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GRADUATE COLLEGE

CLASSICAL CHINESE CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS  
AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON CONTEMPORARY CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

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degree of

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KUO-CHUNG LIN

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CLASSICAL CHINESE CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS  
AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON CONTEMPORARY CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

APPROVED BY

Oliver E. Benson  
Rufus Hall  
John Carl Humeau  
Donald E. Keast  
Ray Buchanan

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE



中國古代國際政治思想

及其

對當代中國外交政策的影響

林國炯 著

奧克蘭拉瓦特大學政治系  
一九七九年二月

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### Glossary of Chinese Phrases

- 1) Chan Kuo (戰國): the Warring States period.
- 2) Cheng bu ju ch'i (正不如奇): The way of normal is less than the way of extraordinary; the use of surprise is superior to that of common.
- 3) Cheng-Ch'i (正奇): Normal or Common and Extraordinary or Surprise; direct and indirect.
- 4) chi-mi (羈縻): loose rein; regional autonomy.
- 5) chi-suo-bu-yu-wu-shih-yu-jen (己所不欲勿施於人): not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself.
- 6) chi-yu-li-er-li-jen, chi-yu-ta-er-ta-jen (己欲立而立人, 己欲達而達人):  
Wishing to be established himself, he seeks also to establish others;  
wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others.
- 7) chia t'ien-tzu i lin chu-hou (挾天子以令諸侯): controlling the Son of Heaven in order to dictate to the vassals.
- 8) chiao-hsiang-li (交相利): mutual aid, mutual benefit.
- 9) chien-ai (兼愛): universal love.
- 10) chu-luan shi (據亂世): despotism.
- 11) Ch'un Ch'iu (春秋): the Spring and Autumn period.
- 12) chun-tzu (君子): superior man or gentleman.
- 13) fei-kung (非攻): anti-offensive-attack, anti-aggression, condemnation of offensive war.
- 14) Ho-Tsung (合縱): the Vertical Alliance, an east-west alignment, in which one joins with a number of weak states in hopes of attacking a strong one; a system of collective defense.
- 15) hsia (俠): the knights-errant.
- 16) hsiao-jen (小人): small man, mean man.
- 17) hsiao-k'ang (小康): small tranquility.
- 18) hsin (信): trustworthiness, good faith, sincerity.
- 19) hsin-jen (行人): office of diplomat, advisor on foreign policy and international relations.
- 20) hu-t'ung-yu-wu (互通有無): exchange of different needs.



- 21) hui-meng cheng-chih (會盟政治): the politics of conference and alliance.
- 22) i-i-chih-i (以夷治夷): using barbarians to check barbarians.
- 23) jen-ts'u (仁慈): benevolence.
- 24) juo-kuo-wu-wai-chiao (弱國無外交): The weak state has no diplomacy.
- 25) ku-wei-chin-yung; yang-wai-chung-yung (古為今用, 洋為中用): The ancient wisdom is for present use; the foreign knowledge is for Chinese use.
- 26) li (禮, 里, 利): ritual, courtesy, propriety, moral; Chinese measure of distance and one li equals to one-third mile; utility, gain, profit, benefit, interest.
- 27) li-chih (禮治): rule of ethics; rule by virtue.
- 28) lieh-kuo (列國): the states with equal sovereignty in the Chinese feudal system.
- 29) Lien-Heng (連橫): the Horizontal Alliance, a north-south alignment, in which one serves a strong state for the purpose of attacking a number of weak ones; a policy or strategy of "divide and rule" in the concept of the balance of power.
- 30) luo-ching-hsia-shih (落井下石): dropping a stone into the well where a person fell in and was drowning.
- 31) nei-yu wai-huan (內憂外患): inside disorder and outside calamity.
- 32) nung-chan (農戰): agriculture and war; farmer and soldier.
- 33) Pa (霸): hegemony; hegemonism.
- 34) Pa Tao (霸道): the way by force, rule or control with force, the way of hegemony.
- 35) Pai-Ho (捭闔): open and close, direct and indirect, positive and negative, yang and yin.
- 36) Shang-T'ung (尚同): Universal Equality.
- 37) sui-pu-chung, pu-yuan-yi (雖不中, 不遠矣): Although he might not have reached his goals exactly, it is not far from the target.
- 38) Szu-hsiang (思想): the thought; the concept.
- 39) ta-kuo-pa-chuan-chu-yi (大國霸權主義): big-power hegemonism or the big-nation hegemony.
- 40) Ta-T'ung (大同): Great Harmony.

- 41) Tao (道): the Truth, the Harmony, the Order, the Way, the natural law.
- 42) teh (德): the virtue, the goodness.
- 43) The Three Chins (三晉): It refers to the three states, Han, Chao, and Wei which are fragments of the former Chin state.
- 44) t'ien-hsia (天下): all-under-heaven; the world.
- 45) t'ien jen ho yi (天人合一): the union of man and nature.
- 46) tsun-wang jang-i (尊王攘夷): respecting the central authority of Chou monarch and protecting the Chinese confederation from the barbarian invasion.
- 47) tuo-k'ai-hao-shen-ti-chien-she-she-hui-chu-i-tsu-kuo (多快好省地建設社會主義祖國): aiming high and achieving greater, quicker, better and more economical results in building socialism.
- 48) Wang Tao (王道): the way by virtue, rule or control with virtue, the way of kingship.
- 49) Wu Pa (五霸): the five hegemonic leaders.
- 50) wu ti-kuo wai-huan che kuo heng wang (無敵國外患者國恆亡): A state without an adversary and external threat is apt to perish.
- 51) wu-wei (無為): inaction, do-nothing.
- 52) Yang (陽): the male, the active element, the challenge, the form or heaven, the direct way or force.
- 53) yi (義): justice, righteousness.
- 54) Yi (易): the change, the dialectics.
- 55) Yin (陰): the female, the passive element, the response, the matter or earth, the indirect way or force.
- 56) yuan-chiao chin-kung (遠交近攻): associate with the afar and/or big state and attack the near and/or small state.

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

A leader is best  
When people barely know that he exists,  
Not so good when people obey and acclaim him,  
Worst when they despise him.  
"Fail to honor people,  
They fail to honor you;"  
But of a good leader, who talks little,  
When his work is done, his aim fulfilled,  
They will all say, "We did this ourselves".<sup>1</sup>

Lao Tzu, "Tao Te Ching", Chapter 17

.....  
Rivers and mountains are beautiful  
and made heroes bow and compete to catch the girl -  
lovely earth.  
Yet the emperors Shih Huang and Wu Ti  
were barely able to write.  
The first emperors of the Tang and Sung dynasties  
were crude.  
Genghis Khan, man of his epoch  
and favored by heaven,  
knew only how to hunt the great eagle.  
They are all gone.  
Only today are we men of feeling.<sup>2</sup>

Mao Tse-tung, "Snow" (Feb., 1936)

"In the soundless calligraphy of Chinese ideograms, lucidly  
arranged, he records his vision of nature and man. Old and new China  
come together in his fresh poems in the traditional style."<sup>3</sup>

(Professor Willis Barnstone on Mao's poems.)

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I. ACADEMIC CONTROVERSIES ON  
CHINESE CULTURAL CONTINUITY

China is an old country with a long history of civilization. Throughout past history there have been a great number of drastic social changes and ideological breakthroughs. Within this dialectical process of development there existed several major fluctuations, such as the breakdown of Chou feudalism succeeded by the classical periods of Spring and Autumn and of the Warring States (771-221 B.C.), the dictatorial Empire of Ch'in, the turmoil of periods of barbarian invasions (approximately 300-580 A.D. and 900-1150 A.D.), the importation of foreign Buddhism, the barbarian dynasties of the Mongols and Manchus, and the modern Western military and ideological challenges. The impact of Western challenges and modern imperialism and colonialism on Chinese life and ideology have been particularly tremendous. They have consequently motivated the great response of Chinese nationalism in collaboration with traditional concepts of internationalist thought.

For the Chinese, the adoption since 1949 of a foreign ideology, Marxism-Leninism, is regarded as an extraordinary action. It replaced an ideology--the blend of Confucianism, Taoism, and Legalism, which had dominated Chinese history for two thousand years. Under the influence of this new ideology, today's China has been profoundly changed during the past two decades in all phases of life and society. In the light of Chinese history this has been a major landmark or historical turning-point. Not surprisingly, the current academic study of China has been controversial, both in its various and conflicting approaches and in its differing views as to the true nature of political and cultural developments in China.

In a general review, there are four schools of academic approaches

studying Communist China and its ideology today. Professor James Chieh Hsiung briefly describes them as: "(1) the 'complete break' theory, which denies any continuity whatsoever with the past; (2) the 'recurrence of history' theory, which views the Communist regime as the latest turn of the dynastic cycle; (3) the 'textual study' approach, which compares Mao's writings with those of Marx and earlier Marxist writers, and the actual conditions of the Chinese revolution with the basic tenets of orthodox Marxism-Leninism; and (4) the 'originality' approach, which is closely akin to textual study and seeks to determine whether 'Maoism' contains original elements or merely rephrases earlier Marxist-Leninist positions".<sup>4</sup>

In fact, the key questions of this subject are: (1) Is there any cultural or ideological linkage between old China and new China?; (2) if there is, to what extent has the traditional legacy influenced contemporary Chinese life, and in which fields of political and social activities and public policies is there a persistent traditional continuity? To answer these questions we need an over-all and comprehensive study of China, not only of her traditional concepts but also of her contemporary policies and attitudes within a dynamic framework. Within this general framework, this dissertation is particularly devoted to the subject of traditional concepts which may have affected current Chinese perceptions of modern world order and China's foreign policy.

#### A) The Case for the Continuity of Chinese Culture

One group of scholars, including John K. Fairbank, C.P. FitzGerald, Mark Mancall, O. Edmund Clubb, and Robert S. Elegant, have argued the continuity of Chinese culture and the Chinese ways of life which could hardly be disrupted in light of its profound role in the age-old Chinese civilization. They regard the contemporary Chinese Communist revolutionary

movement and reforms as similar to those of past Chinese history. Current Chinese policies in domestic and foreign areas not only have certain linkages to the traditional concepts and heritages, but simultaneously they reflect uniquely Chinese responses to modern Western military, economic and ideological challenges.

Particularly in the field of international politics and in the Chinese perception of world order, many scholars feel that the traditional Chinese concept of world order does survive in the current Chinese view of world politics. To a certain extent, China has been following the traditional model in dealing with foreign relations and the world political system.<sup>5</sup>

However, this group of scholars' study of Chinese communism has its limitations, which perhaps might apply to most of the China observers. The term "traditional", to which they refer, is limited only to the school of Confucianism in general, and to a limited historical period from the Han dynasty to the Ch'ing dynasty. In fact, they mainly ignore, in their historical study and interpretation, other prominent schools of thought such as Taoism, Mohism and Legalism, which were especially important during the contending Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods prior to the Ch'in dynasty.<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, their studies are handicapped by the lack of an overall, dynamic view of current Chinese communism and the new phases of China. The drastic and revolutionary changes and reforms of the past two decades have made it very difficult for this group of scholars to argue their case convincingly. Alternatively, their interpretation tends to fall into the "recurrence of history" theory which overemphasizes continuity from the pre-Communist past and ignores new problems and their resolution in a new age. They argue that the development of Chinese history

is cyclical, and thus that the modern Chinese Communist movement is still exactly in the traditional pattern of cultural continuity. This view is particularly apparent in the study of Chinese concepts of world order.

B) The Case against the Continuity of Chinese Culture

In contrast, another group of scholars tends to divide Chinese culture and history into sharply separated parts: the pre-Communist and the Communist periods, which they regard as completely unrelated in content. This view particularly rejects a relationship between the traditional Chinese concept of world order and Communist China's concepts of foreign relations. The representatives of this group include Benjamin Schwartz, Albert Fuerwerker, and others.<sup>7</sup> They argue that to cope with the new challenges and conditions in modern times the Chinese Communists adopted whatever was practical and realistic. The old concepts and traditions are simply obsolete and out of date as guides for dealing with modern problems. Particularly, they treat the traditional Chinese concept of suzerainty and the tribute system in foreign relations as obsolete in the modern international legal and political system.

Objecting to this view, Professor James Chieh Hsiung comments: "The 'complete break' view is too simplistic: it overestimates the Communists' ability to wipe out everything 'old' and create a 'new' nation totally divorced from its past cultural matrix."<sup>8</sup> It is important to note that a nation with so deep-rooted a culture and so ancient and highly developed a civilization as China's would find it impossible to discard its traditions entirely within such a short period of time.

Moreover, the "complete break" theory has defects similar to those of the "recurrence of history" theory due to limitations in the scope and the length of the historical period taken into account in this approach to

the study of China. This inadequacy consequently results in an isolated viewpoint, often mere blind speculation on current Chinese questions. As Professor Hsiung comments, "Anyone attempting to understand Communist China without an adequate knowledge of its political culture, therefore, is like the fabled blind man trying to 'see' the whole elephant by feeling its trunk or leg".<sup>9</sup> In addition, in the study of comparative politics of East and West, some scholars tend to measure different Eastern social systems and their ways of life on the basis of Western criteria. Obviously, the socio-political realities of those countries are thus seriously distorted and incomprehensible. This is particularly true of China when certain scholars attempt to evaluate the Chinese political system through the psycho-cultural approach.

#### C) The Continuity of Chinese Culture: Another View

In accordance with an ancient Chinese philosophic principle, the Book of Changes says: "When there comes the end, change is needed. By change there is a way (ch'iung-tse-pian, pian-tse-t'ung)". During the past, whenever there have been many crucial issues and obstacles blocking the process of Chinese historical development, it was often this idea which proved the key concept which wiped out the difficulties and paved the way for China's cultural consistency and continuity.

Obviously, the issues of modern times are different from those of the ancient not only as to conditions and circumstances but also in fundamental nature. In order to meet new problems and conditions, the ancient Chinese civilization has been in a process of transformation in the beginning of twentieth century, and particularly since the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949. But certain legacies do survive radical change. The adoption of modern Marxism-Leninism by the



Chinese Communists may be simply an attempt to reinforce their ancient wisdom to cope with the new problems and issues of today. It is believed that past and present, old and new, and Chinese and Western are actually interrelated in a complex, blended organic whole composed of human intelligence. Thus Mao Tse-tung gives as his general principle on China's overall policy: "The ancient wisdom is for present use, and the foreign knowledge is for Chinese use. (ku-wei-chin-yung, yang-wei-chung-yung)"<sup>10</sup> On the point of the consistency and continuity of Chinese history, Mao Tse-tung also points out that Chinese history, from the age of Confucius down to the modern age of Sun Yat-sen, can not be chopped into pieces. It must be given an overall and critical study to its development.<sup>11</sup>

Accordingly, Mao's principle is eclectic and dynamic in adopting whatever is good for China. This view of synthesis is consistent with the traditional Chinese intellectual spirit. Similar to the great synthesizer of antiquity, Hsun Tzu, Mao blends traditional Chinese concepts and teaching with modern thought, Marxism-Leninism, into a practical doctrine for the welfare of the Chinese people of today. As Professor James Chieh Hsiung points out, "instead of debating whether or not Chinese Communism is unique, one should examine the extent to which old and new, Chinese and Marxist, are compatible and complementary, the ways in which they have been blended, and the evolution of Mao's thought over time, in response to changing circumstances".<sup>12</sup> It is this belief that the author holds to be the correct view of the continuity of Chinese culture.

A careful and comprehensive study of both today's Chinese Communism and of classical Chinese concepts has further reinforced this belief, disclosing that a number of elements of the Chinese cultural legacy in many broad areas are similar to the tenets or modern Marxism-Leninism. For instance, the traditional and communist Chinese perception of world order

and foreign policy is one of the major areas of similarity, a blending of principles which has substantial impact on the entire current world political system. Pursuing his observation, Professor Hsiung further commented:

Throughout Chinese intellectual history, value has always been placed on synthesis rather than originality, which is essentially a concern of the West. Confucius specifically disclaimed originality and cast himself in the role of a great synthesizer. No Chinese thinker has departed from that tradition, not even Mao. Chinese Communist propaganda praises Mao only for his "gift" of creative "development" and "application" of Marxism-Leninism.<sup>13</sup>

It is the author's belief that in order to obtain a comprehensive view and complete picture of Chinese culture the scope of study of classical Chinese concepts must be broadened to include all contending schools of thought during the classical periods which actually contributed to the basic themes of Chinese civilization. Most of the China scholars have narrowed their studies to Confucianism only. On the other hand, the period of history studied should commence at least with the classical ages of Spring and Autumn and the Warring States and continue down to modern times so as to include the full content of Chinese history. Particularly, in the field of international relations, most of the modern China scholars have regarded the Chinese concept of suzerainty and the tribute system after the Han dynasty as the only authentic theory of Chinese traditional international relations. Therefore, they are inevitably faced with difficulty in interpreting the spirit of current Chinese foreign policies in light of the modern world system and power politics. As a matter of fact, certain conceptual elements which have contributed to the formation of current China's foreign policy could be attributable to the various contending thoughts of classical schools in the periods of Spring and Autumn and Warring States. For example, in their writings and speeches Mao Tse-tung and his associate leaders have often cited the ancient Chinese teachings

and used quotations from leading ancient philosophers or eminent figures such as Lao Tzu, Confucius, Hsun Tzu, Meng Tzu, Sun Tzu, Mo Tzu, Han Fei Tzu, and others to support their various views on current issues. As an illustration, in a recent meeting with Dr. Yang Cheng-ning, a Nobel prize winner in physics, Mao Tse-tung has compared the concept of dialectical materialism to similar principles of classical Chinese thinkers such as Hsun Tzu, Kung-sun Lung, and Han Fei Tzu, to illustrate the consistency of historical evolution on this subject.<sup>14</sup>

Such considerations as these emphasize the important influence of classical Chinese thought on current Chinese politics and foreign policy.

## II. METHODOLOGY, SCOPE, TECHNIQUE OF STUDY AND ORGANIZATION

### A) Methodology

The methodology employed of this study is the traditional or historical approach. In recent years, there have been a number of new approaches in studying political phenomena. However, it is probably true that the historical approach is still the one most used to study China, particularly on such subjects as the traditional Chinese concept of world order, classical concepts and philosophers, and conceptual heritage. The major value of the historical approach is perhaps its usefulness in providing a theoretical consistency between the cultural background and current circumstances.

The basic methodological feature of this study is its use of historical and cultural approaches in a prescriptive analysis. Throughout the study certain generalizations and evaluations are drawn on the basis of subjective and personal intellectual perceptions supported with histo-

rical facts and documents.

B) Scope of Study

The scope of this study contains three major fields of political science, that is, international relations, comparative politics and political theory, which have been closely associated in the content. Particularly, it brings elements of the ancient and the present, the Chinese and the Western, into a synthesis whole. However, it gives primary emphasis to Chinese perceptions of the world order, past and present, and to Chinese responses in current foreign policies. Attention to the West is mainly focused on general situations in the modern world politics, various foreign policies of major powers and the role of the Third World nations in international relations. In addition, as a part of the world system, especially in the recent years, the functions and roles of the United Nations and international law are also treated in the light of Chinese perceptions and attitudes. In general, this research involves a broad topic, and a wide range of study.

C) Technique of Study

Regarding the technique of study, the dimensional method is employed. In other words, both the vertical and horizontal analyses are conducted in a chronological (historical) sequence and arrangement and a prescriptive (theoretical) treatment. In each chapter, especially in dealing with the contending schools of thought during the classical periods, a brief analysis of historical background and conceptual heritage is provided for more elaboration and better generalization. Some quantitative tables, historical maps and theoretical diagrams are also provided in order to give a better understanding of the study.

D) Source of Materials

The materials used in this study are basically from primary sources either in Chinese text or in English translation. Particularly, the discussion of the classical contending schools of thought and philosophy depends heavily on the Chinese original works. In the contemporary part of the study, official documents and statements, including the original works of leading personalities have been used and quoted. Secondary sources and scholarly works have also been used and quoted in order to compare or elaborate the author's views or generalizations in this study.

E) Organization

This dissertation consists of five chapters.

Chapter One provides an introductory analysis of the current controversial views and approaches on studying Chinese Communism, including its ideology, domestic reforms and socialist constructions, and foreign policies, in the light of China's traditional culture. The author presents his belief that certain traditional legacies do survive in current Chinese politics and in the political system, particularly their concepts of world order and foreign policy. It is this belief which constitutes the general theme and spirit of this work.

Chapter Two deals with the classical Chinese concepts of international politics and their general pattern of development. Vertically, a diplomatic and political history of the classical periods of Spring and Autumn and Warring States is presented in order to explain the evolution of the political thoughts of the various contending schools in the context of the external environments. Horizontally, the various contending schools of thought and their leading representative thoughts associated with the field of international relations are discussed.

Chapter Three basically provides a discussion of contemporary Chinese concepts of world order and China's foreign policy. The traditional Chinese concept of suzerainty and the tribute system of international relations (pre-20th century) is analysed in the light of China's current position in the world politics so as to explain her perceptions and foreign policies towards the two superpowers and the Third World nations. This chapter is divided into two parts as far as China's foreign policy is concerned. These two elements are the Chinese concept of internationalism and Chinese nationalism, which have been actually interrelated, each reinforcing the other. In this part of the study we find that there are parallels between the traditional concept of internationalism and the current Chinese ideal of world communism, as well as in the implementation of these concepts. Chinese nationalism is the immediate goal of current China's foreign policy. Therefore, China's attitudes towards the two superpowers, the Third World nations, international organization and international law are the major subjects presented for theoretical analysis in this chapter.

Chapter Four concentrates on the various approaches employed by current Chinese Communist leaders to implement their long-range and immediate goals in foreign policy. Taught by their traditional thought and reinforced by their modern revolutionary experiences, the Chinese today have utilized the concepts of "ideology", "nation-building", the "people's war", and "the balance of power" as basic approaches for realizing their foreign policy in the current international political system. In analysing these various approaches, their conceptual roots and roles in modern times have also been treated in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding.

Chapter Five is a general summary of the basic trend in the evolution or development of Chinese concepts of international politics. Furthermore, on the basis of the overall study of both Chinese concepts of international politics and current Chinese foreign policy, some final tentative speculations and theoretical generalizations as to Chinese foreign policy are presented for a perspective on the future role of China in the world system. Concluding comments attempt to give a theoretical consistency to Chinese foreign policy in the light of China's deep-rooted traditions and culture.

Notes of Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

<sup>1</sup>Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, Chapter 17; for English translation, see Witter Bynner, The Way of Life According to Laotzu, (New York: Capricorn Books, 1962), pp.34-35.

<sup>2</sup>Willis Barnstone and Ko Ching-po, The Poems of Mao Tse-tung (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), p.75.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p.25.

<sup>4</sup>James Chieh Hsiung, Ideology and Practice: the Evolution of Chinese Communism (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), pp.9-10.

<sup>5</sup>To this view, for details see, C. P. FitzGerald, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969); Mark Mancall, "The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.349 (September 1963), pp.14-26; John Cranmer Byng, "The Chinese View of Their Place in the World: An Historical Perspective", The China Quarterly, Vol.53 (January/March 1973), pp.67-79. There are also relevant articles in John K. Fairbank (ed.), The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968).

<sup>6</sup>So far as to the author's knowledge, there are only few scholars such as O. Edmund Clubb, James Chieh Hsiung and Robert S. Elegant, who have discussed some about the influence of various classical schools of thought on Mao's idea other than Confucianism. Even so, however, their treatments on this subject is still very limited. For details of their studies, see Robert S. Elegant, The Center of the World: Communism and the Mind of China (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), Revised Edition, pp.208-213; O. Edmund Clubb, Twentieth Century China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), Second Edition, pp.302-306; James Chieh Hsiung, Ideology and Practice, pp.143-147.

<sup>7</sup>Particularly, there are groups of anti-communist Chinese scholars associated with Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalist regime holding this point of view, and who have had it publicized in government propaganda. They claim that the Chinese Communists have betrayed Chinese culture and traditions by adopting foreign Marxism-Leninism as a national ideology rather than traditional Confucianism. They further charge that the current radical political, economic and social reforms being attempted on Chinese mainland are destroying the traditional culture, political system and way of life of the people. Ironically, for example, when the practice of traditional acupuncture in Chinese mainland became popular and known to the world, particularly in the United States, the Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan began to study acupuncture and tried to avoid talking about the practice and accomplishment of their fellow people on the Chinese mainland.

<sup>8</sup>James Chieh Hsiung, Ideology and Practice, p.10.



<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p.4.

<sup>10</sup> This phrase is a popular quotation of Mao Tse-tung in recent years appeared in various official statements and periodicals such as Red Flag (Hung Ch'i) and other publications.

<sup>11</sup> Mao Tse-tung stated this point when he discussed about Chinese history in his writings. For instance, see "Reform Our Study" (May 1941), Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), Vol. III, p. 22.

<sup>12</sup> James Chieh Hsiung, Ideology and Practice, p.11.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p.11.

<sup>14</sup> For Mao's meeting with Dr. Yang Cheng-ning, see official news statement (July 17, 1973) in Peking Review (July 20, 1973), p.1. Mao's referring to the classical Chinese thinkers on dialectical materialism was reported by Dr. Yang Cheng-ning in an interview with a group of Chinese students at the State University of New York at Stony Brook on August 21, 1973. The text of interview was published on Chun Pao (Mass Newspaper), September 3, 1973, Issue No.52, p.7. Chun Pao is a biweekly newsletter published in New York City and circulated among Chinese community in the United States.

CHAPTER TWO  
THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS  
IN PRE-CH'IN DYNASTIES

I. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND POLITICS  
IN THE CHOU DYNASTY

It is generally accepted by Chinese historians that Chinese history can be traced back to the existence of Huang Ti (the Yellow Emperor) who has been credited with fighting successfully against the barbarians and with the establishment of the empire of the Chinese people. But from recent archeological research on inscribed bones which have been unearthed on the site where once stood a capital of the Shang Dynasty, or Yin, it appears instead that the Shang Dynasty was the oldest Chinese empire of which there is scientific evidence. This dynasty existed sometime between the seventeenth and the thirteenth century B.C., more exact dates being yet unobtainable.<sup>1</sup>

The Chou Dynasty, which dated from 1122 B.C., followed the Shang Dynasty. It developed a great civilization and left many historical records. Wen Wang was the founder of the Chou Dynasty, and after him Wu Wang is thought to have established his capital near Ch'ang An (present Sian, Shensi Province). Wu Wang's brother, Chou Kung, was said to have consolidated the power of the dynasty and to have set up a feudal system in the empire and an administrative organization of the realm on a pattern which for generations remained the model.<sup>2</sup>

Yu Wang was reported by tradition to have been hopelessly weak, and the corruption of his reign contributed to the decline of the Chou Dynasty.

At the beginning of the next reign, 771-720 B.C., the weakness of the Chou was made evident to the world when the central Chou monarchy was defeated by insurgent feudal lords and outer barbarians from West Jong, and forced to move from Hao (near Sian), the Valley of the Wei River, to Loyang, further east. The dynasty prior to the removal of the capital is known as the Western Chou and after that event as the Eastern Chou. This change marked the sharp decline of Chou authority and in the following era, known as the Ch'un Ch'iu (Spring and Autumn) period, 771-483 B.C., and the Chan Kuo (Warring States) period, 403-221 B.C., there developed a system of large independent states, somewhat like a modern type of international political system.<sup>3</sup> The international system and politics of these periods are examined below.

A) The Ch'un-Ch'iu (Spring and Autumn) Period, 771-483 B.C.

(1) Boundaries and System of the Western and Eastern Chou.

During the Ch'un-Ch'iu period, Chinese civilization and the Chinese political system were extended eastward through the present Shantung Province, westward into Szechwan Province, and especially southward into the Yangtze Valley. Within these boundaries there seems to have been a closer approach to a uniformity of Chinese culture although variations were found, especially in the frontier states. Generally speaking, besides some minor contacts with the surrounding barbarians, the Chou political system developed in isolation from the rest of the world.

Under the feudal system of the Western Chou period, the number of feudal states ranged from 130 to 1,800, of various sizes, subservient to the central Chou Monarchy.<sup>4</sup> The Chou rulers held the title of Wang or king. Their individual vassals bore one of five specific titles: those of kung, hou, po, tzu, nan, corresponding to the Western titles of duke, marquis, earl, viscount, and baron respectively.<sup>5</sup> The structure of the system was

hierarchical and most feudal lords were dependent upon the Chou monarchy for lands, subsidies, and protection against each other. However, due to the difficulty of transportation and communication among the feudal units and the development of internal administrative mechanisms, the nobles enjoyed a considerable autonomy within their own states. They maintained their own armies, created sub-vassals and fiefs, conducted construction projects, operated the tax system, and controlled many other internal affairs.

In theory, the feudal states were not supposed to expand their territory at the expense of their neighbors without royal sanction. But actually in some cases they fought wars with each other over territorial spoils. In the Spring and Autumn period, due to the weakness of the Chou central monarchy, the strength and independence of feudal lords grew rapidly at the expense of the central Chou authority.<sup>6</sup> The Chou monarchs were unable to prevent the eventual growth of power among the many vassals who had succeeded in building self-sufficient states. This pattern of strong vassals and weak central power developed markedly during the period of the Western Chou.

By the beginning of the eighth century B.C., the rulers of the vassal states were already able to fight against each other and even against the Chou monarchy itself. Some of them started to call themselves kings (wang) rather than dukes (kung).<sup>7</sup> Ironically, in 707 B.C. the Chou monarch's army was defeated by one of the vassals.<sup>8</sup> The system was gradually turned into one characterized by the central monarchy having to rely for its prestige and power on those theoretically subordinate to it. The pattern of dependency had become reversed. The central authority of the Chou came to have only a certain symbolic and ceremonial importance indicating of the theoretical unity of China.

Furthermore, rudimentary forms of nationalism grew up within the independent states, replacing the popular patriotism toward the village

Map 1

The Period of Spring and Autumn: Political  
Boundaries of China about 560 B.C.,  
Showing the Spheres of Influence  
of Ch'u and Chin



Source: Hsu Cho-yun, Ancient China in Transition: Analysis of Social Mobility, 722-222 B.C. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), p.4.

chiefs and the central "Son of Heaven" of the earlier period.<sup>9</sup> The differences in dialects, customs, ways of life and cults among the states began to be recognized and emphasized by the people while the concept of nationalism was quite primitive. Many famous and capable men had served as prime ministers or generals in several different states. The development of nationalism made it easy for the rulers in the Warring States period to organize peasant militias and armies to fight their wars for them with the feeling that they were struggling for the sovereignty, independence, and honor of their own states, not just as a duty to a feudal lord. (Map 1)

Among the hundreds of states in the period of Spring and Autumn, there were about twelve states which were important in international politics. They were Lu (魯), Ch'i (齊), Chin (晉), Ch'in (秦), Ch'u (楚), Sung (宋), Wei (魏), Cheng (鄭), Ch'en (陳), Ch'ai (蔡), Wu (吳), and Yueh (越).<sup>10</sup> However, only five of these states were classified as great powers and played the role of leadership in China during this period.

Generally speaking, there were about eleven barbarian groups outside the "Middle Kingdom", a term which referred to a culture center rather than to the center of a race.<sup>11</sup> They were called Bird Yi, Lo, Jong, Mountain Jong, North Jong, West Jong, Ti, Chin Man, Yueh Tribe, P'o, and Pa.<sup>12</sup> Frequently, these barbarians were great threats to the cultural center. Traditionally, the Chinese term "nei-yu-wai-huan" (inside disorder and outside calamity) expressed the close relationship between internal strength and external order. One could not long survive without the other; that is, "when the barbarians were not submissive abroad, rebels might more easily arise within".<sup>13</sup> Thus, all rulers through the succession of historical dynasties have been forced to deal with foreign affairs in accordance with this theory in order to confirm their reign in China.

Table 1

The Frequency of Wars in the Ch'un-Ch'iu Period

Years B.C.	War score in each year of decade*										Total war score	Peaceful years
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
722-713 .....	4.5	4	0	11	11.5	4	1.5	0	1.5	13	51	128
712-703 .....	7.5	0	2.5	1	2.5	4.5	3	4	4	5	34	
702-693 .....	4	1.5	4.5	8.5	6	5	6	5.5	2	0	43	
692-683 .....	1.5	4	1.5	6	3	0	2.5	2	10.5	2	33	87
682-673 .....	2.5	1.5	6	5	6	0	2.5	7.5	1.5	2	31.5	
672-663 .....	0	0	1.5	0	6.5	0	8.5	1.5	1.5	0	19.5	
662-653 .....	1	4	4	8.5	4.5	3	22	3.5	15	2	67.5	170
652-643 .....	1.5	2	3.5	5.5	1.5	2.5	1.5	17	3.5	4	41.5	
642-633 .....	10	6	3	10.5	9	4	4	7	12.5	7	61	
632-623 .....	18.5	0	5.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	4	7	11	5	69	167.5
622-613 .....	3.5	0	4.5	2	9.5	3.5	4.5	3.5	1.5	3	37.5	
612-603 .....	6	3	8	0	16.5	9	7	5	4	4.5	63	
602-593 .....	4	6	13.5	9	6.5	7.5	5	4	3.5	2	61	191
592-583 .....	0	3	1	10	11.5	3.5	0	10	12.5	7	58.5	
582-573 .....	7.5	9	0	1.5	9	1.5	3	14	22	7	74.5	
572-563 .....	16	7.5	3.5	5.5	12.5	2.5	2	4.5	14	17.5	85.5	193
562-553 .....	21	4.5	2	14.5	3.5	12	6.5	2	4	1.5	71.5	
552-543 .....	1	0	4.5	21.5	8.5	7	0	0	0	0	41	
542-533 .....	0	3	0	0	11	11	2.5	0	2	2	31.5	80.5
532-523 .....	1.5	2	5.5	3	0	2	1.5	3.5	1	4.5	24.5	
522-513 .....	0	5	3	9	3.5	0	2	2	0	0	21.5	
512-503 .....	1.5	1	1.5	0	2.5	1.5	21.5	5	5.5	4	41	134
502-493 .....	10	2	2	0	2	5	6	3.5	7.5	1.5	39.5	
492-483 .....	5.5	2.5	4	8.5	8.5	8.5	6	11	3	2	50.5	
482-473 .....	7.5	2	10	0	10.5	1.5	3	1.5	0	1.5	37.5	52.5
472-461 .....	2	4.5	0	3.5	3	0	0	0	2		15	
259-year total .....											1,211.5	38

\*The "war score" is calculated as follows: In any single campaign each of the thirteen major powers involved is computed as one point, while each small state involved is computed as one-half point. The yearly score is the total points of all the campaigns in that year. The thirteen major powers are Ch'i, Ch'in, Chiu, Ch'u, Ch'en, Cheng, Lu, Sung, Ts'ai, Ts'ao, Wei, Wu, and Yen.

Source: Hsu Cho-yun, Ancient China in Transition: An Analysis of Social Mobility, 722-222 B.C. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), Table 5.

At the beginning of Spring and Autumn period, the international scene was a "one-power-predominance" of Ch'i state, the first hegemonial leader, and then an international system of bipolarity between Chin bloc and Ch'u bloc. However, this system of bipolarity during the period of peace persisted under an atmosphere of cold war for about forty years. Then, the system of bipolarity was gradually turned into one of multipolarity when Chin failed to deter Ch'u's attack Ch'ai in 506 B.C.<sup>14</sup> Along with the decline of Chin, Ch'i grew stronger and Wu in the South emerged as a great power with the capability to deter Ch'u.

The end of the Spring and Autumn period was marked by the internal confusion of Chin and its splitting into fragments: the three states of Han, Wei, and Chao.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, the sphere of the Chou system was expanded greatly and the system was characterized by a greater diffusion of power as a result of the constant fighting. A system of multi-polarity emerged and the power centers increased numerously. In general, there were seven major powers in the international system. The struggle for power among those great centers began the period of Warring States. (Table 1)

(2) The Foreign Policy of Five Great Powers (Wu Pa 五霸)  
and the Politics and Diplomacy of the League.

Scholarly attempts to identify the five Leaders of Hegemony, Wu Pa, has resulted in controversy. Consensus is that the five Pa were Duke Huan of Ch'i, Duke Wen of Chin, Duke Mu of Ch'in, Duke Hsiang of Sung, and King Chuang of Ch'u. Strictly speaking, only Duke Huan, Duke Wen, and King Chuang were the three most important with power enough to lead all the other states in the Chou system.

However, among the five leading powers of hegemony, only Ch'i and Chin were regarded as the successful and legitimate leaders in the Chou system. Others were treated as barbarians, which included the western



barbarian, Ch'in, and the southern barbarian Ch'u. Here a brief look at the foreign policies of the great powers is in order.

1) Duke Huan of Ch'i, Duke Wen of Chin and Their Descendants.

a) Long-range Policy Goal: Like all the other states, the national goal of Ch'i and Chin was mastery over their contemporary states which included enlarging their territories through the annexation of the small states.

b) General Principles of Foreign Policy: Both Ch'i and Chin were guided by a general principle which was termed "respecting the central authority of the Chou monarch and protecting Chinese confederation from barbarian invasion" (tsun-wang jang-i 尊王攘夷). In fact, this principle was more a technique for them to attract the other states under their leadership through a legitimate approach.

Through the whole period of Spring and Autumn, the Chinese confederation of Chou was constantly bothered by outside barbarian invasions, such as Ti and San Jung in the north, Ch'in and Western Jung in the west, and Ch'u, Wu, Yueh and other barbarians in the south.<sup>16</sup> So, it was naturally an urgent task for the great powers like Ch'i and Chin to unite the other small states for a self-defense system as well as for the garrison of the Chou Monarchy. Confucius awarded the credit to Duke Huan and his minister Kuan Chung for saving China from barbarian invasions, and said:

Kuan Chung acted as prime minister to the Duke Huan, made him leader of all the princes, and united and rectified the whole kingdom. Down to the present day, the people enjoy the gifts which he conferred. But for Kuan Chung, we should now be wearing our hair unbound, and the lappets of our coats buttoning on the left side.<sup>17</sup>

c) Strategy of Foreign Policy: The word "hegemony" or Pa is based on the concept of power instead of virtue, or just pretending virtue as the sugarcoat. Ch'i and Chin were no exceptions. They took advantage of their leading position to control and dictate the small states who were already

weak in the name of the Chou Monarchy. The Discourse of Warring States (Chan Kuo Ts'e) stated:

In the past time, Duke Huan had led all nobles into leagues for nine times under the title of King Hsiang of Chou authority. By respecting the monarch, he established his leadership. Through the activities of nine conventions Duke Huan was respected by the other states no less than what the Chou monarch received.<sup>18</sup>

To form a league and alliance were also useful for increasing their national prestige for leadership purpose. Both Ch'i and Chin were very active in pursuing this strategy. Diplomatic contacts among the states during the period of Spring and Autumn were frequent and resulted in alliances, treaty organizations, leagues, conventions, and conferences. In the entire period, there were 206 times such meetings according to historical records.<sup>19</sup> The politics of league and alliance diplomacy was conducted variously as part of a struggle for power and leadership; for self-defense, independence, survival and security; in connection with warfare and invasion; for mutual assistance; in connection with peace settlements; and for other social and economic reasons.<sup>20</sup>

The use the military force has always been an instrument of national power. This was true also for Ch'i and Chin. However, based on Sun Tzu's principle of war, they tried to limit the use of force to the minimum and to utilize political power to the maximum. During Duke Huan period, for example, there were nine peace conventions but only four military conferences.<sup>21</sup>

## 2) The Foreign Policy of Ch'u, Ch'in, Wu and Yueh

The main goal embodied in the foreign policies of these states, especially Ch'u, was that of conquering the Chou confederation and establishing their leadership and hegemony. Since they were regarded as the barbarians, they could not take advantage of the policy of "respecting the central monarch and repelling the barbarian" to dictate to their fellow

states as Ch'i and Chin did. What they could do was only to maximize their diplomatic manipulation, through which their power and prestige could be increased in order to compete with the Ch'i or Chin bloc. Throughout this period, Ch'u was in effect a great power which, along with its satellites, constituted a collective defense system against the legitimate Chin bloc, somewhat analogous to bloc politics between the U.S. and Soviet groups during the 1950's.

In ancient China as well as in contemporary times, the middle and small states, which are important components of a bloc, have been the targets of the foreign policies of the big powers. During the Spring and Autumn period, the small states such as Ch'en, Ch'ai, Hsu, and especially Cheng were geographically located among the great powers--Ch'i, Chin, and Ch'u-- and were the buffer zone of the two blocs, Chin and Ch'u.<sup>22</sup> Through almost entire period the immediate goal of Ch'u's foreign policy was gaining the allegiance of these buffer states. For the buffer states, it was naturally the question of selecting Chin or Ch'u as allies since neutrality was impossible. Generally speaking, Ch'en, Ch'ai and Hsu were allied with Ch'u and Sung and Lu and Wei with Chin although they sometimes shifted around. Cheng was between these two blocs and could tip the balance of power although she herself was not a big power. As a balancer, Cheng, therefore, became the target of military, as well as political, struggles among the great powers. In addition, in a weaker strategic position than Cheng's, Ch'en was an immediate step-stone for Ch'u to gain Cheng.<sup>23</sup> For one hundred and twenty eight years, Cheng suffered in the power struggle among the great powers both politically and militarily, including the most important battles of Chao-ling, Ch'eng-p'u, and Yen-ling during the Spring and Autumn period.<sup>24</sup> Like the present international situation, the buffer states or the Third World states have always tried to conduct the policy of non-alienment but in vain.

In general, during the Spring and Autumn period, most of the great powers which aimed for leadership operated the so called policy of "allying the afar and/or big state and attacking the near and/or small state (yuan-chiao chin-kung 遠交近攻)" and through the use of diplomatic manipulation. The politics of conference and alliance (hui-meng cheng-chih 會盟政治) was very popular. This diplomatic intercourse enriched the scene of international politics among the states and a rudimentary body of international law was founded through the interstate customs, principles and rules.

### 3) Rules and International Law of the System of the Chou Monarchy.

In his study, Professor Shih-Tsai Chen pointed out that during the Spring and Autumn period there had already been the concept of the equality of states and national independence, which have been a basic principle of modern international law. Under the name of "li" (禮), a great number of rules were followed by Chinese feudal states in their intercourses within the system.<sup>25</sup> However, these rules of li did not apply to the barbarian states which were outside the Chinese family of states, since they had been considered as culturally inferior and, therefore, could not be treated equally. Professor Chen suggested several facts as evidence to support this point in his study.<sup>26</sup>

First, regardless of thier official rank, size, population, wealth, military strength, or political influence, all the feudal lords were equally addressed as "chun" (君), or sovereign, in interstate intercourse. Sometimes they even addressed each other as brothers.<sup>27</sup>

Second, all the feudal states were of equal sovereignty one with another and "equally independent one from another". "In law, none of the feudal lords was subject to the jurisdiction of any other of them." Under this principle the concept of diplomatic immunities found its rational basis

in ancient China.<sup>28</sup>

Third, no matter whether they were great, middle or small powers, all the feudal states with similar status in the Chinese Chou system were equal in rights and obligations under the rules of international law. They were equal in the awards of arbitration protected by the law and equal in the stipulations of treaties which were equally binding upon them. In the bilateral and multilateral treaties reciprocity of rights and obligations was very common.<sup>29</sup>

Fourth, "the wills and acts of the feudal states with similar status belonging to the Chinese family of states had equal value in law".<sup>30</sup> The signatures of different states in the treaties contained the equal value although politically, it might result differently in the enforcement of the treaties. The rules that treaties could bind only the contracting parties presented a rational basis in ancient China.

However, in the Spring and Autumn period, the Chou monarchy had a special position in law and, therefore, was not equal but superior to the feudal states. The principle of the equality of states applied only to the states of Chinese feudal system, the so-called "lieh-kuo" (列國). The will of the Chou monarch could in theory override that of the feudal lords and there could be no treaty between the former and the latter. Moreover, the feudal states, theoretically and legally, could not wage war against the Chou authority, and "The Son of Heaven had no wars but only expeditions" which were armed strifes between superiors and inferiors.<sup>31</sup> According to the same theory, the armed conflicts between the Chinese and the barbarian states could not be termed as wars, and simply, the notion prevailed that the Chinese always defeated the barbarians.<sup>32</sup> However, the idea of "barbarian" was determined not by race but by behavior, and the ancient Chinese

concept of international law was cultural rather than racial.<sup>33</sup> For example, at the end of Spring and Autumn period and during the Warring States period, many states of the Chou system became "new" barbarians because of their behavior such as Wu and Yueh.<sup>34</sup> And naturally the rules of international law did not apply to them thereafter.

In practical international politics there were several rules and principles existing in the Chou system which were especially important for the great powers searching for leadership. The first was "li" (ritual, courtesy, propriety). In addition to the rules of international law mentioned above, in practical politics the feudal states, especially the great powers, in the Chou system should follow the principle of "respecting the Chou monarchy and deterring the barbarians". The official mythology and customary rules of behavior which were presented in the writings of Confucian School emphasized feudal unity, order, obedience to the "Son of Heaven", harmonious relationships and the necessity of hierarchy. In practice, it was discounted, and, in a system of many powerful ambitious, and independent states, these rules and principles were anachronisms or they served superficially as advantages for the big states in their power struggles. Therefore, Mencius and Hsun Tzu, the Confucian followers, were against the concept of hegemonial leadership and criticized the five leaders in the Spring and Autumn period because their leaderships were based simply upon power and statecraft rather than the appropriate li.<sup>35</sup>

More than the concept of the humanistic principle li, the Confucian School suggested an idea of natural law, the Mandate of Heaven, which tried to apply the mythological religious oath and committance to the political reality. There were numerous examples in the "politics of alliance and league".<sup>36</sup>

The second rule and principle in conducting international relations

was 'teh' (德), the virtue. For the great powers teh was a very important factor for them to win their fellow brother states' support for leadership. It was mentioned that under prime minister Kuan Chung's suggestion, Duke Huan of Ch'i was very careful in using the forces in order not to reverse the virtue.<sup>37</sup> Therefore, the later leaders were regarded as less virtuous as Duke Huan due to their gradual ignoring of virtue in favor of their own self-interest.

The third set of rules and principles was the "yi" (義), righteousness and the "hsin" (信), trustworthiness, good faith, or sincerity, which were also important principles, and were the required factors for the great powers to establish their leadership. Hsun Tzu said: "The leadership of hegemony was established upon trustworthiness".<sup>38</sup> He regarded it as the "way" to a leading position among the states. For instance, after Duke Huan of Ch'i formed a league with his fellow states, Cheng was attacked by Ch'u in 666 B.C. In order to perform its commitment, Ch'i consulted with Lu and Sung and sent forces to save Cheng from invasion. This action was appraised with merit through international public opinion and Duke Huan's prestige increased greatly.<sup>39</sup>

A superior man (chun-tzu) will say, "If there be not the appendage of good faith, covenants are of no use. It is said in the Poems 'The king is continually insisting on covenants, and the disorder is thereby increased; '--which was from the want of good faith'.<sup>40</sup>

In a league, suspicions among the members are common. Therefore, trustworthiness will decide its fate.<sup>41</sup>

Duke Huan was also applauded by his fellow nobles for his fighting a just war to help the Yen state against barbarian Mountain Jung's aggression in 674 B.C.<sup>42</sup> The idea of righteousness was expressed through this operation and this concept was prerequired and supplemented by li, teh, and hsin into a systematic way (tao) to leadership. That is why early leaders such as Duke Huan of Ch'i and Duke Wen of Chin have been appraised at a higher position

than other leaders by Confucianists.

In general, these idealistic rules were somewhat psychological and intangible forces in character. In the later years of the Spring and Autumn period and especially during the period of Warring States, they were ignored and overridden by the realistic power political concepts suggested by the Legalists.

### (3) Conclusion

Several points can be concluded at the end of the Spring and Autumn period.

Through several hundred years of international intercourses, many barbarian races around the frontier of the Chou system were absorbed into the Chinese race and, therefore, culturally civilized, such as states like Ch'in, Ch'u, Ti barbarian, Wu, Yueh etc. Following the cultural expansion, the boundary of the Chinese system of states was enlarged to a great extent: west to present Shensi and Kansu; north to Hopei; south to Hunan, and east to the sea. This formed the basic Chinese territory thereafter.


In social, economic and literary fields, there were great changes. The feudal system broke down and the merchant class emerged. Education became popular and the pragmatic humanitarianism took over the religious mythology. When Confucius set up his school of thought, the golden age of philosophy began. Thereafter, "a hundred schools contended and a hundred flowers blossomed". Numerous scholars and statemen appeared, and Chinese scholarship turned into a new era.

Due to the breakdown of the feudal system, Chinese society was in chaos. The international anarchy was characterized with power politics. A movement for unity had been felt necessary and urgent during the Warring States period. This hope was finally realized by Ch'in in 221 B.C.



Map 2

The Period of Warring States:  
The Political Boundaries of Warring States



China in c. 350 B.C.

Source: Jacques Gernet, Ancient China: from the Beginning to the Empire (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1968), p.97.

B) The Chan-Kuo (Warring States) Period, 403-221 B.C.

(1) International System and Politics.

The intermediate period between Ch'un-Ch'iu and Chan-Kuo was an international system of four power centers: Chin, Ch'i, Ch'u, and Yueh. When the Chou monarch, King Wei-lieh, endowed the "feudal state" title to the Three Chins (Han, Chao and Wei) in 403 B.C., the period of Warring States began.<sup>43</sup>

Due to several hundred years of international intercourse and cultural expansion in the Spring and Autumn period, the Chinese system of international politics had been greatly enlarged as the Warring States period started. The beginning of the period was a scene of struggle for power through conquest and territorial annexation among the feudal states. Externally, at this time the great powers met each other frequently for alliance and mutual assistance purposes. Internally, they began their social, political, and economic reforms. For example, in 356 B.C. Wei Yang (Lord of Shang), was appointed to make a reform in Ch'in. The same type reforms were also performed in Ch'i and several other states. Gradually, there appeared on the scene seven great powers in the international system. They were Yen (燕), Chao (趙), Han (韓), Wei (魏), Ch'i (齊), Ch'u (楚), Ch'in (秦), the so-called "Seven Powers of Chan-Kuo".<sup>44</sup> (Map 2)

In brief, the entire Warring States period was one of constant wars among these seven powers under the general strategic policies of balance of power: "Ho-Tsung 合縱" (Vertical Alliance) and "Lien-Heng 連橫" (Horizontal coalition). At that time, the Chou monarch was extremely weak as a small power, although he was still regarded as the center of the Chinese system, the Son of Heaven. But, starting in 354 B.C. battles among the great powers became more severe and many famous military strategists such as Sun Pin or Sun Tzu and Wu Ch'i appeared. In 334 B.C., rulers of Wei and Ch'i began to entitle themselves as wang or king, which was the same rank as the

Chou monarch. Rulers of other powers followed without hesitation.<sup>45</sup> Thereafter, Chou authority was completely ignored. In 256 B.C., the Chou monarch was attacked and conquered by Ch'in. The annexation of Chou territory by Ch'in toppled the superficial "Son of Heaven", and the Chou Dynasty came to an end.<sup>46</sup>

Shang Yang's reform gave Ch'in a new life and Ch'in immediately emerged as a more powerful nation overriding the other powers. In the process of power struggles by military forces, Ch'in adopted Chang Yi's foreign policy of Lien-Heng to divide the alliance of its rivals by manipulating the contradictions among them. By correct handling of military power and diplomatic technique, Ch'in gradually defeated and conquered the other six powers one by one. In 221 B.C., under Ch'in's rule a strong unified Chinese empire appeared for the first time.

## (2) The Foreign Policies of the Seven Powers

Unlike in the period of Spring and Autumn, the foreign policies of great powers in the Warring States international system concentrated on the concepts of Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng. Ch'in, located in the west, was a great power and a potential threat to the bordering states, and others too. Therefore, the only possible solution was a Horizontal Alliance, where any state would ally with Ch'in to attack others, or of a Vertical Alliance, where the other states would form a united front against Ch'in. The purpose of the policy of Ho-Tsung was to deter Ch'in's aggression under a collective defense system which Ch'in was obviously worried about. Hoping to break the tie and diminish the effectiveness of this collective defense system, Ch'in devoted herself to winning any power or states among them by various means including the use of military threat, a promise of sharing the profit, and correctly handling the contradictions among the opponents. Because of these premises

of self-interest among the states, the policy of Ho-Tsung had never seemed effective enough to check Ch'in's expansions through the entire period.<sup>48</sup>

In general, the foreign policies of the great powers during the Warring States period oscillated between Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng according to the appropriate situation and specific individual national interest. In the case of Ch'in, Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng had been alternately utilized along with national expansion. Moreover, its flexible manipulation of the contradictions among the states and the strategy of allying and attacking, including the use of a fifth column, determined Ch'in's rule of China.

### (3) Rules and Laws of the International System

Unlike during the former period of Spring and Autumn, the previously established general rules of the international system no longer existed during the Warring States period. The only "rule" left was the struggle for power and securing self-interest. Therefore, the realist school and the concept of Legalism reached their golden age while the idealist Taoism and Confucianism declined. Great advocates of Legalism, men such as Wei Yang, Su Ch'in, Chang Yi, Sun Pin, and Wei Liao, were very active and popular among the leaders of the great powers at that time. Even the Confucian follower, Hsun Tzu, became a realistic thinker though he still kept Confucian principles in mind. But his two students, Li Ssu and Han Fei were determined to be famous Legalists.

The period during this new international system differed greatly from that of the period of Spring and Autumn. The Chou monarchy was no longer respected and was even conquered. The feudal system collapsed completely. Most states were complete independence and equality from one another. The rules and concepts of li, yi, hsin, and teh, which were popular in the Spring and Autumn period, no longer existed. In the struggle for power, most

Table 2

The Frequency of Wars in the Chan-Kuo Period

Years B.C.	War score in each year of decade*										Total war score	Peaceful years
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
463-454	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	2.5	3.5	9	7
453-444	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	0	1.5	1.5	0	4.5	7
443-434	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	9
433-424	0	1.5	1.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	4.5	7
423-414	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	8	10	8
413-404	4	1.5	0	2	6	3	0	0	0	0	16.5	5
403-394	0	2	5.5	0	1.5	0	0	1.5	3.5	3.5	17.5	4
393-384	0	2	5	1.5	0	1.5	2	4.5	0	2	18.5	3
383-374	0	0	6	1.5	5.5	1.5	3.5	1.5	0	7.5	24	3
373-364	3.5	2	4	4	4	0	3	1.5	4	0	26	2
363-354	5	2	0	0	2	3.5	0	1.5	4	5.5	24.5	3
353-344	2	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	8	6
343-334	0	2	5	4	1.5	0	0	2	0	4	18.5	4
333-324	3	1.5	2	4	2	1.5	0	4	0	2	20	2
323-314	2	0	0	2	6	7	3.5	2	3.5	2	28	2
313-304	8	1.5	1.5	0	2	2	2	0	0	4	21	3
303-294	0	10	2	2	6	0	4	5.5	2	3	34.5	2
293-284	0	2	4	2	2	2	5.5	2	8	2	29.5	1
283-274	2	2	6	4	2	2	3	3	2	4	30	0
273-264	4	2	4	2	2	0	2	4	2	2	24	1
263-254	4	2	2	0	0	4	7	3	0	0	22	4
253-244	0	2	0	5	2	10	2	0	2	2	25	3
243-234	2	8	2	0	2	0	2	3	2	2	23	2
233-224	2	2	2	2	2	0	4	2	2	2	20	1
223-222	6	4									10	
242-year total											468.5	89

\* The "war score" is calculated as follows: In any single campaign, each of the seven major powers involved is computed as one point, while each small state is computed as one half-point. The yearly score is the total points of all campaigns in that year. The seven major powers are Ch'i, Ch'in, Ch'u, Chao, Han, Wei, and Yen.

Source: Hsu Cho-yun, Ancient China in Transition: An Analysis of Social Mobility, 722-222 B.C. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), Table 6.

of the individual states resorted to the use of force externally and to national political, economical, and social reforms internally. Comparatively, warfare at this time became crueler, longer and larger involving much more manpower, although the number of wars was smaller than that of the Spring and Autumn period. (see Table 1 and Table 2) Some new weapons were invented at this time, such as "yun-ti (雲梯)", a scaling ladder to climb the city wall, and "kou-chu (鉤鉤)", the hooked claws used in naval battles. Most of the states started to build great walls along their frontiers which later were formed by the First Emperor of Ch'in (Shih Huang-ti) into the famous "Great Wall".<sup>49</sup> Moreover, the components of national power were now based not only upon the number of four-horse military chariots as before, but also upon such factors as population, political and social systems, national morale, manipulation of diplomacy, etc. which have been regarded as requirements of a national power in modern times.<sup>50</sup>

Indeed, like its name implies this period was a system of anarchism and a constant state of war. (Table 2)

#### (4) The Unification of China

In 221 B.C. Ch'in brought the warring states system to an end and unified China. There were several reasons why Ch'in was able to achieve this change that resulted in unification.

First, a comparatively new state, Ch'in acknowledged a smaller gap between the feudal noble class and the proletarian peasant class than that of the other states. It was therefore easier to make more extensive political, social, and economic reforms. Especially, after the national reform by Wei Yang in 356 B.C., Ch'in became a Spartan-like social and political system and totalitarian centralist state, while other states such as Ch'i, Ch'u, and the "Three Chins" remained under the feudal system and order. Class

conflicts were more radical, and the political and social system was less consolidated. Occasional peasant rebellions corrupted the political and social system and weakened national power with the consequence of defeat by external invasions. For example, the greatest peasant uprising during the Warring States period was led by Chuang Ch'iao in Ch'u in 301 B.C. This rebellion corrupted Ch'u and aided Ch'in's success.<sup>51</sup>

Second, effective reforms in political, social, and economic fields made Ch'in a stronger power. The Legalist oriented administrative centralism increased efficiency in external and internal affairs. In the process of imperialistic expansion that led to unification, Ch'in could consolidate the occupied areas through the extension of its political, social and economic system. The national power of Ch'in was continuously increased along with its military advances, and finally all competition was eliminated.

Third, there was a general desire for unification. Due to the constant international anarchy and social chaos the people were searching for peace, and they were willing to support those states that could provide them the political, social, and economic need required for unification. Unlike other states, Ch'in was competent to do this.

Fourth, the rulers of Ch'in could appropriately use many able men to its advantage. Persons like Wei Yang and other Legalist men had been the ministers of Ch'in and contributed considerably to the national development. Moreover, in its struggle for power, Ch'in could effectively implement the appropriate foreign policies and military strategies including the use of a fifth column. For instance, flexible use of the policies of Lien-Heng and Ho-Tsung had made Ch'in a superpower during the latter part of the Warring States period.

After Ch'in unified China in 221 B.C., its ruler entitled himself the First

Emperor of Ch'in hoping to establish a permanent empire. He reinforced the legalist concept of political centralism which made China a totalitarian state for the first time in Chinese history. However, the radical legalist concept could be employed only in a transitional stage rather than during a more tranquil period. Ch'in's tight control eventually generated the people's reaction, and the dictatorial policies finally induced peasant uprisings. After no more than twenty years' rule, Ch'in was forced to yield its administration to the long-lasting Han Dynasty, which alternately adopted the pacific thoughts of Taoism and Confucianism.

## II. SOURCES OF CONCEPTS ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Karl Marx points out that ideas are determined by material conditions.<sup>52</sup> This was probably true in the case of Chinese history, especially during the Ch'un-Ch'iu and Chan-Kuo periods which have been regarded as China's golden age of thought even though under circumstances of chaos and anarchy.

Confucius and Lao Tzu spread their idealistic concepts of world order and philosophy during the latter part of Ch'un-Ch'iu period, and at that time international relations were still under a hierarchical feudal system and the international rule of "li". Therefore, Lao Tzu suggested a political philosophy of wu-wei (do-nothing, inaction) and Confucius conservatively urged the restoration of former Chou's hierarchical system as an ideal order. When the international system entered into the power-politics period of Chan-Kuo (Warring States), the idealistic thoughts declined and were overridden by the realistic thoughts of Mohist utilitarianism and Legalism. Even Hsun Tzu, the great Confucian follower, due to a change of circumstances, also turned into a realist thinker. "His day was



thought differ due to their own efforts, investigations and interpretations. All the great thinkers have been eager to discover this very Tao with their great efforts. For instance, Confucius said: "If a man in the morning hears the right way (Tao), he may die in the evening without regret".<sup>60</sup>

(2) Tao: from Idealism to Realism, and the Synthesis

The Chinese schools of thought do not differ from each other on the cosmic world-view but on the temporal social world. Because the ages of Ch'un-Ch'iu and Chan-Kuo were abnormal with disharmony, different schools at that time suggested different theories for the purpose of correction and order.


