Holzinger Marianne	Kaufmann	Reichenbachstr. 13/I	1.11.87		
558	Hofmeister Rudolf	Oberpostsekretär	Rosenthalstr. 6/II	5.5.62		
559	Hofmann Jenny	Aufseherin	Landwehrstr. 34/II	14.11.88		
560	Holderith Franz	Kaufmann	Isargartenstr. 10/II	21.11.95		
561	Hübel Louis	Buchdruckereibesitzer	Klingenstr. 31/5	20.1.79		
562	Hummel Elise	Kaufmannsgattin	Türkenstr. 62/II	23.9.67		
563	Huber I. Josef	Zeichnungslehrer	Kaiserstr. 20/3	15.1.85		
564	" II. "	Bizepolizeirat	L.R. Heilmannstr. 5/II Nürnberg	23.9.92		
565	" Wally	Kaufm. Gattin	Kaiserstr. 20/3	29.3.86		
684	Hofer Josef	Direktor d. Lichtbühne	Hohenzollernstr. 31/3	6.1.01		
718	Hartmann Franz	Kaufmann	Arnulfstr. 130/I	19.3.87	4.2.20	
733	Hamerl Anna		Hirtenstr. 14/I		23.2.20	
734	Haug Jenny		Nordendstr. 2/6	24.7.86	"	
735	Haymann Rudi	Kaufm. Gattin	Klingenstr. 22		"	
736	Hesse Johann	Buchhändler	Georgenstr. 15/II	14.9.93	"	
737	Hüllmann Heinrich	Dipl. Ingenieur	Leopoldstr. 3/3		"	
763	Hergeth Franz		Münchenbergerstr. 12		"	
765	Hofmann Otto	Schreiner	Wittelsbacherplatz 4/II	13.4.94	11.11.19	
766	Hauthinger Michael	Monteur	Marsstr. 5/1	28.9.84	"	
767	Heisner Adolf	Oberbuchdruckereibesitzer	Klingenstr. 31/5	23.11.93	"	
838	Händle Heinrich	Kand. med.	Gabelsbergerstr. 5/I	1.2.87	23.2.20	
839	Heber Otto	Lehrling	Nordendstr. 14/I	22.2.05	"	

W 2265. Buchdruckerei des Blinden-Vereinslazarettes, Otto Gauer, Charlottenburg, Kaiserdamm 15.

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588.	Hlächer Franz	Kassen-Offizier	Mikesbüchse Folgerstr. 125	5.V.98	8.VII.21.	
595.	Hafeßler Berta	Schneiderin	Milchgarbeiterin	7.11.92	14.VII.21.	
601.	Hartenhauer Paul	Maurer	Brauerei Gr. Kornbecker	4.2.00	14. "	
605.	Heliz meier Hg.	Arbeiter	Kettenfabrik Wolthuser	14.X.01	"	
453.	Hesse Alfred	Arbeitsbg. Klaharr	Arbeiterbt. 46 Bahnhof	12.4.99	20.VII.21.	
618.	Hübner Georg	" "	"	7.8.95	"	
620.	Hitler Adolf	Schriftsteller	Hochschüler 4.17	20.9.87	26.7.21.	
692.	Hannemann Emil	Buchhalter	Großhandlungsgehilfe	10.9.97	26.7.21.	
694.	Hermann Erwin	Arbeiter	Bahnhof Hochheim	21.9.03	"	
1471.	Hacke Arthur	Fuhrmann	Hermannstraße 14	14.6.98	25.7. 21.	
713.	Heiligenaetzer	Arbeiter	Wiesenbeck	28.	30.11. 21.	
723.	Hartmann Josef	Tischler	Blücherstr. 13	6.8.01	8.21.	
757.	Hägele Otto	Kaufmann	Wilhelmstraße 13	1.11.11	28.7.21.	
761.	Heiss Paul	Schlosser	Wilhelmstraße 13	21.10.98	"	
739.	Hendorfer Max	Kaufmann	Sanitätsrat R.	1.8.01	28.10. 21.	
770.	Hammann J.	Dingfestmacher	Wilhelmstr. 135	22.11.01	"	
1796.	Heinrich Johann	Kaufmann	Walkmühlstr. 47	16.3.94	29.2.20	
2029.	Hopf Johann	Werkzeugmacher	Fronmüllerstr. 9/3	17.2.72	14.6.21	
2112.	Hartl Hugo	Kaufm. Angestellter	Sulzbacherstr. 47/5	21.10.00	29.2.24	
2180.	Huber Anton	Schlosser	Arbeiterbt. 46	6.6.09	15.8.21	
2216.	Hamacher Jakob	Arbeiter	Arbeiterbt. 46	9.12.05	"	
2310.	Holzmüller Georg	Schreiner	Berlin-Neukölln Hermannstr. 12	21.6.86	"	
2349.	Held Wilhelm	Kaufmann	Spitalstr. 2/2 a	10.8.00	"	
2363.	Hoffmann Josef	Landwirt	z. z. Oberland	24.9.98	"	
2394.	Häfele Georg	Schlosser	Kaufbeuren Schmiedgasse 12	5.9.96	"	
2093.	Reid Dr. Hans Jenny		Zollikon	25.10.95		

