INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

74-12,303

BINGHAM, Richard Donnelly, 1937-
    FEDERAL GRANTS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT: PATTERNS OF USE
    AND EFFECTS OF PUBLIC HOUSING AND URBAN RENEWAL.

    The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1973
    Political Science, general

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company , Ann Arbor, Michigan

THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

FEDERAL GRANTS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT: PATTERNS OF USE AND

EFFECTS OF PUBLIC HOUSING AND URBAN RENEWAL

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

RICHARD DONNELLY BINGHAM

Norman, Oklahoma

1973

FEDERAL GRANTS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT: PATTERNS OF USE AND

EFFECTS OF PUBLIC HOUSING AND URBAN RENEWAL

APPROVED BY

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

And finally, I wish to thank my family, Martha, Connie, and Paul, for two years of patience while I was immersed in this project.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

CHAPTER I

FEDERAL GRANTS IN AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVE

There is no question but that federal grants-in-aid have become
a dominant concern of both scholars and practitioners of intergovern-
mental relations. Federal grants are a fact of life--they are here to
stay. The proliferation of grants during the past forty years has had
a profound effect upon the character of American federalism. By 1968,
per capita federal grants amounted to exactly $90.00 for every man,
woman, and child in this country. These grants accounted for 19.4 cents
of every dollar of total state and local revenue. In other words, almost
20 percent of all state and local revenue was received from the federal
government.[1] Federal grants as a percent of state and local revenues
ranged from a low of 14.7 percent in Indiana to an astonishing high of
71.3 percent in Alaska. Those states with the lowest per capita income
generally appear to benefit the most from federal grant programs. In
the seventeen states with the lowest per capita income between 1965 and
1967, the federal government added grants of 36 cents to each state and
local dollar as compared to 23 cents for all states.[2]

A Brief History

Federal grants had an inauspicious beginning in 1802 when Ohio was
admitted to the union. Congress allowed 5 percent of the proceeds from

the sale of public lands in Ohio to be applied to the construction of roads within the new state. In 1818, Congress broadened the law to provide that all states be given 5 percent of the proceeds of land sales within their borders. They further required that 3 percent be used for the "encouragement of learning" with one-sixth of the 3 percent designated exclusively for a college or university.[3]

Some sources credit the Morrill Act of 1862 with the practical beginning of the modern grant system.[4] The Morrill Act was designed to assist states in establishing and maintaining the land grant college system. The grant was in the form of federal land rather than money; however, states were allowed to sell or lease the land but were required to use the money to support a state land grant college. The Act placed certain conditions on the use of the revenue derived from the land sales and required annual reports. Thus the pattern was established; needed resources were provided by the federal government in exchange for state acceptance of a national program coupled with certain minimum standards.

In the late 1800's, federal aid took the form of direct monetary payments rather than contributions of land. The first along this line was a program passed in 1887, the Hatch Act, to establish agricultural experiment stations. Congress also enacted grant programs for highway construction and for vocational education and rehabilitation.[5]

The depression of the 1930's brought on a new wave of programs-- programs in the areas of welfare and economic security. Major areas of emphasis included grants for low-rent public housing, improved health services, Social Security, etc. The increasing number and complexity of these grants brought on more extensive supervision by the national

government.[6] Direct intergovernmental transfers from federal to local

governments also originated with the depression of the 1930's. Most

were administered by ad hoc agencies--the Federal Emergency Relief

Administration, Public Works Administration, Works Progress Administra-

tion, etc.[7] These agencies were liquidated during the early years of

World War II and the grants ceased--but they had established the trend

of things to come.

Following World War II, Congress initiated a new series of grants

for health care, education, and for renewal of the physical environment

of urban areas. The era was characterized by increasing emphasis on

social programs with new grants for education, special assistance to de-

pressed areas, the "war on poverty," and "model cities." All of these

programs were designed to fight significant aspects of what is popularly

known as the "urban problem."[8]

Current Trends

During recent years certain trends in federal grant programs have

been identified. These trends include (1) large scale growth, (2) exces-

sive categorization and widespread proliferation, (3) direct federal-

local relations, and (4) increased use of project grants.

The amount of money allocated for federal grants to state and

local government has been rapidly increasing. Federal grants have re-

corded continuous increases in every year since 1948 with the annual

increase in grants-in-aid from 1949 through 1970 averaging almost

13 percent.[9] Table 1-1 shows the increases between 1949 and 1968. In

percentage terms, federal grants increased by 10 percent or more in

exactly half of the twenty year period considered. Some credit this

TABLE 1-1.--Annual increases in federal grants-in-aid, 1949-1968

Year	Millions of dollars	Percent	Year	Millions of dollars	Percent
1949......	226.2	14.0	1959......	1,586.0	33.5
1950......	371.7	20.2	1960......	530.3	8.4
1951......	30.5	1.4	1961......	461.1	6.7
1952......	131.3	5.8	1962......	411.4	5.6
1953......	368.6	16.3	1963......	635.1	8.2
1954......	206.0	7.5	1964......	1,522.8	18.2
1955......	129.5	4.4	1965......	777.0	7.2
1956......	517.3	16.7	1966......	2,041.7	19.2
1957......	200.8	5.6	1967[a].....	2,366.8	18.6
1958......	914.5	24.0	1968[a].....	2,044.1	13.6

[a]Estimate

Source: Deil S. Wright, Federal Grants-In-Aid; Perspectives and Alternatives (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1968), p. 64.

growth to the nature of federal-state-local fiscal relations. John Kenneth Galbraith, for example, notes a serious imbalance in the revenue capabilities between federal, state, and local governments. One consequence, he believes, is a constant pressure on the federal government to utilize its superior revenue position to help redress the balance at lower levels.[10]

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations contends that the most striking characteristic of the recent trend in the federal grant program has been not only growth, but widespread proliferation and excessive categorization.[11] The most commonly cited example is the case of water and sewer grants--four separate grants administered by four separate agencies, and all for the same purpose. Nowhere is this trend more evident than by glancing through one of the federal government's grant catalogs. The 1970 Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, for example, alphabetically lists 1013 programs by title and contains more than 1040 pages.[12]

A third trend has been the expansion of direct federal-local relationships. The concept is frequently referred to as "direct federalism." Large scale bypassing of the states, though not a recent concept, is characteristic of the 1960's. Of the thirty-eight programs in which the state plays no part (as of 1967), twenty-three were passed between 1961 and 1967. Direct federalism, whereby grants are made directly from the federal government to local units, and bypassing the states, began with the low-rent public housing program of 1937.[13] The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations notes several distinguishing characteristics of direct federalism:

> First, to some extent it is a response to the
> problems of big cities thought to be neglected
> by States, and as such reflects the independent
> political role of large urban centers. Second,
> however, direct Federal-local grants have never
> been limited to the big cities; such grants as
> public housing, urban renewal, education and
> airports have substantially aided small localities
> and suburbs as well. Third, direct federalism is
> a way of pinpointing target areas. It is a re-
> action to the more conventional system of distri-
> buting Federal funds through State governments
> and reflects growing impatience with State and
> local boundaries. Finally, in most programs,
> national control of local performance is rela-
> tively close.[14]

The main categories of direct federal-local transfers are in education,

housing and community development, airport construction, waste treatment

facilities, and other miscellaneous grants.[15] Figure 1-1 illustrates the

growth trend by functional category from 1940 through 1968.

Many credit the states with the development and growth of direct

federalism. Richard Leach believes that direct federalism can be con-

sidered a direct outgrowth of the failure of the states to either assist

local government or to remove the shackles which make them "too weak and

inept" to accomplish their purposes. A vacuum had been created and the

federal government stepped in by default.[16]

Terry Sanford also points an accusing finger at the states. He

cites the states with failure to cede to the cities adequate powers to

tax, zone surrounding areas, regulate housing, provide mass transporta-

tion, and acquire open space.[17]

James Maxwell, too, blames the states for direct federalism:

> But the fact is that most state governments have
> not been interested in urban renewal, low rent
> public housing, airport construction, and the war
> on poverty programs. Irresponsive to urban needs,
> the states did not resist federal-local action.

FIGURE 1-1.—Federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments, by
major functional categories 1940-1968

Billions of Dollars

Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System, Vol. 1
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 147.

> Accordingly, a direct federal-local relationship
> developed, federal aid being provided on a con-
> tractual basis to numerous local agencies without
> an intervening state authority; the interests of
> the state in the activity, as well as its respon-
> sibility to its local governments, were side-
> tracked.[18]

Finally, another recent trend has been the expanding use of project

grants. In 1962, approximately two-thirds of the federal grants in ef-

fect were of the project type. By 1966, this figure had increased to

three-quarters. In part, the increase in the use of project grants is

related to the growth of the direct federalism concept. Project grants

are typically used extensively in urban areas. As direct federal-local

relationships increased, the project grant has been a primary vehicle for

that increase.[19]

Types of Grants

There are a number of ways that grants may be described. They are

often categorized either by the administrative procedures involved in

their distribution or according to the conditions attached to their use.

Utilizing classification according to administrative procedures, grants

might be designated either as formula grants or project grants. A for-

mula grant is a grant which is distributed to all states, cities, or

other units of government, in accordance with a formula written into the

enacting law. These grants then become a matter of right and not of

privilege. Project grants, on the other hand, are grants to meet spe-

cific problems and are not necessarily spread uniformly.[20] Two states

as of the mid 1960's, for example, never passed the enabling legislation

necessary to allow localities to receive assistance for public housing

construction, although the program has been in effect since 1937.[21]

Both types of grants generally require some type of matching. The matching requirements may be of two kinds: variable matching which reflects the differing abilities of the recipient unit of government to support the aided function, and a fixed matching ratio under which each of the receiving units is required to share the same percentage of the program costs.[22]

According to conditions of use, grants might be considered either categorical grants or block grants. "Categorical grants are made for narrowly circumscribed purposes determined by the Congress to be of national concern. . . . Block grants are either unconditional fiscal grants to a specified level of government, or grants restricted to a broad program purpose. . . ."[23] An example of the latter might be the Partnership in Health Act of 1966, a block grant for health purposes. Figure 1-2 presents a diagram of the types of grants based upon conditions of use and the administrative procedure involved in the grant distribution.

Selma Mushkin and John Cotton describe grants according to condition of use under the following four typologies:

1. Categorical (or conditional) matching grant, open-end. A grant offering limited to use for a specified objective— requiring the recipient to match a fraction of the grant; no upper limit on the offering.

2. Categorical (or conditional) matching grant, closed-end. Same as above except that there is an upper limit to the offering to each state.

3. Categorical (or conditional) grant, no matching, closed-end. A grant offering limited to use for a specified objective of determined magnitude for which no matching on the part of the recipient is required.

4. General unconditional grant. A grant offering which the recipient is free to use as he desires and which has no matching requirement.[24]

FIGURE 1-2.—Relationship between grants categorized by conditions of use and by administrative
procedure involved in grant distribution

Grants	Type of assistance	Basis of offering
CONDITIONAL	CATEGORICAL GRANTS BLOCK PROGRAM GRANTS "TARGET" AREA GRANTS	FORMULA PROJECT APPROVAL
UNCONDITIONAL		FORMULA

Source: Selma J. Mushkin and John F. Cotton, <u>Sharing Federal Funds for State and Local Needs</u>
(New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 22.

Figure 1-3 illustrates the fiscal tradeoffs officials might make between

two programs, program X and program Y, under the aforementioned cate-

gories. In all cases, line AB represents the tradeoff options between

the two programs in the absence of grants. In all cases, program X will

receive the grant. Also in all cases, point 1 represents the decision-

makers judgment as to the best combination of programs X and Y to pur-

chase with a given dollar without grants.

An open-end categorical matching grant changes the budget constraint

AB to AC. The decision-maker then selects the new best combination of

programs. A selection of point 2 would produce an increase in both pro-

grams X and Y while selecting point 2' would decrease program Y while

substantially increasing program X.

The closed-end categorical matching grant is identical in operation

to the open-end grant up to a level where the allotment for program X is

exhausted (point D). Up to point D, changes in the levels of X and Y

could be determined by the combination of substitution and income effects

as with the open-end grant. Beyond D there is an income effect only and

the grant acts merely as an unrestricted addition to income.

The categorical grant with no required matching would produce

budget line AFG. In this case, F of program X is received at no cost to

the local jurisdiction. Note also that program Y is increased through a

substitution effect.

Finally, the unrestricted fiscal grant merely shifts the budgetary

decision line from AB to HJ and has a pure income effect. The suggested

effect would be to increase the magnitude of all programs.[25]

FIGURE 1-3.—Fiscal effects of grant-in-aid programs

a. Open-end matching
categorical grant

b. Closed-end matching
categorical grant

c. Categorical grant
with no matching

d. Unrestricted fiscal
grant

Source: Selma J. Mushkin and John F. Cotton, Sharing Federal
Funds for State and Local Needs (New York: Praeger,
1969), p. 34.

Grant Objectives

Grants, then, are designed with certain effects in mind—effects that go far beyond the narrow purpose of the specific grant. Implicit in all grants is the attempt by the granting authority to modify in some way the behavior of the grantee through the use of a "carrot and stick approach." Grants, at least theoretically, have a number of specific objectives which may be regarded as independent or as potentially complementing each other. Selma Mushkin and John Cotton present an excellent summary of these objectives.[26]

One objective is the promotion of national standards for programs which concern the nation as a whole. Within this guideline there are three types of issues:

1. Activities affecting the nation's security and defense.

2. Activities at the local or state level which if carried out (or if not carried out) would have significant impact on jurisdictions outside the state of origin—for example, education, pollution control, transportation.

3. Services considered to be part of the birthright of citizens of this nation—for example, programs to ensure that all American citizens have adequate opportunity for individual growth and for a decent standard of living (based on income, health care, housing, and so on).[27]

The mitigation of benefit spillover is a second objective that has received emphasis in recent years: the premise being that a state or local governmental unit, when making an expenditure or taxation decision, will make the decision based exclusively on the interest of the citizens in its jurisdiction. However, these decisions have effects beyond the government's jurisdiction. Presumably, this series of independent suboptimal decisions do not produce an optimum allocation of resources from a national viewpoint. Grants, then, can provide a correction for

such spillover. Since grants attempt to influence sub-unit spending,
presumably they tend to offset the spillover effect.

A third function advanced for grants-in-aid is that of narrowing
interstate financial differences. Through the use of formulas, usually
based upon a measure of wealth such as per capita income, the "poor"
states are often allocated a higher per capita amount than the "rich"
states. Attempts are made to equalize in a number of areas. Among them
is the attempt to equalize public revenues: certain grants are designed
to reduce the gap in per capita revenues between the states. Closely
related is the attempt to equalize public services. The notion of
equalizing effort to achieve some desired minimum level of services is
probably more feasible politically than equalization of revenues.
Finally, a much less ambitious and more probable goal is that of equali-
zation to achieve national program standards. This is based on the con-
tention that resolving explicit problems or providing certain minimum
standards should not place a differential burden on taxpayers in differ-
ent states. There is probably general concensus, for example, on certain
minimum benefits for the handicapped or on minimum standards for sewage
treatment.

Finally, a fourth proposed function of the grant-in-aid system,
and one which is obviously more controversial than the other three, would
use grants to change the balance of resources between the public and
private sectors. For example, the national revenue system could draw
revenues from the wealthy suburban sector of our metropolitan areas and
redirect them to the central cities. It might also be used to foster a
national policy concerning population movement or industrial location.

A Framework for Study

Any further discussion of grants must now move from generalities to the specific. Having thus far examined the grant-in-aid from an historic perspective, and having briefly examined some of the more common economic models, it is necessary to examine grants in relation to their environment and to devote some attention to their effects. Perhaps the most widely utilized "method" of recent years devoted to quantitative analysis of governmental outputs has been public policy analysis. The major impetus to this systematic and quantitative movement undoubtedly came from scholars in the field of economics. A major pathfinder in this area was Solomon Fabricant's The Trend of Governmental Activity in the United States Since 1900 published in 1952.[28] Fabricant used multiple correlation analysis to study the relationship between three factors (per capita personal income, population density, and percent of the population living in urban places) and the interstate variations in the level of 1942 operating expenditures of state and local governments. He found that these three variables "explained" 72 percent of the variation in expenditures for the various functions analyzed. Little of significance in this area followed Fabricant's work for almost ten years. It was not until 1961 that Glenn Fisher attempted a replecation of Fabricant's efforts. When using 1952 data, Fisher found that Fabricant's independent variables accounted for only a little more than 50 percent of the variation in levels of state and local expenditures.[29] In 1962, G. Ross Stephens and Henry J. Schmandt used a similar analytic framework to study local government revenue patterns.[30] They found that wealth and state fiscal policy appear to be more influential determinants of revenue patterns than do demographic characteristics.

This type of analysis was not solely limited to economic studies; in the early 1960's other academic disciplines recognized the utility of this analysis and were quick to adapt it to their own use. Of substantial interest is a 1963 study by two political scientists, Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson analyzing the relationships among interparty competition, socioeconomic conditions, and measurements of welfare policy in the American states.[31] They found significant relationships between each pair of the three sets of variables until they held socioeconomic conditions constant. They then noted that the relationship between interparty competition and welfare expenditures was substantially reduced. They thus concluded that interparty competition was not as influential a determinant of welfare policy as were socioeconomic characteristics. One writer credits Dawson and Robinson with creating a renewed interest in state and local politics.[32] Their contribution to the development of studies in policy analysis is significant for several reasons. Most important was the use of aggregate data. Their analysis was over all states and not merely a comparison of a few. These writers were also among the first to systematically explore the relationships between public policy outputs (welfare), socioeconomic variables, and political characteristics of the states.[33]

Of equal importance in the early 60's was the genesis of an analytical framework that would prove useful in giving theoretical meaning to analysis of public policy. David Easton's application of a systems approach to the study of political science is often credited with providing such a framework.[34] Thomas Dye developed a model based upon Easton's systems approach which he used as a basis for a major study

published in 1966.[35] Dye's model assumed that environmental inputs

operated through the political structure to produce outputs in terms of

policy actions. Outputs, then, were the dependent variables while en-

vironmental inputs and the political structure were the independent

variables. Dye used simple, partial, and multiple correlation analysis

to test his model. He used four socioeconomic characteristics of the

state's population as his environmental inputs: median family income,

industrialization, educational level, and urbanization. He also selected

four variables to represent the political system of the state: voter

participation, legislative malapportionment, interparty competition, and

degree of party control of the state government. Dye's outputs were the

commonly used state expenditures for education, highways, welfare, etc.

His conclusions were much the same as Dawson and Robinson's—that eco-

nomic and social characteristics of the state are more influential than

political system characteristics in shaping public policy in the states.[36]

While Dye has been criticized for selecting weak indicators of the po-

litical structure (Dye admitted that they were "crude at best"), nonethe-

less, his study stands as a landmark in policy analysis as it provided

the basic framework for the plethora of studies to follow.

The systems approach along with Dye's model have been widely

accepted as providing a conceptual framework for analysis at the local

as well as the state level. Any number of reasons can be cited for

using the systems approach in the search for understanding urban politi-

cal behavior. For one thing, it forces the researcher to separate

political activity from other activities. It also forces attention on

the specific components of the political system. In years past,

government research emphasized the formal, or structural aspects of the system. The systems approach forces a look at all of the components of the allocative system—not merely the structural. And finally, systems analysis is highly compatible with empirical research. The systems framework provides a useful model for the statistical and mathematical techniques in common use today.[37] Brett Hawkins is more pragmatic—he advocates systems analysis simply because he finds thinking in terms of systems useful.[38] Figure 1-4 presents a model of a political system, its environment, and output, which presents a clear frame of reference for continued discussion of urban policy analysis. The only concept not adequately portrayed in the model is the concept of feedback.[39] Feedback connotes a continuous process. By adding a feedback loop connecting output to the environment, we can think in terms of a complete pattern of interrelationships between environment, the political system, and outputs.

A number of urban theorists have examined the relationship between the characteristics of the environment and the characteristics of the urban political system—and often with varying results. Examining the political system, and the relationship between a number of its components, Edward Banfield and James Wilson reported difficulty in attempting to isolate the effects of the reform effort on local governments (reform here being considered the council manager form of government, non-partisan municipal elections and at-large representation).[40] This was especially true with attempts to distinguish between non-partisanship and at-large elections because they are so closely related. They did note a number of effects which they attributed to reformism. For example, reformism tends to favor incumbent councilmen, minority groups are disadvantaged

FIGURE 1-4.--A political system, its environment and output

Environment   Political System   Output

Education
Race
Residence
Income
Economic Base
Ethnicity
Power Structure

| Inputs of Demand and Support | A → | System Characteristics | B → | Decisions and Actions on Rewards and Deprivations |

C

e.g.
Votes
Policy preferences aggregated by
   parties and transmitted
Policy preferences aggregated by
   interest groups and transmitted
Issue-specific citizen group
   activities
Influence buying

e.g.
Type of ballot
Type of administra-
   tion
Type of election
   district
Council size
Policy preferences
   of councilmen

e.g.
Welfare expenditures
Education expenditures
Taxes
Provisions for utilities
   and sanitation
Provisions for police
   and fire protection

NOTE: Line C shows a direct impact of inputs on outputs, independent of the characteristics of the political system. Lines A and B show a set of relationships in which inputs shape system characteristics, which in turn shape the policy decisions that are made.

Source: Brett W. Hawkins, <u>Politics and Urban Policies</u> (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), p. 12.

19

by reform, non-partisan representation reduces the turnout of Democrats in local elections, there is little loyalty toward the mayor, and it is easier to eliminate corrupt or incompetent persons. In general, reformism is characterized by a good-government minded, middle-class domination.[41] Banfield and Wilson note that reform measures are common to cities having a public regarding (as opposed to private regarding) ethos. Their findings indicate that the public regarding ethos is characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, middle class (plus the Jewish community) while the private regarding ethos is characteristic of the lower class immigrant culture.[42]

The structure of government was also of empirical concern to Robert Alford and Harry Scoble.[43] They examined the relationship between social heterogeneity, class composition, population growth and mobility, and form of city government and, as expected, found them related. They found that Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, growing, and mobile cities were highly likely to be council-manager cities and that ethnically and religiously diverse, non-mobile, industrial cities are likely to be mayor-council cities. The commission form was found to be associated with a low educational level, low white-collar composition, and low ethnic and religious diversity.

Raymond Wolfinger and John Field also examined reformism in government, particularly with regard to the ethos theory.[44] They hypothesized that private-regarding behavior is not evenly distributed, that it might be related to the character of immigrant experience in America and that these experiences differed widely from one geographic region to another. When they examined the relationship between ethnicity and form of

government within geographic regions, they found that this control eliminated most of the apparent relationships. They suggest then that there is no nationally relevant level of ethnicity above which one form of government is likely to predominate. Wolfinger and Field conclude that one can do a much better job of predicting a city's form of government by knowing what part of the country it is in than by knowing anything about the characteristics of its population.

Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler, in another research effort, reach conclusions which are generally consistent with the Banfield and Wilson ethos theory.[45] Rather than dealing with a regional variable, however, they chose to explain it away by calling it a "potpourri of socio-economic, attitudinal, historical and cultural variations"[46] and then empirically ignore it. Their major thesis is that governments which have the characteristics of the reform movement behave differently from those which have unreformed institutions, even if the socioeconomic composition of the population is the same. They note that political institutions filter the input-output conversion process and that reform structures (council-manager government, at-large constituencies and nonpartisan elections) tend to minimize the impact of cleavage indicators on public policy. They conclude that cities with reformed and unreformed governments were not markedly different in terms of demographic variables— the important difference was in their behavior. Using multiple correlation coefficients, they were able to predict city outputs more exactly in unreformed than in reformed cities. They thus conclude that cities with reform structures are governed less on the basis of conflict and more on rational theory of administration than are their unreformed counterparts.

Again referring back to Figure 1-4, the relationship between the environment and the political system becomes apparent. The few studies cited in the previous paragraphs show a definite relationship between certain environmental variables and reformed or unreformed governmental structure. Furthermore, Lineberry and Fowler noted a difference in their ability to predict outputs between reformed and unreformed cities. This leads directly to the next task—that of examining the outputs of the model to see if the political system has an independent effect on outputs or whether outputs are based strictly on environmental variables. The vast majority of studies to date have emphasized the importance of the socioeconomic environment in explaining policy outputs. This poses some serious questions for political scientists. Do the system variables exert an independent influence on policy outputs or are these outputs determined solely by environmental characteristics?[47]

One obvious, and important, measure of the outputs of political systems is the dollar. Outputs are thus often examined in terms of dollars spent on given functions, both in the aggregate and on a per capita basis. Similarly, revenue sources are examined in a like manner. Alan Campbell and Seymour Sacks utilized such measures when examining metropolitan fiscal behavior.[48] In examining the relationship between state and local taxation, they noted that assignment of revenue responsibility to local governments is stimulative of total state and local tax revenue. Every additional 1 percent total state and local tax responsibility assigned to local government produces a corresponding total revenue increase of 1.3 percent.[49] They noted a significant difference in expenditure patterns between central cities and the suburban/rural rings

surrounding them. The area outside the central cities spends a much

higher percentage of its total fiscal package on education than do the

central cities. They also noted that the expenditure difference between

metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas was declining--a fact which they

attribute, in part, to the effects of state aid.[50] Differences in state

aid were significant in explaining expenditures but not taxes or revenues.

Oliver Williams and Charles Adrian present a typology which charac-

terizes four different roles for local government: (1) promoting eco-

nomic growth, (2) providing or securing life's amenities, (3) maintaining

(only) traditional services, and (4) arbitrating among conflicting inter-

ests.[51] They associate the council-manager form of government with

economic growth and/or amenities. The city manager is characterized as

> a member of a profession. He is a person skilled
> in the art of doing. But the manager is not simply
> an administrator, for his profession incorporates
> a sense of mission. . . . Career advancement for
> managers is based upon concrete achievement not
> simply satisfied councilmen . . . managers believe
> that they should do things that will enable them
> to "move up" to more desirable cities.[52]

Cities oriented toward economic growth or toward the provision of ameni-

ties provide the manager with the opportunity to "do things" which will

show concrete achievement. Maintaining traditional services is thus in

conflict with the professionalism of the city manager.

Bernard Booms studied cities in Ohio and Michigan with populations

between 25,000 and 100,000. He examined the expenditures of these

cities for the common functions of government--that is, police, fire,

interest on local debt, non-capital expenditures for highways, sanita-

tion, and public health.[53] He found a definite difference in expenditures

based upon type of government. He concluded that the form of government

has an independent effect on the level of per capita expenditures.

Booms found that expenditures were generally lower in council-manager

cities and concluded that "if one can accept an assumption of equal

(quality and quantity) output levels, then in some sense manager cities

might be considered more 'efficient' in that they supply the same per

capita levels of public service at lower costs per capita."[54]

Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone developed typologies of cities

based upon stages of development.[55] They characterized cities according

to these stages (retarded, transitional, advanced) or on phases between

the stages (emergent, maturing) based upon expenditures for planning and

amenities over a five year period. If a city's expenditures for both

planning and amenities fell below the median, the city was categorized

as retarded. If the city had expenditures above the median on only one

function, it was categorized as transitional; while if above the median

on both functions it was considered advanced. If a city moved from one

cell to the next during the five year period it was considered emergent

or maturing, depending upon its previous stage of development. Eulau

and Eyestone correlated the typologies with census data, expenditure

data, and questionnaire results (attitudes of city councilmen). They

found that a city's development typology was positively related to both

city size and growth rates. Development was not related to resource

capability even when size and growth were controlled. The policy

orientation of councilmen was not related to size, growth, or revenue

capability; however, councilmen more favorable to development were found

in the more developed cities while those favoring a wide scope of govern-

mental activity were generally found in those cities in intermediate

phases. They concluded that resource capability may be an important constraint on policy development in some cases; but the willingness of policy makers to draw upon those resources which are available seems to play a more important role in explaining city policy development.

This abridged summary of urban policy analysis is presented to introduce the general framework which will be used to analyze federal grants to local government. Accepting federal grants is unquestionably a local policy decision. The systems approach thus presents one useful way of examining grant utilization and impact.

Grant Use

Little has been done in the analysis of public policy that indicates which cities utilize federal grants and why; the effects attributed to grants are much more commonly discussed. In 1969, Morley Segal, A. Lee Fritschler, and Douglas Harman conducted a survey of all cities over 10,000 population concerning many aspects of intergovernmental relations.[56] One area of some interest was the result of their findings concerning distribution of federal grants. According to their data, all cities received an average of $52.25 in federal grants for every man, woman, and child residing within the city. Within this average, however, were many disparities in terms of size, geography, and city type.

Cities between 50,000 and 100,000 and those between 250,000 and 500,000 seem to benefit least from federal grants with grants per capita of only $39.95 and $38.74 respectively. The smaller communities appeared to do quite well—those in the 25,000 to 50,000 category received slightly more than $13.00 above the average for all cities. As Table 1-2 illustrates, cities under 250,000 seem to do quite well as far as grant

TABLE 1-2.—Federal grants to cities

Classification	Number of cities reporting	Total population (in thousands)	Number* of grants	Total* dollars (in thousands)	Grant per capita
Total, all cities	642	34,935	3,247	$1,825,490	$52.25
Population group					
Over 500,000	7	6,281	269	350,894	55.87
250,000-500,000	18	6,096	400	236,147	38.74
100,000-250,000	41	5,950	801	334,172	56.16
50,000-100,000	84	5,731	419	228,934	39.95
25,000- 50,000	160	5,626	566	367,179	65.26
10,000- 25,000	332	5,251	792	308,164	58.64
Geographic division					
New England	54	1,752	271	162,516	92.76
Mid-Atlantic	68	2,843	183	206,797	72.74
East North-Central	114	5,702	467	305,008	53.49
West North-Central	79	3,244	362	192,898	59.46
South Atlantic	90	5,379	496	298,500	55.49
East South-Central	27	2,221	189	147,315	66.33
West South-Central	59	3,669	527	94,679	25.80
Mountain	36	1,562	166	94,110	60.25
Pacific Coast	115	8,563	586	323,667	37.80
City type					
Central	118	21,026	1,680	1,065,547	50.68
Suburban	272	8,293	809	308,228	37.17
Independent	252	5,616	758	451,715	80.43

*These figures are based on information from the chief administrative officer of responding cities.

Source: Morley Segal and A. Lee Fritschler, "Emerging Patterns of Intergovernmental Relations," in International City Management Association, The Municipal Year Book 1970 (Washington: International City Management Association, 1970), p. 15.

receipts are concerned—they appear to be doing better on a per capita basis than are the large cities. These figures contradict the claim by many of the smaller cities that they are losing out to the larger cities in the battle for federal aid.[57]

Independent cities (those outside of SMSA's[58]) received a much higher per capita amount than did cities within SMSA's—central cities and their suburbs. Suburban communities average a very low $37.17 in per capita grants as compared to the $80.43 received by the independent cities.

Table 1-2 also shows the geographic distribution of grants. New England cities received a whopping $92.76 in per capita grants followed by Mid-Atlantic cities with $72.74. West South-Central cities appeared to be low in the scramble for federal aid with only $25.80 in grants per capita. It is impossible to determine the independent effects of city size, city type, and geographic region as statistical controls were not used to consider the independent contribution of each variable. It is possible (though unlikely), for example, that there is no real difference in per capita grant receipts due to region—that the variation is explained by the differences in average city size within the regions.

Organizing to deal with the sources of assistance from Washington has increasingly become a major activity of local governments. The most visible form that this organization takes is an office created to initiate and coordinate federal grants. Segal and Fritschler term this a "federal liaison office."[59] Table 1-3 shows the relationship between federal grants per capita and the existence of, and attitude toward, federal liaison offices. Cities are classified by population and city

TABLE 1-3.—Grants per capita and the existence of and attitude toward federal liaison offices[a]

Classification	Per capita grants	% Who have a FLO	% Who do not have a FLO but believe having one would help obtain grants	% Who have attempted to establish a FLO
"Successful Believers"[b]				
Over 500,000	$55.87	62	80	40
Central cities	50.68	54	63	18
"Unsuccessful Believers"[b]				
250,000 to 500,000	38.74	60	100	25
"Successful Nonbelievers"[b]				
100,000 to 250,000	56.16	47	46	19
25,000 to 50,-00	65.26	21	52	6
10,000 to 25,000	58.64	6	47	7
Independent cities	80.43	33	57	9
"Unsuccessful Nonbelievers"[b]				
50,000 to 100,000	39.95	21	47	11
Suburban cities	37.17	45	34	5

[a]Information is taken from "Federal, State, Local Relationships," Urban Data Service, ICMA, December, 1969, Vol. 1, No. 12, Tables 10-12.

[b]"Successful" and "unsuccessful" refer to those jurisdictions above and below the average grant per capita of $52.25. "Believers" and "Non-believers" refer to those jurisdictions that seem to support the idea of having a federal liaison office and those that do not.

Source: Morley Segal and A. Lee Fritschler, "Emerging Patterns of Intergovernmental Relations," in International City Management Association, The Municipal Year Book 1970 (Washington: International City Management Association, 1970), p. 18.

type as successful believers, unsuccessful believers, successful

nonbelievers, and unsuccessful nonbelievers, depending on per capita

grants and the percent of cities having a federal liaison office. The

authors note that the successful believers are the large cities which

receive a large amount of grant money and also attempt to tie into the

intergovernmental system (as indicated by the percent with a federal

liaison office). The unsuccessful believers are the cities with popula-

tions of 250,000 to 500,000. A high percent of these cities have estab-

lished federal liaison offices but they receive a low level of per

capita aid. Segal and Fritschler have similarly categorized the smaller

cities (under 250,000) and found them to be either successful nonbelievers

or unsuccessful nonbelievers.[60] A different description might be appro-

priate, however, if the number of grants per city from Table 1-2 is

compared with the percent of cities having a federal liaison office

(Table 1-3). This comparison is shown in Table 1-4. Note that the

number of grants per city rises both as population and the percent of

cities with a federal liaison office increases. Thus cities that are

unsuccessful when considering per capita grants only are quite success-

ful when considering number of grants. It is possible that both criteria

are valid. Perhaps economies of scale contribute to the fluctuations in

per capita grants. In any event, Table 1-4 shows the relationship

between city size, percent of cities with a federal liaison office, and

number of grants per city. A causal relationship cannot be established.

It is noted, however, that there is a positive relationship between city

size and both percent of cities having a federal liaison office and grant

success as measured by number of grants per city. It is also noted that

TABLE 1-4.--Grants per city as compared to the percent of cities with a federal liaison office

Classification	Number of grants per city[a]	Percent of cities with a federal liaison office[b]	Average dollars per city[a] (in thousands)
Population group			
Over 500,000	38.4	62	50,127
250,000 to 500,000	22.2	60	13,119
100,000 to 250,000	19.5	47	8,150
50,000 to 100,000	5.0	21	2,725
25,000 to 50,000	4.5	21	2,294
10,000 to 25,000	2.4	6	928

[a]Computed from information in Table 1-2.

[b]From Table 1-2.

a linear relationship does not exist between any of the three aforementioned variables and grant success as measured by per capita grants. Table 1-4 also shows the average total dollars per city for each of the population categories. This financial measure indicates a relationship between city size and total grant-in-aid dollars received. Thus while grants per capita does not increase as city size increases, total dollars in grant money does appear to be related to city size.

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, while presenting no empirical evidence, also related grants to city size. They believe that the present grant system has led to confusion and uncertainty as to what grants are available, how to apply for them, what the requirements are, etc. This, they say, gives an advantage to the larger and better organized states and cities in getting federal money.[61]

A study somewhat similar to Segal and Fritschler's examined some of the influences on city managers' knowledge of grant-in-aid programs in four states.[62] Ted Hebert and Richard Bingham initially examined the relationship between the city managers' knowledge of grants with Congressional obligations and found a low, but significant, relationship. Managers showed a greater knowledge of those programs with the most money available. They also noted a substantial difference in knowledge depending upon the federal department or agency managing or operating the program. The programs sponsored by the Department of Housing and Urban Development were clearly the best known. The authors found a positive relationship between knowledge of grants and managers' education but noted little relationship between knowledge and managers' experience in terms of number of years as a city manager.

The strongest relationship of the study was shown when city size was correlated with the manager's knowledge. Managers in the larger cities were clearly more knowledgable of grant programs than were their counterparts in smaller cities. When the authors reexamined the relationship between knowledge and education while controlling for size, they found that the importance of education was substantially reduced. Education was only significantly related to the manager's knowledge in the large cities. The relationship between city size and knowledge held, however, when education was controlled. The study also confirmed the Segal and Fritschler findings relating city size to the use of a grantsman (or federal liaison office). The probability that a city utilizes the services of a grantsman increases as city size increases. The fact that a city utilized a grantsman apparently has little relationship to the manager's knowledge of grants. It was only in very small cities (less than 5,000 population) where managers' having either a full or part-time grantsman on their staff indicated a level of knowledge higher than those managers without grantsmen.

The two studies, Segal and Fritschler, and Hebert and Bingham, complement each other. Both emphasize the importance of city size when examining federal grant-in-aid programs, specifically concerning the apparent relationships between size, number of grants used, and knowledge. The relationship between size and use of a grantsman or federal liaison office was also confirmed. Obviously weaker relationships were shown when grants were examined in dollar terms. No relationship was shown between city size and grants on a per capita basis and the relationship between manager's grant knowledge and grant obligations was

shown to be weak. About all that can be confirmed is the obvious

premise that large cities receive more grant money than small cities.

The sparse literature clearly shows the relationship between one en-

vironmental variable, city size, and the political variable, grant use.

Grant Effects

Referring again to Figure 1-4, it is necessary to examine the out-

put side of the model. Once a city decides to use federal grants, what

difference does it make? What effect do grants have? Far and away, the

effects of grants have been a dominant concern of economists with the

National Tax Journal acting as the primary vehicle for continuing debate.

Obviously, each grant is designed for a specific purpose and should have

an effect that is at least slightly different from any other grant.

Chapter II will examine in depth the past studies dealing with public

housing and urban renewal—the specific grants which form the basis of

this study. The purpose here will be to examine the general effects of

grants, primarily from a fiscal perspective.

A common complaint about federal grants concerns their effect upon

state and local expenditures. Grants are often accused of causing a

"skewing" of state and local budgets. These governments are induced to

change their expenditure patterns away from what they would otherwise

prefer and to budget money that will allow them to spend more of their

resources on programs with high federal matching.[63] To some degree, of

course, this is exactly what federal grants are designed to do—encourage

participation in programs which foster national goals. If lower units

of government can be persuaded fiscally to change policies which conflict

with national goals (maintaining separate segregated schools, for example), skewing is the desired result.

Federal grants to local government may be said to have three effects: they are either additive, stimulative, or substitutive.[64] Actually, most grants are probably some combination of all three. An additive effect might be achieved when a fiscal grant is provided, generally conditionally, which "adds to" funds available for a given objective (or objectives). In pure form, an additive effect, is almost unknown for it causes no change in normal fiscal behavior of the receiving unit. To cause no change in fiscal behavior, an additive grant would most likely have to be categorical and one-time. A one-time grant to local libraries for additional book purchases could conceivably have an additive effect--that is if the normally budgeted funds for book purchases were not transferred to another function. A stimulative effect occurs when the budgetary unit increases its revenue beyond what it would normally raise to provide funds to meet the matching requirements of the grant. A perfect stimulative effect would occur if the budgetary unit's increased revenue was at least equal to its matching share. A perfect substitutive effect occurs when the budgetary unit does not increase revenue to provide funds for matching but instead transfers the required funds from another function. The new function is thus substituted for the old.

Mushkin and Cotton provide a schematic display of stimulative and substitutive effects (Figure 1-5).[65] The vertical axis measures the level of expenditures of a function for which a federal grant is not provided (Y) while the horizontal axis measures the level of expenditures

FIGURE 1-5.--Stimulative and substitutive effects of grant-in-aid programs

Level for Program X

of a function for which a grant is intended (X). Line AB represents the
budget constraint applied to programs X and Y prior to the grant, with
point C representing the chosen expenditure package that the unit would
adopt in the absence of grants.

If the unit were to move to any point along line CD when offered
the grant, the grant would have a perfect substitutive effect since it
would produce no increase in the level of X. Adopting a program of ex-
penditures which fell in the area bounded by line DCE, would give the
grant a partial substitutive effect. A portion of the added revenues
would be diverted to programs for which the grant was not intended.
Points on line CE are illustrative of a perfect additive effect. In
this case the grant is neither substitutive for other programs nor stimu-
lative of increased expenditures for the grant program by the unit con-
cerned. And finally, perfect stimulation occurs if the program distribu-
tion were to fall into the area bounded by ECB and the X axis. All
additional revenue raised by the unit is ear-marked for the grant pro-
gram, program X.

Thus far, the fiscal effects of grants have been examined in a
theoretical vein--no attempt has been made to look at studies in a
practical light. The discussion will turn to a review of recent litera-
ture concerning general grant effects to see if grants actually have the
substitutive and/or stimulative effects often attributed to them.
Studies covered in this examination generally utilize empirical methods
on the effects of grants on state and/or local governments. Since many
of these studies draw on the work of predecessors, this short review will
present the major findings ordered by date rather than conclusion. The
final paragraphs will attempt to summarize the findings.

In a case study of Philadelphia published in 1961, W. H. Brown and C. E. Gilbert noted the "skewing" effect later publicized by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.[66] They found that federally (and state) funded projects were given a preference in Philadelphia's capital programming. They concluded that revenue type, in this case "free" money, may bias a city's resource allocations.

Seymour Sacks and Robert Harris empirically examined the effects of grants.[67] They viewed the theoretical effect of federal grants as stimulative of state expenditures. Their research, in fact, confirmed their a priori assumption. They noted the fact that a high intergovernmental flow of funds is related to a high level of expenditures for state and local governments combined. They also noted that in areas where federal aid is substantial, for example in welfare and highway expenditures, "federal aid is by far the most important determinant of expenditures as measured by the beta weights."[68]

George Bishop found education grants more substitutive than stimulative.[69] In a study of state aid to education in New England, he measured the effect of state aid to local schools and found that the primary effect was to substitute state aid for the local tax burden.

Roy Bahl and Robert Saunders were more interested in the determinants of changes in state and local expenditures, a la Fabricant, than in the effects of grants per se.[70] They used multiple regression analysis and found that, of their five variables, per capita federal grants to states was the only factor which significantly affects changes in state and local per capita spending. They conclude that

> the generally diminished ability of Fabricant's
> three standard variables to explain variations

> in the level of per capita state and local
> expenditures is primarily due to the increas-
> ing importance of federal aid as a determinant
> of state and local spending.[71]

Bernard Booms studied the effects of state aid on cities with popu-

lations between 25,000 and 100,000 in Ohio and Michigan and reached some

surprising conclusions.[72] He noted that the effect of state aid in Ohio

is substantially different from the effect in Michigan. In Ohio he found

aid to be both stimulative and substitutive while in Michigan it appeared

that state aid was purely stimulative.

Jack Osman used two classes of federal aid variables--per capita

aid to the function under study and per capita aid to all other functions

when examining the impact of federal grants on lower units of government.[73]

He concluded that federal aid was stimulatory toward those functions to

which it was directed and was not merely substitutive. He attempted to

measure the stimulatory effects of federal aid to six common functions

(i.e., highways, health and hospitals, local schools, etc.) and found

that per capita expenditures for a given function would rise with both

increases in per capita federal aid to the particular function under study

and with increases in per capita aid to all other functions.[74] Wallace

Oates, however, is critical of Osman's study on methodological grounds--

"the econometric problems inherent in Osman's study are such that we

cannot place much credibility in his results."[75]

L. R. Gabler and Joel Brest raise a serious methodological ques-

tion.[76] They note a tendency to "double-count" the aid money. Since

federal grant programs require matching funds, every dollar of federal

aid will represent a fixed fraction of the resultant expenditure. Thus

some portion of total state and local expenditure for a given function

will correlate perfectly with federal matching funds. This is likely to exaggerate the overall statistical association between the expenditures for the given function and federal grants for that function.

Edward Gramlich developed a time series statistical model designed to compare the effects of several alternative policies which might influence total state and local expenditures.[77] Table 1-5 shows his computed responses to a hypothetical billion dollar federal policy action. He finds that there is little doubt that matching grants, even though accompanied by a substitution effect, are an effective means of stimulating state and local expenditures. The performance of the block grants in the model, especially the unconditional block grant, was rather disappointing. If block grants were offered with no federal strings attached, they increased expenditures by less than 30 percent of the grant.

In a later article, Gramlich affirmed his earlier findings.[78] He notes the weakness of unconditional grants as stimulators of state spending. He thus speculates that the various conditions which may be attached to federal grants, matching requirements or effort formulas, appear to be most essential in insuring that grants are stimulative of state and local spending.

David Smith examined the "skewing" or distortion issue.[79] Smith demonstrated that the distortion thesis is based upon the assumption that demand for the aided function is price elastic and that skewing could not occur where the demand for the aided function or service is price inelastic. He found that lower level governments respond to grants with increased spending. Spending increases cover not only the aided functions, but the unaided. Grants, then, subsidize a wide range of

TABLE 1-5.--State and local expenditure response to a hypothetical
billion dollar policy action, ranked by potency

Policy action	Expenditure response (billions)
1. Open market purchase (monitary policy)	1.36
2. Matching grant-in-aid	1.21
3. Block grant which has to be spent	1.00
4. Income tax credit	.55
5. Block grant with tax effort formula	.55
6. Unconditional block grant	.28
7. Federal income tax cut	.05

tie (between rows 4 and 5)

Source: Edward M. Gramlich, "Alternate Federal Policies for
Stimulating State and Local Expenditures: A Comparison
of their Effects," National Tax Journal, XXI (June, 1968),
128.

governmental activities—well beyond the aided function. Smith's conclusions are substantially the same as Osman's (mentioned earlier).

James Wilde substantiated the work by Gramlich.[80] He developed a basic model designed to analyze how grant-in-aid programs might be expected to influence the expenditure level of the recipient governments. He concludes that only specific matching grants can be expected to increase expenditures by more than the amount of aid given.

Finally, Thomas O'Brien found that federal grants are stimulative of the function being aided but that expenditures for unaided functions are reduced.[81] The overall effect, however, has been stimulative when examining total state and local expenditures. O'Brien used a simultaneous equation approach to test the relationship between grants and state and local expenditures and concluded that grants and expenditures are not simultaneously determined. Grants then, he concludes, are exogenous variables in the determination of expenditures. His estimates "show that federal grants have stimulated state-local government expenditures from own funds on aided categories and have caused a reallocation of expenditures on other categories."[82]

Thus the literature concerned with the aggregate analysis of grant effects is mixed. It is difficult to draw any definite conclusions from a review of the literature, but it is possible to note certain trends. First, the literature does suggest some skewing of budgets, but this does not appear to be either substantial or significant. As in Philadelphia, federal grants to cities are probably far more likely to effect capital accounts and bonded debt rather than a city's operating budget.

Second, most studies attribute some stimulative effect to federal matching grants. The only question here appears to be one of degree. Unconditional block grants are not considered stimulative to any substantial degree but such is not the case with the matching grant. Matching grants, either project or formula, are found to be highly stimulative—especially with regard to the aided function. The literature is not clear concerning the unaided functions. Some studies empirically show that grants have a stimulative effect on unaided as well as aided functions while others show that there is no stimulative effect on the unaided functions.

Closely tied to the issue of stimulation toward unaided functions is the issue of substitution. Again, findings are mixed. Some studies report a clear substitution effect while others report that substitution does not occur, or that the effect is so small as to be negligible. Some substitution undoubtedly does occur but it is extremely difficult to determine empirically. Such studies must be done over time and probably by a combined mathematician/seer. Not only quantitative analysis is needed but the researcher must predict what a unit's expenditure pattern would have been like had the unit not used the grant—a highly improbable task.

Notes

[1] Sophie R. Dales, "Federal Grants to State and Local Governments, 1967-68," _Social Security Bulletin_, XXXII (August, 1969), 21.

[2] _Ibid._, 21-22.

[3] James A. Maxwell, _Financing State and Local Governments_ (Revised ed.; Washington: Brookings Institution, 1969), p. 52.

[4] Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, _Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System_, Vol. 1 (2 vols.; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 138.

[5] _Ibid._, p. 139. See also Maxwell, _Financing State and Local Governments_, p. 52.

[6] Advisory Commission, _Fiscal Balance_, Vol. 1, p. 139.

[7] Maxwell, _Financing State and Local Governments_, p. 54.

[8] Advisory Commission, _Fiscal Balance_, Vol. 1, p. 139.

[9] Deil S. Wright, _Federal Grants-In-Aid; Perspectives and Alternatives_ (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1968), pp. 64-65; and F. Ted Hebert and Richard D. Bingham, _Personal and Environmental Influences upon the City Manager's Knowledge of Federal Grant-In-Aid Programs_ (Norman, Okla.: Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma, 1972), p. 1.

[10] John Kenneth Galbraith, _The Affluent Society_ (New York: New American Library, 1958), pp. 206-207.

[11] Advisory Commission, _Fiscal Balance_, Vol. 1, p. 150.

[12] U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity, _Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance_ (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970).

[13] Advisory Commission, _Fiscal Balance_, Vol. 1, pp. 164-165.

[14] _Ibid._, p. 165.

[15] Maxwell, _Financing State and Local Governments_, pp. 55-56.

[16] Richard H. Leach, _American Federalism_ (New York: Norton, 1970), pp. 135 and 150.

[17] Terry Sanford, _Storm Over the States_ (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), p. 24.

[18] Maxwell, _Financing State and Local Governments_, p. 56.

[19]Advisory Commission, Fiscal Balance, Vol. 1, pp. 153-154.

[20]Ibid., p. 138.

[21]As of 1972, all states had passed the necessary enabling legislation so that their local governments could participate in the housing program.

[22]Advisory Commission, Fiscal Balance, Vol. 1, p. 138.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Selma J. Mushkin and John F. Cotton, Sharing Federal Funds for State and Local Needs (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 33.

[25]Ibid., pp. 34-35.

[26]Ibid., pp. 24-30.

[27]Ibid., p. 25.

[28]Solomon Fabricant, The Trend of Governmental Activity in the United States Since 1900 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952).

[29]Glenn W. Fisher, "Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures: A Preliminary Analysis," National Tax Journal, XVI (December, 1961), 349-355.

[30]G. Ross Stephens and Henry J. Schmandt, "Revenue Patterns of Local Governments," National Tax Journal, XV (December, 1962), 432-437.

[31]Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," Journal of Politics, XXV (May, 1963), 265-289.

[32]David R. Morgan, Handbook of State Policy Indicators (Norman, Okla.: Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma, 1971), p. 2.

[33]Ibid.

[34]David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965); and David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965).

[35]Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

[36]Ibid., p. 296.

[37]David R. Morgan and Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, eds., Urban Political Analysis: A Systems Approach (New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 9-11.

[38]Brett W. Hawkins, Politics and Urban Policies (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), p. 11.

[39]For a discussion of feedback see Edmund P. Fowler and Robert L. Lineberry, "Patterns of Feedback in City Politics," in Urban Political Analysis, ed. by Morgan and Kirkpatrick, pp. 361-367.

[40]Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 94.

[41]Ibid., pp. 138-182.

[42]Ibid., pp. 234-240.

[43]Robert R. Alford and Harry M. Scoble, "Political and Socio-economic Characteristics of American Cities," in The Municipal Year Book 1965 ed. by Orin F. Nolting and David S. Arnold (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1965), pp. 85-97.

[44]Raymond E. Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," American Political Science Review, LX (June, 1966), 306-326.

[45]Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, LXI (September, 1967), 701-716.

[46]Ibid., 707.

[47]Hawkins, Politics and Urban Policies, p. 85.

[48]Alan K. Campbell and Seymour Sacks, Metropolitan America (New York: Free Press, 1967).

[49]Ibid., pp. 53-66.

[50]Ibid., pp. 82-97.

[51]Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, "Community Types and Policy Differences," in City Politics and Public Policy ed. by James Q. Wilson (New York: Wiley, 1968), pp. 17-36.

[52]Ibid., p. 33.

[53]Bernard H. Booms, "City Governmental Form and Public Expenditure Levels," National Tax Journal, XIX (June, 1966), 187-199.

[54]Ibid., 192.

[55]Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis," American Political Science Review, LXII (March, 1968), 124-143; and Robert Eyestone and Heinz Eulau, "City Councils and Policy Outcomes: Developmental Profiles," in City Politics and Policy ed. by Wilson, pp. 37-65.

[56]Morley Segal and A. Lee Fritschler, "Emerging Patterns of Inter-governmental Relations," in International City Management Association, The Municipal Year Book 1970 (Washington: International City Management Association, 1970), pp. 13-38.

[57]Advisory Commission, Fiscal Balance, Vol. 1, p. 12.

[58]Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.

[59]Segal and Fritschler, "Emerging Patterns," p. 17.

[60]Ibid., pp. 17-18.

[61]Advisory Commission, Fiscal Balance, Vol. 1, p. 12.

[62]F. Ted Hebert and Richard D. Bingham, "The City Manager's Knowledge of Grants-In-Aid: Some Personal and Environmental Influences," Urban Affairs Quarterly, VII (March, 1972), 303-306; and Hebert and Bingham, Personal and Environmental Influences.

[63]Advisory Commission, Fiscal Balance, Vol. 1, p. 160.

[64]A good background discussion of the three financial effects may be found in Deil S. Wright, "The States and Intergovernmental Relations," Publius, I (Winter, 1972), 15-18.

[65]Mushkin and Cotton, Sharing Federal Funds, pp. 94-95.

[66]W. H. Brown, Jr., and C. E. Gilbert, Planning Municipal Investment: A Case Study of Philadelphia (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1961), p. 270.

[67]Seymour Sacks and Robert Harris, "The Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures and Intergovernmental Flow of Funds," National Tax Journal, XVII (March, 1964), 75-85.

[68]Ibid., 85.

[69]George A. Bishop, "Stimulative Versus Substitutive Effects of State School Aid in New England," National Tax Journal, XVII (June, 1964), 133-143.

[70]Roy W. Bahl, Jr., and Robert J. Saunders, "Determinants of Changes in State and Local Government Expenditures," National Tax Journal, XVIII (March, 1965), 50-57.

[71]Ibid., 57.

[72]Booms, "City Governmental Form."

[73]Jack W. Osman, "The Dual Impact of Federal Aid on State and Local Government Expenditures," National Tax Journal, XIX (December, 1966), 362-373.

[74]Ibid., 370.

[75]Wallace E. Oates, "The Dual Impact of Federal Aid on State and Local Government Expenditures: A Comment," National Tax Journal, XXI (June, 1968), 220-223.

[76]L. R. Gabler and Joel I. Brest, "Interstate Variations in Per Capita Highway Expenditures," National Tax Journal, XX (March, 1967), 78-85.

[77]Edward M. Gramlich, "Alternative Federal Policies for Stimulating State and Local Expenditures: A Comparison of Their Effects," National Tax Journal, XXI (June, 1968), 119-129.

[78]Edward M. Gramlich, "A Clarification and A Correction," National Tax Journal, XXII (June, 1969), 286-290.

[79]David L. Smith, "The Response of State and Local Governments to Federal Grants," National Tax Journal, XXI (September, 1968), 349-357.

[80]James A. Wilde, "The Expenditure Effects of Grant-In-Aid Programs," National Tax Journal, XXI (September, 1968), 340-347.

[81]Thomas O'Brien, "Grants-In-Aid: Some Further Answers," National Tax Journal, XXIV (March, 1971), 65-77.

[82]Ibid., 70.

CHAPTER II

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Although the studies reviewed earlier provide a basis for the analysis of federal grants to local governments, the limitations of aggregative analysis are readily apparent. This approach has not been helpful in determining patterns of grant use or in attempting to identify characteristics which might stimulate a local government to take advantage of federal offerings. Furthermore, the aggregative approach only scratches the surface of the entire area of grant effects since the approach is primarily concerned with the fiscal effects of grants on recipient governmental units. Economist David Smith, author of a number of such aggregative studies, recognizes the need to change approaches:

> In the end, it may be that the usefulness of
> aggregative studies of state and local spending
> has been maximized or even pushed to the point
> of diminishing returns, and the time has come
> for disaggregative studies of state-local be-
> havior. In particular, I think that attention
> should be devoted to detailed analysis of the
> relative valuation of various public goods and
> to the response of state and local governments
> to specific grant programs.[1]

Unfortunately, most of the analyses of grant programs have taken the form of case studies. Brett Hawkins notes the plentiful supply of descriptive studies of state and federal grants to local governments and the laws governing their use.[2] He complains that a major weakness in the

48

available literature is the lack of attempts to assess the impact of grants on local governments. Hawkins finds that little of the research is guided by a theoretical perspective, almost none involves systematic comparison of one community with another, and very few are quantitative in nature.

Lee Fritschler and Morley Segal note the movement to apply advanced methodological and analytical techniques to most of the subfields of political science.[3] They lament, however, the lack of professional attention given to intergovernmental relations. They refer to intergovernmental relations as "a kind of methodological Cinderella after midnight."[4]

This study will utilize a disaggregative approach to explore two fundamental questions pertaining to federal grants to local governments. First, why do some cities make extensive use of federal grants while other cities virtually ignore them? Second, what impact have these grants actually had on cities?

Selection of the Grant Programs

The first task in developing the analytic framework for grant study was the selection of the specific grant programs to be analyzed. A number of criteria were used in the selection process. The first might be considered obvious: since this study is concerned with "direct federalism" or federal-local relations, only grants made directly to local units of government with a minimum of state interference were considered. Secondly, and closely related, only project grants requiring application were considered. In order to study patterns of grant use, grants distributed automatically on a formula basis have not been included. Thirdly, grant history was considered in selection. The grant programs had to have been

in existence long enough (theoretically at least) to have had a
measurable impact. Closely related is the fourth criterion. The grants
must have a history of appropriations which are large enough over time
to have been capable of producing change and to have been utilized by a
reasonable number of cities. The grants were also limited to those with
a physical impact. Many of today's grants can only be judged on a "cases
treated" basis—people seen, workers trained, etc., but the actual effects
of the grants are never known. Leonard Goodwin, for example, makes a good
case against the federal government's Work Incentive Program when he
examines the job success of the graduates rather than figures concerning
"people trained."[5] Thus, the programs selected for analysis here are
those with a measurable physical impact. The sixth criterion relates
closely to the fourth. Programs selected must be well known and they must
present a real alternative to city governments. If it is unlikely that
city officials are aware of the grants under study, findings concerning
patterns of use might be unreliable or misleading. The final criterion
is one of very practical consideration—data availability. It would be
foolish to select grant programs for analysis only to discover that data
were not available on a city-by-city basis. Data compiled only by SMSA's,
for example, would have little practical use in this study. Since the
study deals with effects and changes over time (insofar as possible), data
must also be available for the entire period under study, not just a por-
tion of it. Recordkeeping in some reasonably accessible format is a new
development with many federal agencies—a development that may be the only
lasting contribution of PPBS.[6]

Only two programs were found to adequately satisfy all of the aforementioned criteria: (1) public housing and (2) urban renewal. Even these programs will be limited. The study of public housing is confined only to the construction and occupation of low-income public housing units by local housing authorities. Not included are programs such as the 202 and 221(d)(3) Below Market Interest Rate programs, Rent Supplement programs, or FHA 235 or 236 subsidy programs. A wide range of urban renewal programs have been selected for analysis. The programs included are: (1) community renewal programs, (2) urban renewal projects, (3) code enforcement projects, (4) demolition projects, (5) neighborhood development programs, (6) interim assistance programs, (7) certified area programs, and (8) demonstration programs. The nature of each of these programs will be examined later in this chapter.

History

Low-income public housing was born in the depression of the 1930's. In 1933, the Public Works Administration, established by the National Industrial Recovery Act to administer public works projects, constructed some 21,600 units of housing. This was prior to the enactment of the Housing Act of 1937.[7] The PWA Housing Division was authorized to lend money to limited-dividend corporations involved in slum clearance or construction of low-income housing and to buy, condemn, sell, or lease property while developing new projects itself. The PWA program met with limited success. The limited-dividend projects succeeded primarily as a vehicle by which real estate agents unloaded property at excessive valuation on the government. A 1935 Federal Court ruling deprived the Housing Division of condemnation power which severely weakened the

program. And finally, many of the projects that were constructed under

the Act were too expensive for the poor or the working class to afford.

Despite the failures, the PWA projects set a precedent for future policy.[8]

Low-rent public housing as we know it today began with the United

States Housing Act of 1937.[9]

> An act to provide financial assistance to the
> states and political subdivisions thereof for
> the elimination of unsafe and unsanitary hous-
> ing conditions, for the eradication of slums,
> for the provision of decent, safe, and sanitary
> dwellings for families of low income, and for
> the reduction of unemployment and the stimula-
> tion of business activity, to create a United
> States Housing Authority, and for other pur-
> poses.[10]

Public housing, then, was a program of multiple goals. Not only

designed to provide "decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings" for low-income

families, but the public housing program was designed to aid unemployment

and to stimulate business.

The public housing program places the responsibility for design,

development, and project management on local government. These functions

are generally performed by an independent local governmental agency called

a housing authority. The governing officers are usually appointed by the

chief elective officer of the city; however, the city council may, and

sometimes does, appoint itself as the local housing authority. To receive

federal assistance, the local authority must have the approval of both the

local government and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. A

wide variety of state laws lay down even more stringent requirements--

some, for example, require local government approval of specific sites.