For Lao Tzu and his followers, the Tao was no more than the following of nature and the principle of inaction, wu-wei (無為). For Confucianism, the Tao was no more than the humanistic relations of "Jen" (仁), "Yi" (義), "Li" (禮), and the principle of hierarchy. For Mohism, the Tao was no more than searching for utility and the principle of practical profit. For Legalism, the Tao was no more than the realistic functions of law, authority, and statecraft operating in the social, economic and political fields. Hsun Tzu commented on the various schools of thought:

In the past, the traveling scholars were blinded, so they had different schools of thought. Mo Tzu was blinded by utility and did not know the value of culture. Sung Tzu was blinded by desire, but did not know (that men seek for) gain. Shen Tzu was blinded by law but did not know (the value of) talent. Shen Tzu was blinded by authority but did not know wisdom. Hui Tzu was blinded by words but did not know facts. Chuang Tzu was blinded by what is of nature but did not know what is of man.<sup>61</sup>

However, the idealist schools, Taoism and Confucianism interpreted the Tao through an idealistic viewpoint of optimism and suggested an ideal world in the future. Lao Tzu saw an ideal state where a sage ruler would undo all the causes of trouble in the world and would govern with non-action. Similarly, Confucians saw an ideal world state in the society of Ta-T'ung which Li Yun or Evolution of Rites (禮運), one of the chapters in the Li Chi or Records of Rites (禮記), states that "When the great Tao was in practice,

Figure 1

The Trends of the Concept of International Politics  
During the Periods of Ch'un-Ch'iu & Chan-Kuo



(Note: Since the biographies of the thinkers during Ch'un-Ch'iu & Chan-Kuo periods are not certain, the chronological locations of the thinkers in this chart are therefore tentative. The purpose of this chart is to show the shifting trends of concepts from idealism to realism as conditions changed.)

one of slaughter, licence, and sophistry. From this came his very low estimate of human nature, cardinal in his philosophy. He saw that while the idealism of Confucius might have worked in the ancient 'Age of Peace' something sterner was needed for his own 'Age of Trouble',<sup>53</sup> stated Professor H. G. Creel. The transformation of thoughts from idealism to realism exactly revealed the trend of the international political and social systems at that time. (Figure 1)

#### A) Chinese Concept of World-View: Sinism

##### (1) Tao, Dialectical Materialism, and World Revolution

Chinese minds are primarily social and practical, and their true cosmos is anthropocentric rather than theocentric. Therefore, a leading principle of Chinese natural philosophy is that the physical world is a world of action or phenomena which appear to be always in flux with little to do with any eternal verities, as opposed to assumptions of a static world and a world of substance.<sup>54</sup> In general, the Chinese believe that all the phenomena in the world in the realms of art, literature, philosophy, politics and religion, do not exist individually but are closely associated with one another as a continuous whole. This is the spirit of Chinese culture and the concept of "Tao" (道),--the Truth, the Harmony, the Order, the Way--by which all things come to be. If the idea of Tao could be put into a modern western term, it would correspond to the concept of "natural law".

This monistic concept of the cosmos was typical dialectical materialism and was first indicated in the ancient writing of Yi Ching, Book of Changes, which stated:

Heaven and earth existing, all (material) things then got their existence. All (material) things having existence, afterwards there came male and female. From the existence of male and female there came afterwards husband and wife. From husband and wife there came father and son. From father and son there came ruler and minister. From ruler and minister there came high (superior) and low (inferior). When the distinction of high and low had existence, afterwards came the arrangements of propriety and righteousness.<sup>55</sup>

Therefore, the universe is regarded as a current with no reality but only a transitional process, the Yi (Change). In this change, "there is no thought, no action. It is in itself still and calm; but, when acted on, it penetrates forthwith to all phenomena and events in the universe".<sup>56</sup> Lao Tzu also wrote: "From the Tao there comes One; from One comes Two; from Two comes Three; from Three comes all things."<sup>57</sup> Chuang Tzu followed the idea that "The world and I have a common origin and all creatures and I together are one. Being one, our Oneness can be expressed... or unexpressed. The one, with the expression, makes two, and the two, with one (what is unexpressed), make three. From there on ..."<sup>58</sup> In the Universe there is a cosmic force which produces in turn the "Yin" (陰), the passive element, the response, the matter or earth, and the "Yang" (陽), the active element, the challenge, the form or heaven, and through the interaction of these two elements, challenge and response, springs life and all things. With the concept of Yin and Yang there is the idea of relativity, negative and positive, life and death, right and wrong etc. Moreover, the Yang represents the constructive force of the universe and the Yin represents the destructive force. The Universe, the process of change and the struggle between status quo and revolution, all things appear. It is in permanent revolutionary and endless change.

Similarly, the Chinese see the human relationship among individuals, societies, interstates in the world as a harmonious whole. This great harmony has been exemplified in natural phenomena. Like nature, it may sometimes be abnormal but there is no concept of evil as substance. It will become good as soon as proper relationships are restored. The Chinese believe that once the disharmony occurs there is a way or Tao, "the right way, and the only way for the affairs of the cosmos to be carried on".<sup>59</sup> It is the very revolutionary Tao which the historical Chinese sages and philosophers have been searching for, and it is the very starting point which the various schools of

the world was common (or public) to all; ... "62 On the contrary, the realist schools, Mohism and Legalism interpreted the Tao through the realistic viewpoint of pessimism as a practical means or a right way to control the world disorder in order to restore the universal harmony. Mohists suggested pragmatism and utilitarianism, and the Legalists saw the law, the authority, and the statecraft as the proper tools for social and political management.

From the past thousands of years of human experience and practice in Chinese history, present Chinese Maoism is trying to synthesize the idealism and realism, the form and matter, into a better transformation under the concept of Tao. In other words, Chinese Communists see the Tao in the Maoist doctrine, the synthesis of reason or theory and practice in the principle of dialectical materialism.

B) The Naturalistic School: Lao Tzu and Taoism

Lao Tzu and his followers are the great interpreters on the theory of Tao along the cosmic system of nature. Their first principle is that Tao is the law of nature and the right way concerning the relations between man and nature. Through the experienced phenomena, the universe is great and perfect which is well beyond human comprehension. "Look at it but you cannot see it! Its name is formless. Listen to it but you cannot hear it! Its name is soundless. Grasp it but you cannot get it! Its name is bodiless. These three are unfathomable; therefore, they blend into one."63 To follow the law of nature is the right way or Tao to reach the great harmony. Thus, "Man follows the ways of the earth; the earth follows the ways of the heaven; the heaven follows the ways of the Tao; the Tao follows its own ways (the nature)."64

The Tao for Taoists is neither moral nor theistic but a neutral and impartial principle which governs all things in the universe and is devoid

of human volition and emotion. It is, therefore, under the principle of materialism. The heaven and earth for Taoists are not under human control. Indeed, they dominate man; they treat all creatures alike as "straw dogs". In other words, Tao is working on its own way and is all-powerful and perfect.

From the concept of Tao and Yin-Yang, Taoists see history and the universe as dialectical materialism. They regard the phenomena in the world as a relativity. Somewhat like the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, Lao Tzu stated, for instance, "All things under heaven are born of existence; existence is born of non-existence."<sup>65</sup> ... "The Tao gives birth to one; one gives birth to two; two gives birth to three; three gives birth to all myriad things."<sup>66</sup> ... "When the great Tao is abandoned, there appear charity and duty. ... When darkness and disorder reign, there appear loyalists."<sup>67</sup> Chuang Tzu also regarded the concept of "right" and "wrong" as relative. "This is why a sage harmonizes the different systems of right and wrong, and rests in the revolving of Nature."<sup>68</sup> This "revolving of Nature", for Chuang Tzu, was not in the sense of destroying but transcending, and it represented the spontaneous revolving change going on in all things. Therefore, the Taoist concepts of dialectics and relativity are revolutionary and it is the characteristic movement of Tao. "A complete reversing is the movement of the Tao."<sup>69</sup> "If the quality of a thing has developed to its highest pitch, then that quality inevitably changes and becomes its opposite."<sup>70</sup> Putting this revolutionary concept into the temporal society, it provides certain justification for the movements of revolution in Chinese history. It is the "Mandate of Heaven" in traditional Confucian terms and the "World Revolution" in current Maoist and Communist language.

Idealistic Taoism was popular in the late period of Spring and Autumn and the early part of the Warring States period. But it was overridden by

Legalism when the international situation entered into chaos. However, when the unified Ch'in Empire fell in 206 B.C. and the Han Empire was established, the pacific oriented Taoism gained its popularity in the early prosperous era under Emperors Wen and Ching (文景之治) of the Han Dynasty until 136 B.C. when Confucianism was made orthodoxy under the reign of Emperor Wu-ti (武帝).

(1) Lao Tzu (老子)

1) Wu-Wei and Dialectical Materialism.

Following his cosmic concept of Tao, Lao Tzu suggested the idea of Wu-Wei, do-nothing or inaction, as the basic theme of political theory. He believed that all authorities and institutions are man-made and artificial, and that all moral norms and social standards are contrary to the spirit of nature, Tao. Those who are busy in setting up the social system, institutions, and even the project of nationalistic universalism are responsible for the miseries and disorders of the human being. Let there be no goodness or badness, no justice or injustice, no beauty or ugliness, because they are all man-created and there are no such things in nature. Let all the concepts of "must", "should", and "ought" be done away with because they are subjective and prescriptive. He believed all people who follow the natural way will be in happiness. Some people see Taoism as a negative thought. However, what Lao Tzu urged was to teach people this basic characteristic of nature and consequently to follow the natural way without reluctance. In this sense, Lao Tzu was realistic. As a matter of fact, he implied that man should do what the man's reason dictates according to his natural tendency rather than reversing the existing facts and human rationality.<sup>71</sup>

2) Wu-Wei and Class Struggle

Lao tzu's theory of do-nothing is critical. He believed that current society had done too much and this excess had resulted in social disorder

and human disharmony. Whenever there is exploitation between the ruling and the ruled, conflict and struggles result. Lao Tzu explained:

The world is won by refraining. How do I know this is so? By this: As taboos increase, people grow poorer; when weapons abound, the state grows chaotic; where skills multiply, novelties flourish; as statutes increase, more criminals start. So the Wise Man will say: As I refrain, the people will reform, since I like quiet, they will keep order; when I forebear, the people will prosper; when I want nothing, they will be honest.<sup>72</sup>

### 3) Wu-Wei and International Power Politics.

Similarly, putting Lao Tzu's philosophy of wu-wei into an international political setting, he believes that the international system will be stable through inaction and by reducing the desire of interest. World disorders are due to the desire of searching for national interest and the interferences of great powers. Today, for instance, the so-called nationalistic universalism is the root of all the causes of the international state of conflict. The developments of science and weapons, the concepts of "national interest", "prestige" and the ideologies of "democracy" and others comprise the factors of world disorder. For Lao Tzu, all these actions are artificial and are away from the Tao. They are doomed to fail.

When one desires to win over the world by action, I find that he will never have a moment of rest. The possession of the world is something ordained by nature. It cannot be gained by action, or held. Those who try to gain by action are sure to fail; those who try to hold are sure to lose.<sup>73</sup>

It should also be understood that the whole world will be won by inaction rather than by action. "By letting go, it all gets done; the world is won by those who let it go. But when you try and try, the world is then beyond the winning."<sup>74</sup>

### 4) Anti-aggression and Anti-imperialism.

Furthermore, Lao Tzu also realistically admitted that sometimes the use of military force and interstate war are inevitable, but they should be



eliminated to the maximum because of their evil nature. War among nations is a human catastrophe and should be avoided as much as possible. The fact that the gain from war is generally less than that from avoiding war should be understood by statesmen and policy makers. Therefore, war should not be glorified and employed enthusiastically.<sup>75</sup>

Moreover, Lao Tzu suggests that only by following the Tao or the virtue of nature, not by the force, can a nation get sufficient support to be a leader in the world. Conquest through war should not be encouraged. Imperialism through force should be severely condemned.

Those who use Tao in assisting the ruler do not resort to war for the conquest of the world. War is a most calamitous evil. Wherever armies are quartered, briars and thorns become rampant. Famines inevitably follow in the wake of great wars.<sup>96</sup>

#### 5) Tao and Strategy

However, once war occurs, stratagem should be planned and trickery should be applied.<sup>77</sup> According to the Tao, everything in the universe is relative. Wise policy-makers are satisfied when an appropriate attack is stopped, and they do not venture to pursue conquest for supremacy. The victors should limit themselves and not be vainglorious, aggressive, arrogant, or anxious for supremacy through conquest, because it is contrary to the Tao for the strong to do harm to the weak. Those who act contrary to the Tao are doomed to perish early.<sup>78</sup>

Thus, Lao Tzu argued that even the utilization of warfare as a means of foreign policy should be based on the appropriate nature of Tao. The best leaders are supported by virtue and Tao; they do not shun them; and therefore, none in the world can compete with such leaders.

The best warriors are not warlike. The best strategists are not impulsive. The best winners are not quarrelsome. The best leaders are not arrogant. All these indicate the virtue of noncontention, the ability to employ men, compliance with Heaven's sublime way.<sup>79</sup>

According to the Tao Lao Tzu suggests a strategy of defensive war. He points out: "One of the ancient strategists said: 'I do not venture to fight an offensive war; I prefer to be on the defensive...!'" As to the political-military strategic policy, the power of supposed enemies should be carefully calculated and not be underestimated. This is the key factor in not being defeated.<sup>81</sup>

#### 6) Tao and Foreign Relations

Regarding international diplomatic relations, Lao Tzu suggested that states should practice humility, especially the great powers. The small nations, like the female, the Yin, are willing to occupy a passive, responsive, and subordinate position to serve or to cooperate with their big brothers. Therefore, if the great powers are humble with virtue according to the Tao, the minor powers will be willing to remain under the protection of their big brothers. Thus, there are mutual benefits. The great powers have expended nothing more than humility and the world is governed by harmony.<sup>82</sup> True, today if the great powers can be humble with virtue instead of arrogant with power, cooperative regionalism could probably be achieved harmoniously.

#### 7) Wu-Wei and Utopian Society

Extending the idea of inaction, Lao Tzu's concept of the foreign policy of states is isolationism with international intercourse and communication being minimized as much as possible. He suggested as an ideal society a small state with simplicity and self-reliance, a utopian community.

The ideal land is small and its inhabitants are few, where tools abound ten times or yet a hundred-fold beyond their use; where people die and die again but never emigrate; have boats and carts which no one rides. Weapons have they and armor too, but none displayed. The folk returns to use again the knotted cords. Their meat is sweet; their clothes adorned, their homes at peace, their customs charm. And neighbor lands are juxtaposed so each may hear the barking dogs, the crowing cocks across the way; where folks grow old and folks will die and never once exchange a call.<sup>83</sup>

Lao Tzu's utopia is a state of freedom, self-sufficiency, anarchism, and social harmony.

(2) Chuang Tzu (莊子)

Chuang Tzu was a naturalist, not a worldly man. He withdrew from society and stepped into the realm of nature where he longed to be a free being like a butterfly in the great universe (idea of the famous chapter of his writings "The Dream of a Butterfly"). He sought freedom from all temporal, spatial, and physical limitations. Unlike Yang Tzu, another Taoist, who escaped from the world into his own ego, Chuang Tzu put his ego into a state of mystic union with the entire universe.<sup>84</sup>

1) Nature, Artificial Difference, and Class Struggle

Chuang Tzu's basic theme is to follow nature. This concept has been indirectly and symbolically expressed by his writings. Opposed to the Confucian humanistic system, Chuang Tzu and the Taoists deny the value of the rectification of names which define the terms of all things so as to set up a standard of moral values and the relationship between ruling and ruled classes in the political and social system. In fact, the difference between what is of nature and what is of man is the key to human happiness and pain, order and disorder. Chuang Tzu pointed out: "What is of nature is internal. What is of man is external. That oxen and horses should have four feet is what is of nature. That a halter should be put on a horse's head, or a string through an ox's nose, is what is of man."<sup>85</sup>

The duck's legs are short, but if we try to lengthen them, the duck will feel pain. The crane's legs are long, but if we try to shorten them, the crane will feel grief.<sup>86</sup>

2) Nature, Anti-Imperialism, and National Self-Determination

Therefore, following what is of nature or following what is of man is the source of all happiness, order, peace, and goodness, or the source of

all pain, disorder, war, and evil in the world. However, the purpose of all laws, morals, institutions, and governments, even the world system and organizations, is to establish uniformity and eliminate difference. That is why Chuang Tzu strongly opposes the idea of governing through the formal machinery of government or enforcement but suggests that the best way of governing, even expansion, is through non-government--a natural, cultural, and social development. It is the idea of culturalism.

Similarly, in the field of international politics, for Chuang Tzu, what is of nature is a country's specific environment, character of people, its own cultural traditions, its ways of life, and its particular social and political system. The internal feature of a nation is its nature. However, certain ambitious nations, especially those great powers, formulate their foreign policies motivated by national self-interests and unilateral ideologies to have externally initiated a series of what is of man--international rules, institutions, legal systems-- to impose upon others through the way of nationalistic universalism and finally power struggle and war. It is, therefore, contrary to what is of nature, though the idea of uniformity might probably be motivated subjectively by human compassions. For Chuang Tzu, however, it only makes the international situation more tragic and severe. In his terms, today's policies of imperialism and colonialism and other ideologies motivated by national self-interests in modern world politics are what is of man. To let countries decide their own self-development or national self-determination is what is of nature and is necessary in the promotion of their progress and human happiness. Like Lao Tzu and Yang Tzu, Chuang Tzu favored a policy of non-interference which may give a nation a chance for its internal nature to be freely developed. This is what Tao tells. The Tao does nothing and yet there is nothing that is not done. Thus, the

self, the world, and the universe are mixed into a great harmony. In general, Chuang Tzu devoted himself to blending man and nature together into a union.

C) The Idealistic and Humanitarian School: Confucius and Confucianism

Unlike Taoism, Confucius and his followers found the idea of Tao in practical human relations. They realized that man is compelled by his nature to live in the company of other men, in other words, in society. Oriented by this concept of humanity, man has been searching for the appropriate ways to handle human conflict and to promote human harmony. The idealistic Confucians start with the basic assumption that man's nature is good and with sympathy, jen, which can be extended to others. They believe that chaotic internal and external situations result not because of the nature and constitution of society and civilization but because of the wrong direction that society and civilization had taken. So, they suggest preserving order in social and cultural institutions by stressing proper relations among men under the doctrine of jen. The starting point is with the individual, from which cultivated virtue and human sympathy are extended by the appropriate "li" (禮), courtesy or rites, to the closest persons in a family, then from family to the society, then to the state, and then finally to the whole world. Like Plato and many other philosophers, the Confucians synthesize politics and moral ethics.

Confucians regard the family as a model of human moral relationships, while society, the nation, and the world are the extensions of this basic unity. This monitic idea regards the nations as a big family and the world as a family of nations. The head of a nation and its officials are the parents of the people. Therefore, the appropriate relationships of superior-inferior in the family should also be applied in the state and in the world. The Confucians believe in the sage-rule with virtue as the key for human harmony.

Confucius in the late part of Spring and Autumn period initiated

Confucianism. It was not popular at that time and Mohism and Taoism superseded Confucianism in the Mencius' era. During Hsun Tzu's time, the idealistic Confucianism declined and the realistic Legalism became popular. This decline was not abated until Tung Chung-shu succeeded in establishing Confucianism as the orthodox or national belief in the early Han Dynasty. Thereafter, the Confucian concept of the international system and politics triumphed until the early twentieth century in China.

(1) Confucius--K'ung Tzu (孔子)

1) Jen and Human Relationship

The principal concept of Confucius was the idea of Jen (仁), benevolence, human-heartedness, man-to-manness, perfect virtue, or sympathy. Confucius believed that man was born with jen but that it had to be cultivated and developed, and this is the point of division between the superior man, chun-tzu (君子), and the small man, hsiao-jen (小人). The meaning of jen for Confucius was very broad, for instance, "It is to love all men."<sup>87</sup> "Now the man of jen, wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others."<sup>88</sup> "It is, ... not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself; to have no murmuring against you in the country, and none in the family".<sup>89</sup> Moreover, Confucius said, "The man of jen is cautious and slow in his speech."<sup>90</sup> Therefore, for Confucius, jen can be anything which is of propriety in human relations according to the Tao.

2) The Family, Nation, World

The development of jen, for Confucius, was hierarchical in a system of order which started with the cultivation of the individual person. In the "Great Learning", Ta Hsueh (大學), Confucius teaches the process.

The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the world, first ordered well their own nations. Wishing to order well

their nations, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. ...

From the Son of Heaven down to the mass of the people, all must consider the cultivation of the person the root of everything besides.<sup>91</sup>

After all of these processes are done, the whole world will be made tranquil, happy, and harmonious. In order to set up the hierarchical system of order, Confucius stressed the importance of the rectification of names under the principle of li, courtesy or rites. He suggests a status stratification in the social and political systems, so that the appropriate human relationship can be realized.<sup>92</sup> Thus, "The king or the superior should be benevolent, his officials or inferior respectful, the son filial, and the father loving. In their relations they should be faithful."<sup>93</sup> Furthermore, from the rectification of names and status, the five relationships can be harmonized between sovereign or superior and subjects or inferior by loyalty or respect; between father and son by filial piety; between husband and wife by love; between elder brother and younger brother by kindness; and between self and friends by yi or righteousness.

Confucius' world was a system of patriarchy based upon the assumption that good people are the foundation of a good political system thus resulting in a peaceful and harmonious world. The nations in the world are just like the individual members in the family. The good member states will make a harmonious world family. Thus, a nation, internally, must cultivate herself by sage-rule with virtue and guide the component members into appropriate relationships under the principles of jen and li. Externally, it is necessary for a nation to see its fellow states as elder or younger brothers in the world family. That is, like family relationships, small nations should look upon big nations as elder brothers with respect and admiration, while the great powers ought to treat their younger fellows with kindness and friendliness.

### 3) Virtue and International Relations

Concerning international intercourse, Confucius believed that nations should conduct their diplomatic relations not only with jen but also under the principles of yi, righteousness, and hsin, trustworthiness. He said: "I do not know how a man (a nation) without trustworthiness is to get on."<sup>94</sup>

The superior man in everything considers righteousness to be essential. He performs it according to the rules of li. He brings it forth in humility. He completes it with sincerity.<sup>95</sup>

Moreover, Confucius opposed the concept of profit or national interest and argued: "The mind of the superior man is conversant with righteousness; the mind of the small man is conversant with gain."<sup>96</sup> Confucius seems to indicate that lower grade nations are interested in profit and will be more aggressive in nature, while higher grade nations are cognizant of the spirit of righteousness and will be peaceful in nature.

As to the general theme of rule in the world community, Confucius suggested the principle of li instead of international law or sanction. He argued: "If the fellows (nations) are restricted by (international) law and influenced by the fear of punishment (war), they will try to avoid the punishments, but will have no sense of shame or national dignity. But if they are restricted by virtue and influenced by regard for li or ethics, they will not only have the sense of shame or national dignity, but will also be removed from evil intention."<sup>97</sup>

Moreover, Confucius emphasizes the importance of sincerity and trustworthiness in international intercourse and diplomatic mission.

Of the three essential, the greatest is good faith. Without a revenue and without an army, a state may still exist; but it cannot exist without good faith.<sup>98</sup>

### 4) Virtue, Leadership, and World Politics

Confucius favored the idea of leadership in the world community to



promote world order and happiness. As to leadership, he suggested that world leaders act in accordance with virtue according to the appropriate moral principles. He argued that if the superior or great powers behave correctly according to moral virtues, their fellow states will automatically follow the pattern without reluctance.

When a leader's conduct is correct, his policies will be respected and without the enforcement. If his conduct is not correct, he may issue forces and orders, but none will follow.<sup>99</sup>

The relations between superiors and inferiors is like that between the wind and the grass. The grass must bend when the wind blows across it.<sup>100</sup>

Therefore, "If you lead your fellows with correctness, who will dare not to be correct?"<sup>101</sup> Confucius advised the world leaders not only to strengthen their power, in a quantitative sense, which is the required factor to be a leader, but also to enrich themselves with virtue. Once the latter was achieved, a sphere of influence would automatically be formed and set.<sup>102</sup>

##### 5) Virtue, Culturalism, and Sphere of Influence

To Confucius, it was virtue which made the world orderly and in harmony, not the exercise of force. He said: "A horse is called a chi (a kind of leading horse) not because of its strength, but because of its other good qualities."<sup>103</sup> Confucius taught that leadership, with culture as a weapon based upon moral concepts and virtue, will be more effective and stable in achieving expansion. Cultural influence can deeply penetrate the ways of life of the people and alter their thoughts and finally assimilate them. Leadership with moral virtues instead of physical force will be victorious and everlasting in creating spheres of influence without difficulty. Confucius said: "Let his (a leader's) words be sincere and faithful, and his actions honorable and careful; such conduct may be practiced extensively among the rude barbarians of the South or the North. Otherwise, will he be appreciated even in his neighborhood?"<sup>104</sup>

6) Utopian Ta-T'ung Society and World Communism

In general, the system of human relationships for Confucius was monistic. What could be exercised in the family, in the national society, would also be applicable in the international community, especially those basic moral principles. He saw the great Tao in human relationships rather than in nature. His was a time when the stable feudal system had been crushed and replaced by one consisting of many independent states, and a social system that was in disorder. Therefore, Confucius contributed his concepts for social and political reform hoping to restore the system of the early Chou monarchy.

Ho Hsiu (129-182 A.D.) who wrote a commentary on the Kung Yang Commentary (公羊傳), interpreted the "Ch'un-Ch'iu" as "a record of the process through which Confucius ideally transformed the age of decay and disorder into that of 'approaching peace', and finally into that of 'universal peace'".<sup>105</sup> Li Yun, or the theory of "Evolution of Rites", also presents the three stages of social progress: despotism, constitutionalism, and anarchism.

The first stage is a world of disorder, chu-luan-shi (據亂世), of which Confucius learned through transmitted records. This was the age after Chou Kung until Confucius. The second stage is that of "small tranquility", hsiao-k'ang (小康), in which Confucius, having given good government to his own state through social and political reforms, next brought peace and order to all the other states lying within the Middle Kingdom.

Now, the great Tao has fallen into obscurity, the world has become like families in which each loves but his own parents and treats as children only his own children. ... The states build up their own defense system for self-security and the international relations are based upon the principles of li and yi. ... This is called the age of hsiao-k'ang.<sup>106</sup>

The third age was an ideal utopia for Confucius, the Ta-T'ung Society, in which all the people in the world are civilized and harmonized in order and peace. He compared this age to the period of the ideal society of wu-wei

which is compatible with Lao Tzu's idea of wu-wei and utopian communism during the legend sage-rulers, Yao and Shun emperors. Confucius pictured this utopia as follows:

When the great Tao was in practice, the world was common to all; men of talents, virtue and ability were selected, sincerity was emphasized and friendship was cultivated. Therefore, men did not love only their own parents, nor did they treat as children only their own sons. A competent provision was secured for the aged till their death, employment was given to the able-bodied, and a means was provided for the upbringing of the young. Kindness and compassion were shown to widows, orphans, childless men, and those who were disabled by disease, so that they all had their homes. They hated to see the wealth of natural resources undeveloped, (so they developed it), but this development was not for their own use. They hated not to exert themselves, (so they worked, but their work) was not for their own benefit. Thus (selfish) schemings were repressed and found no development. Robbers, filchers and rebellious traitors did not show themselves, and hence the outer doors were left open. This is the period of Great Harmony, Ta T'ung (大同).<sup>107</sup>

To this scene, Confucius' ideal Ta-T'ung society is undoubtedly akin to the picture of utopian world communism, which the current Chinese Communists portray as their goal.

## (2) Mencius--Meng Tzu (孟子)

### 1) Yi, Justice, and People

Mencius followed Confucius' idea of jen, yi, li, and other virtues but he emphasized the importance of yi or righteousness as a principle of human conduct. Like Confucius, he agreed with the concept of a politics of virtue, and condemned the evils of war which he regarded as the great human tragedy. So, he argued that "if the ruler of a state loves benevolence, he will have no opponent in all the world."<sup>108</sup> Mencius believed that if a state wants to be a world leader or to win the whole world or to influence other nations, the key principle is to win the people over rather than by exerting force which people dislike.

There is a way to get the world: get the people, and the empire is got. There is a way to get the people: get their hearts, and the people are got. There is a way to get their hearts: it is simply to collect

for them what they like, and not to lay on them what they dislike.<sup>109</sup>

## 2) Concepts of "Wang" and "Pa" and Superpower

War among the nations is a great crime to the people. Mencius condemning it stated: "Death is not enough for such a crime".<sup>110</sup> Therefore, Mencius opposed the concept of Pa (霸), or Hegemony in world politics because it was based upon the threat of force. The concept of Wang (王), or Kingship, which is based upon virtue and righteousness, is important in the international system of conducting world affairs and harmonizing interstate relations. A great power with the concept of Pa may not be supported by his fellow states, but a small power with the concept of Wang could be able to win the whole world. Mencius said:

He who, using force, makes a pretense to benevolence, is the Pa which requires to be a great power. He who, using virtue, practices benevolence --is the Wang which need not wait for being a great power. ... When one by force subdues men, they do not submit to him in heart. They submit, because their strength is not adequate to resist. When one subdues men by virtue, in their hearts' core they are pleased, and sincerely submit.<sup>111</sup>

## 3) Justice, National Interest, and Anti-Imperialism

Keeping the principle of yi in mind, Mencius strongly opposed the concept of profit or interest, li (利), especially the imperialistic acquisition through conquest. He observed that men were constantly struggling over gains, profits, and national interests, unsatisfied till they have usurped all. Therefore, he strongly condemned wars of imperialism for interests and profits, and he denied the right of one state to intervene in the internal affairs of other states because it often resulted in war. Mencius was an exponent of self-determination for peoples. The states should be independent on their own feet and the government established for the welfare of the people. With some democratic ideas in mind, Mencius asserted that in a nation the people were the most noble and important element of the state, the ministers and material resources next, and the ruler the least essential.<sup>112</sup> So, the

government is supposed to serve the public interest of the people rather than tyrannize the people. Externally, the state should maintain peaceful coexistence with its fellow states and should not be imperialistic or develop self-interests for its own people at the expense of other peoples.

#### 4) Defensive Concept and People's War

In order to deter imperialistic aggression Mencius approved the war of justice, yi, for self-defense. He did not feel the state needed to participate in international alliances or organizations for collective defense because these are often distorted by certain individual states and are often filled with suspicions. Once Mencius was counseled about the question of self-defense and alliance, he said: "There is one thing I can suggest. Dig deeper your moats; build higher your walls; guard them along with your people. In case of attack, be prepared to die in your defense, and have the people so that they will not leave you: this is the proper course."<sup>113</sup>

Mencius emphasized that the real strength of a nation lies in its people and their morale rather than in material power. The strongest forces and weapons may very well collapse through the corruption of morale in either the defenders or aggressors. Proper military preparations and material resources and facilities are necessary, but they constitute no guarantee of winning. But "most important of all is a happy, contented, loyal, united, benevolently governed people."<sup>114</sup> This point is exactly what today's Chinese Communists emphasize in the concept of people's war.

#### 5) Self-Cultivation, Self-Reliance, Permanent Revolution, and Arduous Struggle

Mencius further suggests that the way to a strong individual or nation is achieved through self-cultivation, self-discipline, and self-reliance. Too much ease and pleasure in prosperity will spoil man's nature and may corrupt the nation. Therefore, a nation needs external hostile stimuli or outside

threats to sustain emotional tension for constant self-restrengthening. Internally, people of a nation need a continuous revolutionary mood for human cultivation, self-training, social discipline and system reform. Mencius emphasized that the survival and strength of a nation could come through a condition of suffering and calamity, while ease and comfort pave the way to weakness and collopse.

Thus, when Heaven is about to confer a great mission on any man, it first exercises his mind with suffering, and his sinews and bones with toil. ... By all these methods it stimulates his mind, hardens his nature, and supplies his incompetencies. Men for the most part err, and are afterwards able to reform. They are distressed in mind and perplexed in their thoughts, and then they arise to vigorous reformation. ... If a nation has no brilliant elites and statesmen internally, and if abroad there are no hostile states in threat or other external calamities, the nation will generally come to ruin. From these things we see how life springs from sorrow and calamity, and death from ease and pleasure.<sup>115</sup>

This advice is quite similar to the preaching of the "Yenan Spirit" of current Chinese Communists--a call for national self-strengthening, self-reliance and world revolution.

(3) Hsun Tzu--Hsun Ch'ing (荀子)

1) Virtue, Concept of Wang and Pa, and World Politics

Hsun Tzu, like all other Confucians, emphasized virtues in human relations and politics, especially among the great powers in world politics. He, like Mencius and others, distinguished carefully the concept of "Wang", the rules of kingship which qualify one for a leadership position by virtue and public sanction on the basis of correct ritual principles, and the concept of Pa, the rules of hegemony, which lead to militarism by strengthening their military and economic power and overawing fellow states in the world. Not resenting the rules of hegemony as Mencius had, Hsun Tzu admired the rule of hegemony such as Ch'in state enjoyed during his time; but he preferred the better quality of kingship rule which was a higher grade of politics. He

believed that the practice of Wang would be more successful for a leader in world politics.

His benevolence is the loftiest in the world, his righteousness is the loftiest in the world, and his authority is the loftiest in the world. ... With an authority that cannot be opposed, abetted by ways which win men's allegiance, he gains victory without battle and acquires territory without attack. He need not wear out his men and arms, and yet the whole world is won over to him. This is the way of one who understands how to be a king (Wang).<sup>116</sup>

For Hsun Tzu, the kingship (Wang) works to acquire the willing support of people. "He who promotes ritual will become a true king; he who governs well will be strong; he who wins over the people will find safety".<sup>117</sup> Just as Mencius argued, the concept of Pa, the hegemony, is based upon the exercise of force and militarism, according to Hsun Tzu. To abuse force is not following the correct principle of Tao. So, the state which relies upon strength will be gradually reduced to weakness.<sup>118</sup> Furthermore, the other states "never cease to eye him with hatred and to dream of revenge; never do they forget their enmity. They spy out his weak points and take advantage of his defects, so that he lives in constant peril".<sup>119</sup>

Therefore, Hsun Tzu advocated that one who truly realizes how to use force does not rely upon force but instead carefully follows the principles of "Wang Tao", the way of kingship. Thus a potential world leader must have a combination of force and virtue and be one who "builds up his might and creates a fund of good will. With his might well established, he cannot be weakened by the other feudal lords (other states); with a fund of good will to rely upon, he cannot be reduced to insignificance by the other feudal lords (other states)."<sup>120</sup> Thus, the state which follows the Wang Tao will always be victorious and consequently the leader of the world, and it is he who truly understands how to use force.<sup>121</sup>

## 2) People, People's War, and Military Stratagem

People, the most important factor of a nation, Hsun Tzu does not ignore. Like Mencius, he regarded people as the most fundamental of all a nation's resources. Hsun Tzu pointed out that when people are uprising the nation will be in danger, and when people are in order the nation will be in safety.<sup>122</sup> Moreover, similar to the concept of the Mandate of Heaven, he compared people with the characteristics of water: "The ruler (government) is the boat and the common people are the water. It is the water that bears the boat up, and the water that capsizes it".<sup>123</sup> If the nation wants to be safe, the best thing for the government to do is to govern fairly and to love people.

Following Mencius' concepts of just war and anti-imperialism, Hsun Tzu argued that the practical and realistic way to stop imperialistic aggression and eliminate the chaos resulting from a state of war is to "use war to eliminate war", similar to Mao Tse-tung's concept of "war and peace"--abolishing war through war.<sup>124</sup> Hsun Tzu was convinced of fighting a just war for the sake of peace and justice.

However, Hsun Tzu also realized that the ability to fully generate adequate national power to fight a war fundamentally rests upon the willingness and the support of the people. He prescribed a basic principle that the essence of using forces to wage a war is to win the support of the people and to fight a people's war.<sup>125</sup>

Hsun Tzu regarded war as an inevitable approach to obtain peace sometimes, and it is not for imperialistic gain but stop ambitious aggression. However, according to the principle of Wang Tao the best way to operate war is to win all the people's support with virtue, so that people are cultivated by moral principles of jen and yi and regulated by the principle of li towards the full mobilization of national morale.<sup>126</sup> With the total mobilization of people armed with the proper ideology combined with other national sources



of power, the people's war will be almighty because the entire people can fight hand by hand with one heart.<sup>127</sup> To this point, Hsun Tzu proposed that "man is the decisive factor in war, not materials".<sup>128</sup> In other words, winning people is superior to obtaining materials, because the imperialistic evil aggressor and war-loving states cannot employ their own people to carry out war even with better materials if not supported by their people. Therefore, the state which follows Wang Tao grows day by day more illustrious. And those among the other states associated with it will find safety, those which turn away from it will be in danger, and those which turn against it will perish.<sup>129</sup>

From a people's war follows the principle of Wang Tao, according to Hsun Tzu, and the state becomes almighty. The nation that devotes herself to this Tao will eventually bring her leadership in the world.<sup>130</sup>

The nation which gains its people's efforts will be rich; the nation which acquires its people's willingness to fight will be strong; and the nation which obtains its people's respects will be reputable....<sup>131</sup>

In general, Hsun Tzu emphasized the relationship between people and government and between people and war which formed his whole concept of politics. As to the concept of Wang Tao in world politics, he synthesized Confucian idealism and Legalist realism. In this respect, Hsun Tzu's views, to some extent, are akin to that of present Maoism.

#### D) Pragmatic Utilitarian School--Mo Tzu and Mohism

In the latter part of the Spring and Autumn period, there appeared a third great school of thought, Mohism, which represented the proletarian and the lower middle classes, such as independent artisans, workers, and free farmers, who were emancipated from the traditional feudal bonds between the noble and the serf and slave classes. Neither wealthy nor powerful, they were a common lot of plain, hard-working, self-supporting and practical people interested only in what was useful. They were equally opposed to the aristo-

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and security and to implement international rules and justice through enforcement whenever it is violated.

Mohist doctrine enjoyed its popularity during Mencius' time. Thus, Mencius pointed out: "The words of Yang Chu and Mo Ti fill the world. If you listen to people's discourses throughout it, you will find that they have adopted the views either of Yang or of Mo."<sup>138</sup> Meanwhile, the activities of Mohist groups also worked to a certain extent to eliminate the possible outbreak of war. However, after the death of Mo Tzu, the Mohist school declined and was neglected for over two thousand years until the present time when it was rediscovered by Chinese scholars. Current Chinese Communist scholars have noted the "class struggle" aspects of Mohism and have stated that Mohism was the only school of thought which represented the proletarian majority.<sup>139</sup>

(1) Mo Tzu--Mo Ti (墨子)

- 1) Universal Love (chien-ai 兼愛), Mutual Aid (chiao-hsiang-li 交相利), and Internationalism

Unlike the Confucian concept of jen which is based upon the "graded love" expanding from self to family to state and to the world, Mo Tzu preaches his doctrine of "universal love" and mutual aid which tries to treat others the same as oneself. These doctrines are fundamentally pragmatic utilitarianism because he argues that the evaluation of an idea or act as good or evil is finally to be determined by whether it is beneficial or harmful to the majority of the people. It differs from the pragmatism of the modern Benthamites in that the ideal Mohist, though conscious of self-interest, is a self-denying and self-sacrificing personality. The Mohists would forsake pleasure and incur pain if this would benefit others. Other differences include that Benthamite utilitarianism arises from the bourgeois class while Mohism originates from the proletarian classes.<sup>140</sup>

Mo Tzu analysed the causes of world disorder in his age and concluded that they lay in a pervading selfishness and partiality. Thus he condemned the Confucian concept of graded love, a system of partiality, which he regarded as the source of human calamities.<sup>141</sup>

Similarly, in world politics it is partiality which makes nations be concerned only with their own interests in struggling for power at the expense of other nations. Due to this selfishness the whole world falls into disorder and the catastrophe of war:

Now at the present time, what brings the greatest harm to the world? Great states attacking small ones, great families overthrowing (exploiting) small ones, the strong oppressing the weak, the many harrying the few, the cunning deceiving the stupid, the eminent lording it over the humble--these are harmful to the world.<sup>142</sup>

The doctrine of universal love for Mo Tzu really implies the refutation of the concept of hierarchy which Confucianists suggest. Disregarding the differences between big states and small states, near and far, superior and inferior etc., it is a proposal to replace the concept of nationalism with a doctrine of internationalism, in which people would give their loyalties and loves to the whole human race. In this respect, it sounds quite similar to both the modern Wilsonian internationalism and the Communist internationalism. Thus, most people would grant the validity of the principle of universal love, although they would doubt that it could be realized. Mo Tzu takes universal love as neither an abstract principle nor an arbitrary injunction and argues: "Whoever loves others is loved by others; whoever aids others is aided by others; whoever hates others is hated by others; whoever injures others is injured by others. Then, what difficulty is there with universal love? Only, the government fails to employ it in his state and the common man in his conduct".<sup>143</sup>

2) Anti-Offensive-Attack (fei-kung 非攻), Just War, and Anti-Imperialism

Through human experience Mo Tzu realizes that war is the great obstacle to the practice of universal love and the great cause of human disturbance. Thus, "Condemnation of Offensive War" becomes a corollary principle. Some argued that many powerful and rich states came into being through conquest. Taking his utilitarian principle of the greatest good for the greatest number, Mo Tzu replied to this point that, while four or five successful states might benefit thereby, we must consider the suffering of the majority of states before we can justify offensive war. Therefore, he severely condemns the few great powers which attack the majority of innocent states for purposes of self-interest and expansion.

Mo Tzu said: When the people of the world praise something as good, what is their reason? ... Even the stupidest man will reply that it is praised because it brings benefit to Heaven on high, to the spirits in the middle realm, and to mankind below ...

But the rulers and states of today are not like this....they set off to attack some innocent state...such warfare we find that they have crippled the basis of the nation's livelihood and exhausted the resources of the people to an incalculable degree. This brings no benefit to mankind below.<sup>144</sup>

Since in reality offensive wars sometimes occur, Mo Tzu puts a moral justification upon the defensive war in contrast to the immoral offensive war. He further urges the small states to strengthen their defensive ability so as to discourage the ambitious great powers from attacking. Thus an effective defensive system by the small states may prevent the occurrence of international warfare and pave the way for world peace and order.<sup>145</sup> In order to secure a defensive ability and to frustrate the ambitions of the great powers, the Mohist disciples even were trained with the art of defence and tactics of fortification as a warrior group ready to help the victim states to deter the aggressors should the master's mission of peace persuasion fail.<sup>146</sup>

Mo Tzu regards the doctrines of universal love and condemnation of

aggression as the "Will of Heaven" for the welfare of mankind. To implement the righteous will of heaven he would further justify a war of punishment as contributing to world peace.

Based on moral considerations, Mo Tzu also argued that wicked rulers and governments do not love their people and should be removed, peacefully if possible but by force if necessary. This would be a relatively small price to pay to be rid of an evil and to promote the principle of love in the end. However, while such removal is probably true and justified for the internal affairs of a country, it is very difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between a "war of aggression" and a "war of punishment" in international relations. That is, who or what institution can judge fairly? Can a war of aggression be defined as a "first attack" and a war of punishment as a "second attack" or "counter-attack" from either the attacked nations or a third party? Mo Tzu did not give us a clear answer. This issue remains a great source of confusion even today in determining the definition of "aggressor" or "defender" in world politics.

Finally, Mo Tzu suggests that if a great power wishes to be a leader in the world it should not rely on force because its strength will be used up in maintaining superiority. Instead, a great power should not only abolish the idea of conquest but also try to practice the virtue of benevolence and righteousness to win the respect of other states. Therefore the nation will be stable and stronger day by day and no other state can dare to attack. Such moral supremacy of position will eventually ensure her leadership in the world.<sup>147</sup> Mo Tzu's moral concepts of virtue in international politics is (like Confucianism) somewhat idealistic, reflecting Chinese humanitarian traditions, while his theory of utilitarian arguments, representing proletarian pragmatism, is along the line of realist schools in general. Mo Tzu

and his followers found the Tao in human mutual benefit which was the Will of Heaven.

## (2) Mohist Group and Its Political Movement

During the whole Warring States period Mohist thought was very popular and Mohist followers were active in their political activity among the states of China. The nucleus of Mohist followers was a highly disciplined and militant group which was similar to modern militant political parties in the implementation of their ideal thought and political reforms. Armed with spirit of universal love and sincerity, the members of Mohist group acted like religious preachers. They had great self-confidence and a spirit of self-sacrifice in becoming revolutionaries for their principles. This kind of belief and conduct was perhaps derived from the social climate of the times which was marked by a disintegrating feudal system.

### 1) Hsiah and Mohist Group

With the disintegration of feudalism during the latter part of Chou Dynasty, the warrior specialists, who were the backbone of the armies of feudal lords at that time, lost their positions and titles and scattered around the country. These people were known as the Hsiah (俠) or Yu Hsiah (游俠), the knights-errant. The personality of such knights-errant is described by the Shih Chi: "Their words were always sincere and trustworthy, and their actions always quick and decisive. They were always true to what they promised, and without regard to their own persons, they would rush into dangers threatening others."<sup>148</sup> This concept of professional ethics was largely adopted by Mo Tzu in his teaching.

Unlike the ju (literati), who were specialists attached to the houses of the aristocrats throughout Chinese history, the Hsiah were more frequently recruited from the lower classes. There is much evidence that Mo Tzu and his

followers came from the proletarian class, Hsiah. They opposed the monopoly of the social amenities, such as the luxuries of rituals and music, by the aristocrats. They criticised the Confucian teachings for serving only the privileged aristocratic minority, not the proletarian majority. They further denounced the traditional feudal institutions which the Confucianists supported in their hierarchical concept of human relations. This criticism, combined with the rationalization of the professional ethics of their own social class, formed the theme of Mohist thought.

The spirit of Hsiah has existed in the lower classes of Chinese society throughout history. The numerous peasant rebellions in the past were largely influenced by the spirit of Hsiah and carried out by this group of people for the welfare of the peasant majority. (The rise of Mao and Chinese Communists was also influenced by this tradition.) Later, the development of secret societies in Ming and Ch'ing dynasties was partially derived from the traditions of Hsiah. Similarly, Chinese literature, as in the famous novel, Shui Hu Chuan (All Men Are Brothers), which Mao Tse-tung favored most, also reflects the philosophy of Hsiah.

Today, the Chinese Communists regard the spirit of Hsiah and Mohist doctrine as one of most valuable Chinese traditions, compatible with the revolutionary "Spirit of Yen-an". They urged that this golden part of Chinese treasure be enlarged and critically adopted in contributing to the development of modern China.<sup>149</sup>

## 2) Righteousness, Mohist Warriors, and International Force

The importance of the Mohist group in the field of international politics is their practice of Mohist thought of righteousness through a status of international enforcement. From various sources we realize that the Mohists constituted a strictly disciplined organization of warriors armed with Mohist moral ideology. In the works of Huai Nan Tzu,<sup>150</sup> Mo Tzu,<sup>151</sup> and other classics



all provided this fact.

Oriented by Mohist principles of universal love and anti-offensive warfare, the Mohist group of warriors was formed to implement these principles in the international field. To perform righteousness in opposing offensive war they were eager help attacked nations, especially weak nations, to fight a defensive war. From many sources and stories, it is known that their acts of justice in the international arena were quite effective and did prevent many wars from occurring. For instance, the famous story in the work "Mo Tzu" tells how Mo Tzu made his great effort to stop Ch'u's attack upon Sung.<sup>152</sup> In the Chapter of Lu Wen of the same work, it tells that through Mo Tzu's persuasions Ch'i state stopped attacking Lu state, and Lu state cancelled its invasion upon Cheng state.<sup>153</sup> Similarly, in the Chapter of Anti-Offensive Warfare of the same work, it tells that Sung Tzu, a Mohist disciple, presented a possible confrontation between Ch'in state and Ch'u state by means of persuasion through the Mohist utilitarian principle.<sup>154</sup> From many other contemporary works of the "Mo Tzu", there were a large number of cases illustrating the righteous conduct of the Mohist group as an international force in the world politics of China at that time.

Inspired by Mohist performance in the international field, it is possible that ancient Chinese interstate politics included a concept of international enforcement to preserve world peace and security which is similar to the function of modern international organizations, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. The Mohist group might have been primitive in the sense of preventing the occurrence of war and of the systematic promotion of human welfare, but it did provide the valuable idea of an international and impartial party to mediate confrontations or to put sanctions into practice on behalf of moral justice if necessary. Moreover,

a considerable merit of the Mohist group is its neutral and impartial stand, which is especially important in helping the majority of weak nations in cases of threatened invasion, and not serving as a tool for the great powers as the modern international organizations have done. On the contrary, the Mohist group not only was set up to fight a defensive war for the attacked nations but also was a "professional standing force" in the implementation of international principles, which modern international organizations lack. Since the stand of the current United Nations is not clear enough to be neutral in serving all the nations in the world, the United Nations has therefore been frequently accused by China and Third World nations of serving only a few western great powers, especially the two superpowers, at the expense of the majority of small nations.

If we can see any influence of Mohist thought upon contemporary Chinese foreign policy, it is the Mohist principles of internationalism, universal love, and anti-imperialistic attack which inspired their attitude towards the role of international organizations today.

#### E) The Realist School--Han Fei Tzu and Legalism

When the international situation worsened in the latter part of the Warring States period, the philosophy of politics was being drastically re-directed into realistic Legalism. The realist Confucian follower, Hsun Tzu, suggested an eclectic approach which later served as a transition toward the blossoming of Legalism when political circumstances involved into a desperate struggle for national survival.

Due to the change of conditions at all social levels, what the rulers were concerned with was not idealistic programs to benefit their people as the idealist schools of thought suggested, but with realistic methods for dealing with the critical situations which their governments now faced.

Because the times called for a realistic approach, the Legalist School (Fa Chia 法家) enjoyed considerable popularity during the latter part of Warring States period. There were certain Legalists who devoted their efforts to military strategy and art of war, thus forming the Strategic School or School of Military Science, Ping Chia (兵家). Some prominent contributors to this school were Sun Pin (孫臏), Wu Ch'i (吳起), Jang Chu (穰苴), and Wei Liao (尉繚). They all wrote important works on military affairs. Among those works the work "Sun Tzu Ping Fa" (The Art of War) is today the most famous.

Another group of Legalists were concerned with diplomatic manipulations among states and founded the "Vertical and Horizontal Alliances" School, Tsung-Heng Chia (縱橫家). The most prominent members of this school of international politics were Su Ch'in (蘇秦) and Chang Yi (張儀). In terms of their methods, both the Strategic School and the Tsung-Heng School are usually classified within the School of Legalism.<sup>155</sup>

#### (1) Philosophical Views of Legalism

##### 1) Human Nature and Historical Materialism

Like all other realist philosophers, most of the Chinese Legalists believe that human nature is evil. Since all men act from motives of selfishness and self-profit, it is sensible for the government to set up a system of rewards and punishments.

For Legalists, the philosophy of history is of historical materialism as a dynamic force in social evolution. This completely contradicts the Confucian illusions of Yao, Shun, and early Chou, and the Mohist illusions of Yu, the remote golden age of sage-politics. They believe that history is a continuous flow, with men, events, and ideas blended through material circumstances. The past is nothing to be repeated or regretted; only the

present and the future remain to be challenged through human intellect and power.<sup>156</sup> The Legalists fully understood the changing needs of material conditions and faced it realistically. Han Fei Tzu suggests that new problems can only be solved by new measures, and "Therefore affairs go according to their time, and preparations are made in accordance with affairs."<sup>157</sup> He and most of the Legalists, although admitting that the people of ancient times were more innocent or more virtuous, argued that it was due to material circumstances rather than to any inherently superior good nature. Therefore, they maintained that the body politics or politics of virtue could only be employed in ancient times but not under the conditions of their day. Han Fei Tzu gave this example:

In ancient times King Wen... practiced benevolence and righteousness, ... King Yen of Hsu ...practiced benecolence and righteousness, ...until King Wen of Ching, fearing for his own safety, called out his troops, attacked Hsu, and wiped it out. Thus King Wen practiced benevolence and righteousness and became ruler of the world, but King Yen practiced benevolence and righteousness and destroyed his state. This is because benevolence and righteousness served for ancient times, but no longer serve today. So I say that circumstances differ with the age.<sup>158</sup>

Another great Legalist, Shang Yang, had already made a similar point before Han Fei Tzu and stated that as conditions in the world change, different principles were practiced. To this point, the Legalist theory of historical materialism is quite akin to modern Karl Marx's analysis of dynamic social and economic relations and the famous theory of dialectical materialism which states that ideas are only products of the material environment in which men live.

Furthermore, in a striking parallel to Marx's view of historical materialism on the basis of economics, Han Fei Tzu holds that in ancient times "there were few people but plenty of supplies, and therefore the people did not quarrel. But nowadays ... there are many people but few supplies, and that one has to work hard for a meager return. So the people fall to

quarreling, and though rewards are doubled and punishments are piled on, they cannot be prevented from growing disorderly."<sup>159</sup> Similar to Marx's analysis of the evolution of history on the basis of means of production and economic conditions, Han Fei Tzu divides history into three periods: remote antiquity, middle antiquity, and recent antiquity.<sup>160</sup>

## 2) The Three Groups and Han Fei Tzu as Synthesizer

By and large there were three groups in the Legalist School. The first group was headed by Shen Tao (慎到), a Taoist as well as a Legalist, who laid stress on shih (勢), which could be termed "power" or "authority". This group of thinkers attempted to discover the source of control in human relations. What they discovered was that it is position or role in social relations which creates power and influence. It is the prestige, reputation, and position of a man or a nation which produces power-relations that govern all of human society.<sup>161</sup>

Similarly, a nation's power and influence in the international community is due to its prestige and role in world politics. A skillful demonstration of national power may increase a nation's prominence so that it can play an appropriate role with a larger sphere of influence. Therefore, a nation's shih is not only derived from internal sources of national power but also from its skill in managing relations among fellow states in the world community.

The second group of Legalists emphasized the importance of shu (術), which could be termed "statecraft" or methods of government somewhat like the modern technique of public administration. The leader of this group was Shen Pu-hai (申不害) who was appointed minister in Han state in 351 B.C..<sup>162</sup>

The third group of Legalists stressed the function of law, fa (法). Shang Yang (商鞅) led this line of thought which was regarded as inevitable

due to the drastic change of circumstances during the Warring States period. Han Fei Tzu regards law and shu, or statecraft, as two indispensable tools for government, because statecraft can serve the ruler in power and laws are what are to be obeyed by the people.<sup>163</sup>

Therefore, each of these three groups made a contribution to Legalist Tao. But Han Fei Tzu considered all these three views of Legalist Tao as equally important and thus synthesized them further with the Taoist concept of wu-wei into a systematic theory of Legalism.

## (2) Kuan Tzu, Shang Yang and Nation-Building

The Legalists fully realized that the effectiveness of a nation's foreign policy and a role of leadership in world politics relied heavily upon its internal strength, especially upon such tangible and intangible elements of national power as social and political structure, military preparedness, and national morale. Within an era of power-politics like the Warring States period, it was very true that the internally weak nation was weak externally. Thus, both Kuan Tzu and Shang Yang were well known for their successful political and social reforms.

### 1) Kuan Tzu (管子) and Legalist Reform

Kuan Tzu not only emphasized the function of law but also paid much attention to the proper type of education for the people. A highly disciplined and educated people would be a tremendous source of manpower for a nation's mobilization. On the local level, Kuan Tzu tightened social relations among families through a group system of mutual responsibility. He set up a centralized control of people through semi-social and political units throughout the country.<sup>164</sup>

On the economic side, Kuan Tzu put stress on the people's living standard, that is, the economic security of people which is one of the most

important areas in politics. He pointed out: "When their foodstocks are full, the people understand what is courtesy or politeness. When there are enough civil supplies, the people realize what is honor or humiliation".<sup>165</sup> ...

"Therefore, a rich nation is always in order, while a poor nation is always in chaos. Thus, those who really know how to deal with politics must make people rich first, and then rule the people."<sup>166</sup>

Furthermore, Kuan Tzu also understood the importance of the problem of economic distribution. In his time, the internal and external commerce of a state was under private control and a capitalistic economic system had been highly developed. In order to prevent the monopoly of capital and economic exploitation by certain big capitalists, Kuan Tzu implemented a policy of socialism through nationalization of all big enterprises which might effect national or civil development. His socialist reform corrected the earlier capitalist policy of laissez-faire which had created some economic problems.<sup>167</sup>

On the agricultural aspect, Kuan Tzu operated an agrarian reform to equalize ownership of cultivated land among the people, somewhat like the traditional "Well-Field" (井田) system. The government also set up certain policies to help or to protect the interests of peasants.<sup>168</sup>

Due to Kuan Tzu's drastic political, social, and economic reforms, which set up the foundation of national power, the Ch'i state under Duke Huan eventually became the first hegemonic leader among its fellow states during early Spring and Autumn period.

## 2) Shang Yang (商鞅) and Totalitarianism

One of the most important events during the middle Warring States period was Shang Yang's political and social reforms in Ch'in, which led Ch'in to become the most powerful state among its fellow states. Following the Legalist line Shang Yang emphasized the function and importance of law

but his main contribution to the political field was the policy of totalitarian nationalism--a harsh struggle for nation-building. A profound legal system, for him, was a wise basis for governmental rule. However, what was more important was how to increase national power, because almost all the Legalists realized that power was a prerequisite for determined leadership in the world. "The reason for a nation that is respected and for a ruler who is honored is because of power."<sup>169</sup>

The most tangible sources of national power at that time were agricultural and military strength. Therefore, Shang Yang's reform was first concentrated on the increase of agricultural products by encouraging a universal participation in land cultivation. He urged all people of his nation to join in laboring for economic production, even soldiers and intellectuals. Thus the nation would benefit from the economic increase.

Besides his emphasis on agricultural development, Shang Yang also stressed a highly disciplined militia type of military system. All people in the state participated in military exercises and training so that, in addition to the formal standing army, a peasant-soldier type of militia was organized. Under this policy "strong men are organized as an army; strong women are organized as an army; the weak men and women are organized as an army; and these are the three armies". All three armies help military operations specifically by taking their appropriate roles to fight, to supply, and to take care of civil affairs.<sup>170</sup>

In general, Shang Yang's country was a centralized and highly controlled totalitarian society with militaristic and nationalistic ideologies under strict laws. His political, social and economic reforms of totalitarianism limited individual development and freedom, but promoted Ch'in's national power. History tells that Shang Yang's totalitarian reforms won honor and status in the Legalist School of thought, although the dynasty of the tota-



litarian Ch'in was the shortest in Chinese history.

(3) Han Fei Tzu (韓非子)--Representative of Legalist Thought

1) Power, State, and Power Politics

Han Fei Tzu was a scholar of keen observation and a writer of the "power concept" in political affairs. He studied men and institutions from the Taoist standpoint and he never indulged in utopian dreams and wishful fantasies as the idealist Confucians and Mohists did. He realistically is concerned only with what is at the present and what will be in the near future.

According to his theory of the evolution of the state, a theory of historical materialism, Han Fei Tzu claims that the ancient ideal ruler is a moralist, the medieval a philosopher, and the modern a man of power. "Men of high antiquity strove for moral virtue; men of middle times sought out wise schemes; men of today vie to be known for strength and spirit".<sup>171</sup> Like Bodin, Han Fei Tzu points out that the essential characteristic of the state is power, force, or sovereign authority. Without the sovereign power, even the sages like Yao and Shun would just be mere individuals and could not maintain peace and order throughout the world. And it is national power which regulates a nation's internal and external affairs.

Thus he who has great power at his disposal may force others to pay him court, but he whose power is weak must pay court to others. For this reason the enlightened ruler works to build up power.<sup>172</sup>

Like most of the Legalists, Han Fei Tzu warns of the political reality and coldness of power politics in international relations. He criticizes the idealist doctrine of practicing benevolence and righteousness in the world politics.<sup>173</sup> Instead he urges a proper awareness of these external power struggles and the building of strength through nationalism internally. Only realistic means and effective methods could deal with the cruel realities

of power politics.<sup>174</sup>

## 2) Nation-Building and Foreign Affairs

Han Fei Tzu therefore suggest that the highest aim of a state is the power and wealth which are extremely important to its conduct of foreign affairs. A strong policy within is a prerequisite to effective foreign policy without. He considers a nation's power and wealth to be mainly generated from internal strength and development rather than the wisdom of its foreign policy.

Neither power nor order, however, can be sought abroad--they are wholly a matter of internal government. Now if the ruler does not apply the proper laws and procedures within his state, but stakes all on the wisdom of his foreign policy, his state will never become powerful and well ordered.<sup>175</sup>

Therefore, in this aspect of political development Han Fei Tzu, like Shang Yang, urged totalitarian political and social reforms to strengthen the nation. The nation must so regiment and educate the people that they all work as soldiers and farmers combined for increasing the power and wealth of the nation. All the people in the state serve as public citizens not private individuals. For Han Fei Tzu, a high mode of nationalism and patriotism must be adopted in order to foster national self-reliance and strength. Somewhat like the modern German statism, Han Fei Tzu's philosophy of state seems to be that the state exists for its own sake and the individual must live and die for the sake of the state.<sup>176</sup> Hence, Han Fei Tzu's cold-blooded concept of statism was criticized by an eminent modern writer who said that "Han Fei Tzu sees only the state, but does not see man; he sees only the group, but does not see the individual."<sup>177</sup>

## 3) Independent Diplomacy and the Balance of Power

As for his attitude towards the popular policy of Horizontal Alliance (Ho-Tsung) or Vertical Alliance (Lien-Heng), the balance of power, Han Fei Tzu seems to be quite cautious about a nation's participating in either of

these alliances because of the international uncertainty. The lack of mutual trust and the sometimes secret diplomacy are the main obstacles to an effective alliance in international relations. To stake one's national survival upon an uncertain alliance is a dangerous gamble for a nation.<sup>178</sup> International politics during the Warring States period clearly present the fact that nine-tenths of the Vertical Alliances, Ho-Tsung, failed due to mutual distrust among the allied states. Therefore, Han Fei Tzu seems to suggest to the middle and the smaller states that they keep a policy of non-alignment and stay away from the alliances and struggles for power, which are the affairs of the great powers. He especially gives advice to those smaller states not to participate in alliances unless one's internal power has been built strong enough for an independent diplomacy which can participate in the game of the balance of power.

...Chou was ruined by the Vertical Alliance and Wey was destroyed by the Horizontal Alliance. Instead of being so hasty in their plans to join an alliance, they should have worked to strengthen the order within their domains, to make their laws clear and their rewards and punishments certain, to utilize the full resources of the land in building up stores of provisions, and to train their people to defend the cities to the point of death, thus ensuring that any other ruler would gain little profit by trying to seize their lands, but on the contrary would suffer great injury if he attempted to attack their states.... Once the wisdom of its foreign policy is exhausted and its internal government has fallen into disorder, no state can be saved from ruin.<sup>179</sup>

In general, Han Fei Tzu does not encourage states to join the system of the balance of power except those great powers that are capable of standing as power centers each with independent diplomacies.

