

INDIAN TRIBES IN THE NORTHWEST.

MESSAGE

FROM THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

IN ANSWER TO

Resolution of the House of the 18th December last, respecting the cause of the recent outbreaks of the Indian tribes in the northwest.

FEBRUARY 16, 1863 —Laid on the table and ordered to be printed.

WASHINGTON, February 13, 1863.

SIR: I herewith communicate to the House of Representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 18th of December last, a report from the Secretary of the Interior, containing all the information in the possession of the department respecting the causes of the recent outbreaks of the Indian tribes in the northwest, which has not heretofore been transmitted to Congress.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

HON. GALUSHA A. GROW,

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

Washington, February 12, 1863.

SIR: On the 19th of December last you referred to this department for report a resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on the preceding day, at the instance of a member of the Committee on Indian Affairs, in the following words:

“*Resolved*, That the President of the United States be requested to communicate to this House, so far as is consistent with the public interest, any information in his possession in relation to the cause of the recent outbreak of the Indian tribes of the northwest, and which shall tend to show whether the same was incited or encouraged by any person or persons not of said tribes, and if so, by whom, and especially whether it has in any degree been caused by the fraud or improper conduct of any of the agents of the United States for said tribes practiced upon them or any of them.”

As all the official information on this subject which had reached the department up to the date of this request from the House of Representatives had been

embodied in the documents which accompanied your annual message of the 1st of December last, this report has been delayed to await the receipt of the annual report of the Sioux agent, Thomas J. Galbraith, which came to hand on the 7th instant, and is herewith submitted. I also beg leave to lay before you the accompanying statement, which was made to me while in Minnesota in November last, by Mr. George H. Spencer, jr., who had resided among the Sioux Indians for several years preceding the recent outbreak, and was taken prisoner by them, and held in captivity until released with the other captives by General Sibley's command. His intelligence, intimate acquaintance with many of the Indians, his familiarity with their language, and ample opportunities for observation, seem to render his testimony desirable in a search for the true origin of the Sioux outbreak, and to entitle his opinions to respect.

As to the real cause of the recent Sioux outbreak, it is difficult, if not wholly impossible at the present time, to determine with that degree of certainty which the character and magnitude of its results demand. Conflicting opinions have been expressed, even by those who had enjoyed the best opportunities for an intelligent and correct judgment, and some few isolated facts adduced to sustain them. I have not been able to discover any satisfactory and conclusive evidence of a premeditated design on the part of the Indians. That they had long brooded over their dissatisfaction with their treaty relations with the government and had frequently complained of their not being, in all respects, in accordance with their understanding of them at the time the treaties were made, all seem to agree, but nothing is more common than complaints of this character, and, ordinarily, they excite no serious apprehension in the minds of those familiar with Indian habits and characteristics: They are, no doubt, often properly attributable to the misunderstanding naturally the result of great dissimilarity of language and to the want of faithful and competent interpreters. Sometimes they result from the existence, as in this case, of several treaties or parts of treaties in force at the same time, rendering it difficult for any one not familiar with their various provisions, to determine what articles remain in operation and what have been modified or wholly superseded by subsequent negotiation. But they are not unfrequently traceable to unscrupulous and designing persons whose cupidity is ministered to by misrepresentation and intrigue.

Agent Galbraith does not appear to have apprehended any unusual difficulty with the lower bands of Sioux up to the time the outbreak occurred. Only three days prior thereto he had an interview with "Little Crow," the leader of the revolt, who, he says, then "seemed to be well pleased and satisfied" with all he was doing for him and the other Indians. It would seem, from his report, that the most ample arrangements had been made for their civilization and material advancement, and that their general and cordial co-operation with him afforded reasonable assurance of eminent success, and rendered their future prospects bright and cheering. Neither he nor Mr. Spencer attach any importance to the suggestion that the outbreak was incited or encouraged by rebel emissaries. Mr. Spencer says, messengers were sent by the Indians to various other tribes and to the governor of the Selkirk settlement, to inform them that they had declared war against the whites, and that they confidently expected assistance from them. I doubt whether any just reason existed for such expectations on the part of the hostile Indians. They may have been feigned by the leaders of the revolt, simply to inspire confidence and to encourage their more timid and reluctant followers. From all the inquiry and examination I have been able to make, I am inclined to the opinion that the Sioux outbreak was chiefly caused by the unfortunate affair in which a few dissolute and reckless young men of the tribe became involved at Acton, through the influence of intoxicating liquor, that fruitful source of embarrassment in the management of our Indian relations, and of loss to the Indians and to the white settlers in their vicinity.

This occurrence happened at a time when the minds of the Indians had become restless and agitated by accounts, incautiously or maliciously communicated to them, of the bloody conflicts in which the army of the United States had been engaged; and when they had become distrustful and uneasy because of the delay which had occurred in the payment of their annuities, the reasons for which had been misrepresented to them, as is alleged, by evil disposed persons, who taught them to believe that the government had been broken up and they left to take care of themselves as best they could. Exasperation thus produced, added to their long felt dissatisfaction at having parted with their lands, no doubt led them to attempt to repossess themselves of their former hunting grounds—now become fruitful fields in the hands of the industrious whites—and to wreak, with their accustomed ferocity, vengeance upon the defenceless inhabitants within their reach, for their imaginary wrongs.

I cannot but regret, however, the misdirected zeal and patriotism which induced the agent to leave his post at so critical a moment, nor escape the painful conviction that his continued presence there might possibly have been the means of averting the terrible calamity which so soon succeeded his departure. But a short time previous thereto such open discontent and violence had been manifested by the upper bands as to render it necessary for him to call upon the military authorities at Fort Ridgley for assistance and protection, and when the news of the murders at Acton reached the lower bands the fact that the agent—the only officer of the government to whom they looked for the payment of their anxiously expected annuities and for counsel and guidance in trouble—had taken many of the employés and most of the able-bodied white men in the neighborhood and left the Indian country, was not well calculated to remove from their minds the impression that they had been abandoned by the government.

The difficulties with the Chippewas of the Mississippi and Pillager and Lake Winnibigoshish Indians occurred about the same time, but resulted, fortunately, in no loss of life and but comparatively little destruction of property. They assumed, for a time, a threatening aspect, but by judicious management were soon allayed and amicable relations re-established.

Many causes have also been assigned as the origin of these disturbances, which I am satisfied had no real existence. The difficulty appears to have been exclusively of a personal character, and confined, in the beginning, to the late agent and the principal chief of the Mississippi bands. The latter felt aggrieved because the agent did not treat him with the consideration and favor he thought himself entitled to, and also charged the agent with fraud. These disagreements, founded to some extent in misapprehension, colored and perverted by persons having antagonistic interests and views, increased to mutual distrust and animosity, and finally culminated into acts of avowed and open hostility. The agent sought, with the assistance of the military force at Fort Ripley, to arrest the chief, with a view to punishing him, and he prepared, with such force as he could command, for resistance. Happily no collision ensued, and the Indians were induced to return to their homes. Pending these troubles the agent suddenly died, thus rendering inquiry into the causes of the outbreak more difficult; but, after careful examination into the matter, I am fully satisfied that no combination existed between these bands and the Sioux, as some have suspected, and that no hostile movements against the whites were intended by them. After passion had given place to reason and reflection, the Indians felt and acknowledged that they had done wrong in many acts of depredation committed by them, and cheerfully consented to have the amount of the damage charged against their annuities, which was ordered to be done.

The Indians still believe that injustice has been practiced towards them, but, so far as any proof has been adduced before me, I am unwilling to think the

agent had been guilty of fraud or any culpable misconduct sufficient to provoke the threatened collision between the United States and that tribe.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. P. USHER,

Secretary of the Interior.

The PRESIDENT.

THE SIOUX WAR.

Ever since the treaty which was made in 1851 with the nation of Dacotah or Sioux Indians, they have been finding fault and complaining that the government did not strictly comply with the stipulations of the treaty. While some of the causes of these complaints have been imaginary, there can be no doubt but that there has been good grounds for others. In regard to the management of affairs among the Lower Sioux, where the recent outbreak originated, I cannot speak knowingly, as I have not resided among them since the treaty went into effect. But among the Upper Sioux, the Sissitons in particular, with whom I have been engaged in trade for the past two years, there has been some cause for complaint on their part.

I have often heard Standing Buffalo, the Sissiton chief, complain about the whites not fulfilling their promises in regard to the location of mills, schools, mechanics, physicians, &c., among his tribe. It is true that the lower bands enjoyed all the advantages to be derived from these sources, but as they were located at a distance of nearly one hundred miles from the villages and fields of the Sissitons, they derived but little, if any, benefit from them. It is too often the case, that the parties who are employed by the government to hold councils, form treaties, &c., with Indian tribes, do not sufficiently understand the character of the parties with whom they are negotiating; and, consequently, although matters may go off smoothly enough at the time, difficulties are liable to arise in the future, the consequences of which may be disastrous.

As there are other savage tribes standing in the same relations to the government to day that the Sioux occupied previous to the insurrection, it may be well enough to examine minutely one or two points connected with Indian affairs, which, if properly observed, may be the means of preventing a repetition of the cruel blow by other tribes which has been so fearfully inflicted by the Sioux. In the first place, let us examine the Indian himself. What is an Indian?

Simple as this question may seem, yet it is one that, in my opinion, is not thoroughly understood by our officials and others who have Indian affairs in charge. In the great chain of nature the Indian is a connecting link between the wild beast and the human species. In shape he is human and has the gift of speech, and to a limited extent the use of language. In almost all his actions he seems to be guided by instinct rather than reason; to say that he possesses *no* intellect might possibly be saying too much; but if he does, it seems to be so clouded and obscured that it does not avail him much. Long association with the whites has developed in some of them the reasoning faculties, and shown them to be possessed of some little intelligence. So the same thing may be said of some animals, whose performances seem to be more the result of reason than instinct. The treachery of the Indian is proverbial. Unaccustomed to the comforts and luxuries of a home, there is in his language no word which answers to our word home. Accustomed from infancy to witness scenes of violence and bloodshed, and, as soon as he can speak, it is impressed upon his mind that the greatest achievement he is capable of performing is to dye his hands in the blood of his fellow-creatures, whereby he may become entitled to wear a scalp-feather. He soon learns to take delight in participating in the excitement of

the chase, and in following the war path. His passions being subjected to no restraint whatever, his imagination is constantly taxed to invent some new mode of torture to apply to the victim that may have been unfortunate enough to fall into his hands. The brutish propensities largely predominating, it requires but slight provocation to cause him to turn his murderous weapons against his fellow-beings. Poets may sing and romancers may write as much as they will about the "noble savage;" the "dignified and majestic bearing of nature's nobleman;" the "generous traits of character" possessed by these "sons of the prairies," &c.; but "distance lends enchantment to the view," and after having been more or less intimately associated with them for the past ten years, I have been unable to perceive but a very few of those noble attributes which have been so plentifully ascribed to them. There are some individual exceptions it is true; as you will find among our own race persons who have been reared under the holy influences of Christianity possessing the spirits of fiends, so you will find occasionally an Indian who is possessed of some feelings of humanity. Skilled to perfection in the peculiar craft pertaining to his calling, and his powers of endurance being almost incredible when aroused, he becomes the most dangerous of foes.

When difficulties and misunderstandings arise between civilized nations, they may be amicably adjusted by negotiation, or, that failing, a resort to warfare conducted on scientific principles, but never losing sight of the great principles of humanity. But not so with a race of savages. Diplomacy is something unknown to them.

When they feel that they have been wronged, they proceed (actuated solely by the desire for revenge) to wreak their vengeance upon defenceless, helpless women and children. Such being the state of things, how important it is that the government should see that the stipulations of the treaties now existing with those tribes who yet remain friendly should be strictly and faithfully complied with. Since open hostilities have been commenced by one tribe, it will not require much to induce other tribes to follow their example.

Another point, which is a very essential one, is the employment of competent interpreters—men who have a thorough knowledge of the two languages. It is my opinion that more than one half of the misunderstandings which arise between the Indians and the government may be traced to the fact that the interpreter did not understand himself what had been said to him. As a general thing half-breeds are employed to interpret.

White men who are capable of interpreting cannot afford to accept the position of government interpreter, because the salary is so small that they can make more other ways. To explain what I mean more fully, we will examine the languages. Ten thousand words will probably more than cover the number of words in the Sioux language, while our language is said to contain over forty thousand words. Now, the half-breed, of course, is raised among Indians, and acquires his mother tongue perfectly; as he grows up he becomes associated with the people of the frontier, and from them acquires his knowledge of English, which is not such English as is spoken among the élite. The person who has acquired his education, and has graduated from our high schools, speaks a different language, you might say, from the backwoodsman, who probably never saw the inside of a school-house.

The excess of thirty thousand words in our language over that of the Indian renders it very easy to say things which cannot be literally interpreted into the Indian tongue. In such cases you can only convey the idea; that is, if the interpreter has intelligence enough to catch the idea himself. Now, our officials are generally intelligent and educated men. In councils with the Indians they use the English language in its purity, to which the ear of the poor half-breed is entirely unaccustomed. He hears big sounding words; they are all Greek to him, and, under such circumstances, to convey the proper idea is next to an

impossibility. Under such circumstances treaties are formed, and, when signed by all parties, the Indian is half the time as ignorant of the contents of the document as a native of Africa. On the other hand, I have known instances where white men, who were wholly unfit for the office, have received and held the responsible position of interpreter for the government; men whose knowledge of the Indian tongue scarcely enabled them to carry on simple everyday conversation. They were favorites of those in authority, and therefore received the appointment, the question of competency never being taken into consideration. Under such circumstances it is the easiest thing in the world for serious misunderstandings to arise between the Indians and the government.

Now, in regard to the Sioux, they knew that the federal government had been carrying on an expensive war for a long time; they believed that almost all our able-bodied men had gone south to take part in the war. The customary time arrived for the payment of their moneys and distribution of goods, and the Indians were assembled to receive them; but the money did not arrive.

They were put off with promises that, by such and such a time, they should have their money, but were as often disappointed.

Two months after the customary time for making payments had passed, when their agent volunteered to go into the service of his country, and taking almost every able-bodied man on the reservation with him, he left his post to be gone no one knew how long. The Indians finding that their agent had thus left them without giving them any satisfactory explanations, were at once impressed with idea that the federal government had ceased to exist, and that their money had been expended for the purpose of carrying on the war, and that they were left to take care of themselves as best they could.