The cost of housing authority project development is financed by issuance

and sale of long-term, tax-exempt bonds while rents in public housing are

lowered through a number of subsidies. The federal government annually contributes an amount equal to the debt retirement costs. Over and above this, the government pays a subsidy to the local authority for each of the elderly, disabled, and poor that it houses. Finally, authority property is tax-exempt--instead of the normal real estate taxes on real property, authorities pay a much lower payment in lieu of taxes.[11] Operating expenses for the authority are paid by rental income plus the applicable subsidies mentioned above.

The next major change in the housing program was contained in the Housing Act of 1949, some twelve years after the original act; but the public housing sections of the act were little changed. The provisions for loans and subsidies remained the same as in the 1937 act but with 135,000 new housing structures authorized per year for the next six years. The President was also empowered to increase or reduce this figure (within specified limits) upon the recommendations of his Council of Economic Advisors. The unique feature of the 1949 act was Title I.[12] Title I provided for slum clearance and a redevelopment program which has since evolved into the present-day urban renewal program. It became the responsibility of local government to clear slums and blighted areas and to provide land for private enterprise to construct residential, commercial, or industrial facilities on the renewed land. Title I authorized loans to cities to plan for the redevelopment of blighted areas. A city would complete the planning for the redevelopment of an area and submit the plans to the federal government for approval. Once the project was approved, the city would purchase the land, clear it, develop it according to the approved plan (i.e., streets, etc.), and sell the land to a

private developer--at a price usually substantially less than acquisition

and clearance costs. Two-thirds of the difference between what the city

paid and the price received for the land was paid for by a federal grant

with the remaining one-third of the cost being borne by the city. Bellush

and Hausknecht note that:

> There is apparent in the law a not-too-subtle
> shift to concern with private enterprise rather
> than the very real housing need of the society.
> Thus, Title I helps clear slums by helping pri-
> vate entrepreneurs, but Title I does nothing
> about the reverse side of the coin--standard
> housing for the displaced slum dweller. In
> 1937, public housing was seen, in part at least,
> as a means of alleviating the distress of the
> slum dweller. In 1949 such housing is seen as
> a prerequisite for private redevelopment projects;
> that is, public housing is justified to a larger
> extent for those displaced by private projects
> who cannot find housing at rents they can afford.
> In sum, the emphasis shifts from the social and
> economic situation of the slum resident to the
> needs of private enterprise.[13]

The Housing Act of 1954 added a new dimension to both public hous-

ing and urban renewal. It required that communities develop a "workable

program" before they could become eligible for assistance under the

public housing, urban renewal, and later the 221(d)(3) programs.[14]

> The workable program shall include an official
> plan of action, as it exists from time to time,
> for effectively dealing with the problem of urban
> slums and blight within the community and for
> the establishment and preservation of a well-
> planned community with well-organized residential
> neighborhoods of decent homes and suitable living
> environment for adequate family life.[15]

The workable program requirement thus forced the community to plan

and to integrate renewal and public housing into the plan for community

development. The workable programs required master planning, zoning, fire

standards, and the adoption of building codes and ordinances.

The Housing Act of 1959 foretold another major trend in low-income

housing. Section 202 of the act authorized direct loans from the federal

government to nonprofit sponsors of rental housing for the elderly and

the handicapped.[16] These loans were originally at a rate based on the

interest on outstanding federal debt, but this rate was later limited to

a maximum of 3 percent. The significance of Section 202 was the fact that

it recognized the need for a housing program for those families whose in-

comes were marginally above the eligibility for public housing. Secondly,

this was the first housing program where Congress authorized direct loans

at a below market interest rate to a private corporation--albeit a non-

profit private corporation; thus, the stage was set for the next major

change in housing policy--the Housing Act of 1961.

The Act of 1961 provided for a program commonly referred to as

221(d)(3) after the applicable section of the 1961 act. Section 221 was

> designed to assist private industry in providing
> housing for low- and moderate-income families
> and families displaced from urban renewal areas
> or as a result of governmental action.[17]

The 221(d)(3) Below Market Interest Rate (BMIR) program greatly in-

creased the opportunity for private development and investment in low-

income housing. The program authorized the FNMA (Federal National

Mortgage Association--commonly referred to as Fannie May) to purchase

mortgage loans made to limited-dividend profit-making organizations as

well as to nonprofit organizations. Calculation of the interest rate

was based on the interest rates on outstanding federal debt as with

Section 202 housing. By 1965 the interest on the federal debt had risen

to over 4 percent. The Housing Act of 1965 therefore pegged the below

market interest rate at a maximum of 3 percent. This rate applied to

both 202 and 221(d)(3) housing. Both programs, then, enjoyed a direct

federal subsidy since the Treasury ultimately made up the difference

between the federal borrowing rate and the 3 percent ceiling.[18] The act

of 1965 also introduced several other innovations into low-income housing,

one of which, the rent supplements program, was extremely controversial.[19]

The supplement program provided direct payment to private nonprofit or

limited-dividend organizations housing low-income tenants. Under the law,

the tenant was required to pay one-fourth of his income as rent, and the

federal government made up the difference between this amount and the

actual unit rental. Eligibility for the program was restricted to the

elderly, the handicapped, families displaced by urban renewal, other gov-

ernment action or natural disaster, and occupants of substandard housing.

The program had several substantial advantages. First, the amount of the

subsidy was related to a tenant's need; and second, housing costs to the

federal government were spread over a lengthy period of time. The impli-

cations of this program were clear—it fostered economic as well as racial

integration. The program, however, was given Congressional approval only

by a slim margin and has since been restricted in a number of ways. First,

appropriations have been very limited. Second, Congressional pressure

forced HUD to impose regulations on the program that have made use of the

program increasingly limited. Limits on construction costs and maximum

rents, for example, have almost restricted application of the program to

the South and certain areas of the Southwest. Limitations on amenities

allowed in rent supplement projects have been so severe that developers

find it difficult to rent to nonsupplement tenants. Builders now assume

that 90 percent or more of the supplement project tenants will receive

supplements. These pressures have essentially destroyed the original goal of the program—economic integration within projects as well as cities.[20]

The other new technique provided by the 1965 act was the Section 23 Leased Housing program.[21] Under this section, public housing agencies were encouraged to the maximum extent possible to take advantage of vacancies in the private housing market by leasing privately owned housing and then utilizing these dwellings for public housing. This program also served to foster both economic and racial integration in the community but did not meet with the Congressional resistance that the rent supplement program received. The major limitation to Section 23 housing is the restriction that the annual contribution for housing under the act cannot exceed the amount of the contribution which would have been established had the authority constructed a new project of the same number of units. In effect, this forces the authority to absorb the higher maintenance costs connected with scattered sites. This has been one of the limiting factors in application of the Section 23 program.

The Housing Act of 1968 continued the movement toward subsidized housing. Section 235 provides a subsidy to allow low-income families to purchase their own homes, and Section 236 provides for a new rental program for those just above public housing incomes.[22] Under the home ownership program (235), the federal government pays part of the buyer's mortgage payment. The government subsidy may reduce the purchaser's payment to that which he would pay if his mortgage loan were financed at a 1 percent interest. There are restrictions, however. Each family must devote a minimum of 20 percent of its income to paying off the

mortgage. As family income rises, the family assumes a larger share of the payment, and the subsidy payment is reduced. This may continue until family income reaches a level where there is no longer a subsidy payment. This program provides modest but adequate housing for those families with incomes of approximately $3,000 to $7,000 (depending on family size). Down payments are very low--in no case more than 3 percent of the value of the house.[23]

The Section 236 program was designed to replace the 202 and 221(d)(3) programs. In many respects it is similar to the rent supplement program in that it relies on private developers and provides subsidy payments. A tenant in a 236 project will pay 25 percent of his income toward rent, and the federal government will make up the difference. The maximum federal payment on a unit is the difference between the actual payment on the project mortgage and the figure that would have been paid had the project been financed with a 1 percent mortgage. The maximum subsidy for a family will run about $50 to $60. To be eligible for 236 housing, a family's income must not exceed 135 percent of the limits for admission to public housing. The 236 program thus fails to reach very poor families, but it does provide a deeper subsidy than those available under either Section 202 or Section 221(d)(3).[24]

Urban renewal goals are not as easy to identify as are the goals of the housing provisions. The effects of renewal are complex and varied, with many effects being unintended. Since the Housing Act does not de-lineate specific goals for renewal, goals are thus implicit in the in-tended consequences. Jerome Rothenberg lists three goals that he finds important in the case of residential redevelopment: (1) elimination of

slums, (2) enhancement of the economic viability of the central city, and (3) subsidization of central city financial resources.[25]

The program which is commonly known as the Urban Renewal program, or Title 1 of the Housing Act of 1949, permitted land cleared with the aid of federal funds to be sold or leased to private developers for residential development.[26] The Housing Act of 1954, besides requiring the workable program, established the concept of rehabilitation by recognizing the need to retain and improve existing sound structures within the urban framework. In addition, the act broadened the program by recognizing the need to attack decay and blight in commercial and industrial areas as well as in residential districts. Initially, 10 percent of all renewal funds could be used for nonresidential renewal; but that figure has subsequently been increased to 35 percent. A research orientation was also added with the act of 1954 with a provision for a demonstration grant program.

The Housing Act of 1959 created the Community Renewal Program. This program provides federal financial assistance for a comprehensive long-range program for the community's renewal, both public and private.

The 1965 act extended federal aid for concentrated code enforcement projects to reverse the deterioration process and provided grants for the demolition of buildings determined to be a public hazard.

And finally, the Housing Act of 1968 authorized grants for neighborhood development programs—urban renewal projects of various types that are carried out on the basis of annual increments. Financing is thus on a year-by-year basis. The act also set up an interim assistance program to provide interim assistance for slums or blighted areas scheduled for

renewal but where some immediate public action is necessary. The other

significant feature of the act was the initiation of the certified area

program to rehabilitate residential structures within areas planned for

future urban renewal or concentrated code enforcement projects.[27]

For cities with a population of 50,000 or more, federal grants can

cover up to two-thirds of the net project costs for urban renewal projects,

neighborhood development programs, code enforcement projects, demolition

projects, interim assistance, and community renewal programs. Grants may

also cover up to nine-tenths of the cost of demonstration projects; they

may also cover the full cost of writing and publishing the reports of the

findings. In addition, relocation payments to business and families dis-

located by any of the above renewal programs are covered by 100 percent

grants. This includes payment for moving, property loss, certain reloca-

tion adjustment payments, and grants to owner-occupants of residences to

assist in the purchase of replacement homes. The full amount of rehabili-

tation grants to individual property owners to cover the cost of repairs

and improvements to structures in renewal areas is also borne by the

federal government.[28]

Analytic Framework

A review of the literature dealing with public housing and urban

renewal suggests the theoretical model presented in Figure 2-1. The model

hypothesizes that certain city characteristics (physical, socioeconomic,

etc.) generate pressures which operate on a given political environment

(the intervening variables) to produce decisions concerning the use of

federal low-income housing and urban renewal programs. The results of

these decisions concerning program use substantially alter the environment

FIGURE 2-1.--A model of the urban political system

which, in turn, alters the character of the city profile and the political environment. The model thus assumes a continuous process over time whereby the effects of political decisions are continually modifying the profile and the political environment which produces the decisions. The analysis of housing and renewal presented in this study covers a time frame of ten years, from 1960-1970. The city profiles were constructed from 1960 data (t_1). The political environment includes variables that existed in 1960 as well as indicators (e.g., voting) between 1960 and 1970 (t_2). In the aggregate, then, the exact time frame for t_2 is not certain; t_2 represents some average time between 1960 and 1970. Housing and renewal decisions are summarized for the entire period 1960 through 1970 and are represented by the total t_1 through t_3 (t_1-t_3). The decisional effects are thus measured at 1970 and are represented by t_3. While this representation is simplistic at best and attempts to put artificial time constraints on what is really an ongoing process, the model should provide the time differential for the required temporal ordering.

Determinants of Grant Use

The first task of grant analysis is an investigation into the patterns of use of urban renewal grants and public housing construction. The study attempts to isolate the variables within the community which are significantly related to the use of the public housing and urban renewal programs. The Segal-Fritschler study of grant use discussed in Chapter I found that grant use was related to city size.[29] There is no reason to believe that urban renewal and public housing grants do not fit this general pattern.

Amos Hawley investigated the relationship between highly centralized city power structures and urban renewal expenditures.[30] He hypothesized that cities with a high concentration of the power function (as measured by a ratio of managers, proprietors, and officials to the employed labor force) would show a greater success in urban renewal endeavors than those with a diffuse power structure. He found that his hypothesis was essentially correct—that power was highly concentrated in execution-stage cities and was most diffuse in those cities not attempting renewal. Hawley introduced extensive controls for such factors as metropolitan status, type of government, region, and a number of socioeconomic measures and found that power was related to urban renewal success under virtually all conditions of control.

Terry Clark's study of fifty-one American communities produced findings that were substantially at odds with Hawley's results.[31] He found that a zero order correlation of .35 existed between his measure of decentralized decision-making structure and urban renewal expenditures. Clark, however, does not necessarily consider his work to be in conflict with Hawley's. He defines urban renewal as a "fragile issue," or new issue. Hawley studied renewal during the 1950's when the program was subject to the stresses of new programs. Clark believes that the issue matured since Hawley's investigation, and thus, the relationship between renewal and power changed from centralized to diffuse. In any event, he found that urban renewal expenditures were positively related to a decentralized decision-making structure.

Michael Aiken and Robert Alford analyzed urban renewal programs in the 582 American cities with 1960 populations over 25,000.[32] They used

measures of urban renewal as indicators of community innovation. The presence of innovation was measured by the presence of an urban renewal program, speed of innovation by the number of years after 1949 before entering the urban renewal program, by the number of years it took to establish a local agency after state enabling legislation was present, and the level of output by the number of dollars reserved per capita. Aiken and Alford correlated a variety of community characteristics with these variables and found a substantial but negative correlation between renewal expenditures and family income and measures commonly associated with governmental reform. They also found a positive relationship with unemployment, city size, substandard housing, and nonwhite population. They noted that middle-class cities have less urban renewal than do highly ethnic larger cities. The authors concluded that older and larger cities, those with high unemployment, low levels of education and income, and a slow growth rate are the most innovative. Also of interest was the use of an electoral variable, percent voting Democratic in the 1964 presidential election, as an attempt to isolate the presence of a population holding private-regarding values.[33] A low positive correlation (.08) was noted between this variable and the number of dollars reserved per capita for urban renewal.

Aiken and Alford conducted a comparable study concerning public housing.[34] Using a methodology similar to their renewal study, they measured the presence of innovation by the presence of a public housing program; speed of innovation by the number of years after 1933 before construction began on the first housing project as well as the number of years it took after state enabling legislation was present; and level of

output by the number of public housing units constructed per 100,000 population. The same independent variables were used to represent political culture, community power, and community differentiation as were used in the renewal study. The findings were also very similar--i.e., there was the substantial and negative correlation between housing construction and family income and with governmental reform measures. Again, as with renewal, a significant and positive relationship was noted between housing and unemployment, city size, substandard housing, and non-white population. One might thus suspect that there is a positive relationship between housing construction and renewal expenditures.

The aforementioned quantitative studies have been in a distinct minority when examining renewal and housing literature. Most studies of urban renewal have utilized the case studies approach[35] while housing has been approached from a sociological perspective.[36]

Many of the case studies emphasize the role of the executive director of the renewal agency as a new breed of "entrepreneur."[37] The role of the renewal entrepreneur is characterized by three elements: first, he supplies the money (through grants); second, he manages the organization; and third, he provides the necessary link between the public and private sectors.[38] Louis Danzig of Newark, Edward Logue of New Haven and Boston, and Robert Moses of New York are oft-cited examples of successful renewal entrepreneurs.[39]

Danzig's Newark Housing Authority was nearly autonomous in its operation. From the beginning Danzig had the assurance that city hall would not interfere with his programs. The council and mayor had little more privilege than the man on the street. Danzig was a highly trusted

administrator who operated in somewhat of a power vacuum. This permitted

his authority to exert considerable influence over renewal policies and

housing decisions.[40]

The dramatic success, if one measures urban renewal success in terms

of dollars received, of New York's early program is generally credited to

the Chairman of New York's Slum Clearance Committee, Robert Moses.[41]

Through his reputation, strength of personality, and red tape-cutting

methods, Moses ran the largest renewal program in the country. He also

contributed to renewal's unsavory reputation through the use of many

questionable practices to avoid open competitive bidding, secrecy in

project planning, heartless evictions, and a disregard for relocation

requirements. He was often accused of replacing housing for the poor

with housing for the rich, but he unquestionably did wonders for the city

tax base. To stimulate private sponsorship of Title 1 projects, Moses

initiated an unusual (now illegal) approach to redevelopment. The most

abused feature of the system was the immediate transfer of an uncleared

Title 1 site to a sponsor once he signed a contract with the city to re-

build the area. The sponsor paid the city the reduced price for the land

at an after-clearance value although he became the immediate owner of the

existing property, complete with occupied buildings. The sponsor thus

became a slumlord until he was ready to relocate the tenants and demolish

the land. From the sponsor's viewpoint, such a system encouraged him to

"milk" the property and rerent slums rather than redevelop land.[42]

A number of case studies underscore the important role citizens

organizations have had in the urban renewal process. Renewal in Pittsburgh

provides an excellent illustration of the impact and influence of citizen

organizations.[43] The impetus to the redevelopment in Pittsburgh as well as the character of that redevelopment, was substantially different from cities with the spark for development provided by renewal entrepreneurs. The power behind renewal in Pittsburgh was a coalition between the Mellon-sponsored Allegheny Conference on Community Development, a group of industrial and business leaders, and the Democratic administration of Mayor David L. Lawrence. The redevelopment brought about by this coalition had a distinct flavor--an orientation toward slum clearance for downtown commercial revitalization and land assembly for industrial expansion. Lacking was any substantial program to deal with slum housing or programs to halt the spread of blight in residential areas. Since the orientation of the powers behind Pittsburgh's renewal was to the business world, it comes as no surprise to find that the city's renewal efforts reflected this orientation. The decay and stagnation of the business climate in Pittsburgh shaped the redevelopment efforts of the city. While commercial expansion and renewal undoubtedly helped the city, the orientation of the power structure guided redevelopment along a narrow plane and tended to ignore many pressing city problems.

The force behind renewal efforts in Philadelphia was strikingly similar to Pittsburgh but on a much broader basis.[44] Philadelphia borrowed Pittsburgh's formula--the combination of public and private powers. But, in Philadelphia

> the combination is more intricately orchestrated
> and multilayered, more democratic and diverse.
> The new direction was not imposed from the top;
> it emerged from many sources, and progress has
> been infused with the critical viewpoints and
> talents of middle-class civic leaders, university
> professors, urban designers, political administra-
> tors, as well as the dynamic leadership of city
> hall and top business.[45]

One dominant force behind Philadelphia's renewal was the formation

of the City Policy Committee. The Committee was substantially different

from other pressure groups in that it was more comprehensive and action-

orientated, it was broader based—its members included minorities and

women. A second civic organization pressing for renewal was the Greater

Philadelphia Movement. This was a group of top business executives (the

board was limited to thirty-five men, almost all of them presidents of

home-owned corporations) organized very much in Pittsburgh fashion. In

general, they were the men who controlled the city's banks, universities,

department stores—and generally ran Philadelphia.[46] As with most cities,

the first projects involved efforts to revitalize the central city as a

place to live and work. Mayor Dillworth was very candid about the high-

priced, center-city redeveloped housing as being an attempt by the city

to bring the economic leadership back to Philadelphia. Philadelphia's

renewal was not all directed at the central business district, however.

The broad and diverse base of citizen groups forced renewal to attempt

to alleviate poor housing conditions.

> Philadelphia, more than any other city, has
> emphasized provision for low-rent housing in
> renewal areas. It provided the Housing
> Authority with hard-to-find sites at reduced
> cost, tried to avoid economic and racial ghettos
> by putting low-rent and middle-income units in
> the same project areas, and pioneered new ap-
> proaches, such as the Used House program and
> scattered sites, to avoid stigmatizing poor
> families.[47]

And yet slums and blight in Philadelphia are still major problems.

The assistance did not prove to be enough. Under existing financial

constraints, some say it would take 100 years to complete all the Title 1

projects that were needed for all areas needing treatment.[48]

The best-known political folk hero of the renewal process is undoubtedly Richard C. Lee of New Haven.[49] He was one of the first mayors in the country to make urban renewal the cornerstone of his administration. New Haven's program is often cited as a model for renewal for the rest of the nation. Lee strongly identified himself with urban renewal, spent countless hours interpreting the program to the people and basing his election campaigns on the redevelopment program. Missing was the broad community business support and even support from the local newspaper so necessary in other cities. Lee never avoided an opportunity to sell the program at PTA meetings or at other such community gatherings. It is reported that there was a cartoon in the Planning Department office depicting the city department heads chained together in the mayor's office. Lee was telling them, "You will all freely testify in your own words why Oak Street must go."[50]

This short review of several renewal case studies has shown the importance of some diverse political elements affecting the scope and character of the local urban renewal programs. The case studies seem to show the emergence of three distinct groups or bodies which are influential in the renewal process: (1) renewal entrepreneurs, (2) civic groups (generally business-oriented), and (3) political leaders. Apparently one or some combination of one or more of these characters is necessary for large-scale programs.

The Oakland Task Force found the location of federal offices to be an important variable in a city's grant success.[51] They noted that cities which are located close to an agency's regional headquarters have fewer problems with intergovernmental communications than do cities not as

favorably situated. They also found that agencies located in Oakland itself seemed to have a clearer view of the city's problems and appeared to give the city a higher priority for grants.

Finally, community attitudes appear to play a major part in determining the community's pattern of grant uses.[52] Warren, Michigan, a Detroit suburb, recently conducted a referendum that would repeal the city's urban renewal program—a program designed to refurbish older residential areas. The issue was somewhat muddled with concerns over federal "strings" which were perceived as threats to Warren's way of life. One of these strings was

> a demonstration of "affirmative" action toward
> integration, and thus, one vote here is often
> interpreted as a clear-cut referendum on the
> white workingman's feelings about integration.
> Indeed, 17 percent of the voters here cast their
> ballots for George Wallace in the 1968 Presiden-
> tial election, which suggests that there is some
> racism here.[53]

When HUD Secretary Romney visited Warren to talk to Warren officials, he was hooted and jeered by 300 to 400 angry demonstrators. These same demonstrators then cheered the avowed segregationist mayor of Dearborn who was also present for the meeting. It thus appears that the political and social attitudes of a city's population may play a significant part in shaping housing and renewal developments.

Hypotheses—Determinants of Grant Use

The literature examining the examples of patterns of grant use summarized above suggests a number of hypotheses designed to answer the first major research question: Why do some cities make extensive use of federal grants while other cities virtually ignore them? The first series

of hypotheses is designed to test the relationship between the outputs

of the political system and measures of the city's profile:

1. Public housing construction and urban renewal expenditures are positively related to city size and industrialization.

2. Public housing construction and urban renewal expenditures are negatively related to measures of city socioeconomic status.

3. Central cities exhibit significantly higher levels of public housing construction and urban renewal expenditures than do suburban cities.

The remaining hypotheses will test the relationship between the

system outputs and the intervening variables—the variables associated

with the political system at all levels, federal, state, and local:

4. Public housing construction is positively related to urban renewal expenditures.

5. Cities located in the same state with a HUD regional office exhibit higher levels of public housing construction and urban renewal expenditures than do cities in states without HUD regional offices.

6. Public housing construction and urban renewal expenditures are positively related to the ease with which cities are able to participate in the programs as authorized by state-enabling legislation.

7. Public housing construction and urban renewal expenditures are negatively related to measures of reformism in city government.

8. Public housing construction and urban renewal expenditures are directly related to community political culture.

Grant Effects

A major purpose of grants is to affect change and public housing

and urban renewal grants are no exception. This section will examine the

housing and renewal literature dealing with the effects of these grant

programs in four broad areas: effects on the physical city itself, on

local business, on city government and politics, and the social effects.

A recent feasibility study of cost-benefit applications in urban renewal group the explicit and implicit goals of the renewal program into three categories: (1) elimination of blight and slums, (2) enhancement of the competitive position of the central city with respect to the suburbs, and (3) strengthen the fiscal capacity of the central cities.[54] A more detailed breakdown of these goals as enunciated in legislation from official HUD statements and implicit program objectives deduced from actual operation of the programs themselves is found in Table 2-1. While these goals are quite explicit and straight-forward, total effects are not so clear-cut. Students of renewal programs have documented a variety of benefit spillover effects--both positive and negative. Public housing goals are equally straightforward--a decent home for every American, and business and economic stimulation. But again, like renewal, there are both positive and negative spillover effects.

Effects on Business

There is little question but that public housing and renewal activities are of benefit to local business. Scott Greer contends that renewal occurs not where it might benefit the community, but where it will benefit business. Any benefit to the general public, he believes, is indirect.[55]

Jerome Rothenberg used Chicago as a laboratory for an economic evaluation of urban renewal. He reported three main slum removal benefits. He initially found an increase in the productivity of land made possible by urban renewal. Secondly, he noted that removing slums and replacing them with higher-quality uses improves the neighborhood for nearby property and generally enhances its quality. Increases in

TABLE 2-1.--Urban renewal goals

I. <u>Elimination of Blight and Slum-Living Conditions</u>

   1. Improvement in life opportunities for slum dwellers (employment, education, health, etc.)

   2. Increase in supply of low-cost housing

   3. Removal of physical blight (increase in productivity of land use)

   4. Inducement of private investment into renewal

   5. Decrease in social costs of slum living

II. <u>Enhancement of the Central City vis-a-vis the Suburbs</u>

   1. Enticement of moderate-income households into central city

   2. Attraction of "clean" industry into central city and job creation

   3. Revitalization of commercial core (CBD)

   4. Expansion and support of central-city institutions (e.g., universities and hospitals)

   5. Increase in efficiency (e.g., reduced cost) of public-renewal investments

III. <u>Strengthening of Fiscal Capacity of the Central City</u>

   1. Increase in central-city tax base and fiscal capacity

   2. Decrease in social costs of slum living

   3. Increase in efficiency (i.e., reduced cost) of public-renewal investments

       Source: Philip H. Friedly, <u>et al</u>., <u>Benefit-Cost Applications in Urban Renewal: Summary of the Feasibility Study</u> (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 6.

property value were noted several blocks from the renewal site. The

third benefit derives from the physical destruction of slums themselves.

Slum occupancy is decreased; although the benefit is partially offset by

the creation of new slums.[56]

Housing and renewal programs were ostensibly developed to provide

decent housing for the poor and to remove slums. However, the fact that

the program relies on the private sector changes the underlying motiva-

tion from social conscience to a profit motivation. This generally sur-

faces in development of middle-income housing, central-city office

buildings, industrial expansion, and the like. "Though not cynical in

intent, the program operated in the name of housing the poor to unhouse

the poor and the black and to rehouse banks and other downtown businesses."[57]

Even with the business orientation of the housing and renewal programs,

Norton Long believes that the programs have done little to focus concern

on the overall economic problems of the city. Renewal, as an economic

tool, is too "bound up in brick and mortar" to be effective.[58]

Robert Lineberry and Ira Sharkansky note an adverse effect of re-

newal on small business. Small businessmen have been shown to be par-

ticularly vulnerable to relocation with renewal forcing some 30 to 40 per-

cent of the evicted enterprises out of business.[59]

A detailed analysis designed to evaluate the assertion that the

liquidation rate of small businesses dislocated by urban renewal is

excessive was undertaken in Chicago.[60] The authors studied business

relocations in the Hyde Park-Kenwood area of Chicago and found that, in

the aggregate, the liquidation rate was not excessive. They conclude that

> it was not as high as it might have become if
> renewal had not taken place and Hyde Park had

> experienced the same transition as Woodlawn.
> Secondly, the substantial decline in the
> number of businesses operating in the com-
> munity was accomplished by clearance of land
> that effectively reduced the entry rate of
> new businesses rather than the exit of old.
> Viewed dispassionately, dislocation at worst
> hastened the inevitable for a few.[61]

This is not to say that there were no adverse effects on the indi-

vidual businessmen involved; there obviously were. From the viewpoint of

the individual businessman, renewal did introduce a number of costs, even

though the costs did not alter the liquidation rate in the aggregate.

The Oakland Task Force attempted to assess the economic impact of

a number of grant programs on the city of Oakland.[62] Table 2-2 presents

an impact summary indicating the income-generating effects of a variety

of federal programs. The table dramatically illustrates the difference

in income generation capabilities between "hardware" programs such as

urban renewal and "software" programs like job-training. In the short

run, the hardware programs generate a much smaller dollar impact than do

the software programs. The Task Force does caution, however, that their

model neglects the secondary effects of hardware programs—effects which

would probably place these programs in a more favorable light. In the

Acorn renewal project, only 16 percent of the federal money spent could

be said to have contributed to local income. An important factor here

was the fact that 71 percent of the people working for the Redevelopment

Agency lived outside the city and, consequently, spent the major part of

their wages outside the city. The impact of the project through sales

tax generation was considered negligible. Of far more importance was the

effect of the program on land value in and around the project area.

TABLE 2-2.--Impact of federal grant programs on the City of Oakland

Agency	Program	Federal Expenditures in Oakland	Man-Years of Work Generated	Total Sales Taxes to Oakland	Total Federal Assistance	Local Income Generation of One Federal Dollar
HUD	Title I Urban Renewal	$1,255,559	54.00	$8,461	$10,039,116	$0.221
EDA	Public Works Grant and Loan-Block B	258,142	9.00	1,790	1,704,113	0.267
OEO	Legal Services- CAP	43,116	1.85	290	194,067	0.38
HUD	Public Housing	200,587	17.60	2,721	1,518,705	0.45
HEW	Mental Retardation Clinic & Services	28,066	1.20	189	98,621	0.491
OEO	Family Planning-CAP	12,623	.50	85	40,604	0.510
DOL	Job Training-MDTA	199,958	8.60	1,346	635,246	0.543
HEW	Title I, ESEA Compensatory Education	917,553	34.90	6,185	2,508,484	0.611
DOL	Job Training-NYC	304,765	13.00	1,833	472,673	1.105

Source: Oakland Task Force, Federal Decision-Making and Impact in Urban Areas (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 137-138.

76

The Task Force also assessed the economic impact of the construction

of a 105-unit public housing project in Oakland—the Tassafaronga Housing

Project.[63] Local income generated by this project was estimated at 34.2

percent of the total development cost. In terms of total income-

generating effect, the sum increased to 45.5 percent of the project cost.

These figures seem to suggest that federal projects which require fed-

erally funded (development) and controlled construction have a greater

income-generating effect than do programs involving only site preparation.

Nevertheless, the aggregate effects of public housing on total

construction appear to be very small indeed. Public programs are often

accused of suffering from a "hardening of the arteries." Robert Weaver

notes that in recent years the better financed and more sophisticated

limited-dividend sponsors can build more units more quickly than can a

public sponsor. The limited-dividend sponsor is by far the most effec-

tive and efficient.[64]

As a major sponsor of the Housing Act of 1949, Senator Robert Taft

expected public housing to account for 10 percent of the homes built

each year. This, of course, would have had a substantial effect on the

construction industry. In essence, public housing appears to have had a

negligible effect on business, accounting for only 1 percent of the total

housing construction.[65]

Effects on the Physical City

There is no question but that urban renewal, and to some extent

public housing, dramatically changes the physical face of the city. One

of the foremost urban renewal critics, economist Martin Anderson,

recognizes the dramatic effect of the construction of new buildings on

former slum areas. He also notes the changes in land use as measured

by total construction in renewal areas. For example, 24 percent of the

total construction was devoted to public works (parks, schools, libraries,

roads, and other public facilities), 6 percent to publicly subsidized

housing, and 56 percent to private residential housing.[66] Thus, while

the overall destructive and damaging effects of renewal programs are dif-

ficult to get at, some effects on the physical city can probably be de-

tected and measured.

City size is considered by some to be a major factor influencing

the impact urban renewal will have on a city. Some New York City offi-

cials, for example, dismiss New Haven's dramatic achievements as irrele-

vant to large cities. The problems of race, poverty, and slums were not

nearly as extensive in New Haven as they were in most larger cities.[67]

Renewal and housing, then, may have a greater impact on cities where

problems are more manageable.

One factor noted in renewal studies has been the change in the

balance between public and privately owned land in urban renewal areas.

Urban renewal appears to result in an increase in the proportion of tax-

exempt land (parks, playgrounds, etc.) in the redeveloped areas.[68]

The belief that public housing projects generally degenerate into

slums is apparently widespread. President Nixon recently attacked several

federal public housing and urban renewal projects as "wasteful" in an at-

tempt to end these programs.[69] Concerning the housing issue, the President

said, "We must stop programs that have been turning the Federal Government

into a nationwide slumlord."[70]

Alvin Schorr emphasizes the relationship between public housing and urban renewal. He noted that public housing historically finds its sites chiefly on land cleared for renewal. He also found that growing suburbs have successfully resisted public housing, and thus, these facilities are largely confined to the central city.[71]

Changing patterns of land use is the obvious result of urban renewal projects. Because of the profit factor necessitated by private rather than public development, the net effect on the face of the city is to redistribute land to higher and higher cost uses.[72]

Effects on Politics and Government

The case studies mentioned earlier concerned with renewal politics (New Haven, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia), indicate a trend in some big cities for mayors to bet their political futures on the renewal issue. In the studies cited, renewal seems to have been a factor in the mayors' longevity in office. Renewal is essentially a political issue. While a renewal agency may be autonomous, it is politically and fiscally responsible to city hall.[73]

A positive effect of urban renewal programs commonly conceded by friend and foe alike is the effect on the tax base. There is unquestionably a great deal of variation in the amount of tax benefit from city to city depending upon the size and type of project. One fact is clear, however, an increase in the tax base is one of the major effects of the urban renewal program. William Slayton, for example, examined 403 projects in which redevelopment was started or had been completed. He noted that assessed valuations increased by 427 percent when comparing valuations before urban renewal with valuations after renewal.[74]

Rothenberg noted that subsidization of the central city through urban renewal is important chiefly for its redistributional effect. Thus, the intergovernmental subsidization of the central city might produce an improvement in overall resource use that might be a real income gain. This, however, must be determined on a case-by-case basis.[75]

Lineberry and Sharkansky also believe that the most valid claim for urban renewal is that it has expanded the tax base and improved the economic vitality of the city.[76]

Housing and renewal grants are thought to be stimulatory toward other grant use. Urban renewal has forced cities to realistically examine slums and blight and to look at their social and racial problems although they may have lacked the means and/or desires to solve them. It has long been recognized that extensive governmental assistance and further subsidy is necessary for renewal to help slum dwellers or improve housing in low-income neighborhoods.[77]

Social Effects

The major criticisms of urban renewal and public housing programs usually cover the social costs or social effects of the programs. Jane Jacobs, an early critic of the renewal program, believes that the program is a failure because, at best, it merely shifts slums from one place to another; at worst, it destroys viable neighborhoods.[78] She claims that renewal officials worry about high density when they should really be concerned with overcrowding (1.5 or more persons per room). She maintains that high densities are required to produce city liveliness, safety, convenience, and interest.[79]

A well-documented effect of renewal programs has been the issue of "Negro removal." Typically, renewal has meant the displacement of Negroes by whites or by economic symbols of the white world.[80] Segregation has forced minority groups into areas that are prime targets for renewal. In 1961, for example, of the almost 100,000 families living in renewal areas, over two-thirds were Negro. Even where renewal is fostered as an aid to integration, over half of the families relocated move into predominantly minority areas.

In some respects, however, renewal does foster integration. In five case studies of urban renewal in Detroit, Eleanor Wolf and Charles Lebeaux confirmed earlier findings by Chester Rapkin and William Grigsby[81] concerning racial mixture in renewal areas. Contrary to many discussions concerning "white flight," they found little reluctance on the part of white households to rent in predominantly Black areas. Such reluctance was only exhibited in areas concerning home ownership.

> The most stable interracial housing thus far
> appears to be new, fairly large-scale develop-
> ments often brought into existence through urban
> renewal programs . . . a key element in their
> stability may be the centralized marketing and
> the high prices of dwellings. Whether these
> areas would continue to remain racially stable
> if built for somewhat lower-income groups in
> cities with large Negro populations has not yet
> been determined.[82]

Probably the most frequent criticism of the urban renewal program concerns a change in the structure of the housing market. Many students of housing mention a discrepancy between program goals and performance. While the goal of housing and renewal programs is to provide a decent home for every American, renewal is often blamed for reducing the amount of low-rent housing available to city dwellers.[83]

One of the principal objectives of urban renewal is to attract more middle-class families back to the central city. Toward this objective, renewal has wrought a major change in the cost of housing. Developmental activities by private enterprise on renewal land has generally produced higher-cost housing.[84]

Rothenberg, in his economic analysis, noted a regressive income redistribution attributed to urban renewal. As expected, the lower-income groups consuming at the bottom end of the housing stock suffer the most.[85]

Chester Hartman examined the relocation pattern of a Boston renewal project and found that the families were spread rather evenly throughout the city of Boston and in the inner-core suburbs.[86] In other words, the neighborhood or community (taken in a social sense) was not relocated, it was destroyed. He also noted an increase in the living space of the relocated families as well as an increase in private outdoor space and an improvement in the overall physical quality of the houses to which they moved. Relocation also resulted in a marked increase in housing costs. The median rent rose from $41 to $71 per month—a 73 percent increase. The rent/income ratio rose from 13.6 percent before relocation to 18.6 percent after relocation. Hartman also examined and summarized relocation data from thirty-three U.S. relocation studies between 1933 and 1963. Of the nine studies covering the 1960's, the majority show an increase in housing quality accompanied by an increase in housing costs. In the aggregate, however, Hartman concludes that:

> Given the premise that one of the cardinal aims
> of renewal and rehousing should be the improved
> housing welfare of those living in substandard
> conditions, it is questionable whether the
> limited and inconsistent gains reported in most
> studies represent an acceptable level of
> achievement.[87]

Public housing projects have frequently been considered massive

slums. Harrison Salisbury refers to them as "human cesspools . . .

massive barracks for the destitute . . . a $20,000,000 slum."[88] Public

housing has become synonomous with welfare, unemployment, illegitimacy,

crime, drugs, etc. Gilbert Steiner reports on a study conducted by

Austin Hollingshead and L. H. Rogler matching two groups of families in

San Juan, Puerto Rico.[89] All of the families lived either in a slum or

in public housing. The families living in public housing had superior

living conditions—were housed more adequately, paid less rent, and were

less crowded. When queried about their environment, 65 percent of the men

and women who lived in slum homes liked the slums, while some 85 percent

of the men and 71 percent of the women living in public housing disliked

public housing. When asked about the neighborhood as a place to raise

children, 38 percent of the slum-dwelling husbands and 15 percent of the

wives pronounced the slum a good place to raise children. On the other

hand, only 7 percent of the husbands and none of the wives in public

housing found the environment good for children.

These studies, while perhaps more interesting than most, are not

really representative. In general, public housing performs at least

acceptably well for a large number of poor families.

> When they are asked, the majority of families
> who live in public housing say that they like
> it. They appreciate its facilities; their
> general morale is higher than it was in sub-
> standard housing . . . for those who take up
> tenancy, public housing represents a consider-
> able improvement in physical surroundings.[90]

Wolf and Lebeaux, in a participant observation study, examined the

extent to which the slum clearance phase of urban renewal uprooted and

destroyed a satisfactory neighborhood social matrix and compared the results with studies conducted in Boston's West End.[91] In contrast to the extensive feelings of positive sentiments about their Italian West End neighborhood, only about one-fourth of the predominantly Negro residents of the Detroit area under study expressed any positive sentiment concerning their neighborhood. In addition, the less-liked poor Negro neighborhood was less crowded, had a higher rate of owner-occupied dwellings, and was probably of about the same physical quality as the West End. People remained in the West End on the basis of personal preferences, while most residents of the Detroit study did not.[92]

Concerning the consequences of relocation on Boston's North End families, psychologist Marc Fried found that the loss of the feeling of community was readily visible for more than two years after relocation. Far from adjusting to their new neighborhoods, 26 percent of the women remained sad or depressed even after two years in the new neighborhoods.[93]

And yet, perhaps the consequences are not always that bleak. Wolf and Lebeaux note that

> The changes that come into the lives of these
> people as a consequence of relocation were about
> what one would expect if a block of substandard
> homes had been destroyed in a fire and the
> families living there had insurance enough to
> cover moving costs. Many would miss old neigh-
> bors (as people often do when they move); the
> houses to which they moved probably were struc-
> turally superior simply because not much housing
> remained as substandard as that on the burned-
> down block; on the other hand, the new housing
> was somewhat more expensive and meant borrowing
> funds from other kinds of expenditures. Some
> (usually elderly people) who owned their homes
> would be glad to get some compensation for a
> house no one wanted to buy; others, attached to
> dwelling or ownership, knew they had scant chances
> of buying elsewhere and were accordingly resentful.[94]

Hypotheses—The Effects of Renewal and Housing

The literature dealing with the effects of the public housing and urban renewal programs summarized in the preceding paragraphs suggests the following hypotheses designed to answer the second major research question: What impact have federal grants actually had on cities? The first series of hypotheses is designed to examine the effects of housing construction and urban renewal grants on the business and economic environment of the community.

1. A city's economic vitality is positively related to public housing construction and urban renewal expenditures.

2. Total housing construction is positively related to urban renewal expenditures.

3. Total housing construction is not related to public housing construction.

4. Property values are positively related to urban renewal expenditures.

The following hypotheses will examine the effects of public housing construction and renewal expenditures on the politics and government:

5. Political stability is negatively related to public housing construction.

6. Political stability is positively related to urban renewal expenditures.

7. Governmental efficiency is positively related to urban renewal expenditures.

8. City tax revenues are directly related to urban renewal expenditures.

9. Urban renewal expenditures and public housing construction are stimulative of other grant use.

10. Public employment is positively related to urban renewal expenditures and public housing construction.

The literature also suggests several hypotheses which will test

the relationships between housing and renewal and indicators of change

in the actual physical structure of the city.

11. The amount of land devoted to public use is positively related to urban renewal expenditures.

12. Structural changes within cities are positively related to public housing construction and urban renewal expenditures.

And finally, the following hypotheses are suggested which will test

the relationships between housing and renewal and predicted social effects:

13. The quantity of low-cost housing is positively related to public housing construction.

14. The quantity of low-cost housing is negatively related to urban renewal expenditures.

15. Improved housing conditions are positively related to public housing construction.

16. Improved housing conditions are positively related to urban renewal expenditures.

It is immediately apparent that the literature review suggests a

large number of other hypotheses that are not listed above. Examples

might include hypotheses such as: "Relocation of the Negro community is

positively related to urban renewal," or "Urban renewal destroys the

social cohesiveness of neighborhoods." Examination of these effects in

all of the 310 cities with over 50,000 inhabitants is beyond the scope

of this study. This study will, however, examine these predicted effects

in a qualitative way through the use of several case studies. Since re-

liance on a few case studies limits the conclusions which may be drawn

from the results, effects which cannot be examined in all 310 cities are

thus not included as major hypotheses.

Thus far, this chapter has reviewed federal grants in general, and

housing and renewal grants in particular. The framework for analysis has

also been developed, and the major hypotheses of the study have been
presented. The next chapter will present the research design to be
used in the investigation. As suggested earlier, both quantitative and
qualitative techniques will be used in an effort to present as complete
an evaluation of these federal-local relationships as is possible. The
study will place primary reliance on the use of quantitative techniques
so that substantive generalizations concerning the uses and effects of
grants will be possible. Detailed qualitative analysis will be sub-
stantial, however. Chapter III presents the details of this methodology.

Notes

[1]David L. Smith, "Federal Grant Elasticity and Distortion: A Reply," *National Tax Journal*, XXII (December, 1969), 553.

[2]Brett W. Hawkins, *Politics and Urban Policies* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), pp. 102-103.

[3]A. Lee Fritschler and Morley Segal, "Intergovernmental Relations and Contemporary Political Science: Developing an Integrative Typology," *Publius*, I (Winter, 1972), 95-122.

[4]*Ibid.*, 94-95.

[5]Leonard Goodwin, *Do the Poor Want to Work?* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1972).

[6]Leonard Merewitz and Stephen H. Soznick, *The Budget's New Clothes* (Chicago: Markham, 1971).

[7]Public Law 67, 73d Congress, 48 Stat. 195, 40 U.S.C. 401.

[8]Jewel Bellush and Murray Hausknecht, "Urban Renewal: An Historical Overview," in *Urban Renewal: People, Politics and Planning*, ed. by Jewel Bellush and Murray Hausknecht (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books edition, 1967), pp. 6-9.

[9]Public Law 412, 75th Congress, 50 Stat. 888, 42 U.S.C. 1401 et seq.

[10]Quoted in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Currency, *Basic Laws and Authorities on Housing and Urban Development* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 225.

[11]The President's Committee on Urban Housing, *The Report of the President's Committee on Urban Housing: A Decent Home* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 59-61.

[12]Public Law 171, 81st Congress, 63 Stat. 413-414, 42 U.S.C. 1450.

[13]Bellush and Hausknecht, "Urban Renewal: An Historical Overview," p. 13.

[14]The President's Committee, *A Decent Home*, p. 57.

[15]Quoted in Committee on Banking, *Basic Laws*, pp. 357-358.

[16]Public Law 86-372, 73 Stat. 654, 667, 12 U.S.C. 1701q. Excerpts may be found in Committee on Banking, *Basic Laws*, pp. 283-287.

[17]Committee on Banking, *Basic Laws*, p. 60.

[18]The President's Committee, A Decent Home, pp. 58-59. See also pp. 61-64 for a more detailed description of 202 and 221(d)(3) programs.

[19]Public Law 89-117, 79 Stat. 451, 12 U.S.C. 1701s. Excerpts may be found in Committee on Banking, Basic Laws, pp. 262-266.

[20]The President's Committee, A Decent Home, pp. 64-65.

[21]Committee on Banking, Basic Laws, pp. 252-255.

[22]Ibid., pp. 98-108.

[23]The President's Committee, A Decent Home, p. 66.

[24]Ibid., pp. 65-66.

[25]Jerome Rothenberg, Economic Evaluation of Urban Renewal (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 13.

[26]Public Law 171, 81st Congress, Stat. 413, 414, 42 U.S.C. 1450.

[27]Carl G. Lindbloom and Morton Farrah, The Citizen's Guide to Urban Renewal (Revised ed., West Trenton, New Jersey: Chandler-Davis, 1968), pp. 179-183.

[28]U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Urban Renewal Directory: As of December 31, 1970 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 147-148.

[29]Morley Segal and A. Lee Fritschler, "Emerging Patterns of Inter-governmental Relations," in International City Management Association, The Municipal Year Book 1970 (Washington: International City Management Association, 1970), pp. 13-38.

[30]Amos H. Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," in Community Structure and Decision-Making: Comparative Analyses, ed. by Terry N. Clark (San Francisco: Chandler, 1968), pp. 393-405.

[31]Terry N. Clark, "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," American Sociological Review, XXXIII (August, 1968), 576-593.

[32]Michael Aiken and Robert R. Alford, "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Urban Renewal," American Sociological Review, XXXV (August, 1970), 650-665.

[33]Ibid., 653.

[34]Michael Aiken and Robert R. Alford, "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Public Housing," American Political Science Review, LXIV (September, 1970), 843-864.

[35]For example Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Harold Kaplan, Urban Renewal Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), and James Clarence Davies III, Neighborhood Groups and Urban Renewal (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).

[36]For example Lee Rainwater, Behind Ghetto Walls: Black Family Life in a Federal Slum (Chicago: Aldine, 1970).

[37]Jewel Bellush and Murray Hausknecht, "Entrepreneurs and Urban Renewal: The New Men of Power," in Urban Renewal, ed. by Bellush and Hausknecht, pp. 209-224; and also contained in Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXXII (September, 1966), 289-297.

[38]Bellush and Hausknecht, "Entrepreneurs and Renewal," p. 211.

[39]Robert L. Lineberry and Ira Sharkansky, Urban Politics and Public Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 332.

[40]Ibid., pp. 332-333. For the complete study of renewal in Newark see Kaplan, Urban Renewal Politics.

[41]Jeanne R. Lowe, Cities in a Race With Time (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 45-109.

[42]Ibid., p. 91.

[43]Ibid., pp. 110-163.

[44]Ibid., pp. 313-404.

[45]Ibid., p. 314.

[46]Ibid., p. 325.

[47]Ibid., p. 397.

[48]Ibid., pp. 394-395.

[49]Ibid., pp. 405-554, and Dahl, Who Governs?

[50]Lowe, Cities in a Race, p. 425. Oak Street was a blighted residential neighborhood.

[51]Oakland Task Force, Federal Decision-Making and Impact in Urban Areas (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 17.

[52]Walter S. Mossberg, "A Blue-Collar Town Fears Urban Renewal Perils Its Way of Life," Wall Street Journal (November 2, 1970), pp. 1, 13.

[53]Ibid., p. 1.

[54]Philip H. Friedly, et al., Benefit-Cost Applications in Urban Renewal: Summary of the Feasibility Study (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 5.

[55]Scott Greer, The Urbane View (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 215.

[56]Rothenberg, Economic Evaluation, pp. 13-18.

[57]Norton Long, The Unwalled City (New York: Basic Books, 1972), p. 134.

[58]Ibid., p. 173.

[59]Lineberry and Sharkansky, Urban Politics, p. 341.

[60]Brian J. L. Berry, Sandra J. Parsons, Rutherford H. Platt, The Impact of Urban Renewal on Small Business (Chicago: Center for Urban Studies, University of Chicago, 1968).

[61]Ibid., p. xv.

[62]Oakland Task Force, Federal Decision-Making, pp. 132-149.

[63]Ibid., pp. 146-149.

[64]Robert C. Weaver, "The Role of Government in Improving the Urban Environment," in William E. Zisch, Paul H. Douglas, and Robert C. Weaver, The Urban Environment: How It Can Be Improved (New York: New York University Press, 1969), pp. 82-83.

[65]Lowe, Cities in a Race, p. 253.

[66]Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964), pp. 90-110.

[67]Lowe, Cities in a Race, p. 548.

[68]William L. Slayton, "Report on Urban Renewal," in Urban Renewal, ed. by Bellush and Hausknecht, p. 386.

[69]"Nixon Says Crisis in Cities Is Over; Cities Dip in Crime," New York Times (March 5, 1973), pp. 1, 20.

[70]Ibid., p. 20.

[71]Alvin Schorr, "Slums and Social Security," in Urban Renewal, ed. by Bellush and Hausknecht, pp. 415-417.

[72]Lineberry and Sharkansky, Urban Politics, p. 337.

[73]Greer, _Urbane View_, p. 215.

[74]Slayton, "Report on Urban Renewal," p. 385.

[75]Rothenberg, _Economic Evaluation_, p. 16.

[76]Lineberry and Sharkansky, _Urban Politics_, p. 336.

[77]Lowe, _Cities in a Race_, p. 560.

[78]Jane Jacobs, _The Death and Life of Great American Cities_ (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 271.

[79]_Ibid._, pp. 205-210.

[80]Jewel Bellush and Murray Hausknecht, "Relocation and Managed Mobility," in _Urban Renewal_, ed. by Bellush and Hausknecht, pp. 366-377.

[81]Chester Rapkin and William G. Grigsby, _The Demand for Housing in Racially Mixed Areas_ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), pp . 54-55.

[82]Eleanor Paperno Wolf and Charles N. Lebeaux, _Change and Renewal in an Urban Community_ (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 509.

[83]Roland L. Warren, "Politics and the Ghetto System," in _Politics and the Ghettos_, ed. by Roland L. Warren (New York: Atherton, 1969), p. 12.

[84]Robert C. Weaver, _The Urban Complex_ (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1964), p. 37.

[85]Rothenberg, _Economic Evaluation_, p. 15.

[86]Chester W. Hartman, "The Housing of Relocated Families," in _Urban Renewal_, ed. by Bellush and Hausknecht, pp. 315-353.

[87]_Ibid._, p. 330.

[88]Harrison Salisbury, _The Shook-Up Generation_ (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 74.

[89]Gilbert Y. Steiner, "Trends in Welfare Assistance for Low-Income Families--Their Significance for Housing Assistance Programs," in _Critical Urban Housing Issues: 1967_, ed. by National Association of Housing and Redevelopment (Washington: National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, 1967), pp. 36-44.

[90]Alvin Schorr, "Slums and Social Security," in _Urban Renewal_, ed. by Bellush and Hausknecht, p. 418.

93

[91]Herbert Gans, The Urban Villagers (Glencoe: Free Press, 1962); Marc Fried and Peggy Gleicher, "Some Sources of Residential Satisfaction in an Urban Slum," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXVII (November, 1961), 305-315; Chester Hartman, "Social Values and Housing Orientations," Journal of Social Issues, XIX (April, 1963), 113-131.

[92]Wolf and Lebeaux, Change and Renewal, pp. 530-537.

[93]Summarized in Herbert J. Gans, "The Failure of Urban Renewal: A Critique and Some Proposals," in Urban Renewal, ed. by Bellush and Hausknecht, p. 469.

[94]Wolf and Lebeaux, Change and Renewal, p. 529.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN

Chapter II presented the major hypotheses of this study and a model
of the urban political system designed to measure the patterns of use and
impact of federal grants. Both quantitative and qualitative analysis
will be used in the investigation of grant use. Initially, a quantitative
explanation of renewal and housing will be posited, followed by more quali-
tative data which will be used to add insight to the variance explained by
the quantitative analysis and to suggest explanations for the remaining
unexplained variance.

Quantitative Analysis

Before analysis of grant use is possible, it is first necessary to
develop procedures which might identify characteristics of cities which
might determine or predict such use. Thus the initial task of the method-
ological design is the development of the city profiles.

City Profiles

Several alternatives were available in the development of the pro-
files. The most common approach would be to select a substantial number
of demographic and socioeconomic variables from census data and similar
sources; group these variables to represent certain city characteristics

such as socioeconomic status, suburban characteristics, etc.; and let the variables stand by themselves as city indicators. An alternative approach would be to utilize a mathematical technique such as factor analysis or cluster analysis to group the variables.

There are serious drawbacks to the first approach. In the first place, it takes a very large number of census-type variables to do even the most superficial job of coming to grips with city characteristics. If an adequate number of variables are finally selected, description of relationships becomes extremely complex simply because of the large number of variables involved. Factor analysis provides a viable method for iden- tifying the underlying dimensions of a large number of variables which might accurately describe a city in quantitative terms.[1] As C. F. Schmid noted, factor analysis possesses two special advantages: the first is parsimony or data reduction. Factor analysis can reduce a large number of interrelated variables to a manageable number of factors. Secondly, factor analysis is an excellent technique for identifying underlying unities.[2]

The use of both cluster analysis and factor analysis as techniques to identify the underlying dimensions of American cities is not new.[3] Schmid, and later Schmid, MacCannell, and Van Arsdol examined some forty census variables for 1940 and 1950 and concluded that there was a major socioeconomic dimension underlying the structure of cities.[4] One of the most complete factor analytic studies of American cities was published in 1965 by Jeffrey Hadden and Edgar Borgatta.[5] They employed principal components factor analysis with a varimax rotation and analyzed some sixty-five variables of 1960 census data for cities over 25,000. They

developed sixteen factors which they believe are crucial for the analysis

of urban structures. In their initial analysis they noted an overwhelm-

ing dominance of a total population or size factor.[6] They attempted to

"control" for this domination by examining factors within constructed

categories such as large, medium, and small cities, and central cities,

suburban, and independent cities. They found substantial parallelism

between the categories. Table 3-1 presents the factors discovered by

Hadden and Borgatta. Using the Hadden-Borgatta correlation matrices,

John Tropman reanalyzed the data and found four rather than twelve major

dimensions.[7] They were size, socioeconomic class, racial composition,

and maturity/growth.

Richard Forstall grouped American cities based on a multivariate

factor analysis of ninety-seven variables for 1,761 cities.[8] He found

some fourteen factors or underlying dimensions describing cities: factors

which were very similar to the Hadden-Borgatta dimensions. Forstall used

only five of his factors (size, socioeconomic status, stage in family

cycle, percent nonwhite, and percent in manufacturing) in his classifica-

tion scheme.

This study will also utilize factor analytic procedures to identify

the underlying dimensions of American cities. Some twenty-four variables

were selected from 1960 census data.[9] These variables were carefully se-

lected in an attempt to identify those variables which might provide the

most comprehensive description of the cities. A listing of the variables

is found in Table 3-2. Variables 18 and 19 were then used to compute a

new variable, percent housing owner occupied (V18/V19). Similarly,

variables 21 and 22 were combined ([100-V21]+V22) to form a dependency

TABLE 3-1.--Hadden-Borgatta underlying dimensions of American cities
with populations of 25,000 and over

Factor	Dimensions
1	Socioeconomic Status Level
2	Nonwhite
3	Age Composition
4	Educational Center
5	Residential Mobility
6	Population Density
7	Foreign Born Concentration
8	Total Population
9	Wholesale Concentration
10	Retail Concentration
11	Manufacturing Concentration
12	Durables Manufacturing Concentration
13	Communication Center
14	Not named
15	Not named
16	Not named

Source: Jeffrey K. Hadden and Edgar F. Borgatta, American Cities:
Their Social Characteristics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).

TABLE 3-2.--Selected 1960 census variables

1. Total population
2. Population per square mile
3. Population increase or decrease, 1950 to 1960 (percent)
4. Percent population nonwhite
5. Percent population living in group quarters
6. Median family income (dollars)
7. Percent of families with income under $3,000
8. Percent of families with income $10,000 and over
9. Median school years completed for population 25 years and older
10. Percent college graduates for population 25 years and older
11. Percent of population residing in the same house in 1960 that they
    were living in five years prior
12. Percent of the population living in a different county in 1960
    from the one in which they lived five years prior
13. Percent of civilian labor force unemployed
14. Percent of employed persons in white collar occupations
15. Percent of employed persons working outside of county of residence
16. Percent of housing units in one-unit structures
17. Percent of housing units sound with all plumbing facilities
18. Number of owner occupied housing units
19. Total number of occupied housing units
20. Number of manufacturing establishments with 20 or more employees
21. Percent of population 21 years and over
22. Percent of population 65 years and over
23. Percent foreign born
24. Percent native of foreign or mixed parentage

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, County
         and City Data Book 1962 (Washington: Government Printing
         Office, 1962), pp. 476-575.

variable made up of the percent of the population under age 21 and over

64. Variables 23 and 24 were also combined (V23+V24) to form an ethnic

index. Thus a total of twenty-one variables will finally be subjected

to factor analysis. Both orthogonal and oblique rotations will be per-

formed on the data using principal component factor analysis. The number

of factors produced is limited by Kaiser's criterion (eigenvalues greater

than unity). Since the factors will ultimately be used in a "causal"

explanation along with a number of other variables, factor scores for

each city will be obtained from the orthogonal factor matrix. Orthogonal

rotation was selected for a number of reasons: simplicity, conceptual

clarity, and amenability to further analysis. In orthogonal rotation,

the factors are by definition uncorrelated as the axes are 90 degrees

from each other. Thus an orthogonal restriction ensures that the factors

are statistically independent of one another.[10]

Cities having missing data for any of the variables will not have

factor scores computed for them. Although it is possible to assign the

mean value for a given variable to a city to replace missing data in the

computation of the factor score, it was felt that since the city profile

was to be used to "predict" renewal expenditures and housing construction,

a greater accuracy might be obtained without this distortion—no matter

how minor it might be.[11]

Political Environment

The next step in the analysis is to attempt to identify and account

for the areas making up the political/governmental environment at all

levels—federal, state, and local.

Federal, State, and Local Government

For the purpose of this study, variables representing each level of
the federal structure will be examined separately. The investigation at
the federal level concerns distances of cities from HUD regional offices;
major state variables concern degree of difficulty imposed upon cities
attempting to use housing and renewal grants by state laws and enabling
legislation; and city variables account for governmental reform measures.
Measures of city governmental reform; specifically the council-manager
government, at-large representation, and non-partisan election, have
often been linked to policy outputs.[12] Robert Lineberry and Edmund
Fowler developed a simple reformism scale by adding the number of these
reform characteristics in each city.[13] While emphasizing the crudity of
their index, their findings strongly suggested that reformism may be a
continuous variable. Table 3-3 presents a listing of the operational
definitions representing governmental influence on grant use. A detailed
discussion of the definitions will be given in the appropriate evaluative
chapters to follow.