46 2045. Empfehlend für Büchlein-Formular, Gebr. Emmy, Erlangen I. C. 11. 11.

Name: Rümp, Robert
Geb.-Datum: 15. 7. 84
Stand: Sattler
Wohnung: Berlin-Markgr.
Bergstraße 146.
Berlin
Ortsgruppe:
Gau: Berlin
Mitgl.-No. 41847
Eingetreten: 4. Aug. 1926
Ausgetreten: 2.1.12.26

Name: Riegel Gottfried
Geb.-Datum: 29. V. 03 Rostock
Stand: Kaufmännischer Angestellter
Wohnung: Rostock, Claudiusstr. 16
Ortsgruppe: Rostock
Gau: Mecklenburg
Mitgl.-No. 75204
Eingetreten: 1. Feb. 1928
Ausgetreten: 1. 12. 29 P. A.
Wiedereingetreten: 1. 8. 30
Ausgeschieden: 1. 12. 32 Bundesstaat Mecklenburg

The cards above are typical representatives from the original alphabetical file. On the readers' left, Robert Ruemp, a 42-year-old artisan from Berlin, joined the Nazi party in August, 1926, only to leave it in December of the same year, never to return. On the right, Gottfried Riegel, a 25-year-old employee when he joined the party in February, 1928, was from the city of Rostok in North Germany. He left the party in October 1929 and rejoined it in August of the next year. He was killed in action in June, 1942.

6.588.414

Mitglieds Nr.: 146467 Vor- und Zuname: Tüsch Dr. Gerhard

Aufnahme unglltig lt. R.L. Gau Sud. Hann. Braunschw. 26.10.38

Eingetreten am: 1. AUG. 1929 wieder Eingetr. am: 1.11.38

Ausgetreten am: nicht auf. 1450 Jug.

Ausgeschlossen am:

Gestorben am:

Geburtszeit: 9.8.08

Geburtsort: Magdeb.

Ledig, verheiratet, verwitw.:

Stand oder Beruf: Dr jur. Referent

Bemerkungen:

Wohnort: B.

Wohnung: Damm 9

Ortsgruppe: Braunschweig

Gau: Süd Han/ Braunschw.

1.11.38

Wohnort: Karden a/Mos.

Wohnung: Kirchengasse 108

Ortsgruppe: Karden

Gau: Sudetenland

Above is a card from the original geographical file for the same individual as the card on the right from the alphabetical file. Note the information on marital status on the Gau card. The party member in question was a 21-year-old student when he entered the party in 1929. He left the party the next year and subsequently completed his studies, re-entering in 1938 as a Doctor of Jurisprudence.

Name: Tüsch Gerhard

G. D. 9.8.08. Ort: Magdeb.

Stand: Student Jur.

Wohnung: B. Karden a/Mos. 1929 Damm 9 Kirchengasse 108

O.G. Braunschweig Karden

~~Süd-Han/ Braunschw.~~

Gau: Sudetenland

Mitgl.-Nr.: 146467 Eingetr. 1. AUG. 1929

Aufnahme unglltig lt. R.L. Gau 12 vom 26.10.38

Ausgetreten: ~~nicht auf. 1450 Jug.~~

Wiedereingetreten: 1.11.38 — 6588414

APPENDIX II

OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION AND DETERMINANTS OF SOCIAL CLASS

One of the greatest difficulties of a study of this sort is constructing categories of occupation within which all the many and various jobs in a complex industrial society may reasonably fall and yet restrict those categories to a manageable number. It is necessary that the categories should accurately reflect the social class of the persons contained in it.