Just at this time four young men started out on a war party against the Chipeways, but being unable to find any, and procuring some liquor, they murdered some whites near Acton. They came home on the morning of the 17th of August, and told what they had done. A council was immediately held, and it was decided that, taking all things into consideration, the best thing that could be done under the circumstances was to declare war against the whites, and that the first blow should be struck the next morning. This proposition came from Little Crow. Accordingly, on Monday morning, the 18th day of August, 1862, about two hundred and fifty or three hundred Indians, armed and naked, except the breech cloth, came into the lower agency (twelve miles above Fort Ridgely,) and dividing themselves into small parties, and stationing themselves around almost every building in the place, at a given signal the attack commenced. I had been residing at Big Stone lake, among the Sissitons, for the past two years and had just arrived at the lower agency the day before the outbreak. I was in the store of Major W. H. Forbes when the attack commenced; attracted by the firing and yelling outside, I, with four or five others, rushed to the door to see what was going on, when we received a volley of ball and buckshot from about twenty-five or thirty Indians, which resulted in the death of four persons. I received a ball through my right arm, another struck me in the right breast, and still another in the abdomen. One man was not injured, with whom I rushed up stairs; I did not fall, and when I reached the foot of the stairs I turned and beheld the store filling with Indians. One had followed me nearly to the stairs, when he took deliberate aim at my body, but providentially both barrels of his gun missed fire, and I succeeded in getting above without further injury. Not expecting to live a great while I threw myself upon a bed, and while lying there could hear them open cases of goods and carrying them out and threatening to burn the building. I did not relish the idea of being burnt to death very well, so I arose very quietly, and taking a bed cord, I made fast one end to the bedpost and carried the other to a window, which I raised. I intended, in case they fired the building, to let myself down from the window and take the chances of being shot again rather than to remain where I was and burn. The man who went up

stairs with me seeing a good opportunity to escape rushed down through the crowd and ran for life; he was fired upon, and two charges of duckshot struck him, but he succeeded in making his escape. I had been up stairs probably an hour when I heard the voice of an Indian inquiring for me. I recognized his voice and felt that I was safe. Upon being told that I was up stairs he rushed up, followed by ten or a dozen others, and approaching my bed asked me if I was mortally wounded. I told him that I did not know, but that I was badly hurt. Some of the others came up and took me by the hand and appeared to be sorry that I had been hurt. They then asked me where the guns were. I pointed to them, when my comrade assisted me in getting down stairs.

The name of this Indian is Wa-kin-yan-ta-wa, or in English, "His Thunder." He was, up to the time of the outbreak, the head soldier of Little Crow, and some four or five years ago went to Washington with that chief to see their Great Father. He is a fine looking Indian, and has always been noted for his bravery in fighting with the Chippewas. When we reached the foot of the stairs some of the Indians cried out to "kill him," "spare no Americans," "show mercy to none." My friend, who was unarmed, seized a hatchet that was lying near by and declared that he would cut down the first one that should attempt to do me any further harm. Said he, "If you had killed him before I saw him it would have been all right; but we have been friends and comrades for ten years, and now that I have seen him, I will protect him or die with him." They then made way for us and we passed out; he then procured a wagon and gave me over to a couple of squaws to take me to his lodge. On the way we were stopped two or three times by armed Indians on horseback, who inquired of the squaws "what that meant?" Upon being answered that "this is Wa-kin-yan-ta-wa's friend and he has saved his life," they suffered us to pass on. His lodge was about four miles above the agency, at Little Crow's village. My friend soon came home, and washed me and dressed my wounds with roots.

Some few white men succeeded in making their escape to the fort. There were no other white men taken prisoners. The half-breeds were saved and considered as prisoners, and in many instances were compelled to go with the Indians on the war parties. There were five or six Canadians who had lived with the Indians for twenty-five or thirty years, who had married Indian women and have children grown up, who were also compelled to follow them, but were hardly considered as prisoners, as they were allowed to retain their teams and other property. One of these men made his escape, but returned to his family a few days after.

Upon the alarm being given at the fort, Captain Marsh, with between forty and fifty men, came up to quell the disturbance. They were met at the ferry by the Indians, who defeated them, killing more than half their number, including their commander. The Indians lost but one killed and five or six wounded. On the nineteenth the Indians all moved up to Little Crow's village (that is all who had their villages below that place) and formed one encampment. We remained here probably four or five days, during which time the settlements in the vicinity of the agency were all visited by the savages, who killed all the men, except a few who managed to escape by flight. Some women and children were also killed, and a great many were brought in as prisoners. They were nearly all compelled to dress in Indian costume. We then broke up camp and started for Yellow Medicine, which was about twenty-five miles above; we were nearly two days making the journey. The train of Indians, teams loaded with plunder, &c., must have been about five miles in length. A fine large flag of the Hudson Bay Company was flying out to the breeze from one of the wagons in front, and a few American flags, which had been captured, were raised at different points of the procession.

It did not occur to me to inquire how they came by that emblem of British authority, but I supposed it to have been presented to some chief or soldier

many years ago, and it had been preserved until the present time. In the early part of the present century British flags, medals, &c., were freely distributed among all the Indian tribes by the British traders.

At Yellow Medicine they encamped in a large circle, with the soldiers' lodge in the centre. The soldiers' lodge is composed of warriors, who set aside the authority of the chiefs and headmen, and take the reins of government into their own hands. In time of war the soldiers' lodge governs everything, and from its decisions there is no appeal. Their regular buffalo hunts are also governed by rules and regulations established by the Ti-yo-ti or soldiers' lodge. Immediately upon their arrival the house of Am-pe-tu-to-ke-ca, or Other Day, was fired and his fields destroyed. The agency buildings were also burned.

The Indians who lived around Yellow Medicine did not seem to be so blood-thirsty as the lower ones. "Other Day," a full-blood Indian, gave the alarm, and piloted a party of about sixty whites to a place of safety. The houses and churches of the missionaries were also burned. Here much time was spent in counselling. Little Crow was very anxious to move up in a body and place themselves under the protection of the English at the Red River settlement, but a majority were against him. In the meantime the attacks upon New Ulm and Fort Ridgely had been made, but their statements were so conflicting, and I was suffering from my wounds so much, that I took no pains to ascertain the particulars; one thing is certain, however, that they did not lose so many men as the whites have always supposed to have been killed.

At New Ulm the Sioux were assisted by some of the Winnebagoes, and the conduct of "Little Priest" in that engagement was very highly spoken of by the Sioux.

"Little Priest" is the head chief of the Winnebagoes, and lost two of his warriors in that attack. Messengers were sent from here to the Sissitons, Yanktons, Yanktonnais, and to the governor of Selkirk Settlement, to inform them that they (the Mede-wa-kan-toans and Wa-hpe-kwtes) had declared war against the whites, and praying for their assistance. They considered it almost certain that the western tribes would join them, and they also confidently believed that the English would assist them. They say that many years ago the English gave them a small piece of artillery, and named it "Da-ka-ta-chis-ti-na," a "Little Sioux," and promised them that in case any trouble should arise between the Americans and themselves, that they could look to them (the English) for assistance. I could not hear, in any of my conversations with them, anything that caused me to suspect that secessionists had anything to do with it. If the tribes on the Missouri have been tampered with by secessionists, (which may have been the case,) this outbreak, I think, was no part of the programme.

My friend refusing to take part in the battles, Little Crow attributed it to my influence over him, and began to threaten to put me out of the way. I was often hidden in other lodges, or in holes in the ground, when the warriors were seen coming around our lodge.

While encamped here, "Standing Buffalo," the head chief of the Sissitons, came down with about two hundred warriors, and, in a council with Little Crow, demanded the goods that had been taken from the agency buildings at Yellow Medicine as his property. This demand Little Crow refused to comply with, saying that as he had done all the fighting he was entitled to the plunder. Standing Buffalo then refused to take any part in the war, and threatened Little Crow or any of his people with death if they came into his country for protection, in case they were defeated by the whites.

A favorable opportunity offering, the friendly camp was formed and strongly entrenched. Colonel Sibley was advancing slowly, but surely, and the Indians decided to give him battle at Yellow Medicine. The battle of Wood Lake was fought, and for the first time the Indians were defeated. So great was their confidence in their being able to overpower Colonel Sibley, that a great many

of them brought down their squaws and wagons to take back the plunder. The manner in which they made the attack on our troops showed also that they were confident of success. Between 700 and 800 Indians attacked about twice their own number in the open prairie and in broad daylight. Such an attack was probably never before heard of in Indian warfare. They returned home downhearted and dejected. Hastily holding a council, they decided to continue their flight northward, and if those in the friendly camp were fools enough to give themselves up to the whites they could do so. About 120 captives had been gathered into the friendly camp and were delivered up to Colonel Sibley upon the arrival of his forces.

In regard to the treatment of the prisoners, for my own part, I was constantly with my friend, and received the best of treatment from him and his wife. But the female captives were, with very few exceptions, subjected to the most horrible treatment. In some cases a woman would be taken out into the woods and her person violated by six, seven, and as many as ten or twelve of these fiends at one time. There was, I believe, but one captive killed; that was a boy who had in some way offended his captor, who deliberately shot him dead.

With the exception of being almost devoured by fleas and other vermin, which always infest an Indian lodge, my situation was as comfortable as it could be under the circumstances. Before leaving the Indian camp my friend restored to me my watch, ring, pin, and, in fact, every thing that I had about my person when I was taken.

Too much praise cannot be awarded to Colonel Sibley, whose thorough knowledge of Indian character has so successfully enabled him to accomplish the objects of the expedition.

The rescue of his unfortunate countrymen, who were held as captives by a savage foe, was ever uppermost in his thoughts, and although others may censure him for not coming up to their expectations, we who have been rescued will ever hold the name of Henry H. Sibley dear in our hearts.

GEORGE H. SPENCER, JR.

OFFICE SUPERINTENDENT OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
St. Paul, January 27, 1863.

SIR: I herewith transmit the annual report of Thomas J. Galbraith, agent for the Sioux of the Mississippi.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CLARK W. THOMPSON,
Superintendent of Indian Affairs.

Hon. WM. P. DOLE,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

ST. PAUL, January 27, 1863.

The year which has just closed has been a strange and eventful one in the history of the agency of the Sioux of the Mississippi. It began in hope, apparent prosperity, and happiness, and closed amid disappointments and blood.

To furnish to the government and the public a clear, just, and detailed account of the agency for this eventful year, to set forth the causes which gave rise to, and to trace the recent and, although smothered, yet existing rebellion, or murderous raid, from its incipency to its present situation, although clearly my duty, is yet an undertaking which I approach not without many misgivings.

The leading interests involved, the welfare of two races, the whites and the

Indians, dictate that my report should be just, fair, and full in the premises, and logically true in conclusions.

The responsibility of the work, and the yet imperfect and crude state of the facts and data are my excuse for having thus far delayed my report so far beyond the usual time.

In this case, while I have endeavored and desired to be quick and prompt, yet I had rather be accurate and useful, if in my power, than meet the requirements of the department in having my report published in the "reports."

Not yet, indeed, has the time arrived to write this history.

The facts, or rather reports of facts, are in a confused and imperfect state.

The atrocities and savage outrages of the Indians are yet too fresh and recent to entirely free one's mind of the bias which must necessarily give a coloring to the recital of the events which have crowded upon us with such fearful rapidity in so short a time.

An interested party, having personal knowledge by being myself a witness of the murders, outrages, and atrocities committed, and the effect on me of having had my own family and friends, as I supposed, for eleven days exposed to the same kind of outrages and horrible indignities to which I *knew* others were exposed—this terrible suspense so exasperated my feelings as to place me in anything but a fit condition to do justice to the subject on hand.

Now, however, that I know and *realize* that my family and many friends have escaped as from the jaws of hell and death, and are safe and free from outrage—that time for thought and reflection has elapsed—when for a time a lull in the fierce storm exists, I venture on the work before me.

And first an account of the ordinary affairs and transactions of the agency will be attempted:

My books, memoranda, bills, and accounts having been nearly all lost or destroyed at the commencement of the outbreak, I have been obliged to gather up such information as I could from persons cognizant of the facts. This, added to my own recollection of the transactions, aided by scraps of paper and books saved from the wreck, is all I have to depend upon. I have been unremitting in my endeavors to collect all the information available, and careful to digest and arrange it.

I visited, as soon as possible, the reservations with Colonel, now Brigadier General, Sibley's command, and remained there from September 22 to November 8, collecting all the information which I possibly could. Hence, in regard to this part of my report, while it cannot of course be accurate, yet it will be sufficiently correct for all practical purposes. Neither can it be as full in details as desirable, as any details in regard to which I am uncertain I shall omit, content to be correct so far as I can be, rather than *full*, and, in all probability, *mistaken*.

The autumn of 1861 closed upon us rather unfavorably. The crops were light; especially was this the case with the Upper Sioux; they had little or nothing. As heretofore communicated to the department, the cutworms destroyed all the corn of the Sissitons, and greatly injured the crops of the Wah-pay-toans and Mede-wah-kan-tons and Wah-pe-cutahs. For these latter I purchased on credit, in anticipation of the agricultural and civilization funds, large quantities of pork and flour at current rates to support them during the winter. Early in the autumn, in view of the necessitous situation of the Sissitons, I made a requisition on the department for the sum of \$5,000 out of the special funds for the relief of "poor and destitute Indians;" and in anticipation of receiving this money I made arrangements to feed the old and infirm men, and the women and children of these people. I directed the Rev. S. R. Riggs to make the selection and furnish me a list. He carefully did this, and we fed in an economical, yea, even parsimonious way, about 1,500 of these people from the middle of December until nearly the first of April. We had hoped to get them off on their spring

hunt earlier, but a tremendous and unprecedented snow storm during the last days of February prevented.

In response to my requisition I received \$3,000 and expended very nearly \$5,000, leaving a deficiency not properly chargeable to the regular funds of about \$2,000.

These people, it is believed, must have perished had it not been for this scanty assistance. In addition to this the regular issues were made to the "Farmer Indians" in payment for their labor. These were kept at work during the winter in making rails, getting out and hauling to the mill saw-logs for their individual use, and in taking care of their families and stock.

In the month of August, 1861, the superintendents of farms were directed to have ploughed "in the fall," in the old public and neglected private fields, a sufficient quantity of land to provide "plantings" for such Indians as could not be provided, with oxen and implements. In pursuance of this direction there was ploughed, at rates ranging from \$1 50 to \$2 per acre, according to the nature of the work, by teams and men hired for the purpose, for the Lower Sioux about 500 acres, and for the Upper Sioux about 475 acres. There was also, at the same time, ploughed by the Farmer Indians and the department teams, about 250 acres for the Lower and about 325 acres for the Upper Sioux. This fall ploughing was continued until the frost prevented its further prosecution. It was done to facilitate the work of the agricultural department and to kill the worms which had proved so injurious the previous year.

In November, 1861, the new stone warehouse, mentioned in my last annual report, was completed and occupied. It proved to be, as anticipated, a safe, convenient, and substantial structure.

The scarcity of timber on the reservations induced me to have all the fallen wood and tree tops cut up into firewood for the use of the employés, mills, and brick-yards before the snow had fallen. We thus secured on the upper reservation between five and six hundred cords, at a cost of \$2 55 per cord, and on the lower reservation about two hundred cords, at a cost of \$1 23 per cord, without injury to a single standing or growing tree. I also made contracts for stocking both saw-mills with logs and shingle blocks. In pursuance of which there was delivered at the lower mill 650,000 feet of saw-logs and 128 cords of shingle blocks, and at the upper mill 178,000 feet of saw-logs.

The carpenter shops at both agencies were supplied with lumber for the manufacture and repair of sleds, wagons, and other farming utensils. Sheds were erected for the protection of their cattle and utensils of the department, and the "Farmer Indians," assisted by the department carpenters, erected stables, pens, and other out-houses for the protection of their cattle, horses, and utensils. The upper saw-mill was closed about the 1st of November, 1861, the stock of logs having been exhausted. The lower saw-mill was kept in operation generally during the winter, and the corn-mills attached to both saw-mills were put in order and used when required. Hay, grain, and other supplies were provided, and in short, everything was done which the means at command of the agent would justify.

The work of the autumn having been thus closed, I set about making preparations for the work of the next spring and summer, and in directing the work of the winter. I made calculations to erect, during the summer and autumn of 1862, at least fifty dwelling-houses for Indian families at an estimated average cost of \$300 each; and also to aid the Farmer Indians in erecting as many additional dwellings as possible, not to exceed thirty or forty; and to have planted for the Lower Sioux at least twelve hundred acres, and for the Upper Sioux at least thirteen hundred acres of crops, and to have all the land planted, except that at Big Stone lake, enclosed by a fence.