Local Political Values

Several variables were selected to represent local political atti-
tudes of the community: percent voting for Goldwater in 1964, percent
voting for Wallace in 1968, a scale score representing political culture,
and a regional variable. Voting statistics on a city by city basis were
not available, therefore the 1964 and 1968 voting percentages are figures
for the county in which the city is located.[14] There are a number of
studies which tie the Goldwater and Wallace votes to conservative political
attitudes[15]--especially to attitudes which might be expected to influence

TABLE 3-3.--Variables used to operationalize concepts of the political environment, housing and renewal decisions, and decisional effects

Political Environment

Federal effects

Designation as model city
Location of HUD regional offices

State effects

Renewal difficulty scale
Years since 1949 to local renewal agency
Years since 1960 to state renewal enabling legislation
Housing difficulty scale
Years since 1937 to local housing authority
Years since 1960 to state housing enabling legislation

Local effects

Form of government
Representation
Type election

Local political culture

Wallace vote in 1968
Goldwater vote in 1964
Elazar's political cultures
Metropolitan status

Housing and Renewal Decisions

Urban renewal receipts
Public housing construction/leasing

Decisional Effects

Business and economics

Percent unemployed 1970
Housing permits 1960-1970

Politics and government

Size of city planning staff
No. park and recreation employees
No. employees in common functions
No. employees in variable functions

TABLE 3-3.--Continued

Intergovernmental revenue received
Change in general revenue
Change in city taxes
Change in property tax
Change in general expenditures
Change in total debt
No. mayors 1960-1970

Physical city

Percent of land privately owned
Change in school recreation land
Change in city park and recreation land

Social effects

Change in percent housing lacking plumbing
Change in number rental units under $60
Change in percent rental units under $60

grant use. While county vote obviously will not conform to the city

vote in most cases, it is assumed that the general differentials in

voting between counties will provide a rough measure of these attitudes.

Daniel Elazar's concepts of American political culture were opera-

tionalized to provide the scale representing political culture. Elazar

identified three dominant political cultures in American life: indivi-

dualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic.[16] The individualistic po-

litical culture emphasizes government instituted for strictly utilitarian

reasons; an ideological concern for a "businesslike" operation of govern-

ment, and a belief that government need not have any direct concern with

questions of a "good society." The moralistic culture emphasizes demo-

cratic participation. Politics is considered one of the great activities

of man. Consequently, the moralistic culture sees politics as an activity

concerned with the public good and the advancement of the public interest.

The traditionalistic political culture exhibits a paternalistic and

elitist concept of government. This culture accepts the idea of a hier-

archical society and expects those at the top to take an active part in

government. Political functions are thus relegated to a rather small

elite who almost inherit their "right" to govern. Parties here are of

minimal importance. Maintenance of the traditional order is a dominant

characteristic. Elazar traced the origins of these dominant cultures

and their migration across the United States. Each of the cities in this

study was assigned a classification based on the location of the city in

comparison to Elazar's cultural distribution. Elazar's cultures were

then operationalized as follows:

MT	M	MI	IM	I	IT	TI	T	TM
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

A similar operationalization of Elazar's cultures was used at the

state level by Ira Sharkansky.[17] His operationalization (below) was only

slightly different from the one designed for grant analysis.

M	MT	MI	IM	I	IT	TI	TM	T
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Elazar's original scale had omitted the MT (moralistic-traditionalistic)

classification as is shown below:

M	MI	IM	I	IT	TI	T	TM

Sharkansky added the MT category and assumed that the M (moralistic) and

T (traditionalistic) classifications were considered as opposites. This

study, on the other hand, operationalizes Elazar's concept merely by add-

ing the MT classification at the beginning of Elazar's original scale

rather than change the order of the classifications since the interest

in this study is in Elazar's conceptualizations rather than for compari-

son with Sharkansky's findings. The basic scale, however, are very much

the same. As Sharkansky notes: "Because of the small number of states

that are primarily 'MT' or 'TM,' however, there is little substantive

differences between the positions of most states on our revised scale,

and Elazar's scale."[18] Sharkansky's analysis generally supported Elazar's

designations of political culture. He reported that

> the resulting scale of political culture shows
> important relationships with several traits of
> state politics and public service. Many of
> these relationships are independent of both the
> social-economic characteristics of personal in-
> come and urbanism, and other features of each
> state's regional history and traditions. The
> findings indicate that Elazar is a perceptive--
> if sometimes abtruse--observer of state cultures.[19]

Simple regression will be used to identify the relationships between the independent variables and dependent variables, and stepwise multiple regression will be used to explain the variation in the dependent variables accounted for by variation in the independent variables. Stepwise regression introduces the independent variables one by one beginning with the variable which yields the largest reduction in the unexplained variance of the dependent variable. The remaining independent variables are then added in the same manner (e.g., the second variable added yields the next largest reduction in the unexplained variance) until all variables are included or until the contribution of the remaining variables falls below a given threshold.

Partial correlation coefficients will also be computed to evaluate the independent contribution of the variables within the model.

Housing and Renewal Decisions and Effects

The systems model developed in Chapter II indicates that housing and renewal decisions will have certain measurable effects on the environment which will, in turn, modify the city's physical, social, and political profile. The hypothesized effects were in four broad areas: effects on economics and business, the physical structure of the city, government and politics, and effects on the social community. Again, operational definitions are presented in Table 3-3 with a detailed discussion of the definitions in the evaluative chapters. Simple and partial correlation will again be used to examine pertinent relationships between grant use and grant effects.

Qualitative Analysis

The quantitative analysis outlined in the above paragraphs will undoubtedly account for the bulk of the analysis presented in this study. However, quantitative methods in social science generally leave large amounts of unexplained variance. To examine qualitative factors which might explain additional variance in patterns of grant use and the effects of grants, six cities will be subjected to study through the use of participant observation techniques. In a broad operational sense, participant observation is a blend of methods and techniques involving social and other interaction in the field between the researcher and the subjects under study. The end product of participant observation is

> an analytic description of a complex social or political organization. . . . An analytic description (1) employs the concepts, propositions, and empirical generalizations of a body of scientific theory as the basic guides in analysis and reporting of facts, (2) employs through and systematic collection, classification, and reporting of facts, and (3) generates new empirical generalizations (and perhaps concepts and propositions as well) based on these data.[20]

The author will spend approximately one week in each city examining public records, interviewing elites, and generally trying to get a "feel" for housing and renewal issues and applications within each community.

The difficulty with the application of participant observation to this study was not a methodological problem, but was the more realistic difficulty of selecting the cities which would be subjected to qualitative analysis. Ideally, of course, the researcher should visit all in the population, or at least a representative random sample, to be able to generalize about the findings with any degree of certainty. Only six

cities will be selected for detailed analysis here due to the realistic constraints imposed by limited funds and lack of time.

City Selection Procedures

Selection of the six cities can nevertheless be accomplished in as "scientific" a framework as possible. Certain criteria were therefore adopted for city selection: (1) two large cities, two medium sized cities, and two small cities would be visited; (2) at least two of the cities would be suburban and two would be central cities; (3) cities would be selected in pairs (at least two per state) so that comparisons could be made within the framework of given state laws; (4) the pairs of cities would be geographically diverse to avoid a regional bias; and finally (5) three cities would be high grant users and three would deviate to the low end of the national pattern with regard to grant use.

The actual city selection will be accomplished through the use of residuals generated through stepwise multiple regression. The factor scores obtained from the twenty-one selected variables are to be the initial independent variables used. In addition, factors will be obtained to represent political values of the community. The factors are to be composed of the loadings of four variables: percent voting for Goldwater in 1964, percent voting for Wallace in 1968, the scale score representing Elazar's political cultures, and a regional variable. The regional variable is a simple South-Nonsouth dichotomous variable. This, again, was based upon research at the state level by Sharkansky and others.[21] The final variable to be utilized in city selection will be Lineberry and Fowler's reformism scale score for each city.

Generation of Residuals

The factor scores representing the city profile, the political culture factor scores, and the reformism scale scores will be taken as the independent variables, and urban renewal expenditures and public housing occupancy are the dependent variables for each city. Stepwise multiple regression will be performed to obtain a multiple correlation coefficient and constant values for the regression equation. The regression equation can then be used to predict a value for the dependent variables for each city. Residuals for each city will be computed by subtracting the actual value of the dependent variables from the predicted values. Thus a positive residual of $5.0 million for a given city, for example, indicates that the city received $5.0 million more in renewal funds than its physical and political patterns predicted based upon an equation for all cities. Complete details of city selection are presented in Chapter IV.

Organization of the Volume

In summary, then, the ensuing pages will encompass both a quantitative and qualitative examination of public housing and urban renewal. The basic thrust of the study will be quantitative--both in determining the patterns of grant use and in examining grant effects. The data generated through the participant observation studies will be used basically to "explain" the unexplained variance of the quantitative work. The greatest reliance on qualitative data will be in the second half of the study--determining the effects of grants. Many effects are not quantifiable and thus the study must rely heavily on much more impressionistic data. This is especially noted in the unintended effects of grants (e.g., destruction of "sense of community").

The next chapter will examine the patterns of use of the grants under investigation. Since both quantitative and qualitative data are needed to explain grant use, the first part of Chapter IV will present a detailed discussion of the city selection procedure. This will be followed by the quantitative explanation of renewal expenditures and housing construction; and finally the results of the six field experiences will be used to posit explanation for the unexplained variance and to add insight to the variance explained by the quantitative analysis. Chapters V through VIII will deal exclusively with grant effects while Chapter IX will present a summary of the study and some concluding remarks.

Notes

[1]R. J. Rummel, *Applied Factor Analysis* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), and Harry H. Harman, *Modern Factor Analysis* (2nd ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

[2]C. F. Schmid, "Urban Crime Areas: Part 1," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (August, 1960), 535.

[3]A fine review of this literature is found in Desmond S. Cartwright, "Ecological Variables," in *Sociological Methodology 1969* ed. by Edgar F. Borgatta (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969), pp. 155-218.

[4]C. F. Schmid, "Generalizations Concerning the Ecology of the American City," *American Sociological Review*, XV (April, 1950), 264-281; and C. F. Schmid, E. H. MacCannell, and M. D. Van Arsdol, "The Ecology of the American City: Further Comparison and Validation of Generalizations," *American Sociological Review*, XXIII (August, 1958), 392-401.

[5]Jeffrey K. Hadden and Edgar F. Borgatta, *American Cities: Their Social Characteristics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).

[6]*Ibid.*, p. 39.

[7]John E. Tropman, "Critical Dimensions of Community Structure: A Reexamination of the Hadden-Borgatta Findings," *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, V (December, 1969), 215-232.

[8]Richard L. Forstall, "A New Social and Economic Grouping of Cities," *The Municipal Year Book 1970* (Washington: International City Management Association, 1970), pp. 102-159.

[9]U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book 1962* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 476-575. The data utilized in this computation were made available by the Inter-university Consortium for Political Research. The data were supplied in partially proofed form and the Consortium bears no responsibility for either the analyses or interpretations presented here.

[10]Rummel, *Applied Factor Analysis*, pp. 384-389.

[11]Seven cities had missing data.

[12]Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (New York: Random House, 1963); Amos H. Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," in *Community Structure and Decision-Making: Comparative Analyses* ed. by Terry N. Clark (San Francisco: Chandler, 1968), pp. 393-405; and Bernard H. Booms, "City Governmental Form and Public Expenditure Levels," *National Tax Journal*, XIX (June, 1966), 187-199.

[13]Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (September, 1967), 701-716.

[14]Richard M. Scammon, ed., <u>America Votes 7</u> (Washington: Governmental Affairs Institute, 1968), and Richard M. Scammon, ed., <u>America Votes 8</u> (Washington: Governmental Affairs Institute, 1970).

[15]Robert A. Schoenberger, ed., <u>The American Right Wing: Readings in Political Behavior</u> (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1969), and Philip E. Converse, <u>et al.</u>, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," <u>American Political Science Review</u>, LXIII (December, 1969), 1083-1105.

[16]Daniel J. Elazar, <u>American Federalism: A View from the States</u> (2nd ed.; New York: Crowell, 1972), pp. 93-139.

[17]Ira Sharkansky, "The Utility of Elazar's Political Culture," <u>Polity</u>, II (Fall, 1969), 66-83.

[18]<u>Ibid.</u>, 71.

[19]<u>Ibid.</u>, 83.

[20]George J. McCall and J. L. Simmons, eds., <u>Issues in Participant Observation: A Text and Reader</u> (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1969), p. 1. See also Norman K. Denzin, ed., <u>Sociological Methods</u> (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), and William J. Filstead, ed., <u>Qualitative Methodology</u> (Chicago: Markham, 1970).

[21]Ira Sharkansky, "Economic Development, Regionalism and State Political Systems," <u>Midwest Journal of Political Science</u>, XII (February, 1968), 41-61, and Sharkansky, "Regional Patterns in the Expenditures of American States," <u>Western Political Quarterly</u>, XX (December, 1967), 955-971.

CHAPTER IV

PATTERNS OF USE

The preceeding chapters have presented a background for this
study in some detail, developed a framework for analysis, and outlined
the methodology to be used in the analysis. This chapter is devoted to
the determinants of grant use—that is, the chapter will attempt to
answer the first major research question: Why do some cities make ex-
tensive use of federal grants while other cities virtually ignore them?
As mentioned previously, examination of patterns of use will be accom-
plished through the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods.
The first part of this chapter, then, will be devoted to the selection
of the six cities which were subjected to field study. The second area
for discussion will be the quantitative analysis of grant use; and
finally, findings from the field observations will be posited as explana-
tory factors for the remaining unexplained variance of the quantitative
analysis, and to provide additional insight into the quantitative
results.

Two areas were common to both the city selection procedure and the
quantitative analysis. First was the development of the factors repre-
senting the city profiles and second was the operational definition of
the dependent variables—housing and renewal grants. Urban renewal

grants included in this study are defined by federal dollars actually disbursed to cities (as opposed to program approval used by some authors) between January 1, 1960, and December 31, 1970, for a variety of renewal activities.[1] Disbursals for urban renewal projects, neighborhood development programs, demonstration programs, code enforcement projects, interim assistance programs, demolition projects, community renewal programs, and certified area programs make up the total renewal grants. Public housing construction is operationally defined by the total number of low-rent public housing units having a date of occupancy for the first unit occupied in the project between January 1, 1960, and June 30, 1970.[2] In other words, a public housing project must have construction (or leasing) completed and at least one housing unit of the project occupied between 1960 and 1970 to merit inclusion in the study.

City Profile

The city profile was developed through the use of principal components factor analysis of the twenty-one variables listed in Table 4-1. The factor matrix for the unrotated principal components analysis is presented in Table 4-2. The number of factors was limited by Kaiser's criterion—all have eigenvalues greater than unity. Factor 1 explained 27.75 percent of the total variance; Factor 2, 19.27 percent; Factor 3, 11.67 percent; Factor 4, 8.22 percent; and Factor 5, 6.15 percent of the total variance.

Both orthogonal and oblique rotations were performed on the data. The orthogonal solution is presented in Table 4-3. Most of the variables loaded rather clearly on one, or at the most two, of the factors. Both Factor 1 and Factor 2 contain primary loadings of variables designed to

TABLE 4-1.--Variables included in city profile factors

1. Percent of the population living in a different county in 1960 from the one in which they lived five years prior

2. Percent of the civilian labor force unemployed

3. Percent of employed persons in white collar occupations

4. Percent of population residing in the same house in 1960 that they were living in five years prior

5. Percent college graduates for population 25 years and older

6. Median school years completed for population 25 years and older

7. Percent of families with income $10,000 and over

8. Median family income (dollars)

9. Percent of population living in group quarters

10. Percent of families with income under $3,000

11. Percent population nonwhite

12. Percent of housing units sound with all plumbing facilities

13. Percent housing units owner occupied

14. Ethnic index

15. Population per square mile

16. Percent of housing units in one-unit structures

17. Dependency ratio

18. Total population

19. Number of manufacturing establishments with 20 or more employees

20. Population increase or decrease, 1950-1960 (percent)

21. Percent of employed persons working outside of county of residence

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book 1962 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 476-575.

TABLE 4-2.--Principal components unrotated factor matrix

	1	2	3	4	5
Total population	0.15163	0.36915	-0.45981	0.75633	-0.16211
Pop per sq mile	0.20425	0.71827	-0.18172	0.01029	0.14945
Pop chg 50-60	-0.13005	-0.07143	0.20200	0.24578	0.69859
Percent nonwhite	0.48865	-0.27862	-0.45912	0.02060	0.03104
Pct in grp quarters	0.05816	-0.16702	-0.52120	-0.35927	0.07114
Med family income	-0.85029	0.39451	0.14378	0.03012	-0.07416
Pct income -3000	0.71553	-0.47133	-0.30852	-0.06500	0.03344
Pct income +10000	-0.83809	0.30485	-0.13340	-0.05433	-0.07893
Med school complete	-0.84825	-0.20975	-0.21825	0.00265	-0.05842
Pct college grad	-0.66955	-0.13724	-0.53937	-0.20491	-0.04059
Pct same house	0.36164	0.58720	0.39448	-0.15615	-0.23865
Pct diff county	-0.48340	-0.54866	-0.30939	0.13622	0.43144
Pct unemployed	0.56578	-0.02163	0.21826	0.18666	0.18813
Pct white-collar	-0.78876	-0.04933	-0.35574	-0.09143	-0.10467
Pct commuting work	-0.17301	0.35425	0.08227	0.11463	0.59296
Single family house	-0.31356	-0.73706	0.31329	0.32777	-0.12907
Sound housing	-0.80383	0.29283	0.18249	0.11270	0.04164
Owner occupied	-0.52683	-0.40443	0.57788	0.31671	-0.15360
Manufacturing	0.15628	0.40802	-0.43701	0.74009	-0.16975
Dependency ratio	0.08147	-0.59539	0.30181	0.15298	-0.10153
Ethnic index	-0.09180	0.81423	0.17720	-0.15437	0.09733
Pct total variance	27.75	19.27	11.67	8.22	6.15	73.07

115

TABLE 4-3.--Varimax rotated factor matrix (normalized solution)

	Status, Wealth, and Education (low)	Central City	Urban Density	Size/ Manufacturing	Commuting/ Growth	
Pct diff county	-0.60190	0.18341	-0.40970	-0.02885	0.52011	
Pct unemployed	0.59455	0.22933	-0.02578	0.07185	0.16294	
Pct white-collar	-0.83782	-0.25508	-0.04824	0.01158	-0.03102	
Pct same house	0.57126	-0.29464	0.43809	-0.05987	-0.32229	
Pct college grad	-0.89414	-0.00354	0.01315	-0.03731	-0.02465	
Med school complete	-0.80454	-0.30716	-0.26225	-0.02061	0.06124	
Pct income +10000	-0.67450	-0.58403	0.15716	0.03863	0.00833	
Med family income	-0.48327	-0.81066	0.11010	0.02037	0.04942	
Pct in group qtrs	-0.36689	0.49134	0.18775	-0.14851	-0.06110	
Pct income-3000	0.26112	0.86019	-0.13905	-0.00645	-0.08464	
Pct nonwhite 60	0.04408	0.70599	-0.00360	0.16098	-0.04785	
Pct sound housing	-0.42221	-0.75326	0.01193	0.02852	0.18169	
Pct owner occupied	-0.04963	-0.55581	-0.75931	-0.08321	0.06389	
Ethnic index	0.14358	-0.50036	0.68075	-0.01228	0.03946	
Pop per sq mile	0.16056	-0.07753	0.71272	0.25987	0.07621	
Pct 1 family house	-0.10251	-0.11030	-0.91419	-0.04363	0.05909	
Dependency ratio	0.17796	0.10726	-0.65327	-0.12405	-0.02469	
Total population	0.02069	0.05093	0.15780	0.97005	-0.00911	
Manufacturing	0.04118	0.02364	0.18835	0.95928	-0.02179	
Pop chg 50-60	0.08103	-0.10001	-0.10670	-0.04033	0.76268	
Pct commuting work	0.01521	-0.24806	0.30693	0.02754	0.60844	
Pct total variance	20.77	19.25	16.67	9.61	6.78	73.08

116

measure socioeconomic status. Eight variables load highly on Factor 1—most in a negative direction. That is, the extreme end of this underlying dimension denotes high unemployment, residential stability, low levels of education and low income. The factor was thus termed Status, Wealth, and Education.

Factor 2 also contains significant loadings of variables which are also measures of socioeconomic status. It is characterized by low income, a high percent nonwhite, low quality, renter occupied, multi-family housing and a low level of ethnicity. Since this factor contains high loadings of variables usually associated with core or central cities, the factor was named Central City.

Urban Density was the name given to Factor 3. Characterized by a high ethnic population, multi-family rental housing, high density population concentration, and a low dependency ratio, the factor is highly descriptive of densely populated central city ethnic neighborhoods.

Only two variables loaded highly on Factor 4. This factor was clearly a measure of Size/Manufacturing and was so named.

And finally, Factor 5 was termed Commuting/Growth. Three variables loaded heavily on this—measures of population growth, migration, and commuting.

The selected census variables have thus been used to clearly identify five underlying dimensions of American cities. However, a few of the variables loaded highly on more than one factor (see Table 4-3). While the factor scores will be generated through the orthogonal factor matrix for reasons of statistical independence, conceptual clarity, and amenability to further analysis; an oblique rotation was performed to

attempt to isolate variables loading on more than one factor. Two matrices were obtained for the oblique solution—the matrices containing the primary structure and primary pattern loadings. Since it was important that the underlying dimensions of the city be identified as clearly as possible, the primary pattern loadings were examined in some detail.[3]

While oblique rotation attempts to best identify the underlying dimensions of the variables, there is no restriction on the correlation between the dimensions. Thus while the oblique solution also identified five major dimensions, it was possible that some of the dimensions may be so highly correlated as to measure the same thing. Table 4-4 presents two correlation matrices—correlations between reference factors and correlations between primary factors. Multicollinearity between factors does not appear to be a major problem, although some relationship between factors is noted. The highest correlation coefficient was $r=.19$ between Factors 1 and 2 on the reference factor matrix.

With the apparent independence of factors generated through the use of oblique rotation, it was logical to predict that the loadings on the primary pattern matrix would be quite similar to the matrix generated through orthogonal rotation. Indeed, this was the case. The similarity between the oblique and orthogonal matrices was striking. There were virtually no differences in variable loadings on Factors 4 and 5. Only two variables of the twenty-one showed any substantial change in loadings depending on solutions—both of the mobility variables, variable 1 and variable 4 (Table 4-1). Variable 1, the percent of the population living in a different county in 1960 from the one in which they lived five years prior, loaded quite evenly on Factors 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the oblique matrix.

TABLE 4-4.--Correlations between reference factors and correlations
between primary factors for oblique solution

Correlations between reference factors

	1	2	3	4	5
1	1.00000				
2	0.19151*	1.00000			
3	-0.04098	-0.03965	1.00000		
4	0.04059	0.07183	0.07186	1.00000	
5	-0.17744*	-0.14086*	-0.15560*	-0.06948	1.00000

*Significant at the .05 level.

Correlations between primary factors

	1	2	3	4	5
1	1.00000				
2	-0.16545*	1.00000			
3	0.06217	0.05577	1.00000		
4	-0.02247	-0.06233	-0.06742	1.00000	
5	0.16146*	0.11459*	0.16681*	0.04441	1.00000

*Significant at the .05 level.

On the orthogonal matrix, however, this variable loaded clearly on

Factors 1 and 5. Variable 4, the percent of population residing in the

same house in 1960 that they were living in five years prior, loaded

evenly on Factors 1, 2, and 3 of the oblique matrix. Utilizing the

orthogonal solution, however, the variable clearly loaded on Factor 1.

The differences between solutions thus proved to be minor. With-

out question, the underlying descriptive dimensions remained the same.

The descriptive names given the five factors based upon loadings on the

orthogonal matrix are equally valid for the oblique factors. As Rummel

notes, "the spatial configuration of variables defined by the preliminary

solution is not altered by rotation. Rotation changes only the perspec-

tive, not the interrelationship between the variables."[4]

The orthogonal factor matrix was thus deemed suitable for genera-

tion of the factor scores. Factor scores for the five factors were com-

puted for most of the 310 cities—the exception being those cities with

missing data for any of the twenty-one input variables.[5] Cities having

missing data did not have factor scores computed for them to avoid pos-

sible distortion of the results of the quantitative analysis and to

avoid selection of cities for detailed study based upon erroneous data.

The factor scores for each city are found in Appendix A.

Political Culture

A factor attempting to describe community political culture was

developed through the use of principal components factor analysis of the

four variables listed in Table 4-5. Only one factor was created as only

the eigenvalue (lambda) of the first factor satisfied Kaiser's criterion.

This factor explained 61.94 percent of the total variance. Table 4-6

TABLE 4-5.--Variables descriptive of community political culture

1. Percent voting for Wallace in 1968

2. Percent voting for Goldwater in 1964

3. Scale score for Elazar's political culture

4. Geographic region (south-nonsouth)

TABLE 4-6.--Factor matrix (Local Culture)

	Local Culture	
Wallace vote	0.87909	
Goldwater vote	0.77441	
Elazar's cultures	0.78512	
South-nonsouth	-0.69911	
Pct total variance	61.94	61.94

presents the factor matrix for this one factor. With only a single factor, there is obviously no distinction between types of rotation so only the one matrix is presented. The factor was named Local Culture. As with the profile factors, factor scores for each of the 310 cities were computed. Again, cities having missing data for any of the four input variables did not receive factor scores.[6] These factor scores are shown in Appendix B.

Reformism

The final independent variable designated for use in the city selection process was Lineberry and Fowler's simple scale of reformism in city government.[7] Reformism here encompasses the usual three reform measures often adopted by city governments: the council-manager government, at-large representation, and non-partisan elections. Reformism scores were assigned as follows:

0	City has adopted no reform measures
1	City has adopted one reform measure
2	City has adopted two reform measures
3	City has adopted all three reform measures.

These structural measures of the city conform to the time period of the city profile. They, too, were city characteristics as of 1960.

City Selection

The seven variables identified thus far in this chapter were used to select the six cities subjected to field study analysis. The housing and renewal variables were the dependent variables and were treated separately. The independent variables were the same for both housing

and renewal regressions and correlations. The seven independent variables included the five city profile factors, the political attitude factor, and the reformism scale score. Stepwise multiple regression was initially computed with renewal receipts as the dependent variable and the factor scores and reformism scores as independent variables. All results were included in the stepwise regression regardless of statistical significance. Stepwise regression was selected so that the multiple correlation coefficient, the b values, and constant terms for the regression equation could be obtained. Table 4-7 presents the results of this regression. Seven steps of regression were performed. The computations were highly successful with the independent variables explaining 65.5 percent of the variation in the renewal variable. The computation also confirms the expected importance of the Size/Manufacturing variable with an initial correlation coefficient of $r=.75$ between Size/Manufacturing and urban renewal. Constant terms and b values were also obtained for use in a regression equation which would ultimately be used to predict urban renewal receipts for each of the 310 cities.

In a similar manner, stepwise multiple regression was computed with public housing occupancy as the dependent variable and the factor scores and reformism scores as independent variables. Again, all steps of the regression were used regardless of statistical significance. Table 4-8 presents the results of this regression. The housing computations were even more successful than the renewal results. In this case, the seven independent variables explained 81.9 percent of the housing variation. Once again, Size/Manufacturing proved dominant with a correlation coefficient of $r=.89$. Constant terms and b values for the housing regression equation were also obtained.

TABLE 4-7.--Results of stepwise multiple regression explaining urban renewal funds received

Step number	Variable added	Cumulative R	Cumulative R^2
1	Size/Manufacturing	0.745*	0.555
2	Urban Density	0.791*	0.625
3	Central City	0.798*	0.638
4	Status, Wealth, and Education (low)	0.805*	0.648
5	Commuting/Growth	0.807	0.651
6	Reformism	0.808	0.653
7	Local Culture	0.809	0.655

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 4-8.--Results of stepwise multiple regression explaining public
housing construction/leasing

Step number	Variable added	Cumulative R	Cumulative R
1	Size/Manufacturing	0.887*	0.769
2	Urban Density	0.898*	0.806
3	Central City	0.903*	0.815
4	Commuting/Growth	0.904*	0.818
5	Reformism	0.905	0.818
6	Status, Wealth, and Education (low)	0.905	0.819
7	Local Culture	0.905	0.819

*Significant at the .05 level.

The constant terms and b values obtained for both renewal and housing equations were then used in separate equations to predict renewal receipts and housing construction for each of the cities.[8] Residuals for each city were computed by subtracting the predicted value of the dependent variables from the actual values. Residuals for each city are found in Appendix C.

The cities with large positive residuals were cities receiving more urban renewal funds/constructing more public housing units than predicted on the basis of the values of the independent variables. Conversely, cities with negative residuals received fewer renewal funds/constructed less public housing than was expected. The list of residuals was carefully examined to select six cities also meeting the criteria discussed in Chapter III: specifically, (1) two large cities, two medium-sized cities, and two small cities; (2) at least two of the cities would be suburban and two would be central cities; (3) cities would be selected in pairs (at least two per state); (4) the pairs of cities would be geographically diverse; and (5) three cities would be high grant users and three would be low grant users.

Six of the cities meeting the criteria were then selected for further qualitative analysis through participant observation techniques. They were: Austin and Beaumont, Texas; Alhambra and Vallejo, California; and Buffalo and Syracuse, New York. Table 4-9 compares the cities in relation to some of the criteria for city selection. The findings from the participant observation studies will be presented following the quantitative analysis in each chapter.

TABLE 4-9.--Cities selected for qualitative study

City	State	Size and Population[a] (1960)		Metro Status[b]	Renewal Residual	Housing Residual
Austin	Texas	Medium	186,545	Central City	+5,868,895	+32
Beaumont	Texas	Medium	119,175	Central City	-7,722,403	-456
Alhambra	California	Small	54,807	Suburb	-6,196,166	-278
Vallejo	California	Small	60,877	Suburb	+2,914,423	+300
Buffalo	New York	Large	532,759	Central City	-9,801,040	-1,968
Syracuse	New York	Large	216,038	Central City	+19,264,128	+513

[a]U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book 1962 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 476-575.

[b]The Municipal Year Book 1960 (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1960), pp. 89-117.

Urban Renewal Grant Use

Simple, partial, and multiple regression and correlation was used to quantitatively determine patterns of urban renewal grant use. The independent variables identified as representing the city profile are the factor scores for the same five factors developed for the city selection procedure: Status, Wealth, and Education; Central City; Urban Density; Size/Manufacturing; and Commuting/Growth. Orthogonal rotation was utilized to insure the independence of the factors and to reduce problems of multicollinearity. To insure that the factors were indeed independent, Pearson's product moment correlation coefficients were computed showing the relationship between the factor scores. Table 4-10 shows these relationships. The matrix again confirms the relative independence of the factors with only the scores of Factor 1 and Factor 5 significantly related at the .05 level (r=-.14). This same relationship existed between the reference factors (r=-.16) utilizing oblique rotation. The other significant relationships between the reference factors did not prove to be statistically significant when factor scores were computed from the orthogonal matrix. In spite of the data manipulations, then, the factor scores for the cities on the five factors are relatively independent of each other.

Product moment correlation coefficients were then computed to show the relationship between urban renewal and each of the five factors. These coefficients are shown in Table 4-11. Two relationships immediately stand out. Size/Manufacturing is significantly and substantially related to grant use with r=.75. This one factor "explains" approximately 56 percent of the variation in urban renewal funds received by the cities.

TABLE 4-10.--Zero order produce moment correlation coefficients between city profile factor scores

	Status	Cent. City	Urban Dens.	Sz/Mfg.	Comm./Gr.
Status, Wealth, Education (low)	1.000				
Central City	0.010	1.000			
Urban Density	0.006	-0.005	1.000		
Size/Manufacturing	0.007	-0.004	-0.002	1.000	
Commuting/Growth	-0.135*	0.086	0.060	0.040	1.000

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 4-11.--Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between city profile and urban renewal

	Urban Renewal
Status, Wealth, and Education (low)	0.109
Central City	0.108
Urban Density	0.263*
Size/Manufacturing	0.745*
Commuting/Growth	-0.018

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 4-12.--Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between federal variables and urban renewal

	Urban Renewal
Model city	0.357*
HUD office in state	0.042

*Significant at the .05 level.

The Urban Density factor was also substantially related to the dependent variable with r=.26. Central City and Status, Wealth, and Education (low) were also positively related to renewal grants with r=.11 in both cases (not statistically significant at the .05 level). Only the Commuting/ Growth factor did not show a substantial relationship with the dependent variable.

Effects of Federal Environment

Two variables were selected for analysis as indicators of federal influence on grant use. First was the designation of a city as a "Model City" under the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966.[9] Designation as a model city would presumably give a city priority in obtaining renewal funds although the relationship might be expected to be weak since the model cities concept was not developed until the mid 1960's. The second federal variable was the location of HUD regional offices.[10] It was expected that cities located in the same states with a HUD regional office would have a greater degree of grant success than cities in states without such offices. The location of the HUD regional offices changed in the late 1960's with a change in federal service concepts. The location used in this analysis was the early location covering the period up to 1968 (approximately). Both federal level independent variables were dichotomous.

Pearson's produce moment correlation coefficients were computed between these independent variables and the dependent variable. Only one, however, was found to be significantly related to urban renewal use as Table 4-12 shows. A significant correlation coefficient of r=.36 was found to exist between model cities and urban renewal. The surprising

relationship, or better—lack of relationship, was the low coefficient of

r=.04 between the location of the regional HUD office and urban renewal

funds. Nor was HUD office location substantially related to model cities—

the coefficient here was only r=-.09. It is apparent then that at least

part of one of the hypotheses will be rejected. Cities located in the

same state with HUD regional offices do not appear to be any more success-

ful in obtaining urban renewal funds than do cities in states without such

offices.

State Environmental Effects

State laws were also hypothesized to have a substantial effect on

grant use. Some state legislatures have made participation in federal-

local grant programs quite easy. These states passed enabling legislation

quickly and insured that the legislation did not place substantial pre-

requisites in the way of city participation. On the other hand, a few

states were extremely slow to pass enabling legislation and/or placed

impediments (e.g., requiring a local referendum to establish a renewal

authority) in the way of use of the grant programs by city government.

If these differences in state laws and enabling legislation do exist,

the differences should be included in the model.

The Department of Housing and Urban Development was able to pro-

vide a listing of the years each state passed enabling legislation for

both public housing and urban renewal programs.[11] HUD was not, however,

able to furnish any estimate of the difficulty cities might have in es-

tablishing these programs based upon requirements in the various state

laws. To obtain this information, the legislative council in each state

was surveyed by mailed questionnaire. A copy of the questionnaire is

found in Appendix D. All states having cities with populations over 50,000 with the exception of Michigan and Nebraska responded to the survey. States were asked when housing and renewal enabling legislation was first passed, whether a local referendum is required to establish renewal and/or housing authorities, and whether a local referendum is required for approval of each individual project. A simple difficulty scale was then constructed ranging from 0 to 2. Cities were scored 0 if no referendum was required, 1 if referendum was required to either establish a renewal authority or approve individual projects, and a 2 if referendum was required for both authority and project approval.

In order to discover what difficulties, if any, cities had in establishing urban renewal authorities, two variables were selected as indicators of a city's difficulty: the number of years from 1949 until cities established renewal agencies, and the number of years from the date of the state enabling legislation until cities established renewal agencies. The independent variables were the number of years from 1949 to the time it took states to pass enabling legislation, and the renewal difficulty scale. Table 4-13 shows the relationships between these variables. Neither of the independent variables was significantly related to the length of time since 1949 that it took cities to establish urban renewal agencies. Both of the independent variables, however, were significantly related to the length of time between state enabling legislation and the establishment of local urban renewal agencies. The peculiar nature of the relationship is its direction—both coefficients were negative. Apparently cities in states which delayed passage of enabling legislation were quick to establish renewal agencies once the states

TABLE 4-13.--Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between
state enabling legislation and establishment of local urban
renewal authorities

	Years since 1949	Years since enabling leg.
Time, to state enabling legislation	0.024	-0.772*
Renewal difficulty scale	-0.124	-0.275*

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 4-14.--Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between
measures of renewal difficulty and urban renewal

	Urban renewal
Renewal difficulty scale	-0.050
Years since 1949 to local agency	-0.083
Legislation since 1960	0.111

allowed them to do so. While this idea of cities trying to play "catch-up" in the competition for federal grants is logical, there is no direct explanation for the other negative coefficient. Cities located in states having a high degree of difficulty attached to urban renewal success through restrictive state laws were quicker to establish renewal agencies than those located in states without such restrictions. One explanation for this relationship is the possible interrelationship of the independent variables. If states which delay passage of renewal enabling legislation also make use of renewal grants more difficult, the obvious explanation for the relationship between difficulty and speedy agency establishment makes good sense. This was indeed the case. There was a significant positive relationship ($r=.31$) between the length of time a state took before passing enabling legislation and the difficulty scale. This suggests then that cities in slower states established renewal agencies rapidly in spite of a higher degree of difficulty.

Is there then any relationship between renewal difficulty and success in obtaining urban renewal funds? Apparently not. Table 4-14 presents the correlation coefficients between several measures of renewal difficulty and urban renewal funds received. None of the coefficients were significant at the .05 level. There was no apparent relationship between renewal difficulty, or enabling legislation, and the amount of money a city received from 1960 to 1970. There was also no relationship between the length of time since 1949 that it took for cities to establish renewal authorities and funds received. Since urban renewal funds in this study were only measured between 1960 and 1970, it was possible that the date states passed enabling legislation might be important if

1960 was taken as base year—that is, all cities in states with enabling legislation passed in 1960 or prior would be coded 0; with legislation passed in 1961, coded 1, etc. Even this scale did not prove to be significantly related to renewal receipts. Analysis of the state variables, then, proved to be disappointing. While there was a definite relationship between a number of variables and the date local renewal authorities were established, there was no significant relationship between the state level independent variables and local urban renewal receipts.

Local Effects

Certain measures of city government were also hypothesized to effect grant use. They included the three measures of reformism commonly considered: that is, council-manager form of government, at-large representation, and non-partisan elections.[12] The three variables were considered both independently and collectively. To indicate strength of reformism, the Lineberry and Fowler scale discussed in Chapter III was also included in the evaluation.

The relationship between the individual reform measures and the reformism scale was initially examined. Table 4-15 presents a correlation matrix showing these relationships. All individual measures of reformism were found to be substantially interrelated with the highest relationship between form of government and representation (r=.49). The lowest, but still significant, relationship was between representation and type election with a coefficient of r=.24. Of course, all three measures correlated highly with the reformism scale score with coefficients of r=.78, r=.80, and r=.67 respectively.

TABLE 4-15.--Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between
measures of local government reform

	Government	Representation	Election	Score
Form of government	1.000			
Representation	0.487*	1.000		
Type election	0.299*	0.240*	1.000	
Reformism score	0.780*	0.779*	0.669*	1.000

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 4-16.--Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between
measures of local government reform and urban renewal

	Urban renewal
Form of government	-0.233*
Representation	-0.128*
Type election	-0.117*
Reformism score	-0.203*

*Significant at the .05 level.

The relationship between these four variables and urban renewal receipts was then considered. The results are shown in Table 4-16. In each case, the coefficients were negative, ranging from r=-.23 between Form of Government and Renewal and r=-.12 between type election and renewal. The coefficient showing the relationship between renewal and the reformism score was -0.20; a figure slightly below the relationship Renewal and form of government. The use of the reformism scale will be examined again later in this chapter, but indications thus far do not substantiate the claim that reformism is additive--at least not concerning urban renewal funds.

Local Political Culture

The final political variables included in this analysis were measures designed to indicate the dominant political attitudes of local citizens. A number of measures were selected as possible indicators of community attitudes toward "liberal" federal programs. These measures included the variables discussed earlier in the construction of the Local Culture factor and a simple dichotomous variable, metropolitan status, which divided cities between central or independent cities and suburbs. The interrelationships between these variables can be found in Table 4-17. All relationships were relatively straightforward and in the direction one might expect (i.e., the Wallace and Goldwater votes were interrelated, etc.). One problem did appear with the inclusion of the metropolitan status variable. This variable was included as an attempt to measure differences in attitude concerning grant use between central city and suburban residents.[13] One might expect, however, that this distinction was captured by the city profile factors. To test this

TABLE 4-17.--Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between measures of local political attitude

	Wallace	Goldwater	Elazar Scale	Factor	Status
Wallace vote	1.000				
Goldwater vote	0.632*	1.000			
Elazar scale	0.602*	0.432*	1.000		
Local culture factor	-0.718*	-0.308*	-0.520*	1.000	
Metro status	-0.254*	-0.192*	-0.270*	0.279*	1.000

*Significant at the .05 level.

possibility, metropolitan status was correlated with the five factors

making up the profile (Table 4-18). As expected, the status variable was

significantly related to all five factors. Thus while this variable may

measure differences in attitudes, the five factors probably also measure

most of the same thing.

The five attitudinal variables were then correlated with the depen-

dent variable with very disappointing results. Of the five variables,

only two (the Goldwater vote and metropolitan status) were significantly

related to urban renewal grants with correlations of r=-.23 and r=-.19.

respectively (Table 4-19). The type of political conservatism represented

by the Goldwater vote appears to be the only attitudinal variable presented

here that either encourages or discourages grant use. The Goldwater vote

thus appears to represent a cultural value which discourages the use of

federal grants by local government, while the metro status variable merely

indicates the obvious—that central cities receive more urban renewal funds

than do suburbs.

In summary then, of the seventeen independent variables hypothesized

to be related to urban renewal, eight were found to be statistically sig-

nificant at the .05 level. On the other hand, when the individual govern-

mental reform measures were combined into a reformism score and when the

Local Culture factor was substituted for the Elazar scale and Goldwater

and Wallace votes, five of the thirteen variables were significant at the

.05 level when zero order correlation coefficients were computed.

Multivariate Relationships

Once the zero order relationships between the independent variables

and urban renewal were examined in some detail, stepwise multiple

TABLE 4-18.--Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between
measures of city profile and metropolitan status

	Metro status
Status, Wealth, and Education (low)	-0.137*
Central City	-0.501*
Urban Density	0.261*
Size/Manufacturing	-0.128*
Commuting/Growth	0.250*

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 4-19.--Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between
measures of local political attitudes and urban renewal

	Urban renewal
Wallace vote	-0.084
Goldwater vote	-0.232*
Elazar scale	-0.021
Local culture	0.068
Metro status	-0.189*

*Significant at the .05 level.

regression and correlation was utilized to compute the overall explanatory power of the independent variables. These multiple correlation coefficients are shown in Table 4-20. The seventeen variables explain 71.9 percent of the variation in urban renewal funds received with one variable, Size/Manufacturing, accounting for the initial 55.5 percent of the variance explained. The variables added during the first nine steps were significant at the .05 level and accounted for almost all of the explained variance (71.6 percent) in renewal receipts. The first five variables added had previously been found to be significantly related to urban renewal when zero order relationships were computed. The variables added at steps 6 through 9 were not, however. The three variables added at steps 6 through 8 were all of the variables selected as indicators of the effect of state government on the use of urban renewal by local governments. None of the state variables were significantly related to renewal at the zero order level but when considered along with all of the other independent variables, all three make a significant contribution to the variance explained. The final variable to make a significant contribution to renewal explanation, the Central City factor, had not been significant in zero order relationship with renewal (r=.11).

It was interesting to note that the three variables representing local reformism had been significantly related to urban renewal at the zero order level. Within the framework of multivariate relationships, however, all three were unable to make a significant contribution to the explanation of variation in urban renewal receipts. These variables are probably too interrelated to make a unique contribution. They lose their explanatory power when considered along with measures of the city profile

TABLE 4-20.--Results of stepwise multiple regression (with individual
political variables) explaining urban renewal funds received

Step number	Variable added	Cumulative R	Cumulative R^2
1	Size/Manufacturing	0.745*	0.555
2	Urban Density	0.791*	0.625
3	Model City	0.810*	0.657
4	Metro status	0.820*	0.672
5	Goldwater vote	0.829*	0.687
6	Years since 1949 for URA	0.837*	0.700
7	Years since 1960 for legislation	0.840*	0.706
8	Renewal difficulty	0.843*	0.711
9	Central City	0.846*	0.716
10	Form of government	0.847	0.718
11	Elazar scale	0.848	0.719
12	Status, Wealth, and Education (low)	0.848	0.719
13	Wallace vote	0.848	0.719
14	Type election	0.848	0.719
15	HUD office in state	0.848	0.719
16	Representation	0.848	0.719
17	Commuting/Growth	0.848	0.719

*Significant at the .05 level.

and federal and state political variables. This finding adds support to Richard Cole's conclusion concerning local political structure: ". . . by itself, political structure is an inadequate predictor of urban policy."[14]

A second attempt to measure the combined effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable utilizing multiple regression and correlation was computed, but this time using a more parsimonious approach. The reformism scores were substituted for the three reform measures at the local level, and the Local Culture factor scores were substituted for the Wallace vote, Goldwater vote, and Elazar's political cultures. The result of the stepwise computations are found in Table 4-21. Neither the reformism score nor Local Culture made a significant contribution to the R^2. The reformism score made no significant contribution to the explained variance just as the three measures taken individually made no significant contribution. More interesting perhaps was the effect of Local Culture. This factor also made no significant contribution to the explained variance--in fact, use of the factor hid the influence of local conservative attitudes as expressed by the vote for Goldwater. Thus, while the use of this factor might add parsimony to the model, it also hides what might be an important attitudinal constraint to the use of grants.

Partial correlation coefficients were then computed between each of the independent variables and urban renewal while controlling for all other independent variables. Partials were used to identify the independent relationships between the independent variables and renewal that could be hidden in stepwise regression where all variables are not controlled at each step. The partial coefficients are shown in Table 4-22.

TABLE 4-21.--Results of stepwise multiple regression (with combined
political variables) explaining urban renewal funds
received

Step number	Variable added	Cumulative R	Cumulative R^2
1	Size/Manufacturing	0.745*	0.555
2	Urban Density	0.791*	0.625
3	Model city	0.810*	0.657
4	Metro status	0.820*	0.672
5	Years since 1960 for legislation	0.825*	0.680
6	Years since 1949 for URA	0.829*	0.687
7	Renewal difficulty	0.833*	0.694
8	Reformism score	0.835	0.696
9	Central City	0.835	0.697
10	HUD office in state	0.835	0.697
11	Local culture	0.835	0.697
12	Status, Wealth, and Education (low)	0.835	0.698
13	Commuting/Growth	0.835	0.698

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 4-22.--Partial correlation coefficients (with individual political
variables) between independent variables and urban renewal
funds received

City profile factors

Status, Wealth, and Education (low)	-0.038
Central City	0.138*
Urban Density	0.265*
Size/Manufacturing	0.782*
Commuting/Growth	-0.009

Political variables

Federal level
Model city	0.143*
HUD office in state	-0.017

State level
Renewal difficulty	-0.132*
Years since 1949 for URA	-0.190*
Years since 1960 for legislation	0.184*

Local level
Form of government	-0.052
Representation	-0.010
Type election	-0.031

Local political attitudes
Wallace vote	0.031
Goldwater vote	-0.234*
Elazar scale	-0.051
Metro status	-0.114*

*Significant at the .05 level.

There were no surprises. Of the seventeen independent variables, nine were found to be significantly and independently related to renewal. These were the same nine variables making a significant contribution to the explained variance in the stepwise computation. Again, as with the stepwise regression and correlation, the reformism score and Local Culture were substituted for the three reform measures and the individual measures of political attitude. Once again, no surprising relationships appeared. Seven of the thirteen independent variables were significantly and independently related to renewal (Table 4-23). Once again, these seven variables were the same seven making a significant contribution to the explained variance in the multiple correlation computation.

The model in Chapter III suggested that the political variables acted as intervening variables between the city profile factors and urban renewal funds received. By this it is suggested that the influence of the city profile is carried through, or modified by the political variables. With seventeen independent variables to work with, causal modeling would be impractical, as it would add more confusion than conceptual clarity. It might be appropriate, however, to present a model of urban renewal grant use based upon partial correlation coefficients. Even though avoiding causal modeling techniques, an attempt to portray the relationships discovered thus far is difficult at best. To simplify matters somewhat certain intervening variables have been eliminated from the model--specifically, all intervening variables have been eliminated which were not significantly related to urban renewal when controlling for all other variables in the model. Likewise, connecting links between the variables are not shown where the relationship was not statistically

TABLE 4-23.--Partial correlation coefficients (with combined political
variables) between independent variables and urban renewal
funds received

City profile factors

Status, Wealth, and Education (low)	0.025
Central City	0.046
Urban Density	0.367*
Size/Manufacturing	0.771*
Commuting/Growth	0.013

Political variables

Federal level
Model city	0.202*
HUD office in state	-0.037

State level
Renewal difficulty	-0.130*
Years since 1949 for URA	-0.160*
Years since 1960 for legislation	0.182*

Local level
Reformism score	-0.079

Local political attitudes
Local culture	0.030
Metro status	-0.133*

*Significant at the .05 level.

significant.[15] The city factors are by definition (orthogonal) independent of each other (actually there is the small, but statistically significant relationship between Commuting/Growth and Status, Wealth, and Education discussed earlier). Directional lines were drawn showing all significant relationships discovered. Partial correlation coefficients were then computed between urban renewal and all of the independent variables and between the intervening variables while controlling for the remaining variables in the model (only the relationship between model city and the Goldwater vote was significant, r=-.20). Again, directional lines were drawn and numerical values assigned to the lines. All relationships not reaching the .05 level of significance were then deleted from the model. The rather complex model presented in Figure 4-1 shows the remaining relationships.

All of the city factors appeared to contribute to the explanation of urban renewal grant use. Three, Central City, Urban Density, and Size/Manufacturing, are related both independently and through the intervening political variables, while Status, Wealth, and Education, and Commuting/Growth are related only through the intervening variables. Size/Manufacturing was significantly related to four of the intervening variables when controlling for all others. Central City, Commuting/Growth, and Status, Wealth, and Education were significantly related to three, and Urban Density to two intervening variables. Only one of the factors correlated significantly with the federal level variable. Three factors were related to at least one of the state political variables, and all five of the city factors were independently related to at least one of the indicators of local political attitude. All five factors of the

FIGURE 4-1.—Model of urban renewal grant use

Central City

Urban Density

Status, Wealth, and Education (low)

Size, Manufacturing

Commuting, Growth

Model City

Years Since 1949 for URA

Years Since 1960 for Legislation

Renewal Difficulty

Goldwater Vote

Metro Status

Urban Renewal Grant Use

R=.85

.17 .14 .14 .17 .27 -.19 .23 -.14 -.14 .18 -.18 .12 -.20 .22 -.13 .14 .18 -.23 .78 .21 -.23 -.48 .36 -.11 .32 -.14

community profile apparently made a substantial contribution to the use
of urban renewal grants. While Commuting/Growth and Status, Wealth, and
Education showed no significant independent relationship with urban re-
newal, both are significantly related to three of the intervening var-
iables--two state variables and one cultural variable. Size/Manufacturing
was undoubtedly the most important determinant of renewal grant use. It
was not only highly related to grant use directly (r=.78), but it was sig-
nificantly and independently related to four of the six intervening var-
iables.

The quantitative analysis presented thus far substantiates the
general model with some modification. The city profile measures operate
both independently and through intervening political variables to predict
urban renewal receipts. Political variables measuring federal and state
influence appear to act as intervening variables as do local political
attitudes. The surprising finding thus far was the lack of influence
that governmental reform measures appear to have on grant use--either in-
dependently or as intervening variables. This discovery will be discussed
at length later in this chapter. Since both housing and renewal grants
act as the operational definitions of local grant use, conclusions with
regard to the specific hypotheses will be delayed until a detailed analysis
of public housing grant use has been completed.

Low-Income Public Housing

As with the analysis of urban renewal grants, simple, partial, and
multiple regression and correlation was used to quantitatively determine
patterns of construction and leasing of low-income public housing units.
The independent variables used in this section of the study were almost

the same as those examined with urban renewal. The city profile was once
again represented by the factor scores for the same five factors developed
for the city selection procedure. Pearson's product moment correlation
coefficients were computed to show the zero order relationship between
public housing and the factors (Table 4-24). Again, Size/Manufacturing
is the dominant independent variable (r=.88) with Urban Density also prov-
ing to be significant (r=.19). Size/Manufacturing is more closely related
to public housing than to urban renewal while Urban Density explains less
of the variation in housing than it did for renewal. Central City, Status,
Wealth, and Education, as well as Commuting/Growth were again not signifi-
cantly related to the dependent variable.

Federal Effects

Three variables were selected to represent the influence of the
federal government on public housing. The first two are the same variables
used to explain variations in urban renewal receipts: designation as a
model city and location of the HUD regional offices. The third variable
is the previous dependent variable--urban renewal receipts. Two basic
facts suggest this relationship. First, low-income public housing is
heavily relied on to provide standard low-cost rental housing for families
faced with relocation due to urban renewal.[16] And secondly, federal law
requires that a majority of the total housing units provided in a
community's urban renewal projects will be standard housing units for low
and moderate-income families (20 percent of the total must be for low-
income).[17]

Pearson's produce moment correlation coefficients were computed
between the three federal-level independent variables and public housing.

TABLE 4-24.--Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between city profile and public housing

	Public housing
Status, Wealth, and Education (low)	0.036
Central City	0.093
Urban Density	0.189*
Size/Manufacturing	0.877*
Commuting/Gorwth	0.005

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 4-25.--Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between federal variables and public housing

	Public housing
Model city	0.329*
HUD office in state	0.071
Urban renewal	0.796*

*Significant at the .05 level.

Two of the three were found to be statistically significant (Table 4-25).
Model cities was found to be significantly related to public housing with
a coefficient of r=.33. As with renewal, the location of the HUD regional
offices was not a determining factor in grant use. Apparently, then,
cities located in the same state with HUD regional offices did not receive
the favored treatment this study hypothesized. The striking relationship
of this section of the study is the extremely high correlation coefficient
(r=.80) between urban renewal and public housing. In spite of some diffi-
culty in trying to deal with problems of temporal ordering, urban renewal
funds received explains almost 64 percent of the variance in public housing
construction and leasing. While some relationship was certainly expected,
a correlation coefficient of this magnitude was not. The independent ef-
fect of urban renewal will be discussed later in this chapter.

State Effects

Again, as with urban renewal, the state was expected to have some
effect on public housing construction through state laws and enabling
legislation. Table 4-26 presents zero order relationships between mea-
sures of public housing difficulty imposed by the state on the cities'
ability to establish local housing authorities. Two variables were se-
lected as indicators of difficulty for the city: number of years since
1937 until cities established housing authorities, and number of years
since the state passed enabling legislation until cities established
housing authorities. Both of the independent variables were significantly
related to the length of time after 1937 before the state passed public
housing enabling legislation. The first relationship was expected—
using 1937 as a base; the longer it took states to pass enabling

legislation, the longer it took for cities in those states to establish

housing authorities. This relationship had not been found to be statis-

tically significant within the urban renewal model. A partial explanation

for this difference between housing and renewal might be found in the next

relationship. Recall that the zero order correlation coefficient between

the time (since 1949) a state took before passing renewal enabling legis-

lation and the time between the date of this legislation and establishment

of local renewal authorities was $r=-.77$. In the case of public housing,

the relationship between enabling legislation and local housing authorities

was only $r=-.32$. While this relationship is still statistically signifi-

cant, it is not as strong as the relationship found in the case of urban re-

newal. With renewal, cities in those states lagging in the passage of

enabling legislation appeared to establish renewal agencies as soon as

they could after enabling legislation was passed. Not so with housing:

while some cities did establish housing authorities as soon as they were

able, the tendency to do so was not as strong as in the case of urban

renewal—thus the significant positive relationship between the first two

variables.

The housing difficulty scale was not significantly related to

either the time since 1937 or the time since enabling legislation until

establishment of local housing authorities. Apparently, a local refer-

endum is not a significant factor which might serve to delay the estab-

lishment of public housing authorities.

Three variables were selected as independent variables measuring

housing difficulty and were correlated with public housing construction/

leasing. The independent variables were the housing difficulty scale,

TABLE 4-26.--Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between
state enabling legislation and establishment of local
public housing authorities

	Years since 1937	Years since enabling legis.
Time to state enabling legislation	0.233*	-0.324*
Housing difficulty scale	0.025	0.096

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 4-27.--Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between
measures of housing difficulty and public housing

	Public housing
Housing difficulty scale	-0.089
Years since 1937 to local authority	-0.125
Legislation since 1960	-0.025

length of time since 1937 to establish a local housing authority, and a scale of state enabling legislation since 1960 (developed the same way as urban renewal since 1960). There was no statistically significant relationship between any of the independent variables and public housing (Table 4-27). As with renewal, then, measures of difficulty in state public housing legislation was not related to housing success. The highest relationship was between the years since 1937 to establish a local authority and public housing with r=-.13; but even this coefficient was not significant at the .05 level.

Local Effects

City governmental reform measures were expected to be related to public housing success in much the same manner that these measures were related to urban renewal. This was indeed the case. Table 4-28 presents the zero order relationships between reform measures and public housing. Only one relationship was not statistically significant--the coefficient between type election (partisan--non-partisan) and public housing. The relationship between both form of government and type representation and public housing was significant with coefficients of r=-.20 and -.12 respectively. The reformism scale score was also significantly related to public housing with r=-.16. Overall results were very similar to the relationships found between reformism and urban renewal. Measures of city reform were negatively related to public housing construction and leasing. Again, the reform measures do not appear to be additive as a higher correlation coefficient was found between form of government and housing than between the reformism scale score and public housing.

TABLE 4-28.--Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between
measures of local government reform and public housing

	Public housing
Form of government	-0.195*
Representation	-0.115*
Type election	0.004
Reformism score	-0.163*

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 4-29.--Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between
measures of local political attitudes and public housing

	Public housing
Wallace vote	-0.032
Goldwater vote	-0.112*
Elazar scale	0.005
Local culture	0.024
Metro status	-0.084

*Significant at the .05 level.

Local Political Culture

And finally, the political variables shown in Table 4-29 were correlated with public housing in an attempt to measure the relationship between local attitudes and public housing. Of the five variables, only the Goldwater vote was significantly related to housing with r=-.11. Once again, the type of political conservatism associated with the Goldwater vote appears to represent a value which discourages the use of low-income public housing programs.

Multivariate Relationships

Stepwise multiple regression and correlation was then utilized to test the overall explanatory power of the independent variables. The multiple correlation coefficients are shown in Table 4-30. Of the eighteen independent variables, nine made a significant contribution to the explained variance in housing (R=.93). The first nine steps of the regression accounted for virtually all of the explained variance with R=.92. Size/Manufacturing, the first variable added, accounted for an explained variance of 76.9 percent. The first four variables added in the stepwise computation had previously been found to be related to low-income housing at the zero order level. Zero order computations between the state level housing difficulty measures and public housing showed no significant relationships. In the multiple relationship, however, two of the three state measures (steps 6 and 7) made a significant contribution to the explained variance in housing construction/leasing. Of the three individual measures of local reform, type election was the only variable not significantly related to public housing at the zero order level. In the multiple relationship, however, type election along with form of

TABLE 4-30.--Results of stepwise multiple regression (with individual
political variables) explaining public housing
construction/leasing

Step number	Variable added	Cumulative R	Cumulative R^2
1	Size/Manufacturing	0.877*	0.769
2	Urban renewal	0.903*	0.815
3	Urban Density	0.910*	0.828
4	Model city	0.915*	0.838
5	Type election	0.918*	0.842
6	Housing difficulty	0.919*	0.845
7	Years since 1937 for LHA	0.921*	0.848
8	Central City	0.923*	0.851
9	Form of government	0.924*	0.853
10	Years since 1960 for legislation	0.924	0.854
11	HUD office in state	0.925	0.855
12	Commuting/Growth	0.925	0.856
13	Wallace vote	0.925	0.856
14	Metro status	0.925	0.856
15	Elazar scale	0.925	0.856
16	Representation	0.925	0.856
17	Status, Wealth, and Education (low)	0.925	0.856
18	Goldwater vote	0.925	0.856

*Significant at the .05 level.

government makes a significant contribution. Representation, on the other hand, is not a major contributor. In the urban renewal computations presented earlier, the Goldwater vote was significantly related to urban renewal in both zero order computations and in the stepwise correlations. This variable behaves quite differently in the public housing model. While significantly related at the zero order level, the Goldwater vote makes no significant independent contribution to the explained variance in housing in a multiple relationship. A conservative political attitude (at least as measured in this study) may not be an important influence on the public housing program.

Table 4-31 presents the results of a second stepwise computation—this time adding the reformism score and Local Culture factor and deleting the individual variables making up these indices. The city profile factors and the federal level intervening variables making a significant contribution to the explained variance in Table 4-30 also made a significant contribution here. Two major differences between the computations, however, were readily apparent. First, when the city reform measures were combined into the reformism score, the score failed to make a significant contribution to explained variance. In fact, the independent contribution of the score was so small that it was the last variable added in the stepwise computation. This finding substantiates the earlier discovery concerning the nature of the reformism scale—namely that reform measures are not additive as determinants of local grant use. The second unusual finding was the contribution made by Local Culture. None of the individual component measures of the Local Culture factor made a significant contribution to the explained variance in public housing (Table 4-30) and yet

TABLE 4-31.--Results of stepwise multiple regression (with combined
political variables) explaining public housing
construction/leasing

Step number	Variable added	Cumulative R	Cumulative R^2
1	Size/Manufacturing	0.877*	0.769
2	Urban renewal	0.903*	0.815
3	Urban Density	0.910*	0.828
4	Model city	0.915*	0.838
5	Local culture	0.917*	0.842
6	Years since 1937 for LHA	0.919*	0.844
7	Central City	0.920*	0.846
8	Commuting/Growth	0.920	0.847
9	Years since 1960 for legislation	0.921	0.848
10	Housing difficulty	0.921	0.848
11	HUD office in state	0.921	0.848
12	Metro status	0.921	0.848
13	Status, Wealth, and Education (low)	0.921	0.849
14	Reformism score	0.921	0.849

*Significant at the .05 level.

the factor, added at Step 5, was found to be significant. The contribution to the explained variance, however, was so limited as to be substantively insignificant.

