

INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.
5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Xerox University Microfilms

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

74-9866

DAMRONGCHAI, Prasit, 1941-
METROPOLITAN POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN
GREATER BANGKOK.

The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1973
Political Science, public administration

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

METROPOLITAN POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN GREATER BANGKOK

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY






BY
PRASIT DAMRONGCHAI

Norman, Oklahoma

1973

METROPOLITAN POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN GREATER BANGKOK

APPROVED BY

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author is particularly grateful to Dr. David R. Morgan, Associate Director of the Bureau of Government Research, who suggested this problem and gave freely of his valuable time, knowledge, and experience in supervising it to completion.

Special thanks are due to Dr. Hugh G. MacNiven, Dr. Walter F. Scheffer, Dr. Oliver E. Benson, and Dr. John W. Wood who read the manuscript and offered helpful suggestions.

For their time and experiences given to the author through interviewing, thanks are extended to Dr. Amara Raksasataya, Dean of the School of Public Administration, National Institute of Development Administration, Thailand; Governor Winyou Ankanarak; Dr. An Nimanahaeminda; Dr. Somporn Sangchai; Director Swai Sirimonghol, Local Administration Division.

Appreciation is also expressed to Dr. Samuel A. Kirkpatrick for providing the use of computer time, to Suthee Arkaslerk and Chakra Hansakul for providing letters of introduction, to Director Anuree Wanglee of the National Statistical Office for providing census data, to Mr. Richard D. Bingham for his valuable suggestions and encouragement, and to Walter A. Thomas for his sympathy and encouragement.

Many thanks are due to friends in the Department of Political Science, especially Richard Gorton, Lee Bernick, Bill Lyons, and Pornsak

Phongphaew, who kindly helped in one way or another. Many friends in Bangkok also deserve the author's appreciation.

Last but not least, the author must thank his wife, Vantanee, for her patience, understanding, encouragement, and help in providing data and information from Thailand throughout the entire work.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE APPROACH OF STUDY

Chapter	Page
I. METROPOLITAN POLITICAL INTEGRATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE	2
The Process of Political Integration	2
Metropolitan Reform: A Theoretical Perspective	4
Objective of the Study	18
Definition of Terms	19
Research Setting	20
Contributions of the Study	21
II. THE MODEL FOR ANALYSIS, HYPOTHESES, AND METHODOLOGY	28
The Model for Analysis	28
Hypotheses	33
Methodology	36
Method of Presenting Material	43
PART II. METROPOLITAN POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN GREATER BANGKOK	
III. THE METROPOLITAN PROBLEMS	49
Local Government Structure	52
Metropolitan Problems: Myths and Realities	55
Alternative Approaches to Metropolitan Reorganization	58
Obstacles to Metropolitan Reorganization	61
IV. ENVIRONMENT FOR CHANGE AND GOVERNMENTAL INNOVATION IN GREATER BANGKOK	66
Government and Politics in Greater Bangkok	66
Early Efforts Toward Metro Planning	74
The Metropolitan City Municipality: Starting Point or Dead-End	85
The Bangkok Metropolis	87

Chapter	Page
V. THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF METRO POLITICS	92
Population Characteristics in Greater Bangkok	93
Local Political Leaders	102
Local Administrators	111
The Press	117
Summary	118
VI. ATTITUDINAL VARIATION AMONG LOCAL LEADERS, LOCAL ADMINISTRATORS AND THE PRESS	124
Attitudinal Differences Among Local Elites	125
Summary	175
VII. THE PROSPECTS FOR METROPOLITAN REFORM: A CONCLUSION . . .	181
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	193
APPENDIX	205

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Population and Area of the Four Municipalities Comprising Greater Bangkok Area (1970)	21
2. Interview Date by Group Membership, 1972	38
3. Numbers of Total in Each Subpopulation, Numbers Interviewed, and Percent Interviewed	39
4. Average Interviewing Time Used for Each Group in Each Municipality in Minutes	40
5. Local Administrators in Bangkok Metropolitan Area by Office	42
6. Education, Occupation, and Economic Status, Greater Bangkok Area, 1970	98
7. Familism Scores, Greater Bangkok Area 1970	99
8. Ethnic Status, Greater Bangkok 1970	102
9. Local Political Leaders' Occupation, Greater Bangkok Area 1971	104
10. Local Political Leaders' Education, Greater Bangkok Area 1971	106
11. Local Political Leaders' Income, Greater Bangkok Area 1971	108
12. Local Political Leaders' Age Group, Greater Bangkok Area 1971 (Percent)	109
13. Local Political Leaders' Length of Present Residency Greater Bangkok Area 1971 (Percent)	109
14. Municipal Administrators' Education, Greater Bangkok Area 1971	113

Table	Page
15. Municipal Administrators' Income, Greater Bangkok Area 1971	115
16. Municipal Administrators' Age Group, Greater Bangkok Area 1971 (Percent)	116
17. Municipal Administrators' Length of Service in Present Office, Greater Bangkok Area 1971 (Percent)	117
18. Pattern of Citizens' Voting on the Belief of Leaders, Administrators and the Press by Community Social Rank (Percent)	128
19. Pattern of Citizens' Voting on the Belief of Leaders, Administrators and the Press by City Size (Percent)	129
20. Leaders' and Administrators' Preferences on Some Area-Wide Services, by Community Social Rank	132
21. Leaders' and Administrators' Preferences on Some Area-Wide Services, by City Size	134
22. Leaders' and Administrators' Number One Selection for Metro Boundary, by Community Social Rank	135
23. Leaders' and Administrators' Number One Selection for Metro Boundary, by City Size	137
24. Reasons for Leaders and Administrators Preferring Metro Government, by Community Social Rank	138
25. Reasons for Leaders and Administrators Not Preferring Metro Government, by Community Social Rank	139
26. Leaders' and Administrators' Average Score on Semantic Differential Scale Toward the Concept of "Metropolitan Government" by Community Social Rank	141
27. Leaders' and Administrators' Opinions of Factors Causing Metro Reorganization	143
28. Leaders' and Administrators' Beliefs on Factors Causing Metro Reorganization, by Community Social Rank	144
29. Leaders' and Administrators' Attitudes Toward the Procedure for Filling Metro Offices (Percent)	147

Table	Page
30. Leaders' and Administrators' Attitudes Toward the Procedure for Filling Metro Mayor's Office, by City Size (Percent)	149
31. Leaders' and Administrators' Attitudes Toward the Procedure for Filling Metro Mayor's Office, by Community Social Rank (Percent)	150
32. Leaders' and Administrators' Attitudes Toward the Procedure for Filling Metro Assembly Office, By City Size (Percent)	151
33. Leaders' and Administrators' Attitudes Toward the Procedure for Filling Metro Assembly Office, by Community Social Rank (Percent)	153
34. Leaders' and Administrators' Attitudes Toward Direct and Indirect Election for Metro Councilor, by City Size	155
35. Leaders' and Administrators' Attitudes Toward Direct and Indirect Election for Metro Councilor, by Community Social Rank	156
36. Percentage of "Good or Better" Ratings for Selected Local Services, by Community Social Rank and Group Membership	158
37. Leaders' and Administrators' Attitudes Toward Burden of Local Taxes Compared to Services Provided, by Community Social Rank	160
38. Leaders' and Administrators' Attitudes Toward Burden of Local Taxes Compared to Services Provided, by City Size	162
39. Leaders', Administrators', and the Press' Attitudes Toward Having Some Services Provided on an Area-Wide Basis	165
40. Leaders', Administrators', and the Press' Number One Selection for Metro Boundary	166
41. Reasons for the Press Preferring Metro Government	167
42. The Press' Attitudes Toward the Procedure for Filling Metro Offices	169

Table	Page
43. Leaders', Administrators', and the Press' Attitudes Toward Whether Elected Metro Assembly Members Would Be More Effective Than Those Appointed	170
44. Leaders', Administrators', and the Press' Attitudes Toward Whether Elected Metro Assembly Members Would Be More Representative Than Those Appointed	172
45. Leaders', Administrators', and the Press' Attitudes Toward Burden of Local Taxes Compared to Services Provided	173
46. The Press' Belief on Factors Causing Metro Reorganization . .	174

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Posited Relations Among Variables in the Metropolitan Reform Tradition	8
2. Posited Relations Among Variables in the Political Economy Tradition	9
3. Cultural Characteristics of Present Thai Government	51
4. Two-Tier Metropolitan Government for Greater Bangkok Proposed by the Interior Ministry 1967	82
5. One-Tier Metropolitan Government for Greater Bangkok Proposed by the Interior Ministry 1967	84
6. The Location of the Four Greater Bangkok Cities in the Social Space Diagram	100

PART I

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE APPROACH OF STUDY

CHAPTER I

METROPOLITAN POLITICAL INTEGRATION:

THEORY AND PRACTICE

The Process of Political Integration

The concept of integration, although widely used to describe closely knit political and economic relationships, has not been precisely and consistently defined even in some of the recent important research and statements of public policy concerning it.¹ Political integration generally implies a relationship of community among people within the same political entity, held together by mutual ties of one kind or another which give the group a feeling of identity and self-awareness.² One study, developed from an analysis of the problem of political integration in the new states, refers to community "norms" as criterion for defining the degree of political integration, and explains that:

A political system is integrated to the extent that the minimal units (individual political actors) develop in the course of political interaction a pool of commonly accepted norms regarding political behavior and a commitment to the political behavior patterns legitimized by the norms. Commitment to those norms channels the flow of exchanges (output and inputs, actions and reactions, expectations and responses) among interacting political actors. . . . A political system is malintegrated to the extent that political exchanges are not regulated by a normative culture. In malintegrated political systems the emphasis is on effective rather than on legitimate means for pursuing political goals; in highly integrated political systems the emphasis is on legitimate rather than on effective means.³

By applying functional theory to the study of urban political systems, Kaplan argues that when large areas of behavior are controlled by norms and role prescriptions, when the individual internalizes the values of the system and considers them sacred or not open to question, and when the individual is motivated to perform his role in the manner expected of him, that system may be said to be well integrated.⁴

Two different ideas concerning political integration in metropolitan communities have emerged in recent years. One concept emphasizes structural changes, the other aims at cooperative arrangements.⁵ The former-permanent arrangements--views political integration as the combination of governmental units, previously separated by laws, into one unified system. There are two forms of permanent arrangements: unitary, or one-tier systems; and federal, or two-level systems.⁶

In cooperative arrangements the essence of the integrative relationship is seen as collective action to promote mutual interests.⁷ Integration in this sense has been defined as minimal consensus which permits the maintenance of social order; the functioning of a system of public and private institutions for the production and distribution of services regarded as essential; recognition of minimal rights of all groups in the population; and enforcement of those obligations necessary to maintain the system and permit its normal growth and change.⁸

Deutsch uses "rewards" and "penalties" as the key words in explaining how cooperative arrangements would work. His two hypotheses are as follows:

The first hypothesis . . . holds that if people have experienced a high level of transactions, with substantial joint rewards at one time, they may be quite willing to accept joint deprivations at a later time, provided joint rewards come again still later. The second hypotheses . . . is that a group of people

taught to identify with each other by means of initial joint rewards but then reinforced by a probabilistic mixture of joint rewards and joint deprivations will show greater cohesion and greater strength of habit than a group of people who have experienced nothing but joint rewards.⁹

According to these two hypothesis, rewards must come before the penalties, and rewards must be strong and frequent enough to initiate the habit.¹⁰ According to the general theory of cooperative arrangements, if local governments were invited to share burdens, losses, or sacrifices at an early stage, this would be much less successful than if one devised a way in which local groups would just share joint rewards and only later be invited to make joint sacrifices.¹¹

These two theories of political integration, unification and polycentric or cooperation forms, have been the main references in the literature of metropolitan reforms in various parts of the world.

Metropolitan Reform: A Theoretical Perspective

For more than a half century, most political scientists, urban planners, and many other social scientists writing about urban areas have agreed that the urban problem is the existence of a large number of independent public jurisdictions within a single metropolitan area.¹² Many reforms, in various countries, have been proposed for adapting local government to urban growth and for achieving metropolitan governmental integration. The United States, with its 243 metropolitan areas, as defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census in 1970, has tried almost all of the alternatives in seeking solutions to metropolitan problems; others, for example, Canada, England, Japan, and Thailand, with few metropolitan areas, have experimented on a few approaches. However, these reform efforts, which have been called the "political reform tradition," have not yet succeeded in gaining

acceptance by most American citizens. The lack of success opened the way for the new group, the anti-reformers, to reconsider metropolitan problems from another perspective during the 1960's.

Metropolitan Reform Movements

The reform tradition has presented a theoretical framework for analyzing problems and a set of solutions for them that are generally consistent, even though several of the underlying assumptions are not often made explicit and very little empirical analysis has been accumulated to provide evidence for the appropriateness of the suggested solutions.¹³ Examples of reform literature during the 1920-1960 period are Maxey's "The Political Integration of Metropolitan Communities";¹⁴ Anderson and Weidner's American City Government;¹⁵ Studenski's study for the National Municipal League, The Government of Metropolitan Areas;¹⁶ Jones' Metropolitan Government;¹⁷ and Bollens' study for the Council of State Governments, The States and the Metropolitan Problems.¹⁸

Basic recommendations by most metropolitan reformers for institutional changes are reflected in Anderson and Weidner's work, which emphasized that

. . . in each unified urban area there should be as far as possible only one local government. . . . A second point upon which agreement is almost complete is that the voters should elect only the important, policy-making officers and that these should be few in number. . . . Most reformers are also anxious to see the complete abolition of the separation of powers in local government At the same time, however, . . . the functions of legislation and control on the one hand are so distinct from that of administration should be a separate group of men and women, especially trained and adequately compensated for their work. . . . Furthermore, the administration should be organized as a single integrated system upon the hierarchical principle, tapering upward and culminating in a single chief executive officer. . .¹⁹

While this summary comes from a textbook written originally in 1925, Elinor Ostrom notes that these basic recommendations of metropolitan reformers have remained amazingly stable.²⁰ Recent examples include those studies by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Committee for Economic Development, and others interested in reform.²¹ They include contentions that the "public interest" should take precedence over individual interests; political fragmentation leads to chaos; area-wide equal service levels are desirable; the complexity of governmental structures prevents citizen control; and political units should be large enough to achieve economies of scale.²²

Scott Greer summarizes the working hypotheses of one reform group, which prepared a proposal for the greater St. Louis area:

It was . . . hypothesized that this congery of heterogeneous and overlapping governmental units would produce these results:

- 1) greater variation in output, or service levels, among the different units,
- 2) great variations in the efficiency, or cost benefit ratio, among the units,
- 3) a general low level of some services throughout the area, due to the deleterious effects of poor services in one governmental unit upon the services in other, independent units²³

In sum, the reform tradition presumes a causal relationship between the formal structure of government and the performance of the system,²⁴ and presumes that the existing multinucleated governmental structures should be centralized so that all or most public services are provided by a single jurisdiction which has boundaries that encompass the total metropolitan area.²⁵

However, less than a half dozen of the more than 200 metropolitan areas in the United States have adopted reorganization plans which have involved significant governmental centralization at the regional level;

the rest of the reform recommendations have been defeated at the polls.²⁶ These unsuccessful attempts have been blamed by some on lack of explicit empirical evidence offered by the reform movement.

In attempting to make theoretical structure explicit, Elinor Ostrom suggests a model for further empirical research, as shown in Figure 1.

She presents a set of seven propositions containing two independent variables--size of urban governmental units and multiplicity of agencies within a metropolitan area--; three intervening variables--professionalization, reliance upon hierarchy, and number of elected officials--; and five dependent variables--output per capita, efficient provision of services, equal distribution of costs to beneficiaries, responsibility of local officials, and participation by citizens.²⁷


The Anti-Metropolitan Reform Position²⁸

It is not completely true to say that all studies, most of which appeared in the 1960's, criticizing metropolitan reform traditions are "anti-metropolitan reform." Some of them are between the two extremes. For example, Elinor Ostrom's "Metropolitan Reform" presents an alternative model called "Posited Relations Among Variables in the Political Economy Tradition."²⁹ According to this model, the type of public goods or services should play an important role in determining the size and number of governmental units within a metropolitan area. It suggests that certain services could be better provided by a metropolitan form of government (see Figure 2).

As Oliver Williams comments: "Of the two extreme (reform versus anti-reform movements) suggestions for structuring government in metropolitan areas, proposals closer to the latter have been most successful."³⁰ To make this comment clear, the following discussion will be devoted to the

FIGURE 1


POSITED RELATIONS AMONG VARIABLES IN THE METROPOLITAN REFORM TRADITION



Source: Ostrom, "Metropolitan Reform", 475.

FIGURE 2

POSITED RELATIONS AMONG VARIABLES IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY TRADITION



Source: Ostrom, "Metropolitan Reform", 487.

anti-reform or polycentric position.

The failure of reform recommendations to gain voter's acceptance in most American metropolitan communities is the focal point of criticism by the anti-reformers. They contend that reform recommendations ultimately tend to resort to despotic solutions--subverting the preferences of individual citizens to the preferences of the planners and political performers controlling the centralized mechanism.³¹ The reformers recommend a single hierarchically organized area-wide metropolitan government to force small local communities to act in the public interest regardless of individual preferences. The anti-reformers believe that specialization and differentiation exist in all metropolitan areas, and there are real and persistent conflicts of interest associated with areal specialization, dividing subpopulations in metropolitan areas.³²

Los Angeles County and Philadelphia are two important cases supporting anti-reformists' argument against super-area-wide government. The pattern of cooperation, competition, and conflict resolution is the framework for anti-reformers' references. To such anti-reformers, the assertion that hierarchical relationships are necessary to achieve coordination is theoretically and empirically false.³³

Much of the theoretical underpinning of the polycentric position can be traced to a belief in the crucial role of coordination, which is achieved through non-hierarchical mechanisms such as that found in the economic theory of the price and market systems.³⁴ The success in cooperation, the pattern and effect of competition, and the conflict resolution found in Los Angeles County, especially the Lakewood Plan, seem to support the polycentric position that a high degree of stability is possible for a general system of voluntary agreements among public agencies with diverse characteristics,

although particular aspects of the relationships are subjected to modification.³⁵ Warren found in his study of this Los Angeles area that the capacities of a multinucleated governmental system may be at least equal, if not superior, to one in which decision-making is formally centralized.³⁶

Another alternative suggested by Thomas R. Dye, from his study in the Philadelphia area, is that of bargaining among leadership groups.

Competitive bargaining can result in the formation of rewarding coalitions. Strategy requires that integrative efforts be concentrated upon structuring the decision-making process in metropolitan areas to facilitate bargaining, rather than upon comprehensive "solutions" that ignore the consequences of social and political diversity.³⁷

Dye notes that this technique may be a most appropriate, if not the only feasible technique for achieving policy integration within the metropolitan area.³⁸

In short, the anti-reformers believe that a single, area-wide governmental unit designed to handle all public functions in metropolitan areas is unlikely to be as responsive or as efficient in meeting citizen demands as a polycentric political structure is likely to be.

While the debate over the most suitable governing structure for a metropolitan area will undoubtedly continue, those who favor greater centralization no longer occupy an unchallenged theoretical position. Evidence is now accumulating to suggest that where institutional change has occurred, the benefits have not always outweighed the costs.³⁹ Above all, the current trend appears to minimize the necessity for single, far-reaching structural reforms and to emphasize the variety of mechanisms and arrangements that have developed to handle urban problems that spill over local boundaries. Thus, any effort to analyze proposals for metropolitan reform in the United States or elsewhere should be considered in light of the emerging theoretical anti-reform arguments and the apparent work-ability

of various types of reform structures that do not require permanent, drastic change.

Reform Experiences Outside the United States

The lack of success in metropolitan structural reform in the United States, as generally known, is associated with American ideologies retained from the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian periods--in particular, the seeming need to subject reform proposals to public referenda and the notion that small governments close to home are best. The political-governmental pattern that has evolved at the local level, grounded as it is on these norms and beliefs, stands as a formidable obstacle to change.⁴⁰ Does this same situation prevail in efforts at metropolitan reform in countries other than the United States? What factors are involved in the success or failure of metropolitan reorganization in other areas? If reforms have taken place, what have been the results of those reforms?

Other than Toronto and Greater London, experiences of metropolitan government reform outside the United States are not very well known in the literature of urban politics.⁴¹ Moreover, the reform in Toronto, London, and other metropolitan areas in Asia and Africa have different backgrounds than such experiences in the United States.

With very few exceptions, there is widespread admiration throughout North America, the United Kingdom, and in Europe both for the form of government inaugurated in Toronto on January 1, 1954, and for its achievements.⁴² Such a form of government and the reasons for supporting or opposing this reform are not unknown in the United States. The federation form of metropolitan government has been proposed and even adopted in the United States, as in the case of Miami-Dade County. Basically, the proponents

and opponents of reform such as that in Toronto present an identical lineup to those who prevailed in the United States in the late 1940's and early 1950's.⁴³

The amalgamationists, by and large, are the politicians of the City of Toronto who believe that the one big-city approach will best enhance the image of the city and serve its future development; the newspapers, which have never accepted Metro as anything but "a stage on the way to complete amalgamation"; the research specialists and bureaucrats who stand for apparently "neat and tidy" solutions for urban problems; and persons who honestly believe that perfect equality is conceivable within political and administrative compromises. . . . The opponents of amalgamation, on the other hand, are the so-called "selfish" politicians of the suburban municipalities; a majority of the residents in those municipalities; and citizen groups and individuals who argue that there are important human values inherent in moderate or small-sized local governmental units.⁴⁴

The success in operationalizing the metropolitan plan is due to its proponents' domination of the opponents of the plan. The Ontario Municipal Board (OMB), which is a provincial, quasi-judicial body with sweeping powers over municipalities, including the power to order changes in municipal boundaries or municipal governmental structure, also favored the Metro plan along with a majority of the Ontario legislature.⁴⁵ The notion of federation was favored because it created a regional government without changing municipal boundaries and without greatly disturbing the operation of municipal government.⁴⁶

The achievement in the implementation of the Metro plan depends upon common agreement that its functions are regional rather than local in nature, and upon an appropriate system of representation from its constituent units.⁴⁷ Furthermore, the plan was designed to achieve a dual purpose: to give the Metro government enough powers to meet regional

problems and promote greater financial equity, but at the same time to make a Metro government as acceptable to the municipalities as possible.⁴⁸ It increases the satisfaction of some without decreasing the satisfaction of any.⁴⁹

However, the Toronto Metro plan was imposed by legislative act. Ontario officials never seriously considered a referendum, as in the United States examples; nor did they grant the municipalities concerned an unofficial veto power over proposed metropolitan reforms.⁵⁰ Kaplan, in a functional assessment of Metro's performance, summarizes that without provincial constraint Metro could not have survived.⁵¹

Greater London is another experience with some degree of difference from such reforms in the United States. The recommendations of the Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London (1957-1960) have essentially the same meaning as those in Toronto; that is, the Boroughs should be the primary units of local government and should perform all functions except those which can only be effectively performed in the wider area of Greater London.⁵²

After the long debate and fighting between the proponents and opponents of the reform proposal recommended by the Royal Commission, the new Greater London government was created by Act of Parliament and received Royal Assent on July 31, 1963. This success was the result of two characteristics of British political culture: national government domination and Parliamentary decision.⁵³ If the national government desires certain action, it can usually do so without conceding a great deal; in this case, it favored the reform recommendation proposed by the Royal Commission.

In Parliament, there is little conception of enacting legislative change subject to the concurrence of the electorate, even when it involves the abolition of political institutions; Parliament devised the existing local government and changed it without local referendum.⁵⁴ However, other interest groups and organizations also have indirect, if not direct, influences upon the final plan, as Sharpe emphasizes:

. . . throughout the reform process there was a meaningful debate between area and function, about the competing demands of local democracy and functional efficiency, about the respective roles to be played by national and local government. And these arguments influenced the shape of the reform. It was not the mere resolution of the demands of competing groups and interests.⁵⁵

In Asia and Africa, even urbanization that is influenced by the West is distinct from Western urbanization. Asian urbanization, as discussed by one scholar,⁵⁶ includes the following elements:

- (1) it is "pseudourbanization" and is different from "true urbanization which occurred in the West;
- (2) it is due to "natural population increases" rather than to rural-urban migration;
- (3) rural-urban migration in Asia is due to the "push" of the poor countryside rather than the "pull" of the developing city;
- (4) Asian countries are "overurbanized" in that the percentage of people living in cities is much higher than that which existed in the West at comparative levels of development; and
- (5) the social changes taking place in the cities of Asia are not similar to those that occurred in the cities of the West.

The Impact of Elite Opinion on Metro Government in Nonwestern Countries

In the West, urban problems are generally seen as problems of local government; in contrast, the study of city politics in the Third World can hardly be divorced from national politics.⁵⁷ The links between

urbanization and national development are much more intimate in these regions, and studies of development therefore should take this into consideration.⁵⁸ Reform movements usually emphasize national development and nationalism in maintaining unity, legitimacy, and integration.⁵⁹ The assumption in the Western world, in which the main purpose of local government was to translate existing wealth into social services which would have an equalizing tendency, as between rich and poor, could not be applied to these developing countries because there was too often no existing wealth and everyone was poor.⁶⁰ Furthermore, the instrumentalities of decision making were largely controlled by state-appointed and local bureaucrats who were, in turn, subject to extensive state control.⁶¹ This strong control by central government without public objection has also been observed in Tokyo, Japan.⁶² Consequently, metropolitan reforms are completely dependent upon those elites in local and central governments, with little direct influence from local citizens.

Western political systems of democracy have been implanted among the knowledgeable at the top in most of the Third World nations. Nevertheless, governments are dominated by elite groups influenced minimally by popular opinion. Colonialism may be considered by some scholars as the cause of this phenomenon; Pye notes, "Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, colonialism brought mainly bureaucratic administrations rather than popular politics."⁶³ Political power has been transferred from the god-king, not to people but to small groups of elites.

In Southeast Asia, as the gap between the ruling elites and the masses widens, the elites rely more extensively on repressive measures with the help of their party or the army to maintain control.⁶⁴ However,

since the cities in Asia are playing a key role in the political development of countries in the region, they are especially important in nation-building. Urbanism serves to undermine loyalties and identifications with sub-national entities to make the development of new and broader politics possible. At the same time, cities are crucial in economic and social development, where the rational administrative and political approaches arising from urbanism are applied to national problems.⁶⁵ The cities, especially the capitals, serve as the window of the developing countries to the West, and culture borrowings, with proper adaptation, contribute greatly to development.⁶⁶ Accordingly, urban and ruling elites find it necessary to rely more on the administrative rationality and legitimacy of metropolitan reform while simultaneously maintaining their power structure.

Reform is inevitable, but the degree of centralization varies from city to city. The success or failure, of course, depends upon how ruling groups can manipulate the reform to be viewed as legitimate and rational by the masses. No matter how strongly the ruling groups can exert their control, they must accept this consideration as a crucial matter. To meet this criterion, a federal structure of metropolitan organization has been suggested as a solution since it would not only energize public participation, but would also suit a heterogeneous territory.⁶⁷

As metropolitan areas the world over continue to expand and develop and attention is turned increasingly to governmental reorganization as a way of solving public problems, it has become obvious that socio-economic and political culture plays a decisive role in determining the success or failure or the ways in which the metropolitan community is integrated.

Local politics and administration, with local citizens actually dominant over major governmental reorganization, are more independent from national and state domination. Experience to date suggests that relatively minor reorganization is likely to be consummated by the official governmental units, while major changes require voter ratification.⁶⁸

In contrast, the nonwestern experiences with metropolitan reforms are closely connected to the national government and elite groups. Part of the reason is the lack of citizen participation; another reason is the need for national development and integration. In all of these countries, the national-local relationship is decidedly hierarchical in most phases of their activities, and most major functions are organized under an assumption that the local governments' various units are descending rungs on a ladder.⁶⁹ It is more likely that success in the Third World will be attained by applying the unification model of metropolitan reform. It is less likely that a polycentric type of government will be a solution, especially in Bangkok, where every unit of local government is poor, lacks negotiative power, and above all lacks the autonomy to effect negotiation and cooperation.

Objective of the Study

The main objectives of this study are as follows:

- (1) to examine the forces and factors at the local level as related to political integration in metropolitan areas; and
- (2) to utilize such findings to explain the prospect for a Greater Bangkok government.

It is obvious that the final decision on form and structure of metropolitan government in Thailand rests with the top national ruling group. As mentioned earlier, Western democracy was introduced to this

top ruling group, who in turn tried to transfer it to the people. Since they must now rely more on legitimacy and rationality, as far as their power is concerned, the ruling elites are more or less receptive to the desires of lower level and local citizens.

It is the intention of this study to determine how the local elites and local bureaucrats in each city within the metropolitan area believe or feel about metropolitan government. This intention is based on the assumption that "the actions and roles of the political leadership of Thai municipal government are determined or shaped by the community."⁷⁰ It also is based on another assumption that "the success or failure of the Thai municipal government depends on community values and on the perceptions of people with whom the leadership works."⁷¹

An additional basis is the Western idea that political integration is related to socio-economic differentiation and specialization within metropolitan areas.⁷² It is believed that, even in the highly centralized system of Thai government, if the differentiation and specialization produce separate and conflicting group interests, it will certainly have a profound influence on the prospects of metropolitan political integration.

Definitions of Terms

Political integration means a state of mind or disposition to be cohesive, to act together, and to be committed to mutual programs, and refers to more than one aspect or dimension of behavior.⁷³ This meaning covers both integration ideologies--the unification and cooperation aspects as discussed earlier. That is, the whole range of options, varying from complete unification as the result of structural changes to certain rather

limited or minor changes aimed at producing a greater degree of cooperation, will be taken into consideration in explaining the prospect of metropolitan political integration in the Greater Bangkok area.

Greater Bangkok in this study is defined as the area covering four municipalities: Bangkok; Thonburi; Smut Prakarn; and Nonthaburi, as they were before the November, 1971, coup.⁷⁴ Bangkok, with the most population, is located on the east side of the Chao Praya River and is considered a central urban city. Adjacent to the west, across the Chao Praya River, is Thonburi, with Smut Prakarn to the south and Nonthaburi to the north. Accordingly, greater Bangkok's meaning is different from the newly established "Bangkok Metropolis" (Krungthep Mahanakhon) where only Bangkok and Thonburi are included. However, the word "Metropolitan area" in this study, as used regarding Thailand, denotes the areas covered by Greater Bangkok, as defined above.

