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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA  
GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES 1946-1975:  
A STUDY OF A SMALL POWER IN AN ALLIANCE

A DISSERTATION  
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE COLLEGE  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

ORLANDO M. HERNANDO

Norman, Oklahoma

1976

THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES, 1946-1975:

A STUDY OF A SMALL POWER IN AN ALLIANCE

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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this investigation is to describe and analyze the alliance between the United States and the Philippines utilizing a conceptual framework that suggest small power motives for joining, adhering, or withdrawing from an alliance: (1) security in relation to the geographical situation; (2) prestige in the international community; (3) domestic stability; (4) economic aid and military assistance; and (5) ideology.

Through the use of primary and secondary sources, this investigation analyzes the alliance in three parts. Part I is the preliminary considerations section. It includes the introduction, the discussion of the definitions and concepts of alliance and small power, and the general background about the Philippines regarding its history, economy, politics, geography, and foreign policy. Part II describes and analyzes the principal treaties of the alliance. Part III presents the problems, prospects, and alternatives open to the Philippines with regard to

the alliance; and the conclusions and observations developed by the investigation. On the basis of the conceptual framework, the Philippines' motives for joining the alliance were based on her need for security, prestige, domestic stability, economic aid and military assistance, and because of her ideological affinity with the United States. Because these factors still play an important role in assessing the future security needs of the Philippines, the Philippines may find it difficult to scrap the alliance and attempt to experiment with other foreign policies like neutrality or nonalignment, or alliance with other powers or regional associations.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This dissertation owes a large debt of gratitude to Americans and Filipinos who worked together in the building of a new nation. There was a missionary named Dr. Hall with whom my mother worked. Together they labored to heal the sick and the injured, so that by example and by deed, the ideals of Christianity may be learned by Filipinos. Another Dr. Hall, Dr. Rufus Hall, Jr., worked very hard to encourage and assist me in the writing of this dissertation in order that I could complete my studies at the University of Oklahoma.

I thank all my teachers, both American and Filipino; the missionaries who encouraged me to continue my education in the United States; the members of my dissertation committee--Dr. Donald E. Secrest, Dr. Paul A. Tharp, Jr., and Dr. V. Stanley Vardys--and many individuals who offered encouragement and material assistance in one form or another.

I thank the University of the Philippines for graduate fellowships; Kansas State University for a graduate assis-

tantship that provided the opportunity for me to travel to the United States for graduate studies; the University of Oklahoma for a graduate assistantship and many opportunities to help me in my education; and Central Philippine University for the development of my ideas and ideals.

Mr. Savoie Lottinville, eminent historian and editor, generously gave of his busy time and splendid energy to read the entire manuscript and offered numerous critical suggestions toward improving the style and format of the dissertation. Mr. John Fowler, MA in history, read earlier drafts and gave the manuscript the benefit of a critical and perceptive mind.

The author thanks his family for their patience and understanding and dedicates this work to his father, Fernando Hernando, and his mother, Feliciano Maravillas.

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## PART I

### BACKGROUND AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

During the unsettled and chaotic period following the end of World War II in the Pacific, the Philippines and the United States entered into a series of negotiations which culminated in the signing of several treaties and agreements, the most important of which are the treaties on military bases, mutual defense, military assistance, and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. These agreements are considered to be mutually beneficial to the two nations in relation to their respective national objectives. For the Philippines, the agreements provide guaranties for the protection of its national security and the preservation of its political independence. For the United States, the agreements enable that great power to project its role as a Pacific power in the pursuit of its policy of preventing the dominance of Asia by any single power in the world. The treaties also provide protection for the United States territory by the establishment of forward bases in the Far East.

As a result of these agreements, the United States and the Philippines established what is technically called in international law and relations as an alliance. It is



the purpose of this investigation to identify and describe the reasons for that alliance between the United States and the Philippines--one a great power and the other a small power; the issues and problems that have produced stresses and strains in that alliance; and the prospects of that alliance in the light of evolving events in the external and internal environments of the Philippines.

Part I of this study explores the background and general considerations pertinent to this investigation. Chapter I is a discussion of the problem to be investigated, the importance of the problem, the major questions of the investigation, the scope of the investigation, operational definitions, the method or technique of the investigation, a short review of the significant literature related to the investigation, and the organization of the study.

Chapter II is a discussion of the concepts of alliance and the small state. Some discussion is devoted to a survey of political science literature on the subject of conceptual and analytical frameworks which have been utilized in the study of alliances.

Chapter III provides the geographic, historical, economic, and political background of the Philippines.

## THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES, 1946-1975:

### A STUDY OF A SMALL POWER IN AN ALLIANCE

#### CHAPTER I

##### INTRODUCTION

In a major policy speech delivered on July 7, 1975, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos expressed the desire of the Philippine government to "assume control" of all American military bases in the Philippines in order to "put an end to the practice of extraterritoriality in our country in keeping with our dignity as a sovereign Republic."<sup>1</sup> Marcos said this was in keeping with the developments of the time. In the same speech, Marcos said that the Philippines was now ready to enter into negotiations with the United States regarding treaties between the two countries involving mutual defense, military assistance, and military bases.<sup>2</sup> Although Marcos sought full control over U.S. military bases in the Philippines, he also said that he was not objecting to new arrangements that would enable the United States to continue to maintain an effective presence over the air and sea lanes of the Western Pacific in order to protect the national security of the United States.

Marcos stated that his position was in full accord with the aspirations of all Asian peoples, never depending on foreign troops to fight "our battles", having adopted a policy that in meeting threats to internal stability "we have always refused to allow foreign troops to fight in our territory."<sup>3</sup> There was no reason why foreign troops should remain on Philippine soil after fifty years, Marcos asserted, but:

. . . having never been known as a worthless ally, there is no reason why we should deny those facilities which a historical ally might or must need in fulfilling its assigned role for the maintenance of peace in the region.<sup>4</sup>

These frank and bold statements on the part of a Philippine statesman regarding Philippine-American relations since U.S. withdrawal from the Asian mainland have focused attention on the future of one of the oldest alliances the United States has fashioned in Southeast Asia in the aftermath of World War II in the pursuit of its policy of containment of Communist expansion in all parts of the world. Because the Philippines has historically depended for its military security on the United States, the statements of Marcos must be considered in the light of the long period of relationship between the two countries, the developments in the global environment since the end of the war in Vietnam, and the changes in the internal politics of the Philippines.

There has, indeed, been a reshaping of the direction of Philippine foreign policy, perhaps not away from the United States, but more in its psychological need for the development of national self-reliance in a world where

accommodation and flexibility in diplomacy have now become necessary.

In an earlier speech delivered on May 23, 1975, Marcos outlined the following guidelines for a new foreign policy:

First, to intensify, along a broader field, our relations with the members of ASEAN;

Second, to pursue more vigorously the establishment of diplomatic relations with Socialist states, in particular with the People's Republic of China and with the Soviet Union;

Third, to seek closer identification with the Third World with whom we share similar problems;

Fourth, to continue our beneficial relationship with Japan;

Fifth, to support the Arab countries in their struggle for a just and enduring peace in the Middle East; and

Finally, to find a new basis, compatible with the emerging realities in Asia, for a continuing healthy relationship with the United States.<sup>5</sup>

This new policy has resulted in the negotiation of and the subsequent establishment of diplomatic relations with all of the Communist countries of eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China. The latest development in this sphere was the conclusion of negotiations leading to diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Philippines on June 2, 1976 at Moscow.

The Philippines strongly supports ASEAN through which it seeks greater cooperation on economic matters with its members and the creation of a "zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality" in Southeast Asia. The Philippines views

the SEATO as having outlived its usefulness and does not place any reliance on it for its security since it has a bilateral treaty of mutual defense with the United States.

In calling for a reexamination of all defense agreements with the United States, Marcos refers to the 1947 Military Bases Agreement which expires in 1991, the 1947 Military Assistance Agreement which has been amended, and the 1952 Treaty of Mutual Defense.

Marcos is deeply interested in renegotiating the military bases agreement. There are two major U.S. bases in the Philippines: the Air Force Base at Clark Field, and the Naval Base Complex at Subic Bay. Clark Air Base, 52 miles north of Manila, spreads over 131,000 acres, making it greater in size than the combined area of all U.S. air bases outside the continental United States. The Subic naval base complex is situated on 36,000 acres of land and encompasses 26,000 acres of water. About fifteen thousand U.S. servicemen are stationed at the two bases supplemented by 47,000 Filipino employees. In 1974, the budget for Clark and Subic was \$232 million. The bases represent a major investment for the United States, a major payroll for the Philippines, and an irritating issue to both countries.

In announcing the negotiations for a new base agreement, the Philippine Government said that it will be guided by these principles:

1. To give added impetus to Philippine reliance;
2. To enhance respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Philippines; and
3. To help maintain a balance of power in the region.

From the Philippine point of view, negotiation of a

new status for the bases involves three main issues: (1) Filipinization of the bases or elimination of extra-territorial carry-overs; (2) use of portions of the bases for commercial purposes and economic development which can be on a joint basis; and (3) return of portions of the base lands.

There is no question that the bases are important to Filipinos in terms of providing security to the country, as well as promoting regional stability and aiding the local economy. For the United States, the bases constitute vital links in its defensive system.

The future of these bases is inextricably linked to the question of what direction Philippine policy may take in the post-Vietnam era. In a sense, the settlement of the bases question may also determine the future of the alliance relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines.

In fact the possibilities that face the Philippines in case it decides to terminate the alliance are explored by Salvador P. Lopez, former Philippine ambassador to the UN:

We will have to consider whether a decision to abrogate these arrangements might so weaken the American military posture in the Western Pacific that the new quadrilateral balance of power in the region would be seriously disturbed. We will also have to ponder the wisdom of joining the ranks of the non-aligned at a time when the policy of non-alignment is receding before the advancing

principle of détente. Since non-alignment was essentially a response to the Cold War, its relevance as a foreign policy option must diminish as the Cold War thaw continues.<sup>6</sup>

Lopez warns against a radical and precipitate foreign policy shift from alliance to non-alignment because this might create for the Philippines the very danger of conflict which it had sought to prevent by adopting a policy of non-alignment. He suggests that while it is desirable for the Philippines to forge new links with China and the Soviet Union, it must carefully consider under what terms and conditions the Philippines can maintain existing ties and mutually beneficial relationships, including security arrangements, with the United States and the West. "The whole purpose of the exercise, after all," Lopez concludes, "is not to substitute one hegemony for another, but to broaden our options and to strengthen our hand in international affairs."<sup>7</sup>

In his own way, U.S. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield agrees that the "winds of change" have swept over Asia and that the United States must fashion new policies to meet new challenges. In reviewing the Philippine situation and its desire to renegotiate U.S. security agreements with that country, Mansfield concluded in a report to the

Senate foreign relations committee on October 14, 1975, that:

In summary, the Philippine republic is experiencing a period of growing national assertion and economic progress. At the same time, its ties with the United States which go back three quarters of a century are in transition. What is involved in this transition of principal concern to the United States are the vestiges of the previous dependency relationship which, in my judgment, no longer accord with the enduring interests of either nation. There is a need for a reshaping of attitudes and arrangements which will reflect the changes that have taken place in the Philippines and in the Pacific and the world. The future of the Philippines is bright and so, too, can be the outlook for continued cooperation and beneficial interchange with the United States if the adjustments which are now required are made in good faith and are managed with sensitivity and understanding --on both sides.<sup>8</sup>

It is anticipated that the negotiations which are now going on will be difficult for both the Philippines and the United States involving as it is an agonizing reappraisal of their historic relationship and their agreements creating an alliance partnership between them.

#### Statement of Purpose

It is, therefore, the purpose of this investigation to describe and analyze the alliance between the Philippines and the United States following a conceptual framework of an alliance between a great power and a small power.



### Importance of the Study

Generally, the study of alliances is important because more knowledge is needed of its internal operations as well as its function in the community of nations.<sup>9</sup>

In terms of the involvement of small nations in international politics, in spite of the traditional theory that their influence remains weak in a world of power politics, one cannot ignore them altogether.<sup>10</sup>

It has also been asserted that "additional investigations of small-power capabilities, determinants, motivations, and behavioral patterns during the Cold War and the era of peaceful coexistence seem useful, even necessary."<sup>11</sup>

Finally, for the writer it is very important to investigate this subject himself for very personal reasons because he grew up in an educational system patterned closely after that in the United States, supported the American cause without question during World War II, and personally experienced hardships because of his loyalty and friendship to Americans.

### Major Questions of the Study

The principal questions that this investigation undertakes to answer are the following:

First, what were the motivations or reasons of the Philippines in joining an alliance with a great power, the United States.

Second, what were the benefits and costs to the

Philippines as a result of her alliance with the United States?

Third, what are the prospects of the alliance considering the developments in the external and internal environments of the Philippines insofar as foreign policy-making is concerned?

#### Scope of the Investigation

The period to be covered by this investigation will principally include the period after World War II to the present. Some past history prior to World War II will also be included insofar as they are relevant to the study.

#### Sources of the Study

Government or public documents will form the core of the primary materials of this study. Many documents used in this study were classified documents at the time of their preparation and were classified, therefore, in varying categories as secret, top secret, confidential, or restricted. These documents have now been declassified and are available to the public for research and other purposes. Because of the confidential nature of these documents at the time of their preparation, they reveal many insights into the policymaking process and are therefore very valuable in furnishing background information to the policymaking process. Many of these documents include studies prepared for the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other U.S. agencies. One outstanding example of these documents is the so-called

Pentagon Papers. Another group of materials have been released for research in the Foreign Relations of the U.S. series of documents published by the U.S. Department of State. Other primary materials utilized for this study include the speeches and writings of public officials and statesmen, texts of treaties and agreements, transcripts of congressional hearings, congressional reports and documents, and department releases. Many books, monographs, pamphlets, and newspapers were also consulted as secondary sources.

#### Operational Definitions

The principal terms to be defined in this study are alliance and small power. Because there exists a body of literature discussing the concepts of alliance and small power, a survey was made for purposes of this research of a considerable body of writing on alliance and small power. The results of this survey of literature on alliance and small power are included as a separate chapter of this investigation.

#### Method or Technique of Inquiry

This study is concerned with the foreign relations of a single state--the Philippines. It is intended as an analysis of the participation of a small power in an alliance with a great power, in this case, the United States.

It is hoped that by the use of a conceptual framework in the analysis of small power behavior in alignments, we can facilitate theorizing about the behavior of a cer-

tain category of small states.

We agree with the author of a recent monograph that the possibility of comparative analysis

depends less on the use of a common framework than on the willingness of writers of case studies to put their conclusion in the form of general hypotheses, using well-known, loosely defined variables capable of easy translation from one study to the next.<sup>12</sup>

Chapter II of this investigation presents and analyzes a number of conceptual and analytical frameworks utilized in a number of investigations relating to the subjects of alliance and small power or small state. Some of these frameworks require elaborate and expensive attention to detail and are beyond the capabilities of graduate students desiring to do research in this field unless they have the support of some foundation or a government agency.

However, for purposes of presenting a compact analysis of Philippine behavior in its alliance with the United States, the following conceptual framework, as suggested by Omer De Raeymaeker, is used in this investigation. According to De Raeymaeker, small power motives for adhering to or possibly withdrawing from alliances may be classified as follows:<sup>13</sup>

1. Security in relation to the Geographical Situation.

The first and most vital motive determining a small power's basic strategic choice is the quest of survival as an independent and sovereign entity. To survive, a small power elite must de-

fend its national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Yet the security of a small nation depends heavily on variables within the international system and on its geographic and topographic location within the system. Much will also depend on the small nation's historical experience, on its perceptions concerning the attitudes of foes and friends alike, on the military capabilities of enemies, on its own industrial-military potential, on the quality of its leaderships, its morale, its political cohesion, and similar characteristics.

## 2. Prestige in the International Community.

A nation's relative rank in the international hierarchy of prestige, thus of its estimation in the eyes of other countries' decision makers, is not altogether insignificant. An alliance or nonalliance policy may enhance or diminish a small power's status. Superior recognition will accord it wider influence in the international community, and by the same token the prestige of its ruling elite will augment or increase. Prestige is also a kind of first defense line of a country's security. Its erosion may induce other nations to consider pressure or even attack.

## 3. Domestic Stability.

Domestic stability may be threatened by "material and political<sup>14</sup> burdens and strains flowing from alliance" or nonalliance. Whether small states' decision makers decide to join or reject a coalition is very much related to their quest for the security of tenure. Some governments may stay or fall by their identification with a great power or coalition. Particularly in democratic nations the government's choices may be narrowly limited by pressure from the press, public opinion, various interest groups, or the legislature.

#### 4. Economic Aid and Military Assistance.

In the eyes of the ruling elite, even in the eyes of the peoples concerned, alliances may result favorably in the pooling of resources and the material support of allies. As G. Liska argues: "On the economic plane, alliance promotes internal stability most commonly when pooling of resources and division of roles among members enables a regime to stop short of mobilizing disaffected groups and interests; beyond that, alliances may entail outright subsidy or other forms of material support."<sup>15</sup> But this attraction that a stronger state holds for the weaker aware of its trade and economic needs is only provisional. "Resentment of economic dependence and an opportunity to draw on alternative sources and outlets"<sup>16</sup> may set off a political reaction.

#### 5. Ideology.

Ideology, which may or may not be tied to cultural affinity, is definitely related to the elite's quest for both external and internal security. For instance, in the West the fear of Russian expansion was probably augmented by the fear of Communist ideology and totalitarian political structure.

It is the view of Omer De Raeymaeker that the movement toward or away from an alliance is a function of these five motives, and any assessment of a basic strategic choice involves a comparison of the hypothetical gains and losses of either move. Whether interstate or intergroup conflicts determine a country's position, observes De Raeymaeker, depends on their relative intensity.

### Review of the Literature

For a long period of time, political scientists and specialists in international relations have consistently forsaken the subject of small states. The pioneering work in this field is Annette Baker Fox's investigation of the behavior of five small neutral European states during World War II.<sup>17</sup> Two other works have appeared since then, the first, Robert Rothstein's Alliances and Small Powers<sup>18</sup> and David Vital's The Inequality of States.<sup>19</sup>

Two books published in recent years in Belgium also systematically explore the behavior of small states in alliances. The first is Small Powers in Alignment by Omer De Raeymaeker, Willy Andries, Luc Crollen, Herman De Fraye, and Frans Govaerts.<sup>20</sup> The second book is Luc Crollen's Portugal, The U.S. and NATO.<sup>21</sup>

Probably the most original and penetrating studies ever to be made of the theory of alliance are the works of George Liska: Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence,<sup>22</sup> Alliances and the Third World,<sup>23</sup> and Imperial America: The International Politics of Primacy.<sup>24</sup>

With reference to the Philippines, there is an excellent treatment of United States and Philippine relations by George B. Taylor entitled The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership.<sup>25</sup> Published just recently and using a comparative analysis of the foreign policies of the Philippines and Thailand is W. Scott Thompson's Unequal Partners: Philippine and Thai Relations with the United States 1965-75.<sup>26</sup>

Numerous documents of the U.S. Congress, particularly hearings on appropriations for the Departments of State and Defense were researched for material for this investigation. However, one vital document merits special attention with regard to its value to this study. It is the United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: The Republic of the Philippines, a document containing the transcripts of hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.<sup>27</sup>

### Organization of the Study

The study is organized as follows:

#### Part I. Background and General Considerations

Chapter I. Introduction

Chapter II. The Concepts of Alliance and the Small State

Chapter III. The Philippines: General Background

#### Part II. The Framework of the Alliance

Chapter IV. The Agreements on Military Bases and Military Assistance

Chapter V. The Treaty of Mutual Defense

Chapter VI. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty

#### Part III. Problems and Prospects of the Alliance

Chapter VII. The Troubled Partnership 1946-1975

Chapter VIII. The Future of the Alliance

Chapter IX. Conclusions and Observations



## NOTES

## CHAPTER I

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6. Salvador P. Lopez, "New Directions in Philippine Foreign Policy," The Carillon (Philippines) July, 1975, p. 7.

7. Ibid.

8. Mansfield, op. cit.

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14. George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 30.

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## CHAPTER II

### THE CONCEPTS OF ALLIANCE AND THE SMALL STATE

#### Alliance

Alliances are regulators in the equilibrium mechanism. They are as old as the spear and as modern as strategic nuclear weapons, and tribes, city-states, peoples, and states have sought various kinds to fulfill their respective security needs. Nowadays entire continents are entrenched in alliances. Yet even the permanent ones seldom last. They fail and fall apart; they are successful but may experience a disintegrative process. Today's ally may be a neutral tomorrow and an adversary the day after . . . Omer De Raeymaeker.<sup>1</sup>

As the above quotation comprehensively states, alliances constitute one of the most ancient political compacts entered into by nations.<sup>2</sup> And when we speak of international relations we cannot avoid referring to alliances.<sup>3</sup>

Alliances, therefore, constitute a universal component of relations between political units irrespective of time and place.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, it can also be said that

alliance politics lie at the core of a nation's foreign policy so that when one speaks of alliances, he actually speaks of foreign policy in general.<sup>5</sup> This makes alliance policy an integral part of foreign policy.<sup>6</sup> This is so because alliances enable states to seek the cooperation of other states in order to enhance their ability to protect and advance their interests. In a negative way, an alliance policy becomes a necessity for some states who actually seek to avoid alliances.<sup>7</sup>

Since history relates innumerable alliances between the several states, they have always played an important part in international politics.<sup>8</sup> This observation led one scholar to theorize that alliances constitute one of the two main threads of modern international history.<sup>9</sup> The development of defensive alliances and the principle of the balance of power is believed to be the reason in fact why no great strong empire has ever dominated the liberties of the free national states of Europe, nor indeed of any part of the world.<sup>10</sup>

So pervasive are alliances in human history that they have compelled the conclusion that they stem from the very nature of man himself:

If individual man is, in truth, a political or social animal, and by his very nature craves the society of his fellows, it would appear that collective man, the state, is a social creature, if habitual behavior is any guide. The behavior of states from the time when states first made their appearance in the world indicates that they stand in need of the society and cooperation of their fellows.<sup>11</sup>

Alliances may be the most ancient of state practices but they still continue to flourish on the world scene.<sup>12</sup> And yet even if it is quite ubiquitous on the human scene, the concept of alliances cannot be treated as a simple one.<sup>13</sup> In spite of the fact that "the most cursory review" of the literature "will quickly reveal that writing on international alliances and coalitions has been prolific," most of this research do not meet the scientific standards of explicitness, visibility, and repeatability. So that while there are many histories of the workings of alliances, there remains a lack of any workable theory on the basis of which nations might learn how to operate alliances better.<sup>14</sup>

Another relatively unworked field is the membership of small powers in alliances.<sup>15</sup> It is not surprising that one writer has suggested that additional investment of time and energy in the study of alliance as a component

of international politics is clearly warranted. There is need for more knowledge of its internal operations as well as its function in the community of nations.<sup>16</sup>

In order that the major questions of this investigation can be formulated and answered, it becomes necessary at this stage to define the concepts of alliance and small power.

Concept of Alliance. -- It is the ultimate purpose of national power to preserve the people of the state in their culture and well-being. Because international relations is not governed by one law court supreme over all states, each state must finally depend upon its own implied and applied capabilities.<sup>17</sup>

National capabilities must also rest on considerations of sufficiency of resources whether economic, political or military. In a world of growing scarcity of resources, a national decisionmaker must determine how he can best allocate national resources in order to attain national goals.

One alternative is to seek the cooperation of other states in the attainment of national goals. There are several ways by which nations display cooperative behavior:<sup>18</sup>

1. Formal alliance - A cooperative effort in which

the rights and duties of each member are codified in a treaty.

2. Coalition - A cooperative effort formed for the attainment of short-range, issue-specific objectives.

3. Informal alignment - Learned expectations on the part of nations as to how much cooperation might be expected from other nations.

4. Behavioral alignment - Actual efforts of nations to coordinate their behaviors in a similar manner with respect to common objects

The classical writers of international law have looked at alliance as a treaty or union between two or more states for the purpose of defending each other against an attack in war, or of jointly attacking third states, or for both purposes.<sup>19</sup>

Typically, an alliance involves a commitment among two or more states, formalized by a legally binding international agreement, to come to one another's aid in the event of a certain specified action by an outside state or states.<sup>20</sup>

A more detailed definition of the concept of alliance in the traditional sense is as follows:



Alliance: partnership, or contracted agreement between two or more powers in pursuit of a given object. In contrast to a formal permanent link between states, such as a Union or Confederation, an alliance has a temporary nature. The contracting powers, who forfeit none of their political independence in favour of the partnership, are termed Allies. The object of an alliance is specific; it entails mutual support in given circumstances for the attainment of given objectives, and not as is the case with a union or confederation, the joint realization of overall national aims.<sup>21</sup>

The utilization of force is implicit in another definition which defines alliance as a formal agreement that pledges states to cooperate in using their military resources against a specific state or states and usually obligates one or more of the signatories to use force, or to consider (unilaterally or in consultation with allies) the use of force, in specific circumstances.<sup>22</sup>

An alliance can also be understood not only in terms of its legal characteristics, but also as a type of international organization: when it is applied, for example, to the organized unity among the permanent members of the Security Council dedicated in the Charter as the foundation of universal collective security.<sup>23</sup>

Alliances have also be considered to be "instruments of national security," as where it is defined as "a formal

agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues."<sup>24</sup>

The concept of alliance may also be distinguished from other forms of international cooperation if the following pivotal features are considered:

- a. existence of an enemy or enemies, actual or anticipated;
- b. contemplation of military engagement and the risk of war; and
- c. mutuality of interest in either the preservation of the status quo or aggrandizement in regard to territory, population, strategic resources, and so forth.<sup>25</sup>

Then the alliance may be viewed as a relationship between two or more nation-states which is characterized by:

- a. pairing or collaboration with one another for a limited duration regarding a mutually perceived problem;
- b. aggregation of their capabilities for participation in international affairs;
- c. pursuit of national interests jointly or by parallel courses of action; and
- d. probability that assistance will be rendered by members to one another.<sup>26</sup>

For the purposes of this investigation, alliances will be viewed as "regulators in the equilibrium mechanism." The formation of the alliance between the United States

and the Philippines was developed for purposes of preserving the balance of power or equilibrium in Asia. At least that was the intended purpose. This alliance may be analyzed in the light of the theoretical literature involving the use of the equilibrium model:

The actors on the stage of international politics --principally states--are supposed to have the natural tendency to consciously or unconsciously oppose excessive concentrations of power in one nation or group of nations. Under conditions of the possible use of force, the increment in the coercion capacity of one power unit will lead to a more or less proportionate growth of the means of coercion of at least one other unit in the system. Great disturbances in the equilibrium of the system, for instance, through the rise of a hegemonial power, will generally lead the other actors to augment their coercive capacities and/or to join together for the purpose of containment. This leads to equilibrium or stalemate, situations which may then be provisional or permanent, partial or total. Change is not possible. Equilibrium may be disturbed and eventually end up in a new equilibrium on a different level.<sup>27</sup>

There are two alternatives open to small states in the movement toward equilibrium which can be best achieved by a system of alliances:<sup>28</sup>

1. Alignment:

A small state can decide to ally itself with one or more states in order to deter a potential aggressor. This can be done on either a bilateral or a multilateral basis.

2. Nonalignment:

A small state may decide to provide its security outside alliance systems. Various kinds of nonalliance policies range from neutralization or permanent neutrality to neutralism, nonalignment, and noninvolvement.

Although the present world structure appears to be bipolar on the strategic and nuclear level, there is a movement on the political level toward new power centers. In Asia, for example, Japan and the People's Republic of China are making their presence felt. Within this structure it is believed that a strategically-located small state seems to have only two alternatives: integration in one of the two power blocs, or the risky nonalignment that hopes for no conflict, or if conflict happens, to hope for noninvolvement.<sup>29</sup>

Features of Alliances. -- Most treaties of alliance contain a fundamental commitment of response in military contingency. Such contingencies have been identified either as "aggression" or "armed attack." This feature of an alliance has been traditionally identified as the casus foederis:

Casus foederis is the event upon the occurrence of which it becomes the duty of one of the allies to render the promised assistance to the other. Thus, in the case of a defensive

alliance, the casus foederis occurs when war is declared or commenced against one of the allies. Treaties of alliance often define precisely the event which shall be the casus foederis, and then the latter is less exposed to controversy. But on the other hand, there have been many alliances concluded without such a precise definition, and consequently, disputes have arisen later between the parties as to the casus foederis.<sup>30</sup>

Not only disputes arising from an interpretation of the casus foederis, but alliance treaties, in common with all treaties, have also been subjected to questions respecting the original power of the signatories to conclude the treaty, the duration and binding effectiveness of the pact, scope of the obligations assumed, and the effect of the treaty upon other treaties and other parties. One particular instance of legal questions involving treaties is the exercise of national jurisdiction upon foreign troops garrisoned in the territory of the host country. As will be discussed later on, this question has been one of the most irritating subjects between the United States and the Philippines as alliance partners. Because alliances are constituted by treaties, questions involving alliances so constituted have come to be included within the scope of international law.<sup>31</sup>

Besides armed aggression or armed attack, contemporary treaties of alliance have identified in advance either specifically in the agreement or in broad and general terms, the enemy or the victim against whom the alliance is organized. Thus "communist expansion" or "capitalist imperialism" have been mentioned as the most common targets of alliances constructed in the existing bipolar cold war.<sup>32</sup>

Another feature of alliances is that they are limited in scope -- the treaty area covered by a treaty of alliance is never worldwide. The treaty normally mentions the members of the alliance, the territories covered, and the particular geographical area embraced by the alliance is either explicitly or impliedly stated.<sup>33</sup>

Treaties of alliance are not only aimed at limited purposes of attack or defense in particular geographic areas, they are also ad hoc and decentralized in nature. They are described as ad hoc because: (1) the treaties are for a short and usually specified duration of time; (2) they have a narrow policy-range, because most of them today are either aimed at anti-communism and some at anti-capitalism; and (3) their agencies and institutions usually

function on the basis of a decentralized though coordinating agency.<sup>34</sup>

In sum, the most common features of alliances include: restricted membership--they are composed of only the like-minded states, with common bonds; limited scope of activity--usually limited to the military goals of attack or defence in defined territory; limited duration and effectiveness -- they are organized for a fixed length of time, lacking independent and final authority to decide or act in any manner and dependent upon the vagaries of national politics. They are best described therefore as: temporary relationships between two or more states that are joined together on an ad hoc basis, through an agreement for the achievement of limited military purposes like prosecution of war or defense against aggression, potential or actual, all in the name of national interest.<sup>35</sup>

Conceptual Frameworks of Alliances. -- Systematic and rigorous review of the literature of alliances has been done elsewhere<sup>36</sup> and will therefore not be done in this investigation. However, a few attempts at a systematic analysis of alliances will be presented in order to lay the basis for the conceptual framework that will be

utilized in this study.

Five conceptual or analytical frameworks of alliances are arbitrarily chosen from the literature of alliances.

They are:

1. A descriptive model of alliances proposed by David Edwards in his book, International Political Analysis.<sup>37</sup>

2. Ten dimensions of bilateral relationship as drawn up by Dr. William W. Whitson of the Rand Corporation.<sup>38</sup>

3. A propositional analysis of alliances as surveyed by Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan in Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies.<sup>39</sup>

4. A conceptual framework of analysis by Philip M. Burgess and David W. Moore from their study "Inter-Nation Alliances: An Inventory and Appraisal of Propositions."<sup>40</sup>

5. An operational framework of analysis by Omer De Raeymaeker, Willy Andries, Luc Crollen, Herman De Fraye, and Frans Govaerts in Small Powers in Alignment.<sup>41</sup>

1. A descriptive model of alliance by David V. Edwards assumes alliance as an outcome of conscious policy-making. There are five major questions or hypotheses in Edwards' model.<sup>42</sup>

First, Edwards asks why and when do nations align? The basic factors for consideration are: the preceding conditions, the perception of the conditions, the believed interests of each party to the alliance, the policy and action that these factors determine, and finally



the negotiation that results from such actions.

The second question asked by Edwards is: What determines the nature and form of the alliance? The factors that enter into consideration here include the specific features of the world situation, the interests of the parties to the alliance, and the way in which the treaty was formalized.

Thirdly, Edwards asks: What is the morphology of alliance relations? Among the factors to be considered here would be the regular interaction or normal interaction that occurs to nations whether or not they are allied, and the responsive interaction that is a consequence of the alliance.


Fourth, Edwards asks: What is the life cycle of an alliance? What determines its development? The factors to be considered here include questions involving expansion and deterioration as major possible stages in the life cycle of an alliance.

Fifth, and last, Edwards asks: What determines when and how alliances will end? Treaties of alliance terminate by expiration, cancellation, military destruction, unilateral abrogation, default, and other causes.

Below is Edwards' descriptive model for the study of alliances: <sup>43</sup>

Figure 1.

## DESCRIPTIVE MODEL FOR THE STUDY OF ALLIANCE



2. Dr. William W. Whitson proposes that salient American interests in a particular country could or should be expressed in terms of ten relations (expressed as U.S. or joint U.S.-host country strategies.)<sup>44</sup>

1. General Rationale of the Bilateral Relationship and US Commitment

2. The Diplomatic (Propaganda or Verbal) Elaboration of the Commitment

3. U.S.-Host Country General Purpose Force Commitments and Role

4. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Commitment

5. U.S.-Host Country Base Posture

6. U.S.-Host Country Military Assistance Strategy

7. U.S.-Host Country Intelligence Collection Strategy

8. U.S.-Host Country Trade and Economic Assistance Strategy

9. U.S. Approach to Host Country Domestic Politics

10. U.S. Approach to Host Country Relations with Third Countries

3. Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan surveyed theories and propositions on international alliances with special emphasis on their (1) formation, (2) performance, (3) disin-

tegration, and (4) effects.<sup>45</sup>

The major questions that these authors asked with respect to theories of alliance formation were the following:<sup>46</sup>

1. What motives lead statesmen to join or avoid alliance.
2. Are some states more likely to form alliances than other?
3. Can we deduce patterns of alignment from the international distribution of power, or does the premise that like states will attract each other better inform our predictions?

With regard to alliance performance, the authors asked the following questions:<sup>47</sup>

1. How is influence distributed within the alliance?
2. What makes for cohesion among the member states?
3. What factors distinguish effective alliances from ineffective ones?

With regard to alliance termination, the following questions were raised:<sup>48</sup>

1. Why do some alliances endure while others disintegrate rapidly?

2. What are the likely consequences of nuclear weapons and their proliferation for alliances?

With regard to the effects of alliances, the following questions were posed:<sup>49</sup>

1. Do alliances serve to maintain stability by maintaining an equilibrium and by increasing the predictability of international affairs?

2. Are they a prime cause of war, or are they the seeds of more lasting forms of integration?

3. What are the domestic effects of alliance participation?

4. Burgess and Moore also developed an inventory and appraisal of propositions relating to alliances. Their study proposed that the following questions be explored in order to establish a conceptual framework for the investigation of alliances:<sup>50</sup>

a. Why do nations form alliances?

b. What are the characteristic properties of different alliances?

c. What are the relationships between the characteristics of alliance members, the composition of the alliances, and other coalition properties?

d. What are the relationships between coalition properties and the behavior of the coalition?

e. What are the effects of coalition behavior on the coalition itself, on the international system, on the individual members of the coalition--nations and nonmember nations?

The resultant model that Burgess and Moore propose identifies nations and alliances as the two major units of analysis. Nations are described (1) by national attributes (such as size, level of economic development, societal cohesion and integration); (2) by situational and contextual factors (e.g., the existence of threats or proximity to conflict) that are related to occasions or opportunities for joining coalitions or withdrawing from them; and (3) by motivational factors (e.g., the desire to gain rewards or in the form of side payments to defend against threats to independent existence).<sup>51</sup>


The model also includes global properties of the alliance itself: the integration and concentration of alliance decisionmaking authority; the extent of internal conflict and tensions; alliance capability; the stability and effectiveness of alliances; the intra-alliance distri-

bution of costs and rewards, and the scope of member interests covered by the alliance. Finally, the model includes two behavioral clusters of variables--one for the nation and one for the alliance. With respect to the nation several different classes of behavior were examined: joining and withdrawing from alliances; expanding and contracting the functions of alliances; and the level and duration of commitments to alliances. With respect with respect to alliance behavior or the collective behavior of nations in alliances, the propositions concern belligerent and restrained behavior; predictable versus unpredictable behavior; and the effects of alliance behavior on international systems, on the domestic political systems of member nations, and on the alliance itself.<sup>52</sup>

Figure 2 illustrates the model proposed by Burgess and Moore as shown on page 40.<sup>53</sup>

Figure 2. Process Model of Inter-Nation Alliances

FIGURE 1. Process Model of Inter-Nation Alliances\*



\* The broken arrows indicate that a nation in an alliance is part of the *internal* influences of an alliance. The attributes of a nation (e.g., power), its motivational factors (e.g., goals), and its behavior (e.g., assuming a dominant role among alliance members) *all* constitute part of the internal influences on alliance behavior. The double-headed arrow suggests that alliance behavior influences the environment, which thereby influences the environment of the nation. When a *nation* is the unit of analysis, its environment consists of (1) other nations, (2) the international system, (3) the alliance. When an *alliance* is the unit of analysis, its environment consists of (1) the international system, (2) nonmember nations (member nations constituting internal influences), and (3) other alliances. In short, for the unit being analyzed (whether a nation or an alliance), there are both *internal* and *external* factors. *Internally*, variables are grouped according to the attributes and motivational factors that describe the unit. *Externally*, there are the contextual factors, which refer to the unit's relationship with its environment.



5. Omer De Raeymaeker proposes what he calls an "unpretentious yet operational framework of analysis" of alliances based on the assumption that a small power elite making decisions about alignment, nonalignment, and de-alignment, seeks to maintain or improve its position in the international, regional, or domestic level. Theoretically, such decisions are made with reference to the national interest. Since no abstract criterion exists for defining a state's national interest, reference must be made to concrete conditions and conflict, and to particular objectives in matters of security, the status of states and regimes in the international community, domestic stability, economic aid and military assistance, and ideology. Based on these conditions, the model proposed by De Raeymaeker and his associates propose the following model which is described in more detail on pages 12-14 of this study.

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~~Small power motives for adhering to or possibly withdrawing from alliances may be described as follows:~~

a. Security in Relation to the Geographical Situation

b. Prestige in the International Community

- c. Domestic Stability
- d. Economic Aid and Military Assistance
- e. Ideology

This framework of analysis is also employed by Luc Crollen in his book, Portugal, The U.S. and NATO,<sup>55</sup> and in some ways is similar to that employed by Annette Baker Fox's pioneering study entitled The Power of Small States<sup>56</sup> and also by Donald E. Nuechterlein in his article "Small States in Alliances: Iceland, Thailand, Australia."<sup>57</sup>

This analytical framework is used as the basis for this study of the military alliance between the United States and the Philippines.

### The Small Power

Definition of Small Power. -- Like the concept of alliance, "small power" is an elusive term. While we are forced many times to admit a substantial difference in the respective international positions of nations which are placed in the categories of small power, medium power, and superpower, the difference hardly appears in the scale of rank on quantitative factors. Also, when we compare the role of small powers as against the middle powers and

the superpowers, we find out that the difference is actually, in terms of degrees, very minute, and that the small powers oftentimes play a disproportionate role compared to their attributes of power capability. Even then this observation does not really entitle us to imagine that the small power is a big power in miniature. In the interactions or relations between the great powers and the small powers, we might look for international behavior characterized by extremes such as perfect domination by the great power and complete submission by the small power. Between these two extremes, all types of combinations between dimension and power become conceivable.<sup>58</sup>

Whatever the distinctions between states in international politics, the study of the foreign policies of small states is considered a neglected aspect of the discipline of international relations.

By foreign policy here we mean the range of external actions pursued to achieve certain defined objectives or goals of which these may or may not have internal cognizance or approval. The essential elements of this foreign policy include (1) capability, e.g. internal human and material resources, organization, political will; (2) purpose;

(3) means, which will range from statements of position, diplomatic negotiations, foreign visits, economic agreements, cultural-technical exchanges, to the threat and use of military force. The foreign policy of a state will be shaped by internal factors and by the interplay between these and external restraints such as the dominance of a more powerful neighbor, limitations arising out of membership of an alliance, and so forth.<sup>59</sup>

There are some difficulties in defining a small state on the basis of the preceding considerations. First, there is a question of size. In this sense, small states have been characterized by one or more of the following: (1) small land area, (2) small total population, (3) small total GNP (other other measure of total productive capacity, and (4) a low level of military capability.<sup>60</sup> Based on the preceding characteristics, small states are traditionally depicted as exhibiting the following policy behavior patterns when compared to large states:<sup>61</sup>

- (a) low levels of overall participation in world affairs;
- (b) high levels of activity in intergovernmental organizations (IGO's);

- (c) high levels of support for international legal norms;
- (d) avoidance to the use of force as a technique of statecraft;
- (e) avoidance of behavior and policies which tend to alienate the more powerful states in the system;
- (f) a narrow functional and geographic range of concern in foreign policy activities;
- (g) frequent utilization of moral and normative positions on international issues.

In an attempt to resolve some of the difficulties in defining a small state, Ronald P. Barston suggests four possible approaches in defining the term: First, arbitrarily delimiting the category by placing an upper limit on, for example, population size; secondly, measuring the "objective" elements of state capability and placing them on a ranking scale; thirdly, analyzing relative influence; and fourthly, identifying characteristics and formulating hypotheses on what differentiates small states from other classes of state.<sup>62</sup>

Whatever the quantitative results of ranking the size of states, it has been pointed out by Arnold Wolfers in his essay, "Power and Influence: The Means of Foreign Policy," that small states can exercise disproportionate

power that seems to run counter to traditional power concepts in international relations.<sup>63</sup> This has been observed in the following instances:<sup>64</sup>

First, a state may be economically weak, have low military strength and be politically unstable; but its weakness can be a source of bargaining power if a great power perceives the territory of the small state to be of strategic importance and is prepared to commit conventional military forces to its assistance.

Second, the bargaining power of small states involved in a military conflict will be increased if there is a clear and overt commitment by both great power to opposite sides.

Third, a coalition of small states which is weakly organized, with disputed leadership and whose members have differing political systems and ideologies, will have a high degree of stress within it over the formulation and implementation of common objectives, when involved in a military conflict.

Fourth, a small state can sometimes act with impunity against a great power. The response of the great power will be determined primarily by the type of threat, the degree of its active involvement elsewhere, and concern lest any retaliatory action might adversely affect its relations with other states in the region.

Fifth, small states can use international organizations to mobilize support for their policies by widening the arena of debate and criticism.

Sixth, a small state will be able to resist collective non-military sanctions if it receives support from border states and if the collective sanctions are not universally or equally applied by members of the international organization.

