76-3104

HOUGH, Sandra Jean Wurth, 1938-
A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS FOR PREDICTING INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR: A PERSON-CENTERED PRETHEORY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP--CHARLES DE GAULLE.

The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1975
Political Science, international law and relations

Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

PLEASE NOTE:

Page 272 is not available
for photography.

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS

THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS FOR PREDICTING INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR: A PERSON-CENTERED PRETHEORY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP-- CHARLES DE GAULLE

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

SANDRA JEAN WURTH HOUGH

Norman, Oklahoma

1975

A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS FOR PREDICTING INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR:

A PERSON-CENTERED PRETHEORY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP--

CHARLES DE GAULLE

APPROVED BY

Rufus G. Hall

Paul A. Thayer Jr.

Donald E. Hoard

Joseph M. Foran

John Paul C. Ilmen

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

PREFACE

I doubt. . .that the impetus for writing anything but a textbook can ever be rationalized. Eric Erikson

Ideally, a dissertation is written primarily for the benefit of the researcher, for the experience gained in the exercise of research, and the knowledge which may be acquired not only in the subject matter but the writing process itself. In contrast to a thesis, which is a hypothesis to be defended, the dissertation is expected to be a contribution to knowledge. The topics for such intellectual exercises vary considerably from university to university as well as from discipline to discipline within the university structure and range from the most obscure to topics which reach the zenith of intellectual activity. Due to the stage and state of our profession, most political science dissertations are very specialized. This one is not.

This particular study includes a survey of political leadership - a conceptual focus and distinct field of political inquiry theoretically immature, albeit slowly evolving. Beliefs, attitudes, and political styles of individual political leaders have received less research attention then they deserve, primarily due to inadequate methodologies for acquiring the raw data necessary for scientific analysis. The objective herein, however, is to consider the influence upon Charles de Gaulle of such political leadership "inputs" as his culture, acculturation and motivations, and political

beliefs and style. Basically this has necessitated an eclectic analysis not unlike, in some aspects, the popular approach used in the field of International Relations, the decision-making study. The ultimate aim here is to explore a framework within which a researcher can generalize for predictability - a long suffering neglect of our "science" - rather than merely permit a reconstruction of any particular political action or decision.

General de Gaulle has interested, indeed fascinated, this writer since the heyday of "Gaullism" in the 1960's when the doctoral general examinations were completed. It was during that study period that most information on France, indeed much of what was written on Europe, inevitably focused critically on President de Gaulle. Most of the American literature on the subject presented predominately vehement opinions of this particular political leader. Because of this lack of objectivity by social scientists and laymen alike, the first of many attempts to explain, generalize, and understand de Gaulle's international behavior and hence the American reaction to him began. Various "methodologies" were selected, partially implemented and then rejected when essential data was either unavailable or research findings invariably inconclusive. Often the use of one methodology resulted in more problems being "found" than questions answered. It was only since 1968 and the information

explosion of diverse political leadership studies and my students' constant clamoring for essentially "personality" explanations of Presidential leadership behavior that the "problems" of previous attempts at analysis were diminished. Perhaps this is the most important "finding." Political leaders can not be adequately "understood" or predictive analysis undertaken by "a" methodology or "a" discipline, but only by open-ended or eclectic approaches involving interdisciplinary talents and resources. By incorporating the major features of a leader's cultural background, his personality and life experiences to adulthood, his personal philosophy and political style (as herein applied to Charles de Gaulle), we may better understand the complexities of the political leader who controls so much of our international life.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In dedication and thanksgiving:

to A DA NV DO for all beginnings and beauty;

to the extended family, whether Reaves, Wurth, Brown or Cost, for all that is love;

to Rufus and Joline Hall, John Paul Duncan, and Joseph Crim Pray for physical and spiritual contributions in very special relationships;

to Lawrence, Laurie, and Neosha for unending support, patience, and love during the process and completion of yet another "monster."

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS FOR PREDICTING INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR: A PERSON-CENTERED PRETHEORY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP-- CHARLES DE GAULLE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW

Political Leadership Models

George Sabine writes that a political theory, and thus a pretheory or a core concept such as political leadership, "contains among its elements certain judgments of fact, or estimates of probability which time proves perhaps to be objectively right or wrong."[1] This is particularly true in doctoral studies, which are essentially experimental regardless of subject matter. Insofar as this research analyzes one political leader, Charles de Gaulle, with little comparative analysis, the result is a "pretheory" of political leadership. The conclusions of one study do not permit the drawing of needed prescriptions, which is a recognized limitation.

Practically and theoretically, political leadership is a complex, multi-dimensional subject, with few concurring

---

[1]George Sabine, Preface to the First Edition, A History of Political Theory (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1937), p. v.

theses.[1] Still, it is a subject studied and written upon by more and more social scientists; for political leadership--whether viewed as leaders collectively or a leader alone, the great men studies,[2] is a phenomenon of all governments, whether democracies or dictatorships. That is, in all instances the masses, the many, are governed by political elites, the few, regardless of the nomenclature applied to the power distributions

---

[1]According to Murray Edelman, political leadership has three major attributes: 1) reciprocity or a mutual dependence relationship between the demands of followers and a leader's actions (stressed by most contemporary social scientists), 2) environmental setting, a specific situation and 3) influence or the shaping of opinions. He does not believe leadership is found in the "static characteristics of individuals." See his The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), pp. 73-94. However, as will be noted in this dissertation, leadership is also an "attitudinal" phenomenon, necessarily incorporating consideration of a leader's personality. See Lewis Edinger, Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 4. Also Donald D. Searing, "Models and Images of Man and Society in Leadership Theory," The Journal of Politics 31 (February 1969): 6. The complexity of the subject is evident in the panel topics considered by the American Political Science Association program committee for the 1974 convention: "The Chief Executive in the Modern State," "Political Recruitment: Paths and Credentials," "Personality and Motivation," "Power Elite Revisited," "Elites and Dependent Nations," and "Elite-Mass Linkages:New Directions," to cite a few. PS 6 (Summer 1973):337-8. This is not as evident in the 1975 convention program.

[2]See, for example, Harold Lasswell and C. Easton Rothwell, The Comparative Study of Elites: An Introduction and Bibliography (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1952). Also, Edgar F. Borgatta, Robert F. Bales and Arthur S. Couch, "Some Findings Relevant to the Great Man Theory of Leadership," The American Sociological Review 19 (December 1954):755-9; Sidney Hook, The Hero in History: A Study in Limitation and Possibility (New York: John Day, 1943); Morris R. Cohen, The Meaning of Human History (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1947), see particularly his chapter, "Great Men in History.

within particular nation-states.[1] Although this division into masses and elites is universal, the behavior, interaction and even the basic values and attitudes of these "groups" may differ markedly.[2] Yet many "leadership studies" continue to be essentially "common man"[3] studies, varying only in the "models" employed. For while the phenomenon of a political leader and leadership is universally accepted by both historicism[4] and functionalism, the "models" and images of man and society as

---

[1]Importantly, an elite as a political elite seems to be an American innovation. Frenchmen, for example, view only the intellectual as an individual as an elite, although this is changing. See Michalina Clifford-Vaughan, "Some French Concepts of Elites," The British Journal of Sociology 11 (December 1960):327. Also, Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970): "From the Many are Chosen the Few," American Behavioral Scientist 13 (November/December 1969): 169-187; or The Ruling Elites: Elite Theory, Power, and American Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, Pubs., 1973). The latter was written with Alan Stone.

[2]See Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950). This seems particularly true in the United States, where the emphasis is on "groups." Many contemporary American political scientists and sociologists view leaders and leadership as primarily determined by social forces, in contrast to an earlier emphasis on a leader's superior traits as determinants of "followship." See Harmon Zeigler and Thomas R. Dye, "Editors' Note," American Behavioral Scientist 13 (November/December 1969): 167-8.

[3]See Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes as He Does (New York: Free Press, 1962).

[4]By this is meant generally the "great man" studies. See David Easton, The Political System (New York: Knopf, 1953); A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965) and A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley, 1965).

applied by social scientists in their study of the concept[1] often result in differing conclusions from identical raw data.[2] In its extreme, two distinct "images" of man are evident in studies of leadership: the mechanistic and the organismic.

In succinct terms, the mechanistic approach regards leaders and society as basically atomistic parts, with conflict relationships prevailing in a subsystem dominance.[3] That is, there is an emphasis upon the institutional aspects of society while both man and society are considered unchanging or static. As the "parts" are emphasized above any

---

[1]Concept is understood here in the traditional sense, as a mental tool employed to understand, and thus eventually a conceptual system to control, the mental universe. Or as Charles O. Lerche, Jr. and Abdul A. Said note, it is a "workable scheme for classification of data." See their Concepts of International Politics. 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, INc., 1970), pp. 4-5. Typical concepts include man, power, state, authority and, of course, political leadership.

[2]Thus when Robert Redfield (Tepoztlán, A Mexican Village: A Study of Folk Life [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930] and The Little Community and Peasant Society and Culture [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956] studied the Mexican village of Tepoztlán, it was termed "harmonious," as that was Redfield's theoretical direction. However, Oscar Lewis (Life in a Mexican Village: Tepoztlán Restudied [Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1951]) studied the same village and found it full of violence and corruption, as his emphasis was on "disharmony." This methodological weakness could have been diminished somewhat if the village had been analyzed as to whether social interaction could be characterized overall as harmonious or disharmonious. See Searing, "Models," Politics, p. 3.

[3]Searing, "Models," Politics, pp. 8-15 and 19.

"whole,"[1] studies employing the mechanistic model emphasize personality, particularly childhood effects on adult beliefs and attitudes.[2] This includes the works of Carlyle and his contemporary variations, Tucker, Lasswell, George and George, and Barber.[3] The "personality" emphasized in this study is

---

[1]In reality, this alludes to one of the major pitfalls of most social science research. That is, in order to study a complex subject adequately, it is "taken apart." However, most systems, whether an individual or a nation-state, operate as a unity. To divorce elements from each other, then, is to destroy essential linkages and vital relationships.

[2]Like many terms, the concept "personality" has so many definitions it has become "inoperative." See Gordon Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation (New York: Holt, 1937), pp. 24-54. What is worse, the diverse definitions vary so much from discipline to discipline that political scientists do not agree definitionally with psychologists, who in turn disagree among themselves. Even further, political scientists tend to "color" personality as part of the conflict and ego defenses most evident in the clinician's work, yet paradoxically view political attitudes, as part of voting behavior, as excluded from personality studies and therefore within the realm of political studies. See Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush," The American Political Science Review 61 (September 1967): 629-641.

[3]Carlyle's aristocratic view is that leaders are heroes of exceptional powers, Divinity, Prophet, Poet, Priest, and Man of Letters. See Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History, ed. Archibald MacMechan (Boston: The Athenaeum Press, 1901). See also Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind: Studies in Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change (New York: Praeger, 1963); Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York: Norton, 1948); Alexander George and Juliette George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: John Day, 1956); and James David Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1972). The current psychopolitical trend is often "traced" to Lasswell, with the best example of a "neo-Lasswellian" being Barber. The mechanistic approach is also employed by Erwin C. Hargrove, Presidential Leadership:Personality and Political Style(New York: Macmillan, 1966) and E. Victor Wolfenstein,The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi(Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1967a).

an attempt to explain consistent individual behavior, regardless of situational variables, and thus does not follow either "pure" psychology as interpreted by political scientists or political science and personality, again as interpreted by political scientists.

In contrast, the organismically-oriented studies of leaders and leadership argue that society is composed of interdependent parts. Thus the complete social matrix must be analyzed in its changing evolution. The dominance of the system, then, is typified in the efforts of Hegel, Erikson, Burns, and Edinger.[1] As previously noted above, however, what is missing for methodological strengthening is a combination of these extreme "models." Although a growth of such "pairing" has begun on a limited scale,[2] it has not yet received universal acceptance by the academic community. Yet importantly, such a "combination of opposites," even as attempted in this study, could result in research becoming complementary, rather than

---

[1]See Georg Hegel, Philosophy of History, tr. J. Sibree (London: Bell, 1905); Edinger, Schumacher; James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1956); Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1958). Not all studies, even the ones noted, fit perfectly in one "type" or another, perhaps because the "images"are superimposed on too much data until the "minor" exceptions magnify themselves. Still, there exists a general nonrecognition of the inherent weaknesses of single-purpose research and analysis.

[2]See Ralf Dahrendorf's discussion of "paired models" in Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959); Reinhard Bendix and Bennett Berger on "dual tendencies" in "Images of Society and Problems of Concept Formation in Sociology," in Llewellyn Gross (ed.), Symposium on Sociological Theory (New York: Harper & Row, 1959) and the combination of opposites," in Redfield, Community.

mutually exclusive in character as is so often evidenced in nonpaired or mono-modal research.[1] For by insisting on remaining "pure," researchers intensify not only the methodological problem of which "image" to use, but permit valuable research to be influenced by an overall a priori image of social reality,[2] which further obscures objective analysis.

This a priori image of social reality may be seen in the tendency of many American political scientists, although using innovative methodologies of the discipline, to permit an unconscious advocacy of classical democratic theory to color not only how they study, but what is studied. In other words, the predominant emphasis is on "groups," in part resulting from the belief held by many of our social scientists that "the interactions of . . .'groups' [here again, masses/elites] is the very heart of the governing process," and further, that leadership is a process of communication or connection--again, between these groups.[3] Human behavior,

---

[1]The need for complementary approaches is explored further by Fred I. Greenstein in "Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference and Conceptualization," American Behavioral Scientist 11 (November/December 1967):38-53.

[2]Searing, "Models," Politics, p. 29.

[3]Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (New York: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 157-60, 72-6. Emphasis supplied. The reality is that leadership theory, since the beginnings of psychological theory applications to social science in the role theories of George H. Mead, Charles H. Cooley and John Dewey, although termed "individual" holds that man cannot be considered apart from his society and social relations. Thus in the social sciences, man

then, is molded by social interaction, i.e., roles are "satisfied mutual expectations of leaders and followers."[1] This emphasis upon group and situational components calls for the leadership role to change with the particular situation at hand, although leadership behavior is conceived as determined "by the nature of the particular environment in which the leader perceives himself as functioning as well as by the characteristics of the person who is doing the leading."[2]

This obvious methodological limitation is compounded when the values of the researcher, usually pro-democracy, "are not always made as explicit as they should be."[3] The normally "unstated" initial research premise of many political leadership studies, and most political science tracts in general, is found in the basic Lockean concepts of political democracy, popular sovereignty, equality, majoritarianism, and freedom. The idea is that no one rules or governs, but rather power is a

---

"apart" results in alienation and anomie. This is not to be confused with studying man "as a part." See also Allport, Personality, and Eric Fromm, Escape From Freedom (New York: Farrer & Rinehart, 1941).

[1]Cecil A. Gibb, Arnold S. Tannenbaum and Lester G. Seligman, "Leadership" in David L. Sills (ed.), The International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 9 (New York: The Macmillan Co. & The Free Press, 1968): 91-113.

[2]Ibid., emphasis supplied.

[3]Thus, "research oriented to action, or policy, as some political leadership studies are requires both an analysis of reality and a definite choice of values." Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War (New York: Praeger,1965), p.19. Emphasis supplied. Also F.S.C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities (New York: Meridian Books, 1959 [orig. 1947]).

shared or "group" commodity.[1] Yet our requirements, at least so-stated by some behavioral methodologists, include a value-free science from a theoretically-bound value-ridden political science.[2] The essential fact is that by unconsciously holding to subjective selection of democracy as "the" best form of government, political scientists automatically prejudice any theory or analyses of phenomena which run counter to the classical concepts of "majority rule, minority dissent." One area of concentration which has suffered as a consequence is interpretative and predictive analysis[3] of the individual leader, whether in a

---

[1]See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. "On Heroic Leadership and the Dilemma of Strong Men and Weak Peoples," Encounter (London) 15 (December 1960): 3-11.

[2]See John Paul Duncan, "The Political Philosophy of American Political Scientists" (Paper presented at Southwestern Social Science Convention, Dallas, Texas, March 25, 1967). Also Heinz Eulau, Micro-Macro Political Analysis: Accents of Inquiry (Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co., 1969), p. xii. Eulau believes "value neutrality" is neither a fact nor an attainable goal. Also Ole R. Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972), p. 3 where he comments on the lack of a "value free" science. Lerche and Said, International Politics, p. 12 comment further, that the "political world is not free of values."

[3]Or what is coming to be called "futurism." See Section 1: "Forecasting Techniques" and Section 12: "Decision Making" in The Future: A bibliography of Issues and Forecasting Techniques by Peter Padbury and Diane Wilkins. (Ontario 2000-Alternative Futures, April, 1972). Also John McHale, The Future of the Future (New York: George Braziller, 1969).

micro/peer group or macro/nation-state. Thus a theory of a individual as an individual is viewed subjectively, whether consciously or unconsiously, as an "elitist" philosophy. Such a philosophy is counter to the very core of Lockean democracy and must then be considered a corrupt or deviant political form from classical democracy at most[1] and a temporary boil on the body politic at least, in other words, irrationalism or a cult of leadership as a Hitler or Stalin.[2] The fact that there has been little academic consideration of individual political leaders is most evident in surveying political science dissertation abstracts from January, 1968, to the present (June, 1975).[3] Although 5,500 political science doctorates have been awarded during the past seven and a half years,[4] dissertations directly researching executive or Head of Government political leadership and its variables, such as performance in office, political role socialization, personality and perceptions, number

---

[1]Thus power motives seem destined to automatic characterization as nondemocratic, as for instance in Alexander L. George, "Power as a Compensatory Value for Political Leaders," The Journal of Social Issues 24 (July 1968): 29-49.

[2]See Raymond F. Hopkins and Richard W. Mansbach, Structure and Process in International Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).

[3]Dissertation Abstracts: The Humanities and Social Sciences (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, A Xerox Company, 1968 to June, 1975). Vol. "A:" The Humanities and Social Sciences.

[4]Precise figures on earned doctorates in political science vary with the source consulted. A minimum would be 5,500 according to figures in Table II:"Distribution of Doctorates for the Years," American Doctoral Dissertations (Ann Arbor: Compiled for the Assocation of Research Libraries by University Microfilms, 1968 to the present).

less than two dozen.[1] Consequently, American democratic philosophy, theory, or practical politics has rarely considered personal/positive[2] individual leadership as a conceptual focus, and thus few specialists in the area exist. Indeed most American social scientists seem to agree, at least tacitly, with Henry Kissinger that "a structure which can be preserved only if there is a great man in each generation is inherently fragile," and is thus of less importance for academic focus.[3] The supremacy of the individual leader then remains applicable traditionally to those political systems dominated by a Hitler or a Mussolini or a Stalin, rather than a George Washington or Abraham Lincoln or Franklin D. Roosevelt. Thus, although the Twentieth Century is distinguished by the influences exerted by individual political

---

[1]With duplications of comparative analyses, individual political leadership studies include: United States - 4:Harry Truman, Andrew Jackson, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, George Washington; USSR-2: Khruschev, Stalin; China-4:Maso; India-3:Mahatma Gandhi; Africa-2:Kenyatta, Nkrumah; South American-1:Betancourt; Cuba-1:Castro; Middle East-1:Nasser; Europe-1:Hitler; Great Britain-2:Churchill; Phillipines-1:Magsaysay, Garcia, Mecapagal and Marcos.

[2]The term "personal/positive individual leadership" is a redunancy necessitated by two major factors. First, leadership study is so clouded by emphases on interaction processes and strata analysis that some focusing on a person, an individual, needs to be sharpened. Secondly, when the latter is done, the results tend to be negative, i.e.,"a personal leadership" connotes authoritarianism to many, scholar and peasant alike, hence the need for the term "positive."

[4]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Policy Toward Europe and Related Matters, Hearings, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966, p.131. Interestingly, during recent negogiations, European news sources were heard to comment that Middle Eastern peace is where the man Kissinger is.

leaders such as Roosevelt, Churchill, Hitler, de Gaulle, Nasser or the contemporary effects of a Mao, Qadafi, I. Ghandi, Sadat and even Ford, American studies of political leaders remain firmly grounded on groups and processes or even situational contexts, that is, the particular environment existing during the decision-making process.[1]

Much of the primary research in political leadership analysis has been micro-analysis of small groups, a focus on the parts of the whole (reductionism) with study conclusions merely elevated to the macro level.[2] Still, such a procedure has some validity, as Raymond Aron noted in re international studies:

---

[1]See Schlesinger, Leadership," Encounter and Lasswell and Kaplan, Power. Also, Morton Deutsch, Albert Pepitone and Alvin Zander, "Leadership in the Small Group," The Journal of Social Issues 4 (Spring 1948): 31; John J. Hemphill, Situational Factors in Leadership (Columbus, Ohio:Ohio State University, 1949) and Alvin W. Gouldern (ed.), Studies in Leadership (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950).

[2]Holsti, Crisis, p. 70 notes that important differences in individuals are often neglected when individual data are merely aggregated as a means to test hypotheses relating to international system behavior. See the emphasis on differences in James N. Rosenau,"Private Preferences and Public Responsibility: The Relative Potency of Individual and Role Variables in the Behavior of U.S. Senators" in J. David Singer (ed.), Quantitative International Politics:Insights and Evidence (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1967). Also Gibb, "Leadership," IESS, pp. 108-9. Or to attack a "god," although man-the-micro is a power-seeker in some instances according to Hans Morganthau, we can not assume that the nation-state or macro likewise seeks power. However, reductionism is not without its proponents. See Eulau, Political Analysis where he discusses reducing to "fundamentals." Another classic example is Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs: Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. v-vi.Dahl makes analogies of the United States national party system based on his study of New Haven's party system.

> . . .the principal actors [nation states] . . . [determine] the [international] system more than they have been determined by it. Thus events or actors in the 'microsystem' are appropriate for study in that they determine what the 'macrosystem' will be like.[1]

What is argued here, however, is that the weight of political science research should be more equitably distributed. Although organizational and situational variables are vital aspects of understanding political processes, current trends of continuing centralization of executive power and the crisis-centered orientation of many, if not all, governments necessitates a focusing, or refocusing, of some of our professional attention on the individual political leader, his personality and role.

Political Leadership Studies

Such a focusing may be found in a growing body of literature labeled "political leadership" studies, which attempt to erase the general conceptual neglect of so vital an areal focus. However, the undertaking of research in the field has been slowed in part by the murky conceptualizations of the single word, "leadership." This one word has been identified as a "position, office, task or function" involving power and influence either explicitly or implicitly, and in formal or informal groups. Such a traditional definition of leadership as a position or positional-ascriptive is simple in

---

[1]Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (Garden City: Doubleday, 1966), p. 95.

comparison to some behavioral conceptualizations distinguishing leadership as "permissive/coercive, authoritarian/democratic, responsive/irresponsive" with leadership traits as "static and universal or dynamic and particularistic."[1] Here behavioral-descriptive emphasis is on performance in a stimulus-response process or social interaction. We are then back to the methodological weaknesses inherent in the "models" or images of man and society and an emphasis on assemblies of persons or groups. More pertinent for this study is a third conceptual variation of political leadership, the cognitive-attitudinal, where the subjective perception of an individual results in self-orientation as a leader. The personality of a political leader, plus role analysis, best suits the understanding of the interrelationship between individual and situation in the cognitive-attitudinal analysis. Leadership, for our purposes here, is both objective and subjective insofar as it is both a goal and a fact. Political leadership is further delineated by Glenn Paige, who views its conceptual framework as consisting of "personality, role, organization, task, values and setting" interacting in the four dimensions of human behavior--power, affect, instrumentality, and association,[2] a construct that has been recognized only recently.

---

[1]Lewis J. Edinger, "Political Science and Political Biography:Reflections on the Study of Leadership:II,"The Journal of Politics 26 (August 1964):648-676.

[2]Glenn D. Paige (ed.), Political Leadership:Readings for An Emerging Field(New York:The Free Press, 1972), pp. 69-84.

The origins of the attempts to reduce the gap between political leadership behavior and its explanatory methods are found primarily in the application of psychology and social psychology to both domestic and international politics by examining the "nature of belief systems, images, image formation and perception."[1] In international relations research, the change from the traditional image of man as a rational being to one of a man of images or values (i.e., fluid settings) began with Richard Snyder and Herbert Simon in their reconstructive analyses of executive decision-making, emphasizing processes of decisions rather than policies.[2] Importantly, this decision-making approach is grounded in the belief that decision-making is a two-level process. It is rational insofar as an individual calculates a decision based in part on the situational context he believes to exist, and secondly, it has an inner emotional level which

---

[1]This really began with Bentley and was turned to for explanations of behavior which could not be understood by other means, that is, the previously noted so-called irrational behavior. Too, these studies, generically biographical in nature, attempt to provide analyses of cross-sectional attributes such as styles, characteristics and skills. Analyses of individuals in power positions by Hegel and Carlyle do predate the discipline contemporarily termed political. The seminal study of personality and politics is that of Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (New York: Viking, 1960 wherein man is viewed as a compensatory power seeker.(Orig. 1940 by University of Chicago Press)

[2]The main criticism of this method is that of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, who noted that one "can not step twice in the same river." See Philip Wheelwright, Heraclitus (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 29(Fragment 21). "Reconstructions" then are fraught with perils. But more importantly, they seldom measurably aid in approximating any predictability of future decisions.

has received less attention due to the theoretical problems involved.[1] It is evident then that the concept of political leadership does not lend itself to simplification. This is readily apparent in Paige's review of the great diversities of studies on the subject. An "overview" of the varieties of leadership studies requires repeating not only for its intrinsic value, but as indicative of the diverse theoretical and methodological directions employed in political leadership studies in general, and in some partial measure in this particular study.[2]

Paige distinguishes between eleven varieties of political leadership studies. Generally, this literature

---

[1]Paige, Readings, p. 6 enumerates ten reasons for the past failures of graduate emphasis, and thus few specialists, in the "field" of political leadership. The American political culture and academic subculture have 1) an anti-leadership bias which is compounded by 2) "chronic mutual disdain" between politicians and professors, impeding research in this field. This is evident by 3)few specialized schools for political leaders. Throughout all is the thread of 4)a strain of determinism among social scientists and the political culture wherein leaders are not believed to have the capacity to exert independent impact upon political life, with 5) politics viewed as resulting from basic economic and social forces. 6)Politicians merely represent these basic interests. Thus 7)leaders are helplessly trapped in the web of institutions. Still, 8)cross-level, cross-cultural and cross-historical comparisons in the scientific study of politics has begun, although only recently. Unfortunately, these studies have often been clouded or obscured, for 9)explanative analysis of political leaders' behavior has been as taboo as discussion of sex during the Victorian era. Too, 10) political "science," which began with voting behavior studies of "followers," continues to orient itself so, rather than emphasize individual political leaders.

[2]See Glenn D. Paige, The Study of Political Leadership (New York: The Free Press, forthcoming).

may be grouped as research having a predominately group emphasis and favored by American social scientists until the past decade, those emphasizing individual variables, and a combination of the above orientations.[1]

The emphasis on groups is found in:

1. Institutional role studies. Here the formal positions of political leadership, such as the American Presidency, Congressmen, Senators, and Governors are explored. By far the greatest emphasis has been on studies of the American Presidency, with a general neglect of not only many other positions, but other national presidencies or premierships. The dominant consideration has been the "whole" of the office, although there is some evidence that the international and domestic "roles" may be distinct in many aspects and in important ways.[2]

2. Political elite studies. A single dominant power circle, a minority, is emphasized here. Originating with Mosca, Pareto and Michels, aggregative political elite studies have been done by Lasswell, Lerner and Rothwell, among others. Since 1968, an overwhelming emphasis in the academic community has been research of political elites in the United

---

[1]As with most studies, the "varieties" are not mutually exclusive. However, the dominant thesis of each work determines its inclusion under a particular group. The individual-group-combination division is by this writer. See Paige, Readings, pp. 8-9, 13-17 for further bibliographical references.

[2]See the numerous articles in The Journal of Peace Research (Oslo), Johan Galtung (ed.).

States and Soviet Union.[1]

3. Community influentials. A variation of the political elite studies, but analyzed as community power by emphasizing particular power structures or leadership groups, this research includes both an emphasis on political elites as oligarchical and pluralistic in such cities as Atlanta and New Haven. In all, the political leadership group, power structure and regime present infinite study variations.

4. Follower response studies. How and why leaders or issues elicit political responses from "followers" dominate our discipline, and to date provide the only reliable predictability in political science. Exemplifying this extensive research is Campbell's The American Voter, an analysis of interrelationships of personalities, styles and issues.[2]

Emphasis on individual political leaders or comparative research thereof is evident in:

1. Didactic studies. The thesis of this "how to" literature is to teach survival in the individual political leadership role, although not necessarily a study of particular leaders per se. Such literature ranges from Machiavelli's The Prince to Don Cass' contemporary How to Win Votes and Influence Voters.[3]

---

[1]See Dissertation Abstracts, "Political Science."

[2]Angus Campbell, et al, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960).

[3]Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, tr. Luigi Ricci, rev. E.R. P. Vincent. Intro. Christian Gauss. (New York: The New

2. Political biographical and autobiographical materials. Although both are widespread, by far the more important scientifically for political scientists is the political autobiography, which includes such primary sources as the writings of Charles de Gaulle and Winston Churchill.[1] Biographical materials, written not only by social scientists but in virtually all disciplines, vary from selective to exhaustive detail. The "factual" detailing of historical information in these studies, however, is often contradictory and thus self-limiting for unqualified inclusion in scientific analyses.[2]

Combinations of the above two "varieties" of studies exist in:

1. Area surveys. Political leadership characteristics of either countries or regions are explored by combining various elements of the previously noted methodologies. Variations include John Wilson Lewis' study of political leadership in China and Willard Hanna's analysis of Southeast Asian leaders.[3]

American Library, 1952); Donald P. Cass, How to Win Votes and Influence Elections (Chicago: Public Administrative Service,1962).

[1]Even with the reality that autobiographies sometimes fail to meet objective standards, such literature often constitutes a major portion of the data available on various aspects of a leader's "operational code." Too, such works may contain valuable insight to the variable of personal relationships between political leaders, such as personal perceptions of each other held by de Gaulle, Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill during their wartime conferences.

[2]See Lelia Biggs Helms, "De Gaulle's Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice." (PhD dissertation. Tufts University, 1968).

[3]John W. Lewis (ed.) Party Leadership and Revolutionary

2. Leadership studies emanating from other socio-behavioral sciences and applied fields. This rapidly growing body of leadership literature includes specialties in anthropology, economics, industrial science, labor relations, religious leadership, military, public executive, psychology, and sociology, among other fields.

3. Political leadership ideas and values. Comparative ideological surveys and systematic comparative inquiries into the relationships between values and other aspects of political leadership behavior are combined in this category with the original writings of political leaders themselves.

4. Charisma. A rather nebulous compilation of studies are included under the concept of charisma, the unique leadership quality which elicits popular support. Such research varies from Max Weber to Ann Ruth Wilner and perceives political leaders possessing such a quality as falling somewhere on a continuum between the "missionatic" prophet to the activist-planner endowed with superlative practical leadership powers.

5. Style. Attempts to determine not only what patterns exist between personality and political leadership but the "operational codes"[1] of individual political leaders is

---

Power in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Willard Hanna, Eight Nation Makers: Southeast Asia's Charismatic Statesmen (New York: St. Martain's Press, 1964).

[1]Alexander L. George, The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making. (Santa Monica: The Rand Corp., 1967).

analyzed as leadership style. Often this particular type of literature is essentially theoretical, although case studies of individual political leaders are beginning to be included.[1]

From a perusal of the aforementioned political leadership literature, it becomes evident that certain basic variables or issues emerge. One question or "issue" is whether political leadership is an individual attribute or trait.[2] Do leaders have like abilities or hold any physical or mental traits in common? Or is political leadership determined by the situation, with leaders merely pawns of prevailing social forces? Thus the big question is exactly how much historical influence do "great" individuals have?[3] All this leads into the more theoretically relevant questions of the highest order, such as what are the basic factors in world politics--the forces of ideologies, economics, or the "power of individuals?"[4]

---

[1]Studies by Barber and Hargrove in particular would be relevant here.

[2]Alvin Gouldner views the division of leadership studies as a dictomy: the "traits school" versus the "situationist school." He concludes that an interplay of traits and situation is most realistic. See his Leadership, passim.

[3]Robert C. Tucker, "The Dictator and Totalitarianism," World Politics 17 (July 1965): 555-584. Also Gouldner, Leadership. The theoretical and methodological issue of personality and politics, including the relationships of individual personality to political behavior, is explored by Daniel J. Levinson as the "mirage" and "sponge" theory. See Fred I. Greenstein, "Role, Personality, and Social Structure in the Organizational Setting," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 55(1959):170-9.

[4]See Rosenau's"variables" in Singer, International Politics.

These fundamental questions are significant to describe and analyze individual political leadership and thus ultimately facilitate the comprehension of international politics. Most importantly, by using the conceptual framework of individual political leadership, rather than merely explaining a decisional event, our ability to theorize on general tendencies and ascertain probable trends in international political behavior is enhanced.[1] We can probably never achieve complete predictability, but we can move closer to it. The success or failure of a leadership need not concern us. Although time is a crucial dimension in the leadership process, success or failure is a time-perspective, thus everchanging.

This lack of predictability, contemporarily at a low level both normatively and empirically,[2] is particularly noticeable in studies of the chief formulator of a nation-state's foreign policies.[3] To know more about this individual

---

[1]See Lasswell's five objectives for social scientists in Hopkins and Mansbach, International Politics, p. 30.

[2]For a discussion of the need of predictability to permit our discipline to be termed a political science, see Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford:Stanford University Press, 1962), Ch. 15:"The Study of Politics: A Science?" pp 191-205. It is necessary not only to understand a situation, but to be able to do something about it.

[3]Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Relation of States to Their World," paper presented at Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 5-9, 1967. Waltz reiterates a previous point, that there exists a tendency on the part of many American political scientists to separate international relations and domestic politics, not only as what to study, but how. Thus international politics is viewed often as relationships

actor would enable the construction of theories or conceptual systemization of international politics in general. However, as noted, in Rosenau's analysis of the variables in foreign policy formulation--external, individual, role, governmental, and societal--the least studied is the individual, his personality, experience, intellect, values and political style.[1] We now turn to how to study this particular factor in political leadership, the individual himself.

The Research Design: Assumptions, Aims, Sources and Structure

In order to warn the reader of the prejudices encountered herein, notice should be taken of some major research assumptions.

1. International politics is reduced to the political behavior of individuals, who by their relationships and interaction determine the performance of the political system in maintaining order, stability, and national unity. George E. G. Catlin definitively expressed this assumption in 1927 when saying: "The subject matter of politics is the acts of individuals, not of states; the individual will is the political

---

between nation-states while domestic politics is analyzed almost exclusviely in sociological terms.

[1]James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 95-150 or Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 27-92. Lerche and Said, International Politics, pp. xi-xii note that international politics may be analyzed on three levels: the individual political actor, the political system structure and the substance of political action.

unit."[1] In particular instances, international behavior then "becomes" a particular individual's behavior, in what DeRivera has termed, "the psychological dimension of foreign policy."[2]

2. Today many American social scientists believe that the goals of the individual political leader and leadership itself are processes of action-reaction-interaction. However, in international behavior, process is often, if not predominately, secondary. This is an important assumption, but one beyond the scope of this study to explore in any depth. Still, it must be remembered that domestic and foreign behaviors have distinct patterns of their own, with no, or at most little, correlation between the two.[3] In either case, foreign political behavior is primarily individual behavior and not necessarily to be analyzed as subject to the same forces as domestic leadership behavior.

---

[1]George E. G. Catlin, Science and Method of Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), pp. 141-2.

[2]Joseph H. DeRivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Pub. Co., 1968), pp. 2-5.

[3]See the multitude of Peace Research Society Papers, including those published since 1964 in The Journal of Peace Research (Oslo), Johan Galtung (ed). Thus R. J. Rummel, "Research Communication: Some Attributes and Behavioral Patterns of Nations," The Journal of Peace Research (Oslo) 4(No. 2 1967): 196-206 at p. 197 states that domestic and foreign conflict are unrelated to each other, although in his earlier papers a "small" correlation was found. Yet Jonathan Wilkenfeld (in "Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations," The Journal of Peace Research (Oslo) 5(No. 1 1968):56-69) believes that some correlation exists, but with an unexplanable time lag.

3. Individuals in political decision-making roles operate within the confines of a particular view of politics in general, often expressed as values and ideologies. This "operational code"[1] not only includes basic orientations toward society and politics, but the "personality, values and aims" of the individual and his political style.[2] As "the State" at most or "the government" at least, these "actors" formulate political policies or actions resulting from such beliefs, which in foreign policy decision-making includes a unique view of world politics. Too, the political style of an actor is determined by the content of his philosophy at the time of initial political role-taking.[3] Decision-makers respond to their own perceptions of an international event rather than necessarily the action itself.[4]

4. By understanding the assets and liabilities of the central actor in a political process, here the Chief Foreign Policy Maker, more valid comparisons of the actions of a

---

[1]Leites, Operational Code, passim.

[2]James B. Christoph (ed.), Cases in Comparative Politics (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965). See Bernard E. Brown article on France, pp. 129-205 at 129. Also Joel Edward Anderson, Jr., "The 'Operational Code' Belief System of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg:An Application of the George Construct." (PhD dissertation. The University of Michigan, 1974).

[3]Robert D. Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of 'Ideology'," The American Political Science Review 65 (September 1971):651-681.

[4]DeRivera, Foreign Policy, p. 31.

particular government or the goals and behavior of the larger international political system are permitted. This is particularly true when the cultural environment peculiar to a specific decision-maker is considered.

5. Thus the primary or key assumption of this dissertation is that in crisis situations and with a centralization of power in the political executive, international political behavior is predominately indicative of the character of the Chief Executive. In other words, reciprocal relationships as either decision-making analyses, leader/follower analyses, or any other taxonomy employed, are inadequate forms for research and study. The political pattern of international executive behavior is determined during crisis/power centralization periods by the beliefs, attitudes, and style of the individual leader. But this continues only so long as such institutional variables prevail, either practically or in the perceptions of the leader. Personal/positive leadership, then, in contrast to political process leadership, is influenced in many ways by factors traditionally characterized as "personality."[1] This is not to say that all political behavior is determined exclusively by psychological factors with situational factors of little or no consequence. What does result, however, is expressed best by Greenstein:

---

[1]Greenstein, "Personality," APSR, p. 629.

> It is. . .sometimes instructive to think of attitude and situation as being in a kind of push-pull relationship: the stronger the attitudinal press for a course of action, the less the need for situational stimuli, and vice versa.[1]

As Jacques Maritain noted, it then becomes possible during "periods of crisis, birth, or basic transformation that the role of the inspired servants, the prophets of the people, takes on full importance."[2] Thus it is that political leaders are most important when "societies first come to birth, [when] it is the leaders who produce the institutions of the republic. Later, it is the institutions which produce the leaders."[3] Yet even then the particular character of the leader "produced" is of prime importance. This significance was expressed succinctly by Eric Severid upon the transfer of executive power from our thirty-seventh to thirty-eighth President. He commented that:

> . . .our vast complex instituions of law and government can protect us as they have just done, but they can not lead the people. This immense varied society always requires a man, one man. We have no king, no Delphic oracle, no Platonic academy of the all wise. What we have is the President of the United States. One man's character will be the key to what happens with us, as one man's character was the key to what has been happening. . .[4]

---

[1]Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference and Conceptualization.(Chicago:Markham,1969).

[2]Jacques Maritain, Man and State (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 140.

[3]Montesquieu quoted by Schlesinger in "Leadership," Encounter, p. 10.

[4]Eric Severid, "Commentary," CBS Nightly News (Friday, August 9, 1974), transcribed from television by this writer.

This "reality" is not as widely accepted in America as elsewhere, particularly in France.

During the past two or more decades, the institutionalized structure of political France under the 5th Republic, including the presidency, parliament, bureaucracy, political parties, pressure groups, and military, are reflective of one leader, Charles de Gaulle. He is one man who not only governed, but founded a French Republic. Yet de Gaulle's attitudes, beliefs, values, habits, and style have been neglected, as has the "operational code" of other major political leaders. Primarily this neglect results from the existence of the many methodological difficulties involved in gathering or using data on the perceptions, ideals, and assumptions about reality held either by the international political elite or by an individual political leader.[1] Direct testing and interviews are impossible. Only indirect study is possible or even permissible, necessitating the multi-methodological or cross-disciplinary approach. Thus many of the techniques used in the mass of literature on political leadership are used in this one study.[2]

---

[1]George Modelski, "The World's Foreign Ministers: A Political Elite," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 14(June 1970):135-175.See also Ole R. Holsti, Richard A. Brody and Robert C. North,"Measuring Affect and Action in International Reaction Models: Empirical Materials from the 1962 Cuban Crisis," The Journal of Peace Research (Oslo) 1(1964):170-189.

[2]Because it is emphasized in many disciplines, political leadership as an areal focus has the potential to unify the diverse fields of study with the possibility of understanding, and thus coping with, the future.

In the case of de Gaulle, the amount of data that could be analyzed is overwhelming. Much of this sheer volume of material is not only contradictory, but largely unverifiable. Lelia Helms addresses this problem in her study by dividing this "book form data" into distinct biographical, descriptive, historical, polemical, ideological, doctrinal, and methodological sections.[1] Yet even with such abundant data, large information gaps still exist, particularly concerning the important years of childhood socialization.[2] However, by using the multi-method approach and indirection, these problems are diminished somewhat.

The data emphasized, therefore, is primary source materials. A major portion of these materials are found in the speeches, press conferences, and books by Charles de Gaulle. But also included are resources supplied by the New York City based French News Services, the United States State Department, the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the staff of the Library of Congress, and the Interlibrary Loan Service. Access to source materials under these respective jurisdictions was invaluable. Innumerable professional journals, particularly those dated from 1968 to the present were used extensively, as were doctoral dissertations and other unpublished

---

[1]Helms, "De Gaulle," pp. 8-20.

[2]Ibid., pp. 374-8. Appendixes I, II, and III compare selected author's often contradictory biographical accounts of de Gaulle's activities.

materials from the same period. The intent here was to tap that wealth of empirical and normative studies on France, de Gaulle, and political leadership that seldom filter down to the widest academic level.

The majority of these documents are readily available in both French and English. However, in the case of the de Gaulle materials, comparative analyses of texts in the two languages rarely reveal <u>any</u> discrepencies. This is due essentially to the General's long-established practice of personally editing his speeches, press conferences, and books, including "official" English translations of his works, with the jaundiced eye of a research historian, negating any necessity of post-editing. Thus in most instances, the English translation is utilized, although the use of such primary materials is not without its problems.[1] When French language sources are employed, translations are by this writer, unless otherwise noted. Usage of the French texts is not without merit, for often the deeper and more subtle meanings of a statement are revealed in the use of French rules of grammar or in the various symbols of the unspoken language of French culture.

---

[1]DeRivera terms these "distortion" problems. Such would include the passage of time from the point of a political action to the writing about it, plus the reasons for so writing. See his <u>Foreign Policy</u>, pp. 6-9.

The direction of this study is two-fold. First, it seeks an "explanation" of de Gaulle's political behavior, an emphasis on his "political psychology" or "operational code" in order to realize which values governed foreign policy decisions during his political tenure in terms of his norms. Such a study is not meant to apply unequivocally to the France of Presidents Pompidou and Giscard. Today France is in a socio-politico-economic structure of a transition nature, one de Gaulle did not face, although he did "begin." In other words, the current crisis-center is primarily domestic, not international. Thus forces predominate other than those prevailing during the 1940-1944 and 1958-1969 eras. However, many of de Gaulle's "policies" survive, although whether this is by mere coincidence or design is, of course, debatable, as is the proposition that the reason his "policies" do survive is their cultural basis. Still, it is only with a developmental study of the individual that we may assess whether political behavior is indeed basically power compensatory or determined by role expectations.[1]

Secondly, this study seeks to emphasize political leadership as a conceptual focus, applicable to particular environmental variables. This personal/positive leadership is necessitated by the variables of crisis-centered and

---

[1]See George, "Power," Social Issues, and Lasswell's various works.

executive power-concentrated political societies.

Decision-makers, to reiterate, can not be studied in isolation. Some consideration must be made of governmental institutions. However, when a decision-maker establishes political institutions, as de Gaulle did, and a crisis situation exists, the decision-maker is able to operate irrespective of institutional and environmental variables, particularly in the foreign policy arena. The methodological issue here is personality and politics, not only the concern of the individual in politics, but the relationship of the individual personality to political behavior. In searching for the answers to these questions in re de Gaulle, it should be noted that concrete foreign policies as reflections of his beliefs, attitudes and style are not considered in any depth. Policy sciences, that is, particular political actions or case studies of particular decisions, are presented only as illustrations of the theoretical generalizations being discussed. This is necessary not only because his specific foreign policies have been studied, but conceivably some political actions may actually violate an actor's philosophical aims.

Chapter Outline

Chapter II proceeds from the assumption that "political events have their roots in civilization and culture, the sum

total of a people's activities."[1] Therefore, to present the average beliefs, attitudes and perceptions of the French community at large, whether termed French political ideas, themes, or perspectives, permits us later to indicate whether a leader deviates from these averages.[2] Importantly, theories of international behavior are not grounded as much in a nation-state's size or geography as in a people's relatively stable basic attitudes[3] and perceptions reflected in culture and held by the principle decision-makers.[4] This chapter, then, seeks the French metaphysics--the world view, theology and religion which express ultimately the "culture-bound" nature of all political ideas and styles of individuals. The individual political leader, therefore, is not only a "product" of this culture, or socialized by and in it, but becomes "bound"

---

[1]Albert Guérard, France: A Modern History (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1950), p. vii. Note that in this instance the broader term culture is employed, rather than "political culture." The latter most often is used not only to define the limits for political action, but also to indicate propensity for change in a political system.

[2]Alfred O. Hirschman, "The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding," World Politics 22 (April 1970): 329-343.

[3]DeRivera, Foreign Policy, p. 41.

[4]Hopkins and Mansbach, International Politics, p. 95.

by its limits in decision-making processes.[1]

The individual, of course, is Charles de Gaulle, whose political socialization and recruitment are reflected in Chapter III. Using autobiographical writings and biographies, this chapter briefly presents de Gaulle's social background, his socialization, and adult career pattern. Unlike historical biography where detail is used extensively, the attempt here is to reconstruct only salient behaviors to determine political role socialization variables as well as psychological-personality variables. This was accomplished after researching the basic categories for biography set forth by Lasswell, Edinger, and others.[2] In large part, this political profile of family, school, church and peer group becomes an "abstract," a life history employing personality and political psychology theory, a psychobiography[3] seeking the relationship of childhood learning and experiences

---

[1]George Kateb, Political Theory: Its Nature and Uses (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), p. 48. A good contemporary example is the firing of Special Watergate Prosecutor Cox by President Nixon, with the subsequent American reaction. The boundary in that instance was the concept of justice or fair play, although institutionally the President was acting legally.

[2]Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics, pp. 26-7; Lewis Edinger and Donald D. Searing, "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry," The American Political Science Review 61 (June 1967):428-445; Edinger, "Biography:I,II," Journal of Politics.

[3]See Betty Glad, "Contributions of Psychobiography," in Jeanne N. Knutson (ed.), Handbook of Political Psychology (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973), pp. 296-321.

to adult political behavior.[1] De Gaulle's motivational values will be analyzed within the framework of Abraham Maslow's generalized theory of basic human "drives." To reiterate, this chapter is required insofar as the experiences of a man's life help account for many of the peculiarities of his thought and political action as to both strengths and weaknesses.[2]

De Gaulle's "thought" is expressed in Chapter IV. After extensive study of the corpus of de Gaulle's writings, speeches and press conferences, an initial intuitive analysis was made of the major ideas or themes presented. Then a summary of selected political "value words" was included,[3] with special emphasis on such symbols and concepts as strength, independence, leadership, and the nation-state. In the instance of the nation-state, for example, de Gaulle's perceptions of other countries are examined in light of Boulding's framework of images of friends, enemies, and neutrals.[4] By understanding the character traits and the normative value system

---

[1]The premise that knowledge of a political leader's perceptions aids in the analysis of his political behavior raises the basic problem of obtaining such data. Thus the prevalence in this particular area of study of content analysis. See Holsti, "Cuban Crisis," Peace Research (Oslo).

[2]DeRivera, Foreign Policy; Ross Stagner, Psychological Aspects of International Conflict (Belmont,Calif.:Brooks-Cole Pub., 1967).

[3]Ralph K. White, Value-Analysis: The Nature and Use of Method (Glen Gardner, N.J.:Libertarian Press for the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, 1951).

[4]Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1956).

of a leader, together with style, some predictability of political behavior during an individual political tenure can occur.[1] John Plamenatz notes that social and political theory does affect how individuals conduct their lives, whereas what they believe about the physical universe does not change the nature of that universe.[2] Thus a decision-maker's definition of a situation is shaped by his values, which in turn determine goal-choice, or foreign policy. Men's images of the world around them not only affect the way they behave, but help explain their actions. This chapter, therefore, explains de Gaulle's images.

How the images are manifested is the subject of Chapter V, the analysis of de Gaulle's leadership style and relationships, his personal way of responding to the demands of his political role as foreign policy maker.[3] The attempt here is to relate behavior and values in a general sense. The emphasis, however, is upon style, how de Gaulle did things in contrast to the foregoing chapter on what he thought. A summary of the chapter considers Barber's paradigm of active-positive, active-negative, passive-positive and passive-negative

---

[1]Thus Dorothy June Rudoni in her doctoral study, "Harry S. Truman: A study in Presidential Perspective"(PhD dissertation. Southern Illinois University, 1968) concludes that Truman's perception of his presidential responsibility was the key determinant of his political tenure, or political performance. His perception was grounded in memory, imagination, social and political experience to form consistent beliefs or a personal ideology.

[2]See John Plamenatz, Ideology (New York: Praeger Pubs, 1970).

[3]See Putnam, "Political Culture," APSR, pp. 651-681.

to discern whether as President de Gaulle enjoyed political life. Further, was his style one manifested in "roles?"[1] A"role system," if evident, is a valid concept, that in its individualistic and collectivistic sense permits an essential linkage in studying individual behavior. That is, role theory intertwines or combines the "opposites" of behavioralism and institutionalism.[2]

The concluding chapter, Chapter VI integrates the research findings by relating de Gaulle's "operational code" to the predictive endeavors of our discipline. That is, given his cultural background, personal ideology, and style, what in a general sense could be expected in foreign policy during his political tenure? More importantly, what conclusions may be drawn for future French policy in general and the study of other political leaders by the method employed here.

---

[1]See Barber, Presidential Character.