Research Setting

Four municipal areas have been selected as subjects of this study. Bangkok, with a 1970 census population of 1,867,297, is classified as a large city. Thonburi, with a population of 627,989, is a medium sized city; Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi, with populations of 55,439 and 33,974 respectively, are classified as small cities. Bangkok and Thonburi, even with large differences in area and population (see Table 1), are similar in status as city municipalities (Tesaban Nakorn). Both Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi share the status of town municipalities (Tesaban Muang).

Bangkok will be treated as a central city or urbanized area. Thonburi, due to its geographical area and residential characteristic, will be treated as a suburban city. For purposes of this study, Smut Prakarn

and Nonthaburi will be considered suburban cities.

TABLE 1
POPULATION AND AREA OF THE FOUR MUNICIPALITIES
COMPRISING GREATER BANGKOK AREA (1970)

Municipality	Population	Area in Square Kilometers	Classification
Bangkok	1,867,297	238.56	Large
Thonburi	627,989	52.00	Medium
Smut Prakarn	55,439	7.30	Small
Nonthaburi	33,974	2.50	Small

Sources: 1970 Population and Housing Census, National Statistical Office, Thailand; and Statistical and Data Book, City Planning Division, Bangkok Municipality, 1969.

The use of these four municipalities as subjects of the study is justified by three factors: (1) the area is more than sufficient to contain any foreseeable future growth of the Bangkok metropolitan area; (2) at the present time the Thai government has considered this entire area for special purposes (Metropolitan Electricity Authority and Metropolitan Water Works Authority);⁷⁵ and (3) a recent report of the Committee for Metropolitan Planning has included some parts of the Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi provinces in the new metropolitan plan, which indicates the probability of the inclusion of these two cities in the Bangkok Metropolis in the future.⁷⁶ (More discussion of this report will follow in subsequent chapters.)

Contributions of the Study

It is hoped that this study will make a contribution in at least two ways in addition to its strictly academic purpose of providing a greater understanding of the process of metropolitan integration in a

non-Western nation.

1. There is no existing empirical study dealing with the issue of metropolitan reorganization in Thailand. This study can, therefore, be the basic background for additional studies in other cities in Thailand.

2. Since the Metropolitan Plan is an innovation for the Thai government, the advantages or disadvantages of this Plan are not known. This study should therefore stimulate the governments (at all levels) and citizens in the area to regard metropolitan planning in a broader way, that is, to include a consideration of metropolitanization in an ecological sense.

Footnotes

¹Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community," in The Integration of Political Communities, ed. by Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964), pp. 3-4.

²Ibid., p. 4.

³Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967), pp. 3-4.

⁴Harold Kaplan, Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 5.

⁵Steven P. Erie, et al., "Can Something Be Done? Propositions on the Performance of Metropolitan Institutions," in Reform of Metropolitan Governments, ed. by Lowdon Wingo (Washington, D. C.: Resources for the Future, Inc., 1972), pp. 9-13.

⁶Ibid., p. 12.

⁷Jacob and Teune, "The Integrative Process," p. 5.

⁸William L. C. Wheaton, "Integration at the Urban Level: Political Influence and the Decision Process," in The Integration of Political Communities, ed. by Jacob and Toscano, p. 136.

⁹Karl W. Deutsch, "Communication Theory and Political Integration," in The Integration of Political Communities, ed. by Jacob and Toscano, p. 55.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid., p. 56.

¹²Elinor Ostrom, "Metropolitan Reform: Propositions From Two Traditions," Social Science Quarterly, LIII (December, 1972), 475.

¹³Norton E. Long, "Recent Theories and Problems of Local Government," in Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris, eds., Public Policy, VIII (Cambridge: Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University, 1958), pp. 285-295.

¹⁴Chester Maxey, "The Political Integration of Metropolitan Communities," National Municipal Review, XI (August, 1922), 229-253.

¹⁵William Anderson and Edward W. Weidner, American City Government (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1925).

¹⁶Paul Studenski, The Government of Metropolitan Areas (New York: National Municipal League, 1930).

¹⁷Victor Jones, Metropolitan Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).

¹⁸John C. Bollens, The States and the Metropolitan Problems (Chicago: Council of State Governments, 1956).

¹⁹Anderson and Weidner, American City Government, pp. 641-642.

²⁰Ostrom, "Metropolitan Reform," p. 476.

²¹Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Alternative Approaches to Governmental Reorganization in Metropolitan Areas (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962); Committee for Economic Development, Modernizing Local Government (New York: CED, 1966), and Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas (New York: CED, 1970); Roscoe Martin, "Government Adaptation to Metropolitan Growth," in Politics in the Metropolis, ed. by Thomas R. Dye and Brett W. Hawkins (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1967); Duane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970); and John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, The Metropolis: Its People, Politics, and Economic Life (2d. ed., New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1970).

²²Robert L. Bish, The Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971), p. 149.

²³Scott Greer, "Dilemmas of Action Research on the Metropolitan Problem," in Community Political System, ed. by Morris Janowitz (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1961), p. 193.

²⁴Robert O. Warren, Government in Metropolitan Regions: A Reappraisal of Fractionated Political Organization (California: The Regents of the University of California, 1966), p. 33.

²⁵Ibid., p. 5.

²⁶Ibid., p. 3.

²⁷A more detailed description of the relationship of these variables is found in the seven propositions, Ostrom, "Metropolitan Reform," p. 479.

²⁸Examples of this group include Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout and Robert Warren, "The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Area: A Theoretical Inquiry," The American Political Science Review, LV (December, 1961), 831-842; Thomas R. Dye, et al., "Differentiation and Cooperation in a Metropolitan Area," Midwest Journal of Political Science, VII (May, 1963), 145-155; Oliver Williams, et al., Suburban Differences and Metropolitan Policies (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965); Warren, Government in Metropolitan Region; Thomas R. Dye, "Metropolitan Integration by Bargaining Among Sub-Areas," in Politics in the Metropolis, ed. by Thomas R. Dye and Brett W. Hawkins (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1967), pp. 451-453; Bish, The Public Economy; and Ostrom, "Metropolitan Reform," pp. 475-493.

²⁹Ostrom, "Metropolitan Reform," p. 487.

³⁰Williams, et al., Suburban Differences, p. 306.

³¹See Bish, The Public Economy, p. 161; and Ostrom, et al., "The Organization," pp. 836-837.

³²Dye, "Metropolitan Integration," p. 452; Dye, et al., "Differentiation and Cooperation," pp. 145-155; and Williams, et al., Suburban Differences, p. 305.

³³Bish, The Public Economy, p. 151.

³⁴Ibid. This concept has been used in much anti-reform literature; for example, Warren, Government in Metropolitan Regions; Ostrom, et al., "The Organization of Government"; and Bish himself.

³⁵Warren, Government in Metropolitan Regions, p. 237.

³⁶Ibid., p. 248.

³⁷Dye, "Metropolitan Integration," p. 453.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹For more detail about benefits and costs associated with alternative institutional arrangements, see Erie, et al., "Can Something Be Done?" pp. 36-37; and Jacob and Teune, "The Integrative Process," pp. 15-16.

⁴⁰Bollens and Schmandt, The Metropolis, p. 376.

⁴¹Examples of Toronto studies are Kaplan, Urban Political Systems; Thomas J. Plunkett, Urban Canada and Its Government: A Study of Municipal Organization (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1968); Albert Rose, "The Case Against Total Amalgamation in Metropolitan Toronto," in Government of the Metropolis, ed. by Joseph F. Zimmerman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968), pp. 219-227; and "Report of the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto," in Government of the Metropolis, pp. 227-263. Greater London examples include L. J. Sharpe, "The New Government in Greater London," in Government of the Metropolis, pp. 277-281; "Government Proposals for Reorganization of London Government," in Government of the Metropolis, pp. 264-277; Donald L. Foley, Governing the London Region: Reorganization and Planning in the 1960's (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972); Frank Smallwood, Greater London: The Politics of Metropolitan Reform (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965).

⁴²Rose, "The Case Against Total Amalgamation," p. 219.

⁴³Ibid., p. 220.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵The inputs for this success are discussed by Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, pp. 41-50.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 50.

⁴⁷Rose, "The Case Against Total Amalgamation," p. 227.

⁴⁸Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, p. 50.

⁴⁹Erie, et al., "Can Something Be Done"? p. 31.

⁵⁰Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, p. 48.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 250.

⁵²Rose, "The Case Against Total Amalgamation," p. 221.

⁵³Sharpe, "The New Government," p. 280, and Smallwood, Greater London, pp. 257-259.

⁵⁴Sharpe, ibid., p. 280.

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 280-281.

⁵⁶Aprodicio A. Laquian, "The Asian City and the Political Process," Philippine Journal of Public Administration, XIV, (January, 1970), 9.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 14.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ronald Wraith, Local Administration in West Africa (New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972), pp. 37-38.

⁶¹Donald B. Rosenthal, The Limited Elite: Politics and Government in Two Indian Cities (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 1.

⁶²"Lesson From Tokyo," Local Government Chronicle (January 23, 1971), 158-159.

⁶³Lucian W. Pye, "Introduction," in Cases in Comparative Politics Asia, ed. by Lucian W. Pye (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), p. 14.

⁶⁴For more detail on urban elites in Asian cities, see Laquian, "The Asian City," pp. 13-14.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 19.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 20.

⁶⁷Dharmendra Nath, "The Governmental Set Up of Delhi: Problems, Views and Experiments," The Indian Political Science Review, V, (April-September, 1971), 156.

⁶⁸Thomas M. Scott, "Metropolitan Governmental Reorganization Proposals," Western Political Quarterly, XXI (June, 1968), 252.

⁶⁹Harry J. Friedman, Local Government in Third-World Asia (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1973), p. 5.

⁷⁰Chakit Noranitipadungkarn, Elites, Power Structure and Politics in Thai Communities (Bangkok: Research Center, National Institute of Development Administration, 1970, revised from unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh), p. 5.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²This idea can be seen in Williams, et al., Suburban Differences; and Oliver Williams, "Life Style Values and Political Decentralization in Metropolitan Areas," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XLVIII, (December, 1967), 299-311.

⁷³Jacob and Teune, "The Integration Process," p. 10.

⁷⁴As the result of the coup, Bangkok and Thonburi have been abolished and consolidated into one metropolitan government of "Metropolitan City Municipality."

⁷⁵The first two factors are considered in the "Greater Bangkok Plan 2533," Litchfield Whiting Bowne and Associates, (Bangkok: Kanachange Co., Ltd., 1964), pp. 27-28.

⁷⁶"Report of the Committee for Metropolitan Planning First Meeting 1971," The Journal of Town Planning, XXV (October, 1971), 11-12.

CHAPTER II

THE MODEL FOR ANALYSIS, HYPOTHESES, AND METHODOLOGY

The Model for Analysis

"The urban ecological approach" will be utilized as a primary means of delineating socio-economic and political value differences among sub-areas in the proposed Greater Bangkok.¹ Social area analysis and attitudinal analysis will be applied in the explanation of forces and factors affecting the prospects for metropolitan political integration in Greater Bangkok.²

Social Area Analysis

According to Shevky and Bell,³ the theoretical reasoning behind the establishment of the social area framework was derived from certain broad interrelated trends produced by change brought on by the increasing scale of modern society. These trends have produced changes in three areas of urban society: (1) the arrangement of occupations (reflected by social rank or economic status and defined by the education and occupation index); (2) changes in the modes of living (reflected by familism or urbanization index from three census variables--fertility, women in the labor force, and single family detached dwelling units ratio); and (3) the redistribution of the population in space (reflected by the index of ethnic status or segregation).⁴

Wendell Bell indicates that there are at least four general utilizations of social area analysis:

- (1) the delineation of subareas,
- (2) comparative studies at one point in time,
- (3) comparative studies at two points in time, and
- (4) a framework for the execution of other types of research . . . and also utilized as a framework for the analysis of attitudes and behavior of individuals.⁵

Since its introduction, a steadily increasing number of investigations have applied the techniques of social area analysis to urban studies in the United States and abroad.⁶ The differences in each application were in the variables used and their measurement. For example, Oliver Williams and his associates used the percentage of persons twenty-five years and over with one or more years of college as the measure for education level⁷ while Thomas R. Dye used the median school years completed by persons twenty-five years of age and over.⁸ However, the three types of variation (social rank, life style, and ethnicity) will be used in this dissertation because they are basic to understanding the urban residents who must be governed.⁹ The indices employed in the analysis of these three variables are as follows:

- (1) A community social rank index, made up of two components equally weighted:
 - (a) percent of male employees in the professional, managerial and sales classification of the census;
 - (b) percent of persons twenty-five and over attaining a university level of education;
- (2) A community familism index, consisting of a simple average of three census measures:

- (a) fertility (number of children born alive per 1,000 females aged fifteen years and over);
 - (b) women in the labor force (number of females in the labor force per 100 females eleven years of age and over);
 - (c) single-family dwelling units (percent of single-family dwelling units or detached houses);
- (3) An ethnicity index, using census data to indicate the presence of ethnic groups within each community.

The socio-economic characteristics developed from this social area analysis (particularly community social rank) provide the framework for the analysis of attitudinal parts of this study.

Attitudinal Analysis

The creation of a consolidated government for the Bangkok metropolitan area to solve the problems of local governments surrounding the central city was first advanced a few years ago. Prior to that time, only a few studies had been made of urban or metropolitan problems in this area. Recently, however, two special studies have been undertaken: one by the Ministry of the Interior and one by the Bangkok Municipality.

Similar to the metropolitan governments in other countries, the purposes of a Bangkok metropolitan government would be to solve urban problems by providing comprehensive planning and area-wide service. Accordingly, the emphasis in both studies is placed upon the physical and administrative aspects of the subareas included in the proposed metropolitan area.¹⁰ These physical aspects include population, land use, transportation, public service, public utilities, housing, environmental control, etc. The purpose of the studies is to develop a rational plan from which the central government might write

appropriate legislation. A metropolitan government would be created by the central government with the expectation that it is the best method of providing adequate services to local citizens. The initiation and determination of the form of the metropolitan government ultimately will be decided by higher government authority rather than by direct public referendum. This characteristic of the unitary system of government also appears in metropolitan governments of many other countries (for example, London, England; Toronto, Canada; and Tokyo, Japan). In contrast, in the United States the initiation and determination of the form and scope of local government are strongly influenced by local public opinion.

In the United States one of the most promising recent research developments in the field of metropolitan government concentrates largely on devising more satisfactory approaches to understanding the actual functioning of the present metropolitan political system. As Dye and Hawkins note in the introduction of their book, this trend indicates that the problem of resolution of conflict or political problems is never less important than that of administration.

. . . It is true, of course, that urban governments serve two functions: the "service" function of providing certain goods and services--such as street paving and fire protection--and the "political" function of managing conflict. No one denies the importance of the administrative and technical aspects of paving streets, fighting fires, directing traffic, removing trash, treating sewage, and so on. But the really critical problems facing urban dwellers are problems which cannot be solved by administrative efficiency or technological invention. Poverty, racial hatred, slum housing, crime, financial crisis, and transportation chaos are problems which cannot be solved by expertise alone. It is not for lack of technical know-how that these problems go unsolved. Nor is it because administrative arrangements are inadequate. The obstacles to the solution of these problems are primarily political.¹¹


They also state that the fundamentals among men in the way they make their livings, in their income and educational levels, in the color of their skin, in the way they worship, in their styles of living, and so on, are at the roots of political life.¹² An important approach to understanding the political complexion of a particular area is through a survey of the attitudes of the general public and the various political elite groups that dominate the local public arena.

The whole question of public attitudes toward metropolitan government reform has long been of central concern in political science. When the merger of local government is the issue, the actors who make and/or influence decisions concerning metropolitan areas are the public officials of the area, the interest group representatives, and the voters.¹³ In the United States, voters are generally the most important in that they usually must make the final decision in an election, and it is their negative decision that usually prevents merger.¹⁴ This fact is confirmed by Scott Greer in his extensive study of the politics of metropolitan reform. He found that grass roots voter opposition can defeat reform proposals despite considerable support by the mass media and prominent civic leaders.¹⁵ In Thailand, on the other hand, this initiation and decision is made solely by public officials--particularly the Ministry of Interior--with some influence from the press. This phenomenon was also found by Kaplan in Toronto, as he notes that "The most politically influential people on Metro were the appointed and elected officials--in contrast to both the business elite and broker leadership systems."¹⁶

Traditional reform efforts in the U.S. have invariably assumed that the desire for greater economy and efficiency in the local public sector would generate sufficient support to achieve greater metropolitan centralization. Yet such assumptions were almost as universally untested. Thus, it seems most desirable to explore the potential support for metropolitan reorganization in Bangkok by examining attitudes of influential groups in that area. This also provides a cultural dimension for the ecological approach being followed in this study.

To conform with Charles Press' three influential actors, local political leaders or municipal assembly members will represent the voters, local administrators and the press will represent public officials and interest groups, respectively.

In short, this research involves the examination of those forces and factors within the systems of local government in the proposed metropolitan area which tend to support or oppose the creation of a Greater Bangkok government, with the following model as a guide for analysis.



Hypotheses

According to the main objective stated earlier, the following hypotheses are offered to explore the existing phenomena.

1. Increases in community social rank are more likely to be positively associated with opposition party votes.
2. Elected local leaders in the central city (Bangkok) are more likely to favor the proposed metropolitan plan than those of suburban cities--Thonburi, Smut Prakarn, and Nonthaburi.

Assumption: Supporters of the metropolitan plan tend to view the proposed new government in terms of efficiency and economic services for the metro area, while opponents of the plan commonly charge that the new supergovernment is less accessible to the average citizen.¹⁷

3. Municipal administrators in larger cities are more likely to favor metro government than those in smaller cities.
4. Local administrators are more likely than local leaders, who tend to view reorganization as the desire for more control from the Interior Ministry, to be concerned about planning and zoning and administrative efficiency.
5. The election of metro officials is more likely to be favored by local leaders than by local administrators, who tend to favor the appointment of those officials by the central government.
 - 5.1. The appointment of the metro mayor by the central government is likely to be favored to a higher degree in larger cities than in smaller ones.
 - 5.2. It is likely that local leaders of large and small cities will not differ to a significant degree in favoring direct election of metro assembly members.
 - 5.3. Local leaders in all sizes of cities are more likely to favor direct than indirect election of the metro mayor.
 - 5.4. The direct election of the metro mayor is likely to be favored to a higher degree by local leaders in suburban cities than by those in central cities.
 - 5.5. The indirect election of the metro mayor is likely to be favored to a higher degree by local administrators in larger cities than by those in smaller cities.
 - 5.6. The indirect election of metro councilors, as opposed to the direct election, is likely to be favored to a higher degree by both local leaders and administrators in all sizes of cities.

- 5.7. The appointment of metro assembly members is likely to be favored to a higher degree by local administrators than by local leaders.
- 5.8. The appointment of the metro mayor is likely to be favored to a higher degree by local administrators than by local leaders.
- 5.9. The appointment of metro councilors is likely to be favored to a higher degree by local administrators than by local leaders.
6. The higher the community social status the less likely its leaders and administrators will believe that the burden of local taxes, when compared to services provided by municipal government, is too high.
 - 6.1. Local leaders believe that local taxes are likely to be higher than the services provided by municipal government.
 - 6.2. Local administrators believe that local taxes are likely to be lower than the services provided by municipal government.
 - 6.3. The higher the community social status the lower the burden of local taxes will be viewed by local leaders in that community.
 - 6.4. The higher the community social status the lower the burden of local taxes will be viewed by local administrators in that community.
7. The members of the press are more likely than other groups to favor the metro plan, seeing it as a means for providing better services to suburban cities.
 - 7.1. The daily newspaper is more likely to favor efficiency, coordination, and cooperation in providing services rather than democratic government.
 - 7.2. The daily newspaper is more likely to favor the appointment of the metro mayor than the election by local citizens.
 - 7.3. The daily newspaper is more likely to favor direct election for metro assembly members than appointment by the central government.
 - 7.4. Members of the press contend that elected metro assembly members are more likely to effect better local services than assembly members appointed by the central government.

- 7.5. Members of the press contend that local taxes are likely to be higher than services provided by local government.
- 7.6. Members of the Press contend that the desire for more control by the Interior Ministry is more important for metro reorganization than other factors.

Methodology

Two research methods are utilized in this study: documentation and interview.

Documentation

The first half of Part II of this study is based on written sources concerning the situation in Thailand. Books, articles, and official documents are available from the following sources: The National Institute of Development Administration, a main source of theses and research works; The National Statistical Office; Department of Town and Country Planning; Department of Local Administration; Metropolitan City Municipality; Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi municipalities; university libraries; and prominent scholars and administrators. Another main source is thirteen major daily newspapers which are considered the best sources for information relevant to the contemporary situation in metropolitan areas.¹⁸

Interviews

The main source of information to reach the objectives of this study was collected during four months of field work. The interview schedule in the Appendix was used, Parts I and II being used for all groups and Part III being applied only to local leaders.

After four pretests with Thonburi local administrators, only minor changes in the interview schedule were necessitated, since it

was well prepared from interview schedules and questionnaires used by other scholars in this field (many by David R. Morgan¹⁹) and coupled with the fact that the writer was the only interviewer for this study.

The four month span of time used for interviews began in September, 1972, and ended in December of the same year.

The local administrator group was the first to be approached, especially in Bangkok and Thonburi due to the changes taking place as a result of metropolitan reorganization. The next groups were local leaders and newspapers, respectively. However, there was no systematic order to determine which group or person would be interviewed first (see Table 2). For most cases, no appointment was made in order to make the interview as informal as possible.

Three influential groups--local leaders, local administrators, and daily newspapers--comprise the population for this study. These three population groups are further classified into nine subpopulation groups: one group is the thirteen daily newspapers, and the other eight groups are those local leaders and local administrators in each of the four municipalities. The total number of each subpopulation and the number interviewed are shown in Table 3.

The average interviewing time for each group in each of the municipalities is shown in Table 4. It ranges from 29.25 minutes for Nonthaburi local administrators to 57.46 minutes for Thonburi local leaders. The average total for all groups in all four municipalities is 48.14 minutes.

Local leaders are those municipal assembly members elected by general election in the last municipal election²⁰ to represent their

TABLE 2
INTERVIEW DATE BY GROUP MEMBERSHIP, 1972

Group	Sept. 1-15	Sept. 16-30	Oct. 1-15	Oct. 16-31	Nov. 1-15	Nov. 16-30	Dec. 1-15	Dec. 16-31	Total
Local Leader	1	1	26	12	28	6	1	1	76
Local Administrator	19	40	20	4	2	0	0	0	85
Newspaper	0	0	0	0	6	6	0	1	13
Total	20	41	46	16	36	12	1	2	174

TABLE 3
NUMBERS OF TOTAL IN EACH SUBPOPULATION, NUMBERS INTERVIEWED,
AND PERCENT INTERVIEWED

Municipalities	Local Leaders			Local Administrators			Newspapers		
	Total No.	No. Inter- viewed	%	Total No.	No. Inter- viewed	%	Total No.	No. Inter- viewed	%
Bangkok	24	20	83	46	37	80	13	13	100
Thonburi	24	23	96	33	31	94	--	--	--
Smut Prakarn	18	16	89	9	9	100	--	--	--
Nonthaburi	18	17	94	10	8	80	--	--	--
Total	84	76	90	98	85	87	13	13	100

TABLE 4
AVERAGE INTERVIEWING TIME USED FOR EACH GROUP
IN EACH MUNICIPALITY IN MINUTES

Group	Bangkok	Thonburi	Smut Prakarn	Nonthaburi	Total
Local Leader	57.00	57.46	44.88	39.32	50.63
Local Administrator	51.58	45.66	40.50	29.25	46.15
Daily Newspaper	46.65	--	--	--	46.65
Total	52.21	50.69	43.30	36.10	48.14

communities. One of the most active groups in politics, they act on behalf of the majority of citizens. Experience in municipal government and politics provides them with knowledge of local affairs and attitudes toward local services and administration. And, as noted by Dr. Noranitipadungkarn (quoted earlier), the actions and roles of the political leadership of Thai municipal government are determined or shaped by the community. The study of their attitudes also should be related to community attitudes as a whole; therefore, this study is not only a study of the attitudes of local leaders directly but is also an indirect study of community attitudes toward local and metropolitan government.²¹

For purposes of this study, local administrators are defined as those high ranking officials in each municipality with a wide range of responsibility in administrative work. Accordingly, Bangkok (a large city) municipal administrators are those who hold the office of division head, bureau head, deputy city clerk, and city clerk. Thonburi (a medium size city) local administrators are section head, division head, deputy city clerk, and city clerk (there is no bureau level). Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi (small cities) local administrators are unit head, section head, deputy city clerk, and city clerk (there are no division or bureau levels in these two municipalities). See Table 5.

The press, especially daily newspapers, is generally regarded as the most influential group among all interest groups, and because of the lack of other sources is also cited as evidence of public opinion.²² The thirteen major daily newspapers within the metropolitan area are included in the study; in fact, these major newspapers are all located

TABLE 5

LOCAL ADMINISTRATORS IN BANGKOK METROPOLITAN AREA BY OFFICE

Office	Bangkok	Thonburi	Smut Prakarn	Nonthaburi	Total
City Clerk	1	1	1	1	4
Deputy City Clerk	2*	--	1	1	4
Bureau Head	7	--	--	--	7
Division Head	36	5	--	--	41
Section Head	--	27	3	2	32
Unit Head	--	--	4	6	10
Total	46	33	9	10	98

*There are three Deputy City Clerks but one of them is also acting as a Bureau Head.

Sources: Bangkok, Thonburi, Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi municipality official files.

in Bangkok. Weekly and other types of publications are excluded due to their existence for purposes of entertainment rather than for politics, public opinion, or administration.

Originally, the chief editor of each daily newspaper was selected purposefully as the representative of his newspaper. After conversing informally with some editors, it was found that a number of the chief editors have no connection with their newspapers other than legal or administrative responsibilities. Some of the editors decentralize their responsibilities to section heads or columnists and reporters. Accordingly, the interviewer asked each chief editor or his assistant to identify the individual who would be the best representative of his newspaper concerning policy and local political and administrative issues.

The results of the interviews with the thirteen major daily newspapers are compared with the attitudes of other groups in both urban and suburban areas. In this way the views of an important interest group which attempts to formulate and encourage public opinion in the metropolitan community can be considered in light of the attitudes of other influential groups.

Method of Presenting Material

The following part of the study is the presentation of the contemporary situation in Greater Bangkok. Although this study does not concentrate on a comparative approach, certain metropolitan experiences in other countries are mentioned as an aid to understanding metropolitan development in Bangkok.

The historical and environmental information discussed in Chapters III and IV provides the background for the attitudinal analysis. The unit of analysis--city by size, by urbanism or suburbanism, and by social status--is derived from the "Social Area Analysis" technique. Thus the socio-economic differentiation discerned from this technique becomes the basis for the analysis of group attitudes in Chapter VI.

It is necessary to note here that the analysis basically focuses on three main groups: local leaders, local administrators, and daily newspapers. The first two groups are classified not only as local leaders and local administrators but also are subdivided into high-low social rank, large-small cities, and central-suburban cities.

The concluding chapter considers the prospects for metropolitan political integration in the Greater Bangkok area in light of the information presented in previous chapters.

Footnotes

¹The explanation of the characteristics and development of socio-economic influence and political implication of urban ecology are presented in David R. Morgan, Suburban Differentiation and Metropolitan Political Integration (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Oklahoma, 1969), pp. 37-57; and Williams, et al., Suburban Differences, pp. 21-26.

²However, an analysis of policy variation, which is an important factor in considering metropolitan integration (for example, Williams, et al., Suburban Differences) will not be included in this study. This exclusion is based on the assumption that the highly centralized administrative patterns, under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior, determine the pattern of public policies in the four municipalities. Examples include the approval of local expenditure, and the appointment and promotion of municipal personnel are in the hands of this ministry. Accordingly, the pattern of determining public policies in the Thai municipal governments will not serve as a barrier to the metropolitan plan.

³One of the first attempts in the development of what has become known as social area analysis appears in Eshref Shevky and Marilyn Williams, The Social Areas of Los Angeles (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1949). Six years later it again appears in Eshref Shevky and Wendell Bell, Social Area Analysis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955).

⁴Shevky and Bell, Social Area Analysis, pp. 3-4.

⁵Wendell Bell, "Social Area Typology of Urban Neighborhoods," in Community Structure and Analysis, ed. by Marvin B. Sussman (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1959), pp. 87-88.

⁶The citation on the application of this technique has been made completely by Morgan, Suburban Differentiation, p. 66.

⁷Williams, et al., Suburban Differences, p. 52.

⁸Thomas R. Dye, "Urban Political Integration: Conditions Associated with Annexation in American Cities," in Politics in the Metropolis: Conflict and Cooperation, ed. by Thomas R. Dye and Brett W. Hawkins (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1967), p. 434.

⁹Scott Greer, Governing the Metropolis (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 27.

¹⁰Both studies would include the central city of Bangkok and the suburban cities of Thonburi, Smut Prakarn, and Nonthaburi.

¹¹Thomas R. Dye and Brett W. Hawkins, ed., Politics in the Metropolis: Conflict and Cooperation (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1967), p. 2.

¹²Ibid., p. 3.

¹³Charles Press, Main Street Politics: Policy Making at the Local Level (East Lansing: Institute for Community Development, Michigan State University, 1962), p. 54.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Scott Greer, Metropolitics: A Study of Political Culture (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963), pp. 193-197.

¹⁶Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, p. 157. In the business elite system, political power is concentrated in the hands of perhaps thirty or forty of the community's leading businessmen, and issues are raised and defined in the offices of the major business executives and informally transmitted to the mayor and city council (p. 31). In the broker leadership system, issues are generally raised and defined by private groups. The political officials put off a commitment on the issues, waiting to see what the alignment of groups on any particular issue will be and whether any decision at all will be required (p. 32).

¹⁷Williams, et al., Suburban Differences, p. 288.

¹⁸Three of these newspapers are published in English, the rest in Thai.