To carry out these calculations, early in the winter, the superintendents of farms, the blacksmiths, the carpenters, and the superintendent of schools were

directed to furnish estimates for the amount of agricultural implements, horses, oxen, wagons, carts, building material, iron, steel, tools, and supplies needed to carry on, successfully, their several departments for one year from the opening of navigation in the spring of 1862.

These estimates were prepared and furnished me about the 1st of February. In accordance with these estimates, I proceeded to purchase, in open market, the articles and supplies recommended.

I made the estimates for one year and the purchases accordingly, in order to secure the benefit of transportation by water in the spring, and thus avoid the delays, vexations, and extra expense of transportation by land in the fall. The bulk of the purchases were made with the distinct understanding that payment would be made out of the funds belonging to the quarter in which the goods, implements, or supplies were expended.

During the month of March, 1862, I purchased 16 breaking ploughs, 16-inch steel; 240 cross ploughs, 12-inch steel; 144 corn ploughs, 10-inch steel; 72 corn ploughs, 8-inch steel; 244 hoes, garden, steel; 350 hoes, planter's, steel; 175 hoes, prairie, steel; 300 mowing scythes, steel; 300 snaths; 250 hay forks; 60 shovels; 100 spades; 3 grain cradles; 25 sets plough harness; 45 ox carts; 4 wagons; 75 ox yokes; 82 ox chains; 12 wheelbarrows; 285 bushels seed corn; 30 bushels seed wheat; 3,690 bushels seed potatoes; 10 bushels seed beans; 10 bushels seed peas, and proportionate quantities of turnip, ruta бага, pumpkin, squash, beet, onion, tomato, carrot, parsnip, cabbage, and other garden seeds.

I also purchased, partly in the autumn of 1861, and in the winter and spring of 1862, seventy-nine yoke of oxen, and ten or fifteen odd oxen to match the same number of single oxen in the hands of Farmer Indians, and during the summer I purchased forty-seven cows and calves, and eighty-eight sheep, and four horses.

I also purchased 250 glazed window sash, 48 doors, 40 kegs nails, 15 spikes, 125 door locks and latches, 175 butts, 18 M pine lumber, assorted, 300 hats, 325 summer coats, 600 pants, 300 shirts, 16 sacks coffee, 400 pounds tea, 10 barrels salt, 22 barrels sugar, 50 casks dried apples, 8 boxes candles, 75 boxes soap, 1 barrel vinegar, 2 barrels molasses, 2 barrels rice, 4 barrels lard, 1 barrel machine oil, 28 tons iron, 3 tons steel, 1 set of blacksmith's and part of two sets of carpenter's tools, besides a large quantity of tubs, buckets, churns, hardware, queensware, and other household and kitchen furniture, too various for detail in this report. The foregoing goods were all delivered at the lower agency by boats in good order.

During the winter the lower Farmer Indians made 18,000 rails and posts, and the upper Farmer Indians 12,000 rails and posts.

Most of the seed corn above mentioned, and some of the seed potatoes, were obtained from the Farmer Indians in exchange for goods and provisions from the warehouse. Thus it will be seen that, in the spring of 1862, there was on hand supplies and material sufficient to carry us through the coming year. Besides what is above set forth, we had on hand nearly 200,000 brick, which were manufactured the previous autumn. Thus, to all appearance, the spring season opened propitiously.

To carry out my original design of having as much as possible planted for the Indians at Big Stone lake and Lac qui Parle, as early in the month of May, 1862, as the condition of the swollen streams would permit, I visited Lac qui Parle, Big Stone lake, going as far as North island, in Lake Traverse, having with me Antoine Freniere, United States interpreter; Dr. J. L. Wakefield, physician of the Upper Sioux, and Nelson Givens, assistant agent. At Lac qui Parle we found the Indians willing and anxious to plant. I inquired into their conditions and wants, and made arrangements to have them supplied with seeds and implements, and directed Amos W. Huggins, the school-teacher there, to aid and instruct them in their work, and to make the proper distribution of

the seeds and implements furnished, and placed at his disposal an ox-team and wagon and two breaking-teams, with instructions to devote his whole time and attention to the superintendence and instruction of the resident Indians throughout the planting season, and until the crops were safely cultivated and harvested. I likewise found the Indians at Big Stone lake and Lake Traverse very anxious to plant, but without any means whatever so to do. I looked over their fields, in order to see what could be done. After having inquired into the whole matter, I instructed Mr. Givens to remain at Big Stone lake, and superintend and direct the agricultural operations of the season, and to remain there until it was too late to plant any more. I placed at his disposal ten double plough teams, with men to operate them, and ordered forward at once one hundred bushels of seed corn and five hundred bushels of seed potatoes, with pumpkin, squash, turnip, and other seeds in reasonable proportion, together with a sufficient supply of ploughs, hoes, and other implements for the Indians, and a blacksmith to repair breakages, and directed him to see that every Indian and every Indian horse or pony did as much work as was possible. The necessary supplies were also furnished.

Thus instructed, with the interpreter and physician, I started for the agency, and arrived there on the 24th day of May, having been absent fifteen days. On my way to the agency I found that Mr. Huggins had been assiduously attending to his work at Lac qui Parle. The Indians were all at work. The supplies had all arrived, and everything promised well.

On my way down to the agency I visited the plantings of Ta-ham-pi-h'da, (Rattling Moccasin,) Ma-za-sha, (Red Iron,) Mah-pi-ya-wi-chasta, (Cloud Man,) and Rattling Cloud, and found that Mr. Goodell, superintendent of farms for the Upper Sioux, had, in accordance with my instructions, been faithfully attending to the wants of these bands. He had supplied them with implements and seeds, and I left them at work. On my arrival at the agency I found that the Farmer Indians, residing thereabouts, had, in my absence, been industriously at work, and had not only completed their ploughing, but had planted very extensively. The next day after my arrival at the agency I visited each Farmer Indian at the Yellow Medicine, and congratulated him on his prospects for a good crop, and spoke to him such words of encouragement as occurred to me.

The next day I proceeded to the lower agency, and then taking with me Mr. A. H. Wagner, the superintendent of farms for the Lower Sioux, I went round to each planting, and for the second time visited each Farmer Indian, and found that, in general, my instructions had been carried out. The ploughing was generally completed in good order, and the planting nearly all done, and many of the Farmer Indians were engaged in repairing old and making new fence. I was pleased and gratified, and so told the Indians. The prospect was so encouraging.

About the 1st of July I visited all the plantings of both the Upper and Lower Sioux, except those at Big Stone lake, and found in nearly every instance the prospect for good crops very hopeful indeed.

The superintendents of farms, the male school-teachers, and all the employes assisting them, had done their duty. About this time Mr. Givens had returned from Big Stone lake, and reported to me his success there.

From all I knew, and all I thus learned, I was led to the belief that we would have no "starving" Indians to feed the next winter, and little did I dream of the unfortunate and terrible outbreak which in a short time burst upon us.

Early in the spring the saw-mills were ordered to be fully manned, and to cut all the lumber possible, under the direction of Mr. Nairn, Lower Sioux carpenter.

The contractor, Mr. De Camp, went industriously to work, and kept the mills running to the full extent of their capacity. At the same time I directed Mr. Ryder, the contractor for brick making, to proceed to work, and manufacture

brick as fast as he could. He promptly did so, and by the middle of July had burned in good order a kiln of over two hundred thousand excellent brick, and up to the time of the outbreak he had made some one hundred thousand bricks, which were either placed in a new kiln or piled up in the yard. The necessity for brick at the lower agency and the apparent impossibility of finding good brick clay induced me early in the season to offer a reward to any one who would discover such clay. A man named ———, after diligent search, discovered an excellent bed of clay very near the surface of the earth, and about four feet in thickness, and in an eligible location.

I at once determined to make a brick-yard there, and ordered the discoverer of the clay to dig a well, as there was no water at the place, and had the lumber and other necessary things prepared to have brick made at once. The well was just finished, and we were ready to commence work on the brick-yard on the fatal 18th day of August, when the unfortunate discoverer of the clay was assassinated at his work, finishing the well, by the Indians, for whose benefit he was laboring. In June, 1862, I concluded a contract with H. G. Billings for cutting and delivering 300 tons of hay, at \$1 85 per ton, for the Lower Sioux, and 250 tons, at \$1 95 per ton, for the Upper Sioux. At the time of the outbreak he had cut and put into cock all the hay contracted for the Lower Sioux, and on the morning of the eventful 18th of August he had made arrangements to haul and stack it at the hay yard of the Lower Sioux agency, preparatory to his going to the Yellow Medicine to fulfil his contract there.

During the winter of 1862 there were split and delivered under my direction 2,000 wagon spokes for the Lower Sioux and 2,800 spokes for the Upper Sioux; and there were made and delivered 200 ox bows for the Lower and 104 ox bows for the Upper Sioux.

In the fall of 1861 a good and substantial school room and dwelling, a store house and blacksmith shop were completed at "Lac qui Parte," and about the first of November Mr. Amos W. Huggins and his family occupied the dwelling, and assisted by Miss Julia La Frombois prepared the school room and devoted their whole time to teaching such Indian children as they could induce to attend the school. The warehouse was supplied with provisions, which Mr. Huggins was instructed to issue to the children and their parents at his discretion. Here it may be permitted me to remark that Mr. Huggins, who was born and raised among the Sioux, and Miss La Frombois, who was a Sioux mixed blood, were two persons entirely capable and in every respect qualified for the discharge of the duties of their situation, than whom the Indians had no more devoted friends. They lived among the Indians of choice, because they thought they could be beneficial to them. Mr. Huggins exercised nothing but kindness towards them. He fed them when hungry, clothed them when naked, attended them when sick, and advised and cheered them in all their difficulties. He was intelligent, industrious, energetic, and good, and yet he was one of the first victims of the outbreak. Shot down like a dog by the very Indians whom he had so long and so well served:

The blacksmith shop was supplied with tools and iron, and a careful blacksmith placed in charge.

Early in the spring there was made and delivered at the lower agency blacksmith shop 2,950 bushels of coal, and at the upper blacksmith shop about 3,100 bushels of coal. In June, 1862, I employed George Lott to erect a blacksmith shop, dwelling house, root house, and to make 2,500 bushels of coal at Big Stone lake, and also to cut and put up about 50 tons of hay, and I had also planted by Mr. Givens, in the spring, about seven acres of potatoes and other vegetables for seed for the Sissitons, and to supply the blacksmith whom I proposed to send them, and had purchased tools and iron to supply the shop.

Mr. Lott had nearly completed his work when he and his hands, on the 21st of August, were attacked by the Indians and all but one killed.

With all the material for house building thus on hand or clearly in prospect, I felt safe in commencing to erect the dwelling houses proposed, and I had accordingly made arrangements with a contractor to commence work upon them as soon as the details could be settled and a written contract entered into, with the consent of the Superintendent of Indian Affairs.

The department carpenters were engaged, so far as their time would permit, in erecting and in aiding the Indians to erect dwelling houses during the summer of 1862, and up to the time of the outbreak.

In the month of June, 1862, being well aware of the influence exerted by Little Crow over the "Blanket Indians," and by his plausibility led to believe that he intended to act in good faith, I promised to build him a good brick house, provided that he would agree to aid me in bringing round the idle young men to habits of industry and civilization, and that he would abandon the leadership of the "Blanket Indians" and become a "white man." This being well understood, as I thought, I directed Mr. Nairn, the carpenter of the Lower Sioux, to make out the plan and estimates for "Crow's House," and to proceed at once to make the window and door frames; and to prepare the lumber necessary for the building, and ordered the teamsters to deliver the necessary amount of bricks as soon as possible. Little Crow agreed to dig the cellar and haul the necessary lumber, both of which he had commenced. The carpenter had nearly completed his part of the work, and the brick were being promptly delivered at the time of the outbreak.

On the 15th day of August, 1862, only three days previous to the outbreak, I had an interview with Little Crow and he seemed to be well pleased and satisfied. Little indeed did I suspect at that time that he would be the leader of the terrible outbreak of the 18th.

A resumé of the farmer work of the summer of 1862 will now be given :

In the spring there was planted for and by the Lower Sioux—

Of corn.....	1,025 acres.
Of potatoes.....	260 acres.
Of turnips and ruta bagas.....	60 acres.
Of wheat (a new trial).....	12 acres.

And large quantities of beans, peas, beets, pumpkins, squashes, and other field and garden vegetables.

And for and by the Upper Sioux—

Of corn.....	1,110 acres.
Of potatoes.....	300 acres.
Of turnips and ruta bagas.....	90 acres.
Of wheat.....	12 acres.

And field and garden vegetables in proportion.

These crops were well attended, ploughed, hoed, and weeded, and, a few days prior to the outbreak, promised as fair a yield as any crops which I ever saw, and this was the common testimony of all who saw them.

The prospective yield was a matter of speculation and remark, and I put my estimate at the lowest I heard made.

It is, corn, twenty-five bushels; potatoes, one hundred and twenty-five bushels; turnips and ruta bagas, two hundred and twenty-five; and wheat, twenty bushels per acre.

This estimate would then give us for the Lower Sioux—

Of corn.....	25,625 bushels.
Of potatoes.....	32,500 bushels.
Of turnips and ruta bagas.....	13,500 bushels.
Of wheat.....	240 bushels.

And for the Upper Sioux—

Of corn.....	27,750 bushels.
Of potatoes.....	37,500 bushels.
Of turnips and ruta bagas.....	20,250 bushels.
Of wheat.....	240 bushels.

The beans, peas, beets, pumpkins, &c., can only be estimated by stating that they were planted in full proportion to, and were doing as well as other crops mentioned.

The yield must have been good, but I have not sufficient data to justify me in giving figures.

These crops had all been safely enclosed by fence, except those at Big Stone lake, where fences were not needed, because the Indians there as yet had no stock to destroy their crops.

Every necessary preparation had been made to have the Farmer Indians and some of the Blanket Indians to cut and put up hay sufficient for their stock during the winter, and they were busily engaged at this work when we were stopped by the outbreak.

I need hardly say that our hopes were high at the prospects before us, nor need I relate my chagrin and mortification when, in a moment, I found those high hopes blasted forever.

The almost impassable condition of the sloughs, brooks, and creeks between the lower agency and Yellow Medicine induced me to have these spanned with cheap, substantial, permanent bridges. Accordingly, I had the bridges erected and the road repaired to correspond. This done, and the road was rendered one of the best in the State. There were eighteen of these bridges in all; seventeen of them, common bridges, made of first-rate oak timbers, covered with good oak plank; all elevated above high water-mark. Ten of these averaged 22½ feet; five of them 37 feet, and two were 50 feet in length. The eighteenth was a truss bridge, 67 feet in length, over *Wood Lake creek*. Here the battle of Wood Lake was fought, and this bridge was fired by the Indians and greatly injured, though not destroyed.

The amount of transportation from the lower to the upper agency was so great that I deemed it a matter of the greatest importance that these bridges should be built. It was an economical and highly useful outlay. Before the bridges were built the cost of transportation was forty cents per cwt., and after, only thirty cents; indeed, offers were made to haul for twenty-five cents per cwt.

In addition to this, there would have been saved the injury to teams, wagons, and harness, caused by miring in the sloughs, and annoying delays avoided. The bridges were finished about the first of August, just prior to the outbreak, and hence were little used. They proved of great use to General Sibley's expedition, and it is hoped will hereafter prove of general benefit.