[2]See Eulau, Political Analysis, pp. vii-viii.

CHAPTER II

THE FRENCH CULTURAL MILIEU: BOUNDARIES OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR[1]

Introduction

Men pass, but France is eternal. Henri-Honoré Giraud.

Almond and Verba in their study, The Civic Culture, note that although "great ideas of democracy," such as freedom, equality, and individuality are inspiring, the principles by which the democratic polity functions are less understood.[2] These "principles" include the "norms and attitudes" of both the political elites and nonpolitical citizenry, actually "subtler cultural components" controlling the decision-making process in general.[3] Hopkins and Mansbach concur, stating that "international behavior theories are grounded in attitudes and perceptions of culture," with major world cleavages reslting more from attitudes than geography.[4]

---

[1]Laws, customs, institutions, and other social patterns broadly defined as an environment constitute a "milieu," although in actuality the term is untranslatable. See Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics," Journal of Conflict Resolution 1 (December 1957):311.

[2]Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 3.

[3]Ibid., emphasis supplied.

[4]Hopkins and Mansbach, International Politics, pp. 95-6.

In the sense of the western political systems, a "world culture" must be acknowledged,[1] even if merely viewed or treated as a projection of the self as France has always understood it.[2] This western world culture is identified as a cosmopolitan one, which includes secularism, rationalism, scientism, technology and industrialism in a basically humanistic and popularistic set of political values.[3] These values are reflected in diverse international goals, whether considered as power, wealth and peace or glory and idea.[4] This "culture" is grounded on the western idea of a nation-state as a natural phenomena of political life, a collective identity[5] or integrated community held together by ethnic similarity, linguistic compatibility, shared traditions and common culture.[6] Still, substantial variations in individual

---

[1]Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), pp. 9-11, 198-9.

[2]Herbert Luethy, France Against Herself: A Perceptive Study of France's Past, Her Politics and Her Unending Crisis. 2d ed. tr. Eric Mosbacher. (New YOrk:Praeger,1955), p. 12.

[3]Pye, Political Development, p. 105; Politics, Personality and Nation Building (New Haven:Yale Univ. Press,1962),Ch.1.

[4]Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th ed (New York: Knopf, 1967); Aron, Peace and War; A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York:Knopf, 1958); Robert Aron, On War, tr. Terence Kilmartin (Garden City,N.Y.:Doubleday, 1959).

[5]Pye, Political Development, p. 11.

[6]See Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959).

national cultures do exist. Therefore, although most states are concerned with preserving national security and promoting general welfare in a basic foreign policy goal of peace, the means to do so are diverse. Reaching this "common" goal is influenced by such factors as the type of government, culture, and economy. Mead noted this thirty years ago:

> To know the differences among the ways in which Frenchmen and Germans, Englishmen and Italians view human relationships in the family, the community, the nation, and the world become differences to be taken into account in predicting whether an international conference will fail or succeed or in gauging the changes which any international plan has for acceptance.[1]

Cultural variations then produce different policies or types of diplomacy. Importantly, systematic analysis of these variations in national culture could result in comprehending the "periodic tensions and misunderstandings that [have] arisen between individual members."[2] To ignore the cultural aspects of a nation-state in general and political leadership in particular is to omit a keystone of political analysis, particularly in world or global politics.[3] This

---

[1]Margaret Mead in Margaret Mead and Rhoda Métraux (eds.), Themes in French Culture: A Preface to a Study of French Community.(Stanford: The Hoover Institute and Library on War, Revolution and Peace: Stanford University Press, 1954. Hoover Institute Studies Series D:Communities, No. 1 April 1954), p. xi. The studies were begun during the mid-1940's.

[2]George A. DeVos, "National Character, 11 IESS, p.14.

[3]James N. Rosenau, David Vincent and Maurice A. East, The Analysis of International Politics (New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 16-7.

omission, however, pervades our discipline, or when considered is not taken very seriously. Still, international studies, in particular those employing decision-making or political leadership analyses, must take into consideration the fact that political events or national behavior originate in the sum of a people's activities. Spitzer terms this the "totality of meanings, values and norms possessed by the interacting persons and vehicles," more commonly referred to as culture and civilization.[1] All explanations of natural events and human behavior then are "culture-relative."[2] Not only are political ideas affected, and effected, by culture, but the individual political style of leadership is culture-bound. That is, the leadership role must be analyzed as a phenomena of political culture modified by personality. Regardless of who or what the leadership is, culturally imposed limitations or mores in political action exist. Conceivably, these expressions of a way of life of a given region and time could have more universal applicability.[3]

In some instances, then, general social forces set boundaries for the individual's overt behavior, although as

---

[1]Stephen P. Spitzer, The Sociology of Personality: An Enduring Problem in Psychology (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1969), pp. 203-4.

[2]Karl M. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949), pp. 129-130.

[3]See Hopkins and Mansbach, International Politics, p.145.

Eulau notes, "the future is always a combination of causal influences from the past with unpredictable elements."[1] Yet social forces or culture influence how an individual perceives his environment and how he copes with perceptions such as authority, obedience, loyalty or friendship.[2] Such historically affected symbols as national pride, identity goals, myths, education, language, experience and ideology should be considered.[3] To reiterate, culture must be a prime consideration for political analysts in so far as a political leader is assumed, generally speaking, to be socialized in the particular culture he leads. Too, every age and country has had powerful personalities. However, the development of these figures is favored or hindered by the specific cultural climate. This significance for international studies is recognized in Kelman's statement that:

> The culture into which the individual becomes socialized makes available to him certain national self-images, images of the outsider in general, images of specific other nations, and images of an intersocietal order.[4]

The development of these images is part and parcel of the

---

[1]Eulau, Political Analysis, p. 359. Also Andrew S. McFarland, Power and Leadership in Pluralist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 174.

[2]Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 500, 503.

[3]Hopkins and Mansbach, International Politics, p. 145.

[4]Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Rinehart & Winston, 1965), p.43.

culture or subculture which develops them.[1] Duijker terms these character-images shaped by a particular culture as "cultural character," uniformities which arise during the socialization process in a particular cultural milieu.[2]

Whether termed cultural differences or national character, the cultural applications to political commentary are not easy ones to make. First, personal qualities, whether considered on the individual plane or as national and social character, do not permit the ready use of precise analysis by political scientists. Therefore we often leave vital elements, including political leadership analysis in general, to other disciplines, particularly disciples of Clio, the Muse of History. Still, as Knorr and Rosenau comment:

> Political science should move into historical research so the understanding of the past will not be in the exclusive hands of the literati and subject to first one revisionist or counter-revisionist interpretation after another.[3]

Secondly, difficulty results from the proliferation of the meaning of the term "culture" and such sister and subconcepts as "society," "political culture," and "national

---

[1]Boulding, The Image, p. 16.

[2]Hubertus C. J. Duijker and N. H. Frijda, National Character and National Sterotypes: A Trend Report Prepared for the International Union of Scientific Psychology (UNESCO: Amsterdam North-Holland Pub. Co., 1960), pp. 12-29.

[3]Klaus Knorr and James D. Rosenau (ed.), Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, The Center for International Studies), p. 82. Emphasis supplied.

character," among others. Unfortunately, the working definitions of such concepts relate more information about the author or observer of a study than the concept or nation being analyzed.[1] Thus the differences between "culture," "society," and other concepts are essentially theoretical and methodological variations of the sister disciplines of American sociology and anthropology. For example, anthropologists view culture pattern as the basic concept, while sociologists use social structure as the key.[2] Add to this the political scientist with his emphasis on political culture, which includes general acculturation, political socialization and political recruitment, and the concept becomes more complex.[3] For example, Almond and Verba employ the "narrower" application of "political culture," terming it the attitudes, beliefs and sentiments prevailing in the total population yet fundamental to those distinct parts termed political behavior and the political process.[4] "Child

---

[1]Claude Levi-Strauss, Les structures elémentaires de la parenté (Paris: Presses Universitaries de France, 1949). Also Levi-Strauss quoted in Laurence Wylie and Armand Bégué, Deux villages (Anthropologie Structurale de Paris: 1958), p. 22.

[2]Milton Singer, "Culture," IESS, Vol. 3, p. 528.

[3]More specifically, political culture is that "system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation to politics." Verba, Political Culture, p. 513.

[4]Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, p. 32; Pye, Political Development, p. 104.

development" then is replaced by the concept "political socialization," while "national character" or its subconcept "modal personality" is ignored. Mead and Métraux, rather than using "character" or "culture," turn to the term "cultural character structure."[1] George totally disregards culture and role in favor of "predisposition," "environment," and "response."[2] It is little wonder that the concept "culture," even "political culture," may or even has become unusable as currently employed. In light of the current study's emphasis, Lane's explanation of change in political ideology is important as an attempt to clear the air. He says:

> For any society: an existential base creating certain common experiences interpreted through certain cultural premises by men with certain personal qualities in the light of certain social conflicts produces certain political ideologies.[3]

This too is culture, for both concepts emphasize group experience over individual experience, social over case history, and the shared institutional and common bonds over the unique.[4] Yet "political culture," just as the generalized term culture, includes such basic elements as economics, history,

---

[1]Margaret Mead in Margaret Mead and Rhoda Métraux, The Study of Culture at a Distance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 4.

[2]See his Operational Code or Woodrow Wilson.

[3]Lane, Political Ideology, pp. 415-6.

[4]Ibid., p. 10 and 416.

politics and social structure with the principal components of values, beliefs and emotional attitudes. Still, regardless of the concept employed, what is right or normative, cognitive or existential--that is, how things actually are in the real world, and affective or emotional reactions or feelings are never clearly delineated. We then come full circle from the view expressed in 1871 that culture[1] is a complex whole which includes many "capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society"[2] to the contemporary American political science emphasis on "political culture." The latter concept encompasses "many others, including political ideology, national ethos and spirit, national political psychology and the fundamental values of a people."[3] To repeat, culture, even "political" culture, has many variations, usually in direct relationship to the professional orientation or theoretical bent and methodologies employed. It is therefore possible for different observers of the same national behavioral patterns to reach diametrically opposed conclusions.[4] For purposes herein, particularly in relation to the French,

---

[1]Will Durant and Ariel Durant, The Story of Civilization: The Age of Voltaire, IX(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965). See their discussion of the French term "civilization," a word coined to signify an advancement in social culture with progress in the arts, science and statecraft.

[2]Edward Tylor, Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art and Custom (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 1 of Vol. I(orig. 1871-4).

[3]DeVos, "Political Culture,"IESS, 12, p. 218.

[4]Sprout and Sprout, International Politics, pp. 500-3.

"culture" has a more valid application than "political culture," although by American "standards" the latter is included in what is being discussed. However, the French themselves emphasize culture or civilization above all other concepts. In simplest terms, then, what may be called either culture or national character is a general spirit or a genius of a national civilization[1] resulting from the independent but interpenetrating status of social, personality, and culture systems.[2] In broadest terms, French culture may be defined as a perspective shared in a particular group, whether viewed as a community at large or elites.[3] That "perspective" or attitude includes the basic beliefs or ideology[4] of identity, goals, and expectations of others, including nations and roles. It may be termed a "basic personality structure"[5] or a "national character," a concept generally refined as those

---

[1]E. Sapir, "Culture, Genuine and Spurious," American Journal of Sociology 29 (January 1922):401-429.

[2]Talcott Parsons, "Some Comments on the General Theory of Action," American Sociological Review 18 (1953):618-631.

[3]See Hirschman, "Search for Paradigms," World Politics.

[4]Ideology was originally a French word meaning the science or study of ideas.

[5]Abram Kardiner, "The Concept of Basic Personality Structure as an Operational Tool in the Social Sciences" in Ralph Linton (ed.), The Science of Man in the World Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), pp. 469-483.

"relatively enduring personality characteristics and patterns that are modal among the adult members of the society."[1] This national character or "basic personality structure" includes man's genius, his world view or Weltanschauung, and values, as either "social character" or "personal qualities."[2] Cultural values, goals or perspectives are "publicly recognized" in either a positive or negative way, but always intelligible to the audience. These "value orientations" or ethics influence all individual and group behavior, including man-environment relationships, the expectations of one individual toward another, and individual role perceptions in conjunction with perceptions of other nations.[3] What a society or culture is, then, is determined by the underlying "conjunction of forces, habits, interests, and ideas,"[4] which gives life meaning, that world view termed by many as ideology.

This complex semantic jungle leaves us with no satisfactory concept of either culture or national character.

---

[1]Alex Inkeles and Daniel J. Levinson, "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural Systems" in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. II (Cambridge, Mass.:ADdison-Wesley Pub. Co., Inc., 1954), pp. 977-1020.

[2]Anthony F. C. Wallace, Culture and Personality, 2d ed. (New York: Random House, 1970 (orig. 1940)); Robert Lane, Political Thinking and Consciousness: The Private Life of the Political Mind (Chicago: Markham Pub. Co., 1969).

[3]Lane, Political Thinking,p. 20.

[4]August Heckscher in Raymond Aron and August Heckscher, A Diversity of Worlds:France and the United States Look at Their Common Problems (New York: Reynal & Co., 1954), p. 159.

Explicit or implied is the meaning of that which has been acquired through a lifetime's learning and interaction with other individuals.[1] Enduring personality characteristics and unique life styles are traceable to formative influences of a cultural character.[2] Essentially national character is beliefs, not reality. As such, it is often expressed as an ideal adult character of major importance for parents and other adults in authority to use as behavioral examples in child-rearing techniques.[3] These beliefs or values seem to be a hierarchical arrangement. The "top" is comprised of a small number of broadly defined values, then a "middle range" or more specific norms and values held by subsections of the population, and finally the "base" or individual personality. This is true only if we first accept the idea that a "degree of uniformity of character structure occurs among the individuals who participate in any given set of cultural behaviors."[4]

---

[1]Duijker and Frijda, National Character, p. 165.

[2]DeVos, "National Character," IESS, p. 15.

[3]Geoffrey Gorer, The Concept of National Character (Middlesex, England: Harmondsworth for Penguin Books, 1950), p. 77.

[4]Bateson, "Systematic Approaches," Journal of Personality 11, p. 131.

Still, "national" character is a given set, with individual character differing from another more in relative strength and mutual interplay than mere tendencies. Cultural behaviors can be explained by examining how the learning process is "rigged," i.e., what the context for learning cultural variations is. Here will be found not only the content of thought in a society, but the way of thinking--those "pervasive patterns of sensing and thinking, of believing and orienting, that are characteristic of human behavior in a particular place at a particular time."[1] Thus in any complex society several "levels" of culture exist, each transmitted primarily through the family, with the aid of such other social groups as religious associations, philosophical schools, and academies.[2]

To understand specific objectives of a country's foreign policy, whether expressed as national interest, purpose, or destiny, requires some consideration of culture, including the symbols and nonlegal restraints of national myths and national ideas or traditions of the national past with its heroes.[3]

---

[1]Eulau, Political Analysis, p. 355. In other words, what is being discussed is ethos.

[2]Thomas Bottomore, Elites and Society (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1965), pp. 1-9. See also Eliot, Notes Toward the Definition of Culture.

[3]Sprout and Sprout, International Politics, pp. 500-503.

French Culture: A Research Dilemma

Such an analysis of cultural characteristics or national character suggests a Pandora's box at best. The ideal research precondition would be to study a homogeneous society, with little societal fragmentation. As Pye notes, a political culture relatively homogeneous with a stable political system presents factual evidence to validate the normative statement that such a society would have core values that directly effect its foreign policy. In such a culture, each generation is socialized out of common experience and against a common memory of past traditions, with family, religion, etc. reinforcing each other.[1] However, we are not to consider here the realities of whether any society, in particular a French society, is homogeneous or heterogeneous or whether indeed there exists within French culture one dominant structure (highly unlikely) or many subcultures. Empirical data and normative considerations undeniably are evident to support the existence or nonexistence of any number of these combinations, just as it is possible to "prove" national character is nonexistent.[2]

It is not the intent here to discuss all aspects of French national character. To do so would require examination

---

[1]Pye, Political Development, p. 105.

[2]William R. Schonfeld, Youth and Authority in France: A Study of Secondary Schools (Beverly Hills, Calif.:A Sage Professional Paper, 1971), p. 8; Duijker and Frijda, National Character, pp. 31-2.

of such simple cultural patterns as diet, dress, and work habits, and the more complex habitual thought patterns, including any rationalized religious system, political and social patterns.[1] Too, common values of all systems, such as the universal will to survive, will be assumed without further discussion. Rather, the consideration here is to analyze the dominant cultural characteristics from which, in which, and through which the political leadership functions, but recognizing that "individual" variations are merely variations on the same theme.[2] Neither is it within the scope of this chapter, if indeed any study, to verify the validity of the existence of the characteristics being examined. What is established empirical fact is not as important to understanding human behaviors, whether individual or cultural behaviors and particularly decision-making behavior, as the reality of what is perceived to be fact by the culture or individual. Using our own experiences, then, whether Americans are group-oriented, indeed social corporatists in practice (albeit limited), does not negate the reality that many perceive themselves as rugged individualists, shaped by a frontier spirit

---

[1]Singer, "Culture," IESS, p. 529.

[2]Importantly, cultural backgrounds provide a basis for comparative analysis. Knowing this data could result in meaningful comparative relationships of such things as artistic backgrounds of political leaders. See Paige, Readings.

which few have experienced firsthand. Yet such a myth has definite effects on public policy, both domestic and foreign.

One of the earliest "warnings" of the difficulties in attempting to analyze French culture came in 1907. Bodley referred to France as "the most complex product of civilization on the face of the globe," and "the last country in the world about which it is possible to generalize."[1] Complexity often leads to oversimplification, and even further to caricature or stereotype, i.e., undifferentiated judgment.[2] Such difficulties are contextual in so far as a stereotype exists only if the situation or context is one which favors the caricature. In other words, the same concepts or terminology mean different things to different people in different contexts. This is not to say that auto-stereotypes or self-images and hetero-stereotypes or foreign images are unimportant, for "relatively stable opinions of a generalizing and evaluative nature" do exist.[3] Yet to describe the French as both very amorous and highly rationalistic provides a stereotype of contradictory proportions. What the French society is, of course, is a special conjunction of forces, habits, interests, and ideas that too readily submit to easy caricature and oversimplification,[4] particulrly when,

---

[1]J. E. C. Bodley, France (London: Macmillan, 1907), pp.3-4.

[2]Duijker and Frijda, National Character, p. 115.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Heckscher in Aron and Heckscher, Diversity of Worlds, p. 159.

as Bagehot warned, the illustrating of a principle requires that a writer "exaggerate much. . .and omit much."[1]

To study French culture requires indirect methods of observation, but then research in international politics and political leadership depends to a greater extent on such methods.[2] In some respects, all cultures are studied at a distance, even if one is physically there. The major problem, however, is that in trying to assess French culture and character, the measures of our own culture are employed.

One other research limitation should be noted. This analysis of French national character or culture applies more readily to the pre-1970 period and the political leadership thereof. Statistical data and studies since 1968 are revealing more about an evolutionary, even revolutionary change, of the French culture. Since culture is never static, this natural evolution will eventually affect the core values, attitudes, etc. of France, which has been undergoing profound changes in her entire socio-economic structures since the 1960's, modifications actually begun as the result of the impact of World War II. However, these "changes," if they become such rather than faddish cultural experimentation, have yet to make major changes in the French national character.[3] Too, those being

---

[1]See Norman St. John-Stevas, Walter Bagehot (Indiana:np,1958).

[2]Knorr and Rosenau, International Politics, pp. 10-11; Singer, International Politics. Decision-making, event-interaction analysis, and content analysis studies require indirect methodologies.

[3]Indeed, as Lane notes, within a culture, the easiest and fastest to change is government. See his Political Ideology,p203.

most affected by the changing socio-economic-political structures are still under thirty years of age and do not dominate the political or elite positions where cultural change would be reflected.

Before exploring the generalized culture or national character of France, it would be well to make brief note of how such characteristics have been investigated. Duijker broadly divides the diverse conceptions of national character into two main types, personality-centered and culture-centered. The former emphasize general patterns of personality characteristics while the latter focus on habits, norms, values and practices. These "camps" encompass all studies in the spectrum (cultural, individual, and institutional), analyzing the same phenomena from different perspectives, with other studies centering on the linkages between the "types." Within these ranges of study, there have evolved six main conceptions, which may also be considered as methodologies, of national character.[1] It is useful to review briefly these various orientations to culture or national character, particularly the French variation.

1). Essayistic literature from ancient to modern times has sought to understand and explain national character by the only conceptual tool available, the recording or describing a people with an emphasis on those psychological traits

---

[1]Duijker and Frijda, National Character, pp. 12-29.

supposedly characteristic of a given nation-state. Although a popular form, essayistic literature often falls into stereotypes reflecting the writer's biases or cultural references. However, these materials do provide unproven hypotheses, even intuitive direction, for those empirical studies seeking common or standardized characteristics in a society.[1]

2). "Modal personality" is a research strategy employing statistical concepts and presumes national character as relatively enduring personality characteristics and patterns occuring most often among adult members of society.[2] These studies indicate not only unimodal but multimodal personalities within the same national population, but more as a "character of a nation" than "national character." Although such a modal personality does seem to exist, the studies employing this psychological technique are not definite enough to preclude cultural differentiation over individual psychological responses during testing. This methodology does, however, provide for subcultural variations in its pluralistic variations.[3] Still, frequency distributions of personality patterns are as hard to come by as essayist objectivity.

---

[1]See for example Salvador de Madariaga, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards: An Essay in Comparative Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1928); Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Knopf, 1960).

[2]See Linton, Science of Man; Lindsey, Social Psychology; Alex Inkeles and Levinson, "National Character and Modern Political Systems" in F. Hsu (ed.), Psychological Anthropology: Approaches to Culture and Personality (Homewood:The Dorsey Press, 1960), pp. 981-3.

[3]Lindsey, Social Psychology, I, pp. 5-6.

3). Basic Personality Structure is a similar orientation, but one that does take into consideration cultural variations. The emphasis is upon the belief that different cultures "generate" different personality types to insure self-preservation. The basic beliefs or nationality are shared by groups as a set of symbols, an identity. For example, France must "generate" acquisitive personality types with high discipline and acceptance of structure, such as punctuality, in order to be an effective industrial society. Basic Personality Structure is a very generalized concept, basic to the culture but not necessarily to personality. Such cultural aspects as the family structure, childhood, and education are studied. It is therefore an experience or explanatory concept rather than a statistical one. Importantly, it provides international relations researchers with a more valid use-concept insofar as the emphasis is on a nation-wide culture rather than a modal class. Gorer, however, views the concept as an unfortunate term, an attempt to describe the shared societal motives, habits, and culture of a society.[1] To reiterate, common, individual personality structures of motives or a combination of traits or motives is the research focus. Thus the concept may be used with many different

---

[1]See Geoffrey Gorer, The American People: A Study in National Character (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1948) or his Exploring English Character (New York: Criterion Books, 1955).

personality or other theories, although that of psychoanalytic theory is more prevalent and notorious.

4). National character may also be analyzed as "systems of attitudes, values and beliefs held in common by the members of a given society," or a "social personality."[1] This concept variation permits analysis of the conscious aspects of adult personality that political scientists are more familiar with, rather than delving into the deeper more fundamental aspects. The emphasis is on the "more or less conscious idea-systems: beliefs, attitudes, values, sentiments"[2] obtained from representative samples of particular national populations.[3]

5). National character may also be examined from the standpoint of culture and personality, the psychological aspects of a national culture drawn from anthropological analyses. This methodological orientation includes not only such culturally learned behavioral data as folkways, institutional practices and behavior, including of course political behavior, but also systems of norms and values evident in the culture. Thus those collective social patterns important in shaping man's experiences-

---

[1]Duijker and Frijda, National Character, p. 20.

[2]Alex Inkeles, "Some Sociological Observations on Culture and Personality Studies" in C. Kluckhohn, H. A. Murray and D. M. Schneider (eds.), Personality in Nature, Society and Culture, rev. ed. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1953), pp. 577-592.

[3]See Sondages, Institut Français d'Opinion Publique, Vols. 19-31.

religious systems, education, commerce, and observation of family interactions-are studied.[1] Actually, within the culture and personality studies three approaches are evident: those seeking relationships between child-learning and later behavior, the cultural restraints of interpersonal interactions, and the simple descriptions of a "single cultural configuration," that is, a surface description of some aspect of the life style.[2] The values being observed result from a collective study of the "national way of life, the characteristic behaviour [sic] and the attitudes of the national population,"[3] based on the belief that certain qualities of intellect and character occur more frequently and are more highly valued in one society than another. It then becomes possible to describe what pressures the individual will face in a political role.[4]

6). The most restricted "meaning" of national character refers to the mentality reflected in a nation's cultural products, its literature, art, and philosophy. The "genius of

---

[1]See Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1946); Mead and Métraux, Culture; Gorer, National Character; Lane, Political Ideology, p. 215; also Benedict's Patterns of Japanese Culture (Boston:Houghton-Mifflin, 1934).

[2]Mead in Mead and Métraux, Study of Culture at a Distance, p. 15.

[3]Duijker and Frijda, National Character, p. 27.

[4]Joseph A. and V. F. Murray, Chamorros and Carolinians of Saipan: Personality Studies (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1951); also Wylie, Deux villages.

a people" expresses the dominant values of a culture. In reality, this may be more the dominant values of an elite rather than the whole of the population.[1] In broadest terms, elites are source-symbols of a cultural common life, embodying the values that maintain that culture. Still, these elites might represent cultural values more clearly than other strata of the population. Duijker notes that this methodology is rarely used except by those who have more than a second hand knowledge of psychology, and then to rehash current stereotypes.[2] Still this type of study could provide the key to national character, particularly since content analysis has been applied to such diverse media as speeches, mass television and children's stories.[3]

It should be evident that national character studies involve a complexity of methods. To review such methods makes us aware of the necessity of selectivity in what is to be discussed. Regardless, the phenomena of national character or culture can not be ignored.

During his political tenure Charles de Gaulle was often characterized as an aberration, a throwback to the nationalistic era of the nineteenth century, an "unmodern"

---

[1]See Madariaga, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards.

[2]See David C. McClelland, "Measuring Motivation in Phantasy: The Achievement Motive," in Harold Guetzhow(ed.), Groups, Leadership and Men (Pittsburgh: Carnegie Press, 1951), pp. 191-205. Also Duijker and Frijda, National Character, p.29.

[3]Movies are a popular topic for this analysis. See pp. 267-316 in Mead and Métraux, Study of Culture at a Distance.

political leader. Franklin Roosevelt called de Gaulle his "cross of Lorraine" while Congressmen called him a "mortal enemy." Newsweek reported that the General ruled "like some popularly elected medieval monarch."[1] An underlying question then is whether indeed de Gaulle was so different than his countrymen. That is, did this political leader deviate from French cultural norms, and if so, how? If, however, his actions are found to be "culturally compatible," particularly in re foreign policy values, what could such a "conclusion" have on the subsequent political leadership of Pompidou and Giscard?

French Culture:
Stable Instability and Contradictory Similarities

Cultural phenomena are those underlying presuppositions that have evolved over the generations to give life meaning, a world view or ideology. The elementary factor in the beliefs and ideals of any ideology is, of course, historical consciousness.[2] This brings us full circle, for the forces of the past are called, by some, national character. Such forces may either conflict, coexist or synthesize. Still, the important factor is that every society shares a history that

---

[1]"End of an era: France after de Gaulle," Newsweek (May 12, 1969), p. 41.

[2]Mullins, "Concept of Ideology," APSR, pp. 500, 510.

is not experienced by any other peoples. Within this history are deeply embedded cultural norms continually being refined and passed from one generation to the next, culminating in the predispositions shared by the present generation.[1] When these norms include an "elaborate, integrated and coherent" belief system, there exists justifications for the exercise of power, judgments and explanations of historical events, differentiation between political right and wrong,causal and moral connections between behavior and other activities, and guidelines for action.[2]

Every culture has a rhythm, an organization of the cycle of life into stages from childhood to marriage to death. There exists a particular cultural pace of either punctuality (U.S.A.) or leisure (France), a historical focus on either the past, present (U.S.A.) or future (France combines all) and generational relationships on the use of the family (U.S.A.-nuclear; France-extended). These factors are reflected in the political mind as a sense of time, place, and community.[3] Or to use political theory concepts, within cultural premises will be found time, focus, nature-Metaphysics; morality-Ethics; and boundaries of knowledge-Epistemology.[4]

---

[1]Rosenau, International Politics, p. 146.

[2]Mullins, "Concept of Ideology," APSR, pp. 500, 510.

[3]Lane, Ideology, pp. 284-295.

[4]Ibid., p. 433.

In short, the major cultural factors in the determination of "Frenchness" constitutes the focus here. This venture is limited by an inability to quantify much of the research phenomena being examined. However, as Brinton notes, this does not mean it is "unreal."[1] The discussion begins with a brief examination of the general structure and characteristics of French culture, including selected aspects of the acculturation process. Some discussion will be made of the dominant social (family, education) and political (history and philosophy) determinants of French culture. This analysis includes those French ideal values and qualities which should bind its population in varying degrees, and in particular Charles de Gaulle during his political tenure.

General Structure and Characteristics of French Culture

Novice students of French society and its politics are immediately cognizant of the existence of numerous contrasts, so much so that it is impossible to use simple categories to classify "the way the French do or think about anything."[2] Even self-acknowledged simple interpretations reveal the same author advocating contradictory characteristics

---

[1]Crane Brinton, The Americans and the French (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 29.

[2]Schonfeld, Youth and Authority in France, p. 8.

as simultaneously existing, but as the dominant French cultural characteristic. Tocqueville, one of the first students of national character per se recognized this:

> The French character is full of contrasts, constantly doing worse or better than what was expected of it, at times above, at times below, the level of mankind. . .temperamentally rebellious, better able to put up with the arbitrary and even violent rule of one sovereign than with the orderly and free government of the chief citizens; to-day the sworn foe of all obedience, tomorrow serving with a sort of passion; never so free as to go beyond the reach of slavery, or so enslaved as to be unable to break a yoke - a worshipper of change, of power, of success, of noise, of glamour, rather than of true glory, more capable of heroism than of virtue, of genius than of commonsense. . .the most brillant and dangerous of all European nations, the most fitted to become in turn an object of admiration, of pity, of terror - but never of indifference.[1]

French civilization since Tocqueville's observations has changed. As early as 1929, the major element of "progress" was recognized as a negative force of change. Siegfried wrote that machine industrialization would destroy French individualism.[2] Therefore to survive, France must change her "outlook on life, the character of her population, her manner of living, and her ancient conception of political life."[3] Although industrialization has affected French

---

[1]Alexis deTocqueville, Recollections. See the new translation by George Lawrence, ed. J. P. Mayer and A. P. Kerr. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1971), pp. 91-2.

[2]See André Siegfried, France: A Study in Nationality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930).

[3]Heckscher in Aron and Heckscher, Diversity of Worlds, pp. 108-9.

society, the change[1] is far from complete, with many aspects of French civilization and its distinct personality surviving. Yet even with the growth of industrialization, there exists the French choice of values and ends. Thus contemporary French culture seems designated best by the Chinese symbol for crisis. That is, both disaster and opportunity exist in a ying-yang relationship. Even with the formalism and stratification of the French traditional society, basic changes do occur. These changes, particularly those involving social attitudes, have been difficult for the French people to accept, and acceptance when accomplished is slow. For example, in 1959 a New Franc was instituted, yet as long as eight years later many educated people continued to calculate in Old Francs.[2] Thus "change," or more specifically the "universalizing of phenomena linked to the development of material civilization"[3] is viewed negatively. So-called "inevitable" innovations are believed destructive of the French:

> . . .flair for style and care for quality, [its] honoring of individual prowess, the ethos of individual fulfillment; lucidity of thought, a passion for ideas, a certain concept of liberty, of human proportion, of harmony amid diversity; [and] the enrichment of the present through the past.[4]

---

[1]See J. E. Flower, France Today, 2d ed (London:Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1973), passim.

[2]John Ardagh,The New French Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 231.

[3]Robert Aron et al, As Others See Us: The United States Through Foreign Eyes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), see particularly "From France," pp. 57-71.

[4]Ardagh, New French Revolution, p. 455.

Although French culture today includes variations of "negative" technologically-associated characteristics, much of the fundamental nature of French civilization remains unchanged. Thus a traditional political and social policy has been and is that of"grandeur," a matter of spiritual, cultural and aristic prestige rather than material benefits. Politically this "grandeur" is the subjective determination of the national interest at any one period of time and even extends to Europe as a whole, i.e., European grandeur is the "Europe of States." It is a characteristic applied to phenomenon when no other explanation suffices.

Another longstanding characteristic is that like most European countries, France has a long history of self-conscious awareness of national differences,[1] particularly between the French people and "others." Studies have shown that the essential "differences" between the French and other nationalities are along racial and political lines. In references to the United States and the U.S.S.R., for example, it is believed that Russians are less dissimilar to "Frenchness" than Americans.[2] The United States has long been distrusted by the French for a perceived political immaturity, in part because our leadership--or lack thereof--

---

[1]DeVos, "National Character," IESS, p. 15.

[2]Library of Congress Document #8863, ADI Auxiliary Publication Project (Washington, D.C.:Photoduplication Service).

increases the propsects for disorder, particularly nuclear war.[1] Too, the French view international "battles" as being conducted by political, economic, and psychological means. They emphasize the latter, while the United States prefers military strength.[2]

In contrast to the United States, but like her European neighbors, France continues to have an elaborate social grading scheme. Social distance is large, with status differences reflecting some variations in norms or codes of behavior.[3] However, more so than her neighbors, the French social hierarchy is based on intelligence and adaptability, particularly the willingness to conform. At the top of this hierarchy are the intellectuals, a group which includes writers, artists, scientists, philosophers, religious thinkers, social theorists, political commentators, university teachers, lawyers, engineers, and journalists.[4]

---

[1]John T. Marcus, Neutralism and Nationalism in France: A Case Study (New York: Bookman Associations, 1958), p. 131.

[2]Aron in Aron and Heckscher, Diversity of Worlds, p. 21.

[3]Duijker and Frijda, National Character. See also Flower, France Today.

[4]Bottomore, Elites and Society, p. 70.

The role of this group is reflected in the fact that for several centuries intellectuals have formed nearly half the total number of individuals recorded in Petit Larousse.[1] Although all intellectuals seem to nourish hopes of eventual membership in Richelieu's French Academy, those accepted may be divided into two groups: those of the upper social class with strong right wing attitudes who have graduated from the Ecole Libre des Sciences politicques and the working middle class or peasantry whose leftwing attitudes came out of the Ecole Normale.[2] The emphasis of this "class," however, is upon literary intelligence and style, to the point that Nourissier's statement is valid. That is, the French have an "unconscious horror" of oversimple statesmen, preferring "enlightened despotism, brutality embellished by style, [and] literary intelligence as much as political."[3] France, then, is an exception to the rule that:

> Philosophers are less numerous than the clergy, less intelligible than novelists, less exciting than political pamphleteers, less revered than scientists.[4]

---

[1]Alain Girard (ed.), La reussite sociale: ses caracteres, ses effets, ses lois en France (Paris: Press Universitaires de France, 1961), pp. 256-9.

[2]Bottomore, Elites and Society, p. 76.

[3]Francois Nourissier, The French. tr. Adrienne Foulke (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 102.

[4]G. J. Warnock, English Philosophers Since 1900 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 166.

In contrast to the intellectuals is the French peasant, a term that encompasses not only small farmers or those directly working the land, but artisans and bourgeois, those of the middle class consciousness.[1] More so than the intellectuals, this "group" is a characteristic rather than a statistical entity. Rightly or wrongly, the peasant is characterized as having a quick, clear, precise mind[2] along with the prerevolutionary bourgeois conception of work and thrift. The French peasant is often suspicious of the outside world, although he believes it operates along Descartes' rational procedures.[3] He is highly individualistic, which often means not wanting government"interferences" with agriculture. Yet Bonapartist tendencies are prevalent in the rural areas, usually as a democratic variation. Still, the "defense of the little peasant in French politics is traditionally as sacred as the defense of southern womanhood among Dixie congressmen."[4]

Other that the fundamental differences between intellectual and peasant, there are few major national and

---

[1]See Ernest Labrousse, "The Evolution of Peasant Society in France from the Eighteenth Century to the Present" in Evelyn M. Acomb and Martin L. Brown Jr. (eds.), French Society and Culture Since the Old Regime. The Eleutherian and Mills Colloquium, 1964,of the Society for French Historical Studies and the Societe D'Histoire Moderne (New York: Holt,Rinehart & Winston,Inc.,1966) pp.25,43-64

[2]Charles Seignobos, The Evolution of the French People,tr. Catherine A. Phillips (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1932), pp. 373-82

[3]Herbert J. Spiro, "Comparative Politics: A Comprehensive Approach," APSR 56(Sept. 1962): 577-595; Andree Hoyles,"Social Structures" in Flowers, New France, pp. 1-26.

[4]Gordon Wright,"Catholics and Peasantry in France", Political Science Quarterly 68 (December 1953): 543

regional differences between the "French People."[1] French culture is essentially Parisian culture, not only because culture is something of small groups, but because Paris has long exercised predominant influence in this area. Paris has developed a form of urban psychology only with the recent past. Rather, families living in Paris continue formal ties with the countryside, not only by visits there, but by ownership of second homes in the regions from which they originally came. When one speaks of French literature, what is really being discussed is the activity of the Paris literary groups.[2] Still these small groups are not closed, for one of the main characteristics of French culture is the pluralist and open character of modern French society,[3] a factor existing regardless of political instability. That is, even with five Republics, two Empires and three provisional governments, the French social climate is remarkably stable.

Thus France, both politically and socially, is more an ideal, " a purely cerebral creation, which rests less and less on concrete realities:"[4] France is not a race nor territory,

---

[1]For an opposing viewpoint see Alex N. Dragnich and Jorgen Rasmussen, Major European Governments, 4th. Ed. (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1974), pp. 157-59

[2]See Sapir, "Culture," American Journal of Sociology.

[3]Brinton, French, p. 209

[4]Jacques de Launay, DeGaulle and His France: A Psycho-Political and Historical Portrait of Charles deGaulle. tr. Dorothy Albertyn (New York: The Julian Press, Inc., 1968), p.34.

but rather an "increasing consciousness."[1] To be French, therefore, is to have a French mind and a French heart.[2] French civilization is something that can be taught and learned, but never completely by "outsiders," at least not enough to be a total Frenchperson.[3] Thus Frenchness is a "given," a nonmystical, nonracial, "positive" doctrine of nationality by history.[4] A Frenchman is not someone who merely possess a French passport and speaks the language of Descartes. Rather a Frenchman is one who knows "who broke the Soissons vase, what happened to Buridan's donkey, why Parmentier gave his name to a hash, why Charles Martel saved Christendom."[5] How a Frenchman knows such things, of course, is a matter of socialization, begun in the primary stages by the family and the educational system.

Le foyer et l'honnête homme:
The French Home and School

Each French generation is socialized out of common experience and against a common memory of what Durkheim calls

---

[1]Gerard, France, pp. viii-ix.

[2]D. W. Brogan, French Personalities and Problems, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 60.

[3]Mead in Mead and Métraux, Study of Culture at a Distance, p. 19

[4]Brogan, French Personalities, p. 59.

[5]Sanche DeGramont, The French: Portrait of a People, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1968), p. 11.

a "collective consciousness."[1] Past traditions, the family and religion, each reinforcing the other as the conscience,[2] provide the rules and standards of behavior that are necessary to preserve social solidarity. According to many, the most crucial phase of this "conscience" occurs at a relatively early age, childhood.[3] For in any given culture, character-structure is shaped not only by "innate predispositions" but direct and specific formal and informal influences in the growth processes.[4] The primary influence in most instances is, of course, the family. And importantly, it is the authority relationships of the family that provide the predominant means to study many aspects of our discipline. All institutions have patterns of authority, subordination and superordination, among actors. Thus families, just as all other formal and informal relationships, have political characteristics. Any individual's experience with any authority, whatever the context, conditions both attitudes

---

[1]Émile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology. tr. John A. Spaulding and George Simpson. (Glenco, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), p. 584.

[2]Pye, Political Development, p. 105.

[3]H. Hyman, Political Socialization (Glencoe:The Free Press, 1959); David Easton and R. D. Hess, "The Child's Political World," Midwest Journal of Political Science, V (August 1962-3):229-46.

[4]Here again, individuals may deviate from this pattern. However, our interest is in the pattern itself. See Kardiner, "Basic Personality Structure" in Linton, Science of Man, p. 475.

and behavior in the national and international political systems.[1] This family authority pattern is evident in collective adult phenomena such as folklore, political behavior, institutional practices, religious idea systems, rituals, and mass media, along with psychological analyses of the essentials of the child-rearing system or even personal assessment of individuals as individuals.[2] When studies have been made of the French family, it has been concluded that the core of most family relationships is a peculiarly French middleclass concept, le foyer.

In both their original and subsequent research, anthropological studies by Mead and Métraux have sought to explain le foyer as an essential ingredient to understanding French national culture and its self-image. Within this central concept they have discerned several "themes," each of which expands the initial view that le foyer is a husband, wife and children "living together in a fixed place and forming a closed circle."[3]

First, there exists the conception of le foyer as a model for closed circle relationships. This "closed circle"

---

[1]Harry Eckstein, "Proposal for a 'workshop' on the social bases of stable rule," (mimeo) in Schonfeld, Youth and Authority in France, p. 10.

[2]Mead and Métraux, Study of Culture at a Distance; Benedict, Chrysanthemum and Sword; or Gorer, National Character.

[3]Mead in Mead and Métraux, Themes in French Culture, pp. 2-3. The themes are modified somewhat herein.

is a sense of boundary to protect individuals within from outside intruders, including "adopted" individuals. Circles (cercle)then are self-contained and private, even to the point that an individual's health is not considered a proper topic of public conversation. This "privateness" is sealed by special blood relationships, the family, or outside le foyer by especially strong interests. Non-circle members are excluded on even the most informal level. Within these reciprocal personal relationships, each member responds to the other in a way which simultaneously includes the substance of the next action and response. More than merely a stranger, outsiders are l'étranger, one with whom there are no common bonds and about whose intentions there is no certainty. The concept is pervaded by this "basic" orientation, which is informative when it is recognized that le foyer is also a concept that could be incorporated on the national or international scale.[1] The traditional family is viewed as being a series of foyer circles encompassing past, present, and future. The past is continually incorporated into the present to provide models for the future. So too would be le foyer nationale. In either instance, le foyer is a key to French social stability.

Second, as previously noted, le foyer relationships originate an exclusive dyadic form which ultimately extends to

---

[1]Mead in Mead and Métraux, Study of Culture at a Distance, p. 52.

all areas of French society. These dyadic relationships begin with a married couple and their children, with "pairing" as adult-child, male-female, and younger-older relationships. These relationships are as unequal partners with distinct roles that "favor" the older members of society above peers or those younger.[1] Still these reciprocal personal relationships in their compartmentalization between pairs of individuals, provide "strength, richness and significance" in the family.[2]

Third, danger to members of le foyer are handled by externalization and distantiation. Children are taught that violence or aggression merely leads to more of the same, although some contrast exists in the Parisian expression, "as stupid as peace." Internal conflicts are "satisfied" by verbal battles, just as the chauvinistic passion is cleansed by a verbal antimilitarism. The traditional exceptions to this "rule" are during industrial strikes and baccalaureate week. The former is considered a valid exercise in fun, profit, or politics, while clashes with the police in the latter instance are a matter of student folklore. In addition, there are every fifteen years, "sudden" collapses in the "will to work" among a majority of the population.[3]

---

[1]Lane, Political Ideology, p. 268; Edward R. Tannenbaum, The New France (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1961), p.27.

[2]"Interview with a French Couple:Dyadic Relations in the Foyer" in Mead and Métraux, Study of Culture at a Distance, pp. 182-8. [3]Jean B. Blondel, "Challenges to Democracy in Britain

Fourth, the character and training of le foyer are in essence determined by the parents and have remained exceedingly stable through the generations.[1] Individual development is seen as a lifelong process, with "maturity" or adulthood possible after a long apprenticeship, often culminating only after the death of the parents. Throughout this apprenticeship and later life, the individual learns that all activities inherently present two potentials or qualities. The most sought, of course, is bonheur or "welfare, felicity, and good fortune."[2] But there is also malheur, the failure that results when the individual does not use skill or personal control over his body and its emotions.[4] In the end, as Voltaire noted, everything is done to the individual, who must be satisfied with cultivating his own garden, for no supernatural, natural justice exists. All that can be understood, then, and hopefully controlled,

---

and France," in E. A. Goerner (ed.), Democracy in Crisis:New Challenges to Constitutional Democracy in the Atlantic Area (Notre Dame:University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), pp. 1-17 at 1. The "collapses" have occurred in 1909, 1920, 1936, 1953, and 1968.

[2]Mead in Mead and Métraux, Themes in French Culture, p. 27.

[3]See Saul K. Padover with collaboration of Francois Goguel, Louis Rosenstock-Franck and Eric Weil, French Institutions: Values and Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), pp. 11-12.

[4]The latter must not be excessive and can be controlled by substituting verbalization for action.

are human behavior and the physical objects around us. Such role expectations are revealed in French children's stories, where the children learn that self-discipline and rational planning are the only ways to achieve personal satisfactions.[1] Rewards and deprivations in life may be equally undeserved, but the world can not be changed merely to satisfy human wishes. Therefore if one can not have what he wants, it is necessary to make the best of what is available by prudence and foresight. Consequently, French parents admonish their children "Sois Sage!" in contrast to the American "Be Good!" Child-rearing in the French home, then, stresses intellectuality, including distinctions in relationships, ideas and expression. Besides these aspects, parents also begin the teaching of language. If it is true that language is the most direct expression of national character, French is unique in its content and style of delivery. The language lends itself to abstraction and is delivered or pronounced distinctly in a word order sentence structure that has a rigid fixity. This language art is reinforced by the educational system.

The French educational system reinforces the abstract nature of its language by emphasizing theoretical and encyclopaedic training.[2] In addition, the learning process reinforces the very regular rules of le foyer with its emphasis on honesty and nonviolence and particularly the dominance-submission or

---

[1]Tannenbaum, New France, pp. 24-26. For example, McClelland's content analysis reveals marked differences in children's tales, depending on the cultural translation.

[2]Aron, As Others See Us.

authority-laden authority pattern. The latter term best describes French behavioral control, without ideological control, exercised by superordinates upon subordinates.[1] It is a syndrome found throughout French society, but usually associated with the educational system. In the system of superordinates, the teacher directs student response thoroughly. Not only are instructions given as to the general curriculum, such as reading materials and homework, but more detailed instructions require student compliance. This includes the type of paper to use in doing homework, what kind of writing instrument to use, the general format of the writing upon the page and so forth.[2]

The entire learning process, then, in both informal "familial" and formal "educational" processes, is rigged to give a sense of dominance. But there is also an emphasis on discrimination. For example, national geography studies are clued on the French hexagon shape, which is seen as a balance and harmony.[3] This "natural" concept of balance consequently

---

[1]Schonfeld, Youth and Authority in France, p. 72 f. 3.

[2]Ibid., p. 15. Schonfeld divides this directiveness into instrumental coverage, comportmental coverage and ideological coverage. This writer disagrees that ideological coverage is successful. It would appear that since some students also experience a chahut syndrome, i.e., rebel against the authority-laden syndrome, the overall result of the curriculum and ideological coverages is that the students accept the former but eventually reject portions of the latter. See also p. 34.

[3]See Joseph T. Carroll, The French: How They Live and Work (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969).

leads to the educational ideal which sees specialization, here again, technological specialization in particular, as a cardinal sin. Science and its technology is viewed only as a means. What is done with these means is a philosophic problem linked to happiness and justice. Thus lies at least one explanation for the heavy French educational reliance on philosophical studies. This emphasis is successful through an educational system so rigidly state-controlled that until very recently all students studied the same thing at the same time. Teaching, then, is deductive, rhetorical, formal, and preoccupied with literary style and expression through the emphasis on the classics, literature and logic. Necessarily the teacher seldom has real personal contact with pupils. Rather, the more important task is to train intellects, men of literature rather than politics.[1] This results in a "severe and savage system" of written exams, from even the youngest age.[2] For example, many an eleven year old preparing to enter the lycée has faced this test question:

> Comment on the philosophical significance of the Gide passage where he described as a boy how his favorite marble rolled into a crack in the wall, whereupon he grew one fingernail to huge length to get it out, but by then lost interest in the marble so bit off the nail again.[3]

---

[1]See Ardagh, New French Revolution, p. 310.

[2]Padover et al, French Institutions, pp. 10-15.

[3]Ardagh, New French Revolution, pp. 310-316.

Or there are the baccalaureate questions, a portion of one question asked:

> Does the "honest man" of the seventeenth century such as he is defined by LaRochefoucald, Pascal, and deMere possess qualities compatible with the needs of contemporary society?[1]

Such examples indicate philosophy's role in education, as also evident in the fact that secondary school students devote an entire complementary year to the study of philosophy. If the student is a science major a more limited emphasis is required, but one still including the study of logic, epistemology and ethics.[2]

Still, there is actually little attempted ideological coverage in the educational system. Rather, teachers try objectively to communicate a critical bend of mind, an individualistic outlook in a humanistic education. One means to do this is the exercise "explication de texte." Students not only read, analyze and critique a given philosophical passage, but then are assigned a contemporary essay topic to employ the philosophic style, reasoning and expressions being studied. The process results in pupils being exposed to such diverse ideological beliefs that their own belief systems scatter all along the ideological spectrum.[3] It would be rather difficult to consider the

---

[1] Ibid.

[2] Mead in Mead and Métraux, Themes in French Culture, p. 161.

[3] Schonfeld, Youth and Authority in France, p. 17.

influence of such philosophers as De Tocqueville, Rousseau, Voltaire, and Péguy as being anything other than contradictory.

However, it is also true that until 1900 classical education in France did reflect political and social situations with a sharp division between primary and secondary education. At that time "the people," that is, those in primary education, first began to acquire the free inquiry and free consciences created by the bourgeoise secondary education.[1] Even before the educational reforms of 1968, students each week had a minimum of five hours of science, nine hours of math, thirteen to seventeen hours of physics, biology or higher math and at least nine hours of philosophy, considerably more than the "equivalent" American student enjoyed.[2] Still, even with philosophical diversity and the rigid classical emphasis, the French educational ideal remains "l'honnête homme." That is, what is sought is the formation of an intellectually complete man, not the specialized creature American society emphasizes and not even an individual who is a "useful member of society."[3] Still, the

---

[1]Henri Wallon, "The Philosophy of Education and Theory in France," in Martin Farber (ed.), Philosophic Thought in France and the United States: Essays Representing Major Trends in Contemporary American Philosophy (Albany, New York: State University of New York, 1950), pp. 320-335.