Small states have been able to influence great powers because of the presence of some factors like a vitally needed resource, a location dominating some strategic point of transit, the possibility of allying with the great power's enemy at a crucial stage in the conflict, and a disagreement within the threatening great power or between it and an ally.<sup>65</sup>

Since the foreign policy of small states can be seen as being purely defensive it, therefore, aims at withstanding pressure from the great powers, at safeguarding their territorial integrity and independence, and at insuring the continued adhesion to national values and ideals.<sup>66</sup> A small power looks to its security.<sup>67</sup>

#### Alliances of Small and Great Powers

George Liska looks at alliances as the "institutional link between the politics of the balance of power and the politics of preponderance or empire."<sup>68</sup> In the first case, an alliance results in the increase of a state's power

and in the second case it may be viewed as an instrument to control the ally's use of power even while supplementing it.<sup>69</sup> These considerations can be understood when the motives of small and great powers for joining alliances are considered.

The motives of small powers to ally with great powers can be those of security, stability and status.<sup>70</sup> On the other hand, the principal motives of great powers to enter into "unequal alliances" are: aggregation or addition, diversion, and disguise of power and its exercise.<sup>71</sup> By aggregation, the great power intends to expand or increase its national power by the acquisition of allies.<sup>72</sup> By diversion, the great power desires to divert small state power from alliance with an adversary.<sup>73</sup> By disguise of power and its exercise, the purpose of the great power is to insure small power cooperation. The actual purposes of such an alliance may include hegemonial dominance, restraint to foster equilibrium and peace, and surveillance to guard against disastrous ventures or surprises.<sup>74</sup>



Alliances and Balance of Power

There are many writers who hold to the view that alliances are basic to the operation of a balance of power system.<sup>75</sup> The creation of alliances is one of the operating forms of the balance of power system.<sup>76</sup> Morgenthau suggests that historically, the most important manifestation of the balance of power is not to be found in the equilibrium of two isolated nations but in the relations of one nation or alliance of nations and another alliance.<sup>77</sup> He thus finds that alliances constitute a necessary function of the balance of power operating within a multiple-state system. Morgenthau illustrates this as follows:<sup>78</sup>

Nations A and B, competing with each other, have three choices in order to maintain and improve their relative power positions. They can increase their own power, they can add to their own power the power of other nations, or they can withhold the power of other nations from the adversary. When they make the first choice, they embark upon an armaments race. When they choose the second and third alternatives, they pursue a policy of alliances.

Morton A. Kapan also recognizes that alliances are basic to the operation of a balance of power system.<sup>79</sup>

In Kaplan's view the six rules of the balance of power system<sup>80</sup> operate to produce fluid alliances that "regulate the system and prevent any one power or coalition of powers from achieving hegemony."<sup>81</sup>

Alliances provide a means, therefore, for the foreign policy-maker in a balance of power situation because:

(1) they enable the leaders to maintain the pluralism of the system and to ensure the continued existence of its essential actors, albeit at the cost of solidarity; (2) alliances deter hegemonial ambitions by being flexible and fluid; (3) alliances are made without regard to ideology, cultural affinities, relations among monarchs and other elites; and finally (4) each alliance is independent of past alliances and alliance patterns since each is based solely upon present state interest and current threats to the balance of power.<sup>82</sup>

The existence of a balance of power is believed to have preserved the independence of weak nations. Small nations have owed their independence either to the balance of power or to the preponderance of one protecting power or to their lack of attractiveness for imperialistic ambitions.<sup>83</sup>

Resort to alliances in the search for a balance of power is not without its risks, however, for both great and small powers. Morgenthau warns that an alliance between a nuclear power and a nonnuclear power places an enormous strain on both. The nonnuclear power risks being devastated in a war between two nuclear powers which may not concern it; and the nuclear power in turn faces the risk of being drawn into a nuclear war to further the interests of its weaker partner.<sup>84</sup>

## NOTES

## CHAPTER II

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## CHAPTER III

### THE PHILIPPINES: GENERAL BACKGROUND

#### Land and People

Scattered over a total of 500,000 square miles of the western Pacific Ocean, the Philippine archipelago extends about 1,100 miles north to south along the southeastern rim of Asia, forming a land chain between the Pacific Ocean on the east and the South China Sea on the west. It lies about 500 miles southeast of continental Asia between latitudes  $4^{\circ}$  and  $41^{\circ}$  and  $21^{\circ}$  and  $25^{\circ}$  North and longitudes  $116^{\circ}$  and  $127^{\circ}$  East. Within insular Southeast Asia, its 7,107 islands, islets and rocks total a land area of 115,600 square miles (300,780 square kilometers), make the Philippines a medium-sized country, a little larger than the British Isles, about two-thirds the size of Spain, or New England and New York State put together.<sup>1</sup>

The land area of the archipelago stretches from northernmost Y'Ami island in the Batan group which is 61.4 miles from Formosa to Saluag in the south which is only 30 miles east of Borneo. Hongkong is only one hour and 40 minutes by jet from Manila; Singapore is three hours away, and Sydney, 7-1/2 hours by air from

Manila. Also by air, it is only 17 hours to Europe and 15 hours to the American West Coast.

The archipelago can be divided into three regions or sections: Luzon and its islands; the Visayas, which includes Palawan and Mindoro (the central Philippines); and Mindanao, including Sulu, often called the Southern Philippines. Thirty-seven per cent of the land area is in Luzon, 29% in the Visayas, and 34% in Mindanao.

Only 154 islands have areas exceeding 5 square miles and 11 of them, with more than 1,000 square miles comprise about 95% of the total land area and population. The larger islands are mountainous or uplands and the more rugged interior of many islands is marked by folding faulting, and in some cases by recent volcanic activity because volcanic masses form the cores of most of the larger islands.

The entire island group lies within the tropics so that the lowland areas have a yearly warm and humid climate. With only slight variations, the average mean temperature is 80° F. The generally adequate rainfall throughout the year varies from place to place because of the wind direction and the shielding effects of the mountains. The average annual rainfall for the entire nation is about 100 inches. Because the Philippines lies astride the typhoon belt, an average of 15 of these cyclonic storms affect the Philippines yearly with at least heavy rainfall, and 5 to 6 may strike with destructive winds and torrential rains. Also the islands are subject to destructive earthquakes because of a number of volcanoes that still exist.

Although the Philippines closely resembles the mainland of Southeast Asia in terms of physical geomorphic history, climatic regimes, vegetative assemblages, and soil characteristics, the position of the Philippines on the island arcs of the Pacific has given the archipelago a physiographic composition and a topographic form rather unlike most parts of the mainland. In spite of its small territory, the Philippine archipelago possesses so many varied and unusual characteristics which complicate a more systematic analysis of Philippine geography. However, it is suggested that in order to better understand the land and its people, the following concepts are suggested: (1) The Philippine is an island world; (2) This world has its own distinctive combinations of man and land; (3) The Philippines is peripheral to the Asian mainland; (4) The Philippines displays a particular, distinctive and significant blending of the Orient and the Occident. Because of its basic geographic position on the oceanic margins of southeastern Asia, 500 miles off the coast of the South China coast, the Philippines have shared in three physical and cultural world: the Asian world, the Pacific world, and the occidental world.

Resources. -- Of the total land area, 40% is commercial forest land, 38% is arable farm land, and the rest is uncultivable grasslands, swamps, and marshes. Originally, most of the Philippines was well-covered by tropical forests. But after 400 years of settlement by

European man, much of this protective covering has disappeared.

The archipelago is highly mineralized, with extensive proven and potential reserves of metallic as well as non-metallic minerals. Chromite and nickel deposits are considered as among the largest in the world. The Philippines is also the dominant gold producer in Asia. The other important metallic minerals are: copper, iron, silver, manganese, and coal, gypsum, sulfur, mercury. The non-metallic minerals include clay, limestone, dolomite, feldspar, marble, silica, and phosphate rock. It is believed that there are petroleum deposits and prospecting for petroleum has been going on for some time. Rich as it is in mineral resources, however, only a small portion of the country has been adequately surveyed and actively exploited.

Most of the mined minerals have been exported abroad. The Philippines is the world's leading supplier of refractory chromite, most of which is shipped to the United States. Almost all of the gold also goes to the United States. Copper in concentrate form is the most valuable mineral export, followed by gold, silver, manganese, pyrites, mercury, sulfur, limestone, and zinc.

Besides its forests, minerals, and agricultural products, the Philippines is also rich in fish resources. A wide variety of fish like anchovies, sardines, croakers, grunts, and other tropical fish abound in Philippine waters.

Demography. -- Like its varied geographic charac-

teristics, the Filipinos are a people derived from diverse ethnic stocks. The early ethnic mixture was made up of the Negrito, the proto-Malay, and the Malaysian. Later groups such as the Chinese, Japanese, Indonesian, Indian, Spanish, and American contributed to the ethnic stocks. The largest number of Filipinos, however, share rather uniformly the Malaysian or Indonesian ethnic element.

Christianity is the dominant religion with 80% of the population belonging to the Catholic faith, 15% as members of the Protestant churches or the Philippine Independent Church, and roughly 5% are Muslims (Moros) concentrated mainly in the Sulu archipelago and in southwestern Mindanao.

In 1975, the population was estimated at 42.8 million, the sixteenth largest in the world. 55% of the population are below 20 years old and only 3% are above 65 years of age. The average family has 5.6 members. The relative density was 123.1 persons per square kilometer in 1970. 80% of all Filipinos live in rural areas. Life expectancy at birth is 56 years for men and 60 for women.

Filipinos speak a total of 70 languages and dialects, each of which is spoken by more than 200 persons as a mother tongue. Most of these, however, are dialects only, and others are dying languages. The Philippine languages belong to the Indonesian family of languages. The national language, Pilipino, is based on Tagalog, the language of Manila and the nearby provinces. English

is the main language of instruction, government, and business. Literacy is estimated at 85.7%, considered the highest in Asia outside of Japan.

### History

The history of the Philippines is generally broken down into four distinct phases: the pre-Spanish period, the Spanish period (1521-1898); the American period (1898-1941); and the years since independence (1946-present).<sup>2</sup>

The Pre-Spanish Period. -- The Philippines possess a pattern of culture that is best described as neither typically oriental nor as a regional variant of the two chief Asian cultural orientations, Indian and Chinese. An analysis of Philippine culture, both material culture manifesting itself in the landscape and nonmaterial culture, reveals a wide range of elements derived from pre-European island sources, from mainland Asian sources, from historical occidental sources, and from contemporary worldwide sources.

The earlier settlers of the Philippines, probably Negrito in origin, probably walked across parts of the broad lowland known as Sundaland or the South China Sea. The later arrivals, Proto-Malay, Malay, Indonesian-Malay, Sinitic, Chinese, and other ethnic stocks arrived in the Philippines by boats. These groups like the Negrito group arrived in the Philippines over the last few thou-



sand years, not in single migrations, but each group in repeated movement patterns and in variable numbers. Much of what happened during these early years has not been recorded. The conclusion is that the record of prehistoric movement, regional occupance, ethnic relationships, territorial control, and local settlement history for the Philippines, is still vague and incomplete.

The pre-Spanish period did not see the development of a political state, but by the time the Spaniards came in the sixteenth century, a few hundred islands were permanently populated by approximately a half-million people from all parts of southern and eastern Asia. This people already had commercial contacts with the Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, Arab, and Indonesian traders. Islam had penetrated Sulu and then spread into Mindanao and as far north as Manila Bay.

The Spanish Period. -- The period of Spanish occupation of the Philippines is marked by conversion of the natives to Christianity, the political organization of settlements to a highly centralized form of governmental administration, the galleon trade, attacks by the Dutch, British, and Chinese pirates, and the rise of Filipino nationalism.

Ferdinand Magellan arrived in the Philippines in the course of his voyage around the world on March 16, 1521. After the rest of his crew returned to Spain, a number of expeditions were sent to the Philippines. In 1543, Ruy de Villalobos, who headed one such expedition,

named the islands, the Philippines, in honor of the then King Philip II of Spain. In 1564, Miguel Lopez de Legaspi arrived from Mexico to serve as the first governor appointed by the Spanish throne. Upon his arrival in the Philippines he made peace with the local leaders and established the first Spanish settlement in the present city of Cebu. On June 24, 1572, Legaspi moved to Manila which he established the capital of the Philippines. In succeeding years, the various orders of the Catholic Church sent missionaries to the Philippines where they converted the natives to Christianity and established schools. In time, the power of the friars grew with their prestige.

The Philippines was organized as a colony whose rule centralized in the person of the king, who governed through the Council of the Indies. In the colony, the highest representative of the king was the governor who was appointed by the king for a specific term. Next to the governor was the audiencia, the highest tribunal of justice and advisory council to the king. Next to the central government in Manila were the provincial governors known as alcaldes mayores, appointed by the central authority. Local administration at the township and village levels was entrusted to Filipinos who attained office through local elections.

The galleon trade, which lasted for 250 years, was carried on for commerce and communication between the Philippines and Mexico. For some time it was the main occupation and source of income for the Spanish settlers.

During the period from 1596 to 1640, the Dutch attacked the galleon trade in the course of a dispute over the Spice Islands. Also in 1762, the British captured Manila but were forced to relinquish control of the city under the provisions of a treaty with Spain. Not only the Dutch and the British threatened Spanish possession of the Philippines, but the Spaniards also were never able to pacify the Moros in southern Mindanao and Sulu.

Near the end of the nineteenth century, an indigenous revolution also threatened Spanish domination of the archipelago. Led by Filipino intellectuals who had studied in Europe, the Filipinos began to demand political and social reforms. In the 1890's, armed rebellion broke out. The Filipinos, however, did not succeed in their plan to drive the Spaniards out of the Philippines. In 1898, war broke out between Spain and the United States. This event was to determine the future of the Philippines for the next century.

Whatever the faults of Spain in governing the Philippines, its administration achieved a number of things. Continued occupation of the Philippines from the sixteenth century to 1898 allowed Spain to develop the beginnings of a centralized government, the conversion of the natives to Christianity, the building of a landholding class that was to lay the foundations of Filipino nationalism, and also the establishment of a system of education.

The American Period. -- Hostilities between Spain

and the United States broke out over the sinking of the U.S. warship Maine in the harbor of Havana, Cuba. Orders were then transmitted to Dewey, who was already in Asiatic waters, to attack and destroy Spanish naval units in the Philippines. Dewey accomplished his mission and awaited further orders.

Meanwhile, Filipino revolutionaries under Aguinaldo who were living in exile in Hongkong returned to the Philippines. Aguinaldo reorganized his forces and on June 12, 1898, he proclaimed the establishment of the first Republic of the Philippines. Although relations between the Filipino leaders and Dewey started on an amicable note, hostilities broke out between Filipino and American soldiers on February, 1899. Bitter fighting took place between the Filipinos and American forces who were now under orders to occupy the Philippines. The capture of Aguinaldo by U.S. General Funston led to the cessation of the fighting and the United States Government started to organize the political administration of the Philippines as a territory of the United States.

Progressive self-government was given to the Filipinos until they were able to govern themselves, first, as a Commonwealth Government, and later as a free Republic of the Philippines upon the grant of independence by the United States on July 4, 1946. The United States governed the Philippines continuously from 1898 until 1946 except for a brief period of time when the islands were occupied by the Japanese forces during the outbreak of World War II.

The Americans laid the foundations of public education, public health, democratic civil government, and a sound

legal system. However, their failure to effectuate land reform, pacify the Moslem minorities in the South, and stabilize the national economy, saddled the new Republic with massive problems from the start of its independence.

Independence to the Present. -- From 1946 until September, 1972, the Philippines enjoyed a liberal democracy based on a constitution patterned after that of the United States. In its early years it was faced by tremendous problems of economic rehabilitation as a result of the devastation of World War II. Communist-inspired outbreaks of rebellion broke out in the late 1940's and early 1950's. But the movement was crushed by innovative tactics introduced by Ramon Magsaysay who was then Secretary of National Defense together with the assistance of the United States.

Six presidents were elected in free elections during the period from 1946 to 1972. On August 21, 1971, President Marcos ordered the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, declaring that the nation was threatened by communist subversion. This was followed by his declaration of martial law on September 22, 1972 throughout the country on the ground that an armed uprising was being planned. Since 1972, the country has been under martial law and no elections have been held since then.

### The Economy<sup>3</sup>

Philippine economy may be well described as a basi-

cally agricultural in nature. Its fundamental elements of strength are sizable natural resources, room for population expansion, increased agricultural production, a growing industrial section, and a relatively high level of popular education. Since World War II, Philippine economy has had to cope with a predominantly agricultural economy, constantly recurring trade deficits resulting in a shortage of foreign exchange, shortage of investment capital, limited government revenues, high rates of unemployment and underemployment, and inflation.

During the Spanish occupation, Philippine economy was essentially colonial and comparatively sluggish. During most of the American period which was characterized by free trade, the nature of commerce was profoundly changed: a vigorous capitalism was introduced and a considerable selective expansion took place. However, little change actually took place as the United States replaced Spain as the Philippines' major trading partner and the fact that only semi-finished or raw materials were still being channeled to the mother country. The relationship during these years and also during the immediate post-war years showed a continued subservience to American interest. In spite of attempts by the Philippine government to set up heavier industrial projects, the bulk of exported produce remains in an unfinished or semi-finished form.

Philippine economy also suffered a severe handicap following independence as a result of the destruction suffered by the country during World War II. In the

final report of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippines on June 30, 1947, the picture of destruction showed that the Philippines "was without question the most completely destroyed and dislocated battleground of the war."<sup>4</sup>

Another description of that destruction was more explicit:

The transportation system, with its roads, bridges, and ferries, its railways, inter-island vessels, and harbours, had all been partially or completely destroyed. Sugar-mills were derelict, their light railways and embarkation facilities unusable. Mining equipment was largely inoperative and the system formerly used to transport the raw material or the partially treated ore to points of shipment were almost completely lacking or had been summarily patched up and were fairly ineffective. The few light industries set up during the Commonwealth were equally undermined. Electricity supply was quite insufficient for more than restricted purposes and public transport was almost non-existent.<sup>5</sup>

Because of this devastation suffered by the Philippines, enormous amounts of assistance in the form of war damage payments as well as military and economic aid were made necessary and had to come from the United States, the former metropolitan power. However, all this assistance did not come free. Strings were attached to all forms of assistance extended to the Philippines during the early years of the Republic. War damage payments were made contingent upon the signing of the military base agreement. Other economic assistance depended

upon tying Philippine trade to that of the U.S. Thus the Philippine Trade Act and its successor, the Laurel-Langley Agreement, continued Philippine dependence upon U.S. trade. The relationship has changed in recent years upon the expiration of the Laurel-Langley Agreement in 1974. Economic and military assistance have continued, however.

### Government and Politics<sup>6</sup>

Under the 1935 Constitution, the Philippine Government was republican in form, based on the principle of separation of powers. Executive power was vested in a President who was elected for a four-year term and could not serve more than 8 years consecutively. Legislative power was vested in a bicameral Congress which consisted of a 24-member Senate and a 110-member House of Representatives. Senators were elected at large for a six-year term, one-third being chosen every two years. Members of the House of Representatives were elected for a four-year term in the same election in which the President was chosen. Judicial power was vested in an eleven-member Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, justice of the peace courts, and other special courts. Supreme Court justices were appointed by the President and sit on the court until they are 70 years of age.

The Philippines is divided into provinces, chartered cities, and municipalities. Administrative authority, however, remains highly centralized at Manila.



Traditionally, there have been two major political parties--the Nacionalista and the Liberal Party--the latter being actually an offshoot of the first party.

In November 1972, a new Constitution was completed by a Constitutional Convention to replace the 1935 Constitution. It was put into effect in January, 1973.

The new Constitution provided for a parliamentary form of government, with extensive executive power vested in a Prime Minister. The head of state is a President. Both the President and Prime Minister are to be elected from the membership of the National Assembly, the President for a six-year term. The Prime Minister will appoint the Cabinet, dismiss them at his discretion, and has powers for initiation of most legislation and control over appropriations. The Prime Minister was also the Commander-in-Chief, with the power to call out the armed forces, suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and declare martial law. The other powers of the Prime Minister included the appointment of general officers in the armed forces, ambassadors, and judges. He may also enter into treaties, contract for domestic and foreign loans, and veto specific items of appropriation or tariff bills. He may be removed from office by the National Assembly by electing a successor by majority vote of all the members.

Legislative power was vested in a unicameral National Assembly whose members are to be elected for six-year terms. Judicial power was vested in an expanded Supreme Court composed of a Chief Justice and 14 associate jus-

tices.

On September 21, 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law throughout the Philippines, basing his action on a provision of the Constitution which enables the President to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law "in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it. . . ." In his proclamation Marcos referred to "a full scale armed insurrection and rebellion " in the Philippines instigated and carried out by "an insurrectionary force, popularly known as 'the New Peoples' Army.'" In the same proclamation, Marcos announced his intention of proceeding immediately to implement a reform program, the New Society, including proclamation of land reform, reorganization of the government, new rules for the conduct of civil servants, removal of corrupt and inefficient public officials, and the breaking up of criminal syndicates.

Since his institution of martial law, Marcos has substituted military rule for the democratic republican system; adopted the new Constitution approved by the 1972 Constitutional Convention after incorporating provisions for a transitory form of government; abolished Congress and suspended the 1973 national election following a referendum among citizens' assemblies which, in accordance with the wishes of the new regime, endorsed the martial law government and the extension of Marcos' term of office beyond 1973.

Foreign Relations<sup>7</sup>

In his inaugural address on May 28, 1946, the first President of the Republic of the Philippines, Manuel Roxas, stated in clear and unambiguous terms the foreign policy of the new republic:

We will maintain . . . friendly and honorable relations with all our neighbors and look forward to the day when peace and security will be maintained by the collective conscience of mankind.

But until that happy dawn upon us, we can much more securely repose our fate in the understanding and comradeship which exists between the Philippines and the United States. . . . We are fortunate to have as the guarantor of our security the United States of America, which is today the bulwark and support of small nations everywhere in the world.<sup>8</sup>

On July 4, 1946, in ceremonies marking the restoration of Philippine independence, President Roxas left no doubt as to the direction of Philippine foreign policy which he intended to pursue as the first President of the Republic:

We are committed to the cause and the international program of the United States of America. . . . Our safest course . . . is in the glistening wake of America whose sure advance with mighty prow breaks for smaller craft the waves of fear.<sup>9</sup>

The most overwhelming fact of Philippine history since 1898 has been its relationship with the United States so that it is not difficult to conclude that the strongest determinant of Philippine foreign policy

as well as its domestic politics is that historical experience. This historic relationship produced a nation that stands closest to the West of any country in Southeast Asia: a country that was given the longest training in democratic self-government of any colony in Southeast Asia thereby imposing upon it an "image of the world" quite not unlike that of the United States. The dominance of the Catholic religion fostered strong opposition to the communist ideology upon the elite and widespread fear of it upon the masses. The insularity of the islands isolated the country for a long time until after its independence from the political currents of Southeast Asia thereby making the presence of American air and naval power a credible policy for national defense. Because of these elements and the expressed statements of Philippine statesmen, the foreign policy of the Philippines was believed to consist of the following: (1) close ties with the United States, (2) adherence to the concept of regional collective security; (3) support for genuine nationalist movements among dependent peoples; (4) cultivation of ties with Asian neighbors not in the Communist bloc, and (5) loyalty to the principles of the United Nations.

This close relationship with the United States during the early years of independence was characterized by a high volume of diplomatic trade, aid and military treaties between the two countries. Conditions in the Philippines such as wartime devastation which had ruined Philippine economy, threats to internal stability by the

communist-led Hukbalahap organization, and unstable conditions in the external environment dramatized by the fall of China to Communism, determined a close relationship that was in fact dominated by the United States. In effect, the United States did take advantage of these conditions to determine the details and official dates of political independence, the content of numerous economic programs which protected American agricultural and manufacturing interests through quotas and tariff arrangements. The most outstanding of these agreements which protected American interests was the trade agreement which provided that American citizens, and corporations owned or controlled by such citizens, were entitled to the same rights as Filipinos in regard to business investments in the Philippines. Under the military bases agreements, whose approval was contingent to the passage of a law awarding war damages to Philippine citizens as a result of war, the United States exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over Philippine citizens, although in contrast, agreements with NATO powers and Japan expressly exclude the United States from jurisdiction over nationals of the host state.

However, in spite of its expressed alignment with the United States in its foreign policy, the Philippines did not always agree with its former metropolitan power. From the very beginning, for example, in its relations with Japan, Philippine foreign policy was aimed at three basic objectives: first, to make certain that Japan, through genuine political and economic reform, will never

again be a menace to the Philippines and other countries; second, to obtain an early and equitable reparation of the damage caused by Japan to the Philippines and other countries; and third, to welcome, at a suitable time and under proper conditions, a democratic and non-militarist Japan as a friendly neighbor and to secure its cooperation in maintaining the peace and fostering the progress of the Pacific area and of the world as a whole. These objectives of Philippine foreign policy toward Japan caused it to differ sharply with the United States when the latter made preparations toward the signing of a Japanese Peace Treaty. The Philippines was influenced first by its feelings that it has suffered the heaviest damage at the hands of the Japanese, second by the geographical proximity of Japan which meant that a rearmed Japan would be dangerous to Philippine security, and thirdly, the United States had yet to make itself clear in its avowals of providing security for the Philippines. It was only after the United States had signed a treaty of mutual defense with the Philippines in 1951 that the Philippines was finally induced to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty which was not ratified by it until 1956 because of political opposition at home.

Close ties with the United States also did not prevent criticism and demands for renegotiation of the basic military agreements between the two countries. Three agreements had been entered into between the United States and the Philippines in matters of security. The Military Bases Agreement, signed on March 14, 1947, gave the United States the right to keep, for a period

of ninety-nine years, a number of naval, air, and army bases in the Philippines. A military assistance agreement concluded on March 12, 1947 provided for the training of military forces of the Philippines by a group of American military experts known as the Joint United States Military Advisory Group. On August 30, 1951, the United States and the Philippines signed a bilateral treaty of mutual defense.

Over a period of years, these treaties had undergone some changes because of demands on the part of the Philippines with the consent of the United States. These changes will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Besides its relations with Japan, the foreign relations of the Philippines has also undergone some changes. Over a period of twenty years since its independence, the Philippine government through successive administrations, had refused to entertain any direct contact with communist countries. Recently, however the Philippines has established diplomatic relations with Romania and Yugoslavia in 1972. In 1973, diplomatic missions were exchanged with Poland, Hungary, Mongolia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic. In September 1973, a Russian mission arrived in Manila to discuss oil exploration and a trade treaty. On September 20, 1974, Mrs. Imelda Marcos visited Peking and a trade treaty between the Philippines and the People's Republic of China was concluded during that visit.

Since independence, the Philippines has also in-

creased its contacts with its Asian neighbors. Although the Philippines came into conflict with one Asian neighbor, Malaysia, over its claims to North Borneo, or Sabah, the Philippines tried to lay the basis for Southeast Asian regionalism. For example, in 1961, President Carlos P. Garcia took the lead in organizing the Association of Southeast Asia or ASA with Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines as members. In 1963, President Diosdado Macapagal took the initiative in the establishment of Maphilindo, a much bolder attempt at confederation among the three countries of Malay origin--Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. In 1967, President Ferdinand Marcos supported the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN, which brought together the former members of ASA and Maphilindo and included Singapore as a new member.

Philippine foreign relations has seen many shifts and changes in recent years. With the expiration of the Laurel-Langley Agreement of 1955 came the termination of the whole system of preferential trade between the United States and the Philippines starting in 1974. This also meant the end of the parity clause in the Constitution of the Philippines which permitted Americans equal rights with Filipinos to invest in the Philippines. All in all, the termination of the sugar quota, the preferential trade system, and the parity clause ended those aspects of U.S.-Philippine relationship that were so dominant after Philippine independence until 1974. This development including the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam, the emergence of Japan as an Asian power, and the in-



creasingly peaceful relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, create a new environment within which Philippine-American alliance relations will have to operate. As already mentioned in the introduction of this paper, the Philippines is now interested in re-negotiating its military agreements with the United States.

The evolution of Philippine foreign policy has moved toward the direction of increasingly independent lines during the past three years. It has moved Philippine diplomacy away from the strongly pro-Western course that it had followed during most of the three decades after its independence in 1946. This new foreign policy has seen a deepening involvement in Southeast Asian affairs, a growing sense of identification with the Third World, and rapprochement with the Communist countries accompanied by an increasingly hardnosed reassessment of its traditional "special relations" with the United States.

The Philippines has also normalized relations with Japan which now competes with the United States for trade with the Philippines through the ratification of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, which had been negotiated thirteen years before. Attempts to deal with the Muslim rebellion in Mindanao and Sulu have stimulated Philippine efforts to achieve closer relations with the Arab powers of West Asia. Finally, in the United Nations, the Philippines has chosen to identify itself unequivocally with the Afro-Asian bloc of countries.

## NOTES

## CHAPTER III

1. Geographic data about the Philippines abounds in numerous sources. Basic data for this chapter was researched from the following sources:

Frederick L. Wernsted and J. E. Spencer, The Philippine Island World: A Physical, Cultural, and Regional Geography (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967); Alden Cutshall, The Philippines: Nation of Islands (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1964); R. E. Huke, et al., Shadows on the Land: An Economic Geography of the Philippines (Manila: Bookmark, 1963); American Geographical Society, Focus: Philippine Islands, XI:6 (April, 1961; Area Handbook of the Philippines (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969); Department of the Army, Insular Southeast Asia, DA Pamphlet 550-12 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971); U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Syncrisis: The Dynamics of Health: An Analytic Series on the Interactions of Health and Socioeconomic Development, IV: The Philippines, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972); U.S. Bureau of International Commerce, Basic Data on the Economy of the Philippines, Overseas Business Reports 68-74, (August, 1968); Charles Robequain, Malaya, Indonesia, Borneo, and the Philippines: A Geographical, Economic and Political Description of Malaya, the East Indies and the Philippines, trans. by E. D. Laborde (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954); Alice Taylor, ed., Focus on Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972); and Keith Lightfoot, The Philippines (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973).

House Document No. 389 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 20.

5. Keith Lightfoot, The Philippines (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 142.

6. For background on politics and government, see Department of Public Information, Backgrounders on Philippine-American Relations and the Philippines Today (Manila: Department of Public Information, 1975); American University, Area Handbook for the Philippines (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969); U.S. State Department, Background Notes -- Philippines (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974); Philippine Studies Program, University of Chicago, Area Handbook of the Philippines, Human Relations Area Files (New Haven, 1956); and David Wurfel, "The Philippines," in Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia, ed. George McTurnan Kahin (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1959).

7. For background information on the foreign relations of the Philippines, see Milton Meyer, A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic, Ph. D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1959 (Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms, Inc., 1975); Department of Public Information, Backgrounders on Philippine-American Relations and the Philippines Today (Manila: Department of Public Information, 1975); Russell H. Fifield, Southeast Asia in United States Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1963); American University, Area Handbook for the Philippines (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969); George E. Taylor, The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1964); The American Assembly, The United States and the Philippines (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1966); Garel A. Grunder and William E. Livezey, The Philippines and the United States (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951); and W. Scott Thompson, Unequal Partners: Philippine and Thai Relations with the United States (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1975).

8. Cited in Salvador P. Lopez, "New Directions in Philippine Foreign Policy," The Carillon, XVI:5 (June, 1975), pp. 4-5.

2. Sources for the discussion on Philippine history are the following: Department of Public Information, Backgrounders on Philippine-American Relations and the Philippines Today (Manila: Department of Public Information, 1975); American University, Area Handbook for the Philippines (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969 ; Onofre, D. Corpuz, The Philippines (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966); T. M. Burley, The Philippines: An Economic and Social Geography (London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd., 1973); Philippine Studies Program, University of Chicago, Area Handbook of the Philippines, Human Relations Area Files (New Haven, 1956); J. L. Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses, 1565-1700 (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959); and David Wurfel, "The Philippines," in Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia, ed. George McTurnan Kahin (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1959

3. Basic economic data for the Philippines derived from: Department of Public Information, Backgrounders on Philippine-American Relations and the Philippines Today (Manila: Department of Public Information, 1975); U.S. Domestic and International Business Administration, Marketing in the Philippines, Overseas Business Reports 76-03, March, 1976; United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Industrial Development Asia and the Far East (New York: United Nations, 1966); United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East (New York: United Nations, 1973); John Badgley, Asian Development: Problems and Prognosis (New York: The Free Press, 1971); John H. Power and Gerardo P. Sicat, The Philippines: Industrialization and Trade Policies (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); and Frank H. Golay, The Philippines: Public Policy and National Economic Development (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961).

4. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Seventh and Final Report of the High Commissioner to the Philippines. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Seventh and Final Report of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands Covering the Period from September 14, 1945, to July 4, 1946.

9. The full text of the speech is reprinted in the Seventh and Final Report of the High Commissioner to the Philippines, op. cit., pp. 130-135.

PART II

THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ALLIANCE

The alliance between the United States and the Philippines is the result of a number of treaties or agreements which were negotiated and concluded over a period of years since the end of World War II.

Chapter IV is a discussion of the negotiations that led to the conclusion of the agreements relating to the establishment of U.S. military bases in the territory of the Philippines and the giving of military assistance by the United States to the Philippines.

Chapter V is a discussion of the negotiations that led to the conclusion of the treaty of mutual defense between the United States and the Philippines.

Chapter VI is a discussion of the negotiations that led to the signing of the multilateral treaty called the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

The alliance between the United States and the Philippines is therefore constituted by bilateral and multilateral treaties. The United States has also made commitments regarding the defense of the Philippines in a number of statements made by executive officials of the Philippines. These commitments are discussed in Chapter VI.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE AGREEMENTS ON MILITARY BASES AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE

General Background. -- Theodore Roosevelt, who was strongly influenced by the strategic ideas of Mahan, believed very strongly that the security of the United States rested upon the expansion and wise use of naval power. Corollary to this theory was the proposition that naval power could be utilized to its fullest potential through the acquisition and utilization of naval coal-ing stations strategically located all over the world. It was, therefore, inevitable that

Virtually every one charged with responsibility for the direction of American foreign policy in Asia at one time or another endorsed the idea of an American base on or adjacent to the mainland of China.<sup>1</sup>

When the Spanish-American war broke out, Theodore Roosevelt sent orders to Admiral George Dewey who was already in Hongkong to destroy units of the Spanish navy in Philippine waters. After Dewey accomplished his mission, it was a foregone conclusion that the Philippines would become a possession of the United States. In the words of Tyler Dennet:

For more than thirty years before the Spanish-American War there had been among some Americans, especially naval authorities, a feeling that the United States ought to possess at



least a naval base in the Far East. At times Korean ports had been discussed in that connection, but the acquisition of the Philippines definitely transferred all American political interests from the Asiatic mainland.<sup>2</sup>

Indeed, it was the influence of the military services whose role extended into many matters that led to the acquisition of the Philippines by the United States:

There were, for example, military representatives at the Peace Conference in Paris in 1898 which settled the Spanish-American War. Indeed, even before the delegation left Washington, McKinley made it clear that he personally attached great importance to the views which Generals Merritt and Greene and Admiral Dewey would express about the advisability of retaining the Philippines and hoped that the delegates would pay attention to their recommendations. At Paris, moreover, one of the strongest presentations on behalf of keeping all of the Philippines was made by Commander (soon to be Admiral) Bradford; his testimony according to one close observer, had a strong impact upon the delegation, even to its anti-expansionist members.<sup>3</sup>

The acquisition of the Philippines meant not only access to the markets of the East, making the Philippines the "Hongkong, the Kiaochow, the Port Arthur of the United States in the Far East",<sup>4</sup> but it also resulted in the Philippines becoming one of the bases or outposts which would afford protection to the security of the United States. This vital interest not only in the security of the United States but ultimately also that of the Philippines critically influenced the formulation of U.S. foreign policies for the Far East in the first half of the twen-

tieth century.<sup>5</sup> Although the acquisition of the Philippines marked the entry of the United States into the class of "world powers," Samuel Flagg Bemis described it as a "great national aberration."<sup>6</sup> To Bemis, it was the greatest blunder of American diplomacy: it led rapidly to involvement in the politics of Asia and through them of Europe, and to a long row of further diplomatic blunders.<sup>7</sup>

Before Admiral Dewey left Hongkong for his historic rendezvous with destiny, he had been in touch with Filipino revolutionaries in exile in that colony. After destroying the Spanish naval squadron, Dewey assisted Emilio Aguinaldo, the Filipino revolutionary leader, and his group to land in the Philippines where they immediately organized forces to resume fighting the Spaniards assisted by American arms and ammunition. On June 12, 1898, Aguinaldo proclaimed Philippine independence and inaugurated a Republic of the Philippines on January 23, 1899. Although no American official made any specific agreement with them that the independence of the Philippines would be established upon the expulsion of Spanish forces, the Filipinos honestly believed this to be the case and they fought the Spaniards with vigor. In later days, some historians see this as some kind of alliance between the two peoples against Spain.

When the Filipinos learned that the Americans intended to occupy the islands permanently, a bitter war ensued. Unknown to the Filipinos the decision to seize the islands was already made when the McKinley administration had decided to send an army of occupation to

the Philippines before Dewey attacked the Spanish fleet.<sup>8</sup>

In effect the proposal to seize the Philippines was the link between the naval offensive in those islands planned first of all as a result of military considerations, and the share in the Chinese market desired by corporate interests . . . . When the Administration saw the connection and decided to bring it off, the plan to strike down Spanish naval power in the Pacific grew into a plan to hold the Philippine Islands with ground forces . . . .<sup>9</sup>

Faced by superior forces and isolated internationally, their only aid being the moral and political support from the American anti-imperialist movement, the Filipinos lost the war against the Americans.

In the coming years, the strategic considerations which played a very important part in the decision to seize the Philippines, a decision which was certainly alien to American traditions of democracy and liberty, was to be subjected to varied views. Theodore Roosevelt himself began to have second thoughts about the strategic value of the Philippines. In a letter that he sent to William Howard Taft on August 21, 1907, Roosevelt expressed the following views that seemed prophetic at that time:

The Philippine Islands form our heel of Achilles. They are all that makes the present situation with Japan dangerous. I think that in some way and with some phraseology that you think wise you should state to them that if they handle themselves wisely in their legislative assembly we shall at the earliest possible moment give them a nearly complete independence. . . . Personally, I should be glad to see the Islands made independent, with perhaps

some kind of international guarantee for the preservation of order, or with some warning on our part that if they did not keep order we would have to interfere again. . . .<sup>10</sup>

This did not sound like Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt who saw in 1898 in the Philippines a heaven-sent opportunity to establish a strategic position that would carry forward American continental westward movement and also strengthen its bargaining position in China and Japan.<sup>11</sup>

On July 29, 1905, President Roosevelt further showed his concern for the security of the Philippines, by promoting an executive agreement with Japan in the best tradition of Realpolitik.<sup>12</sup> On that date, Roosevelt's Secretary of War, William Howard Taft, negotiated a secret agreement with Kororo Katsura, the Japanese Foreign Minister, in which the United States recognized Japan's "sovereignty over Korea" in exchange for a Japanese disclaimer of any aggressive designs on the Philippines. Roosevelt entered into this agreement because he sincerely believed that the defense of the Philippines against an attack by Japan had become seriously compromised because of her then increased power. However, as the naval and military power of Japan continued to expand, the Philippines became increasingly more vulnerable to a Japanese attack becoming thereby a hostage which could easily be seized in a war with the United States.<sup>13</sup>

Theodore Roosevelt's anxiety over the Philippines was further made manifest in the Root-Takahira executive agreement of November 30, 1908, wherein, among other

things, Japan and the United States agreed to respect the territorial possessions belonging to each other in the Pacific region.<sup>14</sup> The Root-Takahira understanding, as it was called, supplemented the earlier Taft-Katsura "agreed memorandum. To Bemis, it meant that Theodore Roosevelt

had already come to feel that the Philippines --for the conquest of which he had been so ardent in 1898--were the "Achilles heel" of the United States, and that the United States could not fight Japan over Manchuria. His executive agreements reflect this conviction, the greatest anxiety of his foreign policy.<sup>15</sup>

In 1922, after the end of World War I, in clear recognition of Japan's growing power in the Pacific region, the United States worked out in the Washington Naval Conference not only limitation of naval armaments but in order to secure Japanese approval promised to limit the fortification of certain islands including the Philippines.<sup>16</sup>

The future of the Philippines was, therefore, more or less determined on its strategic and commercial value to the United States.

As an attempt to provide for its security, there were also several proposals for the neutralization of the Philippines, concluding in the inclusion of a provision in the Philippine Independence Act of 1934 which urged international negotiations for the perpetual neutralization of the islands after independence.

Under more dramatic circumstances on February 8, 1942, the neutralization of the Philippines was asked by Quezon when the fall of the Philippines was imminent in the course of World War II. President Quezon made

the proposal on the basis of two assumptions. First, he knew that the United States was committed to grant independence to the Philippines by virtue of the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie law. Second, the Japanese invading forces had announced publicly its intention to grant independence to the Philippines. In his proposal, Quezon suggested a number of steps to be taken. First, he asked that the United States immediately grant the Philippines complete and absolute independence. Second, following the grant of independence, the Philippines should be neutralized at once. Third, all occupying troops, both American and Japanese should be withdrawn by mutual agreement with the Philippine government within a reasonable length of time. Fourth, neither the United States or Japan should maintain military bases in the Philippines. Fifth, the Philippine Army should be immediately disbanded and the only armed forces to be maintained should be a constabulary of modest size. Sixth, immediately upon granting independence the trade relations of the Philippines with foreign countries should be a matter to be decided by the Philippines and the foreign countries concerned. Seventh, and last, American and Japanese civilians who desire to be withdrawn from the islands, should be allowed to do so with their respective troops under mutual and proper safeguards.<sup>17</sup>

Quezon was not entirely alone in thinking along these lines if the Filipino people were to be spared the further ravages of war. In the opinion of the U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippines Sayre at that time,

If the premise of President Quezon is correct, that American help cannot or will not arrive here in time to be available, I believe his proposal for immediate independence and neutralization of the Philippines is the sound course to follow.<sup>18</sup>

Accompanying Quezon's suggestion to the President of the United States proposing independence and neutralization of the Philippines was a message from Douglas McArthur, then commanding Philippine-American forces in the Philippines during World War II, analyzing the situation as follows:

Since I have no air or sea protection you must be prepared at any time on the complete destruction of this command. You must determine whether the mission of delay would be better furthered by the temporizing plan of Quezon or by my continued battle effort. The temper of the Filipinos is one of almost violent resentment against the United States. Every one of them expected help and when it has not been forthcoming they believe they have been betrayed in favor of others. . . . So far as the military angle is concerned, the problem presents itself as to whether the plan of President Quezon might offer the best possible solution of what is about to be a disastrous debacle.<sup>19</sup>

Unknown to Quezon and McArthur, although the Philippines had become the point of focal interest following the attack at Pearl Harbor, its defense had become once more the desperate and losing struggle which had been forecast in the planning of earlier years.