There is no unanimity of opinion among social scientists as to what categories should be included in each social class or which occupations should be included in each category. For the purposes of this study, I have created categories and made admittedly arbitrary decisions about which occupations should fall into which categories. These should be explained in some detail.

Twenty-five separate categories are used, although some of them are clearly related. They are as follows: unskilled laborer, skilled laborer, agricultural laborer, enlisted man (military), officer (military), professional,

school teacher, professor, clergy, farmer, large landowner, self-employed, capitalist, financier, private income, civil servant, white-collar, unemployed, student, housewife, foreman, manager, artisan, arts, and retired.

The following occupations were included under each category. (This is not an exhaustive list of all occupations encountered in the membership cards. Its purpose is to acquaint the reader with the spirit of the classification system used.) All persons whose occupations were listed as Arbeiter (worker) on the membership cards are included under unskilled laborer. These made up the largest part of that category. Other occupations encountered in the Zentralkartei listed here as unskilled laborer include Hilfsarbeiter, Ladeschauffeur (longshoreman), Stuetze (maid), Portfeullier (porter), Eisenbahner (railroad worker), Sager (sawer), Bergmann (miner), Kaminkahler (chimney sweep), Kutscher (driver), Kellner (waiter), Dienst (servant), and Heizer (stoker). Some argue, with justification, that household servants should be included separately from industrial laborers. I feel that the difference in the wages and Weltanschauung of the two groups were close enough together to merit inclusion under the same category. It can also be maintained that railroad workers are technically civil servants. Once again, it appears to me that railroad workers had much more in common in Weimar Germany with factory workers than with, for example, police officials.

The most difficult part of a difficult job was differentiating between skilled laborers and artisans. This is a critical distinction, since the skilled laborers are generally considered as a part of the proletariat, while artisans are usually identified with the lower-middle class. Some occupations were not difficult to classify. For example, there would be little argument about calling a tool and dye maker a skilled laborer or a blacksmith an artisan. Many other occupations, however, are much less readily classifiable. For example, is a printer an artisan or a skilled laborer? What about a Spengler (tin smith)? The following criteria were finally adopted to distinguish between skilled laborers and artisans: (1) Did this occupation exist prior to 1800 (a date approximating the beginning of industrialization in Germany)? (2) Did this occupation have a clearly defined apprenticeship period during which the apprentice goes through a series of stages to emerge as a journeyman? (3) Did a member of this occupational group have a reasonable expectation of one day owning his own business practicing his trade? (4) Did persons practicing this occupation necessarily rely on one of the processes or products of the industrial revolution in his trade?

If the answers to the first three questions is "yes" about a specific occupation and "no" to the fourth, then that occupation is included under the category

artisan; if exactly the reverse is true, then that occupation is included under skilled laborers. If the responses to those questions provide no clear results, then an arbitrary decision was made about the category in which to place a specific occupation.

Using this method, the following occupational groups were included under the category skilled laborers: Fabrikheizer (fabric stoker), Dreher (machinist or lath operator), Walzer (skilled iron worker), Nieter (riveter), Artmanane (galvanizer), Telegrapher, Ankerwinkler (armature winder), and Monteur (fitter or mechanic).

Classifying agricultural laborers was not difficult. Persons giving the following occupations were placed in that category: Landwirtsgehilfen (farmers' helper), Pferdepfleger (literally "horse nurse'), Schaefer (shepherd), Gartner (gardener), Knecht (literally knight--actually refers to someone employed on the land), Dienstknecht, Schweiger (dairy worker, and Kakerknecht.

The two military categories are not controversial. Not included under these classifications are persons who gave their occupations as retired military personnel or reserve officers.

The following occupations are included under the category professional: Arzt (medical doctor), Zehnarzt (dentist), Ingenieur (engineer--various kinds), Baumeister

(architect), Tierarzt (veterinarian), Rechtsanwalt (lawyer), Museumdirektor, Apotheker (drugist).

Teachers, professors, and clergymen are all readily identifiable. The persons who listed the following occupations are included under the category farmers: Landwirt, Landmann, Bauer, Gutesbesitzer, and Adler were included under large landowners.

