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THE POLITICAL CULTURE-AND-PERSONALITY OF THE LAOTIAN POLITICAL-BUREAUCRATIC ELITE

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THE POLITICAL CULTURE-AND-PERSONALITY OF THE

LAOTIAN POLITICAL-BUREAUCRATIC ELITE

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The turbulent years of anticolonialist struggle had come to an end, but for several decades, and particularly from the time that full political independence was gained from France in 1954, Laos has been a country without peace. It was, of course, deeply involved in the complex struggle between the nationalist, Western, and Communist nations. The movement from traditionalism to modernity, however, has been quite minimal. The country still holds the rank of the least urbanized as well as the least literate in Southeast Asia. Based on self-contained farm villages, the Laotian economy is the least developed in Indochina.[1]

One of the basic problems in Laos has been--and still is--the fact that it has little precedent for being a "nation." Unlike neighboring Thailand, for example, which has long had a central government, the territory of present-day Laos has traditionally been divided into several competing principalities. Although Laos was governed as a unit by the French for many years, the unifying effect of this was minimal

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[1]In 1972, the United Nations described Laos as one of the twenty-five least developed countries on earth. The twenty-five least developed countries, in alphabetical order, are: Afghanistan, Botswana, Bhutan, Burundi, Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Laos, Lesotho, Malawi, Republic of Maldives, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sikkim, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Western Zamoa, and Yemen. See, "DAC's New Target for Aid," War on Hunger (December, 1972), 1-3.

because the French mainly exercised control through the existing regional structures. Some degree of unity of purpose was achieved during the Laotian independence movement, but independence itself was followed almost immediately by civil war, and the end of that war was so recent that the Laotian leadership has still had little experience in governing the territory as a true nation.

In Laos, the most distinctive characteristic of the political system was the lack of agreement among the political elites and between these elites and the average citizen as to what constitutes the legitimate and appropriate ends and means of political action. The clashes between old and new, between foreign and indigenous,[2] between democracy and socialism, and between universal and parochial orientations inevitably create tremendous gulfs in understanding among different segments of the society.[3]

It has been speculated that the majority of the Lao population still clings to traditional ways, but among the Laotian elites there are likely to be variances in position and view. Some people may be more entrenched in traditional practice and may thus see politics largely as a means for expressing status differences and reinforcing

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[2]For example, Prince Boun Oum, a Rightist of the South, once said that "the war in Laos is between a Frenchman and a Vietnamese. I alone am Lao." The "Frenchman" was, of course, Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister; the "Vietnamese" meant Prince Souphanouvong, the leader of the Laotian Patriotic Front. See Arthur J. Dommen, "Lao Political Under Prince Souvanna Phouma," in Indochina in Conflict: A Political Assessment, ed. by Joseph J. Zasloff and Allen E. Goodman (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1972), pp. 86-96.

[3]Lucian W. Pye, "The Developing Area: Problems for Research," in Studying Politics Abroad: Field Research in Developing Areas, ed. by Robert E. Ward (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), p. 12.

hierarchical relationships. Others may have been influenced by Western experiences and think of government largely as involving problems of administration and maintenance of law and order. Many others may be imbued with the spirit of nationalist movements and think of the political realm as primarily providing opportunities for self-expression and national assertion. Others, fascinated by socialist doctrine, think of discarding Western-style democracy for an authoritarian regime for the purpose of survival. Still others may come to view the government as giving guidance in mobilizing the entire people for social advancement and economic development.[4]

Unlike other countries, where several different types of elites may govern,[5] only political-bureaucratic elites govern in Laos. They are, to use the words of Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, "the key political, economic, and social decision-makers."[6] The country is in their hands, and political events have little relevance to the sentiment of the masses,[7] who are mostly aliens to the world of public affairs. The key to understanding the Laotian situation, therefore, lies in

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[4]See, J. H. Halpern, The Lao Elite: A Study of Tradition and Innovation (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1960); Phoumi Vongvichit, Laos and the Victorious Struggle of the Lao People Against U.S. Neo-Colonialism (Paris: Neo Lao Hak Xat Editions, 1969); and, Joseph J. Zasloff, The Pathet Lao (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973).

[5]For example, see, Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967).

[6]Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 219.

[7]This also is largely true even in advanced countries, see, N. Glazer and Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Polls on Communism and Conformity," in The New American Right, ed. by Daniel Bell (New York: Criterion Books, 1967), p. 161.

understanding the political-bureaucratic elites themselves. What are their characteristics, their attitudes, their values, and their perspectives on human beings, Laotian society, and the political institutions to which they devote their lives? These points, concerning the personality and culture of the elites themselves, are likely to give us a better picture of Laos in the present and on the road ahead.

Statement of the Problem

As human beings the elites interact, influence each other, and bring influence to bear upon their environmental systems. Through these processes ideas are formed which, in turn, constitute the basis of interrelationships between the elites and their environments. But, what are the deep-seated preoccupations of the elites? What ideas are shared by them? In other words, what are the characteristics of those elites?

This study is intended to investigate the role perceptions of the Laotian political-bureaucratic elites, placing the perceptions within the context of various behavioral and institutional phenomena. We assume that the elite's opportunities and limitations for political actions are structured by the political situation, the polity, and the political culture-and-personality.

The investigation has entailed two separate but related efforts. First: the literatures of psychology, sociology, anthropology, social psychology, and political science have been drawn together eclectically to develop a conceptual framework within which the Laotian elites might be studied. Second: an extended visit was made to Laos for the purpose of making observations and conducting interviews with the elite population.

At this point key terms--such as "elite," "culture," "personality," and "political culture-and-personality"--which will be used throughout this study should be considered at greater length.

The Conceptualization

The term "elite" in this study refers to the small stratum of individuals who are most active and most influential in a society's political affairs.[8] For purposes of simplification, we assume that all political systems can be stratified into the elites and the non-elites. The elites--or the rulers or leaders--who possess the most power and make important decisions in a society play the key political roles: they shape and reflect the values, attitudes, and beliefs of a society, carve out the public institutions, and mold the framework for the lives of those who are ruled. They also formulate and articulate demands within the political system and enact, interpret, and enforce the rules which govern the non-elites.

Because the elites' roles are key to a society, the word "elite" has been extended to involve other definitions and connotations. Among them are "bureaucrat" and "establishment." But the sense of "bureaucrat" is often pejorative, even evil--very nearly synonymous with ruling class, dictatorship, or aristocracy. Elites have occupied the attention of a

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[8]Harold D. Lasswell defines "elite" in a broader sense: "The few who get the most of any value are the elite; the rest are the rank and file." See Harold D. Lasswell, World Policies and National Security, 1st paperback ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 3. For theoretical foundations of the political elite approach, see: Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, trans. by Hannah D. Kahn (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939); Vifredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, trans. by Andrew Bongorno and Authur Livingston (New York: Hartcourt, Brace, 1935); and Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, trans. by Eden and Cedar Paul (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949).

great many political and social philosophers from the time of Plato to Aristotle to Pareto, Mosca, Saint-Simon, Mannheim, Lasswell and C. Wright Mills--to mention only a few. The central idea of the "elite" concept is that a small group in a given society is differentiated from the rest (sometimes referred to as the masses) by one or more of these characteristics: 1) the elite exerts, or possesses, crucial power with respect to the decisions in his society; 2) the elite is the beneficiary of special privilege in terms of wealth, income, or other perquisites; and 3) the elite has high prestige in the society as a whole.

There are two principal categories of elite studies. According to the first, the existence of a political elite is held to be common to all political systems regardless of location, time, or culture; and a common basis is assumed to exist for the undertaking of cross-national comparisons. Studies falling into the second category are involved with stratifying a particular political system into the rulers and the ruled. This provides the opportunity for study at either level. The present study falls within the second category of elite studies. It investigates the Laotian political elite in considerable depth, and--for reasons given below--relatively ignores non-elites.

According to James Bill and Robert Hardgrave, Jr., the study of elites "can yield the most fruitful results with regard to precisely those societies about which we know least and within which the processes of modernization are most dramatically evident."[9] They further comment that

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[9]James A. Bill and Robert Hardgrave, Jr., Comparative Politics: The Quest for Theory (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1973), p. 171.

> African, Asian, Middle Eastern, and Latin American societies lend themselves to the elite approach for two basic reasons: (1) they tend to be those societies which are most obviously elitist; and (2) personal and informal politics are relatively more significant here.[10]

Regardless of the categories or methods used, the studies of the elites of developing countries have yielded quite similar results. Elite analyses in Africa and the Middle East by Manfred Halpern and Daniel Lerner, in Turkey by Frederic Frey, in Iran by Marvin Zonis, in India by Myron Weiner, in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) by Marshall Singer, in Malaysia by James Scott, in Burma by Lucian Pye, and in Latin America by Seymour Martin Lipset, Aldo Solari, and John Johnson--to cite but a few--have presented a remarkably consistent composite picture of the political elite. According to these studies, a typical member of the elite would be an urbanized man having at least some secondary school education, knowing a world language, belonging to the salaried middle classes, strongly influenced by nationalism and the desire to modernize his country, and often inclined toward state capitalism or socialism.[11]

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[10] Ibid.

[11] John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958); Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958); Myron Weiner, The Politics of Scarcity: Public Pressures and Political Response in India (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962); Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building: Burma's Search for Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and Africa. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963; Marshall Singer, The Emerging Elite: The Politics of Leadership in Ceylon (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964); Frederic Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965); Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari, Elites in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia: Reality and Beliefs of an Elite (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and, Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

In one of these studies, Lucian Pye comments that

> The elite who dominate the politics of most non-Western countries generally represent a remarkably homogenous group in terms of educational experience and social background--it is those who have become urbanized, have received the appropriate forms of education, and have demonstrated skill in establishing the necessary personal relations who are admitted to the rank of the elite.[12]

Similarly, Edward Shils observes that the members of these elites by and large are rational-minded and that they believe in dynamic change, in science, in rational administration, in written law and order, and in the planning of large-scale improvement schemes.[13] And Manfred Halpern states that in the Middle East leadership is being increasingly seized by a class of men inspired by non-traditional knowledge. They form a core of salaried civilian and military politicians, organizers and administrators, and other technical "expert," and they have to a large extent taken power from the former elite--which consisted of land-owners and the commercial and professional middle class.[14] Furthermore, John Johnson describes the groups which are most influential in Latin America as urban, above average in education, pro-industry, nationalistic, and by and large favoring state participation in social and economic areas.[15] In like fashion, Myron Weiner remarks that India is governed by modern or Westernized elites who favor a unified national state and large-scale economic development and who are concerned with making

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[12]Pye, op. cit., p. 16.

[13]Edward Shils, "The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma," World Politics, 11 (October, 1958), 1-19.

[14]Halpern, op. cit.

[15]Johnson, op. cit.

substantial modifications in the social structure.[16] Finally, Fred Von der Mehden states that elites in most underdeveloped countries are motivated by a desire for national unity, social welfare, and industrialization under government auspices.[17]

Perhaps the most important similarities which emerge from this comparison of elites in underdeveloped countries, as Halpern has pointed out, is that in their great majority they are "modern" elites, similar in function and to some degree in outlook to the modern Western elites defined by Raymond Aron--they are the "managers of modern mass society."[18]

Many of the earlier studies of developing nation elites tended to treat them as simply local copies of Western political elites, and gave little attention to the ways in which their socio-cultural backgrounds might make them behave differently than Westerners. Later studies, while having the merit of bringing in a behavioral perspective, have tended to emphasize conflict and the vertical stratifications of their societies.[19] But according to Larry Hill, "a mere study of the distribution of various political attitudes over the society might obscure important configurations of them within individual

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[16]Weiner, op. cit., chapter 1.

[17]Fred R. Von der Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations (Englewood-Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964).

[18]Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class," British Journal of Sociology, 1 (March, 1950), 1-16.

19 See comprehensive bibliographies of elite study in: Carl Beck and J. Thomas McKennie, Political Elite: A Select Computerized Bibliography (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1968); and, William B. Quandt, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970).

personalities."[20] Failure to search for the "political attitude configurations within the individual,"[21] to use Hill's phrase, is a limitation of many studies.[22] He suggests a "political culture-and-personality" approach as an alternative. This approach will be considered further below.

A Political Culture-and-Personality Focus

Political culture-and-personality is one particular area of research where anthropology, sociology, psychology, and political science come together. In order to explain this approach let us begin with Edward Tyler's statement that culture is "the complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."[23] But this may be called an omnibus definition, in that it lumps together a number of different categories. In trying to analyze the theoretical diffusion of culture, Clyde Kluckhohn's Mirror for Man devoted twenty-seven pages to defining "culture." To cite only ten of his definitions,

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[20] Larry B. Hill, "Political Culture-and-Personality: Theoretical Perspectives on Democratic Stability from the New Zealand Pattern," in Social Psychology of Political Life, ed. by Samuel A. Kirkpatrick and Lawrence K. Pettit (Belmont, Calif.: Duxbury Press, 1972), p. 141.

[21] Ibid.

[22] For detailed discussions of the difficulties of doing research on those personality characteristics that contribute to elite behavior, see: Fred I. Greenstein, "Impact of Personality on Politics: An attempt to Clear Away Underbrush," American Political Science Review, 61 (September, 1967), 629-41; Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1969); and, Richard L. Merritt, Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970), pp. 129-134.

[23] Edward B. Tyler, Primitive Culture Researches into the Development of Mythology, Religious, Language, Art, and Customs (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1877), p. 1.

Kluckhohn said that culture could be defined as: 1) "the total way of life of a people"; 2) "the social legacy the individual acquires from his group"; 3) "a way of thinking, feeling, and believing"; 4) "an abstraction from behavior"; 5) "the way in which a group of people in fact behave"; 6) a "storehouse of pooled learning"; 7) "a set of standardized orientations to recurrent problems"; 8) "learned behavior"; 9) "a set of techniques for adjusting both to external environment and to other men"; 10) "a precipitual of history," and turning (perhaps in desperation) to similes, as "a map," as "a sieve," and as "a matrix."[24]

Later, over 150 definitions of culture were reviewed by A. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn. These reviewers found considerable commonality among these definitions, they described the pattern as follows:

> Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of further action.[25]

They also speculated as to how this definition might change: "the main respects in which, we suspect, the formula will be modified and enlarged in the future are as regards (1) the interrelations of cultural forms; and (2) variability and the individual."[26] Thus they

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[24]Clyde Kluckhohn, Mirror for Man (New York: Whittlesey House, 1949), chapter 1.

[25]A. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (Cambridge: Harvard University Peabody Museum of American Archeology and Ethnology Papers, 1952), Vol. 27, No. 1, p. 181.

[26]Ibid.

speculated that psychology would make major contributions to cultural studies, because of that discipline's central concern with the individual as a unit of analysis.

In congruence with the above conceptions, Anthony Wallace has suggested an operational definition that culture is "those ways of behavior or techniques of solving problems which, being more frequently and more closely approximated than other ways, can be said to have probability of use by individual members of society."[27] He further points out that, in operational terms, personality is "those ways of behavior or techniques of solving problems which have a high probability of use by one individual."[28] The culture is, in reality, a result of the congregation of many diverse personalities.

Perhaps the most profitable procedure is to combine the words "culture" and "personality" to form a term--"culture-and-personality"--which can represent an indefinitely large number of different empirical operations. All of the operations under the rubric of "culture" have in common certain broad and general features; and, similarly, so do those operations which we refer to as "personality." The core of culture-and-personality in this sense has been described by Francis Hsu, who says that "culture-and-personality deals with human behavior primarily in terms of ideas which form the basis of interrelationship between the individual and his society.[29] Culture-and-personality thus

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[27]Anthony Wallace, "Individual Differences and Cultural Uniformities," American Sociological Review, 17 (December, 1952), 747.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Francis L. K. Hsu, ed., Psychological Anthropology: Approaches to Culture and Personality (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1961), p. 6.

is a significant aspect of the cultural process which addresses its attention to acculturation or socialization, cultural change, the institutionalization of modes of coping with individual diversity, and the like. Furthermore Hsu states:

> On the one hand, [culture-and-personality] deals with ideas shared by a considerable portion of any society . . . how those and other ideas held by the individuals are rooted in the diverse patterns of culture in which they grow up. On the other hand, culture-and-personality deals with characteristics of societies; reaction to conquest and disaster, internal and external impetuses to change, militarism and pacifism, democratic or authoritarian character; it is being associated with some societies may be related to such things as the aspirations, fears, and values held by a majority of the individuals in these societies.[30]

Based on social psychology and the culture-and-personality aspects of anthropological concepts mentioned, Larry Hill, in 1972, coined the term "political culture-and-personality" to be used in his study as a new concept focusing upon the personality as the unit of analysis. It employs the inference of psychological characteristics of behavior to describe "the important intersectices between man, his society, and his political institutions."[31] He mentions the promise of using the political culture-and-personality methods for research as follows:

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[30] Ibid. Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry Murrey have expressed some dissatisfaction with the phrase "culture-and-personality" partly because of the dualism implied by it. They feel that "culture in personality" or "personality in culture" would serve as better conceptual models. The usual phrase ignores other determinants of personality besides culture. "'Culture-and-personality' is as lopsided as 'biology and personality.'" See, Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murrey, Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 44. Francis Hsu has suggested the term "psychological anthropology" to designate this field. See, Francis L. K. Hsu, ed., Psychological Anthropology (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkmen Publishing, 1972), pp. 8-9. The writer prefers to hyphenate this phrase to emphasize its unity.

[31] Hill, op. cit., p. 142.

> They are best described as eclectic and innovative. Usually a variety of procedures is utilized, such as participant observation, interviewing, the administration of psychological tests, and the analysis of social institutions, in order to provide as rich a basis as possible for interpreting the phenomena under analysis. Of course, one cannot be blind to the danger of such eclectic methods, particularly to the problems of reliability of intersubjective valuations and of inferring culture-and-personality from behavior and institutions. It is possible to minimize error through careful observation, through cautious borrowing from previous treatments of the subject, and through the development of innovative and economical research strategies.[32]

These political culture-and-personality methods can contribute to the understanding of historical events; i.e., why particular groups of human beings responded as they did to specific challenges. We cannot accurately interpret history in terms of economic and political factors while ignoring human beings. The term political culture-and-personality is broader than the term "political culture,"[33] for it encompasses the analysis of political behavior within which is included (as the foregoing definitions mentioned) behavioral and institutional phenomena that are not normally included under the category of political culture. For present purposes, this concept is preferable to other social

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[32] Ibid.

[33] As Lucian Pye's definition in International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences 12: 218, that "Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in thepolitical system." The advantages of the political culture concept in research can be seen in the following: Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); and, Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

psychological terms such as political ideology, national character,[34] and political culture because it focuses upon the personality as the unit of analysis. As a result, this concept requires a search for political attitude configurations within individual personalities.

Eclectic Nature of the Study

This study is eclectic in nature, in acknowledgement of the fact that the social sciences themselves are eclectic. Drawing from other disciplines to build our own framework in a particular case seems often to help us get a better perspective. We shall try to integrate and see the elite in several dimensions from different viewpoints.[35]

The historical perspective involves an orientation to what were regarded as facts and realities in the succession of human events in Laos. It assumes that when these facts and realities are depicted

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[34]For a thorough discussion of national character and political analysis, see, Alex Inkeles, "National Character and Modern Political Systems," in Politics and Social Life, ed. by Nelson W. Polsby, et al. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), pp. 172-189. For studies employing political ideology, see, David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press, 1964); Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does (New York: The Free Press, 1962); James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and, Robert D. Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).

[35]For an example of efforts to arrive at unified knowledge about man see William F. Ogburn and Alexander Goldenweiser, eds., The Social Sciences and their Interrelations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1927). For the interrelations of anthropology, psychology, and sociology, see John P. Gillin, ed., For a Science of Social Man: Convergences in Anthropology, Psychology, and Sociology (New York: Macmillan, 1954); and on economics, history, and sociology, see Mirra Komaroasky, ed., Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957); and Don Martindale, ed., Functionalism in Anthropology, Economics, Political Science and Sociology (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1965).

their underlying order, or casual connections, would be apparent and that the present and the future are to be understood from the past. The perspective of geography is oriented toward the characteristics of human and material resources in defined areas of Laos in relation to government and politics. The perspectives of sociology and anthropology emphasize concern for institutions and processes, social structures and functions, the development and influence customs and techniques, and informal as well as formal human relationships. And the perspective of psychology emphasizes the ultimate nature of human beings and the efforts to discover the principles that explain individual and group behavior. Several scholars of the developing areas support such an eclectic approach. Monroe Berger, for example, contends that political-administrative contexts in developing and developed countries cannot be described simply and unidimensionally; accurate descriptions require a diversified multidimensional approach that covers all patterns of covariance between these dimensions.[36]

For example, in the area of political psychology studies, which have served as the core of this study, it is noted that psychological variables are of greatest value as a research tool when used to refine present knowledge gained from the application of general measures of socio-economic status, role, political activity, and other sociological variables which are now in popular use.[37] In other words, as Richard

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[36]Monroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

[37]For example, see, Herbert McClosky and J. H. Schaar, "Psychological Dimensions of Anomy," American Sociological Review, 30 (February, 1965), 14-40. They found that anomie can be studied as either a psychological or a sociological dependent variable.

Christie has pointed out, "any attempt to relate personality variables to political ideology without taking social context into account is apt to be highly misleading as well as an oversimplification of some highly complex interrelationships."[38]

It should be noted that in this kind of eclectic study, we are faced with an enormous range of concepts, theories, and frameworks in each discipline concerned. In order to use each tool adequately it is necessary to review several bodies of literature. However, it is impossible to review each of them thoroughly because of limited space. Consequently, jumping from one to the other discipline is sometimes necessary in order to catch a point to illuminate the picture of the elites which we are studying.

Theoretical Assumptions

It is assumed as a central theme of this study that the Laotian political-bureaucratic elites, which from now on will be called "the Laotian elites," have a common psycho-cultural configuration that knits them together. Based on the elites' deep-seated dispositions, as shaped by their personality and culture, there is a single set of stable, habitual preferences and priorities in their behavior, thoughts, and feelings. As a result of their learned habits, common memories, operating preferences, symbols, events in history, and personal associations, the elites have become used to a certain way of life; they have some similar ideas about good, bad, and other things; and they have a tendency to act in certain ways.

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[38]Richard Christie, "Eysenck's Treatment of the Personality of Communists," Psychological Bulletin, 53 (November, 1956), 428.

In exploring this central characteristic of the elites, their psycho-cultural traits have been studied.[39] The central theme of "traits" is mostly concerned with needs, values, personality, and culture of the elites in various aspects. The reader may expect to find the degree of intensity in each element of the elites' culture-and-personality.

Rationale

It is obvious that different societies have shown differences in such characteristics as authoritarianism, dogmatism, closeness, openness, and social cooperation--to cite only a few. Obviously, there is more individualism and freedom of self-expression in some societies than in others. This research attepts to investigate what factors bring about such differences.

As mentioned above, the political culture-and-personality research approach will provide a means of combining the insights of sociology, psychology, anthropology, and political science. Furthermore, it is valuable to have descriptive behavioral accounts of the everyday lives of the elites in a society which has been studied as little as Laos and look at their pattern of personality tendencies. Without such documentation we would have a much more limited conception of the range

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[39] By "trait," we refer to a "mental structure" as its meaning in "Robert B. Cattell's psychological traits," as example. Gordon Allport has defined trait as a "neurotic structure having capacity to render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide equivalent (meaningfully consistent) forms of adaptive and expressive behavior." Or, in short, trait is "the unique patterns of individuality." See Gordon Allport, Pattern and Growth in Personality (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 373. See also, Calvin S. Hall and Garner Linzey, Theories of Personality, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1970).

of possibilities in human behavior. Related to the foregoing point is the consideration that political culture-and-personality research will contribute to an understanding of the relationship between culture and psychological traits. This knowledge should contribute to a more relativistic view of forms of elite behavior.

In addition, political culture-and-personality research may contribute to an understanding of historical events. Perhaps it will help to explain why particular human groups responded as they did to particular challenges. We cannot make sense of history by considering only economic and political variables, while holding human nature constant.

Significance of the Study

The researcher's motivation to become engaged in this study lay in the fact that there is a great deal that is not known about political and behavioral patterns in Laos, and that especially little is known about the political-bureaucratic elites. These patterns need to be identified before theoretical propositions can be formulated. Such study must also involve the exploration of elite communication patterns, as well as the many ways in which they are linked by various organizations and cultural ties.

Another motivating factor was that while the decades of the 1950s and 1960s have seen a phenomenal growth of political/psychological research, the problem of its overall relevance and meaning for political behavior and political philosophy has largely been neglected. Further, while there now exists a body of thoughtful psycho-biographies of political elites and a multitude of personality-related field research

reports, the application of such studies to a developing country's elite should present more perspective to the political science discipline. For example, the study of the feelings, beliefs, the degree of intensity of both, and the relationships between dimensions of psycho-cultural characteristics such as authoritarianism, anomie, dogmatism, misanthropy, constant-pie orientation, attitudes toward entrepreneurship, rules of the game, political and economic equality, and cynicism, to mention a few, should be a worthwhile attempt to see what actually are the psycho-cultural dimensions of Laotian political men.

Purpose of the Study

The main purpose of this study is to explore the patterns of the Laotian political-bureaucratic elites' culture-and-personality as these are related to politics. The findings may make at least five contributions. First, they may increase our knowledge of the Laotian elites, the key force in moving the country, with regard to their political culture-and-personality. Second, the Laotian data, as a case study, may serve to test some hypotheses concerning political-bureaucratic elites in developing nations or the least developed countries. Third, by utilizing political culture-and-personality as a research device, it may add to our understanding of individual behavior in developing nations. Fourth, this research is meant to detail the way in which politically important characteristics can profitably be linked with anthro-psychological theory, and as such provide another perspective on the growing realization of the utility of anthro-psychological explanations in political analysis. And, finally, since a review of standard indexes indicates a paucity of advanced field research in Laos,

this study is intended to partially fill some of the evident gap in scholarly research.

Definition and Terms Used

For the purpose of this study, the following terms will be associated with the meanings given below. The explanations of traits will be treated more comprehensively in Chapter V, VI, and VII, but the definitions here will serve as introductory conceptions.

Lao

Refers to the ethnic group that forms the majority of Laos' population.

Laotian

Refers to the native people or nationals of Laos.

Laotian Political-Bureaucratic Elites

Refers to the high ranking politicians (members of the PGNU, members of the JNPC, and members of the National Assembly),[40] high ranking civil service officials of the first class or higher positions, or the comparable positions in the military or police of Laos.

Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism is a pattern of expression and behavior which is based upon simple learning of a conception of reality prevalent in one's culture or subculture; it includes a high degree of conformity, dependence on authority, overcontrol of feelings and impulses, rigidity

[40]The PGNU is the Provisional Government of National Union, i.e., the cabinet, and the JNPC is the Joint National Political Council, which advises the cabinet.

of thinking, and ethnocentrism. Authoritarianism represents an attempt to link deep-seated personality dispositions with the socially significant forms of belief and social behavior involved in adhering to a rigid and dogmatic ideology and not discriminating against outgroups.[41]

Theoretically, authoritarians are expected to show cynicism; anti-intraception; authoritarian submission (the propensity to demur to authority); conventionalism: authoritarian agression (that which is directed toward violators of conventional values); concern with power, and toughness; projectivity; dichotomization of complex issues; and acceptance of traditional authoritarian figures--in sum, the attitude that one lives in a hostile, jungle-like milieu, and should behave accordingly.[42]

Dominance

Dominance is a pattern in which some individuals assert a higher rank than others. (In this study, it is intended to investigate capacity for status, sociability, social presence, and sense of well-being.) As human beings, the elites learn that one way of getting what they want is to appropriate and defend a territory of their own. Dominance is a drive which some people develop and others do not.

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[41] See T. W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 1950).

[42] Richard Christie and M. Jahoda, Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality" (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1967), p. 57.

Dogmatism

Dogmatism derives from the concept that individuals are seen as having a "belief system" (things believed, accepted as true) and a "disbelief system" (things rejected, disbelieved, seen as false).[43] The major variable, therefore, is the openness-closedness of belief systems of individuals, conceptualized as relatively antithetical traits organized in terms of belief-disbelief, centrality-peripherality, and certain aspects of time perspective.

Open systems can be characterized by a low degree of rejection of disbelief systems, and full communication within and between belief and disbelief systems. Open systems can be conceptualized as showing a low degree of differentiation (richness of detail) between belief and disbelief. Conversely, closed systems are hypothesized to show greater rejection of disbelief, with isolation of parts within and between belief and disbelief sub-systems.

The determining factors of degree of openness versus closedness can be seen as two opposing sets of motives--the need to know and the need to defend against threat. Prevalence of the former theoretically leads to openness; that of the latter, to closedness. Time orientation is presumably broader for those with open systems, and narrower and more past-oriented for those with closed ones.[44]

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[43]Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960), p. 57.

[44]Ibid.

Faith-in-People

Faith-in-people is one's degree of confidence in the trustworthiness, honesty, goodness, generosity, and brotherliness of people in general. It is alternately called the "misanthropy scale."[45]

Other-Directedness

Other-directedness is the concept of an externalized superego which implies the operation of some external agency to serve the function of discouraging socially disapproved behavior and beliefs.[46]

Aside from supernatural authority, these sanctions operate through people who evaluate and then either sanction or condemn. As appropriate roles for different situations are learned, however, a kind of precensorship takes place so that sanctioned behavior is normally produced. A person's social antenae sense what others expect, and thus he avoids ridicule and condemnation. Cultures in which the superego is modally externalized are "other-directed" cultures since "others" perform the function of the superego.

Anomie

Anomie is viewed as an individual's generalized, pervasive sense of social malintegration or "self-to-other alienation" (as opposed to "self-to-other's belongingness"). The traditional sociological model, e.g., Durkheim, assumes that social conditions give rise to specified feelings (anomie) which in turn result in certain behavior.

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[45] Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," American Sociological Review, 21 (1956), 690.

[46] Ibid., pp. 690-695.

Anxiety

The emotion of anxiety is an effect experienced by the total personality. It should be noted here that the term "anxiety" is not used as a synonym for "fear." Fear is the reaction to a known specific danger while anxiety is the reaction to an unknown one.[47]

Neurotic anxiety. Neurotic anxiety is the result of the individual's inability to differentiate between the wish and the action, when the wish is repressed and is thereby unconscious.

Social anxiety. Social anxiety is the anxiety that results from an anticipation in which the individual recreates, in his fantasy, a memory about his society.

Constant-Pie Orientation

Constant-pie orientation is an orientation that assumes a fixed scarcity of desired material goods.[48] The "pie" cannot be enlarged that all might have larger "slices" but rather is constant, so that much of political and economic life is seen as constituting a struggle of one individual, family, group, or nation to expand its slice at the expense of other individuals, families, groups, or nations.

Rules of the Game

"Rules of the game" refers to widely shared beliefs about how the government, or various categories of political actors, ought to behave. The concept is rarely used to refer to formal or written rules--

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[47]See C. Spielberger, ed., Anxiety: Current Trends in Research (New York: Academic Press, 1972).

[48]Scott, op. cit., p. 94.

statutes, constitutions, court decisions, and the like--but usually, as in this study, refers to informal or unwriten rules, attitudes, and expectations.

Scope and Limitations of the Study

This research effort has been limited by the time and financial resources available to the researcher. The sample survey was limited to the Laotian political-bureaucratic elites, as defined above, who held office in 1974 when the field research was conducted. (The elite population is shown in Appendix C.) Thus, the findings may only be used to make inferences about the elites of Laos at that time. However, since the Laotian political-bureaucratic elites were and are relatively few in number, and because many of them still have impact and influence and are even active in political affairs, the generalizations would seem to retain a considerable amount of reliability.

Assumptions and methodology always incur some limitations. A fundamental problem of the political culture-and-personality research approach is that it has no theory of its own. Indeed, it is an eclectic framework. This author, who has been trained in political science, therefore has less authoritative knowledge in some of the other fields involved. Further, working with the busy people at the top of the society within the context of the sensitive situation in Laos at the time of interviewing also imposed some limitations. As one political scientist (anonymous) was heard jokingly to remark on the use of clinical and attitudinal methods in his research: "I'm not going to use psychological variables in any field study of mine. The first time we ask a legislator whether he'd rather crochet or play football, we'd be thrown out of his office."

Further, as Lucian Pye--a pioneer and the most distinctive scholar in the study of this field--puts it, "work with elites involves skill in interpreting ideologies, in characterizing operational codes, and defining the spirit and calculations that lie behind high risk political behavior."[49] Political elites have, by and large, quite sophisticated and complex political culture-and-personality structures and the cruder techniques of survey research may not do justice to the subtleties and nuances which are critical to understanding them. Anthony Wallace has even suggested that the study of culture-and-personality requires the researcher to take formal instruction in subjects such as physiology, symbolic logic, mathematics, and cognition theory as well as training in descriptive statistics, dynamic psychology and projective testing.[50] This study has followed those scholarly works which have been most influential in the particular area concerned.

This study is devoted to finding aspects of personality common to a group of the elites; as in the concepts of social character, basic personality structure, and natural character; but far more, it tries to emphasize interrelationships between the elites and their environments, or natural spheres of action. Twenty psycho-cultural traits have been selected and developed from noted studies in anthropology, sociology, social psychology, and political science. (See Appendix A).

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[49]Lucian Pye, "Introduction to Political Culture and Political Development," in Political Culture and Political Development, ed. by Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 16. See also his employment of the methods in Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building, one-third of this book concerns the broader issues of methodology, model building, and a number of valuable general propositions concerning politics of transitional societies.

[50]Anthony Wallace, Culture and Personality (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 3-4.

In their original forms, most of these scales are in the so-called "positive direction." This practice has been criticized by many scholars[51] on the ground that might, in part, measure acquiescence. But, according to A. Couch and K. Keniston,[52] acquiescence does not seem to be a very promising candidate for being the major component in these scales. However, the acquiescence "set" of some traits are included, and some other scales have been changed to the "negative direction" in order to increase the study's reliability.[53] (The directions of each item in the questionnaire can be found in Table 1).

Methodology

Sample Survey Design

The sample survey design chosen for this research effort is intended to gain the greatest possible measurement precision under the limitations imposed by the practicality of the situation. Commensurate with these objectives, the sample size was determined and stratified

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[51] T. Cohn, "The Relation of the F Scale to a Response to Answer Positively," American Psychiatrist, 8 (1953), 335; B. Bass, "Authoritarianism or Acquiescence," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51 (1955), 616-623; R. Christie, J. Havel, and B. Seidenberg, "Is the F Scale Irreversible?" Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 56 (1958), 143-159; D. Peabody, "Attitude Content and Agreement Set in Scales of Authoritarianism, Dogmatism, Anti-Semitism, and Economic Conservatism," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63 (1961), 1-12; and, J. Kirscht and R. Dillehay, Dimensions of Authoritarianism: A Review of Research and Theory (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967).

[52] A. Couch and K. Keniston, "Yeasayers and Naysayers: Agreeing Response Set as a Personality Variable," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 60 (1960), 151-174.

[53] Nevitt Sanford, "Authoritarian Personality in Contemporary Perspective," in Handbook of Political Psychology, ed. by Jeanne Knutson (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973), p. 150.

TABLE 1

DIRECTIONS OF ITEMS IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Trait	Item Numbers
I =	+ (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14)
II =	+ (15, 16, 19) - (17, 18)
III =	+ (20, 21, 22, 23, 24)
IV =	+ (25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38)
V =	+ (40, 45, 46, 48) - (39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 49)
VI =	+ (50, 51, 52)
VII =	- (53, 54, 55, 56, 57)
VIII =	+ (58, 59, 60, 61)
IX =	+ (62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70)
X =	+ (71)
XI =	+ (72, 73)
XII =	+ (74, 75, 76)
XIII =	+ (77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110)
XIV =	+ (111) - (112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118)
XV =	+ (119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124)
XVI =	- (125, 126, 127, 128)
XVII =	- (129, 130, 131, 132)
XVIII =	- (133, 134, 135, 136)
XIX =	+ (137, 140) - (138, 139, 141)
XX =	+ (142, 143)

random sampling techniques were used to determine which respondents should be requested to answer the questionnaire.

Sample Size Determination. The determination of sample size requires a decision as to the amount of error the researcher is willing to accept from the sample statistics along with a specification of the level of confidence required. The calculation in this instance, using the formula developed by Morris Hansen, William Hurwitz, and William Madow,[54] indicated that a sample size of 26 would provide a confidence level of greater than 95 percent and an error rate of less than 10 percent. However, since the exact degree of homogeneity[55] of the target population, i.e., the Lao political elites, cannot be known, the researcher decided to use 66 people, or 50 percent of the population universe, to increase the study's reliability.

Because the population elements for this study were separated into three mutually exclusive groups or strata, a stratified random sample method was used. Then, a simple random sampling method determined respondents in each stratum. The proportional drawing of samples from each stratum insured equal representation of each group in the sample, while still achieving random sampling. A table of random numbers was used to select the respondents to be questioned. All of the respondents chosen, after being contacted personally, agreed to participate in this study.

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[54]Morris H. Hansen, William N. Hurwitz, and William G. Madow, Sample Survey Methods and Theory, Vol. 1 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1953), p. 127. The sample size calculation is shown in Appendix D.

[55]Charles H. Backstrom and Gerald D. Hursh, Survey Research (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 25.

Subject Selection. The sample used in this study was composed of fifty percent of the Lao political elites who held high positions during the period of July-October 1974, when this research was conducted. Twelve bureaucratic elites who held high office in the same period were added by random sampling method from the list of high ranking government officials (first class or higher) including military and police. The following table (Table 2) is a summary of the political positions held by those in the sample. (The names of the population are presented in Appendix D).

TABLE 2

SAMPLES

Strata	Population	Sample
PGNU Members[a]	24	12
JNPC Members	42	21
National Assembly Members[b]	46	21
Bureaucratic Elite[c]	X	12

NOTE:

[a]Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister, was excluded because he was ill and went to France for recuperation during the research schedule.

[b]Five members of the National Assembly who were selected for the test-retest of reliability and other members who were also PGNU or JNPC members are not included in this count.

[c]The population is unknown. Twelve names were randomized from the Ministry of Defense, Interior, Public Health, Finance, and Economics and Plans.

The compostion of the sample is shown in Table 3. It should be noted here that the name "People's Democratic Republic of Laos" has officially replaced the "Kingdom of Laos." The coalition government was dissolved in 1975, bringing about big changes for the country. However, more than fifty percent of our sample in the PGNU are still active in Laotian public affairs. The JNPC and the National Assembly were also dissolved. A general election has been set for mid-1976, and because of the limited number of political elites, the writer speculates that some members of the old National Assembly, still prominent in their regions, will be back to play active roles in Laotian politics in the future.[56] Therefore, even today the sample is considered to have a considerable degree of reliability. However, further research needs to be made for confirmation and comparison.

Instrumentation

The questionnaires, as aforementioned, are developed from several sources (see Appendix A), and are Likert type in form. The scales consist of four items--"strongly agree," "agree," "disagree," and "strongly disagree."

The following steps were taken in developing the Lao version of the questionnaire. First, the questionnaires were selected from several sources and adapted to Lao by the researcher. Second, three interpreters--one from USAID Vientiane, one from a local newspaper's staff, and the researcher himself--translated them into Lao. Third,

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[56]See also The New York Times (6 December 1975); and, The New York Times (19 December 1975).

TABLE 3

SAMPLES CHARACTERISTICS

Characteristics	N	Percent
Sex:		
Male	61	98.4
Female	1	1.6
Marital Status:		
Single	1	1.6
Married (average 4 children)	61	98.4
Age:		
Less than 45	24	38.7
45 to 55	28	45.2
More than 55	10	16.1
Race:		
Lao	60	96.5
Tribal and others	2	3.2
Education:		
Elementary or lower	5	8.1
Secondary	48	77.4
University	9	14.5
Training or Education Abroad:		
Asia	32	51.6
Europe	22	35.5
America and others	4	6.5
None	4	6.5

four judges--two lecturers from Dong Dok Teachers College, one staff member from USAID Vientaine, and a local newspaper staff member--were selected to make final judgments for the Lao version. Consistency with the English version and validity in Lao culture were the main judgmental criteria.

The questionnaire consists of 158 items; it took approximately one hour to answer. The test-retest method was used to examine its reliability. The test respondents--five government officials and five members of the National Assembly--were asked to answer the questionnaire for the process of test-retest in a two-week period. The formula used for reporting reliability was the Kuder-Richardson 21 (KR_{21}).[57] The average reliability of the questionnaire for all trait groups was .62, and individual trait group reliabilities ranged from .42 to .68. Ergo, given the overall length of the questionnaire, the complexity of the subject matter, and the (approximately) two-week interval between test and retest, the writer concluded that the reliability of the questionnaire would be adequate for this study.

Data Collection

Upon validation of the questionnaire, the strategy for administering it to the busy politicians was planned carefully. Each respondent was contacted by meeting him individually, mostly in Vientiane and Luang Prabang. It was explained that he was requested in his personal capacity and on behalf of the research student from the

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[57]The detailed process is shown in William A. Scott, "Attitude Measurement," in Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, 2nd ed., ed. by Gardner Linzey and Elliot Aronson (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968), pp. 256-257.

University of Oklahoma to aid in research on developing nations and that participation in the study would be strictly unofficial. It was also explained to him that the questionnaire was composed of 158 items, that it was entirely academic in character, that it was not sponsored nor approved by any agency of the United States or other governments, that no name would appear on the questionnaire, that his opinions would be entirely off the record, and that his name would be guaranteed its anonymity--in writing if requested (no one did). Above all else, he was asked to answer the questionnaire by himself and then mail it in the self-addressed envelope provided. The place and time for answering the questionnaire depended upon the preference of the respondent, but he was asked to do it at home during a period of relaxation.

Of 66 questionnaires, 62 copies were returned (in a two-month period), which constituted a return rate of approximately 93 percent.

In addition to the questionnaire technique, efforts were made to interview some of the respondents during the period of administering the questionnaire when the opportunity permitted. The respondents were interviewed on general aspects of life. Roughly speaking, the interviews concerned the elite's life history; family, childhood, and school experiences; his estimate of his own personality; his attitude toward friends and money; his personal values and religious views; attitudes toward social class; his concept of an ideal society, and his notions of governmental systems; his concept of equality, freedom, and the cause of war and poverty; and his political interests and activities. Actually, the interviewing contexts were quite similar to those in the questionnaire but permitted a wider variety of responses from the

respondents. The researcher believes that the transcripts of the interviews will offer important support for some of the conclusions of the study as well as confirm the patterns found in the questionnaire technique.

Treatment of the Data

Each item on the questionnaire was scored as followed:

Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion
+2	+1	-1	-2	0

For ease of treatment these scores have been converted to absolute score ranges from +1 to -1, and the items contributing to each trait have been accumulated to produce the trait score (the average of the total scores for all items in the trait). The following formula has been used to compute the absolute score:

$$\text{Absolute Score} = \frac{\left[2N_a + N_b\right] - \left[N_c + 2N_d\right]}{2N}$$

where, N = number of all respondents,
a = strongly agree, b = agree,
c = disagree, d = strongly disagree.

The directions, positive or negative, are shown in Table 1. Plus signs (+) preceding items denote a positive direction, and minus signs (-) preceding items denote a negative direction.

To compute the "Item Absolute Score," for example, an item in which all 62 "strongly agreed" would receive a score of +1, or

$$\frac{\left[(2 \times 62) + 0\right] - \left[0 + (2 \times 0)\right]}{2 \times 62} = +1.0$$

For an item on which all 62 "agreed":

$$\frac{[(2 \times 0) + 62] - [0 + (2 \times 0)]}{2 \times 62} = +.5$$

For an ietm on which all 62 "disagreed":

$$\frac{[(2 \times 0) + 0] - [62 + (2 \times 0)]}{2 \times 62} = -.5$$

For an item on which all 62 "strongly disgreed":

$$\frac{[(2 \times 0) + 0] - [0 + (2 \times 62)]}{2 \times 62} = -1.0$$

For an item on which half "agreed" and half "disagreed," or in which a mixture of strong and moderate agreement and disagreement was exactly balanced:

$$\frac{[(2 \times 0) + 31] - [31 + (2 \times 0)]}{2 \times 62} = 0.00$$

$$\frac{[(2 \times 11) + 22] - [14 + (2 \times 15)]}{2 \times 62} = 0.00$$

This method provides each trait with a measurement of intensity. When correlations among traits were needed for the analysis, product-moment correlation calculation and factor analysis were used through the QUANAL computer program. The program is described in some detail in Appendix E.

Organization of the Study

This introduction has served as a clearing ground for the detailed program of the study; it has introduced the methodology and identified the research tools. Chapter II will deal with human nature; it will begin with an examination of basic human needs, both biological and psychological, as these are treated within the discipline of psychology. Following that it will go to anthropology for that discipline's study of the values that are assumed to knit human society together.

Since many salient characteristics of the current Laotian elites have been shaped and forged by the events of their history, Chapter III will present a brief history of the country. Working from the premise that it is important to describe Laotian society in general terms before exploring the top, Chapter IV briefly surveys the "Laotian Ways of Life."

Chapters V, VI, and VII present our findings. Each element of the elites' responses in the areas of personality psychology, socio-economic values, and political attitudes is reported in considerable detail. Finally, in Chapter VIII, an attempt will be made to assess our findings and integrate them into the developing literature on political culture-and-personality.

CHAPTER II

PSYCHO-CULTURAL BASIS OF HUMAN NATURE IN POLITICS

INTRODUCTION

Political thinkers of the past--for example, Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes--recognized that if one is to understand political phenomena he has to study human nature. On this basis, Graham Wallas has stressed that if one were able to photograph a man's activities for an entire day and then present him with the film, he would, of course, see that many of his actitities consisted of half-conscious repetition, under the influence of habits of movement which were originally more fully conscious. But even if all cases of habit were excluded he would find that only a small proportion of the residue could be explained as being directly produced by an intellectual calculation.[1] Other political scientists also emphasize such "dispositions" in political analysis. However, Robert E. Lane warns that:

> Explanations of political decisions which rely wholly upon analyses of the social environment, while they may have high predictive value, neglect a vital link, they never explain why an individual responds to the environment the way he does.[2]

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[1]Graham Wallas, Human Nature in Politics (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1962), p. 47.

[2]Robert E. Lane, Political Life (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), p. 98.

Thus, in exploring psychological characteristics, as in this study, we need to know first what characteristics are basic to human nature, and then how they influence the behavior of the individual. The study of political-bureaucratic elites can be seen as an attempt, within many diverse frameworks, to study human nature from various viewpoints. Some view of human nature is assumed in any expression of conviction concerning the feasibility and desirability of a particular ordering of political relations. S. Wolin has pointed out that any view of human nature inevitably delimits the "angle of vision."[3]

Such traditional philosophers as Plato and Aristotle have opted for the view that man is a rational animal and is capable of ordering his relationships with other men so as to achieve through society self-fulfillment and the "good life." Others, Rousseau particularly, have considered man to be naturally good, naturally fulfilled; in political society, man finds not the ultimate in self-expression, but rather the corruption of his noble nature. Hobbes, on the other hand, has pictured man as passionate, power-seeking, unsatisfiable, and inherently at war with other men. It is only through the polity's strict control of his passions that man can find social peace and order. This social peace does not come from within; it is imposed by the great leviathan--the state. Machiavelli and some others have attempted to get political philosophy out of the fact-free vacuum in which it had been contemplating human nature in relation to various types of social organization, and confront it with the problems of social organization in the real world.

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[3]S. S. Wolin, Politics and Vision (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), chapter 1.

Up to the present day, political philosophers have based their theories on views of human nature that were at times logically consistent, but certainly not empirically verified. For example, Marx held that human nature is perfectable to a point where the ordering of societal relationships would be a natural function of man's harmony with himself and the economic arrangements in his society. But Erich Fromm notes that

> He did not recognize the irrational forces in man which make him afraid of freedom, and which produce his lust for power and his destructiveness. On the contrary, underlying his concept of man was the implicit assumption of man's natural goodness, which would assert itself as soon as the crippling economic shackles were released. . . . With their chains they have also to lose all those irrational needs and satisfactions which were originated while they were wearing the chains.[4]

Throughout political philosophy, social controls have been thought sufficient to eliminate deviant types. The only categorization offered has at times been between the ruler and the ruled.

Since the benchmark work of Freud, political philosophers have been able to ask more penetrating questions about human nature. Lucian Pye has noted that "in his insight into the full dimensions of man's inner nature, Freud made it embarrassingly clear that previous theories of political relationships were generally premised on impoverished and inadequate notions of human nature."[5] Further, cultural anthropologists have offered additional refinements of the patterns

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[4]Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (Greenwich: Fawcett Publications, 1955), p. 232.

[5]Lucian W. Pye, "Personal Identity and Political Ideology," in Political Decision-Makers, ed. by D. Marvick (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961), p. 291.

which human nature may display.[6] An increasing number of political scientists have begun to give recognition to the fact that politics and political behavior include the study of more than institutions and legal frameworks.[7] In short, they have begun to appreciate anew Plato's insight of pre-political dispositions, and that, in Harold Lasswell's words, "the stability of the constitution depends upon the molding of the appropriate form of character."[8]

Most attempts to explain human nature, in general and in politics, are entirely based on the background of personality, values, and culture in psychology and anthropology. We shall first trace it on the psychological basis of taking the individual as a unit of analysis, followed by the anthropological theoretical framework of human nature based on a group of individuals as a unit of analysis.

Talcott Parsons has pointed out that in studying human nature "the contribution of psychological analysis to the social sciences has consisted of an enormous deepening and enrichment of our understanding of human motivation."[9] Our theories of human motivation are based on evidence that man has certain inborn, basic needs which must be

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[6]The contributions of the cultural anthropologists will be presented in the second-half of this chapter.

[7]For a useful discussion of this process, see, Harry Eckstein, "A Perspective in Comparative Politics, Past and Present," in Comparative Politics: A Reader, ed. by Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter (New York: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 3-22.

[8]See a series of essays on Harold D. Lasswell's impact on the study of political behavior in A. A. Rogow, ed. Politics, Personality, and Social Sciences in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

[9]Talcott Parsons, Social Structure and Personality (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 18.

satisfied to grow to self-actualization. It is felt that throughout each culture, and in the past as well as the present, the human personality has been shaped by these basic needs and the way in which they are satisfied or left unsatisfied; it is posited that these needs are arranged in a hierarchy of importance so that after--and only after--the first and most basic is largely satisfied does the next need become a motivating force. Along this line, Abraham Maslow set forth his carefully described and clinically derived statements on a "hierarchy of the basic needs" in Motivation and Personality.[10]

Humans' Basic Needs

Nobody would deny that man everywhere shares physiological needs such as hunger, thirst, and sexual gratification and procreation. We can be sure about the universality of these needs because they are biologically determined. Generally, needs may be thought of as basic and underlying psychic dispositions.[11] There is some evidence that an inability to fulfill particular needs will cause perceptual if not behavioral distortions.[12] More important, however, for social and political analysis, Maslow asserts that the basic needs are hierarchically ordered. When an individual is deprived of a need in the first category, i.e., a physiological need, this condition will activate his central control systems so that he will pursue its satisfaction before returning to other activity. He has posited the existence of a need hierarchy in the

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[10]Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 1954).

[11]Ibid.

[12]James Davies, Human Nature in Politics (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1963).

following order of ascendance: (1) physiological, (2) security, (3) social-affection, (4) self-esteem, and (5) self-actualization needs.[13]

Physiological needs refer to the need of the body for food, sleep, water, or air. Security needs are next in the need hierarchy and refer to the need to be physically and psychologically secure. When these needs have been met the social-affection needs emerge. The social-affection needs refer to the desire for feelings of self-worth originating in the interplay between personal competence and those social norms that govern the area and nature of competence. Furthermore, not until the physical, security and social-affection needs are at least minimally satisfied will the individual seek satisfaction of his self-esteem needs. Lastly, when all of these needs have been fulfilled, the need for self-actualization emerges. Self-actualization is defined as the desire for self-fulfillment, the attempt to actualize what is potential, or as Maslow puts it, "to become everything that one is capable of becoming."[14] In political analysis it appears worthwhile to observe the impact of all these basic needs.

Physiological Needs

First and foremost is the necessity that the most basic human needs be satisfied--that the individual have food, shelter and sexual gratification so he and his species can survive. In this connection the story of evolution seems to tell us that members of every species stake out some particular territory for themselves in order to support

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[13]Maslow, op. cit.

[14]Abraham Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," Psychological Review, 50 (1943), 370.

their needs and enable them to carry on their living. The extent of this territory is dependent on what is required for survival of the species.[15]

Physiological needs, if unfulfilled, become the basic organizing mechanism of human activity. While it may be true that man does not live by food alone, calorie deprivation appears to lead to a decreased interest in the surrounding environment and increased interest--one might say a preoccupation--with food.[16] Physiological deprivation is not without its implication for political behavior, as Eric Hoffer notes:

> . . . to be engaged in a desperate struggle for food and shelter is to be wholly free from a sense of futility. The goals are concrete and immediate. Every meal is a fulfillment; to go to sleep on a full stomach is a triumph . . . . Where people toil from sunrise to sunset for a bare living they nurse no grievances and dream no dreams.[17]

Also in reference to the sense of futility and passivity in politics that derives from the necessity of being highly concerned with psysiological needs, H. H. Dicks reports the common feeling that "all this is far too difficult for me, I am only a small man."[18] Christian Bay also points out that "starvation can confine freedom of expression more effectively than can political tyranny."[19] People who live at a starvation level are only peripherally concerned with such higher needs.

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[15]This, incidentally, is a major reason for the hope of some psychologists that human beings will regard the whole world as their territory now that narrower boundaries are meaningless to atomic weapons.

[16]See the discussion of the Minnesota experiments in James Davies, op. cit., pp. 11-15. According to this theory, the political apathy common in developing countries is largely derived from unfulfilled needs.

[17]Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper & Row, 1951), pp. 26-27.

[18]H. V. Dicks, "Personality Traits and Natural Socialist Ideology," Human Relations, 3 (1950), 118.

[19]Christian Bay, The Structure of Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1965), p. 15.

Failure to recognize this basic fact has been a stumbling block in the attempt of the United States to build democracy in developing countries.

Security Needs

Maslow asked "what happens to man's desires when there is plenty of (food) and when his belly is chronically filled?"

> At once (other higher) needs emerge and these rather than physiological hungers, dominate the organism. And when these terms are satisfied, again new (and still higher) needs emerge, and so on.[20]

There is a desire for security to protect gains already made and to assure a beachhead from which further advances may be staged. Man wants some assurance that one action can lead to another, some definite protection which provides an orientation and integration through time.

Maslow points out that this need falls into two parts: (1) a need for physical safety, and (2) a need for psychological security. The first refers to the need to be secure from attack or aggression and to live one's life without being the object of physical threat. The second is more subtle and refers to the psychological need for an orderly and predictable world.

In children this need takes the form of "a preference for some kind of undisrupted routine . . . (a preference) for a safe, orderly, predictable, organized world which he can count on and in which unexpected, unmanageable, or other dangerous things do not happen."[21]

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[20]Maslow, op. cit., p. 80. Also see some evidence in: B. Bettelheim, The Informed Heart (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960); and, Davies, Human Nature in Politics.

[21]Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. 86-87.

This need is not absent in adults. Irving Goffman, for example, has noted that adults engage in elaborate "stage managing" in order to routinize many of their social interactions, i.e., to enhance their feelings of security, and he says that such activities are perfectly normal.[22] Carried to an extreme, however, the attempt to manipulate the environment for psychological security needs begins to resemble the compulsive personality derived clinically by K. Horney, and in the area of politics by Alexander and Juliette George in their comprehensive study of Woodrow Wilson's personality.[23]

The pervasiveness of this security need has a historical explanation, and has serious implications for political movements in present day Laos and some other countries. When the Germans accepted Nazi leadership in the past,[24] security needs accounted for a part of their motivation. In another aspect, G. M. Gilbert finds a connection between the search for security and ardent nationalism. He comments:

> With the expansion of ethnic identification groups from the primitive tribe to the modern state, the socially identified security of the individual has been correspondingly extended. The aggressive nationalism that has characterized many dictatorships must be regarded as an enlarged manifestation of the continuing quest for security through group solidarity.[25]

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[22]Irving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Anchor Press, 1959).

[23]K. Horney, Neurotic Personality of Our Times (New York: Norton, 1937); and, Alexander A. George and Juliette George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1964).

[24]H. P. Gert, "The Nazi Party: Its Leadership and Composition," The American Journal of Sociology, 45 (January, 1940), 517-541.

[25]G. M. Gilbert, The Psychology of Dictatorship (New York: Ronald Press, 1950), p. 8.

The Needs for Affection and Belongingness

After both the physiological and safety needs have been largely fulfilled, according to Maslow, the higher needs emerge. Affection needs, one of the higher ones, include the desire and need for human warmth and a sense of mutuality in relationships with the human environment. The deleterious effects on human growth when these needs are not satisfied have been well-documented in studies by K. Davis.[26] Organisms deprived of this need early in the life cycle grow up emotionally stunted, and never seem able to recover. The implications of the deprivation of this need for the political system may appear small at first glance, but a further look reveals its importance. A recent psychoanalytic study of Adolph Hitler suggests that emotion deprivation had important consequences for his behavior as a political leader.[27]

George and George, for example, in analyzing Woodrow Wilson's personality concluded that "throughout his life, Wilson had great concern with the problem of whether he was loveable and loved, and required an inordinate amount of explicit reassurance on this score."[28] Then, they comment that while Wilson was driven by a need for self-esteem, "power was not the only operative value in Wilson's political

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[26] K. Davis, "Final Note on a Case of Extreme Isolation," American Sociological Review, 4 (1956).

[27] Walth Langer, The Mind of Adolph Hitler (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

[28] George and George, op. cit., p. 31.

behavior . . . . His desire for power was mitigated by a simultaneous need for approval, respect and, especially, for feeling virtuous."[29]

It appears likely that the person with a great need to achieve self-esteem and outside approval will provide a lower quality of leadership than that required to help others achieve self-actualization. But even more important, the ability of such a psychologically deprived individual to assess reality and to perceive new information will be severely restricted by his need to hear favorable information. Furthermore, individuals with an unsatisfied chronic need for affection will be likely to be intolerant and undemocratic. The need for affection, then, is an important determinant of many types of political behavior.