About the 25th of June, 1862, a number of the chiefs and headmen of the Sissitons and Wahpetons visited the agency and inquired about the payments, whether they were going to *get any money*, (as they had been told, as they alleged, that they would not be paid,) and if so, how much, and when. I answered them that they would certainly be paid, exactly how much I could not say, but that it would be very nearly, if not quite, a full payment; that I did not know when the payment would be made, but that I felt sure it could not be made before the 20th of July. I advised them to go home, and admonished them not to come back again until I sent for them. I issued provisions, powder and shot, and tobacco to them, and they departed.

In a few days after I went to the lower agency, and then spoke to the lower Indians in regard to their payments. As they all lived within a few miles of the agency, little was said, as when the money came they could be called together

in a day. I remained about one week there, visiting the farms and plantings, and issued to the Indians a good supply of pork, flour, powder, shot, and tobacco, and urged upon them the necessity of cutting and securing hay for the winter, and of watching and keeping the birds from their corn.

I left them apparently satisfied, and arrived at Yellow Medicine on the 14th of July, and found, to my surprise, that nearly all the upper Indians had arrived, and were encamped about the agency. I inquired of them why they had come, and they answered that they were afraid something was wrong; they feared they would not get their money, because white men had been telling them so. Being in daily expectation of the arrival of the money, I determined to make the best of it, and notified the superintendent of Indian affairs accordingly. How were over 4,000 Annuity and over 1,000 Yanktonais Sioux, with nothing to eat, and entirely dependent on me for supplies, to be provided for? I supplied them as best I could, parsimoniously, indeed, from necessity it was, still I did all in my power. Our stock was nearly used up, and still on the 1st day of August no money had come.

The Indians complained of starvation. I held back, in order to save the provisions to the last moment. On the 4th of August, early in the morning, the young men and soldiers, to the number of not less than four hundred mounted and one hundred and fifty on foot, surprised and deceived the commander of the troops on guard, and surrounded the camp, and proceeded to the warehouse in a boisterous manner, and in sight of and within one hundred and fifty yards of one hundred armed men, with two 12-pound mountain howitzers, cut down the door of the warehouse, shot down the American flag, and entered the building, and before they could be stopped had carried over one hundred sacks of flour from the warehouse, and were evidently bent on a general "clearing out." The soldiers, now recovered from their panic, came gallantly to our aid, entered the warehouse and took possession. The Indians all stood round, with their guns loaded, cocked, and levelled. I spoke to them, and they consented to a "talk." The result was that they agreed, if I would give them plenty of pork and flour, and issue to them the annuity goods the next day, they would go away. I told them to go away with enough to eat for *two days*, and to send the chiefs and headmen for a council the next day, unarmed and peaceably, and I would answer them. They assented, and went to their camp. In the meantime I had sent for Captain Marsh, the commandant of Fort Ridgley, who promptly arrived early in the morning of the next day. I laid the whole case before him, and stated my plan. He agreed with me, and in the afternoon the Indians, unarmed, and apparently peaceably disposed, came in, and we had a "talk," and in the presence of Captain Marsh, Rev. Mr. Riggs, and others, I agreed to issue the annuity goods and a fixed amount of provisions, provided the Indians would go home and watch their corn, and wait for the payment until they were sent for. They assented. I made on the 6th, 7th, and 8th of August the issues as agreed upon, assisted by Captain Marsh, and by the 9th of August the Indians were all gone, and on the 12th I had definite information that the Sissitons, who had started on the 7th, had all arrived at Big Stone lake, and that the men were preparing to go on a buffalo hunt, and that the women and children were to stay and guard their crops. Thus this threatening and disagreeable event passed off, but, as usual, without the punishment of a single Indian who had been engaged in the attack on the warehouse. They should have been punished, but they were not, and simply because we had not the power to punish them, and hence we had to adopt the same "sugar-plum" policy which had been so often adopted before with the Indians, and especially at the time of the Spirit lake massacre in 1857.

During this time an incident occurred which, though seemingly unimportant in itself, deserves notice in this report.

The news of the repulses which General McClellan had met with before Richmond—his retreat, and the withdrawal of his army from the peninsula—of the subsequent defeat of the army under Pope near Washington, and of the President's call for 600,000 men, had just reached the agencies.

The young men—Frenchmen—mixed-bloods, employés who were about to be discharged by me, and sojourners, to the number of about fifty good fighting men, seemingly at the same moment, expressed a wish to go to the war. It was evident that a company could be raised, but who would organize and lead them? Soon more than half a dozen *leaders* arose, and it was likely that the whole number of these men willing to go would be split up into factions and their service lost to the government. The men, under this state of affairs, called upon me and said to me, "If you will take charge of us we can all unite, otherwise we cannot." I saw the trouble, and, I think, appreciated the situation. I consulted with Captain Marsh, who was present, and the result of our conference was that I told these young men that they by all means ought to go; that the country needed their services; and that if my services were needed to unite them and get them off I would cheerfully render them all the aid in my power; that I would go with them to Fort Snelling, and even to Richmond, or wherever else they might be ordered, if I could be relieved of my duties as Sioux agent without injury to the public service; that I would see them safely to Fort Snelling, the place of rendezvous, and there communicate with the government as to my course. On the 12th day of August, some thirty men enlisted at Yellow Medicine, and with them, on the 13th, I proceeded to Red Wood. Some nineteen or twenty enlisted there on the 14th. I remained at the lower agency, putting things in order, and on the afternoon of the 15th we proceeded to Fort Ridgley, where Captain Marsh furnished quarters and rations, and on the 16th, Captain Marsh having placed at our disposal sufficient transportation and detailed Sergeant now Second Lieutenant McGren, company B, fifth regiment Minnesota volunteers, with four men to accompany us, we started for New Ulm, to get some recruits who were there, and on the morning of the 18th we started for and arrived at St. Peter in the afternoon. About sundown Mr. J. C. Dickinson arrived from the lower agency in a state of excitement bordering on insanity. First Lieutenant N. K. Culver, company B, fifth Minnesota volunteers, who accompanied us on business connected with the quartermaster's department, Sergeant McGren, and myself took him to a room and gathered from him that there was trouble at the lower agency; that the Indians had broke out; and that Captain Marsh with some men had started up from the fort to the scene; but so confused, conflicting, and disconnected were his statements, that at first we were in doubt what reliance to place on them. However, after another and more careful examination, we were satisfied that there was trouble sufficient to induce us to return, and we at once called the men together and broke the subject to them, and examined Dickinson before them. Many of them doubted him, and most of them refused to return to the fort. Satisfied, myself, that there was trouble, I despatched Wm. H. Shelley, esq., who accompanied us, as soon as possible with a message to Governor Ramsey, in which I informed the governor of the trouble, and requested him in earnest terms to send at once at least two hundred men to Fort Ridgley. Lieutenant Culver accompanied my despatch with another calling for five hundred men. We at once set about getting arms for our men, now numbering fifty-five in all, and learned that there were in St. Peter some fifty United States Harper's Ferry muskets and accoutrements belonging to the State of Minnesota. These we determined to secure, and finally, about midnight, after great trouble, by giving bonds, we obtained them, and armed most of our men. By this time the first fugitive from New Ulm, Mrs. Siter, an intelligent and collected lady, had arrived, and we had an interview with her. She satisfied us of the *reality* of the outbreak, and we at once communicated the facts to the men, who, now thoroughly convinced, eagerly volunteered to go back. We promptly despatched another messenger,

Captain Nelson Roberts, to the governor, and proceeded to secure ammunition. After several vain efforts, we finally succeeded in getting powder, lead, and buck-shot enough to make about ten rounds of slug-shot cartridges, besides some additional lead and powder. The men all went to work to make the cartridges and otherwise to prepare for the expedition. The mules and horses were harnessed and a "cold bite" ordered for the men in order to start just as soon as we could get ready. It was now 4 o'clock Tuesday morning, the mules were hitched up, and the men nearly ready, when Sergeant Sturgis, of Captain Marsh's company, arrived from Fort Ridgley, with despatches from Lieutenant Gore, in command, conveying to us the sad news of the death of Captain Marsh, and the decimation, yea, even destruction of his command, at the battle of the Lower Sioux ferry, and giving details of the extent and character of the massacre and the resulting panic. We secured him a fresh horse, and with additional despatches he was, about 5 o'clock a. m., started for St. Paul.

Now, at dawn of day being all ready, so far as was possible to be, we started for the relief of the fort, with very slender hopes indeed. As soon as we had proceeded a few miles from St. Peter we began to meet the advance of the fugitive trains. As we went on the crowd increased. The road was blocked up with the excited crowd of flying men, women, and children; on foot, on horseback, in wagons, they came. The scene was terribly painful and distressing. As we kept on the crowd increased, and we were soon brought to a realization of what had happened, and our imaginations pictured what was occurring. We hastened on silently—even solemnly—towards the fort, with very little hope indeed of saving it, as we had every reason to fear that the savages had taken it; since after Captain Marsh's surprise and defeat there could not, so far as we had any reason to believe, be more than twenty-five effective men to defend it. Still we went on, and about 5 o'clock p. m. in a drenching rain arrived at the fort, and found the little garrison yet safe. The savages had not yet attacked them; and it was well, yea providential, that they had not on the previous night, as less than twenty-five men could have been mustered for their defence. Lieutenant Sheehan, with fifty men, had arrived a few hours previous to us. Our men were at once placed upon duty, and for the nine succeeding days and nights they, with the remnant of Marsh's men, Sheehan's detachment, and a few fugitive citizens, and Sergeant Jones with the big guns, were on constant duty, with little or no rest and no time to eat a single decent meal. Like heroes they discharged their duties, and all contributed to defend the fort, and patiently and anxiously awaited relief from below. It was a serious time. When we arrived on Tuesday evening over two hundred and fifty fugitives, principally women and children, occupied the soldiers' quarters in the fort; and these poor forlorn creatures kept coming in daily until the number reached nearly three hundred.

Tuesday night but few slept or rested. Time passed until Wednesday noon, when a messenger, with a despatch from Judge Flandreau, acting commandant at New Ulm, arrived, and we learned of the attack of the Indians on that place in force on Tuesday. Judge Flandreau expected another attack, and called for aid in men, arms, and ammunition. Just as the commandant of the fort had dictated a reply the pickets ran in; in a moment volley after volley, in quick succession, was poured into the fort by about two hundred and fifty of the savages, who had stealthily crept upon us through the brush and ravines which command Fort Ridgley on its entire river side. This was about half past 2 o'clock p. m. Until sundown these yelling, naked devils, hidden in the grass and weeds, behind logs and piles, and indeed always under cover, kept shooting incessantly. At night they withdrew; but the garrison all kept watch again that night.

Thursday and Thursday night passed quietly, and Friday, till about 2 o'clock p. m., when suddenly a volley from not less than four hundred Indians again drove every man, and woman too, to their *posts*. These terrific volleys were

kept up with little cessation until dark, when the savages withdrew; and although fighting ceased the watch was kept up.

On Saturday morning we saw the Indians, who had evidently stayed with us during the night, on the river bottom, on their way toward New Ulm. We watched them until they disappeared, and could follow their course for miles by the fires which marked their path. While we all surmised where they were going, yet most of us were glad that they were leaving us. That day they attacked New Ulm in full force the second time, and although repulsed, they succeeded in destroying most of the town and in carrying off an immense quantity of plunder, and on the next day the town and indeed the whole county of Brown was evacuated. No other attack was made on the fort, yet continued watch was kept to avoid surprise.

On Thursday morning, August 28, we were relieved by the advance of Colonel Sibley's command, and now for the first time I learned of the escape and safety of my family and friends from Yellow Medicine and Hazelwood, after a painful and torturing suspense to which death, to me, would have been preferable. My joyous surprise at receiving a letter from my wife, informing me of her escape and the safety of all, cannot be described, if, indeed, it can be imagined.

General Sibley and his command arrived on the same day, and remained in camp inactive until Sunday, the 31st of August, when a detachment of a company of mounted men, under Captain Anderson, and a company of infantry, under Captain Grant, was sent out under the command of Major Joseph R. Brown. Several citizens, among whom I was one, volunteered to go along. The object of this expedition was to reconnoitre and bury the dead. On the first day we went as far as the mouth of Birch Coolie, opposite to and about one mile from the lower agency, and camped there in La Croix's field for the night, having buried all the bodies which we found on the way, among which were Dr. P. P. Humphrey, the physician for the Lower Sioux, and the burned and charred remains of his wife and child. Early on Monday morning we went to the agency ferry and witnessed the scenes of the massacre of Captain Marsh's men, and there buried some twenty dead bodies. The ferry being gone and the river high, it was arranged that the mounted men should cross the river and go up on the reservation side, and that Captain Grant's company should go up on the State side, and that each should bury all the dead found; that the mounted men should recross and join Captain Grant's company at the place of rendezvous—the head of Birch Coolie, opposite to and about three miles northward from the lower agency—that night. I being mounted, crossed the river and proceeded with the mounted men under Captain Anderson, Major Brown being with us. After looking about the remains of the lower agency, and burying the dead found there, we went up to Crow's Village, about five miles above, and there found evidence of a very large Indian camp. We remained there about two hours, examining matters, and were satisfied that the Indians had all gone from there at least six days before. (They had been gone seven days as we now know.)

Major Brown now ordered us to recross the river at the ferry nearly opposite to Crow's Village, which we did late in the afternoon, still seeing no recent traces of Indians. We now fell into the track of Captain Grant's men, who were about one hour in advance of us, and followed them up to Beaver creek, and, about sundown, joined them at the place of rendezvous above mentioned—Birch Coolie. Here we pitched our tents, partook of a hearty supper, and, being tired, retired to rest, in the belief that no Indians were within twenty miles of us. We all, I think, slept soundly. In the morning, at the very earliest dawn, we were awakened by a volley of some three hundred guns, at a distance of about 125 yards from us, aimed so as to rake our tents "fore and aft." This volley was terrific, and something of its power may be inferred from

the fact that it was heard at Fort Ridgley, a distance of nearly fourteen miles. For more than three hours this firing was kept up with scarcely an intermission, and in that fatal three hours some twenty men were killed or mortally wounded, and some sixty more or less severely wounded, and about seventy-five horses killed, or nearly so. The Indian guns being mostly double-barrelled, there was a perfect rain of lead upon our devoted little camp. The tents were perfectly riddled and the scene beggars description.

After the effect of the first "morning call" was somewhat over, at it we went to "dig," and dig we did, with one pick, three spades, a couple of old axes, knives, bayonets, sticks, and everything that would dig. We went at it, and by 4 o'clock p. m. had "holes enough in the ground" to protect us from the shooting at a distance. After this time I think we lost no men, and the Indians never once charged on us. And here I may be permitted the remark that no fears need be entertained that they will charge on any place when they think there is danger. Well, to be brief, here we were kept from four o'clock a. m. of Tuesday until about eleven o'clock a. m. on Wednesday, (31 hours,) without food or water, with but thirty rounds to the man when we commenced, and with less than five when we were relieved by General Sibley's command about eleven o'clock on Wednesday morning. To sum up, we had about one hundred and sixty men, including teamsters, to start with, and about one hundred horses. The Indians, we have since learned, had 349 men. We had killed and mortally wounded 24 men, and wounded, as near as I can ascertain, 67 men. Every horse we had was killed or wounded. I counted 97 horses "*hors de combat*," soon after we were relieved. We buried our dead (noble fellows) on that lone prairie, and went back to Fort Ridgley sadder and, I think, wiser men, than when we started from it. At least, we knew more about Indians; perhaps as much as our Longfellows, Coopers, and our philanthropic friends of Pennsylvania and Boston. At least some of us claim the right to think so. This attack on us happened, as we now know, in this wise: The Indians had been in camp at Yellow Medicine for some time, and they had planned a campaign in this wise:

This party of 349 intended to get into General Sibley's rear and divide into two parties and make a simultaneous attack upon St. Peter and Mankato, and accidentally discovered our party just before we went into camp.