#### 4) One Power Predominance and World Unification

Most of the schools of thought during the Warring States period were urging an end to the contending international situation. Each presented its means and philosophy for world peace and unification just as in today's world condition. Eventually, however, it was the realist Legalism which took

the role of world dominance. The Legalist policies of science, encouraging economy and warfare, disciplining the people under rule of laws, and conducting the foreign policies with realist power-politics approach eventually made Ch'in powerful enough to complete its conquest over the other states in China in 221 B.C. Han Fei Tzu's thought visualized Chinese unification and thereafter has been profitably drawn upon again and again by later rulers and political theorists. Its penetrating analyses and astute advice remain of vital interest and influence today in contemporary Chinese politics.

A great thinker and Taoist follower of Han Dynasty, Wang Yun (王允) criticized Han Fei Tzu: "The way (Tao) to govern a nation contains two faces. First is to cultivate virtue and the second is to generate power. ... Things can be done through virtue and can also be completed by power. A nation may be furnished with virtues in conducting foreign affairs externally but should be strengthened with power internally. So that the states of virtue-admirer can be won by conducting virtues without war and the states violating virtues can be carried by force. ... Therefore, neither virtue could solely be relied upon to satisfy the art of politics nor power could solely be used to deal with the enemy".<sup>180</sup> Following the Taoist philosophy of relativity, he tried to synthesize the two faces of Tao which the idealists and the realists suggest.

Current Chinese politics seem to be following this tradition of the middle way to deal with its internal and external affairs. The Chinese are nowadays searching for the way to synthesize the various strains of idealism and realism from their past treasure of thought and experiences.

#### F) The School of Tsung-Heng: The Balance of Power

"The Horizontal Alliance (Lien-Heng 連橫) was an east-west alignment of states under the leadership of the powerful state of Ch'in in the west.

The Vertical Alliance (Ho-Tsung 合縱), a north-south alignment, was designed to preserve the independence of the weaker states and block Ch'in's expansion,"<sup>181</sup> according to Professor Bruton Watson. Han Fei Tzu also defined the meaning of Tsung-Heng as "the Vertical Alliance (Tsung), in which one joins with a number of weak states in hopes of attacking a strong one," and "the Horizontal Alliance (Heng), in which one serves a strong state for the purpose of attacking a number of weak ones."<sup>182</sup> In other words, if we translate the basic theme of Tsung-Heng theory into a modern idea, it is the concept of the balance of power as an approach to international politics. In general, the approach of Ho-Tsung could be regarded as "alliances for balance" and the Lien-Heng as "divide and rule."

The School of Tsung-Heng was emerging when the realist thought of Legalism dominated the philosophical schools in the latter part of Warring States period. As the degree of chaos increased due to a vicious struggle for power among the contending states at that time, a realistic method was needed to solve the problems. Thus, a group of Legalists who devoted their efforts specifically to the field of international relations and foreign policies founded the School of Tsung-Heng (Tsung-Heng Chia 縱橫家).

The most eminent men in the School of Tsung-Heng were Su Ch'in (蘇秦) and Chang Yi (張儀), who both were disciples of Kuei Ku Tzu (鬼谷子).<sup>183</sup> The former was leader of the Ho-Tsung group and the latter was leader of the Lien-Heng group. However, there were many less famous but still notable persons within these two groups from time to time during the Warring States period and throughout Chinese history.

#### (1) General Introduction of Tsung-Heng School

##### 1) Hsing-Jen (行人) and Tsung-Heng School

Pan Ku (班固), a great historian of the Han Dynasty, in his work

Literature of Han (漢書藝文志) pointed out in the preface the various Schools of thought: "The founder of Tsung-Heng School derived from the position of hsing-jen." The so-called hsing-jen, in modern terms, is the diplomat.

When international conditions were getting chaotic and the struggle for power among the contending states intensified, the hsing-jen in a state played a more important role as an advisor of national security and foreign policy. Due to the national needs and coinciding with the international situation, a concept of balance of power was gradually formed through various experiences of the hsing-jen. In an international situation of contending states, the Vertical Alliance and the Horizontal Alliance became the most popular proposals for a national foreign policy among the states. The study of these alliances as a national foreign policy formulated the School of Tsung-Heng.

## 2) Tsung-Heng School and Other Schools of Thought

The Confucian idealistic concept of virtue cannot be reconciled with the realistic concept of balance of power suggested by the Tsung-Heng School. Therefore, although they were well known, the words of Confucius and Mencius did not impress the rulers.

The Taoist concept of Tao and Yin-Yang provides the important theory of dialectical materialism. In the dialectical change of Yin-Yang, the Yi (易), supplies the variables for strategic manipulation. The negative, indirect, and responsive approaches of Yin supplement the defects of the positive, direct and challenging approaches of Yang. Taoist doctrine had a great influence on the flexible operation of the balance of power for the Tsung-Heng School. Such an idea of flexibility in manipulating matters has been stated by Lao Tzu: "What is to be shrunken is first stretched out; what is to be weakened is first made strong; what will be thrown over is first

raised up; what will be withdrawn is first bestowed. This indeed is subtle light; the gentle way will overcome the hard and strong."<sup>184</sup> This dialectical concept was adopted by Tsung-Heng School in its application of international affairs.

The Mohist spirit of pragmatism also provides a realistic and scientific basis for the Tsung-Heng School in its diplomatic manipulation. Upon Legalist realism and the Machiavellian type of approaches, national totalitarianism and international power-politics, the Tsung-Heng School based its approach to international manipulation.<sup>185</sup>

The use of trickery and deception in war and strategy suggested by the Stratagem School coincides with the game playing and secret diplomacy in the balance of power. Kuei Ku Tzu was not only the teacher of the Tsung-Heng School but also the master of the Stratagem School. He adopted the Taoist concept of dialectical materialism and applied the principle of Tao and Yin-Yang as a political realist approach in warfare and international politics.<sup>186</sup>

### 3) General Principles of Ho-Tsung

Although the main theme of Ho-Tsung is an alliance among states for collective defense to deter the menace of a greater power's domination, there are several other principles of this policy may be generalized for study.

#### (a) A Stress on the Advantages of Collective Defense System.

When a group of minor powers' security is threatened by a world power, the advantage of a system of collective defense seems to be quite obvious for them. Because the common interest among the states is urgent and necessary, a temporary united front can be established regardless of certain disadvantages to that alliance.

At this point, therefore, Su Ch'in started his system of Ho-Tsung, persuading the concerned states by stressing the advantages of collective

defense system. He was successful in doing so, first with the weaker and more concerned states like Yen, Han, and Chao and then with the stronger and less concerned states like Wei, Ch'i and Ch'u.<sup>187</sup> Therefore, the outcome of the system of Ho-Tsung was due to the advantage of mutual benefit in a collective defense system.

(b) Competition and Alliances against World Domination

In order to form an effective collective defense system, as many as possible states are urged to participate in this system, especially those great leading powers which may play a decisive role. Thus, a pattern of competition for alliances among the states, especially for the great powers, is formed. In the process of competition for balance of power, both the most concerned minor and major powers are liable to be persuaded and the rest of the other powers might shift their policies after a system is nearly built up. Su Ch'in formed his system of Ho-Tsung not only by first persuading the weak and most concerned state of Yen but also by attempting to get one of the major powers, Chao, to lead the system of Ho-Tsung alliances to deter the world dominant Ch'in state.<sup>188</sup> After he succeeded and formed a relatively stable alliance, it did not take too much effort to attract other major states to participate in the alliance, such states as Wei, Ch'i, and Ch'u. Thus, a system of Ho-Tsung was finally established.

(c) Rejection of Appeasement

Since contradictions always exist within all matters, especially in a situation of struggle for national interest among nations, a great weakness of the system of collective defense is probably the mood of mutual distrust among the member states which may finally lead to a total collapse through appeasements by certain member states. Therefore, continuous consultations and commitments to reinforce collectivity, mutual trusts, and cooperation



are urged to prevent the possible occurrence of appeasement. A modern example of this situation can be illustrated by a serious controversy between the United States, the leading member, and its European allies, especially France, in the NATO system during 1960's.

Similarly, in order to consolidate his system of Ho-Tsung, Su Ch'in not only tried to embrace all the concerned states in a system of collective defense but also attempted to eliminate the contradictions among them and to reconcile their relationship. A great contribution to the system of Ho-Tsung was his success in persuading the great power of Ch'i not to accept the title of "Eastern Emperor" in 234 B.C. The powerful state of Ch'in had offered this in an attempt to bribe Ch'i into sharing the hegemonic superiority over fellow states in order to eliminate the system of Ho-Tsung.<sup>189</sup> Su Ch'in was successful in preventing this possible appeasement from occurring and thus completed his system of Ho-Tsung which maintained world peace and checked Ch'in's aggression for a period of twenty-nine years.<sup>190</sup>

#### 4) General Principles of Lien-Heng

Since it is opposite to the system of Ho-Tsung, the principles of Lien-Heng are concentrated on diplomatic techniques and the manipulation of contradictions among states in order to break down the alliance and the system of collective defense. It is mainly a policy of "divide and rule" in the balance of power.

##### (a) Stress on the Disadvantages of Collective Defense System.

Unlike the system of Ho-Tsung which is constructed on the basis of the advantages of collective defense, the policy of Lien-Heng is aimed at breaking down the system of Ho-Tsung through stressing its disadvantages, defects and weaknesses. To this purpose, such defects of alliance as mutual distrust and suspicion, secret diplomacy for self-national interest, the

uncertainty of the power balance, and the unreliability of security commitments, are greatly exaggerated in order to diminish the feasibility of collective defense. It is the negative side and the psychological weapon of Lien-Heng.

Following this principle, Chang Yi and other Lien-Heng followers devoted their efforts to persuade rulers of various states, especially the small and middle powers, not to participate in or to withdraw from the system of collective defense, emphasizing the disadvantages of such an alliance. They further tried to incite the great powers to ally themselves with Ch'in, the superpower, to share world conquest.

(b) Competition, Divide and Rule, and  
Manipulation of Contradictions

Due to the reshaping of the balance of power by the alliances, the system of Lien-Heng was forced to compete for allies in order to diminish the power of its opponent. This competition for associates was mainly aimed at great powers who, being secure, are easily tempted by the offering interest and bribes. Thus, the strategy of Lien-Heng concentrated on the principle of divide and rule. To achieve this goal, not only the tactics of bribery with various interests, compensation of certain territory and concessions of minor conflicting policies are used to attract concerned parties to keep neutral or to become associates, but also the techniques of manipulating contradictions among the member states of opponent alliances so as to break up unity and to reduce the potential power of the system of collective defense. When an alliance begins to weaken from the rising self-interest of the member states, that will be the correct time for the world dominant power to proceed in attacking the individual states one by one.

(c) "Yuan-Chiao Chin-Kung" and United Front and Struggle.

The process of divide and rule for the purpose of conquest is for-

ulated through the strategy of "yuan-chiao chin-kung", associating with far-off and/or big states and attacking near and/or small states.<sup>191</sup> This formula is featured by the principle of united front and struggle. The state conducting the strategy of Lien-Heng devoted its efforts first to associating temporarily with the less concerned and distant great powers to form a united front or at least to make those states keep neutral. Then its aim turns to the seriously concerned and geographically near and small states for attack. After the liquidation of the small, less powerful and near states, which contributes to her national power, the state which follows Lien-Heng then gradually turns to the isolated allies of united front for struggle. At this moment, the hopelessly isolated far-off states will face a predominant challenge and can not keep neutral nor have associates, and they will either be defeated or have to surrender. The dialectical process of swinging between a united front and a struggle becomes the Tsung-Heng system's basic approach to the reshaping of the balance of power.

Chang Yi's concrete proposal of "yuan-chiao chin-kung" finally made Ch'in an unconquerable power among its fellow states through reshaping the balance of power. In her process of making a united front with the far-off and less concerned great powers such as Ch'u and Ch'i,<sup>192</sup> Ch'in in the meantime began to launch attacks on the near and small states such as Wei and Han about 317 B.C.<sup>193</sup> At this time, Chang Yi started his mission of persuading Chao and Yen to submit to Ch'in in the system of Lien-Heng. After completing this task, Ch'in turned attacks first on Ch'u and then on Ch'i, her allies of the united front. When Ch'i was hopelessly defeated and annexed, Ch'in finished its conquest of all states and unified China in 221 B.C.

- 5) The Role of the Tsung-Heng School in the Process of Ch'in's Conquest and the Unification of China

The realist school of international politics regards balance of power as the main approach to preserving world peace and national security. However, its opponents criticized balance of power as the main cause of international conflict and disorder because of its relatively unbalanced, vague power concept and power uncertainty. This contemporary controversy actually reveals the major theme of the philosophy of Tao and its two faces, Yin and Yang. Since nothing is absolute in the universe, the interactions of Yin and Yang, a dialectical process of balance and imbalance, led to historical, social and economical evolutions through war and peace.

The main theme of the Tsung-Heng School is the concept of balance of power. It presents the dialectical theory of Tao--the unity of opposites. The existence of the concept of Tsung-Heng is because of its contradictive two phases, Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng. To this point, members in the Ho-Tsung system are "response states" in the phase of Yin which attempts to maintain the balance of power, and the states in the Lien-Heng system are "challenge states" in the phase of Yang which attempt to break or to reshape the balance of power. The interaction of response and challenge, the Yin and Yang, and the transformation of balance and imbalance led to the final unification of China. In the interaction of the Tsung-Heng system, Ch'in could correctly handle the dialectical transformation of contradiction. In the latter part of Warring States period, Ch'in did from time to time swing its policy between the system of Ho-Tsung and the system of Lien-Heng according to various circumstances. With correct manipulation of the Tsung-Heng theory, Ch'in drastically increased her power along with each transformation of Tsung-Heng, the reshaping of the balance of power. The amount of power which Ch'in gained from the manipulation of the balance of power was much more than that which she gained through the physical conquest over her fellow

states. In his work "Liu-kuo Lun" (The Six States), Su Hsun (蘇洵 1009-1066 A.D.), one of the Sung Dynasty's "Eight Great Prose Masters", described this situation and pointed out the role of the Tsung-Heng system in the process of unification.

The Six States were not destroyed because their weapons were dull or their warfare inept. Their real weakness lay in appeasing Ch'in: to bribe Ch'in and so diminish their own strength was the path to certain destruction.

... Those states which did not bribe Ch'in were destroyed by the ones that did because the former were robbed of effective aid by the latter and very soon could not stand by themselves--this is why I say the real weakness of the Six States lay in appeasing Ch'in. The territory Ch'in acquired without having to do battle for it--... actually amounted to a hundred times more than she even got by warfare.<sup>194</sup>

The role of the Tsung-Heng School in the process of China's unification was impressive, especially the system of Lien-Heng which paved the way for the finality. Liu Hsiang of Han Dynasty concludes his preface in the Chan-kuo Ts'e by giving the credit of China's eventual unification under Ch'in to Chang Yi's accomplishment.

When Su Ch'in died Chang Yi formed the Coalition (system of Lien-Heng). All the Lords obeyed him and faced the west to do homage to Ch'in. It was for this reason that Ch'in Shih-huang ... ate away the Six States as the silk-worm gnaws away the leaf. He brought all the Lords under his control and unified the empire.<sup>195</sup>

## (2) Kuei Ku Tzu (鬼谷子)--Founding Father of Tsung-Heng School

Nothing is certain about Kuei Ku Tzu and his life. The Shih Chi tells us that a hermit lived in the place of Kuei Ku (鬼谷) in the city of Yang (陽城) during the Warring States period and that he called himself Mr. Kuei Ku.<sup>196</sup> The content of the book Tao Chang (道藏) tells that Kuei Ku Tzu's name was Wang Hsu (王翊) and lived in the period of Duke P'ing Chin.<sup>197</sup> Certain people regarded Kuei Ku Tzu and Su Ch'in as the same person, since Su Ch'in pretended to be somewhat mysterious for his own advantages.<sup>198</sup> Kuei Ku Tzu wrote the book Kuei Ku Tzu in a total of three volumes.<sup>199</sup>

1) Tao, Yin-Yang, Pai-Ho and Dialectical Materialism

Kuei Ku Tzu's theoretical foundation of the Taung-Heng concept rests on the Taoist concept of Tao and Yin-Yang, which co-exist in a manner of unity and contradiction. In this sense, Tao represents the phenomena of regularity and ordinariness and the Yin-Yang dialectic represents the phenomena of irregularity and exception in the universe. However, in the objective process of transferring from the unity to the contradiction or from the contradiction to the unity there exists a transitional point or stage which is the key for a subjective motivation and manipulation. It is this subjective motivation and manipulation which Kuei Ku Tzu regards as a great wisdom in controlling complicated human relations and social affairs.

In the process of unity and dissociation, or beginning and ending, of the universe, there exists a conversional gap or stage which we should investigate. For those who can understand it through dialectical flexibility (Pai-Ho 捭闔) and manipulate it will be the great wise men. The great wise men are the missionaries of the universe. <sup>200</sup>

The idea of Pai-Ho (Open and Closed) which is highly dialectical in sense may correspond with that of Yin-Yang. The flexible interaction of Pai and Ho, Yin and Yang, according to the appropriate objective conditions will create a situation which may lead to a subjective human control. In international relations an appropriate management of the interaction of Pai-Ho (捭闔) and Tsung-Heng (collective defense alliance and "divide and rule") may provide a condition from which the subjective operator can take advantages. As with modern natural science which follows the objective laws of nature operating in the universe, man investigates its rules and may subjectively lead it to the area of human benefit. Kuei Ku Tzu pointed out:

We investigate the nature of Yin-Yang and its relations with K'ai-Ho (open and close, active and passive) in order to entitle all things. In the universe all phenomena are complicated with infinite change according to its own rule. It may be Yin or Yang, soft or hard, open or close, loose or sharp. So that, in order to cause your opponent to express or to act, it would be rather through indirect or negative

way to obtain the truth. To obtain the truth, informations through this way are valuable. Therefore, the alternate use of negative and positive ways and the dialectical interactions of Yin and Yang may provide advantages for us.<sup>201</sup>

Lao Tzu, the great Taoist, in his work Tao Te Ching also pointed out similar principles as a science of method for human conduct and argued that sometimes the negative or indirect way (Yin) will override the positive or direct way (Yang) in conducting human affairs.<sup>202</sup>

2) Cheng-Ch'i (正奇), Human Psychology, and Science of Method

Kuei Ku Tzu discovered that man has emotional tendencies which contains both human strength and weakness. In conducting human affairs a wise man should follow the human psychological tendency by disclosing one's strength and not mentioning his weakness. So that there will be no difficulty in persuasion and planning.

It is human nature to hear what he likes and to do what he desires. Therefore, a wise man will not disclose other's weakness but rather employ his strength; will not use his shortage but rather discover his skillness. So that, there can be no difficulty.<sup>203</sup>

Therefore, in persuasions and diplomatic missions, the indirect and negative way will be sometimes convince people more effectively than the direct and positive way.

Furthermore, Kuei Ku Tzu also praises the merit of the principle of "extraordinary (Ch'i 奇) among normal (Cheng 正)" in human affairs and psychology. In other words, he points out the performance of "surprise out of the common" in human social conduct. Human nature, which contains curiosity and selfishness, can be manipulated appropriately and advantageously. Successful operation of this human nature is important in a diplomatic negotiation and persuasion. Moreover, in conducting either a national foreign policy or a military strategy, the advantages of "surprise out of the common" are incredible. However, the creation of the extraordinary, or surprise,

will be up to a relative use of the normal, or common, which creates regularity and blinds human mind to flexibility. The relationship between "surprise" and "common" is dialectical and reproductive in nature just like Tao and Yin-Yang, but with wisdom it can be subjectively manipulated. According to Kuei Ku Tzu, the use of the "surprise or extraordinary" is superior to that of the "common or normal" in general (Cheng bu ju Ch'i 正不如奇).<sup>205</sup>

In general, Kuei Ku Tzu follows the Taoist cosmic philosophy of Tao and Yin-Yang and investigates the materialistic nature and conditions of human affairs. His importance in scholarship is that he adopts the objective principle of Tao and Yin-Yang and advises a subjective manipulation of materialistic conditions into a synthesis in terms of Tsung-Heng Pai-Ho (縱橫捭闔 active-passive interaction and the manipulation of contradictions) which is the science of method in human affairs. His students, Su Ch'in and Chang Yi, applied these teachings to international affairs in operating the balance of power. And another student of his, Sun Tzu (Sun Pin) applied these principles to military strategy and created a science of military stratagem.<sup>206</sup> Thus, Kuei Ku Tzu was credited as being the founding father and theorist of the Tsung-Heng School and the School of Military Stratagem.

### (3) The Philosophy of Tao, Yin-Yang and Tsung-Heng

Like the cosmic phenomena and principles of Tao and Yin-Yang as the Taoist teaches, the opponent of Su Ch'in's system of alliance for collective defense was the system of coalition proposed by Chang Yi, Su Ch'in's classmate, for breaking the system of collective defense through a policy of divide and rule. If we put the system of Ho-Tsung on the side of Yin which is negative, passive and responsive in character, and put the system of Lien-Heng on the side of Yang which is positive, active and challenging in nature, the contradiction and struggle between these two can co-exist synthetically.



The process of the dialectical transformation of these two forms presents a synthetic track which is the Tao of Yin-Yang and Tsung-Heng and paves the way for progress, leading to the unification of China among the contending states in 221 B.C.

G) The School of Military Stratagem: Sun Tzu and the Art of War

(1) War and Politics in the Age of the Warring States

The relationship between war and politics is as intimate as brotherhood throughout human history. War and diplomacy are two swords in conducting international relations. Carl von Clausewitz, a great Western philosopher of war, presents his view on the relationship between international relations and war: "Clashes of interests between two states are typically resolved by the imposition of the will of one state upon that of another. Therefore, war is a normal phase in the relations among states."<sup>207</sup> The definition of war for him is: "War, therefore, is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will."<sup>208</sup> Thus, the nature of war is political rather than physical violence per se. In other words, just like diplomacy, war is a special form of politics among nations but in a violence sense.

The basic feature of the Warring States period in ancient China was war itself. Thus, warfare and the politics of Tsung-Heng diplomacy were two phases in the struggle for power and hegemony. As the failure of diplomatic manipulation in an unbalanced transitional period of the international system oscilated between the Ho-Tsung alliance and the Lien-Heng alliance, war was a magic alternative in pursuit of a national goal. Although the politics of Tsung-Heng diplomacy contributed a great deal in finalizing the period of Warring States war itself was so important that the unification of all China (or world) by Ch'in might not have been completed without military conquests.<sup>209</sup> The concept of a world government was eventually accom-

plished through the realistic means of war.

(2) The Leading Feature of the Martial Classics

Because of the importance of war in relation to the conduct of international politics, there have been many people who devoted their efforts to military science. From certain historical records, many great administrators and philosophers, most of them realists, studied the role of war and civil-military relationships in early ancient China. The great administrators included Chiang T'ai-kung or Chiang Shang (姜尚) of Chou, Kuan Chung of Chin during the early Spring and Autumn period, Ssu-ma Jon-chu (司馬穰苴), Shang Yang, Wei Liao (尉繚), Wu Ch'i (吳起), Sun Pin (孫臏), and others. Philosophers who were concerned with the role of military affairs in politics were Lao Tzu, Hsun Tzu, Mo Tzu, Han Fei Tzu, and Kuei Ku Tzu. However, among these, the most prominent representatives of the group who devoted their efforts to the science of war were Wu Ch'i and Sun Pin. For thousands of years their eminent works, Sun Wu Ping Fa (孫吳兵法) "The Art of War of Sun Tzu and Wu Ch'i", have been regarded as indispensable for professional generals and policy strategists throughout Chinese history. The concept and theories of war elaborated by this group of people who were continuously involved in politics evolved into science of war referred to as the School of Military Stratagem, Ping Chia.

A great feature of the School of Military Stratagem was their philosophical view of realism. They realistically regarded war as the means to the end from which peace could be secured. For example, Legalist thinkers like Kuan Chung, Li K'uei, Shang Yang, and Han Fei Tzu, put superiority on "agriculture and war" and "power" as the necessary means for achieving national goals and survival.<sup>210</sup> Sun Tzu regarded war as a grave concern of the nation which needed to be thoroughly studied.<sup>211</sup> Ssu-ma Jon-chu in

his work, Treatise of Ssu-ma (Ssu-ma Fa 司馬法), stated: "It is justified to employ war in order to stop war. ... Therefore, even a big nation will perish if she abuses war. Although the world is in peace, a nation will be in danger if she ignores the possibility of war."<sup>212</sup> Hsun Tzu, though not a member of the School of Military Stratagem, viewed war from a moral and ethical basis and approved of armies "for the purpose of stopping tyranny and getting rid of injury."<sup>213</sup>

(3) Sun Tzu (孫子) and "The Art of War" (Sun Tzu Ping Fa 孫子兵法)

The most distinguished representative of the School of Military Stratagem is Sun Tzu whose work The Art of War contains thirteen chapters of treatise which have survived past thousands of year.

1) The Philosophical Concept of Sun Tzu's The Art of War

War is peculiar to human affairs and it has its own characteristics. The first of which is that there is something vital concerned with survival. Thus, it is positive, creative, and active rather than negative and passive in human mind and activity. Second, war is a competition and interaction of physical power. It is something obviously realistic in nature. Third, war has its own general rules in action. A complete understanding and following of these objective rules is necessary in planning and commanding in the interaction of physical violence. Thus war is an objective activity not a subjective imagination. Fourth, the conducting of war not only should follow the objective rules and circumstances but also need to be motivated in dynamic mobility. Therefore, the philosophical view of war is a unity of objective observation and subjective creativity in management. Fifth, war is a competition both of physical power and of human wisdom. All warfare is based on the deception and trickery which are dynamic according to the variety of circumstances. This philosophy of change and dynamic of war is dialectical in nature.

According to these general characteristics of war, we will pursue some philosophical points in The Art of War by taking three views: the epistemological realism, the dialectical methodology, and the unity of subjective motivation and objective regularity.

(a) Epistemological Realism

Sun Tzu's attitude towards epistemology is materialistic, that is, matter is primary and the knowledge is based on the concrete facts. By realizing the objective facts and circumstances, the result of a war, victory or defeat, could be predicted to a certain extent. This prediction is based on realistic factors rather than spiritual wishes.

What is called "foreknowledge" can not be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation.<sup>214</sup>

From this point, Sun Tzu points out five concrete factors which determine the outcome of a war: "The first of these factors is Tao, moral influence; the second, weather (t'ien); the third, terrain (ti); the fourth, command (chiang); and the fifth, doctrine (fa)."<sup>215</sup> These five factors are the real roots of a war's outcome. Thus, Sun Tzu concludes: "There is no general who has not heard of these five matters. Those who master them win; those who do not are defeated."<sup>216</sup>

Furthermore, Sun Tzu points out the relativity of the knowledge of actuality. An objective analysis and comparison of the facts and situation will also determine the outcome of a war.<sup>217</sup> The actual comparison and analysis of the relativity of powers between the enemy and yourself is the way to victory, because you can appropriately control the activity. Sun Tzu concludes his view on the outcome of a war in general with these words: "Therefore I say: 'Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself,

your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril'."218

(b) Tao, Yin-Yang, and Dialectical Methodology

Sun Tzu's concept of materialistic epistemology is not just a simple experiment, but a dialectical perception of reality through phenomena. Sun Tzu adopted the Taoist cosmic concept of Tao and Yin-Yang, the philosophy of change and the dialectical transformation of opposition, and applied them to the field of military science in order to construct his concept of war and strategic policy. Comparable to the concept of Yin and Yang, concepts of dialectical character do exist in the science of war. Specifically, they are the concepts of the advantageous and disadvantageous, directness and indirectness, benefit and harm, siege and release, order and disorder, cowardice and courage, weakness and strength, offense and defense, action and inaction, normal (Cheng) and extraordinary (Ch'i), etc. All these concepts, like the nature of Tao and Yin-Yang, have a sense of unity and contradiction. In a certain circumstances they are changeable and transformable. Sun Tzu presents this dialectical idea in the conduct of military affairs. For example, Sun Tzu points out that the concepts of advantage and disadvantage are mutually reproductive and inter-locked. Like the concept of Yin-Yang and philosophy of change, dangers are inherent in the advantages, and advantages inherent in the dangers.<sup>219</sup> If one does not understand what is harmful, he does not know what is beneficial either. Thus, only after evaluating both what is harmful and beneficial he can, under certain conditions, alter the situation towards his goal.<sup>220</sup> Therefore, Sun Tzu advises: "Thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations. Your aim must be to take All-under-Heaven intact. Thus your troops are not worn

out and your gains will be complete. This is the art of offensive strategy".<sup>221</sup> With this principle, he comments on the conduct of war as "Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances. The next best is to attack his army. The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative."<sup>222</sup> This idea constitutes Sun Tzu's basic theme of political-military relationship.

Similarly, the concepts of the direct and indirect, siege and release, order and disorder, cowardice and courage, weakness and strength, as related to harm and benefit are all opposites, but can be altered dialectically. Thus it is important to control those factors which may cause the alteration under a certain circumstances. Sun Tzu points out this dialectical concept vividly in his illustration of military strategy.

Nothing is more difficult than the art of manouever. What is difficult about manouever is to make the devious route the most direct and to turn misfortune to advantage. Thus, march by an indirect route and divert the enemy by enticing him with a bait. So doing, you may set out after he does and arrive before him. One able to do this understands the strategy of the direct and the indirect.<sup>223</sup>

The philosophical view of dialectic in "The Art of War" can be also found through the idea: "Ground in which the army survives only if it fights with the courage of desperation is called 'death'".<sup>224</sup> Li Ch'uan, a commentator of "The Art of War", illustrates this idea: "Blocked by mountains to the front and rivers to the rear, with provisions exhausted. In this situation it is advantageous to act speedily and dangerous to procrastinate."<sup>225</sup> This transformation from danger to safety or a nearly defeated situation to a victory illustrates the peculiar approach of dialectics. Sun Tzu further points out the dialectical dilemma that "Apparent confusion is a product of good order; apparent cowardice, of courage; apparent weakness, of strengtn."<sup>226</sup> Thus, he advises not to push situations to the extreme so as to secure the favourable position. Such as in siege of a city, "To a

surrounded enemy you must leave a way of escape. Do not press an enemy at bay."<sup>227</sup> All matters in the universe are dialectical in nature. They are reproductive and transformable from one extreme to the other. By the Taoist teaching of cosmology, Sun Tzu cleverly caught this wisdom and applied it to military science.

Furthermore, appropriate manipulation and control following the dialectical doctrine in conducting military strategy may alter a situation from unfavourable to favourable, weak to strong, few to many, defeated to victorious, defensive to offensive. The accomplishment of this transformation depends upon a subjective motivation according to the specific objective conditions and circumstances. Sun Tzu points out in his "The Art of War":

If I am able to determine the enemy's dispositions while at the same time I conceal my own then I can concentrate and he must divide. And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his. There, I will be numerically superior. Then, if I am able to use many to strike few at the selected point, those I deal with will be in dire straits.<sup>228</sup>

Similarly, in the conduct of offense and defense, a dialectical operation would gain a great deal of advantages. Sun Tzu comments that "Therefore, against those skilled in attack, an enemy does not know where to defend; against the experts in defense, the enemy does not know where to attack".<sup>229</sup> The creation of uncertainty and ambiguity in the enemy is what Sun Tzu regards as the subjective motivation or creativeness.

The concept of Cheng (normal, common) and Ch'i (extraordinary, surprise) which may be extracted Sun Tzu's general principle of military strategy originated from teachings of Kuei Ku Tzu, the founding father of Tsung-Heng School and a theorist of military strategy. It is dialectical in character. According to Sun Tzu, the arts of war and military operations are all derived from manipulation of the myth of Cheng and Ch'i. Under certain conditions, Cheng could become Ch'i and Ch'i could be changed into

Cheng. Like the nature of Yin and Yang, the variety of the interaction of Cheng and Ch'i could be endless and numberless.

In battle there are only the normal and extraordinary forces, but their combinations are limitless; none can comprehend them all. For these two forces are mutually reproductive; their interaction as endless as that of interlocked rings. Who can determine where one ends and the other begins?<sup>230</sup>

In military operation, for example, "the normal (Cheng) force fixes or distracts the enemy; the extraordinary (Ch'i) forces act when and where their blows are not anticipated. Should the enemy perceive and respond to a Ch'i manouever in such a manner as to neutralize it, the manouever would automatically become Cheng".<sup>231</sup> This dialectical process constructs the myth of the Cheng-Ch'i concept which in the Taoist term is Tao. Kuei Ku Tzu comments on the operation of Cheng and Ch'i: "The Ch'i manouever is better or more effective than the Cheng manouever."<sup>232</sup> Sun Tzu, Kuei Ku Tzu's student,<sup>233</sup> elaborated on this concept in "The Art of War": "Generally, in battle, use the normal force to engage; use the extraordinary or surprise to win".<sup>234</sup> Moreover, Sun Tzu concluded: "That the army is certain to sustain the enemy's attack without suffering defeat is due to operations of the extraordinary and the normal forces".<sup>235</sup> The alternation and transformation of these two forces, like the nature of Tao and Yin-Yang, are endless.

Now the resources of those skilled in the use of extraordinary forces are as infinite as the heavens and earth; as inexhaustible as the flow of the great rivers. For they end and recommence; cyclical, as are the movements of the sun and moon. They die away and are reborn; recurrent, as are the passing seasons.<sup>236</sup>

If we can summarize some principles of Sun Tzu's dialectical methodology, there are three general features. First, the military strategic theory in "The Art of War" contains the philosophical view of the unity of opposites which are self-denial and reproductive. It is dynamic, dialectical, and active in nature. Second, the methodological approach in "The Art of War"



is that of realism. To mankind war is a vital matter of survival. Third, Sun Tzu's dialectical methodology in "The Art of War" presents an important concept of subjective exercise and motivation within the process of dialectics. The combination of dialectics and subjective motivation constructs an active and realistic world-view and a scientific study of military theory. This concept as expressed in "The Art of War" is much more progressive in social practice than that of the Taoist School which has reduced its cosmic view of Tao and Yin-Yang into a passive and fatalistic world outlook.<sup>237</sup>

(c) The Unity of Subjective Motivation and Objective Regularity

Sun Tzu realizes that military operation is a matter of realistic competition and confrontation of human power and wisdom. This engagement concerns a great deal of subjective human motivation for struggle and activeness. But the function of subjective motivation is limited by the objective conditions and physical circumstances. Dialectically, however, the objective regularity, conditions and circumstances can be altered due to an appropriate subjective motivation. They are interrelated and mutually influenced. Therefore, and appropriate evaluation of the specific situation of a military operation must be based on a combined consideration of the subjective motivation and the objective regularity.<sup>238</sup>

In "The Art of War", Sun Tzu teaches: "Therefore, a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates. He selects his men and they exploit the situation".<sup>239</sup>

Military strategy and theory, like other matters in the world, has its own Tao, the natural law, and to follow this objective way will lead to an anticipated goal.

However, since the objective conditions are constantly changed due to various factors, it is vitally important to exercise subjective motivation and creativity in ordering events.

And as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions. Thus, one able to gain the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine.<sup>240</sup>

Because a certain factors depend on the other party, the enemy, it is necessary and important to alter circumstances in order to gain control of the situation.

Anciently the skilful warriors first made themselves invincible and awaited the enemy's moment of vulnerability. Invincibility depends on one's self; the enemy's vulnerability on him.<sup>241</sup>

To exercise the subjective motivation in order to create favourable conditions, for example, "The Art of War" points out several general principles according to the philosophical view of dialectics. First, to eliminate one's weakness means to strengthen one's self. To this point, Sun Tzu suggests ways to do this, such as political, social and economic reforms; military discipline and training; adequate preparation and supplies; keeping secret, etc. Moreover, "It is a doctrine of war not to assume the enemy will not come, but rather to rely on one's readiness to meet him; not to presume that he will not attack, but rather to make one's self invincible."<sup>242</sup> A careful evaluation of the situation may also avoid traps which would cause one's weakness. Therefore, "When he pretends to flee, do not pursue. Do not attack his elite troops. Do not gobble preferred baits. Do not thwart an enemy returning homewards."<sup>243</sup> All these teachings are the proper ways to minimize one's weakness.

Second, to induce the enemy to make the mistake of attacking means to increase one's favourable conditions and power. Dialectically, therefore, one's unfavourable conditions could be changed to favourable ones. The ways to do so, according to Sun Tzu's teaching, include various strategy and techniques. The use of trickery and deception may be important. Sun Tzu points out: "All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable,

feign incapacity; when active, incativity.....Anger his general and confuse him; pretent inferiority and encourage his arrogance."<sup>244</sup> Adequate disposition of military force may also create a favourable condition for one's self so as to use full strength in attacking a fraction of the enemy.<sup>245</sup> Disturbance is also an effective technique in altering an existing situation for benefit. Thus, "When the enemy is at ease, be able to weary him; when well fed, to starve him; when at rest, to make him move."<sup>246</sup>

Furthermore, other strategy and techniques such as the use of surprise attack, "Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you,"<sup>247</sup> and the employment of secret agents are all proper means to weaken the enemy through subjective motivation.

In general, Sun Tzu recognizes that the objective law of physical conditions shapes the way of military operation. "Invincibility depends on one's self; the enemy vulnerability on him.... those skilled in war can make themselves invincible but can not cause an enemy to be certainly vulnerable".<sup>248</sup> But, dialectically the objective conditions can be altered by subjective motivation through properly playing upon the enemy's vulnerability. He vividly presents this philosophical view of the unity of subjective motivation and objective regularity in his work, "The Art of War".

## 2) Sun Tzu on War and Peace

Sun Tzu's philosophy of war and peace is politically oriented. In the first verse of "The Art of War", he presents the idea that war is greatly related to the politics which influence the survival or ruin of a nation. To this point, war is only a peculiar type of politics which contains physical violence and is a transitional and extraordinary stage of politics. The final goal of war is peace under which regular politics is performed. Sun Tzu recognized that on the road of politics there exist

certain obstacles which block its operation. Therefore, in order for politics to be continued war, a special type of destructive power, is necessary and inevitable in wiping out those obstacles. Thus, the use of war should be minimized unless there is no alternative. Sun Tzu elaborates this principle of war that:

Generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this....For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.<sup>249</sup>

To this point, Sun Tzu suggests that the political power derived from military threat and strategy will be the best weapon in international politics, the next best will be a skillful diplomatic manipulation with favourable alliances. The inferior way in conducting international politics is the performance of physical violence, warfare itself.<sup>250</sup>

On the philosophy of war, in general, Sun Tzu concludes: "Thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations."<sup>251</sup> This idea fully indicates the concept that war is for peace.

### 3) Sun Tzu on Protracted War

Sun Tzu teaches in his "The Art of War" that a protracted war should not be applied in an active offensive attack. This is because the lasting war may cause the change of conditions and circumstances which involve the military manpower, supplies, and morale. A quick attack and completion is the key for victory, especially when it is from a superior position.

Victory is the main object in war. If this is long delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed. When troops attack cities, their strength will be exhausted. When the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the state will not suffice. Thus, while we have heard of blundering swiftness in war, we have not yet seen a clever operation that was prolonged. For there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited.<sup>252</sup>

A philosophical view, thus, was pointed out in "The Spring and Autumn":

"War is like unto fire; those who will not put aside weapons are themselves consumed by them."<sup>253</sup> Therefore, Tu Yu, a famous general of Han Dynasty, commented on Sun Tzu's teaching that "An attack may lack ingenuity, but it must be delivered with supernatural speed."<sup>254</sup>

Dialectically, however, when one is under a defensive and inferior position, the application of a protracted war may drain the enemy's strength and finally wage the war in victory. Thus, the use of protracted war is dynamic and under the philosophical principle of dialectics. In modern history, this point can be exemplified by first, the Russian application of protracted war in defense against Napoleon's invasion and Nazi Germany's attack; second, the Chinese strategy of protracted war against Japanese aggression during World War II; and third, Mao Tse-tung's protracted strategy of revolutionary war with Kuomintang and in the Chinese civil war, 1945-1949. Mao's concept of protracted strategy has been currently applied to Chinese foreign policy in confronting international power politics.

However, the most important factor in fighting a protracted war is popular support, especially in a nationalistic or a moralistic war. This would involve certain special conditions and human factors. Therefore, in general, Sun Tzu concludes: "Hence what is essential in war is victory, not prolonged operation".<sup>255</sup>

#### 4) Sun Tzu On People's War

War involves a great amount of physical materials and human sources. The collection and operation of the national resources require the cooperation of the mass of people and popular support. The people of a nation are the real vital factor in waging war. A harmonious relationship between government and population, superior and inferior, commanders and soldiers would obviously pave the way to victory. Thus, so vitally important as the

people are, no wise man can ignore them. Therefore, Wu Ch'i, another famous military strategist, sincerely teaches:

Anciently, those who planned against another state would surely first instruct the hundred clans (popular people) and then display affection toward the myriad people. There are four matters in which concord may be lacking. When there is discord within the country the army cannot be mobilized. When there is discord in the army it cannot take the field. When there is lack of harmony in the field the army cannot take the offensive. When there is lack of harmony in battle the army cannot win a decisive victory. Therefore the generals of a sovereign who follow "The Right Way" (Tao), when about to employ the people, first establish concord and then undertake matters of great importance.<sup>256</sup>

Sun Tzu also realizes the importance of popular support of the people. He teaches in his work, "The Art of War" that to fight a war the government must be able to initiate the moral influence "which causes people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril."<sup>257</sup> To obtain the support of the people, the government must treat them with benevolence, justice and righteousness, and have confidence in them. In the Confucian idea of benevolent rule, Jen-Cheng (仁政), there will be a harmonious relationship between the superior and the inferior in a government of Tao, the army will be united in mind, and all will be willing to serve their leaders. The people, thus, are happy with their government and the government may direct the people without difficulties. "The Book of Changes" says: "In happiness at overcoming difficulties, people forget the danger of death."<sup>258</sup>

Mao Tse-tung fully adopted this concept and initiated his revolutionary war with the popular support of the peasants. Mao's army was a people's army which was mainly composed of peasants, and thus won over Chiang Kai-shek with a mass-supported people's war. Today, Mao's concept of people's war has not only been applied in Chinese military strategy

but also in the operation of Chinese foreign policy.

#### 5) Sun Tzu on Guerrilla Warfare

There are two general characteristics of guerrilla warfare, that is, mobility and deception. These two peculiar tactics may balance the general inferiority of guerrilla warfare. To conduct guerrilla warfare requires of the army a high degree of mobility. This is related to the principle of deception. Sun Tzu teaches that the variety of tactics necessary to make an active attack is possible only through great mobility.

It follows that when one rolls up the armour and sets out speedily, stopping neither day nor night and marching at double time for a hundred li, the three commanders will be captured.<sup>259</sup>

Because of this mobile capacity, the army can avoid strength and strike weakness according to the various conditions. Furthermore, the army can apply the principle of deception to confuse the enemy and attack under a favourable condition.

All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; when he is strong avoid him. Anger his general and confuse him. Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance. Keep him under a strain and wear him down. When he is united, divide him. Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you.<sup>260</sup>

Therefore, through the tactical manipulation of deception, one can dialectically alter the inferiority in strength of guerrilla warfare to superiority. One can concentrate while the enemy divides and thus become numerically superior. In this way, the general advantages of guerrilla warfare would appear through an active control. "When the enemy is at ease, be able to weary him; when well fed, to starve him; when at rest, to make him move. Appear at places to which he must hasten; move swiftly where he does not expect you."<sup>261</sup>

Moreover, the variation of terrain is also an important factor in conducting guerrilla warfare. Appropriate use of terrain may be a great help in the battle.<sup>262</sup>

In general, though Sun Tzu does not specifically point out the form of guerrilla warfare, his concepts on deception, military mobility and other principles of war can be fairly applied in the conduct of guerrilla warfare. In his revolutionary struggle, Mao Tse-tung further developed and applied a great deal of Sun Tzu's principles in conducting guerrilla warfare.



Notes of Chapter Two

THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN PRE-CH'IN DYNASTIES

<sup>1</sup>Kenneth Scott Latourette, The Chinese: Their History and Culture (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), pp.37-41.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp.42-44.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp.46-47; also see K. G. Holsti, International Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p.29-30.

<sup>4</sup>Holsti, p.31.

<sup>5</sup>Derk Bodde, "Feudalism in China", in Feudalism in History, ed. by Rushton Coulborn (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), p.55.

<sup>6</sup>Richard L. Walker, The Multi-State System of Ancient China (Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press, 1953), p.37.

<sup>7</sup>Edward T. Williams, A Short History of China (New York: Harper & Row, 1928), p.62.

<sup>8</sup>Li Dun J., The Ageless Chinese: A History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965), p.50.

<sup>9</sup>Walker, p.36.

<sup>10</sup>T'ung Shu-yeh, The History of Spring and Autumn (Hong Kong: Taiping Book Company, 1962), p.121.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p.114, pp.119-120; also see Latourette, p.48.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp.115-118.

<sup>13</sup>John K. Fairbank (ed.), The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p.3.

<sup>14</sup>Liu Po-chi, The Politics of League and Diplomacy in the Spring and Autumn Period (Taipei, Taiwan: Editorial Committee of the Chung Hua Book Series, 1962), p.212.

<sup>15</sup>T'ung, p.258; also Latourette, p.51.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., pp.149-150.

<sup>17</sup>Confucian Analects, Book XIV, Chapter 18, English translation by James Legge in Chinese Classics 5 Vols. (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 1960). Hereafter, for the general and basic works of Chinese classics, only the specific work and chapters will be cited in the footnotes, because it is much easier to trace the original sources in any published edition.

<sup>18</sup>Liu Hsiang (ed. Han Dynasty), Chan Kuo Ts'e (Discourse of Warring States) 2 Vols. (Taipei, Taiwan: Culture Book Company, 1968), Vol.II, Chapter of Han, "To King of Cheng", p 89. Hereafter this work will be referred as Chan Kuo Ts'e in notes.

<sup>19</sup>Liu, p.216.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., pp.217-236.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p.93.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., pp.103-112.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., pp.110-114, pp.121-122.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p.119.

<sup>25</sup>Chen Shih-tsai, "The Equality of States in Ancient China", American Journal of International Law, Vol.XXXV (1941), pp.641-650.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp.649-650.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p.643.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., pp.643-644.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., pp.645-646.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., pp.646-647.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., pp.647-648.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p.649; also see Ku-Liang, Book VIII, Year XII.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p.650; also see Tso-Chuan, Book IX, Year XIV.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p.650; also see Kung-Yang, Book X, Year XXIII.

<sup>35</sup>Liu, pp.4-5; also see Holsti, p.40.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., pp.462-463.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p.91.

<sup>38</sup>Hsun Tzu, Chapter of "Wang and Pa".

<sup>39</sup>Liu, p.90.

<sup>40</sup>Tso-Chuan, Duke Huan, Year XII; also see James Legge, Chinese Classics, p.59.

<sup>41</sup>Ku-Liang, Duke Hsi, Year V.

<sup>42</sup>Liu, p.17.

<sup>43</sup>Yang Kuan, Chan Kuo Shih (The History of Warring States), (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1955), p.130; also see Chang yin-ling, Outline of Chinese History (Ancient Part), (Taipei, Taiwan: Cheng-Chung Book Company, 1969), p.103.

<sup>44</sup>Yang, pp.127-132.

<sup>45</sup>Chang, pp.117-118.

<sup>46</sup>Yang, p.161.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p.173; also see Ssu-ma Ch'ien, Shih Chi, Chapters of "Ch'in Shih Huang" and "Family of T'ien".

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., pp.149-150.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p.134, pp.139-142; also see Chang, p.116.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., pp.136-138.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., pp.174-175; also see Burton Watson (trans. and ed.), Hsun Tzu, Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p.72.

<sup>52</sup>Judd M. Harmon, Political Thought: From Plato to the Present (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p.392.

<sup>53</sup>H. G. Creel, Sinism (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1929), p.85.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., pp.20-21.

<sup>55</sup>Ch'u Chai and Winberg Chai (ed.), trans. James Legge, I Ching, Book of Changes (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1969), pp.435-436 (Orderly Sequence of Hexagrams, Section II).

<sup>56</sup>Idem (ed.), The Changing Society of China (New York: The New American Library, 1962), p.111.

<sup>57</sup>Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, Chapter 42, Section 1.

<sup>58</sup>Chuang Tzu, Chapter 2; also see R. B. Blakney (trans.), Lao Tzu: The Way of Life (New York: The New American Library, 1955), p.95.

<sup>59</sup>Creel, p.45.

<sup>60</sup>Confucian Analects, Book IV, Chapter VIII; also see James Legge, The Chinese Classics, Vol.I, p.168.

<sup>61</sup>Hsun Tzu, Chapter XXI, "On Freedom from Blindness"; also see Fung yu-lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964), p.184.

<sup>62</sup>Fung, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, p.202.

- <sup>63</sup> Tao Te Ching, Chapter 14.
- <sup>64</sup> Ibid., Chapter 25.
- <sup>65</sup> Ibid., Chapter 40.
- <sup>66</sup> Ibid., Chapter 42.
- <sup>67</sup> Ibid., Chapter 18.
- <sup>68</sup> Chuang Tzu, Chapter of "Ch'i Wu Lun".
- <sup>69</sup> Tao Te Ching, Chapter 40.
- <sup>70</sup> Fung Yu-lan, The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p.63.
- <sup>71</sup> Chao Wen-hsiu, Study of Lao Tzu (Taipei: Yen-Ching Press, 1969), pp.24-25.
- <sup>72</sup> Tao Te Ching, Chapter 57.
- <sup>73</sup> Ibid., Chapter 29.
- <sup>74</sup> Ibid., Chapter 48.
- <sup>75</sup> Ibid., Chapter 31.
- <sup>76</sup> Ibid., Chapter 30.
- <sup>77</sup> Ibid., Chapter 57.
- <sup>78</sup> Ibid., Chapter 30.
- <sup>79</sup> Ibid., Chapter 68.
- <sup>80</sup> Ibid., Chapter 69.
- <sup>81</sup> Ibid., Chapter 69.
- <sup>82</sup> Ibid., Chapter 61.
- <sup>83</sup> Ibid., Chapter 80. Several points in this chapter have been translated into different meaning by different people, but it has not disturbed the whole picture. See Blakney, p.133; Yang Chia-lo (ed. and trans.), Loa Tzu (Taipei: The World Book Company), pp.140-142.
- <sup>84</sup> Lin Mousheng, Men and Ideas (New York: The John Day Company, 1942), p.76.
- <sup>85</sup> Chuang Tzu, Chapter 17. For English translation, see James R. Ware (trans.), The Sayings of Chuang Chou (New York: The New American Library, 1963).

- <sup>86</sup> Ibid., Chapter 8.
- <sup>87</sup> Confucian Analects, Book XII, Chapter 22.
- <sup>88</sup> Ibid., Book VI, Chapter 28.
- <sup>89</sup> Ibid., Book XII, Chapter 2.
- <sup>90</sup> Ibid., Book XII, Chapter 3.
- <sup>91</sup> Ta Hsueh (The Great Learning), "The Text of Confucius".
- <sup>92</sup> Confucian Analects, Book XII, Chapter 11.
- <sup>93</sup> Ta Hsueh.
- <sup>94</sup> Confucian Analects, Book II, Chapter 22.
- <sup>95</sup> Ibid., Book XV, Chapter 17.
- <sup>96</sup> Ibid., Book IV, Chapter 16.
- <sup>97</sup> Ibid., Book II, Chapter 3.
- <sup>98</sup> Ibid., Book XII, Chapter 7; also see Frank M. Russell, Theories of International Relations (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1936), p.20.
- <sup>99</sup> Ibid., Book XIII, Chapter 6.
- <sup>100</sup> Ibid., Book XII, Chapter 19.
- <sup>101</sup> Ibid., Book XII, Chapter 17.
- <sup>102</sup> Ibid., Book II, Chapter 1.
- <sup>103</sup> Ibid., Book IVX, Chapter 35.
- <sup>104</sup> Ibid., Book VX, Chapter 5.
- <sup>105</sup> Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, p.202.
- <sup>106</sup> Li Chi, Chapter of Li Yun. For English text, see Fung Yu-lan, trans. by Derk Bodde, A history of Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1952), Vol.I, p.378. Hereafter it will be referred as Chinese Philosophy.
- <sup>107</sup> Fung, Chinese Philosophy, pp.377-378.
- <sup>108</sup> Meng Tzu (The Works of Mencius), Book IV "Le Low 離婁", Part I, Chapter 7.
- <sup>109</sup> Ibid., Chapter 9.
- <sup>110</sup> Ibid., Chapter 14.

- 111 Meng Tzu, Book II "Kung-Sun Ch'ow 公孫丑", Part I, Chapter 3.
- 112 Ibid., Book VIII "Tsin Hsin 盡心", Part II, Chapter 14.
- 113 Ibid., Book I "King of Liang Hwuy 梁惠王", Part II, Chapter 13.
- 114 Russell, p.22; also see E. O. Thomas, Chinese Political Thought (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1927 & 1968), p.246.
- 115 Meng Tzu, Book VI "Kao Tzu 告子", Part II, Chapter 15.
- 116 Hsun Tzu, Chapter of "The Regulation of A King". Also see Watson, Hsun Tzu, p.41.
- 117 Watson, Hsun Tzu, pp.38-39.
- 118 Ibid., pp.39-40.
- 119 Ibid., p.40.
- 120 Ibid., p.40.
- 121 Ibid., p.53.
- 122 Hsun Tzu, Chapter of "Wang and Pa"; also see Chen An-jen, History of Chinese Political Thought (Taipei: Commerce Press, 1966), p.51.
- 123 Watson, Hsun Tzu, p.37.
- 124 Chiang Shang-hsien, System of the Concept of Hsun Tzu (Tainan, Taiwan: Hsie-Yi Press, 1966), p.343.
- 125 Watson, Hsun Tzu, p.56.
- 126 Chiang, pp.344-345.
- 127 Watson, Hsun Tzu, pp.57-58.
- 128 Chiang, p.347. This idea was also stated by Mao Tse-tung and was elaborated in an article by Shih Tung-hsiang titled "Man Is the Decisive Factor in War, Not Materials", Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), no.7, 1965.
- 129 Watson, Hsun Tzu, p.59.
- 130 Chiang, p.347.
- 131 Hsun Tzu, Chapter of "Wang and Pa".
- 132 Lin, pp.88-89.
- 133 Huai Nan Tzu, Chapter 19.
- 134 Lin, p.89.

- 135 Huai Nan Tzu, Chapter 19.
- 136 Lin, p.89; also see Mei Yi-pao, Motse: The Neglected Rival of Confucius (London: Arthur Probsthain, 1934), p.47.
- 137 Lin, p.90.
- 138 Meng Tzu, Book III, Part II, Chapter IX; also see Legge, Chinese Classics, Vol.II, p.282.
- 139 Lu Cheng-yu, History of Chinese Political Thought (Peking: San-Lien Press, 1962), p.112.
- 140 Lin, pp.92-93.
- 141 Mo Tzu, Vol.I, Chapter of "Universal Love", Section III.
- 142 Ibid.; also see Burton Watson (trans. and ed.), Mo Tzu, Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p.39.
- 143 Ibid., Section II; also see Mei, p.91.
- 144 Mo Tzu, Vol I, Chapter of "Against Offensive Warfare", Section III; also see Watson, Mo Tzu, pp.52-54.
- 145 Mei Yi-pao (trans.), The Ethical and Political Works of Motse (no place and no date), pp.128-129.
- 146 Mei, p.97; also see Watson, Mo Tzu, p.2.
- 147 Watson, Mo Tzu, pp.59-60.
- 148 Ssu-ma Ch'ien, Shih Chi, Chapter 124.
- 149 Lu, p.129. Many current slogans and phrases of ideology which the Chinese Communists advocate are similar to the philosophy which the Mohists devoted for.
- 150 Huai Nan Tzu, Chapter 20; also see Fung, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, p.51. From various evidences we understand that the number of Mohist disciples is over three hundreds and it is not what Huai Nan Tzu stated.
- 151 Fung, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, p.51.
- 152 Ibid., also see Mo Tzu, Chapter of "Kung-Shu 公輸".
- 153 Mo Tzu, Chapter of "Lu Wen 魯問".
- 154 Mo Tzu, Chapter of "Fei Kung 非攻", Section I.
- 155 Ch'en Ch'i-tien, Outline of Chinese Political Philosophy (Taipei: Hua-Kuo Press, 1951), p.104.

- 156 Lin, p.106.
- 157 Han Fei Tzu, Chapter of the Five Vermin (五蠹); also see Fung, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, p.159.
- 158 Ibid., also see Burton Watson (trans. and ed.), Han Fei Tzu, Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p.99.
- 159 Watson, Han Fei Tzu, p.97.
- 160 Ibid.
- 161 Han Fei Tzu, Chapter of Nan-Shih (難勢).
- 162 Fung, Chinese Philosophy, Vol. I, p.324.
- 163 Han Fei Tzu, Chapter of Tin-Fa (定法).
- 164 Hsiao Kung-chuan, A History of Chinese Political Thought (Taipei: Chinese Cultural Career Press, 1968), Vol. II, pp.204-206.
- 165 Kuan Tzu, Chapter of Mu-Min (牧民).
- 166 Ibid., Chapter of Governing the Nation (治國).
- 167 Ibid., Chapter of Hai-Wang (海王).
- 168 Ibid., Chapter of Ch'in-Chung-Ting (輕重丁).
- 169 Book of Lord Shang, Chapter of Shen Fa (慎法).
- 170 Ibid., Chapter of Military Defense (兵守).
- 171 Han Fei Tzu, Chapter of Five Vermin; also see Watson, Han Fei Tzu, p.100.
- 172 Ibid, Chapter of Eminence in Learning (顯學); also see Watson, Han Fei Tzu, p.125.
- 173 Ibid., Chapter of Five Vermin; also see Watson, Han Fei Tzu, p.100.
- 174 Ibid.
- 175 Ibid.; also see Watson, Han Fei Tzu, p.114.
- 176 Lin, pp.113-114.
- 177 Ibid., p.114; also see Chao Hai-chin, Study on Han Fei Tzu (Taipei: Cheng-Chung Book Company, 1967), p.106.
- 178 Han Fei Tzu, Chapter of Five Vermin; also see Watson, Han Fei Tzu, pp.114-115.
- 179 Ibid.



- 180 Chao Hai-chin, Han Fei Tzu, pp.106-107.
- 181 Watson, Han Fei Tzu, p.111, note no.14.
- 182 Ibid., p.112.
- 183 Ku Nien-hsien, Study on Tsung-Heng School (Taipei: Taiwan Commerce Press for the China Committee for Publication Aid and Prize Awards, 1969), p.102, p.148.
- 184 Tao Te Ching, Chapter 36; also see Blakney, p.89.
- 185 Ku, pp.36-39.
- 186 Ibid., pp.40-42.
- 187 Ibid., p.102.
- 188 Ibid., pp.114-115.
- 189 Ibid., pp.142-144; J. I. Crump, Jr. (trans.) Chan-Kuo Ts'e (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp.193-195 ("The Book of Ch'i-King Min", section 156 and section 157).
- 190 Ibid., p.103. Since the system of Ho-Tsung was completed, the troops of Ch'in did not dare to cross over the Pass of Han-Ku (Ch'in's border line) for about fifteen years. See also Crump Jr., p.13; Also see Shih Chi, Chapter 69, Biography of Su Ch'in.
- 191 Ibid., p.155. Professor Derk Bodde translates this phrase in A Short History of Chinese Philosophy as this: "to make alliance with distant states, but attack the ones that were near", see Fung's book, p.180.
- 192 Ibid., p.159; also see Crump Jr., pp.144-147, pp.174-175. (During the period of 328-284 B. C.)
- 193 Ibid., pp.156-159, pp.164-166.
- 194 Crump Jr., p.9.
- 195 Ibid., p.14.
- 196 Shih Chi, Chapter 69, Biography of Su Ch'in.
- 197 Ku, p.85.
- 198 Shih Chi, Chapter 69, Biography of Su Ch'in.
- 199 Ku, p.85.
- 200 Ibid., p.86. (This quotation is from the book of Kuei Ku Tzu and the English translation is by author.)

<sup>201</sup>Yang Chia Lo, Kuei Ku Tzu (Taipei: World Book Company, 1965), Chapter of Pai-Ho, The First.

<sup>202</sup>Tao Te Ching, Chapter 36; also see Blakney, p.89 and note 169.

<sup>203</sup>Kuei Ku Tzu, Chapter of Authority, The Ninth.

<sup>204</sup>Ibid., Chapter of To Scheme, The Tenth.

<sup>205</sup>Ibid., Chapter of Authority, The Ninth; also see Ku, p.98.

<sup>206</sup>Ku, p.40.

<sup>207</sup>Anatol Rapoport (ed.), Clausewitz on War (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books Inc., 1968), p.63.

<sup>208</sup>Ibid., p.101.

<sup>209</sup>I agree with Professor Fung Yu-lan's view on the word "world" referring to the Chinese term "t'ien-hsia" rather than some translators put it as "Empire". See Fung, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, pp.180-181.

<sup>210</sup>See previous discussion on Legalism in this chapter.

<sup>211</sup>Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 1, "Estimate". For English translation, see Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu: The Art of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p.63.

<sup>212</sup>Wei Cheng (ed.), The Essentials of Various Philosophers Vol. I (Taipei: World Book Company, 1967), p.54.

<sup>213</sup>See previous discussion on Hsun Tzu in this chapter.

<sup>214</sup>The Art of War, Chapter 13; also see Griffith, pp.144-145.

<sup>215</sup>Ibid., Chapter 1; Griffith, p.63.

<sup>216</sup>Ibid.

<sup>217</sup>Ibid., Chapter 3; Griffith, pp.82-83.

<sup>218</sup>Ibid., Griffith, p.84.

<sup>219</sup>Ibid., Chapter 8; Griffith, p.113.

<sup>220</sup>Ibid.

<sup>221</sup>Ibid., Chapter 3; Griffith, p.79.

<sup>222</sup>Ibid.; Griffith, pp.77-78.

<sup>223</sup>Ibid., Chapter 7; Griffith, p.102.

- 224 Ibid., Chapter 11; Griffith, p.131.
- 225 Ibid.
- 226 Ibid., Chapter 5; Griffith, p.92.
- 227 Ibid.; Chapter 7; Griffith, pp.109-110.
- 228 Ibid.; Chapter 6; Griffith p.98.
- 229 Ibid.; Griffith, pp.96-97.
- 230 Ibid., Chapter 5; Griffith, p.92.
- 231 Ibid.; Griffith, p.91.
- 232 Kuei Ku Tzu, Chapter Nine "Authority"; also see Ku, pp.98-99.
- 233 Ku, p.40. Both Sun Pin and P'ang Chuan studied under Kuei Ku Tzu on military theory. P'ang Chuan regarded his ability as not equal to that of Sun Pin. See Griffith, p.59.
- 234 The Art of War, Chapter 5; Griffith, p.91.
- 235 Ibid.; Griffith, p.91.
- 236 Ibid.
- 237 Kuan Feng, Study on Sun Tzu's Concept of Military Philosophy (Hupei, China: Hupei People's Press, 1957), pp.28-31.
- 238 Ibid., pp.32-35.
- 239 The Art of War, Chapter 5; Griffith, p.93.
- 240 Ibid., Chapter 6; Griffith, p.101.
- 241 Ibid., Chapter 4; Griffith, p.85.
- 242 Ibid., Chapter 8; Griffith, p.114.
- 243 Ibid., Chapter 7; Griffith, p.109.
- 244 Ibid., Chapter 1; Griffith, pp.66-67.
- 245 Ibid.; Griffith, p.98.
- 246 Ibid.; Griffith, p.96.
- 247 Ibid., Chapter 7; Griffith, p.102.
- 248 Ibid., Chapter 4; Griffith, p.85.
- 249 Ibid., Chapter 3; Griffith, p.77.

250 Ibid.; Griffith, pp.77-78.

251 Ibid., Griffith, p.79.

252 Ibid., Chapter 2; Griffith, p.73.

253 Ibid.; Griffith, p.73.

254 Ibid.

255 Ibid.

256 Wu Ch'i, Wu Tzu, Chapter 1, Section 2; for English translation, see Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu, The Art of War, pp.151-152.

257 The Art of War, Chapter 1; Griffith, p.64.

258 Ibid.; Griffith, p.64.

259 Ibid., Chapter 7; Griffith, p.102.

260 Ibid., Chapter 1; Griffith, pp.66-70.

261 Ibid., Chapter 6; Griffith, p.96.

262 Ibid., Chapter 10; Griffith, pp.127-128.

## CHAPTER THREE

### THE INFLUENCE OF CLASSICAL CONCEPTS ON CONTEMPORARY FOREIGN POLICY

#### I. THE ESSENCE OF MAOISM: THE THEORETICAL GUIDE OF FOREIGN POLICY

Since the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, Mao Tse-tung's thought has been the guideline for governmental policy and national ideology. Chinese public political attitudes and behavior, both internally and externally, have been greatly motivated and oriented by the principles of Maoism. In order to understand its essence and conceptual sources, it is of vital importance for us to investigate the basic principles and general characteristics of Maoism philosophically.

#### A) Philosophical Epistemology--Tao, Yin-Yang and Dialectical Materialism

The concept of dialectical materialism adopted by Mao Tse-tung in his world-view is not something totally new. The Chinese Taoist cosmic concept of Tao and Yin-Yang is dialectical and materialistic. But when the Taoists applied their cosmic views to human affairs, the factor of inner cause or subjective motivation was ignored and thus, a passive attitude towards the human world, or fatalism, resulted.<sup>1</sup> The Mohist concept of pragmatism was principally materialistically based but it finally became the idea of the "Will of Heaven" as a religiously oriented political belief and thus turned into spiritualism.<sup>2</sup>

The realist Legalism improved this concept of Tao and Yin-Yang in

human affairs based on the theory of historical materialism, especially as asserted by Han Fei Tzu. Kuei Ku Tzu further elaborated the concept of epistemological realism and absorbed the Taoist concept of dialectics into his theory of the science of method. The representatives of the Tsung-Heng School, Su Ch'in and Chang Yi, applied it to the theory of balance of power in international politics. And Sun Tzu, another student of Kuei Ku Tzu, applied this science of method further to his theory of military strategy and tactical practice.

In general, the concept of Tao and Yin-Yang, dialectical materialism, as elaborated upon by the Chinese Legalists was much improved by their revision with the active concept of the unity of subjective motivation and objective regularity, that is, putting the Taoist cosmic concept of dialectics into human affairs.

The Marxist philosophy of nature and the theory of truth are based on the concept of historical and dialectical materialism. The epistemological position for the Marxist on the idea of materialism is expressed by Lenin thus:

Materialism in general recognizes objectively real being (matter) as independent of the consciousness, sensation, experience, etc., of humanity ... Consciousness is only the reflection of being, at best<sup>3</sup> an approximately true (adequate, perfectly exact) reflection of it.

This tone is strikingly similar to the Chinese Taoist concept of Tao and cosmology. The Taoists see the human world as a struggle between ruling class and ruled class which is based on artificial institutions and moral concept, and thus, they conclude in teaching the concept of wu wei, do-nothing or inaction in order to eliminate the class gap and struggle which is derived from cosmic materialism. The Marxist concept of historical materialism which sees the class struggle as based on economic motivations is somewhat similar to that of the Chinese Legalists in its relations between

basic structure and superstructure. The Marxist philosophy resulted in an active revolutionary political movement, not just a passive and idealistic philosophical teaching as the Chinese Taoism did.

Dialectical materialism for the Marxist is not a dogmatic pronouncement, but "the laws of reality which are guides to further study and empirical investigation, as well as guides to action, practice, and changes in human history".<sup>4</sup> "Communism proceeds not from principles, but from facts. It is no doctrine, but rather a movement".<sup>5</sup> These words are very close to the "concept of change", the movement of Tao and Yin-Yang, as taught by the Book of Changes, and the Chinese Taoists. Marx and Engels did not regard themselves as founders of the dialectical laws of reality, but as descendants and synthesizers of the early Greeks, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Diderot, Rousseau, Hegel, and Feuerbach.<sup>6</sup>

Similarly, the Maoist concept of Tao and Yin-Yang and dialectical materialism is derived from both the classical Chinese concept of Tao and Yin-Yang and the modern Marxist concept of historical and dialectical materialism. As a classically educated Chinese, practising within the Chinese physical condition, Mao Tse-tung (and so too his "Thought") is highly oriented towards the Chinese mind. Acknowledging this Professor Harold C. Hinton says: "It has already been suggested that Maoism differs significantly in spirit from orthodox, or Soviet, Marxism-Leninism, and it will be shown later that Maoism has introduced major innovations in the fields of 'socialist revolution' and 'socialist construction'".<sup>7</sup>

In the light of China's long history and traditions, its sociopolitical legacy and culture, and its destiny of modernization initiated by modern ideology, one would ask to what an extent Maoism is influenced by Chinese traditions. It seems to be obvious that there are salient points in

the Thought of Mao Tse-tung that are unique to China, in contrast to the experience of the West. Thus, the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" has been officially defined as the synthesis of Marxist-Leninist theory and Chinese revolutionary practice. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Constitution of 1945 declared:

The Chinese Communist Party takes as its guide for all action the thought (szu-hsiang) of Mao Tse-tung--the thought that unifies the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution--and is opposed to any dogmatic or empiricist deviation.<sup>8</sup>

It is Mao's thought rather than Marxism-Leninism which still serves as an official ideology for the CCP and the Chinese people to this day.

The ideology of the Chinese Communist system is complicated and difficult to define. It is the source of morality and authority and the basis for a social order and a political program. Thus a Chinese professor, Mu Fusheng, points out that:

The Communist ideology offered a solution to ethical and aesthetic problems, an ontology, a theory of history, an epistemology, a pretension to philosophy of science, and a universal formula or "law" of thought, the Dialectics, very much like the old Chinese formula of Yin and Yang.<sup>9</sup>

With emphasis on the theory of contradictions, Maoist dialectical materialism is based on the duality of contradictions. Mao adopted the basic Hegelian notion, endorsed by Marx and Lenin, that contradiction within everything is the primary cause of change, but he further suggested that a different kind of contradiction exists between two or more things, which is the secondary cause of all change and development. "Mao's conception of the duality of contradictions--both within a thing and between two or more things--recalls a fundamental principle of Yin-Yang philosophy: that antinomy (or contradiction) is found between two entities (one Yin and one Yang) as well as within a given entity."<sup>10</sup> Influenced by the Taoist concept of Tao and Yin-Yang, Mao insists that without contradiction "each aspect loses the condition of its existence".<sup>11</sup>



Without life, death is nonexistent; without death, life is nonexistent. ... If not for the existence of bad fortune, nothing can be known as good fortune; if not for good fortune, nothing can be known as bad fortune.<sup>12</sup>

These sentences are just the same as the sayings of Lao Tzu in his work, Tao Te Ching. As a matter of fact, in his pre-Marxist years, Mao was greatly influenced by the traditional Chinese Yin-Yang concept. He says:

I say: the concept is reality, the finite is the infinite, the temporal is the intemporal, imagination is thought, I am the universe, life is death, death is life, ... the Yin is the Yang, the high is the low, ...<sup>12</sup>

This language is very much like that of Chuang Tzu, the great Taoist thinker during the Warring States period. Unlike Hegelian antagonistic dialectics, the traditional Chinese Yin and Yang principle is supposed to be in a mutually complementary form in all beings at all times. The Yin is not an antithesis to Yang but its temporary deflection. When a return from this deflection to the perfect state represented by Yang is completed, a cyclical nation of progress is presented.<sup>13</sup> This kind of progress through the Yin-Yang antinomy differs from the "Hegelian logic of a linear progressive development to higher stages through thesis, antithesis, and synthesis,"<sup>14</sup> which was followed by Marx, Engels, and the modern Marxists.

Professor Hsiung Chieh points out: "The Yin-Yang reasoning has probably influenced Mao's theory of contradictions as much as Marx and Lenin have."<sup>15</sup> Mao has often cited the sayings of Lao Tzu and even once directly mentioned this great Taoist.<sup>16</sup> In his work, "On Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", 1957, Mao Tse-tung pointed out that the bad things can be changed to good things and the good things can also become bad things. If one person or the government can correctly handle the contradictions among the people which always exist, an unfavourable conflict could be altered into a harmonious union.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, since 1949 two general tendencies, which could be regarded as adventurous and moderate, have existed

in Chinese domestic and foreign policy. As Mao served in a position of a balance wheel, the relationship between these two opposite lines has been not one of hostility but rather of complementarity. Thus, as Robert J. Lifton has observed, the thought of Mao is a "Way", the Tao, a call to a particular mode of being on behalf of a transcendent purpose and a synthesis of Yin and Yang, the adventurous and moderate.<sup>18</sup> The complementary concept of Yin-Yang, the contradiction of co-existence, and its influence further reminds us of a famous Chinese dictum of Mencius' teaching: "A state without an adversary and external threat is apt to perish," (wu-ti-kuo-wai-huan-che-kuo-heng-wang).<sup>19</sup> Following this idea, the policies of "building our country through diligence and frugality" and "self-reliance and arduous struggle"<sup>20</sup> have been launched and the existence of foreign enemies and the potential imperialistic threat were strongly emphasized in current Chinese nationalism and nation-building.

Therefore, "If Mao drew from orthodox Marxism his concept of antagonistic contradictions, it is quite possible that his theory of nonantagonistic contradictions owes much to the Yin-Yang heritage of Chinese thought. Like the Yin-Yang antinomy, Mao's nonantagonistic contradictions are not between truly antithetical polarities; such contradictions may continue to exist after the passage from capitalism to socialism".<sup>21</sup> However, different from the Yin-Yang circular motion but in a way reminiscent of Hegelian thought, Mao sees the final resolution of all contradictions in an advance toward a higher stage of development and progress.<sup>22</sup>

Following this nonantagonistic but complementary concept of the Yin-Yang antinomy and the Hegelian dialectical concept of a higher stage of development, Mao explains the origins of human knowledge under a circular process and development.<sup>23</sup> The interaction and transformation between Yin-

Yang under certain conditions would provide the variety and complexity of world and human affairs.<sup>24</sup> In general, while Mao recognizes the existence of antagonistic contradictions, he prefers the promotion of non-antagonistic contradictions, the complementary concept of the Yin-Yang antinomy, for better and further development.

... Antagonism is one form, but not the only form, of the struggle of opposites. ... In accordance with the concrete development of things, some contradictions which were originally non-antagonistic develop into antagonistic ones, while others which were originally antagonistic develop into non-antagonistic ones. ...<sup>25</sup>

As to the similar dialectical materialistic principle of the unity of subjective motivation or creativeness and objective regularity, which the Chinese Legalists, such as Kuei Ku Tzu, Su Ch'in and Chang Yi in the Tsung-Heng School and Sun Tzu in the Military Stratagem School, suggested and applied in the international politics and military strategy,<sup>26</sup> Mao also gives his comments: "Marxist philosophy holds that the most important problem does not lie in understanding the laws of the objective world and thus being able to explain it, but in applying the knowledge of these laws actively to change the world".<sup>27</sup>

In general, Mao's philosophical epistemology synthesizes the traditional Chinese concept of Tao and Yin-Yang and the modern Marxist view of dialectical materialism. His concept of the Yin-Yang antinomy as applied in contemporary Chinese foreign policies can be illustrated by Sino-Soviet relations and Sino-American relations in the past and present.

B) Eclecticism and Political Synthesis: Idealism and Realism; Internationalism and Nationalism

The struggle between idealism and realism has a long history in all fields of human knowledge, both Western and Oriental. Just like the principle of dialectics in the universe, the swing between idealism and realism in

human affairs has depended upon conditions and circumstances. This seems to be especially exemplified in Chinese history which can be divided into four periods, each of which can be characterized as leaning toward either idealism or realism.

The period of Spring and Autumn in ancient China may be regarded as the first stage which incorporated idealism as its concept of international politics. It was represented by the idealistic concepts of Taoist utopian anarchism, Confucian virtual culturalism, and Mohist internationalism of universal love.

The following period of Warring States may be regarded as the second stage, characterized by realism in its concept of international politics. This stage was represented by Hsun Tzu's concept of eclecticism, the Legalist concepts of law, authority, statecraft and power, the concept of balance of power by the Tsung-Heng School, and the concept of military stratagem represented by Sun Tzu.

The period of the third stage was from the unified Han Dynasty (206 B.C.) down to 1919's May Fourth Movement of republican China. The leading philosophical concept in this period was idealist Confucianism, from which the Chinese concept of international culturalism was derived. Due to the Western challenge of realism, the idealist Confucianism collapsed and caused the emergence of realistic nationalism.


The fourth stage was characterized by a synthesis of idealist internationalism expressed in proletarian Marxist-Leninist internationalism and the Chinese ideal of Universal Harmony, and in the realist nationalism of power politics which is reflected in the concepts of anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and national liberation movements. From 1919 down to the present, the doctrines of Sun Yat-sen and the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung are representative. Sun's first principle of his Three People's Principles is nationalism

Figure 2

Major Trends of the Concepts of International  
Politics in Chinese History

Abbreviation:

T. : Taoism	N. : Nationalism
C. : Confucianism	IN. : Internationalism
M. : Mohism	I. : Idealism
L. : Legalism	R. : Realism



which he regarded as a necessary step and approach towards the ultimate Communist internationalism or Confucian Universal Harmony.<sup>28</sup> (Figure 2)

Mao Tse-tung's commitment to anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, and to socialism and communism represent ideas similar to Sun's. As a general philosophical attitude towards current Chinese society and conditions, Mao teaches: "Ancient wisdom is for present use; foreign knowledge is for Chinese use (Ku-wei-chin-yung; Yang-wei-chung-yung)".<sup>29</sup> Inspired by this, on the question of internationalism versus nationalism, Mao insists upon the synthesis and unity of these two.<sup>30</sup> He emphasizes that patriotism or nationalism is an indispensable step to the stage of internationalism. The former is the inevitable approach to the latter.

We are at once internationalists and patriots, and our slogan is, "Fight to defend the motherland against the aggressors." ... The victory of China and the defeat of the invading imperialists will help the people of other countries. Thus in wars of national liberation patriotism is applied internationalism.<sup>31</sup>

For Mao and the Chinese Communists, the questions of internationalism versus nationalism and idealism versus realism seem to be without contradiction. For them one supplements the other and combining both is an indispensable approach to the ultimate goal. This idea concides somewhat with the Chinese classical concept of the Yin-Yang antinomy for mutual harmony.

However, as an important step to the goal of internationalism, especially in the transitional period of today's world power politics, the spirit of nationalism has played a great role in current Chinese foreign policy, which has been explicitly expressed in Chinese efforts for anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and support of national liberation revolutionary movements.<sup>32</sup>

### C) The Spirit of Ideology: The Thought of Mao Tse-tung

#### (1) The Chinese Tradition and Communist Ideology

For thousands of years ideology has played an important role in Chinese thought and Chinese society. Confucianism shaped Chinese life for the past two thousand years. The new China since 1949 has been no exception and the Thought of Mao Tse-tung has taken the place of traditional Confucian doctrine.

The content of Chinese Communist ideology is vast involving questions of political power, organization, leadership, policy, and social ethics. In other words, "it is at once the source of morality and authority and the basis for a social order and a political program."<sup>33</sup> Unlike the West, at least since Machiavelli, China has never known a separation between morality and politics; such a separation is foreign to the Chinese tradition. Under the Chinese Communist regime, just as the Confucian li prevailed in both state and society in the past, morality and authority are fused into one, which not only dictates public laws but also seeks to legislate the private morality of its people. However, unlike the Confucian system of the past, the real locus of authority today in China is not in the conscience of the individual as taught by Confucian doctrine but in the affairs of the nation. The teachings of Confucius have been replaced by the Thought of Mao Tse-tung.<sup>34</sup> Personal identification with the values of the regime has to be created in order to obtain the Chinese people's loyalty and willingness to make sacrifices. Meanwhile, the regime attempts to provide reasonable programs and justified revolutionary goals for the nation. As Professor Hsiung puts it:

In Mao's usage, the word "ideology" is coterminous with "culture", ... Communist ideology has replaced the Confucian li; it has taken over the latter's function as the culmination of what we in the West term social conscience, morality, religious faith, and constitutional law. In the metabolism of Communist China, a new combination of revolutionary nationalism, socialist collectivism (comradeship), and Party discipline has supplanted the traditional combination of culturalism, familism, and bureaucratism.<sup>35</sup>

Thus ideology is all-important. It is now believed that correct

thought is the key to correct action, just as tradition taught that the mind (hsin) determines people's behavior and expands the individual's psychic consciousness. Instead of thumbing through the classics, the Chinese today must study Marxism, Leninism, and especially the Thought of Mao Tse-tung, which synthesize the traditional Chinese concepts and the modern philosophies with respect to the current Chinese situation.

As Professor Hsiung says, the supremacy of ideology (szu-hsiang or thought), "politics in command" (Mao's phrase), "was not only anticipated by Sun Yat-sen, Tseng Kuo-fan, and Wang An-shih but can be traced back to Mencius."<sup>36</sup> Through Mao's synthesis these traditional precepts have become merged with new concepts borrowed from Marxism-Leninism, such as the class struggle and the function of a political party. It is interesting to note that the Confucian tradition has shown a remarkable ability to absorb new ideas and to renew itself even in the modern age, even in the communist era. As to whether Chinese Communism departs from tradition, Professor Hsiung Chieh points out that:

Throughout Chinese intellectual history, value has always been placed on synthesis rather than originality, which is essentially a concern of the West.... No Chinese thinker has departed from that tradition, not even Mao.<sup>37</sup>

Professor Lucian W. Pye is also positive on the question of the endurance of traditional Chinese culture and its influence on current Chinese communism. He argues that the Chinese tolerance of contradiction and of conflicting philosophies such as Confucianism and Taoism is an outstanding characteristic of Chinese civilization.

An important characteristic of Chinese Communist ideology is the concept of szu-hsiang (thought), which for Chinese Communists, like the idea of hsin (mind) of the Confucian and Neo-Confucian thinkers, is the synthesis of mind and action, "the meeting ground of theory and practice."<sup>38</sup>



Thus, "the szu-hsiang (thought) of Mao Tse-tung" has been officially exalted as the synthesis of Marxist-Leninist theory and of Chinese revolutionary practice. Concerning the idea of hsin (mind), Chinese Communist leaders on occasion use this term, which comes down from Confucian and Neo-Confucian works.<sup>39</sup>

The concept of szu-hsiang is extremely important for Chinese Communism according to Mao's interpretation. It has been romanticized as the source of what amounts to a superhuman power. Chinese Communists argue that correct szu-hsiang provides total devotion to Communism and the Party and presents an indomitable spirit with inexhaustible strength, with the result that "stupidity gives way to intelligence, the difficult becomes easy, the dangerous path becomes smooth, and (the individual becomes) capable of achieving distinction and being outstanding in any kind of work."<sup>40</sup>

The emphasis on human will power and the spirit of ideology by Chinese Communists is seen in Mao's concern with Party rectification. His fear of revisionism resulted in the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960's. It is revealed in the concept of the "people's war" and national defence in Chinese foreign policy, and in such slogans as "in agriculture, learn from Tachai", "in industry, learn from Taching" which were proclaimed by Mao in 1964 for Chinese nation-building.<sup>41</sup>

Szu-hsiang, for Chinese Communists, has an independent existence and thus it is no longer within the Marxist concept of superstructure. Therefore, proletarian szu-hsiang needs frequent ideological purification campaigns. Influenced by Chinese traditional philosophies, says Pye, "Mao thus contributed to the long-standing tendency of Marxism-Leninism to move away from a strictly sociological view of class; he regards ideological or intellectual positions as bases of the historical dialectic."<sup>42</sup>

Pye adds a summary comment on Mao's synthesis of Chinese tradition and modern Marxism: "In short, just as Marx had turned Hegel upside-down and made materialism more important than idealism, so Mao turned Marx upside-down and reasserted the supremacy of ideas. This feat of Mao was consistent with the historical propensity of the Chinese to attach prime importance to intellectual and ethical considerations."<sup>43</sup>

In general, unlike the original Marxism, the Chinese Communist concept of szu-hsiang actually consists of man, the subjective world, and his environment, the objective world, blended into an integral whole. The substructure, or economic base, and the superstructure, or ideology, in the original Marxist framework, are no longer separated but blended into a continuum as in the Chinese Yin-Yang concept.

## (2) Ideology and Its Implications for World Revolution

Beside other factors, such as the Chinese conception of world politics and of China's own proper world role, her national interest and historical experience, the relationship between goals and capabilities, and Chinese world prestige, Maoist ideology has played a major role in the formulation of Chinese foreign policy.

The ultimate goal of Marxism-Leninism, the internationalism of humanitarianism, connected with the classical Chinese Confucian "Great Harmony" (Ta-tung Society), Taoist Utopianism, and the Mohist concept of "Universal Love"--all these have inspired Chinese efforts for world revolution. However, in its international application, Maoism represents a specific strategy for world communism, attributed to Mao. Through the experience of the Communist revolution in China, Maoist strategy is a synthesis of the classical "left" strategy of the international Communist movement, which provided the idea of a "united front from below", and the classical

right strategy which emphasized the "two-stage" revolution (feudalism-to-capitalism and capitalism-to-socialism, as outlined in Mao's The New Democracy). Mao adopted the "left" strategy and agreed with the two-stage revolution, but rejecting the classical right strategy, he insisted on the maintenance of Communist hegemony from the very first stage of the two-stage revolution.<sup>44</sup> Maoist ideology, which differs from that of the Soviets, has been a crucial factor in the Sino-Soviet split.

Unlike Soviet revisionism (the "Brezhnev Doctrine", the socialist imperialism exemplified by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968), China's view of herself as the "center of world revolution" means only that China is "a source of inspiration and ideological leadership for the underdeveloped world rather than a center of direct organizational control or direct participation."<sup>45</sup> The meaning of Chinese ideology is that the thought of Mao Tse-tung is the creative application of Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions, with the implication that other nations which have conditions similar to China's might well follow her lead. Thus the Chinese interpret Mao's famous phrases "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" and "a single spark can start a prairie fire" to mean that it is China who will provide this single spark and it is the underdeveloped third world nations which will be the prairie fire in the world revolution. From past reality and ideology, there is enough evidence to show that the Chinese Communists are more concerned with instructing or providing models for other people as to how to conduct their own revolutions than with participating or interfering in revolutions elsewhere as the other great powers have done, the Chinese Communist leaders point out: "Revolution is self-inspired, it can not be exported."<sup>46</sup> So the Chinese Communists "continued to express respect for nationalism and to think in terms of the

need for ideological leadership of the world Communist movement, as distinct from direct organizational control or intervention by any Communist super-power."<sup>47</sup>

With the idea which has roots in the classical Chinese concept of humanism that "man (with the right ideology) is more important than weapons", the practical conduct of Chinese foreign policy has emphasized the export of its ideology rather than the export of material aid. This policy truly manifests Mao's belief that correct ideology, szu-hsiang, is central to Communist China's perception of its role in the world revolution as primarily spiritual and ideological."<sup>48</sup> As professor Lucian W. Pye asserts, the belief in human willpower and morality as the key to Chinese modernization is probably the true spirit of Chinese politics and provides the continuity of Chinese tradition. On this point, Professor Hsiung Chieh also suggests that "The Chinese Communist view recalls the traditional Chinese view of the world as an ideologically defined hierarchical order based on a universal moral code."<sup>49</sup> Whereas in the past the universal moral code was Confucianism, at the present, it is the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" based on Marxism-Leninism. Professor John K. Fairbank gives his view in similar words:

Since the pattern of the past cannot be entirely expunged, they remain curiously intertwined with new motifs. Peking today has a Marxist-Leninist Maoist ideological orthodoxy as vigorous as Confucianism used to be; but it believes in progress toward a future millennium, not cyclical repetition descending from a golden age.<sup>50</sup>

From the basis of such discussions, we begin to understand how important is the role of the human mind and ideology in Chinese politics, whether in the past or the present.

## II. THE LONG-RANGE GOAL OF FOREIGN POLICY: INTERNATIONALISM

### A) Idealism, Internationalism, and Humanitarianism

The ultimate goal of Chinese foreign policy is the stage of humanitarian internationalism, world communism.

Defining this goal, Mao Tse-tung pointed out: "The ultimate aim for which all communists strive is to bring about a socialist and communist society."<sup>51</sup> We Communists never conceal our political views. Definitely and beyond all doubt, our future or maximum programme is to carry China forward to socialism and communism. Both the name of our Party and our Marxist world outlook unequivocally point to this supreme ideal of the future, a future of incomparable brightness and splendour".<sup>52</sup> He further asserted that the Chinese Communists were internationalists and devoted their efforts to the international emancipation of the proletariat.<sup>53</sup>

However, to what extent does this ideal humanitarianism connect with Chinese traditions and philosophies? Professor Harold Hinton gives his answer:

To say that the Chinese Communist revolution is a non-Western revolution is more than a truism.... Hence the Chinese Communist attitude toward China's traditional past is selectively critical, but by no means totally hostile. The Chinese Communist revolution, and the foreign policy of the regime to which it has given rise, have several roots, each of which is imbedded in the past more deeply than one would tend to expect of a movement seemingly so convulsive.<sup>54</sup>

#### (1) The Chinese Spirit of Idealism and Communism

It is probably true that a commitment to some form of idealism is a universal trait and evident in the history of all peoples. In the case of China, there are obvious parallels between the classical Chinese concepts of social and political idealism and modern communist thought. Hou Wai-lu, a famous Chinese Communist historian, says:

In Chinese history there have been many concepts of active materialism, atheism, and simple dialectics. There also has been the concept of the ideal "Great Harmony (Ta-Tung)" world and the "Universal Peace (T'ai-P'ing)" world.<sup>55</sup>

In Chinese history there are also various utopian thoughts... At that time many representative intellectuals proposed many different

ideals for social reform, such as Confucius' "the aged to rest, the young to be treated", Mo Tzu's "universal love and mutual benefit", Lao Tzu's "utopian anarchism with small state and few people", Chuang Tzu's "world of absolute virtue", Hsu Hsin's "the ruling and the ruled working together", Mencius' "system of well-field cultivation".

The chapter of the Evolution of Rites about "Ta T'ung" (Great Harmony) was produced in a later time, and it may be regarded as the typical example of utopian concept in Chinese history.<sup>56</sup>

In a further elaboration, we could find a similar theory of the "state" somewhere between Chinese Taoism and modern Marxism. The Marxist regard the state as an organ of the ruling class and an instrument to secure its own interest by exploiting the ruled class, while the Chinese Taoists reject all man-made creatures, such as political institutions, moral systems, and social hierarchical classes. The Chinese Taoists urged the abolition of artificial differences and entities including the classes and the "state", and thus provided a revolutionary concept for human equality and harmony much the same as the Marxists suggested.

Furthermore, the communist theory of "withering away of the state" also has its precedent in the Chinese Taoist utopian concept of anarchism stated in Lao Tzu's "Tao Te Ching".<sup>57</sup> Chinese Taoist concepts of anti-aggression, anti-imperialism, and the elimination of human exploitation for social sufficiency and harmony are obviously very similar to modern communist idealism in the philosophical sense.

Human equality and dignity, which the communists have advocated, is also the basic spirit of Chinese Confucianism, which regards man as the center of society.<sup>58</sup> The ideal and final stage of communist society is a society of classlessness, equality, freedom, public cooperation and an atmosphere of human love. According to communist theory, it is stated that:

The classless society will show forth man's true dignity. Gone will be the exploitation of man by man. The individual will no longer live merely for himself and his family, but for all mankind. Society pools its labor, natural resources, capital and knowledge. ... Such a society becomes then "an association in which the free development of each is

the condition for the free development of all."<sup>59</sup>

Parallel to this portrait of ideal communist society, Chinese Confucianism also provides a utopian picture in its final stage of Ta-T'ung society. Therefore, Professor Hou Wai-lu commented: "The ideal society of Ta-T'ung is a progressive society."<sup>60</sup> The Ta-T'ung society is characterized by human kindness, cooperation, equality, love, order, and morality. The people in the world at this stage are civilized and live harmoniously in order and peace, and there appears an ideal anarchist society of the Taoist "wu-wei" (do-nothing):

When the great Tao was in practice, the world was common to all; men of talents, virtue and ability were selected; sincerity was emphasized and friendship was cultivated. ...<sup>61</sup>

Besides the aspects of political order and social morality, the economic condition in the stage of ideal communism is prosperous and, in the eyes of Marx, the principle of distribution is a fulfillment of needs, that is, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."<sup>62</sup> With similar phrases describing the economic condition and the principle of distribution, the feature of Chinese Ta-T'ung society is stated:

A competent provision was secured for the aged till their death, employment was given to the able-bodied, and a means was provided for the upbringing of the young. Kindness and compassion were shown to widows, orphans, childless men, and those who were disabled by disease, so that they all had the wherewithal for support. ...<sup>63</sup>

Moreover, like the evolutionary theory presented by the Marxism which gives the transitional stages from capitalism to communism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, socialism, and communism, the Chinese theory of the ideal Ta-T'ung society also points out three transitional stages of evolution, that is, despotism (chu-luan-shi), constitutionalism (hsiao-k'ang), and the Great Harmony (Ta-T'ung). In contrasting the descriptions of the stages provided by Marxist Communism and the Confucian Ta-T'ung society, it is interesting to match them--the Marxist dictatorship of the proletariat with

the Confucian transitional stage of despotism, socialism with constitutionalism (hsiao-k'ang), and communism with the Great Harmony (Ta-T'ung). Comparing the spirit of the two systems, Marxist socialism in which the political mechanism, social morality and economic distribution are still under a realistic principle of "from each according to his talents, to each according to his worth"<sup>64</sup> is akin to the Confucian transitional stage of constitutionalism in which "the world has become like families in which each loves but his own parents and treats as children only his own children. ... The states build up their own defense system for self-security and the international relations are based upon the principles of li and yi."<sup>65</sup> It is probably fair to point out that it is the very stage of socialism or hsiao-k'ang toward which China is striving today. In essence, the final stage of communism for the Marxists is very much compatible with the final stage of the classical Chinese Ta-T'ung society.

Marx, Engels and their predecessors such as Plato, Thomas More, Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Owen, the so-called Utopian Socialists, have provided an ideal of communism for mankind. Although Marx and Engels represent a new synthesis with the "scientific socialism" of dialectical materialism, there still exists an inevitable gap between the theory and the practice. It is Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung who actually applied Marxism to various conditions. However, in matching the theory and the practice to different situations and places, the applications and interpretations obviously varied. Thus appeared the accusations of dogmatism and revisionism according to considerations of national self-interest, as manifested in the ideological split between China and the Soviet Union today. The gap between goal and means is probably the reason for this dispute. Nevertheless, the communist parties led by Lenin, Mao Tse-tung, and other Marxists in various countries



contribute the practical mechanism for implementation of the communist ideal. The present-day communist parties and movements in various countries and the three pre-World War II Communist Internationals are examples of communist internationalism. (Indeed, the Second and Third Internationals still exist in some form).

A philosophic comparison between the classical Chinese concept of internationalism and the contemporary movement of communist internationalism is possible. Chinese Taoism and Confucianism did provide an ideal of internationalism for the future, but they left only the concept without practical means. Although Confucianism was adopted as the national doctrine from the Han Dynasty forward, its approach could not be practised in the chaotic and contending situation of international power politics which characterizes the modern world. It even failed in practice during the Warring States period.

However, the Chinese pragmatic Mohist School aimed not only at an ideal internationalism, the doctrine of "Universal Love" and "Universal Equality (Shang-T'ung)", but it also presented a practical apparatus--the international Mohist movement led by a highly-disciplined and militant Mohist group. Moreover, it is also interesting to note that the background of the Mohist movement, which was based on the proletariat, is akin to that of the current communist movement. Their spirit of humanitarianism and internationalism, of universal love and universal equality, is not very different from that of the modern communist doctrine.

The Mohist ideal of universal love and the society of universal equality contains certain principles similar to those of communist doctrine and which are currently advocated by the Chinese Communists. For example, both ideologies advocate a world in which the principle of universal love is performed without discrimination. Men regard other people as they do them-

selves. They regard not only other families as their own families but also other countries as their own countries. In this world of equality, men love each other so that the strong will not oppress the weak; the majority will not ignore the minority; the rich will not exploit the poor; the bourgeoisie will not look down upon the proletariat; the wise will not take advantage of the common. It is a world without war and a society of peace. All nations of the world regardless of size will be treated as equals. There is no aggression nor exploitation from the big powers but mutual benefit and assistance. On the above principles, Mo Tzu really speaks for the proletariat and the weak members of mankind.<sup>66</sup>

Furthermore, acting as a vanguard in the international scene, the Mohist group positively strove to save and to relieve the weak nations from the invasions of the strong nations. This might be regarded as similar in spirit to the communist doctrine of liberating the oppressed and exploited peoples and weak nations--namely the Third World nations and peoples--from the oppressing and exploiting class and nations--namely the capitalist imperialist nations and the superpowers.

If we could find an explanation for its failure to obtain popularity during the latter part of the Warring States period and thereafter, the proletarian-oriented Mohism lacked a strong scientific methodology such as dialectical materialism with which the contemporary communist movement has armed itself. It was the later Chinese Legalism which adopted the philosophical methodology of dialectical materialism to complete its mission of Chinese unification during the period of the Warring States.

Thus, the ideal of utopian concept in ancient China was criticized by a current Chinese Communist author as follows:

We can not idealize the concept of Ta-T'ung in Chinese history regardless of the factor of historicism. ... Due to the limitations of

history the previous philosophers did not understand the general rule of social development and were unable to point out a common way towards the realm of Ta-T'ung.<sup>67</sup>

(2) Mao Tse-tung's View on the Great Harmony Concept and Marxism-Leninism

It might be argued that political idealism is much easier to initiate than to practice. A feasible approach to filling the gap between the ideal heaven and the physical world has been the general task of most philosophers and statesmen throughout history.

The concept of Great Harmony has actually existed for a long time in Chinese history and has been espoused by leading personages, including a number of emperors since the time of the Han Dynasty; statesmen such as Wang Mang of the Han Dynasty, Wang An-shih of the Sung Dynasty, and K'ang Yu-wei of the Ch'ing Dynasty; philosophers such as Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming; and republican revolutionary leaders such as Sun Yat-sen. Like their predecessors and contemporaries, Mao Tse-tung and his associates also anticipate the ideal state of the Great Harmony in the future. In his work, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" (June 30, 1949), Mao outlined the ultimate goal of Chinese communism in these words: "But for the working class, the labouring people and the Communist Party the question is not one of being overthrown, but of working hard to create the conditions in which classes, state power and political parties will die out very naturally and mankind will enter the realm of Great Harmony (Ta-T'ung)".<sup>68</sup>

However, Mao criticized his antecedent idealists for taking the stage of the Great Harmony as only dream, without any practical or scientific implementation. He cited Marx's words in his work, "On New Democracy": "He (Marx) also says, 'The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it'".<sup>69</sup> On this point, Mao suggested the adoption of whatever there might be in which foreign or ancient

cultures would be useful to China today and to her future.

To nourish her own culture China needs to assimilate a good deal of foreign progressive culture, not enough of which was done in the past. We should assimilate whatever is useful to us today not only from the present-day socialist and new-democratic cultures but also from the earlier cultures of other nations,...

Without ignoring the Chinese classics and traditional cultural treasures, he carefully takes an attitude of synthesis and points out the inevitable connections between the old and the new.

It is imperative to separate the fine old culture of the people which had a more or less democratic and revolutionary character from all the decadence of the old feudal ruling class. China's present new politics and new economy have developed out of her old politics and old economy, and her present new culture, too, has developed out of her old culture; therefore, we must respect our own history and must not lop it off.<sup>71</sup>

With this critical attitude, Mao not only praised but also has been influenced by the invaluable traditional concept of the idealist's "Great Harmony". But he pointed out that:

From the time of China's defeat in the Opium War of 1840, Chinese progressives went through untold hardships in their quest for truth from the Western countries. Hung Hsiu-chuan, Kang Yu-wei, Yen Fu and Sun Yat-sen were representative of those who had looked to the West for truth before the Communist Party of China was born.<sup>72</sup>

Mao adds that, although "Kang Yu-wei wrote Ta T'ung Shu, or the Book of Great Harmony, he did not and could not find the way to achieve Great Harmony".<sup>73</sup>

K'ang Yu-wei, a Confucian scholar of modern times, followed the Confucian ideal of the Ta-T'ung society and drew the ideal picture in his work Ta T'ung Shu which provides the One-World philosophy but without any concrete or practical approach for reaching this goal.

With Marxism-Leninism, Mao argued, "Bourgeois democracy has given way to people's democracy under the leadership of the working class and the bourgeois republic to the people's republic. This has made it possible to achieve socialism and communism through the people's republic, to abolish classes and enter a world of Great Harmony (Ta T'ung)".<sup>75</sup> After his cri-

ticism and synthesis of idealism and realism, both in Western and Chinese phases, he confidently concluded that to achieve the ideal stage of Great Harmony for human beings, "The only way is through a people's republic led by the working class."<sup>76</sup>

Professor Hou Wai-lu points out in the preface of his work "The Ideal of Ta T'ung in Chinese History" that the traditional concept of Ta T'ung in China was the product of an oppressed class conducting a brave class struggle for achieving its great ideal. "The world of Ta T'ung is the prospect which human beings have been longing for for about a thousand years or more. However, this great ideal will be fulfilled in this generation by our hands."<sup>77</sup> In the conclusion, he comments:

Although the former Chinese philosophers had the ideal of Ta T'ung, they could not find a road towards the realm of Ta T'ung. Only through the synthesis of Marxism-Leninism and Chinese revolutionary practice, and only through the leadership of the Communist Party, could a concrete way be scientifically pointed out towards socialism and communism. Thus, we could critically absorb the valuable part of former philosophers' beautiful ideal concept, and realize it.<sup>78</sup>

#### B) The Role of China in World Communism

On the point of relationship between the Chinese revolution and the world communist movement, Mao Tse-tung gave a clear-cut statement: "The Chinese revolution is part of the world revolution".<sup>79</sup> That is, the first and most important step of this thesis is the Chinese revolution itself, through which there would be a revolutionary new China to play a role in the world revolution. Mao continued:

In other words, not only do we want to change a China that is a politically oppressed and economically exploited into a China that is politically free and economically prosperous, we also want to change the China which is being kept ignorant and backward under the sway of the old culture into an enlightened and progressive China under the sway of a new culture. In short, we want to build a new China.<sup>80</sup>

In the meantime, when the world bourgeoisie-capitalist front col-

lapses, the established socialist state should give active support to the liberation of all colonies and semi-colonies in order to fulfill the ultimate goal of world revolution. Thus, it is the role of China to give active support to the colonial and semi-colonial oppressed nations, namely the Third World nations, for their national liberation movements.<sup>81</sup>

In regard to the thesis of the extension of humanitarianism to all the world, we can extract it from certain Chinese classics. The proletarian-based Mohist movement with its doctrine of relieving the suffering and oppressed nations and peoples is representative. The general spirit of the Mohists is the same as that of today's communist movement in which members devote their efforts toward ideal internationalism. Moreover, the Confucian one-world view and spirit of jen, which should be extended from the individual to the family, then to the nation, and finally to the world, presents a similar spirit of internationalism. The Confucian doctrine of "(Now the man of perfect virtue), wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others, (chi-yu-li-er-li-jen; chi-yu-ta-er-ta-jen)"<sup>82</sup> is one example of the essentials of Confucian internationalism.

Following this traditional concept, Sun Yat-sen, the great modern Chinese revolutionary, developed his famous principle of Chinese foreign relations saying that China should unite "in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals". On this point, Sun postulated the formation of an international united front for anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, in which China would support the small and weak nations actively in their national liberation movements.<sup>83</sup>

Mao Tse-tung elaborated Sun's view of this point but from a different class standpoint in his work "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship".<sup>84</sup>

He pointed out the Chinese role of a proletarian international united front with language generally similar to Sun's:

Externally, unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals and united with the peoples of all countries. That is, ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the People's Democracies and with the proletariat and the broad mass of the people in all other countries, and form an international united front.<sup>85</sup>

Thus Mao clearly outlined the Chinese role in international relations as one connected with the world communist movement. Furthermore, in order to reconcile the contradiction between nationalism and internationalism, he argues that under the communist theory of internationalism national liberation patriotism is in fact the application of internationalism. Since China is currently struggling at this stage, he seems to insist that fighting in defense of the motherland is the only way to defeat imperialism and achieve national liberation. "And only by achieving national liberation will it be possible for the proletariat and other working people to achieve their own emancipation".<sup>86</sup> From the philosophy of Yin-Yang, the reconciliation of nationalism and internationalism actually exists within the contradiction.

However, parallel to the Confucian cultural concept of the Middle Kingdom, the center of the world, ideologically, the Chinese Communists consider China as only the center of inspiration for world communism rather than a center of direct intervention and control of the world communist movement, as the Soviet Union considers itself. It is probably due to the traditional heritage and cultural influence that the Chinese concept of leadership of the world revolution tends to be more ideologically oriented than was Trotskyism or than is the hard-line policy of the Soviet Union, as evidenced in the 1968 Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and the direct Soviet control of other Eastern European nations.

On the question of traditional influences on contemporary Chinese

concepts and policies, it might be appropriate to cite Mr. Joseph Alsop's comment on his recent visit to China. He concluded:

They are too Chinese. The right way to see the New China, in truth, is to forget the Communist label, and to consider the revolution as a specifically Chinese event. China's majestic history even teaches that this was, in some sense, a characteristically Chinese event.<sup>87</sup>

As a matter of fact, the Chinese simply have blended those concepts and ideologies whether Chinese or foreign which they think useful for the benefit of China and the world's future.

In general, the long range goal of world revolution to which the Chinese Communists are currently devoted is still within the traditional conceptual framework of culturalism, although in a different style.

### III. THE IMMEDIATE GOAL OF FOREIGN POLICY: THE CONCEPT OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM

After two thousand years the idealist Confucian concept of culturalism, a system of suzerainty and cultural superiority, collapsed for the first time when it was challenged by the Western powers with their modern concept of nationalism during the mid-nineteenth century. Due to western superiority in science and technology, China was defeated by the imperialist nations and her traditional confidence in her cultural predominance was bankrupt after the first western challenge in the Opium War in 1840. Worse than that, thereafter, China was required by the imperialist powers to submit to the unequal treaties and was treated as having a so-called "semi-colonial" status in the international community.

The realist concept of patriotism or nationalism then was emerged with the sole purpose to save China from invasion and collapse. Persons like Hung Hsiu-chuan, K'ang Yu-wei, Yen Fu, and Sun Yat-sen devoted their efforts to save China. Revolutionary movements such as the Movement of the Taiping



Heavenly Kingdom, the Reform Movement of 1898, the Revolution of 1911, and the May Fourth Movement were typical examples of this concept of realism to create a basis for Chinese nationalism. Especially, the May Fourth Movement brought the concept of nationalism or patriotism to its peak in 1919 and indirectly gave birth to the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, when a group of Chinese intellectuals adopted Marxism-Leninism.

The first impetus for the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party was to save China from imperialist oppression and economic exploitation by the western capitalist powers. Furthermore, it also aimed to wipe out the traditional feudalism and to build a new China.<sup>88</sup> The basis upon which the Chinese Communists worked toward their goal was Marxism-Leninism. The principles of Marxism-Leninism coincided with Chinese needs in two major ways, which may be described as realism and idealism. Realistically, Marxism-Leninism might satisfy Chinese nationalism in order to liberate China from foreign imperialism and create a strong new China; idealistically, it would strive for humanitarian internationalism as conceived by Chinese world-view.

By 1949 the victory of Chinese Communist Party in the Chinese civil war ended the rule of Chiang Kai-shek on the Chinese Mainland, and Chiang was forced to flee to the island of Taiwan. At that time the international situation was under an atmosphere of bipolar cold war which was later reinforced by the Korean War in the early 1950's. The Chinese civil war between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists, which was strictly an internal affair, was unfortunately disturbed and complicated by the American containment policy in Asia in support of Chiang Kai-shek's government as part of the anti-communist bloc. The Sino-American confrontation in the Korean War and the American support of Taiwan in violation of Chinese territorial integrity thus have made the United States the number one enemy of the People's

Republic of China in foreign policy.

On the other hand, the mixture of ideological dispute and national interests has also caused the once intimate Sino-Soviet relations to fall apart since 1960. The increasing border conflicts between China and Russia have further reinforced the collapse of their partnership and even reached the brink of physical warfare.

It is interesting to note that no matter whether it is because of the difference of ideology or of the national interest involved, the great powers in the world seem to be inevitably in a condition of antagonism. Thus, it is our task to look into how the Chinese viewed the world situation and the roles of the two superpowers in international politics in the light of China's foreign policy in a global context.

#### A) Chinese Rivalry with the Superpowers

##### (1) Nationalism

##### 1) Conceptual Heritage and Background

Nationalism has played a great role in modern international relations, especially after World War II. As a Chinese Communist leader soberly pointed out: "Where there is oppression there is resistance, and where there is aggression there is struggle against aggression".<sup>89</sup> The concrete facts to reflect this principle can be realized by the struggles of national liberation movements against those western imperialist colonial powers in the under-developed areas, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and the emergence of new states in the international community since 1950's.

In the long traditions of China, the concept of nationalism did once appear in the ancient chaotic periods of Spring and Autumn and Warring States, when many independent states emerged. The struggle among the states at that time was conducted by various means, such as physical violence, territorial

annexation through conquest, domestic political and economic reforms, and the mobilization of national morale for national restoration. All these forms of striving for national interest have presented a primitive type of nationalism similar to the modern concept of nationalism.

The Chinese Confucian view of international order has realistically put the state as an immediate transitional vehicle towards the realm of ideal universal harmony, the stage of Ta T'ung. "The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the world (t'ien-hsia) first ordered well their own nations".<sup>90</sup> This transitional stage in which the states struggled among themselves in the world of chaos in order to give a good government to their own people by social and political reforms was called the "small tranquility (hsiao-k'ang)".

Mencius also pointed out the necessary stage of nationalism leading the way to the ideal society. He argued the principle of national self-determination for peoples and urged that the states should be independent standing on their own feet. In support of this principle he approved the concept of a "just war" for self-defense. In the mood of nationalism Mencius urged the necessity of national motivation for self-reliance and arduous struggle for nation building.<sup>91</sup> All these ideas have been the general principles of current Chinese nationalism advocated by the Chinese Communists.

During the late part of the period of Warring States, the concept of nationalism initiated and proposed by the Chinese Legalist thinkers and administrators had developed to an extreme and resulted in a turbulent world order of power struggles and territorial conquests. However, nationalism disappeared when Ch'in conquered all her contemporary rival states and unified the Chinese empire in 221 B.C. This concept of nationalism did not reappear until the modern age of Chinese history in the late part of the


nineteenth century.

Since the great Han and T'ang dynasties, China has been a self-centered and civilized world as far as Chinese experience reached. China regarded herself as the center of cultural superiority among the surrounding barbarian states. This idea remained firm in Chinese minds even long after it had ceased to be true in fact after the western challenge in the nineteenth century. Thus a concept of cultural superiority and of political suzerainty based on the tributary system in international relations was developed.<sup>92</sup> Professor C.P. Fitzgerald points out that, "The whole growth of the Chinese empire, throughout more than 3,000 years, had been built on this principle; the barbarians were conquered, then absorbed and turned into Chinese by slow assimilation and cultural influence". He continued: "Territory once won for civilization must not be given back to barbarism; therefore, territory which was once Chinese must for ever remain so, and if lost, must be recovered at the first opportunity."<sup>93</sup> Truly, this territorial concept is a by-product of the Chinese culturalism. It is interesting to note that this concept of culturalism has been transformed into a peculiar type of Chinese nationalism after its failure in the cultural area proper. As to whether this concept has influenced the current communist government of China, Professor Fitzgerald gives an affirmative answer: "It is unlikely that these old ideas have wholly disappeared; indeed there is much evidence to suggest that in a new form they are very much alive".<sup>94</sup>

Accordingly, it seems to be that the most important role for the Chinese Communists in the current stage of world order is to carry out the mission of Chinese nationalism. As early as 1945, and frequently since then, Mao Tse-tung used an ancient Chinese fable "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountain" to preach the resolute will of the Chinese people to struggle .

Map 3

CHINA: The World Order (Traditional Model)



Source: Tang Tsou (ed.), China in Crisis: China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), Vol.II, p.77.

against imperialism and for nationalism. His words reflect the highly motivated willpower characteristic of Chinese traditional exhortation:

Today, two big mountains lie like a dead weight on the Chinese people. One is imperialism, the other is feudalism. The Chinese Communist Party has long made up its mind to dig them up. We must persevere and work unceasingly, and we, too, will touch God's heart. Our God is none other than the masses of the Chinese people. If they stand up and dig together with us, why can't these two mountains be cleared away?<sup>95</sup>

In his speech at the plenary meeting of the 26th session of the U.N. General Assembly, Chiao Kuan-hua, Chairman of the Chinese Delegation pointed out the spirit of the Chinese struggle for national liberation:

... In order to win national independence, freedom and liberation, the Chinese people, advancing wave upon wave in a dauntless spirit, waged protracted heroic struggles against imperialism and its lackeys and finally won the revolution under the leadership of their great leader Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communist Party.<sup>96</sup>

The Chinese today have confidence that China will achieve self-respect, international prestige, and world power. Thus, in his speech to the People's Political Consultative Conference in September 1949, Mao Tse-tung proclaimed: "Our nation will never be an insulted nation any more: We have stood up."<sup>97</sup>  
(Map 3)

## 2) Sino-American Hostility: Struggle for National Interest

Blended with ideology and national interest since 1949, the antagonism between China and the United States seemed to be inevitable in the international power-politics of the post World War II period. As far as national interest is concerned, Sino-American relations have been mainly jeopardized by (a) the Korean War, (b) the Taiwan Question, (c) the American sphere of influence in the Far East.

### (a) The Korean War

The Chinese decision to intervene in Korean War in 1950 was mainly due to reasons of self-defense and national security. This decision was reached with extreme reluctance but it was inevitable. Professor Harold C.

Hinton considers that "the CPR's entry into the Korean War was motivated overwhelmingly by concern for its own security, and only very secondarily by concern for North Korean survival. Still less important, apparently was a desire to reduce American and enhance Chinese influence in the Far East."<sup>98</sup>

For the past two millennia the Chinese view of foreign relations towards its border states and neighbor kingdoms has been the concept of suzerainty under the tributary system, especially those remote states such as Burma, the states of Indo-China, and some of the pre-Dutch states of Indonesia. To those states, Chinese assumed no obligations for their defense and never intervened in their internal affairs. But as far as the Chinese national security is concerned, the bordering states such as Korea and Annam, and also Tibet, served a strategic purpose. Should these states be in enemy hands, a real danger to China would result. Moreover, they have long been under strong cultural influence and formed a kind of extension of the Chinese world. Since the periods of Spring and Autumn and Warring States the Chinese concept of culturalism has become so deep that the view that territory once won for civilization must not be given back to barbarian and therefore territory which was once Chinese must for ever remain so has not been changed even at the present time.<sup>99</sup>

Traditionally, Korea was under Chinese influence and cultural system and even had, in antiquity, actually been a Chinese province.<sup>100</sup> However, for the past century due to the weakness of the Ch'ing Dynasty it was dominated first by Russia, then by Japan as a step for the invasion of Chinese Manchuria, demonstrated in the Manchuria Crisis and the Second Sino-Japanese War in the 1930's. Due to past experiences on national security, China was seriously concerned with the Korean War in 1950 when it became a serious threat to China, especially as the new-born communist regime was just established.

The situation of 1950 was extremely dangerous to the Chinese Communist regime when the United States reversed its hands-off China policy and launched the containment policy in Asia after the outbreak of the Korean War. When General MacArthur proposed to rearm Japan and decided to invade Manchuria in association with Chiang Kai-shek's government in Taiwan, without paying attention to Chou En-lai's warning, this finalized the Chinese decision for intervention.<sup>101</sup> The Chinese criticism of the American intervention in Korean War was voiced in a speech by Chou En-lai:

In fact the attack by the puppet Korean troops of Syngman Rhee on the Korean Democratic People's Republic at the instigation of the United States Government was a premeditated move by the United States, designed to create a pretext for the United States to invade Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines. It is nothing but a further act of intervention by U.S. imperialism in the affairs of Asia.<sup>102</sup>

To this day, China still accuses the United States with an imperialistic occupation of Korea.<sup>103</sup>

From the example of the Korean War, Professor Harold C. Hinton has provided his view on the Chinese concept of national interest in the conclusion that:

It is one of the main themes of this study that when the CPR (Chinese People's Republic) has employed overt violence toward outsiders, as it did in Korea, it has generally done so mainly in order to protect its security rather than to enhance its influence. The latter, after all, can usually be promoted more safely and more effectively by political means.<sup>104</sup>

#### (b) The Taiwan Question

Since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, which resulted in American support to the Nationalist Chinese Government in Taiwan, the Taiwan question has been the essential issue of Sino-American relations for the past two decades. For the Chinese the appearance of American troops and military bases in Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait is the symbol of American imperialism against China, just as the Chinese have experienced in the past. "We are de-



terminated to liberate Taiwan" has been the unshakable slogan and chief policy since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. After the settlement of Korean War in 1954, Chou En-lai issued his report on foreign relations to the Central People's Government Council and pointed out that one of the "tasks now before us" was "to take determined action on the liberation of Taiwan so as to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity".<sup>105</sup> To this point, China seemed to charge that American protection of Taiwan was violating its own principle of the Open Door Policy by interfering in China's internal affairs. It also implies the continuation of national humiliation imposed by western imperialism since the Opium War in the nineteenth century.

The Chinese political attitude and insistence on the Taiwan question, which includes not only the American military intervention but also the so-called "Formosa Independence Movement" and "Two-Chinas" policy supported by the United States and Japan, has not been changed for the past two decades in spite of American hostility and containment in various means through military, political, economic, diplomatic fields, etc. Due to the realistic shift of power-balance in Europe and Asia since the 1960's and the collapse of the American image of communist expansion as exemplified by Chinese cautious actions and political behaviors in the international relations, American policy marked a great change when President Nixon took over the administration in 1969. The Taiwan question, a key issue in the Sino-American talks in Warsaw for more than a hundred times since 1958, did not reach any acceptable agreement until the Ping-Pong Diplomacy began in April, 1971 and Nixon's China trip in February, 1972 with a joint communique.

Historically, Taiwan was part of China for a thousand years until it was ceded to Japan by the imperial Ch'ing government in 1895 due to the

Chinese defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War. When Japan was defeated in World War II, Taiwan was due to return to China as stated in the Cairo Declaration of December 1943 and the Potsdam Declaration of 1945.<sup>106</sup> The American attitude toward this status of Taiwan was confirmed by President Truman's statement in January, 1950 that "in conformity with the Cairo Declaration of December, 1943, it was the U.S. view that Taiwan belonged to China". He further clearly pointed out that "If, as the administration contended, Taiwan was Chinese, there could be nothing but trouble for the United States if it intervened to separate the island from the mainland government".<sup>107</sup> However, while U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson raised no doubts about the Chinese claim to Taiwan, he hinted that "the administration would not hesitate to occupy this part of China if in a major war situation such occupation would be strategically advantageous for the United States."<sup>108</sup> Unfortunately, the outbreak of the Korean War several months later made his assumption a reality and the United States has unilaterally occupied China's Taiwan for the past two decades.

As early as 1956, Premier Chou En-lai made a policy speech on Taiwan to attack the so-called "Two-Chinas" policy as American intervention in Chinese internal affairs.<sup>109</sup> This continued unshakable Chinese position on the Taiwan question which caused the inevitable antagonism between China and the United States and international tensions in the area of the Far East.

The Chinese insistence of legitimate rights on Taiwan might actually root in the traditional Chinese concept of culturalism and suzerainty. Though it is under the Communist ideology, the present Chinese government continues to accept the old view that "once part of China, always part of China" as a general policy. That is, that "lands which were once Chinese are by right always Chinese", and that "any division of the empire and any cession of

territory is at best temporary, invalid, and unjust".<sup>110</sup> As Professor Fitzgerald puts it:

The Chinese, therefore, have never felt, or indeed thought, that territories lost in the age of Manchu weakness were fully and finally lost; that frontiers fixed against their will or inclination were permanently drawn; that any encroachment upon the fullest possible claim that China could justify had any validity. One constant aim of Chinese foreign policy is to recover such frontiers and annul such cessions.<sup>111</sup>

In this Chinese view, the appearance of American troops in Taiwan and the recognition of the Chinese Nationalist regime are regarded as not only a denial of the just claim that the island is a Chinese province but also a national humiliation with the continuation of Western imperialism. Consequently, the United States has been treated as the major enemy by China for the past twenty years because American refused to give up Taiwan. To reinforce this concept and policy, for the past two decades the statement that "Taiwan is an inalienable part of China" has been the general prerequisite to establish diplomatic relationships between China and other nations in the world.

Moreover, from the ideological humanitarian viewpoint of traditional jen or benevolence in the light of Chinese long-range-goal foreign policy, Taiwan seems to be destined to be liberated from the Western capitalist imperialism as a first priority. Confucian teachings state: "The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the world first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their families."<sup>112</sup> Taiwan has long been a member of the brotherhood of the Chinese family although forcibly separated from the motherland since 1895. Thus, the first task of both idealist communist world revolution and realist nationalism could be none other than the liberation of Taiwan.

The frozen Sino-American relationship began to dissolve on the way towards normalization when the United States adopted the Chinese position that "there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China" in the

Shanghai Joint Communiqué which resulted from President Nixon's China trip in February, 1972. This important milestone document for the normalization of the Sino-American relationship specifically pointed out the crucial issue of Taiwan in the following phrases:

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan", "one China, two governments", "two Chinas", an "independent Taiwan" or advocate the "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined".

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.<sup>113</sup>

The prospect of a Sino-American relationship developed further toward normalization by Dr. Henry Kissinger's China trip and talk with Chinese leaders including Chairman Mao Tse-tung beginning on February 15, 1973. The Kissinger Mission resulted in an establishment of formal diplomatic liaison offices in both Peking and Washington in order to speed up the normalization of relations between China and the United States.<sup>114</sup>

It appears to be that the long-standing antagonism between China and the United States in regard to the national interest on the Taiwan question will be gradually terminated and a better relationship can be foreseen in the near future when the traditional concept of the Middle Kingdom is respected on the basis of general principles of peaceful coexistence.

(c) Sphere of Influence

When the Korean War broke out, the United States extended its containment policy from Europe to Asia. This action developed increasing security pressure against China, and thus began the Sino-American confrontation over the sphere of influence. American appearance in Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and then expanding military encirclement in Indo-China and Southeast Asia in the forms of SEATO and bilateral treaties with nations in these areas during the early and mid-1950's created a great threat to Chinese national security. It was difficult for Chinese to tolerate American hostility, especially in such close proximity as in Korea, Taiwan and Indo-China.

Similar to Korea, the relations between China and Vietnam could be retraced about two thousand years. Under the Chinese concept of suzerainty, both Korea and Vietnam were strongly influenced by Chinese culture and served as an important strategic buffer whenever China had a strong government. In the Chinese mind, these two states are regarded as a natural sphere of Chinese influence and even a kind of extension of the Chinese world. From the viewpoint of Chinese national interest, it is important that they should not be controlled by a hostile power. Thus, when these buffer states were threatened, China was not reluctant to become involved with full support as exemplified in the Korean War and the Indo-China War.

Other than in these two buffer states, China's interests with the more distant neighbor states such as Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaya are seen as less vital. China merely regards these states as areas of political-cultural spheres of influence and as international united fronts for anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. In the lands beyond the Chinese sphere of traditional influence, such as Western Asia, Europe, Latin America, Africa, or the Pacific region, Chinese foreign policy is guided by traditional culturalism, in the modern ideological form of Marxism-

Leninism, rather than by considerations of national security.

In general, due to American hostility and containment policy toward China, which involves mutual national interest concerns, the Sino-American confrontation for spheres of influence in the buffer zone areas has been competitive for the past two decades. The Chinese policy towards these areas seems to be traditional, national, and strategic rather than ideological in character. Thus, Professor C.P. Fitzgerald gives these words:

In her relations with the borderlands Chinese policy is manifestly traditional, national, strategic, and only modified to a minor degree by the ideology of communism. It is indeed very doubtful whether the policy and actions of an equally strong non-Communist China would be perceptible different.<sup>115</sup>

After almost two decades American involvement in the Vietnam War was finally terminated when the United States decided to withdraw from that area and signed a cease-fire agreement on January 25, 1973. The Sino-American confrontation over spheres of influence in these vital areas, along with the Taiwan issue, greatly diminished and thus it contributed to a normalization of the Sino-American relationship.

### 3) Sino-Soviet Dispute: Struggle for National Interest

Sino-Soviet relations have constituted an important part of current international politics and may vitally affect the peace of the world.

When the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, Chairman Mao proclaimed China's "leaning-to-one-side" policy toward the Soviet Union which formulated the intimate Sino-Soviet partnership in the early 1950's. China initially seemed glad to accept Soviet seniority and aid, although the Russians regarded China as a second-rate state in the Communist bloc. However, a reversal of policy and attitude between these two giant communist nations occurred after the death of Stalin, and their mutual attacks and conflicts became apparent in 1960. Mao Tse-tung once said philosophically: "In given

conditions, a bad thing can lead to good results and a good thing to bad results. More than two thousand years ago Lao Tzu said: 'Good fortune lieth within bad, bad fortune lurketh within good'.<sup>116</sup> Truly, a friend can be an enemy and an enemy can be a friend. This reverse is just the dialectical principle of Yin and Yang taught by the Chinese Taoists. As far as the national interest is concerned, the given conditions for the dialectics of Sino-Soviet relations can be generalized by several phases. That is, (a) the issue of nuclear weapon and economic assistance, (b) the border disputes, (c) the role of leadership and sphere of influence.

(a) The Issue of Nuclear Weapon and Economic Assistance

A nation's military strength probably is one of the major factors determining its power status in modern international politics. A strategic nuclear capability obviously is the key to being a great power today, such as the United States and the Soviet Union.

Owing to the realization of the importance of military power, especially as negatively experienced during the past century of Western imperialism, the Chinese Communists are very interested in building up nuclear weapons for China's national interest. The Chinese goal of becoming a militarily effective nuclear power is generally inspired by the following purposes: "(1) the desire for a more credible deterrent against an American attack; (2) the desire for increased influence within the Communist world; (3) the desire for additional means of supporting wars of national liberation; and (4) the desire for additional means for establishing Chinese hegemony in Asia".<sup>117</sup> Thus, the Chinese expected Soviet assistance in this field from the beginning and hoped for wholehearted support from their socialist big brother.

It is now evident that China received Soviet assistance on the nuclear

weapons program in 1957 when Chinese officials, such as Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi, in 1958 and later admitted that China would have nuclear weapons in the near future.<sup>118</sup> This help, however, was suspended in 1960 when the Soviets halted such assistance.<sup>119</sup> This dispute over these nuclear relations, which produced sharp polemics between China and the Soviet Union, was disclosed by Chinese sources. In a comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 3, 1963, the Chinese pointed out that they signed an agreement with the Soviet Union on "new technology for national defense" on October 15, 1957, which was unilaterally broken by the Russians on June 20, 1959, because the Russians refused to provide the Chinese with "a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture."<sup>120</sup> From the sources disclosed by both Chinese and Soviet documents in their charges, it appears that after signing the agreement in 1957, the Russians began to put limitations and conditions on their committed assistance to China, perhaps to bargain for permission to place Soviet controlled strategic missiles on Chinese territory and to station a united fleet in the Pacific.<sup>121</sup> The Chinese regarded these actions as an assault on China's sovereignty similar to that experienced in the past and, therefore, strongly rejected the Soviet demands.

As members of fraternal countries in the socialist family, in the Chinese eye, the Soviet Union should give wholehearted support to its brothers in order to hasten the achievement of their common goal of world revolution. The Chinese traditional Confucian concept of the family system provides the rule of fraternal relationship that the elder brother should treat the younger brother with kindness, not arbitrary dictation. The nations in the world family should behave according to li (the rite), mutual respect and good faith, especially in the fraternal socialist world. According to



the Confucian concept of chun-tzu (superior man) and hsiao-jen (small man), the Chinese maintain that the lower-grade nations are full in mind of profit (li) and national self-interests and thus will be more aggressive as exemplified by the power politics of the capitalist imperialism, but the higher-grade nations are full in mind of virtue, ethics and the spirit of righteousness as expressed in the proletarian internationalism by socialist countries. Therefore, the Soviet demands in the case of Sino-Soviet nuclear relations at the expense of Chinese interests have seriously violated the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and have turned into the socialist revisionism similar to the capitalist style of imperialism with mind of profit.<sup>122</sup>

In the Chinese mind, sincerity and trustworthiness as taught in the Chinese traditions should be the general principles in conducting international relations, particularly within the ethics-oriented socialist world. A harmonious relationship among nations depends upon a nation's good faith and humility toward other nations. Therefore, Russia's demands and repudiation of the Sino-Soviet agreement for a nuclear weapons program were regarded by the Chinese as lack of trustworthiness and good faith. This experience has virtually driven the Chinese from relying upon the Russians for help, and they have persisted on a policy of self-reliance thereafter. This policy was especially reinforced by the Soviet's total withdrawal of economic assistance from China in 1960 when China was at that time enduring hard-times due to natural disasters.

The Sino-Soviet dispute over the issue of nuclear weapons was further widened when China decided to go ahead with her own nuclear program without Russian assistance. Fearing that Chinese success would threaten them, the Russians started importuning the Chinese to abandon their nuclear program and rely instead on the Soviet Union on the basis that preventing

the spread of nuclear weapons was in the interest of China because of China's backward economy and her feasibility of a small nuclear capacity only. The Soviets argued that Chinese development of a nuclear capability would stimulate the further spread of nuclear weapons and merely place China in an even less stable position as the potential target of an American nuclear strike.<sup>123</sup> The Chinese reply to this point was evidently filled with a tone of strong sentiment of Chinese nationalism.

Is not China very poor and backward? Yes, it is. The Soviet leaders say, how can the Chinese be qualified to manufacture nuclear weapons when they eat watery soup out of a common bowl and do not even have pants to wear?

The Soviet leaders are perhaps too hasty in deriding China for its backwardness. They may or may not have judged right. But in any case, even if we Chinese people are unable to produce an atom bomb for a hundred years, we will neither crawl to the baton of the Soviet leaders nor kneel before the nuclear blackmail of the U.S. imperialists.<sup>124</sup>

John Dixon, and Australian film director, interviewed the Chinese Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi in September, 1963, about the issue of Sino-Soviet nuclear relations. He asked: "In view of Soviet assurances about the defence of China against foreign aggressors, why does China regard it as essential to construct her own atomic weapons?". Ch'en Yi's answer was filled with nationalist sentiment and complete distrust of Soviet sincerity and friendship. He said:

In the first place, what is this Soviet assurance worth? ... How can any one nation say that they will defend another - these sort of promises are easy to make, but they are worth nothing. Soviet protection is worth nothing to us. Atomic weapons are in use by other powers - so therefore we need atomic weapons for our defence. It may be ten-fifteen-or twenty years before China can solve the technical problems involved in making atomic weapons, but however long it takes - we will do it!

It's the same with the USSR - they do not treat with us on a basis of equality. They think that they are an orchestra conductor and that we must always follow their baton. They act as if we must always listen to their orders. But this is their leadership.... They can do as they please, but we will build our own strength up. The China question will only be solved by China standing up for herself.<sup>125</sup>

This tone reminds us of Mencius' teachings of self-reliance and the realistic Legalists' advice of self-strengthening in the light of the ruthless nature of power politics in the world. Mencius' advice of a nation's defense on its own feet seems to be particularly important for the Chinese today as indicated in their experience with the Russians in the past. Ironically, a news report in early 1973 disclosed that China was developing an international ballistic missile that was even larger than the largest Soviet SS-9 by approximately 20 per cent in volume and "is also building concrete and steel silos to protect it against surprise attack".<sup>126</sup>

Moreover, the nature of Sino-Soviet economic relations and the Soviet suspension of economic assistance to China in 1960 have contributed to the widening split between Sino-Soviet relations. In general, the nature of Soviet assistance, except in the early years of 1950 has been of little significance and less favourable to China but more in Soviet national interest. For instance, the total Soviet loan to China "during the latter's first decade of existence represented only 2 per cent of China's current fiscal revenue at that time; the significance of Soviet assistance is very limited."<sup>127</sup> Li Hsien-nien, the Chinese Vice-Premier in charge of financial affairs, further commented in September, 1959:

However, with the exception in the earlier years of the founding of our country when the Soviet Union granted us some low-interest loans, this assistance was primarily conducted through the trade processes in a mutually beneficial way. ... Our financial resources for national reconstruction relied basically on internal accumulation, or the survival through our own strength.<sup>128</sup>

Furthermore, Professor Cheng Chu-yuan pointed out: "China's trade with the Soviet Union was conducted under unfavorable circumstances. The over-valuation of the ruble exchange rate since 1950 proved to foster Soviet exploitation." To this point, it is interesting to note that "About 60 per cent of China's aid to foreign countries has been on a gratuitous basis, while all

Soviet loans to China have been repayable with interest".<sup>129</sup>

Thus, in the Chinese view, the Soviet profit-hunger economic policy toward its fraternal countries appears to be no different from that of capitalist imperialism. It is not only contradictory to Marxism-Leninism but also contrary to the Chinese traditional mind of humanism and the "chun-tzu" (superior man) behavior.

By and large, the Chinese sentiment of nationalism against the Soviet Union reached its peak in 1960 when the Russians decided to withdraw all their assistances from China. This action by the Russians was a vital blow to the Chinese economy and national reconstruction. Almost all of the major projects under construction with Soviet aid were interrupted and the effect on the Chinese industrialization program and the disturbance on the development of nuclear weapons were almost incalculable. To this, one can imagine the Russian's intention in trying to slow down the Chinese economic development and delay an earlier Chinese nuclear threat. However, in the Chinese eye, this incident merely exposed the ugliness of Soviet motives. To them, such behavior was that of a "small man" (hsiao-jen); in Chinese terms, it is virtually "dropping a stone into the well where a person fell in and was drowning" (luo-ching-hsia-shih). Therefore, the Russians have been bitterly condemned by the Chinese as betrayers of the Marxist-Leninist spirit of internationalism.

In fact, along with mutual distrusts the Sino-Soviet conflict has been enlarged and has resulted in increasing military tensions with more than one million troops stationed on each side of the border preparing for possible war. On the Russian side, there is fear of a future Chinese threat when China catches up with them in strength. On the other side, the Chinese seriously distrust the Russians and are speeding up their nuclear program

and simultaneously building and digging air-raid shelters around the country in an effort to defend themselves against a possible Soviet nuclear strike.<sup>130</sup>

(b) Border Dispute

The Sino-Soviet border question has had a long history and can be traced back to the period of the imperial government of the Ch'ing Dynasty when China was challenged by Western imperialist nations. Today, regarding the issues of Sino-Soviet boundaries, the Chinese, under the influence of nationalism, regard the Russian tsarist government as the imperialist nation who had imposed unequal treaties on China. These were the Treaty of Aigun (1858), the Treaty of Peking (1860), and the Treaty of Ili or St. Petersburg (1881).<sup>131</sup> During the period of Sino-Soviet partnership in the 1950's, the border question had not been raised. Since 1960, the border disputes have been frequently brought into open charges of intended subversion by each side. For instance, the Chinese condemned Soviet subversive activities on Chinese minorities along the border area. They charged:

In April and May 1962 the leaders of the CPSU used their organ and personnel in Sinkiang, China, to carry out large-scale subversive activities in the Ili region and enticed and coerced several tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into going to the Soviet Union. ... To this day this incident remains unsettled. This is indeed an astounding event, unheard of in the relations between socialist countries.<sup>132</sup>

Especially, after the border crisis of Chenpao or Damansky Island in the Ussuri River in March, 1969, the Chinese began to accuse the Soviet government of new tsarist imperialism which included naval expansion in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific.<sup>133</sup> Thus, a Chinese government statement proclaimed that "all of the treaties relative to the present Sino-Soviet frontier are unequal treaties, and all should be annulled".<sup>134</sup> In the Chinese eye, as noted by Chou En-lai, "a great area of China had been ceded to Czarist Russia as a result of unequal treaties".<sup>135</sup>

Traditionally, under the concept of culturalism since the periods

of Spring and Autumn and Warring States, the Chinese have held the view that, "Territory once won for civilization must not be lost to barbarism" and that "once part of China, always part of China" regardless of the influence of current communist ideology. According to this concept, the Chinese traditionally did not draw clear-cut lines or national boundaries between China and her neighbor states in the modern sense of nationalism but only a vague range of suzerainty and civilized areas. Today, in the light of traditional culturalism and modern nationalism, the Chinese government is willing to negotiate definite lines or national boundaries with neighbor countries, but they want to reserve the right to claim the lost territories which were ceded to foreigners under unwilling conditions.<sup>136</sup>

Realistically, in considering her present power status and physical capability, the Chinese government has been very cautious in handling the border problems with the Soviet Union and agreed that despite of the facts of unequal treaties in the past, noted by Chou En-lai, "China is still willing to take the old treaties as the basis for defining the boundary line".<sup>137</sup> Therefore, on September 11, 1969, the Soviet Premier Kosygin on his way home after attending Ho Chi Minh's funeral met with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai in Peking to reach an agreement on negotiating the border dispute. It was reported that Chou En-lai was promised by the Soviet Premier that the Sino-Soviet border question would be settled through appropriate negotiations without using military threat by the Soviet Union. On the contrary, however, the Russians after that immediately started their military build-up along the Sino-Soviet border line in an attempt to bargain for power. This action was regarded as a lack of good faith and trustworthiness by the Chinese, and they began preparing for a defensive war to prevent a possible Russian first strike.<sup>138</sup>

Probably owing to their different traditions, cultures and concepts, the negotiations which have been underway since the 1960's regarding the Sino-Soviet border questions have been complicated, and an appropriate solution seems to be far off. For the Russians, there is a fear of possible Chinese demographic pressures on Soviet territory and the so-called "yellow peril" which the Russians once experienced in the thirteenth century at the hands of the Mongols. In the Chinese view, however, both tsarist and communist Russia are regarded as still the crude and hairy barbarians with gain-hunger minds from the northern steppes, an appropriator of Inner Asian territories that once belonged to China, and "as a power historically ready to take advantage of any weakness in China to make further depredations."<sup>139</sup> Starting on this point, the Sino-Soviet border relations have far to go.

(c) Leadership and Sphere of Influence

For many centuries, even since the periods of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States, the golden Han and T'ang dynasties down to the Ch'ing Empire, China regarded herself as the center of the world, the center of civilization. With such a cultural superiority among her barbarian neighbors, she never had an ally and she never sought a friend. Add to this her experiences of anti-imperialism and nationalism in the past century and the Chinese are further convinced that China has never had a true friend but stands alone for self-reliance. For China, it was proved that "when they had been strong they had needed no ally; when they were weak, allies had proved to be false friends".<sup>140</sup> The Japanese aggression of China, the American China policy before and after World War II, and the Russian behavior, while ostensibly a Chinese ally since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, have all contributed to this Chinese belief that China needs to be physically powerful and culturally or ideologically superior. This obviously has to

include not only the traditional geographical areas of spheres of influence in Asia but also in a global sense. Thus, Professor Fitzgerald pointed out: "What her policy must seek to avoid is the kind of settlement which would leave her permanently in the second rank, for their experience in recent years and long history alike have conditioned the Chinese to believe that supreme power is their heritage and that any inferior status is but the prelude to further decline."<sup>141</sup>

Soviet global competition with the United States for spheres of influence has caused the Russians to ambitiously expand their domination to Central Asia, South and Southeast Asia, and Pacific Asia and thus has disturbed the peripheral buffer states for China, such as Mongolia, Korea, Vietnam and the other Indo-China states, India, and Pakistan. This Soviet disturbance has constituted a great threat to China's national security, as presented in the recent military tension along the Sino-Soviet border areas with military bases, missiles, and millions of troops. Therefore, to achieve national security China has competed with the Soviet Union for spheres of influence at least in these buffer areas through various means, such as ideology, military, economic, political and moral supports.

Moreover, to the Chinese, the nuclear stalemate might lead to a Russo-American detente achieved at China's expense as shown by the Russo-American summit talk at Camp of David in 1960. This would disturb their whole system of struggle against U.S. imperialism in order to liberate Taiwan, their appropriate role in Indo-China, and the international united front for world revolution. For instance, the Chinese charged that the objective of Russo-American cooperation was to monopolize the nuclear weapons at the expense of Chinese interest.<sup>142</sup>

On the aspect of leadership, Soviet internal and external policies



during the Khrushchev era and afterwards have been viewed by the Chinese as the betrayal of the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, and the Chinese claim that the Soviets can no longer provide the leadership for a socialist camp and world revolution. The following developments have been cited by the Chinese as evidence of this: 1) Soviet utilization of an internal incentive system in economic policies, which in effect encourages the revival of capitalism; 2) the Soviet policy of big-brother-dictatorship, the Brezhnev Doctrine, over the fraternal countries in Eastern Europe as illustrated by Russia's role in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, Warsaw Pact, Hungarian suppression of 1956, Occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, etc.; 3) the Soviet attitude of arrogance of power and lack of good faith toward China; 4) the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence and compromise with the United States in collaboration for two-superpowers' hegemonism at the expense of the Third World nations for world domination. In the Chinese view, all these actions by the Russians are similar to that of capitalist imperialist and thus should be condemned by the true Marxist-Leninist devotee as "Soviet revisionist social-imperialism". Consequently, the Chinese now claim to be the upholders of pure Marxism-Leninism under the Thought of Mao Tse-tung, "and denounce Russia as faint-hearted, 'revisionist', and too ready, for fear of nuclear war, to betray world revolution in favour of a form of co-existence which would in reality lead to the perpetuation of the capitalist society".<sup>143</sup>

China's tradition of standing alone and her culturalism today, in the case of the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute, seem to have regained a traditional role and confidence that China is the center of aspiration for ideology and culture while the Soviet Union has proved deviate from the true Marxism-Leninism. To this point, Professor Fitzgerald observed:

It also reinforces the traditional Chinese view of the world, which sees China as the centre, the sole upholder of true civilization, the lawgiver to the barbarians. There can be now no doubt that this view, in a modern form, is prevalent in China and is positively stated in the many polemical articles which have appeared since the dispute with the Soviet Union has come into the open.<sup>144</sup>

In fact, as far back as 1949, the Chinese claimed that their revolution was the model for the underdeveloped, or "semi-colonial" countries and areas, such as Asia, Africa, and Latin America, because these countries had faced the similar conditions as China did, and Mao Tse-tung had made a basic contribution to the treasury of Marxism-Leninism through the experience and practice of the Chinese revolution. This claim implied that the future revolutions among the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America should be based and guided with the Chinese model towards their goals, and China could provide that interpretation of the orthodox doctrines of communism most applicable in thier needs.<sup>145</sup>

Along with this claim, the Chinese recall that the old Confucian idealist teaching, that "the true ruler needs no armies, for the barbarians and foreigners will be attracted to him by the very virtue of his government,"<sup>146</sup> will not be enough as long as capitalist imperialism and revisionist social-imperialism exist. It appears that a political synthesis of Confucian idealism and the Legalist realism as advocated by the great ancient thinker, Hsun Tzu, must receive top priority. Through his own experiences Mao Tse-tung teaches that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. The Chinese thus decided "that purity of doctrine is not enough: armed force may often be needed to establish the rule of a true doctrine".<sup>147</sup> In Chinese history, many Confucian Emperors were of this opinion too, and acted on it. In the light of Sino-Soviet dispute and the shift of the world power balance, Professor C.P. Fitzgerald commented:

The Chinese view of the world has not fundamentally changed: it has

been adjusted to take account of the modern world, but only so far as to permit China to occupy, still, the central place in the picture. ... Mao Tse-tung had to "enrich the treasury of Marxist-Leninist thought", so that the contents of that treasury could become current coin in China; it was inevitable that Chinese Marxism should be found to be purer than that of Russia, that Mao should be hailed as the greater prophet, and that "some people" should be shown to be in error. There cannot be two suns in one sky.<sup>148</sup>

The dialectics of Sino-Soviet relations which shifted from friend to enemy have changed the world power system from bipolarity to a triangle relationship, a form of the balance of power. It then inevitably brings Sino-American relations at once from enemy to the current friendship when given conditions such as national interests in the Taiwan issue plus U.S. involvement in Indo-China are in the process of change.

The correct handling of the contradictions among the nations depends upon the objective given conditions according to the principle of dialectical materialism, Tao and Yin-Yang. This seems to be very true in the current case of a triangle relationship among the United States, China, and the Soviet Union.

## (2) Anti-Imperialism and Anti-Paism

### 1) Conceptual Heritage and Current Background of Anti-Imperialism

Ideologically, in the light of nationalism and internationalism, the doctrines of anti-imperialism and anti-superpower-hegemonism or anti-paism, constitute the main themes of China's foreign policies today.

In fact, the term "imperialism" in modern times is vague and difficult to define and subject to various schools of thought for definition according to their political environments. The modern realist school led by Hans Morgenthau defines "imperialism" as "a policy that aims at the overthrow of the status quo, at a reversal of the power relations between two or more nations".<sup>149</sup> To this concept, it is merely an objective observation and

without value judgement. The Marxist theories of imperialism which were further elaborated by Lenin in attacking the Western capitalist expansionism and colonialism are based on an economic viewpoint and value-concept oriented to serve the revolutionary purpose on behalf of the exploited countries and peoples in light of nationalism and proletarian internationalism. They also provide a definite criterion to distinguish progressive or reactionary and historical or antihistorical wars.<sup>150</sup>

In addition, other definitions and theories of "imperialism" have also been varied according to the different criteria of judgement, such as motive, cause, and goals being used. Thus, how some scholars view "the word 'imperialism' is, therefore, entirely at the mercy of its user", and "the term loses its historical connotation and becomes a purely theoretical system".<sup>151</sup> Nevertheless, in a general perception, the concept of imperialism appears to reflect not only the reality of a power system but also an ethical norm that, "a superior-inferior relationship in which an area and its people have been subordinated to the will of a foreign state",<sup>152</sup> or "the relationship of a hegemonial state to peoples or nations under its control".<sup>153</sup>

To Chinese, this tone of ethics referring to "imperialism" relates to her traditional concepts and cultural heritage in regard to current Chinese foreign policies of anti-imperialism and anti-hegemonism. The Chinese have not provided a clear definition of "imperialism", but their general criteria to define it are not based on such factors as power relations, race, national interest, or religion, etc. Instead, they make the differentiation of relationships between ruling and ruled, oppressing and oppressed, exploiting and exploited, or equal and unequal, with great ethical connotations. The relationship between these categories with the imposition of will by the former upon the latter identifies the chief features of imperialism both morally

and psychologically. However, according to Chinese traditions, if a peculiar relationship is established on the basis of willingness or voluntary acceptance with respect to mutual benefit or rule of virtue, it may not be regarded as imperialism, such as the Confucian political concept of virtue (Wang Tao), or the tribute-system in the past.

Imperialism, in general, can involve a great array of actions, such as intervention, expansions, and arbitrary imposition in international relationships, and it is characterized with excessive actions of immorality. Lao Tzu teaches dialectics that explain, "If the quality of a thing has developed to its highest pitch, then that quality inevitably changes and becomes its opposite."<sup>154</sup> Thus, nationalism is the outcome of imperialism in this respect. Lao Tzu's philosophy of wu-wei or inaction in international relations contributes to an extent to the doctrine of anti-imperialism. He claims: "When one desire to win over the world by action, I find that he will never have a moment of rest. The possession of the world is something ordained by the nature. ... Those who try to gain by action are sure to fail; those who try to hold are sure to lose."<sup>155</sup> The Chinese communists see these dialectics and Mao Tse-tung, thus, points out: "The U.S. imperialists and reactionaries of all countries are paper tigers", which not only contains philosophical meaning but also has psychological importance. For instance, to the international united front of anti-imperialism against the United States in the Vietnam War, the Chinese expressed their full support to the Vietnamese people in a similar tone of philosophical confidence: "The heroic Vietnamese people are sure to win! The diabolical U.S. imperialists are sure to be defeated!"<sup>156</sup> It is interesting to note that Mao Tse-tung once cited Lao Tzu's words to strengthen his "paper tiger" thesis:

Lao Tzu said, "The people fear not death, why threaten them with it?" U.S. imperialism and its running dogs, the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries,

have not only "threatened" us with death but actually put many of us to death.<sup>157</sup>

Nevertheless, Lao Tzu further pointed out: "Those who take delight in the killing of men cannot win the approval of the whole world".<sup>158</sup> This teaching of anti-imperialism and anti-war was elaborated by the Chinese Communists with the factor of human willpower in a theory of people's war for struggle. To the philosophy of dialectics, human willpower plays an active and positive role in the process of change.

The three Indo-Chinese peoples, uniting together, daring to fight, persevering in protracted war, defying difficulties and advancing wave upon wave, will certainly defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs.

Victory surely belongs to the three heroic Indo-Chinese people!<sup>159</sup>

Dialectically, it is to imply that once the oppressed or invaded peoples and nations are daring to fight to death against imperialist policies of war, the imperialist aggressors will eventually turn from the real tiger into the paper tiger because of their inner immoral and unjust nature.

On a general basis of anti-imperialism, Chuang Tzu, a Taoist thinker, employs the concept of Tao and nature to distinguish what is of nature and what is of man. The imperialist intervention and aggression is what is of man and the national self-determination is what is of nature along with the historical trend. As a leading naturalist thinker, Chuang Tzu condemns the imperialist aggression and intervention backed with force which will impede human progress seriously.

Moreover, in the classical Chinese concept of international relations, the Mohist doctrine of universal love and non-aggression had further contributed to the concept of anti-imperialism. Mo Ti saw the world of disorder as due to the lack of mutual love and respect, and it thus resulted in a struggle for self-interest at the expense of others. He was wholeheartedly against great power interventions and aggressions. He regarded equality as

the immediate general principle of international relations despite their power status or size in the world, because they all should have equal rights to exist.<sup>160</sup> To implement this doctrine, the Mohists organized themselves as a fighting group to help other nations defend themselves. Moreover, Mencius also condemns the foreign policy of imperialism and regards the policy of war and aggression as the greatest criminal action of mankind and that "death is not enough for such a crime".<sup>161</sup>

Today, in a similar tone, the Chinese Communists charge the great powers' policies of intervention and gunboat diplomacy upon the weaker nations as criminal aggressive actions.

Everyone knows that to seize another country's territory, to infringe upon another country's sovereignty and to interfere in another country's internal affairs is to commit acts of aggression.<sup>162</sup>

On the issue of American intervention in Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Government charged the U.S. as being an aggressor. The American policy of containment which disturbed the world system and interfered with other nations' internal affairs was also labeled as aggressive and doomed to failure.<sup>163</sup>

On the other hand, to form an international united front of anti-imperialism, the Chinese criticized American imperialist and aggressive policies in Indo-China, Latin America and other Third World nations. With the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in May, 1970, the Chinese charged the American aggression as the enemy of the whole world, especially the Indo-Chinese people.<sup>164</sup> To support the nationalist movements and anti-American imperialism of the Latin American people, the Chinese Government condemned the U.S. gunboat diplomacy and aggressions on Latin American nations in light of the Dominican Republic issue in May, 1965:

The assertion by the Johnson Administration that troops had been sent to the Dominican Republic to "protect the lives and ensure the safety of American nationals", to "preserve law and order" and to "establish an international zone of refuge" is nothing but a pretext habi-

tually used by imperialist gangsters. This only serves to reveal once again that U.S. imperialism is the common enemy of the people of the Dominican Republic and other Latin American countries as well as all people of the world who cherish peace, independence and freedom.<sup>165</sup>

Furthermore, after the Sino-Soviet conflict in the 1960's, the Chinese on the one hand condemned the U.S. imperialism of conducting world-wide military, economic and political interventions and, on the other, they also charged the Soviet actions in international relations as the cunning style of a "small man" (hsiao jen) with shameless conspiracies and double-dealings behind the scene. Thus, the Russians, as revisionists' social-imperialism, would be even more dangerous than the capitalist imperialism to the Third World nations and peoples. Regarding the Sino-Soviet border disputes, particularly on the issue of Chenpao Island in the Ussuri River in 1969, the Chinese condemned the Soviet Government as the new tsars and socialist-imperialism.

Moreover, the Chinese regard the Soviet world-wide policies of interference and expansionism in the Middle East, Asia, Eastern Europe, and other areas as similar to that of U.S. imperialism. They condemn the Soviet's greediness of self-interest and a gain-hunger-oriented mind on the basis of traditional Chinese idealist concept. For instance, the Chinese criticized the Soviet conspiracy and intervention in the Middle East as follows:

Through the recent developemnts in the Middle East, the Arab people have learnt an important lesson. They have come to gradually recognize the sinister features of the Soviet revisionist clique as those of a false and treacherous friend. Israel's armed aggression against the Arab people was in essence a frantic attack jointly plotted by the United States and the Soviet Union. It was also a joint U.S.-Soviet political manoeuvre to trap the Arab countries. ... One day it voiced "support" for the Arab people and the next day it engaged in behind-the-scenes dealings with the United States and cooked up a so-called "cease-fire" resolution in the U.N. Security Council, a most shameless betrayal of the Arab people.<sup>166</sup>

In general, according to her traditions and heritage, China appears not as a material-interest seeker nor profit-gain expansionist but rather as a center of ethical-cultural influence and an ideological promoter, to



which the character of "chun-tzu" (superior man) is seriously distinguished from that of the profit-mind "hsiao-jen" (small man). To emphasize this view, Confucius once said: "The mind of the superior man is conversant with righteousness; the mind of the small man is conversant with gain".<sup>167</sup> Mencius also opposed the concept of gain but advocated the concept of justice or righteousness and virtue in one's behavioral motivation. He holds the position against the concept of profit or gain which is imperialistic and aggressive in nature at the expense of others.

In retrospect, it seems to be hard to doubt that there exists ample evidence to prove the linkage between the classical conceptual heritage and the contemporary Chinese position of criticism of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

## 2) Conceptual Heritage and Current Background of Anti-Paism

Associated with the concept of anti-imperialism, there has been a peculiar concept of anti-paism or anti-superpower hegemonism, in China's foreign policy today. Historically, it was rooted in the traditional heritage of denouncing the big power's hegemonial control with force by the idealist thinkers. This concept of anti-superpower hegemonism first originated in the concept of "Way of Hegemony" (Pa-Tao) and "Way of Kingship" (Wang Tao) during the periods of Spring and Autumn and Warring States, and thus it would probably be difficult for Westerners to understand without closely examining its content and heritage.

In the traditional Chinese mind, the status and label of superpower hegemonism is a bad thing which is contrary to the teachings of humility. For the past years, the Chinese Communists constantly declared that China would never be a superpower although other nations were trying to include China in the group of superpowers status in the light of China's rising inter-

national position. To Chinese, this offer which the Westerners have been seeking and regarded as honorable prestige is merely a humiliation in the sense of a nation's good faith. In a joint editorial article "New Year Message" of Hung Ch'i (Red Flag) in 1973, it was pointed out: "Chairman Mao also instructs us to 'dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony'".<sup>169</sup> Some scholars once pointed out that the excessiveness of nationalism might be turned into imperialism. The last phrase of Chairman Mao's instruction "never seek hegemony" can be fairly explained as a precaution to reflect this concept on the eve of China's rising position. The Chinese Premier Chou En-lai has constantly stated before foreigners that China had no intention of assuming the role of a superpower in international politics "neither now nor even in the future". "We will always stand together with oppressed countries and peoples in firmly opposing power politics of superpowers", Premier Chou said.<sup>170</sup> To this unique idea of anti-hegemonism, there has been a linkage with the Chinese traditional concept of Pa Tao which needs more elaboration.

The concept of "Pa" or hegemony was very popular in the international politics during the periods of Spring and Autumn and Warring States (771-221 B.C.). All ambitious leaders of big states at that time were eager to seek the status of hegemony, Pa or Fang-Po, a superpower position. Thus, in Chinese historical records, there appeared five recognized hegemonial leaders or superpowers (Wu-Pa) in the period of Spring and Autumn.<sup>171</sup> In advocating his moral concept of anti-imperialism, Mencius first initiated his theory of Pa (Hegemony) and Wang (Kingship):

He who, using force, makes a pretense to benevolence, is the Pa which requires to be a great power. He who, using virtue, practices benevolence--is the Wang which need not wait for being a great power. ... When one by force subdues men, they do not submit to him in heart. They submit, because their strength is not adequate to resist. When subdues men by virtue. in their hearts' core they are pleased, and sincerely submit.<sup>172</sup>

As a Confucian ideal, Mencius strongly condemned the "Way of Pa" (Pa Tao) by the great powers but endorsed the "Way of Wang" (Wang Tao) by states in conducting benevolence with virtue. To reject the exercise of force by great powers, Confucius also hinted the difference between Wang and Pa that, "A horse is called a chi (a kind of leading horse) not because of its strength, but because of its other good qualities".<sup>173</sup>

Hsun Tzu, a Confucian realist thinker and the great synthesizer of the idealist school and the realist school into his own thought, elaborated Mencius' concept of Wang and Pa rendering it into a feasible approach to keep world peace and security. He was against the abusing exercise of force but not too much against the particular rule of hegemony such as the Ch'in state of his time. However, he would have preferred the better quality of kingship rule, Wang Tao, which was the higher grade of politics and almighty.<sup>174</sup> In his mind, to abuse the force would cause a superpower gradually to weaken because it was not following the correct principle of Tao. In fact, for Hsun Tzu, the principle of Wang Tao is the synthesis of idealism and realism, a combination of the virtue and the force which would be almighty, while the Pa Tao is merely to abuse force without virtue.<sup>175</sup>

In contrasting Hsun Tzu's concept of Wang Tao and Pa Tao with current Chinese foreign policy, there certainly appear similar tones and themes. That is, on the one hand, China builds up its strength politically, economically and militarily, and on the other hand, she preaches the truth of ideology, the spirit of Marxism-Leninism without using force abroad. She resolutely refuses to assume the role of superpower in world politics and strongly condemns the exercise of force and power politics to impose arbitrary wills upon other nations by two superpowers' hegemonism. Obviously, China is favored to be the center of truth of ideology along with the majority

of nations in the world, but not the center of hegemonial power for control and dictation with force. The Chinese Government pointed out:

U.S. imperialism is now calling China a "potential superpower", implying that China may also squeeze into the ranks of the superpowers some day. Thank you, American lords, but China will never accept this kind of compliment! China will never seek the so-called big-power position. We will for ever stand side by side with all nations subjected to aggression, control, intervention or subversion by superpowers; we will for ever stand side by side with all oppressed people and oppressed nations. The Chinese people will fight together with the people of the whole world to resolutely smash the doctrine of big-nation hegemony (ta-kuo-pa-chuan-chu-yi)!<sup>176</sup>

The Chinese attitude and policy of avoiding big-power hegemonism but standing along with the small and medium-size and oppressed nations to fight against the superpower's international dictatorship virtually reflects a parallel tone and spirit of classical Mohist doctrine of universal love and anti-aggression. The Mohists regarded all nations in the world, big or small, as equal, each with rights to survive and be free from others' aggression or interference. They severely condemned the big-power dictatorship in international relations. The Mohist group led by Mo Ti not only preached this doctrine but also actively threw themselves in the fighting line side by side with the attacked or small and weaker nations to deter the big-powers' aggressions. The Mohist spirit of proletarian internationalism and humanitarianism does coincide with the current spirit of Chinese foreign policy of anti-superpower hegemonism with Marxism-Leninism.

In general, the Chinese criticism of superpower hegemonism can be summed up in the following themes: (a) spheres of influence, (b) superpower's role in the United Nations, and (c) issues of nuclear weapons, disarmament, and arms control.

#### (a) Spheres of Influence

China has severely charged the two superpowers' contending and colluding to monopolize international affairs and to divide the world into

spheres of influence respectively.

U.S. imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism always subject other countries to aggression, subversion, intervention, plunder, control and bullying. The two superpowers are contending and at the same time colluding to monopolize international affairs and practise hegemony. ...

... In the 50s U.S. imperialism was swashbuckling as the sole world overlord, claiming wildly that the whole world must put under U.S. "leadership". In the 60s, the United States and the Soviet Union contended for world hegemony and domination.<sup>177</sup>

Since the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine in the nineteenth century, the Latin American nations have been traditionally under American economic exploitation and control and military intervention. The United States holds many interests in this area and it is an exclusive and incompatible sphere of influence for Americans. This American monopoly and concern was ironically evidenced by the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis in a show down with another superpower, the Soviet Union. Thereafter, a "gentleman agreement" of mutual respect of spheres of influence seems to have been reached between these two superpowers. However, the Chinese pointed out that, "The Latin American people's struggle against U.S. imperialism deepened in 1971. It has pushed forward Latin America's mounting historical current opposing the superpower's hegemony and safeguarding national interests and state sovereignty in recent years."<sup>178</sup> Although the Latin American nations are in the process of revolutionary struggle for national liberation from American control, they are still under the U.S. hegemonial influence and plunder economically, militarily, and politically.

On the other side of the ocean, the Soviet Union has conducted its hegemonial domination over the Eastern European nations which have been regarded as an unquestioned sphere of influence for the Russians. The Soviet hegemonial monopoly was generally evidenced in its suppression of the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and its occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. To challenge the Soviet right of domination, the Chinese criticized the so-called

Brezhnev Doctrine as an outright doctrine of hegemony similar to that of the Americans. They attacked:

First, the theory of "limited sovereignty". ... You have imposed your all-highest "supreme sovereignty" on the people of other countries is "limited", whereas your own power of dominating other countries is "unlimited".

Secondly, ... the "international dictatorship" you refer to simply means the subjection of other countries to the new tsars' rule and enslavement. ...

Thirdly, ... A "socialist community" indeed! It is nothing but a synonym for a colonial empire with you as the metropolitan state.

.....  
This "Brezhnevism" is imperialism with a "socialist" label, it is outright hegemonism, naked neo-colonialism.<sup>179</sup>

In addition to these two restricted areas of spheres of influence, the two superpowers after 1950 also launched their policies of expansionism and intervention for competition in the Far East, South and Southeast Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and even Africa. After 1960, these two superpowers seem to have cooperated with mutual understanding for a divided world domination. In general, China has broadly condemned the United States and the Soviet Union constantly contending at one time and cooperation at another time for a joint hegemonial control of spheres of influence in a global scene.<sup>180</sup>

#### (b) Superpowers' Role in the United Nations

Since the establishment of the current international organization in 1945, the United Nations has been criticized as a playground of power-politics and bloc cold-war by the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, for their own national interests. They have played dominant roles and exerted control in almost every field or function of the United Nations, including such issues as membership, UN chief executive selection and the international civil service, UN peace-keeping operations, and UN economic and social functions. To these phenomena, Professor John G. Stoessinger precisely pointed out:

During the past twenty-five years, both superpowers have tried to use the UN as a vehicle for the advancement of their individual, anti-thetical foreign-policy interests. In this quest, the Organization has been a more important vehicle for the United States than for the Soviet Union, because the United States has successfully involved the UN in more activities that have served its national interest. ... No less important, however, has been controlled politically and financially by the United States and its military allies. On the several occasions when UN action threatened U.S. national interests, the United States reacted vigorously--by casting "hidden" vetoes, infringing on the neutrality of the Secretariat, crippling a UN agency through outside bilateral agreements, and embarking on similar courses of action. ...<sup>181</sup>

The superpowers' utilizing the structurally ceremonial and powerless United Nations as a vehicle to dictate to the other member states for its own national interest today is similar to the situation and style of the foreign policies of the five hegemonial leaders (wu pa) during the period of Spring and Autumn, when they were operating the policy called "controlling the Son of Heaven in order to dictate to the vassals" (chia-t'ien-tzu-i-lin-chu-hou).<sup>182</sup>

Therefore, China today severely criticizes the two superpowers' hegemonial role in controlling the world peace-keeping organization and urges the majority nations to stop the condition of big-nation monopolies. Although the increasing members of the Third World countries in the United Nations since 1960 has gradually checked and balanced the superpowers' roles to a certain extent, the monopolies of the latter are still influential and destructable to UN functions.<sup>183</sup>

Before the restoration of her legitimate seat in the U.N. in October 1971, China condemned the U.S. hegemonial role and policy of imperialism "which, in its obstinate stand of hostility towards the Chinese people, has for the past twenty years manipulated the voting machine of the U.N. and installed in the U.N. the Chiang Kai-shek clique which has long been spurned by the Chinese people".<sup>184</sup> To elaborate the Chinese case in the light of current American defeat, the Chinese further commented on the irresistible trend of the UN development in the future:

The baton of U.S. imperialism in the United Nations has become more and more ineffective, and it has become increasingly difficult for U.S. imperialism to continue to manipulate the U.N. voting machine. An increasing number of countries have risen against the crime of U.S. imperialism and its accomplice in playing power politics and practising hegemony in the United Nations.<sup>185</sup>

(c) Issues of Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, and Arms Control

Obviously, in contemporary international politics, the military technology of nuclear weapons contributes a major factor for a nation to be ranked as a great power. All nations in the world, big or small, are sensitive on this issue; especially, the great powers are extremely reluctant to see the nuclear proliferation of their rivals in obtaining nuclear weapons. For the past two decades, both the United States and the Soviet Union have devoted their efforts to improving their nuclear weapons and simultaneously to preventing the other nations from developing nuclear weapons, particularly China. Thus, as early as July 25, 1963, when a nuclear test-ban treaty was signed by the representatives of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union in Moscow, the Chinese charged it was merely an instrument to consolidate the great powers' nuclear monopoly and to fool the people of the world with a superficial language.<sup>186</sup>

China further condemned the Soviet Union's cooperation with the capitalist imperialism as an effort to monopolize nuclear weapons for world domination at the expense of other nations in the socialist camp.<sup>187</sup> Therefore, part for her own national security and interests and part on behalf of the non-nuclear and less-powerful nations, China criticized the conspiracy of two superpowers' hegemonism and urged the non-nuclear countries to unite for resistance.

There are more than 130 countries in the world. All countries, big or small, nuclear or non-nuclear, are equal. It is absolutely impermissible for two or three countries to brandish their nuclear weapons at will, issue orders and commands, and lord it over in the world as self-ordained nuclear overlords, while the overwhelming majority of



countries are expected to kneel and obey orders meekly, as if they were nuclear slaves.<sup>188</sup>

On the questions of disarmament and arms control, the Chinese Government rejected the Soviet proposal of convening a world disarmament conference in August, 1972. In the Chinese eye, it would merely be an "empty talk club" and "only serve to hoodwink and lull the people of the world".<sup>189</sup> Realistically, on the other hand, China's attack on the Soviet proposal of disarmament in the U.N. has special strategic importance in the light of current military power balance for politics. As Mr. Joseph C. Harsch pointed out in the Christian Science Monitor in November, 1971, China not only speaks for the majority of less-powerful nations but also is concerned with her own national security and interest.

The nuclear arms race is moving to a moment in history of special importance to the Chinese. It will be the moment of their greatest danger and greatest vulnerability.

It will be the point at which Russia will do one of two things: either allow the Chinese to develop a nuclear deterrent against Russia, or take drastic military action to wipe out China's growing nuclear capacity. ...

For China, it means the absolute necessity for any protection and help it can get from any source during this critical phase. And there is help to be found in the UN, where lots of small countries share China's discomfort over being vulnerable to the big nuclear powers.<sup>190</sup>

To this view, Chairman Mao's instruction in the New Year message of 1973 to "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony" does provide a certain mood and evidence.

Furthermore, the Chinese pointed out the reality of two superpowers' hegemonism which is the key obstacle to a meaningful step for disarmament and arms control today in promoting world peace and security.

The actual situation in the world today is this: the two superpowers are maintaining military bases of various kinds, including nuclear bases, and stationing large numbers of their armed forces, including nuclear-missile forces, in many countries; ... To varying degrees, all the countries in the world with no nuclear weapons and those with few nuclear weapons are exposed to their threat. The most urgent question today is the withdrawal of foreign armed forces, rather than the reduction of

armaments. Let the two superpowers withdraw all their armed forces, both conventional and nuclear, back to their own countries. If they do not even want to effect a withdrawal, how can one believe that they are willing to make an arms reduction?<sup>191</sup>

In general, the Chinese position of anti-two-superpowers' hegemonism has gradually gained support from a majority of nations in the world for the past years, particularly from Third World nations. Due to this fact, the world power balance is shifting to a situation which makes China available to speak for the weaker nations to a certain extent. As Professor Hans Morgenthau pointed out, the reality of whole world politics was the struggle for power between nations with the policy of maintaining the status quo and the nations with policy to overthrow the status quo.<sup>192</sup> However, for the Chinese, they not only realize this realistic truth but also inject their traditional value and ethical concept into the theme of international politics for their ideal goal. In the light of national liberation movements in the Third World nations and China's policy of resolute opposition to the superpower's hegemonism, the Chinese concluded: "Countries want independence, nations want liberation, and the people want revolution; this has become an irresistible trend of history."<sup>193</sup>

B) Chinese Attitude Towards International Law, World Order and International Organization

(1) Conceptual Heritage and Modern Background

1) The Nature and Role of International Law

The modern concept of international law might be new for the Chinese but the general rules of interstate relations were not unknown to the ancient Chinese people. A systematic body of general rules of interstate relations had developed during the periods of Spring and Autumn and Warring States but it collapsed and ceased at the end of the Warring States period with the unification by Ch'in state in 221 B.C. Thus, when a similar style of

modern interstate rules came into being during the past several centuries, it seemed to be difficult for the Chinese to recall in a current expanding global interstate relations. Under their own traditional concept of world order since the Han Dynasty in the first century, the Chinese response to the modern Western-developed system of international law had appeared to be naive and lacking knowledge when China faced the Western imperialist challenges during the past. The Chinese concept of international law during the early republican period was mainly oriented with a Western-style of conducting international relations until the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949.

Based on the Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese see international law in terms of class struggle. In their mind, the modern international law system is solely the product of the states with European backgrounds in the Western civilization and thus it lacks universality in a global sense. According to the Marxist-Leninist theory, the superstructure of international law only serves the national interest of the ruling class of capitalist nations in exploiting the oppressed and underdeveloped countries and areas. The Chinese argued that the reason that international law survived the addition of non-Western states in the past was part because Western nations stood in a predominant power to enforce it and part because it contained a certain degree of practical utility and adoptability.<sup>194</sup>

Therefore, in the Chinese eye, the role of modern international law is merely an instrument of the foreign policies of the capitalist-imperialist nations for global expansion and aggression. They reject the "purely legalistic viewpoint" of international law but regard it as the servant of national policy. By giving the facts to illustrate this point, scholars in Chinese Mainland such as Ying T'ao, Wei Liang, and Wang Yao-t'ien pointed out that as a source of modern international law, the Covenant of the League of

Nations "was signed by the victor powers of World War I to maintain their acquired interests over the vanquished and to prescribe a post-war international order most amenable to their tight grip on their colonies."<sup>195</sup> They further charged that in nearly all major international treaties after World War II it appeared that the great powers intended to protect their interests by imposing treaties favorable to them on the weaker states. For example, through nominal "equality of opportunity" clauses the capitalist powers may acquire special privileges because of their financial superiority. The Marshall Plan provided the chance for the United States to interfere in the internal affairs of the "Marshallized" countries. Other bilateral trade agreements between the capitalist, highly industrialized nations and the underdeveloped countries actually opened the door for the exploitation of natural resources by capitalist and imperialist nations.<sup>196</sup>

Particularly, the Chinese pointed out the Taiwan issue as a typical example of utilizing international law as instrument for American foreign policy. Before the outbreak of the Korean War no nation, including the United States, had challenged the Taiwan status of returning to China according to the Cairo and the Potsdam Declarations. However, when the Korean War broke out on June 27, 1950, President Truman said that "determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations".<sup>197</sup> There is no legal ground which could be set forth to explain this reversal of America's position on the Taiwan question except political consideration. Therefore, in his severe criticism, one Chinese writer, Ying T'ao, wrote:

In the Western capitalist world, suppression of the weak by the strong and the eating of small fish by big fish are not only tacitly condoned by bourgeois international law but also are cloaked with a mantle of "legality".<sup>198</sup>

Thus, because of the very nature of international law as an instrument

for the implementation of a nation's foreign policy, the Chinese attitude regarding it, was that:

International law is an instrument for settling international problems. If this instrument is useful to our country, to the socialist cause, or to the cause of peace of peoples of the world, we will use it. But if it is disadvantageous to our country, to socialist enterprises or to peace enterprises of the people of the world we will not use it and should create a new instrument to replace it.<sup>199</sup>

They further criticized the so-called "science of international law" as merely the theoretical instrument to defend the imperialist big power's policy of aggression and war. Theories of the Naturalists, Positivists, Grotians, the Normativists (Kelsen) and the Social Solidarists (Duguit) all serve this purpose.<sup>200</sup> With this criticism, certain scholars believe that there actually exist two separate systems of international law side by side, one bourgeois, which is used as means for oppression and struggle of power among the bourgeois nations, and the other socialist, which is based on the principle of proletarian internationalism with rights and obligations of mutual assistance from each other. The reality of all treaties and agreements between capitalist and socialist countries is merely the result of struggle and power balance between the two parties which does not reflect the common value but a compromise.<sup>201</sup> Other scholars hold that there is only one system of international law which is applicable to all states and reflects the constant change as a result of the growth of new centers of power and process of transition from capitalism to socialism.

However, the majority view which might be considered as a semi-official point provides that a "general recognized" principle or a body of peremptory norms (jus cogens) exist side by side with "modern" existing norms which are subject to reform according to current needs and conditions. The former will apply to all states, while the latter will be performed within the socialist countries and the bourgeois countries separately. For

instance, both the principle of proletarian internationalism and the five principles of peaceful coexistence or the UN Charter will be applied in the treaty concluded with the socialist countries, but the treaty concluded with the bourgeois nations does not contain the principle of proletarian internationalism.<sup>202</sup>

As the state apparatus, the nature of law and international law which is backed with force for application is by no means virtue or benevolence but violence and cruelty in the eyes of Marxists. Mao Tse-tung once pointed out:

The state apparatus, including the army, the police and the courts, is the instrument by which one class oppressed another. It is an instrument for the oppression of antagonistic classes; it is violence and not "benevolence" (jen-ts'u).<sup>203</sup>

In retracing this idea in the Chinese traditions, Confucius also pointed out the inferiority of the "law" in comparing the "virtue" and "li" or rite to keep world order and peace.<sup>204</sup> He seems to argue that the performance of international law backed with enforcement, which is frequently resulting in interstate war, will easily fall into the way of hegemonism, Pa Tao, an international dictatorship by the great powers. To conduct the principle of li, ethics or rite in international relations, there will be no arbitrary enforcement and dictatorship but a harmonious relationship under the way of kingship, Wang Tao, with mutual respect and assistance in accordance with propriety, righteousness and virtue.

The concept of big power or superpower hegemonism which is based on force has been severely condemned in Chinese tradition, including today's Chinese Communists. But the concept of virtue or rule of ethics, li-chih, which is based on the performance of benevolence, good faith, mutual respect, and righteousness or justice has been honored traditionally, for Confucius gave the argument that,

When a leader's conduct is correct, his policies will be effective and respected without the enforcement. If his conduct is not correct, he may issue forces and orders, but none will follow.<sup>205</sup>

With this view in mind, the spirit and theme of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence which China holds today as a set of general principles for international relations whether with bourgeois or socialist, big or small nations, might be regarded as similar to the idea of li or rite in Confucian terms.

On the other hand, China practises the ethical principle of proletarian internationalism with the socialist nations and the oppressed nations on a basis of mutual assistance. This principle becomes an important part of international rules within the socialist countries and among the oppressed nations and peoples.

## 2) The Nature and Role of War and Peace

The dialectics of war and peace, like Yin and Yang, paves the way, the Tao, of historical development. The process of change between war and peace provides various concepts and theories of international relations throughout human history. Both war and peace have been glorified and condemned by different philosophers and thinkers on the basis of various conditions, concepts and theories. As Sun Tzu, an ancient Chinese military theorist, pointed out, war is something vital concerned with survival which connects seriously with the welfare of mankind. Thus, we need to examine closely the nature and role of war and peace in the light of current Chinese foreign policy and world politics.

### (a) The Dilemma of War and Peace

Most Chinese philosophers in history have been seeking peace and order and condemn war as a calamitous evil. Meanwhile, however, they cannot but recognize the reality of existing war in human society. Lao Tzu and Chinese Taoists advised eliminating the conduct of war to a minimum in order

not to abuse the force, but they did not leave war as an approach for peace. Hsun Tzu realized the dilemma of war and peace which follows the law of dialectics, the Tao and Yin-Yang. Thus, on the one hand he condemned the evil phase of war but on the other hand he realistically adopted the policy of war to stop war for the sake of peace and justice. Similarly, Sun Tzu's philosophy of war holds the point that the purpose of war is for peace and subject to the command of politics.

In a similar tone, the Chinese Communists today hold the same concept of war and peace to view this dilemma of contradiction. They recognize the evil of war but realistically admit that the only approach to destroy war for peace is through war itself. Mao Tse-tung gives his view:

War, this monster of mutual slaughter among men, will be finally eliminated by the progress of human society, and in the not too distant future too. But there is only one way to eliminate it and that is to oppose war with war, to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war, to oppose national counter-revolutionary war with national revolutionary war, and to oppose counter-revolutionary class war with revolutionary class war.<sup>206</sup>

We are advocates of the abolition of war, we do not want war; but war can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun it is necessary to take up the gun.<sup>207</sup>

To clarify these two kinds of war, the Chinese define just war as the war of progressive, revolutionary and anti-imperialistic nature, while the unjust war is defined as reactionary and imperialist aggression at the expense of others' interests.<sup>208</sup> The line between the just and unjust war is drawn on the basis of ethics and morality which emphasizes a difference between the welfare of a whole people and the interest of a certain privileged group of people. Therefore, under Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung pointed out: "Our country and all the other socialist countries want peace; so do the people of all the countries of the world. The only ones who create war and do not want peace are certain monopoly capitalist groups in a handful of imperialist countries which depend on aggression for their profits."<sup>209</sup> In fact, this



line of differentiation presents nothing new but traditional in character.

In their concepts of anti-imperialism and anti-aggression, Mencius, Hsun Tzu, and Mo Ti all condemn wars of imperialism and aggression, especially those imposed by the great powers' hegemonism upon the small and weaker states. However, they approve fighting a defensive just war against imperialism. Both Mencius and Hsun Tzu advised fighting the defensive war of justice on the basis of self-reliance and with support of the whole people, a theory of people's war, which has been performed in today's China. Mo Ti and the Mohist followers urged fighting a defensive war of justice not only on the basis of self-reliance and a nation's whole people but also extending active mutual assistance under the principles of universal love and non-aggression.<sup>210</sup> To this aspect, the spirit of the Mohist international movement is akin to that of the current Communist principle of proletarian internationalism.

In regard to the belief of virtue and human progress, all the just-war proponents hold an optimistic view for a final victory, because they believe people are the basic motive of historical progress. Therefore, both the ancient Chinese just-war theorist and current Chinese Communists have emphasized the concept of people's war. The former gave the concept of virtue and righteousness or Wang Tao, and the latter provided the concept of proletarian revolution on the basis of class struggle. Chairman Mao pointed out:

When human society advances to the point where classes and states are eliminated, there will be no more wars counter-revolutionary or revolutionary, unjust or just; that will be the era of perpetual peace for mankind. Our study of the laws of revolutionary war springs from the desire to eliminate all wars; herein lies the distinction between us Communists and all the exploiting classes.<sup>211</sup>

#### (b) War as a Means of Politics

War can never be neutral but is always an integral part of politics. Mao Tse-tung viewed the nature and role of war as follows:

"War is the continuation of politics". In this sense war is politics and war itself is a political action; since ancient times there has never been a war that did not have a political character. ...

When politics develops to a certain stage beyond which it cannot proceed by the usual means, war breaks out to sweep the obstacles from the way. ... When the obstacle is removed and our political aim attained, the war will stop. But if the obstacle is not completely swept away, the war will have to continue till the aim is fully accomplished. ... It can therefore be said that politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed.<sup>212</sup>

Truly, this philosophy of war can be found not only in modern Western thought but also in the ancient Chinese classics. Lao Tzu recognized the reality and function of war in conducting international relations but urged its minimum use. When Mencius, Hsun Tzu, and Mo Tzu approve the war of justice, it implies that war contains the proper political character. They admit war as a weapon to eliminate and wipe out the obstacles of politics in promoting political virtue and righteousness.<sup>213</sup> Sun Tzu, an eminent ancient Chinese military theorist, also viewed war as one way to continue politics along with the diplomacy in serving a nation's foreign policy. When a national goal is achieved, the less use of war, the better; the art of war is political in nature.

Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy; next best is to disrupt his alliances; the next best is to attack his army. The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative. ...

Thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations.<sup>214</sup>

All these words reflect the fact that war contains its political purpose for peace and is not allowed to abuse.

This concept of political-military relationship has been traditionally followed by Chinese statesmen and military strategist throughout history, including today's Chinese Communists. From the Marxist-Leninist approach looking at the nature of war, Mao Tse-tung pointed out that under certain conditions and circumstances, the peaceful means for socialist transformation

is impossible under an extreme reactionary and feudal system such as the conditions in China before 1949; revolutionary wars are obviously needed for political progress.<sup>215</sup> Therefore, Mao Tse-tung gave his famous teaching: "Every Communist must grasp the truth, 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun'"<sup>216</sup> He explained:

Without armed struggle neither the proletariat, nor the people, nor the Communist Party would have any standing at all in China and it would be impossible for the revolution to triumph. In these years (the eighteen years since the founding of the Party) the development, consolidation and bolshevization of our Party have proceeded in the midst of revolutionary wars; without armed struggle the Communist Party would assuredly not be what it is today.<sup>217</sup>

Accordingly, the Chinese Communists urged armed struggle and fighting a revolutionary just-war against the imperialism, colonialism, and war of aggression of great powers in international relations.

In conclusion, regarding the general concept of war and peace, there do exist similarities and connections between the ancient Chinese classical theories and contemporary Chinese thoughts, especially, when we consider that the Chinese Communists are performing their policies in such a physical condition with the long tradition and brilliant civilization of the past.

## (2) Policies in Practice and International Organization

Regardless of the various schools of thought on world order and peace during the ancient periods of Spring and Autumn and Warring States in China, there did exist certain general rules and principles in regulating interstate relations. The rules of li or rite which contained the concept of the equality of states and national independence were popularly accepted as general rules or international laws of international relations at that time. The concept of equal sovereignty, whether for big or small states, and diplomatic rules were commonly recognized and performed in the ancient Chinese family of states. In addition to these general rules in practice certain

moralist concepts of international behavior such as "teh" (virtue), "yi" (justice or righteousness) and "hsin" (trustworthiness or good faith) being performed in the system were greatly honored. They were also regarded as the qualitative requirements for a state to obtain leadership in the world family. To the Confucian thought, it was the way of kingship, Wang Tao.<sup>218</sup>

In attempting to act as a leader, the big states at that time frequently initiated bilateral or multilateral alliances, international treaty organizations, and interstate leagues or conferences for diplomatic, political, and military purposes. For instance, in 546 B.C. a great peace movement was initiated and resulted in a disarmament conference with fourteen participant states including big, middle and small states, and this has been regarded as an ancient precedent of the League of Nations by modern scholars. This international league contributed to international peace for a period of forty years in the Chinese family of nations at that time.<sup>219</sup>

Similarly, in modern times because of the increasing interstate relations, a system of international rules and laws has been developed. The politics of leagues and conferences has been popular too, particularly after two world wars in the twentieth century. The great powers have played a dominant role in the forms of international organization and collective-security politics, such as the League of Nations after World War I and the United Nations after World War II. The five permanent seats of great powers in the power nucleus, forming the Security Council of the United Nations, fairly reflect the current realist international power-politics, especially the two superpowers' role of hegemonism since the founding of this world organization in 1945.

To face the reality of global international relations with various social systems and ideologies, the Chinese Communists have recognized the

general principles of international law, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, applicable to all state in the world. In a joint communique of China and India in 1954, these principles were first time set up to improve Sino-Indian relations. They are: 1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2) Non-aggression; 3) Non-interference in each other's internal affairs; 4) Equality and mutual benefit; and 5) Peaceful co-existence. It was expected that these principles could further serve as general rules of international relations in the world. The joint communique stated:

The Prime Ministers reaffirmed these principles and felt that they should be applied in their relations with other countries in Asia as well as in other parts of the world. If these principles are applied not only between various countries but also in international relations generally, they would form a solid foundation for peace and security and the fears and apprehensions that exist today would give place to a feeling of confidence.<sup>220</sup>

This body of peremptory norms has also been enacted in the United Nations Charter which China endorsed.<sup>221</sup> As early as 1956, Mao Tse-tung expressed his view on the Chinese attitude toward the general rules of international relations to keep world peace and order. He said:

To achieve a lasting world peace, we must further develop our friendship and co-operation with the fraternal countries in the socialist camp and strengthen our solidarity with all peace-loving countries. We must endeavour to establish normal diplomatic relations, on the basis of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty and of equality and mutual benefit, with all countries willing to live together with us in peace.<sup>222</sup>

Accordingly, the spirit of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence has been the general criteria used in establishing diplomatic relations between China and all other countries in the world. The diplomatic relations concluded on this basis between China and the non-communist Afro-Asian nations, Western capitalist nations, and other nations since 1949 are examples.

As a matter of fact, in the theory of Marxism-Leninism there is no

sense of "nation" but only class difference, because "nation" is the product of the capitalist system.<sup>223</sup> Consequently, there should be no sense of international law emanating from this class-struggle world outlook. However, the reality of the present nation-state condition is a transitional stage from capitalism or feudalism to socialism and communism in which a set of temporary international rules are necessary for a better and smoother socialist transformation.

Similarly, the main purpose and function of the establishment of an international organization is to keep world peace and order for a smooth transformation along with human progress under fundamental and generally-accepted international rules. The Chinese Communists' attitude toward an international organization is based on this premise and they, therefore, endorsed the United Nations Charter and its general structure. Mao Tse-tung agreed upon the spirit and framework of the United Nations and said on the eve of the United Nations San Francisco Conference in 1945:

In regard to the establishment of an institution to preserve international peace and security, the Chinese Communist Party completely approves of the proposals made at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference.... The Chinese Communist Party has already sent its own representative to join the Chinese delegation at the San Francisco Conference in order to express the will of the Chinese people.<sup>224</sup>

Idealistically, the Chinese expected that under the principle of universality, the United Nations would embrace all nations and peoples, regardless of size and other differences in the world family, on the basis of internationalism with mutual respect and equality. Similar to the Mohist concept of universal love and non-aggression, the Chinese hoped that under the general principles of peaceful coexistence, the majority of nations and peoples could express their wills under the doctrine of national self-determination. Moreover, it appears that the Chinese hoped that under the system of collective security of the United Nations Charter, the United Nations as

an international body could play the role of world police to preserve justice against aggressions and protect the general rights of all nations. As protectors of justice embodied in the power nucleus of five great powers in the Security Council, the Chinese expected that the two socialist members with permanent seats, China and the Soviet Union, could check and balance the other capitalist great powers such as the United States, Great Britain and France at least in policy-making for future socialist transformation.

In retrospect, this theory of preserving world peace and justice under a set of general rules of international relations centered in an international organization has its precedent in the ancient Chinese Mohist concept of international force and movement to implement the doctrine of universal love and non-aggression. To preserve righteousness and peace against aggressions it was reported that Mo Ti and his disciples had performed quite successfully in stopping the aggressive wars and frequently had paid great sacrifices to save the small and weaker nations from big-nations' invasions.<sup>225</sup> This spirit of hsia (the knights-errant) and proletarian internationalism apparently has influenced the current Chinese attitude toward the role and function of the United Nations.

Unfortunately, the role and practice of the United Nations for the past quarter century have been far from its ideal and theory stated in the Charter. Since the bipolar cold war developed after World War II, this world organization has gradually become a playground of two-superpowers' antagonisms and bloc power-politics in seeking their national interests at the expense of the other majority nations in the world. Particularly, since the outbreak of the Korean War, the People's Republic of China with a quarter of the world population has been technically blocked for two decades from participating in this world organization by the United States under its hegemonial role.

Because of this unfair situation and power-politics, the Chinese bitterly attacked and mobilized the small and medium-size nations against the two-superpowers' hegemonism in the United Nations.

In view of the two superpowers' control of the United Nations, Vice-Premier Ch'en Yi presented the Chinese view on the international organization in front of a group of Japanese correspondents as early in 1965. He said:

The United Nations has long been controlled by the United States and has today become a place where two big powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, conduct political transactions. This state of affairs has not changed even though dozens of Afro-Asian and peace-loving countries have made no small efforts in the United Nations. China needs not take part in such a United Nations.

During the U.S. war of aggression against Korea, the United Nations adopted a resolution naming China as an aggressor. How can China be expected to take part in an international organization that calls her an aggressor? Calling China an aggressor and then asking the aggressor to join, would not the United Nations be slapping its own face?<sup>226</sup>

Thus, the Chinese urged the international organization to reform and establish a revolutionary United Nations in accordance with the spirit and principle of the UN Charter and free from the superpower's control and manipulation. They further demanded the correction of past mistakes of the United Nations and the implementation of the general principle of universality for membership, naturally including the restoration of China's legitimate seat.<sup>227</sup>

After a long diplomatic battle aided by both her rising status in international relations and the support by the majority nations, China eventually defeated the United States' block in the General Assembly with restoration of her legitimate rights in the United Nations on October 25, 1971. With this victory, China on the one hand continues to attack the two superpowers' hegemonial role in the United Nations and on the other hand works to mobilize the majority small and medium-size nations to break the superpower's monopoly leading eventually toward the correct way for the United Nations. Taking the issue of Chinese representation in the United Nations



as an example, the Chinese commented on its perspective in the future.

All countries, big or small, should be equal; the affairs of a country must be handled by its own people; the affairs of the world must be handled by all the countries of the world; the affairs of the United Nations must be handled jointly by all its member states--this is the irresistible trend of history in the world today. The restoration of the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations is a manifestation of this trend.<sup>228</sup>

In supporting the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter as general rules and as a means to maintain world peace and security, China warned the United Nations to avoid the past failure of the League of Nations and play its due role for justice and the promotion of human progress.<sup>229</sup> Based on this attitude of goodwill, China presents her willingness to cooperate with the majority nations for this goal and to contribute to human progress. In China's first policy statement at the United Nations General Assembly in November, 1971, the Chairman of Chinese Delegation, Chiao Kuan-hua said:

We hope that the spirit of the United Nations Charter will be really and truly followed out. We will stand together with all the countries and peoples that love peace and uphold justice and work together with them for the defense of the national independence and state sovereignty of various countries and for the cause of safeguarding international peace and promoting human progress.<sup>230</sup>

It appears that China is willing to play the revolutionary role of vanguard with the support of majority nations to uphold the general rules of international law and preserve justice and world peace through the international organization. This spirit of revolutionary vanguardism seems to be connected with the idea of hsia in an international scene which the Mohists and their followers have traditionally advocated in Chinese history.

In conclusion, the general characteristics of the Chinese views on international law, an international organization, and world order are much more moral and ethically oriented and emphasized than those of the modern Western nations. Since China was admitted to the United Nations and began playing an influential role in international relations, some observers have

recently pointed out that China's attitudes and actions will be likely shaped by the pressures and styles existing within the United Nations' network. They believe China will act, even if not speaking, in a similar style customary to a great power under the Western system of international politics.<sup>231</sup> However, this argument which is based on the modern realist school of thought and mainly derived from a Western-oriented analysis of nation states and nationalism may only partially true in that China will be flexibly and pragmatically working in the present framework of an international system so as to cooperate and associate with most of the nations in the world under the general principles of peaceful coexistence for world peace, order and human progress. However, China constantly and seriously expresses her resolute refusal to act the role of a great power or superpower like the United States and the Soviet Union.

Conversely, certain observers indicate that China will continue its historical task of anti-imperialism and conduct the revolutionary change of the international system towards the ultimate goal of revolutionizing human consciousness.<sup>232</sup> To synthesize these two points of view, the complementary nature of classical Yin-Yang dialectics might provide an appropriate view on Chinese behavior in current world politics. China will follow one phase, the Yin, cooperating on the formal level within the present system of international relations realistically competing and contending national self-interest under nationalism which has played a vital role for the past century. On the other phase, the Yang, China will positively commit herself to adopt an ethical and moral style of diplomacy and political behavior in international relations which has its traditional heritage and concepts. The concept of Wang Tao (politics of virtue), the leadership with virtue which was postulated by Confucius, Mencius, Hsun Tzu, Mo Ti and most dynasty emperors and intel-

lectuals throughout the past Chinese history reflect well the moral and cultural identity of Chinese tradition. This peculiar Chinese characteristic, which has been injected into the ideology of communism expressed in China's attitude towards international relations and foreign policy since 1949, should not be under-estimated and ignored in predicting China's role in the future. To support this point, Professor John Cranmer-Byng also gave his view of the Chinese attitude towards international law and the United Nations:

One essential quality, which both versions of this faith in China's special mission have in common, is their "imprinted" belief in the relevance of Chinese cultural values and life style as an inspiration to guide other peoples of the world in the future. As a result of the Cultural Revolution China is being propelled forward by revolutionary fervour just as much as by nationalism. It would not seem realistic, therefore, to take it for granted that China will come to accept the total ethos on which the western-evolved system of international law and relations is based without a struggle to modify it substantially, even though in the tactics and mechanics of diplomacy she maintains very considerable flexibility.<sup>233</sup>

Thus, he further pointed out the possible pattern of Chinese international behavior and foreign policy in the future.

According to this analysis, therefore, China will continue to display both "ethical" and "self-interest" styles in her foreign relations. She will go along with the basis international system of international relations as practised within the United Nations, though attempting, under certain circumstances, to change what she feels to be intolerable in that system as judged by her own ethical standards.<sup>234</sup>

In describing synthesis, which has been a major theme of the Thought of Mao Tse-tung, Professor John Cranmer-Byng appears to speak in a tone consistent with the Tao (the Way) and Yin-Yang dialectics.

#### C) Chinese Attitude Toward Weaker Nations, Nationalities, and Disputed Territories

##### (1) Conceptual Heritage and Current Background

##### 1) The Spirit of Wang Tao: The Politics of Virtue

In addition to her positive policies of anti-imperialism and anti-paim, the phase of Yang, China also conducts its negative policy of sup-

porting the national liberation movements of the small and weaker Third World nations on the basis of the humanitarian aspect of Marxism-Leninism, the phase of Yin. (Parenthetically, the words "positive" and "negative" are used in the special framework of the Yin-Yang dialectic; they do not imply strictly opposite meanings, but contrasting or complementary elements of a phenomenon which interact to produce dialectical change). This negative or humanitarian aspect of foreign policy also contains two phases--idealistic and realistic. Idealistically, it provides a moralistic expression of humanity and equality with the ultimate goal of world communism, strongly connected with traditional Chinese ethics. Realistically, it serves to strengthen Chinese nationalism and an international united front of anti-imperialism. Differing from the Western type of support and the Western attitude strongly based on national self-interest and use of force (the Pa Tao) towards the weaker developing nations, the nature and the style of Chinese support for and attitude toward these nations and peoples are based on the politics of virtue or the spirit of Wang Tao (brotherhood), in Chinese terms.

(a) Support of the National Liberation Movements

The policy of defending and supporting the smaller and weaker and particularly the attacked states against great power aggression and imperialism has been traditionally honored by Chinese idealist thinkers. For instance, in the ancient Spring and Autumn period a great power's rescue of a small state from another great power's attack would be highly praised by the people in that interstate community, and thus, the prestige or leadership of the former would be greatly enhanced. The Confucian thinkers regarded this kind of moral behavior as the way of virtue, the Wang Tao.<sup>235</sup> Another school of political idealists, the Mohists, preached the doctrine of universal love and non-aggression and devoted their efforts to help and support the weaker

and attacked states against great power aggressions. Mohists' ethical and moral behavior have developed the spirit of hsia and proletarian internationalism throughout Chinese history.

On the basis of virtue and benevolence, Confucius taught: "Now the man of perfect virtue, wishing to be established himself, he seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others. To be able to judge of others by what is nigh in ourselves; --this may be called the art of virtue".<sup>236</sup> Following this traditional concept of virtue, Sun Yat-sen in his principle of nationalism of the "Three People's Principles (san min chu i)" urged the Chinese to "unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals".<sup>237</sup> After achieving her own security and national development China is logically obligated to help and support the smaller and weaker nations and peoples in their struggle for national liberation.

In connection with this moral and ethical tradition, reinforced by the modern proletarian internationalism of Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese Communists support the national liberation movements of the oppressed and underdeveloped nations and peoples. Mao Tse-tung teaches in a tone similar to that of traditional internationalism:

What kind of spirit is this that makes a foreigner selflessly adopt the cause of the Chinese people's liberation as his own? It is the spirit of internationalism, the spirit of communism, from which every Chinese Communist must learn. ...<sup>238</sup>

The people who have triumphed in their own revolution should help those still struggling for liberation. This is our internationalist duty.<sup>239</sup>

During his first trip to the Arab-African countries in 1963-64, Premier Chou En-lai stated China's attitude toward the Third World nations in a voice of tradition. At the press conference it was reported:

Premier Chou En-lai said: One of the main contents of the foreign

policy of the Chinese Government is active support for the national democratic movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. China is a country that has been liberated from the colonial shackles of imperialism. We shared the same lot as the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Naturally we sympathize with and support each other. Moreover, since China has won its own victory, it has the obligation to support countries which have not yet won victory or are about to win it.<sup>240</sup>

On the consistency of China's policies towards the Third World nations, as well as China's general foreign policy for the 1970's, it was stated in the political report to the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party delivered by the late Defense Minister Lin Piao:

The foreign policy of our Party and Government is consistent. It is: To develop relations of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation with socialist countries on the principle of proletarian internationalism; to support and assist the revolutionary struggle of all the oppressed people and nations; to strive for peaceful coexistence with countries having different social system on the basis of the Five Principles ... Our proletarian foreign policy is not based on expediency; it is a policy in which we have long persisted. This is what we did in the past and we will persist in doing the same in the future.<sup>241</sup>

Similarly, in his political report to the Tenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Premier Chou En-lai repeated the same principles of China's foreign policy.<sup>242</sup> In general, China's emphasis on the spirit of internationalism and its consistency truly reflects traditional Chinese ethics and moral concepts advocated by the various classical schools of thought.

Moreover, in addition to the spirit of proletarian internationalism another special feature of Chinese foreign policy differing from the Western style has been the policy of non-intervention. As Professor J.D.B. Miller observed, "The Chinese leaders have not given armed support to any revolutionary movement; their use of war has been confined to their own borders".<sup>243</sup> This point is supported by the fact that there have been no Chinese armed forces stationed abroad during peacetime, nor any Chinese armed intervention in other nations' internal affairs, in contrast to the record of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The

past two episodes of Chinese military operations (in the Korean War and the Sino-Indian border conflicts) were strictly initiated by and limited to the consideration of China's critical national security. After the armed conflicts terminated, Chinese troops were immediately pulled back to her own territory. Unlike the Americans and the Russians, the Chinese have never conducted military intervention in other nations' internal affairs as these two superpowers have done in their satellite states or in their spheres of influence, as in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia. China's emphasis on the principles of national self-determination and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence has ruled out armed intervention as a normal approach in her foreign policy. The Chinese attitude of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism and opposition to the policy of war and aggression reflect this posture of non-intervention. China actively encourages the Third World nations to wipe out the great powers' policy of intervention and proclaims: "Today, the struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples against imperialism, colonialism and power politics and for winning and safeguarding national independence has become an irresistible historical current."<sup>244</sup>

To understand this pacific character of Chinese foreign policy, it would be appropriate to recall the traditional Chinese concept of Wang Tao, the spirit of kingship or of culturalism (in essence, Wang Tao means "All men are Brothers".) The Chinese regard the military approach in a nation's foreign policy as the Pa Tao, the way of hegemonism, which has been traditionally condemned. Because, Mencius pointed out: "When one by force subdues men, they do not submit to him in heart. ... They submit, because their strength is not adequate to resist." As soon as the great powers' leadership and forces decline, their satellites would reverse their posture of submission and respect. Consequently, the great powers are constantly

seeking for armament to keep the status quo and thus find themselves in a situation of constant military tension and insecurity.

In contrast, the Chinese are conducting their foreign policy on the basis of the pacific "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" intermingled with the traditional moral spirit of Wang Tao. Actually, this non-military and non-aggressive principle of interstate relations was proposed by a great number of classical Chinese thinkers. However, the Chinese Communists point out that although non-military peaceful-coexistence is a suitable policy for relations among states, it does not apply to the conditions between oppressed peoples and their oppressors in an individual nation or in the world. This is because, according to Lenin's theory in "The State and Revolution", those who hold power will not relinquish it peacefully and the imperialist oppressors and local reactionaries ultimately must be overthrown by revolutionary war. Particularly in the underdeveloped areas and states, conditions are even worse. Therefore, Mao Tse-tung teaches that political power is based on armed struggle. The Peking Review points out:

The principle of peaceful co-existence can apply only to relations between countries with different social systems, not to relations between oppressed and oppressor nations, nor to relations between oppressed and oppressing classes. For an oppressed nation or people the question is one of waging a revolutionary struggle to overthrow the rule of imperialism and the reactionaries; it is not and cannot be, a question of peaceful co-existence with imperialism and the reactionaries.<sup>245</sup>

Accordingly, the Chinese Communists do encourage local armed struggles against the colonialism and reactionary governments, based on the people's war concept, in the underdeveloped areas and nations. They provide international moral support and material assistance for the local national liberation movements. But the Chinese retain their military policy of non-intervention. In the Chinese view revolution in each country is made by the people of that country and can not be exported, either by the Chinese or



by any other foreigners. Lin Piao, then Chinese Defense Minister, pointed out the doctrine of self-reliance as an important theme in the theory of people's war:

Revolution or people's war in any country is the business of the masses in that country and should be carried out primarily by their own efforts; there is no other way.<sup>246</sup>

Foreign military intervention in a nation's revolutionary movement, if objected to by the native people, is deemed by the Chinese as nothing other than imperialist aggression. Therefore, it is contrary to the traditional spirit of Wang Tao and the principles of Marxism-Leninism. For, in Lin Piao's words, "the liberation of the masses is accomplished by the masses themselves --this is a basic principle of Marxism-Leninism".<sup>247</sup>

In connection with Chinese traditional anti-militarism, the concept of Wang Tao, Professor Peter Van Ness observed, regarding Chinese support of wars of national liberation in the Third World:

Generally speaking, it has not been Peking's policy to commit Chinese troops to support foreign wars of national liberation. As of 1965, the only Chinese troops known to be stationed outside China's borders for any purpose were Chinese service troops engaged in rebuilding bombed out roads and railroads in North Vietnam. ... However, no Chinese combat troops have yet been known to have fought in the revolution in the South. The situation that would be most likely to prompt a Chinese decision to commit troops to the battle in the South would be one in which Peking felt that the national security and integrity of China were drastically threatened (analogous to the Korean situation in the autumn of 1950), but this would be very different from committing Chinese troops for the purpose of advancing a war of national liberation per se.<sup>248</sup>

(b) Leadership and Virtue: Revolutionary Model of the Third World

The positive phase of the traditional Chinese Wang Tao theory rests on establishing a model of virtue for others to follow. This is essentially the Chinese Communists' present attitude towards the Third World nations and peoples. This aspect of "virtue-model" politics originated in classical Confucianism. Confucius said:

The conduct of political affairs by the Way of Virtue may be compared to the north polar star, which keeps its place and all the fellow stars revolve around it.<sup>249</sup>

Let his words be sincere and faithful, and his actions honorable and careful; --such conduct may extensively be practiced among the rude barbarians of the South or the North. Otherwise will he be appreciated even in his neighborhood?<sup>250</sup>

Confucius emphasized that the model of virtue would attract others and thus these others would be culturally influenced and assimilated into a harmonious relationship. To serve as a model in the international community, and to attract its fellow states, a nation needs to be disciplined by revolution and to possess and prize its own culture. Confucius taught:

Therefore, if remote peoples are not submissive, all the influences of civil culture and virtue are to be cultivated to attract them to be so; and when they have been so attracted, they must be made contented and tranquil.<sup>251</sup>

Accepting this concept of virtue, Mencius elaborated it in his thesis of Wang Tao and asserted: "When one subdues men by virtue, in their hearts' core they are pleased, and sincerely submit".<sup>252</sup> Thus, both the Confucian idealist and realist followers, Mencius and Hsun Tzu, advocated the way of leadership on the basis of virtue and ideology, a universal model of culture.

For the past two thousand years, from the Han Dynasty down to the Ch'ing Dynasty, this classical Confucian concept of virtue-politics has been developed and applied in the Chinese concept of suzerainty, a tribute system of world order and foreign relations with the peripheral states. With her cultural superiority, China has traditionally conducted the chi-mi or "loose rein" policy and the policy of i-i chih-i or "using barbarians to check barbarians" as general strategies to manipulate the surrounding states and to control frontier areas throughout the historical dynasties. This policy has been regarded as compatible with the classical Confucian tradition.<sup>253</sup>

In connecting and blending this classical tradition and the modern revolutionary ideology of Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese Communists since

the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949 have claimed that the experiences of the Chinese Revolution and modernization could serve as a model for revolutions in the countries of the Third World.<sup>254</sup> They argue that the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung", which led the Chinese Revolution, is the application of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism in China. There are a great many similarities between Chinese conditions and those of the Third World nations. Mao's theory of revolution and the Chinese experiences of socialist construction would be applicable, therefore, to the areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America. To compete with the Soviet Union in the light of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Chinese leaders excluded the Russian October Revolution as a leading revolutionary model applicable to the Third World nations and underdeveloped areas. In his famous essay "Long Live the Victory of People's War!", Lin Biao pointed out that the contribution of Mao Tse-tung to Marxism-Leninism was his establishment of a revolutionary model for the Third World nations which contained essential differences from the Russian October Revolution. He wrote:

The October Revolution took place in imperialist Russia but the Chinese revolution broke out in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. The former was a proletarian socialist revolution, while the latter developed into a socialist revolution after the complete victory of the new-democratic revolution. ...

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war ... has not only been valid for China, it is a great contribution to the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and people throughout the world.<sup>255</sup>

In the Chinese mind the Soviet Union is too Western to direct the revolution in the underdeveloped areas or the colonial and semi-colonial countries or the East, or even to understand the prerequisites of such a revolution. China, the most populous of the underdeveloped nations and the most experienced in dealing with imperialism has to assume the leading role as a revolutionary model under Marxism-Leninism for national liberation movements of the Third World nations.

In addition to the aspects of political ideology and socialist revolution, the Chinese leaders further pointed out that the experiences and approaches of Chinese economic development and socialist construction can serve as a model of national modernization for the underdeveloped nations too. The pattern of the Chinese Five Year Plan economic program has attracted a great many developing nations, although that attraction was temporarily disturbed by the setbacks of the "Great Leap Forward" and the natural disasters of 1959-61. Similar to the agriculture-based economies of most underdeveloped countries, China presents her tested economic policies as a balance between national and local development, between agricultural and industrial investment, as well as a balance between light industry and heavy industry (the so-called "Two Legs Walking", liang-t'iao-t'ui-tso-lu, principle). Moreover, the Chinese teach the important principle of self-reliance, which they have learned from their experiences, as essential to avoid foreign imperialist control and exploitation. For the Chinese, the principle of self-reliance is the key to national independence and economic growth without foreign intervention. Therefore, Tseng Yun, a Chinese leader in charge of economic affairs, pointed out:

Revolution cannot be exported. The revolution in a country can only be made by its own people. ...

After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese people continued to follow the policy of self-reliance in socialist construction. ...

The practical experience of the Chinese people has fully testified to the correctness of the view ... that <sup>256</sup>every socialist country must rely mainly on itself in construction".

In general, for the past two decades, Chinese revolutionary policies concerning political, economic and social issues have been given close attention by most nations in the world and widely adopted by the developing nations of the Third World as models for their national modernization. In connection with Mao's revolutionary theory of armed struggle and the national

liberation movements of the Third World nations, Professor Harold C. Hinton concluded: "One important principle that the CPC does preach to the newly independent nations is the maintenance of armed forces allegedly for the main purpose of protecting themselves against 'imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism'. ... The CPC of course rejects any suggestion that the Soviet Union (or for that matter the United States, India, or Yugoslavia) offers any kind of model for the developing countries."<sup>257</sup>

In reviewing the traditional Chinese Wang Tao concept, the approach of China's foreign policy and her international behavior do contain certain special features differing from the hegemony-oriented Paism of the two super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Chinese do not believe that the western capitalist nations can give a correct direction for the developing nations due to their incorrect ideology, while the right way and appropriate approach will always come from culturally superior China, tempered by her authentic experiences.<sup>258</sup>

Despite their cultural pride and ideological self-confidence, the Chinese also accept the traditional teachings of humility, one of the major features of the Wang Tao theory, to avoid the aggressiveness of great power hegemonism (Pa Tao) and great power chauvinism.<sup>259</sup> To the Chinese, an attractive model is more effective than arbitrary dictation or forcible suppression, either in domestic or foreign policy. Mao Tse-tung once spoke in a nationalistic mood of humility, as the typical Chinese revolutionary intellectuals did, in a discussion of China's future role in the world. He said:

In another forty five years, ... China will have undergone an even greater change. She will have become a powerful socialist industrial country. And that is as it should be.... and she ought to have made a greater contribution to humanity. ...

But we must be modest--not only now, but forty-five years hence, as well. We should always be modest. In our international relations,

we Chinese people should get rid of great-power chauvinism resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely.<sup>260</sup>

We must never adopt an arrogant attitude of great-power chauvinism and become conceited because of the victory of our revolution and certain achievements in our construction. Every nation, big or small, has its strong and weak points.<sup>261</sup>

In summary, China's attitude toward the weaker and underdeveloped countries has been strongly associated with and influenced by the traditional concept of Wang Tao and spirit of humanity.

## 2) The Nationalities Question

### (a) Theoretical Analysis of the Question of Nationalities

For 4,000 years, through the dynasties of Hsia, Shang, Chou, and still today, China has been a multi-national country. When the ancient Chou feudalism broke down and the periods of Spring and Autumn and of the Warring States followed, the original Chinese civilization around the Yellow River enjoyed a great expansion through interstate interaction and military conquest, culminating in a unified Ch'in Empire in 221 B.C. Following dynasties of Chinese history, Han, T'ang, Sung, Yuan, Ming and Ch'ing, further contributed to Chinese territorial and cultural expansion from the areas of the Yellow and Yangtze rivers to the present national boundary. Throughout this long period of racial and cultural assimilation, China has embraced a great number of ethnic peoples into her national realm. Within this large Chinese family of peoples, the Han nationality make up more than 90 per cent of the population and the ethnic minorities consist of other peoples with a total population of about thirty-five million altogether.<sup>262</sup>

The most impressive feature of the Chinese ethnic assimilation during the past several thousand years has been the process of cultural interaction rather than modern nationalism. Except in the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods, which were similar to modern international systems, the Chinese concept of nationality was generally, if vaguely, iden-

tified with universalism (the concept of t'ien-hsia--all-under-heaven, or treating all mankind as a whole). The only differentiation between the Chinese and other peoples in the world was based on the criteria of cultural level and civilization. Once the wild barbarians were civilized by Chinese culture or merged into the Chinese system there could be no difference between the Chinese and the other peoples. This traditional Chinese concept of culturalism survived until challenged by the modern Western concept of nationalism in the nineteenth century.

Traditional Chinese universalism, rather than nationalism for the ethnic groups and peoples, is the Chinese Communist policy today. This policy is not entirely inconsistent with Marxism-Leninism, which holds a similar attitude towards the question of national minorities. However, instead of using the traditional cultural line, the Chinese Communists today argue that the fundamental cleavages of world society are along class rather than national lines. The official Party position is:

"Nations" are artificial units which came into being with the rise of capitalism and which are destined to disappear when capitalism is replaced with communism; nationalism is a club used by capitalists to keep the world proletariat divided and subdued. When the proletariat lays siege to world power, then, according to the theory, nations and nationalism will vanish.<sup>263</sup>

Accordingly, in the view of communist internationalism any claim for national independence of an ethnic minority in a socialist country is counter-revolutionary and will not be permitted. Only in capitalist and colonial countries are such claims correct and operative. In a proletarian socialist country the oppression of one nationality by another is impossible, so if an ethnic minority demands independence, it is automatically an agent of world imperialism and thus an enemy of "the people".<sup>264</sup> On the basis of the spirit of internationalism, a Chinese leader, Chang Chih-i, argued:

In the present-day world, the American imperialists continue at

the head of the colonialist camp. They stubbornly oppose lasting peace and people's democracy and cling to their policies of encroachment and colonialism. If we cannot satisfactorily unite the national minorities within our borders, this might have the effect of pushing them out of the great family of the Chinese People's Republic, handing them over to imperialism, and causing slavery to be imposed upon them. This is not the way for Communists.<sup>265</sup>

He further pointed out certain miserable historical experiences of several nationalities for independence such as Mongols and Uighur controlled by the Russians and the Tibets by the Great Britain since late nineteenth century to support his argument:

In recent history, certain national minorities in our country have experienced independence movements. Not only did these meet with complete failure, but before one foot could get picked up to walk away from the motherland, the other foot had already sunk in the trap set by the imperialists. This historical lesson has served as a warning for the leading personalities of China's comparatively large national minorities.<sup>266</sup>

This kind of internationalism and humanitarianism has certain similarities with the traditional Chinese concept of culturalism. According to the Chinese Confucian concept and the system of suzerainty, once non-Chinese territories and peoples are civilized by Chinese ideology and culture from barbarism, they should not be lost to other barbarian control. The Chinese attitude toward their frontier areas and peripheral states was built on this principle for more than 3,000 years. The actual process whereby the conquered barbarians were absorbed and turned into Chinese by slow assimilation and cultural influence was compatible with traditional Chinese idealism and humanitarianism. Any attempt at disunion or claim of separation from the orthodox center of civilization, the motherland, would be regarded as barbarian rebellion, and thus harmful and disadvantageous to both the minority people and the people of the whole system. As early as the period of Spring and Autumn, Confucius praised the prime minister of Chin state, Kuang Chung, as a great man of virtue for defending Chinese civilization against barbarian encroachment and saving China, the Chou feudalism, from disunion.<sup>267</sup> The



general goal of foreign policy at that time and since was the preservation of the Chinese system of suzerainty and cultural influence. The so-called right of national self-determination in the modern style was not understood and in fact definitely denied.

Thus, the traditional Chinese attitude and the current Chinese Communist policy on the question of nationalities are alike in opposing cultural disunion and national independence. Unlike the Soviets, who adopted the principle of "national self-determination" to implement federalism, the Chinese, although endorsing and honoring this Soviet principle, have preferred only to allow national regional autonomy within a united country.<sup>268</sup>

In opposing the Western concept of national self-determination and separation, Mao Tse-tung commented on the question of the minority nationalities and urged the elimination of both great Hanism and local nationalism. He said:

It is imperative to foster good relations between the Han people and the minority nationalities. The key to this question lies in overcoming Han chauvinism. At the same time, efforts should also be made to overcome local nationalism, wherever it exists among the minority nationalities. Both Han chauvinism and local nationalism are harmful to the unity of the nationalities; they represent a special contradiction among the people which should be overcome.<sup>269</sup>

According to Marxism-Leninism, the principle of "national self-determination" is not a call for national separation nor the breaking off and separate establishment of small nation states, but is simply a practical manifestation of profound opposition to national oppression of all kinds.<sup>270</sup> Therefore, the Chinese Communist Party concludes:

In sum, the principal aim of Marxist-Leninists insisting on the necessity of recognizing the right of national self-determination is that of opposing imperialism by seeking to make allies of the oppressed nationalities in the socialist revolution of the international proletariat; it is clearly not their aim to advocate indiscriminately the separation of each nation, nor to urge the establishment of a great number of small nation-states.<sup>271</sup>

The Chinese Communist policy on national minorities has led to a decision to establish autonomous regions (which are mostly around the national frontier and border areas) instead of a political federalism as the Soviet Union has chosen to do, with its different historical background and traditions. The major autonomous regions in China today, are Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang Uighur, Tibet, Kwangsi Chuang, Ningsia Hui, and a number of autonomous chous (prefectures), which were Chinese national frontier areas in the past, occupied by barbarians. These regions have enjoyed quite a lot of autonomy as they did under the traditional Chinese system of suzerainty during the past two thousand years. Following the Confucian theory of Wang Tao in the past, the Chinese adopted the general policy of chi-mi or "loose rein" in dealing with barbarians. Perhaps influenced by both idealist Mencius and realist Hsun Tzu, there were two approaches to implementation of this Confucian theory. Professor Yang Lien-sheng, a Chinese historian at Harvard, describes them as follows: "In the Confucian classic, the Tso Chuan, one discerns two tendencies, one toward pacifism and the other toward militarism as the most effective means for dealing with the barbarians. Most views were mixed with various amounts of idealism and realism, persuasion and intimidation".<sup>272</sup> The Chinese attitude and traditions of "loose rein" and local administrative autonomy for the ethnic minorities can be traced back to the Han Dynasty. Professor Yang gives a historical survey of this policy:

Most of the definitions of chi-mi were made in Han times. Pan Ku's chi-mi pu-chueh or "keeping under loose rein without severing the relationship" was a principle already current in the time of Han Wu-ti.

With the establishment of the chi-mi fu chou or "military and civil prefectures under loose rein" by the T'ang dynasty on its frontier, the expression chi-mi became part of a technical term referring to a special institution. ... The Sung continued the institution of ch-mi chou. The Ming also used the terms chi-mi chou hsien, "prefectures and districts under loose rein".... Such prefectures and districts under loose rein constituted a frontier prefectural system in name but a frontier feudal system in reality. The efforts made by the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties to convert them into regular prefectures and districts

(a process known as kai-t'u kuei-liu) yielded only limited results.<sup>273</sup>

With this tradition of the local chi-mi institutional system under the loose-rein policy, as a means for cultural and ideological transformation of minorities into the Chinese system, the Chinese Communists today have also set up similar autonomous regions and prefectures (chou), respecting the specific conditions and customs of the ethnic minority groups, as a technique for an appropriate socialist transformation. The Party attitude is one of equality, brotherhood and mutual help toward the national minorities within a united China, but at the same time the Party strongly opposes local nationalism and any claims of national disunion and separation. The Party position is given in these words:

We must rely on the principle of nationalities equality in order to eliminate contradictions among the nationalities; to give the national minorities democratic rights; to let them manage their own internal affairs; to respect their religious beliefs, spoken and written languages, and customs and habits; to assist them in improving their economic conditions of life; to help them train cadres and establish armed forces, etc. ...<sup>274</sup>

Throughout Chinese history, China has been truly culturally internationalist and expansionist in her concept of world order. In certain ways, that historic posture is compatible with the contemporary Chinese Communist concept of proletarian and ideological internationalism, as in the Communist position on the question of nationalities.

#### (b) Policies on Frontier Areas and Bordering States

According to the Communist Chinese theory on the minority nationality question, any claim of national independence and separation from the socialist motherland under the banner of national self-determination for a certain nationality should not occur. Since under the general spirit of proletarian internationalism, the principles of national equality, solidarity, and mutual help are fully operative, a movement for independence must

be mistaken and unjustified. Should such claim or such a movement occur, it must represent bourgeois local nationalism under the influence of foreign imperialist plots. These plots or intrigues of the imperialists and the local reactionary forces must be put down and crushed for the sake of proletarian welfare as a whole.

Since the establishment of the People's Republic, China has been confronted with two major problems of local nationalism and claims for independence, namely, the Tibetan rebellion and the Taiwan Independence Movement. The national minorities in other frontier areas have been fairly satisfied and their living conditions have greatly improved, approaching the level of the Han majority. The Han and the national minorities have been intermingled to a certain degree under the policy of solidarity, a process which has contributed greatly to the principle of proletarian internationalism. Ulanfu, an important minority leader (Inner Mongolia), wrote in 1960:

With the victory of the Chinese people's revolution and the founding of the Chinese People's Republic, the reactionary rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism in our country was overthrown. National oppression was thoroughly eliminated. Equality and solidarity among the nationalities were established and the relations among them radically changed. China entered a new era of friendship co-operation and simultaneous development of the nationalities.<sup>275</sup>

In both of the critical cases involving an independent movement, the Tibetan rebellion and the Taiwan Independence Movement, the Chinese Communists regarded them as plots and conspiracies of the local bourgeois reactionaries in collusion with foreign imperialism. In the case of Tibet, the Chinese Communist leaders pointed out:

Imperialism began its rabid aggression against all the nationalities in China from the beginning of the 19th century, militarily, politically, economically and culturally. Tibet was no exception. At the very outset, imperialism resorted to brute force in the hope of occupying Tibet by armed invasion and turning it into one of its colonies.<sup>276</sup>

The foreign imperialist nations to which they referred were Great Britain and the United States associated with India. These western powers were charged with having conspired in an imperialist plot for the so-called "independence of Tibet" since the Second World War.<sup>277</sup> In 1950, the Chinese Communists entered Tibet and set up Tibetan local government for socialist transformation. However, they charged the U.S. and British imperialists with obstructing the Chinese campaign for national unification by creating the "Tibetan Independence Movement"<sup>278</sup> When the Tibetan armed rebellion broke out in March, 1959, the Chinese regarded this uprising as a plot engineered by foreign imperialism and thus quickly sent troops to put it down. The People's Daily commented in March 1959:

The local government of Tibet and the reactionary clique of the upper social strata there, in collusion with imperialism, the Chiang Kai-shek bandits and foreign reactionaries, have openly torn up the 17-article Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, abducted the Dalai Lama and launched an armed rebellion. These monstrous crimes, betraying the motherland, disrupting unification of the country and undermining national unity, are absolutely intolerable to the people of all nationalities throughout the country including the patriotic people of Tibet.<sup>279</sup>

On this subject of the armed suppression of the Tibetan rebellion, Premier Chou En-lai made an official report. He generalized the policy of the Central People's Government on Tibet and explained the reason for military suppression of the revolt. He said:

The policy of the Central People's Government in regard to the Tibet region has always been clear. In accordance with the stipulations of the Constitution, we have always adhered to the principle of the unity of all the nationalities of our country and the unity of the Tibetan people themselves and have stood for the institution of national local autonomy in Tibet. ... But the former local government of Tibet and the reactionary clique of the upper social strata continued their collusion with the imperialists, the Chiang Kai-shek gang and foreign reactionaries on whose forces they attempted to rely to split the motherland, restore the imperialist aggressive forces in Tibet, and preserve a backward, dark, reactionary and cruel serfdom in Tibet. ... Their activities seriously violated the interests of the Tibetan people and the common interests of all the nationalities of the

country.<sup>280</sup>

In general, the incident of Tibetan uprising in 1959 was viewed by the Chinese as a class struggle, and the armed rebellion was thus suppressed in accordance with the general policy on the nationalities question. Under the banners of humanitarianism and proletarian internationalism, as the Chinese saw it, the general interest of the Tibetan people was saved and the unity of the motherland was greatly consolidated.

In the case of Taiwan, the situation is more complicated than that of Tibet. First, the Taiwanese people are of Han nationality and so not a national minority. Thus, there is no question of national oppression. Second, the Taiwan island is still held by the Chinese Nationalist (Chiang Kai-shek's) government, supported by the United States and other western countries. Ethnically and culturally, in fact, the Taiwanese people are identical with the Chinese mainlanders. Although there were peasant rebellions and nationalist resistance against the colonial rule of the Dutch and the Japanese in Taiwan during the past few centuries, the character of these movements was essentially the same as the older Chinese anti-foreignism. Taiwan "was still intimately tied to the very same cultural values and the same patterns of loyalty that existed on the mainland".<sup>281</sup> The spirit was not that of modern nationalism for, a separate national independence, but rather a feeling of Chinese patriotism. Even the extreme case of alleged Formosan nationalism, the declaration of a "Formosan Democratic Republic" in resistance to the Japanese occupation when the Chinese Ch'ing government conceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895, did not represent a desire for the creation of an independent Formosan nation. Its purpose "was intended as a temporary device to achieve international support to resist the Japanese with the view to eventually re-uniting Formosa with the mainland".<sup>282</sup>

The current sentiment of Formosan nationalism for independence since World War II has been in fact due to the misconduct, dictatorship, and corruption of the Chinese Nationalist Government under Chiang Kai-shek's rule. This was shown particularly in the Formosan revolt of February 28, 1947, which crystallized Formosan nationalist feelings.<sup>283</sup> In the view of the Chinese Communists, however, Formosan nationalism is simply a manifestation of the class struggle between the oppressed mass proletariat and the bourgeois-bureaucratic reactionaries which existed similarly in the Chinese mainland before the liberation of 1949. Thus there has been nothing different in the Taiwan situation in comparison with that of other regions of the Chinese Mainland in the past, except for the fact that Taiwan is currently controlled by the United States in collusion with the Chiang Kai-shek reactionary forces. This, of course, has been the main obstacle to Taiwan liberation. The major problem in Taiwan, therefore, is foreign imperialism and bourgeois reactionary rule, not the issue of national oppression. In Chinese Communist eyes, there is no reason for the people of Taiwanese to claim national independence. Formosan nationalism is inconceivable, as far as the general interests of the mass proletariat are concerned, unless inspired by plots of the foreign imperialists in collusion with local bourgeois reactionaries, aimed at national disunion.

Accordingly, the policy of the Chinese Communists on the Taiwan issue has been focused since 1950 on attacking the United States China-policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek. China also accuses Japan of cooperating with the United States in a conspiracy to separate Taiwan from her motherland by supporting the Taiwan Independence Movement. In an official interview with James Reston, vice president of the New York Times, on August 9, 1971, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai pointed out:

Japan has ambitious designs with regard to Taiwan. Japan wants to control Taiwan in her hands. So it's not a simple matter that Japan is supporting Taiwan in the United Nations.

In fact, we can even go on further from there. That is, not only will there be a question of two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan - it's even conceivable that they are trying to separate Taiwan from China and, under the direction of Japan and also possibly with support from some quarters in the United States, to bring about a so-called independent Taiwan.<sup>284</sup>

Pointing to the American role in the Taiwan question, Chou En-lai said:

If the United States Government withdraws all forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait and no longer considers Chiang Kai-shek as the representative of China, then the logical result would be that Chiang Kai-shek and Taiwan would be matters internal to China. This would be recognition that the People's Republic of China is the only lawful government. There can be no possibility of two Chinas or one China and one Taiwan.<sup>285</sup>

In brief, the Chinese viewed the true nature of the so-called "Taiwan Independence Movement" as a plot of American imperialism and Japanese reactionaries and thus urged the reunification of China in light of the common interests of the whole Chinese people.

In addition to these two particular cases, Chinese nationality policies in other frontier areas are consistent with the same theory of nationalities. The general principles of national solidarity, equality and mutual assistance according to proletarian internationalism are propagated and enforced. Possible unrest or uprisings in the frontier areas are theoretically and factually blamed upon plots and subversion of foreign imperialism in collusion with local bourgeois reactionaries. In the case of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, Russian revisionist social-imperialism was condemned and charged with conspiracy and subversion, agitating for the Uighur nationality to separate from China. This conspiracy was also shown in the Sino-Soviet border disputes. Since the Ch'ing dynasty, the Russians have recurrently interfered along China's Sinkiang and Mongolian frontiers. Mongolia was technically and subversively separate from



China as an independent "Mongolian People's Republic" in 1946 under Russian influence and control.<sup>286</sup> The Chinese, therefore, are very sensitive to Russian ambitions and activities in the Sinkiang area. Since the widened border disputes in the 1960's, they have frequently accused Russia of subversive activities along the Sinkiang border area.<sup>287</sup> With regard to the most important strategic frontier areas such as Sinkiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia, where the major Chinese nuclear facilities are located, the Chinese are extremely careful in handling the nationality question and in watching the Russians, for obvious reasons of national security.

## (2) The Implementation of Internationalism

### 1) The Spirit of Bandung

When the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, China initially pursued a foreign policy of "leaning to one side" toward the Soviet Union. Under Russian control and influence, the general characteristics of Chinese foreign policy from 1949 to 1954 were unequivocally "revolutionary" and "militantly nationalistic". The Chinese openly encouraged armed struggle and subversion beyond their borders, especially in Asian countries.<sup>288</sup> This phase of foreign policy was partially in support of Soviet national interests and partially reflected the revolutionary sentiment of Chinese nationalism and anti-imperialism. However, since 1954, with the death of Stalin and the need for socialist rehabilitative construction after the Korean War, China has been more independent of Soviet control and influence in conducting her foreign policy. Thus, the traditional spirit of mutual assistance and nonaggression has dominated, along with the general "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence", the "panch shila", which were formalized in a treaty concluded between China and India in 1954.

In April, 1955, China participated in the Bandung Conference in Indonesia with twenty-eight other Asian and African nations. In the traditional Chinese spirit of Wang Tao toward other states, and now more independent from Soviet control, the Chinese delegation presented a program calling for mutual assistance and peaceful coexistence, and urged Afro-Asian solidarity against imperialism and colonialism. Premier Chou En-lai spoke at the Conference:

The Chinese Delegation has come here to seek common ground, and not to create divergence. ...

There is every reason to make the five principles the basis for establishing friendly co-operation and good neighbourly relations among us. We Asian and African countries, with China included, are all backward economically and culturally. If our Asian-African Conference does not exclude anybody, why couldn't we understand each other and enter into friendly co-operation?<sup>289</sup>

This appeal to proletarian internationalism brought China praise, and friendship from the Afro-Asian countries thereafter. China acquired a new image and an enhanced international status in the eyes of the developing nations, thus paving the way for greater Chinese influence in the Third World nations and peoples.

This appeal for pacifism and proletarian mutual assistance coincides in nature with the classical Wang Tao theory and the Mohist spirit of "universal love and nonaggression". It is essentially the same as the Bandung spirit, which the Chinese frequently refer to as a major feature of their foreign policy. In addition to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the Bandung Ten Principles were adopted, focusing on the principles of anti-colonialism and mutual respect for further consolidation of the Afro-Asian nations.

Through the Bandung Conference, China expanded her foreign relations with the Asian countries and began her first diplomatic activity in Africa.

This diplomatic campaign for peace was impressive and powerful. It was further reinforced by Premier Chou En-lai's official visits to Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Burma, Nepal, Ceylon, Cambodia, and North Vietnam. More than a hundred cultural, trade, and technical treaties and agreements were concluded during the years 1956-57.<sup>290</sup> With China's support the impact of the Bandung Spirit was enormous. Professor Bruce D. Larkin observed on this subject:

Institutions aside, China invoked the Bandung spirit to encourage Asians and Africans to join in initiatives which China favored. It stood for an aura of benignity. Guided by the Panch Sheela and the Bandung Ten Principles, on a platform of anti-colonialism and mutual respect, countries as dissimilar as China and India could peaceably coexist and prosper. Real arguments aired at Bandung were mute. African leaders, prompted to do so in the proper context, readily affirmed their attachment to the spirit of Bandung.<sup>291</sup>

The importance of the Bandung Conference for China was obvious. It brought China into the Afro-Asian group of nations and thus marks the beginning of her influence in the Third World, including the Latin American states. Therefore, Professor Harold Hinton concluded: "The Bandung Conference can be taken as marking the beginning of the CPR's transition from the status of an almost purely Asian power to that of an Afro-Asian power".<sup>292</sup> Moreover, China began to present her revolutionary experiences and her program of socialist construction to the underdeveloped Afro-Asian countries as a model for their own nation-building and modernization. The Chinese Communists, in a traditional tone, have claimed that the Chinese experiences of revolution and socialist construction would serve as a model superior to that of the Russians and, of course, to that of the Western capitalists, because Chinese economic and social conditions have been so similar to those of these Third World countries. Not surprisingly, most of the Third World nations were impressed and attracted by this Chinese appeal and by China's performance and achievements in economic and social reforms. China's "popular

diplomacy" with the Afro-Asian nations enabled communism to gain considerable approval among the peoples of these nations as a way of nation-building.

This appeal is discussed by Professor R. G. Boyd as follows:

In general, China's presentation of Communism as the ideal path of development has answered serious dissatisfaction in the South and South-East Asian countries about the slow rates of industrial and agricultural advancement achieved under politico-economic systems which have placed emphasis on the initiative of Western-style private enterprise. Communism has held out prospects of more rapid economic advancement than that possible by imitation of the West, and has thus offered a restoration of prestige to the Asian peoples who have felt humiliated by their failure to emulate Western material progress after liberation from colonial rule.<sup>293</sup>

The intellectuals, and public opinion as well, of Japan and India were particularly affected. In Japan, Professor Boyd commented, "China's example in nation-building has seemed highly commendable because their own country's advances in recent years, although rapid, have involved the continuation of grave injustices; in addition the Chinese example has been felt to reflect a more noble approach to the work of national development than Japan's own imitation of Western capitalism".<sup>294</sup> India, favored by extensive Western and Soviet assistance, has been in the best position to compete with China's model of nation-building and its appeal of communism. However, India's national development and economic advancement have been much less than that of China, so that many people in India have felt and urged that only drastic Communist methods of social mobilization could enable India to advance her backward economy.<sup>295</sup>

After the Bandung Conference, China began to promote her relations with the African countries. In 1956 and 1957 Chinese delegations launched a series of goodwill missions to African states and visited Ethiopia, Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Ghana. Thereafter, the Chinese influence on these nations has particularly increased and thus paved the way for further contacts with other newly independent African countries.<sup>296</sup> In the

1960's, China further improved relations with most African countries, particularly the newly independent states.

In general, the Bandung Conference marked a decisive and far-reaching step for China's entry into Third World politics, enabling her to preach her revolutionary gospel of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. Thereafter, the Chinese have gained more popularity and a more influential status among the underdeveloped countries and peoples than have the other major powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union. The Bandung spirit, with its emphasis on peaceful coexistence, equality, mutual respect and cooperation, was enthusiastically adopted by the Afro-Asian nations as the general basis of international relations. In retrospect, this spirit of Bandung fairly reflects the Chinese classical Mohist spirit of hsia and contemporary Marxist proletarian internationalism. Its doctrine of mutual assistance, especially assisting the weak against the aggressive strong, and its doctrine of equality with mutual respect fully coincide with the Chinese Communist policy of supporting the national liberation movements of the Third World countries. In addition, Chinese military and economic assistance to the Third World nations under the Ten Principles of Bandung further reflect the traditional spirit of goodwill and the policy of virtue in Confucian ethics. China's appeal on behalf of her revolutionary model and her ideological puritanism, as well as her superiority among the underdeveloped areas and peoples, all combine to remind us of the traditional Chinese Wang Tao theory in substance, though expressed (if not exclusively) in the modern words of Marxism-Leninism.

## 2) International United Front

On the basis of dialectical materialism, the Chinese have concretely analysed the major contradictions in the world and the essential obstacles

which impeded her policy objectives. They concluded that since World War II the principal contradiction of all fundamental contradictions today has been that between the oppressed nations and capitalist imperialism headed by the United States. A quotation from Red Flag (a policy journal of the Chinese Communist Party) is appropriate:

Taking the world situation as a whole, the contradiction between the oppressed nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and imperialism headed by the United States is the most prominent and most acute of all the fundamental contradictions and is the principal contradiction in the contemporary world.<sup>297</sup>

Accordingly, in order to defeat U.S. imperialism and its associates so as to promote Chinese nationalism and world revolution, China has called for the broadest possible international united front to oppose imperialism and colonialism. The vast areas of the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are regarded as the major potential members of this united front, since those nations share common ground and conditions with China. In Chinese eyes, the major forces for anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism depend upon these areas, which constitute the storm-centers of world revolution.

Applying his theory of contradictions and revolutionary experiences to the international scene, Mao Tse-tung called in 1964 for the broadest united front to defeat the U.S. imperialism:

The people of the countries in the socialist camp should unite, the people of the countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America should unite, the people of all the continents should unite, all peace-loving countries should unite, and all countries subjected to U.S. aggression, control, intervention or bullying should unite, and so form the broadest united front to oppose the U.S. imperialist policies of aggression and war and to defend world peace.<sup>298</sup>

Mao received numerous delegations and visitors from different parts of the world in May and June 1960, especially from the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. In these receptions and talks, he stressed the need for

the broadest united front, even including the people of the United States, to struggle against U.S. imperialism.<sup>299</sup> The Chinese have carefully differentiated between the imperialist policies of governments and the friendly mass peoples of the world who all share common ground and interests.

The humanitarianism ingredient of proletarian internationalism is a familiar theme of the Chinese classics, which stressed it as the basic criterion of political value judgement. Mencius pointed out that man was born with human compassion, from which the theory of justice was developed to condemn aggressive war and imperialism. Although arguing that man was born evil, Hsun Tzu agreed with the theory of justice against imperialism. With deep sympathetic compassion, Mo Ti and his followers not only postulated the justice theory but also enthusiastically provided concrete and tangible rescue and assistance to the weak and small states in accordance with their doctrines of universal love and nonaggression. All these idealist principles of Chinese classics have continued to play a part in the formulation of the theory of the justice and humanitarianism. The Chinese Communists today, influenced by the same principles, express their sympathy for the sufferings of the oppressed peoples and countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America at the hands of the imperialists. (Unlike the classical idealists, of course, they believe man's nature to be neutral, according to Marxism-Leninism). Owing to her past miserable condition, which was similar to that of the developing nations today, China's sympathetic appeal and support is more convincing to the peoples and nations of the Third World than that of the other Western powers. In his talks with the delegations from twelve African nations in May, 1960, Mao Tse-tung, on behalf of the 650 million Chinese people, expressed full sympathy and support to the African people against imperialism and colonialism. In September, 1970,

the Chinese Government made a statement commenting on the Third Conference of Non-Alligned Countries attended by more than fifty nations, in these words:

Our great leader Chairman Mao has pointed out: "The Chinese people regard victory in the anti-imperialist struggle of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America as their own victory and give warm sympathy and support to all their anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggles".<sup>300</sup>

Moreover, with a similar attitude of sympathy and, of course, a realistic and conceivable strategy, Premier Chou En-lai explained the logic of an international united front for the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism and colonialism. He urged:

We, peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, have had the common experience of suffering from imperialist and colonialist aggression and oppression, and have the common militant task of combating imperialism and old and new colonialism. World peace and human progress will certainly be won if the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America, if the people of all continents, become united in a resolute and unremitting struggle against the imperialist policies of aggression and war.<sup>301</sup>

In general, the Chinese policy of the international united front has well reflected the connection of traditional Chinese humanitarian idealism and the current practical strategic concept of "people's war".

The strategy of the united front has been a powerful weapon to manipulate the contradictions in international relations. According to his theoretical analysis of Chinese society and revolutionary experiences, Mao Tse-tung set up a general principle of the united front as a mass mobilization against the enemy: that is, uniting the left revolutionary progressive classes, neutralizing the middle-of-the roaders, and attacking the extreme right reactionaries.<sup>302</sup> In applying this strategy to the current world situation, China is serving as the revolutionary vanguard while the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America are playing the leading



and decisive role as the proletarian class in the world revolution. Some developed capitalist countries such as Japan, Australia, Canada, and the states of West Europe could be regarded as the intermediate zone, corresponding to the class of petty bourgeoisie or anti-revolutionary lackeys. The capitalist U.S. imperialism and the Soviet revisionist social-imperialism, since the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960's, are considered as the reactionaries and targets for world revolution. For China, the broadest international united front is to be achieved by uniting closely with the proletarian Third World nations, and associating with or neutralizing the intermediate zone nations according to their specific conditions, for a strong mass union to struggle against the leading imperialists, U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionist social-imperialism. In his analysis of the East-West bipolar world contradictions, Mao Tse-tung pointed out in 1957:

It is my opinion that the international situation has now reached a new turning point. There are two winds in the world today, the East Wind and the West Wind. There is a Chinese saying, "Either the East Wind prevails over the West Wind or the West Wind prevails over the East Wind". I believe it is characteristic of the situation today that the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind. That is to say, the forces of socialism have become overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism.<sup>303</sup>

Mao's appeal and his confidence in the East Wind thesis are closely associated with the strategy of a world united front to deter the challenge of the hegemony of two superpowers. Furthermore, as to the East Wind thesis a statement from PLA sources noted in 1966 that the prevailing wind from the East came predominantly from China and its proletarian allies, the nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The East Wind is the anti-imperialistic revolutionary force of the proletariat and the oppressed people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America: whereas the West Wind represents decayed imperialism and all other reactionary forces.<sup>304</sup>

Incidentally, it is interesting that this thesis not only represents the will

of the proletarian international united front but also contains the general characteristics of the traditional Chinese concept of world order, the concept of the Middle Kingdom.

### 3) The Nature of Economic Aid and Foreign Trade

In modern international relations, the foreign aid program has been one of the major features of a nation's foreign policy, especially being used by the major great powers. Combining the traditional Chinese spirit of universal love and mutual benefit and the modern Marxist-Leninist doctrine of proletarian internationalism, the Chinese give a bitter criticism of the imperialist nature of the current foreign aid programs offered by the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. They argue that a foreign aid program should reflect the spirit of humanitarian internationalism and must be mutually beneficial and unconditional. The two superpowers, however, have been utilizing their foreign aid programs as a means for promoting their national self-interests, playing power politics at the expense of the small and weak nations. An official Chinese statement in 1973 points out:

We hold that countries giving truly internationalist aid must strictly respect the sovereignty and equality of the recipient countries, attach no conditions and ask for no privileges. If one thinks that by giving another something he is entitled to dictate everything to the recipient, or arbitrarily tears up agreements, withdraws experts and sabotages the recipient's industrial effort when the latter refuses to be ordered about, this is out-and-out hegemonism and neo-colonialism.<sup>305</sup>

In this regard, Chinese spokesmen pinpoint the American control of a great number of weaker countries and American attempt in the past to influence and exploit them with foreign aid programs. This use of American aid was exemplified by the U.S. threat to cut off foreign aid to many Third World nations when they opposed U.S. China policy and voted for the resolution to restore China's legitimate rights in the United Nations in 1971. China also

particularly condemns the imperialist character of the Soviet economic assistance to China during the 1950's, the true purpose of which was revealed when the Russians withdrew their experts and aid due to China's refusal of unreasonable Soviet demands. In criticizing the insincerity of the past Soviet economic aid to China, the Chinese argue that their view on the real spirit of foreign aid is in accordance with true proletarian internationalism:

While adhering to the policy of self-reliance in our socialist construction, we have highly valued and welcomed international assistance. But life has taught us the lesson that it is important to discern the real nature of foreign aid before accepting it. The foreign "aid" provided by imperialism and old and new colonialism is nothing but an instrument of aggression. We Chinese people do not want such "aid". We welcome and accept aid given on the basis of proletarian internationalism, aid coming from socialist countries which uphold Marxism-Leninism as well as aid provided by the revolutionary people all over the world.<sup>306</sup>

As to international trade, in Chinese eye, it should also be on the basis of the general principles of mutual benefit, mutual respect and equality rather than one-sided exploitation. A writer in the Peking Review points out that in the past "imperialist exploitation by means of investment is accompanied by exploitation in the form of unequal terms of trade with the 'underdeveloped' countries which are exporters of primary products".<sup>307</sup> Thus, the advanced capitalist countries, backed by gunboat diplomacy, launched the large-scale export of commodities to the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and destroyed their handicrafts and national industries. The economies of the underdeveloped countries thus become more lopsided through the unequal terms of trade enforced by military imperialism. In the Chinese view, the purpose of international trade is for exchange of different needs (hu-t'ung-yu-wu) for mutual benefit rather than one-sided imperialist exploitation.

It is interesting to note that one major feature of the traditional

Chinese concept of Wang Tao is the practice of the Confucian virtues, jen (benevolence), yi (righteousness) and hsin (trustworthiness or sincerity) in all kind of human relations. These are quite unlike the modern capitalist concept of profit-seeking and exploitation. Mencius strongly denounced the motive of profit-seeking, which was regarded as the typical characteristic of the small man (hsiao jen). Hsun Tzu approved and encouraged international trade relations on this ethical basis. To practise the virtues of yi and hsin in international relations in order to uphold justice and goodwill, has been considered essential throughout the Chinese tradition. With their idealist doctrines of universal love and non-aggression, the classical Mohists urged the performance of mutual assistance with equality for mutual benefit among nations and peoples all over the world. In the same spirit, the Chinese concept of suzerainty and the tribute system did not involve the purpose of profit-seeking from the peripheral areas or subordinate states but, rather the goal of a relationship based on brother and cultural harmony.

Perhaps because of this traditional ethical heritage and their experiences of suffering from modern imperialism and colonialism, the Communist Chinese policies of foreign aid towards the underdeveloped nations since the 1950's are truly contrary to those of other major powers. In an interview with reporters of the Ghana News Agency in January, 1964, Premier Chou En-lai outlined the general principles of Chinese foreign aid policy:

The aid China offers to all friendly new emerging countries is based on socialist principles and the principle of respecting the sovereignty of the countries concerned. It never takes the form of the export of capital, direct investment and profit-seeking. It consists of providing economic and technical assistance to the governments of these countries and helping these countries develop their own independent national economies.<sup>308</sup>

He further pointed out "the eight principles" of foreign aid which the

Chinese Government has strictly observed and performed since they were outlined during his first visits to the African countries in 1953-54.<sup>309</sup>

Moreover, it is interesting to note that once quoting directly from Confucius words, Premier Chou En-lai expressed Chinese good-will and the nature of mutual assistance in the Bandung Conference in 1955: "As a Chinese proverb says: 'Do not do unto others what you yourself do not desire'. We are against outside interference; how could we want to interfere in the internal affairs of others?"<sup>310</sup> Speaking in a similar tone on the Chinese attitude towards the foreign aid program, Chiao Kuan-hua, Chairman of the Chinese Delegation, spoke at the 27th U.N. General Assembly Session as follows:

The purpose of providing aid to other countries should be to help the recipient countries stand on their own feet and develop an independent national economy. They must not reduce the recipient countries to dependence and subordination in the name of "economic aid" and "international division of labour", let alone placing them under their control on the pretext of "aid". China, too, received some foreign aid in the past and had direct experiences in this regard. Therefore, today when we provide aid to other countries, we endeavour to act on the above-mentioned principles. Of course, our capabilities in this respect are limited and the aid we can give is not much. But we hold that the above-mentioned principles should be propagated and applied universally.<sup>311</sup>

The nations which China particularly accuses are the United States and the Soviet Union. In contrast to these two superpowers' foreign aid programs, the Chinese specifically set forth the terms which should apply to foreign assistance:

We hold that all countries which are sincere in providing aid to others, including multilateral aid through the United Nations, should help the recipient countries and not exploit them. Their loans should be interest-free or, at least, low in interest. They must not press for repayment but should allow its postponement. When providing a loan or other forms of aid, they should strictly respect the sovereignty of the recipient countries, attach no conditions and ask for no privileges.<sup>312</sup>

These are the terms on which China has actually conducted her pro-

grams of international aid and her trade relations with the Third World nations. The statistics give a positive impression of her sincerity and goodwill. For instance, "by the end of 1965 China already had made total of \$2 billion in economic grants to some twenty-five underdeveloped countries, out of which 74.5 percent were interest-free loans, 16.6 percent donations, and only 8.9 percent had a 2.0 - 2.5 percent interest charge".<sup>313</sup>

In addition, several individual aid projects were particularly impressive and worthy of mention. One case was that of trade relations between China and Ceylon, a non-Communist country. After a Sino-Ceylonese trade agreement was concluded in 1952, China has continuously guaranteed a stable market for Ceylon's rubber with no sign of exerting direct political influence or control although the Chinese are fully capable of doing so. Another striking case was China's decision to undertake the costly (\$340 to 400 million) and difficult project of the 1,060-mile Tanzania-Zambia Railway construction.<sup>314</sup> This was especially impressive since the World Bank, the United States, the Soviet Union, and other advanced powers had rejected this difficult and financially unfavorable project, while China accepted this self-sacrificing task on the basis of the spirit of proletarian internationalism. Combined with her traditional ethics, yi (righteousness), China felt the obligation to undertake this difficult construction due to Tanzania's and Zambia's urgent needs. Thus, Professor George T. Yu commented: "It can be seen as a role response to specific Tanzanian expectations which China felt obligated to perform, even at great self-sacrifice."<sup>315</sup> Perhaps, in addition to her traditional idealist ethical motivation to accept this task, China also intended to show the Third World nations and peoples the essential differences between the real socialist country of Marxism-Leninism on the one hand and capitalist imperialism and the pretended

revisionist social-imperialism on the other. Indeed, the Minister of Finance of Tanzania, Amir H. Jamal, commented on the Chinese assistance in construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway in July, 1970, in these favorable words:

Your massive assistance to the cause of developing countries, while engaged in a much needed reconstruction at home, is a clear demonstration of the commitment of the Chinese people to international solidarity in the struggle for the construction of a just and peaceful world order in which imperialism, fascism and colonialism will have been banished for ever.<sup>316</sup>

Obviously, from the capitalist profit-seeking standpoint, this peculiar Chinese behavior seems to be in conceivable. But the Chinese mean to convince the peoples of the world that the pure model of ideal socialism and the correct ideology can only come from the center of the world, the Middle Kingdom.

However, besides the point of international aid for national development and modernization, the Chinese insist that the essential approach for a nation's economic growth is based on the principle of self-reliance and its own efforts. According to their own past experiences, the Chinese stress the vital importance of the role of self-reliance for national independence and nation-building. Tseng Yun says on this subject:

Our experience in construction over the last 15 years shows that there can be no real political independence in the absence of economic independence. It is the implementation of the policy of self-reliance that has enabled us to withstand the pressures of imperialism, old and new colonialism and modern revisionism and preserve our national independence and sovereignty.<sup>317</sup>

Incidentally, the policies of self-reliance and national self-struggle, in retrospect, had already been suggested by the Chinese classical thinkers, such as Mencius, Hsun Tzu, Mo Ti and the Mohist followers, Han Fei Tzu, and most of the Legalist thinkers. Their teachings have continuously contributed to the Chinese experiences of cultural development and modernization

throughout history, especially in modern times. The Chinese Communists further emphasize that the principle of self-reliance would not exclude international assistance and economic cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. But they urge, as Kuo Wen puts it, that:

This is the road of pushing ahead the national-democratic revolution uninterruptedly, the road of self-reliance. It is the only one which will enable the "underdeveloped" countries to become strong and prosperous.<sup>318</sup>

The tone and conclusion of Chinese advice implies that only genuine revolutionary experiences can lead to national independence and social prosperity for the Third World nations. The Chinese seem to believe that this model is the only correct one, not the model of U.S. imperialist capitalism, nor that of Soviet revisionist social-imperialism.


To conclude this discussion of the Chinese attitude on the foreign aid program towards the Third World nations, it is appropriate to refer to what Chairman Mao Tse-tung has said on the Chinese role in world progress and human relations. He said:

China ought to make a greater contribution to humanity. What we have done is far from adequate. We are determined to give stronger support to the just struggles of the Afro-Asian peoples and the people of the world against U.S. imperialism and all its lackeys, and stronger assistance to friendly countries in their cause of national construction.<sup>319</sup>

It is this tone which reflects the essence of the traditional Chinese concept of world order, with China the center of the world, in current world politics.



Map 4  
CHINA: The World Order (Current Model)



Source: Same as Map 3

Notes of Chapter Three

THE INFLUENCE OF CLASSICAL CONCEPTS  
ON CONTEMPORARY FOREIGN POLICY

1

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2

Ibid., pp.41-43; Lu, pp.107-111; pp.123-129.

3

V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, in Collected Works (Moscow, 1960-1963), XIV, p.326. (It was quoted from George H. Hampsch, The Theory of Communism (N.Y.: The Citadel Press, 1965), p.11.

4

Hampsch, p.59.

5

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6

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7

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<sup>14</sup>Hsiung, Ideology and Practice, p.30.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p.103.

<sup>16</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "On Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", Selected Readings of Mao Tse-tung's Works (Peking: People's Press, 1965), p.359. For Mao's direct citation of Lao Tzu's words in English translation, see K. Fan, Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1972), p.190.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp.327-363.

<sup>18</sup>Robert J. Lifton, Revolutionary Immortality (N.Y.: Random House, 1968), p.70.

<sup>19</sup>See Chapter Two of this dissertation, the Confucian School, the section of Mencius.

<sup>20</sup>Mao Tse-tung, Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), pp.186-202. Hereafter, it will be cited as Quotations.

<sup>21</sup>Hsiung, Ideology and Practice, p.103.

<sup>22</sup>Mao, Quotations, pp.206-208.

<sup>23</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "On Practice" (July 1937) Selected Works, I, p.304.

<sup>24</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "On Contradiction" (August 1937), Selected Works, I, pp.311-346.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., pp.343-345.

<sup>26</sup>See Chapter Two, sections of Kuei Ku Tzu and Sun Tzu's philosophical concept of military strategy.

<sup>27</sup>Mao, "On Practice", p.304.

<sup>28</sup>Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I (Three People's Principles), translated by Frank W. Price, (Shanghai: China Committee, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1927), pp.146-48.

<sup>29</sup>It is a very famous and popular quotation of Chairman Mao.

<sup>30</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War" (October 1938), Selected Works, II, p.196.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p.196.

<sup>32</sup>Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1970), see related chapters.

<sup>33</sup>Hsiung, Ideology and Practice, p.106

<sup>34</sup>Lucian W. Pye, China: An Introduction (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1972), see chapter 12 and chapter 18, and p.354.

<sup>35</sup>Hsiung, Ideology and Practice, p.7.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p.8.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p.11.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p.146.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p.139. I agree with Mr. Hsiung's translation and therefore quoted his writings.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p.317, note no.43.

<sup>41</sup>Tachai: Standard Bearer in China's Agriculture (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1972). Also, Taching: Red Banner on China's Industrial Front (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1972).

<sup>42</sup>Pye, China, p.211.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Hsiung, Ideology and Practice, p.319, note 23.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p.160.

<sup>46</sup>The Chinese Communist leaders such as Chou En-lai, Lin Piao, Tseng Yun and others, all expressed this point in their speeches and writings from time to time.

<sup>47</sup>Hsiung, Ideology and Practice, p.164.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., p.165.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p.164.

<sup>50</sup>John K. Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), Third Edition, p.406.

<sup>51</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party", Selected Works, II, p.331.

<sup>52</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "On Coalition Government", Selected Works, III, p.282.

<sup>53</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War", Selected Works, II, p.196.

<sup>54</sup>Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, p.3.

<sup>55</sup>Hou Wai-lu (ed.), The Ideal of Ta T'ung in Chinese History (Peking: Science Press, 1959), p.1. The English translation is by author.

<sup>56</sup>Section of the History of Chinese Philosophy, The Research Institute of Philosophy, The Chinese Academy of Science (ed.), Materials on Chinese Concept of Ta T'ung (Peking: Chung Hua Book Company, 1959), p.1. The English translation is by author.

<sup>57</sup>For Taoist utopian anarchism, see Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, chapter 80. For fundamental concepts of ideal communism, general descriptions can be found in various works by Marx, Engels, Lenin and other interpreters and commentaries.

<sup>58</sup>See Chapter Two of this dissertation about Confucianism.

<sup>59</sup>Hampsch, p.5; see also its cited notes for original source.

<sup>60</sup>See Materials on Chinese Concept of Ta T'ung, p.2.

<sup>61</sup>See Chapter Two of this dissertation about Confucius for the complete text on Ta T'ung society.

<sup>62</sup>Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme", Karl Marx Selected Works, ed. V. Adoratsky, 2 Vols. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1935-1936), II, p.566.

<sup>63</sup>For full text, see Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, I, pp.377-378.

<sup>64</sup>Hampsch, p.3.

<sup>65</sup>Fung, A History of Chinese Philosophy, I, p.37.

<sup>66</sup>Mo Tzu, Chapter of Universal Love and Chapter of Anti-aggression. Also see Hou Wai-lu, The Ideal of Ta T'ung in Chinese History, pp.4-7. English translation is by author.

<sup>67</sup>Hou, The Ideal of Ta T'ung in Chinese History, p.1.

<sup>68</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", Selected Works, IV, p.412. Hereafter cited as "People's Dictatorship".

<sup>69</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "On New Democracy", Selected Works, II, p.340.

<sup>70</sup>*Ibid.*, p.380.

<sup>71</sup>*Ibid.*, p.381.

<sup>72</sup>*Ibid.*, p.412.

<sup>73</sup>*Ibid.*, p.414. For the text of Ta T'ung Shu, see Laurence G. Thompson (trans.), Ta T'ung Shu: The One-World Philosophy of K'ang Yu-wei (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1958).

- <sup>74</sup>See the contents of Ta T'ung Shu.
- <sup>75</sup>Mao, "People's Dictatorship", p.414.
- <sup>76</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>77</sup>Hou, The Ideal of Ta T'ung in Chinese History, pp.i-ii.
- <sup>78</sup>Ibid., p.54. English translation is by author.
- <sup>79</sup>Mao, "On New Democracy", p.344.
- <sup>80</sup>Ibid., p.340.
- <sup>81</sup>Ibid., pp.343-344.
- <sup>82</sup>Confucian Analects, Book VI, Chapter 28.
- <sup>83</sup>See Sun Yat-sen's San Min Chu I, the first principle "Nationalism".
- <sup>84</sup>Mao, "People's Dictatorship", pp.414-415.
- <sup>85</sup>Ibid., p.415.
- <sup>86</sup>Mao, "Role of CCP in the National War", p.196.
- <sup>87</sup>Joseph Alsop, "Mao's Revolution Follows Pattern", Daily Oklahoman (Oklahoma City, Oklahoma), January 16, 1973.
- <sup>88</sup>Mao, "On New Democracy", p.340.
- <sup>89</sup>"Chairman of Chinese Delegation Chiao Kuan-hua's Speech at 27th U. N. General Assembly Session", Peking Review, October 13, 1972, p.8. Hereafter cited as "Chiao's Speech at 27th UN Session".
- <sup>90</sup>The Great Learning (Ta Hsueh), "The Text of Confucius".
- <sup>91</sup>Frank Russell, Theories of International Relations, pp.20-22. For detail, see Chapter Two of this dissertation about Mencius.
- <sup>92</sup>See Yang Lien-sheng, "Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order" and Mark Mancall, "The Ch'ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay" in The Chinese World Order edited by John K. Fairbank, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp.20-23, pp.63-89.
- <sup>93</sup>C. P. Fitzgerald, "The Chinese View of Foreign Relations", The World Today, Vol.19 (January 1963), p.10.
- <sup>94</sup>Ibid., pp.11-12.
- <sup>95</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains", Selected Works, III, p.272.

- <sup>96</sup>Irresistible Historical Trend (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1971), p.8.
- <sup>97</sup>Mao Tse-tung's speech (September 21, 1949) to the People's Political Consultative Conference. For English translation, see K. Fan, Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao, p.91.
- <sup>98</sup>Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, p.214.
- <sup>99</sup>Fitzgerald, "The Chinese View of Foreign Relations", p.10.
- <sup>100</sup>Ibid., p.11.
- <sup>101</sup>Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, pp.209-216; also see O. Edmund Clubb, China and Russia (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1971), p.389.
- <sup>102</sup>Chou En-lai, "Refuting Truman's Statement" (June, 1950), Oppose U.S. Occupation of Taiwan and "Two-China's" Plot (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), pp.5-7.
- <sup>103</sup>"Speech by Chiao Kuan-hua, Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, at the Plenary Meeting of the 26th Session of the U.N. General Assembly", Irresistible Historical Trend (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1971), p.10.
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- <sup>110</sup>Fitzgerald, "The Chinese View of Foreign Relations", pp.13-14.
- <sup>111</sup>Ibid., p.11.
- <sup>112</sup>The Great Learning, "Text of Confucius".
- <sup>113</sup>The Sino-American Joint Communiqué on February 27, 1972 in Shanghai. English text appeared in The New York Times, February 28, 1972. Also see, Sino-U.S. Joint Communiqué (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, February 28, 1972).

<sup>114</sup>The Sino-American Joint Communique on February 22, 1973 in Peking and Washington. The English text appeared in The New York Times, February 23, 1973.

<sup>115</sup>Fitzgerald, "The Chinese View of Foreign Relations", p.15.

<sup>116</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" (February 27, 1957). For English text see K. Fan, Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao, p.190.

<sup>117</sup>Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1965), p.44.

<sup>118</sup>*Ibid.*, p.72.

<sup>119</sup>President L.B. Johnson's speech of October 18, 1964, text in The New York Times, October 19, 1964, p.14.

<sup>120</sup>"Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government--A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 3", Peking Review, August 15, 1963, p.14.

<sup>121</sup>"The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves", Peking Review, September 13, 1963, p.12. Hereafter cited as "The Origin of Differences".

<sup>122</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>123</sup>"Statement of the Soviet Government", Peking Review, September 6, 1963, p.20.

<sup>124</sup>"Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government--A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 21", Peking Review, September 6, 1963, p.9.

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<sup>126</sup>"China Making Huge Missile", New York Times service, Sunday Oklahoman (Oklahoma City, Oklahoma), March 4, 1973, p.9.

<sup>127</sup>Cheng Chu-yuan, Economic Relations Between Peking and Moscow: 1949-63 (N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1964), p.86. Hereafter cited as Economic Relations.

<sup>128</sup>Li Hsien-nien, "The Great Achievement in Finance of the Chinese People's Republic during the Past 10 Years", Ts'ai-cheng (Fiance), Peking, No.18 (1959), p.4.

<sup>129</sup>Cheng, Economic Relations, p.93.



<sup>130</sup>Seymour Topping, "Air-Raid Shelters in City and Village", Report from Red China (N.Y.: The New York Times, Quadrangle Books, 1971), pp.32-35.

<sup>131</sup>Robert C. North, The Foreign Relations of China (Belmont, Calif.: Dickenson Publishing Company, Inc., 1969), p.111.

<sup>132</sup>"The Origin of Differences", Peking Review, September 3, 1963.

<sup>133</sup>Clubb, China and Russia, pp.500-503.

<sup>134</sup>*Ibid.*, p.504; also see Le Monde (Paris), May 27, 1969.

<sup>135</sup>Audrey Topping, "Chou, at Dinner, Talks of Rift with Soviet", Report from Red China, p.28.

<sup>136</sup>Fitzgerald, "The Chinese View of Foreign Relations", p.11.

<sup>137</sup>Audrey Topping, p.28.

<sup>138</sup>Professor Lucian W. Pye's seminar lecture at the University of Oklahoma on March 12, 1973. He was told by the Chinese officials about this fact during his visit to China in January, 1973.

<sup>139</sup>Harold C. Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest (N.Y.: The Macmillan Company, 1970), p.206.

<sup>140</sup>C. P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1969), p.53. Hereafter cited as Chinese Place in the World.

<sup>141</sup>*Ibid.*, p.68.

<sup>142</sup>"The Origin of Differences", Peking Review.

<sup>143</sup>Fitzgerald, Chinese Place in the World, p.58.

<sup>144</sup>*Ibid.*, p.57.

<sup>145</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.48-49.

<sup>146</sup>*Ibid.*, p.58.

<sup>147</sup>*Ibid.*, p.59; also see Chapter Two of this dissertation about Hsun Tzu.

<sup>148</sup>*Ibid.*, p.59.

<sup>149</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf Publisher, 1967), Fourth Edition, p.42.

<sup>150</sup>"Imperialism", International Encyclopedia of Social Science, Vol.7, pp.102-103.

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- <sup>154</sup>Fung Yu-lan, The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p.63.
- <sup>155</sup>Tao Te Ching, Chapter 29.
- <sup>156</sup>"Resolute and Unreserved Support for Vietnam", Peking Review, April 23, 1965, pp.6-7.
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- <sup>158</sup>Tao Te Ching, Chapter 31.
- <sup>159</sup>"On U.S. Invasion of Cambodia", Peking Review, May 8, 1970, p.14.
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- <sup>162</sup>Chou En-lai, "On U.S.-Chiang Kai-shek 'Mutual Security Treaty'" (December, 1954), Oppose U.S. Occupation of Taiwan and "Two-China's" Plot, pp.18-27.
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- <sup>166</sup>Chinese Editorial, Jen-Min Jih-Pao (People's Daily), June 11, 1967.
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- <sup>169</sup>"New Year Message", Peking Review, January 5, 1973, p.10.
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- <sup>185</sup>Ibid., p.372.
- <sup>186</sup>Government Statement, "On Nuclear Test-ban Treaty" (July, 1963), People of the World Unite for the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), p.1.
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- <sup>188</sup>Ibid., p.8.
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- <sup>190</sup>Joseph Harsch, "Disarmament Dance: Chinese Trip Soviets", The Christian Science Monitor, November 29, 1971, pp.1-2.
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- <sup>192</sup>Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Chapters 1-10.

- <sup>193</sup>Irresistible Historical Trend, pp.6-7.
- <sup>194</sup>James Chieh Hsiung, Law and Policy in China's Foreign Relations (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp.14-15.
- <sup>195</sup>Ibid., p.20. Also see, Ying T'ao, "A Critique of Bourgeois International Law Concerning State Sovereignty", Study of International Problems (kuo-chi-wen-ti-yen-chiu, KCWT), No.9, p.47.
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- <sup>212</sup>Mao, "On Protracted War", pp.152-153.
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- <sup>246</sup> Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" (September 3, 1965), Peking Review, No.36, 1965, p.19.
- <sup>247</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>248</sup> Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, pp.112-113.

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- 250 Ibid., Book XV, Chapter 5.
- 251 Ibid., Book XVI, Chapter 1.
- 252 Meng Tzu, Book II, Kung-sun Ch'ow, Part II, Chapter 3.
- 253 For detail, see Lien-sheng Yang, "Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order", in The Chinese World Order, pp.31-33.
- 254 The earliest definition of the Chinese revolutionary model to be published was that put forward by Liu Shao-ch'i in his address to the Asian and Australian Trade Union Conference convened in Peking in November of 1949. See Hsin-hua Yueh-pao, December 15, 1949, pp.440-441.
- 255 Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!", pp.22-23.
- 256 Tseng Yun, "How China Carries Out the Policy of Self-Reliance", Peking Review, June 18, 1965, pp.12-15.
- 257 Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, p.74.
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- 259 On the aspect of traditional Confucian teachings of humility, see Confucian Analects and other associated Chinese classics for reference. Also see the section of Confucian School in Chapter Two of this dissertation.
- 260 Mao Tse-tung, "In Commemoration of Dr. Sun Yat-sen" (November, 1956), Quotations, pp.179-180.
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- 262 Moseley, p.29. The original Chinese text is by Chang Chih-i, "A Discussion of the National Question in the Chinese Revolution and of Actual Nationalities Policy (Draft)".
- 263 Ibid., p.5.
- 264 Ibid., p.7.
- 265 Ibid., p.66.
- 266 Ibid., p.73.
- 267 Confucian Analects, Book XIV, Chapter 18. The wearing fashion which Confucius described was the barbarian style of costume at that time.
- 268 Moseley, pp.78-79.

<sup>269</sup> Mao, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People"; for English translations, see K. Fan, Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao, p.178.

<sup>270</sup> Moseley, pp.70.

<sup>271</sup> Ibid., p.71.

<sup>272</sup> For the detail of examples and his observation, see Yang Lien-sheng, "Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order", pp.24-27.

<sup>273</sup> Ibid., pp.31-33.

<sup>274</sup> Moseley, pp.53-54, p.59.

<sup>275</sup> Ulanfu, "Strengthen Incessantly the Great Solidarity of Our Country's Nationalities", Ten Glorious Years (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), p.229.

<sup>276</sup> Concerning the Question of Tibet (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1959), p.198.

<sup>277</sup> Ibid., p.203.

<sup>278</sup> Ibid., p.207.

<sup>279</sup> Ibid., p.17.

<sup>280</sup> Ibid., pp.61-62.

<sup>281</sup> Maurice Meisner, "The Development of Formosan Nationalism", in Formosa Today edited by Mark Mancall, (N.Y.: F. A. Fraeger, Publishers, 1964), p.149.

<sup>282</sup> Ibid., p.150.

<sup>283</sup> For detailed discussion on Formosan nationalism and Taiwan Independence Movement, see Maurice Meisner's "The Development of Formosan Nationalism" and Ong Joktik's "A Formosan's View of the Formosan Independence", both in Mark Mancall's Formosa Today, pp.147-170.

<sup>284</sup> "Transcript of Reston Interview with Chou", Report From Red China, p.84.

<sup>285</sup> Seymour Topping, "U.S. Defense of Taiwan Is an Obstacle", *ibid.*, pp.40-41.

<sup>286</sup> For detail and historical survey, see O. Edmund Clubb, China and Russia: the Great Game, on the related chapters.

<sup>287</sup> "The Origin of Differences", pp.92-99.

<sup>288</sup> Winberg Chai, The Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, p.160.



- 289 Chou En-lai's Speech at the Bandung Conference.
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- 294 Ibid., p.111.
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- 297 Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), 1965, No.6, p.4. English translation is quoted from Peter Van Ness, p.24.
- 298 Mao Tse-tung, "Statement Supporting the Panamanian People's Just Patriotic Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism" (January 12, 1964), Quotations, pp.178-179.
- 299 "Important Talks with Guests from Asia, Africa, and Latin America" (May and June 1960), in Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao, edited by K. Fan, pp.259-60.
- 300 Same as Note No.244 of this chapter.
- 301 "Chou En-lai's Radio Message to Guinean People" (January, 1964), Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, pp.205-209.
- 302 Mao Tse-tung, "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society", Selected Works, I, p.19.
- 303 "Imperialism and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers", Quotations, p.75.
- 304 Quoted from J.D. Simmonds, China's World: The Foreign Policy of A Developing State (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1970), Chapter 8, Note 6.
- 305 Chinese Government Statement, "Reliable Way to Realize Industrialization" (May 8, 1973), Speech by Chinese Representative Wang Yueh-yi at the Seventh Session of the United Nations Industrial Development Board opened in Vienna on May 7, 1973, Peking Review, May 18, 1973, p.5.
- 306 Tseng Yun, "How China Carries Out the Policy of Self-Reliance", pp.12-15.
- 307 Kuo Wen, "Imperialist Plunder--Biggest Obstacle to the Economic Growth of 'Underdeveloped Countries'" (June, 1965), Peking Review, June 18,

and June 25, 1965.

<sup>308</sup>"Chou En-lai's Interview with Reporters of the Ghana News Agency" (January, 1964), Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, pp.146-150.

<sup>309</sup>"Eight Principles" are elaborations on the general statement as Chou En-lai pointed out above. For the full text and detail of the "Eight Principles", *ibid*, pp.149-150.

<sup>310</sup>Chou En-lai's Speech at the Bandung Conference (April, 1955).

<sup>311</sup>"Chiao's Speech at 27th UN Session", p.8.

<sup>312</sup>*Ibid.*, p.7.

<sup>313</sup>Winberg Chai, The Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, p.214.

<sup>314</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.214-215.

<sup>315</sup>George T. Yu, China and Tanzania (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Center for Chinese Studies, China Research Monographs Number Five, 1970), p.58.

<sup>316</sup>News Commentary, "Tanzania and Zambian Delegations Visit China" (July, 1970), Peking Review, July 17, 1970, pp.16-17.

<sup>317</sup>Tseng Yun, "How China Carries out the Policy of Self-Reliance", pp.12-15.

<sup>318</sup>Kuo Wen, "Imperialist Plunder-- ..." (June 18 and 25, 1965).

<sup>319</sup>Same as Note No.316 of this chapter.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY:

#### A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

In order to realize their immediate and long-range goals of foreign policy, the Chinese have formulated a set of practical strategies and approaches which reflects the synthesis of Chinese traditional concepts and modern revolutionary experiences for its implementation. These approaches and strategies contain certain peculiar features of Chineseness, so that they differ from those of other major powers in the world. These features have been attributed both to China's modern revolutionary experiences and also to a group of teachings and principlly of traditional Chinese philosophy. Examination of the extent of these influences on the implementation of current Chinese foreign policy is the task of this chapter.

#### I. IDEOLOGY AS AN APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY

##### A) Conceptual Heritage and Current Background

It has well been pointed out that mind commands the body and thus, ideology will decide one's attitude and action. This is also true of a nation and its foreign policy. The importance of thought or Szu-hsiang to a person and a nation has been traditionally emphasized throughout Chinese history. In ancient times Confucianism taught: "The cultivation of the person depends on rectifying the mind".<sup>1</sup> Thus the correct mind will direct an individual's action correctly, and then correctness is extended to the family, the nation, and the whole world (t'ien-hsia, all-under-heaven).<sup>2</sup>

With this goal, the Hundred Schools of thought contended during the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods each attempting to present the correct thought and ideology to cure human problems. The interpretation of the Truth, the Tao, and the details of doctrine varied according to their different viewpoints and with different historical physical conditions. Thus the thoughts and ideologies of the different schools rose and fell irregularly in popularity throughout these historic periods. After the great unification of China in 221 B.C. and later in the Han Dynasty, Confucianism became the orthodox ideology in China. Scholars and political administrators advocated the extension of Confucianism to the rest of the world. Confucianism thus constituted the basic Chinese concept of suzerainty and culturalism. Throughout the past two thousand years, the implementation of this concept of suzerainty and culturalism was successful in maintaining the realm of Chinese world order in East Asia. Thus, Confucianism set the central pattern for the implementation of China's foreign policy in the past. In a similar way, ideology also plays an important role in today's China in its programs of national development and foreign policy.

#### B) Marxism-Leninism As the Means of World Revolution

Not satisfied with traditional orthodox Confucianism inherited from the feudal past, the Chinese Communists have also adopted and synthesized the progressive portions of the various classical schools of thought with modern Marxism-Leninism. The product of this ideological interaction is the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" which is the application of Marxism-Leninism in the light of the concrete conditions in China. Mao himself has pointed out the spirit of synthesis: "The ancient wisdom is for present use; foreign knowledge is for Chinese use (ku-wei-chin-yung; yang-wei-chung-yung)."<sup>3</sup>

Maoism thus contains basic elements of an idiosyncratic "Chineseness".

Moreover, on an international level, a potential model for Maoism is designed to serve as a universal ideology and for the eventual world revolution. As Liu Shao-ch'i pointed out early in 1960:

The Chinese Communist Party, which has led the Chinese revolution to victory, is armed with Marxism-Leninism; this is epitomized in the famous words of Comrade Mao Tse-tung: "The integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution". ... Of course, revolution and construction in China have features peculiar to this country. But it is also possible that some of these important special features may reappear in some other countries. In this sense, Chinese experience is to a certain extent of international significance.<sup>4</sup>

Parallel to the traditional concept of Chinese world order with China the "Middle Kingdom", the Chinese Communists today claim China as the world center, where the true ideology exists as an inspiration for world revolution. On the one hand, the Western powers, led by the United States, are condemned for their capitalist imperialism and colonialism. On the other hand, upholding the ideological Puritanism of Marxism-Leninism the Chinese condemn the Russians as revisionist social-imperialists, perhaps even worse than the capitalist imperialists. In the Chinese view, both imperialist superpowers are directed by incorrect ideologies, and thus are unable to lead the world revolution to universal human harmony.

Moreover, the Communist leaders, upholding the "correct" ideology inherited from classical idealism felt an international duty to "Rescue the weak, lift up the fallen"<sup>4</sup> in opposing the aggressive great powers. Thus classical idealism was transformed into the "noble spirit of proletarian internationalism" and has been most appealing to the weak and developing Third World nations and peoples. Proletarian internationalism could also serve as a strategy for a massive and powerful world united front to "unite the many, defeat the few", that is, the two superpowers. The Chinese Commu-

nists confidently present their ideology, the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung", as a revolutionary guideline and a set of principles of socialist construction for the underdeveloped nations--now the stormcenter of world revolution. On this ideological confidence as the world center, Professor Robert North observes:

The political culture of the leading circles of the People's Republic consists of a subtle blend of traditional Chinese and Marxist-Leninist-Maoist elements that find expression in foreign policy. Among the more powerful traditional Chinese elements are the predispositions to view Chinese society as unique in the world and China itself as occupying a central position among all nations.<sup>5</sup>

Apparently, under the influence of tradition, the Chinese are convinced that correct ideology is the only vehicle to universal truth. All the ideological "pests" will eventually perish. The Chinese Thought of Mao Tse-tung, a synthesis of Marxist-Leninist principles and of lessons drawn from the concrete Chinese revolutionary experiences, is considered an ideology applicable to the similar conditions of the underdeveloped areas, and which will serve as the revolutionary spark to light the political consciousness of the Third World nations and peoples in their struggle for their rights and for justice. Only the correct ideology can serve as the necessary "sharp weapon" to eliminate the phenomena of human oppression and exploitation and help the peoples of the world to reach toward the realm of world communism and universal harmony.

## II. "NATION-BUILDING" AND NATIONAL DEFENSE AS AN APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY

### A) Conceptual Heritage and Current Background

Throughout history, "power" has played an essential role in determining a nation's position and its influence in interstate relations. Realizing this, leaders of most of the nations in the world, particularly of the major powers, have always sought means to escalate their national

power. To China, this vital truth from her traditional teachings is enhanced by her modern experiences of national humiliation.

In the violent period of Warring States in ancient China, the realist thinkers of the Legalist School urged that a state's national power be maximized through a program of overall political, economic and social controls. For instance, Kuan Chung and Shang Yang, two great Legalist administrators, made their states, Chin and Ch'in, into great powers by channeling all economic, social, and political resources to the advancement of agriculture and the military. Their brilliant performances and the effective policy of "agriculture and war (nung-chan)" led to a number of changes in other states and had a lasting influence throughout Chinese history.<sup>6</sup> Han Fei Tzu, a great Legalist thinker, observing the reality of power politics in his time, urged the need of realistic means and effective methods to promote a state's national power. He argued that national power was mainly generated by internal nation-building through political, economic, social and ideological discipline rather than the wisdom of a nation's foreign policy alone. This is so because "the weak state has no diplomacy", juo-kuo-wu-wai-chiao in Chinese terms. Like Kuan Chung and Shang Yang, he approved and encouraged the policy of complete state support for farmers and soldiers, "agriculture and war," which in modern terms correspond to are economic development and military preparedness, for military security and economic self-sufficiency. In fact, Shang Yang had set the national foundation for a great Ch'in state. And it was Han Fei Tzu who contributed to the realization of unified Chinese empire in 221 B.C.

From the Han Dynasty down to the Ch'ing Dynasty, there were periodic important political, economic and social reforms proposed by various brilliant administrators inheriting the Legalist tradition, such as the reforms

by Wang Mang in the Han Dynasty, by Wang An-shih in the Sung Dynasty, by Chang Chu-cheng in the Ming Dynasty, and others. Throughout these historical experiences, the Chinese have been convinced that internal disorder would lead to external calamity and aggression, nei-yu-wai-huan. This principle has been particularly true in the modern history of China, facing Western imperialist challenges from the Opium War to the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. During this period a number of ambitious administrators and intellectuals devoted their efforts to movements for national reform and national development, but in vain. Mao Tse-tung particularly pointed out this fact in his work, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", and concluded that, "They found Marxism-Leninism, the universally applicable truth, and the face of China began to change."<sup>7</sup> In this belief, accordingly, the Chinese today have not hesitated to give first priority to national socialist construction along with the struggles against imperialism. Thus, as observed by Philippe Devillers, Chinese foreign policy under current circumstances is governed by two factors: Chinese nationalism and Chinese socialism.

Chinese nationalism means to restore China's lawful and historic rights over all that foreign imperialism wrested from her throughout a century, and also to restore China's power so that she cannot again be humiliated.

Chinese socialism means definitely breaking the power of the "reactionary" propertied classes (landlords, big bourgeoisie, militarists, etc.)<sup>8</sup>

#### B) Struggle for National Power: Socialist Nation-Building and Modernization

The road of Chinese socialist nation-building since 1949 has not been easy and straight but fluctuating in general. As an overall effort for modernization, the economic development was launched along with the political and social reforms and campaigns which were devoted for eliminating the



out-of-date traditional feudalist and bureaucratic evils. During the first period of national rehabilitation (1949-1952) the Chinese began their basic economic development and agrarian reforms for land redistribution in rural areas along with two campaigns in urban areas: the "Three-anti movement (san-fan)" and the "Five-anti movement (wu-fan)" against bureaucratic and business "evils". These were accompanied by appeals to nationalism in order to resist U.S. imperialism in the Korean War (the "Resist America, Aid Korea Campaign"). The political system was organized on the principle of democratic centralism; education and political socialization were directed toward socialist construction.

The second stage of national development, the "Period of Transition to Socialism", involved the collectivization of agriculture, the introduction of the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57), and the policy of socialized industrialization. In industry, it was characterized by introducing a new heavy industrial system with the aid of Soviet advice, capital equipment, and credits under the Russian model and influence. This plan was generally regarded as basically successful in the industrial sector even with the Soviet vacillation and internal disagreement within the Chinese leadership. This stage of national construction was featured by economic steady growth internally, along with the soft line of the "Bandung Spirit" in foreign policy. Domestic social reforms continued in the democratic atmosphere of "Let one hundred flowers bloom; let one hundred schools of thought contend" as proclaimed by Chairman Mao.

The third stage of national construction was marked by the drastic campaign of the "Great Leap Forward" and the "Three Flags" slogan. Together with the economic policy of the "Great Leap Forward" in agriculture and industry, the people's commune system was introduced and the spirit of

willpower was emphasized under the slogan of "aiming high and achieving greater, quicker, better and more economical results in building socialism" (duo-kuai-hao-shen-ti-chien-she-she-hui-chu-i-tsu-kuo) in an effort to "catch up with Great Britain". Due to certain mismanagement and three years of natural disasters (1959-1961) economic growth became economic ungrowth. At this critical moment of Chinese socialist construction, the Russians betrayed Sino-Soviet socialist friendship by withdrawing all their economic aid and technical assistance from China. This caused further setbacks in the Chinese economy. By this episode the Chinese were taught the lesson of "self-reliance" again. The following stage was the "Period of Readjustment", a time of striving for economic development without foreign assistance. A social movement of "socialist education" was also launched in preparation for the next stage of the "Renewed Class Struggle and Socialist Education Campaigns", which began in 1962 and lasted throughout the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution was the most massive movement ever since 1949, involving a nation-wide effort to correct the overall policy of socialist revisionism and to purify the ideology of Marxism-Leninism under the principle of the class struggle, while continuing with socialist construction.<sup>9</sup>

In general, the dialectical process of Chinese economic development and nation-building centered on the principle of self-reliance and on psychological-social efforts to strive for Chinese nationalism under the doctrines of the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung". Regarding the function and effectiveness of willpower, Chairman Mao teaches the spirit of "building our country through diligence and frugality" and "self-reliance and arduous struggle". This is necessary, he points out, because: "We must recognize difficulties, analyse them and combat them. There are no straight roads in the world; we must be prepared to follow a road which twists and turns

and not try to get things on the cheap". However, "By uniting with the entire people in a common effort, we can certainly overcome all difficulties and win victory".<sup>10</sup>

This key role of human willpower has been traditionally emphasized in China. Confucius once said: "A man can enlarge the principles which he follows; those principles do not enlarge the man".<sup>11</sup> Again, "The commander of the forces of a large state may be carried off, but the will of even a common man cannot be taken from him".<sup>12</sup> Mencius also taught the importance of man's will in the struggle for prosperity and survival. He pointed out that when a mission is about to confer on a great man, his mind will be suffered and his sinews and bones exercise with toil in order to stimulate his mind, hardens his nature, and supplies his incompetencies. Similarly, if a state is not internally equipped with good laws and intelligent advisors and is then externally threatened with hostile states and other calamities, it will generally come to ruin. Therefore, "From these things we see how life springs from sorrow and calamity, and death from ease and pleasure".<sup>13</sup> Mencius further taught that the principle of self-reliance will be the most stable way for a nation's development. This view has been also supported by other thinkers such as Hsun Tzu, Mo Tzu, Han Fei Tzu and a number of Legalist followers. In fact, China had been self-reliant and self-sufficient for two thousand years when internal order broke down under the Western challenges of the past century. With the imperialist nature of Western capitalist powers and revisionist social-imperialism of Russia, the Chinese learned once more the value of self-reliance. Thus, Mao Tse-tung pointed out:

On what basis should our policy rest? It should rest on our own strength, and that means regeneration through one's own efforts. We are not alone; all the countries and people in the world opposed to imperialism are our friends.<sup>14</sup>

We stand for self-reliance. We hope for foreign aid but cannot be

dependent on it; we depend on our own efforts, on the creative power of the whole army and the entire people.<sup>15</sup>

For the past two decades of efforts in nation-building and socialist construction, the main theme of the Chinese developmental process has been self-reliance and arduous struggle with willpower armed with Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Tse-tung. As observed by Tseng Yun, one of the leading officials in charge of economic policy, the policy of self-reliance is of key importance not only nationally but internationally in the process of building socialism.

As a result of our implementation of the policy of self-reliance and the smooth development of our national economy, we are now in a better position to fulfil our international duty. Our increased capacity for building socialism self-reliantly has directly strengthened the might of the whole socialist camp. Through the successful advance of our national construction, we have not only lightened the burden on the fraternal socialist countries but gained greater strength to assist them.<sup>16</sup>

In general, the Chinese believe that, although China is still a developing nation and economically less advanced in comparison with the Western advanced countries, they are on the correct way and moving in the right direction for nation-building and socialist construction to fulfil their goals of nationalism and internationalism.

C) Struggle for National Power: National Defense System and General Military Strategy

(1) The Nature of Military Preparedness and the Role of the Chinese Army

Traditionally, the Chinese concept of the military role is that should be under political and civil control. Throughout Chinese history, not only the realist thinkers such as Hsun Tzu, Mo Ti, Shang Yang, Han Fei Tzu, and Sun Tzu but also the idealist philosophers such as Lao Tzu, Mencius, and Chuang Tzu, all upheld this position. Without exception, the modern

Chinese Communists are also following this view. In addition, it appears that efforts were often devoted throughout the dynasties to balance authority between civilians and soldiers. This historical cycle was particularly exemplified by military weakness and political collapse in the latter part of the Ch'ing Dynasty when China was challenged by the Western powers. Accordingly, the Chinese Communists today are very serious about their national defense. The military establishment is to serve the domestic political goals and the implementation of foreign policy. Mao Tse-tung pointed out: "Without a people's army the people have nothing".<sup>17</sup> Therefore, "Our national defense will be consolidated and no imperialist will be allowed to invade our territory again. Our people's armed forces must be maintained and developed with the brave and steeled People's Liberation Army as their foundation. We will have not only a powerful army but also a powerful air force and a powerful navy".<sup>18</sup> As to the civil-military relationship, he said: "Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party".<sup>19</sup>

Moreover, as to the role of the armed forces, Mao Tse-tung outlined the multi-purpose tasks of the Chinese army, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as follows:

The Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution. ... The Red Army fights not merely for the sake of fighting but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses, organize them, arm them, and help them to establish revolutionary political power.<sup>20</sup>

Beside the major task of national defense, the PLA is expected to perform its international role for political purpose.

The People's Liberation Army is always a fighting force. Even after country-wide victory, our army will remain a fighting force during the historical period in which classes have not been abolished in our country and the imperialist system still exists in the world.<sup>21</sup>

However, the general pattern of the PLA's role has been defensive as China's military deterrent against a possible attack by foreign nations, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union. The performance of its international role has been very limited in providing military aid, direct or indirect, to carefully selected friendly foreign governments, such as North Korea, North Vietnam, Pakistan, Tanzania, Albania, and others. The PLA also gives certain concrete support to some national liberation movements of the Third World nations following the concept of people's war. But it has not engaged in any overt military mission to invade foreign states or to promote revolutionary activities. Under the general policy of defense, the PLA has conducted certain strategic or tactical offensives, as in the Korean War and the Sino-Indian War. The tentative offensives in the case of Taiwan and the invasion of Tibet were basically for the purpose of national unification. On this defensive nature of the Chinese armed forces, Professor Harold C. Hinton observed:

To date, the PLA has not engaged in overt military action on or against foreign territory primarily for aggressive purposes or for the promotion of revolution. Any such action has been taken for reasons of national security and has been, at least in Peking's eyes, essentially defensive in nature. On the basis of this record, it is certainly fair to conclude that the CPC leadership does not regard overt military action across frontiers for either aggressive or revolutionary purposes as one of the PLA's missions.<sup>22</sup>

In addition, the PLA has also participated in various civilian works for socialist construction during the past two decades. They have been involved in agricultural productions, industrial construction, the extraction of strategic minerals, socialist civil education, science and technical research, etc. During the period of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960's, the PLA served as a neutral force to keep social order and also participated in administrative work in provincial and local organi-

zations. This multi-functional role of the Chinese army is based on the principle of a "people's army", in which the peasants constitute the major part of the army and thus the army is motivated to serve the common people. Because of its homogeneity, the people's army is powerful enough to conduct the people's war for national defense. Mao Tse-tung pointed out the general characteristics of the people's army:

This army is powerful because all its members have a conscious discipline; they have come together and they fight not for the private interests of a few individuals or a narrow clique, but for the interests of the broad masses and of the whole nation. The sole purpose of this army is to stand firmly with the Chinese people and to serve them whole-heartedly.<sup>23</sup>

In the Chinese strategic concept of national defense, the PLA is the major force for conduct of military activities, but is associated closely with the Production and Construction Corps in the inner border areas, and with the people's militia. In fighting a people's war, these two latter groups would be led by the PLA.

## (2) The Modernization of the National Defense System

Due to their disastrous experiences with a weak national defense, involving a series of foreign invasions during the past century, the Chinese have devoted a great deal of effort to modernizing China's military capability in order to keep up with the major world powers. These efforts were not entirely successful until China exploded her first nuclear device in 1964, more than a decade after the establishment of the People's Republic, and so became one of the leading nuclear powers in the world. Since the first Chinese hydrogen bomb was successfully exploded in June 1967, China has been ranked as the third among the nations as a nuclear power. As of July 1973, China has conducted fifteen nuclear tests in order to improve her nuclear capability. The substantial improvement of Chinese nuclear

weapons was accompanied by China's effort in building a missile system. The impressive development of her nuclear delivery system resulted by October 1966 in a test of a guided missile with a range about 500 miles and in the two recent satellite launchings in April 1970 and March 1971. Thus, most China observers anticipate a Chinese ICBM (inter-continental ballistic missile) in the near future. It was remarked by some China observers, as Charles Horner wrote:

Greater insight into the Chinese rocket program is provided by the two satellite launchings. The first, in April, 1970, is presumed to have used a rocket analogous to an IRBM, though it may have been the test of an ICBM prototype. A second satellite launching in March, 1971, revived speculation that the testing of an ICBM was imminent.<sup>24</sup>

Furthermore, a current speculation, reported in March, 1973, is that China was planning to conduct a test of huge ICBM thought to be "20 per cent larger in volume than the Soviet SS-9".<sup>25</sup> In order to improve the efficiency of the nuclear delivery system, China was also reported to be constructing a nuclear submarine with a Polaris-type missile system.<sup>26</sup> In general, China is attempting to keep up with the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, in modern nuclear military science and technology so as to serve her political goals of national defense and international leadership.

In addition, without neglecting the function and capability of the conventional forces, China maintains relatively strong regular armed forces for possible conventional warfare. The PLA maintains about 2.5 million men in ground forces, consisting of 140 divisions, including two airborne and five armored. These units are well equipped with appropriate weapons, all produced in China.<sup>27</sup> China has been traditionally a continental rather than a maritime country. The major task of the Chinese navy is to defend the Chinese coast against foreign invasion and thus the naval forces consist of light and defensive vessels, such as submarines, destroyers, light



cruisers, high-speed torpedo boats, and high-speed missile boats. The total number of combat vessels is about 1,530. The nuclear submarine armed with a Polaris-type missile system is under development and designed for possible defensive second-strike retaliation. With other associated naval units, including a marine corps, the Chinese naval force amounts to 240,000 men.<sup>28</sup> Because of the great cost of a modern navy, and because of her traditional and geographic background, China has developed her navy in the direction of a defensive strategy, emphasizing high-efficiency light vessels in accordance with the principle of "aiming high and achieving greater, quicker, better and more economical results in building socialism". The Chinese air force has about 3,500 combat aircrafts including sophisticated jet-fighters of the Soviet types MIG-21 and MIG-23, and strategic nuclear bombers produced in China. The manpower of the Chinese air force is about 600,000 including the airborne and anti-aircraft combat units.<sup>29</sup>

In general, the Chinese strategy of building a strong military force is aimed at developing China's military capability to a maximum level of efficiency within a minimum time, in order to reach the point of marginal physical deterrance against the possible military challenges of the two superpowers. The Chinese have developed their conventional forces to a degree of minimum national defense, supplemented by the people's militia and the Production and Construction Corps within the system of "people's war". They plan to by-pass and avoid the conventional costly heavy weapons such as the heavy tank, long-range heavy artillery, heavy bombers, and especially heavy-duty naval vessels like the heavy cruiser, the aircraft carrier and the battleship. Instead, the nuclear weapons system and modern sophisticated military weapons, ships and aircraft are particularly emphasized in order to keep up with the modernity of the two superpowers in military capability.

The struggle for a "great leap forward" in building the Chinese military seems to reflect an old Chinese saying: "In order to advance ahead of others it is first necessary to hold a position where one cannot be defeated". Or, in Sun Tzu's words on military strategy: "Therefore the skillful commander takes up a position in which he cannot be defeated and misses no opportunity to master his enemy".<sup>30</sup>

### III. THE CONCEPT OF PEOPLE'S WAR AS AN APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY

Early rays of sun illumine the parade grounds  
and these handsome girls heroic in the wind,  
with rifles five feet long.  
Daughters of China with a marvelous will,  
you prefer hardy uniforms to colorful silk.<sup>31</sup>

Mao Tse-tung, "Militia Women"  
(February, 1961)

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The term "people's war" has been popular in modern times, particularly in China and other developing Third World nations since World War II. The term has become familiar to Westerners during the past decades because of the East-West confrontation. Westerners have had substantial opportunities to observe the role and significance of the people's war concept as put into practice in recent world politics, and have been able to observe its merits in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the revolutionary national liberation movements of the Third World nations and peoples since the 1950's.

The Chinese claim that people's war is the key strategy for revolutionary movements directed against imperialism and colonialism. However, what are the essentials of the people's war concept and its real meaning? What are the substantive roots and peculiarities of the Chinese concept of people's war in terms of "Chineseness" and in light of China's conceptual

traditions and modern background? Particularly, what are the contributions and influences of the traditional Chinese concept of people's war on the current practice in light of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's important instruction: "The ancient wisdom is for current use and the Western knowledge is for Chinese use, (ku-wei-chin-yung, yang-wei-chung-yung)?" Moreover, what are the basic characteristics of the Chinese concept of people's war and its applications in China's military strategy, and foreign policy? We attempt now to answer these questions.

#### A) Conceptual Heritage and Current Background

Since the 1920's the concept of people's war has been the central factor in the general strategy of the Chinese Communists' revolutionary movement. A "people's" war would involve the masses as the major force. Mao Tse-tung pointed out: "The people, and the people alone, are the motive force in the making of world history."<sup>32</sup> He continued: "The revolutionary war is a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses and relying on them."<sup>33</sup> Thus, in conclusion, he said: "Our strategy and tactics are based on a people's war; no army opposed to the people can use our strategy and tactics."<sup>34</sup> Because, "The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people."<sup>35</sup>

This notion of the people's role in waging a war or revolutionary movement derives from traditional classic teachings. The Chinese Confucian School regarded people as the core of the society and suggested the principle of "rule of man or sage". Mencius pointed out that the way to victory in war rested upon the people and their relationship with the ruler. He said:

Opportunities of time vouchsafed by Heaven are not equal to advantages

of situation afforded by the Earth, and advantages of situation afforded by the Earth are not equal to the union arising from the accord of Men. ... He who finds the proper course has many to assist him. He who loses the proper course has few to assist him.<sup>36</sup>

Regarding war, he preferred defensive strategy, and argued that proper military preparations and material resources and facilities might be necessary but were no guarantee of winning. However, Mencius concluded that "the most important of all is a happy, contented, loyal, united, benevolently governed people."<sup>37</sup> Similarly, the great realist thinker, Hsun Tzu, also advised that the people were the key factor in a nation's survival. The people have the characteristics of the water, he commented, "The ruler is the boat and the common people are the water. It is the water bears the boat up, and the water that capsizes it."<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, to win the general support of the people it is necessary to practice the politics of Wang Tao, the way of virtue, so that a people's war could be conducted with a united and harmonious will against foreign invasion.<sup>39</sup>

An eminent military scientist in ancient China, Sun Tzu, recognized the importance of people in waging a war. Among the five fundamental factors that decide a war's outcome, he regarded the Tao, or the Right Way (moral influence), as uppermost. In explaining the Right Way, he said:

By the Tao I mean that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril.<sup>40</sup>

This is to say that if the leaders deal with the people according to principles of virtue, that is, with benevolence, justice, and righteousness, a people's army would be united in mind and willing to fight a war for the state. Thus, the Book of Changes says: "In happiness at overcoming difficulties, people forget the danger of death."<sup>41</sup>

The classical Chinese Taoists such as Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu also

suggested that to comply with what the people like will produce order, otherwise there will be disorder; this is a law of nature, and whatever leader opposes this will be doomed to perish. To this natural law, Confucianism added the idea of the "Mandate of Heaven", an immortal humanitarian doctrine. For the past two thousand years, the fall of each ruler and the collapse of each dynasty, including the fall of Chiang Kai-shek's government on the Chinese Mainland in 1949, has been regarded as resulting from a loss of the Mandate of Heaven because of the improper conduct of rulers against the people. During modern times, the leaders of the Taiping Revolution of 1840-54 and of the Revolution of 1911 attempted to capture for themselves the Mandate of Heaven, but such efforts were unsuccessful until the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949. The genius of the Chinese communist movement and its success rested upon the key role of the peasants in the revolution. The Chinese Communists recognized that it was the people, the mass of the Chinese peasants, who would generate the power to complete the revolution as taught by the classical thinkers. Furthermore, according to their past revolutionary experiences, they were convinced that only the people could defend the socialist system and complete the construction of Chinese socialism in the future by waging a people's war.

## B) General Features of the People's War Concept

### (1) Dialectical Materialism

Dialectical materialism, the philosophical guideline of the modern people's war, is consistent with classical tradition. The Chinese Taoist philosophers pointed out the dialectical concept of Tao and Yin-Yang which is the law of unity of opposites. All things are constantly changing, revolving and transcending. This self-movement of Tao is the spirit of nature. To

illustrate the concept of the dialectic, for instance, Lao Tzu said: "All things under heaven are born of existence; existence is born of non-existence."<sup>42</sup> ... "For is and is-not come together; hard and easy are complementary; long and short are relative; high and low are comparative; pitch and sound make harmony; before and after are a sequence."<sup>43</sup> Similarly, "Good fortune lieth within bad, bad fortune lurketh within good."<sup>44</sup> This dialectical concept of Tao and Yin-Yang was adopted by Sun Tzu in his principles of military strategy. He carefully analyzed the contradictory relationship between the ideas of advantage and disadvantage, direct and indirect, siege and release, weak and strong, offense and defense, action and inaction, norman and extraordinary, etc. According to the dialectic, all these are mutually reproductive and interlocked. The direct can be turned into the indirect and offense can be turned into defense under certain circumstances. Skill in military strategy depends upon an appropriate handling of the transformation of dialectical relationships. For instance, Sun Tzu taught:

...march by an indirect route and divert the enemy by enticing him with a bait. So doing, you may set out after he does and arrive before him.<sup>45</sup>

Ground in which the army survives only if it fights with the courage of desperation is called "death".<sup>46</sup>

To a surrounded enemy you must leave a way of escape. Do not press an enemy at bay.<sup>47</sup>

All these strategic and tactical principles have expressed the dialectical principle in a way that, "Apparent confusion is a product of good order; apparent cowardice, of courage; apparent weakness, of strength."<sup>48</sup>

Throughout the past two thousand years, all the eminent statesmen, military strategists, and generals of China have dedicated themselves to Sun Tzu's principles of military strategy. Mao Tse-tung and his associates are not exceptions.

1) Unite the Many, Defeat the Few

In his works of military strategy, Mao Tse-tung adopted greatly from the classic teachings of dialectics and strategic principles. Following the dialectical concept, he pointed out that weakness under certain circumstances can be turned into strength; defense rests upon offense, and offense upon defense. For instance, Mao discusses the relationship between general military strategy and individual military tactics as follows:

We use the few to defeat the many--this we say to the rulers of China as a whole. We use the many to defeat the few--this we say to each separate enemy force on the battle-field.<sup>49</sup>

Our strategy is "pit one against ten" and our tactics are "pit ten against one"--this is one of our fundamental principles for gaining mastery over the enemy.<sup>50</sup>

The key principle rests upon "concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by one."<sup>51</sup> Accordingly, retreat and attack are dynamic, dialectical, and flexible according to the general strategy or individual tactical operation. They are transformable and interreinforced. Mao continues:

We can change the converging attack directed by the enemy against us on the plane of strategy into converging attacks directed by us against the enemy on the plane of campaigns and battles. We can change the enemy's strategic superiority over us into our superiority over him in campaigns and battles. ... This is what we call exterior-line operations within interior-line operations, encirclement and suppression within "encirclement and suppression", blockade within blockade, the offensive within the defensive, superiority within inferiority, strength within weakness, advantage within disadvantage, and initiative within passivity.<sup>52</sup>

2) Paper Tiger Thesis

Mao Tse-tung further elaborated the dialectical concept of military strategy into his "paper tiger" thesis. Its general principle is that, "strategically we should despise all our enemies, but tactically we should take them all seriously."<sup>53</sup> This thesis is important philosophically and psychologically and it was generated in Mao's mind by his experience with

the Chinese Communist revolutionary struggle. In his words:

Just as there is not a single thing in the world without a dual nature (this the law of the unity of opposites), so imperialism and all reactionaries have a dual nature--they are real tigers and paper tigers at the same time... On the one hand, they were real tigers; they devoured people, devoured people by the millions and tens of millions... But in the end they changed into paper tigers, dead tigers, bean-curd tigers. These are historical facts... Hence, imperialism and all reactionaries, looked at in essence, from a long term point of view, from a strategic point of view, must be seen for what they are: paper tigers. On this we should build our strategic thinking. On the other hand, they are also living tigers, iron tigers, real tigers which can devour people. On this we should build our tactical thinking.<sup>54</sup>

Mao explained that if the people's army were not to despise the enemy strategically, revolutionary confidence would be lost and the error of opportunism would result in surrender to the enemy. If, on the other hand, the army fails to deal with concrete problems and with particular enemies seriously, it will commit the error of adventurism and the revolution will be defeated.<sup>55</sup> Lao Tzu taught:

To underestimate the enemy's strength may cost a nation its survival. In the event of war, those who regard it as a lamentable necessity will win.<sup>56</sup>

The influence of Sun Tzu's strategic teachings are evident in Mao's thought. He once quoted Sun's words to illustrate the character of dialectical materialism and its effect upon military estimation and preparedness and strategy:

There is a saying in the book of Sun Wu Tzu, the great military scientist of ancient China, "Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat", which refers both to the stage of learning and to the stage of application, both to knowing the laws of the development of objective reality and to deciding on our own action in accordance with these laws in order to overcome the enemy facing us. We should not take this saying lightly.<sup>57</sup>

### 3) Man Versus Weapon

The "paper tiger" thesis shaped the ideas of the Chinese Communists regarding nuclear war which has apparently been central to China's foreign



policy strategy. In his talk with the American correspondent Anna Louise Strong in 1946, Mao Tse-tung pointed out that although the nuclear weapon was a horrible device it was still a paper tiger in the strategic and philosophical view, because the decisive factor determining the outcome of a war is not one or two new weapons or kinds of technology but the people themselves. He said:

The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the U.S. reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapon.<sup>58</sup>

Obviously, the Chinese have not ignored the importance of nuclear weapons to national defense. But they argue that the decisive factor in waging a war is the one that controls the weapon, not the weapon itself. In their eyes, the so-called theory of "weapons decide everything" is obsolete, and deviates from the general principle of dialectical materialism. In his work "On the Protracted War" written in May 1938, Mao elaborated this point in his view of the people's war. He said:

The so-called theory of "weapons decide everything" ... is a mechanistic theory of war, a subjectivist and one-sided view. Our view is contrary to this; we see not only weapons but also the power of man. Weapons are an important factor in war but not the decisive one; it is man and not materials that is decisive. The contest of forces is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also one of the power and morale of man. Military and economic power must be controlled by man.<sup>59</sup>

Some would challenge this view and argue that the Chinese emphasis on the man is attributable to their inferior nuclear weapons and their relatively low-power armed forces, concluding, therefore, that the Chinese man-power theory is only a psychological rationalization to build up revolutionary and national confidence. There is some truth to this position, but it is necessary to study Chinese conceptual perceptions and the cultural background influencing Chinese views and policies in order to comprehend the real

meaning of their concept of people's war.

Many classical thinkers such as Mencius, Hsun Tzu, Confucius, Mo Tzu, and Kuei Ku Tzu emphasized the role of the people in waging war. Sun Tzu particularly regarded the man as the decisive element. Adopting teachings from his precedent thinkers and contemporaries, he believed that the moral strength and intellectual faculty of man would essentially decide the outcome of a war. Therefore, Sun Tzu's general political-military strategic concept was aimed at defeating enemy's manpower and morale, and thus conquering his army without battle, and taking his cities and his state. Sun Tzu's concept of national morale and unity in a people's war was generally based on the Confucian teachings of "benevolence and righteousness", the concept of Wang Tao, which he particularly stressed in his notion of people's war.<sup>60</sup> Recognizing the importance of man's willpower, Mao Tse-tung has cited an ancient Chinese fable called "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains" to encourage the people to face the hardness and fight against imperialism and feudalism for socialist construction and world revolution.<sup>61</sup>

#### 4) The Art of Deception and Guerrilla Warfare

According to the concept of dialectical materialism, all matters in the universe are dynamic, self-moving and changing in accordance with objective conditions and circumstances, that is, with the principle of the unity of subjective motivation and objective regularity. Warfare is no exception. The conduct of war is physically limited by objective conditions and elements, but dialectically, these objective conditions and factors can be altered appropriately by human subjective motivation, for they are inter-related and mutually influenced.<sup>62</sup> According to the idea of subjective motivation, it is the man who can set the goal and wage the war. In realizing this principle, Kuei Ku Tzu teaches that in the process of unity and dis-

sociation of all matters there exists a conversional gap or stage which may be manipulated. He who can understand it and direct it will be truly the man of great wisdom, holding the Mandate of Heaven.<sup>63</sup> Thus, man is the essential key to the manipulation of the conversional stage according to his direction and purpose. Kuei Ku Tzu further pointed out:

In the universe all phenomena are complicated with infinite change according to its own rule. ... Therefore, the exchange use of negative and positive ways and the dialectical interactions of Yin and Yang may provide advantages for us.<sup>64</sup>

An appropriate manipulation of this conversional stage will alter the objective conditions and circumstances in a war, for instance, from a weak position to a strong one, or to manage the few to defeat the many. This dialectical process of alteration becomes the concept of deception and the basic strategy of guerrilla warfare. Kuei Ku Tzu particularly emphasized the use of cheng-ch'i (direct-indirect) principle. He reminded us that the use of extraordinary or indirect force would be superior to that of normal or direct force (cheng-bu-ju-ch'i), a principle that is always correct. However, the dialectical concept of cheng and ch'i, the direct and indirect, is revolving and reproductive according to conditions and human perceptions. From this comes the art of deception based on human intelligence. As a student of Kuei Ku Tzu, Sun Tzu was skilled in teaching the art of deception in his military stratagem. He claimed:

All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. ...<sup>65</sup>

Thus, the competent generals and political-military strategists must be skilled in this art of deception and must manipulate the situation to seize advantages in waging a war. As a matter of fact, this philosophical principle of deception originated in Lao Tzu's philosophy of Tao. He said:

What is to be shrunken is first stretched out; what is to be weakened is first made strong; what will be thrown over is first raised up; what will be withdrawn is first bestowed.<sup>66</sup>

The best warriors are not warlike. The best strategists are not impulsive. The best winners are not quarrelsome. The best leaders are not arrogant.<sup>67</sup>

Taught the classical thoughts of military strategic principles and recognizing their importance in the revolutionary war, Mao Tse-tung and his associates did not hesitate to adopt them. The Chinese Communists have employed the principle of deception in particular in order to balance their inferior physical forces and equipment in their struggles against Chiang Kai-shek's superior troops and the Japanese aggression before 1949. In a tone similar to that of Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung pointed out that war demands deception. He said:

It is often possible by adopting all kinds of measures of deception to drive the enemy into the plight of making erroneous judgements and taking erroneous actions, thus depriving him of his superiority and initiative.<sup>68</sup>

Furthermore, the general principle of guerrilla warfare depends upon deception and mobilization. For instance, Mao Tse-tung quoted Sun Tzu's teachings on deception in formulating his Chinese revolutionary war:

When Sun Wu Tzu said, "Avoid the enemy when he is full of vigour, strike when he is fatigued and withdraws", he was referring to tiring and demoralizing the enemy so as to reduce his superiority. ...