Although it was recognized that there was a need for facing the "agonizing experience of seeing the dreamed /Philippine/garrison gradually pulled down"<sup>20</sup> Washington

decided that

Strategically it was of very great importance that the Army in the Philippines should prolong its resistance to the limit. Politically it was still more important that this defense be supported as strongly as possible, for neither the Filipino people nor the rest of the Far Eastern world could be expected to have a high opinion of the United States if she adopted a policy of "scuttle." On these grounds Stimson and Marshall reacted strongly against any defeatist attitude. They argued "that we could not give up the Philippines in that way; that we must make every effort at whatever risk to keep McArthur's line open and that otherwise we would paralyze the activities of everybody in the Far East."<sup>21</sup>

If the messages of Quezon and McArthur caused some shock and consternation to General Marshall and Secretary of War Stimson, it was the decision of President Roosevelt in his message to General McArthur of February 9, 1942 that:

American troops will continue to keep our flag flying in the Philippines so long as there remains any possibility of resistance. I have made these decisions in complete understanding of your military estimate that accompanied President Quezon's message to me. The duty and the necessity of resisting Japanese aggression to the last transcends in importance any other obligation now facing us in the Philippines.<sup>22</sup>

McArthur was accordingly instructed to organize his defenses and his forces in order to make his resistance as effective as circumstances would permit and as prolonged as humanly possible. Although President Roosevelt did not accede to the wishes of President Quezon, he assured Quezon that he was not lacking in understanding or sympathy.



thy with the situation of Quezon and the Commonwealth Government. In the conclusion of his message, Roosevelt pledged that:

So long as the flag of the United States flies on Filipino soil as a pledge of our duty to your people, it will be defended by our own men to the death. Whatever happens to the present American garrison we shall not relax our efforts until the forces which we are now marshaling outside the Philippine Islands return to the Philippines and drive the last remnant of the invaders from your soil.<sup>23</sup>

Underlying these pledges of support and redemption of the islands was the recognition of the strategic importance of the Philippines. Behind this reasoning lies the American motivation for the establishment of military bases in the islands before its independence and the desire for their retention after independence. The question of military bases was to occupy a major part of the relations between the United States and the Philippines both prior to and after independence. Because of this, the background to the question will next be explored because as a result of Quezon's messages for relief of the Philippines and his proposal for neutralization during World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt pledged that the Japanese would be driven from the Philippines and that the Filipino people would have their freedom restored and their independence established and protected. This promise of Roosevelt was interpreted to mean that the United States desired military bases in the Philippines.<sup>24</sup>

However, this is getting ahead of our story.

During Spanish occupation of the Philippines, military and naval bases were maintained in the islands. Upon the transfer of the Philippines to the United States, the United States succeeded to the rights of Spain.

In the Organic Law of the Philippines of July 1, 1902, it was provided that all property and rights which may have been acquired in the Philippine Islands by the United States under the Treaty of Spain of December 10, 1898, was placed under the control of the government of the islands to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants of the islands, except "such land or other property as shall be designated by the President of the United States for military and other reservations of the Government of the United States."<sup>25</sup>

These military bases in the Philippines included Fort Santiago and Cuartel de Espana in Manila; Fort William McKinley near Manila; Fort Nichols, the air base also located near Manila; Fort Mills on the island of Corregidor; Fort Stotsenberg between Manila and Baguio; Camp John Hay in Baguio, and Pettit Barracks in Zamboanga. The Asiatic squadron of the U.S. Navy maintained naval stations in Cavite and at Olongapo at Subic Bay.

U.S. military bases and the problem of Philippine security cropped up in the discussions involving the grant of Philippine independence. Sometime in 1923, in hearings before the 85th Congress, in response to Philippine petitions for increased autonomy, the then Secretary of War Weeks opposed Philippine independence by citing the dangers that would arise from external aggression, internal dissension, and the lack of Filipino parti-

cipation in the commerce and industry of the islands, and from the the poor financial condition of the government.<sup>26</sup>

U.S. Admiral Hilary Jones also testified in another hearing that American protection of the Philippines would, from every naval point of view, be vastly more difficult if the Philippines were independent.<sup>27</sup>

On February 11, 1932, in testifying before the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs on S.3377, the Hawes-Cutting Bill which would grant independence to the Philippines, Secretary of War Patrick Hurley, stated emphatically that it did not seem possible "either in the proximate or distant future, that the Philippine Islands can successfully undertake the primary and most essential function of independent government, namely, self-defense."<sup>28</sup> Hurley was of the opinion that under its present economic conditions, the Philippines was totally incapable of maintaining a professional force that could offer any effective resistance to an invading army. Besides, he added, the Philippines did not have any industries capable of producing munitions of war, while the building and maintenance of a fleet was out of the question.<sup>29</sup>

In the same bill that was passed by Congress in December, 1932, there were two significant provisions. One provided that the United States was entitled to retain military bases in the islands. The other provision instructed the U.S. President to enter into negotiations for the neutralization of the Philippines.

In sending back the bill to Congress with his veto, President Hoover said:

Our responsibility to the Philippine people is, that in finding a method by which we consummate their aspiration we do not project them into economic and social chaos, with the probability of breakdown in government, with its consequences in degeneration of a rising liberty which has been so carefully nurtured by the United States at a cost of thousands of American lives and hundreds of millions of money. Our responsibility to the American people is that we shall see the fact of Philippine separation accomplished without endangering ourself in military action hereafter to maintain internal order or to protect the Philippines from encroachment by others, and avoid the very dangers of future controversies and seeds of war with other nations. We have a responsibility to the world that, having undertaken to develop and perfect freedom for these people, we shall not by our course project more chaos into a world already sorely beset by instability.<sup>30</sup>

Hoover was more specific in his veto message regarding the capability of the Philippines to maintain stable government and protect itself:

The income of the Philippine government has never in the past been sufficient to meet in addition to other expenditures, the cost of supporting even the Filipino Scouts, much less an army or navy. The United States expends to-day upon the native and American military forces for the protection and assurance of internal order and for the maintenance of the minimum requirements of external defense a sum amounting to approximately 28 per cent of the entire revenues of the Philippine government. If the naval expenditures of the United States in the Philippine Islands are included, this figure is increased to 36 per cent; and it must be remarked that both figures relate to the expenses of the forces actually in the

Islands and do not include the very pertinent potential protection afforded by the entire military and naval powers of the United States. It can scarcely be expected that the Philippine Islands will be able to increase their revenues by 36 or even 28 per cent to provide the force necessary for maintaining internal order and the minimum of external defense, even were no internal economic degeneration expected. They could only do so at a sacrifice of a large part of their educational and public improvements.<sup>31</sup>

While Hoover was reluctant to allow the Philippines to be independent because of its weakness, former President Roosevelt felt that the "complete severance of the Philippines . . . was not merely desirable but necessary."<sup>32</sup> Roosevelt persisted in believing that the Philippines was still "our heel of Achilles" if the United States was attacked by a foreign power. From a military standpoint, the Philippines continued to be a source of weakness to the United States.<sup>33</sup>

Notwithstanding Hoover's veto, Congress passed the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. It was not acceptable, however, to the Philippine Legislature because a provision for military, naval, and other reservations to be retained by the United States was considered as inconsistent with true independence, violated the national dignity, and subject to misunderstanding.<sup>34</sup>

During the term of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a compromise was reached with the leading Filipino statesman, Manuel Quezon. The compromise which Roosevelt described in a message to Congress requested that the portion of the law authorizing the United States to retain an option on military and naval bases be changed.

Roosevelt desired that the U.S. should not retain permanent military bases on the islands and that arrangements for naval bases be concluded on terms mutually satisfactory to the United States and the Philippines.<sup>35</sup>

In the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, therefore, the law specifically eliminated the provision for the retention of army bases after independence and the President of the United States was authorized to negotiate for the retention of naval bases. In the same law, the President was requested, at the earliest practicable date, to enter into negotiations with foreign powers with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the perpetual neutralization of the Philippines after Philippine independence had been achieved. The effect of this provision was the removal of U.S. army forces and the relinquishment of army reservations which comprised a total of some 300,000 acres of land before World War II. The most significant result of this provision was its effect on the course of future Philippine-American relations in the field of military security.

Before World War II, the total number of troops in the Philippines never numbered more than 10,000 men. A number of ships and some naval forces were also stationed in the Philippines during the same period. The total number of forces stationed in the Philippines before the outbreak of World War II was never considered sufficient for the defense of Philippine territory. Although the United States prepared the Philippines for political independence, it paradoxically did not adequately prepare the islands to provide for its economic and military

security.

During the early period of the pacification campaign following the decision of the United States to occupy the Philippines in 1898, the United States Army stationed large contingents of troops in the islands. After the period of military government was over, following the capture of Filipino General Emilio Aguinaldo and the collapse of the resistance movement against the United States, the number of American troops rarely numbered more than 10,000 men, more than half of which were native troops called the Philippine Scouts.

The American and Filipino soldiers formed what was then known as the Philippine Department of the United States Army. It was usually commanded by an officer with the rank of Major General. Seven military garrisons were established, most of them in Manila or its environs.

The United States Navy also maintained an Asiatic Squadron which was based in naval stations in Cavite and at Olongapo at Subic Bay. The naval shore activities required the services of less than five thousand men.

Although some part of the Asiatic fleet was constantly in Manila waters, its activities were normally concentrated along the China coast. Just before the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific, the fleet normally consisted of a heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, a dozen destroyers and about the same number of small submarines, a few naval airplanes together with auxiliary vessels and some gunboats in Chinese coastal waters and rivers. In 1939, the force was reinforced by an aircraft

carrier, a number of long range bombers, and a number of large, modern submarines. The main United States naval base was at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, about 5,000 miles away from the Philippines.

Although a number of Philippine Scout and Philippine Constabulary officers were trained at West Point and Annapolis during the period of American occupation of the Philippines, the Filipinos, prior to 1905, were not required or allowed to prepare themselves for the protection of their country by having full responsibility or even sharing in the responsibility for organizing, equipping, financing, and controlling large military forces. The only experience the Philippines ever had in this direction was the organizing and training of a division of the Philippine National Guard during World War I. That experience was too brief, however, to be of significant or enduring military value to the Filipinos.

Just before the outbreak of hostilities in 1941, the Philippine Commonwealth Government secured the services of General Douglas MacArthur as military adviser to the Commonwealth as well as chief of a Philippine military mission of United States Army officers. The principal duty of MacArthur and his staff was to prepare the Filipinos for the task of defending their country. There was very little time, however, because the Japanese launched their attacks in 1941 and in a short time overran American and Filipino positions. The story of that valiant defense is a matter of historical record. It also showed how weak the country was in matters of defense.



It was also observed that although the United States did prepare the country for political independence, its preparations for the economic stability and military security of the people were woefully inadequate.

Establishment of Military Bases.--In accordance with the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Law, the Filipino people adopted a Constitution in 1934. Among its provisions was an ordinance which recognized the right of the United States to expropriate property for public uses, to maintain military and armed forces in the Philippines, and, upon order of the President of the United States, to call into the service of such armed forces all military forces organized by the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines. The Constitution also conferred the right to intervene on the United States in internal affairs of the Philippines for the preservation of its government, the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for the discharge of governmental obligations.

During the desperate days of World War II, when President Quezon, as mentioned earlier, tried to have his country neutralized, President Franklin Roosevelt pledged that the Japanese would be driven from the Philippines, the restoration of freedom to the Philippines, and the establishment and protection of their independence.

It was the feeling of Commonwealth Vice President Sergio Osmeña that the promise of American protection of Philippine independence meant the establishment of U.S. military bases in the Philippines, a situation not contemplated in the Tydings-McDuffie Act which set the date of Philippine independence on July 4, 1946. Upon receipt of Roosevelt's message, Osmeña asked Quezon if he favored American bases in Philippine territory. Quezon replied that with the lessons of World War II, there was no way of "escaping the necessity of accepting the bases."<sup>36</sup> Osmeña realized then that future independence for the Philippines was now linked to the security of the United States.<sup>37</sup> When he eventually succeeded Quezon as President on the latter's death, Osmeña adopted a grand view of United States-Philippine relations. Osmeña was convinced that America should be allowed to retain military bases in the Philippines not only because they were vital to Philippine liberty and development, but also because they gave the United States the opportunity of preventing any enemy from approaching her Western shores.

Following the occupation of the Philippines by Japan in the course of World War II, Japanese Prime Minister Hideki Tojo delivered a message to the 91st session of the Japanese Imperial Diet dated January 27, 1943, wherein he mentioned the intention of the Japanese Imperial Government to grant political independence to the Philippines. In order to counter-act the propaganda effect of Tojo's message, Roosevelt sent a message to the U.S.

Congress requesting authority to advance the date of independence and to negotiate with the Philippine Government for the establishment of military bases in the Philippines for their mutual defense after the grant of independence.

In response to Roosevelt's message, Senator Tydings proposed a resolution to be introduced in the Senate which would advance the date of the grant of independence to the Philippines coincident with ousting the Japanese from the Philippines. Upon learning of Tydings' intention, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes sent a memorandum to Roosevelt in which he stated that:

President Quezon desires that the United States rather than (or in addition to) an international body provide for the military security of the Philippines. He rests this policy on your statement of December 28, 1941, ". . . that their freedom will be redeemed and their independence established and protected." To further this purpose he wishes the United States to establish naval and air bases in the Islands. If this policy is followed, our military authorities may prefer to arrange for the bases prior to independence. 38

Upon reading Ickes' letter, Secretary of State Cordell Hull made known his own views to Roosevelt in a memorandum dated September 8, 1943, as follows:

. . . The Tydings-McDuffie Act already contains authority for the retention of naval reservations and fueling stations in the Philippines after complete independence is granted. It is understood, however, that the Commonwealth authorities now feel that not only an adequate naval force should be maintained in the Islands but that a formidable air force will also be required. It is most likely that the entire question of

defense for the Philippines will be reviewed when Congress next gives consideration to Philippine affairs. There will probably be an insistent demand from Filipino leaders for protective measures of a much broader character than was contemplated when the Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed. This is a subject concerning which the appropriate officials of the War and Navy Departments are in a better position to make recommendations, based on experience and expert knowledge, than are officials of the Department of State. Nevertheless, it can be said that the principle of maintaining naval facilities in the Philippines after independence is granted is already recognized in the Tydings-McDuffie Act and that what remains to be done is to decide in what form and to what extent these facilities and other security measures will be maintained after the Philippines becomes independent.<sup>39</sup>

As he promised, Senator Tydings introduced on September 24, 1943, Senate Joint Resolution 81 which would grant immediate independence to the Philippines. In connection with this resolution, a memorandum was prepared by Assistant Secretary of State Long stating the views of the Department of State with regard to the establishment of bases in the Philippines as follows:

The military operations planned for the defeat of Japan contemplate the use of the Philippines as air and naval bases for the prosecution of the war against Japan. If the Philippines were granted their immediate independence, the United States Government would have to deal with that Government as an entirely independent concern. It is possible that members of the Government now present in the United States would reappear in the Philippine Islands to assume control of that part of the Islands freed from Japanese domination. The theory of dealing with that

Government as an independent Government would raise difficulties because we would no longer have the right to exercise the authority we have under the present arrangement with the Philippine Commonwealth. It is even possible that members to be added to the Government there might take the position that they had contributed very heavily to the war and desire to be at peace and might assume a policy of neutrality. In that case it would be necessary for the United States to take steps which in effect would make war against the Philippines in order to use those areas for military and naval bases for use in the operations against Japan.<sup>40</sup>

These views, of course, were unknown to the leader of the Philippine Government-in-exile in the United States. The United States Government was, in effect, ready to go to war against the Philippines in order to have access to military bases in that country in the prosecution of the war effort against Japan. This probably accounts for Quezon's action during a meeting held at his apartment in Washington, D.C., on October 6, 1943, to discuss Tydings' resolution, where a number of American officials were in attendance. During this meeting, Quezon took Undersecretary of Interior Abe Fortas aside and suggested to him that Fortas recommend that Roosevelt transmit a message to the U.S. Congress requesting provision for negotiations to insure the security of the Philippines. Quezon, however, intimated that in Roosevelt's message it would not be wise to make any special mention of the word "bases."<sup>41</sup>

On November 3, 1943, Tydings introduced Senate Resolution 93, which declared the policy of the Congress with

respect to the Philippines. As passed by Congress, it declared, first of all, that it was the policy of the Congress that the United States shall drive the treacherous invading Japanese from the Philippines, restore as quickly as possible the orderly and free democratic process of government to the Filipino people, and thereupon establish the complete independence of the Philippine Islands as a separate and self-governing nation. Secondly, after negotiation with the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, or the President of the Filipino Republic, the President of the United States was authorized by such means as he finds appropriate to withhold or to acquire and to retain such bases, necessary appurtenances to such bases, and the rights incident thereto in addition to any provided for by the Act of March 24, 1934, as he may deem necessary for the full and mutual protection of the Philippine Islands and of the United States. Finally, the President of the United States was authorized after consultation with the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines to advance the date of the independence of the Philippines prior to July 4, 1946. In the same resolution, the Congress of the United States pledged the resources of the United States, both of men and materials, to redeem the Philippines from Japan and to speed the day of ultimate and complete independence of the people of the Philippine Islands.

Philippine Vice-President Sergio Osmeña appeared before the House Committee on Insular Affairs to urge approval. Upon approval of the resolution, President Roose-

velt issued the following statement:

On the problem of bases, the present Organic Act permitted acquisition only of naval bases and fueling stations, a situation wholly inadequate to meet the conditions of modern warfare. The measure approved today will permit the acquisition of air and land bases in addition to naval bases and fueling stations.

I have been informed that this action is most welcome to Commonwealth authorities and that they will gladly cooperate in the establishment and maintenance of bases both to the restored Commonwealth and as an independent nation. By this we shall have an outstanding example of cooperation designed to prevent a recurrence of aggression and to ensure the peaceful use of great oceans by those in pursuit of peaceful ends.<sup>42</sup>

On June 30, 1944, President Osmeña stated that the enactment of Senate Joint Resolution 93 was a long step toward the real freedom and independence of the Philippines and its survival as a free and Christian nation. He also mentioned that the provision for naval and air bases was not only for the benefit of the United States but was for the mutual protection of both the United States and the Philippines<sup>43</sup>

Later on, in a press interview, when asked whether he favored that the United States should maintain army and navy bases in the Philippines, he replied, "Absolutely, all the time."<sup>44</sup>

In another press interview on December 5, 1944, after American liberation forces had landed on the island of Leyte, Osmeña stated that while the Philippines de-

sired independence as rapidly as the military situation permitted, it was willing to grant the United States whatever naval and military bases the latter needed for military security. It was Osmeña's view that the existence of U.S. bases in the Philippines would guarantee the protection of the young republic from further oriental or other aggression in that part of the world. At this time it is clear that Osmeña's views on U.S. bases in the Philippines had changed radically as a direct result of his war-time experiences; now he felt ~~the~~ necessity for the existence of bases in the Philippines. Subsequently, on May 14, 1945, Osmeña was called to Washington where he signed an agreement with President Truman permitting the United States to have military and naval bases in the islands. The agreement stated that

pending development of the detail plan, the United States will retain all sites which were held by the U.S. Army as military reservations on 7 December 1941 and by the U.S. Navy except at Cavite and will be accorded rights to sites in the localities shown on the attached Appendix.<sup>45</sup>

The United States also had the option to acquire "now" or in the future new sites if they were required.

In his Memoirs, Truman later stated that this agreement was concluded because

The Philippines are a vital strategic center in the Pacific, and we were anxious that a military agreement be concluded in order that we might in the future continue to protect them against outside attack. The Filipinos themselves were equally anxious to have this protection, because without



it the republic we were helping to establish might sometime find itself helpless.<sup>46</sup>

The position of Osmeña was endorsed by the Congress of the Philippines which enacted enacted House Joint Resolution No. 4 wherein the President of the Philippines was authorized to negotiate with the President of the United States on the establishment of military bases. The Philippine President was further instructed that in the course of the negotiations, he should insure the territorial integrity of the Philippines, the mutual protection of the Philippines and the United States, and the maintenance of peace in the Pacific.<sup>47</sup>

Following the restoration of civil government in the Philippines, steps were taken by the United States Government to negotiate with the Philippines for the acquisition of military and naval bases in the islands.

In a memorandum prepared by Frank P. Lockhart,<sup>48</sup> Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs of the Department of State, addressed to the Secretary of State, dated April 18, 1945, the following points were raised: (1) the legal basis of the right of the United States to maintain military and other reservations and armed forces in the Philippines by virtue of the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act; (2) the authorization conferred upon the President of the United States by the provisions of the Senate Joint Resolution 93, approved June 23, 1944, to negotiate with the Philippine Commonwealth President to withhold, acquire, or retain military and naval bases as he finds necessary in the Philippines; (3) that no information was possessed by the State Department as to the

extent or location of the bases which might be desired by the Army or Navy; (4) that no negotiations had been conducted on the subject between Army and Navy authorities of the United States and the Philippine Commonwealth Government nor between any other officials of the Governments of the United States and the Philippines; and finally (5) that the question of procedure should be determined at that time whether it would be better to start preliminary and exploratory negotiations or to wait until the Philippines had become independent.

The Departments of the Navy and War subsequently submitted communications to the State Department in response to the memorandum of Lockhart. In his memorandum of April 30, 1945, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal indicated that the Navy Department was desirous that negotiations be started immediately with the Philippine Government in order to obtain rights and to establish bases in certain areas in the Philippines. Forrestal mentioned that among the rights to the bases were: the right to use harbors, to construct shore facilities, including airfields and seaplane ramps, and other measures as strategy might require. He also mentioned the areas in the Philippines in which the navy was interested: Tutu Bay (Jolo), Tawi Tawi, Balabac Island, Leyte-Samar (Leyte Gulf area), Guimaras Strait--Iloilo Strait area, Mactan Island, Coron Bay, Subic Bay, Sarangani Island, Sorsogon, San Miguel Bay, Polillo, Aparri, and Puerto Princesa. Forrestal also recommended the following: (1) that engineering studies be conducted at these places as soon as practicable in order to select those sites

most suitable for use in conditions likely to exist after World War II; (2) that perpetual rights in all of the areas listed above be retained because changing conditions subsequent to the conclusion of the war would require changes in dispositions for the defense of the Philippines; and (3) that any agreements entered into with the Philippine Government concerning the above areas should leave the way open for future negotiations for other sites.<sup>49</sup>

On May 11, 1945, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson submitted the views of the War Department regarding military bases in the Philippines. Stimson felt that for the full and mutual protection of the Philippines after the grant of independence, the closest cooperation of the Filipinos with U.S. military forces would be required. On the basis of that cooperation, U.S. military responsibilities would be limited only to those which were beyond the capabilities of the Philippines. Predicting that the Filipinos would probably be unable to provide substantial air and naval forces as well as ground forces for its defense, Stimson recommended that the U.S. should be prepared to meet requirements for air and naval forces, and, initially to provide nearly all ground forces.<sup>50</sup>

Stimson also submitted a detailed plan. The basis for the U.S. Army military security system consisted of major air centers in Central Luzon and Northern Mindanao with rings of outlying fighter fields. In addition, there would be staging and mounting bases, with ground garrison installations to protect air bases, harbor entrances, and other critical points. Eventually, it was contemplated that the Filipinos would take over a

large proportion of the ground responsibilities as the military effectiveness of their forces increased. When this happened, in accordance with a process of constant screening of U.S. base sites, some bases would be released to the Philippines as they become surplus to the needs of the United States. Also, as they gained effectiveness, the Filipino forces would be accorded increasing participation in the use of certain United States bases. Stimson also recommended that in addition to sites that had already been specified, certain others would need to be designated and acquired in the future by the United States. These included sites necessitated by changes in the art of war, sites of historical significance, sites developed for operations during World War II, and U.S. military cemeteries.

Finally, Stimson recommended that:<sup>51</sup>

1. The necessary agreements should be concluded on principles relating to freedom of movement, communication, and operation of U.S. military bases in the area.

2. Firm agreement should be reached on the basic principle of cooperation of United States and Filipino forces as well as integration of their military plans.

3. No nation other than the United States or the Philippines should be permitted to establish or make use of any bases in the Philippines without the prior agreement of both the United States and the Philippines.

On May 14, 1945, therefore, following the submission of the preceding memoranda by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, a meeting was held in Washington, D.C., attended by the following persons: President Harry S. Truman, Stimson, Forrestal, Senator Tydings, Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Vice Admiral Richard S. Edwards, Acting Joseph C. Grew, all of the United States, and Philippine President Sergio Osmeña. During this meeting Osmeña was given a document entitled "Preliminary Statement of General Principles Pertaining to the United States Military and Naval Base System in the Philippines To Be Used as a Basis for Detailed Discussions and Staff Studies."<sup>52</sup> After reading this document, already mentioned in an earlier part of this chapter, President Osmeña said that he was in accord with the proposals. Both Truman and Osmeña then signed the document which is included in this study as Appendix "A." The document listed 24 areas in the Philippines where the United States proposed to establish bases.

After the signing of this agreement, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes asked U.S. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal whether the Navy Department was ready to enter into preliminary or final negotiations on the question of Philippine bases. Byrnes also sent a similar letter to the War Department on September 4, 1945. In his letter to the War Department, Byrnes also mentioned that Judge Francisco Delgado, a special representative of President Osmeña in the United States, had been directed to inquire whether the United States Government was in a position to undertake negotiations looking to

the drawing up of a definitive agreement on the subject of American military and naval bases to be retained by the United States in the Philippines after its independence. Judge Delgado, according to Byrnes, had informed the State Department that the agreement might include such matters as the exact bases desired, the extent of the areas affected, and the nature of the installations required. Furthermore, Byrnes informed the War and Navy Departments of the legal basis for the negotiations; first, that the President of the United States had authority to proceed with negotiations for the retention of American bases in the Philippines after independence; second, the Philippine Congress had also authorized the President of the Philippines to proceed with negotiations with the United States for the retention of American bases in the Philippines.<sup>53</sup>

The Departments of War and the Navy replied on October 10, 1945, that they were not yet ready to enter into negotiations into the question of military bases. Both departments said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not be in a position to recommend definitive requirements for specific base sites and other military rights which had to be finally negotiated with the Philippine government until the completion of on-the-site surveys then in progress and a detailed study of the survey results. Both departments informed the Secretary of State that orders had already been sent in order to expedite the completion of the surveys and studies as well as the submission of an integrated report. In the meantime, the two departments were of the opinion

that the agreement of May 14, 1945 between Truman and Osmeña adequately safeguarded U.S. military interests during the interim period.<sup>54</sup>

In the meantime, following the landing of American forces in the Philippines, Secretary Forrestal stated on May 16, 1945, that the United States would continue to bear responsibility for the security of the Philippines. To be able to perform that task, Forrestal pointed out that the United States would need bases and strategic areas supporting the bases. He also mentioned that negotiations were then underway to accomplish that purpose. Earlier, on May 7, 1945, the New York Times reported that Forrestal was negotiating for strategic bases in the Philippines.<sup>55</sup>

President Osmeña also announced in the wake of American operations to re-occupy the Philippines, that the United States would be granted military bases in the Philippines with the full support of the Filipino people when the Philippines became independent. In the same report of the New York Times of May 25, 1945, Osmeña stated that while he was ready to go to the people, he did not think that would be necessary. He emphatically pointed out that the Filipino people recognized the necessity of American protection and welcomed them to the country. He also mentioned that details for the military bases were being worked out between the United States and the Philippines and that, for the protection of the bases, Filipinos would supply the ground troops.<sup>56</sup>

The day after Osmeña's statement, Senator Millard Tydings, who had accompanied Osmeña back to the Phil-

ippines, stated in a press conference that the question of maintaining U.S. naval and air bases in the Philippines after the war presented no practical difficulties. He pointed out, however, that there seemed to be an anomaly of one nation's maintaining military installations on the territory of another while not exercising jurisdiction over that host country's foreign affairs. Because the Philippines would be unable for some time to maintain a large navy or air force, its security contribution would be expected to be ground troops. Tydings also observed that the Filipinos realize what a good friend the United States was to them during war and would therefore be prepared to give the U.S. what she needed since world security was no longer national and that no nation alone could keep aggression in check.<sup>57</sup>

Not everyone, however, was happy about the situation. On July 4, 1945, U.S. Admiral Kincaid stated that the American naval station in Manila Bay had become outdated and was not likely to represent any large part of America's post-war military establishment. Furthermore, he observed that while some bases would be retained in the Philippines, Manila itself was considered not suited to modern operations because it was not logical to put a large naval base in the center of a capital city.<sup>58</sup>

Besides the State, Navy, and War Departments, the U S Congress was also interested in the question of naval and military bases. Contrary to what Congress felt to be a popular conception that the subject of Pacific bases was exclusively a matter of foreign policy and military necessity and hence a question to be determined only by



the executive branch of the government, the U.S. Congress believed that national security is the primary concern of Congress. The popular conception, to Congress, overlooks the constitutional authority and responsibility of Congress to the people, including those in uniform, to legislate for the defense of the United States, and to guarantee the best possible use of the money which is levied in the form of taxes. In the pursuit of this duty, the Subcommittee on Pacific Bases of the House Committee on Naval Affairs of the 79th Congress, by virtue of House Resolution 154, a resolution for an investigation to determine whether the war effort is being carried forward efficiently, expeditiously, and economically, conducted an inspection tour of Pacific bases from July 14 to August 2, 1945. Following this tour, they submitted a report entitled "A Study of Pacific Bases" to the Chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs on August 6, 1945. The members of the subcommittee recommended, among other things, (1) that the United States should be given specific and substantial rights to the sites where American bases have been constructed on island territories of Allied nations; (2) that the United States must not permit its Pacific bases to lapse back into a state of unpreparedness; (3) that United States strategy of defense in the Pacific should revolve around a center line running north of the Equator through the Hawaiian Islands, Micronesia, and the Philippines; (4) that the Philippines was one of the bases that appear to possess the greatest advantages as a main fleet base, as well as a secondary

base; (5) that the Philippines should be considered as one place where air bases should be established. The subcommittee report pointed out the primary and secondary missions of the United States in the Pacific relative to the bases there. The primary mission was to occupy, maintain, and defend such bases in the Pacific area as were required to insure the superiority of the United States on the sea, on the land, and in the air in order to protect the continental United States and its possessions against any probable enemy. The secondary mission was to occupy the minimum number of bases in the Pacific area needed to carry out the measures required to prevent aggression in the Pacific and to assist in maintaining world peace.

The subcommittee justified its recommendation for the retention of Pacific bases on the following grounds: (1) the loss of American lives in taking the bases; (2) the expenditure of vast sums of American money in establishing and equipping the bases; (3) the great dependence of the world upon the United States for maintaining peace in the Pacific and the world; and (4) the apparent preference of the natives of these islands for the United States Government.<sup>60</sup>

The subcommittee also cited the strategic importance of the Philippines in their report:<sup>61</sup>

Located squarely between the Orient and the western limits of the Occident, the Philippines have been called the watch dog of the Orient. Unless they control the Philippines the Japanese cannot reach the rich southland and attain the tin and rubber of Malaya, the quinine and oil of the Netherlands East Indies, or the tungsten of Burma. Through the Philippines, the United States forces can reach China and Japan.

Following their inspection of possible sites in the Philippines for post-war military and naval facilities, the subcommittee recommended the following to be most suitable: Cavite Harbor, Subic Bay, Coron Bay, Puerto Princesa, Tawi-Tawi, Iloilo, Mactan Island, and Samar-Leyte.

There is no doubt, therefore, that the United States had a very great interest at this point of time in the establishment of military bases in the Philippines. There was also to some extent some receptivity on the part of the Philippines toward the establishment of such bases on its territory.

The passage by the Philippine Congress of Joint Resolution No. 4, authorizing the President of the Philippines to enter into negotiations with the U.S. Government for military bases, and Joint Resolution 93 of the U.S. Congress, likewise authorizing the President of the United States to do the same thing, set the stage for negotiations leading to the establishment of military bases by the U.S. in the Philippines.

#### Preliminary Negotiations for the Bases

On October 2, 1945, while in the United States, President Osmena made the observation that American commitments to protect Philippine independence as promised by the U.S. and to establish air and naval bases for mutual security involved not only the bases themselves but effective com-

munications and a "peaceful and prospering hinterland." Sergio Osmeña, however, failed in his bid for election as President of the new Republic of the Philippines. He was defeated by Manuel Roxas who had stayed behind in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation and had served in the puppet government set up by the Japanese. Roxas, like Osmeña, however, also favored the establishment of U S. military bases in the Philippines.

On May 2, 1946, Secretary of State Dean Acheson sent a telegram to Roxas, congratulating the latter on his election and inviting him to visit Washington. At this point of time, there seemed to be no great difficulties standing in the way of concluding a military bases agreement between the United States and the Philippines.

In the meantime, in anticipation of the proclamation of the independence of the Philippines on July 4, 1946, Secretary of State Dean Acheson informed President Truman on May 8, 1946 that the U.S. State Department was preparing drafts of instruments to be entered into by the United States and the Philippines. These draft treaties were: a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation, an executive agreement relating to trade, a treaty of general relations, a consular convention, an extradition treaty, an income tax treaty or convention, an estate tax treaty or convention, and a military bases agreement. In the same communication Acheson informed Truman that he intended to hand these drafts to Paul V. McNutt, U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippines, upon his arrival in Washington for transmission to Philippine President-elect Manuel Roxas. Acheson also suggested to

Truman that it would be desirable to conclude on July 4, 1946, the military bases agreement since it would not require ratification by the United States Senate as congressional authorization had already been given to the President in Joint Resolution No. 93, approved on July 29, 1944. Finally, Acheson mentioned that the question of concluding a military assistance agreement with the Philippines was still being studied by the State Department.

On May 10, 1946, Roxas arrived in Washington and called at the Department of State accompanied by Paul V. McNutt, U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippines. Roxas met with Secretary of State Acheson and Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. During their conversation, Roxas mentioned that he would be glad to look the draft treaties over and to take them with him upon his return to Manila. He expressed confidence that the draft treaties would be acceptable to the Philippine Government, and if there were any revisions, the State Department would receive them within a week after his return to Manila.

Before formal negotiations could take place, however, some internal problems relating to the draft treaty on military bases had to be ironed out between the State Department on the one hand the the War and Navy Departments on the other. Three basic issues had to be adjusted by these three departments: (1) the resolution of the question of the joint use of the bases by the Philippines and the United States; (2) the reduction in the number and size of the bases; and (3) the question of jurisdic-

tion over American military and civilian personnel outside the bases.

On the question of the joint use of the bases, it was agreed that the draft treaty should contain a provision which would permit the armed forces of the Philippines to serve on United States bases, and vice versa, whenever the armed forces of both countries agree that such would be beneficial. However, there remained the problem of whether the bases should be made available to the UN Security Council with the consent of the Philippines alone or with the consent of the Philippines and the United States. The War Department preferred the second alternative, but it was anticipated that the first alternative would be acceptable.

The question of a possible reduction in the number of bases retained by the United States which numbered 71 at that time and in their size -- one base covered 150,000 acres -- was referred to General McArthur for his opinion.

The question of jurisdiction was difficult to resolve. It was generally agreed that the United States should exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by American military or civilian personnel within the bases. The War and Navy Departments also wanted U.S. jurisdiction over offenses committed by such personnel outside the bases on the grounds that it was justified by international practice and that it was essential to their military program and position in the islands. President Roxas had indicated that he was opposed to U.S. jurisdiction over offenses committed out-

side the bases in time of peace. The State Department was of the opinion that the U.S. Government should not force the Philippines to grant the U.S. such extensive jurisdiction in time of peace. It recommended that the U.S. exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any offenses committed by American military or civilian personnel in the Islands in time of war or national emergency and according at other times exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by such personnel within the bases. The State Department urged approval of this recommendation because the draft program would involve some 50,000 American personnel and would run for 99 years and that Philippine courts have functioned to the satisfaction of American authorities, military as well as civilian. To approve the proposal of the Navy and War Departments, observed the State Department, would result in the following: (1) a feeling by the Filipino people and other friendly Far Eastern peoples that extraterritoriality was being revived by the United States; (2) it would create popular opposition to the bases agreement in the Philippines, making approval of the agreement difficult in the Philippine Congress; and (3) the United States would stand to lose some of its good will among Far Eastern peoples without attaining any corresponding advantages to the United States.

The State Department eventually proved correct in its assessment of the situation as the question of U.S. jurisdiction proved to be a thorny issue not only in the negotiations but in the relationships between the two countries for a long time after the treaty was in force.

Subsequently, the War and Navy Departments submitted a redraft of Article XIV on jurisdiction which provided for concurrent jurisdiction which might result in cases of double jeopardy and which should be avoided whenever practicable. The redraft also contemplated the creation of United States civil courts in the places in which the offenses would be tried, in effect giving the United States primary jurisdiction over all offenses committed by members of U S. armed forces and civilian personnel outside the bases. The State Department thought that the paragraph as redrafted by the Army and Navy Departments was a poor rewording of Article IV of the British Bases Agreement, which to the State Department had proved unsatisfactory in practice and was in fact going to be revised.

On June 14, 1946, a draft military base agreement was transmitted to the U.S. High Commissioner at Manila with a letter requesting him to discuss the draft with Roxas and to report to the State Department the result of the negotiations.

The first draft which was submitted by the representatives of the U.S. Government to Philippine representatives in informal negotiations provided in Article XIV for the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction by the U.S. Government over all offenses committed by American military and civilian personnel, both within and without the bases.

The Philippine Government, in turn, submitted a redraft of the draft agreement of May 14, 1946, a provision



which followed exactly Article IV of the British Base Agreement with the United States. The Army and Navy Departments objected to the Philippine redraft because it did not grant jurisdiction that was considered to be wide enough for the United States Government. The State Department also objected because (1) the British Base Agreement had not worked well in practice and was going to be revised; (2) contained language found to be ambiguous; (3) contemplated the creation of civil courts by the U.S. which has not been done and will not be done; and (4) provided concurrent jurisdiction which should be avoided whenever possible.

The Legal Adviser's Office of the Department of State in order to expedite the progress of the informal discussions, prepared a draft provision which stated that in time of war or national emergency the U.S. Government should have exclusive jurisdiction over American military and civilian personnel, both within and without the bases; at all other times, the U.S. Government should have jurisdiction only over offenses committed within the bases, and such jurisdiction should be exclusive. Prepared as a working paper and a basis for discussion, it was acceptable in principle to the Philippine Government and to the State Department. It was, however, rejected by the representatives of the War and Navy Departments. In spite of the objections of both departments, the final redraft was nevertheless included in the first draft agreement to be presented to the Philippine Government as the basis for formal negotiations which were due to start very soon.

The Formal Negotiations for the Military Bases Agreement. -- The record does not show exactly when the formal negotiations for the military bases agreement started. Although the Americans were anxious to conclude the military base agreement on July 4, 1946, this was not possible. During this period when communications were exchanged between the U.S. Department of State and the office of the President of the Philippines, no mention was made about an agreement setting up a military alliance between the two countries. At that time, it was believed that the military bases agreement and the military assistance agreement would suffice for providing security to the new nation. Steps were also being undertaken in order to rehabilitate the shattered economy and trade of the country.

The United States was not being completely generous to her ward by making preparations for concluding a military bases agreement in order to fulfill previous commitments to provide security for the Philippines. The establishment of military bases in the Philippines was part of an overall military strategy on the part of the United States. Carl Kaysen indicates that American military strategy in the past has been shaped by three chief goals all interrelated: (1) The first was to deter and defend against a direct attack on the United States. (2) The second was to deter and defend against both a direct attack on Western Europe and the use of the threat of military force, including the threat of attack on the United States, as a weapon in the indirect conquest by political means

of some or all of Western Europe. (3) The third, was to oppose expansion of communist power in any part of the world, especially when it took the form of a takeover by communists, with overt or covert assistance from the Soviet Union, of the government of a previously non-communist state.<sup>62</sup>

In order to carry out the third goal, that is, to deter the Soviet Union from its aggressive designs, the United States adopted a policy of containment which had the following features: (1) To confront the Soviet Union by establishing a powerful military force that included an air force second to none, a powerful navy, and large numbers of ground troops, together with increased appropriations for research in nuclear and other sophisticated weaponry. (2) To surround Soviet territory with a string of military bases and embark on a policy of military alliances. (3) To strengthen the defense capabilities of its allies by military assistance grants. (4) To adopt a policy of economic assistance in order to buy time for its allies, especially those that had been ravaged by war.<sup>63</sup>

In Asia, U.S. policy had always been towards the maintenance of a balance of power. As stated by Hans Morgenthau,

. . . underlying the confusions, reversals of policy and moralistic generalities of our Asiatic policy since McKinley, one can detect a consistency that reflects, however vaguely, the permanent interest of the United States in Asia. And this interest is again the maintenance of the balance of power.<sup>64</sup>

The foregoing considerations are also found, more or less, in perhaps one of the clearly expressed statements about the major national objectives of the United States as stated in the "Joint Board Estimate of United States Over-all Production Requirements" of September 11, 1941 as follows:<sup>65</sup>

. . . preservation of the territorial, economic and ideological integrity of the United States and of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere; prevention of the disruption of the British Empire; prevention of the further extension of Japanese territorial domination; eventual establishment in Europe and Asia of balances of power which will most nearly ensure political stability in those regions and the future security of the United States; and, so far as practicable, the establishment of regimes favorable to economic freedom and individual liberty.

The search for some kind of equilibrium in Asia after World War dominated American strategic thinking in their plans for the Philippines. First, of all, it was believed that the American strategists fully expected the United States to retain their position of supremacy in the Pacific. Therefore, it was assumed that American power, having been vastly extended to the western limits of the ocean, could or should be retrenched after the war. On this basis, it was decided that the islands that the American forces had occupied and thereafter established strategic bases, could or should be retrenched after the war.