¹⁹Morgan, Suburban Differentiation, pp. 345-366.

²⁰The last municipal elections held in Bangkok and Thonburi were September 1, 1968, and the last municipal elections held in Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi were December 23, 1967.

²¹Even though many studies of small communities in the United States such as: Kenneth Prewitt and Heinz Eulau, "Political Matrix and Political Representation: Prolegomenon to a New Departure from an Old Problem," American Political Science Review, 63 (June, 1969), 427-41; Prewitt, "Political Ambitions, Volunteerism, and Electoral Accountability," American Political Science Review, 64 (March, 1970), 5-17; and Gordon S. Black, "A Theory of Professionalism in Politics," American Political Science Review, 64 (September, 1970), 865-78, found that the norm of voluntarism (nonprofessional political orientation with little appreciation for the art of politics) is prevalent where councils are more likely to vote for what their preferences are, and less likely to perform services for constituents. Under this circumstance, the attitudes of local representatives may not represent community attitudes. But in Thailand, the contrast has been found in the study by Noranitipadungkarn, Elites, Power Structure, p. 5, where he believed that the actions and roles of local representatives were strongly influenced by the community. In the Greater Oklahoma City area, Morgan, Suburban Differentiation, pp. 252-282, also found a considerable amount of agreement between officials and their constituencies that the actions and roles of local representatives were strongly influenced by the community.

²²For more detail about interest groups in Thailand, see Fred W. Riggs, "Interest and Clientele Groups," in Problem of Politics and Administration in Thailand, ed. by Joseph L. Sutton (Indiana: Institute for Training for Public Service, Department of Government, Indiana University, 1962), pp. 153-192.

PART II

METROPOLITAN POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN GREATER BANGKOK

CHAPTER III

THE METROPOLITAN PROBLEMS

Metropolitan problems are the consequences of political and administrative ideologies maintained in special areas--urban and suburban. The types, nature, and characteristics of the problems vary from region to region, and these variations are generally related to the historical background of the society and the practices of local government in the area.

In Thailand, the present political and administrative ideologies are based primarily upon a complex mixture of Western ideas and the traditional system which existed prior to 1868. Paternalism is considered the original philosophy of the Thai government, beginning during the administration of the Sukhothai Kingdom (1257-1350) comprised of small and less populated communities. The expansion in the size of the country and the increase in population in the Ayuthaya Kingdom (1350-1767) opened the door for the Khmer and Indian culture of divine rights of kings to replace the early concept of paternal kingship. This period was well known for its absolutism and the claim of divinity by its monarchs. The increasing complexity of administration and the expansion of the territories and number of communities outside the capital city created a new type of local government known as "feudalism." Complete decentralization

of authority existed during the Ayuthaya period, with all power and authority vested in the hands of the feudal lords who administered each province. There was no significant change in the Thonburi and the beginning of the Bangkok periods until 1868, when King Chulalongkorn introduced into the kingdom Western ideas of government.


The present characteristics of the Thai governments and administration, both central and local, can thus be summarized in Figure 3.¹

This pattern of ideologies makes the Thai political system, the behavior and attitudes of the people, and the role of political elites distinct from their Western counterparts, especially those in the United States. A form of Western democracy was nevertheless introduced by bureaucrats trained and educated in the West who eventually occupied top positions in the governmental organization. This particular variation of democracy in Thailand is initiated from the top down (from political elites to local citizens). It does not originate with local citizens, trying to govern themselves and to govern for themselves. The root of traditional ideologies is so deep that citizen participation has not yet become an important element in the attitudes of the people. Riggs reflects on this phenomenon in his study.

The revolution of 1932 sought to replace the absolute monarchy, as master of the restructured bureaucracy, by the conventional Western institutions of constitutional government. . . . In practice, however, the new institutions of political control remained largely formalistic. They presented an imposing facade of official constitutionalism, but behind this front, real power passed largely to members of the bureaucracy, both military and civilian. . . . The revolution of 1932 brought a greater dispersal, as the grip of the monarchy was broken and more people entered the political arena to participate in decision making processes.

FIGURE 3

CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PRESENT THAI GOVERNMENT



But the new entrants were for the most part in the military and civil bureaucracies, not outside.²

In its consideration of various aspects of local government to follow, this study contends that these Thai ideologies (paternalism and divine rights of kings) still have a great influence on local citizens' participation in political activities and considerable influence on the control by ruling elites and bureaucrats of their followers and people.

Local Government Structure

Local government in Thailand is classified as to central local administration and local self-government. Both reflect the "traditional-Western" style of democracy discussed earlier. The central local government is comprised of administrative units at the provincial, district, commune, and village levels. However, its hierarchy extends only to the district levels, and the central government has no regular civil service officials working below that level. There were, prior to the 1971 coup, seventy-one provinces, each headed by a governor who is appointed by and responsible to the Minister of the Interior. The district, a subdivision of the province, is under the general charge of a district officer, who is also appointed by the Minister of the Interior and reports directly to the governor of the province. The administration of provinces and districts is composed of career civil servants appointed by the ministries. These administrations are financed and hence controlled by the national government; as local administrative units, they implement the policies and decisions of the national government.

Under the absolute monarchy, local self-government was adopted according to Western style long before the revolution of 1932. But it

was only an experiment by the monarch in introducing Western democracy to local citizens. After the revolution of 1932, the promoters of the revolution publicly announced their devotion to the principles of democratic constitutional government, which was interpreted to mean local self-government as well as representative institutions in national government. At present, there are four different types of local self-government: provincial authority, municipality, sanitary district, and communal authority.³ Although self-governing powers are exercised through elective bodies, they are quite nominal.⁴

It is necessary at this point to discuss further the structure of municipal government as it is related directly to urban and metropolitan reorganization. In 1933, one year after the revolution, the Municipal Act was passed, providing for self-government in urban areas. The Act, which was amended in 1953, established three classes of municipalities: (1) the commune (Tesaban Tambon), which consisted of a group of contiguous villages with considerably limited power; (2) the town (Tesaban Muang), which included the capitals of provincial governments and towns of populations exceeding 10,000 and an average density of not less than 3,000 people per square kilometer; and (3) the city (Tesaban Nakorn) exceeding a population of 50,000, which enjoyed full municipal government.

Theoretically, municipal governments have legislative as well as executive functions which are carried out through municipal assemblies and municipal councils (or municipal executive committees); in practice, municipal councils have usually dominated municipal assemblies. Municipal assembly members are popularly elected, and the membership varies in

size, a commune having twelve, a town having eighteen, and a city municipality having twenty-four.

The municipal council, headed by the mayor, consists of two members in communes and towns, and four members in city municipalities. Members of the municipal council are appointed by the provincial governor and selected from among the assembly members, subject to approval by the assembly. The council is required to resign collectively if the assembly rejects the annual budget proposal submitted by the mayor.

Since all of the municipalities rely on the central government for budgetary support and because local taxation does not produce sufficient revenue to meet their expenses, the central government exercises considerable control over municipal finances and administration through the Department of Local Administration, the Ministry of the Interior, and various provincial administrations. The provincial governor has the authority to review municipal budgets, appoint and impeach municipal officials, and under certain circumstances dissolve municipal councils and assemblies. Because the powers of the Ministry of the Interior have usually been exercised through the provincial authorities, this dual jurisdiction of municipal affairs has occasionally produced administrative confusion and delay. This confusion and delay does not result in critical problems for smaller municipalities where urban problems are not so complex. However, during the last few decades, it has been a most important obstacle to the efficient administration of the Bangkok municipality, where urban problems grow so rapidly that changes or reforms must be made. This issue of administrative confusion and delay is one of the forces behind Greater Bangkok metropolitan reform at the present

time. More elaborate detail concerning this situation is presented in Chapter IV.

Metropolitan Problems: Myths and Realities

The common problems among all metropolitan areas are over-crowded conditions; traffic and transportation; housing; crime; water supply and drainage; garbage collection; financial crisis; lack of independence from higher levels of government; health, education, and welfare; and administrative problems. All of these are related to political, economic and social problems; solving metropolitan problems necessitates dealing with these three main concerns. The differences among metropolitan areas are the attitudes of people in each metropolis, the ways and means used by each metropolis to solve the problems, and the degree of differences among each problem in each metropolis.

There are two groups of thought concerning metropolitan problems in Thailand: first are university professors, scholars, and political and administrative scientists; second are those practitioners in government offices (the bureaucrats) and politicians who hold offices at the national level (generally military men). The two groups are at opposite extremes in their philosophies; however, both seek the same end of "metropolitan reform," but with different means.

The latter group--supported by the high political ranks of its members--views municipal government and its local leaders as inefficient, incompetent, and corrupt. This group believes that strong control or centralization is the best way to deal with local or metropolitan problems and that appointed local government officials, especially

municipal council members, are preferable to those directly elected by local citizens.

The first group--university professors, scholars, and political scientists--views local self-government as the best way to solve local problems. This group believes that the central government should provide more autonomy and authority to municipal government in order to provide adequate services where local citizens really need them. Democracy should extend from the bottom up instead of from the top down. They believe that local government can be strong and effective only if it is governed by cooperative local citizens from its majority population. This group bases its belief on American and Western ideas of local government. Most of them, like the practitioners and political elites, prefer super metro government with strong centralization.⁵ But the differences between the two groups are, as already mentioned, in the means and procedures of operating a metro government. For these scholars, greater metropolitan centralization without so many controls from the national government is needed to cope with present growing metropolitan problems. To achieve this autonomy they recommend a ministerial status for metropolitan government with the mayor elected by metro citizens from among highly qualified persons. Some of them suggest establishing smaller units of self-government within this metro area, such as those in the federation form and borough plans.

The ideas of both groups have contributed to the present structure of local and metropolitan governments, but the agreement over the appropriate form of government is in name only. These governmental forms, in fact, are not actually utilized in the Thai administrative system since

the national political elites and the bureaucrats adopt the Western form of local government only to say that they have democracy. Riggs calls this characteristic "formalism," in which the forms do not represent reality.⁶ Ferrel Heady refers to Riggs' study of political development in Thailand: "The process of modernization has permitted successful response to the impact of the West, but in the transition the official class has become the ruling class, largely self-recruited from the upper reaches of the military and civilian bureaucracy."⁷ Accordingly, laws are enforced only for the benefit of the top elite groups and are ignored when the laws interfere with the advantages of these groups.

Another myth concerns the social and economic characteristics of metropolitan inhabitants. Metro areas in Thailand differ from other large metropolitan areas especially those located in the northeastern United States, where central cities purportedly are the homes of the poor, the minorities, the unskilled and unemployed, the undereducated, and the poorly housed; and the suburbs are the home of the prosperous, the well-educated, the healthy, and the middle-class.⁸ The typical pattern in Greater Bangkok is reversed, with social and economic status high in the cities and low in the suburbs.⁹ However, the increasing urban problems (for example, air and water pollution, crime, traffic congestion, over-crowded conditions, and the high cost of land) are causing the upper and upper-middle classes to increasingly move to the suburbs. This phenomenon began a few years ago and may take four or five decades to reach the point now seen in the northeastern metropolitan areas of the United States.

Alternative Approaches to Metropolitan Reorganization

Over the last few decades, many reforms in various countries have been proposed for adapting local government to urban growth and for achieving metropolitan governmental integration. The United States, with its 243 metropolitan areas as defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census in 1970, has tried almost all of the alternatives in seeking solutions to the metropolitan problems, while others--for example, Canada, England, Japan, and Thailand, with few metropolitan areas--have experimented with only a few approaches.

There is no uniform agreement on the most desirable alternative approaches to reorganization of local government in metropolitan areas. Paul Studenski's early work considered a number of alternatives based on the degree of political integration achieved by each: intermunicipal arrangements; annexations and consolidations; city-county separation and consolidation; expansion of county government; special metropolitan authorities; borough plan; and the federated city.¹⁰

Victor Jones, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, and Roscoe Martin all considered proposals based on the effects on existing governmental structure--ranging from the mildest to the strongest.¹¹

Duane Lockard discussed three leading solutions to the metropolitan problems: (1) annexation, (2) metropolitan districts and public authorities, and (3) integrated government.¹²

John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt present a classification of metropolitan reorganization with three broad approaches: (1) the one-government approach--annexation, city-county consolidation, and school

district consolidation; (2) the two-level approach--metropolitan districts, comprehensive urban county plan, and federation; and (3) the cooperative approach--inter-local agreements, and metropolitan councils of governments.¹³

The Greater Bangkok area has attempted at least four approaches: (1) metropolitan district and public authorities; (2) consolidation; (3) metropolitan councils of government; and (4) the creation of a metropolitan city-state. The first organization in the form of metropolitan or area-wide service district to solve growing problems is the Metropolitan Electricity Authority, created on August 1, 1958, as a public authority to provide electrical service in Bangkok, Thonburi, Smut Prakarn, and Nonthaburi. In 1967, the Metropolitan Water Works Authority was formed by the central government in the same manner, and it covers the same areas as those of the former. Both area-wide organizations are operated in the form of single purpose agencies. They are creatures of the central government and are independent of the remainder of the governmental system in the metropolis. The councils of both authorities are appointed by the central government.

The second approach, consolidation, was introduced in Greater Bangkok late in 1971, just after the November coup. The National Executive Council issued Decree Number 25 to consolidate Thonburi Municipality and Bangkok Municipality, giving "Metropolitan City Municipality" as the name of the newly established metropolitan area.¹⁴ No significant change has been made to these two municipalities, with the exception of the name and the appointment of the Governor of Bangkok-Thonburi province

as ex-officio mayor of the new metropolitan government in lieu of an appointment from the elected assembly members as before.

Metropolitan Councils of Government, the third approach, were established in November, 1972, for purposes of coordinated planning of public utility activities in the Metropolitan City Municipality area.¹⁵ Professor Nikom Chantaravitoon was appointed as chairman of the eleven-man council by General Prapas Charusathiara, National Security Division, National Executive Council. The Council was created due to the increasing need for metropolitan approaches to planning, control, and coordination of independent agencies--the Metropolitan Electricity Authority, the Metropolitan Water Works Authority, the Telephone Organization, and the Metropolitan City Municipality. The Council's main purpose is to prepare a master plan and supplementary plan for all public utilities service agencies in carrying out their projects. It is hoped that this council will solve the problem of lack of coordination and cooperation. For example, the Metropolitan City Municipality frequently builds new roads, only to have the Metropolitan Electricity Authority, the Telephone Organization, and the Metropolitan Water Works Authority dig across that new road for main cables and main pipelines during the following three months. Then the Metropolitan City Municipality has to repair the newly built roads again. However, the Council does not have functional powers and lacks the authority to implement proposals, relying almost entirely on persuasion of constituent governments or organizations to effect programs.

The Metropolitan city-state approach, as discussed by Victor Jones in 1942, is the fourth method.¹⁶ The newly designated capital city,

Krungthep Mahanakhon (Bangkok Metropolis) was formed by National Executive Council Decree Number 335¹⁷ to replace the one year old Metropolitan City Municipality. According to this Decree, the provincial administration in Bangkok-Thonburi will be discontinued, and the new metropolitan government will cover all of the old Bangkok-Thonburi province with the legal status of a province with respect to central local administration.¹⁸ The Governor--who also may be called city manager or mayor--will be appointed politically by the Minister of the Interior and responsible directly to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior. When invited by the Prime Minister, he may attend Cabinet meetings when matters concern the metropolis, but he will have no vote in the Cabinet. He will work with an assembly comprised of twenty-three district representatives appointed from civic-minded persons in various walks of life. The Bangkok Metropolis also has a bureau status--concurrent with its provincial status--with its Governor having Deputy Cabinet rank.

Obstacles to Metropolitan Reorganization

There are a number of serious obstacles which must be overcome before any successful reorganization of the metropolitan political structure can be achieved.¹⁹ Scott Greer, in his incisive analysis of American metropolitan civic life, classifies three groups of interrelated impediments to governmental restructuring: (1) the underlying cultural norms of Americans concerning local government; (2) the resulting legal-constitutional arrangements; and (3) the political-governmental system built upon them.²⁰ Each one will vary in severity, of course, from area to area, but all must be considered.²¹

The norms that have helped shape the Thai system of local government are derivatives of the mixture of traditional Paternalism, Divine Rights, and Western democratic ideologies. This combination of ideologies forms the aristocratic norm of present Thai politics. The announcement by the 1932 revolutionary group of a new Western-style democracy of government by the people and for the people is only what Riggs terms "formalism." In fact, the government is controlled by a small elite group in the form of aristocracy or elitism. Unlike American norms supportive of local home rule, which are derived from Jeffersonian and Jacksonian ideologies,²² the normative character of Thai society is the cause and consequence of lack of consensus.²³ This is due to new laws, regulations, and ethical standards borrowed from abroad which cannot be fully activated. At the same time, the older customs which once fully regulated social and secular behavior become decadent survivals clung to only by the older generation, the arch-conservatives, or the ancient-minded. Reform or restructuring of local government is based largely on the desired satisfaction of the ruling elites.

Prior to 1971, the legal structure of local self-government, in the form of the municipality, was based solely on the provisions of the Municipal Act of B.E. 2496 (A.D. 1953). Only minor amendments have been made since then during which time the increasing scale of Thai urban society has become enormous. This law provides for all municipalities in the country to have the same form of government--a parliamentary form similar to the mayor-council form in the United States. The Municipal Act of 1953, with some other supplementary statutory provisions, is not only an obstacle to the reorganization of local government but limits

city authorities in their abilities to cope with the growing urban problems, especially in the Bangkok metropolitan area.

Any major surgery proposed for the political-governmental system at the local level is dependent upon the wishes of the elite group and the bureaucrats. The movement by outside reformers and academic groups toward governmental restructuring is almost invisible. Even urban dwellers, unlike those in the United States,²⁴ are insensitive to any arrangements for the control of public services and regulatory devices related to the maintenance of their life styles.

The special district is another obstacle to metropolitan reorganization. The Metropolitan Electricity Authority and the Metropolitan Water Works Authority, which operates as a public enterprise, are not under the control and coordination of the Bangkok-Thonburi Metropolitan City Municipality. There is very little chance at present for the city government to claim control of these two services, even though the services are a compulsory requirement of the Municipal Act of 1953, because not only are they making great profit, but they are also places for political rewards. Without the inclusion of these two services in the power of the metropolitan government, the reforms designed to provide metro citizens with desired services are almost impossible.

Since almost all decision-making power is in the hands of the national ruling elites, the question is, "Why do they wait so long before metropolitan-wide government is formed?" Some answers to this question were offered in Chapter I; more detail and explanation is offered in Chapter IV.

Footnotes

¹For more detail on each ideology see Daniel Wit, Thailand: Another Vietnam? (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), pp. 21-33; Fred W. Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966); and William J. Siffin, The Thai Bureaucracy (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966).

²Riggs, Thailand, p. 148.

³The National Executive Council Announcement Number 218, September 29, 1972, Part III.

⁴John W. Henderson, Area Handbook for Thailand (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 182.

⁵Examples include Kasem Udayanin, "A Note on Greater Bangkok," Journal of Administration, III (February, 1972), 6-9; Paiboon Changrien, Metropolitan Government (Bangkok: Thai Watanapanit Ltd., 1973); Choompol Swasdiyakorn, "Problem of Metropolitan Administration," in Reports on Metropolitan Problem Seminar at Chulalongkorn University, March 26-28, 1972, ed. by Issara Suwanabol, et al. (Bangkok: Social Science Association Press, 1973), pp. 193-209; and Issara Suwanabol, "Urban Administration--Some Problems in Research," in Reports on Metropolitan Problem Seminar, pp. 211-220.

⁶Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), pp. 15-19, 182-184.

⁷Ferrel Heady, Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 82.

⁸Bernard J. Frieden, Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1966), p. 19.

⁹According to the 1970 population and housing census, the populace in the Bangkok Municipality area has the highest standard score on economic status, with 82.9 compared to Nonthaburi, Thonburi, and Smut Prakarn with scores of 50.0, 27.9, and 9.1 respectively. Details are in Chapter V.

¹⁰Paul Studenski, The Government of Metropolitan Areas.

¹¹Victor Jones, Metropolitan Government, pp. 85-154; Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Alternative Approaches to Governmental Reorganization in Metropolitan Areas; Roscoe Martin, "Government Adaptation to Metropolitan Growth," pp. 404-418.

¹²Duane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government, pp. 486-502.

¹³John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, The Metropolis: Its People, Politics, and Economic Life, pp. 279-372.

¹⁴Royal Gazette, Volume 88, Section 144, December 21, 1971 (B.E. 2514).

¹⁵"Planning System in Metropolitan Public Utilities Work," Siam Rath, Tuesday, November 15, 1972 (a Thai language daily newspaper, p. 5.

¹⁶Jones, Metropolitan Government, pp. 151-154.

¹⁷Royal Gazette, Volume 190, December 13, 1972 (B.E. 2515).

¹⁸The provinces in Thailand are equivalent to states in the United States.

¹⁹Stanley Baldinger, Planning and Governing the Metropolis: The Twin Cities Experience (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1971), p. 16.

²⁰Scott Greer, Governing the Metropolis, pp. 124-125.

²¹Baldinger, Planning and Governing the Metropolis, p. 16.

²²Jefferson's ideas on local government were always couched in terms of the small community of educated yeomen rather than the large city with its teeming populace. Jacksonians stressed the "sacred right" of local self-rule but they welcomed the urban masses to share in the function of government--public office was opened to all on the premise that any citizen of normal intelligence could satisfactorily manage the affairs of the city or country.

²³Riggs, Administration, pp. 181-183.

²⁴Bollens and Schmandt, The Metropolis, p. 376.

CHAPTER IV

ENVIRONMENT FOR CHANGE AND GOVERNMENTAL INNOVATION IN GREATER BANGKOK

Government and Politics in Greater Bangkok

Politics arises out of conflicts, and it consists of such activities as reasonable discussion, impassioned oratory, balloting, and street fighting.¹ In metropolitan politics the roles played by national and local governments are a principle source of conflict since not only does conflict occur within each level but also between the two levels.

The discussion of government and politics in Greater Bangkok must take historical characteristics of the Thai political heritage into account. Wit assesses this policy's role in Thai society as: (1) the polity has long been deeply rooted in the national culture (not alien to it) and thus has benefited from a significant degree of general consensus; (2) concurrently, it has been harmoniously and effectively interrelated with the social and economic structural-functional systems of society rather than clashing with them; (3) the interrelationships among the several strategic structural-functional systems have been such that the polity always has been overwhelmingly dominant while the other vital organizing systems have been ancillary to and supportive of

it; (4) this historic pattern has continued down to the present despite various changes and modifications within the polity itself, changes which of course inevitably have been reflected in the other key systems.² Wit further outlines major political traditions as: (1) the dominance in society of relatively benevolent but authoritarian governmental leadership; (2) the periodic modernization of governmental structures (chiefly in response to external politico-military threats to national security) upon the basis of selective borrowings and adaptations from foreign societies; (3) the bureaucratization of politics; (4) the high degree of popular compliance with the decisions of government despite the absence of significant direct means for participation in the national political process.³

Bangkok, as the capital of the country under the unitary system, has no less of a need for central government, no less conflict of interests, no less complex socio-economic and political problems than those national capitals in federal states.⁴ In the long history of Thailand the capital city is of major importance. To occupy the capital cities in the war among the surrounding countries of Laos, Burma, and Cambodia means domination over these countries. Accordingly, the establishment of Thonburi in 1767 as the nation's capital and then Bangkok in 1782 were only the beginning of the high centralization of growth and urbanization since then. The twin cities of Bangkok-Thonburi have grown in the last forty years with astounding speed. During the thirty-six year period of 1932-1968 the area has increased seven times from 40 to 290 square kilometers and the population has quadrupled from 700,000 to 2,716,710.⁵ After the 1932 revolution, the increase in population and

the expansion of the city area were without systematic planning. The city grew haphazardly. As the nation's capital city Bangkok-Thonburi became a primate city.

In 1971, the Town and Country Planning Department, Ministry of the Interior, found that 60 percent of Thailand urban inhabitants are in Bangkok-Thonburi while the other 40 percent are scattered in 118 other cities.⁶ Thirty-five percent of the country's service workers are in Bangkok-Thonburi, 40 percent of the industrial workers, 60 percent of the sales workers, 80 percent of the private cars, 62 percent of the taxies, and 97 percent of university students are also in Bangkok-Thonburi.⁷

The aforementioned statistics show the reason why some foreigners refer to Bangkok as Thailand or Thailand as Bangkok.

Since the capital city has been so important from ancient times to the present, almost all political activities are played and performed in Bangkok, political power structures are based in Bangkok, and, above all, Bangkok citizens are more sensitive and active in politics than their rural counterparts. Local politics in Bangkok play an almost equally important role as that of national politics.

Political conflicts between local and national governments came to their peak during the decade before the November, 1971, coup. After about a twenty-five year experiment in adopting local self-government structures from the West with popular election for local representatives, the system failed to work the way it had in the original countries. The difficulty did not lie in the concept of local self-government but in all of the factors involved in its implementation.

First, the administrators, not the ordinary citizens, encouraged the adoption of local democracy. Second, the process of government, when put into practice, could not fulfill the dual goals of the ruling group; that is, to promote local self-government and to direct national development. Third, the absence of European-type middle classes opened the way for the senior bureaucrats, instead of local citizens, to lead the nation into political development. Fourth, democracy was new, strange, and above all against the traditional cultural and behavioral patterns where people were used to being ruled, not governing themselves. Finally, the understanding of the concept of democracy among the people was doubtful, popular participation was weak, and the attitudes of the high-ranking officials grew increasingly negative, as reflected by the comments of a former Director General of the Department of Local Administration:

- (a) . . . [An] election cannot provide highly qualified men because the qualifications required by law are too low, and the local people show too little interest in becoming candidates in municipal elections.
- (b) The members of the executive committee act as politicians rather than as executives. They promote their personal interests and power, and try to favor their supporters rather than making an effort to become good executives. Moreover, they lack experience in administration, and try to interfere with the routine administrative work which is the responsibility of the permanent employees. This introduces violations of the rules and regulations, and leads to disorganization in a municipal corporation.
- (c) Permanent employees, according to the law, are under the control of the executive committee; therefore, they try to curry favor with the executive committee rather than abide by rules and regulations. In this way they ally themselves to the executive committee for their own protection and advancement.

- (d) Municipal supervision and control is becoming weaker. This is due to the fact that the law's attempt to grant freedom and local autonomy to the municipal government met with very poor results because the local people cannot take advantage of this freedom and autonomy.
- (e) The expenses of municipal activities are too high because there are too many municipal council (assembly) members. Municipal management is inefficient and too large an amount of money is spent on salaries.⁸

In response to this defect, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, head of the October 20, 1958, coup, announced a decree to suspend local popular elections in 1959 and replace elected officials with appointed municipal assembly members and councilors.⁹ The conflict within local politics which influenced the effectiveness of local administration and the stability of local executive committee (council) was reflected in Sarit's speech:

. . . our municipal governments have started after the 1932 revolution and it was only twenty-five years old. . . . Since it is new it faced many difficulties. In some cases, it turned to quarreling and destroying each other as in political affairs. In fact, municipal government is a domestic administration affair, not politics such as those of the national government. . . .¹⁰

In Bangkok and Thonburi, after the suspension of popular elections, there was an act requiring Bangkok and Thonburi municipalities to be responsible directly to the Ministry of the Interior, bypassing the governor's control. The reason offered for this act was efficiency and feasibility in providing public services. Moreover, the appointed Mayor of Bangkok and Thonburi municipalities during this period was the Director General of the Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior, who was responsible for local administration, both central local administration and local self-government. While this act helped in

reducing the complexity and red tape of municipal administration, in fact, it was the intention of the central government to place closer control on Bangkok and Thonburi municipalities.

The administration under Sarit's direction worked well in the beginning because of his strong personality. After his death in December, 1963, Bangkok and Thonburi municipal services and administration became even worse than before the coup. Corruption and chaos in local administration were commonplace in these two cities. The purchase of 1,000-rai of land (one rai is equal to 0.4 acres or 1,600 square meters) for 207 million baht (20 baht equal \$1.00 U.S.) by the Bangkok Municipal Council was the main issue for local newspapers which alleged corruption in the Council and among top-ranking officials.¹¹

Another example of chaos in municipal administration was the inability of the Council to solve the problem of rising meat prices in Bangkok, especially pork, which was under the control of the Union Livestock Trading Company, a municipal trade enterprise. The people's attitudes toward government operations were so bad that the majority voted for the opposing party in both local and national elections in the Bangkok area (1968 and 1969 respectively), and first ever held in the ten years since the Sarit regime. As a result of these elections, at the national level, all Bangkok representatives were from the Democrat Party (Prachatipat Party), which is the only major opposition party in Thailand. However, the Government Party (Sahapracha Thai or United Thai People's Party) still maintained their majority by winning in other provinces and, of course, by having the right to form a national government with Field Marshall Thanom Kittikachorn as the Prime Minister.

At the local level, the Democrat Party, by winning twenty-two out of twenty-four seats in Bangkok, formed the new Bangkok Municipal government. This new local government thus was controlled by the opposing party to the national government.

After losing local control in Bangkok to the Democrat Party, the national government under the United Thai People's Party employed another political strategy by turning direct control of Bangkok and Thonburi municipalities back to provincial governors in the hope that the governors would exercise greater supervision over the new Bangkok and Thonburi governments than would the Ministry of Interior or the national government. Since the direct control over municipal government is in the hands of the governors, who are civil service officials, the Government Party (national government) can exercise close administrative control over the performance of all municipal functions without receiving any serious criticism from the opposing party and local citizens.¹²

The conflicts which developed between the Bangkok Governor and Bangkok Municipality, followed by many restrictions placed upon them by the national government, resulted in an excessive control (for example, budget approval, appointment and by-law approval) that made local self-government unworkable. The Government Party's strategy had worked. Many continuing projects have been interrupted by these red tape requirements and the lack of financial support from the central government. New plans and projects were difficult to work out; the new people's government could do no better than the former autocratic government.