Partial correlation coefficients were also computed between each of the independent variables and public housing while controlling for all other independent variables. These partials are shown in Table 4-32. Of the eighteen individual independent variables, eight were significantly and independently related to housing. All eight of these variables had previously made a significant contribution to the explained variance in the stepwise computation. Only form of government had been significant in the stepwise computation but was not found to be independently related to public housing.

Once again, the reformism score and Local Culture were substituted for the three reform measures and the individual measures of political attitude. Again, there were no surprises. Six of the fourteen independent variables were significantly and independently related to public housing (Table 4-33). All six variables contributed significantly to the explained variance in the stepwise computations. Only Local Culture had previously been significant but was now not found to be independently related to public housing.

A model explaining public housing construction/leasing was drawn in much the same manner that the urban renewal model had been developed (see Figure 4-2). Again, the model is based upon statistically significant partial correlation coefficients. All intervening variables not significantly and independently related to public housing are not shown.

TABLE 4-32.--Partial correlation coefficients (with individual political variables) between independent variables and public housing construction/leasing

City profile factors

Status, Wealth, and Education (low)	0.004
Central City	0.142*
Urban Density	0.243*
Size/Manufacturing	0.751*
Commuting/Growth	-0.053

Political variables

Federal level	
Model city	0.158*
Urban renewal	0.273*
HUD office in state	0.064
State level	
Housing difficulty	-0.117*
Years since 1937 for LHA	0.179*
Years since 1960 for legislation	0.098
Local level	
Form of government	-0.086
Representation	-0.012
Type election	0.220*
Local political attitudes	
Wallace vote	-0.032
Goldwater vote	0.002
Elazar scale	0.015
Metro status	0.020

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 4-33.--Partial correlation coefficients (with combined political
variables) between independent variables and public
housing construction/leasing

City profile factors

Status, Wealth, and Education (low)	-0.028
Central City	0.130*
Urban Density	0.238*
Size/Manufacturing	0.754*
Commuting/Growth	-0.056

Political variables

Federal level
Model city	0.202*
Urban renewal	0.268*
HUD office in state	0.033

State level
Housing difficulty	-0.060
Years since 1937 for LHA	0.157*
Years since 1960 for legislation	0.097

Local level
Reformism score	-0.013

Local political attitudes
Local culture	-0.060
Metro status	0.032

*Significant at the .05 level.

FIGURE 4-2.--Model of public housing construction/leasing

As with the urban renewal model, all of the city profile factors appear to contribute to the explanation of low-income public housing construction and leasing. Three factors, Central City, Urban Density, and Size/Manufacturing contributed to the explained variance both directly and through the intervening variables, while the remaining two factors were related only through the intervening political variables. Once again, Size/Manufacturing, was the dominant variable contributing to housing explanation directly as well as through four of the intervening variables. The apparent weakness of Commuting/Growth, and Status, Wealth, and Education was somewhat surprising. Both were only independently related to one intervening variable—housing difficulty. While neither variable had shown an independent linkage with urban renewal (Figure 4-1), both were significantly related to three intervening variables in the renewal model. In the case of public housing, however, their contribution was considerably reduced with an independent relationship between the factors and only one intervening variable.

There is an obvious basic similarity between the two models—renewal and housing. The city profile measures have all been important contributors to the explained variance in the dependent variables—both independently and through the political system. Federal and state level intervening variables were also important in both models. The main difference between renewal and housing use appears to be determined at the local level. In the renewal model, city reform characteristics were only related to urban renewal at the zero order level. Reform characteristics did not contribute significantly to the explained variance in a multivariate setting—nor were reform characteristics independently related to

renewal when controlling for the effects of the other independent variables. In the housing model, however, one of the reform measures, type election, contributed to the explained variance in public housing and was also found to be independently related to housing when controlling for the other independent variables. Non-partisan elections were, for some reason, associated with higher levels of public housing activity. One can only suggest that political parties emphasize the cleavages in an urban community and, as a strong issue area, public housing expansion is adversely affected by the cleavages. This possibility will be examined in more detail later in the chapter.

Local political attitudes, on the other hand, were much more important in the renewal model than they were in housing. Both metropolitan status and the Goldwater vote were important explanatory variables in the urban renewal model, while neither were significantly related to public housing. Suburban status is associated with low renewal grant use as is the Goldwater vote. This gives support to the contention that there is some kind of political culture, or significant local attitude, operating in opposition to certain types of grant use. It was interesting that this appeared only in the renewal issue and was not related to public housing construction. Again, this difference will be discussed in depth later in the chapter.

Background for Field Studies

The author spent approximately one week in each of the cities selected for detailed study, examining public records and newspapers, interviewing administrators, elites, and past and present public officials, and recording impressions of factors in these cities as they related to grant

use. Officials in each city were made aware of the author's impending

visit and were advised of the purpose of the visit through letters of

introduction.[18] In addition, to secure the full cooperation of all of

the individuals interviewed, anonymity was guaranteed to all of those per-

sons consenting to the interviews. To respect this guarantee, this study

will not name or give the job titles of any of the individuals inter-

viewed. Three broad titles will be used to aid the reader in interpreting

comments: (1) local administrators, (2) elected officials, and (3) repu-

tational elites.[19] To place each community in an analytic perspective,

a brief overview of each city is presented to serve as background material

for the more detailed discussion of grant use to follow.

Alhambra

Alhambra, California, the smallest of the six cities visited, is a

suburban city of some 62,147 population located adjacent to the City of

Los Angeles in Los Angeles County, California. Alhambra is one of Southern

California's oldest cities--incorporated in 1903. Small in area, only 7.6

square miles, the city is an attractive, balanced community of tree-lined

streets, attractive homes and apartments, and fine commercial and indus-

trial developments. Commercial activity, primarily in the form of retail

specialty stores, is located along two East-West arteries--Main Street and

Valley Boulevard. Alhambra serves as the gateway to the San Gabriel Valley,

a former agricultural area now made up of numerous suburban communities.

Multi-family housing has been an important recent trend in the city--so

much so that by the end of the 1960's more than half of the city's popu-

lation resided in multi-family structures.[20] The median family income is

$11,004 with 5.4 percent of families with incomes below the poverty

level. The population is 13 percent foreign born—primarily Mexican-American. Approximately 19 percent of the residents have Spanish sur-names. There are virtually no Negro citizens of Alhambra (114 total or .2 percent).[21]

Alhambra is governed by a five man city council elected for four year terms under the council-manager plan. Representation is non-partisan with at-large elections, although the councilmen are nominated from each of five geographic districts in which they reside. The city council elects one of its members to serve as mayor for a two year term. Unlike many of the suburban communities of Los Angeles County, Alhambra provides local police and fire protection and maintains its own library rather than contracting with the county for such services.[22]

Vallejo

Vallejo, California, an independent suburb of some 66,209 population, is located in Solano County some thirty-one miles northeast of San Francisco on the eastern shores of San Pablo Bay. Vallejo's population is 16.8 percent Negro with another 9 percent of the population having Spanish surnames. Approximately 5 percent of Vallejo's population was foreign born. The median family income for the community is $10,596 with 8.4 percent of the families with incomes below the poverty level.[23] Vallejo was the site chosen for California's first permanent seat of government (1852). Vallejo was incorporated in 1867. An attractive city of rolling hills overlooking the San Pablo Bay, Vallejo has been tradi-tionally geared to a waterfront life. The local economy is dominated by the Mare Island Naval Shipyard (employing 8,488), one of the world's largest shipbuilding and repair stations. "Lower Georgia Street," the

twenty-six square block area of bars, gambling, and prostitution remembered by many World War II Navy personnel, is gone. The area has been rebuilt with high rise and garden apartments as well as commercial and public buildings.

Vallejo provides a full range of urban services for its citizens. The city is governed through a council-manager form of government with non-partisan representation and at-large elections. Six councilmen and the mayor are elected for four year terms with elections staggered at two year intervals.[24]

Beaumont

Beaumont, Texas, a city of 116,163 population established in 1838, is located in southeast Texas on the Neches River. It is eighty-five miles east of Houston and is the center of activity in a region containing over 10 percent of the world's oil refining capability. Only 1 percent of Beaumont's population is foreign born. Approximately 30 percent of the population is Negro and another 3 percent have Spanish surnames. The median family income is $8,925 with 14.1 percent of the city's families with income below the poverty level.[25] The city has been dominated by petroleum refining, petrochemical industries, and shipping related activities during recent years although most of the plants are not located within the Beaumont city limits. Lamar University, one of the universities in the Texas state system with an enrollment of approximately 11,000 students, is also located in Beaumont. Beaumont's population declined by 1.4 percent during the 1960's while the overall state population increased by about 14 percent. The city entered a period of economic stagnation during the 1960's and is now trying to combat the trend. The

downtown area has a large number of vacant buildings and the three

downtown hotels have been closed. A large percentage of the housing

units within the city are substandard. Through its location on the Neches

ship channel, Beaumont has an active port facility.[26]

Beaumont during the 1960's was also governed by a council-manager

form of government with a mayor and four councilmen. Elections were par-

tisan and at-large with councilmen running for seats within wards but

elected by the population at-large.

Austin

Austin, Texas, the fast-growing capital of the State of Texas with

a population of 251,791, is located in central Texas about 200 miles south

of Dallas and 160 miles northwest of Houston. The median family income

for the city is $9,180 with 11 percent of the city families having incomes

below the poverty level. The city has a large Mexican-American population

with 15.7 percent of the citizens having Spanish surnames. About 12 per-

cent of the population is Negro.[27]

Austin is the home of the University of Texas (the south's largest

with 35,500 students), a large number of state and federal offices, and

Bergstrom Air Force Base (6,080 personnel). A city of hills, trees, lakes,

and architectural beauty, Austin is one of the most attractive cities in

the southwest. The population of the city grew approximately 35 percent

during the 1960's with much of the growth resulting from annexation.

Austin is governed by a council-manager form of government with a

mayor and six councilmen elected for staggered terms. Elections are

typical of council-manager cities with non-partisan elections and at-

large representation.[28]

Syracuse

Syracuse, New York, a city of 197,332 population in north central New York, was settled as the result of the economic potential of salt springs discovered near Syracuse, with commercial development of the springs beginning in 1793. Syracuse now has a median family income of $9,246 with 9.8 percent of the families below the poverty level. Some 8 percent of the residents of Syracuse are foreign born with a Spanish speaking population of only 1 percent. Approximately 11 percent of the Syracuse residents are Negro.[29]

Like most large urban cities, Syracuse has been declining in total population while the lower income population has been increasing relative to the total population. The city is noted for chemical production (originally due to the salt production) and electronics manufacturing. The city has large amounts of substandard housing with some areas (census tracts) having more than 50 percent substandard housing units. Syracuse University, a major private university with an enrollment of 23,000 is a dominant feature of the city.[30]

The city government of Syracuse is of the strong mayor type administered by a mayor and common council. The mayor is elected on an at-large basis (partisan elections) for a four year term. The Common Council is composed of ten councilmen--five members elected at-large (including the president) serve four year terms, and five district councilmen serve two year terms.[31]

Buffalo

Buffalo, New York, the largest of the cities selected for field study with a 1970 population of 462,781, is located on the St. Lawrence

Seaway in northwestern New York. Median family income for Buffalo is

$8,804 with 11.2 percent of the city families having incomes below the

poverty level. Approximately 20 percent of the population is Negro while

less than 2 percent have Spanish surnames. Almost 8 percent of the

residents are foreign born.[32] Buffalo is a densely populated older in-

dustrial city whose total population is declining, housing stock is

rapidly deteriorating, and whose lower income population is increasing

relative to the total population.

Buffalo was incorporated in 1816 and developed into one of the

largest industrial centers in the United States. The city's basic indus-

tries include chemical products, steel, flour milling, and shipping. The

State University of New York at Buffalo is located on the outskirts of

the city. The impact of the declining population, as well as its changing

character, has been a declining tax base and increasing governmental costs.

Buffalo has not significantly changed its boundaries since 1853 and is

consequently faced with a shortage of undeveloped land. A critical hous-

ing situation exists in the city. During the 1960's Buffalo lost some

11,000 housing units, primarily as a result of urban renewal, highway

construction, etc. On top of this loss, some sources estimate that

another 17 percent of the housing stock requires immediate clearance.[33]

Buffalo has a strong mayor form of government with three clear gov-

ernmental divisions—the executive, legislative, and fiscal. Elections

are partisan with a combination ward and at-large system. The mayor is

elected for a four year term to head the executive branch. The comptroller

is the chief fiscal officer and is also elected for a four year term. The

Common Council is composed of fifteen councilmen—six members at-large

(including the president) elected for staggered four year terms, and nine district members elected for two year terms.[34]

Qualitative Analysis

Alhambra

Alhambra, California, is one of a number of cities in the United States which uses neither public housing nor federal urban renewal programs. There are a number of probable reasons for this based upon both physical characteristics of the city and local community attitudes. Physically, Alhambra is a unique city in many respects. It is extremely small (only 7.6 square miles) and has virtually no vacant land (estimated less than ten acres of undeveloped land within the city). Secondly, its physical appearance is one of a very homogeneous middle-class community.

Physical Characteristics

Although no general plan existed for Alhambra until 1965, the city experienced orderly, though somewhat peculiar, patterns of growth within a framework of zoning laws. Zoning and development in Alhambra date back to 1937. Thus a large number of commercial buildings and residential dwellings are thirty to forty years old. A large part of the city is zoned for multi-family housing. In fact, Victor Gruen Associates believes that Alhambra's present zoning would accommodate a population of 170,000 (as compared to the 1970 actual population of 62,147), in spite of the fact that there is virtually no vacant land in the city. The general plan, however, favors the eventual reduction of the amount of space presently zoned for high density residential use.[35] Of the 1060 acres zoned for multi-family dwellings, only 20 percent is currently used for this

purpose. The multi-family zoning is not new—it has been a characteristic of the city for more than thirty years. Years ago people bough the multi-family zoned lots for long term speculation and then built their single family homes on the lots. Thus the citizens had a nice home as well as a long-term investment.[36]

Recent years have brought pressure on Alhambra for increased multi-family development, but developers have had some difficulty in land assembly. With less than ten acres of undeveloped land in the city, developers have had to assemble the small lots (zoned multi-family) with the existing single family homes. This is a slow and expensive procedure so multi-family developments have not increased at a rapid rate.

Alhambra is amenity oriented (for example, there is a $50.00 per unit assessment to an open space fund for the Recreation Department when building permits are issued). There is a strong feeling of identification on the part of local citizens with Alhambra rather than with Los Angeles.[37] City administrators and officials associate this feeling of city pride with a high percentage of home ownership. This attitude is perceived as an attribute, thus there is a strong single family orientation to the community leadership. To further develop this civic pride orientation, the Planning and Building Department is encouraging the development of condominiums rather than multi-family rental units.

While the 1970 median family income for the city was $11,004 one official estimated that 3,000-4,000 family units in Alhambra were receiving welfare assistance. About 35 percent of the population is elderly, and it is likely that a large percentage of the welfare families fall into this category. Most of the remainder of the welfare recipients are

commonly believed to be from the 15-20 percent of the population making up the Mexican-American community. And yet it is difficult to physically identify any low-income or slum area. There is no area concentration in the city of low-income families. They are almost randomly dispersed throughout the community.[38]

The Central Business District, or CBD, is often discussed when local officials are talking of future developments. And yet there really is no physical CBD--the business district consists of miles of strip zoning along the two major east-west arteries. The CBD is made up of small specialty shops and restaurants. It appears quite prosperous with very few vacant stores. It is a retail center of sorts--78 percent of the retail income comes from the San Gabriel Valley, not just from Alhambra. And yet most businesses are small, highly personalized, locally-owned shops.

While Alhambra is a dormitory community, it is a balanced dormitory community with a sizable industrial base. The Alhambra Industrial Center, a 370-acre area in the western section of the city, has been the location of over 200 industries for a number of years.[39] The Industrial Center has not escaped the trend of deterioration and decline common to many such areas. Fragmented land ownership patterns, high land cost, parking shortages, etc. moved the center to a point of "critical absolescence."[40] To stimulate redevelopment in the industrial area, Alhambra established the Alhambra Redevelopment Agency in 1968 (functional beginning in 1969) to provide the "opportunity for marshalling and implementing all the diverse private and public efforts essential to the revitalization of the Industrial Center."[41] While concerned with the upgrading of the public

areas within the Center, the main job of the Agency is land assembly for

industrial users. The Agency therefore has the power of eminent domain

within the project area. Financing is accomplished through a tax incre-

ment plan under the Community Redevelopment Law of the State of

California.[42]

The Agency only acquires land when it has a buyer. It purchases

small individual land parcels from the owners based upon an appraised

valuation (or use the power of eminent domain and court proceedings) and

assemble the land which it then sells to the industrial developer/user.

Much like the federal urban renewal program, it usually sells the land at

a lower price than the acquisition costs.[43]

The Politics of Housing and Renewal

Politically, Alhambra is a highly conservative community. In 1964,

the local newspaper, the Alhambra Post-Advocate, supported the candidacy

of Barry Goldwater for the Presidency.[44] With a voter turnout of almost

90 percent, Goldwater carried Alhambra with 15,638 votes, to Johnson's

14,263.[45] In 1968, the Post-Advocate endorsed Richard Nixon for President--

"Nixon has key to future."[46] Nixon carried Alhambra with 16,668 votes to

10,858 for Humphrey and 1,424 votes for George Wallace.[47]

The city seldom has referendum elections. Bond issues generally

fail. The city paid cash for its new city hall complex in 1960, for

example, and will pay cash for a new library in the near future.[48]

Alhambra even once turned down the offer of a free Carnegie Library.[49]

Very status-quo oriented, the community resists change. They utilize

few federal programs because they do not want the "federal strings."

While located in Los Angeles County, the city exhibits the Orange County
conservative orientation.

There is an association of area governments (COG), but the city,
though a member, has little to do with the association. Since the power
of the association is in the area of federal grant approval, and since
Alhambra never applies for federal grants, there is little participation
by the city in the association. The city does, however, keep up with the
association's transportation plans as it is in this area where the deci-
sions of the association can affect the community.[50]

Local election issues are usually concerned with the maintenance of
private property and with keeping down the property tax rate. Residents
are almost infected with an all-pervasive norm concerned with "keeping up
private property." The norm is often voiced by the newspaper—everyone
talks about it. The city has a stringent nuisance ordinance which is
strictly enforced as is the local noise ordinance.[51] Though the city is
older, and certainly not wealthy by California standards, the "keep up
private property" norm has kept Alhambra a virtually slumless city. The
norm is not only a characteristic of the long-time anglo residents, but
it is also characteristic of the newer Mexican-American community as well.

Public housing and urban renewal have never really been issue areas
in the community. The author could find no evidence of public housing as
a public issue. It apparently was never considered. Urban renewal was
suggested, however, by Gruen Associates as a possible vehicle for the
industrial redevelopment project.[52] Renewal never became a public issue
although it was considered at length in the planning for the Redevelopment
Agency.

Urban renewal was never publicly put forth as an alternative for the Redevelopment Agency. In the first place, it was extremely doubtful that the community would approve such a program if it went to referendum as it was certain to do. Some members of the city council apparently also opposed it on ideological grounds (the "federal strings" argument).[53] Another reason given by a number of officials and administrators was that Alhambra's priority for renewal funds would be too low—that it would delay the project much too long.[54]

Conclusions

A study of the City of Alhambra suggests several reasons for the lack of urban renewal and public housing programs. The city really has no need for renewal and no wish for public housing.

Physically, the city has not deteriorated the way many other American cities have. This is probably due to a number of factors. First, the old zoning laws, while certainly not perfect, did allow for an orderly and quality development of the community. While zoning laws are not usually a key to community development, in this case the zoning laws were probably an important factor in the local development.

A second factor peculiar to Alhambra was its small size—only 7.6 square miles which is completely surrounded by other incorporated communities. The small size of the community allow for close supervision and control of the physical development of the city. City officials and administrators were able to keep an eye on community development in the normal course of doing business, or through merely living in the city. The limited physical area of Alhambra undoubtedly produced a strict control on potential blight and deterioration within the community.

Probably the most important reason that Alhambra has not experienced decay has been the norm concerning the maintenance of private (and public) property. The strict nuisance ordinances are strongly supported by the community. The average citizen believes that lawns should be maintained, that cars should not be parked on the street at night, and that air conditioning units should not be too loud. Ordinances such as Alhambra's nuisance ordinance cannot be effectively enforced without broad community support. In Alhambra, this support not only exists, but the all-pervasive "keeping up private property" norm defines the community's life-style.

In many respects Alhambra is quite provincial. While it exists in a large metropolitan area, it sees only its own problems. The city has no interest in public housing. Low-income people are not solicited--they are seen as a liability. Problems in Los Angeles are not seen as problems for Alhambra (except for transportation planning). The city is "not in any hurry for social change,"[55] as one administrator put it. The citizens of Alhambra are apparently proud of their community and their way of life and do not want to do anything that might change it.

Alhambra voting patterns confirm the use of the Goldwater vote as a measure of local political attitudes operating in opposition to the use of federal grants. Apparently the Goldwater vote is indicative of a kind of "local independence" operating against intergovernmental ties.

Alhambra may also indicate certain weaknesses in variable selection for the quantitative analysis. It appears that the land area of the city may be an important quantitative measure not heretofore considered.

Vallejo

Vallejo, California, was one of the smaller suburban cities

receiving more urban renewal funds and constructing or leasing more low-income public housing than the quantitative models had predicted. Like Alhambra, Vallejo is unique in many respects. Here, however, the physical characteristics of the city which ultimately led to the need for an urban renewal program (and low-rent housing) were primarily economically based.

Physical Characteristics

During the 1960's, Vallejo had three operating urban renewal projects. The first, Marina Vista, was a waterfront/downtown project of approximately 125 acres. The second project, Flosden Acres, was a rehabilitation project of about 70 acres in an outlying residential area. The third was a concentrated code enforcement project of 359 housing units in South Vallejo and in the McKinley School areas. No public housing units were constructed in Vallejo during the 1960's, although approximately 600 units were leased under the Section 23 program.

Marina Vista, Vallejo's first and largest urban renewal project, unquestionably explains the city's positive renewal residual of $2,914,423. This one project alone had an estimated gross project cost of $15.2 million. With a net project cost of $10.5 million, the city received (or would receive) approximately $7 million from the federal government.[56]

Marina Vista is a downtown urban renewal project of 125 acres consisting of twenty-four former city blocks and approximately a mile of waterfront on the Mare Island Strait. By 1950, the broad area between the central business district and the waterfront was characterized by dilapidated commercial buildings and over-crowded, antiquated living

quarters. The center of the area, lower Georgia Street and lower Virginia Street, made up the "sporting" area for the workers at the Mare Island Naval Shipyards during World War I and World War II. As normal times returned, Vallejo "cleaned up" the vice in the area and all that remained were many largely vacant and dilapidated structures. The shoreline was largely abandoned and was choked with mud and debris.

The first major phase in the project was the acquisition of the 337 separate parcels of land in the area--largely through negotiated price settlement rather than eminent domain. Secondly, the Redevelopment Agency assisted over 500 families, individuals, and businesses in relocation forced by the renewal project. The third phase of the program was the removal of <u>all</u> buildings from the site. Over 600 structures required demolition. This phase was completed between 1961 and 1963.

Once the area had been completely cleared, and before the land was offered for sale, the topography of the area was completely changed. A major hill was leveled and a million cubic yards of earth were redistributed. Some twenty-five acres of land were reclaimed from mudflats and tons of mud were cleared from the shoreline.[57]

By 1972, the project was 95 percent complete with most of the land having been sold, leased, or committed by 1968. Included in the development were a new post office, civic center, library, and city hall. Also included in the area were four apartment complexes of some 618 units, and a number of new office buildings, service stations, banks, and a supermarket. The new 5,000 foot concrete sea wall and promenade deck heightened the waterfront development. Marina Vista includes two new parks and many original sculptures, fountains, and works of art.

Restaurants, a local yacht club, a ferry terminal constitute a portion

of the waterfront development.[58]

The project constituted a massive undertaking for such a small com-

munity and required a large commitment on the part of the city. Marina

Vista now has a reputation as an example of a successful urban renewal

project--many cities have sent local officials and administrators to

Vallejo to view the project.

Low-income housing in Vallejo has been another matter. During

World War II, roughly 15,000 public housing units were constructed in

Vallejo, housing a population of some 40,000 people. The units were con-

structed to house the workers at the Mare Island Shipyards and were com-

monly called Lanham War Housing. After the war, the Lanham housing was

slowly torn down until all projects had been demolished with the exception

of one project. The city kept this one project, Floyd Terrace, consist-

ing of 1,000 units--all either one or three bedrooms. The Vallejo Housing

Authority ran this project for roughly seven years until the mid 1960's

when the project was closed and eventually demolished.

Several years elapsed before Vallejo once again provided low-rent

public housing. Through the Section 23 leased-housing program, the City

now leases approximately 600 units from private owners which it operates

as low-rent public housing.[59] There are now some 1,200 families on the

waiting list for public housing.[60]

Vallejo's housing presents the city with more of a problem than did

Alhambra's. Some 13 percent of the housing is classified unsound with

42 percent of the structures being twenty years old or older.[61] Nonethe-

less, the general housing condition is not critical in the same sense

that it is in many older Eastern cities. Like most cities, there is a definite shortage of low-rent housing (i.e., 1,200 families on the waiting list for public housing). The problem is somewhat compounded by the fact that 45 percent of the families in Vallejo have incomes under $7,000 per year (the national average is 40 percent).[62]

The Politics of Housing and Renewal

Local political attitudes in Vallejo were significantly different than those found in Alhambra. While Goldwater carried Alhambra by some 1,375 votes, in Solano County, Johnson defeated Goldwater by a margin of more than two to one (Johnson-21,438 votes and Goldwater-9,418 votes).[63]

Similarly, urban renewal found an easy acceptance in Vallejo--so little opposition developed that the Redevelopment Agency was established by vote of the city council rather than through local referendum. The renewal project itself (and thus the establishment of the Redevelopment Agency) had wide popular support. The original proposal for a downtown renewal project came from the Downtown Association, an association of local merchants. The Association wanted James D. Richardson, the Executive Director of the Housing Authority, to direct the project. The city council established the Redevelopment Agency and appointed Mr. Richardson as Executive Director. The Board of Directors of the Housing Authority was also appointed as the Board of the Redevelopment Agency. However, this set-up soon became unworkable and separate boards were appointed for Redevelopment and Housing although one administration (and Mr. Richardson) served them both.[64]

Support for the Marina Vista project was widespread. Virtually all of the candidates in the 1961 city council election were in favor of

"going ahead with renewal."[65]   In the 1965 election, one incumbent

councilman ran on his record of support for redevelopment--"rooted out

22 blocks of tired dilapidation and crime-breeding blight in exchange for

an emerging, true, gleaming new vista."[66]

The Redevelopment Agency, in addition to managing the renewal pro-

gram, made every effort to keep the Marina Vista project constantly before

the people. The former Executive Director said, "I would talk to anybody,"

meaning that he would discuss the project with any group, coffee club, etc.,

to "sell" the redevelopment program. The Agency developed an elaborate

one-hour slide show using three projectors simultaneously and approxi-

mately 540 slides. The elaborate show, followed by a question-and-answer

period, was designed to keep the community informed about the progress and

programs of the Agency. They made a "fetish" of ground-breakings or open-

ings with large luncheons or dinners. The city council was constantly

kept up to date on the projects progress. "There wasn't six weeks went

by, whether they liked it or not, that the city council and their wives

were[n't] invited to a little story presentation. . . ."[67]

Elaborate brochures were printed explaining in graphic detail all

elements of the project and projecting the eventual benefits to the com-

munity.[68] The Agency thus made public relations an important part of the

overall program.

While broad public acceptance and support may have been character-

istic of urban renewal, it was not characteristic of public housing--

especially not low-income (as opposed to housing for the elderly) public

housing. During the period between 1960 and 1970, public housing became

an election issue only once during the period. One candidate for the city

council, Robert Doran Boot, campaigned on a housing platform: "Low rent housing--we need it NOW."[69] "Low-rent housing for the senior citizens and all those who need it."[70] Another candidate in the 1963 election, Les Fisk, called for "a study to determine what the real need is for low-rent housing."[71] Fisk was elected, Boot defeated.

One major elected official was queried concerning the reasons for the demolition of Floyd Terrace. The response was ". . . the economy was good--it was time for them [the tenants] to stand on their own feet."[72]

In the late 1960's, some pressure did develop for additional low-income housing. In a Forum for Community Development in 1969, the issue of low-rent housing was highlighted. The operations officer for the Vallejo Housing Authority outlined the procedure necessary before any public housing could be built in Vallejo: ". . . state law requires approval of a ballot referendum at the polls before any city can construct public housing. This particular type of referendum measure requires a two-thirds 'yes' vote."[73] The Chairman of the Vallejo Community Action Committee did not believe that such a referendum would pass since "the minority people who need homes are in the minority and 85 percent of the community won't do a darn thing about it."[74] The Chairman of the Solano County Economic Opportunity Council added that "there has been no vocal commitment from anyone in the city for public housing. We are aware that most of the programs would require a referendum but we have city officials who do not commit themselves. The measure will not pass without city support."[75]

Conclusions

The high positive residual in urban renewal receipts was the direct

result of the Marina Vista project. Marina Vista was no small undertaking for a community the size of Vallejo. It was large in area and was financially ambitious. Marina Vista was not a trial project in any sense of the word. The success of the project in large part can be attributed to the Executive Director of the Redevelopment Agency, James D. Richardson. His competence and political skill undoubtedly made a major contribution to not only the successful completion of the project, but to the broad community support as well. While acknowledging that he "couldn't get by with this today," Richardson supervised a massive land clearance project in the early 1960's. Faced with 125 acres of rubble and leveled buildings, what else could the city council candidates of 1961 do but voice their approval of "going ahead with renewal"? They had little choice at that point.

Being a salesman, as well as an administrator, was one of Mr. Richardson's strong points--and, indirectly, reflected the good judgment of the Downtown Association in promoting him for the position of Executive Director. Through the public relations efforts of the Agency, the Marina Vista project was viewed with some measure of community pride.

The positive housing residual indicates some of the difficulty in total reliance on census type data and statistical analysis. While it outwardly appeared that Vallejo had increased its stock of public housing by more than 300 units over what had been predicted, Vallejo had actually decreased its public housing inventory. The HUD report accurately reported the initial occupancy of 557 Section 23 units, but it did not report the demolition of the 1,000 unit Floyd Terrace project. Thus, when considering the total stock of public housing, Vallejo did not have

a positive residual of 300 units, it actually had a negative residual of 700 units.

The housing program is thus not a success—it serves merely as a replacement program. The community norms concerning public housing are exemplified by the attitudes of the elected leaders. Low-income public housing is simply not wanted. As one administrator put it, low-income housing is "politically infeasible" while Section 23 housing is "tolerated."[76] And yet the community is not as heartless as it seems. In many ways, Vallejo exemplifies the successful application of the provision of low and moderate-income housing through the BMIR programs. The application of these programs in Vallejo will be discussed at length in Chapter VIII.

Beaumont

Beaumont, Texas, provides an example of a medium-sized, Southern, central city having negative renewal and public housing residuals. Like Alhambra, Beaumont has never had an urban renewal program, but it has a public housing authority and has had low-rent public housing since 1937. In a geographic sense, Beaumont is very similar to Vallejo. It, too, is located on a ship channel and is heavily dependent upon one industry. Downtown Beaumont looks very much like "lower Georgia Street" (before urban renewal).

Physical Characteristics

During the 1960's it became evident that Beaumont's economy was running into trouble. City population declined by 1.4 percent and the economy of the Beaumont-Port Arthur-Orange SMSA went into a period of relative stagnation. The retail function of the central business district

has been steadily declining over the past decade with many of the retail

businesses leaving the core area for suburban shopping centers. As a re-

sult, empty storefronts in the central business district are the rule,

rather than the exception.

New police and library buildings are presently under construction

in the downtown areas. The municipal building and the Jefferson County

Courthouse are both located in the central business district but both are

outdated and in need of replacement.[77]

> The exodus of retail establishments from the CBD,
> coupled with the closing of many other businesses
> (three old hotels in the CBD are closed for transit
> trade), a lack of cultural facilities, and gener-
> ally the failure to reinvest in the CBD, have re-
> sulted in a serious problem of decay and deteriora-
> tion. The CBD does not have a hotel, meeting
> facilities, or a good public restaurant.[78]

A housing study by the Beaumont Chamber of Commerce indicates that

there are between 9,000 and 11,000 substandard structures in the City of

Beaumont. An area referred to as "Old Beaumont" was recently inspected

by the city and 20 percent of the structures were found to be substandard.

One of the prime factors for the substandard determination is lack of

proper bathroom facilities, or lack of a bathroom entirely. Some 80 per-

cent of the structures in Old Beaumont do not have hot water heaters.[79]

Beaumont has 650 units of public housing of which 150 are reserved

for the elderly. There are virtually no vacancies in any of the housing

projects. The Beaumont Housing Authority reported a waiting list of ap-

proximately 400 applicants. The only development of public housing units

in the 1960's was the construction of 150 elderly units in the early 60's;

however, the Housing Authority presently has a proposal before the city

council to lease 500 units (to be built especially for this program) to help alleviate the housing shortage.[80]

Beaumont has two projects financed under Section 236 (of the Housing Act of 1968). Washington Manor has 150 units and Virginia Manor 110. A rent supplement program is also in operation and rent supplement tenants are in both 236 projects.[81]

Surprisingly for a city with a population of more than 100,000 Beaumont has no official master plan. In 1960, a comprehensive plan for the city was prepared by Harland Bartholomew and Associates but it was never adopted by the city.[82] It was not until 1971 that the city even adopted a minimum housing code.[83] The city planning department still operates without a master plan or long-range planning. A complete inventory of housing is not available although the city is making application for federal 701 funds to complete this inventory. The planning department does not really plan, it controls (through zoning, etc.), "we have a city hall [administration] that follows—we have no advocacy function—it's not wanted."[84]

The Politics of Housing and Renewal

Jefferson County (Beaumont) has traditionally been a Democratic (although conservative) stronghold. In the 1964 Presidential campaign, for example, voters in the county gave Johnson 61 percent of the vote (44,584) to Goldwater's 39 percent (28,771).[85] Since President Johnson was a native Texan this might have been expected, even in a county which an outsider might associate with a Goldwater type of conservatism.

A more conservative trend was evident in the 1968 election when Hubert Humphrey received only 38.6 percent (30,032) of the total vote.

The combined vote for Richard Nixon with 33.4 percent (26,007) and George Wallace with 28.0 percent (21,824) was more nearly what was expected.[86] George Wallace made significant inroads in this conservative Democratic area.

Housing

In spite of the fact that housing, especially low-rent housing, is in critical supply in Beaumont, there was no organized political pressure for more public housing during the 1960's.[87] Attitudes toward the housing problem are best described by the Chamber of Commerce report. While there is apparently a realization of a need for more public housing for the elderly, additional public housing for low-income families is another matter. The Chamber report concludes that "Many say it makes little sense to place large welfare families in new buildings, because rehabilitated dwellings can be provided at far less cost. Therefore, we may wish to direct our efforts towards something along the Code Enforcement Program lines of rehabilitation."[88] The report indicates a general reluctance concerning the construction of additional low-rent public housing. As a Chamber official put it, "From talking with the local people involved in low-cost housing, the general consensus is doubtful that federal housing programs are the best solution to the housing problem for the poor."[89]

Urban Renewal

Beaumont provides an interesting study of urban renewal politics because the issue, or the attempt to establish an urban renewal authority in Beaumont, was submitted to a vote of the people twice during the 1960's. On June 14, 1960, the issue was defeated 8,898 to 1,581 and again on

November 18, 1967, urban renewal was defeated by a vote of 12,503 to
2,946.

The first attempt to establish a renewal authority in Beaumont pro-
moted urban renewal as a tool to affect "slum clearance." The urban re-
newal campaign appeared to be characterized by three phases: first was
media editorial support. The second phase was characterized by the
emergence of support by local elites and civic groups while the third
phase was the emergence of a strong opposition. The local newspaper, the
Beaumont Enterprise, could hardly be considered liberal, especially in
the area of civil rights[90]--and yet the Enterprise was a strong supporter
of the urban renewal effort. In an editorial discussing some of the
common arguments against renewal, the editor asked: "Since when is it
pampering to make it possible for an American child to live better than
a rat?"[91] A later editorial appealed to the citizens of Beaumont to sup-
port urban renewal with the argument that urban renewal funds came from
Beaumont taxpayers, so this money should be spent in Beaumont.[92] Two days
later, the paper ran a page one article showing the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce's support for renewal.

> Urban Renewal is characterized by the Chamber of
> Commerce of the United States as "probably the
> most creative and constructive tool with which to
> attack problems of community deterioration" in a
> statement cited in letters now being distributed
> to members of the local chamber.[93]

Unfortunately for the renewal backers, the neighboring community of
Port Arthur had recently established an urban renewal agency but renewal
was running into serious opposition from large groups of citizens. The
Enterprise reported some of this opposition: "Although no one in the
audience was allowed to speak, sentiment among the Negroes was definitely

anti-Urban Renewal."[94] With vocal citizen opposition the agency in Port

Arthur was having difficulty in obtaining project approval from the city

council.[95]

The second phase of the renewal campaign began early in June with

the emergence of elite and organizational support for the coming referen-

dum: "The Beaumont Chamber of Commerce's endorsement last year of Urban

Renewal was reaffirmed by Elmo Beard, president, in the current issue of

Spotlight, the organization's official publication."[96] The local chapter

of the American Institute of Architects unanimously approved a resolution

favoring urban renewal in Beaumont,[97] and the Beaumont Building and Con-

struction Trades Council endorsed renewal and urged its approval.[98]

As the referendum date approached, ads urging approval of the refer-

endum appeared in the Enterprise. On June 7, in a full page ad, The

Beaumont Council Committee, "Twenty well-known Beaumonters selected from

all walks of life . . . ,"[99] urged renewal adoption. Advertisements

urging adoption appeared several more times prior to the referendum.[100]

By June 7, the opposition began to organize publicly. Initial

public opposition appeared in the form of "letters to the editor" in the

Enterprise and generally urged the use of local tools for redevelopment

and housing improvement.[101] Opposition came from local realtors:

> Since the Urban Renewal Program firmly establishes
> Federal interference in Local affairs, insures an
> unsound Federal and Local spending program, and
> contains a questionable concept of the right of
> eminent domain for use by private purposes, the
> Beaumont Board of Realtors recommends the rejection
> of the program in the election of June 11, 1960.[102]

On June 10, the Enterprise reported renewal opposition from the Beaumont

Academy of Medicine and a group called the Property Owners and Landlords

Association.[103] And finally, on the day of the referendum, the _Enterprise_

carried large advertisements opposing urban renewal from the Beaumont

Citizens for Responsible Government, the Beaumont Academy of Medicine,

and the Beaumont Retail Lumber Dealers Association.[104]

Renewal was soundly defeated by the voters of Beaumont with 1,581

votes for urban renewal and 8,898 against. The issue was rejected by a

margin of 5.5 to 1, and failed to carry even a single voting box.[105]

Undaunted, the urban renewal supporters tried again in 1967--this

time with a change of tactics. Instead of supporting renewal on the slum

clearance issue, the second attempt was linked to the expansion of Lamar

Tech. Again the _Beaumont Enterprise_ supported the renewal proposal,[106]

but this time the opposition efforts coalesced at an earlier date, pri-

marily through the vehicle of the Republican Party. The Beaumont Repub-

lican Municipal Policy Committee declared its "total opposition to federal

Urban Renewal and urged every responsible citizen to vote against it in

the Nov. 18 special election."[107] Support for renewal again came largely

from the business community with the Board of Directors of the Beaumont

Junior Chamber of Commerce, the Action Now Committee (much like the

Beaumont Council Committee of the 1960 attempt), the Board of Directors

of the Beaumont Chamber of Commerce, the Baptist Ministers Union of

Beaumont, and (this time) the Beaumont Board of Realtors.[108]

The mayor and three of the four city councilmen were active in their

support of urban renewal.[109] In an attempt to rally support for renewal,

approximately ten days before the referendum, Mayor Jack Moore named the

nine members he would appoint to the urban renewal board should the issue

be approved. He said that all of the prospective board members had the

unanimous approval of the city council.[110] The mayor's selections were

hailed by both the Action Now Committee and the Beaumont Enterprise.[111]

In addition to providing editorial support for the issue, the

Enterprise gave page one coverage to stories concerning the success of

Port Arthur's urban renewal project and printed a lengthy article on how

renewal was able to help solve the growth problems of the University of

Texas.[112] The point of this article was obvious--what worked well in

Austin (home of the University of Texas) could work equally well in

Beaumont for Lamar Tech's expansion.

In addition to opposition from the Republican Policy Committee, the

local American Legion Post "declared its opposition to federal Urban Re-

newal as 'inimical to and contrary to' the basic constitutional rights of

all citizens." Opposition also came from a group called the Beaumont

Citizens for Responsible Government.[113] Scare tactics were prevalent.

One large advertisement addressed to "All Beaumont Business Men" warned

that "according to recent studies, most businesses forced to close by

federal urban renewal, never re-open their doors because it is too costly

to comply with zoning laws."[114] Feeling the pressure, the Action Now

Committee responded with a letter to the Chamber of Commerce claiming

that slumlords were behind the move to kill urban renewal.[115]

Slumlords or no slumlords, urban renewal failed by a margin of more

than four to one, 12,503 votes against 2,946 in support of renewal. Dr.

Dale C. Hager, Chairman of the Beaumont Republican Policy Committee which

opposed the referendum hailed the election results as "a great victory

for the small businessman and home-owner . . . a mandate from the people

to replace the present city administration."[116] Renewal in Beaumont was

not dead, however; in the next city council election, urban renewal was to be a major issue. The effects of this renewal attempt on the outcome of the 1968 city council election will be covered in Chapter VI.

Conclusions

Beaumont, when examined on the basis of the predictive measures, indicated negative housing and renewal residuals. Like Alhambra, the negative residuals appeared to be based largely on local attitudes operating in opposition to federal grant programs. Again, this attitude appears to be measured by a large vote for Barry Goldwater in 1964. And yet in the renewal model (Figure 4-1), the independent effect of the Goldwater vote was only -.23. In cities such as Beaumont, however, local attitudes appear to dominate over the physical characteristics of the city as determinants of grant use.

Alhambra and Beaumont suggest that there is some "threshold" point where local political attitudes become the dominant determinant of grant use. It is probable that in the overwhelming majority of cities, physical characteristics are the primary determinants of grant use. On the other hand, in the small number of cities exhibiting highly conservative political philosophies, it appears that local attitudes are the major determinants.

Austin

Austin, the capitol city of Texas, was eminently successful in its urban renewal and public housing endeavors during the 1960's. Renewal and housing efforts in Austin contrast sharply with Beaumont. Like Washington, D.C., Austin was created as a capitol city. Since its founding in 1839, Austin has been primarily a government center—the city is

headquarters for most state agencies and state institutions (such as the University of Texas). As a by-product, almost 200 private associations also have their headquarters in the city. In 1960, government employed 21,700 of the 79,000 persons in the Austin labor force. As a government center, Austin has certain difficulties with its tax base as 52 percent of the property in the city is tax exempt.[117]

Physical Characteristics

During the decade of the 1960's, Austin had five operating urban renewal projects. The University East project cleared an area of approximately forty city blocks of some 310 structures. The land will eventually be sold to the University of Texas for campus expansion. As might be surmised from the name of the project, University East, the area is located directly east of the University of Texas. Many of the residences in the area were in good physical condition, so in order to save as many of the dwelling units as possible, the Urban Renewal Agency tried to sell the structures to be moved and rehabilitated wherever possible. Eighty-seven structures, with a total of 302 residential dwelling units were moved and rebuilt in this manner. The project will add approximately ninety-eight acres to the University of Texas campus and will also provide land for the widening of Interstate Highway 35 through the area. The Department of Housing and Urban Development has appropriated $8.8 million as its two-thirds contribution toward the project.

The Brackenridge project of some forty-five city blocks is located adjacent to, and to the east of, the State Capitol complex. Brackenridge is bordered on the north by the University of Texas and the University East project. Approximately twenty city blocks in this project will go

to the University of Texas for expansion of the campus. Another major

portion of the project land will be used for the expansion of the city-

owned Brackenridge Hospital and for the allied medical and health facili-

ties adjoining it. As with University East, land along the eastern border

of the project will be provided for the widening of Interstate Highway 35

while some lots on the southern end of the project will be made available

for private and public redevelopment. This project had a federal appro-

priation of $9.0 million.

The Kealing project was Austin's first residential urban renewal

project. Located in the eastern part of the city in a predominantly black

area, Kealing combined clearance and rehabilitation techniques (emphasis

was on the clearance). Forty-two substandard houses were rehabilitated

and fifty-two new homes were constructed on cleared land. The area also

contains a new 100 unit low-cost rent-supplement housing project.

The Blackshear project area is located directly south of, and

adjacent to, the Kealing area. While designated a project area, work in

the Blackshear area remained at a virtual standstill during the 1960's.

There are 356 structures in the 61.6 acre area of which 200 are considered

to be dilapidated. Political pressure from the residents of the Blackshear

area forced the Urban Renewal Agency to abandon the conventional urban

renewal approach it had originally planned for the area and to adopt a

Neighborhood Development Program.

The fifth project, Glen Oaks, was initiated in 1963 to lessen the

problems associated with the flooding of a creek through the area and to

eliminate poor housing conditions. Land in the flood plain of the creek

will be converted to an open green space to serve as a drainage area as

well as for recreational activities. A total of $12.0 million was appropriated by HUD for the three residential renewal areas.[118]

The Housing Authority of the City of Austin operates eight housing projects consisting of 1,050 units. Two of the projects are designed specifically for the elderly and both were built in the late 1960's. The Authority maintains a waiting list of approximately 1,200 families (approximately 300 elderly).

The City of Austin gave a high priority to the upgrading of housing within the city during the 1960's. Housing problems have been attacked through the use of a number of tools, specifically: public housing, concentrated code enforcement, model cities, as well as through urban renewal. Success has been such that the number of units lacking some or all plumbing facilities decreased by approximately 70 percent during the ten year period.[119]

Earlier in this chapter a strong independent statistical relationship was noted between public housing and urban renewal. This relationship had been expected for two reasons: (1) to provide low-rent housing for families relocated due to urban renewal projects, and (2) to provide replacement housing for the low-rent housing destroyed in the urban renewal areas. It was thus expected that most urban renewal projects, especially those in predominantly residential areas, would make provisions for public housing on the land being redeveloped. None of the five Austin urban renewal projects had provisions for additional public housing. The reason for this apparent lack of concern for low-income families is found in the Texas urban renewal laws: "No real property acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be sold, leased, granted, conveyed or

otherwise made available for any public housing."[120] Thus while Austin

may have wanted to allocate space in one or more of the urban renewal

areas to public housing, state law prohibited such allocation.

The Politics of Housing and Renewal

Austin voters exhibited substantial differences in voting behavior

from Beaumont voters. Austin voting was along much more traditional

Democratic lines. In the 1964 presidential elections, Travis County

voters gave overwhelming support to President Johnson with 69 percent of

the vote (44,058) to Goldwater's 31 percent (19,838).[121] In 1968, Hubert

Humphrey received 48.1 percent (39,667), Nixon 41.6 percent (34,309), and

Wallace 10.2 percent (8,424) of the vote.[122] While Nixon did considerably

better in Austin than he did in Beaumont, George Wallace did not fare

nearly as well. The third party candidate was thus not as influential

in the more cosmopolitan Austin as in Beaumont.

On December 5, 1959, the voters of Austin approved urban renewal in

the City of Austin by a narrow 55 vote margin, one of the closest elections

in Austin's history. The final count was 3,424 votes for the renewal

issue and 3,369 against. The low voter turnout of less than 20 percent

of the city's electorate apparently indicated voter indifference to the

renewal issue.[123]

Opposition to the renewal issue generally came from real estate

interests, a group called the Austin Taxpayers Association, and certain

religious groups.[124] Editorial support for urban renewal was provided by

both Austin newspapers[125] with most political leaders of the community also

supporting the issue.[126]

During the 1961 city council elections, urban renewal was not a significant issue as the referendum election of 1959 was at the time tied up in litigation. Virtually all candidates supported "slum clearance and urban renewal" if the courts validated the election.[127] The clearance program was subsequently upheld.

During the campaign for the 1963 city council elections, the Austin League of Women Voters sought the opinion of the candidates on the issue of urban renewal. "Austin has launched its Urban Renewal program with the initiation of Kealing and Glen Oaks (Boggy Creek) projects. What is your position on these projects?"[128] Only one candidate indicated any opposition—Paul W. Stimson, Place 3, who also ran on a platform opposing fluoridation.[129] Stimson was defeated.

Urban renewal was not an issue in the 1965 city council campaign. There was little public discussion of the issue. In the 1967 campaign, two of the candidates for city council had public comments on renewal. M. Z. Collins, Place 3, "urged a re-shaping of the Urban Renewal program which he said was 'in bad shape,'"[130] and Jasper Glover, Place 4, who supported the concept of renewal but believed that Austin's program "is being run wrong and the people are suffering."[131] Again, both candidates were defeated.

The council election of 1969 brought the issues of urban renewal, model cities, and public housing into the public view more than any campaign during the 1960's. D. R. Price, ranch developer and investor, running against long-time liberal councilwoman, Emma Long, "suggests that urban renewal here has not been successful, especially in its endeavors to relocate people in better conditions than they previously had."[132]

Price favored a strong code-enforcement program. In Place 6, East Austin

real estate broker Robert B. Smith "proposed a review of 'inequities' in

the Urban Renewal program."[133] Candidate for Place 3, Jimmy Lee Ball,

suggested that "Before the city spends large sums of money on rejuvenating

low-income areas of Austin . . . the council should initiate a 'neighbor-

hood clean-up' campaign to get people 'to help themselves.'"[134]

Incumbent councilman Travis LaRue, jumped places to face Mayor Harry

Akin in Place 4. He made model cities a prime target and called the proj-

ect an "extension of Urban Renewal and could end up costing the city as

much as urban renewal."[135] In Place 7, Les Gage, termed the "liberal"

candidate by his opponent Warren Smith, wanted to revamp Austin's low-

cost housing efforts. Smith, on the other hand, was "not inclined to sup-

port give-away projects like model cities."[136]

Mr. Price defeated Mrs. Long in Place 1 and Mr. LaRue defeated the

Mayor in Place 4. The other renewal critics were not elected. "Liberal"

Les Gage won by a substantial majority.[137]

In spite of the fact that the urban renewal issue was frequently

discussed in the 1969 campaign, it was not the real issue. The real issue

in this election was open housing in Austin. In the late 1960's, the city

council passed an open housing ordinance, but the ordinance was subse-

quently voided by a referendum vote of the people. This was the under-

lying issue of the 1969 campaign. The 1969 election was an attempt by

the opponents of the ordinance to remove the open housing supporters from

the council and replace them with more conservative members. In this they

succeeded.[138]

Urban renewal, however, became a very heated issue in certain limited segments of Austin--so much so that one project was delayed for a number of years and nearly cancelled.[139] This project (Blackshear) will be discussed at length here and again in Chapter VIII. In general, however, urban renewal apparently never ranked as an important issue for the majority of the population in the city of Austin.[140]

Blackshear

Blackshear was the third residential urban renewal project attempted in Austin. The first two, Kealing and Glen Oaks, were "slum-clearance" type projects, and Blackshear was scheduled for the same type of clearance. A number of the Blackshear residents formed an organization to fight the project (called the Blackshear Residents Organization). With the assistance of legal aid and University of Texas faculty and students, the BRO was able to keep the project tied up in the federal courts for a number of years. A major complaint of the residents concerned the attitude of the renewal authority and disputes over relocation procedures. Finally HUD, tired of the constant delay, insisted that the Renewal Agency either come to agreement with the BRO or cancel the project. The Renewal Agency changed the project to an "NDP type" project (neighborhood development program) and reached a lengthy agreement with the BRO concerning relocation.[141] The issue was complicated by the emergence of a second resident organization, The Blackshear Residents for Individual Property Rights, whose members were anxious to sell their property to the Renewal Agency. This organization, obviously, was made up largely of Blackshear property owners.[142]

To best understand the failure (or success, depending upon one's normative philosophy) of Blackshear, it is necessary to examine the attitudes of the project residents. Such a study was undertaken by Professor Allen Williams of the University of Texas. Williams found that 45.2 percent of the residents would dislike being forced to move and that, of those who would either not mind moving or would like to move, the primary dissatisfaction with the neighborhood was based on the physical environment.[143]

Some 57 percent of the Blackshear residents had some knowledge of urban renewal while another 12.9 percent had a reasonably good knowledge. Of those having some knowledge of renewal, approximately 50 percent had unfavorable attitudes toward the program. Furthermore, unfavorable attitudes toward renewal were highly associated with a dislike toward moving. A number of the respondents expressed anxiety over their expected relocation, not knowing when or how it was to be accomplished.[144]

Kealing and Glen Oaks forced approximately 652 household relocations in East Austin.[145] Criticism of the relocation efforts in these projects came from a variety of sources.[146] Concern from a portion of the community at-large (especially legal aid attorneys and University faculty and students) brought expert assistance to the Blackshear residents. The residents were then able to effectively organize to change the direction and concept of the Blackshear project. One administrator, however, attributed the Blackshear changes more to "agitation by students and faculty" at the University rather than to the desires of the residents.[147]

The Positive Residual

While the Blackshear project provides an example of the application

of political pressure to delay and change a project, in general Austin

has had a highly successful (in terms of funds received) program. This

is largely attributed to the high dollar cost associated with the two

University connected projects--University East and Brackenridge. Some

claim that the long personal relationship between the Executive Director

of the Urban Renewal Agency and President Johnson was a major factor in

obtaining quick HUD approval for these two large and expensive projects.

Another theory suggested that the "University and Chancellor Frank Irwin

were 90 percent and 150 percent" responsible for the two projects.[148]

There was a very close relationship between the city of Austin and the

University of Texas (the administration, not necessarily faculty or

students). In fact, it was the city which first approached the University

concerning the possibility of using the urban renewal program for Univer-

sity expansion. The University had been given special power of eminent

domain by the state legislature within a given area of the city for ex-

pansion, but instead of the University undertaking the expansion itself

through this eminent domain (at a much higher cost), the University and

the City cooperated in the present urban renewal effort.[149] In fact, one

administrator claims "that the city government is dominated by the Univer-

sity and the State Legislature."[150] Unquestionably, the University of

Texas (particularly Chancellor Frank Irwin) was extremely influential in

Texas politics and in the two renewal programs. The extent of the involve-

ment, however, cannot be documented as all sources interviewed were not

able to delineate the exact relationships which might bear on this in-

vestigation, although most sources believed that the influence of the

Chancellor was a major factor in renewal success.

Housing

Two housing projects for the elderly comprised the only housing
projects built in Austin during the 1960's. The Lakeside Apartments con-
sisting of 164 units were first occupied in 1967, and the Rosewood Addi-
tion consisting of 32 units was initially occupied in 1966. In addition,
the Housing Authority received a program reservation for 1,000 units of
public housing (750 family and 250 elderly) in February, 1966. The
Authority's first project, known as TEX 1-9, was for 300 units to be con-
structed on land the Authority had purchased in East Austin.[151] The
Blackshear Residents Organization, "as representatives of all Mexican-
American and Negro residents of Austin," sued to halt planning and con-
struction of the project on the basis that the project would perpetuate
racial segregation in the City of Austin.[152] The Court noted that racial
segregation was the official policy of the Housing Authority between 1938
and 1967—even the elderly projects of the 1960's were intended to be
segregated with Lakeside for Anglos and Rosewood Addition for Negroes.
Moreover, the Court found that HUD was aware of and condoned the Housing
Authority's occupancy system despite knowledge that similar action by a
local authority violated rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution.[153] The court held

> that both the Housing Authority and HUD are charged
> with the affirmative obligation to further the
> national housing policy expressed in the 1964 and
> 1968 Civil Rights Acts and that . . . the selection
> and approval of the Project TEX 1-9 site produced a
> decision that failed to consider that policy . . .
> and must therefore be set aside.[154]

This decision forced the Housing Authority to re-examine its site

selection procedures and caused a delay in implementing construction of

the 1,000 units. The Board of Directors of the Housing Authority took little action during the 1960's while awaiting the Blackshear decision. Thus the 1,000 unit program reservation became a program of the 1970's and is therefore beyond the scope of this investigation.

Syracuse[155]

Like Austin, Syracuse had substantial positive residuals for both public housing and urban renewal. Unlike Austin, however, Syracuse is typical of large central cities in that it is declining in population (-8.7 percent between 1960 and 1970)[156] and is faced with deteriorating physical facilities and a relative increase in low-income population.[157] Unlike many other cities, however, the property tax base is not shrinking[158]--primarily due to the success of the urban renewal programs in the city.

The City of Syracuse listed a number of goals in its <u>1968 Workable Program</u>. The first two areas of emphasis pertained to renewal and housing:

1. The most sensitive and vital goal is the provision of new or rehabilitated housing for low and medium income groups, including in-migrants, relocatees, and racial minorities. . . .

2. Rebuilding the commercial and business core of the City into an attractive, functional, and vibrant area is a prerequisite for rebuilding the City, and by necessity will continue to rate as a high priority goal.[159]

Physical Characteristics

During the decade of the 1960's, urban renewal in Syracuse was directed almost entirely toward downtown redevelopment. While only one project was in the middle of the central business district, virtually all of the other financially significant projects were on the fringes of the CBD and were essentially business (or governmental) redevelopments.

Syracuse had five renewal projects in various stages of development during the decade.

The Near East Side project was the first full scale urban renewal project in Syracuse (there was a small trial project in the mid 1950's). An area of some 100 acres immediately to the east of the central business district, Near East Side was a clearance project forcing relocation of large numbers of families and businesses. The area was formerly considered blighted, having a large number of substandard structures. Redevelopment in the Near East Side area includes numerous office complexes, a state Public Safety Building, garage, three apartment complexes including 318 units for middle and low-income tenants, a State Mental Hygiene Department hospital, as well as a museum, motel, and theaters.

The second local project came into being as a result of a campaign promise for a downtown renewal project. Downtown One was designed to redevelop and renew the commercial, retail, and office core of the central business district. Included in Downtown One will be the MONY project (a multi-story office complex and associated garage), a major department store, and numerous stores, offices, and apartments (Clinton Plaza).

The Clinton Square urban renewal project was the third downtown project in Syracuse. It was also designed to renew a business and civic area within the central business district. Redevelopment in Clinton Square included a major department store, two banks, a newspaper printing and publishing plant and several office complexes.[160]

The first of two residential projects, Thorden Park East, is a 190 acre residential Concentrated Code Enforcement Project coupling the rehabilitation of structures with public improvements.

Finally, the Syracuse Hill NDP is a 410 acre project in the Syracuse University area. The project will facilitate expansion plans of the University and medical complex and will renew or conserve blighted residential and commercial facilities within the area.[161] Started in the late 1960's, this project was not in operation long enough to have an impact on the city's urban renewal success during the decade under study.

Urban renewal in Syracuse has not operated to help the poor secure adequate and fair cost housing. Urban renewal (especially the Near East Side project) razed far more low-income housing units through slum clearance projects than it has constructed. The consequent tighter housing supply has caused an increasing concentration of poor families in adjacent areas.[162]

Despite new housing developments and apartments and the fact that Syracuse has been losing population, both home-owner and renter vacancy rates decreased between 1964 and 1967. The rental vacancy rate of 4.6 percent in 1960 decreased to 3.6 percent in 1964, and then to 2.7 percent in 1967. (A rate of 5 percent is generally considered acceptable.) Although Syracuse had been experiencing a tight housing market, approximately 5,500 people in the city were displaced and relocated between 1959 and 1969.[163]

The Syracuse Housing Authority operated six housing projects plus a leased housing program during the 1960's. Four of the projects operate under federal housing laws while two are state funded housing developments. Syracuse had a total of 2,436 public housing units (not including leased housing) by 1970—of these, 1,124 units were for the elderly. Of the 2,436 units, almost half (1,058) were initially occupied during the

1960's. In addition to the James-Geddes Homes opened in 1961, a 500 unit

project, Central Village, was initially occupied in 1963, and the 364

unit Toomey-Abbott Towers for the elderly was opened in 1969. In addi-

tion, a scattered site leased housing was approved in April, 1968, by the

Syracuse Common Council. The Authority began leasing the first of a

scheduled ninety-four unit program for large families in September, 1968.

The Politics of Housing and Renewal

Syracuse provided an example of an anachronism in its voting behavior

during the 1960's. The city constantly supported Republican candidates at

the local and state levels while supporting the Democratic candidates for

President. In 1964, Syracuse gave overwhelming support to President

Johnson with 63,113 votes (72 percent) to Goldwater's 24,912 (28 percent).[165]

The city also voted Democratic in 1968 with Humphrey polling 38,210 votes

(52 percent) to 31,564 for Nixon (43 percent) and 3,250 votes for George

Wallace (5 percent).[166] Locally, however, the Republican party dominated

the common council and the mayor's office throughout the 1960's (until

1969).