In addition, we can induce the enemy to make mistakes by our own actions, for instance, by "counterfeiting an appearance", as Sun Wu Tzu called it, that is, by making a feint to the east but attacking to the west (shen-tung-chi-hsi).<sup>69</sup>

In discussing the strategy of guerrilla warfare, Mao pointed out that its importance is second only to mobile warfare in the conditions that existed in China during the revolution and the defense against foreign invasion. Mobile warfare was important because it was a step to a higher level. Of course, guerrilla warfare must closely coordinate with the masses.<sup>70</sup> On the basis of the concept of deception supplemented by their practical

revolutionary experiences, the Chinese Red Army developed their general tactics of guerrilla warfare according to Mao Tse-tung's sixteen-character jingle which is similar to several of Sun Tzu's verses. These sixteen Chinese characters constitute four slogans:

When the enemy advances, we retreat!  
When the enemy halts, we harass!  
When the enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack!  
When the enemy retreats, we pursue!<sup>71</sup>

The basic characteristics of guerrilla warfare, too, are dialectical, both because of its deception, and because of its battlefield. As General Vo Nguyen Giap pointed out, "There was no clearly defined front in this war. It was there where the enemy was. The front was nowhere, it was everywhere."<sup>72</sup>

These concepts indicate the close connection between the classical theory of a military strategy based on deception and the current Chinese strategic application in their revolutionary wars. Professor Samuel B. Griffith has commented:

Mao Tse-tung has been strongly influenced by Sun Tzu's thought. This is apparent in his works which deal with military strategy and tactics and is particularly evident in "On Guerrilla Warfare", "On the Protracted War", and "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War", it may also be traced in other essays less familiar to Western readers.<sup>73</sup>

In addition, Edgar Snow has pointed out in his Red Star Over China that the Chinese classical stories and historical novels such as Shui Hu Chuan (水滸傳 All Men are Brothers) and San Kuo Yen Yi (三國演義 Romance of the Three Kingdoms) have greatly influenced Mao Tse-tung's thought on military strategy.<sup>74</sup>

## (2) Protracted War and Encirclement from the Countryside to the City

The people's war is a total war of the masses, and also is a protracted war. It requires a total national mobilization politically, economically, socially and militarily. The Chinese concept of people's war is de-

fensive in nature. Because of its peculiar conditions and background such as the population, geography, social and economic characters, national morale, etc., China can fight a protracted war against a foreign invasion. Although her national power was relatively weak in resisting Japanese aggression in World War II, China could dialectically have converted her weak position into a strong one by appropriate strategic manipulation. Mao Tse-tung analyzed this situation and outlined concrete steps. "One of the special features of this war is the interlocking 'jig-saw' pattern which arises from such contradictory factors as the barbarity of Japan and her shortages of troops on the one hand, and the progressiveness of China and the extensiveness of her territory on the other". he said.<sup>75</sup> The concept of protracted war did demonstrate merit in Chinese resistance against the Japanese invasion during World War II.

According to their theoretical analysis of defensive strategy and their past practical experiences, Mao Tse-tung and his associates have developed a system of strategy for people's war. It can be generally summed up as follows.

1) A Sound Mass Base and the Encirclement from the Countryside to the City

This requires a combination of political strategy and military strategy in order to gain mass support in the rural areas which contain the peasants who are the majority in China. Thus it can unite the many, the rural majority, to encircle the city and defeat the isolated few. In the "Ten Commandments" of the Red Army, Mao Tse-tung taught: "Take small and medium cities and extensive rural areas first, take big cities later."<sup>76</sup> This strategy of encirclement, some China observers suggest, is similar to the general strategy of the traditional popular Chinese chess game theory

of wei-ch'i. Furthermore, the strategy of wei-ch'i game theory has been considered to apply extensively to the global scene as China's foreign policy which includes a dialectical process for protracted struggle.<sup>77</sup>

Today, in order to defend the broad Chinese territory and to consolidate the rural areas, especially the border areas, China is conducting a system of "Everybody is a Soldier" by civil organization and training the people's militia. The civil organization developed in the local and rural areas has been the establishment of the people's commune system, which combines the political, economic, social and military functions into an independent cell in the general framework of people's war.

The practice of making everybody a soldier is a major measure of consolidating our national defense and safeguarding our socialist construction...

For this reason Chairman Mao Tse-tung said: "The militia is a good organization and should be promoted. It is a military organization, an educational organization, and also an athletic organization. As imperialism oppresses us so much, we should consider it a serious challenge. We need not only a mighty regular army, but a large number of militiamen. By so doing the imperialists when invading us will find it difficult to step forward even an inch."

To make everybody a soldier is an important content of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's strategical thinking on the people's war and also a component part of his thinking on the people's communes.<sup>78</sup>

Since the escalation of the Vietnam War and the Sino-Soviet border conflicts in 1960's, China has greatly improved her civil defense and people's militia systems. In the border areas such as Sinkiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, China has established the PLA Production and Construction Corps along with the regular army. This production-defense system, in retrospect, is similar to that of the farmer-soldier policy initiated by the ancient Chinese Legalist thinkers such as Juan Chung, Shang Yang and Han Fei Tzu in their programs of reforms. The people's militia system does play an important role in the Chinese strategic concept of national defense.

## 2) The Multiple-Strategy Concept of Strategic Warfare

In order to promote favorable conditions and to "preserve oneself and destroy the enemy," a variety of military strategies need to be combined for the appropriate operations. Thus, Mao Tse-tung suggested a series of strategies in his military teachings on fighting a protracted war, including the combination of conventional warfare and guerrilla warfare; mobile warfare and positional warfare; war of attrition and war of annihilation and finally, offense within defense, quick decisions within a protracted war, and exterior lines within interior lines--a jig-saw pattern of warfare.<sup>79</sup> The dialectic is the basis of these combinations.

### 3) The Unity of National Defense and Economic Development

Since 1954 the three "five-year plan" economic programs have been closely associated with the development of the national defense system in order to enhance national power sufficiently to deter a possible foreign invasion. The great efforts for socialist construction have always contained two-fold functions both for economic and defensive development under the principle of "civil use in peacetime, military use in wartime."

Sun Tzu teaches that a protracted war should not be conducted in an active offensive attack because what is essential in war is victory, not prolonged operation. For a nation with superior power, a quick attack and completion is the key to victory. Dialectically, however, it will be favorable and advantageous for a nation with an inferior power to conduct a defensive operation. A protracted war could drain the enemy's superior strength and finally lead to victory. This theory has been proved in the Chinese Communist revolutionary wars against Chiang Kai-shek's troops and the Japanese invasion. It has also been proved correct in the two-decade revolutionary war of Vietnam against France and against the intervention of the United States.



C) The Application of the People's War Concept in the Strategy of Chinese Foreign Policy

(1) Dialectical Process of World Revolution

According to the concept of Tao and Yin-Yang, the world is always in a dialectical process of change. So is the stage of international relations and the world revolution. There exist contradictions among the socialist camp, the capitalist bloc, the non-alignment bloc, and also among the nations in each of these groups. An appropriate manipulation by subjective motivation may alter a currently inferior position into a superior one in the future. In applying the part of dialectics applicable to the idea of the people's war, the Chinese formulated their strategy of foreign policy. After a careful analysis of the world situation Mao Tse-tung claimed as early as 1946 that all imperialists and reactionaries were paper tigers. Strategically, he taught that China should despise all enemies to provide the psychological self-confidence necessary to dare to fight in the long run. This stems from the Chinese view that the real power rests with the people, the man, rather than physical or material force. Mao explained his paper tiger thesis as applied to imperialism in this fashion:

I have said that all the reputedly powerful reaction-aries are merely paper tigers. The reason is that they are divorced from the people...<sup>80</sup>

Imperialism will not last long because it always does evil things. It persists in grooming and supporting reactionaries in all countries who are against the people, it has forcibly seized many colonies and semi-colonies and many military bases, and it threatens the peace with atomic war.<sup>81</sup>

Thus he believed that the existing oppressive situation would eventually change because imperialism pushed the majority people of the world to the side of its enemies. The great world revolution would finally come as the condition became ripe.

Tactically, however, imperialism can only be torn down gradually

piece by piece. As Mao put it, "Strategically, we take the eating of a meal lightly--we know we can finish it. But actually we eat it mouthful by mouthful."<sup>82</sup> It is necessary to take account of the concrete problems seriously and solve them one by one. According to the strategic principle "unite the many, defeat the few" of the people's war, China has aimed the real mass power at the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America which contain the majority of the world's population.

(2) Protracted Struggle--Encirclement From the World Country-side to the World City

The Chinese believe that their current struggles will duplicate their past domestic revolutionary experiences, and that their conflict with other nations, especially the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, will be a protracted one in which their strategy must be similar to that of protracted war. They believe it is necessary to build a sound base for world struggle around the world's mass-populated rural areas in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Chinese interpret these vast areas to be the real storm-centers of world revolution where powerful forces will be generated to overthrow imperialism.

The various type of contradictions in the contemporary world are concentrated in the vast areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America; these are the most vulnerable areas under imperialist rule and the storm-centers of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism  
...<sup>83</sup>

In applying the concept of people's war to the global scene, the Chinese regard the Third World nations as the rural areas of the world which will accept the mission to encircle the advanced industrialized capitalist nations in North America and Western Europe--as in the Chinese revolutionary model of the past. In his famous article "Long Live the Victory of People's War", the former Chinese Defense Minister Lin Biao extended the general strategy of "encirclement from the countryside to the city" into a global-view strategy

for the protracted struggle against imperialism and for the world revolution.

He pointed out:

Taking the entire globe, if North American and Western Europe can be called "the cities of the world", then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute "the rural areas of the world"... In a sense, the contemporary world revolution (as compared with domestic revolutions in developing countries) also presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population.<sup>84</sup>

Following this global strategic guideline, therefore, the first priority of Chinese foreign policy has been aiming at building friendly relationships with the Third World nations, and further to form an international united front to struggle against imperialism and colonialism. China has expressed her intention to support the national liberation movements in the Third World nations with political, economic and military assistance. The Chinese are not hesitant to indicate that the decisive matter for the success or failure of the current stage of the world revolution depends on the outcome of the national liberation struggles of the peoples of the Third World. So far the achievement of friendly Chinese relationship with the Third World nations, along with the global strategy of people's war has been quite successful, as evidenced by the outcome of several world issues including the achievement of Chinese representation in the United Nations in 1971. Moreover, Chinese prestige and status in the international system have been increasing for the past two decades. It seems that they are convinced that the application of the people's war concept in their strategy of foreign policy is on the correct track of the Tao, the universal truth. It follows, they feel, that the future is progressive and optimistic and on their side.

IV. THE CONCEPT OF HO-TSUNG AND LIEN-HENG, THE  
BALANCE OF POWER, AS AN APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY

Kunlun,  
you don't need all that height or snow.  
If I could lean on heaven, grab my sword,  
and cut you in three parts,  
I would send one to Europe, one to America,  
and keep one part here  
in China  
that the world have peace  
and the globe share the same heat and ice. 85

Mao Tse-tung, "Kunlun Mountain"  
(October 1935)

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The basic themes and concepts of social science contain similarities between ancient and present times, in both the Western and Eastern worlds. Nevertheless, in addition to the modern Western concept of balance of power which mainly originated in European politics of the nineteenth century, there did exist a similar concept of "balance of power" during the ancient classical period of Warring States (403-221 B.C.) in China. This Chinese concept of "balance of power" has been traditionally referred to as Ho-Tsung (Vertical Alliance) and Lien-Heng (Horizontal Coalition) and thus was identified (combining the two final characters) as the philosophic School of Tsung-Heng.

Attempting to explain the original international situation and system of the Warring States period, Professor Burton Watson translated and explained the meaning of Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng as follows: "The Horizontal Alliance (Lien-Heng) was an east-west alignment of states under the leadership of the powerful state of Ch'in in the west. The Vertical Alliance (Ho-Tsung), a north-south alignment, was designed to preserve the independences of the weaker states and block Ch'in's expansion".<sup>86</sup> However, an ancient leading Chinese realist thinker, Han Fei Tzu, substantially defined the meaning of Tsung-Heng politics as "the Vertical Alliance (Tsung), in which one joins with a number of weak states in hopes of attacking a strong one",

and "the Horizontal Coalition (Heng), in which one serves a strong state for the purpose of attacking a number of weak ones".<sup>87</sup> As a matter of fact, if we translate the basic theme of Tsung-Heng theory into a modern idea, it is the concept of the balance of power in which the policy of Ho-Tsung could be regarded as "alliances for balance" or "collective defense system" and the Lien-Heng as "divide and rule" or the strategy of attacking opponents one by one.

Modern international politics, prior to the World War II, was characterized by the balance of power system. But the post-war bipolar international system between the Western bloc led by the United States and the Communist bloc led by the Soviet Union was not generally regarded as fitting the classical or typical concept of the balance of power until the development of a multi-polar international system with several existing power centers, namely, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China in the 1960's. Today, world politics tends to be reviving the classical concept of the balance of power.

Consequently, playing the role as a major power center, what is the Chinese perception of the balance of power concept and what are their responses? What is the classical Chinese concept of the balance of power and how much has it been applied to current world politics in light of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's general principle of synthesis: "The ancient wisdom is for current use and the Western knowledge is for Chinese use"? To answer these questions and to provide a theoretical and brief analysis is the task of this section.

#### A) Conceptual Heritage and Current Background

##### (1) The Concept of Power and the Balance of Power

The classical Chinese concept of power was emerging as international relations became anarchism during the Warring States period. The classical realist thinkers such as Kuan Chung, Shang Yang, Hsun Tzu, Shen Tao, Sheng Pu-hai, Li Ssu and Han Fei Tzu all contributed to the system of power concept. Han Fei Tzu, who has been regarded as a "Chinese Machiavelli" by modern scholars and who was a leading figure of classical Chinese Legalism, was the most eminent among them. In general, his view of history as a process of dialectical materialism based on economic factors is similar to the modern Marxist theory. Han Fei Tzu saw his age as one of struggle for power because of the chaotic international system and frequent wars. He criticized idealists and moralistic thinkers as daydreamers seeking for utopia without facing reality, and concluded that they were doomed to failure as the victims of history. He observed:

Thus he who has great power at his disposal may force others to pay him court, but he whose power is weak must pay court to others. For this reason the enlightened ruler works to build up power.<sup>88</sup>

King Yen practiced benevolence and righteousness and the state of Hsu was wiped out; Tzu-kung employed eloquence and wisdom and Lu lost territory. ...<sup>89</sup>

Therefore, Han Fei Tzu urged the ruler to concentrate upon nation building and overall reforms to develop a powerful nation before entering the international game of power politics.

Another prominent realist thinker was Kuei Ku Tzu, who synthesized the Taoist concept of dialectical materialism and the Legalist concept of power into a philosophical science of method. His doctrine of the science of method was applied by his student, Sun Tzu, in the principles of military strategy laid down in the immortal work "The Art of War", discussed above. Two of Kuei Ku Tzu's other students, Su Ch'in and Chang Yi, by applying his concept to international relations, contributed to the concept of the balance of power, an elaboration of the principles of Ho-Tsung

and Lien-Heng.

The concept of the balance of power is dialectical in nature, the unity of opposites as Tao and Yin-Yang. The defensive and responsive system of collective defense alliance, Ho-Tsung, represents the phase of Yin and the active and challenging system of "divide and rule", Lien-Heng, represents the phase of Yang. The dialectical process of revolving the Yin and the Yang, constitutes the balance of power, the Tao. The operations of the policies of "collective defense" and "divide and rule", if applied to diplomatic manipulation according to the principle of subjective motivation with objective regularity, would finally develop a power balance to one's advantage and would achieve one's goal as Kuei Ku Tzu taught in his science of method and dialectics.<sup>90</sup> That is, an appropriate diplomatic manipulation would tip the transforming stage of dialectical change to a favourable position, namely, from weakness to strength, a subordinate position to a leading status, etc., for one's benefits and goals. Kuei Ku Tzu concluded: "Therefore, the alternate use of negative and positive ways and the dialectical interactions of Yin and Yang may provide advantages for us".<sup>91</sup> Incidentally, it is interesting to note that one of the modern leading realist thinkers, Hans J. Morgenthau, also argues that diplomatic manipulation is the key to a maximum development of national power, although he does not present his concept as one based on dialectical materialism.<sup>92</sup>

(2) The Role of the Balance of Power Concept in International Politics:  
Past and Present

The importance of the role of the concept of Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng in international politics was evidenced by the Ch'in state's emerging status as a result of its having implemented these concepts dialectically in the international system during the ancient Chinese Warring States period. In

brief review, during the early part of the classical Spring and Autumn period (771-483 B.C.) in ancient China, the international system was an east-west bipolarity between the predominant Ch'i and Chin states surrounded by less powerful states. In the latter part of this period the bipolar system turned to a system of north-south bloc politics, with considerable antagonism between the Chin group and the Ch'u group accompanied by other minor powers, such as Ch'i, Ch'in, Sung, Wu, and Yueh; this was similar to the modern international system of the 1950's and 1960's. Bipolar bloc politics finally collapsed when the Chin state was dissolved and became three states, Han, Chao, and Wei, thus creating a multi-polar international system at the outset of the period of Warring States. Thereafter the struggle for power was characterized by wars among the power centers--wars which represented extreme political action but which nevertheless were tempered by Tsung-Heng diplomatic manipulation. All major powers at that time were actively devoting their efforts to the internal political, economic and social reforms and the external application of Tsung-Heng diplomacy. In the History of Warring States (Chan Kuo Shih), it was pointed out:

The alternation of the policies of Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng was the key to the transformation of feudal wars during the Warring States period. ... Under an antagonistic bipolar situation the two big powers, Ch'i and Ch'in, adopted both the policies of Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng according to the variable conditions and circumstances. If the policy of Ho-Tsung was successful then it consequently shifted to the policy of Lien-Heng. When the policy of Lien-Heng was impeded, the policy of Ho-Tsung was adopted again.<sup>93</sup>

At first, Ch'in was a less powerful major state. When Ch'in internally adopted Shang Yang's Legalist reforms and externally implemented the Tsung-Heng policies, her national power increased rapidly. Because of sound application of diplomatic manipulation and military attacks, Ch'in was finally able to annex its contemporary states into a unified Chinese empire.



In the middle age of the Warring States period, Ch'in constantly annexed territories along with the alternative policies of Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng. ... When Ch'in conducted the Ho-Tsung policy to defeat Ch'i, the Ch'in-Ch'i bipolar situation collapsed and Ch'in became a predominant power. ... At this time, Ch'in set up its foundation for the victorious "annexation of the world" in the future.<sup>94</sup>

Two eminent scholars, Liu Hsiang of the Han Dynasty and Su Hsun of the Sung Dynasty, both commented on this historic event and pointed out that the systems of Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng did play the vital role in Ch'in's unification of China.<sup>95</sup>

One group of Chinese scholars has regarded the ancient Chinese international system during the periods of Spring and Autumn and Warring States as a precedent for the modern international system, especially the post-World War II situation.<sup>96</sup> For instance, V.K. Wellington Koo, formerly a Judge of the International Court of Justice, once wrote: "Diplomacy is an ancient art, as it was much practised in China as early as the period of Warring Kingdoms about 2500 years ago. In the Occident it is of more recent origin. But the nature and method of old diplomacy were much the same in the East and West."<sup>97</sup> Professor Winberg Chai also presented a similar attitude on this point, saying: "From a Chinese point of view, so far as international politics is concerned, modern history seems to be repeating Chinese history of the Eastern Chou period (771-221 B.C.), a period of intensified warfare".<sup>98</sup>

Thus, when we take a close look at the post-World War II international situation, there appear certain parallels with ancient Chinese historical situations. During the immediate post-war period of the 1950's, the system of world politics was characterized by the two superpowers' bloc bipolarity with cold-war antagonisms between the Western camp led by the United States and the Communist camp led by the Soviet Union. Within

the decade of the 1960's certain power centers have newly emerged along with the two leading powers: namely, China associated with the Third World nations, those Western European nations associated with the Common Market, and Japan. These five power centers constitute the current environment of the international political system.<sup>99</sup>

This change in the international power balance system of course has greatly affected the nature of world politics, particularly after the Sino-Soviet conflicts and the U.S.-France controversy in the 1960's. Currently, world politics embraces a pattern of multi-polarity similar to the classical power-balance manipulation. This situation has enhanced the importance of the individual power center in the system of balance of power. Consequently, after the American frustration of the Vietnam War and the severity of the Sino-Soviet conflicts in 1969, American foreign policy has gradually shifted from the containment policy to one of balance of power, in which the "Nixon Doctrine" dominates, accepting today's world as "an era of negotiation rather than confrontation". This fundamental change in American policy was evidenced by the substantial improvement of Sino-American relationships, beginning with the Ping-Pong Diplomacy in 1971 and highlighted by President Nixon's China trip in 1972. It has also been demonstrated by the improvement of Russo-American relationships, leading to two summit meetings, Nixon's trip to Moscow (May, 1972) and Brezhnev's visit to Washington (June, 1973). Further bilateral summit conferences and talks on general policies are scheduled among the three crucial power centers, the United States, the Soviet Union and China, and others may be anticipated. In addition, there have been a number of other summit meetings between each of these three power centers and their allies. These current international activities and other developments tend toward a dialectical conversion of the conflicts

among nations; the notion of power balance in today's world politics is a revival of classical traditions, and dominates the minds of the leaders and policy-makers of the major powers. Limited by its current physical conditions and external environments, as a leading power center, China, although persisting in her long-range goal of idealism, was inevitably drawn into this pattern of realistic international politics. China now engages in diplomatic manipulation in an attempt to use classical techniques to accomplish what her leaders perceive as her essential missions--national reunification and the promotion of world revolution.

B) China's Implementation of the Policies of Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng in Current World Politics: A Brief Review

During the development of international politics throughout the past quarter century a tentative pattern of Chinese foreign policy emerged in the form of a balance of power concept that is compatible with the classical Chinese international system and the concepts of Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng. Since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, the general pattern of Chinese foreign policy can be viewed as a dialectical process in applying the policies of Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng. This dialectical development of Chinese foreign relations has brought China from the status of a regional and subordinate country at the beginning to her present position as a global power. China's potential influence on international politics is considerable, and her role is likely to be crucial. The substantial employment of the concept of balance of power in China's foreign relations falls into several stages, as follows:

(1) The First Stage of the Lien-Heng Policy: 1950-1953

When the communist government of China was established in 1949, the regime was relatively weak and faced the turmoil of an internal post-

civil-war situation. Domestic rehabilitation was the first priority of national policy. Thus, the main foreign relations emphasis was to obtain substantial assistance to promote and protect national reconstruction. Along with this task China's foreign relations in the early 1950's involved a commitment to "lean to one-side" in associating with the Soviet Union.<sup>100</sup> The unexpected Korean War in the early 1950's not only impeded China's opportunity for broadening her foreign relations with the major world powers, but also intensified the multi-dimensioned American containment policy which reinforced Chinese reliance on the Soviet Union for assistance and protection.

In this period, therefore, Chinese foreign policy was subordinated to that of the Soviet Union, a situation that led to a radical mood intent upon encouraging militant revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped areas. Its motivating principle was the strategy of Lien-Heng, to associate with a great power to protect national security and to seek other assistance while working toward "divide and rule" in international politics. China's status at this stage was simply that of a regional Asian power with a second-rate position in the socialist camp.

(2) The First Stage of the Ho-Tsung Policy: 1954-1959

After the death of Stalin and the armistice of the Korean War China gained more independence from Soviet influence and control. On the one hand, China continued to concentrate on her domestic nation-building and economic development by introducing the first five-year plan. On the other hand, her foreign policy was shaped with the "Bandung Spirit" of peaceful coexistence in order to ease international tension and give a favourable image of Chinese foreign policy to the Afro-Asian countries, for it was this group of nations that China sought as her basic allies. On this point, Premier Chou En-lai pointed out that China's basic attitude

towards the Third World nations was "friendly cooperation", "mutual understanding and respect, mutual sympathy and mutual support" on the basis of proletarian internationalism.<sup>101</sup>

In addition to the general principle of peaceful coexistence which was based on the famous "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence", China further proposed an "international anti-imperialist united front" among nations with common interests with China as the center. During this period China actively engaged in diplomatic manipulations to persuade the Afro-Asian nations of Chinese sincerity and achieved a great deal of success in winning support from the Third World nations in international politics. Thus, this Chinese Ho-Tsung policy has turned China from a regional Asian power to a popular member of the Afro-Asian group.

Moreover, China in this period not only urged the Afro-Asian nations to form an international united front according to the Ho-Tsung strategy against Western imperialism and colonialism, but also devoted her efforts to breaking the American encirclement resulting from the containment policy which, in the form of SEATO and a number of bilateral military mutual-defense treaties with various countries and regions in Asia, was aimed at China. On the basis of the Lien-Heng strategy, China tried to convince Afro-Asian nations of the imperialist nature of the American role in the underdeveloped areas, and urged them to reject any kind of cooperation and alliance with the United States, or at least to keep neutral. This effort was evidenced by China's close relations with India, Indonesia, Egypt, and other non-aligned countries during this period of time.

### (3) The Second Stage of the Lien-Heng Policy: 1960-1964

When Khrushchev stabilized his political power in the Soviet Communist Party and adopted "peaceful coexistence" as the general Soviet

foreign policy, the Soviet Union began its collaboration with the United States on various world issues, such as nuclear weapons control, the test-ban treaty, Middle-East affairs, disarmament, etc. The Chinese eyed this Soviet attitude toward the United States and the Western capitalist powers as "socialist-revisionism", an attempt to share imperialist hegemony with the United States at the expense of the Third World nations. Certain Soviet actions lent credence the Chinese suspicions, such as the U.S.S.R.'s refusal to assist China's nuclear weapons program in 1959 and its withdrawal of all economic aid and technical assistance from China in 1960 even when China faced a serious natural disaster. The Soviet motivation appeared to be to undermine the Chinese nuclear weapon development and her leading position in the Third World. This complex and sometimes contradictory interaction of ideology and national interests has been a factor in the Sino-Soviet conflicts since 1960. From then on, the Soviet Union has attempted to isolate China not only at the level of state relations in the socialist camp but also in the international communist movement. For instance, in the International Conference of Communist Parties of 1960 each side launched severe attacks on the other. Up to 1963, the Soviet Communist Party had conducted campaigns to mobilize the Communist parties of its satellite states to attack the Chinese Communist Party with charges of "dogmatism" and "adventurism".

In coping with this Soviet political challenge and with its diplomatic encirclement, China responded with the Lien-Heng strategy. Chinese leaders began to criticize Soviet imperialism, charging the U.S.S.R. with revisionism and neo-colonialism toward Eastern European nations which was a deviation from Marxism-Leninism. In order to break the Soviet political and diplomatic encirclement, China began to exploit the tensions between

the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites, especially Albania and Romania. The Chinese open support of Albania's challenge to Soviet oppression and hegemony provided great motivation for the rest of the Soviet satellites to weaken their ties with the Russians. The Sino-Albanian alliance constituted a Lien-Heng pattern aimed at increasing the divisions between the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites in order to make the Russians face pressures from both front and rear. The aim was to reduce direct Soviet pressure upon China by diverting attention to its satellites in the rear. In general, the Sino-Soviet conflict has provided opportunities for the Eastern European countries to take some advantage and has led to more independence from the Soviet Union.

On the global scene during this period China continued its policy of Ho-Tsung to associate with the Third World nations against imperialism and colonialism, particularly against the Western capitalists led by the United States. Toward her old ally but new rival, the Soviet Union, China directed the policy of Lien-Heng to break the Soviet diplomatic and physical encirclements by allying herself with certain Eastern European nations and manipulating contradictions to agitate their revolts against Soviet control and oppressions. Concurrently, in the global front line of the Third World areas, China promoted relations with most Afro-Asian countries, which efforts were crystalized by Chou En-lai's visits to fourteen Afro-Asian nations in 1963 and 1964. Particularly, China concluded a friendship treaty with India's rival, Pakistan, on the basis of contradiction-manipulation so as to restrain and deter India's possible alliance with the Soviet Union at China's expense, especially after the Sino-Indian border conflicts in 1962.

(4) The Second Stage of Ho-Tsung: 1965-1969

In this stage the major contradiction of the world, as far as China's interest was concerned, was the American intervention and military escalation in the Indo-China War. The appearance of a half-million American armed forces in Vietnam in the late 1960's signified danger and was a serious threat to China's national security, suggesting the possibility of an American take-over of the whole of Indo-China would still constitute a viatl threat to China's national security. In coping with this great challenge, China turned her focus of foreign policy to the Vietnam issue and lowered the Sino-Soviet controversy to a secondary contradiction. Thus, the strategic principle of Chinese foreign policy began to shift from the policy of Lien-Heng to the policy of Ho-Tsung in order to form a world-wide united front, at least of the Third World nations, to deter the American invasion of Indo-China, particularly Vietnam. In assisting in the Vietnamese struggle China provided whole-hearted political, economic, military and diplomatic supports to North Vietnam and to the Viet Cong. China further called upon the whole people of the world to defeat the U.S. policy of war and aggression in Indo-China. Chou En-lai expressed chis policy in these words:

The Chinese people's great leader Chairman Mao has pointed out: "The 700 million Chinese people provide a powerful backing for the Vietnamese people; the vast expanse of China's territory is their reliable rear area". ... The three fraternal Indo-Chinese peoples may rest assured that in the common struggle against U.S. imperialism, the Chinese people will always stand by their side. Together we unite, together we fight and together we will win victory.<sup>102</sup>

In a statement of May 20, 1970, Mao Tse-tung personally appealed to the people of the world, including the American people, to stop U.S. imperialism in Indo-China on the basis of the "people's war" concept.

By the end of 1969, the American military operation in Vietnam was seriously frustrated not only militarily but also politically because of world-wide condemnation and criticism, which included massive domestic



anti-war campaigns by the American people. In facing these internal and external pressures, the United States was led to retreat from Indo-China and President Nixon designed the American withdrawal according to the "Nixon Doctrine".<sup>103</sup>

So far as the Chinese national interest was concerned, the American retreat from Indo-China eased the Sino-American military tension and contributed relative peace to the area of Southeast Asia. Dialectically, however, the incident of the Sino-Soviet border conflict at Chen-pao Island in Chinese Manchuria in March 1969 escalated the Sino-Soviet military tension seriously along the border areas. This new development caused China to shift again from the policy of Ho-Tsung to the policy of Lien-Heng. This condition has encouraged the improvement of Sino-American relations in an attempt to deter the Soviet threat. In a sense it appears that the world politics of 1970's is returning to the classical concept of balance of power as some scholars have observed.

(5) The Third Stage of Lien-Heng: 1970-?

1) The Severity of Sino-Soviet Relations

Sino-Soviet relations have deteriorated severely since the military border clashes in March, 1969. Since that time, the first-strike proposal has been debated among Soviet policy-makers. The Soviet military build-up along the Sino-Soviet border areas has resulted in serious military tension and psychological insecurity.<sup>104</sup> Furthermore, the Soviet Union launched a political and diplomatic campaign in an attempt to encircle and isolate China under Brehznev's "Asian Collective Security System". The proposed major "chain nations" in this system included Mongolia, Pakistan, India, the Southeast Asian states, Japan, North Korea and even Taiwan headed by the Soviet Union.<sup>105</sup>

To cope with this Soviet military and political challenge, China on the one hand terminated her domestic Cultural Revolution campaign in order to concentrate every effort to face the external threat. On the other hand, the Chinese began to intensify the development of nuclear weapons, and otherwise strengthen the military by stressing the system of the people's militia under the people's war concept, and developing a broad system of civil defense including tunnel-digging all around the country. Regarding political and diplomatic responses, China further strengthened relations with Pakistan, the Indo-China states, North Korea and other Third World nations in order to break down the encirclement-chain of Brehznev's plan, particularly aiming at improving Sino-Japanese relations in the Far East. Directed to this end, were Chinese Premier Chou En-lai's visits to North Korea and North Vietnam, his presentation to the Summit Conference of the Three Indo-Chinese Peoples in 1970 and 1971, and the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972.

As to the Eastern European states, China has concentrated on friendship with Albania and Romania. Meanwhile, the Chinese condemned the "Brezhnev Doctrine" as imperialist hegemonism and neo-colonialism, as evidenced by the 1968 Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. To support the Eastern European nations' struggles against Soviet oppression, China established normal diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, another tough ideological rival of the Soviet Union.

In Europe, China was encouraging a powerful anti-Soviet force including the NATO system to prevent the concentration of Soviet power eastward at China's expense. Thus, China endorsed British participation in the European Common Market to strengthen the power of Western Europe. China also persuaded France to support the European collective defense

system of NATO.<sup>106</sup> As a matter of fact, in this sense, China is currently participating in the diplomatic competition in Europe. There have been three general strategic tasks for China: first, to agitate the Eastern European states to revolt against Soviet control; second, to make Western Europe as powerful a force as possible to restrain Soviet capability on its eastern front; third, not to allow any form of Berlin agreement or Soviet-European compromise in order to prevent the Soviet Union from concentrating its efforts on the East.

However, the most drastic breakthrough for the Chinese policy of Lien-Heng has been the dramatic improvement of Sino-American relations since the Ping-Pong Diplomacy in April, 1971, the first approachment between these two rivals in two decades.

## 2) The Improvement of Sino-American Relations

In order to deter the vital Soviet threat to China's immediate national security, the Chinese began promoting Sino-American relations. This effort concluded in Nixon's China trip in 1972 and the subsequent establishment of diplomatic "liason offices" both in Peking and Washington in 1973 as an immediate step toward normal diplomatic relations. This direction was reinforced by U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger's recent trip to China in November 1973 and concluded in a joint communique.<sup>107</sup> Accompanying the improvement of Sino-American relations, the world power balance has undergone a change in relations among the three major power centers. It has led to the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan and a great number of other Western and Third World nations. Most damaged by these developments has been Chiang Kai-shek's government in Taiwan, as evidenced by the Sino-American Shanghai Communique in February, 1972. As far as American interest is concerned, the strategic position

of Taiwan was doomed by the developing Sino-American friendship.

China's strategy of "associate with the afar and attack the near (yuan-chiao-chin-kung)" comes under the policy of Lien-Heng, and has broadened her diplomatic manipulation onto the global scene, greatly increasing China's international status and reputation. As to Chinese management of global power relations, Professor Harold C. Hinton observed:

In its propaganda, Peking still maintains the dual-adversary strategy and claims to be opposing both "superpowers". In fact, however, it has tilted strongly toward the United States. One reason for this, and the U.S. Government would like to think the only reason, is Peking's fear of the Soviet Union. But Peking also knows that the Nixon Administration is eager, for domestic purposes, to get help in reaching a political settlement for Vietnam, believes China could be useful toward this end if only it were willing, and is in the process of reducing the American military presence in Asia and the Western Pacific in part on the theory that previous American administrations had overrated the Chinese threat to Asia. Hence, there are vulnerabilities in the American position, and Peking has been trying to play on them, not only to achieve a positive political relationship that might help to counterbalance the Soviet threat, but also to exploit the rift between the United States and Japan, get concessions on Taiwan and possible on Vietnam, and promote American military withdrawal from the region before the Soviet Union or Japan is in a position to fill the vacuum.<sup>108</sup>

#### (6) Conclusion

In conclusion, under the implementation of the politics of Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng policies, China's foreign relations have dialectically developed from a regional and subordinate position to a global and independent one which virtually reflected the dialectical process and spirit of Tao and Yin-Yang. The first stage of China's foreign relations was concentrated on gaining foreign protection and allies for domestic construction and rehabilitation because of her disadvantageous position and weak national power. The second stage of China's foreign relations was to implement a policy of peaceful coexistence to attract the Third World nations' friendship and cooperation so as to develop a partially independent role for the regional Afro-Asian areas. The third stage of China's foreign relations

rose to an independent level from the dialectical alternation of the first and second stages in order to break the diplomatic monopoly of the two super-powers. The Chinese independent role associated with the Third World nations in world politics has altered the international system from one of bipolarity to one of multipolarity, at least to a tripolarity, which has been tending toward the classical system of balance of power. The fourth stage of China's foreign relations was concentrated on the international united front to stop the American invasion in Indo-China for the sake at least of China's national security. The fifth stage of China's foreign relations has ripened to a level of global diplomatic manipulation of the power balance among nations for China's national interest and security. The immediate goal of China's foreign policy, national reunification, thus has reached a point of breakthrough and is nearing realization with China's admission to the United Nations and the improvement of Sino-American relations.

For the past five stages of China's foreign relations, the dialectical process of development has been in a vertical dimension from the point (nation) to the line (a group of nations) and to the surface (world-wide areas of countries) level. Horizontally, it has developed from the local people (the area of Asia) to the regional people (Afro-Asian and the Third World nations) and to the global people (a world-wide nations) level including the American people. (see Figure 3 and Figure 4)

In general, to the Chinese, times are advancing; the world is changing; and the future is optimistic and progressing, just as taught by the ancient wisdom of Tao and Yin-Yang in the Book of Changes.

Figure 3

Diagram of the Dialectical Development of  
China's Foreign Relations  
(Vertical Process: point, line, & surface)

Abbreviations of Figure 3 and Figure 4:

L. - <u>Lien-Heng</u>	O. - Oceania
H. - <u>Ho-Tsung</u>	N.A. - North America
S.U. - The Soviet Union	U.S. - The United States
B.C. - Bandung Conference	J. - Japan
A.A. - Afro-Asian countries	I. - Italy
F. - France	C. - Canada
A. - Albania	l. - local
R. - Romania	r. - regional
E.E. - Eastern European states	i.c. - inter-continental
W.E. - Western European states	g. - global
L.A. - Latin American states	





Figure 4

Diagram of the Dialectical Development of  
China's Foreign Relations  
(Horizontal Process: local, regional & global)



Notes of Chapter Four

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY:  
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

<sup>1</sup>The Great Learning (Ta Hsueh), "Commentary of the Philosopher Tseng", Chapter 7.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., "The Text of Confucius".

<sup>3</sup>This quotation of Mao Tse-tung has been frequently cited in various articles, official documents and statements. For instance, it appeared in Cheng Lei, "To Move a Further Advance for the Press Work", Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), No.5, 1973, p.46.

<sup>4</sup>Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I, pp.146-148.

<sup>5</sup>Robert C. North, The Foreign Relations of China, p.60.

<sup>6</sup>For detail, see Chapter Two of this dissertation on the section of "Kuan Chung and Shang Yang".

<sup>7</sup>Mao, "People's Dictatorship", pp.412-413.

<sup>8</sup>Philippe Devillers, What Mao Really Said, translated by Tony White, (N.Y.: Schocken Books, Macdonald & Co. Publishers Ltd., 1969), p.215.

<sup>9</sup>Lucian W. Pye, China: An Introduction, p.185.

<sup>10</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "On the Chungking Negotiations" (October 17, 1945), Selected Works, IV, pp.59-60. Also see, Quotations, pp.196-197.

<sup>11</sup>Confucian Analects, Book XV, Chapter 28.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., Book IX, Chapter 25.

<sup>13</sup>Meng Tzu, Book VI, Chapter 15.

<sup>14</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "The Situation and Our Policy After the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan" (August 13, 1945), Selected Works, IV, p.20.

<sup>15</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "We must Learn to Do Economic Work" (January 10, 1945), Selected Works, III, p.241.

<sup>16</sup>Tseng Yun, "How China Carries Out the Policy of Self-Reliance", pp.12-15.

<sup>17</sup>Mao, "On Coalition Government", pp.296-297.



- 18 Mao, Quotations, p.102.
- 19 Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy", p.224.
- 20 Mao Tse-tung, "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party" (December, 1929), Selected Works, I, p.106.
- 21 Mao Tse-tung, "Report on the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China" (March 5, 1949), Selected Works, IV, p.362.
- 22 Harold C. Hinton, An Introduction to Chinese Politics (N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p.179. Hereafter cited as Chinese Politics.
- 23 Mao, "On Coalition Government", p.264.
- 24 Charles Horner, "The Production of Nuclear Weapons" in Chapter 12, The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s, edited by William W. Whieson, (N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p.241.
- 25 New York Times Service, "China Making Huge Missile", Sunday Oklahoman (Oklahoma City, Okalhoma), March 4, 1973, p.9.
- 26 The Yearbook on Chinese Communism Editorial Committee, Yearbook on Chinese Communism 1971 (Taipei, Taiwan: The Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems, the Shanghai Printing Press, 1971), pp.2:77-78.
- 27 Hinton, Chinese Politics, p.182.
- 28 Yearbook on Chinese Communism 1971, p.2:40.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu, The Art of War, p.87.
- 31 Mao Tse-tung's poem "Militia Women", for English translation, see Willis Barnstone with Ko Ching-po, The Poems of Mao Tse-tung (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1972), p.99.
- 32 Mao, "On Coalition Government", p.257.
- 33 Mao Tse-tung, "Be Concerned with the Well-Being of the Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of Work" (January 27, 1934), Selected Works, I, p.147.
- 34 Mao Tse-tung, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks" (December 25, 1947), Selected Military Writings (Peking: Foreign Languages Press), 2nd Edition, pp.349-350. Also see, Quotations, p.98.
- 35 Mao, "On Protracted War", p.186.
- 36 Meng Tzu, Book II, "Kung-sun Ch'ow", Part II, Chapter 1.

<sup>37</sup>Russell, p.22.

<sup>38</sup>Burton Watson, Hsun Tzu, p.37.

<sup>39</sup>For details of Hsun Tzu's concept of people and people's war, see Chapter Two of this dissertation on the section of "Hsun Tzu".

<sup>40</sup>Griffith, p.64. Samuel Griffith translated "Tao" as "Moral influence" in connection with the meaning of the text. However, I would rather prefer to keep the original Chinese word and let Sun Tzu himself explain its meaning in the text.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Tao Te Ching, Chapter 40.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., Chapter 2.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., Chapter 58. For English translation of Mao's citation, see K. Fan, Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao, p.190.

<sup>45</sup>Griffith, p.102.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p.131.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., pp.109-110.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., p.92.

<sup>49</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", Selected Works, I, p.239.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p.237.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p.235.

<sup>53</sup>Mao, Quotations, p.79.

<sup>54</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "Speech at the Wuchang Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China" (December 1, 1958), quoted in the explanatory note to "Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong", Selected Works, IV, pp.98-99.

<sup>55</sup>"Imperialism and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers", Quotations, pp.79-80.

<sup>56</sup>Tao Te Ching, Chapter 69.

<sup>57</sup>Mao, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", p.190.

<sup>58</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong", p.100.

<sup>59</sup>Mao, "On Protracted War", see text in K. Fan, Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao, p.230.

<sup>60</sup>This point was also held and commented by Samuel B. Griffith in the "Introduction" of his Sun Tzu, The Art of War, p.39.

<sup>61</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains" (June 11, 1945), Selected Works, IV, pp.271-273.

<sup>62</sup>For detailed discussion of this philosophical concept, see Chapter Two of this dissertation on the section of "The Philosophical Concept of Sun Tzu's 'The Art of War'".

<sup>63</sup>Kuei Ku Tzu, Chapter of "Manipulation", the Fourth. For direct quotation and English translation see Chapter Two of this dissertation on the section of "Kuei Ku Tzu".

<sup>64</sup>Kuei Ku Tzu, Chapter of Pai-Ho (Open and Close), the First.

<sup>65</sup>The Art of War, Chapter 1, Estimates.

<sup>66</sup>Tao Te Ching, Chapter 36.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., Chapter 68.

<sup>68</sup>Quoted from Griffith, The Art of War, p.53, Note No.3.

<sup>69</sup>Mao, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", pp.217-218.

<sup>70</sup>Mao, "On Protracted War", pp.172-173.

<sup>71</sup>For English translation, see Griffith, p.51.

<sup>72</sup>Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War People's Army (Hanoi: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1961), p.21.

<sup>73</sup>Griffith, p.45.

<sup>74</sup>Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (N.Y.: Grove Press, Inc., 1961), pp.126-130.

<sup>75</sup>Mao, "On Protracted War", p.145.

<sup>76</sup>"The People's War", Quotations, p.95.

<sup>77</sup>For detailed analysis, see Scott A. Boorman, The Protracted Game, A Wei-Ch'i Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1969), particularly Chapter 6; also see Whitson, The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s, Chapter 16, "Deception

in Chinese Strategy" by Scott A. Boorman.

<sup>78</sup>Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, "Everybody Is A Soldier", Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), No.10, October 16, 1958.

<sup>79</sup>Mao, "On Protracted War", pp.157-178.

<sup>80</sup>Mao, Quotations, p.75.

<sup>81</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "Interview with a Hsinhua News Agency Correspondent" (September 29, 1958), Quotations, p.77.

<sup>82</sup>Mao, Quotations, p.80.

<sup>83</sup>"The CCP Central Committee Letter of June 14, 1963, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union", The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement, p.13.

<sup>84</sup>Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War", p.24.

<sup>85</sup>Willis Barnstone, The Poems of Mao Tse-tung, p.69.

<sup>86</sup>Watson, Han Fei Tzu, p.111, Note No.14.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p.112; also see Han Fei Tzu, Chapter of the Five Vermin.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., p.125.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., p.100.

<sup>90</sup>Kuei Ku Tzu, Chapter of Manipulation, the Fourth. English translation is by author.

<sup>91</sup>Kuei Ku Tzu, Chapter of Pai-Ho, the First. English translation is by author.

<sup>92</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp.135-136.

<sup>93</sup>Yang Kuan, The History of Warring States (Chan Kuo Shih) (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1955), p.169. The English translation is by author.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., pp.169-170.

<sup>95</sup>J.I. Crump Jr., Chan-kuo Ts'e, p.9, p.14.

<sup>96</sup>Quite a few people have approved this argument and provided certain patterns for comparison. For example, see Winberg Chai, "International Law and Diplomacy in Ancient China (771-221 B.C.): An Introduction", p.47; Ku Nien-hsien, Study on the Tsung-Heng School, in the introduction and the last chapters; Liu Po-chi, The Politics of Alliances and Conferences During the Spring and Autumn Period, in the introduction and conclusion chapters.

<sup>97</sup>Winberg Chai, "International Law and Diplomacy in Ancient China ..." p.47.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid.

<sup>99</sup>This five-power-center concept was first expressed by the U.S. President Nixon's address to a press conference in Kansas City on July 6, 1971. For text, see "The Speech Chou En-lai Read Before Kissinger Did", U.S. News & World Report, August 2, 1971, pp.46-47.

<sup>100</sup>Mao, "People's Dictatorship", p.415.

<sup>101</sup>Chou En-lai's Speech at the Bandung Conference (April, 1955).

<sup>102</sup>Chou En-lai's speech at the banquet celebrating the conclusion of the Summit Conference of the Three Indo-Chinese Peoples, Peking Review, May 8, 1970, pp.34-35.

<sup>103</sup>Richard Nixon, "President's Message on U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's", National Diplomacy: 1965-1970 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1970), pp.118-147.

<sup>104</sup>Joseph Fromm, "Russia vs. China in Big War? It's A Real Worry to Many", U.S. News & World Report, August 27, 1973, pp.32-33. Also see Hinton, Chinese Politics, pp.278-279, p.285. Certain implications on this point have been expressed in the statements of Chinese Government since 1969. For example, see Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China (October 7, 1969) (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1973), pp.2-3. Since March, 1969, there have been quite a few similar reports appeared in the New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor and other literatures from time to time, especially reports in the New York Times during the summer of 1969.

<sup>105</sup>Hinton, Chinese Politics, p.279. The Soviet representative, Victor Louis' mission to Taiwan and his discussion with Chiang Ching-kuo, the de facto leader in Taiwan, was reported in the Washington Post, April 19, 1969.

<sup>106</sup>"President Pompidou Visits China", and "Premier Chou En-lai's Speech", Peking Review, September 14, 1973, pp.8-11.

<sup>107</sup>"Chairman Mao Meets Secretary of State Kissinger", and "Communique", Peking Review, November 16, 1973, pp.5-6, p.10.

<sup>108</sup>Hinton, Chinese Politics, pp.278-280.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSION

#### I. TRADITIONS AND INFLUENCE

Every society in the world has its own traditions, and they have played an important role in influencing the people's way of life and of thought. Even nations engaged in modern times in radical ideological and political changes are still affected greatly by their traditions, customs and usages. This is particularly true for certain countries with deep-rooted cultures and civilizations. The case of China is no exception.

The essentials of Chinese civilization blossomed in the classical age of the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods. A hundred schools of thought contended and a hundred states employed them to seek power and hegemony or peace. Thus these schools of thought gained their currency variously in accordance with the fluctuations of social change and the conditions of interstate relations. Nevertheless, it is these contending schools of thought which constituted the fundamentals of Chinese culture and civilization for the last two thousand years.

Isolated from other major civilizations in the world by self-sufficiency, China developed her self-contained culture, her concept of world order and her system of foreign relations, summed up in the concept of the "Middle Kingdom". This uniquely Chinese worldview, or weltanschauung, lasted for two millennia until the challenges of Western ideology and civi-

lization in the mid-nineteenth century. To cope with these challenges to China's very survival, Chinese intellectuals and revolutionaries alike were put to the test of searching for means and approaches to meet the challenges. They finally found and adopted Marxism-Leninism. Mao Tse-tung and his Communist associates applied the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of Chinese society, to save China from total collapse. This synthesis, formed by blending a foreign ideology and Chinese social conditions with tradition and classical teaching is the basic theme of Mao Tse-tung Szu Hsiang, or the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung", or Maoism. There is a certain unique political element contained in this synthesis: the "Chinese-ness", traceable to the classical philosophers of China. The Chinese approach to public policy thus differs from that of other major countries. Professor O. Edmund Clubb has commented on this unique feature of Chinese politics as follows:

It is this writer's proposition that the Chinese Communists are Chinese first and Communists only second. In other words, instead of being a corpus inherited from Marx and Engels via Lenin and Stalin, the Chinese Communist doctrine is shaped by China's past. Both "Communism" and "China", of course, are important factors in the composition called "Chinese Communism"; but the Chinese element is the more important.

... The introduction of new concepts into Chinese is like putting new wine into old bottles; the wine is often somewhat changed, if not spoiled. And past political concepts deeply influence contemporary thought.

In general, the traditional ideal of the Ta-T'ung society (Great Harmony), advocated by various classical schools of thought such as Taoism, Confucianism and Mohism has been injected into and contributed to the contemporary Chinese political ideal of constructing Chinese socialism and world communism. It is compatible with the Marxist idealist goal of communism. The Chinese classical idealism of the Great Harmony reinforces current Chinese efforts for long-range goals in politics and foreign relations. Another step

to fulfill the Chinese concept of internationalism, the Great Harmony, has set the pattern of performance in terms of the traditional concept of the "Middle Kingdom". In support of this point, another quotation from O. Edmund Clubb is appropriate:

The evidence indicates that the men who came to power in Peking in 1949 were true sons of the Middle Kingdom and felt as did their forebears that Chinese culture in its totality was superior to all others. To that philosophic constant there is now added the messianic conviction that the Chinese, as a "leading" cultural group, are destined to guide the world's "oppressed" peoples, and especially<sup>2</sup> their fellow Asians, into a New Era-- to be determined by Maoism.

On the other hand, the immediate task of Chinese foreign policy is to respond to imperialism and colonialism. The ideological basis for such response is simply Chinese nationalism, which has an impact on current world politics and the international system because of China's place in the world. China has resolutely struggled against the imperialist major powers, especially the two superpowers, on the basis of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, a struggle which reflects the traditional Chinese attitude of anti-Paism (anti-hegemonism). Meanwhile, China has wholeheartedly supported the national liberation movements of the Third World nations against imperialism and colonialism on the basis of Chinese internationalism which consists of elements of the traditional Chinese concept of Wang Tao (the politics of virtue). Following this policy of internationalism, China has established friendly relationships with the Third World nations and peoples for an international united front under the strategy of the people's war concept against imperialism and colonialism.

In order to realize Chinese nationalism and promote the ideal of world communism, China has applied various realistic approaches: ideology, nation-building, military power, the people's war strategy, and balance-of-power manipulation. These approaches actually contain certain features



which are attributable to various classical Chinese concepts in each of these areas. Because it is unique, current Chinese foreign policy differs from that of other major world powers in its nature, its attitudes toward world order, and in its international behavior.

Thus, the Chinese cultural heritage plays an important role in forming contemporary Chinese foreign policy, a role not to be ignored by any student of international relations or of Chinese politics.

## II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE FUTURE OF CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

One of the major Chinese cultural legacies, from the "ancient wisdom", is the philosophical concept of dialectics which was particularly advocated and adopted by the classical schools of Taoism, Mohism and Legalism. Throughout Chinese history the concept of dialectics has had a great influence on the Chinese way of life and on Chinese ideologies. Dialectics is thus a major philosophical key to the understanding of the development of Chinese history and the evolution of the Chinese view of world order.

The development of the Chinese concept of international politics has been dialectical in the sense of changing with changing conditions and changes in the international environment. Especially, the emergence, popularity and the rise and fall of the contending schools of thought throughout Chinese history depended upon variations in environmental changes. In other words, the various contending schools of thought in China were initiated and developed throughout history to cope with the environmental challenges. Thus, the philosophical trends have dialectically swung between idealism and realism according to historical needs.

When the ancient Chinese Chou feudalism collapsed it was followed by the period of Spring and Autumn, dominated by various independent feudal

states. Thus, in this period there developed the first Chinese concept of international relations. During this period the international system became gradually chaotic, each state struggling for power and hegemony, but the competition was relatively less drastic in comparison with the later period of Warring States. To cope with this international disorder, the idealism of Taoism and Confucianism emerged and became the leading philosophy of this period. This was the first stage of a philosophical trend of idealism with the goal of international peace and order.

As interstate wars and power politics among the major states became more drastic, featured by military conquest, diplomatic maneuver and territorial annexation the international system began its second stage of development, the classical period of Warring States. The contending schools of thought at this time were particularly flourishing, so that the period became the golden age of classics. The domestic political system and the external environment during this period inspired realistic and practical national reforms and statecraft to meet the challenges. Among the contending schools the realist School of Legalism thus dominated the scene at this period and the philosophical trend shifted from idealism to realism.

When China entered into a long pacific period, beginning with the Han dynasty and continuing to the end of the Ch'ing dynasty, the philosophic systems of idealism (that is, Taoism and Confucianism), revived in response to Chinese internal and external conditions. Particularly, during the Han dynasty, Confucianism was adopted as the national orthodox ideology and it has since guided Chinese concepts in domestic politics and foreign relations. For two thousand years in this period China developed her concept of suzerainty and the tribute system of foreign relations on the basis of idealist Confucianism. It was this culturalism, the concept of the "Middle

Kingdom", which constituted the third stage in the Chinese concept of international relations.

Due to challenges from the West and China's frustrations in world politics during the past century, Chinese Confucian idealism has again given way to the realist nationalism. This new version of realism is essentially a blend of certain classical Chinese Legalist concepts and modern Marxism-Leninism, and serves as the ideological basis for policies of opposing foreign imperialism and aggression and of restoring China's past prestige and place in the world. Thus, Chinese nationalism has been the major trend of Chinese politics today. Its spirit is reflected in the Thought of Mao Tse-tung which is regarded as the application of Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions and Chinese society. On this point, the essence of Maoism is the synthesis of classical Chinese thoughts, modern Marxist idealism and Chinese nationalism. In accordance with this conceptual guideline, China's policies of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism and of support for the national liberation movements of the Third World nations have become the basic themes of foreign policy, and constitute the fourth stage of the Chinese concept of international relations.

In general, the development and variation of Chinese concepts of international relations has been dialectical in process throughout history. By and large, a nation's foreign policy depends mainly upon its national goals, capability, and the external environment. The balance among these factors determines the practical foreign policy of that country. China is no exception. On the one hand, China anticipates the future trend of world order and sets up her immediate and long-range goals, the construction of Chinese socialism and the ideal of world communism. On the other hand, limited by the current international system and politics, China seeks

practical means and approaches to realize her national goals. To achieve both immediate and long-range goals, China has adopted both old and new concepts and approaches in forming her foreign policy.

In addition, pursuant to the theory of dialectical materialism, the Chinese regard national goals and practical approaches as being inter-related and mutually reinforcing. They believe that the correct handling of contradictions and an appropriate manipulation of approaches could alter the external environment and thus minimize the international limitations, so as to strengthen China's capability, and thus enhance the feasibility of achieving national goals. In this "critical conversional" stage of the dialectic, the Chinese believe that human willpower and intelligence play a vital role in bringing about the desired alterations.

In conclusion, Chinese foreign policy is largely determined not only by China's current political system, national goals, the international system and international politics, but also by her traditions, conceptual heritages and present perceptions of world order. This special combination of determinants results in peculiarly Chinese political policies, approaches, and characteristics, differing from those of other major world powers. The student of Chinese politics who wishes to have a better understanding and more accurate grasp of China's foreign policy will find, perhaps, in this very element the most valuable guideline. Once a person catches this key point, as Confucius pointed out: "Although he might not have reached his goals exactly, he is not far from the target (sui-pu-chung, pu-yuan-yi)"<sup>3</sup>.

Notes of Chapter Five

CONCLUSION

<sup>1</sup>O. Edmund Clubb, Twentieth Century China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), Second Edition, p.302.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.303.

<sup>3</sup>Confucian Annalects.

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
# APPENDIX A

## Chinese History, 1000 B.C. to A.D. 1949\*

CENTURY	EXTERNAL RELATIONS	DYNASTIES (Non Chinese Underlined)	POLITICAL STRUCTURE	INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS
B. C. 1000	Chinese Expansion	WEST CHOU	FEUDALISM	
900				
800	Barbarian Invasions			
700		EAST CHOU		Rise of philosophic schools Confucianism, Taoism, Mohism, Legalism
600				
500		WARRING STATES		
400				Courage
300				
200	Chinese Expansion	CHIN		Great Walls built Peasant revolts
100	Caravan Trade Introduction of Buddhism	WEST HAN		Establishment of bureaucracy Confucianism as a state cult
A. D. 1	Chinese Expansion	EAST HAN		Reforms of Wang Mang A. D. 8-23
100				Peasant revolts (Yellow Turbans, etc.)
200		THREE KINGDOMS		
300	Barbarian Invasions	WEST CHIN		Beginning of the decline of the Northwest and growth of the Southeast
400	Beginning of Maritime Commerce	BARBARIAN STATES	MONARCHY AND BUREAUCRACY OF THE GENTRY	
500		WEI		Buddhism flourished
600	Chinese Expansion	BARBARIAN STATES		
700	Foreign Religions Foreign Invasions	SUI		Canal to Chang'an Government and Civil Service examination system perfected Golden Age of art and literature Introduction of Li Lu Shan Invention of Printing Peasant revolts (Huang Chao, etc.) Widespread use of paper money Reforms of Wang An-shih 1069-85 Capital transferred to north
800		T'ANG		
900	Foreign Invasions	FIVE DYNASTIES-TEN STATES		
1000		LIANG		
1100	Foreign Ideas and Maritime Commerce	NORTH SONG		Neo-Confucianism, Chu Hsi
1200		CHIN		
1300	Chinese Expansion Naval Expeditions	SOUTH SONG		
1400	Foreign Invasions European Contact by Sea	YUAN		Canal to Peking Peasant revolts
1500		MING		
1600				Peasant revolts
1700	Chinese Expansion	CH'ING		
1800	War with the West Cultural Impact of the West			Tai'ping Rebellion, 1851-64 Modernization and Reform Revolution of 1911
1900	Two World Wars Soviet Influence	REPUBLIC		Nationalist government Communist government
		PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC		


STRONG UNITY-CENTRALIZATION . . . WEAK UNITY-DECENTRALIZATION . . . DIVISION . . .

\* Area Handbook for Communist China (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967)



# APPENDIX C

## Decision-making Chart of China's Foreign Policy\*



\* From various background materials on China

Source: Winberg Chai, The Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1972), Appendix B.