Conflict within Bangkok and Thonburi municipalities themselves was another phenomenon during the four years (1968-1972) of local democratic governments. For Thonburi, conflict took place between two major groups: the Democrat Party and the Thonburi People's Group. Both groups had almost equal seats in the Municipal Assembly with only one seat difference. The Thonburi People's Group, which had the chance to form the executive committee or municipal council could not carry on local administration under its policies. After one mayor resigned, another in his group replaced him, but the conflicts continued along with serious restrictions from the governor.

In Bangkok, the outlook, just after the election, was very favorable for the new local government. In 1968 the Democrat Party won twenty-two out of twenty-four seats. But later on, conflicts within that group were ever stronger than those between the two Thonburi groups. It led to the resignation of the first Municipal Council not long after the election. The new Municipal Council, which was also formed by the Democrat Party, could do no better than its predecessors. Reasons for the conflicts can be summarized in three categories: (1) individual interests were not fulfilled; (2) no familiarity and no strong party identification existed among the member of the group; and (3) Party headquarters placed more control and restriction on Municipal Assembly members and councillors.¹³

Many observers believe that under the present system of local and national government there is little chance of solving local problems in this metropolitan area. Some experienced local leaders comment that it was the Democrat Party's mistake in trying to take total responsibility

and control of the Bangkok municipality. They suggest that the Democrat Party would be more effective as the opposing party in both local and national government. The reasons they give are: (1) under the present system of local government they can never fulfill their policies; and (2) they are the opposition party to the central government which will never want to support this opposing local government.

In fact, no matter whether this comment is true or not, the Democrat Party has never really profited from its control of the Bangkok Municipal government. It may have lost so much support of the people that it might lose control of the local government if municipal elections were held in the near future.

Early Efforts Toward Metro Planning

The city beautification movement, which originated in Europe and America, was introduced into Bangkok by King Rama V about a century ago. Whether or not the introduction was intended to establish systematic planning for the future growth of Bangkok, the results have been the New Road, public parks, railroads, water and electrical systems, and many other projects credited to the foresight of the introducer. These Western ideas of local planning and administration were implemented by Kings Rama VI and VII.¹⁴ So that until recently, there were no problems such as excess population, slums, traffic congestion, air and water pollution, and other urban problems.

After the 1932 coup, Bangkok grew out of all proportion to all other cities in Thailand. There was no critical consideration given to physical, systematic and comprehensive planning for this rapid urban growth.

It was not the Thai Government but the United States, being experienced in serious urban problems, which took the initiative to offer a grant for a two year contract toward metropolitan planning in 1957 which resulted in the Greater Bangkok Plan 2533. This scientific planning has since been used as the basic background for later metropolitan planning by the Ministry of Interior, Bangkok Municipality, and other urban planners.

Greater Bangkok Plan 2533

The Greater Bangkok Plan 2533 (A.D. 1990) is a report of a study of the problems and prospects for the areas covered by Bangkok and Thonburi provinces. The plan was prepared by the consulting firm of Litchfield Whiting Bowne and Associates serving under contract with the International Cooperation Administration, represented by the United States Operations Mission to Thailand, and the Thai Ministry of Interior. After over two years of study, the plan was presented to the Ministry of Interior in 1960 to cover the period of the following thirty years.

The purposes of the plan, as stated, are three-fold: (1) to prepare a comprehensive general plan which will provide a rational, consistent framework within which specific physical plans for regional services and facilities may be developed; (2) to develop general, practical plans, including programs for their implementation, for water supply, storm and sanitary sewage, transportation, schools, etc.; and (3) to institutionalize planning as a continuing program and process in the Bangkok-Thonburi Metropolitan Area.¹⁵

Recommendations of this Plan can be summarized as follows:¹⁶

a. Population. During the next thirty years, hold the population of the Greater Bangkok area to a total of 4.5 million people by encouraging the growth and development of other cities and regions throughout the country in order to provide adequate services and facilities for all.

b. Land Use. Expand the land for urban use by six times in order to provide proper services and facilities for the future population increase of two and one-half times. Facilitate this future land development in a "finger" type growth to most economically provide needed utilities and traffic routes while preserving liveability and amenity with "open" types of land use between the more intensely developed "finger."

c. Circulation. The development of integrated loop and arterial roads with adequate parking facilities, to provide easy movement of traffic within and around the Metropolitan Area, and to strengthen other cities. The separation and expansion of railway passenger and freight facilities. The expansion of the port to meet present needs, plus consideration of a new port for future needs.

d. Services and Facilities. Provide for sufficient schools, recreation and open spaces, fire stations, branch libraries, a new national library, university and zoological garden, and expansion of the University of Fine Arts and the National Museum. Also necessary are approximately 562,000 units of new housing and the clearance of blight in the existing metropolitan area, during the life of the Plan.

e. Utilities. These include the expansion of the water distribution system, the establishment of a sanitary sewage system, utilization

of the canals plus collection system and pumping to eliminate or reduce storm flooding, and the construction of perimeter canals and locks plus diking to protect against flooding from high river stages and flooding from the surrounding rice fields.

f. Effectuation. To be accomplished, the following should be done: (1) the establishment of a permanent central planning and development office staffed with trained personnel; (2) enactment of legislation to enable the planning office to function with adequate legislative powers and financial resources; (3) institution of long-range financial planning for the metro area; and (4) coordination of all public improvements in the metro area through the planning office. The total cost of improvements contained in the Plan amounts to approximately 27 billion baht (approximately \$1.35 billion). This should be financed by national appropriations, bond issues, short-term loans, capital city revenues and foreign loans and grants.

Unfortunately, the Plan has been shelved since then without any implementation except the establishment of the Department of Town and Country Planning as the permanent planning agency in 1962. There has been no official announcement of the reason for not utilizing the plan. However, it is possibly a reflection of an elite's opposition to changes where their political interests would be adversely affected by those changes.

Greater Bangkok Plan 2543

Another Plan, the Greater Bangkok Plan 2543, based entirely on Litchfield's Plan, was prepared in 1970 by the City Planning Division,

Bangkok Municipality. To cover the next thirty-year span, it was extended to the year B.E. 2543 (A.D. 2000). All other statistics and expectations have been changed to conform with the ten-year head start of the old plan. Population at the end of 2000 was expected to be 6.5 million. Urban area was increased from Litchfield's 460 to 520 square kilometers. Other areas--commercial, industrial, residential--have been increased in certain proportions.

The Plan was proposed for implementation no later than 1971. It is also only a plan on paper without any attention paid to it by the government.

The Department of Town and Country Planning Plan

After the establishment of the Town and Country Planning Department in the Ministry of Interior (as the result of Litchfield's proposal in 1962), considerably greater interest developed in systematic town and city planning in Thailand. Most of the urban areas, especially the provincial headquarters, have the master plans needed to control urban growth. The Greater Bangkok Plan was among those plans prepared by the Department, although it was based primarily upon Litchfield's Plan, with some revision to suit the local situation and culture.¹⁷

The Plan was proposed to be fulfilled in B.E. 2533 (A.D. 1990), the same date as that of Litchfield's Plan. Since it proposed to start in B.E. 2514 (A.D. 1971), the Plan was a twenty-year project and limited metro population to 6.5 million.

The Department of Town and Country Planning realized that metropolitan problems were related to problems occurring in other parts of

the country. In response, it studied and analyzed related information and came up with three levels of planning policies: national, regional, and metropolitan levels.

At the national level, according to the above study, the government should decentralize urban growth to three major urban areas: Chiangmai, Khonkaen, and Hardyai.

The regional plan includes the development of three industrial centers at the site of Nakorn Pathom, Chonburi, and Smut Sakhon, which are approximately fifty to sixty kilometers from Bangkok.

The metropolitan level plan will cover an area of approximately 732 square kilometers within the four provinces that were proposed by Litchfield.

The plan was presented to the Committee for Metropolitan Planning at its first meeting on September 13, 1971.¹⁸ At the end of this meeting the Committee decided to appoint five subcommittees to consider and work out the details of the Plan. The five subcommittees included the subcommittee on population, on general land use, on industrial land use, on transportation and communication, and on utilities.

Until now, the Plan has not been completed but the possibility for acceptance by the government is high for several reasons; for example, the committees appointed by the government and metropolitan problems have become increasingly more critical. Above all, however, it was supported by General Praphat, one of the most influential government authorities, who as Chairman of the Committee at its first meeting demonstrated his support of the Plan in his open meeting speech.¹⁹

Metropolitan Government Plan

Metropolitan government reorganization for the Greater Bangkok area was initiated by the Interior Ministry soon after Chamnan Yuwaboon become the appointed Mayor of Bangkok Municipality and Director General of the Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior (1958-1968). The Ministry of Interior appointed a committee composed of government officials, retired officials, merchants, bankers, and university professors who teach politics and administration to study and draft the plan for a metropolitan governmental structure.

After several meetings, in November, 1967, certain principles were agreed upon by the majority of the committee members. First, the metro governor, who would be politically appointed, would directly carry out metropolitan governmental policies laid down by the central government; and second, the metropolitan boundary would be the same as that of Litchfield's proposal (covering all of Bangkok and Thonburi provinces and some parts of the urban areas of Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi provinces). Considerable conflicts developed over the plan for metropolitan governmental structure among the committee members. The main opposing ideas concerned whether the metropolitan government should be a two-tier or a one-tier system. Since no agreement was reached, the Committee presented both ideas to the Interior Ministry in 1967.

The Two-Tier Metropolitan Government

Metropolitan government, according to the two-tier proposal, would be divided into a central metropolitan administration and what is called metropolitan self-government.

The first tier or central metropolitan administration would be an independent organization operated under the direct control of the central government, separated from any ministries and other government agencies. It would include a politically appointed governor and three deputy governors who would be regular central civil servants.

The second tier or metropolitan self-government would be divided into two subtiers: the metropolitan municipality and the metropolitan sanitary district. (See Figure 4.)


The members of the metropolitan municipal assembly would be elected by local citizens to perform legislative functions for the lower tier. The mayor and other council members would be appointed from among the elected assembly members.

The metropolitan sanitary districts are those outer districts to be made up from a combination of urban and rural areas. There would be no mayor but an appointed director who would be a central civil servant performing as the sanitary executive. The assembly members would be half elected from and by local citizens, and half appointed.

Proponents of this idea contend that the two-tier system has been successfully used in London, Toronto, and Tokyo. In fact (see Figure 4), this proposal contains nothing not already found in the 1953 Municipal Act except more power has been given to the Governor, and the metropolitan legislative body consists of metro municipal and sanitary district representatives. It cannot be said to be a truly federated system where each municipality has more independence and more authority within a metro government.

FIGURE 4

TWO-TIER METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT FOR GREATER BANGKOK PROPOSED BY THE INTERIOR MINISTRY 1967



Source: The Thai Ministry of Interior, "Proposal for Greater Bangkok Administration Act B.E. an official letter presented to the Prime Minister, November 6, 1967. (Mimeo)

One-Tier Metropolitan Government

The main purpose of the one-tier government is to avoid fragmentation, red tape, and inefficient local administration in the capital city, according to its supporters. The structure of government would consist of the Governor, the Council, and the Legislature. The Governor would be politically appointed by the Cabinet which is recommended by the Interior Minister.

The Metro Council would be composed of those representatives from various ministries, departments, and other governmental agencies, all of whom are regular civil servants. Metro Assembly members would be popularly elected. (See Figure 5.)


It is clear that this one-tier metropolitan government would serve and be responsible to the central government rather than local citizens because the Governor and the councilors would be appointed by central government officials.

Metropolitan administration would be divided into region (Ket) and subregion (Kwaeng). Each of them would be a field office or administrative unit of the Metro Government. In other words, these regions and subregions would be governed not by local citizens but by central government officials. What decentralization may be found in this plan is decentralization of administration, not power or authority, to the field offices in each region and subregion.

Since the metropolitan area is so important as the national capital, the Ministry of Interior, after considering the Committee's recommendation, proposed to the Prime Minister and his Cabinet an elaborate consideration of the future plan of the nation's only metropolitan area

FIGURE 5

ONE-TIER METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT FOR GREATER BANGKOK PROPOSED BY THE INTERIOR MINISTRY 1967



Source: The Thai Ministry of Interior, "Proposal for Greater Bangkok Administration Act B.E. an official letter presented to the Prime Minister, November 6, 1967. (Mimeo)

in November, 1967. It is this proposal consisting of both ideas, one-tier and two-tier, that provided the basic background for the later established Metropolitan City Municipality and finally the Bangkok Metropolitan.

The Metropolitan City Municipality: Starting
Point or Dead-End

Since the ideas of Western democracy were first introduced to Thailand by King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), both national and local systems of government were determined from the top by the ruling elite. Until now, the ruling group continued to regard its mission as a paternal one of leading the people, and the political forms and methods used by the government seemed to matter little to the people so long as the authorities were not oppressive.²⁰

As noted in a previous section, the reforms for a metropolitan type of government and planning have been made around the Bangkok area for many years, but the central government (the elite group) was not quite sure how its power would be affected by the new proposal prepared by a committee of knowledgeable persons and academicians. After another coup in November, 1971, the National Executive Council (NEC), the revolutionary group, announced a month later that Decree Numbers 24 and 25 amalgamated the two provinces of Bangkok and Thonburi into a single administrative unit.²¹ The two municipalities within each province have also been consolidated into one municipality and given "Metropolitan City Municipality" as the new name for this metropolitan government. The reasons for the consolidation, as explained by NEC, are: the two cities are closely related in both history and government; the way of

life in both cities is identical as a single community; and there are many governmental organizations operating and providing similar benefits for both cities, for example, court and registration for certain businesses. This reform, as announced by the NEC, would purportedly bring about economy, efficiency, and progress to the life of all metropolitan citizens.

Without any doubt, this reform has at least conformed to the desires of the ruling elites. The two-tier approach has been applied but certain changes have been made. The primary departure from the proposal prepared by the Committee a decade ago is in the structure of the new government. The Committee had proposed popular election for Metropolitan Municipality Assembly members, with the Metro Mayor and councilors appointed from among these assembly members. However, according to Decree Number 25, during the drafting of the Metropolitan Act and Election Law, the Metropolitan Assembly would be composed of no more than thirty-six members appointed by the Interior Minister from those who qualify. The Metropolitan Executive Committee would be headed by the Metro Mayor and no more than eight other councilors appointed by the Minister of Interior. Furthermore, the Metropolitan Governor would be the Metro Mayor ex-officio.

This reform can thus be viewed as the starting point toward more centralization of power at the central government level in controlling the capital city. This intention has been noted by one Thai public administration student after his extensive research:

. . . the establishment of the municipality of Metropolitan Bangkok-Thonburi was influenced mainly by political consideration. This can be clearly observed by looking

at the modification of the municipality laws in different periods starting from 1933 up to the present. The idea of municipality was first conceived by the People's Party leaders as a basic instrument in educating the masses who were ignorant of democratic ways of life. However, failure in this attempt had led the government in the later periods to emphasize "centralization" as a special feature of municipal government. Municipal laws of 1938, 1943, and 1953 were all designed to consolidate the power of the central government instead of decentralizing it. Such laws were tailored to suit the temperament of the ruling cliques at that time with the idea that municipal government would help in maintaining their political stability.²²

The Bangkok Metropolis

The establishment of the Bangkok Metropolis by the national government to replace the one-year old Metropolitan City Municipality, in December, 1972, is another aspect of the above thesis. The two-tier arrangement was replaced by a one-tier system. The Metro Governor, with greater power and authority, would be appointed politically by the central government. The Assembly members would be half appointed and half elected. This half and half arrangement would become effective only after the first four years. During the first four years, all members of the Metro Assembly would be appointed by the central government.

Accordingly, there can be no doubt about the central government's intention to control Greater Bangkok. There can be no real opposition between the central government and the metropolitan government because the central appointed Governor will assume the sole control over Metropolitan administration. The opposing party will no longer continue to dominate the Metro Assembly.

The division of the Metropolis into region (Ket) and subregion (Kwaeng) has been referred to by the central government as the

decentralization of administration. In fact, it is only the decentralization of operations to the appointed officers in subareas, not to local citizens.

Those criticisms made by anti-reformers among American students of metropolitan politics discussed in Chapter I can also be applied to the present Bangkok reform. In particular it has been argued that reformers tend to resort to despotic solutions, subverting the preferences of individual citizens to the preferences of the planners and political performers controlling the centralized mechanism.

In summary, at this time, the present political phenomena in Greater Bangkok is a result of the historical and cultural characteristics of the Thai society. Initiation for changes has not come from the local citizenry, or even where such seems to occur, it will never be accepted by the ruling group or perhaps even by the public itself. The belief that the government must take the initiative and provide services to the people is still strong, even in metropolitan areas. In other words, it is the duty or responsibility of government, not the citizen, to provide public services. Government is expected to function without significant citizen assistance, participation, or involvement. In effect, all governments since 1932 have acted on the assumption that their mission was to lead and guide the people.²³ They have continued to maintain that the people were not yet fully prepared for participation in the Western form of democratic political process.²⁴

However, the results of the last elections (1967-1969), both local and national, in Bangkok and Thonburi areas may be an indication that this long-standing belief is undergoing modification. It is still not

clear whether the results indicate a change in the attitudes of the public toward the government's ability or a feeling that the government should be more responsive to the larger public. The following chapter will provide some answers to this question.

Footnotes

¹Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Random House, Inc., 1963), p. 7.

²Wit, Thailand, p. 21.

³Ibid.

⁴For a discussion of federal capitals in seventeen federations see Donald C. Rowat, "The Government of Federal Capitals," International Review of Administrative Services, XXXVI (1970), 347-355.

⁵An Nimmanahaeminda, "Important Problems on Metropolitan Bangkok-Thonburi City Planning," Journal of Administration, III (February, 1972), 26.

⁶The definition of urban areas in Thailand, according to the National Statistical Office, are those areas within the municipality's boundaries.

⁷"Report of the Committee for Metropolitan Planning First Meeting 1971," p. 9.

⁸Chamnan Yuwaboon, "Thoughts on Municipal Government Problems," in The First All Mayor's Conference, ed. by Reum Dolasopon (Bangkok: Ramindra Press, 1955), translated by Choop Karnjanaprakorn.

⁹"Revolution Party Announcement Number 34," Royal Gazette, Special Issue, Volume 75, Section 10, December 8, 1958, p. 1.

¹⁰Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, "Speech on the Opening Session for Deputy Governor and District Officer Meeting, April 27, 1959," Collection of the Speech by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, The Prime Minister

¹¹See Siam Rath, November 22, 1968.

¹²More detailed description of this strategy is found in Achirawit Supanapaesat, "The Municipality of Metropolitan Bangkok-Thonburi: A Study of the Causes of the Establishment, Model and Problems of Administration" (Bangkok: unpublished master's thesis, National Institute of Development Administration, 1972), pp. 61-66.

¹³Ibid., pp. 66-69.

¹⁴An Nimmanahaeminda, "Planning for the Systematic Growth of the Metropolis," in Reports on Metropolitan Problem Seminar at Chulalongkorn University, March 26-28, 1972, ed. by Issara Suwanabol, et al. (Bangkok: Social Science Association Press, 1973), p. 251.

¹⁵Litchfield Whiting Bowne and Associates, Greater Bangkok Plan, p. ix.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 9-11.

¹⁷For more detail, see "Report of the Committee for Metropolitan Planning First Meeting 1971," pp. 1-27.

¹⁸The members of this Committee have been appointed by the government from the head of relevant governmental agencies and those involved in planning and implementation of this Plan. There are no private or citizen representatives on this Committee.

¹⁹"Report of the Committee for Metro Planning First Meeting," pp. 3-6.

²⁰Harvey H. Smith, et al., Area Handbook for Thailand (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 301.

²¹"The National Executive Council Announcement Numbers 24 and 25," Royal Gazette, Volume 88, Section 144, December 21, 1971.

²²Supanapaesat, "The Municipality of Metropolitan Bangkok-Thonburi," pp. 177-178.

²³Henderson, et al., Area Handbook for Thailand, p. 188.

²⁴Ibid., p. 189.

CHAPTER V

THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF METRO POLITICS

From an intensive study of the power structure of two small urban communities, one Thai scholar reflects upon the social context of Thailand community politics in these words:

Since Thailand was governed for so long by the central government, working for municipal government is not considered to be an attractive job. Instead, there are community and social functions in which the leaders of high social status and power participate. In these functions, the power of the elites was found to be as far-reaching as it was in both the municipal and central governments. In many instances the leaders of these activities were the same people who were municipal executives. Men of high social status and great power can discuss both community and governmental affairs more effectively than those outside the power stratum, and it is easy to see why this occurs.¹

As noted in the previous chapter, the roles of these leaders are determined by the community. Thus, the study of the socio-economic background of the people living in each community in this chapter might provide some insight into the forces supporting or opposing metropolitan reform in Greater Bangkok. The central proposition of this study has been that differentiation and specialization in metropolitan areas result not only in interdependence among local units of government, and consequently in pressure for governmental integration, but also in divergent

local interests that perpetuate demands for autonomy.² The socio-economic background of local leaders, administrators, and the press have also been compared to their local constituencies. An analysis of the attitudes of these three groups will be presented in the next chapter.

Population Characteristics in Greater Bangkok

It is a matter of everyday observation that metropolitan areas are subdivided into different sections, each exhibiting certain distinctive features.³ To study the differences among subcommunities in the Greater Bangkok area a "social area analysis," which was initiated by Shevky and Bell,⁴ has been applied as a method for the systematic analysis of their social characters.

The advantages of social area analysis have already been discussed in Chapter II. Here it is appropriate to note some of the limitations of this technique before proceeding to its application.

There are at least three basic limitations to its use.⁵ First, at the broader conceptual level the Shevky-Bell typology suffers from the same disadvantages as other classification devices: the arbitrary manner of defining categories and the lack of relevance to a broad theory.⁶ There is no unique criterion for the selection of variables, and little attempt is made to tie in the notion of the social area with any of the underlying theory.⁷

Second, the fallacy of ecological correlation may result from the use of this technique. This involves the problem of making inferences about the individual from aggregate data.⁸ However, the proponents of this technique have argued that collected observations and ecological correlations may be of considerable usefulness for certain kinds of

studies without the necessity of making assumptions about individual behavior.⁹ One can make valid inferences from aggregate data about the behavior of units at that same level of aggregation. Furthermore, the structure of the whole metropolitan area is viewed as a product of the characteristics of its subareas. Thus, this limitation may easily be avoided when applied to a metropolitan area.

A third criticism of ecological studies concerns the reliability of inferences about group structure and behavior from spatial clusterings of certain population characteristics.¹⁰ It cannot be assumed, for example, that a particular pattern of social interaction will occur merely because certain characteristics are present within a particular census tract. It has also been argued that no such serious problem exists for those who study city government because local governments are spatially structured.¹¹

Despite these shortcomings, social area analysis has a utility for urban research far greater than that of any other single approach which currently exists,¹² and will be used as the main research technique for this study.

Indices of Economic, Family, and Ethnic Status

Based primarily on the 1970 Population and Housing census, all census variables have been reduced to three basic factors, including the economic, family, and ethnic characteristics of the city populations.¹³ The basic unit of analysis in the construction of social areas for this study is the city (municipality), not the census tract that is generally used in the United States.¹⁴

The index of economic status for each city is the average of the standard score of two selected variables--education and occupation. The index of family status is the average of the standard score of three variables--fertility ratio, women in the labor force, and single-family detached dwellings. Ethnic status index is the percentage of foreign citizens in each city.¹⁵ The variables selected to measure the three factors are summarized as follows:

<u>Index of Economic Status</u>	<u>Index of Family</u>	<u>Index of Ethnic Status</u>
Education	Fertility ratio	Foreign citizens
Occupation	Women in the labor force	
	Single-family detached dwelling	

Each city can be given three scores--one each for the indices of economic, family, and ethnic status. These scores have been standardized to range from zero to 100. In a city with high scores on the index of economic status there are many persons having white-collar occupations. Cities having high scores on the index of family status contain populations which have low fertility ratios (not many children born alive in relation to the number of women aged 15 and over); many women in the labor force; and not many single-family detached dwellings. Cities which contain many foreign or minority citizens will have high scores on ethnic status.

The economic level or social rank score allows us to place a given neighborhood or city at one level of socio-economic status according to the occupation and education of its residents; the familism or urbanization score tells us something about the other variations in "life style independent of social rank and segregation"; the ethnicity or segregation

score allows us to measure the concentration of ethnic population in the area.¹⁶

Computation of the Indices of Economic, Family, and Ethnic Status

The following procedure for the computation of the indices of economic, family, and ethnic status are applied from those that have been done by Shevky and Bell.¹⁷

A. The formula for standardization:

$$S = x(r-o)$$

where

S = standardized score for a particular variable;

r = city ratio for a particular variable;

o = lower limit of the city ratio for a particular variable;

$$x = \frac{100}{\text{range of the ratio for a particular variable}}.$$

B. For women in the labor force which has an inverse relation to the other indices which are computed, the formula is adjusted to read as follows:

$$S = 100 - x(r-o).$$

C. Index of Economic Status:

1. Compute the following ratio:

- a. Education ratio--the percentage of persons aged 25 and over with a college degree;
- b. Occupation ratio--the percentage of male employees in the professional, managerial and sales classifications.

2. Compute the education and occupation standard scores using the formula given in A above.

3. Compute a simple average of the education and occupation standard scores. The average is the Index of Socio-Economic Status for a city.

D. Index of Family Status:

1. Compute the following ratios:

- a. Fertility ratio--the number of children born alive per 1,000 females aged 15 and over;
- b. Women in the labor force ratio--the number of females in the labor force per 100 females 11 years old and over;

- c. Single-family detached dwelling units ratio--the percentage of single-family dwelling units.
2. Compute the fertility and single-family dwelling units standard scores from the formula given in A above.
3. Compute the women in the labor force standard score using formula given in B above.
4. Compute a simple average of the fertility, women in the labor force, and single-family dwelling units standard scores. The average is the Index of Family Status for a census city.

E. Index of Ethnic Status:

1. Add the number of persons designated "foreign citizens."
2. Divide the above sum by the total population in each city.
3. Multiply the above quotient by 100 to obtain the Index of Ethnic Status for each city.

Socio-Economic Characteristics in the Four Cities

Based on the social area indices, it is possible to classify the socio-economic level of the four cities--the units for attitudinal analysis in the subsequent chapter.

Bangkok, with its high percentages of both education and occupation, has the highest economic status with a standard score of 82.9. (See Table 6.) Because Bangkok has over 90 percent of the university students it is the center for all of the activities that attract the highly educated and the white-collar and sales workers.

Perhaps the most interesting case is Nonthaburi which has the lowest percentage of people 25 years old and over with a college education, but the highest percentage of professional, managerial, and sales workers compared to the other three cities. This area was also found to be an exceptional case in one study about a decade ago where the average population growth rate in the four cities of Greater Bangkok was far above the average annual rate of the national level, but Nonthaburi was far below

the average national rate.¹⁸ The high ratio of white-collar occupations in this area would seem to be primarily the result of the concentration of urban population (see Table 1). Nonthaburi's downtown business center has a high percentage of sales, managerial (including government officials), and other professional and related workers.

TABLE 6
EDUCATION, OCCUPATION, AND ECONOMIC STATUS
GREATER BANGKOK AREA, 1970

City	Education	Occupation (Males)	Economic Status
	College Graduate (%)	Professional, Sales, Managerial (%)	Standardized Score
Bangkok	6.1	34.3	82.9
Nonthaburi	2.8	36.9	50.0
Thonburi	4.6	29.4	27.9
Smut Prakarn	3.4	29.3	9.1

Smut Prakarn has the lowest ratio in both education and occupation which results in the lowest score of economic status of 9.1.

Since the urban center of Bangkok has a much higher economic status than the three suburban cities, it seems advisable to group these four cities by economic status into "High" and "Low" categories.

Bangkok should be designated as a high economic status city; Thonburi, Smut Prakarn, and Nonthaburi were considered as low economic status for purposes of subsequent analysis of group attitudes.

From the three census components--fertility ratio, women in the labor force, and single family detached dwelling units--the familism

index has been devised to measure differences in family life styles or family status or urbanization.¹⁹

TABLE 7
FAMILISM SCORES, GREATER BANGKOK AREA 1970

City	Fertility Ratio ^a	Women in Labor Force (%)	Single-Family Dwelling (%)	Familism (Standardized Score)
Bangkok	2,225.9	44.9	47.1	25.7
Thonburi	2,386.5	58.7	56.1	28.0
Nonthaburi	2,444.7	41.5	70.6	83.0
Smut Prakarn	2,576.3	40.9	75.0	92.1

^aFertility ratio--the number of children born alive per 1,000 females aged 15 and over.

Greer and Kube clarify how an urban area is different from a suburb in the United States as they note that at one extreme we may speak of the "urbanism" of the densely inhabited apartment district and at the other, of the "familism" of the suburbs.²⁰

Table 7 provides the picture of familism in the Greater Bangkok area with the cities of Bangkok and Thonburi sharing the low score on the familism index while at the other end, Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi both have high familism scores. This simply means that Bangkok and Thonburi are more urbanized communities than Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi which are less urban according to Greer and Kube's idea above. The question remains, however, of whether Thonburi should be analyzed as urban and thus grouped with Bangkok or suburban and joined with Smut Prakarn and

Nonthaburi as specified earlier. It has been previously noted that Thonburi has many characteristics in common with Bangkok but differences also exist. Economic status and geographical setting make Thonburi more like a suburban city.

Another look at Table 7, taking size of the city into consideration, reveals that city size is related to the life style of people living in the area. That is, the smaller the city the higher the score of family status.

Social areas are composed of a city or cities having particular scores on the indices of economic and family status. Thus, Figure 6 shows the location of each city in social space based on its score on both indices.²¹

FIGURE 6

THE LOCATION OF THE FOUR GREATER BANGKOK CITIES
IN THE SOCIAL SPACE DIAGRAM




Figure 6 reveals an inverse relationship between family and economic status. The correlation between them is -0.47 which is a rather high correlation compared to the census tracts of the San Francisco Bay area which Bell found to be only -0.13 .²²

The picture of ethnic status in the Greater Bangkok area has been estimated from province statistics because the number of foreign citizens in the four municipal areas cannot be obtained. The ethnic status indices in Table 8 provide a rough indication of the minority composition in the Greater Bangkok area based on province data. The foreign citizen index is high in Bangkok and Thonburi where the downtown businesses are far bigger than those of the other two cities. The reasons behind this discrepancy are: (1) about 90 percent or more of the minorities in all four cities are Chinese; (2) the Chinese community is essentially urban (much of Bangkok's population is Chinese or partially Chinese);²³ and (3) Bangkok province has a higher degree of urbanization than the other three provinces. If we could obtain the index of ethnic status directly from the data in the municipal area this index would show an even greater discrepancy between Bangkok and the other three suburbs.