On the same day that we were relieved at Birch Coolie, a war party of about 150, headed by Crow in person, made an attack upon the town of Hutchinson and were repulsed, but succeeded in carrying off large quantities of plunder and a few captives. About the same time an attack, with a large force, said to be 750, was made upon Fort Abercrombie. The fort was invested for several days. This party, as is believed, was made of Cut-heads and young men from the several northern Sissiton bands, aided by a few of the Wahpetons from Lac qui Parle and Red Iron's village, and a very few of the Lower Sioux.

Owing to the fact that the gallant little garrison were cooped up in the fort and could *only defend it*, their chances for observations were slight, and hence the meagreness of definite information in regard to the attacking Indians. From the best information which I have been able to obtain I am strongly inclined to the belief that at first the Big Stone lake Sissitons as a body did not enter into the outbreak. Indeed, it seems that they opposed it quites tronly for a time. Tatan-kan-naj, (Standing Buffalo,) the leading and hereditary chief of the Sissitons, I am satisfied resisted the outbreak as far as he was able, but he could not control his *young men*, who, I think, generally participated. Indeed, unless they did the large number attacking Fort Abercrombie cannot be accounted for. And this leads me to the conclusion that, with few exceptions, and these consisting of old men, some of the chiefs, and those of their immediate relations whom they could control, all of the Annuity Sioux were, to a greater or less extent, engaged in the outbreak.

At the battle of Yellow Medicine or Wood lake there were present about 750 Indian men, and at Fort Abercrombie about 750. Add to these 1,500 at least 200, who were scattered about in small marauding parties, and say about 250 who for different causes abstained, and we have nearly if not all the warriors which can be mustered by both the Annuity and Yanktonais Sioux ordinarily. Here it should be stated that none of those who participated at *Wood lake* were at Abercrombie, and *vice versa*. After the battle of Birch Coolie, as soon as I was able, I started for Saint Paul to meet Commissioner Dole, whom I had learned was there, to consult with him as to my future action, and to have arrangements made to pay the employés the arrearages due them for work promptly, as they had lost all they possessed, and been turned out of employment. The action of the Commissioner in this regard was prompt, noble, and satisfactory, and to Commissioner Dole the destitute employés (whose lives were saved, and the widows and orphans of those who had been butchered) are indebted for the promptness with which their just claims were met. Among other things he directed me to proceed at once to Yellow Medicine, with a view to a general examination of the condition of affairs, and to remain there as long as necessary. Accordingly on the 19th day of September, in company with Colonel William Crooks, 6th regiment Minnesota volunteers, I started for the reservations, and arrived at the battle ground of Yellow Medicine or Wood lake about dark on the day after the battle, and found that General Sibley's command had moved on. Where they were we did not know. We had as escort one company of infantry, and about twenty mounted men. We bivouacked on the battle ground, and early in the morning started, and in the afternoon overtook Colonel Sibley's command at Camp Release, opposite the mouth of the Chippewa river, about twenty miles above Yellow Medicine and ten below Lac qui Parle, just at the moment the captive women and children were delivered to Colonel Sibley. It was both a happy and a sad moment—one never to be forgotten. Two hundred and seventy-seven persons were thus rescued, and it must be permitted me to bear testimony to the wisdom and discretion exercised in this part of the campaign by Colonel Sibley. From the start he made it his prime object, above all things, to rescue those unfortunate captives. Of this object he never for a moment lost sight, and from its pursuit nothing could drive or divert him. His final success at Camp Release is worthy of more honorable mention than if he had won many a great battle. Here I remained, getting what information I could, and aiding, under Colonel Sibley's direction, to secure the stolen plunder, and in finding out and aiding to arrest the guilty Indians who had surrendered.

On the 4th of October Colonel Sibley handed me a letter of instructions, a copy of which I herewith transmit, marked A. As directed in this letter, I proceeded to Yellow Medicine the same day with about 1,250 Indians and mixed-bloods, of whom about 275 were men—the residue women and children. They were all put to work, as directed, and in a week we had gathered and housed about 6,000 bushels of potatoes and 1,500 bushels of corn. We were thus engaged when Captain Whitney, in command, received instructions from Colonel Sibley to cause to be arrested, and safely detained in custody, all the Indian and mixed-blood men, except such as, in the opinion of Agent Galbraith, were "*above suspicion*," and to disarm *all*. This we did successfully, and with little or no trouble, by the exercise of a justifiable piece of strategy, the details of which I will not relate, lest it raise a cry of injustice to the poor Indian.

Out of the whole number I designated forty-six Indian men, whom I regarded as coming as near to Colonel Sibley's standard as possible. Of all these I believe only four or five were tried and convicted, and only some seven of those kept in confinement were acquitted. Here we remained in camp until the 12th of October, when we were ordered to proceed to the lower agency, with all the

Indians. We arrived there on the 15th day of October, General Sibley's entire command arriving at the same time. Here we remained until November 7th, engaged principally in the trials of the indicted Indians, and in securing food and forage. On the — day of November General Sibley ordered Lieutenant Colonel Marshall, 7th regiment Minnesota volunteers, with an escort of three companies of infantry, to remove the uncondemned Indians and their wives and families, and the families of the condemned and absent Indians, numbering in all about 1,700 persons, to Fort Snelling, and directed me to accompany them.

On the 14th day of November we arrived at the fort, and the Indians were placed in camp near the fort, where they still remain in charge of the military.

The same day I arrived in St. Paul and held a short interview with Judge Usher, the Assistant Secretary of the Interior. I found that in my absence Mr. Sinks, my clerk, had been engaged in collecting and arranging the agency business, and had paid most of the employes; all indeed whom he could settle with in my absence. I at once set about the work which now devolved upon me, and since then until now, with scarcely a moment's intermission, I have been engaged in collecting and arranging all the facts I could, in order to arrive at some definite knowledge of the condition of affairs. The pressure upon me has been great indeed, and in addition to my direct and incidental official duties I have had to provide for my family, who were left entirely destitute—neither house, clothing, or anything had they. Now, indeed, some order begins to appear out of the chaos left by the Indian raid, and I begin to see when the end will be. When I shall get there I hardly know—soon I hope, the sooner the better—when, if not before, it is to be hoped that some one of the many *good* and *honest* men who have labored so hard to place upon me the blame of the outbreak, and to justify the “poor, wronged Indians” in their mistaken butcheries and atrocities, will be placed in the incumbency of the superintendency of the Sioux agency, to enjoy its emoluments and its pleasures, and to grow fat on the spoils. Having thus given, as best I could, a narrative of the condition of the affairs of the agency as they progressed up to and existed at the time of the outbreak itself, I proceed to another more serious and much agitated subject: “What was the cause of the outbreak?”

And first, on this subject, it will be necessary to strip the Indian of the filagree coloring of romance, which has been thrown around him by sentimental poets and lovesick novelists, and present him as he is, a matter of fact being; for there is no man who *knows* Indians *well* who will disagree with me when I state that the Indian of the poets and novelists is a pure *myth*. I know little of other Indians except from history. Of the Sioux I know a little from observation. They are bigoted, barbarous, and exceedingly superstitious. They regard most of the vices as virtues. Theft, arson, rape, and murder are among them regarded as the means to distinction, and the young Indian from childhood is taught to regard “*killing*” as the highest of virtues. In their dances, and at their feasts, the warriors recite their deeds of theft, pillage, and slaughter as precious things, and the highest, and indeed the only ambition of a young brave is to secure “*the feather*,” which is but a record of his having murdered or participated in the murder of *some* human being, whether man, woman, or child, it is immaterial; and after he has secured his first “feather” appetite is whetted to increase the number in “his cap,” as an Indian brave is estimated by the *number* of his feathers. Without “the feather” a young Indian gentleman is regarded as a *squaw*, and cannot get into “*society*.” Indeed, as a general rule, he cannot get a wife. He is despised, derided, and treated with contumely by all. The head-dress filled with these feathers, and other insignia of *blood*, is regarded as “*wakan*,” (sacred,) and no unhallowed hand, or woman, dare touch it. So indeed it is with all their instruments and evidences of crime. “The feather” is the great goal of a Sioux Indian's ambition. Often has it been asked why do the Sioux kill the Chippewas so; why do they go to war

so much; and who has ever received any decided answer. The general belief is that it is some old hereditary spite; but I feel safe in saying that no Sioux Indian even gave such a reason, or if he did he was instructed so to do by some white man. When asked these questions they evade an answer, but on strict inquiry you can learn the true reason, and it is nothing more nor less than the ambition to kill somebody and get "*the feather*." There is no other cause for it. There is no war or cause of war existing. "*The feather*" is the cause of these *malicious murders* committed on the Chippewas, and to get the feather they would just as soon kill anybody else as a *Chippewa*. They kill Chippewas and Omahas because they have been neighbors, and because they have been accustomed so to do from time immemorial. If they *but dared* they had rather kill whites, because they regard the whites as a greater people than the Chippewas, and the more distinguished the victim the higher the character of the feather.

To kill the agent, superintendent, a captain, colonel, or general, the Secretary of the Interior, or the *President* himself, would be a deed which would ennoble the murderer and his relatives forever, and make them "*wakan*," and the distinguished assassin of one of these dignitaries would be voted a *whole tail of a raven, a crow, or an eagle*, according to the distinguished character of his victim. Hence, during the recent campaign, a *crow's tail* was offered for the devoted scalp of Brigadier General Sibley—and for those under him, ten feathers for one, five for another, and one for others, according to rank—by Little Crow. As an instance of the force of this desire to secure "*the feather*," I need but relate the sad tale of *Ha-pink-pa*. He was a "*Farmer Indian*," who resided in a good brick house, near the agency, at Yellow Medicine, and had been treated with all the kindness and favor possible. He was, too, an elderly man, about fifty years old; was somewhat indolent and of little force of character. On the night of the 18th of August, when the Indians had determined to kill the whites and pillage the stores at Yellow Medicine, *Ha-pink-pa*, unlike Other Day, Paul, Simon, and others, went with the crowd. The first attack was made on the store of S. B. Garvie, esq., and Garvie was mortally wounded. This *Ha-pink-pa*, although he did not fire a single shot, as I am well satisfied, yet boasted that he had killed Garvie, and for this he was hanged at Mankato, last Friday; justly, too, as I think. Now, this boast was made to secure a "*feather*," and for nothing else. *Idleness*, too, is idolized among the Sioux "*braves*," and labor is regarded as a debasing institution, only fit for "*squaws*." And this code, and such consonant codes of morals, is taught to the Indians from childhood by their medicine men and priests, and forms their code of "*ancient customs*." By every means—by the father, the mother, the medicine man, the priest, the chief, and all—these "*ancient customs*" are taught and inculcated by precept and example, and ingrained into the young Indian from his first days of perception throughout his life. These are his life, his existence, his religion; and not only is it taught and believed that the commission of these crimes, and such as these, will insure him temporal distinction, but his hopes for the future are founded on the same theory.

In short, then, ignorance, indolence, filth, lust, vice, bigotry, superstition, and crime, make up the "*ancient customs*" of the Sioux Indians, and they adhere to the code with a tenacity and stoicism indefinable. They are not brave in the proper acceptance of the term; on the contrary, they are mostly inveterate cowards. To sneak up and, under the guise of friendship or the cover of some protecting thing, to kill a man is their habit. A square "up and down face to face fight" the Sioux Indians, as a general rule, in my opinion, will not make, unless it be with unarmed persons or greatly inferior numbers. To this rule there are exceptions, I know, but they are few; and yet, for the maintenance of their "*ancient customs*" and superstitions, they will suffer torture, contumely, and death, with a most remarkable stubbornness and stolidity and with all the

apparent fortitude of a devoted Christian martyr. The medicine man, or sorcerer, and the Indian priest, by their deceptions, cheats, and incantations, stimulated by the hope of ease, comfort, and gain, encourage the Indians in this miserable devilish system; and, being the recognized doctors of both body and spirit, they, to maintain their position and ascendancy, teach the Indians to be, and in most instances succeed in keeping them, ignorant, deluded, superstitious, and wicked creatures, degraded and brutal in all their habits and instincts and always prepared to do any bad thing. This is the Sioux Indian as he is.

If this be granted, then, we have, I think, the true cause of the outbreak, and I might be content to leave this part of the subject where the Rev. S. R. Biggs, formerly thirty years a missionary among the Dakotah or Sioux Indians, has left it. He says the "*devil*" caused the outbreak; and if ever the devil was well represented on earth, he certainly is in the ancient religious and social customs of the Sioux Indians. There every precept, example, act, or deed, is either purely diabolical or strongly tinctured with devilry.

But it may be permitted me to elaborate a little on this subject, and to set forth at some length my views on the same.

The radical moving cause of the outbreak is, I am satisfied, the ingrained and fixed hostility of the savage barbarian to reform, change, and civilization. As in all barbarous communities in the history of the world, the same people have for the most part resisted the encroachments of civilization upon their "ancient customs;" so it is in the case before us; nor does it matter materially in what shape civilization makes its attack. It may be either by Christianity, pure and simple, through the messenger of the cross, or by some of the resulting agencies or necessary accompaniments or harbingers of Christianity. Hostile opposing forces meet in conflict and a war of social elements is the result—civilization being aggressive and barbarism stubbornly resistant. Sometimes, indeed, civilization has achieved a bloody victory; but generally it has been otherwise. Christianity itself, the true basis of civilization, has, in most instances, waded to success through seas of blood. The Christian system was inaugurated by the shedding of the blood not only of its Divine founder, but of his disciples and successors, and that, too, at the hands of the savage, the barbarian, and worse, Pharasaical bigot. Having said thus much, I state, as a settled fact in my mind, that the encroachments of Christianity and its handmaid or daughter, civilization, upon the habits and customs of the Sioux Indians is the cause of the late terrible Sioux outbreak. There were, it is true, many immediate *inciting causes*, which will be alluded to and stated hereafter, but they are all subsidiary to and developments of or incident to the great cause set forth. It may be said, and indeed it is true, that there is a wicked as well as a Christian civilization. That such civilization is only true civilization *perverted*, a counterfeit, a "base coin," which could not pass but for the credit given to it by the original, will, it is believed, be admitted. And that the recent Sioux outbreak would have happened at any rate, as a result, a fair consequence of the cause here stated, I have no more doubt than I doubt that the existing great rebellion to overthrow our government would have occurred had Mr. Lincoln never been elected President of the United States.

Now, as to the exciting or immediate causes of the outbreak. By my predecessor a new and radical system was inaugurated practically, and in its inauguration he was aided by the Christian missionaries and by the government. The treaties of 1858 were ostensibly made to carry this new system into effect.

The theory, in substance, was to break up the community system which obtained among the Sioux; weaken and destroy their tribal relations; individualize them by giving each a separate home, and having them subsist by industry—the sweat of their brows; till the soil; to make labor honorable and idleness dishonorable; or, as it was expressed in short, "*make white men of them*," and have them adopt the habits and customs of white men. This system, once inaugu-

rated, it is self-evident, was at war with their "ancient customs." To be clear, *"the habits and customs of white men are at war with the habits and customs of the Indians."* The former are civilization, industry, thrift, economy; the latter, idleness, superstition, and barbarism, and I have already stated with what tenacity these savages cling to their habits and customs.

On the 1st day of June, 1861, when I entered upon the duties of my office, I found that the system had just been inaugurated. Some hundred families of the Annuity Sioux had become novitiates, and their relatives and friends seemed to be favorably disposed to the new order of things. But I also found that against these were arrayed over five thousand Annuity Sioux, besides at least three thousand Yanktonais, all inflamed by the most bitter, relentless, and devilish hostility.