Those persons listing the following occupations were included under the category self-employed: Wirt, Gastwirt (both mean innkeeper), Handler (retail merchant or wholesaler), Kuschner (furrier), Kontraktor, Handelsmann, Besitzer, Verlager (publisher), Immobilien Makler (real estate dealer). Included in the category capitalists are persons whose occupations were given as Fabrikant and Fabrikantsbesitzer. Only the occupation Bankier was included under the category financier. Private income includes persons whose occupations were given as: Rentier, Hausbesitzer, Privatisier, Privatmann. Under the category civil servant were included all persons other than common laborers who worked for the local, state, or federal governments. These included people working for the post office, police, railways, etc., as well as mayors, Reichstag representatives, etc.

The following occupational groups were listed under the category white-collar: Secretar, Kassier (cashier), Vertreter (representative), Kaufmann (salesman), Prokurist

(head clerk), Schlichter (counselor), Schriftsleiter (editor), Redakteur (editor), Drogist (clerk), Handelsgehilfer (assistant), Reisender (traveling salesman), Vergeichner (bookkeeper), Angestellter (employee--many prefixes).

The category students includes those persons whose occupations were given as students, whether from universities or lower schools. The category housewives is self-explanatory.

Persons whose occupations were listed as Geschaftsfuehrer, Verwalter, Betriebsleiter, and Direktor are included under the category manager. Most occupations listed with the suffixes "Fuehrer" or "Leiter" are included under the category foremen. Persons receiving pensions were usually listed as Pensionier and were included under retired. The category arts includes those whose occupations were given as one of the following: Stepperin (dancer), Pianist, Schriftsteller (author/writer), Konzert Direktor, Musiker, Dekaratur, Opernsaenger, Schauspieler (actor), Kunstgewerber, and Kunstmahler (artist).

The most controversial category is that of artisan. Included are the following occupations: Maurer (mason), Steinmetz (stonemason), Sattler (harness maker), Gipser (plasterer), Friseur (barber), Backer (baker), Schlechter, Schachter, Metzger, and Fleischhandler (all mean butcher),

Ziegler (bricklayer), Weber (weaver), Gerber (tanner), Spengler (tin smith), Konditioner (pastry cook), Korbmacher (basket maker), Klempner (plumber), Tischler (joiner), Drucker (printer), Schlosser (locksmith), Schmid (smith), Zimmermann (carpenter), Kobbler and Schumacher, Farber (dyer), Platzmeister (handyman), Lackierer (lacquerer), Schnittmacher (pattern maker), Filenhauer (file maker), Dachdecker (thatcher), Ofensitzer (stove fitter), and Maler (painter).

The division of these categories into social classes is also a difficult proposition. In this matter I relied heavily on the works of Theodore Geiger and Ralf Dahrendorf.[1] As in the case of occupational classification, there can be several objections raised to the assignment of the various categories to a particular "class." This is especially true in the case of the categories white-collar, artisans, and farmers. Persons in these occupations clearly exhibit a number of dissimilarities in income, Weltanschauung, and social status, and yet are all considered in this study as parts of the "lower-middle class," the Kleinburgertum. The rationale in lumping them together is that all three groups have a great deal more in common with each other than with the readily distinguishable social classes above and below them.[2]

Harold Gordon has made a strong argument that the old divisions of German society into upper, middle, and

lower classes is no longer valid.[3] According to Gordon, Angestellte were not foreseen in the Marxist models of social stratification and do not easily fit into them.[4] In addition, he argues that the old distinctions between artisan and skilled laborers had disappeared by the end of the First World War. As a result, Gordon maintains that both these occupational categories should be included under "workers" and considered a part of the working class. Max Kele has reached similar conclusions.[5]

In my opinion, these arguments are not valid for one overriding reason: the white-collar workers and artisans consider themselves a part of the middle class. They therefore adopt the lifestyle, attitudes, and expectations of that class which are considerably different from those of the working class.[6] Therefore, although they may differ considerably from the middle class in income, they constitute a part of it--a lower middle class.

APPENDIX II

FOOTNOTES

[1]Theodor Geiger, Die Soziale Schichtung des Deutschen Volkes. Soziographische Versuch auf Statischen Grundlagen (Stuttgart, 1932); Rolf Dahrendorf, Soziale Klassen und klassenkonflikt in der Industriellen Gesellschaft (Stuttgart, 1957); and Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (London, 1968).