Esteem Needs

Every individual wants to feel that he himself is worthwhile; he wants to be able to respect himself, to have some faith in his own values. These desires are called esteem needs. Maslow describes these needs in two ways:

> First, the desire for strength, for achievement, for adequacy, for mastery, and competence for confidence in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom. Second, the desire for reputation and/or prestige, status, dominance, recognition, attention, importance, application.[30]

Therefore, self-esteem can be thought of as a very positive feeling. An individual may have either a large or a small amount of self-esteem. Negative concepts of self may also exist, although they are not necessarily the opposite of self-esteem; that is, an individual may

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[29]Ibid., p. 320. See also E. V. Wolfenstein's interesting analysis of Leon Trotsky, Personality and Politics (Belmont: Dickinson Publishing Co., 1969).

[30]Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 20.

have little self-esteem, but this need not imply "negative" self-evaluation. Robert Lane says that "the person who is disappointed in himself, and in his status in the eyes of the world, is also disappointed about the world that sees him this way."[31] In this sense esteem needs lie at one point along a continuum of involvement with one's environment, which is of great importance in understanding political behavior.

The word "self" as used here refers to the sense of selfhood that forms the core of personality. It can be used interchangeably with "ego" to refer to the central attitudes that constitute a person's identity. Essential to one's identity, then, are ideas about "who" one is and "what" one can do. The first of these ideas involves the individual's "self-concept," and the second relates to his feelings of "competence" in dealing with different aspects of his world. The self is a major point of reference in any person's cognitive system. An elite member acts as he does because he is a political leader, department head, decision-maker, nationalist, and so on. Many of these beliefs and opinions are "ego involved." That is, they are closely related to one's sense of self. The response of a politician depends upon who he is and how he compares himself to others with whom he is interacting.

One's self or selfhood is not inborn, nor does it necessarily await the development of language. At birth, the infant probably does not distinguish self from non-self. Gradually, through experience with

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[31]Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 106-107.

his own inner sensations, as well as the sights, sounds, and feeling coming from outside himself, the infant acquires a primitive identity.[32]

The self is a product of interaction with the social world, as well as the physical world. The self reflects evaluations and comparisons with other people. Kuhn and McPartland's study which asked college students to write twenty answers to the question "who am I?" found that one's self-conception is strongly rooted in one's group membership.[33] The students tended to describe themselves first in terms of group and social class membership, e.g., man, student, Catholic, son, or husband. Later items were couched in more evaluative terms such as good student, happy, pretty, not very handsome, and so on. According to William James, our self-esteem can be expressed as a ratio of our accomplishments to the things that we think we can do. He adds that ". . . our self-feeling in this world depends entirely on what we 'back' ourselves to be and do."[34]

The importance of this need in the study of politics has been suggested by a number of scholars. Harold Lasswell has undoubtedly been the leader in pointing to the importance that self-esteem lends to the striving for power, the seeking of positions of influence, the assessment of social situations with regard to their potential for fulfilling this desire for influence, and the acquisition of the

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[32]The process of differentiation of the sense of "I," "Me," and "Mine" was aptly described by G. Murphy, L. B. Murphy, and T. M. Newcomb, Experimental Social Psychology, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1937).

[33]M. H. Kuhn and T. S. McPartland, "An Empirical Study of Self-Attitudes," American Sociological Review, 49 (1954), 68-76.

[34]William James, Psychology: The Briefer Course (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), p. 54.

necessary knowledge and skills to achieve political goals.[35] In another study a group of political candidates, for example, were asked to describe why men sought effective office. The answer was a fairly clear picture "of self-interest in which the most important elements were personal advancement and prestige."[36] The pursuit of power as a compensatory personality goal is undoubtedly a significant motivational force in politics.

Self-Actualization

The need for self-actualization emerges after all the other needs mentioned have been satisfied. As Maslow noted, "what man can be, he must be."[37] Once the other needs have been met then men can concentrate on realizing their potential. The relationship between self-actualization and political behavior has been analyzed by Jeanne Knutson.[38]

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[35]Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York: W. W. Norton, 1948), p. 39. For the details of other studies of self-esteem related to political behavior, see a comprehensive review in William F. Stone, The Psychology of Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1974), pp. 97-107.

[36]Robert Rosenzweig, "The Politician and the Career in Politics," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 2 (1957), 166. For useful examples of psychobiographies, see: Erik Erikson, Young Man Luther (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969); L. J. Edinger, Kurt Schumacher (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965); and, Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966).

[37]Maslow, Motivational and Personality, p. 91.

[38]Jeanne N. Knutson, The Human Basis of the Polity (Chicago: Aldine, 1972). For the review of the measurements of self-esteem and self-actualization, see, John P. Robinson and Phillip Shaver, Measure of Social and Psychological Attitudes, rev. ed. (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, 1974), pp. 45-162.

Generally, the self-actualizing person is found to be more politically concerned, more tolerant and less likely to join extremist groups.[39]

Let us now turn to the personality of the individual. This personality, of course, is rooted in the physical organism with its generic constitution and its metabolic needs for food, respiration, elimination, and so forth. But more importantly, the main structure of personality is built through social interaction. It develops through the normative patterns governing the child's interaction in social situations.

Of course, the primary agency of early socialization is the family in which the child is brought up. The process in general starts with the development of a deep attachment to the mother. This in due course is used as a basis of leverage to motivate and reward autonomous behavior, within the framework of a basic security acceptance. Erotic components, as we know since Freud, play a central role in these early relationships, particularly as a bridge between the needs of the organism and the generalization of motivation to the level of socially organized patterns of behavior.

With the oedipal transition the child emerges from a life primarily contained within the family. His sex role has become emotionally consolidated to a considerable degree, and he enters upon a new and rapid process of instrumental learning especially concerned with the school and with informal relations with his peers. Then, as he enters adolescense, he becomes capable of a much more differentiated set of commitments, not only to the continuance of formal education, but to

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[39] *Ibid.*

responsible participation in associational activity, to a re-emerging basis of concern with his relations to the opposite sex, leading eventually to marriage, and on a new level, with the problem of his personal moral commitments and their backing with reference to an orientation to the problems of meaning.

Any individual person is bound within the framework not only of the generic constitution of the organism and the condition of its healthy functioning but also of his personal life history, which is never exactly like that of any other, and its bearing on his interests, goals, and capacities for dealing with the problems of adult life. And this involves all his roots in the biological, social, and cultural soil of his experience. He is what and who he is by virtue of the time and status of his birth, his sex, his parentage, his many associations. In this sense every human life starts from an ascriptive origin and can depart from the fixities of this origin only by the paths of structured "opportunity" provided by the structure of the culture and society in which he is embedded and by the exigencies of his own personality.

Dispositions

Maslow's theoretical assumption of basic human needs postulates that what makes people act is a "need," or in other terms, "drive." Hunger is a drive that stimulates action in the search for and eating of food. In other words, most human behavior is caused, motivated, and goal directed.[40] People do not behave randomly but in order to satisfy

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[40]See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).

some basic need. What makes people differ is not these needs, but rather "a tendency to respond in a certain way in a given situation." These are "dispositions," which change the actual content of needs and the ways to satisfy them. In sum, form and order are given to behavior by a pattern of dispositions.[41]

Types of Dispositions

Dispositions come in several types, such as dispositions toward certain opinions, attitudes, beliefs, and values. In another dimension, a disposition can be thought of as a psychological characteristic or factor, such as personality trait, which is unconsciously related to other political phenomena. Returning to a discussion of opinions, the term has been defined as "an explicit verbal response or 'answer' that an individual gives in response to a particular stimulus situation in which some 'general question' is raised."[42] A particular combination of opinions can be called an "attitude." In other words, an opinion has to do with a specific issue, but an attitude has to do with generality. Lewis Froman defines attitude as "a disposition of an individual to evaluate some aspect of his world in a favorable or unfavorable manner, that is, a predisposition to approve or disapprove, like or dislike some social or physical objects."[43] In this sense an

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[41]Clifford Geertz, Interpretation of Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 140-141.

[42]H. J. Eysenck, The Psychology of Politics (London: Rutledge & Kegan Paul, 1954), p. 111.

[43]Lewis Froman, People and Politics (Englewood Cliffs: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), p. 20.

attitude is probably more stable and durable than an opinion. At another level, a cluster of attitudes can be called an "ideology." Eysenck has called this a "super-attitude."[44] Dispositions can be more or less unconscious, thus, we are unaware of many dispositions which influence our behavior.

Closely related to dispositions are "beliefs" and "values." The first is defined as "cognitions with an extra feeling of credibility which are not beliefs."[45] Thus a belief can be true or false, but a false belief is no less a belief, for its truth or falsity is logically independent of the psychological uncertainty of its believer. The relevance of beliefs to political behavior is obvious. What a man believes is often the main determinant of what he does and what his attitudes are. The second term, "value," is "a statement of 'good' or 'bad,' 'right' or 'wrong,' something which is desired or thought desirable."[46] Political scientists often emphasize the importance of political values (or values pursued politically) when explaining political behavior. As Lasswell has stated, the values that men seek in politics are, for example, power, wealth, well-being, skill, enlightenment, affection, rectitude, and respect.[47] While values are not true or false, it is a fact that people have various values and

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[44]Eysenck, op. cit., p. 113. For a view of attitude as "perspective," see Geertz, Interpretation of Culture, p. 110.

[45]Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 31.

[46]Froman, op. cit., p. 18.

[47]Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930).

that the holding of a value can be empirically tested. Alan Isaak says that "values in this empirical sense are fair game for political scientists."[48] For a greater understanding of the phenomena of values, we shall examine the contributions of anthropologists.

Value System and Culture

Cultural anthropologists assume that every society is composed of a multitude of elements; everything from tools, weapons, houses, religions, and social institutions is called "culture." Culture is a systematic and integrated whole whose parts are linked together by a central value system. In addition, since human behavior does not operate at random, man in treating his cultural extensions tends to develop certain patterns of doing things. Along this line, these societal elements created by men are governed by a common set of rules. It is this common set of rules which is called here the value system. An important characteristic of this value system is that a great part of it lies hidden and is thus outside the voluntary control of man.[49] Because it is passed on from generation to generation, and man learns it from his childhood, these patterned ways of doing things lie at the root of his subconsciousness in such a way that when he acts he merely takes them for granted and most of the time he is not aware of them.

This value system appears to constitute what is called in system theory "the basic relationships in a system," those which link

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[48]Alan Isaak, Scope and Methods of Political Science (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1969), p. 166.

[49]Man is used here in the sense of men in interaction, not "the individual."

all the parts together to make them a whole. It is in this sense that we can say that the whole is reflected in the parts and the parts in the whole. Thus, the parts and the whole, man and his creations, constitute an interrelated system in such a way that the basic relationships can be found in any element that bears the imprint of man.[50] It should be noted that in stressing the role of man as the only active element and the value system as the linking element in culture, it is by no means our intention to minimize the role of material elements such as technology.

Man and Culture

We have stressed the importance of the value system that exists in man because it is man who is the creator and carrier of culture. We have to explain why man has this capacity, why individuals in a culture tend to share a common value system, and how it directs their behavior so that they tend to act in ways different from people in other cultures. This uniqueness of man has been described by Leslie A. White in these terms:

> Man as an animal possesses a number of characteristics which qualified him for culture. Among these may be mentioned erect posture, which frees the forelimbs for nonlocomotory activities, an opposable thumb, which makes an effective grasping organ, stereoscopic, chromatic vision, gregariousness, and possibly a few other traits. But the most important qualification of all is the capacity to symbol.[51]

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[50] In the sense that we consider the characteristics of the elites; both a part--personality, and a whole--culture; or in an aggregated term--culture-and-personality.

[51] Leslie A. White, "The Evolution of Culture," in Cultural and Social Psychology, ed. by Peter B. Hammond (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1964), p. 406.

And he defines the capacity to symbol as: "the ability freely and arbitrarily to originate and bestow meaning upon a thing or event, and correspondingly, the ability to grasp and appreciate such meaning."[52] This capacity of assigning and appreciating values cannot be achieved with sensory organs but with man's mind, which is unique among all species of living beings. Through his mind man can have greater freedom of choice than can other animals whose behavior is governed by drives and instinct. It is this freedom to symbolize, combined with other unique abilities, that enables man to create cultures--constituted of things and events, such as language, institutions, customs, clothing, ornaments, tools, and so forth. Since few people would deny this unique human capacity, we shall not elaborate on this point. What we need to emphasize here, because of its far-reaching consequences for the interpretation of human behavior, is the evidence found in physical anthropology that the Homo sapiens, or modern man as we know him today, is the result of a long-term evolution in which the brain of the human species increased gradually in size with the addition of more complex faculties as a consequence of the interaction of the ancestors of modern man with the environment. The evolution of the human species during the Pleistocene or first million years, according to Washburn and Howell's interpretation based on fossil records and archeological specimens associated with human fossils, has followed three stages. In the first stage, the Australopithecines (which evolved from a mammal of the order Primates) were characterized by bipedal locomotion, reduced dentition, a small brain, and some sign of early culture. At the middle

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[52] Ibid.

Pleistocene, came the early Homo stage in which the Hominids (which appeared to have evolved from the Australopithecines) were endowed with more structural and cultural advances--larger brain, hunting tools. About forty thousand years ago the Homo sapiens stage began with men structurally like ourselves. They possessed large brains and created major cultural innovations and rapid technological advances. These abilities of modern man are essential to complicated social life.[53] Expressing the belief that "in the future it may become possible to demonstrate that this social brain is the outcome of new selection pressures which came with an increasingly complex society," Washburn and Howell conclude that "from the immediate point of view this brain structure makes possible a complicated technical-social life; but from the long term evolutionary point of view, it was altered selection pressures of the new technical social life which gave the brain its peculiar size and form.[54]

The proposition that the human mind is a result of the interplay between culture and biology seems to have great significance for political theory in its interpretation of human behavior. If it is true that man has never had an innate nature independent of his culture, human behavior must be viewed as the result of the interaction between biological and cultural factors and not by biological factors alone, as is supposed by the stimulus-response model. Between human organization and

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[53]S. L. Washburn and F. Clark Howell, "Human Evolution and Culture," in Physical Anthropology and Archeology, ed. Peter B. Hammond (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1964), pp. 12-25.

[54]Ibid., p. 24.

environment, culture is the intervening variable. Man shares with other animals basic drives such as hunger, thirst, and a need for sexual gratification and procreation, but everywhere in human societies the basic drives are given cultural interpretations. Americans, Indians, Laotians--all must eat, but what, how, and when to eat is culturally determined. It is interesting to note that some biological needs cannot only be restrained, but also completely suppressed by the action of culture. In response to religious convictions, man may cease to procreate and to satisfy sexual urges. Thus, even man's most basic needs are given symbolic content and their fulfillment is conditioned by the value system of a particular culture.[55]

In addition to these drives, man possesses another one which is termed by Goldschmidt as "the need for positive affect." This drive, which, according to the author, appears unique to man and is at present unproved and perhaps unprovable (because research into the animal nature of man as unaffected by culture is virtually impossible), has been defined by him as the need for "each person to crave response from his human environment. It may be viewed as hunger, not unlike that for food, but more generalized. Under varying conditions it may be expressed as a desire for contact, for recognition and acceptance, for approval, for esteem, or for a mastery."[56] This drive, which may be called social need, had its original source in biology and thus is a generalized

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[55]Walter Goldschmidt, "The Biological Constant," in Cultural Anthropology, ed. Hammond, pp. 2-5.

[56]Ibid., p. 7.

behavioral attribute universal to man, making him live in social systems and seek to attain the approval of his fellow men. If this social need as well as the physiological needs are universal to man, the ways to fulfill them are culturally determined. In other words, these needs may be viewed as constants or universals and the cultural factors as variables. The former merely lay down the broad conditions under which societies must operate. It is, finally, the cultural variable that can explain the variation in human behavior in different cultures.[57]

Since all these needs, biologically derived, change in form, content, emphasis, and with the cultural interpretation given to them, it appears somewhat hazardous to posit a hierarchy of needs which is genetically determined as specified by Maslow. We cannot say that physiological needs are more potent than higher social needs--i.e., that only after satisfying lower order needs will the human personality begin to think of fulfilling his higher needs--simply because the relative prepotency of each need is culturally but not genetically determined. Moreover, the extent to which a need is satisfied can only be judged, even in general terms, by taking into account the cultural factors.

Value System and Culture-and-Personality

We have shown that man has unique capacities that permit him to make a culture. Among these, the most important one is the freedom to bestow meanings and symbols on things and events. This capacity of symbolizing is a product of the human mind which permits man to learn the symbols and meanings of his culture and to transmit them to his posterity. The ability to learn makes man act in response to social

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[57] Ibid., pp. 7-8.

conditioning, rather than to inherited patterns of activity like animals. Behavior learned through social conditioning is reinforced by the relatively prolonged period of immaturity and dependence which makes people accept the particular symbols of their culture and by the patterns of organization of their society. We can not utterly reject these symbols and organizational symbols. When people become mature and able to act independently, they are already imbued with the assumptions and imperatives of their culture. It is this process of socialization, permitted by conscious and unconscious learning, that gives culture its continuity and makes social life possible. Indeed, there would be complete chaos if every societal member behaved in a random and unpredictable manner. Though the degree of integration may vary from culture to culture, some common norms of behavior--more or less shared and internalized by members through the process of socialization--appear to be necessary for the survival of any society.

As a consequence of the process of socialization, a great part of these transmitted norms, altered or unaltered from generation to generation, are so taken for granted that they normally do not enter into consciousness. These norms are referred to by cultural anthropologists as the underlying principles which govern the behavior of people and which make for the particularity of each culture. Because these principles exist mostly at the level of subconsciousness and are rarely stated explicitly, they can seldom be observed directly but only inferred on the basis of consistencies in thought and action. The following example given by Kroeber and Kluckhohn may give an idea as to what an underlying principle is: the Navaho Indians hide their faces and see to it that no other person can get any of their bodily parts or

products such as hair, nails, or spit. They are also very careful to keep their personal names secret, and tend to have a negative verbal reaction when asked about witchcraft. All of these behavioral patterns, as well as others not mentioned, are, according to the authors, a manifestation of an underlying principle or "cultural entheymeme" which may be called "fear of the malevolent activities of other persons."[58]

These underlying cultural principles are usually termed by anthropologists "implicit culture" or "covert culture," in opposition to the "explicit" or "overt" culture which consists of observable human behavior and its resulting products. Others call them "unconscious canons of choice," "world view," "culture theme," "configurations," "thought patterns," "background phenomena," "ethos," "value orientations," etc.[59] The importance of these underlying principles in helping us understand the behavior of people in a culture has been emphasized by Kroeber and Kluckhohn in these terms:

> The logical construct, culture, is based upon the study of behavior and behavioral products. It returns to behavior and behavioral products in that the concept of culture makes more behavior intelligible and, to an appreciable extent, makes possible predictions about behavior in particular areas. But culture is not behavior nor the investigation of behavior in all its concrete completeness. Part of culture consists in norms and standards of behavior. Still another part consists in ideologies justifying or rationalizing certain selected ways of behavior. Finally, every culture includes broad general principles of selectivity and ordering

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[58]A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (Cambridge: Harvard University Peabody Museum of American Archeology and Ethnology Papers, 1952), pp. 336-337.

[59]About these concepts, see, Victor Barnouw, Culture and Personality, rev. ed. (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1973), pp. 55-90; Bert Kaplan, ed., Studying Personality Cross-Culturally (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Co., 1961); and, Kroeber and Kluckhohn, op. cit.

("highest common factors") in terms of which pattern of and for culture contents are reducible to parsimonious generalization.[60]

All of these underlying principles are assumed to be related to one another in a certain manner because human behavior is supposed to strive toward a certain degree of consistency. A number of principles may derive from higher principles, which in turn may stem from one oversummative principle. Some principles may be in conflict with each other. How these underlying principles are integrated to form what we call here the "value system" is a great issue confronting anthropologists, who differ as to how they are really related. There are those who hold that the value system is integrated by one highest principle. The highest principle is called "world-view," "Weltanschauung," or "ethos," which may be roughly defined as the basic attitude imprinted upon man by his perception of nature. Spengler, in The Decline of the West, attributes the Apollonian, static character of Hellenic culture to the clear air of the innumerable islands of the Aegean Sea and the Faustian, dynamic, progressive Western European culture to the darker landscape and the incessant fog which lingered over the forests of Europe. Similarly, the scenery of the Indian jungle, with its superabundance of plant and animal life, is thought to be formative of the Indian value system, which is dominated by the cult of the supernatural because man feels so small before such a spectacle of nature.[61] Along the same line Benedict describes the value systems

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[60]Kroeber and Kluckhohn, op. cit., p. 375.

[61]Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, vol. II (New York: Knopf, 1939), p. 57.

of some Indian tribes as dominated by one basic spirit--Dionysian or Apollonian.[62]

Others see child-rearing practices, i.e., the relationship within the family, as the determinant of the main value systems of a culture. Parent-child relationships with such patterns as dominance-submission, succoring-dependence, and exhibitionism-spectatorship are, according to Mead,[63] what makes cultures differ. The difference between the English and American character has been attributed by the author to habits acquired since early childhood. For example, the British have a tendency to "understate" and the American to "overstate," and they accuse each other of "arrogance" and "boasting." The author explains this divergence in character as resulting from the different patterns of exhibitionism-spectatorship in British and American families.

> In Britain it is the father who exhibits to his children: he is the model for their future behavior. Father does the taking and provides the model, before a very quiet and submissive audience; in accordance with the deep ethical disapproval of the use of strength he understates his position, speaks with a slight appearance of hesitation in his manner, but with the cool assurance of one who knows. In the United States, this position is reversed: at the American breakfast table, it is not the Father but Junior who talks, exhibits his successes and skills, and demands parental spectatorship and applause with an insistence that can be clamoring and assertive because, after all, he is speaking from weakness to strength.[64]

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[62]Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Boston: Hougton Mifflin Co., 1934).

[63]Margaret Mead, "The Application of Anthropological Techniques to Cross-Cultural Communication," in Every Man His Way, ed. by Alan Dundes (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), pp. 518-534.

[64]Ibid., p. 523.

Along the same line, Hsu maintains that the core value acquired in the family tends to pervade all other spheres of life. Cultures may be classified according to the prevailing relationship in the family system; father-son, husband-wife, mother-son, etc. The Chinese family, dominated by the father-son relationship, stresses a value of mutual dependence which spreads over the whole way of life of the Chinese people. The Chinese tends to depend upon his clan to fulfill all his physiological as well as social needs, making the clan the most important group in Chinese society. On the other hand, the American family is dominated by the value of individualism, a self-reliance expressed in the primacy of the husband-wife relationship (free association between equal partners). This value acquired in the family, in turn, influences the way of life of an American society characterized by a proliferation of voluntary clubs and associations through which individuals can fulfill their needs.[65] In contrast to this view that the value system and consequently the culture is dominated by a single integrative principle, there are those like Opler who argue that the value system is made up of a limited number of themes--"dynamic affirmations"--which are not necessarily pervasive but which interact with and balance one another.[66]

Another maintains that the values or underlying principles that compose the value system of any culture are the same, with the difference between cultures resulting only from differences of emphasis,

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[65]Francis H. Hsu, The Study of Literate Civilizations (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1969).

[66]Morris E. Opler, "Themes as Dynamic Forces in Culture," American Journal of Sociology, 51 (1945), 198-206.

combination, or rank-ordering. For instance, Alisjahbana has classified values into six types--theoretical, economic, political, solidarity (or social), aesthetic, religious--which are assumed to exist in the value system of any culture, group or individual.[67]

In the author's opinion it is the interrelationships between, and the hierarchy of, values subordinated to one or two higher values that determine the difference in value systems and consequently in individual, group, and cultural behavior. Religious people tend to stress their religious values, other values being subordinated to it and supplementing it. Businesspersons tend to emphasize the economic value, scientists the theoretical value, and politicians the political value. The family gives primacy to the solidarity value, business corporations to the economic value, universities to the theoretical value. Similarly, some cultures give more weight to the economic or theoretical values, others to the religious and aesthetic values. As every individual, group, and culture tends consciously or unconsciously to realize these values, the products of their actions are the expression of these values. If we look at the American culture, what strikes us most is the number and size of the buildings that house the business firms, banks, and universities, that are the concrete manifestation of the economic and theoretical values. There are, of course, also government buildings, churches, parks, and tourist sites, that are the emanation of the political, religious, and aesthetic values. But these structures are overshadowed by the ones dedicated to economic and

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[67]S. Takdir Alisjahbana, Values as Integrating Forces in Personality, Society and Culture (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1969).

theoretical values, and they tend in some way to support and contribute to the realization of these higher values. Government and bureaucracy, which are concerned with the political value, serve to strengthen the economic value in the American culture. Religion, via the Protestant ethic, also tends to contribute to economic development. Scientific research, which is the realization of the theoretical value, is not done merely for the sake of science but ultimately for utilitarian purposes. On the other hand, the Indian culture shows a preference for the religious value expressed in the abundance of holy persons, animals, places, and things.

If we look at each cultural item separately, we can see the value system of its creator reflected in it. A church, for example, is the realization of a hierarchy of values dominated by the highest one; economic, aesthetic, and theoretical values are also expressed in the church, but they are secondary to the highest value. We can also say that any cultural good has one objective aspect, depending on its inherent physical or biological qualities, and a subjective aspect stemming from the subject who perceives and evaluates it according to his own value system. Thus, the meaning of goods changes with the value system of the evaluating subject. A church may change its meaning under the Communists, who may use it as a museum.

The difference between individuals, groups, and cultures depends upon the hierarchical arrangements of the six values in their value system and the forms and ways of achieving these values. If we want to know how the value system of a culture integrates the various elements, we must view each individual as a totality in itself within a higher totality--the social group, which, in turn, is part of a larger

totality--the society, which is also a subsystem of total mankind. Personal behavior tends to realize a personal value system dominated by a higher value, with group behavior reflecting group values which are subordinated to some more predominant one. By realizing their own value systems, they tend directly or indirectly to realize the highest value or values of their cultures. In short, it can be said that individual roles, group norms, folkways, morals, customs are all expressions of cultural values; and they determine a people's way of life, which tends to realize the highest values of its culture.[68]

With Alisjahbana we have seen that the value system is made up of the same values everywhere, with local differences only in emphasis and combination. This universality of values is also claimed by Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck, who assume that human values and acts are directed toward the achievement of problems common to man in every culture. These include conceptions about: (1) the nature of man, (2) the relationship between man and nature, (3) time and space, (4) man's activity, and (5) man's relation with other men. All values in any culture are oriented toward the solution of these problems (which stem from the inherent nature of man), and cultures differ only in the patterning or rank-ordering of these value orientations. Value orientations are defined by the authors as:

> Complex but definitely patterned (rank-ordered) principles, resulting from the transactional interplay of three analytically distinguishable elements of the evaluative process--the cognitive, the affective and the directive elements--which give order and direction to the ever-flowing stream of human

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[68] *Ibid.*

acts and thoughts as these relate to the solution of "common human" problems.[69]

This definition differs from those of certain others--e.g., Clyde Kluckhohn's "configuration," Opler's "cultural themes," Thompson's "core culture," Kardiner and Linton's "personality type," Redfield's "world view,"--in three main respects, i.e., according to Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1) values are complex principles which are variable only in rank ordering--for example, in relation to time, cultures may be oriented toward the past, the present or the future; (2) the principles are on an implicit-explicit continuum and not in terms of either/or; (3) the directive aspect of the total process is of primary importance and derives from biology. The concept of value orientation in the system can be used to explain change of two kinds: first, elaboration of the same pattern, and second, basic change. An example of basic change might be a change in the rank-ordering of values, e.g., a shift from a harmony-with-nature orientation toward a mastery-over-nature orientation.

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck devised a questionnaire to test the value orientations of five subcultures in the United States--Navaho, Zuni, Spanish American, Mormon, and Texan. The results showed a highly significant statistical difference in the patterning of value orientations among these cultures, supporting the authors' hypothesis that those subcultures (Mormon and Texan) that had the same rank-ordering of value orientations as did the majority of the American people have been able to assimilate with it without difficulty. Whereas those

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[69]Florence R. Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodtbeck, Variations in Value Orientations (Evanston, Ill.: Peterson and Co., 1961), p. 4.

whose patterning of value orientations differed the most from the majority culture tended to remain the most isolated from it.[70]

Many other empirical studies have also confirmed the difference in value systems between people of different cultures. Morris has measured the value profiles of students in ten cultures--the United States, China, India, Japan, Norway, Canada, Pakistan, England, New Zealand, and Italy--using a questionnaire containing thirteen "ways to live" deriving from a combination of three basic components of human personality--dionysian, promothean, and buddhistic--which are roughly equivalent to the values of dependence, dominance, and detachment, respectively. These ways of life are summarized by the author as follows: (1) preserve the best that man has attained; (2) cultivate the independence of persons and things; (3) show a sympathetic concern for others; (4) experience festivity and solitude in alternation; (5) act and enjoy life through group participation; (6) constantly master changing conditions; (7) integrate action; (8) enjoyment; (9) wait in quiet receptivity; (10) control the self stoically; (11) meditate on the inner life; (12) chance adventuresome deeds; (13) obey the cosmic purposes.

These thirteen "ways to live" are fragments or aspects of world views or value orientations. The research study was an attempt toward the building of a theory of value or a science of preferential behavior. The results showed that in each country, the ratings of individual questions were made along the same common value dimensions

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[70]*Ibid*.

and that there was an underlying value structure which was very much the same in the culturally diverse group of students.[71]

Morris's findings generally agreed with the results of Hsu's study, which used the Thematic Apperception Test to measure the "individual-centeredness" of samples of American, Chinese, and Indian students, respectively.[72]

Another very important finding which supports the hypothesis that the value system integrates all other systems in a culture has been reported by the anthropologist Thompson. In the Indian Education, Personality, and Administration Project (IEPA), which was a multidisciplinary empirical study of several Indian tribes in the 1940s, six systems of variables were studied:

1) The ecological system (the pattern of transaction between the community and its natural environment)

2) The sociological system (the transacting human organisms which comprise the community, viewed as a society or social structure)

3) The symbolic system (the communal symbolic system, including language, ceremonials, arts and crafts, mythology, folklore, etc.)

4) The psychic system (the community viewed as a group of transacting personalities in process of formation and self-realization)

5) The somatic system (the community viewed as a system of transacting somatic units)

6) The <u>core value system</u> (the community's system of largely <u>implicit</u> emotionally tinged beliefs and attitudes regarding the nature of the world of man, of animals and plants, the relationship between them and the sources and dynamics of power within that system.

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[71]Charles Morris, <u>Varieties of Human Values</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).

[72]Hsu, <u>op. cit</u>.

The findings reveal that the core value system functions as the key integrating mechanism between several interdependent systems of variables. The social structure and group personality structures have been found as interdependent "not overly and directly, but indirectly and covertly, through a common set of basic values and through the somatic system."[73] The personality system is related also to the ecological system; not directly, but indirectly through the core value system and through the somatic system. On the other hand, the somatic and the personality systems are interrelated both directly as aspects of the psychosomatic system as a whole, and indirectly through the core value and symbolic system. Similarly, the ecological system and the sociological system are related "directly through their reflection of a common set of core values."[74]

The role of the value system as an integrating element in culture has been emphasized by Thompson in these terms:

> . . . a major finding of the IEPA project was the discovery, by means of empirical observations and tests, of the key role played by the core value set of variables in the community supersystem. A related finding was that contrary to the initial assumption of the research staff, the group of personality set of variables was not related directly to the social structure, but rather was related to it indirectly by means of the core value set of variables.[75]

We have reviewed the literature about the different theories of value and the empirical studies supporting them to provide a theoretical basis for what we are exploring. Though using different conceptual

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[73]Laura Thompson, Toward a Science of Mankind (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1961), p. 60. (Underlining added).

[74]Ibid., p. 67. (Underlining added).

[75]Ibid., p. 164.

approaches and research methods, many scholars have arrived at the same conclusion: that there exists an underlying value system, which is distinctive for people in each culture, and that this value system can be used to explain certain consistencies and regularities in their behavior which, in turn, make for the particularity of each society. The relationship between value and behavior needs to be elaborated further to avoid misinterpretation.

Value and Behavior

As we have seen, anthropologists emphasize that the value system is made up of largely implicit, unstated, or unconscious values, principles, or assumptions that make people behave the way they do. By this it is meant that when people act, they are most of the time unaware of the tacit values directing their action; it is merely their custom to act in a certain way. These values, transmitted from generation to generation, modified or not, have been internalized in such a way that they are taken for granted; they seem to be something too obvious to be consciously considered. What is obvious to a person is the most difficult thing for him to see, and as Kroeber and Kluckhohn put it, "the really important thing to know about a society is what it takes for granted."[76] It is important in the sense that implicitly it motivates people to do what they do without questioning it, and in this way it helps maintain social life.

For a society to survive, the following imperatives, according to John Bennett and Melvin Tumin,[77] must be fulfilled: (1) maintenance

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[76]Kroeber and Kluckhohn, op. cit., p. 336.

[77]John W. Bennett and Melvin M. Tumin, "Some Cultural Imperatives," in Cultural Anthropology ed. by Hammond, pp. 9-21.

of the biologic functioning of societal members; (2) production and distribution of goods and services; (3) reproduction of new members; (4) socialization of new members into functioning adults; (5) maintenance of order; and (6) maintenance of meaning and motivation. Among these the last one, that of maintaining meaning and motivation, is a "master category which is present and gives tone and support to all the five preceding categories," because "no human activity is possible unless humans are motivated to perform the activity in question."[78] And motivation is provided by making individuals internalize the values inherent in the activity itself:

> Society builds motivation right into each of the major problems and patterns of activities attendant upon them. Thus, the motivation to pursue survival activities is not an abstract and separate feature of our lives. It is built right into the pattern of activity itself. We are taught work habits, how to conduct our social relations, and the like, in such a way that their desirability and the reason for engaging in them are not questioned but taken for granted. Or if questioned they are rationalized for us so that the answers are usually satisfactory and become part of our very innermost core of personality.[79]

The relationship between value, understood in this sense, and behavior is that value determines behavior almost automatically.

It is important to note that in stressing the mechanistic aspect of the relationship between value and behavior, anthropologists are by no means deterministic because they do not dismiss the fact that value is, in turn, the product of a host of other factors--technology, history, geographic conditions--thus implying a theory of multiple causation and interaction. Moreover, they recognize that besides the implicit

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[78] Ibid., p. 19.

[79] Ibid.

values that exist at the level of unconsciousness and thus direct man's behavior outside of his awareness, there are those that belong to the level of consciousness and are consequently under his control.

The differentiation between the conscious and unconscious, and their mutual interaction and their impact upon human behavior, are great issues confronting anthropologists and have a great significance for technical assistance. It suffices now to note that it is mainly the tacit values that make for the difference in behavior between people in different cultures. The following example given by Clyde Kluckhohn may give us an idea as to how the implicit values determine the reaction of people in different cultures to the same problem.

> Five groups, each with a distinct culture, who carry on subsistence agriculture in the same ecological area in the Southwest, are faced with severe drought. Two groups react primarily with increased rational and technological activity, two with increased ceremonial activity and one with passive acceptance.[80]

Because values are so much an intrinsic part of our lives and behavior it appears very difficult to be completely rational or objective, to base one's decision just on facts and avoid value judgments. It also seems difficult to exclude values from the study of politics. Research findings have demonstrated, for example, that "personal values are important determinants in the choice of corporate strategies,"[81] because implicit values are "the guidance system a personality uses when faced with a choice of alternatives."[82]

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[80] Clyde Kluckhohn, "Values and Value Orientations in the Theory of Action," in Toward a General Theory of Action, ed. by Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 405.

[81] William D. Guth and Retano Tagiuri, "Personal Values and Corporate Strategy," Harvard Business Review, 43 (September-October, 1965), 123.

[82] Ibid., p. 125.

In one empirical study, Guth and Tagiuri used the classification of values developed by Spengler to identify six types of men in accordance with the highest value in the hierarchy of values of their respective value systems--theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, political, religious.[83] It was found that the value system of business managers tended to be dominated in order of decreasing importance by the economic, theoretical, and political values, in contrast to men in other professions. In the field of religion, for example, the value system of ministers tended to be dominated in order of decreasing importance by the religious, social and aesthetic values. The findings revealed that corporate managers tended to choose corporate strategy in accordance with the dominant value or values in their own system. The economic man is more likely to emphasize an increase in productivity, the theoretical man to maintain truth and honesty in relation to suppliers, dealers, and employees, the political man to strengthen his personal power. Yet, each one is convinced that his decision is the rational one based on facts.

Summary

A lengthy exploration has been made of the basic ground of human nature in general, and the relationships of this to political behavior in particular. We have considered Maslow's theory of a hierarchy of basic needs, and since men are rational in acting to achieve their goals, this theory has helped us to understand why men act as they do in various cultural circumstances. Further, we have noted that man as a social animal creates his own societies and that these give rise to complex

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[83] Ibid., pp. 123-132.

cultures. Culture itself has been described as a systematic and integrated whole, whose parts are knitted together by a central value system. Then, in considering that human characteristics are guided by the basic needs and shaped by the standard norms of each society, we would seem to have a solid framework within which to understand human nature.

In the next chapter we shall survey the history of Laos to find patterns that have appeared in the past. We shall observe history as an element of the environmental system that has shaped the political culture-and-personality of the Laotian elites.

CHAPTER III

GEO-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

Laos is a new addition to the regional map of the world. Prior to the second World War, "Laos" was more of a geographic expression that a nation, and there was little sense of internal identification. Its peoples differ widely in social organization, culture, and political identity. To the extent that there is a dominant group it is the Lao Loum, or lowland Lao, who live along the Mekong River, and it is their elites who have traditionally played the strongest roles in Laotian history. The Lao Loum have their own divisions, but in general they share a common life style, language, religion, culture, and history, and the present Laotian political-bureaucratic elites have been drawn mainly from their ranks.

There are especially great differences among the hill tribe peoples, who make up about half of the population and who occupy more than half of the land area of Laos. Further, these people have little or no identification with the cultural, social, and political systems of the lowland Lao. So achieving a national identity and integrating these various groups of the people into a nation-state will be a great challenge for this country, and especially for the elites--in addition to the problems of economic development and modernization. The mountainous geographical setting seems to be one of the major variables

complicating this task, as it tends to block internal communication and social mobility. Moreover, it divides the people into graups with different cultures and even histories. These factors affect the culture-and-personality of the elites as a whole. In sum, the Laotian elites have their own unique environmental problems.

Country and Environment

"Soft countries," wrote Herodotus, "invariably breed soft men, and it is impossible for one and the same country to produce splendid crops and good soldiers." The Persians, he continued, chose "to live as an imperial people in a rough country rather than to cultivate the lowlands as some other nation's slaves."[1] Such classical writing on history and politics contends that the nature of human character and the societies that in some sense derived from it were ultimately rooted in the soil and the climate. Geographers, historians, and political scientists generally accept some relationship between societies and environments.[2] What they argue about is the extent to which the broad lines of history and politics in a society are influenced by the physical setting.

At the most fundamental level, land is a necessary component of a state; a state is inconceivable without area and without a government in effective and sovereign control of it. Policy is the set of choices,

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[1]Herodotus, Herodotus IX Book (New York: Arno Press, 1973), p. 112.

[2]The historian Arnold J. Toynbee emphasized the importance of such relationships, see, A Study of History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1934). For other ecological environments, see, for example: John A. Morrison, "Russia and Warm Water," United States Navel Institute Proceedings, 78 (1952), 1169-1176; James Fairgrieve, Geography and World Power (London: University of London Press, 1921); and, Sidney F. Markham, Climate and the Energy of Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944).

made by the elites within the state, of ends and of the means by which those ends may be most conveniently achieved. Power is the sanction which enables the elites, as decision-makers, to pursue the policies of the state. And the basic common factor in the various policies pursued by every state in the modern world is the preservation of its own territorial integrity and the welfare of its own citizens--despite varied perceptions regarding the nature of security and welfare, and in spite of the devious and sometimes unrealistic courses by which their achievement is sought. Power, or at least power to maintain an independent state, then, is the means whereby the state seeks to secure its own well-being, and the power of a state is itself made up of two elements. First and most obvious are the physical and tangible components of power: land and agricultural wealth, fuel and mineral resources; population, man-power, and manufacturing industries; defensible boundaries and other simple facts of geographical location. Second, less tangible though no less real, are the non-material components: the morale and social cohesion of its peoples; the energy and intelligence of its leadership; and the image of itself which it succeeds in projecting before the world.

It is not difficult to name states that by the vigor of their leadership alone have raised themselves to a degree of importance inconsistent with their size and natural endowment. Nor is it hard to name states whose internal weight has been greatly enhanced by their internal stability and good order--political, social, and economic. But tangible resources are a necessary if not always sufficient basis of national power. In considering the geographical components of power, as

they might be used in the implementation of policy, two terms require definition: state and nation. The first describes an inhabited land, politically organized, with a sovereign government in effective control. The term nation, by contrast, connotes a body of people with strong internal bonds of cohesion, such as common language, tradition, history, religious faith, and social values. And in reference to the second of these, Sol Sanders indicates that "by no criterion is Laos a nation."[3]

We are concerned here with the geography and history of Laos as a part of the environmental system of the elites. In sum, we are assuming that they must have adapted their way of life to their environment,[4] and that through better understanding of the ecological environment and the background of the "nation" we can achieve better understanding of the culture-and-personality of the elites.

Geographical Sketch

The modern Laos is a landlocked state of 91,425 square miles, almost the same size of Great Britain, located between 13 and 28 north latitude on the tropical Southeast Asia mainland. Its width ranges from 300 miles in the northern part to 90 miles in the middle. (See Figure 1.) The elevation ranges from sea-level plains to highlands; the Boloven Plateau in the south has an altitude of 3,500 feet, the Xieng Khouang Plateau in the north has an altitude of 4,500 feet,

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[3]Sol Sanders, A Sense of Asia (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), pp. 34-35.

[4]Theoretical assumptions about the influence of ecological factors on culture are discussed in J. L. M. Dawson, "Research and Theoretical Bases of Bio-Social Psychology," Gazette, 16 (1969), 1-10.



Figure 1. Map of Laos

and the highest peak in Laos is 9,242 feet.[5] The highlands of Laos at particular altitudes have remained the province of hill tribe peoples who are sometimes nomadic, who practice hunting, gathering, and slash-and-burn agriculture, and who seem scarcely to have evolved from Neolithic life.

The jungled mountains and narrow river valleys that form the northern terrain give way in the south to sparsely forested tablelands. From the long mountain chain separating Laos and Vietnam, many rivers flow westward toward the Mekong River, which serves as the major communications link between north and south along the greater length of the Laos-Thailand border. Laos is also bordered by China and Burma in the north and northwest and by Cambodia in the south (see Figure 2).

The Mekong River, which flows from the Tibetan mountains through Laos and feeds into the South China Sea in Vietnam, provides a major source of food and an important communication network for the country. But its frequent rapids and low water level in the dry season prevent year-round, large-scale, long-distance transportation; and the great falls at Khone in the south rule out its international use.

There are two distinct seasons: dry and wet. The dry season begins in November and ends in April; the wet season of monsoon rains is from May to October. It has been reported that the mean annual rainfall is about 70 inches, with a range from 40 inches around Sayabury in the north to 160 inches on the Boloven plateau in the south.[6]

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[5] Frank LeBar and Adrienne Suddard, Laos: Its People, Its Culture, Its Society (New Haven: The HRAF Press, 1965).

[6] Ibid., p. 28.



Figure 2. Map of Laos Region

Further, Laos has a tropical climate. The highest temperatures, in the 90°s; come in March and April. But in December and February, Temperatures in the 30°s have been reported on the highest plateaus.

The population was estimated to be about 3,180,000 in 1973 (see Table 4). The people are Mongoloid in race, but of diversified ethnic

TABLE 4

POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR LAOS

Year	Total	Male	Female	Average per Square Mile
1964	2,469,000	1,301,000	1,268,000	28.09
1965	2,631,000	1,331,000	1,300,000	28.78
1966	2,694,000	1,363,000	1,331,000	28.92
1967	2,759,000	1,369,000	1,363,000	30.18
1968	2,825,000	1,429,000	1,396,000	30.90
1969	2,893,000	1,464,000	1,429,000	31.64
1970	2,962,000	1,499,000	1,463,000	32.40
1971	3,033,000	1,535,000	1,498,000	33.17
1972	3,106,000	1,483,000	1,523,000	33.97
1973	3,181,000	1,621,000	1,560,000	34.79

SOURCE: Ministry of Economics and Plans, Annuaire Statistique (Vientiane, 1973), p. 10.

backgrounds. The Lao, one of the Tai ethnic groups who live in the lowlands, make up about half of the total population and have been dominant in the political affairs. The remainder is made up of tribes of Kha or Lao Theung, Meo, Man or Yao, Ho, and Tais. The Kha tribes

originally occupied what is now the highlands of Laos, before the Lao people came in the thirteenth century.[7]

Culturally, the Tai tribes are closely related to the Lao, and they speak Sino-Tibetan languages that are distantly related to those of the Meo and Man. The Meo and Man are believed to be the most recent immigrants; they came to Laos about 1850, and are closely related to the Chinese. The Kha tribes, which are made up of small groups, speak the Mon-Khmer language of Cambodia and the Malay penninsula. In addition, there are foreign minorities comprised of Vietnamese, Chinese, Indians, and Pakistanis, who are mainly concentrated in the urban centers. The proportions of these ethnic groups in the total population are shown in Table 5.

TABLE 5

ETHNIC GROUPS IN LAOS

Ethnics	Percentage of Total Population
Lao	50
Kha	25
Tai	16
Meo and Yao	5
Others	4

SOURCE: S. Kunstadter, ed., Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 260.

[7]For an ethnological outline, see, G. Coedès, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia, trans. by Susan Brown Cowing, ed. by Walter F. Vella (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1968), pp. 10-13.

Historical Background

Laos has been a country without peace. The modern history of Laos began with the arrival of the French in 1893, and since its independence in 1954, Laos has suffered from an internal conflict that reflects the worldwide ideological confrontation of communism and capitalism. The elites were drawn into opposing camps, thus creating an unpleasant atmosphere hostile to the forging of a common national identity. In 1975 the country changed its name to "People's Democratic Republic of Laos" and espoused Marxist-Leninist ideology.

The Lao are not, however, entirely without a traditional heritage--common origins, recorded events, and cultural symbols. This heritage (to be described below) might facilitate the development of an integrated national culture. Although modern writings in history tend to stress the continuity of the Lao tradition as the sole unifying human factor of the Laotian state, this story is not all true. The land called "Laos" at present actually consists of many Lao states that were in the past independent. This loose integration is characteristic of Laos. To the elite, the history of Laos is the story of the ethnic Lao people. Most of the political-bureaucratic elites before 1970 were members of the nobility and quasi-nobility--the mandarinate--of the royal families of the principalities of Laos. The main principalities were Luang Prabang in the north, Vientiane in the middle, and Champassak in the south. At present, the elite group includes members of common families, but the old elites are still active and are counted as the most intellectual and modernized members of society. Pride in

historical heroes seems to be little evident among the elite, perhaps because they derive their ancestors from different kingdoms, and it is almost non-existant among the common man except in terms of various fables.

In sum, the political culture-and-personality of the present Laotian elites is partly the product of a long and evolutionary Laotian history. This personality is very complex, having been influenced by the shared Lao culture, historical background, geography, economic resources, colonialism, the impacts of the recent war, and the changing international political setting. Understanding this background increases our comprehension of the elites' political culture-and-personality, showing why they perceive their world as they do and why they possess particular characteristics and pursue certain goals. For this reason, the remainder of this section will present a brief history of Laos, limited to those elements which help to illustrate the themes of the Lao culture-and-personality.

Early Period

The history of Laos merges into archaeology in one direction and blurs into fables in another. According to most scholars, the Lao were originally a Tai[8] ethnic group dwelling south of the Yangtze River in China. Their earliest unification was the Kingdom of Nan Chao--which in Mandarin Chinese means "South of the Clouds"--in north Yunnan in the middle of the seventh century A.D. Successfully resisting

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[8]"Tai" is used as a generic term to those peoples who originated in South China and who are today scattered throughout Northern portions of Southeast Asia. It is different from "Thai" which refers to Tai who live in Thailand.

Chinese efforts at conquest in the eighth century, Nan Chao slowly spread its domain southward and eastward. By the ninth century it had invaded Tonkin in what is now North Vietnam.

Nan Chao fell to the Mongols in 1253 when Kublai Khan was conquering China. Before Nan Chao's fall, however, bands of Tai had already moved into the Shan states of Burma and into parts of present North Vietnam, Laos, and Northern Thailand. The Tai of Burma later came to be called Shans; those of Laos were called Lao; and those of Vietnam called Tai Dam (Black Tai) and Tai Dang (Red Tai). Tai settlements were eventually established as far west as Assam in India and as far east as Hainan Island off the Southwest coast of China.[9]

Before Nan Chao's fall the area of present-day Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia was occupied by the Mons in the West and the Khmer in the East. The Mons established the kingdom of Dvaravati with its capital in the area of Nakorn Pathom, thirty miles southwest of the present Bangkok. Dvaravati was in contact with Ceylon from earlier times, and through this contact was responsible for spreading Hinnayan or Theravada Buddhism among the incoming Tai.[10]

The Mons were notably receptive to the art and literature of India and Ceylon and were important as disseminators of Indian civilization to the courts of mainland Southeast Asia. They are thought to have been the source of important artistic, literary, and governmental features of the Khmer, the Burmese, and the Tai. Their political control

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[9]Coedès, op. cit., pp. 189-191.

[10]Ibid.

was seldom extensive, however, and they repeatedly fell under the domination of stronger neighbors. By the end of the tenth century Dvaravati and other Mon kingdoms along the Chao Phraya River had come under the control of the Khmer Empire, which had grown up on the site of ancient Funan in Cambodia. The Mon Kingdom of Haripunjaya in the north of Thailand remained outside the Khmer Empire but fell to the incoming Tai in the thirteenth century. The cultural dominance of the Khmer over Laos was also enhanced by extensive contact during later periods.[11]

The Tai peoples developed the art of writing only after they left Nan Chao and became associated with the Indianized Khmer. This Indian influence is also evident in their rites and mythology, which provided supernatural sanction for their rulers. The elaborate legend of their origin provides a semi-divine ancestor, the sage Khoun Borom. According to legend, he established the Kingdom in the area of present-day Dien Bien Phu and divided the land among his seven sons; the divisions corresponded to the various lands into which the Tai peoples migrated. Khoun Lo, the eldest son, was given the lands of Muong Swa, from which Lan Xang developed.

Lan Xang Domination

The recorded history of the Lao began a hundred years after the fall of Nan Chao, under Fa Ngum, who was the twenty-third successor to Khun Lo. While he was young, Fa Ngum found assylum at the Court of

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[11]Coedès points out that the countries of Southeast Asia were never political dependencies of India, but rather cultural colonies, *ibid.*, pp. 252-253.

Angkor and married a Khmer princess. With Khmer assistance, he subsequently regained his heritage in Muong Swa and carved out an empire comprising all of present-day Laos and much of northern and eastern Siam. In 1353 he united the territory as the Lao state of Lan Xang.[12]

It was Fa Ngum who accepted Theravada Buddhism and received a mission of Khmer Buddhist monks who carried with them a revered golden statue of Buddha--the Prabang. Prabang became the principal religious symbol of Laos in honor of which Muong Swa was later renamed Luang Prabang. Despite Fa Ngum's establishment of Buddhism as the state religion, the majority of the people continued to worship the phi--spirits representing the forces of nature. In the period of King Fa Ngum, Lan Xang extended its boundary to Cochine Annamitique in the south, to the Black River in the north, and to the watershed between the Mekong and Chao Phraya River in the west.

After Fa Ngum, his son Sam Sene Thai reigned between 1373-1416 and consolidated and organized the Kingdom. He developed an administrative structure that lasted for centuries. Based on the principle of absolute monarchy, the system employed princes of royal blood as the King's principal advisers. These advisers were supported by a hierarchy of officials, judges, collectors of tribute, and minor

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[12]For the details of the founding of Muong Swa, see "Annals of Lan Xang," in Kingdom of Laos, ed. by Rene de Berval, et al. (Saigon: Francie-Asie, 1959), pp. 375-410; and, Katay D. Sasorit, "Historical Aspects of Laos," ibid., pp. 24-31. In the same volume, Coedès (p. 20) states that Fa Ngum's success was facilitated by the decline of Sukhothai, a kingdom of Tai which in the thirteenth century exercised sovereignty over the Mekong River but later became a vassal of the Kingdom of Ayutthaya, a Tai which was founded in 1350 on the lower Chao Phraya River. See also, Coedès, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia, pp. 223-236.

functionaries. These officials held their positions at the pleasure of the King--only those of the royal family being hereditary. Next to the King in political power was the maha oupahat--the second King. The maha oupahat was the King's most intimate adviser. Chao muong or governors of districts might be royal appointees, sometimes princes, but often were selected by a local council of notables, usually from among the family of the previous incumbent. In practice, any qualified person could rise to high office regardless of birth.

During the reign of Sam Sene Thai, the Buddhist monk began to assume a place of honor in the community. The pagoda became the center of community life, serving as school and place of worship and social gathering.

Fa Ngum and Sam Sene Thai established Lan Xang when the surrounding states were variously embroiled with one another or with China. Lan Xang encompassed more territory than the Lao have controlled during any other period, and the subsequent history of the Lao has been one of struggle to regain the lands of Lan Xang.

The following King, Phothisarath, reigned from 1520-1547 and was notable for his devotion to Buddhism, his temple building, and his attempt to suppress the cult of the phi by royal edict. He succeeded in strengthening the official position of the established religion, but the common people remained as much spirit worshipers as Buddhists. Phothisarath also embroiled Lan Xang in a power struggle with Siam and an expanding Burma by taking advantage of an interregnum in Lan Na (another Tai kingdom) to obtain its throne for his son Setthathirath. In 1547, Setthathirath inherited the throne of Lan Xang and returned

from Lan Na with an important religious statue known as the Emerald Buddha. During his reign, Lan Xang--usually in alliance with Siam--experienced more than forty years of warfare with Burma.

Seeking a closer association with Siam, and especially to improve their military communications, Setthathirath moved his capital to Vientiane. There he built the Wat Keo and the That Luang, the ruins of which are venerated by present-day Laotians. Simultaneously he gave the old capital, Muong Swa, its present name of Luang Prabang. After 1571, Lan Xang succumbed to conquest and endured twenty years of Burmese rule. Then the resurgent Siamese expelled the Burmese, retaining control of Lan Na for themselves.

Lan Xang soon entered a period of nondynastic rule, followed by the ascendency of a collateral line of the original royal family and a power struggle from which Souligna Vongsa emerged as King in 1637. He held Lan Xang together and ruled until it fell to the small Lao Kingdom of Xieng Khouang in 1694.

An interesting point about the history of the early period is that the Indian cults of Vishnuism, Brahmanism, and Buddhism all appeared officially at all royal ceremonies. Since that period, Buddhist cosmogony and cosmology[13] and the doctrines of retribution for one's acts and transmigration have been deeply implanted in even the humblest classes, and both the Buddhist monks and mandarinates have been

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[13]The Dharmasastras are political treatises, and have contributed to the hierarchical administration, conduct, and theoretical rule by the king and mandarinates. See, P.V. Kane History of Dharmasastra (Poona Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1941).

elevated to positions of high esteem.[14] Lao religious characteristics are deeply drawn and are the products of this heritage.

Along with the Indian religious heritage, the influence of Indian law has been profound. The Dharmasastra,[15] and especially the most famous of them known as the "laws of Manu," have formed a framework for the ordering of Lao--and several other Southeast Asian countries'--customs, through royal courts, in somewhat the same fashion that Roman law served the Western countries. This facet of early Lao culture seems to be imprinted in the deep-seated political concepts of the modern Laotian elite.

Divided Kingdom

The succession struggle at the beginning of the nineteenth century destroyed the territorial unity of Lan Xang. The prince ruling at Vientiane, who controlled a considerable area of both sides of the middle Mekong, was tributary to Annum. Another prince established a separate kingdom at Luang Prabang and sometimes held the allegiance of the semi-independent northern tribesmen. A third prince established the kingdom of Champassak, which controlled the southernmost provinces on both sides of the Mekong.[16] This historical evidence helps to explain

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[14]The mandarinates were relatives of the King, and what we are really saying here is that the Indian cults served to establish some sort of "divine right to rule" for the Lao royalty.

[15]One excellent discussion of this cosmology's implications for Laos is the anthropological study of S. J. Tambiah, Buddhism and Spirit Cults in Northeastern Thailand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

[16]According to its annals, Champassak developed independently during the seventeenth century from a mere town situated on the Mekong River into a quasi-principality whose jurisdiction was confined to a

why in modern times the integration of Laos as a nation-state is very loose. Each of the three ex-kingdoms tends to hold its own identity as it was in the past.[17]

Throughout the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries, the nao states quarreled among themselves and also struggled against invaders from neighboring states. The city of Vientiane declined steadily and at last was occupied by Siam, while also accepting vassalage to Annam. Such double vassalage was possible because it customarily implied little more than a symbolic act of deference, and little other obligation from either party. Eventually Chao Anou, a former maha oupahat who had obtained the throne with Siamese support, involved Viantiane in war with Siam. In 1828 Vientiane was destroyed and later annexed alternatively by Siam and Annam.[18]

Luang Prabang suffered from wars with Vientiane, Burma and Siam. Later, Meo tribesmen migrated into its northern territory and were often rebellious. In the late nineteenth century, in the aftermath of

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small area and whose control over the populace was limited. It remained outside of the mainstream of events in the north. See Department of Fine Arts, Thailand, "Pravatsart Nakorn Champassak" (History of Champassak) in Choomnoom Pongsavadarn (Collected Chronicles), 70 (Bangkok, 1941), pp. 1-23; Term Vibhakbhanakij, Pravatsart Isan (History of Isan), (Bangkok: Social Science Association Press, 1973), pp. 35-137; and Thao Nhouy Abhay, "En marge de l'histoire du Laos," Francie-Asie, 3 (April, 1948), 460-463.