Housing and renewal as public issues were quite different in

Syracuse than they were in the western and southern cities visited. For

one thing, housing was a much more salient issue in Syracuse while re-

newal was the subject of little public controversy. Secondly, neither

issue made a substantial impact on the local political scene until 1969.

In 1961, there was some controversy involving these grant programs. Un-

successful candidate for President of the Common Council, William Rafter

(Dynamic Party), cited a pressing need for more "government sponsored

housing."[167] Both major parties, however, indicated support for increased

urban renewal efforts. Two of the Democratic candidates for councilman-at-large campaigned for expansion of the renewal program and William Walsh, the Republican candidate for mayor, pledged a downtown urban renewal program if elected (he was). While not attacking renewal expansion directly, Joseph Grosso, Dynamic Party candidate for mayor, condemned the past Republican administration for its failure to adequately take care of those displaced by urban renewal.[168]

It was not until 1969 that urban renewal emerged again as a significant issue. With an increasing minority population coupled with the "white flight" to the suburbs, the trend in the later 1960's was away from Republican domination of local politics. In 1969, the voters of Syracuse elected Democrat Lee Alexander mayor--the first Democratic mayor in Syracuse in sixteen years. The Republicans also lost control of the common council with the Democrats gaining a six to three majority.[169] The future direction of the city's urban renewal program was a major issue in the campaign. As Lee Alexander put it: the major difference between Gualtieri (Republican candidate for mayor) and himself is that Gualtieri proposed to "continue to concentrate on downtown development, while he [Alexander] will put some of the resources into the neighborhoods."[170] One administrator noted that the Democratic timing was perfect--in 1969 HUD was shifting its urban renewal emphasis from redevelopment to neighborhood preservation. The Democratic Party in Syracuse was able to predict this shift and capitalized on it.[171]

The renewal approach taken by the city of Syracuse was closely patterned after the successes in Philadelphia and New Haven. To insure citizen involvement and program approval, a thirty-five member citizens

group, The Citizens Council for Urban Renewal, sought to represent the

thinking of a wide variety of civic-interest groups within the city.[172]

The Citizens Council is the mandated citizen participation group in rela-

tion to the overall development of the urban renewal program. While

praised in its early years by officials of the Federal Housing and Home

Finance Agency,[173] the city admits to a major weakness of the council:

"It strives to increase representation of the poor and black populations

by membership in its committees. It has tried to win inner city repre-

sentation, to little avail."[174]

Renewal supporters attempted to give political and administrative

muscle to the program in its early stages. John Searles, the former head

of the Washington, D.C., Urban Renewal Agency, was brought to Syracuse to

head up the Metropolitan Development Association (MDA)--a sort of super

chamber of commerce. The MDA was primarily an organization of downtown

businessmen trying to promote the growth of downtown Syracuse. As Director

of the MDA, Mr. Searles was able to "get things moving." His knowledge of

the urban renewal program and his friendships in Washington made Mr.

Searles especially helpful in securing quick project approvals.[175]

Syracuse also brought in George Schuster as the second Director of

the Urban Renewal Agency. Mr. Schuster spent a number of years working

under Edward Logue, the highly reputed renewal director in New Haven, and

brought a wealth of experience and ability to the Syracuse program.[176]

Searles and Schuster, through their reputations and ability, were able to

keep the renewal program "professional" rather than political.

Nor can the influence of local businesses be discounted, especially

local banks and real estate interests. The apparent influence of one

firm, Eagan Real Estate, a local broker and developer, was mentioned by several sources.[177]

In Syracuse there was apparently a consensus favoring (downtown) development—especially among community elites.[178] Literally no opposition developed to any of the downtown projects. The Near East Side project was typical of many large projects of that era—it was essentially a "Negro removal" program. The black community in Syracuse at that time was small and politically weak and was not able to generate effective opposition.[179]

Another factor which undoubtedly accounts for a high level of urban renewal expenditures is the amount of the local contribution necessary. In some states (for example New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut) a portion, often half, of the local contribution is matched by state grants. Thus cities in states such as New York are able to double the size of their urban renewal projects for a given dollar.[180]

The influence of Syracuse University on urban renewal in that city contrasts sharply with the influence of the University of Texas on Austin's program. Ties between the University and the city were "unimportant." Rather than taking pride in the University, it was often called the "Little Red Schoolhouse on the Hill." During the 1960's, the city administration was thoroughly Republican and, rightly or wrongly, the University was perceived as Democratic. The relationship between the two institutions was thus often strained.[181]

Another cause of substantial renewal receipts in the city was inaccurate cost estimates. Project costs were occasionally grossly understated. The original estimated purchase price for the 456 parcels in the

Near East Side project was approximately $18.9 million. Final land cost

in the project area was in excess of $32.0 million—a figure almost twice

that of the original estimate.[182] Almost 60 percent of the property

owners went to court for settlement rather than accept the price nego-

tiated with the Renewal Agency. This was obviously a long and costly

process.[183]

Unlike Vallejo or Austin, the City of Syracuse attempted to utilize

its public housing program to provide homes for those displaced by urban

renewal. As far back as 1956, the city began planning for additional

public housing to be constructed and ready for occupancy in time to assist

those displaced by renewal. In proposing a 319 unit addition to the James

Geddes Homes project, the Housing Authority, supported by Arthur J. Reed,

the Urban Renewal Director, recommended common council approval of the

project "on the basis of long range need tied to the city's slum clear-

ance and renewal program."[184] The Common Council agreed and approved the

project.[185]

The State of New York also offered the City of Syracuse a $6.6 mil-

lion state public housing contract for construction of 400 new units in

the Near East Side. The Housing Authority, however, told the mayor that

it "definitely does not want" the state contract. Authority Chairman

Jacob C. Lattif said, "we definitely do not want to use the state contract.

We have sufficient public housing as such."[186]

As the Near East Side project moved into execution, however, the

city recognized the need for additional public housing. This led to the

construction of the additional 500 unit Burt Street Housing Development

(Central Village).[187]

The Citizens' Council on Urban Renewal reported a continuing shortage of low-income housing in early 1964 leading the Commissioner of Urban Improvement to promise "the city contemplates no new projects which will displace large numbers of families until an adequate supply of housing is available to meet the resulting needs."[188]

The mid 1960's was characterized by an attempt at retrenchment. Syracuse Mayor William Walsh pushed for increased public housing--but in the suburbs of Syracuse rather than in the central city. Walsh suggested "that the Syracuse Housing Authority be expanded into the towns so that housing can be built there or that new legislation be sought to permit a county-wide authority." He suggested that the city "should take a look at those best able to provide this housing."[189] A growing number of community organizations began pressing for an increase in the public housing stock--primarily through the scattered site concept. The Syracuse Area Council of Churches, the Community Chest, the Human Rights Commission, the League of Women Voters, CORE, NAACP, the Urban League, and other such organizations urged the city to seek additional public housing in the form of scattered site units.[190] The pressure groups were successful-- the Syracuse Housing Authority embarked upon a program in the late 1960's to lease scattered site housing units from private owners for use as public housing for low-income families.[191]

Conclusion

Renewal in Syracuse had a definite business orientation. The program was designed primarily to revitalize the downtown commercial area and, to this end, experienced and effective administrators were imported to assure the program's success. Political support was provided by the

Metropolitan Development Association and through the citizens committee

appointed by the mayor. Unlike Austin, the local university was not

influential in renewal--the "Little Red Schoolhouse" avoided the issue.

Another aspect of renewal success (when measured by dollars received) was

the drastic increase in dollar costs of the projects (particularly Near

East Side) over the original estimates. This of course meant increased

funds from the federal government.

Unlike the other cities studied thus far, Syracuse had a definite

interest in public housing. Two factors are believed to have accounted

for this interest. First, the city recognized its future relocation

problems and tried to schedule public housing construction so that it

would help alleviate the pressures caused by relocations. Second, commu-

nity support for low-income housing was well organized. The civic action

pressure groups in Syracuse were much more active and effective than they

were in many other cities. This pressure undoubtedly contributed sig-

nificantly to public housing expansion during the 1960's.

Buffalo

The City of Buffalo provides an interesting comparison to Beaumont

and Syracuse--the two other cities characterized by urban deterioration.

Buffalo, the largest of the cities analyzed through field study, had both

negative housing and negative urban renewal residuals. And yet, Buffalo

was somewhat successful in renewal and housing, it is merely that the

need (predicted grant use) was much greater than the city's grant success.

Physical Characteristics

During the 1960's, Buffalo had a total of six urban renewal projects

in various stages of completion. Of the six, only three are federally

assisted, the other three are supported entirely by the city. In

addition, Buffalo has two federally assisted code enforcement projects.

The population of the City of Buffalo declined by 74,451 during

the 1960's. At the same time, there has been a significant increase in

the proportion of low-income persons residing in the community. The ad-

verse impact of these two factors has been a declining tax base coupled

with an increased demand for city services.

Like Alhambra, Buffalo's land area is restricted--the city has had

no significant change in boundaries since 1853. Buffalo ranked 20th in

population in 1960, but has the smallest land area of any of the twenty-

nine largest cities.

During the decade, Buffalo lost almost 11,000 housing units--mostly

as a result of urban renewal, highway construction, or code enforcement.

In spite of the decrease in population, Buffalo faces a critical

housing situation. City officials estimate that 18 percent of the city's

housing supply is substandard or deficient. From the standpoint of housing

vacancy, a June, 1968, Post Office survey estimated an overall vacancy

rate of only 0.7 percent in the City of Buffalo. Between 1960 and 1970,

Buffalo lost 10,797 housing units (-6.1 percent). Toward the end of the

decade there was a slight improvement with an increase of 1,486 (0.9 per-

cent) units between 1966 and 1970.[192]

Urban renewal has had some impact on the overall housing situation.

The Ellicott project was the first redevelopment project in the State of

New York. Ellicott covers 161.4 acres and was predominantly a clearance

project although some rehabilitation was included. Ellicott was a de-

teriorating residential and commercial area located on the eastern fringe

of the central business district. The development program consists of

1,444 low and moderate housing units, new and expanded recreational facil-

ities, and a new commercial plaza.

The Waterfront project borders the central business district on the

west and as its name suggests, is located on the shores of Lake Erie.

Like Ellicott, Waterfront was predominantly a clearance project with some

rehabilitation. Waterfront called for 3,000 new housing units for the

elderly and low/moderate-income families. Also included are two seawalls

and land reclamation projects, a new elementary school, commercial plaza,

office tower, motels, parking garage, and hospital expansion. The total

project covers 292.8 acres and began in 1962.

The Oak Street project was the third of the three federally assisted

renewal projects in Buffalo. Consisting of 161.2 acres, Oak Street was

also predominantly a clearance project with selected rehabilitation. It

is located adjacent to, and to the north of, the downtown area. Oak

Street development includes 1,544 low or moderate housing units, residen-

tial rehabilitation, hospital and medical facility expansion, parking,

and commercial development.

Downtown (phases I and II) were total clearance projects in the

heart of the central business district encompassing fifteen acres. Both

projects were financed entirely by the city with no federal assistance.

Financing cost to the city was approximately $6 million. Phase I devel-

opment included the "Main Place" enclosed shopping mall and underground

parking garage, the Erie County Bank Tower, the M and T Bank Building,

and the Church Street extension, and Cathedral (mini)park. Phase I is

the only renewal project which was entirely complete at the time of the

field observation. Phase II calls for a retail/office complex, office tower, and pedestrian plaza.

The Industrial Park pilot project was a non-assisted project of 41.4 acres of clearance and rehabilitation to provide sites for light industrial development. Industrial Park achieved a very limited success.

Maryland Street/West was a non-assisted total clearance project located adjacent to and north of the Waterfront redevelopment. A small project, twelve acres, Maryland Street provided space for the construction of a 240 unit tower apartment building and 52 townhouse units.

In addition, Buffalo had plans for a Neighborhood Development Program encompassing 1,281 acres. As this program was not underway during the 1960's, it is beyond the scope of this study.

The Allentown/Lakeview concentrated code enforcement project covered 350 acres of predominantly residential property. The project was located immediately north of the central business district and west of the Oak Street area. Allentown/Lakeview brought 2,655 structures into code compliance with federal loan and grant assistance.

The second code enforcement project was Hamlin Park, an area of 271.3 acres. This project brought 2,622 structures into compliance.[193]

Public housing in Buffalo has historically been accepted by the public but yet has had an unusual cycle of development. Low-income housing in Buffalo began with the Kenfield project in 1937, and public housing construction under both federal and state laws continued through 1959. After Talbert Mall, a state-aided project with an initial occupancy date of November, 1959, no public housing projects were constructed until the thirty-five unit Schwab Terrace for the elderly was opened in July, 1966.

Only two other small projects were opened during the decade--Kelly

Gardens, consisting of forty-four units opened in March, 1967, and Kowal

Apartments, consisting of twenty-four units opened in December, 1968.

Both Kowal and Kelly Gardens were elderly projects. Thus public housing

construction during the decade amounted to only 103 units, all for the

elderly.

Between January, 1970, and August, 1972, the Buffalo Municipal

Housing Authority opened an additional five housing projects consisting

of 436 units, again all for the elderly.[194]

The Buffalo Authority is also unique in one other respect from other

authorities studied--it has leased out one of its housing projects to a

private company which now operates the project for moderate-income tenants.

Dante Place, a low-income family project of 616 units constructed as a

state-aided project was opened in October, 1952. Like so many of the hi-

rise apartment-type projects of that era, Dante Place was constructed in

an isolated area and it soon became a project noted for its high crime

rate and increasing vandalism. The Authority could not cope with the

social problems associated with the project and was also unable to provide

satisfactory project maintenance; so the project was vacated and leased to

a private developer who renovated the apartments and converted it to

moderate-income housing.[195]

By 1970, two other state-aided hi-rise projects were well into a

cycle of high deterioration with Talbert Mall (763 units) being 21.2 per-

cent vacant and Ellicott Mall (590 units) 8.5 percent vacant. By 1972,

the state-aided hi-rise projects were almost 50 percent vacant. To

counter this trend, the Housing Authority was attempting to convert one

of the projects from family occupancy to an elderly project.[196] In

addition, the Housing Committee of the Regional Planning Board recommended

that the Ellicott Mall and Talbert Mall projects be converted to coopera-

tives and sold to the tenants.[197]

Not including Dante Place, the Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority

had 6,670 units in 22 projects under management by August, 1972. Vir-

tually all of the family-type projects in Buffalo were constructed prior

to 1960 and all of the elderly units were constructed since 1965.[198]

The Politics of Housing and Renewal

The city of Buffalo has been a traditional Democratic stronghold

in national, state, and local elections. In the 1964 presidential elec-

tion, Johnson defeated Goldwater by a margin of five to one--Johnson re-

ceived 172,592 votes (80 percent) to Goldwater's 43,628 (20 percent).[199]

In 1968, Humphrey also received a substantial majority, carrying Buffalo

with 119,279 votes (66 percent) to 480,079 for Nixon (27 percent) and

13,025 votes for George Wallace (7 percent).[200]

Although Buffalo had been a Democratic stronghold for years, in

1961 the Republican candidate was elected mayor. Chester Kowal, the

Republican and Liberal Party candidate, was able to take advantage of a

split in the Democratic Party and win the election. The incumbent mayor,

Frank A. Sedita, failed to win the Democratic nomination for mayor and

ran as an independent. The Democratic vote was thus split between the

Democratic candidate and the incumbent mayor, allowing Kowal to emerge

as the winner. The Democrats, however, were still able to maintain an

eleven to four margin in the common council.[201] During the campaign,

virtually all candidates supported the urban renewal program. Ethnic

divisions within the population proved to be the major issue.[202]

The results of the 1961 election provided the city of Buffalo with four years of frustration and delay in the city's urban renewal efforts. Bickering between the mayor's office and the common council over renewal contracts was characteristic of the Kowal administration. The federal government finally became so dissatisfied with the program in Buffalo that they threatened to withhold certification (and funds).

The *Courier Express* reported that the Ellicott Project was in a state of "utter and unbelievable confusion." The urban renewal commissioner and the mayor wanted to sell the 160 acre project to a developer unacceptable to the Democratically controlled common council while the council wanted a developer who was unacceptable to the Republican mayor. The reporter commented: "Perhaps it would be different if one party controlled both the mayor's office and the legislative branch."[203]

The difficulty over the selection of renewal developers led to a legal squabble over who had the power to award contracts—the administration or the council. In June, 1963, the Common Council awarded the development contract for the Ellicott project to the First Hartford Realty Corporation. The mayor called the action illegal and vetoed the contract.[204]

Ellicott was not the only disputed project. The same sort of difficulty existed over the development of the Industrial Park pilot project. In November, 1963, after two years of bickering and delays, the mayor finally approved development of the industrial park.[205]

In the 1965 election for mayor, Frank A. Sedita (this time the candidate of the Democratic and Liberal parties) defeated Roland R. Renzow, the Republican candidate, by a margin of 11,759 votes—92,950

for Sedita to Penzow's 81,191 votes. The common council remained Democratic by the same eleven to four margin.[206] Renewal was an important part of the Democratic platform for the election: "We are convinced that the future of our city depends in large measure upon getting our urban renewal program back on the track."[207]

The _Buffalo Evening News_ complained bitterly about the city's lack of urban renewal progress noting a consultants report concerning "the detrimental effects of 'political discord' and 'a negative attitude towards urban renewal,' by citizens in bogging down Buffalo's program."[208] The _News_ also recommended the formation of an urban renewal agency to remove political pressure from the renewal program.[209] The paper later complained that "For more than 10 years, Buffalo has watched in vain for signs, however small, of urban renewal's ideal result."[210]

Several years later, the renewal program still showed little progress. James P. Kavanaugh called the Buffalo program an "impossible blend of politics and redevelopment and has caused the city to become 'a disgrace in urban renewal throughout the country.'" When asked if the City Charter could be revised to make the Urban Renewal Department autonomous, Kavanaugh replied, "It'll never happen here. People who have to take it out of politics are in politics."[211]

In the 1969 election for mayor, Frank Sedita easily won his third term as mayor by defeating Republican candidate Mrs. Alfreda Slominski by more than 20,000 votes.[212] Mrs. Slominski's

> often-recorded antipathy toward federal grant programs,
> further, prevented her from posing solutions to the
> many problems besetting Buffalo in a convincing manner.
> While her campaign literature pointed with outrage to
> lagging urban renewal, blighted housing and poorly

equipped playgrounds, her votes against harnessing
federal aid to relieve these ills muddled the issue.[213]

Conclusion

During the ten year period under study, Buffalo lagged far behind
expected urban renewal receipts and public housing construction. Concern-
ing public housing, the negative residual may have been illusory. While
Buffalo added only 103 public housing units during the 1960's, it was
possible that a flurry of construction in the late 1960's might result
in large numbers of initial occupancies in the early 1970's. Such was
not the case, however. Only 436 units were initially occupied between
January, 1970, and August, 1972.[214] Public housing construction in
Buffalo, then, followed the same pattern as did the private housing sec-
tor. Neither public nor private housing supplies kept pace with the
demand.

The limited number of public housing units constructed during the
1960's is in part also explained by the Housing Authority's reluctance
"to attempt such an undertaking until the image of public housing has
improved, as well as, the social problems presently being encountered
in some of its projects."[215]

The negative residual noted in Buffalo's renewal program during
the decade was unquestionably caused by political factors. For the four
year period beginning with the election of a Republican mayor along with
a Democratic common council, the urban renewal program in Buffalo came
to a virtual standstill. With urban renewal under the control of the
mayor's office in what is commonly known as a "machine city," the award-
ing of development contracts became a major political issue. Republican
supported developers could not win approval from Democratic common

council and Democratic supported developers could not win the approval
of the Republican mayor. Renewal in Buffalo thus ground to a halt. The
frustration and delay caused by the political nature of the renewal pro-
cess in Buffalo is probably a major determinant of the negative renewal
residual. The quantitative measures of reformism do not adequately cap-
ture this type of political conflict. The findings in Buffalo suggest
that renewal and housing can become major sources of conflict in unre-
formed cities having a mayor of a different political party from the
council majority. If data were available on a city-by-city basis concern-
ing this type of split, the Buffalo case suggests that such a variable
might be important in explaining additional amounts of the unexplained
variance in grant use.

Another deterrent to renewal in Buffalo is related to the critical
housing shortage in the city. There simply was no relocation housing
available for the displaced of proposed renewal projects.[216] Thus little
additional renewal could be undertaken until the present projects were
far enough along to provide adequate low-rent housing.

Conclusions and Contentions

The review of the literature in Chapter II suggested a number of
hypotheses pertaining to the relationship between the outputs of the
political system, in this case housing and renewal success, and measures
of the city's profile. Specifically:

1. Public housing construction and urban renewal expenditures are
   positively related to city size and industrialization.

2. Public housing construction and urban renewal expenditures are
   negatively related to measures of city socio-economic status.

3. Central cities exhibit significantly higher levels of public housing construction and urban renewal expenditures than do suburban cities.

The first hypothesis obviously cannot be rejected. The underlying dimension of city size and manufacturing is undeniably the major determinant of the use of public housing and urban renewal grants. This dimension contributed substantially and significantly to the explained variance of the grant programs both independently and through the intervening political system variables. The findings here thus substantiate relationships suggested by other scholars.

It was also expected that public housing and urban renewal would be related (negatively) to measures of socioeconomic status. Such was not the case. The factor containing significant variable loadings commonly associated with socioeconomic status (Status, Wealth, and Education) was not significantly related to either public housing or urban renewal at the zero order level. When controlling for other variables in the renewal and housing models, the factor still showed no significant independent relationship with grant use. Status, Wealth, and Education was, however, related to urban renewal grant use through three of the intervening variables—two state level variables and one measure of local political attitudes. This factor was not as influential in the housing model as it was related to public housing construction only through the housing difficulty scale. Thus socioeconomic status makes only a minor contribution to the explained variance in urban renewal and public housing. What influence it does exert is through the intervening political variables. Status, Wealth, and Education (low) is negatively related to both renewal and housing difficulty as expressed by state laws, while

both renewal and housing difficulty are negatively related to the

dependent variables. Thus, cities with low status (presumably those need-

ing housing and renewal the most) are located in states where the state

recognizes the need for these grants and puts few impediments in the way

of city participation. These cities, in turn, then have higher levels of

housing and renewal success. This type of relationship exemplifies

intergovernmental cooperation stimulated by the physical characteristics

of the city but made "operable" by the political system.

It was also noted that central cities exhibit higher levels of

public housing construction and urban renewal receipts than do suburban

cities. One profile factor, termed Central City, contained substantial

variable loadings of variables normally associated with urban core cities.

To further test the validity of the factor as a measure of the central

city/suburban dichotomy, the factor scores were correlated with the metro-

politan status dichotomous variable (Table 4-18). The significant r of

-.50 substantiated the isolation of central city characteristics. Central

City (the factor scores) was correlated with renewal and housing success

but was found not to be significantly related to either dependent variable

at the zero order level. Once all of the variables in both the renewal

and housing models were held constant, however, Central City was found to

have a small but significant independent relationship with both housing

and renewal. Central City was also related to urban renewal through the

federal variable and the two variables representing local political cul-

ture. In the housing model, Central City was related to public housing

through one federal and one state variable. Central City was thus posi-

tively related to model cities designation (the federal variable) which,

in turn, was positively related to both housing and renewal success. It is thus noted that cities with central city characteristics are most likely to have been designated a "model city" by the federal government. The high priority given to the grant applications of the model cities by the federal approving authorities in turn stimulates housing and renewal success by the central cities.

The findings thus far generally support previous research findings. While examining grants in a slightly different vein, the studies concerning the importance of city size as a determinant of grant use by Segal and Fritschler and by Hebert and Bingham are generally substantiated. The relationships between the other profile factors and grant use also provide general support for the housing and renewal work of Aiken and Alford. While Aiken and Alford were dealing with individual variables rather than the underlying dimensions presented here, nonetheless, the overall conclusions are very similar to those of this study.

The remaining hypotheses suggested relationships between the system outputs and the intervening variables. Specifically:

4. Public housing construction is positively related to urban renewal expenditures.

5. Cities located in the same state with a HUD regional office exhibit higher levels of public housing construction and urban renewal expenditures than do cities in states without HUD regional offices.

6. Public housing construction and urban renewal expenditures are positively related to the ease with which citizens are able to participate in the programs as authorized by state enabling legislation.

7. Public housing construction and urban renewal expenditures are negatively related to reformism in city government.

8. Public housing construction and urban renewal expenditures are directly related to community political and social attitudes.

Urban renewal was closely related to public housing construction/
leasing. Other than Size/Manufacturing, urban renewal independently ex-
plained the largest amount of the variance in public housing. In addi-
tion, renewal served as an intervening variable for a portion of the
influence of Urban Density and Size/Manufacturing, two of the three fac-
tors which also showed an independent relationship with public housing.
Several of the case studies also exemplified this relationship. In
Syracuse, it was noted that public housing construction was often pro-
grammed to coincide with the need for relocation housing generated by
urban renewal. Buffalo, on the other hand, exemplified the use of re-
newal land to provide sites for public housing (albeit elderly housing).

The location of HUD regional offices was not related to grant suc-
cess. Although the Oakland Task Force report suggested that cities
located near HUD offices might expect some increased priority/success in
the grantsman game, this study found no such relationship.

State laws, and the rapidity with which local renewal agencies were
established, play an important role in renewal and housing success. Legal
impediments to the use of federal urban renewal programs (through state
laws and state enabling legislation) significantly affects the level of
grant use. This was also found to be the case with public housing
construction/leasing.

There was a noticeable difference between renewal and housing suc-
cess and the early establishment of local authorities. Those cities
establishing renewal agencies rapidly (after 1949 authorization) had
higher levels of renewal success during the 1960's than their slower
counterparts. Apparently the long lead time between project initiation

and the receipt of federal funds along with the probability that such cities would have more projects in the execution stage than the late-comers explains this relationship. With housing construction/leasing, on the other hand, those cities which were late in establishing local housing authorities constructed/leased more units during the 1960's than their earlier counterparts. This is also logical as HUD authorizations for new public housing construction during the 1960's was probably higher for cities with no public housing (or low levels of housing) than for cities with established and sizable programs.

The findings concerning reform measures in city government were disappointing. Local reformism was not independently related to urban renewal success while only the election type was related to public housing. Non-partisan elections were the only reform measure found to be related to public housing. It is quite possible that public housing is a partisan political issue with, as a general rule, Republicans opposing housing construction and Democrats supporting it. Apparently, without party support the issue is diffused, and higher construction/leasing levels are possible. This supports the previous finding of Lineberry and Fowler that reformism (at least this one reform measure) tends to minimize the impact of cleavage indicators on public policy. The analysis in this chapter did not, however, support Lineberry and Fowler's contention that reformism is additive.

Local community attitudes were shown to have important relationships to urban renewal grant use but were of little significance in determining levels of public housing construction. The attitudes of suburbanites, for example, was found to be an anathema to urban renewal. Of interest also was the apparent difference in the types of conservatism indicated

by the Goldwater and Wallace votes. While recognizing the dangers in oversimplifying the meanings attributed to votes for political candidates, nonetheless, the vote for Goldwater was taken as a rough measure of a basic ideological conservatism concerning the activities of government, and the Wallace vote was used as a rough measure of racism in the community. While more will be said in Chapter IX concerning racism, the Wallace vote was not related to either housing or renewal success. Communities with a high vote for Goldwater, on the other hand, were not prone to utilize federal urban renewal programs. There apparently exists a community attitude concerning the scope of governmental activity, captured by the vote for Goldwater, that explains a reluctance to utilize federal urban renewal programs. Alhambra and Beaumont both strongly supported Goldwater's candidacy, and both communities rejected the use of federal urban renewal. Beaumont, on the other hand, gave moderate support to George Wallace while Alhambra voters strongly rejected his appeal.

The case studies of urban renewal and public housing success closely followed other case study literature. Cities such as Vallejo, Austin, and Syracuse were exemplified by capable and energetic administrators, high degrees of political support for the programs, and a general downtown or business orientation and/or domination. The other cities either exhibited local norms or attitudes which were in conflict with federal renewal and housing programs (Beaumont and Alhambra) or were characterized by serious political in-fighting and administrative bungling caused by the programs becoming "too political," as was the case with Buffalo.

One conclusion here becomes extremely important. The case study approach tends to inflate the importance of the "political hero" or the

"super administrator" in the grant process. Richard Lee and Edward

Logue probably made very little difference in New Haven's urban renewal

program, just as James Richardson in Vallejo or George Schuster in

Syracuse probably made less of an impact than the case study approach

might lead one to believe. No matter who was running the show in any of

these cities, it is most probable that the cities would have had success-

ful urban renewal and public housing programs and, in terms of development,

would probably not be much different than they are today. Unquestionably,

the physical characteristics of the city are the important determinants

of grant use. These characteristics are "filtered through" the political

environment, made up of federal, state, and local decisions and attitudinal

constraints, to determine patterns of grant use. Good administration or

bad administration probably makes little difference.

The general flavor of Buffalo's renewal and housing programs was

set by the city's physical profile, not by its politics. Political

squabbling, poor administration, and corruption may help account for the

negative residual in the program, and had Richard Lee and Edward Logue

been in Buffalo instead of New Haven, Buffalo might have had a more suc-

cessful program. The point is, in an $87 million program, the $87 million

is of primary importance, not a $9 million negative residual. The

residual is of undeniable importance when attempting to explain as much

of the program variation as possible, but it must be kept in its proper

perspective. Over reliance on qualitative case studies tends to convey

the erroneous impression that the factors which might serve to explain the

residuals (e.g., politics, good administration, citizen support, etc.) are

more important than the true determinants.

Notes

[1]U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, <u>Urban Renewal Directory as of December 31, 1970</u> (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971).

[2]U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, <u>Consolidated Development Directory</u>, Report S-11A (Washington: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1970).

[3]R. J. Rummel, <u>Applied Factor Analysis</u> (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 148.

[4]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 385.

[5]Seven cities had missing data.

[6]Thirty-three cities had missing data.

[7]Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," <u>American Political Science Review</u>, LXI (September, 1967), 701-716. Data source was <u>The Municipal Year Book 1960</u> (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1960), pp. 84-90.

[8]Predicted Urban Renewal Funds = (-1285000 x Reformism) + (3954800 x Central City) + (6810600 x Urban Density) + (2273300 x Status, Wealth, and Education) + (20285000 x Size/Manufacturing) + (-2130400 x Commuting/ Growth) + (1616700 x Liberalism Factor) + 13455121. Predicted Public Housing Construction/Leasing = (-56.249 x Reformism) + (232.19 x Central City) + (450.14 x Urban Density) + (39.262 x Status, Wealth, and Education) + (2069 x Size/Manufacturing) + (-137.95 x Commuting/Growth) + (-36.303 x Liberalism Factor) + 816.6.

[9]U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Execution Project Number by State," Transmittal Notice MC-24, February, 1970. (Mimeographed.)

[10]Office of Economic Opportunity, <u>Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance</u> (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 969.

[11]"Dates of Enactment of State Housing Authorities Laws," and "Dates of Enactment of State Urban Renewal Laws." Attachments to letter from Deborah Greenstein, Program Analyst, Housing Management Research Division, Department of Housing and Urban Development, November 3, 1972.

[12]<u>Municipal Year Book 1960</u>, pp. 89-117.

[13]Metropolitan status is not normally considered a measure of attitude. It was used as an attitudinal variable in this instance in an attempt to capture different attitudes based upon residential location. See Scott Greer, <u>The Urbane View: Life and Politics in Metropolitan</u>

America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972) for a discussion of
these differing attitudes.

[14]Richard L. Cole, "The Urban Policy Process: A Note on Structural
and Regional Influences," *Social Science Quarterly*, LII (December, 1971),
651.

[15]See Denton E. Morrison and Ramon E. Henkel, eds., *The Significance
Test Controversy: A Reader* (Chicago: Aldine, 1970).

[16]Robert P. Groberg, *Centralized Relocation: A New Municipal Ser-
vice* (Washington: National Association of Housing and Redevelopment
Officials, 1969), p. 4.

[17]Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives,
Basic Laws and Authorities on Housing and Urban Development (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 370.

[18]Letters of introduction were furnished by the Director of the
Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma.

[19]Local administrator refers to municipal or county employees and
employees of quasi-governmental units such as renewal or housing authori-
ties, etc. Elected officials refers to present and former elected office
holders--usually mayors or city councilmen. The elite category refers to
persons of reputational stature within the community. The category might
include business leaders, members of appointive boards and authorities,
opinion leaders, clergymen, and the like.

[20]Alhambra Chamber of Commerce, *1972-73 Community Factbook* (Whittier,
Calif.: Frank Clement, 1972); Alhambra Chamber of Commerce, *Alhambra
California Facts* (Alhambra: Alhambra Chamber of Commerce, 1972); Margaret
J. Dutcher and Robert Studer, *History of Alhambra* (Alhambra: Alhambra
Chamber of Commerce, n.d.).

[21]U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, *General Social
and Economic Characteristics: California* (Washington: Government Print-
ing Office, 1972).

[22]Alhambra, *Factbook*, p. 9.

[23]Bureau of the Census, *California*.

[24]Vallejo Chamber of Commerce, *Vallejo, California* (Encino, Calif.:
Windsor Publications, 1971); Vallejo Chamber of Commerce, *Vallejo,
California* (Vallejo: Solano County Board of Supervisors, n.d.).

[25]U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, *General Social
and Economic Characteristics: Texas* (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1972).

[26]Central City Development Corporation, "Beaumont Central City Analysis: Advance Information Kit," Beaumont, 1972. (Mimeographed.)

[27]Bureau of the Census, Texas.

[28]Austin Chamber of Commerce, "Austin's Remarkable Growth Pattern," Austin, 1972. (Mimeographed); Austin Chamber of Commerce, "General Demographic Trends," Austin, 1972. (Mimeographed); "Community Profile: Austin, Texas," Austin, 1972. (Mimeographed).

[29]U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, General Social and Economic Characteristics: New York (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972).

[30]Department of City Planning and Department of Urban Improvement, A Community Renewal Program: Syracuse, New York (Syracuse: City of Syracuse, New York, n.d.).

[31]Syracuse, Governmental Research Bureau and Metropolitan Development Association, Profile of Central New York (Syracuse: Syracuse Governmental Research Bureau and Metropolitan Development Association, 1973), p. 117.

[32]Bureau of the Census, New York.

[33]Nathaniel S. Keith and Marcou, O'Leary and Associates, Inc., Buffalo Community Renewal Program Extension for the City of Buffalo, New York (Buffalo: City of Buffalo, New York, n.d.), p. 11.

[34]"Buffalo," Encyclopedia Americana, 1970, IV, 712-716.

[35]Victor Gruen Associates, Alhambra 1985: A General Plan for Alhambra, California (Los Angeles: Victor Gruen Associates, 1965), p. 7.

[36]Personal interview with local administrator (A), January 8, 1973, Alhambra, California.

[37]Gruen Associates, Plan, p. 8.

[38]Administrator (A), Alhambra.

[39]Alhambra Industrial Directory (Alhambra: Alhambra Chamber of Commerce, 1972).

[40]Gruen Associates, Alhambra Industrial Redevelopment: A Design and Implementation Framework (Los Angeles: Gruen Associates, August, 1970), p. 2.

[41]Ibid.

[42]Alhambra Redevelopment Agency, "Redevelopment Plan for the Industrial Redevelopment Project," Alhambra, May 26, 1969, p. 4. (Mimeographed.)

[43]Personal interview with local administrator (B), January 9, 1973, Alhambra, California.

[44]Post-Advocate (Alhambra, California), November 2, 1964, p. 1.

[45]Ibid., November 4, 1964, p. 1.

[46]Ibid., October 29, 1968, p. 2-B.

[47]"How Valley Cities Voted," Ibid., November 8, 1968, p. 6-A.

[48]Personal interview with local administrator (C), January 8, 1973, Alhambra, California.

[49]Personal interview with former elected official (A), January 12, 1973, Alhambra, California.

[50]Personal interview with local administrator (D), January 8, 1973, Alhambra, California.

[51]Ordinance No. 070-3480, "An Ordinance of the Alhambra City Council Amending the Alhambra City Code by Adding a New Chapter 6-26 Pertaining to Maintenance of Property, and Property Nuisances and by Repealing Chapter 6.28 Thereof," City of Alhambra, California, July 7, 1970; Ordinance No. 071-3512, "An Ordinance of the Alhambra City Council Amending the Alhambra Municipal Code by Adding Thereto a New Title 18 Prohibiting Emission or Creation of Noise Beyond Certain Levels and by Repealing Sections 9.04.010 and 9.04.020 Thereof," City of Alhambra, California, April 6, 1971.

[52]Gruen Associates, Plan, pp. 87-93.

[53]Personal interview with elected official (B), January 11, 1973, Alhambra, California.

[54]Former elected official (A), Alhambra.

[55]Administrator (D), Alhambra.

[56]Redevelopment Agency of the City of Vallejo, Marina Vista (Vallejo, Calif.: Gibson Publication, n.d.), p. 13.

[57]Ibid., p. 1.

[58]Ibid., pp. 2-11.

[59]Personal interview with former Vallejo local administrator (A), January 18, 1973, San Francisco, California.

[60]Personal interview with local administrator (B), January 16, 1973, Vallejo, California.

[61]Vallejo Planning Department, "Neighborhood Analyses: Vallejo, California," Vallejo, 1966. (Mimeographed); Vallejo Planning Department, "1967 Special Census Release," Vallejo, 1968. (Mimeographed.)

[62]Charlotte Pruitt, "Vallejo is Facing a Housing Dilemma," Vallejo Times-Herald (April 20, 1969), pp. 1, 4.

[63]Ibid., November 4, 1964, p. 1.

[64]Administrator (A), Vallejo.

[65]Vallejo Times-Herald, April 5, 1961, p. 1.

[66]Sunday Times-Herald, April 4, 1965, p. 6.

[67]Administrator (A), Vallejo.

[68]Redevelopment Agency, Marina Vista; Redevelopment Agency of the City of Vallejo, Urban Design for Marina Vista: A Redevelopment Project for the Urban Renewal of Downtown Vallejo California (Vallejo, Calif.: Gibson Publications, n.d.).

[69]Vallejo Times-Herald, April 1, 1963, p. 12.

[70]Ibid., April 2, 1963, p. 10.

[71]Ibid., April 1, 1963, p. 13.

[72]Personal interview with elected official (A), January 19, 1973, Vallejo, California.

[73]Pruitt, "Housing Dilemma," p. 4.

[74]Ibid.

[75]Ibid.

[76]Administrator (B), Vallejo.

[77]Central City Development Corporation, Beaumont Analysis, pp. 2-5-2-8.

[78]Ibid., p. 2-9.

[79]J. Earl Brickhouse, A Low Cost Housing Study of Beaumont, Texas, Beaumont, April 25, 1972, p. 1. (Mimeographed.)

[80]Personal interview with local administrator (A), December 5, 1972, Beaumont, Texas.

[81]Brickhouse, Housing Study, pp. 3-5.

[82]Central City Development Corporation, Beaumont Analysis, pp. 2-29.

[83]Brickhouse, Housing Study, p. 1.

[84]Personal interview with local administrator (B), December 5, 1972, Beaumont, Texas.

[85]Richard M. Scammon, ed., America Votes 7 (Washington: Governmental Affairs Institute, 1968), p. 383.

[86]Richard M. Scammon, ed., America Votes 8 (Washington: Governmental Affairs Institute, 1970), p. 386.

[87]Administrator (A), Beaumont.

[88]Brickhouse, Housing Study, p. 15.

[89]Ibid.

[90]An editorial, for example, took issue with Democratic National Chairman Paul Butler's "radical ideas on civil rights." Beaumont Enterprise, May 3, 1960, p. 1.

[91]Ibid., April 3, 1960, p. 6A.

[92]Ibid., June 1, 1960, p. 6.

[93]"U.S. Chamber's Urban Renewal Approval Cited," Ibid., June 3, 1960, p. 1.

[94]Willis Swearinger, "Urban Renewal Meet Recesses at Port Arthur," Ibid., June 2, 1960, p. 1.

[95]Ibid., June 4, 1960, p. 1.

[96]"Board Reaffirms C-C's Urban Renewal Stand," Ibid., June 6, 1960, p. 1.

[97]"Urban Renewal Approved by Architect Unit," Ibid., June 7, 1960, p. 1.

[98]Ibid., June 10, 1960, p. 1.

[99]Ibid., June 7, 1960, p. 7.

[100]Ibid., June 9, 1960, p. 2; June 10, 1960, p. 34.

[101]Ibid., June 7, 1960, p. 4.

[102]Ibid., June 8, 1960, p. 13; and Ibid., June 9, 1960, p. 37.

[103]Ibid., June 10, 1960, pp. 3, 6.

[104]Ibid., June 11, 1960, pp. 3, 8, 16.

[105]Ibid., June 12, 1960, p. 1.

[106]Ibid., November 3, 1967, p. 8.

[107]Ibid., November 1, 1967, p. 2.

[108]Ibid., November 1, 1967, p. 1; Ibid., November 5, 1967, p. 4A; Ibid., November 10, 1967, pp. 1, 9; Ibid., November 14, 1967, p. 7.

[109]Ibid., November 17, 1967, p. 1.

[110]Ibid., November 5, 1967, p. 1.

[111]Ibid., November 8, 1967, p. 6.

[112]Ibid., November 5, 1967, pp. 1-2; Ibid., November 9, 1967, pp. 1, 5.

[113]Ibid., November 8, 1967, p. 1; Ibid., November 12, 1967, p. 10A.

[114]Ibid., November 10, 1967, p. 17.

[115]Ibid., November 14, 1967, p. 30.

[116]Sunday Enterprise, November 19, 1967, p. 4A.

[117]David M. Olson, "Austin: The Capital City," in Urban Politics in the Southwest, ed. by Leonard E. Goodall (Tempe, Ariz.: Institute of Public Administration, Arizona State University, 1967), pp. 23-24.

[118]"Urban Renewal Special," Austin American-Statesman, August 27, 1972, pp. 4-5, 7.

[119]City of Austin, 1972-1973 Workable Program (Austin: City of Austin, 1972), pp. 37-41.

[120]Art. 12691-3, Section 3, Acts 1957, 55th Legislature, p. 704, Ch. 298, Vernon's Annotated Revised Civil Statutes of the State of Texas, Volume 2B (Kansas City, Mo.: Vernon Law Book Company, 1963), p. 375.

[121]Scammon, America Votes 7, p. 384.

[122]Scammon, America Votes 8, p. 369.

[123]Bill Woods, "Urban Renewal Wins With 55-Vote Margin," Austin American-Statesman, December 6, 1959, pp. 1, A-4.

[124]Ibid.; Austin American, December 4, 1959; Austin Statesman, December 4, 1959.

[125]Austin American, December 2, 1959, p. A-4; Austin Statesman, December 1, 1959, p. A-4; Austin Statesman, December 3, 1959, p. A-4.

[126]Austin Statesman, December 3, 1959, p. A-15; Austin American, December 4, 1959, p. 1.

[127]Austin American-Statesman, March 26, 1961, pp. B1, B5.

[128]Ibid., March 31, 1963, pp. D1, D3.

[129]Ibid.

[130]Austin American-Statesman, March 12, 1967, p. D-1.

[131]Ibid.

[132]Austin American, March 23, 1969, p. 16.

[133]Ibid.

[134]Ibid.

[135]Ibid.

[136]Ibid.

[137]Austin American, April 7, 1969, p. 1.

[138]Personal interview with former elected official (A), November 30, 1972, Austin, Texas.

[139]J. Allen Williams, Jr., "The Effects of Urban Renewal Upon a Black Community: Evaluation and Recommendations," Social Science Quarterly, L (December, 1969), 703-712; J. Allen Williams, Jr., Blackshear Diagnostic Survey: A Description and Problem Analysis, Austin: The Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Austin, June, 1968. (Mimeographed.)

[140]Charles M. Bonjean, "Dimensions of Power Structure: Some Problems in Conceptualization and Measurement," in Future Directions in Community Power Research: A Colloquim, ed. by Frederick M. Wirt (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies/University of California, Berkeley, 1971), pp. 19-42. For a general discussion of Austin politics in the 1960's see David M. Olson, Nonpartisan Elections: A Case Analysis (Austin: Institute of Public Affairs/University of Texas, 1965).

[141]Amended Memorandum of Understanding, Austin: Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Austin, July 1, 1972. (Mimeographed.)

[142]Personal interview with local administrator (B), December 7, 1972, Austin, Texas.

[143]Williams, Blackshear, p. 172.

[144]Ibid., pp. 192-201.

[145]Personal interview with local administrator (C), November 30, 1972, Austin, Texas.

[146]Official (A), Austin; Williams, Blackshear; Williams, "Effects of Renewal."

[147]Personal interview with local administrator (A), November 28, 1972, Austin, Texas.

[148]Ibid.

[149]Personal interview with former local official (B), November 28, 1972, Austin, Texas.

[150]Administrator (A), Austin.

[151]Personal interview with local administrator (D), November 28, 1972, Austin, Texas.

[152]Memorandum Opinion: Blackshear Residents Organization, et al. vs. Housing Authority of the City of Austin, et al., Civil Action No. A-70-CA-51, Austin: United States District Court, Western District of Texas, Austin Division, Filed December 3, 1971, p. 1. (Mimeographed.)

[153]Ibid., p. 5.

[154]Ibid., p. 14.

[155]For a description of community power in Syracuse see Roscoe C. Martin, et al., Decisions in Syracuse (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961); Linton C. Freeman, Patterns of Local Community Leadership (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968); H. George Frederickson and Linda Schluter O'Leary, Power, Public Opinion, and Policy in a Metropolitan Community: A Case Study of Syracuse, New York (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973).

[156]Syracuse Research Bureau, Profile, p. 17.

[157]Housing Committee of the League of Women Voters of Metropolitan Syracuse, Housing in Onondaga County: Present Facts and Future Goals (Syracuse: League of Women Voters, February, 1969), pp. 1-2.

[158]Gene Goshorn, "Syracuse tackles problem head-on," Syracuse Herald-American, January 2, 1966.

[159]*A Workable Program for Community Improvement: 1968 Progress Report for the Elimination and Prevention of Slums and Blight in Syracuse, New York* (Syracuse: City of Syracuse, 1968), p. 18.

[160]Syracuse Research Bureau, *Profile*, pp. 14-16.

[161]*Workable Program, Syracuse*, p. 21.

[162]League of Women Voters, *Housing*, p. 1.

[163]*Ibid.*, p. 4.

[164]*Ibid.*, pp. 19, 5.

[165]*Syracuse Post-Standard*, November 4, 1964, pp. 1-2.

[166]*Ibid.*, November 6, 1968, p. 1.

[167]*Ibid.*, November 1, 1969, p. 8.

[168]*Ibid.*, November 2, 1961, p. 24.

[169]*Ibid.*, November 5, 1969, p. 1.

[170]*Ibid.*, November 1, 1969, p. 8.

[171]Personal interview with local administrator (A), March 1, 1973, Syracuse, New York.

[172]See Freeman, *Patterns of Leadership* for background information.

[173]"Renewal Council Praised," *Post-Standard*, November 2, 1962.

[174]*Workable Program, Syracuse*, Citizen Involvement, p. 3.

[175]Personal interview with local administrator (B), March 1, 1973, Syracuse, New York.

[176]Personal interview with local elite (A), February 28, 1973, Syracuse, New York.

[177]*Ibid.*

[178]Personal interview with former local administrator (C), March 1, 1973, Syracuse, New York.

[179]Elite (A), Syracuse.

[180]*Ibid.*

[181]Elite (A), Syracuse; Administrator (B), Syracuse.

[182]Joseph A. Porcello, "UR condemnation," Syracuse Herald-Journal, July 16, 1968.

[183]Administrator (B), Syracuse.

[184]Joseph V. Ganley, "719 Units Can Now Be Built," Post-Standard, May 17, 1956, pp. 1, 25.

[185]"Council Accepts $4.5 Million Federal Housing Aid," Ibid., May 29, 1956.

[186]Joseph V. Ganley, "City Holds Off State Housing," Herald-Journal, April 23, 1959, p. 3. Under federal housing, the city government is not responsible for housing authority financial losses. Under New York state housing, however, if the state sponsored projects are losing money, the city is required to make up the loss.

[187]"Action Asked in Urban Renewal Problems," Post-Standard, July 30, 1961, pp. 1, 31.

[188]Eleanor Rosebrugh, "Housing Needs Are Reviewed," Ibid., April 15, 1964.

[189]Joseph V. Ganley, "see city public housing as ending," Herald-Journal, May 31, 1965.

[190]Eleanor Rosebrugh, "Scattered Site Housing Urged," Post-Standard, August 12, 1966.

[191]Eleanor Rosebrugh, "Expect Housing Action," Ibid., December 9, 1966.

[192]Keith, Buffalo CRP, pp. 11-19.

[193]Frank Stahl, Reflections: A Summary of Urban Renewal Activities in Buffalo, New York 1971/1972 (Buffalo: Department of Urban Renewal/ Buffalo, New York, 1972), p. 18.

[194]Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority, "Data on Occupied Projects Under Management, 1972," Buffalo, August, 1972. (Mimeographed.)

[195]Personal interview with local administrator (A), February 22, 1973, Buffalo, New York.

[196]Ibid.

[197]Housing Committee of the Erie and Niagara Counties Regional Planning Board, Technical Report on Housing in the Erie-Niagara Region: First Year Study (Grand Island, New York: Erie and Niagara Counties Regional Planning Board, June, 1970), pp. 1-17.

[198]Buffalo Housing Authority, Data on Projects.

[199] _Buffalo Courier Express_, November 4, 1964, p. 1.

[200] _Ibid._, November 6, 1968, p. 1.

[201] _Ibid._, November 8, 1961, p. 1.

[202] _Ibid._, November 1, 1961, pp. 7, 36; _Ibid._, November 5, 1961, pp. 5, 14.

[203] Dick Hirsch, "Buffalo Renewal in Utter Confusion," _Ibid._, June 2, 1963, pp. 1B, 5B.

[204] "Mayor Vetoes Second Ellicott Project Action," _Ibid._, June 6, 1963, p. 11.

[205] "Kowal Approves Industrial Park Work," _Ibid._, November 2, 1963, p. 1.

[206] _Ibid._, November 3, 1965, p. 1.

[207] _Ibid._, October 19, 1965, p. 32.

[208] Frank Buell, "20-Year Program of Urban Renewal Projected for City," _Buffalo Evening News_, April 19, 1965, p. 1.

[209] At this time the city's urban renewal program was operated by the Department of Urban Renewal--a line department within the city administration. The _News_ recommended that renewal be handled by a semi-autonomous agency as was the case in most cities.

[210] Frank Buell, "New Ideas Needed to Breathe Life into Renewal Phantoms," _News_, August 18, 1965, p. 39.

[211] Dominic Merle, "Renewal Delays Tied to Council," _Ibid._, December 2, 1968, p. 28.

[212] _Courier Express_, November 5, 1969, p. 1.

[213] Douglas Turner, "Sedita Win Caps Masterful Effort," _Ibid._.

[214] Buffalo Housing Authority, _Data on Projects_.

[215] _Workable Program 1970/1972_ (Buffalo: City of Buffalo, 1969), p. 11B.

[216] Keith, _Buffalo CRP_, p. 33.

CHAPTER V

EFFECTS OF RENEWAL AND HOUSING ON LOCAL BUSINESS

Thus far, this study has attempted to provide some insight into the patterns of use of federal grants to local government—specifically urban renewal and public housing grants. The remaining chapters will be concerned with the second of the two major research questions: what impact have these grants actually had on cities? This chapter will deal with one of the four broad areas of hypothesized grant effects--the effects on local business.

There is one significant methodological difference between the preceding chapter and the chapters dealing with grant effects. Chapter IV attempted to isolate the city physical and social characteristics, along with the political characteristics, which would explain the variation in the dependent variables, namely, urban renewal and public housing. The chapters concerning grant effects, however, are not attempting to explain a large percentage of the variation in the dependent variables, only that variance explained by renewal and housing grants.

One hypothesized effect of urban renewal and public housing to be discussed in this chapter, for example, is the effect of these grants on residential construction. The dependent variable, then, is residential construction. However, the purpose of this paper is not to "explain" the

variation in residential construction, or to predict construction, but merely to isolate the effects of renewal and housing on this construction.

In this chapter, and in the remaining chapters concerned with grant effect, environmental influences not contained in this analysis are probably the major determinants of most of the effects being considered. Many factors affect local construction levels, for example, but this study is only concerned with two of those factors—urban renewal and public housing. For this reason, multiple regression and correlation is not a particularly appropriate methodological technique. Simple and partial correlation coefficients provide more appropriate analytical tools.

Two measures were selected as representative of general business conditions within the cities. One such measure was the unemployment rate. In theory at least, both renewal and public housing programs are stimulative to general business activity. If renewal and housing programs were large enough to substantially affect business conditions within a community, they should be associated with a low unemployment rate. The unemployment rate for each city was obtained from the 1970 census.[1]

The other area of economic activity expected to benefit from urban renewal and public housing was the area of residential housing construction. The number of new housing units authorized in permit-issuing places from 1960 through 1970 was selected as an indicator of residential construction.[2]

Bivariate Relationships

Table 5-1 shows the zero order relationship between the grant programs and the indicator of the city's economic vitality—the unemployment

rate. Neither urban renewal receipts nor public housing construction/ leasing were significantly related to unemployment.

Both renewal and housing, however, were significantly related to residential housing construction as is shown in Table 5-2. Both relationships were quite substantial with the coefficient between renewal and housing permits of r=.59 and between public housing and housing permits of r=.73. Temporal ordering became a significant problem here—especially in the relationship between public housing construction and housing permits. Obviously, the housing permit comes before housing construction and occupancy in the temporal sequence. Just how much before is another question. There is no "average" construction time that can be assumed to exist between permit issuance and unit occupancy in public housing. The variables determining the time lag could not be built into a model. They include method of bid (e.g., turnkey vs. conventional bidding), climatic conditions, number of units in the project, specifications, material shortages, type units (i.e., hi-rise or single family units), etc. Rather than risking adoption of an invalid time-series sequence which could produce erroneous conclusions, the data were not temporally ordered. Both independent variables and the dependent variable cover the entire 1960-1970 time frame. The reader, then, must recognize these limitations to the data.

At the zero order level, urban renewal and public housing programs apparently do not make enough of an impact on the local economy to affect overall economic vitality as measured by the unemployment rate. On the other hand, both programs are significantly and substantially related to housing construction. The unanswered question is, however, whether these

TABLE 5-1.—Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between grant use and unemployment

	Percent unemployed 1970
Urban renewal	0.037
Public housing	0.015

TABLE 5-2.—Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between grant use and housing construction

	Housing permits 1960-1970
Urban renewal	0.591*
Public housing	0.733*

*Significant at the .05 level.

relationships are independent or are indicative of other possible relationships within the model. Is the relationship between urban renewal and housing construction independent or does the coefficient of r=.59 actually show the relationship between City Size/Manufacturing and housing construction?

Multivariate Relationships

To test the independence of the zero order correlations, partials were computed between renewal and housing (as independent variables) and the economic indicators, while controlling for the five city profile factors and all of the individual political variables. Since the use of the reformism score and the Local Culture factor in Chapter IV tended to hide important relationships, all of the individual political variables were included in the computation. Table 5-3 shows the independent relationships between grant use and local economic vitality. Both correlation coefficients are negative as expected; however, public housing was found to be independently related to the unemployment rate when controlling for the other variables in the model. The relationship (r=-.13) was not high enough, however, so that public housing construction/leasing can be considered a real determinant of employment. The multivariate relationships here generally verify the zero order correlations.

Partials were also computed between grant use and housing construction (Table 5-4). Both urban renewal and public housing were found to be significantly and independently related to housing construction--but this time in a negative direction with r=-.25 and r=-.24 respectively. Thus high levels of renewal receipts and public housing construction/leasing are independently related to a reduced number of housing permits.

TABLE 5-3.—Partial correlation coefficients showing independent
relationships between grant use and unemployment

	Percent unemployed 1970
Urban renewal	-0.047
Public housing	-0.133*

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 5-4.—Partial correlation coefficients showing independent
relationships between grant use and housing construction

	Housing permits 1960-1970
Urban renewal	-0.247*
Public housing	-0.238*

*Significant at the .05 level.

It had been expected that urban renewal and public housing might be independently related to housing construction--but in a positive direction. This was not the case. The relationships between housing permits and each of the variables in both the renewal and housing models, while controlling for all others, was then examined for a possible key to the negative coefficients. Tables 5-5 and 5-6 present the partial coefficients. No other unusual relationships are apparent. Size/Manufacturing is once again a dominant influence; but this is certainly no surprise.

There is a plausible explanation for the unusual negative relationships, nevertheless. Recall that in Chapter IV, Central City, Urban Density, and Size/Manufacturing were positively related to, and significant contributors to, the explained variance in both urban renewal and public housing. The conditions isolated by these factors are descriptive of the older, stagnant, and decaying core cities. The political and governmental officials respond to the physical conditions and deterioration of the city by heavily participating in federal programs such as urban renewal and public housing in an attempt to "get things moving again." The same characteristics (Central City, Urban Density, and Size/Manufacturing) are also indicative of higher levels of housing construction.

Let us now compare two hypothetical cities both of which have roughly the same factor scores on the aforementioned three factors--but with one city in reasonably sound economic health and the other characterized by a badly deteriorating economic condition. One indicator of this deteriorating economic condition (with socio-economic factors held constant) is a low level of housing construction (building permits). In

TABLE 5-5.--Partial correlation coefficients showing independent
relationships between renewal model variables and
housing construction

	Housing permits 1960-1970
Status, Wealth, and Education (low)	-0.223*
Central City	0.155*
Urban Density	0.142*
Size/Manufacturing	0.792*
Commuting/Growth	0.040
Model city	0.099
HUD office in state	0.060
Renewal difficulty	-0.020
Years since 1949 for URA	0.055
Years since 1960 for enabling legislation	0.013
Form of government	-0.153*
Representation	0.037
Type election	0.121*
Wallace vote	-0.127*
Goldwater vote	0.044
Elazar's political cultures	-0.020
Metro status	-0.124*
Urban renewal	-0.247*

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 5-6.--Partial correlation coefficients showing independent
relationships between housing model variables and
housing construction

	Housing permits 1960-1970
Status, Wealth, and Education (low)	-0.233*
Central City	0.200*
Urban Density	0.183*
Size/Manufacturing	0.733*
Commuting/Growth	0.020
Model city	0.130*
HUD office in state	0.118*
Urban renewal	-0.201*
Housing difficulty	-0.036
Years since 1937 for LHA	0.110
Years since 1960 for enabling legislation	0.101
Form of government	-0.175*
Representation	0.032
Type election	0.156*
Wallace vote	-0.145*
Goldwater vote	0.053
Elazar's political cultures	-0.019
Metro status	-0.124*
Public housing	-0.238*

*Significant at the .05 level.

this situation, the political officials in the economically weak city might be inclined to favor large doses of federal construction money to aid the economic situation.

In this context, then, the problem may merely be one of failure to account for the time lag. Under the same controls used in this chapter, it is possible that high levels of renewal and housing from 1960 through 1970 might be independently associated with an increase in building permits during the period 1970 through 1980, while at the same time exhibiting the negative association found here during the 1960 through 1970 period.

Qualitative Analysis

The business and economic effects of the public housing and urban renewal programs were also examined through the case study approach. In part, the case studies suggest a strong economic orientation to the programs--especially urban renewal.

Vallejo

At best, the economic effects of urban renewal and public housing on a given community are difficult to measure. This is especially true of suburban communities such as Vallejo which usually hire out-of-town developers for large local projects. It is much more likely that larger central cities would be able to hire local architects and construction firms than would cities of Vallejo's size. For example, San Francisco (thirty-one miles away) would undoubtedly have little difficulty in hiring local firms for renewal and housing work while there may be no local firms in Vallejo capable of handling much of the complex renewal

work. Thus the economic effects of Vallejo's renewal and housing programs undoubtedly reach well outside the local community.

During the eleven year period from January, 1960, through the end of 1970, the City of Vallejo issued 11,930 construction permits.[3] Without even considering commercial construction in the Marina Vista area, the residential construction of 618 dwelling units in the area accounted for roughly 5 percent of the total construction in the city during the eleven year period. With almost as much commercial zoning as residential in the area, commercial construction probably accounted for another 4 percent of the total construction.

During the 1960's, approximately 600 housing units were taken off the private rental market when they were leased to the Vallejo Housing Authority for Section 23 low-income housing. Concerning housing in Vallejo, the Vallejo Chamber of Commerce advises that "housing, both for sale and for rent, is not plentiful. . . ."[4] Conservatively assuming that the removal of 600 units from the rental market generated a 50 percent replacement construction of 300 units, public housing operations in the city could conceivably have accounted for 2.5 percent of the construction in the city during the period.