At the very outstart I thus found existing the war of the "Scalp-locks and Blanket" against the "Cut-hair and Breeches." The Pantaloons importuned me to have them protected, and the Blankets to go with them and break up the new system. I saw to some extent the difficulty of the situation, but I determined to continue, if in my power, the civilization system. To favor it, to aid and build it up by every fair means, I advised, encouraged, and assisted these farmer novitiates; in short, I sustained the policy inaugurated by my predecessor and sustained and recommended by the government. I soon discovered that the system could not be successful without a sufficient force to protect the "Farmer" from the hostility of the "Blanket Indians."

In addition to the natural hostility of the wild Indians to the "white men," I soon discovered that evilly disposed white men and half-breeds in their interest were engaged in keeping up this hostility and in fomenting discontent. I found that previous to my arrival the Indians had been industriously told that on the arrival of the "new agent," the "Dutchmen" (an opprobrious name for the Farmer Indians) would be "*cleaned out*," and that the "Blanket Indians" would be restored to special favor; that the new agent would break up the new system and restore the old order of things. This vile story had its effect. While the Farmer Indians were satisfied with my course the Blanket Indians were disappointed, because, as they said, I did everything for the "Dutchmen." Thus, in the start, an ill-feeling was engendered. Although my partiality to the "white" party was looked upon with great jealousy, yet I kept on as I best could from the commencement until the outbreak in aiding the work of civilization. During my term, and up to the time of the outbreak, about one hundred and seventy-five Indian men had their hair cut, and had adopted the habits and customs of white men.

For a time, indeed, my hopes were strong that civilization would soon be in the ascendant. But the increase of the civilization party and their evident prosperity only tend to exasperate the Indians of the "ancient customs" and to widen the breach.

Here, then, we had the hostile contending forces brought face to face—the "Farmer Indians," the government, represented by the agent and employes and missionaries on the one side, and the Blanket Indians and those who deemed it their interest to take sides with them, and their priests, medicine men, and sorcerers on the other. The latter were for the "ancient customs," the former for diametrically the opposite system. In this shape the radical cause of the outbreak had been developing itself prior to the outbreak, from the day of its inauguration as a system until it exploded in the outbreak itself. These immediate, exciting causes, or rather, off-shoots, incidents, results, *fruits* of the great cause, are many; indeed, their name is "legion," and such as I can call into rank I shall enumerate. But whilst these are to be enumerated, it may be permitted me to hope that the radical cause will not be forgotten or overlooked; and I am bold to express this desire, because ever since the outbreak the public journals of the country, religious and secular, have teemed with editorials by, and com-

munications from, "reliable individuals," politicians, philanthropists, philosophers, and hired penny-a-liners," mostly mistaken, and sometimes wilfully and grossly false, giving the cause of the "Indian raid."

The general tenor of these lucubrations has been that the *Indian agents* got the annuity money *in gold*, kept it, and speculated on it by exchanging it for green backs, at a premium of from fifteen to thirty per centum, as their fertile and mercenary imaginations suggested, and some very pious fellow, doubtless an officer in the army, says that the agent got these green backs and tendered them to the poor Indians in lieu of gold, and sheds a quantity of crocodile tears over the awful result.

To be short, and in justice to the truth of history, I state here, however inappropriate to an official report, that these stories are malicious and base falsehoods. Prior to the Sioux outbreak the Sioux agent never had control of any portion whatever of the *annuity money* of the Sioux Indians for the year 1862. This whole series of lies about the speculation in the annuity funds of the Sioux is nothing more nor less than emanations from the brains of persons who have measured the Sioux agent by their own standing formed by their own personal experience in the past, and have expressed what they would have done had they but had the opportunity, and what, doubtless they have done when opportunity has been afforded them.

That Indians have been wronged and cheated by white men is doubtless true, and it is equally true, too, that white men have been cheated by white men and Indians too; but to publish to the world that this system of cheating, which exists in perfection alike on Wall street, upon Indian reservations, and in all intermediate places, is *the cause*, and a *justifiable cause*, too, of the late Sioux Indian outbreak is, in my humble opinion, simply puerile, shallow, and silly. And for the editors of distinguished and able journals, religious and secular, to publish to the world slanders upon individual character, which, if true, would consign the subject of them, not only to the penitentiary, but to temporal and eternal infamy and disgrace, on bare inference or on the authority of some correspondent who writes what he is told to by some reliable old citizen of Saint Paul, is strange indeed. I hope this reference to this subject here may be pardoned if not justified.

I shall now endeavor to set forth, as fairly as I can, some of what seems to me to be the chief exciting causes of that discontent and dissatisfaction which preceded the outbreak.

From the best information which I have been able to obtain, it seems that at the time of the treaties of Mendota and Traverse des Sioux, in the year 1851, in order to induce the Indians to sign the treaties, very liberal, if not extravagant, promises were made to them—promises for the occasion, without regard to consequences. What these promises were and the extent of them I shall not pretend to state at length; it would be a long task. This, I must say, however, that the alleged non-compliance with "promises" made "at the treaty" was the text and conclusion of nearly every Indian orator's speech which I have had the fortune to hear, (and I have heard not a few.) In substance, they recited that at the treaty it was promised them that each one of them should have one blanket at least every year—and plenty (ota) of pork, flour, and sugar to eat, and that every hunter should have his gun and all the ammunition he wanted. That white men would be hired to do all their work, and that coffee, tea, tobacco, hatchets, and such like in large quantities would be furnished them, and they should have "all they wanted," in addition to all of which *things*, money, (maza ska) to the amount of "\$40,000" to the upper and "\$46,000" to the lower bands, would be paid to them every year, and that they should be taken care of and never suffer from want any more. With such statements every speech teemed, whether made to the agent, superintendent, or in their own councils. Whether it is all true I do not pretend to say; but I do say that it was a perpetual source of complaint, discontent, and annoy-

ance. Hence, I concluded that where there was so much smoke there must have been some fire. To say the least, there must have been some serious misunderstanding somewhere; if such promises were made, it will be easy to see that no sufficient provision was made to fulfil them, when I state that these treaty Indians number nearly 7,000 souls, and that the whole amount set apart for them annually is about \$150,000, \$90,000 of which is to be paid in money, ("annuities.") I submit that the balance, \$60,000, will not go very far towards, carrying out such magnificent promises, and leave the subject, thus stated, as worthy of consideration among the "causes of the outbreak."

Again, in the year 1858, treaties were made between the Upper and Lower Sioux and the government; by these treaties the Indians ceded to the United States so much of their reservations as were north of the Minnesota river; *no price was fixed by the treaties*; but the United States Senate subsequently, by resolution, fixed the price at thirty cents per acre. This yielded to the lower bands about \$96,000, and to the upper about \$240,000.

These treaties contain some wise provisions, and are apparently unexceptionable. Indeed, although imperfect in not going far enough, they are in theory pre-eminently civilization treaties. As they were interpreted by the whites and understood by the Indians, the greatest good promised to flow from them; yet these apparently beneficent treaties proved to be the veriest of *Pandora boxes* for mischief. And this, not because the treaties were wrong in themselves; but because of the failure to provide the means to carry out the provisions of the treaties, and the *neglect* to perform the promises made contemporaneous with and subsequent to the execution and confirmation of these treaties.

These treaties could not be carried out without the power—a sufficient force—to protect the "Farmer" from the "Blanket Indians," and such force was never provided, and this at first, in time of peace, and during the administration of my predecessor, because, as I learn, the matter was not fully comprehended by the War Department, and since, because it was "hoped" that we could get along with the Indians with a merely nominal force, in order that all the available men possible might be used to put down the "*great rebellion*" and save the Union. To this "hope," or rather decision, I yielded, sorrowfully and reluctantly, yet determined to stay at my post, do my duty and abide the consequences, still not yielding my fixed belief, that it is easier to *keep from rising* than to *put down* a rebellion or raid. May we all learn a lesson herefrom is my sincere desire.

While these treaties were "making" and after they were made, as I have been informed, not only by the Indians, but by respectable white men, the Indians were lead to believe that as a result of these treaties the Lower Sioux would be paid in cash "one hundred boxes of money," (a box means \$1,000,) and the Upper Sioux "a heap," (ota.) Yet the Lower Sioux fund was exhausted to pay "debts," and about two-thirds of the Upper Sioux fund was applied to the same purpose. Whether these debts were just or unjust I know not, but I do know that when the treaties were made only \$70,000 was set apart to pay debts in each treaty, and out of that sum the Indians all claim that only \$60,000 was to be paid on debts, and that \$60,000 was all claimed against them and all they ever agreed to pay; and here I confess that the express language of said treaties would seem to indicate that there is some ground for this state of facts. What happened subsequently, what was done by the Indians or by the whites in the premises, I shall not pretend to relate in detail. Indeed, this whole affair is so mixed up with apparent truth, doubtful, and sometimes exaggerated and ridiculous "hearsay," and assertions and denials, that nothing but a fair, strict, and searching investigation would justify any one in deciding how it does stand.

This much in justice I must state: From the first day of my arrival upon the reservation up to the outbreak this matter was a perpetual source of wrangling,

dissatisfaction, and bitter, ever threatening complaints on the part of both the upper and lower bands.

Special deputations visited me, and special councils were held. I advised, expostulated, and within the bounds of truth did everything I could to keep dissatisfaction down, but "it would not down." Whatever the cause, the fact was there. Discontent, uneasiness and complaints were common and widespread. Here, again, there was a *misunderstanding*, and a serious one too—too serious, I often have thought, to be trifled with.

Again, the great rebellion, the war for the Union, has been a fruitful source of trouble among the Sioux, exciting inquiry, restlessness, and uneasiness. Half-breeds and others who could read the news kept telling the Indians all kinds of exaggerated stories about the war, sometimes that the "*niggers*" had taken or were about to take Washington. That the Great Father and the agent were friends to these "*niggers*." That the Great Father was whipped out, or, as they generally expressed, "*cleaned out*." That the Indians would get no more money. That the "*niggers*" would take it, or that it would be used up to pay for the war. That all the people, except the old men and the women and children, were gone to the war. And with such tales were their minds filled daily, and thus were they kept in a perpetual ferment. The effect of this upon the savage and superstitious minds of the Indians can easily be imagined. The knowledge of the fact that we were engaged in a great war, without any details, was of itself enough to excite them, as any one who for a moment reflects must perceive. Often when I have upbraided them for going to war with their hereditary enemies, the Chippewas, have they replied to me thus: "Our Great Father we know has always told us it was wrong to make war; now *he* is making war and killing a *great many*; how is this? we don't understand it." And Little Crow has often said to me, "When I arose this morning and looked toward the south it seemed to me that I could see the smoke of the big guns and hear the war whoop of the contending soldiers."

That there was any *direct* interference by rebel emissaries with the annuity Indians I have no evidence sufficient to assert with any degree of certainty; yet I am clearly of the opinion that rebel sympathizers did all in their power to create disaffection among the Indians in my agency, and I firmly believe that time will bring out in full relief this fact not only, but more—much more. Let us wait and see—"Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof."

Owing to the state of the finances of the country, the government found it inconvenient to send on the "*annuity money*" as early as had been usual for some four years previous; and although the delay was only about four or five weeks, yet the Indians did not understand it. They were excited about it, and kept inquiring why their money did not come. I assured them that it would come, and asked them to wait patiently. They seemed content on this subject, and however unfortunate the delay may have been in furnishing a pretext for the outbreak, yet I am well satisfied that nobody but scribblers, scamps, and unmitigated scoundrels have ever alleged this delay as a cause of or even a fair pretext for the outbreak. No Indian or half-breed has ever said or thought so. Yet the delay, short as it was, was unfortunate in this, that it afforded material to work upon, and to befog the public mind as to the real cause or causes of the outbreak. As the misstatements on this question have been widely circulated, it may be permitted me here to state a few facts. There is no time fixed, by either law or treaty, for the Sioux annuity payments. Prior to the year 1857 the payment was made semi-annually; one-half in the spring or early summer, and the other half in the autumn. Superintendent Cullen changed this (and I think wisely) by having but one time of payment each year, and that *when the grass affords good pasture*. Last year (1861) the Lower Sioux were paid on the 27th of June, and the Upper Sioux on the 18th of July.

This year (1862) the money did not leave St. Paul until the 17th day of August, and it arrived at Fort Ridgley on the 18th day of August, the very day of the outbreak, at the lower agency. There it remained during the siege. After the siege was raised, it was concluded to postpone the payment till a more favorable season, and the money "in the original package" was started back to St. Paul, in care of those who had brought it up, viz: C. W. Wykoff, Major Hatch, J. C. Ramsay, A. J. Van Voorhees, and C. M. Dailey, esqs. When it left New York, when it arrived at St. Paul, and what happened to it in the interval I do not know. For information on this subject I respectfully refer to J. J. Cisco, esq., deputy treasurer, New York; to the express company, and to C. W. Thompson, esq., superintendent of Indian affairs, St. Paul. I never saw the money itself; I saw the *keg* at Fort Ridgley in which it was said to be. I think it was there, and I believe it was gold. Neither I nor any other person, in the year 1862, offered any annuity money in the shape of gold, silver, "green backs," or in the shape of anything else, to the Sioux of the Mississippi. I have been a little particular in this regard, for what seem to me good reasons; yet I am somewhat grieved thus to spoil so many fine, pious, romantic, philanthropic, lachrymose, and devilish publications on the subject of the "cause of the raid," "dishonest agents," "green backs," "discount for gold," "Lo! the poor Indian," and others, with which in lectures, speeches, letters, sermons, and editorials the public have been regaled for the last four months. These facts may take "Othello's" occupation away, but it cannot be helped. Such is life.

Grievances such as have been related, and numberless others akin to them, were spoken of, recited, and chanted at their councils, dances, and feasts, to such an extent that in their excitement, early in June last, a secret organization, known as "a soldier's lodge," (a well-known institution among the Dacotahs) was formed by the young men and soldiers of the Lower Sioux, with the object, as far as I was able to learn through spies and informers, of preventing the "traders" from going to the pay-table, as had been their custom. Since the outbreak I have become satisfied that the real object of this "lodge" was to adopt measures to "clean out" all the white people at the time of the payment.

One transaction, in connexion with the outbreak, deserves especial notice at my hands, and this from the prominence given to it by persons high in authority and my own intimate relation to it. It has been stated officially, and reiterated in various forms, that immediately before the outbreak "the Sioux agent took away from the reservation every able-bodied man," and hence the outbreak. This is said in regard to the company of the recruits which I aided to collect and started with me to Fort Snelling—the company known as the "Renville Rangers," a portion of the honorable history of whom I have already given, together with all the material facts in connexion with the origin and progress and my connexion with the company. It only remains to be stated that the most of the men composing this company were employes of the agency, who were about to be discharged because their services could be safely and profitably dispensed with, and the balance of the company was made up of a few traders' clerks who had determined to go to the war anyhow, and half-breeds who had nothing to do, or rather who did nothing. I state what I know when I assert that not ten white men enlisted in the company who would not necessarily have left the reservation at any rate; and that, after the company had gone, there remained upon the reservation over one hundred "*able-bodied*" white men, besides a large number of half-breeds and all the Indians considered friendly. I submit these facts.