[17]See an excellent description of how these three powerful families recently expressed their own prestige and identity in Arthur J. Dommen, "Lao Politics Under Souvanna Phouma," in Indochina In Conflict, ed. by Joseph J. Zasloff and Allen E. Goodman (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1972), pp. 81-98.

[18]See David K. Wyatt, "Siam and Laos, 1767-1827," Journal of Southeast Asian History, 4 (September, 1963), 13-21; and, Walter F. Vella, Siam Under Rama III (Locust Valley, N.Y.: J. J. Augustin, Inc., 1957), pp. 80-86.

the Taiping and Moslem rebellious, rebels and bandits ravaged the area. Simultaneously, Siam tightened its control in an effort to prevent French encroachment. In 1885 it reduced King Oun Kham of Luang Prabang to the status of a governor, and later did the same to the king of Champassak.[19]

Colonialism Experienced

The French began to penetrate Indochina in 1858. After annexing Cochin China and asserting a protectorate over Cambodia, they displayed interest in the area of present-day Laos. Ostensibly to suppress Chinese bandits, but actually to prevent French assertion of Annamese suzerainty claims, Siamese troops occupied Xieng Khouang and Houa Phan in 1885. The French recognized Siamese suzerainty, but they secured the right to maintain a vice consul in Luang Prabang. They credited vice consul Auguste Pavié with winning the area of present-day Laos by convincing the royal court of Luang Prabang that France had its best interests at heart. Apparently genuinely sympathetic to his need for protection against Chinese raiders, Pavié induced King Oun Kham to request French protection.[20]

Siam formally ceded its claims to all territory east of the Mekong to France only after a French fleet moved up the Chao Phraya River to blockade Bangkok in 1893. In 1896 a treaty with Great Britain

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[19]Vibhakbhanakij, op. cit. For further details, see also D. G. E. Hall, A History of Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1955), pp. 207-210, 376-385, 591-612.

[20]Auguste Pavié, et al., Mission Pavié: Indochine, 1879-1895, 6 (Paris: E. Leroux, 1911), 113-114.

established the boundary between the Shan states of Burma and French territory at the Mekong.[21] By 1905 a series of treaties with Siam had expanded French territory to include the west bank section of Luang Prabang and the province of Champassak. By 1895 a series of treaties with China had established the boundary in the north along geographical features. An inconclusive treaty in 1904 between France and Siam affected the border between Champassak and Cambodia. In fact, this boundary, like that with the territories in Vietnam, was determined by French administrators.[22] In 1899 a French Résident Superiéur was stationed in Vientiane, and the territories of Luang Prabang and Xieng Khouang and the former kingdoms of Champassak and Vientiane were given the French administrative designation of Laos. The French reduced Vientiane, Xieng Khouang and central Laos to provinces and made no effort to revive their former royal families. After he pledged loyalty to France, the only son of the late King of Champassak was made governor of Champassak, but was accorded no royal status. The king of Luang Prabang retained his royal title and prerogatives under French protection, but his realm was indirectly governed by the French. French commissioners, ultimately responsible to the Résident Superiéur, more directly administered the eight provinces outside of Luang Prabang. The French army commanded the northernmost area, now Phong Saly, which was designated a military territory.

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[21]The Anglo-French agreement of 1896 and the fourteen-power Declaration on Laotian Neutrality of 1962 bear a remarkable similarity. See the text of the 1962 agreement in The New York Times (22 July 1962). For the Anglo-French rivalry, see Hall, op. cit., pp. 591-612.

[22]Historically, Annam's rights in Laos were more verbal than real and were exaggerated to serve France's cause. See, Luang Vichitr Vadakarn, Thailand's Case (Bangkok: Thai Commercial Press, 1941).

On the whole, the hand of French rule rested lightly on Laos. The French generally accepted the advice and employed the services of the local elite, especially the tribal chiefs. Insofar as patterns of local rule and local custom and tradition were compatible with French principle and ultimate sovereignty, they were unmolested. At the outset, the French were adamant only in abolishing slavery and tightly controlling all fiscal administration. Gradually, they influenced the judicial and educational systems and, later, undertook an innovation by establishing a service of health and sanitation.

After realizing that the Mekong River was not the important communication route they had originally thought it to be, the French considered annexing Laos to Annam. Lao resentment caused them to abandon this idea. The traditional Lao mistrust of the people "from the other side of the mountains," who were noted for greater energy and personal aggressiveness, had been intensified by French introduction of partially French-trained Annamese into minor positions in the government.

Otherwise, the Lao caused the French no trouble. Returning from his studies in Paris to assume the throne of Luang Prabang in 1904, King Sisavang Vong accepted French overlordship, as had his predecessor. Only three situations required military force, none involving the Lao. Between 1901 and 1907 a group of southern Mountain Mon-Khmer rebelled, apparently in opposition to French suppression of their customary slave trading. Then, Yunnanese bandits kept the colonial army fully occupied in the military territory between 1914 and 1916. Finally, apparently excited by visionary dreams of a messianic kingdom, the Meo raided the Lao and the various tribes from 1919 to 1921.

Otherwise, the French administered the country without incident until World War II.

World War II and Transition

By the time of the fall of France in June 1940, Japan in its southward march in Asia had reached almost to the Indochina border and had signed a treaty of friendship with Thailand. The next Japanese move was to get from the Vichy French regime a concession permitting the movement of troops into Indochina. Meanwhile, Japan permitted Thailand (previously known as Siam) to seize the parts of Luang Prabang and Champassak west of the Mekong that had earlier been ceded to France. In July 1941 all of Indochina was occupied. A few Lao engaged in underground resistance against the Japanese, but, generally, the Lao showed little resentment toward either the Thai or the Japanese, and life went on much as usual. Inability to protect the country from Japan--or even from Thailand--severely damaged French prestige, which further declined with the realization by the people of Laos that their former colonial masters were merely obeying the orders of an Asian power that chose to rule through them.

In August 1941 a treaty with the Vichy French extended the domain of Luang Prabang to include the provinces of Vientiane, Xieng Khouang and Houa Khong. It also authorized King Sisavang Vong to form a Cabinet composed of a prime minister and four other ministers, appointed with Vichy French concurrence. In addition to his traditional duties as maha oupahat, Prince Phetsarath assumed the post of prime minister.

In March 1945 the Japanese decided to oust the Vichy French officials, who were discredited completely by the Allies' liberation of France, and declared the colonial regime ended. Whereas Tonkin and Annam united to form the Republic of Vietnam, and Cambodia declared itself an independent kingdom, the aging King of Luang Prabang and his son, Crown Prince Savang Vatthana, delayed the assumption of independent status for one month. Even then, they left the southern provinces free to decide for themselves. During this period the Japanese sent the Crown Prince to Saigon, leaving Prince Phetsarath a relatively free hand in running the country. Vichy French officials were interned and replaced with Japanese military representatives.

The vacuum thus created by the Japanese surrender on August 14, 1945, resulted in agitation. Japan had few troops in Laos, however, and looked favorably upon the development of anti-European movements. Chinese forces, which the Potsdam Conference had authorized to receive the surrender of the Japanese as far south as the 16th parallel (the level of Saravane), did not enter Laos until September. After assuming control of Champassak, the Free French prepared to reoccupy the entire country, including the area which had been temporarily occupied by Thailand, and to reinstitute colonial rule.

On August 18, 1945, Prince Phetsarath declared a Japanese-instigated declaration of independence from France to be in force for all of Laos, unified under King Sisavang Vong. The Prince formed a committee of Lao Issara (Free Lao), which soon included virtually all the Western-educated elite. Few of the members originally were motivated strongly by ideology, or had any history of resistance to colonialism;

Most had served in the colonial administration, and a few had joined the anti-Japanese resistance.

Against the will of Prince Phetsarath, French paratroopers soon occupied Vientiane, further alienating members of the Lao Issara by ignoring them. Other paratroopers entered Luang Prabang, and a few days later King Sisavang Vong announced the resumption of the French protectorate. Explanations of the King's action differ, one version asserting that the Chinese, who arrived at that time, offered him a choice between French protection and their own.

These events stiffened the reaction of the Lao Issara members in Vientiane. In response to Prince Phetsarath's dismissal as prime minister and maha oupahat, a Committee of the People was formed in early October. The Committee proclaimed a provisional constitution, which provided for a legislative assembly. Prince Phetsarath indirectly determined the policies of the Lao Issara government that was then set up.

King Sisavang Vong refused to approve the constitution and government, whereupon the National Assembly deposed him on October 20, contending that he was not a free agent. No responsible official was willing to accept the deposition of the King as a final solution, and a delegation went to Luang Prabang to apprise him of the attitude of the factions represented at Vientiane and elsewhere. As soon as he realized the strenght of the movement, he accepted the constitution and denied any binding agreement with the French. The National Assembly then unanimously voted to reinstate him as a constitutional monarch. On April 23, 1946, amid traditional ceremony, Sisavang Vong was enthroned as King of all Laos.

Meanwhile, the French had assembled a larger ground force in the south. Advancing up the Mekong, this force put down the resistance offered by the small Lao Isaara forces. Supported by Communist Viet Minh troops sent by Ho Chi Minh, the Lao Issara force broke up into guerrilla bands. Many of these bands escaped into Thailand, followed by the whole Lao Issara government. Prince Phetsarath then set up a government in exile and called himself the Regent of Laos.

After reoccupying Vientiane and Luang Prabang, the French became more conciliatory. A modus vivendi produced by a newly formed Franco-Laotian Commission was signed on August 27, 1946. It confirmed an autonomous country unified under King Sisavang Vong, who was made a constitutional monarch. Prince Boun Oum of Champassak renounced his sovereign rights to that principality, in return for which his title as prince was confirmed and made hereditary, and he was appointed Inspector General of the kingdom for life. The modus vivendi also provided for the election of a constitutional assembly; the election was held in January 1947. Forty-five delegates were selected despite widespread rural violence. The Constitutional Assembly produced the Constitution, which was promulgated by the King on May 11, 1947.

These events occurred during the absence in Thailand of most of the politically sophisticated elite, whose government in exile experienced dissension. Prince Phetsarath was resolutely anti-French. His next younger half brother, Prince Souvanna Phouma, led those who desired complete independence but were inclined to work with the French to get it. A half brother of the other two, Prince Souphanouvong, who had commanded the Lao Issara army, advocated collaboration with the Viet Minh, whose ideas and methods he favored. All intermediate

shades of opinion were represented. A homeward trend began in late 1947 when the Lao Issara's continued operation in Thailand was threatened by a change in the Thai Government. The Lao Issara dissolved itself in 1949 after the conclusion of a new Franco-Laotian convention which fulfilled many of the Lao Issars's demands. With the notable exception of Prince Phetsarath, who remained in Thailand, the leaders of the exiles returned to reenter government service. Prince Souphanouvong was expelled from the Lao Issara shortly before its dissolution and went to Hanoi.[23]

The Franco-Laotian Convention of 1949 inaugurated Laotian independence as an Associate State of the French Union. Laos obtained greater authority in the conduct of foreign affairs, including the right to apply for membership in the United Nations. As a result of an open rebellion of the Viet Minh in Vietnam in 1950, the French hastened progress toward Laotian independence. With the conclusion of the Franco-Laotian Treaty of October 22, 1953, Laos became fully sovereign.

It was constituted as a parliamentary democracy with the King as titular head of state. Diplomatic representation abroad no longer required French approval, French courts disappeared, and all

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[23] Souphanouvong attended the Lycee Albert Sarraut in Hanoi. There, short of money, he was befriended by an innkeeper, whose daughter, a member ofthe Vietnamese Communist Party, he later married. In 1937, at the age of twenty-five, he graduated from the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussees in Paris. He then returned to Hanoi, where he was employed by the Public Works Department. In 1945 he was contacted by the Viet Minh, who sent him south to Vinh; there he was joined by seventy Laotian and Vietnamese guerrillas with whom he attacked Tchepone in east-central Laos. See Sisouk Na Champassak, Storm Over Laos (New York: Frederic A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 21-29; Zasloff, op. cit., pp. 114-116; and, Wilfred Burchett, Mekong Upstream (Hanoi: Red River Publishing House, 1957), pp. 257-258.

French control of ministries ended. Earlier attempts to create for the Indochinese states certain common organs, mostly economic, had failed. Thus, even though Laos voluntarily accepted the presumed benefits of membership in the French Union, the term "Associate State" had little substantive meaning. In late 1954, France and the Associated States ended the economic and customs union established four years before. The kip replaced the Indochinese piaster as the Laotian unit of currency. In 1956 the Constitution was revised to omit all reference to the French Union.[24]

Civil War Period[25]

Independent Laos immediately encountered economic, military and political difficulties. Its perennial financial deficit was no longer made up from the favorable balances of the other Indochinese states, the newly independent governments of which had their own troubles. In fact, political independence encouraged economic dependence by requiring the support of a larger bureaucracy. Beginning in 1955 the United States got involved in Laos, and this involvement increased until interrupted by the Pathet Lao takeover in 1975.

In 1950 the French began to withdraw their troops from Laos to points of more imminent Viet Minh attack elsewhere in Indochina. As a result, Laos was compelled to form its own army, which was accomplished under French tutelage. This National Army required

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[24]Alfred W. McCoy, "French Colonialism in Laos, 1893-1954," in Laos: War and Revolution, ed. by Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy (Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 67-99.

[25]For more details than presented here see a study by Nina S. Adams, "Patrons, Clients, and Revolutionaries: The Laos Search for Independence, 1945-1954," Laos: War and Revolution, pp. 100-122.

complete French financial and logistic support, furnished from funds and stocks supplied to France by the United States.

Laos was among the least prepared of the former French colonies for independence and its compound problems. Before the coming of the French, the peoples of the present day Laos composed three feudal kingdoms, the political legacy of which persists to this day in the form of the main contending families. Richard Butwell observes that, before the Japanese declared Laos's independence in 1945, "there had been no nationalist movement seeking to replace French with Laotian rule, nor did even the elite think in Laos-wide terms but rather in terms of three traditional feudal kingdoms."[26] It was the Japanese occupation, however, that stimulated Lao nationalism, as it did elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

It is of considerable significance that Ho Chi Minh's communist party in 1929, called the Indochinese Communist Party, poured over into the left-wing nationalist movements in Laos in the early 1950's. The Viet Minh, indeed, treated all Indochina as the battleground in its war with the French and fought in Laos against France before the termination of the Franco-Viet Minh war in 1954.

In the wake of the second World War the young Laotian nationalist leadership split into two main groups. One of these sought to negotiate independence from French rule and after independence was obtained, tried to steer a "middle way" in terms of political tactics and foreign policy. The other chief faction chose to fight for

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[26]Richard Butwell, Southeast Asia: A Political Introduction (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 29.

freedom from the French, joining in alliance with the Viet Minh, and became the insurgent Pathet Lao--which was not wholly Communist in the beginning but became very much so by 1954. French colonial rule had served to link the Laotian people--the minorities of the northern and eastern hill country as well as the majority western lowlands Laos--together, but in a real sense this only affected the elite level.

The Pathet Lao, which has been strongly aided by the Vietnamese communists through the years, controlled an estimated three-quarters of the total territory of Laos (in which, however, lived a minority of the population) at the time of the February 1973 political agreement that ended most of the fighting in the country. The Pathet Lao assumed full control over Laos near the end of 1975.[27]

Although Laos was a battlefield in the eight-year Viet Minh war to oust the French from all Indochina, it did not assume any real importance in the struggle until toward the end. It was the moderates, moreover, who controlled the government of the country in the wake of the 1954 Geneva settlement, although the two northeasternmost provinces were held by the Pathet Lao (who were never to give them up, even when they entered into the coalition governments with the non-Communists in 1957, 1962, and 1973). In a very real sense, independence was won for Laos by the Ho Chi Minh-led Viet Minh in neighboring Vietnam, a fact that has not been lost on any of the major parties

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[27]For the history of the Pathet Lao and its organization, see Zasloff, The Pathet Lao; Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy, eds., Laos: War and Revolution (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1970), pp. 411-460; and, Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff, North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao: Partners in the Struggle for Laos (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

involved in Laotian politics since 1954--the moderate nationalists, the Pathet Lao, and the communist Vietnamese.

The political history of Laos since the 1954 Geneva Accords illustrates the difficulty for the great powers in seeking to legislate a framework within which the political development or growth of a country like Laos should proceed. The Geneva Settlement clearly provided for the international neutralization of Laos, and for the establishment of a coalition government in which the Pathet Lao should participate together with the moderate nationalists (who in the immediate post-1954 years were dominated by their right, rather than left wing). The non-communist nationalists sought the integration of the Pathet Lao into the government, but the communists, suspicious of the moderates for pursuing an intentional delaying tactic, resisted such incorporation into the legitimate Laotian political process. Elections were held, accordingly, in 1956 without the Communists.[28]

In 1957 Prince Souvanna Phouma, as Premier, was able to negotiate a political agreement with the Pathet Lao, and supplementary elections were held in which the Communists made a very impressive showing. A coalition government was then formed. Right-wingers within the government, however, then moved against the communists, possibly with American CIA encouragement, and the Pathet Lao military forces, in the process of being incorporated into the government's ranks, were fortunate to escape liquidation. The political die, accordingly,

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[28]Marek Thee, "Background Notes on the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Laos and the Vientiane Agreements of 1956-1957," in Laos: War and Revolution, pp. 121-138.

was cast for internal struggle for years to come: the Communists, denied a legitimate role in the country's political process, seemed to be justified in their renewed resort to force and even, possibly, in their alliance with the North Vietnamese.[29]

Things went rapidly from bad to worse, as the CIA played a role in the emergence of the right-wing as the dominant force in the national government and may have aided the military takeover of that government in 1960. In August of the same year, however, the limits of great-power direction of Laotian politics were most dramatically demonstrated when a hitherto obscure Laotian Air Force captain, Kong lè, led a coup d'etat that unseated the pro-American regime and returned the popular and politically skillful Prince Souvanna Phouma to the premiership. Following that, the United States--acting largely through the CIA and with the aid of Thailand--sought to establish Prince Boun Oum (of one of the three onetime independent Laotian kingdoms) and General Phoumi Nosavan as the political leaders of the country.[30] This bold and unconcealed power play by the Americans provoked a strong counterresponse from the North Vietnamese, who intervened even more dramatically than they had hitherto been doing. The result was a veritable rout of the pro-Americans, a second Geneva Conference that produced the 1962 Laotian Accords, and the United States' acquiescence in the return of Souvanna Phouma as the country's Prime Minister.

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[29]For a good description of the American involvement, see Adams and McCoy, op. cit., pp. 283-407.

[30]See, Wilfred G. Burchett, The Second Indochina War: Cambodia and Laos (New York: International Publishing, 1970), pp. 97-188.

This sequence of events was to seem particularly ironic in the middle and late 1960's and the early 1970's, when the United States accorded strong diplomatic, economic, and military support to the same Souvanna Phouma as Premier against the Communists. Yet, on two occasions in the late 1950's and early 1960's the United States endeavored to engineer Souvanna Phouma's replacement as leader of the Laotian Government for his allegedly excessive willingness to negotiate with the Pathet Lao.

The 1962 Geneva Accords, like those for all Indochina eight years earlier, sought the neutralization of Laos and a nationalist-communist coalition to rule the country. Such a coalition was, in fact, set up but was quickly abandoned by the Pathet Lao, who resumed their military struggle against the moderate nationalists, including Souvanna Phouma. In all likelihood, the Laotian Communists developed second thoughts about the wisdom of a political coalition with the able and adroit Souvanna Phouma, but ensuing events, such as the murder of the anti-American "neutralist" Foreign Minister of the country, probably also renewed their fears of a new right-wing move against themselves.[31]

In the decade that followed the break-up of the 1962 coalition government, the Communist Pathet Lao was to increase dramatically the amount of national territory under its control. It was able to do this despite all-out United States' military, economic, and other aid to the Souvanna Phouma government, despite American bombing activity in support of the non-communist regime, despite U.S. training, support, and leadership of the fiercely fighting Meo tribesmen of the country against the communists, despite participation of more than 20,000 Washington-

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[31]See Adams and McCoy, op. cit., pp. 139-212.

paid Thai "mercenaries" in the war (in Laotian uniform), and despite the steady and general improvement of the Laotian armed forces (though not to the level of the fighting ability of the Pathet Lao).[32] The reasons for the Pathet Lao military successes are not easy to determine. Although variously aided by the more militarily capable North Vietnamese (who often fought the Laotian government forces directly), the Pathet Lao was outnumbered by Souvanna Phouma's army, was far less equipped, and had no air power whatsoever at its disposal. The communist Vietnamese on whom the Pathet Lao depended, moreover, were themselves foreigners--whose visible participation in the war ought to have provoked some kind of nationalist reaction. The North Vietnamese, in addition, were interested primarily in the battle for control of Vietnam itself and clearly gave the Laotian struggle secondary priority-except, of course, for the purpose of keeping open the so-called "Ho Chi Minh Trail" for the movement of supplies through eastern Laos into South Vietnam.

In February, 1973, a month after the U.S.-North Vietnamese agreement to end American direct participation in the Vietnam war, the two Laotians factions--the nationalists and the communists--agreed to end their fighting, too. Actually, they reached much greater political agreement than was to be achieved between the two Vietnamese sides in the political war in the adjacent country. This was probably because there were fewer and less deep-divisions between the communists and the Souvanna Phouma-led nationalists, except for the extreme right-wing military and feudal elements among the latter.

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[32]Douglas F. Dowd, "The CIA's Laotian Colony; or, An Interview with Souvanna Phouma," in Laos: War and Revolution, pp. 377-381.

More than half a year after the fighting had largely stopped in the war for Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma's anti-communist side and the Pathet Lao reached an agreement in principle on the sharing of portfolios in a new coalition government--the third to be attempted in the country since the end of French colonial rule. The superior military position of the Communists, who controlled about three-quarters of the country, was not reflected in the proposed composition of the cabinet.[33] Souvanna Phouma would again be Premier; probably everybody, including the Pathet Lao, recognized that the popular prince, at 72, was nearing the end of his political career. Deputy premierships were to be shared by the nationalists and the Communists, each having one, with the portfolios otherwise to be equally divided between the two sides, with Souvanna Phouma's group holding most of the key ministries. Another half year passed, however, without the establishment of such a government, but in February, 1974, on the eve of the first anniversary of the 1973 cease-fire, agreement was reached on the composition of police and military forces guarding the country's twin capitals, royal and administrative, and in April, for the third time since 1957, a coalition government finally took office.

"People's Democratic Republic of Laos"

Through a steady erosion of the third coalition government and with the collapse of South Vietnam in April 1975, the Pathet Lao gradually increased its influence over Laos. And after 19 months, through political maneuvering, it achieved a bloodless coup resulting in its

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[33]See names of the members of the cabinet and the members of the National Assembly in Appendix C.

complete takeover of the landlocked "Kingdom of Million Elephants" and abolition of monarchy in December, 1975.[34] The country has proclaimed the formation of the "Democratic People's Republic of Laos" and announced a new government: Prince Souphanouvong is the President; Kaysone Phomvihan (also Secretary-General of the Laos People's Party) is Prime Minister; and Neuhak Phomsuvan (the second-ranking leader of the Laos People's Party) is the First Deputy Prime Minister.[35] While on its way to political socialism, Laos has been reported to be slow in moving to the extreme left. The historical and present Laotian tendency to move in the middle way seems to reflect the "Lao way of life" that be presented in the next chapter.

A Note on the Laotian Political Elites

The Lao elites stem largely from the traditional Lao aristocracy which still holds most of the political power and public service positions in Laos. They are the descendents of the influential families (largely royal) of Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Champassak and Xieng Khouang provinces, or of commercial leaders in the towns. Two reasons

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[34]The New York Times (1 December, 1975), p. 9; The New York Times (4 December, 1975), pp. 1, 10, 11; and, The New York Times (5 December, 1975), p. 4.

[35]Kaysone is the son of a Vietnamese father who served as a secretary to the French Resident in Savannakhet--southern Laos. He had his secondary and university education in Hanoi; one of his teachers was Vo Nguyen Giap, and he also was personally close to Ho Chi Minh. He was the first Laotian to join the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in 1946, and was Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Peoples' Party of Laos in 1967.

Nouhak also was born in Savannakhet, the son of lowland Lao peasant parents, and was closely tied with the Viet Minh leaders beginning in the 1940's. For more details of their biographies see Zasloff, The Pathet Lao.

why they have held their near-monopoly are that (1) they came from the well-to-do families and could afford an education which helped to make them qualified for political and public service posts, and (2) the cultural characteristics of Laos in the area of lineal relationships, which will be presented in the next chapter, create a patrimonial system in Lao public affairs. Since Laos is a small country, the elites are also limited in number. All of them share not only family relationships, but many have gone to school together and have served together in the independence struggle and in war.

Besides those traditional hereditary elites, the new political elites who rose to power in 1975 are also largely from well-to-do families. Among them are Kaysone Phomvihan, Prime Minister, from Savannakhet; Nouhak Phomsuvan of Savannakhet; Faydang, a Meo chieftain from Xieng Khouang; Phoumi Vongvichitr, an ex-district official of Xieng Khouang; Sithone Khommadam and Sisana Sisane, both Khas from Saravane and Savannakhet respectively; General Singkapo Chounlamany of Savannakhet; and Colonel Phoune Sipraseut of Khammouane. There are, in addition, dozens of well-known former civil servants and a few ex-governors.[36]

Summary

Auguste Comte considered that the history of mankind was to be found in the history of its beliefs, while Gaetano Mosca thought that the history of all societies was the history of their ruling classes.[37]

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[36]The New York Times (6 December,1975); and The New York Times (19 December, 1975).

[37]Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, trans. by Hannah Kahn (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939).

This brief treatment of the history of Laos certainly has indicated that various elite groupings have played key roles in the country's evaluation. The following chapters will show the importance of this tangled political history to the understanding of the political culture-and-personality patterns of the country's ruling classes.

It is evident that as the least-developed country in Southeast Asia, Laos has been more a geographic expression than a nation. With a population of about three million, its people differ widely in social organization and political identity. The lowland Lao who live along the Mekong River valley share a common life style, a common language, Theravada Buddhism, and an economy based on wet rice agriculture. They have developed political loyalties to the powerful families of the various regions, and only in recent years have these regions been joined, still loosely, into a single nation.

As for Laos in the past, its land was relatively empty and its rulers ordinarily were concerned far less with controlling land then they were with gathering and controlling manpower. Lao rulers in practice conceived of their states as groupings of people, rather than as bounded tracts of territory; and they saw these groups of people as organized on hierarchical scales of leaders and followers or patrons and clients, with individuals bound to leaders and hierarchical groups bound to rulers by mutual ties of loyalty and obligation. These ties of loyalty were necessarily fragile and highly personalized. Most local rulers in rural Laos governed in provinces and districts that their fathers and grandfathers had ruled before them. They had ties to local individuals and families going back some generations, and each party to such a relationship could feel that the other could be turned

to in times of trouble. There was thus a mutuality, and flexibility, plus a personal give-and-take to government that in normal times could be a source of considerable strength and stability.

Two additional features of the pre-modern order in Laos are worthy of mention: the nature of the cities, and relations with ethnic minorities. If one could call Luang Prabang, Vientiane and Champassak "cities" in the nineteenth century, then one would have had to use the term in a very traditional sense. These were Buddhist ritual centers, centers of royal and religious life, and cultural centers; but economic centers more by virtue of their administrative functions than in their own right. Just as all power was legitimized by flowing out through the capitals to the outlying districts and provinces, so was all supra-local trade legitimized by spilling over from governmental activities--as in the marketing to passing traders of commodities collected as taxes in lieu of cash or labor service.

It is evident that there are great differences among the peoples of the mountains which cover about half of the country. At the middle altitudes are a great variety of Mon-Khmer, known as Kha or Lao Theung, and at the higher altitudes are Sino-Tibetan peoples, the Meo and Yao, each group with its own language and social organization. These mountain-dwelling peoples traditionally lay outside the social mainstream, were left virtually autonomous, and were related to the court and lowland society mainly by tribute payments and ceremonies. In most cases they were not at all integrated into the life of the lowland society, and both sides probably were satisfied with this state of things so long as neither posed a military threat to the other. They have been loosely connected to the indigeneous elites and to the

government, sometimes by being given rank and title in the bureaucracy or by ruling elite and by recognition of their leadership in their communities.

The political-bureaucratic elites of Laos have traditionally been drawn largely from the lowland Lao, specifically from the powerful families of Luang Prabang and Xieng Khouang in the north, Vientiane in the middle, and Champassak in the south. The new elites include members of common but well-to-do families, plus a few ethnic minority members such as the Lao Theung. While the powerful mandarinate families have lost some of their monopoly on power, they still exercise strong influence in Laos and are expected to continue to do so for some time.

There has been little modernization in Laos. The brief, indirect French rule did not break down the traditional institutions of the society. Visitors to Laos have consistently noted the gayety and equanimity of its people. However, the tragedy of war has changed this harmonious image. In the chapter following we will explore the culture-and-personality of Laotian people in general, as a background against which to understand the elites' political culture-and-personality.

CHAPTER IV

THE LAOTIAN WAY OF LIFE

Introduction

We have followed the psychologists in studying basic human needs, and the cultural anthropologists have assured us that every culture is a whole, more or less systematically integrated by a common set of values. Ergo, in order to lay a solid background for exploring Laotian elite characteristics, in this Chapter we shall attempt to identify a system of values characteristic of the Lao in general and to relate these values to the ways of life of the Laotian people. The Laotian elites are, after all, a component of the mass political culture of Laos, so it is believed that an analysis of the overall value structure is needed as a basis for later comparisons and contrasts with the values of the elites. In other words, our purpose is to use "value" as a means of discovering certain consistencies and regularities in the behavior of the elites in the Lao culture.

The value system which will be discussed hereafter is assumed to be generally shared by the majority of Laotians, and especially by the Lao Loum--the majority ethnic Lao. The ethnic minorities--as mentioned in Chapter III--seem to be less influenced by the elite culture-and-personality pattern. It should be emphasized again that these values are mostly taken for granted by the Laotian people, and that they direct Laotian behavior almost outside of the people's awareness. In brief,

these values are basic, implicit assumptions of the Laotian culture that have been inculcated into the people through the normal process of socialization. And although the Lao experienced years of colonialism (as we have seen in the last chapter), the basic pattern of Lao values has been relatively unaffected by civilatrice francaise--or by anything else. A general satisfaction with their traditional ways of life makes the Laotians reluctant to change.[1]

Lao Value Orientations

In order to clarify the value system of the Lao culture, an attempt will be made first to identify some "value orientations." These orientations are assumed to exist in every culture, because of the problems to which people everywhere must be oriented. As has been mentioned in the last Chapter, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck consider value orientations to be the cardinal categories in any value system. These include: (1) human nature orientation; (2) man-nature orientation; (3) time orientation; (4) space orientation; (5) activity orientation; and (6) relational orientation.[2]

From these orientations certain "focal values," or core values--about which numerous "specific values" cluster--will be derived. Thus,

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[1]Frank M. LeBar and Adrienne Suddard, Laos, Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1967), pp. 95-103. The writer also observed during the field work that, even when there were good relationships with the United States, the Laotian government heavily censored most of the Hollywood and other Western movies showing in Laos. The reason was that they ran counter to the Laotian customs and culture and might be harmful to them.

[2]Florence Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodtbeck, Variations in Value Orientations (New York: Row, Peterson and Co., 1961), pp. 10-20. In fact, space orientation, though considered a cardinal category, was not used by the authors in their empirical study because it had not been sufficiently worked out.

it is assumed that a value system is made up of specific values centering around focal values which, in turn, stem from "value orientations," as suggested by the anthropologist Cora Du Bois.[3] It is implied in this assumption that "no system of values can encompass genuine contraries," and "in any value system where such spurious oppositions exist there will be a strain for consistency."[4]

Human Nature Orientation

This orientation is concerned with the character of innate human nature. Cultures may conceivably view man as inherently good, evil, both good and evil, or simply neutral. Moreover, the goodness or badness of human nature may be conceived as changeable or not changeable during the course of an individual's life. The Laotian orientation, under the influence of Buddhism and Hinduism, tends to hold that man is essentially of a good nature--but corruptible.[5] Thus, he must constantly work to keep it good. This seems to be reflected in the constant preoccupation of the Laotian with self-examination, which he does with the intent of improving his moral self. LeBar and Suddard remarked that, for Laotians:

> Suffering in life is ascribed to man's struggles to fulfill his own desires, but there is a way or method--the Eight-

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[3]Cora Du Bois, "The Dominant Value Profile of American Culture," in The Character of Americans, ed. by Michael McGiffert (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1964), pp. 224-231.

[4]Ibid., p. 225.

[5]LeBar and Suddard say that: "Accepting man's mixed nature in his capabilities for good and evil, Theravada Buddhism is largely nonprescriptive and nonprohibitory in relation to the individual, especially the laymen." See LeBar and Suddard op. cit., p. 96.

fold-Path--by which one may avoid or cancel out suffering in this life or future lives through the acquisition of merit."[6]

This orientation is largely derived from the teachings of Buddhism and from Brahman beliefs that are rooted in the early history of Laos.

Man-Nature Orientation

According to philosophers, cultural historians, and anthropologists, any culture tends to emphasize one of three main conceptions about the man-nature relationship--subjugation to nature, harmony with nature, and mastery over nature. The subjugation-to-nature orientation is characterized by an attitude of passive acceptance of the forces of nature--e.g., storms, floods, illness, death--as inevitable. In the harmony-with-nature conception, man, nature, and "super-nature" are viewed as but parts of an harmonious and unified whole. There is a close interrelationship between parts which are simply extensions of one another. In contrast to this, the mastery-over-nature position is dominated by a strong confidence that man can control and subdue nature, which is to be put to the use of human beings.[7]

A central theme of the Laotian culture is that everything is made up of the same substance. Man, animal, vegetable, mineral are all the subsumed elements of the universe, the soul and matter of which they contain. Reciprocally, the universe is endowed with elements, and a soul identical to that of man and his animal, vegetable, and mineral brothers. With these pantheist conceptions, the souls of creatures and

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[6]Ibid.

[7]Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, op. cit., p. 13.

the divine soul are of exactly the same substance and are conceived as complementary parts of the universal soul. In sum, the basic Lao orientation is toward harmony with nature.

Time Orientation

Besides a view of nature, every culture must have its conceptions of the past, the present, and the future. While all societies have to deal with these three aspects of time, their emphasis upon one or another of them may be of great consequence for their way of life--in planning, changing, conforming, etc. While other cultures (for example, the American) tend to think that people should look forward to the future,[8] Laotian culture appears to be more attached to the past. This is reflected in spirit worship,[9] strong family traditions, and respect for older people[10]--and especially for the "passionless sage," who is supposed to be more experienced and more knowledgeable of the rules of the ancients and the customary and time-honored norms of behavior which serve as guides for others in their everyday life. The living depend on the support of their forefathers' souls in their efforts to live in happiness and prosperity.

Space Orientation

Time seems to be closely linked to space. People who are more oriented to the future tend to stress movement and mobility. According

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[8]For a detailed treatment of the American conception of time, see, Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1959), pp. 128-145.

[9]See LeBar and Suddard, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

[10]Ibid., pp. 97-98.

to the French author André Siegfried, if ingenuity is the dominant trait of the French national portrait, tenacity of the English, discipline of the German, and mysticism of the Russian, then dynamism is the key aspect of the American character.[11] And to the extent that "dynamism" involves mobility, which it certainly does, the American stands in sharp contrast to the Laotian: because of his attachment to the past, and the great importance of the extended family and the village to his way of life, the common Laotian does not want to move away from his ancestral home. Since he depends upon his family and village to satisfy almost all of his biological and social needs, he seems to feel lost, lonely, and insecure outside these primary groups. His world is really a village world as LeBar and Suddard have said:

> Loyalty to one's village is probably a strongly developed trait, although there is relatively little information available upon which to base such opinion. Most rural people have little contact with the world beyond their village. The fact that the partners to a marriage tend to come from within the same village, the fact that most disputes are settled within the village, and the involvement of the entire village in the religious life of the monastery are all factors which would tend to strengthen the individual's psychological identification with his own village.[12]

Activity Orientation

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck have classified this orientation into a threefold range--"being," "being-in-becoming," and "doing." The "being" orientation is the tendency to act to satisfy one's impulses and desires. In other words, it is the spontaneous expression in activity

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[11]Quoted by Jan O. M. Broek, "National Character in the Perspective of Cultural Geography," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 370 (March, 1967), 10.

[12]LeBar and Suddard, op. cit., p. 102.

of impulses and desires. This orientation appears to be dominant in some cultures, such as in Mexico with its ramified patterns of fiesta activities.

The "being-in-becoming" orientation shows a preference for activities which develop all aspects of the self as an integrated whole. Unlike the "being" orientation, it stresses the control and containment of impulses by means of meditation and detachment.

While both the "being" and the "being-in-becoming" orientations are concerned with what the human actor is rather than what he can accomplish, the "doing" orientation emphasizes the accomplishment itself and prefers "the kind of activity which results in accomplishments that are measurable by standards conceived to be external to the acting individual." These three orientations are roughly equivalent to the "Dionysian," "Apollonian," and "Fromethean" tendencies coined by Charles Morris.[13]

The "being-in-becoming" orientation appears to be characteristic of the Laotians as well as other Orientals belonging to the Indian and Chinese cultures. This is reflected in the Buddhist "Middle Path" which urges self-control, meditation and caution in one's actions.

The Laotians devote a great deal of time to leisure activities, such as celebration of the New Year, the boun, or religious holidays, and the ngan, or formalized courtships. All of these involve great feasting and celebration--enjoyed with special foods, drink, ballad singers (mo-lum), reciters of legends (mo-khub), and experts at repartee. This Laotian love of leisure and of organized feasts is notorious.

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[13]Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, op. cit., pp. 15-17.

However, it is important to note that all of these activities are aimed at "making merit" in the Buddhist sense.

Relational Orientation

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck have said that the character of man's relation to other men can be divided into three patterns--lineal, collateral, and individualistic. While all three variations exist in every society, in predominantly "individualistic" societies the autonomy of the individual is pronounced, and individual goals prevail over those of collateral or lineal groups. If "collaterality" is predominant, the individual is not important except as he is a part of a social order--a laterally extended group--such as the extended family, the goals and welfare of which are prevalent. When the "lineal" principle dominates the relational system, group goals again prevail over those of the individual, but one of the most important of these goals is the continuity of the group through time; ordered positional succession occurs within the group.[14]

The principle of lineality has governed the Chinese extended family or "clan" for thousands of years, as described by the anthropologist Hsu.[15] The clan stresses mutual dependence, not just among living members, but also between the latter and the dead, and between both of these and all future generations. All are bound together by a

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[14] Ibid., pp. 17-19.

[15] See, Francis L. K. Hsu, Clan, Caste and Club (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1963); Under the Ancestor's Shadow, Kinship, Personality and Social Mobility in Village China, 2nd ed. (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1967); and, American and Chinese: Two Ways of Life (New York: Henry Schumann, Inc., 1953).

clearly defined network of reciprocal obligations that have the goal of strengthening and perpetuating the clan. This is manifested in such traditions as the common house for ancestor worship, the common graveyard, family solidarity and mutual help, and the exercise of authority by family elders. The role of the individual, who exists mainly for the clan, is clearly defined within this network of relationships. The culture of Laos and the Laotian family system have been almost totally dominated by the principle of lineality.[16] LeBar and Suddard observe that:

> The rights and obligations that exist between an individual and the relatives who constitute his "spatially extended" family, or kindred, are extremely important. A man borrows money and rents land from a relative, because he can expect to pay less interest and less rent that he would to a nonrelative. When parental households disintegrate or are no longer able to accommodate the grown children and grandchildren, a man or a woman may look within the kindred for a relative whose house group he can join . . . a person's kindred are bound to him and to one another by common obligations and mutual help and support.[17]

In this discussion of some important assumptions of Laotian culture, no claim is made that the problems selected are wholly definitive or that the possible range of solutions given to them is exhaustive. Nor it is assumed that any one of these value orientations overrides all others, to form an ethos or oversummative principle governing every aspect of life in a society. The classification scheme should rather be considered as a tentative formulation that would permit one to identify some degree of consistency among the solutions given to certain basic human problems and also to predict the amount of emphasis to be placed on different behavioral spheres in a culture. It should be noted that in studies of

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[16]LeBar and Suddard, op. cit., pp. 62-68.

[17]Ibid., p. 68.

the Laotian character, one can see definite relationships between the orientations of good-but-corruptible human nature, harmony-with-nature, past time, immobility in space, being-in-becoming, and lineality. Combined together, these orientations lead to a focus of interest on the intellectual-aesthetic behavioral spheres.[18] The identification of these six basic assumptions of Lao culture is likely to help one relate the innumerable complex, disparate, and contradictory value patterns of Lao society into a meaningful framework which may demonstrate certain consistent tendencies, resolve apparent contradictions, and explain why the Laotian people behave the way they do.

Laotian Focal Values

From the basic Laotian value orientations already mentioned, the following focal values appear to emerge: self-control, harmony with environment, social hierarchy, and mutual dependence.

Self-Control

It has been said that an underlying assumption of the Lao culture is that man is born good, but is corruptible. And in the activity orientation, the Laotian tends to be preoccupied with the control and containment of his impulses and desires, in order to develop his self as an integrated whole. These two cultural themes seem to be the sources of the Laotian's constant concern with self-examination--which he does in an attempt to master himself and thereby maintain his inherent goodness--and the improvement of his moral self. This is likely

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[18]Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, op. cit., p. 31.

to be the reason why the personal virtues most desired by Laotians are based on the control of self: moderation, modesty, equanimity, moral probity, and resignation.

Harmony with the Non-self

This harmony is manifested in one's relationship with nature and with other men. Harmony with the universe is assumed to be realized when man conforms to the existing natural order about him. Thus, the location of houses or graves, for example, must take into account terrestrial influences and other natural laws, since any site can bring happiness or misfortune depending upon its disposition in accordance with the stars and benevolent planets. There are "good" as well as "bad" days for engaging in any kind of activity. Before doing something important, such as travelling or building a house, it is advisable to consult a geomancer, an astrologist, a horoscopist, or a chiromancer. Even a Sovereign must not trouble world harmony; any wrong deed on his part may bring about catastrophes for the country--floods, epidemics, earthquakes.

Harmony should be maintained not only between man and nature, but also in social relationships. The general code of conduct here is to seek equilibrium by following the Buddhist "Middle Path." The following qualities are required for the maintenance of this path: avoidance of injury to others, concern for not taking advantage of susceptibility, compromise, politeness, delicacy, tactfulness, gentleness, suppleness, and flexibility. Anthony Eden observed that "patience and a general reluctance to slit a neighbor's throat seemed

to be national traits."[19] He added that the Laotians were in no sense crusaders.[20]

Because face is something extremely important to the Laotian, there is a great concern for sparing others the humiliation of losing face. Thus, care should be taken never to hurt anybody's ego. Complimentary terms should be applied to others and deprecatory terms used for oneself.

The previous examples may suffice to give some idea of the Laotian preoccupation with achieving harmony of action in both the natural and the human environment. As a result of this concern for harmony, a high premium is placed on the status quo, and change tends to be considered as disruptive of the existing harmonious order of things. Consequently, the best way to preserve existing harmony is to follow the ways of the past, which have been proven by experience.

The future is not anticipated in terms of change and progress, but only as an extension of the past and present order of things. By the same token, attachment to one's place and land, and to routine everyday activities, may contribute to the preservation of this harmony. This seems to be one of the reasons why Laotian culture has remained static for hundreds of years.

In this respect, Hall's distinction between "ageric" (active) and "non-ageric" (non-active) cultures may shed light on one difference between the Laotian culture and others. In an ageric culture--for example, the American--"just plain sitting, trying to capture a

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[19]Anthony Eden, Toward Peace in Indochina (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 52.

[20]Ibid.

sense of self, is not considered to be doing anything." In a non-ageric culture--for example, the Laotian--"in the process of handling the matter of 'becoming late' it makes no difference whether you do something or not." In other words, so long as you do not disrupt the present order, there is no difference between "the 'active' and 'dormant' phases of things."[21] This present order is also one in which the rights and duties of everyone are clearly defined according to their positions in the social hierarchy.

Social Hierarchy

Social hierarchy is an adaptation of the cosmic order and is consequently strongly related to the harmony-with-nature orientation, as well as to the lineal principle in the relational orientation. The universe, as conceived by the Laotians, is dominated essentially by the hierarchical principle. This view, derived from both Buddhism and Hinduism, is based on the assumption that hierarchy, and not equality, is the natural order of everything in the cosmic system. Heaven is superior to earth, male to female, husband to wife, father to son, and sovereign to subject. Since inequality is the law of nature, to live in harmony with nature is to conform to this hierarchical system, to know one's position in it, and to behave accordingly. The subordinate is supposed to obey the superior, whose authority is taken for granted. Thus, the society is based on a clear hierarchy of status, which in turn is supported by a body of formal rules governing the relationship between people at the higher and lower levels. These formal conventions

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[21]Hall, op. cit., p. 139.

must be adhered to by everyone, and conformity becomes a necessary virtue. Accordingly, using hierarchy as a focal value, we can derive the following sub-values: concern for status, formalism, and conformity.[22]

Concern for Status. - Awareness of status appears to be very strong in Laotian society. The most striking thing about the cultural patterns in which Laotian concepts of personal identity are embodied is the degree to which they depict virtually everyone--friends, relatives, neighbors, and strangers; elders and youths; superiors and inferiors; men and women; chiefs, kings, priests, spirits; even the dead and the unborn--as stereotypes. Each of the symbolic orders of person-definition, from concealed names to flaunted titles, serves to stress and strengthen the standardization of relationships between individuals. Geertz observes that such symbolic structuring reflects the impact of a time perception that recognizes in oneself and in one's fellowmen the process of biological aging--the appearance, maturation, decay, and disappearance of discrete individuals throughout one's life.[23]

Linguistic devices abound for the purpose of distinguishing status. In English, "I" and "you" can apply to anybody in the conversation. In Lao, there are no such "status-free" personal pronouns. The child calls his father "paw" and himself "kha-noi," his elder brother, "eye"; and so on. (Calling those of higher status by plain

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[22]For the Laotian conception of the cosmos and hierarchical system, see, S. J. Tambiah, Buddhism and Spirit Cults in Northeastern Thailand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

[23]Clifford Geertz, Interpretation of Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 360-361.

names is to insult them.) The same personal pronouns can also be used in non-family relationships, by equating the other person to one's grandfather, father, mother, brother, or sister, depending upon his age and status. Status is awarded great importance because it is the legitimate basis of authority; according to Hindu doctrine, authority is legitimate only to the extent that it derives from status.

The Laotians seem to accept authority with little obvious tension. Preference, courtesy and proper respect are always expressed toward those in authority. Normally, the wisdom or competence and efficiency of the authority figure is not openly questioned. However, if the authority figure does not honor accepted reciprocal relationships, the oppressed individual may quietly cease to follow higher directions. This latter course will be done without rudeness, discourteousness or any other public display of indignation.

Passiveness in regard to authority seems to be an acceptable solution to the Lao, who view power as a by-product of virtue, or of Buddhist merit. The higher an individual's status within the Laotian social hierarchy, the greater his piety and wisdom are thought to be. Even when a misuse of power occurs, the Laotian--with his faith in cosmic retribution--is supposed to remain undisturbed--after all, tyrants can be reborn as dogs, while those who are abused by tyranny are not really martyrs. Instead, they are simply persons who must bow to their Karma because of misdeeds in previous existences. Since power comes from an unknowable source, its effectiveness is the major criterion for judging its magnitude. The passivity with which the Laotians appear to have accepted the abolishment of their monarchy and the establishment of a socialist state is a case in point.

Formalism. - To preserve this hierarchical structure, heavy stress is laid upon formal rules of conduct. An extensive system of ceremonial conventions has been devised to maintain order in social relationships. In a meeting, each must be properly seated according to his social position. There are prescribed patterns of speech for greetings between superiors and subordinates and between equals, depending upon the positions held in the social hierarchy. A person loses face if he does not receive the treatment to which his status entitles him.

Conformity. - In such a formalitic social structure, conformity to rituals and etiquette is highly valued because it contributes to the maintenance of social harmony and order. Submission to authority is something taken for granted. The precision of the patterns of conduct to be observed in each situation leaves no room for initiative or ambiguity. The good child is the one who obeys his parents without ever questioning their orders. A good student never challenges or doubts his teacher's authority and knowledge. This seems to be the reason why many foreign observers point out that the typical Laotian evinces a lack of imagination and inventiveness, and has a tendency toward imitation and indiscriminate borrowing in lieu of creativeness. But to the Laotian, he is simply conforming with accepted social values. Most Laotians are peasants, and the predominence of conformity helps to explain why there is no history of Laotian peasant revolt.

Mutual Dependence

Conformity, formalism, and concern for status are reinforced by a clearly delineated network of mutual dependence. As we have seen in

the relational orientation, Laotian society is dominated by a principle of lineality according to which the interests of the group prevail over those of the individual. If the American individualistic orientation makes self-reliance an esteemed quality, the predominance of the group goals in Laos makes mutual dependence among group members a highly desirable value. Solidarity and reciprocity are thus the cornerstones of relationships between members of the family and of larger social groups.

In the same vein, if one member of the extended family is successful in his work, the whole family will profit from it; if he does something wrong, the whole family will bear the disgrace of his deeds. For this reason, a stranger who is kind is a relative, and an unkind relative is a stranger.

Mutual dependence, which plays such an essential part in family life (filial piety is, of course, a cardinal virtue), is also an important principle governing non-family relationships. Here it is expressed in the form of gratitude, which applies in the exchange of assistance and presents. The Laotians believe that mutual give-and-take produces mutual satisfaction, and that "if one receives a kilo of pork one must return a kilo of chicken."

This principle of solidarity creates especially strong ties among members of a village, which usually consists of a group of related families and occupies their ancestors' land. Loyalty to the village is a great virtue, since the individual depends upon the village for almost everything.

The relationship between sovereign and subject was also traditionally governed by the same principle of mutual dependence. The

subject depended on the sovereign for his title and the privileges attached thereto; the sovereign relied on the subject's service.

With this discussion of mutual dependence and its origins, we conclude our examination of the Laotian value system. In the next part, we shall see how these value patterns influence the way of life of the Laotian people.

Values and the Laotian Way of Life

The value configuration mentioned previously has been assumed to be more or less shared by the majority of the Laotians. To be sure, few people in Laos conform completely to the expected value patterns, and everybody would agree that Laotians do differ in their individual character and behavior. It can be expected, nevertheless, that these values constitute a central tendency around which individual behavior varies or deviates, or a general ideal which the Laotians strive to achieve in their everyday activities. In this sense, although the utility of the value configuration in predicting the behavior of individual Laotians may be limited, it can at least permit us to set forth some generalizations about the overall way of life or recurrent behavioral patterns of Laotians as a people. The following comment by Hoebel on Hsu's book, Clan, Caste and Club, may serve as a guideline for understanding the relationship between cultural values and national behavior:

> On a moderately high level of generalization, Hsu's data and analyses do portray clear and notable differences in the ideational and behavioral character of Hindus, Chinese, and American engros . . . . Its (Hsu's work) may have only limited predictive value for individual behavior in a particular situation, but there is no question but that it goes a long way in shedding a rational light on the major attributes of what one may expect

> in the main from Hindus, Chinese, and Americans as people. And that is all reasonable anthropologists are likely to ask of national character studies today.[24]

Value, Need and Behavior

Few people would deny that Laotians, with all other people, share physiological needs for food, drink, sexual gratification, and procreation. We can be sure about the universality of these needs because they are clearly biologically determined. On higher level needs, usually referred to as "social" needs, opinion differs as to whether they derive from biology or from culture and also as to what they really are. As we have seen at the outset of this Chapter, Goldschmidt calls all these social needs the "need for positive affect," and the controversy regarding their biological or cultural origin seems to have been resolved for him in favor of the biological.[25] And even though many anthropologists and psychologists appear to doubt the assumption that the ultimate source of these social needs is only biological, and although research cannot bring rigorous evidence to bear in either direction due to methodological difficulties, one must at least view this need as inherent in man because:

> Our theoretical orientation requires a preestablished motive for human acquiescense to the demands of social existence. If we treat it as a product of culture and then explain cultural phenomena in terms of it, we are engaging in circular

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[24]Adamson Hoebel, "Anthropological Perspectives on National Character," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 370 (March, 1967), 7.

[25]Walter Goldschmidt, "The Biological Constant," in Cultural and Social Anthropology, ed. by Peter B. Hammond (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1964), pp. 2-9.

> reasoning. To say it is biological is not to say it is "instinctive," as that word is habitually used, but rather that it is a generalized behavioral attribute universal to normal human beings that derives directly from some biological quality (or combination of biological qualities) with which they are endowed. Whatever the source, this need for positive affect is a constant and recurrent element in human social behavior.[26]

Briefly, according to Goldschmidt, though culture may change the content of the social need and the way to fulfill it, this need can be viewed as a biological constant which is universal to all mankind. The same point of view has been held by such social scientists as Erasmus, Hsu, and Cantril.[27] Thus, we may conclude that Laotians, like people everywhere, have social needs to be fulfilled.

Need for Sociability, Security, and Status

But what do these social needs consist of? What are they? Here again we have to select among a variety of social needs that seem to have universal existence. Hsu, a Chinese-American, feels that because many people in Western societies tend to seek satisfaction of their needs outside the family, sociologists and psychologists conceived such culture-bound needs as Maslow's "self-actualization." Thomas's "wish for new experience" and Rogers' "greater independence of self-responsibility" are but variations of the same Western theme. In Hsu's opinion, all of the so-called social needs--Linton's "psychic need," McClelland's "motive," Maslow's "higher order needs"--may be subsumed under three main types: (1) the need for "sociability" or "the

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[26] Ibid., p. 8.

[27] Charles J. Erasmus, Man Takes Control--Cultural Development and American Aid (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1961), pp. 9-14; Francis L. K. Hsu, Clan, Caste and Club, op. cit., pp. 138-161, and 232-262; and, Hadley Cantril, The Pattern of Human Concerns (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1965), pp. 8-20.

individual's enjoyment of being with his fellow men," (2) the need for "security" or "the individual's certainty of his bonds with his fellow men," and (3) the need for "status" which "gives the individual his sense of importance among his fellow men in all or most situations which concern him." Briefly, these three kinds of social need, which Hsu assumes to be universal, are the need "to be with other human beings, to be related to them, and to be of importance to some or all of them."[28]

Impact of Culture Upon Need Satisfaction

How the satisfaction of these needs has been influenced by cultural values to result in different ways of life has been tested by Hsu in relation to the cultures of the United States, India, and China. In the American culture, which is dominated by the individual-centered orientation, social relationships are based mainly on the "contract" principle, and "clubs," or free associations among equals, are the instruments through which individuals can best satisfy their social needs. The Indian supernatural orientation has led to the "hierarchy" principle in interpersonal relations, and to the predominance of the "caste" as the group which can best satisfy individual social needs. The harmony-centered orientation of the Chinese culture, on the other hand, has made "kinship" the leading principle in social relationships and the "clans" or extended families the ideal means by which individual social needs can be fulfilled. Hsu's hypothesis has been supported by a series of Thematic Apperception Tests administered to samples of

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[28]Hsu, op cit. The need for status or "prestige motivation" has been particularly emphasized by Erasmus who views it as a stimulus to cultural development. See Erasmus, op cit.

American, Indian, and Chinese students.[29] Although his model for expressing the relationship between value and behavior, using "need" as an intervening variable, appears to need further empirical validation, it seems quite applicable to our purpose in studying the relationship between value and the Laotian's way of life.

In short, it is assumed that Laotians seek to satisfy--in addition to their biological needs--the three kinds of social needs (sociability, security, and status) which may be regarded as common to all mankind. Some of the difference between the Laotian way of life and that of other peoples may be explained in terms of the impact of cultural values upon the way individuals fulfill these needs. In the interest of brevity, we shall concentrate on two basic aspects of social life: the way people organize themselves into groups, and the kinds of activity pursued for the fulfillment of these needs.

Group Organization

Throughout history, man as a social animal has not lived alone but in social groups. Depending upon the values and beliefs of a culture, the human groups created to deal with the problems of life will be organized along different lines. If, for example, the value system stresses the principle of inequality among men, the organization will tend to be dominated by hierarchy and the power of superiors over subordinates. In case equality is valued, cooperation and teamwork will be given more emphasis than power and hierarchy. If individual goals are predominant, groups will tend to form according to the

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[29] Hsu, Clan, Caste, and Club.

principle of contract. In contrast, status is more likely to be stressed in situations where group goals prevail over those of the individual. It should be noted that these are all questions of "more-or-less," because all these principles of organization--hierarchy, power, cooperation, and status--are present in any type of organization. But to the extent that one or two principles are emphasized, others must be deemphasized to a similar extent. Moreover, within a culture, emphasis on any one of these principles may differ depending upon the nature and purpose of the organization--military groups must require more hierarchy and discipline than voluntary clubs.

Nevertheless, from a cross-cultural perspective, it can be said in general that each culture tends to stress one or two organizational principles at the expense of others. Bureaucratic organizations require a certain amount of hierarchy and status distinction anywhere, but it seems no exaggeration to say, for example, that because of the prevailing social values in German culture, power and hierarchy are given more emphasis in German bureaucracy than in American.

As already indicated, anthropologists and others have suggested that the value system of a culture is reflected first and foremost in the family, which is the socializing agent par excellence, and that starting with the study of kinship behavior, one can hope to explain the behavior of a people in other spheres of life.