On the surface, the minorities, especially the Chinese, are subject to social discrimination and to exclusion from political and administrative roles in government on the grounds that they are aliens. They have been unable to secure the adoption of laws favoring their business interests or to impose effective restraints against the arbitrary exercise of power by officials.²⁴ However, the present Chinese influence is growing rapidly, a fact which could not have been detected a few decades ago.²⁵ This issue of minority status needs intensive study to delve beneath the

surface, but such an effort is beyond the scope of this dissertation. The purpose of presenting ethnic status in this study is only to point out the difference between the social structure of urban and suburban cities. Further use of the social area typology will be based primarily upon economic and family status.

TABLE 8
ETHNIC STATUS, GREATER BANGKOK 1970

Province	Total Population	Foreign Citizens	Ethnic Index	% Chinese of Total Foreigners
Bangkok	2,157,303	117,636	5.5	89.3
Thonburi	920,033	41,123	4.5	96.1
Smut Prakarn	329,404	5,132	1.6	96.1
Nonthaburi	269,067	3,144	1.2	90.0

Local Political Leaders

Local political leaders, as noted earlier, are those municipal assembly members of the four municipalities who were directly elected in the general election: Bangkok and Thonburi are those who held the offices during September 1, 1968, to June 15, 1972; and Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi are those who held the offices during December 23, 1967, to June 15, 1972.²⁶ Since municipal councilors, who are on the municipal executive committee, are appointed from among the members of the municipal assembly, they are also included in the political leaders group.

The purpose of this portion of the analysis is to determine the degree to which the Greater Bangkok area municipal assembly members are

representative of their constituencies. This finding will provide the background for an analysis by city of the attitudes of these leaders. For a more complete understanding of the conditions necessary to produce greater metropolitan political integration it is necessary to turn to the subsequent chapter.

Social and Economic Background

Occupation

In metropolitan areas it is difficult to compare a local leader's economic status to his constituency. First, to be a leader in his community, especially in a developing area, he should possess an exceptional amount of ability, knowledge, experience, power, money, and have the respect of his followers.²⁷ Consequently, a leader's economic status should be far higher than the community status in general. Secondly, the smaller the community the more likely it is that the top elites will dominate at the polls. In certain areas of the United States this tendency has been found. Adrian and Press, for example, report that "in general, the smaller the city, the more likely it will be that council members are from among the upper strata of the community."²⁸ Morgan, from his study in the Greater Oklahoma City area, found the same phenomenon.²⁹ However, in the Philadelphia area the elected officials' and the citizens' occupations were comparable and the social characteristics of the public officials accentuated the social differences among communities.³⁰

In Greater Bangkok the percentages of professional, managerial, and sales classifications for local leaders in each city are far higher than those of each community as a whole. Compare Table 9 to Table 6. Smut

TABLE 9

LOCAL POLITICAL LEADERS' OCCUPATION, GREATER BANGKOK AREA 1971

Occupation	Bangkok		Thonburi		Smut Prakarn		Nonthaburi	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Professional, manager, sales	12	60.0	10	43.5	13	81.2	10	58.8
Farmer	5	25.0	4	17.4	3	18.8	7	41.2
Others	3	15.0	9	39.1	--	--	--	--
Total	20	100	23	100	16	100	17	100

Prakarn has the lowest in both community social rank and percentage of professional, managerial and sales workers but has the highest percentage of leaders in these occupational categories. This is the only deviance. The other three cities are in the same order for both the communities' and the leaders' occupations ratio.

It should be noted here that the higher percentage of farmers as Nonthaburi leaders, compared to the other three cities, is believed to be a result of that community's position as a long-time farming area. It is well known as the "Nonthaburi orchard farm" where various famous fruits in the markets are grown. This is unlike Smut Prakarn where downtown business areas have existed for a long period of time, and are surrounded by industrial suburbs where white collar workers dominate community activities. Nonthaburi farmers who are native born still dominate over the newly-arrived business and trade workers in the late-growing downtown area. This is the reason why Nonthaburi has the lowest percentage of professional, managerial, and sales workers, while Smut Prakarn has the highest percentage of these occupations among their leaders. It could be said that to gain respect and popularity in his community one should, other than those requirements mentioned earlier, be a native or a long term resident in that community.

Education

The percentage of local leaders who have a college education is higher than that of the citizens of their communities.³¹ Bangkok leaders have the highest percentage of those who have attended one or more years of college with 89.5 percent, while Nonthaburi leaders have the lowest with 17.6 percent among their leaders. Bangkok has the highest percentage

TABLE 10

LOCAL POLITICAL LEADERS' EDUCATION, GREATER BANGKOK AREA 1971

Education	Bangkok		Thonburi		Smut Prakarn		Nonthaburi	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
No college	2	10.5	15	65.2	8	50.0	14	82.4
One year or more in college	17	89.5	8	34.8	8	50.0	3	17.6
Total	19	100	23	100	16	100	17	100

of college educated citizens of 6.1 compared to Nonthaburi's 2.8 percent. Even with a wide discrepancy between the community and its leaders, the order pattern is almost the same with a rank correlation coefficient of 0.8. This situation appears to be similar to that of the Philadelphia area study where a high educational correlation between citizens and officials was found when the cities were compared by social rank.³²

Income

It is obvious that income, occupation, and education should be highly correlated. In the Greater Bangkok area (see Table 11), the Bangkok Municipal leaders, who have high percentages of both college educations and upper-status occupations, have a far higher percentage of those belonging to the upper income category than the leaders of the lower social ranking cities of Thonburi, Smut Prakarn, and Nonthaburi.

Other Social Characteristics

The age and length of present residency are other characteristics of leaders' social backgrounds. In Table 12, the distribution of the age group of 35 and over is only slightly different among the leaders in the Greater Bangkok area, excepting Thonburi where those in the 50-60 age group dominated the poll with over 60 percent. Of the younger candidates under thirty-five years of age, few become community leaders.

Length of residency, as it appears in Table 13, is an additional factor in becoming a community leader. Few people with less than ten years of residency have been elected as local representatives. The majority are those who have resided for more than twenty-one years in the four cities dealt with. This result tends to support the earlier discussion of occupation where Nonthaburi farmers still represent one of

TABLE 11
LOCAL POLITICAL LEADERS' INCOME, GREATER BANGKOK AREA 1971

Annual Income (Baht ^a)	Bangkok		Thonburi		Smut Prakarn		Nonthaburi	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Under 24,000	--	--	3	13.1	4	25.0	5	29.4
24,000-48,000	4	20.0	5	21.7	4	25.0	8	47.1
Over 48,000	16	80.0	15	65.2	8	50.0	4	23.5
Total	20	100	23	100	16	100	17	100

^aTwenty baht is equal approximately to \$1 U.S.

TABLE 12

LOCAL POLITICAL LEADERS' AGE GROUP
GREATER BANGKOK AREA 1971
(PERCENT)

Age Group	Bangkok N=20	Thonburi N=23	Smut Prakarn N=16	Nonthaburi N=17
26-34	5.0	4.3	--	--
35-49	30.0	4.3	31.3	47.1
50-60	30.0	60.9	43.7	23.5
61 and over	35.0	30.5	25.0	29.4
Total	100	100	100	100

TABLE 13

LOCAL POLITICAL LEADERS' LENGTH OF PRESENT RESIDENCY
GREATER BANGKOK AREA 1971
(PERCENT)

Length of Service (Years)	Bangkok N=20	Thonburi N=23	Smut Prakarn N=16	Nonthaburi N=17
Less than 10	5.0	4.3	6.3	5.9
10-21	20.0	26.1	12.5	11.8
22 and over	75.0	69.6	81.2	82.3
Total	100	100	100	100

the majority groups. One may note here that the smaller the community the more likely it is that residential length will be an important factor for becoming community leader.

Only one female in each community investigated was elected as a leader except in Thonburi. This fact clearly indicates that it is preferable if the candidate is a male.

Political Background

Unlike the officials in developed communities or urban centers where businessmen usually dominate the local political arena, in Greater Bangkok the central civil service is the major occupation for community leaders before becoming elected to public office. The Bangkok municipal area is the only exception where the majority of officials are businessmen or merchants.

In Bangkok, Thonburi, and Smut Prakarn local leaders are primarily from the families of central civil servants and merchants. In Nonthaburi, because of its unique situation as noted earlier in the paragraph on leaders' occupations, the majority of local leaders are from farmer's families.

Most local leaders in all four cities are considered to be active participants in community associations or organizations with less than 15 percent (10 percent in Bangkok, 9 percent in Thonburi, 19 percent in Smut Prakarn, and 23 percent in Nonthaburi) not being a member of any organization. Those having an official post who belong to more than three organizations are the highest percentage--but are not a majority. This group composes an average of 26 percent. Local leaders from Bangkok and Thonburi, each with 30 percent in this category, are more active than Smut Prakarn (25 percent) and Nonthaburi (18 percent).

It should be noted here that the more complex the society and the more social activities taking place, the more likely it is that local leaders will be active in community organizations.

When asked about the reason for their interest in public office, political party influence was the most important factor for leaders in Bangkok and Thonburi where the election was held under party competition. For Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi, it was the leader's own interest in both specific issues, for example, water and electricity services, and his activity in community services in general that led to his involvement in politics.

Local Administrators

In the absence of a viable constitutional and political order, the continuity of Thailand's governance has been provided mainly by its loyal and able public service.³³ This situation is true for both national and local governments, as reflected by Siffin:

. . . no government of any size or significance can exist, assert meaningful goals, and seek to implement them without some sort of administrative machinery. . . .

One of the things we have learned and learned again is that bureaucracies are more than mere implementive mechanisms of the state. They are important parts of the system of society. They may help hold it together, reflect its cultural foundations, nurture and suppress various forces within it, define and assert and enforce important social goals, and greatly affect the ability of a given social system to survive and change.³⁴

Since bureaucracy has played a fundamental role in Thai society and in the process of modernization, as reflected above, it is necessary to study public administrators as a means of understanding metropolitan

development in the Greater Bangkok area. That is the purpose of this portion of the dissertation.

Administrative structures in the Thai municipal government are similar to the strong-mayor plan rather than the weak-mayor plan that is employed in the United States. There is a short ballot from which municipal assembly members only are directly elected to perform legislative functions. Few of these members have been indirectly elected by the Assembly to perform executive functions. All city clerks, bureau heads, and other administrative posts are appointed by the Interior Ministry from among the career municipal officers. These administrators are under the municipal civil service code which is: (1) based on the merit system; (2) in theory accountable to the municipal political executive; and (3) not considered to be a part of the national civil service.³⁵

Social and Economic Background

Employment cannot be used as an indicator for an administrator's social rank because all local administrators classify themselves as permanent municipal officials, this being their major occupation. However, the other variables, education and income, that have been used for the local leaders can be applied to the local administrators as well.

Education

Education is the most important qualification for a government job. Only a few public officials, both national and local, can rise to an administrative position without obtaining a college education. Table 14 shows that the percentages of local administrators with at least one year of college education are far higher than those of the local leaders in all four cities.

TABLE 14

MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATORS' EDUCATION, GREATER BANGKOK AREA 1971

Education	Bangkok		Thonburi		Smut Prakarn		Nonthaburi	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
No college	--	--	5	16.1	2	22.2	2	25.0
One year college or more	37	100	26	83.9	7	77.8	6	75.0
Total	37	100	31	100	9	100	8	100

The pattern of the education ratio of administrators among the four cities, when compared to Table 6, has a perfect positive rank correlation to the community education ratio. Bangkok has the highest percentage of administrators who attended one or more years of college, at 100 percent. The other three cities, Thonburi, Smut Prakarn, and Nonthaburi, have 83.9 percent, 77.8 percent, and 75.0 percent respectively.

Income

The pattern or order of the administrators' incomes, appearing in Table 15, is comparable to community social rank. Income groups in this table are based on personal incomes that are in turn based on the rank of municipal officials. On the average, Bangkok administrators have a higher rank and salary than those in the other three cities.

Furthermore, the percentages of the administrators' incomes at the upper levels are much lower than those of their local leaders. Compare Table 15 to Table 11.

Other Social Characteristics

An interesting difference between large, medium, and small cities is in the age of their local administrators. The larger the city, the more likely it will be that local administrators are in the older age group. (See Table 16) Over one-half of Bangkok's administrators are in the 50-60 age group but only a few officials of the small suburbs of Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi are in this category.

It might be noted here that municipal officials all over the country can be transferred from one city to another. Promotions for high-ranking administrators in small cities are usually made by transferring them to larger cities. This may be one reason why Bangkok, the

TABLE 15
MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATORS' INCOME, GREATER BANGKOK 1971

Annual Income (Baht)	Bangkok		Thonburi		Smut Prakarn		Nonthaburi	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Under 24,000	--	--	11	35.5	4	44.4	6	75.0
24,000-48,000	13	35.1	14	45.2	4	44.4	1	12.5
Over 48,000	24	64.9	6	19.3	1	11.2	1	12.5
Total	37	100	31	100	9	100	8	100

largest urban city, has a high percentage of older administrators, while medium sized Thonburi is high on the middle age group of 35-49, and smaller Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi are composed of younger administrators, 34 years old and under.

TABLE 16
MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATORS' AGE GROUP
GREATER BANGKOK 1971
(PERCENT)

Age Group ^a	Bangkok N=37	Thonburi N=31	Smut Prakarn N=9	Nonthaburi N=8
26-34	--	6.5	55.6	37.5
35-49	43.2	61.3	22.2	50.0
50-60	56.8	32.2	22.2	12.5
Total	100	100	100	100

^aMunicipal officials are retired at sixty years of age.

Resident longevity is not considered to be an important factor in becoming a local administrator since they are permanent civil officials appointed by the central government. Furthermore, they are transferable as noted above. Because of the usual practice of promotion from a smaller to larger city, Bangkok's local administrators have resided there a longer time than the other officials have in their respective cities.

Most of the local administrators in the Greater Bangkok area have held their present offices for three to six years. (See Table 17) However, the variation in the four age groups among the officials from the four cities is small, ranging from 11 percent for those over ten years in

Smut Prakarn to 51 percent for the Bangkok administrators who have served from three to six years.

TABLE 17
MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATORS' LENGTH OF SERVICE IN PRESENT
OFFICE, GREATER BANGKOK AREA 1971
(PERCENT)

Length of Service (Years)	Bangkok N=37	Thonburi N=31	Smut Prakarn N=9	Nonthaburi N=8
Less than 3	18.9	22.6	22.3	12.5
3-6	51.4	45.2	33.3	50.0
7-10	13.5	19.3	33.3	25.0
Over 10	16.2	12.9	11.1	12.5
Total	100	100	100	100

Unlike the local leaders, the administrators are composed of a higher percentage of females, ranging from about one-third in Bangkok to over one-half in Thonburi.

The Press

The newspapers play an important role in Thai politics because of the lack of other public opinion channels.³⁶ The press believe that they represent both rural and urban public opinion. Their comments on government activities are important for Thai citizens who otherwise would have little access to information on local and national politics. There appears to be no evidence of bias for or against any area as is sometimes seen in the United States, although all thirteen major local newspapers are in the Bangkok Municipal area.

The purpose of this part of the study is only to compare newspapers' attitudes as representative of important political influence in the entire Greater Bangkok area with the attitudes of the local leaders and administrators.

About one-half of the newspapermen interviewed were under thirty-five years of age. One-third of them were in the 35 to 49 age group, and only one person was over sixty years of age.

While most of the men are young, over three-quarters of them have an annual personal income at the upper level (48,000 baht and over). None of them have an income lower than 30,000 baht.

Over three-quarters of the newspapermen have one or more years of college education. This is a high educational ratio, comparable to the local administrators in all four cities and to local leaders in the Bangkok Municipality.

Summary

The main purpose of this chapter was to ascertain the degree of social differentiation in the Greater Bangkok area using the technique of social area analysis. The first part was devoted to the analysis of community specialization and differentiation. The latter part concentrated on local leaders, administrators, and newspapermen's social and political backgrounds compared to the constituencies found in the first section.

With only a few exceptions, Bangkok was found to be of "High" economic status where the other three cities were combined in the "Low" social rank category.

Based on the familism index, Bangkok had the lowest score with Thonburi being only barely higher with the score of lower than 30. Smut

Prakarn and Nonthaburi have overwhelmingly high scores of over 80. This index provided an urbanized image for Bangkok, and a semi-urban one for Thonburi. The other two cities, Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi, with their high familism scores were found to be suburban communities. However, Thonburi, with other characteristics close to Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi, should be grouped as a suburban city for further attitudinal analysis.

Social rank and familism were found to have a high negative correlation. For example, Bangkok with a high economic status has a low family status. This was the reverse of Smut Prakarn which has a low economic status score but a high familism score.

Bangkok was also high on ethnic status in comparison with Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi where slightly fewer foreign citizens were residing. All four cities are similar on the percentages of Chinese who constitute about 90 percent of the minority in each city.

While members of the press in Greater Bangkok was considered to be the major representative for the interest groups in that area, they did not consider themselves either urban or suburban.

For local leaders and local administrators the findings demonstrate that a consistent pattern of social and economic status of the four cities, based primarily on social rank, exists for both groups. The high correlations between the leader's and administrators' occupation and the education ratio over their constituencies are common for all cities. The rank order of elite's economic status was comparable to that order among the residents of the four communities. Bangkok has a higher socio-economic status as a community as well as among its leaders and administrators than the other three cities.

Measured by each of the foregoing characteristics, the analysis to this point has shown that specialization and differentiation do exist in the Greater Bangkok area. First, in contrast to the Northeastern metropolitan areas of the United States, the central city in Greater Bangkok has a higher social rank than its surrounding suburbs. Second, suburban communities are less differentiated among themselves than between each suburb and the central city. Third, taking city size into account, it appears that large and small cities reflect a considerable difference in the life-style of their citizens. The larger the city the greater the proportion of apartment dwellers, the greater the number of women working outside the home, and the less the fertility ratio.

The proponents of metropolitan reform, as discussed in Chapter I, argued that fragmentation, specialization, and differentiation in metropolitan areas result in interdependence among local units requiring greater governmental integration. Other students of metropolitan problems, on the other hand, insisted that the pattern of complexity indicates that no simple solution to metropolitan governmental fragmentation is available.³⁷ This latter group believed that specialization and differentiation would result in divergent local interests that would perpetuate demands for autonomy.

In order to complete this study on Greater Bangkok, another test is required based on a survey of the beliefs and attitudes of these three important groups who may play such a crucial role in the success of a metro government in Bangkok. This survey will be dealt with in the next chapter.

Footnotes

- ¹Noranitipadungkarn, Elites, Power Structure, p. 182.
- ²This proposition has been adopted from Williams, et al., Suburban Differences, p. 17.
- ³Bell, "Social Areas: Typology of Urban Neighborhoods," p. 62.
- ⁴Shevky and Bell, Social Area Analysis.
- ⁵For more elaborate discussion of these limitations see Morgan, "Suburban Differentiation," pp. 71-74.
- ⁶Ibid., p. 72.
- ⁷See Otis Dudley Duncan, review of Shevky and Bell, Social Area Analysis, in American Journal of Sociology, LXI (July, 1955), 84-85.
- ⁸W. S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," American Sociological Review, XV (June, 1950), 351-357.
- ⁹Herbert Menzel, "Comments on Robinson's 'Ecological Correlations' and the Behavior of Individuals," Ibid., 674.
- ¹⁰Amos H. Hawley and Otis Dudley Duncan, "Social Area Analysis: A Critical Appraisal," Land Economics, XXXII (November, 1957), 337-345.
- ¹¹Morgan, "Suburban Differentiation," p. 74.
- ¹²See Wendell Bell and Scott Greer, "Social Area Analysis and Its Critics," Pacific Sociological Review, V (Spring, 1962), 3-9.
- ¹³Alternative designations for the three basic dimensions are social rank, urbanization, and segregation, respectively.
- ¹⁴As noted by Bell, "Social Areas: Typology of Neighborhoods," p. 65, other units of analysis such as the county, the state, countries as a whole, etc., can be used in the construction of the social area typology as well.
- ¹⁵The percentage of aliens or foreign nationals has been employed instead of "foreign born citizens" which is commonly used in the United States, because of statistical limitations. These two variables have almost the same meaning and yield almost the same result; for example, the index of ethnic status for Smut Prakarn based on foreign nationals is 1.56, and is 1.53 when "foreign born citizens" is used. For Nonthaburi, the former basis is 1.16, and the latter gives 1.07, which is only slightly different for each city.

¹⁶ See Scott Greer and Ella Kube, "Urbanism and Social Structure: A Los Angeles Study," in Community Structure and Analysis, ed. by Marvin B. Sussman, p. 95.

¹⁷ Shevky and Bell, Social Area Analysis, pp. 54-57.

¹⁸ Litchfield, Greater Bangkok Plan, p. 28.

¹⁹ Urbanization is also based upon the proportion of the fertility ratio, single-family dwelling units, and women in the labor force. But it has an inverse value to the familism index; the higher the score on the familism index the less urbanization in that community. The urbanization score is directly proportional to the third index (women in the labor force) and inversely proportional to the first two components.

²⁰ Greer and Kube, "Urbanism and Social Structure," p. 96.

²¹ This has been called the "Shevky Typology." The construction and application of this social area typology can be seen in Shevky and Bell, Social Area Analysis, pp. 25-27; Wendell Bell, "The Utility of the Shevky Typology for the Design of Urban Sub-Area Field Studies," Journal of Social Psychology, LXVII (February, 1958), 71-83; and Bell, "Social Areas: Typology of Urban Neighborhoods," pp. 71-78.

²² Bell, "Social Areas: Typology of Urban Neighborhoods," p. 74.

²³ Henderson, et al., Area Handbook for Thailand, p. 59.

²⁴ Riggs, Thailand, p. 252.

²⁵ The study of Chinese ethnics in Thailand can be seen in Riggs, Ibid., pp. 251-254; and G. William Skinner, Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958).

²⁶ Until now there was no other group of elected local political leaders in these areas--other than the above mentioned--since the October 20, 1958, coup in which all members of municipal assembly were appointed by the central government.

²⁷ Noranitipadungkarn, Elites, Power Structure, p. 16.

²⁸ Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press, Governing Urban America (3rd ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), pp. 246-247.

²⁹ Morgan, "Suburban Differentiation," p. 158.

³⁰ Williams, et al., Suburban Differences, p. 226.

³¹ Two different levels of education have been used: college graduate for community education ratio and one or more years in college for local leaders and administrators. Direct comparison cannot be made except in proportion.

³²Thomas R. Dye, "Certain Political Correlates of Social and Economic Differentiation Among Suburban Communities" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1961), p. 113.

³³Edgar L. Shore, "The Public Service," in Problems of Politics and Administration in Thailand, ed. by Joseph L. Sutton (Bloomington: Institute of Training for Public Service, Indiana University, 1962), p. 23.

³⁴Siffin, The Thai Bureaucracy, p. 1.

³⁵See John W. Ryan, "Municipal Government and Administration," in Problems of Politics and Administration in Thailand, ed. by Joseph L. Sutton, p. 89.

³⁶Riggs, "Interest and Clientele Groups," p. 179.

³⁷For example, see Williams, et al., Suburban Differences.

CHAPTER VI

ATTITUDINAL VARIATION AMONG LOCAL LEADERS, LOCAL ADMINISTRATORS, AND THE PRESS

The most distinctive characteristic of the ecological approach¹ is its emphasis on the distributive relationships between human beings and social forms, and the factors that determine these relationships.² The consequences of differentiation and spatial distribution in the modern metropolis have increasingly come to be recognized as having considerable political significance. This recognition results from the fact that some of the socially specialized sub-areas in the metropolis also exist as separate governmental entities. Each separate unit of local government may or may not produce ideological differences among its officials who are both appointed and elected and whom, in many respects, are considered to be the only active political participants in Thai local government.

This portion of the analysis develops the second part of the basic model presented in Chapter II.³ Based primarily on spatial distribution, the analysis focuses on the attitudes of selected political elite groups in the Greater Bangkok area. It is based on the assumption that differences among locally elected leaders and local administrators may contribute negatively to governmental centralization.

Attitudinal Differences Among Local Elites

The purpose here is to survey and analyze the beliefs of three groups of elites living in communities of different socio-economic status with respect to whether attitudinal differences occur regarding certain political variables. The second step is to analyze these findings as related to the matter of political integration. Several hypotheses will be presented and tested by the interview data collected.

Political differentiation may be measured in a variety of ways. While the principle focus in this chapter is on variations in political attitudes among three elite groups, political differentiation may also be explored by examining variations in voting behavior. If large disparities in voting patterns are found between local units of government, it might be argued that a greater potential exists for political conflict. In fact, in the U.S., Edward C. Banfield has contended that metropolitan political integration will be extremely difficult to achieve in those areas where large partisan differences exist between the central city and its suburbs.⁴ While this phenomenon alone may not prevent greater unification, if such variations are found, along with other indicators of political fragmentation, it may have some affect on those forces and factors shaping metropolitan political reform. Thus, at the outset, voting differences among the four Greater Bangkok communities will be considered.

The First Hypothesis:

"Increases in community social rank are more likely to be positively associated with a vote largely determined by partisan influences."

This hypothesis aims at measuring the relationship between community social rank and the pattern of voting in local elections. Based on the

elections of 1967 for Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi and of 1968 for Bangkok and Thonburi, it was found that only the Bangkok Municipal election was substantially influenced by partisan considerations. In Thonburi some degree of influence by the political party occurred while elections in Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi were almost completely uninfluenced by partisan considerations.

Political parties in Thailand have not yet developed to the point where each party has a permanent organizational structure as found in the United States (except for the Democrat Party which was established a few decades ago, as the opposing party). Thus, political party influence on local elections has been negligible until the last Bangkok and Thonburi municipal elections of 1968. The increasing importance of Bangkok as the capital of the country has attracted both major parties, the Government's United Thai People's Party and the opposing Democrat Party, to contest for control over this city's government. Both parties nominated candidates who campaigned with open support by the two parties.

Analysis of local elections in Bangkok is difficult because the usual voting statistics used in the United States are not available or complete enough for the analysis of voting behavior in specific areas. The only local election in Bangkok was for municipal assemblymen where only the name of the candidates and the votes they obtained appeared in the official files. The Democrat Party (opposing party) won twenty-two of the total twenty-four seats in Bangkok, while the Government Party won only two seats. There was no official indication of whether the people voted under partisan influence or in accordance with what Eugene Lee has called the "politics of acquaintance," where the individual

candidate's personality has a great influence upon the vote.⁵ Therefore, as a way of determining the variation in partisan influence on local elections in the four cities, local leaders and local administrators were interviewed.

It was expected that the political parties, especially the major parties, would have a higher degree of influence in local elections among larger cities than in smaller ones.⁶

When local leaders, local administrators, and the press were asked how people in the Greater Bangkok area voted in the last local elections, all local newspapers and almost all of the leaders and administrators believed that people in the Bangkok Municipality (the city with the greatest population and the highest social rank) cast a party vote for the Democrat Party. See Tables 18 and 19.

In the low social rank community, less than 20 percent of each of the three groups believed that the citizens were influenced by partisan considerations in voting for the opposing party. Most of them believed that the majority of the low social rank community preferred to vote for the individuals as indicated in Table 18.

City size also has an effect on the pattern of the citizens' voting behavior as shown in Table 19. Over 95 percent of the administrators, 98.6 of the leaders, and 100 percent of the press believed that most people in the largest city (Bangkok Municipality) voted on the basis of partisan considerations. In the medium size city, about 15 percent of the press, 40 percent of the administrators and 42 percent of the leaders were convinced that most of the citizens were motivated by party choice. None of the leaders or the press and only about 6 percent of the

TABLE 18

PATTERN OF CITIZENS' VOTE ON THE BELIEF OF LEADERS, ADMINISTRATORS
AND THE PRESS BY COMMUNITY SOCIAL RANK (PERCENT)

Pattern of Vote	Leader		Administrator		The Press	
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
Party vote for opposing party	98.6	15.7	95.2	19.7	100	5.7
Party vote for government party	--	6.1	--	19.2	--	2.9
Voted for certain individuals	1.4	69.3	3.6	51.8	--	68.6
Voted combination of the three above	--	8.9	1.2	9.3	--	22.8
N	70	179	83	193	13	35

TABLE 19

PATTERN OF CITIZENS' VOTE ON THE BELIEF OF LEADERS, ADMINISTRATORS,
AND THE PRESS BY CITY SIZE (PERCENT)

Pattern of Vote	Leader			Administrator			The Press		
	Large	Medium	Small	Large	Medium	Small	Large	Medium	Small
Party vote for opposing party	98.6	41.8	--	95.2	39.8	6.1	100	15.4	--
Party vote for government party	--	7.5	5.4	--	19.2	19.1	--	7.7	--
Voted for certain individuals	1.4	28.3	93.7	3.6	35.9	62.6	--	15.4	100
Voted combination of the three above	--	22.4	0.9	1.2	5.1	12.2	--	61.5	--
N	70	67	112	83	78	115	13	13	22

administrators believed that most of the people in the small sized city were primarily voting a party ticket.

An additional question was asked concerning these local elections, not only of the study groups but also of scholars and high ranking central officials: "Why did the majority of the people in Bangkok vote for the opposing (Democrat) Party?" Different answers were given: (1) the people believed that the Democrat Party would provide a more democratic system of government; (2) the local government was long dominated by those who were appointed by the central government without the consent of the local citizens, and therefore it was thought that a new group would be able to provide better services than the old one; (3) the literacy rate was higher in Bangkok City and the people could better decide how they should vote; (4) most of the people who went to the polls were poor and the government had never aided them, so they voted for the opposing or Democrat Party; and (5) the Democrat Party consisted of the most popular and qualified candidates.