In addition, it is likely that the generation of demand for the construction of single family dwellings had a greater impact for local contractors than did a large portion of the renewal work. Construction of the $3.0 million John F. Kennedy Library in the Marina Vista area is a case in point. Architects in association for the library were Beland, Gianell, and Associates of Vallejo and Marquis and Stoller of San Francisco. General contractor was the firm of Christensen and Foster of

Santa Rosa.[5] Thus a large portion of the $3.0 million cost of the library went to firms located out of town.

Urban renewal is often thought to attract industry and commerce to a city. The Marina Vista project in Vallejo did not prove to be significant in this regard. Most of the businesses in the project are Vallejo firms relocating from other parts of the city. The relocations appear to be generating large numbers of vacancies in commercial buildings-- vacancies which are not being filled by new businesses.[6]

Overall, it is reasonable and conservative to conclude that urban renewal and public housing probably accounted for a minimum of 10 percent of the construction in Vallejo between 1960 and 1970. While the total construction generated by the urban renewal project far exceeded the construction generated by public housing, it is likely that a higher percentage of the construction dollars accounted for by public housing remained in the city than was the case with urban renewal monies.

While the ability of renewal and housing to generate construction in Vallejo might be easily accepted, there is some question as to the overall effect on business. Thus far, the overall effects of both renewal and housing on commercial and industrial activity within the city appears to be marginal. A note of caution, however, is necessary here-- it is really too early to try to measure the effects of the renewal project on attracting new industry and commerce. The value of Marina Vista in improving the overall business climate and in providing an attractive city for commercial and industrial firms probably cannot be determined until the end of the 1970's.

Austin

While Austin, like Vallejo, had positive renewal and housing residuals, the economic climate of the two cities was distinctly different. Vallejo had a much more fragile economy, relying to a large extent on defense spending for economic health. While Austin's economy is also government dominated, the economy is affected (Bergstrom Air Force Base) but not dominated by defense expenditures.

The most important economic difference between Vallejo and Austin, however, was in the growth rate. While Vallejo was expecting an improved economic condition due to urban renewal and housing, Austin was not. Austin's population growth rate between 1960 and 1970 was a phenomenal 35 percent--the highest in Texas. The National Planning Association predicts a continuing growth of 34 percent for the 1970-1980 decade--the nation's third highest for cities over 250,000 population.

Austin's total employment increased by 5.5 percent between 1960 and 1970 approaching a figure of 140,000. The city unemployment rate has been among the lowest in the state ranging between 2 and 3 percent while the national rate has been between 5 and 6 percent.[7]

During the eleven year period from 1961 through 1971, the City of Austin issued some 46,809 building permits (for dwelling units). Of this total, 7,524 permits were issued during 1971--the highest figure for the ten year period.[8] Recall that Vallejo, during the eleven year period 1960 through 1970, issued 11,930 construction permits.

With residential construction of only 152 units in Kealing and less than 100 units (prior to 1971) in Glen Oaks,[9] the construction impact of urban renewal and public housing in Austin has been minimal. In this

regard, Austin has not utilized these programs to generate local area construction. In fact, one official reports a severe shortage of contractors in the city--contracts go begging as the city builders have all the work they can handle.[10] There were rumors in Austin concerning excess profits on some of the transactions in the University East project--especially concerning purchase, removal, and re-building of apartment units.[11] These changes, however, were unsubstantiated.

Overall, urban renewal and public housing in Austin have apparently had little effect upon the business and economic climate of the city. Analysts have examined Austin's growth and economic factors and have come up with the simple conclusion that "'People just like to live in Austin.' Residents who had originally planned a temporary stay, such as former governors, university students and servicemen, regularly choose Austin as the place to make their home."[12]

In the mid 1960's, there was some talk of a "downtown" convention center which would require the use of urban renewal to clear a sixteen block area. This proposal effectively died. Major opposition from the local business community coupled with the probable high costs of land acquisition killed the proposal.[13] Redevelopment in the downtown area of Austin appears to be a continuing process. With the city's strong economic climate, private redevelopment has encompassed a total area of some ten to twelve square blocks.[14] There is a common belief in the city that the "inner city [downtown] will correct itself;"[15] and given the economic climate of Austin, this is probably true.

Austin thus represents the unusual--the use of urban renewal and public housing for non-economic purposes. With Austin's high growth

rate and continuing economic expansion, renewal in the city was not

proposed with the primary goal being economic growth. The major effects

of Austin's programs will thus be discussed in Chapters VI and VII.

Syracuse

The changes in the business and economic climate of downtown

Syracuse appear to be based largely on the urban renewal program. One

former administrator believes that the "only real development in Syracuse

is due to renewal."[16]

Total employment in downtown Syracuse increased from approximately

20,500 in 1950 to 25,000 in 1962 and then decreased again to 23,000 in

1970. Between 1958 and 1963, the number of retail stores in the downtown

area declined by 17 percent and retail sales dropped by $2 million.[17]

After this drop in sales in the early 1960's, the retail business in down-

town Syracuse improved considerably. The decline in downtown employment

between 1962 and 1970 was accounted for primarily by a change in merchan-

dising methods—not in problems in the retailing business. Office employ-

ment in the central city increased during the period, largely as a result

of the urban renewal project.[18]

While renewal undoubtedly helped the downtown business climate in

the long run, in the short run there were some detrimental effects. Be-

tween January, 1961, and January, 1964, urban renewal relocated a total

of 147 businesses—119 of which relocated within the City of Syracuse.

Another 117 businesses were forced to discontinue their operations rather

than relocate due to age, high rents or inability to relocate their

marginal businesses. Thirty-five of these businesses were one or two-man

operations. Eleven of the thirty-five ceased operations due to "age of

the proprietors or inability to adjust business operations to suit new neighborhoods and no suitable location available for reasons other than price."[19]

The Citizens' Council on Urban Renewal claims that these businesses were "typically marginal" and were generally operated by "aging owners who decided to retire rather than relocate." The Council noted that offsetting this is "cumulative evidence many of the businesses that have relocated in other sections of Syracuse have modernized their establishments and expanded their plants with the result that they are experiencing increased sales and profits."[20]

Housing construction in Syracuse during the decade was weak, with federal reports indicating that only 6,620 housing units were authorized by permit from 1960 through 1970.[21] With 1,058 units of public housing constructed over the eleven year period, public housing accounted for over 15 percent of the residential construction in Syracuse.

Urban renewal was responsible for approximately 5 percent of the non-residential construction in the entire Syracuse SMSA during the decade. With existing or planned development of $57.4 million in urban renewal, non-residential construction has been significantly stimulated by renewal generated building.[22] When considering the effect only on the City of Syracuse rather than the entire SMSA, renewal was undoubtedly responsible for well over 10 percent of the business and commercial construction in the city.

Buffalo

Renewal and housing in Buffalo have had an obvious short-term effect on the city's business community. Financing for the city's urban renewal

projects alone amounts to $82.1 million while code enforcement projects account for another estimated $5.3 million.[23] Unquestionably, $87.4 million in urban renewal will generate substantial amounts of construction--both residential and commercial. And yet, federal sources report only 2,816 housing units authorized by permit from 1960 through 1970 in the City of Buffalo.[24] The execution of Buffalo's urban renewal projects of the 1960's are generating housing construction in the 1970's. During the period from 1970 through 1975, Buffalo was expected to construct 6,100 new housing units--the majority being for low and moderate-income families and constructed on land made available through urban renewal. Four projects, Ellicott, Maryland Street West, Waterfront, and Oak Street, alone will provide sites for 5,150 of the units.[25] It was some twenty-four years ago in 1949 that Congress passed urban renewal legislation. It is hard to believe that New York's first project, Ellicott, had not been closed out by February, 1973, the date of the field observation. The small, by today's standards, 160 acre project has exemplified the slowness of the renewal process in Buffalo.

The Buffalo projects where substantial progress has been made show no evidence of attracting much outside commerce and industry to the city. The vast majority of the tenants and owners in the new developments have merely relocated from other sections of the city (although many have expanded their operations).[26]

The Industrial Park pilot project has been weak by any standard. The city found it difficult to move the land once it was purchased and does not now plan any more projects of this type.

Conclusions and Contentions

Chapter II posed a number of hypotheses to examine the effects of public housing construction and urban renewal grants on the business and economic environment of the community. Specifically:

1. A city's economic vitality is positively related to public housing construction and urban renewal expenditures.

2. Total housing construction is positively related to urban renewal expenditures.

3. Total housing construction is not related to public housing construction.

4. Property values are positively related to urban renewal expenditures.

Public housing construction appears to be independently, although weakly, related to employment within a city—those cities having high levels of public housing construction during the ten years between 1960 and 1970 were likely to have lower unemployment rates than cities with low levels of public housing construction/leasing. This relationship was not noted in the case of renewal, however. The 1970 unemployment rate is apparently independent of the level of urban renewal receipts.

The second and third hypotheses are both rejected. Housing and renewal successes during the decade were both independently and negatively related to housing construction. Urban renewal and public housing programs unquestionably "cause" some housing construction; however, cities with high overall construction levels are not the cities achieving unusual success in either housing or urban renewal.

While public housing construction is able to exert a small independent influence on the employment rate, in general, these programs (renewal and housing) are not associated with the short term economic health

of the community. Cities unquestionably use urban renewal and public

housing (especially urban renewal) as tools to improve the local business

climate and to develop the local economy. Deteriorating cities (such as

Beaumont), especially those without urban renewal programs, see urban re-

newal as some kind of a magic formula which will transform a worn-out

dying community into a thriving metropolis. This just does not happen.

There are segments of the local economy which receive short run economic

benefits from renewal and housing--notably local banking interests, real

estate firms, developers, investors, and specialized (and large) construc-

tion and architectural firms. Renewal and housing are, in the short run,

unable to make a sick city well. It is possible that in the long run,

say over thirty years, that these grants can at least assist in the eco-

nomic turnaround of a city. It is apparent, however, that the time lag

necessary for this transition is much longer than this author had orig-

inally supposed.

One note of caution, however. There do appear to be cities, and

Syracuse is a prime example, that are in a cycle of development where the

city is transitioning from a healthy economic status into a stage of

deterioration and decay. If grant programs are applied soon enough, and

in large enough quantity, it appears that the decay can be reversed in a

very short period of time. Timing in this instance is probably extremely

important. The author's natural pessimism thus attributes the judicious

application of renewal and housing grants in Syracuse to sheer luck

rather than to any careful planning on the part of local officials.

The case studies also suggest that the "residential requirement"

of urban renewal law is probably not being applied quite the way that

Congress intended. Many of the so-called residential projects border the central business district and are really commercial redevelopments. While these projects may meet all of the technical requirements of the law, their purpose is obvious--to augment the central business district. The required number of housing units may be provided but in most instances single family units and/or two or three family dwellings are replaced by apartment towers or townhouses and the like, leaving plenty of land available for the real purpose of the redevelopment project.

Data were not available to evaluate the relationship between property values and urban renewal on any systematic basis, thus only tentative suggestions are made on the basis of the findings generated from the field studies. In all cases (even in Downtown One in Syracuse), the property values of the redeveloped land and the associated structures were higher after redevelopment than before redevelopment. Renewal was also generally found to have a beneficial effect on the property values within two or three blocks of the renewal project. Thus renewal favorably affects property values in and around the project. But what about the rest of the city? In Vallejo and Buffalo, a few administrators and officials complained that the vast majority of the businesses moving into the redeveloped areas were merely relocating from other parts of the city. As these firms moved, vacancies were created in the areas they were moving from and property values began to decline. While the evidence of such situations gathered during this study is so sketchy that no conclusions should be drawn, a note of caution suggests that examination of the effects of urban renewal on property values should cover more than the redevelopment itself and a two or three block surrounding area--especially in the case of commercial renewal projects.

Notes

[1]U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, General Social and Economic Characteristics: U.S. Summary (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 1-566 - 1-570.

[2]U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, New Housing Units Authorized by Local Building Permits, Annual Summary 1960-1961, Construction Reports C40-38 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962); U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, Housing Authorized in Individual Permit Issuing Places, Construction Reports C40-50 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963); U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, Housing Authorized in Individual Permit-Issuing Places 1964, Construction Reports C40-74 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964); U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, Housing Authorized by Building Permits and Public Contracts 1966, Construction Reports C40/C42-66-13 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967); U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, Housing Authorized by Building Permits and Public Contracts 1968, Construction Reports C40-68-13 Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970); U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, Housing Authorized by Building Permits and Public Contracts 1970, Construction Reports C40-70-13 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971).

[3]Vallejo Chamber of Commerce, Fact Card No. 8 (Vallejo: Vallejo Chamber of Commerce, n.d.).

[4]Vallejo Chamber of Commerce, Vallejo California (Vallejo: Solano County Board of Supervisors, n.d.).

[5]John F. Kennedy Library (Vallejo, California: Vallejo Public Library System, n.d.).

[6]Telephone interview with Solano County, California, administrator (D), January 17, 1973, Vallejo, California.

[7]Front Runner for the New Decade, Austin: Chamber of Commerce, January 24, 1972, p. 1. (Mimeographed.)

[8]Housing and Apartment Development: Austin, Texas, Austin: Chamber of Commerce, February 21, 1972. (Mimeographed.)

[9]"Urban Renewal Special," Austin American-Statesman, August 27, 1972, pp. 4-5, 7.

[10]Personal interview with former local official (A), November 30, 1972, Austin, Texas.

[11]Telephone interview with former Austin local elite (A), December 12, 1972, Norman, Oklahoma.

[12]Living At Its Best (Austin: Chamber of Commerce, n.d.), p. 1.

[13]Personal interview with local administrator (E), November 29, 1972, Austin, Texas.

[14]Telephone interview with local elite (B), November 29, 1972, Austin, Texas.

[15]Official (A), Austin.

[16]Personal interview with former local administrator (C), March 1, 1973, Syracuse, New York.

[17]Gene Goshorn, "Syracuse tackles problem head-on," Syracuse Herald-American, January 2, 1966.

[18]Personal interview with local elite (A), February 28, 1973, Syracuse, New York.

[19]"Renewal Group Reports 147 Businesses Moved," Syracuse Post-Standard, January 12, 1964.

[20]Ibid.

[21]See footnote 2, this chapter.

[22]Goshorn, "Syracuse tackles problem."

[23]Frank Stahl, Reflections: A Summary of Urban Renewal Activities in Buffalo, New York 1971/1972 (Buffalo: Department of Urban Renewal/ Buffalo, New York, 1972), p. 18.

[24]See footnote 2, this chapter.

[25]Nathaniel S. Keith and Marcou, O'Leary and Associates, Inc., Buffalo, Community Renewal Program Extension for the City of Buffalo, New York (Buffalo: City of Buffalo, n.d.), pp. 34-35.

[26]Personal interview with local elite (A), February 22, 1973, Buffalo, New York.

CHAPTER VI

EFFECTS OF HOUSING AND RENEWAL ON LOCAL

POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

Urban renewal and public housing were hypothesized to significantly
affect local government and politics, in particular, government employ-
ment, local finances, and political stability.

Governmental Employment

Grants to local government, specifically housing and renewal grants,
were expected to be stimulative of government employment. The first area
of interest was the relationship between housing, renewal, and the size
of the city planning department. It was expected that the planning re-
quirements associated with public housing and urban renewal would stimulate
the city to expand the size of its planning staff. The size of the city
planning staff was available for 148 of the 310 cities as of January
1971.[1] It was also expected that housing and renewal grants would stimu-
late overall governmental employment in both common and variable functions.[2]
Renewal and housing were expected to be directly related to the number of
employees in variable functions because housing and renewal authority
employees are included in the variable category. It was also expected
that the demand for municipal services fostered by renewal and public
housing projects would stimulate employment in the common functions. The

number of full-time employees in both common and variable functions is as

of October, 1969.[3] The segment of common functions where pressure for

increased services was expected to be greatest was in the area of parks

and recreation. As a consequence, the final measure of local government

employment to be examined in relation to housing and renewal was the num-

ber of full-time park and recreation employees as of October, 1969.[4]

Table 6-1 shows the zero order relationships between grant measures

and measures of city government employment. As expected, all relation-

ships were significant and substantial. At the zero order level, there

is no question but that grants are related to government employment. The

real question, however, is whether grants are independently related to

employment levels.

To test the independence of the relationships, partial correlation

coefficients were computed between the employment measures and renewal and

housing while holding the city profile factors and political variables

constant. When controlling for all other variables, the positive zero

order relationships reversed themselves and became negative. That is,

all of the statistically significant relationships under controlled con-

ditions (except the relationship between urban renewal and the number of

employees in common functions) were negative (Table 6-2). Public housing

was significantly and negatively related to all four measures of public

employment while renewal was negatively related only to the size of the

city planning staff and was positively related to the number of employees

in common functions. No significant relationship existed, however, between

renewal and either the number of employees in variable functions or the

number of park and recreation employees.

TABLE 6-1.--Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between grant use and measures of city government employment

	Size of city planning staff	No. park and recreation employees	No. employees in common functions	No. employees in variable functions
Urban renewal	0.702*	0.731*	0.547*	0.750*
Public housing	0.784*	0.816*	0.378*	0.763*

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 6-2.--Partial correlation coefficients showing independent relationships between grant
use and measures of city government employment

	Size of city planning staff	No. park and recreation employees	No. employees in common functions	No. employees in variable functions
Urban renewal	-0.268*	-0.077	0.186*	0.046
Public housing	-0.529*	-0.199*	-0.404*	-0.354*

*Significant at the .05 level.

Recall that in Chapter V there was a significant and positive relationship between grants and residential construction at the zero order level, but that once controls were introduced through the use of partial correlation coefficients, the relationships between the variables were found to be negative. The same general pattern of reversal is noted here between grants and government employment. Tables 6-3 and 6-4 show the relationships between all model variables and the size of the city planning staff. The planning staff variable was selected for detailed examination because the most dramatic reversal occurred with this variable. No unexpected relationships are noted. In Chapter V, explanation of the reversal suggested that cities with major problems of deterioration, stagnation and decay responded to the problems through heavy grant use and that the time period necessary for a city to reverse its deterioration process was so long that housing construction, as an economic indicator, did not have time to respond. Such is probably also the case with public employment. Again, Central City, Urban Density, and Size/Manufacturing are descriptive of urban stagnation and decay and are independently related to grant use. It is thus suspected that these same cities (those characterized by stagnation and decay) would be deficient in the area of public employment and, under controls, housing and renewal would be negatively related to employment characteristics.

The fact that urban renewal was positively related to the number of employees in common functions and was not significantly related to the number of employees in variable functions while housing was negatively related to both also poses some interesting possibilities. It is quite possible that these relationships are indicative of a difference in

TABLE 6-3.--Partial correlation coefficients showing independent
relationships between renewal model variables and
size of the city planning staff

Status, Wealth, and Education (low)	-0.017
Central City	0.262*
Urban Density	0.551*
Size/Manufacturing	0.900*
Commuting/Growth	0.215*
Model city	-0.007
HUD office in state	0.142
Renewal difficulty	-0.070
Years since 1949 for URA	0.111
Years since 1960 for enabling legislation	-0.185
Form of government	-0.174
Representation	-0.095
Type election	0.062
Wallace vote	-0.209*
Goldwater vote	0.021
Elazar's political cultures	-0.035
Metro status	-0.377*
Urban renewal	-0.268*

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 6-4.—Partial correlation coefficients showing independent
relationships between housing model variables and
size of the city planning staff

Status, Wealth, and Education (low)	-0.051
Central City	0.380*
Urban Density	0.658*
Size/Manufacturing	0.901*
Commuting/Growth	0.169
Model city	0.115
HUD office in state	0.241*
Urban renewal	-0.198
Housing difficulty	0.002
Years since 1937 for LHA	0.210*
Years since 1960 for enabling legislation	0.095
Form of government	-0.233*
Representation	-0.188
Type election	0.193
Wallace vote	-0.249*
Goldwater vote	0.014
Elazar's political cultures	-0.036
Metro status	-0.399*
Public housing	-0.529*

*Significant at the .05 level.

demand systems. With urban renewal's apparent business orientation, it

is possible that renewal does not place a demand for services upon

municipal government. On the other hand, low-income public housing should

impose a high demand for personal services (and thus municipal employment)

upon local government. Quite possibly, however, a lengthy lead time

exists before local government responds to pressures for these services—

especially to pressures from low-income families. It is likely that

public housing constructed during the 1960's places a demand on the city

for services (police, fire, recreation, welfare, etc.)—demands that are

largely unmet for a lengthy time period—a longer period than the ten

years considered in this study.

Intergovernmental Transfers

A review of the economic literature concerning federal grants sug-

gested that cities tending to utilize programs such as housing and re-

newal are also likely to participate heavily in other federal-local grant

programs. Such was indeed the case. Zero order correlation coefficients

between renewal and housing and intergovernmental revenue received in

1969-1970[5] were r=.81 and r=.89 respectively (Table 6-5).

Since other studies have shown the overwhelming importance of city

size in grant use, partials were computed, again controlling for city

profile factors and political variables. As expected, the positive rela-

tionship was reduced but remained statistically significant (Table 6-6).

Both correlation coefficients were approximately the same in spite of

substantial differences in the types of intergovernmental transfers

involved. Housing authorities receive annual contributions from the

federal government based upon debt retirement costs, and the number of

TABLE 6-5.--Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between grant use and intergovernmental transfers

	Intergovernmental revenue received
Urban renewal	0.807*
Public housing	0.887*

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 6-6.--Partial correlation coefficients showing independent relationships between grant use and intergovernmental transfers

	Intergovernmental revenue received
Urban renewal	0.306*
Public housing	0.301*

*Significant at the .05 level.

low-income, disabled, and elderly tenants it houses. Renewal grants, on the other hand, are not annual grants but are based upon project execution. Housing construction then would be directly related to 1969-70 intergovernmental transfers because the total intergovernmental transfer funds include the housing subsidies. Renewal funds received between 1960 and 1970, however, need not be related to intergovernmental transfers in 1969-1970 (FY 1970). There is thus a strong reason to suspect a stimulative relationship between renewal, housing, and intergovernmental transfers.

City Income, Expenditures, and Debt

Both public housing and urban renewal are hypothesized as having a major impact on local governmental finances. Critics of the housing program often claim that public housing is costly in that it removes property from the tax rolls, while at the same time, increasing the demand (thus expenditures) for city services. A major benefit attributed to urban renewal (theoretically) has been that renewal improves the city's tax base and helps increase city income. On the other hand, renewal is also likely to increase a city's debt and total expenditures due to the one-third city matching requirement of the renewal grants. Cities might be expected to float a bond issue to pay the matching share or to pay for in-kind contributions.

The changes in per capita income, expenditure, and debt between 1960 and 1970 were computed from census figures[6] and are shown in Table 6-7. All measures showed a substantial increase during the ten year period. These changes in per capita income, expenditure, and debt were computed as the dependent variables, and housing and renewal were again

TABLE 6-7.—Change in per capita city incomes, expenditures, and debt between 1960 and 1970 for cities over 50,000 population

	Mean change	Standard deviation	Minimum code	Maximum code
General revenue	96.03	77.03	-15.78	579.90
City taxes	47.36	38.10	-24.20	300.55
Property tax	32.61	36.99	-24.12	183.46
General expenditures	101.25	91.36	-102.41	672.00
Total debt	118.96	126.15	-131.11	807.05

the independent variables. The results of the zero order correlations are contained in Table 6-8. A significant and positive relationship was found to exist between both housing and renewal and almost all of the financial change variables.

Public housing was not significantly related to changes in city property taxes. Apparently the amount of property removed from tax rolls by public housing construction is so small as to have no effect on the tax base. In general, however, the zero order relationships tend to confirm the arguments against public housing--that is, public housing is costly in terms of general tax increases because it increases the demand (and thus expenditures) for the city services, and raises bonded debt.

Renewal is also associated with increased debt and expenditures; but it is credited with increased tax revenues, not by increasing the tax burden on the individual citizen, but by increasing city property values. However, it is again important to look with suspicion on these simple correlations. The close relationship between the selected grant programs and the city profile factors may be hiding the true relationships between the grant programs and financial changes in the city.

This was very much the case as is shown by the partials in Table 6-9. The partials were again computed by controlling for the city profile factors and the political variables. Under controls, virtually all of the significant relationships between public housing construction/leasing and changes in city finances disappeared. Low-income public housing does not, then, provide a drain on the local tax base by significantly and independently affecting either property taxes, total city taxes, or general revenue. Additional public housing does not increase

TABLE 6-8.--Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between grant use and changes in per capita city incomes, expenditures, and debt

	General revenue	City taxes	Property tax	General expenditures	Total debt
Urban renewal	0.467*	0.339*	0.179*	0.437*	0.270*
Public housing	0.328*	0.219*	0.096	0.301*	0.152*

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 6-9.--Partial correlation coefficients showing independent relationships between grant use and changes in per capita city incomes, expenditures, and debt

	General revenue	City taxes	Property tax	General expenditures	Total debt
Urban renewal	0.220*	0.160*	0.119*	0.226*	0.226*
Public housing	-0.109	-0.064	0.022	-0.063	-0.046

*Significant at the .05 level.

general expenditure levels, nor is it significantly related to total debt. In other words, increased levels of public housing within a city do not bring about significant changes in the city government's financial structure (in itself).

Such is not the case with urban renewal. Renewal was significantly and independently related to all five of the changes in city financial structures. Urban renewal was found to be significantly related to increases in city total debt. Cities apparently increase debt levels to produce matching funds or to pay for in-kind contributions for local urban renewal programs.

Renewal receipts were also found to be independently related to all three revenue measures, change in per capita property tax ($r=.12$), change in per capita city taxes ($r=.16$), and change in per capita general revenue ($r=.22$). Urban renewal is apparently an effective tool to increase income from property taxes without placing substantial additional burden on the local taxpayer. The increase in property tax receipts is probably brought about by increased property values in and around urban renewal projects. There also appears to be some type of multiplier effect at work. Notice the change in the relationships between renewal and the revenue measures with renewal having the closest independent relationship with the dependent variable at the highest revenue level (general revenue). This suggests the possibility that renewal is also related to other city revenue measures such as increased city sales tax receipts, or increases in intergovernmental revenue.

With the relationships shown above concerning changes in debt and revenue, it is only logical to assume that renewal would be associated

with changes in expenditures. This was the case with a coefficient of r=.23 between the variables.

Political Stability

The numerous case studies of renewal and housing efforts in cities throughout the country indicated that a number of city administrations based their political campaigns on housing and renewal issues. It was thus expected that large amounts of renewal funds received would aid in-cumbent administrations in re-election efforts. It was also expected that large amounts of low-income housing construction would be detrimental to an administration's re-election, although this hypothesis is not as clear-cut. It is also probable that public housing architectural and construc-tion contracts stimulate contractor campaign contributions to incumbents. In any event, some relationship was expected.

To test the hypothesis, a simple stability scale was developed based upon the number of mayors each city had between January, 1960, and January, 1970. This information was obtained simply by recording the mayors' names every year between 1960 and 1970 and then totalling the number of differ-ent mayors for each city.[7] The crudity of this measure must be emphasized. Some cities have two year terms for mayor while others have four year terms. In many manager cities the mayor's office is rotated between councilmen. Nonetheless, while the scale is admittedly crude and covers a very short time period, it will hopefully differentiate between cities with high and low political stability in the mayor's office.

Zero order product moment correlation coefficients were computed between the political stability scale and urban renewal and public housing. Both urban renewal and public housing showed a low but

significant negative relationship with the stability rating with r=-.14 and r=-.13 respectively (Table 6-10). Renewal and housing successes thus appear to contribute to increased political stability in city politics.

Once again, however, the independence of the relationships becomes important. Do renewal and housing contribute to political stability or does the relationship merely reflect a relationship between stability and one of the demographic or political variables? Partials were again computed controlling for the city profile and the political variables. The relationship between grant success and stability disappeared (Table 6-11). Grant success apparently does not have an independent effect upon mayors' tenure.

Partials were also computed between the stability measure and each of the independent variables in both the renewal and housing models, while controlling for all other variables. Only two correlation coefficients in the renewal model were statistically significant at the .05 level. Stability was independently related to Urban Density (r=.12) and form of government (r=.25). Three coefficients in the housing model were significant: housing difficulty (r=.13), form of government (r=.24) and metro status (r=-.11). The major determinant of turnover in the mayor's office appears to be the presence of the city manager form of government rather than unsuccessful renewal or housing programs.

Qualitative Analysis

Information obtained during the field studies generally supported the quantitative conclusions. In most cases, the relationship between increased city revenue and urban renewal success was the most clear-cut and obvious. While housing and renewal were not quantitatively related

TABLE 6-10.—Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between grant use and mayors' longevity

	No. mayors 1960-1970
Urban renewal	-0.141*
Public housing	-0.129*

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 6-11.—Partial correlation coefficients showing independent relationships between grant use and mayors' longevity

	No. mayors 1960-1970
Urban renewal	-0.031
Public housing	-0.034

to political stability, both issues were found to be important determinants

of political stability/instability in several of the cities.

Vallejo

A Vallejo Redevelopment Agency publication, in discussing the Marina

Vista project, stated that "the main objective of a redevelopment or urban

renewal plan is to sell or lease the project land to private developers so

it can be returned to the tax rolls as quickly as possible."[8] The approxi-

mate assessed valuation of all of the property in the renewal area in 1960

prior to redevelopment was $1.5 million. The Agency expected assessed

valuation in the area to equal $5.0 million by 1970, and between $5.5

million and $6.0 million by 1980.[9] In spite of the fact that large amounts

of the land in the Marina Vista area would be devoted to public use, one

administrator expected an increase in the overall tax base of 5 to 1—

that is, for every $100,000 in assessed valuation before redevelopment,

$500,000 in assessed valuation was expected after redevelopment.[10] There

has already been a tax gain from the Marina Vista project although it is

not as large as expected.[11]

One administrator said that the overall financial effects of the

renewal project are still unknown. The old area was run-down, but it was

entirely built-up. While the new area has large amounts of land devoted

to public use, the assessment values in the area generally increased and

property values within a two block circumference around the project

(approximate) increased.[12]

The same administrator believes that there have been detrimental

effects from Marina Vista that must also be considered. The project, in

some ways, drained the remainder of the downtown. "Most of the businesses

in the new area are from the old downtown."[13] This has led to larger

numbers of vacancies in the older areas and has been a direct cause of a

downward assessment in surrounding areas.

Park and recreation maintenance costs to the city were undoubtedly

increased by the addition of two city parks—the nine and one-half acre

Memorial City Park, and the smaller U. S. S. Independence Park. These,

along with the sea-wall promenade and the Town Square (plaza), undoubtedly

increased the need for maintenance. Renewal thus placed increased demands

for services on the Parks and Recreation Department although their respon-

siveness to these demands has been questioned.[14]

Beaumont

Beaumont provides an excellent case study into the political effect

of an urban renewal election. Recall that Dr. Dale C. Hager, Chairman of

the Beaumont Republican Policy Committee which opposed urban renewal,

called the 1967 election "a mandate from the people to replace the present

city administration."[15]

Both 1968 candidates for mayor were critical of the urban renewal

effort. One of the candidate's advertisements for mayor headlined: "You

Saw Jim McFaddin On The Firing Line Fighting Urban Renewal- - -YOU KNOW

Where He Stands."[16] Even the more moderate candidate, James D. McNicholas,

accused the city council of holding a "secret meeting" to plan for the

urban renewal election prior to a public hearing on the election.[17] Al-

though McNicholas was the Democratic candidate for mayor, he took pains

to disassociate himself from the slate of four Democratic candidates for

city council. Fear of an urban renewal backlash caused him to campaign

independently of the other party candidates. McNicholas was victorious but only by a slight margin.[18]

A slate of four "Independent" candidates opposed the Democratic ticket for the city council. All four Independents were elected. Included were two Republicans, Dr. Dale C. Hager and Ken Ritter--both members of the Beaumont Republican Policy Committee which had been so strongly opposed to urban renewal.[19]

A former local official claimed that the Democratic slate was defeated by "the John Birchers who coalesced for the 1967 renewal election."[20] Urban renewal was the main issue in the 1968 election and the incumbent councilmen were defeated because they had supported the renewal effort. In Beaumont, he claims, renewal is associated with Communism. He believes that the citizens never really understood the issues, they only heard the catch phrases--"Communism; they can take your house; and federal control by the Easterners."[21]

This criticism appears to have some validity. In a 1968 survey of community attitudes by the Beaumont Jaycees, one question asked: "Do you understand most aspects of Urban Renewal?" The responses split almost evenly with 48.5 percent indicating "no."[22] Citizens apparently recognize that Beaumont is in trouble, nevertheless. In response to "Do you feel that Beaumont has kept up with most cities in general improvements?" approximately 60 percent of the respondents said "no."[23]

The major supporters of urban renewal had been the "chamber of commerce types" or the downtown businessmen. With the second defeat of urban renewal at the polls, what could they do to start the local economy moving forward again?

To attempt to reverse the decline in the central business district, the Central City Development Corporation (CCDC) was formed in June, 1971, by civic and business leaders interested in revitalizing the deteriorating Beaumont central business district. The goal of the Corporation is to create a downtown that Beaumont can be proud of and a central business district that will contribute to the overall growth of the community. Toward this end, the CCDC is concentrating in two major areas:

> Our effort will be to help establish a comprehensive plan of action for the Downtown Area that will provide direction for future projects involving land use, transportation, utilities, community facilities, private development, etc. The other major effort of CCDC will be to implement projects to meet the urgent and pressing problems currently facing Central City.[24]

The CCDC, then, performs a number of functions which are normally associated with a city planning department. One knowledgeable businessman calls the city planning effort "grossly inadequate." He said that the "city hasn't planned—there is no real master plan, only an inventory, and that is no good."[25] The CCDC thus is an attempt by the business leaders of Beaumont to compensate for the inadequacies of the city planning department and to search for alternatives to federal urban renewal which might assist in downtown revitalization. Toward this end, the CCDC engaged the services of the Urban Land Institute of Washington, D.C., to:

a. evaluate the redevelopment prospects for the Central Business District;

b. evaluate the present plans now being designed by governmental agencies that will affect Central City;

c. and to suggest priorities and programs designed for immediate and long-range implementation in the development of the Central Business District into an active center of the city.[26]

At the time of this investigation, the Urban Land Institute had just completed its visit to Beaumont and was in the process of preparing its report.

Urban renewal, as a public issue in Beaumont, has had far-reaching effects on political and governmental institutions. The issue itself forced a dramatic change in the political make-up of the city council. In fact, the issue probably accounted for, at least in part, a charter amendment which changed Beaumont city elections from nominally partisan to true non-partisan elections. Failure of the renewal election also forced the business community to develop a "shadow administration" in the form of the CCDC which has been forced to perform many of the planning functions normally associated with city government.

Austin

In Chapter IV, it was noted that some 52 percent of the land in Austin was devoted to public use and that this created certain revenue problems for the city. The five urban renewal projects in Austin, far from attempting to increase the tax base, transferred large amounts of land from private to public use—in fact, much of this land was prime commercial and multi-family residential property.

While the Renewal Agency claimed that urban renewal tripled the assessed tax valuation in the Kealing area,[27] improving the tax base was never an issue in Austin's renewal programs. Quite simply, a city which has historically devoted much of its land to the public weal, has had to find a revenue source other than the property tax. In Austin's case the city relies on utility income.

The loss of property tax revenue due to urban renewal and the subsequent University of Texas and Brackenridge Hospital expansion was not a major issue because Austin's income is derived primarily from annual transfers from the city owned municipal utility plant (electricity) and water plant.[28] Austin, with this type of financial diversity, is apparently able to approve urban renewal projects which other cities might find financially unacceptable. The form of Austin's renewal program was thus, in part, shaped by the city's ability to devote additional land to public use without having to be overly concerned with the expected tax loss.

Syracuse

Urban renewal has unquestionably assisted the City of Syracuse in avoiding many of the financial problems facing other older American central cities. Unlike many other cities, the property tax base in Syracuse is not shrinking. Between 1953 and 1965, urban renewal was responsible for $57.4 million in existing or planned development. During this time period, the city has received in excess of $39 million in federal renewal grant funds.

Ultimately, renewal is expected to produce a six-fold increase in tax assessments. Former Renewal Commissioner George B. Schuster estimated that "the $5 million in assessments urban renewal has taken off the city tax rolls will be replaced with a solid $30 million in new assessments."[29]

Some citizens do not agree with this contention, however. One knowledgeable citizen, for example, does not believe that urban renewal (Downtown One in particular) has increased downtown property values all that much--primarily because the project removed some rather expensive property from the tax rolls to begin with. Another factor, he believes,

was the governing Republican administration which, in many cases, gave

the new users of the redeveloped property abnormally low tax assessments.[30]

In the late 1960's, Syracuse became a city in political transition—

moving from a Republican-dominated city toward a more independent orienta-

tion. While the voters undoubtedly wanted a change in 1969, urban renewal

was a substantial issue in the community and was at least a contributing

factor in the change of administrations. The Democratic candidate for

mayor called for a change in the pattern of urban renewal—he wanted "to

do something for the neighborhoods."[31] The local Democrats were able to

predict a trend in HUD away from redevelopment and toward neighborhood

preservation and were able to politically capitalize on this shift in

federal policy.[32]

Buffalo

There are three basic goals to Buffalo's urban renewal program:

revitalization of the central business district, the development of

standard low-income housing, and increasing the property tax base. One

of the major problems of the city administration has been a declining tax

base coupled with growing responsibilities to provide social services and

economic opportunities to Buffalo's residents.[33]

Revitalization of the central business district through renewal

obviously goes hand-in-hand with an increasing tax base. The only dif-

ficulty with a program of this type, coupling business or industrial

development renewal projects with a program to expand the tax base, might

be program delays. Phase I of the Downtown renewal project exemplified

proper operation of the renewal program. Land was purchased by the city

(and thus temporarily removed from the tax rolls), cleared, sold, and

redeveloped in a relatively short period of time—thus the tax income

lost during the redevelopment cycle was minimized and was more than made

up by the increased tax returns after redevelopment. Ellicott and the

Industrial project did not conform to this standard, however. In both

projects (but especially Ellicott) land was purchased and cleared by the

city (and removed from the tax rolls) and remained as city-owned vacant

land for many years. Renewal, when operated in this manner, further

serves to destroy the tax base.

It is often suggested that two of the renewal objectives operate

in conflict with each other—that attempts to increase the tax base are

an anathema to the development of low-income housing as much of the low-

income housing will require various forms of real estate tax abatement.

This contention is not necessarily true as exemplified by Buffalo's

Maryland Street West project. This project area (twelve acres), of which

one-third was city owned, returned $7,108 in taxes per year prior to re-

development. After completion, the project was expected to return

$71,000 per year in taxes, even after tax abatements.[34] Increases of

this magnitude are possible through judicious site selection. By re-

developing land which is currently producing low tax yields, or which is

tax-exempt by reason of public ownership, large tax increases are possible.

In addition, payment in lieu of taxes of 10 percent of shelter rents is

paid on housing developed by the New York State Urban Development Corpora-

tion and the Buffalo Housing Authority.[35] In many cases, this 10 percent

payment amounts to more than the prior tax yield.

Conclusions and Contentions

A review of the housing and renewal literature suggested a number

of hypotheses concerning the effects of housing and renewal on politics
and government:

1. Public employment is positively related to urban renewal expenditures and public housing construction.

2. Urban renewal expenditures and public housing construction are stimulative of other grant use.

3. City tax revenues are directly related to urban renewal expenditures.

4. Political stability is negatively related to public housing construction.

5. Political stability is positively related to public housing construction.

The study had originally hypothesized that public employment would
be positively related to measures of government employment—the theory
being that housing and renewal would generate a demand for services and
the city would respond through increased personnel levels. However, the
findings in Chapter V suggested that the hypothesis might be invalid and
the situation might be reversed; that is, urban renewal and public housing
are negatively related to levels of government employment. Once controls
were introduced, this was indeed the case. Thus, instead of renewal and
housing generating a demand for services (and personnel) met by the city,
renewal and public housing are indicative of cities with serious problems—
one being lower services and personnel levels.

Renewal and housing grants were found to be significantly related
to the level of intergovernmental transfers. It is not possible to con-
clude absolutely from this relationship that housing and renewal grants
are stimulative of the use of other federal grants as renewal and housing
grants are themselves a portion of the intergovernmental transfers. There
is reason to suspect, however, that due to the nature of the renewal and

housing grants, there is a stimulative relationship between renewal,
housing, and intergovernmental transfers.

The most important finding generated by this chapter has been the
relationship between grants and changes in city financial measures. There
was no independent relationship between public housing and changes in city
financial measures. This might very well have been expected in spite of
the criticisms of public housing opponents. Urban renewal, on the other
hand, was independently related to positive increases in city financial
measures. Renewal is positively related to increases in per capita
property tax receipts, city tax receipts, and general revenue. This does
not necessarily mean, however, that renewal is associated with changes in
the tax rate. This evidence simply suggests the effectiveness of urban
renewal in increasing city revenue. The relationship does suggest one
other possibility that in all fairness must be mentioned. If high renewal
levels are indicative of city deterioration, it is possible that cities
are increasing their tax rates, and thus revenue measures, in response
to deteriorating conditions and increased demand for services. The
qualitative evidence from the case studies, although limited by the small
number of cities visited, does seem to support the first contention—that
is, renewal serves as an effective tool to increase city revenues.

There may be a financial drawback associated with renewal, however.
As expected, urban renewal was related to positive increases in per capita
city debt. Cities apparently increase bonded debt to pay for their cash
or in-kind contributions.

Urban renewal and public housing have been shown to be important
political issues in local government. In spite of exceptions such as

Beaumont, however, both issues do not affect stability in the mayor's office to any significant degree on a nation-wide basis. Renewal and housing may be important issues to the voters; however, the voters do not turn out the mayor due to renewal or housing success or failure. Other factors, such as type of government, are the important determinants of local political stability.

Notes

[1] James Hannah, Expenditures, Staff, and Salaries of Planning Agencies, 1971 (Chicago: American Society of Planning Officials, April 1971), pp. 21-24.

[2] Common functions include highways, police, fire, sewage and sanitation, parks and recreation, libraries, financial administration, water, and general control. Variable functions include all of those functions not normally performed by municipal governments: education, airports, port facilities, corrections, urban renewal, public housing, welfare, health and hospitals, utilities, etc.

[3] The Municipal Year Book 1971 (Washington: International City Management Association, 1971), pp. 190-202.

[4] Ibid.

[5] U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, City Government Finances in 1969-70 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971).

[6] Ibid., and U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book 1962 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 476-575.

[7] Mayors' names were obtained from The Municipal Year Book for 1960, 1962, 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970.

[8] Redevelopment Agency of the City of Vallejo, Marina Vista (Vallejo, California: Gibson Publications, n.d.), p. 3.

[9] Ibid., p. 12.

[10] Personal interview with former Vallejo local administrator (A), January 18, 1973, San Francisco, California.

[11] Personal interview with local administrator (C), January 19, 1973, Vallejo, California.

[12] Telephone interview with Solano County, California, administrator (D), January 17, 1973, Vallejo, California.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Administrator (A), Vallejo.

[15] Sunday Enterprise, November 19, 1967, pp. 1, 4A.

[16] Beaumont Enterprise, May 12, 1968, p. 15A.

[17] Ibid., May 10, 1968, p. 8.

[18]Ibid., May 15, 1968, pp. 1, 5.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Telephone interview with former elected official (A), December 5, 1972, Beaumont, Texas.

[21]Ibid.

[22]The Beaumont Jaycees, Beaumont Community Attitude Survey, Beaumont: The Beaumont Jaycees, March 15, 1968, p. 18.   (Mimeographed.)

[23]Ibid., p. 17.

[24]CCDC (Beaumont: Central City Development Corporation, n.d.), p. 1.

[25]Personal interview with local elite (A), December 6, 1972, Beaumont, Texas.

[26]CCDC Newsletter, 1 (Beaumont: Central City Development Corporation, November, 1972).

[27]"Urban Renewal Special," Austin American-Statesman, August 27, 1972, pp. 4-5.

[28]Personal interview with former local official (B), November 28, 1972, Austin, Texas.

[29]Gene Goshorn, "Syracuse tackles problem head-on," Syracuse Herald-American, January 2, 1966.

[30]Personal interview with local elite (A), February 28, 1973, Syracuse, New York.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Personal interview with local administrator (A), March 1, 1973, Syracuse, New York.

[33]Nathaniel S. Keith and Marcou, O'Leary and Associates, Inc., Buffalo Community Renewal Program, Extension for the City of Buffalo, New York (Buffalo: City of Buffalo, n.d.), p. 11.

[34]Ibid., pp. 24-25.

[35]Ibid.

CHAPTER VII

EFFECTS OF HOUSING AND RENEWAL ON

CITY LAND USE PATTERNS

Low-income public housing and urban renewal projects undoubtedly
affect city land use patterns since the elimination of slums and blight
are major goals of both programs. The ever increasing number of renewal
and housing case studies point to enormous changes in land use patterns
based upon these federal grant programs. The question, however, is:
is there a difference in land use patterns between cities utilizing
housing and renewal programs and those which do not? Do renewal and
housing programs cause a change in city land use?

Land Ownership Patterns

The predominant difficulty in attempting to assess the impact of
renewal and housing grants on the physical make-up of American cities is
the lack of data available on a nationwide basis. In spite of severe
limitations in this area, some data were available which might be useful
in hypothesis testing. It is expected, for example, that urban renewal
and public housing (especially urban renewal) operate in such a way as
to transfer land from private to public use. Public housing unquestion-
ably transfers land from private to public use in that low-income housing
projects are usually built on land purchased from the private sector.

299

The urban renewal process also involves the transfer of land from private ownership to the urban renewal agency. The agency retains the land for a limited time period (for clearance and development) and then sells it to the new developer/user. In a great many cases at least part of the renewal land is sold to public agencies for civic centers, schools, park land, playgrounds, public housing sites, etc. In effect, then, urban renewal may serve as a device to transfer land from the private to the public sector.

Allen Manvel recently reported the results of a land use survey in a number of large American cities.[1] One of the items reported in the survey was the percent of total city land which was privately owned. Unfortunately, each city reported this percentage as of the date they last compiled this data so there was no uniform effective date the data were gathered. Generally, however, cities reported the percentage as of a date between 1961 and 1967. Another limitation to the data was the small number of cities having usable data. Only seventy-four cities had useful (for this study) responses on this item. While ideally this study would be concerned with the change in land ownership between 1960 and 1970, data limitations force certain constraints. Nonetheless, it was felt that the land use patterns which were available would provide some indication of changes in use brought about by housing and renewal programs.

Zero order correlation coefficients were computed showing the relationships between urban renewal, public housing, and land ownership. Both renewal and housing were significantly and negatively related to private land ownership with $r=-.47$ and $r=-.37$ respectively (Table 7-1). The amount of land cities devoted to public use is thus related to both

urban renewal and public housing programs. The relationship between renewal and land ownership was expected, but the relationship between public housing and land ownership was somewhat of a surprise. With public housing accounting for only 1 percent of all the housing units in the country, it was not likely that public housing construction would account for the substantial zero order relationship found.

Partial correlation coefficients were computed to test the independent relationships between housing and renewal and land use patterns. Again, the city profile factors and political variables were held constant. As expected (see Table 7-2), the relationship between public housing and land use disappeared (r=.02); but urban renewal was still significantly related to land ownership (r=-.33). While the possibility that this relationship is caused by the temporary holding of land by renewal agencies cannot be discounted, it is much more likely that the relationship reflects a trend toward devoting increasing amounts of land to public enterprises among cities using urban renewal programs.

Park and Recreation Land

As another test of the relationship between grant use and public land holdings, changes in park and recreation land were examined. The Bureau of Outdoor Recreation of the U.S. Department of the Interior was able to provide data on park and recreation land for a number of American cities for both 1960 and 1970.[2] Two indices of change in the number of acres of recreation land in each city were selected: the change in the number of acres of school recreation land between 1960 and 1970, and the change in the number of acres of city park and recreation land between 1960 and 1970. Once again the number of cases subjected to analysis was

TABLE 7-1.--Zero order product moment correlation coefficients
between grant use and land ownership

	Percent of land privately owned (N=74)
Urban renewal	-0.474*
Public housing	-0.369*

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 7-2.--Partial correlation coefficients showing independent
relationship between grant use and land ownership

	Percent of land privately owned (N=74)
Urban renewal	-0.332*
Public housing	0.017

*Significant at the .05 level.

substantially reduced with data for only ninety-six cities available

concerning school recreation areas and 146 cities concerning city park

land. Survey research was utilized to gather the data in both 1960 and

1970. Since this analysis is concerned with change, each city would have

had to provide the required information both in 1960 and again in 1970 to

be included in the analysis. Most cities did not do this.

Most cities responding in both 1960 and 1970 increased both their

number of acres of school recreation land and their number of acres of

city park land between 1960 and 1970. The mean increase in school recre-

ation land was 123 acres, from a mean of 113 acres in 1960 to a mean of

236 acres in 1970. The change ranged from a loss of 728 acres to an in-

crease of 3,640 with a standard deviation of 473.

The mean increase in city park land was 770 acres with a 1960 mean

of 1,440 acres and 2,318 acres in 1970.[3] The change ranged from a loss of

8,281 acres to a gain of 23,616 with a standard deviation of 3,192 acres.

Product moment correlation coefficients were computed between

housing, renewal, and the measures of change in recreation land. At the

zero order level, only one relationship was found to be significant. As

shown in Table 7-3, only urban renewal was significantly related to

changes in city park land ($r=-.22$) while neither urban renewal nor public

housing were related to changes in school recreation land.

When partials were computed, again controlling for the city profile

and political variables, urban renewal was found to be significantly

related to changes in both school ($r=-.34$) and city ($r=-.21$) recreation

areas (Table 7-4). Both measures of change were again found to be inde-

pendent of public housing construction/leasing.

TABLE 7-3.--Zero order product moment correlation coefficients
between grant use and changes in amount of
recreation land

	Acres of school recreation areas (N=96)	Acres of city park and recreation land (N=146)
Urban renewal	-0.105	-0.220*
Public housing	-0.020	-0.113

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 7-4.--Partial correlation coefficients showing independent
relationship between grant use and changes in
amount of recreation land

	Acres of school recreation areas (N=96)	Acres of city park and recreation land (N=146)
Urban renewal	-0.340*	-0.213*
Public housing	-0.145	-0.029

*Significant at the .05 level.

Partials were then computed between the change measures and each of the independent variables in the renewal model. Other than urban renewal, Size/Manufacturing was the only other variable independently related to the change in school recreation acres (r=.33). The change in park land fared little better, with Elazar's political cultures being the only other variable showing an independent relationship with the change in city park and recreation land (r=.16).

It is not difficult to posit an explanation for the negative relationship between renewal and the measures of change in city recreation land. When controlling for profile measures and political variables, urban renewal success is significantly related to low levels of park and recreation land acquisition. It is very likely that the negative relationship is merely a matter of city priorities. Cities finding themselves in serious economic/social difficulties probably give priority to the types of public projects which will stimulate economic growth rather than concentrating on amenities such as the acquisition of parkland.

It might also be possible that urban renewal is associated with central cities and that suburban cities, expanding in both population and physical size, were emphasizing parkland acquisition. This possibility did not prove out. There was no significant relationship between growth in parkland and change in city size (square miles) between 1960 and 1970 or the metropolitan status dichotomous variable.

Qualitative Analysis

Once again, the case studies analysis provided general support for the quantitative findings. Cities appeared to use renewal as a tool to expand public land, although this was not found to be true in communities

with a shortage in vacant land. Little relationship was noted between parkland and renewal or public housing.

Vallejo

The overall physical effects of the Marina Vista urban renewal project have been described at length in Chapter IV. Marina Vista dramatically changed the face of Vallejo turning an area of dilapidated structures into an impressive example of redevelopment. Earlier in this chapter, an independent relationship was found to exist between urban renewal and the percent of publically owned land in the city. Vallejo appears to confirm this finding. The Marina Vista project converted large amounts of land from private to public use.[4] Included in this changeover were two parks, a post office, library, town square, parking lots, sea-wall promenade, boat launching ramp, and a possible civic center complex. Of the 124.6 acres in the project, approximately 81 acres are devoted to public uses.[5]

Renewal in Vallejo was not associated with a dramatic increase in parkland. Only 12.1 acres of the renewal area was utilized for parks, courts, and plaza.[6] Conforming to the trends noted in the quantitative analysis, Vallejo did not show a dramatic increase in parkland during the ten year period.

Austin

Urban renewal in Austin also fit the pattern noted in the quantitative analysis with regard to the relationship between renewal and the percent of land within a city devoted to public use. The two University of Texas connected projects, University East and Brackenridge, will

transfer almost 200 acres of valuable property from private to public

uses. In addition, the Kealing project increased the size of the site

of the Kealing Junior High School from 4.8 acres to 20.5 acres with an

associated park, playground and pool. The Glen Oaks project will even-

tually convert the flood plain area of Boggy Creek into an open green

space.[7] Urban renewal in Austin, then, appears to conform to the national

trend.

There was no noticeable relationship between urban renewal and park-

land in Austin during the 1960's. Three projects, Brackenridge, Kealing,

and Glen Oaks, slightly increased the amount of parkland in the city;

however, the overall effect of the increase was miniscule. Austin has

ten major parks and forty playgrounds with a total of over 6,566 acres of

parkland.[8] Like Vallejo, however, there did not appear to be any signifi-

cant relationship between parkland and urban renewal in Austin.

Syracuse

Renewal in the City of Syracuse provides an interesting contrast

in land use patterns when compared to Vallejo and Austin. Syracuse does

not exemplify the quantitative relationship noted between urban renewal

success and land devoted to public. Very little of the urban renewal

land was converted from private to public use through the renewal process.

A total of nineteen acres in the Near East Side project was devoted to

public purposes. The Community Plaza consisting of the North Garage,

Public Safety Building, and the Everson Museum covered 9.7 acres while

the State Department of Mental Hygiene hospital took up 3.2 acres. The

remaining 6.1 acres went to the City of Syracuse and Central Tech High

School.

The Roman Catholic Diocese of Syracuse was expected to build a small office building on 0.2 acres in the Downtown One project area. This was the only tax-exempt development scheduled in this area.

And finally, the only tax-exempt project scheduled for Clinton Square was a federal office building on 2.7 acres.[9] Thus a total of only 21.9 acres of renewal land will be converted to tax exempt status.

There was no noticeable relationship in Syracuse between urban renewal and land devoted to park and recreational uses. Syracuse has been hampered by a shortage of developable vacant land which has, in turn, increased the intensity of land use, building coverage, and residential densities. The land shortages realistically limit the City's choices of action in land redistribution. Open space and recreational facilities are critically lacking in many areas of the city. High land costs and pressures for higher intensity land use have made park and recreation development in the city a slow process.[10]

Buffalo

Buffalo, like Syracuse, did not use urban renewal as a vehicle to effect the transfer of land from private to public use. If anything, the City tried to do just the opposite--transfer land from tax-exempt status to a revenue producing situation. This approach was exemplified by the Maryland Street West project whereby urban renewal was the vehicle used to transfer an area making up one-third of the project area from public to private ownership. While Maryland Street exemplifies an approach not found in the other cities, the overall effect of urban renewal on land use patterns in Buffalo was negligible.

There was also no noticeable relationship between changes in the amount of city parkland and urban renewal efforts. While Buffalo has been found to be "sadly lacking in usable neighborhood parks and play spaces,"[11] urban renewal was not related to any efforts to increase or decrease the amount of city parkland.

Buffalo does, however, have some interesting plans for parkland changes proposed for the period 1970 through 1975. First, the city found that two parks, Grover Cleveland and South Park, are located away from most residential neighborhoods and are too large to be efficiently utilized. The city, therefore, is considering converting part of the parkland to land for housing. Table 7-5 shows the proposed reallocation of park resources.

A parallel proposal would provide replacement parkland scattered throughout the city to balance off the 170 acre loss in South and Cleveland parks. A total of thirteen sites encompassing 344.8 acres was proposed. This proposal is found in Table 7-6. Note that urban renewal (or NDP) is the proposed development mechanism for seven of the new sites.[12] Thus, while Buffalo park development was not related to renewal activities during the 1960's, planning for the 1970-1975 period proposed urban renewal as a vehicle for substantial park developments.

Conclusions and Contentions

Two hypotheses were suggested concerning the relationship between public housing and urban renewal and the physical structure of the city. Specifically:

1. The amount of land devoted to public use is positively related to urban renewal expenditures.

TABLE 7-5.--Recommended disposition of South Park and Grover Cleveland
Park land, Buffalo, New York

Site	Acres remaining in park usage	Acres converted to housing	Acreage
South Park	72.3	90.0	162.3
Cleveland Park	31.6	80.0	111.6
Total	103.9	170.0	273.9

Source: Nathaniel S. Keith and Marcou, O'Leary and Associates,
Inc., Buffalo Community Renewal Program Extension for
the City of Buffalo, New York (Buffalo: City of Buffalo,
n.d.), p. 63.

TABLE 7-6.--Replacement acreage for park land converted to
non-park use, 1970-1975, Buffalo, New York

Location:	Acreage Converted To Park Use	Existing Use	Development Mechanism
Site C	4.3 acres	vacant	urban renewal
Site F	31.8 acres	vacant	develop city-owned land
Site K	6.0 acres	vacant	renewal or private dedication
Site M	13.0 acres	vacant	private dedication
Site N	13.4 acres	vacant	city purchase and develop
Cold Spring	9.5 acres	residential/commercial	urban renewal
Model Cities NDP	15.0 acres	residential/commercial	neighborhood development program
Ellicott Project	16.0 acres	vacant/park	urban renewal
Waterfront Project	21.0 acres	vacant	urban renewal
Other renewal action	5.0 acres	varies	urban renewal
Central Model Cities	15.0 acres	residential/commercial	model cities
Squaw Island	75.0 acres	vacant	city develop
15% of Parks Plan	119.8 acres	varies	varies
Total	344.8 acres		

2. Structural changes within cities are positively related to
   public housing construction and urban renewal expenditures.

Urban renewal success was found to be significantly and independently related to public land ownership while public housing was not. At the zero order level, however, both programs were related to land ownership patterns, but once controls were introduced only urban renewal was independently and negatively related to the private ownership of land. Unfortunately, data were not available to test the relationship between urban renewal and changes in land ownership patterns.

On the basis of the statistical evidence and the qualitative data furnished by renewal experience in Vallejo and Austin, urban renewal appears to be an effective vehicle for the transfers of land from the private to the public sector. There appears to be one major exception to this trend, however. This process apparently works only in cities where there are substantial amounts of vacant land available for development. In cities such as Buffalo and Syracuse renewal is not ordinarily used to permanently transfer land from the private to the public sector.

Another factor comes into play at this point also. Cities such as Austin, which are not forced to rely heavily on the property tax for income, appear to have less trouble, and are apparently more willing to utilize urban renewal for public redevelopment purposes.

Renewal and housing were also expected to have a positive relationship with increases in park and recreation land. This relationship did not appear; in fact, high levels of renewal were independently related to low levels of park expansion. The Buffalo experience may point to a failure on the author's part to select an adequate unit of measure. Buffalo was planning to use urban renewal, not to increase the number of

acres of parkland, but to increase the total number of parks. It is thus possible that total quantity of parkland was a poor measure and that renewal and housing might better be related to changes in the number of parks and recreation areas within a city rather than to changes in total acreage.

The most dramatic effect of urban renewal grants is the actual physical change in the face of the city brought about by redevelopment. Unfortunately, beauty cannot be quantified—thus there is no way to "prove" the second hypothesis. From an impressionistic viewpoint, however, the physical changes brought about by urban renewal are dramatic. Renewal in Vallejo changed the face of that city forever. While Jane Jacobs rightly deplores the destruction of Boston's North End, there is no question but that renewal is capable of transforming an area of blight and ugliness into pride and beauty—Vallejo, Austin, and Syracuse attest to that reality.

Notes

[1]Allen D. Manvel, "Land Use in 106 Large Cities," in National Commission on Urban Problems, Three Land Research Studies (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 19-59.

[2]George D. Butler, ed., Recreation and Park Yearbook 1961 (New York: National Recreation Association, 1961), pp. 47-119; U.S. Department of the Interior/Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, "Volunteer Recreation Leaders and Recreation and Park Areas," Series AA, Report 301-303 and 306 (Washington: unpublished computer printout, dated 04/19/71); _____, "Recreation and Park Areas," Series AA, Report 604-615 (Washington: unpublished computer printout, dated 04/15/71).

[3]The difference between the 1960 and 1970 means does not equal 770. A total N of 274 was used to compute the 1960 mean and an N of 160 was used for the 1970 mean. Only 147 cities responded to both questionnaires so the mean change of 770 acres applies only to these 147 cities.

[4]Telephone interview with Solano County administrator (D), January 17, 1973, Vallejo, California.

[5]Computed from data on map of the Marina Vista Project, Bond and Dougherty, Inc., Vallejo, California, February, 1969.

[6]Ibid.

[7]"Urban Renewal Special," Austin American-Statesman, August 27, 1972, pp. 4-5.

[8]Chamber of Commerce, Community Profile: Austin, Texas (Austin: Chamber of Commerce, 1972).

[9]Syracuse Governmental Research Bureau and Metropolitan Development Association, Profile of Central New York (Syracuse: Syracuse Governmental Research Bureau and Metropolitan Development Association, 1973), pp. 14-15.