The Family System. - In Laos, conjugal union tends to be a social contract rather than a personal relationship; its primary purpose is the continuation of the lineage. Because the perpetuity of the family is assured by male descendants, it is the father-son relationship which is most salient. The selection of spouse tends to be decided by parents and

relatives based on family considerations rather than on mutual attraction between individual partners.

Within this framework, children have been raised to respect and obey submissively not only their parents and older brothers and sisters, but also grandparents, aunts, uncles, and grand cousins, and to live in a relationship of mutual dependence with them. In spite of almost a century of contact with French culture and all the recent political, economic, and spiritual upheavals, the Laotian society is still governed, though to a lesser extent, by a system of order and values which leave little room for individual self-expression.

The Family and Satisfaction of Individual Needs. - As a result of this process of socialization, the clan has become a world in which the Laotian can satisfy almost all his social needs. The certainty of his bonds with fellow members, or fulfillment of his needs for security, is assured by his position within the clan, and his duties and rights are clearly defined. In case of disaster, he can expect to get help from his relatives just as the latter can expect to be assisted by him. His enjoyment of being with others, or fulfillment of his needs for sociability, are satisfied by numerous opportunities for interaction with other clan members--meeting at the wat in public ceremonies, mutual courtesy visits during special holidays, and also visits at regular intervals to inquire about health and everyday activities. The frequency of interaction varies with the degree of closeness and kinship and the network of interaction extends not only to relatives on the father's and mother's sides but also to in-laws. These activities may occupy almost all of his spare time.

His need for status is fulfilled by putting himself in a position to give more help, assistance, and gifts to his kinsmen than he himself gets from them. The best way to satisfy his need for prestige is to strive to reach the top of the social ladder, i.e., to become a leader or bureaucrat through educational achievement. By entrance to the elite class, a young man's dreams are fulfilled, for he has at once discharged his duty to his family, assured its prosperity, and gained for himself and his venerated ancestors an honored position in society.

The Village as a Way of Life. - Because the Laotian is able to satisfy almost all his needs within the village network, he does not seem to be much interested in what happens outside of his world. Since he has been trained to depend on his clan for almost everything, he tends to distrust strangers, making it difficult for secondary groups to develop. The predominance of the clan seems to be responsible for the absence of strong social groups in Laos--such as political parties and labor unions--capable of serving as a meaningful check upon the central government and thereby making democracy viable. Moreover, the paternalistic pattern of the family system, which is the principal agent of socialization, has been extended to all other fields, including village administration and central government. The village, which is but a group of clans, was traditionally governed by a council of elders. Given this cultural background, we can understand why it has not been easy for democracy in the Western sense to develop quickly in Laos.

Spheres of Occupational Activity

In every culture, certain types of activity will be more psychologically rewarding than others, depending upon the prevailing value

configurations. As Williams has pointed out:

> All associations have standards of character and proficiency and accord rewards to those best meeting whatever standards are most highly appraised, whether of military prowess, ritual knowledge, asceticism, piety, or what not.[30]

Thus, activities which are used as social criteria for judging personal excellence are most likely to fulfill the individual need for status. The consequence for the whole culture is that these activities tend to be more developed since they are more appealing to the best elements in the society.

By way of example, if American culture appears to care more for economics, business, and science than for politics and the civil service, Laotian culture is more likely to give preference to the latter.[31] This seems to be a logical consequence of the Laotian value system, which lays heavy stress upon moral virtues and harmony in social relationships rather than on material production. The view that the nature of man is "good but corruptible" has led to the idea of a need for self control and the moral virtues related thereto. "Harmony with nature" has suggested that one has to accept the order of things as it is, and not to change anything lest this harmony should be disrupted. The "being-in-becoming" orientation requires containment of desires and passions through reflection and detachment, so as to behave in accordance with the "middle path." The "lineal principle" in social

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[30]Robin Williams, Jr., "Values and Beliefs in American Society," in The Character of Americans, ed. by Michael McGriffert (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1964), p. 177.

[31]Ibid.; Florence Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, op. cit.; and, Geoffrey Gorer, The American People, rev. ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1964).

relationships signifies that one exists primarily for the group, with status and role clearly defined. One has to conduct himself accordingly in order to conform to the natural harmony in society. Hence, the heavy emphasis on social hierarchy and mutual dependence.

Since the scholar and especially the priest, is the ideal man, businessmen have been looked down upon. The merchant is viewed simply as an "intermediary exploiting others for his personal profit," possessing no virute or education. Even though he may have plenty of wealth, the old proverb continues to be repeated "sib paw ka bo thow phagna lieng," or "ten merchants cannot be compared to one phagna's servant." For this reason, it is not unusual for businessmen to feel insecure about their status as "rich but not noble," and to try to make friends with the literati so as to share in the latter's prestige. However, most business in Laos is in the hands of foreigners, mainly Chinese.[32]

Farmers are made respectable by the staple food they produce for the society. Even though they are usually uneducated, they are loved for their honesty and for the way they conform to nature. "Still at work after sunset, they are already out of bed before sunrise."

To be poor in Laos means to have no rice, hence the proverbs "lack of rice brings turmoil to the country" and "with rice in the barn, there is nothing to be worried about." Conforming to this value,

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[32]According to the doctrine set forth by the new "Democratic Republic of Laos," businessmen who employed more than three people as well as those political-bureaucratic elites who have business interests are designated as enemies of the Laotian people. See Joseph J. Zasloff, The Pathet Lao (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973), p. 22.

previous kings and other elites preferred working on their farms to going to golf courses, when time was available. In Laos, as in other rice consuming countries, rice means many things: the major starch eaten at every meal, the major source of cash, and the object of most labor. Its production, consumption, and sale are the topics of most village conversation; even the verb "to eat" is "to eat rice."

Religion and Culture-and-Personality

Laos is a country steeped in Buddhism, "which is not only a religion, but a civilization, a way of life. The monks are the priests of the Buddha's teachings, but they have always been seen also as terchers responsible for educating the mind."[33] There is a critical balance in which the structure of society stands between the cultural system and its religious components on the one hand, and the personality on the other. And the focus of the set of interconnections is the set of values institutionalized in the society and internalized in the personality. As crucial as social values are in the dynamics of the social system, they cannot be the sole determinants of process in society. Process is a function of the resources which are available for implementing values and goals, and is an outgrowth of many internal adjustments by which various strains and tensions can be handled.

Talcott Parsons points out that the religious anchors of societal values stand at a higher level of cultural generality than do the societal values themselves. And they stand above societal obligations, personal obligations, and those independent of either--for

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[33]Bounthong Vixaysakd, "Primary Education in Laos," Paper presented to the UNESCO Regional Office for Education in Asia, June, 1973, p. 1. (mimeo)

example, obligations to scientific "truth" or to religious salvation. On religious levels these very highest valuational choices are grounded in the higher-order orientations of meaning.[34] In this sense, Clifford Geertz concludes that a religious system is not a thing in itself, but a facet of the total culture in which it occurs; it permeates other institutions and is in turn permeated by them.[35] In the following section we will turn to the effects of Buddhism on Lao culture-and-personality.

Buddhism and the Lao Culture-and-Personality

Any meaningful discussion of Lao values and culture demands knowledge of Buddhism, because it provides the Lao with a set of values or life standards. Buddhism is thought of as a way of life, rather than as a religious society. The political implications of this are crucial; the elites, whoever they are, cannot at any point afford to ignore, or even to neglect, the "national consciousness" of Lao Buddhists.[36]

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[34]Talcott Parsons, Social Structure and Personality, rev. ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1970), pp. 101-102.

[35]Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

[36]The "Twelve Point Program" of the Laotian Patriotic Front in 1968 declared its destiny to be the protection and guardianship of the religion. "To respect and defend Buddhism, preserve the purity of monks and their right to practice Buddhism, protect pagodas, encourage unity and mutual assistance among monks and believers of various Buddhist factions, and encourage solidarity among the priests and followers of other religions." In designating "enemy of the people" categories, they neglected Buddhism while including the king, the royal family, those with business interests, and employers of more than three employees. See Joseph J. Zasloff, op. cit., chapter 2. Tambiah points out that "one of the most important features of Theravada Buddhist policy is its active consciousness of historical continuity."

The "Four Woeful States"

The ordinary Laotian conceives the "four woeful states," or apaya realistically and materially as outside himself, to be attained after death (These are "hell," or naraka; "the realm of beasts," dirajana; "the hungry ghosts," or peta; and "the frightened ghosts," or asura.) But in the language of the Dharmas, i.e., the canons, the woeful states are experienced here and now: "The hungry ghosts of the Dharmas are purely mental. Ambition based on craving, worry based on craving--to be afflicted with these is to be born a hungry ghost." "If one is afraid, one is simultaneously born an asura."[37] Whenever greed, anger and delusion cause us to be excited and heated, we become creatures in the hell-like samsara.[38] Again, in dealing with the paired concepts of heaven and hell, Buddhadasa declares that while in everyday language there are outside realms to be attained after death, "the heaven and hell of the Dharma language may be attained any time at all depending on one's mental make-up."[39]

The Doctrinal Perspective

The canonical texts of Buddhism (like the Bible of Christianity or the core texts of any other religion) are complex and rich in meaning,

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See S. J. Tambiah, "The Persistence and Transformation of Tradition in Southeast Asia," in Post Traditional Societies, ed. by S. N. Eisenstadt (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 55-84.

[37]Buddhadasa Bhikku, Pasaa Khon Pasaa Dham (Layman and Dhamma Language) (Bangkok, 1968).

[38]Buddhadasa Bhikku, In Samsara Exists Nirvana, Mutual Understanding Between Religions, Series 12. (Bangkok, 1970).

[39]Ibid., pp. 23-24.

and by the same token sometimes ambigous or subject to different levels of interpretation. But most authorities would agree with Buddhadasa, one of the most renowned scholar-monks, when he wrote that: "The aim of the Buddhist quest is 'complete freedom from selfhood' (anatta) and the attainment of 'emptiness' (sunnatta), which is beyond both good and bad action (karma). To train oneself not to cling to anything with the feeling of 'I' or 'mine'--that is the highest system of spiritual culture."[40] This interpretation is compelling to Laotians because it stems from one basic thrust; it is the world "here and now" that is relevant. This fundamental point has many ramifications and resonances. Not only does it call for action here and now as being productive, but it also "interiorizes" the Buddhist cosmology--declaring that heaven and hell, rebirth (samsara) and liberation (nirvana), are within one's mind and are not outside events or experiences. Central to this exposition is the flat assertion that the language of the common man is sometimes misleading and different from the language of the Dharmas.

In explaining the concept of nirvana, Buddhadasa states that there are different levels of this, and says: "Nirvana is attained at any moment that the mind becomes free from compounding. [Compounding means grasping and clinging with attachment.] Freedom from compounding, at any moment, is nirvana. Permanent cessation of compounding is full nirvana."[41]

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[40] Buddhadasa Bhikku, Exchanging Dharma While Fighting, Mutual Understanding Between Religions, Series 10. (Bangkok, 1969), pp. 32-33.

[41] Ibid.

The concept is that the world here and now, our own present time, our own mental states, comprise the stage for urgent and immediate action to achieve Buddhist goals. The quest for nirvana does not mean abnegation and renunciation of action in this world; the ideal is that man should act in this world with metta, with loving kindness and compassion, not for his own selfish gain but for the collective good. Finally, the Buddhist monks totally reject the view that Buddhism is "pessimistic" and "misanthropic" and stands for a devaluation of this world.

The most well-known doctrines among lay Buddhists, however--the Five Precepts, The Four Noble Truths, and the "middle way" Eight-Fold Path--are much more passive than the action-oriented credo of the professional monks.

The Five Precepts. - Buddhists are taught that the basic rules by which ordinary people should live are as follows: (1) refrain from taking life, (2) refrain from taking what is not given (don't steal), (3) refrain from improper sexual behavior, (4) refrain from false speech, and (5) refrain from intoxicants and other stimulants which dull the mind.

Failure to live in accord with these precepts will jeopardize one's happiness, wealth, and achievement and block the way to nirvana. Violation of these precepts may cause one to be reborn into a scale lower than that of human beings. Incidentally, according to Buddhist dogma, there are at least five levels of living existence, so the foregoing warning is no light matter. Moreover, only through the elimination of ignorance can emancipation within Buddhism become a reality. Since there is no God, saint, or intervening power to help

man, he must gain his own "salvation." No one can protect himself from the results of his own deeds since the impersonal Karmic Law declares that each must suffer or benefit from his own actions.

The Four Noble Truths. - It is proclaimed that the Four Noble Truths were discovered by Buddha and taught by him in support of his basic doctrines. The first Noble Truth is dukkha.[42] The following excerpts from the Buddhist Canon may provide insight into the meaning of this Truth for the ordinary believer:

> This is the noble truth of suffering: birth is suffering, old age is suffering, sickness is suffering, death is suffering, union with unpleasant things is suffering, separation from pleasant things is suffering, not obtaining what one wishes is suffering; in short, to cling to existence is suffering.[43]

> The eye, O Monks, is burning, visible things are burning . . . burning with the fire of lust, the fire of anger, the fire of ignorance, burning with the anxiety of birth, decay, death, grief, lamentation, suffering, dejection and despair.[44]

The second Noble Truth is samudaya which declares that the origin and continuing cause of suffering is "desire," or excessive craving. The people are taught that the gratification of what a Westerner might consider to be ordinary drives or basic needs is really

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[42]This term seems to have no completely satisfactory English equivalent. Such terms as "unsatisfied," "imperfect," and "suffering" are frequently substituted. According to Vibhanga 199:99 (this reference indicates volume and page in the Buddhist Canon, Pali Text Society, Romanized Edition), dukkha means un-ease of both body and mind.

[43]Buddhist Canon, Vinaya Mahavagga 1:6:10.

[44]Buddhist Canon, Mahavagga 1:21:2.

the fundamental reason that one cannot find happiness and cannot escape the cycle of life and move into nirvana.[45] These excerpts from the Buddhist Canon may be further descriptive of samudaya:

> And this, O Monks, is the noble truth of the cause of suffering: desire (craving) which leads to rebirth, accompanied by delight and passion, rejoicing at finding delight here and there, the craving for lust, the desire for existence, and the desire for non-existence.[46]

> On ignorance depends karma; on karma depends consciousness; on consciousness depends name and form (nama-rupa); on name and form depends the six organs of sense; on contact depends sensation; on sensation depends desire; on desire depends attachment; on existence depends birth; on birth depends old age and death, sorrow, lamentation, misery, grief and despair. Thus does this entire aggregation of misery arise.[47]

The third noble truth, nirodha, is that dukkha, (suffering), comes to an end when all cravings and deisres cease.[48] Moreover, as there is no transcendant savior, man must bring this about through his own effort. These excerpts from the Canon are offered as further explanation of this Truth:

> And this, O Monks, is the noble truth of the cessation of suffering: the complete and trackless cessation of desire, abandonment of it, relinquishment, release and aversion.[49]

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[45]Sumudaya is to know the cause of the arising of dukkha. The cause is called tanha, or craving, and is composed of three parts: (1) wanting objects of emotional attachment, (2) wanting to be this or that, and (3) wanting not to be this or that. (See Vibhanga 199:99).

[46]Buddhist Canon, Vinaya Mahavagga 1:6:10.

[47]Buddhist Canon, Samyutta Nikaya 22:90:16.

[48]By completely quelling craving, dukkha is also quelled and ceases. The cessation of dukkha is called nirodha. (See Vibhaga 199: 99).

[49]Buddhist Canon, Vinaya Mahavagga 1:6:10.

The fourth noble truth, magga, is that success in reaching nirvana can come only by the Eight-Fold Path. Through this Path, all mankind is provided a way to find release from dukkha--an existence with less suffering--and reach nirvana. Again, an excerpt from the Canon is offered:

> And this, O Monks, is the noble truth of the path that leads to the cessation of suffering; this is the noble eight-fold way: right views, right resolve, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right moodfulness and right concentration.[50]

Because Theravada Buddhism holds these four Noble Truths, it in essence declares that a Way of Salvation is gained by means of Intuitive Knowledge. This Intuitive Knowledge of Enlightenment is gained by means of the Eight-Fold Path. Essentially this is achieved by two types of personal effort: (a) to break the chain of 12 Nidanas (Chain of Causation) at the link of desire through moral discipline and detachment (upekha) so that there is no cause for future rebirths; (b) to so train and discipline the mind through concentrated meditation that the mind is freed from all earthly ties, a trance-like state is attained, with a final intuitive flash of Insight or realization which is Enlightenment leading to nirvana.

The Eight-Fold Path. - The eight-fold path that the good Buddhist must consider as his set of rules for a healthy life and a way to nirvana is described as follows:

1. Right Understanding requires awareness of the Buddha's teaching, plus a thorough self-examination in connection with

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[50] Ibid.

each experience encountered in life. The Buddha taught that such examinations should be without self-delusion or rationalization. This permits each event or emotion to be seen in its true perspective, instead of as it might appear to be. Real "right understanding" is arrived at through the Four Noble Truths.

2. Right Thought requires sufficient detachment from the idea or event to enable one to view it objectively. Moreover, right thought even permits one to examine one's own motives in his feelings toward others. The elements of "right thought" are: (a) thoughts of getting free from desires, (b) thoughts in which there is no vindictiveness, and (c) thoughts in which there is no idea of doing harm.

3. Right Speech precludes saying anything about others that may be displeasing, even though it may be completely true. One application of this teaching, within cultures strongly affected by Buddhism, results in foreigners being told what they want to hear rather than the straight hard facts. Thus the Westerner is often faced with a facade which is quite different from reality, but which he should accept and work through rather than demonstrate impatience, anger or discouragement. The elements of "right speech" are avoiding: (a) false speech, which means telling lies, speech which provokes anger and discord, coarse speech, and talking nonsensically; (b) backbiting and slander; (c) rough and harsh speech; and (d) rambling speech and nonsense.[51]

4. Right Action encourages action in harmony with the Buddha's thoughts and teaching; it requires the adherent to act quite differently than he might be inclined to act. Certainly right action

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[51]Anguttara Nikaya, V:281.

makes excellent sense in a closed community, and most of Laos is composed of closed communities. The Patmokka gives 227 rules of right action and conduct for the monk. In general, "right action" falls into three broad categories which involve avoiding: (a) killing another being; (b) stealing or cheating; and (c) improper sexual behavior.[52]

5. Right Livelihood requires that one's occupation fall within certain accepted parameters, i.e., it should be one that benefits as many living things as possible while avoiding harm to all. It is a practical application of ahimsa, "compassion."

6. Right Effort declares that constant practice is required if thought is to result in proper development. Thus one must learn to practice self-control, self-appraisal, self-discipline, and engage in continuing efforts to understand oneself.

7. Right Mindfulness requires that one's total perspective be kept in focus. This will permit the individual to relate all thought and actions to reality instead of to the illusions which sometimes dominate life.

8. Right Concentration provides a means for the individual to gain insight with its resultant knowledge, through deliberate concentration on Dharma or a single suitable subject. This concept is rooted in the various approaches to the practice of meditation.

The Behavioral Perspective

It can almost be said that to be Lao means to be Buddhist, since the Lao Loum who dominate the country are Buddhists. However, a

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[52] Ibid.

more accurate description of the Laotian's religion is Buddhism with a very heavy admixture of animism--belief in benevolent and manevolent spirits who must be appeased, and animation--belief in "magic" or the existence of power residing in natural phenomena, which when manipulated properly can bring about desired results, and a sprinkling of Brahmanism--mostly appearing as elements such as chants in certain ceremonies and rituals.

If Lao Buddhism is examined behaviorally rather than doctrinally, that is, as actually practiced by ordinary people, the dominating concept is that relating to merit-making (boun). From birth to death the Lao individual, villager or urbanite, peasant or elite member is ceaselessly engaged in a wide variety of merit-making activities--feeding the monks, helping in construction or repair of temple structures, serving in the monastery as monks or novices for varying periods ranging from one day to several years, giving alms to the poor, releasing trapped animals (usually birds and fishes), participating in religious festivals and ceremonies, and generally observing the Buddhist codes of conduct (sila).[53] By these various actions the individual amasses merit and thereby ensures for himself (or herself) a more secure position in the next life. However, there is considerable evidence that the individual is thinking in terms of this life as well. Thus, by living a meritorious life a person may fall heir to unexpected prizes, as in a lottery, as well as achieving increased moral happiness.

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[53]Doctrinally, merit-making is only a way of decreasing craving, with that in turn decreasing dukkha. "Angutara Nikaya, IV:241" indicates that a meritorious field of action can be acquired by giving (generosity); maintaining Buddhist precepts of moral behavior (sila); and developing Bhavana or training one's mind in meditation.

In this mixture of Buddhism, Brahmanism, and animism, the Laotian perceives that all living beings stand in a hierarchy of varying ability to make their actions effective, and of varying degrees of freedom from suffering. As actions become more effective, beings suffer less; such is the nature of existence. Above man is heaven--a land of gods and angels who can get everything they need. Man, moreover, must accumulate much merit or virtue (kuamdee) in order to be free from suffering and to be reborn into this heaven. Below man are animals who share with him some ability to make their actions effective, and in the lowest hierarchy are satans and demons in various levels of hell.[54]

To the Westerner "merit" implies a fairly fixed characteristic, but among Laotians all beings are seen as constantly gaining or losing merit. Merit-making is perhaps the most important motivating or driving force in life for the individual Laotian; it sustains and shields him from birth to death. If the highly individualistic Laotian is commited to anything, it is to this concept and all that it implies.

There are countless ways in which animistic (spirit) and animatistic (magical) beliefs manifest themselves. In times of crisis, such as drought, flood, or sickness, the people supplicate different spirits or attempt to ritually manipulate powerful superhuman forces in order to seek relief or favor. Shamans, or spirit doctors, are consulted in time of serious illness. Amulets to ward off diseases or evil spirits are commonly worn. Practically every Lao village has a

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[54]For an excellent presentation of Laotian Cosmology, see S. J. Tambiah, Buddhism and Spirit Cults in Northeastern Thailand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 53-57.

guardian spirit for whom a special shrine is maintained, usually at the edge of the village. Astrology, which is something of a mixture of animism and animatism, is religiously observed by people generally.

Direct Effects of Culture-and-Personality

It is important to observe that in all social relationships an individual must strive to display an appearance of equanimity, and in addition endeavor to suppress feelings of anger, hostility, disappointment, and any other emotion that may cause embarrassment to others. But this is only part of the story, because in actuality the Lao personality resembles a pendulum swinging back and forth between Apollonian and Dionysian values--the bipolar concept which Ruth Benedict employed in contrasting the Hopi and Kwakuitl Indian cultures.[55] On the one hand, the individual is taught to curb his emotions in all ordinary social relationships--the Apollonian value. On the other, he is encouraged vigorously to indulge in fun and frivolity in socially approved ways--the Dionysian value.

Actually, the search for equanimity or serenity is basically a Buddhist value, not merely Apollonian in character. The perspective of all the dharmas (Buddhist doctrine) requires, as aforementioned, the elimination of all emotions, producing equanimity in all three types of behavior: body action, speech, and thought. This is the first essential step toward the ultimate goal of nirvana, as well as toward the more immediate goal of good social relationships.

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[55]Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934).

In their socialization process Laotians are infused with Buddhist values; the teachings of Buddha are absorbed from earliest childhood as a natural part of the environment. In everyday life they are heavily involved with the religious norms of the community, and in school many precepts and doctrines are recited or appear in textbooks. Before marriage men are normally expected to serve in the monkhood, and while there they are taught 227 points of discipline designed to control their bodies, speech, and thoughts. And when leaving the monastery they bring back with them sets of rules (sila-dharma) to govern their lives as laymen. In sum, it can be seen that Buddhist values are both reinforcers and originators of the principles we are considering. A few of the more important Buddhism-based characteristics of the Laotian culture-and-personality are described below.

Jai-yen. - The culture places great value on internal equanimity, i.e., upon being jai-yen, or having a "cool heart." This enables one to take life as it comes, without strain or excitement. To be jai-yen is to be without anxiety; to rest at ease, survey and weigh the situation, accept cheerfully what must be, and then take advantage of the circumstances--including the stupidity of others. The maintenance of a "cool heart" is supported by an attitude epitomized in the common phrase "bo-pen-young-dog," meaning "it's of no importance," "never mind." The expression is more than a phrase; it symbolizes a defense mechanism for minimizing events which might otherwise disturb a "cool heart."

Social Patterns. - One of the most important rules of Lao social behavior is to maintain smooth interpersonal relations. This may be an expression of an existential anxiety about the essential

instability, uncertainty, and impermanence of all life (including their own), anxiety which has its cognitive basis in the "Wheel of Law" and other Buddhist doctrine. They tend to avoid overt expressions of hostility and open conflict by withdrawal, and prefer not to have aggressive encounters. Were uninhibited aggression permitted, a fundamentally distasteful degree of involvement in each other's lives would result.

An almost profound concern with personal freedom-of-choice appears to encourage the rural Lao to ignore or emotionally isolate himself from the influence and effects of others. This withdrawal might be interpreted as a resort to isolation based on difficulties in relating to others, but it is more likely that the rural Lao is emotionally tough, with sufficient self-reliance and emotional security that his need of others is not imperative.

Generally, the connections between religious or ethical values and behavior patterns are not articulated. These connections are interwoven in the cultural milieu so that conscious perception is seldom evident. But there is one definitive pattern pertaining to the concept of individuality that accounts for much of the foci of life, and this is the assumption that much of the individual's basic character is born with him, with many of his tendencies already well formed due to his previous existence. This belief affects not only childhood, but the whole life, as it is built around the concept that each individual is uniquely different in his approach to nirvana, and outside interference is wrong.

Charity. - Buddhist practices in Laos have traditionally been "materialistic," in the sense they have supported the people's standard

of living at a static level not too much above that of subsistence. Charity has not, therefore, been so freely distributed in Laos as in some Western countries. This is in full accord with the Lao concept of the Karmic Law, however; belief in this doctrine declares that an unsatisfactorily status is the result of one's previous non-merit actions. And why should one be relieved of punishment? If it is avoided now, which it most likely cannot be, it will only come later and in a stronger form because of the delay. This law of cause and effect is a significant behavioral control factor in Laos.

Expediency. - Lao villagers have a trait of "expediency"--a tendency to do something only if its value is apparent, and if it will not be boring or require an excessive amount of energy.[56] One can see possible tensions between this tendency and certain practices that will be required if Laos is to really begin the process of modernization. For example, a tendency toward expediency will inherently conflict with the need for saving. Also, "expediency" can lead to easy compromises with nature, and something much more than this is essential for industrial development.

Kuam Muan Xuen. - This characteristic has a very high value throughout Laos. In essence, it refers to a sense of pleasure or happiness that must be present in either leisure or work. Even a talk that is expected to be profitable may be dropped if it does not prove to be enjoyable or fun. Many of the rural people seem to think that unless activity has a potential for fun, it is not worth doing. Fun

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[56]See also Konrad Kinghill, KUDAENG-The Red Tomb, (Bangkok: Bangkok Christian College, 1965), p. 7.

seems to reflect an attempt on the part of the villagers to lead a psychologically integrated life, wherein the time and energy one gives to an activity is rewarded immediately and directly with pleasure. This concept will undoubtedly create tensions when confronted with the essential efficiencies of modernity, because muan is an unforced, uncalculated, spontaneous theme which the planned used of resources, time, and efficiency will challenge.

Happiness seems to be the apex and sum of the other Lao qualities, values, and behaviors. It is descriptive of the non-compulsive enjoyment of life which is the ideal of the Laotian. It is in agreement with Buddhist teachings, in the sense that most people are still so far from nirvana so that when some happiness is achieved, one's Karma must not be too bad. But life is not ideal, and tensions do appear to be unavoidable in many instances. And when these confront the individual and all alternatives have negative values for him, he may simply escape the situation by leaving without a word.

Sometimes, when the situation becomes too tense, one may brood for a time behind socially acceptable devices. (The time span will depend upon the degree of involvement.) Following this, however, internal pressures may result in direct or indirect socially unacceptable behavior. This may take the form of verbalization, or the acting out of displeasure against some inanimate object or perhaps an animal, owned by and within a perceptual distance of his closest superior. In some cases the individual may even be moved to sudden and violent action, such as the killing of those deemed responsible for his problem. Realization that repressed emotions may erupt in violence may be an important factor in the reluctance of employers to directly "fire" or

dismiss employees or subordinates. At the very least, it helps to account for the indirect method of expressing displeasure, and it helps to explain what appears to many foreigners to be an extraordinary veneer of politeness that makes Laos "the land of the smile."

Buddhism Values and Attitudes Toward Authority

The Laotian seems to accept authority with much less obvious tension than do many Americans. Deference, courtesy, proper status, and respect are always formally expressed toward those in authority, and normally the wisdom or competence and efficiency of the authority figure is not openly questioned. However, if the authority figure does not provide the expected reciprocal relationship, the oppressed individual may simply quietly cease to follow direction--although this will be done without rudeness, discourteousness, or any public display of indignation.

Passivity with regard to authority seems to be an acceptable course to the Laotian, who accepts the concept of power as a by-product of virtue, or Buddhist merit. The higher the individual's status is within the Lao social hierarchy, the greater his piety and wisdom are thought to be. Even when misuse of power occurs, the Laotian with faith in cosmic retribution is supposed to remain undisturbed--after all, tyrants can be reborn as dogs, while those who are abused by tyranny are not really martyrs. Instead, they are persons who must work out their karma because of misdeeds of their previous existences. And since power comes from an unknown source, its effectiveness is the major criterion for judging its magnitude.

The Lao peasant or hill tribe member is largely concerned with his immediate world, and not too concerned about events beyond the

horizon. Moreover, he tends to ignore or not question matters that are beyond his ability to influence or control.

Political Legitimacy[57]

It is a basic concept that the person who has accrued much merit in this and previous lives will be a success, and most probably achieve some important position in the social hierarchy. This concept serves as a source of political legitimacy in Laos, and is perhaps more important there than the legal sources of legitimacy which underwrite political power in the West. Politicians who move to assume political positions through something other than the electoral process can always justify themselves, by playing upon the traditional belief that politicians and top bureaucrats are those who have compiled enough merit that they can be trusted, and are therefore legitimate to rule.

Summary

The value system has been assumed to be made up of six major value orientations--man-nature, human nature, space, activity, and human relations. Laotians tend to believe that man should live in harmony with nature, and that he is inherently good but corruptible. They tend to look to the past, to stay with their father's lands and village, and to value group goals and any activity that can maintain and reinforce human goodness.

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[57]By political legitimacy, we mean the degree to which the existing political institutions are justified as right and proper and are considered as the most appropriate ones for the society. For a brief explanation of the concept of legitimacy consult Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1960), pp. 46, 77. See also Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 28-32; and Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr, Patterns of Authority (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975), pp. 19-21.

Buddhist values pervade every sphere of Laotian life. Buddhist doctrines control all three channels of behavior (i.e., body, speech, and mind) and foster equanimity. Merit-making is a main psychological goal of the entire society. Buddhism enhances particular characteristics of the Lao culture-and-personality, e.g., those of individualism, non-agrandizement, pacificism, gentleness, love of fun and enjoyment, respect for superiors, status consciousness, formalism, conformity, and piety. As members of the society, elites may be expected to be pervaded by some or all of these characteristics in varying degrees of intensity.

CHAPTER V

THE LAOTIAN ELITE'S PERSONALITY

Thus far, we have made a general surveys of the basic needs, values, and culture of the Laotians. Through interviews with members of the elite, we shall in this Chapter attempt to identify sets of general value systems; furthermore, we shall attempt to classify the elites into some "modal personality types."[1]

We have stated that culture is to society as personality is to the individual. In other words, the personality of the elite is relative to the general configuration of the Lao culture they have been taught. The theoretical assumptions of culture-and-personality suggest that culture is composed of psychological structures by means of which individuals or groups of individuals guide their behavior, that culture is located in the minds and hearts of men, and that culture is a result of the congregation of many diverse personalities.[2]

In this Chapter, we shall examine several elite personality traits that seem to be outstanding--especially authoritarianism and dogmatism. The subsequent chapters will explore other areas, such as society, economics, and politics. A summing up of these traits will be presented in Chapter VIII.

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[1]"Modal personality types" is derived from the "mode" as the term is used in statistics. The mode is the item that occurs most frequently in a distribution of scores. Thus, the modal personality type is the one that occurs most frequently among the elite and best represents the "typical" personality of the elite.

[2]Refering to the conceptualization presented in Chapter I.

Authoritarian Personality

The personality of the elite is assumed to be closely related to their styles of behavior. These styles concern leader-follower relationships that constitute a democratic or authoritarian system.[3] Such frameworks are used in an important series of studies by R. White and R. Lippitt.[4] They isolate three leadership styles:

1. Authoritarian. All policy is determined by the leader; steps in activities are dictated one by one so that future steps are uncertain; the leader dictates tasks to be worked on workers; the leader personality praises and criticizes members but remains aloof from active group participation.

2. Laissez-faire. Policy is determined completely by the individual members of the group with minimum leader participation. The leader supplies materials and information when asked but neither praises nor criticizes group members.

3. Democratic. All policy is a matter of group discussion and decision with the active participation of the leader; procedures are outlined and alternatives suggested by the leader; members are free to work with whomever they choose; the leader is "objective" or "fact-minded" in his praise and criticism; and tries to be a group member in spirit without doing too much of work.[5]

Generally, the different styles of leadership found in White and Lippitt's study produce quite marked differences in member behavior. For example, boys in the authoritarian group stuck to their assigned tasks, which were operations in the manufacturer of a model airplane, but were either sullenly apathetic or (in other groups) clearly aggressively hostile toward each other. While they did not work as hard or continuously

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[3]Sidney Verba, Small Groups and Political Behavior: A Study of Leadership (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

[4]R. K. White and R. Lippitt, Autocracy and Democracy: An Experimental Study (New York: Harper & Row, 1960).

[5]Ibid., pp. 26-27.

as the authoritarian group members, the boys in the democratic group atmosphere produced superior products. Also, there was much greater unity and "we feeling" in the democratic groups. Boys in laissez-faire groups produced few tangible products. Most of their time was spent in play.

Authoritarian and democratic group organization in the roles of the leader was also described by White and Lippitt. In the authoritarian model, direction comes from the leader, who oversees all activities of the group members and who may even dictate the interpersonal relationships possible in the group. Democratic group organization, on the other hand, provides for member participation in the decision-making process. While the democratic leader may make suggestions and give guidance, he is receptive to feedback from individuals in the group. But a number of factors other than the behavior of the leader influences group atmosphere. Also important to group atmosphere are the structure of the group and the nature of the task facing the group. The purpose of this study, however, is not only to describe the style of leadership but also to determine the degree of authoritarianism in the Laotian elite as a decision-making group.

Orientations Toward Others

Modern social psychology is replete with attempts to describe differences among people in their willingness to accept direction from others. David Riesman suggested a historically changing system of orientation toward others, from "traditional" to "inner" direction to "other" direction.[6] American society, he felt, had evolved through the

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[6]David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).

first two stages and was in the process of transition from inner to other direction. Riesman felt that most people could be thought of as ranging between two polar types. The first type is the inner-directed person whose behavior is self-directed. This person is autonomous from the point of view of contemporary influences, although his behavior is in accordance with internalized norms and values. The second type is the other-directed person whose behavioral direction is determined by his current milieu. His antennae are constantly set to receive the expectations of others; he is very responsive to situational pressures and current fads.[7]

A somewhat different perspective, which developed in the 1930s, stems from the concern of social scientists over the rise of Nazism in Germany. In particular, some social scientists began to take the position that there is present in some people a deep-seated need not only to obey, but to adore and to offer complete submission to an all-powerful leader. An early publication of the Institute of Social Research in Germany on authority and family suggested the concept of the authoritarian personality as a link between psychological dispositions and political leanings. In Escape from Freedom,[8] Erich Fromm furthered the notion of authoritarian character structure as a basic foundation of Fascism.

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[7]Research conducted during the 1950s and early 1960s supported the notion that people could be meaningfully arranged along the inner-other continuum, see W. W. Kassarjian, "A Study of Riesman's Theory of Social Character," Sociometry, 25 (1962), 213-230. Further evidence of the concern with autonomy versus acceptance of the influence of other people is the vast literature on conformity; see E. P. Hollander and R. H. Willis, "Some Current Issues in the Psychology of Conformity and Non-conformity," Psychological Bulletin, 68 (1967), 62-76.

[8]Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1941).

Authoritarian Character

Fromm's thesis is that man, freed from primary group ties by the historical developments associated with the rise of capitalism, found himself alone, helpless, and isolated. The sense of anxiety over aloneness is experienced by everyone growing up in modern culture as an aspect of the development of selfhood. These unbearable feelings of isolation and powerlessness can be overcome by developing a loving relationship with one's fellow man and through development of one's capacity for productive work. Too often, however, man seeks to escape from the freedom that accompanies the attainment of individualism. This escape can be manifested by the use of any of a number of psychic mechanisms, including authoritarianism, destructiveness, and conformity.

According to Fromm, authoritarianism arises from

> the tendency to give up the independence of one's own individual self and to fuse one's self with somebody or something outside of oneself in order to acquire the strength which the individual self is lacking. Or, to put it in different words, to seek for new, "secondary bonds" as a substitute for the primary bonds which have been lost.[9]

These tendencies are based on a deep-seated personality dynamic that developed, Fromm believed, from a desire for preservation and for relatedness to the world outside oneself. The particular personality dynamics involved in the authoritarian character are sadistic and masochistic strivings. That is, the authoritarian wants to hurt and dominate others, while at the same time he wants to be hurt and dominated. These tendencies represent the individual's reactions to feelings of inferiority, powerlessness, and individual insignificance. Fromm preferred to talk in terms of sado-masochistic character structure, rather than simple power striving,

[9] Ibid., p. 163.

since he felt that the latter terminology as represented in Alfred Adler's thought,[10] neglected unconscious personality dynamics.

Sadistic and masochistic impulses are present in everyone in some degree. Even though some people exhibit one of these tendencies to a marked extent, its opposite is always prevalent. The individual, then, harbors both desires--to dominate and to be dominated. Fromm observed that these two tendencies may be complementary between persons. Symbiotic attachments attachments are often formed between two people, for example, in which each, the sadist as well as the masochist, is profoundly dependent upon the other. Fromm also suggested that a person whose personality is dominated by sadistic and masochistic traits may be, but is not necessarily, neurotic. He believed that certain cultural patterns could result in whole classes of people in whom the sado-masochistic character was typical, though the people involved were "normal." To designate this character type, Fromm suggested the term "authoritarian character":

> This terminology is justified because the sado-masochistic person is always characterized by his attitude toward authority. He admires authority and tends to submit to it, but at the same time he wants to be authority himself and have others submit to him. There is an additional reason for choosing this term. The Fascist systems call themselves authoritarian because of the domination of authority in their social and political structure.[11]

Fromm went much further in describing the authoritarian character structure, which is rooted in the basic feeling of powerlessness and characterized by a worship of power and power relations, together with a lack of love and human tenderness. We now turn to a famous empirical study that was

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[10]See Alfred Adler, Social Interest (New York: Capricon Books, 1964).

[11]Fromm, op. cit., p. 186.

in part stimulated by Fromm's theory as set forth in The Authoritarian Personality.[12] The study is an important work for political scientists, because for the first time, an attempt was made to establish on a broad scale an empirical link between political ideology and personality.

Toward the end of World War II a group of researchers in psychology and sociology who were concerned by the Nazi atrocities began a study of the psychological factors underlying Fascism and Anti-Semitism. The authors, through clinical and attitudinal approaches, constructed, validated, and tested scales of anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, politico-economic conservatism, and authoritarianism on hundreds of normal subjects. In addition, the investigators used projective tests and clinical interviews with smaller samples in their attempt to assess the underlying personality dynamics of Fascism-prone subjects.

Among the number of techniques used in the study of authoritarianism, our focus will be on only one instrument, the F scale, which was borrowed for use in our study. This scale was designed to measure the personality characteristics which underlie the acceptance of Fascist ideology and leadership. The justification for emphasizing the F scale is that all the other techniques (attitudinal scales, projective tests, and clinical interviews) converged in the formation of this one device.

Central to the research effort on authoritarianism is the conception of a particular personality type that is prone to accept Fascist ideology

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[12] T. W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 1950). The study has fueled controversy for over two decades. The controversy has yet to be resolved to the satisfaction of many social scientists. However, critics have questioned the validity of the findings because of the deficiencies, which will be discussed in a subsequent section.

and propaganda. The F scale is the instrument defining the core personality dispositions that lead to the acceptance of such antidemocratic attitudes. The F scale we used reflects the suppositions regarding the manifest beliefs of the authoritarian personality. "Conventionalism, authoritarian aggression, anti-intraception, superstition and stereotype thinking, admiration of power and toughness, destructive and cynical attitudes, and projection of fears, aggression, and sexual urges"[13] are characteristics derived from psychoanalytic theories. The character structure was thought to stem from childhood experiences, especially from subjection to harsh, inflexible discipline, together with a rather cold emotional climate in the home.

The Elite's Responses

The section which follows is an investigation of the extent to which an authoritarian personality structure is found among the Laotian elite. The number in parentheses is the item number in the questionnaire. The intensity of each element in the structure is represented by the absolute score followed by the heading of the characteristic and each statement. The degree of intensity ranges from +1 through 0 to -1, representing the highest to lowest degree of authoritarianism.

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[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 255-257.

1. Conventionalism: Rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values. Composite Score +.65.

   (1) The monk and the teacher are probably more important to Lao society than the businessperson and the manufacturer.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly Disagree	Total[14]	Score
59.7 %	25.8 %	11.3 %	1.6 %	98.4 %	+.65

2. Authoritarian Submission: Submissive, uncritical attitude toward idealized moral authorities of the ingroup. Composite Score +.55.

   (2) The findings of science may someday show that many of our most deeply-held beliefs are wrong.

56.5 %	32.3 %	4.8 %	6.5 %	100.1 %	+.64

   (8) Bosses should say just what is to be done and exactly how to do it if they expect us to do a good job.

82.3 %	1.6 %	9.7 %	6.5 %	100.1 %	+.72

   (10) Everything can really be predicted by astrology.

11.3 %	69.4 %	6.5 %	12.9 %	100.1 %	+.30

3. Authoritarian Aggression: Tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional values. Composite Score +.56.

   (5) What young people need most of all is strict discipline by their parents.

61.3 %	19.4 %	8.1 %	11.3 %	100.1 %	+.56

   (7) Sex criminals deserve more than prison; they should be whipped in public or worse.

48.4 %	17.7 %	24.2 %	9.7 %	100.0 %	+.36

   (9) An insult to one's honor should always be punished.

72.6 %	19.4 %	8.1 %	0.0 %	100.1 %	+.78

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[14]Percent is more or less than 100 because of rounding and "No Opinion" responses have been excluded.

4. Anti-Intraception: Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative the tender-minded. Composite Score +.43.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly Disagree	Total	Score
(1) Repeated						+.65
(11) It is not good to think too much.						
	45.2 %	11.3 %	27.4 %	16.1 %	100.0 %	+.21

5. Superstition and Stereotypy: The beliefs in mystical determinants of the individual's fate; the disposition to think in rigid categories. Composite Score +.50.

(2) Repeated						+.64
(10) Repeated						+.30
(13) People can be divided into two classes: the strong and the weak.						
	51.6 %	29.0 %	17.7 %	1.6 %	99.9 %	+.56

6. Power and "Toughness": Preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power figures; overemphasis upon the conventionalized attributes of the ego; exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness. Composite Score +.62.

(5) Repeated						+.56
(6) Most people who do not get ahead just do not have enough will power.						
	58.1 %	19.4 %	22.6 %	0.0 %	100.1 %	+.57
(9) Repeated						+.78
(13) Repeated						+.56

7. Destructiveness and Cynicism: Generalized hostility, vilification of the human. Composite Score +.51.

(3) Human nature being what it is, there must be war and conflict.						
	62.9 %	9.7 %	21.0 %	6.5 %	100.1 %	+.51

8. Projectivity: The disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; the projection outwards of unconscious emotional impulses. Composite Score +.66.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly Disagree	Total	Score
(14) There are so many evil people nowadays that it is dangerous to go out alone.	72.6 %	8.1 %	17.7 %	1.6 %	100.0 %	+.66

9. Sex: Exaggerated concern with sexual "goings-on." Composite Score +.36.

(7)	Repeated	+.36

The levels of authoritarianism may be understood by Freud's conception that "id-ego-superego" form the structure of personality.[15] Given that the primal impulses of the id are at first dominant and unchecked in the infant period, the process of development is one of developing controls over the satisfaction of these urges. Through socialization, our Laotian elites have developed--like other people--two control mechanisms for satisfaction and suppression of the sexual and aggressive impulses of the id: the ego and superego.

The ego is the structure of personality whose job is to deal rationally with society and to maximize the satisfaction of id impulses within the restrictions of the society. The superego contains the standards that specify which gratifications are permissible and which

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[15] Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and Analysis of Ego (New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1951); see also Ross Stager, Psychology of Personality, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974), pp. 263-273. A useful discussion of ego psychology elucidating the difference between defensive and coping behavior can be found in T. C. Kroeber, The Study of Lives (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), pp. 178-199.

must be prohibited in the elite's home and their culture. The superego is developed through simple learning processes and operates to a large degree without the elite's awareness. Therefore, the ego is often in a position of mediating between id demands and superego prohibition, in addition to its dealings with the outside world.

Freud believed that the authoritarian character is typified by a harsh, punitive superego and a weak, or incompetent, ego. Because of harsh treatment at a young age, internal mechanisms are not developed for direct satisfaction of id impulses. Instead impulses are denied and they are expressed through mechanisms that operate unconsciously. Nevitt Sanford[16] additionally explains that the authoritarian personality stems from an attempt on the part of an individual to overcome a basic fear of personal weakness. A complex configuration of psychological factors in the raising of the child (chief among these factors is the failure to achieve adequate solution to the Oedipal complex) lies behind this fear of weakness. In turn, the fear of being or seeming weak leads the individual--by means of psychological mechanisms of overcompensation, displacement, projection, and identification--to strive for power and status, to conceal or deny signs of weakness or dependency, and to assign responsibility for any failing in himself to the operation of powers beyond his control. He, thus, is psychologically ready to believe that persons who are in some respect dissimilar to him are untrustworthy, weak, inferior in character, resentful, envious, and, therefore, dangerous.

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[16]Nevitt Sanford, "The Approach of the Authoritarian Personality," in Psychological Personality, ed. by J. L. McCary (New York: Logos Press, 1956).

The Findings

The authoritarian level of the Laotian elite was found to be in the medium high range with a score of +.50 in the possible range of -1 to +1. This level of authoritarianism seems to reflect the characteristics of the Lao political system because of the close interpenetration of the elites' roles and political roles. However, one should be careful about the circumstance that the relationship between personality and the political system is sometimes ambigous. The fact is that an authoritarian, for one, is presented with a much wider range of opportunities to express his personality needs. As Fred Greenstein has pointed out, people with similar psychological characteristics may entertain different political beliefs or may express their needs in different ways.[17] In addition to this point, some of the Laotian elites' political beliefs will be presented in Chapter VII.

The particular characteristics of the elite's authoritarianism should also be observed. (See Figure 3). The extent of their rigid adherence to "conventional," middle-class values--as those values have been defined for Lao society in Chapter IV--was found to be very high, +.65. They strongly supported the statement that "the monk and the teacher are probably more important to Lao society than the businessperson and the manufacturer." Such a value seems to be congruent with the Laotian values in business indicated earlier. Adorno and associates point

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[17]Fred I. Greenstein, "Personality and Political Socialization: The Theories of the Authoritarian and Democratic Character," The Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, 361 (1965), 81-95; and also Neil J. Smelser, "Personality and the Explanation of Political Phenomena at the Social System Level: A Methodological Statement," Journal of Social Issues, 24 (1968), 123.

Figure 3. Degree of Intensity of the Elite's Authoritarianism.



out that the high scorer on conventionalism is created largely by internalization of parental authority rather than independent values.[18]

The same explanation as that for the conventionalism applies to the elite's "submission to authority." Since the superego inhibits aggressive authority, and since the elite inevitably harbors aggressive feelings, the elite "displace" their hostility onto other targets. This seems similar to "scapegoating," in which the elite in a frustrating and uncertain situation turns against some plausible source of its difficulties. As the score indicates (+.55) submissive or uncritical attitudes towards idealized moral authorities of the elites themselves does not appear very high. However, responses to a single statement, "bosses should say just what is to be done and exactly how to do it if they expect us to do a good job," runs high at +.72. Such a finding might reflect the aristocratic origins of our respondents.[19].

The authoritarian person, however, is "compelled" to attack people who are different. "Authoritarian aggression" results from deep-seated personality needs: the authoritarian must, out of an inner necessity, turn his aggression against outgroups.[20] The tendency to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate Lao values of the elite is indicated to be medium high with a score of +.56. The response to the statement "an insult to one's honor should always be punished" scored as high as +.78. Such a score would also indicate, in addition to aggressiveness, the dominance which is anticipated to be high among elites in general.

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[18]Adorno, et al., op. cit.

[19]For a description of the characteristics of aristocracy, see John H. Kautsky, The Political Consequences of Modernization (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972), pp. 28-29.

[20]Adorno, et al., op. cit., p. 233.

Because the authoritarian character structure requires denial, rather than acknowledgement, of impulses, various mechanisms are employed in the service of self-deception. "Anti-intraception," for example, is an attitude of opposition to any close examination of one's own feelings. Consequently, the Laotian elite score of +.43 characterizes them as a denial-minded, non-imaginative, and non-subjective group. It indicates their closed mindedness which will be further observed in the next section.

A belief in mystical determinants cause the superstition and stereotypy which likewise reduces the need for self-examination was indicated to be moderately high among the elite (score +.50). Such characteristics--derived from Brahmanism and animism--are observed among the Laotian masses as well. This characteristic also signals a lack of confidence in reason and its allies, science and technology, and a reversion to more primitive, animistic ways of understanding, the closet ally of which in Lao culture is superstition.

The Laotian elite also emphasized power and identified themselves as power figures who asserted strength and toughness. This characteristic can also be seen as a form of denial--in this case the denial of the elite's lack of ego control.

In a society such as Laos where the elites have had experience in war and conflict throughout their lives, the score for "destructiveness" is not unusual at a high of +.51. "Projection" (that is, the tendency to project one's acknowledged desires onto other people) permeates all of the ideas mentioned above. Statement 14, "there are so many evil people nowadays that it is dangerous to go out alone," scored +.66. Thus, the elite projected their emotional impulses to their environment and

situation. They were slightly less concerned with sexual matters, only implying projection of repressed sexual impulses.

Implications of Authoritarianism

There are many empirical correlations of authoritarianism as the hundreds of studies that have employed the F scale since 1950 demonstrate. For example, authoritarian attitudes have been shown to relate to specific policy preferences that are consistent with "psudo-conservatism." The Americans who scored high in authoritarianism disagreed with the statement that "MacArthur should have been dismissed."[21] In the same study, C. Williams found that highly authoritarian American students overwhelmingly supported hawkish military operations against Cuba in the case of the hijacking of an airplane in 1961.[22] Such an example would indicate that high scorers in authoritarianism are likely to support policies of aggression or harsh punishment.

For other examples, Eysenck has also shown that both communists and fascists score high in authoritarianism.[23] A. Elms and S. Milgram have shown that those who scored high on the F scale showed significantly more obedience to authority than those who scored low.[24] In terms of

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[21] P. V. Gump, "Anti-Democratic Trends and Student Reaction to President Truman's Dismissal of General MacArthur," Journal of Social Psychology, 38 (1953), 131-135.

[22] C. D. Williams, "Authoritarianism and Student Reaction to Airplane Hijacking," Journal of Social Psychology, 60 (1963), 289-291.

[23] H. J. Eysenck, The Psychology of Politics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954); and H. J. Eysenck, "The Psychology of Politics and the Personality Similarities Between Fascists and Communists," Psychological Bulletin, 53 (1956), 431-438.

[24] A. C. Elms and S. Milgram, "Personality Characteristics Associated with Obedience and Defiance toward Authoritative Command," Journal of Experimental Research in Personality, 2 (1966), 282-289.

leader preference, W. Haythorne and associates found that authoritarians tended to prefer leaders who were friendly and less directive.[25] M. Shaw found performance and satisfaction of group members to be related to their degree of authoritarianism and the structure of the group.[26] Another important relationship to political phenomena was described by Gordon Allport. According to him, the higher the degree of nationalism, the higher the authoritarian score.[27] We could reasonably hypothesize such phenomena among the Laotian elite, too. This speculation could be useful in forming hypotheses for testing in further studies of Laos or for comparative study of the elites in other developing countries. We might also speculate that a slightly pessimistic view of human nature would spill over into other related values in the political lives of the elites. Such correlations will be observed in subsequent sections.

Controversies About the Authoritarian Personality Studies

The publication of The Authoritarian Personality set off a wave of discussion, replication, and reanalysis.[28] One of its active controversies concerned the "response-set" factor which had been found to influence the results of the F scale answer. The items were all stated

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[25] W. Haythorne, et al., "The Effects of Varying Combinations of Authoritarian and Equalitarian Leaders and Followers," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 53 (1956), 210-219.

[26] M. E. Shaw, "Acceptance of Authority, Group Structure and the Effectiveness of Small Groups," Journal of Personality, 27 (1959), 29.

[27] Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1954), p. 381.

[28] Formost among this was the collection of critiques edited by Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, Studies in Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality" (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1967).

so that agreement was scored as authoritarianism. A person who tended toward agreement, for example, one whose verbal ability was poor, would likely be found in the authoritarian group.

The improvement and analysis of research techniques did not stop here. It has been suggested, for example, that individuals who are "yea-sayers" in pencil and paper tests differ in personality characteristics from those who are "nay-sayers."[29] With this criticism in mind, which has also been shown to apply to Milton Rokeach's study of dogmatism, a new F scale was constructed which reversed items to correct for this weak point.[30] But the debate goes on not only over measures, but also pointing out further difficulties. For example, it has been hypothesized that extreme scorers, on either end of the scale, will differ in personality characteristics from individuals who mark a more central choice in a Likert-type scale.[31]

Irving Sarnoff and Daniel Katz,[32] in discussion these difficulties, question what is being measured. They suggest that the F scale may not

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[29]See A. Couch and K. Keniston, "Yeasayers and Naysayers: Agreeing Response-Set as a Psychological Variable," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 60 (1960), 151-174; Lester W. Milbrath, "Latent Origins of Liberalism-Conservatism and Party Identification: A Research Note," Journal of Politics, 24 (1969), 679-688; and, L. C. Rorer, "The Great Response-Style Myth," Psychological Bulletin, 63 (1965), 129-156.

[30]E. Lichtenstein, R. P. Quinn, and G. L. Hover, "Dogmatism and Acquiescent Response Set," Journal of Social Psychology, 63 (1961), 636-638.

[31]I. A. Berg, "Response Bias and Personality: The Deviation Hypothesis," Journal of Psychology, 40 (1955), 61-72; and, O. G. Brim and D. Hoff, "Individual and Situational Differences in Desire for Certainty," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 52 (1957), 225-229.

[32]Irving Sarnoff and Daniel Katz, "The Motivational Bases of Attitude Change," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 49 (1954), 115-124.

be purely a personality measure "since the authoritarian values it measures may well reflect the individual's values rather than other basic personality characteristics." Further, some of the basic assumptions of its authors have been questioned. Kecshemeti, for the another, has shown that the F scale primarily measures "right" authoritarianism because of the content of its items, and does not discriminate equally intolerant, dogmatic individuals who hold beliefs which could be termed "left," or "center."[33] Dogmatism, which we shall discuss next, is seen as referring to the structure of a belief system, the individual's central ideas about the world, and the attitude that he has toward authority--not to any particular type of intolerance which is dogmatically espoused.

Dogmatism

"Dogmatism," according to Rokeach,[34] is the state of what he calls "closedness" of belief systems. At the opposite end of the continuum, which is called "openness," a person's belief system is open if "the person can receive, evaluate, and act on relevant information received from the outside on its own intrinsic merits, unencumbered by irrelevant factors in the situation arising from within the person or from the outside."[35]

A system is defined to be closed to the extent that there is a high magnitude of rejection of all disbelief subsystems, an isolation of beliefs, a high discrepancy in degree of differentiation between

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[33] P. Kecshemeti, "The Study of Man: Prejudice in the Catastrophic Perspective," Commentary, 2 (March, 1951), 286-292.

[34] Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960).

[35] Ibid., p. 57.

belief and disbelief systems, and little differentiation within the disbelief system. The more closed the system, the higher is the likelihood that a particular belief is dependent on irrelevant internal drives and on arbitrary reinforcements from external authority. The relation among beliefs should depend on such irrelevant considerations rather than on considerations of logical consistency. On the other hand, the more open the system, the more should the person address himself to objective structural requirements--that is, logical relationships--and the more should he resist irrelevant motivational or reinforcement pressure. In this way, isolation is shown to be the defining characteristic of openness-closedness.

Rokeach's study derived from his dissatisfaction with the inconsistent relationship between scores on the authoritarian personality scales and specific beliefs and attitudes. He argues that the authoritarian is distinctive in how he holds beliefs but not in specific content of those beliefs.[36] The social situation or references such as peer group opinion can act as a constraint on whether or not the authoritarian personality expresses his views in the predicted style.