The stronger partisan vote in Bangkok appears to result from a combination of the above reasons, coupled with the size of the city. As suggested in Chapter V, the personal characteristics of leadership, not the party, play the most important role in a candidate becoming a local leader in the smaller communities. In a larger city, the leaders and the people are not able to communicate directly. Thus, the party played a great role in the big and complex city of Bangkok.

It can be concluded here, based on the limited information available, that:

1. Increases in community social rank and in city size are more likely to be positively associated with a party vote.

2. The smaller the city the greater the chance that a local leader will rely on his own personality and less on the influence of the party in a local election.

Thus, according to the perceptions of important elite groups, there are significant differences in voter motivation and behavior among the communities in the Greater Bangkok area, particularly between the central city and its suburbs. While this phenomenon alone would not serve as a serious obstacle to greater metropolitan unification, it does reflect an attitudinal variation along social area dimensions that, coupled with other forms of variation, may contribute to the desire for greater political independence among sub-units of the metropolis.

The Second Hypothesis:

"Elected local leaders in the central city (Bangkok) are more likely to favor the proposed metropolitan plan than those in the suburban cities of Thonburi, Smut Prakarn, and Nonthaburi."

The Third Hypothesis:

"Municipal administrators in larger cities are more likely to favor metro government than those in smaller cities."

The second and third hypotheses aim at testing the attitudes of leaders and administrators toward the metropolitan plan. Cities have been chosen by size and social rank to be used as the criterion for analysis.

The first question used to assess the interest in metro government concerned whether officials might favor having certain urban services performed on an area-wide basis as opposed to having these services offered by strictly municipal units of government. When asked if some kind of services could be better provided on an area-wide basis, Table 20 shows

TABLE 20

LEADERS' AND ADMINISTRATORS' PREFERENCES ON SOME
AREA-WIDE SERVICES, BY COMMUNITY SOCIAL RANK

Area-Wide Preference	Leaders				Administrators			
	High		Low		High		Low	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	11	55.0	21	37.5	27	77.1	36	75.0
No	9	45.0	35	62.5	8	22.9	12	25.0
Total	20	100.0	56	100.0	35	100.0	48	100.0

 $\chi^2=1.851; p>.05$
 $\chi^2=0.051; p>.05$

that local administrators in both low and high social status communities had a higher percentage favoring area-wide services than those local leaders in both the low and high social rank communities.

The first half of Table 20 reveals that the high status elected leaders of Bangkok were more likely to favor area-wide services than those of low social status cities. However, the strength of the relationship between city social status and metro preferences was weak. The difference between community social rank and the leaders' preferences was not statistically significant.

For local administrators, the relationship between community social rank and area-wide preferences barely existed (no statistically significant differences were found).

When the size of the city is taken into account (see Table 21), only a slightly stronger relationship occurred between city size and leaders' preferences. This relationship was even weaker among the administrator groups. There was no statistically significant difference between the leaders' and administrators' attitudes as representatives of the different sized cities with respect to their preference for having some urban services performed on an area-wide basis. Planning and zoning, public education, and public health received the highest area-wide preference from all groups.

Local administrators were more consistent in preferring metro government than the local political leaders. This can be seen in the response to the question: "What is your number one choice for a metro boundary: include Bangkok-Thonburi only; all four cities; more than four cities; or have no metro at all?" Table 22 shows that, irrespective

TABLE 21

LEADERS' AND ADMINISTRATORS' PREFERENCES ON SOME
AREA-WIDE SERVICES, BY CITY SIZE

Area-Wide Preference	Leaders						Administrators					
	Large		Medium		Small		Large		Medium		Small	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	11	55.0	11	47.8	10	30.3	27	77.1	22	71.0	14	82.4
No	9	45.0	12	52.2	23	69.7	8	22.9	9	29.0	3	17.6
Total	20	100.0	23	100.0	33	100.0	35	100.0	31	100.0	17	100.0

 $\chi^2=3.559; p>.05$
 $\chi^2=0.829; p>.05$

TABLE 22

LEADERS' AND ADMINISTRATORS' NUMBER ONE SELECTION FOR METRO BOUNDARY,
BY COMMUNITY SOCIAL RANK

Metro Boundary	Leaders				Administrators			
	High		Low		High		Low	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Bangkok-Thonburi only	7	35.0	13	23.2	16	44.4	18	38.3
All four cities	1	5.0	10	17.9	11	30.6	16	34.0
More than four cities	--	--	--	--	1	2.8	1	2.1
No metro at all	12	60.0	33	58.9	8	22.2	12	22.5
Total	20	100	56	100	36	100	47	100

 $\chi^2=2.464; p>.05$
 $\chi^2=0.393; p>.05$

of community social rank, there was a high percentage of administrators preferring some form of merger to "no metro at all." But leaders in high status communities preferred some of the area-wide services discussed above (compare Table 22 to Table 20) to the merger. These characteristics remain the same when taking the size of the city into consideration (see Table 23). There was no significant difference between high and low social status cities or among large, medium, and small cities with respect to the leaders' and administrators' preferences toward a particular metro boundary as measured by the Chi-square test. The only interesting result was that a rather high percentage of small-city administrators wanted to have their cities included in the metro boundary (52.9 percent).

When asked for the reasons why they favored metro government, the most important reasons were the same for both leaders and administrators in both high and low social rank communities. They believed that metro government would bring about greater efficiency and economy. See Table 24.

Those who opposed the metro plan not only believed that the plan would discourage local leadership, but would also lower efficiency and economy and discourage local cooperation, according to Table 25.

Further investigation was made by the use of a semantic differential scale (SD) to explore the differences between group attitudes toward the words "Metropolitan Government."⁷ The purpose of this scale was to probe attitudes toward the concept of "Metropolitan Government" in general. But the knowledge and experience of the respondents was limited since Greater Bangkok is the only metropolitan area and its government had been in action only a few months when the interview took place.

TABLE 23

LEADERS' AND ADMINISTRATORS' NUMBER ONE SELECTION
FOR METRO BOUNDARY, BY CITY SIZE

Metro Boundary	Leaders						Administrators					
	Large		Medium		Small		Large		Medium		Small	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Bangkok-Thonburi only	7	35.0	7	30.4	6	18.2	16	44.4	14	46.7	4	23.5
All four cities	1	5.0	1	4.3	9	27.3	11	30.6	7	23.3	9	52.9
More than four cities	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	2.8	--	--	1	5.9
No metro at all	12	60.0	15	65.2	18	54.5	8	22.2	9	30.0	3	17.6
Total	20	100	23	100	33	100	36	100	30	100	17	100

$$\chi^2=8.419; \quad p>.05$$

$$\chi^2=6.980; \quad p>.05$$

TABLE 24

REASONS FOR LEADERS AND ADMINISTRATORS PREFERRING METRO
GOVERNMENT, BY COMMUNITY SOCIAL RANK

Reasons	Leaders				Administrators			
	High		Low		High		Low	
	Score ^a	Mean Score	Score	Mean Score	Score	Mean Score	Score	Mean Score
Increase cooperation and coordination	26 (N=8)	3.25	66 (N=21)	3.14	85 (N=28)	3.04	105 (N=36)	2.92
Greater efficiency and economy	25 (N=8)	3.13	60 (N=21)	2.86	93 (N=28)	3.32	114 (N=36)	3.17
Encourage local leadership	19 (N=8)	2.38	42 (N=19)	2.21	72 (N=28)	2.57	83 (N=34)	2.44
Attract industry	17 (N=8)	2.13	51 (N=20)	2.55	55 (N=24)	2.29	86 (N=32)	2.69
Lower overall local tax	17 (N=8)	2.13	45 (N=21)	2.14	40 (N=24)	1.67	55 (N=35)	1.57
Reduce price of services	14 (N=7)	2.00	46 (N=20)	2.30	62 (N=26)	2.38	84 (N=35)	2.40
	$\bar{x}=2.50$		$\bar{y}=2.53$		$\bar{x}_a=2.55$		$\bar{y}_a=2.54$	

^aThe scores used in this table are based on the following scale: strongly agree=4; agree=3; disagree=2; strongly disagree=1.

TABLE 25

REASONS FOR LEADERS AND ADMINISTRATORS NOT PREFERRING
METRO GOVERNMENT, BY COMMUNITY SOCIAL RANK

Reasons	Leaders				Administrators			
	High		Low		High		Low	
	Score ^a	Mean Score	Score	Mean Score	Score	Mean Score	Score	Mean Score
Lower efficiency and economy	40 (N=11)	3.64	114 (N=33)	3.45	25 (N=8)	3.13	34 (N=12)	2.83
Discourage local leadership	38 (N=11)	3.45	121 (N=34)	3.56	24 (N=8)	3.00	26 (N= 9)	2.89
Discourage local cooperation	37 (N=11)	3.36	108 (N=33)	3.27	21 (N=8)	2.63	41 (N=12)	3.42
Increase service price	28 (N=10)	2.80	79 (N=31)	2.55	18 (N=8)	2.25	17 (N= 8)	2.13
Increase overall local tax	27 (N=10)	2.70	74 (N=30)	2.47	19 (N=7)	2.71	28 (N=11)	2.55
Discourage industry	20 (N= 8)	2.50	76 (N=29)	2.62	18 (N=7)	2.57	21 (N= 9)	2.33
	$\bar{x}=3.08$		$\bar{y}=2.99$		$\bar{x}_a=2.72$		$\bar{y}_a=2.69$	

^aThe same as in Table 24.

Consequently, most of the answers were based on only a few months experience with the Metropolitan City Municipality.

A look at the mean scores discloses several interesting patterns (see Table 26). As expected from the previously noted responses, administrators as a whole were more likely to react positively to the idea of metro government while leaders tended to view the concept negatively.⁸ Both leaders and administrators in the low social rank communities showed a higher score in favor of metropolitan government than their high social rank counterparts. These differences were significant only in the high and low social rank communities with respect to the administrators' attitudes. There was no significant difference between those leaders in high and low social rank communities as far as the concept "metropolitan government" was concerned.

This finding concerning the attitude of the leaders confirms the previous result where no evidence of significant difference was found between those living in high and low social rank communities.

Differences did emerge, however, among the municipal administrators. Different levels of community social status were associated with variations in attitude toward metropolitan government.

Two conclusions may be reached at this point:

1. Differences in community social rank, or even in city size, did not provide a significant difference in the local political leaders' attitude toward the metropolitan government plan.
2. The municipal administrators' attitudes need further study since part of the investigation supported and part opposed the expected result that the administrators of high social rank or in a large city are more likely to favor metro government than those in smaller or lower rank cities.

TABLE 26

LEADERS' AND ADMINISTRATORS' AVERAGE SCORE ON SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL SCALE TOWARD
THE CONCEPT OF "METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT" BY COMMUNITY SOCIAL RANK

Adjective- Pairs Scale ^a	Leaders		Administrators	
	High (N=20)	Low (N=56)	High (N=37)	Low (N=48)
Bad-Good	4.45	4.12	5.08	5.13
Weak-Strong	3.55	3.86	4.97	5.10
Unsatisfactory-Satisfactory	2.95	3.50	4.89	5.13
Inefficient-Efficient	3.40	3.89	4.76	5.12
Uneconomy-Economy	3.45	3.77	4.88	5.02
\bar{x}	3.56	3.83	4.92	5.10

$t=1.18; p>.05$

$t=4; p<.01$

^aThe scale ranged from most negative to most positive as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.

The Fourth Hypothesis:

"Municipal administrators are more likely to be concerned about planning and zoning and administrative efficiency than elected leaders (who tend to view reorganization as the desire for more control from the Interior Ministry)."

As revealed in Tables 24 and 25, supporters of the metro plan were more concerned about efficiency and economy of services while opponents of the plan were more concerned with local leadership and democratic ideas. It is the purpose here to see if political leaders and local administrators as a whole have any differences of opinion concerning the metro plan.

Table 27 indicates the responses when the two groups were asked "How do you think each of the following factors or reasons has affected metropolitan reorganization?" The highest mean score for leaders was the "Desire of the Interior Ministry for more control and centralization." For administrators, "Planning and zoning" and "Administrative efficiency" had the top priority in causing metro reorganization. The lowest mean score of both groups is that for "Corruption." This does not mean that there is no corruption at the local level, only that both groups believe that corruption is not a cause for reorganization and metro reform.

However, the testing of the mean of the standard scores between leaders and administrators by the use of the t-statistic reveals no significant difference between these two groups.

There was a slight change in the rating pattern of the factors causing metro reorganization when controlled by community social rank as shown in Table 28. "Desire of Interior Ministry" was the most

TABLE 27

LEADERS' AND ADMINISTRATORS' OPINIONS OF FACTORS
CAUSING METRO REORGANIZATION

Factors	Leaders		Administrators	
	Score ^a	Mean Score	Score ^a	Mean Score
Desire of Interior Ministry	166 (N=53)	3.13	180 (N=64)	2.81
Planning and zoning	171 (N=56)	3.05	285 (N=82)	3.48
Budgeting problem	140 (N=53)	2.64	229 (N=74)	3.09
Administrative efficiency	130 (N=50)	2.60	248 (N=79)	3.14
Traffic and transportation	101 (N=41)	2.46	224 (N=74)	3.03
Service charges	59 (N=30)	1.97	121 (N=47)	2.57
Corruption	59 (N=30)	1.97	85 (N=38)	2.24
		$\bar{x}=2.55$		$\bar{y}=2.91$

$$r_s = 0.59; \quad t = 1.64; \quad p > .05$$

^aThe scores used in this table are based on the following scale: strongest=4; strong=3; weak=2; weakest=1.

TABLE 28

LEADERS' AND ADMINISTRATORS' BELIEFS ON FACTORS CAUSING METRO
REORGANIZATION, BY COMMUNITY SOCIAL RANK

Factors	Leaders				Administrators			
	High		Low		High		Low	
	Score ^a	Mean Score	Score	Mean Score	Score	Mean Score	Score	Mean Score
Desire of Interior Ministry	54 (N=16)	3.38	112 (N=37)	3.03	66 (N=23)	2.87	114 (N=41)	2.78
Planning and zoning	54 (N=16)	3.38	117 (N=40)	2.93	121 (N=35)	3.46	164 (N=47)	3.49
Traffic and transportation	34 (N=12)	2.83	67 (N=29)	2.31	109 (N=35)	3.11	115 (N=39)	2.95
Budgeting problem	38 (N=14)	2.71	102 (N=39)	2.62	94 (N=30)	3.13	135 (N=44)	3.07
Administrative efficiency	39 (N=15)	2.60	91 (N=35)	2.60	104 (N=32)	3.25	141 (N=47)	3.00
Service charges	12 (N= 8)	1.50	47 (N=22)	2.14	48 (N=17)	2.82	73 (N=30)	2.43
Corruption	18 (N= 9)	2.00	41 (N=21)	1.95	29 (N=13)	2.23	56 (N=25)	2.43
	$\bar{x}=2.63$		$\bar{y}=2.51$		$\bar{x}_a=2.98$		$\bar{y}_a=2.85$	

$t=0.43$; $p>.05$

$t=0.65$; $p>.05$

^aThe same as in Table 27.

important influence according to the leaders in both high and low social rank communities followed by "Planning and zoning." There was no significant difference between the high and low status community leaders' attitudes toward the rating of factors causing the reform. This relationship also holds for the local administrators where differences in community status had no effect on their attitudes. "Planning and zoning" and "Administrative efficiency" were still high on the rating scale, followed by "Budgeting problems." The most interesting rating was the "Desire of Interior Ministry" where administrators were found below the mean of the standard scores. This appears to be the most serious conflict between leaders' and administrators' attitudes toward metropolitan reform. "Traffic and transportation" is another factor that draws more concern by those living in the high status category of urban Bangkok than those of the lower status and smaller suburb.

The findings of this section weakly support the fourth hypothesis. The differences of leaders' and administrators' attitudes were not significant enough to say that both groups had contrasting opinions about the factors affecting metropolitan reorganization.⁹ The only real difference that can be noted is the question of control of the Interior Ministry. Local elected leaders viewed this factor as the most important cause of metro reform but local administrators disagreed.

The Fifth Hypothesis:

"The election of metro officials is more likely to be favored by elected local leaders than by municipal administrators, who tend to favor the appointment of those officials by the central government."

How municipal assembly members', mayors', and the councilors' positions should be filled has been a major issue since the introduction of local self-government into Thailand. Since the 1933 Municipal Act, the procedure for filling assembly-member positions has been changed from all appointed to half elected and half appointed, then to all elected, and then returning to all appointed just recently.¹⁰ History may be repeated for the newly established Bangkok Metropolitan Government. The opponents of election argue that those who are elected to office cannot manage local government as efficiently as the appointed, more knowledgeable members. These elected officials have usually been of low education, lacked experience in local affairs, and were alleged to hold personal interest over the public interest. Furthermore, local citizens are not ready for this Western style of democracy, it is argued.

Election proponents tend to view local self-government as the means for democratic government. They consider the election of local representatives as a primary way of fulfilling local interests and the needs of the local citizens.

This section of the dissertation examines the attitudes of leaders and administrators based on the size and status of their cities toward the procedure for filling metropolitan offices.

Table 29 displays the attitudes toward the metro office filling procedures as reflected by most of the leaders and administrators. The highest percentage among the leaders was for direct election (51.1 percent) and among the administrators was for appointment (47.5 percent). The rank correlation coefficient between these two groups (overall average) was rather high and was negative (-0.5). Obviously, the two groups had

TABLE 29

LEADERS' AND ADMINISTRATORS' ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE PROCEDURE FOR FILLING METRO OFFICES
(PERCENT)

Selection Procedure	Leaders				Administrators			
	For Mayor	For Council	For Assembly	Overall Average	For Mayor	For Council	For Assembly	Overall Average
	N=75	N=75	N=75		N=83	N=81	N=82	
Appointment	8.0	8.0	6.7	7.6	60.2	56.8	25.6	47.5
Direct election	34.7	25.3	93.3	51.5	16.9	14.8	74.4	35.4
Indirect election ^a	57.3	66.7	----	41.3	22.9	28.4	----	17.1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

^aIndirect election is an election held among the membership of the assembly for filling the Mayor and Council offices.

opposing ideas toward the procedure for determining how metro offices are to be filled.

The two groups shared an attitude toward the selection procedure for the metro assembly: the majority of both groups was for direct election. However, with a closer look at the percentage of this category in Table 29, we find that elected leaders (with 93.3 percent) were more committed to the direct election for metro assembly than the administrators who had 74.4 percent for direct election.

It is clear that in respect to the mayor and councilor offices the majority of the leaders favored indirect election and the administrators favored appointment (see Table 29).

The size of the city had no significant effect on leaders' and administrators' attitudes toward the general selection procedure for metro offices (see Table 30). But, as expected, the percentage of those leaders who favored the appointment of the metro mayor in the large city was about three times higher than those in the smaller cities.

Table 31, taking community social rank into account, reveals the same result. There was a very weak association between high and low social rank communities for both leaders and administrators toward the selection procedure for metro mayor. Furthermore, the difference in the leaders' and the administrators' attitudes between high and low social status cities was not statistically significant.

There was no systematic relationship among leaders from different sized cities in respect to the attitude toward selection procedure for metro assembly members (see Table 32). For municipal administrators, the smaller the city the more likely they were to favor direct election,

TABLE 30

LEADERS' AND ADMINISTRATORS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PROCEDURE FOR FILLING METRO
MAYOR'S OFFICE, BY CITY SIZE (PERCENT)

Filling Procedure	Leaders			Administrators		
	Large N=19	Medium N=23	Small N=33	Large N=35	Medium N=31	Small N=17
Appointment	15.8	4.4	6.1	62.9	58.1	58.8
Direct Election	47.4	30.4	30.3	17.1	19.3	11.8
Indirect Election	36.8	65.2	63.6	20.0	22.6	29.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

$$\chi^2=5.034; \quad p>.05$$

$$\chi^2=0.892; \quad p>.05$$

TABLE 31

LEADERS' AND ADMINISTRATORS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PROCEDURE FOR FILLING METRO
MAYOR'S OFFICE BY COMMUNITY SOCIAL RANK (PERCENT)

Filling Procedure	Leaders		Administrators	
	High N=19	Low N=56	High N=35	Low N=48
Appointment	15.8	5.4	62.9	58.3
Direction Election	47.4	30.3	17.1	16.7
Indirect Election	36.8	64.3	20.0	25.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

 $\chi^2=4.978; p>.05$
 $\chi^2=0.293; p>.05$

TABLE 32

LEADERS' AND ADMINISTRATORS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PROCEDURE FOR FILLING METRO
ASSEMBLY OFFICE, BY CITY SIZE (PERCENT)

Filling Procedure	Leaders			Administrators		
	Large N=19	Medium N=23	Small N=33	Large N=34	Medium N=31	Small N=17
Appointment	5.3	4.3	9.1	35.3	19.4	17.6
Direct Election	94.7	95.7	90.0	64.7	80.6	82.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

 $\chi^2 = .571; p > .05$
 $\chi^2 = 2.876; p > .05$

and the larger the city the more likely for them to favor appointment. But these relationships were not significant at the .05 level.

Community social rank, when taken into consideration, had the same result as that of city size in relation to the leaders' and administrators' attitudes toward metro assembly members. The relationship between each group in high and low social rank communities in respect to their attitudes was not significant at the .05 level (see Table 33).

A common factor among leaders and administrators was that the majority of both groups in all size and social rank cities tended to favor direct election for metro assembly members. However, the percentage was somewhat higher among local leaders who were more concerned about local leadership and democratic government as discussed in the second, third, and fourth hypotheses, than those administrators who had administrative efficiency as their top priority.

Another question concerning effectiveness and representativeness was asked to see if the respondents would agree that "the elected local assembly member would provide better services and would be a better representative than those appointed by the central government." Over two-thirds of the leaders and administrators in every size city and in both high and low social status alike answered "agree." However, there was no significant relationship among different sized cities or between the urban and suburban areas.

The expectation that the indirect election of metro councilors, as opposed to direct election, was more likely to be favored by both local leaders and administrators in all size and social status cities was also confirmed by this survey. Nevertheless, the higher the social

TABLE 33

LEADERS' AND ADMINISTRATORS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PROCEDURE FOR FILLING METRO ASSEMBLY
OFFICE BY COMMUNITY SOCIAL RANK (PERCENT)

	Leaders		Administrators	
	High N=19	Low N=56	High N=34	Low N=48
Filling Procedure				
Appointment	5.3	7.1	35.3	18.8
Direction Election	94.7	92.9	64.7	81.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

 $\chi^2=0.081; p>.05$
 $\chi^2=2.859; p>.05$

rank, or the larger the city, the more likely the leaders were to favor direct election. This association was not significant for the administrators. Tables 34 and 35 show an exception to this, however, in the large and high social status urban center of Bangkok where both direct and indirect election are favored alike by local leaders.

In addition, this survey found that over a quarter of the leaders and administrators supported direct instead of indirect election for metro council which had previously been filled only by appointment and indirect election from the assembly members since the beginning of local self-government a few decades ago.

It should be concluded concerning the fifth hypothesis that:

1. Leaders in all size and status cities as a group are more likely to favor election, both direct and indirect, to a higher degree than the local administrators, who tend to favor the appointment procedure for metro officials.
2. Size and social status of communities has very little effect on the attitudes of the leaders and administrators in respect to the selection procedures for metro mayor, council, and assembly members.
3. Several other relationships were confirmed by the data obtained: (1) the degree of support for an appointed metro mayor is higher among large city leaders than those in smaller ones; (2) there is no significant difference between local leaders' attitudes in large and small cities in respect to the degree of favoring direct election of metro assembly members; and (3) the indirect election of metro councilors, as opposed to the direct election, is likely to be favored to a higher degree by both local leaders and administrators in all size and status of cities.

The Sixth Hypothesis:

"The higher the community social status the less likely its leaders and administrators will feel that the burden of local taxes, when compared to services provided by the municipal government, are too high."

TABLE 34

LEADERS' AND ADMINISTRATORS' ATTITUDES TOWARD DIRECT AND INDIRECT
ELECTION FOR METRO COUNCILOR, BY CITY SIZE

Election	Leaders						Administrators					
	Large		Medium		Small		Large		Medium		Small	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Direct	8	50.0	3	13.6	8	25.8	5	38.5	4	28.6	3	37.5
Indirect	8	50.0	19	86.4	23	74.2	8	61.5	10	71.4	5	62.5
Total	16	100	22	100	31	100	13	100	14	100	8	100

$$\chi^2=6.19; \quad p<.05$$

$$\chi^2=0.40: \quad p>.05$$

TABLE 35

LEADERS' AND ADMINISTRATORS' ATTITUDES TOWARD DIRECT AND INDIRECT
ELECTION FOR METRO COUNCILOR, BY COMMUNITY SOCIAL RANK

Election	Leaders				Administrators			
	High		Low		High		Low	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Direct	8	50.0	11	20.8	5	38.5	7	31.8
Indirect	8	50.0	42	79.2	8	61.5	15	68.2
Total	16	100	53	100	13	100	22	100

$$\chi^2=5.29; \quad p<.05$$

$$\chi^2=0.23; \quad p>.05$$

Two controversies have inevitably intruded into virtually every metro reform movement, the proclaimed need for better services, especially in the outlying areas, and the fear of higher taxes.¹¹

In the Oklahoma City area, Morgan found that the upper social rank suburbanites were more satisfied with certain services in their municipality than those in the middle and lower status ones.¹²

In Greater Bangkok, the opposite phenomenon was found, as shown in Table 36. Respondents were asked to rate each local service as being either superior, very good, good, fair, poor, or "don't know." Using the percentage of "good" or better replies as the criterion, low social rank leaders (suburbanites) and administrators were more satisfied with their local services, although the difference was not as significant¹³ as those in the high social status Bangkok area.

The most interesting result was that administrators as a whole were more satisfied with their local services than their leader counterparts, but both had a very low percentage average of "good" and better ratings for all services. The highest average was among those administrators in low status communities with only 25.2 percent. The lowest ratings were found among the leaders of the high social status city with 12.4 percent.

The best ratings overall went to the public health service and the school system. Those services with the lowest ratings were garbage collection, sewer system, parks, and market service.

According to the low percentage of those who were satisfied with local services in Greater Bangkok among both groups, it might be said that the majority of leaders and administrators was not satisfied with their local government performance, especially in such basic functions

TABLE 36

PERCENTAGE OF "GOOD OR BETTER" RATINGS FOR SELECTED LOCAL SERVICES
BY COMMUNITY SOCIAL RANK AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP

Service Rated	Leaders		Administrators	
	High	Low	High	Low
Public health	47.4	30.4	63.9	51.1
School system	31.6	37.5	57.1	45.7
Parks	10.5	2.7	0.0	11.6
Street repair	5.0	33.9	16.7	29.2
Sewer system	5.0	14.5	0.0	12.5
Planning and zoning	0.0	8.0	14.3	18.4
Market service	0.0	5.4	9.1	18.6
Garbage collection	0.0	10.7	0.0	14.6
\bar{x}	12.4	17.9	20.1	25.2

 $p > .05^a$ $p > .05^a$

^aProbability based on "Differences Between Two Percentages Which Are Statistically Significant at the .05 Level for Minimum Numbers in Two Groups," O. Benson, Political Science Laboratory: Statistical Supplement, p. 20. The table is based on chi-square.

as garbage collection and the sewer system. This may be one reason why they were more likely to favor the metro experiment in these areas.

The tax issue, even though not as critical or as popular as in American metropolitan areas, should be included in the discussion since it has a close relationship with local services.¹⁴

In this section of the study, an attempt was made to determine how the leaders and administrators felt about the "relative" local tax burden. They were asked, "How do you feel about local taxes when compared with services provided by municipal government?"

Table 37 reveals a finding contrary to the expectation that leaders' would believe that local taxes were too high in proportion to the services provided by local government. Over 57 percent of the high status community leaders felt that relative taxes were too low while only 15.8 percent of them said they were too high. For low status communities, the leaders' beliefs were spread almost evenly with about 37 percent feeling that the taxes were too high, 33 percent too low, and 30 percent that they were about right. A negative correlation was found between the attitudes of leaders in high and low status communities in respect to relative local taxes. This relationship was significant at the .05 level.

Those who believed that relative taxes were too low argued that local taxes did not provide enough funds to initiate better services. Many felt that there was not enough money to even maintain basic functions.

Those who felt that relative taxes were too high contended that tax money was returned to people in the form of services but only in very small amounts. The largest sum was taken by the central government, for

TABLE 37

LEADERS' AND ADMINISTRATORS' ATTITUDES TOWARD BURDEN OF LOCAL TAXES
COMPARED TO SERVICES PROVIDED, BY COMMUNITY SOCIAL RANK

Taxes Relative To Service	Leaders				Administrators			
	High		Low		High		Low	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Too High	3	15.8	18	33.3	5	13.9	6	13.0
About Right	5	26.3	16	29.6	10	27.8	18	39.1
Too Low	11	57.9	20	37.0	21	58.3	22	47.8
Total	19	100	54	100	36	100	46	100

 $t_b = -0.191; p < .05$
 $t_b = -0.079; p > .05$

example, as automobile-user tax. Furthermore, leaks and misuses of tax money at the local levels were alleged.

As expected, the administrators in both low and high status communities had the higher percentage of those who believed that relative local taxes were too low to enable local government to provide better services. The percentage of those administrators who believed that local taxes were too low among high status communities was also somewhat higher than that among the low social ranking ones. While this relationship was negative, it was not significant at the .05 level.

When the size of the cities was taken into account, as shown in Table 38, a considerable difference was found in the leaders' attitudes. The medium size city was the only case with a higher percentage of those who believed that relative local taxes were too high (52.2 percent). Despite the apparent differences related to the size of the cities, this association was not significant enough to say that a difference in city size would make a difference in the leaders' attitudes as was the case when community social rank was involved.

For administrators, size had no significant relationship to attitudes toward the local tax burden. However, there was some degree of negative correlation between city size and relative local taxes insofar as leaders' and administrators' attitudes were concerned.