There have been, in addition to those related, many other "causes of the outbreak" uttered and published, but I cannot stop to notice them. There did exist many complaints other than those mentioned, a few real and substantial, and very many the most silly, frivolous, and false conceivable. He knows little of the Sioux Indians who has not learned that to imagine, manufacture, and

improvised *complaints* is characteristic of the entire Sioux nation. This is a staple article of their stock in trade. A volume not so poetical as "Hiawatha," but quite as interesting, might be written on this subject. I might, by way of illustration, give incidents, but I must forbear. Generally, however, it may be stated that "confidence men" and "*Jeremy Diddlers*" are common among the Sioux, and that at least some of them will *lie*, a few will cheat and steal, nearly all are beggars, and treachery is not unknown among them. Hence it is well to take their stories of hunger, privation, and wrongs *cum grano salis*.

Here I venture the statement that the "Lower Sioux Indians," the very miscreants who started and kept up the outbreak, were then, and generally had been, better supplied with both the necessities of life and the means of obtaining a livelihood than any equal number of our industrious frontier settlers.

One Sunday, the 17th day of August, A. D. 1862, at the village of Acton, in the county of Meeker, and State of Minnesota, four Lower Sioux Indians, of Sha-ko-pee's band, part of a hunting party composed of fourteen, obtained whiskey, became intoxicated, and killed six persons, including a man named Jones, from whom it is alleged they obtained the whiskey. This was the immediate exciting cause of the outbreak—the spark which ignited the train leading to the magazine, in which, for more than ten years, had been accumulating the combustibles of discontent, dissatisfaction, and premeditated devilment, and which on Monday morning following exploded with such fearful and terrific violence. This Acton party at once returned to their village, at Rice creek, on the lower reservation, called a council of their immediate relatives and said, in substance: "We have killed white men and, if caught, must die. Let us unite *now* and kill the whites at the agency. It is a good time to carry out our original and long cherished designs. The whites are all gone to the war, except the old men, the women, and the children. We can kill them all, take their property, and repossess ourselves of the land which we sold them, and occupy it." This harangue and others like it had their desired effect. About twenty warriors at once united into a war party, and started for Redwood creek and toward the agency. As they proceeded they were joined by the warriors of the bands of Sha-ko-pee, Little Crow, Black Dog or Big Eagle, Blue Earth, and Passing Hail, all ripe for the work proposed. These bands all had their villages and plantings above the lower agency, from four to ten miles therefrom, and most of their young men and soldiers belonged to the "soldier's lodge."

By daylight on Monday morning, the 18th of August, this war party, now increased to about two hundred soldiers, armed and fierce for the fray, proceeded to the lower agency, having sent messengers to the bands of Taopi, Wabasha, Wakuta, Sate-Comedu, and Husha-sha, who resided about and below the agency, informing them of the purpose formed, and asking and ordering them to join the war party forthwith, on pain of being punished even to death in case of refusal. Many of these latter bands, especially the older men and the chiefs, were "*Farmer Indians*," and supposed to be friendly to the whites, (and this was generally so;) hence the *orders and the threats*. As soon as the news of the uprising spread the young men of these bands rushed up to the agency, and, excited, joined the war party, now being momentarily augmented in numbers and stiffened up with courage and resolution.

Little Crow, always cunning, without principle, itching for popularity, power, and domain, at once struck out into the current and (most of the other chiefs hesitating) became the leader of this now formidable band of warriors. Many of the chiefs, older men, and "Farmer Indians," remonstrated and even protested, but all was in vain. "The die was cast." Madness ruled the hour. About six o'clock on this sad and eventful Monday morning the work of death and devastation began by an attack on the trading post of Stewart B. Garvie, known as Myrick's; it immediately spread to the other stores and soon reached the government stables, warehouses, shops, and dwellings. The people, panic-

stricken, fled in all directions; many were shot or captured; the rest escaped, leaving all they had behind. Now the houses, stores, and shops were plundered and committed to the flames, and the Indian fiends held high carnival over the ruins. Thus was the Sioux outbreak of the year 1862 inaugurated.

In the beginning it was the intention of Crow to make regular "war" after the manner of white men, but his "braves" having tasted of blood and plunder became wild and unmanageable and again yielded to the popular current, and "Crow's war" degenerated into a savage, barbarous, and inhuman massacre, not exceeded in atrocity by any similar outbreak of modern times.

Blood and plunder united the Lower Sioux, and the reports of their success reaching the Wah-pay-tons and Lower Sissitons on Monday afternoon, they, too, although divided in council, to the number of about one hundred and fifty, decided to go into the fight. About two o'clock a. m. on Tuesday, the 19th of August, they attacked the store of Stewart B. Garvie, known as "Myrick's," mortally wounded Mr. Garvie, the proprietor, and severely wounded a young man named Patwell; all the rest of the traders fled and escaped. The suddenness of the outbreak seems to have taken these Upper Sioux by surprise; they seemed to have no concert of action, and acted as if intent on plunder rather than to take life.

Friendly Indians, and at least one half-breed, Joseph La Frombois, gave timely warning to the whites at Yellow Medicine and Hazelwood Mission. The employes of the agency, with their families, the agent's family, (a wife, three children, and two young ladies,) and other persons, making, in all, twenty-two men and forty women and children, got together during the night in the agency dwelling and warehouse, at first determined to remain and defend themselves. From this course they were dissuaded by that "Christian hero," John Other Day, (Ampa-tu-to-kecha.) By his advice and under his guidance, the entire party, sixty-two in all, at early dawn on Tuesday morning, the 19th of August, 1862, left the agency with four wagons and one single carriage, taking nothing with them but a scanty covering of clothing and a few crackers. Led by the noble Other Day, they struck out on the naked prairie, literally placing their lives in this faithful creature's hands, and guided by him, and *him alone*. After intense suffering and privation they reached Shakopee on Friday, the 22d of August, Other Day never leaving them for an instant; and this Other Day is a *pure, full blooded Indian*, and was not long since one of the wildest and fiercest of his race. Poor, noble fellow, must he, too, be ostracised and suffer for the sins of his nation? I commend him to the care of a just God and a liberal government, and not only him, but others who did likewise.

The same night the families of Rev. Stephen R. Riggs and of the Rev. Dr. T. S. Williamson, the devoted missionaries, and the teachers, assistants, and sojourners connected with the old Dacotah mission, numbering in all forty-five souls, having been warned and aided by friendly Indians, escaped, barely saving their lives, and after wandering on the bleak prairie and suffering all sorts of hardships, arrived safely at the settlements on the 24th day of August, 1862.

I could relate in detail the hair-breadth escapes of individuals and families—how, for days and nights, ranging from two days to *eight weeks*, men, delicate women, and little children, sometimes wounded, almost in a state of nudity and without food other than what they could gather, wandered, they knew not where, until perchance they were "picked up" accidentally, arrived at some place of safety, or wearied, worn out, exhausted, dropped down and died. But I forbear. *I was there*, and am a witness to these and such heart-rending occurrences; I turn away from them; let some other pen than mine record them.

Monday and Tuesday, August 18 and 19, 1862, were days of torture, carnage, desolation, and blood—sad days and gloomy for the Minnesota frontier.

The savages, now stimulated with their successes, were fierce and jubilant; small parties of six or seven, ten or twenty, spread or deployed out among the

frontier settlements in all directions. The men were killed, the women taken captive, and the children, when not killed, left to their fate. The houses and barns were burned and the cattle driven off *by these small parties, sent out for this special purpose. These were the foraging parties of Crow's army.* Large war parties, numbering from one hundred to four hundred, went to Fort Ridgley, New Ulm, and the "*Big Woods,*" and in their mode made their attacks on those places. *But I desire it to be understood that these small foraging parties and the larger war parties were constituent parts of one design. They cannot and should not be separated. The savages engaged in the one are as guilty as those engaged in the other.* Fort Abercrombie was also invested and attacked.

The peaceful and industrious frontier people, unarmed and engaged in their peaceful avocations, panic-stricken, fled, abandoning their homes and their crops growing ripe for the reaper, in the swath, sheaf, or stack. The panic was general, a belt of country nearly, if not quite, two hundred miles in length, and, on an average, fifty miles wide, was *entirely abandoned*, and, as the news spread, the balance of the State of Minnesota and the frontiers of Wisconsin and Iowa were justly alarmed. What were, a few days before, prosperous frontier settlements, were now scenes of disturbance, desolation, ruin, and death. Our neighbor, young sister, Dakota, has, too, suffered her full share; young and weak though she is, yet her people are "bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh," and they have been killed, captured, and left desolate.

The real value of the property destroyed or abandoned, as the *immediate* result of the raid, has not yet been ascertained, nor indeed can it be for some time to come. But, I believe, I very nearly approximate the truth when I set it down at two millions of dollars. Indeed, the data in my possession would justify me in placing it at a higher figure. And this does not include the losses on the reservations of Indian trust property.

What the *resultant* losses will amount to cannot now, if indeed it ever can, be estimated. It cannot be estimated in dollars and cents. When the matter has passed into history the impartial historian may make a just estimate; but the time is not yet. In this regard very much, yea, in a great measure, everything, depends upon the action of the government. If the sufferers are promptly compensated, the Indians removed, and the frontier secured against the reasonable probability of future raid of the kind, then the *effects* of the outbreak will soon comparatively disappear, and the frontier will, in a short time, resume its wonted prosperity; new settlements of hardy and industrious pioneers will be made, and education, civilization, and religion will, with "the star of empire" westward, make their way. And all will be well. On the contrary, if there are hesitancy and delay, or neglect and abandonment of the policy indicated, the results can only be *imagined*.

I now deem it proper to give an account of the destruction of property upon the reservations, and in this I shall be as particular as the limits of this report will allow—not so particular as I would desire—but sufficiently so to convey a clear, general idea of the matter.

All the dwelling-houses, (except two Indian houses,) stores, mills, shops, and other buildings, with their contents, and the tools, implements, and utensils upon the upper reservation were either destroyed or rendered useless.

After a careful estimate, I place the loss sustained upon the upper reservation at the sum of \$425,000.

On the lower reservation the stores, warehouses, shops, and dwellings of the employes, with their contents, were destroyed entirely, and most of the implements and utensils, and some of the Indian houses, (eight, I believe, worth, with their contents, about \$5,000,) were also destroyed or rendered useless.

The mills and all the rest of the Indian dwellings were left comparatively unharmed by the Indians. The new stone warehouse, although burned out as far as it could be, needs only an expenditure of a few hundred dollars to make

it as good as ever. I put this loss at \$375,000. If, however, no attention is paid to the standing and uninjured houses and mills, they, too, may be taken as destroyed—lost for all practical purposes. As I feel almost certain that such will be the case, I therefore estimate the entire loss at the lower agency, in buildings, goods, stock, lumber, supplies, fences, and crops, at not less than \$500,000. Thus, on the reservations alone, we find a direct loss of about \$1,000,000, and most of this is to be placed to the account of the United States as trustee for the Indians. Indeed, I much doubt whether a million dollars will cover this loss.

An estimate of the quantity of the growing crops has already been given, I now present an estimate of their value on the reservations.

Lower Sioux.

25,625 bushels corn, at 80 cents.....	\$20, 500
32,500 bushels potatoes, at 50 cents.....	16, 250
13,500 bushels turnips, at 20 cents.....	3, 700
Beans, peas, pumpkins, squashes, and other vegetables.....	8, 000
Total, Lower Sioux.....	48, 450

Upper Sioux.

27,750 bushels corn, at \$1.....	\$27, 750
37,500 bushels potatoes, at 75 cents.....	28, 125
20,250 bushels turnips, at 30 cents.....	6, 075
Beans, peas, pumpkins, squashes, and other vegetables.....	9, 000
Total, Upper Sioux.....	70, 950
Add, Lower Sioux.....	48, 450
	119, 400

Here, then, we have the value of the crops in round numbers, say \$120,000, and I am satisfied as I live that this estimate is below the real cost of these things on the reservations, as things at present rate.

At the time of the outbreak the corn (being early Indian corn) was just ripe enough to invite the attacks of the myriads of blackbirds and crows which infest the frontier; and it is safe to say that these birds devoured full one half of the corn of the Lower Sioux, and perhaps as much of that of the Upper Sioux, below Lac qui Parle. The Indians on Big Stone lake, and for the most part at Lac qui Parle, had gathered and buried their corn before the outbreak effectually reached them. Indeed, this is true of most of the Upper Sioux above Hazzlewood mission. The Lower Sioux and the Upper Sioux below the mission, gathered none of theirs, except what they used for "roasting ears," or green corn. It was abandoned to the birds and the immense herds of cattle which Crow's party had taken from the settlers on the frontier. These herds were large; how large I cannot state, but sufficiently large to destroy a large quantity of corn, and with the Indians used up, to a considerable extent, the potato-crops.

It is impossible to form an accurate estimate of the amount of crops on the reservations when General Sibley's command first crossed the Minnesota river, on the 19th day of September, A. D. 1862. I think it perfectly safe to state that at least one-third of the corn and more than three-fourths of the potatoes remained at that time. On that day General Sibley had at least 1,450 rank

and file, besides his teamsters and camp followers, who numbered together not less than 150 men, and he must then have had at least 250 horses.

After the battle of Wood lake he was reinforced, on the 25th of September, by not less 100 men, with their transportation teams. After that time "mounted men," each one riding one horse and leading another, in companies, began to scatter in, until, by the time he left camp Release, General Sibley must have had connected with his expedition not less than 2,200 men and 600 horses; and during his stay on the reservations, from the 19th day of September until the 9th day of November, he must have had on an average not less than 1,800 men and 350 horses connected with his expedition. In addition to these, the camp of Indian prisoners, which was taken on the 25th of September, numbered not less, on an average, than 1,700 persons, with about 100 yoke of oxen and 125 ponies and horses. All these remained on the reservations until the 9th day of November, in all, on an average, say fifty days.

How much all these men, women, and children, horses, oxen, and ponies consumed in these fifty days I know not. The "rank and file" I know were by no means liberally supplied with rations; sometimes, yea, oftentimes they had little else to eat than potatoes and salt and parched corn, and very little salt at that. The horses had little forage beside corn, and the Indians literally lived on corn and potatoes and beef, foraged, or got the best way we could get it. All these potatoes and most of this corn were gathered upon the reservations. How much it was I know not, nor will anybody ever know.

I state only my own conclusions when I assert that more than one half of the actual subsistence of the soldiers, teamsters, Indian prisoners, horses, ponies, and oxen connected with Colonel now General Sibley's expedition, while he remained on the reservations, were obtained from the Indian plantings.

Starving men, starving horses, hungry Indians, and hungry oxen "gobbled up" the corn and potatoes at a great rate, when supplies and rations were out of the question, away in "the rear." I leave this interesting subject for those more apt than I in supplying armies in the field. Why not investigate it, so that the books be balanced between the Interior and War Departments?

In justice to General Sibley I must say that, situated as he was, it was utterly impossible for him to have kept even an approximate account of the things thus used. He did all in his power in this as well as every other respect. With the means at his command he accomplished wonders.

On the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th of November, when the troops, Indians, and everybody else abandoned the reservations, there was left of the crops on the upper reservation, below Big Stone lake, about 4,000 bushels of potatoes, and little, if any, corn, and on the lower reservation about 15,000 bushels of potatoes and 2,000 bushels of corn. We have no definite accounts from Big Stone lake, but doubtless the Indians gathered their crops there.

Much of the lumber was left uninjured at the lower agency, and the iron, steel, stoves, and ploughs there were very little damaged. The lumber and stoves were used advantageously by General Sibley's command; and the general directed that all property not needed by his command should be properly cared for.