Rokeach has devised a measure of his general authoritarian style which he labels "dogmatism." The distinguishing characteristics of this style include rigidity, inflexibility, and intolerance of ambiguity. The basic distinction is in terms of whether an individual's belief system is open or closed. The belief system consists of all beliefs, hypotheses, and explanations that the individual accepts as true. The converse, his disbelief system, consists of all beliefs, hypotheses, and

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[36] *Ibid.*

explanations he accepts as false.[37] Three dimensions are presented in the belief system: the belief-disbelief, the central-peripheral, and the time perspective dimensions. The central-peripheral dimension has three components: (1) the central region which encompasses basic beliefs about the nature of the physical world, the self, and others; (2) an intermediate region which contains beliefs about authority and persons exercising authority over others; and, (3) a peripheral region, representing beliefs about the past, present, and future. This dimension is characterized as varying from narrow to broad, with a narrow time perspective representing a focus on one time period and a broad perspective incorporating all three. The belief-disbelief dimension refers to two interdependent parts, with varying degrees of similarity possible between beliefs that are accepted and beliefs that are rejected (disbeliefs).[38]

One can evaluate belief-disbelief systems in terms of the degree of isolation among different beliefs. Indicators of this are the "coexistence of logically contradictory beliefs" in a person's belief or disbelief system and the extent to which differences are emphasized and similarities are minimized in comparing belief-disbelief systems. This can be judged by the degree of knowledge an individual possesses about his beliefs and disbeliefs, and the degree of similarity about disbeliefs.[39] For example, what amount of knowledge underlies an individual's beliefs and disbeliefs about the Soviet Union and communist China? Secondly, does he believe that communism in the Soviet Union is the same as in communist China? A third measure of the belief-disbelief system is the

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[37] Ibid., p. 33.

[38] Ibid., p. 34.

degree of comprehensiveness of the system. Thus, we would evaluate the number of disbelief systems within a person's total belief-disbelief system.

The open-versus-closed minded distinction is based on more than the degree to which an individual relies on authority in restructuring his belief system. Yielding to others and resistance to acculturation (acceptance of the predominant culture) as well as reliance on authority all have a common cognitive basis, according to Rokeach. That basis is the extent to which an individual distinguishes between the substance of the communication and the character of or information about the source.[40]

Rokeach summarizes the characteristics of the open-closed systems as follows:[41]

Open	Closed
Belief-Disbelief Continuum	
1. The magnitude of rejection of disbelief subsystems is relatively low at each point along the continuum.	1. The magnitude of rejection of disbelief subsystems is relatively high at each point along the continuum.
2. There is communication of parts within and between belief and disbelief systems.	2. There is isolation of parts within and between belief and disbelief systems.
3. There is relatively little discrepancy in the degree of differentiation between belief and disbelif systems.	3. There is relatively great discrepancy in the degree of differentiation between belief and disbelief systems.
4. There is relatively high differentiation within the disbelief system.	4. There is relatively little differentiation within the disbelief system.

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[39] Ibid., p. 34.

[40] Ibid., pp. 36-39.

[41] Ibid., pp. 55-56.

Central-Peripheral Dimension

Open	Closed
1. The specific content of primitive beliefs (central region) is to the effect that the world one lives in, or the situation one is in at a particular moment, is a friendly one.	1. The specific content of primitive beliefs (central region) is to be the effect that the world one lives in, or the situation one is in at a particular moment, is a threatening one.
2. The formal content of beliefs about authority and about people who hold to systems of authority (intermediate region) is to the effect that authority is not absolute and that people are not to be evaluated (if they are to be evaluated at all) according to their agreement or disagreement with such authority.	2. The formal content of beliefs about authority and about people who hold to systems of authority (intermediate region) to the effect that authority is absolute and that people are to be accepted or rejected according to their agreement or disgreement with such authority.
3. The structure of beliefs and disbeliefs perceived to emanate from authority (peripheral region) is such that its substructures are in relative communication with each other.	3. The structure of beliefs and disbeliefs perceived to emanate from authority (peripheral region) is such that its substructures are in relative isolation from each other.

Time Perspective Dimension

1. Relative broad time perspective.	1. Relative narrow, future oriented time perspective.

Rokeack's study has prompted several critiques. Many scholars have argued that his data do not support the assertion that there is a left wing authoritarianism. Certainly the survey studies of samples of the American voting age population do not provide this kind of evidence. Rokeach administered his dogmatism scale and the F scale to samples of English Communists and adherents of other English political parties. The Communists ranked lowest on the F scale and higher on the dogmatism scale, but on the latter the differences were not large enough to be considered statistically significant. The problem may be that the dogmatism scale

(which is designed to measure the openness or closedness of a belief system) and the opinionation scale--which is designed to measure the extent to which people are rejected or accepted because of the beliefs they hold, the leftness or the rightness of opinionation, and liberalism-conservatism (opinionation is not included in this study)--do not measure that which they purport to measure.[42]

However, they key to the character of an authoritarian is that he has a closed belief system, changing his beliefs only when authorities to whom he is highly responsive advocate policies or perceptions at variance with his own beliefs. Non-authoritarians would require a different kind of stimulus before they would change their beliefs; the stimulus would be awareness of the logical inconsistency between their preferred values and professed beliefs.[43]

An assumption in the study was that if an elite strongly agrees with each statement it would indicate that he possesses one extreme of the particular characteristic being tapped, and if he strongly disagrees, that he possesses the opposite extreme. Some verbal statements from the Rokeach's form which he designed for the "average age person" were changed to be suitable for our samples, the political-bureaucratic elite, but the content was left unchanged. Each statement in the scale had to be designed to transcend specific ideological positions in order to penetrate to the formal and structural characteristics at all positions. We hope that this scale will show a clearer picture of the elite's personality. The scale diverges equally to each end of a continuum;

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[42] Ibid., pp. 80-87, 114.

[43] Roger Brown, Social Psychology (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 541-543.

therefore, it can measure dogmatic capitalists or communists, Buddhists or non-Buddhists, "Westerners" or "non-Westerners," etc.

The Responses

The definitions of characteristics and the questionnaire which follow are borrowed from Rokeach's study. The number in parenthesis in front of each statement refers to the sequential number of the item in the questionnaire. The response is presented in a percentage. The few "No Opinion" scores in the response are ignored. The intensity of each statement in the structure is represented by the absolute score followed by each character heading and each statement. The degree of intensity ranges from +1 through 0 to -1, representing the highest (closedness) to the lowest (openness) degree of dogmatism.

I. Statements Involving the Belief-Disbelief Dimension. Composite Score +.52

I.1. Isolation within and between belief and disbelief systems. Composite Score +.31.

Isolation refers to the degree of segregation or lack of intercommunication between neighboring regions or subregions. It is assumed that the more closed the system the greater the isolation between and within the belief and the disbelief systems.

I.1.a. Accentuation of differences between the belief and the disbelief systems. Composite Score +.08.

(78) Nations which have opposing ideologies have nothing at all in common with one another.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly Disagree	Total[44]	Score
37.1 %	9.7 %	35.5 %	16.1 %	98.4 %	+.08

[44] Percent is more or less than 100 because of rounding and "No Opinion" responses have been excluded.

I.1.b. The coexistence of contradictions within the belief system. Composite Score +.54.

(96) The highest form of government is a democracy, and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly Disagree	Total	Score
75.8 %	11.3 %	4.8 %	4.8 %	96.7 %	+.74

(101) Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a good goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

43.5 %	21.0 %	24.2 %	8.1 %	96.8 %	+.34

I.2. Relative degree of differentiation of the belief and the disbelief systems. Composite Score +.72.

The belief system is assumed to be generally more differentiated than the disbelief system. It is further assumed that with an increase in closedness there will be less differentiation of disbelief subsystems with respect to each other; that is, different subsystems will be perceived as "the same."

I.2.a. Relative amount of knowledge possessed. Composite Score +.72.

(100) It is only natural that a person would have a much better knowledge of the ideas he believes in than ideas which he opposes.

54.8 %	38.7 %	4.8 %	0.0 %	98.3 %	+.72

II. Statements Involving the Central-Peripheral Dimension. Composite Score +.50.

II.1. Specific content of primitive beliefs. Composite Score +.58.

The central region is composed of a constellation of "pre-ideological" primitive beliefs, for the most part unverbalized, that historically are prior to the rest of the beliefs in the system. These primitive beliefs are concerned with whether the world we live in is friendly or hostile, what the future has in store for us, the adequacy of the self, and what must be done to alleviate feelings of inadequacy. It is assumed that the more closed the system, the more will the content of such beliefs to be the effect that we live alone, isolated and helpless in a friendless world; that we live in a world where the future is uncertain; that the self is fundamentally unworthy and inadequate to cope alone with this friendless world; and that the way to overcome such feelings

is by a self-aggrandizing and self-righteous identification with a cause, a concern with power and status, and by a compulsive self-proselytization about the justness of such a cause.

II.1.a. Beliefs regarding the aloneness, isolation, and helplessness of man. Composite Score +.15.

(83) I would like it if I would find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly Disagree	Total	Score
77.4 %	12.9 %	6.5 %	0.0 %	96.8 %	+.81

(77) Most people just do not give a "damn" for others.

38.7 %	9.7 %	32.3 %	16.1 %	96.8 %	+.11

(95) Man by himself is a helpless and miserable creature.

30.6 %	3.2 %	43.5 %	22.6 %	99.9 %	-.12

II.1.b. Beliefs regarding the uncertainty of the future. Composite Score +.47.

Fear of the future.

(79) It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful for the future.

51.6 %	35.5 %	11.3 %	0.0 %	98.4 %	+.64

A feeling of urgency.

(90) There is so much to be done and so little time in which to do it.

61.3 %	24.2 %	11.3 %	1.6 %	98.4 %	+.66

Compulsive repetition of ideas and arguments (self-proselytization).

(80) Once I get involved in a heated discussion, I just cannot stop.

24.2 %	11.3 %	50.0 %	14.5 %	100.0 %	-.10

(88) In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly Disagree	Total	Score
66.1 %	22.6 %	6.5 %	4.8 %	100.0 %	+.69

(81) In a heated discussion, I generally become so involved in what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what others are saying.

12.9 %	9.7 %	51.6 %	22.6 %	96.8 %	-.31

II.1.c. Beliefs about self-adequacy and inadequacy. Composite Score +.79.

Need for martyrdom.

(82) It is a better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.

80.6 %	6.5 %	9.7 %	0.0 %	96.8 %	+.79

II.1.d. Self-aggrandizement as a defense against self-inadequacy. Composite Score +.73.

Concern with power and status.

(84) Even though I do not like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great-man like Gandhi.

67.7 %	6.5 %	24.2 %	0.0 %	98.4 %	+.59

(86) The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.

72.6 %	19.4 %	6.5 %	1.6 %	100.1 %	+.77

(89) If given the chance, I would do something of great benefit to the world.

72.6 %	24.2 %	1.6 %	0.0 %	98.47 %	+.84

II.2. Formal content of intermediate belief region. Composite Score +.35.

In the intermediate region we have represented beliefs about the nature of positive and negative authority, ranging from rational at one extreme to arbitrary at the other, and beliefs

about people, having to do with the extent to which people are accepted and rejected according to the positive and negative authorities they line up with. The more closed the belief-disbelief system, the more will authority be seen as absolute and the more will people be accepted and rejected because they agree or disagree with one's belief-disbelief system.

II.2.a. Authoritarianism. Composite Score +.27.

Beliefs in positive and negative authority.

(91) In the history of mankind, there have probably been just a very small number of really great thinkers.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly Disagree	Total	Score
58.1 %	21.0 %	17.7 %	0.0 %	96.8 %	+.60

(92) There are a number of people I have come to hate because of things they stand for or believe in.

30.6 %	16.1 %	46.8 %	6.5 %	100.0 %	+.09

Beliefs in the cause.

(97) A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to be a "wishy-washy" or indecisive sort of person.

40.3 %	21.0 %	17.7 %	17.7 %	96.7 %	+.24

(98) To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

21.0 %	4.8 %	61.3 %	11.3 %	98.4 %	-.19

(99) In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness.

53.2 %	17.7 %	22.6 %	4.8 %	98.3 %	+.46

(102) Of all the different philosophies which exist in the world, there is probably only one which is correct.

25.8 %	3.2 %	53.2 %	16.1 %	98.3 %	-.15

(108) It is only when a person devotes himself to an idea or cause that life becomes meaningful.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly Disagree	Total	Score
61.3 %	24.2 %	14.5 %	0.0 %	100.0 %	+.66

II.2.b. Intolerance. Composite Score +.42.

Toward the renegade (persons adhering to disbelief subsystems most similar to one's own belief systems--factional or renegade systems--are often likely to be perceived as especially threatening to validity of the belief system. We assure that this will become increasingly the case the more closed the system).

(103) A group which tolerate too many differences of opinion among its own members cannot exist for very long.

64.5 %	22.6 %	8.1 %	1.6 %	96.8 %	+.70

(107) The worst crime a person could commit is to publicly attack the people who believe in the same thing as he does.

50.0 %	14.5 %	22.6 %	11.3 %	98.3 %	+.35

Toward the disbeliever.

(85) A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness should be hated and despised.

72.6 %	12.9 %	12.9 %	1.6 %	100.0 %	+.71

(87) There are two kinds of people in this world: Those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.

61.3 %	17.7 %	17.7 %	3.2 %	99.9 %	+.58

(104) Most ideas which get printed nowadays are not worth the paper they are printed on.

8.1 %	8.1 %	61.3 %	19.4 %	96.9 %	-.38

II.3. Interrelations among primitive, intermediate, and peripheral beliefs. Composite Score +.57.

The more closed the system, the more will a change in a particular peripheral belief be determined by a prior change in the intermediate (authority) region. Further, the primitive and intermediate regions are assumed to control not only what will be represented in the peripheral region but also what will not be represented.

II.3.a. Tendency to make a party-line change (referring to a change in peripheral beliefs following a a change in intermediate beliefs. Composite Score +.58.

(106) It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what is going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly Disagree	Total	Score
59.7 %	17.7 %	21.0 %	0.0 %	98.4 %	+.58

II.1.b. Narrowing (referring to the selective avoidance of contact with facts, events, etc., incongruent with one's belief-disbelief system). Composite Score +.54.

(105) In the long run, the best way to live is choose friends and associates whose preferences and beliefs are the same as one's own.

56.5 %	22.6 %	9.7 %	8.1 %	96.9 %	+.55

III. Statements Involving the Time-Perspective Dimension. Composite Score +.37.

It is assumed that the more closed the belief-disbelief system, the more will its organization be future or past oriented, and the more will the present be rejected as important in its own right. Expressions of such a time perspective are to be found in one's attitude toward the past, present, and future, in the extent to which one feels able to appraise accurately or to understand the future, and in one' attitude toward the use of force as a way of revising the present.

III.1. Attitude toward the past, present, and future. Composite Score +.41.

(109) The present is all too often full of unhappiness; it only the future which counts.

54.8 %	14.5 %	12.9 %	14.5 %	96.7 %	+.41

III.2. Knowing the future. Composite Score +.33

(94) Unfortunately many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems do not really understand what is going on.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly Disagree	Total	Score
58.1 %	11.3 %	22.6 %	6.5 %	98.5 %	+.46

(110) Most people just do not know what is good for them.

33.9 %	24.2 %	21.0 %	16.1 %	95.2 %	+.19

The Findings

The Laotian elite scored rather high (+.38) in dogmatism. This degree of intensity means that their basic beliefs are relatively closed. As Rokeach relates,[45] the more closed the belief system the more difficult for the elite to distinguish between information received about the world and information received about the source. What the external sources say is true about the world, becomes all mixed up with what the external source wants the elite to believe is true and what it wants the elite do about it. The elite finds it difficult to distinguish the two kinds of information received from the source, they have a limited capacity to receive, evaluate, and act on information in terms of inner experience.

Conversely, the elites have little ability to evaluate or act on information and proceed in accord with the inner structural requirements of the situation. They are governed in their actions less by internal self-actualizing forces than by irrational inner forces. One important implication here is that the elites have little strength to resist externally imposed reinforcements or rewards and punishments.

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[45] Rokeach, op. cit., p. 58.

In looking at the three dimensions of dogmatism, there are some variations among them. For the first dimension, the belief-disbelief continuum, the absolute score is +.51, which is relatively high and higher than the total score of the Laotian elites on dogmatism. Based upon this finding, one would expect the elites to depend on irrelevant internal drives and on arbitrary reinforcement from external authority. The relation among their beliefs, according to dogmatism theory, depended on such irrelevant considerations rather than on considerations of logical consistency. The isolation between parts is believed to reflect a tendency not to relate beliefs to the inner requirements of logical consistency. For example, they agreed overwhelmingly (score +.74) with the statement that "the highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent." The response to this statement also indicates, beside dogmatism, that the Laotian elites expressed their favor of "authoritarian democracy." They are unlikely to believe that the masses are able to make wise decision for running the country.

On the central-peripheral dimension, the response indicates that the elites' sense of "self-aggrandizement," as anticipated, is the highest scoring item. In particular, the secret ambition to be a great man (like Gandhi or other heroes) was found to be +.59; their intention of doing something important in their lives was found to be +.77; and the highest score on the dogmatism scale was reached on the statement which said that if given a chance they would do a great thing for the world (score +.84). Another high score was that on martyrdom (score +.79). They feel an urgency to do things (+.66) and feared the unpredictable situation in Laos, +.64. The elites disgreed with the statements that contended that this

Figure 4. Degree of Intensity of the Elite's Dogmatism.



world is a lonesome place and that man is helpless creature. They seemed to believe that the printed ideas nowadays are worthwhile in one way or another, and their minds were open to the existing theories in the world today.

Considering the time-perspective dimension, the Laotian elite were mostly oriented to the present and only slightly oriented to the future. This means that they are slightly less able to appraise or to understand the future. They generally disagreed with the statement that "most people do not know what is good for them."

The psychological trait of dogmatism has been shown to affect the quality of the elite's political activity. The trait theoretically refers to the structure, as opposed to the content, of the elite's belief system. We are likely to conclude that they have some difficulty in assimilating new information. Consequently, they are likely to reject information outright if it conflicts with their belief or they may perceptually distort the information so that they can accept it (for instance, they can support Prince Souphanouvong as leader because he is a prince, the same as Prince Souvanna Phouma). They may accept--but not necessary integrate--the new information if it comes from a valued authority; or if the change in beliefs required by information from a positive authority is too great, they may devalue the authority. For example, the elite may think that the monarchy needs to be abolished, or the "people's democracy" is much better than the "idealistic imperialist democracy." It is evident that a member of the elite can change his support for the Lao monarchy and join the movement toward a people's democracy--accepting wholly, as a matter of faith, dogma stemming from a positively valued authority.

Jeanne Knutson cites the usefulness of the dogmatism study as follows: "we have been able to discuss psychodynamics without needing to take up the more difficult problem of psychogenesis."[46] For a better illumination of the elite's personality, we shall go on to observe some other traits in the following section.

Other-Directedness

The concept of externalized superego implies the operation of some external sources to serve the functions of discouraging socially disapproved behavior. Aside from supernatural authority, these sanctions operate through persons who evaluate and then either sanction or condemn. As appropriate roles for different situations are learned, however, a kind of pre-censorship takes place so that sanctioned behavior is normally produced. A person's social antennae sense what others expect and, thus, he avoids ridicule and condemnation. This is the "radar" system to which David Riesman refers in explaining the concept of "other-directedness."[47] Cultures in which the superego is modally externalized are "other-directed" cultures since "others" perform the function of the superego.

To be more specific about the "other" in "other-diectedness," the elite may be "directed" toward colleagues, superiors (if any), or inferiors in terms of their status rankings and may be directed toward editorial mass-media and other sources from their environment. Among the other-directedness of "those who are changing," Leonard Doob observes that "in comparison with those who remain unchanged or those who have changed, people changing

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[46] Jeanne N. Knutson, Handbook of Political Psychology (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973), p. 48.

[47] Riesman, op. cit., p. 22.

from old to new ways are likely to be generally sensitive to other people."[48] He feels that this "sensitivity" is heightened since one is continually testing to see if his behavior is appropriate to the new group or situation. Riesman writes:

> What is common to all other-directedness is that their contemporaries are the source of direction for the individual . . . . The goals for which the other-directed person strives may shift . . . it is only the process of striving itself and the process of paying close attention to the signals from others that remain unaltered throughout life.[49]

Other-directedness, when looked at from a slightly different analytical perspective, as James Scott has suggested, is similar to "role-adaptability,"[50] The other-directed man is able to adjust to new situations so that his belief and behavior "fit in" the new social environment. It is observed by social scientists that in the most transitional societies other-directedness is also "upper-" directedness.

As the data in Table 6 indicate, other-directedness was found in avery low degree of intensity among the Laotian elite (score -.42, see Appendix A for details). This intensity indicates that the elite's minds are slightly "closed" to external pressures such as we found in the dogmatism score. This characteristic might result from the circumstance that they are already at the top of the ladder and have no other "upper" to direct them. From the other viewpoint, we may think that they are "non-other-directed" because of dominance in their character.

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[48] Leonard W. Doob, Becoming More Civilized: A Psychological Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), p. 135.

[49] Riesman, op. cit.

[50] James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 144.

TABLE 6

"OTHER-DIRECTEDNESS" AMONG THE LAOTIAN ELITE

	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Total	Absolute Score
53.	One should not become a close friend of someone who does not pay any attention to the common social customs of the group.	58.1	14.5	12.9	14.5	0.0	100.0	-.44
54.	A person should strive to be successful even if it means he will be unpopular and others will be jealous of him.	77.4	14.5	6.5	1.6	0.0	100.0	-.80
55.	It is important not to dress or act very differently from other people or else you will lose their respect.	58.1	22.6	17.7	0.0	1.6	100.0	-.61
56.	My opinion is almost never swayed at all by editorials in the newspapers.	37.1	12.9	33.9	16.1	0.0	100.0	-.11
57.	As long as I do what I think is right, it does not matter at all what my family, friend, and community think of me.	33.9	17.7	37.1	9.7	1.6	100.0	-.15
	Average	52.9	16.5	21.6	8.4	0.6	100.0	-.42

Note: Scores are presented in percentages.

Anxiety

One characteristic that seems to affect individual behavior in every sphere is anxiety. Gordon Allport defines anxiety as "a diffuse, irrational fear, not directed at an appropriate target and not controlled by self-insight."[51] He adds that "like a grease spot, it has spread throughout the life and stains the individual's social relationships."[52]

In this disorder, the individual suffers from an irrational sense of distress arising from an unconscious source, the feeling that something terrible is going to happen, and displaces this feeling onto specific objects or situations. Anxiety reactions are responses to danger which the individual feels but does not recognize. These responses are out of proportion to any apparent cause; this is because they arise from situations touching sensitive areas deep within the personality (unresolved conflicts, forbidden impulses, disturbing memories) which threaten self-esteem and well-being. Anxiety occurs when all devices and defense mechanisms which are commonly used to ward off anxiety, such as compensation, protection, or rationalization, have failed or have never been utilized. Such situations occur in persons motivated by unfulfilled basic needs.[53] As anxiety develops, it becomes increasingly introverted, conscientious, and usually creates unrealistically high standards that lay a person open to feelings or failure and guilt.

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[51] Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1954), p. 364.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Maslow, Motivation and Personality. For a comprehensive study of the basic needs and politics, see Jeanne Knutson, The Human Basis of the Polity (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1972), chapter 2.

There are number of schools in psychology which use the concept of anxiety in roughly the same sense. Although there is a general agreement about what anxiety is and its significance as an important personality characteristic, there are substantive controversies. For example, Eysenck regards anxiety as a product of the two more fundamental personality traits of neurotism and introvertism,[54] while Cattell and Scheier break it down into the five subfactors of guilt, ergic tension, poor-ego strength, suspiciousness, and poorly developed self-sentiment.[55] Other-psychologists, Gellhorn and Loofbourrow, for example, think of anxiety as a unity trait dependent largely on the dominance of the sympathetic nervous system.[56]

Anxiety, as used in our study is conceptualized as a personality trait or dimension, measurable both by psychological tests, such as questionnaires, and psychological tests of the reactivity of the systematic nervous system. Various measurements of anxiety which have been employed in questionnaire forms have been developed by many scholars, for example, by G. Welsh, I. Sarason, I. Janis, R. Lane, and J. Taylor.[57]

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[54] H. J. Eysenck, The Biological Basis of Personality (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1967).

[55] Raymond B. Cattell and I. H. Cheier, Measurement of Neuroticism and Anxiety (New York: Ronald Press, 1961).

[56] E. Gellhorn and G. N. Loofbourrow, Emotions and Emotional Disorders (New York: Harper & Row, 1963). For more details of the literature on anxiety, see R. Lynn, Personality and National Character (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1971), pp. 19-23.

[57] G. S. Welsh, "An Anxiety Index and an Internationalization Ratio for the MMPI," Journal of Consulting Psychology, 16 (February, 1952), 65-72; I. G. Sarason, "Empirical Findings and Theoretical Problems in the Use of Anxiety Scales," Psychological Bulletin, 57 (September, 1960), 403-415; Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); Lane employed a 24 item anxiety scale developed by Sarason and I. Janis and revised for that particular occasion by David

In our study, as the responses that be shown in Table 7, we found that the Laotian elites scored at the center between low and high (+.01 in social anxiety and +.04 in neurotic anxiety). At this level we can speculate that they are emotionally stable and seem to be in no danger from serious worry and nervous tension.

In its middle range, anxiety manifests itself as nervous energy or "strained or solicitious desire," and it is here that it is used in the sense of the person being anxious to achieve something. This usage has a slight connotation of worry, but the chief implication is one of strong motivation. It is only when anxiety becomes intense that it becomes a neurotic condition which both induces unhappiness and interferes with endeavor. It is probably advantageous to have a moderate level of anxiety such that it manifests itself as strong motivation, although it is disadvantageous for the anxiety to be so high that it turns into neurosis. The anxiety can be either useful or otherwise, depending on its degree of intensity.

The specific influences for individual or group differences in anxiety present an intriguing problem. Each individual or group has its own particular pattern, experiences, environments, and hereditary, and may have a different level of anxiety.[58] In this study we will not be concerned with the sources of the influences but the level.

Sears (this is the scale we have adapted for this study); and J. A. Taylor "A Personality Scale of Manifest Anxiety," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 48 (January, 1953), 285-290.

[58]For example, Lynn's study found that national anxiety levels were significant influenced by affluence, degree of urbanization, political instability, the strength of religious conviction, the speed of economic growth, and even by race and climate. See Lynn, op. cit.

TABLE 7

"ANXIETY" AMONG THE LAOTIAN ELITE

Statements	A lot	A Good Deal	A Little	Not At All	No Opinion	Total	Absolute Score
SOCIAL ANXIETY							
20. How nervous are you when you have to talk in front of a group of several people?	11.3	32.3	33.9	19.4	3.2	100.1	-.09
21. When you are doing a job, how much does the fear that you might not be doing too well keep you from doing your best?	14.5	27.4	38.7	14.5	4.8	99.9	-.06
22. How much do you worry when your superior tells you to come to see him without telling you why he wants to see you?	19.4	29.0	25.8	22.6	3.2	100.0	-.02
23. How much do you worry about how well you get along with people?	9.7	30.6	33.9	21.0	4.8	100.0	-.13
24. When you have been in a situation in which you have done poorly or made some mistake, how do you keep on worrying about it?	25.8	46.8	24.2	1.6	1.6	100.0	+.36
Average	16.1	33.2	31.3	15.8	3.5	100.0	+.01

TABLE 7 (Continued)

Statements	A lot	A Good Deal	A Little	Not At All	No Opinion	Total	Absolute Score
NEUROTIC ANXIETY							
25. How afraid are you when you hear thunder or see lightening?	11.3	38.7	41.9	8.1	0.0	100.0	+.02
26. When you go to a dentist, how much do you find yourself worrying about the pain you will feel?	14.5	22.6	48.4	14.5	0.0	100.0	-.13
27. How often do you have trouble going to sleep because you are worrying about something that has happened to you or some thought you have had?	19.4	27.4	46.8	4.8	1.6	100.0	+.05
28. How often do you feel restless on holidays, when you have nothing in particular to do ?	19.4	25.8	48.4	6.5	0.0	100.1	+.02
29. When you are in a high place, how frightened are you when you look down?	4.8	24.2	64.5	6.5	0.0	100.0	-.22
30. How often do you feel uneasy or uncomfortable without knowing why you are feeling that way?	9.7	12.9	67.7	9.7	0.0	100.0	-.27
31. In comparison to other people you know, how much do you worry about your physical health?	19.4	29.0	30.6	19.4	1.6	100.0	.00

TABLE 7 (Continued)

Statements	A lot	A Good Deal	A Little	Not At All	No Opinion	Total	Absolute Score
32. When you go to the doctor (or when he comes to you) because you do not feel well, how worried are you about what the doctor will say is wrong with you?	22.6	61.3	12.9	1.6	1.6	100.0	+.45
33. How often in the past year have you had nightmares or dreams from which you have awakened feeling nervous or frightened?	19.4	54.8	21.0	3.2	1.6	100.0	+.33
34. How much do you worry about your mental health, in comparison to other people you know?	14.5	35.5	35.5	11.3	3.2	100.0	+.03
35. How often do you find it hard to pay attention to your work because disturbing or frightening thoughts come in to your mind?	46.8	6.5	45.2	0.0	1.6	100.1	+.28
36. In comparison with other people of your age, how nervous do you feel about fighting with someone?	41.9	25.8	17.7	12.9	1.6	99.9	+.33
37. How often do you find yourself worrying about a particular person, situation or happening, even though you know that there is little reason for worrying?	9.7	29.0	38.7	22.6	0.0	100.0	-.18

TABLE 7 (Continued)

Statements	A lot	A Good Deal	A Little	Not At All	No Opinion	Total	Absolute Score
38. How afraid of drowning are you when you are near a body of water, in swimming, or in a boat?	16.1	25.8	43.5	14.5	0.0	99.9	-.07
Average	19.2	30.0	40.2	9.7	1.0	100.1	+.04

Note: Scores are presented in percentages. "Total" is more or less than 100 because of rounding.

After a detailed review of the literature, Sarason offers some general conclusions that high scorers on anxiety have been found to be more self-deprecatory, more self-preoccupied, and generally have less control over themselves and the lower scorers in the distribution of anxiety senses. These differences are most likely to be seen in the subject's ability to cope with various situations, thus, differences in behavior and attitude may appear in stress situations. In other words, subjects can be differentiated in the response tendencies activated by personality threatening conditions with interest in, effort on, and attention to the task at hand. High scorers respond to threats with self-oriented, personalized responses. In conditiond requiring an automatic responses, those high on anxiety do better; in more complex situations, the situation is reversed. Knutson also concludes that it is possible to use the anxiety scale to measure the way in which psychologically deprived individuals cope with deep-seated personality needs.[59]

The results of these previous studies indicate that anxiety is a useful dimension in studying political behavior on both the macro-level and the micro-level--such as in the decision-making processes in some particular situation.[60] Our findings were not in agreement with Rokeach's statement that "dogmatism and anxiety are clearly shown to emerge together as part of a single psychological factor."[61] In this case we found that there is no significant correlation between them ($r = -.11$, $p. < .05$ for

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[59]Knutson, op. cit., p. 139.

[60]See the study of the effects of anxiety in politics in F. Neumann, "Anxiety in Politics," in Identity and Anxiety, ed. by M. R. Stein, A. J. Vidich, and D. M. White (New York: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 269-290.

[61]Rokeach, op. cit., p. 349.

social anxiety, and r = -.03 for neurotic anxiety). However, we found a significant relationship between authoritarianism and social anxiety ($r = -.40$, $p. < .05$). (See Intercorrelation Matrix of Elite Traits in Appendix A.)

In the literature of political anxiety, a constant theme has been the crippling effects of anxiety. It has been suggested that each of the psychologically deprived groups will, for different reasons, have anxieties that will interfere with the way in which they handle the problems which the world presents to them. Anxiety will color their interpersonal relation as well. Erikson states as his first clinical postulate

> that there is no anxiety without somatic tension seems immediately obvious; but we must also learn that there is no individual anxiety which does not reflect a latent concern common to the intermediate and extended group. An individual feels isolated and barred from the sources of collective strength when he (even though only secretly) takes on a role considered especially evil, be it that of a drunkard or a killer, a sissy or a sucker, or whatever colloquial designation of inferiority may be used in this group.[62]

While Lasswell[63] postulates the non-existence of "anxiety free personalities" in modern society, it has been frequently demonstrated that individuals do differ in the amount of their latent and their manifest anxiety.

Summary

In the personality domain we have found in the Laotian elite moderately high degrees of authoritarian and dogmatism, with a somewhat

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[62]Erik Erikson, Childhood and Society, rev. ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1963), p. 35.

[63]Harold D. Lasswell, "Political Constitution and Character," Psychoanalysis and Psychoanalytic Review, 46 (Winter, 1956), 3-18).

higher degree of "own-directedness." Their characteristics of social and neurotic anxiety are found to be at the normal level.

It should be mentioned here that personality alone is not synonymous with behavior. Yet neither is there a one-to-one relationship between cultural or situational factors and elites' actions. While the concern of this chapter is general personality factors, a knowledge of their influences will only be of value in studying political behavior when they are considered in relation to cultural and situational factors. These are considered in the following chapter.[64]

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[64]See R. R. Sears, "Social Behavior and Personality Development," in Toward a General Theory of Action, ed. by Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 465-478. Sears notes that "to describe a person as having 'high emotionality' or 'low sensitivity' or 'diffuse anxiety' is acceptable only if other variables are added that will, together with these personal properties, signify what kind of behavior can be expected from him under some specific circumstances." (p. 477).

CHAPTER VI

SOCIO-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

In the previous chapters, we have discussed a great deal of the background of Lao society and several aspects of the personality of the Laotian elite. Such study is a part of exploring the basic beliefs and value orientations which, as mentioned, constitute the core of the elite's consciousness about political behavior.

According to Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck,[1] (1) all societies face a limited number of common human problems, which must be solved; (2) the range of possible solutions is limited, neither random nor limitless; and (3) some solutions to problems are differentially preferred. Based on these assumptions, they single out the modes of value orientations that were presented in Chapter IV. In this framework every group of persons is believed to have a rank order of value orientations, and these values, taken together, constitute the "personality" of that society. According to this theory, the nature of the rank order is considerably influenced by the culture into which one was born. This chapter is intended to present the elite's value orientations concerning human nature, Lao and global society, and economics. Viewing the elite with regard to these values will present a clear picture of their political culture and personality.

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[1]Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck, Variations in Value Orientations (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company, 1961), pp. 10-12.

The Elite's Values of Human Nature

It would be difficult to overstate the importance of a man's estimate of human nature in influencing the construction of his political beliefs. Seeing human nature as good, neutral, or evil has an effect on how one views the nature of others and whether cooperation with others for common ends is considered possible. Specifically, in Lao society, conceptions of good or evil in people are based on merit--the accumulation of doing good.

There are several reasons for expecting some conceptions of human nature to be reflected in political behavior. First, political beliefs often contain implicit assumptions about human nature. For example, the democratic doctrine assumes that most citizens are sufficiently rational to govern themselves. Such an assumption takes for granted a certain minimum level of reasonableness and concern for others as fundamental to human nature. Secondly, since a political system basically involves people in action, the individual's view of human nature is likely to be linked to his evaluation of how well the system actually works. Thirdly, the individual's stand on certain specific political questions may be influenced by his assumptions about the nature of man, e.g., the belief that men are fundamentally selfish may induce the individual to socialism because it stresses economic equality as a means of overcoming individual selfishness. Public policies made by the elite are usually based on assumptions about people, or, more to the point, the value orientation of the elite toward human nature.

Levels of Faith-in-People

Some scepticism and even cynicism about human nature is probably not absent from any culture. A measure of scepticism is common in every society, but its degree will vary from culture to culture.[2] The degree of scepticism is crucial as it determines what the dominant orientation is toward the human nature of the elite.

Our findings indicate that the Laotian elites are likely to view the people as good but corruptible (absolute score -.07). For the sake of clarity a cross-cultural comparison is attempted here. Using the same questionnaire, as that employed here,[3] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba measured the level of faith-in-people in their study of political culture in five nations.[4] The same questionnaire was also used by James Scott in his study of political ideology of a Malaysian elite.[5] Table 8 below shows the comparison. Since the Laotian elite study contains 62 respondents, while Almond and Verba's figures are for an "N" of roughly 1,000, the comparison can only be suggestive. However, Scott's Malaysian scores are based on only 17 subjects, so comparison may not be useless. Both our own and Scott's subjects are the political-bureaucratic elite which provides an initial basis for comparative study.

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[2]Ibid., chapter 1.

[3]The questionnaire is borrowed from Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," American Journal of Sociology, 21 (1956), 690-695.

[4]Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965).

[5]James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

TABLE 8

LAOTIAN ELITES' PERCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL TRUST, COMPARED WITH PERCEPTIONS REPORTED IN OTHER NATIONAL SURVEYS

	Statements	Percentage who agree						
		U.S.	U.K.	Germany	Italy	Mexico	Malay-sia	Laos
	Distrust:							
17.	If you do not watch yourself, people will take advantage of you.	65	75	81	73	94	100	100
18.	No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it.	38	45	72	61	78	76	79
	Trust:							
15.	Most people can be trusted.	55	49	19	7	30	18	40
16.	Most people are inclined to help others.	31	28	15	5	15	12	79
19.	Human nature is fundamentally cooperative.	80	84	58	85	82	88	82
	N	970	963	955	955	1,007	17	62

Source: Data for United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Mexico are taken from Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), p. 213. Data for Malaysia are taken from James C. Scott, The Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

The responses to Items 17 and 18 show the high degree of pessimism among the elite, higher than any other country for which data are available. About the same level of trust-to-people exists in Laos as in other nations in the table as indicated by the response to the statement: "human nature is fundamentally cooperative." Exceptions to this finding are Germany and Italy, whose scores are far below the others. The Laotian elite believe that "most people are inclined to help others"; 79 percent of the respondents agree with this statement, which is remarkably higher than the level in the other nations. Even though the Laotian elite appears to believe such help is the inclination of human nature, they also believe living in the world today requires that one must watch oneself in order that evil people do not take advantage of a person. This is shown by the 100 percent agreement with statement 17. Here is evidence of the cultural skepticism alluded to earlier.

The responses of the Laotian elites seemed conflicting. While they agree in the magnitude of 79 percent with the faith-in-people item which contends that "most people are inclined to help others," they express their distrust very strongly on the statement that "if you do not watch yourself, people will take advantage of you." It can, therefore, be hypothesized that the distrust the Laotians are exhibiting in the latter case might be attitudes reflecting what they believe to be major problems in the world: (1) a scarcity of goods, which leads to a struggle for advantage in the face of such a scarcity; and (2) a feeling that the present Lao society is a normless or anomic one in which people seek to rid themselves of each other to achieve relative

advantage. We shall consider the former case in the section following and the latter in the subsequent one.

Constant-Pie Orientation

Scott, in his study of the Malaysian elite's ideology, found that more than 60 percent of the sample believed in a concept of a fixed social product. He also found that the impact of the concept was upon the distribution of justice, the fragility of political cooperation, and some other political implications. Scott labels such a conception as "constant-pie," to mean "an orientation which assumes a fixed scarcity of desired material goods."[6] He explains:

> The "pie" cannot be enlarged that all might have larger "slices" but is constant, so that much of political and economic life is seen as constituting a struggle of one individual, family, group, or nation to expand its slice at the expense of the other individuals, families, groups, or nations.[7]

Such an orientation is believed to be a basic cause of war, both international and domestic, because there is not enough to go around.

Asking for reactions to the statement "Even in a rich country, if population grows rapidly, there is great danger that there will soon not be enough to go around," should tap attitudes about the concept of "fixed goods." The Laotian elites agreement is to be found at the lower range of the scale for this statement. The agreement is 51.6 percent (absolute score of +.11). This figure may be compared to the Malaysian score of 60 percent agreement, which reflects greater concern over the issue among Malaysian respondents. The Lao elite

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[6]*Ibid.*, p. 94.

[7]*Ibid.*

TABLE 9

LAOTIAN ELITES' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CONSTANT-PIE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION

	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Total	Absolute Score
58.	Even in a rich country, if population grows rapidly, there is great danger that there will soon not be enough to go around.	30.6	21.0	37.1	11.3	0.0	100.0	+.11
59.	Those who get ahead get ahead usually at the expense of others.	11.3	9.7	66.1	11.3	1.6	100.0	-.28
60.	When an individual or group gains, it usually means that another individual or group loses.	62.9	16.1	19.4	0.0	1.6	100.0	+.61
61.	Any government that wants to help the poor people will have to take something away from the rich in order to do it.	53.2	17.7	12.9	16.1	0.0	99.9	+.40
	Average	39.5	16.1	33.9	9.7	0.8	100.0	+.21

Note: Scores are presented in percentages. "Total" is more or less than 100 because of rounding. The scale is borrowed from James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 284.

rejected the statement that "those who get ahead get ahead at the expense of others," as can be seen by the 66.1 percent disagree response.

The endorsement of the Hobbesian attitude towards political and economic life, on the one hand, and the belief in social norms of economic equality, on the other, appear in the +.61 score showing overwhelming agreement with the statement that "when an individual or group gains, it usually means that another individual or group loses." Furthermore, our elite subjects agreed that "any government that wants to help the poor people will have to take something away from the rich in order to do it," (score +.40). The belief in the socialist norm of economic equality will also be observed in more specific statements in subsequent sections. Taken together, the statements demonstrate that the Laotian elite has a slightly pessimistic attitude about the world.

Comparing the constant-pie orientation scores with three out of four scale items used in England by Robert Putnam[8] and also by Scott in Malaysia indicate that the Laotian elites are strikingly higher than respondents in either Britain or Malaysia on two of the items (see Table 10). Items 60 and 61 yield scores of +.61 and +.40, respectively, indicating greater support for the constant-pie thesis.

Turning now to the second component of pessimism, we shall discuss whether the Laotian elites see their society as normless (anomic) or as a healthy one. The concept of anomie and its study are presented in some detail before proceeding to the findings in Laos.

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[8]Robert Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians: The Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).

TABLE 10

LAOTIAN ELITES' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CONSTANT-PIE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION, COMPARED WITH ATTITUDES REPORTED IN OTHER NATIONAL SURVEYS

Statements	British Civil Servants	British M.P.s	Malaysian Civil Servants	Laotian Elite
59. Those who get ahead usually get ahead at the expense of others.	-.20 (N=23)	-.26 (N=85)	+.16 (N=82)	-.28 (N=62)
60. When an individual or group gains, it usually means that another individual or group loses.	-.21 (N=21)	-.27 (N=80)	+.03 (N=82)	+.61 (N=62)
61. Any government that wants to help the poor people will have to take something away from the rich in order to do it.	+.11 (N=23)	-.01 (N=83)	+.25 (N=80)	+.40 (N=62)
Average	-.10	-.18	+.15	+.24

1 The scores are presented in absolute scores (with the possible range from +1 through -1).

2 The British data are taken from Robert Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians (Yale University Press, 1973); the Malaysian data are from Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia, p. 102.

Anomia

In recent years, a good deal of behavioral research has included an interest of anomie--a state of normlessness in society, characterized variously by the breakdown of social cohesion, the use of unapproved means to attain socially desirable goals, or the meaninglessness of social regulations governing behavior, conflict between belief systems, or the disintegration of belief systems. Traditionally, social scientists have been concerned with anomie as an objective, sociological reality and have dealt with questions involving its socially structured causes. The relative amount of anomie present in a given society at a particular time, social groups in which it is likely to be found, and its relation to the sociological problems (such as various forms of deviancy) have been major foci of research into this area. The research follows the approach first defined by Durkheim. However, because of the difficulty of measuring anomie directly, sociologists have been forced to employ measures of individual behavior. Even this approach has not been entirely satisfactory though, because such acts as anomic suicide and withdrawal from social pursuits because of perceived meaninglessness may occur in a non-anomic society. Moreover, an anomic society may contain many persons who do not display anomic patterns of behavior at all despite being surrounded by such behavior.

Other research, recognizing the differential existence of anomie in any given group, has studied anomie from the viewpoint of the individual: as a subjective, psychological condition marked by disaffection of the individual from his social environment. To indicate the difference in emphasis, of this research, Leo Srole has coined the term "anomia" to distinguish it from the social state of

"anomie."[9] The condition that he describes is also sometimes referred to as "alienation," a psychological and social state which, it is maintained by some writers, represents a separate dimension from either "anomia" and "anomie." Such a definition leads many writers to use anomia and alienation interchangeably. However, it is felt in the deepest sense that anomia is alienation although the opposite is not always true.

According to Robert K. Merton,[10] the sociological concept of anomie clearly refers to objective conditions: "Anomie refers to a property of a social system, not to state of mind of this or that individual within the system. It refers to a breakdown of social standards governing behavior and so also signifies little social cohesion."[11] Anomie, it is hypothesized by Merton, comes about in the United States because while upward mobility is considered an absolute value, the differential access to the opportunity structure causes appreciable numbers of people to become estranged from a society that promises them in principle what they are denied in reality. This withdrawal of allegiance from one or another part of prevailing social standards is what we mean, in the end, by anomie.[12]

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[9]For an excellent discussion of the whole area of anomie, see J. M. Yinger, "On Anomie," Journal of Scientific Study of Religion, 3 (1964), 158-173.

[10]See Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," in Social Theory and Social Structure, ed. by Robert K. Merton (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949).

[11]Robert K. Merton, "Anomie, Anomia, and Social Integration: Contexts of Deviant Behavior," in Anomie and Deviant Behavior, ed. by M. B. Clinard (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 226.

[12]Ibid., p. 218.

To S. de Grazia as well as Merton, such anomie stems not from a lack of rules, but rather, from conflict between the directives of two belief systems. De Grazia notes that one belief system, which represents the religio-political dimension, is based on familial inclusiveness, equality, and solidarity. The other type of belief system is economic, representative of modern capitalism, which stresses competition; its directives conflict with those of the cooperative religio-political value system. This, in de Grazia's terminology, is "simple anomie" and its symptom is the need for belongingness or affection, which modern life does not satisfy.[13] Acute anomie is then defined as the disintegration of the community of beliefs, due to the inability or indifference of the rulers. Its typical symptom is "anxiety accompanied by the image of a menacing world."[14] In other words, anomie arises not simply because some people have no access to opportunities for social mobility, but because of (1) the conflict in value systems and/or (2) the perceived indifference of the rulers.

Anomie, then, is the condition of denying legitimacy to and failing to be guided by official standards and rules. Merton talks about anomie in a theory of social deviance that can be explained in Marxian terms. When the legal and cultural norms no longer reflect the social group's desires, when behavioral expectations are not clear, then an anomic condition exists. Perhaps social control, the

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[13]S. de Grazia, The Political Community, A Study of Anomie (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 72, 107.

[14]De Grazia discussion, in Gaetano Mosca's terms, of the difficulties which arise when the ruler and the ruled belong to two different environments offers some fascinating parallels to, for example, modern American ghetto problems.

use of authority and power, will bring the society back into line with official standards; or, perhaps questioning and deviant individuals will act as the antithesis through which a new synthesis is possible. Certainly, it is often an accurate description of social conditions to explain the disjunction between official norms and actual behavior in such a way; it is also possible to empirically test such a proposition. That is, it is possible to measure whether official norms of behavior (as taught in schools or religions and as pronounced by government officials, etc.) are (1) agreed with verbally and (2) conformed to behaviorally. However, neither the existence of anomia nor faulty socialization can be equated with a disintegration of social structure.

In view of the great importance in the behavioral literature of the concept of anomie-anomia as a means of assessing the possibilities of both social integration and political stability, it behooves us to question what light personality measures can throw on the subject as well as what inferences can reasonably be made from anomie to anomia or vice versa. If, for example, there is a conflict between the economic and community beliefs systems, is this conflict differentially perceived? According to Merton, the answer is affirmative: those groups whose upward striving is unsuccessful will be those whose social bonds will weaken. Merton also mentions that personality factors are likely to enter in. It is possible that those who feel that the competitive nature of the economy is destroying the cooperative social framework will be those, throughout the social structure, whose personality needs lead them to perceive the world as hostile and unmanageable.

Even if the disjunction or disintegration of values is equally perceived, will not personality shape individual response? De Grazia discusses several factors which determine what an individual's adjustment to anomia will be. A major factor is the "incidence of anomie, simple or acute, in the community." "Once the perception that many others are in the same miserable state occurs, a greater inclination appears toward attempting adjustments in concert."[15] But does not the desire to attempt "adjustments" also depend upon the individual's view of whether or not the sociopolitical world "is adjustable"--that is responsive to individual or group action? If action is keyed to "the perception" of widespread, deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, does not personality--as well as objective conditions--determine the manner in which conditions are perceived? When one is concerned with "behavior or perception," personality predispositions are again variables that must be considered.

It appears essential to attempt to separate persons who deny legitimacy to and fail to be guided by official standards, rules, and mores from persons who feel strong ties to the dominant belief system--a system which is viable for them--and who nevertheless feel personal despair about their own life chances. In other words, it appears possible to separate individual-to-society alienation from alienation of individual-to-himself. It is possible that a person can perceive his social world as meaningful and purposeful in general, but feel that his own life lacks meaning. In sum, it is necessary to distinguish anomia from anomie and to consider separately the sociopolitical importance of each.

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[15]De Grazia, op. cit., pp. 131-132.

It is possible, at least theoretically, that persons who despair about the responsiveness, manipulability, and orderliness of their world would nevertheless agree on sociocultural values and give them at least passive support until a weakened social structure gave these persons opportunity to act out their hostilities and anxieties. E. E. Maccoby, J. P. Johnson and R. M. Church,[16] in their study of delinquency in Cambridge, Massachusetts found that when the respondents were questioned about seven different kinds of deviant activity, their ratings on the questions indicated a similarity to what they considered to be serious acts. In other words, the respondents revealed their social values.

Because of the proclivity of sociologists to consider anomic persons as indicative of the state of a society, one additional point can be made. One must be aware that in measuring feelings one is measuring predispositions, not actual behavior. Moreover, these predispositions of various social groups are probably not equally likely to affect social conditions throughout the society. As Herbert McClosky and J. H. Schaar state:

> The leap from the subjective feelings expressed by individuals to statements about objective social conditions is a perilous one. What people believe about a society may or may not be an accurate reflection of its nature: perceptions and feelings are never a literal copy of what is "out there" but are always powerfully shaped by the needs,

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[16]E. E. Maccoby, J. P. Johnson, and R. M. Church, "Community Integration and the Social Control of Juvenile Delinquency," Journal of Social Issues, 24 (1958), 38-51, reprinted in Human Behavior and International Politics, ed. by J. David Singer (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).

> motives, attitudes, and abilities of the observer. Hence, we can never confidently assume that because some people feel anomic the society is anomic.[17]

Nevertheless, this most definitely does not mean that the existence of anomic individuals is not of actual and potential sociopolitical import.

Whether or not Lao society is characterized by anomie (with all its political relevance) and whether Laotians can be characterized as exhibiting anomia (keeping in mind the meaning this has for the political and social structure of Laos) bears directly on our concerns here. The measurement and isolation of anomia offers a fruitful avenue for those concerned with the "propensity" for social and, hence, political change and stability, given specific social conditions. We are concerned, not only with what people do today but also with what they may do tomorrow; thus, we place major emphasis on the interpretations that people put on the world around them.

The impetus for the recent interest in anomia has been due to the work of Leo Srole.[18] His thesis is that people can be fitted along a "eunomia-anomia" continuum based on R. M. MacIver's definition of anomie as the breakdown of the individual's sense of attachment to society.[19] Specifically, Srole is concerned with testing the

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[17]Herbert McClosky and J. H. Schaar, "Psychological Dimensions of Anomy," American Sociological Review, 31 (February, 1965), 18-19.

[18]Leo Srole, "Social Integration and Certain Corollaries. An Exploratory Study," American Sociological Review, 21 (December, 1956), 709-16; and- "A Comment on 'Anomy,'" American Sociological Review, 30 (October, 1965), 757-62.

[19]R. M. MacIver, The Ramparts We Guard (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1964), pp. 84-92.

hypothesis that anomia,--a personal state of "social malintegration,"--is positively related to prejudice. He has suggested five dimensions to anomia:

> 1. the individual's sense that community leaders are detached from and indifferent to his needs, reflecting severance of the interdependent bond within the social system between leaders and those they should represent and serve.
>
> 2. the individual's perception of the social order as essentially fickle and unpredictable, i.e., orderless, inducing the sense that under such conditions he can accomplish little toward realizing future life goals.
>
> 3. the individual's view, beyond abdication of future life goals, that he and people like him are retrogressing from the goals they have already reached.
>
> 4. the reflection or loss of internalized social norms and values reflected in extreme form in the individual's sense of the meaninglessness of life itself.
>
> 5. the individual's perception that his framework of the immediate personal relationships, the very rock of his social existence, was no longer predictive or supportive. . . .[20]

It is apparent that what Srole is measuring, with the possible exception of the first dimension, is not directly related to social structure, but rather is expressive of a personalized view of the world.

Expanding on this point, McClosky and Schaar[21] suggest that the psychological dimension has not received adequate study in research on anomia. They suggest that the question of concern for current studies should not be whether or not society is anomic, but rather what groups are so cut off from "patterns of communication and interaction that [their position] reduces opportunities to see and understand how society

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[20]Srole, op. cit., pp. 712-13.

[21]McClosky and Schaar, op. cit.

works, and what its goals and values are."[22] They criticize, in other words, current research for treating anomie sociologically, rather than psychologically. However, in their discussion of the fact that past research efforts have found high anomie scores to be among the isolated, low status individuals who occupy positions in the social structure that limit patterns of communication, it would seem that McClosky and Schaar are still advancing a sociological explanation. In doing so, they suggest that anomic feelings are learned through faulty socialization and go on to posit at least three factors that are involved in this process: (1) "Cognitive factors that influence one's ability to learn and understand; (2) Emotional factors that tned to lower one's ability to perceive reality correctly; (3) Substantive beliefs and attitudes that interfere with successful communication and interaction."[23]

Using their own "anomy scale,"[24] which is similar to the Srole scale, they found an inverse relationship between their anomy scale and cognitive functioning. In regard to the emotional factors influencing learning, a significant relationship was found between anomy and original scales measuring inflexibility, rigidity, "the employment of defense mechanisms," obsessiveness, anxiety, disorganization, bewilderment, low ego strenght, hostility, paranoia, intolerance of human frailty, and contempt for weakness. In effect, they are

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[22]Ibid.

[23]McClosky and Schaar, op. cit.

[24]They prefer the spelling "anomy" for reasons discussed in their article.

measuring a world view which de Grazia and McDill's factor analysis would logically lead one to connect with anomia.[25]

Regarding substantive beliefs, the authors found a relationship between anomia and totalitarianism, fascist tendencies, left and right wing attitudes, lack of tolerance, lack of faith-in-people, Calvinism, elitism, inequalitarianism, and ethnocentrism. Although independent assessment cannot be made of the scale items, it would appear that these social and political views fall along the same dimension as the emotional factors which were also correlated with anomia.

McClosky and Schaar also found that after controlling for seven sociological variables (education, age, size of community, occupational status, race, sex, and region), "high anomics continue to differ from low anomics on the psychological variables . . . the differences remain in every instance large enough to leave no doubt that personality factors determine Anomy independently of social influence."[26] In sum, they regard "anomy as a by-product of the socialization process--as a sign of the failure of socialization and of the means by which socialization is achieved, namely, communication, interaction and learning . . .," they go on,

> Contrary to Srole's claim that anomy reflects mental disturbance only the latter is "severe," and that social dysfunction is the independent variable producing anomy both with and without psychopathology, we found that personality factors are correlated with anomy at all levels of mental disturbance, and that they function in all educational categories and in all sectors of society.[27]

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[25]E. L. McDill, "Anomie, Authoritarianism, Prejudice, and Socio-Economic Status: An Attempt at Clarification," Social Forces, 7 (September, 1960), 239-45.

[26]McClosky and Schaar, op. cit., p. 39.

[27]Ibid.

The discussion by McClosky and Schaar is a most worthwhile addition to the conceptualization of anomia, but to conclude that such emotional and sociopolitical attitudes which the authors found to be correlated with anomia stem from faulty socialization is to use the terms "socialization" and "learning" in ways that do not reflect the conclusions to which McClosky and Schaar come.

Socialization refers to the manner in which infants learn "to adjust to the group by acquiring social behavior of which the group approves."[28] McClosky and Schaar, however, are not dealing with social behavior. Their concern is rather with the results of "faulty psychological growth"; results which often accompanied by a certain position in the social structure, do not uniformly affect individuals in any one social position and are found in all status groups as they note. Further, these psychological beliefs are, in Rokeach's terms, "central beliefs about the world." They are not accepted and adhered to, as for example, the belief that democracy is the best form of government in every situation or that the world is round but instead are simply remembered and may change over time given the right stimulus. They are consciously developed as the individual develops physical skills--breathing, crawling--and just as inseparable parts of him. Thus, while the contribution of McClosky and Schaar widens our understanding of the psychological dimensions of anomia substantially, their conclusion has only obscured the unique personality aspects of anomia and retarded research in this direction.

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[28]The International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (1968), Vol. 14: 534.

Gwynn Nettler strikes at the heart of the inadequacies of the McClosky-Schaar anomia study. She states that while McClosky and Schaar hypothesize that anomic feeling stems from inadequate socialization "reflected by an inaccurate view of reality," they "offer no data to support their own conception of American model values--nor do they test the relative acuity of the anomic eye."[29] The problem of a faulty view of reality is not simply the problem that anomic views may not be an accurate reflection of "social" reality, but that such views have an autonomy all their own; once formed, they will likely be maintained regardless of the individual's life situation.

Among the Laotian elite, we found from their responses that there is no high intensity state of Lao social malintegration (see Table 11). Simply put, they view their society as slightly anomic, but still meaningful, orderly, and predictable.

Economic Values

We have discussed so far the elites' attitudes toward their society. We have found that there is some tendency toward beliefs in socialist norms in the sense of economic equality. This section is intended to illuminate the Laotian elites' orientations toward the economic world.

The Current Economic Situations

Since gaining independence in 1954, Laos has been in nearly a constant state of war, both from within and without. To these man-made

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[29]Gwynn Nettler, "A Further Comment on 'Anomy,'" American Sociological Review, 30 (October, 1965), 762-763.