[10]A Workable Program for Community Improvement: 1968 Progress Report for the Elimination and Prevention of Slums and Blight in Syracuse, New York (Syracuse: City of Syracuse, 1968), pp. 15-16.

[11]Nathaniel S. Keith and Marcoue, O'Leary and Associates, Inc., Buffalo Community Renewal Program Extension for the City of Buffalo, New York (Buffalo: City of Buffalo, n.d.), p. 61.

[12]Ibid., pp. 61-67.

CHAPTER VIII

SOCIAL EFFECTS OF PUBLIC HOUSING AND

URBAN RENEWAL PROGRAMS

Unquestionably, the most vocal criticisms of public housing and urban renewal programs in recent years have been directed at the social effects of the programs—both planned and spillover. A planned social effect of urban renewal, for example, has been the reduction of substandard housing. In attempting to attain this goal, however, renewal has justly been criticized as a program of Negro removal. Thus, a spillover effect has become a major consequence of the program. This chapter will examine some of the social effects attributed to renewal and housing in light of some of the major effects and criticisms of the programs.

Improved Housing Conditions

An aggregate approach to the examination of the effects of urban renewal and public housing on housing conditions in American cities between 1960 and 1970 was made extremely difficult due to changes in the 1970 census of housing. It was initially expected that housing and renewal success could be correlated with the change between 1960 and 1970 in the percent of sound housing with all plumbing facilities. It was expected that urban renewal and public housing would be positively associated with an increase in this variable. Unfortunately, the Bureau

of the Census changed their housing classifications and no longer report dwelling units as sound, deteriorating, or dilapidated.

The census for both 1960 and 1970 did, however, contain data on plumbing that could effectively be used to measure the change in the percent of dwelling units without all plumbing facilities. It was expected that both urban renewal and public housing success would be related to a decrease in the percent of housing units lacking some or all plumbing.

The 1960 figure was created by adding the percent of sound housing with all plumbing facilities[1] plus the percent of deteriorating housing with all plumbing facilities[2] and subtracting from 100. The 1970 percent of housing lacking some or all plumbing facilities required no computation.[3] The change in the percent of housing lacking some or all plumbing facilities was then obtained by subtracting the 1960 figure from the 1970.

In general, the housing stock in cities with populations of 50,000 or more improved dramatically between 1960 and 1970. The percent of housing lacking plumbing facilities was reduced by an average (mean) of 7.09 percent during the ten year period. The change ranged from a substantial reduction of 29.5 percent to a slight increase of 1.1 percent with a standard deviation of 5.3 percent. By 1970, an average (mean) of only 3.34 percent of the housing in cities over 50,000 lacked some plumbing facilities. Housing conditions varied widely from city to city with a high of 18.7 percent and low of 0.3 percent lacking some or all plumbing.

Surprisingly, neither urban renewal nor public housing success was found to be related to this change. Zero order product moment correlation coefficients were computed between housing and renewal and the change

in the percent of housing units lacking some or all plumbing facilities between 1960 and 1970 (Table 8-1). Neither urban renewal nor public housing was significantly associated with this measure of change in housing quality.

Suspecting that the independent relationships between variables might be hidden by the influences of other variables in the model, partial correlation coefficients were computed controlling for the city profile factors and the political variables. The partials are found in Table 8-2. Neither relationship was significant at the .05 level. The importance of this lack of relationship cannot be understated. It was expected that both urban renewal and public housing would have strong relationships with changes in the stock of substandard housing but the relationship was not shown by either simple or partial correlation.

Does this then mean the urban renewal and public housing programs do not affect the quality of housing within a community? Not at all. The general improvement in housing conditions between 1960 and 1970 has already been noted. Urban renewal and public housing unquestionably account for part of this change. The important finding concerning the lack of relationship between renewal and housing and changes in aggregate housing conditions concerns the meaning of the relationship to cities not receiving substantial amounts of renewal funds or constructing/leasing substantial numbers of public housing units. Apparently these cities are able to improve the quality of their housing without the aid of either federal program. It is likely that state programs such as New York's housing program or California's renewal program, local code enforcement projects, and/or private renewal and renovation serve to offset the predicted effects of urban renewal and public housing.

TABLE 8-1.—Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between grant use and change in housing conditions, 1960-1970

	Change in percent lacking plumbing
Urban renewal	-0.059
Public housing	-0.058

TABLE 8-2.—Partial correlation coefficients showing independent relationship between grant use and change in housing conditions, 1960-1970

	Change in percent lacking plumbing
Urban renewal	-0.020
Public housing	-0.081

Change in Low-Rent Housing Stock

Both urban renewal and low-income public housing are commonly suspected (or credited) as being major determinants of change in the stock of low-rent housing. Public housing is usually credited with increasing the supply of low-rent housing while urban renewal is generally blamed for reductions in the number of low rent housing units. To test these propositions, two measures of the change in the stock of low-rent housing were developed from 1960[4] and 1970[5] census data. These measures were (1) the change in the number of contract rental units under $60.00 from 1960 to 1970, and (2) the change in the percent of contract rental units (of total rental units) under $60.00 from 1960 to 1970.

A substantial decrease in low-rent (under $60.00) housing was expected simply due to inflationary factors. Such was the case. Cities showed a mean reduction of 8,991 low-rent housing units between 1960 (mean of 15,709) and 1970 (mean of 6,718). Changes ranged from a reduction of 605,902 units to a slight increase of 340 units with a standard deviation of 36,904.

A second indicator of change in low-rent housing was also computed—the change in the percent of rental units under $60.00 from 1960 to 1970. The percent of low-rent housing units also decreased dramatically during the ten year period with an average (mean) reduction of 25 percent and standard deviation of 12 percent. Changes ranged from an increase of 65 percent to a reduction of 72 percent.

Both urban renewal and public housing were significantly related to large decreases in the total stock of rental housing under $60.00 (Table 8-3) with r=-.75 and r=-.82 respectively. Without controlling for

city demographic variables, however, this figure has little meaning. Perhaps more meaningful is the low, but statistically significant, zero order relationship between urban renewal and the change in the percent of low-rent housing. In this case the positive relationship indicates that an increase (or small decrease) in the change in percent of low-rent housing is associated with urban renewal success.

The relationships change considerably with the introduction of controls. When the city factors and political variables were held constant, there is no significant relationship between renewal or housing and the change in the percent of low-rent housing. A weak but significant independent relationship does exist between housing (r=-.26) and renewal (r=.13) and the change in the total number of low-rent housing units. Table 8-4 shows these relationships. The slight positive relationship between urban renewal and change in the number of low-rent housing units indicates that urban renewal success is independently related to the least reduction in low-rent housing. On the other hand, public housing construction was independently related to large decreases in the total low-rent housing stock. Apparently cities experiencing serious declines in their total supply of low-rent housing react by increasing construction/leasing public housing units. However, this construction effort was not adequate to offset the decline in housing stock.

These figures raise serious questions concerning the common contentions about the effects of urban renewal on the low-rent housing stock. Renewal does not appear to be as villanous as was heretofore believed. Table 8-5 shows the partial correlation coefficients between the renewal model variable and the change in the percent of rental units under $60.00

TABLE 8-3.—Zero order product moment correlation coefficients between grant use and change in low-rent housing stock, 1960-1970

	Number rental units under $60	Percent rental units under $60
Urban renewal	-0.748*	0.155*
Public housing	-0.892*	0.065

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 8-4.—Partial correlation coefficients showing independent relationship between grant use and change in low-rent housing stock, 1960-1970

	Number rental units under $60	Percent rental units under $60
Urban renewal	0.132*	0.090
Public housing	-0.259*	0.041

*Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 8-5.—Partial correlation coefficients showing independent
relationships between renewal model variables and
the change in the percent of rental units
under $60, 1960-1970

	Change in percent under $60
Status, Wealth, and Education (low)	-0.022
Central City	-0.108
Urban Density	-0.202*
Size/Manufacturing	-1.000*
Commuting/Growth	0.036
Model city	0.047
HUD office in state	0.030
Renewal difficulty	0.000
Years since 1949 for URA	-0.028
Years since 1960 for enabling legislation	0.037
Form of government	-0.010
Representation	-0.026
Type election	0.019
Wallace vote	-0.001
Goldwater vote	0.071
Elazar's political cultures	0.035
Metro status	0.029
Urban renewal	0.060

*Significant at the .05 level.

between 1960 and 1970. Only two of the relationships are significant

at the .05 level with a perfect partial correlation coefficient of

-1.0 between Size/Manufacturing and the change in low-rent housing stock.

Thus urban renewal does not really determine the reduction in low-rent

housing, it is city size and density measures which affect the cost of

housing. The contention that urban renewal reduces the supply of low-

cost housing probably resulted from examination of short-term case studies.

There is no question but that massive clearance programs destroy low-cost

housing in the short run. Over the long run, however, the data do not

support this contention. The case studies presented later in this chapter

appear to amplify this finding.

Qualitative Analysis

Examination of the social affects of renewal and housing grants

proved to be most difficult. Given the relatively short amount of time

the author was able to spend in each city, heavy reliance had to be placed

on secondary data sources. Fortunately, much information was available.

Alhambra

Of the six cities visited during the field observations, Alhambra

was the only city operating a renewal or redevelopment program without

federal assistance. For this reason, some of the social effects of

Alhambra's program were examined for later comparison with programs

operating under the restrictions imposed by federal law.

Alhambra tried a rather unusual approach to what little slum clear-

ance (and it can hardly be called that) they have attempted. There were

a number of low value residential dwellings in commercial and industrial

areas of the city. These dwellings were located on land which had been zoned for commercial or industrial use after the houses had been built. The city refers to these dwellings as "non-conforming residences." There were 124 non-conforming residences in commercial areas and 163 in the industrial area.[6] While far from what one might consider "slum housing," for Alhambra these dwellings constituted the city's low-rent housing.

On August 2, 1966, with an effective date of September 8, 1966, the city council passed (5 to 0) an ordinance requiring, in essence, that wood frame dwellings used for residential occupancy which were over thirty-five years old and constituting a non-conforming structure would be removed within five years of the effective date of the ordinance.[7] This ordinance would have virtually eliminated low-rent housing in Alhambra by September 8, 1971. This date was later changed to November 18, 1972.[8] In 1971, a number of the residents of the non-conforming dwellings were able to apply enough pressure on the city council to have the date for the elimination of non-conforming dwellings changed to five years from January 14, 1972 (January 14, 1977).[9] Thus an attempt to legislate the removal of low-rent housing merely because it constituted a non-conforming use failed. Non-conforming structures in Alhambra are removed or demolished as a matter of course in the city—but generally only when another use for the property is planned.

The general appearance and condition (though not necessarily sub-standard) of the non-conforming dwellings violated the city norm concerning maintenance of private property. Though the attempt to "do away" with these structures failed, it was not so much the non-conforming nature of the dwellings that caused the attempt at elimination, but

rather the appearance of the property. As a class, the owners and tenants of this property were in violation of an important community norm. The community responded in what was for it a logical manner.

Alhambra also provides an interesting contrast to the relocation requirements of federal law. Operating under the Community Redevelopment Law of the State of California, Alhambra's redevelopment plan called for the Redevelopment Agency to "assist all persons (including families, business concerns, and others) displaced by the Project in finding other locations and facilities."[10]

Toward this end, the Agency would pay a maximum of $200.00 in moving expenses.[11] Relocation efforts consisted of assisting families (and occasionally businesses) in finding new homes—mainly through local realtors. There was no specific attempt made to keep the families in Alhambra; in fact, most relocated outside the city.[12] A side benefit to redevelopment, as seen by the city, was the transfer of low-income families from Alhambra to adjacent communities.

Vallejo

The accusation that urban renewal is responsible for a reduction in the supply of low-rent housing is not substantiated by urban renewal activity in Vallejo. For one thing, two of the Vallejo projects involve very little clearance. The Flosden Acres project is primarily a program of residential rehabilitation rather than residential destruction. The same is true of the Concentrated Code Enforcement program—359 units will be brought into conformance with the city codes rather than being destroyed.

Only the clearance project, Marina Vista, might be accused of reducing the supply of low-rent housing. In the long run, however, Marina Vista substantiates the findings in Table 8-4. The Marina Vista project demolished over 600 major structures,[13] of which approximately 400 were residences.[14] Administrators report anywhere between 160[15] and 350[16] residential relocations forced by the project. Even assuming that all of the 400 housing units demolished could have provided safe, decent, sanitary housing for low-income families, more low-rent housing was put into the Marina Vista project area than could possibly have been removed.

Table 8-6 shows the present residential redevelopment in the Marina Vista project. Note that 618 housing units are provided, whereas only 400 were destroyed. In addition, another 100 unit hi-rise apartment building for low-income elderly residents is planned for the area.[17] Assuming, however, that the additional 100 units are never built, there still remain 466 subsidized units (all but the Carolina Apartments) in Marina Vista. Urban renewal in Vallejo, then, not only accounts for the upgrading of existing residential dwelling units, but in the long run is associated with an increase in the supply of low-rent housing.

Chapter IV suggested a rather negative attitude on the part of the citizens and officials of Vallejo concerning federal housing programs for low-income families. The attitude is not as pervasive as it might originally have been perceived. There is no question but that the city is not interested in low-rent public housing; however, the use of a variety of federal programs to provide subsidized housing for low and moderate-income families appears to be well accepted. Government programs to provide privately owned (or institutionally owned) low-rent housing at

TABLE 8-6.--Housing in the Marina Vista urban renewal project,
        Vallejo, California

Ascension Arms (202)   75 units

Marina Vista Apartments [221(d)(3)]   236 units

Carolina Apartments   152 units

Hi-rise (236)   155 units

        Total   618 units

Source: Redevelopment Agency of the City of Vallejo, Vallejo,
         California, January 19, 1973.

reduced rates is encouraged. Nowhere is this more evident than in the use of three such programs in the Marina Vista area. There thus appears to be a distinction on the part of Vallejo's citizens between providing for the "elderly and the working poor" on the one hand (acceptable) and the "welfare poor" on the other (unacceptable).

Austin

Austin provided an excellent opportunity to examine the social effects of urban renewal forced relocations. The early relocations in Austin associated with the Kealing and Glen Oaks areas contributed substantially to the later difficulties the Urban Renewal Agency would experience in Blackshear. One former official reported that "the relocation of the people was really just a sham."[18]

With field studies lasting approximately one week in each of the cities visited, it was impossible to study citizen attitudes (as opposed to elite and media opinions) in any depth. For this reason, every attempt was made to examine both published and unpublished secondary sources dealing with housing or renewal. Such an opportunity was available concerning the effects of relocations in Austin.[19]

Allen Williams randomly sampled 95 of the 182 households displaced from the Kealing urban renewal area between 1964 and 1968. In examining the housing condition of the relocatees, interviewers estimated the condition of the new dwellings and found that almost one out of every three households moved into a new dwelling which was classified as deteriorating or dilapidated.[20] Thus, almost one-third of the families displaced from Kealing did not obtain a decent home.

Williams also found that 70.5 percent of the relocated households were faced with an increased financial burden after relocation and 18.7 percent of those who owned their own homes in Kealing became renters after the move. Of the forty-four families who were renting in Kealing and continued renting after relocation, 67.4 percent were faced with an average rental increase from $39.00 per month to $52.00 per month.

Of the Kealing home owners, 60.4 percent had paid for their former homes. Five of the former homeowners became renters after relocation, seven purchased and completely paid for new homes, while the remaining 58.6 percent purchased other homes and were making an average house payment of $77.00. Thus only 24.1 percent of the former Kealing homeowners were able to relocate without increased housing costs.[21]

In addition to surveying the changing housing characteristics, Williams attempted to examine the effects of urban renewal on the social community. Concerning the physical characteristics of the neighborhoods, the majority of those interviewed indicated that there was little difference between Kealing and their new neighborhoods. Similarly, the majority of respondents found little difference between neighborhoods concerning convenience to facilities such as schools, churches, transportation, or shopping. Of the 40 percent (approximate) reporting differences, however, roughly two-thirds considered their old neighborhood more convenient.

Data were available on the relocation addresses of 98.2 percent (169 households) of those Kealing residents relocating in Austin. None of these households relocated in a predominantly white neighborhood. Approximately 66 percent relocated within one mile of the center of the Kealing area with the majority of the remaining families moving further

to the east but still remaining in the black community. Furthermore, no white families moved into the redeveloped Kealing area. The conclusion here is obvious--the Kealing project relocations in no way contributed to desegregation in the City of Austin.[23]

For a large number of those forced to relocate from the Kealing area (26.3 percent), factors associated with a loss of community were salient, but these factors were not major complaints by the majority. The strongest complaint was the forced disruption of neighborhood friendships or kinship, although a secondary area causing some problem was the difficulty in church attendance forced on some by relocation.[24]

The Williams study provided important insight into the social effects of urban renewal in Austin--at least as far as the relocations forced by one project are concerned. The Kealing relocations undoubtedly helped many improve their housing conditions; however, a very high percentage of those relocated did not obtain suitable housing. The relocations also placed a financial burden in terms of increased housing costs on the vast majority of the former Kealing residents. There was some change in the social community due to relocation but this did not appear to be an important factor for the majority. And finally, renewal was not a useful tool in promoting racial integration within the city.

Syracuse

The first large urban renewal project in Syracuse, the Near East Side project, is a prime example of the reason renewal critics term urban renewal "Negro removal."[25] This project forced the relocation of a substantial number of black families to make way for business and civic redevelopment. Relocations from this area required moving 800 to 900

families and 630 single persons to new homes over a five year period.[26]
In spite of the fact that the city attempted to coordinate the construction of public housing units to alleviate the burdens of relocation, it was not entirely successful. Far fewer low-income housing units were constructed in Syracuse than were razed by urban renewal. Over a ten year period from 1959 through 1968, approximately 5,500 persons were displaced and relocated (a large number from freeway construction).[27]

Blaming urban renewal for all low-income housing problems and relocations in Syracuse, however, oversimplifies a complex social process. Outside of the Near East Side in the early 1960's, renewal has not been a significant cause of relocations. Table 8-7, for example, presents the city relocation estimates for a two year period ending in March, 1969. Note that the vast majority of relocations were not as a result of HUD assisted projects. City and state programs were causing many more relocations in Syracuse in the late 1960's than was urban renewal. In 1960, approximately 20 percent of the housing in Syracuse was classified as substandard. In an effort to upgrade local housing quality, the city embarked upon a large scale code enforcement program. The program has substantially aided in upgrading housing quality, but it has not been without its negative effects—forced relocations.[28] Thus while renewal has received substantial, and often justified, criticism in Syracuse, the program has often served as a smokescreen for other culprits.

Buffalo

Rather than utilize urban renewal clearance and public housing construction as major tools to eliminate slums and blight in residential

TABLE 8-7.—Estimates of displacements and relocations for the period April 1, 1967 through March 31, 1969, in Syracuse, New York

Type of governmental action	Number of families displaced		Number of families relocated in standard housing		in substandard housing	
	white	black	white	black	white	black
HUD-assisted projects	8	4	8	4		
Code enforcement	50	100	47	90	3	10
Highway construction	15		15			
Mental hygiene	8	103	8	103		
Over-income in public housing	35		35			
TOTAL	116	207	113	197	3	10

Source: <u>A Workable Program for Community Improvement: 1968 Progress Report for the Elimination and Prevention of Slums and Blight in Syracuse, New York</u> (Syracuse: City of Syracuse, 1968), Housing and Relocation Requirements, p. 6.

neighborhoods, Buffalo adopted an approach much like Syracuse's.

Specifically, Buffalo is now concentrating its efforts on code enforce-

ment. The city has initiated a Systematic Neighborhood Improvement Pro-

gram (SNIP) of code enforcement. The City's Division of Rehabilitation

and Conservation will ultimately inspect for code compliance every single

dwelling unit in Buffalo. In areas designated for urban renewal, inspec-

tions will only cover areas of immediate hazard. Upon completion of the

present SNIP program, the City will establish a schedule that will result

in bi-annual inspections of multiple dwellings and routine periodic in-

spections of all other dwellings at adequate intervals to insure continu-

ing compliance.[29]

In Buffalo, as in Syracuse, displacement by urban renewal has been

a problem. However, it does not account for even one-half of the recent

displacements in the city. Between October 1, 1967, and September 30,

1969, HUD assisted programs (primarily urban renewal) accounted for only

185 of the 475 forced family relocations (Table 8-8). Again highway

construction and code enforcement accounted for approximately 60 percent

of the relocations during the period.[30]

As of 1969, renewal accounted for the destruction of many more

low-income dwelling units than it created. In the long run, however,

this will not be the case. If present plans are put into effect, 5,150

low and moderate-income dwelling units will be constructed during the

period 1970-1975 in four urban renewal areas: Ellicott, Maryland Street

West, Waterfront, and Oak Street.[31]

Thus while renewal is associated with a decrease in low-rent hous-

ing in the short run, in the long run, renewal will result in an

TABLE 8-8.--Number of displaced families and relocations for the two year period ending September 30, 1969, in Buffalo, New York

| | Number of families displaced | | Number of families relocated | | | |
| | | | in standard housing | | in substandard housing | |
Type of governmental action	white	minority	white	minority	white	minority
HUD-assisted projects	152	33	145	30	7	3
Code enforcement	60	80	58	75	2	5
Highway construction	57	93	55	89	2	4
TOTAL	269	206	258	194	11	12

Source: Workable Program 1970/1972 (Buffalo: City of Buffalo, 1969), p. 13.

increased supply of low-cost homes. Had Buffalo's renewal program
progressed at a reasonable rate, renewal in Buffalo, like Vallejo, would
have probably provided increased low-rent housing during the decade under
study.

Conclusions and Contentions

The final hypotheses in this study examine the relationships be-
tween housing and renewal and the expected social effects of the program:

1. The quantity of low-cost housing is positively related to
    public housing construction.

2. The quantity of low-cost housing is negatively related to
    urban renewal expenditures.

3. Improved housing conditions are positively related to public
    housing construction.

4. Improved housing conditions are positively related to urban
    renewal expenditures.

One of the most surprising results of this entire study was the
lack of relationship found between both urban renewal and public housing
and the 1960-1970 change in the percent of local housing units lacking
some or all plumbing. In cities throughout the nation, the percent of
housing units lacking plumbing decreased dramatically during the decade.
This decrease, however, was not specifically related to urban renewal or
low-rent public housing construction/leasing. While housing and urban
renewal, especially renewal, provide vehicles to improve the overall
quality of housing, cities not electing to use urban renewal for this
purpose are apparently able to find other equally successful methods to
improve overall housing quality. Likewise, cities achieving substantial
success in terms of urban renewal funds received may devote most of the

funds to downtown or commercial renewal rather than toward housing improvement.

One of the major criticisms directed at urban renewal has been that it reduces the supply of low-cost housing in the city. On the other hand, it was expected that public housing construction would increase the supply of low-rent housing. In the long run, this was not found to be true. Neither urban renewal nor public housing was found to be independently related to changes in the percent of low-rent housing. In fact, urban renewal showed a slight positive relationship with the change in the total number of low-rent housing units. Public housing, on the other hand, was negatively related to the change in the total number of rental units. It thus appears that public housing construction is brought about by the knowledge that there will be a reduction in the quantity of low-rent housing. The case studies have generally supported these findings. In the long run, renewal is probably associated with an increase in the supply of low and moderate-rent housing. Renewal, then, may temporarily reduce the low-income housing supply but in the long-run, it appears to increase it.

But what of the effects of renewal on the individuals directly involved? The findings of Allen Williams in Austin are probably very similar to what one would find in most American cities—that minorities are the victims of urban renewal, that there is a disruption of the community (good or bad), that families forced to relocate generally move into improved housing but pay a higher price for that housing, and that renewal really does not do much to help the cause of racial integration.

The case studies did show, however, that while urban renewal may bear the brunt of the criticism concerning forced relocations, highway

construction and code enforcement projects may be the real present-day

villains.

Notes

[1]U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book 1962 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 476-575.

[2]Computed from data in U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Housing 1960, HC (1), separate volume for each state (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), Table 12.

[3]U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, Housing Characteristics for States, Cities, and Counties, Vol. 1, separate volume for each state (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), Table 1.

[4]Computed from data in U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, Census of Housing 1960, Table 17.

[5]Computed from data in U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, Housing Characteristics, Table 10.

[6]Personal interview with local administrator, January 8, 1973, Alhambra, California.

[7]Ordinance No. 066-3334, City of Alhambra, California, August 2, 1966.

[8]Ordinance No. 967-3383, City of Alhambra, California, October 10, 1967.

[9]Ordinance No. 071-3546, City of Alhambra, California, December 7, 1971.

[10]Alhambra Redevelopment Agency, Redevelopment Plan for the Industrial Redevelopment Project, Alhambra, California: Alhambra Redevelopment Agency, May 26, 1969, p. 11. (Mimeographed.)

[11]Ibid.

[12]Personal interview with local administrator (B), January 9, 1973, Alhambra, California.

[13]Redevelopment Agency of the City of Vallejo, Marina Vista (Vallejo, California: Gibson Publications, n.d.), p. 1.

[14]Personal interview with former Vallejo local administrator (A), January 18, 1973, San Francisco, California.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Personal interview with local administrator (E), January 19, 1973, Vallejo, California.

[17]Personal interview with local administrator (B), January 16, 1973, Vallejo, California.

[18]Personal interview with former local official (A), November 30, 1972, Austin, Texas.

[19]J. Allen Williams, Jr., "The Effects of Urban Renewal Upon a Black Community: Evaluation and Recommendations," Social Science Quarterly, L (December, 1969), 703-712. J. Allen Williams, Jr., Blackshear Diagnostic Survey: A Description and Problem Analysis, Austin: Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Austin, June, 1968. (Mimeographed.)

[20]Williams noted that "The interviewers were not trained appraisers, but their judgments of structures in another urban renewal area compared favorably with those made by experts. For example, whereas the urban re- newal agency classified 56.0 percent of the houses substandard, inter- viewers classified 53.6 percent substandard." Williams, "Effects of Renewal," 704.

[21]Williams, "Effects of Renewal," 704-705.

[22]Ibid., 706-707.

[23]Ibid., 207-208.

[24]Ibid., 208-209.

[25]Personal interview with local elite (A), February 28, 1973, Syracuse, New York.

[26]"Action Asked in Urban Renewal Problems," Syracuse Post-Standard, July 30, 1961, pp. 1, 31.

[27]Housing Committee of the League of Women Voters of Metropolitan Syracuse, Housing in Onondaga County: Present Facts and Future Goals (Syracuse: League of Women Voters, February, 1969), pp. 1, 4.

[28]A Workable Program for Community Improvement: 1968 Progress Report for the Elimination and Prevention of Slums and Blight in Syracuse, New York (Syracuse: City of Syracuse, 1968), Housing and Relocation Requirements, pp. 1-7.

[29]Workable Program 1970/1972 (Buffalo: City of Buffalo, 1969), p. 3B.

[30]Ibid., p. 13.

[31]Nathaniel S. Keith and Marcou, O'Leary and Associates, Inc., Buffalo Community Renewal Program Extension for the City of Buffalo, New York (Buffalo: City of Buffalo, n.d.), pp. 34-35.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter will not attempt to present a detailed summary of the

findings concerning the determinants of grant usage or grant effects;

this has been done in the last section of each of the preceding chapters.

The purpose here is to briefly summarize the broad findings within the

framework of the model developed in Chapter II and to relate these find-

ings to the overall framework of American urban society.

Concerning the patterns of use of renewal and housing grant pro-

grams, the overwhelming dominance of a city's physical and socioeconomic

profile as a determinant of grant use was noted. The profile factors

operate through an intervening political framework consisting of federal,

state, and local decisions, as well as an environment consisting of the

political attitudes of the local populace. Federal influence was not

only felt within the framework of housing and renewal laws and project

approvals, but through an apparent advantage of federally selected

"model cities" or "demonstration cities" in urban renewal funding and

housing authorizations.

State lawmakers also significantly affected the outcome of the grant

programs. The rapidity with which state legislatures passed program en-

abling legislation and the impediments placed in the way of program

utilization by state laws substantially affected use by local governments.

The formal structure of local government (reform characteristics) was influential in determining public housing construction and leasing but had little effect on local use of urban renewal. On the other hand, local political attitudes (as measured) helped shape the urban renewal program, but had no effect on the growth and development of public housing. In addition, this study tended to confirm that an overreliance on the individual case study might result in overestimating the importance of the political leader and program administrator in urban renewal and public housing grant use.

Both programs, but especially urban renewal, were business dominated, and were often used to enhance the economic position of the city. Public housing construction appeared to have a slight effect on the short-term local employment picture, while urban renewal did not. While renewal and housing are used to enhance the city's economic position, there is no evidence that the programs are successful in this regard in the short run. It is possible, but undetermined here, that renewal and housing may benefit the community's economic position over the long run (perhaps thirty-fifty years); this study, however, notes little short term success—except in rare cases such as that exemplified by Syracuse.

Both renewal and housing have little independent effect on local governmental employment. Renewal, however, was positively related to increased city tax revenues, expenditures, and debt. Urban renewal thus was found to be an effective tool for increasing the city's tax base.

Neither program showed the expected relationship with stability in the mayor's office. Other factors, particularly the form of government, were more important determinants of the mayor's re-election chances.

Urban renewal success was found to be greatest in cities devoting large amounts of land to public purposes, suggesting that urban renewal is an effective vehicle for transferring land from private to public use.

And finally, urban renewal and public housing were not related to the overall upgrading of local housing (plumbing facilities). Nor was renewal related to reductions in the supply of low-rent housing; in fact, it actually showed a weak but positive relationship to the number of rental units under $60.00. In the early stages of the program, urban renewal forced massive relocations but by the end of the 1960's, much more administrative care was being shown as the program moved away from the clearance concept toward one of renovation and restoration. Nonetheless, renewal is often still blamed for forced relocations while highway construction programs and local code enforcement projects may in fact be the major causes of these relocations. Evidence on the effects of relocations since 1968 (and the new benefits) is sketchy. Under the old relocation act, however, families and businesses forced to relocate were hurt much more than they were helped.

Urban Renewal in an Urban Society

While physical and demographic characteristics of cities are the prime determinants of whether a city will have an urban renewal program and how large it will be, local political factors determine how the program is shaped. Before discussing renewal within the framework of urban society, it is first necessary to discuss the limits placed upon the

discussion of renewal and to examine two concepts not heretofore

discussed—institutional racism and the concept of the zero-sum game.

Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, among others, make a

distinction between individual racism and institutional racism. Indi-

vidual racism involves individual whites acting in a racist manner against

individual blacks, while institutional racism involves acts by the total

white community against the black community. Individual racism

> consists of overt acts by individuals, which cause
> death, injury, or the violent destruction of
> property. This type can be recorded by television
> cameras; it can frequently be observed in the pro-
> cess of commission. The second type is less overt,
> far more subtle, less identifiable in terms of spe-
> cific individuals committing the acts. But it is
> no less destructive of human life. The second type
> originates in the operation of established and
> respected forces in the society, and thus receives
> far less public condemnation than the first type.[1]

Institutional racism need not be conscious acts of the white com-

munity against the black. It relies on "the active and pervasive opera-

tion of anti-black attitudes and practices,"[2] conscious or unconscious.

Before examining urban development programs in light of this dis-

cussion of racism, it is necessary to consider the second major point:

that renewal, from a local perspective, is a zero-sum game. That is,

there are winners and there are losers in the renewal process. In a

non-zero-sum game, it is possible for all, or most, players to win (or

lose). In a zero-sum game, some win while others lose.

From a financial viewpoint, urban renewal is downtown oriented.

Most projects are located in the central business district or in a "near

downtown" area. They are oriented toward improving economic vitality

although they may meet the legally defined residential requirements.

Renewal, then, is generally associated with business or governmental (in the broad sense including schools, hospitals, universities, etc.) expansion. But resources for renewal are extremely limited in terms of local needs. Alan Altshuler notes that society allocates its resources in accordance with the "squeaky wheel" principle,

> Resources are scarce, claims abundant; people are selfish, the consensus on priorities weak. This is not to say that the public lacks any sense of what is right and proper, or that this sense can be ignored. It is merely to say that this sense is extremely general, and is itself largely and indirect and lagged product of power relationships.[3]

As urban renewal is applied to the squeaky wheel of physical blight, economic decay, and social injustice in the city, certain segments of the community reap the benefits. Local government benefits through an expanded tax base. The community as a whole benefits through an improved physical appearance and increased public land for parks, museums, universities, hospitals, etc. Certain types of business interests benefit directly from the renewal process while local businessmen in general may see themselves as benefiting from renewal in the long run. (Whether they actually do or not is open to debate.)

In a zero-sum game, however, there are always losers. The losers here are the residents of the "near downtown" areas--America's minorities. By Carmichael and Hamilton's definition, then, urban renewal is a thoroughly racist program--not through design of law, but through the manner in which it is implemented at the local level. This does not mean that renewal administrators are racists--most are capable and compassionate individuals. As long as the poor, the powerless, and the black reside in the "near downtown," urban renewal will always work to their

disadvantage for rejuvenation of the "near downtown" is foremost in the minds of those citizens and interest groups having the power to influence the renewal process.

Public Housing

Low-rent public housing when viewed within a local framework differs substantially from urban renewal in that it is not a zero-sum game. Theoretically, everyone can benefit from public housing—there need not be any losers. While there are those who object to public housing sites in their particular neighborhoods on the basis that it will reduce property values, there is little evidence to support this contention. There are, of course, specific instances in which public housing could reduce adjacent property values. There is undoubtedly not much demand for home sites adjacent to Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis or to Buffalo's Talbert Mall or Ellicott Mall. This situation, however, has been the result of a lack of awareness of the problems these high density units would create rather than a deficiency in the low-income public housing program per se. High density projects and housing developments located in such a manner as to be inaccessible to basic services are now known to be undesirable and to be major contributors to a city's social problems.

Virtually all segments of the society in American cities can benefit from a properly developed public housing program. Architectural firms, construction companies and suppliers, all benefit from the construction of the housing itself, as does local employment. Banks and financial institutions benefit from the tax-exempt bonds issued to finance the project, and investors benefit from the purchase of the bonds. The projects cost the city nothing—the city government assumes no financial

liability, and housing construction has been shown to be unrelated to city financial measures. In fact, the city indirectly benefits because the pressures operating to create additional slums and blight are relieved. And finally, the low-income segment of the population benefits from safe, decent, sanitary housing at rates they can afford.

Public housing, then, when viewed within the larger community operates as a non-zero-sum game. That is, everyone benefits and nobody loses. Recall again that the major assumption of this contention is that the program is properly conceived, carried out and administered. Pruitt-Igoe also was a non-zero-sum game—but everyone lost.

President Nixon was quite correct when he expressed the fear that the federal government was becoming a "nationwide slumlord."[4] Some housing projects are still "human cesspools . . . massive barracks for the destitute . . . a $20,000,000 slum."[5] However, this is not because the public housing concept is deficient, it is because such projects were built either without knowledge of, or without caring about, the consequences of the program.

The Future for Public Housing and Urban Renewal

This is not an attempt to predict the political future of two highly controversial programs, but rather is an effort to suggest some ways that the negative effects of the programs might be minimized. As of this writing, both programs might well be eliminated by the Nixon administration. A complete cost-benefit study might indicate that there are better ways to meet our housing and redevelopment goals. The future of public housing and urban renewal in its present form is thus highly uncertain.

From this author's perspective, drawn primarily from field observations of housing programs, there appears to be nothing wrong with the basic low-income public housing program that minor modifications could not alleviate.[6] It would be a simple task for congress to extend tenant income limits or to raise the ceiling on per unit construction costs. The legal changes that might be made to the present program, then, are technical details.

Properly administered, public housing operates to the benefit of all and the detriment of none when viewed from the local perspective. It is a non-zero-sum game and can operate to everyone's benefit. The major failing in the public housing program, and a critical failure, has been poor planning, design, and administration. Any reasonable man would fire his doctor if he failed to prescribe medicines developed since 1949 or would seek disbarment of an attorney whose case searches ignored precedents set since 1949. Yet failure to utilize current knowledge in governmental programs is common practice. Social science research of the past twenty years in the arenas of housing and other social needs has been singularly ignored by local officials and HUD administrators alike.[7]

Local housing authority directors are generally appointed for considerations other than their knowledge of the housing and social needs of the local low-income population. This may be no problem so long as that needed input comes from somewhere; but in today's operation of the housing program it generally does not emerge from within the local community. Guidance should then come from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, but it does not. HUD is in a position, through its ability to give and/or withhold project approval, to insure that public housing

projects are designed, not only utilizing up-to-date building methods,
but utilizing social knowledge as well. A wealth of knowledge is avail-
able—and a wealth of knowledge is ignored.

While public housing may operate to everyone's benefit, urban re-
newal in the context of Carmichael and Hamilton's definition of institu-
tional racism is a thoroughly racist program. As a zero-sum game, urban
renewal operates to the detriment of the urban minority population. In
fact, Congress recognized this in 1968 when it provided increased reloca-
tion payments for displaced households. An owner-occupant may be eligible
for a replacement housing grant of up to $5,000. Relocation payments of
up to $1,000 may be made to renters over a two year period.[8] The diffi-
culty, however, is that the benefits are not always worth the disruption—
especially to renters. There is some evidence that hostility to urban
renewal is not great among property owners who might stand to gain from
the sale of their property to the urban renewal agency—witness the emer-
gence of the Blackshear Residents for Individual Property Rights, organ-
ized in opposition to the anti urban renewal forces in Austin. This
organization was made up predominantly of local property owners anxious
to sell their property to the urban renewal agency.

To remove the racist overtones from urban renewal, several changes
are necessary. First, Congress, HUD, and the general public must recog-
nize the program for what it is—a program oriented (through its applica-
tion) to downtown and near downtown redevelopment. There is no sin in
utilizing urban renewal for this purpose, the sin is in not recognizing
that this is the way the program is being operated. Without the urban
renewal program, or some similar form of federal aid, there would be very

little downtown redevelopment in American cities. It is only in the "boom" cities such as Austin that private enterprise can afford to undertake downtown redevelopment projects on its own. In spite of the mistakes of the past (again, administrative errors) such as the destruction of Boston's West End,[9] urban renewal can do much to enhance American cities—both physically and financially.

Once the true purpose of urban renewal is recognized, it would then be necessary to change the program so that it is no longer racist in nature. This can be done by converting renewal to a non-zero-sum game so that everyone will benefit from the renewal process. As it stands now, the city and the business community are the winners in the renewal process while the black community and other minorities lose (an admitted over-simplification). If the black and minority communities were also winners in the renewal process, urban renewal would no longer operate as a zero-sum game and the program would no longer be racist in nature.

Most of affluent America's relocation is economic. When John Doe is told by his employer, IBM, that he is being transferred from Austin, Texas, to New York City he may not be very happy about it, but in the vast majority of instances he will make the move. Why? For economic considerations. IBM might tell Mr. Doe that he will lose his job if he does not accept the move, or more likely, IBM might offer him a large salary raise if he moves to New York. In either case, Doe moves for economic reasons, either because he wants to keep his job or because he finds the offer of more money attractive enough so that he willingly moves to New York City.

Such should also be the case with urban renewal. Just as John Doe is offered an economic profit to change locations for the convenience

of his employer, so should urban renewal offer those displaced by renewal compensation for their forced relocations. This is already done in a limited manner for certain relocatees. An owner-occupant displaced by urban renewal may now be eligible for a replacement housing grant of up to $5,000, in addition to the negotiated (or court ordered) cost of the property to be acquired by the renewal agency. A renting family, on the other hand, is only eligible to receive an extra $41.66 per month for a two year period. What if the family unit is elderly, disabled, on welfare, or on some form of fixed income? After a two year period in improved housing they must face another move to a home that they can afford.

If the true purpose of urban renewal is recognized (again, not its purpose according to law, but its purpose according to application), a correction of the inequities makes good sense. If people and businesses are displaced for reasons of governmental profit (increased property tax revenues) or business profit, why shouldn't they benefit in the same manner as John Doe when he is relocated by his employer? Such a move would change the concept of urban renewal from a zero-sum to a non-zero-sum game, where the program works to everyone's advantage. Why should owner-occupants be primary beneficiaries while the renter is not? If a cash grant of some reasonable size were offered to families in renewal areas as an incentive to move, a large majority might relocate with much less reluctance than they do today.

Urban renewal will always have its victims--people living most of their lives in a familiar neighborhood who have no wish to move at any price, but this group will likely be a small minority. People live in slums because they have to, not because they want to. A substantial

grant acting as compensation for relocation should be as welcome to a family forced to relocate by urban renewal as is John Doe's move-associated pay raise. Since both Doe and the renewal area family are forced to move for someone's profit, both should benefit in a similar manner.

In final summary, this study has examined the patterns of use and some of the effects of federal urban renewal and public housing programs in some detail. The findings have pointed out the overwhelming importance of the city's physical and socioeconomic characteristics in determining grant use. A number of the effects of these grants were noted and certain myths concerning grant effects were dispelled. It was suggested that the weakness in the low-rent public housing program was in its administration rather than in some basic program failure. On the other hand, it was argued that urban renewal operates as a zero-sum game and embodies the characteristics of institutional racism in its present form. Renewal would thus require a fundamental change in concept to be of real benefit to all segments of urban society.

Notes

[1] Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1967), p. 4.

[2] Ibid., p. 5.

[3] Alan A. Altshuler, Community Control: The Black Demand for Participation in Large American Cities (Indianapolis: Pegasus, 1970), p. 193.

[4] "Nixon Says Crisis in Cities Is Over; Cities Dip in Crime," New York Times, March 5, 1973, pp. 1, 20.

[5] Harrison Salisbury, The Shook-Up Generation (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 74.

[6] In addition to the field studies, the author also draws on personal experience with the Oklahoma City Housing Authority, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

[7] See, for example, J. Allen Williams, Jr., "The Multi-family Housing Solution and Housing Type Preferences," Social Science Quarterly, LII (December, 1971), 543-559; and Oscar Newman, Defensible Space (New York: MacMillan, 1972).

[8] For a short discussion of 1968 changes in relocation benefits see J. Allen Williams, Jr., "The Effects of Urban Renewal Upon a Black Community: Evaluation and Recommendations," Social Science Quarterly, L (December, 1969), 709-712.

[9] Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Random House, 1961).

SOURCES CONSULTED

Books

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System. Vol. 1. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967.

_____. Measures of State and Local Fiscal Capacity and Tax Effort. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962.

_____. State and Local Finances--Significant Features 1967 to 1970. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967.

Alford, Robert R., and Harry M. Scoble. "Political and Socioeconomic Characteristics of American Cities." The Municipal Year Book 1965. Edited by Orin F. Nolting and David S. Arnold. Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1965. Pp. 85-97.

Alhambra Chamber of Commerce. Alhambra California Facts. Alhambra: Alhambra Chamber of Commerce, 1972.

_____. 1972-73 Community Factbook. Wittier, Calif.: Frank Clement, 1972.

Alhambra Industrial Directory. Alhambra: Alhambra Chamber of Commerce, 1972.

Alhambra Redevelopment Agency. Redevelopment Plan for the Industrial Redevelopment Project. Alhambra, Calif.: Alhambra Redevelopment Agency, May 26, 1969. (Mimeographed.)

Altshuler, Alan A. Community Control: The Black Demand for Participation in Large American Cities. Indianapolis: Pegasus, 1970.

Anderson, Martin. The Federal Bulldozer. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964.

Art. 12691-3, Section 3, Acts 1957, 55th Legislature, p. 704, Ch. 298. Vernon's Annotated Revised Civil Statutes of the State of Texas, Vol. 2B. Kansas City, Mo.: Vernon Law Book Company, 1963.

353

Austin Chamber of Commerce. Austin's Remarkable Growth Pattern. Austin: Austin Chamber of Commerce, 1972. (Mimeographed.)

_____. General Demographic Trends. Austin: Austin Chamber of Commerce, 1972. (Mimeographed.)

City of Austin. 1972-1973 Workable Program. Austin: City of Austin, 1972.

Banfield, Edward C., and James Q. Wilson. City Politics. New York: Random House, 1963.

The Beaumont Jaycees. Beaumont Community Attitude Survey. Beaumont: The Beaumont Jaycees, March 15, 1968. (Mimeographed.)

Bellush, Jewel, and Murray Hausknecht, eds. Urban Renewal: People, Politics and Planning. New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books edition, 1967.

Berry, Brian J. L., Sandra J. Parsons, and Rutherford H. Platt. The Impact of Urban Renewal on Small Business. Chicago: Center for Urban Studies, The University of Chicago, 1968.

Bonjean, Charles M. "Dimensions of Power Structures: Some Problems in Conceptualization and Measurement." Future Directions in Community Power Research: A Colloquim. Edited by Frederick M. Wirt. Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies/University of California, Berkeley, 1971. Pp. 19-42.

Brazer, Harvey E. City Expenditures in the United States. Occasional Paper No. 66. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1959.

Break, George F. Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the United States. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967.

Brickhouse, J. Earl. A Low Cost Housing Study of Beaumont, Texas. Beaumont: Beaumont Chamber of Commerce, April 25, 1972. (Mimeographed.)

Brown, W. H., Jr., and C. E. Gilbert. Planning Municipal Investment: A Case Study of Philadelphia. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1961.

"Buffalo." Encyclopedia Americana. 1970. Vol. IV.

Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority. Data on Occupied Projects Under Management, 1972. Buffalo: Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority, August, 1972. (Mimeographed.)

Butler, George D., ed. Recreation and Park Yearbook 1961. New York: National Recreation, 1961.

Campbell, Alan K., and Seymour Sacks. Metropolitan America. New York:
    Free Press, 1967.

Carmichael, Stokely, and Charles V. Hamilton. Black Power: The Politics
    of Liberation in America. New York: Vintage Books, Random House,
    1967.

Cartwright, Desmond S. "Ecological Variables." Sociological Methodology
    1969. Edited by Edgar F. Borgatta. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,
    1969. Pp. 155-218.

CCDC Newsletter. I. Beaumont: Central City Development Corporation,
    November, 1972.

Central City Development Corporation. Beaumont Central City Analysis:
    Advance Information Kit. Beaumont, Texas: Central City Develop-
    ment Corporation, 1972. (Mimeographed.)

Clark, Terry N., ed. Community Structure and Decision-Making: Compara-
    tive Analyses. San Francisco: Chandler, 1968.

Community Profile: Austin, Texas. Austin: Austin Chamber of Commerce,
    1972. (Mimeographed.)

Dahl, Robert A. Who Governs? New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.

Davies, James Clarence, III. Neighborhood Groups and Urban Renewal.
    New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.

Denzin, Norman K., ed. Sociological Methods. Chicago: Aldine, 1970.

Department of City Planning and Department of Urban Improvement. A
    Community Renewal Program: Syracuse, New York. Syracuse: City
    of Syracuse, New York, n.d.

Derthick, Martha. The Influence of Federal Grants: Public Assistance
    in Massachusetts. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
    1970.

Doxiadis, C. A. Urban Renewal and the Future of the American City.
    Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1966.

Duhl, Leonard J., ed. The Urban Condition. New York: Basic Books,
    1963.

Dutcher, Margaret J., and Robert Studer. History of Alhambra. Alhambra:
    Alhambra Chamber of Commerce, n.d.

Dye, Thomas R. Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes
    in the American States. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966.

Easton, David. The Political System, An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science. New York: Knopf, 1953.

_____. A Framework for Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965.

_____. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley, 1965.

Elazar, Daniel J. American Federalism: A View from the States. 2nd ed. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972.

_____. The American Partnership. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.

Eyestone, Robert, and Heinz Eulau. "City Councils and Policy Outcomes: Developmental Profiles." City Politics and Public Policy. Edited by James Q. Wilson. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968. Pp. 37-65.

Fabricant, Solomon. The Trend of Government Activity in the United States Since 1900. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952.

Filstead, William J., ed. Qualitative Methodology. Chicago: Markham, 1970.

Fisher, Robert M. Twenty Years of Public Housing. New York: Harper, 1959.

Forstall, Richard L. "A New Social and Economic Grouping of Cities." The Municipal Year Book 1970. Washington: International City Management Association, 1970. Pp. 102-159.

Fowler, Edmund P., and Robert L. Lineberry. "Patterns of Feedback in City Politics." Urban Political Analysis, A Systems Approach. Edited by David R. Morgan and Samuel A. Kirkpatrick. New York: Free Press, 1972. Pp. 361-367.

Frederickson, H. George, and Linda Schluter O'Leary. Power, Public Opinion and Policy in a Metropolitan Community: A Case Study of Syracuse, New York. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973.

Freedman, Leonard. Public Housing: The Politics of Poverty. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969.

Freeman, Linton C. Patterns of Local Community Leadership. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968.

Friedly, Philip H., Jerome Rothenberg, Jon E. Burkhardt, and James L. Hedrick. Benefit-Cost Applications in Urban Renewal: Summary of the Feasibility Study. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968.

Friedman, Lawrence M. *Government and Slum Housing: A Century of Frustration.* Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968.

Front Runner for the New Decade. Austin: Chamber of Commerce, January 24, 1972. (Mimeographed.)

Galbraith, John Kenneth. *The Affluent Society.* New York: New American Library, 1958.

Gans, Herbert. *The Urban Villagers.* Glencoe: Free Press, 1962.

Goodwin, Leonard. *Do the Poor Want to Work?* Washington: Brookings Institution, 1972.

Graves, W. Brooke. *American Intergovernmental Relations.* New York: Scribners, 1964.

Greer, Scott. *The Urbane View: Life and Politics in Metropolitan America.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.

_____. *Urban Renewal and American Cities.* Kansas City: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.

Groberg, Robert P. *Centralized Relocation: A New Municipal Service.* Washington: National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, 1969.

Grodzins, Morton. *The American System, A New View of Government in the United States.* Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966.

Gruen Associates. *Alhambra Industrial Redevelopment: A Design and Implementation Framework.* Los Angeles: Gruen Associates, August, 1970.

Victor Gruen Associates. *Alhambra 1985: A General Plan for Alhambra, California.* Los Angeles: Victor Gruen Associates, 1965.

Hadden, Jeffrey K., and Edgar F. Borgatta. *American Cities: Their Social Characteristics.* Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965.

Haldi, John. "The Role of Analysis." *Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis.* Edited by Harley H. Hinrichs and Graeme M. Taylor. Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear Publishing Company, 1969. Pp. 151-159.

Hannah, James. *Expenditures, Staff, and Salaries of Planning Agencies, 1971.* Chicago: American Society of Planning Officials, April 1971.

Harman, Harry H. *Modern Factor Analysis.* 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.

Hawkins, Brett W. *Politics and Urban Policies*. Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1971.

Hawley, Amos H. "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success." *Community Structure and Decision-Making: Comparative Analyses*. Edited by Terry N. Clark. San Francisco: Chandler, 1968. Pp. 393-405.

Hebert, F. Ted, and Richard D. Bingham. *Personal and Environmental Influences Upon the City Manager's Knowledge of Federal Grant-In-Aid Programs*. Norman, Okla.: Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma, 1972.

Hollingshead, August, and L. H. Rogler. "Attitudes Toward Slums and Public Housing in Puerto Rico." *The Urban Condition: People and Policy in the Metropolis*. Edited by Leonard J. Duhl. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963. Pp. 229-245.

Housing and Apartment Development: Austin, Texas. Austin: Chamber of Commerce, February 21, 1972. (Mimeographed.)

Housing Committee of the Erie and Niagra Counties Regional Planning Board. *Technical Report on Housing in the Erie-Niagara Region: First Year Study*. Grand Island, N.Y.: Erie and Niagara Counties Regional Planning Board, June, 1970.

Housing Committee of the League of Women Voters of Metropolitan Syracuse. *Housing In Onondaga County: Present Facts and Future Goals*. Syracuse: League of Women Voters, February, 1969.

International City Management Association. *The Municipal Year Book 1971*. Washington: International City Management Association, 1971.

Jacobs, Jane. *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. New York: Random House, 1961.

Kaplan, Harold. *Urban Renewal Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.

Keith, Nathaniel S., and Marcou, O'Leary and Associates, Inc. *Buffalo Community Renewal Program Extension for the City of Buffalo, New York*. Buffalo: City of Buffalo, New York, n.d.

John F. Kennedy Library. Vallejo, Calif.: Vallejo Public Library System, n.d.

Leach, Richard H. *American Federalism*. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1970.

Lindbloom, Carl G., and Morton Farrah. *The Citizen's Guide to Urban Renewal*. West Trenton, N.J.: Chandler-Davis, revised ed., 1968.

Lineberry, Robert L., and Ira Sharkansky. Urban Politics and Public Policy. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.

Lipsky, Michael. Protest in City Politics: Rent Strikes, Housing and the Power of the Poor. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970.

Living At Its Best. Austin: Chamber of Commerce, n.d.

Long, Norton. The Unwalled City. New York: Basic Books, 1972.

Lowe, Jeanne R. Cities in a Race With Time. New York: Random House, 1967.

Manvel, Allen D. "Land Use in 106 Large Cities." Three Land Research Studies. National Commission on Urban Problems. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968.

Margolis, Julias. The Analysis of Public Output. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1970.

Martin, Roscoe C., et al. Decisions in Syracuse. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961.

Maxwell, James A. Financing State and Local Governments. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1969.

McCall, George J., and J. L. Simmons, eds. Issues in Participation Observation: A Text and Reader. Reading: Addison Wesley, 1969.

Meltsner, Arnold J. The Politics of City Revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.

Merewitz, Leonard, and Stephen H. Sosnick. The Budget's New Clothes. Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1971.

Miner, Jerry. Social and Economic Factors in Spending for Public Education. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963.

Moore, William, Jr. The Vertical Ghetto: Everyday Life in an Urban Project. New York: Random House, 1969.

Morgan, David R. Handbook of State Policy Indicators. Norman, Okla.: Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma, 1971.

_____, and Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, eds. Urban Political Analysis, A Systems Approach. New York: Free Press, 1972.

Morris, Peter. "A Report on Urban Renewal in the United States." The Urban Condition: People and Policy in the Metropolis. Edited by Leonard J. Duhl. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1963. Pp. 113-123.

Morrison, Denton E., and Ramon E. Henkel, eds. The Significance Test
Controversy: A Reader. Chicago: Aldine, 1970.

Mushkin, Selma J., and John F. Cotton. Sharing Federal Funds for State
and Local Needs. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969.

National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials. Critical
Urban Housing Issues: 1967. Washington: National Association
of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, 1967.

Newman, Oscar. Defensible Space. New York: MacMillan, 1972.

Nolting, Orin F., and David S. Arnold, eds. The Municipal Year Book
1960. Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1960.

_____, eds. The Municipal Year Book 1961. Chicago:
International City Managers' Association, 1961.

Oakland Task Force. Federal Decision-Making and Impact in Urban Areas.
New York: Frederick Praeger, 1970.

Olson, David M. Nonpartisan Elections: A Case Analysis. Austin:
Institute of Public Affairs/University of Texas, 1965.

_____. "Austin: The Capital City." Urban Politics in the Southwest.
Edited by Leonard E. Goodall. Tempe, Arizona: Institute of
Public Administration, Arizona State University, 1967.

The President's Committee on Urban Housing. The Report of the
President's Committee on Urban Housing: A Decent Home.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968.

Rainwater, Lee. Behind Ghetto Walls: Black Family Life in a Federal
Slum. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970.

_____, and William L. Yancey. The Moynihan Report and the Politics
of Controversy. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967.

Rapkin, Chester, and William G. Grigsby. The Demand for Housing in
Racially Mixed Areas. Berkeley: University of California Press,
1960.

Redevelopment Agency of the City of Vallejo. Marina Vista. Vallejo,
Calif.: Gibson Publication, n.d.

_____. Urban Design for Marina Vista: A Redevelopment Project for
the Urban Renewal of Downtown Vallejo, California. Vallejo,
Calif.: Gibson Publications, n.d.

Rossi, Peter H., and Robert A. Dentler. The Politics of Urban Renewal.
New York: Free Press, 1961.

Rothenberg, Jerome. Economic Evaluation of Urban Renewal. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967.

Rummel, R. J. Applied Factor Analysis. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.

Salisbury, Harrison. The Shook-Up Generation. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958.

Sanford, Terry. Storm Over the States. New York: McGraw Hill, 1967.

Scammon, Richard M., ed. America Votes 7. Washington: Governmental Affairs Institute, 1968.

_____, ed. America Votes 8. Washington: Governmental Affairs Institute, 1970.

Schnore, Leo F. The Urban Scene. New York: The Free Press, 1965.

Schoenberger, Robert A., ed. The American Right Wing: Readings in Political Behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1969.

Segal, Morley, and A. Lee Fritschler. "Emerging Patterns of Intergovernmental Relations." The Municipal Year Book 1970. Washington: International City Management Association, 1970. Pp. 13-38.

Sharkansky, Ira. Spending in the American States. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968.

_____. The Politics of Taxing and Spending. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969.

Stahl, Frank. Reflections: A Summary of Urban Renewal Activities in Buffalo, New York 1971/1972. Buffalo: Department of Urban Renewal/Buffalo, New York, 1972.

Sundquist, James L., and David W. Davis. Making Federalism Work: A Study of Program Coordination at the Community Level. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1969.

Syracuse Governmental Research Bureau and Metropolitan Development Association. Profile of Central New York. Syracuse: Syracuse Governmental Research Bureau and Metropolitan Development Association, 1973.

Talbot, A. R. The Mayor's Game: Richard Lee of New Haven and the Politics of Change. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1970.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Banking and Currency. Basic Laws and Authorities on Housing and Urban Development. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969.

U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. County and City Data Book 1962. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962.

_____. New Housing Units Authorized by Local Building Permits, Annual Summary 1960-1961. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962.

_____. United States Census of Housing 1960. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962.

_____. Housing Authorized in Individual Permit Issuing Places. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963.

_____. Housing Authorized in Individual Permit-Issuing Places 1964. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964.

_____. Housing Authorized by Building Permits and Public Contracts 1966. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967.

_____. Housing Authorized by Building Permits and Public Contracts 1968. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970.

_____. City Government Finances in 1969-70. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971.

_____. Housing Authorized by Building Permits and Public Contracts 1970. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971.

_____. General Social and Economic Characteristics: California. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972.

_____. General Social and Economic Characteristics: New York. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972.

_____. General Social and Economic Characteristics: Texas. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972.

_____. General Social and Economic Characteristics: U.S. Summary. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972.

_____. Housing Characteristics for States, Cities, and Counties. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Consolidated Development Directory. Report S-11A. Washington: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1970.

_____. Urban Renewal Directory: As of December 31, 1970. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971.

U.S. Department of the Interior. Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. Recreation and Park Areas. Series AA, Report 604-615. Washington: Unpublished computer printout, April 15, 1971.

_____. Volunteer Recreation Leaders and Recreation and Park Areas. Series AA, Report 301-303 and 306. Washington: Unpublished computer printout, April 19, 1971.

U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity. Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970.

Vallejo Chamber of Commerce. Vallejo, California. Encino, Calif.: Windsor Publications, 1971.

_____. Fact Card No. 8. Vallejo: Vallejo Chamber of Commerce, n.d.

_____. Vallejo, California. Vallejo: Solano County Board of Supervisors, n.d.

Vallejo Planning Department. Neighborhood Analyses: Vallejo, California. Vallejo: City of Vallejo, California, 1966. (Mimeographed.)

_____. 1967 Special Census Release. Vallejo: City of Vallejo, California, 1968. (Mimeographed.)

Warren, Roland L., ed. Politics and the Ghettos. New York: Atherton, 1969.

Weaver, Robert C. The Urban Complex. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964.

Williams, Oliver P., and Charles R. Adrian. "Community Types and Policy Differences." City Politics and Public Policy. Edited by James Q. Wilson. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968. Pp. 17-36.

Wilson, James Q., ed. City Politics and Public Policy. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968.

Wolf, Eleanor Paperno, and Charles N. Lebeaux. Change and Renewal in an Urban Community. New York: Praeger, 1969.

Wolman, Harold. Politics of Federal Housing. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1971.

A Workable Program for Community Improvement: 1968 Progress Report for the Elimination and Prevention of Slums and Blight in Syracuse, New York. Syracuse: City of Syracuse, 1968.

Workable Program 1970/1972. Buffalo: City of Buffalo, 1969.

Wright, Deil S. Federal Grants-In-Aid: Perspectives and Alternatives. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1968.

Zisch, William E., Paul H. Douglas, Robert C. Weaver. The Urban
    Environment: How It Can Be Improved. New York: New York
    University Press, 1969.

Periodicals

Aiken, Michael, and Robert R. Alford. "Community Structure and Innova-
    tion: The Case of Public Housing." American Political Science
    Review, LXIV (September, 1970), 843-864.

_____. "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of
    Urban Renewal." American Sociological Review, XXXV (August,
    1970), 650-665.

Bahl, Roy W., Jr., and Robert J. Saunders. "Determinants of Changes in
    State and Local Government Expenditures." National Tax Journal,
    XVIII (March, 1965), 50-57.

_____. "Factors Associated with Variations in State and
    Local Government Spending." Journal of Finance, XXI (September,
    1966), 523-534.

Bellush, Jewel, and Murray Hausknecht. "Entrepreneurs and Urban Renewal:
    The New Men of Power." Journal of the American Institute of
    Planners, XXXII (September, 1966), 289-297.

Bishop, George A. "Stimulative Versus Substitutive Effects of State
    School Aid in New England." National Tax Journal, XVII (June,
    1964), 133-143.