As I had, of a reasonable necessity, to abandon the agency and place myself in the care of the army, I felt and realized that I had little to say or do, and tried to say or do as little as possible, except to obey orders. I felt that I was *functus officio*, and yielded the practical control of affairs to Major General Pope, by whose authority, I expect, every reasonable account will be given of the property taken possession of by the army. Indeed, all the property taken possession of by General Sibley was needed by his command to such an extent that he had to take it or allow his men to suffer. And I certainly would not, even if I had believed that I had the power, have objected to the appropriation of

any property on the reservations to the use and comfort of the gallant men who so promptly rushed to arms at their country's call.

But what is property lost in comparison with the precious lives extinguished ; with the anguish, sorrow, and heart desolation entailed by this horrible outbreak ?

For a long time I have endeavored to secure an accurate account of the number of those killed and missing since the outbreak. Up to this time, strange as it may seem, I am only able to furnish an approximate statement of the number. I believe the following will prove very nearly correct :

CITIZENS MASSACRED.

In Renville county, including reservations	221
In Dakota Territory, including Big Stone lake.....	32
In Brown county, including Lake She-tek.....	204
In the other frontier counties.....	187
Total	644

SOLDIERS KILLED IN BATTLE.

Lower Sioux ferry, (Captain Marsh's command).....	24
Fort Ridgley and New Ulm	29
Birch Coolie	23
Fort Abercrombie, Acton, Forest City, Hutchinson, and other places, including Wood lake, (4).....	17
Total	93
Add citizens	644
	737

Here, then, we have seven hundred and thirty-seven persons who, I am convinced, have been killed by the Indians. More there may be, and I think there are yet. I confine myself to the facts which I *have*. Are they not enough ? Most, say two-thirds, of this number were full-grown men and boys over twelve years of age. The rest women and children ; the mother, the maiden, the little boy or girl, and the innocent infant. Is it not enough ?

I shall now proceed to consider the question, what shall be done with the Sioux Indians ; and what policy shall be adopted towards them. This is, indeed, a serious matter, one which I approach not without serious misgivings as to my ability to answer it, so much of vital importance alike to the whites and the Indians being dependent upon its solution.

Whilst I must confine myself to the Sioux, I cannot keep out the fact that what is generally true of the Sioux is also generally true of all our other Indian tribes.

Since the outbreak countless theories have been advanced on this subject. Extermination, massacre, banishment, torture, huddling together, killing with small pox, poison, and kindness, have all been proposed. Theories preposterous, barbarous, inhuman, puerile, impracticable, thoughtless, have been advanced and dilated upon. Some have been reasonable and some fair, but none *just right*. Ah ! there is the trouble, to get the right theory and the correct practice of it. Can I accomplish this ? I much fear I cannot. I do wish that I or some one else could. All I can hope to do is to approximate—to “try.”

When we look the subject in the face, I take it few will contend, seriously, that the Sioux and all the other Indians can be “*exterminated*” just now. Ex-

terminate is a severe, a terrible word—much easier written than put into practical operation. Then I leave "*extermination*." And may we not be careful to inquire whether it would be expedient, right, or practicable, to place all the Sioux, Chippewas, and Winnebagoes, on *Isle Royal*? Is not this, when undisguised, a proposition for a "*Kilkenny cat*," fight on an extensive scale? To one who knows anything of the relations of the *Sioux* and *Chippewas*, it does seem so. It may be wise, sound, and even Christian, but I must confess my inability to see it in any such light. Nor can I see the wisdom of the one "Indian State" theory, where all the Indians are to be congregated in one body politic. It is a splendid theory, but it will not work in practice; it is but the *Isle Royal* theory on a huge scale. If the thing were practicable, if the Indians could ever all be "*got there*," then I would stop to argue its propriety; but as it cannot be and never will be accomplished, I leave it with *Isle Royal* and "*extermination*."

But, then, the Indians must leave the State of Minnesota, says one; so say I, emphatically. The recent atrocities of the Sioux have so exasperated the people of the State, as a body politic, that these people and the Sioux Indians can never again exist together with safety or benefit to either in the same State limits. The Indians must be sent out and kept out of the State, or for years and years to come there can be no peace or security. Yet, true as it is, the "remnant" of these Sioux must go somewhere and something must be done for them. Now, where shall they be sent? As we cannot send them out of the *United States*, they must be settled in some State or some *to-be-State* of "the Union." They are not desirable neighbors to white people generally, and they will prove little better to one set of whites than to another. Hence it is believed that the place where and the system which will conduce most effectually to establish and keep up *non-intercourse* between the whites and the Indians, under present circumstances, keeping in view the best interests of both, are those which should be selected and adopted. The place to which the Sioux ought to be sent should, then, be, as nearly as possible, an isolated one; not only isolated now, but one which would promise to be easily kept isolated for as long a time as possible. Besides *isolation*, other conditions should attach to the location. There should be sufficient arable land, wood, water, and pasturage, and the place should, other things being equal, be as near to some source of supplies, both for the Indians and necessary troops, as possible, and it should be healthful. Is there such a place? There may be and doubtless are many; yet I know certainly of but one, where all these conditions obtain to any reasonable extent.

The Coteau des Prairie, or "The Mountain," is an elevation or swell of the vast prairie which spreads out northward, westward, and southward of Fort Ridgley, toward Iowa, the Rocky mountains, and the British possessions. This prairie mountain is on an average about eighteen miles distant from and westward of Big Stone lake; from a point west of the foot of the lake and nearly parallel thereto it extends northward about thirty miles to the "head of the Coteau," and is on an average about twenty miles wide. Upon this end of the Coteau there is a large quantity of good agricultural lands and chains of small lakes are literally scattered all over it. These lakes abound in fish, wild fowls, and fur-bearing animals. Timber sufficient for practical purposes is distributed on the banks of these lakes, and in the innumerable "coolies" through which flow the numerous outlets of the lakes, in their course into the Minnesota, Red, and Big Sioux rivers. This section of country is entirely surrounded by prairie, and for hundreds of miles in every direction there is scarcely any timber. In fact, I know of no section of our prairie country less inviting to the emigrant than the surroundings of this proposed Coteau reservation, which would embrace some seven hundred square miles. A more healthful region I think nowhere exists.

Here I would locate the remnant of the annuity Sioux of the Mississippi. I

say remnant, because of these six thousand six hundred Annuity Sioux less than four thousand will ever be got together again on any reservation, and these will be for the most part women and children. General Sibley has now in his charge, including those condemned to be hanged, about 1,800; and of those, exclusive of the convicts, there are only sixty men, and those mostly old ones; thus it will be seen that of this 1,800 there are over 1,500 women and children, and only sixty men who can be permitted to go at large on a reservation. The remaining Annuity Sioux, numbering some 4,800, are with the Yanktonais and other nomadic bands, numbering 3,000 or 4,000, doubtless banded together for hostile purposes, and must be caught before they are caged or cared for. Until these are severely chastised nothing can be done with them. They will never deliver themselves up as prisoners; to use a vulgar expression, "that is played out." They can now be taken by force or fine strategy alone. The power of the government must be brought to bear upon them. *They must be whipped—coerced* into obedience. After this is accomplished, few will be left to put upon a reservation. Many will be killed, more must perish from famine and exposure, and the more desperate will flee and seek refuge on the plains or in the mountains. Few, except women and children, can be captured, and if they should be, they never should be allowed to cause trouble again. A very small reservation should suffice for them.

Other and better locations may exist, but I know not of them. I simply recommend this one for consideration, firmly convinced that it has peculiar merits. I submit in good faith.

Let the Indians be located where you please, some policy must be adopted toward them. What shall that policy be?

With all my feelings of exasperation against these savages, I cannot recommend other than a humane policy; firm, strong, and even severe it may be; yet allowing free scope for the exercise of a wise humanity. The policy should be severely and strictly paternal in its general features, and adapted to the nature and wants of the Indians.

The government should, then, at once abandon the "treaty system," and in lieu thereof *take charge* of the Indians as *wards* or *children*, not as lunatics or madmen, and compel the Indians to submit to the authority of the government. Let the idea be abandoned in theory, as it has indeed been in fact, that Indians are an independent sovereign nation; treat them just as we find them, untutored, uncivilized barbarians, savages; yet as human beings not capable or fit to manage their own affairs, but yet susceptible of being prepared by culture and discipline to become in time men, citizens, safe and good neighbors; let a simple, clear, and well digested code of laws be adopted for their government, in form and substance such as the laws regulating the relations of parent and child, guardian and ward, or teacher and pupil, and of course the *means* and the *power* to *enforce* these laws and to punish their infraction should be provided for, else the laws would be of no utility; more accurately, they would not be laws unless they were operative and of force.

This code of laws should require the Indian novice to *disarm* and keep *disarmed* till otherwise ordered; to abstain totally from the medicine, war, scalp and other barbarous, superstitious and bloody dances; to eschew paint and feathers; in short, to abandon and throw away the accursed paraphernalia of Indian war, murder, superstition, jugglery, and bigotry. And, on the other hand, to adopt and practice the habits and customs of enlightened Christian civilization. And this should be not only required and taught, but rigidly enforced. To this end the pious missionary of the cross and the devoted teacher should be encouraged, protected, and sustained, and good, reliable and sufficient force of troops should always be on hand to prevent resistance and enforce obedience. Unless this force is provided and kept on hand ready for any emergency all the rest must go for nought.

Moral suasion, "sugar plums," and the like, may be used in times of peace, and on proper occasions, to conciliate, to maintain friendly relations, and all that; but stern facts stare us in the face, and this Indian outbreak and the "great rebellion" have taught or are teaching us that force and "hard blows" are sometimes needed to *enforce* obedience to law, to *quell* riots, and suppress rebellion. How much the more and the better it would be to employ force to *prevent* all these, I submit to others. "A stitch in time saves nine," and "*in time of peace prepare for war*" are trite maxims, but how little do we heed them in practice. Had these been properly appreciated and acted upon our Indian "raid" might have been avoided and the "great rebellion" prevented. Here let us learn a lesson for the future; let us always be prepared.

If the Annuity Sioux, and such others as can be safely placed among them, should be located on the north end of the Coteau, as recommended, then the entire space between the reservation and the lake should be declared to be a military reservation, and this reservation should extend *over* the lake a sufficient distance to cover the coolies of timber on the eastern side of the lake, to prevent settlements there and to save the little timber there for the use of the troops. Indeed, I would surround the proposed Indian by a military reservation. Military posts should then be established at such points as might be determined upon by sound military authority, with a view to keep the Indians on their reservations and to keep the whites off the reservation, *for mutual protection*.

On this reservation, or such an one, I would place just as many Sioux Indians as possible, provide them with the means *in kind*, and tell them to till the soil and earn their living by the sweat of their brows, and compel them to do it. As a general rule, pay them no money. Break up entirely the old trading system, alike injurious to the trader and the Indian, and have the Indians furnished by the government with those things which they need for their comfort and convenience, *as a reward for labor performed, and not otherwise*. Establish a sufficient number of schools, and compel them to send their children to them. Many will work and send their children to school at the outset, and when they find out that they *must* do it, all the rest will gradually come up to their duty, with the use of little or no compulsion. Let the system be voluntary to the greatest extent possible, but keep the force on hand and use when necessary.

Some Indians, indeed, such as Other Day, might, even now, be permitted to settle among the whites, as far as mutual safety is concerned, but I doubt much its expediency. Yet the fact that *some* of them have become thus Christianized and civilized establishes the possibility of civilizing and Christianizing more of them, and fitting them to live among or in the neighborhood of white men. To accomplish this result the preparation of the Indian for life among white men, whether he ever actually lives among them or not, is the object to be attained. To accomplish this, time, labor, patience, and system are required. Years, yea, centuries it may take, yet I think it can be done. I believe in it. But while this is being done, let it be kept in mind that the Indian must be deprived of the means of bringing irretrievable ruin upon himself and of seriously injuring the whites.

I am aware that this proposed system of disarming and *forced* good behavior will meet with many objections, but I am satisfied that it is right, and hence I recommend it.

One of two things must, in my opinion, happen: either the entire race must become extinct or they must assimilate with the whites and become part of the people, or if not *part* of the people, at least friends of the people. Unless Indian nationality is abolished, the Indian race ere long must be known only in history. Before the approach of the aggressive civilization of the age, unless they become a part of it, they must disappear.

The whites, by merely keeping the Indians in a state of *semi-national* subjection and protection, may overshadow them, and after a few "outbreaks" or

"raids," witness the last "remnant" of this people melt away as the last snow flakes melt away before the spring sun. Yet I do believe that this great nation, in its strength, can and will adopt a system which will, in the end, induce some of them, yea, many, to be of us and among us, citizens, neighbors and friends, adopting our habits, speaking our language and worshipping the God of our fathers. Poor fellows! whilst I hate and am exasperated at their recent atrocities, yet I cannot but pity them when I reflect that God, our common Father, made them for some wise purpose only known to Himself. While I would be severe with them, yet I would be just, even generous.

While I thus plead for a humane policy, I do not forget that the *guilty* Indians should be punished. Those who have wantonly killed, massacred and tortured the whites should not be permitted to live, and this, not as a matter of revenge or hate, but as a matter of stern justice. Whenever Indians on a large or small scale commit crimes, they should be promptly punished. A failure to do this heretofore has been very unfortunate, in my humble opinion. I will give one instance only, although there are hundreds. In the winter of the year 1857 the Sioux Indians massacred some fifty persons at Spirit lake, and took several female captives. *Yet not one of the Indians engaged in this massacre was ever punished.*

It was all charged to "Ink-pa-duta" and allowed to pass. The Indians interpreted this action or rather non-action of the government thus: "The whites either have not the ability or the inclination to punish us, which we are not sure; but we are not satisfied that they *will not* punish us." Thus they reasoned and kept on committing depredations, and were never punished. This was all wrong. At the time of this Spirit lake massacre, the power of the government to punish the guilty should have been exhibited and exercised. Every guilty Indian should have been punished—should have suffered the just penalty of his crimes. Had this been done, then I believe that our recent outbreak would never have occurred.

I sincerely hope that no false philanthropy or morbid sentimentalism will ever cause a repetition of the course pursued by the government in regard to the Spirit lake massacre.

But I must close this long report. It is not what I had desired it should be, but yet I hope it may do some *good*. With this hope I submit it in its present imperfect and crude state.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS J. GALBRAITH,

Sioux Agent.

CLARK W. THOMPSON, Esq.,

Superintendent Indian Affairs, St. Paul, Minnesota.

A.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY EXPEDITION,
Camp Release, October 4, 1862.

SIR: You will take charge of the Indians, and such of the half-breeds and mixed-bloods as may be designated to accompany them, and proceed to the lower agencies to collect the crops there and secure them, and in so doing you will insist that the men, as well as the women capable of labor, shall be employed. I have detailed two companies of infantry, commanded by Captain Whitney, to accompany you as an escort, and remain for your protection and that of the friendly Indians and half-breeds. You will allow no time to be lost in securing the crops in a proper manner. Captain Whitney has orders to obey any requi

sition you may make upon him if in his judgment judicious and wise, but his orders are to exercise his discretion in all military matters, and to report to these headquarters for orders.

I desire that you will impress upon the chiefs and principal men in the camp that they will be held personally responsible if they do not report to you at once any fresh arrivals of Indians in camp, and you will cause the arrest and delivery to Captain Whitney of any individuals suspected of being concerned in the late outrages upon the whites.

I do not wish to interfere with your official duties as United States Indian agent, and you will therefore make your customary reports to the proper department, but in all cases in which the proper restraint and discipline of the Indians are concerned, under the general orders from these headquarters, you will report to the colonel commanding the expedition.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. H. SIBLEY,
Colonel Commanding.

Major THOMAS J. GALBRAITH,
United States Indian Agent, in camp.

H. Ex. Doc. 68—4