[2]Ardagh, New French Revolution, p. 313; Schonfeld, Youth and Authority in France, p. 73.

[3]Luethy, France Against Herself, pp. 57-61.

French see an essential difference between the complete man and the "learned idiot," a mindless man who knows, but does not understand. In striving for the ideal man, the heir to Greece and Rome, French education lays all importance on the unit of the individual with all his peculiarities, not the "unit" of society. Social organization is but a necessary evil, a means, with man the center of all things. Even the state is an adversary to be kept in bounds and any talk of social conscience is merely a rhetorical flower of speech. The French ideal is the golden mean, or correct measure, here again a balance or harmony of those extremes that come with the individualistic inclination. These values or ideals are inculcated by le foyer and subsequent formal education. Also shaped at this time is:

> A person's consciousness of himself as a citizen of a particular national society. . . [This consciousness is shaped also by an] understanding of what that society is. Sense of self and sense of nationality are intertwined. Western man has had a sense of history as having a beginning, an end, and a purpose. The idea of national mission and purpose emerged out of that view of history. Every society has its own version of how it came to be, where it is going, and what its dominant values are and should be.[1]

---

[1]Erwin Hargrove, Professional Roles in Society and Government: The English Case. Sage Professional Paper, Comparative Politics Series, Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.) (Beverly Hills, California: 1972), p. 14.

The Ought Over the Is: French History and Philosophy

It would be difficult then to ignore the effect of historical consciousness on a culture and its products. Even Mark Twain warned that to understand a Frenchman it is necessary first to consult a French history book, an old one. Historical consciousness, however, presents a contrast between belief and reality, a prime example of the previously noted statement that what is is not as important as what is believed to be. That is, myth or legend is a most indestructible creation and one not necessarily based on truth. Thus although the French have experienced many forms of government, they basically believe in an overall French stability. In other words, France has a fundamental unity, "is united," yet she is also diverse and multiple--two fundamental yet contradictory beliefs. Further, the French have the illusion of control over their political decision-making bodies. Yet parliamentary deputies are treated as "influence peddlers" rather than lawmakers.[1] Still another illusion concerns Joan of Arc, who is often cited as a means to understand French national feeling. More than anything else, this nonFrenchwoman typifies the reality that French national unity is not necessarily an objective fact, but rather an act of faith.[2] Schonfeld furthers the list of

---

[1]Tannenbaum, New France, pp. 6-7.

[2]Guerard, France, p. xvii.

myths and contrasts:

> The French [are a people who systematically] refuse to cooperate with one another, and yet, during WWII, they had one of the most effective resistance organizations of any nation under German control.[1]

In many respects WWII was not as much a war against fascism as a French civil war, with de Gaulle fighting the Vichy more than the Germans. Here is one more instance of defeat being claimed a victory. Another contrast is that France, still a nation of small shopkeepers, invented the department store. A double myth is that the French fight for disinterested causes and that enemies of France are enemies of Christian civilization.[2] Needless to say, France as a reality is not coextensive with French government.[3] This all inevitably results in French history and its theories being a mélange, a mixture or jumble, which seems to validate Voltaire's warning that history is merely the tricks the living play on the dead. Thus it is possible to pick or choose from any number of classifications used to explain French history and its politics, including:

1). traditionalist, bourgeois and industrial orders

2). the traditions of authority, liberty, and equality

3). the "geological faults" of the Great Revolution and the Industrial Revolution

4). the forces of order and the forces of movement

---

[1]Schonfeld, Youth and Authority in France, pp. 8-9.

[2]DeGramont, The French, p. 65. [3]Guerard, France, p. xii.

or 5). the representative and administrative traditions.[1] These "classifications" are not necessarily contradictory. Regardless, French history usually is regarded by Frenchmen as extraordinary, whether they disapprove or approve any particulars. Thus French history "forms a French nature which transcends French division."[2]

It has been said that the monarchy made France and the Church made the monarchy. Thus Nourissier sees France as "the embodiement of Christianity, Monarchy by Divine Right, Liberty, [and] the Rights of Man."[3] It is true that the principles and traditions of France are monarchical, while the sovereign is demos.[4] Thus some republicans are more royalist than Kings. This essential cleavage of royalism versus republicanism remains. Each has a distinct class consciousness, church, and even peasant origin. Conversely, however, royalism is dead, with few denying they are republican.[5] This is true particularly relative to the lay

---

[1]See Spiro, "Comparative Politics," APSR, pp. 588-9.

[2]See James Friguglietti and Emmet Kennedy (eds.), The Shaping of Modern France: Writings on French History Since 1715 (London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1969).

[3]Nourissier, The French, pp. 7.101-110. [4]Guerard, France, pxii.

[5]See Nathan Constantin Leites, On the Game of Politics in France (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959) and his The Rules of the Game in Paris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

and religious forces that have divided France since 1789. Each "force" has its own politics, philosophy, and social and cultural differences, even to the point that some consider them two distinct nations.[1] This "fact" is basically an intellectual cleavage caused by the Revolution and divides France into 1) conservative, traditionalist, Catholic, nationalistic and 2)individualistic, democratic, anti-clerical pacifists.[2] France is, however, by majority Roman Catholic, at least nominally.[3]

The French Revolution and the Napoleonic period have always exercised profound influence upon the continuity of French historical development,[4] with issues affecting politics as much a part of the past as the present.[5] This is true of the entire political, economic, social, and cultural life of the whole western world. The French Revolution was not only an event, but an idea coming out of the classical philosophical writings of the physiocrats and bound to a series of societal changes. It has become even more, a religion complete with a dogma of liberté et égalitié.[6]

---

[1]Brown, "France," in Christoph, Comparative Politics, p. 131.

[2]Charlotte Touzalin Muret, French Royalist Doctrines Since the Revolution (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, n.p.),p.217.

[3]Nourissier, The French, pp. 116-7. [4]Acomb and Brown, French Society, p.12.

[5]Ellen D. Ellis, "French Politics and World Affairs," Current History 28 (May 1955): 257-263.

[6]The latter has become more than part of a religion. A legal fiction that gross inequities of income, opportunity and way of life do not exist results. See Ardagh, New French Revolution, p. 232.

In worship form, this "religion" is an adaptation of Catholic ceremonial, with civic fetes, saints, heroes, and martyrs of liberty.[1]

After the French Revolution, the most influential historical presence is Napoleon I. He exemplifies the French love of revolutionaries, a fact easily apparent in French wax museums, which are devoted primarily to revolutionary figures rather than stable figures. Why this may be so, particularly *in re* Napoleon, was explained by Max Lerner:

> My own feeling is that the great man does his work in the frame of impersonal forces, but there are a number of these forces operating, often at cross purposes, and the question of which will prevail depends on the character of the men who serve as their carriers and express them.[2]

Over 200,000 books have been written on Napoleon alone. A French Public Opinion Institute poll questioned Frenchmen on Napoleon's 200th birthday. Of 100 individuals queried, thirty-five thought Napoleon was the greatest Frenchman ever, while Louis XIV had a mere five points and Joan of Arc and Charlemagne had three each. General de Gaulle was alive at that time and not included in the survey. Napoleon's popularity is believed to be based on his efforts to advance

---

[1]Carl L. Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 155 (orig. 1932).

[2]Max Lerner, "Napoleon's Mistake: He Used Sword," *Norman Transcript* (Oklahoma) (August 21, 1969).

the glory and grandeur of France.[1]

The Revolution, Napoleon, and subsequent events, all part of the French historical consciousness, also demonstrate the fact that France has periodically entered what could best be described as high pressure situations for centralized authoritarian leadership. Korten notes that such situations occur when the following factors are present: high drive state, national status drive, sense of crisis, definite goal structure, low level of technical skill, stress from externally imposed threats, and motivations from increased level of expectations, including changes in values.

> The greater the stress, and the less the clarity and general agreement on goals and path, the greater the compulsion among the group members to give power to a central person who in essence promises to remove the ambiguity and reduce the stress.[2]

The crux of the matter is that the usual French form of government is what Schonfeld calls the "assumed-coverage" type.[3] In this situation, citizens follow detailed, although not necessarily formal, rules--without explicit leadership directions. When the governmental unit is perceived to act ineffectively, the relationships change to the authority-laden regime. Thus the French scene,

---

[1]David C. Korten, "Situational Determinants of Leadership Structure," Journal of Conflict Revolution 7(September 1962):222-235. Also Hook, The Hero in History, pp. 152-7.

[2]Schonfeld, Youth and Authority in France, pp. 66-72.

whether in the home, education, or politics, is often one of authority versus reason. This interpretation conforms to the conception which argues that within each French person there are two different and usually diametrically opposed attitudes toward authority. For example:

1). Dell in 1920 wrote that the French have a "natural dislike for authority."[1]

2). Hoffman in 1963 spoke of the French need for, yet fear of, authority.[2]

3). In 1964 Crozier discussed the French desire to avoid face-to-face dependency relationships.[3]

4). And in 1968 Macridis noted the political culture dualism between the "search for authority" and the deep distrust of it.[4]

Still these traditional cleavages constitute an essential role in the functioning of the French political system, orienting not only such things as individual behavior, but political roles as well.

---

[1]R. Dell, My Second Country, France (New York: John Lane, 1920).

[2]Stanley Hoffmann, et al, In Search of France (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).

[3]He also makes note of this attitude in his latest work. See Brian Crozier, De Gaulle.

[4]Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, 3rd ed. (New York: Dorsey, 1968); Schonfeld, Youth and Authority in France.

Granting that the political system reflects not only a nation's life but the moving force to achieve change, evaluation must consider not only what a particular society is, but "what it strives to become."[1] The cultural phenomena of ideology, the underlying presuppositions of a society's world view,[2] and historical consciousness are important, but regardless of terminology, at the root of it all is the basic definition of the nature of man.[3] This ideological commitment of a nation-state, along with its bellicosity, self-control, stability, and physical capability shape the structure of international politics.[4] These aspects are found in an ideology, which function within the constants of a French tradition or what Jacques Havet terms the "French genius."[5] This pseudo-concept is applicable to either a single individual or a more complex society. It includes "the cumulative weight of past experience" interacting with current stimuli.[6]

---

[1]Heckscher in Aron and Heckscher, Diversity of Worlds, p. 123.

[2]Mullins, "Concept of Ideology," APSR, p. 500.

[3]Blondell, "Challenges," in Goerner, Democracy, p. 10. Persistent beliefs or set of beliefs about a topic or related set of topics may be termed a philosophy or ideology.

[4]Waltz, "The Relation of States to Their World," p. 6.

[5]Jacques Havet, "French Philosophical Tradition Between the Two Wars," in Farber, Philosophic Thought, p. 5.

[6]Rosenau, International Politics, p. 153.

Theoretically, a knowledge of this French ideology and the cumulative impact of French historical experience would lead to an ability to predict forms or trends of behavior.

The historical consciousness of French ideology has been typified as politically revolutionary while socially conservative.[1] Traditionally this has included the revolutionary slogans of equality in a hierarchy laced with opportunity for individual advancement. The fundamental idea to understand French or any philosophy or ideology is what the "good society" should be. This would necessarily include some consideration of such theoretical concepts as the nature of reality, the world view, theology and religion or metaphysics, and how propositions are connected--logic. The nature of knowledge and the principle for obtaining it or epistomology, and the differences between right and wrong or ethics ultimately determine whether the distinctions between French cultural philosophy or ideology are rationalist-empiricist, idealist-materialist, or monist-pluralist.

Between World War I and 1929, de Gaulle's career formative period, three major philosophical themes, dissimilar though not necessarily contradictory, were prevalent in

---

[1]Luethy, France Against Herself, pp. 30-40.

France: liberalism with Alain, traditionalism with Maurras, and the Socialism of Marx. These all contained elements of the traditional, and were followed after World War II with the existentialism of Sartre. The latter replaced to some extent the following of the philosophical materialism of the Vienna circle, commonly called logical positivism. This was largely a division of an anti-technical and nationalistic character which is quite consistent with the traditional French culture. Frenchmen have long embraced a combination of the Thomist tradition linked to Cartesian philosophy to oppose the development of material civilization so typical of the United States. In American thinking, thought is technical and every situation is looked to as a problem just waiting to be solved. The French look upon this as an "error" in logic, an essential difference between a craftsman civilization and industrial barbarism.[1]

Brinton sees French philosophy as including modern neopositivism with symbolic logic, a linguistic philosophy, but also existentialism and neoromanticism.[2] This romanticism is an attitude toward life in combination with rationalism. For example, the French deal more with romantic

---

[1]George Duhamel, Scenes de la vie future cited in Aron, As Others See Us, p. 65.

[2]See Brinton, The French, passim.

politics than means. Or as Siegfried states:

> Principles and ideals are the very heart and soul of our politics, but their eventual application often remains a matter of quasi-indifference.[1]

The emphasis then is upon fundamental principles as a means to salvation.[2]

Philosophically, Thomism also exists, with its rejection of idealism and a logicism of distinction which establishes hierarchies. Thus many French philosophers are classifiers, not unlike Aristotle.[3]

French logical and moral philosophy comes from the teachings of Thomas, Descartes, Plato and Kant. To their critics, disciples of these philosophers have developed their minds only to conformity, while becoming theoretically undisciplined and uncreative. On the positive side, however, such individuals are schooled to think imaginatively and verbalize with great clarity, although along predetermined lines. That is, although not consistent by adherring to one theory, the French are usually logical. This means a combination of humanism and naturalism, universalism and encyclopaedism. French thinking, then, sees:

---

[1]Siegfried, France, p. 25.

[2]Muret, French Royalist Doctrines, p. 169.

[3]Jacques Maritain, for example. See Henry Dumery, "Catholic Philosophy in France," in Farber, Philosophical Thought, pp. 219-248.

> . . .every problem is a situation, and situations admit not of solution but of clear perception, a gradual inurement, possibly a transformation effected by man-above all the great master of man and things, time.[1]

The French analyze a situation to note that each possible decision clashes with insurmountable obstacles and then wait until time or events remove the obstacles to the solution. The emphasis is upon principles. Events are first explained by elaborating the universal laws, generalizing about the nature of man and society and perhaps the facts or statement of particulars may be slighted altogether. In other words, Popper's initial conditions are ignored.[2]

This rationalism, abstraction and codification in all fields of French social life may be traced to Descartes, Montesquieu, and Voltaire. It results in an incompatability of thought and action, the advocacy of principle before practice, and ultimately in uncompromising postures. Personal behavior, then, is somewhere between logicality and impulsiveness, between idealism and realism, with an ethic of enlightened self-interest, i.e., Kantian. This is the "Man of Thought"[3] trained by Descartes to seek the rational meaning of the universe.

---

[1]Aron, As Others See Us, p. 62.

[2]Lane, Political Identity, p. 349.

[3]Madariaga, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards, p. 30.

Descartes is more than a French philosopher. For many Frenchmen, his writings signify the beginning of all philosophy and not merely a division between ancient and modern philosophy.[1] Still, since the seventeenth century, the French have recognized themselves as Cartesian to the point that all French thinkers embrace aspects of this thought. That is, most thinkers distrust all knowledge not capable of mathematical formulation. Even human relations are explainable according to laws of mechanical causation. Too, most French ideologies embrace the Catholic ideal of unique truth, that which is absolutely determinable at any moment. In his writings, Descartes sought to "extend and vindicate" knowledge derived from science and mathematics, that is, mathematics is considered the ideal paradigm of knowledge. Thus Cartesianism, although ultimately based on the mathematical sciences of nature and the mechanical principles governing the universe, also includes the values and doctrines attributed to Christianity. This seeming paradox is rationalized by recognizing two separate realms: the spiritual, subjected to theology and much influenced by the teachings of St. Thomas, and the realm of matter and extension subjected to mathematical laws.

---

[1]This "division" is dated 1637 with the publication of Discourse on the Method. See The Philosophical Works of Descartes, tr. Elizabeth Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (N.P.: Peter Smith Publishers, 1931).

The French philosophy is thus bicentric, based on two separate theses. First, there is a sound philosophy which cultivates methodical doubt, that is, the prelude to philosophical inquiry is doubt. There is then a psycho-metaphysical tradition, the cogito. The only thing one can not doubt is his doubting, expressed by Descartes as "I think, therefore, I am."[1] The universal or primary truth is experience or immediate awareness, subjective critical reflection wherein the experience of thought is in thinking.[2] Therefore one must not only "have a good mind" but apply it well, in other words have and use common sense.[3]

Disciples of this thought investigate limited areas rather than attempting to explain everything. Thus Descartes is existential, with a stress on consciousness, but is not an existentialist. The essence of mind is to think, to explore with logical tools a world which is made up of precise entities, orderly arranged. The representation in our mind forms an "objective" reality, which in turn reveals a "formal reality." The latter is the idea of the infinite and perfect Being, for the perfection of God (the First Cause) brings with it His

---

[1]René Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences in Works, pp. 95-100.

[2]See Rene LeSene, "La Philosophie de l'espirit" in Farber, Philosophic Thought, pp. 103-120.

[3]Descartes, Discourse, Part I in Works, pp. 81-7.

truth-system of Eternal verities.[1] Man then attains God by supernatural revelation and by "natural light" or reason. To know this, man can then dominate nature without alienating himself from it. This is very consistent with that which Thomas set out to do when he rationalized Greek pagan philosophy with aspects of Catholicism, revelation and faith. Soul and body is an original indivisibility.[2] The human personality is joined to that universality whose origin is in God and of which the world is the realization. This nature of man is within the Platonic tradition and is acceptable to both St. Thomas and Descartes.

Cartesian philosophy is a secularized version of Reformist thought presented as a paradigm of philosophical rationalism and incorporating two elements of French culture, the humanism of the Greco-Latin era and Christian thought. This is evident in the Cartesian method, which begins with the admonition that one commence with simple rather than complex notions. The method is of classic symmetrical syllogisms where that which is disagreed with is discarded, not necessarily because it is intrinsically wrong, but seems

---

[1]See his Fourth Meditation in Works, pp. 171-9.

[2]Passions of the Soul in Works, pp. 331-427.

wrongly reasoned. Only those beliefs which are derived deductively from intuitively evident principles should be accepted as reliable. These two basic divsions may be examined in greater detail as follows:

1). Nothing is true unless it is clearly known to be so.

2). Every difficulty should be divided into as many parts as necessary to resolve it.

3). Deal with problems in their order of difficulty, beginning with the simplest and easiest to the most complex.

4). Make exhaustive general reviews to ensure that nothing is left out.

This philosophical rationalism, rather than an empiricist one, develops the belief that there are self-evident and nontautological truths from which can be deduced substantial conclusions about the way things have been, are, and will be. But always the following dictum is present:

> [The] power of judging well and of distinguishing the true from the false . . .is naturally equal in all men. . . The diversity of our opinions arises from the fact that we conduct our thoughts along different paths and do not consider the same things.[1]

The man of Cartesian thought, therefore, finds his center of gravity in the intellect. In fact, thinking is his natural

---

[1]So men do not have differing amounts of reason. See Descartes, Discourse, Part 1 in Works, pp. 81-7.

reaction to life, to the point where theorizing "prethinks" abstract future problems. In this process, definition and classification permits not only "knowing" but "foreseeing." All is judged by intellectual standards which then can not, must not, be sacrificed by such tactics as compromise. To do so would mean sacrificing order. One result of this type of thought is a complicated French system of written laws whose end is foreseeing all possible cases within a general network of principles, the Civil Code and le droit.

The French mind is one tending toward universalism, with the egocentric attitude that their case is the case of the human race. Humanism provides a basis for individualism, or vice versa, in that all men have something in common--reason.[1] Individualism, then, is a cardinal virtue of French philosophy and is evident throughout French society. To some this means France's image includes the reign of the self, the quest for privilege, deceit, imposture, trickery, "I do as I like," to the point of cynicism.[2] This individualism is learned and has at its base the notion that each should act or be according to his own taste. However, this applies only to those who have been assimilated in the proper cultural

---

[1]Henri Wallon, "The Philosophy of Education in France," in Farber, Philosophic Thought, p. 325.

[2]Leites, Rules of the Game, passim.

norms of the French society. This individualism is a human value and to the French is both universal and comprehensible. Therefore the emphasis is on striving for precision and clarity in the belief that any complex and personally stated idea may be communicated or known exactly if it can be related logically to the traditional and what is commonly known. Since logic is assigning things and ideas to their proper categories, so personal happiness is behavior appropriate to each particular compartment of life; otherwise frustration and maladjustment result. However, this attitude often results in leaving few things unsaid in a spirit of frankness and honesty that is assumed to be bad manners in other cultures. Candor in politics has prevented some tacit agreements to be arrived at silently elsewhere. However, nonpolitical relations in France have a clearness and definiteness lacking in other cultures.[1] DeTocqueville viewed this individualism as:

> . . .a mature and calm feeling, which disposes each member of the community to sever himself from the mass of his fellow creatures: and to draw apart with his family and friends: so that, after he has thus formed a little circle of his own, he willingly leaves society at large to itself. . .individualism is of democratic origin, and it threatens to spread in the same ratio as the equality of conditions.[2]

---

[1]Tannenbaum, New France, passim.

[2]Alexis DeTocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J. P. Mayer, Vol. III (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1969), Bk. 2, Ch. 2. Note the similarity to our previous discussion of le foyer and a closed circle arrangement.

The emphasis is on logic and precision with issues affecting politics viewed as much a part of the revolutionary past as the present. Thus individualism carries over to the foreign policy area, for what is a French "domestic" concern is universal, therefore also a part of foreign policy. This individualism is reflected in French politics then as:

> . . .large and sweeping practical maxims, from which, as ultimate premises, men reason downwards to particular applications, and this they call being logical and consistent. . ., [a] measure ought to be adopted because it is the consequence of the principle on which the form of government is founded; of the principle of legitimacy, or the principle of sovereignty of the people.[1]

As an adult "individualist," a person is free to make choices and improvise in ways that will be understood by other persons with the same background of home training and education. Thus it is to some anthropologists and philosophers that French values and ideas are universal ones. Yet to reiterate, only people born into a French family and reared in France can communicate with others from similar backgrounds at all levels of experience. As Ernest Renan notes, there must be "a common possession of a rich legacy of memories."[2] Still there are enough alternative forms

---

[1]John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1936), p. 618.

[2]Ernest Renan quoted in DeGramont, The French, p. 65. See also Tannenbaum, New France.

of behavior to accommodate all tastes and temperaments. This individualism is both a weakness and a "grandeur." Within it, the French have an acute sense of right and devotion to what they consider logical. However, this results in internal discords, particularly in its extremes. An example may be seen in French social manners. Anonymity is revealed in the unusual fear of informal relations among subordinates and superiors, and the desire to preserve privacy, which presents difficulties in allocating responsibility in the French system.[1] Office workers, government employees, and teachers, among others,refuse to give their names in social intercourse. This notion of "discretion" is a pillar of French manners and tends to discourage name exchanging or familiarity. It further encourages a characteristic of French political, economic, and social life known as le systeme, se debrouiller, or popularly, le Systeme D, which is translated best as a uniquely Gallic caginess. This "technique" serves to circumvent the bureaucratic system in order to give human proportion to inhuman official procedures. It is necessitated by the "vicious circle of impersonal authoritarianism pervading all official life."[2] Thus system D

---

[1]See Brogan, French Personalities, passim.

[2]Ardagh, New French Revolution, pp. 441-3.

is a method for cutting corners, a way of getting through red tape by working the angles, with such "benefits" as not paying taxes.[1] This anonymity also effects political buck-passing, which is more culturally complex, incorporating the French concept of an authority which is absolute, monarchic, and here again, anonymous.[2] In all, the result is the French tendency to enter into some enterprise and then deliberately scuttle it. Or there is "the lifting of the mortgage" and "waiting," to proceed by stages for fear that premature announcment of a solution may be fatal to success. But then there is the French belief that decisions are "valid" only if conceived in the heat of a decision. The passage of time will provide an automatic solution or that ingenuity will find a solution if only enough time is available. Equivocation is thus a means of making possible temporary alliances, and action is to be taken only when catastrophe appears. The immediate future alone is taken into account. These ways of behaving at the domestic level are extended to foreign affairs. For example, France accepted and then rejected the European Defense Community. She rejected the Paris Agreements of 1954 but had accepted detailed blueprints

---

[1]This is in contrast to the English method of "muddling through."

[2]Ardagh, New French Revolution, p. 443.

for them earlier in the London Agreement.[1] Aptly, the French are often called "girouette" or weather vane, often changing camps and those they support.[2] Yet even when there have been campaigns to end these "tactics," those in the campaign refuse to give their names.[3]

The French emphasis on individuality may also be seen in that until the late 1940's, there were few organizations of any kind-religious, economic, or social--that the French joined.[4] "Joining" was, and even is, not necessary for personal happiness or "le bonheur." Personal happiness is achieved by a delicate balance of skill, foresight and the exercise of enlightened control. Such happiness can come only with maturity and the human dignity and privacy an adult alone can possess. Hence the validity of Mead's comment that French childhood is a long apprenticeship to adulthood.[5]

This central characteristics of French individualism is reflected also in French life by the struggle of the individual against the state, a struggle so important that there is a separate entity established for administrative

---

[1]Leites, Politics in France, p. 2.

[2]DeGramont, The French, pp. 105-6.

[3]Washington Post (January 20th,1974), p. G-2.

[4]Tannenbaum, New France, p. 5.

[5]Mead in Mead and Métraux, Themes in French Culture.

justice. The state then is an important concept to note, for at the root of subsequent international maladjustments is the development in children of the idea of the homeland and of the relations with other countries.[1] Even in the most individualistic French Anarchist can be found the old nationalist tradition.[2] However, this is an attachment to a nation-state, not to a language.[3] In this, the French have been greatly influenced by Bodin in regard to his ideas of peace and order as the end of the state, and also to Grotius. Contemporarily, Maurras has exercised influence with his theory of integral nationalism, which he states as "the exclusive pursuit of national policies, the absolute maintenance of national integrity and the steady increase of national power, for a nation declines when it loses military might."[4] This nationalism, the Jesuits recognized, "combined the new recognition of political facts with ancient ideals of unity, and the older conception of law as an eternal verity."[5] States then are juristicly equal persons, but unequal

---

[1]Jean Piaget and Anne Marie Weil, "The Development in Children of the Idea of the Homeland and of Relations with Other Countries, International Social Science Bulletin, 3(1951):561.

[2]Péguy, Situations (Paris: Galliard, 1940).

[3]DeGramont, The French, p. 196.

[4]Colette Capitan-Peter, Charles Maurras et l'idéologie d'action française (Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1972).

[5]J. N. Figgis, Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 216.

in power. Thus the state is an adversary to be kept in bounds.[1] Appeals to a Frenchman's nationalistic pride find responsive audiences, whereas an appeal from a particular regime usually does not. Here is the reoccurring indication of the fact that although Frenchmen disagree on the details of their political or social system, they do not disagree on its "essentials."[2] This reinforces the fact that French individual character is based exclusively on the awareness of a common civilization.[3] This belief is a conservative one, as Montesquieu recognized:

> The problem for individuals and for nations is not to create themselves as they would wish to be (an impossible task!) but to keep themselves as the centuries have predestined them.[4]

Throughout, therefore, the French view of politics is as a theater, a show at which they are satisfied to be passive spectators.[5]

The French state is expected to assume a moral role with the Civil Code providing a behavioral model for those good citizens who obey that state.[6] Equality before the

---

[1]Luethy, France Against Herself, p. 57.

[2]Maurice Duverger, The French Political System, tr. Barbara and Robert North (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 5.

[3]Luethy, France Against Herself, p. 3.

[4]Leon de Montesquieu, Les Raisons du nationalisme, pp. 15-6 in Muret, French Royalist Doctrines, p. 221.

[5]Nourissier, The French, p. 107. [6]DeGramont, The French, p.204.

state apparatus exists. Freedom is the state's ability to regulate and adjust conflicting interests. Civil liberties permit the opposing of those in power, but are of relatively recent innovation, originating from the nineteenth century.[1] Still, the rights of the individual are secure through a "perfection of personality" within the culture.[2] Liberty is seen as participation in collective decisions, but there is always distrust of power and a "natural" tendency to defy authority. It is possible to have the state without justice, but not justice without the state. There is a need to combine autonomy with cooperation. Groups, even the elite, can not be unified or such would mean an end to freedom. Yet there can be too much disunity, which could even lead to the end of the state, so there must be an intermediate point.[3] This need for order has long occupied French philosophical thought. Richelieu, for example, sought to restore order by theorizing that authority is boundless, with disobedience being a sin. His state, of course, would be the prince, for "to multiply the number of pilots, is to ruin the possibility of a safe voyage."[4] Even the Church must be controlled, although royal

---

[1]Duverger, French Political System, p. 146.

[2]Aron in Aron and Heckscher, Diversity of Worlds, p. 86.

[3]Robert Aron, Social Structure and the Ruling Class (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), p. 143.

[4]See Armand Jean du Plessig, Political Testament: The Significant Chapters and Supporting Selections, tr. Henry B. Hill (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961).

authority would have no counter-balance either in political assemblies or corporations or municipal privilege.

Throughout, the French have retained faith in the permanence of sovereign states (with Paris as the center of the Solar System), in the durability of national interests as order in the world over supranational interests, and in the concept of the national soul, an evanescent ideal.[1] But this French nation maintains an emphasis on values of stability, harmony, permanence, resistance to the machine age, and a focus on moderation and equilibrium within a national ideal of order. This order is provided in part by a strong French government, headed preferably by aged leaders, but one which claims to be based on the sovereignty of the people.[2] Throughout the system, however, there are various expressions for the French taste for individuality with its preferences for "fine distinctions, a distrust of power and a will to preserve existing social institutions."[3] Still with the distrust of human nature and an innate defiance and cynicism on the personal level, there exists an unbelievable tolerance on the philosophical level.

These are the cultural values which form part of the milieu relevant to the individual French decision-makers in

---

[1]Snyder, New Nationalism, p. 76.

[2]Raymond Aron, "Raymond Aron Weighs Up the World," Realitiés (No. 198 May 1967): 27-9, 90.

[3]Aron and Heckscher, Diversity of Worlds, p. 124.

their development of images vital to their roles. When these factors are combined with specific situations and include an analysis of the individual's personality, it is possible to come close to behavior prediction at most, behavior tendencies at the very least. We now turn to Charles de Gaulle as an individual to see if he has experienced these cultural values and distinctive acculturation processes.

CHAPTER III

DE GAULLE: THE IDIOSYNCRATIC VARIABLE

Introduction

Political ideas--like the consumption of cigarettes and hard liquor--do not suddenly begin with one's eighteenth birthday. Richard G. Niemi

Many American political scientists consider political leadership behavior a natural result of political environment, or what some term "environmental antecedents of behavior." Still, regardless of how political behavior is analyzed, its core is the individual. Barber expresses this writer's viewpoint most succinctly in saying:

> . . .to the grand theorists of social movements and the engineers of systems and structures--some of whom see human choice as determined by forces beyond the control of human beings--I can only express puzzlement. Shuffle the system as you will, there is still at its center the person, and it is his initiatives and responses that steer the ship.[1]

Political and other successes, then, depend to a considerable extent on the quirks and idiosyncracies of one very human individual, for the principal actors determine a system more than they are determined by it.[2] Such an opinion does not preclude the influence of other variables.[3] Thus, in its

---

[1]Barber, Presidential Character, p. vii.

[2]See Raymond Aron, Peace and War, Chapter 1.

[3]See Leites, Rules of the Game, p. 3.

widest scope, foreign policy is affected or influenced by no less than five "variable clusters:" the societal or non-governmental aspects discussed in Chapter 2 above, the systemic or international system, the governmental or institutions, the role variables, and the idiosyncratic or individual.[1] This idiosyncratic cluster includes the political leader's experiences, values, personality and style (considered in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 herein) in what DeRivera calls a "psychological approach" to foreign affairs analysis, i.e., the consideration by political scientists of the individual's perceptions, values and interpersonal relationships.[2] What foreign policies will be advocated, what commitments will be made, what priorities will be drawn between domestic and foreign affairs, and related aspects of international political relations really depend on that idiosyncratic variable, the Chief Executive, whether in the United States or France.

Although social,systemic, governmental, or even role variables rarely change radically, every change in political leadership will result in some alteration in decision-making.

---

[1]See Rosenau, Foreign Policy. Also found in Greenstein's modification of Smith's psychological analysis of single political actors where he discusses the social and political system, the socio-political environment that shaped a personality, the individual's personality structures and finally the immediate environmental antecedents of a decision. M. Brewster Smith, "A Map for the Analysis of Personality and Politics," Journal of Social Issues, 24 (July 1968): 15-28.

[2]See Holsti, Crisis, pp. 51, 70-1; DeRivera, Foreign Policy.

Variations result from the fact that the individual personality, values, and life experiences of an incoming leader will not be identical to those of his predecessor.[1] Unfortunately, the behavior and personality of the political leader "tends to be all too often obscured--if not factored out" in most American social scientist analyses.[2] Yet regardless of how it is defined, politics, domestic or international, hinges on the interrelation of environmental situations and psychological predispositions of the decision-maker and the resultant human behavior.[3] The fact is that an actor's psychological characteristics are mediating factors between the decisional stimulus and its political response.[4] That is, every time an event occurs:

> . . .it is a stimulus that may be legitimately perceived in several different ways. The perception that actually occurs is the one that requires the least reorganization of the person's other ideas. Without any distortion of the stimulus there may be perceptual error.[5]

Thus the political decision-maker's perception links the

---

[1]See David J. Rosen, "Leadership Change and Foreign Policy," paper presented at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Chicago, Ill.:August 29-September 2, 1974); DeRivera, Foreign Policy, pp. 165,181-2.

[2]Edinger, "Biography," Journal of Politics, p. 437.

[3]Greenstein, Personality and Politics, pp. 6-7;James C. Davies, "Where From and Where To?" in Knutson, Handbook, pp. 1-27; Human Nature in Politics (New York: Wiley, 1963).

[4]Greenstein, Personality and Politics, p. 11.

[5]DeRivera, Foreign Policy, p. 22.

external environment and policy decisions. That perception, whether it is correct or not, is the individual's "real" world.[1] Differences in personality may result in diverging definitions of the decisional situation.[2] Any behavior, therefore, is the result of culture and personality factors interacting in a particular situation. One further dimension should be added. The political decision-maker's behavior and decisions are influenced also by his personal life experiences. Much political activity, then, is explanable only after personal characteristics are considered,[3] for the experiences of a man's life will help account for many of the peculiarities of his thought.

Still, as we noted in Chapter 1 above, political science analyses of individual political leaders are a recent innovation. Political psychology did not receive any great impetus until 1956 with the Georges' study of Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House.[4] Since then similar studies have followed the George example, but not in any great depth or volume. Still, Lasswell and others have recognized the need to apply pyschological concepts in the study of politicians, whether

---

[1]John Spanier, Games Nations Play: Analyzing International Politics (New York: Praeger Pubs., 1972),p. 33.

[2]Holsti, Crisis, pp. 50-70.

[3]Greenstein, "Personality on Politics," APSR, p. 629.

[4]George and George, Woodrow Wilson.

researching an individual's political socialization and recruitment into political decision-making roles or studying the decision-maker's personal characteristics and its relationship to subsequent political decisions.[1] What is needed is an emphasis on "psychobiography." Such a study includes personality, those behavioral regularities which prevail regardless of diverse stimuli and which are inferred rather than directly observed. Specifically, this psychological approach is at the extreme micro level in its consideration of the perceptions, cognitions, expectations, and motivations of people.[2] In relative terms, political science is more at the macro-level. Importantly, in foreign relations studies, personality analyses aid in determining:

> . . .whether the incumbent of a position which he perceives as promising potential or actual leadership makes a choice primarily in terms of future internal or external sanctions and whether he sees immediate or future gratification or deprivation resulting from one alternative action or another.[3]

Besides the psychological emphasis of such attempts, however, the "psychobiography" is biographical. Edinger notes that the task of political scientists should be:

---

[1]See A. Gottfried, Boss Cermack of Chicago (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962); A. A. Rogow, James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics, and Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1963).

[2]N. Kiell, Psychological Studies of Famous Americans (New York: Twayne, 1964); Betty Glad, "Contributions of Psychobiography" in Knutson, Handbook, pp. 296-321.

[3]Edinger, "Biography," Journal of Politics, p. 670.

> . . .to write political biographies of dead, as well as living individuals, which will increase our understanding of their actions both as aspirants to and as incumbents of positions of political leadership.[1]

Biographies attempt to recreate either the entire life cycle or some "significant portion of it, in order to describe and explain the contribution and responses" of the individual to his environment.[2] Thus a psychobiography identifies salient personality and situational variables that permit the relating of childhood learning and experiences to adult political behavior. There are several problems evident in such studies. First, political scientists usually do not consider the complex personal characteristics that motivate a political decision-maker's behavior until or unless that behavior is "deviant" from the observer's perceived norms or values. Rogow expresses this clearly:

> While most political leaders neither require nor merit a psychobiography, the form is particularly appropriate when we are dealing with odd or deviant political careers.[3]

Even when the behavior is deemed "deviant," the usual tendency is to render an explanatory analysis grounded in external or situational variables.[4] Only when the situational

---

[1] Ibid., p. 674.

[2] Paige, Readings, p. 197.

[3] A. A. Rogow, "Review of V. Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality," The American Political Science Review 62 (1968): 605.

[4] See Glad in Knutson, Handbook, pp. 296-321.

explanation is found to be patently false will psychological explanations finally be employed or attempted by most political scientists. Thus the tendency is to assume that personality theory is specifically a method or tool for the study of the pathological. Further, there is the correlate assumption that political leaders, indeed "politicos" in general, nurture a love of "pure power as an end that motivates their adult behavior.[1] Wolfenstein verbalizes this belief: "Leaders crave, relish, and have confidence in their own power and authority."[2] Political scientists particularly view this power-seeking as a monistic drive, a "first" and only cause for political role-seeking. Consequently, there is the tendency, when psychological data is used, to "overpsychologize" political phenomena in such a way that wider application of psychobiographical and similar studies is thwarted, and thus graduate emphasis and the growth of expertise in this field. What is needed are balanced studies of individual leaders. This seems to be possible only when several methodological or theoretical directions are employed in one study, hence the emphasis herein on considering cultural restrictions (Chapter 2), the individual motivations and personality (Chapter 3), theory (Chapter 4) and style (Chapter 5). The generalized or

---

[1]See Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: Wiley, 1960).

[2]E. Victor Wolfenstein, Personality and Politics (Belmont: Dickinson Publishing Co., 1960), p. 33.

eclectic approach results in what may be termed a "skimming" or superficial effect, but it does preclude the more deadly quicksand effect of in depth, overextended monistic analyses. For example, an extreme in the "pure" biography category emphasizes such "politically relevant" facts about George Washington as his undistinguished ancestry; his trading and relationships with slaves, indentured servants, and squatters; his false teeth; and his lack of children, possibly due to an earlier attack of mumps.[1] A contemporary example of psychological emphasis is found in Robert U. Akeret's photoanalysis of Richard Nixon.[1] The theme of this study is that the former President's face is not symmetrical, thus indicating the duplicity of Nixon's inner emotional state. In other words, there has always been the "old" and the "new" Nixon, which is revealed in what might be called the "Mona Lisa smile syndrome." An even more extreme example is found in portions of Launay's study of de Gaulle, who is "explained" as follows:

> Like the majority of those in blood group O, he is predisposed to inflammations and troubles of the circulation, but this never shows. . .A hypertrophia of the hypophysic gland caused the giantism which disturbed his bodily development. On the mental plane, aggravated by this giantism, a

---

[1]Robert U. Akeret, Photoanalysis, ed. Thomas Humble (New York: Peter H. Wyden, Inc., 1973).

[2]W. E. Woodward, George Washington: The Image and the Man (New York: Boni and Liverwright, 1926).

> hypertrophia of the ego has been noted, a prodigous egocentricity and tendencies to exhibitionism and mythomania, to spitefulness and revenge.[1]

Granted all of this information may be true and potentially relevant politically, but the studies by their narrow-gauge approaches do not validate anything other than the thesis that these approaches are used, with the data garnered to the theoretical direction.

In general, "biographies" have been in-depth and at-length attempts to describe the "whole man." However, as Edinger warns, this must be sacrificed in favor of the less complete analysis oriented toward understanding that "part" termed political behavior, and even more specifically, foreign policy behavior.[2] Thus it is not the purpose here to "fall" into any one of the fifty categories for biography or fifty definitional types of personality.[3] Rather, the developmental study research results on de Gaulle are presented.[4] Only those biographical characteristics which are most useful in conjunction with other information will be presented, in order to see patterns of behavior. Knowledge

---

[1]Launay, De Gaulle and his France, pp. 25-7.

[2]Edinger, "Biography," Journal of Politics, p. 676.

[3]See Allport, Personality and Lasswell's writings.

[4]The actual developmental study is too lengthy to be considered here. Major events in de Gaulle's life are noted in the attached Appendix I.

of the latter could result in predicting "climates and modes," but not necessarily day-to-day behavior of a political tenure.[1] Future predictions can be made on the basis of the relatively stable personality types into which adults fall.[2] More pertinent in de Gaulle's case is that the decision-maker's basic values form an environmental framework for a particular policy. As previously indicated, the study's basic theme is to indicate the validity of eclectic-methodological political leadership studies as a base for future predictive behavior analyses. In toto, all:

> . . .social scientists must understand the outlook of the man he studies, see things as they see them, before he can profitably employ the apparatus and objectivity of science.[3]

Unfortunately, when the political leader, in this case that "politician of catastrophe"[4] de Gaulle, is dead, "his dreams and fantasies, his Oedipus complex and identity crisis" must be inferred to an even greater extent.[5] Even when alive, political incumbents are "a notoriously secretive lot, and any inkblots. . .inadvertently left behind are

---

[1]The phrase is Barber's. See his Presidential Character.

[2]Jeanne Knutson, The Human Basis of the Polity: A Psychological Study of Political Man (Chicago: Aldine, 1972), p. 15.

[3]Redfield, Community, p. 81. [4]Luethy, France Against Herself.

[5]Rogow, "Review," APSR, p. 605.

usually wiped clean by their loyal posterity."[1] In de Gaulle's case, most "inkblots" were destroyed before the ink dried, for once a speech or press conference presentation was perfected and memorized, all previous drafts were summarily destroyed. De Gaulle's written works do provide an ample source if it is accepted that the written word includes a level of consciousness not evident in the spoken word, i.e., the subconscious in however shallow a form _is_ included in an individual's productive writings. Even speeches indicate an individual's tacit assumptions about reality, his ideological eyeglasses so to speak.

Other methods helpful in discovering the idiosyncratic aspects of an individual's political behavior include: 1) direct or indirect observation, such as Theodore White's U. S. Presidential election studies[2] or in the form of visual tapes. However, it must be remembered that de Gaulle's public appearances were extremely well-_staged_; 2) personal interviews, increasingly rare as the pressures of political office increase and with de Gaulle, sacrificed for the greater value of personal privacy; 3) content analysis of writings, including public speeches, provide the most readily available but indirect measure of motivations toward power;

---

[1] _Ibid._, pp. 605-6.

[2] Theodore H. White, _The Making of the President_ (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1973).

4) biographies or hagiographies, numerous and useful as long as constant comparisons are made; and 5) case studies, the culmination, hopefully, of using all the methods.

Fortunately,there is no lack of documentation of the behavior of most contemporary political leaders, including de Gaulle. The abundant record includes, potentially:

> . . .oral epics, songs, plays, poems, paitings, diaries, letters, memoirs, speeches, state papers, autobiographies, biographies, photographs, films, sound recordings, historical accounts, journalistic observations, and contemporary public appearances.[1]

Such documentation is generally self-explanatory, except for minor problems magnified in de Gaulle's case. There is a natural distortion for writers of autobiographical works to attempt to place themselves in a good light. De Gaulle did this in part of his writings "between" political tenures. Distortion also occurs when time has passed between the behavior and the writing of it, so that what is "recalled" is "logical" in light of habits and future developments rather than actual facts. Often alternatives to an action or decision are forgotten, particularly when a past event, a foreign policy for example, cost money and lives. Events then <u>had</u> to occur, whereas less costly decisions, when successful, are viewed as resulting from personal abilities.[2] DeGaulle's <u>Memoirs</u>, therefore, must be scrutinized against the autobiographical writings of others, particularly his international decision-

---

[1]Paige, <u>Readings</u>, p. 194

[2]See DeRivera, <u>Foreign Policy</u>, pp. 6-7

making peers such as Winston Churchill.[1]

Biographical sources present even greater problems. The Hoffmanns succinctly state the situation:

> [De Gaulle's] biographers do not give much detail, they do not indicate their sources, they copy one another often without acknowledging it, and sometimes contradict each other.[2]

Then there is the diversity of "approaches to de Gaulle." Helms in her doctoral study discerned at least seven.[3] There are the standard biographical studies such as la Gorce, Werth, Hatch and Clark; descriptions of the content of de Gaulle's policies by Kulski, Aron, and Grosser; doctrinal studies that are multi-factoral by Mann and Johnson; historical analyses written by Langer, Funk, and DePorte; ideological studies focusing on one idea as did Macridis and Duverger; methodological exercises that explore the manner of policy implementation attempted by Callaui, Thomson, Gorday, and Revel; and the polemical stuides of Schoenbrum, Grinnel-Milne, Lacouture, Aron, and Fabre-Luce.[4]

---

[1]Thus an objective view of WWII would have to include the writings of de Gaulle, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. See Dwight Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday, 1963); Arthur Bryant, Triumph in the West (Garden City, N.Y.: 1959) and his To Turn the Tide (New York: Doubleday, 1957).

[2]Stanley Hoffmann and Inge Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur: de Gaulle as Political Artist," Daedalus (Summer 1968): 829-867 at 879.

[3]Helms, "De Gaulle's Foreign Policy," p. 8.

[4]See the attached bibliography for full citations.

With such an abundance of materials, it is necessary to remember Barber's dictum that although there may be errors of fact in a study, the emphasis is on the reports of de Gaulle's words and/or actions rather than the individual opinions of his biographers.[1] For example, it is not necessary to know whether it was de Gaulle's mother or father who, when questioned about the four de Gaulle sons said, "yes, but they are republican [not royalist]..." The content and consistency of the statement is what is important. Or there is the question of whether Henri de Gaulle was teaching in Lille when his son Charles was born, or if Jeanne de Gaulle had followed a traditional pattern and returned to her parents' home for the event. What is important is de Gaulle's ties with northern France.[2]

Still, regardless of the source consulted or the methods employed, such personal leadership qualities as "wide sensitivity, active energy, . .ab ofness of manner"[3] or good judgment are not and can not be analyzed precisely.[4] All-in-all then, when analyzing individual political leaders,

---

[1]See Barber, Presidential Character, pp. v-vii.

[2]For some of the most interesting biographical discrepencies, see Georges Cattaui, Charles de Gaulle: l'homme et son destin. (Paris: Universitaires, 1956) and J. R. Tournoux, Pétain and De Gaulle (Paris: Plon, 1964).

[3]Dankwart A. Rustow, "Atatürk as Founder of a State," Daedulus (Summer 1968); 794.

[4]See also DeRivera, Foreign Policy.

we must take Edinger's advice to employ "conceptual models and quantitative analysis in conjunction with a frank but disciplined use of empathy and other forms of imaginative speculation."[1]

There remains but one other deficiency, a problem evident in any biography but more pointed in psychobiographies. That is:

> . . .knowledge about the early childhood influences in the lives of political leaders is invariably fragmentary. Even less is known or knowable about the reasons that leaders became such while their brothers, sisters, parents, and children usually are individuals of no great distinction. We can trace back from the broad, fast running river of the leader's public career to the headwaters of his childhood, but we cannot yet explain why most such headwaters do not become such big rivers.[2]

Yet childhood is a crucial time for political socialization. Although the chief learning in every early childhood consists of satisfying innate drives for the primary gratifications of hunger, thirst, etc., there are also secondary drives of fear and anger and biological derivatives of maturation.[3] It is during this time that the individual child is made aware he is loved, has rules, develops his own personality, and establishes important parental relationships. The latter may be based on one parent exploitation[4]

---

[1]Edinger, Schumacher, pp. 1-8 at 4. Emphasis supplied.

[2]Davies, "Where From and Where To?" in Knutson, Handbook, pp. 24-5.

[3]Gorer, National Character, p. 77.

[4]Interview with David Barber, "What's the Big Idea,"PBS-TV(Raleigh,N.C.), recorded October-November,1972, televised August 29, 1973; also see S. Freud and W. C. Bullitt, Thomas Woodrow Wilson:A Psychological Study (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,1967).

or focus on siblings and other significant persons.[1] Rules and judgments of right and wrong and other major value orientations, then, are developed by the time an individual is six or seven years of age.[2] Whether or not we agree that the crucial time is early childhood[3] or a lifelong process of identity crises,[4] it is evident that:

> . . .the significant aspects of an individual's personality and values tend to remain relatively stable throughout adult life, and experiences, by their very nature, tend to be cumulative over time and will undergo only incremental change.[5]

Thus early life habits not only influence all subsequent learning,[6] but childhood learning relates to the adult political life. Too, the early environment is considered crucial insofar as it is easier to change habits, values, etc. at this early stage than later in adulthood.[7]

---

[1]A. Adler, Understanding Human Nature (New York: Fawcett World Library, 1969). (Orig. 1927).

[2]Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, tr. Marjorie Gabain (New York: Free Press, Macmillan, 1965).

[3]H. H. Hyman, Political Socialization (New York: Free Press, 1959); Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority," The American Political Science Review 54 (1960):934-43.

[4]Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society, 2d ed. rev. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963).

[5]Rosen, "Leadership Change," p. 5.

[6]Gorer, National Character, p.77.

[7]See B. Bloom, Stability and Change in Human Characteristics (New York: Wiley, 1965).

> The guiding question for political leadership studies is not whether leaders have personalities different from followers but rather the effects of whatever personalities they do have. . . [T]he whole life cycle from birth and childhood through old age and death, should be of potential interest in political leadership studies.[1]

It is important then to understand de Gaulle's early identification with politics and political leaders, how his value attachments emerged and the relative strengths and effect of these values on his behavior.[2] For, as Piaget notes, patriotism does not come naturally to a child.[3]

To reiterate, this chapter has a two-fold purpose. The primary theme is to discover what aspects of de Gaulle's personality and motives resulted in his quest for power and subsequent political behavior. That is, could his unconscious motives be explained by the "ambition theory" that he was a compensatory power-seeker[4] or was his political role-seeking a conscious pursuit of personal self-interest or even the nebulous goal of the collective good?[5] Secondly, did de Gaulle exemplify his culture as discussed in Chapter 2 above?

---

[1]Paige, Readings, p. 71.

[2]Ibid., p. 197.

[3]See Otto Klineberg and Wallace E. Lambert, International Commission for a History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind (UNESCO:1962).

[4]George and George, Woodrow Wilson; Also see any study by Lasswell.

[5]Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 87.

As previously noted, personal political motivations have been subjected to many explanatory hypotheses. We believe that the psychological method holds the greatest portent for both individual and comparative political leadership studies. Knutson writes:

> It is possible for political scientists also to deal with the total personality as a meaningful way of integrating the disparate findings which past research has gathered and in pointing the way to the type of questions whose answers we should seek in the future.[1]

One theory of total personality is that of Abraham Maslow. His is a generalized approach based on four basic human drives: physiological, security or safety, affection and belongingness, and self/social esteem, ordered in a hierarchy and "topped" by Self-Actualization. Although some psychologists advocate dividing the hierarchy into only two areas, security-searching and self-actualization, Maslow's theory does permit an analysis of changing patterns of motivation most appropriate in both individual and comparative political leadership studies. As a psychological theory, Maslow's concepts are more applicable for political science since it is not as in depth as Freudian analysis nor as lengthy as the more complicated psychoanalytic procedures. The idea of priority or hierarchy, although not new, does appear to explain those patterns of political behavior[2] that

---

[1]Knutson, Human Basis, p. 103.

[2]For political implications of this hierarchy, see Davies in Knutson, Handbook, Chapters 1-2 and Knutson, Human Basis.

have often been categorized as irrational. Erikson's theory of "epigenesis" is similar, although his eight successive stages of development from infancy to maturity are more complicated.[1] He does agree with Maslow, however, that if full development does not occur at any given stage, the individual does not proceed normally.

In some respects Maslow's "theory" is also similar to Barber's Presidential Character dichotomies. Indeed it would be valid to use Barber's thesis exclusively. Instead, both will be utilized. That is, de Gaulle's motivational values will be studied within the narrower framework of Maslow's generalized theory in this chapter, while Barber's more well-known and well-criticized formula will be used in discussing de Gaulle's political style in Chapter 5.

In applying a psychological framework, the difficulty of separating personality, philosophy, and political style is more evident since no mutually exclusive realm really exists that is not affected by a value, habit, philosophical orientation, or such. For academic purposes, however, an attempt at divorcing the variables is being made.

De Gaulle au Maslow

Abraham Maslow's theory is a "holistic" view of the

---

[1]The stages are basic trust, autonomy, initiative, industry, identity, intimacy, generativity, and ego integrity. See Erikson, Childhood and Society, pp. 247-268.

humanistic school of psychology.[1] This "Third Force" school of thought contrasts with the other two subdisciplines of psychology, Freudianism and Watsonian radical behavioralism, in contending that no behavior--social, political, or otherwise--can be divorced from the total personality. In other words, individual traits, attitudes and behaviors must be studied in relation to the total personality. What must be understood is the organizing principle of each personality. Thus humanistic psychology owes a debt to: 1) Plato in his admonition that prepolitical dispositions shape political institutions; 2) Socrates' belief that in order to improve human and social values it is necessary to first advance the state of our knowledge and particularly our knowledge of persons[2] and 3) seventeenth century philosophers like Bacon who advocated a unitary science which would be a "synthetic whole in the service of man."[3] Thus, as Lane writes:

> Plato, Freud and the Jesuits agree that whatever is learned early has a special importance to the adult; it is more likely to endure; it is more likely to be central to his philosophy.[4]

---

[1]A complete bibliography of his writings may be found in A. H. Maslow: A Memorial Volume, Compiled by Bertha Maslow (Belmont, Calif.:Brooks Cole, 1972), pp. 115-133.

[2]Maslow, Memorial, p. 63. Notes dated October 7, 1969.

[3]Ibid., pp. 6-7. However, Maslow "left out" the emphasis on religion and used the term humanistic rather than pansophia.

[4]Lane, Political Ideology, p. 251.

This humanistic psychology is "a world view or life philosophy. . .a way of living; a system of ethics and values, of politics and economics, of education and religion; a philosophy of science."[1] It is thus positive, as may be seen even in its basic methodology. That is, unlike many other theorists who have influenced political scientists,[2] Maslow emphasizes psychologically healthy individuals.[3] The study of the crippled, immature, and unhealthy can result only in a weak psychology and philosophy. Thus psychoanalysis presents a picture of man in a "lopsided, distorted puffing up of his weaknesses and shortcomings [while purporting] to describe him fully."[4] Still, Maslow considered himself Freudian, but not exclusviely Freudian.[5] He refutes much of Freudian theory as being too reductionistic about higher human values:

> The deepest and most real motivations are seen to be dangerous and nasty while the highest human values and virtues are essentially fake, being not what they seem to be but being camouflaged versions of the deep, dark and dirty. [Social scientists carry this along, for] total cultural determinism is still the official orthodox doctrine for many or most of

---

[1]Maslow, Memorial, p. 60.

[2]Such as T. W. Adorno et al, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, 1950).

[3]See Maslow's Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), pp. 199-203.

[4]Maslow, Memorial, p. 71. Notes dated August 16, 1965.

[5]Ibid., p. 73. Letter dated 72-3; November 23, 1960.

> the social scientists and anthropologists. This doctrine not only denies intrinsic and higher motivations but comes perilously close sometimes to denying human nature itself.[1]

All that is necessary to prove that all people are basically decent is to discover the motives for their "superficial behavior - nasty, mean, or vicious as it may be."[2] It is Maslow's view that individuals who "fully utilize and exploit their talents, capacities, and capabilities [are] fulfilling themselves to a much greater extent than most individuals."[3] They are those with "B-cognition" or "Being," the psychic economy of plenty or the Self-Actualizer in contrast to those of the "D" or "Deficiency realm." This Self-Actualizing individual is one who has:

> . . .developed or [is] developing to the full stature of which [he is] capable. . . This is to say that [he feels] safe and unanxious, accepted, loved and loving, respect-worthy and respected, and that he has worked out his philosophical, religious or axiological bearings.[4]

Such a concept is not novel. Goldstein's "self-actualization," Fromm's "productive character," Whitehorn's "mature personality" and the "self-affirmation" of the

---

[1] Ibid., p. 23. Emphasis supplied Reported by Denis O'Donovan.

[2] Ibid., p. 95. Notes dated June, 1937.

[3] Gordon Mercer, "Psychological Dimensions of Executive Leadership," Paper presented at the Southern Political Science Convention (November 1-4, 1973), p. 15.

[4] Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. 200-1.

existentialists are essentially of the same warp. Even Freud alluded to mature self-realization, but did not consider it in depth.[1] In all these variations, but particularly in Maslow's interpretation, the human being is believed to be motivated by basic needs[2] which are not only genetic or instinctual in origin, but evident throughout the species and apparently unchanging. The Self-Actualizing individual is one in whom inborn basic emotional needs have been satisfied. These basic needs, or "need areas," are hierarchical in nature.[3] When a "need" is absent, there is:

> . . .illness, its presence prevents illness, its restoration cures illness. . .it is preferred by the deprived person over other satisfactions and it is found to be inactive, at a low ebb, or functionally absent in the healthy person.[4]

These hierarchical "need areas" include the self-oriented physiological concerns and security or safety; the transition to other-directed motives in affection and belongingness, and those solely concerned with the environment and the self in relation to that environment, the higher plane of self

---

[1]See Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, "Psychiatric Aspects of Anxiety" in M. R. Stein, A. J. Vidich and D. M. White (eds.), Identity and Anxiety (New York: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 129-44.

[2]Davies in Knutson, Handbook; Knutson, Human Basis and Lane, Political Thinking.

[3]Abraham Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," Psychological Review 50 (1943):370-396 at 370.

[4]Maslow, Psychology of Being, p. 22.

and social esteem. Self-actualization is the "being level" above the "need levels." In each instance, the basic need is that perceived by the individual, in this instance Charles de Gaulle, and not by an outside observer. In most instances, the lowest need level must be fulfilled before higher needs emerge to become the prime motivational force. Or to put it another way, deprivation in one category so conditions an individual that he will continue to pursue the "need" until minimally satisfied. And, of course, which of these need areas has been satisfied or unsatisfied, even severely deprived, will affect the attention, behavior and performance of a person.[1] Psychic needs therefore can determine decision-making, particularly in ambiguous situations that are complex, new, or contradictory.[2] Indeed, if severe deprivation of a need has occurred during childhood, a syndrome will develop to motivate the individual's behavior the rest of his life, even after many years of satisfying the basic need. The further importance of the theory of need and being levels may be seen in Eckstein's contention that a system's stability and even longevity may be equated with the congruence of the authority patterns of the government and society.[3] These

---

[1]Maslow, "Human Motivation," Psychological Review, pp. 370-5.

[2]See Greenstein, Personality and Politics.

[3]See Harry Eckstein, A Theory of Stable Democracy (Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1961) or his "Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry," The American Political Science Review, 67 (December 1973):1142-1161.

patterns, however, appear to result from the "more elemental congruence of values, philosophy and need requirements as the basis of political stability."[1] Thus a governmental and economic system will be stabler to the extent that its philosophy and political actions are based on the personality needs of its citizens.[2] A change in man's motivational level may be the basic cause of many political and cultural differences between developing and developed nations.

Physiological

The first of the basic "need areas" is physiological, and like the next three areas is specific and delimitable. Food, shelter and clothing or more specifically, hunger, thirst, sleep, warmth, sex, etc., are basic requirements upon which physical health depends. If these needs are unfulfilled, the suffering individual will be apathetic and uninvolved in anything, particularly political behavior, until this vital "self" motive is satisfied. Maslow writes:

> For the man who is extremely and dangerously hungry, no other interests exist but food, he thinks about food, he emotes only about food, he perceives only food, and he wants only food. . .Such a man can fairly be said to live by bread alone.[3]

---

[1]Knutson, Human Basis, p. 274.

[2]Ibid., p. 276.

[3]Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. 82-3.

Unfortunately, past United States foreign policy often has sought to "build democracy" in areas of the world where a majority of the population is concerned more with basic human survival. We have thus neglected the repercussions of this very basic need. Once fed, etc., however, the effect of deprivation does not automatically disappear. Extreme lack of food bordering on starvation during the early years of life often later results in adult food hoarding and similar habits. The important thing to remember here is that the deprivation of the basic need must be perceived as such by the individual concerned, and not through the perceptions of over-fed, over-clothed, over-warm, and basically over-indulged Americans, for example. Deprivations in this basic area, then, are more typical in the so-called developing coutnries or in unusual situations such as the Jewish concentration camps during World War II. However, any deprivation of whatever duration or depth has the potential of coloring the individual's response to the luxury of adulthood.

In de Gaulle's case, there exists no indication that he was ever severely deprvied in physiological terms. He often did characterize his background as "poor." However, this was generally in contrast to the European class structure in general and the bourgeoise in particular. In this context de Gaulle says:

> Bourgeois? That, I have never been. The bourgeois is wealth, either the consciousness of having it, or the wish to acquire it. My family and I have

> always been poor. . .I have never felt myself bound to the interests or aspirations of that class.[1]

The de Gaulle family outlook, concerns, and resources were not typical of the French bourgeoise. Thus de Gaulle was never a strong part of a French class in its hierarchy to the exclusion of other classes, and could more readily identify himself with the "whole" of France. True, his father, Henri de Gaulle, was a poorly paid Lillian and Parisian Professor. He had even given up a military career, since officer status required social expenditures that a twenty-two year old in charge of a fatherless family could not afford. He also postponed marriage until the age of thirty-eight, primarily because of financial problems. Later, with five children to support, he taught at more than one school simultaneously. However, the home atmosphere Charles de Gaulle experienced was not as much severely deprived as it was one of planned frugality,[2] which resulted in austerity as a means to such ends as having three homes--one in Lille, one in Paris, and a summer place in the Dordogne. This meant that when it was fashionable to live in a first floor apartment, the de Gaulles resided in a fifth-floor flat. There is even evidence that money to provide more physiological

---

[1]Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 4. Emphasis supplied.

[2]Clark, The Man Who is France, p. 22.

comforts was held in "quiet contempt."[1] Frugality, then, was more a family habit and tradition than any dire necessity. For example, Jean de Gaulle left his family 841,000 French pounds in the early part of the nineteenth century. The de Gaulles still have some unknown portion of their daily livelihood from that inheritance.[2]

De Gaulle then did not perceive himself as being physiologically deprived during his childhood, although he did acquire an adult passion for the taste of a particular French pastry called madelines. Still, as a married adult, his wife's menus were primarily hardy stomach-filling fare such as cabbage, hardly an indication of compensatory food indulgences. Further, neither de Gaulle wanted to change the "rustic" nature of their home at Colombey-les-deux-eglises. It is evident that the basic physiological need was satisfied in de Gaulle's case. And when satisfied, the next higher need, safety or security, emerges to dominate the organism and provide a continuing process organized in a hierarchy of relative prepotency.[3]

---

[1]Pierre Galante, The General (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 47; Brian Crozier, De Gaulle (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), p. 17.

[2]Alden Hatch, The De Gaulle Nobody Knows: An Intimate Biography of Charles de Gaulle (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1960), p. 19.

[3]See Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. 80-106.

An individual becomes motivated by an awareness of the world, which the physiologically deprived does not even perceive, when and only when the primary need area is satisfied.

Security or Safety

This awareness away from the self is seen in childhood motivations resulting from a lack of safety or security.

> Whatever words we use, there is [a] character difference between the man who feels safe and the one who lives his life out as if he were a spy in enemy territory.[1]

That is, an "inner panic" results from the basic perception that the world is chaotic. The individual thus attempts to overcome this feeling by seeking order in its simplest but most permanent form. There is suspicion of anything foreign or "different," often manifested in conservativism in its purest sense. Such an individual would be the typical example of one who over-conforms and is "other-directed."[2]

The measure of generalized psychic deprivation of the safety/security syndrome is to be found in a psychological test, the Security-Insecurity Inventory.[3] In reality, the test also determines various aspects of all the need areas. There are

---

[1] Ibid., p. 114.

[2] See Fromm, Escape from Freedom.

[3] Abraham Maslow, The Security-Insecurity Inventory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952).

fourteen factors in the insecurity syndrome,[1] three of which are causal to the other eleven. Although political leaders would probably never be induced to take this test knowingly, the "questions" are often answered in other contexts. It is possible, then, to arrive at a determination of insecurity indirectly with these three basic factors:[2]

1) There is a perceived feeling of being unloved or rejected, with parental treatment either without affection or cold, even to the point of being hated or despised. In contrast, a secure feeling would be of being liked, loved, accepted, and generally warmly treated.

2) The insecure has a feeling of isolation, aloneness, ostracism, or of being left out. Here again, in contrast, the secure individual feels at home, with a sense of belonging--whether in the family, group, or the world at large.

3) The insecure has a constant feeling of anxiety, of being threatened with danger. The secure's feelings are

---

[1]Davies ("Where From and Where to?" in Knutson, Handbook, p. 7) contends that security is an instrumental need in that it is acquired in the pursuit of the other need areas. Thus he recommends the addition of "knowledge and power" here. Others have also critiqued Maslow's theory for not incorporating "cognitive understanding" as a higher need. However, Maslow always emphasized his use of "need areas" over the singular "need" so that knowledge, power, or "cognitive understanding," however each is defined, could be added to the appropriate step in the hierarchy. His usual reply was also that "young" theories are rarely "fullblown." Moreover, he began his concepts as a case study of his own graduate school professors, who were "explainable by this particular hierarchy. He did "add" the social-self differentiation in the "esteem" need area at a later date.

[2]Maslow,"Human Motivation," Psychological Review, pp. 370-96.

unanxious, in a safe-secure aura with only rare occasions of perceived threat and danger.

As an adult, the deprived individual will be motivated primarily for search for security in what is perceived to be an insecure or unsafe world. Richard Nixon epitomizes such an insecure individual.[1]

Maslow doubtlessly intended the security/safety need area to be a personally perceived or self-orientation. Taken in that light, Charles de Gaulle was not severely deprived in this area either. His early childhood and adolescence were during French periods of relative social and political stability, on both the domestic and international scene. His family and relatives formed the closed circle, le foyer, when that institution was at its zenith. In fact, throughout his career, de Gaulle was not one to bother with the "great world" as the French call "society."[2] There is no indication at all that de Gaulle suffered any insecure periods as far as his being was concerned. However, after analyzing his writings and speeches and the biographies and hagiographies centered on him, Maslow's original safety/security need area requires elaboration.

De Gaulle, indeed most if not all of his family, were insecure at a time when France as a nation was secure, relatively. Yet their insecurity was not for any "individual

---

[1]See Bruce Mazlish, In Search of Nixon: A Psychological Inquiry (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972).

self," but for the French nation in a socio-political sense.[1] During Henri de Gaulle's early childhood and adolescence French culture had been in what might be called a severe security/safety deprivation period, marked by such chaotic events as the unfinished truce of ralliement, the long period (1789 to 1875) of revolutions and counter-revolutions, the Dreyfus case, anti-clericalism, and the rise of Socialism. The de Gaulle family as a whole perceived France as being subjected to insecure forces and their personal and political behavior reflected this perception. This perception is so persistent and of such strength that it must be considered as a primary motivation in de Gaulle's adult political behavior. Thus, contrary to Maslow's original hierarchy, the resultant ostracism, isolation, rejection, and anxieties the de Gaulles perceived were relative to the public self, the cerebral France. These perceptions were inculcated in Charles de Gaulle, whose socialization occurred during a period that Hoffmann characterizes as a stalemate society.[2] French nationalism was dormant, not to be revived until the period of World War I.

---

[1]Possibility the insecurity was even in an economic sense. De Gaulle personally did not care for this "discipline" and seemed to deliberately ignore it, although he majored in astronomy and mathematics and was not unaware of the forces of economics. However, only one of his writings was economically oriented and not very well at that.

[2]Hoffmann, In Search of France, pp. 3-4.

All these factors of past national humiliation distressed the de Gaulles. Their beliefs ran against the then-current dogmas and would label them as nontypical Frenchmen. Lacouture goes further and writes that de Gaulle's uniqueness, his historical isolation, solitude and basic beliefs result in his lack of value as a sociological specimen or representative Frenchman.[1]

The de Gaulle "solid" foyer, reinforced by Roman Catholic teachings, accentuated the uniqueness of Charles de Gaulle. His formal schooling was initially in his father's school. This too was reinforcement of the impressions of political insecurity acquired in his socialization process. The familial sources or origins of this syndrome that divides personal and public self reveal the depth to which the dichotomy exceeds the more familiar "public good" motivations we see in Franklin D. Roosevelt or John F. Kennedy.

Charles André Joseph Marie de Gaulle was born November 22, 1890 in the heart of the Jansenist quarter in Lille, a northern French province near Belgium, into a family of scholastic traditions. The de Gaulles included educators, lawyers, state functionaries, military bourgeoise and historians.[2] This tradition was not a silent one, but rather persistently alluded to in the family circle.

---

[1]Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 2; Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," Daedulus, p. 832.

[2]Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 67.

De Gaulle's grandmother, Josephine-Anne-Marie Maillot, in contrast to the more "typical" Frenchwomen of her day was a writer of innumerable novels and biographies. The latter were primarily glorifications of such revolutionary figures as Proudhon, Jules Valles, and Daniel O'Connell, the liberator of Ireland. Interestingly, her theme in the O'Connell book is the validity of bloodless revolution, paralleled in Charles'political career.[1] Werth notes that her writings reveal a"certain scocialist and revolutionary romanticism,"[2] although Crozier views her works as essentially high moral exercises of piety. In either case, France, revolution, unity, and other aspects of de Gaulle's concepts and values growing out of psychological insecurity fixation for France are evident in these earlier ancestoral efforts.

De Gaulle's uncle by the same name, Charles, was a poet and writer. His emphasis was the Celts, with a theme of worldwide union for all celts. The earlier Charles added a further dimension to the family traditions in an oft-quoted passage:

> When, in a camp surprised, at night, by an enemy attack, when each one fights alone, one does not ask his rank of whoever raises the flag and takes the initiative of rallying the men.[3]

---

[1]Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 18. She also wrote of Chateaubriand, at least one travel book on thenorth of France and edited a journal, Correspondence des Familles. Werth, Alexander. DeGaulle: A Political Biography (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1966), p. 64.

[2]Werth, De Gaulle, pp. 64-5; Crozier De Gaulle, p. 18.

[3]Cattaui, Charles De Gaulle, p. 16; Grinnel-Milne, Triumph of Integrity, p. 30; Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," Daedulus, p. 831

Nephew Charles not only wrote on the same theme, but acted upon it during his London years.

The family's literary tradition is also found in Grandfather Julien-Phillippe De Gaulle, who wrote a history of Paris, edited a history of St. Louis, and traced the family geneology which de Gaulle learned at an early age.[1] Yet another noted de Gaulle was a Great-Grandfather, Jean-Baptiste-Phillippe, who held a Director of Transport and Posts position in the Grand Armée under Napoleon.[2] As a whole, then, the de Gaulle family had a tradition of service to the state in public-oriented vocations or written themes reflecting such, regardless of their endeavors elsewhere. They were often characterized as "impoverished nobles," or noblesse de robe et d'épée, although Charles de Gaulle never used such nomenclature himself.[3]

As for the immediate foyer, de Gaulle's parents were not only cousins, but both from established norther Catholic conservative lines, although the de Gaulle family had strong Parisien ties.[4] Relatively little is known of de Gaulle's

---

[1]See the literary license resulting from this family geneology in Cattaui, Charles de Gaulle.

[2]Or merely Director of Promotions according to Thompson, Pledge to Destiny, p. 16

[3]See Paul-Marie de la Gorce, De Gaulle entre deux mondes, (Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1964); Adrian Crawley, De Gaulle: A Biography (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1969), p. 14.

[4]Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 17.

military service as a volunteer. This ended in his being wounded and medaled in the 1870 Franco-Prussian War at the seige of Le Gourget, a Paris battleground.[1] Here again, the war and battle were so typical of Erbfeindschaft, the "hereditary enmity of the French and German people"[2] and the subsequent era of French revanche.[3] The event is important in its destruction of the dominating fascination of the Napoleonic legend with its illusions about the essence of German.[4] All of this was recognized by de Gaulle in his 1938 study of the French Army. Indeed, the three chapters of history taking place during his childhood were entitled Vers la revanche, a recognition of the influence it had on his generation. This "revenge" was more than mere rhetoric. It included an extensive search for security, defined inevitably as safety from Germany.[5] There was the fear that any future war would again be on French soil, a major factor in French foreign policy.[6] Yet the Church's view was that such struggles were essentially materialistic. All of this merely reiterated

---

[1]Hatch, Biography of Charles De Gaulle, p. 20.

[2]See Frank Roy Willis (ed.), France, Germany and the New Europe: 1945-1967 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. vii.

[3]Hatch, Biography of Charles de Gaulle, p. 36.

[4]See Hans Kohn, The French Mind: Making of the Modern (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1955), p. 40.

[5]Simon Serfaty, France, De Gaulle and Europe: The Policy of the Fourth and Fifth Republics Toward the Continent (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1968) Originally a PhD Dissertation.

[6]See Padover, French Institutions, pp. 82ff.

the de Gaulle theme of the various humiliations of the French State and the need for safety and security. Henri de Gaulle inculcated these "facts" in his children, who when they were young were taken often to the scene of French humiliation, the Parisian battlefields. But Charles' father also showed his children the symbols of French glory and repeated his own fascination with the history of France so evident in the Parisian environs.

After giving up thoughts of a military career, and a brief sojourn with the Paris police department which ended with a clash over principles, Henri de Gaulle turned to the teaching profession. He was diversified, holding the Doctor of Letters, Science and Law[1] at a Church school first in Lille and then Paris. His opinions of the state lycée system and his unbending principles as a fervent Roman Catholic precluded secular employment. In Paris at both a Jesuit College and a school in Rue des Postes,[2] Henri taught philosophy, mathematics, history,literature, Latin and Greek. He became lay headmaster or prefet after only a year. He remained at the church "high school" until its 1907 liquidation, under the Combes Law of 1905, in the midst of a wave of anti-clericalism which expelled the Jesuits from France. When this

---

[1]Tournoux, Petain and De Gaulle, p. 1.

[2]Clark, The Man Who is France, p. 21.

occurred, he established his own private school, École or Pension Fontanes, a "crammer's" school for baccalaureate preparation.[1] Charles, however, was sent to Antoine, Belgium with the exiled Jesuits.

Charles de Gaulle characterized his father as a "thoughtful, cultivated, traditional man, imbued with a feeling for the dignity of France."[2] He was both royalist and anti-republican, but not in a sectarian manner. That is, Henri de Gaulle did not have the intense hatred, whether anti-republican, anti-Semitic, or xenophobia, so characteristic of the French Right.[3] A stern moralist with an inflexible code, he had an "old-time" sense of honor reflected in the Greek elegies he wrote. His deep even mystical love for France, her history, and her classical literature provided him with the background to understand ongoing events on the French scene. But the lessons of the past and the events of the present were essentially a continuation of the French search for national security, prestige and continuity.[4] To Henri and his family, this French nation exemplified:

---

[1]Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 9.

[2]De Gaulle, Memoirs, p. 3.

[3]Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," Daedulus, p. 832.

[4]Serfaty, De Gaulle and Europe, p. 13.

> . . .the highest temporal good, . . .a cultural partnership of the living and the dead, the virtues of the soldier as both the defender of the nation and the carrier of the Christian faith.[1]

Henri de Gaulle had a unique ability to employ mime in teaching in order to make the past come alive for his students.[2] One of his students was Charles, whose character and values were shaped by a parent who was also the teacher, on both a formal and informal basis. Henri's favorite teaching example was Ignatius Loyola, the soldier-priest,[3] along with the Greek ideal of a sovereign personality. Charles assimilated the latter without modification, but his personal ideal would come to be a balance between the citizen-soldier and the cabinet-minister colonel.

"Entertainment" for the de Gaulle family invariably was educational sojourns, such as rare attendance at Parisian plays. These included classical presentations of French literature such as Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, Rostand's L'Aiglon, a romantic drama of the last days of Napoleon's sons, or Cyrano de Bergerac.[4] Even the traditional de Gaulle walks were educational reinforcements, always noting historical landmarks or visiting museums. Throughout, Henri

---

[1]Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," Daedalus, p. 832.

[2]De Gaulle would do just as well with his political "stagecraft."

[3]Tournoux, Petain and de Gaulle, p. 5.

[4]Hatch, Biography of Charles de Gaulle, p. 23.

de Gaulle inculcated in his son the contrast of the ideal of a grave and faithful Christian France, the unworthiness of her citizens who so often fell short of it, and the subsequent insecurity created by the existence of such a dichotomy. His was a cult of integrity, of France, but including religious devotion, philosophic abstractions and literary articulateness: all for the security of Order through God and King.[1] These emphases on throne, altar, sword and Holy Water were actively pursued in public service, discipline, and submission to causes, but not classes. Thus Henri de Gaulle valued justice above class solidarity.[2] Understandably, he came to defend Dreyfus at a time when his "class" did not, for the de Gaulles were "extreme moderates," condemning excesses. Theirs was a tradition of examining issues on its own merits, independently, rather than on any preconceived opinions or ideologies. In other words, there were open belief systems that would take into account higher values such as justice and the state. This objectivity may be seen in Charles de Gaulle's first book, which was written during the frustrations of his German captivity. Yet even after considering the cultural and familial values, including _ravanche_, the book's constant theme is "moderation."[3]

---

[1]See Tournoux, _Petain and de Gaulle_, p. 3; Edelman, "Vision," Part I, p. 64.

[2]_Ibid_., p. 39n.

[3]Charles de Gaulle, _La Discorde Chez l'Ennemi_ (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1924).

Generally, however, the de Gaulle family perceived the French State to be in chaos. Order, unity, etc. had to be reinstated in order to restore her place or grandeur among other nations. The epitome of such beliefs are found in the repercussions of "The Dreyfus Affair."

In France as early as 1886 the Roman Catholic Church, the military, and the aristocracy led an anti-Semitic campaign that would become more than a case of whether a Jewish Army Officer had indeed sold French secrets to the Germans. The "real" question was the Republic versus the Church, the nature of modern French society, the role of the Army in that society and that Republic, and the objectivity of basic principles of justice or the national interest against the rights of the individual.[1] It is natural then that the de Gaulles were not as much concerned with whether Dreyfus was guilty or innocent as the effects of a national scandal which spotlighted many normally latent French conflicts and in which both "sides" behaved lamentably.[2] Perhaps they thought Dreyfus innocent. There is even comment that Henri de Gaulle's vocalizing of such an opinion had more to do with his giving up a military career than financial problems. Still the dominant distaste

---

[1]See Kohn, Modern French Mind, pp. 70-1; Crawley, De Gaulle, p. 20.

[2]Charles de Gaulle, France and Her Army, tr. F. L. Dash (London: Hutchinson & Co., n.p.), p. 82.

for the affair was its effect on the country in general, in other words, the French nation-state in general and the military in particular. The constant strife with its intrigues, confessions, forgeries, retractions, mutual slander, duels and suicides lasted through de Gaulle's early adolescence.[1] The case and its wounds were reopened and the sentence eventually annulled when de Gaulle was fifteen years of age, so the controversy was a long one. The end result was a demoralization of shame and defeat for the French Army and a tarnishing of its prestige, which resulted in a depopularization of military careers. There was not only a rise in anti-militarism with a reduction in Army manpower (Army Law of 1905), but a general pacifism in the country. De Gaulle, in reviewing the Dreyfus matter writes: "the illusions of pacifism and the newly awakened distrust of the military mind [resulted] in the army [beginning] to lose strength and cohesion."[2] The de Gaulles viewed the Army as the essence of France. The military provided a means to fulfill France's place in the world and her "historical destiny" in such national purposes as the defense of French territory and the colonial expansion of French interests. In contrast, the

---

[1] Ibid., also Clark, The Man Who is France, p. 27.

[2] De Gaulle, France and Her Army, p. 82.

Dreyfus Affair epitomized the de Gaulle perceptions of a cataclysmic world and the decline of the French state. For more than personal security, the de Gaulles feared for "their France."

The fact that such beliefs motivated Charles de Gaulle is readily apparent in his writings, whether Une mauvaise rencontre, a playlet written at age fourteen, or the posthumous publication of Memoirs of Hope.[1] Even more relevant support is found in de Gaulle's political behavior during his political tenure. His "idea of France" is evident in all of his London British Broadcasting Company broadcasts:

> At this hour all Frenchmen know that the ordinary forms of power have disappeared. In the confusion of French souls and the liquefaction of a government fallen under the servitude of the enemy, I, General de Gaulle, a French soldier and chief, I assume to speak in the name of France.
>
> In the name of France I formally declare the following:
>
> Every Frenchman who is bearing arms has a sacred duty to continue the resistance. . .To relinquish even the smallest sliver of French land to the enemy would be a crime against the Nation. . .and now I speak above all for French North Africa; for an intact North Africa. . .every man possessing a shred of honor must refuse to carry out the conditions imposed by the enemy.
>
> Soldiers of France, wherever you may be, arise.[2]

---

[1]See Tournoux, Pétain et de Gaulle (Paris: Plon, 1964), pp. 28-37 for the playlet in French; Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970.

[2]Quoted in Hatch, Biography of Charles de Gaulle, p. 104; Clark, The Man Who is France, pp. 128-9. Emphasis supplied.

To reiterate, the deprivation of perceived safety or security did not motivate the "de Gaulle self" in any personal quest for order, but rather for France. De Gaulle did not experience the psychological loss of a parent or the physical loss of siblings that fed Nixon's search for security and order, for example. Indeed, de Gaulle seems to have rarely sought anything, but rather has, in the French tradition, let time and events determine the pace of activity. He merely took advantage of surfacing events when the time was "right."

Affection and Belongingness

Although the distinction of personal self and public self would indicate a transition from self-concern to concern for others in the environment, Maslow views the transition as actually beginning with the "need area" of affection and belongingness. He defines "love" nonsexually, as being deeply understood and accepted.[1] The lack of love or emotional coldness is often the most common cause of maladjustments in society.[2] Such a deficiency may be partial, that is, the rejection of the child by one parent, or even harsh parental discipline in general. Several American Presidential studies have explored the results of a child's perceived lack of

---

[1]See S. DeGrazia, The Political Community, A Study of Anomie(Chicago: Unviersity of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 107 for a discussion of how the lack of this basic need results in anomie.

[2]Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 89.

love on subsequent political behavior. The Georges, for example, explore the dual motivations of love and self-esteem relative to President Woodrow Wilson. They find that he had a:

> . . .core feeling of inadequacy, of a fundamental worthlessness which must ever be disproved, that the unappeasable quality of his need for affection, power and achievement, and the compulsive quality of his striving for perfection, may be traced to the lack of affection shown him as a child .[1]

Wilson's primary interest in political power and its leadership was essentially because it provided a means to compensate for his damaged self-esteem and perceived lack of love.

> The urgent inner need constantly to struggle against these mischievous self-depreciating legacies from his early years crippled his capacity to react objectively to matters at hand. . . [His was a necessity] to prove to himself that he was, after all, an adequate and virtuous human being.[2]

Wilson would emotionally commit himself to specific measures whose fate became, to him, a test of his personal worth. All of this could be applied equally as well to Richard Nixon, with more disastrous conclusions. A less extreme example is Lyndon B. Johnson, a man driven for political power by a love <u>through</u> performance which replaced an inability to relate to people on the one-to-one level.[3] In contrast, Franklin D. Roosevelt had an overpowering mother and a very

---

[1]George and George, <u>Woodrow Wilson</u>, p. 8.

[2]<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 114-6.

[3]Doris Kearns, "What's the Big Idea?" PBS-TV(Raleigh, N.C.).

old father. His political motivations and traits developed in reaction to these factors, rather than permitting an unhealthy situation to exist.[1] Wilson, however, sought political power as a value in itself, as a means to find "approval, respect and . . .a virtuous feeling," in other words, love, affection and self-esteem.[2] Even with the acquisition of power, however, Wilson was never satisfied. His childhood deprivations even affected his political style or role behavior. He preferred to hear only favorable information communicated in the Presidential decision-making process, even when from his closest advisers.

Further, deprivations of affection and belongingness can result in hostility, prejudice and autism. As Adler comments: "the stronger the feelings of personal inferiority, the greater the likelihood that a person will hold negative attitudes toward others. Thus those individuals with "unfulfilled need for affection will tend, because of their anxieties and hostilities, to be authoritarian and undemocratic."[3]

In contrast, it is difficult to find examples of perceived severe deprivation of love in de Gaulle's pre-adult life or even to infer such from his adult behavior. Although, as previously noted, Henri de Gaulle was a "stern

---

[1]Maslow considered Roosevelt a prime example of the Self-Actualizer.

[2]George and George, Woodrow Wilson, p. 320.

[3]Knutson, Human Basis, pp. 39-40. Here again, Nixon.

moralist" and his wife one who hid her inner emotions, what little is known of de Gaulle's childhood is indicative of a protective le foyer functioning at its best. The few occasions "love" is mentioned, the inference is that the de Gaulle family life was a normal one. Tournoux writes that:

> Henri de Gaulle was an extremely devoted father, proud of all [five of] his children, and he admired Charles's exceptional gifts. And further, Charles is the most affectionate of the de Gaulle children.[1]

The Hoffmanns go so far as to note that de Gaulle "must have experienced, at home, . . .the opulence of affection," although as a child he had "no special privileges," for all the children were treated equally.[2] The Hoffmanns consider this a "deprivation" for such a "remarkable boy."[3] Such an opinion, also expressed in the hagiographies, does not consider the consequences of singling out one child of five for "special" attention. Although the other four children were not carbon copies of Charles, it appears that each in his own field of endeavor was more than "average."[4]

---

[1]Tournoux, Petain and De Gaulle, p. 15.

[2]Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," Daedalus, pp. 834-5. Emphasis supplied.

[3]None of his biographers seems to dispute that Charles was very precocious, "wise beyond his years," according to his father.

[4]The eldest brother was even considered the family intellectual. Little is known of the only sister.

Until his adolescence, de Gaulle appears to have been a typical boy, more interested in martial games[1] and adventure stories than studying, although he did some verse writing, including his playlet. A practical joker, de Gaulle's aggressive temper often required "physical chastisement" from his father.[2] This, however, appears well within the so-called "typical" experiences of a growing boy, with no indication that the family relationships were sufficiently unusual as to result in compensatory motivational behavior. Indeed, de Gaulle's twenty year devotion to his retarded daughter is indicative of a capacity to love that could only come from one who had experienced affection and belongingness. Unfortunately, because he rarely broke the customs of le foyer and its shelter of privacy, plus the unique style of his particular personality, de Gaulle's biographers continually reiterate the uncontested, undocumented, and largely unanalyzed statement that he had been reared in an ice house, or at least had fallen into one during adolescence.[3] Yet, as we have noted, in de Gaulle's few references to his youth, the awareness of his family-world

---

[1]Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 23; Galante, The General, p. 47.

[2]Philippe Barrés, Charles de Gaulle (Paris: Plon Cartier, 1941), pp. 22, 30; Tournoux, Petain and De Gaulle, pp. 24-5; Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 22.

[3]The phrase is found somewhere in most of what has been written on the childhood period. See Crawley, De Gaulle, Chapter 1; Tournoux, Petain and de Gaulle, p.7; Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur, Daedalus, p. 834.

is one that was safe and secure for "his self," but chaotic for the "self" of France. In a more tenuous way, the need area of affection and belongingness could be dichotomized the same way. For example, the love of France the de Gaulle family had is reflected in the portrayal of Henri de Gaulle by one of his former students, Marcel Prevost:

> It is France you love at this school. In speaking to you of France, I know I am repeating myself. You can all testify, all of you: in the ten years I have addressed you here, I have never done so without speaking of France.[1]

Charles de Gaulle's religious and nationalistic love of France was strong, if not deeper, as indicated in his oft-quoted "certain idea of France:"

> The emotional side of me tends to imagine France, like the princess in the fairy stories or the Madonna in the frescoes, as dedicated to an exalted and exceptional destiny.[2]

"France" was de Gaulle's marotte or obsession. With a motto of "grandeur," from an early age he totally identified his destiny with the preservation and promotion of that abstraction, "France." For he believed that as long as there is France, there is no need for anything more.

As noted previously, the dichotomy of self and State is so strong a part of the individual makeup of the de Gaulle family that it must be considered as something other than a motivation to duty in the "public interest," a concept which

---

[1]See Marcel Prevost, Le Scorpion (Paris: n.p.).

[2]De Gaulle, Memoirs, p. 3.

too often does not adequately express the "non-people" orientation of de Gaulle's "France." More detail on this idealization and idolization of France will be considered in Chapters 4 and 5, since it is a major element in both de Gaulle's political philosophy and style. In the present context, however, France "needs" to belong, to be respected not only by her citizens (nationalism), but other nation-states as well. Henri de Gaulle taught his children the history of France's shame and defeat and the need for patriotism, faith and religion.[1] Charles de Gaulle in turn sought a means to help recapture the grandeur of France and her honor. For a time he thought that the means to do this was to be an African missionary. As a practicing Roman Catholic, he accepted the teachings of the Church with complete faith.[2] However, his eventual choice of a military career was based in part on the deep sense of duty and the military orientation cultivated early by his family.[3] He saw a greater role in regaining French grandeur or esteem with the Army. As a soldier he could also, as in French colonial days, "carry

---

[1]Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 21.

[2]Ibid., p. 45; Hatch, Biography of de Gaulle, p. 266.

[3]Tournoux, Petain and de Gaulle, p. 41. After years of recreating French battles, wherein he always played the role of France, de Gaulle chose the military career when he was about seventeen.

the faith" while defending the nation. In all then, de Gaulle had an apocalyptic vision of international politics as crisis-oriented. But he believed he would play an undefined role in that vision. Such a role would be for the entire French State rather than for the Church which represented merely a part of that State.

Esteem

Esteem, the fourth "need area" has less clarity. In Maslow's analysis, the lack of esteem may either spur activity toward seeking prestigous roles or be a barrier to activity by producing a shyness that inhibits role-seeking. Although characterized by others as personally shy, it appears that de Gaulle's reticence was more the result of the influence of le foyer and the particular behavioral and political style he adopted so early. If indeed he was shy,[1] it did not permanently inhibit political role-seeking. Further, any shyness could be explained in the Cartesian thought-pattern that advocates waiting for the right moment to permit events to do the "acting." De Gaulle was a "waiter." He was forty-nine years old before he emerged as a French leader. His brief political tenure over, he was to wait another twelve and a half years before returning to political leadership. Further, once in political office, he sought to awaken the

---

[1]Grinnel-Milne, Triumph of Integrity, p. 39.

French political consciousness, not an easy thing to do. Such a national consensus in France has often been directed against political parties and the institutions of the government. And historically, the "director" has been an individual whose sole role seemed to be restoring France's rank or grandeur, her esteem, rather than functioning as a specific problem-solver.[1] De Gaulle's political style was definitely not tinged with any "shyness."

Maslow divided this "need area" of esteem into the need to be a worthy individual--to have strength, freedom, and independence--and the need to be recognized as a worthy individual in the esteem of others.[2] There are vital differences between the two. Self-esteem entails confidence, competence, mastery, adequacy, achievement, independence and freedom while social-esteem results in prestige, recognition, acceptance, attention, status, reputation and appreciation. For many researchers, this general "need area" constitutes the prime motivating force in the pursuit of power. Power compensates for previous deprivations. It "is expected to overcome low estimates of the self, by changing either the traits of the self or the environment in which it functions."[3] This pursuit

---

[1]Serfaty, De Gaulle and Europe, p. 91 quoting Fougeyrollas, Politique, pp. 178-89.

[2]Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 90.

[3]Lasswell, Power and Personality, p. 39.

of power is viewed by Lasswell et al as a compensatory personality goal that is not entirely healthy, i.e., the neurotic seeking naked power. Yet the pursuit of power can come from those with high self-esteem, particularly by those individuals who can survive the rigors of political candidacy and consequent office and whose leadership is a commitment to a high moral cause. Barber states this view:

> A political role is based on deeper motives, it is not likely to be taken by two kinds of people: those who have such high self-esteem that they can manage relatively easily the threats and strains involved in this change; and those who have such low self-esteem that they are ready to do this extraordinary thing to raise it.[1]

De Gaulle was the individual of high self-esteem. However, his obsession with "French destiny" led him to sacrifice his personal career in the military for the eventual grandeur of France,[2] rather than to seek political power as a compensatory action per Lasswellian precepts. Further, the seeking of "naked power" for the sake of domination is rare in certain cultural instances. For example, although his inner conflicts would make it appear that pure power would be sought by President Wilson, these conflicts were tempered by the external environment of his family, their values, and the larger cultural context. These

---

[1]J. David Barber, The Lawmakers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 223-4.

[2]Thompson, Pledge to Destiny, pp. 256-7.

factors moderated Wilson's original motivations. In de Gaulle's case, much the same is true. The French have a anti-dictatorial tradition, found essentially in their concept of liberty. Liberty is seen as a means or civil right for the citizenry to oppose those in power.[1] "Naked power" is anathema to the French, who have a "natural" tendency to defy what they distrust, authority and power. Too, France does not have the authoritarian tradition evident in a country like Germany, for example.[2] And if we assume the acquisition of "naked power" is fairly consistent with dictatorships, then neither Wilson nor de Gaulle could be so categorized.

In de Gaulle's case, no examples of severe deprivation of either self or social esteem exist, unless the dichotomy of the French public versus the personal self is continued. This, however, would only complicate Maslow's own self/social divisions in this particular "need area." The established fact of the existence of the dichotomy is more important than reiterating its application to each "need area." Too, the "public self" will be analyzed further in subsequent chapters. Although this writer believes de Gaulle experienced no severe esteem deprivation, this is not true with the Hoffmanns.

---

[1]See Duverger, French Political System, pp. 8-9.

[2]Note again, the previous discussion of authority-laden versus authoritarianism.

Their conclusion is that the entire de Gaulle family was "frustrated" both socially and politically by the domestic and international political conditions.[1] The Hoffmanns contend that these frustrations, combined with familial values, resulted in de Gaulle choosing a military career.[2] In other words, his motivation was to shape the future, yet renew France's destiny as it had been in the past. But because his political beliefs were not monarchical as were his family's de Gaulle chose to identify himself in his goal of the restoration of French grandeur with the French State, that is, an entity above every and all ideologies.

It seems, however, that in the main de Gaulle was an individual high in both security and self-esteem for the self. Maslow writes that such a leader will be motivated only in fields or areas that interest him and then only for the sake of the task to be accomplished, the advancement of the field in which he is interested, or for the good of society in general. His acitons would not be merely subterfuges for internal frustrations. That is, de Gaulle viewed political power as merely a means to further objective

---

[1]This idea originated with Emanul de la Vigeria D'Astier in his Sept Fois, Sept Jours (Paris: de Minuit, 1947).

[2]Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," Daedalus, pp. 835-6.

goals, often viewed as a "public duty" but not as an end. Still, active political participation can reflect a need for self-esteem while lack of social esteem impedes socio-political participation.[1] Overall, an individual deficient in esteem will tend to be intolerant of others, while exhibiting a concern for power and status. Such individuals are susceptible to closed belief systems, for dogmatism aids in their understanding the external environment and in seeking security in power.[2] Unfortunately, de Gaulle's political style often left him open to such criticisms, although the evidence to support such a view is meager. Generally, he does not fit unequivocally into any of Maslow's "deprived-to-motivate" categorizations. Since it is impossible to "prove" unquestionably the depth of the "public-self of France syndrome" on de Gaulle's "personal self," other than that evident in his conscious political philosophy and style, we must conclude that de Gaulle more readily fits Maslow's Self-Actualizing individual.

When severe deprivation during the formative years has occurred in any of the "need areas," the individual who survives is one crippled by an inability to assess reality

---

[1]Studies are actually inconclusive at this stage and support either self or social esteem.

[2]See Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind: Investigations into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1960).

accurately.[1] A different quality of leadership characterizes such an individual. And although there is little specific data, it has been suggested by Morganthau and Thompson that the quality of leadership affects the overall power position of nation-states. Relative to political style, the leader who has emerged from a deprived childhood tends to make decisions without all relevant information, a potentially fatal factor resulting from defective or unhealthy interpersonal relationships with others, including political advisors. That is, political advisors are expected to function primarily "toward" the political leader's personality needs. When that leader once makes a decision, it is rarely changed. Indeed when the situation requires decisional certainty, inaction often results. When action does result, it often lacks flexibility, as conformists lack independence or freedom and thus function inflexibly.[2] When the psychically deprived become politically active, it is often with the aim of forcing social and political change in an effort to create greater stability.[3] Yet their political

---

[1]Knutson, Human Basis, pp. 41-6.

[2]Ibid., pp. 64-7. In contrast, de Gaulle's policies were often so flexible that opposite interpretations were given to the same outlining speech.

belief systems are "short-term, egoistic, concrete."

> Their sickness is a character sickness; they have a sick philosophy of life, which is to say a false, incorrect one. It is understandable that they should have formed such a philosophy when we understand their jungle childhood. But their jungle philosophy doesn't change even when they grow up and come out of the jungle. It resists new facts. It is sick because it reacts to an outgrown past, rather than to the real present.[1]

De Gaulle's personal and political philosophy and his unique political style just do not validate his characterization as such an individual, although in unscientific personal reflections it would appear that Maslow did just that.[2]

Self-Actualization

Rather than a motivational force buffeted by deprivations, Self-Actualization constitutes a "being level," a process of growth rather than a "need level." In contrast to the previous discussion of deficiency-related areas, Self-Actualization occurs when the individual's basic needs are met. It is a process wherein the human personality "unfolds" to its fullest extent, is mentally healthy or more "fully human."[3] As such, Self-Actualization can not be specifically defined or delimited, although it appears

---

[1]Abraham Maslow, "Power Relationships and Patterns of Personal Development," in A. Kornhauser (ed.), Problems of Power in American Democracy (Detroit: Wayne State University, 1957), p. 130. A jungle philosophy is valid in jungle-like worlds, however.

[2]See his letters in Maslow, Memorial.

[3]Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 183.

more often in those over the age of sixty. De Gaulle's personal growth is most evident after he reached the age of fifty and during his second political tenure, although not necessarily the last two years of that tenure.

This growth process is indicated by self-actualization needs or "metaneeds," nebulous concepts perceived by the individual. These include: meaningfulness, self-sufficiency, effortlessness, playfulness, richness, simplicity, order, justice, completion, necessity, perfection, individuality, aliveness, beauty, goodness, and at the pinacle - truth.[1] A majority of these "metaneeds" are evident in de Gaulle's written philosophy. However, this is a normative judgment since the use of a Personal Orientation Inventory is impossible now and would be improbable for political reasons for the living. Thus it is again necessary to infer intuitively how well Maslow's Self-Actualizing individual fits de Gaulle.

Maslow expresses this "being" as "what a man can be, he must be:"[2]

> One's only rival is one's own potentialities. One's only failure is failing to live up to one's own possibilities.[3]

---

[1]Maslow, Psychology of Being; Frank G. Goble, The Third Force: The Psychology of Abraham Maslow (New York: Grossman Pub., 1970), p. 46.

[2]Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 91.

[3]Maslow, Memorial, p. 99. Notes dated February 23, 1970.

> Capacities clamor to be used, and cease their clamor only when they are used sufficently. That is to say, capacities are needs and therefore are intrinsic values as well.[1]

Maslow's basic theme seems to be that the Self-Actualizing individual exhibits opposing characteristics to those of the psychically deprived group. The most radical difference is in their individual Weltanschauung as related to individual personality needs. This is an old idea, as Fichte notes:

> The kind of philosophy a man chooses depends upon the kind of man he is. For a philosophic system is not piece of dead furniture one can acquire and discard at will. It is animated with the spirit of the man who possesses it.[2]

Or, from the psychological camp, Allport writes:

> The political nature of a man is indistinguishable from his personality as a whole, and . . .his personality as a whole is not the sum total of his specific reactions, but rather a congruent system of attitudes, each element of which is intelligible only in the light of the total pattern. A man's political opinions reflect the characteristic modes of his adjustment to life.[3]

In contrast to the "deprived," the Self-Actualizer has an open personality system that does not impede "successful social functioning,"[4] in part because personality does not

---

[1]Maslow, Psychology of Being, p. 144.

[2]Quoted in Stein, Identity and Anxiety, p. 542.

[3]Gordon W. Allport, "The Composition of Political Attitudes," The American Journal of Sociology 35 (1930):238.