[2]This argument is developed in great detail in Mayer, "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problems."

[3]Gordon, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, pp. 72-73.

[4]Fritz Croner, Soziologie der Angestellten (Berlin, 1962), also concluded that the Angestellte are a new class, neither lower nor middle. For the growth of this group relative to other occupational categories in Germany, see Hans Speier, "The Salaried Employee in Modern Society," Social Research 1 (February 1934): 133.

[5]Kele, Nazis and Workers, pp. 90 and 215.

[6]For evidence that white-collar workers, artisans, and farmers consider themselves a part of the middle class, see Speier, "The Salaried Employee in Modern Society," pp. 124-125, and Morris Janowitz, "Soziale Schichtung und Mobilitaet in Westdeutschland," Koelner Zeitschrift fuer Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 10 (June 1958): 112-144. For a number of striking differences in the life styles, outlook, and expectations of persons who conceive of themselves as "workers" compared to those who describe themselves as "middle class" see Heinrich Popitz, H. P. Bahrndt, E. A. Jueres, and Hans Kesting, Das Gesellschaftbild des Arbeiters (Luebingen, 1961).

APPENDIX III

THE SAMPLING METHOD USED IN THIS STUDY AND TESTS OF ITS VALIDITY

The ideal way to study the social composition of any group is to compile statistics on every member of that group. Often, however, this is either impractical or impossible. Since the membership cards at the Berlin Documents Center used in this study are only 54 per cent complete, compiling statistics for the entire 1925-1930 membership of the NSDAP was not possible. Also, the time and expense involved in surveying all the surviving cards was prohibitive. Therefore, it was necessary to take a sample that would incontrovertibly be representative of the whole.

After a series of conversations with Professor David Schwarzkopf of the mathematics department at the University of Oklahoma (whose specialty is statistical theory), the following hypothesis was formulated. Since the card file is arranged alphabetically, se decided that the total of cards under any given letter of the alphabet should constitute a representative sample of the whole

providing they were complete. To test this hypothesis I determined to record the data from the membership cards of all the persons in a given letter of the alphabet who joined the party before January 1, 1930, and consider that as a sample in itself. This procedure was to be repeated for as many letters of the alphabet as possible, and each was to be regarded as a separate sample. By comparing each variable in these separate samples by the chi-square method it should be possible to determine the accuracy of the sample as a whole.

Following this hypothesis, I recorded biographical data from the cards of all the persons who joined the NSDAP before January 1, 1930, from the following letters of the alphabet: C, D, E, I, P, R, U, V, and Z. These letters were not chosen at random. The number of cards in each letter of the alphabet in both the surviving card files (see above, Appendix I) is as follows:

Letter	Reich	Gau
A	50,000	165,600
B	1,045,000	801,000
C	95,600	72,200
D	402,600	262,800
E	299,200	199,800
F	59,400	345,600
G	17,600	450,000
H	899,800	853,200
I	41,800	32,400
J	132,000	198,000
K	123,200	1,011,600
L	19,800	433,800
M	28,600	549,000
N	6,600	171,000
O	2,200	100,800
P	312,400	349,200

Letter	Reich	Gau
Q	2,200	9,000
R	338,800	484,200
S	1,111,000	1,418,400
T	123,200	237,600
U	85,800	63,000
V	143,000	102,600
W	235,400	646,200
X&Y	2,200	1,800
Z	118,800	113,400
Totals:	5,772,200	9,052,200

The number of cards in the letters chosen indicate that the surviving cards for those letters are the most nearly complete in the original alphabetical file which was used in this sample.

Table 55 shows the number and percentage of persons from each letter group who fell into the various age categories. The chi-square statistic for this table was 13.787 with 14 degrees of freedom. The error code = 0 indicating there was no significant difference between the letter groups. The widest deviation from the group totals was 2.1 per cent.

Table 56 indicates the number of men and women who joined the NSDAP in 1925-1930 in each letter group. The chi-square statistic = 6.139 with 8 degrees of freedom giving an error code = 0 indicating no significant difference between the letter groups. The widest deviation from the group totals was 1.0 per cent.