TABLE 11

LAOTIAN ELITES' PERCEPTIONS OF ANOMIE

	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Total	Absolute Score
50.	A person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.	53.2	4.8	25.8	14.5	1.6	99.9	+.28
51.	These days a person really does not know who he can make friends with.	32.3	17.7	46.8	3.2	0.0	100.0	+.15
52.	The lot of the average man is getting worse, not better.	41.9	8.1	37.1	11.3	1.6	100.0	+.16
	Average	42.5	10.2	36.6	9.7	1.1	100.1	+.19

Note: Scores are presented in percentages. "Total" is more or less than 100 because of rounding. The scale is borrowed from Leo Srole, "Social Integration and Certain Corollaries: An Exploratory Study," American Sociological Review, 21 (1956), 709-716.

hazards are added the natural ones of lack of access to seaports, geographic barriers to transportation and communication, and lack of readily accessible natural resources. Altogether, these factors have produced a severe economic imbalance which has been reflected in recent years as a consistent annual government budget deficit.

After gaining independence, Laos emerged as a country ill-prepared to survive economically as a twentieth century state. French rule in Laos was far less sophisticated than in Vietnam and Cambodia. During the French colonial period, Laos became part of the Indochina economic complex. As such, the need for internal development was viewed in the context of Indochina as an economic whole. Government expenditures always exceeded the revenue which the economy of Laos could yield and international payments were always greater than the foreign exchange that the economy of Laos could earn. The deficits in both instances were met out of the surpluses derived from earnings in Vietnam and Cambodia. Development efforts were directed primarily toward construction of a road network to facilitate the political and military administration of Indochina. There was some investment of French private capital, for example, in tin and coffee, both for export, but the effect of this on the economy was slight. Sixteen years after independence, Laos remained largely undeveloped, with most of its natural resources unexploited and even unsurveyed. The many years of conflict within its borders have prevented gathering the basic data that are needed to identify, plan for, and exploit these

natural resources.[30] This situation is believed to form an intimate environment for the elite, which shapes their culture-and-personality.

Elite and Economic Development

Exploring the elites' attitudes toward economic affairs can contribute to our knowledge of political culture-and-personality in general, and to the idea of economic development in particular. Since the elite is the entity which sets policy for the entire society, much depends on the basic beliefs and attitudes of the elite toward the present-day economic world. Before examining their attitudes, a brief glance at the concept of economic development in general will be taken as background material.

The search for "first causes" of development started in the more limited field of economic development. Economists sought to explain how development begins. When economic theories of growth and development did not provide complete and satisfacotry answers, they began to search for the cause in social, administrative, and political institutions, as did other social scientists. This search produced a spate of literature on social and cultural obstacles to development and attempts to identify the social, political, and other preconditions for economic development. In pushing the exploration ever more deeply, economic historians and sociologists identified a range of beliefs, attitudes, and values which they believed permitted and encouraged the generation of entreprenuers and enterprise. Max Weber's exploration

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[30]For a good discussion of Laos' economics and problems, see Asian Regional Team for Employment Promotion, Transition and Development: Employment and Income Generation in Laos (Bangkok, 1973). (Mimeo)

of the "Protestant ethic" hypothesis, for example, was a classic statement of the influence of many other scholars searching for the key to economic growth.

The inevitable next step was to push the search into the foundations of human behavior and motivation. Psychologists and psychologically oriented social scientists are now exploring the dependence of entrepreneurship and economic development on the emergence of innovative personalities or the presence of achievement motivation in individuals. For example, Everett E. Hagen, an economist, provocatively employs the insights of sociology and psychology to construct a theory of social change that attempts to explain how economic growth begins.[31] He inquires into the forces which disrupt the great stability of traditional society and cause groups to emerge which abandon traditional ways and turn their energies to the tasks of modernization. More evidence for the psychological perspective is provided in The Achieving Society by David McClelland.[32] He discusses the conditions

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[31]Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1962), chapter 1.

[32]David McClelland, The Achieving Society (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961), p. 84. See also: Alex Inkeles, "Making Men Modern: On the Causes and Consequences of Individual Change in Six Developing Countries," American Journal of Sociology 75 (September, 1969), 208-255; Alex Inkeles, "The Modernization of Man," in Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth, ed. by Myron Weiner (New York: Basic Books, 1966), chapter X. To McClelland, personality is the independent variable and the social structure, or that part of it which is the economy, is the dependent variable. Changes occur in the mind of men with the result that economic development is likely to follow. For Inkeles, the reverse is true. Inkeles finds that, to a striking degree, the same syndrome of attitudes, values, and ways of acting defines the modern man in each of six countries he studied. The characteristics of modern man include: a disposition to accept new ideas and try new methods; a readiness to express opinions; a time sense that makes men more interested in the present and future than the past; a better sense of punctuality; a greater concern for planning, organization, and

and personality traits that lead particular individuals and groups in the society to become entrepreneurs--to exploit opportunities, to take advantage of favorable trade conditions, and, in general, to shape their own destinies. Explanation for such activities is found in changes which occur in the minds of men: a personality characteristic becomes more prevalent in individuals that McClelland designates as a "need for Achievement."[33] Where a high need for achievement is found, economic development is likely to follow, McClelland argues. He does not merely maintain that the achieving society possesses large numbers of individuals with a high need of achievement but goes on to contend, based on systematic empirical investigations along historical lines, that the presence of individuals with high need for achievement is "antecedent" to enterpreneurship and economic growth.

McClelland's emphasis on human nature is quite different from the Darwinian or Marxist view of man as a creature who "adapts" to his environment. It is even different from the Freudian view of civilization as the elimination of man's primitive urges. Nor can he agree with Arnold J. Toynbee, who recognizes the importance of psychological factors as "the very forces which actually decide the

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efficiency; a tendency to see the world as calculable; a faith in science and technology; and a belief in distributive justice. Admittedly, these characteristics embrace more than the need for achievement, but the modern man, as Inkeles describes him, clearly is achievement-oriented. Inkeles finds that elements of social structure change individuals. Education is the more powerful factor in making men modern, but occupation in large-scale organization, and especially in factory work, makes a significant contribution to creating modern attitudes and teaching individuals to act like modern men.

[33]McClelland, op. cit.

issue when an encounter takes place." Toynbee states that these factors "inherently are impossible to weigh and measure and therefore to estimate scientifically in advance."[34] Civilization, McClelland argues, at least in its economic aspects, is neither adaptation nor sublimation; it is a positive creation by a people made dynamic by a high level of n-Achievement--(the need for achievement), not a desire or motive for prestige but the attainment of an inner feeling of personal accomplishment.[35]

Further questions are what produces the need for achievement and how is the need for achievement stimulated? The need for achievement is seen as resulting from the child rearing practices and early socialization. The answer to the second question may be somewhat incomplete and tentative, but some psychologists feel that the beginnings to an answer are emerging. David McClelland and David Winters, for example, report on experimental efforts in developing nations as well as in the United States to change motivation so that individuals can express their entrepreneurial personalities and thereby contribute to economic growth.[36]

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[34]Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 35.

[35]McClelland, op. cit., p. 84.

[36]David C. McClelland and David G. Winters, Motivating Economic Development (New York: The Free Press, 1969), especially chapter II. They also concluded that it is practicable to run need for achievement training courses for businessmen and to compare their yield, at least roughly, in terms of an activity level score. There is encouraging evidence that the need for achievement courses may actually increase the subsequent activity levels of the businessmen who take them.

In explaining the origins of development, both Hagen and McClelland concentrate on psychological changes occurring within the individual. At another level, however, ideology may be a force which is equally important in the multiple dimensions of the modernization process. Harry Johnson makes a strong case with respect to the ideology of economic policy. There are also important similarities which permit their being discussed collectively. These similarities result from common influences that affect all developing nations.[37] Johnson identifies such influences as "political nationalism" (which has its counterpart in economic nationalism) and economic ideas as experiences inherited from the recent history which provides for a nation a common interpretation, thought, and policy prescription, as well as, a source for an international language of economic development. The consequences of this ideology for the economic policies of developing nations include policies of economic autarky, concentration of industrialization at the expense of agricultural development, a preference for economic planning and for public control of industry, and hostility to large foreign enterprises operating in their countries.

The nationalist elites who make use of ideology are termed "assaulted" individuals by Mary Matossian[38] because they are caught

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[37]Harry G. Johnson, "The Ideology of Economic Policy in New States," in Economic Nationalism in Old and New Societies, ed. by Harry G. Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 124-141.

[38]Mary Matossian, "Ideologies of Delayed Industrialization: Some Tensions and Ambiguities," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 6 (April, 1958), 217-228. Reprinted in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, Political Development and Social Change, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley, 1971), pp. 113-121.

between the pressures of traditionalism and modernization. The West may be resented, but the intellectuals who begin to implement the ideology are partly Westernized. Their desire is to resolve the conflict resulting from exposure to the West and to create a sense of identity for themselves as individuals and for the nation as a whole. They search for true selves to create a national character. The ideologies these elites formulate and embrace also reduce the ambiguity between the newness of the West and the oldness of the indigeneous culture. The past is turned to many uses, both negative and positive. It may be employed as an escape, or it may be used to sanction innovation and national self-strengthening.

From Matossian's analysis it becomes clear why the intelligensia of developing countries may be sincerely attached to contradictory premises. Their ideologies provide criticism and comfort. They stand for class equality and exhort the masses to follow orders and accept unequal rewards. While condemning the peasant for his backwardness, at the same time they praise him for being a "real" representative of his culture.

Entrepreneurial Values of the Laotian Elite

According to David McClelland, an entrepreneur is defined as "someone who exercises some control over the means of production and produces more than he can consume in order to sell (or exchange) it for individual (or household) income."[39] Following McClelland, we do

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[39]McClelland, op. cit., p. 65. For defining "classes" of the people and enemy of the Laotians, see Joseph Zasloff, The Pathet Lao (Lexington: Lexington Books Company, 1973), p. 22.

not intend to use the term "entrepreneur" in the sense of "capitalist" but rather to divorce the entrepreneur entirely from any connotation of ownership. For example, an executive in China's machine production program is an entrepreneur under such a definition. The entrepreneur, therefore, often collects material resources, organizes a production unit to combine the resources into a new product, and sells the product. In this study, the meaning of the statements in the questionnaire refer to the ideas of the general business interest in large enterprises and their management.

Harry Johnson comments that "each new state has its own particular economic structure and corresponding economic problems toward which its economic policy and ideology are necessarily oriented."[40] We might expect substantive differences, then, between Laos and other countries with respect to attitudes toward economic policy.

There are, to begin with, attitudes toward entrepreneurship within the elite which can be observed as ideologies revealed through economic activities. The Laotian economy has been particularly influenced by French ideas gained during the colonial period. As time went on United States influences became more important, but currently, socialist approaches seem most important. The war and the shortage of a special, talented elite in Laos has colored the elites" attitudes toward economic affairs in one way or another.

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[40]Harry G. Johnson, "The Ideology of Economic Policy in the New States," in Economic Nationalism in Old and New States, ed. by Harry G. Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 124.

The responses of the elites to the questionnaire items (see Table 12) indicate that they are in the middle range of the degree of intensity supporting entrepreneurship; they scored +.27 on the average. Looking at segments of the questionnaire, Table 12 shows that the elites most strongly accept that "the most important factor in the success of a commercial firm is the establishment of a reputation for the excellence of its products." This is construed to be a favorable comment about commercial firms, because a group of anti-business respondents might rather have thought of "profit" as the most important factor in gauging commercial success. Next, they were generally opposed to using "seniority" as a major factor in giving promotions, and this reflects a business management outlook, as opposed to the common approach of governmental employers. And finally, these elites were somewhat in favor of the use of "incentive pay," which is a common practice in industry but is seldom used in government.

From the foregoing, it seems fair to assume that if the surveyed elites had been left alone to plan for the economic development of Laos, private enterprise--teamed, perhaps, with a strongly entrepreneurial public sector--would have been favored by Laotian economic policy.

Summary

Throughout this chapter we have explored the elite personality with regard to attitudes concerning general human nature, society, and economic affairs. Focusing on society, a general, if not deep, sense of pessimism was found. The elite seemed to feel that Lao society today is slightly normless. Similar findings in the same degree of

TABLE 12

LAOTIAN ELITES' ATTITUDES TOWARD ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Total	Absolute Score
62. An article for sale is worth what people will pay for it.	75.8	9.7	11.3	0.0	3.2	100.0	+.75
63. Seniority should be given greater weight than merit in giving promotions.	17.7	4.8	50.0	27.4	0.0	99.9	-.32
64. Incentive pay snould not be used because workers will overwork and ruin their health or destroy jobs for others.	37.1	9.7	46.8	4.8	1.6	100.0	+.14
65. Workers should not be promoted to managerial jobs even if they are qualified because it would destroy the respect for authority which the workers must have toward management.	33.9	9.7	35.5	21.0	0.0	100.1	0.00
66. The amount of education a person has should be a major factor in determining his pay scale.	41.9	19.4	35.5	1.6	1.6	100.0	+.32
67. I approve a career or job outside the home for married women.	45.2	41.9	8.1	3.2	1.6	100.0	+.59
68. A good son should try to live near his parents even if it means giving up a good job in another part of the country	3.2	0.0	66.1	29.0	1.6	99.9	-.59

TABLE 12 (continued)

Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Total	Absolute Score
69. The most important factor in the success of a commercial firm is the establishment of a reputation for the excellence of its products.	80.6	9.7	8.1	0.0	1.6	100.0	+.82
70. A man with money cannot really learn how to behave in polite society if he has not had the proper unbringing.	72.6	19.4	1.6	6.5	0.0	100.1	+.75
Average	45.3	13.8	29.2	10.4	1.2	99.9	+.27

Note: Scores are presented in percentages. "Total" is more or less than 100 because of rounding. The scale is borrowed from David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961), pp. 284-286.

intensity were discovered in the elites' constant-pie orientation. In matters of economics, the elite express their general approval of entrepreneurship, whether it be found in the public or private sector.

In the following chapter, an investigation will be made to find further essential characteristics of the elite. Their attitudes toward the statements of liberal democratic thought will be highlighted.

CHAPTER VII

POLITICAL BELIEFS

We have explored the elites' personality in general and their attitudes toward economics and their society. In this chapter, we explore the elites' political beliefs. The purpose is to observe what they do and do not believe with regard to some general political values.

Belief Concepts

Beliefs organize and give relevance to man's experiences--they are the evaluative function of mind. Without this capacity, man's experiences would be so many chronologically ordered memories; they would have no significance. Beliefs depend on abstraction, and the belief system of the individual is his abstracted representation of his environment. Belief is thus the link between the individual and his society and between the group and its environment. At one extreme, it represents knowledge, which is belief reinforced by experience. At the other extreme is delusion; belief which is in flat contradiction to either part of physical reality accessible to man or to the beliefs of the individual's society.

So far as we can be determined, no man now living or who has lived has been without belief, at least in the sense of conviction of the truth of propositions of which he has not or could not have direct personal experience. We may consider individual character or individual personality as the ensemble of beliefs or the belief system that is basic to a given group. The relations between men--trust and distrust, authority

and rebellion, loyalty and disloyalty--are based on attitudes and beliefs.

The secular literature on the topic of belief is enormous. Its size, and the great extent of contemporary interest in this subject matter, is obscured by differences in approach used in various disciplines that deal with the subject: sociology, anthropology, psychology, philosophy, and political science. The terminology used by all these disciplines, too, is vast and confusing at first sight. Mores, ethos, myths, norms, conventions, symbols, roles, expectations, perceptions, attitudes, opinions, values, all are terms used in one discipline or the other. As mentioned at the outset, psychology emphasizes the term attitude; sociology and anthropology use values, norms, and roles; political science employs opinion and interests. All of these designations apply to aspects of the same human phenomena.

We find that the word which best covers the entire category is the word "belief." All of the phenomena listed above can be considered as aspects of belief, the human ability to become convinced of the truth or value of a proposition and to act on that conviction. As the term "belief" is used as a segment of the elite's culture-and-personality in this study, it covers the entire spectrum of the elite's opinion, from conscious transitory opinion whose holder is aware it is fragmentary, through knowledge, belief confirmed by experience, and on to faith--the unquestioning acceptance of a position without proof and in the awareness that no proof may exist.

Individuals are guided in their lives by loose groupings or structures of beliefs, variously termed outlook, credo, or belief

system. The belief system is the individual's currently operative explanation of himself, of the world, and of his position in the world. It has been called the cognitive map of the individual. For the purpose of convenience, we may consider the beliefs of an individual to be hierarchically organized, with values representing the most deeply seated beliefs, then followed by attitudes and finally by opinion, which can be considered consciously or tentative assessments. We may consider these terms to represent a spectrum of beliefs held with varying degrees of conviction; "values" with the deepest conviction and "opinions" with the least, out of other aspects mentioned in Chapter II.

A great deal of effort has been expended by social psychologists in the attempt to differentiate between belief, attitude, opinion, sentiment, and so forth. Martin Fishbein and Bertram Raven, for example, attempt to distinguish between "belief," which they consider a cognitive opinion based on probability, and "attitude," which they consider evaluative and emotion-based.[1] Jack Brehn and A. R. Cohen consider that attitudes are composed of two elements: opinion, which signified rational knowledge whether something is true or untrue, and evaluation, which indicates how one feels about the subject concerned.[2] Theodore Newcomb, Ralph Turner, and Philip Converse consider attitudes to be "stored cognitions," with positive and negative associations. They conclude that the attitude concept reflects quite faithfully the primary form in which

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[1]Martin Fishbein and Bertram Raven, "The A. B. Scale: An Operational Definition of Belief and Attitude," Human Relations, 15 (February, 1962), 35-44.

[2]Jack Brehm and A. R. Cohen, Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1962), p. 17.

past experience is summed, stored, and organized in the individual as he approaches any new situation. The attitude can be described as a residue, highly organized, of cognized objects to which experience has lent affective color or value.[3] Daniel Katz uses a definition of attitude which helps to make the concept clearer. For him, an attitude is "the specific organization of feelings and beliefs according to which a given person evaluates an object or symbol positively or negatively, . . . an attitude is an organization of feelings and beliefs directed to a single object or subject."[4]

In general, we have followed in this study the definition used by Milton Rokeach, as presented in Chapter V. Rokeach considers the most elementary definition of a belief to be "any simple proposition, conscious or unconscious, inferred from what a person says or does capable of being preceded by the phrase 'I believe that'."[5] According to Rokeach and many of his fellow social psychologists, each belief can be considered to have three components: (1) a cognitive component, representing a person's knowledge, held with varying degrees of surety, about what is true or false, good or bad; (2) an affective component concerning an object or belief or another person, which reflects an emotional like or dislike position toward the person or the object, or the belief itself; (3) a behavioral component. An attitude, according to Rokeach's definition, is a "relatively

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[3]Theodore Newcomb, Ralph Turner, and Philip Converse, Social Psychology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), pp. 41-42.

[4]Daniel Katz, "Attitude Formation and Public Opinion," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 367 (September, 1966), 151.

[5]Milton Rokeach, "Attitude," The International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (New York: The Free Press, 1968), Vol. I, pp. 449-457.

enduring organization of beliefs around an object or situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner."[6]

Rokeach considers the individual's belief system as "the total universe of a person's beliefs about the physical world, the social world and the self." He defines values as "a type of belief centrally located in the belief system about how one ought to or not to behave, or about some end state of existence worth or not worth attaining."[7] Elsewhere Rokeach estimates that an adult may have many thousands of attitudes, but only a limited number of values. Here he defines the belief system as "a hierarchical mental organization which is in some psychological sense internally consistent. Any change in any part of the value-attitude system will affect other parts."[8]

The Elite's Political Consensus

This section is an effort to explore the degree of political beliefs among the elites in terms of their attitudes towards liberal democratic values, by using Herbert McClosky's scale.[9] In his research, McClosky assumes that we can codify the central ideas of liberal democratic thought and present them in a statement form to establish the degree of adherence to these norms among subjects. He then constructed the scales to tap the central political beliefs along the following dimensions:

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[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Milton Rokeach, "The Role of Values in Public Opinion Research," Public Opinon Quarterly, 32 (Winter, 1968-1969), 550.

[9] Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1964), 361-382.

1. Rules of the game (mostly due process)
2. Free speech and opinion
3. Specific applications of free speech and procedural rights
4. Political equality
5. Economic equality
6. Cynicism toward politics
7. Political futility

Rules of the Game

The concept "rules of the game" is intended to tap widely shared beliefs of the elite about how the government or political actors ought to behave. Indeed, it is essentially normative and procedural. Actually, the rules of the game concept overlaps with other concepts used in contemporary political science: political culture, norms, ideology, values, role, and so on. Some of these competing concepts are usually more sharply defined. But the concept serves as a central reminder of the importance of informal, normative expectations and unwritten rules in shaping political behavior.

Previous studies showed that general and specific statements about liberal democracy among the American highly educated mass were overwhelmingly agreed upon.[10] This finding led the authors, Prothro and Grigg, to speculate that the widespread agreement on the rules of the game at the elite level may be a precondition for democratic politics, but that on the mass level it apparently is not. In a later study, Robert

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[10] James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," Journal of Politics, 22 (1960), 276-294.

Dahl[11] confirmed that the same minority of the population that possesses the highest levels of political interest, skills, and resources also possesses the greatest commitment to the rules of the game of democratic politics. The vast majority of the citizenry may not agree with these rules, but lack the interest, skills, and resources to do much about it.

McClosky provides data on attitude towards the rules of the game of a national sample. It is clear that a sizable minority of American citizens do not accept the rules of the game. In the same article, McClosky reports the interview results that were obtained when his original questionnaire was administered to the delegates and alternates to the Democratic and Republican national party convention in 1956. Their responses (under the label "U.S.Influentials") indicate far wider agreement with the rules of the game among these political activists than among rank-and-file Americans.[12]

Assuming that the United States is a reasonable approximation of a liberal political democracy, these studies suggest that agreement about the rules of the game on the mass level is less important than either the philosophers or the group theorists assume. Elite agreement on these rules may well be a necessary condition for a successful political democracy, but only additional research conducted in a variety of political systems will tell us whether the hypothesized relationship between the attitudes concerning the rules of the game and political democracy needs merely to be revised or whether it must be abandoned altogether.

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[11]Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

[12]McClosky, op. cit., p. 364.

In his application of McClosky's questionnaire to Malaysian elites, James Scott points out that the rules of the game, a concern with due process, "is as important as freedom of speech but is not nearly as prominent in the popular mind."[13] He adds that "when democratic beliefs tend to be formalistic, it may be due process which is cast aside before more celebrated freedoms such as free speech."[14]

As in Table 13, comparing the rules of the game among the groups--American as the Western model and Malaysian as the non-Western model, the extent of the Laotian elite's overall support for "democratic" rules of the game is far below the American (31.5 percent) but slightly above Malaysian civil servants (3.5 percent). If we refer to the McClosky 75 percent consensus level,[15] the absolute levels of democratic response among Laotian elites have ominous implications. Only on mass electorate issues (Statement 111) do they achieve this figure, while for six of the eight items they do not even muster 50 percent support for certain rules of the game. Bear in mind that the group we are examining is presumably the most important political career group. Surely if the rules of the game find so little patronage among these educated power holders, we can hardly be sanguine about the prospects for liberal democracy in a country like Laos.

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[13] James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia: Reality and the Beliefs of an Elite (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 187.

[14] Ibid., p. 192.

[15] The 75 percent consensus level is an entirely arbitrary figure. Consensus usually means more than 50 percent agreement but less than 100 percent.

TABLE 13

LAOTIAN ELITE'S ATTITUDES TOWARD THE POLITICAL "RULES OF THE GAME," COMPARED WITH AMERICAN AND MALAYSIAN ATTITUDES

	Statements	Percent Supporting Democratic Rules of the Game[1]		
		U.S. Influentials[2] (N = 3,020)	Malaysian Elite[3] (N = 17)	Laotian Elite (N = 62)
111.	People ought to be allowed to vote even if they cannot do so intelligently.	65.6	78	87
112.	I do not mind a politician's methods if he manages to get the right things done.	74.4	29	41
113.	It is all right to get around the law if you do not actually break it.	78.8	21	60
114.	In dealing with subversives, sometimes you cannot always give them all the legal rights which peaceful citizens have, otherwise many will escape the law.	75.3	20	49
115.	We might as well make up our minds that in order to make the world better, a lot of innocent people will have to suffer.	72.8	59	31
116.	Very few politicians have clean records, so one should not get excited about the mudthrowing that sometimes takes place.	85.2	21	16
117.	There are times when it almost seems better for the people to take the law into their own hands rather than wait for the machinery of government to act.	86.7	58	48

TABLE 13 (Continued)

Statements	Percent Supporting Democratic Rules of the Game[1]		
	U.S. Influentials[2] (N = 3,020)	Malaysian Elite[3] (N = 17)	Laotian Elite (N = 62)
118. To bring about great changes for the benefit of mankind requires cruelty and even ruthlessness.	80.6	54	36
Mean	77.4	42.5	46

[1]Responses were dichotomized; the small number of "No Opinion" responses for each item (see Appendix A for details) was ignored. Agreement with statement 111 and disagreement with the other statements were taken to indicate acceptance of the rules of the game.

[2]From Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1964), 365.

[3]From James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 190-191.

Free Speech and Opinion

Daniel P. Moynihan's statement that "there is no nation so poor that it cannot afford free speech"[16] seem to be agreed upon among the Laotian elite. The picture changes sharply when we turn from the rules of the game to items which in a broad, general way express belief in freedom of speech and opinions. As can be seen from Table 14, support for the values is remarkably high. Comparing support for the free speech and opinions among the groups, the Laotian elite's support for the free speech and opinions statements is higher than the American in all items and Malaysian in five out of six items. Our respondents even endorse the rights of atheists and agnostics.

Specific Applications of Free Speech and Procedural Rights

At the center of the democratic creed, as we have approached it here, is the idea of democratic restraint. The idea of restraint has several components, among them, the notion of judical prohibition. The state and its citizens are under the restraint of the law even when dealing with a threat to the law. The guarantee of due process, for example, is a classic expression of judical prohibition, for it binds the state to provide a fair and speedy trial, citizens are presummed innocent until found guilty by a duly constituted court; they cannot be convicted on evidence obtained illegally; they have a right to avoid self-incrimination, and so forth. All people have all of these rights (in principle, but unhappily not always in practice). No one ought to lose any of them because of his opinions, political convictions, or style of life.

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[16]"Some Moynihanisms," Times (26 January 1976), 28.

TABLE 14

LAOTIAN ELITES' ATTITUDES TOWARD "FREE SPEECH AND OPINION," COMPARED WITH AMERICAN AND MALAYSIAN ATTITUDES

	Statements	Percent Supporting Free Speech and Opinion[1]		
		U.S. Influentials[2] (N = 3,020)	Malaysian Elite[3] (N = 17)	Laotian Elite (N = 62)
119.	People who hate our way of life should still have a chance to talk and be heard.	86.9	97	93
120.	Nobody has the right to tell another person what he should and should not read.	81.4	66	92
121.	Unless there is freedom for many points of view to be presented, there is little chance that the truth can ever be known.	90.6	91	100
122.	No matter what a person's political beliefs are, he is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else.	96.4	91	98
123.	Freedom of conscience should mean the freedom to not believe in gods as well as the freedom to warship in religion of one's choice.	87.8	37	98
124.	You cannot really be sure whether an opinion is true or not unless people are free to argue against it.	94.9	97	98
	Mean	89.7	80	96

[1]Responses were dichotomized; the small number of "No Opinion" responses for each item (see Appendix A for details) was ignored. Agreement with all statements were taken to indicate acceptance of free speech and opinion.

[2]From Herbert McClosky, Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1964), 366.

[3]From James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 188-189.

The scale is designed to access commitment to judical protection, broadly conceived. The items ask, among other things, whether the government ought to force the people to do certain things in dangerous situations, whether in the investigation of "dangerous subversives" they must stick to the rules, and so forth. As we can see in Table 15 showing the summary findings for all statements and also comparing them with other countries, the elites are asked if they favor free expression for people who "don't know what they are talking about," whether due process should extend even to "dangerous enemies of the nation," and so on. The construction of these statements allows us to see how universal principles fare when they are taken from a largely rhetorical context and placed in a setting which demands the sacrifice of other valued goals. It is one thing for a man to be an "other things being equal" democrat but since, in the real world, democracy does imply that other goals are postponed or foregone, these items are a more realistic test of liberal democratic beliefs.

Even more than the rules of the game items, Table 15 indicates that Laotian elites fall far below the American group in their support for free expression and procedural rights. The average frequency with which they elect democratic values is 56.3 percent points below that of the American influentials; and fully nine points behind the level of the Malaysian sample. Averaging the frequencies of democratic choices on all four statements, the Laotian elites fall far below consensus.

These responses offer persuasive evidence that their democratic beliefs in free speech and opinions are formalistic. Statements 125 and 128 deal with specific applications of this freedom and the average supporting is only 38.5 percent, while for the more rhetorical statements of

TABLE 15

LAOTIAN ELITES' ATTITUDES TOWARD "SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF FREE SPEECH AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS," COMPARED WITH AMERICAN AND MALAYSIAN ATTITUDES

Statements	Percent Supporting Specific Speech and Rights Issues[1]		
	U.S. Influentials[2] (N = 3,020)	Malaysian Elite[3] (N = 17)	Laotian Elite (N = 62)
125. A book that contains wrong political views cannot be a good book and does not deserve to be published.	82.1	59	41
126. In dealing with dangerous enemies of the nation, we cannot afford to depend on the courts, laws, and their slow unreliable methods.	92.6	32	24
127. When the country is in great danger, we may have to force people to do certain things against their will, even though it violates their rights.	71.5	14	4
128. A man ought not to be allowed to speak if he does not know what he is talking about.	82.7	36	36
Mean	82.0	35.3	26.3

[1]Responses were dichotomized; the small number of "No Opinion" responses for each item (see Appendix A for details) was ignored. Disagreement with all statements were taken to indicate acceptance of the specific applications of free speech and procedural rights.

[2]From Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1964), 367.

[3]From James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 198-199.

Table 14 the figure was extremely high 96 percent. Fifty-seven and a half percent of those who muster tropological support for the free speech seemed willing to abandon their beliefs when they are asked to make sacrifices to defend it. Many of democracy's defenders desert when the assault on their position begins.[17] This trend was also true in Scott's study on the Malaysian elite.[18]

If the beliefs in free speech were not formalistic, one would expect some "carry over" from rhetoric to application. That is, those who support the principle of free expression should be more supportive of the same principle in difficult circumstances than those who do not seem committed to the principle in the first place. In a rough way, we can test for a formalism by comparing the performance of the elite for the items of Table 14 (freedom of free speech and opinions) with their performance on the statements in Table 15. In the case of the Laotian elite, we found that percentage of support dropped off sharply from the former to the latter, 96 to 26 percent.

Political and Economic Equality

That all men are created politically equal is one of the most basic liberal democratic tenets. The aristocratic notion is that some men, whether by virtue of wealth, family lineage, or physical prowess, are inherently better suited to rule. A belief in equality does not

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[17] Items 126 and 127 concern specific applications of the "rules of the game" and the average supportive responses for these items is 14 percent. This is 32 percent below the average figure for the due process statements in Table 13. The difference is due to the drop-off from rhetoric to application as mentioned.

[18] Scott, op. cit., pp. 198-199.

imply that all people are biologically equal or that each citizen ought to possess exactly the same political influence are every other citizen. Political equality refers to the ability to compete on an equal basis. Under conditions of equality, decisions generally are made on the basis of majority rule--that is, regardless of the physical or social characteristics of individuals. If the Laotian elite concur most strongly about liberty in the abstract, they disagree very strongly about political equality, but not economic equality.

Political equality. Equalitarian values were tapped through statements about the ability of the people to rule themselves, to know their best interests in the long run, to understand the issues, or to pick their own leaders wisely. Support for these equalitarian features is believed to indicate the degree of support for "popular" democracy.

Table 16 summarizes the results of the series of statements about political equality. The statements express scepticism about the civic qualifications of the electorate and imply elitism or authoritarian as the way out. Our results indicate that the Laotian elites are less inclined to support the value of political equality than either the U.S. influentials or the Malaysian sample. On the average, somewhat more than one-fifth of our respondents chose equalitarian responses. It is interesting that the highest rate of agreement was with Statement 131, which was the most specific of the items, in political terms. Agreeing with the statement may have seemed to imply that the process of voting was unwise, and over one-third of the respondents disagreed. Nevertheless, in toto, about three forths of the elite appear to have little faith in the wisdom of the Laotian people to make the choices entrusted

TABLE 16

LAOTIAN ELITES' ATTITUDES TOWARD "POLITICAL EQUALITY," COMPARED WITH AMERICAN AND MALAYSIAN ATTITUDES

Statements	Percent Supporting Political Equality[1]		
	U.S. Influentials[2] (N = 3,020)	Malaysian Elite[3] (N = 17)	Laotian Elite (N = 62)
129. The main trouble with democracy is that most people don't really know what's best for them.	59.2	22	14
130. It will always be necessary to have a few strong, capable people actually running everything.	51.5	39	24
131. Political "issues" and arguments are beyond the understanding of most of the voters.	62.5	26	36
132. Few people really know what is in their own best interest in the long run.	57.4	32	13
Mean	61.1	29.8	21.8

[1]Responses were dichotomized; the small number of "No Opinion" responses for each item (see Appendix A for details) was ignored. Disagreement with all statements were taken to indicate acceptance of political equality.

[2]From Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1964), 369.

[3]From James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 193.

to it by popular government (thus, the country's new official name, "People's Democratic Republic of Laos," have a confused meaning to much of the elite). The pessimism recorded above probably has a basis of reality, since it indicates that our respondents have no illusions about the handicaps which a largely illiterate and low income and low educated electorate impose on a democracy. Nonetheless, this does not alter the fact that the Laotian elites are more willing to entrust the political system to "a few strong, capable people" than either American or Malaysian groups.

Some of the scepticism about equality found here may bring us back to the evaluations of human nature discussed above. Items 129 and 132 imply that democracy is crippled by people's penchant to pursue their own short-run interests at the expense of the community, and this is exactly the dominant view of human nature among the 62 members of the elite. This orientation may predispose them to hold a low opinion of the possibilities for a "civic culture" in their nation.

Economic equality. While democratic norms show little penetrative power, the socialist norm of economic equality among the Laotian elites is extremely high, according to the data in Table 17. On all four items dealing with the possibility of eliminating poverty and with the responsibility of the state for standard of living, jobs, and housing, the Laotian elite score remarkably higher than either the American or the Malaysian groups. Their degree of support is almost two-thirds higher than the Malaysian elite. One can speculate that "people's democratic" may have real meaning with reference to economic equality, but not, as

TABLE 17

LAOTIAN ELITES' ATTITUDES TOWARD "ECONOMIC EQUALITY," COMPARED WITH AMERICAN AND MALAYSIAN ATTITUDES

	Statements	Percent Supporting Economic Equality[1]		
		U.S. Influentials[2] (N = 3,020)	Malaysian Elite[3] (N = 17)	Laotian Elite (N = 62)
133.	The government ought to make sure that everyone has a good standard of living.	34.4	92	97
134.	I think the government should give a person work if he cannot find another job.	23.5	66	98
135.	There will always be poverty, so people might as well get used to the fact.	59.6	31	89
136.	Every person should have a good house, even if the government has to build for him.	14.9	58	80
	Mean	33.1	61.8	91.0

[1]Responses were dichotomized; the small number of "No Opinion" responses for each item (see Appendix A for details) was ignored. Disagreement with all statements were taken to indicate acceptance of economic equality.

[2]From Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1964), 369.

[3]From James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 195.

we have seen, with reference to abstract concepts of citizens' potential for democratic decision making.

Cynicism Toward Politics and Political Futility

We are interested in the degree of feelings of cynicism toward politics and political futility--the fruits of a social negativism that narrow the scope of efficacious political conduct. A number of writers have explored these matters in Western countries, but relatively less attention has been paid to them in Eastern countries. Political cynicism and futility are, of course, negative qualities, rather than positive ones like the other traits we have mentioned so far. The purpose of this analysis is to explore the extent of the traits rather than their causes and consequences.

Some observers have suggested that after a number of years in office, the elites become increasingly cynical sbout politics and their colleagues. Others suspect that some of the elites are "dependents," or "careerists," who are disdainful of politics and apathetic. Still others think that some elites distrust their colleagues because they feel intellectually superior to them; thus these people may feel that only bad luck has kept them from reaching the very highest positions. Others may believe politics and government are generally corrupt and evil. Such beliefs would be indicative of a general attitude toward "human nature;" Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (fifth edition) defines cynical people as those who are "contemptuously distrustful of human nature."

Political cynicism. Robert Agger, Marshall Goldstein, and Stanley Pearl, in their study of political cynicism among the American masses, found that the acquisition of formal education tends to produce political

trust (non-cynicism), regardless of social class background; political cynicism levels tend to remain tentatively constant for people with different levels of education regardless of how much money they make; and, aging tends to produce more political cynicism.[19]

In our study, the Laotian elites--a homogeneous, high income, and educated group--were found to have higher degree of political cynicism (by 23.9 percent) than the U.S. influentials, but a lesser degree (by 8.4 percent) than the Malaysian elite. Furthermore, their absolute score was -.08 (the scale ranges from -1 to +1; see Appendix A). This finding seems to mean that the elites see themselves or their group as relatively average or normal; or they feel that their group is comprised of good and evil persons like the general population. They have confidence that "the government will do what is right," but they do not believe that the politicians "really mean what they say." They have achieved consensus in one our of five statements, according to McClosky's definition (see Table 18).

Feelings of futility. Feelings of futility or purposelessness are quintessential elements in the classic notion of alienation or anomie as formulated by Durkheim.[20] But the notion of futility extends beyond a sense of purposelessness; it also involves a sense of powerlessness.

One of the items in Table 19 taps the elite's belief that political parties are too complex, which persons with low self-regard are much

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[19]Robert Agger, Marshall Goldstein, and Stanley Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," Journal of Politics, 23 (1961), 477-506.

[20]Dwight G. Dean, "Alienation: Its Meaning and Measurement," American Sociological Review, 26 (1961), 753-757. See also Elizabeth Douvan and Alan Walker, "The Sense of Effectiveness in Public Affairs," Psychological Monographs, General and Applied, 70 (1956), 1-19.

TABLE 18

LAOTIAN ELITES' ATTITUDES TOWARD "POLITICAL CYNICISM," COMPARED WITH AMERICAN AND MALAYSIAN ATTITUDES

Statements	Percent Expressing Cynical Attitudes[1]		
	U.S. Influentials[2] (N = 3,020)	Malaysian Elite[3] (N = 17)	Laotian Elite (N = 62)
137. There is practically no connection between what a politician says and what he will do once he get elected.	21.4	56	89
138. I usually have confidence that the government will do what is right.	18.4	23	22
139. To me, most politicians don't seem to really mean what they say.	24.7	69	14
140. No matter what people think, a few people will always run things anyway.	30.0	83	72
141. Most politicians can be trusted to do what they think is best for the country.	22.9	49	39
Mean	23.5	56.0	47.2

[1]Responses were dichotomized; the small number of "No Opinion" responses for each item (see Appendix A for details) was ignored. Agreement with statements 137 and 140, and disagreement with the other statements were taken to indicate political cynicism.

[2]From Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1964), 370.

[3]From James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 210.

more likely to confess. According to this criterion, the Laotian elites are slightly lower in their degree of political futility than the U.S. influentials (2.3 percent) and much lower than the U.S. electorate (33.9 percent). The Laotian elites are even lower in degree of futility in the sense of powerlessness. They perceive of themselves as important in Laos, seeing themselves as "a giant cogs in a hugh machine" (see Item 142). They have very nearly achieved consensus in this sense (74.2 percent), but the score of the American "influentials" on this item was even higher.

Edgar Litt points out that feelings of political cynicism and futility are nurtured and sustained by a cluster of personality and social factors. He mentions that "the origins of political cynicism may be traced to community as well as to personality roots."[21] In other words, he sees these feelings in terms of human nature or, in Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck's framework, the man-other man value orientation, as mentioned in Chapter IV.

Individuals who think poorly of themselves tend to think poorly of others. They lack confidence in the honesty and amiability of others, and their suspicion, coupled with hostility, invites a deep cynicism about government. For example, Morris Rosenberg has shown that persons with low self-esteem (of human basic needs) are less likely to have faith in their fellow men than those with high self-esteem.[22] A lack of self-

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[21] Edgar Litt, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility," Journal of Politics, 2 (May, 1963), 319.

[22] Morris Rosenberg, Society and Adolescent Self-Image (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 181-182; "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," American Sociological Review, 21 (1956), 690-695; and, "Misanthropy and Attitudes Toward International Affairs," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1 (1957), 340-345.

TABLE 19

LAOTIAN ELITES' ATTITUDES TOWARD "POLITICAL FUTILITY," COMPARED WITH AMERICAN INFLUENTIAL AND MASS OPINION

Statements	Percent Expressing Cynical Attitudes[1]		
	U.S. Influentials (N = 3,020)	U.S. Electorates (N = 1,484)	Laotian Elite (N = 62)
142. Nothing I ever do seems to have any real effect on what happens in politics.	8.4	61.5	25.8
143. Political parties are so big that the average member has not got much to say about what goes on.	37.8	67.5	35.5
Mean	23.1	64.5	30.7

[1]Responses were dichotomized; the small number of "No Opinion" responses for each item (see Appendix A for details) was ignored. Agreement with all statements were taken to indicate political futility. American data are taken from Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1964), 371.

approval ought to incline an individual to the view that most people lack the understanding and temperament to participate responsibly in the political process, that the important issues of the day are beyond the grasp of most citizens, and that their choices of candidates for public affairs are unlikely to be either informed or sensible. The person who thinks little of himself probably will think little of those in public life. This cynicism is likely to extend from the people in politics to the political institutions themselves. The man with little faith in his fellow citizens and the candidates they elect to office are not likely to have much faith in elections as a way to determine public policy. Thus, they tend to feel unable to influence the political process, and may attribute the same inefficacy to others. A natural consequence of such a feeling of futility in the belief that the political process is unresponsive: politicians don't care what the citizens want and most citizens are in no position to make their voice heard, let alone secure the benefits they desire. We have found that there is no such negativism or indication of inefficacy among the Laotian elites.

Summary

In exploring the Laotian elite's political beliefs through searching for the presence or absence of liberal democratic values, we have found a low degree of endorsement of the general norms of liberal democratic thought (except in the response to abstract statements about free speech and opinions; on this matter consensus has been achieved). Nonetheless, the elites expressed their support of the socialist value of economic equality; 91 percent agreement was reached on this value (this score was about three times higher than that of the American

influentials, and two-thirds higher than the Malaysian elite's score). Our Laotian respondents' attitudes about the rules of the game are about at the center, implying that they are moderates. Our findings which deal with political cynicism and futility indicate that feelings of inefficacy are not widespread.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION AND CONJECTURES

Our concern throughout this paper has been to explore the Laotian elites' political culture-and-personality. In the preceding chapters, details of measurement have been the center of attention. Now we would like to consider, on the one hand, some of the broader implications of the specific findings, for we believe these findings suggest certain marginal notes about larger questions in the study of personality and culture as these relate to politics. On the other hand, we also need a "good map"[1] to aid us in keeping "the whole Elephant" in view. With the elites' personality traits at hand, the time has come for an integrated analysis of their beliefs in terms that are both broader (to include traits or a single personality syndrome) and deeper (to include a study of predispositions to various types of political behavior), so that the elites' traits can be seen as integrated manifestations of deep-seated psycho-cultural states. The "conclusions" in the following sections are appropriately modest and are merely conjectures, which are too tenuous to be called firm conclusions.

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[1]The term is suggested by M. Brewster Smith, "A Map for Analysis of Personality and Politics," Journal of Social Issues, 24 (July, 1968), 15-28; and, M. Brewster Smith, ed., Social Psychology of Human Values (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1969), pp. 14-32.

The Idea of Political Culture-and-Personality

As we noted in Chapter I, the concept of political culture-and-personality begins with or, at least must include, a knowledge of people's basic needs and motives and involves values to which people are oriented by the cultural elements of their society. These needs and motives are the cause of striving for achievement, and values determine areas of gratification if the striving is successful or of frustration if it is not. The values also affect people's patterns of recognition, acceptance, approval, esteem, and occupational choices. And since culture dictates norms and standards of behavior, it also serves to make one's behavior more intelligible and predictable for others.

In another respect, political culture-and-personality consists of both political consciousness and political unconsciousness.[2] To be politically conscious is to be aware of political consequences and to know what one is doing and what will happen because of it. Total consciousness in any area is perhaps impossible, but one can at least achieve a sophisticated awareness of the issues of time, place, self and others, value choices, cause and effect, and abundance and scarcity in the environment. The unconsciousness part lies in the arena of personality. It is largely in the unconscious (or subconscious) that one is aware of one's own identity and of one's social milieu and group reference, partly because they are conceptually and psychologically interrelated, as is evidenced in the concept of "social identity," or

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[2]These terms are given comprehensive treatment by Robert E. Lane, Political Thinking and Consciousness: The Private Life of the Political Mind (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969).

culture. In addition, a consciousness of identity answers the question "who am I?" And as an outgrowth of this, a person's political identity is that feature of his self-image which becomes relevant when he thinks about political matters.

Political culture-and-personality involves one's knowledge of the nature and the meaning of concepts employed in analyzing the nature of meaning of political ideas. It refers to the "self-in-politics," both in action and in thought, as well as containing inferences for one's approach to problem-solving in politics.

In this vein, Gordon Allport has said, "as soon as an individual's philosophy of life is known, his personal activities, which taken by themselves are meaningless, become understood."[3] But to ask the elites about their philosophical and operational belief system is like asking them to tell us of their autonomic nervous systems. Many of these beliefs and values orientations just are; they are given. One's political culture-and-personality, then, comes into being through an eclectic absorption of defined ideas and beliefs, and serves as one's model for political behavior.

The Political Culture-and-Personality of Laos

The political culture-and-personality of Laos is complex. It has been shaped by Laotian history, geography, economic resources and development, the colonial experience, and postindependence problems. To understand Lao culture-and-personality, one must comprehend such environments and experiences.

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[3]Gordon Allport, Becoming (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), cited by Lane, ibid.

In Laos, the political legacy of the colonial era was limited, and the training experience for the elite in governing the country became one-dimensional. The elite would act the same whether working through an autocratic or a democratic political institution. Self-doubt manifested itself in various ways after independence. Laos has a long history and related identity that preceded the period of French rule. It is not just institutionally, however, that the precolonial past has seemed to exercise a lasting influence over the "elite's mind" and the society. Both the regal and mystical elements of traditional Lao culture shape the basic laws and authority of the elite.

Like other countries in Southeast Asia, Laos is rooted and still is very much in the mold of "plural society"-- that is, one with more than two societies and cultures, existing within the structure of the state. This problem poses the question then, "is Laos really a nation?"

The postcolonial "new state" of Laos, as other colonial countries, was explicitly expected to adopt democratic political institutions and to follow democratic "political rules" so that the Lao people selected their leaders and otherwise governed themselves. Moreover, the Laotian elites wanted their country to be ruled democratically. Their own "identity" and "self-confidence" crises required them to prove that they were not inferiors by managing the country as democratically as the peoples of the West manage their own. But, democratic political institutions proved to be too foreign to the tradition, experience, and, possibly, the needs of Laos. Experimentation with democratic institutions left a strong imprint on the political environment of Laos in the 1960-70's. Beginning with the second half of the 1970's, a new political institution arose stressing "economic equality"; the so-called

"people's democracy" (following the Chinese model) has been applied to Laos. It is reasonable, at least, as Philippines Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo has said, that developing countries have discarded "Western-style democracy" for "a military or an authoritarian regime" for the purpose of survival.[4]

There were, and still are, several aspects of the economic environment of major importance to the nature and functioning of the national political system of Laos. The preponderance of population consists of peasants and mountain minority groups of very modest means. The economy within which they function, moreover, is mainly agricultural and extractive. Politically, these circumstances have meant two things in particular: (1) that there is an enormous gap between the wealthy ruling class and most of the people, and (2) that most of the ruling elite have had as one of their leading policy goals the modernization of their country's economy. The elite has sought modernization both for its own sake and to lessen the continuing "neocolonial" dependence of their economy on the more developed nations.

Throughout modern history, Laos has been a subordinate area in international politics; the object, indeed, the victim, of the foreign policies of more formidable powers. This international setting has influenced and also shaped the elites' political culture-and-personality into a unique configuration.

The political situation threatened the Laotian elite in the 1960s. Growing consciousness of the Lao society and culture posed many difficulties to the elite regarding how to rule Laos in order to be

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[4]Carlos Romulo, Speaking at the Manila Rotary Club, Manila, 13 December 1975.

congruent with Lao culture-and-personality and the values of modernization. Furthermore, at least, a small group of the elite has selected the socialist way to be the total answer or to be the best path to modernization.[5] It is difficult to predict the future of socialism in Laos, but it seems that a political system must be designed to meet the needs and nature of man.

Governments in Southeast Asia have generally been ones of men, not of institutions, as evidenced under Sukarno in Indonesia, U Nu in Burma, and more recently under the Marcos regime in the Philippines. Even where "legislatures" or "elections" exist, they are largely forms, not effective elements in these highly personalized political systems. In Laos too, it is probable that the fate of the nation is dependent upon the quality of the men who rule the country rather than the institutions.

Conclusions About the Laotian Elites' Characteristics

The political nature of the elite is, as pointed out by Gordon Allport,[6] merely one aspect of the whole personality, and the personality as a whole is not the sum total of specific reactions but rather a congruent system of attitudes, each element of which is intelligible only in the light of the total pattern. "A man's political values reflect the characteristic modes of his adjustment to political life."[7]

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[5]On this point, see Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967).

[6]Gordon W. Allport, "The Composition of Political Attitudes," The American Journal of Sociology, 35 (1930), 220-228.

[7]Ibid., p. 228.

Having explored in parts the three interlocked components of the elites' attitudes--affective, cognitive, and behavioral--we found their psycho-cultural characteristics are not very far from the "middle-way" of Laotian life. Figure 5 represents the summary of their characteristics. The absolute scores for elite characteristics are in general at about the center, or midpoint, of the scale. Some of the more skewed characteristics will now be summarized.

Support of Free Speech and Opinions

Strangely enough, the findings reveal that the Laotian political-bureaucratic elite is a group of people who highly believe in and support the free speech and opinion doctrines. Such doctrines are perhaps the best known of the elements of liberal democratic ideology. In the same vein, James Scott has also found that such doctrines appear to have significantly penetrated the belief system of Malaysian administrators.[8] While the elite eulogizes freedom of speech and opinions, they do not believe in specific application of free speech and procedural rights. This is a persuasive indication that the democratic beliefs of the Laotian elite, like those of most of the political elites in other developing countries,[9] are formalistic and tend to crumble under pressure.

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[8]James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 187-197.

[9]The Indian government appears to conform to the same pattern, see Myron Weidner, Political Scarcity: Public Pressure and Political Response in India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

Figure 5. Profiles of Laotian Elite's Personality Traits



Stress on Economic Equality

The second striking characteristic of the Laotian elite is that they have accepted the socialist norms of economic equality. They believe that it is the responsibility of the state to provide a decent job, a decent house, and an adequate income to the Laotian people. This finding suggests that the chronic economic distress of Laos at the present time may be highly upsetting to the elites.

Medium High Levels of Risk-Taking in Decisions, Dogmatism, and Authoritarianism

The elite appears to be approximately in the middle-range for risk-taking in decisions, dogmatism, and authoritarianism. According to the interpretations of previous studies, our findings that the Laotian elite scores at the middle-range on the dogmatism scale, may indicate that they will be able to make only moderately effective political leaders because their central or primitive beliefs allow them little flexibility in assimilating new information or in opening up their perception of reality. They only function at a moderate level of effectiveness in changing or challenging situations that are ambiguous.[10] While it is undoubtedly correct that dogmatic, authoritarian groups can serve useful political ends at times when political conditions are inherently in a state of flux, it is hypothesized here

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[10] Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960), p. 211. Rokeach has found that in new and different situations, persons with closed minds, because of their anxieties, simply cannot function effectively. Further, this inability to function is due to their perception of the world as threatening, rather than their intellectual ability. For a replication of Rokeach's work (in a study which analyzed all the range of scores, not just the extremes), see Samuel Fillenbaum and Arnold Jackson, "Dogmatism and Anxiety in Relation to Problem Solving: An extension of Rodeach's Results," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63 (1960), 212-214.

that, sooner or later, a dogmatic individual will be self-defeating as a political leader. That is to say, his actions will be dysfunctional in terms of his political goals.

Concerning the political relevance of the types of cognitive functioning, Rokeach suggests many observations: 1) Dogmatic individuals are susceptible to appeal from authorities that to them are positive--appeals that they may act on without analysis;[11] 2) Problem solving proceeds more smoothly in closed-minded persons when new beliefs are presented all at once rather than when presented gradually;[12] by presenting completed sets of ideas (an ideology) as a whole, resistance is lowered as the ideas can now be accepted without being analyzed (providing the authority from which they came is positive).[13] 3) They will by virtue of having relatively great isolation within their belief systems, find it difficult to see logical contradictions between beliefs.[14] Equally important: "in the language of politics, isolation within a belief system may be thought of as the structural basis for party-line thinking, and, also, of the inability to defect from an inherently contradictory system."[15] Thus, persons with closed belief systems, because of the isolation between their beliefs, may

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[11]Rokeach, op. cit., p. 225.

[12]Ibid.

[13]For some more details see F. Restle, M. Andrews, and M. Rokeach, "Differences Between Open- and Closed-Mind Subjects on Learning-Set and Oddity Problems," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 68 (1964), 648-654.

[14]Rokeach, op. cit., p. 245.

[15]Ibid., p. 288.

sustain contradictory ideas, become "trapped within impossible systems without knowing it" and struggle for unobtainable solutions. 4) The elites not only tend to be extreme in ideology (and perhaps skewed toward the conservative end), they have also been shown to tend to conform "without question" to the opinions of authorities that, for them, are possible. Just as the authoritarian person grants positive authority to individuals who have the outward appearance of positive authority and to individuals who have the outward symbols of status and power, there are some suggestions that dogmatic persons evidence a similar phenomenon.[16]

Several case studies of dogmatism (for example of Presidents Hoover, Wilson, and politician Schumacher) remind us that the dogmatic leader tends to be an ineffective and dysfunctional leader in relation to the person's avowed political goals. However, Jeanne Knutson remarks:

> The prime importance of a positive authority--an authority which speaks to personality needs, and not to the logic of the situation, in determining how a dogmatic person will assess the new information that the world in which he lives and breathes and has his being constantly presents him--and on which he must find a basis for opinions and action.[17]

Concerning authoritarianism, political elites generally are likely to hold some degree of authoritarianism in their personality structure. Politics, according to Lasswell, can be conceptualized as a study of power relationships, the political personality can be considered

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[16]R. N. Vidulich and I. P. Kaimon, "The Effect of Information Source Status and Dogmatism upon Conformity Behavior," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63 (1961), 639-642.

[17]Jeanne N. Knutson, The Human Basis of the Polity (New York: Aldine Publishing, 1973), p. 105.

as a particular type in which the need for power is the dominant value.[18] He later comments:

> The authoritarian type is the one most closely approximating the "perfect" politician in the sense of one whose primary goal value is power, whose preferred base value is also power (threat or use of extreme deprivations in any sphere), and whose basic expectations are that the most important human relations are matters of power.[19]

The Laotian elite, with an absolute score on authoritariansim of +.31, fairly well fits Lasswell's definition of the "perfect politicians." However, this is an assumption rather than documented empirical fact. D. Spitz quotes Lasswell's suggestion that "all top leaders in democratic or totalitarian regimes . . . tend to be recruited from fundamental personality patterns that are not primarily oriented to power."[20] Such an assumption could be another study in the case of Laos.

More specifically, the Laotian elite is fairly rigidly directed toward a mastery of the environment. Because of their stereotyped conception, they hardly do justice to all the possible aspects of reality.[21] In this sense, they may be a slight danger to free society.

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[18]Harold D. Lasswell, "Personality, Prejudice, and Politics," World Politics, 3 (April, 1951), 340.

[19]Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York: Viking Press, 1948), p. 17.

[20]D. Spitz, "Power and Personality: The Appeal to the 'Right Man' in Democratic States," American Political Science Review, 52 (March, 1958), 90.

[21]Elve Frenkel-Brunswik, "Environmental Controls and the Impoverishment of Thought," in Totalitarianism, ed. by Carl J. Friedrich (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 187.

Spitz has stated that "an authoritarian individual can act democratically in times of a permissive, open, anxiety-free situation."[22] It is also realized that, in times of stress, because of the authoritarian personality's anxieties, the elite will be led to project their hostilities in situations involving choice of political activities in ways which are slightly harmful to the maintenance of an open society and equalitarian interpersonal relationships.

In addition to these characteristics, the authoritarian personality type of the elite suggests that "sympathy for the weak cannot develop where there is ingrained fear of weakness and where the weak furnishes the only practical target of aggression."[23] In other words, they hold their basic authoritarian bias.

The Rejection of Liberal Democratic Doctrines

On the negative end of continuum, the elites show their low belief in the political equality component of liberal democratic ideology. Their attitudes toward specific applications of free speech and opinions, for example, is low at -.54.

Equality has been one of the keystones of democracy since antiquity. Today's proponents of "participatory democracy" draw from a long tradition of speculation about how to make man effectively the political equal of his fellows. Throughout the long history of the concept of equality, the controversy over its definition has spilled beyond the bounds of political institutions to involve broader social and economic issues.

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[22]Spitz, op. cit.

[23]Frenkel-Brunswik, op. cit., p. 195.

Classical democracy implies the most egalitarian distribution of influence, whereas authoritarian democracy seems to imply a narrowly restricted pattern, in which citizens are subject to manifold duties and controls. Polyarchal democrats attribute a moderately passive role to ordinary citizens, while liberal democrats appear to support a distribution of influence less egalitarian than that endorsed by classical democrats, but more egalitarian than that supported by the polyarchal democrats.

The evidence from the questionnaire, as summarized in Figure 5, confirms that the Laotian elite falls in the category of moderate authoritarian democracy. While they approved freedom of speech and opinions in general terms, they seem to despise specific applications of it and interpreted it narrowly. However, they emphasize economic equality as a substitute for democratic values.

A factor analytic examination of the relationship of the elite's values concerning political equality to other values also supports these conclusions. The examination indicates that the elite's belief in political equality is significantly related to economic equality, specific applications of free speech, dogmatism, entrepreneurial attitudes, and faith-in-people. (See Interrelation Matrix of Elite's Traits in Appendix A.) They believe that political matters cannot be influenced by ordinary people as indicated in the correlation of the political equality variable with the cynicism toward politics variable. ($r = .38$, $p < .05$). They look at the country as having limited goods to distribute to the people and then place heavy stress on their belief in economic equality.

Indeed, political equality is a value that can be variously interpreted and applied. An elites' orientation to this value must be studied within the context of its orientation toward many other values, and most especially within the context of the total economic environment of the nation being studied. For example, the Laotian elite is quite apt to argue for a "political equality" that will help all the people to share equally in the benefits governmental activity, while the well-intentioned elite of England is more apt to be concerned with equality of inputs, e.g., voting rights. The difference is in the economic environment, because the Laotian elite knows that the current primary concern of the average citizen of Laos must be with the finding of food (rice) for his cooking pot.

A Closing Note

Unlike other animals that appear to act and react according to instinct or training, man is required to reason in order to formulate behavioral patterns consistent with his belief-value systems. Human behavior is never haphazard since it is always in harmony with unconscious or even conscious value systems exposed in man's culture-and-personality. It is the author's earnest hope, before terminating, that this kind of study of the identity of the "men-at-the-top" in one small part of the world may contribute, in some measure, to cause more understanding among mankind and to good international relationships.

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Dissertation

As mentioned at the outset of the study, this paper is necessarily exploratory and descriptive because it was formulated at a high level of generality, it deals with the highest possible unit of analysis,

it concerns sensitive areas of field research, and it encompasses findings and orientations from a number of academic disciplines.

In our study of political culture-and-personality we have been concerned with two distinct areas that have as yet only tenuous links between them. On the one hand we have a generalization about Laotian national culture, which blends eventually into history, economics, and cultural anthropology. On the other hand, we study the psychological characteristics of the elite. The mixing of the two areas needs more work by social scientists.

J. Milton Singer has pointed out that neither psychological nor socio-cultural theories by themselves focus chiefly on behavior. The primary concern of personality theorists is "the inner tendency system of the individual and how it is produced" while sociologists place major emphasis on "socio-cultural systems and how they are produced."[24] The variables or psycho-cultural traits isolated by either group are of predictive and heuristic value in the study of behavior only in stable situations; they may be much less useful in ambiguous or highly fluid situations.

Similarly, Psychologist Raymond Cattell, a distinguished psychological trait specialist, commented recently that:

> It has irritated many a student of social sciences that social psychological and sociological theories often mix no better than oil and water. The sociologist and the cultural anthropologist virtually ignore personality and seek explanations in laws of the larger organism: the group and its culture. When they come to the molecule level--that of individual behavior--they tend to argue

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[24] J. Milton Yinger, "Research Implications of a Field View of Personality," American Journal of Sociology, 68 (March, 1963), 580; see also J. Milton Yinger, Toward a Field Theory of Behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1965).

> that differences of role and custom account for the observed pattern of behavior, whereas the psychologist sees the differences between groups in their performances and certainly the many events of history as fully applicable only by individual personalities . . . . The sociologist points to behavior in driving along the street in terms of traffic lights and car signals that virtually obey; the psychologist accounts for accidents and important differences in speed and control in terms of personality.[25]

Yet, there is really no contradiction; instead, the approaches complement each other. A formal model in the multivariate tradition needs to be developed to bring them together.[26] This is true because the individual or the elite modes of action are largely expressions of the personality and dynamic structural factors, which are by nature multivariate.

It is evident that the choice of personality variables for inclusion in recent studies is ordinarily not made on the basis of a systematic framework of personality theory. Each investigator selects a few variables in which he is particularly interested or for which quantitative measures are available. The need remains for a more inclusive, standardized, and theoretically comprehensive analytic scheme in terms of which culture-and-personality can be described and compared cross-culturally.[27]

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[25]Raymond B. Cattell, Personality and Mood by Questionnaire (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973), p. 465.

[26]See R. J. Rummel, Applied Factor Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

[27]For a discussion of the same ideas, see, Alex Inkeles and R. A. Levinson, "National Character: The Study of Model Personality and Socio-Cultural Systems," in The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. IV, 2nd ed., ed. by Gardner Linzey and Elliot Aronson (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1969), pp. 442-460.

The theory and data concerned here are more or less selective, and some hypotheses are based more on impressionistic observations than on empirical evidence. In certain respects, this somewhat grandiose model may be compared with a spaceship that can be used to explore other planets but would run the risk of disintegrating upon descending to the earth. For this reason, the reader is advised to be equipped with a parachute like a spaceship pilot, and to consider what has been said in this paper as highly speculative and at best hypothetical.

Suggestions for Further Research

Given the suggested qualities and defects of this paper, further research may refine the model by making it more dynamic through systematic gathering of data. For example, systematic selection of attitudinal or psycho-cultural scales by factor analytical methods and multidimensional correlations may be needed. Further, a more thorough study of the characteristics of both eastern and western elites, (especially in developing areas) may shed more light on elite theory, on the basis of comparisons in comparative politics, and on the impact of foreign policy-making and international relationships as a whole.

To bring the paper to an end, Lasswell's words are particularly appropriate and encouraging:

> Elite studies are the heart of research into the world revolution of our time. Since an essential criterion of revolution is change in elite structure. The hypothesis that a world revolution is underway during our epoch can only be verified when basic information enables us to estimate the depth and extent of elite changes throughout the globe.[28]

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[28]Harold D. Lasswell, Danial Lerner and C. E. Rothwell, The Comparative Study of Elites: An Introduction and Bibliography (Stanford: Standord University Press, 1952), p. 13.

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APPENDIX A

TRAIT SCORES

SOURCES OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Authoritarianism

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TRAIT I. AUTHORITARIANISM

Item No.	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
1.	The monk and the teacher are probably more important to Lao society than the business-person and the manufacturer.	59.7	25.8	11.3	1.6	1.6	1.5161	0.7775	+.65
2.	The findings of science may someday show that many of our most deeply-held beliefs are wrong.	56.5	32.3	4.8	6.5	0.0	1.6929	0.8492	+.64
3.	Human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict.	62.9	9.7	21.0	6.5	0.0	1.7097	1.0062	+.51
4.	People ought to pay more attention to new ideas, even if they seem to go against the Lao way of life.	32.3	38.7	8.1	16.1	4.8	1.9839	1.1143	+.32
5.	What young people need most of all is strict discipline by their parents.	61.3	19.4	8.1	11.3	0.0	1.6935	1.0253	+.56
6.	Most people who do not get ahead just do not have enough will power.	58.1	19.4	22.6	0.0	0.0	1.6452	0.8250	+.57
7.	Sex criminals deserve more than prison; they should be whipped in public or worse.	48.4	17.7	24.2	9.7	0.0	1.9516	1.0538	+.36
8.	Bosses should say just what is to be done exactly how to do it if they expect us to do a good job.	82.3	1.6	9.7	6.5	0.0	1.4032	0.9062	+.72
9.	An insult to one's honor should always be punished.	72.6	19.4	8.1	0.0	0.0	1.3548	0.6247	+.78
10.	Everything can really be predicted by astrology.	11.3	69.4	6.5	12.9	0.0	2.2097	0.8060	+.30
11.	It is not good to think too much.	45.2	11.3	27.4	16.1	0.0	2.1452	1.1619	+.21
12.	Nowadays the courts give more punishment to lawbreakers than they ought to give.	14.5	50.0	19.4	16.1	0.0	2.3710	0.9199	+.14
13.	People can be divided into two classes: the strong and the weak.	51.6	29.0	17.7	1.6	0.0	1.6935	0.8150	+.56
14.	There are so many evil people nowadays that it is dangerous to go out alone.	72.6	8.1	17.7	1.6	0.0	1.4839	0.8375	+.66
	Average	52.2	25.1	14.8	7.6	0.5	1.7753	0.9088	+.50

TRAIT II. FAITH-IN-PEOPLE

Item No.	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
15.	Most people can be trusted.	14.5	25.8	46.8	12.9	0.0	2.5806	0.8899	-.09
16.	Most people are inclined to help others.	45.2	32.3	9.7	11.3	1.6	1.8387	1.0191	+.45
*17.	If you do not watch yourself, people will take advantage of you.	66.1	30.6	0.0	0.0	3.2	1.2742	0.5134	-.81
*18.	No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get ill-fated and poverty-stricken.	59.7	19.4	11.3	9.7	0.0	1.7097	1.0062	-.54
19.	Human nature is fundamentally cooperative.	71.0	11.3	11.3	6.5	0.0	1.5323	0.9284	+.65
	Average								-.07

NOTE: Asterisk (*) is negative direction item.

TRAIT III. SOCIAL ANXIETY

Item No.	Statements	A lot	A Good Deal	A Little	Not At All	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
20.	How nervous are you when you have to talk in front of a group of several people?	11.3	32.3	33.9	19.4	3.2	2.5484	1.0267	-.09
21.	When you are doing a job, how much does the fear that you might not be doing too well keep you from doing your best?	14.5	27.4	38.7	14.5	4.8	2.2742	1.0344	-.06
22.	How much do you worry when your superior tells you to come to see him without telling you why he wants to see you?	19.4	29.0	25.8	22.6	3.2	2.4516	1.1313	-.02
23.	How much do you worry about how well you get along with people?	9.7	30.6	33.9	21.0	4.8	2.5645	1.0719	-.13
24.	When you have been in a situation in which you have done poorly or made some mistake, how do you keep on worrying about it?	25.8	46.8	24.2	1.6	1.6	1.9839	0.7930	+.36
	Average	16.1	33.2	31.3	15.8	3.5	2.3645	1.0115	+.01

TRAIT IV. NEUROTIC ANXIETY

Item No.	Statements	A Lot	A Good Deal	A Little	Not At All	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
25.	How afraid are you when you hear thunder or see lightening?	11.3	38.7	41.9	8.1	0.0	2.4677	0.7975	+.02
26.	When you go to a dentist, how much do you find yourself worrying about the pain you will feel?	14.5	22.6	48.4	14.5	0.0	2.6290	0.9022	-.13
27.	How often do you have trouble going to sleep because you are worrying about something that has happened to you or some thought you have had?	19.4	27.4	46.8	4.8	1.6	2.3387	0.8970	+.05
28.	How often do you feel restless on holidays, when you have nothing in particular to do?	19.4	25.8	48.4	6.5	0.0	2.4194	0.8716	+.02
29.	When you are in a high place, how frightened are you when you look down?	4.8	24.2	64.5	6.5	0.0	2.7258	0.6518	-.22
30.	How often do you feel uneasy or uncomfortable without knowing why you are feeling that way?	9.7	12.9	67.7	9.7	0.0	2.7742	0.7496	-.27
31.	In comparison to other people you know, how much do you worry about your physical health?	19.4	29.0	30.6	19.4	1.6	2.4677	1.0583	.00
32.	When you go to the doctor (or when he comes to you) because you do not feel well, how worried are you about what the doctor will say is wrong with you?	22,6	61.3	12.9	1.6	1.6	3.0000	0.7620	+.45
33.	How often in the past year have you had nightmares or dreams from which you have awakened feeling nervous or frightened?	19.4	54.8	21.0	3.2	1.6	2.8548	0.8200	+.33
34.	How much do you worry about your mental health, in comparison to other people you know?	14.5	35.5	35.5	11.3	3.2	2.3710	0.9711	+.03
35.	How often do you find it hard to pay attention to your work because disturbing or frightening thoughts come into your mind?	46.8	6.5	45.2	0.0	1.6	1.9516	0.9907	+.28
36.	In comparison with other people of your age, how nervous do you feel about fighting with someone?	41.9	25.8	17.7	12.9	1.6	1.9839	1.0850	+.33
37.	How often do you find yourself worrying about a particular person, situation or happening, even though you know that there is little reason for worrying?	9.7	29.0	38.7	22.6	0.0	2.7419	0.9147	-.18
38.	How afraid of drowning are you when you are near a body of water, in swimming, or in a boat?	16.1	25.8	43.5	14.5	0.0	2.5645	0.9267	-.07
	Average	19.2	30.0	40.2	9.7	1.0	2.5206	0.8268	+.04

TRAIT V. DOMINANCE

Item No.	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
*39.	I try to see what others think before I take a stand.	54.8	25.8	14.5	4.8	0.0	1.6935	0.8906	-.37
40.	In a group, I take responsibility for getting people introduced.	59.7	22.6	12.9	4.8	0.0	1.6290	0.8842	+.00
*41.	I have to stop and think before I act, even in trifling matters.	72.6	27.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2742	0.4461	-.86
*42.	I am embarrassed with people I do not know well.	24.2	51.6	19.4	4.8	0.0	2.8710	0.8129	-.36
*43.	I would rather not have very much responsibility for other people.	50.0	37.1	8.1	4.8	0.0	1.6774	0.8186	-.60
*44.	When in a group of people I have trouble thinking of right things to talk about.	19.4	35.5	45.2	0.0	0.0	2.2581	0.7606	-.15
45.	I have a natural talent for influencing people.	38.7	37.1	22.6	1.6	0.0	1.8710	0.8129	+.44
46.	There are times when I act like a coward.	6.5	21.0	61.3	9.7	1.6	2.1613	0.7447	-.23
*47.	I hate to tell others what to do.	24.2	24.2	43.5	8.1	0.0	2.3548	0.9349	-.07
48.	I like to give orders and get things moving.	67.7	21.0	8.1	1.6	1.6	1.4032	0.7287	+.73
49.	I refuse many things which I regret afterwards.	21.0	38.7	37.1	1.6	1.6	2.7097	0.8686	-.20
	Average								-.11

TRAIT VI. ANOMIE

Item No.	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
50.	A person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.	53.2	4.8	25.8	14.5	1.6	1.9839	1.1980	+.28
51.	These days a person really does not know who he can make friends with.	32.3	17.7	46.8	3.2	0.0	2.2097	0.9356	+.15
52.	The lot of the average man is getting worse, not better.	41.9	8.1	37.1	11.3	1.6	2.1452	1.1337	+.16
	Average	42.5	10.2	36.6	9.7	1.0	2.1129	1.0891	+.19

TRAIT VII. OTHER-DIRECTEDNESS

Item No.	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
*53.	One should not become a close friend of someone who does not pay any attention to the common social customs of the group.	58.1	14.5	12.9	14.5	0.0	1.8387	1.1244	-.44
*54.	A person should strive to be successful even if it means he will be unpopular and others will be jealous of him.	77.4	14.5	6.5	1.6	0.0	1.3226	0.6666	-.80
*55.	It is important not to dress or act very differently from other people or else you will lose their respect.	58.1	22.6	17.7	0.0	1.6	1.5645	0.7956	-.61
*56.	My opinion is almost never swayed at all by editorials in the newspapers.	37.1	12.9	33.9	16.1	0.0	2.7097	1.1272	-.11
*57.	As long as I do what I think is right, it does not matter at all what my family, friends, and community think of me.	33.9	17.7	37.1	9.7	1.6	2.7258	1.0802	-.15
	Average	52.9	16.4	21.6	8.4	0.6	2.0323	0.8388	-.42

NOTE: Asterisk (*) mark is negative direction item.

TRAIT VIII. CONSTANT-PIE ORIENTATION

Item No.	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
58.	Even in a rich country, if population grows rapidly, there is great danger that there will soon not be enough wealth to go around.	30.6	21.0	37.1	11.3	0.0	2.2903	1.0221	+.11
59.	Those who get ahead get ahead at the expense of others.	11.3	9.7	66.1	11.3	1.6	2.7419	0.8608	-.28
60.	When an individual or group gains, it usually means that another individual or group loses.	62.9	16.1	19.4	0.0	1.6	1.5323	0.8175	+.61
61.	Any government that wants to help the poor people will have to take something away from the rich in order to do it.	53.2	17.7	12.9	16.1	0.0	1.9194	1.1402	+.40
	Average	39.5	16.1	33.9	9.7	0.8	2.1209	0.9602	+.21

TRAIT IX. ENTREPRENEURIAL ATTITUDES

Item No.	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
62.	An article for sale is worth what people will pay for it.	75.8	9.7	11.3	0.0	3.2	1.2903	0.7045	+.75
63.	Seniority should be given greater weight than merit in giving promotions.	17.7	4.8	50.0	27.4	0.0	2.8710	1.0078	-.32
64.	Incentive pay should not be used because workers will overwork and ruin their health or destroy jobs for others.	37.1	9.7	46.8	4.8	1.6	2.1613	1.0348	+.13
65.	Workers should not be promoted to managerial jobs even if they are qualified because it would destroy the respect for authority which the workers must have toward management.	33.9	9.7	35.5	21.0	0.0	2.4359	1.1587	.00
66.	The amount of education a person has should be a major factor in determining his pay scale.	41.9	19.4	35.5	1.6	1.6	1.9355	0.9482	+.32
67.	I approve of a career of job outside the home for married women.	45.2	41.9	8.1	3.2	1.6	1.6613	0.7817	+.59
68.	A good son should try to live near his parents even if it means giving up a good job in another part of the country.	3.2	0.0	66.1	29.0	1.6	3.1774	0.7301	-.59
69.	The most important factor in the success of a commercial firm is the establishment of a reputation for the excellence of its products.	80.6	9.7	8.1	0.0	1.6	1.2419	0.6140	+.82
70.	A man with money cannot really learn how to behave in polite society if he has not had the proper upbringing.	72.6	19.4	1.6	6.5	0.0	1.4194	0.8142	+.75
	Average	45.3	13.8	29.2	10.3	1.2	2.2016	0.8660	+.27

TRAIT X. RISK-TAKING IN DECISION

Item No.	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
71.	In an important decision, you should not wait until everyone is agreed. It is better to make a few people angry than to delay the decision until it is unanimous.	46.8	33.9	8.1	9.7	1.6	1.7742	0.9742	+.50
	Average								+.50

TRAIT XI. CONTROL-OVER-FUTURE ENVIRONMENT

Item No.	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
72.	Planning only makes a person unhappy, since your plans hardly ever work out anyway.	37.1	11.3	27.4	24.2	0.0	2.3871	1.2096	+.05
73.	When a man is born, the success he is going to have is already in the stars, so he might as well accept it and not fight against it.	40.3	6.5	32.3	21.1	0.0	2.3387	1.2041	+.06
	Average	38.7	8.9	29.8	22.6	0.0	2.3629	1.2069	+.06

TRAIT XII. SUPERIOR AS VINDICTIVE AND THREATENING

Item No.	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
74.	A subordinate who questions his superior's decisions will usually find that his superior will hold a grudge against him thereafter.	24.2	14.5	40.3	16.1	4.8	2.3971	1.1550	-.05
75.	Most subordinates are somewhat afraid of their superiors.	19.4	27.4	35.5	12.9	4.8	2.3226	1.0742	+.03
76.	Once a person gets authority over others, he is apt to use it to boss around others and to show what a big man he is.	51.6	19.4	22.6	3.2	3.2	1.7079	0.9569	+.47
	Average	31.7	20.4	32.8	10.7	4.3	2.1398	1.0620	+.15

TRAIT XIII. DOGMATISM

Item No.	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
77.	Most people just do not give a "damn" for others.	38.7	9.7	32.3	16.1	3.2	2.1935	1.2027	+.11
78.	Nations which have opposing ideologies have nothing at all in common with one another.	37.1	9.7	35.5	16.1	1.6	2.2742	1.1663	+.08
79.	It is only a natural for a person to be rather fearful for the future.	51.6	35.5	11.3	0.0	1.6	1.5645	0.7099	+.64
80.	Once I get involved in a heated discussion, I just cannot stop.	24.2	11.3	50.0	14.5	0.0	2.5484	1.0109	-.10
81.	In a heated discussion, I generally become so involved in what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what others are saying.	12.9	9.7	51.6	22.6	3.2	2.7742	1.0383	-.31
82.	It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.	80.6	6.5	9.7	0.0	3.2	1.2258	0.6579	+.79
83.	I would like it if I would find someone who would tell me how to solve my persons problems.	77.4	12.9	6.5	0.0	3.2	1.2258	0.6069	+.81
84.	Even though I do not like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great man like Ganthi.	67.7	6.5	24.2	0.0	1.6	1.5323	0.8747	+.59
85.	A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness should be hated and despised.	72.6	12.9	12.9	1.6	0.0	1.4355	0.7750	+.71
86.	The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.	72.6	19.4	6.5	1.6	0.0	1.3710	0.6776	+.77
87.	There are two kinds of people in this world: Those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.	61.3	17.7	17.7	3.2	0.0	1.6290	0.8842	+.58
88.	In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.	66.1	22.6	6.5	4.8	0.0	1.5000	0.8181	+.69
89.	If given the chance, I would do something of great benefit to the world.	72.6	24.2	1.6	0.0	1.6	1.2581	0.5059	+.84

TRAIT XIII. Continued

Item No.	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
90.	There is so much to be done and so little time in which to do it.	61.3	24.2	11.3	1.6	1.6	1.5000	0.7777	+.66
91.	In the history of mankind, there have probably been just a very small number of really great thinkers.	58.1	21.0	17.7	0.0	3.2	1.5323	0.8175	+.60
92.	There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand for or believe in.	30.6	16.1	46.8	6.5	0.0	2.2903	0.9736	+.09
93.	Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.	21.0	8.1	51.6	19.4	0.0	2.6935	1.0095	-.20
94.	Unfortunately many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems do not really understand what is going on.	58.1	11.3	22.6	6.5	1.6	1.7419	1.0307	+.46
95.	Man by himself is a helpless and miserable creature.	30.6	3.2	43.5	22.6	0.0	2.5806	1.1437	-.12
96.	The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.	75.8	11.3	4.8	4.8	3.2	1.3226	0.8186	+.74
97.	A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to be a "wishy-washy" or indecisive sort of person.	40.3	21.0	17.7	17.7	3.2	2.0645	1.1896	+.24
98.	To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.	21.0	4.8	61.3	11.3	1.6	2.5968	0.9912	-.19
99.	In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness.	53.2	17.7	22.6	4.8	1.6	1.7581	0.9786	+.46
100.	It is only natural that a person would have a much better knowledge of the ideas he believes in than with ideas which he opposes.	54.8	38.7	4.8	0.0	1.6	1.4677	0.6148	+.72
101.	Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a good goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.	43.5	21.0	24.2	8.1	3.2	1.9032	1.0581	+.34
102.	Of all the different philosophies which exist in the world, there is probably only one which is correct.	25.8	3.2	53.2	16.1	1.6	2.5645	1.0869	-.15
103.	A group which tolerates too many differences of opinion among its own members cannot exist for very long.	64.5	22.6	8.1	1.6	3.2	1.4032	0.7505	+.70
104.	Most ideas which get printed nowadays are not worth the paper they are printed on.	8.1	8.1	61.3	19.4	3.2	2.8548	0.9306	-.38
105.	In the long run, the best way to live is to choose friends and associates whose preferences and beliefs are the same as one's own.	56.5	22.6	9.7	8.1	3.2	1.6290	0.9876	+.55
106.	It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what is going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.	59.7	17.7	21.0	0.0	1.6	1.5806	0.8337	+.58
107.	The worst crime a person could commit is to publicly attack the people who believe in the same thing as he does.	50.0	14.5	22.6	11.3	1.6	1.9194	1.1115	+.35
108.	It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.	61.3	24.2	14.5	0.0	0.0	1.5323	0.7344	+.66
109.	The present is fil too full of unhappiness, it is only the future which counts.	54.8	14.5	12.9	14.5	3.2	1.8065	1.1617	+.41
110.	Most people just do not know what is good for them.	33.9	24.2	21.0	16.1	4.8	2.0468	1.1738	+.19
	Average	49.9	16.1	24.1	8.0	1.9	1.8329	0.9295	+.38

TRAIT XIV. RULES OF THE GAME

Item No.	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
111.	People ought to be allowed to vote even if they cannot do so intelligently.	58.1	29.0	0.0	11.3	1.6	1.7097	1.0982	+.61
*112.	I do not mind a politician's methods if he manages to get the right things done.	33.9	21.0	25.8	14.5	4.8	2.1129	1.1654	-.17
*113.	It is alright to get around the law if you so not actually break it.	37.1	9.7	32.3	17.7	3.2	2.2419	1.2140	-.08
*114.	In dealing with subversives, sometimes you cannot always give them all the legal rights which peaceful citizens have, otherwise many will escape the law.	30.6	17.7	17.7	30.6	3.2	2.4194	1.2895	.00
*115.	We might as well make up our minds that in order to make the world better a lot of innocent people will have to suffer.	40.3	25.8	29.0	1.6	3.2	1.8548	0.9306	-.37
*116.	Very few politicians have clean records, so one should not get excited about the mud-throwing that sometimes takes place.	61.3	21.0	16.1	0.0	1.6	1.5161	0.7775	-.64
*117.	There are times when it almost seems better for the people to take the law into their own hands rather than wait for the machinery of government to act.	29.0	21.0	32.3	16.1	1.6	2.3226	1.1039	-.07
*118.	To bring about great changes for the benefit of mankind often requires cruelty and even ruthlessness.	53.2	6.5	25.8	9.7	4.8	1.8226	1.1574	-.34
	Average								-.13

TRAIT XV. SUPPORT FOR FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OPINIONS

Item No.	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
119.	People who hate our way of life should still have a chance to talk and be heard.	66.1	27.4	3.2	0.0	3.2	1.3065	0.5844	+.78
120.	Nobody has a right to tell another person what he should and should not read.	77.4	14.5	1.6	6.5	0.0	1.3710	0.8079	+.77
121.	Unless there is freedom for many points of view to be presented, there is little chance that the truth can even be known.	74.2	25.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2581	0.4376	+.87
122.	No matter what a person's political beliefs are, he is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else.	74.2	24.2	0.0	1.6	0.0	1.2903	0.5503	+.85
123.	Freedom of conscience should mean the freedom not to believe in any gods as well as the freedom to worship in the religion of one's choice.	69.4	29.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	3.6452	0.6500	+.84
124.	You cannot really be sure whether an opinion is true or not unless the people are free to argue against it.	61.3	37.1	0.0	1.6	0.0	3.5806	0.5833	+.78
	Average	70.4	26.3	0.8	1.6	0.8	2.0752	-.6023	+.81

NOTE: Asterisk (*) mark is negative direction item.

TRAIT XVI. SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF SPEECH AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

Item No.	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
*125.	A book that contains wrong political views cannot be a good book and does not deserve to be published.	51.6	8.1	38.7	1.6	0.0	1.9032	0.9790	-.35
*126.	In dealing with dangerous enemies of the nation, we cannot afford to depend on the courts, laws, and their slow unreliable methods.	74.2	8.1	16.1	1.6	0.0	1.4516	0.8167	-.69
*127.	When the country is in great danger, we may have to force people to do certain things against their will, even though it violates their rights.	69.4	27.4	1.6	1.6	0.0	1.3548	0.4983	-.81
*128.	A man ought not to be allowed to speak if he does not know what he is talking about.	43.5	21.0	25.8	9.7	0.0	2.0161	1.0394	-.31
	Average	59.7	16.2	20.6	3.6	0.0	1.6814	0.8584	-.54

TRAIT XVII. POLITICAL EQUALITY

Item No.	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
* 129.	The main trouble with democracy is that most people do not really know what is best for them.	56.5	29.0	8.1	6.5	0.0	1.6452	0.8817	-.60
* 130.	It will always be necessary to have a few strong, capable people actually running everything.	53.2	22.6	24.2	0.0	0.0	1.7097	0.8306	-.52
* 131.	Political "issues" and arguments are beyond the understanding of most of the voters.	51.6	12.9	22.6	12.9	0.0	1.9677	1.1212	-.32
* 132.	Few people really know what is in their own best interests in the long run.	64.5	21.0	11.3	1.6	1.6	1.4677	0.7770	-.68
	Average	56.4	21.5	16.5	5.2	0.4	1.6976	0.6526	-.53

TRAIT XVIII. ECONOMIC EQUALITY

Item No.	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
133.	The government ought to make sure that everyone has a good standard of living.	75.8	21.0	1.6	1.6	0.0	1.2903	0.5789	+.84
134.	I think the government should give a person work if he cannot find another job.	71.0	27.4	1.6	0.0	0.0	1.3065	0.4948	+.84
135.	There will always be poverty, so people might as well get used to the fact.	83.9	4.8	11.3	0.0	0.0	1.2742	0.6518	+.81
136.	Every person should have a good house, even if the government has to build it for him.	61.3	19.4	14.5	4.8	0.0	1.6290	0.9022	+.59
	Average	73.0	18.2	7.2	1.6	0.0	1.3750	0.6569	+.77

NOTE: Asterisk (*) mark is negative direction item.

TRAIT XIX. CYNICISM TOWARD POLITICS

Item No.	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
137.	There is practically no connection between what a politician says and what he will do once he gets elected.	67.7	21.0	1.6	9.7	0.0	1.5323	0.9284	+.08
*138.	I usually have confidence that the government will do what is right.	58.1	19.4	19.4	1.6	1.6	1.6129	0.8680	-.57
*139.	To me, most politicians do not seem to really mean what they say.	45.2	40.3	1.6	12.9	0.0	1.8226	0.9759	-.52
140.	No matter what people think, a few people will always run things anyway.	41.9	29.0	8.1	19.4	1.6	2.0161	1.1569	+.33
*141.	Most politicians can be trusted to do what they think is best for the country.	41.9	19.4	29.0	6.5	3.2	1.9355	1.0453	-.31
	Average								-.08

TRAIT XX. POLITICAL FUTILITY

Item No.	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	Mean	Standard Deviation	Absolute Score
142.	Nothing I ever do seems to have any real effect on what happens in politics.	4.8	19.4	53.2	21.0	1.6	2.8226	0.8711	-.33
143.	Political parties are so big that the average member has not got much to say about what goes on.	16.1	19.4	37.1	27.4	0.0	2.8065	1.0134	-.20
	Average	10.5	19.4	45.1	24.2	0.8	2.8146	0.9323	-.27

NOTE: Asterisk (*) mark is negative direction item.

INTERCORRELATION MATRIX OF ELITE TRAITS

Trait	Authoritarianism	Faith-in-People	Social Anxiety	Neurotic Anxiety	Dominance	Anomie	Other Directedness	Constant-Pie Orientation	Entrepreneurial Attitudes	Risk-Taking in Decisions	Control over Future and Environment	Superior as Vindictive and Threatening	Dogmatism	Rules of the Game	Support for Freedom of Speech and Opinions	Applications of Free Speech and Opinions	Political Equality	Economic Equality	Cynicism Toward Politics	Political Futility
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
1	X	-.10	-.40	-.07	+.60	+.46	+.32	+.40	+.49	+.40	+.64	+.28	+.61	+.78	+.47	+.29	+.11	+.44	+.39	+.18
2	-.10	X	+.25	+.35	+.18	-.06	+.11	+.22	+.23	-.07	-.02	+.28	+.16	+.14	-.58	-.04	+.40	-.01	-.08	+.39
3	-.40	+.25	X	+.45	-.13	-.10	+.06	+.16	+.08	-.17	-.09	+.16	-.11	-.16	-.16	-.32	-.19	-.53	-.31	+.20
4	-.07	+.35	+.45	X	-.15	-.30	-.12	+.22	+.12	-.27	+.08	+.19	-.03	+.17	-.28	+.06	+.15	-.30	+.03	+.38
5	+.60	+.18	-.13	-.15	X	+.57	+.50	+.39	+.57	+.48	+.57	+.39	+.64	+.62	+.13	+.14	+.23	+.39	+.08	+.13
6	+.46	-.06	-.10	-.30	+.57	X	+.26	+.40	+.37	+.41	+.30	+.24	+.50	+.39	+.42	-.01	+.19	+.39	-.01	-.20
7	+.32	+.11	+.06	-.12	+.50	+.26	X	+.23	+.42	+.73	+.44	+.36	+.47	+.55	+.21	-.07	+.04	+.32	+.05	+.19
8	+.40	+.22	+.16	+.22	+.39	+.40	+.23	X	+.66	+.26	+.47	+.48	+.61	+.51	+.26	+.15	+.30	+.15	+.01	+.09
9	+.49	+.23	+.08	+.12	+.57	+.37	+.42	+.66	X	+.36	+.53	+.48	+.71	+.66	+.38	+.26	+.43	+.33	+.32	+.05
10	+.40	-.07	-.17	-.27	+.48	+.41	+.73	+.26	+.36	X	+.43	+.37	+.48	+.53	+.32	+.07	+.09	+.36	+.12	+.04
11	+.64	-.02	-.09	+.08	+.57	+.30	+.44	+.47	+.53	+.43	X	+.33	+.70	+.75	+.21	+.19	+.10	+.23	+.25	+.18
12	+.28	+.28	+.16	+.19	+.39	+.24	+.36	+.48	+.48	+.37	+.33	X	+.62	+.54	+.05	+.36	+.19	+.21	+.23	+.16
13	+.61	+.16	-.11	-.03	+.64	+.50	+.47	+.61	+.71	+.48	+.70	+.62	X	+.71	+.35	+.50	+.49	+.56	+.36	+.06
14	+.78	+.14	-.16	+.17	+.62	+.39	+.55	+.51	+.66	+.53	+.75	+.54	+.71	X	+.30	+.37	+.26	+.43	+.46	+.36
15	+.47	-.58	-.16	-.28	+.13	+.42	+.21	+.26	+.38	+.32	+.21	+.05	+.35	+.30	X	+.24	+.02	+.37	+.32	-.31
16	+.29	-.04	-.32	+.06	+.14	-.01	-.07	+.15	+.26	+.07	+.19	+.36	+.50	+.37	+.24	X	+.56	+.61	+.50	-.15
17	+.11	+.40	-.19	+.15	+.23	+.19	+.04	+.30	+.43	+.09	+.10	+.19	+.49	+.26	+.02	+.56	X	+.60	+.38	-.15
18	+.44	-.01	-.53	-.30	+.39	+.39	+.32	+.15	+.33	+.36	+.23	+.21	+.56	+.43	+.37	+.61	+.60	X	+.44	-.25
19	+.39	-.08	-.31	+.03	+.08	-.01	+.05	+.01	+.32	+.12	+.25	+.23	+.36	+.46	+.32	+.50	+.38	+.44	X	+.02
20	+.18	+.39	+.20	+.38	+.13	-.20	+.19	+.09	+.05	+.04	+.18	+.16	+.06	+.36	-.31	-.15	-.15	-.25	+.02	X

TRAIT GROUPING BY FACTOR ANALYSIS

Factor		Trait	Weight	FACTOR 1	2	3	4	5	Commun-ality	Pure Factor Measuring
1	20	Political Futility	1.3374	.694	.012	-.122	.248	.236	.614	.784
	4	Neurotic Anxiety	0.8432	.570	.412	-.014	.216	-.292	.626	.518
2	8	Constant-Pie-Orientation	1.6296	.013	.739	.043	-.029	.287	.632	.865
	9	Entrepreneurial Attitudes	1.3049	.008	.688	.042	-.037	.424	.713	.664
	12	Superior as Vindictive	0.7503	.140	.535	.180	.152	.341	.478	.599
3	16	Applications of Free Speech	2.5991	-.018	.215	.826	-.058	-.048	.734	.929
	19	Cynicism toward Politics	1.2520	.184	.061	.677	-.205	.089	.546	.840
	18	Economic Equality	1.4759	-.381	.028	.717	.014	.384	.807	.637
	17	Political Equality	1.1831	-.247	.364	.663	.396	.001	.789	.557
	3	Social Anxiety	0.5793	.196	.458	-.555	.173	-.225	.637	.484
4	2	Faith-in-People	2.1787	.195	.272	.020	.797	.063	.751	.845
	15	Support Free Speech	1.6095	-.292	.244	.190	-.736	.210	.767	.707
5	7	Other-Directedness	2.0582	.006	.106	-.085	.094	.786	.645	.958
	10	Risk-Taking in Decisions	1.6708	-.138	.071	.045	-.068	.745	.585	.948
	5	Dominance	1.5922	-.083	.276	.126	.090	.734	.646	.834
	11	Control over Future	1.0104	.298	.338	.179	-.226	.621	.672	.574
	1	Authoritarianism	1.0199	.182	.186	.380	-.378	.623	.743	.523
	14	Rules of the Game	1.3722	.375	.377	.392	-.125	.700	.942	.520
	6	Anomie	0.7047	-.483	.342	-.006	-.158	.517	.642	.416
	13	Dogmatism	0.8775	-.052	.573	.440	-.018	.581	.863	.391
		Total		.0876	.1415	.1548	.0899	.2178	.6916	
		Communality per Factor		.1267	.2046	.2238	.1300	.3149	1.000	

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE (LAO VERSION)

ແ ບ ບ ຄ ຳ ຖ າ ມ

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ແບບຄຳຖາມນີ້ ເປັນສ່ວນນຶ່ງທີ່ເຮັດຂຶ້ນ ເພື່ອຂໍຄວາມຄິດເຫັນຈາກທ່ານ ເພື່ອຈະນຳໄປປະກອບ ກຽມກັບການສຶກສາຂອງ "ຜູ້ນຳ" ເພື່ອຈະນຳໄປວິຈັຍສຶກສາ ແລະ ເພີ່ມພູນຄວາມຮູ້ທາງດ້ານ ຣັຖສາດ ການປົກຄອງຂອງໂລກໂດຍກົງ. ດ້ວຍກຽດຂອງຂ້າພະເຈົ້າ ໃນຖານະຂອງ ນັກວິຊາການ ແບບຄຳຖາມນີ້ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າ ຈະຖືເປັນຄວາມລັບຢ່າງສຸດຍອດ ແລະ ຈະບໍ່ມີຊື່ຜູ້ຕອບ ກຽມຂອງຢູ່ໃນການສຶກສານີ້ຢ່າງເດັດຂາດ ດັ່ງນັ້ນ ເພື່ອຄວາມຈິງ ແລະ ເປັນປະໂຍດທາງດ້ານວິຊາການ ຕໍ່ປະຊາກອນຂອງໂລກ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າຈຶ່ງຂໍຄວາມກະຣຸນາຈາກທ່ານ ໄດ້ໂປດກະຣຸນາສລະເວລາຂອງທ່ານ ຕອບ ຄຳຖາມທີ່ມີຢູ່ໃນແບບສອບຖາມນີ້ດ້ວຍ <u>ໂດຍໂຕທ່ານເອງ</u> ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າຜູ້ຈັດທຳ ຈຶ່ງຂໍຂອບອົກຂອບໃຈ ແລະ ຂໍຈົດຈຳໄວ້ຢ່າງບໍ່ລືມ ຕໍ່ຄວາມກະຣຸນາຮ່ວມໃນ ຮ່ວມມື ແລະ ຊ່ວຍເຫລືອຈາກທ່ານໃນຄັ້ງນີ້ ຢ່າງສຸດອົກສຸດໃຈ.

ໂປດກະຣຸນາຂຽນເຄື່ອງຫມາຍຖືກ (✓) ລົງໜ້າຄຳຕອບທີ່ທ່ານວ່າຖືກຕ້ອງທີ່ສຸດ, ຂໍ້ລະຄຳຕອບດຽວ

ໂຕຢ່າງເຊັ່ນ : _____

ຄົນລາວສ່ວນຫລາຍຮູ້ພາສາຝຣັ່ງເສດ ຫລາຍກວ່າ ພາສາອັງກິດ

✓ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄຣູບາ ແລະ ນາຍຄຣູມີຄວາມສຳຄັນຕໍ່ສັງຄົມລາວ ຫລາຍກວ່ານັກທຸຣະກິດ ແລະ ນັກວຸດສາຫະກັນ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ມື້ນີ້ຂ້າງຫນ້າ ການຄົ້ນຄວ້າທາງວິທະຍາສາດ ຈະບອກໃຫ້ເຮົາຮູ້ວ່າ ສິ່ງທີ່ເຮົາມີຄວາມເຊື່ອຖືຢຶດຫມັ້ນ ຢ່າງຕລອດຫລາຍໃນທຸກມື້ນີ້ ເປັນຄວາມເຊື່ອຖືທີ່ຜິດກໍ່ໄດ້.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ບໍ່ວ່າທີມງານຂອງມະນຸດ ຈະເປັນແນວໃດກໍ່ຕາມ ກໍ່ຈະມີການຂັດແຍ້ງກັນ ແລະ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງປອງດອງກັນ ຢູ່ສະເມີ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຂ.- ປະຊາຊົນລາວຄວນຈະໃຫ້ຄວາມຄິດຄວາມອ່ານ ແລະ ສົນໃຈຕໍ່ສິ່ງໃຫ່ມໆ ເຖິງແມ້ວ່າຄວາມຄິດຄວາມອ່ານນັ້ນໆ ຈະຂັດຕໍ່ສະພາບຊີວິດຄວາມເປັນຢູ່ ຂອງຊາວລາວທຸກວັນນີ້ກໍ່ຕາມ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄ.- ໃນທຸກມື້ນີ້ ພໍ່ແມ່ຕ້ອງສິ່ງສອນລູກ ຢ່າງເຂັ້ມງວດດ້ານລະບຽບວິໃນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ງ.- ຄົນສ່ວນຫລາຍ ທີ່ບໍ່ໄດ້ຮັບຄວາມກ້າວໜ້າ ກໍ່ຄິດນຶ່ມພະລັງອຳນາດຂອງຈິດໃຈນ້ອຍ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຈ.- ຄົນຫນຶ່ງຮັດຄວາມຜິດເຮື່ອງການຄົ້ນຢ່າງຮຸນແຮງ ສົມຄວນລົງโทດຫລາຍກວ່າການຈຳຄຸກ ພວກເຂົາສົມຄວນຈະຖືກລົງโทດດ້ວຍການນຳໄປປະຈານ ຕໍ່ຫນ້າສາທາຣະນະຊົນ ຫລື ຫລາຍກວ່ານັ້ນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ສ.- ຖ້າຫາກຜູ້ທີ່ເປັນນາຍ ຕ້ອງການໃຫ້ເຮົາເຮັດວຽກການໄດ້ດີ, ເຂົາຄວນຈະບອກໃຫ້ເຮົາຮູ້ວ່າ ວຽກອັນໃດທີ່ເຂົາຕ້ອງການໃຫ້ເຮົາເຮັດ ຕລອດເຖິງການອະທິບາຍ ໃຫ້ເຮົາຮູ້ຢ່າງຊັດແຈ້ງ ເຖິງວິທີການເຮັດ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຈ.- ບຸກຄົນຜູ້ໃດ ຫລົບຫລູ່ກະດະຂອງບຸກຄົນອື່ນ ສົມຄວນຈະຖືກລົງໂທດສະເນີ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຈ0.- ໂທຣາສາດ ສາມາດຈະທຳນາຍ ໄດ້ຖືກຕ້ອງໂດຍແທ້.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຈ1.- ການຄິດຫລາຍເປັນການບໍ່ດີ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຈ2.- ໃນສະໄໝປັດຈຸບັນ ສານຍຸຕິທັນ ໄດ້ພິພາກສາລົງໂທດຜູ້ຝ່າຝືນກົດຫມາຍ ແຮງກວ່າທີ່ສົມຄວນຈະຕັດສິນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຈ3.- ອິນເດີ້ສາມາດແບ່ງເຂດໄດ້ເປັນສອງຫວກຄື ພວກທີ່ແຂງແຮງ ແລະ ຫ່ວກທີ່ອ່ອນແອ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໑໔.- ປັດຈຸບັນນີ້ ມີຄົນທີ່ມີຈິດໃຈຊົ່ວຊ້າຫລາຍຂຶ້ນກວ່າເກົ່າ ຈຶ່ງເປັນອັນຕະລາຍຕໍ່ການໄປມາ ແຕ່ຜູ້ດຽວ.

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໑໕.- ຄົນສ່ວນຫລາຍ ເປັນຄົນທີ່ໄວ້ເນື້ອເຊື່ອໃຈໄດ້.

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໑໖.- ສ່ວນຫລາຍແລ້ວ ມະນຸດເປັນຜູ້ທີ່ມີຈິດໃຈຊ່ວຍເຫລືອເອື້ອເຟື້ອຕໍ່ຄົນອື່ນ.

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໑໗.- ຫາກທ່ານບໍ່ຣະວັງໃນໂຕຂອງທ່ານແລ້ວ ບຸກຄົນອື່ນຈະຫາຜົນປະໂຍດຈາກໂຕຂອງທ່ານ.

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໑໘.- ບໍ່ມີບຸກຄົນໃດຈະສົນໃຈທ່ານ ເມື່ອທ່ານຕົກອັບແລະໂຊກຮ້າຍ.

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๑๗.- ທັນຈາດຂອງມະນຸດຢ່າງນຶ່ງກໍ່ດີ ການຮ່ວມໄມ້ຮ່ວມມືຊຶ່ງກັນແລະກັນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๘๐.- ທ່ານມີຄວາມວິຕົກກັງວົນຫລາຍປານໃດ ກ່ອນທີ່ທ່ານຈະອອກໄປປາໄສ ຕໍ່ຫນ້າປະຊຸມຊົນ.

_____ ວິຕົກຫລາຍ _____ ບໍ່ວິຕົກ

_____ ວິຕົກ _____ ບໍ່ວິຕົກເລີຍ

๘๑.- ຄວາມຢ້ານວ່າທ່ານຈະເຮັດວຽກການ ບໍ່ໄດ້ດີຢ່າງເຕັມທີ່ ເປັນຈຸປສັກຂັດຂວາງຕໍ່ທ່ານຫລາຍປານໃດ.

_____ ຂັດຂວາງຫລາຍ _____ ບໍ່ຂັດຂວາງ

_____ ຂັດຂວາງ _____ ບໍ່ຂັດຂວາງເລີຍ

๘๘.- ທ່ານມີຄວາມກັງວົນໃຈຫລາຍປານໃດ ເມື່ອນາຍຂອງທ່ານຮ້ອງທ່ານເຂົ້າໄປພົບ ໂດຍທີ່ເຂົາບໍ່ບອກໃຫ້ທ່ານ ຈາບລ່ວງຫນ້າ.

_____ ກັງວົນໃຈຫລາຍ _____ ບໍ່ກັງວົນໃຈ

_____ ກັງວົນໃຈ _____ ບໍ່ກັງວົນໃຈເລີຍ

๘๙.- ທ່ານມີຄວາມກັງວົນໃຈຫລາຍປານໃດ ໃນການເຂົ້າສະມາຄົມກັບຄົນອື່ນ.

_____ ມີຫລາຍ _____ ບໍ່ມີ

_____ ມີແຄ່ _____ ບໍ່ມີເລີຍ

๘๔.- ເມື່ອທ່ານຢູ່ໃນຖານະທີ່ຈະປະຕິບັດວຽກບໍ່ໄດ້ດີ ຫລື ປະຕິບັດວຽກບາງຢ່າງຜິດພາດໄປ ທ່ານມີຄວາມກັງວົນ ຫລາຍປານໃດ.

_____ ມີຄວາມກັງວົນຫລາຍ _____ ບໍ່ມີຄວາມກັງວົນ

_____ ມີຄວາມກັງວົນແດ່ _____ ບໍ່ມີຄວາມກັງວົນເລີຍ

๘๕.- ເມື່ອທ່ານໄດ້ຍິນ ສຽງຟ້າຮ້ອງຟ້າຜ່າ, ທ່ານມີຄວາມຮູ້ສຶກຢ້ານຫລາຍປານໃດ.

_____ ຢ້ານຫລາຍ _____ ບໍ່ຢ້ານ

_____ ຢ້ານນ້ອຍນຶ່ງ _____ ບໍ່ຢ້ານເລີຍ

๘๖.- ກ່ອນທ່ານຈະໄປຫາມາຍຫໍ້ປ່ວຍ ທ່ານຮູ້ສຶກຢ້ານຕໍ່ຄວາມເຈັບປວດ ທີ່ທ່ານຈະໄດ້ຮັບນັ້ນນ້ອຍຫລາຍປານ ໃດ.

_____ ຢ້ານຫລາຍ _____ ບໍ່ຢ້ານ

_____ ຢ້ານນ້ອຍນຶ່ງ _____ ບໍ່ຢ້ານເລີຍ

๘๗.- ເມື່ອມີບາງສິ່ງບາງຢ່າງເກີດຂຶ້ນແກ່ທ່ານ ຫລື ມີສິ່ງທີ່ເຮັດໃຫ້ທ່ານຄິດ ບໍ່ສະບາຍໃຈຈົນນອນບໍ່ຫລັບ ທ່ານໄດ້ປະສົບກັບສິ່ງນັ້ນ ນ້ອຍຫລາຍປານໃດ.

_____ ຫລາຍທີ່ສຸດ _____ ບໍ່ຫລາຍປານໃດ

_____ ຫລາຍ _____ ບໍ່ມີເລີຍ

๘๙.- ເຖິງແມ້ວ່າທ່ານຈະບໍ່ມີແນວໃດຈະເຮັດ, ແຕ່ກໍ່ຮູ້ສຶກທ່ານບໍ່ໄດ້ພັກຜ່ອນເຕັມທີ່ ໃນມື້ພັກການ, ເຕດການ ແນວນີ້ ເກີດຂຶ້ນກັບທ່ານຫລາຍປານໃດ.

_____ ຫລາຍທີ່ສຸດ _____ ບໍ່ຫລາຍ

_____ ຫລາຍ _____ ບໍ່ເກີດຂຶ້ນເລີຍ

๘๗.- ເມື່ອທ່ານຢູ່ເທິງສູງໆ ທ່ານຕົກລົງຂ້ຽວລົ້ງມາທາງລຸ່ມ ທ່ານຕົກໃຈນ້ອຍຫລາຍປານໃດ.

_____ ຕົກໃຈຫລາຍ _____ ຕົກໃຈນ້ອຍໆ

_____ ຕົກໃຈ _____ ບໍ່ຕົກໃຈເລີຍ

ນ0.- ທ່ານຮູ້ສຶກອຸກໃຈ ຫລື ບໍ່ມີຄວາມສຸກໂດຍທີ່ທ່ານບໍ່ຮູ້ວ່າ ເປັນຄ້ອຍເຫດໃດ ທ່ານຈົ່ງມີຄວາມຮູ້ສຶກແນວນັ້ນ ຄວາມຮູ້ສຶກເຊັ່ນນີ້ ເກີດຂຶ້ນກັບທ່ານຫລາຍປານໃດ.

_____ ຫລາຍທີ່ສຸດ _____ ບາງທີທີນ

_____ ຫລາຍນ້ອຍຄຽວ _____ ບໍ່ເຄີຍປາກົດເລີຍ

ນ1.- ໂນການປຽບທຽບກັບບຸກຄົນອື່ນທີ່ທ່ານຮູ້ຈັກ ແລ້ວທ່ານມີຄວາມກັງວົນ ກ່ຽວກັບສຸຂພາບຮ່າງກາຍຂອງທ່ານ ເຈັບນ້ອຍຫລາຍປານໃດ.

_____ ມີຄວາມກັງວົນໃຈຫລາຍກວ່າຄົນອື່ນປ່າງຫລາຍແທ້

_____ ມີຄວາມກັງວົນໃຈຫລາຍກວ່າຄົນອື່ນນ້ອຍຄຽວ

_____ ມີຄວາມກັງວົນໃຈນ້ອຍກວ່າຄົນອື່ນນ້ອຍຄຽວ

_____ ມີຄວາມກັງວົນໃຈນ້ອຍກວ່າຄົນອື່ນທີ່ສຸດ

ນ2.- ເມື່ອທ່ານໄປຫານາຍຫມໍ (ຫລືເມື່ອເວລານາຍຫມໍມາຫາທ່ານ) ເມື່ອເວລາທີ່ທ່ານບໍ່ສະບາຍ ທ່ານມີຄວາມ ຕົກໃຈຫລາຍປານໃດ ທີ່ທ່ານຈະໄດ້ຍິນນາຍຫມໍບອກທ່ານວ່າ ທ່ານເປັນພະຍາດແນວໃດ.

_____ ບໍ່ຕົກໃຈເລີຍ _____ ຕົກໃຈຫລາຍ

_____ ຕົກໃຈນ້ອຍຄຽວ _____ ຕົກໃຈຫລາຍທີ່ສຸດ

ນ້ນ.- ໃນປີທີ່ຜ່ານມາ ທ່ານໄດ້ລະເມີ ຫລື ຝັນ ແລ້ວເຮັດໃຫ້ທ່ານຕົກໃຈຕື່ນຂຶ້ນ ອາການເຈັ່ນນີ້ເກີດຂຶ້ນກັບທ່ານ ເລື້ອຍປານໃດ.

_____ ບໍ່ເຄີຍເກີດຂຶ້ນເລີຍ

_____ ບາງຄັ້ງກໍ່ເກີດຂຶ້ນສະເນີ

_____ ບາງຄັ້ງກໍ່ເກີດຂຶ້ນ

_____ ເກີດຂຶ້ນຢູ່ເລື້ອຍໆ

ນ້ຄ.- ເມື່ອທ່ານປຽບທຽບໂຕທ່ານ ກັບບຸກຄົນອື່ນທີ່ທ່ານຮູ້ຈັກ ທ່ານມີຄວາມກັງວົນກ່ຽວກັບ ສະພາບຈິດໃຈຂອງ ທ່ານຫລາຍປານໃດ.

_____ ຫລາຍກວ່າຄົນອື່ນແທ້

_____ ນ້ອຍກວ່າຄົນອື່ນແດ່

_____ ຫລາຍກວ່າຄົນອື່ນແດ່

_____ ນ້ອຍກວ່າຄົນອື່ນແທ້

ນ້ຄ.- ເພາະວ່າມີສິ່ງລົບກວນທ່ານ ຫລື ເມື່ອທ່ານມີຄວາມຄິດ ທີ່ຕ້ານກັງວົນໃຈ ເກີດຂຶ້ນໃນຈິດໃຈຂອງທ່ານ ແລ້ວສິ່ງເຫລົ່ານັ້ນເປັນເຫດທີ່ເຮັດໃຫ້ທ່ານ ຍາກທີ່ຈະມີຄວາມຕັ້ງໃຈປະຕິບັດວຽກການ ເຫດການດັ່ງກ່າວນີ້ ທ່ານໄດ້ພົບພໍ້ຫລາຍປານໃດ.

_____ ຫລາຍແທ້

_____ ພໍ້ເປັນບາງຄັ້ງ

_____ ຫລາຍ

_____ ບໍ່ເຄີຍພົບພໍ້ເລີຍ

ນ້ຜ.- ໃນການປຽບທຽບກັບຜູ້ທີ່ມີອາຍຸໃນຈຳດຽວກັບທ່ານແລ້ວ ທ່ານມີຄວາມວິຕົກກັງວົນ ທີ່ຈະຕໍ່ສູ້ແຂ່ງຂັນກັບຄົນ ອື່ນໆ ນ້ອຍຫລາຍປານໃດ.

_____ ມີຫລາຍ

_____ ມີນ້ອຍກວ່າ

_____ ມີນ້ອຍ

_____ ບໍ່ມີເລີຍ

ນ້ຫ.- ຫລາຍປານໃດທີ່ທ່ານມີຄວາມກັງວົນກັບຄົນອື່ນ ຫລື ເຫດການແນວໃດແນວນຶ່ງ ທັງງທີ່ທ່ານເຈົ້າບໍ່ສົມຄວນ ຈະວິຕົກກັງວົນກັບເຣື່ອງແນວນັ້ນ.

_____ ຫລາຍແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຫລາຍປານໃດ

_____ ຫລາຍ _____ ບໍ່ເຄີຍກັງວົນເລີຍ

ນ້ຊ.- ເມື່ອທ່ານຢູ່ໃກ້ນ້ຳ, ຢູ່ເທິງເຣືອ ຫລື ກຳລັງລອຍນ້ຳຢູ່ ທ່ານຢ້ານວ່າທ່ານຈະຈົມນ້ຳຕາຍຫລາຍປານໃດ.

_____ ຢ້ານຫລາຍ _____ ບໍ່ຢ້ານ

_____ ຢ້ານ _____ ບໍ່ຢ້ານເລີຍ

ນ້ພ.- ກ່ອນການຕັດສິນໃຈໃດໆ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າຈະພະຍາຍາມຄິດຄຳນຶງເຖິງຜູ້ອື່ນກ່ອນວ່າ ເຂົາເຈົ້າເຫລົ່ານັ້ນມີຄວາມ ຄິດແນວໃດ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄ0.- ໃນການຈຸມນຸມພົບປະສະມາຄົມກັນ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າຖືເປັນຫນ້າທີ່ ທີ່ຈະແນະນຳໃຫ້ຄົນຮູ້ຈັກກັນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄ1.- ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າມັກຈະຄິດກ່ວນຈະເຮັດ ເຖິງແນ້ວ່າເຣື່ອງນັ້ນຈະເປັນເຣື່ອງເລັກນ້ອຍກໍ່ຕາມ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໔໒.- ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າມີຄວາມຮູ້ສຶກກັງວົນໃຈ ເມື່ອຂ້າພະເຈົ້າຢູ່ໃກ້ກັບຄົນທີ່ບໍ່ເຄີຍຮູ້ຈັກກັນ.

_______ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _______ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_______ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _______ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໔໓.- ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າ ບໍ່ຄວນຄິດກ່ຽວກັບເລື່ອງຂອງຄົນອື່ນຫລາຍຈົນເກີນໄປ.

_______ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _______ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_______ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _______ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໔໔.- ຕໍ່ໜ້າໝູ່ເພື່ອນຫລາຍຄົນ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າມີຄວາມຖຸກໃຈ ໃນການຄິດຫາຄວາມເວົ້າອັນຖືກຕ້ອງ ທີ່ຈະນຳອອກມາເວົ້າ.

_______ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _______ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_______ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _______ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໔໕.- ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າຮູ້ສຶກວ່າ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າມີຄວາມສາມາດເປັນພິເສດ ໃນການຈັກຊວນຜູ້ອື່ນໃຫ້ເຫັນດີນຳ.

_______ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _______ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_______ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _______ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໔໖.- ມີຫລາຍເທື່ອທີ່ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າ ຮູ້ສຶກວ່າ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າເປັນຄົນຂີ້ຢ້ານ.

_______ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _______ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_______ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _______ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າບໍ່ມັກທີ່ຈະບອກຄົນອື່ນ ໃຫ້ເຮັດແນວນັ້ນແນວນີ້.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າມັກຈະອອກຄຳສັ່ງ ແລະ ຄຸມໃຫ້ວານເດີນຢູ່ສະເມີ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ມີຫລາຍໆສິ່ງທີ່ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າປະຕິເສດໄປແລ້ວ ມາເກີດຄວາມເສຍໃຈພາຍຫລັງ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄົນເຮົາຄວນຄິດເຖິງຈິວິດໃນມື້ນີ້ໃຫ້ຫລາຍໆ ສຳຫລັບມື້ຫນ້າກໍເປັນອີກເຣື່ອງນຶ່ງຕ່າງຫາກ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ທຸກມື້ນີ້ ຄົນເຮົາບໍ່ຮູ້ຈັກວ່າ ໂຕຈະຜຸກມິດກັບຜູ້ໃດ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຂ.- ໂດຍຄິດແລ້ວຄົນເຮົາຈື່ອຈຳຈົວທຸກມື້.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ງ.- ບຸກຄົນທີ່ບໍ່ສົນໃຈຕໍ່ປະເພນີ ການປະຕິບັດຂອງກຸ່ມຈົນໃດ ກໍບໍ່ຄວນຈະເປັນມິດສນິດ ກັບກຸ່ມຈົນນັ້ນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຈ.- ເຖິງແມ້ວ່າຈະເປັນແນວທາງເຮັດໃຫ້ທຸກຍາກ ຫລື ຖືກວິດສາຣະສັຍາໃດກໍ່ຕາມ ຄົນເຮົາກໍຄວນຕໍ່ສູ້ເພື່ອ ຄວາມສຳເຣັດຂອງຕົນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ສ.- ຖ້າຕ້ານແຕ່ງໂຕ ຫລື ປະຕິບັດໂຕ ເກີນກว่າປະຊາຊົນທົ່ວໄປ ປະຊາຊົນເຫລົ່ານັ້ນຈະບໍ່ນັບຖືທ່ານ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຊ.- ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າບໍ່ເຄີຍມີຄວາມຄິດປຣົ່ມແປງເລີ່ມ ຕົ້ນຄັ້ນນາທິການຂອງຫນັງສືພິມ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໕໗.- ຖ້າຫາກວ່າສິ່ງໃດທີ່ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າຄິດວ່າ ເປັນການຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ແລ້ວ ເຖິງແມ້ນວ່າຄອບຄົວ, ຫມູ່ພວກ ຫລື ມວນຊົນ ຈະຄິດແນວໃດກໍ່ຕາມ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າບໍ່ເຄີຍປ່ຽນໃຈ.

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້	________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ
________ ຖືກຕ້ອງ	________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໕໘.- ເຖິງແມ້ນວ່າເປັນປະເທດທີ່ຮັ່ງມີ ຫາກວ່າປະຊາກອນ ເພີ່ມຫລາຍຂຶ້ນຢ່າງກະທັນຫັນແລ້ວ ໃນອະນາຄົດອັນບໍ່ນານ ປະເທດນັ້ນກໍ່ຈະກັບກາຍເປັນປະເທດຍາກຈົນ.

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້	________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ
________ ຖືກຕ້ອງ	________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໕໙.- ຄົນທີ່ກ້າວໄປໄກໄດ້ ຕ້ອງດັນຜູ້ອື່ນໄປໄວ້ທາງຫລັງ.

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້	________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ
________ ຖືກຕ້ອງ	________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໖໐.- ໃນສັງຄົມຂອງເຮົາ ເມື່ອພວກນຶ່ງໄດ້ຜົນປະໂຍດ ຈະຕ້ອງມີອີກພວກນຶ່ງເສັຍຜົນປະໂຍດ ເປັນຂອງທັມດາ.

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້	________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ
________ ຖືກຕ້ອງ	________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໖໑.- ການຊ່ວຍເຫລືອປະຊາຊົນທີ່ຍາກຈົນຂອງຣັຖບານ ກໍ່ຄືການຍາດແຍ່ງເອົາບາງສິ່ງບາງຢ່າງ ຈາກປະຊາຊົນທີ່ຮັ່ງມີ ເພື່ອນຳໄປຊ່ວຍເຫລືອປະຊາຊົນທີ່ຍາກຈົນ.

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້	________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ
________ ຖືກຕ້ອງ	________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๕๘.- ຄຸນຄ່າຂອງສິ່ງຂອງໃນການຊື້ຂາຍ ຍອມມີເທົ່າກັບຄຸນຄ່າຂອງເງິນ ທີ່ຈ່າຍໄປຂອງຜູ້ຊື້.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄ້ນ.- ການພິຈາລະນາເລື່ອນຊັ້ນ, ເລື່ອນຕຳແໜ່ງ "ຄວາມອາວຸໂສ" ຄວນໄດ້ຮັບການພິຈາລະນາຫລາຍກວ່າ "ຄຸນວຸດທິ".

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄ້ນ.- ລະບົບການຈ່າຍເງິນເພື່ອ ສົ່ງເສີມ ນ້ຳໃຈ ໃນການປະຕິບັດງານທີ່ດີ ບໍ່ຄວນນຳມາໃຊ້ ເພາະຈະທຳໃຫ້ຄົນເຮົາ ເອກະພາບຫລາຍເກີນໄປ ເປັນການເສັຍສຸຂະພາບ ແລະ ຍາກແຍ່ງວິຊາຂອງຜູ້ອື່ນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄ້ນ.- ບໍ່ເປັນການສົມຄວນ ທີ່ຈະເລື່ອນຊັ້ນຄົນງານ ຂຶ້ນເປັນຜູ້ບໍລິຫານ ເຖິງແມ້ວ່າຄົນງານຜູ້ນັ້ນ ຈະມີຄວາມ ເຫມາະສົມກໍຕາມ ທັງນີ້ກໍເພາະວ່າຈະເປັນການທຳລາຍວຽກນາດ ໃນການບັງຄັບບັນຊາ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄ້ນ.- ຂະດັບການສຶກສາຂອງຄົນ ຄວນຈະເປັນຫົວໜ້າໃຫ່ຍ ໃນການພິຈາລະນາກຳນົດຂັ້ນເງິນເດືອນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ພ້ກ.- ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າເຫັນດີນຳ ທີ່ໃຫ້ຜູ້ຍິງທີ່ມີຄອບຄົວແລ້ວນັ້ນ ອອກໄປທຳມາຫາກິນ (ເຮັດວຽກການ) ເຫມືອນກັບ ກັບຜູ້ຊາຍ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ພ້ຂ.- ລູກທີ່ດີຄວນຈະພະຍາຍາມຢູ່ໃກ້ພໍ່ແລະແມ່ ເຖິງແມ້ວ່າຈະມີວຽກການ ທີ່ດີກວ່າ ຢູ່ເມືອງອື່ນທີ່ໄກອອກໄປ ເຮົາກໍບໍ່ຍອມໄປຮັບຕຳແຫນ່ງນັ້ນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ພ້ຜ.- ສິ່ງສຳຄັນໃນການປະສົບຄວາມສຳເລັດ ຂອງຮ້ານຄ້າທຸຣະກິດ ກໍຄືການສ້າງຊື່ສຽງ ຂອງຜົນຜະລິດວ່າເປັນ ຂອງດີ ມີຄຸນພາບ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ກ0.- ຖ້າຕາກບໍ່ມີການອົບອົມກັນຢ່າງດີຕັ້ງແຕ່ເກີດແລ້ວ ຄົນມີເງິນກໍຈະປະຕິບັດຕົນ ເປັນຄົນສຸພາບຮຽບຮ້ອຍໄດ້ຍາກ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ກ1.- ການຕັດສິນໃຈທີ່ສຳຄັນ ທ່ານບໍ່ຄວນລໍຖ້າຄວາມເຫັນດີນຳຂອງທຸກຄົນ ຍອມໃຫ້ຄົນສ່ວນນ້ອຍໂກດແຄ້ນໂມໂຫ ດີກວ່າ ການຈັກວ້ຳຈາກການລໍຖ້າຄວາມເປັນເອກະສັນຂອງທຸກໆຄົນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ภ๖.- ການວາງແຜນເປັນການຮັດໃຫ້ຄົນຍາກນຳທີ່ນັ້ນ ເພາະວ່າເຖິງຈະວາງແຜນໄປແນວໃດ ຄົນຈະຮັດນຳໄດ້ສະເມີ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ภ๗.- ວາສນາ ຫລື ຄວາມສຳເລັດຂອງຄົນນັ້ນ ຖືກກຳນົດໄວ້ຕາຍໂຕແລ້ວຕັ້ງແຕ່ເກີດ ຈະໄປຝືນພົນລິດນັ້ນບໍ່ໄດ້.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ภ๘.- ລູກນ້ອງຜູ້ຈອກແຈກຖານເຈົ້ານາຍນັ້ນ ຈະຮັດໃຫ້ເຈົ້ານາຍບໍ່ພໍໃຈ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ภ๘.- ເປັນລູກນ້ອງຕ້ອງຢ້ານເຈົ້າຢ້ານນາຍ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ภ๙.- ຄົນທີ່ໄດ້ອຳນາດມາ ມັກຈະໃຊ້ອຳນາດນັ້ນ ເພື່ອສະແດງໃຫ້ຄົນອື່ນເຫັນວ່າ ໂຕເອງມີອຳນາດແນວນັ້ນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

๗๗.- ຄົນສ່ວນຫລາຍຢາກເຫັນຄວາມຮັ່ງມີຂອງຄົນອື່ນ ຫລາຍກວ່າຄວາມຈິບຫາຍ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๗ຊ.- ຈາກຕ່າງວັນທີ່ ລັດທິປົກຄອງກົງກັນຂ້າມ ຈະບໍ່ມີແນວໃດດີກັນເລີຍ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๗ຍ.- ການຢ້ານຕໍ່ອານາຈັກ ເປັນພຽງທັນຈາກຂອງມະນຸດທັ້ນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຮ໐.- ຖ້າຂ້າພະເຈົ້າໄດ້ເຂົ້າຮ່ວມ ອະພິປາຍຖືກຖຽງ ຢ່າງເຜັດຮ້ອນແລ້ວ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າຫ້ານໂຕເວງໃຫ້ຢຸດບໍ່ໄດ້.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຮ໑.- ໃນການອະພິປາຍ ຖືກຖຽງຢ່າງເຜັດຮ້ອນນັ້ນ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າມັກຈະສົນໃຈແຕ່ສິ່ງທີ່ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າກຳລັງຈະເວົ້າ ແລະ ຖືກຖຽງທັນ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າລືມຟັງວ່າ ຄົນອື່ນເຂົາກຳລັງເວົ້າແນວໃດ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຂ໔.- ຕາຍຢ່າງກ້າຫານ ດີກວ່າມີຊີວິດຢູ່ຢ່າງຂີ້ຂາດຕາຂາວ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຂ໕.- ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າມີຄວາມພໍໃຈ ຖ້າຫາກວ່າມີຄົນອື່ນ ມາຊ່ວຍແນະນຳໃນການແກ້ບັນຫາສ່ວນຕົວຂອງຂ້າພະເຈົ້າ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຂ໖.- ເຖິງແມ້ວ່າ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າຈະບໍ່ຄິດນຳກັນ ແຕ່ຄວາມກະຕືລືລົນສ່ວນເລີກຂອງຂ້າພະເຈົ້າ ກໍຢາກເປັນຜູ້ມີຊີສະຫວ້ຍ ທ້ຽງໃຫ່ຍໄຕຢ່າງເຊັ່ນ ມະຫາຕະມະຄານທີ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຂ໗.- ຄົນທີ່ຄິດເອົາແຕ່ຄວາມສຸຂສ່ວນໂຕ ຄວນຈະໄດ້ຮັບການປະນາມວ່າຄົນຈົ່ວ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຂ໘.- ສິ່ງສຳຄັນໃນຊີວິດຂອງມະນຸດກໍຄື ຕ້ອງການສ້າງຄວາມສຳຄັນ ແນວໃດແນວນຶ່ງຂອງໂຕເອງໄດ້.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຊກ.- ໃນໂລກນີ້ມີມະນຸດຢູ່ສອງຈຳພວກ ຄືພວກທີ່ຕໍ່ສູ້ເພື່ອຄວາມຈິງ ກັບພວກທີ່ລັດວ້າງຕໍ່ຄວາມຈິງ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຊຂ.- ໃນການປະຊຸມອະພິປາຍ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າມີຄວາມຈຳເປັນຢູ່ຫລາຍ ທີ່ຕ້ອງຫົບທວນໂຕຂອງຂ້າພະເຈົ້າຫລາຍໆ ເທື່ອ ເພື່ອໃຫ້ແນ່ນອນວ່າຂ້າພະເຈົ້າເຂົ້າໃຈບັນຫານັ້ນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຊຄ.- ຖ້າຫາກว่า ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າມີໂອກາດ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າຈະປະຕິບັດຢ່າງໃດຢ່າງນຶ່ງ ເພື່ອໃຫ້ເກີດຜົນປະໂຍດຕໍ່ຊາວ ໂລກ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຊງ.- ມີຫລາຍສິ່ງຫລາຍຢ່າງທີ່ຈະຕ້ອງເຮັດ ແລະ ປະຕິບັດ ແຕ່ກໍມີເວລາບໍ່ພໍ ທີ່ຈະປະຕິບັດໃຫ້ລຸລ່ວງສຳເຮັດໄດ້.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຊຈ.- ໃນປະວັດສາດຂອງມະນຸດຊາດ ນັກຄົນຄິດຜູ້ຍິ່ງໃຫຍ່ທີ່ແທ້ຈິງນັ້ນ ມີຢູ່ເປັນຈຳນວນນ້ອຍທີ່ສຸດ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ພ8.- ມີຄົນຈຳນວນຫລາຍທີ່ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າມີຄວາມສັງກະດົດ ເພາະວ່າຕົນເຫລົ່ານັ້ນເຊື່ອຖື ແລະ ຍຶດໝັ້ນໃນສິ່ງທີ່ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າບໍ່ນັບ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ພນ.- ເບື້ອງຢ່າງເລີ່ມເຊື່ອແລ້ວ ໂລກທີ່ເຮົາອາໄສຢູ່ນີ້ ເປັນໂລກທີ່ເປົ່າປ່ຽວ ແລະ ວຸ່ນວາຍ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ພຊ.- ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າຮູ້ສຶກພິດຫວັງຫລາຍ ເພາະວ່າປະຊາຊົນທີ່ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າສົນທະນານຳ ກ່ຽວກັບບັນຫາທາງສັງຄົມ ແລະ ສິນທັມນັ້ນ ເຂົາບໍ່ຮູ້ຢ່າງແທ້ຈິງກ່ຽວກັບບັນຫານັ້ນ ວ່າເປັນຢ່າງໃດ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ພຄ.- ໂດຍໂຕຂອງໂຕເອງແລ້ວ ມະນຸດເປັນສັດທີ່ຫນ້າສົງສານ ແລະ ຈຸ່ຍເຫລືອໂຕເອງບໍ່ໄດ້.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ພງ.- ຣະບົບການປົກຄອງສູງສຸດກໍ່ດີ ຣະບົບການປົກຄອງແບບປະຊາທິປະໄຕ ແບບຂອງປະຊາທິປະໄຕດີທີ່ສຸດຄືການປົກຄອງທີ່ປະກອບດ້ວຍບຸກຄົນທີ່ສະຫລຽວສະຫລາດ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຜກ.- ບຸກຄົນທີ່ມີຄວາມສັດທາແຮງກ້າ ກັບຄວາມຄິດເຫັນຫລາຍແນວຈົນເກີນໄປ ມັກເປັນຄົນທີ່ດື້ແຕ່ເວົ້າ ຫລື ເປັນຄົນຈຳພວກທີ່ມີຈິດໃຈລ້ຽງຄົນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຜຊ.- ການປ້ອງກັນກຸ່ມການເມືອງ ຝ່ຍກົງກັນຂ້າມຂອງພວກເຮົາຈະເປັນອັນຕະລາຍ ເພາະວ່າປົກຕິແລ້ວ ຈະເປັນການນຳໄປສູ່ການທໍລະຍົດຕໍ່ຝ່ຍຕົນເອງ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຜຍ.- ໃນສະພາບການເຊັ່ນປັດຈຸບັນນີ້ ຖ້າຄົນຢຶດເອົາຄວາມສຸຂຂອງໂຕເອງເປັນຫລັກແລ້ວ ເຂົາຈະເປັນຄົນທີ່ເຫັນແກ່ໂຕຢ່າງໂຫດຮ້າຍ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຈ00.- ມັນເປັນທັນຈາດຂອງຄົນ ທີ່ມີຕາດພົນຫລາຍຕໍ່ສິ່ງໂຕເອງນັກ ແລະ ມີຕາດພົນນ້ອຍຕໍ່ສິ່ງທີ່ໂຕເອງບໍ່ນັກ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๑๐๑.- ເຖິງແມ້ວ່າເສລີພາບໃນການຈະພິປາຍຂອງກຸ່ມຈິນຫ້ວງຫລາຍ ຈະເປັນອຸດົມການທີ່ດີ ແຕ່ຍັງມີຄວາມຈຳເປັນ ທີ່ຈະຕ້ອງຈຳກັດເສລີພາບແນວນັ້ນ ຕໍ່ກຸ່ມການເມືອງຕ່າງໆຢູ່.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๑๐๘.- ຫລັກປັດຊະຍາຕ່າງໆຫ້ວງຫນຶ່ງ ທີ່ມີຢູ່ໃນໂລກນີ້ ອາດຈະມີແຕ່ພຽງອັນດຽວທີ່ນັບວ່າ ເປັນ ທີ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๑๐๙.- ກຸ່ມຈິນທີ່ມີຄວາມແຕກຕ່າງກັນ ຢ່າງກວ້າງຂວາງພາຍໃນຫມູ່ສະມາຊິກຂອງເຂົາເຈົ້າ ຈະບໍ່ສາມາດຍືນຫຍັດ ຢູ່ໄດ້ດົນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๑๑๐.- ຄວາມຄິດເຫັນສ່ວນຫລາຍ ທີ່ພົບເຫັນໃນທຸກມື້ນີ້ ເປັນພຽງເຈ້ຍທີ່ບໍ່ມີຄຸນຄ່າ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๑๑๑.- ໃນອານາຄົດຂ້າງຫນ້າ ການມີຊີວິດຢູ່ທີ່ດີທີ່ສຸດ ກໍຄືການເລືອກເອົາຫມູ່ພວກ ແລະ ການສ້າງສັນກັບຫມູ່ພວກ ທີ່ມີຄວາມໂນ້ມອຽງ ແລະ ມີຄວາມເຊື່ອຖືຄືກັນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๑๐ฝ.- ກ່ອນທີ່ຈະຕັດສິນໃຈ ໃນບັນຫາໃດບັນຫານຶ່ງລົງໄປ ຄົນເຮົາມັກຈະລໍຟັງຄວາມຄິດເຫັນຂອງຜູ້ທີ່ໂຕນັບຖື ຫົວຫລາຍເສັຍກ່ອນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๑๐ກ.- ການໂຈມຕີຜູ້ທີ່ມີຄວາມເຊື່ອຖື ຄືກັນກັບໂຕເອງຕໍ່ຫນ້າສາທາຣະນະ ນັບເປັນອາຊະຍາກັມທີ່ຮ້າຍແຮງທີ່ສຸດ ຂອງມະນຸດ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๑๐ຂ.- ຊີວິດຂອງຄົນຈະມີຄວາມຫມາຍ ກໍຕໍ່ເມື່ອເຂົາຄຸທິດຕົວຂອງເຂົາເຈົ້າ ຕໍ່ຄວາມຄິດເຫັນ ແລະ ອຸດົມການ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๑๐ຜ.- ຄວາມສຸຂທີ່ມີຫລາຍທີ່ສຸດກໍດີ ຄວາມສຸຂທີ່ມີໃນປັດຈຸບັນ ສ່ວນອານາຄົດເປັນຄວາມສຸຂທີ່ບໍ່ແນ່ນອນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๑๑๐.- ຄົນສ່ວນຫລາຍບໍ່ຮູ້ວ່າ ສິ່ງໃດແດ່ດີສໍາຫລັບໂຕເອງ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໑໑໑.- ເຖິງແມ່ນວ່າບຸກຄົນເຫຼົ່ານັ້ນ ຈະໃຊ້ສິດຂອງໂຕຢ່າງໂງ່ໆກໍຕາມ ແຕ່ເຂົາກໍຄວນຈະໄດ້ໃຊ້ສິດອອກສຽງເລືອກຕັ້ງ.

✓________ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ
________ ຖືກຕ້ອງ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໑໑໒.- ບໍ່ວ່າຈະດ້ວຍວິທີອັນໃດກໍຕາມ ຖ້າຫາກວ່ານັກການເມືອງປະຕິບັດງານໃຫ້ແລ້ວເສັດໄດ້ ກໍເປັນອັນວ່າໃຊ້ໄດ້ທັງນັ້ນ.

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ
________ ຖືກຕ້ອງ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໑໑໓.- ຖ້າທ່ານບໍ່ທຳການຝ່າຝືນກົດໝາຍຢ່າງຈັດແຈ້ງ ເປັນແຕ່ພຽງຫຼົບຫຼີກເລັກໆນ້ອຍໆ ກໍນັບວ່າເປັນຂອງທັມດາ.

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ
________ ຖືກຕ້ອງ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໑໑໔.- ໃນການປາບກໍຣະນີທີ່ຮ້າຍແຮງ ມັນເປັນການບໍ່ເໝາະສົມ ທີ່ຈະໃຊ້ຂໍ້ປະຕິບັດທຸກຢ່າງ ຕາມລຳດັບຂັ້ນຂອງກົດໝາຍ.

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ
________ ຖືກຕ້ອງ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໑໑໕.- ເຮົາຕ້ອງຍອມຮັບຄວາມຈິງຂໍ້ນີ້ວ່າ ໃນການປັບປຸງໂລກຂອງເຮົາໃຫ້ດີຂຶ້ນ ຈະຕ້ອງມີຄົນພວກທີ່ບໍ່ຮູ້ເຣື່ອງຮູ້ຣາວພວກນຶ່ງ ໄດ້ຮັບຄວາມເດືອດຮ້ອນ.

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ
________ ຖືກຕ້ອງ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄ.- ມີນັກການເມືອງຈຳນວນນ້ອຍ ທີ່ມີປະວັດໃສສະອາດ ດັ່ງນັ້ນເຮົາບໍ່ຄວນຈະຕື່ນເຕັ້ນ ຕໍ່ການໂດດສນາທັບຖິ່ນກັນ ຂອງນັກການເມືອງ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ງ.- ບາງຄັ້ງການຕັດສິນລົງโทດຜູ້ເຮັດຄວາມຜິດ ໂດຍໂຕເຮົາເອງ ກໍເປັນຜົນດີຕໍ່ປະຊາຊົນ ຫລາຍກວ່າການ ພິຈາຣະນາລົງโทດຕາມລຳດັບຂັ້ນ ຂອງກົດໝາຍບ້ານເມືອງ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຈ.- ໃນການເຮັດໃຫ້ມີການປຽນແປງທີ່ຍິ່ງໃຫ່ຍ ເພື່ອຜົນປະໂยດຕໍ່ມະນຸດຈາດນັ້ນ ສ່ວນຫລາຍແລ້ວຕ້ອງມີຄວາມ ຫາຣຸນโทດຮ້າຍ ແລະ ຂັດຂວາດ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ສ.- ພວກຄົນທີ່ບໍ່ມີກົວທີການດຳເນີນຊີວິດຂອງພວກເຮົາ ກໍຄວນໄດ້ມີໂອກາດສະແດງຄວາມຄິດເຫັນ ແລະ ເຮົາກໍ ຄວນຮັບຟັງຄວາມຄິດເຫັນຂອງເຂົາເຈົ້າ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຊ.- ບໍ່ມີຜູ້ໃດມີສິດທີ່ຈະບອກຜູ້ອື່ນວ່າ ເຈົ້າມີສິດອ່ານເຣື່ອງໃດ ຫລື ບໍ່ມີສິດອ່ານອັນໃດ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๑๘๑.- ຖ້າບໍ່ມີການຍອມຮັບເສລີພາບ ໃນການສະແດງຄວາມຄິດເຫັນທີ່ແຕກຕ່າງກັນ ຫລາຍໆຢ່າງແລ້ວ ໂອກາດທີ່ຈະຮູ້ຄວາມຈິງນັ້ນກໍມີນ້ອຍ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๑๘๒.- ບໍ່ວ່າຄວາມປົດຫມັ້ນ ຫລື ຄວາມເອື້ອຊຶ່ງທາງການເມືອງຂອງໃຜ ຈະເປັນແນວໃດກໍຕາມ ເຂົາກໍມີສິດຢ່າງອິດສະຫລະ ຕາມກົດຫມາຍ ແລະ ໄດ້ຮັບການປົກປ້ອງຄຸ້ມຄອງຕາມກົດຫມາຍ ເຫມືອນກັບກັບຄົນອື່ນໆ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๑๘๓.- "ເສລີພາບໃນການນັບຖື" ຄວນຈະຫມາຍເຖິງເສລີພາບທີ່ຄົນຈະນັບຖື, ບໍ່ນັບຖືການໄຫວ້ບູຊາ ຫລື ຢ່າງໃດກໍຕາມສຸດແທ້ແຕ່ໃຈຂອງເຂົາເຈົ້າ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๑๘๔.- ທ່ານບໍ່ສາມາດຈະບອກໄດ້ວ່າ ແນວຄວາມຄິດອັນນຶ່ງນັ້ນ ຈະເປັນຄວາມຈິງຫລືບໍ່ຈິງ ຈົນກว่າຈະມີຄົນໂຕ້ຖຽງຄັດຄ້ານແນວຄວາມຄິດນັ້ນ ໄດ້ຢ່າງເສລີ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໑໖໕.- ຫນັງສືທີ່ມີທັສນະທາງການເມືອງ ທີ່ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ ເປັນຫນັງສືທີ່ບໍ່ດີ ແລະ ບໍ່ສົມຄວນທີ່ຈະພິມອອກສູ່ສາຍຕາຂອງປະຊາຊົນ.

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ
________ ຖືກຕ້ອງ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໑໖໖.- ໃນການປະຕິບັດກັບສັດຕຣູທີ່ເປັນອັນຕະລາຍແກ່ປະເທດຊາດ ເຮົາຈະອາໄສສານ, ກົດຫມາຍ ຫລື ວິທີການອັນຈັກຊາຍຢ່າງອື່ນຢູ່ບໍ່ໄດ້.

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ
________ ຖືກຕ້ອງ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໑໖໗.- ເມື່ອປະເທດຊາດຕົກຢູ່ໃນພາວະອັນຕະລາຍ ເຮົາຈຳເປັນຈະຕ້ອງບັງຄັບປະຊາຊົນ ໃຫ້ກະທຳບາງສິ່ງບາງຢ່າງແມ່ນວ່າສິ່ງນັ້ນ ພວກເຂົາເຈົ້າບໍ່ຢາກເຮັດ ຫລື ແມ່ນວ່າຈະເປັນການຝ່າຝືນຕໍ່ສິດຕ່າງໆ ຂອງເຂົາກໍຕາມ.

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ
________ ຖືກຕ້ອງ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໑໖໘.- ເຮົາບໍ່ຄວນອະນຸຍາດໃຫ້ຄົນເວົ້າ ຖ້າເຂົາບໍ່ຮູ້ວ່າເຂົາກຳລັງຈະເວົ້າເຣື່ອງໃດ.

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ
________ ຖືກຕ້ອງ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

໑໖໙.- ອຸປສັກອັນຍິ່ງໃຫຍ່ ຂອງລັດທິປະຊາທິປະໄຕກໍຄື ປະຊາຊົນບໍ່ຮູ້ຢ່າງແທ້ຈິງວ່າ ແມ່ນຫຍັງດີທີ່ສຸດ.

________ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ
________ ຖືກຕ້ອງ ________ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๑ນ0.- ນັ້ນມີຄວາມຈຳເປັນຕໍ່ປະເທດ ທີ່ຈະຕ້ອງມີ ກຸ່ມບຸກຄົນທີ່ເຂັ້ມແຂງມີຄວາມສາມາດກຸ້ມນ້ວ ທີ່ຈະປະຕິບັດ ວຽກງານໄດ້ທຸກຢ່າງ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄນ0ນ.- ຍັດຕິແລະນັ້ນຫາທາງການເມືອງ ເປັນຂອງເຫລືອວິໄສ ທີ່ຄົນສາມັນທັມດາຈະເຂົ້າໃຈໄດ້.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄນ0ສ.- ມີຄົນຈຳນວນນ້ອຍທີ່ຮູ້ແຈ້ງເຫັນຈິງວ່າ ສິ່ງໃກລ້ເຫີ້ນປະໂຍດຂອງໂຕ ໃນອານາຄົດອັນຍາວໄກ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄນ0ມ.- ຣັດຖບານຄວນຄຳນຶງ ແລະ ເຮັດຢ່າງລັກແນ່ວ່າ ປະຊາຊົນທຸກຄົນມີມາດຖານ ການຄອງຊີບທີ່ດີ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄນ0ຄ.- ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າຄິດວ່າ ຣັດຖບານເອງຄວນຈະໃຫ້ວຽກໃຫ້ການຄົນເຮັດ ຖ້າຫາກວ່າຄົນຜູ້ນັ້ນຫາວຽກຫາງານ ທາງອື່ນບໍ່ໄດ້.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຈນ.- ເຂົ້າຍາກຫມາກແພງຈະມີຢູ່ສະເມີ ປະຊາຊົນຄວນຈະຮູ້ຄວາມຈິງນີ້.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຈນ.- ທຸກຄົນຄວນຈະມີບ້ານເຮືອນອາໄສທີ່ດີ ເຖິງແມ່ນວ່າມີຄວາມຈຳເປັນເຖິງຂັ້ນທີ່ຣັຖບານ ຈະຕ້ອງເຮັດໃຫ້ກໍ່ຄວນຈະເຮັດໃຫ້ເຂົ້າເຈົ້າ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຈນ.- ເປັນຂອງທັນດາວ່າ ຄຳເວົ້າການຫາສູງກ່ອນເລືອກຕັ້ງ ກັບການປະຕິບັດຫລັງຈາກທີ່ເຂົາໄດ້ຮັບເລືອກຕັ້ງແລ້ວນັ້ນ ນັກການເມືອງຈະເຮັດໄດ້ບໍ່ຄືກັນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຈນ.- ປົກກະຕິແລ້ວ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າມີຄວາມເຊື່ອ ແລະ ໄວ້ວາງใจຣັຖບານว່າ ຣັຖບານຈະບໍ່ຕາມປະເທດໄປໃນທາງທີ່ຖືກຕ້ອງສະເມີ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຈນ.- ສຳຫລັບຄວາມຄິດຄວາມເຫັນສ່ວນໂຕຂອງຂ້າພະເຈົ້າແລ້ວ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າເຫັນວ່ານັກການເມືອງເກືອບຫມົດນັ້ນປາກເວົ້າໄປຢ່າງນຶ່ງ ແຕ່ໃຈຈິງເປັນໄປອີກຢ່າງນຶ່ງ ປາກບໍ່ກົງກັບໃຈທີ່ໃດ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄ.ສ.- ເຖິງແມ່ນວ່າປະຊາຊົນຈະຄິດຢ່າງໃດກໍ່ຕາມ ຜູ້ບໍ່ຮູ້ຫານກໍ່ມີພະຈວດຄົນກຸ່ມນ້ອຍກຸ່ມນຶ່ງ ຢູ່ແບບນີ້ຕະຫລອດໄປ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄ.ສ.- ເປັນທີ່ເຊື່ອໄດ້ວ່າ ນັກການເມືອງສ່ວນຫລາຍ ປະຕິບັດວຽກທີ່ເຂົ້າຄິດວ່າດີ ແລະ ເປັນປະໂຍດທີ່ສຸດແລ້ວ ສຳຫລັບປະເທດ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄ.ສ.- ຄົນສ່ວນຫລາຍວ່າ ຂ້າພະເຈົ້າບໍ່ໄດ້ເຮັດແນວໃດໃຫ້ເກີດພົນປະໂຍດແປງອັນແທ້ຈິງ ໃນວົງການເມືອງເລີຍ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄ.ສ.- ນັກການເມືອງ ຫລື ກຸ່ມການເມືອງນັ້ນເປັນຂອງໃຫ່ຍເກີນໄປ ສະມາຊິກນ້ອຍງົວນົມດາ ບໍ່ສາມາດມີສຽງໄດ້ເລີຍ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄ.ສ.- ກ່ຽວກັບຄວາມຄິດຄວາມເຫັນທາງການເມືອງ ຜູ້ຍິງມັກຈະມີຄວາມຄິດຄວາມເຫັນ ອຽງໄປນຳພໍ່ແລະສາມີສະ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄິດທີ່ຢູ່ບ້ານນອກ ແລະ ຄົນທີ່ຢູ່ໃນເມືອງຍ່ອມມີ ຄວາມຄິດຄວາມເຫັນຕໍ່ແນວທາງຂອງຣະບົບການເມືອງ ຕ່າງກັນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ໂດຍການເປັນຈິງແລ້ວ ຣະບົບການປົກຄອງແບບ ປະຊາທິປະໄຕ ກໍບໍ່ມີຄວາມແຕກຕ່າງກັບ ຣະບົບສັງຄົມ ນິຍົມປານໃດ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ໃນຂະນະທີ່ສະຖານການຂອງບ້ານເມືອງ ກຳລັງເຄັ່ງຕຶງ ການໃຊ້ຣະບົບຜະດັດການຊົ່ວຄາວ ກໍເຫມາະສົມ ກວ່າການໃຊ້ຣະບົບປະຊາທິປະໄຕ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ບາງຄັ້ງປະຊາທິປະໄຕ ກໍສ້າງຄວາມຍຸ້ງຍາກ ແລະ ລຳຈົກໃນການປົກຄອງບ້ານເມືອງ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ນັກການເມືອງຜູ້ໄດ້ຮັບ ການເລືອກຕັ້ງຈາກປະຊາຊົນ ສ່ອນຫລາຍແລ້ວຈະປະຕິບັດວຽກໄດ້ດີ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄ.- ບຸກຄົນບາງຄົນກໍແປຄວາມຫມາຍຂອງ ປະຊາທິປະໄຕว่า ທຸກງຄົນທີ່ມີຄວາມສະລາດ ແລະ ທຸກງຄົນທີ່ມີ ຄວາມໂງ່ ເຂົາກໍຄວນມີສິດເສລີພາບ ໃນການລວມສຽງເທົ່າທຽມກັນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄ.- ຄົນທຸກຄົນທີ່ເກີດມາ ຕ້ອງມີຄວາມສະເມີພາບທັງກັນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ວງແທ້

ຄ.- ວຽກງານທຸກຢ່າງ ຄົນທຸກຄົນຄວນຈະໄດ້ຮັບຄ່າຈ້າງຕອບແທນ ເທົ່າກັນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄ.- ຄົນລວຍເຮົ້ານ້ຳ ມີສິດເສລີພາບນ້ອຍໄປ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄ.- ອ້ານະເຈົ້າຮູ້ສຶກว่า ສາສນາມີຄວາມສຳຄັນແທ້ງຕໍ່ອ້ານະເຈົ້າ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

ຄ.- ຄວາມກ້າວຫນ້າທາງວິທະຍາສາດ ແລະ ຄວາມເຊື່ອຖືທາງສາສນາ ມີຄວາມຂັດແຍ້ງຕໍ່ກັນ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๑๔ฉ.- ຜີ ເຮັດໃຫ້ຄົນເຈັບໄຂ້ກໍໄດ້.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๑๔ຊ.- ລາວຄວນຈະເລີກນັບຖືສາສນາຜີ ຢ່າງສົ້ນເຊີງ ຈຳພະເຈົ້າກໍສັນບສນຸນ ການປາບການນັບຖືສາສນາຜີ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

๑๔ຍ.- ກ່ຽວກັບວ່າ ຮ່າງກາຍຂອງຄົນເຮົາປະກອບດ້ວຍຂວັນ ສ່ຽ ຢ່າງ ຖ້າຂວັນນັ້ນວວກຈາກຮ່າງກາຍແລ້ວ ຈະເຮັດໃຫ້ຄົນນັ້ນ ເກີດການເຈັບປ່ວຍ.

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ

_____ ຖືກຕ້ອງ _____ ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງແທ້

<u>ໂປດກະຣຸນາ ຂຽນເຄື່ອງໝາຍຖືກ (✓)ລົງໜ້າຊ່ອງว่าง ໃຫ້ຖືກຕ້ອງກັບຕົວທ່ານເອງ</u>

<u>ເພດ</u> _____ ຍິງ _____ ຊາຍ

<u>ອາຍຸ</u> _____ ๘๐ - ๘ฉ ປີ _____ ๘๐ - ๘ฉ ປີ

_____ ฉ๐ - ฉฉ ປີ _____ ฉ๐ ປີ ຂຶ້ນໄປ.

_____ ๘๐ - ๘ฉ ປີ

ຕຳແໜ່ງການ

_____ ຈັ່ນໂທທະລິທຣັບເທົ່າ
_____ ຈັ່ນເອກທະລິທຣັບເທົ່າ
_____ ຈັ່ນພົນເສດທະລິທຣັບເທົ່າ
_____ ຂ້າຣາຊການທະຫານຕຳຣວດ.
_____ ຜູ້ຊະນະ
_____ ຂ້າຣາຊການການເມືອງ
_____ ຂ້າຣາຊການພົນເຮືອນ

ການສຶກສາສຳເຣັດ

_____ ປະຖົມສຶກສາບໍຣິບູນ
_____ ມັທຍົມສຶກສາ
_____ ປະຖົມຍາ
_____ ສູງກວ່າປະຖົມຍາ

ຈາກ _____ ໃນປະເທດ
_____ ຕ່າງປະເທດ

ຈາກ _____ ອາຊີ
_____ ອະເມຣິກາ
_____ ຢູໂຣບ
_____ ປະເທດສັ່ງຄົມນິຍົມ

ສາສນາ (ໂປດຂຽນຊື່ສາສນາຂອງທ່ານ) _____

ຄອບຄົວ

_____ ແຕ່ງງານແລ້ວ ມີລູກ _____ ຄົນ
_____ ເປັນໂສດ

ເຊື້ອຊາດ

_____ ລາວ
_____ ແມ້ວ
_____ ໄທຍ
_____ ວຽດນາມ
_____ ອື່ນໆ

_____ ຈົບແບບຄຳຖາມ _____

APPENDIX C

THE LAOTIAN POLITICAL ELITE ROSTER

I. Members of the Provisional Government of National Union.

(June, 1974)

1. Prince Souvanna Phouma. Prime Minister.
2. Phoumi Vongvichit, Phagna. Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
3. Luem Insixiengmay, Phagna. Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Education.
4. Pheng Phongsawan, Phagna. Minister of Interior and Social Welfare.
5. Ngon Sananikone, Phagna. Minister of Finance.
6. Souk Vongsak, Tiao. Minister of Information and Tourist.
7. Sesouk Na Champassak, Chao. Minister of Defense and Veteran Services.
8. Singkapo Chounramany. Minister of Public Works and Transportation.
9. Khamsing Souvanlasy, Phagna. Minister of Justice.
10. Sot Phethrasy. Minister of Economics and Plans.
11. Khampheng Boupha, Phagna. Minister of Post, Telegraph, and Telecommunications.
12. Kou Souvannemethi, Maha. Minister of Cults.
13. Khamphai Abhay, Phagna. Minister of Public Health.
14. Kham Ouane Boupha. Secretary of State, Ministry of Defense.
15. Soukan Vilaysarn, Phagna. Secretary of State, Ministry of Cults.
16. Deuane Souvannarath, Colonel. Secretary of State, Ministry of Interior.
17. Ouday Souvannavong, Phagma. Secretary of State, Ministry of Information and Tourist.

18. Bousabong Souvannavong. Secretary of State, Ministry of Finance.

19. Houmphanh Xayasith, Phagna. Secretary of State, Ministry of Public Works and Transportation.

20. Somvang Somsathit. Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice.

21. Touby Lyfoung, Phagna. Secretary of State, Ministry of Post, Telegraph, and Telecommunications.

22. Ounneua Phimmasone. Secretary of State, Ministry of National Education.

23. Tianethone Chantharasy. Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

24. Khamlieng Pholsena. Secretary of State, Ministry of Public Health.

25. Somphou Oudomvilay, Dr. Secretary of State, Ministry of Economics and Plans.

II. Members of the Joint National Political Council (JNPC).

1.	Souphanouvong, Prince.	President
2.	Sisoumang Sileumsack, Tiao.	Vice President
3.	Khamsouk Keola, Phagna.	Vice President and Secretary General
4.	Sananh Southichak.	Member
5.	Khanphanh Vilaychack, Maha.	Member
6.	Khamsouk Vongvichith, Nang.	Member
7.	Lofoung.	Member
8.	Thammasinh Xaykhamfanh.	Member
9.	Y. Bouttaphadid.	Member
10.	Visith Sanhtivong.	Member
11.	Phao Vanthanouvong, Phagna.	Member
12.	Souvanhdy.	Member
13.	Bouddy Souriyasack, Maha.	Member
14.	Phayboun Pholsena, Nang.	Member
15.	Thip Litthideth.	Member
16.	La Soukanh.	Member
17.	Phao Phimmachanh.	Member
18.	Ouane Ratthikoune, Phagna.	Member
19.	Chao Singh.	Member
20.	Houmphanh Norasing, Phagna.	Member
21.	Khamla Kingsada.	Member
22.	Vannavong Rajakoune.	Member
23.	Bounthanh Heuangpraseuth.	Member

24.	Khamfanh Nounesavanh, Phagna.	Member
25.	Bounteng Insixiengmay.	Member
26.	Souvanh Sananikhom.	Member
27.	Phom Bounlutay.	Member
28.	Heng Saythavi.	Member
29.	Salath Rasassack.	Member
30.	Sihalat Phasouk, Tiao.	Member
31.	Yangdao, Dr.	Member
32.	Viboun Abhay.	Member
33.	Pha Vongxay, Phagna.	Member
34.	Bounnak Souvannavong.	Member
35.	Khamleck Xayasith.	Member
36.	Khamta Phommachanh.	Member
37.	Houmpheng Soukhaseum, Phagna.	Member
39.	Sisavang Chantapha.	Member
40.	Khamphanh Simmalavong.	Member
41.	Vongsavanh Boudsavad.	Member
42.	Tane Paphasalang, Dr.	Member

III. Members of the National Assembly (As Elected of January 4, 1974).

Phong Saly Province

1. Chant Pathummayo
2. Khamphaeng Boupha, Phagna*
3. Sesouphanh Phunpadid, Phagna

Houa Phan Province

4. Phom Bounleutay*
5. Meuxeu
6. Phone Phakonekham

Houa Khong Province

7. Korayok Souvannavong, Phagna
8. Phan Sisavad
9. Phao Vongkhamchanh

Luang Prabang Province

10. Oune Rattikoune, Phagna*
11. Khamla Kingsada*
12. Souk Boavong, Chao
13. Meekham Pilavan, Yanang
14. Souk Oupparavan, Phagna
15. Khamphang Yanouvong, Phia
16. Ampornsavad S. Vongkodrattana
17. Phon Morind
18. Phan Vongpid, Tid

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*Repeated name in Lists I & II.

Sayaboury Province

19. Vannah Phengsavaddy

20. Laojeu

21. Houmphanh Norasing, Phagna*

Xieng Khouang Province

22. Sobxisana Soutanakoumarn, Chao

23. Bountanh Huengprasert

24. Letoupey

Vientiane Province

25. Khamsing Sananikone

26. Somphou Oudomvilay, Dr.*

27. Phouy Sananikone, Phagna Hoau Knong

28. Houmphanh Xayasith, Phagna

Borikhane Province

29. Xay Ounarome, Phagna

30. Amkha Soukavong, Phagna

Khammouane Province

31. Ngone Sananikone, Phagna*

32. Sung

33. Phosy Vaewpadid

34. Nouphad Chullamany, Phagna

35. Sack Voravongsa

Savannakhet Province

36. Leum Insixiengmay, Phagna*

37. Bounteng Insixiengmay*

38. Phanh Simoukda

39. Khod Vanvongsod, Phagna

40. Khamphanh Nuensavanh, Phagna

41. Khamsing Rajaboud

42. Sing Pettone

43. Khamphouy S. Pedxomphou, Yanang

44. Heng Saythavi*

45. Khamton Sackda

Wapikhamthong Province

47. Khamled Voraxiyasack

48. May Vilaysan, Phia

Attapeu Province

49. Khamtay S. Phabmixay

50. Khamsanh Bounyasang, Phagna

51. Suvanh Sananikom*

Saravane Province

52. Veug Darasang

53. Khamtanh

54. Loay Oubmalay, Phia

Champassak Province

55. Sithad Sidthiboune, Phagna

56. Boun Oum Na Champassak, Sadet Chao

Sithandone Province

57. Khamphai Abhay, Phagna, Dr.*

58. Khamphouy Sisavad, Maha

APPENDIX D

SAMPLE SIZE CALCULATION

CALCULATION OF SAMPLE SIZE FOR LAO POLITICAL ELITE

Strata	Number of Members
1. PGNU	24
2. JNPC	42
3. National Assembly	42
3	108

$$\bar{X} = \frac{108}{3} = 36$$

$$N_i = 3$$

$$N = 108$$

$$K = 2$$

$$D = \pm .10$$

$$V = \frac{S}{\bar{X}} = \frac{10.392}{36} = .289$$

$$s = \sqrt{\sum^{N} \frac{(X_i - \bar{X})^2}{N_i - 1}} = \frac{216}{2} = 10.392$$

$$n = \frac{K^2NV^2}{ND^2 + K^2V^2} = \frac{2^2 X\ 108\ X\ .289^2}{108\ X\ .1^2 + 2^2\ X\ .289^2} = \frac{36.08}{1.41084} = 25.5$$

Where: n = Sample Size

N = Universe

X - Sample Mean

K = Number of Standard Deviations associated with a ninety-five percent confidence level.

s = Standard Deviation of Sample

V = Coefficient of Variation

D = Level of Accuracy Required

APPENDIX E

QUANAL COMPUTER PROGRAM

QUANAL PROGRAM

QUANAL or Q Analysis program used in this study was developed by N. Van Tubergen, Mass Communication Research Bureau, School of Journalism, University of Iowa. The program is written in FORTRAN IV for Version 9 of the IBM 7044 or IBM 360/65 Operating Systems. The program assumes these maximums: number of variables or number of test items, 109; number of observations or respondents, 130; and number of factors, 10.

QUANAL is a multiphrase program which allows data manipulation, correlation, principal components factoring, orthogonal or oblique rotation to simple structure, and a summary procedure called WRAP (Weighted Rotational Analytic Procedure) which in Q analysis indicates the response patterns of the different types of people to the test items.

The program consists of eight different sub-programs arranged in four different phrases and a main (controlling) phrase. One of the features of the program permits the user to enter the execution cycle at nearly any phrase and terminate at any subsequent phrase. The program also contains a wide variety of error checking procedure and exists when an error is taken, a diagnostic message is written on the output unit and execution of the remainder of the problem is terminated.

A typical QUANAL error occurs when the user begins with some sort of factor matrix as input. If a value greater than absolute 5.0 is found in a C matrix input, or a value greater than absolute 1.0 is found in a simple structures matrix input, the program assumes that an erroneous read format was supplied. A message of that effect is listed and an error exist is taken. Such unreasonably large value could be

accounted by incorrect card counts, and so forth.

The structure of the program is as follows:

1. Main Phrase

   QUANAL --establishing routine among phrases, maintains blank common.

2. Phrase 1

   INVMTX --a matric inversion subroutine used in phrases 2 and 3.

   PREPRS --evaluates user requests, echoes control summary and first rows of data, reads data by one of two procedures, alters data in any of three ways requested, including normalization.

3. Phrase 2

   PRNCOM --computes Pearson correlations or intersection matrix and performs principal components factoring.

4. Phrase 3

   ROTATE --varimax (orthogonal) or oblimax (oblique) rotation; or reference structure computed from user supplied transformation (C) matrix.

5. Phrase 4

   WRAP --provides standardized arrays for each item as seen by card type (factor), prepares a series of summary tables.

   DSCND --routine used by WRAP to form descending arrays of z-scores for tabular presentation.

Examining these sub-programs in details, the pre-processor stage (PREPRS) allows the investigator to submit his data matrix either in R or Q form. The pre-processor then makes appropriate adjustments in the data arrangement according to the user's request. This stage also provides means to normalize data and to reverse or add a constant to all scales used in the study. Optionally, the addition of a constant and the reversing-of-scales function may be carried out on a set of scales selected by the user, rather than on all scales.

In the second phrase of the program (PRNCOM), a Pearson product-moment correlation matrix is produced from the data and means and standard deviations for all variables are reported. If the user is dealing with binominal, or other nominal-type scales, he may elect to have this phrase of the program produce an intersection matrix for factoring, instead of the correlation matrix. The intersection coefficients which comprise this matrix are formed by examining every possible pairing of the variables and counting the number of observation which have the same value on both variables in the current pair.[1] The coefficient equals this sum divided by the total number of observations.

Next, the correlation matrix (or intersection matrix) is evaluated for principal component factors, using a procedure outlined by Harman.[2] Communality estimates are used in the diagonal for factoring.

The number of factors produced by this program is dependent upon one of three things: a fixed number of factors to be extracted as requested by the user, a maximum limit fixed by the user, or the program's test of eigenvalues. In the case of the latter two, the program makes its tests and continues to factor until either the user's maximum is reached or the program's test is satisfied. In this test, the user specifies the smallest eigenvalue to be accepted for a factor.

The third phrase of the program (ROTATE) provides rotation of the factors to a varimax (orthogonal) or an oblimax (oblique reference structure) solution. The solution aimed at here should be characterized

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[1]See James Deese, The Structure of Association in Language and Thought (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1965).

[2]Harry H. Harman, Modern Factor Analysis, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

by the elements of simple structure described by Thurstone[3] and summarized variously by Kerlinger[4] and Harman. In the event the user is not satisfied with one of these rotations, he may elect to determine subjectively his own normalized transformation (or, as Harris[5] terms it, C) matrix from an examination of the extended vector matrix, which QUANAL always lists. The user wishing to employ these intuitive-graphical methods would plot the extended vector matrix and choose pivotal points for the rotation from these plots. The Harris articles contain details, as do several standard factor analysis texts.[6] Since QUANAL may be begun at any phrase and terminated at any subsequent phrase, the user can prepare his own normalized transformation matrix and begin the program at rotation, continuing from there through WRAP if desired.

The two mathematical rotation procedures used will be described briefly. Varimax rotation, used in this study, is performed in the traditional manner. The factor matrix is normalized and a maximum is sought for the criterion by the formula following:

$$V = n\sum_{p=1}^{m} \sum_{j=1}^{n} a_{jp}^{4} - \sum_{p=1}^{m} \left[\sum_{j=1}^{n} a_{jp}^{2} \right]^{2}$$

where a_{jp} is the normalized factor value for the jth variable on the pth

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[3]L. L. Thurstone, Multiple Factor Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947).

[4]Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research, 2nd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973).

[5]Chester W. Harris, "Direct Rotation to Primary Structure," Journal of Educational Psychology 39 (1948), 449-468; and Chester W. Harris, "Projections of Three Types of Factor Patterns," Journal of Educational Psychology 17 (1949), 385-403.

[6]For example, Benjamin Fruchter, Introduction to Factor Analysis (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1954).

factor. The computation of rotation angle follows the method described by Harman; all rotations greater than two degrees will be performed for a pair of factors. Transformation, of course, is determined iteratively. The criterion must not increase more than .00001 in four successive iterations to determine a stable maximum. The initial and final values for the criterion are reported, and the rotated factor matrix is denormalized and listed.

The oblimax rotational method used in the program also follows the one outlined by Harman. Under this method, a relative maximum is achieved for the criterion

$$K_p = \sum_{j=1}^{n} v_{jp}^{4} \Big/ \left[\sum_{j=1}^{n} v_{jp}^{2} \right]^2$$

for each factor during an iteration (where v_{jp} is the factor value of the jth variable on the pth factor). At the end of each iteration the overall criterion,

$$K = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{p=1}^{m} v_{jp}^{4} \Big/ \left[\sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{p=1}^{m} v_{jp}^{2} \right]^2$$

is evaluated. When K reaches a relative maximum, or stabilizes at a maximum (i.e., does not increase more than .00001 in four successive iterations), iteration is stopped.

Transformation in the oblimax procedure is computed from roots of a fourth degree polynominal. QUANAL determines the roots through a combination of Graeffe's root-squaring method and Newton-Raphson method.[7]

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[7]Refers to Isaac Newton, Universal Arithmetrik, trans. by Joseph Raphson (London: J. Senex, 1720); see Chester W. Harris and Dorothy Knoell, "The Oblique Solution in Factor Analysis," Journal of Educational Psychology (1948), 385-403.

The program notes the presence (but not the explicit value) of complex roots. Since a complex root cannot be used in the transformation, an orthogonal transformation (as suggested by Harman) is substituted when such roots occur. If such action must be taken excessively, it would appear that oblimax is an inappropriate rotation for the matrix in question; therefore, when a large number of complex roots are found during oblimax solution, the program automatically reverts to a varimax rotation.

If an oblimax solution is reached, the result is a reference structure matrix. The iterative process has implicitly defined a transformation matrix A such that

(1) $V = AA$

where V is the reference structure and
A is the original orthogonal factor matrix.

Since V and A are known at the end of iteration, the complete transformation matrix A can be determined explicitly:

(2) $A^{-1}V = A$

But A is non-symetrical, so

$$A^{-1} = ((AA')^{-1}A)'$$

is computed and A found from (2). The matrix A is then corrected for error that may accrue during iteration and the final reference structure, V, is then computed directly from (1). The matrix of correlations between the reference factors is determined from

$$\Psi = A'A$$

The arc cosines of these correlations indicate the angles between vectors.

The matrix V represents the correlations of the variables with each of the reference vectors (factors) and is of simple structure form. For interpreting value, however, the primary pattern matrix, P, is most helpful. (Harman discusses this, notably in Chapter 13.) This matrix P gives the coordinates of each variable with respect to the primary factors. The relationship between P and V may be found by normalizing A^{-1} by rows and postmultiplying the result by A, yielding the diagonal matrix, D. Then,

$$P = VD^{-1}$$

The output from oblimax rotation, then, includes the initial and final values of the overall criterion, a record of any factors which have been reflected after rotation (so that each factor is at least 50 percent positive), the pattern matrix P, correlations and angles between primary factors, the reference structure matrix V, and the correlation matrix (with angle equivalents). Angles are expressed in degrees and decimal fractions of degrees.

WRAP is the fourth and final phrase of QUANAL and provides a summary of the Q results in terms of the semantic values of the study underway. WRAP first evaluates the rotated factor matrix to determine the presence of any bi-polar factors. A bi-polar factor is defined as one in which the absolute sum of the negative factor loadings is greater than 25 percent of the sum of the absolute values of this factor's loadings. (The user may adjust this criterion to another value if he wishes.) When a bi-polar factor is encountered, the negative loadings are taken from that factor and replaced with zeros. These negatives are then made positive and formed into an added factor. At this point in the processing, all factors may be seen as types--

usually in Q studies, types of people. The factor matrix is then weighted, according to one of two procedures. The weighted factor values for the types are used to form standardized typal arrays of z-scores which indicate the behavior of each type of subject toward each item.

The arrays are computed easily. Each row of the weighted factor matrix is examined and the highest positive loading for that variable is located; all other loadings for the variable are set to zero.

Where N is the number of variables (in Q, people),
n is the number of observations (in Q, items),
p is the number of types (after the bi-polar analysis of the rotated factor matrix),
F_{jk} is the weighted factor value of the jth variable on the kth type, and
D_{ij} is the response of the jth variable to the ith observation:

$$A_{ik} = \sum_{j=1}^{N} D_{ij} \; F_{jk}, \quad \text{where } i = 1, n \text{ and } k = 1,$$

Since $F_{jk} = 0$ or F_{jk} = the highest positive loading for the jth variable, it is possible for a particular k that all F_{jk} are zero. The resulting array A_{ik} would then also be zero. If such a condition occurs, the zero array is eliminated at this point.

After the check for zero arrays is made and any necessary eliminations completed, the arrays A_{ik} are standardized in the usual manner to yield the arrays Z_{ik}. These present a standard (z) score is for an item on a type, the stronger the response to that item by the people falling into that type.

From this point, WRAP is simply a program which compares comparative tables. First, it presents all items in the original order with their z's on all types. Next, it finds the Pearson correlation

between the typal arrays. It then prepares a table of the items in descending order according to z-scores for each of the types.

Next, each type may be compared with each other type. Here, a difference between an item's z-score on one type and its z-score on the other type is computed and a table is formed in descending order of these differences (from highest positive z to highest negative z). First Type 1 is compared with each of the others, beginning with Type 3; etc. The user may choose to have none of these comparisons made, or to have only selected comparisons made.

In the next section of WRAP, the program determines which items have their highest z-score on Type 1; these are listed as "Type 1 items greater than all others." Those items with their lowest z-score on Type 1 are next located and listed as "Type 1 items less than all others." This process is repeated for each type. Each of the sections of these tables is listed in descending order, according to the difference between the z-score in question and the average of all other z-scores for that item.

Finally, the WRAP phrase locates "consensus items" and lists them in descending order of their average z-score. A consensus item is defined as an item having a z-score difference among types no greater than some arbitrary value. The program assumes 1.0 as a criterion value, but this is adjustable at user discretion. At this value, one could say that a consensus item is one which, from one type to another, never varies in array position more than z - 1.0, or one standard deviation.