The conclusion of this section can be stated as follows: the attitudes of the local elected leaders and municipal administrators toward the burden of local taxes, when compared to the services provided by the municipal government, were likely to be negatively related to community social rank and city size. But this relationship was significant only

TABLE 38

LEADERS' AND ADMINISTRATORS' ATTITUDES TOWARD BURDEN OF LOCAL
TAXES COMPARED TO SERVICES PROVIDED, BY CITY SIZE

Taxes Relative To Service	Leaders						Administrators					
	Large		Medium		Small		Large		Medium		Small	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Too High	3	15.8	12	52.2	6	19.4	5	13.9	4	13.8	2	11.8
About Right	5	26.3	5	21.7	11	35.5	10	27.8	12	41.4	6	35.3
Too Low	11	57.9	6	26.1	14	45.2	21	58.3	13	44.8	9	52.9
Total	19	100	23	100	31	100	36	100	29	100	17	100

 $t_b = -0.010; p > .05$
 $t_b = -0.050; p > .05$

for those leaders in respect to community social rank. Furthermore, the assumption that there would be a high percentage of local leaders who felt that local taxes did not materialize. However, the tax issue is not considered important enough in Thailand to be used as a meaningful indicator of differences between communities or groups.

The Seventh Hypothesis:

"The members of the press are more likely than other groups to favor the metro plan for providing better services to suburban cities."

This hypothesis was formulated from the Toronto experience where Kaplan noted that newspapers would indicate what the general problems were and would urge that something be done.¹⁵ The recentralization ideology of the press in Toronto was centered around the need to combat haphazard suburban sprawl, revive public transit, place tight controls on the use of the automobile, renew the central core, etc. In Bangkok, the disparity of municipal services in urban and suburban areas was thought to be the general problem leading to the need for metropolitan integration. The press, the only major source of public opinion, was believed to be concerned about the well-being of the suburbs as well as the urban areas, and therefore likely to support a plan that might improve suburban public services.

Since only a few differences between the leaders' and administrators' attitudes toward local and metropolitan issues of services and reform was found between high and low social rank communities, each of them was used as a whole group in comparing them to the attitudes of the members of the press in this section.

Table 39 reveals how the three groups, leaders, administrators, and the press, responded to the question "Could some services be better provided on an area-wide basis rather than by each separate municipality?" It was not the press who reacted as the highest percentage preferring some area-wide services, as expected, but the local administrators. Local leaders gave the least support to this notion. It was found that the difference in group membership resulted in a significant difference in the attitude toward area-wide services.

The same phenomenon occurred when the respondents were asked to give their number one choice on a metro boundary (see Table 40) which included "no metro at all" in the selection list. There appeared to be a significant difference between group attitude in respect to preferences for metro government. The expectation that the newspapers would be more concerned about the benefit of the suburbs was not fulfilled. The highest percentage among the press, with 58.3 percent, chose Bangkok-Thonburi as the metro boundary compared to only 41.0 percent and 26.3 percent among the local administrators and leaders respectively.

Those members of the press who favored metro government were asked their reasons for preferring that governmental arrangement. Table 41 reveals that the newspapers were more concerned about efficiency, economy, cooperation and coordination in providing metro services. Local leadership or more democratic governments received a score of only 2.11 which was below the mean of the standard score of 2.47. This pattern of concern was similar to those of the leaders and administrators that was presented earlier (see Table 24).

TABLE 39

LEADERS', ADMINISTRATORS', AND THE PRESS' ATTITUDES TOWARD
HAVING SOME SERVICES PROVIDED ON AN AREA-WIDE BASIS

Area-wide Preference	Leaders		Administrators		The Press	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	32	42.1	63	75.9	8	61.5
No	44	57.9	20	24.1	5	38.5
Total	76	100	83	100	13	100

$$\chi^2=18.881; \quad p<.05$$

TABLE 40

LEADERS', ADMINISTRATORS', AND THE PRESS' NUMBER ONE
SELECTION FOR METRO BOUNDARY

Boundary	Leaders		Administrators		The Press	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Bangkok-Thonburi only	20	26.3	34	41.0	7	58.3
All four cities	11	14.5	27	32.5	1	8.3
More than four cities	0	0.0	2	2.4	1	8.3
No metro at all	45	59.2	20	24.1	3	25.0
Total	76	100	83	100	12	100

 $\chi^2 = 28.607; p < .05$

TABLE 41

REASONS FOR THE PRESS PREFERRING
METRO GOVERNMENT

Reasons	Score ^a	Mean Score
Greater efficiency and economy	27 (N=9)	3.00
Increase cooperation and coordination	27 (N=9)	3.00
Attracting industry	21 (N=8)	2.63
Reduce price of services	20 (N=9)	2.22
Encourage local leadership	19 (N=9)	2.11
Lower overall local tax	15 (N=8)	1.88
		$\bar{x}=2.47$

^aThe same as in Table 24

However, when the selection procedure for metro offices was raised, the newspaper representatives' views diverged from the leaders and administrators on how the metro mayor should be selected (see Table 42 compared to Table 29). Over 61 percent of the members of the press believed that the position of metro mayor would be better filled by direct election rather than by appointment or indirect election. Only 34.7 percent and 16.9 percent of the leaders and administrators were in this category.

As for the offices of metro council and metro assembly the press and local leaders had identical beliefs. Direct election for the metro assembly was the favored approach receiving the support of 92 percent of both groups. Over half of both leaders and newspaper representatives preferred indirect election for metro council while only 28.4 percent of the administrators had this preference.

Another test was made to see how much the newspapers, leaders, and administrators were concerned with democratic government. "Effectiveness" and "representativeness" were used as key words in the question of whether directly elected assembly members could provide better local services and be more representative (more adequately reflect the views of their constituents) than those appointed by the central government. Table 43 shows no significant difference among the three groups concerning the question of whether more effective services might be provided under elected assembly members. About two-thirds to three-quarters of them agreed that an elected local assembly should provide better services than an appointed one.

Leaders, administrators, and the newspapers showed a significant difference in their reactions to the representativeness issue (see

TABLE 42

THE PRESS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PROCEDURE
FOR FILLING METRO OFFICES

Filling Procedure	Mayor		Council		Assembly	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Appointment	3	23.1	1	7.7	1	7.7
Direct election	8	61.5	5	38.5	12	92.3
Indirect election	2	15.4	7	53.8	--	----
Total	13	100	13	100	13	100

TABLE 43

LEADERS', ADMINISTRATORS', AND THE PRESS' ATTITUDE TOWARD WHETHER ELECTED
METRO ASSEMBLY MEMBERS WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THOSE APPOINTED

Elected Members More Effective	Leaders		Administrators		The Press	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Agree	57	76.0	60	72.3	8	61.5
Disagree	18	24.0	23	27.7	5	38.5
Total	75	100	83	100	13	100

$$\chi^2=1.232; \quad p>.05$$

Table 44). It was found that the leaders were more concerned about democracy than the other two groups. Over 93 percent of the local leaders, compared to about 78 and 77 percent of administrators and the press, believed that elected assembly members would more accurately reflect the views of their constituents than those appointed by the central government.

Generally speaking, daily newspapers felt that the quality of local urban services was poor. An overall average of only 8.5 percent (compare with Table 36) believed that local services were "good" or better. Of the eight services listed, only three received a rating of "good" or better--public health with 33.3 percent, education with 18.2 percent, and market service with 16.7 percent. This attitude toward local services undoubtedly affected the press' view of the relative local tax burden. Table 45 showed a higher percentage among the newspapers than among the leaders and the administrators of those who believed local taxes were too high when compared to the services provided by the local government, even though this difference was not statistically significant.

A question concerning the factors causing metropolitan reorganization was also asked members of the press: "How do you think each of the following factors or reasons has affected metropolitan reorganization?" (See Table 46.) "Planning and zoning" was the most important factor followed by "Administrative efficiency" and "Desire of Interior Ministry," according to the views of members of the press.

Regarding the press, these conclusions seem justified:

1. The members of the press, as representatives of a larger public opinion, have shown considerable deviation from the local leaders and administrators on various issues pertaining to the

TABLE 44

LEADERS', ADMINISTRATORS', AND THE PRESS' ATTITUDE TOWARD WHETHER ELECTED
METRO ASSEMBLY MEMBERS WOULD BE MORE REPRESENTATIVE THAN THOSE APPOINTED

More Representative	Leaders		Administrators		The Press	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Agree	70	93.3	65	78.3	10	76.9
Disagree	5	6.7	18	21.7	3	23.1
Total	75	100	83	100	13	100

$$\chi^2=7.570; \quad p<.05$$

TABLE 45

LEADERS', ADMINISTRATORS', AND THE PRESS' ATTITUDES TOWARD
BURDEN OF LOCAL TAXES COMPARED TO SERVICES PROVIDED

Taxes Relative to Services	Leaders		Administrators		The Press	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Too High	21	28.8	11	13.4	4	30.8
About Right	21	28.8	28	34.1	5	38.5
Too Low	31	42.5	43	52.4	4	30.8
Total	73	100	82	100	13	100

$$\chi^2=6.916; \quad p>.05$$

TABLE 46
THE PRESS' BELIEF ON FACTORS CAUSING
METRO REORGANIZATION

Factors	Score ^a	Mean Score
Planning and zoning	38 (N=11)	3.45
Administrative efficiency	40 (N=12)	3.33
Desire of Interior Ministry	35 (N=11)	3.18
Service charges	9 (N= 3)	3.00
Budgeting problem	30 (N=12)	2.50
Traffic and transportation	19 (N= 8)	2.38
Corruption	1 (N= 1)	1.00
		$\bar{x}=2.69$

^aThe same as in Table 27

establishment of a metro government, e.g., metro boundary preference, some area-wide services, and representativeness.

2. Most of the expectations regarding the attitudes of newspaper representatives were confirmed by the data collected with a few exceptions such as: (a) only about 17 percent of them were willing to have suburban cities (except Thonburi) included in the metro boundary; and (b) the majority of the newspapers tended to favor the election of the metro mayor rather than his appointment by the central government.

Summary

The previous chapter, based upon social area analysis, was aimed primarily at classifying the four subareas to see if any important socio-economic differences exist. It was found that the Bangkok municipality has certain distinctive characteristics as a large, highly urbanized central city with relatively high social status. The other three cities were different from Bangkok: as suburbs they were much smaller in size and lower in socio-economic status.

This chapter, based upon attitudinal analysis, investigated the opinions and attitudes of the local leaders and administrators in the subareas. The press was another group selected to be representative of a larger public interest in the study area, and their attitudes were compared to those of the local leaders and administrators as whole groups, not by subareas.

Community social rank and to a lesser degree the size of the city were used as independent variables. The dependent variables were the political measures such as local vote, municipal services, tax burden, metro plan, metro offices selection procedure, and factors causing metro reform.

The following general findings were reported:

1. Community social rank and city size were found to have a considerable effect upon the citizen vote. The larger the size or the higher the social status of the city, the more likely the citizens were to cast a party vote for the opposing party in the last municipal election. In the smaller cities, the political party played a lesser role in local elections, and the personalities of the candidates were found to be the most important factor.

Since this finding was based on one election during a short span of time, it may not apply consistently to general voting behavior. However, it gave the characteristics of the citizens' vote during the study period based upon the beliefs of the respondents.

2. Differences in community social rank or city size did not provide significant variation in local leaders' or administrators' attitudes toward the metro plan.

3. Municipal administrators as a whole reflected a higher degree of preference for the metro plan than those local elected leaders in the metro area.

4. Local leaders and administrators shared common beliefs concerning planning and zoning, the budget problem, and administrative efficiency as important factors causing the present metro reorganization. The only difference was found in regard to "Desire of Interior Ministry" which local leaders believed to be the strongest reason, while local administrators rated this factor lower than the average mean score.

5. There was no significant variation within each group, leaders or administrators, on what selection procedure for metro offices (Mayor,

Council, and Assembly) should be employed. However, the variation within the leaders group (among large, medium and small city size, or between high and low social status cities) appeared to be higher than those of the local administrators, especially concerning the direct or indirect election for metro councilor where a significant difference was found.

6. Local leaders as a whole reflected more concern for democratic government than the municipal administrators which could be seen from the response to the selection procedures for the metro offices.

7. The tax issue, even though not as useful as in the United States in indicating differentiation among the subareas, has been included in this study. Local leaders have also shown a greater variation within the group than those administrators of the smaller cities who believed that the burden of local taxes, compared to services provided by local government, was too high. However, the interesting result was that most of both groups as a whole in all social status and size of cities, except the medium size, felt the taxes collected were too low to be enough to provide adequate local services.

8. There was a great variation among the groups including the leaders, administrators, and the press, on various issues pertaining to the establishment of a metropolitan government. While most of the leaders believed in local independence as it was previously, the press strongly favored supporting the amalgamation of Bangkok and Thonburi, but omitting the other two cities. Another variable with a high degree of conflict is the selection procedure for the metro offices, especially for the metro mayor, in which the leaders believed in indirect election,

the administrators favored appointment, and the press preferred a direct election.

On the whole, the findings could be divided into two categories: differences within groups and differences among groups. One of the purposes of this dissertation was to test the existence of variations in political attitudes within each group, leaders and administrators, in respect to community social status and the size of the cities. But, it became necessary to take variation among groups into consideration since this deviation was considerable and might become an important factor in metro reform.

The administrators group, no matter what the size or status of the community, were generally more sympathetic to the goals of the present metro reorganization plan. This group tended to view municipal services as poor, inefficient, and lacking in coordination and cooperation. They believed that metro government could solve these problems provided that more authority and centralization be given to the metro government.

Local leaders were found to have a significant degree of differentiation among subareas on matters such as the selection procedure for metro offices and the burden of local taxes. On other issues, e.g., the preference for certain area-wide services, and the attitude toward the metro boundary, even though differences were not significant, the leaders showed a higher degree of variation within the group than those within the administrator group in respect to community social rank and size.

All attitudinal differences discussed above should have some effect on the future of the metropolitan plan. The subsequent chapter will provide an analysis of how these variations might affect the process of metropolitan reorganization.

Footnotes

¹A concise but informative discussion of the development of human ecology can be found in Leonard Reissman, The Urban Process: Cities in Industrial Societies (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 93-121.

²Calvin F. Schmid, "Research Techniques in Human Ecology," in Scientific Social Surveys and Research, 2nd ed., ed. by Pauline V. Young (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1949), p. 429.

³The first part of the model employed in this study (see page 33 of this dissertation) involves social and economic differentiation based upon social area analysis. The second part is attitudinal analysis which leads to the last part which is the prospect for metropolitan political integration.

⁴Edward C. Banfield, "The Politics of Metropolitan Area Organizations," Midwest Journal of Political Science, I (May, 1957), 85.

⁵See Eugene C. Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship: A Study of California City Elections (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1960).

⁶See Adrian and Press, Governing Urban America, pp. 99-101.

⁷The uses and advantages of the semantic differential are discussed in Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundation of Behavioral Research (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1964), pp. 564-580.

⁸The score of 4 has been considered as neutral.

⁹Rank correlation between two groups is rather high ($r_s = .59$).

¹⁰The policy of all appointed members was established at the beginning of the adoption of the municipality. The recent all appointed policy for assembly members was the result of the coups.

¹¹Morgan, "Suburban Differentiation," p. 240.

¹²Ibid., pp. 241-242.

¹³The difference between two percentages which are statistically significant at the .05 level can be seen in Oliver Benson, Political Science Laboratory Statistical Supplement (University of Oklahoma, 1971), p. 20.

¹⁴Tax systems in Thailand did not provide the knowledge to the general citizens on how much tax they actually pay or what the tax money is to be spent for. As noted earlier, the people believe that it is the government's responsibility to provide better services, but they do not know how the government can do it.

¹⁵See Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, pp. 178-180.

CHAPTER VII

THE PROSPECTS FOR METROPOLITAN REFORM:

A CONCLUSION

The trend toward metropolitan government in Greater Bangkok developed in 1960 as the result of the study made and presented to the Thai Ministry of Interior by Ritchfield Whiting Bowne and Associates. This plan, only a physical one, proposed the consolidation of Bangkok and Thonburi provinces and some parts of the Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi provinces. Since then, more elaborate detail in both physical and governmental structure has been instituted by the Interior Ministry and the Bangkok Municipality. This led to the consolidation of the Bangkok and Thonburi areas into the Metropolitan City Municipality in 1971 and eventually to the present Bangkok Metropolis in 1972.

This change resulted in the consolidation of the two local governments and the expansion of the Bangkok area; however, the services provided in this area did not seem to be improved. Newspapers still complained of the delay in road construction and repair, lack of recreational facilities, poor zoning, and insufficient public utilities.¹ The Metro Council and Assembly, all appointed by the national government rather than elected, did not instigate any significant improvement in metro services in spite of the expectation that better services would

be provided by this super government. These developments created doubt as to whether the metro government was still too young to be able to solve major metro problems, or if something was wrong in the application of metropolitan government in this area.

In considering whether or not metropolitan government is appropriate for Thailand, and especially the Bangkok area, many factors involving this governmental arrangement should be taken into consideration. In the United States, especially, two major factors are thought to be of crucial importance in assessing the prospects for metropolitan government: socio-economic differentiation and attitudinal differentiation of sub-areas.

This dissertation has adopted the above two criteria as guidance for the study of the Bangkok area to determine whether or not differences in socio-economic status and political attitudes have any effect on the newly formed metropolitan government. This section of the dissertation is the final segment of the three-component parts model specified earlier. Thus far, the findings include the following:

1. Metropolitan problems were found to exist in the Greater Bangkok area. These problems, similar to those outlined by Williams, resulted from three occurrences, namely, maintaining the system, unequal distribution of resources and services, and border relationships.²
2. The metropolitan problems were serious enough to warrant action to cope with the problems.
3. Some degree of differentiation and specialization existed among the subareas within Greater Bangkok

4. This differentiation and specialization could result either in interdependence among local units which need some form of governmental integration, or in the demand for autonomy. In fact, these forces could produce tendencies in both directions simultaneously.³

5. Almost no difference in attitudes toward municipal services appeared among the three elite groups included in the study--political leaders, municipal administrators, and the press--when they were grouped by status and size of the subareas. Most evaluations were likely to be on the negative side of the scale.⁴

6. The greatest degree of attitudinal variations occurred among groups of leaders, administrators, and the press followed by variations within the leaders' group. The least differentiation in political attitudes toward the metro plan appeared in the administrators' group.

The main hypotheses guiding this study were derived from two previous studies.⁵ That is, differences in community social rank and life style among metropolitan political subunits lead to differing preferences and attitudes, and these differing attitudes have serious consequences for efforts to bring about greater metropolitan political unification. Williams and Morgan both found that socio-economic differences spatially distributed tend to be associated with a corresponding heterogeneity in attitudinal characteristics. For example, suburbanites with high social status were more satisfied with their local services and ways of life. These authors concluded that appeals to "efficiency and economy," which were customarily the most important reasons given for metro reform, would not be sufficient to draw support from these communities for greater metropolitan political integration.

While decentralization or centralization does affect such questions as economy, efficiency, and speed of action, the true test of the adequacy of a metropolitan governmental system, according to Williams, is whether it can so structure the political process of negotiation and compromise as to deal effectively and adequately with metropolitan problems.⁶ Morgan also contends that the actual test of integration would be the proportion of "public-oriented," cooperative, corporate activities in which people in various communities engage, as opposed to actions that are non-corporate, or "privatistic."⁷ The Lakewood Plan of Los Angeles is the most popular example of the success of the above assumptions.⁸

Although public policy questions were not addressed in this study, Williams, Morgan, and Warren all shared the same idea that differentiation and specialization in metropolitan areas tend to result in divergent local interests and policies that perpetuate demands for autonomy rather than in pressures for governmental integration.

A principle concern of this study is whether the spatial differentiation existing in Greater Bangkok results in different preferences and attitudes among important elite groups in that area. In fact, only a limited degree of attitudinal variation was found. Thus, the overall prospect for metropolitan integration, as far as group attitudes are concerned, is better here than in most areas in the United States. Only one variable--voting behavior--revealed any great difference among the subareas. The other variables--procedures for selecting municipal officials, municipal services, metro preferences, tax, city size, and social status--had little effect on group attitudes. This finding can

be compared to the situation in Metro Toronto where Kaplan found that social structure was not important in metro politics.⁹

It would probably be unwise to make any conclusions about the prospect of metropolitan reform in Greater Bangkok without referring to experiences in other metro reforms. As mentioned earlier, "integration" in this study refers to either the concept of formal governmental unification or the presence of informal cooperative structures. Examples of those at the unification end are Metro Toronto and Greater London. At the other end, examples include the Los Angeles and Philadelphia areas.

The social and political characteristics of Greater Bangkok should permit that metropolitan area to achieve a relatively high degree of unification such as found in Toronto and London.¹⁰ All three areas share the common characteristics of being part of a unitary system of government at the national level, and reorganization in each instance was imposed by a higher level of government rather than by local authorities.

As noted above, the links between social structure and metro politics in both Greater Bangkok and Toronto were not strong. Both metro areas lacked many of the social tensions present in many large American metropolitan areas. The low temperature of metro politics in both areas reflected a large degree of social consensus. For Greater Bangkok, this situation seems to be largely the result of traditional characteristics inherited from the beginning of the Thai society.

With regard to the existence of cooperative mechanisms to further political integration, those two successful experiences of Philadelphia and Los Angeles possessed distinctive characteristics. Thomas R. Dye

pointed out that Philadelphia's existing decentralized political structure is functional to the metropolitan system in a number of significant ways, many of which are very directly related to the psychological well-being of its inhabitants.¹¹ Vincent Ostrom, Charles Tiebout, and Robert Warren have indicated in a similar manner that "Los Angeles' highly unstructured metropolitan area possesses a very rich and intricate framework for negotiating, adjudicating and deciding questions that affect . . . diverse public interests."¹²

The Greater Bangkok area was not found to possess these characteristics or mechanisms for a polycentric cooperative arrangement. The usual practice of control over municipal activities by the national government, the lack of funds to provide general services, and the absence of citizen support and participation make it difficult for the essential cooperative framework to develop.

While Williams' argument that metropolitan heterogeneity leads to decentralization of life-style services and centralization of system-maintenance functions¹³ could be applied to the Greater Bangkok area, the pattern or system of metropolitan relations would be different. This is so primarily because elite opposition to metropolitan integration in this area is weak.¹⁴ In fact, most urban elites were found to be at the positive end of the reform spectrum. Moreover, governments in Thailand, especially at the national level, are able to provide services in virtually whatever way they choose with almost no resistance from the citizenry. Thus, there is no inherent reason in the Bangkok area why services affecting inhabitants' life-styles would necessarily have to be decentralized.

However, since Western democracy increasingly has been assimilated into the Thai cultural system, it seems appropriate to develop a metropolitan system for Bangkok similar to that in some highly developed area which possesses a related cultural pattern, such as Toronto. The two-tier system of Metro Toronto that has already been claimed to be the present model for the Bangkok Metropolis might be considered the most suitable example.¹⁵ Under this arrangement, system maintenance services should be adequately provided at the metro level while life-style services should be left in the hands of local government.

A successful metropolitan government for Bangkok is unlikely either through a cooperative basis or through complete unification. Urban citizens in this area are now capable of determining and deciding their own life styles, providing they have enough power and authority to do so. Although the cultural setting is not now conducive to this prospect, the trends toward new ideas of democracy and self-government are believed to be strong enough for local units in this area to establish their own urban service levels and be effective participants interacting with higher levels of government. However, this would require consistent practice which can be achieved only if the national government does not interfere. This prospect is based on Durkheim's social theory¹⁶ where he reminds us that if a society is to be integrated and have resistive force, its component parts must be functionally complementary.¹⁷ Durkheim concludes that the division of labor produces solidarity because it creates among men an entire system of rights and duties which link them together in a durable way.¹⁸

Since a certain degree of differentiation was found within the group of leaders--among difference in social status and size of city--the distribution of functions between local and metropolitan levels in Greater Bangkok should be an important consideration. In Toronto, the Metro Act left as much power with the municipalities as possible and shifted to the metro level only those powers necessary to deal with critical regional problems, e.g., only public transportation was shifted wholly to the metro level.¹⁹

The present Bangkok Metropolis Act (The National Executive Council Announcement Number 335) specifies only the structural and operational details for the upper-tier where proper control mechanisms can be exerted by the national government over area-wide problems. It leaves the door open for further reform at the second tier. Accordingly, the Toronto metropolitan concept could be effectively applied to the Bangkok area if certain changes were made to conform with the cultural setting and sociological theory discussed above.

At the second tier, or local level, the thirteen regional (Ket) offices of the present Bangkok Metropolis should have municipal status along with the two cities--Smut Prakarn and Nonthaburi.²⁰ Local self-government with popular elections is also needed at this level.

At the upper tier, where Bangkok is the special city as the capital of the nation and national socio-economic and political development are highly dependent on it, the Metro Governor might be appointed by the national government to act as chairman of the Metro Council, as in the case of Toronto in the beginning years. The rest of the Metro Council

and Assembly members should be from regional representatives--either by direct election or from those elected second-tier officials.

The case for metropolitan government reform is not based on the lack of alternatives, but in the belief that the alternatives do not work well enough.²¹ In Greater Bangkok, at least three developments might be projected for the future.

First, the importance of Bangkok as the national capital and in all other respects will continue long into the future. The control and domination by the national government is not likely to decrease in the next few decades. At the same time, growing metropolitan problems will make this domination even more legitimate. However, the political and bureaucratic elites who make most of the policies will increasingly realize that they cannot maintain their power and perform all functions without help from the local citizens. It is expected that the second-tier or local level will receive more attention from these important elites toward the end of permitting local communities to decide upon their own ways of life and to encourage cooperation and participation at the metro level.

Second, the weakness of local self-government as experienced in Thailand derives mainly from the lack of consistency. The frequent coups always ended the operations of democratic local government and returned the performance of functions to the national level. If this trend continues, the future of reform will be no better than those efforts in the past where citizens had to repeatedly re-learn the democratic ways of life. Consistency in retaining self-government, even only at the local level, will bring not only the true knowledge of

democracy to local citizens and their leaders, but also the accountability that the leaders should have to their constituency.

The third phenomenon is closely related to the second one; it is the conflict between local leaders and local administrators. The main issues which lead to this conflict are the differences in ideology and responsibility which have existed since the beginning of local self-government. Local administrators, who are under the close control and supervision of the national government, are more concerned about the desires of the national administration than the needs of the local community. They view local leaders or elected officials as incompetent, uneducated, inexperienced, lacking in administrative knowledge and skill, seeking power for personal interests, and misusing the power they have.

Local leaders, generally influential local elites, view local administrators as corrupt, inefficient autocrats who lack an understanding of local needs and distrust local representatives.

This conflict of ideas between these two groups still exists, as the results of this study suggest. However, if consistency in local self-government can be achieved in the future, this may help reduce this conflict. If this antagonism can be kept within reasonable bounds and gradually minimized over the years, the prospects for successful metro government in the Bangkok area would be greatly improved. This source of serious friction and its potential impact on the operation of the metropolitan government should be worthy of further study in the future.

Footnotes

¹Examples are found in Swaeng Yingyeod, "Welcome to 1973 Dr. Chamnan," Bangkok Post, January 1, 1973, p. 5; and Krisda Arunvongse, "Man and the City," Sunday Nation, November 12, 1972, p. 9.

²Williams, et al., Suburban Differences, pp. 299-305.

³See Oliver P. Williams, "Life Style Values and Political Decentralization in Metropolitan Areas," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XLVIII (December, 1967), 299-311. He differentiates between system maintenance functions and those that more directly affect life style with a comment the same environmental pressures may produce some integration and some independence (depending in part on the nature of the function).

⁴The contrast has been found in Oklahoma City SMSA where satisfaction with the level and quality of local public services was evident among the vast majority of the respondents. See Morgan, "Suburban Differentiation," p. 250.

⁵Williams, et al., Suburban Differences, in the Philadelphia area; Morgan, "Suburban Differentiation," in the Greater Oklahoma City area.

⁶Williams, et al., Suburban Differences, p. 306.

⁷Morgan, "Suburban Differentiation," pp. 307-308.

⁸See Warren, Government in Metropolitan Regions.

⁹More explanation of the relationships of social factors and metro politics in Toronto can be found in Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, pp. 156-214.

¹⁰For the case of Greater London, see Smallwood, Greater London; and Foley, Governing the London Region. For Toronto see Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, p. 41.

¹¹Dye, "Metropolitan Integration by Bargaining," pp. 451-453.

¹²Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren, "The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas," p. 842.

¹³Williams, "Life Style Values."

¹⁴Elite opposition to metro reform in the United States played a much more important role than found in Thailand. For a discussion of the U.S. case see David A. Caputo and Richard L. Cole, "Dimensions of Elite Opposition to Metropolitan Consolidation," Publius (Fall, 1972), 107-118.

¹⁵Kaplan, Urban Political Systems. For Metro system see pp. 50-55; for municipal system see pp. 55-56.

¹⁶Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, trans. George Simpson (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933).

¹⁷Ake, A Theory of Political Integration, p. 49.

¹⁸Durkheim, The Division of Labor, p. 406.

¹⁹Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, p. 52.

²⁰Metro Toronto is composed of the City of Toronto and twelve suburban cities.

²¹Williams, et al., Suburban Differences, p. 309.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Abcarian, Gilbert, and Soule, John W., eds. Social Psychology and Political Behavior: Problems and Prospects. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1971.
- Adrian, Charles R., and Press, Charles. Governing Urban America. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968.
- Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Alternative Approaches to Governmental Reorganization in Metropolitan Areas. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962.
- _____. Factors Affecting Voter Reactions to Governmental Reorganization in Metropolitan Areas. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May, 1962.
- _____. Governmental Structure, Organization and Planning in Metropolitan Areas. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July, 1961.
- _____. Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966.
- _____. Metropolitan Social and Economic Disparities: Implications for Intergovernmental Relations in Central Cities and Suburbs. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January, 1965.
- Ake, Claude. A Theory of Political Integration. Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1967.
- Almond, Gabriel A., and Coleman, James, eds. The Politics of Developing Areas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.
- Anderson, William, and Weidner, Edward W. American City Government. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1925.
- Backstrom, Charles, and Hursh, Gerald. Survey Research. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1963.

- Baldinger, Stanley. Planning and Governing the Metropolis: The Twin Cities Experience. New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1971.
- Banfield, Edward C., and Wilson, James Q. City Politics. New York: Random House, Inc., 1963.
- Bell, Wendell. "Social Area Typology of Urban Neighborhoods." Community Structure and Analysis. Edited by Marvin B. Sussman. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1959.
- Benson, Oliver. Political Science Laboratory. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1969.
- _____. Political Science Laboratory Statistical Supplement. Norman, Oklahoma: By the Author, University of Oklahoma, 1971.
- Bish, Robert L. The Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971.
- Blalock, Hubert M., Jr. Social Statistics. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1960.
- Blanchard, Wendell, ed. Thailand: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture. New Haven: HRAF Press, 1966.
- Bollens, John C. The States and the Metropolitan Problems. Chicago: Council of State Governments, 1956.
- _____, and Schmandt, Henry J. The Metropolis: Its People, Politics, and Economic Life. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1970.
- Breese, Gerald. Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966.
- Butwell, Richard. Southeast Asia Today--And Tomorrow: A Political Analysis. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961.
- Callow, Alexander B., ed. American Urban History: An Interpretive Reader with Commentaries. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Campbell, Angus; Converse, Philip E.; Miller Warren E.; and Stokes, Donald E. The American Voter. Abridged ed. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964.
- Changrien, Paiboon. Governing the Metropolis. Bangkok: Thai Watanapanit Ltd., 1973.
- Clark, Terry N., ed. Community Structure and Decision-Making: Comparative Analyses. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968.
- Committee for Economic Development. Modernizing Local Government. New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1966.

- _____. Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas. New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1970.
- Coppock, J. T., and Prince, Hugh C. Greater London. London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1964.
- Costikyan, Edward N., and Lehman, Maxwell. Restructuring the Government of New York City. Report of the Scott Commission Task Force on Jurisdiction and Structure. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972.
- Coulter, Philip B., ed. Politics of Metropolitan Areas: Selected Readings. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1967.
- Dahl, Robert A. Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.
- Darling, Frank C. Thailand. New York: American-Asian Educational Exchange, Inc., 1969.
- Deutsch, Karl W. "Communication Theory and Political Integration." The Integration of Political Communities. Edited by Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964.
- Durkheim, Emile. The Division of Labor in Society. Trans. by George Simpson. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1947.
- Dye, Thomas R. Politics, Economics and the Public. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966.
- _____. "Urban Political Integration: Conditions Associated with Annexation in American Cities." Politics in the Metropolis: Conflict and Cooperation. Edited by Thomas R. Dye and Brett W. Hawkins. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1967.
- _____, and Hawkins, Brett W., eds. Politics in the Metropolis. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1967.
- Easton, David. A Framework for Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965.
- _____. The Political System. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953.
- _____. A System Analysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965.
- _____, ed. Varieties of Political Theory. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966.
- Erie, Steven P.; Kirlin, John J.; and Rabinovitz, Francine. "Can Something Be Done? Propositions on the Performance of Metropolitan Institutions." Reform of Metropolitan Governments. Edited by Lowdon Wingo. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, Inc., 1972.

- Etzioni, Amitai. Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965.
- Fava, Sylvia Fleis, ed. Urbanism in World Perspective: A Reader. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1968.
- Foley, Donald L. Governing the London Region: Reorganization and Planning in the 1960's. Los Angeles: The Regents of the University of California, 1972.
- Frieden, Bernard J. Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism. Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1966.
- Friedman, Harry J. Local Government in Third-World Asia. Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Corporation, 1973.
- Friesema, H. Paul. Metropolitan Political Structure: Intergovernmental Relations and Political Integration in the Quad-Cities. Iowa City, Iowa: University of Iowa Press, 1971.
- Goodall, Leonard E. The American Metropolis. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1968.
- "Government Proposals for Reorganization of London Government." Government of the Metropolis. Edited by Joseph F. Zimmerman. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968.
- Greer, Scott. "Dilemmas of Action Research on the Metropolitan Problem." Community Political System. Edited by Morris Janowitz. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961.
- _____. The Emerging City: Myth and Reality. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.
- _____. Governing the Metropolis. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962.
- _____. Metropolitics: A Study of Political Culture. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963.
- _____, and Kube, Ella. "Urbanism and Social Structure: A Los Angeles Study." Community Structure and Analysis. Edited by Marvin B. Sussman. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1959.
- _____; McElrath, Dennis L.; Minar, David W.; and Orleans, Peter, eds. The New Urbanization. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968.
- Gulick, Luther. The Metropolitan Problem and American Ideas. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962.
- Hall, Peter. London 2000. 2nd ed. London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1969.

- Hauser, Philip M., and Schnore, Leo F., eds. The Study of Urbanization. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965.
- Hawley, Amos H. Human Ecology: A Theory of Community Structure. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1950.
- Heady, Ferrel. Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966.
- Henderson, John W. Area Handbook for Thailand. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971.
- Hermassi, Elbaki. Leadership and National Development in North Africa. Berkeley: The Regents of the University of California, 1972.
- Hunter, Floyd. Community Power Structure. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953.
- Jackson, Kenneth T., and Schultz, Stanley K., eds. Cities in American History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1972.
- Jacob, Philip E., and Teune, Henry. "The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community." The Integration of Political Communities. Edited by Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964.
- Jacob, Philip E., and Toscano, James V., eds. The Integration of Political Communities. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964.
- Jones, Victor. Metropolitan Government. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.
- Kaplan, Harold. Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967.
- Kaufman, Howard Keva. Bangkuad: A Community Study in Thailand. New York: J. J. Anglestine, Inc., Publishers, 1965.
- Kerlinger, Fred N. Foundation of Behavioral Research. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1964.
- Kersteins, Thom. The New Elite in Asia and Africa. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1966.
- Kruekaew, Paitun. The Nature of Thai Society and the Principle of Community Development. Bangkok: Kuekul Partnership, Ltd., 1963.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. Political Man. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1963.

- Litchfield Whiting Bowne and Associates. Greater Bangkok Plan 2533. Bangkok: Kanachang Company, Ltd., 1964.
- Lithwick, N. H., and Paquet, Gilles, eds. Urban Studies: A Canadian Perspective. Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1968.
- Lockard, Duane. The Politics of State and Local Government. 2nd ed. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970.
- Long, Norton E. "Recent Theories and Problems of Local Government." Public Policy VIII. Edited by Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris. Cambridge: Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University, 1958.
- Martin, Roscoe. "Government Adaptation to Metropolitan Growth." Politics in the Metropolis. Edited by Thomas R. Dye and Brett W. Hawkins. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1967.
- Meadows, Paul, and Mizruchi, Ephraim H., eds. Urbanism, Urbanization, and Change: Comparative Perspectives. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969.
- Nimmanahaeminda, An. "Planning for the Systematic Growth of the Metropolis." Reports on Metropolitan Problem Seminar at Chulalongkarn University March 26-28, 1972. Edited by Issara Suwanabol, et al. Bangkok: Social Science Association Press, 1973.
- Noranitipadungkarn, Chakit. Elites, Power Structure and Politics in Thai Communities. Bangkok: Research Center, National Institute of Development Administration, 1970.
- Nuechterlein, Donald E. Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia. New York: Cornell University Press, 1965.
- Palumbo, Dennis J. Statistics in Political and Behavioral Science. New York: Meredith Corporation, 1969.
- Parsons, Talcott. The Social System. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1951.
- Plunkett, Thomas J. Urban Canada and Its Government: A Study of Municipal Organization. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1968.
- Potholm, Christian P. Four African Political Systems. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970.
- Press, Charles. Main Street Politics: Policy Making at the Local Level. East Lansing: Institute for Community Development, Michigan State University, 1962.

- Pye, Lucian W. Cases in Comparative Politics Asia. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970.
- _____, and Verba, Sidney. Political Culture and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.
- Ranney, David C. Planning and Politics in the Metropolis. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1969.
- Redlich, Josef, and Hirst, Francis W. The History of Local Government in England. 2nd ed. New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1970.
- Reissman, Leonard. The Urban Process: Cities in Industrial Societies. New York: Free Press, 1964.
- "Report of the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto." Government of the Metropolis. Edited by Joseph F. Zimmerman. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968.
- Riggs, Fred W. Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964.
- _____. "Interest and Clientele Groups." Problem of Politics and Administration in Thailand. Edited by Joseph L. Sutton, Indiana: Institute of Training for Public Service, Indiana University, 1962.
- _____. Thailand: The Modernization of Bureaucratic Polity. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966.
- Robson, N. A. Local Government in Crisis. 2nd ed. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1968.
- Rose, Albert. "The Case Against Total Amalgamation in Metropolitan Toronto." Government of the Metropolis. Edited by Joseph F. Zimmerman. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968.
- Rosenthal, Donald B. The Limited Elite: Politics and Government in Two Indian Cities. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970.
- Ryan, John W. "Municipal Government and Administration." Problems of Politics and Administration in Thailand. Edited by Joseph L. Sutton. Bloomington: Institute of Training for Public Service, Indiana University, 1962.
- Sargent, S. Stansfield, and Williamson, Robert C. Social Psychology: An Introduction to the Study of Human Relations. 2nd ed. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1958.
- Sayre, Wallace S., and Kaufman, Herbert. Governing New York City: Politics in the Metropolis. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960.

- Schnore, Leo F. The Urban Scene: Human Ecology and Demography. New York: Free Press, 1965.
- Sharpe, L. J. "The New Government in Greater London." Government of the Metropolis. Edited by Joseph F. Zimmerman. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968.
- Shevky, Eshref, and Bell, Wendell. Social Area Analysis. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955.
- Shore, Edgar L. "The Public Service." Problems of Politics and Administration in Thailand. Edited by Joseph L. Sutton. Bloomington: Institute of Training for Public Service, Indiana University, 1962.
- Siffin, William J. The Thai Bureaucracy. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966.
- Simmons, James, and Simmons, Robert. Urban Canada. Canada: The Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1969.
- Singer, Marshall R. The Emerging Elite. Cambridge, Mass.: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1964.
- Skinner, G. William. Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958.
- Smallwood, Frank. Greater London: The Politics of Metropolitan Reform. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965.
- Sobin, Dennis P. The Future of the American Suburbs. New York: Kennikat Press, 1971.
- Sofen, Edward. The Miami Metropolitan Experiment. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963.
- Studenski, Paul. The Government of Metropolitan Areas. New York: National Municipal League, 1930.
- Sussman, Marvin B., ed. Community Structure and Analysis. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1959.
- Sutton, Joseph L., ed. Problems of Politics and Administration in Thailand. Bloomington: Institute of Training for Public Service, Indiana University, 1962.
- Suwanabol, Issara; Tepawal, Nipon; Pitaktepsombat, Pichit; and Limanon, Passorn, eds. Reports on Metropolitan Problem Seminar at Chulalongkarn University March 26-28, 1972. Bangkok: Social Science Association Press, 1973.

- Swasdiyakorn, Choopol. "Problem of Metropolitan Administration." Reports on Metropolitan Problem Seminar at Chulalongkorn University March 26-28, 1972. Edited by Issara Suwanabol, et al. Bangkok: Social Science Association Press, 1973.
- Ulmer, S. Sidney, ed. Introductory Readings in Political Behavior. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1961.
- Ward, Robert E.; Bonilla, James S.; Hyman, Herbert H.; Pye, Lucian W.; and Weiner, Myron. Studying Politics Abroad. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964.
- Warren, Robert O. Government in Metropolitan Regions: A Reappraisal of Fractionated Political Organization. California: The Regents of the University of California, 1966.
- Weinstein, Michael A. Identity, Power, and Change: Selected Readings in Political Theory. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1971.
- Wheaton, William L. C. "Integration at the Urban Level: Political Influence and the Decision Process." The Integration of Political Communities. Edited by Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964.
- Williams, Oliver P.; Herman, Harold; Liebman, Charles S.; and Dye, Thomas R. Suburban Differences and Metropolitan Policies. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965.
- Wilson, David A. Politics in Thailand. New York: Cornell University Press, 1962.
- _____. The United States and the Future of Thailand. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970.
- Wilson, James Q., ed. City Politics and Public Policy. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968.
- Wit, Daniel. A Comparative Survey of Local Government and Administration. Bangkok: Thammasat University Press, 1961.
- _____. Thailand: Another Vietnam? New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968.
- Wolff, Kurt H., ed. The Sociology of Georg Simmel. New York: The Free Press, 1950.
- Worsley, Peter. The Third World. 2nd ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970.
- Wraith, Ronald. Local Administration in West Africa. New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972.

Zimmerman, Joseph F. Government of the Metropolis: Selected Readings.
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968.

Articles and Periodicals

Bell, Wendell. "The Utility of the Shevky Typology for the Design of Urban Sub-Area Field Studies." Journal of Social Psychology, XLVII (February, 1958), 71-83.

_____, and Greer, Scott. "Social Area Analysis and Its Critics." Pacific Sociological Review, V (Spring, 1962), 3-9.

Dawson, Richard E., and Robinson, James A. "Interparty Competition Economic Variables and Welfare Politics in the American States." Journal of Politics, XXV (May, 1963), 265-298.

Duncan, Otis Dudley. "Review of Shevky and Bell, Social Area Analysis." American Journal of Sociology, LXI (July, 1955), 84-85.

Dye, Thomas R. "Government Structure, Urban Environment, and Educational Policy." Midwest Journal of Political Science, XI (August, 1967), 353-380.

_____. "Metropolitan Integration by Bargaining Among Sub-Areas." Politics in the Metropolis. Edited by Thomas R. Dye and Brett W. Hawkins. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1967.

_____; Liebman, Charles S.; Williams, Oliver P.; and Herman, Harold. "Differentiation and Cooperation in a Metropolitan Area." Midwest Journal of Political Science, VII (May, 1963), 145-155.

Eulau, Heinz, and Eyestone, Robert. "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis." American Political Science Review, LXII (March, 1968), 124-143.

Hawley, Amos H., and Duncan, Otis Dudley. "Social Area Analysis: A Critical Appraisal." Land Economics, XXXII (November, 1957), 337-345.

Kirkpatrick, Samuel A., and Morgan, David R. "Policy Support and Orientations Toward Metropolitan Political Integration Among Urban Officials." Social Science Quarterly, LII (December, 1971), 656-671.

Laquian, Aprodicio A. "The Asian City and the Political Process." Philippine Journal of Public Administration, XIV (January, 1970), 8-20.

Lineberry, Robert L., and Fowler, Edmund P. "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities." American Political Science Review, LXI (September, 1967), 701-716.

Maxey, Chester. "The Political Integration of Metropolitan Communities." National Municipal Review, XI (August, 1922), 229-253.

Menzel, Herbert. "Comments on Robinson's Ecological Correlations and Behavior of Individuals." American Sociological Review, XV (June, 1950), 674.

Morell, David. "Thailand." Asian Survey, II (February, 1973), 162-178.

Morgan, David R., and Kirkpatrick, Samuel A. "Policy Variations, Political Recruitment, and Suburban Social Rank: A Comparative Analysis." Sociological Quarterly, XI (Fall, 1970), 452-462.

Nath, Dharmendra. "The Governmental Set Up of Delhi: Problems, Views and Experiments." The Indian Political Science Review, V (April-September, 1971), 135-158.

"The National Executive Council Announcement Number 25." Royal Gazette. Volume 88, Section 144, December 21, 1971 (B.E. 2514).

"The National Executive Council Announcement Number 24." Royal Gazette. Volume 88, Section 144, December 21, 1971 (B.E. 2514).

"The National Executive Council Announcement Number 335." Royal Gazette. Volume 190, December 13, 1972 (B.E. 2515).

Nimmanahaeminda, An. "Important Problems on Metropolitan Bangkok-Thonburi City Planning." Journal of Administration, III (February, 1972), 23-53.

Ostrom, Elinor. "Metropolitan Reform: Proposition From Two Traditions." Social Science Quarterly, LIII (December, 1972), 474-493.

Ostrom, Vincent; Tiebout, Charles M.; and Warren, Robert. "The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Area: A Theoretical Inquiry." The American Political Science Review, LV (December, 1961), 831-842.

"Report of the Committee for Metropolitan Planning First Meeting 1971." The Journal of Town Planning, XXV (October, 1971), 1-27.

Robinson, W. S. "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals." American Sociological Review, XV (June, 1950), 351-357.

Rowat, Donat C. "The Government of Federal Capitals." International Review of Administrative Sciences, XXXVI (1970), 347-355.

Scott, Thomas M. "Metropolitan Governmental Reorganization Proposals." Western Political Quarterly, XXI (June, 1968), 252-261.

Udayanin, Kasem. "A Note on Greater Bangkok." Journal of Administration, III (February, 1972), 6-9.

Williams, Oliver P. "Life Style Values and Political Decentralization in Metropolitan Areas." Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XLIII (December, 1967), 299-311.

Other Sources

Arunvongse, Krisda. "Man and the City." Sunday Nation, November 12, 1972, p. 9.

The Bangkok Post, 1972-1973.

The Bangkok World, 1972-1973.

Ban Muang, 1972-1973.

Daily News, 1972-1973.

Dye, Thomas R. "Certain Political Correlates of Social and Economic Differentiation Among Suburban Communities." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1961.

Karnjanaprakarn, Choop. "Municipal Government in Thailand as an Institution and Process of Self-Government." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1960.

Meksawan, Arsa. "The Role of the Provincial Governor in Thailand." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1961.

Morgan, David R. "Suburban Differentiation and Metropolitan Political Integration." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1969.

The Nation, 1972-1973.

Phim Thai, 1972-1973.

Siam, 1972-1973.

Siam Rath, 1972-1973.

Supanapaesat, Achirawit. "The Municipality of Metropolitan Bangkok-Thonburi: A Study of the Causes of the Establishment, Model and Problems of Administration." Unpublished master's thesis, National Institute of Development Administration, Bangkok, 1972.

Thai Daily, 1972-1973.

The Thai Ministry of Interior. "Proposal for Greater Bangkok Administration Act B.E. . . ." An official letter presented to the Prime Minister, November 6, 1967.

Thai Rath, 1972-1973.

APPENDIX

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT

Case Number _____	Office Location
Interviewer Number _____	1. Bangkok _____
Date of Interview _____	2. Thonburi _____
Time interview began _____	3. Smut Prakarn _____
Total time used _____	4. Nonthaburi _____

Sample Code

1. Local Leaders _____
2. Local Administrators _____
3. Newspaper Editors _____

Introduction

Hello. . . . My name is _____, a Public Administration student from the University of Oklahoma. I am working on my dissertation about metropolitan government. I have questions about beliefs and attitudes of those who are involved or interested in metropolitan type of administration, especially of local leaders, local administrators, and newspaper editors. For many of the questions there are no right answers; I am merely interested in your opinion. However, I am not concerned with the resulting answers from any particular individual, but only in the totals for the various questions. My final study will preserve the anonymity of each participant and the information contained in this interview will be kept strictly confidential. Your cooperation in assisting me with this research project is greatly appreciated.

Part I. Background Information

1. Where do you live? 1) Bangkok _____
 2) Thonburi _____
 3) Smut Prakarn _____
 4) Nonthaburi _____
 5) Other _____
2. About how long have you lived here? _____
3. Where did you live before moving here?
 1) Bangkok _____
 2) Thonburi _____
 3) Smut Prakarn _____
 4) Nonthaburi _____
 5) Other _____
4. Where have you lived most of your life?
 1) On a farm _____
 2) District headquarter _____
 3) Province headquarter _____
 4) Bangkok or Thonburi _____
 5) Other _____
5. Office now held:
 1) City clerk _____
 2) Bureau head _____
 3) Division head _____
 4) Section head _____
 5) Member or ex-member of municipal assembly _____
 6) Newspaper editor _____
 7) Other _____
6. Length of service in present office _____

Part II. Attitudes and Additional Information

1. Have you ever heard about the Bangkok metropolitan plan before the November coup? Yes _____; No _____.
2. What would you say about the overall operation of the municipal government in your area?
 1) Very satisfied _____
 2) Reasonably well satisfied _____
 3) Not too satisfied _____
 4) Completely unsatisfied _____

3. Here is a card showing ratings for different services provided by your local government. Looking at the card / HAND "SERVICE" CARD / as I mention each service, would you tell me how you would rate that service . . . as superior, very good, good, fair, poor, or don't know.

	<u>Superior</u>	<u>Very Good</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Fair</u>	<u>Poor</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
1) School system	S	VG	G	F	P	DK
2) Fire protection	S	VG	G	F	P	DK
3) Street repair	S	VG	G	F	P	DK
4) Garbage collection	S	VG	G	F	P	DK
5) Water supply	S	VG	G	F	P	DK
6) Park & recreation	S	VG	G	F	P	DK
7) Sewer system	S	VG	G	F	P	DK
8) Planning & zoning	S	VG	G	F	P	DK
9) Sanitarian	S	VG	G	F	P	DK
10) Market service	S	VG	G	F	P	DK

4. Do you think any of these services could be better provided by an area-wide (metropolitan) government instead of by your municipal government? Yes _____; No _____.
If "Yes," which ones? _____

5. Here is a card showing alternatives to metropolitan consolidation / HAND "ALTERNATIVE" CARD /. Would you rank them from your most to least favorable.

If rank "Not at all" as number 1, please go on to ask question 8.

6. Do you favor retaining each municipality to operate certain suitable services or combining all municipalities within metropolitan area and transfer all operations to a metro government?
Retain _____; Combine _____.

7. If you favor metro government, do you agree that metro government would: / HAND "BENEFIT" CARD /

	<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
1) Bring about greater efficiency and economy	SA	A	D	SD	DK
2) Help attract industry	SA	A	D	SD	DK
3) Increase cooperation & coordination	SA	A	D	SD	DK
4) Lower overall local tax	SA	A	D	SD	DK
5) Encourage local leadership	SA	A	D	SD	DK
6) Reduce the price of services	SA	A	D	SD	DK
7) Others _____	SA	A	D	SD	DK

8. If you do not favor metro government, do you agree that a metro government would: / HAND "DISADVANTAGE" CARD /

	<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
1) Result in lower efficiency and economy	SA	A	D	SD	DK
2) Discourage industry	SA	A	D	SD	DK
3) Discourage local cooperation	SA	A	D	SD	DK
4) Increase overall local tax	SA	A	D	SD	DK
5) Discourage local leadership	SA	A	D	SD	DK
6) Increase service prices	SA	A	D	SD	DK
7) Others _____	SA	A	D	SD	DK

9. If you became convinced that a metro government would be more efficient and help keep local tax down, would you favor it? Yes _____; No _____.
10. There are many groups with different ideas and influences on the initiation of metropolitan plan. What would you say about each group's influence on the metro plan / HAND "INFLUENTIAL GROUP" CARD /.

	<u>Most Influ- ence & Favor</u>	<u>Some Influ- ence & Favor</u>	<u>No In- fluence</u>	<u>Some Influ- ence & Oppose</u>	<u>Most Influ- ence & Oppose</u>
1) Central Civil servants	MF	SF	N	SO	MO
2) Municipal Officers	MF	SF	N	SO	MO
3) Councilmen	MF	SF	N	SO	MO
4) Members of Municipal Assemblies	MF	SF	N	SO	MO
5) Newspaper	MF	SF	N	SO	MO
6) Scholar	MF	SF	N	SO	MO
7) Metropolitan citizen	MF	SF	N	SO	MO
8) Political elite groups	MF	SF	N	SO	MO
9) Others _____	MF	SF	N	SO	MO

11. Please place an X mark in the center of one blank along the scale in a position that most nearly represents your own personal judgment.

Example:

President Nixon

Strong _____ _____ _____ _____ X _____ _____ Weak

We mark X on the position which is close to the word "Weak" meaning we feel that President Nixon is weak but not too weak.

Now, would you mark on each row to represent your feeling on metropolitan government. / HAND "SD" CARD /

Metropolitan (Area-Wide) Government

Good	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Bad
Strong	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Weak
Satisfactory	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Unsatisfactory
Efficient	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Inefficient
Economical	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Uneconomical

12. The following is the list of various government functions
/ HAND "FUNCTION" CARD /. Will you indicate how you would feel about having these functions provided by some area-wide agency and not by each former municipal government. Would you strongly favor . . . favor . . . be indifferent . . . oppose . . . or strongly oppose . . . an area-wide agency (metro government) for each function?

	<u>Strongly</u> <u>Favor</u>	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Indif-</u> <u>ferent</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>Strongly</u> <u>Oppose</u>
1) Water supply	SF	F	I	O	SO
2) Fire protection	SF	F	I	O	SO
3) Public education	SF	F	I	O	SO
4) Refuse collection & disposal	SF	F	I	O	SO
5) Planning & zoning	SF	F	I	O	SO
6) Park & recreation	SF	F	I	O	SO
7) Public health	SF	F	I	O	SO
8) Transportation & traffic planning	SF	F	I	O	SO
9) Street repair	SF	F	I	O	SO
10) Electricity	SF	F	I	O	SO
11) Urban renewal	SF	F	I	O	SO

13. Rank three of those favored on question 12 from high to low in order.

1) _____; 2) _____; 3) _____

14. How should the following offices be filled--appointed by central government; directly elected by people; or indirectly elected by Assembly members.

- | | <u>Appointed
by Central
Government</u> | <u>Direct
Election</u> | <u>Indirect
Election</u> | <u>Reason</u> |
|-------------------|--|----------------------------|------------------------------|---------------|
| 1) Metro mayor | A | DE | IE | |
| 2) Metro council | A | DE | IE | |
| 3) Metro assembly | A | DE | IE | |
15. Do you think that the elected member of municipal assembly will be a good representative in his area?
- 1) Strongly agree _____
 - 2) Agree _____
 - 3) Disagree _____
 - 4) Strongly disagree _____
 - 5) Don't know _____
16. Do you agree that the member of municipal assembly will be able to work in the way people whom he represents expect him to?
- 1) Strongly agree _____
 - 2) Agree _____
 - 3) Disagree _____
 - 4) Strongly disagree _____
 - 5) Don't know _____
17. How do you feel about the local taxes when compared with those services provided by municipal government?
- 1) Much too high _____
 - 2) A little too high _____
 - 3) About right _____
 - 4) A little too low _____
 - 5) Too low _____
 - 6) Don't know _____
18. How do you think each of the following factors or reasons has affected metropolitan reorganization?
- | | <u>Strongest</u> | <u>Strong</u> | <u>Weak</u> | <u>Weakest</u> |
|----------------------------------|------------------|---------------|-------------|----------------|
| 1) Planning & zoning | SG | S | W | WK |
| 2) Administrative efficiency | SG | S | W | WK |
| 3) Service charges | SG | S | W | WK |
| 4) Budgeting problem | SG | S | W | WK |
| 5) Traffic problem | SG | S | W | WK |
| 6) Desire from Interior Ministry | SG | S | W | WK |
| 7) Corruption | SG | S | W | WK |
| 8) Others _____ | SG | S | W | WK |

19. Do you feel there are differences in efficiency in providing services among the four municipalities--Bangkok, Thonburi, Smut Prakarn, and Nonthaburi?
- 1) Much different _____
 - 2) Some different _____
 - 3) No different _____
 - 4) Don't know _____
20. If a difference, which one has the most efficiency?
- 1) Bangkok _____
 - 2) Thonburi _____
 - 3) Smut Prakarn _____
 - 4) Nonthaburi _____
- Why? _____
21. Looking at this card / HAND "AGE AND INCOME" CARD / can you give me the number of the age group you fall in?
- 1) 21-25 _____
 - 2) 26-34 _____
 - 3) 35-49 _____
 - 4) 50-60 _____
 - 5) Over 60 _____
22. Now, what yearly income group is your family in?
- | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1) Under 12,000 baht _____ | 6) 36,000-42,000 _____ |
| 2) 12,000-18,000 _____ | 7) 42,000-48,000 _____ |
| 3) 18,000-24,000 _____ | 8) 48,000-54,000 _____ |
| 4) 24,000-30,000 _____ | 9) 54,000-60,000 _____ |
| 5) 30,000-36,000 _____ | 10) Over 60,000 baht _____ |
23. What do you think is your major occupation?
24. What is the last grade in school you completed?
- 1) 0-7 years _____
 - 2) 1-3 years high school _____
 - 3) 4-5 years high school _____
 - 4) 1-3 years vocational school _____
 - 5) 4-6 years vocational school _____
 - 6) 1-2 years in university _____
 - 7) 3-4 years in university _____
 - 8) More than 4 years in university _____; specify: _____
25. In politics, do you consider yourself a Sahapracha Thai; a Prachatipat; an Independent; or something else?
- 1) Sahapracha Thai _____
 - 2) Prachatipat _____
 - 3) Independent _____
 - 4) Others _____
 - 5) No party _____

26. How did people elect their municipal assembly members in the four municipalities?

	Mostly Party Vote for Opposing Party	Mostly Party Vote for Government Party	Vote for Certain Individuals	Combination Of First Three
1) Bangkok	OP	GP	CI	C
2) Thonburi	OP	GP	CI	C
3) Smut Prakarn	OP	GP	CI	C
4) Nonthaburi	OP	GP	CI	C

27. In your personal choice, how did you vote?

- 1) All for opposing party _____
- 2) All for government party _____
- 3) Voted for certain individuals _____
- 4) Voted combination of the three above _____
- 5) No answer _____

28. / RECORD SEX / Male _____; Female _____

29. So that I can check in case I have made any mistakes, what is your name please? _____
And address _____

Thank you very much for your time.

INTERVIEWER'S SIGNATURE

FOR THE MEMBER OR EX-MEMBER OF THE MUNICIPAL ASSEMBLY, CONTINUE TO
PART III.

Part III. Local Leaders

1. What was your occupation before you were elected as municipal assembly member?

1) Merchant _____	5) Wage earner _____
2) Municipal officer _____	6) Student _____
3) Central civil servant _____	7) Teacher _____
4) Actor _____	8) Others _____
2. Where is your father's residence for most of his life? _____

3. Father's occupation for most of his life? _____
4. Are you a member of any association or organization?

1) Civic association _____; officer _____
2) Church or charity group _____; officer _____
3) Fraternal _____; officer _____
4) Recreational _____; officer _____
5) Business or occupation _____; officer _____
6) Others _____; officer _____
5. How do you first get into public office?

1) A friend or neighbor got me interested _____
2) Through work in community organization _____
3) My active interest in particular issue _____; what: _____
4) The nature of my occupation got me involved _____
5) Political party nomination _____
6) Others _____
6. Who first asked you to run for public office?

1) Party officer _____
2) Association or organization _____
3) Businessman _____
4) Municipal officer _____
5) Others _____

Thank you very much for your time.

INTERVIEWER'S SIGNATURE