The geographic origins of Nazis in each letter group is recorded in Table 57. The chi-square statistic for this table is 26.019 with 21 degrees of freedom and

an error code = 0 indicating no significant difference between letter groups. Letter group "I" shows the widest deviations from the party totals percentagewise, probably owing to the small size of that group. Letter groups "U" and "Z" show a larger percentage of persons from Schleswig-Holstein than do the other groups, while group "R" shows a higher percentage from North Germany and group "C" shows a high percentage from the Rhineland. These deviations apparently balance each other to the point that the chi-square test disregards them.

The figures for Table 58 showing the occupations of persons in all letter groups yielded chi-square statistics which showed a significant difference between letter groups until it was computed without letter group "I." Leaving out "I" resulted in a chi-square statistic of 94.773 with 95 degrees of freedom with an error code = 0 indicating no significant differences between letter groups. The variation was again probably due to the small size of the population within letter group "I."

The final Table 59 shows the size of the communities from which each person in each letter group came. The chi-square statistic = 27.974 with 28 degrees of freedom and an error code = 0 indicating no significant differences between letter groups. In this instance letter group "E" showed the greatest deviation from the norm for no apparent reason.

The above statistics show that the sample used in compiling the statistics on NSDAP members used in the previous chapters is representative of the persons who joined the Nazi party between 1925 and 1930. There is no reason to believe that if it were possible to compile statistics on the population as a whole they would differ significantly from those presented on the pages above.

TABLE 55

THE AGES OF PERSONS IN EACH LETTER GROUP WHO JOINED THE NSDAP IN 1925-1930 COMPARED TO EACH OTHER AND THE MEMBERSHIP TOTALS IN EACH GROUP

Age Group	Letter Group C	%	Letter Group D	%	Letter Group E	%	Letter Group I	%	Letter Group P	%	Letter Group R	%	Letter Group U	%	Letter Group V	%	Letter Group Z	%	Total in Party	% in Party
Under 20	179	15.0	1,260	17.4	890	16.7	84	16.2	1,023	18.0	1,011	17.0	276	18.0	339	14.9	380	16.9	5,442	17.0
20-29	520	43.4	3,052	42.3	2,280	42.7	219	42.4	2,373	41.9	2,547	42.8	637	41.6	1,008	44.2	962	42.7	13,958	42.6
30-39	215	18.0	1,315	18.3	969	18.2	94	18.2	1,034	18.2	1,021	18.0	282	18.4	405	17.8	405	18.0	5,790	18.1
40-49	159	13.3	833	11.5	619	11.6	69	13.3	640	11.3	677	11.4	173	11.3	275	12.1	256	11.4	3,692	11.6
50-59	77	6.4	405	5.6	291	5.4	29	5.6	335	5.9	352	5.9	83	5.4	126	5.5	135	6.0	1,833	5.7
Over 60	24	2.0	155	2.1	109	2.0	10	1.9	122	2.2	128	2.2	29	1.9	46	2.0	43	1.8	662	2.1
No Entry	32	2.7	202	2.8	163	3.4	12	2.4	143	2.5	163	2.7	51	3.4	81	3.5	73	3.2	940	2.9
Totals	1,197	100.0	7,222	100.0	5,337	100.0	517	100.0	5,670	100.0	5,949	100.0	1,531	100.0	2,280	100.0	2,254	100.0	31,957	100.0

TABLE 56

SEX OF PERSONS IN EACH LETTER GROUP WHO JOINED THE NSDAP IN 1925-1930 COMPARED TO EACH OTHER AND THE MEMBERSHIP TOTALS IN EACH GROUP

Sex	Letter Group C	%	Letter Group D	%	Letter Group E	%	Letter Group I	%	Letter Group P	%	Letter Group R	%	Letter Group U	%	Letter Group V	%	Letter Group Z	%	Total in Party	% in Party
Male	1,143	95.5	6,816	94.4	3,074	95.1	492	95.2	3,349	94.3	3,590	94.0	1,463	95.6	2,155	94.5	2,150	95.4	30,232	95.6
Female	54	4.5	406	5.6	263	4.9	25	4.8	321	5.7	359	6.0	68	4.4	125	5.5	104	4.6	1,725	5.4
Totals:	1,197	100.0	7,222	100.0	3,337	100.0	517	100.0	3,670	100.0	3,949	100.0	1,531	100.0	2,280	100.0	2,254	100.0	31,957	100.0

TABLE 57

GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS IN EACH LETTER GROUP WHO JOINED THE NSDAP IN 1925-1930 COMPARED TO EACH OTHER AND THE MEMBERSHIP TOTALS IN EACH GROUP

Geographic Area	Letter Group C	%	Letter Group D	%	Letter Group E	%	Letter Group I	%	Letter Group P	%	Letter Group R	%	Letter Group U	%	Letter Group V	%	Letter Group Z	%	Total in Party	% in Party
E. Prussia	33	2.8	356	4.9	217	4.1	13	2.5	297	2.2	277	4.7	73	4.8	72	3.2	86	3.8	1,424	4.5
N. Germany	486	40.6	2,892	40.0	2,069	38.8	222	42.9	2,255	37.8	2,495	42.0	556	36.3	960	42.1	879	39.0	12,814	38.1
R. Germany	280	23.4	2,091	29.0	1,495	28.0	131	25.4	1,618	28.5	1,625	27.3	448	29.5	602	26.4	579	25.7	9,869	27.8
Rhineland	279	23.3	1,339	18.6	987	18.5	134	25.9	1,000	17.6	1,144	19.2	241	15.7	504	22.1	401	17.8	6,029	18.9
Schleswig-Holstein	119	9.9	515	7.1	563	10.6	17	3.3	474	8.4	379	6.4	213	13.8	138	6.1	309	13.7	2,729	8.5
No Entry	0	0.0	29	0.4	4	0.1	0	0.0	26	0.5	25	0.4	0	0.0	4	0.1	0	0.0	92	0.2
Totals:	1,197	100.0	7,222	100.0	5,337	100.0	517	100.0	5,670	100.0	5,949	100.0	1,531	100.0	2,280	100.0	2,254	100.0	31,957	100.0

TABLE 58

OCCUPATIONS OF PERSONS IN EACH LETTER GROUP WHO JOINED THE NSDAP IN 1925-1930 COMPARED TO EACH OTHER AND THE MEMBERSHIP TOTALS IN EACH GROUP

Occupation	Letter Group C	%	Letter Group D	%	Letter Group E	%	Letter Group I	%	Letter Group F	%	Letter Group R	%	Letter Group U	%	Letter Group V	%	Letter Group Z	%	Total in Party	% in Party
Unskl. Lab.	201	17.0	1,324	18.3	949	20.4	89	17.2	1,007	17.8	1,105	18.6	256	16.7	437	19.2	374	16.6	5,744	18.0
Skl. Lab.	53	4.3	210	2.9	201	4.3	18	3.5	131	2.3	172	2.9	47	3.1	108	4.7	76	3.4	1,015	3.2
Agr. Lab.	18	1.5	192	2.7	122	2.6	17	3.3	150	2.6	159	2.7	35	2.3	55	2.3	44	2.0	789	2.5
Soldiers	1	0.1	17	0.2	7	0.2	1	0.1	12	0.2	15	0.3	1	0.1	5	0.2	1	0.04	60	0.2
Officers	1	0.1	10	0.1	3	0.1	0	0.0	7	0.2	8	0.1	1	0.1	1	0.04	1	0.04	34	0.1
Profesnl.	25	2.2	121	1.8	86	1.9	11	2.1	94	1.6	116	2.0	18	1.2	50	2.2	32	1.4	564	1.8
Professors	0	0.0	2	0.03	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	0.04	2	0.03	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	6	0.02
Sch. Tch.	8	0.7	56	0.8	34	0.7	6	1.2	39	0.7	57	1.0	5	0.3	24	1.1	12	0.5	241	0.8
Clergy	2	0.2	3	0.04	2	0.04	0	0.0	3	0.05	5	0.1	0	0.0	2	0.1	2	0.1	19	0.1
Farmers	153	13.8	774	10.7	651	14.0	57	11.0	650	11.5	645	10.8	208	13.6	238	10.4	322	14.3	3,698	11.6
Ig. Indust.	2	0.2	29	0.4	20	0.4	0	0.0	27	0.5	23	0.4	8	0.5	4	0.2	10	0.4	123	0.4
Sit. Imp.	59	4.9	260	3.6	186	4.0	31	6.0	198	3.5	236	4.0	43	2.8	100	4.4	82	3.6	1,195	3.7
Capitals.	4	0.3	33	0.5	24	0.5	4	0.8	26	0.5	28	0.5	7	0.5	10	0.4	10	0.4	146	0.5
Financers.	0	0.0	6	0.08	4	0.1	1	0.1	4	0.07	5	0.1	1	0.1	2	0.1	1	0.04	24	0.1
Pvt. inc.	7	0.6	35	0.5	20	0.4	3	0.6	31	0.5	35	0.6	4	0.3	10	0.4	11	0.5	157	0.5
Civ. Ser.	32	2.7	272	3.8	178	3.8	18	3.5	199	3.4	222	3.7	47	3.0	89	3.9	38	2.6	1,108	3.5
Wh.-Collar	237	19.8	1,391	19.3	1,032	22.2	84	16.2	1,167	20.2	1,097	18.4	325	21.2	380	16.7	459	20.4	6,152	19.3
Unemp.	0	0.0	1	0.03	2	0.04	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	0.03	0	0.0	2	0.1	0	0.0	8	0.03
Store.	44	3.7	300	4.2	190	4.1	25	4.8	235	4.1	259	4.4	49	3.2	91	4.0	74	3.3	1,267	4.0
Waivers.	18	1.5	160	2.2	109	2.3	8	1.5	119	2.1	133	2.2	29	1.9	51	2.2	39	1.7	666	2.1
Foremen	11	0.9	40	0.6	33	0.7	2	0.4	28	0.5	26	0.4	9	0.6	15	0.7	12	0.5	176	0.6
Managers	15	1.3	87	1.2	59	1.3	9	1.7	62	1.1	68	1.1	14	0.9	31	1.4	20	0.9	364	1.1
Artisans	227	19.0	1,444	20.0	1,076	23.2	97	18.8	1,144	20.2	1,168	19.6	321	21.0	438	19.2	458	20.3	6,373	19.9
Arts	11	0.9	74	1.0	62	1.3	4	0.8	64	1.1	58	0.1	22	1.4	18	0 8	20	1.3	343	1.1
Retired	9	0.8	84	1.2	57	1.2	6	1.2	68	1.2	64	1.1	18	1.2	21	1.0	22	1.0	349	1.1
No Entry	57	4.8	281	3.9	223	4.8	26	5.0	221	3.9	239	4.0	62	4.0	100	4.4	101	4.5	1,320	4.1
Totals:	1,197	100.0	7,222	100.0	5,337	100.0	517	100.0	5,670	100.0	5,949	100.0	1,531	100.0	2,280	100.0	2,254	100.0	31,957	100.0

TABLE 59

SIZE OF COMMUNITIES FROM WHICH EACH MEMBER IN EACH LETTER GROUP CAME, 1925-1930 COMPARED TO EACH OTHER AND TO THE MEMBERSHIP TOTALS

Community Size	Letter Group C	%	Letter Group D	%	Letter Group E	%	Letter Group I	%	Letter Group P	%	Letter Group R	%	Letter Group U	%	Letter Group V	%	Letter Group Z	%	Total in Party	% in Party
Under 10,000	448	37.2	2,702	40.2	2,023	43.5	207	40.0	2,326	41.0	2,374	39.9	599	39.1	827	36.3	849	37.7	12,454	39.3
10-50,000	254	21.2	1,493	22.2	1,221	26.3	108	20.9	1,217	21.4	1,157	20.1	388	25.3	449	19.7	581	25.8	6,868	21.6
50-200,000	204	17.0	823	12.2	766	16.5	79	15.3	836	14.6	750	13.1	184	12.1	395	17.3	314	13.9	4,311	13.5
Over 200,000	292	24.4	1,830	25.3	1,316	28.4	122	23.6	1,403	24.7	1,512	25.4	360	23.5	598	26.2	528	23.4	7,761	24.4
No Entry	2	0.2	72	1.0	11	0.2	1	0.2	65	1.1	75	1.3	0	0.0	11	0.5	2	0.1	243	0.7
Totals:	1,197	100.0	7,222	100.0	5,337	100.0	517	100.0	5,670	100.0	5,869	100.0	1,531	100.0	2,280	100.0	2,254	100.0	31,557	100.0