Booms, Bernard H. "City Governmental Form and Public Expenditure Levels."
    National Tax Journal, XIX (June, 1966), 187-199.

Clark, Terry N. "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget
    Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities."
    American Sociological Review, XXXIII (August, 1968), 576-593.

Cole, Richard L. "The Urban Policy Process: A Note on Structural and
    Regional Influences." Social Science Quarterly, LII (December,
    1971), 646-655.

Converse, Philip E., et al. "Continuity and Change in American Politics:
    Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election." American Political Science
    Review, LXIII (December, 1969), 1083-1105.

Crew, Robert E., Jr. "Dimensions of Public Policy: A Factor Analysis
    of State Expenditures." Social Science Quarterly, L (September,
    1969), 381-388.

Dales, Sophie R. "Federal Grants to State and Local Governments, 1967-68." Social Security Bulletin. Vol. XXXII, No. 8. Washington: Government Printing Office, August, 1969, pp. 15-22, 54.

Davis, Otto A., and George H. Haines, Jr. "A Political Approach to a Theory of Public Expenditure: The Case of Municipalities." National Tax Journal, XIX (September, 1966), 259-275.

Dawson, Richard E., and James A. Robinson. "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States." Journal of Politics, XXV (May, 1963), 265-289.

Dye, Thomas R. "City-Suburban Social Distance and Public Policy." Social Forces, XLIV (September, 1965), 100-106.

_____. "Income Inequality and American State Politics." American Political Science Review, LXIII (March, 1969), 157-162.

Eulau, Heinz, and Robert Eyestone. "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis." American Political Science Review, LXII (March, 1968), 124-143.

Fisher, Glenn W. "Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures: A Preliminary Analysis." National Tax Journal, XIV (December, 1961), 349-355.

_____. "Interstate Variation in State and Local Expenditures." National Tax Journal, XVII (March, 1964), 57-75.

Fried, Marc, and Peggy Gleicher. "Some Sources of Residential Satisfaction in an Urban Slum." Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXVII (November, 1961), 305-315.

Fritschler, A. Lee, B. Douglas Harman, and Morley Segal. "Federal, State, Local Relationships." Urban Data Service, December, 1969.

Fritschler, A. Lee, and Morley Segal. "Intergovernmental Relations and Contemporary Political Science: Developing an Integrative Typology." Publius, I (Winter, 1972), 95-122.

_____, and John D. Norton. "Local Intergovernmental Coordinators." Urban Data Service. Washington: International City Management Association, August, 1970.

Gabler, L. R., and Joel I. Brest. "Interstate Variations in Per Capita Highway Expenditures." National Tax Journal, XX (March, 1967), 78-85.

Gans, Herbert J. "The Failure of Urban Renewal: A Critique and Some Proposals." Commentary, XXXIX (April, 1965), 29-37.

Gold, Ronald B. "Fiscal Capacities and Welfare Expenditures of States." National Tax Journal, XXII (December, 1969), 496-505.

Gramlich, Edward M. "A Clarification and a Correction." National Tax Journal, XXII (June, 1969), 286-290.

_____. "Alternative Federal Policies for Stimulating State and Local Expenditures: A Comparison of Their Effects." National Tax Journal, XXI (June, 1968), 119-129.

Harlow, Robert L. "Sharkansky on State Expenditures: A Comment." National Tax Journal, XXI (June, 1968), 215-216.

Hartman, Chester. "Social Values and Housing Orientations." Journal of Social Issues, XIX (April, 1963), 113-131.

_____. "The Housing of Relocated Families." Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXX (November, 1964), 266-282.

Hebert, F. Ted, and Richard D. Bingham. "The City Manager's Knowledge of Grants-In-Aid: Some Personal and Environmental Influences." Urban Affairs Quarterly, VII (March, 1972), 303-306.

Henderson, James M. "Local Government: A Social Welfare Analysis." Review of Economics and Statistics, L (May, 1968), 156-163.

Hofferbert, Richard I. "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States." American Political Science Review, LX (March, 1966), 73-82.

Horowitz, Ann R. "Simultaneous Equation Approach to the Problem of Explaining Interstate Differences in State and Local Government Expenditures." Southern Economic Journal, XXXIV (April, 1968), 459-476.

Johnson, Gerald W. "Research Notes on Political Correlates of Voter Participation: A Deviant Case Analysis." American Political Science Review, LXV (September, 1971), 768-776.

Jones, K., and W. Jones. "Toward a Typology of American Cities." Journal of Reproductive Medecine: Lying-In, X (August, 1970), 20.

Kaufman, Walter C., and Scott Greer. "Voting in a Metropolitan Community: An Application of Social Area Analysis." Social Forces, XXXVIII (March, 1960), 196-204.

Kurnow, Ernest. "Determinants of State and Local Expenditures Reexamined." National Tax Journal, XVI (September, 1963), 252-255.

Lineberry, Robert L., and Edmund P. Fowler. "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities." American Political Science Review, LXI (September, 1967), 701-716.

Masten, J. T., and K. E. Quindry. "A Note on City Expenditure Determinants." Land Economics, XLVI (February, 1970), 79-81.

Maxwell, James A. "Federal Grant Elasticity and Distortion." National Tax Journal, XXII (December, 1969), 550-551.

McIntyre, M. Charles. "Determinants of Expenditures for Public Higher Education." National Tax Journal, XXII (June, 1969), 262-272.

Morse, Elliott R. "Some Thoughts on the Determinants of State and Local Expenditures." National Tax Journal, XIX (March, 1966), 95-103.

Mushkin, Selma J. "PPB in Cities." Public Administration Review, XXIX (March/April, 1969), 167-178.

_____, and Robert F. Adams. "Emerging Patterns of Federalism." National Tax Journal, XIX (September, 1966), 225-247.

Nourse, Hugh O. "Redistribution of Income from Public Housing." National Tax Journal, XIX (March, 1966), 27-37.

Oates, Wallace E. "The Dual Impact of Federal Aid on State and Local Government Expenditures: A Comment." National Tax Journal, XXI (June, 1968), 220-223.

O'Brien, Thomas. "Grants-In-Aid: Some Further Answers." National Tax Journal, XXIV (March, 1971), 65-71.

Osman, Jack. "On the Use of Intergovernmental Aid as an Expenditure Determinant." National Tax Journal, XXI (December, 1968), 437-447.

_____. "The Dual Impact of Federal Aid on State and Local Government Expenditures." National Tax Journal, XIX (December, 1966), 362-373.

Pogue, Thomas F., and L. G. Sgontz. "The Effect of Grants-In-Aid on State-Local Spending." National Tax Journal, XXI (June, 1968), 190-199.

Rainwater, Lee. "Fear and the House-As-Haven in the Lower-Class." Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXXII (January, 1966), 23-30.

Reynolds, Harry W., Jr. "The Human Element in Urban Renewal." Public Welfare, XIX (April, 1961), 71-82.

Sacks, Seymour, and Robert Harris. "The Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures and Intergovernmental Flow of Funds." National Tax Journal, XVII (March, 1964), 75-85.

Schmandt, Henry V., and G. Ross Stephens. "Local Government Expenditure Patterns in the United States." Land Economics (November, 1963), 397-398.

Schmid, C. F. "Urban Crime Areas: Part I." American Sociological Review, XXV (August, 1960), 527-542.

_____. "Generalizations Concerning the Ecology of the American City." American Sociological Review, XV (April, 1950), 264-281.

_____, E. G. MacCannell, and M. D. Van Arsdol. "The Ecology of the American City: Further Comparison and Validation of Generalizations." American Sociological Review, XXIII (August, 1958), 392-401.

Sharkansky, Ira. "Economic and Political Correlates of State Government Expenditures: General Tendencies and Deviant Cases." Midwest Journal of Political Science, XI (May, 1967), 173-192.

_____. "Economic Development, Regionalism and State Political Systems." Midwest Journal of Political Science, XII (February, 1968), 41-61.

_____. "Government Expenditures and Public Service in the American States." American Political Science Review, LXI (December, 1967), 1066-1077.

_____. "Regional Patterns in the Expenditures of American States." Western Political Quarterly, XX (December, 1967), 955-971.

_____. "Some More Thoughts About the Determinants of Government Expenditures." National Tax Journal, XX (June, 1967), 171-179.

_____. "The Utility of Elazar's Political Culture." Polity, II (Fall, 1969), 66-83.

Smith, David L. "Federal Grant Elasticity and Distortion: A Reply." National Tax Journal, XXII (December, 1969), 552-553.

_____. "The Response of State and Local Governments to Federal Grants." National Tax Journal, XXI (September, 1968), 349-357.

Staples, J. H. "Urban Renewal: A Comparative Study of Twenty-Two Cities, 1950-1960." Western Political Quarterly, XXIII (June, 1970), 294-304.

Stephens, G. Ross, and Henry J. Schmandt. "Revenue Patterns of Local Governments." National Tax Journal, XV (December, 1962), 432-437.

Teeples, R. K. "A Model of a Matching Grant-In-Aid Program with External Tax Effects." National Tax Journal, XXII (December, 1969), 486-495.

Thurow, Lester. "The Theory of Grants-In-Aid." National Tax Journal, LXX (December, 1966), 373-377.

Tropman, John E. "Critical Dimensions of Community Structure: A Reexamination of the Hadden-Borgatta Findings." Urban Affairs Quarterly, V (December, 1969), 215-232.

Wilde, James A. "The Expenditure Effects of Grant-In-Aid Programs." National Tax Journal, XXI (September, 1968), 340-347.

_____. "Grants-In-Aid: The Analytics of Design and Response." National Tax Journal, XXIV (June, 1971), 143-155.

Williams, J. Allen, Jr. "The Effects of Urban Renewal Upon a Black Community: Evaluation and Recommendations." Social Science Quarterly, L (December, 1969), 704-712.

_____. "The Multifamily Housing Solution and Housing Type Preferences." Social Science Quarterly, LII (December, 1971), 543-559.

Wilson, James Q. "Planning and Politics: Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal." Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXIX (November, 1963), 242-249.

Wolfinger, Raymond E., and John Osgood Field. "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government." American Political Science Review, LX (June, 1966), 306-326.

Wright, Deil S. "The States and Intergovernmental Relations." Publius, I (Winter, 1972), 7-68.

Unpublished Materials

Amended Memorandum of Understanding. Austin: Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Austin, July 1, 1972. (Mimeographed.)

"Dates of Enactment of State Housing Authority Laws." Attachment to letter from Deborah Greenstein, Program Analyst, Housing Management Research Division, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., November 3, 1972.

"Dates of Enactment of State Urban Renewal Laws." Attachment to letter from Deborah Greenstein, Program Analyst, Housing Management

Research Division, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., November 3, 1972.

Denbow, Stefania, and Joseph Ohren. Housing in the Syracuse Community. Syracuse, N.Y.: March, 1972. (Mimeographed.)

Memorandum Opinion: Blackshear Residents Organization, et al. vs. Housing Authority of the City of Austin, et al. Civil Action No. A-70-CA-51. Austin: United States District Court, Western District of Texas, Austin Division, filed December 3, 1971. (Mimeographed.)

Ordinance No. 071-3546. City of Alhambra, California, December 7, 1971.

Ordinance No. 967-3383. City of Alhambra, California, October 10, 1967.

Ordinance No. 066-3334. City of Alhambra, California, August 2, 1966.

Ordinance No. 070-3480. City of Alhambra, California, July 7, 1970.

Ordinance No. 071-3512. City of Alhambra, California, April 6, 1971.

Rafuse, R. W., Jr. State and Local Fiscal Behavior Over the Postwar Cycles. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, Department of Economics, 1963.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. "Execution Project Number by State." Transmittal Notice MC-24, February, 1970. (Mimeographed.)

Williams, J. Allen, Jr. Blackshear Diagnostic Survey: A Description and Problem Analysis. Austin, Texas: June, 1968. (Mimeographed.)

Newspapers

Austin American, December 4, 6, 1959; March 23, April 7, 1969.

Austin American-Statesman, December 6, 1959; March 26, 1961; March 31, 1963; March 12, 1967; August 27, 1972.

Austin Statesman, December 1, 3, 4, 1959.

Beaumont Enterprise, April 3, May 3, June 1-4, 6-12, 1960; November 1, 3, 5, 8-10, 12, 14, 17, 19, 1967; May 10, 12, 15, 1968.

Buffalo Courier Express, November 1, 5, 8, 1961; June 2, 6, November 2, 3, 1963; November 4, 1964; October 19, 1965; November 6, 1968; November 5, 1969.

Buffalo Evening News, April 19, August 18, 1965; December 2, 1968.

Mossberg, Walter S. "A Blue-Collar Town Fears Urban Renewal Perils Its Way of Life." Wall Street Journal, November 2, 1970, pp. 1, 13.

"Nixon Says Crisis in Cities Is Over; Cities Dip in Crime." New York Times, March 5, 1973, pp. 1, 20.

Post-Advocate (Alhambra, California), November 2, 4, 1964; October 29, November 8, 1968.

Sunday Enterprise (Beaumont), November 19, 1967.

Sunday Times-Herald (Vallejo), April 4, 1965.

Syracuse Herald-American, January 2, 1966.

Syracuse Herald-Journal, April 23, 1959; May 31, 1965; July 16, 1968.

Syracuse Post-Standard, May 17, 29, 1956; July 30, November 2, 1961; November 2, 1962; January 12, April 15, November 4, 1964; August 12, December 9, 1966; November 6, 1968; November 1, 5, 1969.

Vallejo Times Herald, April 5, 1961; April 1, 2, 1963; November 4, 1964; April 20, 1969.

Interviews

Personal interview with local administrator (A), January 8, 1973, Alhambra, California.

Personal interview with local administrator (B), January 9, 1973, Alhambra, California.

Personal interview with local administrator (C), January 8, 1973, Alhambra, California.

Personal interview with local administrator (D), January 8, 1973, Alhambra, California.

Personal interview with former elected official (A), January 12, 1973, Alhambra, California.

Personal interview with former elected official (B), January 11, 1973, Alhambra, California.

Personal interview with local administrator (A), November 28, 1972, Austin, Texas.

Personal interview with local administrator (B), December 7, 1972, Austin, Texas.

Personal interview with local administrator (C), November 30, 1972, Austin, Texas.

Personal interview with local administrator (D), November 28, 1972, Austin, Texas.

Personal interview with local administrator (E), November 29, 1972, Austin, Texas.

Personal interview with former elected official (A), November 30, 1972, Austin, Texas.

Personal interview with former elected official (B), November 28, 1972, Austin, Texas.

Telephone interview with former Austin local elite (A), December 12, 1972, Norman, Oklahoma.

Telephone interview with local elite (B), November 29, 1972, Austin, Texas.

Personal interview with local administrator (A), December 5, 1972, Beaumont, Texas.

Personal interview with local administrator (B), December 5, 1972, Beaumont, Texas.

Telephone interview with former elected official (A), December 5, 1972, Beaumont Texas.

Personal interview with local elite (A), December 6, 1972, Beaumont, Texas.

Personal interview with local administrator (A), February 22, 1973, Buffalo, New York.

Personal interview with local elite (A), February 22, 1973, Buffalo, New York.

Personal interview with local administrator (A), March 1, 1973, Syracuse, New York.

Personal interview with local administrator (B), March 1, 1973, Syracuse, New York.

Personal interview with former local administrator (C), March 1, 1973, Syracuse, New York.

Personal interview with local elite (A), February 28, 1973, Syracuse, New York.

Personal interview with former Vallejo local administrator (A), January 18, 1973, San Francisco, California.

Personal interview with local administrator (B), January 16, 1973, Vallejo, California.

Personal interview with local administrator (C), January 19, 1973, Vallejo, California.

Telephone interview with Solano County, California, administrator (D), January 17, 1973, Vallejo, California.

Personal interview with local administrator (E), January 19, 1973, Vallejo, California.

Personal interview with elected official (A), January 19, 1973, Vallejo, California.

APPENDIX A*

City	Central City	Urban Density	Status, Wealth, and Education	Size/ Manufac- turing
BIRMINGHAM	0011910	-005761	0006931	0003951
GADSDEN	0007698	-011337	0014843	0000037
HUNTSVILLE	0004377	-011381	-011351	0001387
MOBILE	0009765	-011300	0002109	0001637
MONTGOMERY	0015246	-005775	-005559	0000495
TUSCALOOSA	0028223	0000047	-012647	-007333
PHOENIX	-000475	-012789	-004293	0004572
TUCSON	0001857	-011885	-005015	0000900
FORT SMITH	0005195	-013626	0006297	0000071
LITTLE ROCK	0005989	-003315	-008470	-000944
NORTH LITTLE ROCK	0011943	-007245	0000797	-001669
ALAMEDA	0014202	0007362	-015362	-006690
ALHAMBRA	-010937	0001340	-005353	-001091
ANAHEIM	-007648	-010376	-010319	0002453
BAKERSFIELD	-002055	-010131	-003253	0001014
BERKELEY	0005941	0014715	-029202	-002750
BURBANK	-014515	0000716	-003856	0001015
COMPTON	-000897	-009215	0006449	0003929
DOWNEY	-015362	-003590	-008117	0000479
FRESNO	-001393	-008024	-001318	0000536
FULLERTON	-010735	-009770	-015109	0000094
GARDEN GROVE	-009034	-015367	-007569	0002771
GLENDALE	-009374	0004383	-011842	-000414
HAYWARD	-010455	-015387	0000079	0001915
INGLEWOOD	-009217	0009015	-010741	-000641
LAKEWOOD	-020462	-011297	0002567	0001892
LONG BEACH	0001097	0003865	-008958	0000049
LOS ANGELES	-001968	0001532	-007199	0039778
NORWALK	-012662	-012144	0007854	0000483
OAKLAND	0001744	0004632	0001209	0003510
PALO ALTO	-010937	-000022	-032434	-001041
PASADENA	-001933	0002509	-013034	-000872
POMONA	-004583	-010771	-002078	0000472
RICHMOND	-005130	-004175	0006495	0000394
RIVERSIDE	-003216	-009086	-010213	-000003
SACRAMENTO	-002623	0000037	-007258	0000095
SAN BERNARDINO	-003826	-009118	-000636	0000684
SAN DIEGO	0007483	-002695	-014324	0002423
SAN FRANCISCO	0002598	0020629	-009349	0006844
SAN JOSE	-001795	-006555	-008377	0001713
SAN LEANDRO	-017216	-006597	0001619	0000313
SAN MATEO	-012970	0002879	-014335	-000544
SANTA ANA	-003142	-010937	-000540	0000895
SANTA BARBARA	-001219	-002617	-009258	-002423
SANTA CLARA	-004560	-007625	-011244	-000944
SANTA MONICA	0001976	0015266	-013079	-001263
SOUTH GATE	-010095	0001910	0003039	0000097
STOCKTON	0004493	-000190	0002600	-003252
SUNNYVALE	-007536	-011450	-013774	0002062
TORRANCE	-015600	-011651	-005404	0002707
VALLEJO	-001147	-004534	0001092	-000393
WEST COVINA	-020714	-013952	-011238	0001943
COLORADO SPRINGS	0005549	-007385	-007310	-000907
DENVER	0000825	-000373	-009358	0003901

*999999 indicates missing data.

City	Central City	Urban Density	Status, Wealth, and Education	Size/ Manufac- turing
PUEBLO	0999999	CSS9995	0999999	0999999
BRIDGEPORT	-000739	0015090	0011190	-003290
HARTFORD	0005914	CC20199	0002011	-004573
MERIDEN	-009671	CC03916	0010429	-004730
NEW BRITAIN	-007424	0012067	0008750	-005550
NEW HAVEN	0006984	C016945	0001132	-005034
NORWALK	-011098	C002793	-002814	-002579
STAMFORD	-010839	0007395	-007199	-003207
WATERBURY	-008235	CCC8894	0011472	-004588
WILMINGTON	0001734	0002684	0009876	-000408
WASHINGTON	0015690	0016578	-016551	0006033
FORT LAUDERDALE	0006039	-C03257	-009181	0000021
HIALEAH	-009202	-011978	0002667	0001005
JACKSONVILLE	0017493	-C02186	0006471	0000790
MIAMI	0013549	C008751	0001002	0001222
MIAMI BEACH	0011346	0020008	-011052	-005131
ORLANDO	0012451	-005891	-009101	0000124
PENSACOLA	0009913	-009008	0003195	-000433
ST. PETERSBURG	0006856	-015253	0001395	0000803
TAMPA	0007607	-C08551	0005043	0001765
WEST PALM BEACH	0008737	-003124	-002262	-001349
ALBANY	0019831	-C09154	-001055	-000258
ATLANTA	0014330	C001124	-003571	0004316
AUGUSTA	0024245	-003412	0008051	-001935
COLUMBUS	0016766	-0C6195	0005689	0000495
MACON	0022425	CCC0917	0004476	-002361
SAVANNAH	0015374	-005168	0001727	-000013
HONOLULU	0999999	CSS9999	0999999	0999999
AURORA	-009503	-001920	0000444	-001929
BERWYN	-018797	0014807	-001452	-002552
CHICAGO	0000659	CC12803	00C1527	0055948
CICERO	-015212	CC14900	0006137	-0C3440
DECATUR	-001982	-C08763	0001917	-000122
EAST ST. LOUIS	0013560	-005514	0019905	0000306
EVANSTON	-003315	0017875	-034262	-004035
JOLIET	-005537	0001213	-000196	-003550
OAK PARK	-016743	CC14508	-022073	-002460
PEORIA	0000606	-002997	0002655	-001215
ROCKFORD	-004766	-0C2260	C000023	-000629
ROCK ISLAND	-004570	-003017	0001665	-002257
SKOKIE	-024815	-000196	-021090	0001059
SPRINGFIELD	-001229	-CC2571	0000620	-001924
WAUKEGAN	-007665	0001164	-004912	-001805
EAST CHICAGO	0005046	C010559	0013146	-005490
EVANSVILLE	0000931	-009337	00C8904	-000042
FORT WAYNE	-005394	-007129	-001411	0000211
GARY	0001115	-001054	0008594	-000474
HAMMOND	-011539	-002374	0006091	-0C1840
INDIANAPOLIS	0002592	-004283	0001085	0005926
MUNCIE	0003770	-0C7141	00C2984	-001519
SOUTH BEND	-010133	-005423	00C3038	-000012
TERRE HAUTE	0002305	-011579	0006685	-001839
CEDAR RAPIDS	-006003	-0C7344	-003728	-001246
COUNCIL BLUFFS	-005370	-008730	0006638	-001945

City	Central City	Urban Density	Status, Wealth, and Education	Size/ Manufac- turing
WINSTON-SALEM	0012653	-003690	-003086	-000362
AKRON	-005044	-005110	0004546	0002116
CANTON	-002030	-004004	0014522	-000279
CINCINNATI	0999999	0999999	0999999	0999999
CLEVELAND	0009551	0006699	0010327	0013413
CLEVELAND HEIGHTS	-010733	0004061	-019315	-001559
COLUMBUS	0007161	-002357	-003252	0003743
DAYTON	0007020	-002330	0004221	0002473
EUCLID	-018600	-000729	-003062	-000974
HAMILTON	-002950	-006682	0008748	-000014
KETTERING	-01696C	-007358	-015328	0000983
LAKEWOOD	-01172P	0010377	-011914	-002257
LIMA	0000141	-007054	0007348	-000884
LORAIN	-009041	-006475	0013425	-001833
PARMA	-021762	-007119	-000634	-000721
SPRINGFIELD	0003105	-006758	0006147	-000654
TOLEDO	-004248	-002743	0008724	0001709
WARREN	-006588	-003726	0006689	-001015
YOUNGSTOWN	-004517	-003796	0013991	-000337
LAWTON	0010652	-012496	-003571	0001092
OKLAHOMA CITY	0003515	-009613	-005118	0002225
TULSA	-000777	-007295	-004755	0003193
EUGENE	0005617	-004335	-018477	-003186
PORTLAND	0999999	0999999	0999999	0999999
ALLENTOWN	-007526	0002286	0006177	-002489
ALTOONA	-002559	-006630	0016279	-002262
BETHLEHEM	-006678	-001136	0004395	-003628
CHESTER	0005567	0002646	0017910	-000068
ERIE	-004263	-001413	0011361	-000948
HARRISBURG	0003772	0002135	0001370	-000918
JOHNSTOWN	0003574	0007979	0018627	-003819
LANCASTER	-001044	-001893	0008692	-002339
PHILADELPHIA	-002689	0003705	0009575	0031949
PITTSBURGH	0000996	0005466	0010945	0005161
READING	-003499	0003894	0015067	-001827
SCRANTON	-003211	0003414	0014305	-004157
WILKES-BARRE	-007700	0003894	0015314	-001281
YORK	0001219	0000593	0014421	-001101
CRANSTON	-009944	0002293	0001220	-005922
PAWTUCKET	0999999	0999999	0999999	0999999
PROVIDENCE	0005132	0016120	0008420	-002995
WARWICK	-012353	0001808	0001145	-003003
CHARLESTON	0036022	0009958	-000577	-004766
COLUMBIA	0022950	0002534	-012746	-004667
GREENVILLE	0016306	-003568	-008397	-007449
SIOUX FALLS	-007756	-008204	-002766	-002266
CHATTANOOGA	0999999	0999999	0999999	0999999
KNOXVILLE	0015266	-005124	0007187	-001493
MEMPHIS	0010498	-008053	0002511	0005950
NASHVILLE	0025911	0000783	0005479	-001572
ABILENE	0010022	-011793	-010628	-001403
AMARILLO	0005738	-005486	-011104	-000956
AUSTIN	0012496	-006581	-013573	-002295
BEAUMONT	0006897	-008963	0001099	0000198

City	Central City	Urban Density	Status, Wealth, and Education	Size/Manufacturing
BLOOMINGTON	-013653	-015218	-008488	0003039
DULUTH	-004471	-004677	0005752	-003076
MINNEAPOLIS	-001045	0005896	-004595	0003095
ST. PAUL	-005847	0000644	0000797	0000035
JACKSON	0011448	-007718	-007372	0000925
INDEPENDENCE	-008869	0008921	0001008	0000007
KANSAS CITY	0004698	-001219	-002696	0004742
ST. JOSEPH	0001838	0006584	0006584	-003269
ST. LOUIS	0011791	0000103	0006646	0009872
SPRINGFIELD	0007499	-010953	-002785	-001693
UNIVERSITY CITY	-016333	-013082	-016634	-002828
BILLINGS	-001587	-005340	-006202	-000553
GREAT FALLS	0000741	-006294	-002036	-001399
LINCOLN	0003458	-003646	-011128	-002360
OMAHA	-002416	-003160	-003924	0001399
LAS VEGAS	-001301	-000559	-009407	0001161
PENN	-000672	0002513	-012901	0001174
MANCHESTER	-003428	0006703	0009405	-001326
ATLANTIC CITY	0014735	0006564	0015612	-006290
BAYONNE	-006649	0022304	0007050	-003563
BLOOMFIELD	-014668	0014420	-001793	-006560
CAMDEN	-007855	0001234	0016685	-003901
CLIFTON	-017246	0011843	0005244	0000125
EAST ORANGE	0002693	0027165	-010305	-003605
ELIZABETH	-002660	0018865	0005070	-003339
IRVINGTON	-005663	0027500	0004256	-004644
JERSEY CITY	0001687	0027242	0010099	-004274
NEWARK	0011866	0023396	0011624	-001558
PASSAIC	0000637	0027059	0010808	0003969
PATERSON	0003667	0021457	0014227	-005711
TRENTON	0000722	0009434	0008884	-002251
UNION CITY	0000691	0028416	0012269	-001768
ALBUQUERQUE	-007015	-011901	-011920	-002841
ALBANY	0046660	0012448	-002557	0002569
BINGHAMTON	-001698	0006159	0006899	-005129
BUFFALO	0001318	0012042	0011353	-005722
MOUNT VERNON	-002722	0027133	-003548	0003594
NEW ROCHELLE	-000928	0018984	-016594	-003614
NEW YORK CITY	-000922	0020452	0000575	-004694
NIAGARA FALLS	-007192	0004636	0010237	0144872
ROCHESTER	-007855	0007475	0006407	-002328
ROME	-003400	0007475	-003316	-001180
SCHENECTADY	-033320	0002464	-033316	-003165
SYRACUSE	0000779	0009269	-002856	-002790
TROY	0006701	0009269	0005122	-009197
UTICA	0009193	0013019	0008540	-005617
WHITE PLAINS	-004999	0009861	-017786	-005945
YONKERS	-009185	0021226	-007874	-003811
ASHEVILLE	0010766	-005635	-002075	-007033
CHARLOTTE	0007855	0004636	-007163	0001720
DURHAM	0019317	-005662	-003316	-003165
GREENSBORO	0007908	-006590	-009467	-000402
HIGH POINT	0007404	-006006	0007697	-001079
RALEIGH	0016371	0001657	-019467	-004198

City	Central City	Urban Density	Status, Wealth, and Education	Size/ Manufac- turing
DAVENPORT	-003702	-005762	0001139	-002821
DES MOINES	-002503	-007752	-004428	0000381
DUBUQUE	-001011	-005059	0000046	-005111
SIOUX CITY	-002350	-000082	0001009	-007324
WATERLOO	-006568	-012098	0004000	0000046
KANSAS CITY	0001548	-005067	0012006	-000929
TOPEKA	0001713	-008455	-007257	-000874
WICHITA	-001144	-008541	-003655	0002800
COVINGTON	0003567	0005024	0017452	-003070
LEXINGTON	0027537	0001030	-002879	-004770
LOUISVILLE	0059884	-002821	0009870	0003684
BATON ROUGE	0006919	-007149	-004514	0000642
LAKE CHARLES	0006021	-011280	0000980	0000794
MONROE	0020956	-010199	0004596	-000506
NEW ORLEANS	0015316	0002479	0004450	0003655
SHREVEPORT	0010300	-007224	-000778	0001600
PORTLAND	0002085	0003884	0001512	-005076
BALTIMORE	0006914	0002483	-000590	0013009
BOSTON	-004404	0004998	0006993	0004779
BROCKTON	0011816	0020246	-015861	-005433
CAMBRIDGE	-003529	0004632	0007811	-007984
CHICOPEE	0004288	0014705	0019154	-006053
FALL RIVER	-001092	0011646	0009000	-007918
HOLYOKE	0000366	0017415	0013222	-007096
LAWRENCE	0000366	0017415	0013222	-007503
LOWELL	0003079	0008768	0012635	-005269
LYNN	-005272	0010121	0007951	-004746
MALDEN	-007803	0014772	0006706	-005512
MEDFORD	-013790	0012343	0002106	-005991
NEW BEDFORD	0007889	0012114	0020029	-006514
NEWTON	-019410	0007929	-070822	-004086
PITTSFIELD	-007406	0000393	0000550	-004041
QUINCY	-017591	0007313	0002465	-004408
SOMERVILLE	0026549	0026549	0007464	-005161
SPRINGFIELD	-007143	0005381	0005925	-002622
WALTHAM	-005054	0008768	-004613	-007632
WORCESTER	-000990	0010044	0002890	-005370
ANN ARBOR	0013578	0011378	-046391	-007510
BAY CITY	-008558	-007132	0016593	-002241
DEARBORN	-022306	0000419	-000630	-001415
DETROIT	-002276	0002905	0012235	0022670
FLINT	-006025	-006748	0008445	0001431
GRAND RAPIDS	-004632	-003549	0006198	0000417
JACKSON	-004111	-007128	0007465	-001279
KALAMAZOO	0005424	-002621	-008479	-005217
LANSING	-007094	-007134	0000157	-004454
LINCOLN PARK	-027736	-008029	0015169	-000105
LIVONIA	-021378	-021403	-001345	0001375
PONTIAC	-000148	-024600	0009854	-002197
ROSEVILLE	-018202	-010708	0016611	-000781
ROYAL OAK	-020426	-001608	-005525	-000723
SAGINAW	-004014	-006187	0010351	-000448
ST. CLAIR SHORES	-018094	-007555	-000941	0000826
WARREN	0999999	0999999	0999999	0999999

City	Central City	Urban Density	Status, Wealth, and Education	Size/ Manufacturing
CORPUS CHRISTI	0002583	-011264	0003807	0000552
DALLAS	0002148	-007009	-006919	0009132
EL PASO	0004085	-007502	0000961	-000242
FORT WORTH	0004088	-009145	-002298	0003530
GALVESTON	0014306	0000924	0003963	-002879
HOUSTON	0002405	-007609	-003173	0011631
LAREDO	0014773	-009003	0028754	-005238
LUBBOCK	0006650	-012779	-009394	0000549
MIDLAND	0001214	-012594	-019039	0002384
ODESSA	0001935	-013429	-003608	0002652
PASADENA	-010797	-015778	-001930	0001309
PORT ARTHUR	0005068	-009346	0012418	-000048
SAN ANGELO	0005965	-014181	0001358	-001716
SAN ANTONIO	0004641	-010473	0007473	0003531
TYLER	0006211	-010544	-005780	0000540
WACO	0012334	-008943	-002525	-001634
WICHITA FALLS	0011423	-008552	-009152	-002093
OGDEN	-004437	-009330	0000490	-001741
SALT LAKE CITY	-002701	-002751	-004815	-001116
ALEXANDRIA	0002410	0011497	-021696	-001349
HAMPTON	0007130	-004495	-003491	-002488
LYNCHBURG	0007515	-004317	-000851	-002629
NEWPORT NEWS	0013702	-002992	-005156	-001947
NORFOLK	0022396	0000344	-009544	-001931
PORTSMOUTH	0018337	-000990	0002354	-002017
RICHMOND	0013418	0002490	-001526	0000617
ROANOKE	0003945	-005905	0002506	-000193
SEATTLE	-004026	0002301	-006647	0004831
SPOKANE	-003095	-007873	0001129	-000082
TACOMA	-004341	-007580	0006494	-000407
CHARLESTON	0002474	-001818	-006290	-001343
HUNTINGTON	0005167	-002723	-000377	-001558
WHEELING	0000804	0001204	0009337	-003385
GREEN BAY	-006258	-007363	0006389	-002257
KENOSHA	-011711	-000031	0007197	-002727
MADISON	0004527	0002825	-023554	-004731
MILWAUKEE	-003567	0005653	0004524	0007214
RACINE	-010094	-001012	0005159	-001496
WAUWATOSA	-015699	0003174	-019996	-004849
WEST ALLIS	-015391	-001609	0005454	-001919

APPENDIX B*

City	Commuting/ Growth	Local Culture
BIRMINGHAM	-005657	-017408
GADSDEN	-000526	-026726
HUNTSVILLE	0004468	-021771
MOBILE	-004672	-024670
MONTGOMERY	-001580	-025120
TUSCALOOSA	-003047	-028946
PHOENIX	0005709	0003033
TUCSON	0008956	0001961
FORT SMITH	-000552	-009872
LITTLE ROCK	-005405	-010693
NORTH LITTLE ROCK	-003046	-017898
ALAMEDA	0009217	-002290
ALHAMBRA	-007792	0010977
ANAHEIM	0020928	0008566
BAKERSFIELD	-001772	-002097
BERKELEY	0006490	0001021
BURBANK	-004025	0999999
COMPTON	0003983	0026436
DOWNEY	-006043	0001360
FRESNO	0000545	0001105
FULLERTON	0008127	0014514
GARDEN GROVE	0017192	0009755
GLENDALE	-005550	0003144
HAYWARD	0010580	0011360
INGLEWOOD	-001531	0999999
LAKEWOOD	-005375	0999999
LONG BEACH	0000971	0007396
LOS ANGELES	-001853	0004746
NORWALK	0001484	0007308
OAKLAND	0003438	0003654
PALO ALTO	0005255	0002446
PASADENA	-006247	0004387
POMONA	0006505	0039447
RICHMOND	0015445	0014076
RIVERSIDE	0005367	0003492
SACRAMENTO	-001260	0002749
SAN BERNARDINO	0001791	0008180
SAN DIEGO	0007823	0005631
SAN FRANCISCO	0002561	0004825
SAN JOSE	0011369	0006736
SAN LEANDRO	-002619	0007336
SAN MATEO	0008558	0000945
SANTA ANA	0006786	0012954
SANTA BARBARA	0000330	0004770
SANTA CLARA	0014706	0007072
SANTA MONICA	0004010	0000856
SOUTH GATE	-002480	0999999
STOCKTON	-000276	0002893
SUNNYVALE	0022706	0009725
TORRANCE	-000216	0016825
VALLEJO	0007287	-004810
WEST COVINA	0000705	0012641
COLORADO SPRINGS	0005068	0002304
DENVER	0000630	0003463

*999999 indicates missing data.

City	Commuting/ Growth	Local Culture
PUEBLO	0999999	-006279
BRIDGEPORT	-001907	0009026
HARTFORD	-001213	0009678
MERIDEN	0000367	-000450
NEW BRITAIN	-004537	0000705
NEW HAVEN	-002934	0009433
NORWALK	-006933	0005970
STAMFORD	-006445	0006923
WATERBURY	-005126	0001595
WILMINGTON	-004414	0012825
WASHINGTON	0002141	0004262
FORT LAUDERDALE	0006301	-009564
HIALEAH	0004227	-002943
JACKSONVILLE	-003696	0999999
MIAMI	0005521	-006132
MIAMI BEACH	0011670	-007107
ORLANDO	0006225	0000213
PENSACOLA	-003785	-019953
ST. PETERSBURG	0005227	0000089
TAMPA	0002529	-009474
WEST PALM BEACH	-000538	-004260
ALBANY	0002524	-015033
ATLANTA	-001654	0004996
AUGUSTA	-002774	-003557
COLUMBUS	0008424	-015449
MACON	-002753	-019562
SAVANNAH	-003263	-003804
HONOLULU	0999999	-009007
AURORA	-002333	0009422
BERWYN	-009325	0999999
CHICAGO	-006105	0005735
CICERO	-008065	0999999
DECATUR	-004774	0000354
EAST ST. LOUIS	0009079	0011934
EVANSTON	-009461	0002960
JOLIET	-004398	0005200
OAK PARK	-014946	0999999
PEORIA	-005628	0001743
ROCKFORD	-004968	0009520
ROCK ISLAND	-002828	0006626
SKOKIE	-011312	-003658
SPRINGFIELD	-007119	0001008
WAUKEGAN	-002892	0009316
EAST CHICAGO	-002685	-003126
EVANSVILLE	-004331	-000751
FORT WAYNE	-007413	0006443
GARY	-005108	0004661
HAMMOND	-002857	0001534
INDIANAPOLIS	-005213	-002974
MUNCIE	-001717	-001517
SOUTH BEND	-008514	0002271
TERRE HAUTE	-006504	-001457
CEDAR RAPIDS	-006510	0005243
COUNCIL BLUFFS	0010384	0002725

City	Commuting/ Growth	Local Culture
DAVENPORT	-000165	0006630
DES MOINES	-008037	-000345
DUBUCUE	-009871	0999999
SIOUX CITY	-007214	0000732
WATERLOO	-005426	0003267
KANSAS CITY	0007609	-009864
TOPEKA	-004384	0001238
WICHITA	-002772	0002896
COVINGTON	0016055	-004672
LEXINGTON	0003585	-010556
LOUISVILLE	-004067	0001113
BATON ROUGE	-004798	-019120
LAKE CHARLES	0001666	-010114
MONROE	-002458	-020394
NEW ORLEANS	-004323	-006995
SHREVEPORT	-002857	-015213
PORTLAND	-004564	-002035
BALTIMORE	-000085	0001336
BOSTON	0001855	-000537
BROCKTON	0003787	0000353
CAMBRIDGE	0009252	-000717
CHICOPEE	0000520	0001477
FALL RIVER	-003121	-005992
HOLYOKE	-004292	0002667
LAWRENCE	-003613	-001444
LOWELL	-005161	-004044
LYNN	-001363	-000770
MALDEN	0006425	-001070
MEDFORD	0005592	-001916
NEW BEDFORD	-003977	-002833
NEWTON	0000121	0000715
PITTSFIELD	-010565	-003455
QUINCY	0009208	0999999
SOMERVILLE	0011959	-001664
SPRINGFIELD	-004402	0000488
WALTHAM	-003598	0999999
WORCESTER	-009720	0002778
ANN ARBOR	0001245	0000717
BAY CITY	-002701	0002674
DEARBORN	-012929	0999999
DETROIT	-001110	0002828
FLINT	-005681	0004416
GRAND RAPIDS	-006036	0005994
JACKSON	-005027	0005933
KALAMAZOO	-003503	0005130
LANSING	-007104	0004362
LINCOLN PARK	-007294	0999999
LIVONIA	-003405	0999999
PONTIAC	-002531	0007795
ROSEVILLE	0019599	-010525
ROYAL OAK	0010415	0999999
SAGINAW	-005323	0006717
ST. CLAIR SHORES	0031226	0999999
WARREN	0999999	0999999

City	Commuting/Growth	Local Culture
BLOOMINGTON	0002589	0999999
DULUTH	-004543	-003440
MINNEAPOLIS	-004111	0003832
ST. PAUL	-004969	-001661
JACKSON	-002948	-017069
INDEPENDENCE	-004195	-005313
KANSAS CITY	-000279	-000097
ST. JOSEPH	-006483	0000952
ST. LOUIS	-000938	0002013
SPRINGFIELD	-000590	-001537
UNIVERSITY CITY	0015228	0999999
BILLINGS	0002882	0008470
GREAT FALLS	0001957	0000872
LINCOLN	-002053	0002771
OMAHA	-005317	0000754
LAS VEGAS	0010655	-008119
RENO	0006052	0003063
MANCHESTER	-005956	0999999
ATLANTIC CITY	0002525	0004086
BAYONNE	0001569	-001350
BLOOMFIELD	-000600	-003163
CAMDEN	0002211	0010004
CLIFTON	0008917	0999999
EAST ORANGE	0005505	0021897
ELIZABETH	0004004	0004045
IRVINGTON	0005293	0999999
JERSEY CITY	0005911	0003491
NEWARK	0007723	0014345
PASSAIC	0010225	0010597
PATERSON	0008000	0011459
TRENTON	-000651	0007745
UNION CITY	0016218	0999999
ALBUQUERQUE	0003127	0004741
ALBANY	-005008	0001291
BINGHAMTON	-007824	0002642
BUFFALO	-002014	-000430
MOUNT VERNON	0006456	0015339
NEW ROCHELLE	0003403	0001699
NEW YORK CITY	0006715	0003478
NIAGARA FALLS	-002839	0000533
ROCHESTER	-005502	0012566
ROME	-005145	0003233
SCHENECTADY	-000597	0003164
SYRACUSE	-005693	0009458
TROY	0006765	0005938
UTICA	-005174	0007221
WHITE PLAINS	-003664	0003395
YONKERS	0006443	0006079
ASHEVILLE	-007311	-007083
CHARLOTTE	-004378	-000213
DURHAM	-002410	-010139
GREENSBORO	-003958	-003187
HIGH POINT	-002420	-001474
RALEIGH	-002230	-007670

City	Commuting/ Growth	Local Culture
WINSTON-SALEM	-003851	-007406
AKRON	-005358	-000109
CANTON	-003763	000109A
CINCINNATI	0999999	0001972
CLEVELAND	-000472	-002613
CLEVELAND HEIGHTS	-014130	0006990
COLUMBUS	-001532	0000657
DAYTON	-002064	0003398
EUCLID	-007713	0999999
HAMILTON	0000574	-001508
KETTERING	-006719	0999999
LAKEWOOD	-008751	0999999
LIMA	-005348	0006750
LORAIN	-001973	0000069
PARMA	-008669	0999999
SPRINGFIELD	0000719	-002044
TOLEDO	-004983	-003313
WARREN	-003875	-002442
YOUNGSTOWN	-045510	0000418
LAWTON	0009704	-004417
OKLAHOMA CITY	-006031	0000062
TULSA	-004080	0002967
EUGENE	0007579	0008637
PORTLAND	0999999	0000972
ALLENTOWN	-005069	0006509
ALTOONA	-008856	0004833
BETHLEHEM	0000952	-000844
CHESTER	0002934	0009537
ERIE	-004802	000086P
HARRISBURG	-004194	0013784
JOHNSTOWN	-005213	-000227
LANCASTER	-007005	0011655
PHILADELPHIA	-030027	-000677
PITTSBURGH	-005678	-005661
READING	-050004	0003925
SCRANTON	-009150	-003271
WILKES-BARRE	-045505	0001419
YORK	-004264	0006522
CRANSTON	-007751	-006969
PAWTUCKET	0999999	0999993
PROVIDENCE	-026695	-000701
WARWICK	0018316	-006455
CHARLESTON	-000976	-010927
COLUMBIA	-002941	-001182
GREENVILLE	-006273	-002518
SIOUX FALLS	-003101	0001429
CHATTANOOGA	0999999	0999999
KNOXVILLE	-001865	-008636
MEMPHIS	-004499	-010704
NASHVILLE	-001950	0999993
ABILENE	0008306	-001273
AMARILLO	0010109	-003843
AUSTIN	-002576	-004243
BEAUMONT	-004856	-009105

City	Commuting/ Growth	Local Culture
CORPUS CHRISTI	-000742	-006868
DALLAS	-005166	0004323
EL PASO	C003228	-001676
FORT WORTH	-003577	-000082
GALVESTON	-003695	-007646
HOUSTON	-004560	-002145
LAREDO	-002100	0999999
LUBBOCK	0003931	-002751
MIDLAND	0008710	-001336
ODESSA	0013379	-008588
PASADENA	-001554	0999999
PORT ARTHUR	-003408	-002631
SAN ANGELO	-001570	-001387
SAN ANTONIO	-004907	-002100
TYLER	-001890	-009343
WACO	-001844	-006807
WICHITA FALLS	0004470	-004662
OGDEN	-000130	0001143
SALT LAKE CITY	-005898	0005220
ALEXANDRIA	0028101	-001125
HAMPTON	0024978	-007551
LYNCHBURG	-003947	0001095
NEWPORT NEWS	0006979	-014678
NORFOLK	0007440	-005505
PORTSMOUTH	0012972	-009937
RICHMOND	-003320	-004510
ROANOKE	-000172	-000100
SEATTLE	-004118	0004407
SPOKANE	-002829	-007256
TACOMA	-001610	-007197
CHARLESTON	-009526	-003270
HUNTINGTON	-000987	-002835
WHEELING	-000716	-002792
GREEN BAY	-007086	0001090
KENOSHA	-003285	-001291
MADISON	-004665	-000959
MILWAUKEE	-003564	0002399
RACINE	-003095	0007036
WAUWATOSA	-015357	-004204
WEST ALLIS	-008006	0999999

City	Renewal Residual	Housing Residual
BIRMINGHAM	-06137871	0000473
GADSDEN	-02551273	-0C0486
HUNTSVILLE	009376791	CCC0213
MOBILE	C13439623	0000437
MONTGOMERY	-01416755	CCCC11C
TUSCALOOSA	000786099	0000341
PHOENIX	-C8275352	-000385
TUCSON	CC2136311	-CCCC4S
FORT SMITH	-02467678	0000042
LITTLE ROCK	C14685611	-000634
NORTH LITTLE ROCK	UC1C64982	CCC01C5
ALAMEDA	-00854259	0000432
ALHAMBRA	-C6195166	-0C0278
ANAHEIM	CCC913424	-0CC152
BAKERSFIELD	-04528473	-000263
BERKELEY	-C9563462	0000000
BURBANK	-0000CCC9	-CCCCCS
COMPTON	-17136864	-000896
DOWNEY	-C2986955	-CCC33C
FRESNO	024643616	00CC323
FULLERTON	C02102593	0000060
GARDEN GROVE	CC2623645	-CCCC17
GLENDALE	-07036901	-CCC56C
HAYWARD	001708044	0000078
INGLEWOOD	-CCC0CCCS	-CCCCCS
LAKEWOOD	-00C0C009	-CCCCCS
LONG BEACH	-11655555	-0C0547
LOS ANGELES	-57031540	-GC6611
NORWALK	000264345	00C0109
OAKLAND	CCC141312	00C1217
PALO ALTO	CC451C463	CCCCC2S
PASADENA	-03665781	-000555
POMONA	-C5925573	00C0C37
RICHMOND	006785E61	CCCC235
RIVERSIDE	000766489	-0CCC27
SACRAMENTO	011C95E93	0000368
SAN BERNARDINO	0C9195E4C6	-CCC34S
SAN DIEGO	-11224395	-000473
SAN FRANCISCO	C33457C4C	-000726
SAN JOSE	CC2E9C975	00CC512
SAN LEANDRO	-02337329	-0C0C83
SAN MATEO	-CC371E82	-000009
SANTA ANA	-03229820	-CCCCCS
SANTA BARBARA	-03586988	-000009
SANTA CLARA	CC7195422	-CCCCCS
SANTA MONICA	-11528023	-CC1CC8
SOUTH GATE	-C000C009	-000009
STOCKTON	C0322E5CC	0CC1C66
SUNNYVALE	006339233	00CCC1S
TORRANCE	000035EC2	-000242
VALLEJO	CC2914423	0CCC3CC
WEST COVINA	00481C6C7	0000159
COLORADO SPRINGS	-02539385	-000150
DENVER	-C075C872	-CC1C63

*-000009 indicates missing data.

City	Renewal Residual	Housing Residual
PUEBLO	-CCCCCC9	-CCCCC9
BRIDGEPORT	-09541922	-000405
HARTFORD	CC4574822	-000480
MERIDEN	000951428	CCCC313
NEW BRITAIN	003651C51	000CC097
NEW HAVEN	CEC4C336C	CCCC134
NORWALK	05900169	-CCCC73
STAMFORD	010281650	-0000115
WATERBURY	C6494C74	-CCCC43
WILMINGTON	-09343967	-0CCC457
WASHINGTON	-0C0300009	-000009
FORT LAUDERDALE	-C5C64450	-CCCC495
HIALEAH	-00752277	CCCCC55
JACKSONVILLE	-CCCCCCCS	-000009
MIAMI	10615E99	CCC1218
MIAMI BEACH	-1115E035	-CCC0572
ORLANDO	-C8235525	-000337
PENSACOLA	-C4514C63	-CCCC52C
ST. PETERSBURG	-C4C15594	-0000110
TAMPA	CC65?C05C	-0C026?5
WEST PALM BEACH	-C71020036	-CCC195
ALBANY	-08366599	-000009
ATLANTA	C2C655680	CCCC075
AUGUSTA	-11911258	-CCC25C
COLUMBUS	C8172C54	-0C0569
MACON	-1112593C	-CCC364
SAVANNAH	-0C926149	-0CC491
HONOLULU	-CCCCCCCS	-000009
AURORA	-C2742479	CCCC659
BERWYN	-0C000309	-00C0009
CHICAGO	022157312	0006304
CICERO	-CCCCCCCS	-CCCCC9
DECATUR	-C7566C09	-000254
EAST ST. LOUIS	-15460C81	0000482
EVANSTON	C825C3300	-CCC582
JOLIET	0160C3E7	0000747
OAK PARK	-CCCCCCC9	-CCCCC9
PEORIA	-06256104	-CCC258
ROCKFORD	-1056C694	00010021
ROCK ISLAND	-C1C4C821	CCCCC9CC
SKOKIE	-00110125	-CCCC425
SPRINGFIELD	-02814468	0000122
WAUKEGAN	-06522666	-CCCC034
EAST CHICAGO	-05562155	-000163
EVANSVILLE	-C49C5405	-C00198
FORT WAYNE	-03677468	-CCC235
GARY	-09582412	-000411
HAMMOND	-CC495227	-CCC119
INDIANAPOLIS	-22132449	CCCC252
MUNCIE	-07800231	-000309
SOUTH BEND	-C2471C78	CCCC223
TERRE HAUTE	-C2071076	CCCC252
CEDAR RAPIDS	-C00738C44	00C0078
COUNCIL BLUFFS	002677928	0C00399

City	Renewal Residual	Housing Residual
DAVENPORT	-04050649	0000107
DES MOINES	005293370	0000027
DUBUQUE	-0009000S	-000009
SIOUX CITY	003912591	0000346
WATERLOO	004559293	-000151
KANSAS CITY	013798955	0000741
TOPEKA	005699120	0000382
WICHITA	000097812	-000225
COVINGTON	-02126836	0000000
LEXINGTON	-05744320	0000023
LOUISVILLE	016462160	-001116
BATON ROUGE	-07067203	-000201
LAKE CHARLES	-04409275	-000376
MONROE	-09469342	-000723
NEW ORLEANS	-24788448	0000468
SHREVEPORT	-11298624	-000910
PORTLAND	-00164400	0000607
BALTIMORE	036580096	-001710
BOSTON	085955712	-000078
BROCKTON	001050927	0000775
CAMBRIDGE	001441758	0000006
CHICOPEE	-01850426	0000664
FALL RIVER	-08957431	0001225
HOLYOKE	-07377242	0000581
LAWRENCE	-02126951	0000432
LOWELL	-01202748	0000157
LYNN	-02121763	0000073
MALDEN	003237065	0000255
MEDFORD	030812504	0000568
NEW BEDFORD	002097562	0000064
NEWTON	004916372	0000663
PITTSFIELD	001024457	0000261
QUINCY	-00000009	-000009
SOMERVILLE	-14723639	-000517
SPRINGFIELD	-01211061	0000243
WALTHAM	-00000009	-000009
WORCESTER	010543310	0000905
ANN ARBOR	000757595	0000138
BAY CITY	-02040423	0000568
DEARBORN	-00000009	-000009
DETROIT	007059000	-005112
FLINT	-05319850	0000110
GRAND RAPIDS	-03036890	-000281
JACKSON	000070530	0000046
KALAMAZOO	001286446	0000427
LANSING	000507542	0000186
LINCOLN PARK	-00000009	-000009
LIVONIA	-00000009	-000009
PONTIAC	-01504192	-000084
ROSEVILLE	007745855	0000639
ROYAL OAK	-00000009	-000009
SAGINAW	-02349172	0000292
ST. CLAIR SHORES	-00000009	-000009
WARREN	-00000009	-000009

City	Renewal Residual	Housing Residual
BLOOMINGTON	-0000000009	-0000009
DULUTH	-0003633253	0000761
MINNEAPOLIS	0229202324	0002415
ST. PAUL	0324016696	0002045
JACKSON	-0693342145	-0000832
INDEPENDENCE	-0067234743	-0000147
KANSAS CITY	0021267394	-0000651
ST. JOSEPH	-0463431.08	-0000428
ST. LOUIS	-0168656660	-0001187
SPRINGFIELD	0000331305	0000076
UNIVERSITY CITY	-0000000009	-0000009
BILLINGS	-0466760809	-0000208
GREAT FALLS	-0405765927	0000032
LINCOLN	-0322926439	0000987
OMAHA	-0654065387	0000171
LAS VEGAS	0612273754	0000163
RENO	-0412036346	-0000132
MANCHESTER	-0000000009	-0000009
ATLANTIC CITY	0049877770	-0000214
BAYONNE	-0724241048	0000312
BLOOMFIELD	-0795553338	-0000285
CAMDEN	-0910106857	-0000534
CLIFTON	-0000000009	-0000009
EAST ORANGE	-1592025565	-0000759
ELIZABETH	-1345601C3	0000158
IRVINGTON	-0000000009	-0000009
JERSEY CITY	-1775097025	-0001153
NEWARK	0565756556	0001505
PASSAIC	-1533343312	-0000358
PATERSON	-1450040586	-0000216
TRENTON	-0251991088	-0000164
UNION CITY	-0000000009	-0000009
ALBUQUERQUE	0020979722	0000226
ALBANY	-0728222695	0000424
BINGHAMTON	0040526206	0000154
BUFFALO	0340001040	0001963
MOUNT VERNON	-1510106827	-0000911
NEW ROCHELLE	0003013473	-0000211
NEW YORK CITY	-4560024520	0001154
NIAGARA FALLS	-0415961C4	-0000201
ROCHESTER	0107500400	-0000124
ROME	0035930971	0000704
SCHENECTADY	-0620204043	0000152
SYRACUSE	0192540128	0000513
TROY	-0565061664	0000428
UTICA	-0291315773	-0000041
WHITE PLAINS	0133326643	-0000054
YONKERS	-1182710664	0000357
ASHEVILLE	-0221810126	-0000274
CHARLOTTE	-0310030674	0000132
DURHAM	-0000000009	-0000009
GREENSBORO	0555539069	0000203
HIGH POINT	-0000746490	-0000119
RALEIGH	-0271825C	0000000

City	Renewal Residual	Housing Residual
WINSTON- SALEM	002532814	-000458
AKRON	016939616	0000549
CANTON	-11658925	-000111
CINCINNATI	-00000009	-000005
CLEVELAND	001095392	-001783
CLEVELAND HEIGHTS	-01305497	-000153
COLUMBUS	001770224	0001448
DAYTON	007378398	-000322
EUCLID	-00000009	-000009
HAMILTON	-03343926	-000304
KETTERING	-00000009	-000009
LAKEWOOD	-00000009	-000009
LIMA	-08925865	-000301
LORAIN	-03369133	0000502
PARMA	-00000009	-000009
SPRINGFIELD	-04991192	0000037
TOLEDO	012324552	0000125
WARREN	-05403258	0000327
YOUNGSTOWN	-03150840	-000179
CANTON	-02544155	-000426
OKLAHOMA CITY	013944384	0000234
TULSA	001288547	0000233
EUGENE	004759607	0000737
PORTLAND	-00000009	-000009
ALLENTOWN	000442668	0000004
ALTOONA	-01986759	0000049
BETHLEHEM	009051007	0000056
CHESTER	-11033275	-000934
ERIE	006269331	-000251
HARRISBURG	-06657354	-000353
JOHNSTOWN	-05160838	-000277
LANCASTER	000656327	0000140
PHILADELPHIA	173964846	0002377
PITTSBURGH	053534432	0000535
READING	-04443933	-000208
SCRANTON	012657320	0000258
WILKES- BARRE	000993535	-000259
YORK	-12823825	-000465
CRANSTON	000126694	0000629
PAWTUCKET	-00000009	-000009
PROVIDENCE	006753424	-000675
WARWICK	001057885	0000477
CHARLESTON	-21020352	-000918
COLUMBIA	-04550534	-000013
GREENVILLE	-08956428	-000478
SIOUX FALLS	001410946	0000228
CHATTANOOGA	-00000009	-000009
KNOXVILLE	003840077	0000007
MEMPHIS	008319840	-001551
NASHVILLE	-00000009	-000009
ABILENE	000419952	0000036
AMARILLO	001829591	0000013
AUSTIN	005958955	0000032
BEAUMONT	-07722403	-000456

City	Renewal Residual	Housing Residual
CORPUS CHRISTI	-0406103R	-0CC221C
DALLAS	-22922992	-002300
EL PASO	-06081488	-0003046
FORT WORTH	-10730665	-CCCE3C
GALVESTON	-10499068	-000086
HOUSTON	-31521068	-CC2615
LAREDO	-00000009	-CCCCC7
LUBBOCK	-CC382088	-CCCC9
MIDLAND	-CC006153	-CC0412
ODESSA	-02825117	-CC0526
PASADENA	-0003C009	-000009
PORT ARTHUR	-04367581	-CCC553
SAN ANGELO	00085790?	0CC0173
SAN ANTONIO	CC7575048	-000011
TYLER	-03195662	-CCC45C
WACO	0029331S0	-0001176
WICHITA FALLS	-C0261C57	0000056
OGDEN	-C0191889	0CC0135
SALT LAKE CITY	-05322364	-0000274
ALEXANDRIA	CC1547075	-CCC383
HAMPTON	C14C24566	0000353
LYNCHBURG	-04505821	-CCCC31
NEWPORT NEWS	003147692	-0000367
NORFOLK	0363SC240	-0006662
PORTSMOUTH	-C1405117	-CCC144
RICHMOND	-12705244	-000434
ROANOKE	-C2581C15	-000339
SEATTLE	-15031430	0CC0115
SPOKANE	-0249C567	-000277
TACOMA	0C06E1333	0000734
CHARLESTON	-07523537	-000476
HUNTINGTON	-0424E764	-CCC344
WHEELING	-04271621	0CC0124
GREEN BAY	000098668	0000064
KENOSHA	-0411?C44	CCCC45
MADISON	002868774	0CCC455
MILWAUKEE	-C4598672	-000551
RACINE	-07444222	-CCC21C
WAUWATOSA	0036667C3	0CC0316
WEST ALLIS	-CCCCCCCS	-000009

APPENDIX D

Bureau of Government Research
University of Oklahoma
455 West Lindsey, Room 304
Norman, Oklahoma 73069

PUBLIC HOUSING AND RENEWAL SURVEY

State _____

PUBLIC HOUSING

1. Year enabling legislation was first passed (as opposed to current laws) for public housing grants. (year) _____

2. Is a local referendum required to establish a local public housing authority? yes _____ no _____
(if this is a change from original legislation, give year of change. year of change _____).

3. Is a local referendum required for approval of each individual public housing project? yes _____ no _____
(if this is a change from original legislation, give year of change. year of change _____).

URBAN RENEWAL

1. Year enabling legislation was first passed (as opposed to current laws) for urban renewal grants. (year) _____

2. Is a local referendum required to establish a local urban renewal authority? yes _____ no _____
(if this is a change from original legislation, give year of change. year of change _____).

3. Is a local referendum required for approval of each urban renewal project? yes _____ no _____
(if this is a change from original legislation, give year of change. year of change _____).

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION