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DETERMINANTS OF FEDERAL GRANT USAGE IN
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GRADUATE COLLEGE

DETERMINANTS OF FEDERAL GRANT
USAGE IN CITY MANAGER CITIES

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
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degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
JACK V. HOUGH, JR.
Norman, Oklahoma

1975

DETERMINANTS OF FEDERAL GRANT

USAGE IN CITY MANAGER CITIES

APPROVED BY

Land R. Moore
Walter F. Schaffer
Heath G. MacNiven
Rufus G. Hall
Oliver Benson

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

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CHAPTER I

FEDERAL GRANTS AND POLICY ANALYSIS IN PERSPECTIVE

The subject matter of federal grants-in-aid to states and localities has in recent times become a dominant concern of both scholars and practitioners in intergovernmental relations. Part of the impetus for this concern has been the transformation in American intergovernmental relations starting in the nineteen-sixties and continuing to the present time in response to what has been described as the urban crisis. The urban crisis in the last decade encompassed a multitude of problems that demanded action, among them racial strife, deterioration of housing conditions in the central city, widespread segregation in providing public education, a decline of the central city economically, and a worsening of environmental quality. As a result, new federal legislation not only established federal-state-local relations in entirely new fields of activity and on a vast scale, but it established new patterns of relationships as well.

Massive federal intervention, as has been noted by James L. Sundquist and David W. Davis, came in "some of the most sacrosanct of all preserves of state and local authority--notably education and, in 1968, local law enforcement."¹ Entrance into new fields with major national programs has also included manpower training, area economic development, as well as new aid for traditional functions of local government such as sewage treatment, water supply and provision of mass transporta-

tion.²

Current Trends

Major trends have been identified which relate to the topic matter of this dissertation that illustrate the above described changes in this new era of intergovernmental relations. First, in this era, a dramatic rise in the number and change in the composition of federal grants has occurred. The response of the federal government in terms of number and amount devoted to grants to state and local governments has increased from 71 programs at a level of \$2 billion in 1950 to 530 programs at a level of \$24 billion in 1970. Further, the emphasis of total federal grant programs has changed significantly since 1960, as is shown in Table 1. The functions comprising human resource programs--education and manpower, health and income security--have shown a rapid growth during the 1960-1973 period, rising from 47 percent of federal aid in 1960 to 55 percent in 1973. On the other hand, commerce and transportation programs declined from 43 percent of the total in 1960 to 14 percent in 1973.³

To deal with the sheer number, change in composition and the complexity of obtaining grants, another trend in American intergovernmental relations has been the establishment by local governments of better communication linkages with the federal government. In fact, in approximately 52 percent of the cities with populations of more than 100,000 in the 1960's, federal liaison offices have been established.⁴ These offices aid cities in gaining information on a day to day basis on occurrences

TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL AIDS TO STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BY FUNCTION

Function	1950 actual	1955 actual	1960 actual	1965 actual	1970 actual	1973 estimate
Agriculture and rural development	5	8	4	5	3	2
Natural resources and environment	2	3	2	2	3	4
Commerce and transportation	21	19	43	40	21	14
Community development and housing	(¹)	3	3	5	11	10
Education and manpower	11	14	10	10	18	17
Health	5	4	4	7	15	11
Income security	55	47	33	29	26	27
General revenue sharing	--	--	--	--	--	11
Other	1	2	1	2	3	4
	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹Less than 0.5%.

Source: Executive office of the President, office of Management and Budget, Special Analysis of the U. S. Government, Fiscal Year 1973 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Printing Office, 1973), Table P-1, p. 240.

in Washington, D. C. which will affect cities in general, steer cities through grant application difficulties, and help them select, from among many overlapping programs scattered through several federal departments and agencies, the ones which will be most beneficial to their needs.

Another manifestation of this new era has come with the rise in number of "paragovernment" institutions to administer federally financed programs. Paragovernmental institutions as described by Daniel Moynihan are semi-public non-profit organizations which operate almost entirely on federal grant dollars and therefore are free of most local budgetary controls. They generally do not operate within the departmental structures of city government. The only measurable impact city governments have on their decision making process is through mayoral appointment of the board of directors of the organizations. The most common places where paragovernments are currently present are the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) funded community action programs, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) model cities and urban renewal community development programs, the Department of Labor (DOL) manpower training programs, and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) sponsored neighborhood health and childhood development programs,⁵

Another recent trend has been the expanding use of project type grants. In 1967, of the 379 grant-in-aid authorizations, 280 were project type grants and only 99 were formula type grants. This trend can be further dramatized by the fact that 160 of the 280 project grants were enacted in the three year period from 1964-1966. In contrast, more than half of the formula grant authorizations--53 of the 99--were enacted be-

fore 1963.⁶ This trend has affected the urban areas particularly since most project grants are extensively utilized by municipalities.

Project grants at this point should be distinguished from formula type grants. Formula type grants are distributed to all states, cities or other units of government, in accordance with a formula written into the enacting law. Availability of the grants then becomes a matter of right and not of privilege. The formula might, for example, prescribe by law that to obtain a grant a governmental unit must have a certain population, have a certain level of unemployment and other characteristics. Project grants, on the other hand, are grants to meet specific national objectives and are not necessarily spread uniformly. The discretion of the federal agency prescribes certain conditions which must be met in order to obtain this type of federal outlay. The federal agencies further take the advocate role through aggressively promoting programs, soliciting applications and providing extensive technical assistance, either directly or by financing the employment of consultants.⁷

Both formula and project type grants generally require some type of matching. The matching requirements may be of two kinds: (1) a fixed matching ratio under which each of the receiving units is required to share the same percentage of the program costs; or (2) a variable matching which reflects the differing abilities of the recipient units of government to support the aided function. Formula type grants have characteristically required 50 percent matching. Project type grants, however, commonly begin programs with no matching or small match-

ing requirements, and in some instances continue this matching arrangement throughout the program's duration. This is typical of practically all of the paragoovernmental grant programs.⁸

A last trend of this new era, identified by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations⁹ and several other scholars, as it pertains to the subject matter of this dissertation, needs to be pointed out before proceeding. This involves the establishment in the 1960's of federal grant programs which either bypass state governments or involve them only minimally, e. g. , in the passage of enabling legislation. This last trend has been referred to as "direct federalism."¹⁰ The magnitude of "direct federalism" can be seen by the fact that of the 38 programs identified in 1965 in which states had no role, 23 were enacted after 1960.¹¹ The main categories of direct federal-local transfers are in education, housing and community development, airport construction, and waste treatment facilities.¹² The federal grant programs of this type to local governments represent the central policy outputs to be examined later in this study.

Many point to the failure of the states to adequately deal with the problems of the local governments as the major reason for "direct federalism." Terry Sanford has said it is difficult for the state governments to dodge the accusing finger of municipal havoc because they have been given the responsibility of setting up the ground rules for local governments. The states' failings have come in not ceding "to the cities adequate powers to tax, zone surrounding areas, regulate housing, pro-

vide or require mass transportation, and acquire open space."¹³

Richard Leach also credits the movement toward "direct federalism" to the states. He says the movement toward direct federal-local relationships has been brought about because state governments have not assisted local governments or removed the legal shackles which make them too weak to accomplish their purposes.¹⁴

James Maxwell, along the same lines, has cited the neglect and lack of interest of states in local affairs as the reason for "direct federalism." He said:

the fact is that most state governments have not been interested in urban renewal, low rent public housing, airport construction, and the war on poverty programs. Irresponsive to urban needs, the states did not resist federal-local action. Accordingly, a direct federal-local relationship developed, federal aid being provided on a contractual basis to numerous local agencies without an intervening state authority; the interests of the state in the activity, as well as its responsibility to its local governments, were sidetracked.¹⁵

A Framework for Study

Having thus far examined briefly federal grant-in-aid trends of the last decade to the present it is necessary now to examine grants in relationship to their environment. Perhaps the most widely utilized method of recent years devoted to quantitative analysis of governmental outputs has been public policy analysis. The systematic model and methods used and controversies that have arisen in the state and local policy analysis literature become a central concern in this dissertation because the subsequent analysis of federal grants follows in this tradition.

The state and local policy analysis literature has its roots in two social science disciplines--political science and economics. Policy analysis to a large degree synthesizes parts of older studies in these two disciplines.

Two studies regarding relationships between political process variables and public policies should be noted from political science. V. O. Key in his book Southern Politics in State and Nation offered several hypotheses concerning the differences in public welfare policies between southern states with loose multifactional one party systems and those with party systems in which two somewhat cohesive factions compete within the context of a one party system. Key found that states with loose multifactional systems, in which coherence and continuity of competition is less, tend to pursue more conservative policies, i. e., policies favorable to the interests of the upper socioeconomic groups or the "haves." In states in which there is regular competition between two cohesive and enduring factions, more liberal policies are adopted, i. e., policies are more responsive to the interests of the "have nots." To explain the apparent association between interparty competition and policy, he reasoned logically that states with enduring factions may resemble competitive parties in two party states. Identifiable and reasonably permanent factions contend with each other for party (state) control promising "have nots" welfare and other programs. Because the winning factions in legislative and gubernatorial elections usually can be identified in the next election, it is to their interest to fulfill their campaign promises. In contrast, the

several factions in a non-cohesive party where ad hoc coalitions occur are more amorphous, and hence the leaders are more difficult to punish or reward in the next election. Consequently, demands to fulfill greater welfare efforts are less in loose multifactional than in bifactional systems.¹⁶ Duane Lockard in New England State Politics expanded on the work of Key in comparing the results of a competitive two party state situation (as exemplified by Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut) and dominant one party system (as exemplified by Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont). He found two party states receive a larger portion of their revenue from business and debt taxes, pay more money for welfare assistance and are less likely to adopt legislative apportionment schemes which favor certain economic interest groups.¹⁷

These two early studies established the fairly widely accepted notion that state policy was particularly responsive to such political factors as interparty competition. Later, as will be noted, this position is rather severely challenged.

A major pathfinder in the development of state and local policy analysis came in economics with Solomon Fabricant's study in 1952. He found, by using multiple correlation analysis, that three variables--per capita income, percent of population living in urban places, and population density--explained 72 percent of the interstate variations in per capita operating expenditures and from 29 to 85 percent of the variations in expenditures for various functional categories (i.e., education, highways, public welfare, health, hospitals, police, fire, sewage and sanitation, general control and interest, and other). His analysis further found

that income was far more important than urbanization and density in accounting for interstate differences in expenditures.¹⁸ Later research on these socioeconomic variables published in the National Tax Journal, by such men as Glen Fisher, Roy Bahl, Robert Saunders, Seymour Sacks, and Robert Harris, has shown the explanatory power of these independent variables has decreased, accounting for 53 percent of the variance level of state and local expenditures in 1960. Bahl and Saunders have found, indeed, that changes from 1957 to 1960 in Fabricant's three basic variables explain only 18 percent of the variations in state and local general expenditures.

The use of federal and state grant assistance has, in addition, been found by economists to be an important determinant of the level of state and local expenditures. Sacks and Harris used Fabricant's three independent variables, and then, in step-wise fashion, added state aid per capita and federal aid per capita as additional independent variables. Federal aid increased the amount of explained variation in per capita total direct expenditures from 53 percent to 81 percent in this analysis. More impressive is the fact that federal aid increased the proportion of explained variation for welfare and highway expenditures from levels that were of little interest to 83.4 and 83.0 percent respectively. This study also found that the inclusion of state aid for these functional categories added little to the correlational analysis. For other functions, however, local school and health-hospitals, the large increment in explanatory powers came from the introduction into the correlational matrix of state aid.¹⁹

Bahl and Saunders further substantiate the above findings in their

research which included federal grants as an independent variable. The model utilized by these scholars, containing five variables (i. e., changes in per capita income, changes in population density, changes in urban population, changes in per capita federal grants to states, and changes in public school employment), explains approximately 46 percent of the variations among states, with a model containing only the income and federal aid variables explaining 42 percent of the variation among the states. The overwhelming importance of the federal grant factor is exemplified by its coefficient of partial determination of .34 in the five variable model. This coefficient means that of the 46 percent variation explained by the above five variables, 34 percent that is not associated with the other four variables is explained by the federal aid variable.²⁰

Glen Fisher, in his analysis, examines seven independent variables in an attempt to explain a greater percentage of 1960 variations in state and local expenditures. These seven independent variables were divided into three categories--economic (i. e., percent of families with less than \$2,000 income, yield of representative tax system as a percent of U. S. average), demographic (i. e., population per square mile, percent of population in urban place, percent of increase in population 1950-1960), and socioeconomic-political variables (i. e., index of two-party competition, percent of population over 25 with less than five years schooling). Fisher found that 65 percent of the variances in state and local expenditures among states can be accounted for by the above variables. Perhaps the most significant thing revealed is the great importance of the variable percent of families with less than \$2,000, which has the highest beta co-

efficient level for nine out of thirteen expenditure categories.

Fisher does not attempt to determine the effect which federal grants have upon state and local expenditures. He points out it is questionable whether federal aid should be used as an independent variable because of the dependency of the relationship. The nature of the relationship is illustrated by Fisher by assuming that a federal aid program which provides dollar for dollar matching with no limit and no ceiling. In such a case, the amount of federal aid would always be 50 percent of the state expenditures, and the correlation would be perfect (1.0). In this case, it would obviously be unrealistic to assume that the amount of federal aid is independent of the amount of the expenditure, or that federal aid explains the interstate variations in expenditures from state to state.²¹

Economists, traditionally, in their state and local policy analysis research, primarily focused on the socioeconomic influence on expenditure patterns. A shortcoming in their analysis has been that little or no effort has been made to include measures of the political system.

Synthesis

The next step in the development of state and local policy analysis was to combine the two approaches of political science and economics in terms of findings and methodology. This synthesis was provided by James Robinson and Richard E. Dawson in 1963. They used socioeconomic and political measures as independent variables and sought to assess their relationships to variations in state welfare policy (as dependent variables).²² Dawson and Robinson, and those following them, adopted a flow model of the political system revised somewhat from David Easton's model de-

picted in his book The Political System.²³ Thomas Dye in Politics, Economics and the Public²⁴ went even further in an attempt to apply Easton's systems model to state policy analysis. In fact, some derivation of this basic model has been employed in most state and local policy studies, at least in the field of political science. Thus, it is essential to understand fully this model.

Dye's model assumes that environmental inputs of society, that is, any condition defined as external to the boundaries of its political system may directly have an impact on policy or operate through the political system to produce policy action. Outputs, in terms of policy action, then, are the dependent variables while environmental inputs and the political system are the independent variables. The political system is defined as those groups of inter-related structures and processes which function to authoritatively allocate values within a society. Examples are cited in Figure 1 of independent and dependent variables typically used in state and local policy analysis. The system model which will be utilized in this dissertation along with related theories, hypotheses, and variables will be considered at greater length in Chapter II.

In observing Figure 1, linkages (a) and (b) suggest that socioeconomic variables are inputs which shape the political system and that the character of the political system in turn determines policy outcomes. They suggest the possibility that political system variables have an important independent effect on policy by mediating the effects of socioeconomic conditions on policy outcomes. Linkage (c), on the other hand, suggests that socioeconomic variables affect policy directly, with system




Figure 1. A Model for Analyzing Policy Outcomes

Source: Dye, Politics, Economics and the Public, p. 4.

variables having only a neutral influence. Lastly, there is the feedback process (d) which, although widely acknowledged as an important element in a systems model, has not been investigated except in a cursory way. Feedback suggests that policy outcomes have some reciprocal impact on socioeconomic conditions and political system characteristics.²⁵

Most studies in policy analysis at the state and local level have focused on levels of expenditures and revenue collections. They have not, except to a very limited extent, examined the distributive nature of various programs.

Socioeconomic Dominance of State Policy Analysis

The publication noted above, authored by Dawson and Robinson, has had a tremendous influence on subsequent studies. The contribution of these authors is noteworthy for several reasons. First, their study was truly comparative; it included information from all states. Second, the study had an empirical base. The authors defined state policies in terms of selected expenditures (e.g., average payment per family for aid to dependent children). Of most importance, though, it was the first study to systematically explore the relationships between measures of public policy and certain socioeconomic and political characteristics of states.²⁶

Following Key and Lockard, Dawson and Robinson started with the initial hypothesis (concerning only welfare policies of the states) that the greater the degree of interparty competition within a political system, the more liberal will be the social welfare measures.²⁷ After considering the above, the authors focused on whether the socioeconomic status of the states was more closely related to liberalism than inter-party compet-

ition. The study covered a time period from 1938-1958 and looked at competition in elections for the governorship and the two houses of the state legislature in this period. The political system variables were operationalized by ranking the states for (1) percent of popular vote for governor, (2) percent of Senate seats held by the majority party, (3) percent of seats in the House held by the majority party, and (4) an average of these three percentages. In focusing on the other independent variables (socioeconomic) they used the degree of wealth (per capita income), urbanization, and industrialization. Dawson and Robinson found that expenditures for welfare policies (as measured by money expended per pupil, aid to the blind, aid to dependent children, unemployment insurance, and old age assistance) were strongly related to both interparty competition and socioeconomic indices. Wealth was the most important socioeconomic factor which correlated with various welfare policies. When holding interparty competition constant a much higher correlation resulted for wealth than when wealth was controlled and the effects of the political variables were assessed. The authors, from this type of analysis, came to the conclusion--which has been the subject of much subsequent debate--that socioeconomic variables are the principal determinants of welfare orientations in states rather than various political variables.²⁸ Although only rank-order correlation analysis was employed, this general approach set the stage for most of the subsequent studies.

This study stimulated a re-examination of policy outputs by others.

Herbert Jacob concluded in 1964²⁹ and Dye³⁰ in 1965 that legislative malapportionment has not been related to a distinctive pattern of outputs. Policies which might be heavily favored by the under-represented majority in poorly apportioned states were no more in evidence in well apportioned states. The substantial differences in the level of outputs were apparently the result of a variety of other variables, not legislative malapportionment.

Richard I. Hofferbert in 1966 more directly followed Dawson and Robinson's lead, but refined the definition of welfare orientation and added divided party control, malapportionment, and regional controls (South vs. non-South) to interparty competition as independent variables. He reported a low zero order correlation for divided party control and malapportionment, and no independent impact for any of the other political variables considered.³¹

The publication of Dye's Politics, Economics and the Public in 1966 has been recognized by many scholars as a landmark in the systematic analysis of public policy. The model used by Dye was briefly described above. The book was the most elaborate to that date dealing with factors related to public policies. Dye attempted to make his categories of political system and process variables, environmental conditions (socioeconomic inputs) and policy outputs sufficiently inclusive to permit definitive conclusions to be made regarding the relative impact of socioeconomic and political variables. His political system variables included interparty competition, degree of malapportionment, extent of electoral participation, and the extent of control of government by the

Democratic party. The socioeconomic variables utilized were indicators of urbanization, industrialization, education, and income. For dependent variables a wide range of state and local tax and expenditure policies were utilized (i.e., education, welfare, highway, taxation, public regulatory policies, and health).³² Dye used simple, partial and multiple correlation analysis to test his model. His findings were generally consistent with those of his predecessors: for 47 of 54 tax and expenditure measures, socioeconomic variables had more influence on policy outcomes than did political variables. In finding that political indicators had little or no independent effect, Dye did acknowledge that his political system variables were crude and incomplete. His book has been a stimulus for even further research into the various dimensions of public policy.

Questioning the Dominance of Socioeconomic Determinants of State Policies

Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert in 1969 used a more comprehensive and statistically sophisticated methodology in testing the effects of socioeconomic variables vis-a-vis political system variables. In the use of factor analysis they found a mixed picture, with different social and economic characteristics varying in their relevance to substantive areas of policy.³³ Further, in looking only at the state level, state politics were found to be an important factor in some policies, even when controlling for socioeconomic variables. Sharkansky and Hofferbert found that a "welfare-education" dimension of state policy is significantly dependent on a "competition-turnout" dimension of state politics

and an "affluence" dimension of the state economy. The relationship is positive, i. e., higher welfare and education expenditures are correlated with greater party competition, voter turnout and levels of wealth.

These scholars also found that a "highway-natural resource" state policy factor is most dependent on an "industrialization" factor. This relationship is inverse, i. e., more liberal highway and natural resource programs are associated with low industrialization and low density populations.

The factors discovered by Sharkansky and Hofferbert need to be briefly explained for clarity. The two dependent factors were "welfare-education" and "highway-natural resources." These factors suggest that states with high welfare payments are also likely to have a high percentage of highschool graduates, and states with an active highway expenditure program should also have an extensive natural resource development program. The independent factors found were: (1) a "professionalism-local reliance" factor which indicated states with high salaries for judges and legislators, and well financed legislative staffs, were likely to be found together with states where primary reliance was placed on locally raised and spent revenue; (2) a "competition-turnout" factor which has as variables with highest loadings, a measure of turnout in gubernatorial elections, an index of suffrage liberality, and (negatively) one party dominance in the state legislature and in recent elections for governor; (3) an "affluence" factor with high loading among various income variables and education variables; and (4) an "industrialization" factor with high loading among industrialization, urbanization and ethnic

variables. The "competition-turnout" dimension provides some post hoc justification for the many studies of state politics that have focused almost entirely on electoral processes and interparty competition (including those mentioned before by Key and Lockard).

The findings of Sharkansky and Hofferbert indicate that state government cannot be adequately understood by using a few single measures but in fact must be viewed in a truly multiple dimensional fashion. Moreover, they insist, there is no single answer to the question: Is it politics or economics that has the greatest impact on public policy?³⁴ This position seems consistent with some of the recent findings.

A recent study offers a new perspective in the study of policy outputs. Brian Fry and Richard Winters challenge the prevailing view of Dye and others. They argue that while socioeconomic resources of states may largely determine the level of expenditure and taxation, political structure and process variables have a significant independent effect on the distribution of tax burdens and benefits of government expenditures. In their analysis, measures of the net redistribution impact of revenues and expenditures were calculated. In focusing on the states, the authors drew from a Tax Foundation, Inc. study, which selected a number of allocation bases which appeared to describe the incidence of revenue and expenditure totals. Given the revenue and expenditure totals and allocation factors--in education, highway, public welfare, intergovernmental affairs, etc.--the remaining steps in the calculation of the independent variable were relatively simple.

For the independent variables various socioeconomic variables

were chosen (industrialization, median family income, education and urbanization) because of their high explanatory power in previous studies. The percentage of the population with less than \$3,000 annual income and the Gini index of inequality were both added on the assumption that the greater the inequality of income in a state and/or the larger the percentage of low income families in the state, the greater the perceived need for redistribution through state revenue and expenditures.

The political variables in the study were much like those used in previous studies to gauge the amount of political participation, Democratic vote, interparty competition, legislative apportionment, legislative cohesion, gubernatorial powers and gubernatorial tenure. Significantly, Fry and Winters also tried to determine the amount of interest group strength and percentage of state employees under civil service coverage.

In their study they found that political variables had an independent impact on redistribution policies in states; they also found political variables accounted for considerably more of the variance in redistribution than did socioeconomic variables. For the 48 states in the study, the multiple-partial correlation using political variables accounted for a coefficient of determination of .46 when controlling for the socioeconomic variables, in contrast to .27 when political variables were controlled and the effects of socioeconomic variables were tested. The model utilized also significantly accounted for 75 percent of the total variance when using both socioeconomic and political variables.³⁵

Before the results of local policy analysis literature are surveyed, other studies should be mentioned. The first is a book by Ira Sharkansky entitled Spending in the American States, in which the author revealed that spending levels and service levels did not necessarily correspond. Second, he found that the relationship between socioeconomic influences and state government spending by itself tends to be negative. States with low levels of population density and industrialization show the highest per capita levels of state government spending. Local spending, however, was shown to be strongly and positively related to levels of economic resources in the states. Third, Sharkansky found that there was no meaningful relation between state political characteristics and state spending. He did learn, however, that certain government measures had a considerable effect on expenditures, in particular the level of previous state spending (incrementalism).³⁶

Another study, by Jack Walker, suggested a further dimension to policy outputs. He devised a nonmonetary measure of public policy to determine the extent and rapidity of adoption of 88 policies among the states. Walker found that although each of a number of political variables (party competition, voter turnout, legislative apportionment, and legislative professionalism) correlated highly with innovation, the relationship disappeared when socioeconomic controls were introduced for all but the malapportionment-innovation correlation (a finding of no mean significance).³⁷

In a more recent study, Ronald Weber and William Shaffer also use nonfiscal measures of public policy as dependent variables. The

particular dependent or policy variables examined were the adoption or non-adoption of certain statutes by states, which included: public accommodation laws (1965), parochial school aid laws (1965), right-to-work laws (1969), teacher unionization laws (1967), and firearms laws (1967). The five policy output selected were some of the most controversial areas of state policy-making. These variables, in addition, were selected because of the availability of national public opinion data for the five policy areas. Fifteen different independent variables were chosen which sought to measure public preference and membership strength of mass-based interest groups for each of the five policy areas. Significantly, these authors found, while controlling for all other variables, that opinion support of public accommodation laws was the important determinant among all the variables studied. In two other areas of state policy, namely parochial school aid and right-to-work laws, interest group membership was also found to be an important determinant. Weber and Shaffer conclude from their analysis that previous policy analysis scholars have failed to consider the basic relationship posited in classical democratic theory--governmental responsiveness to public opinion. Furthermore, these authors noted that much variance remained to be explained in all but one nonfiscal policy output area, public accommodation.³⁸

Richard DeLeon further emphasizes the importance of mass political organizations from his findings. This author takes as a subject of analysis correlates between measures of economic surplus which include entrepreneurial income, per capita property income as a per-

centage of per capita total personal income in 1957, and an index of redistribution. This study found the following, which stresses the importance of mass organizations: (1) Mass political organizations have little redistribution impact, lacking an economic surplus to redistribute; (2) Economic surplus, where it exists, will not be redistributed in the absence of mass political organizations; (3) Economic surplus and mass political organizations both appear to be necessary conditions for government redistribution--neither by itself appears sufficient for redistribution to occur; and (4) Mass political organizations and economic surplus together seem to constitute a sufficient condition for high levels of redistribution.³⁹

From the brief summary of many of the studies in state policy analysis, the author has demonstrated that the question of whether political or socioeconomic variables have a greater impact on policy is far from decided. The policy outputs analyzed, whether fiscal or nonfiscal, the number and type of policies used, and the methodology utilized by scholars have an impact on actual findings.

Determinants of Local Policy

A similar questioning of the importance of socioeconomic variables vis-a-vis political variables on policy outputs is a subject of controversy in local policy analysis. Brett Hawkins, in his excellent review of local policy analysis literature in Politics and Urban Policies, notes that while none of the studies in local policy analysis show that political system variables have a greater impact than socioeconomic variables, neverthe-

less, political system variables have been shown to be important policy determinants simultaneously with environmental factors.⁴⁰

Three studies should be mentioned that have found political variables of no importance in determining policy outputs. Richard Cole, in his study, found that region had a greater impact than political structure (i. e., whether city manager or mayor-council structure existed within a city) in determining per capita civil service coverage, per capita planning expenditures, and per capita urban renewal requests.⁴¹ Dye comes to similar conclusions concerning the importance of environmental variables and their importance on educational fiscal and nonfiscal policies in comparison with political structure variables.⁴² A more comprehensive study on local policy outputs comes to the same conclusion. Chester Rogers examines several dependent variables (i. e., per capita total expenditures, per capita police expenditures, per capita fire expenditures, per capita planning expenditures, and city fire insurance ratings) and their determinants. His study's independent variables had multiple measures of environmental influence (i. e., resources, population density, total population, urbanization, population mobility, metropolitan status, and employment-resident ratio) and political influence (i. e., form of government, type of ballot, type of council election, administrative centralization as measured by the number of administrative officers elected in each city). Rogers, to reiterate, found in using regression analysis that environmental variables had the most impact on the above policy outputs.⁴³

Four comparatively recent studies will be cited as examples which have demonstrated the importance of political system variables in local policy analysis. First, Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone in their analysis of 87 San Francisco area municipalities define policy outcomes in terms of spending by localities for planning and other services and classify cities in three stages of development--retarded, transitional and advanced. These authors found that the stage of policy development in which a city finds itself is in part determined by its councilmembers' perceptions of city problems, needs and goals. Challenges from the environment, however, are present, indexed in terms of city size, density, and population growth, which also shape policy spending. The authors maintain that the fact that these environmental variables are associated with a developed city policy suggests "city council adopt policies which are congruent with needs rooted in pressures from the environment." In this San Francisco study no assessment is made of whether political system or environmental variables are more important. The main conclusion is that policy development is influenced by the political process itself, not just by challenges or needs arising from the environment.⁴⁴

Hawkins has examined the metropolitan reform assumption that fragmentation of governmental units adversely affects services. Fragmentation is said to increase the cost and to lower the quantity and quality of services. In Hawkins' study of 212 metropolitan areas, fragmentation was measured by the number of governments per capita. The

author observed a few statistically significant and many negative correlations between per capita spending in 14 categories even though these correlations were not large. In fact, environmental factors (median family income and percentage of white collar workers, high school graduates, and non-whites) were more important than indicators of fragmentation except in one instance (per capita expenditures for highways). The multiple-partial correlation coefficient for fragmentation, controlling for the environment for highway expenditures, was .30 as compared with a .22 multiple-partial correlation coefficient for the environment, controlling for fragmentation. Furthermore, for some services the policy impact of fragmentation, a system property, was in the expected direction--negative--indicating that as fragmentation decreases spending decreases.⁴⁵

Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler recently tested the relevance of socioeconomic variables and political structural characteristics in relation to tax and expenditure policies of 200 of the nation's cities over 50,000 in population. The study's central concern was the extent to which governmental structures, both reformed and unreformed, acted as intervening or filter variables for the socioeconomic traits of the population which were used as independent variables.⁴⁶ Reform characteristics were defined in terms of the presence of a manager form of government, nonpartisan election systems and an at-large constituency. Their socioeconomic variables were developed in light of the ethos theory formulated by James Q. Wilson and Edward Banfield. Ac-

cording to the ethos theory, middle class and upper middle class individuals favor wide varieties of public expenditures and services even if these involve high taxes for themselves. These individuals are presumably concerned with the development of the whole city. The theory also holds that religious and ethnic minorities favor policies which especially benefit their own groups. These latter individuals, it is assumed, will exchange their vote for special favors by city government.⁴⁷

Owner-occupancy and median education were used as measures of a public-regarding orientation while ethnic population and private school attendance were used as indicators of private-regarding orientations by Lineberry and Fowler. They indeed found that strength of the correlation between the socioeconomic variables and taxing and expenditures decreases regularly with an increase in reform scores. These authors concluded that cities with reformed and unreformed governments were not markedly different in terms of their socioeconomic character; the important difference instead was in their behavior. Using multiple correlation coefficients, they maintained one could predict city outputs more exactly in unreformed than in reformed cities. The final conclusion made was that cities with reform structures are governed less on the basis of conflict in political life and more on rational theory of administration than are their unreformed counterparts.⁴⁸

A last study needs to be cited before proceeding to the Framework for Analysis (Chapter II). James Clarke in 1969 considered the correlates of adoption of new political forms by cities in Pennsylvania.

In his design this author used 12 socioeconomic and political structure variables that have been prominently used in state and local policy analysis literature, i. e., population, median income, local interparty competition, etc. Significantly, he also employed a list of political process variables which have been used in many case studies on municipal reform and metropolitan reorganization, but which have not often been systematically used in comparative studies. In testing these political process variables in a dichotomous manner he hypothesized that referendum defeat of council-manager proposals were associated with city hall opposition, fear of excessive costs and larger voter turnout. He found in using multiple correlation analysis that four of the sixteen variables included (three political process variables and population size) accounted for 75 percent of the variation in the percentage of the positive vote, i. e., the percentage of votes cast for the adoption of new charters. Three of the variables were the cost issue, city administrator opposition and voter turnout. Clarke concluded that the explanatory importance of socioeconomic and political process variables will vary with the type of policy being considered. Furthermore he noted that the behavioral dimension of politics has been largely ignored in policy output studies.⁴⁹

Other studies have explored the relationship between socioeconomic and political variables and federal grant usage at the local level. Many of these studies are cited later in Chapter II, authored by such scholars as Terry Clark, Michael Aiken, Robert Alford, and Herman Turk.⁵⁰

Conclusion

The above brief review of trends in federal intergovernmental relations and state and local policy literature has provided the essential groundwork for a design to examine the determinants of federal grant usage. Partial parameters of elements to be examined and utilized as dependent variables in the analysis to follow were identified as: (1) the distinction between the more physical-traditional type grants and the social-oriented grants going to communities at an increasingly rapid rate; (2) the increasing use of project grants; (3) the use of paragovernmental institutions in administering federal grants; and (4) the lack of restrictions by the states which allows a direct linkage between the federal government and communities in the establishment and administration of federal grants. Further elaboration of these components as they relate to this research will be found in the second chapter.

The review of state and local policy analysis literature has contributed to the analysis to follow through: (1) providing a systemic framework whereby environmental and political system variables can be statistically measured for relevance; (2) identifying the controversies that exist regarding the importance of socioeconomic vis-a-vis political system variables in explaining policy output; and (3) pointing out the importance of the usage of political process variables in examining determinance of policy outputs.

The author will now turn to Chapter II to provide the reader with the questions, theories, and design which constitute the framework for this dissertation. Chapter III will provide a description of the political

character of the city manager cities which are under study. The actual analysis of determinants of federal grant usage follows in Chapter IV. Lastly, a summary of the findings and how these findings contribute to the literature of policy analysis will be shown in Chapter V.

FOOTNOTES

1. James L. Sundquist and David W. Davis, Making Federalism Work (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1969), 1.
2. Ibid.
3. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Special Analysis of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1973 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Printing Office, 1973), 239-255.
4. Morley Segal and A. Lee Fritschler, "Emerging Patterns of Intergovernmental Relations," Municipal Yearbook 1970 (Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association, 1970), 17-22.
5. William Lilley III, Timothy B. Clark and John K. Iglehart, "New Federalism Report," National Journal, (January 20, 1973), 86-89; Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding (New York: The Free Press, 1969).
6. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), 151.
7. Ibid., 153-159.
8. Ibid., 137-138.
9. Ibid., 164-165.
10. Charles E. Gilbert and David G. Smith, "Emerging Patterns of Federalism in Health, Education and Welfare" (paper prepared for delivery at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1966), 1.
11. Ibid., 6.
12. James A. Maxwell, Financing State and Local Governments (Revised ed.; Washington: Brookings Institution, 1969), 55-56.
13. Terry Sanford, Storm Over the States (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), 24.
14. Richard H. Leach, American Federalism (New York: Norton, 1970), 135-150.
15. Maxwell, Financing State and Local Governments, 56.
16. V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Knopf, 1949), 298-314.

17. Duane Lockard, New England State Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: The Princeton University Press, 1959), 320-340.

18. Solomon Fabricant, The Trend of Government Activity Since 1900 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952).

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21. Glenn W. Fisher, "Interstate Variation in State and Local Government Expenditure," National Tax Journal, XVII (March, 1964), 57-74.

22. Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economics Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," Journal of Politics, XXV (May, 1963), 265-289.

23. David Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), esp. 125-148.

24. Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), 1-21.

25. Ibid., 3-5.

26. David R. Morgan, Handbook of State Policy Indicators (Norman, OK: Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma, 1971), 2.

27. Dawson and Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition," 274-275.

28. Ibid., 278-289.

29. Herbert Jacob, "The Consequences of Malapportionment: A Note of Caution," Social Forces, XLIII (December, 1964), 256-621.

30. Thomas R. Dye, "Malapportionment and Public Policy in States," Journal of Politics, XXVII (August, 1965), 586-601.

31. Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environment of Variables in the American States," American Political Science Review, (March, 1966), 73-82.

32. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public, 7-21.

33. Sharkansky and Hofferbert use factor analysis in such a way as to limit rather sharply the number of factors that can be produced. Selection is made from among a large collection of variables that load highly on principal factors. In this way, the factor technique produces relatively "pure" factors, devoid of large numbers of variables that contribute only weakly to the principal factors. In both the political and policy output variables, a large number of variables load low on two principal factors, and several variables load equally on each principal factor. In order to simplify these factors for the purposes of clarity and further analysis, all elimination was made of variables loading below .5 on both principle factors and those loading at least .5 on one but below .4 on the other factor in each sector. At this point, then, factor analysis of the variables that remained was performed after the above culling procedure. The values derived from this final set of analyses constitute the basis for constructing indexes of the political and policy sectors of the model used in this study.

34. Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics and Public Policy," American Political Science Review, LXIII (September, 1969), 862-879.

35. Brian R. Fry and Richard F. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," American Political Science Review, LXIV (June, 1970), 508-522. Fry and Winters findings have been the subject of some controversy in two recent studies. One study, John L. Sullivan, "A Note on Redistributive Politics," American Political Science Review, LXVI (December, 1972), 1301-1305, criticizes the procedure used by Fry and Winters, which involves comparing the best five of twelve political variables with the best five of six socioeconomic variables as correlates of redistribution. The crucial question in this analysis is whether the results would have been different if twelve political variables were compared with twelve socioeconomic variables, or if the best five of twelve had been compared with the best five of six. Sullivan, in his analysis, adds six additional socioeconomic variables indicating ability to pay, need and willingness to pay of states. Fry and Winters findings are reversed. He finds the best five socioeconomic variables yield a multiple-partial coefficient of determination of .17. The best five political variables yield a multiple-partial coefficient of .12. For all 24 variables, socioeconomic variables are found to be more important than political variables. He states from these findings one can conclude that although politics may make a difference in the amount of redistribution, it by no means overshadows the role of socioeconomic factors. Needless, he concludes further analysis is necessary.

A second study, Bernard H. Booms and James R. Halldorson, "The Politics of Redistribution: A Reformulation," American Political Science Review, LXVII (September, 1973), 924-933, criticizes Fry and Winters' method of deriving their redistribution index (dependent variables). The method used is inappropriate, they argue, because it is derived from percentages based on national distribution of families by income class, while the proportion of families in each income class varies from state to state. Consequently, the application of these percentages to each state's revenues and expenditures erroneously assigns burden and benefits to income classes.

Booms and Halldorson, in their reformulation of the redistribution ratio, formulate an equation for each state that takes into account income before taxes for all families and unattached individuals in each income class for each state. Using this redistribution index, the multiple-partial coefficient of determination of the political variables controlling for the socioeconomic variables stood at .46, which is a significant increase for the socioeconomic variable utilized in Fry and Winters study for 48 states. The multiple-partial coefficient for the socioeconomic variables controlling for the political stood at the same level (.46) as Fry and Winters study. The model used by Booms and Halldorson also accounts significantly for 84 percent of the total variance when using both socioeconomic and political variables as determinants of redistribution.

36. Ira Sharkansky, Spending in the American States (Chicago: Rand, McNally, 1968), Chapter 9.

37. Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovation Among the American States," American Political Science Review, LXIII (September, 1969), 880-899.

38. Ronald E. Weber and William R. Shaffer, "Public Opinion and American State Policy-Making," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XVI (November, 1972), 683-699.

39. Richard E. Deleon, "Politics, Economic Surplus and Redistribution in the American States: A Test of a Theory," American Journal of Political Science, XVII (November, 1973), 781-796.

40. Brett W. Hawkins, Politics and Urban Policies (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1971), 89-100.

41. Richard L. Cole, "The Urban Policy Process: A Note on Structural and Regional Influence", Social Science Quarterly, LII (December, 1971), 646-655.

42. Thomas R. Dye, "Governmental Structure, Urban Environment, and Educational Policy," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XI (August, 1967), 353-380.

43. Chester B. Rogers, "Environment, System, and Output: The Consideration of a Model," Social Forces, XLVIII (September - 1969), 72-87. Another study that has found political system characteristics of less importance in determining policy outputs is Roland J. Liebert, "Municipal Functions, Structure, and Expenditures: A Re-analysis of Recent Research," Social Science Quarterly, LIV (March, 1974), 765-783.

44. Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Development Analysis," American Political Science Review, LXII (March, 1968), 143.

45. Hawkins, Politics and Urban Policies, 94, 96-97.

46. Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, LXIII (September, 1969), 701-716.

47. Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), and James Q. Wilson and Edward Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," American Political Science Review, LVIII (December, 1964), 876-887. See also Raymond Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," American Political Science Review, LX (June, 1966), 322-324, which finds region more important than political characteristics in determining policy outputs.

48. Lineberry and Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies," 713-716.

49. James W. Clarke, "Environment, Process and Policy: A Reconsideration," American Political Science Review, LXIII (December, 1969), 1172-1182.

50. Michael Aiken and Robert B. Alford, "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Urban Renewal," American Sociological Review, XXXV (August, 1970), 650-665; Terry N. Clark, "Community Structure, Decision Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 Communities," American Sociological Review, XXXIII (August, 1968), 576-593; Herman Turk, "Inter-Organization Networks in Urban Society: Initial Perspectives and Comparative Research," American Sociological Review, XXXV (February, 1970), 1-19.

CHAPTER II

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS: QUESTIONS, THEORIES AND DESIGN

A primary concern of this research is to determine the correlates of innovation among cities as they pursue federal grants. Innovation in this context will be defined as the decision by local governments to adopt policies which require federal aid for on-going city functions as well as newly created programs and activities. Innovation as defined may thus derive from the search for additional funds to cope with the rising cost of many traditional municipal services or merely as the result of an effort to expand existing programs. Innovation in federal-local relations will also include activity of a more fragile and creative nature which occurs as a city makes the initial decision to adopt and put into operation a new federal grant which will continually require revenue.¹

Three principal questions in relationship to innovation will be explored as the central thrust of analysis in this dissertation. First, in general, why are some cities innovative in extensive use of overall grants while other cities are less active? Second, and related to the above question, is there a difference between cities which pursue more socially-oriented programs which affect the disadvantaged in society (e. g., Model Cities, Low Rent Public Housing, Neighborhood Youth Corps) vis-a-vis those cities which pursue more physical-traditional type programs which more broadly affect the entire community (e. g.,

Basic Water and Sewer, Urban Renewal, and Airport grants)? And third, what is the place of fragility (i. e., federal grant programs which are new and controversial)² in innovative actions of cities? These questions will be elaborated upon with specific hypotheses below. First, however, the systems model which will guide this research should be presented.

Figure 1 depicts the systems model which forms the basis for this study of urban policy toward federal grants-in-aid. This model is a revision of the political system model developed by Easton in The Political System (1953),³ later modified for state policy analysis by Dye,⁴ and finally more fully presented for urban policy study by Hawkins.⁵ The basic components of this systems model were discussed in the first chapter. This framework for analyzing urban federal aid policies provides greater differentiation between main classes of independent variables than earlier systems models. Forces outside the community are represented by extra-community political and socioeconomic influences. Influences external to the structure and decision making processes of government within the community, which can be an effect on federal grant outcome itself, are represented by the nature of the community power structure and the socioeconomic character of the community. As shown in Figure 1, environmental variables can act to directly influence federal grant outcomes, as illustrated by linkages A and B. Linkages C, D, and E, on the other hand, suggest the premise that environmental variables are inputs which shape the political and

administrative structure and processes and that the character of these political system variables may, in turn, determine federal grant outcomes. The latter linkage suggests the possibility that political system variables have an important independent effect on policy outcomes by mediating between environmental influences and actual policy outputs. The variables which will be utilized in this dissertation, associated with the above five linkages, are listed in Table 1.

Theories, Hypotheses, and Independent Variables

Most research in the literature of comparative policy analysis at the state and local levels has focused on linkages or relationships between various political and environmental variables and levels of revenue and expenditure. A few studies have also directed their attention to the subject of innovation in intergovernmental relations using one federal grant or a few as dependent variables. This dissertation, different from the above literature, will deal with determinants of innovation using both total grants to cities and grants in the social-oriented and physical-traditional areas. Eight theories with corresponding variables (See Table 1, first three sections) taken primarily from the above literature have contributed to the formulation of a number of hypotheses. These explanations of community innovation have never previously been brought together in one study. Therefore, the dissertation makes a second contribution to the literature of comparative policy analysis through theoretical integration of various diverse concepts as they relate to federal grant usage.




Figure 1. Relationships and Variables in Urban Federal Grants-in-Aid Policy Model
 Source: Modified from Hawkins, p. 14.

TABLE 1

VARIABLES TO BE EMPLOYED IN URBAN FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID POLICY MODEL AS SHOWN IN
FIGURE 1

I. Extracommunity Political and
Socioeconomic Influence Variables

1. Representative Congressional Power variables as expressed in terms of Seniority average of Congressional members, and organizational and political positions of Congressional members average score.
2. Regional Culture variables as expressed in terms of geographical location (South and non-South).

II. Community Environmental Variables

1. Political Culture variables as expressed in terms of percent of foreign born; percent of school enrollment - private schools; and median income.
2. Community Power variables as expressed in terms of professional and managerial class, as percent of total employed labor force; median education completed--25 years and over; number of manufacturing establishments with 20 or more employees per capita; number of independent banks with assets over \$10,000,000 per capita; number of voluntary organizations with national headquarters per capita; number of retail establishments with payroll per capita; and number of wholesale establishments per capita.
3. Community Differentiation and Continuity variables as expressed by population size; age of city; change 1960-1970; and density.
4. Poverty Indicator variables as expressed in terms of percent of families with incomes less than \$3,000; percent of individuals with less than five years education--25 years old and over; percent of population non-white; change in non-white population 1960-1970; and percent of housing lacking some or all plumbing

TABLE 1--Continued

III. Community Political and Administrative
System Variables

1. Political Structural Reform variables as expressed by presence of a nonpartisan election system; an at large election system; council size 5-9; mayoral selection by the council; and percent of city employees under the merit system.
2. Leadership Role variables as expressed in terms of city manager ideology; city manager activism; mayoral-administration contacts; city manager appointment power to staff and advisory boards and commissions; city manager professionalism; and city manager staffing for federal grant information.

IV. Policy Outcome Variables

1. Total per capita federal grant outlays for exemplary physical-traditional type programs.
2. Total per capita federal grant outlays for exemplary social-oriented programs.
3. Total federal grants per capita.
4. Newness of a federal grant program to a community (fragility).

The general hypotheses of community innovation, a brief explanation of their theoretical foundations from research findings, and how, from a methodological standpoint, each particular theory will be tested with related variables will now be set forth. The urban federal grant policy model hypothesized linkages A and B are described in the sections numbered 1-6. Linkages C, D, and E are described as hypothesized in those sections numbered 7-8.

1. Political Culture: (A) Cities holding "public regarding" values are more innovative in those policy areas which benefit the community as a whole, even when they are controversial and new, (i. e., total federal grant usage, fragile grant usage and exemplary physical-traditional federal grants) than cities dominated by groups with "private regarding" values. (B) Cities holding "private regarding" values are more innovative in those policy areas which benefit minorities (i. e., exemplary social-oriented grants) than cities dominated by groups with "public regarding" values.

The basis for the above hypotheses comes from the political culture theoretical foundations largely made famous by Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson in their book City Politics.⁶ These authors maintain that a city's native and immigrant makeup have an impact on policy. According to their political culture theory the native or "public regarding" culture founded on the Anglo-Saxon-Protestant tradition of the middle class, characterized by a lack of interest in politics, should correlate with policies being adopted for the good of the entire city rather than those which favor

a minority. On the other hand, the immigrant or "public regarding" culture cities founded upon the European immigrants unfamiliarity with independent political action, upon their familiarity with hierarchy and authority, and upon the urgent needs which come with migration and adaptation to a new environment, should be associated with policy making which benefits a special clientele. Political life in cities with this latter culture took for granted the necessity for government to satisfy individual needs in exchange for loyalty to the political machine.

The list of variables, admittedly only crude measures of political culture, commonly used in local policy analysis are the following: percent foreign born, percent of school enrollments in private schools, and median income. These indicators will be utilized as measures of political culture in this dissertation.

In reviewing the literature using these political culture variables, the following has been found as it relates to this research. Michael Aiken and Robert Alford seem to weakly confirm the above hypothesis concerning exemplary social-oriented grants. In their findings based on a universe of 646 urban areas of a population of 25,000 or more, it was discovered that median income clearly had an influence on a city's use of Low Rent Public Housing grants (a later defined social-oriented type program). This relationship existed in both the North and South with only one exception. However, as it concerns the hypothesis pertaining to the exemplary physical-traditional grants, total and fragile federal grant usage and the "public regarding" ethos, evidence seems to indicate

the inappropriateness of this premise. For example, in their study on Urban Renewal (a latter defined physical-traditional program), using the same universe as above, Aiken and Alford found no relationship between this dependent variable and the political cultural variables.⁸ On the other hand, Terry Clark's study of 51 communities of over 50,000 population, found that a large Catholic population is more closely associated with Urban Renewal grant usage (a less fragile grant at this time in most communities) and general budgetary appropriations--at a path coefficient level of .620 and .922 respectively--than a whole series of other variables including population size, decentralized decision-making structure, education, population, industrial activity, reformed government, and civic organization activity.⁹ Clark's findings indicate, in other words, just the opposite of what has been hypothesized as it related to the "public regarding" ethos except in the case of fragile grant usage.

2. Regional Culture: Cities in certain geographical regions use federal grants more in a total and exemplary sense than cities in other areas of the country.

The meaning of regional culture as a theoretical foundation is confusing. The author, in fact, debated using regional culture as a theoretical base. For as Hawkins has observed in his excellent review of urban policy analysis literature, one does not know when using region what it explains or predicts. As an explanatory variable, in other words, region seems awkward and indefinite because regions vary in so many aspects: in culture, history, demography, economy and politics, to name

just a few. Because of this, the use of region as a control variable, for example, in examining the effects of ethnicity can be criticized as controlling for ethnicity itself, since ethnicity is one of the demographic characteristics by which a region varies. Despite this criticism region will be employed here because it can demonstrate that relationships are not universal in all regions. It therefore serves a descriptive function in showing how various patterns may vary in intensity from region to region in the United States.¹⁰

The above hypothesis has been utilized in many policy studies with contrasting results. As the regional variable relates to federal grant usage it has been found by Raymond E. Wolfinger and John O. Fields that region alters the possible effects of population size, reformism and political culture on Urban Renewal.¹¹ When including a number of other variables Aiken and Alford, however, found that region, with some exceptions, did not alter the pattern of relationships found in Urban Renewal and Low Rent Public Housing federal grant usage.¹²

The United States will be divided into two geographical regions South and Non-South for purposes of this dissertation.¹³ Thus, region will be used in a contextual way (i. e., correlational analysis will be performed separately within each region for all other possible relationships examined). This procedure has the advantage of greatly strengthening the tests of hypotheses if the same patterns are found in different regions or if the deviations can be readily explained.

3. Concentration or Diffusion of Community Power:

(A) The greater the concentration of community power in a city the greater the probability of high performance in fragile federal grant usage. (B) The greater the diffusion of power in a city the greater the probability of high performance in overall, exemplary physical-traditional and social-oriented grants.

The above hypotheses, pertaining to community power and their possible relationships to federal grant usage, have been included mainly to avoid the possible criticism, made occasionally about state and local policy analysis literature, that this type of analysis has virtually ignored extra-community influentials (e.g., the influence of businessmen, labor leaders, etc.) and their effects on governmental decision-making processes and policy outcomes. In short, as James W. Clarke suggests, state and local policy analysis literature has ignored "the group process in policy making and to this extent, it has ignored a vital element in the allocative or distributive functions of the political system."¹⁴

In referring to community power this study will focus on two related explanations of community influence and the consequences of the distribution of power. Community power is first viewed as a property of dominant institutions in society. Secondly, the relationship of the educational level of the community to the power distributions within that community is considered. While both of these conceptualizations differ in the features of community organization which they single out as the critical measures of concentration of power, they share the assumption that the fewer the actors, the more concentrated the power.

From a theoretical perspective, concentration of power leads by inference to greater policy outputs.

The first categorization of community power comes partially from the research performed by Amos H. Hawley on community power and Urban Renewal success. Hawley proceeds from the notion that ultimate decision making power in the community resides not in elected decision makers and their selected administrators in government, but from the subsystem of organizational units within a community. He indicates that since organizational decisions in a community which may effect policy outcomes are made by those in the managerial and professional set, it follows that the number in this set can be an indicator of community power concentration. If the number in the managerial and professional set is great, the possibility of a cooperative atmosphere in decision making which ultimately leads to policy is diminished. On the other hand, if the members in the managerial and professional group are few the probability of conflict is lessened and decision making which leads to policy outcomes is increased.

Hawley uses an MPO ratio (the number in the proprietors and managerial class as a percent of the employed labor force) as an indicator of community power concentration. The study found a significant and high correlation between a low MPO ratio and high Urban Renewal expenditures on a per capita basis.¹⁵ This finding should be taken, however, with some skepticism. Clark in his study of 51 cities with a population of 50,000 or more found that the greater the decentralization of com-

munity power as measured by the number of persons involved in decision making in four issue areas (Urban Renewal, air pollution, poverty programs and the selection of mayor) the greater the number of Urban Renewal dollars per capita secured from the federal government.¹⁶

Clark's findings become a key to another line of investigation in this dissertation. For, as he explains, his research and that of Hawley's need not be viewed as incompatible. Urban Renewal, at the time Hawley's research was carried out in the 1950's, was a fragile program. Clark points out that fragile programs, which have the characteristics of being both controversial and new, tend to generate different community power forces which account for program output. In the case of fragile programs, he points out, concentration of power has been found to be essential for success. This pattern, it appears, is true in that research on other controversial urban issues, such as fluoridation acceptance¹⁷ and the process of school desegregation,¹⁸ have found greater success where power is concentrated. On the other hand, to recapitulate, Clark determined that decentralization is associated with greater Urban Renewal grant usage in advancing years of implementation.

The theoretical foundations for Clark's beliefs on community power are as follows. Concerning less fragile issues he reasons that the greater the number of outside pressures among groups in society which have come into contact with the less fragile activities, each pleading for an increase in a particular section of the budget, the greater the likelihood of compromise resulting in a further expansion of activities

and outputs. He further states that, with familiarity, legitimacy and acceptance generally occur. On the other hand, he argues that opposite results occur with fragile issues where the presence of a larger number of groups may delay or halt action which would lead to increased policy outputs. A weak government, or at least one which must govern with the participation or active consent of many supporting groups, is more likely than a strong one to have difficulty in implementing a fragile program. The number of groups in a community and the degree of elite domination of the government, therefore, become factors which have an influence on the success of fragile programs.¹⁹

In light of these theoretical explanations, the MPO ratio will be used as one indicator of community power to test whether the fragility of a program in the community, as is asserted, has a different relationship to federal grant usage. Fragility will be measured crudely by the number of years a federal program has been in a community. This information will come from a questionnaire to city manager cities in the United States, which is presented later.

Another way to conceptualize community power from an institutional perspective is to directly measure the organizational complexity of a city. The number of organizations of various types per capita-- manufacturing establishments with 20 or more employees, banks with more than \$10,000,000 assets, retail establishments with payrolls, wholesale establishments and voluntary association national headquarters--is important in this regard. Not only the sheer number of org-

anizations, but the number which have sufficient resources to have a potential and/or real impact on decisions concerning federal grant usage is critical.

Aiken and Alford in their studies on federal grant usage concluded that the number of financially important organizations within a city appears to be the most relevant factor in explaining innovation in such decisional areas as Urban Renewal, Low Rent Public Housing, and the War on Poverty programs. This indicates the importance of interorganizational complexity in a community. They found, when controlling for other variables, the more financially potent organizations that existed in a community the more the innovation. This is consistent with the above hypothesis concerning diffusion of community power.²⁰

The second aspect of concentration of power is related to the level of educational achievement in the community. It will be argued here following Aiken, Clark, Crain and Rosenthal that there are fewer power centers in cities with higher educational levels than those with lower educational levels.²¹ Crain and Rosenthal, in fact, found among especially well-educated communities that controversial issues such as fluoridation, school desegregation, urban renewal and bonds for municipal improvements are more likely to be present. These authors argue that among well-educated persons greater support is sufficient to overcome the debilitating effects of high levels of participation they found typified middle class communities. They theorize that the well educated are more likely to endorse innovation and "progress"; to be more liberal on civil rights;

and to support "amenities" such as recreational or cultural facilities. Well-educated people are also more likely to hear about new issues in local policies and have the time, money, and skills to participate in an effort to influence those decisions. Finally, the well educated are more likely to be members of voluntary organizations which can play political roles.

4. Community Differentiation and Continuity: City size, age, growth, and density are major determinants of innovation in federal grant usage.

The above hypothesis, with a city's population size, its age (census year city reached 25,000 population), growth in a decade and density acting as indicators, has two theoretical foundations. The first theory simply maintains that population size, density and growth act as indicators of environmental pressures, needs or demands on government for certain decisions and policy outputs.²² The second theory contends that population size and age are connected with the city's interorganizational makeup. As Aiken and Alford have noted in this connection, larger cities are more likely to have more organizations devoted to specific kinds of decisional areas regarding various grants, which will bolster their usage. And, presumably, the older the city the longer existing organizations will have to work out patterns of interaction, alliances, and coalition. In such a community, it is maintained, reactions to varying proposals for action--whether in the physical-traditional or social-oriented areas--are likely to be quite high, thus increasing the probability of developing a sufficiently high level of coordination to implement successfully community policy outputs.²³

Research in the literature has pointed to the importance of population size, density, growth, and age as they correlate with city expenditures and federal grant usage. Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone found population size important in explaining the level of public service development among 83 San Francisco area municipalities. A city's position in five development types--which is determined by the percentage allocated for planning and amenities expenditures--was found to positively correlate with a city's size and growth rate.²⁴ In another study on general expenditures, Robert Wood's analysis of 64 metropolitan New York municipalities ascertained that variations in spending are more closely related to population size than all other factors combined.²⁵

In relation to federal grant usage two other studies point to the importance of population size, growth and age. Population size was found by Clark to be correlated with Urban Renewal grant usage even when the effects of other variables were taken into account; it was not, however, the most important explanatory variable.²⁶ Furthermore, Aiken and Alford's research on Urban Renewal and Low Rent Public Housing seems to strongly confirm Clark's finding with the addition of age as an important component contributing to greater outputs.²⁷

5. Poverty Indicators: The greater the presence of poverty in a city the greater the federal grant usage in exemplary social-oriented programs.

The federal-local intergovernmental transformation of the Nineteen-Sixties, as observed earlier, has been in the direction of making

more money available to cities in socially oriented federal grants vis-a-vis physical-traditional type grants. This apparent response to the urban crisis of the 1960's presents a key question: Has the presence of poverty in a community been met by a distribution of federal money to the needy? This question concerning distribution of federal grants is crucial if one thinks in terms of alleviating problems in cities. It is also important from a theoretical perspective. If the need of the community for welfare programs accounted for all or most of the statistical variation between communities, the importance of this finding could not be overstated. As Aiken and Alford have observed, this would show that direct need, whether manifested in political demands by the needy or in autonomous responses to need by political leaders regardless of demands, was the major source of innovation and policy outputs, regardless of the value of key groups and the concentration of power.²⁸ One could also theorize that a rational response to the problem of poverty would require that where demands were greatest, all available resources would be utilized in alleviating problems created by poverty.

In reviewing the literature using poverty as an explanatory measure effecting policy outputs, contrasting findings again seem to be the rule. Herman Turk determined that poverty needs within a community played a very minor part in per capita poverty funding. It is of some note, however, that while an additive effect was not found by Turk, nevertheless, a small multiplicative effect with extralocal integration (number of voluntary national headquarters) was apparent. He found in this respect that

poverty demands had a higher correlation with poverty funding where extra-local integration was high.²⁹

Turk's findings differ from those of Aiken and Alford. They found in the Low Rent Public Housing program that cities with a high proportion of dilapidated housing in 1950, a high proportion of poor families, a high proportion of uneducated adults, a high proportion of highschool dropouts, and a large nonwhite population were more likely to have entered the Public Housing program--indeed, to have entered it faster, and to have a high performance level as reflected by the number of housing units per 100,000. These relationships were found to be approximately the same when computed separately for northern and southern cities. Since a strong and consistent relationship was found between the above poverty indicators and the entrance into and performance of this federal grant program, these scholars tried to determine the importance of this finding in the light of other patterns of relationship they had discovered. In this process they first used the level of housing dilapidation and city size as controls against all other variables, computing partial correlation coefficients. A second method of analysis was the utilization of stepwise regression, introducing the need variables first. In performing this exercise, they found that the variables which were strongly related to innovative action in Public Housing previously maintained their relative standing under subsequent testing.³⁰

A community's level of poverty for purposes of this research is reflected by the following variables which will be tested to determine

their correlation with the adoption of various social-oriented federal grants: percent of the population with incomes less than \$3,000, percent of individuals with less than five years education, percent of the population which is non-white, change in non-white population 1960-1970, and percent of housing lacking some or all plumbing. The exemplary social-oriented grants used in this dissertation will be specified later.

6. Representative Congressional Power: The greater the community's Congressional power the greater the probability of high performance for that community in innovative action in obtaining fragile, overall and exemplary physical-traditional and social-oriented grants.

Congressional power as used in the above hypothesis derives its theoretical origins from the basic notion that power is associated with a formal organizational base.³¹ Clearly this is only one of many ways to conceptualize Congressional power and admittedly this approach may omit important aspects of the power relationships existing in the Congress. The crux of this notion rests upon the assumption that a Senator or Congressman may have special control over the fate of legislative proposals of importance to domestic agencies. It is theorized that a mutual exchange system exists in which members of Congress who are important in an institutional, political and subject matter sense (i. e., members and leaders of domestic or party policy committees) may receive favors from federal administrators in the executive branch of government in the form of federal grants to their communities. In return, these Congressional representatives may dispense favors through

committee and floor action on key bills of importance to the administrative agencies.³²

Today, as Segal and Fritschler have reported, a large number of contacts take place between members of Congress and city representatives with reference to federal grants usage. The above authors place particular emphasis on the importance of these contacts since city representatives rank Congressmen and Senators as the first to call on among many other actors at the national and state level when difficulties arise in expediting the grant process. City representatives also rank Congressional members second as a source for obtaining routine information about grants.³³

This dissertation will utilize the following indicators of Congressional power which emphasize formal organizational power: (1) Seniority average of Congressional members; and (2) organization and political positions of Congressional members. An index for the second component above which indicates a Congressional member's organizational and political power (OPI) will assign points for the following:³⁴ two points for each committee chairmanship; two points for floor or assistant floor leadership positions; one point for membership on each prestige committee in the U. S. Senate and House of Representatives;³⁵ one point for membership on each of the party leadership committees;³⁶ and one point for each subcommittee chairmanship position held.

7. Political Structural Reform: (A) City manager cities with a greater number of reform characteristics will exhibit a higher pro-

propensity toward fragile federal grant usage as compared with city manager cities with fewer reform characteristics. (B) City manager cities with few reform characteristics will exhibit a higher propensity toward innovative action in overall and exemplary federal grant usage as compared with city manager cities with a greater number of reform features.

The above hypotheses concerning the structural character of the community's political and administrative system (See Figure 1) are based on the theoretical assumptions that have emerged from the reform movement in the United States. The reform movement at the local level, since its inception, has placed a major emphasis, as Harold Stone and others have noted, on sponsorship of structural devices (i.e., the city manager form, nonpartisan elections, at-large elections, small city councils, a professional civil service, and mayoral selection by the council, etc.). These structural devices were intended to centralize power in the hands of a small legislative body and a professional manager; at the same time, potential power of citizen groups was fragmented and dispersed by removing the instruments of the political party and the ward organization. Reformers argued that, with reform structural characteristics, a city would be more likely to maximize policy output in terms of service. The formal structural character of the municipality was thought to hold, as Stone and the others have emphasized, a key to providing effective services in an efficient manner to the people of the city.³⁷

Most urban policy studies, by political scientists at least, have

attempted to incorporate some measure of reformism in the attempt to explain variation in policy outputs. An examination of this literature suggests that the effects of reform political structure are as expected by the reform movement with some revision. In formulating the first hypothesis above the research of Rosenthal and Crain was again utilized. When considering the fragile issue of fluoridation, they found that adoption was more probable in cities having a strong executive (manager or partisan mayor) and a relative low level of direct citizen participation. Structural attributes which contribute to the manager's strong formal administrative authority are council selection of the mayor and a professional civil service. It should be noted that Rosenthal and Crain did find, contrary to the first hypothesis, that the existence of a nonpartisan election system in a city manager community was an inhibiting factor toward adoption of fluoridation. Their theoretical reasoning for this was that a party system provides a control over possible factionalism and conflict.³⁸

Concerning the second hypothesis correlating few reform characteristics with federal grant innovative action in an overall and exemplary sense, the following has been found which weakly supports our contention. Terry Clark in his study found an inverse zero order correlation between the presence of reform institutions and the use of Urban Renewal expenditures. This inverse relationship is relatively high ($-.308$), yet when controls are added the path coefficient is slightly positive ($.052$).³⁹ A study by Lineberry and Fowler is more conclusive

in support of our second reform hypothesis. These authors, however, did not include federal grant expenditures as a dependent variable for testing. Nonetheless, they did find that when their reform structural index increased, from least reformed on one end of the continuum to most reformed on the other, per capita expenditures decreased.⁴⁰

In testing the effect of reform structural variables on federal grant usage an index of reform will be utilized in this dissertation. Since this research is restricted to city manager cities, only those structural characteristics other than the existence of city manager form will be included.

A key for the index includes the following:

1. Nonpartisan election-1; Partisan election-0;
2. At large election-1; Combination or ward type-0;
3. Council size five through nine-1; Council size over nine-0;
4. Mayoral selection by Council-1; Mayoral selection by the people-0;
5. Percent of city employees under the merit system.

In using this index an additive reform score for each city will be computed for correlational purposes.⁴¹

8. Leadership Role: Leadership by the city manager is a major determinant of innovation in federal grant usage in a fragile, overall and exemplary sense.

Each of the foregoing theories and related variables which have been presented as potential correlates of innovation in obtaining federal grants have dealt with environmental attributes or with the political structure of communities. To complete the list of potential correlates, the role of executive leadership in city manager cities will be examined.

This last hypothesis is offered primarily in response to criticism by Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky⁴² and James W. Clarke⁴³ concerning state and local comparative policy analysis. To briefly summarize their arguments, they noted that scholars using the system model as an organizing framework have almost completely ignored the decision-making process variables in the conversion process.

Leadership of the city manager in his role as policy maker will be presented here as at least a partial way of overcoming the above criticism. Consideration will be given to factors which contribute directly or indirectly to the city manager's discretionary power in carrying out the policy making role in the community and which can have an effect on his activity in pursuit of federal grant programs. The impact of the following factors will be considered as they pertain to city manager leadership in the policy-making role: (1) The effect of a manager's ideology and his activism in city affairs; (2) The effect of the mayor-administrative relationships; (3) The effect of the manager's appointment powers; and (4) The effect of city manager career circumstances. The meaning of each of these subcategories and the way in which they will be operationalized will be set forth below. No previous studies, to the author's knowledge, have attempted to correlate the city manager's leadership role with federal grant usage.

The use of the subcategory of ideology and activism as it pertains to leadership in policy making has come largely from the research of Lawrence B. Mohr and Ronald O. Loveridge. Among local health

departments in four states and Ontario, with population of less than 600,000, Mohr found that the ideology of the public health officer (chief executive officer) and his inclination toward activism were indicative of his organization's emphasis on nontraditional programs. Ideology was defined in terms of a public health officer's opinion regarding the scope of services that should be offered by the local public health agency. Concerning these nontraditional functions the health officer was asked where the proper locus of responsibility should be (either local public agency or local private, etc.) for 26 kinds of medical and health care services. Activism was defined by Mohr in terms of the extent of interaction the health officer requires with others to obtain idea support, approval, and resources for agency programs. To measure opinion regarding the desirability of three different kinds of role activity the health officers were queried concerning: (1) Attempts to influence the health power structure in the community; (2) Attempts to obtain support, such as grant support, beyond local appropriations; and (3) Attempts to seek out community problems as opposed to waiting for them to be pointed out by others. Regarding the public health officer, findings supported the importance of the combined factors of ideology-activism which correlated with progressive nontraditional programing ($r = .40$ when controlling for community size).⁴⁴

Loveridge, in his book City Managers in Legislative Politics, pursued another research strategy focusing on these same forces of ideology and activism. He defines ideology in a conservative-liberal

context. Conservatives by his definition are those who believe in a limited role for government, while liberals favor a wider range of responsibilities and duties for government. Conservatives also are seen as reluctant to change the existing order, in contrast to liberals who supposedly favor continued improvement and purposeful change. To determine where city managers stood from an ideological standpoint a scale was developed based on a series of questions using the above definition.⁴⁵ In assessing activism in policy making an additional scale was developed based on another series of questions. Policy activism was measured by asking how the city manager viewed his policy making role, and how--in reality--he functioned in such subject areas as overcoming hostile attitudes in the community towards policy, his involvement in political affairs of the community to the point of even encouraging people to run for council, and his actual advocacy and initiation of municipal policy.⁴⁶ In this study of council-manager cities in the San Francisco area a strong relationship was found between liberal ideology of managers and policy activism. Conservative managers, on the other hand, were less committed to activism in the policy arena.⁴⁷

From a study by Deil Wright and Robert Boynton another aspect of managerial leadership in policy making that will be used in this dissertation was identified as mayoral contacts with the manager and his administration. In this study of 56 council-manager cities over 100,000 in the United States, a view of urban policy was offered which contrasts with the usual practice of measuring policy outputs in terms of revenue and ex-

penditure. From conversations with city managers and perusal of managerial literature they discerned a meaningful three-fold categorization of municipal policies. The first area was identified as traditional type policies of city government, e.g., roads, buildings, sewers, parks, etc. The second policy category was designated as emphasizing economic development, e.g., taxation, assessment, zoning, urban renewal, finance, etc. The third area specifies program dimensions relating to social or intergroup relations, which includes minority and ethnic group policies, and the range of governmental responses to citizen concerns and grievances.⁴⁸ Wright and Boynton found that as mayoral-manager and administrative contacts increased so did the manager's conception of the importance of his leadership role in the policy-formulating process. The only exception to this finding was at the stage of proposing policy in the field of traditional services. These scholars argue, from a theoretical perspective, that this finding may suggest administrative displacement by the mayor in certain areas of administrative concerns. Because of this displacement the manager is freed or perhaps expelled from traditional service areas and creates leadership roles in different areas.⁴⁹

Another independent variable which may have an effect on the leadership of the manager in the policy-making process is his power over appointments. Power of appointment includes not just appointments to the bureaucracy but also to policy-making boards, advisory boards and commissions. The Wright and Boynton study found a consistent relation between the capacity of the manager to appoint, and an enhanced leader-

ship position in all policy-making phases--proposing, developing support among council and the public, and leading support. Moreover, high appointive power of the manager is associated with the manager playing a prominent role in economic development and social policy areas.⁵⁰

The last component of the leadership role of the city manager in the policy making process as it relates to federal grant usage is the consideration of career circumstances. Career circumstances are defined in terms of educational attainment and tenure of the manager. Studies performed by Booth, Loveridge, and Warner E. Mills and Harry R. Davis will act as the principle reference points in this research.

Concerning the variable of city manager's educational attainment and its relationship to activity in the policy-making process, Booth and Loveridge have come to similar conclusions. Booth, in his book Council Manager Government in Small Cities, found that high educational attainment of managers correlated with an activist role in the policy making process.⁵¹ Loveridge discovered the same relationship along with a tendency for an activist role in the policy making process to be associated with both social science college education and apprenticeships in city management. Both authors explain these findings by the fact that city managers undergo a socialization process in college and on-the-job training which tends to give them a forceful view of the policy-making role. In graduate school, in particular, a social science student is exposed to the problems of the cities and the need for planning and leader-

ship so that shibboleths such as the administration-policy dichotomy may not be considered as appropriate for modern management needs.⁵²

Mills and Davis also discovered that tenure of the manager is an important career circumstance. In one city, they found long tenure greatly enhanced the power position of the manager.⁵³

In testing the above leadership hypothesis, a questionnaire was utilized. The questionnaire was sent to a randomly selected sample of city manager cities in the United States with a population of 50,000 or more. Questions used were obtained primarily from those sources discussed above in the leadership section. City managers were queried with regard to their perception of the following: (1) Managerial ideology and the scope of services he believes to be the responsibility of local government to actively pursue as essential functions (See question 10-11 in Appendix A); (2) The policy role he believes city managers should play and the one he believes he is playing at present (See questions 12 and 15 in Appendix A); (3) Mayoral relationships with the city manager and administrative officials (See questions 16-17 in Appendix A); (4) Managerial power over appointments to his staff and advisory boards and commissions (See questions 13-14 in Appendix A); (5) The manager's professionalism as determined by his educational and city manager experiences (See questions 5-9 in Appendix A); and (6) Staffing for federal grant information in his city (See question 4 in Appendix A). Specific scales have been developed focusing on the above perception of city managers. These scales and the interrelationships which exist

between these responses will be subject matter of the next chapter.

Design of Analysis

An area of vital importance in this dissertation is the selection of the federal grant programs which are to serve as the policy outputs of the urban federal grant model. The choice of federal grants has been determined primarily by the extent to which communities are free from possible interference by states in the grant acquisition process. Thus, grants where no state role is present or where applications are merely subject to comment by appropriate state agencies or the governor have been chosen. These federal grants, which act as dependent variables in the following analysis, also have in common the fact that: (1) The federal government budgeted \$40 billion or more for these grant purposes for FY 1972; (2) They are widely used by many communities in the United States. (See Appendix B for a description of each of these grants).

The total per capita federal grant outlay for FY 1972 for 12 specific grant programs will be employed as one of the dependent variables for testing the hypotheses stated previously.⁵⁴ These federal grant outlays will be further divided into two types--physical-traditional and social-oriented--for additional analysis. The distinguishing characteristic that separates the physical-traditional and socially-oriented grants can be stated in terms of benefit. The main purpose of the former group is to benefit the entire community while the latter group of grants has as its main purpose to benefit a special clientele within the community

(generally the disadvantaged). Urban Renewal, Parks Open Space, Basic Water and Sewer, Urban Mass Transportation, Aid for Airports, and Air Pollution Control grant outlays will be used to demonstrate physical-traditional grants. Low Rent Public Housing, Model Cities, Neighborhood Youth Corps, Operation Mainstream, Community Action and Legal Services grant outlays are considered as social-oriented grants for cities. In 1972 the social -oriented grants were governed in most instances by paragovernmental institutions which have little oversight by municipal legislative and executive bodies. The nature of paragovernmental institutions was discussed in the first chapter. It is believed because the city manager and his administration has little control over paragovernmental organized social-oriented grant programs that the effect of city manager leadership will be less than over the physical-traditional type grant activities.

Another factor to be used as a dependent variable will measure fragility. A fragile federal grant program has been defined as one which is new and controversial. Since the controversial nature of federal programs is hard to quantitatively measure in a comparative sense, the author will use the newness of a federal program to a community as perceived by the city manager in the questionnaire employed in this study as the basis of measurement. (See question 19 of Appendix A). A fragility score for the above 12 grant programs has been computed in terms of total federal grant longevity for each grant in a community added together and divided by the number of grants which

actually exist in the said community. Separate fragility scores for the physical-traditional and social-oriented categories using the above formula have also been computed to act as dependent variables. Points have been assigned for grant longevity through Fiscal Year 1972 in the following manner for each city:

1. Zero (0) points for zero (0) to one (1) year;
2. One (1) point for two (2) through five (5) years;
3. Two (2) points for six (6) years and beyond.

The effect of fragility on the existing patterns of federal grant outlays can, in this manner, be at least taken into account in the research to follow.

The investigation itself will be conducted in two basic components. The first component will consist of a statistical analysis of data from 56 randomly selected city manager cities in the U. S. with populations of more than 50,000.⁵⁵ The population cutoff of 50,000 has been selected largely because data for all independent variables are not readily available for smaller communities. Principal sources of data for this phase of the research have come from the County and City Data Book, 1972,⁵⁶ the Encyclopedia of Associations, 1972,⁵⁷ the Rand McNally International Bankers Directory, 1972,⁵⁸ and the Congressional Staff Directory, 1972.⁵⁹ Identification and other pertinent information on city manager cities which exist in the U. S. is presented in the Municipal Yearbook, 1972.⁶⁰

The second component of the investigation based on the above sample utilizes a questionnaire as a method for collecting data. Scales

of measurement have been devised dealing with city manager perception of reformism, managerial professionalism, ideology, managerial activism, mayoral-administrative activism, city manager appointment power and federal grant longevity in cities. (See Chapter III).

Before the actual analysis of federal grant innovation can be undertaken, it seems advisable to consider the problem of having to deal with such a large number of independent and dependent variables. Factor analysis is a commonly employed technique for identifying underlying dimensions of a large number of variables in order to provide a more parsimonious description of a particular set of characteristics. In using factor analysis, as R. J. Rummel points out, one can handle an unwieldy number of variables by reducing them to common factor patterns. Of further importance, one can uncover independent lines or dimensions in an area of particular interest in research.⁶¹

In the use of factor analysis in this research the number of factors produced will be limited by Kaiser's criterion (eigen values greater than unity). Since the factors will be used ultimately as "casual" explanations along with a number of other variables, factor scores for each city will be obtained from a orthogonal factor matrix. Orthogonal rotation has many advantages in its conceptual clarity, simplicity, and amenability to further analysis. The factors in orthogonal rotation are by definition uncorrelated since the axes are 90 degrees from each other. Orthogonal rotation thus insures that factors are statistically independent of one another. In the use of factor analysis certain factors may be identified which, from a conceptual approach, actually

help demonstrate the possible viability of many of the theories given above.⁶²

In examining federal grant usage simple, partial, multiple and multiple-partial correlation coefficients will be computed to express relationships among variables as is commonly done in other state and local policy research. Factor analysis also aids the analysis in data transformation of a group of related variables which can be used as a single variable.⁶³ The simple (or zero-order) correlation coefficient measures the closeness of association between two variables. It ranges from +1.0 indicating a perfect positive relationship to -1.0 indicating a perfect negative relationship; a coefficient of zero (0) or near zero (0) indicates no relationship among the two variables.

To achieve a control for the possible effect of intervening variables, partial correlation coefficients are utilized. The partial coefficient does this by adjusting the values of the dependent and independent variables to take into account the effect of the controlled variable. Partial coefficients also range in degree from +1.0 to -1.0 with a zero (0) or near zero (0) coefficient indicating that no independent relationship exists between two variables if control is made for the effect of specified intervening variables. The size of the partial coefficient describes the strength of a relationship under controlled conditions.

Lastly, multiple correlation coefficients (R) and multiple-partial coefficients are computed. Multiple coefficients show the effect of all variables in a model combined on a dependent variable. The multiple coefficient squared tells how much variance is accounted for by all

variables in a model on a dependent variable. Multiple-partial coefficients show the effect of a multiple correlation between a dependent variable and several independent variables, controlling for one or more independent variables.⁶⁴

In this study simple and partial coefficients are utilized to show the relationship between environmental and political system variables and federal grant usage as an urban policy output. Partial coefficients, in particular, show the relationship between federal grant innovation and a particular variable while controlling for all other variables. Multiple-partial coefficients aid in distinguishing whether socioeconomic variables together account for more of the variance in federal grant innovation or whether political variables together are more important. This is a particularly important question in the state and local policy literature as was discussed in Chapter I.

In performing this statistical analysis it is hoped that the potential validity of the diverse theoretical foundation presented can be determined and that changes in theory as they relate to federal grant outputs can be discovered. Furthermore, as the various factors related to federal grant usage become known, suggestions may be presented for municipalities to take into consideration in grantsmanship.

FOOTNOTES

1. For reviews of much of the literature on innovation, see Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); Victor A. Thompson, "Bureaucracy and Innovation," Administrative Science Quarterly, X (June, 1965), 2-35; and Eliho Katz, Martin L. Levin, and Herbert Hamilton, "Traditions of Research in the Diffusion of Innovation," American Sociological Review, LIVIII (April, 1963), 231-252.
2. Terry N. Clark, "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," American Sociological Review, XXXIII (August, 1968), 587-588, discusses the concept of fragility which becomes a key topic in this dissertation. A fragile program, as described by the above author, is one which is controversial, new, and hard to implement by decision makers. Clark uses, as a crude measure of fragility, the newness of a particular program to a community. He theorizes, in his article, that it takes a centralized community power structure to pass fragile programs, but as the fragile program grows older and less controversial, a decentralized community power structure is more likely to be innovative in obtaining grant money for the said program.
3. David Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953). Also see this author's other book which further elaborates on systems theory in Political Science, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965).
4. Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics and the Public (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966), 1-21.
5. Brett W. Hawkins, Politics and Urban Policies (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), 10-18.
6. Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), 38-43, 139-154, and 171-172; Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), 9.
7. Michael Aiken and Robert B. Alford, "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Public Housing," American Political Science Review, LXIV (September, 1970), 852.
8. Michael Aiken and Robert B. Alford, "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Urban Renewal," American Sociological Review, LXIV (September, 1970), 653-655.

9. Clark, "Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," 587-590.
10. Hawkins, Politics and Urban Policies, 40-41.
11. Raymond E. Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Governments," American Political Science Review, LX (June, 1966), 322-324.
12. Aiken and Alford, "The Case of Urban Renewal," 659-660; "The Case of Public Housing," 862-863.
13. The geographical regions are defined by the U.S. Bureau of Census.
14. James W. Clarke, "Urban Policy Output Models" (paper prepared for delivery to the American Society for Public Administration Conference, Philadelphia, Penn., April 7-8, 1970), 7.
15. Amos H. Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," in The Search for Community Power, ed. by Willis D. Hawley and Frederick M. Wirt (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), 343-352.
16. Clark, "Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," 587-588.
17. Donald B. Rosenthal and Robert L. Crain, "Structure and Values in Local Political Systems: The Case of Fluoridation Decision," in City Politics and Public Policy, ed. by James Q. Wilson (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968), 217-242; Robert L. Crain, Eliho Katz, and Donald B. Rosenthal, The Politics of Community Conflict: The Fluoridation Decision (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1969).
18. Thomas R. Dye, "Urban School Segregation: A Comparative Analysis," Urban Affairs Quarterly, IV (December, 1968), 141-165.
19. Clark, "Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," 587-588.
20. Aiken and Alford, "The Case of Urban Renewal," 661-663; and "The Case of Public Housing," 859-863; and "Community Structure and the War on Poverty: Theoretical and Methodological Considerations" in Studies in Political Ecology, ed. by Mattei Dogan (Paris, France: 1970).
21. Michael Aiken, "The Distribution of Community Power: Structural Bases and Social Consequences," in The Structure of Com-

munity Power: Readings, ed. by Aiken and Paul E. Mott (New York: Random House, 1970); Clark, "Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," 585-587; Robert R. Alford and Eugene C. Lee, "Voting Turn Out in American Cities," American Political Science Review, LXII (September, 1968), 796-813; Robert L. Crain and Donald B. Rosenthal, "Community Status as a Dimension of Local Decision-Making," American Sociological Review, XXXII (December, 1967), 970-984.

22. Hawkins, Politics and Urban Policies, 65-72.

23. Aiken and Alford, "The Case of Urban Renewal," 662.

24. Robert Eyestone and Heinz Eulau, "City Councils and Policy Outcomes," in City Politics and Public Policy, ed. by James Q. Wilson (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.), 37-65.

25. Robert C. Wood, 1400 Governments (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1961), 31.

26. Clark, "Urban Renewal in 51 Communities," 587.

27. Aiken and Alford, "The Case of Urban Renewal," 657-659; and "The Case of Public Housing," 857-859.

28. Aiken and Alford, "The Case of Public Housing," 858.

29. Herman Turk, "Interorganizational Networks in Urban Society," American Sociological Review, XXX (February, 1970), 14-15.

30. Aiken and Alford, "The Case of Public Housing," 858-859.

31. See Lawrence K. Pettit, "Influence Potential in the United States Senate," in The Legislative Process in the U. S. Senate, ed. by Pettit and Edward Keynes (Chicago: Rand McNalley and Company, 1969), 230-244; Samuel A. Kirkpatrick and Lawrence K. Pettit, "Role Structure and Influence in the United States" (paper prepared for delivery at the Sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, Calif., September 8-12, 1970).

32. Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1964), 84-90.

33. Morley Segal and A. Lee Fritschler, "Emerging Patterns of Intergovernmental Relations," Municipal Yearbook 1970 (Washington, D. C.: International City Management Association, 1970), 55-57.

34. The Senate Organizational and Political Index (OPI) is

taken from Pettit, "Influence Potentials in the United States Senate," 231-232.

35. Senate: Appropriations, Finance, Foreign Relations, Armed Services Committees. House of Representatives: Ways and Means, Rules, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Appropriations Committees.

36. House of Representatives, Republicans: Policy Committee, Committee on Committees; Democrats: Steering Committee, Committee on Committees; Democrats: Policy Committee, Steering Committee.

37. Harold A. Stone, Don K. Price and Kathryn Stone, City Manager Government in the United States (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940), 236-257.

38. Rosenthal and Crain, "The Case of Fluoridation Decision," 224-242.

39. Clark, "Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," 587.

40. Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, XLVIII (September, 1967), 713-714.

41. The scale is a revision of the one used by Bryan D. Jones and Delbert A. Taebel, "Urban Politics in Texas," in Politics in the Urban Southwest, ed. by Robert D. Wrinkle (Albuquerque, N.M.: The Division of Governmental Research, University of New Mexico, 1971), 11.

42. Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure, and Power: An Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics," Journal of Politics, XXX (May, 1968), 510-538.

43. James W. Clarke, "Environment, Process, and Policy," American Political Science Review, LXIII (December, 1969), 1173-1181.

44. Lawrence B. Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation in Organizations," American Political Science Review, LXIII (March, 1969), 115-116.

45. Ronald O. Loveridge, City Managers in Legislative Politics (Indianapolis: The Bobbs and Merrill Company, Inc., 1971), 65. The scale used by this author and later in this dissertation comes from Daniel J. Levinson, "Politico-Economic Ideology and Group Memberships in Relation to Ethnocentrism," in The Authoritarian Personality,

T. W. Adorno, et al (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), 158-163; as revised by Neal Gross, Ward Mason, and Alexander McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), 183-192, 364-365.

46. Loveridge, City Managers in Legislative Politics, 48-51.

47. Ibid., 65-67, 119-126.

48. Deil S. Wright and Robert Paul Boynton, "Policy Formation in Large Council-Manager Cities: Some Thoughts on Mayor-Manager Relationships" (paper prepared for presentation at the Midwest Conference of Political Science, Ann Arbor, Michigan, April 25-27, 1969), 10-11. Also, see Boynton and Wright, "Mayor-Manager Relationships in Large Council-Manager Cities: A Reinterpretation," Public Administration Review, XXI (Jan/Feb., 1971), 28-36.

49. Ibid., 27-29.

50. Ibid., 25-26.

51. David A. Booth, Council Manager Government in Small Cities (Washington, D. C.: International City Management Association, 1968).

52. Loveridge, City Managers in Legislative Politics, 58-67.

53. Warner E. Mills, Jr., and Harry R. Davis, Small City Government (New York: Random House, 1962), 11.

54. Total outlays for all grants to cities came from Office of Economic Opportunity, Federal Outlays, 1972 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972).

55. Eighty-six of a total of 164 city manager cities from 50,000 population and up were sent questionnaires on the basis of region and population size as listed in the Municipal Yearbook, 1972 (Washington, D. C.: International City Management Association, 1973). Fifty-six cities returned the questionnaire and those cities are the basis for subsequent analysis. There is no reason to believe that the nonresponding cities differ in any important way from those that did return the questionnaire. Thus, the 56 cities can be considered as a genuine random sample.

56. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, County and City Data Book, 1972 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Printing Office, 1973).

57. Encyclopedia of Associations, 1972 (Detroit, Michigan: Gale Research Co., 1973).

58. Rand McNally International Bankers Directory, 1972 (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1973).

59. 1972 Congressional Staff Directory (Washington, D. C., U.S. Printing Office, 1972).
60. The Municipal Yearbook, 1972.
61. R. J. Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XI (December, 1967), 448-451.
62. Ibid., 460-475. Also see R. J. Rummel, Applied Factor Analysis (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), and Harry H. Harman, Modern Factor Analysis (2nd ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).
63. R. J. Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis, 450-451.
64. Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (2nd ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), 376-400 and 454-459.

CHAPTER III

POLITICAL CHARACTER OF CITY MANAGER CITIES

This study, different from most research in the literature of state and local policy analysis, seeks to determine the effects that leadership of the city manager, Congressional influence, as well as city political structure, may have on federal grant policy innovation. A brief description of the various studies seeking ways to present factors involved in executive leadership, Congressional influence, and city political structure were included in the previous chapter. Scales utilized in this analysis for Congressional influence and the political structure of cities were included in Chapter II (See Sections 6-7).

In this chapter, the following is presented so that a greater comprehension of the political character of the 56 cities of this study's random sample can be more fully understood:

- (1) Scales utilized to present responses of city managers to certain questions regarding their leadership character;
- (2) A description of the political character of the cities involved in this study with regional contrasts;
- (3) Correlations among the various political variables.

Development of Political Variables

From the questionnaires sent to city manager cities of a population of more than 50,000, various scales have been developed from various

sets of questions seeking the perceptions and attitudes of city managers on several topics. Scales were developed to measure managerial professionalism, ideology, policy activism, mayoral-administrative contacts, and managerial appointment power. Whether cities have staffing to aid in federal grantsmanship also is a question for analysis.

Five questions have been developed to measure city manager professionalism. Subjects of interest, as they relate to professionalism of city managers that are presented by these questions, are the levels of education attained, specialization in management or social science type subjects in undergraduate and graduate studies, tenure as city manager, and preparatory job-training which would enable a city manager to act in a more responsive and professional way in dealing with problems of cities. The questions asked and the scales for a computed city manager professionalism score which is later used as an independent variable in the multivariate analysis are presented in Table 1.

Ideology of a city manager was ascertained by using a series of twelve questions developed by Neal Gross and others.¹ The degree of government control perceived as necessary in various activities, the role of government in society in dealing with interest groups, and admired human traits of individuals were topics of interest in this Politico-Economic scale. Conservatives, according to Gross, are characterized as believing in a limited role for government and being reluctant to change the status quo. Liberals, on the other hand, believe that government should have a wide range of responsibility and move toward purposeful change that will benefit the less fortunate. In the Politico-

TABLE 1

QUESTIONS USED IN CONSTRUCTING THE CITY MANAGER
PROFESSIONALISM SCALE

Questions

1. What is the highest level of education which you have completed?
(Check one).

- | | |
|-------------------------|------------------------------|
| A. Highschool_____ | B. Undergraduate degree_____ |
| C. Graduate degree_____ | D. Others_____ |

(One (1) point will be assigned for completion of college and two (2) points for obtaining a graduate degree).

2. If applicable what was your specialization as an undergraduate?
(Check one).

- | | |
|---|--|
| A. Engineering_____ | B. Physical and natural sciences |
| C. Architecture and
Planning_____ | D. _____
Political Science or Govern- |
| E. Geography, Economics,
Finance, History or | ment_____ |
| Sociology_____ | F. Business Administration_____ |
| G. Public Administration | H. Journalism or English_____ |
| I. _____
Others_____ | |

(One (1) point will be assigned for an undergraduate degree either in the Administrative or Social Science majors--D, E, F, and G).

3. If applicable what was your specialization at the graduate level?
(Check one).

- | | |
|--|--|
| A. Engineering_____ | B. Physical and natural sciences |
| C. Architecture and
Planning_____ | D. _____
Political Science or Govern- |
| E. Geography, Economics
Finance, History or | ment_____ |
| Sociology_____ | F. Business Administration_____ |
| G. Public Administration | H. Journalism or English_____ |
| I. _____
Others_____ | |

(One (1) point will be assigned for a graduate degree in either the Administrative or Social Science areas--D, E, F, and G).

TABLE 1--Continued

Questions

4. How long have you been in the city manager profession? (Check one).

- A. Three or less years_____ B. Four-six years_____
C. Seven-ten years_____ D. Eleven or more years_____

(One (1) point will be assigned for four or more years in the City Manager's profession).

5. What was the position you held immediately prior to your present position? (Check one).

- A. Assistant City Manager B. Chief Administrative Officer
C. _____ Personnel Director_____ D. _____ Finance Director_____
E. Police Chief_____ F. City Engineer_____
G. Line Department Head H. Business Executive_____
I. _____ City Manager_____ J. Other_____

(One (1) point will be assigned for those who have had city manager professional related experience--A, B, and I).

*A professionalism total score is computed for all city manager responses from questions 1-5.

Economic scale (See Table 2) nine questions indicate liberality with a strong agreement response. Three of the questions, on the other hand, indicate conservatism with a strong agreement response. Points in the scale are given for strong agreement, moderate agreement, slight agreement, slight disagreement, moderate disagreement, and strong disagreement to the liberal questions, with responses receiving a 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 points respectively. The three conservatism questions are given the opposite pointage for the same responses above. A possible score of 72 for strong agreement with all liberal questions and strong disagreement with all conservatism questions can be achieved. Twelve points are possible for strong disagreement with all the liberal and strong agreement with all the conservatism questions.

To determine the range of control a city manager believes he should have over non-traditional issue areas in city affairs, another question was developed. This question specifically asks the city manager to indicate which level of government (i. e., city, county, city/county, special district, state, federal, or other) he believes should have primary control for handling several issue areas (i. e., water pollution, air pollution, recreational development, preserving open space, racial discrimination, unemployment, housing, and health care) provided adequate federal funding is available (See Appendix A, Question 11). For each non-traditional issue area that was checked as a city or city/county responsibility, one point was given. Other government categories for non-traditional issue areas checked received a zero score. A total of eight points is possible

TABLE 2
QUESTIONS USED IN CONSTRUCTING POLITICO-ECONOMIC
SCALE

Questions

Here is a list of 12 questions about politics and economics. Circle the number of the response that best expresses your opinion.

Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Slightly Agree	Slightly Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
-------------------	---------------------	-------------------	----------------------	------------------------	----------------------

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

A. When private enterprise does not do the job well, it is up to the government to step in and meet the public's need for housing, water, power, and the like.

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

B.¹ Men like Henry Ford and J. P. Morgan, who overcame all competition on the road to success, are models for all young people to admire and imitate.

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

C. The government should own and operate all public utilities (gas, electric, water).

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

D.¹ In general, full economic security is bad. Most men would not work if they did not need the money for eating and living.

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

E. The only way to do away with poverty is to make basic changes in our political and economic system.

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

F. There should be some upper limit such as \$50,000 per year on how much a person can earn.

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

TABLE 2--Continued

Questions					
Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Slightly Agree	Slightly Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5	6
G. At this time, powerful big business is a greater danger to our national welfare than powerful big unions.					
1	2	3	4	5	6
H. We need more government controls over business practices and profits.					
1	2	3	4	5	6
I. Labor unions in large corporations should be given a larger part in deciding company policy.					
1	2	3	4	5	6
J. The government should develop a comprehensive program of health insurance and medical care.					
1	2	3	4	5	6
K. ¹ America may not be perfect, but the American way has brought us about as close as human beings can get to a perfect society.					
1	2	3	4	5	6
L. Strong labor unions are necessary if the working man is to obtain greater security and a better standard of living.					
1	2	3	4	5	6

¹These three questions in the Politico-Economic Conservatism scale indicate conservatism with a strong agreement response. The other nine questions indicate liberality with a strong agreement response.

if the city manager believes all non-traditional issue areas should fall under his domain.

City manager policy activism is assessed by the development of another scale based on a series of questions first asked by Loveridge of city managers in the San Francisco area.² Policy activism is measured by asking how the city manager viewed his policy making role and how--in reality--he functioned in such subject areas as the following: overcoming hostile attitudes in the community toward policy; his involvement in political affairs of the community to the point of even encouraging people to run for council; and his actual advocacy and initiation of municipal policy. In addition to these topics, the author has introduced a question to ascertain a city manager's attitude toward activism in intergovernmental grantsmanship to aid in community services.

In the scales using questions presented in Tables 3 and 4, seven questions were developed to indicate an activist type of city manager with a strong agreement response. Three other questions in both tables indicate a less activist type of city manager with a strong agreement response. For the seven questions which indicate an activist type, a response of strongly agree, moderately agree, moderately disagree, and strongly disagree assignment is made of 4, 3, 2, 1 points respectively. The three less activist-type questions are given the opposite pointage for the same responses above. A score of 40 is possible for strong agreement with all activist-type questions and strong disagree-

TABLE 3

**QUESTIONS USED IN CONSTRUCTING CITY MANAGER ACTIVISM
ROLE SCORE**

Questions

Ever since the council-manager plan was first adopted, there has been much disagreement over what a city manager should or should not do. Here are ten questions on the job of being a city manager. (Circle the number of the response that best fits your position).

	Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
	1	2	3	4
A. A city manager should advocate major changes in city policies.				
	1	2	3	4
B. A city manager should give a helping hand to good councilmen who are coming up for reelection.				
	1	2	3	4
C. ¹ A city manager should maintain a neutral stand on any issues on which the community is divided.				
	1	2	3	4
D. ¹ A city manager should consult with the council before drafting his own budget.				
	1	2	3	4
E. A city manager should assume leadership in shaping municipal policies.				
	1	2	3	4
F. A city manager should encourage people whom he respects to run for the city council.				
	1	2	3	4

TABLE 3--Continued

Questions				
	Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
	1	2	3	4
G. ¹ A city manager should act as an administrator and leave policy matters to the council.				
	1	2	3	4
H. A city manager should advocate policies to which important parts of the community may be hostile.				
	1	2	3	4
I. A city manager should work through the most powerful members of the community to achieve policy goals.				
	1	2	3	4
J. A city manager should actively attempt to gain intergovernmental grants to aid in community services.				
	1	2	3	4

¹These three questions indicate in the Activism scale a less activist type of city manager with a strong agreement response; the other seven questions indicate an activist type of city manager with a strong agreement response.

TABLE 4

**QUESTIONS USED IN CONSTRUCTING CITY MANAGER ACTIVISM
AS CITY MANAGER SCALE**

Questions

Here are ten questions focusing on actual activities of city managers. (Circle the number of the response which most accurately describes how you behave as city manager in your present community.

Always Often Seldom Never

1 2 3 4

A. I advocate major changes in city policies.

1 2 3 4

B. I give a helping hand to good councilmen who are coming up for reelection.

1 2 3 4

C.¹ I maintain a neutral stand on any issues on which the community is divided.

1 2 3 4

D.¹ I consult with the council before drafting my own budget proposal.

1 2 3 4

E. I assume leadership in shaping municipal policies.

1 2 3 4

F. I encourage people whom I respect to run for the city council.

1 2 3 4

G.¹ I act as an administrator and leave policy matters to the council.

1 2 3 4

TABLE 4--Continued

Questions				
	Always	Often	Seldom	Never
	1	2	3	4
H. I advocate policies to which important parts of the community may be hostile.				
	1	2	3	4
I. I work through the most powerful members of the community to achieve policy goals.				
	1	2	3	4
J. I work actively in attempting to gain intergovernmental grants to aid in community services.				
	1	2	3	4

¹These three questions indicate in the Activism scale a less activist type of city manager with a strong agreement response; the other seven questions indicate an activist type city manager with a strong agreement response.

ment with all the less activist-type questions. Ten points are possible for strong disagreement with all the activist questions and strong agreement with all the less activist questions.

To gain a comprehension of the city manager power over appointments which could contribute to or inhibit his discretionary authority, two sets of questions were asked:

(1) How many department heads can you appoint? _____

On the other hand, how many can you not appoint? _____

(2) How many policy boards and/or advisory commissions can you appoint? _____

On the other hand, how many can you not appoint? _____

An appointment power scale, using the above two sets of questions, designated one point for each department head the city manager cannot appoint and one point where a city manager lacked power to appoint any policy making boards or advisory commissions. A zero in the appointment power scale thus indicates greater power of a city manager over a significant segment of the municipal organization.

Deil Wright and Robert Boynton found that, in large council-manager cities, as mayoral-manager and administration contacts increased so did the manager's conception of the importance of his leadership role in the policy formulating process.³ To create a variable to measure the importance of this relationship, two questions were asked city managers in this study:

(1) What, in your opinion, is the frequency of contact between the mayor and various city officials in your community as it pertains to city affairs? (Check one).

- A. Daily _____ B. More than weekly _____
C. Weekly _____ D. Monthly _____

(2) In your opinion, what is the frequency of contact between yourself and the mayor as it pertains to city affairs? (Check one).

- A. Daily _____ B. More than weekly _____
C. Weekly _____ D. Monthly _____

A mayoral/administration activity score is computed by combining the scores of responses from both of the above questions. Points were assigned in the following manner: one point for daily contacts; two points for more than weekly; three points for weekly contacts; and four points for monthly contacts.

Through the development of the above scales, it has been possible to measure various city manager characteristics and determine their potential effects on federal grant innovation as is discussed in Chapter IV. Before proceeding to this analysis, however, focus will be directed in the next two sections on how the entire group of 56 city managers scored on the political scales along with non-South (35 cities) and South (21 cities) comparisons and on the correlation among these political variables. The correlation analysis later will be used to refine the political variables used as independent

variables for the multivariate policy analysis.

National and Regional Contrasts of Political Variables

Comparisons now will be presented of political variables on an all cities and a South and non-South basis.⁴ An attempt has been made, where possible and within realistic terms, to divide the responses equally into three categories--high, medium, low. This ordinal ranking of the political measures seemed to be the most useful way of presenting the variation captured by the various scales even though, later, many of these variables will be used as interval-level measures in the multivariate equations.

The amount of Congressional influence potentially available to various cities in the study is presented in Tables 5a - 5d. In the Senate, members have an Organizational Power Index (OPI) ranging from .5 to 5, while members of the House of Representatives may have an OPI score ranging from 0 to 6. The OPI, it will be remembered, measures Congressional influence for each city in terms of Congressional committee assignment, leadership in committee actions as determined by whether a member is a chairman or subcommittee chairman, and a member's floor leadership position. Among Senators, seniority varies from 2.0 years to 28.0 years. The House of Representatives' delegations from the cities vary in seniority, on the other hand, from 1.0 to 37.0 years.

Somewhat surprisingly, the OPI and seniority average for Senators is higher in the non-South than the South as is shown in Tables 5a and 5b. This becomes more pronounced when the high and medium OPI categor-

TABLE 5a

**ALL CITIES, SOUTH AND NON-SOUTH CITIES BY SENATE
ORGANIZATIONAL POWER INDEX (OPI)**

OPI	All Cities		South		Non-South	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
High (3.5-5.0)	13	23.3	4	19.0	9	25.7
Medium (2.0-3.0)	19	33.9	3	14.3	16	45.7
Low (.5-1.5)	24	42.8	14	66.7	10	28.6
Total	N=56	100.0%	N=21	100.0%	N=35	100.0%

TABLE 5b

**ALL CITIES, SOUTH AND NON-SOUTH CITIES BY SENATE
SENIORITY AVERAGE**

Seniority Average	All Cities		South		Non-South	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
High (6.5-28.0)	19	34.0	6	28.6	14	40.0
Low (2.0-6.0)	37	66.0	15	71.4	21	60.0
Total	N=56	100.0%	N=21	100.0%	N=35	100.0%

TABLE 5c

**ALL CITIES, SOUTH AND NON-SOUTH CITIES BY HOUSE
ORGANIZATIONAL POWER INDEX (OPI)**

OPI	All Cities		South		Non-South	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
High (2.0-6.0)	21	37.5	8	38.1	13	37.2
Medium (1.0-1.8)	20	35.7	9	42.9	11	31.4
Low (0-.7)	15	26.8	4	19.0	11	31.4
Total	N=56	100.0%	N=21	100.0%	N=35	100.0%

TABLE 5d

**ALL CITIES, SOUTH AND NON-SOUTH CITIES BY HOUSE
SENIORITY**

Seniority Score	All Cities		South		Non-South	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
High (15.7-37.0)	17	30.4	9	42.8	8	22.9
Medium (6.0-15.0)	21	37.5	6	28.6	15	42.9
Low (1.0-5.5)	18	32.1	6	28.6	12	34.2
Total	N=56	100.0%	N=21	100.0%	N=35	100.0%

ies are combined which results in the non-South having a percentage of 71.4 while the South has a percentage of only 33.3, and all cities have a percentage of 57.2. Forty percent of the non-South Senators have high seniority, having been in the Senate from 6.5 to 28.0 years, while in the South 28.6 percent and 34.0 percent from all cities are in this same category.

While the OPI and seniority average of Senators is highest in the non-South, the opposite results are present in the House of Representatives, with the South consistently being higher, both on the OPI and in seniority, as can be observed in Tables 5c and 5d. The OPI score for the South for the combined high and medium categories is 81.0 percent compared to 68.6 percent in the non-South and 73.2 percent for all cities. In comparing the House of Representatives' seniority average for the high category, the South again reports the highest at 42.8 percent (for 15.7 - 37.0 years tenure), as contrasted with the non-South at a level of only 22.9 percent and 30.4 percent for all cities.

Table 6 indicates how the cities compare in terms of the number of reform structural characteristics which are present. Scores assigned to cities of this study vary from 2.0 to 5.00. A score of five represents the possession of all reform characteristics (at-large election, non-partisanship, one hundred percent civic service coverage, and council size 5-9) while a score of only two indicates only two of the reform characteristics are evident. Every city had at least two of these reform features. The conclusion that can be drawn from Table 6 is that cities in the non-South are more reformed in structure than southern cities.

TABLE 6
ALL CITIES, SOUTH AND NON-SOUTH CITIES
BY POLITICAL REFORM CHARACTERISTICS

Reform Score	All Cities		South		Non-South	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
High (4.00-5.00)	22	39.3	6	28.6	15	45.7
Medium (3.15-3.99)	16	28.6	6	28.6	10	28.6
Low (2.00-3.00)	18	32.1	9	42.8	9	25.7
Total	N=56	100.0%	N=21	100.0%	N=35	100.0%

A Federal Liaison Office (FLO) in Washington or in the city where the federal regional departmental offices are present, has been established by nearly 54 percent of the cities in this study as can be observed in Table 7. In the non-South, FLO's are more prevalent where 57.1 percent of the respondents have these institutions as compared to only 47.6 percent in the South. Morley Segal and Lee Fritschler found differing results for cities over 100,000 in population, whether mayor-council or city manager governmental form, with 52.7 percent of the cities in the South having an FLO in contrast with 51.7 percent in the non-South. Fifty-two percent of 94 cities over 100,000 population in this latter study have reported they have a FLO.⁵

The distribution of responses of city managers to questions concerning their leadership, as described earlier in this chapter, is presented in Tables 8a-8g. Rather than describe each table individually, two key results revealed by these tables will be discussed.

The regional character of a city seems to be important in determining the type of leadership a city manager possesses in most instances. Tables 8b, 8d, and 8g show that when descriptions are made of city manager ideology, activism·role in policy making, and perception of mayoral activity, in the non-South, city managers are more liberal, view their role as an activist in policy making, and believe the mayor is a more active participant in city administration than do those city managers

TABLE 7

ALL CITIES, SOUTH AND NON-SOUTH CITIES BY THE PRESENCE
OF A FEDERAL LIAISON OFFICE (FLO)

Presence of FLO	All Cities		South		Non-South	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	30	53.6	10	47.6	20	57.1
No	26	46.4	11	52.4	15	42.9
Total	N=56	100.0%	N=21	100.0%	N=35	100.0%

TABLE 8a

**ALL CITIES, SOUTH AND NON-SOUTH CITIES
BY CITY MANAGER PROFESSIONALISM**

Professionalism Score	All Cities		South		Non-South	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
High (6)	19	34.0	7	33.3	12	34.3
Medium (4-5)	25	44.6	9	42.9	16	45.7
Low (1-3)	12	21.4	5	23.8	7	20.0
Total	N=56	100.0%	N=21	100.0%	N=35	100.0%

TABLE 8b

**ALL CITIES, SOUTH AND NON-SOUTH CITIES
BY CITY MANAGER IDEOLOGY**

Politico- Economic Score	All Cities		South		Non-South	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
High (Liberal) (41-58)	17	31.5	3	15.0	14	41.2
Medium (33-40)	20	37.0	8	40.0	12	35.3
Low (Conservative) (25-32)	17	31.5	9	45.0	8	23.5
Total	N=54	100.0%	N=20	100.0%	N=34	100.0%

TABLE 8c

**ALL CITIES, SOUTH AND NON-SOUTH CITIES
BY CITY MANAGER PERCEIVED NEED
FOR CONTROL OF NON-TRADITIONAL AREAS**

Control of Non-traditional areas Score	All Cities		South		Non-South	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
High (5-8)	15	28.3	7	36.9	8	23.5
Medium (3-4)	21	39.6	10	52.6	11	32.4
Low (0-2)	17	32.1	2	10.5	15	44.1
Total	N=53	100.0%	N=19	100.0%	N=34	100.0%

TABLE 8d

**ALL CITIES, SOUTH AND NON-SOUTH CITIES
BY CITY MANAGER ACTIVISM ROLE**

Activism Role Score	All Cities		South		Non-South	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
High (30-36)	19	33.9	6	28.6	13	37.2
Medium (26-29)	21	37.5	7	33.3	14	40.0
Low (13-25)	16	28.6	8	38.1	8	22.8
Total	N=56	100.0%	N=21	100.0%	N=35	100.0%

TABLE 8e

ALL CITIES, SOUTH AND NON-SOUTH CITIES BY
CITY MANAGER ACTIVISM AS CITY MANAGER

Activism as City Manager Score	All Cities		South		Non-South	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
High (27-34)	18	32.2	7	33.3	11	31.4
Medium (24-26)	23	41.0	8	38.1	15	42.9
Low (14-23)	15	26.8	6	28.6	9	25.7
Total	N=56	100.0%	N=21	100.0%	N=35	100.0%

TABLE 8f

ALL CITIES, SOUTH AND NON-SOUTH CITIES BY
CITY MANAGER APPOINTMENT POWER

Appointment Power Score	All Cities		South		Non-South	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
High (0-1)	17	31.5	6	28.6	11	33.3
Medium (2-3)	23	42.6	13	61.9	10	30.3
Low (4-9)	14	25.9	2	09.5	12	36.4
Total	N=54	100.0%	N=21	100.0%	N=33	100.0%

TABLE 8g

ALL CITIES, SOUTH AND NON-SOUTH CITIES
BY CITY MANAGER PERCEPTION
OF MAYORAL ACTIVITY

Mayoral Activity	All Cities		South		Non-South	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
High (6-8)	38	34.5	11	28.2	27	38.0
Medium (4)	27	24.5	9	23.1	18	25.4
Low (2)	45	41.0	19	48.7	26	36.6
Total	N=110	100%	N=39	100%	N=71	100%

in the South. On the other hand, the perceived need to have control over non-traditional areas (i.e., water pollution, air pollution, recreational development, preserving open space, racial discrimination, unemployment, housing and health care), and actual control over appointment of department heads, policy boards and advisory commissions is more evident in the South as can be observed in Tables 8c and 8f.

The regional character of a community, however, does not seem to have an effect on a city manager's professional background nor on the activism pursued by city managers in city policy making. The distribution of the South and non-South in the high, medium, and low categories in Tables 8a and 8e are practically identical for these two characteristics. A higher percentage of city managers in both regions are found in the medium category as it pertains to professionalism than in the other categories. A higher percentage of managers also are located in the middle range than in the high and low categories when the manager's activities on policy making is examined.

The above findings concerning a city manager's leadership characteristics on a regional basis are not too surprising. For one may have theorized from the outset that the general conservative nature of the South would result in city councils choosing managers that are more conservative in their attitude towards government than those in the non-South. Furthermore, the movement toward functional consolidation of activities is far more prevalent in local governments in the South than in the non-South.⁶ This further is evident in the res-

ponse to one question (See Appendix A, Question 18) where out of 19 functional areas southern city managers said their cities had primary control over the decision making processes and operation of services in 14 or more of the functional areas in 61.9 percent of the cities. In contrast, the non-South city managers had control over 14 or more of these functional areas in only 34.3 percent of the cities.

In summary of the political independent variables then, it has been revealed that there are differences in a number of important areas in the South and non-South in the political attributes which are under study. Regional differences are evident in the following political variables:

- (1) Congressional organizational power and seniority;
- (2) Reform structural character;
- (3) The presence of a Federal Liaison Office;
- (4) City manager ideology;
- (5) City manager control over non-traditional areas;
- (6) City manager activism role;
- (7) City manager appointment power;
- (8) City manager perception of mayoral-administrative activity.

Correlations Among Political Variables

Table 9 presents the simple correlation among all the political variables used in this research. Only in an occasional instance is the correlation large enough between any of the political variables so as to merit elimination of any from the analysis.

TABLE 9

SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG POLITICAL VARIABLES AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Variable Name	Var. No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Senate Organisational Power Index	1	1.00																		
Senate Seniority Average	2	.65***	1.00																	
House Organisational Power Index	3	.06	.31*	1.00																
House Seniority Average	4	-.06	.00	.65***	1.00															
Reform Score	5	.15	.06	.09	.02	1.00														
Presence of Federal Liaison Office (FLO)	6	-.10	.04	-.08	-.17	.18	1.00													
City Manager Professionalism Score	7	-.02	.10	.33*	.38**	.14	-.14	1.00												
City Manager Politics-Economic Score	8	.03	.01	.10	.07	.07	-.10	.27*	1.00											
Control of Non-Traditional Areas	9	-.07	.02	.11	-.00	.00	.15	-.17	-.11	1.00										
City Manager Activism Role Score	10	-.15	-.06	-.02	.12	.16	-.08	.27*	.32*	.09	1.00									
City Manager Activism as City Manager Score	11	-.11	-.05	.09	.18	.16	.05	.30*	.34*	.07	.79***	1.00								
City Manager Appointment Power Score	12	.21	.13	.23*	.29*	.02	-.08	.40**	.24*	.00	.24	.19	1.00							
Mayoral Activity	13	.05	-.14	-.09	-.14	.09	-.07	.04	-.05	.02	.12	.11	.03	1.00						
Physical-Traditional Grant Outlays	14	.08	.22	-.08	-.15	-.19	.31*	.29*	-.12	.03	-.19	-.16	-.19	-.09	1.00					
Social-Oriented Grant Outlays	15	.28*	.24*	.18	-.03	-.12	.22	-.04	-.10	.22	-.16	-.14	.22	.17	.38*	1.00				
Total Grant Outlays	16	.13	.07	-.10	-.22	-.26*	.37**	-.24*	-.18	.18	-.24*	-.18	-.14	.02	.79**	.78**	1.00			
Physical-Traditional Grant Fragility	17	.16	.35**	-.03	-.16	-.07	.25*	-.02	.31*	-.04	.07	.20	-.14	-.03	.12	.06	.07	1.00		
Social-Oriented Grant Fragility	18	-.15	.23*	.15	.13	-.30*	-.14	-.03	.01	.01	.13	.06	-.16	-.07	-.01	-.08	-.09	.38**	1.00	
Total Grant Fragility	19	.01	.32*	-.02	-.12	-.22	.12	-.06	.25*	-.05	.11	.16	-.21	-.07	.07	.00	.01	.89***	.72***	1.00

* P < .05

** P < .01

*** P < .001

In looking at Congressional influence, the Senate seniority average and Senate organizational power index have a simple coefficient of .65 which is significant at the .001 level. This means that 42.3 percent of the variance level of one variable is accounted for by the other variable. The House seniority average and House organizational power index independent variable are further correlated at the same level with a coefficient of .65.

The way a city manager views his activism role and city manager activism as a city manager is further correlated at a level of .79 which is significant at a level of .001. This means that 62.4 percent of the variance level between these variables are accounted for by the other variable.

In the next chapter, because of the large correlation between the above political variables and the fact that they apparently measure essentially the same concept, three variables will be eliminated (i.e., the Senate OPI, the House of Representatives OPI, and a activism role score of city manager). The Senate seniority average, the House seniority average, and the city manager activism as city manager variables will remain as a part of the matrix to examine the possible effects on federal grant usage. All other variables listed in Table 9 will also be included.

Other meaningful correlations revealed in Table 9 are those between city manager professionalism, ideology, activism in policy making, and appointment power. A professional city manager who has been adequately schooled in management or in the social sciences and has had adequate city manager preparatory job training and tenure is apparently

likely to have a liberal ideology, be an activist in policy making, and have appointment powers adequate to better perform his undertakings. This finding is consistent with those of Loveridge and Wright and Boynton.⁷

This study shall now turn to the examination of federal grant innovation in city manager cities. One of the key findings of the next chapter is that the political character of a community is a main determinant of federal grant usage and longevity. This finding is contrary to most state and local policy studies reviewed in Chapter 1 and 2 which have found socioeconomic influence most influential on policy.

FOOTNOTES

1. Neal Gross, Ward Mason and Alexander McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), 183-192.

2. Ronald O. Loveridge, City Managers in Legislative Politics (Indianapolis: The Bobbs and Merrill Company, 1971), 48-58, 119-133.

3. Deil S. Wright and Robert Paul Boynton, "Policy Formation in Large Council-Manager Cities: Some Thoughts on Mayor-Manager Relationships" (paper prepared for presentation at the Midwest Conference of Political Science, Ann Arbor, Michigan, April 25-27, 1969), 27-29.

4. The non-South region includes city manager cities of 50,000 population or more within states in the West, North Central, and Northeast census areas. The South region includes city manager cities of 50,000 population or more within states within that census region.

5. Morley Segal and A. Lee Fritschler, "Emerging Patterns of Intergovernmental Relations," Municipal Yearbook 1970 (Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association, 1970), 19.

6. See John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, The Metropolis: Its People, Politics and Economic Life (2nd ed.; New York: Harper and Row, 1970); Daniel R. Grant, "A Comparison of Predictions and Experience with Nashville 'Metro'," Urban Affairs Quarterly, I (September, 1965), 38-42, 47-48; Edward Sofen, The Miami Metropolitan Experiment (rev. ed.; Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books 1966).

7. Loveridge, City Managers in Legislative Politics, 45-78; Wright and Boynton, "Policy Formation in Large Council-Manager Cities," 23-24.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL GRANT INNOVATION IN CITY MANAGER CITIES

The preceeding chapters have presented a brief review of trends in federal intergovernmental relations and state and local policy literature which have assisted in the overall design of this research. The urban federal grant policy model with related hypotheses and theoretical explanations was developed to provide the structure for the analysis to follow. This chapter is devoted to the determinants of federal grant innovation--that is, the chapter will attempt to answer three major research questions: (1) Why are some cities innovative in extensive use of overall grants while others are less active? (2) Is there a difference between cities which pursue more socially oriented programs vis-a-vis those cities which pursue more physical-traditional type programs? and (3) What is the place of fragility in innovative action of cities?

As mentioned in Chapter II, examination of determinants of federal grant innovation will be accomplished through the utilization of simple (zero order), partial, multiple and multiple-partial correlation statistical techniques. However, the first task of this chapter is the narrowing and structuring of an unwieldy field of independent variables and dependent variables to promote parsimony and clarity. Analysis will then proceed with the identification of determinants of federal grant usage in a total and exemplary categorical sense (physical-traditional, social-

oriented and total grants per capita as dependent variables) and secondly in identifying determinants of innovation when grants are considered along a fragility dimension.

Structuring of Independent and Dependent Variables

To achieve a greater degree of parsimony and to provide structure for the independent and dependent variables a two stage strategy has been employed. First, those variables which are highly intercorrelated and conceptually similar have been identified, so that one variable might be used in place of one or more variables. And second, factor analysis has been chosen to isolate patterns of shared variance among the remaining combination of variables.¹ The first step of eliminating certain highly intercorrelated variables also serves to avoid "loading" the factor analysis with a number of quite similar variables.

Independent Variables

Among the community socioeconomic variables identified as potential independent variables (See Table 1), two sets of variables are identified which have large intercorrelations (See Table 2). In the first set, median income and the percent of families with less than \$3,000 income have a large inverse zero order correlation ($r = -.92$). Median income has been selected as a variable for inclusion largely because it correlates slightly higher with this study's dependent variables than does its inverse counterpart. Second, median education and percent of those educated less than 5 years also have a large inverse relationship ($r = -.71$). Again,

TABLE 1

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES SUBJECT TO ANALYSIS

(Community Socioeconomic)

1. Population
2. Population Density
3. Age Reached 25,000
4. Population Change 1960-1970
5. Negro Population Change 1960-1970
6. Percent of Families with less than \$3,000
7. Percent of 21 year olds with less than 5 years Education
8. Percent of Population Negro
9. Percent of Housing without some or all Plumbing
10. Percent of Foreign Born
11. Median Income
12. Percent of Students in Private Elementary or Secondary Schools

(Community Power)

13. Ratio of Managers and Professional to Employed Labor Force
14. Median Education
15. Number of Manufacturing Establishments with 20 plus Employees Per Capita
16. Number of Retail Establishments with Payroll Per Capita
17. Number of Banks with \$10 Million Assets Per Capita
18. Number of National Association Headquarters Per Capita
19. Number of Wholesale Establishments Per Capita

(Extra Community Socioeconomic)

20. Region (South and Non-South)

(Extra Community Political)

21. Senate Organizational Power Index (OPI)
22. Senate Seniority Average
23. House Seniority Average
24. House Organizational Power Index (OPI)

(Community Political and Administrative System and Processes)

25. Reform Score
26. Presence of Federal Liaison Office
27. Professionalism Score
28. City Manager Politico-Economic Score
29. City Manager Perception of Primary Control of Non-Traditional Areas
30. City Manager Activism Role Score
31. City Manager Activism Score as City Manager
32. City Manager Appointment Score
33. Mayoral-Administration Activity Score

SIMPLE CORRELATIONS AMONG SOCIOECONOMIC										VARIABLES AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES											
Variable Name	Var. No.	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39
Population	20	1.00																			
Population Density	21	-.11	1.00																		
Age Reached 25,000	22	.54**	-.13	1.00																	
Population Change, 1960-1970	23	-.09	-.16	-.04	1.00																
Percent of Families Less Than \$1,000	24	-.05	-.04	-.06	-.33**	1.00															
Percent Educated Less 5 Years	25	-.06	.06	-.06	-.34**	.71**	1.00														
Negro Population Change, 1960-1970	26	-.06	.09	-.08	.48**	-.26	.23	1.00													
Percent of Population Negro	27	.11	-.18	.12	-.38**	.59**	-.49**	-.32**	1.00												
Percent of Housing Without Plumbing	28	-.10	-.11	-.11	-.31**	.57**	.49**	-.24*	.61**	1.00											
Percent of Labor Force Unemployed	29	-.03	.13	-.23*	-.03	.15	-.05	.30*	-.12	-.11	1.00										
Percent Foreign Born	30	-.10	.78**	-.13	-.05	.08	.01	.13	-.44**	-.27*	.29*	1.00									
Percent of Private School Enrollment	31	.04	.65**	-.01	-.35	-.12	-.03	-.17	-.11	-.02	.01	.65**	1.00								
Median Income	32	-.03	.22	-.01	.29*	-.92	-.45**	.18	-.52**	-.52**	-.08	.21	.18	1.00							
					.26*	.03	-.24*	.24*	-.23	-.08	-.14	-.10	-.22	.05	1.00						
Median Ratio Education	34	-.01	-.17	.03	.40**	-.44**	-.70	.30**	-.54**	-.39**	.00	-.15	-.24*	.44**	.62**	1.00					
Manufacturing Per Capita	35	-.11	.17	-.22	-.04	.41**	.44**	-.13	.34**	.58**	-.07	.08	.16	-.31*	-.07	-.23*	1.00				
Retail Per Capita	36	-.10	-.17	.11	-.35**	.25*	.07	-.19	.28*	.10	.27	-.18	-.05	-.23*	.00	.09	.04	1.00			
Wholesale Per Capita	37	.23*	-.13	.16	-.48**	.07	.11	-.22	.18	.09	.03	-.12	.10	-.05	-.14	-.07	.09	.49**	1.00		
Banks Per Capita	38	-.18	-.06	-.07	.15	.26*	.04	.03	.03	.27*	-.32**	-.14	-.11	-.31*	.36	.05	.14	.06	-.11	1.00	
National Headquarters Per Capita	39	-.04	.20	-.08	-.01	.00	.16	.30	.09	.07	.02	.06	.01	.02	.47**	.34**	-.10	.20	-.06	.23*	1.00
Physical-Traditional Grant Outlays	14	.10	.00	.20	-.02	.06	.22	.05	.37**	.15	.06	-.03	-.02	-.07	-.20	-.34**	-.06	.13	.16	.07	.08
Social-Oriented Grant Outlays	15	.08	-.04	.33**	-.16	.09	.00	-.07	.17	.19	-.13	-.09	-.07	-.10	-.01	-.05	-.05	.21	.35**	.17	.18
Total Grant Outlays	16	.12	-.01	.30*	-.12	.05	.13	-.01	.28*	.24*	-.01	-.06	-.03	-.07	-.15	-.24**	-.06	.17	.24*	.17	.17
Physical-Traditional Fragility	17	.11	**.00	-.01	-.04	.30*	.36*	.10	.33**	.31*	-.07	-.14	.05	-.37**	.02	-.24*	.26*	.11	.01	.07	-.01
Social-Oriented Fragility	18	-.03	-.19	-.14	-.01	.31*	.23	.11	.13	.13	-.07	-.23*	-.38**	-.36**	.19	-.14	.04	-.04	.09	.22	-.02
Total Grant Fragility	19	.06	-.11	-.05	-.01	.38**	.34**	.19	.30*	.27*	-.04	-.20	-.16	-.43**	.12	-.23*	.19	-.07	.09	.16	-.06
sp .05		sp .01		sp .001																	

median education correlates higher than the other variable with this study's dependent variables and thus will remain in the analysis. All the variables in the socioeconomic category correlated with one or several of our dependent variables at a Pearson's r level of .10 or above, it should be noted before proceeding.

The next step in dealing with the community socioeconomic variables is to observe the underlying factors which are present. Principal component factor analysis using orthogonal rotation produced three factors (See Table 3) from among the reduced list of community socioeconomic variables which have been named: (1) poverty, (2) culture, and (3) population. These three factors accounted for 67 percent of the total variance among these variables. Factor scores and other characteristics for each of the 56 cities included in the dissertation are presented in Appendix C.

The first factor (poverty) has a high positive loading for percent of the population Negro and percent of households without plumbing and high negative loadings for population change from 1960-1970, Negro population change 1960-1970, median income and median education. The poverty factor compliments the poverty variables identified and theorized in Chapter II. The factor further seems to indicate that those cities with large poverty populations are either losing population or growing slowly if at all.

The second factor which has been named "culture", actually directly corresponds with the variables presented in Chapter II as representing political culture. High positive loadings are achieved for percentage of

TABLE 3
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES^a

Variable Name	Poverty	Culture	Population	
Population	0.04303	-0.02175	0.86253	
Population Density	0.00136	0.87904	-0.10891	
Age Reached 25,000	-0.01110	-0.09253	0.85269	
Population Change 1960-1970	-0.67615	-0.30351	-0.10302	
Negro Population Change 1960-1970	-0.56742	-0.14136	-0.18551	
Percent of Population Negro	0.80919	-0.29393	-0.09986	
Housing Without Plumbing	0.73757	-0.21380	-0.21924	
Percent of Foreign Born	-0.18473	0.88505	-0.13005	
Percent of Students in Private Schools	-0.14877	0.86230	0.09204	
Median Income	-0.68275	0.28459	0.07064	
Median Education	-0.74052	-0.24633	0.04060	
Percent Total Variance	28.37	24.06	14.51	66.94

^a Varimax orthogonal rotation with Kaiser's criterion for number of factors.

the population that are foreign born and the percentage of students in private schools. Density of the population also has a high loading which would seem to indicate that, if one accepts the ethos theory, private regarding values are more prevalent in densely populated areas, which is not too surprising.

"Population" was the name given to factor 3. This factor has high loading for the population of a community and the age of a community (i. e., the age when the community reached 25,000). The population factor can at least partially aid in testing the hypotheses presented in Chapter II.

Next the community power category was reviewed for possible reduction (See Chapter II, Table 1). Factor analysis results in two factors from the series of variables depicting the interorganizational makeup of a community (See Table 4). These two factors account for 71 percent of the total variance among these variables. Factor scores for each city in the sample are presented in Appendix C.

The first factor discovered is called "trade center." This is largely because the number of retail establishments with payrolls and wholesale establishments per capita have high positive loadings on this factor. The second factor, named "financial center," finds the number of banks with \$10 million dollars assets and the number of national association headquarters per capita together with a high positive loading. Further, the number of manufacturing establishments with 20 or more employees per capita which in the original factor matrix loaded by

TABLE 4
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY POWER VARIABLES^a

Variable Name	Trade Center	Financial Center
Number of Retail Est. per capita	0.88792	0.00917
Number of Wholesale Est. per capita	0.79042	-0.39756
Number of Banks per capita	0.10021	0.77763
Number of Headquarters per capita	0.30426	0.74994
Percent of Total Variance	37.89	33.14 71.03

^a Varimax orthogonal rotation with Kaiser's criterion for number of factors.

itself is also to be a subject for further analysis.

The category of extra-community political and socioeconomic variables was also examined for potential interrelationships. The Senate organizational power index (OPI) and Senate tenure average variables were found to have a high zero order intercorrelation ($r = .65$). This high intercorrelation is consistent with Pettit's study where he found a high correlation of .70 between his Senate organizational power index and Senate seniority.² Congressmen's OPI and seniority has further been discovered to be highly correlated. The simple correlation between these variables is $r = .65$. Because of these relationships, the Senate and House seniority average variables were selected for use in this research since they had higher associations with this study's dependent variables than their intercorrelated counterparts (See Chapter III, Table 9).

Continuing to restructure and reduce the independent variables to be used in the research, a fourth area (political system leadership) was reviewed which resulted in the elimination of one leadership variable. A zero order correlation of .79 was found between the city manager activism role score and actual activism. Thus, in our analysis, city managers tend toward actualization of their conceived roles as city managers in policy making. Only the actual city manager activism score was used because of its slightly higher correlation with federal grant innovation indices (See Chapter III, Table 9).

Dependent Variables

In an effort to determine whether the various federal grant measures were significantly related, factor analysis was again employed. Table 5 presents two factors generated by orthogonal rotation. These factors account for 78 percent of the total variance found among these six variables.

Factor 1 represents fragility with high loadings among fragile physical-traditional, social-oriented and total grant longevity average. Factor two, on the other hand, represents actual federal grant utilization by cities with high loadings among physical-traditional, social-oriented and total federal grants per capita.

These factors are significant in that they succinctly indicate that the earlier proposed typology distinguishing between physical-traditional and social-oriented grants per capita is not valid. Cities which have high utilization of total grant usage also have high grant innovation in social-oriented and physical-traditional exemplary grant categories as well. This is not too surprising since physical-traditional and social-oriented grant variables have a product moment correlation of .79 and .78 respectively with the total grant usage variables. Also the physical-traditional and social-oriented variables of a fragile character have a high product moment correlation of .86 and .72 respectively with total grant fragility (See Chapter III, Table 9).

In this dissertation, the total federal grant per capita as well as total fragile grant score variables are employed in place of the above two factors since both have such extremely high loadings (.98 and .99

TABLE 5
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES ^a

Variable Name	Fragility	Total Grant
Physical-Traditional Grants per capita	0.06850	0.82279
Social-Oriented Grants per capita	-0.03537	0.81821
Total Grants per capita	-0.01722	0.97995
Fragile Physical-Traditional Grant average score	0.86809	0.11441
Fragile Social-Oriented Grant average score	0.78227	-0.11123
Fragile Total Grants average score	0.98992	0.02911
Percent Total Variance	39.92	38.16 78.08

^aVarimax orthogonal rotation with Kaiser's criterion for number of factors.

respectively) on the two respective factors. Correlations will also be made focusing on physical-traditional and social-oriented grant usage as dependent variables in an attempt to determine the validity of the political culture and poverty hypotheses. These latter two hypotheses are the only ones which make a distinct differentiation between physical-traditional grant usage and social-oriented grant usage.

Table 6 lists the final group of variables that will subsequently be used in the analysis of federal grant innovation. The characteristics of these variables are also presented so one can obtain a better comprehension of the profile of the 56 city sample.

Patterns of Federal Grant Usage

Tables 7 through 9 present the simple, partial, and multiple correlation coefficients for each variable with the various measures of federal grant usage.

The first two tables present simple, partial, and multiple correlations for total federal grant usage per capita, physical-traditional grants per capita, and social-oriented grants per capita. The control for region, presented in Table 9, tests whether the correlations may vary in magnitude from region to region (South-non-South). This, it may be recalled, was hypothesized in Chapter II.

The regional control is only performed on the dependent variable total federal grants per capita since this measure is so closely correlated with physical-traditional and social-oriented grants per capita

TABLE 6
FINAL INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT
VARIABLES AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS

Variable Name	Number (N)	Range		Mean	Standard Deviation
		Low	High		
Prop./Mgr. Class	56	113	413	256.32	58.95
Senate Seniority Average	56	2.0	28.0	6.12	4.96
House Seniority Average	56	1.0	37.0	12.36	8.64
Reform Score	56	2.00	5.00	3.81	.85
Presence of Federal Liaison Office	56	0	1	.46	.50
Professionalism Score	56	1	6	4.45	1.45
Politico-Economic Score	54	25	58	37.63	8.37
Control Non-Trad. Areas	53	0	8	3.55	2.14
City Manager Activism Score	56	14	34	25.41	3.65
City Manager Appoint- ment Score ^a	54	0	9	2.63	2.0
Poverty Factor Score	49	(-)2.32	2.58	.102	.96
Culture Factor Score	49	(-)1.50	2.39	(-).184	.91
Population Factor Score	49	(-)1.40	2.97	.02	1.09
Trade Center Factor Score	56	(-)2.19	2.71	.02	1.04
Financial Center Factor Score	56	(-)1.27	3.10	.02	1.02
Manufacturing Per Capita	56	.01	5.44	.75	.87
Mayoral-Adm. Activity	55	1	4	2.08	1.03
Phys. -Trad. Grants Per Capita	56	0	128.84	14.36	22.40
Social-Oriented Grants Per Capita	56	0	161.44	16.27	28.16
Total Grants Per Capita	56	0	227.74	28.72	40.41
Fragility Phys. -Trad.	49	0	2.0	1.24	.55
Fragility Soc. -Oriented	49	0	2.0	1.27	.44
Fragility Total	49	0	2.0	1.28	.43

^a A high recruitment score represents low recruitment power for the city manager.

TABLE 7

SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
BETWEEN INDICATORS OF FEDERAL GRANT USAGE
AND SELECTED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Variable Name	Total Federal Grants	Physical-Traditional	Social-Oriented
Proprietary and Managerial Class (MPO)	-.15	-.20	-.01
Poverty Factor	.17	.17	.10
Culture Factor	.13	.08	.04
Population Factor	.15	.08	.22
Trade Center Factor	.22	.13	.27*
Financial Center Factor	.13	.03	.16
Manufacturing/Capita	-.06	-.06	-.05
Senate Seniority Average	.07	.22	.24*
House Seniority Average	-.22	-.15	-.03
Reform Score	-.26*	-.19	-.12
Presence of Federal Liaison Office	.36**	.31*	.22
Professionalism Score	-.24*	-.29*	-.04
Politico-Economic Score	-.18	-.12	-.10
Control of Non-Traditional Areas	.18	.03	.22
City Manager Activism	-.18	-.16	-.14
Appointment Score	-.14	-.19	.22
Mayoral Activity	.02	-.09	.17

*P < .05

**P < .01

***P < .001

TABLE 8

PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
BETWEEN INDICATORS OF FEDERAL GRANT USAGE
AND SELECTED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Variable Name	Total Federal Grants	Physical- Traditional	Social- Oriented
Proprietary and Managerial Class (MPO)	-.26	-.25	.07
Poverty Factor	.00	.04	.02
Culture Factor	.38*	.26	.25
Population Factor	-.06	-.11	.10
Trade Center Factor	.20	.12	.22
Finance Center Factor	.28	.14	.28
Manufacturing/Capita	-.27	-.20	-.20
Senate Seniority Average	.27	.36*	.33*
House Seniority Average	-.13	.00	-.02
Reform Score	-.52***	-.39*	-.27
Presence of Federal Liaison Office	.47**	.40*	.23
Control of Non-Traditional Areas	.24	-.01	.26
Professionalism Score	-.08	-.16	-.03
Politico-Economic Score	-.09	.00	-.09
City Manager Activism	-.10	-.04	-.21
Appointment Power	-.04	-.11	.25
Mayoral Activity	.14	.03	.23
	(R ² = .56)	(R ² = .46)	(R ² = .34)
<div> <div>*P < .05</div> <div>**P < .01</div> <div>***P < .001</div> </div>			

TABLE 9

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
BETWEEN INDICATORS OF TOTAL FEDERAL GRANT USAGE
AND SELECTED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES BY REGION

Variable Name	SOUTH	
	Simple Correlation	Partial Correlation
Proprietary and Managerial Class	.06	.16
Culture Factor	.01	.17
Trade Center Factor	.26	.10
Finance Center Factor	-.01	.15
Manufacturing/Capita	-.08	-.16
Senate Seniority Average	-.05	.13
Reform Score	-.18	-.34
Presence of Federal Liaison Office	.38*	.45
Control of Non-Traditional Areas	.23	.30 ($R^2 = .36$)
NON-SOUTH		
Proprietary and Managerial Class	-.21	-.31
Culture Factor	.12	.54**
Trade Center Factor	.21	.46*
Finance Center Factor	.19	.09
Manufacturing/Capita	-.08	-.52**
Senate Seniority Average	.16	.48*
Reform Score	-.32*	-.64***
Presence of Federal Liaison Office	.39*	.67***
Control of Non-Traditional Areas	.18	.13 ($R^2 = .71$)

*P < .05

**P < .01

***P < .001

among the sample cities. The final list of independent variables reported in Table 6 is further reduced for the subsequent multiple correlation analysis to include only those with a partial coefficient with total federal grant innovation of .20 or above within each region. This reduction was necessary primarily to provide an appropriately small number of independent variables in a multiple correlation analysis for the South, which has only 21 cities in the sample. If the total number of independent variables is not reduced to about one-third of the number of cases being analyzed, artificially high multiple coefficients might result.³

It is at this point that answers will be sought for the first two research questions presented earlier in this chapter. Hypotheses for testing will be presented which were formulated in Chapter II with some revision for each component subsystem of this study's urban federal grant policy model followed by an analysis of relationships.

Community Socioeconomic Influence

The hypotheses for the community socioeconomic influence component subsystem, which have been drawn from the earlier described state and local policy analysis literature are the following:

1. Political Culture. (A) Cities holding "public regarding" values are more innovative in those policy areas which benefit the community as a whole (i. e., total federal grant usage and exemplary physical-traditional federal grants per capita) than cities dominated by groups with "private regarding values. (B) Cities holding "private regarding" values are more innovative in those policy areas which benefit minorities (i. e., exemplary social-oriented grants per capita) than cities dominated by groups with "public regarding" values.

2. Community Differentiation and Continuity. A city's demographic character is a major determinant of innovation in federal grant usage per capita in a total sense.

3. Poverty. The greater the presence of poverty in a city the greater the federal grant usage in exemplary social-oriented programs per capita.

The most striking finding concerning the effects of community socioeconomic influence is the partial rejection of hypothesis 1. As one can observe (Tables 7 and 8) in looking at the culture factor there is little difference in the correlation between physical-traditional and social-oriented grant usage as has been hypothesized. The social-oriented grant variable is in the right direction at a non-significant partial coefficient level of .25, but the physical-traditional partial coefficient is also in the same direction at .26. The total federal grant partial coefficient of .38 is significant at the .05 level. These correlations indicate that the political culture hypothesis should be rejected with political culture having the same effect on physical-traditional and social-oriented grant innovation.

The relationships between political culture and total grant usage are regional in character according to the correlations in Table 9. The culture factor for the South has a relatively low non-significant partial coefficient of .17 as compared with a high partial coefficient of .54 which is significant at the .01 level for the non-South. The lack of a meaningful relationship in the South between the culture factor and total federal grant usage per capita can probably be accounted for by the fact that private school attendance and ethnic populations are far less prevalent

in the South as compared to the non-South. This finding suggests, then, that the political ethos theory has some explanatory potential with respect to federal grant usage outside the South. Those cities with the potential for private regarding values are clearly more likely to be successful in the federal grant arena than their more public regarding counterparts when other demographic and political characteristics are controlled. Why this should be the case is not altogether clear although apparently more private regarding communities, even with a council-manager form of government, are more concerned with getting federal funds for local projects instead of relying on their own resources.

Hypothesis 2 which is concerned with the demographic character of a city, and which requires a correlation of the population factor with total federal grant usage per capita, is not substantiated. The correlations are extremely low and indeed almost nonexistent.

Hypothesis 3 must also be rejected. The poverty factor has a very low simple and partial correlation coefficient with social-oriented grants per capita. According to this finding, cities do not receive social-oriented grants at a higher rate because of the poverty state of the community. Firmly, then, the level of poverty is not correlated with cities obtaining federal money for the underprivileged. This finding complements Herman Turk's research findings but not those of Michael Aiken and Robert Alford.⁴

Community Power and Organizational Complexity.

The community power subsystem component of our urban federal

grant policy model has one hypothesis to test its influence on obtaining total federal grants:

The greater the diffusion of power in a city the greater the probability of high performance in total federal grant usage.

Concentration of power in the hands of a few managers and proprietors seems to contribute somewhat to the gaining of total federal grant outlays according to the partial correlation in Table 8. However, the partial correlation coefficient of $-.26$ for the MPO ratio is not statistically significant.

Another distinction is observed in the way in which interorganizational complexity influences federal grant outlays. Federal grant usage is related to measures of local organizational complexity, although only modestly, with a partial coefficient of $.20$ for the trade center factor, $.28$ for the finance center factor and $-.27$ for the number of manufacturing institutions per capita. The existence of a large number of retail and wholesale establishments along with the presence of banking centers and national headquarters seems to be of at least some importance for cities seeking federal grants. The data does indicate, however, that the manufacturing institutions are lower in number where total federal grant dollars going to a community are high.

Again, in the non-South region we find a more meaningful relationship than in the South (See Table 9). Indeed the trade center factor is significantly related to federal grant usage per capita with a partial coefficient level of $.46$ and manufacturing per capita is inversely related at $-.52$ in cities outside the South.

Extra-Community Political Influence

Extra community political influence in this dissertation is measured by the effects of Congressional organizational power and seniority on federal grant usage. These two variables are highly intercorrelated in the House and Senate of the United States as was specified earlier in this chapter. Since this was the case, it was decided to employ only one of these measures--the Senate and House of Representatives seniority average--as the means of testing the following hypothesis:

The greater the community's Congressional representation power the greater the probability of high performance for that community in innovative action in obtaining total federal grants.

Senators with greater seniority (and thus a higher power index) have a positive impact on cities obtaining greater federal grant outlays (See Tables 7 and 8), although the effect is apparently not great. Seniority demonstrates a simple correlation of .24 with social-oriented grants and .22 with physical-traditional grants. The Senate seniority average variable, however, is significantly correlated at the .05 level with two dependent variables--physical-traditional and social-oriented grant outlays per capita--at a partial coefficient level of .36 and .33 respectively when the effects of all other variables are controlled.

House seniority, on the other hand, does not have much effect on total federal grant usage among the 56 cities. There is a negative simple correlation of -.22 with total federal grants usage to start; however, disappointing results are apparent when partial correlation analysis is performed controlling for all other dependent variables (the re-

relationships virtually vanish as revealed in Table 8).

Congressional power in the Senate in its relationship to federal grant usage seems to be importantly attached to region. The partial coefficient with total federal grant usage on a per capita basis for the South stands at only .13 in contrast to .48 in the non-South area. This latter correlation was significant at the .05 level (See Table 9).

Political and Administrative Structures and Processes

The political and administrative structure and process variables seek to assess the extent to which political structure and the various forces which directly or indirectly contribute to or inhibit a city manager in his leadership capabilities have an effect on a community obtaining federal grant outlays. The structural aspects of city government are measured in terms of the extent of reform structure a city possesses and whether a city has taken leadership in dealing with the federal government through the creation of a Federal Liaison Office.

The following hypotheses have guided this section of research:

1. Political Structural Reform. City manager cities with few reform characteristics will exhibit a high propensity toward innovative action in total federal grant usage as compared with city manager cities with a larger number of reform characteristics.

2. Leadership Role.

- (A) Leadership of the city manager is a major determinant of innovation in total federal grant usage.
- (B) The establishment of a Federal Liaison Office in city manager cities is a major determinant of success in obtaining federal grant outlays.

The lack of a reform structure in cities is indeed a major determinant of federal grant usage as has been hypothesized above. The

reform score not only correlates with total federal grants per capita at a simple coefficient of $-.26$, which is significant at the $.05$ level (See Table 7), but also more importantly the partial coefficient of $-.52$, which is significant at the $.001$ level, is the strongest relationship in the whole analysis when all cities are included in the analysis. This means that 27 percent of the variance of federal grant usage is accounted for by the lack of reform in this study's model.

Both the South and non-South analyses also reveal the importance of the lack of structural reform characteristics in obtaining federal grants (See Table 9). The partial correlation of $-.64$ for the reform scale in the non-South region is the second highest correlation when controlling for all other variables. In the South, the partial coefficient is also second in importance at a level of $-.34$. This latter relationship, however, is not significant at the $.05$ level.

Hypothesis 2B is also strongly confirmed. The relationship between the presence of a Federal Liaison Office and total federal grants per capita, in fact, has the highest simple coefficient at $.36$ (significant at the $.001$ level) and the second highest partial coefficient at $.47$, which is significant at the $.01$ level (See Tables 7 and 8). Thus, the partial coefficient of determination between the presence of a Federal Liaison Office and total federal grant usage stands at a level of 22 percent in this study's model.

In cities outside the South, as well as those in that region, the importance of possessing a Federal Liaison Office cannot be overstated

in a city's effort in gaining total federal grants (See Table 9). The partial correlation between the presence of a Federal Liaison Office and total federal grant usage per capita is the highest in both the South and non-South at levels of .45 and .67 respectively. The latter correlation is significant at the .001 level. Whether cities that are getting lots of grant money find it convenient, if not essential, to create such a Federal Liaison Office merely to coordinate these activities, and in fact, act as a liaison after the fact, is not clear from these findings. This must, however, be viewed as a possibility.

The coefficients reported in Tables 7 through 9 suggest that hypothesis 2A should be rejected. City manager control over non-traditional areas is the most important facet of leadership that affects cities obtaining federal grant outlays. A partial coefficient of .24 appears for the relationship between this variable and total federal grants per capita which, however, is not significant at the .05 level.

The total explanatory power of the variables of this analysis on total federal grant usage is determined by the coefficient of multiple determination (R^2). Table 8 reveals that the percent of variance accounted for by the 17 variables included on total federal grant usage is 56 percent. In Table 9, the explanatory power of the non-South variables is shown to be greater than that of the South. In the non-South cities, 71 percent of the variance level of total federal grant usage is accounted for by the variable selected, as contrasted with only 36 percent among the variables selected in the cities in the South. From these

results, the great importance of region is dramatized. Furthermore, the explanatory power of the variables selected is greater in the 35 non-South region cities than for the variables included for the 56 cities of both regions.

The Correlates of Fragility

Tables 10 through 12 present the simple, partial, and multiple correlation coefficients to assess the effects of various independent variables on fragile grant programs. In this dissertation, fragile federal grant programs are defined in terms of the newness of the program which is believed will make the programs more susceptible to opposition. The fragility score, to recapitulate, has been computed in terms of total federal grant longevity for each of 12 grants in a community added together and divided by the number of grants which were reported to exist by city managers (See Appendix A, Question 19). Separate fragility scores for the six physical-traditional grants and six social-oriented grants using the above formula have also been computed to act as dependent variables. Assignment of points for federal grant longevity before and during FY 1972 to compute the fragility average score gave zero points for zero to one year, one point for two through five years, and three points for six years and beyond. The ultimate question this section will attempt to ascertain is whether fragility of various federal grant programs is related to various independent variables in the same way as are the actual federal grant outlays for the sample cities.

TABLE 10

SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
BETWEEN INDICATORS OF FRAGILITY
AND SELECTED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Variable Name	Fragility Total	Fragility Phys. - Trad.	Fragility Soc. Orien.
Proprietary and Managerial Class	.12	.02	.19
Poverty Factor	.11	.17	.06
Culture Factor	-.28*	-.07	-.40**
Population Factor	.02	.11	-.07
Trade Center Factor	-.00	-.10	.01
Financial Center Factor	.04	.02	.12
Manufacturing/Capita	.19	.26*	.04
Senate Seniority Average	.32*	.35**	.23*
House Seniority Average	-.12	-.16	.13
Reform Score	-.22	-.07	-.30*
Presence of Federal Liaison Office	.12	.25*	-.14
Professionalism Score	-.06	-.02	-.03
Politico-Economic Score	.25*	.31*	.01
Control of Non-Traditional Areas	-.05	-.04	.10
City Manager Activism	.16	.20	.06
Appointment Power Score	-.21	-.14	-.16
Mayoral Activity	.07	.03	.07

*P < .05

**P < .01

***P < .001

TABLE II

PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
BETWEEN INDICATORS OF FRAGILITY
AND SELECTED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Indicator	Fragility Total	Fragility Phys. - Trad.	Fragility Soc. - Orien.
Proprietary and Managerial Class	-.02	-.05	.08
Poverty Factor	.02	.04	.08
Culture Factor	-.20	.09	-.29
Population Factor	.04	.09	.09
Trade Center Factor	.05	-.17	.05
Financial Center Factor	-.16	-.03	-.07
Manufacturing/Capita	.19	.31*	-.01
Senate Seniority Average	.36*	.48**	.20
House Seniority Average	.00	-.09	.20
Reform Score	-.27	-.26	-.19
Presence of Federal Liaison Office	.20	.30	.12
Control of Non-Traditional Areas	-.14	-.09	-.08
Professionalism Score	.15	.12	-.06
Politico-Economic Score	.36*	.34*	.07
City Manager Activism	.14	.28	.02
Appointment Power Score	-.41*	.28	-.29
Mayoral Activity	.11	-.07	.15
	(R ² = .47)	(R ² = .52)	(R ² = .34)

*P < .05

**P < .01

***P < .001

TABLE 12

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
BETWEEN INDICATORS OF FRAGILITY
AND SELECTED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES BY REGION

Variable Name	SOUTH	
	Simple Correlation	Partial Correlation
Culture Factor	.17	.24
Manufacturing/Capita	.17	.08
Senate Seniority	.28	.45
Reform Score	-.22	-.30
Presence of Federal Liaison Office	-.09	.00
Politico-Economic Score	.05	.03
Appointment Power Score	.07	-.27 ($R^2 = .28$)
NON-SOUTH		
Culture Factor	-.39**	-.67***
Manufacturing/Capita	.14	.61**
Senate Seniority	.30	.28
Reform Score	-.10	-.023
Presence of Federal Liaison Office	.22	.40
Politico-Economic Score	.49***	.77***
Appointment Power Score	-.41**	-.79*** ($R^2 = .80$)

*P < .05

**P < .01

***P < .001

Hypotheses for testing will now be presented which were formulated in Chapter II with some revision for this particular component of the federal grant policy model.

Community Socioeconomic Influence

How the socioeconomic character of a community influences the actual decision to successfully adopt and maintain federal grants in their initial years is the topic of the first set of hypotheses:

1. Political Culture. Cities holding "public regarding" values are more innovative in those policy areas which on balance benefit all segments of the community, even when they are controversial and new, than cities dominated by groups with "private regarding" values.
2. Community Differentiation and Continuity. A city's demographic character is a major determinant of innovation in federal grant fragility.
3. Poverty. The greater the presence of poverty in a city the greater the possibility of federal grant initiation of social-oriented programs.

Hypothesis 1 is rejected by the relationships shown in Tables 10 through 12. The political culture factor correlates with the fragile total grant score with a simple coefficient of $-.28$, which is significant at the $.05$ level; a non-significant partial coefficient of $-.20$ is computed, however, while controlling for all other variables. Political culture has an inverse simple relationship which is significant with fragile social-oriented grants, but the partial coefficient is not significant.

The inverse relationship of political culture and total grant longevity is actually a regional phenomenon. In the non-South, a partial

correlation occurs of $-.67$ which is significant at the $.001$ level. Thus, in the non-South, public regarding values account for 45 percent of the variance level of all variables in determining total grant longevity. In the South, an opposite relationship occurs between political culture and total grant longevity at a partial coefficient level of $.24$ (See Table 12).

Hypotheses 2 and 3 above can be rejected in light of the correlation coefficients presented in Tables 10 and 11. The population and poverty factors have little effect, not only on the efforts of communities to preserve newly developing grant programs, but also in their efforts to maximize the total amount of federal grants received.

Community Power

The community power subsystem component of our urban federal grant policy model has one hypothesis to test the influence community power has on grant initiation:

The greater the concentration of power in a city the greater the probability of federal grant longevity.

Among the community power variables, the number of manufacturing establishments per capita is the only variable which significantly correlates with federal grant fragility (See Tables 10-12). The number of manufacturing institutions per capita, it may be recalled, correlates inversely with total grant outlays in the previous section. The opposite is true here as the simple and partial correlation coefficients for manufacturing establishments per capita correlate positively with fragile grant usage score in the physical-traditional area. Also, as has been

observed previously, the highest correlation as it pertains to community power concentration has appeared among non-South cities. Again this is true when the number of manufacturing institutions per capita is correlated with total federal grant longevity. The result is a partial coefficient of .61 which is significant at the .01 level.

This analysis thus indicates that the diverseness and potential influence of manufacturing establishments is a factor in the non-South with respect to the longevity of federal grant programs. The diverseness of activity of banking and trade establishments and national headquarters are, on the other hand, more critical in securing total federal grants.

Extra Community Political Influence

The Senate and House of Representatives seniority averages which represent Congressional representative power provide an appropriate means for testing the following hypothesis:

The greater the community's Congressional representative power, the greater the probability of high performance for that community with respect to grant fragility.

Congressional representative power is also important in a city's effort to sustain grant programs over a lengthy period. The Senate seniority average not only correlates with total grant longevity at a simple product moment coefficient level of .32, with a significance level of .05, but also has a partial coefficient of .36, again with a significance level of .05. Senatorial seniority seems to be more important in perpetuating the longevity of physical-traditional grants vis-a-vis fragile social-oriented grants.

In the House of Representatives, seniority has little or no effect in innovative action of cities as shown by the low coefficients in Tables 10 and 11. The exception to this finding comes in the partial correlation between the House of Representatives seniority variable and non-fragile social-oriented grants where a .20 correlation level is achieved. This latter correlation, however, is not significant at the .05 level.

When the cities are divided into a South and non-South group, the same relationship as above is found between Senate seniority and the fragile total grant usage score.

Thus, Senatorial power, as measured by seniority, appears to be a major determinant of federal grant fragility as well as total grant outlays. The only true significant difference has been obtained in the effect of the region in cities obtaining total grant outlay. Cities in the non-South have a higher correlation between Senate seniority and total federal grant outlays (See Tables 7-9) than those in the South.

Political and Administrative Structure and Process

The following hypotheses have guided this section of the research:

1. Political Structure Reform. City manager cities with more reform characteristics exhibit a high propensity toward fragile exemplary federal grant usage as compared with city manager cities with fewer reform characteristics.

2. Leadership Role.

- (A) Leadership of the city manager is a major determinant of federal grants longevity.

- (B) The leadership of a city in federal grantsmanship through the establishment of a Federal Liaison Office is prominently associated with federal grant longevity.

Hypothesis 1 is rejected by the findings of this research. In Tables 10 and 11, a reported $-.22$ simple coefficient and $-.27$ partial coefficient are evidence of the relationship between the reform score and fragile total grant usage. However, both of these measures of association are not statistically significant. These findings are quite different from the effect reform has on total federal grant usage where a much higher negative association was reported in the previous section.

The reform relationships of grant longevity are of a regional character. The partial coefficient for the South stands at $-.30$ as compared to $-.02$ in the non-South region.

Hypothesis 2B is rejected. The Federal Liaison Office's (FLO) presence correlates positively, but not significantly, with grant longevity at a partial coefficient level of $.20$. The presence of a Federal Liaison Office, however, seems to be more important in the permanence of physical-traditional grants (i.e., partial correlation of $.30$) as compared with the longevity of social-oriented grants (partial coefficient of $.12$). Neither, however, are significant at the $.05$ level.

The above results correlating the presence of a Federal Liaison Office with fragility in federal grant usage contrasts greatly with the correlations presented earlier when the effects of a FLO on total grant usage were assessed. The presence of a Federal Liaison Office correlated highly with total federal grant outlays. Furthermore, there was not a distinct pattern between the South and the non-South.

The leadership of the city manager is the most strongly related to the presence of grants over a long period of time. This finding, therefore, confirms hypothesis 2A. City manager leadership is important in determining federal grant usage in two ways: by virtue of his ideology and in his appointment powers. This is in contrast with the earlier finding that leadership of the city manager played a very small role in obtaining total federal grant outlays.

The politicoeconomic scale, which is one of the measures used to identify a city manager's ideology (See Chapter II and Appendix A, Question 10), correlates relatively highly with total non-fragile grant utilization. A high score on this scale represents liberalism (a maximum score of 72 is possible) and a low score indicates conservatism (a minimum score of 12 points is possible). This ideological scale, which seeks to discern a city manager's view on the role of government in society, has a simple correlation with fragile total federal grant usage of .25 which is significant at the .05 level. The partial coefficient for this relationship stands at .36 which is also significant at the .05 level (See Tables 10 and 11). The liberalism of a city manager has more of an effect upon non-fragile physical-traditional grant usage as is indicated by a partial coefficient of .34 in contrast with a partial correlation coefficient of only .07 when a city manager's ideology is correlated with social-oriented non-fragile grant usage.

The finding above might be accounted for by the fact that a liberal city manager seemingly would be more favorably disposed to maintaining federal grants regardless of whether they were of a social-oriented

or physical-traditional type. He would not be constrained by his belief that the role of government should be limited.

The effect of ideology on the longevity of all federal grants is a regional phenomenon. The partial correlation of ideology as it relates to fragile total federal grants is .77 in the non-South as compared to a partial coefficient level of only .03 in the South (See Table 12). The fact that city managers are more liberal in the non-South than in the South, as reported in Chapter III (Table 8b), helps explain the vast difference between these associations.

The control the city manager has over the appointment function also contributes to grant longevity. The scale devised for testing the control the city manager has over appointment, it may be remembered, assigns points for each department head the city manager cannot appoint and adds one point if the city manager lacks the power to appoint any policy making board or advisory commission of the city. Therefore, the lower the points given a city manager the higher his appointment powers. With this in mind, the control the city manager has over appointment reflects a $-.21$ simple coefficient and a $-.41$ partial coefficient (both statistically significant) in its relationship with the fragile total grant usage score. The partial coefficient of $-.41$ is the highest relationship present among all variables in the correlation matrix when total grant longevity is considered. (See Table 11).

The regional analysis points to the importance of appointment

power in total federal grant survival both in the South and the non-South. However, the non-South correlation with the fragile total grant usage score stands at a much higher level with a partial coefficient of $-.79$ (which is significant at the $.001$ level) in contrast to $-.29$ in the South (which is not significant).

What is there about the ability of the city manager to appoint department heads and advisory boards that makes this variable so important in the longevity of total federal grants? The answer to this question could be one of many: (1) The city manager has confidence in the department heads and therefore will go out of his way to assist them in their financial needs; (2) The city manager with his ability to appoint various members on advisory boards has a further impact in winning the confidence of the city council through the individuals he places on the boards; (3) Departmental communication is more likely to be present where the city manager is in ultimate control; and (4) A city manager is in a position where he may, in fact, be in ultimate control of federal grant programs when all departments have to report to him directly.

The total explanatory power of the independent variables used in the analysis of the determinants of fragile total grant longevity varies according to region (See Tables 11 and 12). For all 17 variables examined (See Table 11), 47 percent of the variance level of fragile total grants is accounted for in the analysis above. The non-South cities' independent variables account for the highest level of variance on this dependent variable with 80 percent, in contrast to the South's selected

variables which accounted for only 28 percent of the variance on this grant longevity measure. The importance of region in this analysis was also previously recognized in the preceding section.

Conclusion

In the preceding two sections of this chapter extra community political variables and political and administrative system and process variables have been found to be of great consequence as determinants of federal grant innovation. Socioeconomic and community power variables have also been important but it would appear to a lesser degree. This is a rather startling development, in light of the fact that most state and local policy literature, starting in the early 1960's and continuing to the present, has in most instances arrived at contradictory conclusions.

To test whether these various political system and process variables are more potent determinants of federal grant innovation than socioeconomic and community power variables, multiple-partial correlations have been computed for relationships with both of the main dependent variables. As can be observed, Table 13 supports the above conclusion. Total grants per capita and total grant longevity are more influenced by political variables when controlling for socioeconomic than vice versa as indicated by multiple-partial coefficients of .48 and .38 respectively (compared with the corresponding coefficients of .37 and .11).

TABLE 13
 MULTIPLE-PARTIAL COEFFICIENTS FOR TOTAL GRANT USAGE
 AND FRAGILE GRANT USAGE

	Socioeconomic and Community Power Vari- ables Controlling for Extra-Community Poli- tical and Administra- tive System and Process Variables	Extra-Community Political and Poli- tical and Adminis- trative Process Variables Control- ling for Socioecon- omic and Commu- nity Power Variables
Total Grants Per Capita	.37	.48
Fragile Total Grant Average Score	.11	.38

FOOTNOTES

1. R. J. Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XI (December, 1904), 345.
2. Lawrence K. Pettit and Edward Keynes, ed., The Legislative Process in the United States Senate (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), 227-244.
3. Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (2nd ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1972), 468.
4. Herman Turk, "Interorganization and Networks in Urban Society," American Sociological Review, XXX (February, 1970), 14-15; Michael Aiken, "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Housing," American Political Science Review, LXIV (September, 1970), 858-859.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Attention will be directed toward two topics in concluding this research. First, the author will show how this study has responded to much of the criticism that has often been directed at local policy analysis. Second, a review will be presented of the findings in Chapter IV of variables that correlate with federal grant innovation. In this review of findings, answers are presented to the three principal questions which have acted as the central thrust of analysis.

Action in Response to Problems in Policy Analysis Literature

In using the systems model as an organizing framework, scholars in local policy analysis, generally, have concentrated almost exclusively on environmental inputs, structural political variables, and policy outputs, while virtually ignoring the decision making actors in the model. For example, these models rarely include any indicators of interest group activity and political leadership within and outside the political system. The political variables which are included in most aggregate urban research are easily attainable formal or structural characteristics of the urban polity (e.g., form of government, type of ballot, and/or the size of the constituency). While it is interesting to learn whether political structure is an important determinant of revenue, expenditure and/or federal grant policies, until group or decision processes of the informal polity are analyzed, it is premature to generalize that politi-

cal variables are of little importance when they have not even been included. Future local policy scholars need to be more aggressive in the development of decision process variables and test to see if they are indeed more important than environmental variables as determinants of policy outputs.¹

Several urban policy studies cited in the first two chapters of this research have failed to include decision making process variables. Among these are studies authored by Lineberry and Fowler,² Wolfinger and Field,³ Banfield and Wilson,⁴ Robert Wood,⁵ and Richard Cole.⁶

Notably, a few authors in urban policy analysis using federal grants as a policy output variable have taken into account the decision making processes inside and outside of government and have found them important. Amos Hawley examined the number of those in the managerial and proprietary set to the total employed labor force as an indicator of community power and found that group to most influential in determining the amount of urban renewal expenditure of cities in the first years of operation.⁷ Terry Clark has attempted to capture the components of community power by interviewing eleven strategically placed informants in 51 communities with populations of 50,000 to 750,000 including: the mayor, the chairman of the Democratic and Republican parties, the president of the largest bank, the editor of the newspaper with the largest circulation, the president of the chamber of commerce, the president of the bar association, the head of the largest labor union,

the health commissioner, the urban renewal director, and the director of the major hospital fund drives. Clark found that the greater the decentralization of community power, as measured by the number of persons involved in decision making, the greater the number of urban renewal dollars per capita secured from the federal government in advancing years of implementation.⁸ Michael Aiken and Robert Alford examine community power from an institutional perspective. These scholars found that the number of well-off organizations (i. e., manufacturing, banking, and union organizations) within a city is the most relevant factor in explaining innovation in such decisional areas as urban renewal, low rent public housing, and the war on poverty programs.⁹

This dissertation uses the above MPO ratio, a trade center factor (combines the number of retail establishments with payrolls per capita and the number of wholesale establishments per capita in one factor), a financial center (combines the number of banks with \$10 million assets per capita and the number of national associations headquarters per capita into one factor), and the number of manufacturing establishments with 20 or more employees per capita to examine the effects of community power. In addition, various independent variables have been included as they pertain to Congressional influence and city manager leadership. These variables include Senate seniority, House seniority, the presence of a Federal Liaison Office, city manager professionalism, city manager ideology, city manager perception of primary control of

non-traditional issue areas, city manager policy activism as city manager, city manager appointment power, and city manager perception of mayoral-administrative frequency of contact. Some of these variables in this analysis have been shown to be of primary importance as determinants of federal grant innovation as will be summarized in the next section.

Most policy analysis studies, furthermore, have not attempted to categorize policies on the basis of criterion of similarities and dissimilarities. Three research efforts which employ a taxonomic scheme empirically are provocative. Lewis Froman distinguished between "areal" policies (i. e., activities which affect the entire community simultaneously) and "segmental" policies (i. e., activities which affect different and/or smaller segments of the community at different times). He classified adoption of council-manager plan and nonpartisan elections, annexation, intermunicipal cooperation, educational services, and fluoridation as "areal". The three "segmental" policies were urban renewal, total per capita expenditures, and welfare. "Areal" policies were found to be associated with greater environmental homogeneity and "segmental" policies with greater heterogeneity.¹⁰ A second way policies can be categorized has been suggested by Clark in terms of the extent to which they are "fragile" (i. e., newer and more susceptible to opposition strategies) and "less fragile" (i. e., older, more familiar, and more customary). He theorizes different sets of independent variables affect "fragile" and "non-fragile" policies.¹¹

Finally, Deil Wright and Robert Boynton point to a three-fold categorization which was developed through conversation with city managers and perusal of managerial literature. The first was identified as traditional policies of city government (e.g., roads, buildings, sewers, parks, etc.). The second policy area was designated as emphasizing economic development (e.g., taxation, assessment, zoning, urban renewal, financial, etc.). The third area specifies program dimensions relating to social or intergroup relations, which includes minority and ethnic group policies and the range of responses to citizen concerns and grievances. A city manager's perception of a large number of mayoral-manager and administrative contacts and greater control over appointment of his administrative as well as various policy boards or advisory commissions was found to have a relationship with leadership in the economic and social policy areas.¹²

In the development of dependent variables in this study, a six-fold categorization of policy has been utilized which has some similarities to those policy categories described above. Twelve federal grants were first selected, based on their freedom from possible interference by states in the grant acquisition process for communities. These federal grants also held in common the fact that a \$40 billion or more federal commitment had been devoted to them in FY 1972, and their use is prevalent among many communities. In using grants in cities of over 50,000 in population, a total grant usage score was computed by totaling the federal grant outlays for the 12 grants. These federal grants were further divided into two topical areas--physical-traditional

and social-oriented. The physical-traditional grants' (e.g., Urban Renewal, Park Open Space, Basic water and Sewer, Aid for Airports, Air Pollution) main purpose was to benefit the entire community, while the social-oriented grants' (e.g., Low Rent Public Housing, Model Cities, Neighborhood Youth Corps, Operation Mainstream, Community Action, and Legal Services) main purpose was to benefit only a special clientele within the community (generally the disadvantaged). A total outlay score for each of the physical-traditional and social-oriented grants was computed in a like fashion to the total federal grant usage score. Last measures used as dependent variables measured federal grant fragility. This study used Clark's definition of fragile federal grant programs as those grants to communities which are new and susceptible to opposition strategies from various segments in a community. Fragility has been computed, admittedly rather crudely, in terms of total federal grant longevity for each of the 12 grants, assigning points in the following manner for each grant in existence in a city:

1. Zero (0) points for zero (0) to one (1) year;
2. One (1) point for two (2) through five (5) years;
3. Two (2) points for six (6) years and beyond.

The score achieved from each of these grants, then, is added together and divided by the number of grants in a community to obtain a total score. Separate fragility scores for the six physical-traditional grants and six social-oriented grants, using the above formula, is computed for the remaining dependent variables.

The literature of state and local policy analysis has been criti-

cized by Stuart H. Rakoff and Guenther F. Schaefer as presenting a "one-sided picture of policy", in that revenue and expenditures have been the primary dependent variables.¹³ In state policy analysis, several studies have begun to examine the variables associated with redistribution policies and the passage of various statutes by state legislatures, which are an exception to this criticism.¹⁴ In local policy analysis, also, there are a few studies that have responded to this criticism. Terry Clark, James Clarke, and Froman's local policy analyses have examined non-fiscal areas in looking at the variables associated with reform institutions and forms of government by cities.¹⁵

In this research, fragility of federal grants is used as a non-fiscal measure of policy. The study attempts to perceive if there are any differences in the variables that affect the longevity of federal grants vis-a-vis the total amount of grants. The findings indicate there is a difference between the types of variables which affect non-fragile grants and those which are associated with total federal grant outlays among the sample cities.

Thus, in several ways this dissertation has responded to three principal criticisms of local policy analysis while constructing the study's urban federal grant policy model with related theories, hypotheses, and variables. The findings which are summarized below indicate the usefulness of the model.

Summary of Findings

This dissertation has been designed primarily to answer three

major questions concerning federal grant innovation. These are:

1. Is there a difference between cities which pursue more social-oriented grant programs vis-a-vis those cities which pursue more physical-traditional type programs?
2. Why are some cities innovative in extensive use of total federal grants, while others are less active?
3. What is the place of fragility in innovative action of cities?

Answers to these questions, using the city manager cities of the study's random sample, are summarized below.

According to the findings of this study, there are only a few small differences between those cities which pursue more socially-oriented federal grant programs in contrast with physical-traditional grant programs. There is a high correlation and high factor loading between total grants per capita, physical-traditional grants, and social-oriented grant outlays. Also, the physical-traditional and social-oriented variables of a fragile character have a high product moment correlation and high factor loading with total grant fragility. Thus the usefulness of only examining the total federal grant outlay and total grant fragility variables became apparent except when hypotheses directly related to the physical-traditional and social-oriented dichotomy.

Certain key observations can be gained from this study's examination of variables associated with total federal grant usage. First is the over-riding importance of structural type variables. In many studies,

these have been discounted. The lack of reform features in city manager cities (i. e., partisanship, ward elections, council size above nine individuals, mayoral selection by people, lesser percentage under merit system) is the most important of 17 variables in maximizing total federal grant outlays. The existence of a Federal Grant Liaison Office (FLO) is the second most important variable. Somewhat compatible with these findings is the fact that "private regarding" cultures are significantly correlated with total federal grant usage, but at lower levels than the two variables mentioned above. Thus, a combination of being institutionally prepared to review, revise, and deal with problems of federal grantsmanship through the presence of a FLO, and having a culture which is more heterogenous with corresponding political structural attributes which are more likely to respond to a certain segment of the community, are the most important considerations in obtaining greater federal grant outlays according to the findings of this study.

Regional considerations are particularly important in examining total federal grant usage. For northern cities, the list of variables, which have partial coefficients which are significantly correlated with total federal grant usage, expands to six (i. e., reform structure, the presence of an FLO, manufacturing institutions per capita, trade center factor, political culture factor, and Senate seniority). The South, in contrast, has no variables which are significant at the .05 level. Needless to say, the multiple correlation of all variables included in the non-South correla-

lational matrix is higher than that which exists in the South. The findings concerning the importance of region as a descriptive variable is further dramatized by the fact that the explanatory power of variables selected is greater in the non-South region than for the variables included in the correlational matrix from both regions.

This dissertation finds a distinct difference in the types of variables which effect innovation in total federal grant outlays, and those which effect federal grant longevity. The leadership of the city manager has been found to be of prime importance, in that, a liberal ideologically leaning city manager with large control over appointment of his administrative and policy boards has been found to correlate at the highest level in this study's correlational matrix with the total federal grant fragility score. A liberal city manager, as indicated from this study's findings, is more favorably disposed to maintaining federal grants regardless of whether they were social-oriented or physical-traditional types. He, further, is not constrained by the fact that the role of government should be limited. His power of appointment further aids the city manager, it has been theorized, in believing he is in a position to have better control over federal grant programs and the boards where potentially conflicting views may appear. He, therefore, may believe he is at more liberty to seek and maintain grants for cities than city managers which have less control over appointment. None of the political leadership variables have been found to have a significant effect on innovative action of cities in obtaining federal grant outlays.

Apparently the lack of reform characteristics and the Federal Liaison Office have no real impact on grant longevity. This is in contrast to the earlier findings relative to total federal grant outlays. The presence of a FLO apparently does not influence grant longevity nor does reform structure, whether more reformed or less reformed.

Different patterns of relationship also occur in looking at political culture. A private regarding culture has been found to be of importance in obtaining total federal grants, although the presence of a more private regarding or public regarding culture is of no consequence in determining how long the 56 cities have had certain federal grant programs.

Senatorial influence has been found to be important in grant longevity. Senators who have institutional influence and seniority apparently can help make the difference in cities maintaining federal grant programs. In contrast, the importance of Senatorial power and influence among all cities in obtaining total federal grant outlays is minimal.

Among all cities, community power, population, and poverty influences have not been found to be important determinants of either total federal grant outlays or total federal grant fragility. A distinct pattern of difference, however, emerges when looking at community power and political culture on a regional basis. The number of manufacturing establishments per capita and public regarding cultures are

clearly related to the existence of a high proportion of grants that are more permanent in nature among non-South cities. Just the opposite is true in cities obtaining total federal grant outlays in the non-South, where a private regarding culture and a lower number of manufacturing establishments per capita has been found to be influential in cities obtaining total federal grant outlays.

Regional considerations in the non-South are again particularly important in examining cities total federal grant longevity. Variables in every category had higher partial correlation coefficients than for total grant usage. The variables listed in order of their importance in maintenance of total federal grants are: City manager appointment power, city manager liberal ideology, public regarding culture, and greater number of manufacturing establishments per capita. The South, in this analysis, had no variables which were significant at the .05 level. This finding concerning regional importance should receive special attention.

As this dissertation applies to city practitioners, the author believes that four findings are particularly important in cities being innovative in obtaining federal grants. First, for a city manager to be successful in maintaining federal grants, it appears that he must have an ideological base which supports wide government involvement in society. Second, the city manager of a community must be given wide appointment powers, whereby control can be maintained over the use of federal grants brought to the city by his administration. Third,

structurally speaking, a city which allows for maximum political participation of the people, with each segment being able to be heard, is in a better position to obtain federal grant outlays. Last, the presence of a Federal Liaison Office seems imperative for cities that wish to maximize federal grant outlays.

FOOTNOTES

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8. Amos H. Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," in Search for Community Power, ed. by Willis D. Hawley and Frederick M. Wirt (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), 343-352.
9. Terry Clark, "Community Structure, Decision Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," American Sociological Review, XXXIII (August, 1968), 576-593.
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11. Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "An Analysis of Policies in Cities," Journal of Politics, XXIX (February, 1967), 94-108.

12. Clark, "Community Structure," 587-588.

13. Deil S. Wright and Robert Paul Boynton, "Policy Formation in Large Council-Manager Cities: Some Thoughts on Mayor-Manager Relationships" (paper prepared for presentation at the Midwest Conference of Political Science, Ann Arbor, Michigan, April 25-27, 1969).

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

CITY MANAGER QUESTIONNAIRE

CITY MANAGER QUESTIONNAIRE

1. What is the population of the city you serve as city manager? _____
2. What characteristics of the following best describes your city's form?
(Check the appropriate spaces.)

- | | |
|--|--|
| A. Nonpartisan election system _____ | Partisan election system _____ |
| B. At large selection of council _____ | Ward selection of council _____ |
| C. Mayoral selection by council _____ | Mayoral selection by the
electorate _____ |

3. What is the percent of city employees under the merit system in the city you serve as city manager? _____
4. Does your city have presently an office (either in the city or in Washington) devoted to carrying on liaison activities with the federal government concerning federal grants? Yes _____ No _____

The following questions pertain to your (1) personal background, (2) experiences, and (3) perception concerning the city responsibilities and activities. Please answer these questions as accurately as possible.

5. What is the highest level of education which you have completed? (Check one.)

- | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| A. Highschool _____ | B. Undergraduate degree _____ |
| C. Graduate degree _____ | D. Others _____ |

6. If applicable, what was your specialization as an undergraduate? (Check one.)

- | | |
|---|---|
| A. Engineering _____ | B. Physical and natural sciences _____ |
| C. Architecture and Planning _____ | D. Political Science or
Government _____ |
| E. Geography, Economics, Finance,
History or Sociology _____ | F. Business Administration _____ |
| G. Public Administration _____ | H. Journalism or English _____ |
| I. Others _____ | |

7. If applicable, what was your specialization at the graduate level? (Check one.)

- | | |
|---|---|
| A. Engineering _____ | B. Physical and natural sciences _____ |
| C. Architecture and Planning _____ | D. Political Science or
Government _____ |
| E. Geography, Economics, Finance,
History or Sociology _____ | F. Business Administration _____ |

G. Public Administration _____

H. Journalism or English _____

I. Others _____

8. How long have you been in the city manager profession? (Check one.)

A. Three or less years _____

B. Four-six years _____

C. Seven-ten years _____

D. Eleven or more years _____

9. What was the position you held immediately prior to your present position? (Check one.)

A. Assistant City Manager _____

B. Chief Administrative Officer _____

C. Personnel Director _____

D. Finance Director _____

E. Police Chief _____

F. City Engineer _____

G. Line Department Head _____

H. Business Executive _____

I. City Manager _____

J. Other _____

10. Here is a list of 12 questions about politics and economics. Circle the number of the response that best expresses your opinion.

Strongly
Agree
1Moderately
Agree
2Slightly
Agree
3Slightly
Disagree
4Moderately
Disagree
5Strongly
Disagree
6

A. When private enterprise does not do the job well, it is up to the government to step in and meet the public's need for housing, water, power, and the like.

1 2 3 4 5 6

B. Men like Henry Ford and J. P. Morgan, who overcame all competition on the road to success, are models for all young people to admire and imitate.

1 2 3 4 5 6

C. The government should own and operate all public utilities (gas, electric, water).

1 2 3 4 5 6

D. In general, full economic security is bad. Most men would not work if they did not need the money for eating and living.

1 2 3 4 5 6

E. The only way to do away with poverty is to make basic changes in our political and economic system.

1 2 3 4 5 6

Strongly Agree 1	Moderately Agree 2	Slightly Agree 3	Slightly Disagree 4	Moderately Disagree 5	Strongly Disagree 6
------------------------	--------------------------	------------------------	---------------------------	-----------------------------	---------------------------

F. There should be some upper limit such as \$50,000 per year on how much a person can earn.

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

G. At this time, powerful big business is a greater danger to our national welfare than powerful big unions.

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

H. We need more government controls over business practices and profits.

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

I. Labor unions in large corporations should be given a larger part in deciding company policy.

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

J. The government should develop a comprehensive program of health insurance and medical care.

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

K. America may not be perfect, but the American way has brought us about as close as human beings can get to a perfect society.

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

L. Strong labor unions are necessary if the working man is to obtain greater security and a better standard of living.

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

11. Now, taking up some of the major issues faced by cities, indicate which level of government you believe should have primary control for handling and solving these issues (provided adequate federal funding is available in your community).
(Check one level per issue area.)

Issues	City	County	City/ County	Special District	State	Federal	Others
Water Pollution							
Air Pollution							
Recreational Development							
Preserving Open Space							
Racial Discrimination							
Unemployment							
Housing							
Health Care							

12. Ever since the council-manager plan was first adopted, there has been much disagreement over what a city manager should or should not do. Here are ten questions on the job of being a city manager. Circle the number of the response that best fits your position.

Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4

- A. A city manager should advocate major changes in city policies.

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

- B. A city manager should give a helping hand to good councilmen who are coming up for reelection.

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

- C. A city manager should maintain a neutral stand on any issues on which the community is divided.

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

- D. A city manager should consult with the council before drafting his own budget.

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

- E. A city manager should assume leadership in shaping municipal policies.

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

- F. A city manager should encourage people whom he respects to run for the city council.

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

- G. A city manager should act as an administrator and leave policy matters to the council.

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

- H. A city manager should advocate policies to which important parts of the community may be hostile.

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

- I. A city manager should work through the most powerful members of the community to achieve policy goals.

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

- J. A city manager should actively attempt to gain intergovernmental grants to aid in community services.

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

12 continued

Comments: _____

13. How many department heads can you appoint? _____
 On the other hand, how many can you not appoint? _____
 Comments: _____
- _____
- _____

14. How many policy making boards and/or advisory commissions can you appoint? _____
 On the other hand, how many can you not appoint? _____
 Comments: _____
- _____
- _____

15. Here are ten questions focusing on actual activities of city managers. Circle the number of the response which most accurately describes how you behave as city manager in your present community.

Always	Often	Seldom	Never
1	2	3	4

A. I advocate major changes in city policies.

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

B. I give a helping hand to good councilmen who are coming up for reelection.

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

C. I maintain a neutral stand on any issues on which the community is divided.

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

D. I consult with the council before drafting my own budget proposal.

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

E. I assume leadership in shaping municipal policies.

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

F. I encourage people whom I respect to run for the city council.

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

G. I act as an administrator and leave policy matters to the council.

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

Always
1

Often
2

Seldom
3

Never
4

H. I advocate policies to which important parts of the community may be hostile.

1

2

3

4

I. I work through the most powerful members of the community to achieve policy goals.

1

2

3

4

J. I work actively in attempting to gain intergovernmental grants to aid in community services.

1

2

3

4

Comments: _____

16. What in your opinion is the frequency of contact between the mayor and various city administrative officials in your community as it pertains to city affairs? (Check one.)

A. Daily _____

B. More than weekly _____

C. Weekly _____

D. Monthly _____

17. What in your opinion is the frequency of contact, on the other hand, between yourself and the mayor as it pertains to city affairs? (Check one.)

A. Daily _____

B. More than weekly _____

C. Weekly _____

D. Monthly _____

18. Here is a list of services that cities in some instances control and perform. Indicate which level of government (if any) has primary control over the decision making processes and operations of the services below in your community. (Check one level per service area.)

18 continued

Services	City	City/ County	County	Special District	State	Federal
Air Pollution Control						
Civil Defense						
Fire Protection						
Flood Control						
Hospitals						
Industrial Development						
Libraries						
Parks and Recreation						
Planning						
Police Protection						
Public Primary and Secondary Education						
Municipal Public Welfare Assistance						
Refuse Disposal						
Public Housing						
Municipal Health						
Municipal Roads						
Urban Renewal						
Water Pollution Control						
Water Supply						

19. The following list of Federal grant-in-aid programs are possibly utilized by your city. Please specify the number of years each one of the following programs has been active in your city. If the Federal grant-in-aid program is non-existent in your community, write 0.

Federal Grant-In-Aid Programs	Years in Existence in Community
Urban Renewal	
Open Space-Developed and Undeveloped	
Basic Water and Sewer Facilities	
Grant-In-Aid for Airports	
Air Pollution Control Program Grants	
Urban Mass Transportation Fund	
Model Cities	
Community Action	
Low Rent Public Housing	
Public Employment Program	
Neighborhood Youth Corps	
Legal Services	
Operation Mainstream	

APPENDIX B

FEDERAL GRANTS

- A. Physical-Traditional Grants
- B. Social Oriented Grants

PHYSICAL-TRADITIONAL GRANTS

URBAN RENEWAL PROJECTS

FEDERAL AGENCY: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

AUTHORIZATION: Housing Act of 1949; Title 1, as amended, Public Law 81-171; 63 Stat. 443,444; 42 U.S.C. 1450-1468a.

OBJECTIVES: To provide financial assistance for the rehabilitation or redevelopment of slums and blighted areas.

TYPES OF ASSISTANCE: Project Grants; Direct Loans.

USES AND USE RESTRICTIONS: This program provides grants, planning advances, and temporary loans for surveys and planning, land acquisition and clearing, rehabilitation of existing structures, and the installation of public improvements including streets and sidewalks, utilities, incidental recreational areas, flood protection, and the preservation of historic structures. Funds may not be used for construction of buildings.

ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS:

Applicant Eligibility: Local public agencies which can be a local renewal agency or housing authority, or a local or county department of government, depending upon state enabling legislation.

Beneficiary Eligibility: Project area.

Credentials/Documentation: The local governing body must enact a resolution approving the urban renewal project. The locality must adopt a Workable Program for Community Improvement certified by the Secretary of HUD. The area to be assisted must be a slum, blighted, deteriorated, or deteriorating area or a vacant, unused, underused or inappropriately used area.

APPLICATION AND AWARD PROCESS:

Preapplication Coordination: The urban renewal area must be defined and the city must review the applications before submission. State and area clearinghouses must be notified when an agency intends to file an application, as specified by Office of Management and Budget Circular No.A-95 Part I (revised).

Application Procedure: Three separate applications must be submitted: (1) Survey and Planning Application which defines the area and proposed treatment. Approval of this application provides funds for planning the project and a grant reservation for carrying out the project; (2) Part I, Loan and Grant Application, contains the Urban Renewal Plan for the area and costs for the project in execution; (3) Part II, Loan and Grant Application, contains the local approvals of the Urban Renewal Plan and other aspects of the renewal project. After approval of the Part II application and execution of the loan and grant contract, project activities can begin.

Award Procedure: Applications are processed by HUD field offices. HUD field offices send contract for planning. Notification of award must be made to the designated State Central Information Reception Agency and OMB on SF 240.

Deadlines: The Part II Application for Loan and Grant (the third and last of a series of applications) must be submitted within approximately 18 months after the approval of the Survey and Planning Application (the first application).

Range of Approval/Disapproval Time: Average processing times from submission of: (1) Survey and Planning Application, 90 days; (2) Part I, 100 days; (3) Part II, 60 days.

Appeals: None

Renewals: None

ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS:

Formula and Matching Requirements: The applicant must provide at least one-third of the funds needed to carry out project unless it represents a community located in a designated redevelopment area, or one with less than 50,000 inhabitants.

Length and Time Phasing of Assistance: Length of Completion Period: 10 years on the average; Time Phasing of Assistance: The LPA receives planning funds in the form of repayable direct advances during the planning state. During the execution stage, it receives temporary loans and capital grants.

POST ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Reports: Reports on all phases of operation after the project enters execution must be submitted semiannually. Relocation reports must be submitted quarterly.

Audits: Periodically by HUD and by GAO at the time the project is completed.

Records: Records of all phases of operation must be maintained.

FINANCIAL INFORMATION:

Obligations: (Grants) FY 72 \$1,037,078,115.

Range and Average of Financial Assistance: \$800,000 to \$40,000,000.

PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS: In fiscal year 1971, 47 new projects were started.

**BASIC WATER AND SEWER FACILITIES-GRANTS
(Water and Sewer Grants)**

FEDERAL AGENCY: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

AUTHORIZATION: Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, section 702, as amended; Public Law 89-117, 79 Stat. 451, 489, 42 U.S.C. 3101.

OBJECTIVES: To provide grants to construct water and sewer facilities.

TYPES OF ASSISTANCE: Project Grants.

USES AND USE RESTRICTIONS: Types of eligible projects include facilities to store, supply, treat, purify or distribute water, sanitary sewer systems for the collection, transmission and discharge of liquid wastes (excluding sewage treatment works) and storm water caused by rainfall or ground water runoff. Building or household connections and local distribution and collection laterals are not eligible for assistance. The facility system must be part of the comprehensively planned development of the area.

ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS:

Applicant Eligibility: Cities, towns, counties, Indian tribes, or public agencies or instrumentalities of one or more states or one or more municipalities which have the legal authority to plan, finance, construct and operate the facility.

Beneficiary Eligibility: Same as applicant eligibility.

Credentials/Documentation: None

APPLICATION AND AWARD PROCESS:

Preapplication Coordination: Applicant should follow procedures established by Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-95. Coordination is also maintained between the Department of Agriculture and Commerce and the Environmental Protection Agency. The HUD Area Office will provide guidance on specific problems and technical assistance in the preparation of applications.

Application Procedure: Application is made to the appropriate Area or Regional Office serving the project area. Following review of the submitted Standard Form 101 those applications that most clearly meet program objectives are invited to attend an application conference. At this conference the applicant is made aware of program requirements and the necessary supporting project documentation.

Award Procedure: The Area Office Director (if not yet established, the Regional Administrator) makes final decisions on individual applications. These offices are responsible for providing notification of the grant approval to the public body as well as to the designated State Central Information Reception Agency (on SF 240).

Deadlines: None

Range of Approval/Disapproval Time: 90 to 180 days.

Appeals: No appeal procedures.

Renewals: Not applicable.

ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS:

Formula and Matching Requirements: Program grants are not to exceed 50 percent of eligible land and construction costs for new water and sewer facilities. Under certain circumstances, communities having a population of less than 10,000 are eligible for 90 percent grant assistance. The applicant must provide sufficient funds in cash to complete funding of the project.

Length and Time Phasing of Assistance: Grant assistance is available for a reasonable length of time as required by project completion. Such funds are not disbursed until after the grantee's portion of project funds has been substantially expended. Federal funds are dispensed only in amounts estimated to meet project obligations for the ensuing 3 months.

POST ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Reports: None

Audits: All projects are subject to audit at grantee's expense.

Records: Weekly payroll records and other pertinent project documentation must be retained for 3 years.

FINANCIAL INFORMATION:

Obligations: (Grants) FY 72 \$191,748,000.

Range and Average of Financial Assistance: \$25,000 to \$1,500,000; \$440,000.

PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS: Since the inception of this program in 1966, 1,489 projects totaling \$664,957,000 in grant assistance have been approved under the Water and Sewer Program as of June 30, 1970. Of this total, 59 percent of all approved projects have been for water facilities and 41 percent for sewer facilities. Approximately 85 percent of all projects approved were for communities with populations under 50,000.

OPEN SPACE LAND PROGRAMS

FEDERAL AGENCY: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

AUTHORIZATION: Title IV of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970; Public Law 91-609, 84 Stat. 1770, 1781.

OBJECTIVES: To help communities meet the rapidly growing recreation needs of urban areas by assisting these communities acquire and develop parkland.

TYPES OF ASSISTANCE: Project Grants.

USES AND USE RESTRICTIONS: Eligible acquisition costs include those for acquiring title to, or other interests in open space land in urban areas, demolition of inappropriate structures where developed land is being acquired, and real estate services. Acquisition costs may also include undeveloped, or at least predominately undeveloped land, in a planned development sector, such as, urban shaping areas to guide urban development and the acquisition of historically significant structures listed on the National Register of Historic Places. Eligible development costs include roadways, landscaping, basic utilities, recreational facilities, swimming pools, improvements of acquired structures, preservation of historic and architecturally significant structures listed on the National Register of Historic Places, etc.

Acquisition and development of the open space land must be in accord with a unified and officially coordinated program for development of open space land as part of local and areawide comprehensive planning. Major construction, such as marinas, etc., is not eligible under this program.

ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS:

Applicant Eligibility: State and local public bodies, including Indian tribes, bands, groups, and nations legally authorized to undertake an open space project.

Beneficiary Eligibility: Same as applicant eligibility.

Credentials/Documentation: Grants can only be made to local communities meeting Areawide Comprehensive Planning Requirements. The applicant must make a commitment to acquire and/or complete development within 1 year. The applicant must also certify to fully fund activities for the sites for at least 3 years. For historic preservation projects, the property to be acquired or developed must be listed on the National Register of Historic Places.

APPLICATION AND AWARD PROCESS:

Preapplication Coordination: Intent to file applications must be made known to the appropriate State and Metropolitan or Regional Clearinghouses in accordance with OMB Circular No. A-95 Part I (revised) (see HUD Circular 1300.8). Prior to submission of the letter of intent, chief executive sign-off is required. Letters of intent may be filed for projects meeting priority categories for early fund assurance. A pre-application conference is needed for all but very experienced applicants. Assistance on the preparation of the application is available from the HUD Area Office.

Application Procedure: Application is made to the HUD Area Office serving the area in which the open space land is located. The application contains the necessary certifications and must be accompanied by the public body resolution and opinion of counsel.

Award Procedure: The Area Office Director makes final decisions on applications and will so inform the interested parties. Notification of award must be made to the designated State Central Information Reception Agency and OMB on SF 240.

Deadlines: None.

Range of Approval/Disapproval Time: Average time between application and approval or disapproval-30 to 90 days (30 days for projects meeting priority categories).

Appeals: Applications can be resubmitted if activities have not been carried out; resubmissions are considered as new applications.

Renewals: Not applicable.

ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS:

Formula and Matching Requirements: Not more than 50 percent of total cost of acquisition and development of open space land in urban areas and historic preservation will be provided by HUD. Also, at the present time not more than 50 percent of the total cost of acquisition of undeveloped or predominantly undeveloped land for urban shaping purposes will be provided by HUD.

Length and Time Phasing of Assistance: Length of assistance period for approved project, 12 months from date of contract execution to complete activity. Payments are made on reimbursable basis only. Partial payments may be made where 25, 50 and 75 percent completed.

POST ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Reports: None.

Audits: All project activities under the open space land contract are subject to audit by a representative of HUD or the Comptroller General of the United States. If an audit is to be made at least 10 percent of the total grant will be withheld until completion of audit.

Records: Records must be retained for 3 years after final payment is received. (See Accounting Procedure Handbook 1970.8.)

FINANCIAL INFORMATION:

Obligations: (Grants) FY 72 \$81,325,871.

Range and Average of Financial Assistance: \$4,900 to \$2,500,000; \$135,800.

PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS: During fiscal year 1971, 551 open space grants were approved.

**AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT AID PROGRAM
(ADAP)**

FEDERAL AGENCY: FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

AUTHORIZATION: Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970; Public Law 91-258, 84 Stat. 219 et seq.

OBJECTIVES: To assist public agencies in the development of a nationwide system of public airports adequate to meet the needs of civil aviation.

TYPES OF ASSISTANCE: Project Grants; Advisory Services and Counseling.

USES AND USE RESTRICTIONS: Grants can be made for: (1) land acquisition, (2) site preparation, (3) construction, alteration, and repair of runways, taxiways, aprons, and roads within airport boundaries, and (4) construction and installation of lighting utilities, navigational aids, and certain offsite work. Grants may not be made for the construction of hangars, parking areas for automobiles, or for buildings not related to the safety of persons on the airport. Technical advisory services are also provided.

ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS:

Applicant Eligibility: State, county, municipal, and other public agencies are eligible for airport development grants if their airport requirements are shown in the National Airport System Plan.

Beneficiary Eligibility: General public.

Credentials/Documentation: Sponsors must submit information establishing financial capability and legal authority to accomplish the project and to operate the airport.

APPLICATION AND AWARD PROCESS:

Preapplication Coordination: Preapplication conference recommended but not required. Consultation and assistance available at FAA District and Regional Offices. Applications should be reviewed under procedures in Part I of OMB Circular No. A-95 (revised).

Application Procedure: Request for Aid, FAA Form 5100-3 filed with District Office, reviewed by Regional Office and submitted to Washington Office for program approval. No State plan is required.

Award Procedure: Upon program approval, applicant submits Project Application, FAA Form 5100-10 to Area Office. Reviewed and forwarded to Region. Regional Office prepares Grant Offer, FAA Form 1632 for execution by FAA and applicant. Notification of award must be made to the designated State Central Information Reception Agency and OMB on SF 240.

Deadlines: Requests for aid may be submitted at any time.

Range of Approval/Disapproval Time: 90 days.

Appeals: None

Renewals: None

ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS:

Formula and Matching Requirements: Federal Government generally provides 50 percent of the allowable costs of project airport development. Applicant must be able to supply matching fund from its own or other sources.

Length and Time Phasing of Assistance: No set period of time. Assistance is released upon application for progress payments as needed.

POST ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Reports: During project construction, sponsor submits periodic cost estimates regarding construction costs in order to receive partial

payments. Applications for payments in planning grants may be made on a periodic basis.

Audits: An FAA audit to determine allowable project costs is made prior to final grant payment.

Records: Sponsors' records are required to be made available for inspection by FAA and General Accounting Office. Layout plan of the airport must be kept up to date and available as long as his agreement lasts, ordinarily a period of 20 years. Accounting records reflecting all project costs, books, documents, and records pertinent to grants received under ADAP retained for 3 years after date of final grant payment.

FINANCIAL INFORMATION:

Obligations: (Grants) FY 72 \$292,403,409.

Range and Average of Financial Assistance: From \$5,000 minimum Federal funds to no set maximum. Average \$500,000.

PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS: In fiscal year 1971, 231 grant agreements were made, totaling \$170,000,000.

**URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT GRANTS
(Capital Grants)**

- FEDERAL AGENCY:** URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
- AUTHORIZATION:** Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 and related laws, as amended through October 15, 1970; Public Law 91-453 and 88-365; 78 Stat. 302; 49 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.
- OBJECTIVES:** To assist in financing the acquisition, construction, reconstruction, and improvement of facilities and equipment for use, by operation, lease, or otherwise, in mass transportation service in urban areas and in coordinating service with highway and other transportation in such areas.
- TYPES OF ASSISTANCE:** Project Grants.
- USES AND USE RESTRICTIONS:** Eligible facilities and equipment include land, buses, other rolling stock, and other real and personal property needed for an efficient and coordinated mass transportation system. Excludes ordinary governmental or nonproject operating expenses. Adequate public notice must be given of intent; social and economic impact on environment must be considered; project must be consistent with official plans for comprehensive development of urban area.
- ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS:**
- Applicant Eligibility:** Public agencies or private transportation companies through contractual arrangements with a public agency. Applicant must have legal financial and technical capacity to carry out proposed project.
 - Beneficiary Eligibility:** Same as applicant eligibility.
 - Credentials/Documentation:** Resolution by an authorized public body approving the filing for an application; information of labor and relocation; environmental impact statement; legal opinion; coordinated regional planning documentation.
- APPLICATION AND AWARD PROCESS:**
- Preapplication Coordination:** Applications should be reviewed under procedures in Part I of OMB Circular No. A-95 (revised).
 - Application Procedure:** Applications are made to the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, Washington, D.C. 20590. A sample format is available from that office.
 - Award Procedure:** The Administrator, UMTA, makes the final decision to approve projects. UMTA is responsible for providing notification of grant approval to the public body and to the designated State Central Information Reception Agency and OMB on SF 240.
 - Deadlines:** None
 - Range of Approval/Disapproval Time:** Acknowledgement of receipt of application is made immediately. Approval time not predictable.
 - Appeals:** Not applicable.
 - Renewals:** Yes, amendments to approved projects.
- ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS:**
- Formula and Matching Requirements:** A grant may be made for not more than two-thirds of net project cost. Where the program for an officially coordinated urban transportation system is under active preparation, but there is an urgent need for the project, the grant may not exceed 50 percent of the net project cost. If the program is completed within 3 years of the grant contract an

additional one-sixth grant of the net project cost may be made.

Relocation costs are 100 percent federally financed.

Length and Time Phasing of Assistance: Terms and conditions are agreed on between UMTA and the applicant.

POST ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Reports: (1) Progress reports; (2) construction reports where applicable; (3) final audit by UMTA when advised project activities have been completed.

Audits: (1) Audit report by audit agency of sponsor or CPA as directed by UMTA; (2) interim audits arranged by UMTA; (3) final audit by UMTA, when advised project activities have been completed.

Records: Recipient is required to retain intact, for 3 years following project settlement, all project contract documents, financial records, and supporting documents.

FINANCIAL INFORMATION:

Obligations: (Grants) FY 72 \$575,320,851.

Range and Average of Financial Assistance: \$11,000 to \$60,000,000; \$4,586,000.

PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS: In fiscal year 1971, \$284.7 million was committed for 64 grants; 15 of these (\$160.2 million) for rail rapid and commuter rail systems; 49 grants were in the bus category of which 21 went to cities with populations under 100,000. Fiscal year 1972 looks to major improvements to rapid transit and commuter rail systems in some larger cities.

AIR POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAM GRANTS

FEDERAL AGENCY: OFFICE OF AIR PROGRAMS, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

AUTHORIZATION: Clean Air Act of 1963; Public Law 88-206 as amended; Public Law 91-604; Sections 105 and 106, 42 U.S.C. 1857c.

OBJECTIVES: To assist State, local, regional, and interstate agencies in planning, developing, establishing, improving, and maintaining adequate programs for control of air pollution.

TYPES OF ASSISTANCE: Project Grants.

USES AND USE RESTRICTION: Grant funds may be used for costs specifically incurred in the conduct of a project in accordance with the purposes enumerated in the approved application. These include personnel costs, supplies, equipment, training of personnel, travel, and other necessary expenditures during the approved project period. Funds may not be used for construction of facilities, nor for expenses incurred other than during each approved award period.

ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS:

Applicant Eligibility: Any local, regional, State, or interstate agency with legal responsibility for air pollution control is eligible for grant support provided such organization furnishes funds for the current year in excess of its expenditures for the previous year for its air pollution program.

Beneficiary Eligibility: Same as applicant eligibility.

Credentials/Documentation: The application must supply evidence of legal authority for air pollution control; evidence of the availability of non-Federal matching funds; and a workable program officially adopted for the agency. A State Plan, coordinated with the Governor's office, is required under Part III of OMB Circular No. A-95 (revised).

APPLICATION AND AWARD PROCESS:

Preapplication Coordination: Applications should be reviewed under procedures in Part I of OMB Circular A-95 (revised). Prior to approval of any grants, the official State air pollution control agency must coordinate local efforts.

Application Procedure: Requests for application forms and completed applications should be submitted to the Grants Administration Division, Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. 20460. Application must meet the requirements of the grant regulations and will be reviewed to determine merit and relevancy of the proposed project.

Award Procedure: Notification of grant award must be made to the State Central Information Reception Agency and OMB on SF 240.

Deadlines: None

Range of Approval/Disapproval Time: 90 days.

Appeals: None

Renewals: None.

ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS:

Formula and Matching Requirements: For planning, development, establishment, and improvement grants: Agencies having substantial responsibility in carrying out all or portions of an Air Quality Control Region Implementation Plan-up to 75 percent Federal.

Others 66 2/3 percent Federal. For maintenance grants: regional

programs-60 percent Federal; others-50 percent Federal. Not more than 10 percent of the funds available shall be granted for air pollution control programs in any one State.

Length and Time Phasing of Assistance: The term of grant shall be determined at time of grant award.

POST ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Reports: As specified in grant award (usually quarterly interims and final progress and expenditure reports).

Audits: Subject to inspection and audit by EPA and Comptroller General.

Records: Financial records, including all documents to support entries on the accounting records and to substantiate charges to each grant, must be kept available to personnel authorized to examine EPA grant accounts in an institution. All such records must be maintained for 3 years after the end of each budget period, and if questions still remain, such as those raised as a result of audit, related records should be retained until the matter is completely resolved.

FINANCIAL INFORMATION:

Obligations: (Grants) FY 72 \$42,196,744.

Range and Average of Financial Assistance: \$1,200 to \$2,780,000; \$132,000.

PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS: During fiscal year 1971, 470 grants, totaling \$30,200,000, were awarded to State, local, and regional air pollution agencies to develop, establish, improve and maintain air pollution control programs.

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SOCIAL-ORIENTED GRANTS

PUBLIC HOUSING-ACQUISITION (WITH OR WITHOUT REHABILITATION)
AND CONSTRUCTION

FEDERAL AGENCY: HOUSING PRODUCTION AND MORTGAGE CREDIT/FHA, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

AUTHORIZATION: U.S. Housing Act of 1937, as amended; Public Law 75-412; 42 U.S.C. 1401-1435.

OBJECTIVES: To provide decent, safe and sanitary low-rent housing and related facilities for families of low income through authorized public agency ownership.

TYPES OF ASSISTANCE: Direct Loans; Project Grants.

USES AND USE RESTRICTIONS: To assist local housing authorities in providing low-rent housing by (1) acquiring existing housing from the private market (acquisition); (2) procuring construction by competitive bidding where the housing authority acts as the developer (conventional); or (3) letting contracts to private developers (turnkey). Annual contributions are made to housing authorities to guarantee debt service, to assure the low-rent character of the projects, and to achieve and maintain adequate operating and maintenance service and reserve funds.

ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS:

Applicant Eligibility: Local housing authorities established by a local government in accordance with state law, authorized public agencies, or Indian tribal organizations are eligible. The proposed program must be approved by the local governing body.

Beneficiary Eligibility: Families of low income. A single person who is elderly, handicapped, displaced, or the remaining member of a tenant family is also eligible.

Credentials/Documentation: The applicant must support the application by furnishing population and housing data showing the need for the number of units requested. If it is the first application, the applicant must also furnish documentation that it is a legal entity.

APPLICATION AND AWARD PROCESS:

Preapplication Coordination: Execution of Cooperation Agreement between local government and local public agency. Intent to file must be coordinated with policies in Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-95, Part I (revised). HUD regional and area offices will transmit a copy of the initial application to the appropriate State clearinghouses and metropolitan or regional clearinghouses.

Application Procedure: Submission of Application for Low-Rent Housing Program (Forms HUD 52470, 52470A and sometimes 52470C). HUD Guide HPMC-FHA 7404-1 covers applications for housing units and preliminary loans.

Award Procedure: The Area Office Director (or Regional Administrator for Region VIII) makes final decision to authorize approval of individual applications.

Deadlines: None.

Range of Approval/Disapproval Time: Approximately 30 days for processing application.

Appeals: Not applicable.

Renewals: Not applicable.

ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS:

Formula and Matching Requirements: Annual contributions to housing

authorities to meet debt service requirements. Additional contributions are available to maintain adequate operating and maintenance services and reserve funds. There are no matching requirements. An indirect local contribution results from the difference between full local property taxes and payments in lieu of taxes made by local housing authorities.

Length and Time Phasing of Assistance: Contributions made annually for up to 40 years.

POST ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Reports: Annual Operating Budget; periodic occupancy and financial reports.

Audits: Periodic fiscal, occupancy, general management, and maintenance audits.

Records: Those necessary to indicate compliance with Annual Contributions Contract.

FINANCIAL INFORMATION:

Obligations: (Grants) FY 72 \$497,662,406.

Range and Average of Financial Assistance: In fiscal year 1972, the average per unit annual contribution is estimated at \$.,575.

PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS: During fiscal year 1971, annual contributions contracts were executed for 81,646 dwelling units.

MODEL CITIES SUPPLEMENTARY GRANTS
(Model Cities)

FEDERAL AGENCY: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

AUTHORIZATION: Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Title I as amended, Public Law 89-754. Stat. 1255, 42 U.S.C. 3301.

OBJECTIVES: To provide financial and technical assistance to enable cities of all sizes to plan, develop, and carry out locally prepared and scheduled comprehensive city demonstration programs containing new and imaginative proposals to rebuild and revitalize large slums and blighted areas.

TYPES OF ASSISTANCE: Project Grants.

USES AND USE RESTRICTIONS: Supplemental grants may be used for administrative costs related to the implementation of an approved Model Cities program; 100 percent of the cost of relocation may be approved.

Supplemental funds may not be used for costs related to general administration of local government, nor may they be used to replace non-Federal contribution obligated to projects or activities prior to applying for planning grant.

ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS:

Applicant Eligibility: Any municipality, county, or other public body having general governmental powers (or two or more public bodies jointly) is eligible to be a Model City. Limited to 150 cities which have already been selected.

Beneficiary Eligibility: Neighborhood residents, organizations and other groups providing services or other assistance to a blighted target area (model neighborhood) located within a model city.

Credentials/Documentation: Applicant must show that the proposed model neighborhood contains serious physical, social and economic problems and make a substantial impact on the quality of urban life.

APPLICATION AND AWARD PROCESS:

Preapplication Coordination: The model cities program requires coordination in accordance with the policies of the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-95.

Application Procedure: No further applications for participation in the program are being received at this time.

Award Procedure: A supplemental grant is awarded to a city that has successfully completed its planning year and has submitted an acceptable comprehensive plan. Notification of award must be made to the designated State Central Information Reception Agency (SF 240).

Deadlines: Deadline for Planning Grants have passed.

Range of Approval/Disapproval Time: Up to 3 months for supplemental grants.

Appeals: Appeals are accepted

Renewals: Not applicable.

ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS:

Formula and Matching Requirements: Allocations of supplemental grants have been developed through the utilization of a formula based on the population in the model neighborhood and the degree of poverty in the individual city. Section 105(c) of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 authorizes the Secretary to make grants to city demonstration agencies "of not to exceed 80

percent of the aggregate amount of non-Federal contributions otherwise required to be made (by the city) to all projects or activities assisted by Federal grant in aid programs . . . which are carried out in connection with such demonstration programs." The total eligible non-Federal contribution is referred to as "base."

Length and Time Phasing of Assistance: Monetary assistance is available in yearly program increments. A supplemental grant is released to a city in the form of a letter of credit. The city draws against the letter of credit on the basis of actual expenditures.

POST ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Reports: Quarterly progress reports and reviews are required. Quarterly report of draw downs against letter of credit and monthly costs and financial statements are required.

Audits: Annual management and financial audits upon completion of program year.

Records: Local accounts must be maintained from which the above reports are made.

FINANCIAL INFORMATION:

Obligations: (Grants) FY 72 \$589,966,907.

Range and Average of Financial Assistance: \$750,000 for a city of 6,000 to \$65,000,000 for the largest city.

PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS: As of December 31, 1970, 125 cities have funds obligated amounting to \$607,000,000.

NEIGHBORHOOD YOUTH CORPS
(NYC)

FEDERAL AGENCY: MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

AUTHORIZATION: Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, as amended, Title 1B, section 123a (1 and 2) 42 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.

OBJECTIVES: To provide opportunities to students of low income families to earn sufficient funds to remain in school while receiving useful work experience and to provide work experience, training and support services for youths from low income families who have dropped out of school to enable them to return to school or to acquire skills that will improve their employability.

TYPES OF ASSISTANCE: Project Grants.

USES AND USE RESTRICTIONS: The Neighborhood Youth Corps has three major components: (1) an in-school component which provides part-time work for students of high school age from low income families; (2) a summer program that provides these students with job opportunities during the summer months; (3) an out of school program to provide economically deprived school dropouts with practical work experience and on the job training to encourage them to return to school and resume their education, or if this is not feasible, to help them acquire skills that improve their employability. Enrollees may not be employed on projects involving construction, operation or maintenance of any facilities used or intended for use in sectarian or religious worship. Enrollees must not displace any employed workers nor impair existing contracts for service.

ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS:

Applicant Eligibility: Sponsors are designated to carry out the Neighborhood Youth Corps program in given areas. The sponsor within each community must be a public or private nonprofit agency capable of planning, administering, coordination, and evaluating the program. Delegate agencies may assist the sponsor.

Beneficiary Eligibility: The in-school and summer components are open to students from low-income families, grades 9 through 12 (or the equivalent 14-21 year age group). The out of school program is open to enrollment of unemployed youth from low-income families, who are 16 to 19 years of age.

Credentials/Documentation: Certification of poverty status required.

APPLICATION AND AWARD PROCESS:

Preapplication Coordination: None.

Application Procedure: Applications are made in the form of contract proposals using Federal forms available from Regional Offices of the Manpower Administration listed in the appendix.

Award Procedure: Contracts are awarded by Regional Offices of the Manpower Administration on the basis of ability to meet program specifications and standards. Notification of award must be made to the designated State Central Information Reception Agency and OMB on SF 240.

Deadlines: None.

Range of Approval/Disapproval Time: Approximately 2 weeks.

Appeals: No limits specified.

Renewals: Usually by modification of contracts.

ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS:

Formula and Matching Requirements: The Federal Government will finance up to 90 percent of the cost of these projects. The head sponsor's

share may be in cash or in kind (facilities equipment, services provided, and supplies).

Length and Time Phasing of Assistance: Annually funded. Time Phasing-- not applicable.

POST ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Reports: The following Manpower Administration forms are to be completed monthly: NYC 9; Daily: MA 101.

Audits: Annual.

Records: Same as for Reports. Required to keep in file 3 years from termination date.

FINANCIAL INFORMATION:

Obligations: (Grants) FY 72 \$516,465,681.

Range and Average of Financial Assistance: NYC In-School decreases financial hardships of disadvantaged, in-school youth. Participation continues high, the 1971 enrollment was 78,800. NYC Summer provides meaningful activities for youth who otherwise would have had few opportunities for constructive use of summer vacations. In 1971 the largest number to date were served--687,900. By working in this program many were enabled to return to school. NYC Out-of-School stresses remedial education, supportive services, training, and work experience for enrollees 17 to 21 years old to introduce them to the world of work or encourage return to school. Opportunities were provided for 40,100 in 1971.

OPERATION MAINSTREAM
(Mainstream)

FEDERAL AGENCY: MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

AUTHORIZATION: Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, as amended. Title 1b, section 123a (3), and Title 1e, section 162a (1).

OBJECTIVES: To provide work-training and employment activities, with necessary supportive services, for chronically unemployed poor adults who have poor employment prospects and are unable, because of age, lack of employment opportunity, or otherwise, to secure appropriate employment or training assistance under other programs.

TYPES OF ASSISTANCE: Project Grants.

USES AND USE RESTRICTIONS: Enables persons to contribute to the betterment or beautification of communities or areas served by the project. Job opportunities may involve the management, development, and conservation of parks, highways, and recreational areas of Federal, State, and local governments; the improvement and rehabilitation of other community facilities and the provision of social, health, and educational services to the poor. Enrollees may not be employed on projects involving construction, operation, or maintenance of any facility used or intended for use in sectarian religious worship. Enrollees must not displace any employed workers nor impair existing contracts for service.

ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS:

Applicant Eligibility: State and local government agencies and private non-profit organizations may sponsor projects under the program. Emphasis is placed on establishing projects in rural areas or towns. Projects authorized under Title 1e must meet one of the following area requirements: (1) non-standard metropolitan statistical areas in states eligible under STEP; (2) small areas with significant cutbacks in local defense installations or seriously impacted by closing or reductions in defense facilities; (3) other relatively small areas with significant increases in employment as compared with a year ago; (4) Indian reservations that do not have a Title 1b Operation Mainstream.

Beneficiary Eligibility: Adults 22 years of age or older who are chronically unemployed and have annual family income below the poverty line. Forty percent of enrollment must be adults 55 years of age or older.

Credentials/Documentation: Certification of poverty status required.

APPLICATION AND AWARD PROCESS:

Preapplication Coordination: None.

Application Procedure: Applications are made in the form of contract proposals using Federal forms available from Regional Offices of the Manpower Administration.

Award Procedure: Awards are made at the regional level in accordance with the program guidelines. Notification of award must be made to the designated State Central Information Reception Agency and OMB on SF 240.

Deadlines: None.

Range of Approval/Disapproval Time: Approximately 2 weeks.

Appeals: No limits specified.

Renewals: Usually by modification of contracts.

ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS:

Formula and Matching Requirements: The Federal Government will finance up to 90 percent of the cost of these projects. The local sponsors share may be in cash or in kind (facilities, equipment, services provided, and supplies).

Length and Time Phasing of Assistance: Annually funded. Time phasing--not applicable.

POST ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Reports: Form NCY-9 is to be completed monthly; Form MA101, daily.

Audits: Annual.

Records: Same forms as in Reports. Required to keep in file 3 years from termination date.

FINANCIAL INFORMATION:

Obligations: (Grants) FY 72 \$85,131,888.

Range and Average of Financial Assistance: \$2,400 to \$3,800; \$3,800.

PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS: As of November 30, 1971, 22,821 persons were enrolled in the program. Six percent of the programs are in urban areas and 94 percent in rural areas.

COMMUNITY ACTION

FEDERAL AGENCY: OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

AUTHORIZATION: 42 U.S.C. 2781, et seq., Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 as amended; Title II; 78 Stat. 508 as amended; 79 Stat. 973; 80 Stat. 1451; 81 Stat. 690; Public Law 88-452.

OBJECTIVES: The Community Action Agency (CAA) is the prime mechanism for implementing Community Action Programs. The objectives of the CAA are to mobilize and channel the resources of private and public organizations and institutions into antipoverty action; to increase the capabilities as well as opportunities for participation of the poor in the planning, conduct, and evaluation of programs affecting their lives; to stimulate new and more effective approaches to the solution of poverty problems; to strengthen communications, mutual understanding and to strengthen the planning and coordination of antipoverty programs in the community.

TYPES OF ASSISTANCE: Project Grants.

USES AND USE RESTRICTIONS: Funds may be used for administrative costs of CAAs, nonprogram staff activities, neighborhood centers in target areas, and locally developed programs which further the objectives of community action. Projects may include health, education, housing, family planning, economic development, employment, day care, community organization, and other services. Any of these programs also may be funded to meet the needs of the American Indian. Technical assistance is also available to communities in developing, conducting and administering programs under Title II and for training for specialized or other personnel which is needed with those programs. The Act provides funds for assistance to state agencies designated in accordance with state law to carry out the functions of the State Economic Opportunity Office (SEOO). The State Economic Opportunity Office is the prime mechanism by which OEO seeks to aid state governments in their efforts to eradicate poverty within their boundaries; acts as advisor to the Governor on antipoverty matters; mobilizes and coordinates antipoverty resources at the state level; gives technical assistance to CAAs and other OEO grantees; and participates in the monitoring and evaluation of OEO-funded programs.

ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS:

Applicant Eligibility: A CAA must be designated by the state, a political subdivision of the state, a combination of such political subdivisions or Indian tribal organizations. A state or local government (or a combination of subdivisions) may designate itself or another agency which may be either a separate public agency or a private nonprofit agency which he finds is capable of carrying out the project in an efficient and effective manner. The Director may provide financial assistance to state agencies designated in accordance with state law to carry out the functions of the SEOO.

Beneficiary Eligibility: Low income families and individuals of all ages, in urban and rural areas.

Credentials/Documentation: Following its designation as a CAA by a state or local government, OEO must insure that the CAA meets certain legislative and administrative requirements.

APPLICATION AND AWARD PROCESS:

Preapplication Coordination: States, local governments, and poverty-related agencies must be given notice and an opportunity to comment

on proposed applications to OEO for recognition of locally-designated CAAs. Applications should be reviewed under procedures in Part I of OMB Circular No. A-95 (revised).

Application Procedure: Initial application: The applicant initially must have applied for recognition as a CAA under the provisions of OEO instruction 6302-2. (Note: Due to funding limitations, OEO will not be able to recognize CAAs designed to serve communities which are not now served by a CAA, even if the CAA and the community otherwise meet eligibility requirements.) CAAs submit plans and priorities documents (as outlined in OEO instruction 6710-1), for approval by OEO.

Award Procedure: Awards are issued from the OEO Regional Office directly to the applicant except for Indian grants which are issued directly from OEO Headquarters to the applicant. The Governor is notified by letter and has a 30-day period in which to act. Notification of grant award must be made to the designated State Central Information Reception Agency and OMB on SF 240.

Deadlines: Not applicable.

Range of Approval/Disapproval Time: Approximately 100 days from submission to OEO of the plans and priorities to approval of the grant. Then there is an additional 30 days awaiting Governor's approval.

Appeals: There is no appeal for new fundings.

Renewals: May be refunded annually.

ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS:

Formula and Matching Requirements: General rule: 20 percent in non-Federal contribution. Exceptions: Grantees serving communities with per capita incomes below \$750 per year will provide 10 percent of the program cost whenever possible; those serving communities with per capita incomes in the \$750-\$999 range shall provide at least 10 percent but may request exemption of that portion above 10 percent which they are unable to provide.

Length and Time Phasing of Assistance: Generally, grants are funded on a 12-month basis, with the possibility of renewal. All grants in excess of \$250,000 will have the funds made available to the grantee by letter of credit. All other grants will be paid by check.

POST ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Reports: "Quarterly Grantee Financial Report and Support Data Sheet." See OEO instruction 6710-1 for other required documentation.

Audits: Preliminary audit within 3 months after the initial funding and an annual audit thereafter.

Records: All financial records, all source documents supporting accounting transactions, the general ledger, subsidiary ledgers, personnel and payroll records, cancelled checks, and all other related documents and records must be retained by the grantee for a period of 5 years after the last day of the program year.

FINANCIAL INFORMATION:

Obligations: (Grants) FY 72 \$302,301,323.

Range and Average of Financial Assistance: \$10,000 to \$35,000,000; \$250,000.

PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS: In fiscal year 1971, there were 984 Community Action Agencies.

LEGAL SERVICES

FEDERAL AGENCY: OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

AUTHORIZATION: Public Law 88-452; 42 U.S.C. 2781, et seq.

OBJECTIVES: To provide legal services to those of low income who are unable to secure such assistance.

TYPES OF ASSISTANCE: Project Grants.

USES AND USE RESTRICTIONS: Provides funds to establish law offices in low-income neighborhoods and provides attorneys to advise and represent clients who cannot afford to pay for a lawyer's services. By statute, such representation is limited to civil cases. Clients must meet the standard of indigency which is set locally. Local legal services agencies also provide representation to groups, provide assistance in plans for economic development and attempt to make the law more responsive to the needs of the poor through the prosecution of test cases.

ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS:

Applicant Eligibility: Existing legal aid societies, nonprofit corporations organized for the specific purpose of providing legal assistance, universities, and bar sponsored organizations are eligible to apply for programs.

Beneficiary Eligibility: Beneficiary eligibility requirements are determined locally by each project.

Credentials/Documentation: None.

APPLICATION AND AWARD PROCESS:

Preapplication Coordination: Submission to state and local bar association and State Economic Opportunity Office.

Application Procedure: Applications are forwarded to the appropriate Regional Office (listed in the appendix).

Award Procedure: Awards are issued from the Regional Office directly to the applicant. The Governor is notified by letter and has a 30-day period in which to act. Notification of grant award must be made to the designated State Central Information Reception Agency and OMB on SF 240.

Deadlines: None.

Range of Approval/Disapproval Time: Approximately 100 days for sponsoring organization.

Appeals: Not applicable.

Renewals: Refunding upon submission of forms listed in method of application above.

ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS:

Formula and Matching Requirements: Federal assistance may not exceed 80 percent except in special cases where the local share cannot be met.

Length and Time Phasing of Assistance: Funded annually.

POST ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Reports: "Quarterly narrative reports"; "Monthly financial reports."

Audits: Annually by Regional Office of Economic Opportunity.

Records: Books and accounts necessary for program review and audit.

FINANCIAL INFORMATION:

Obligations: (Grants) FY 72 \$60,205,854.

Range and Average of Financial Assistance: \$45,000 to \$4,300,000; \$175,000.

PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS: In fiscal year 1972, 2,280 attorneys in the legal services projects handled over 1,100,000 cases.

APPENDIX C
CITY MANAGER CASES

- A. Characteristics of City Manager Cities**
- B. Community Socio-economic Factor Scores**
- C. Community Power Factor Scores**

APPENDIX C

CITY CASES

- A. Characteristics of City Manager Cities**
- B. Community Socioeconomic Factor Scores**
- C. Community Power Factor Scores**

A. CHARACTERISTICS OF CITY MANAGER CITIES

Case No.		Population	Percent	Senate	House	Reform Score	Presence	Number of	Total	Grant
			Prop. /Mgr. Class	Seniority Average	Seniority Average		of FLO	Manufacturing Establish- ments	Grants Per Capita	Avera
1	Little Rock, AR	132,482	29.6	28.0	33.0	4.99	0	91	11.88	1.5
2	Fort Lauderdale, FL	139,543	25.7	2.0	5.0	4.99	1	218	12.57	1.0
3	Miami Beach, FL	86,974	31.2	2.0	13.0	3.90	0	176	7.17	2.0
4	Tallahassee, FL	71,934	34.0	2.0	9.0	4.00	1	235	68.78	0.8
5	Albany, GA	72,623	20.6	8.0	2.0	2.00	0	395	0.14	1.8
6	Savannah, GA	118,344	20.0	8.0	11.0	2.98	0	312	29.46	1.8
7	Durham, NC	95,412	27.7	16.0	5.0	2.99	1	47	67.73	1.8
8	Greensboro, NC	144,245	26.7	16.0	3.0	4.00	1	129	13.27	1.6
9	Norman, OK	52,128	37.3	5.5	23.0	3.99	1	5	10.02	1.0
10	Oklahoma City, OK	366,734	25.4	5.5	15.7	3.00	1	162	71.03	1.9
11	Columbia, SC	113,542	28.0	5.0	1.0	3.00	0	37	73.22	1.2
12	Amarillo, TX	127,049	24.1	5.0	5.0	3.00	0	42	11.97	1.3
13	Austin, TX	251,817	32.0	5.0	9.0	3.15	1	52	46.45	1.5
14	Beaumont, TX	115,965	25.4	5.0	19.0	2.80	0	44	12.78	0.8
15	Dallas, TX	844,189	24.4	5.0	14.3	2.61	1	642	38.44	1.4
16	Fort Worth, TX	393,463	23.4	5.0	21.5	4.00	1	240	5.90	1.0
17	Garland, TX	81,324	25.8	5.0	9.0	3.75	0	48	0.96	--
18	Midland, TX	59,689	35.3	5.0	37.0	3.00	0	09	1.80	1.3
19	Port Arthur, TX	57,380	17.3	5.0	19.0	4.00	1	12	57.36	1.4
20	San Angelo, TX	63,884	24.4	5.0	29.0	3.33	0	26	12.53	1.4
21	Chesapeake, TX	89,580	18.3	6.5	24.0	4.00	1	22	1.44	1.9
22	Phoenix, A Z	581,600	25.3	6.0	12.0	3.99	1	13	23.99	0.9
23	Alameda, CA	70,941	23.8	2.0	27.0	3.97	0	12	2.52	--
24	Anaheim, CA	166,118	26.9	2.0	5.3	5.00	1	113	2.41	0.5
25	Bakersfield, CA	69,515	27.7	2.0	5.0	3.00	0	30	34.51	--
26	Burbank, CA	88,894	11.3	2.0	9.0	4.99	0	25	0.00	0.3

Case No.		Population	Percent Prop. /Mgr. Class	Senate Seniority Average	House Seniority Average	Reform Score	Presence of FLO	Number of Manufacturing Establishments	Total Grants Per Capita	Grant Average
27	Ontario, CA	64,105	19.0	2.0	9.0	4.00	0	33	18.49	1.0
28	Pasadena, CA	113,254	33.0	2.0	3.5	5.00	0	81	7.85	0.8
29	Sacramento, CA	254,364	24.4	2.0	8.5	3.00	0	71	38.43	1.2
30	San Diego, CA	696,566	29.5	2.0	19.0	3.97	1	143	18.27	1.4
31	San Leandro, CA	68,698	19.0	2.0	10.0	3.45	0	89	0.00	--
32	Santa Ana, CA	156,520	19.1	2.0	27.0	5.00	1	115	9.86	--
33	Santa Barbara, CA	70,211	29.0	2.0	5.5	3.95	0	26	17.33	0.6
34	Santa Monica, CA	88,289	32.1	2.0	17.0	4.99	1	77	0.00	1.3
35	Stockton, CA	107,459	24.9	2.0	9.0	4.90	1	62	23.43	1.4
36	Boulder, CO	66,870	41.3	3.0	15.0	4.00	1	17	10.90	1.6
37	Colorado Springs, CO	135,017	28.6	3.0	5.0	3.75	0	33	48.08	1.6
38	Las Vegas, NV	125,641	24.2	15.5	7.0	3.93	1	18	87.83	1.4
39	Eugene, OR	76,341	32.9	4.0	7.0	2.00	1	52	55.51	1.6
40	Champaign, IL	56,621	36.4	3.5	5.0	2.50	0	21	2.18	1.6
41	Decatur, IL	90,705	29.1	3.5	21.0	4.97	0	53	14.99	1.6
42	Peoria, IL	126,964	28.1	3.5	15.0	3.00	0	84	2.64	--
43	Des Moines, IO	200,772	23.9	7.0	13.0	2.85	1	104	167.91	1.2
44	Sioux City, IO	85,925	24.8	7.0	5.0	4.90	0	48	8.21	1.5
45	Wichita, KS	276,699	26.4	6.5	11.0	5.00	1	145	43.72	1.6
46	Flint, MI	193,380	16.2	9.5	5.0	3.99	0	56	32.93	1.5
47	Kalamazoo, MI	85,661	24.9	9.5	5.0	3.98	0	90	2.77	--
48	Saginaw, MI	91,820	17.2	9.5	11.0	5.00	0	63	32.70	1.4
49	Independence, MI	111,589	20.1	11.5	13.0	3.00	0	21	7.89	1.0
50	Cincinnati, OH	452,550	23.1	2.0	6.0	3.98	1	462	31.56	1.5
51	Toledo, OH	384,015	20.9	2.0	15.0	3.95	0	255	19.62	1.3
52	Bloomington, MN	81,948	33.4	5.5	1.0	2.99	0	45	0.64	--
53	Hartford, CN	315,801	16.6	5.0	1.0	2.99	1	99	227.40	2.9
54	Medford CN	64,409	20.8	7.5	17.0	4.00	0	24	0.29	1.0
55	Worcester, MA	176,603	22.2	7.5	25.0	4.96	1	209	59.01	0.9
56	Clifton, MA	82,437	22.7	15.0	3.0	4.99	1	133	0.00	--

B. COMMUNITY SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTOR SCORES

CASE NO.	Poverty Factor 1	Culture Factor 2	Population Factor 3
1	0.27217	-0.85519	0.51827
2	-0.29606	0.43755	0.62634
*** CASE 3 ASSIGNED MISSING DATA SCORES ***			
3	99.99989	99.99989	99.99989
4	0.79082	-0.99106	-1.21033
5	2.03160	-1.30850	-1.39737
6	2.58123	-0.37769	-0.85541
7	1.26015	-0.89010	-0.78988
8	0.17982	-0.74395	0.67538
9	-1.49089	-0.50107	-1.31622
10	0.13737	-0.98392	1.26171
11	1.39820	-1.22036	0.10600
12	0.13015	-0.50799	0.68090
13	-0.15819	-0.49369	0.87104
14	1.24645	-0.75144	0.39300
15	0.05244	-0.24103	2.97258
16	0.38639	-0.64794	1.37473
17	-1.53759	-0.89846	-0.82997
18	-0.24594	-0.43801	-0.51334
19	2.11579	-0.52736	-0.81351
20	0.62853	-0.76002	-0.96786
*** CASE 21 ASSIGNED MISSING DATA SCORES ***			
21	99.99989	99.99989	99.99989
22	-0.36883	-0.08328	2.04009
23	-0.28533	0.93354	-0.60072
*** CASE 24 ASSIGNED MISSING DATA SCORES ***			
24	99.99989	99.99989	99.99989
25	-0.22398	-0.50921	-0.70272
*** CASE 26 ASSIGNED MISSING DATA SCORES ***			
26	99.99989	99.99989	99.99989
27	-0.77436	-0.27248	-0.98300
28	-0.04712	1.03033	0.66015
29	-0.63408	-0.09167	0.78781
30	-0.41925	-0.12414	2.33926
*** CASE 31 ASSIGNED MISSING DATA SCORES ***			
31	99.99989	99.99989	99.99989
32	-1.30587	0.18894	0.13972
33	-0.37730	0.33222	-0.83464
34	-0.40876	1.89200	-0.59424
35	0.12996	-0.04283	0.09466
36	-2.31830	-0.70300	-1.20754
37	-1.01784	-0.93501	0.16349
38	-1.19701	-0.70413	0.47780
39	-1.24537	-0.78358	-0.99382
40	-0.21144	-0.00163	-0.91758
41	0.28671	-0.33649	-0.89913
42	0.07459	0.29860	0.45584
43	0.08915	-0.16556	0.70027
44	0.45707	0.10652	-0.69778
45	-0.04157	-0.28848	1.03839

CASE NO.	Poverty Factor 1	Culture Factor 2	Population Factor 3
46	0.66916	0.28891	0.67892
47	0.15746	0.08448	-0.76985
48	0.76626	0.69268	-0.63467
49	-0.95062	-0.74965	0.46970
50	1.59525	0.81989	1.51412
51	0.13540	0.87960	1.46665
*** CASE 52 ASSIGNED MISSING DATA SCORES ***			
52	99.99989	99.99989	99.99989
53	1.14061	1.71287	0.30231
54	-0.27416	2.38916	-0.56936
55	0.17208	1.42572	0.50597
*** CASE 56 ASSIGNED DATA SCORES ***			
56	99.99989	99.99989	99.99989
56 CASES HAVE BEEN SCORED			

C. COMMUNITY POWER FACTOR SCORES

CASE NO.	Trade Center Factor 1	Financial Center Factor 2
1	1.38873	-0.12856
2	-0.05570	2.18925
3	-2.18778	0.74480
4	-0.27066	1.03902
5	0.08077	-0.23904
6	0.45539	-0.32912
7	-0.18329	0.36044
8	0.87872	-1.09416
9	-1.32147	3.09802
10	0.62179	0.03177
11	0.27352	0.37951
12	1.18154	-0.29091
13	-0.59199	0.46892
14	0.59000	-0.21560
15	0.96240	-0.29906
16	-0.08900	-0.15399
17	-1.59970	-0.40252
18	0.30955	-0.54976
19	-0.09376	-0.03528
20	0.37044	0.61182
21	-2.01282	-1.26301
22	-0.28605	-0.98094
23	-1.99543	-0.99519
24	-0.50301	-1.04952
25	2.71208	-0.03719
26	0.68703	-0.92766
27	-1.06324	-1.06082
28	0.45630	-0.14571
29	0.47808	-0.70209
30	-1.13507	-0.88255
31	0.67994	-1.26601
32	-0.32011	-0.86932
33	1.60177	1.70823
34	0.23029	0.57938
35	0.71838	-0.09315
36	-1.00679	2.47960
37	-1.16038	1.30873
38	-0.63378	-0.92190
39	1.46102	-1.13730
40	-0.39528	2.67416
41	-0.12869	-0.10075
42	0.51490	0.46851
43	0.82844	0.89728
44	0.93580	0.14122
45	0.41264	-0.00443
46	-0.43073	-0.56335
47	0.70401	0.52710
48	0.32342	-0.40734
49	-1.71966	-0.09309
50	1.24665	-0.09606
51	-0.25584	-0.84806
52	-1.49649	-0.81340
53	1.00515	1.16382
54	-1.26454	-0.66537
55	0.28993	-0.07328
56	-0.19629	-1.13536

56 CASES HAVE BEEN SCORED