Although the United States had promised political independence to the Philippines before World War II and this determination had not changed in the course of World War

II, MacArthur's declaration, "I shall return," indicated that the United States planned to reestablish America's position in the islands before they gained independence. Once the Philippines gained its independence,

. . . it was expected that the Philippines would remain closely tied to the United States, especially in terms of its security and military needs. What was visualized, then, was first to drive the Japanese out and then to proceed toward Philippine independence, to be coupled with some arrangement for retention of American strength so as to prevent instability and resurgence of Japanese imperial ambitions.<sup>66</sup>

On the world scene, the political and military conditions constituted by the crudely aggressive designs and policies of the Soviet Union, the political instability, economic weakness, and military vulnerability of European and Asiatic countries which demanded the policy of containment of Communism, helped shaped U.S. policies of strategy which included the establishment of military bases. At least seven functions have been determined for the presence of U.S. military bases abroad and these are: (1) direct and explicit strategic nuclear deterrence; (2) indirect and implicit deterrence; (3) alliance cohesion; (4) local defense; (5) military display and demonstration; (6) intervention; and (7) control over the resources and dimensions of conflict.<sup>67</sup> Considered as specialized instruments of national power supporting the general strategies of defense and deterrence, the military mission of American armed forces stationed in foreign countries in the event of conflict, as part of the total

military arsenal are: to punish the enemy, to limit his capacity to damage the United States and its allies, and to deny him territorial gains. In the absence of conflict, the primary purpose of U.S. armed forces is to prevent warfare from occurring. One study made the following observations about U.S. overseas bases:<sup>68</sup>

1. The presence of American forces in unstable areas serves as a deterrent to overt Communist military expansion and provides a basis for counteraction against other methods of Communist expansion. At the same time the forward presence of U S. forces can be made to serve U.S. policy by helping organize local resistance to communism by means of military assistance and advice and by active participation in technical, economic, and social assistance programs.
2. Forward presence of U.S. forces provides means for pre-positioning supplies and equipment for use in general and limited wars at the same time that they provide immediate military resources for preventing crises or containing crises once they have developed.
3. American bases and forces overseas may provide security for supply lines and to cover movement and employment of reinforcements in the event of war while providing secure communications outlets to ensure adequate facilities for central direction of appropriate military response based on adequate intelligence.
4. The dispersal of retaliatory forces in bases overseas enhances U S. second strike capability in the event of nuclear war, forcing a dissipation of the enemy's strategic strike. At the same time forces disposed on the perimeter of the Communist block may resist Com-

munist absorption of peripheral territories while providing a nucleus for build-up of counter-offensive forces moved from the United States.

The advantages which can accrue to U.S. policy through the presence of U S. forces overseas have been classified as of two kinds: (1) those which are directly related to the immediate and constant threat to the position of the United States and of the Free World; (2) those which contribute directly or indirectly to the long-range goals of U.S. policy.<sup>69</sup>

The direct military advantages include: (1) The presence of American forces may help focus resistance to communism in Areas where there is conflict. (2) U.S. forces can encourage self-help through the building up of indigenous military forces capable of taking the major share of responsibility for the defense of the country. (3) U.S. forces can provide reliable intelligence about the nature of a crisis and the direction of its development in an unstable area and communications secure in the hands of U.S. forces can keep the United States informed of the situation as well as serve as the channel for communicating orders for counteraction to fit the requirements of U.S. policy. (4) U.S. forces abroad can help control and maintain the efficient use of weapons, especially nuclear weapons positioned overseas. (5) U.S. forces abroad can promote tactical mobility capability by accumulating stocks of transport equipment and maintain them for employment in active operations.<sup>70</sup>

The second group of advantages which contribute to

the long-range goals of U.S. policy include: (1) The presence of overseas American forces may provide assistance to international security organizations, like the United Nations, for dealing with threats to the peace without direct U.S. intervention. By fostering the growth of such international security organizations, U.S. interest is protected. (2) There are also civic advantages to the U.S. presence abroad by integrating military effort with other political and economic measures to give a convincing and effective rebuttal to Communist arguments that they are the only ones that can help the oppressed and destitute. (3) American military power deployed overseas, by responding to calls for humanitarian assistance can create goodwill for the U.S. (4) U.S. forces abroad have the opportunity to set an example of the role of responsible self-government at the same time that they are teaching the use of weapons and tactics for the defense against the Communists. (5) American forces abroad can contribute to the general welfare of the people they are trying to defend. (6) U.S. forces overseas can furnish local technical assistance by furnishing training to the local population in techniques and methods which will contribute to the progress of the area.<sup>71</sup>

The United States had clear stakes toward the retention of its military bases in the Philippines. For the Philippines, the issues were perhaps as clear as they were for the United States.

The level of involvement of a country in various



international issue areas is generally the expression of its orientation toward the rest of the world. K. J. Holsti defines this orientation as a "state's general attitudes and commitments toward the external environment, its fundamental strategy for accomplishing its domestic and external objectives and aspirations."

In dealing with its international environment, the state may decide on (1) a policy of isolation, or (2) non-alignment, and (3) coalition-making and alliance construction.

The decision that a state makes in terms of its foreign policy rest mainly on (1) its perceptions of its national interests, (2) domestic conditions or constraints, (3) perceptions of threats or violence in the international environment, and (4) the assessment of its elites as to what the foreign policy of the state should be.

In the formulation of state policies, the most common objectives of states have been survival, the search for security, a desire for influence, the preservation or promotion of economic welfare, the protection and advancement of a particular ideology, and the quest for power.

The over-riding consideration is self-preservation:

Because territory is an inherent part of a state, self-preservation means defending its control over territory; and, because independence is of the essence of the state, self-preservation also means fighting for independent status. This explains why the basic objective of the foreign policy of all states is the preservation of territorial integrity and political independence.<sup>72</sup>

Small states no less than large states are concerned with the protection of their national security. Considering the desperate status of the Philippines following the destruction and devastation of war, it seemed inevitable that the maintenance of a close relationship with the United States was desired by the Philippines if it was to recover from the effects of war.

Recognizing the condition of weakness of the Philippines, Manuel Roxas declared in a speech on the direction of Philippine foreign policy:

Our entire foreign policy [is]. . . firmly based on our special relationship with the United States. . . . We must remember, however great our pride in our independence that we are a small nation, presently poor and defenseless. In a world far from stabilized, no small nation today is without its special ties with a greater or stronger power. Do we prefer to establish special ties with China, with Russia, or with France? I do not think so. History has made our decision for us and for this we must be fervently thankful. We have the privilege, for which every other nation in the world would pay in billions, or have a special position in relation to the United States. That position is our greatest asset today. It is an asset which we cannot buy for any amount of money. It lends us prestige, strength, security, and economic support.<sup>73</sup>

Roxas was more specific why he desired a closer relationship with the United States:

The United States is one of the world's greatest powers, perhaps the greatest. The Philippines is a small, war-devastated nation. Our total national income is less than that of the city of San

Francisco. The United States treats us as with an equal and deals with us as with an equal. But we are not really equal. How could we be? <sup>74</sup>

The time was very favorable for the conclusion of a military bases agreement between the United States and the Philippines. The legal basis for the authority of representatives of both government to engage in the negotiations had already been granted by the legislative bodies of both countries. The draft agreement had been prepared and was ready for discussion.

Plans had been made by the United States to conclude the agreement on July 4, 1946, the date on which the Philippines was going to be proclaimed independent by the United States. On July 3, 1946, therefore, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson sent a telegram to U.S. High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt wherein he instructed McNutt to propose to Philippine authorities that the base agreement be signed on July 4, 1946. He also informed McNutt that the State Department was negotiating revision of the British Base Agreement. McNutt was therefore instructed to say to Philippine President Roxas that the United States hopes that he will be prepared to accept in the draft agreement whatever provision regarding jurisdiction may be involved between the U.S. and Great Britain. Acheson told McNutt that the Departments of State, War and Navy attached importance to the signing of the base agreement on July 4, 1946. However, the hopes of the United States were not to be realized. Philippine independence was proclaimed as scheduled. A

treaty of general relations and a trade treaty were signed. But the military bases agreement which the United States had hoped to conclude on that day was not signed.

On July 6, 1946, the New York Times reported that Navy Secretary Forrestal was in the Philippines inspecting U.S. naval bases and facilities. The report did not mention anything about the base agreement negotiations.

On July 26, 1946, U.S. Ambassador Paul McNutt informed Acheson that he was following up the status of some pending treaties and conventions between the United States and the Philippines. McNutt informed Acheson that President Roxas was planning to appoint a congressional committee to take part in the negotiations on military bases. He also stated in the same communication that the Filipinos were making a study of the provisions of the agreement and should be able to participate in the negotiations in a short time.

Eventually it was announced that the members of the Philippine negotiating panel were appointed by President Roxas. The panel, which was headed by no less than Vice-President Elpidio Quirino, concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs, included Secretary of National Defense Ruperto Kangleon, Secretary of Justice Roman Ozaeta, members of the General Staff of the Philippine Army, Liberal Senators Vicente Francisco, Proceso Sebastian, Salipada Pendatun, and Nacionalista Senator Tomas Cabili. McNutt headed the American panel which was made up mostly of military officers.

Roxas later had high praise for the members of the Philippine panel when he said:

This Government has been fortunate in its negotiators. Vice President Quirino, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, was in complete charge of the negotiations and conducted them with a skill which did him great honor in this most difficult and technical arrangement. He was ably and brilliantly assisted by a committee appointed by me which consisted of the best minds which could be brought to bear upon this subject. They all participated wholeheartedly in the negotiation and contributed in major measure to its success.<sup>75</sup>

Sometime between July and August, negotiations between the United States and the Philippines over the military bases agreement began. A report dated August 11, 1946, from U.S. Ambassador McNutt to the Secretary of State stated that the question of jurisdiction constituted a principal obstacle toward the prompt completion of the base and military assistance agreements. In lieu of a formal treaty, McNutt suggested that jurisdiction over all persons should rest with the Philippine Government.

Another report from McNutt dated September 5, 1946, informed the Secretary of State that President Roxas, reacting to press reports about a deadlock on the base negotiations, branded such reports as untrue and asked the press to refrain from publishing information which was vital to the Philippines, the dissemination of which might work to the disadvantage of the Philippines. Roxas' press statement also said that the negotiations were proceeding routinely but that "intimate details" should not be disclosed since they involved the mutual security of the Philippines and the U.S. Roxas also requested

Philippine negotiators to refrain from commenting to the press on the progress or any detail of the negotiations.

The negotiations appeared to move smoothly with the report of McNutt to the Secretary of State on September 7, 1946, that the negotiators had agreed on a substitution for article XIV on jurisdiction. In the same report, McNutt stated that the unsettled questions involved some changes in the use of some Army bases and that Roxas was very anxious to present the treaty for ratification by the Senate before the end of its session on September 18. Roxas, therefore, wanted immediate approval of the changes reported to date.

Roxas, however, was not able to present the base agreement to the Philippine Senate for its ratification during its regular session because there was not enough time for adequate consideration by the Senate and also because of unfavorable conditions obtaining in the legislative body. At that time, President Roxas was working for the approval of a constitutional amendment that would give Americans equal rights with the Philippine citizens in the exploitation of their natural resources. Roxas promised to deliver a major address to the nation after adjournment to review base negotiations in order to counteract a hostile press and then to call a special session to consider the base agreement and other unfinished domestic legislation.

A more optimistic report was made by Howard C. Petersen, U.S. Assistant Secretary of War on September 19, 1946, when he said that agreements between the United States and the Philippines concerning American naval and military bases

in the Philippines would be concluded shortly. Petersen said that while in Manila he had conferred on the base question with President Roxas and Ambassador Paul V. McNutt. Petersen praised the manner in which Roxas was handling the problem. He also added that the Filipinos realize that the bases were a matter of mutual interest and that they were as keen as Americans to have the bases in their country.<sup>76</sup>

Local press reports in the Philippines again reported a breaking off of military base negotiations on September 25, 1946, although no reason was given why. Roxas was to issue a press release stating that the suspension of the negotiations was due to the pressure of essential domestic problems.

The decision of Roxas not to submit the base agreement was disappointing to the Departments of War, Navy, and State. The State Department was particularly interested in the reasons of those who opposed the base agreement. McNutt informed the State Department that Roxas' struggle to have the parity amendment approved was the strongest test of his leadership. Roxas was, therefore, not enthusiastic about submitting the base agreement during the special session. On September 30, 1946, it appeared that the principal problems that remained to be resolved involved (1) the retention of the McKinley-Nichols Field Area, and (2) U.S. jurisdiction over temporary bases in urban areas. McNutt said that he felt that objection (1) had validity because the bases were located in the midst of large centers of population, but that would mean the abandonment of installations that were constructed

at great cost by the United States.

These were not the only obstacles toward concluding the base agreement. A press release on October 16, 1946, clarified the Philippine objections to the draft base agreement. A report by the New York Times said that (1) the Filipinos insist that there should be no bases in Manila; (2) that they will discuss only first-line bases, deferring consideration of auxiliary bases and reservations; (3) that no extra-territorial rights will be granted outside military bases; and (4) that American contractors working on bases should be subject to Philippine tax laws.<sup>77</sup>

The reaction by the U.S. Government to the objections of the Philippine panel startled the Filipinos: the United States would withdraw all U.S. armed forces from the Philippines. The United States felt that the problems presented in connection with the negotiations for a base agreement with the Philippine Government had resulted in a reconsideration of the strategic and political importance of the bases in the Philippines. The Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, Dwight Eisenhower, said that he recognized that the military importance of the Philippines was of lesser weight in the national interest of the United States than the future good relations of the two nations and that the long term continuance of U.S. army forces in the Philippines would be of little value unless their retention was the result of an expressed desire of the Philippine Government.<sup>78</sup> The Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, also noted



that the removal of U.S. forces from the Manila area to another place would require the construction of expensive facilities and that the War Department could ill afford that expense at that time or in the future. Patterson also said that U.S. commitments in other areas were of predominant importance.

Meanwhile there were press reports about the bad behavior of American troops. These reports about the "brash, ill-mannered, slovenly" behavior of American troops may have influenced the desire of the Filipinos to ask that the bases be moved out of centers of population in order to avoid friction between the natives and the soldiers assigned to the bases.

The Filipino people were assured at one time by one member of the Filipino negotiators that the national interest was being protected by their representatives in the discussions and that the Americans were sympathetic and understanding.

In a State of the Nation address during the joint session of the Philippine Congress on January 27, 1947, President Roxas again sought to reassure his people that despite press reports to the contrary, the United States was perfectly willing to withdraw all military forces from the Philippines unless the Filipinos desired to have them in their territory. Roxas told the Congress that

America recognized her basic commitment to underwrite the security of the Philippines, in accordance with our wishes. When I advised the American Government that the Philippine Congress by unanimous resolution (on

28 July 1945) had agreed to the establishment of American bases here and that the Filipino people desired the retention of these bases, it was decided to carry out the original program.<sup>79</sup>

Roxas pointed out to the Congress that the Philippines must take advantage of every opportunity to guarantee her own military security by saying that"

The establishment of these bases, not for aggression but for defense, will guarantee our own safety and advance the cause of world peace and security, which is the aim of the United Nations.<sup>80</sup>

Congress was also brought up to date on the status of the negotiations by Roxas:

The exact location of the bases and other military establishments to be maintained here by the United States has been engaging the attention of the officials of both governments. I am able to report to you, that the United States Government has shown every disposition to consider our wishes in this matter. It has in no instance been arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable in the location of the base site.<sup>81</sup>

Although the position of Roxas was that the American Government did not put pressure on the Philippines by offering to withdraw its troops from the Philippines and its rejection by the Philippines, one news story call the American offer as strengthening the American position.

As for the behavior of the American troops, Roxas said that

Our relations with the United States Army today are satisfactory. The Army and all its person-

nel are assisting us in every possible way. With few isolated and probably inevitable exceptions, the American troops are conducting themselves in a manner that reflects credit and honor upon the United States Government. The same, of course, also holds true for the United States Navy through the splendid cooperation of Admiral Good.<sup>82</sup>

In the same speech, Roxas expected that the base agreement would be signed within a short time and that he would then report upon it to the Congress. Immediately following the conclusion of the base agreement, Roxas informed the Philippine Congress that he would seek an agreement with American authorities on a broad military assistance program. The projected agreement would provide the following:<sup>83</sup>

1. The United States will send a military mission to advise the Philippine Army and Navy in their organization and training.
2. The United States Army will provide Philippine forces with assistance and cooperation during the next five years.
3. The United States Navy will turn over to the Philippines 84 ships for off-shore patrol some of which will be available for use as lighthouse tenders and customs and immigration patrol boats.

It was reported by the New York Times on February 4, 1947, that the draft of the military bases agreement had been completed. Another story on March 3, 1947, stated that a highly-placed, well-informed Philippine official had announced that the signing of the military bases agreement was "imminent". On March 14, 1947, the United States and the Philippines concluded the Military Bases Agreement

of 1947 in the festive atmosphere of a farewell party for Ambassador Paul V. McNutt. McNutt signed for the United States and Roxas signed for the Philippines. The treaty entered into force on March 26, 1947.

At the signing of the agreement, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson emphasized the amicable relations between the two states thus:

President Roxas has informed this government that the Philippine Congress and the Filipino people desire the maintenance of the United States bases in the Philippines. The present agreement was accordingly concluded. In the negotiation, the parties have been constantly guided by the principle of respect for each other's sovereignty, by the mutuality of interest, by regard for their equality of status as members of the United Nations and by the commitment of both nations to the purposes and principles of the United Nations . . . The present agreement will contribute to international security and peace in the Pacific and will supplement and support such future arrangements for world peace as may be reached under the Security Council of the United Nations.<sup>84</sup>

In his own statement, President Roxas considered the signing of the agreement "a truly historic occasion." It was his feeling that the agreement for 99 years would strengthen Philippine national defense and assure its security. He recalled the historical background of the agreement and was pleased that on some questions the Philippines was able to maintain its position. Roxas pointed out that the Philippines desired that no operating bases should be established in or near a major center of population and the United States acceded to this request.<sup>85</sup>

Roxas also stated that he was pleased with the performance of the Philippine negotiators, especially that of Vice President Elpidio Quirino, who was also serving as the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Many years later on Quirino furnished some insight on how the negotiations were conducted for the benefit of the Philippines in his Memoirs:

Roxas and I had a private understanding. In dealing with this ticklish question [jurisdiction] I was to hold firm while he remained the picture of sweet amenability to Mr. McNutt. Often the U.S. Ambassador would run to Roxas to complain that I was gumming up the works, or I was getting inaccessible to what could appear as the smooth imperial approach. Roxas would telephone ever so often, after a grievance session with the ambassador to warn not to mind too much his gestures of seeming surrender. We were quite a team.<sup>86</sup>

It was also reported by a Filipino newspaperman that when U.S. Ambassador McNutt delivered the desire of the U.S. Government to withdraw American forces in the Philippines unless Quirino yielded to the American position that bases be retained around the metropolitan Manila area, Quirino did not give ground.<sup>87</sup>

In a way this was the first major test of Filipino diplomacy in meeting foreign negotiators across the table and they were not found wanting. First, while the Americans wanted to get the agreement signed as quickly as possible, the Filipinos were able to delay the conclusion of the agreement until they had negotiated with the Americans over the issues that they wanted to present. Second, the Filipinos were at least able to modify American de-

mands on a number of points: they succeeded in reducing the number of bases from 70 to 23; they succeeded in removing American bases from metropolitan areas; they were able to compromise on the question of jurisdiction and in later years were able to successfully revise the original provisions similar to those of NATO jurisdiction provisions; while they were not able to tax American contractors working on base construction projects, in later years they were able to work out more suitable provisions not only relating to taxation but also to customs regulations.

Although the treaty itself did not formalize any alliance relationship, it was held that the establishment and maintenance of military bases in the Philippines by the United States were agreed upon to secure the military defense of the two countries. In his message to the Senate transmitting the agreement for its ratification, Roxas mentioned that the signing of the agreement was a logical development of a policy which had been historically followed and supported by the Filipino people. In the same message, Roxas said that the Americans felt themselves to be committed to protect Philippine independence, they were moved by historic associations and Philippine loyalty to the war cause, they desired the promotion of democracy and freedom in that part of the world, and they nurtured a desire to advance the cause of world peace, security and freedom which American champions today. In asking the Senate to ratify the treaty, Roxas said that he was asking them to assume the greatest responsibility they had ever been asked by anyone because it involved the most

vital factors facing the nation, those of preservation and security. The Senate complied swiftly and on March 26, 1947, nine days after the submission of the treaty, ratified it with an 18-0 vote, three senators being listed as absent. Although the vote resulted in ratification, there were some rumblings in the Senate. Among the objections were voiced were the following: the ninety-year arrangement was too long; the base agreement was not submitted to the Senate prior to approval; the bases were an encroachment to Philippine sovereignty; an invitation to atomic attack; too numerous; and a usurpation of Philippine jurisdictional rights.

In assessing the effect of the military bases agreement, the following analysis was made in 1959:

The bases agreement left a mixed heritage for the future. United States maintenance of bases precluded extensive Philippine budgetary outlays for military defense and helped to concentrate Philippine efforts and finance on domestic economic reconstruction and rehabilitation. But the bases led to increased Philippine dependence on United States military power and sharpened the dilemma of Philippine foreign policy. Moreover, the matter of bases was not finalized. Questions of jurisdiction, of sovereignty and of boundaries were to rise again and to plague American and Philippine negotiators in a climate less friendly and with more publicity than during the era of good feeling in 1947. The uniqueness of past Philippine-American relations that shaped foreign policy in the Roxas Administration made for precedent in military, as well as economic, arrangements but precedence, which granted immediate strength to the Republic, was also to constitute a source of future strain.<sup>88</sup>

For the Filipinos, the military bases agreement represented the Philippine link between national and international security. Despite the necessity of Philippine dependence on American military bases and assistance, the Filipinos, especially its President, Roxas, emphasized the equality of the partnership and the retention of Philippine initiative in mutual negotiations. At least, for Roxas, the conclusion of the bases agreement met two fundamental objectives of Philippine-American defense arrangements: (1) to secure Philippine security and sovereignty; and (2) to aid in strengthening collective security in the western Pacific area. This was revealed by Roxas in a speech he delivered on October 12, 1946:

It is my considered judgment that by retaining our military ties with the United States, we are serving first of all the interests of the Philippines. . . . I have only one basic and guiding rule for our foreign policy as well as for our domestic policy - and that is the enduring interests of the Filipino people. There is no other consideration which has any weight in my mind.<sup>89</sup>

Military Assistance. -- The second link in the military relations between the United States and the Philippines was the military assistance agreement that was concluded between the two countries on March 12, 1947, which provided that it became effective on July 4, 1946, for a period of five years and renewable periodically upon Philippine request. Even prior to Philippine acceptance of the agreement, the U.S. Congress voted the sum of \$19,750,00 for the fiscal year 1947 to carry out the



obligations under the act.

Philippine reaction to U.S. military assistance was not very enthusiastic. When Roxas requested authority from the Philippine Congress on July 31, 1946, to enter into an agreement with the United States to implement provisions of the military assistance Act, the House approved the request by a vote of only seven votes above the necessary simple majority and by the required majority in the Senate.

It was reported that Philippine Senator Carlos P. Garcia (later becoming President of the Philippines after the death of Ramon Magsaysay) voiced the following opinion when he voted for military assistance:

What I am afraid of, frankly speaking, is the possibility of our army becoming a simple appendage to that of the United States since the authority that they will exercise as assistants, advisers and technical men might turn out to be a way of getting control over even the internal organization and functions of the Philippine Army. . . . So in voting for this bill, I wish to be assured as much as possible that no such consequences will result from our acceptance of this military assistance.<sup>90</sup>

According to the terms of the agreement, military equipment and some 83 ships for the Philippine offshore patrol were provided by the United States, although title to the equipment was retained by the United States. The agreement made an integrated plan for the training of Philippine armed forces with the advice of American military forces, called the JUSMAG, or Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group.

To Roxas, the military assistance agreement which enabled the transfer of military equipment and the utilization of U.S. personnel to train Philippine troops, was a "boon beyond price." Roxas emphasized that under the terms of the agreement, the Philippines was to receive much and granted nothing in return. There were two aspects of the military assistance program that Roxas said justified it: (1) it provided aid against external aggression; and (2) it maintained the internal security of the Philippines.

The military assistance furnished by the United States to the Philippines since 1946 may be summarized as follows:

During the postwar period, from 1946 to 1948, the Philippines received some \$72.6 million in military assistance in the form of grants.

Following the Marshall Plan period, from 1949 to 1952, as a result of the Korean War, U.S. military assistance increased to some \$80.2 million distributed as follows: \$19.6 million in Military Assistance Program grants, \$1.5 million worth of stocks from the U.S. Armed Forces, and \$59.1 in other grants.

From 1953 to 1961, during the period of the Mutual Security Act, U.S. military assistance to the Philippines took an upturn, rising sharply to \$218.2 million in the form of grants which also included \$204 million under the MAP, and some \$14.2 million in the transfer of excess stocks from the U.S. Armed forces.

During the next four years, U.S. military assistance

further increased, to some \$130 million, with a peak of \$42.3 million in 1967, all in the form of grants.

After receiving some \$25.8 million in grants under the U.S. military assistance program, the Philippines received a record low figure of only \$17.1 million in 1971.

Military assistance, however, increased to \$19.3 million in 1972. Such assistance almost doubled in 1973 with some \$37.7 million in grants, which included a \$15.7 million grant under the MAP, \$4.9 million in the transfer of excess stocks, and \$17.1 million in other grants.

During the period of thirty years since 1946, military assistance to the Philippines by the United States had the following objectives: (1) encourage and assist great Philippine efforts to develop capabilities for external and especially for internal defense; (2) help maintain the United States-Republic of the Philippines defense partnership in Southeast Asia; (3) accelerate Philippine economic development through training in the use and maintenance of equipment which has both military and civilian uses; (4) promote the regional alliance system through supporting a Philippine capability to deploy limited forces within SEATO for mutual defense tasks; and (5) encourage effort toward greater self-sustaining capabilities within the Philippine Armed Forces which, hopefully, will eventually permit total elimination of the need for U.S. assistance.<sup>91</sup>

Total U.S. military assistance to the Philippines during the period from 1970-1972 was \$60.2 million and it increased by about 100 per cent during the next three

year period, 1973-1975, to \$118.7 million, which are the years after the institution of martial law in the Philippines.

## NOTES

## CHAPTER IV

1. Richard D. Challener, Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy 1898-1914 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 78.

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12. Lawrence H. Battistini, The Rise of American Influence in Asia and the Pacific (Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1960), p. 210.

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17. The Commanding General of United States Army Forces in the Far East (MacArthur) to the Chief of Staff (Marshall), in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1942, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 895, hereinafter referred to as Foreign Relations.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 395.

21. Ibid. Stimson was very candid in his appraisal of the situation in his memoirs:

It was quickly apparent that the hopes of the previous autumn could not be realized; there would be no successful defense of the Philippines by air power. The preparations had not been completed; the Japanese were too strong; most important of all, there had been no adequate realization of the degree to which air power is dependent on other things than unsupported airplanes. American planes by scores were lost on the ground, in the Philippines as in Hawaii. Nor could there be any major reinforcement through the air, which, like the sea came swiftly under Japanese control. Thus the defense of the Philippines became once more the desperate and losing struggle which had been forecast in the planning of earlier years.

And as early as December 20, 1941, Stimson had prepared a memorandum where the joint war plans of the U.S. and Great Britain recognized the North Atlantic as the principal theater of operations. Although Stimson recognized the great importance of the southwestern Pacific theater, he strongly believed that the Atlantic theater was most important. See John Jacob Beck, MacArthur and Wainright: Sacrifice of the Philippines (Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 1974), p. 30.

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24. Roosevelt's promise is contained in a communication he sent to Quezon on December 5, 1942, Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. 1, pp. 911-912.

25. 32 Stat. 691.
26. U. S. Congress. House of Representatives. Hearings on H.J. R. 131, H.R. 3824, H.J.R. 127, and H.R. 2817, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 61-68.
27. Senate Committee on Territories and Insular possessions, Hearings on S. 912, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 99-101.
28. Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, Independence for the Philippine Islands, Hearings before the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, 1st Sess., on S. 3377 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1932), pp. 33-34.
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37. Ibid.



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39. Ibid., p. 1100.
40. Ibid., pp. 1102-1103.
41. Ibid., p. 1104.
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43. New York Times, June 30, 1944, p. 1.
44. New York Times, August 11, 1955, p. 1.
45. See Appendix for full text of agreement.
46. Harry S. Truman, Years of Decision, Vol. I Memoirs (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1955), p. 277.
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48. Foreign Relations, 1945, Vol. VI, pp. 1204-1205.
49. Ibid., p. 1205.
50. Ibid., p. 1206.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., pp. 1207-1208.
53. Ibid., pp. 1210-1211.
54. Ibid., p. 1211.
55. New York Times, May 7, 1945, p. 1.
56. New York Times, May 25, 1945, p. 1.

57. New York Times, May 26, 1945. p. 1.

58. New York Times, July 4, 1945, p. 1.

59. U. S. Congress. House of Representatives. A Study of Pacific Bases. A Report by the Subcommittee of the Committee on Naval Affairs, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., pursuant to H. Res. 154 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 1009-1011.

60. Ibid., p. 1014.

61. Ibid., p. 1098.

62. Carl Kaysen, "Military Strategy, Military Forces, and Arms Control," in United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Broader Aspects of U.S. Commitments, Hearing before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., November 24, 1970 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 11-31.

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64. Hans Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962), p. 5.

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66. Akira Iriye, The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974), p. 69.

67. Harold W. Rood, The Possible Utility of the U.S. Overseas Base Structure (Washington, D.C.: Defense Analysis Center, 1962), pp. 17-18.

68. Ibid., p. 17.
69. Ibid., p. 43.
70. Ibid., pp. 43-45.
71. Ibid., pp. 45-50.
72. Nicholas John Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942), p. 17.
73. Congressional Record, XLIII:10, p. A1160.
74. Ibid.
75. Manuel Roxas
76. New York Times, September 19, 1946.
77. New York Times, October 16, 1946.
78. The Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Secretary of State, November 29, 1946, Foreign Relations, 1946, Vol. VIII, p. 901.
79. The Ambassador in the Philippines (McMutt) to the Secretary of State, January 27, 1947, Foreign Relations, 1947, Vol. VI, p. 1103.
80. Ibid., p. 1104.
81. Ibid., p. 1103.
82. Ibid., p. 1104.
83. Ibid.
84. Department of State Bulletin, XVI:403, (March 23, 1946), p. 554.
85. Ibid., p. 553. Roxas also said that the signing of the pact was a logical development of a policy which had been historically followed and supported by the Filipino people.

86. Elpidio Quirino, "Memoirs," Sunday Times Magazine (Manila), March 10, 1957, p. 24. Quoted in Meyer, op. cit., p. 74. Meyer also adds the following note: "A similar teamwork was to be repeated in Magsaysay's Administration between president and head of panel when negotiations were in process in late 1956 to revise this very agreement on bases."

87. Teodoro F. Valencia, "How Those Bases were Negotiated in 1946," Expressweek Magazine (Manila), May 5, 1975. Valencia also wrote that: "Few Filipinos know that if the Americans had prevailed on their original demand for bases in the Philippines, there would have been 98 and not just the few that we know today." In the same article, Valencia noted that the Roxas government was in no position to oppose the bases.

88. Meyer, op. cit., pp. 79-80.

89. Roxas, Important Speeches, pp. 196-197, quoted in Meyer, ibid., p. 72.

90. Congressional Record, 1. Cong., 1 Sess., House, I: 50 (August 9, 1946), pp. 1045-1046; quoted in Meyer, ibid., p. 68.

91. U.S. Congress, Senate, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: The Republic of the Philippines, Hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security and Commitments Abroad, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 248.

## CHAPTER V

### THE TREATY OF MUTUAL DEFENSE

The signing of the treaties on military bases and military assistance did not seem to satisfy many Filipinos, especially those who belonged to the opposition party. Milton Meyer writes that during the Quirino Administration, Filipino leaders questioned both the extent of U. S. military aid and the intent of its military protection. The Filipinos were afraid of the geographic expansion of international communism, especially in China. The Filipinos also resented the American policy of giving priority to the military build-up of Japan in the U.S. effort to contain communism in Asia.

On March 3, 1949, Congressman Hermenegildo Atienza called for the negotiation of new treaties with the U.S. that would include U.S. guaranties toward protection of Philippine security. Atienza believed that the U.S. was unwilling to defend the Philippines in case of war.

On April 4, 1949, senatorial candidate Claro M. Recto attacked U.S. neglect of the Philippines because of its Europe first policy. Recto approved the Philippine policy of close ties with the United States in military matters, however, he suggested that the Filipinos should consider their geographic location so that they should also look to

their Asian neighbors because of loosening American ties.

On February 10, 1950, minority Senator Camilo Osias expressed a desire to know how far the U.S. would go toward the defense of the Philippines. Criticizing the military equipment turned over by the United States to the Philippines as "deteriorated, battle-worn, insufficient, and inadequate even to cope successfully with internal order," Osias was for revising the 99-year military bases agreement.

On March 3, 1950, Secretary of National Defense Ruperto Kangleon told a joint session of the House Committee of National Defense and Foreign Affairs that the United States had failed to furnish adequate military assistance by providing only \$70 million out of an expected amount of \$226 million.

The American response to Filipino criticism of U.S. military aid and assurances of providing security to the Philippines was the signing of an agreement on March 11, 1950 which extended the Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 for three more years. On April 18, 1951, U.S. President Harry S. Truman declared that the United States would "act accordingly" in case the Philippines became the object of an armed attack by another power. Truman made it clear that:

The whole world knows that the United States recognizes that an armed attack on the Philippines would be looked upon by the United States as dangerous to its own safety and that it would act accordingly.<sup>1</sup>

This did not reassure Senator Recto. In a commencement address before the graduates of the University of the

Philippines, Recto said:

If America really believes that war is inevitable, then let her give us in Asia a resolute leadership we can trust. Let her give us the same unconditional pledges and guarantees and the same actual evidence of a spirit of equality and common fate that she has given to her kinsmen and allies in the Atlantic community; and we shall have justification for the risk of war and incentive to make common cause.<sup>2</sup>

"Otherwise," Recto advised his countrymen, "we must restrain our enthusiasms, dissemble our sympathies, moderate our words and actions, and in fulfillment of the prime duty of self-preservation, make no enemies where we can make no friends, and hold our peace . . . ." <sup>3</sup>

If America was really sincere in her promises to defend the Philippines, Recto desired at least the establishment of an alliance between the U.S. and the Philippines through a formal treaty of an alliance with a guarantee of an automatic declaration of war in case the Philippines was attacked by an outside power. The memory of World War II was very strong in the mind of Recto as he asked for U.S. declarations to defend the Philippines; in the course of that war the United States had pursued a Europe first policy, thereby abandoning the Philippines to a cruel fate at the hands of the Japanese invaders.

At the time that these criticisms were being levelled against the United States, Quirino who succeeded Roxas as president of the Philippines, was conducting a search toward the establishment of some form of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. The reasons for this "quest for non-Communist Asian unity" are not difficult to find. The

Filipinos had a genuine desire to create a third force in Asia that would counterbalance the dominant forces of Russia and the United States. They also desired to acquire leadership and prestige in Asian affairs. Also, the Filipinos were sensitive to charges upon their independence that they were only puppets of the United States; by pursuing the concept of union among the Pacific peoples they wished to show their initiative in international affairs. Although there were variations in Quirino's proposals for a Pacific union regarding its military or non-military nature, its geographical membership, and the participation or non-participation of the United States, his quest for non-Communist unity was his administration's most distinctive foreign policy. Quirino had to adjust to external opposition and domestic criticism his plans for Asian unity. The chronology of events regarding this venture of the Filipinos into the field of international affairs is as follows.

In January, 1949, during the New Delhi Conference on Indonesia, Carlos Romulo of the Philippines proposed the establishment of a small permanent secretariat in New Delhi or Manila in order to create continuing machinery for the implementation of proposals adopted during the conference. Romulo was then acting in accordance with instructions from Quirino who wanted this organization in order to give small Asian countries an opportunity for self-determination, to promote mutual interests of Asian countries within the framework of the United Nations without creating dissension between the east or west or feelings of racial animosity.



No such organization came out of the conference, but before the conference closed, Romulo again presented the merits of his proposal on January 23, 1949, the final plenary session:

We have demonstrated here the new strength and unity of Asia. Out of this Conference a new political factor of great weight and significance has come into being. Nations comprising more than 50 per cent of the world's population, inhabiting a geographic area extending half way around the globe and constituting a full one-third of the membership of the United Nations have got together on the basis of common interests and in pursuit of common aims. That is a massive political fact from any standpoint, and it must count heavily in the future consideration of any problem or the foundation of any policy affecting the peace, freedom and prosperity of mankind.<sup>4</sup>

The Philippine proposal in early 1949 conceived the organization to be anti-Communist, nonmilitary, and political and its membership to include non-self-governing as well as independent peoples.

After the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Quirino advocated on March 21, 1949, a Pacific treaty organization closely patterned after the NATO, under U.S. leadership, to fight communism in the Far East. Again this proposal met with opposition at home and derived no support from the United States although Quirino himself visited the United States sometime in August, 1949 to drum up support for his Pacific Union idea.

The most tangible expression of Quirino's interest in a Pacific regional grouping was the holding of a

conference in Baguio on May 26, 1950. Six of eight nations invited attended the conference: Australia, Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Thailand, and Indonesia. Burma and New Zealand were invited but did not attend. The Chinese Nationalist government was not invited according to Quirino because it desired military aid against communism. Domestic opposition expressed in the words of Recto who had warned against any commitments to the Chinese Nationalists that "President Quirino is playing with fire and not he but the whole nation will be burned," must have influenced that decision. The work of the conference was summarized by Meyer as follows:

The conference steered clear of issues of military cooperation and anti-Communist gestures. It appointed economic, social, and cultural subcommittees. It adopted a single resolution in the final plenary session on May 30, 1950, which recommended that participating governments take common measures to promote commercial and financial interests and unite their efforts to facilitate cultural progress and social well-being. The resolution recommended no political measure, and it established no continuing machinery.<sup>5</sup>

Another observer concluded that the "Baguio Conference of 1950 may be best described as a small, first step toward regional cooperation." <sup>6</sup>

Throughout this period when the Philippines was trying to exercise leadership in the organization of a regional organization, the United States was sympathetic but made it clear that it was not ready to commit itself in the defense of all of Southeast Asia. But then came the negotiations for the Japanese peace treaty and the United States would take the lead in promoting, not a regional alliance yet

the undertaking of specific commitments to defend the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. Because the Filipinos desired stronger American commitments to defend the Philippines and the establishment of a regional alliance under the leadership of the United States, it should be thought that they would be easily receptive to the idea of a Japanese peace treaty under the initiative of the United States. They were not.

Filipino attitudes toward Japan after World War II were conditioned by two major considerations. First, the Filipinos had suffered terrible destruction and damage at the hands of the Japanese during World War II and could henceforth feel that Japanese aggression had left "its permanent scars in our soul as a nation." Second, because of its geographic location, the Filipinos feared a resurgence of Japanese militarism. It is therefore understandable that Philippine foreign policy objectives included as early as November, 1949, the declaration of "early and material recognition of our just claims against Japan, and an unequivocal position against Japan's resurgence in the future as a dominant power capable once more of threatening the peace in this part of the world." The Filipinos wanted nothing less than the payment of "just" reparations by Japan and adequate security guarantees to prevent any possible revival of Japanese militarism.

Because of its demand for reparations, the Filipinos were not readily amenable toward the conclusion of any peace treaty with Japan until its claims were honored by the United States. Believing that Japan could not or was not in a position to pay reparations to the Pacific nations,

John Foster Dulles, who was given the mission of negotiating a peace treaty with Japan, ruled out the possibility of payment of reparations by Japan on economic grounds. Dulles further pointed out the inability and disinclination of Japan to maintain military forces and that U.S. troops would remain in Japan under the proposed United States-Japanese treaty of mutual defense. Dulles' strongest argument was the offer of the United States to conclude a treaty of mutual defense with the Philippines, offering them a measure of guaranteed support in case of any armed attack "pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area." The end result of this security arrangement contemplated by Dulles, as part of the peace treaty settlement, was the establishment of a "rudimentary security system comprising a series of bilateral and trilateral pacts linking Japan with the United States and the United States with Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, the principal military powers on the far side of the Pacific." It was very important to Dulles that Japan become a bulwark against the new tide of despotism which threatened Asia. Japan would be incorporated within the security system of the free nations as well as simultaneously make it a peaceful member of the system.

The opposition of the Filipinos to the early drafts of the Japanese peace treaty stressed reparations and security. So intense was their opposition that a long series of talks were held in Manila between the United States and the Philippines on the issues of reparations and security. Finally, agreement was reached on August 10,

1951, on the following points: (1) a strong Japan was needed in the "basic defense" against communism, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Far East; (2) any aggression against the Philippines from any source would be recognized as a threat against the United States; and (3) Filipino claims for reparations would be recognized.

This accord and other assurances by the United States to safeguard the security of the Philippines through a bilateral treaty of mutual defense enabled the United States to persuade the Philippines to sign the Japanese Treaty. The mood of the Philippines at San Francisco during the peace conference, however, was still one of bitterness and disappointment. Its representative, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo recalled that his country had "borne a disproportionately heavy share of destruction and suffering at the hands of Japan."<sup>7</sup>

Out of a population of eighteen million we lost more than a million lives. Beyond the loss of lives, our people endured moral trauma so deep that final healing is yet to come. After four years of brutal occupation and unrelenting resistance to the aggressor our national economy was totally razed to the ground. The estimate that the Philippines was the most devastated country in Asia in proportion to area and population has never been challenged.<sup>8</sup>

Romulo then mentioned the three basic objectives of the postwar foreign policy of the Philippines towards Japan: (1) to make certain that Japan, through genuine political and economic reform, will never again be a menace to the Philippines and other countries; (2) to obtain an early and equitable reparation of the damage caused by Japan to the Philippines and other countries; and (3) to welcome

at a suitable time and under proper conditions, a democratic and non-militarist Japan as a friendly neighbor and to secure its cooperation in maintaining the peace and fostering the progress of the Pacific area and of the world as a whole. On the basis of this policy, Romulo felt that the peace treaty with Japan had some defects. First of all, Romulo pointed out that "it is straining human credulity to believe that Japan, within a brief period of six years, has been completely and permanently transformed from the aggressive, feudal, militarist police state which it has been for centuries into a practicing and thorough-going democracy." Romulo, however, pointed out that since the treaty contemplated the entry of Japan into collective security arrangements to which the Philippines would be party, the Philippines was able to accept the security provisions of the treaty. Secondly, Romulo pointed out that the Philippine Government was not satisfied with the provisions on reparations in the treaty:

The Philippine Government cannot accept the theory that the payment of a due amount of reparations from Japan is an act of vindictiveness. The principle of indemnification for damage willfully caused can no more be renounced in the relations between States than it can be relinquished in the relations between individuals.<sup>9</sup>

Romulo felt that Japan had the capacity to pay reparations because of its rapid industrial recovery and therefore believed that the Philippines was at least entitled to the right to have a free hand in negotiating with Japan for the payment of reparations. Despite his objections to the treaty, Romulo trusted that the treaty would help stabilize the situation in Asia.

The signing of the treaty of mutual defense between the United States and the Philippines was directly related to the signing of the Japanese peace treaty. Actually, the instructions of Dulles had empowered him to negotiate a broad regional security pact. During his travels in Southeast Asia, Dulles found, however, that while Australia and New Zealand were willing to ally themselves with the United States, they refused to enter into a pact that would include Japan. Australia was also not willing to join any pact that would include the Philippines because of the internal disturbances then occurring in the latter country. The negotiations of John Foster Dulles with these countries finally resulted in the following arrangement: (1) a bilateral United States-Japan security agreement providing for the continued presence of American forces in Japan at the invitation of the Japanese Government; (2) a bilateral United States-Philippine security agreement incorporating previous agreements and placing obligations on a mutual basis; and (3) a tripartite agreement involving the United States, Australia, and New Zealand (the ANZUS Pact) assuring the latter two countries of American support in the event of external aggression.

This was a considerable turn-about on the part of the United States which felt that in 1949 when Quirino proposed a Pacific Union that the time was not ripe for an Asian alliance despite "serious dangers." And although he had very strong reservations about signing a peace treaty with Japan, Quirino had to accede to the strong pressure exerted upon him by the U.S. Government and John Foster Dulles to sign a treaty of mutual defense with the United States.

At the signing of the treaty, President Truman pointed to the historic relationship between the United States and the Philippines by saying that the treaty was a "natural development springing from the long association of our countries and our common sacrifices for freedom." 10

President Quirino also recognized the historic reasons for the signing of the treaty and recalled that it was at Washington, D.C. (where the treaty was signed) that he had proposed the conclusion of a Pacific security pact under the initiative of the United States. 11

Secretary of State Acheson called the treaty the "natural outgrowth of the relationship of over half a century between the Philippines and the United States." He recalled the other commitments between the United States and the Philippines which led to the mutual defense treaty such as the Trade Agreement of 1946, the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946, the Military Bases Agreement of 1947, and the Military Assistance Agreement of 1947. Acheson emphasized that the treaty served to tell the rest of the world that the Philippines and the United States stood together in the Pacific. 12

Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Romulo summarized the historic event as follows:

By the terms of this treaty, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines have assumed the solemn obligation to assist each other in case of armed attack against either or both of them from any source whatever. This obligation covers any act of aggression, whether proceeding from a new source or arising from a repetition of aggression. The moral imperatives underlying



this treaty go much deeper than any formal pledge. They are rooted in our shared experience and ideals and they are nourished by our common hope of the future. Beyond the letter of these commitments, therefore, the warmest sentiments of mutual regard and united purpose stand behind the signatures that have been affixed to this Treaty of Mutual Defense. <sup>13</sup>

The United States Senate ratified the Treaty and the Philippine Senate did the same thing. However, there were some criticisms of the treaty in the Philippine Senate. Senator Recto said that the termination provision benefited the United States and that there were no iron-clad guarantees in the treaty. Senator Jose Locsin called the treaty a product of the "incompetence of the administration." Other senators praised the treaty; one senator expressing the hope that the treaty would serve as the foundation for the formation of a Pacific system of defense. <sup>14</sup>

During the exchange of ratifications on August 27, 1952, Quirino characterized the treaty of mutual defense as the fulfillment of Philippine domestic and foreign policy objectives -- to secure political stability, economic security, and external security. He also foresaw a more comprehensive Pacific pact in the future. Quirino did not see the materialization of a Pacific pact in the course of his administration, but Milton Meyer called the treaty of mutual defense significant, being the first long-range military program initiated by the Philippine Government in the postwar world. In the space of a few short years, the Philippines would sign a collective security treaty with the United States and other countries. Again, initiative would lie with the United States.

## NOTES

## CHAPTER V.

1. Department of State Bulletin, XXIV, No. 617 (April 30, 1951), p. 699.
2. Quoted in Sung Yong Kim, United States-Philippine Relations, 1946-1956 (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968), p. 42. See Philippines Free Press, April 17, 1954.
3. Ibid.
4. Quoted in Milton Meyer, A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic, Ph. D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1959 (Ann Arbor Michigan: University Microfilms, Inc., 1975), p. 234.
5. Ibid., p. 258.
6. Roger M. Smith, "The Philippines and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization," in Two Papers on Philippine Foreign Policy, Data Paper No. 38, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, December, 1959, p. 2.
7. Department of State, Record of Proceedings of the Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, San Francisco, California, September 4-8, 1951 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 225.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 228.

10. Department of State Bulletin, September 10, 1951, p. 422.

11. Ibid., p. 423. In the same message Quirino said that the treaty "means so much to the economic development and happiness of the Filipino people.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 425.

14. Meyer, op. cit., pp. 172-173.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY

Three perceptions dominated U.S. strategic policy-making during the period from 1950 to 1954. First, the U.S. recognized clearly the growing importance of Asia to world politics. Second, the U.S. viewed the worldwide communist threat in monolithic terms. Third, the U.S. felt that the attempt by Ho Chi Minh's communist forces to evict the French from Indochina was part of a worldwide aggressive intent of communism to dominate the international environment.<sup>1</sup> These perceptions led, among other things, to the establishment of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

A report of the National Security Council called NSC 48/1, dated December 23, 1949, identified Russia as the principal source of the communist threat in Asia. It also described the importance of Asia to the U.S. as follows:<sup>2</sup>

In the first place, denial of USSR control over Asia might prevent the acquisition by the Soviets of elements of power which might in time add significantly to the Russian war-making potential. Secondly, to the degree that Asian indigenous forces develop opposition to the expansion of USSR influence, they would assist the U.S. in containing Soviet control and influence

in the area, possibly reducing the drain on the United States economy. The indigenous forces of Asia, including manpower reserves, would also be a valuable asset, if available for the support of the United States in the event of war. Thirdly, Asia is a source of numerous raw materials principally tin and natural rubber, which are of strategic importance to the United States . . . .

NSC 48/1 concluded that U.S. basic security objectives with respect to Asia were the following:<sup>3</sup>

a. Development of the nations and peoples of Asia on a stable and self-sustaining basis in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

b. Gradual reduction and eventual elimination of the preponderant power and influence of the USSR in Asia to such an degree that the Soviet Union will not be capable of threatening from that area the security of the United States or its friends and that the Soviet Union would encounter serious obstacles should it attempt to threaten the peace, national independence, and stability of the Asiatic nations.

c. Prevention of power relationships in Asia which would enable any other nation or alliance to threaten the security of the United States from that area, or the peace, national independence and stability of the Asiatic nations.

In pursuit of the foregoing objectives, the National Security Council recommended, among other things, that the United States should pursue a policy toward Asia containing the following components:<sup>4</sup>

a. The United States should make known its sympathy with the efforts of Asian leaders to form regional associations with non-Communist states of the various Asian areas, and if in due course associations eventuate, the United

States should be prepared, if invited, to assist such associations to fulfill their purposes under conditions which would be to our interest.

The NSC also suggested that certain principles should guide the United States with regard to the formation of Asian regional organizations as follows:<sup>5</sup>

(1) Any association formed must be the result of a genuine desire on the part of the participating nations to cooperate for mutual benefit in solving the political economic, social and cultural problems of the area.

(2) The United States must not take such an active part in the early stages of the formation of such an association that it will be subject to the charge of using the Asiatic nations to further United States ambitions.

(3) The association, if it is to be a constructive force, must operate on the basis of mutual aid and self-help in all fields so that a true partnership may exist based on equal rights and equal obligations.

(4) United States participation in any stage of the development of such an association should be with a view to accomplishing our basic objectives in Asia and to assuring that any association formed will be in accord with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with regional arrangements.

Subsequent to these policy formulations came the development of the "domino principle" which would be a determining factor in future U.S. policies concerning Southeast Asia. The first explicit statement of the "domino principle" was made in NSC 64 which was adopted as policy on February 27, 1950 by the Truman Administration:<sup>6</sup>

It is important to United States security interests that all practicable measures be taken to prevent further communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Indochina is a key area of Southeast Asia and is under immediate threat.

The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under Communist domination if Indochina were controlled by a Communist-dominated government. The balance of Southeast Asia would then be in grave hazard.

Later on in NSC 124/2 of June, 1952, the "domino principle" in its purest form was written into the "General Considerations" section. It linked the loss of any single state of Southeast Asia to the stability of Europe and the security of the United States.<sup>7</sup>

The U.S. Congress itself was also receptive to the idea of the formation of a collective security organization. In the "Findings and Declaration of Policy of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949," it is declared that:<sup>8</sup>

The Congress hereby expresses itself as favoring the creation by the free countries and free peoples of the Far East of a joint organization, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to establish a program of self-help and mutual cooperation designed to develop their economic and social well-being, to safeguard basic rights and liberties and to protect their security and independence.

From 1949 through 1953, the National Security Council expected a broader regional defense pact to be initiated by the countries of Southeast Asia. In testimony before the U.S. Congress, Secretary Acheson emphasized that the initiative should come from Southeast Asian nations in the organization of a regional organization. He also mentioned

that:

The President of the Philippines has been going forward to accomplish this. We have stated to him, and publicly, that we are most sympathetic to this activity on his part, but it is most important that it should be a spontaneous Asian action.<sup>9</sup>

As mentioned earlier in this study, President Quirino's attempt toward regional cooperation resulted in the Baguio Conference of 1950 and the promise by President Truman that the United States would help the Philippines to remain "free and self-reliant, and to watch with sympathetic interest the efforts of the non-Communist Asian nations to unite for political security."<sup>10</sup>

Actually the United States, in spite of later statements to the contrary, was not ready to set up a regional organization in Southeast Asia. It was felt that the developing nations of that region did not constitute suitable material for such a type of association.<sup>11</sup>

But later events were to change the thinking of the leaders of the United States. First, there was the outbreak of the war in South Korea. Second, conditions deteriorated in Indochina. Third, China fell to the hands of the Communist armies of Mao Tse Tung. Then it would be stated for the historical record that the United States had always been ready toward working out collective security agreements with the nations of the Pacific area.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in its report on Executive K on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty on January 25, 1955 included a background of the treaty. The background statement said that at the time



the negotiations were begun in 1950 leading to the Japanese security treaty and to the series of separate security pacts in the Pacific area, it was hoped that a rather broad type of collective arrangement for security might be worked out. This goal was not realized because of hostilities in Indochina. However, the defense treaties with Japan, the Philippines, and Australia and New Zealand were entered into pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area.<sup>12</sup>

During the hearings on the Korean Defense Treaty, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressed the opinion that a multilateral agreement for the Pacific, similar to the NATO treaty would be desirable. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, however, pointed out that substantial cultural, political, and geographic differences existed among the Pacific countries which distinguished this area from Europe and constituted serious obstacles to achieving the desired development at an early date.

The Philippines was not overlooked during all these attempts at formulating a policy for Southeast Asia. The Korean war brought the realization to the United States of the importance of the military bases in that country. Accordingly, additional aid was authorized to that country by the U.S. Government.

On April 10, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in preparing for the eventual fall of Indochina, recommended that the Philippines should be changed from a position of support to become a front-line base in the defense of the Western Hemisphere.

Action to organize a regional association in Southeast Asia might be said to have begun when President Eisenhower advocated "united action for Southeast Asia" in a speech he delivered on April 16, 1953. This was followed by a statement by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in March, 1954, that "united action" was needed in the area to meet the Communist threat. On April 13, 1954, another statement was issued, after a meeting with Prime Minister Eden of Great Britain, that England and America were ready "to take part, with the other countries principally concerned, in an examination of the possibility of establishing a collective defense, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, to assure the peace, security and freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific."<sup>13</sup>

On August 13, 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States expressed the opinion that U.S. policy in the Far East should be directed toward achieving the following objectives:<sup>14</sup>

- a. Development of the purpose and capability of the non-Communist countries of the Far East to act collectively and effectively in opposing the threat of aggressive Communism.

- b. Eventual establishment of a comprehensive regional security arrangement among the non-Communist countries of the Far East, with which the United States, the United Kingdom, and possibly France, would be associated.

- c. Reduction of the power and influence of the USSR in the Far East, initially through the containment and reduction of the relative power of Communist China, and ultimately the detachment of China from the area of Soviet Communist control.

In the accomplishment of these objectives, the JCS recommended, among others, that the U.S. foster a system of treaties which would lead eventually to a comprehensive and cohesive security arrangement in the Far East Area. They also said that the United States was publicly committed to the sponsoring and support of a collective security arrangement for Southeast Asia even before the collapse of the French effort in Indochina, but they had serious misgivings concerning the military provisions of such a pact lest they imply commitments which the United States would not be able to meet. The failure to meet the expectations of the signatories in the matter of military aid, the JCS felt, could result in the alienation of friendly governments rather than the acquisition of new allies.<sup>15</sup>

With regard to the projected Southeast Asian defense treaty, the JCS recommended the following:<sup>16</sup>

a. The clear purpose of the treaty should be to form a collective security arrangement to deter and, if possible, prevent any further extension of Communist control, by whatever means, within the general area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

b. The initial membership should be limited to those nations willing to join in the type of organization which can be effective in accomplishing the purpose set forth in a above.

c. The treaty should provide for the future accession of other powers having interests in the Far East which may subsequently desire to join. (It is considered that the pact should ultimately include Japan, Korea, and possibly Nationalist China.)

d. There should be no built-in power of veto. The treaty provisions should permit concerted action

by a lesser number than the total of the signatory nations in the event that the political or territorial integrity of any signatory is threatened by Communist aggression in any form.

e. Careful consideration should be given to the practicability and desirability of providing voting machinery in the governing council which would preclude the possibility that, at some time in the future when the membership is expanded, a bloc of "neutrals" or a British Commonwealth bloc, could exercise a controlling voice.

f. The treaty should establish the moral justification and provide the political framework and necessary machinery within which and by which any act of overt Communist aggression could be met by prompt military counteraction, not excluding military action against the real source of aggression.

g. The treaty should specifically provide that any further extension of Communist control through infiltration or subversion, or through any other direct means, should as in the case of overt aggression, be met by prompt and appropriate counteraction.

h. It should be made clear in the preliminary negotiations and in the provisions of the treaty itself that no commitment by the United States to support the raising, equipping, and maintenance of indigenous forces and/or to deploy United Forces in such strengths as to provide for an effective defense of all of the national territory of each signatory is implied or intended. Military aid by the United States to the Southeast Asian countries who are members of the pact should be limited to that necessary to permit the countries concerned, to raise, equip, and maintain military forces as necessary to insure internal stability, to contribute toward a reasonably effective opposition to any attempted invasion, and to instill national confidence.

i. It should be made equally clear that the treaty would not commit the United States to a large scale program of economic aid to the signatory countries in lieu of military aid since, in the final analysis, funds for economic aid must come from the total amount of money available for the national security programs of the United States.

The position of the United States toward the establishment of a regional collective security organization in the foregoing is thus made clear by the foregoing machinery set up by the Joint Chiefs of Staffs.

In the Philippines, the initial response to the "united action" plea by the United States was reserved and lukewarm. President Ramon Magsaysay expressed his support toward establishing an alliance, if this were done, in a statement on April 19, 1954. However, he qualified his support on the basis of a declaration by the United States that it would respond automatically in case of an attack on the Philippines. In a policy statement, President Magsaysay declared on April 18, 1954, that while the Philippines would support a regional defense organization, it would only do so if the following conditions were met:

First, that the right of Asian peoples to self-determination is respected; and second, that the Philippines be given a clear and unequivocal guarantee of United States help in case of attack under our Mutual Defense Act.<sup>17</sup>

It was Magsaysay's view that the Philippines was in accord with plans for united action against external Communist aggression, but it was not prepared to contribute militarily to it. He favored strongly the move to ask the United States for stronger military commitments. He also

opposed the use of Filipino troops in the Indochina conflict. He also wanted the establishment of a council to implement matters of mutual concern arising from the bilateral treaty of mutual defense with the United States. On May 25, 1954, Magsaysay got what he wanted: a Joint United States-Philippine defense council was established.

Although the Philippines felt slighted during the five power military conference in Washington in June, 1953, it received strong assurances of U.S. support for its security. On September 4, 1954, Secretary of State Dulles said:

I wish to state in the most emphatic terms that the United States will honor fully its commitments under the Mutual Defense Treaty. If the Philippines were attacked, the United States would act immediately. . . . The President of the United States has ordered the Seventh Fleet to protect Formosa from invasion by Communist aggressors. In the case of the Philippines, no specific orders are required; our forces would automatically react.<sup>18</sup>

This statement of Mr. Dulles was criticized by Philippine Senator Recto who pointed out that nowhere in the treaty of mutual defense between the Philippines and the United States was the United States committed to automatic reaction if the Philippines were attacked. Recto, therefore, desired revision of the treaty to incorporate Dulles' interpretation that the U.S. was committed to automatic reaction in case of attack on the Philippines. Accordingly, in a joint communique dated September 7, the U.S. pledge of automatic reaction was mentioned. The U.S. also agreed to Philippine proposals for strengthening her armed forces.

Before the start of the formal negotiations for the multi-lateral defense treaty, the Philippines had the following objectives in mind: (1) it would seek an alliance patterned after NATO; (2) it would ask the signatories to the treaty to support the rights and freedoms of all peoples in Southeast Asia and agree to take steps to assure progress of all nations toward self-rule and independence; (3) it would urge the members to work jointly for economic and social development; and (4) it would insist that the treaty area include all the territorial limits of the signatory countries in Southeast Asia and also of the non-member states that might later join the organization.<sup>19</sup>

During the conference in Manila in September, 1954, the Philippines backed down on its proposal for a Nato-type alliance and agreed to the establishment of a modified ANZUS-type alliance. The final treaty as approved was seen by President Magsaysay as beneficial to the Philippines.

The military provisions of the Treaty constitute the armor designed to protect the area against aggression. The provisions on economic development and self-determination formulated in accordance with the principles enshrined in the Pacific Charter, are the heart and soul that give the Treaty life and meaning for the peoples of Asia.<sup>20</sup>

As signed on September 8, 1954, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, along with the Pacific Charter, had two important paragraphs in Article IV. The first one stated that the member states would deal with armed attack in accordance with their constitutional processes. In the second one, the members would consult immediately on measures which should be taken in dealing with subversion.

In a recent study on the role of SEATO in U.S. foreign policy,

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty also known as the Manila Pact, signed on September 8, 1954, is the founding document of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The treaty was designed primarily as a tool to prevent armed Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. It commits its eight original signatories (Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the Philippines, and the United States) to act if a party to the treaty or a protocol state is subject to armed attack; however, it does not specify what action is required, leaving that choice to the individual member states. When a party to the treaty or a protocol state is the victim of some other form of threat (such as subversion or insurgency), SEATO members are obligated only to consult immediately. The treaty also calls for cooperation in the promotion of economic development and social wellbeing among the member states.<sup>21</sup>

For the Philippines, the treaty was considered a forward step in the development of a more comprehensive collective system of security in the region as earlier advocated by the Philippines.

During the ratification of the treaty by the Philippine Senate, Senator Recto abstained from voting and said:

The treaty is too much and at the same time too little. Too much in the sense that under its terms we accept commitments to back the provisions of the treaty when we do not have the necessary power to back it, and too little in the sense that it affords very scant protection to the Philippines as far as external defense is concerned.<sup>22</sup>

Other Commitments of the United States to the Phil-



ippines.-- Besides the formal treaties relating to military bases, mutual defense, military assistance on a bilateral basis, and the multilateral treaty setting up the SEATO, there are other evidences of American commitments to defend the Philippines. These other statements of U.S. commitments are mentioned here, even though the legal interpretation of these statements is that they are subject to the concept of constitutional procedures that determine U.S. action in coming to the defense of the Philippines. The listing is not meant to be a complete record of the commitments expressed by the United States. It is meant to illustrate the scope of that commitment of the U.S. to come to the defense of the Philippines.

Sometime in January, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson said:

The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. Our relations, our defensive relations with the Philippines are contained in agreements between us. Those agreements are being loyally carried out and will be loyally carried. Both peoples have learned by bitter experience the vital connections between our mutual defense requirements. We are in no doubt about that, and it is hardly necessary for me to say an attack on the Philippines could not and would not be tolerated by the United States.<sup>23</sup>

Because of the presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines, Secretary of State Dulles mentioned this point in a note to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines as follows:

Under our Mutual Defense Treaty and related actions, there have resulted air and naval dis-

positions of the United States in the Philippines, such that an armed attack on the Philippines could not but be also an attack upon the military forces of the United States. As between our nations, it is no legal fiction to say that an attack on one is an attack on both. It is a reality that an attack on the Philippines is an attack on the United States.<sup>24</sup>

A joint communique issued on the occasion of the visit of Philippine President Garcia to President Eisenhower on June 16, 1958, stated that:

President Eisenhower made clear that in accordance with these existing alliances and the deployments and dispositions thereunder, any armed attack against the Philippines would involve an attack against United States forces stationed there and against the United States and would be instantly repelled.<sup>25</sup>

On October 12, 1959, U.S. Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen to the Philippines and Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Felixberto M. Serrano concluded a memorandum of agreement which included more or less the same commitments made by Dulles and included in the joint communique issued on the occasion of the state visit of President Garcia to the United States.<sup>26</sup>

On October 6, 1964, another joint communique issued on the occasion of the visit of President Diosdado Macapagal to President Lyndon Johnson also included a statement that an armed attack against the Philippines would be regarded as an attack against the United States forces stationed there and against the United States and would be instantly repelled. Both presidents also agreed that the relationship between their respective countries was a dynamic and flexible association with a long history

of past achievement and a heavy stake in a common future.

On September 15, 1966, a joint communique on talks between President Marcos and President Johnson contained the following paragraph:

The two Presidents pledged themselves to strengthen the unity of the two countries in meeting any threat to their security. In this regard, they noted the continuing importance of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and the United States in maintaining the security of both countries. President Johnson reiterated to President Marcos the policy of the United States regarding mutual defense as stated by him and by past U.S. Administrations to the Philippine Government since 1954.<sup>27</sup>

On September 16, 1966, an exchange of notes between U.S. Secretary of State Rusk and Philippine Foreign Secretary Ramos reaffirmed the policies expressed in the 1959 Bohlen-Serrano Memorandum of Agreement. After making reference to the Military Bases Agreement of 1947 and the Bohlen-Serrano Memorandum of Agreement of October 12, 1959, Secretary Rusk in his note took occasion "to reaffirm the policy of the United States regarding mutual defense expressed in the 1959 Memorandum." <sup>28</sup>

The U.S. State Department believes that the Philippines attaches great importance to presidential and other statements to the effect that any armed attack against the Philippines would be regarded as an attack against United States forces stationed there and against the United States and would be instantly repelled. However, the Philippine Government has continued periodically to seek a change in the Mutual Defense Treaty that in their view would make its im-

response more automatic.

In the opinion of then Undersecretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach during his testimony to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings investigating U.S. commitments to foreign powers on August 16, 1967, none of these commitments made by the United States to the Philippines incur automatic response:<sup>29</sup>

Let me emphasize the constitutional quality of these commitments. By their nature, they set only the boundaries within which the United States will act. They cannot and do not spell out the precise action which the United States would take in a variety of contingencies. That is left for further decision by the President and the Congress.

In short, none of these incur automatic response. But they do make clear our pledge to take actions we regard as appropriate in the light of all the circumstances--our view that we are not indifferent to the actions of others which disturb the peace of the world and threaten the security of the United States.

NOTES

CHAPTER VI.

1. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967, Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, Committee Print (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), Book 1, p. A-45, hereinafter referred to as the Pentagon Papers.

2. Pentagon Papers, Book 8, pp. 255-256.

3. Ibid., p. 266.

4. Ibid., p. 267.

5. Ibid.

6. Pentagon Papers, Book 8, pp. 282-285. NSC 64 made the observation that "the threat of Communist aggression against Indochina is only one phase of anticipated Communist plan to seize all of Southeast Asia." It concluded with a statement of what came to be known as the "domino principle."

7. Pentagon Papers, Book 8, pp. 520-534.

8. Ibid., Book 1, p. A-9.

9. Ibid., p. A-10.

10. Roger M. Smith, "The Philippines and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization," in Two Papers on Philippine Foreign Policy, Data Paper No. 38, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, December 1959, p. 4.

11. As stated by John Foster Dulles: ". . . it is not at this time practicable to draw a line which would bring all the free peoples of the Pacific and East Asia into a formal mutual security area. . . . Those Asian nations such as Indonesia and Burma which have just won liberation from Japanese aggression and political freedom from Western colonialism have hesitated to assume security relationships either with Japan or with the Western Powers." John Foster Dulles, "Security in the Pacific," Foreign Affairs (January, 1952), pp. 182-183.

12. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on Executive K, Executive Report No. 1, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 2-3.

13. Smith, op. cit., p. 4

14. Pentagon Papers, Book 10, p. 720.

15. Ibid., p. 721.

16. Ibid., p. 722.

17. Smith, op. cit., p. 6.

18. Quoted in the Manila Times, September 5, 1954, cited in Smith, op. cit., p. 13.

19. Milton Meyer, A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic, Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University 1959 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1975), pp. 381-382.

20. Manila Times, September 10, 1954; quoted in Smith, op. cit., p. 16.

21. Robert D. Shuey and Larry A. Niksch, "The Role of SEATO in U.S. Foreign Policy," in U.S. Commitment to SEATO, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. on S. Res. 174 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 65.

22. Quoted in Meyer, op. cit., p. 391.

23. Department of State Bulletin,

24. Embassy Note No. 0284 transmitted to Department of State as unclassified enclosure No. 5, Despatch No. 245 from Manila, note sent by Secretary Dulles to Philippine Foreign Secretary Carlos P. Garcia, cited in United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: The Republic of the Philippines, Hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 349.

25. Department of State Bulletin, June 21, 1958, p. 121.

26. Memorandum of Agreement, Ambassador Bohlen and Foreign Secretary Serrano of the Philippines, October 12, 1959, File 711.56396/10-1659, reprinted in full in United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, op. cit., p. 59. An exchange of notes between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Secretary Ramos of the Philippines, dated September 16, 1966, referred to the Bohlen-Serrano Memorandum, wherein the Secretary of State reaffirmed the policy of the United States regarding mutual defense with the Philippines. See note 28, infra.

27. Department of State Bulletin, October 10, 1966, p. 531.

28. TIAS 6084. Signed at Washington, D.C., September 16, 1966.

29. U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. on S. Res. 151 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 75.

### PART III

#### PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF THE ALLIANCE



Part III is an overall discussion of the problems and prospects of the alliance, with especial reference to the Philippines. Chapter VIII explores some of the critical problems that have induced strains and stresses in the relationship and some of the steps undertaken by the Philippines and the United States in order to maintain friendly and harmonious relations between themselves. Chapter IX investigates some of the factors that may influence the future of the alliance and the alternatives or options available to the Philippines for the protection of its security besides the alliance relationship with the United States. Chapter X attempts to provide conclusions arising from a study of an alliance between a great power and a small power by utilizing a conceptual framework suggested by some students of the concept of alliance.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP 1946-1975

The years between 1947 and 1975, which was a period of growing up for the Philippines, and for the United States a period of coping with its increased responsibilities and interests in a postwar world, were years of uneasy and troubled partnership between two nations that had stood shoulder to shoulder together in the battles of World War II. For the Philippines, these were years when the nation started to depend heavily upon the United States to rehabilitate its shattered economy and sustain its political independence and gradually learn to develop its self-reliance when it discovered that the United States had to meet increasing demands upon its time and resources from other nations in order to protect its own national security. For the United States, having lived up to its promises to grant political sovereignty to the Philippines and to assist to some extent in its rehabilitation, its attention was drawn to several theaters where its interests were threatened by a rising tide of Communism both in Europe and then in Asia.

It is not intended to present a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the United States and the Philippines in this chapter. Since such relationship has

already been determined by agreements between these two countries, this chapter will describe and analyze the developments which occurred by reason of these agreements: the agreements on military bases and military assistance, the mutual defense treaty, and the SEATO treaty.

#### The Military Bases Agreement of 1947

From the standpoint of the military alliance relationship, the 1947 military bases agreement is the most important instrument compared to the other agreements. Since 1947, U.S. interest in the Philippines has been determined solely by the stationing of its troops in military bases in the Philippines including the construction of facilities in the bases to facilitate the setting up of its military posture in the Southeast Asia region. Although the U.S. has expressed considerable commercial interest in the Philippines, such interest has not lived up to Philippine expectations despite Philippine amenability to a rewording of its Constitution in order to confer equal rights to Americans in the development and exploitation of its natural resources. U.S. interest in the Philippines has been justified in connection with hearings in congressional appropriation committees on the basis of the presence of American troops and equipment in military bases in the Philippines. Such interest has always been connected with the Philippines being a part of the U.S. defensive strategy.

The general objectives of the United States in its

relations with the Philippines were set forth by the U.S. State Department sometime in 1969:

Help encourage the development of self-sustained economic growth and a general economic modernization that will make improving standards of living available to people of all classes.

Assist Filipino efforts toward increased agricultural productivity and rural development.

Lay the groundwork for U.S.-Philippine bilateral economic relations after 1974 when the Laurel-Langley Agreement terminates.

Help the Government of the Philippines increase its capability for improvement of law and order.

Implement understandings reached with the Government of the Philippines aimed at reducing irritants rising out of our maintenance of U.S. military bases essential to our strategic posture in East Asia.<sup>1</sup>

As a result of the Military Bases agreement and two other subsidiary treaties signed between the United States and the Philippines in 1947, the United States was given the right to maintain 23 bases and reservations in the Philippines for a period of 99 years after independence. Many of these bases date back to colonial times. Clark Air Base in Pampanga Province, 82 kilometers (52 miles) north of Manila used to be a fort for horse cavalry. Subic Naval Base, located in Zambales Province on the China Sea coast northwest of Manila, is the United States Navy's largest support base in the Pacific. It is almost 50 miles northwest of Manila and was originally the site of a Spanish naval station. Turned over to the United States following the Spanish-American War of 1898, Subic

Naval Base has remained under U.S. control except for a brief period during World War II when the Japanese occupied the base. There were several other bases that were set up for the Allied counter-offensive against Japan during World War II, while still others are navigational stations for the American air-defense network set up all over the Western Pacific during the Cold War.

Of the 23 original U.S. bases and reservations found in the Philippines, only seven military reservations remain today (1975), the rest having been turned over to the Philippines.

Located about 100 miles north of Clark Air Base in mountainous country near the city of Baguio, is John Hay Air Base. This base has a radio station which provides high frequency circuits in support of airlift operations and air traffic control. John Hay Air base also has other circuits which support a weather research facility and the Voice of America transmitted. It is also widely used for conferences by A-1 services in the western Pacific and as a rest and recreation facility for approximately 2,500 people per month during the height of the Vietnam war.

Fifteen miles north of Clark Base is a communications site, Camp O'Donnell, which is shared by the Air Force, the Navy, and a regional relay facility of the U.S. State Department. As part of the overall communications net of the Department of State, it relays messages from posts in Southeast Asia on through to other posts around the world.

Besides these bases, there are four other small reservations, strung along the west coast of Luzon Island, and

contain radio transmitting and receiving stations and air-navigational aids.

Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base are the two major U.S. bases operating in the Philippines. Clark Air Base, the center of logistical and combat support for the operations of the US air forces in the Southeast Asian region, has facilities which allow the launching of large-scale aircraft and tactical air operations. With a total area of 202 square miles -- a little larger than the city of New Orleans, Louisiana -- most of which is used as a bombing and gunnery range and a training area in jungle warfare, only eight per cent of the total base area is used for the base proper purposes. The headquarters of the U.S. 13th Air Force and its various staff units which provide the command control, administrative and logistics support for the U.S. air forces in Thailand, Taiwan, and the Philippines, Clark Air Base also serves as base for three USAF units: the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing, the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing, and the 3rd Combat Support Group. The broad responsibilities of the 13th Air Force include the maintenance of assigned forces at a level of readiness to insure successful completion of directed military operations; to support and advance the national policies and interests of the United States; and to represent the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces, in the interdepartmental and interservice activities in the 13th Air Force Area of responsibility. Because the Philippines is a major communications hub for both north-south and east-west military communications for the western pacific, the Air Force is the principal operator of defense communications

systems facilities in the Philippines. The Air Force is also the operator of certain tactical communications facilities which are non-DCS. As of July 1, 1965, a total value of \$218,515,000 of construction has been completed at Clark Air Base, Mactan Air Base, and Wallace Air Station. A total amount of \$10,536,000 as of the same date was under construction. These figures are cited only to show the considerable investment the U.S. has in the air bases. Also for the fiscal year 1968, for example, the foreign exchange expenditures at the Air Force bases in the Philippines reached a total of \$48,927,747. In 1969, the corresponding amount was \$49,976,604.

The U.S. Naval Base at Subic Bay has the primary mission to provide logistic support primarily to 7th Fleet units, and also to locally assigned vessels and activities, transient naval vessels, aircraft and other naval activities in the Philippines. Composed of eight major commands and 40 smaller units and detachments, and providing altogether support services to the 70,000 men, 90 ships, and 550 aircraft of the 7th Fleet, Subic is the biggest U.S. naval installation in Asia. It is 56 square miles in area and controls some 40 square miles of water. The total base complex include the Subic Naval Station, a Naval Air Station at Cubi Point, a ship repair facility, a supply depot, a naval magazine, a Marine barracks and amphibious training camp, and a naval hospital. The Naval Communications Station at San Miguel provides communications for the command, operational control and administration of the naval establishment, as well as operation and

maintenance of certain facilities of the Defense Communications System. It is one of the U.S. principal communications stations worldwide and is essential to the 7th Fleet when operating in the southern part of its area. The total U.S. capital investment at the Subic Bay/Cubi Point complex including the communications facilities at San Miguel was set at \$214.6 million as of June 30, 1969. Also, in 1969 the total operating cost of all U.S. naval bases in the Philippines reached a total of \$89,000,000. During fiscal year 1969, the total salaries of Filipinos at the Air Forces bases totaled \$16,410,792. At the naval bases, it reached the total figure of \$27,581,668. In 1969, the total defense presence of the United States in the Philippines was 28,000 military personnel, 1,400 U.S. civilians, and 22,000 dependents. The combined base-related U.S. foreign exchange expenditures in the Philippines at that time contributed about 6 per cent of the Philippine gross national product. Comparable figures for 1975, are not complete but as of September 1, 1975, there were 6,233 U.S. military personnel at Subic Naval Base, 343 civilian, and 10,633 Filipino civilians who were paid out of appropriated funds. 243 U.S. civilians and 3,940 Filipinos were paid out of non-appropriated funds. A total number of 11,000 Filipinos were also employed as domestics, stevedores, and contract employees. All in all there were a total of 6,233 U.S. military personnel, 586 U.S. civilians, and 25,573 Filipinos employed at the U.S. naval base at Subic alone. The U.S. Air Force had a total of 9,500 military personnel on December 31, 1974.



During the years since the signing of the Military Bases Agreement in 1947, a number of disputes and misunderstandings arose between the United States and the Philippines over a number of issues which included the following: (1) title to the bases, (2) criminal jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel, (3) exploitation of natural resources within the bases by Filipinos, (4) shortening of the period of use of bases, (5) prior consultation with the Philippine Government before the stationing of long-range missiles on the bases or the use of the bases for combat operations outside the scope of the Mutual Defense Treaty or SEATO, (6) standards to govern conditions of employment for Filipinos employed on the bases, and (7) customs procedures.

The discussion involving the revisions that were made in the original 1947 agreement has been done in more detail elsewhere. It will be the purpose of this investigation to summarize the subsequent modifications to the 1947 agreement in order to show how the Philippines sought to protect its interests in the face of the demands of a great power ally.

On July 15, 1953, President Eisenhower made the initial move toward revision of the 1947 agreement when he requested in a letter to President Quirino about the prospect of increasing the number of active bases in the Philippines as well as developing the bases that were already operating. The conditions at this time in the external environment may well be understood in reading the Pentagon Papers. This was then the period when the United States was seeking to formulate a policy toward Vietnam, then torn in conflict.

Apparently not much was done by President Quirino, although he did mention to President Eisenhower that he was sharing Eisenhower's desire to reach an agreement on the questions concerning the military bases. Quirino, however, also mentioned that he was interested in other matters that "remain unclarified or unresolved" with the purpose of removing any possible misunderstanding with regard to them. When Magsaysay became President, he mentioned in his first State of the Union Message of January 25, 1954, that:

It is clearly in the national interest that we meet with the representatives of the United States Government to settle pending legal questions so that the bases we have granted to that country can be immediately developed and fully activated.<sup>2</sup>

Magsaysay forthwith appointed a panel of negotiators to discuss issues with the United States involving (1) sovereignty over the bases, (2) expansion of some bases, and (3) clarification of jurisdiction over the bases.<sup>3</sup> On March 16, 1954, U.S. Attorney General Brownell released a legal opinion wherein he stated that the United States retained title to the land area comprising the bases included in the 1947 agreement, as well as other areas not listed in the agreement. The Philippines' panel rejected the American claim and Magsaysay postponed the talks. It took two years, during which Magsaysay resorted to secret diplomatic negotiations, before formal talks resumed. It was during the intervening period, on September 4, 1954, that Secretary of State Dulles stated that the United States "will honor fully its commitments under the mutual defense treaty" with the Philippines.

On July 3, 1956, in a joint communique, President Magsay-

say and Vice-President Nixon issued a statement that:

The United States has, since the independence of the Philippines, always acknowledged the sovereignty of the Philippines over such bases; and expressly reaffirms full recognition of such Philippine sovereignty over the bases. Furthermore, the United States will transfer and turn over to the Philippines all title papers and title claims held by the United States to all land areas used either in the past or present as military bases, except those areas which may now or will be used by the United States for its diplomatic and consular establishments.<sup>4</sup>

Another announcement in late July said that talks on the revision of the bases agreement would resume again. And so on May 25, 1956, the Philippines announced that the discussions would cover: (1) jurisdiction within the bases; (2) delimitation and expansion of the bases; (3) taxes, tariffs, and other economic laws of the Philippines that should be applied to the bases; and (4) ownership and sovereignty over the bases. The bases negotiations, however, were suspended again because members of the U.S. panel had to depart for the United States because of urgent business there. One cause of the failure of the negotiations was believed to be too much publicity about the discussions.

Almost two years passed before something was done to resume the talks on the bases. While the United States did not make any overtures to resume negotiations, it did indicate its concern by appointing Charles E. Bohlen, a top American diplomat, to be Ambassador to the Philippines. Within a year after his appointment, Bohlen signed two agreements: (1) one agreement relinquished control over

the Manila Air Station; and (2) the other established a Philippine-United States Mutual Defense Board.

The purpose of the Philippine-United States Mutual Defense Board was to provide continuing inter-governmental machinery for direct liaison and consultation between appropriate Philippine and United States authorities on military matters of mutual concern so as to develop and improve, through continuing military cooperation, the common defense between the two countries. The members of the Board were as follows: For the Philippines: (a) Co-Chairman of the Board: The Chief of Staff, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or a Flag or General Officer designated by him; (b) Members of the Board: Chief, Philippine Constabulary; Commanding General, Philippine Army; Commanding General, Philippine Air Force; and Flag Officer in Command, Philippine Navy; for the United States: (a) Co-Chairman of the Board: The United States Military Representative of the Council, or a Flag or General Officer designated by him; (b) Members of the Board: The senior United States Service representative of the Army, Navy and Air Force on duty in the Philippines and, if not already represented, the Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group. The Board and its members were to be assisted by such staff, military or civilian, as they consider appropriate.<sup>5</sup>

Subsequently, other agreements were reached between Ambassador Bohlen and Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Felixberto Serrano. The first, a memorandum of agreement dated August 4, 1959, announced the relinquit-

ment by the United States of seventeen base areas with a total area of 117,075 hectares. This memorandum of agreement took effect on December 22, 1965.

On October 12, 1959, a second memorandum of agreement contained the following: (1) the operational use of bases will be the subject of prior consultations with the Government of the Philippines in case of military combat operations; (2) establishment by the United States of long-range missiles on the bases will be the subject also of prior consultations with the Philippine Government; (3) the duration of the bases agreement is reduced from 90 years to 25 years, with a proviso for renewal at the expiration of the 25 year period or earlier termination by mutual agreement, with the 25 year period beginning on the date of signature; and (4) the United States reaffirmed its policy with regard to armed attack on the Philippines, i.e., that any armed attack against the Philippines would involve an attack against United States forces stationed there and against the United States and would be instantly repelled.<sup>6</sup>

As for the criminal jurisdiction arrangements, it would not be until 1965 that the changes would be made. When it was so made in the 1965 revision, the change is almost identical to the criminal jurisdiction provisions of Article VII of the NATO SOFA. Again, the issue over criminal jurisdiction is discussed quite extensively elsewhere because it was one of the leading causes of irritations between the United States and the Philippines because of the military bases agreement between these two countries.<sup>7</sup>

Also important to the establishment of harmonious relations between the two countries was the exploitation of natural resources, especially mineral resources, within the bases by Filipinos. An Exchange of Notes dated at Manila on April 8, 1957, provided an interim arrangement between the U.S. and the Philippines for the exploitation of mineral resources without prejudice to the military purpose for which the bases were being used. Such exploitation was authorized in accordance with principles, procedures, and conditions which gave full recognition both to the desire to foster economic development of the Philippines and to the need to ensure the security of the bases and the ability to accomplish military operations and training. This interim arrangement was subsequently confirmed in an exchange of notes on August 24, 1967.

Besides the areas already mentioned as being relinquished by the United States to the Philippines, the following areas were also relinquished: (1) United States Naval radio transmitting facility at Bagobanty, Quezon City, effected by exchange of notes December 31, 1962 and January 11, 1963; (2) Olongapo and adjacent areas, effected by exchange of notes signed at Manila on December 7, 1959; (3) certain land areas in Camp John Hay, effected by exchange of notes signed at Manila December 13, 1966; (4) Bataan Pol Terminal at Kitang Point, effected by exchange of notes dated at Manila on April 30, 1968; and (5) Naval Station, Sangley Point, effected by exchange of notes signed at Manila on August 21 and 31, 1971.<sup>8</sup>

The presence of these military bases on Philippine territory is considered by the Philippine Government as a sources of irritants between the two countries. First, the Filipinos believed that the circumstances under which the American bases were established easily enabled the Americans to obtain from the Philippines the best possible terms for their use. The almost complete economic and military dependence on the United States at the time of independence severely handicapped the Filipino leaders in negotiating with the Americans. As the Filipinos began to develop a measure of economic, military and political self-confidence, they began to question the arrangements on military bases. Second, the Filipinos still raise the question of de facto extraterritoriality that they charge are given the Americans. Under the bases agreement, the Philippine government has no jurisdiction over an American serviceman who commits an offense while in the performance of his military duty. The right to determine whether or not an erring soldier is considered on duty or not is reserved for the base commander. Also, even though an American serviceman is accused of committing an offense over which the Philippine government has jurisdiction, the American base authorities are allowed to keep custody of the serviceman. This resulted in many cases where accused serviceman were shipped out of the Philippines while facing criminal charges in Philippine courts. Third, the Filipinos charge that the U.S. guarantee to defend the Philippines in case of attack is subject to varying interpretations, depending on the mood of the U.S.

Congress. The U.S. feels obligated to repel an attack on the Philippines only if the American bases on Philippine territory were directly attacked. The Filipinos feel that this congressional theory is an apparent contradiction of explicit statements made by American presidents such as Eisenhower and Johnson that any attack on the Philippines would necessarily involve an attack on U.S. forces and on the United States and would be instantly repelled. Fourth, statements about base contributions to Philippine economy are misleading because (1) actual inflows into Philippine income stream from base-spending is probably just a portion of the total annual figure; (2) unusual dependence of trading and recreational facilities by regions surrounding military bases has led to severe local crises, as for example, the collapse of the Angeles housing industry in the wake of the Vietnam war; and (4) a grave economic problem arises from the bases in the outflow of luxury consumer goods from the Post Commissary system into the national market, bypassing customs barriers.

If the bases are transferred to the custody of the Philippines, the Philippine Government has a program ready for developing both Clark and Subic bases into commercial-military complexes.<sup>9</sup>

Clark Air Base will be developed as a passenger/cargo air terminal and trans-shipment point for both domestic and international traffic; a major aircraft manufacturing, repair, and maintenance facility; a center for other industrial activity and a site for corporate farming projects.

Subic will be developed as a major ship-repair service complex, an offshore supply base,



particularly for oil exploration in the Philippines; an anchorage for laid-up tankers, and a site for related industries.

The official Philippine position on the American military bases was stated by President Marcos on July 7, 1975:<sup>10</sup>

We want to put an end to the practice of extra-territoriality in our country in keeping with our dignity as a sovereign Republic and in keeping with the developments of our times.

We want to assume control of all U.S. bases and put them to a productive economic, as well as military, use.

At the same time, we are willing to enter into new arrangements that would help the United States maintain an effective presence over the air and sea lanes of the Western Pacific.

On December 7, 1975, a joint communique issued on the occasion of the visit of U.S. President Gerald Ford to the Philippines, it was stated that: <sup>11</sup>

. . . the military bases used by the United States in the Philippines remain important in maintaining an effective United States presence in the Western Pacific . . . .

They [Marcos and Ford] agreed that negotiations on the subject of United States use of Philippine military bases should be conducted in the clear recognition of Philippine sovereignty. The two Presidents agreed that there should be an early review of the steps necessary to conclude the negotiations through the two panels already organized for that purpose.

Negotiations for re-examination of the bases began at Washington, D.C. on April 19, 1976. Sometime in June, the United States announced that it needed the military

bases in the Philippines for the protection of its security.

In both the Korean conflict and the Vietnam War, the Americans realized the value of its bases in the Philippines in the pursuit of an aggressive policy in Southeast Asia. As George Taylor puts it:<sup>12</sup>

Immediately following the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the United States increased its air and naval forces in the Philippines, and Clark Field became one of the great air commands of the western Pacific. So much was said about the strategic importance of the Philippines as the anchor of the island chain that it became safer for Filipinos to put more pressure on the United States than they had before over such issues as the status of the military bases. The situation and the bargaining position of the Philippines had changed. It was now clear that the United States wanted the bases for its own defense and could always be counted on to come to the rescue of the government in power at a time of economic crisis. When a strong power is in partnership with a weak one, the bargaining positions are not necessarily a direct reflection of their relative military and economic strength.

During the Vietnam war, especially in the year 1968, at the height of United States ground action in Vietnam

. . . there were 1,712 visits by United States naval ships to Subic Bay and 895 by merchant ships. On an average day that year 10,000 naval personnel stationed aboard ships of the Seventh Fleet were at Subic. By comparison, in 1965, there were 1,372 ship visits to Subic.<sup>13</sup>

In fact, all the major American military facilities in the Philippines supported American military operations in the Vietnam war.

Among other functions, Subic Bay provides logistical support for the carrier task force

on the Yankee Station. San Miguel serves as communications link between Vietnam and the United States. Clark Air Base provides rear echelon support for airlift and fighter squadrons in Vietnam. So, too, did Mactan, until its airlift squadrons were reassigned to Clark. The main function of Sangley's squadrons was the surveillance of the coastal waters of Southeast Asia.<sup>14</sup>

### Military Assistance

Military assistance was an important factor in the buildup of the armed forces of the young Republic of the Philippines. The Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) set up in that country was the first of such type of organization to be set up in Southeast Asia so that when other mutual defense assistance treaties were signed with countries in that region, it became the prototype for similar bodies organized in other countries. The JUSMAG administered a total amount of \$169.3 million during the first ten years to support a wide range of projects. These included the training of jet pilots at Clark Air Base; the delivery of training jets, minesweepers, and ammunition; the improvement of airfields; and the construction of warehouses and training sites. The JUSMAG also contributed a considerable amount of advice and equipment when the Philippine Government was meeting the challenge of the Hukbalahaps, a communist-led organization in the fifties. However, the JUSMAG has also been charged with meddling in domestic politics by helping Ramon Magsaysay's effort to become president of the Philippines.

During the 1960's and the early 1970's, the Philippines received the average amount of \$20 million a year from

the United States. Actually during the fiscal year 1965 through fiscal year 1969, the level of military assistance to the Philippines averaged \$22.5 million annually. The largest amount received by the Philippines for this period was \$27 million for fiscal year 1967. Two years later the amount appropriated for the program was less than \$19 million. Total American grants during the period from 1946 to 1973 have totaled \$709.7 million.

Military assistance to the Philippines was first authorized by the U.S. Congress in 1946 when it passed an act "To provide military assistance to the Republic of the Philippines in establishing and maintaining national security and to form a basis for participation by that government in such defensive military operations as the future may require." Three years later under the Truman Doctrine, military assistance for the Philippines became part of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) which has since then been redesignated as the Military Assistance Program (MAP).

Besides equipment, training, and other support provided the Philippines from appropriated MAP funds, their armed forces have also received delivery of numerous items from excess stocks at no cost to regular grant program except shipping charges and in some cases, necessary reconditioning. Some of these items include: spare parts for aircraft weapons and communications equipment; ammunition; T-33 aircraft and C-47 aircraft; patrol craft, light cargo ship, and various small boats and craft.

The overall objective of U.S. military assistance to the Philippines in providing advice and assistance to

the Armed Forces of the Philippines is justified as being necessary in order to assure protection of U.S. interests in the Philippines and to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives in the area as defined by the U.S. Department of State. Secretary of State Kissinger has also described U.S. security assistance policy as an effective instrument for decades in maintaining the strength of the U.S. alliances, which have been, and are to Kissinger, the anchor of world peace and stability.

In the latest hearings on international security assistance, the total figure appropriated by the United States for the Philippines for the period from 1955 to 1973 was \$322 million. This amount includes the military assistance program, foreign military sales, and the military assistance training program. Under the military assistance training program, a total of 14,745 Filipinos were trained in the U.S. and the Philippines for the period during 1950 to 1973.

#### Mutual Defense

During the course of the partnership from 1947 to 1975, the Philippines had asked for and received assurances from the United States that the latter would provide protection for Philippine security. In terms of domestic politics, it became something of a fashion to criticize American arrangements for the security of the Philippines as being inadequate or as an invitation to attack by other countries, especially because of the presence of U.S.

military bases in the Philippines.

The Philippines acted in concert with the United States during the Korean conflict by sending Philippine combat troops to fight in Korea. The troops arrived in Korea in September, 1950, with a total strength of 1,369 men. The actual number of Philippine soldiers, however, varied continuously because of casualties, rotation, and other factors. The actual number of troops during various periods was as follows:

June 30, 1951	1,143
June 30, 1953	1,494
July 31, 1953	1,496
June 30, 1954	445

By June 17, 1955, all Filipino troops had gone home to the Philippines. The salaries of the troops were paid by the Philippine Government. Logistical support which was provided by the Eighth Army of the United States totaled \$47,907,630.40.<sup>15</sup>

In the fall of 1964, the United States started discussions with the Philippines regarding the sending of a Philippine military contingent to South Vietnam. The discussions were first started with Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal and were carried over with President Marcos in late 1965 and 1966.<sup>16</sup>

Macapagal later on would privately confirm the persuasions made upon him by Washington as follows:<sup>17</sup>

President Johnson personally and through top advisors like the Secretary of State . . . Defense and the American Ambassador . . . undertook steady persuasions as tactfully as they could to make my administration send a 2,000 men engineer contingent to Vietman. More

out of conviction than their persuasion, I recommended to Congress in 1965 the dispatch of the contingent.

Macapagal's efforts were to no avail in the Philippine Congress because of the strong opposition led by Marcos, then Senate President. Despite the continued persuasion upon him by the United States, Macapagal declined to certify the enactment of the bill to send a Philippine contingent to South Vietnam in the two special sessions of Congress after the regular session failed to enact the measure. It was suspected that Macapagal's refusal was based on his reaction to American policy:

It was not so much for my support of the project to send 2,000 men to Vietnam as on the basis of the general mutual cooperation between the two countries for the promotion of common objectives that I expected the Johnson administration to implement the terms of the Johnson-Macapagal communique of October 6, 1964, which could assist my administration. The implementation turned out to be lukewarm as indicated by the fact that the 100,000 tons of rice committed to be shipped to the Philippines in 1965 did not arrive and, I understand, was rerouted to Vietnam.<sup>18</sup>

The original offer made to President Macapagal by the United States Government in order to induce him to send a Philippine contingent to South Vietnam consisted of the following:<sup>19</sup>

1. To equip PHILGAG /Philippine Civic Action Group, Vietnam/ in Vietnam on a loan basis and provide logistics support.

2. To pay overseas allowances, over and above the regular pay to be provided by the Philippine Government.

3. To provide replacement costs for a replacement unit in the Philippines.

The Philippines was also offered the following, in addition to the above:

1. Two Swiftcraft over and above two committed earlier. Swiftcraft are river patrol craft about 50 feet in length.

2. Accelerated funding in fiscal year 1966 of equipment for three engineer construction battalions previously considered for later financing under the military assistance agreement.

3. M-14 rifles and M-60 machineguns for one battalion combat team to be funded in fiscal year 1966.

The additional equipment promised to the Philippine Government were to be funded by the Department of Defense from service funds as Vietnam-related costs and not from the military assistance program.

Because of Macapagal's intransigence, the United States Government made no further overtures upon him to send a Philippine unit to South Vietnam, probably preferring to wait it out until his successor, Ferdinand Marcos, was elected to the Philippine presidency.

Upon his election, Marcos made a turnabout and began to press for authorization from the Philippine Congress to appropriate funds to send a troop contingent unit to South Vietnam. Marcos disclaimed any pressures being brought to bear upon him by the American Government and emphasized in an address to the nation that the decision to ask Congress to appropriate funds for PHILCAG was not made

. . . for and in consideration of any additional



aid whether in dollars or any form from the United States. . . . Neither coercion, threats, blackmail, or dollars have dictated this judgment. Now and in the future, only the national interest of the Philippines shall determine my decision.<sup>20</sup>

In 1966, Marcos therefore adopted a "very high public posture toward PHILCAG, supporting it strongly in major addresses and in pushing the necessary legislation through the Congress, linking this to Philippine national interests and formal requests for assistance from the Government of South Vietnam."<sup>21</sup>

The American Government, however, also worked very hard in order to bring about the sending of a Philippine unit to South Vietnam. In fact, a Manila newspaper charged that

. . . the pressure on the Philippine government to send the military contingent to Viet-Nam is reminiscent of the drive to secure passage of the Bell Trade Act of 20 years ago. . . . The implication appears to be that no such aid can be expected if the condition is not fulfilled.<sup>22</sup>

A Philippine legislator, Senate President Arturo Tolentino also denounced the "incredible pressures" applied upon the Filipino lawmakers. Tolentino remarked that while it was the government of South Vietnam that had requested Philippine help, it was the U.S. which resorted to "intimidation" and other coercive measures to secure presidential support in the first instance.<sup>23</sup>

American pressure was in fact subtly applied:

The Americans made a constant show of attention to the Philippines in early 1966. Vice President Humphrey came twice; Secretary of State Rusk and

Ambassador Harriman came on the "peace offensive" that Johnson had dispatched to all parts of the globe; General Lansdale came in from Saigon to see his old friends, as did Congressman Zablocki from Washington.<sup>24</sup>

Eventually, all these efforts paid off and Marcos sent a Philippine contingent to South Vietnam. American sources later on said that there were at least three factors that led to this action on the part of the Philippine Government. First, there was an active interest on the part of the U.S. Government in bringing forces from other nations into the conflict in Vietnam. On the basis of this interest, the U.S. Government initiated discussions with the Government of the Philippines, the Government of Thailand and the Government of Korea, and the Government of Australia, and the Government of New Zealand. Second, the Government of South Vietnam approached the Government of the Philippines directly and asked if they would make contribution. Third, it was believed that there was a considerable body of opinion in the Philippines itself which felt that such a contribution should be made by the Government of the Philippines in these circumstances.<sup>25</sup>

As a result of this action, the Philippine Government accepted officially the promise to equip the PHILCAG in Vietnam on a loan basis and provide a logistics support for it, as well as the offer to pay overseas allowances over and above the regular pay to be provided by the Philippine Government. Actually, the Philippines practically received all the items promised by the U.S. Government except the offer to equip a replacement unit in the Phil-

The Philippines also received \$31.2 million in veterans benefits and later in 1966, the U.S. House of Representatives voted to expand hospitalization and children's benefits for Philippine veterans of World War II. In 1966 it was also agreed that the Philippines and the United States would open discussions on the Laurel-Langley Trade Agreement.<sup>26</sup>

Later in 1966, President Johnson, inspired by the idea that if Korea could send a 50,000 force to South Vietnam, the Philippines could possibly support a proportionally greater force instead of its tiny battalion, instructed U.S. Ambassador Blair in the Philippines to work toward this end. However, in spite of all U.S. efforts, the Philippines declined to increase its force in South Vietnam.<sup>27</sup>

The American reaction to this between 1966 and March 1968 was their resentment at the smallness of the Philippine contingent. All in all, however, when everything it put into perspective by one writer:

Perhaps, the strongest card of the Filipinos in bargaining with the Americans was their own weakness. They could do little actively for the United States, and in substantial measure, they thought that what they had been asked to do was not going to be terribly useful, and might be harmful. Nothing the United States could do would induce them to send 50,000 troops; they had their own very clear views of what was needed, and knew their own limitations as well. Other things being equal, their decision should have elicited more respect from Americans than the Thai decision, as it was openly, and less cynically, reached.<sup>28</sup>

Incidentally, in 1968, when the Philippines revived its claim to Sabah, the Americans made clear, through a spokesman of the State Department, that the United States would not be involved in defending the Philippines even "if her ally got her fingers burned over Sabah." This statement angered one Filipino newsman to the point that he wrote in the Manila Bulletin of July 24, 1968 that there was no reason why

. . . the Philippines must go on supporting America's military adventure in Vietnam, when America cannot even be persuaded to support the Philippines in the first and most important dispute that confronts it and its nearest neighbors. . . . Washington evades every opportunity to express its support to its former colony.<sup>29</sup>

This generated a response from Philippine General Yan who wrote that the Philippines had

unequivocally declared that it has no intention of resolving the Sabah dispute by force. The relevance, therefore, of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty in relation to the Sabah dispute is hypothetical.<sup>30</sup>

Yan added that:

However, it must be pointed out that unlike in the case of SEATO, where the U.S. has officially limited its interpretation in case of external aggression in the Treaty Area to Communist aggression . . . no such provision is present in the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty.<sup>31</sup>

The Philippine position on the sending of a force to South Vietnam was based on part on a long-range assessment of the situation: an evaluation of the pres-

sent and future configuration of forces in Southeast Asia. The Philippines did not merely wish to be in a position of supplying forces in order to secure continuation of American military economic aid programs: it also wished to influence the ongoing strategy of the war as much as possible and also to be able to participate in the peace settlement that would eventually take place.

In the Philippines, the important developments arising from the Mutual Defense Treaty were the establishment of the Mutual Defense Board, the development of a contingency plan for the Philippines, and the holding of joint exercises between various units of the armed forces of the United States and the Philippines.

During the base negotiations of 1956, the Philippine Government proposed, and the U.S. Government agreed, that intergovernmental machinery should be established to carry out effectively the specified purposes and objectives of the security and defense agreements between the two countries. It was, therefore, agreed that the Mutual Defense Board should be established for the purpose of providing continuing intergovernmental machinery for direct liaison and consultation between appropriate Philippine and U.S. authorities on military matters of mutual concern so as to develop and improve, through continuing military cooperation, the common defense of the two sovereign countries.

The Mutual Defense Board was first organized and had its first meeting on May 15, 1958. Thereafter, it

has met monthly. The Board reports directly to the Council of Foreign Ministers which consist of the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Ambassador who acts in behalf of the U.S. Secretary of State. In its annual meetings the Council of Foreign Ministers is in personal attendance. Copies of the minutes of the Board are distributed to all these officials as well as to the appropriate military members.

In 1969, the Board considered Communist China as the principal threat to the Philippines with possible assistance from internal dissident groups.

By reason of this threat and also in pursuit of treaty obligations between the U.S. and the Philippines, joint contingency plans for the defense of the Philippines have been drawn up. The plan has been described as a continuing operation.

The Mutual Defense Board has authorized the establishment of a U.S. Air Force-Philippine Air Force Defense System. Officers of the U.S. Air Force serve as members of the air defense working group and consult on air defense matters from time to time.

The U.S. Air Force has also supported joint training exercises in the Philippines. From February 1967 to August 9, 1969, alone, a total of 10 joint air defense exercises using simulated targets were used. From September 7, 1966 to August 27, 1969, wartime exercises totaled 124.

As for U.S. obligation to the Philippines in the event of foreign attack, it is interpreted to be restricted to armed attack under the terms of the mutual defense

treaty. Such action to be taken in the event of armed attacked under the terms of the treaty was considered a matter of the U.S. President's constitutional authority. Insofar as consultation with the U.S. Congress is concerned, a statement made by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers on August 20, 1969 was referred to:

And I have said to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee that we fully understand the necessity for support in any military venture, both by Congress and the public. If there is one thing that Vietnam has made clear it is that now we will, to the fullest extent of our ability, get the advice of Congress, consult with them along the way, and in any appropriate circumstances we will get their consent.<sup>32</sup>

As for counterinsurgency efforts, the official U.S. Government position is that it does not support counterinsurgency efforts as such in the Philippines. But it does have two programs which have a bearing on Philippine counterinsurgency efforts. One is the AID public safety program and the USMAG military assistance program. It is also U.S. policy that U.S. personnel are not authorized to participate in Philippine military operations of any kind.

Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Organization. -- There is very little doubt that the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 made the SEATO commitment to the Philippines by the United States superfluous as far as American security guarantees to that country were con-

concerned. But even before the massive U.S. intervention in Vietnam, there was great importance attached to the Philippines in U.S. planning:

It is not generally understood that US policies in Southeast Asia today depend in great measure on a political and military partnership with the Republic of the Philippines . . . . The major concern of US policy is how to maintain and develop this peculiarly intimate, complex, and dynamic relationship. Without it the US position in Southeast Asia would be extremely difficult.<sup>33</sup>

On March 6, 1974, another view of SEATO and the Philippines was made by Dr. George McT. Kahin in a hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations when he said that in the Philippines the continuing existence of SEATO increases the possibility of the U.S. being drawn into military intervention against insurgents. He explained this by saying that:

The same distortion of the SEATO treaty that permitted it to be used as authority for a presidentially-initiated military intervention against insurgents in Vietnam could be applied in the Philippines.<sup>34</sup>

Dr. Kahin's objections to the continuation of SEATO with reference to the Philippines are based on a number of reasons:<sup>35</sup>

While SEATO constitutes the sole basis for the American defense commitment to Thailand, in the Philippines this backing comes not only through SEATO but also through the antecedent bilateral, Mutual Defense Treaty signed in 1951. Through a series of executive actions, never submitted to the Senate for approval, this 1951 treaty has been reinterpreted in a way that has committed the



U.S. more heavily and with less flexibility than envisaged. In their combination, this Mutual Defense Treaty and U.S. obligations under SEATO, especially when perceived in the context of the islands major U.S. air and fleet bases, add up to a formidable American commitment.

The Philippines believed at the time it joined SEATO that its position in regional and world affairs would be strengthened by the alliance and hoped for further American military and economic aid and for preferential treatment. However, one Filipino statesman, after reading the 1969 Senate Hearings on US security commitments in the Philippines which he called the "Philippines' Pentagon Papers," concluded that "A Philippine foreign and security policy based in its present form would show all the symptoms of the congenital disease that proved so fatal in Bataan."<sup>36</sup>

As for the United States, members of Congress were severely critical of the Philippine contribution as part of its SEATO commitments to the American war effort in South Vietnam. This subject is covered with some detail in the preceding section on the mutual defense treaty.

As far as the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty is concern, at the twentieth annual meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers, which was held in New York on September 24, 1975, it was decided that the organization should be phased out over a two-year period. The SEATO Secretary General was reported to have developed a plan which will permit the phase out to be conducted in an orderly and systematic manner. The plan is now

being reviewed by representatives of the member nations.

## NOTES

## CHAPTER VII

1. Statement of James M. Wilson, Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission, Manila, Philippines, "U.S. Objectives in Relations with the Philippines," in United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: The Republic of the Philippines, Hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 210.

2. Official Gazette, L:1 (January, 1954), p. 81, quoted in Joseph W. Dodd, Criminal Jurisdiction Under the United States-Philippine Military Bases Agreement: A Study in Conjurisdictional Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. 86.

3. Dodd, op. cit., p. 86.

4. Department of State Bulletin, XXV:890 (July 16, 1956), p. 96.

5. Establishment of Mutual Defense Board and Assignment of Military Liaison Officers, Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines Effected by Exchange of Notes, Signed at Manila, May 15, 1958, TIAS 4033.

6. United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: The Republic of the Philippines, Hearings, op. cit., p. 24.

7. See Dodd, op. cit. See also Jesus R. Aguilar, "Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Revised Bases Agreement," Philippine Law Journal, XLI (August, 1967), pp. 728-749;

Pablo B. Badong, "Philippine Jurisdiction Over the George E. Roe Cast, : Philippine Law Journal, XXII (1957), pp. 403-410; and Crispino de Castro, "U.S. Jurisdiction Over Armed Forces in the Philippines," Far Eastern Law Review, VII (1959), pp. 626-651.

8. Not only were areas reverted back to the Philippines but in numerous other understandings or agreements, the Philippines was a recipient of benefits from the United States.

9. In Backgrounders on Philippine American Relations and the Philippines Today, prepared by the Department of Public Information, Manila, Philippines, December, 1975, on the occasion of the state visit of U.S. President Gerald Ford to Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos. A copy was furnished the writer of this study by Lt. Joe Griffin of the U.S. Navy presently stationed at Subic Bay. Lt. Griffin also loaned to the writer his file of newspaper clippings from Philippine newspapers for the years 1974 and 1975.

10. Bulletin Today, July 8, 1975,

11. Department of State Bulletin, LXXIII:1905 (December 29, 1975), p. 926.

12. George E. Taylor, The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership (New York: Praeger, Publishers, 1964), p. 150.

13. United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: The Republic of the Philippines, Hearings, op. cit., p. 88.

14. Ibid.

15. U. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: The Republic of the Philippines, Hearings, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 36.

16. Ibid., p. 253.

17. W. Scott Thompson, Unequal Partners: Philippine and Thai Relations with the United States 1965-75 (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975), p. 79,

18. Ibid.

19. Hearings on United States Security Agreements, pp. 254-255. Thompson in his book cited above estimated the equipment and logistic support of PHILCAG by the U.S. to be worth at about \$35 million. Each of the Swiftcraft promised by the U.S. was valued at about \$200,000 each. See Thompson, op. cit., p. 81.

20. Thompson, op. cit., p. 81.

21. Hearings on United States Security Agreements, p. 256.

22. Thompson, op. cit., p. 80, citing the Manila Times, February 8, 1966.

23. Ibid., quoting the Manila Chronicle, April 18, 1966.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Hearings on United States Security Agreements, p. 258.

26. Thompson, op. cit., pp. 81-82.

27. Ibid., pp. 82-83.

28. Ibid., pp. 88-89.

29. Quoted in Thompson, ibid., p. 110.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Hearings on United States Security Agreements,  
p. 131.

33. Donald E. Weatherbee, "Collective Defense, Neutralization, and the Balance of Power: Contending Security Policies in Southeast Asia," Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, September 12, 1975, p. 6.

34. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Commitment to SEATO, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. on S. Res. 174 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, p. 38.

35. Ibid., p. 39.

36. Leon Ma. Guerrero, "The Pensacola Syndrome," Pacific Community, April, 1972, p. 472, quoted in Weatherbee, op. cit., p. 6.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE

In his perceptive study of the national interests of the United States in a changing world, Donald E. Nuechterlein attempts to draw a distinction between the terms national interest and public interest of that country. Nuechterlein views the public interest as the well-being of the American people and American enterprise within the territorial boundaries of the United States and national interest refers to the well-being of American citizens and American enterprise involved in international relations and affected by political forces beyond the administrative control of the United States government. The public interest is heavily influenced by the nature of the international environment in which the United States interacts, particularly when there is a threat of war, while the national interest is influenced by the degree of social stability and political unity prevailing within the country at any given time. Nuechterlein then proceeds to discuss strategic interests as being derived from a clear perception of national interests although they are only a second-order interests.

They are concerned with the political, economic and military means of protecting the nation against military dangers and are defined to

a large degree by geography, the availability of scarce resources, military technology, and the limitation of damage which could be inflicted on American territory or that of an ally. Occasionally strategic interests tend to determine national interests, rather than the reverse, and in such cases confusion and overemphasis on military security often results.

The basic national interests of the United States are perceived by Nuechterlein to be three: defense, economic, and world order. Defense is the protection of the people, territory, and institutions of the United States against potential foreign dangers. Economic national interest of the United States is the promotion of its international trade and investment, including protection of its private interests in foreign countries. The establishment of a peaceful international environment in which disputes between nations can be resolved without resort to war and in which collective security rather than unilateral action is employed to deter or cope with aggression represents the national interest of the United States in world order.

There are also what Nuechterlein calls transitory interests; they are interests which are subject to change depending on the government's perception of their urgency at any given time and these are further divided into: (1) survival interests, where the very existence of the nation is in peril; (2) vital interests, where probable serious harm could result to the security and well-being of the nation if strong measures, including the use of force, are not taken by the government; (3) major interests, where potential serious harm could come to the nation if no action is taken to counter an unfavorable trend abroad; and



(4) peripheral, or minor, interests, where little if any harm will result to the entire nation if a "wait and see" policy is adopted. Vital interests as conceived by Nuechterlein is practically the same as national interests since both seem to refer to "the protection of the country against probable dangers to its political survival and economic well-being and the promotion of a peaceful international environment."<sup>2</sup>

In the case of the Philippines, Nuechterlein's conceptual framework has some value in helping to chart its future problems and the course of its foreign policy. The question of national objectives, the capability of the nation for achieving such objectives, and the implementation, or the actual expenditure of efforts and resources in the pursuit of selected objectives, provide the framework for determining the course of future Philippine foreign policy.

Alliances and Special Relations. Alliances or the policy of alliances is believed to have been of some value to the United States. In the words of Robert E. Osgood:<sup>3</sup>

Not only have they [alliances] been a major means of protecting American power; they have also been the most prominent instrumentality by which the nation has related itself to a vastly expanded role in the international area. In addition to being calculated instruments of deterrence, alliances have appealed to the American ideal of organizing order by means of collective institutions. They have been the nearest thing to "collective security in a world of power politics. They have been documentary evidence of America's

effort to organize the "free world" against "communist aggression." Thus, in hundreds of pronouncements, official and unofficial, American spokesmen have hailed the forty-two allies of the United States as interdependent links in a collective system of deterrence, which departs from old-fashioned alliances and provides a barrier against the anarchy of nationalism. . . . "The integrity of these alliances," says Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "is at the heart of the maintenance of peace, and if it should be discovered that the pledge of the United States is meaningless, the structure of peace would crumble, and we would be well on our way to a terrible catastrophe.

The alliances established by the United States at the end of World War II followed several doctrines as established by its policymakers. Foremost among these doctrines was the doctrine of containment. For twenty years, the concept of containment provided a coherent framework for the East Asian policy of the United States:

Defense commitments, military bases, and U.S. forces deployed in the western Pacific formed the skeleton of the containment policy, but it was fleshed out with all the tools of modern diplomacy to restrict the power and influence of the adversaries of the United States and rapidly strengthen its allies. The purpose of the policy was not only to deter the Chinese Communists and their allies from using military force to extend their dominion, but also to confine and weaken their political influence. American leaders believed that increases in Peking's prestige and political and economic influence would facilitate its support of communist insurgents in Southeast Asia.<sup>4</sup>

In short:

Although the methods by which the containment policy was carried out were many-sided and complex, its purpose was quite simply to prevent the expansion of territory in Asia under communist control. In a largely bipolar world it was assumed that seizures of power by communist parties supported by China and the USSR would add to the strength of the Sino-Soviet bloc and weaken the coalition headed by the United States.<sup>5</sup>

In 1946, the principal inter-departmental organization concerned with the coordination of foreign and military policies was the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, otherwise known as SWNCC.<sup>6</sup> It held its first meeting on December 19, 1944, and continued its work until 1948 when, upon the establishment of the National Security Council, its work was terminated. The files of the SWNCC contain some of the basic policies of the United States for those years when the principal enemy of the United States was perceived to be the USSR. For the Philippines, the policies formulated by the United States determined the retention of military bases by the U.S. in the Philippines, the conclusion of the mutual defense treaty as part of the Japanese peace settlement, and in later years, U.S. policy toward Indo-China led to the signing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. In the early years of the Republic of the Philippines, its foreign policy was clearly to follow the lead of the United States in foreign affairs.

In the files of SWNCC, there is a memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated March 27, 1946, and classified as "Top Secret" and numbered SWNCC 282. The

document establishes that the basic purpose for maintaining the armed forces of the United States is to provide for its security and to uphold and advance its national policies, foreign and domestic. The document then enumerates the major national policies which determine the military policy of the United States as follows:

a. Maintenance of the territorial integrity and security of the United States, its territories, possessions, leased areas and trust territories.

b. Advancing the political, economic and social well-being of the United States.

c. Maintenance of the territorial integrity and the sovereignty or political independence of other American states, and regional collaboration with them in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Western Hemisphere.

d. Maintenance of the territorial integrity, security and, when it becomes effective, the political independence of the Philippine Islands.

e. Participation in and full support of the United Nations Organization.

f. Enforcement, in collaboration with our Allies, of terms imposed upon the defeated enemy states.

g. Maintenance of the United States in the best possible relative position with respect to potential enemy powers, ready when necessary to take military action abroad to maintain the security and integrity of the United States.<sup>7</sup>

As part of its general military policy in order to be prepared to take prompt and effective military action

wherever necessary with the armed forces of the United States, it was recommended that the United States maintain the security of the United States, its territories, possessions, leased areas, trust territories and the Philippine Islands. Among the principal supporting military policies was to develop and maintain a system of outlying bases, adequately equipped and defended and also to maintain liaison with and to support the development of the armed forces of the Philippines with other nations which contribute to the security of the United States.<sup>8</sup>

In another document entitled "Policy Concerning Provision of United States Government Military Supplies for Post-War Armed Forces of Foreign Nations" dated March 21, 1946, and classified also top secret as SWNCC 202/2, there is a statement about the authorization conferred upon the President of the United States to acquire and retain bases in the Philippines for the mutual protection of the Philippine Islands and the United States. The same document, therefore, concludes:

It can, therefore, be said that there is an obligation to aid the armed forces of the Philippines by making available to them United States military supplies not only for their security but also for the security of the United States. In addition, it is essential that measures be taken to insure peace and order in the Philippines following the granting of complete independence on July 4, 1946.<sup>9</sup>

These citations from government documents of the United States indicate that policies had already formulated for the defense of the security of the Philippines

as part of the military policy of the United States. There were also other considerations involved on political and economic grounds. The United States wanted to make sure that the Philippines survived as a free nation and economically, it desired that the Philippines be able to maintain a viable republican government on a sound economic foundation.

This concern by the United States for the Philippines has been viewed in two different perspectives. One, such a relationship was based on imperialism and has been labelled "neo-colonialism." The other term used for a different view is "special relationship."

According to the first point of view,

Filipinos . . . tend to see themselves as members of a society, subject for over three centuries, which was the first among Asian societies to coalesce in a nationalist movement and, after a prolonged struggle, achieve independence. This independence was compromised, however, by arrangements accepted in the environment of uncertainty which attended the transfer of power after World II, or which were accepted under duress as the emergence of Communist China promised a hostile international environment.<sup>10</sup>

This lingering colonial complex was not only external in its character, that is, superimposed by a dominant superpower, but it was in fact due to character of the Filipino himself. In the words of the late Senator Claro M. Recto, one of the most respected intellectuals among political leaders of his day: <sup>11</sup>

Our peculiar situation has been heightened by the unique circumstances in which we attained

our independence. The other liberated Asian nations have been spared the ambiguities under which we labor; they faced issues that were clear-cut; blood and tears, exploitation and subjugation, and centuries of enmity divided the Indonesians from the Dutch, the Indians and the Burmese from the British, the Vietnamese from the French; and their nationalist victories were not diluted by sentiments of gratitude, or by regrets, doubts, and apprehensions.

But an intensive and pervasive cultural colonization, no less than an enlightened policy of gradually increasing autonomy, dissolved whatever hatreds and resentments were distilled in the Filipino-American war, and, by the time of the enactment of the Jones Law, promising independence upon the establishment of a stable government, an era of goodwill was firmly opened. . . . The vicissitudes and triumphs of the common struggle against the Japanese Empire completed the extraordinary structure, and it was not at all strange or unexpected that, when our independence was finally proclaimed, it was not so much an act of separation, as one of "more perfect union."

This first interpretation of the relationship between the Philippines and the United States is extremely critical of the security arrangements between the two countries, for it looks upon such arrangements merely as an excuse for the United States to continue to exercise control or surveillance upon a former colony in the pursuit of its own objectives of national interest. In the first twenty years of the existence of the Republic of the Philippines, this was not the popular nor the official view of such relations. In the late sixties and in the

early seventies, this has increasingly been the popular view and is also reflected in official statements by leading statesmen of the Philippines, especially by its leader, President Ferdinand Marcos. The net result of this position has been called a policy of self-reliance.

A second interpretation of Philippine-American relations is one labelled "special relationship." In one sense, this relationship connotes the emotional interplay between the two countries which stretches back over more than half a century -- a relationship which started with a degree of hostility in the conflict over the annexation of the Philippines by the United States but which gradually developed into one of mutual trust until it was finally cemented by the sharing of common hardships and sacrifices occasioned by World War II.

This special relationship in terms of geography, history, ideology, and economic assistance is evidenced in the military alliance which guarantees Philippine security buttressed by economic assistance. But with the years, American national interests in Southeast Asia (which includes the Philippines) have changed.

Although President Nixon made the following pledge:

. . . Our bilateral treaties with Japan, the Republic of China, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea remain the touchstone of regional stability. Similarly, our multilateral security pacts -- ANZUS and SEATO -- have made a valued contribution peace. They have been and will be honored.<sup>12</sup>

He also expressed the hope

. . . that we can initiate a new era in Phil-



ippine-American relations, not returning to the old special relationships because the winds of change have swept away these factors, but building a new relationship, a new relationship that will be based on mutual trust, on mutual respect, on mutual confidence, on mutual cooperation.<sup>13</sup>

The "winds of change" did, indeed, sweep over Asia. The seventies brought about changing great power relations, a changing context for minor-power policies, changing military power relationships, changing economic power relationships, and changing moral-political relationships.

The result of these changes was the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine, which in 1969

. . . sought to induce allies of the United States to assume a larger share of the burden of providing for their own security and for the economic development of the developing nations. It proposed a partnership between Western Europe and Japan befitting their increased economic power. It also sought to cross the barriers separating the United States from its principal adversaries, the Soviet Union and China, to reach agreements that would moderate past differences and open areas for cooperation. Its objective was to create and expand pressure groups within the societies on both sides that would have a vested interest in diminishing the risk of war and promoting constructive cooperation.<sup>14</sup>

The Nixon doctrine has been elaborated to mean that so far as the Southeast Asian nations are concerned.<sup>15</sup>

1. The United States will maintain its treaty commitments, but it is anticipated that Asian nations will be able to handle their own defense problems, perhaps with

some outside material assistance but without outside manpower. Nuclear threats are another matter, and such threats will continue to be checked by counterpoised nuclear capacity.

2. As a Pacific power, the United States will not turn its back on nations of the Western Pacific and Asia; the countries of that region will not be denied a concerned and understanding ear in this Nation.

3. The United States will avoid the creation of situations in which there is such great dependence on us that, inevitably, we become enmeshed in what are essentially Asian problems and conflicts.

4. To the extent that material assistance may be forthcoming from the United States, more emphasis will be placed on economic help and less on military assistance.

5. The future role of the United States will continue to be significant in the affairs of Asia. It will be enacted, however, largely in the economic realm and on the basis of multilateral cooperation.

6. The United States will look with favor on multilateral political, economic, and security arrangements among the Asian nations and, where appropriate, will assist in efforts which may be undertaken thereunder.

In effect, therefore, containment in its classic form is no longer a viable doctrine in that part of the world because (1) American withdrawal from South Vietnam has created a serious blow to American credibility in complying with its alliance commitment; (2) the Nixon doctrine with its ambiguities raises the idea that Asians must assume more responsibility for their own defense;

(3) since containment policy in Southeast Asia was aimed at the People's Republic of China, the recent understandings and relaxation of tensions between that country and the United States have certainly put that policy into disrepute and questionable utility; (4) the Asian nations themselves do not seem to agree that Peking is a threat to their security and such an agreement is an indispensable condition for the success of policies modeled on European-type containment; (5) Asian nations perceive that the United States is unlikely to succeed in arousing a high level of fear among them about China unless Peking behaves in a manner more threatening to them collectively and individually; (6) nationalism is a divisive force in Asia with which the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic will have to contend; and (7) the real problem of the United States is the potential rise of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes in Asia, other than containing Communism.<sup>16</sup>

The reaction of the Philippines to the changed environment relative to relations with the U.S. was articulated by President Marcos in summary form as follows:<sup>17</sup>

1. The Mutual Defense Pact between the U.S. and the Philippines does not require the former to defend the latter against attack by other states. Rather American action depends on the will of the United States Congress. Thus, the commitments of Presidents Eisenhower and Johnson are not binding, nor would those of President Ford have any substance unless explicitly underwritten by Congressional legislation.

2. Ironically, although American forces cannot be relied upon to defend the Philippines,

the latter's forces would be required to defend American forces if attacked in the Philippines.

3. The existence of American forces in the Philippines are a provocation to China and Vietnam, as well as to the Soviet Union.

It is the view of President Marcos, therefore, that security arrangements with the United States "are apparently dependent on the mood of the U.S. during any historical period." Because of this uncertainty, Marcos pointed out that:<sup>18</sup>

The United States must understand we cannot wait until events overtake us. We reserve the right to make our own accommodations with the emerging realities in Asia. . . . I do ask, with all the sincerity of trusted friends, whether the bases have not outlived their usefulness, whether they have not lived beyond their appointed task. I do ask whether our Mutual Defense Treaty in the light of Indo-China has not become a dead letter.

This statement marks a considerable departure in the direction of Philippine foreign policy as observed by George E. Taylor:<sup>19</sup>

The Filipinos . . . went along with all the major developments of U.S. policy in Asia. They accepted both economic and military aid, refused to recognize Communist China, allowed American forces to remain on Philippine soil, sent troops to fight in Korea, sponsored the Manila Charter, joined SEATO, spoke up for democratic ideals and hopes at Bandung, and in general stood firmly by their former guardian and present ally.

As for U.S. military bases, Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo recently pointed out

the negative aspects of U.S. military bases:

In the world emerging in Asia, U.S. bases have these negative effects on the new Philippine foreign policy. First, they tend to retard our hopes for accommodations with the communist powers in Asia. Second, they diminish our credibility with our Southeast Asian neighbors as well as with many non-aligned countries, with whom we are trying to forge new and stronger links.<sup>20</sup>

Besides the changing context of Philippine-American "special relations" in terms of U.S. national interests and policies which resulted in U.S. military withdrawal from South Vietnam, the Sino-American rapprochement, and the emergence of Japan as a regional power, there were other factors which affected that special relations. First, there was the termination of the Laurel-Langley Agreement of 1955, superseding the Bell Trade Act of 1946, on July 3, 1974. With it ended the whole system of preferential trade as well as the parity clause in the Philippine Constitution which permitted Americans to invest in the Philippines on terms equal to Filipino citizens but denied other foreign investors. This meant that there would be no more charges of neo-colonial impositions by the United States upon the Philippines and a movement towards a more normal third-country relationship.

Recent events have shown Philippine accommodation to what it refers to as the emerging realities of the world environment. Diplomatic relations have been established between the People's Republic of China and more recently, on June 1, 1976, diplomatic relations were established with the Soviet Union.

In terms of alliance theory, what does this all add up to considering this background of special relations between the United States and the Philippines? What are the prospects of the alliance between these two countries? What are the alternatives open to the Philippines?

Prospects of the Alliance. The general considerations involving U.S. policy of containment has already been discussed as it affects the alliance between the Philippines and the United States. Perhaps the second theoretical consideration that is involved at this point is the theory of balance of power.

In Asia, containment is actually a reaffirmation of the strategic principle that no single continental power was to be permitted to conquer or dominate the nation-state. The theoretical formulation of this idea is best stated by Hans Morgenthau who concluded that

. . . underlying the confusions, reversals of policy, and moralistic generalities of our Asiatic policy since McKinley, one can detect a consistency that reflects, however vaguely, the permanent interest of the United States in Asia. And this interest is again the maintenance of the balance of power. . . . However unsure the United States has been in its Asiatic policy, it has always assumed that the domination of China by another nation would lead to so great an accumulation of power as to threaten the security of the United States.<sup>21</sup>

This balance or pattern of power, the central feature of which was the conflict between the Sino-Soviet bloc and the American alliance system, apparently existed in Asia and the Pacific in the 1950's. But there are

signs that this pattern of power is disintegrating in the seventies. Instead of a bipolar pattern, there are signs that there may be a multi-power pattern that will emerge with four powers dominating the Asian scene: the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Japan. The development of this multi-power arrangement in Asia and the Pacific may well result in a diminished community of interest among the partners of the American alliances in the Pacific. In the opinion of Hedley Bull, this means the decay of the American alliance system in the Pacific.

Not only has there been a change in the power pattern in Asia, but tremendous advances in war technology such as nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and mobile forces have created shifts in military thinking that most certainly will affect the status of the American-Philippine alliance.

For the United States, the potential use of nuclear weapons for an all-out war may have created untenable demands from commitments undertaken in the defense of its allies threatened by nuclear destruction. For nations allied to the United States there continually exists the threat of nuclear destruction simply because they are allies of the U.S. The small nations, particularly, have reason to think that while their alliance with the United States has some advantages, there exists at least one disadvantage: that such a relationship will involve them in nuclear conflicts not of their own making. Since small nations have relatively little power to influence changes in the international environment, they become helpless

pawns in the conflicts generated by great powers. Henry Kissinger eloquently makes a case for the impact of nuclear weapons upon alliances:

Nowhere are the dilemmas of the nuclear age more apparent than in the attempt to construct a system of alliances against Soviet aggression. It reveals once more the problem of establishing a relationship between a policy of deterrence and the strategy we are prepared to implement, between the temptation to pose a maximum threat and the tendency to recoil before it. In our alliance policy, these problems are compounded by the vulnerability of our allies and the sense of impotence produced because they are either junior partners in the atomic race or excluded from it altogether. Moreover, we have never been clear about the strategy behind our alliance policy -- whether we mean to defend our allies against invasion or whether we rely on an over-all strategy superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc to defeat aggression. To us this choice may represent a strategic option; to our allies it appears as a matter of life and death.<sup>22</sup>

Deterrence is another concept inextricably involved with alliances. Generally, deterrence is defined as simply persuading one's opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits.

The chief purpose of the over-all alliance structure set up by the United States since the end of World War II was to surround the Soviet periphery with a system of alliances so that an attack upon any part of it will always confront the aggressor with an alignment of powers which would make him hesitate to strike. The concept of deterrence, however, has some weaknesses which thereby undermine the alliance system. Again, as Kissinger points



out,

As long as our strategic doctrine threatens to transform every war into an all-out war, our allies will not only be reluctant to make a military effort of their own; they will also seek in most issues likely to be in dispute, to keep us from running major risks ourselves.<sup>23</sup>

Moreover, as Kissinger emphasizes, the acid test of an alliance is its ability to achieve agreement on two related problems -- whether a given challenge represents aggression, and, if so, what form resistance should take.

Linked to alliance systems is the existence of overseas bases to deter aggression. Bases, however, also have the disadvantage of high vulnerability as pointed out by Albert Wohlstetter in "The Delicate Balance of Terror." <sup>24</sup>

But perhaps the most crucial factor that should be taken into consideration insofar as the alliance between the Philippines and the United States is concerned is the gradual change in the opinion involving the strategic importance of the Philippines. The acquisition of the Philippines provided the United States with a commercial and military avenue to the Orient. At the conclusion of World War II, Dwight Eisenhower asserted that anyone can see the importance of the Philippines as a Pacific air center.<sup>25</sup> In March, 1949, General Douglas MacArthur stated that:

Now the Pacific has become an Anglo-Saxon lake and our line of defense runs through the chain of islands fringing the coast of Asia. It starts from the Philippines and continues through the Ryukyus archipelago, which includes

its broad main bastion. Then it bends back through Japan and the Aleutian Island chain to Alaska.<sup>26</sup>

Lately, however, the views about the strategic usefulness of the Philippines to the United States are being challenged. An Asian scholar, Bernard K. Gordon, recommends that:<sup>27</sup>

. . . an unsentimental approach to U.S.-Philippine relations, despite the many historic and friendly ties between the two countries, would require that full weight be given to the deteriorating politico-economic environment in the Philippines as well as the relative non-involvement of the Philippines in wider Asian affairs. Logic based on these considerations leads in one direction for U.S. policy: it suggests that there is not wholly persuasive evidence on which to base the belief that the U.S. will continue automatically to regard the security of the Philippines as a vital U.S. national interest.

As for U.S. military bases in the Philippines, they were regarded as high-priority candidates for reduction or elimination and relatively poor prospects in either use or size in a Rand study.<sup>28</sup>

There is also the view that in defending Philippine interests in Southeast Asia, the United States might get embroiled in larger conflicts, especially in the light of its commitments. Besides this consideration, the following reasons have been advanced as to why the United States should withdraw from its Philippine bases before it may be required to do so:

First, is the nature of our commitment to the Filipinos themselves, especially under Nixon Doctrine modifications. We are not com-

committed to operating bases in the Philippines until 1991; we merely have the right to do so.

Second, if the Philippines develops the capability to defend itself against conventional attack, as is our stated objective, then U.S. forces would have no local defense responsibilities. Consequently our own strategic concerns could dictate the positioning of U.S. combat forces in the Pacific, and we would be free to effect a strategically sound and economical consolidation into an interior position.

Third, U.S.-Philippine relations are reaching a crucial period; and the volatile political situation there, coupled with the lack of bases that could be considered absolutely vital to our Pacific presence might simply make it in our best interests to leave.<sup>29</sup>

There is one other important aspect of U.S. policy which has a crucial impact upon the existing alliance between the United States and the Philippines. This is the U.S. policy of detente with the US3R and the People's Republic of China. Began early in the Administration of President Nixon, this series of diplomatic initiatives called detente has led to major shifts in the posture of the United States toward the nations of the communist world. Meaning literally, as a relaxation of tensions, detent has brought about a thawing of relations with mainland China, with some of the European satellite countries, and most particularly with the Soviet Union.

The policy of detente has been articulated in a number of policy statements. On April 10, 1975, President

Gerald Ford mentioned détente during an address before a joint session of Congress:

The United States and the Soviet Union share an interest in lessening tensions and building a more stable relationship. During this process we have never had any illusions.

We know that we are dealing with a nation that reflects different principles and is our competitor in many parts of the globe. Through a combination of firmness and flexibility, the United States in recent years laid the basis of a more reliable relationship founded on mutual interest and mutual restraint. But we cannot expect the Soviet Union to show restraint in the face of the United States' weakness or irresolution. As long as I am President America will maintain its strength, its alliances and its principles as a prerequisite to a more peaceful planet. As long as I am President, we will not permit detente to become a license to fish in troubled waters. Detente must be and I trust will be a two-way relationship.<sup>30</sup>

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger testified on September 19, 1974, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on U.S. relations with Communist countries. His testimony included the following words about detente:

Detente is admittedly far from a modern equivalent to the kind of stable peace that characterized most of the 19th century. But it is a long step away from the bitter and aggressive spirit that has characterized so much of the post-war period.<sup>31</sup>

In the light of the U.S. policy of détente, the Philippines has also undertaken steps in order to establish friendly relations with Communist countries, particularly Soviet Russia and the People's Republic of China.

On June 9, 1975, the Philippines and the People's

Republic of China decided upon mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. In a joint communique issued on that day, the two governments declared that the difference between the economic, political, and social systems between the two countries should not constitute an obstacle to peaceful coexistence and the establishment of peaceful and friendly relations in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality, and mutual benefit. The two governments also agreed to settle all disputes by peaceful means on the basis of the preceding principles without resorting to the use or threat of force.<sup>32</sup>

In the same communique, the two governments agreed that all foreign aggression and subversion and all attempts by any country to control any other country or to interfere in its internal affairs are to be condemned. They stated their opposition to any attempt by any country or group of countries to establish hegemony or create spheres of influence in any part of the world.

As a result of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the Philippine government announced the termination of all existing official relations between the Philippines and Taiwan.

More recently, the Philippines established diplomatic relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on June 2, 1976. Both governments affirmed that the relations between the USSR and the Philippines shall be

based on the principles of peaceful coexistence: mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.<sup>33</sup>

In a joint Soviet-Philippine statement, it was also announced that the two countries signed a trade agreement that would provide a framework for the expansion of trade between the two countries on an equitable and mutually beneficial basis. The two countries also pronounced themselves in favor of initiating scientific and technical cooperation between the USSR and the Republic of the Philippines, and in this connection expressed their intention to promote exchanges of scientists and postgraduate students, and to widen contacts between research organizations and institutions of the two countries.<sup>34</sup>

The two countries also emphasized the importance of cultural exchanges in promoting mutual understanding and friendship between the peoples of the two countries and agreed to encourage further the development of contacts in the fields of culture, education and sports.

Both the Soviet Union and the Philippines, in the joint statement, attached great importance to the strengthening of peace and stability in Asia and declared the determination of each of them to facilitate in every possible way the further relaxation of tensions in the region and the creation of conditions for making Asia a continent of peace, freedom, and constructive international cooperation.

In the joint statement the two countries pronounced

themselves in favor of bringing about general and complete disarmament, covering nuclear as well as conventional weapons. They also denounced imperialism and colonialism in all their forms and manifestations.

The Philippines was the last nation in the Far East to establish diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia.

In the light of these developments discussed above, what are the alternatives left to the Philippines?

Alternatives to Alliance. -- The Philippines might exercise the option to continue its alliance relationship with the United States. The United States still considers the Philippines important as an ally. On June 24, 1975, Assistant Secretary of State Philip C. Habib declared that:

In security matters, the Philippines has traditionally been one of our closest and most important treaty allies in East Asia. The defense commitments and mutual security interests of both countries are formally embodied in long-standing agreements. We have military bases in the Philippines, the existence of which is important both for Philippine defense and for broader security interests of the United States. <sup>35</sup>

In the negotiations now going on in Washington, D.C. over U.S. military bases in the Philippines, the view has been expressed that the United States intends to retain the bases in that country.

In the hearings on Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976 before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the United States Senate, Lt. Gen. H. M. Fish, Director of

the Defense Security Assistance Agency, testified that the United States has an important military interest in the Philippines because of its strategic location.<sup>36</sup> In the same hearings, the Honorable Carlyle E. Maw, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance and the Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, chairman of the subcommittee on appropriations had the following colloquy:<sup>37</sup>

#### PHILIPPINE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Senator INOUE: According to the press reports, the President of the Philippines is suggesting that his country is to take full control of the bases we have at Clark and the Pacific Bay.

What will happen to the grant and material assistance programs?

Mr. MAW. Negotiations are about to begin. As you know, we have enjoyed very important bases in the Philippines, but they are not tied together with the military assistance and development programs as a quid pro quo. The entire relationship is now, of course, under study with regard to the bases.

Senator INOUE. Has the United States received formal communication of the proposal of the President of the Philippines?

Mr. MAW. No. I think that all of this is in the newspapers.

In the same hearings mentioned above, there is also the following table which appears as part of the appendix to the hearings:<sup>38</sup>



TRANSFERS OF U.S. RESOURCES TO

Philippines

(In Thousands of Dollars)

	FY 1974 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1975 <u>Estimated</u>	FY 1976 <u>Proposed</u>
<u>Total of All U.S. Resources Transferred</u>	90,230	89,765	106,513
<u>Military Assistance (Sub-total)</u>	26,814	31,002	58,177
Military Assistance Program	15,981	21,000	20,350
MAAG's Mission & Military Groups:			
Military Department Support	1,113	1,002	927
Excess Defense Articles	1,120	2,000	19,500
Foreign Military Credit Sales	8,600	7,000	17,400
<u>Economic Assistance (Sub-total)</u>	60,542	56,276	45,739
Agency for International Development			
Food Production and Nutrition	21,464	39,171	20,700
Population Planning and Health	21,194	5,615	14,700
Education & Human Resources			
Development	274	50	100
Security Supporting Assistance	544	157	-
Public Law 480	16,714	10,927	10,129
International Narcotics Control	352	356	110
<u>Other Assistance (Sub-total)</u>	2,883	2,487	2,597
Peace Corps	2,543	2,115	2,183
Mutual Education & Cultural	340	372	414
Exchange			

The most cursory reading of the table on page 265 will show that there is a substantial increase in the total amount representing the value of all U.S. resources transferred to the Philippines during the period from 1974 to 1976. The total amount proposed for the fiscal year 1976, in terms of all U.S. resources transferred to the Philippines, is \$106,513,000, compared to a total amount of \$90,230,000 for the fiscal year 1974.

The same table shows a consistent increase in the total amount appropriated for military assistance. For the fiscal year 1976, the total amount proposed for military assistance to the Philippines by the United States, is \$58,177,000 compared to a total amount of only \$26,814,000 for the fiscal year 1974.

On the other hand, there appears to be a decline in the amounts designated for economic assistance to the Philippines by the United States. The total amount proposed for the fiscal year 1976 is \$45,739,000 compared to a total amount of \$60,542,000 actually appropriated for the fiscal year 1974. Perhaps the most dramatic decrease in appropriations designated for a specific purpose is the one for international narcotics control. For the fiscal year 1974, the amount of \$352,000 was actually appropriated for that item, while for the fiscal year 1976, only the amount of \$110,000 is proposed to be appropriated.

Appropriations for the Peace Corps have also been trimmed by Congress as it appears in the preceding table, while the amount appropriated for mutual education and cultural exchange has been substantially increased for 1976.

Justification for the 1977 development assistance program for the Philippines in AID's proposed fiscal year 1977 budget, was premised by Arthur Z. Gardiner, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia, Agency for International Development, among other things, on the following:

Primarily because of inflation, real wages in the Philippines have decreased steadily since 1970; today the purchasing power of the wage earner is about 65% of what it was in 1970. Seventy percent of all Filipinos live in the countryside. Although they account for 50% of total employment, they produce only one-third of the net domestic product. While the World Bank figures show an average per capita income of around \$270, real per capita income of much of the rural population is substantially below this figure. In recent years, the government has become increasingly aware of the disparity between urban and rural well-being and has channelled more and more effort into narrowing it. Our aid has attempted to support this policy.<sup>39</sup>

Gardiner also pointed out in his statement that agricultural production has not kept pace with the high 2.9% population growth rate and the Philippines has had to import rice, its major food crop, in all but three of the last seventy-five years. It is not surprising, therefore, that:

Largely as a reflection of imbalances in domestic food crops, deficiencies in distribution, and the poverty accompanying low per capita agricultural productivity, daily consumption averages only 1.673 calories against the recommended minimum of 2.260 calories.<sup>40</sup>

With the continued assistance of the United States the Philippines may hope to alleviate the effects of the foregoing problems -- problems which the Philippines has been trying to cope with for a long time. The other serious problems that the Philippines may have to contend with, if it decides to forego the status quo and seek other alternatives, are domestic insurgencies occasioned by uprisings of Communist groups like the Hukbalahaps and other similar organizations and the Muslim separatist movement in Southern Philippines.

These are the internal or domestic conditions that the Philippines will have to contend with if it decides to go it alone in a policy of self-reliance. Or the Philippines may opt for membership in the Asian collective security system proposed by Brezhnev in a speech to the June 1969 international Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties. As further elucidated by Kosygin on March 14, 1972, on the occasion of the visit of the prime minister of Afghanistan, Abdul Zahir, to Moscow, the proposal meant:

Measures taken by Asian states to ensure collective security in that area would contribute to the consolidation of peace in Asia. A system of collective security in Asia could be based on such principles as renunciation of the use of force in the settlement of issues in disputes between states, peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, and the development of mutually advantageous cooperation, that is principles which fully comply with the United Nations Charter and are in no way directed against any state.<sup>41</sup>

Kosygin's idea of collective security was further elaborated upon by Brezhnev about six days later with a slightly more detailed statement of principles:

- Collective security in Asia, as we see it, should be based on the principles of renunciation of the use of force in relations between states, respect for sovereignty and inviolability of borders, non-interference in internal affairs, the broad development of economic and other cooperation, on the basis of complete equality of rights and mutual benefits.<sup>42</sup>

Despite Soviet advocacy and efforts to suggest a growing tide of support for the collective security proposal, there appears to be no Asian government that has shown willingness to endorse it. One writer has suggested that in fact there does not appear to be much of a future in Southeast Asia for Soviet-style "collective security." <sup>43</sup>

Another alternative for the Philippines would be to place reliance upon the ASEAN for future security protection. ASEAN is a five-member Association of South-East Asian Nations, founded in 1967 by Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Since its organization, ASEAN has achieved a limited amount of economic cooperation among the members and bilateral military arrangements among the members to combat the Communist insurgencies and upgrade their armed forces.

ASEAN's major diplomatic initiative is the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of November 1971 calling for the neutralization of Southeast Asia as a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality, free from any form or manner

of interference by outside powers"--the neutrality to be recognized by the great powers.

As conceived by Malaysia the neutralization of all of Southeast Asia, including Indochina, would be an arrangement under which the great powers (PRC, USSR, USA, perhaps Japan) would follow policies of noninterference in the affairs of the region and the regional states would refuse to involve themselves in the rivalries and conflicts of the great powers. Within the neutralized zone the Southeast Asian states would devise mechanisms for the peaceful accommodation of regional conflict so as to exclude external intervention, while on the global level the great powers would offer guarantees against the involvement of Southeast Asia in the international power struggle. Ultimately the exclusion of foreign political-military influence in Southeast Asia would require termination of military agreements with external powers and the adoption of an equidistant political stance towards the great powers expressed collectively on vital matters of security.<sup>44</sup>

Insofar as the major powers are concerned, they have reacted cautiously toward neutralization and none appears ready to take the lead in securing its implementation. In relation to the United States, neutralization as viewed within the overall perspective of the Nixon Doctrine, it appeared that:

. . . before the U.S. treaty structure could be replaced by neutralizations, progress must be made toward stabilizing the balance of forces in Indochina, containment of the guerrilla threat throughout the region, and successful normalization of relations between the non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia and China and the Soviet Union (and probably also North Vietnam).<sup>45</sup>

For the Philippines, neutralization as an alternative policy must come to grips with its need for continued U.S. economic assistance and private investment and concern over the Communist insurgency in Luzon and the Muslim rebellion in Mindanao and Sulu:

The most pressing security problem in the Philippines is the Moro insurgency. In central Mindanao, Zamboanga, and the Sulu Archipelago, the Marcos government is faced with what seems to be an irreconcilable challenge. As Manila is forced to utilize more and more of its military assets in meeting the secessionist threat in the south, the United States as its resupplier becomes increasingly important. Already one discerns an effort on Manila's part to use the American desire for the Philippine link in its off-shore strategic stance as a lever for US aid.<sup>46</sup>

Or the Philippines may choose the alternative of non-alignment which has been used to describe the foreign policy of a state which tries to preserve its independence and secure its internal stability without adhering to a military bloc or relying upon armed intervention, at need and by prior agreement, of one of the major military powers. For a region, the test of non-alignment would require the withdrawal of all foreign troops and bases, the total exclusion bloc military pacts, and dependence upon purely regional security arrangements.<sup>47</sup>

There are some reasons why the Philippines may consider non-alignment as a policy: continuing areas of disagreement with the U.S. over the exact status of bases; the continuing controversy over jurisdiction over American troops stationed in the islands; the new

diplomatic and trade relations with Russia and the People's Republic of China; and a large measure of agreement with the non-aligned powers in the United Nations.

When all of this has been considered by the Philippines, it might also consider the recent tendency of the People's Republic of China to consolidate its friendly relations with the United States. Alastair Buchan writes that there are indications that China would be unhappy at the prospect of total American withdrawal from the western Pacific.<sup>48</sup> Buchan also asserts that:

There is, moreover, some evidence to suggest that China would not wish to see a complete abrogation of American responsibilities in the area from her fear of the added freedom of action it would give to the Soviet Union, Japan and India. . . . Indeed as far as the fourth area of Asia, the Pacific region, is concerned one can say that the continuation of the American alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and even in the short run Taiwan is almost a condition of good Sino-American relations, since Peking still has residual fears of an irredentist and nuclear Japan, or of increased Soviet manoeuvring in relation to the smaller powers.<sup>49</sup>

The Philippines may then look to the example of China as it ponders what alternatives are open to it in lieu of an alliance with the United States. The status quo might still be the best alternative open to the Philippines.



## NOTES

## CHAPTER VIII

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## CHAPTER IX

### CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

In the short space accorded to this study of an alliance, it is not possible to bring in all the material that has been accumulated in order to show the evolution, operation, and future prospects of an alliance between a small power and a superpower -- the Philippines and the United States.

The nature of that alliance is replete with historic, geographic, ideological, and economic overtones and undertones. By reason of that alliance, the United States has committed itself to the defense of the Philippines if the latter is attacked by external forces of whatever origin, and until the formal demise of the SEATO, the United States shall join with the Philippines and several other countries in mutual defense against external attack and internal subversion. The alliance which informally started in 1947 with the conclusion of the Military Bases Agreement and more formally with the Treaty of Mutual Defense in 1951 and the 1954 Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty has survived several tempestuous years in which the alliance relationship has been less than harmonious.

On the basis of that relationship, the Philippines had steadfastly linked its foreign policy with the United States:

It accepted both economic and military aid, refused to recognize Communist China, allowed American forces to remain on Philippine soil, sent troops to fight in Korea, sponsored the Pacific Charter, promoted SEATO, spoke up for democratic ideals and hopes at Bandung, and in general stood firmly by its former guardian and ally.

In spite of that closeness with which that alliance was characterized in the external relations of both countries, the internal relations were full of discord and friction. The existence of military bases on Philippine territory, or on any territory whatsoever of foreign troops, would have caused irritations; but in the case of the relations between the Philippines and the United States, the failure of the United States to come to terms with rational Philippine demands for respect for its independence resulted in the creation of bad feeling on both sides. Not all of this is the fault of the Philippines. The testimony of one of America's most respected diplomats, Charles "Chip" Bohlen who had served as U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines is worth repeating here:

One of the sharper contrasts in my new job was the fact that the greatest obstacle to better relations were not in the foreign government but in Washington. My main occupation in Manila was dealing with problems arising from three important bases, Clark Field for the Air Force and Subic Bay and Sangley Point for the Navy. My negotiations on the bases and other questions were entirely with the Foreign Minister, Felixberto Serrano. I attempted to extract from the United States government, over the opposition of some members of Congress and the

Pentagon, a change in the bases agreement of 1946. Under the arrangement, crimes committed by American servicemen off, as well as on, base were tried by the United States military courts, not by the Philippine courts. I strived constantly to persuade the Pentagon of the long-term desirability of giving the Filipinos the same jurisdiction over crimes on their land that other countries where we had bases enjoyed. I did not get very far, however. There seemed to be an almost hysterical fear, particularly in Congress, of letting Americans be tried by systems of justice not in conformity with ours. I have often wondered whether servicemen felt the same way because a Philippine court would probably hand down much lighter sentences than American military tribunals.<sup>2</sup>

It has hurt many Filipinos to feel that on the eve of its independence, for example

. . . American policy appeared to emphasize not the rehabilitation of the Philippine economy so as to strengthen the foundations of an important ally in Southeast Asia, but rather the protection and promotion of American strategic and economic interests.<sup>3</sup>

The Americans led by Ambassador Paul V. McNutt, "seemed to be more interested in securing parity rights for the Americans and ensuring American control of the greatest possible number of military bases." There is no question that in the minds of many Filipinos:

. . . that they are involved with Americans in an unequal partnership. Although it may be true that a genuine partnership can exist only between equals, it is nevertheless possible to establish a relationship between unequals that does not require



mendicant subservience as the inevitable complement of overwhelming power. The unequal partnership becomes tolerable to Filipinos only if a deliberate emphasis on partnership serves to redress -- and obscure -- the basic inequality.<sup>4</sup>

Basic to all this weakness in the alliance relationship is the psychological feeling of lack of mutual respect between the two partners -- a feeling that is perhaps understood better by the Filipino and less by the American partner. For the Filipino, the explicit statements of commitments to come to the aid of the Philippines by the United States in case of war or aggression have a historic as well as psychological foundation of long-standing relations rooted in adversity and war. In fact, it has been stressed over and over again that

The essential ingredient in such a relationship is mutual respect, which has nothing to do with the arrogance of the strong or the insolence of the weak, but with the honest recognition of the true interests of each and of the various ways in which these interests fall together and coincide.<sup>5</sup>

Former Philippine Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez, therefore, argues in the same vein that:

Only the deliberate cultivation of the interests common to both peoples can keep Philippine-American friendship alive and strong. The condition for the cultivation of such common interests is the determination of both peoples to observe the rule of mutual respect . . . in their relations with each other. It is easy to establish mutual respect between nations equal in power and influence; between a great nation and a small one a feeling of consideration is needed to redress the balance

and to create the condition necessary for mutual respect.<sup>6</sup>

In the joint communique issued at Manila on December 7, 1975, on the occasion of the visit of President and Mrs. Gerald R. Ford of the United States at the invitation of President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines, the two Presidents welcomed the opportunity to renew the bonds of friendship between the two nations and to review the status of their alliance in the light of changing circumstances in the Pacific region.<sup>7</sup> Both countries affirmed that sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of all states are fundamental principles which both countries scrupulously respect.

They also confirmed the mutual respect for the dignity of each nation which characterizes their friendship as well as the alliance between the two countries.

The presidents of both countries agreed that in the field of economic and commercial relations, it was timely to conclude a new agreement on trade, investment, and related matters.

They also declared that in the field of security cooperation, that the alliance between the United States and the Philippines is not directed against any country, but is intended to preserve the independence and promote the welfare of their two peoples, while at the same time contributing to peace and progress to all.

Both presidents also agreed that the Treaty of Mutual Defense of August 30, 1951, enhanced the defense of both countries, strengthened the security of the Paci-

fic region and contributed to the maintenance of world peace. The joint communique also stressed the agreement of both presidents that the military bases used by the United States in the Philippines remain important in maintaining an effective United States presence in the Western Pacific in the support of these mutual objectives.

In the light of negotiations now being conducted by both countries on the subject of United States use of Philippine military bases, both presidents agreed that they should be conducted in the clear recognition of Philippine sovereignty.

President Marcos pointed out that he wanted to attain self-reliance for the Philippines and that it was his policy not to allow introduction of foreign ground troops into the Philippines for its defense except as a last resort. President Ford expressed support for these policies and indicated that the United States intended to continue to provide assistance to the Philippines within the framework of available resources.

The communique ends on the note of reaffirmation to their commitment to continue close association on all matters of mutual concern and that the ties between the Philippines and the United States remain strong and mutually beneficial.

This study has tried to show the evolution, course, and future of the alliance between the United States and the Philippines within the framework of an alliance between a small power and a great power. Such an alliance was necessitated by history, economics, geography, and ideology, as well as the rendition of economic and mili-

tary assistance by the superpower to the small power.

In the alliance between the United States and the Philippines, the superpower made impositions by virtue of its role as a leader in international affairs, a role that was indicated by the rise of Soviet Russia as a global power with a doctrinal mission of expanding Communist ideology all over the world. Such a role was determined by its leaders and policymakers. In document after document we see how the United States fostered the policy of containment and its complementary policy of alliances in order to prevent the expansion of Communist ideology. Such a policy of containment and alliances impelled the inclusion of the Philippines in the plans of the United States in the establishment of military bases around the periphery of the Soviet empire in order to deter Communist expansion through force or subversion.

The relations between the United States and the Philippines were defined by formal treaties and agreements which in the course of the life of the alliance the Philippines considered onerous and burdensome. Not only during the operations of the alliance, but during the negotiations that led to the conclusion of the agreements the Philippines formidably interposed arguments intended to protect Philippine sovereignty and independence. It was not only vital to the Philippines that its territorial integrity be secured by formal treaties of alliance, but that psychologically its status and prestige as a free, independent nation should be respected at all times.

Diplomacy and public revelations of its positions in the negotiations between the two countries were the most potent weapons in the arsenal of the small power in order to secure advantages from the superpower. The governmental machinery before martial law which allowed members of the legislative body to participate in discussions involving foreign policy crystallized many of the issues surrounding diplomatic relations between the United States and the Philippines. After martial law, the location and centralization of power on one man has allowed the ease and rapidity of conducting diplomacy between the two nations. Whether this will eventually mean the better machinery, only time will tell.

The value of this study is that investigations of the foreign relations between nations, especially between the United States and the Philippines is greatly facilitated by the availability of documentary material which otherwise has been classified either secret, top secret, or confidential. The availability of these materials to the industrious researcher has always been considered invaluable in investigations of which this study is one, but that very few researchers consider the time well spent.

In the end, because this investigation is made up to a large extent of research material, the words of George E. Taylor display a perceptiveness and sensitivity as to how the Philippines and the United States should conduct themselves toward one another and are therefore quoted because of their striking relevance to the study:

The partnership between Americans and Filipinos is confirmed by written commitments, but its character and effectiveness depend on the quality of human relationships. The present and prospective military arrangements between the two governments, whether open or confidential, are of little significance to the discussion of mutual security. The really important questions concern the values, attitudes, and purposes of the Philippine and American governments and people. If these change, then everything else changes. The most heavily armed bases in the world are useless if they are surrounded by hostile population. The most powerful of allies is a liability if it cannot be trusted to fulfill its obligations. A discussion of mutual security, therefore, is really about mutual understanding and confidence. That is why it is essential to raise questions that bring to the fore, the political, intellectual, and social trends of the two societies. There is no security unless there are mutual interests.<sup>8</sup>

Observations in Search of a Conceptual Framework. --

The alliance between the United States and the Philippines evolved by reason of a long historic relationship between the two countries. The historic relationship and the perceptions by the United States of its role as a power in the Pacific region compelled that country to exercise dominant power initiatives in the formulation, negotiation, and conclusion of agreements that were based on overriding considerations of national interests and national objectives. If the national interests and objectives of the Philippines

were ever considered by the United States, they were either ignored or blithely swept aside because of the dominant power's need for the fulfillment of its own policy objectives in its role as a power in the Southeast area. This investigation, however, shows how valiantly the Philippines tried to protect its national integrity and utilized diplomacy with great skill when negotiating with the great power.

When we consider the motivations that theoretically compel a small power to enter into an alliance with a great power like security, prestige, domestic stability, economic aid and military assistance, and ideology, we find that we have to strain our resources to indicate that these were concrete considerations that played a powerful role in the construction of an alliance between the Philippines in the United States. By this, it is meant that they were considerations that were consciously pursued by the Philippines in its relationship with the United States. On the other hand, these considerations appear to have been pursued in one way or another by the Philippines in dealing with the more powerful partner, the United States. Security and domestic stability were major considerations in the establishment of the alliance. Economic aid and military assistance

were inevitable because of the destruction and devastation visited upon the Philippines as a result of World War II. Ideology was a powerful motivation in the alliance because the Philippines was a democratic experiment of the United States in the Far East. When the Philippines linked its foreign policy to the United States, it was not only because the security of the Philippines could not be divorced from that of the United States, but because to some extent the democratic experiment had resulted in the extension of the American frontier to the Far East in the Philippine model. Prestige was sought by the Philippines as a reason for the alliance, because as stated by President Roxas, other nations would even pay for any kind of relationship with the United States. However, Philippine prestige suffered by reason of the alliance because Asian nations and other great powers like Soviet Russia looked at this relationship simply as an example of American imperialism or neo-colonialism. Also when dealing with the United States, the Philippines felt its prestige challenged in many ways by the patronizing attitude of U.S. negotiators or officials. The record shows that the Philippines was actually successful in many instances of protecting its prestige in the eyes of the



United States and that of other nations.

By reason of its geographic location, the Philippines will still figure prominently in U.S. strategic thinking and policies. Whether it will be beneficial for the Philippines to move away from its alignment with the United States, is a question that the elites or the leaders of that country will have to consider in the light of two major considerations. If the United States needs its bases in the Philippines in order to maintain its military and strategic posture in the Pacific, then the U.S. will be amenable towards continuing as well as increasing its military assistance to the Philippines for the indefinite future. On the other hand, if by reason of its relationship the Philippines constantly faces the threat of aggression or attack because of the presence of U.S. military bases in Philippine territory, then the Philippines will have to take a very strong assessment of its position in the light of its shattering experience of World War II. The Philippines cannot afford to be another battleground when the elephants of the world start not only their fighting but also their lovemaking. Because when elephants fight or make love, the grass suffers.

## NOTES

## CHAPTER IX

1. George E. Taylor, "The Challenge of Mutual Security," in The American Assembly, The United States and the Philippines (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 72.

2. Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History 1929-1969 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1973), pp. 451-452.

3. Salvador P. Lopez, "The Colonial Relationship," in The United States and the Philippines, op. cit., p. 29.

4. Ibid., p. 30.

5. Ibid., p. 31.

6. Quoted in David Wurfel, "Problems of Decolonization," in The United States and the Philippines, op. cit., p. 173.

7. Joint Communique Issued at Manila, December 7, The Department of State Bulletin, LXXIII:1905 (December 29, 1975), pp. 925-926.

8. George Taylor, op. cit., p. 93.

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## Appendix "A"

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES  
PERTAINING TO THE UNITED STATES MILITARY  
AND NAVAL BASE SYSTEM IN THE PHIL-  
IPPINES TO BE USED AS A BASIS  
FOR DETAILED DISCUSSIONS  
AND STAFF STUDIES

1. The principle is agreed that the fullest and closest military cooperation will be observed between the U.S. and the Philippine Government and the military plans of the U.S. and the Philippine Government for the Philippine area will be closely integrated in order to ensure the full and mutual protection of the U.S. and the Philippines.
2. The military forces of the U.S. will be accorded free access to, and the movement between, ports, U.S. bases, and U.S. installations in Philippines, by land, sea, and air.
3. Military and Naval aircraft of the U.S. will be allowed to operate without restriction into and from U.S. bases and over surrounding territory. U.S. forces will be allowed to enter and depart from the Philippines, including territorial waters, at will.
4. The U.S. will have the right to import free of duty, materiel, equipment, and supplies requisite to the improvement, maintenance, operation, and defense of U.S. bases.
5. The U.S. will have the right to maintain such personnel as may be requisite for the operations and defense of bases and facilities.
6. Pending development of the detailed plan, the U.S. will retain all sites which were held by the U.S. Army as military reservations on 7 December 1941 and by the U.S. Navy except at Cavite and will be accorded rights to sites

in the localities shown on the attached Appendix.

7. The U S. will have the right to retain, or to exchange for sites listed in paragraph 6 above, those sites wherein are located bases, installations, or facilities which have been or may be developed in the course of the present war, to acquire additional sites and to acquire such sites in the future as may be required by changes in the means and methods of warfare, including the development of new weapons. The U.S. will have the right to acquire sites and install, maintain and operate thereon, the required communication and navigation facilities and radar installations.

8. The U.S. will retain U.S. military cemeteries and sites of historical significance to the U.S. in the Philippines.

9. Consideration will be given to Filipino participation in certain U.S. bases and vice versa as indicated by the military situation.

10. No nation other than the U.S. or the Philippines is to be permitted to establish or make use of any bases in the Philippines without the prior agreement of both the U.S. and Philippine Governments.

Agreed to May 14, 1945

Harry Truman  
S[ergio] Osmeña

[Annex]

AREAS IN THE PHILIPPINES IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES  
MAY DESIRE THE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH BASES, AS  
SUBMITTED BY THE WAR DEPARTMENT

Designation	Location	Designation	Location
Del Carmen	Luzon	San Jose	Mindoro
Tarlac	Luzon	Surigao	Mindanao

San Marcelino	Luzon	Del Monte (Cagayan)	Mindanao
Laoag	Luzon	Daluagan (Impasugong)	Mindanao
Tuguegarao	Luzon	Dipolog	Mindanao
San Miguel Bay	Luzon	Davao	Mindanao
Aparri	Luzon	Sarangani Island	Mindanao
Polillo	Luzon	Tawi Tawi	Sulu Archipelago
Sorsogon	Luzon	Siminul Island	Sulu Archipelago
Puerto Princesa	Palawan	Leyte Gulf	Leyte-Samar
Balabac Island	Palawan	Guimaras Strait	Panay-Negros
Coron Bay	Palawan	Mactan	Cebu

Attached also was a list entitled "Areas in the Philippines in which the United States May Desire the Right to Establish Bases, as Submitted by the Navy Department." These areas are the following:

- Tutu Bay (Jolo)
- Tawi Tawi
- Balabac Island
- Leyte-Samar (Leyte Gulf area)
- Guimaras Strait-Iloilo Strait Area
- Mactan Island (off Cebu)
- Coron Bay
- Subic Bay (Luzon)
- Sarangani Island (Mindanao)
- Sorsogon (Luzon)
- San Miguel Bay (Luzon)
- Polillo (Luzon)
- Aparri (Luzon)
- Puerto Princesa (Palawan)

Appendix "B"

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES  
AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
CONCERNING MILITARY BASES.  
Signed at Manila, March 14, 1947.

*Note:* The Agreement was concurred in by the Senate, S.R. No. 29, March 26, 1947. The Philippine Instrument of ratification was signed by the President, January 21, 1948. It entered into force, March 26, 1947.

*Reference:* This Agreement is also published in I DFA TS No. 2, p. 144; 43 UNTS 271 and TIAS 1775.

WHEREAS, the war in the Pacific has confirmed the mutuality of interest of the Republic of the Philippines and of the United States of America in matters relating to the defense of their respective territories and that mutuality of interest demands that the Governments of the two countries take the necessary measures to promote their mutual security and to defend their territories and areas;

WHEREAS, the Governments of the Republic of the Philippines and of the United States of America are desirous of cooperating in the common defense of their two countries through arrangements consonant with the procedures and objectives of the United Nations, and particularly through a grant to the United States of America by the Republic of the Philippines in the exercise of its title and sovereignty, of the use, free of rent, in furtherance of the mutual interest of both countries, of certain lands of the public domain;

WHEREAS, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines has requested United States assistance in providing for the defense of the Philippines and in developing for such defense effective Philippine armed forces;

WHEREAS, pursuant to this request the Government of the United States of America has, in view of its interest in the welfare of the Philippines, indicated its intention of dispatching a military mission to the Philippines and of extending to her appropriate assistance in the development of the Philippine defense forces;

WHEREAS, a Joint Resolution of the Congress of the United States of America of June 29, 1944, authorized the President of the United States of America to acquire bases for the mutual protection of the Philippines and of the United States of America; and

WHEREAS, Joint Resolution No. 4 of the Congress of the Philippines, approved July 28, 1945, authorized the President of the Philippines to negotiate with the President of the United States of America for the establishment of bases provided for in the Joint Resolution of the Congress of the United States of America of June 29, 1944, with a view to insuring the territorial integrity of the Philippines, the mutual protection of the Philippines and the United States of America, and the maintenance of peace in the Pacific;

THEREFORE, the Governments of the Republic of the Philippines and of the United States of America agree upon the following terms for the delimitation, establishment, maintenance and operation of military bases in the Philippines:

#### *Article I*

#### GRANT OF BASES

1. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as the Philippines) grants to the Government of the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the United States) the right to retain the use of the bases in the Philippines listed in Annex A attached hereto.

2. The Philippines agrees to permit the United States, upon notice to the Philippines, to use such of those bases listed in Annex B as the United States determines to be required by military necessity.

3. The Philippines agrees to enter into negotiations with the United States at the latter's request, to permit the United States to expand such bases, to exchange such bases for other bases, to acquire additional bases, or relinquish rights to bases, as any of such exigencies may be required by military necessity.

4. A narrative description of the boundaries of the bases to which this Agreement relates is given in Annex A and Annex B. An exact description of the bases listed in Annex A, with metes and bounds, in conformity with the narrative descriptions, will be agreed upon between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments as soon as possible. With respect to any of the bases listed in Annex B, an exact description with metes and bounds, in conformity with the narrative description of such bases, will be agreed upon if and when such bases are acquired by the United States.

*Article II*

## MUTUAL COOPERATION

1. It is mutually agreed that the armed forces of the Philippines may serve on United States bases and that the armed forces of the United States may serve on Philippine military establishments whenever such conditions appear beneficial, as mutually determined by the armed forces of both countries.

2. Joint outlined plans for the development of military bases in the Philippines may be prepared by military authorities of the two Governments.

3. In the interest of international security any bases listed Annexes A and B may be made available to the Security Council of the United Nations on its call by prior mutual agreement between the Philippines and the United States.

*Article III*

## DESCRIPTION OF RIGHTS

1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the rights, power and authority within the bases which are necessary for the establishment, use, operation and defense thereof or appropriate for the control thereof and all the rights, power and authority within the limits of territorial waters and air space adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to provide access to them, or appropriate for their control.

2. Such rights, power and authority shall include, *inter alia*, the right, power and authority:

(a) to construct (including dredging and filling), operate, maintain, utilize, occupy, garrison and control the bases;

(b) to improve and deepen the harbors, channels, entrances and anchorages, and to construct or maintain necessary roads and bridges affording access to the bases;

(c) to control (including the right to prohibit) in so far as may be required for the efficient operation and safety of the bases, and within the limits of military necessity, anchorages, moorings, landings, takeoffs, movements and operation of ships and water-borne craft, aircraft and other vehicles on water, in the air or on land comprising or in the vicinity of the bases;



(d) the right to acquire, as may be agreed between the two Governments, such rights of way, and to construct thereon, as may be required for military purposes, wire and radio communications facilities, including submarine and subterranean cables, pipe lines and spur tracks from railroads to bases, and the right, as may be agreed upon between the two Governments to construct the necessary facilities;

(e) to construct, install, maintain, and employ on any base any type of facilities, weapons, substance, device, vessel or vehicle on or under the ground, in the air or on or under the water that may be requisite or appropriate, including meteorological system, aerial and water navigation lights, radio and radar apparatus and electronic devices, of any desired power, type of emission and frequency,

3. In the exercise of the above-mentioned rights, power and authority, the United States agrees that the powers granted to it will not be used unreasonably or, unless required by military necessity determined by the two Governments, so as to interfere with the necessary rights of navigation, aviation, communication, or land travel within the territories of the Philippines. In the practical application outside the bases of the rights, power and authority granted in this Article there shall be as the occasion requires, consultation between the two Governments.

#### Article IV

#### SHIPPING AND NAVIGATION

1. It is mutually agreed that United States public vessels operated by or for the War or Navy Departments, the Coast Guard or the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and the military forces of the United States, military and naval aircraft and Government-owned vehicles, including armor, shall be accorded free access to and movement between ports and United States bases throughout the Philippines, including territorial waters, by land, air and sea. This right shall include freedom from compulsory pilotage and all toll charges. If, however, a pilot is taken, pilotage shall be paid for at appropriate rates. In connection with entrance into Philippine ports by United States public vessels appropriate notification under normal conditions shall be made to the Philippine authorities.

2. Lights and other aids to navigation of vessels and aircraft placed or established in the bases and territorial waters adjacent thereto or in the vicinity of such bases shall conform to the system in use in the Philippines. The position, characteristics and any alterations in the lights or other aids shall be communicated in advance to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines.

3. Philippine commercial vessels may use the bases on the same terms and conditions as United States commercial vessels.

4. It is understood that a base is not a part of the territory of the United States for the purpose of coastwise shipping laws so as to exclude Philippine vessels from trade between the United States and the bases.

#### Article V

#### EXEMPTION FROM CUSTOMS AND OTHER DUTIES

No import, excise, consumption or other tax, duty or impost shall be charged on material, equipment, supplies or goods, including food stores and clothing, for exclusive use in the construction, maintenance, operation or defense of the bases, consigned to, or destined for, the United States authorities and certified by them to be for such purposes.

#### Article VI

#### MANEUVER AND OTHER AREAS

The United States shall, subject to previous agreement with the Philippines, have the right to use land and coastal sea areas of appropriate size and location for periodic maneuvers, for additional staging areas, bombing and gunnery ranges, and for such intermediate airfields as may be required for safe and efficient air operations. Operations in such areas shall be carried on with due regard and safeguards for the public safety.

**Article VII****USE OF PUBLIC SERVICES**

It is mutually agreed that the United States may employ and use for United States military forces any and all public utilities, other services and facilities, airfields, ports, harbors, roads, highways, railroads, bridges, viaducts, canals, lakes, rivers and streams in the Philippines under conditions no less favorable than those that may be applicable from time to time to the military forces of the Philippines.

**Article VIII****HEALTH MEASURES OUTSIDE BASES**

It is mutually agreed that the United States may construct, subject to agreement by the appropriate Philippine authorities, wells, water catchment areas or dams to insure an ample supply of water for all base operations and personnel. The United States shall likewise have the right, in cooperation with the appropriate authorities of the Philippines, to take such steps as may be mutually agreed upon to be necessary to improve health and sanitation in areas contiguous to the bases, including the right, under such conditions as may be mutually agreed upon, to enter and inspect any privately owned property. The United States shall pay just compensation for any injury to persons or damage to property that may result from action taken in connection with this Article.

**Article IX****SURVEYS**

It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right, after appropriate notification has been given to the Philippines, to make topographic, hydrographic, and coast and geodetic surveys and aerial photographs in any part of the Philippines and waters adjacent thereto. Copies with title and triangulation data of any surveys or photomaps made of the Philippines shall be furnished to the Philippines.

**Article X****CEMETERIES AND HISTORICAL SITES**

1. The United States shall have the right to retain and maintain such United States military cemeteries and such sites of historical significance to the United States as may be agreed upon by the two Governments. All rights, power and authority in relation to bases granted under this Agreement shall be applicable, in so far as appropriate, to the cemeteries and sites mentioned in this Article.

2. Furthermore, it is recognized that there are certain cemeteries and historical sites in the Philippines revered in the memory of the People of the Philippines and of the United States, and it is therefore fitting that the maintenance and improvement of such memorials be the common concern of the two countries.

**Article XI****IMMIGRATION**

1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right to bring into the Philippines members of the United States military forces and the United States nationals employed by or under a contract with the United States together with their families, and technical personnel of other nationalities (not being persons excluded by the laws of the Philippines) in connection with the construction, maintenance, or operation of the bases. The United States shall make suitable arrangements so that such persons may be readily identified and their status established when necessary by the Philippine authorities. Such persons, other than members of the United States armed forces in uniform, shall present their travel documents to the appropriate Philippine authorities for visas, it being understood that no objection will be made to their travel to the Philippines as non-immigrants.

2. If the status of any person within the Philippines and admitted thereto under the foregoing paragraph shall be altered so that he would no longer be entitled to such admission, the United States shall notify the Philippines and shall, if such person be required to leave the Philippines by the latter Government, be responsible for providing

him with a passage from the Philippines within a reasonable time, and shall in the meantime prevent his becoming a public responsibility of the Philippines.

#### Article XII

#### INTERNAL REVENUE TAX EXEMPTION

1. No member of the United States armed forces, except Filipino citizens, serving in the Philippines in connection with the bases and residing in the Philippines by reason only of such service, or his dependents, shall be liable to pay income tax in the Philippines except in respect of income derived from Philippine sources.

2. No national of the United States serving in or employed in the Philippines in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defense of the bases and residing in the Philippines by reason only of such employment, or his spouse and minor children and dependent parents of either spouse, shall be liable to pay income tax in the Philippines except in respect of income derived from Philippine sources or sources other than the United States sources.

3. No person referred to in paragraph 1 and 2 of this Article shall be liable to pay to the Government or local authorities of the Philippines any poll or residence tax, or any import or export duty, or any other tax on personal property imported for his own use; provided that privately owned vehicles shall be subject to payment of the following only: when certified as being used for military purposes by appropriate United States authorities, the normal license plate fee; otherwise, the normal license plate and registration fees.

4. No national of the United States, or corporation organized under the laws of the United States, resident in the United States, shall be liable to pay income tax in the Philippines in respect of any profits derived under a contract made in the United States with the Government of the United States in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation and defense of the bases, or any tax in the nature of a license in respect of any service or work for the United States in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation and defense of the bases.

## Article XIII

JURISDICTION<sup>1</sup>

1. The Philippines consents that the United States shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over the following offenses:

(a) Any offense committed by any person within any base except where the offender and offended parties are both Philippine citizens (not members of the armed forces of the United States on active duty) or the offense is against the security of the Philippines;

(b) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of the United States in which the offended party is also a member of the armed forces of the United States; and

(c) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of the United States against the security of the United States.

2. The Philippines shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over all other offenses committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of the United States.

3. Whenever for special reasons the United States may desire not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to it in paragraphs 1 and 6 of this Article, the officer holding the offender in custody shall so notify the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) of the city or province in which the offense has been committed within ten days after his arrest, and in such a case the Philippines shall exercise jurisdiction.

4. Whenever for special reasons the Philippines may desire not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to it in paragraph 2 of this Article, the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) of the city or province where the offense has been committed shall so notify the officer holding the offender in custody within ten days after his arrest, and in such a case the United States shall be free to

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<sup>1</sup>Amended by an Agreement dated August 10, 1965.

exercise jurisdiction. If any offense falling under paragraph 2 of this Article is committed by any member of the armed forces of the United States

(a) while engaged in the actual performance of a specific military duty, or

(b) during a period of national emergency declared by either Government and the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) so finds from the evidence, he shall immediately notify the officer holding the offender in custody that the United States is free to exercise jurisdiction. In the event the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) finds that the offense was not committed in the actual performance of a specific military duty, the offender's commanding officer shall have the right to appeal from such finding to the Secretary of Justice within ten days from the receipt of the decision of the fiscal and the decision of the Secretary of Justice shall be final.

5. In all cases over which the Philippines exercises jurisdiction the custody of the accused, pending trial and final judgment, shall be entrusted without delay to the commanding officer of the nearest base, who shall acknowledge in writing that such accused has been delivered to him for custody pending trial in a competent court of the Philippines and that he will be held ready to appear and will be produced before said court when required by it. The commanding officer shall be furnished by the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) with a copy of the information against the accused upon the filing of the original in the competent court.

6. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, it is mutually agreed that in time of war the United States shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any offenses which may be committed by members of the armed forces of the United States in the Philippines.

7. The United States agrees that it will not grant asylum in any of the bases to any person fleeing from the lawful jurisdiction of the Philippines. Should any such person be found in any base, he will be surrendered on demand to the competent authorities of the Philippines.

8. In every case in which jurisdiction over an offense is exercised by the United States, the offended party may institute a separate civil action against the offender in the proper court of the Philippines to enforce the civil liability which under the laws of the Philippines may arise from the offense.

#### Article XIV

### ARREST AND SERVICE OF PROCESS

1. No arrest shall be made and no process, civil or criminal, shall be served within any base except with the permission of the commanding officer of such base; but should the commanding officer refuse to grant such permission he shall (except in cases of arrest where the United States has jurisdiction under Article XIII) forthwith take the necessary steps to arrest the person charged and surrender him to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines or to serve such process, as the case may be, and to provide the attendance of the server of such process before the appropriate court in the Philippines or procure such server to make the necessary affidavit or declaration to prove such service as the case may require.

2. In cases where the service courts of the United States have jurisdiction under Article XIII, the appropriate authorities of the Philippines will, on request, give reciprocal facilities as regards the service of process and the arrest and surrender of alleged offenders.

#### Article XV

### SECURITY LEGISLATION

The Philippines agrees to take such steps as may from time to time be agreed to be necessary with a view to the enactment of legislation to insure the adequate security and protection of the United States bases, equipment and other property and the operations of the United States under this Agreement, and the punishment of persons who may contravene such legislation. It is mutually agreed that appropriate authorities of the



two Governments will also consult from time to time in order to insure that laws and regulations of the Philippines and of the United States in relation to such matters shall, so far as may be possible, be uniform in character.

#### Article XVI

#### POSTAL FACILITIES

It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right to establish and maintain United States post offices in the bases for the exclusive use of the United States armed forces; and civilian personnel who are nationals of the United States and employed in connection with the construction, maintenance, and operation of the bases, and the families of such persons, for domestic use between United States post offices in the bases and between such post offices and other United States post offices. The United States shall have the right to regulate and control within the bases all communications within, to and from such bases.

#### Article XVII

#### REMOVAL OF IMPROVEMENTS

1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right to remove or dispose of any or all removable improvements, equipment or facilities located at or on any base and paid for with funds of the United States. No export tax shall be charged on any material or equipment so removed from the Philippines.

2. All buildings and structures which are erected by the United States in the bases shall be the property of the United States and may be removed by it before the expiration of this Agreement or the earlier relinquishment of the base on which the structures are situated. There shall be no obligation on the part of the Philippines or of the United States to rebuild or repair any destruction or damage inflicted from any cause whatsoever on any of the said buildings or

structures owned or used by the United States in the bases. The United States is not obligated to turn over the bases to the Philippines at the expiration of this Agreement or the earlier relinquishment of any bases in the condition in which they were at the time of their occupation, nor is the Philippines obliged to make any compensation to the United States for the improvements made in the bases or for the buildings or structures left thereon, all of which shall become the property of the Philippines upon the termination of the Agreement or the earlier relinquishment by the United States of the bases where the structures have been built.

#### *Article XVIII*

#### **SALES AND SERVICES WITHIN THE BASES**

1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right to establish on bases, free of all licenses; fees; sales, excise or other taxes, or imposts; Government agencies, including concessions, such as sales commissaries and post exchanges, messes and social clubs, for the exclusive use of the United States military forces and authorized civilian personnel and their facilities. The merchandise or services sold or dispensed by such agencies shall be free of all taxes, duties and inspection by the Philippine authorities. Administrative measures shall be taken by the appropriate authorities of the United States to prevent the resale of goods which are sold under the provisions of this Article to persons not entitled to buy goods at such agencies and, generally, to prevent abuse of the privileges granted under this Article. There shall be cooperation between such authorities and the Philippines to this end.

2. Except as may be provided in any other agreements, no person shall habitually render any professional services in a base except to or for the United States or to or for the persons mentioned in the preceding paragraph. No business shall be established in a base, it being understood that the Government agencies mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall not be regarded as businesses for the purposes of this Article.

two Governments will also consult from time to time in order to insure that laws and regulations of the Philippines and of the United States in relation to such matters shall, so far as may be possible, be uniform in character.

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It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right to establish and maintain United States post offices in the bases for the exclusive use of the United States armed forces, and civilian personnel who are nationals of the United States and employed in connection with the construction, maintenance, and operation of the bases, and the families of such persons, for domestic use between United States post offices in the bases and between such post offices and other United States post offices. The United States shall have the right to regulate and control within the bases all communications within, to and from such bases.

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2. All buildings and structures which are erected by the United States in the bases shall be the property of the United States and may be removed by it before the expiration of this Agreement or the earlier relinquishment of the base on which the structures are situated. There shall be no obligation on the part of the Philippines or of the United States to rebuild or repair any destruction or damage inflicted from any cause whatsoever on any of the said buildings or

**Article XIX**  
**COMMERCIAL CONCERNS**

It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right, with the consent of the Philippines, to grant to commercial concerns owned or controlled by the citizens of the Philippines or of the United States such rights to the use of any base or facility retained or acquired by the United States as may be deemed appropriate by both Governments to insure the development and maintenance for defense purposes of such bases and facilities.

**Article XX**  
**MILITARY OR NAVAL POLICE**

It is mutually agreed that there shall be close cooperation on a reciprocal basis between the military and naval police forces of the United States and the police forces of the Philippines for the purpose of preserving order and discipline among United States military and naval personnel.

**Article XXI**  
**TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS**

1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall retain the right to occupy temporary quarters and installations now existing outside the bases mentioned in Annex A and Annex B, for such reasonable time, not exceeding two years, as may be necessary to develop adequate facilities within the bases for the United States armed forces. If circumstances require an extension of time, such a period will be fixed by mutual agreement of the two Governments; but such extension shall not apply to the existing temporary quarters and installations within the limits of the City of Manila and shall in no case exceed a period of three years,

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Port of Manila reservation with boundaries as of 1941 will be available for use to the United States armed forces until such time as other arrangements can be made for supply of the bases by mutual agreement of the two Governments.

3. The terms of this Agreement pertaining to bases shall be applicable to temporary quarters and installations referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article while

they are so occupied by the armed forces of the United States; provided, that offenses committed within the temporary quarters and installations located within the present limits of the City of Manila shall not be considered as offenses within the bases but shall be governed by the Provisions of Article XIII, paragraphs 2 and 4, except that the election not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to the Philippines shall be made by the Secretary of Justice. It is agreed that the United States shall have full use and full control of all these quarters and installations while they are occupied by the armed forces of the United States, including the exercise of such measures as may be necessary to police said quarters for the security of the personnel and property therein.

#### *Article XXII*

#### CONDEMNATION OR EXPROPRIATION

1. Whenever it is necessary to acquire by condemnation or expropriation proceedings real property belonging to any private persons, associations or corporations located in bases named in Annex A and Annex B in order to carry out the purposes of this Agreement, the Philippines will institute and prosecute such condemnation or expropriation proceedings in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The United States agrees to reimburse the Philippines for all the reasonable expenses, damages and costs thereby incurred, including the value of the property as determined by the Court. In addition, subject to the mutual agreement of the two Governments, the United States will reimburse the Philippines for the reasonable costs of transportation and removal of any occupants displaced or ejected by reason of the condemnation or expropriation.

2. Prior to the completion of such condemnation or expropriation proceedings, in cases of military necessity the United States shall have the right to take possession of such property required for military purposes as soon as the legal requisites for obtaining possession have been fulfilled.

3. The properties acquired under this Article shall be turned over to the Philippines upon the expiration of this Agreement, or the earlier relinquishment of such properties, under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by the two Governments.

**Article XXIII****CIVIL LIABILITY**

For the purpose of promoting and maintaining friendly relations by the prompt settlement of meritorious claims, the United States shall pay just and reasonable compensation, when accepted by claimants in full satisfaction and in final settlement, for claims, including claims of insured but excluding claims of subrogees, or account of damage to or loss or destruction of private property, both real and personal, or personal injury or death of inhabitants of the Philippines, when such damage, loss, destruction or injury is caused by the armed forces of the United States, or individual members thereof, including military or civilian employees thereof, or otherwise incident to non-combat activities of such forces; provided that no claim shall be considered unless presented within one year after the occurrence of the accident or incident out of which such claim arises.

**Article XXIV****MINERAL RESOURCES**

All minerals (including oil), and antiquities and all rights relating thereto and to treasure trove, under, upon, or connected with the land and water comprised in the bases or otherwise used or occupied by the United States by virtue of this Agreement, are reserved to the Government and inhabitants of the Philippines; but no rights so reserved shall be transferred to third parties, or exercised within the bases, without the consent of the United States. The United States shall negotiate with the proper Philippine authorities for the quarrying of rock and gravel necessary for construction work on the bases.

**Article XXV****GRANT OF BASES TO A THIRD POWER**

1. The Philippines agrees that it shall not grant without prior consent of the United States, any bases

or any rights, power, or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases, to any third power.

2. It is further agreed that the United States shall not, without the consent of the Philippines, assign, or underlet, or part with the possession of the whole or any part of any base, or of any right, power or authority granted by this Agreement, to any third power.

#### *Article XXVI*

#### DEFINITION OF BASES

For the purposes of this Agreement, bases are those areas named in Annex A and Annex B and such additional areas as may be acquired for military purposes pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.

#### *Article XXVII*

#### VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENT OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS

It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right to recruit citizens of the Philippines for voluntary enlistment into the United States armed forces for a fixed term of years, and to train them and to exercise the same degree of control and discipline over them as is exercised in the case of other members of the United States armed forces. The number of such enlistments to be accepted by the armed forces of the United States may from time to time be limited by agreement between the two Governments.

#### *Article XXVIII*

#### UNITED STATES RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS

It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right to enroll and train all eligible United States citizens residing in the Philippines in the Reserve organizations of the armed forces of the United States, which include the Officers Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps, except that prior consent of the Philippines shall be obtained in the case of such persons who are employed by the Philippines or any Municipal or Provincial Government thereof.

Article XXIX

TERM OF AGREEMENT

The present Agreement shall enter into force upon its acceptance by the two Governments and shall remain in force for a period of ninety-nine years subject to extension thereafter as agreed by the two Governments.

Signed in Manila, Philippines, in duplicate this fourteenth day of March, nineteen hundred and forty-seven.

On behalf of the Government of the  
Republic of the Philippines:

MANUEL ROXAS  
President of the Philippines

On behalf of the Government of the  
United States of America:

PAUL V. MCNUTT  
Ambassador Extraordinary and  
Plenipotentiary of the United States  
of America to the Republic of the Philippines.

ANNEX A

Clark Field Air Base, Pampanga.  
Fort Stotsenberg, Pampanga.  
Mariveles Military Reservation, POL Terminal and  
Training Area, Bataan.  
Camp John Hay Leave and Recreation Center, Baguio.  
Army Communication System with the deletion of all  
stations in the Port of Manila Area.  
United States Armed Forces Cemetery No. 2, San Francisco  
del Monte, Rizal.  
Angeles General Depot, Pampanga.  
Leyte-Samar Naval Base including shore installations and  
air bases.  
Subic Bay, Northwest Shore Naval Base, Zambales Province,  
and the existing Naval reservation at Olongapo and  
the existing Baguio Naval Reservation.



Tawi Tawi Naval Anchorage and small adjacent land areas.  
 Cañacao-Sangley Point Navy Base, Cavite Province.  
 Bagobantay Transmitter Area, Quezon City, and associated  
     radio receiving and control sites, Manila Area.  
 Tarumpitao Point (Loran Master Transmitter Station), Palawan.  
 Talampulan Island, Coast Guard No. 354 (Loran), Palawan.  
 Naule Point (Loran Station), Zambales.  
 Castillejos, Coast Guard No. 356, Zambales.

#### ANNEX B

Mactan Island Army and Navy Air Base.  
 Florida Blanca Air Base, Pampanga.  
 Aircraft Service Warning Net.  
 Camp Wallace, San Fernando, La Union.  
 Puerto Princesa Army and Navy Air Base, including Navy  
     Section Base and Air Warning Sites, Palawan.  
 Tawi Tawi Naval Base, Sulu Archipelago.  
 Aparri Naval Air Base.

## APPENDIX "C"

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC  
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE  
TO THE PHILIPPINES. Signed at Manila, March 21, 1947.

*Note:* The Agreement entered into force, March 21, 1947.

*Reference:* This Agreement is also published in I DFA TS No. 2, p. 161 and 45 UNTS, p. 47.

Considering the desire of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to obtain assistance in the training and development of its armed forces and the procurement of equipment and supplies therefor during the period immediately following the independence of the Philippines, considering the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning military bases, signed March 14, 1947, and in view of the mutual interest of the two Governments in matters of common defense, the President of the United States of America has authorized the rendering of military assistance to the Republic of the Philippines towards establishing and maintaining national security and towards forming a basis for participation by that Government in such defensive military operations as the future may require, and to attain these ends the Governments of the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America have agreed as follows:

## TITLE I

## PURPOSE AND DURATION

ARTICLE 1. -- Subject to mutual agreements, the Government of the United States of America will furnish military assistance to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the training and development of armed forces and in the performance of other services essential to the fulfillment of those obligations which may devolve upon the Republic of the Philippines under its international agreements including commitments assumed under the United Nations and to the maintenance of the peace and security of the Philippines, as provided in Title II, Article 6, hereof.

ARTICLE 2. -- This Agreement shall continue for a period of five years from July 4, 1946 unless previously terminated or extended as hereinafter provided.

ARTICLE 3. -- If the Government of the Republic of the Philippines should desire that this Agreement be extended beyond the stipulated period, it shall make a written proposal to that effect at least one year before the expiration of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 4. -- This agreement may be terminated before the expiration of the period of five years prescribed in Article 2, or before the expiration of an extension authorized in Article 3, by either Government, subject to three months' written notice to the other Government.

ARTICLE 5. -- It is agreed on the part of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines that title to all arms, vessels, aircraft, equipment and supplies, expendable items excepted, that are furnished under this Agreement on a non-reimbursable basis shall remain in the United States of America.

## TITLE II

### GENERAL

ARTICLE 6. -- For the purposes of this Agreement the military assistance authorized in Article 1 hereof is defined as the furnishing of arms, ammunition, equipment and supplies; certain aircraft and naval vessels, and instruction and training assistance by the Army and Navy of the United States and shall include the following:

(a) Establishing in the Philippines of a United States Military Advisory Group composed of an Army group, a Navy group and an Air group to assist and advise the Republic of the Philippines on military and naval matters;

(b) Furnishing from United States sources equipment and technical supplies for training, operations and certain maintenance of Philippine armed forces of such strength and composition as mutually agreed upon;

(c) Facilitating the procurement by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines of a military reserve of United States equipment and supplies, in such amounts as may be subsequently agreed upon;

(d) Making available selected facilities of United States Army and Navy training establishments to provide training for key personnel of the Philippine armed forces, under the conditions hereinafter described.

### TITLE III

#### MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP

ARTICLE 7. -- The Military Advisory Group shall consist of such number of United States military personnel as may be agreed upon by the Governments of the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America.

ARTICLE 8. -- The functions of the Military Advisory Group shall be to provide such advice and assistance to the Republic of the Philippines as has been authorized by the Congress of the United States of America and as is necessary to accomplish the purposes set forth in Article 1 of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 9. -- Each member of the Military Advisory Group shall continue as a member of the branch of the armed forces of the United States to which he belongs and serve with that group in the rank, grade or rating he holds in the armed forces of the United States and shall wear the uniform thereof, as provided in current regulations. Officers and enlisted men so detailed are authorized to accept from the Government of the Republic of the Philippines offices and such pay and emoluments thereunto appertaining as may be offered by that Government and approved by the appropriate authorities of the United States, such compensation to be accepted by the United States Government for remittance to the individual if in the opinion of the appropriate authorities of the United States such course appears desirable.

ARTICLE 10. -- Members of the Military Advisory Group shall serve under the direction of the authorities of the United States of America.

ARTICLE 11. -- All members of the Group shall be on active duty and shall be paid regularly authorized pay and allowances by the Government of the United States of America, plus a special allowance to compensate for increased costs of living. This special allowance shall be based upon a scale agreed upon by the Governments of the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America and shall be revised periodically. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall reimburse the Government of the United States of America for the special allowances provided for in this Article. The special allowance shall be applicable for the entire period each member of the group resides in the Philippines on duty with the Group, except as specified elsewhere in this Agreement.

ARTICLE 12. -- The Government of the Republic of the Philippines agrees to extend to the Military Advisory Group the same exemptions and privileges granted by Article V, XII and XVIII of the Agreement Between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America Concerning Military Bases, signed March 14, 1947.

ARTICLE 13. -- Except as may be otherwise subsequently agreed by the two Governments, the expense of the cost of transportation of each member of the Military Advisory Group, his dependents, household effects, and belongings to and from the Philippines shall be borne by the Government of the United States of America to the extent authorized by law. Members of the Group shall be entitled to compensation for expenses incurred in travel in the Republic of the Philippines on official business of the Group and such expenses shall be reimbursed to the Government of the United States of America by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines except for expenses of travel by the transportation facilities of the Group.

ARTICLE 14. -- The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall provide, and defray the cost of, suitable living quarters for personnel of the Military Advisory Group and their families and suitable buildings and office space for use in the conduct of the official business of the Military Advisory Group. All living

and office quarters shall conform to the standards prescribed by the United States military services for similar quarters. Official supplies and equipment of American manufacture required by the Group shall be furnished by the Government of the United States of America which shall be reimbursed for the cost thereof by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Official supplies and equipment of other than American manufacture shall be provided without cost by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The cost of all services required by the Group, including compensation of locally employed interpreters, clerks, laborers, and other personnel, except personal servants, shall be borne by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

ARTICLE 15. -- All communications between the Military Advisory Group and the Republic of the Philippines involving matters of policy shall be through the Ambassador of the United States of America to the Philippines or the Chargé d'Affaires.

ARTICLE 16(a). -- The provisions of Articles XIII and XXI of the Agreement of March 14, 1947 between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America Concerning Military Bases are applicable to the Military Advisory Group, it being agreed that the Headquarters of the Military Advisory Group will be considered a temporary installation under the provisions of Article XXI of the Agreement aforementioned.

(b) The Chief of the Military Advisory Group, and not to exceed six (6) other senior members of the group to be designated by him, will be accorded diplomatic immunity.

#### TITLE IV

##### LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE

ARTICLE 17. -- The decision as to what supplies, services, facilities, equipment and naval vessels are necessary for military assistance shall be made by agreement between the appropriate authorities of the Republic of the Philippines and the United States.

ARTICLE 18 -- Certain initial equipment, supplies and maintenance items shall be furnished gratuitously by the United States in accordance with detailed arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. Additional equipment and supplies other than those surplus to the needs of the United States required in the furtherance of military assistance shall be furnished by the United States subject to reimbursement by the Republic of the Philippines on terms to be mutually agreed upon. All items of arms, munitions, equipment and supplies originating from sources other than those surplus to the needs of the United States shall be furnished only when the requisite funds have been specifically appropriated by the Congress of the United States.

ARTICLE 19. -- The Government of the Republic of the Philippines agrees that it will not relinquish physical possession or pass the title to any and all arms, munitions, equipment, supplies, naval vessels and aircraft furnished under this Agreement without the specific consent of the Government of the United States.

ARTICLE 20. -- Military equipment, supplies and naval vessels necessary in connection with the carrying out of the full program of military assistance to the Republic of the Philippines shall be provided from Philippines and United States sources in so far as practicable and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall procure arms, ammunitions, military equipment and naval vessels from governments or agencies other than the United States of America only on the basis of mutual agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall procure United States military equipment, supplies and naval vessels only as mutually agreed upon.

## TITLE V

### TRAINING ASSISTANCE

ARTICLE 21. -- As part of the program of military assistance the Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall be permitted to send selected students to designated technical and service school of the ground, naval and air services of the United States. Such students

shall be subject to the same regulations as are United States students and may be returned to the Philippines, without substitution, for violation of such regulations. Numbers of students and detailed arrangements shall be mutually agreed upon and shall be kept at a minimum for essential requirements. All Philippine requests for military training of Filipino personnel shall be made to the Government of the United States through the Military Advisory Group.

## TITLE VI

### SECURITY

ARTICLE 22. -- Disclosures and exchanges of classified military equipment and information of any security classification to or between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America will be with the mutual understanding that the equipment and information will be safeguarded in accordance with the requirements of the military security classification established thereon by the originating Government and that no redisclosure by the recipient Government of such equipment and information to their governments or unauthorized personnel will be made without specific approval of the originating Government.

ARTICLE 23. -- So long as this Agreement, or any extension thereof, is in effect the Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall not engage or accept the services of any personnel of any Government other than the United States of America for duties of any nature connected with the Philippine armed forces, except by mutual agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America.



TITLE VII

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Undersigned, duly authorized thereto, have signed this Agreement in duplicate, in the City of Manila, this twenty-first day of March, 1947.

For the Government of the Republic of the Philippines:

MANUEL ROXAS  
*President of the Philippines*

For the Government of the United States of America:

PAUL V. MCNUTT  
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the  
United States of America to the Republic of the Philippines

## APPENDIX "D"

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE  
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The Parties of this Treaty

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area.

Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship which brought their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side-by-side against imperialist aggression during the last war.

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area.

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area.

Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument shall be considered or interpreted as in any way or sense altering or diminishing any existing agreements or understandings between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America.

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I. The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relation from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II. In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE III. The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty and whenever in the opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific.

ARTICLE IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE V. For the purpose of ARTICLE IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific ocean, its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

ARTICLE VI. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VII. This Treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Manila.

ARTICLE VIII. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other party.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth day of August, 1951.

For the Republic of the Philippines:

(SGD.) CARLOS P. ROMULO  
(SGD.) JOAQUIN M. ELIZALDE  
(SGD.) VICENTE J. FRANCISCO  
(SGD.) DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL

For the United States of America:

(SGD.) DEAN ACHESON  
(SGD.) JOHN FOSTER DULLES  
(SGD.) TOM CONNALLY  
(SGD.) ALEXANDER WILEY

## APPENDIX "E"

SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY AND PROTOCOL  
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS  
Signed at Manila September 8, 1954

Treaty and protocol signed at Manila September 8, 1954;  
Ratification advised by the Senate of the United States  
of America February 1, 1955;  
Ratified by the President of the United States of  
America February 4, 1955;  
Ratification of the United States of America deposited  
with the Government of the Republic of the  
Philippines February 19, 1955;  
Proclaimed by the President of the United States of  
America March 2, 1955;  
Entered into force February 19, 1955.

The Parties to this Treaty,

Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the  
Parties,

Reiterating their faith in the purposes and  
principles set forth in the Charter of the United  
Nations and their desire to live in peace with all  
peoples and all governments,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter  
of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of  
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and  
declaring that they will earnestly strive by every  
peaceful means to promote self-government and to  
secure the independence of all countries whose  
peoples desire it and are able to undertake its res-  
ponsibilities,

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and  
freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy,  
individual liberty and the rule of law, and to pro-  
mote the economic well-being and development of all  
peoples in the treaty area,

Intending to declare publicly and formally  
their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor  
will appreciate that the Parties stand together in  
the area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

#### ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

#### ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial and political stability.

#### ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.

#### ARTICLE IV

1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported

to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

#### ARTICLE V

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

#### ARTICLE VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

## ARTICLE VII

Any other State in a position to further the objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

## ARTICLE VIII

As used in this Treaty, the "treaty area" is the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include within the treaty area the territory of any State acceding to this Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change the treaty area.

## ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that government to the other signatories.

2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all of the other signatories of such deposit.

3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to each other State on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.



## ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

## ARTICLE XI

The English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties, but when the Parties have agreed to the French text thereof and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be equally authentic and binding on the Parties.

## UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

FOR AUSTRALIA:

R. G. Casey.

FOR FRANCE:

G. La Chambre

FOR NEW ZEALAND:

Clifton Webb

FOR PAKISTAN:

Signed for transmission to my Government for its consideration and action in accordance with the Constitution of Pakistan.

Zafrulla Khan

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES:

Carlos P. Garcia  
Francisco A. Delgado  
Tomas L. Cabili  
Lorenzo M. Tanada  
Cornelio T. Villareal

FOR THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND:

Wan Waithayakon  
Krommun Naradhip Bongsprabandh

FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND  
NORTHERN IRELAND:

Reading

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

John Foster Dulles  
H. Alexander Smith  
Michael J. Mansfield

PROTOCOL TO THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE  
DEFENSE TREATY

Designation of States and Territory as to which provisions  
of Article IV and Article III are to be applicable

The Parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam.

The Parties further agree that the above mentioned states and territory shall be eligible in respect of the economic measures contemplated by Article III.

This Protocol shall enter into force simultaneously with the coming into force of the Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

FOR AUSTRALIA:

R. G. Casey

FOR FRANCE:

G. La Chambre

FOR NEW ZEALAND:

Clifton Webb

FOR PAKISTAN: Signed for transmission to my Government for its consideration and action in accordance with the Constitution of Pakistan.

Zafrulla Khan

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES:

Carlos P. Garcia  
Francisco A. Delgado  
Tomas L. Cabili  
Lorenzo M. Tanada  
Cornelio T. Villareal

## APPENDIX "F"

CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN RELATIONS

May 1, 1898 - America's Asiatic Fleet under Commodore George Dewey defeats the Spanish naval force in the Battle of Manila Bay.

June 12, 1898 - General Emilio Aguinaldo proclaims independence of the Philippines.

August 13, 1898 - American troops under General Wesley Merritt occupy Manila after a ceremonial battle with the Spanish garrison.

December 10, 1898 - Signing of the Treaty of Paris, under which Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States.

December 21, 1898 - President William McKinley proclaims his policy of "Benevolent Assimilation" of the Philippines.

January 18, 1899 - The Schurman Commission is established to extend American occupation throughout the Archipelago.

February 4, 1899 - Start of the Philippine-American War.

March 23, 1901 - Capture of General Emilio Aguinaldo in Palanan, Isabela.

July 4, 1901 - Establishment of civil government in the Philippines, with William Howard Taft as first civil governor.

October 16, 1907 - Inauguration of the Philippine Assembly.

August 26, 1916 - Enactment of the Jones Law by the U.S. Congress. It provided that as soon as a stable government could be established, independence would be granted. Passage of the Jones Law makes the government of the Philippine practically autonomous.

October 5, 1921 - Leonard Wood becomes governor-general. His opposition toward independence provoked the Cabinet Crisis of 1923, when Filipino members of the cabinet and the Council of State resigned en masse.

January 13, 1932 - Passage of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill by the U.S. Congress, which would grant independence to the Philippines after a 10-year transition period. The Philippine Legislature rejected the Act because of objectionable economic features. Moreover, the Filipino leaders felt that the retention of U.S. military and naval bases after independence would nullify Philippine sovereignty.

March 24, 1934 - President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the Tydings-McDuffie Law, which provide for the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and the granting of independence after a ten-year transition.

November 15, 1935 - Inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, with Manuel L. Quezon as President and Sergio Osmeña Sr. as Vice President.

December 8, 1941 - Japanese planes attack U.S. military installations in Baguio, Davao and Clark Field, starting the Pacific War.

May 6, 1942 - Fil-American forces surrender in Corregidor to the Japanese Imperial Army.

November 3, 1943 - Sen. Millard Tydings introduces Joint Resolution 93 which authorizes the U.S. President with the President of the Philippine Commonwealth "to withhold or to acquire and to retain bases, appurtenances and incidental rights, in addition to those stipulated in the Independence Act..."

October 20, 1944 - General Douglas MacArthur fulfills his promise to return when he and President Sergio Osmeña Sr. land in Leyte with U.S. liberating forces.

October 23, 1944 - The Commonwealth Government headed by President Osmeña is restored at Tacloban, Leyte.

May 24, 1945 - President Osmeña signs an agreement with U.S. President Harry S. Truman permitting the retention or future location of American military and naval bases in 19 provinces in the Philippines.

July 28, 1945 - President Osmeña approves Joint Resolution No. 4 passed by the Philippine Congress, which authorizes the President of the Philippines to negotiate with the President of the United States on the establishment of American bases in the Philippines.

April 30, 1946 - President Harry S. Truman signs the Philippine Rehabilitation Act.

June 26, 1946 - President Truman approves the Philippine Military Assistance Act, which authorizes the training of Philippine military and naval personnel, the maintenance of equipment and the transfer of supplies.

July 3, 1946 - The U.S. Congress passes the Philippine Property Act of 1946, which affirmed the Philippine Independence Act of 1934. It provided that on the proclamation of Philippine independence, all U.S. government property in the Philippines, except for bases and consular or diplomatic establishments, were to be transferred to the Philippine government.

July 4, 1946 - President Truman issues a proclamation recognizing Philippine independence. Inauguration of Manuel A. Roxas and Elpidio Quirino as President and Vice-President of the Philippines. Implementation of the Philippine Trade Act of 1946, which provided for a 28-year framework for bilateral trade until July 3, 1974.

August 8, 1946 - The Philippines signs exclusive purchasing agreements of abaca, copra and coconut oil with the U.S. government. The agreements were terminated on December 3, 1946.

September 11, 1946 - A surplus agreement was signed by President Roxas and the Central Field Commissioner of the Foreign Liquidation Commission authorizing the Philippine President to accept, administer, sell and dispose of surplus property acquired from the United States.

October 22, 1946 - Effectivity of the Treaty of General Relations.

March 12, 1947 - Signing of Military Assistance Agreement, which provides for an integrated training of Philippine forces with the advice of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group. This agreement was renewed in March 1950 to extend to July 4, 1953, and again in June 1953 to extend indefinitely, subject to the provisions of later U.S. mutual defense acts.

March 14, 1947 - President Roxas and Ambassador Paul V. McNutt sign the Military Bases Agreement, to be effective for 99 years. Its 29 articles dealt with both Philippines and U.S. rights and obligations, including sites for the bases.

November 15, 1950 - Signing of the Quirino-Foster Memorandum of Agreement to implement the recommendations of the Bell Mission. (Upon request of President Quirino, President Truman sent an Economic Survey Mission under Daniel Bell to examine and survey all aspects of the Philippine economy.)

August 30, 1951 - Presidents Quirino and Truman sign the Treaty of Mutual Defense, which recognizes that an armed attack against one would be dangerous to the other's peace and security.

June 23, 1954 - The two governments, through an exchange of notes between U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and General Carlos P. Romulo, agrees, pursuant to the provisions of the Philippine-US Mutual Defense Treaty, to form a consultative council.

September 6, 1955 - Signing of the Laurel-Langley Agreement by the Philippine and American governments, following its conclusion by Senator Jose P. Laurel and James M. Langley on December 15, 1954. It goes into effect on January 1, 1956.

July 3, 1956 - President Ramon Magsaysay and U.S. Vice-President Richard M. Nixon discuss in Manila the need to strengthen military bases in the Philippines in order to bolster the common defense.

May 15, 1958 - The two governments agree to establish a Philippine-U.S. Military Defense Board and to assign a Philippine military liaison officer to the staff of the base commander in major U.S. military bases in the Philippines.

June 20, 1958 - Presidents Carlos P. Garcia and Dwight D. Eisenhower issue a joint statement on mutual military and economic matters. The communique clarifies military arrangements through SEATO and the Mutual Defense Treaty, to mean that any armed attack against the Philippines also involves an attack against U.S. forces stationed here.

October 1959 - U.S. Ambassador to Manila Charles E. Bohlen and Foreign Secretary Felixberto M. Serrano sign a Memorandum of Agreement calling for mutual consultations on long-range missile sites, and shortening base leaseholds from 99 years to 25 years with renewal options.

December 7, 1959 - U.S. Charge d'Affaires George M. Abbott sends a note to Foreign Secretary Serrano confirming acceptance by the U.S. government of the relinquishment of the community of Olongapo and certain areas adjacent to it, which are located within the U.S. Naval Base at Subic Bay.

August 30, 1962 - The U.S. Congress passes Public Law 87-616, authorizing the appropriation of \$73 million for the payment of unpaid balance of awards made by the Philippine War Damage Commission under Title I of the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946.

October 24, 1964 - Preliminary negotiations to revise all existing treaties and agreements between the United States and the Philippines. Carlos P. Romulo and US Ambassador Henry Byroade lay down the guidelines for the negotiations, which would center mainly on the military bases and mutual defense pact, the military assistance pact, and possibly the Laurel-Langley Agreement.

March 16, 1965 - The Philippines and the US agree to establish in Baguio a strategic American communication center intended to link directly the Philippines with American bases and military installations in the East and in the Pacific.

May 21, 1965 - Secretary of Foreign Affairs Mauro Mendez and U.S. Ambassador William McCormick Blair reach virtual agreement on the question of jurisdiction in the P.I.-U.S. military bases agreement. After the jurisdiction question Mendez was expected to tackle problems affecting the administration of U.S. bases, including the question of immigration, customs and uses of bases.

December 17, 1967 - An 11-day exploratory talk held in Baguio City from Nov. 21 to Dec. 1, 1967, between representatives of the Philippines and United States government reach agreement on concepts to govern RP-US economic relations after 1974. One area where



a meeting of minds was reached was on the question of parity. The Philippine panel emphasized that the government is committed to the non-extension of parity rights after 1974. It referred to the statement of President Marcos that replies arising from parity are "co-terminous" with the Laurel Langley Agreement. The US panel made it clear that the US will not seek the extension of parity.

August 31, 1971 - The U.S. closes Sangley Point Naval Air Station Bay and turns it over to the Philippine Government. Coast Guard-operated LORAN stations in the Philippines were likewise turned to the Philippine Coast Guard.

November 21, 1972 - The Agency for International Development (AID) grants \$3.2 million to assist the Philippine government in the building of 1,000 three-room, typhoon-resistant schools by July 1974.

August 21, 1972 - The Philippines and the United States agree by an exchange of notes to amend the 1972 Public Law 480 agreement. The amendment covers the sale of 100,000 metric tons of rice valued at \$14,775 thereby increasing the commodity loan for CY 1972 to \$42,623,000.

February 17, 1973 - The Philippine government asks the government of the United States to relinquish a portion of the American naval station at San Antonio, Zambales, for use in the government's rural electrification program.

February 23, 1973 - The Philippine government asks the U.S. to advance its implementation of the Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) to enable Philippine products to enter the United States mainland duty-free or under lower preferential tariff rates. The GSP is a scheme whereby exports of poor countries like the Philippines are given preferential duties (e.g. zero customs duty but up to a certain quota or volume of exports or lower customs duty) by importing rich countries.

May 16, 1973 - The Philippines officially asks the United States to re-negotiate the entire range of their relations in one sitting. Among the outstanding treaties between the two countries are the Military Base Agreement, the Mutual Defense Pact, the Military Assistance Pact, and the Laurel-Langley Agreement. Discussion on extradition between the two countries may precede the package negotiation.

August 22, 1973 - The United States government grants the Philippines a P4.2 million concessional loan for the development of the Tiwi geothermal facility in Tiwi, Albay, as a source of electric power.

April 4, 1974 - An agreement covering an annual US \$2 million outlay to support the US veterans medical care program in the Philippines was signed by Foreign Affairs Secretary Carlos P. Romulo and US Ambassador William H. Sullivan.

May 24, 1974 - President Marcos and Ambassador Sullivan sign an agreement providing \$15 million for the initial phase of waterworks development programs. The loan will provide funding to cover the foreign exchange requirements and a portion of the Philippines' currency needs.

July 5-13, 1974 - A panel of Filipino and American delegations meet to initiate talks on an agreement that would govern economic ties between the Philippines and the United States in the post Laurel-Langley era. The discussions on the drafts submitted by both governments of a proposed bilateral agreement which would replace the Laurel-Langley that expired last July 3, 1974 centered on close, continuous economic relations. The panels also affirmed that the mutually satisfying economic relations between the two countries will continue to function in a productive and harmonious manner until a new framework for this relationship is concluded.

August 10, 1974 - A temporary agreement in the form of an exchange of notes to improve and expand the airline passenger and cargo services between the Philippines and the U.S. was signed by Foreign Affairs Secretary Carlos P. Romulo and US Ambassador Sullivan. The pact provided for a two-phase expansion of Philippine Airlines DC-10 services to daily flights by April 1975, and for parallel expansion of B-747 services by Pan American Airways and Northwest Airlines to 4 flights weekly each.

## APPENDIX "G"

OFFICIAL VISITS TO THE PHILIPPINES AND TO  
THE UNITED STATES

August 1949, President Elpidio Quirino visited Washington

February 1950, President Elpidio Quirino again visited  
Washington

July 1956, Vice President Richard M. Nixon visited Manila

June 1958, President Carlos P. Garcia visited the United  
States

June 1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower visited Manila

October 1964, President Diosdado Macapagal visited  
Washington

September 1966, President Ferdinand E. Marcos visited  
Washington

October 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson visited Manila

July 1969, President Richard M. Nixon visited Manila

December 1969, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew visited Manila

December, 1975, President Gerald Ford visited Manila.