[4]Knutson, Human Basis, p. 87.

hinder basic assessments of either the external environment-reality or an individual's own personality. Rather there is a superior perception of reality, eventuating "in a superior ability to reason, to perceive the truth, to come to conclusions, to be logical and to be cognitively efficient."[1] This superior ability, by whatever terminology is applied, was recognized by de Gaulle:

> Great men of war have always been conscious of the importance of instinct. Was not what Alexander called his "hope," Caesar his "luck," and Napoleon his "star" simply the fact that they knew they had a particular gift of making contact with realities sufficiently closely to dominate them?[2]

Life is seen clearly, objectively, and with little emotionality to cloud this perception. For example, during the emotional period of his "exile" in London, while he labored to rebuild the fighting French as the Free French, an unknowing subordinate ran up under the Tricolor a Cross of Lorraine flag, de Gaulle's personal symbol. De Gaulle's unemotional and logical response was an order to remove the banner. It was not a French flag.[3] Objectivity is also evident throughout his writings on war and its activities.

---

[1]Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 205.

[2]Charles de Gaulle, The Edge of the Sword, tr. Gerard Hopkins (New York: Criterion Books, Inc., 1960), p. 22; Le Fil de l'Epée, p. 181.

[3]Grinnel-Milne, Triumph of Integrity, p. 121.

His first words in Edge of the Sword quote Faust: "In the beginning was the Word? No! In the beginning was the Act."[1] Military and political action are not necessarily based on a philosophy of words. War is action, the aftermath brings objectivity.

In political terms, de Gaulle's objective perception was "realism." This is evident in his view that the Algerians were fighters for independence, not part of a world-wide Communist conspiracy as the French Generals warned.[2] Ho Chi Minh, in turn, was another nationalist, although the U.S. Pentagon followed their French brothers in viewing him as little more than another link in that "Red" conspiracy. In fact, de Gaulle incorporated Communists in his military and political actions, beginning with a role in the French Resistance--as they were not "pure separatists." His behavior in most instances was uncolored by emotionality. However, this does not mean he was not sensitive, for in the early days of his London years some emotionality showed through his self-control,[3] but his realistic perceptions were not affected by this.

De Gaulle's philosophy and pragmatic political style indicated that the realities of power were clearly

---

[1]De Gaulle, Edge of the Sword, p. 15; Le Fil de l'Epée, p. 161.

[2]Werth, De Gaulle, p. 55.

[3]See Colonel Passy (A. E. V. Dewavrin), Souvenirs, I (Paris: Raoul Solar, 1947).

and objectively faced. In decision-making, this translates into a strong sense of what is right and wrong, with little room, if any, for compromise.[1] What de Gaulle considered "right," particularly in major issues as he determined them to be, was not a matter for either debate or compromise, even if such an attitude resulted in inaction or unpopularity. This element of his personality is evident throughout his public career. It may be seen in his military opinions on the use of a motorized army, his role as leader of the Rally of the French People in the 1950's and all of his foreign policy. This sense of right and wrong was reinforced by a strong personal ethos, a set of principles he termed "honor and honesty." Such qualities enhance the decision-maker's ability to foresee or predict future events. De Gaulle is noted for his prescience, less a totally objective fact since his predictions were made after a crisis had begun in most instances and then were based on what his own political behavior would be. Of course, this behavior was grounded on a basically unchanging philosophy and was predictable. It is only necessary to compare the philosophy of The Edge of the Sword to his actions during WWII to understand how Grinnel-Milne could write: "His most objectionable quality is being almost invariably right."[2] Yet de Gaulle's predictive power is not always evident in international events

---

[1]Crawley, De Gaulle, p. 18.

[2]Grinnel-Milne, Triumph of Integrity, p. 317.

per se, although he did accurately foresee certain major events such as the United States and Russian entry into WWII. This ability to predict circumstances correctly should not be construed as an inability to listen to others. That is precluded by the reality that the Self-Actualizer has an internalized conscience, but one moulded by empathy. As an individual, de Gaulle was humane, indefensive, and cosmopolitan. Such a person may be either a liberal or conservative, although normally oriented toward the present and future. De Gaulle has been characterized as either, both, and neither.

Self-Actualizers, then, are tolerant and accept not only themselves but others. De Gaulle's Memoirs and his actions during his political tenures reveal a willingness to adapt and take others' aspirations into consideration.[1] Although during WWII de Gaulle had a "running battle" with Churchill, Roosevelt and others, his Memoirs usually absolves those with whom he had fought so long and hard, a good indication of his tolerance and forgiveness but not necessarily of Roosevelt's.

The Self-Actualizer has an identification with mankind in general, believing that man is good. De Gaulle did not divide humanity into good and bad, but rather included all

---

[1]Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," Daedalus, p. 851.

in the interests of France. However, "people" or "man" in de Gaulle's interpretation meant essentially the people of northern France[1] or any person who accepted French culture, an ethnic view.[2] He had a "very Christian sense of man's frailty,"[3] noting often that the French are "somewhat weak and fickle," but liking them no less for it. Although tolerant of others and the natural world, in other words identifying with mankind, de Gaulle was intolerant of dishonesty, cheating, inefficiency, and the like. As Thompson notes, there was "the arrogance of his scorn for the compromises and docilities of his fellows."[4] D'Astier goes further by saying for de Gaulle: "I don't like men, I like what elevates them."[5] However, in general de Gaulle viewed man as not necessarily approved of, but essentially good.

Maslow sees the Self-Actualizer as basically free from anxiety or hostility, although the latter may exist. With de Gaulle it existed. His sense of "order" was obtainable only through battle, whether in war or politics. But

---

[1]See de la Groce, De Gaulle.

[2]Crozier, De Gaulle, pp. 54-5.

[3]Hoffmann and Hoffmann, The Will to Grandeur," Daedalus, p. 854.

[4]Thompson, Pledge to Destiny, p. 256.

[5]D'Astier, Sept fois, pp. 60-1.

it was a state of low and well-managed anxiety, one that permitted a creative interest in his environment. Thus although de Gaulle always had to have a quarrel, believing that to be great one must sustain a great quarrel,[1] a "governor" existed in the fact that he was also a French classicist, desiring balance and efficiency attainable only with individual self-control. "Greatness," he told Malraux, "is a road that leads toward something unknown."[2]

De Gaulle was also philosophcally oriented, both practically and theoretically, as are most Self-Actualizers. From early childhood, as early as age five according to some, de Gaulle's formal and informal education was a classical French one, which means philosophical orientation. In addition, he appears to have continued this interest through his life. Whether in his writings, speeches, military or political actions, there are ample evidences of this philosophical orientation. Chapter 4 following explores the content of this philosophy, which draws upon Bergson, Chateaubriand, Saint-Simon, Péguy, Epictetus, Barrés, LaRochefoucauld, Bismark on war and politics, Sartre, Malraux, Descartes,

---

[1]De Gaulle, Edge of the Sword, p. 15. The idea is originally from Hamlet.

[2]Malraux, Felled Oaks, p. 29.

Mauriac, Nietzsche, Montaigne's Essays, Pascal, Maurras- but not as a reactionary, Corneille, de Vigny, Froissant, St. Augustine, Goethe, Socrates, Plato, and Kant - to name a few.[1] This is scarcely typical of, for example, Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon.

De Gaulle was skilled in Greek and contributed philosophically oriented verse and prose to literary reviews while still a teenager.[2] As an adult, he frequented French and Polish salons, including that of Daniel Halévy, a friend of Péguy. He acknowledged the importance of philosophers in writing that:

> . . .in the realm of the mind, men like Bourtroux or Bergson gave new life to the spiritual side of French thought, while Péguy and Barrés appealed to the precocious maturity of a young generation who sensed the presence of the Gleaner, in literature the influence of a Barrés, reviving in the elite an awareness of the imperishable inheritance by uncovering the links that attach it to its ancestors, are at once effects and causes of [the recovery from French pacificism and the demoralization of the military.][3]

As one who was philosophically oriented, de Gaulle advocated waiting for the right moment and then acting decisively. This is his basic concept of time, which ever

---

[1]See Crozier, De Gaulle,pp. 21, 442; Tournoux, Tragedie, pp. 231-2; Lacouture, De Gaulle, pp. 11, 43; Hatch, Biography of Charles de Gaulle, pp. 23-4, 266; Clark, The Man Who is France, pp. 24-5; Crawley, De Gaulle, pp. 17-8; Edelman, "Vision," Part II; Gaston Bonheur, Charles de Gaulle (Paris: Gallimard, 1958), p. 32; and others.

[2]Clark, The Man Who is France, p. 31.

[3]Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 33; Robert Aron, An Explanation of Charles de Gaulle (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. ix-xi. De Gaulle, France and Her Army, p. 87.

cycles from heights to depressions in periods, epochs or returns, similar to the theories of Nietzsche and Péguy. Thus slow orderly change, rather than sudden usually militarily-inspired changes, are preferred. Although the Army was considered a major factor in a nation, de Gaulle recognized that the French Army had been against Dreyfus, for Vichy, and for Algerian integration. Such a force could scarcely be turned to for objective or realistic policies. Yet although his bitterest quarrels were with the military, he still preferred to be called mon Général above all other titles. However, after the military returned him to power, de Gaulle was the one to effectively "tame" it. Indirectly, then, his actions or policies toward the major vehicle of sudden change, the military, are good indications of his advocacy of slow change.The end result may still be revolutionary, but a bloodless one.[1] Slow change, of course, requires the patience to await the proper moment, which de Gaulle had. He was unknown by most Frenchmen until he was forty-nine, and then gave up his political role after only a brief tenure, not to return to formal power positions for twelve years.

Maslow further states that Self-Actualizers are more cosmopolitan or "international people," rather than

---

[1]Note de Gaulle's grandmother's quotation on p. 143 above.

typifying a purely "national character."[1] Although de Gaulle's roots were in the North of France, he did travel extensively whenever possible.[2] He has been said to be an "untypical" Frenchman. In fact he said so in stating that he was "without precedent." A more "typical" French leader would include:

> . . .the ruthless, sarcastic 'Jacobin' Clemenceau; the humourless [sic], hard-working, drearily legalistic Poincaré; Doumergue, the average politician with his false bonhomie; Pétain, the traditional general, suddenly called upon to play the Father Figure [in the midst of his secondary occupation, "skirt-chasing."][3]

Still, de Gaulle is "typical" with respect to his seventeenth century classical educational emphasis and many of the cultural values he held, including the Cartesian thinking he epitomized. However, what Maslow seems to mean here is that the Self-Actualizer does not fall to national pressures to conform when non-humanistic or anti-democratic values are involved, but rather is independent when basic principles are the issue. Yet there is conventionality where less important things like dress or food are concerned. De Gaulle's nonconformist ideas in the military effectively restricted his promotions and slowed his career, yet he never changed his preferences. Conventional on how he dressed and the food he ate, he refused to cultivate "the taste, attitudes and

---

[1]Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. 213-4.

[2]Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 23.

[3]Werth, De Gaulle, p. 56.

features that could flatter" crowds.[1]

De Gaulle, as Self-Actualizers are wont to do, recognized the difference between means and ends in a basically democratic value structure. That is, if one accepts that his values or attitudes were not ideologically authoritarian, it must be assumed that they were democratic. His insistence upon wanting to deal with the people directly in the referendum, universal suffrage, granting women the right to vote, etc. are indications of a democratic value structure. In this, and other political behavior, de Gaulle was more mission-centered and less ego-centered, although he admitted to being an egoist for France. His was a sense of duty or obligation that had to be accomplished.[2] This mission-centered orientation is evident in de Gaulle's Edge of the Sword where he constantly notes that leaders identify themselves with high ideas.[3] So a cause is necessary, a form that is likened to a missionary, in this case of, to, and for France. De Gaulle then is "destiny's instrument" seeking to preserve a cultural entity, the French nation. The Frenchman is a national animal, linked to a homeland, the product

---

[1]Charles de Gaulle, Unity:War Memoirs:1942-44, tr. Richard Howard (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1959), p. 311.

[2]Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 205. For more political application of this theory,i.e.,that the democratic character is one developing from a "combination of emotional maturity, of self-confident strength that permits both respect and healthy control and discipline, of warm or cool affection, and of training in democratic techniques and philosophy" see Lasswell, Power and Personality;Maslow,"Power Relationships" in Kornhauser, American Democracy, pp. 105-8. [3]De Gaulle, Edge of Sword, pp. 87-8.

of a collective temperament and a traditional culture, according to de Gaulle. Within this context, he says:

> A call to honor from the depths of history, as well as the instinct of the nation itself, had led me to bear responsibility for the treasure in default of heirs: to assume French sovereignty. It was I who held the legitimacy. It was in its name that I could call the nation to war and to unity, impose order, law and justice, demand from the world respect for the rights of France.[1]

In decision-making terms, the Self-Actualizing individual has psycholgical strength in spontaneity, unhampered by convention.[2] He is a task-oriented problem-solver open to new ideas and new information. De Gaulle, although considered a traditionalist, opened France to industrialization and modernization. However, he sought to control this evolution so that it would not result in the disadvantages he saw in the experiences of the United States. But he moved from being a French Empire man of the old-time imperialistic school[3] to a decolonizer and leader, or at least friend, of the "Third World" nations. In his nonconformity, de Gaulle dedicated himself to a mission and was willing to discipline himself to work hard to accomplish his goal, in order "not to disappoint oneself" according to Malraux.[4]

---

[1]De Gaulle, War Memoirs (Unity), p. 665.

[2]Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. 208-9.

[3]Werth, De Gaulle, pp. 57-8.

[4]See André Malraux, Antimemoirs (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968), p. 130 or his Felled Oaks: Conversation with de Gaulle (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1972).

But there is objective detachment from a problem. However, this can be, and with de Gaulle was, interpreted by others as coldness or aloofness.[1] Yet humility is more characteristic. In other words, creativity including flexibility, spontaneity, and courageous action is typical of de Gaulle's Self-Actualization. De Gaulle's flexibility[2] is evident in his ability to change both his political orientation and his personality. Thus, although he has often been characterized as a bourgeoise and minor aristocrat, de Gaulle's political support at any given time came from both the bien-pensants of conservative France and the "revolutionists," but not the ideologists.[3] He explains the paradox of his family's background and his adult political beliefs in a newspaper interview:

> I was brought up, like most young men in my class, as an ultra-conservative. That was the atmosphere at St. Cyr. But, during the present war WW II , I have had evidence of treason among the same class. After I started the Free French movement, I soon discovered that the support I was getting from France came from the working class and peasantry. They were the ones risking their lives. This had a profound impression on me and made me alter my opinions.[4]

---

[1]Edelman, "Vision," Part 1.

[2]See Crozier, De Gaulle, pp. 663-4 for an opposing view.

[3]Ibid., pp. 4-5.

[4]Richard Harrity and Ralph G. Martin, Man of Destiny: de Gaulle of France (New York: Duell, Sloan & Peace, 1961), n.p.

His idealism, then, was not rigid in application. He viewed statesmanship as "doing what is possible in the right direction."[1] Thus although he was a traditionalist, he acted more progressively than the radicals, in order to adapt the best of French traditions to what he considered the inevitability of change. "Enemies" were forgiven when their interests approximated those of "France." His personality changed too, or at least mellowed. From an aggressively hot-tempered youth, de Gaulle evolved sometime between WW II and the institutionalization of the Fifth Republic into a man of patience.[2] He even gave up the chain-smoking which alone often indicated his internal turmoil, or his wandering trail during military maneuvers.[3]

De Gaulle's courage and inventiveness may be seen in his reaction to involuntary confinement as a Prisoner of War during WW I. He attempted five escapes from five different prisons, including being smuggled out of camp in a horse-drawn supply wagon, swallowing vast amounts of bicarbonate to turn a jaundice yellow for an easier escape from the camp hospital[4] and digging a tunnel. In each

---

[1]Hatch, Biography of Charles de Gaulle, p. 266.

[2]Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 686.

[3]Thompson, Pledge to Destiny, pp. 40, 49; Grinnel-Milne, Triumph of Integrity, p. 83; Clark, The Man Who is France, p. 105; Hatch, Biography of Charles de Gaulle, p. 216.

[4]Galante, The General, pp. 62-5.

instance he made his own uniforms,[1] but was easily recaptured due to his unusual height. The Germans finally put their "mulehead" into a camp for incorrigible prisoners.[2] When it became evident that the escape attempts were fruitless, since the last camp included among other things, a moat, de Gaulle turned his energies to other ventures. He polished his German language skills and by researching German newspapers on that country's military actions, established the groundwork for his 1924 book, La Discorde chez l'Ennemi. His spare time was spent lecturing his fellow prisoners on the war campaigns from facts he gleaned from the censored German papers. Here again his ability of prescience revealed itself when he was able to predict the German military defeat from such incomplete information.

In their desire for personal privacy and detachment from society, the Charles de Gaulles rarely entertained[3] outside their circle of family and friends. Yet this typical Self-Actualizing behavior means increased autonomy and improved interpersonal relations, although the circle of friends and loved ones with whom feelings of intimacy are shared are small in number. In all his contacts

---

[1]Clark, The Man Who is France, p. 46.

[2]Ibid., Fort IX, Ingolstadt, Bavaria.

[3]Crawley, De Gaulle, p. 14.

with Americans, those he considered friends were few, including Envoy to the Free French Robert D. Murphy, U. S. Ambassador to France Charles E. Bohlen, and NATO/SHAPE Commander, General Lauris Norstead. But detachment from others is preferred so much, that often extreme measures are taken to insure privacy. De Gaulle went so far as to insist that there be no telephones in his immediate vicinity, even when he was France's Chief Executive. Virtually every weekend during his political tenure was spent "away" at Colombey and many weekdays were spent travelling throughout France or abroad.[1] Such privacy meant that few realized how bad de Gaulle's cateracts were during the 1950's, for example. Yet even with such self-imposed social restrictions, the Self-Actualizer sees the world as knowable, and manageable. He learns more than others about this world and life in general from both the formal and informal educational processes. De Gaulle seems to have learned it rapidly, and then became bored with school. He passed first or near first from each school, regardless. He innovatively enhanced his abilities by using his knowledge of language as a vehicle to discipline his mind. He learned, and taught his siblings, to speak French backwards. With such discipline, he

---

[1]Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," Daedulus, p. 857.

memorized lengthy passages and entire plays, such as a favorite, Cyrano de Bergerac.

Interestingly, Goble notes that the Self-Actualizing individual tends to be too competent, therefore discouraging his own children.[1] This could be partially true, as de Gaulle's only son has had a lack-luster military career in the Navy. However, much of this career was during de Gaulle's political tenure. It appears that the Father might be guilty of actually impeding his son's career in an attempt to be objective and avoid nepotism. We do know that de Gaulle refused to make permanent or promote his own temporary rank of General when he had the power to do so. However, there is actually little data to verify if de Gaulle was a "good parent" as Maslow defines it.

De Gaulle's spirituality or religiousness is better known. Although all Self-Actualizers have this characteristic, it is not necessarily in a structured sense. Moral values are often self-determined, although de Gaulle's fall within the boundaries of French Catholicism. He had a vivid appreciativeness of life, with work and play virtually synonomous. As a "complete" or healthy individual, de Gaulle had a unique sophisticated or philosophical humor, in contrast to the more hostile-directed variety. Thus Lacouture quotes

---

[1]Goble, The Third Force, p. 23.

him as commenting: "Reassure yourselves, I shall not fail to die,"[1] or there is Werth noting that a comment on a small "independent socialist" party was "Oh yes, that party with six members and seven tendencies."[2] His wit, then, is of the dry variety so typical of Northern France, a humor without persiflage or irresponsibility.

A Summary

Although Maslow would no doubt disagree with the characterization of de Gaulle as a Self-Actualizer, and de Gaulle would never have submitted himself to the necessary psychological testing to effectively prove or disprove the contention, the data which we do have indicates this as a reasonable explanation for his motivations toward power. To accept unequivocally many statements made about him precludes the applicability of a scientific inquiry. True, Roosevelt considered de Gaulle a potential dictator and noted that he and Joan of Arc _were_ alike--they both heard voices! Even Churchill once characterized de Gaulle as the _Frank_enstein monster. A most recent study contends that

---

[1]Lacouture, _De Gaulle_; Werth, _De Gaulle_, p. 62.

[2]See Galante, _The General_, pp. 153, 164, 186, 208, and 209 for further examples of his wit. Also "The Court" in _Le Canard Enchaîné_ and his own reflections in _Memoirs of Hope_.

de Gaulle was inflexible, vindictive, and a magalomanic and that "as a writer, he wrote too little; as a soldier, he fought too little; and as a statesman, he came too late."[1] But these reports, professional or otherwise, do not make adequate note of the influence of cultural values, individual personality, philosophy and style on understanding a decision-maker's specific situational behavior. Unfortunately, what is more readily consumed is subjective analysis to the exclusion of promoting understanding of leadership behavior. The subjective orientation is exemplified by a recent Jack Anderson column.[2] Thirty of the "most astute foreign affairs observers in Washington," including State Department, Pentagon, Congressional, Embassy, and academic representatives were polled and responded to a "worst leader" list. Their responses included such characterizations as "bush-league autocrat," "fanatic," "petty little dictator" and "madman." The poll ratings not only included Idi Amin, Nguyen Van Thieu, Muammar Qudafi and Lon Nol but Mao Tse-Tung, Leonid Brezhnev and Isabel Peron. Granted some or all of the leaders cited <u>may</u> be guilty of "despotism, ineffectiveness, irresponsibility, personal greed and personal instability."[3]

---

[1]Crozier, <u>De Gaulle</u>, p. 9.

[2]Jack Anderson, <u>News and Observer</u> (March 18, 1975), p. 4.

[3]<u>Ibid</u>.

But our individual perceptions and political values appear to be hindering a more objective assessment of these leaders to enable us to understand and even predict a climate of behavior. No qualifying comments were rendered or possibly asked for, although the question asked appears to be open-ended. Yet as McFarland notes: "From ancient times to modern, men have personified the social-structural forces that shaped their lives."[1] To characterize decisional behavior as "mad" or "irrational" could be more a reaction to political style, without consideration of the cultural context or whether the individual leader is consistent in re his particular philosophy and personality, or what the motivations of that personality are. Regardless of the inaccessibility of most political leaders, social scientists have one readily available source to draw upon, the written word, which can be value or content analyzed. De Gaulle's only pre-adult writing available to American-based researchers is Une Mauvaise Rencontre.

An Unfortunate Encounter is a playlet, written in Alexandrines, when de Gaulle was about fourteen. Originally the work of a popular songwriter, Gustave Nadaud, de Gaulle added his own innovations, including changing the major role

---

[1]McFarland, Power and Leadership, p. 154.

of the brigand to one César-Charles. Briefly, the tale concerns a highwayman's successful acquisition of a traveler's wearing apparel, purse, and watch, all without bloodshed. This brief study in human behavior has been considered a satire on cowards and a lesson in political philosophy and a "boring tale of grandeur, struggle, chaos and loss, loneliness. . .glory and fatalism."[1] Fabre-Luce's terse comment is that cunning and panache attracted de Gaulle at an early age.[2] Much has been made of this very short play. A value analysis of the written words and inferred actions does substantiate a preoccupation with force. César-Charles repeatedly draws the traveler's attention to his two pistols and the threat implied there, whereupon the item being discoursed upon is "voluntarily" relinquished. However, the other Hoffmann characterizations are more tenuous. Although struggle, chaos, loneliness, etc. are evident, the inescapable conclusion for this researcher is that the play's overwhelming emphasis is on style. The chaos of the world of a highwayman and the loss and loneliness of his experiences are merely part of his ruse. Along with flattery and the character faults of the traveler, pity and cowardice

---

[1]See Cattaui, Charles de Gaulle; Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," Daedalus, pp. 837-9.

[2]See Alfred Fabre-Luce, Le Couronnement du Prince (Paris: Table Ronde, 1964).

at least, the brigand obtains his end, the acquisition of material goods laborlessly. There are interesting parallels between what the playlet says and infers and de Gaulle's adult writings and behavior. However, this early writing leaves more questions unanswered than it settles. All of de Gaulle's central values as an integral part of his personality are just not explicitly evident in this playlet.

Charles de Gaulle was motivated toward political power primarily on the basis of his personal philosophy and cultural values. He had a psychically healthy environment, both externally and internally, and sought to be all that he could be or do in whatever endeavor he pursued. There would not have been any great psychic damage then had he remained in the military or pursued a writing career, as his objective appraisal of reality would deny any other reaction. But besides the requirement of being a "healthy individual," cultural values must reinforce the mental being. For de Gaulle, most of these values came from his family or were reinforced there, although these are also evident in the French culture or national culture. But then values by definition are explicit or implicit conceptions distinctive of an individual or even characteristic of a group. Values influence the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action. The key words are "right," or "wrong," "better," or "worse." Either way, value orientations influence decisional behavior. Political decision-makers tend

to rely heavily on their fundamental value orientations, rather than empirical or factual criteria, when the decisional time is short and/or limited.[1] Sometimes single values are good predictors of behavior, such as the value "salvation" tends to be a good predictor of church attendance.[2] De Gaulle's value of order, then, would explain his self-discipline. His major personal values, however, include self-respect, honor, integrity or truth, and fidelity. These were manifested in his personal characteristics, which in review included: erudition, a practical intelligence expressed particularly in political acumen but also a predigious memory, which included a phenomenal knowledge of history. Consequently, he had a prescience of the future which he expressed through a complete mastery of the French language. He was a linguist who used "correct terms" often mistranslated into other languages. He was also capable of using barracks language at will. From an early age he divided his personality into the self and France, with an absolute devotion to France. Here was manifested his tenacity of purpose and the constancy

---

[1]Richard C. Snyder and Glenn D. Paige, "The United States Decision to Resist Agression in Korea: The Application of an Analytical Scheme," Administrative Science Quarterly 3 (1958): 341-8; Paige, Readings, pp. 168-70.

[2]See Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind.

of his plans from youth. He was dedicated in the pursuit of his objectives with an invincible will. This required self-discipline and order, manifested in his choice of the military career where such were cardinal values and virtues. His inflexibility in character, however, did not preclude a flexibility in means. For decisive political action he would be on one side or another, but never in the middle or in a compromise. Yet he believed there was a right moment for action and a wrong moment for action. This could mean disobedience to "authority" when "false disciplines" existed. He was a man of intuition and empiricism, isolated and impassive with little overt sentimentality. This, however, was within the cultural concept of French privacy and the relationships of the foyer. All these values are evident throughout the de Gaulle foyer. Politically, de Gaulle in many respects exemplified his culture. Using Glad's criteria we find:

1) De Gaulle performed "with wide acceptance in a high-status role to which he. . .had routine or easy access."[1] His entry to France's highest political office was politically facile, although remaining in office was not necessarily so. Sondages[2] and other studies reveal his wide acceptance among the French population. Some indication of acceptance of his political role-taking is indicated by virtue of being

---

[1]Glad in Knutson, Handbook, p. 309.

[2]Sondages, See Vols. 19-31.

unopposed in the Free French movement, even after higher-ranking individuals joined the organization. Here again the existence of an equally strong Vichy organization is typical of the French culture.

2) De Gaulle obtained these politically prestigous roles without "great psychic costs." He does make several references to the loneliness required of his role, but this seems to have been accepted as a necessary means to his particular ends and again not atypical of the foyer's concept of privacy or the emotional restraint of the de Gaulle family.

3) "His basic values are also manifest in key institutions which he has encountered in the socialization process."[1] De Gaulle's socialization included the de Gaulle foyer, the Roman Catholic Church, Roman Catholic schools, and peer groups from the same. The "ideas, individuals, interests, and institutions" he encountered were mutually reinforcing.[2]

4) De Gaulle's values were, and yet were not, a basis of reward. His military career and eventual mode of exit from the political scene would indicate a denial rather than reward. However, de Gaulle did not perceive these

---

[1]Glad in Knutson, Handbook, p. 309.

[2]See the term-concept in James MacGregor Burns and Jack W. Peltason, Government by the People, 6th ed (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963).

events in this way, but rather believed that his basic philosophy and its value structure were vindicated by the nonoccupation of France by Allied Forces after WW II, his two political tenures, and the institutionalization of the Fifth Republic.

5) De Gaulle's followers did not necessarily hold similar values, although his teachers and intimate colleagues did. However, this too is not unusual in the French culture. De Gaulle's London years and the beginning of his first political tenure are basically charismatic periods. His political difficulties began when that charisma was institutionalized. In the main, however, de Gaulle's leadership *in re* foreign policy is typical of the French cultural mean. His entry to politics, however, is atypical. Although politics was discussed in the de Gaulle *foyer*, it appears that a career in politics, like a missionary vocation, was only briefly considered. The intellectuals with whom the de Gaulles socialized were not *active* participants in the political process. This was not unusual in a France where the term "intellectual" normally excludes most in politics by simple definition. Although he held some political officials such as Clemenceau in high esteem, de Gaulle's interests and actions were strictly military until approximately 1934 when he was forty-four. At that time he entered politics *indirectly* or "by the back door" when he actively sought to

have the French National Assembly adopt his ideas on the reorganization of the Army.[1] This, however, was begun only after a long series of rebuffs by the conservative military echelon and as a desperate attempt to see his plan implemented. After enlisting journalistic allies, he secured a "political sponsor" in Paul Reynaud.[2] Since his proposals were only partially implemented and with WW II approaching, de Gaulle continued his political activities. This included membership in some radical political organizations, but only as a means to the ends he reiterated so often in his personal and political philosophy.

---

[1]See his The Army of the Future (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1941); Oeuvres, II, pp. 17-114 as Vers l'armée de Metier.

[2]See Hatch, Biography of Charles de Gaulle, pp. 69-70.

CHAPTER IV

INTERNATIONAL IMAGES: DE GAULLE'S PERSONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Can a man disclaim speculation, can he disclaim theory, without disclaiming thought? Jeremy Bentham

Introduction

Jeanne Knutson writes that although "unarticulated and fragmented in many cases, each person nevertheless possesses a coherent philosophy which covers such vital issues as the nature of man, of human relationships and of his environment."[1] This personal philsophy, when expressed in the political concepts of an individual's political culture, constitutes a political philosophy. Political behavior within the "cultural and situational bars which obstruct its actualization" is determined by this political philosophy.[2] From the least involved citizen to national decision-makers, each has a complex of underlying assumptions and conceptual frameworks though which specific opinions and decisions on international politics are formulated. De Gaulle said much the same thing in writing that "the form in which men cast their speculations, no less than the ways in which they behave, is the result of the habits and thought and action which they find around them."[3] The cultural and idiosyncratic variables

---

[1]Knutson, Human Basis, p. 103. [2]Ibid., p. 104.

[2]See de Gaulle, France and Her Army.

that could be expressed in a personal or political philosophy have been noted in Chapters 2 and 3 above, although inevitably various aspects of acculturation are left behind in the maturation process. Still, even when an individual attempts to rise above his background, in many respects he remains a "child of his age." Regardless, the decision-maker's beliefs and values evidenced in his personal and political philosophy may account for the greatest change or deviation in "national" foreign policy behavior.

Theory, or image building, is an indispensible part of our individual being. Without theory we do not have a means or pattern to recognize and then assimilate facts from the world around us.[1] However, what theory is or should encompass is not so simply explained. McClelland discusses the diverse definitions or "feats" that political theory should perform. It is speculative thought, an abstraction, a guide to action, a framework for organizing facts, and a set of statements of how things ought to be.[2] It is often confused with ideology, a simplified or debased political theory.[3] That is, ideology is:

> . . .an unconscious tendency underlying religious and scientific as well as political thought: the tendency at a given time to make facts amenable

---

[1]McClelland, Theory of the International System, pp. 8-11.

[2]Ibid., Chapter 1, passim.

[3]Kateb, Theory, p. 8.

> to ideas and ideas to facts, in order to create a world image convincing enough to support the collective and the individual sense of identity.[1]

But even then, whether theory or ideology, there exists a basic standard of individual behavior and a theory or rationale for leadership.

Political theory is also a means used by a writer to inform and persuade the reader of his views. It is therefore "an elaborate and wide-ranging defense of a political (and moral) position, with a wide exposure of the writer's mind offered to public criticism."[2] Traditionally, theory has four essential characteristics, which are found in varying degrees and depth in de Gaulle's oral and written presentations. A political theory must:

1) Be moral in purpose. This "morality" is defined by the theorist, but basically includes an attempt to "persuade, convince, or convert others" to a political attitude or action. Throughout de Gaulle's writings, particularly Edge of the Sword, his dominant theme is "arms-and-power," in an attempt to persuade the French military and political

---

[1]Erikson, Luther, p. 22. As Hargrove notes (Society and Government, p. 26ff), an individual's ideology develops out of the personal history of an individual. To understand the "mature world view," the relationships of six factors should be analyzed: parental politics, parental class status, identification with ethnic and religious groups, educational experience, young adult experience including working or studying abroad, and the effect of the chosen occupational milieu upon individual values. In essence this is what all leadership studies seek to do, including this one.

[2]Kateb, Theory, p. 88.

authorities to follow a "new path" of national defense and moral rejuvenation. His Memoirs are a unique defense of a philosophical vision of France more than a personal or autobiographical explanation. The writer's central values then form the motivations or rationale for writing, which ultimately answer the question of what ends or purposes a government should serve.[1]

2) Be inclusive in the writing. This intellectual method is expressed in an interest in the entire system of politics and thus includes a discussion of organization, powers, functions, and limitations.[2] Here again, the term "inclusive" is relative. De Gaulle's cardinal interest was a strong executive in a powerful French State. His interest and proposals for reforming the French political system are antecedent to his political tenure. However, his political position on this matter was inclusive in that virtually every conceivable aspect of man's existence somehow related to his concept of France and her role in international affairs. For example, de Gaulle considered the birth control pill a political issue. He rejected attempts to legislate governmental subsidies for or allocations of "the pill" with a caustic remark that the State did not pay for the people's movie or theater-going. Therefore, other forms of "entertainment" should not be subsidized either. The truth of the matter is that de Gaulle

---

[1] Ibid., p. 3.

[2] Ibid.

considered a high birth rate and growth in population as one of the essential elements in a nation-state's power.[1] To limit population growth, therefore, would be to preclude a country's international independence, which is possible only with "power."

3) Be philosophical. That is, an intellectual procedure or method to get to the writer's end is employed. Kateb writes that the assumption is:

> . . .that politics is problematic, that its means are morally dubious and its ends morally preemptive, that the subjective of politics is supremely important because politics involves men in a sizable or important portion of the totality of their moral relations.[2]

"Philosophical" is used in this sense only as an intellectual method meaning the rigorous asking of questions that may seem "simple" and not necessarily finding all of the answers.

Unfortunately, de Gaulle's political policies are often confused with his philosophical ends, particularly since he himself often "mixed" the two realms deliberately. That is, from 1958 on de Gaulle found that public discussion of his articulated philosophic ends and particular political policy "means" resulted in restrictions on his political freedom of action. He then intentionally began to employ the

---

[1]See Morganthau, the Sprouts, and other theorists for similar views that population or people constitutes an element in "power."

[2]Kateb, Theory, p. 4.

style discussed in the following chapter. Still, as Soustelle notes, de Gaulle is philosophical in his writings and political ends:

> When his action is that of a soldier, he is strictly military, but only does so within the framework of his profession--outside, he is a philosopher of history who applies his philosophy to reality-a little like a doctor who is at the same time an engineer.[1]

4) Be general in applicability. The theory should then be applicable to other systems in other time-frames, although the specificity may appear more applicable to a particular contemporary system. France was de Gaulle's primary concern and occupation. However, his concepts of the nation-state in international relations are applicable universally.

5) Some theoretical works also include a systematic presentation. That is, the presentation is orderly, with the "construction and consistency of argument" clearly evident.[2] This fifth aspect of a theory is not always present nor is it even necessary in order to characterize a work as "philosophical." De Gaulle's philosophic arguments are not systematicly presented in the form of classical tracts, unfortunately. In fact, this reader of philosophers disliked abstractions. Still the thread of his theory is evident in his writings and his everyday political decision-making.

---

[1]Jacques Soustelle, Envers et contre tout (Paris: Laffont, 1945-1950). Vols. I and II, pp. 30-1 quoted in Launay, De Gaulle and His France, p. 83.

[2]Kateb, Theory, p. 5.

What were the main ideas in his thought that motivated most of his political actions, whether in foreign or domestic policy? Behind the well-staged flamboyant speeches may be discerned the great issues and concepts of political theory. Many of these concepts are not only complex, but ambiguous and vague, particularly those in the field of European "integration." Too, words like "democracy" and "power" are not easily defined and may be subdivided endlessly.[1] There are even those philosophers who argue that some concepts should remain "open."[2] The intent here, however, is to analyze the main concepts and doctrines, or combinations of political concepts, which form de Gaulle's philosophy. These concepts are evident not only in his formal writings but his speeches and even luncheon "toasts" as well. There is no intent to consider de Gaulle's specific international or domestic policies as indicative of these principles,although for the sake of example some specific policies will be noted. In fact, de Gaulle's political responses or policies are frequently inconsistent. This led Crozier to view de Gaulle's foreign policy as having false underlying premises, "its assumptions illusory, and its consequences divisive and even

---

[1]See Hopkins and Mansbach, International Politics, Chapter 1.

[2]William T. Blackstone, Political Philosophy: An Introduction (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1973), p. 4.

disastrous for the West as a whole and for France in particular."[1] De Gaulle often did reorder the priorities of his principles so that a similar political situation could evoke a different policy. Yet this does not preclude the definite pattern of his foreign policy, for his principles remained fairly consistent.[2] The present concern is de Gaulle's intellectual ideas, which are primarily centered on international relations.

Chapter Format

The explicit and implicit philosophical concepts of de Gaulle's intellectual ideas include the nation-state and sovereignty, power, authority and liberty, freedom and order, the general welfare and the common good, and the forms of government. These will be incorporated in an essay exploring de Gaulle's metaphysics: the universe, what makes it go and what man's society incorporates; the nature of the individual: what is Man? good or bad, rational or irrational, ordinary (the masses) versus extraordinary (the Hero-Leader); and the model of a political system, including the powers a government must have and its delimitations within his theory of the Nation-State. In summary, the result of a primitive value analysis of

---

[1]Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 681.

[2]See Judith H. Young, "French Defense Policy," and Helms, "De Gaulle," p. 361.

a random sample of de Gaulle's speeches and press conferences will be presented. Here selected political "value words" relative to international affairs are used to determine if de Gaulle's political principles were ordered in any priority and whether changes occurred in this priority over a period of time.

Charles de Gaulle in his France and Her Army said that every great leader of men had a philosophical background: "behind Alexander there is always Aristotle." Our concern now is what that "philosophical background" meant. De Gaulle's Aristotle, of course, was Malraux.

The Universe-Image

The beginning of a personal philosophy is to be found in an individual's metaphysics, that is, ideas as to the science of being and fundamental causes and processes. In layman's terms this means an individual's religious beliefs or theological views. Carlyle expresses this importance in saying that:

> . . .a man's religion is the chief fact with regard to him. . .the thing a man does practically believe (and this is often enough without asserting it even to himself, much less to others); . . . relations to this mysterious Universe, . . .duty and destiny there, that is in all cases the primary thing for him, and creatively determines all the rest.[1]

Although de Gaulle's political style had religious

---

[1]Carlyle, On Heroes, pp. 2-3.

overtones or even charismatic characteristics,[1] he rarely verbalized in public the extent of his religious convictions. We have noted that the de Gaulle family were active practicing French Roman Catholics. Charles de Gaulle attended parochical schools and his writings indicate a retention of the Catholic thought learned there.[2] One of the few explicit statements he made on the Church appears to be his answer to a question on his attitude toward priests. His reply, "I'm a Gallican,"[3] reveals only contradictions. For he may have meant he is a "Frenchman," since most are Roman Catholic at least nominally, or the hidden meaning could be a support of Gallicanism. This in essence is the belief that there should be an autonomous French national church. As one who incorporated so much of Péguy's thought in his own philosophy, it is improbable that de Gaulle would ignore the philosopher's warning that the Church should not meddle in the affairs of the State. But unlike President Gerald Ford, who in his April, 1975 "State of the World" address frequently invoked the power of God and prayer, de Gaulle rarely mentioned any Supreme Being or the rituals of established religion. When a speech or press conference contained a possible religious reference, de Gaulle's comment was brief, devoid of fervor, and usually qualified, such as:

---

[1]Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," Daedalus, p. 876.

[2]See the corporativism in his model of a political system or the Rally of the French People.

[3]Launay, De Gaulle and His France, p. 37.

> Now, by the grace of God, a better life is available to the French people provided they remain true to effort and to unity.[1]

Or -

> . . .if only God lets me live and the people listen to me - I pledge myself to. . .[2]

The Spiritual or God is not invoked alone, for the secular is acknowledged in the "will of the people." It would appear that the Hoffmanns are correct. De Gaulle did not serve a harsh God, but a dualism of History and France.[3] Still, de Gaulle's religious beliefs were strong. He attended Church regularly and supported it financially. But his beliefs are reflected in hidden form and must be implied throughout his personal and political philosoophy. At a time when religious beliefs were being challenged, he chose to incorporate in his thinking the philosophies of Bergson and others. These philosophies used "new" knowledge to reinforce or confirm the ancient theory that the universe has a spiritual nature, the basic philosophy of the Roman Catholic Church.

---

[1]"Inaugural Address of General Charles de Gaulle as President of the Republic and of the Community at the Elysee Palace on January 8, 1959," in Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle (New York: French Embassy, Press and Inforamtion Division). Emphasis supplied. Hereinafter cited by title and date only.

[2]"Radio and Television Address on the Future of Algeria," September 16, 1959. Esphasis supplied.

[3]Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," Daedalus, p.855.

In addition, De Gaulle's metaphysics incorporates the typical French cultural thought pattern of Descartes. That is, in seeking a rational meaning of the Universe, a dualism of body and Soul is assumed. Cartesian logic is evident throughout De Gaulle's speeches:

> What will happen will happen because it must happen.
>
> Whoever they are, wherever they are, when you get down to it, men are men.
>
> The national discussion must be for us summed up with this question: France must be France.[1]

De Gaulle combines Cartesian principles with the Bergsonian principles of realism or what de Gaulle calls "elementary common sense." He thus rejects a priori reasoning. Scientific and philosophic progress must be based on the consideration of individual problems, not grandoise general theories or universal terms either. Only instinct and imagination are guides to order, while intellect and intuition provide truth. There is no <u>absolute</u> truth, only the relative truths determined by circumstance.[2] Specifically, de Gaulle did not believe in formulating unalterable plans to be followed regardless of circumstances. He would say instead: "political formulas can wait--this is a practical issue, the solution of which can not be postponed."[3] Still his writings contain a strong thread of Thomist philosophy <u>and</u> Cartesian thinking. His Universe is both spiritual and secular.

---

[1]Quoted in DeGramont, <u>The French</u>, p. 323.

[2]De Gaulle, <u>Memoirs</u>, p. 804.

[3]DeGaulle, "Speech," <u>Free French</u>, 5(No. 8), p.286.

De Gaulle's views of the world is a cataclysmic vision. The Universe is violent, subjected to constant terrible threats.[1] The existence of the modern world is in danger, a brutal fact, for "bitter incitements lead . . . to a universal cataclysm."[2] De Gaulle's view of the nature of international conflict is a Rousseauen one, not unlike the latter's comments relative to the European states:

> [They] touch each other at so many points that no one of them can move without giving a jar to all the rest; their variances are all the more deadly as their ties are more closely woven.[3]

De Gaulle's theory is pervaded by a sense of doom, but not without hope. For although the world is mediocre and life in general and international life in particular are struggles and dangerous,[4] there is the possibility of salvation.[5] He believes that the world could be reorganized by undertaking "constructive work of a material, intellectual and moral nature."[6] The promise of a better world requires order,

---

[1]Address on the Evening of the Referendum on the Constitution, September 26, 1958; "Address on the Algerian Political Situation, Radio and Television," November 4, 1960; "Tenth Press Conference," Elysee Palace, July 23, 1964.

[2]"Economic Program for Algeria," Constantine, October 3, 1958.

[3]Jean Jacques Rousseau, Peace Through the Federation of Europe and the State of War, tr. C. E. Vaugh (London: Constable, n.p.), p. 47.

[4]"Innaugural Address," January 8, 1959.

[5]"Address on the Algerian Political Situation," November 4, 1960

[6]"Speech," Free French, p. 287.

for "nothing can be done without order. . . Woe to him who acts against national unity."[1] International solidarity, then, must not be a "vain word," but realized in a practical way, "in the interests of all, and with due respect for the rights of all."[2] There are but two paths--war or brotherhood.[3] The essence of life, however, always holds the potential of going "higher, faster, [and] further."[4] But there must be a peaceful climate for objective solutions to come into view. War, of course, does not provide for this as it has very few essential principles and no universal system. Only circumstances and personalities prevail.[5]

Here is where de Gaulle obtains his political philosophy, from a philosophy of history and one of action.[6] History never repeats, "the past never resumes as it was."[7] Rather, what is important is the sense of history. Theodore H. White in his most recent study, Breach of Faith: The Fall

---

[1]Ibid., p. 285.

[2]Free French, July, p. 97.

[3]Address on Economic Program on Algeria," October 3, 1958.

[4]"France's Future," Television Address, January 30,1959

[5]See his Memoirs, passim.

[6]Clark, however, terms it a philosophy of command, Clark, The man who is France, pp. 72-73

[7]De Gaulle, August 20, 1964 quoted in André Passeron, De Gaulle Parle 1962-1966, (Paris: Fayard, 1966), pp 222-46.

of Richard Nixon, explores this vital element. He contends that Richard Nixon's cardinal sin and ultimate downfall resulted from a total inability to comprehend American History and the nobler ethical traditions of our country. In other words, he did not have the cultural boundaries or mores that a sense of history provides, however, de Gaulle did.

History is not only what is - reality, but cause and effect too. "In life of a people each action of the past enters into consideration for the future. There is only one history of France."[1] That history has formed a French nature that transcends the divisions of its society. But history to de Gaulle is a force of gravity that can be eluded, thwarted, and suspended.[2] Still it is "almost impossible to resist the powerful stream of events."[3] The essential of life is to live through its events and to do so with a coherent plan or structure.[4] This is not be be confused with a priori thinking. Since it is the nature of things to change, there is a necessity to change one's immediate goals and the means to attain them. Ends are not changed in this process and in adjusting: "we must take the world as it is, and act and live in that kind of world."[5]

---

[1]De Gaulle, Sept. 6, 1964, In Passeron, De Gaulle Parle, p. 239.

[2]Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 231.

[3]"De Gaulle Speaks," State Department Bulletin, (May 16, 1960), p. 774. Emphasis supplied.

[4]Launay, De Gaulle and His France, p. 32.

[5]Quoted in Galante, The General, p. 188. "Radio Broadcast, Presidential Election" (December, 1965).

The only proper course is to leave things as they are. Still de Gaulle admits that times do change and his:

> . . . concepts change with changing circumstances. Universal education at higher and higher levels has produced a higher class of citizen, who requires and is worthy of more explanation, persuasion and association with the leaders of the nation.[1]

Time is the "vehicle of spontaneous creation."[2] History is a stormy sea composed of cycles of time that go from the valleys to the mountains.[3] De Gaulle's concept of history then is traditional. It is seen as a series of struggles and wars and includes geographical considerations along with past history and the vision of the future. Human affairs, therefore, are of a "perpetual return"[4] so that an individual has only to wait out adversity and circumstances will change. This is a view that always includes Grandeur, Gloire, and Patri.[5] He is concerned with certainties rather than probabilities. Indeed the "eternal law" seems to be self-evident facts and independence. The cognitive or existential base of his theory, that which reveals how things actually are in the real world, is grounded with the concrete

---

[1]Conversation with Schoenbrun about Edge of the Sword in David Schoenbrun, The Three Lives of Charles De Gaulle, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966),p. 41.

[2]See Hughes, Consciousness, pp. 117-18

[3]De Gaulle, Edge of the Sword, p. 128; pp 239-40 of French edition, See also his Army of the Future.

[4]See the last page of his Memoirs.

[5]Also legitimacy and self respect. See Robert Aron, De Gaulle Before Paris: The Liberation of France June-August 1944. tr. Humphrey Hare (London: Putname, 1962), p. 64.

more than with abstractions. But occasionally de Gaulle neglected empirical data. Still he was a realist. For example, his recognition of China was based on the self-evident fact that:

> China exists. She appears in all atlases. Even if one does not like the Chinese one can not ignore geography. Since we have a knowledge of geography we might as well recognize China. . .a simple statement of fact![1]

For de Gaulle, there was "no policy . . .worthwhile apart from realities."[2] Yet to come full circle, he said that "reality is, in part, what one makes it." Material events are not always the sole nor significant facts. Sentimental or spiritual values can be more important, as patriotism is based on sentiment not reason.

Men "must consider the cold, hard realities on which action is based, no matter what may be their sorrows or desire."[3] Thus any entity that precludes action, what de Gaulle called "unproductive machinations," must be done away with at once. He explained this in his analysis of the Fourth Republic political system::

> It is not a question of men. . .Those who, today, take their turns in the government, I know them. . .I know how much they are worth. But I say they are caught in a system which does not permit them to act.[4]

---

[1]Quoted in Galante, The General, p. 185.

[2]Address on African and Algerian Realities," June 14, 1960.

[3]See Free French, 5 (8), p. 283. Emphasis supplied.

[4]Le Rassemblement Ouvrier (November 19, 1949) quoted in "De Gaulle and the RPF," Journal of Politics, p. 106.

Thus even war with its inevitable action tends to be glorified by de Gaulle, who says: "Government is a painful, difficult, delicate business. War, War, you see is horrible, but peace is a deadly bore."[1] Action then in whatever form is the logical conclusion of thought.

There is within man's struggle, the pressure and dangers of his universe, a revelation of common interests. De Gaulle views "problems" as worldwide, a part of the whole which must be solved in their entirety, not piecemeal.[2] Global strategies are therefore needed, hence the importance of international relations. There must be order, a peaceful climate, for objective solutions to come into view. He viewed this as an evolutionary process which is both toward and away from natural opposition. It is a process which favors those leaders who alone remain on their feet and those nation-states, such as France "who have in the past risen above disaster and have great future potential."[3] This is a dialectic, a combination of order and anarchy in a unity of opposites. This anarchy results from the presence of disorder and chaos rather than the mere absence of government.[4] Human

---

[1]Quoted in Tournoux, Pétain, p. 343.

[2]See his various comments on the Algerian situation dating from 1959.

[3]See Free French, 5 (8), p.284.

[4]See Waltz, "The Relation of States to Their World," pp. 7-17.

affairs, then, inevitably lead to struggle and conflict.[1] This is the "natural order of things" and a natural, inevitable process caused in part when there is an established order of interdependent elements in an unstable international system.[2] This instability or lack of world balance is due to the international domination of the two so-called superpowers. Stability would result when a third world power emerges, particularly if that is a "new Europe," loosely confederated of states from the Atlantic to the Urals. However, even then the supreme collectivity of the international system are the nation-states.[3]

In this concept of the nation-state, de Gaulle expounds a universal doctrine in the highest moralistic tones. But basically international relations is the nation-state's struggle for power and survival. He considers a realistic conception of international relations as based primarily on bilateral relationships and thus implies a bilateralism of national interest exists. These relationships are based on the indispensible use of force:

> Is it possible to conceive of life without force? . . .in some form or another, it will remain indispensible, for, without it, thought would have no driving power, action no strength. It is the prerequisite of movement and the midwife of progress. . .[Force is] the bulwark of authority, the

---

[1]Tenth Press Conference, July 23, 1964.

[2]See Schoenbrum, Three Lives of Charles de Gaulle, p. 198.

[3]Sixth Press Conference, May 15, 1962.

> defender of thrones, the motive power of revolution [and the begetter of] . . .both order and liberty. Force has watched over civilization in the cradle; force has ruled empires, and dug the grave of decadence; force gives laws to the peoples and controls their destinies.[1]

A nation-state's status in the international community then results from its power. This power is more than mere force, it is a combination of past history and future potential, for "logic and sentiment do not weigh heavily in comparison with the realities of power."[2] In other words, ideologies are unimportant as a power base. They can not alter the basic uniqueness of a people. This unalterable uniqueness is reflected in a nation's history. Indeed, de Gaulle considered history a study of nations and their peoples, not the study of ideologies or idealism which are merely covers for a will to power.

De Gaulle believed that the nation-states, molded by history, incorporate irreconcilable systems most evident in the mechanical and material progress of two countries, the United States and the U.S.S.R.:

> The human race has never been more threatened than it is today. Mechanisms now dominate the earth. It has brought forth gigantic material progress. But at the same time, it has produced two apparently irreconcilable systems, each of which claims it possesses the only workable way to transform society.[3]

---

[1]De Gaulle, Edge of the Sword, pp. 8-10, Part I: "De l'action de Guerre." Force can even "create the event."

[2]De Gaulle, Memoirs, II, p. 114.

[3]"De Gaulle," State Department Bulletin, (May 16, 1960), p. 774.

De Gaulle thus recognized the technical evolution. He saw change as a continuous process characterized by "competition of efforts in the condition of life."[1] To this was added the reality of cultural differences and economic pressure. All of these seemingly contradictory propositions boil down to what de Gaulle called an "irreversible evolution." However, this is a philosophy-style not necessarily openly alluded to, for he said:

> Let's attempt to present as an act of will what appears to be an irreversible evolution. . . We live in a world that is undergoing enormous changes. From one year to the next it is not the same. New forces are emerging.[2]

Here again the evolution is in the natural order of things and thus takes shape little by little.[3] Still this evolution would influence every form of human activity. Some would term this a "revolution." De Gaulle, however, believed the latter had a dual meaning. Revolution could mean "exhibitionism and loud, scandalous and finally bloody riots" or "profound change, especially in the status and condition of the workers."[4] Indeed, included in his corporate ideas was the establishment of an elite specialist corps, the "masters," who would teach the uses and techniques of the technological evolution to the French peasant.

---

[1]"Principles of Foreign Policy Address," May 31, 1960.

[2]1965 Annual Press Conference quoted in Galante, The General, p. 188.

[3]"Economic Program for Algeria Address," October 3, 1958.

[4]Quoted in Galante, The General, p. 240.

But here again the technological evolution enhances the abuses of ideologies, which de Gaulle called labels, transient, and the most unstable elements in the world.[1] Lacouture even quotes de Gaulle as saying that ideologies are mere illusions, originated in the East or in shoddy rags borrowed from German philosophy.[2] Yet even within this instability there can be found stability. A stable world balance is possible by transforming the existing state system. De Gaulle's aims then were both clear and consistent, even when muddled by his tactics. For within the political universe he believed a world order can exist, "a structural harmony of multiple uniqueness."[3] Throughout his writings, de Gaulle seems to be searching for harmonies or a balance, not unlike Rousseau's balance of man and nature or Levi-Strauss' Structuralism. He considers the supreme law to be the welfare of the state. The eternal law, then, is the rights of nations and respect for human beings. De Gaulle's political universe has a single justice and a single code of international morality. But this justice is not the abstract idea of the philosophers, for it would then have no place in the politics of the State. Rather, de Gaulle seems to mean a highest good which is somehow grounded on a psychological and moral

---

[1] Ibid., p. 198.

[2] Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 181.

[3] Quoted in Robert G. Neumann, "Formation and Transformation of Gaullism in France," The Western Political Quarterly 6 (June, 1965):273.

foundation and manifested in whatever furthers the greatness of France. An implication of the Catholic idea of truth as that which is determined at any moment also prevails in his writings. There is no absolute truth, whether in economics, politics, or strategy - only circumstances:

> . . . [the] only basic principles that hold truth for all circumstances are the principles that apply to all national affairs, the determination of a people to succeed, a willingness to die for an ideal and a realistic assessment of all the factors that make a nation stronger or weaker than its neighbours. [sic] [1]

The Individual Image

Serfaty writes that de Gaulle considered the nation-state as the only recipient of human endeavor, since all human activity revolves around that entity.[2] Indeed, de Gaulle's primary concern does not include a wide range of social institutions. What the family, religion, economy, etc. "should be" are not readily apparent in his writings.[3] In fact, it would seem that if the political sphere would only be what it should be, everything else would be fine. Man could then live socially together if habitual and institutionalized social instincts existed, an argument for social solidarity. De Gaulle does allude to the basic nature of man and his capacities throughout his writings. But he means more by "man" than mere men or women. Rather, mankind and "it's honor" are a

---

[1] Discorde quoted in Schoenbrun, The Three Faces of Charles de Gaulle, pp. 36-7. Emphasis supplied.

[2] See page 144 of his dissertation.

[3] Restrictions to our topic preclude exploring these areas in depth. For example, however, de Gaulle divided business into "domaine reservé" and "intendance."

prevalent consideration.[1] The ultimate goal of man is the good of mankind. Humanity and its future is served by international cooperation and a balance-in-power for peace.[2] The "only quarrel worthwhile is that of mankind. It is mankind that must be saved, made to live and enabled to advance."[3] This may be done in the spirit of liberty, equality, and fraternity.[4]

In the Kantian manner, de Gaulle believed man acquired knowledge by three faculties: sense, understanding and reason. Although the heart or emotions may "speak," it is the "voice of reason" or "elementary common sense" that must make itself heard.[5] He further followed Bergson's theory of initiative, imagination, movement and duration which pivoted on the belief that "I am a being which endures," with *élan vital* rather than established doctrines. Man then must strive to adapt to the precise reality of individual problems which can be understood best by learning the true nature of things with an intuitive philosophy rather than analytic intelligence.

De Gaulle's historical thesis is that man is first of all a national animal linked to a homeland, product of a collective temperament and a traditional culture.[6] Man finds

---

[1]"Economic Program for Algeria Address," October 3,1958.

[2]"Television Address on Presidential Election, 1965."

[3]First Press Conference, March 25, 1959.

[4]"Referendum on Independence," March 26, 1962.

[5]"Toast at Mexican Luncheon," March 17, 1964.

[6]See de Gaulle's comments on Stalin in Lacouture, *De Gaulle*, p. 133.

happiness in stability:

> Men, in their hearts, can no more do without being told what to do than they can live without food, drink, and sleep. As political animals they have the need for organization, that is, for an established order and for leaders. . .the natural equilibrium which lies at the base of all things [is] order . . .masses. . .now give recognition to those who assert themselves .[1]

Men do not change so quickly or so completely, nor does human nature move by leaps and bounds, to preclude this need for stability and order. But this stability also incorporates economic security, personal independence and a degree of social importance or prestige.[2] Man's common lot is to be "free, dignified, proud and prosperous."[3] His inheritance includes "the fighting spirit, the art of war, and the virtues of the soldier."[4]

Man is at his best when results are obtained from initiative and action rather than abstract thinking. This means action or resistance rather than merely performing in some purely creative function. Action, then, is the governing law of conduct. Inaction, whether the "normal" pace of political "deliberation" or involuntary political retirement such as during most of the 1950's, de Gaulle considered a cardinal sin. He also followed the Nietzschean

---

[1]De Gaulle, Edge of the Sword, p. 57 or pp. 73-4 in French.

[2]See Padover, French Institutions, pp. 3-4.

[3]Second Press Conference, November 10, 1959.

[4]See Edge of the Sword, Hopkins tr.

premise that man seeks to obtain power in order to dominate all obstacles. But action is meaningful only when placed in lofty perspectives. For this he often used the word "adventure." But action may be practically inappropriate at times. In which case, substitute action may be possible, such as writing personal tracts.

De Gaulle viewed man in the Christian tradition of humanitarianism, for "men are men everywhere," although some are good and some are evil, all can be rational.[1] De Gaulle's emphasis, as readily apparent in Edge of the Sword, is on justice, liberty, and the inherent dignity of individual man. But man, even when a leader, is frail, although his is a capacity for moral goodness. There exists equality in the immortal soul,[2] although de Gaulle often speaks of the "high intellectual and moral elements" in France, implying an elite apart from man.[3] But hierarchical societies on earth are to be expected. Still man is an element in all, including politics. In de Gaulle's case this includes a very simplified form of dividing society into leaders, the masses, and "certain ambitious men and . . .demagogues."[4] He still has respect for the people, which becomes more communicable with

---

[1]Speech at Amiens, June 12, 1964.

[2]A Frenchman has two souls, his individual soul and that soul as a member of a unified community. The latter soul is represented by the French President according to de Gaulle.

[3]"De Gaulle Speech," Free French 5(8), p. 290.

[4]Television Address, December 3, 1960.

universal suffrage and the increases in compulsory education. In the latter, reasoning is refined, for de Gaulle disdained illogical propositions. One of his favorite expressions was "It's absurd." Still he recognized the prevalence of individual egoism. Individuals universally hold desires which contradict rule and reason.[1] They are prone to "theoretical preferences, private interests and partisan attachment,"[2] which de Gaulle considered vices to be put under control by a strong government. He scorned "quarrels of interest, factional strife, and group or class rivalry."[3] Private interest must not prevail over the general interest:[4]

> . . .it is more important to safeguard the future than to preserve temporarily various vague interests of private citizens.[5]

Pure individualism creates anarchy. That is, in a country that is often divided to an extreme degree, it is necessary to think as a coherent and harmonious whole rather than along personal or political lines. He thus prefers a "collective individualism." Wealth must be garnered and directed not to

---

[1]"Address to the French People," Television, April 16, 1964.

[2]"Second Address on Referendum on Algeria," December 31, 1960, television.

[3]"Speech," Free French, 5 (#8), p. 291.

[4]"Economy, Atomic Force, European Policy, Algeria," Addresses on February 5, 1962 and October 2, 1961, television.

[5]De Gaulle to U.S. Ambassador quoted in personal papers of Launay, De Gaulle and His France, p. 36.

private advantage, but to the common interest, the Nation, with direction and control of this wealth by workers and employers. As Alfred Grosser notes, de Gaulle viewed economic progress only as a means, a material basis for the prosperity which would guarantee French independence.[1] There is no place for the huge private monopolies such as we have in American Telephone and Telegraph. But this does not mean an abolition of private property, although de Gaulle did not trust the French bourgeoise and peasantry because of their legendary strong beliefs in the value of private property. Still property is connected or associated with what is mean or common in lesser mortals, such as the persiflage and irresponsibility of many Frenchmen. Only what is lofty in purpose is admired in the people. Those people who live to cooperate and build are important--not those who seek to hate or destroy. Yet even here de Gaulle recognized that bloodshed in war can advance "the cause of reason and justice in the hearts and minds of men."[2]

Because of modern events, however, de Gaulle believed man lives in a condition which is becoming alike everywhere:

> . . .people put in contact with progress are assailed with a growing desire to see their own living standards rise; . . .As a people becomes independent, it needs the help of others. This is something which is only human, that is to say, very natural and which may be acknowledged freely.[3]

---

[1]See Grosser, France, Germany, and New Europe.

[2]"Address on Algerian Political Situation," November 4, 1960.

[3]"Address on Principles of French Foreign Policy," May 31, 1960.

Whether man is alike or diverse, his general interest is impartially represented by the State, the Republic, and the Head of the Republic. De Gaulle believed the public authority is legally and factually valid, but "only when it conforms to the superior interests of the country."[1] He seems to agree with Plato that order is the common good and that order depends on the character of the Leader-Hero. National sovereignty, however, belongs to the people, although this may be exercised through representatives or referendums.[2] De Gaulle preferred to exclude any "intermediaries" or representatives between the Head of the Republic and the people because such tended to emphasize French cleavages as voices of discord. These cleavages and the French reaction to them often caused de Gaulle to call "his" people such names as "cattle," "slackers," "fools," "cretins," and "rabble."[3] His comments on the fact that people have vices, are weak, fickle, ungrateful and prone to "scowling, howling, and growling" are well known:

> Frenchmen are brilliant producers of ideas who yet had not the urge or the need to carry them out, a man who planned his life logically and then proceeded to break all his own rules, a man who had a passionate love for his homeland, which

---

[1]Bayeux Speech, June 18, 1946.

[2]"Television Address on Referendum on Constitution," September 20, 1962.

[3]See Second Press Conference, November 10, 1959; Tournoux, Petain and de Gaulle, p. 329; and Crawley, De Gaulle, p. 293.

> was everything in life, yet who set out for the ends of the earth to found colonies which he attempted to make into France itself - a "hardworking lazybones."[1]

Here again, this does not preclude the fact that de Gaulle considered the individual or what he termed the "human contingencies and events" as major factors in determining what and how the institutions of a society function.[2] He therefore had contempt for many people, but not hatred. "Though severe in his judgments of men, he does not despise them," he wrote.[3] He merely disliked human weaknesses. And one such weakness was to put daily necessities above long-range goals and thus accept mediocrity. Another was to compromise where principles were concerned or with wartime enemies. Still, Man has virtue in active Hope and the creative excellence which seems to be inherent in human nature, although dormant unless cultivated. Man then is free to develop and master his own personality, to seek freedom and equilibrium and to exercise his rights.[4] This characteristic de Gaulle called "la querelle de l'homme." Man can be united, a "union Sacré" of minds and souls where the differences of religion or class or political belief are unimportant.[5] This sacred union results when the sword is

---

[1]Quoted in Clark, The Man Who is France, p. 84.

[2]Fourth Press Conference, April 11, 1961.

[3]De Gaulle, France and Her Army, p. 25.

[4]Press Conference, March 25, 1959.

[5]Free French, #8, p. 284; France and Her Army, p. 15.

drawn in every fervor, i.e., war. Although de Gaulle sought this unity in an expanded form as "Europe" as it was under Napoleon, he believed that the force of personality rather than arms could do it.[1] Still he recognized that the Europeans and Frenchmen in particular had an "old. . .propensity for divisions and quarrels."[2]

Yet de Gaulle had a deep love for the French people and French soil, not unlike the fervor of Péguy. He believed the French were somehow destined to be an "elite people," master of their fate and thus above others. This idea is not unlike an "Elect of God," but without any traces of racism or anti-Semitism. French history has always revealed a deep love for France by other peoples. Even without "political" power, this fact is a justification for France's special status in world affairs. Apparently, part of this "favor" is found also in de Gaulle's belief that Greco-Latin civilizations are the highest of all civilizations.[3]

> Ifneither age nor experience has rid this people of its shortcomings, disaster has been unavailing against its inextinguishable vitality and faith in its destiny. . . .A great people, fit to show others the way, fit for enterprise and combat, for ever playing the leading role in the drama of history, whether as tyrant, as victim, or as champion of the oppressed; a people whose genius, whether in eclipse or in glory, has always found its faithful reflection in the mirror of its army.[4]

---

[1]J. H. Huizinga, "Which Way Europe?" Foreign Affairs 43 (April 1965):487-500.

[2]Bayeux Speech of June 16, 1946.

[3]See his 1964 speeches in Latin America.

[4]De Gaulle, France and Her Army, p. 104.

Realistically, and as a student of human behavior, de Gaulle admitted that not all Frenchmen were "good." "Good" Frenchmen are those who in their social, economic, and political life always subserve their individual interests and desires to the superior interests of France.[1] He carried this idea to his consideration of all people. "Bad" Europeans, those who seek to build Europe, are those "building" as a means to an unknown or unarticualted end. This is one further reflection of de Gaulle's dualism so evident in his thought: the French and Europeans are a diverse people, yet a united people, a good people but with some "nongood" people.

He considered at length many of the "nongood:" politicians. They, like some voters, were only concerned with "their own little soup pot on their own little fire in their own little corner."[2] The politicians incurred his deepest contempt and such epithets as: "imbeciles, drivellers, slobberers, whiners, cheats, cowards, eunuchs, drug-addicts of politics, pitter-patters, anaesthetists, puppets, gigolos, dwarfs," and several "expletive deleted" phrases. Throughout his theory, de Gaulle sought to mute the political powers of such individuals in his ideal French Nation-State.

---

[1]De Gaulle, Salvation, Documents, pp. 185-6.

[2]Time, May 2, 1969, p. 21.

The Nation-State

As advocates of world government might be informed by adherents of a certain other ideological creed, the withering away of the state is not lightly to be presumed.
Inis L. Claude, Jr.

Human survival in our belligerent world is only possible within "a solid State, a modern defense and a united nation."[1] The soul of France[2] is mirrored in her army, an instrument of the State:

> . . .our armies have but one soul. . .and . . .this soul is. . .nobly submitted to the wishes of the nation, and humbly devoted to the service of France.[3]

De Gaulle reorganized that army. In fact, he believed the entire nation-state needed to be strengthened, rebuilt and modernized, since there had been a general decline and weakness in the State from WWI to WWII. By reform, conflicts and discord within the nation and the state would be minimized.

De Gaulle viewed the nation-state as existing only after some maturing, to an unspecified age, although he infers that this is at minimum a period of several centuries. Many so-called newly developing countries would not then be

---

[1]August 20, 1964 in Passeron, De Gaulle Parle 1962-1966, p. 235.

[2]See the Brazzaville Manifesto.

[3]Free French 5 (#8), p. 285.

considered nation-states. Great Powers are those with established continuity, prestige, and security. He further implies that the ideal nation-state is comprised of only one "race" of people.[1]

De Gaulle draws the Maurrassian distinction between pays reél and pays legal. Pays reél are the people or the Nation as an entity, but not as a legal definition.[2] All classes and all beliefs are incorporated in this Nation. De Gaulle's "nationalism" reflects his desire to bring together the juridical reality of the State and the sociological reality of the national group. It represents a dual heritage of Jacobin patriotism and its slogans of liberty, equality and fraternity and the nationalism of the French right found in the works of Maurice Barrés and Jacques Bainville. This is a nationalism of grandeur, power, self-respect, and legitimacy. It is a conception of destiny that requires a national dream to maintain its authority and preserve its cohesion. Importantly, for a Nation such as France or the United States to be a leader in international affairs, the Nation must first believe in itself. Launay quotes de Gaulle as saying:

> Since the death of President Kennedy, America worries me. . . she is losing her grip; she has no real policy; one has the unpleasant feeling that she doesn't even believe in herself.[3]

---

[1]Werth, De Gaulle, p. 181.

[2]This is similar to Bergson's theory.

[3]Launay, De Gaulle and His France, p. 188. Quote is from Launay's personal papers.

A similar expression relative to France is that doubt is the "demon of decadence. . .a France who believes in herself. . .opens her way to the future."[1] Pays reel or the Nation personifies the pays legal, the institutions or State.

The State is only worthy of de Gaulle's concept of the Nation, a Louis XIVth type, when it embodies "the continuity of the national interest." One precondition to this is rising above political party politics. De Gaulle regarded the State:

> . . .not as it was yesterday and as the parties wished it to become once more, a juxtaposition of private interests which could never produce anything but weak compromise, but instead an instrument of decision, action and ambition, expressing and serving the national interest alone.[2]

The national interest is essentially oriented toward foreign policy and evident as whatever the French President says it is. Thus it is not a vague, ambiguous concept as employed by the U. S. Executive in recent times to cover a multitude of sins. Rather it is specific and knowable at any particular time. This national interest is represented by the President but unconsciously conceived by the French people in much the same fashion as Rousseau's general will.

---

[1]Launay, De Gaulle and his France, p. 231.

[2]De Gaulle, Memoirs, (Salvation), p. 780.

By implication, de Gaulle considered the French Nation as having a personality and a Soul.[1] Even the history of France is an entity.[2] This "cult of the French Nation" includes considering France as an ideal (like Hegel), a personalized image that does not mean the French people or their daily activities. Rather, "France" is distinct from the sum of the people who are all engaged in its service.[3] France belongs to everyone, and no one, a unique blend of what "is" and what "ought" to be. There is an incommunicable uniqueness of values and virtues evident in every Nation. The Nation, then, is the highest or supreme collectivity, molded by the nuances of history and the collective consciousness of her people. It is important as a living spiritual entity that gives character and courage to its citizens. De Gaulle's related belief that there can be no separation of the Nation from military might has a religious fervor. No artifical community can do this. That is, any other entity has no political effectiveness and no authority to act. However, there may be some technical value in so-called supranational entities or mega-states.

The State then is the only "valid legitimate and

---

[1]First Press Conference, March 25, 1959.

[2]See his Bergsonian vision of France in his Memoirs.

[3]Alfred Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under De Gaulle (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 17.

capable of achievement" unit in the international system.[1] Or as Grosser states it: "The Nation State represents the supreme political value," although it is not the sole repository of justice.[2] There is therefore little value in such entities as the United Nations:

> The states . . .are the only entities which have the right to give orders and the power to act. To imagine that something can be built up which can act effectively and be approved by the peoples outside or over and above the states is an illusion.[3]

The States are the most stable of world elements and do not disappear. They can not integrate either. World order, therefore, is possible only within a "structured harmony of the multiple uniqueness" reflected in the individual Nation-States. Therefore de Gaulle's ideas of a new world order is one keyed on alliances and modified by the existence of French nuclear armaments. It would then be possible to have an international equilibrium based on the realities of power rather than ideologies. This leads to peace, which de Gaulle considers the having and maintaining of relations based on "reason and sentiment" with all countries.[4] There

---

[1]Sixth Press Conference, May 15, 1962; Third Press Conference, September 5, 1960.

[2]Grosser, French Foreign Policy, p. 15.

[3]Third Press Conference, September 5, 1960.

[4]Radio Address, Presidential Election Evening, 1965.

could then begin international cooperation and the union of Europe.[1]

The State's origin is in the necessities of national defense, for the basic law of the State is independence from political or economic oppression.[2] National defense in contemporary terms requires nuclear armament, the force de frappe or de dissuasion. "A great state which does not possess them while others have them, does not dispose of its own destiny."[3] The ability of a state to remain independent and to make authoritative judgments for other states hinges ultimately on its ability to enforce those judgments. International authority, then, is derived from one's own efforts and own military power besides the necessary strategic strength, political maturity and diplomatic skill and economic and social stability.[4] In addition, independence is a precondition for grandeur, a concept de Gaulle never adequately defined, although presumably he meant "grandeur" in the typical French cultural milieu context. Independence and integrity as wholeness and faithfulness are intertwined. There can be

---

[1]See Speeches No. 239, February, 1966; April 5, 1965 in Passeron, De Gaulle Speaks 1962-66; Fifth Press Conference, September 5, 1961, among others.

[2]Free French 5 (#8).

[3]Speech at Strasbourg, November 23, 1961 in Passeron, De Gaulle Parle, Vol I., p. 357.

no integrity whether as self-respect or dignity without independence. And of course dignity is a central element in grandeur. So here is the rationale for force, the necessary element for the State to flourish and survive.

Once again de Gaulle reiterates his contention that regimes or ideologies are unimportant, even waning. When present, they are negative forces just as political parties are. Rather de Gaulle believed national consciousness is increasing regardless of various anti-statists' denials. He points to the fact that the U.S.S.R. and Marxist ideology did not fight WWII, but the Russian people engaged in a national war against Hitler.

The primary goal of the State is to enhance its power[1] in order not only to survive in the inevitable chaos, struggle, and conflict of the world scene, but further to flourish. Each Nation seeks its own power and glory or status in its own particular way, although friendship with others seems to preclude a State being worthy of its name. Ideologies, therefore, are merely "cover-ups" or labels to this elementary will to power or "external ambition" and are used against the State.[2] But this will to power is

---

[1]Speech of November 3, 1959 quoted in Roy C. Macridis, De Gaulle: Implaccable Ally (New York: Macmillan, 1966).

[2]The term is Grosser's. See his French Foreign Policy, p. 15.

subjected to limitations. By power, de Gaulle does not mean territorial expansion, but rather economic expansion. The French solution to her economic problem is in collective individualism. That is, he viewed improving the condition of the individual and national prosperity as a means to enhance the power of the nation-state.[1] France is the objective.

The realities of power are evident in a Nation's status in the international community and includes the past history of the country, its unity, and the role of the modern military.[2] Relations between individual states are as different as their divergences of interest: "More than the distance between States, what counts is the difference in civilization."[3] When these relations require the use of force, it must be employed on the side of liberty.[4] Liberty and authority are inseparable. A State based on complete liberty is set against all authority, but liberty can not exist without that authority. To separate the two results in the demise of the State.

Power then can not be unbridled ambition to dominate others, for such "may win more or less brilliant and prolonged

---

[1]Message to National Assembly, December 11, 1962.

[2]August 20, 1964 Speech in Passeron, De Gaulle Parle, II, p. 235.

[3]Conversation between de Gaulle and Adenauer from Launay's personal papers quoted in Launay, De Gaulle and his France, p. 154.

[4]See De Gaulle, Edge of the Sword, passim.

successes, but the end is always a downfall."[1] Every State has the right to live in and with its uniqueness and not be destroyed. The American concept of ideological war is thus repugnant to de Gaulle. Rather than fighting wars in the name of a civilization,[2] de Gaulle believed that wars are fought in the name of nations at most or are confrontations of historical visions at least. War then is not a means to spread any doctrine or ideology such as "democracy." Rather war is merely a governmental policy that can be changed at will. It is "of no avail save as an instrument of policy."[3] Thus the United States was "defeated" in Vietnam by American standards, but not by the French standard that holds that a nation's vital interests determine its activities and such do change. In part the divergence of these French and American beliefs may be found in de Gaulle's concept of the Leader-Hero,[4] who is an essential part of the political stability required in a powerful State. In other words, de Gaulle's concept of the State and its primary goal of external ambition provides one explanation of his vision of the Hero-Leader, that one person possessing the power of the State in its external relations.

---

[1]De Gaulle, "United Nations Victory," p. 159.

[2]See Dean Acheson in Foreign Affairs 41 (January 1963), p. 248 for a good example.

[3]De Gaulle, France and Her Army, p. 7.

[4]De Gaulle varied his emphasis on this concept so that at various times it could be Hero-Leader or Leader-Hero.

The Leader-Hero

De Gaulle's concept of "leadership" (there is actually no equivalent term in French) includes a leader who decides what is right, then provides a living example for others to follow. He considers two "types" of leaders, the peacetime statesman and the wartime warriors.[1] Both are "champions of authority," and seem to have a vital activating energy that recalls Nietzchean theory and a combative will that draws on Clauswitz. As such, they are perpetual and contending candidates for power.[3] Yet one should never dominate the other, for the ideal is the interdependence of both authorities. Indeed, the State necessitates a "balance of tendencies" of the inherent conflicts between the statesman and the military chief.[4]

De Gaulle sees the political leader as having a precarious authority, since it emanates from the popular will of the people, the sovereign power. Therefore the statesman must dominate public opinion, which is an "inconstant mistress" at most.[5] His end is to captivate men's minds, while being a servant of the public. In reality this is merely a guise to become its master. The political leader's career, therefore, is committed to general ideas and public speaking:

> Great or small, historic figures or colorless politicians, he comes and goes between power and powerlessness, between prestige and public ingratitude.[6]

---

[1]De Gaulle, Edge of the Sword, p. 103.

[2]Ibid., p. 126 [3]Ibid., p. 115. [4]Ibid., p. 108.

[5]Ibid., p. 104 [6]Ibid., p. 105.

In fact, the modern leader is so pressed with his public life that he does not have the time or inclination to contemplate anything other than the immediate problem before him. Yet de Gaulle considers the ideal individual leader as one who takes decisive political action on his own initiative.

In contrast, the soldier wields absolute authority and thus can be, indeed is, direct in his character and method. He is characterized as having a "taste for system . . .self-assurance, and . . .rigidity:"[1]

> The passion for acting on his own is naturally accompanied by a certain roughness of conduct. . . [which] his subordinates have to put up with. . .Such a chief will be distant. . .for authority is not to be had without prestige nor prestige without aloofness.[2]

But the military in general has as its essence discipline and loyalty to political offices, regardless of the regime. The Army should be nonpolitical and subordinate to the authority of the State. Still in periods of a grave national crisis, de Gaulle believed that military leadership could conceivably take over the control of all policy. In other times, however, the military habit of obedience means little opposition to political incumbents. In the end the statesmen

---

[1] Ibid., p. 107.

[2] Ibid., p. 106-7.

and warriors have the mutual respect of authority for authority. Self-control and patriotism then restrain extreme conflicts. Still de Gaulle sees the need for a balance, an "ordered pattern"[1] which must exist above the compromises that the two types of leaders admit, in order to act in concert. What de Gaulle recognized is a difficult relationship. "Systematic adjustment"[2] of the relations of "disharmony" between the civil and military branches would require divorcing, for example, the conduct of the war which is the statesman's realm from the fighting of the war which is the domain of the soldier.[3] This would be unwise. The preferrable way is to keep the situation fluid. Still de Gaulle believed an "enlightened State" should train potential wartime leaders, a body of military, administrative, and political elite, side-by-side. Even here de Gaulle admits that formal instruction does not necessarily increase understanding. Only "enlightened views. . .supreme wisdom. . .intuition. . .character [and] . . .enthusiasm"[4] can do that. Harmony and understanding comes only when individuals think "along the right lines." In brief, then, de Gaulle believed that "nothing great will

---

[1] Ibid., p. 116

[2] Ibid., p. 125.

[3] Ibid., p. 119.

[4] Ibid., p. 127.

ever be achieved without great men, and men are great only if they are determined to be so."[1] And for this the leader must have faith in his own destiny, or predestination.

De Gaulle's leadership theory from the writing of his tract and actual political tenures did change ever so slightly. He explained this to Schoenbrum:

> I have learned in practice that a chief must be closer to the people than I had thought at the time of writing Edge of the Sword . To move masses of people to accept the general interest over and above the individual egoism it is necessary to be at one and the same time above the crowd, pointing out the higher, wider horizons, and yet close in among the people, infusing them with one's own faith and drawing strength from them. A chief must be farsighted, but if he is too distant from the people he risks marching all alone. Decisions must be taken alone, but there must be followers close by, ready to understand and willing to march ahead.[2]

Thus de Gaulle's concept of the leader evolved as his leadership experiences grew. Throughout, however, are evident traces of his parental love of the monarchy, his purely symbolic role as Head of the Free French, and the almost fascist concepts evident in his role as President of the Provisional Government (1944-46) and the disaster of the Rally of the French People. His original philosophy was actually more a philosophy of command wherein equilibrium in the State would remain so because of a balance between

---

[1] Ibid., p. 127.

[2] Schoenbrum, The Three Faces of Charles de Gaulle, p. 40.

the military leader and the political representatives of the people. His lectures and writings on the role of the leader echo Clausewitz,particularly relative to the influence of the leader's will to fight and the belief that action in war is accidential. But this leader is a superman who has been tempered by Jesuit teachings. Still the leader-hero is one who can disobey under "false disciplines" even to the point of being an enemy of laws. But this does not mean the indiscriminate use of force. Force must be used only on the side of justice.

De Gaulle's hero-leader of men, whether as Chief of State or a military leader, has three essential characteristics: a doctrine, character, and prestige. The doctrine or principles a leader must have are not based ideally on abstractions, a priori thinking or planning, but rather an adaptation to the particular circumstances of any given situation. This includes the economic, military or political realm. The essence of doctrine is found in the leader understanding the character of the time. This way of thinking is in marked contrast to the typical French way of preferring abstractions and systems, the absolute and the categorical. Rather, de Gaulle visualizes a leader who makes decisions with an open mind according to the circumstances. Yet even here his actions would be tempered by the instructive disasters and successes that a knowledge of history brings. This adaptation to particular circumstances is not a novel idea, as de Gaulle

acknowledged. Napoleon's procedural method with the Grande Armee was to understand the situation, adapt to that situation, and then exploit it to his own advantage.[1] De Gaulle applies this not only to military strategy, but leadership theory. The essential leadership element, however, is in the character of the individual leader.

Character is a "divine spark" or creative touch. This Bergsonian initiative is most evident in times of crisis:

> . . .when danger threatens. . .all men at heart realize the supreme value of self-reliance, and know that without it there can be no action of value. . .for nothing great has ever been achieved without that passion and that confidence which is to be found only in the man of character.[2]

Great leaders possess many different faculties. It is not sufficient to have character alone, or even purely intellectual abilities. It is also necessary to commence "great things" and then see these undertakings through to their conclusion. That is, the Leader-Hero has a particular concept of his own destiny that includes a certainty of having an exceptional role to play. For when the "man of character" is challenged by events he has recourse only to himself. It is his own strengths that result in decisions. There is an instinctive response to take action, "to take responsibility for it, to make it his own business."[3] Once given a task or

---

[1]De Gaulle, Edge of the Sword, p. 83.

[2]Ibid., p. 44. [3]Ibid., p. 41.

responsibility, the ideal leader desires to be left free to carry it out. Rather than taking refuge in textbooks, or making laws or regulations bear the responsibility for any decision he may make, the Hero-Leader takes a firm stand and looks the problem straight in the face:

> He is ready to enjoy success on the condition that it is really his own, and that he derives no profit from it.
>
> [Without the leader] there is but the dreary task of the slave; thanks to him, it becomes the divine sport of the hero.[1]

De Gaulle sees a leader's prestige as "largely a matter of feeling, suggestion, and impression" depending essentially on the possession of an elementary gift. It is a natural aptitude which defies analysis. Prestige is a quality of "exuding authority, as though it were a liquid," though it is impossible to say precisely of what it consists."[2] De Gaulle believes prestige and the emotion of love are of a common thread. In toto, prestige exists only when mystery is present also, for familiarity breeds contempt:

> All religions have their holy of holies, and no man is a hero to his valet. In the designs, the demeanor, and the mental operations of a leader there must be always a "something" which others cannot altogether fathom.[3]

De Gaulle admits that prestige comes from successes. Confusion or erratic behavior only brings forth doubts, not greatness. But this does not mean inaccessibility to others.

---

[1] Ibid., p. 41-2. [2] Ibid., p.57. [3] Ibid., p. 58.

If a leader is to lead he must know his fellow beings and this is possible only by being among his fellows. However, this does not mean externalization of thought. In other words, silence is a necessary precondition for authority and thus prestige. Silence is a preliminary to the ordering of one's thoughts: "To speak is to dilute one's thoughts, to give vent to one's ardor, in short, is to dissipate one's strength."[1] This silence is a concealment of strength of mind and determination, not a cover of or for weakness.

The Leader-Hero then must be one who has the power to not only dominate events but to "leave his mark on them" while always assuming responsbiility for the consequences of his own actions.[2] In so doing, there inevitably is a positive effect not only on the leader's own career but the policies and glory of his country as well. Since action occupies his entire being, the Leader remains "within bounds" and does not savor the revenge which would seem natural for one who is unpopular except in times of crises. His actions, then, must be on a grand scale, a visionary aim:

> . . .all leaders of men, whether as political figures, prophets, or soldiers, all those who can get the best out of others, have always identified themselves with high ideals, and this has given added scope and strength to their influence.[3]

The leader is aloof, has character, and personifies greatness. But not all men can perform this mission. The task involves

---

[1] Ibid., p. 59. [2] Ibid., p. 62. [3] Ibid., p. 65.

incessant self-discipline, constant risk-taking, and a continual inner struggle. It is in essence a balance between the citizen-soldier and the cabinet minister-colonel. Therefore the leader in this task often wears the "hair shirt of the penitent," for he must remain isolated from other individuals and the simple pleasures such as friendship or other freedoms of nonleaders. This ideal of the Hero-Leader is operational as the major element in de Gaulle's concept of the ideal political model.

The Ideal Political System

De Gaulle's ideal model of how a political system or government should be structured may be inferred throughout his speeches and writings before 1946. However, on June 16, 1946, he presented a speech in Bayeux, France. That speech forms a comprehensive basis for his political doctrine from that time.[1] The political system outlined there is basically nonideological. It no doubt results in part from de Gaulle's knowledge of the Machiavellian dictim that:

> Whoever obtains the government of a city or a state, above all, when his power is based on weak foundations. . .has no surer method of maintaining himself on the throne than to renew, at the very outset of his reign, all the institutions of the state. . .in a word, there should be no rank, order,employment, nor riches which is not known to stem from him alone.[2]

---

[1]See Le Monde, June 17, 1946; Discours et Messages, pp. 743-4; or L'Année Politique (1946), pp. 534-9 for the complete text.

[2]Machiavelli, The Prince.

When de Gaulle was in a political position to effect change, various aspects of his ideal political system were implemented. Other aspects were modified for the sake of practicality, as may be seen in the completed draft of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. This constitution has been analyzed in great depth. Unfortunately, it is difficult to differentiate in the finished copy the ideas of Michel Debre, the primary drafter of the document, and those of Charles de Gaulle. Many reform proposals in the Constitution are antecedent to de Gaulle and did not intellectually originate with him.

Most of de Gaulle's political theory is based on the early Twentieth Century apprehensions derived from liberal economics, authoritarian politics, and military patriotism. He wanted a government that would be working, effective, and united. His ideas pivot around his belief that France was seeking the decline of republican institutions, in part the result of the French tradition of assembly government. De Gaulle believed that there were four political system possibilities for France: communism, European confederation, "Gaullism," and capitalism. Communism and capitalism he dismissed as making "the worker nothing more than a member of an ant colony."[1] Neither answered what he considered the

---

[1]Quoted in Galante, The General, p. 240.

greatest question of the century: How can we find a human balance for modern mechanized society? He chose Gaullism, or what he himself called "democracy," a disciplined form that precluded dictatorship and whose purpose was to restore French grandeur and sense of duty. It could be called a "social democracy" as its primary purpose was to insure everyone:

> . . .the right to freedom of work, and that will guarantee the dignity and security of all through an economic system planned with a view to developing our national resources.[1]

The core of de Gaulle's political idea is a rigorous separation of political powers in a "parliamentary" system and a system of checks and balances which gets overlooked due to the emphasis on the Executive. His reasons for advocating such a system coincide with Debre's arguments that the Fourth Republic was illegitimate. This theoretical slogan was as follows: France needed radical institutional change in order to effectively organize power to serve the national interest, the cardinal purpose of a truly legitimate political system.[2]

> The public powers have no validity, in fact or in law, unless they are in accord with the superior interests of the country and repose on the confident approval of the citizens.[3]

This is the idea of legitimacy over and above legality. De Gaulle also incorporated Capitant's belief that the very

---

[1]Free French, p. 290. Friedrich would call it neo-liberalism, with the State necessary for there to be citizens.

[2]This idea can be traced to Carré de Malberg.

[3]Bayeux Speech, June, 1946.

roots of the institutional forms of the Fourth Republic were undemocratic, therefore requiring "new" techniques such as the referendum. Once "Gallism" was established in France, European Confederation would be instituted.

De Gaulle's ideas are certainly not "democratic" in the Anglo-Saxon sense of the term. His original ideas provided for a loose federalist French Union with all real power in France, since she alone could be personified in the form of a President. Thus the nation-state of France would have "pre-eminent responsibility" for overseas territories, although the latter should have economic and political development suitable for them individually.

The most important position in this ideal system is an all-powerful Head of State, the President. De Gaulle's philosophizing on the type of leader France needed, wanted, and would accept was evolutionary as the three "requirements" were not necessarily synonomous. Later institutionalized in Article 5, this one concept of the Head of State as one who finds the means to effect change and reform appears to be totally de Gaulle's own.

He envisioned this Chief Executive as an integrating fourth branch or power of government above the legislature, judiciary, and ordinary executive. It is not a figurehead position or what de Gaulle characterized as designed only to "inaugurate chrysanthemums."[1] Rather, the position may

---

[1]Quoted in Carroll, The French, p. 47.

be easily cast as a republican monarch apart from the normal executive and having political authority which by implication results in the legitimacy of an action permitting the leader to execute his functions. In fact, de Gaulle often said what France really needed was a king:

> . . .a special being. . . to be brought [out] now and again in difficult moments. But that has all been destroyed, and you can't put it together again.[1]

In reality the position is one of an "emergency executive" who when the situation demands can dominate with what appears to be unlimited power. Since de Gaulle considered politics ideally to be action, "an ensemble of decisions which are made, things which are done, risks which are taken,"[2] his idea of the Chief Executive is one who can effectuate this action:

> . . .a guide. . .in whom the nation could see beyond its own fluctuations, a man in charge of essential matters and the guarantee of its fate.[3]

Wahl likens this concept to John Locke's fourth or federative power of government. Still, unfettered emergency powers are unusual in French republican history. It would be possible to interpret these powers as essentially those charged with foreign affairs, since de Gaulle's use of domestic policy is one which ideally unifies the nation, a precondition permitting the primacy of foreign policy. He considered it unthinkable

---

[1]Quoted in Tournoux, Petain and de Gaulle, p. 363. Emphasis supplied.

[2]Tenth Press Conference, July23, 1964.

[3]De Gaulle, War Memoirs(Salvation), p. 941.

that at certain times a man should not be the repository of sovereignty.[1] Indeed the leader embodies the "national legitimacy" like the "savior" regimes of the two Napoleons. De Gaulle thus saw this Chief of State as a powerful executive required to counterbalance the natural weakness that a divided France has in times of crisis. The position then is to prevent national disaster, whether involving economic issues or national prestige. It is also de Gaulle's idea that every Frenchman has two souls: the soul of an individual and that soul as a member of the united community represented by the President, who symbolizes the continuity of the State. The President in this capacity defines a single national interest.

De Gaulle's original plan presented at Bayeux included a corporative parliament idea with a tripartite upper house, each having a separate legislative and representative function: territorial, federal and corporative with representatives of economic, social or intellectual, and familial interests.[1] This idea is not unusual, but rather is in the Christian social tradition of corporatism. De Gaulle's ideas also incorporate the ancient cameralist tradition of the French monarchy combined with modern légistes or "state republicans" who held that the "Republic must be a government," that is, it must be able to function.[2]

---

[1]August 11, 1958 quoted in L'Intransigeant.

[2]Other corporative characteristics include his concept of an association of capital and labor, which in simplified form is merely a profit-sharing device.

The particular powers of the President and Premier were only superficially considered by de Gaulle. The Premier would be appointed by the President and would be responsible for the government's policy. As Head of Government, the Prime Minister and other ministers would be collectively responsible, not personally responsible, to the Assembly for their ministerial actions. But their essential functions were viewed by de Gaulle as ultimately part of the overall French policy. There are three key foreign policy posts: Foreign Affairs, which expresses the policy, the War Office, which upholds it, and the Police, which protects it.[1] The Minstry of the Interior is viewed as functioning to preserve the public order necessary to conduct foreign policy. Even so-called domestic policies, such as social security, are conceived by de Gaulle as inspired by the "power of France," necessary once again for foreign affairs.[2]

The Chief of State, as also the Chief of the Executive or President heading the Community and the Republic, was all-powerful. Elected by a "college" that was more than just an assembly to indicate the position was President of the French Union, not just France, the President was not dependent on the National Assembly. He had wider authority than a democratic head normally enjoys and could thus govern

---

[1]De Gaulle, Salvation, Documents (1960), p. 363.

[2]De Gaulle, War Memoirs, (Salvation), p. 779.

regardless of whether he had a majority in the Assembly or not. He provided continuity to government, which was assured by decrees and direct communications with the people via referendums. This particular technique of direct democracy was a Bonapartist feature instituted to maintain an implicit understanding between a leader and his people.

De Gaulle believed the President should chose his ministers as he pleases and have unrestricted power to dissolve Parliament. Presidential control of the Assembly would even extend to the initiation of the budget, formerly the domain of the legislative body. In fact, the President not only makes decisions but determines measures.[1] Particularly when the nation is in peril, the President would function as a "guarantor of national independence and of the treaties concluded by France," for de Gaulle believed that exceptional times required exceptional powers for exceptional tasks. When the peril was internal, as it often is in France, the President's position would be one above politics, where he could function as an arbiter among political parties. The executive structure, then, would be a strong government that does govern but one based on order and legality. The overall structure of the system provides for a strict separation of powers with a deliberate attempt to subjegate political parties to a role below the State.

---

[1] Ibid., p. 780.

De Gaulle believed that party rivalries weakned the government and potentially bring about the rise of dictatorships. Thus it is necessary to insure that the parties function in a subsidiary role.

De Gaulle was less concerned with the structure of the Parliament once the strong executive was established. However, this strong executive concept grew in part out of his perceptions of the vices of the French parliamentary system. Among his criticisms of the legislative branch was that the Chamber of Deputies had a parliamentary sovereignty that had replaced popular sovereignty until there really was no separation of powers as Montesquieu envisioned. This usurpation of the people's sovereignty and further of State power was by a self-interested parliamentary elite which interferred with the need for strong leadership. In essence, the Parliament was based on what divided the French nation, such as the quarrelsome nature of Frenchmen, rather than what unites it.[1] To correct this situation, de Gaulle called for a parliament that sits for debate and deliberation but does not govern or make decisions. Rather, it only "controls" the government's actions.

Being a political realist, de Gaulle necessarily changed his concept of the Parliament during the 1950's. At that time he proposed a bicameral chamber: one chamber a "political" body and the other an "administrative" body to

---

[1]September 27, 1947 quoted in Journal of Politics.

amend what the political chamber had done. The latter would bring into law-making the administrative order that a purely political chamber neglects. This second chamber would be chosen primarily by the Municipal Councils to represent economics, intellectuals and the family. The Senate, in contrast to normal French procedure, would be instituted so as to provide a possible source of government support in case the Executive had direct conflict with the Assembly. There were thus attempts to strengthen it, primarily by causing election to be by local French organizations and functions specifically designed to permit "corrective" actions. It would include representatives of all forms of local interests and have powers in foreign affairs, defense and trade.

As previously indicated, de Gaulle was often vague and ambiguous on the details of his ideal political system. But he did seem to believe that the Leader-Hero and the ideal Nation-State were more important than technical details. Indeed, it could be argued that there is little originality in his theory, which like most thought, was formulated and polished during periods of crises and reflects his personal response to the perceived conditions of his environment. Lacouture most succinctly presents the viewpoint of de Gaulle's critics:

> He replaces facts with a representation of facts, and objects with ideas he wants to propose for them; he forages in history for the basic matter of 'his' history, snatches at that portion of the real which coincides with his dream, and employs his talent, his will, and his arrogance to make of it another form of reality.[1]

But to de Gaulle, the symbols and concepts of his personal and political philosophy are real. This is readily apparent in a cursory analysis of the key symbols in de Gaulle's communications.[2]

Summary

A content or value analysis of a random sample of speeches, press conferences, books and articles is an organized plan which permits examination and interpretation of de Gaulle's key political symbols. It is yet another framework that seeks to aid our understanding of leadership behavior.

Practioneers of this form, such as Ralph K. White's Value Analysis, have evolved their metholodogy from a core of fifty values and value symbols to hundreds of "goal-words" and more complex interpretative procedures, such as Q sort scaling and multi-variate analaysis. The following analysis

---

[1]Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 231.

[2]The analysis is intended primarily to verify or deny the intuitive selections of the concepts discussed above. A content analysis of even selected documents de Gaulle "produced" in his sixty years of public life would be staggering.

is based on the simplest procedures. The aim was to determine the relative emphasis de Gaulle placed on the following values and their opposite or counterpart concept: nation-state, order, independence, justice, action/force, grandeur, reason, and the international images of friends, enemies, and neutrals. Only de Gaulle's words, not actions, were analyzed. The random sample was divided into four three-year periods, each of which provided de Gaulle with a crisis situation: 1941-44, the London years of "exile" and Head of the French Provisional Government; 1951-53, the debacle and demise of the Rally of the French People; 1958-60 Algeria and the Fifth Republic and; 1966-69 the Period of Internal French Dissent.

It was immediately apparent that a content analysis, however primitive, produces as many problems as it solves. Employing a pure random sample in order to preclude prejudicing the data often resulted in evaluating a formal "toast" given at a state banquet or personal but public letters written to other political leaders. Then there was the fact that often de Gaulle's articles and books were written during periods of political inactivity. However, even in these instances a pattern of priority ordering is evident.

Even in the briefest of communications, de Gaulle made some reference to the Nation as France and the State. Often this becomes a very extended discussion incorporating

the values which he considered emanating naturally from this concept--order, force, grandeur and independence. At other times his concept of the leader and his role in the State predominant. But in all instances there seems to be a circular attempt to return to the predominant concepts discussed above, even in those rare occasions when a speech or comment was extemporaneous. The only rank-ordering of priorities appears to be a direct correlation with the particular historical crisis de Gaulle was attempting to resolve at that instant. For example, the 1941-44 period communications were essentially public relations documents. The terminology and reiteration of constant themes indicate that de Gaulle considered his primary task to restore French spirit and unity, which in turn would restore the integrity and independence of France and the Republic in general. But because his personal and political philosophy included an exhaltation of the State, it is understandable that the documents of this period are devoted also to a tortured justification of "legitimate" rebellion. These values and their concomitant concepts prevail at a time when it would seem more natural to exorcise the "enemy." Interestingly, from this period through the other time-frames surveyed, the terms "friend, enemy, and neutral" are virtually undefinable. True, from 1941-44 the documents contain references to "Germanism," "fascism" and "Stalinism." Vichy is usually referenced with a qualification "as under the enemy." But

in his discussions that include such terms, it seems that de Gaulle's criteria for the nomenclatures rests entirely on some perceived threat to the French Nation or State. Thus it would be possible to divide his concept of "enemy" into the totalitarian forces against whom he waged military battles and the "enemy allies" such as the United States and Great Britain to whom he was brutal and unbearable in a generally nonphysical way. "Friends" then were those who supported the French Nation and State, while there is no measurable reference to "neutrals." After all, de Gaulle's personal philosophy precluded compromise and since he had decided the right and the wrong rather rigidly during these years, "neutrality" was impossible.

After the War and during the period 1951-53, de Gaulle's communications bear the imprint of his battles against the Fourth Republic and his consequent attempts to "reform" the State by various proposals of a system of indirect government. He was out of political power during this time, a fact reflected in the frustrated and pessimistic terminology of his speeches. The war years, for example, found his stress on "unity" or "grandeur" while the early 1950's reversed this to talk of "disunity" and "shame" or "disgrace." Because many of his frustrations of this period can be traced directly to the opposition of the Communists, de Gaulle's emphasis understandably was on these "enemies." However, he coined a new phrase to describe them - "separatists" - for their cardinal

sin was to owe allegiance and authority to a foreign nation and a foreign state rather than to France.

From 1958-60, a period when de Gaulle was once again in political office, the prevailing consideration was the Algerian situation and all this entailed. As during the other time-frames, de Gaulle's political vocabulary was centered primarily on the Nation and the State and the effects the crises were having on these entities. A preponderance of "value" words centering on confusion and disorder or disunity are evident, a natural phenomena since his theme was the need to re-establish discipline in the State. There is thus much emphasis on the necessity for State reform, respect for Republican institutions and the waging of a main battle against the politicized Army. The impotence of the government during this period resulted in his emphasis upon the degradation of the regime, something which is not as evident in previous periods. With the establishment of the Fifth Republic Constitution, de Gaulle turned to the institutionalization of this "reformed State" in much the same way and with the identical language he had used during the war years to forge public opinion.

Of the selected time periods, the years from 1966 to 1969 are the most confusing. Perhaps because of his advanced age or more readily the sheer volume of decisions required in his capacity as leader of a modern nation-state, de Gaulle's political communications are confusing. A study of the terminologies used at this time continues to show the emphasis

on France, the need to strengthen the State with some constitutional changes, and the cult of the Nation in general. However, he seems to have returned to some of the negativism of the 1951-53 period in that the concepts or value words used are "anti"-oriented rather than positive in emphasis. In general, however, the diversity of his communications and the particular words or phrases employed do not provide an adequate basis to determine what his priorities were then. Perhaps he himself did not know. What little data can be drawn from his communications indicates that he sought primarily to insure the survival of a strong executive for the French State, in recognition of his imminent political demise. The pessimistic communications in 1968-9 seem to be indicative of an attempt or at least wish to exit the political scene on his own terms. More than anything else, this period is a good example of the extremes of his political style.

CHAPTER V

DE GAULLISM: A POLITICAL STYLE

Introduction

What is excessive does not count. Talleyrand.

We have previously noted the theoretical contention that foreign policy predictability is enhanced when the idiosyncratic variable changes as one political leader replaces another as a formal office-holder.[1] Discussion has centered on the cultural factors (Chapter 2 above), personality (Chapter 3 above), and political philosophy (Chapter 4 above) constituting elements in this idiosyncratic factor. Another independent variable is found in the public aspects of leadership, or "political style." This last concept is considered by some to be the best concept for "describing, analyzing and evaluating leadership, the role of . . . personality and [the] relationship to the system."[2] Rather than what de Gaulle thought, political style is concerned with how things were accomplished, the personal way an individual responds to the demands of a political role.[3] Rustow calls this "the recurrent interplay between private personality

---

[1]See Rosen, "Leadership Change," and Grosser, French Foreign Policy, p. 13.

[2]See John Horace Kress, "N. S. Khruschev's Political Style," PhD Dissertation, University of Washington, 1973.

[3]See Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture," APSR, pp. 656 and 659.

and public performance."[1] To borrow from Tyler, political style is a continuing process, "an individually unique way of political living and goal striving."[2] In this respect it is not unlike the "mode-of-being-in-the-world" concept of the exitentialists.

Political scientists such as Barber, however, employ the concept "political style" to designate the interacting dualism of a collection of habitual action patterns evident in meeting the demands of a political role. These patterns incorporate not only the overt or observed characteristics of the leader's political performance (active or passive), but an inner or emotional context which Barber defines as a "bundle of strategies for adapting, for protecting and enhancing self-esttem," and which are either positive or negative. A political leader then attempts to cope with the political environment by employing the techniques he has found effective in similar situations. Therefore regularities or habitual patterns in political style do exist.[3]

---

[1]Rustow, "Atatürk," Daedalus, p. 683.

[2]"Individual Psychology," IESS, p. 215.

[3]Barber, "Adult Identity and Presidential Style, Daedalus, pp. 938-9.

Unfortunately, the analysis of a political style variable is fraught with perils. There is the conceptual problem of separting personality, political situation and political role from each other. And once accomplished, if indeed that is ever possible, the matter turns to the lack of sufficient quantity and quality of data adequate to prepare an "objective" empirical study.[1] However, such marked disadvantages should not preclude the analytical attempt to add to our knowledge of a French monstre sacre, Charles de Gaulle, and his particular, even peculiar, political style and the organizational relationships through which this style was manifest.

The Press Conference

De Gaulle's political style was marked by the use of three distinctive elements: the press conference, the referendum, and the interpretative use of organizational relationships surrounding the French Presidency. Indeed, as Carroll remarks, de Gaulle's personal policies were enforced by the use of these tactics.[2] Through these vehicles de Gaulle was able to associate himself with the

---

[1]Kress, "Political Style."

[2]Carroll, The French, p. 47.

sacred symbols of French culture:

> . . .the stilted rhetoric of his speeches resembled the rhythms of Richelieu, the stiffness of his gestures evoked the dignity of Henri IV, the mystery and ritual of his public appearances suggested the pomp of Napoleon, and the panache with which he defied the world brought to mind the antics of Cyrano de Bergerac. The General was thus able to draw upon himself the mantle of myth.[1]

The press conferences, or "press performances" as they were sometimes called,[2] were summoned when de Gaulle had something to say. As with all of his public appearances, timing was important.[3] Still, during his political tenure de Gaulle usually held a press conference every winter and spring. An electronic address, either radio or after 1958 television, or simultaneous transmission, occurred in the spring, summer, and autumn. The press conferences were the best source of foreign policy information, as long as Hayward's admonition is remembered. That is, foreign policy is "a field where publicity is the public relations facade that conceals rather than reveals the serious discussions between the select few."[4]

---

[1]Thompson, Pledge to Destiny, p. 256.

[2]Schoenbrun, The Three Lives of Charles de Gaulle, pp. 80-1.

[3]See Werth, De Gaulle, p. 52 for specific examples.

[4]Hayward, Parliamentary Affairs, pp. 234-5.

The press conferences were ritualized to perfection. Questions were required to be submitted beforehand, and then "arranged" by de Gaulle's press officer. Questions de Gaulle considered unworthy or unwelcome were either sluffed off completely or when it was necessary to consider them, some bit of "sardonic wit"[1] sufficed as an incomplete answer.[2] When he had something to say that he had not been "asked," de Gaulle would "extend" one of his answers with the comment, "Oh yes, somebody also asked. . ."[3] The President's responses usually added up to a calculated "affirmation of a policy to arouse the national spirit."[4]

De Gaulle did require time to prepare for the press conferences and to memorize his answers. His "prodigious memory" may have been less a cultivated trait than the result of dedicated labors in writing and rewriting and thus learning his speeches. His writing in any form was slow, primarily because he constantly sought precision in perfection. His policy was to spend two hours every day in complete isolation writing.[5] His Plon editor reported that

---

[1]Crozier, De Gaulle, pp. 9-10.

[2]De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope, pp. 290-1.

[3]Werth, De Gaulle, p. 361.

[4]De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope, pp. 289-90, 291.

[5]Grinnel-Milne, Triumph of Integrity, p. 300.

de Gaulle's habit was to revise his writings incessantly. This constant rewriting even extended to the expensive process of changing the galley proofs of his Memoirs.[1] There were no ghost writers. The only aid de Gaulle used was one or at most two research assistants who, upon specific instructions, searched for requested documents.[2]

The normal press conference began at 3 p.m. sharp. De Gaulle had a fetish for punctuality that even extended to the length of time State banquet courses could be consumed, with plates removed regardless of a guest's "stage" in eating.[3] In attendance at most conferences were media representatives, ministers, and officials, usually about a thousand people in all.[4] Crozier goes so far as to term these events as pure "theatre."[5] The Hoffmanns extend this view by calling the press conference a ritualized form of de Gaulle's gift and love of "drama, acting, and performing on a stage."[6] In whatever forum he chose, de Gaulle was a powerful orator. But unfortunately, he was also:

---

[1]Hatch, Biography of de Gaulle, p. 212.

[2]Werth, De Gaulle, p. 231.

[3]P. Viansson-Ponte, The King and His Court (New York: Houghton Mifflin, n.p.).

[4]Janet Flanner (Genêt) reports that the "normal" autumn and spring press conferences held in the Elysee ballroom were attended by 700 to 800 journalists alone, plus government officials, secretaries and other listeners and observers. See her Paris Journal, II (New York: Atheneum, 1971), pp. 281-3.

[5]Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 592.

[6]Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," Daedalus, p. 856.

> . . .a man who [said] wise things in a foolish manner [so that the] provocative brutality of his speech and the arrogant aggressiveness of his tone remove[d] . . .any curative power from his proposals.[1]

De Gaulle's television appearances were even more "crafted," to a pristine perfection. This was further enhanced by his virtual monopoly of the electronic mass media for political purposes during his formal power-holding. The television presentations were usually pre-recorded, again with no notes or "idiot cards" employed. Every mannerism, gesture, intonation and cadence was carefully calculated in deliberate, slow movements. To insure the maximum effect of his appearance, de Gaulle even took diction lessons from an actor of the Comedie Française.[2] These same "techniques" were utilized most successfully in de Gaulle's various referendum "crusades."

The Referendum

As employed by de Gaulle, the referendum is best described as a suspense drama invoked for diverse political and personal reasons. Theoretically, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic (Article 11) provides the referendum initiative as a Government perogative, but only the President used it for such specific purpose. As such, the referendum rejuvenated de Gaulle-the-man while demonstrating his popular

---

[1]Lacouture, De Gaulle, pp. 190-1.

[2]Werth, De Gaulle, p. 361.

support among the French people. De Gaulle believed it strengthened the special bonds which should exist between a leader and his people. The technique permitted the periodic - five in ten years - reaffirmation of his personal authority, while confirming what de Gaulle called his "profound legitimacy." Politically the referendum was a means to legitimize public policy, an alternative to the "evils" of permitting the "intermediaries" sitting in Parliament a more active part in this process. Thus, when the politicians would not support him on what he considered a vital issue, de Gaulle would rally the masses through a massive public opinion campaign, and with a referendum victory "guarantee" a popular mandate for major policy innovations. The referendum provided a means to solicit the Rousseauean "general will" of the sovereign people, an overt manifestation of de Gaulle's implicit preference for direct democracy. De Gaulle, of course, like the Bonapartes before him, interpreted this general will himself.

One referendum also provided an exercise that from some appearances was an unnecessary event leading to de Gaulle's "fall" from political power. Perhaps in this case the technique was employed as a means to escape from the political scene, although this belief is not without its opponents. Those who disagree with this political suicide

thesis[1] contend that de Gaulle was a crisis leader who was finally cast from power when France entered a period when crisis leaders were unnecessary, a time of relative stability.

Although de Gaulle used the mass media prior to the referendum, he also often traveled to all areas of France for "spotlight" personal visits. Werth reports[2] that in these local speeches, de Gaulle always made specific note of the importance of the area he was visitng. More interesting, however, is that he carried his public perfection even further. Therefore the length and content of his comments were dictated by the size of the entity he was visiting. A village warranted only a few words on a domestic topic while medium-sized towns deserved a three-to-six minute speech, here again on domestic concerns. However, a city was "granted" a twenty minute discourse on both domestic and international topics. In all areas, after the "speech," de Gaulle would go into the usually friendly crowd and "press flesh" as so many U.S. Presidents are wont to do, here again drawing personal strength from a political technique. The importance of these various verbal presentations was expressed best by the General himself:

---

[1]See Bon, Revue Française de Science Politique (April, 197); Lancelot and Weill; Hoffmann in Edinger, Political Leadership.

[2]Werth, De Gaulle, p. 360.

> Politics, you know - the real stuff of politics on the grand scale, which changes the course of events, the destiny of peoples, the future of nations - politics is a matter of the Word. In the beginning was the Word. On the 18th of June I changed History by an appeal of forty lines.[1]

Organizational Staff Relationships

Yet another indication of de Gaulle's political style is found in his use of the organizational staff relationships of the French Presidency. A leader's individual style and personal preferences are most evident here, where general rules, communications received and acted upon, and subordinate relationships are exclusively the function of the idiosyncratic variable.[2]

The Elysee Staff under de Gaulle was composed of four organs:

1) the Private Secretariat or Cabinet responsible for the scheduling of appointments and general political daily life.

2) the Secretariat-General, often considered a "parallel government," of fifteen intellectual technocrats heading departments or ministries such as foreign affairs, finance, education, etc. Working long hours, this group was not noted for being mere "yes-men."

---

[1]Tournoux, Sons of France:Pétain and DeGaulle, p. 215. The reference is to de Gaulle's first BBC broadcast appeal to the French from his London exile.

[2]See Rosen, "Leadership Change,"p. 7.

3) the Department of African and Malagasy Affairs theoretically watched over the relationships of France and her Community or ex-Community as it came to be termed.[1]

4) the Private General Staff which was responsible for all military affairs. These organs were in the French tradition, however, and not exclusively the de Gaulle innovation found in the Council of Ministers meetings and the "restricted councils."

The Conseil des Ministres is not a cabinet in the traditional parliamentary sense insofar as it worked with the President, its official Head, rather than the Prime Minister.[2] The agenda for these meetings held twice a week (at least) were decided in advance by de Gaulle, who insisted meetings be held in a room of totally bare walls to prevent distractions. In the Council de Gaulle used the Lincolnesque technique. He permitted individuals to speak, even have lively debates. After that he presented his viewpoint, along with an explanation. Then he issued his "verdict." Even the cabinet communiques were formulated by the President and the Minister of Information and often had little relationship to the actualities of the particular meeting. Here as always, de Gaulle made major decisions

---

[1]However, this Department was more often considered a cover for various security and intelligence operations.

[2]See Crozier, De Gaulle, pp. 6-9.

alone, in his determination to dominate in his role as one who had assumed the burden of La France. At one time de Gaulle noted that although it was necessary to seek out information and opinions, after ministers had stated their views a Leader should "listen only to yourself" - a French variation of democratic centralism. Launay even quotes de Gaulle as saying:

> When a minister asks to speak it is because he has done something that needs to be forgiven. When a minister says nothing, he is afraid he may have to tell the truth. When a minister offers excuses, it is because there is a decision to make.[1]

In reality the Council was faced with decisions that had been decided in advance. The meetings were primarily to ratify fait accompli decisions and discuss policies and problems that might result from implementation.

The Council of Ministers meetings seldom discussed foreign and military affairs, although they were made cognizant of them in merely ratifying what de Gaulle had decided beforehand. However, it appears that de Gaulle did leave many social and economic questions to his ministers and top civil servants. Yet in his last memoir, Hope, he wrote that all public policy was important to him with none reserved especially for his consideration.[2] Foreign and

---

[1]Launay, De Gaulle and His France, pp. 233-4.

[2]De Gaulle, Hope, pp. 286-7. His ministers in their writings disagree with de Gaulle on this point. However, it is important to note the following discussion of "de gaulle" and DE GAULLE.

defense policy was de Gaulle's exclusive domain. However, too often his foreign policy was "prepared at the Quai d'Orsay, decided . . .at the Elysee and implemented nowhere." This is particularly true as de Gaulle grew older, when as far as action was concerned the system came to a grinding halt. When performing at its best, however, de Gaulle's international policies were the result of his own philosophy and the use of interministerial committees and "Restricted Councils."

Although Conseil Interministeriels had existed in previous French governments, the extent of their use as Conseils Restreints under de Gaulle is without parallel. These Restricted Councils were small groups of various personalities, including civil servants, ministers, and anyone de Gaulle believed should attend. There were no records or written reports kept of the meetings, contrary to de Gaulle's usual dictim that everything important had to be in writing. Indeed, it is often impossible to determine who was present, except for de Gaulle. There was no agenda and the sessions usually were called when a presidential decision was in the offing. In many respects, the Restricted Council and the lesser interministerial committees anticipated and duplicated the work of the ministries, particularly on such topics as the military and the Community, perhaps less so on other topics. It is in these highly secretive meetings that de Gaulle relied heavily on the experts who advised him. Here Pompidou notes, that in working with de Gaulle in general,

"personalities disappear and only functions remain."[1]

In his use of the Restricted Councils de Gaulle's intent and purpose was to deny any one ministry exclusive control over any issue or policy area while permitting the President to exercise close control over those decisional areas of most interest to him. Ministers who were not in on these meetings were merely informed of decisions reached without them and without recourse to review or objections. The importance of this group may be seen in de Gaulle's comment on his meetings and use of various political groups. In a seven year period he met with the Council of Ministers 302 times, the limited interministerial councils 420 times, the Premier 505 times, and the President of the Assembly 78 times.[2] Of course, in exclusively foreign policy issues and decisions, the decisional triumvirate theoretically included the President, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs

De Gaulle's use of the Premiership followed the basic tenets of his political philosophy. He noted that he had always chosen conservative Prime Ministers and then did not go against what the Minister disapproved.[3] The truth was

---

[1]Quoted in Launay, De Gaulle and His France, p. 223.

[2]Twelfth Press Conference, September 9, 1965.

[3]Hayward, Parliamentary Affairs, p. 82.

that de Gaulle choose men with whom he agreed, or rather who agreed with him and with whom he had a "close identity of views."[1] Strong personalities rarely survived in a Gaullist regime, since de Gaulle always assumed credit, in the name of France, for subordinate's ideas while disclaiming failures. Ultimately most of his achievements were based on groundwork laid by others, but made successful by his particular political style.

In all, it was de Gaulle and not the Prime Minister who directed "the action of the government" through the presidential secretariate and the interministerial councils thereof.[2] Still, de Gaulle had a great respect for office, including his own. He insisted upon the maximum authority for himself and others. His confidence in his premier was less complete, according to the degree in which he allowed him more independence. The prime minister's actions were closely watched.

For the system to work well according to de Gaulle's conceptions, the prime minister had to share the views of the head of state on the main lines of general policy. Essential policies would not permit divergent opinions. As de Gaulle consolidated or institutionalized his leadership, he even used the premiership to enhance France's movement toward a

---

[1]Hayward, Parliamentary Affairs, p. 82.

[2]See Le Monde, April 23, 1969.

perfected presidential regime. The Prime Minister was ideally one without past Parliamentary ties. Theoretically he would answer to Parliament, while realistically being devoted to de Gaulle and his cause.[1] When conflict existed between de Gaulle and his Prime Minister, or the latter's popularity approached that of the President, the Prime Minister was summarily replaced. Still, de Gaulle's personal preference of leaving details to others, his contempt for contingencies, and the belief that he did not "save France" to concern himself with the "macaroni ration"[2] necessitated the Prime Minister's important role in integrating the activities of the government. De Gaulle provided political guidance of the most general kind. But here again the Prime Minister's role was viable only as long as confidence by de Gaulle was retained. And even with the near revolution of 1968, de Gaulle did not take on the responsibilities of his subordinates. The importance of the Prime Minister's role was more evident in domestic policy, although he also coordinated de Gaulle's foreign policy decisions in the government and defended his policies in Parliament. The latter was done in conjunction with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

---

[1]See M. Bromberger, Le Destin secret de G. Pompidou (Paris: 1965). Hence Debré was replaced by Pompidou because the former's ties with Parliament were too strong, even though he was loyal to de Gaulle.

[2]Tournoux, Sons of France: Petain and de Gaulle, p. 216.

The appointment of the Minister of Foreign Affairs also was based primarily on de Gaulle's personal confidence in the individual, with such factors as political standing, etc. secondary. De Gaulle established the major directions of foreign policy and then let the Minister have some latitude of action, here again his usual governing technique. De Gaulle seemed to give only intermittent interest to any given political problem. Perhaps this was partially the result of Blum's observation that de Gaulle could not be concerned "with more than one idea at a time, one plan, one belief."[1] When he had a belief or plan, however, he surrendered himself to it.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary-General were responsible then for the detailed implementation of de Gaulle's policy, along with more routine duties such as the normal diplomatic workload. Interestingly, de Gaulle never did trust diplomatic personnel[2] since he could not control them as well as he did his immediate staff. Too, they seemed generally opposed to his blunt "great quarrel" style. De Gaulle met with his Foreign Minister regularly every Friday morning.[3] Even with such "frequent" meetings and responsibilities, the reality was that the ministers

---

[1]In Fragments, p. 114; Werth, De Gaulle, p. 80; Aron, De Gaulle, p. 115.

[2]See his War Memoirs (Unity), passim.

[3]See Couve de Murville, Une Politique Étrangere: 1958-69 (Paris: 1971), pp. 9-10.

were held responsible for the policy which the President had decided and for which his political skills were directed.

Political Skills

Crozier in his monumental study of de Gaulle, notes that the General:

> . . .had many of the attributes of the statesman: the character, the intelligence and the charisma. Between his first and second periods of power, he had even taught himself patience. He was an outstanding technician of power.[1]

The "techniques" de Gaulle employed were as well-thought out as his personal and political philosophy. In fact, most were outlined in general form in de Gaulle's earliest writings. Indeed some of his tactics are viewed as part of and included in his philosophy of command. It was only after de Gaulle acquired political power that his skill in using the traditional instruments of political authority: propaganda, manipulation, and force, subsequently characterized as Machiavellain, was evident. These techniques ranged from the ceremonial and rhetorical to the organizing ability so typical of the military mind. But above all, how de Gaulle did things brings to mind Pareto's warning that Paris is the domain of foxes, where those in power rely on guile more than brute force.

De Gaulle's initial major political activities were those connected with his leadership of the Free French from

---

[1]See Crozier, De Gaulle, Chapter 1.

London during WWII. With a tenuous political legitimacy and virtually none of the typical resources Heads of State normally possess, de Gaulle turned to the use of theatrical devices to accomplish his self-imposed task on the political "stage." As a student of the French theatre with extensive experience in acting,[1] de Gaulle began to "perform" the role as the rightful leader of a country which he considered still waging war against Hitler, even as the flag of Vichy flew in Paris. By his political behavior toward the Allied Powers, reinforced by his talents as an orator, de Gaulle was able to change the disbelief in his political legitimacy held by most of his audiences to belief. His strategy was one based on illusion, oratory or mere talk, and psychological pressures.[2] The tactic is succinctly described by Kriegel-Valrimont as "Operation Seduction." Used for various purposes, such as getting parliamentary action during the June, 1958 crisis, de Gaulle surprised many with his ability to "sweet-talk:"

> No one had expected that he would or could exercise such skill, and show such gifts of diplomacy and psychological understanding.[3]

Thus he was able to twist the detested politial party system and its politicians around his little finger.[4] A less direct example of his use of flattery is evident in the formal state

---

[1]While a military man, de Gaulle often had his soldiers stage plays, among the more typical disciplinarian tactics.

[2]Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 53.

[3]Kriegel-Valrimont reporting speech of June 2, 1958 in Le Monde.

[4]See Werth, De Gaulle, p. 51.

receptions given during the de Gaulle tenure. Diplomats were greeted universally with the comment that their particular country was liked very much, "as you well know." Writers of all kilt were left with the impression that de Gaulle was one of their faithful readers, while priests were enjoined to "pray for us in our need." The older guest was assured that his experience was of great value, while the young were admonished that the future of France rested with them, to be worthy of it. De Gaulle rarely deviated from this basic "script." In all, de Gaulle's political theatrics were:

> . . .a grand spectacle, fast moving, stage-managed with care, epic in proportion and designed in the seductiveness of its dreams and illusions to arouse the passions and morale of the audience. . . stagecraft was suspenseful, a rousing tale of personal initiative, narrow escapes, dangers and pitfalls and ultimate success.[1]

This was particularly evident in de Gaulle's radio transmission to France. In these speeches he polished the language skill he commanded so well. Whether in a press conference or other public appearances, one is struck by de Gaulle's use of the French language. In private, particularly during times of stress, de Gaulle's lanaguage was often abrasive, a "barrack-square coarseness."[2] In

---

[1]Thompson, Pledge to Destiny, p. 256.

[2]Crozier, De Gaulle, pp. 9-10.

public, however, his speech was more noble, although he was still able to employ linguistic subtlies for his own purposes. For example, typically he addressed most of his subordinates as Monsieur, a levelling phrase indicating their "lesser" and mere mortal position relative to Mon Général. Yet in contrast, on a German visit de Gaulle addressed local miners as "Gentlemen" (Meine Herren) rather than the condescending "du."[1] A linguist and "master of the equivocal statement,"[2] de Gaulle often used outdated terminology, but always the mot juste. His language was classical and ancient in style, rather than modern. He preferred the "rhythms and words of the tribe."[3] Terminology was concise and correct, although it was his cross to be misunderstood and mistranslated. Here too this use of language appears as a deliberate attempt to extend the aura of mystery, for de Gaulle did not always want others to know what he said. He would then not be liable or responsible for doing or following what he said. But most of all he disliked the language "franglas" and "volapük." The latter is an old term he dredged up just as he did many others, a prime indication of his love of letters and the bon mot.[4]

---

[1]Galante, The General, p. 183.

[2]Grosser, French Foreign Policy, p. 23.

[3]Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 183.

[4]See Grosser, French Foreign Policy, pp. 26-7.

The tone and structure of de Gaulle's language were borrowed from Barres and included the often stilted rhetorical rhythms of Richelieu with the nationalistic phrases of Maurras.[1] The latter is a special form of nationalism, an "oral shock treatment"[2] where symbols replace realities and it is believed that mere words can change events, remold and reshape facts, and even create the crises or drama necessary for a crisis-leader such as de Gaulle to continue in power.[3] De Gaulle then was an illusionist, skilled at the magic of creating a sense of achievement that factually never existed.[4] However, as Aron explains, de Gaulle's ability to change events with words is the style the French see as giving significance to events.[5]

De Gaulle, then, created events as a historian-dramatist, rather than placidly accepting "facts."[6] For example, in a conversation with the British Ambassador after WWII de Gaulle admitted that his pursuit of glory was deliberate: "Every day I spend five minutes thinking how what I have to do will appear in history."[7] He then behaved

---

[1]See Thompson, Pledge to Destiny, p. 256 and others.

[2]A good example is his famous Quebec speech.

[3]Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 665. [4]Ibid., p. 5.

[5]R. Aron, Realities (May, 1967), p. 90.

[6]Although upon occasions, events occurred over which he had no control, in which case his tactic was to take advantage of whatever opportunities existed, as in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

[7]John S. Ambler, The Government and Politics of France (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1971), p. 135.

according to what history would say, and found it expedient to cultivate a charismatic aura for that purpose. This necessitated the polishing of other political techniques. These major "skills" of instinct, mystery, and intransigence are most evident in de Gaulle's relationships with other Heads of States, such as Churchill and Roosevelt.

De Gaulle's entire political style was colored by an unbelievable instinctive self-sufficiency. He wrote of this "need" in Edge of the Sword: "confident in his judgment and conscious of his strength, he [the Leader] yields nothing to the desire to please." De Gaulle had this instinctive confidence in his own superior judgment, giving the impression that he alone knew right from wrong and following Polonius' dictim "to thine own self be true." His decisions were governed by his own conceptions, for which there are no precedents or predecessors. At times this was as much an illusion as many other devices he employed. Yet his instinct for leadership, which he described as "the practical, particular, and concrete feel of. . .what is"[1] and faith in himself was so strong that it was often characterized as mere arrogance. Since he further insisted on maintaining mystery as part of his style and the character he had created, the defamation was usually accepted unequivocally.

---

[1]De Gaulle, Edge of the Sword, p. 20. Emphasis supplied.

Mystery

De Gaulle was secret and aloof in part because he had consciously renounced personal happiness for the isolation of French grandeur. This solitude and aloofness he believed necessary for the "true leader." He had great patience and could remain silent, an unusual attribute for a political being. To extend this aura of mystery, de Gaulle maintained a social distance from others, believing prestige exists only with mystery, "for people revere little what they know too well."[1] Sometimes moody, he actually made relatively few public appearances, which by his entrances, withdrawals and exits to his political behavior heightened the aura of his presidency. When de Gaulle did speak, it was in what the majority of Frenchmen would call "riddles." They could not always understand the general loftiness of his thinking, a fact compounded by de Gaulle's belief in the validity of using deception.

There are actually two aspects of de Gaulle's mystère, which seemed to follow Descartes' comment, larvatus prodeo, "Masked, I advance." First, there is the ambiguity which de Gaulle developed into an art for the purposes of drama. This followed his belief that one's intentions should be deliberately obscured until the time was right for

---

[1] Ibid.

a decision or action, meaning after the goal had been achieved. Silence then was necessary so that official pronouncements would not be misquoted and misinterpreted, thereby committing him to an untenable policy position.[1] Too, the leader of a truly great France had to be aloof, secretive, and unfettered by emotional bonds such as gratitude or other sentiments. And as de Gaulle grew older, his view was not unlike that of Ho Chi Minh, who noted that he was:

> . . .an old man, a very old man. An old man likes to have a little air of mystery about himself. I like to hold on to my little mysteries.[2]

The second aspect of de Gaulle's mystery was his deliberate use of Pythian formulas, the existence of conflicting alternatives or what Werth called "facing-both-ways-policy."[3] Heraclitus would have admired this working model of his dictim that the only thing permanent is change. The General preferred to have, simultaneously, several action-alternatives available so that if one measure failed another might work. This resulted in a constant, or so it seemed, change in direction, usually unexpectedly. As Aron notes, de Gaulle did not go in a straight line, so that no one would know where he was going until he arrived.[4]

---

[1]See Grinnel-Milne, The Triumph of Integrity, p. 329.

[2]Stated in 1962, quoted in Time (September 12, 1969), p. 22.

[3]Werth, De Gaulle, p. 185.

[4]Aron, De Gaulle, p. 132.

In combination with his love of ambiguity, this political tactic could be termed "ambiguous spontaneity."[1] De Gaulle's ultimate policy decision was a "chance objective" coming forth from noncommitted generalities and all part of a deliberate unpredictability of political actions and pronouncements.

Intransigence

In politics, particularly when vital national interests were concerned, de Gaulle for all intent and purposes refused to compromise. This factor, coupled with his deliberate inculcating of political quarrels, is best described as a psychological tactic of insurgency or intransigence. True, de Gaulle had a rigid and inflexible personality as far as permitting no compromise, a factor which often resulted in his ignoring or removing from power politically important people. If a policy encountered difficulties, he would use threats and arguments. If this did not work, he ultimately adjusted his policy to that fact. But more importantly, de Gaulle used intransigence or "the great quarrel" in order to gain public attention and then mold that attention as he willed it. This intransigence was often "explained" as pure obduracy, although the tactic was to try to tame imponderables by verbal action. His most famous quarrels were those

---

[1]Pierre Nora in Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 209.

with Churchill and Roosevelt. De Gaulle once explained his relationship with Churchill as being along purely tactical lines. Churchill's temper was manifested when he was wrong and de Gaulle's when he was right. Consequently, they were often angry with each other:

> I always quarreled violently with Churchill but we always understood each other very well. I never quarreled with Roosevelt, but we never understood each other at all.[1]

The conflict with Churchill was on the common level of "spirit,"[2] whereas Franklin Roosevelt's clash was a deep, philosophical one. Churchill recongized de Gaulle's deliberate use of this tactic of intransigence:

> He had to be rude to the British to prove to French eyes he was not a British puppet. And he certainly carried out this policy with perserverance. He even one day explained this technique to me, and I fully comprehended the extraordinary difficulties of his problem. I always admired his massive strength.[3]

Political intransigence resulted in systematic or constructive opposition to various elements in the political process. The Rally of the French People symbolized the extremes such a technique can generate; although even here it is possible that de Gaulle was using this neo-fascist semi-organization as a means to obtain American aid, since at that time the United States was on the road to McCarthyism with

---

[1]De Gaulle quoted in Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965).

[2]Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 95.

[3]Winston Churchill, Second World War, IV(Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 1948-54), p. 611.

its red witchhunts. But de Gaulle always seemed to be rebelling against something, whether against the military hierarchy in his youth or the United States in his old age. The latter, of course, harkens to the old diplomatic tradition that weaker nations should challenge the strongest nation.[1] Too, another reason for this tactic was de Gaulle's emphasis on his own, and thus France's, need for freedom of action. His primary short-term but consistent goal was the desire for maneuverability and thereby flexibility of political action. This required the necessity of taking the initiative rather than merely reacting in foreign policy, whether in the form of expedient or transitory alliances or crisis politics in general. De Gaulle warned:

> Never let yourself get tied down, and when an outsider offers you something, always begin by answering no. There will be time enough to accept when you have thought it over.[2]

Aron appropriately termed such action as "ballet" policy, always in motion. Such a tactic is understandable considering de Gaulle's early extolling of the virtue of the "insuperable urge to act." However, it led to his characterization by detractors as typical of a petty dictator in verbal democratic clothing. In many respects de Gaulle did impersonate the French Kings of old relative to style.

---

[1]See Aron, Realitiés, May, 1967.

[2]Quoted in Galante, The General, p. 109.

But de Gaulle's end was a modern and efficient state. The means to this end and some aspects of his personal approach obscured some of his more "radical" beliefs. Regardless, his decisions were boldly made. His method was authoritarian-laden, or what Hayward called those of a "Charismatic Caesarism."[1] However, this was not so much a passionate following of the Weberian concept of charisma as a unique charisma which is manifested primarily during periods of foreign and domestic crises. Tucker and Erikson have pointed out that the charismatic leader's role is enhanced when people experience deep distress shattering their rituals of existence. The term is "existential dread." Such is a valid characterization for de Gaulle's two political entries to French power. When the "dread" was removed, so was de Gaulle. Yet his status among the French was viewed more the lesser among evils in situations where the French people sought escapes from drastic change, and thus supported him. From 1958 when he returned to power, de Gaulle had threatened to step down as France's leader no less than four times--unless he had popular electoral support. Once this support was accepted on the basis of his symbolism, it was de Gaulle's tactic to then make the feared drastic changes

---

[1]Hayward, Parliamentary Affairs.

himself. But de Gaulle was a "man of storms,"[1] preferring the drama of crisis. He therefore maintained the aura of crisis or controlled anxiety by always requiring a quarrel in one form or another. One of his basic tactics was to condemn the "rot" in its various forms that was destroying the Republic. Then the French people would be admonished that the restoration of the people's faith in France could be evidenced by support for him on a particular issue.[2] He felt that France's problems were always resolved in crisis situations. If a problem existed, therefore, it was only necessary to insure its growth into crisis proportions for resolution.

de gaulle and DE GAULLE

One of the more complex techniques Charles de Gaulle used, and one that is commonly misunderstood, was his deliberate linguistic differentiation between "me,""de gaulle," and"De Gaulle." These perceptual distinctions provide an important understanding of his role as a decision-maker as much as his personal philosophy facilitates the comprehension of his political goals.[3]

---

[1]Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 663.

[2]Schoenbrum, The Three Lives of Charles de Gaulle, p. 209.

[3]See Parsons and Shills, Theory of Action, p. 23; Gerth and Mills, pp. 425-6; and Edinger, pp. 674-5 for further discussions of political "role." Succinctly, Eulau, Political Analysis, p. ix notes this importance in that by "his multiple role-taking the politicians mediates between collective demands on government."

Often speaking of himself in the third person, de Gaulle was viewed by some as practicing either childishness or genius. In reality, the differences are deeper. When he spoke of himself as "I" or "me," Charles de Gaulle was referring to a person. In contrast, De Gaulle was either the public-political head of the French Nation and State, or a personage, a public-historical role played on the international stage and a means to discuss his own work as a historical figure emboding the goals of France. It would even be possible to extend this division to La France, which he often attributed with his views and sentiments. The personage de Gaulle "role" dominated the other two personalities. General de Gaulle was very conscious of this technique. He once commented that "De Gaulle interests me only as a historical personality."[1] It appears also to be a means de Gaulle used to get an "outside view" of events. Thus he instituted a sharp cleavage between de Gaulle-the-mere-man and de Gaulle-the-symbol or even institution. This division of his personality into the personal, inner being and the popular myth of a figure or symbol added to his aura of mystery. However, it required an increasing consciousness or self-watch to maintain this separation and the distinctive

---

[1]Quoted in Launay, De Gaulle and His France, p. 53.

words and actions emanating from each.[1] De Gaulle-the-man in fact became almost the prisoner of de Gaulle-the-figure:[2]

> Before I made a speech or reached a major decision I had to ask myself, 'Will de Gaulle approve of this? Is this the way people expect de Gaulle to act? Is this right for de Gaulle and the role he plays?'3

De Gaulle-the-man then was restricted in what he could do by the ever-presence of General de Gaulle, who had assumed the role and burden of France. Interestingly, the "man" did not always approve of what General de Gaulle did. This is most evident throughout the Memoirs, which are usually considered an autobiographical exercise at most and a justification or rationale of a political doctrine or tenure at least. A close study of the Memoirs, however, reveals the inevitable conclusion that the writings are autobiographical of the personage, a monument to his perception of France, and a contribution to French literature, not a more typical example of an individual's life or political history. How de Gaulle felt about his work is indicated by the dismissal of any possibility of permitting them to be serialized in newspapers:"one can hardly imagine Saint Simon allowing detached pieces of his work to appear in Paris daily."[4] Within

---

[1]See Grinnel-Milne, The Triumph of Integrity, pp. 166, 303.

[2]See Schoenbrun interview, Saturday Review (May 16,1959).

[3]Schoenbrum, Three Lives of Charles de Gaulle, pp. 4-5.

[4]Quoted in Tournoux, Tragedié, p. 234.

this unmistakable context, the so-called "errors," omissions, or contradictions in the writings are understandable. De Gaulle did not intend them to be impartial. Further, the Memoirs contain rather scathing criticisms of "De Gaulle." His political leadership is on occasion called a "dictatorship," albeit a temporary one, and a variation on the absolutist monarchies of French history.

The perceptive distinctions of these "roles" are important. In part, their existence may be traced to the General's classical educational background. He considered it repetitive and immodest to use "I" or "me" continuously. For style he would insert "de Gaulle," depending on the context and rhythm of the sentence. More important, however, he early discerned that the French people distinguished between himself as an individual and the public person named de Gaulle. Perhaps this resulted in part because initially few came to know the leader of the Free French except through faceless radio broadcasts from London. De Gaulle made the discovery of this distinction at Douala:

> . . .which was my first contact with the French people since my call to resistance. I landed there after the expedition to Dakar had failed. There were thousands of people and they began to shout, 'de Gaulle! de Gaulle! de Gaulle! I was taken aback. Until then, in London, my contacts had all been personal and individual, with ministers, soldiers, attaches, and so forth. But here was the voice of the people, the [voice] of the crowds. And I suddenly realized for [the] first time what a heavy burden I bore, what a responsibility I had to all these people who were counting upon a man named de Gaulle to liberate them, to give them back their freedom and independence.

> I realized then that General de Gaulle had become a living legend, that they had formed a certain image of him, that they expected many things of him, that they thought of him as behaving in a certain way.[1]

Once de Gaulle realized a most indestructible element, a legend, had been created, he contributed consciously to its continuation and growth.

As Barber and others have indicated, a political style is forged at the time of a leader's first independent political success. The London years were de Gaulle's first such success and explain the continuation of the style he found to be so successful then. These role differentiations as part of de Gaulle's particular political style are important factors, regardless of typology employed for their study.

Summary

One of the early attempts to devise a cross-classification system for analyzing politicians' behavior in general is David Barber's dichotomous political types, ultimately resulting in four character variations. Barber believes that two variables are most important in predicting political decisional behavior. The overt level of political activity invested in a political office, either active or

---

[1]Quoted in Schoenbrum, The Three Lives of Charles de Gaulle, pp. 94-5.

passive, contrasts with the inner or emotional stance toward life and one's activities in it, manifested as being positive or negative.

Barber's thesis and its typology have inherent weaknesses, as Greenstein and others have readily indicated.[1] The typology is incomplete, contains unproved assertions, and permits the arbitrary or subjective assigning of a political individual to any one category. This does not preclude its potential for our discipline when less intuitive methodologies such as content analysis are employed, for example, to determine the degree of political activity a politician exercises. It is too early to dismiss completely Barber's admittedly crude character types, particularly since it provides a further means to study intensively the behavior of those decision-making actors who as Chief Executives can have the greatest effect on us all.

De Gaulle can be described best as one of Barber's "active-positive" types. He was primarily concerned with substantive political achievements or productiveness and therefore emphasized the rational mastery of problems. Unfortunately this "type" often fails to take into consideration the irrational in politics. For example, de Gaulle seems to have completely misjudged the mob activity of the

---

[1]See Knutson, Handbook, among others.

1968 near-revolution in France. Further, the typical general lack of anxiety of the "active-positive" often results in an inability to take the fears and hopes of others into consideration, i.e., a general lack of empathy. In de Gaulle's case, the problem was partially his deliberate subverting of all emotions publicly, combined with the blunt disciplined demeanor of a military mind. Many examples of de Gaulle's lack of empathy are evident. Werth reports de Gaulle's visit to Marseilles immediately after World War II.[1] The locals staged a parade in his honor. Wearing rags, with flower bedecked rifles, the Maquisards pulled a German armored vehicles upon which scantily dressed females waved flags. De Gaulle was not amused at the attempt at humor and muttered "what a masquerade" and "that rabble." Yet he was aware of French problems and how his people suffered as individuals and as a Nation. But as Crawley notes:

> . . .it was always from a mountain that he descended among them. He could not laugh with them or let them see that he suffered. Inevitably people came to feel that he neither understood nor greatly cared about their lives.[2]

The "passive-positive" type primarily seeks to win the affection of others, feeling himself generally unloved. Political involvement is slight, with enjoyment of political

---

[1]See Werth, France: 1940-55, p. 228.

[2]Crawley, De Gaulle, p. 282.

behavior superficial. In contrast, de Gaulle felt the public-historical personage role he affected was loved. Once he became politically involved in the 1930's, de Gaulle was "quicksanded" by his political philosophy of the French Nation-State into more, not less, political activity. As the personage, de Gaulle, he relished the political role he had as "the" representative of the French Nation.

Barber sees those who are politically active because of some call or duty, but perform minimally in that role as "passive-negatives." They reluctantly enter politics and because of a lack of flexibility tend to withdraw from political activity after relatively short periods of time. De Gaulle never performed minimally in any role he assumed. In some respects his lack of compromise may be interpreted as a lack of flexibility. However, de Gaulle's realism did result in some of the same types of change that would have resulted from compromise.

The "active-negative" variation is personally ambitious, with compulsive characters and perfectionistic consciences. Politics performs an ego-defensive function for these individuals. As we have seen in Chapter 3 above, de Gaulle's political activities must be viewed as examples of his realistic approach in the political arena. His view of international politics and the changes he did make in his political behavior negates such a view. He had two

opportunities to take dictatorial power and each time refused it. He never made use of France. His political roles contributed little in personal wealth. Even the proceeds from his Memoirs went to charities or the parish church at Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises.

Barber has elaborated these basic categories further in analyzing the American Presidency. He found it expedient to consider an individual's expressiveness or rhetoric, how he conducts the business of political office, and what personal relations exist.

We have seen that de Gaulle's rhetoric was usually serious and full of the abstract concepts of his personal philosophy, many borrowed from Maurras and Barres. The business of his Presidency was conducted with the disciplinarian orientation and organization he had learned in the military. The presidential staff was greatly expanded during his tenure to include dozens of highly skilled political counselors and high civil servants whose primary duty was to summarize reports and develop position papers. De Gaulle rarely concerned himself with the details of governmental decisions. Perhaps an episode as early as 1924 best demonstrates de Gaulle's staff technique. The Commanding Colonel of a field battle exercise asked the young de Gaulle where "the baggage train of the left-hand regiment of your right-hand division" was during the maneuver. De Gaulle asked his Chief of Staff to answer the question,

wherein the annoyed Colonel pointedly stated that the question was directed at de Gaulle. De Gaulle's answer then held true during his later political tenures. He replied:

> Colonel, you gave me the responsibilities of an army commander. If I had also assumed those of my subordinates I should not have been able adequately to fulfill my mission. De minimis non curat Praetor. The law does not concern itself with small matters. Chateauvieux, please reply to the colonel.[1]

Although he worked primarily with those he himself had appointed or nominated, there were few intimate personal relationships during his tenure. After all, as President he personified the French Nation. He once noted that although "a man may have friendships, a nation never. . .don't forget that our allies are also our adversaries."[2]

In all, de Gaulle was a true-to-life representation of one of Andre Malraux' figures, "characterized by a need for grandeur, a feeling of tragic loneliness, and a constant power of will and disdain."[3] This is evidenced in his personality, his philosophy, and his political style, and is not contrary to French tradition.

---

[1]Quoted in Lacouture, De Gaulle, pp. 26-7.

[2]Tournoux, Sons of France: Petain and De Gaulle, p. 145.

[3]Serfaty, SAIS, pp. 15-21.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Political leadership is a complex, multi-dimensional field of study that is rapidly growing and theoretically immature. In the United States, studies have traditionally resulted in an areal concentration on "shared" or "group" power to the general neglect of academic efforts directly researching "individual" leadership. Yet the crisis-centered orientation of contemporary governments and the continuing centralization of executive power make those factors traditionally characterized as individual "personality" of prime consideration in understanding international political behavior. Although studied by more and more social scientists, what has been termed herein as personal/positive individual leadership and its variables has not yet achieved recognition as a field of specialization, either in political science or as an interdisciplinary endeavor.

The basic proposition of this dissertation has been that until such specialization occurs, an essential part of our science suffers. The ability to go beyond merely explaining events to prediction, that is, theorizing on general tendencies and probable trends, is notably lacking. For such endeavors, this study has advocated an eclectic construct, a multi-methodological approach combining often opposing theoretical directions plus intuitive considerations. Necessarily

such an unorthodox means requires a critical consideration of both the methodologies available, their inherent problems, and the volume of material on this one leader, Charles de Gaulle. This particular leader not only governed France, but his attitudes, beliefs, values, and habits are reflected in the institutionalized structure of political France under the Fifth Republic. Yet his "operational code," as that of other major political leaders, has been neglected.

In many respects this study has been an innovative application of the more popular decision-making approach. That is, the "situation" of decision-making analysis is viewed as shaped primarily by the values of the individual decision-maker. Goal-choice then is bound inextricably to the political psychology of the individual. Applied to an incumbent chief foreign policy maker of a nation-state, predicting aspects of "international" behavior during a particular political tenure is possible (See Chapter I above). Unfortunately, the potential breadth of this study is more conducive to the collegiate research of "pure" behavioral studies than doctoral exercises by any <u>one</u> individual. This factor becomes more poignant when the leader being researched not only is removed from power but dies, thereby making "prediction" a moot construct. However, de Gaulle's Republic "lives," as does the applicability of our method to other political leaders, however emphemeral their tenures.

All political ideas and styles are ultimately "culture-bound" or culture-relative and thus impose limitations or mores on a leader in his political decision-making processes (See Chapter II above). Cultural variations or general social forces then produce different foreign policies by setting boundaries for the individual's overt behavior. We have explored the explicit influence of the French concept of le foyer, reinforced in the classical Roman Catholic educational system. In this, de Gaulle was not so different than his contemporary countrymen. He too was socialized in, and rarely deviated from,the French cultural norms that emphasize privateness, dyadic relationships, externalization of conflict through verbalization, self-control and discipline, and the "golden mean" of balance or harmony of extremes. This balance is reflected as a need for order and is evident in the constant search for stability, permanence, moderation, equilibrium, and resistance to the total implications of the machine age. In this search, the French seek the leadership of complex statesmen-personalities, older men who in their political style can best be described as authoritarian-laden intellectuals well-versed in Cartesian thought patterns.

These cultural variables, combined with the experiences of his individual life, help account for many of the peculiarities of de Gaulle's thought and political action (See Chapter III above). For once established, an individual's

personality and values remain stable during his adult life. Aspects of de Gaulle's personality and motives for his quest for political power were analyzed by using Abraham Maslow's schema. That is, individual motivations are viewed as changing patterns of basic human drives: physiological, security or safety, affection and belongingness, self/social esteem and self-actualization. Charles de Gaulle was a Self-Actualizing individual, motivated to political power by the early inculcation of such cultural values as order, self-respect, honor, integrity or truth and fidelity. He was not, therefore, a power-compensatory creature. The character traits he brought to his political role included erudition, prescience, linguistics, tenacity of purpose and a unique conscious division of his personality into de Gaulle the "person" and de Gaulle the "personage."

The main ideas of de Gaulle's individual theory or thought, his world images, affected the way he behaved and help explain his political actions (See Chapter IV above). A Cartesian by training and a Bergsonian realist by choice de Gaulle's thought incorporates a sense of history seen as a series of struggles and wars that preclude absolutes, including the existence of any absolute truth. International relations understandably are seen as part of a violent universe in need of order and balance. This "order" is obtainable through his "great plan," actuated by that ultimate virtue, action. This "trait" is important not only

for the "common" individual but the nation-state personified in the Hero-Leader or President. An analysis of selections selections from his speeches and writings reflects the consistency of de Gaulle's major thought-concepts. Unfortunately, political style often obscured the rationality of this thought.

How de Gaulle did things, how he responded to the demands of a political role, constitute his leadership style (See Chapter V above). An active-positive President by Barber's typology, de Gaulle's essential rituals included the expert use of press conferences, the revival of the Bonapartist plebiscite as the referendum, and employing the Restricted Councils as a parallel government. In responding to the demands of his political role, de Gaulle consciously and actively employed an expert command of the French language, an aura of mystery, and an overabundance of intransigence as means to his ultimate goal of reforming the French State during and after the periods when he personified the French Nation.

Given his cultural background, personality and experiences, personal philosophy, and political style, what in a general sense could be expected in French foreign policy during de Gaulle's political tenure was done. Indeed it would appear that present French policy still reflects de Gaullism at its best and worse. The keystone of this policy is the overwhelming importance of a powerful independent

French State in a chaotic universe characterized by an unstable international system dominated by the United States and U.S.S.R. To maintain State stability, it is necessary to have an established continuity, prestige, and security keyed on bilateral alliances. But foreign policy makers must also consider that world progress or evolution is an inevitable, self-evident fact. As there is constant change in parts of the whole, the universe, there must be a coherent wholeness to international relationships. Change signifies action, requiring the endless adjusting of means. Thus a French foreign policy does not exist. There is only the continuity of the national interest verbalized by the French President at any particular time. It is the President's duty to employ elementary common sense in a deliberately negative political style. That is, an uncooperating demeanor plus a lapse in time results in change in the decisional circumstances. The French leader may then exercise his powers at the optimum time as he perceives it. In this respect French leadership determines the situation by employing this wait-and-see attitude. That is, prevailing social and political forces are recognized, but dealt with only after some delay and then on a leader's own terms. This is evident not only during de Gaulle's tenure but in that of the subsequent two leaderships.

Our analysis of de Gaulle concludes that in his case political leadership was an individual attribute or trait. Indeed what may best be termed the "call to

destiny" appears at this rough research stage to be a universal trait of the personal/positive political leadership of individuals like de Gaulle, Churchill and Roosevelt. It would also appear that a possible correlation between physical and mental traits or abilities and political leadership role-taking exists. For example, so-called "Great Men" of Europe have tended to be "non-average" physically. There seems to be something that sets the individual apart from his peers during early childhood. In calling attention to this characteristic, such as de Gaulle's unusual height, an initial opportunity to take advantage of the spotlight for exercising leadership exists. Being viewed by others as "different" and then acting as a leader appears to permit the early development of leadership abilities. Interestingly, this development seems to occur more readily in those Europeans who have literary, philosophical, or arts backgrounds rather than the American leadership norm which emphasizes lawyers and businessmen.

Another conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that in considering the basic factors in world politics--the forces of ideologies, economics, and the "power of individuals"--de Gaulle represents the latter. True, ideologies or economics in various guises may provide the <u>means</u> to a political leadership position. But once established in a political role, the power of the individual

constitutes the greater force. As such, "great" individuals exert considerable influence even to the point of being able to "change" the course of history. France without de Gaulle would be radically different today. She would no doubt be a third-rate world power rather than merely the second-rate power he made her. More important, however, without de Gaulle France would have been occupied by American and British military forces after World War II, a factor that would have altered the course of French history and possibly the map of Europe. De Gaulle's historical influence is evident also in the events of 1958 returning him to political power. Had he not been available, France would probably have turned to military government and all that entails. Whether indeed the institutionalization of his leadership survives in toto does not preclude this importance.

It is hoped that the theoretical shallowness necessitated by the breadth this study sought to incorporate has not obscured a vital point. That is, it is now time to extend our research from the necessary studies of voting behavior or political attitudes of political leaders to the consideration of the individual as an independent element in all political systems. Even given the boundaries or restrictions of personal privacies and the fear of "Big Brotherhood," the state of our discipline would permit exhustive studies of the six to twelve potential leaders in

all contemporary nation-states. In essence, such a task would bring together many areas of political leadership study, necessarily in collegiate and computer analysis. Until such an unlikely time when all Presidential aspirants are screened and monitored for their individual "mental health," social scientists are left with less than perfect ways to study our leaders and their political behavior.

APPENDIX

Major Events in de Gaulle's Life

1890 - Born in Lille, France on November 22, 1890.
1894 - Dreyfus case.
1903 - Organized a troop of Scouts.
1909 - Entered St. Cyr Military Academy, drafted for one year as an ordinary soldier with 33rd Inf. Regiment at Arras.
1910 - Two years at St. Cyr, among first ten in class.
1912 - Second Lieutenant under Petain at Arras.
1913 - Promoted to First Lieutenant.
1914 - World War I, wounded at Dinant, Belgium frontier, promoted to Captain.
1915 - Wounded at Champagne.
1916 - Wounded at Verdun, captured by Germans, Legion of Honor "Posthumously."
1916 - 1918 Prisoner of War
1919 - Freed, active combatant then military college instructor in Poland, promoted to Major by Poles.
1921 - Assistant Professor of Military History at Saint Cyr, married Yvonne Vendroux as French Captain.
1922 - Entered War College, Paris.
1924 - Published first book, Discord Among the Enemy.
1925 - Personal staff of Staff Marshall Petain.
1927 - Lecturer at War College, Army of Occupation in Rhineland, promoted to Major.
1928 - Commanding Officer Light Infantry Battalion at Trier.
1930 - On General Secretariat of Ministry of National Defense, two years in Middle East.
1932 - Edge of the Sword published, Conseil Superieur de Defense Nationale for five years.
1933 - Lieutenant Colonel.
1934 - Army of the Future published.
1935 - Campaign for an Armored Corps.
1936 - The Popular Front.
1937 - Commanding Officer tank regiment at Metz.
1938 - Published France and Her Army, joined Catholic leftist club.
1939 - Commanding Officer 5th Army Tanks.
1940 - Colonel, 4th Division Armored. To London: formed French National Committee then Free France to manage public affairs of Free France, Brigadier General, temporary rank. Had been Under Secretary of State for War and National Defense in Paul Reynauld Cabinet.
1943 - Co-President with Giraud of Comité Francais de Liberation Nationale, which became Provisional Government of France.
1944 - Brazzaville: foundations of future French Community. Liberation of Paris on August 25, 1944.
1945 - Confirmed by Constituent Assembly as Head of Government.
1946 - Resigns, retires to Colombey-les-deux-eglises, makes Bayeux speech.

1947 - Founded Rally of the French People.
1951 - Partial success of RPF, de Gaulle withdrew from public life.
1954 - Volume I of Memoirs published. Dien Bien Phu falls.
1956 - Algerian rebellion becomes full scale war.
1956 - 1957 - Traveled abroad.
1958 - Army assumed authority in Algeria and Corsica, becomes Prime Minister and goes to Algeria, September 28, 1958: Fifth Republic instituted.
1959 - President of Republic, self-determination to Algeria.
1960 - First atomic bomb in Sahara.
1961 - "Putsch" of Generals in Algeria.
1962 - Referendum for election of Chief of State by universal suffrage.
1964 - Recognition of Communist China. Evian Agreement.
1965 - Elected President of Republic by universal suffrage, first western Head of State to visit Russia.
1966 - "Quits" NATO.
1968 - Student and Worker Revolt.
1969 - Referendum on Reform Bill for regional government fails, de Gaulle resigns.
1970 - November 9, de Gaulle dies at Colombey, last volume of Memoirs published.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Acomb, Evelyn M. and Brown, Marvin L. Jr. (eds.). French Society and Culture Since the Old Regime. The Eluterian Mills Coloquium, 1964, for the Society for French Historical Studies and the Societe d'Histoire Moderne. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1966.

Adenauer, Konrad. Memoirs. Translated by Beate Ruhm von Oppenheimer. Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1966.

Adler, A. Understanding Human Nature. New York: Fawcett World Library, 1969. (orig. 1927).

Adorno T. W., Frankel-Brunswik, E., Levinson,D.J. and Sanford, R. N. The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper, 1950.

Aglion, Raoul. The Fighting French. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1943.

Allport, Gorden. Personality: A Psychological Interpretation. New York: H. Holt & Co., 1937.

Almond, Gabriel and Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1963.

Ambler, John S. The Government and Politics of France. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1971.

Andrews, William George. French Politics and Algeria: The Process of Policy Formation: 1954-1962. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962.

Apter, David E. (ed.) Ideology and Discontent. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1964.

Ardagh, Joh. The New French Revolution. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.

Aron, Raymond. and Heckscher, August. A Diversity of Worlds: France and the United States Look at their Common Problems. New York: Reynal & Co., 1954.

_____. France: The New Republic. New York: Fund for the Republic, 1960.

_____. France: Steadfast and Changing, the Fourth to the Fifth Republic. Translated by J. Irwin and Luigi Einaudi. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.

_____. The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:Prentice-Hall, 1974.

_____. On War. Translated by Terence Kilmartin. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1959.

_____. Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations. Garden City, N. J.:Doubleday, 1966.

_____. Social Structure and the Ruling Class. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950.

Aron, Robert. An Explanation of De Gaulle. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.

_____. As Others See Us: The United States Through Foreign Eyes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.

_____. De Gaulle Before Paris: The Liberation of France: June-August, 1944. Translated by Humprey Hare. London: Putnam, 1962.

_____. Histoire de la Liberation de France. Paris: Librarie Artheme Fayard, 1959.

_____. The Vichy Regime. Translated by Humphrey Hare. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1958.

D'Astier, de la Vigerie Emmanuel. Sept Fois, Sept Jours. Paris: de Minuit, 1947.

Auburtin, Jean. Charles de Gaulle. Paris: Les Editions Universelles, 1944.

Barber, J. David. The Lawmakers. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965.

_____. The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1972.

Barres, Philippe. Charles de Gaulle. Paris: Plon Cartier, 1941 and London: Hachette, 1941.

Barsalou, Joseph. La Mal Aimee: Histoire de la IVe Republique. Paris: Plon, 1964.

Barzun, Jacques. The French Race. New York: Columbia University Press, 1932.

Beck, Carl and McKechnie, J. Thomas. Political Elites: A Select and Computerized Bibliography. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1968.

Becker, Carl L. The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.

Beloff, Norma. The General Says No. London: Penguin, 1963.

Bendix, Reinhard and Berger, Bennet in Gross, Llewellyn (ed.). Symposium on Sociological Theory. New York: Harper & Row, 1959.

Benedict, Ruth. The Chrysanthemum and the Sword. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1946.

_____. Patterns of Culture. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1934.

Bloch, Pierre. Charles de Gaulle, Premier Ouvrier de France. Paris: Fasquelle Editeurs, 1945.

Blondel, Jean and Godfrey, E. Drexel Jr. The Government of France. 3d ed. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1968.

Bloom, B. S. Stability and Change in Human Characteristics. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964.

Blum, Leon. Nasissance de la IVeme. Paris: Albin Michel, 1958.

Bodley, John E. C. France. New and Revised Edition. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1899.

Bonheur, Gaston. Charles de Gaulle. Paris: Gallimard, 1958.

Bosworth, William. Catholicism and Crisis in Modern France. Princeton University Press, 1962.

Bottomore, Thomas. Elites and Society. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1965.

Boulding, Kenneth E. The Image. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1956.

Bourdan, Pierre. Le Général de Gaulle, Serviteur de la France. Paris: Tallandier, 1945.

Brinton, Crane. The Americans and the French. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

Brogan, D. W. French Personalities and Problems. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946.

Bromberger, M. Le Destin Secret de M. Pompidou. Paris: 1965.

Bryant, Arthur. Triumph in the West: a History of the war years based on the diarieis of Field Marshall Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Garden City, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952.

Buchanan, W., Cantril, He. How Nations See Each Other. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1953.

Bullock, Alan with Hargrove, Erwin. Hitler: A Study in Tyranny. New York: Harper & Row,1962.

Burgess, Philip M. Elites Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1967.

Burns, James McGregor. Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1956.

Cairns, John C. France. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965.

Cantril, H. Human Nature and the Political System. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1961.

Capitant, Rene. De Gaulle dans la Republique. Paris: Plon, 1958.

Carlyle, Thomas. On Heroes, Hero Worship and the Heroic in History. Edited by Archibald MacMechan. Boston: The Athenaeum Press, 1901.

Carmony, Guy de. Foreign Policies of France: 1944-68. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.

Carroll, Joseph T. The French: How They Live and Work. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.

Cass, Donald P. How to Win Votes and Influence Elections. Chicago: Public Administrative Service, 1962.

Catlin,E. George. Science and Method of Politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927.

Cattaui, Georges. Charles de Gaulle, l'homme et son destin. Paris: Universitaires, 1956.

Chapsal, Jacques. La Vie Politique en France depuis 1940. Paris: Press Universitaires de France, 1966.

Christoph, James B. (ed.). Cases in Comparative Politics. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965.

Churchill, Winston. The Second World War. Vol. III. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1953.

Clark, Stanley. The Man Who is France: The Story of General Charles de Gaulle. Revised Edition. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1963.

Cohen, Morris R. The Meaning of Human History. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Pub. Co., 1947.

Colette Capitan-Peter. Charles Maurras et l'ideologie d'Action francaise. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972.

Crawley, Adrian. De Gaulle: A Biography. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1969.

Crozier, Brian. De Gaulle. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973.

Curtius, Ernst R. The Civilization of France. New York: Vintage Books, 1932.

Dahl, Robert A. Who Governs: Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1961.

Dahrendorf, Ralf. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Sanford: Sanford University Press, 1959.

Davies, J. C. Human Nature in Politics. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1963.

Dell, R. My Second Country, France. New York: John Lane, 1920.

DeGrazia, S. The Political Community, a Study of Anomie. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948.

Deutsch, Karl W. The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control. New York: The Free Press, 1963.

De Madariaga, Salvador. Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards: An Essay in Comparative Psychology. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1928.

DePorte, A. W. De Gaulle's Foreign Policy:1944-46. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

DeRivera, Joseph H. The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Pub. Co., 1968.

Descartes. The Philosophical Works of Descartes. Translated by Elizabeth Haldane and G. R. To Ross. n.p.:Peter Smith Pub., 1931.

Dragnich, Alex N. and Rasmussen, Jorgen. Major European Governments. Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1974.

Duijker, Hubertus C. J. and Frijda, N. H. National Character and National Stereotypes: A Trend Report Prepared for the International Union of Scientific Psychology. UNESCO: The Netherlands, Amsterdam, North-Holland Pub. Co., 1960.

Durant, Will and Ariel. The Story of Civilization: The Age of Voltaire. New York. Simon and Schuster, 1965.

Duroselle, Goguel. France: Change and Tradition. Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press, 1963.

Durkheim, Emile. Suicide: A Study in Sociology. Translated by John A. Spauling and George Simpson. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951.

Durverger, Maurice. The French Political System. Translated by Barbara and Robert North. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.

Easton, David. A Framework for Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1965.

_____. The Political System. New York: Knopf, 1953.

_____. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley, 1965.

Eckstein, H. A Theory of Stable Democracy. Princeton University:Center of International Stuides, 1961.

Edelman, Murray. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964.

Edinger, Lewis. Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior. Stanford, Calif.:Stanford University Press, 1965.

_____(ed.) Political Leadership in Industrial Societies: Studies in Comparative Analysis. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967.

Ehrmann, Henry W. Politics in France. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968.

Erikson, Erik. Childhood and Society. 2d ed. rev. New York: Norton, 1963.

_____. Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History. New York: W. W. Norton, 1958.

Eulau, Heinz. Micro-Macro Political Analysis: Accents of Inquiry. Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co., 1969.

Fabre-Luce, Alfred. Le Couronnement du Prince. Paris: Table Ronde, 1964.

Farber, Martin (ed.). Philosophic Thought in France and the United States: Essays Representing Major Trends in Contemporary French and American Philosophy. Albany, New York: State University of New York, 1950.

Farrell, R. Barry (ed.). Approaches to Comparative and International Politics. Evanston:New York Univesity Press, 1966.

Flower, J. E. (ed.). France Today. 2d ed. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1973.

Force, George T. and Slik, Jack R. Van Der. Theory and Research in the Study of Political Leadership. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University, 1969. Public Affairs Research Bureau.

Freud, Sigmund and Bullitt, W. C. Thomas Woodrow Wilson: A Psychological Study. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967.

Frigugletti, James and Kennedy, Emmet (ed.). The Shaping of Modern France: Writings on French History since 1715. London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1969.

Fromm, Eric. Escape from Freedom. New York: Farrer & Rinehart, 1941.

Funk, Arthur Layton. Charles de Gaulle: The Crucial Years: 1943-44. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959.

Furniss, Edgar Stephenson. France, Troubled Ally: de Gaulle's Heritage and Prospects. New York: Harper Pub. Co. for the Council on Foriegn Relations, 1960.

_____. France under de Gaulle. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1960.

_____. De Gaulle and the French Army: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations. New York: 20th Century Fund, 1964.

_____. The Office of the Premier in French Foreign Policy Making: An Application of Decision-Making Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Foreign Policy Analysis Series No. 5, 1954.

_____. Weakness in French Foreign Policy-Making. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Center of International Studies, Memorandum No. 5, 1954.

Galante, Pierre. The General. New York: Random House, 1968.

Gaulle, Charles de (uncle). Les Celtes au dix-neuvieme siecle. Paris: E. Grimaud, 1864.

Gaulle, Charles André Joseph Marie de. (by publication date)
_____. La discorde chez l'ennemi. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1924.

_____. Au fil de l'epee. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1932. Translated as The Edge of the Sword by Gerard Hopkins. New York: Criterion Books, Inc., 1960.

_____. La France et son armee. Paris: Plon, 1938. Translated as France and Her Army by T. L. Dash. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1945.

_____. Vers l'armee de metier. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1934. Translated as The Army of the Future. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1941.

_____.Discours et messages 1940-46. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1946. Translated as Speeches by Shelia Mathieu and William G. Corp. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1946.

_____. La France sera la France. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1947.

_____. Memoires de guerre. Paris: Plon, 1954, 1955, 1959. Translated as War Memoirs: L'Appel(Call to Honor). New York: Viking Press, 1956; L'Unite (Unity). New York: Simon & Schuster, 1959; Le Salut (Salvation). New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960. Documents. 3 Vols. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960-70.Translator Richard Howard.

_____. Oeuvres. I, II. Paris: Club francais des bibliophiles, Visaphone, 1962-3.

_____.de Gaulle Parle:1958-62. Edited by Passeron, Andre. Paris: Plon, 1962.

_____._____:1962-68. Edited by Passeron, Andre. Paris: Plon, 1968.

_____. The Fifth Plan, 1966-70. New York: French Embassy, Press and Information Service, 1966.

_____. Presence en Normandie: Discours et Allocutions: 1944-67. ed. Jean-Yves Roy. Paris: Librarie Plon, n.p.

_____. Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle. New York: French Embassy, Press and Information Division, 1959-1969.

_____. Trois Etudes Precedees du Memorandum du 26 Janvier 40. Avant-Propose de L. Nachin. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1945; Plon, 1971.

_____ and Stalin. Les entretiens de Gaulle-Staline. Paris: Recherches internationales a la lumiere du marxisme, 1959.

(Genet), Janet Flanner. Paris Journal, 2 vols. Edited by William Shawn. New York: Atheneum, 1965 and 1971.

George, Alexander L. "The Operational Code:" A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making. The Rand Corporation, Memorandum RM-5427-PR. September, 1967.

_____ and George, Juliette L. Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study. New York: John Day, 1956.

Girard, Alain (ed.) La reussite social en France: ses caracteres, ses lois, ses effets. Paris: Press Universitaires de France, 1961.

Glad, Betty. Political Leaders and Decision Making. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1967.

Goble, Frank G. The Third Force: The Psychology of Abraham Maslow. New York: Grossman Pubs., 1970.

Goerner, E. A. (ed.). Democracy in Crisis: New Challenges to Constitutional Democracy in the Atlantic Area. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971.

Gorer, Geoffrey The American People: A Study in National Character. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1948.

_____. Exploring English Character. New York: Criterion Books, 1955.

_____. The Concept of National Character. Penguin Books, Middlesex, England: Harmondsworth, 1950.

Gorce, Paul-Marie de la. De Gaulle entre deux mondes. Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1964.

Gottfried, Alexander. Boss Cermak of Chicago: A Study of Political Leadership. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962.

Gouldner, Alvin W. (ed.). Studies in Leadership. New York: Harper & Bros., 1950.

Gramont, Sanche de. The French: Portrait of a People. New York: Putnam's Sons, 1969.

Greenstein, Fred I. Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference and Conceptualization. Chicago: Markham Pub. Co., 1969.

Grinnel-Milne, Duncan. The Triumph of Integrity: A Portrait of Charles de Gaulle. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1962.

Grosser, Alfred. French Foreign Policy under de Gaulle. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967.

Guerard, Albert. France: A Modern History. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1959.

Hanna, Willard A. Eight Nation Makers: Southeast Asia's Charismatic Statesmen. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964.

Hargrove, Erwin. Presidential Leadership: Personality and Political Style. New York: MacMillan, 1966.

_____. Professional Roles in Society and Government: The English Case. Sage Professional Paper, Comparative Politics Series, Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr, eds. Beverly Hills, 1972.

Harrity, Richard and Martin, Ralph G. Man of Destiny: de Gaulle of France. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961.

Hatch, Alden. The de Gaulle Nobody Knows: An Intimate Biography of Charles de Gaulle. New York: Hawthorne Books, 1960.

Hemphill, John J. Situational Factors in Leadership. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University, 1949.

Hegel, Georg. Philosophy of History. Translated by J. Sibree. London: Bell, 1905.

Hermann, Charles F. CREON: A Foreign Events Data Set. Sage Professional Papers in International Studies, April, 1974.

Hoffmann, Stanley, Kindleberger, Charles P., Wylie, Lawrence, Pitts, Jesse R., Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste, Goguel, Francois. In Search of France. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963.

Holsti, Ole R. Crisis Escalation War. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972.

Hopkins, Raymond F. and Mansbach, Richard W. Structure and Process in International Politics. New York: Harper & Row, 1973.

Hook, Sidney. The Hero in History: A Study in Limitation and Possibility. New York: John Day, 1943.

John-Stevas, Norman St. Walter Bagehot. Indiana: n.p., 1959.

Knutson, Jeanne N.(ed.) Handbook of Political Psychology. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1973.

_____. The Human Basis of the Polity: A Psychological Study of Political Men. Chicago: Aldine, 1972.

Kardiner, Abram. The Individual and his Society. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.

Kateb, George. Political Theory: Its Nature and Uses. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968.

Kelman, Herbert C. International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965.

Kiell, N. Psychological Studies of Famous Americans. New York: Twayne, 1964.

Klineberg, Otto and Lambert, Wallace E. International Commission for a History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind. UNESCO, 1962.

Knorr, Klaus and Rosenau, James N. (ed.). Contending Approaches to International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969.

Kohn, Hans. Making of the Modern French Mind. New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1955.

Kornhauser, A. (ed.). Problems of Power in American Democracy. Detroit: Wayne State University, 1957.

Kulski, W. W. De Gaulle and the World: The Foreign Policy of the 5th Republic. New York: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1966.

Lacouture, Jean. De Gaulle. Translated by Francis K. Price. London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1966.

Lambert, Wallace and Klineberg, Otto. Children's Views of Foreign Peoples: A Cross National Study. New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1967.

Lane, Robert E. Political Thinking and Consciousness: The Private Life of the Political Mind. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969.

_____. Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does. New York: Free Press, 1962.

Lasswell, Harold D. Power and Personality. New York:Norton, 1948.

_____. Psychopathology and Politics. New York: Viking, 1970.

_____. and Kaplan, Abraham.Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.

_____, Leites, N., and Rothwell, C. Easton. The Comparative Study of Elites: An Introduction and Bibliography. Stanford, Calif.:Stanford University Press, 1952.

Launay, J. de. De Gaulle and his France: A Psychopolitical and Historical Portrait of Charles de Gaulle. Translated by Dorothy Albertyn. New York: The Julian Press, Inc., 1968.

Leites, Nathan Constantin. On the Game of Politics in France. Stanford, Calif.:Stanford University Press, 1959.

_____. The Rules of the Game in Paris. Translated by Derek Coltman. Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1966.

_____. The Operational Code of the Politburo. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951.

Lerche, Charles O. Jr. and Said, Abdul A. Concepts of International Politics. 2d ed. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970.

Levi-Strauss, Claude. Les structures elementaires de la parente. Paris: Press Universitaires de France, 1949.

Linton, Ralph. The Cultural Background of Personality. New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1945.

_____. The Science of Man in the World Crisis. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945.

Leuthy, Herbert. France Against Herself: A Perceptive Study of France's Past, Her Politics and Her Unending Crises. New York: Praeger, 1955.

Lewis, John Wilson (ed.). Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

Lindsey, Gardner (ed.). Handbook of Social Psychology, II. Cambridge, Mass.:Addison-Wesley, 1954.

Lowry, Richard J. (ed.) Dominance, Self-Esteem, Self-Actualization: Germinal Papers of A. H. Maslow. Monterey, Calif.:Brooks/Cole Pub. Co., 1973.

Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. Translated by Luigi Ricci. Revised by E. R. P. Vincent. Introduction by Christian Gauss. New York: The New American Library, 1952.

Macridis, Roy C. (ed.). De Gaulle:Implaccable Ally. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1966.

Malraux, Andre. Antimemoires. Paris:Gallimard, 1967.

_____. Felled Oaks: Conversation with de Gaulle. Translated by Irene Clephane. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971.

Madariaga, Salvador de. Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards: An Essay in Comparative Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1928.

Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949.

McHale, John. The Future of the Future. New York: George Braziller, 1969.

Marcus, John T. Neutralism and Nationalism in France: a Case Study. New York: Bookman Assoc., 1958.

Maritain, Jacques. Man and State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.

Martin, Kingsley. The Rise of French Liberal Thought: A Study of Political Ideas from Bayle to Condorcet. New York: New York University Press, 1954.

Maslow, Abraham. Farther Reaches of Human Nature. New York: Viking Press, 1971.

_____. Motivation and Personality. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.

_____. New Knowledge in Human Values. New York: Harper, 1959.

_____. Toward a Psychology of Being. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1968.

_____. Religions, Values, and Peak-Experiences. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964.

_____. Toward a Psychology of Being. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1968.

_____. The Security-Insecurity Inventory. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952.

_____. Eupsychian Management. Homewood, Ill.:R. D. Irwin, 1965.

_____. Psychology of Science. New York: Harper and Row, 1966.

Mauriac, Francois. De Gaulle. Garden City: Doubleday, 1966.

Mayer, J. P. Political Thought in France from Sieves to Sorel. London: Faber & Faber, 1948.

Mazlish, Bruce. In Search of Nixon: A Psychological Inquiry. Basic Books, Inc., 1972.

McFarland, Andrew S. Power and Leadership in Pluralist Systems. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969.

Mead, Margaret and Wolfenstein, Martha. (eds.). Childhood in Contemporary Cultures. Chicago: Univ. of Chiago Press, 1955.

_____. and Metraux, Rhoda (eds.). The Study of Culture at a Distance. Chicago: Univ. of Chiago Press, 1953.

_____. _____. Themes in French Culture: A Preface to a Study of French Community. Stanford: The Hoover Institute and Library on War, Revolution and Peace: Stanford Univ. Press, 1954. Hoover Institute Studies Series D: Communities, No. 1 April, 1954.

Mill, J. S. A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive. London:Longmans, Green & Co., 1936.

Muret, Charlotte Touzalin. French Royalist Doctrines Since The Revolution. New York: Columbia Univ. Press,n.p.

Muselier, Emile Henri Desire. De Gaulle contre le Gaullisme. Paris: Editions du Chene, 1946.

Nachin, Lucien. Charles de Gaulle, General de France. Paris: Editions Colbert, 1944.

Newhouse, John. De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons. New York: Viking, 1970.

Noonan, Lowell G. France: The Politics of Continuity in Change. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1970.

Northrop, Filmer Stuart Cuckow. The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities. New York: Meridian Books, 1959.

Nourissier, Francois. The French. Translated by Adrienne Foulke. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968.

Organski, A. F. K. World Politics. New York: Knopf, 1958.

Padbury, Peter and Wilkins, Diane. The Future: A Bibliography of Issues and Forecasting Techniques. Ontario 2000-Alternative Futures, April, 1972.

Padover, Saul K. French Institutions: Values and Politics. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954.

Paige, Glenn D. (ed.). Political Leadership: Readings for an Emerging Field. New York: The Free Press, 1972.

_____. The Study of Political Leadership. New York: The Free Press, forthcoming.

Parry, Geraint. Political Elites. New York: Praeger, 1970.

Passy, Colonel (A.E.V. Dewavrin). Souvenirs,I. Paris: Raoul Solar, 1947.

Peguy. Situations. Paris: Galliard, 1940.

Pickles, Dorothy. The Fifth French Republic. 3rd ed. New York: Praeger, 1966.

_____. The Uneasy Entente: French Foreign Policy and Franco-British Misunderstandings. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1966.

Pierce , Roy. Contemporary French Political Thought. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1966.

_____. French Politics and Political Institutions. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.

Piaget, Jean. The Moral Judgment of the Child. Translated by Marjorie Gabain. New York: Free Press, Macmillan, 1965.

Plamenatz, John. Ideology. New York: Praeger, 1970.

Pye, Lucian W. Aspects of Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966.

_____. Politics, Personality and Nation Building. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.

Redfield, Robert. The Little Community and Peasant Society and Culture. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1956.

_____. Tepoztlan, A Mexican Village: A Study of Folk Life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930.

Remond, Rene. The Right Wing in France from 1815 to de Gaulle. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1966.

Revel, Jean-Francois. The French. Translated by Paula Spurlin. New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1966.

Reynaud, Paul. La Politique etrangere du Gaullisme. New York: The Odyssey Press, 1964.

Richelieu, Armand Jean du Plessis. Political Testament: the Significant Chapters and Supporting Selections. Translated by Henry B. Hill. Madison:University of Wisconsin Press, 1961.

Rokeach, Milton. The Open and Closed Mind: Investigations Into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems. New York: Basic Books, 1960.

Rosenau, James N. The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy. New York: The Free Press, 1971.

_____. (ed.). Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems. New York: The Free Press, 1969.

Rosseau, Jean Jacques. A Lasting Peace Through the Federation of Europe and the State of War. Translated by C. E. Vaugh. London: Constable, n.p.

Rustow, Dankwart A. Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership. New York: n.p., 1970.

Rogow, Arnold A. James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics and Policy. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1963.

Sabine, George. A History of Political Theory. 1st ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1937.

Schoenbrun, David. The Three Lives of Charles de Gaulle. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966.

Schonfeld, William R. Youth and Authority in France: A Study of Secondary Schools. Sage:Beverly Hills, 1971.

Serfaty, Simon. France, de Gaulle and Europe: The Policy of the Fourth and Fifth Republics Toward the Continent. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968.

Siegfried, Andre. France: A Study in Nationality. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930.

Singer, David J. (ed.). Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1967.

Seignobos, Charles. The Evolution of the French People. Translated by Catherine A. Phillips. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1932.

Sevan-Schreiber, J. J. The American Challenge. New York: Antheneum House, 1967.

Sidjanski, Dusan. Political Decision-Making Processes: Studies In National, Comparative and International Politics. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1973.

Smelser, Neil J. and Smelser, William T. (eds.). Personality and Social Systems. 2d ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1970.

Snyder, Richard C. Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.

Soltau, Roger Henry. French Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931.

Sorensen, Theodore. Kennedy. New York: Macmillan, 1965.

Spanier, John. Games Nations Play: Analyzing International Politics. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972.

Spitzer, Stephan P. (ed.) The Sociology of Personality: An Enduring Problem in Psychology. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1969.

Stagner, Ross. Psychological Aspects of International Conflict. Belmont, Calif.:Brooks-Cole Publishing Co., 1967.

Stein, M. R., Widich, A.J. and White, D.M. (eds.) Identity and Anxiety. New York: The Free Press, 1960.

Steward, John. Soldiers Against the State. New York: Anchor, 1968.

Tannenbaum, Edward R. The New France. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961.

Thompson, Robert Smith. Pledge to Destiny: Charles de Gaulle and the Rise of the Free French. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1974.

Thomson, Davis. Democracy in France since 1870. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.

_____. Two Frenchmen: Pierre Laval and Charles de Gaulle. London:Oxford University Press, 1951.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America. New York: Knopf, 1960.

Tournoux, J. R. Sons of France, Petain and De Gaulle. New York: Viking, 1966. Paris: Plon, 1964.

Tucker, Robert C. The Soviet Political Mind: Studies in Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change. New York: Praeger, 1963.

Tylor, Edward B. Primitive Culture. New York: Harper, 1958.

Van Dyke, Vernon. Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis. Stanford:Stanford University Press, 1962.

Viansson-Ponte, The King and his Court. New York: Houghton-Mifflin, n.p.

Viorst, Milton. Hostile Allies: Franklin D. Roosevelt and Charles de Gaulle. New York: Harper, 1965.

Wahl, Nicolas. The Fifth Republic: France's New Political System. New York: Random House, 1959.

Wallace, Anthony F. C. Culture and Personality. 2d ed. New York: RAndom House, 1970.

Warnock, G. J. English Philosophy Since 1900. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958.

Waterman, Harvey. Political Change in Contemporary France: The Politics of an Industrial Democracy. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Pub. Co., 1969.

Wheelwright, Philip. Heraclitus. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959.

Werth, Alexander. De Gaulle: A Political Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1966.

_____. La France depuis la Guerre, 1944-57. Paris: Gallimard, 1957.

_____. The De Gaulle Revolution. Lond: R. Hale, 1960.

White, Ralph K. Value Analysis: Nature and Use of the Method. Ann Arbor: Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, 1951.

Williams, Philip M. De Gaulle's Republic.London:Longmans, 1961.

_____. Crisis and Compromise:Politics in the Fourth Republic. New York: Anchor, 1964.

_____. French Politicians and Elections, 1951-69. New York: Anchor, 1970.

_____. The French Parliament: Politics in the Fifth Republic. New York: Praeger, 1968.

_____. and Harrison, Martin. Politics and Society in de Gaulle's Republic. London: Longman, 1971.

Willis, Frank Roy. France, Germany and the New Europe. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968.

Wilner, Ruth Ann. Theory and Strategies of Charismatic Leadership. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968.

Woodward, W. E. George Washington: The Image and the Man. New York: Boni & Liverwright, 1926.

Wolfenstein, E. Victor. The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi. Princeton:Princeton Univ.Press, 1967a.

_____ and Leites, Nathan. Motives: A Psychologial Study. Glencoe, Ill.:The Free Press, 1950.

Wylie, Laurence and Begue, Armand. Deux Villages. Paris: Anthropologie Structurale, 1958.

Periodicals

American Behavioral Scientist:
Greenstein, Fred I. "Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidnece, Inference, and Conceptualization, 11 (November-December, 1967):38-53.

Hanhardt, Arthur M. Jr., and Welsh, William A. "The Intellectuals-Politics Nexus: Studies Using a Biographical Technique," 7 (March 1964): 3-7

Prewitt, Kenneth. "From the Many are Chosen the Few," 13 (November/December 1969): 169-187.

Zeugler, Harmon and Dye, Thomas R. "Editors Note," 13 (November/December 1969): 167

Allport, G.W. "The Composition of Political Attitudes," American Sociological Review, 35(1930)" 220-38

Barber, J. David. "Adult Identity and Presidential Style: The Rhetorical Emphasis," Daedalus, 97(Summer 1968): 938-68

_____. "Classifying and Predicting Presidential Styles: Two Weak Presidents,: Journal of Social Issues, 24(Kuly 1968): 51-80.

Bolsford, Keith. "Gaullism and the Hemisphere," New Leader, 47(March 30,1964): 3-5

Boulding, K. "The Learning and Reality-Testing Process in the International System," Journal of International Affairs, 21(1967) : 1-5.

Brecher, Michael. "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 13(March): 75-101

Brown, Bernard. "Pressure Politics in the Fifth Republic," Jaurnal of Politics, 25 (August 1963), 509-15

Browning, R. and Jacob H. "Power Motivation," Public Opinion Quarterly, 28 (Spring 1964) : 75-90.

Burgess, W. Randolph. "The Economics and Political Consequences of General De Gaulle," Journal of Politics, 68 (December 1963): 537-47.

Burman, Thomas. "Britain, France and West Germany: The Changing Pattern of Their Relationships in Europe," Journal of International Affairs, 46 (April 1970): 269-79.

Carmony, Gy de. "The Last Year of de Gau-le's Foreign Policy," ~~Journal of Intern~~ational Affairs, 45 (July 1969): 424-35

Clifford, Vaughan, Michalina, "Some French Concepts of Elites," British Journal of Sociology, 11(December 1960), 319-31

Converse, P.E. ad Dupeux, G. "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," Political Science Quarterly, 26 (1962)" 1-23

Cook, T.I. "Democratic Psychology and a Democratic World Order," World Politics, 1 (July 1949): 553-64

D'Amoto, Anthony. "Psychological Constructs in Foreign Policy Prediction," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 11 (1967): 294-11

Dahl, Robert A. "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political Science Review, 52 (June 1958): 463-69

Davies, J.C. "A Note on Political Motivation," Western Political Qarterly, 11 (June 1959)" 410-16

Deutsch, Morton, Pepitone, Albert and Zander, Alvin. "Leadership in a Small Group," Social Issues, 4 (Spring) 31-40.

Eckstein, Harry. "Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry," American Political Science Review, 67 (December 1973): 1142-61.

Edinger, Lewis J. "Political Science and POlitical Biography: Reflections on the Study of Leaership," Journal of Politics 26 (May and August 1964): 423-39 and 648-76.

_____. and Searing, Donald D. "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inguiry," American Political Science Review, 61 (June 1967): 428-45.

Froman, Lewis Jr. "Personality and Political Socialization," Journal of Politics 23(May 1961): 341-52.

George, Alexander. "Political Leadership and Social Change in American Cities," Daedalus 24(Fall 1968): 1194-1217.

_____. "Power as a Compensatory Value for Political Leaders," Social Issues, 24(July 1968): 29-49.

Gordey, Michael. "The French People and ed Gaulle," Foreign Affairs, 42 (July 1964) : 546-58

Greenstein, Fred I. "The Need for Systematic Inquiry Into Personality and Politics: Introduction and Overview," Social Issues, 24 (July 1968) : 1-14.

_____."The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush," American Political Science Review, 61 (September 1967): 629-41.

_____. "The Study of French Political Socialization," World Politics, 22 (1969): 95-137.

Gladstone, A. I. "The Possibility of Predicting Reactions to International Events," Social Issues, 11 (1955):21-28.

Grosser, Alfred. "Charles de Gaulle and the Foreign Policy of the Fifth Republic," Journal of International Affairs, 39 (April 1963): 198-213.

Harrison, Martin. "The French Experience of Exceptional Powers," Journal of Politics, 25 (February 1963): 139-58.

Herald, George, "Charles de Gaulle's Abstractions," New Leader, 46 (February 18, 1963): 13-15.

Hirschman, Alfred. "The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding," World Politics, 22 (April 1970): 329-43.

Hoffmann, Stanley. "Pereceptions, Reality and the Franco-American Conflict," Journal of International Affairs, 21 (1967) : 57-58.

_____."The French Constitution of 1958: The Final Text and its Prospects," American Political Science Review, 53(June 1959): 332-58.

_____. "Succession and Stability in France,: Current History, 18 (1964) : 86-103.

_____ and Inge. "The Will To Grandeur" de Gaulle as Politi= cal Artist," Daedalus 97(Summer 1968): 829-67.

Holsti, Ole R., Brody, Richard A. and North, Robert C. "Measuring Affect and Action in International Reaction Models: Empirical Materials from the L962 Cuban Crisis," Journal of Peace Research, 1 (1964): 170-89.

Janowitz, M. "The Systematic Analysis of Political Biography," World Politics, 6(April 1954): 405-12.

Johnson, Douglas. "The Political Principles of Charles de Gaulle," Current History, 41 (October 1965): 650-62.

Kelman, Herbert C. "The Role of the Individual in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodologicl Considerations, Current History, 24 (1970) : 1-17.

Korten, David C. "Situational Determinants of Leadership, Structure," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7 (September 1962): 222-35.

Lasswell, Harold. "A Note on 'Types' of Political Personality: Nuclear, Co-Relational, Developmental, Social Issues 24 (July 1968) : 81-91.

Lerner, Daniel. "Interviewing Frenchmen," American Journal of Sociology, 62 (September 1956)" 187-94.

Leites, N. Psycho-Cultureal Hypotheses About Political Acts," World Politics, I (October 1948): 102-119.

Luethy, Herbert. "De Gaulle: Man of Destiny," New Leader, 41 (August 4, 1958): 11-16.

McClosky, H. "Perspectives on Personality and Foreign Policy," World Politics, 13 (October 1960): 129-39.

McKay, D.C. "De Gaulle and Louis Napoleon: A Comparison of the Men and the Times," Current History, 16 (May 1949): 267.

Modelski, George. "The World's Foreign Ministers: A Political Elite," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14 (June1970) 135-75.

Mullins, Willard. "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science," American Political Science Review, 66 (June 1972): 498-510.

Neumann, R. G. "Formation and Transformation of Gaullism in France," Western Political Quarterly, 6 (June 1953):

Niebuhr, Reinhold, "De Gaulle Balance Sheet," New Leader, 42 (April 6, 1959): 6-7.

North, Robert C. "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," Current History, 21 (1967) : 103-22.

Pierce, Roy. "De Gaulle and the RPF-A Post Mortem," Journal of Politics, 16 (February 1954): 96-119.

Putnam, Robert D. "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of Ideology," American Political Science Review, 65 (September 1971): 651-81.

Rogow, A.A. "Review of V. Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality," American Political Science Review 62 (June 1968): 604-66.

Rosenthal, Howard. "The Electoral Politics of Gaullists in the Fourth French Republic: Ideology or Constituency Interests," American Political Science Review, 63 (June 1969) : 476-87.

_____."The Popularity of de Gaulle: Findings from Archive Based Research," Public Opinion Quarterly, 31 (Summer 1967).

Rustow, Dankwert. "Ataturk as Founder of a State," Daedalus (Summer 1968): 793-828.

Rummel, R. J. "Research Communications: Some Attributes and Behavioral Patters of Nations," Journal of Peace Research, 4 (1967): 196-206.

Searing, Donald D. "Models and Images of Man and Society in Leadership Theory," Journal of Politics, 31 (February 1969): 3-31.

Seligman, L. G. "The Study of Political Leadership," American Political Science Review, 64 (December 1950) 904-15.

Smith, M. Brewster. "A Map for the Analysis of Personality and Politics, Social Issues, 24 (July 1968): 15-28

_____. "Opinions, Personality and Political Behavior," American Political Science Review 52(March 1958): 1-17.

Spiro, Herbert J. "Comparative Politics: A Comprehnsive Approach," American Political Science Review, 56 (September 1962): 577-95.

Singer, J. David. "Man and World Politics: The Psycho- Cultural Interface," Social Issues, 24 (July 1969): 127-56.

Sprout, Harold and Margaret. "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics,"Journal of Conflict Resolution, 9 (December 1957): 309-328.

Steel, Ronald "The General"s European Campaign: Strategy, Tactics, and Logistics," New Leader, 46 (February 4, 1963): 15-17.

Tucker, Robert. "The Dictator and Totalitarianism," World Politics, 17 (July 1965): 555-84.

Wahl, Nicholas. "The French Constitution of 1958: The Initial Draft and its Origins," American Political Science Review, 53 (June 1959): 358-82

Wilkenfield, Jonathan. "Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations," Journal of Peace Research, 5 (1968): 56-69.

Wright, Gordon. "Catholics and Peasantry in France," Political Quarterly, 67 (December 1967): 526-51.

Yates, Willard, Ross. "Power, Principle and Doctrine of the Movement Republican Populaire, American Political Science Review, 52 (June 1958): 419-36.

Miscellaneous articles:

Davies, J. C. "The Family's Role in Political Socialization," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 361 (Sept [illegible] 1965):10-19.

Virtanen, Reins. "French National Character in the 20th Century. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 370 (March 1967):82-92.

Servan-Schreiber, Jean-Jacques. "De Gaulle's 'Senility'" translated from L'Express, Paris in Atlas, 12 (December 1966):35-6.

"Exchange of Greetings, Paris, September 2, 1959," The Department of State Bulletin, 41 (September 21, 1959):410-2.

"Press of United States and France Coordinate Views on Summit Conference and Exchange of Greetings," The Department of State Bulletin 42 (May 16, 1960):771-5.

"General de Gaulle in the United States and Canada," Free France, 6 (August 1, 1944):96-103.

"General de Gaulle's Adress before Consultative Assembly," Free France, 5 (April 15, 1944):283-91.

Edelman, Maurice. "The Vision of Charles de Gaulle," Holiday, 27 (March 1960):80-1.

Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. "On Heroic Leadership and the Dilemma of Great Men and Weak Peoples, Encounter, 15 (December 1960):3-11.

Anouil, Gilles. "The Mood of Young Europeans," European Community (Feburary 1971):3-5.

"Public Opinion: The Countries Considered France's Best Friends," Commentary (April 1971):3-4.

Piaget, Jean and Anne-Marie Weil. "The Development in Children of the Idea of the Homeland and of Relations with Other Countries," International Social Science Bulletin (1951):561.

Holsti, Ole. "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," 14 (September 1970):233-309. International Studies Quarterly.

Document #8863. ADI Auxiliary Publication Project, Photoduplication Service. Library of Congress. Washington, D.C.

Brown, Bernard. "Religious Schools and Politics in France." Midwest Journal of Political Science (May 1958):160-78.

Hayward, J. E. S. "Presidentialism and French Politics," Parliamentary Affairs, 18 (Winter 1964/5):23-39.

Serfaty, Simon. "Gaullist Myth and French Reality," SAIS Review, 8 (Spring 1964):15-21.

"De Gaulle on United Nations Victory," United Nations Review, (July 15, 1945):159-61.

"The Levantine Question," United Nations Review, 4 (July 15, 1945):161-3.

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Policy Toward Europe (and Related Matters), Hearings, 80th Cong., 2d Session, 1966.

Other: General.
CBS Nightly News (August 9, 1974).
The International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, David L. Sills, ed. 1968.
Le Monde (1958-1970).
Newsweek (1965-1970).
Realities (1965-1970)
Sondages, Institue Francais d'Opinion Publique, Vols. 19-31.
Washington Post (1974).

French Military Journals:
Gaulle, Charles de. "Comment faire une armée de métier? Revue Hebdomadaire, January 12, 1935.

_____. "Du caractère." Revue Militaire Française, June 1, 1930.

_____. "Du prestige." Revue Militaire Française, June 1, 1931.

_____. "Forgeons une armée de métier." Revue des Vivants, January, 1934.

_____. "L'action de guerre et le chef." Revue Militaire Française, March 1, 1928.

_____. "Le flambeau." Revue Militaire Française, March 1, 1927.

_____. "Les origines de l'armée franciase." Revue d'Infanterie, January, 1939.

_____. "Mobilisation economique à l'étranger." Revue Militaire Française, March 1, 1925.

_____. "Orientation de nos doctrines de guerre." Revue Militaire Française, March 1, 1925.

_____. "Pour une politique de la defense nationale." Revue Bleue, February 4, 1933.

_____. "Rôle historique des places francaise." Revue Militaire Française, December 1, 1925.

Dissertations:

Dissertation Abstracts: The Humanities and Social Sciences Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, A Xerox Company. Vol. "A" January 1968 to June, 1975.

Helms, Lelia Biggs. "De Gaulle's Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice."Tufts University, 1968.

Sullivan, T. "Franco-American Relations: Aspects of French Politics under Charles de Gaulle." University of Utah, 1967.

Virasasi, Banphot. "The Emergence and Making of a Mass Move-Ment Leader: Portrait of Mahatma Gandhi in South Africa, 1893-1941." University of California, Berkeley, 1968.

Rudoni, Dorothy June. "Harry S. Truman: A Study in Presidential Perspective." Southern Illinois University, 1968.

Singh, Bhola Prasad. "Gandhi and Roy: A Study of the Political Thought of Two Revolutionary Indian Personalities. Indiana University, 1968.

Myers, James Townsend. "The Apotheosis of Chairman Mao: Dynamics of the Hero Cult in the Chinese System, 1949-1967." The George Washington University, 1969.

Roland, Ruth Ailene. "The 'Rizalista Cult' in Philippine Nationalism: A Case History of the 'Uses' of a National Hero." New York University, 1969.

Harlan, Jonathan Lewin. Charismatic Authority and Technological Integration (Gandhi and Hitler). University of California, 1969.

McHale, Vincent E. "Political Aggregation and the French Party System:1958-1968." The Penna. State University, 1969.

Dalizer, Egambi F. K. "A Study in Agitational and Integrative Politics with Special Reference to Jomo Kenyatta. Claremont Graduate School, 1969.

Gottlieb, Kevin Charles. "The Political Philosophy of Woodrow Wilson as President of Princeton, 1902-1910." Syracuse University, 1970.

Schonfeld, Wm. R. "Authority in France: a Model of Political Behavior Drawn from Case Studies in Education." Princeton University, 1970.

Lumsden, Charles Ian."Consciousness and Conviction: The Political Beliefs of Fidel Castro."University of Toronto, 1970.

Brossard, Emma B."Romulo Betancourt: A Study in the Evolution of a Constitutional Statesman." Claremont Graduate School, 1971.

Souryal, Safwat Sabit. "Andrew Jackson and Gamal Abdul-Nasser: A Behavioral Study in Comparative Political Leadership." University of Utah, 1971.

McDonald, John Wm. "Political Themes in the Thought of Milovan Djilas." Colorado University, 1971.

Cummins, Howard W. "Mao Tse-Tung: A Value Analysis." (Mao, Hsiao K'e, Churchill and Viscount Montgomery). University of Oregon, 1972.

Arnaud, Joanne A. "Some Normative and Empirical Implications of Direct Action: The French Context." Brown University, 1973.

Anderson, Joel E. "The 'Operational Code' Belief System of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg: An Application of the George Construct." The University of Michigan, 1974.

Fomerland, Jacques. "Policy-Formulation and Change in Gaullist France: the 1968 Orientation Act of Higher Education." The City University of New York, 1974.

Convention Papers:

Andriole, Stephen J. "Conceptualizing the Dimensions of Interstate Behavior." Southwestern Political Science Meeting, San Antonio, 1975.

Duncan, John Paul. "The Political Philosophy of American Political Scientists," Southwestern Social Science Meeting, March 25, 1967.

Gilbert, Jerry D. "John Foster Dulles' Perceptions of the People's Republic of China: An Assessment of Accuracy." Southwestern Social Science Meeting, San Antonio, 1975.

Glad, Betty. "The Role of Psychoanalytic Biography in Political Science," American Political Science Association, 1968.

Hermann, Charles F. "International Crises: Theoretical Implications of Current Research," American Political Science Meeting, September 5-9, 1967. (Chicago).

Hopple, Gerald W. "Comparative Foreign Policy: Determinants of Action and Reaction," Southwestern Social Science Meeting, San Antonio, March 27-29, 1975.

Marshall, D. Bruce. "France and the Atlantic Alliance." Southwestern Social Science Meeting, Houston, 1969.

Mercer, Gordon. "Psychological Dimensions of Executive Leadership." Southern Political Science Meeting, November 1-4, 1973.

Rieselbach, Leroy N. "The Ideology of Foreign Policy: A Preliminary Analysis," Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, May 2-4, 1968.

Rosen, David J. "Leadership Change and Foreign Policy," CREON Pub. #35, American Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago Aug 29-September 2,1974.

Rothstein, Robert. "Power, Security and the International System." American Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, 1967.

Waltz, Kenneth. "The Relation of States to Their World," American Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, 1967.

Wilkenfeld, Jonathan. "A Classification of States for the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," Southwestern Social Science Assocation Meeting, 1975.

_____. "Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations: A Cross-National and Case Study Approach. Midwestern Political Science Association Meeting, May 2, 1968. (Chicago).